DIMENSIONS & PATTERNS OF RELATIONS AMONG INTEREST GROUPS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT , Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Robert Leslie Ross 1967 LI 8 R A R Y Michigan Saw University NW! Hm m. (HM [W 3291 96 0265 This is to certify that the thesis entitled Dimensions and Patterns of Relations Among Interest Groups at the Congressional Level of Government presented by Robert L. Ross ,fll; has been accepted toward; fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in_PfolitiC§l Science ///// Major professor Dang January 1967 O-169 m ._— '-— _—-——- “was". _ l.'h‘. Q DIMENSIONS AND PATTERNS (E'RELATIONS AMONG INTEREST GROUPS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT By Robert Leslie Ross AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State university in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ikpartment of Political Science 1967 ABSTRACT DIMENSIONS AND PATTERNS OF RELATIONS AMONG INTEREST GROUPS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT by Robert Leslie Ross Intergroup relations have many dimensions. This paper has focused chiefly on two types of relationships among interest groups: (1) cooperative activities among groups, and (2) shared policy preferences among groups. Two kinds of data were assembled and analyzed to provide information on these relationships. First, interview data concerning cooperation amorg national interest groups were obtained from spokesmen for a random sample of groups having offices in Washington, D. C. Second, "clusters" of groups were identified based on common policy preferences. The policy preferences of groups were recorded from the testimony of 119 groups at hearings on 145 bills considered by selected House committees during the period 1945-60. These data were interpreted using two conceptual frameworks, pluralism and integration, and several hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups. The usefulness of two other frameworks, system and con- flict, for the study of intergroup relationships was also Robert Leslie Ross discussed. The findings of this research fit more easily into the integration than the pluralist mode of thought. Much of the scholarly and Journalistic literature on interest groups stresses such'terms and concepts as the following: the group struggle, a diversity of groups in constant competition, shifting alignments of groups for limited objectives, an open interest group system, and a competi- tive balance among contending interest groups. The data in this research point away from these formulations toward the following: very limited movement of groups into and out of the interest group system, enduring policy prefer- ences of groups over many years, the dominance of some policy sectors by groups of a single type, restricted competition among groups, and limited dynamics in the relationships among groups in the active group pOpulation during a period of several years. In general, the most recurrent theme from the different facets of this investigation has been the notion of "order" in the universe of active interest groups at the congressional level. The interview data showed there is much cooperation among group leaders but it is carried on chiefly by informal rather than formal methods. This informal relating of group to group helps to explain the order among the hundreds of active groups. Another power- ful variable in explaining the order in the interest group Robert Leslie Ross system is the policy preference of the group. Group respondents indicated that shared policy preferences tend to promote cOOperation among groups more than any other factor. And the policy preferences of groups tend to stay put. Very little change was discernible in the policy preferences of groups during a sixteen-year period. DIMENSIONS AND PATTERNS OF RELATIONS AMONG INTEREST GROUPS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT By Robert Leslie Ross A THESIS Submitted to Nflchigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1967 QSEOpyright by Robert Leslie Ross I967 04- T‘—' *' ACIGVOWLEDGEMENTS No brief statement can discharge the obligations owed by me to Dr. Charles R. Adrian, chairman of my thesis committee, and to Dr. Joseph A. Schlesinger and Dr. Charles 0. Press who also served on the committee. Their guidance and commentaries on my efforts at every stage of my work are gratefully acknowledged. I was also the beneficiary of the services and facilities of the Michigan State University Computer Institute for Social Science Research and the Library of congress, wfishinston. D. c . 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page IKTNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . LIST OF TABLES . . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O V LIST OF FIGURES . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Xi Chapter I. INTRODUCTION . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1 The Emergence of the Interest Group Concept The Group Theory of Politics II. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS . . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 30 Systems Pluralism Integration Conflict Summary III. METHODS or DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS . . . 94 The Time Span, 1945-60 Relations Among Interest Groups National Interest Groups Congressional Committee Hearings The Analysis of Group Statements at Hearings The Universe of Interest Groups The Preliminary Universe of Interest Groups he Second Universe of Groups The Third universe of Interest Groups The Selection of the Committee Hearings Guidelines for the Examination of Hearings Testimony The Second Universe of Hearings luster Analysis Procedures Interview Procedures 111 Chapter Page IV. TWO KINDS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS . . . . 161 Frequency of Cooperation Among Interest Groups Types of Cooperation Mest Frequently Practiced by Interest Groups Factors That Promote Cooperation Among Interest Groups Cluster Analyses of Interest Group Relationships Analysis One Hypotheses About Intergroup Relations Identification and Appraisal of Typal Clusters Analyses of Bills in Policy Sectors Conclusions Comprehensive Analysis V. ITMRALISM IN THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM . . . . 264 Characteristics of a Pluralist System Summary VI. INTEGRATION AMONG INTEREST GROUPS . . . . . . 295 ~ Introduction Shared Attributes i Proximity of Groups to Each Other Interaction Among Groups Mutual Knowledge Among Groups Structure in the Group Population The Dominance of the Hearings Process by Incumbent Groups The Persistence of Established Patterns of Group Testimony Previous Integrative Experience Summary and Conclusions VII. SUMIVIARY AND CONCLUSIONS 0 o o o o o o o o o o ZTO]. BmLIOGRAPITY . o o g o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 405 APPENDICES . . . . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 417 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1. First Universe of Groups . . . . . . . . . . Second Universe of Groups . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Select Universe of Groups . . . . . . . . . . 4 Second Universe of Hearings . . . . . . . . . 5. First-roundBills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Second-round Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 o ThiI’d‘I‘omd Hearings 0 o o o o o o o o o o o 8. Group Representatives Interviewed Classified by me O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9. Final Universe of Interest Groups for Cluster AnalySIS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 10. The Subjects of Hearings on Which Group Spokesmen Testified . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Frequency of Cooperation on Legislative Subjects Reported by Forty Group Spokesmen . 12. Frequency with Which Certain Types of Cooperation are Practiced by Groups . . . . . 13. Types of Cooperation Practiced by Respondents . l4. Respondents Ratings of Cooperative Activity: meEooooooooooooooooooo 15. Respondents Ratings of Factors Promoting COCperation Among Groups . . . . . . . . . . 15. Respondents Ratings of the Importance of Formal Structures in Promoting Cooperation Among Groups: TypeE............... 17. Clusters Identified in Analysis One (HSA) . . . Page 131 135 136 146 149 150 150 152 154 157 164 166 168 172 175 179 184 Table 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. Bills on Which Members of Cluster One are Agreed (HSA) O O O O O O O O O O O O O Bills on Which Members of Cluster Two are Agreed . . . . . . Bills on Which Members of Cluster Three are O O O Agreed(HSA)oooooooooo Members of Clusters Identified by Three Different Analytic Techniques . . . . . Group Members of Clusters Classified by TYDE(HSA)......... Bills on Which Clusters are Based . . . . Clusters of Groups Identified at the Lowest Level of Cohesion (HSA) . . . . . . . . . A Comparison of the Number of Groups that Testified in Active Clusters in Two Consecu- tivePeriods ............. A Comparison of the Number of Testimonies by Bach Cluster Member in Two Consecutive Periods O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Cluster Members That Serve the Same Clientele . Bills on Which Conflicts Between Clusters Occurred: Cluster Activity on Thirty-seven Major Bills Clusters and Pairs of Groups of Each Type . . . Clusters Identified on Labor Bills (HSA) Sets of Labor Bills on Which Clusters Were Based O O O O O O O Labor Bills on Which Clusters Were Active . Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the Sets of the Clusters-«Cluster One . . . Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the O O O O O O O O Set of Cluster Two Vi Analysis One (HSA) . . . . . . . . Page 186 187 188 192 197 199 204 208 209 212 215 218 220 225 228 229 231 232 pr Table 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 1+7. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53O 54 55 Page Clusters Active on Trade Bills . . . . . . . . 233 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Trade Bills . 234 Trade Bills on Which Clusters Were Active . . . 236 Clusters Identified on Housing Bills (HSA) . . 237 Sets of Housing Bills on Which Clusters Were Based O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 238 Housing Bills on Which Clusters Were Active . . 239 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Housing Bills in the Sets of the Clusters . . . . . . . . . 240 Clusters Identified in the Analysis of Education-Welfare Bills . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Education- Welfare Bills in the Set of Cluster One . . . 242 Clusters Identified in the Analysis of Foreign Affairs Bills O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 243 Foreign Affairs Bills on Which Clusters Were ACtive0.0000000000000000.243 Clusters Active on Agricultural Bills . . . . . 244 Agriculture Bills on Which Clusters Were ACtive0.0000000000000000.245 Clusters Identified in the Analysis of Civil RightsBills ................ 245 Clusters Identified in Comprehensive Analysis . 248 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the SetofClusterOne . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the Sets of Cluster Two and Three . . . . . . . . 252 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the SetofClusterFour . . . . . . i. . . . . . . 254 Testimonies of Cluster Members on Bills in the SetofClusterFive . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Bills on Which Clusters Were Active . . . . . . 259 vii v“ Table 56. 57. 58. 59. 6o. 61. 62. 63O 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. Distribution of Testimony by 189 Groups on 145 Bills During the Period, 1945-60 . . . . Distribution of Groups of Different Types Among the Twenty-five Most Active Groups in the Presentation of Testimony . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of Testimony by the Most Active Groups of Different Types . . . . . . . . . . Volume of Testimony by Groups on 140 Bills in Different Policy Categories . . . . . . . . . Number of Groups Testifying on 140 Bills Classified by Subject Matter . . . . . . . . Frequency of Group Testimony, Classified by Type of Group, on Bills Classified by Policy Category O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Groups That Presented Testimony on Fifty Per Cent or More of the Bills in Each Policy Category, Classified by Type . . . . . . . . Bills Classified According to the Number of Groups Taking the Minority Position . . . . . Unanimity and Cleavage Among Groups That Testi- fied for or Against 100 Selected Hearings of the House Committee on Agriculture . . . . . Competitive and Non-competitive Hearings Classified by Policy Category . . . . . . . A Comparison of the Volume of Testimony by Groups That Have Offices in Washington and ThoseThatDoNot.............. Comparison of the Volume of Testimonies by Groups Before and After Each Opened an Office in Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of Group Testimony on Bills in Different Policy Categories Under Five Different Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Eleven Groups in the Select Universe That Presented Testimonies on Bills in Three or More Policy Categories . . . . . . . . . . viii Page 267 268 269 271 274 275 279 282 284 285 304 306 310 313 Table 70. 71. 72. 73O 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. Testimony of Groups of Different Types on Bills of Different Policy Categories . . . . Testimony of Groups of Different Types on Bills of Different Policy Categories . . . . . . . Respondents Ratings of Factors That Foster Effective Relations with Congress . . . . . . Respondents Ratings of Factors That Foster Effective Relations with Congress . . . . . . Typal Mean Ratings on Factors That Foster Effective Relations with Congress . . . . . . Typal Mean Ratings on Factors That Foster Effective Relations with Congress . . . . . . Deviant Ratings by ReSpondents on Factors That Foster Effective Relations with Congress . . Means of Ratings of Respondents on Factors That Promote CCCperation Arranged by Kind of Group Deviant Ratings of Respondents on Factors That Promote Cooperation Classified by Type of Group O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Ratings by Respondents of the Importance of Five Types of Cooperation Among Groups . . . Deviant Ratings by Respondents on Types of Cooperation Practiced Classified by Type of Group.................... Numbers of Groups Testifying on Bills in Different Policy Categories for Two Time Spans.........o.......... Groups Entering the Interest Group System, 1953'600000000000000.00... Inside Groups Departing from the System During the Years 1953-60 under Three Definitions of Departure..........o....... Groups That Departed from the Interest Group syStem,1953"60.oo00.000000... Six Page 315 317 321 323 324 327 330 334 335 338 339 346 350 357 359 "I. Table 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. Entrance and Departure of Groups from Interest Group Subsystems Consisting of Bills of One Type O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Group Testimonies Presented to the Ways and Means Committee on Thirty-two Selected Bills, 1945-60, Classified by Type of Group . . . . Numbers of Inside and Outside Groups That Testified on Twelve Trade Bills . . . . . . . Numbers of Incide and Outside Groups That Testified on Five Unemployment Bills . . . . Frequency of Testimonies by 119 Selected Groups at Hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee on Twelve Selected Trade Bills . . Volume of Testimony by Groups of Different Types on 150 Agricultural Bills . . . . . . . Pattern of Testimonies by Agricultural Groups on Agricultural Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . Correlations of the Volume of Testimonies by 166 Groups for Two Consecutive Eight-year Periods O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Correlations of the Volume of Testimonies by 116 Groups on Selected Bills for Two Consecu- tiveTimeSpans............... Correlations of the Volume of Testimonies by Selected Groups on Labor Bills for Two Consecutive Time Spans . . . . . . . . . . . Correlations of the Number of Testimonies on Bills in Different Policy Categories by Selected Groups for Two Consecutive Time Spans O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Page 362 369 372 373 375 380 384 389 390 392 393 '11- LIST OF FIGURES Page Agreement Scores of Pairs in Three Cohesive Clusters Identified in Analysis One . . . . . 190 Disagreement Scores of Pairs in Three Cohesive Clusters Identified in Analysis One . . . . . 191 Analysis Number One, HSA; 119 Groups--37 Bills . 194 The Enlargement of Cluster One . . . . . . . . 195 Number of Conflicts Between Clusters . . . . . 214 Disagreements Among Groups for Six Typal Clusters Tallied for Pairs . . . . . . . . . 223 xi LIST OF APPENDICES Appendices A. Survey Schedules . . . . . . . . B. Hearings Used in Computer Analyses xii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The Emergence of the Interest Group Concept The attention given to group interpretations of politics in the United States in the past decade represents one of the most significant shifts in perspective in political science since the emergence of the political party as a major subject of study.1 Inspection of the titles of articles in the most prestigious political science journal that includes articles on American government and politics, the American Political Science Review, reveals that prior to 1950 few studies of interest groups were published. In the decade of the forties, this journal contained, at most, six articles on interest groups.2 Three of the articles focused on interest groups in political systems abroad. In the decade of the fifties, sixteen articles 1Samuel J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method,’ Interest Groups 311 Four Continents, Henry A. Ehrmann, editor (International Political Science Associa- tion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. 1958). p. 173. 2There is some uncertainty in the classification of a few articles. u n .u - . . 4 o o o- . - . ‘l \- . \..' ‘I . . . . . I . ~ 1 u s I - . s - 2 were published in the same journal on the subject. Seven of these were concerned with interest groups abroad. Five of the remaining nine articles were concerned with the group interpretation of politics. The contents of another political science journal seem to bear out this increased attention to groups. The index of the Western Political Quarterly from 1952 to 1962 contains more than fifteen articles classified under the subject, pressure groups. Many of these are concerned with interest groups abroad. This revisionist movement in the study of Merican politics has gained considerable prominence in several areas of specialization. In recent books, Bertram Gross, Donald Blaisdell, and David Truman describe the legislative process as the forging of compromises among groups. Two specialized studies, one focused on the United States House of Representatives and the other on the United States Senate, also lay heavy stress on the importance of interest group activities.3 The impact of interest groups on the administrative process is extensively recorded in volumes by E. P. Herring, Marver Bernstein, and Avery Leiserson. Three studies which discuss particular administrative agencies in terms which 3Neil MacNeil, For e _o__f Democrac The House of Re resentatives (New Yor : DT— Mc 31mm. FEEEHGWS, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Pfess, 1960); See also William J. and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, Co ress and the States (Englewooa C f8, New Jersey: PFentIce-He'fl'l, 1964). I-u o~ "V. O. '9 3 highlight the role played by interest groups are Philip Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, William Block's book on the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service, and the study of conflict over water in California by Arthur Maass.)4 Although the importance assigned to interest groups in the study of political parties and elections varies substantially among scholars, Wilfred Binkley, E. P. Herring, and David Truman assign considerable importance to groups in this area. Samuel Lubell has long based his analyses of political parties and elections on the premise that interest groups and blocs are the dynamic forces in the election process. Although the attention of scholars to interest groups has become papular chiefly since World War II, several political scientists reported in the 1920's on the important role played by such groups.5 Groups continued to become increasingly important in national politics in the llPhilip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley, California: University of-C'a'lmrnIa Press, 1949); William J. Block, The Separation 93 the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service ‘ITlinois Studies 13 tHe Social Sciences, 0 . r ana: The University of Illinois Press, 1960); Arthur Maass, Mudd Waters, The Army Engineers and the W Rivers (Cam‘Bridge: Harvard Umversfty Press, 1951). 5E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Crow (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); Harwood hilds. Labor and Ca ital _ip National Politics (Columbus, Shio: THE-CHIB—Sta’fie UfiversIty Press, 1930); E. Logan IPbbying," Supplement to The Annals” CXLIVI (July ,. 1929). uoOO' . . "N , o ‘, n .. 5. ' D O ‘.'. Os . l ‘ 9 u . p v. N_ . . .u ‘ 1 t 4 decade of the thirties.6 By 1944 Ernest s. Griffith observed that: In the United States and in England there were always special groups wishing government to make their private objectives its own. By 1940, this . . . type of governmental activity had grown enormously, so much so that the special groups had virtually superseded individuals as the extra-governmental source of public policy.7 Before 1940, studies of interest groups made few claims for the important role which is now recognized for them in politics.8 Research on interest groups consisted almost entirely of a few descriptive case studies that were written with little emphasis on a place for interest groups in the theoretical analyses of politics. For example, Clarence Bonnett's Employers Associations in the United Meg, published in 1922, is fundamentally a chronicle on the formation, growth, and activities of numerous trade associations.9 No systematic effort was made by Bonnett 6The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, V I. 179, May, 1935, is devoted entirely to pressure groups and propaganda. 7Ernest s. Griffith, "The Changing Pattern of Public Policy Formation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 38 (June, 194477-4532. 8There are four major exceptions: E. P. Herring, TR. icitu' E. E. Schattschneider, Politics Pressure and the ari?" “‘— (New York: Prentice-Hall, ay Eon 15. Man, ressures on the legislature of )New Jerse (New York: olum a UEfversity Press, 193811’0183’: The Process 0f Government (Bloomington Indiana: The Principia Press Km 19 9 . . ’ ’ 9C1arence E. Bonnett, Em 10 are Associations in the Uni_____t___ed §________tates (New York: The REC millan 0., 1922. '— Os II I . ONO. ..m. an. _ LP. Ox . ....\. O o O I. ... all.) O 5 to generalize either from the specific facts of the different associations or their role in politics. The same comment applies to Solon Buck's The Granger Move- ment, Arthur Capper's The Agricultural Bloc, and to Peter Odegard's Pressure Politics.1o Nevertheless, a few studies, such as E. P. Herring's Group Representation Before Congress and E. E. Schatt- schneider's study of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, focused systematically on general and theoretical considerations.11 Herring, for example, sees important implications for theories about representation and public Opinion in the lOSOlon Justus Buck, The Gran er Movement; A Study QQAgricultural Organization and Ifs POIiEicaI, Ecoh'omic, a_n_d_ Social Conse uences, 18 0:80 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1813). Th 3 s a historical treatment of the formation, activities, and impact of one of the earlier farm movements. It is well written history but it is not designed to permit generalization to other cases. Arthur Capper, The A ricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. ,1922). THIS volume is a treatise on the farmer’s needs in the post-world war years and how senators and farm leaders attempted to meet them. In no sense is this a study of any particular farm organization or coalition of farm organizations. Although the National Agricultural Conference of 1922 is mentioned and discussed generally, there is no attention to the group base of it or of its attempts to influence Congress or public opinion. Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); See also Orville M. Kile, Th3 Farm Bureau Throu h Three Decades (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1948) which, even though written by a representative of the American Farm Bureau Federation, places that farm organization and its activities in the post-war years more clearly in political context. Kile writes as one who is aware of the authority of a represen- tative of a million-member organization. It is, however, a chronological case study that has no theoretical design and few generalizations emerge from it. 11Herring, 9p. cit.; Schattschneider, _gp. cit. 6 rise of national associations in the United States and their involvement in politics. Schattschneider tests some propositions concerning the relation between economic interests and political behavior. Both of these books are concerned with the proposition that groups occupy a central place in the study of politics and both discuss interest groups as devices for representation of specialized clienteles.12 Edward B. Logan's monograph on lobbying, which appeared in 1929, is another of the early attempts to examine the political activities of interest groups in Washington in terms of the functions they perform for their members and for congressmen.13 Prior to the Second World War, citizen opinion had traditionally regarded the effects of lobbying as a corrupting of the will of the people as it is expressed in electoral majorities. Lobby groups were condemned as selfish private intruders into public democratic processes.14 In the prevailing concept of democracy, interest groups were not assigned a legitimate standing since the represen- tatives of the people must act only in terms of the public l2Herring's study presents evidence to document the DPCposition that in national politics "the individual, as such, is of slight importance . . . He,has become a mere cipher in a larger and emergent unit: the organized group." D. 5-6. Schattschneider devotes Part IV to a discussion of the representative character of pressure Of groups. 13Logan, 9p. cit. 1“Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research, " The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958). .5 fl. .. I—l . .. . O a. “ V O, ‘m i P... .- _ "h -~| . I ’ O ._I ‘s ‘. . in N ... \u .I ‘ . . .O v \ 7 interest.15 Two other factors also contributed to the low status of lobbying, (1) the revelations by reformers and journalists of the abusive power exercised by big business, and (2) three congressional investigations of lobbying, in 1913, 1929, and 1935, each following the exposure of culpable acts.l6 As scholarly studies of political interest groups augmented the expose and reformist literature, it became clear that the major kind of interest group lobbying in the Capital, and the character of lobbying activities, had changed. As the "old lobby” of corporation representatives and “wire-pullers'i was replaced by the highly organized and respected national associations who came as petitioners by their memberships, congressional and public tolerance of group activity gradually increased.17 The extent of this change is clear if one compares some of the articles on interest groups from pOpular journals around the turn of the century with articles in comparable publications today. Two similarities in the 15Alfred DeGrazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups,".The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958) 118; Herring, 532. cit., p.71. 15Edgar Lane, "Some lessons from Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1950)‘I4‘3- C. ”Herring, o . cit. , pp. 40-41; An engrossing account 01’ a coalition of w re-pTl'I'lers and legislators is found in an article. entitled "Is There Anythi in It?" Continental M12111, Vol. 3 (June, 1863) 688-93. No author IisEeaT“ (O - . o u e. . o. .- .i, . ... ., .-., “I 6.. ~-.. . ‘A ; ’ e a ...... ’r. 0.. '4 ., ‘ R I ‘n. I. u :§ . "| O 0.. , . .... .‘n ‘- ’. a %. 1’. ... ‘- .. ... ‘ ‘n. .. . Q. '. \3" 'v ‘ . ‘. K u n 4 \ '. \ .. ‘ u \ s 4 u i l r- .O . , . I‘O 1 ‘\. ,' . ' ‘ O \ ‘0 . . n . 8 articles of both periods deserve comment. First, the authors, early and recent, are inclined to frame their reports in terms of immediate news events concerning lobbying. Bribery, deception, power manipulation in lobbying, or charges asserting that these conditions may exist, are the events that trigger the publication of feature articles on lobbying in pOpular magazines.18 Second, both sets of authors tend to describe lobbyists and their activities in normative terms, usually negative terms.19 An illustration of the second difference between the older and newer treatments was written in response to the lobby investigation of 1913 and is, perhaps, a good guide to some of the limiting norms which define what is unacceptable activity by lobbyists. President Pope, (president of the NAM) says that his body has opposed only "the most flagrant and partisan species" of labor legislation, that it has never directly or indirectly proposed a measure of any kind in Congress . . .2 This statement suggests that interest groups and 18Charles s. Thomas, "W Adventures with the Sugar 'I:obby," World's Work (September, 1913); T. H. Caraway, The Thira House," The Saturday Evening Post (July 7, 1928); J. A. Morris, "The Paralyzing Power of Washington Lobbies, ’ Readers Digest, 82:127-32 (May, 1953). 19Edward Ross, "Political Decay--An Interpretation, " The Inde endent (July 19, 1906); "Smoking Cut Invisible Wernmen’é," T56 Literary Digest (July 12, 1913). (No author listed) 44 20"smok1ng Out the Invisible Government," Ibid., Po . . . I O I ~ . OO .- o .4 -.x Q‘ - " n.~v. r. . ‘ l "- s " a. . o .. n e e u v I h - I O In . O. n. 'n 'o , . '4 I ‘s i. ' e. .- .. II ‘. ‘e . \ q m_._<._ - ————.—~. 9 lobbyists attempted to defend their conduct on grounds that it constituted minimal and justifiable involvement and that they usually did not prepare legislation for which they openly solicited legislative sponsors and support. Today many national interest groups are regularly described as continually active and as the sources of much legislation. Certain groups are expected to bring forward a legislative program for consideration by congressional committees. A recent survey by A1 Toffler published in Redbook on "How Congressmen Make Up Their Minds" states: No aspect of Washington politics is less understood by the ordinary American today than the lobby . . . Many people seem to think that a lobby is necessarily evil and greedy. The truth is that Washington is full of lobbies that work hard for public rather than selfish ends. When working with a senator or representative friendly to his cause, for instance, the lobbyist just makes himself as helpful as possible. He feeds the legislator a flow of information to use in debate. He drafts speeches for him. He may actually draft proposed laws/‘31 There is continuing but sporadic journalistic attention to lobbying today. Many of the articles are still concerned with the bad effects of lobbying but there is sometimes a statement included that reveals the changed perspective of the popular observers of the contemporary political scene from earlier writers. Thus, even a highly value-laden article by J. A. Morris that is critical of the Power that the author says is exerted by many interest t. 21Al Toffler, "How Congressmen Make Up Their Minds," Redbook (February, 1962) Preprint, p. 5. . 10 groups includes the following: In general, Congressmen don't object to the kind of lobbying designed to influence them and not the electorate. They look upon most lobbyists as essential to the orderly conduct of business . . .22 The place of lobbying on the contemporary political scene is summed up in the remarks of House members who served on the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of 1950: The Chairman . . . "The word 'lobbying' has developed unfavorable connotations over the years. One reason for that may be that most congressional investi- gations of lobbying activities in the past were designed to show up fraud or corruption or sinister or evil practices. I personally look upon lobbying as ‘ necessary and essential. We must keep before us at all times the spirit and letter of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States wherein the right of petition is expressed!"23 Mr. Halleck . . . "I am happy to hear the words of your opening statement, particularly at the conclusion where you refer to that definition of 'lobbying' which certainly does not give it the sinister, vicious, selfish aspect that sometimes I think people are inclined to attribute to it."2LL I Mr. Lanham . . . "Mr. Chairman . . . I see you take '7 the same position I do; that lobbying in and of itself ‘ is not an evil. - I am sure, that a lobbyist can be of great help to a the busy congressman because he has the facts at his fingertips and can readily be of great help to a congressman as he tries to find out what the facts are on the many problems that face him."25 22Morris, 32. cit., p. 128. 2311nited States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, Lobb in Direct gig Indirect, Hearings before Subcommittee, 331st Congress, 21d gession, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, a Do 2- 24Ibid. , p. 11 . 25Ibid. 11 Mr. O'Hara . . . "I think that what we should do, this committee, is to find out the views of the peOple as to what they consider legal lobbying and what is improper lobbying . . . I think that it is perfectly prOper that we have lobbying and that it is one of the constitutional guarantees under the first amendment . . . and I think that it is perfectly prOper for the citizen to present to Congress his views upon legislation."26 E. P. Herring is credited with the documentatiOn of the proposition that what distinguishes the "new lobby" from the old is its representation of groups with mass memberships and its use of mass media to mobilize public opinion. United States Senator Charles Thomas writing in 1913 also noted the basic change in the character of lobbying over several years, though he regarded it more threatening to wise law-making than Herring did.27 The Group Theory of Politics In the early nineteen-fifties, the application of the methods, concepts, and theories from physical and biological sciences as well as from sociology, economics, and psychology to politics became popular and extremely influential. The publication of David Truman's _'I_‘r_1_e_ Governmental Process is often cited as a landmark in the establishment of the new perspectivem—the group theory 261bid. 27Thomas, . cit. 3 See also "The Invisible Govern- ment Becoming Visi 1e ,T'The World's Work (March, 1922); and Fred D. Shelton, 'UnbfiiEialTepresentation at Washington,“ The Independent (January 2, 1926). u v “0" - -. v “OI. ’ .n— ,, ‘- n i I. ..x ' . "-1. _ "~ . . n I u . u i , .... e. 'l-!. v .. _"u. u.‘ ' ‘4.- I. .. o. h. e \ .. I " 'r‘ . ... ‘0 . 3.. .‘ _v , ..,‘ \i V O I, ‘ n , ' I 'q l ‘. '- .... . \ n O_‘ ‘O u '\ -' 7. 'I 9 n n K I... .0 \t \‘. ‘v ‘0 n I'- i l \i' ' I u. I a g ‘a O . V .- ._ . . . i O . . 7O \ \ b' . I . . , . . . . A . ... . O . .- . . 12 of politics.28 This theory was associated with the rediscovery of Arthur F. Bentley's The Process 9}: Government which was based on conceptual and theoretical materials from other disciplines than political science.29 The debt the group theorists avow to Bentley is substantial but controversial . 30 The advocates of the group interpretation of politics mingled numerous and diverse elements in their new approach. Such concepts as "equilibrium," "transaction," "interaction," "primary group, " and "attitude" have proved useful to group theorists. Surprisingly, what was generally neglected in discussions of group theory was the organized interest group that had been the only type of group that had claimed the attention of political scientists before 1940. The neglect of the organized interest group by group theorists was partly due to the inability to fit it easily into the new conception of "group" which they advanced. As defined by Bentley and others, the new W 28David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knapf. 1955). 29Bentley, 9p. cit . 3086s the following for contrasting interpretations. 1:11ch W. Taylor, "Arthur F. Bentley's Poliétical Sciei)lce, es ern Political Quarterly, Vol. v. No. 2 June: 1952 - 211L303 E. E. 1'56wlingfl Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range, American Political Science Review: “31' 59: N0. 4 (December—719657 W. fi . c enzie, Stressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework, W ~~This. Vol. 3 (1955) 247-55. , {O (O a ‘- 'Oo... . u c . '- 5.. u 'N. . A. 'o. 4.. ... . n ' ' s.. n “v. KL , -~ ... .. c n .0 u v e V. '- . u‘ _ . ‘0 ‘. ‘l a. . ( . ~ g s . .O ~ I \.' ‘- . . e n n I. a O V 'n .7 ‘3 .v- . .‘. ... l n I. . v 1‘! ’u e’, . 'r c ' ..- . . I I u \ n ‘v , '. v.- \ c \ ‘. \ n' . v .‘I e o v u 13 "group" is a segment of goal-centered activity.3l It is not the same type of concept as the pressure group. It is an analytic concept as distinguished from a concrete concept. Marion J. Levy states: . . . concrete structures are . . . those patterns capable of pHysical separation (in time and/or space) from other units of the same sort . . . Analytic structures are . . . patterned aspects of action that are not even theoretically capable of concrege separa- tion from other patterned aspects of action. 2 An organized interest group (e.g., American Legion) is a concrete concept. Different interest groups may be physically separated from each other and from other groups, such as families. A ”segment of goal-centered activity" cannot be physically separated from other goal-centered activity . R. E. Dowling makes a similar distinction between a"rea1 political factor" and a "conceptual factor." He notes that Bentley begins with "a conceptual entity'called 'Sroup' and then, when saying that in politics only 'groups! are admissible, thinking that one is referring to actual groups."33 According to group theorists, this concept ____ 31Bentley, . cit. 3 Philip Monypenny, "Political Science and the Stu o‘f'Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," Western Political uarterl Vol. VII. NO- 2 $131 1954). pp“. “18’3—u QUIT GET—Elan es . Hagan. :TgelGfimp in ca Science Approaches to the Stud 0 o 1 cs RGland Young, editor vanston,_IllinoIs: NSFthwest'ern “liners”? Press, 195 ); Taylor, 92. Cit- (P 3241611‘Zl-On J. Levy, The Structure of Societ “met“: Princeton UniversiEy Press,—I9 . 33Dow11ns. 2P.- cit., p. 949. (V .- 07.. , ._ v v ~‘ .Q ~ 5". --o.. nu ‘ '. u a. On . . ‘ '0. '4 s. ‘ n._ ‘0. fi . . \ - I N «A. 7' a: I ... .' _. x s ‘o \ C . s, ‘ u, c '- ‘o \ ‘I ‘. ' e 3. - ‘I. I \ i. t l . ‘- 1‘ 5 a 'v 14 is both more discriminating and more inclusive in its scope- than the organized interest group. It is more inclusive, the theorists state, because the group is the sole concept needed in the analysis of political behavior. It is more discriminating because only the relevant behavior of individuals and institutions is included in the analysis of a particular political event.34 Therefore, the theorists state, individuals and institutions are not neglected by group theory; they are only dismantled for the purpose of more accurate description and analysis. Thus the principal merit claimed for the new conception of group is that it breaks down the barriers to thought, investigation, and understanding that exist when individuals, institutions, and groups (e.g., organized interest groups) are used in their customary ways, and reveals the full range of relevant behavior of a given event in the wider environment in which it occurs.35 The analytic group is purported to provide a more accurate formulation of behavior in a particular research project because it permits a more precise division of individual or institutional acts in terms of those for an objective and those against it, and it excludes the remainder as irrelevant. The use of conventional concepts: 31104 as ‘A . 31‘I-Iagan, . cit., “. . . Individuals have meaning 0913' as participafi'Ss In the.decision and only that part or if“ that Operates in the decision-making is relevant to e analysis." pp. 41-2. 3STeylor, pp. 9.3.13.” p. 222. {‘ . . .. I.‘ ‘ I e . . N - O 8 ‘ . a... , "c . y \- . 5“ "~ A “a . ' 9 . .. O O - . "c. ... - 3‘. ’u \, u n .' -. o ‘ 9 I. ‘, ..., u l5 organized interest groups, institutions, and individuals, tends to promote the acceptance of the apparent boundaries of these concepts. For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation at a congressional committee hearing states that it is opposed to federal aid to education. But actually only a small number of leaders and members are opposed. The group theorists in the course of their research would divide the members in the organization into those whose behavior supports the proposal, those whose behavior opposes it, and those who are inactive. In similar fashion each individual who is active might be considered in terms of how his numerous group affiliations affected his action. Not all of them would add positive force to his position on this issue; some would constitute negative force. Institutional acts would be analyzed in similar fashion, according to their positive or negative contributions to the event or their non-involvement. It is possible to go even farther with this frame of reference. In this framework, the notion of "overlapping membership Of groups" has a broader meaning than merely the affiliation of an individual with two or more organized groups.36 The concept 0f ‘- 36At some point in this phase of the discussion, Bentley and Truman go their separate ways. .... ... i u I— v. o v \ . v. ' I» s c u 9. ‘, s s , - ’- v P. < 't 16 "reference group" is implied.37 A reference group is a group whose norms, values and behavior constitute cues for the behavior of an individual whether he is a member of the group or not. Thus the boundaries of organized interest groups, indicated by membership or non-membership, may not provide an accurate guide to the real alignments of individ- uals both within and outside the group on an issue in which the group is interested. In the illustration above, even though a member of the congressional committee may not be a member of the Farm Bureau, he still may take his cues on how to vote in committee on the bill from the position expressed by the spokesmen for this farm group. The difficulty of the task of integrating different conceptions of "group" found in the literature on interest groups into a single theoretical framework can be seen by noting the different frames of reference of what may be called the group "theorists,’ who argue for studies of goal- centered activity, and the "analysts" of organized interest groups (e.g., American LegiOn). Using this distinction, the writings of Bentley, Hagan, Monypenny, and Taylor con- stitute the literature of the group theorists; and the works of Odegard, Herring, Garceau, and Schattschneider represent fairly, perhaps, the literature of the group analysts. Several scholars, such as Truman, Latham, and 37'I‘amotsu Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspec- gévesi" American Journal _o_f Sociology, Vol. 60 (May, 1955), 17 Blaisdell, tour both camps. One major difference between these two positions concerning the meaning of "group" vitally affects the scepe of political behavior which thatconcept is used to explain. The theorists, directly or by implication, claim all political behavior can be adequately explained by the use of their concept alone; the group analysts are more modest in their claim. They regard their concept as an essential one for explaining some types of political behavior but not the only one for explaining all political behavior. Unfortunately, the distinction between "theorists" and analysts" has limited utility. The confusion surround- ing "group" exists not only between but also within each camp.38 The core of the term "interest group" has been used to mean, (1) a goal-centered segment of activity (Bentley, Hagan, Monypenny, Latham), (2) interaction on the basis of shared attitudes (Truman, Gross), (3) interest groupings, such as farmers, (Binkley, Lubell), (4) organized interest groups, such as the National Grange, (Herring, Schattschneider, Blaisdell, Zeigler). It is not difficult to show that some of these authors, although avowedly holding to one of the above meanings, do not restrict the meaning of "group" to it. Bentley, for example, appears __. 38Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal 93 Politics, Vol. 23, NO- 1 (February, 1961)! 25-450 18 to use meanings (l), (3), and (4).39 David Truman's The Governmental Process, that is widely acknowledged as the outstanding volume on the subject of interest groups, also reveals the difficulties inherent in the definition and systematic use of "group." In Part I of the volume, Truman, an avowed disciple of Bentley, undertakes the task of defining the concept "group" and demonstrating its comprehensiveness in explaining political behavior. He begins his discussion by noting that the individ- ual is shaped less "by the society as a whole than differ- entially through various of its subdivisions or groups."40 Here he is referring to such groups as the sex group, the peer group, the family, the religious group, and the locality grouping. Next he notes the importance of primary groups on the development and behavior of individuals. Finally, he discusses "institutionalized groups" such as legislatures and courts, and then voluntary associations. Using all of these types of groups, he defends the notion that a group interpretation of politics is comprehensive in its scope: nothing important is left beyond the reach of the "group.“ We do not, in fact, find individuals otherwise M " 39See Golembiewski's interpretation of Bentley’s group.” Robert Golembiewski, "The Group Basis of Politics," American Political Science Review Vol. 54. N0. 4 3(5545081516531'W9Wan n Bentley’ 92. 92-12), D. 211., i " o ‘ “Truman, 92. 23.3., p. 15. .1 “ 9.x 19 than in groups.All Truman defines an interest group as: . . . a group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.42 By stressing interaction on the basis of shared attitudes in his discussion of interest groups, he includes all of the above types of groups within his definition. Thus in Part I of the book, his use of the term "group” encompasses much, if not all, of the individual's social‘experience, In Part II, however, in his discussion of the operation of the Amcrican political system, he focuses chiefly on voluntary associations. He sometimes refers to "legislative groups" or to courts as groups but he also refers to the legislatures and the courts as institutions. He describes the political party as an "instrmnentality."43 Clearly, he does not find the term "interest group," as he defined it in Part I, as useful in discussing the functioning of American government as he does in discussing the group nature of human experience.44 It is also obvious that Truman does not have much taste for describing groups as goal-centered activity as “192.42.. P. 48- ”21219.- P- 33. “31219.. p. 270. 4('lShifts in the usage of terms of this kind have prompted E. E. Schattschneider to note that group theory begins as general theory but ends "with a defense of Pressure politics as inherent, universal, permanent and inevitable." E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New.York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 28. ., I s... .. ‘ r m " .._ M_.... ... u... u 20 group theorists have urged. His categories of analysis in Part II of the book are (the familiar ones: congressional committees, sub-committees, political parties, administra- tive bureaucracies, and voluntary associations. Given both the tendency of Truman to describe all patterned interaction as groups and his tendency to describe the work of interest groups chiefly in terms of voluntary associations, it is easy to understand why certain critics, in addition to Schattschneider, base some of their attacks on group theory on the notion that group theory rests on the behavior of leaders and members of voluntary associa- tions.45 Truman has really written two books, instead of two parts, that are not closely integrated or related to each other. There can be little doubt that in Part I he constructed an elaborate theoretical argument and conceptual apparatus that he seldom applies in Part II. There are only five authors that attempt to make a systematic effort to discuss the role of political groups in American society.)46 Four of these describe and analyze —.__. 45Roy Macridis, for example, has discussed the writings of the group theorists at times as if the theorists defined interest groups as voluntary associations. Macridis, _gp. 93.3., p. 26-7. “Shaman, _gp. cit. ; v. 0. Key, Politics, Parties, gng Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell C0,, 1964)- Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups; _Zl_._I_1_ American Societ (Engle- ’ wood Cliffs, New Jersey: 'Prentice-Hall, l9 ; Bentley, 92 cit.; Donald Blaisdell, American Democrac Under Pressure . (Ne—w York: The Ronald Press Co., I957). "— ,4 (O .u vv' ' u -- .. , n- - 6 ll '0'.- v " O «. o .‘ ._,p -. ‘Vv ... I“ 0» ‘-‘~.. 6 ‘n, U 'I‘ s.“. h, ~ ...- .‘I‘O ‘7 . . O'. 4 . 21 the political system in terms of voluntary associations, conventionally called "pressure" or "interest" groups.47 The most recent volume, Interest Groups _ip American Society, by Harmon Zeigler, begins with a brief chapter discussing group theory but does not base the remainder of the chapters on it.,48 Zeigler bows in the direction of the theorists in stating that group interests are separate from organized interest groups. In this assertion he accepts the wisdom of the group theorists' point that the boundaries of organized groups do not encompass all individual and institutional acts in support of a specific interest. Nevertheless, he quickly turns to discuss organized groups from which he rarely deviates in subse- quent chapters. At present it seems more apprOpriate to describe the new work on groups as a group "approach" rather than a theory.49 This distinction acknowledges the existence of a new perspective or frame of reference for the study of political behavior, but it does not claim the existence of 1”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 319 (September, 1958) is almost entirely devoted to American interest groups and lobbies. The contributors to it are heavily committed in usage to the discussion of interest groups in terms of organized interest groups. 482eigler, pp. cit., Chapter 1. " 4931depgveld, 9%, cit. , p. 188; Joseph LaPalombara, The Utility and Limita ions of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," Journal 93 Politics, Vol. 22: N0. 1 (February, 1960), 36. I‘ _ ...s ... O‘ _ - ~ I ..o.. r I a _. . '. - .. .. H. as. v p a. - ..i. . ~.,,‘ i..- M... O... “is“ . ,. \A‘ I. . s I o g» v 5 . .n. u 'q u 'l '- I u u .‘ ‘ . s . . w 22 a theory in the sense of a system of related variables. An explicit statement of a group theory of politics has not been written except in the form of the assertion that politics can best be understood through the study of groups. Despite the fact that group theory has been discussed for fifteen years, no published research in political science makes much use of its conceptual apparatus. The chief conceptual contributions of the new group approach have been: (1) a new conception of "group," (2) the potential interest group, (3) the notion Of overlapping membership in groups, (4) an equilib- rium of groups. Of these concepts only item four has been concistently mentioned in monographs on interest groups, and its use has conveyed different meanings.50 In general the ”equilibrium of groups" that is often mentioned in grOup studies, but seldom discussed in detail. chiefly seems to be a loose analogical model of the scientific meaning of equilibrium.51 It is worth noting that none of the group theorists has 50Earl Latham, ”The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," Political Behavigp, Heinz Eulau, 6t. al. editors (Glencoe, Illin'dis: The Free Press, 1956')" p. 239; Lester Milbrath Thewashington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964)., 4 , 51See Peter Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth, " Western Political Quar- terl Vol. 11, No. 3 (September, ,,"08'7-'702; David EasEon, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf" 1959), P. 271; Golembiewski, 9p. cit., p. 968; See also Heinz Eulau's review of Lester MiTB'r'ath's book, "Lobbyists: The Wasted Profession, " Public Opinion Quarter1y_(Spr1ng, 1964) p. 27-38. . .w-u- c - Ox 23 published a research venture using the apparatus of group theory.52 In fact, the similarity of concepts and the basic assumptions of some of the earliest interest group studies by Childs, Herring, and Schattschneider are remarkably like those of Zeigler, McConnell, Baker, Ehrmann, Riggs, and Stewart.53 Both groups of investigators have studied organized interest groups and their place in politics. The principal difference is that a more detailed con- ceptualization of certain types of groups has been developed, such as "catalytic group."54 But there is little evidence fohconcluding that the latter group of 52Latham, of course, has published a study but he has not been classified-in this paper as a group theorist and there is evidence from his study to support the judgment that his research does not use the group theorists' framework. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics A_ Stud in Basing-Point legislation (Ithica, N's—w or : Corne versity Press, 1952). _ 53Childs, o . 9.1.15.- ; Herring, pp. cit.; Schatt- schneider, The Se soverei Peo 1e, pp. 51-5.; Harmon Zei81er, ThE'Polit'ics 0? Small Business (Washington, D. C.: Public AfI'aTrs Press, I961); Gran’E McConnell, The Decline 93 $rarian Democrac (Berkeley, California: fiversi’éy 0f alifornia Hess, 1953); Roscoe Baker, The American Le ion and American Forei n Polic (New Yofk: Bookman ssoc a’E'éSfEB'Tl-TE— enry . BETTA—Hm, Organized Business EFrance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); J. D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1958). 54Fred Riggs, Pressures _o_n Co ress (New York: King's Crown Press, CqumBIa Universi y, 1950) p. 43 ff. I. I. 7‘ (M... " ... . .- ~- -. I-O UIV‘ - ‘---. ... ‘.”I' . 'Q ‘ i \- ‘ n . . l . . 'I ~ .. ’A. ‘I q. .. g. '- . '\ \ ’. ‘4 . '. ; \ u . n ,‘ . l . . w . . 24 studies could not have been written without the con- ceptual and theoretical work of the group theorists. The recent increased consideration given to groups in the political process seems to be chiefly a product of the research on organized interest groups mentioned above. There is clearly a growing awareness of the pervasiveness of group involvement directly or indirectly, in administration, legislatures, public Opinion, and, to some extent, in our courts.55 It may be true, as Robert Golembiewski states, that interest in a group theory of politics is ebbing.56 No defense or elaboration of it has appeared in published form since 1958.57 The critics of group theory, however, continue to increase. These critics have centered their attacks chiefly on three points: (1) that the comprehensive scope claimed for the new concept of ‘___ 55Most of the recent college textbooks on American government include one or more chapters on the role of interest groups in these areas. See £1331? D.DeIrish and(James W. Prothro, I‘lérhg Politics 93 I‘ can mocrac Englewood Cliffs, ew Jersey: PETen cam” 1962); Charles R. Adrian. and Charles Press, The American Political Process (New York: McGraw-HITT Book Co., 1965); Alfred 5e Grazia, 211% American Egg of Government (London: John Wiley and §ons, 55°” 1%7): 56 Golembiewski, 92. cit., p. 962. 57Hagan, o . cit. But Alfred De Grazia is antimistic about e ESE—sibility of constructing a new theory of associational democracy." Alfred De Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest GPOHPS.‘ 92. 933., p. 122. ,4 ~.. -. o ....w r .... o gnu 'v , s - w o'er- v -‘-.-- ..‘. "u , .. ‘K. -\'I J 25 group is not supported by the evidence, (2) that group theory is a crude form of determinism, and (3 ) that it makes extra-ordinarily heavy demands on scholars engaged in research. One of the recent critics, Stanley Rothman, raises two criticisms which challenge the comprehensiveness claimed for the new conception of group. He objects to Truman’s "ad _1'_1_9_<_:_" use of the concept of "status-role" as a supplementary concept to handle "a dimension of experience that cannot be handled" by the "group" concept.58 He also rejects the concept of‘potential interest group as a "deus g; machina" which can be used to explain anything "but fundamentally explains nothing."59 Odegard, in replying to the notion that "group" is a comprehensive concept for studying politics concludes: If every casual relation, direct or indirect, between individuals constitutes a group, then virtually every human act is a group, and the term becomes tautological and useless for scientific purposes. 0 David Smith is convinced that something very important is left out when one relies exclusively on the group approach, namely elements of commonality within a 583tanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory," American Political Science Revievi, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March, ’ 90 59Ibid., p. 23. 600degard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," pp. cit., p. 694: Garceau and La Palombara make the same point. See Garceau, gp. cit., P. 105; La Palombara, 9p. cit., p. 36. 4'. (a . 4 ,. . ... h . . . .. v. x -. "- a, ‘. 9 s v . -. 'u, \ '. o . . . \ s a .‘ -. K \ \ \. '\ u 1 u . , 2’3 nation which make a populace.6l He believes the unifying factors in the political system cannot be accounted for in terms of organized interest groups.62 Roy Macridis raises numerous questions which, he contends, require the use of other categories than "group," such as political parties, institutions, and cultural values.63 He states that if groups are compelled to Operate within enduring cultures or subcultures which shape political behavior, as studies of interest groups abroad show, then the groups are subject to them and the cultural norms constitute independent variables in the political system.64 In regard to the second criticism, Macridis states "It would seem to me that group analysis is . . . a crude form of determinism."65 He believes that the theorists rely exclusively on group interest as the "prOpelling force" in all action and therefore "the content of decisions are determined by the Bentleyian parallelogram of group forces."66 Joseph La Palombara and R. E. Dowling raise similar points. They contend that the activity of ~— 6lDavid Smith, ”Pragmatism and the Group Theory of Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, N0. 3 (September, 196E), 650-10. 621bid.; Zeigler, Interest Grou s in American £99192}; 92. gig” also feels this criticism is Justified. 63Macridis, 9p. _c__i_§., p. 34-6. 541bid. 651bid.. p. 31-2. 66Ibid. ‘—.L—=—— 27 groups tends to fall too readily into the Marxian framework of analysis with groups locked in unceasing struggle.67 The problems of conducting research on the basis of group theory appear to be extremely difficult if not insurmountable given its present conceptual framework. Joseph La Palombara reports: The policy process, as I have researched it in Italy, does not respond to the kind of explication of phenomena goward which most of group "theory" is directed.6 ‘ . . It is worth noting that none of the theorists has published research based on this conception of group. Unless some case studies of particular bills in the legislative process are accepted as examples of the group approach, the theorists' universe of "activity" has not been used in published research at all.69 Itappears that the type of questions in which most political scientists are currently interested cannot be advantageously studied by the new concept of group.70 The gap between group theory and research has been noted by many scholars.71 4 6713a Palombara, 92. cit., Do 323 Dowling, 22° “Cit” Po 9 9. 68La Palombara, loc. cit. 69There may be some studies in the area of small groups that make use of this concept of group. 7OSee the essays and discussion in Henry A. Ehrmann, editor, Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh-719% 7. 71Garceau, _o_p. cit., p. 108; Rothman, 9R0 cit., p. 15; Macridis, 100. c . 28 Other critics, such as Myron Hale, have challenged group theory on different grounds, namely, that it sancti- fies "the actual" and therefore the Bentleyian scheme of thought is conservative.72 Joseph La Palombara has stated nine middle-range propositions regarding interest groups and the political process.73 It is significant that only one of these propositions has a connection with group theory, and none makes use of any of its concepts so that it must be regarded as a product of group theory. Studies of interest groups abroad have neglected the discussion of a group interpretation of politics and few traces of its influence on group research are evident.74 Contrary to the position of group "theorists" in this country, the scholars who reported'at the round-table conference on interest groups sponsored by the International Political Science Association showed no inclination to exorcise ideas, institutions, individuals, or interests.75 —_k 72Myron Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," American Political Science Review) Vol. 52, NO- if ~ . ecem er, EEO), 955-61, Also, Leo Weinstein, The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley, " Essa s 9;; the Scien- MEE. sum of P litics, Herbert J. Storing, edit-Sr (New York: H0 ,Tinehar and Winston, Inc., 1962). Weinstein in discussing Bentleyian theory launches a broad attack on the notion of the “science" of politics. 73La Palombara, pp. cit., p. 42. i 7%3 Judgment is based on those studies of “tereSt groups abroad which have been published in English. 75Hasan, 9p. cit., p. 41. 29 Perhaps through the development or the reforging of its concepts, the group approach will prove to be as comprehensive and useful in analysis as its advocates contend. For the present, however, it appears that research on interest groups may be profitably continued based on the concrete concept of interest group (e.g., American Legion). The present study rests upon this premise. Such research can proceed a step at a time beginning with relatively simple descriptions and hypotheses that extend to a universe of groups of clearly defined and manageable size. The groups on which the present study is based are organized interest groups that were active at the congressional level of government in any session of Congress during the period 1944-60. The hypotheses to be tested are concerned with relations among these interest groups. CHAPTER II APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS This investigation is focused on the identi- fication, description, and analysis of several kinds of relations among interest groups. The data used in this research consist chiefly of group testimony presented at House committee hearings and information obtained from interviews with representatives of groups that have offices in Washington. This chapter reports the relevance of certain conceptual frameworks-~"system," "pluralism," "integration," and "conflict,"--to the study of interest groups, and shows how intergroup relations may be more fully understood by using them. The literature on these concepts makes it clear that each is concerned with the relations among entities in a pOpulation of entities. This chapter is concerned with the discussion and illustration of the usefulness of these concepts for understanding relations among interest groups. A subsequent chapter describes some of the characteristics of the interest group pOpulation at the congressional level that were identified in this inquiry that permit some conclusions about the applica- bility of these conceptual frames of reference for the 30 31 study of interest groups. The major portion of the chapter is concerned with the theoretical framework known as "pluralism" in which the role of interest groups is especially important. The discussion of the characteristics of pluralism provides the setting for the statement of the specific hypotheses concerning intergroup relations that were investigated in this research. This chapter attempts to show that new and different perspectives on interest groups emerge when groups are studied from these conceptual frames of reference; these perspectives reveal dimensions of the subject that seldom have been developed in the literature. Throughout this study, distinctions are made between several "universes of interest groups." All of these universes are composed of groups whose spokes- men were active in the hearings process of fourteen House committees during the period, 1945 through 1960. The most important universe of groups, the select universe, includes 119 interest groups whose repre- sentatives provided testimony most frequently to selected House committee hearings. Another universe of groups, constructed in an early phase of the research, was used to obtain a sample of groups whose represen- tatives were to be interviewed. From this universe, a stratified sample of fifty groups, representing ten tb’pes of groups, was drawn on a random basis. The term <... 32 "group population" as used in this paper refers to all groups whose representatives have participated in the hearings process at the national level. Systems One conceptual framework that may be helpful in seeing national interest groups in a new perspective is systems analysis. The interactions of the interest group pOpulation at the congressional level of government can be conceived as a "system." In this formulation, the concept "system" serves'as a heuristic frame of reference for studying interest‘groups in relation to each other and to their environment. Authors sometimes speak of the interest or pressure group "system" without defining this term or justifying the usebf it to describe relationships among groups.1 Nevertheless, the idea that there is an interest group system is a useful approach since it tends to turn attention toward aspects of interest groups that have been neglected. Until recently the concept of system has not been widely used in political science. Economists, and to a lesser extent sociologists, have given more attention to it. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils‘ Toward a General Theory 9;; Action is one of the most ambitious and “i lad ° gar Lane Lobb in and the Law (Berkeley. University of Califsrfia %ess, 196117 Do 1103 Fred W. Riggs, Pressures on Con ress (New York: King's Crown Press, pCOIlllI'IIIBTa Uflversity, 1950) pp. 198-93 Milbrath, 92- 9.133” ..4. o v. .- - o— . I .. . I». .. . . ‘U. .. ‘Dt~., ‘, v... . ‘§.. . u “A. L., 33 comprehensive attempts to apply systems theory to the analysis of human behavior.2 Among political scientists, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and Morton Kaplan have made extensive use of the concept.3 The notion of system is used in two different ways: first, as an analytical concept in the study of relation- ships between components; second, as a descriptive concept in referring to a functioning set of arrangements.” In this chapter, the term is used in the first sense. The interest group process. is viewed as a "closed system."5 2Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward _a_ General Theogy of Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951). . 3Easton, The Political system, 9p, cit.; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis ("E—n- lewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1965; David Easton, A Systems Analysis oi‘_Political Life (New York: John Wiley 8c Sons,—Inc., 1965); Gabria Almond and James 3. Coleman, The Politics 9;; the Develo in Areas (Princeton: Princeton-University Press, 1960); Moréon A. Kaplan, S stems and Process in International Politics (New York: JOKE Wiley and Sons,—Inc., I957). “Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Societ : A Unified A roach (Homewood, Illinois: RTE-hard T5. Irwin, inc., and Tipie Mrsey Press, Inc. , 1963); Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. git” argues that this distinction 3 no a use 11 one and that all systems are analytic. 5"For use in analysis, a system must be 'closedJ A system which is interacting with its environment is an 'Open' system: all systems of 'real’ life are therefore Open systems. For analysis however, it is necessary to assume that contact with the environment is cut off so that the operation of the system is affected only by given conditions previously established by the environment and not changing at the time of analysis, plus the relation- ships among the elements of the system." Everett E. Hagen, Analytical Models in the Study of Social Systems ," American Journal 93 Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 2 (September, 1961) 145. I». s ,.... a , . on. r‘ . v n a ~- .... ... _ I .o _ o c, ‘ .. t .. 'l.‘ 9,, ' -. c y D a ‘. . w ‘- _' b n. ‘ . ’- a ”M n . ‘. 3., _ . s . n_' 34 A simple model of the interest group system as it is defined in this study, for example, might consist of interest groups, the components of the system, that have representatives appearing at House committee hearings. The interactions among these groups, such as the kinds and frequencies of interaction, constitute the variables of the system. The degree of apathy among the persons affiliated with the interest groups in the system is one parameter of the system.6 The provisions of the Lobby Registration Act establish another parameter of the system. The inputs of the system flow from the environment of which the system is a part. For example, the communications and the expressed demands of the members of the interest groups that are received by group leaders are inputs. The outputs of the system take the form of group information and requests that are communicated to receptors in the environment, such as Congress, other political structures, the leaders of other groups, or the members of groups. According to most scholars, a system is defined in terms of three prOperties: (l) boundaries that separate the components of the system from the environment in which they are set, (2) mutually dependent relationships-of these entities with each other, and (3) tendencies toward _- 51bid., p. 145. 35 self-maintenance.7 The adaption of this frame of reference in appraising the interest group population prompts the formulation of new questions about interest groups. The notion of "boundaries" turns the attention of the investi- gator to such factorsas the degree to which the interest groups may readily enter or depart from the system. The idea of interdependency among groups in the system alerts the researcher to the patterns of interaction among groups within the system and to the differing types and rates of interaction among them. The concept of tendencies-toward- self—maintenance in systems raises a question concerning the possible identification of some form of self-regulation or governance in the interest group population. David Easton notes that: Self-regulation by the members of a political system, even to the point of self-transformation in structure and goals, reprgsents critical capabilities of all social systems. The notion of all of these prOperties, boundaries, interdependence of components, and tendencies toward self- maintenance, also suggests the importance of the notion of the ”growth" of the number of groups in the pOpulation. The possibility that growth in pOpulation may occur points M 7Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 3, No. l (1958); Easton, A Framework-Tor Political Analysis, gp_. _C_i_._t_. it 8§aston, _A_ Framework for Political Analysis, 92. EL..." p0 70 36 to the need for information concerning the strains of adjustment that may accompany growth. James G. Miller notes that ". . . growth in size, number and complexity of components often compels a system to reorganize relation- ships among its parts."9 If we view the interest group system as a subsystem of a larger political system encompassing decision-making by the presidential adminis- tration and the Congress, the impact of growth in compo- nents in the subsystem may increase the volume or intensity of group demands on the Congress. On this type of prob- lem David Easton states: Stress may occur because too many demands are being made, or their variety and content may be such that the conflict they stimulate requires an excessive amount of time to process.10 How autonomous are groups of each other? What kinds of structured relationships exist among them? Do the groups in a given population have a consciousness of mutual interests? These questions have been raised only infre- quently and have been researched even less. The literature on interest groups has tended to focus heavily on the relationships between interest groups and official actors in the political decision-making process, chiefly 9James G. Miller, "Living Systems: Structure and Process," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October, 1965) 373; Seea‘lsoTCenneth Boulding, The Organizational Revolu- tion: A Stu in. the Ethics of E'é'Enomic Organization ~(New.York: arper and Brother—5, l953) p.—22-25. loEaston, _A_ Framework for Political Analysis, 92. 922., p. 120. 37 congressmen. One scholar, for example, has asserted that the general relation of groups to officials, especially elective officials, is one of dependence: the groups are dependent on the parties.11 But perhaps the relations of groups to each other constitute an equally important condition of dependence. It would be significant if the size, stability, composition, activities, and methods of groups in the pOpulation were not affected in important ways by the relationships of the groups to each other. The leaders of each group are informed of the presence and activities of many other groups that are also interacting with congressmen. This information about other groups is certain to have an impact on the behavior of the group receiving it. If the dissemination of common knowledge about group behavior and methods is wideSpread in the group pOpulation, group leaders will find their freedom of action more limited than otherwise. Thus each group in the pOpulation is denied control over its own affairs, to some degree, as the interdependency of the entities in the system is developed. What occurs when representatives of two groups first interact may be a great deal like what happens when interaction is begun by individuals in a dyad relationship. Voluntary interaction between two individuals, even in its earliest phase, consists of exploratory behaviors by each *— lJ-Schattschneider, The Semisovereign PeOple, 92, 933.." po 42'30 - 38 individual designed to gather information about the other. This exchange of actions consists of a recon- naissance by each concerning the other, and one effect of it is to structure to some degree the relationship between them. If the costs of the behavior transaction are low and the rewards high for both individuals, each is likely to develOp the relationship further, perhaps at the sacrifice of exploring the environ- ment for other individuals with whom rewarding relation- ships might be established.12 Or each individual may continue to explore the environment for other satis- fying relationships but not at the cost of sacrificing the first rewarding relationship. Thus, the interaction leads to a relationship that tends to restrict or exclude interactions with others and usually leads to the development of relatively stable expectations by each concerning the behavior of the other on events in which both have an interest. It is a tenable hypothesis that leaders of an interest group behave toward the leaders of other interest groups in the same way as the individual discussed above. The leaders of a new national interest group must explore) the group population in Washington for potential allies and threatening enemies. The s 12.101111 w. Thibault, and Harold H3 Kelley, The ocial Ps cholo of Grou s New York: ohn Wiley aha Sons, cu 95s) p. 511- 6. 39 congressional environment of interest groups is not equally friendly to all groups. Many studies of groups in Washington show that group success often depends on coalition-building among groups in the pOpulation.l3 Group leaders in formulating strategy estimate the support and hostility of other groups. It is this shaping of the group leaders' behavior choices in the light of the estimated behavior choices of the leaders of other groups in the population that makes the hypothesis of the group population as a system credible. Thomas Schelling in a discussion of strategy between adversaries stresses this interdependency . . . . strategy . . . focuses on the fact that each participant's "best" choice of action depends on what he expects the other to do, and that “strategic behavior" is concerned with influencing another's choice by working on his expectation of how one's own behavior is related to his.14 This research does not attempt to define all the variables pertaining to intergroup relationships among the interest groups in the group pOpulation at the congressional level. Parsons and Shils indicate what must be done in determining the interdependence of the entities 13Riggs, 92. cit.; Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Stud in Basing-Point Legislation, Qp.__c"it.; Thomas K. 351 ey, 0'55 ress Makes a Law: The Stor Behind 11:13 Em lo ent Act of I§§§ (New Y'o'rE: Col'umSia University 1950). ' Press, 14Thomas C. Schelling, The Strate (_a_: Conflict (Camgridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University FPGSS, 1960) p0 o 40 in the interest group system: Interdependence consists in the existence of determinate relationships among the parts or variables as contrasted with randomness of variability. In other words, inter- dependence is order in the relationship among the components which enter a system.1 This study does not undertake the demonstration of all the dimensions of interdependency among interest groups, nor does it attempt to construct a model of the interest group system. This research seeks only to determine and appraise a few dimensions of the relationships between groups at one level of government while at the same time it stresses the heuristic value of the concepts of systems analysis for this subject. It is appropriate to use the vocabulary and constructs of systems analysis in this discussion insofar as these terms seem likely to contribute to accurate description and fruitful analysis. In using the concept "system" to gain a new perspective about the interest group. population at the congressional level, it is clear that no case need be made (1) that each group is unaffected in important ways by the environment of the groups, or (2) that the relations of each group with others are more vital to group survival than the relations of the group with government officials or with the individuals affiliated with the group. It is feasible to study the circulatory system of man in medicine even though that system is not a system independent _— 15Parsons and Shils, _qp. cit., p. 107. n ' I ,. o. . .- ... a ... v a “b 9-. ‘, v .... . I ‘v. '. n ‘. ‘o . c. . o ... I. 4 W‘ o . 'o ... ... . ‘. . a. - ‘. a .. . a .’ 1 o '1 . u - 41 of the functioning of other organs, and even though some of the elements in that system are also elements of other systems.16 The application of the system frame of reference to interest groups seems promising because it focuses on the aspects of intergroup relations that have not been fully studied. A few case studies of specific bills have reported on intergroup relationships but the language used to describe these relations does not facilitate comparisons with the findings of other group studies. Some authorities have asserted that the survival of democratic industrial societies is dependent on the adaptability of these systems to changes within the systems and in the environment. For example, technological change in the field of armaments and warfare has made the selec- tive service system, as it currently exists, inadequate for some national security situations. We do not know if the activities or relationships of the interest groups in the group population are becoming dysfunctional for the political system because we do not have even the most rudimentary general information about the group pOpulation and the relationships among groups within it to determine this. Systems and communications theorists cite the importance of the concepts "noise," "distortion," and mi l6xuhn, 9p. cit. A‘o A M N 5. . ‘ .l s a K , a \ 42 "overload."17 Would it be surprising if our interest ' group system became overloaded with excessive numbers of messages from groups that have resources to spend to attain legislative objectives?18 We do not have any conception about the functional limits of the present arrangements because there has been no attention given to the notion that the present arrangements Operate under limiting factors. It will not be persuasive if observers conclude that the systems approach does not seem to be useful because the interest group system in this country, or in any known political system, has never broken down. The strains from noise, distortion, or overload in the communication system may help to explain changes in the relationships among groups and the relations between groups, legislators, and administrators . 19 Since changes in relationships that are the result of communications difficulties are not likely to be sudden or highly visible, they may occur unnoticed. Adjustments 17James G. Miller, "Living Systems: Basic Concepts," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July) 1965), 193-234; . Dan McI'a'cFilan, 3r” "Communication Networks and Monitoring," Public gEinion uarterl Vol. xxv No. 2 (Summer. 1961) 197,- m. u sch, The Nerves of Government: Models of ’ Political Communication and Cantfol (_Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963) p. 150 and 162. l8Lester Milbrath reports that: "The competition for the attention of officials has taken a new turn, however, . . . Decision-makers are deluged with messages from constituents." Milbrath, 93. gig... p. 239. 19Easton, _A Systems Analysis _c_>_i_‘_ Political Life, 92‘ 92-2..) p0 660 ' 43 by the principal actors are likely to be slow and incremental because they tend to be made on a day- by-day basis. Some of the existing gj;roup relationships to congressmen may not be as functional as traditional interpretations have held. For example, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter, in a recent case-«study of the legislative process, assert that the excessive volume of communications directed at congressmen contributes to the freedom of the congressman to take a position on a bill according to his pre- dispositions toward it.20 The transformation of an agrarian society into an industrial society is a revolution in human relationships as well as in technology. The growth Of the group population may cause a transformation in relationships, too, because it impinges on the environment within which the population is set and with which it is related. Changes in these relations seem likely under circumstances of growth but no dis- cussion of growth can be found in the recent literature on interest groups .21 20Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics EFor’éign Trade (New York: her on Press, 1964) p. 421. . 21The subject is raised by Milbrath but given only brief attention. Milbrath, pp. cit. , p. 239. 44 These remarks Show that the vocabulary of systems analysis may, by itself, serve as a stimulus in reordering our thought so that a new perspective emerges. To talk in terms of system is to converse in a language different from those now employed by interest group theorists.22 The apparent dead end at which interest group theory now stands may reflect an in- adequate set of conceptual terms to describe some kinds of relationships which characterize the group popula- tion.23 It may be fruitful to utilize the concepts of different conceptual vocabularies so that we may become aware of features of the field under study that are obscured by other conceptual approaches. For example, in the early decades of this century, public administration was chiefly centered on formal organization structure. The literature and research in administration has changed markedly with the discovery of the importance of informal organization. Today the implications of research findings in social psy- chology are important for theory building in public administration . There is some evidence to indicate that many —‘_ 22Except for "equilibrium" that is used by some group theorists. . , 23It may also be a product of other factors, such as its inadequacy for general theory construction or difficulties of making its concepts operational for research. 45 of the studies of interest groups were designed and executed with a vocabulary that does not lead to fruitful research. Almost all of these studies are terminal in nature, not cumulative. A review of the literature on interest groups makes clear the fact that certain questions about the interest group population and the relationships within it have not been raised. In The Governmental Process, for example, Truman does not discuss, even in general terms, how many interest groups are active at any level of government; nor does he ever imply that the number of active groups may be a factor of importance in interpreting the roles or methods of groups in politics. Truman says, in effect, that interest groups are ubiquitous. But only when some answers, though imprecise, are provided to the questions "How many?" and "How often?" is one likely to turn to'the questions concerning the impact different numbers of groups and changing numbers of groups have on each other, and on the arrangements through which groups relate themselves to each other and to governmental structures. For example, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and his staff cannot Operate in the same way toward the leaders and members of twenty groups and 120 groups. When we discover the magnitude of the group population, the notion of indirect access may prove more useful for interpreting group behavior at 46 the congressional level. Thus intergroup relations emerges as a subject of study because of the importance that group alignments have for the effective mobilization of support. By using the concept system and asking some funda- mental questions about the relationships among groups, the stability of these relationships, and the size of the population, a body of general information about interest groups at a given level of government can be assembled that may yield broad generalizations. For these reasons a later chapter is concerned with some estimates of the size and composition of the pOpulation of groups that are active at the congressional level. Consideration is also given to indicators of stability and change in this population. Pluralism A second general conceptual framework to which this research has relevance is pluralism. Pluralism is used by historians, sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists to refer to the numbers of many different kinds of significant entities within a defined universe. It frequently is used to denote the diversity of religious, ethnic, and racial subgroups in a society. Sociologists also refer to social classes as entities in a pluralistic society. Other types of groups such as families and clans are also frequently included as entities. .... - 4? Political scientists, however, and some sociologists also, have taken the voluntary association as the basic entity in discussing pluralism in modern political systems. In the general discussion of pluralism that follows, authors will be cited who refer broadly to all these groups as entities in social and political pluralism. Nevertheless, there seems to be growing attention to the role of associa- tions at the expense of some of these other groupings.24 There is general agreement among students of the family and, to a lesser extent, social classes, that these entities, the family and class, have suffered a loss of control over their members in this century, and there are few signs which indicate a resurgence for them in the shaping of the behavior of their members. On the other hand, there have never been so many associations competing for the allegiance of individuals, both youth and adult, as there are now. The prospects for continued increases are also favorable.25 In this research, the discussion of the entities in pluralist political systems will refer only to associations. The basic types of associations that are included are the following: business, financial business, agricultural business, small business, labor, professional, agriculture, —_— 22‘LThe term association is used interchangeably with the term interest group throughout the discussion of this research. 25Richard w. Gable, "Political Interest Groups as Policy Shapers," The Annals, .Vol. 319 (September, 1958): p. 92; See also.Truman, _p_. cit., p. 52. . .--‘ o .n._-. h.~. - 48 religious, citizen and veteran. Family and social class are not included. Pluralism is a societal condition to which great importance is assigned by many social scientists. The importance attributed to it by political scientists and sociologists is seen in the numerous references made to it in theories of democracy, totalitarianism, political parties, and in studies of power and decision-making in community and nation. The simple notion of "individualism" on which the classical theory of democracy‘is based has generally been modified in recent decades, or replaced, by the concept "pluralism." The classical formulation of democracy was a product of assumptions inherited from the philosophers and the history of classical Greece, the philosophers of the European Enlightenment, the individualism of nineteenth century economic thought and practice, and from American frontier experience. Classical democratic thought is based on assumptions concerning the civic virtue, ration- ality, and high political motivation of each citizen. Each citizen had a political will based on a conception of the public interest that he communicated to public servants or candidates for public offices. Few institutions and no SI‘Oups, such as interest groups, were needed to facilitate consultation, communication, or mediation between the sovereign citizen and the public servant. r----- .4-0-1 - .. v-.. 0.. . a, ' ‘. ... O I . - ... o. ,. ' . o.‘ -.~ It ~ 'c 'n. D_ ‘ ‘Qwv t ..‘. ‘l D . . Q I. . l " . _- c '~ -! ‘~_ ‘~ '0 . 'u“ ’ ... _V.‘. '1 o ._‘ \. 'u. I A a. P . . u ‘ v- . n. u . '- ,‘ a ,-., v ._ _ n \ . 'n \"| ._ ‘. .‘¢ ‘5 x ‘ ‘ . § \ .t .- . ) .l s .. “ *. ' . I L. '- l“ _. . ~ . s o‘ n. 1 ,_'n ‘. 49 The inadequacy of this model became increasingly apparent following the efforts of reformers to repair Amsrican democracy by statutes that were based on classical democratic premises. Among the writers who refused to accept the individualistic premises of the classical model was A. D. Lindsay. He proceeds from pluralistic premises in his discussion of democracy. We make a great mistake if in considering political democracy we think only of individuals on the one hand, of the political organizations on the other, and neglect the enormous importance in the production of real public Opinion of the innumerable voluntary associations of all kinds which exist in modern democratic society.26 Recent students of democracy, noting the gap between classical democratic thought and the behavior of citizens who are members of functioning democratic socie- ties, have attempted to determine the empirical foundations of Operating democracies and then to reformulate democratic theory on the basis of classical concepts and empirical research. This reformulation was hastened and assisted by the observations and research findings of sociologists and psychologists who repeatedly confirmed the notion that the individual is a product of social experience. Nearly all of the concepts With which individualism was formerly defended have become instruments of the social pSyChologistS M 26A D Lindsay The Essentials of Democr o c . 3 _____ __ ac (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1929) 13. 39-40. Charles Merriam takes a similar position. Charles Merriam, Public and Private Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). , lo... q....,.. o-- ., a i "‘ .. ._, .... . ‘4, .._‘ 5 §. a. -. A '- v- a e ‘o ‘. u, I~ 50 and sociologists in defense of the notion that social groups are Vital in understanding individual behavior, society, and democracy. Such terms as personality, self, conscience, and ego were reduced, at least in part, to perceptions of self based on the response of others to the self.27 These research results received special attention because of the relevance they had to the emergence of the dictatorships in European democracies. The rise of dictatorship was inexplicable on the assumptions of the classical model of democracy. It was made credible by the analyses and interpretations of students from many intel- lectual disciplines whose studies of totalitarianism tend to converge on certain facts. Emil Lederer, Erich Fromm, and Sigmund Neumann are, perhaps, representative of these students of society and politics who saw that the disintegration of subcenters of influence, such as classes, voluntary associations, and families meant the destruction of satisfying personal relationships among individuals.28 The political policy of restructuring *- w 27Oeorge H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, Charles . Morris, editor (Chicago: University of Chica o Press 28mm Lederer, State of the Masses: The Threat of Classless Societ (New Y E: "W a C I 4 , or . . W. Norton an o. 9 0 - E1310 Promm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Rinehard and 233., 1% Sigmund Neumann,‘"cermany," European Pglitical S stems Taylor Cole editor N 1T; ew .York: Alfred A. Kn 195 pp . 322,—,36 . ’ ( Opf , 51 human relationships to exclude autonomous associational centers of influence is now commonly regarded as a factor that contributes to the success of totalitarianism within a political system. Thus the institutions and groups of pluralistic societies were assigned an increasingly important place in the discussion of democracy. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture state: These findings strongly support the prOposition . . . that the existence of voluntary associations increases the democratic potential of a society. Democracy depends upon Citizen participation, and it is clear that organizational membership is directly related to such participation . . . Pluralism, even if not explicitly political pluralism, may indeed be one of the most important foundations of political democracy.29 Specific attention is given to the role of voluntary associations in politics by William Kornhauser in The Politics 93 Mass Sociegt_y_.3O According to Kornhauser, the functions of associations in a democratic Society are three: (1) provide psychological security to their members as organizations with which they can identify, (2) protect the governing elites from the impulsive ideas and whimsical desires of the mass by serving as arenas of criticism, and (3) serve as structures of access to decision-making. The destruction of mediatory groups contributes to the atomiza- tion of society. Each individual tends to become isolated n 29Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 318 and 32. 30William Kornhauser, The Politics 32 Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, T959). *— .- . '5‘ "°.> 'u 1 no . ‘a, ‘Qa.. IC.‘ . . l“ ‘. .". u t. a“ . a '- ..v “\. ‘, n 'o ... u I C‘- l. .' ‘ o '- u o u .. ‘o \ '- l n‘ ' ‘. c. n n t d' u 4 .u h I 4 m , 52 from meaningful relations with others and more susceptible to recruitment by social and political mass movements. David Truman, in his discussion of forces contribu- ting to cohesion in a democracy, assigns an important place to theoverlapping memberships of individuals in numerous groups. He states that when an individual 's allegiance is divided among several groups, this tends to prevent recruitment of him by a group urging extremist solutions to problems. Thus, the overlapping membership of the individual in several groups is a factor that fosters cohesion in the society.31 Joseph R. Gusfield makes a similar point in distinguishing between "linked plural- ism"--in which individual memberships in'one group out acrOss individual memberships in others-«and "superimposed segmentation" in which individual memberships ’in one group coincide with membership in others.32 Today it is common for writers on democracy to look beyond the constitutional and legal structures in order to assess the sources of strength in democratic politi- cal systems. Bernard Berelson notes that one of the conditions for the survival of political democracy is a u‘.‘ 31Trwnan, 92. Cito, p0 508‘21‘). 32Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociolo ical Review, Vol.27, No. 1 (February, W9-35; See aIso HoEIn M. Williams, Jr., Unity and Diversity in Modern America," Social Forces, V01 36, No. 1 (October, 1957, 1- 8. .ki. . K I-. . ,‘ . 'n . ‘ I \‘l t: . . | . . 53 pluralistic social organization.33 Leonard J. Fein, in an essay on American democracy, states that: . . . to the simple majority rule definition of democracy, several amendments must be made that provide for the legal right of Opposition groups to exist, and also speak of the need for a pluralistic society. In the absence of such pluralistic competi- tion, whether overwhelming social consensus or legal restrictions are the fiause, democracy becomes a meaningless concept.3 The literature on political parties also reveals heavy attention to the effect of a pluralist social environment on our political parties. One of the standard works on American parties and politics for many years has been E. P. Herring's The Politics _o_f_ Democracy in which he explains our decentralized non-ideological party system largely in terms of the diversity of interests in our society and the proliferation of associations active in the advocacy of these interests.35 Wilfred Binkley and Lubell tend to describe the parties in terms of the groups and groupings, such as laborers, wheat farmers, and small _4‘ 33Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voti : _A_ Study 93 Opinion Formation in _a_ Presidential Cam ai n !(Chicago: University of Chicago '— Press, 1954) p. 31%. 34Leonard J. Fein, American Democracy: Essa s on .I_m_ag_e_ _a_ngl Realities (New Yofk: Holt, Rinehard, and WinSTon, $110., 1964) p. 13—14; See also Hilda W. and Joseph P. Parker, olgetélocraflc Principles in Social Pgoblemsfi" American Journal cono cs and Sociolo , Vol. 1 , No. .(JuIy, 195 359-78. Other-Writers Have also stressed- the importance of voluntary associations in the maintenance of democracy. Charles Frankel, The Democratic Prospect (New York: Harper 35E P Herring The Politics of Democrac (N . . , __ y ew York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1940). ,‘ on ... a... ,_ cu.- ..~ 54 businessmen, that support certain parties.36 All of these descriptions and theories about the role of groups in democracy, totalitarianism, and political parties draw attention to the usefulness of formulating some empirical hypotheses about pluralism in the United States. Much of the literature citing the importance of pluralism regards the factual basis of it as self-evident or proceeds on the basis of limited data. More detailed studies describing the size and composition of the pluralistic universe, analyzing the relationships among the entities in the universe, and stating with what degree of permanency entities are related, would be useful. In this way it may be possible to get some new leverage on the validity of some of the assertions about the connec- tions between voluntary associational life and democracy, totalitarianism, and various types of decision-making in political institutions such as legislatures, bureaucracies, and political parties. The use of a pluralistic framework in this research requires a brief review of pluralist thought as it developed in the modern period. Perhaps the most important work on pluralism prior to the nineteenth century was that _k ———— Th 1 36Wi1fred Binkjéey, American ilplitical PartieSé e r Natural Histo New York: Al red A. KnOpf 19 2)- Samuel Lubell, Tl—le Euture _o_f American Politics (New York:: Harem—1952). . u ,, n . v n .- -~. .. .... , 9‘ l 'w- 55 of Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory _o__f; Society.37 In this work Gierke attempts to show the "naturalness" of some groups and corporations in the society and notes especially the spontaneity with which they arise.38 He also asserts that these corporations develop group wills that transcend the individual wills of the members of the group.39 The chief thrust in the writings of Gierke and of other pluralists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is against the concept of sovereignty for the state. James Madison used a pluralist argument in advoca- ting a federal union of states to control factions within the nation. Pluralist arguments frequently have been useful for individuals and groups who find the occupants Of centralized authority a barrier to their interests and who have little hope of capturing power through the election process, such as the guild socialists in England in the early decades of this century.40 The difficulty of relying upon pluralism as it was discussed by writers prior to the 1930's for interpreting h 37Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory 9i Society, translator, Ernest Barker (Boston: Beacon Press, 3’BIbidu' See also Francis Coker, ”Techniques of the Pluralist Sta—6e,” American Political Science Review, Vol. xv: N0. 2 (May, lgél); 186-2130 39Gierke, Ibid.; See also Kung Chuan Hsiao, Polit- cal Pluralism, A Stud— i1; Contemporagy Political Theory ndon: egan Pau , Trench, Trubner and Co.,Ttd., 1927). Y . 4Cppancis w. Céker, Recent Political Thought (New ork. D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 193117: 1313- 253-4. (V I"... - .... .. V‘ .I b A y: ., . o. . “" a . ... _‘ “A n. . .I .- '”0¢.. \. I‘..-’ Q. - ..- ‘I .\ ’ 1'. ‘f 'O u ‘ .Q. .. ~ . ‘- ‘- .5 .i'c. . V ... 'e. . '-. V I 'I . ., x a ., . ‘ny .— .‘I . _\ 3 . ... ' ‘» ‘0 . Q . N “ I .‘ \ u 0 ‘. u .... . A. y k . . n . ‘ 56 contemporary Western politics is that it was a mixture of normative and empirical theories. In part, it was a prescriptive theory based on the values of its advocates who postulated the desirability and possibility of attain- ing them, but it was also, in part, a description of features of past and contemporary societies. Therefore, the writings of pluralism in this period suffer from the failure to always distinguish fact from value. Ellen Ellis, in writing about the European pluralists, states: Comparatively little of their (the pluralists') polemic is concerned with the denial that the state can or does control everything within its jurisdiction. By far the greater part of it is taken up with a discussion not of fact, but of right . . . it becomes very difficult to know in the specific case whither one is within the realm of fact or of theory. Nevertheless, these discussions of pluralism are, to some extent, centered on certain common premises about societies. A few premises of pluralism that have empirical referents are repeatedly mentioned and implied. To a considerable degree these characteristics of pluralism are accepted and used by contemporary students of Pluralism. The recent literature on the subject, though not voluminous, is more complete in delineating pluralis- tic theory in empirical terms. Examination of the literature yields four basic characteristics that are repeatedly mentioned directly or by implication by M. Americ ullsEflil; D‘ Ellis. "The Pluralistic State," an o cal Science Review Vol. XIV No. 3 AUgLIst, 1920 ’ 00. H) , chad .._ ...”a. 57 writers as the essential characteristics that constitute pluralism. Some of the writers whose statements on the empirical foundations of pluralism are most comprehensive are Robert Presthus, William Mitchell, William Kornhauser, Robert A. Dahl, Donald Blaisdell, Nelson Polsby, Henry Kariel, Robin Williams, Clark Kerr, Mary Parker Follett, Joseph Gusfield.”2 Only a few) of these authors stated, directly or indirectly, all four of the basic characteris- tics that follow. This is not surprising since only a few of them, the most recent students of the subject, concerned themselves specifically with the enumeration of empirical characteristics of pluralism. Many other authors briefly discuss one or two characteristics of pluralism in 42Some of the authors listed here, such as Henry Kariel, have discussed pluralism in a framework of their own normative judgments and do not present original supporting empirical data. They are cited because they discuss a model of pluralism, sometimes critically, in gegmstog characteristics that have empirical referents. 0 er resthus, Men at the To ; A Stud in Communit Power (New York: "CEfB'Fd‘Ur—iit'égsity Pressj-1964 ); William C. Mitchell, The Axnerican Polit : A Social and Cultural Inter retatitn (GlencoeT‘Illi’noi's‘: The Free Press, 1962); Henry Eriel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford: Stanford Universit, Press,—l'961; Blaisdell, pp. cit.; Nelson W. Polsby, 'How to Study Community Power:_'The Pluralist Alternative ," The Journal pf; Pelitics, Vol. 22, N0. 3 (August, 1960), 4747-84; Williams, pp. cit.; Mary Parker Follett, The New State) Grou Organization, The W _o_f POpular Government ew Erk: Longmans, Green grid 0., 1920); Gusfield, pp. cit.; Robert A. Dahl, "The Jolitics of Planning," International Social Science . %% Vol. XI, No.3, (1959), 341-50; Kori—lfiauser, pp. £____u lark Kerr, Labor and Management in Inductrial gociet (Garden Cimefiork: Anchor—Eooks, Doubleday nd Clo” Inc, 1964) p. 3-42. ’ ~ ‘v.. ‘1 '1, c... H. - 58 writings that are concerned with a different though related subject.43 It is useful to formulate an empirical model of pluralism because it helps to bring a stable core of meaning to the term and, therefore, permits theories and hypotheses that are premised on pluralism to be appraised from a single standard. If pluralism is as vital to a free society as many authors say it is, we must try to find out what is subsumed in the term that makes it vital. As a model of politics, pluralism consists of a set of significant entities related to each other in certain ways. The nature of these relationships is stipulated in the four basic characteristics on which general agreement among authors is found. The most recent and comprehensive effort to state an empirical model of pluralistic society is presented by Robert Presthus in _Mpp _a_p Egg Tppfm Presthus constructed a model of the pluralist society that consists of six elements or characteristics. When his statements are combined with the discussions of other students, an instructive model emerges that can be used as a standard in determining to what extent our political system, or 43For example, see John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York; Henry Holt and COS—I927 ); Set—31's?- e ealists" view of the public interest in Glendon Schubert's The Public Intprest (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960); V: O. Key, Public inion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1964). ‘4 ‘— 2MPresthus, _p. cit. 59 subsystems within it, is pluralistic. The first characteristic Of the pluralist society is that there are numerous competing centers of power within the society. This feature is in the historical tradition of pluralist thought. NO author fails to mention the criterion of dispersed power as Opposed to centralized power. This is the core characteristic of the pluralist society on which there is universal agreement. Even so, it is vague and difficult to apply as an empirical standard. None of the sources discuss this characteristic in terms of numerical quantities; but every author uses language that suggests a larger number of entities than two is essential. It is possible to become bogged down in a search for quantitative guidelines, but it would be foolish to dismiss the numerical dimensions Of the characteristics of pluralism as unimportant. In this research the numerical dimensions of the characteristics of pluralism are described as accurately as possible and some possible consequences of variations in the numbers are noted. Nor is there any indication from the literature concerning the degree of competition that must exist to validate the existence of the characteristic. Among the sources, only Presthus and Kariel show much sensitivity to this problem. Presthus expresses concern with a recent tendency to regard this characteristic as fulfilled when competition is present only among massive groups dominating their respective areas. He seems to have in mind the kind ...:- o'c- "‘ ‘n. ‘1. ., I b._ .7. -.. _' O ._.. .. -. .‘-‘ II l‘-‘ .. ‘\A l \ . ... , 'l - ‘ ~ - . ., ... ...- . ... ‘b a, . .' .. .u _ o. ‘ ‘- .. \. ._ ‘. C'I ‘ . \o . ~ . ‘c I_ T . . I A. . ‘. . . . . . . I . . . 60 of dominance of a field by a single organization that is characteristic Of the medical profession, and, to some degree, of organized labor as illustrated by the AFL—CIO. Henry Kariel is also troubled by what he concludes is the decline in the number of power centers in certain areas and the ascendancy of a few dominant power centers.45 A second characteristic of the pluralist society is the Opportunity for access to decision-making by entities. To some extent, this characteristic may be regarded as a remnant of the insistence by pluralists of an earlier period that groups within the society be treated as autonomous for many purposes.“6 Thus, even though contem- porary groups have lost some degree of autonomy over certain of their affairs to public Officials, they insist on the right to organize and to present their views to them.’47 Robert Horn and Charles Rice have shown that there is a substantial body of law in this country based on court cases involving the right Of freedom of association.48 45Karie1, pp, cit., p. 2. 26 46Coker, Recent Political Thought, 22: Ella: p. 1. ‘ “7In illustration of this condition, both the guild socialist claims to autonomy and the AFL—CIO seeking Pro-labor legislation through lobbying can properly be described as efforts to extend control over their fate-- that is, preserve or enlarge the sphere in which they are autonomous. 48Robert A, Horn, Groups and the Constitution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956); Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association New York: New York Univer- Sity Press, l962). ( ... .a 'u .. «-... .t. ‘ '»-.. 61 Opportunity for access is a variable that can be studied in terms Of three kinds of problems for groups in the society: (1) the problems of the financial and social support needed by groups seeking to communicate with the decision-makers, (2) the problems of mediating the struc- tural barriers, formal and informal, that prevent or tend to impede certain groups and individuals in their efforts to influence officials, (3) the problems of permitting and limiting access on the basis of certain attributes of the groups that seek it. The costs for a group of attaining and maintaining a strong associational identity that has standing with one '3 members and their non-member interest clientele can be very high. Not every group that wants to influence decision-making can afford to Open an office in Washington or even retain a person to attend to their interests on a part-time basis. Identifying the structural barriers that groups must surmount enroute to influencing decision-makers is a relatively unexplored task. The existing literature deals mostly with groups that are able to run the maze success- fully; sometimes these successful groups report there are no barriers at all to inhibit any group from pursuing the same course. But it is known that such seemingly innocuous restraints as the Lobbying Registration Act affect the mode of Operation of some groups. The Buchanan Committee investigations revealed that both the fund-raising and the expenditure policies of the Committee for Constitutional 1‘- --.. ..., u. ._ q». - c L, . ’--. “.-. .,‘ . . I. ,. . .., . '- ... ' n D, ‘ ._. "... . v.. ”-c. . ~ . ... V. \ . ., i I ‘. ‘c e, ‘0 ‘1 'v. . .-_ M . u n ‘. .h 'L .. , . .. .l '\.. \ . \. ... 62 Government, for example, were tailored to that law.49 In this case access was not prevented, but the law had the effect of limiting the range of alternative behaviors from which the group felt it could select one to attend to its interests. Many groups have attributes that serve as creden- tials for some degree of access to decision-making. In general, as Truman has noted, groups that enjoy great prestige in the society also enjoy a great degree of access to congressmen. Technical competence in an area of consequence to the functioning of the society, such as medicine, usually assures a group of considerable access. The third characteristic in the pluralist society requires the use by entities Of the opportunities that exist for them to influence decision—makers. Modern pluralist thought stresses the exercise of influence and not merely the possession of resources of influence. By defining a pluralist society as a going concern and not one in the stage of "becoming," the essential conditions are more readily identifiable in empirical terms. A fourth characteristic in the pluralist model is that relationships among entities are dynamic and not static. Most descriptions of the United States as a 49slaisdell, o . cit., p. 104. See also Karl Schriftgeisser, The Lo byiét : The Art and Business of Influencipg Lawmakers (Boston: Httlé? B'f‘twn, and Co": __‘ “a... 63 pluralist society include the statement that group alignments are for limited purposes, and therefore, these alignments may be transitory when these purposes are realized or appear to become unattainable.5O There is a continuing process of changing relationships among groups; yesterday's allies may be tomorrow's Opponents. There are no stable coalitions of entities as majorities or minori- ties. In many discussions of pluralism, these dynamics are coupled with the assertion that American society is an Open society in which the universe of entities is never fixed. There are few guidelines in the literature, however, that provide clues to the amount of change in the relationships among entities within a stipulated period of time that suffice to discriminate between a static and a dynamic condition. Some observers have expressed uneasiness because of signs in American society that seem to them to indicate a slowing down in these dynamics. Kenneth Boulding, Robert Presthus, William H. Whyte and Henry Kariel have all noted tendencies toward the emergence of massive organizational complexes that seem headed toward greater integration, common identity, and stability for the future.51 ‘— 50See the discussion on pages 65-68 of this chapter. 51Boulding, . cit.; Robert v. Presthus, The 0r anizational SocietE: TE Analysis and a Theo "(N—e—w York: Vintage B30153, l 5 ; William H. Whyte, The rganization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Kariel. Tgp. cit.; ""' h ...... See also Blaisdell, . cit.; C. Wright Mills, e Power Elite, (New York: ‘Ox era—University Press, 1959). OtHEr 64 One of the paramount difficulties in interpreting the fifth characteristic is the uncertainty of the meaning of the terms "alignment" and "alliance of entities." Many of the analysts of interest groups regard the concepts I! it I "group alliance, group coalition,’ and "group combina- tion" as fundamental in understanding the role of interest groups in the legislative process. Truman, McKean, Blaisdell, Kesselman and Riggs specifically acknowledge the importance of these concepts, but only Riggs includes in his work an analysis of any one relationship, the catalytic group, among interest groups.52 The usual treatment given alliance and similar concepts is entirely too facile, casual, and incomplete to warrant any general conclusions. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that these concepts have been used chiefly as self-evident authors see no threat, for example, see: David Lilienthal, "The Case for Big Business," Readin s _i__r_l Politics and Economics H. C. Harlan, editor (New York: Oxford Ufiiversity Press, 1961) pp. 85-94; Peter Drucker, The New mmiet : The Anato of the Industrial Order (New—YErE?“ Harper and-Ffotl'ders, 19497TAdoph A. Berle, Jr., The Twentieth Centupy Ca italist Revolution (New York-T— arcour race andm. 52Truman, o . cit., p. 362—3. Using a list of fourteen different actic—s or techniques of lobbying, Lester W. Milbrath reports that Washington lobbyists (a sample of 100) ranked "collaboration with other groups" as the third most effective technique in their work. Kessel... man and Riggs do focus upon particular webs of intergroup relations. The problem is that they do not use a set of categories or hypotheses that sharpen their inquiries to discriminate among the data for significant and insignifi- cant dimensions of the relationships in a systematic fashion so that replication is possible. The result is that, each set of findings appears unique and generalization from several studies is arduous and risky, if not impossible. See Eldersveld, pp. cit., p. 189-90. t.,,. 1." 2.. . ‘. 65 terms that do not require careful definition or research. In the literature on interest groups, it is sometimes difficult to separate the assumptions and hypotheses regarding alliances from the conclusions. Since most of the studies of interest groups are case studies, the findings seem to have limited application to other group relationships. When a list of statements regarding alliances and coalitions, both premises and conclusions, from group studies is assembled, the results are suggestive but somewhat confusing. The following partial list illustrates the point. 1. Alliances are protean entities, with unstable shifting and fluctuating memberships.53 2. The same group may be involved in two or more alliances.54 3. Normally groups encounter shifting Opposition as one policy after another comes up.55 4. Alliances are temporary and often exist only for a single objective.56 53Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory,".pp. cit. 54Truman, pp. £333., p. 364. 55M11brath, pp. 933., p. 49. 56Bailey, 22. cit., p, 236; Blaisdell, pp. pip” p. 29. /“ ..-" v ,u. .- ..4 . .. u. u v , v~ u ... .1 M. o". - u "a ' .- Nu. . —< .v" . I m, .. ‘-. u. . o '. V" ' N. ... '..' | ‘I, u .N “ « n .‘ ‘n a. 66 5. Alliances are both temporary and informal, and permanent and formal.57 6. Alliances are composed chiefly of groups serving the same type of constituency (e.g., an alliance of farm groups).58 7. Alliances are sometimes made by groups that are usually opposed to each other.59 8. Groups often cancel each other out, though this is not a certainty.60 9. There is so much "natural self-balancing" among groups it almost amounts to a law.61 10. Most major bills in Congress are backed by one coalition of interest groups and opposed by another.62 11. Not more than a third of the groups before the (New Jersey) legislature have any organized Opposition .63 _‘_. 57Truman. 92. cit.; McKean, o . cit., p. 233,- gergéng, 9291—11) Representation Before ongress, QB. cit., 58McKean, _2, cit. 5932-2... p. 264; Truman, .2.- cit. 6OKey, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. ‘02. 9.5.1...) p. 150. 61Milbrath, op. cit., p. 345. 62Mathews, op. cit., p. 185- 63McKean, op. cit., p. 234- ,‘ .... . -~._ ll._ 67 12. Each party attracts an entourage of groups that tend to regularly support it.64 13. Generally, those groups that can form the best alliances are the most effective groups.65 14. Usually, natural lobbying allies (such as different farm groups) are in competition with one another to represent the same clientele.66 15. A "hierarchizing . . . of groups may be taking place over time, with reference to particular policy issues."67 16. Established active groups tend to develOp stable relationships with other groups such as facing common opposition.68 In summarizing the principal objections to existing studies of intergroup relations from the perspective of this research design, the following points are important. (1) Research on interest groups has seldom been focused systematically on the dimensions of a given type of intergroup relationship. (2) Interest group I‘elationships have not been studied in a time dimension beyond a single M 64Schattschneider, Semisovereign People, 92- cit., p. 57% Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, _op. cit. p. 15 -7. 65McKean, 92. cit., p. 233. 66Matthews, 92. 953., p. 187. 67Eldersveld, <_>p_. cit., p. 192. 68Monypenny, 92. cit., p. 198-9. 68 goal-directed event. (3) The concepts applied to the study of intergroup relations are ambiguous and are concerned with a few physical interactions among groups. (A) The reliance on case studies of a single group or a single alliance of groups has yielded unique rather than general findings. (5) The case studies that investigated a particular type of intergroup relationship (e.g., catalytic group) have proceeded without a set of specific hypotheses that would sharpen the focus of research and yield findings that might be compared with those obtained in other studies. A fifth characteristic of pluralism is that a consensus exists on what may be called the "rules of the game" for entities in the society. This characteristic implies that there are limits to the amount of unregulated competition and conflict between groups that a society can bear and still continue to function as a unity. The term "consensus" itself denotes multiple meanings. The term is a general one that usually refers to a fundamental agreement on certain means and ends in the society. The concept underscores the importance of stable mutual eXpectations by groups as to the range of acceptable behavioral choices by groups and the sanctions for compliance or noncompliance. Although the most frequent use of pluralist theory in empirical studies of politics has been at the local level, in certain respects the search for the ..... . ...-av I ‘, ...: . - n o v. -u-‘.. 0.... .. ‘ . I a “-.. . \. .4 . ..‘ Int . s. ' N. . ,.. ‘ I " .l 'g 'l . I ., ~.' ... \- ..‘ l‘.‘( ‘ 0‘. '4 . 'C L i . '.. u . 1., .I ‘. . ‘v ~,‘ " l‘ I. h. '\ . W. p .— . . ‘~ ‘u . b '~ ‘I K.» .. . It ‘ . “_ ' . 3 69 characteristics of pluralism in the society may be carried on with greater expectation of success by observing the operations of voluntary associations in national politics. The weakness of attempting to trace the workings of pluralism at the local level stems from the greater importance and pervasiveness of primary relations between individuals there. There is less formal structuring of relations between citizens and public officials at the local level than at the national level. Personal relation- ships among individuals often make formal interaction unnecessary. Leaders of voluntary associations, at the local level, also frequently interact with each other, with city officials, and with other influential peOple in non-official roles, such as at social events. This greater intersection of roles for association leaders and officials at the local level facilitates communication, and perhaps negotiation, about group goals without the formal institutions and procedures, such as public hearings, that seem to be necessary at the national level. The pressure, deference, negotiation, and coalition-building among groups is probably less overt and therefore less discernible at the local level than it is where such relations are more formal and impersonal. At the national level, group spokesmen are apt to interact more frequently in the single role of group representative. This assertion does not undermine the findings of observers and students of the legislative J- .‘ a. o . " ~p, afl’ . . 7O process who have shown that there is a world of primary relations that are important.69 But, in addition to personal contacts, formal contacts by group representatives with the Congress and administration must be maintained, as Leater Milbrath reports in his discussion of lobbyists in Washington.70 For these reasons the examination of the activities of associations at the congressional level of government may provide new perspectives concerning the degree to which the characteristics of pluralism are found in decision-making at other levels of government in American society'as well as at the congressional level. This research provides several kinds of information that can serve as indicators in assessing the presence or absence of pluralism at the congressional level. The first characteristic of a pluralist system is that competing centers of power exist within the community. The characteristic requires that (A) multiple centers of power are (E) in some degree of competition with each other. Item A stipulates that there is more than one center of power and that these centers are, in some degree, indepen- dent of eachother. Item B requires that these centers be 69Matthews, 0 . cit. ; Richard Fenno, "The House ApprOpriations Commi ee," American Political.Science 331%, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (June, 1962), pp. 316-52. 70Milbrath, 23. cit., p. 228. J W u...r- u. Io...-.. ... n.... on ...... Im...'o. Dw..,..- ‘ oi....{‘. 1 . 71 not only independent of each other but in some degree competitive. In the literature, no standards are stated for either independence or competition. Usually some competition among groups is accepted as evidence of independence of at least some of these centers of power. At the congressional level, one indicator that this characteristic is present in some degree is the number of hearings at which groups espouse contradictory positions on legislative subjects. Examination must be made of all the major policy sectors to determine if conclusions about the pluralism of the political system have generality over the entire system. If competition between numerous groups is found on all issues but foreign affairs, this fact illumines one of the policy sectors where visible limits on the degree of pluralism exist. In determining the existence of competition, the number of instances at which groups appear without Opposition from any other group, and the division of groups for or against legislation are also helpful indicators. By examining several different kinds of bills, it is possible to state the extent to which competition among groups varies according to policy sector. To discover if the first characteristic of pluralism is present, the extent to which the scope of interests of each group is large or small is determined. If the findings show, for example, that there are ten major groups that frequently present testimony in a united front on bills in all major policy categories, this is 72 important information in assessing the state of competition among groups. Pluralistic competition requires that there be no dominant aggregation of groups or pair of power coalitions. The second characteristic in the pluralist model is the opportunity for access to decision-making by individuals and organized groups. The term "Opportunity for access" in this research, refers to the degree of absence ofrestraining structures, practices, or other inhibiting factors. To test for the presence of this characteristic at the national level, it is necessary to determine the degree of situational structure that groups must understand and manipulate, the extent to which tradi- tional norms exist that groups must honor, and the other situational prerequisites to access by groups. A super- ficial judgment might lead to the conclusion that access is, in practical terms, open to all. Closer inspection of the literature on Congress and the documents of congres— sional committee hearings will not permit such a judgment to stand. This research does not explore all of these facets of situational structure. No conclusive assessment of the presence or absence of this characteristic is possible. Nevertheless, the volume of testimony presented at comm1ttee hearings by over 100 groups of different types provides useful information concerning the ease of group access. In addition, inquiries were made by correspondence 73 with all House committee chairmen concerning the rules they follow in announcing the scheduling Of hearings and practices regarding limiting group testimony. Another indicator Of the Opportunity for access is the extent to which new groups enter the system over a period Of years. The pluralist model is a dynamic model and is conceived in terms Of an indeterminate group pOpulation. Therefore, the hypothesis is that new groups will enter the group population occasionally and seek to influence congressional decision-making. Given the increase in population, the economic growth Of the nation, and the tendencies toward the elevation Of conflicts between groupsm-and between groups and local and state units of government—-to the national level, it would be a remarkable commentary on a pluralist system if no changes occurred in the group population. If the group pOpulation is stable over sixteen years during which a major war was fought and several economic recessions and booms occurred, there are grounds for thinking the interest group process is not as open as some have assumed. The entrance and departure of groups is also relevant to the integration conceptual framework. This concept is applied to the data of this investigation in the chapter on integration even though it has relevance to both concepts. The pluralist system also requires, as a third characteristic, that use is made Of the Opportunities for access that exist. One indicator of this characteristic is ‘ an. .. u . _ a - _ "o. -v-. - a 'v ., . a, , u. . n..r . 'Id. . sv-. ...‘ \_. Q '. L.“ ,."‘b_ .. . v.‘ ‘- - q . ... c n, . 74 the interview data on the extent to which laws and amendments are prepared by group leaders and staffs for introduction by congressmen. A second indicator is the evidence concerning the frequency with which groups seek to have hearings scheduled. The fourth characteristic in the pluralist model is that there are changing alignments of groups in the political system. Aside from a few case studies of very limited scope and impressionistic judgments by skilled observers of the legislative process, no discussion has made clear even in general terms any standard against which "changing alignments Of groups" may be compared. Since "change" has not been Operationally defined, it is impossible to'say how much change in alignments is necessary to confirm or deny the presence Of this charac- teristic in the interest group system. The discussion On pages 65-67 has already noted that the existing literature offers a wide range Of assertions on intergroup relation- ships. The discussions Of intergroup relationships in scholarly studies tend to be centered on physical inter- actions among groups as the most important variable in group COOperation. Fred Riggs was chiefly concerned with physical interactions among groups in his study of the Chinese Exclusion Act.71 The Buchanan Committee's _— 71Riss8. 92. cit. 75 investigation of lobbying in 1950 revealed the informal consultation practices Of several interest groups.72 Case studies by Bailey and Kesselman have been informative in terms of interest group cooperation but they Offer limited possibilities for generalization.73 Judging from the four sources mentioned above, Pdggs, Bailey, Kesselman, and the Buchanan Committee, it seems clear that group "coalitions" develop very little formal organizational apparatus. Furthermore , the coali- tions in these studies, excluding the Buchanan findings, seemed to be temporary and limited to a single Objective. The extent to which more stable informal relationships exist among groups is largely unexplored, but some case studies imply the existence of relationships more stable than the temporary catalytic organizations discussed. Such relationships may constitute a foundation on which visible relationships, more fluid in character--such as temporary coalitions-—can be hastily built and disassembled. The analysis Of data to determine to what extent group alignments exist in the group population receives the most careful attention in this investigation. The sixteen-year period for which House committee hearings are studied in this research permits some leverage on the ____ 72United States House, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 92. cit. 73331133,, .92- 9313.; Louis Kesselman, The _S_ocial Politics 93 FEPC (Chapel Hill: University Of North aro ina Press, 1948). 76 question of the degree Of permanency Of group alignments. The matter of defining an "alignment" of groups in this research is undertaken by using a cluster analytic technique that is described below. The search for group alignments, or clusters, is carried on for several pOpulations of groups and sets Of bills as follows: (1) a search for general clusters among all active groups on all kinds Of bills combined that were processed by fourteen House committees, (2) a search for specialized clusters based on a single subject area, such as farm bills, or minimum wage bills, (3) a search for clusters within the types Of groups, such as Agriculture or Business groups. The results should provide not only general information about the group membership of clusters and their stability through time, but also about the extent to which certain groups do not align themselves with any other groups. The approaches used to test for the third charac- teristic of pluralism focus on a very limited number Of dimensions of relationships among groups and provide only a partial exposition Of them. The dimensions explored are: (1) publicly stated positions Of groups on legislative bills and issues at House committee hearings, and (2) consultations between groups reported by group spokesmen in interviews. The following hypotheses about intergroup relations at the congressional level constitute the primary Objectives Of this research. -~-I. . o.:...-, . .... ,, _ A ..i . ‘O .. ' ' o. .' .- .., . . h. i .- , .‘I’ ‘x . . a. h. “ . '4 v. .-. A‘ , . i 'It 1 I v. . ‘. n ' Q Vs. ’-. ‘ . .". u I ‘ u. . . . . u . \~‘ A v - ‘.I . q ~ 3 C. F . ‘. .~‘ . ‘ . I. ‘7 ‘. . ‘1 w ‘ 77 Hypothesis 1.74 Given the existence Of clusters of interest groups during a time span, the sum Of the group members of the clusters does not include the majority of the interest groups in the universe. Definition: A "cluster" is three or more groups in which every member is more like every other member than it is like any non-member.75 Definition: The "time span" may be varied from a term of Congress to the entire sixteen-year period, 1945-60. Definition: The term "universe" refers to a stipulated number Of groups. Universes of different sizes are used. The most frequently used universe consists of 119 groups. I Hypothesis II. The group composition of a cluster in the first phase, T1, of a time Span will be the same for a succeeding phase, T2, of the time span. Definition: The time span, "T1, T2" may be varied from a term of Congress tO the entire sixteen-year period under investigation. Hypothesis III. If two or more interest groups enroll individuals as members from the same interest clientele, these groups do not all become members Of the same cluster . __. 741talics used for emphasis. 75See Chapter IV, p. 182-183. 78 Definition: The term "interest clientele" refers to the aggregation Of individuals that share a concern for one of the following types of subjects according to which all the interest groups in the study are classified: business, financial business, agricultural business, labor, agriculture, veterans, professions, citizens, religion, small business. Hypothesis IV. When two or more clusters are opposed to each other they do not Oppose one another on bills from more than one (policy category. Definition: The term "policy category" refers to the unit of classification that is used to classify all bills considered in the study. The classification scheme has ten policy categories. Definition: One cluster is "Opposed" to another cluster when half of the members of the cluster, but at least three members, take a position on a bill that is Opposed by half of the members, but at least three members, of another cluster, and neither cluster has any members that disagree with the position taken by these group members. Hypothesis V. When two or more clusters exist during a time span,\on some bills no cluster will be active. Definition: Several universes Of bills of different sizes are used in this research. The term "some bills" means one or more bills in the universe under study. ,1 "fi o ‘- (..‘ 79 Definition: An "active cluster" is one in which half Of the members, but at least three'members, take the same position either for or against the bill at hand, and no member of the cluster disagrees. Hypothesis VI. The range of the bills on which one or more clusters are Opposed to other clusters in the first phase, T1, of a time span is less than it is in a succeed- ing phase, T2, Of the time span. Definition: The term "range Of bills" refers to the number of different policy'categories into which the bills are classified. Hypothesis VII. The number Of the bills on which one or more clusters are Opposed to other clusters in the first phase, T1, of a time span is less than it is in the succeeding phase, T2, Of the time span. The final characteristic Of the pluralist model is that a consensus among the groups in the population exists on what may be called the "rules of the game." Most discussions of pluralism explicitly mention this character- istic without describing the rules in specific terms and without discussing either the range Of possible behaviors under the functioning rules or the range of behaviors that constitute violations of these rules. This research is not able to make comprehensive conclusions about this char- acteristic at the congressional level. The problem of locating the limits of acceptable behaviors of groups that are either self-imposed or u. .. hi. . #7,-.. ~ I 5‘. , " '0». u .. ‘- ' V. 8O imposed by features of the environment is an extremely provocative problem. As a population is subject to fewer and fewer limits on group behaviors, the survival Of the system tends to become a secondary goal behind the priority Of total victory in unregulated struggle and the term pluralism no longer applies. A sudden massive disintegra- tion of the customary expectations about what other groups can or will do may reduce the intergroup relationships, at least temporarily, to chaos. Equally perplexing is the question Of how much agreement among groups is necessary tO make the term "consensus" apprOpriate. That is, how many and which rules must'be agreed on--reducing the range Of behaviors deemed acceptable-~before the system may be described as pluralist? This much seems clear, if at the congressional level there are groups whose values, policies, and activi- ties deviate frOm the prevailing tendencies of the group population, the distinctions that can be made between them are worth-while even if they can only be stated in general terms. The utility of the pluralist model in this research is related to the general assertions and assumptions about pluralism and its importance in American society. To look at one phase in the legislative process--the hearings process-~13 a limited approach on which only further hypotheses concerning the larger political system may be based, not firm conclusions. . .... - .- .... .... . o "0“ 81 The pluralist model is also helpful in high- lighting the usefulness of general information about the diversity, stability, growth, and relations among groups in the active interest group pOpulation at the congres- sional level. In effect, each Of the basic characteristics of the pluralist model becomes the basis Of a hypothesis about the interest group population that can be tested empirically. Integration The difficulty has been noted of determining even the approximate magnitudes Of the characteristics of pluralism that warrant the use Of the term pluralism in describing a political system. By shifting from pluralism to two other concepts, "integration" and "conflict," it is possible to continue the examination Of intergroup relations at the congressional level along other lines. Relations between interest groups may be quite complex and have many dimensions. Other conceptual frameworks may provide additional insights about intergroup relations that have not been considered so far.76 Integration is a concept that stresses the cohesive interrelations Of entities. It is concerned with mutual adjustment or coordination Of entities into a —‘ 76Harvey M. Johnson, Sociolo : A Systematic igtxo‘oduction (New York: Harcourt, Brace E World, Inc. , .-.- _- au-.. 4 >v. u..l ... - ....,'( ‘Q .A L. _ A. ' l .- .v s. . y“ ‘ "-~._ In. . \ I.." .1 . . . . ._‘ n I h“ . ~ - l.‘ "k‘ “ I - - . . o n . ~ ‘~ 0 'K . i U ’I \ ' _~. . . . ‘i . p u, o I . .o . '- I ~ - _.._L—-.wmi a—m-a-n-L—i‘ ‘3— 82 unity.77 Sociologists have used it chiefly in the study of societies, cultures, and cities. William Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff say integration has three component parts, "interdependent or common activity, consensus, and morale."78 In exploring the idea that the population Of interest groups at the congressional level can be appraised in terms of integration, the literature on interest groups is of little assistance. Scholars rarely have used this concept in reference to interest groups. Many authors assume that group leaders take their behavioral cues from their definition of the group's interests and from the definitions of the group's interests communicated to them by the members of the group. Often no consideration is given to the constraints on the behavior of the leaders of groups that exist in the environment within which these groups must operate. Here, again, the notion of the interest group process as a system has merit. Communica- tions are carried on between the interdependent groups as well as between the groups and congressmen and committees. 770handler Morse, "The Functional Imperatives," The Social Theories 93 Talcott.Parsons, Max Black, editor . (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 100—52. 78William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociolo (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). Myron Weiner rim-$5 customary uses of the term, but he accepts the notion that integration is what holds a system together. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political DevelOpment," lhairaals. Vol. 358 (March, 1965). 52-5. . .-\ Q- -.. “ I no... 1 v-. ‘ -. '-~«. I a". “ ....” ..‘, §. _ . I u; .. v. - a. . a. a . . . . ". 'I . .. §.. - I. ‘ ll . 0. ‘ . .i . u ‘v,_ ’ I‘- ‘ w .a h n I. ‘5 n, . . ‘- ‘ ,‘. a, -‘ o . v . . u .‘ N. « ‘x' k- .0‘ ‘v ‘._ \ ‘. u ‘ - . u t - .‘— . K . '\ 's 83 The kinds and rates Of intergroup communications and their stability constitute variables in the system. In applying some tests Of integration to the universe Of groups and the group pOpulation, it seems likely that only a small increment Of knowledge will result. But given the present stage Of our knowledge Of intergroup relations, it may be worth-while. New directions for fruitful research may also emerge. Increasing attention is being given to the study of integration in different types Of political communities. One recent volume that is helpful in appraising the methods and determining the degree Of integration in a community is a collection of essays edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, The Integration 93 Political Communi- £133.79 The contributors focus on integration of communi- ties at the metrOpOlitan and international levels.80 In an introductory essay, the editors discuss ten integrative factors that hold promise for appraising degrees of inte- gration. They state that not all Of these factors may be important at any given level of community. The ten inte- grative factors are: (1) proximity, (2) homogeneity, (3) transactions, (4) mutual knowledge, (5) functional 79Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), '_I'_h___e_ Inte ration Of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott-Co” 1961!) Chapter 19. 80For an earlier discussion of community at the international level, see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Npflonality (Cambridge ,“Massachusetts: MITTress ,79537'.‘ . .. o, . u..,.~ , ‘-.-.. ‘\.. , 't.. - . C '-.u._,_ ""r-, ..,_ 1 "~‘.. . Q '-.. ‘-.. 'v.‘ on n 1., I do... "n . v' ' ‘1 '~ '~ v a , ,‘ m v m., .H. n "A. ' l i I O ‘ . u . ... >. a. . ‘ V... ‘ -| I i K, ‘~._. ‘ n a, n \ I H .~. ., ~ ‘. r O \ " , '. n . x n ‘. ‘L e n ‘o u n n v ‘ . 'I‘ ’ I ' o C a \ . p - ~ . Q I 5 I r - ~ _ i _ ... _ _i A I" 5—2:; ___ _a_! ”Wu --—-h' 84 interest, (6) political structure, (7) sovereignty, (8) communal character, (9) governmental effectiveness, (10) integrative experience.81 One of the serious problems in locating and describing the amount of integration within a given community is in finding indicators of these integrative factors. The following discussion focuses on the suitability Of some Of the integrative factors for the assessment of integration among interest groups and the indicators of them in this research. Homogeneity The importance Of this factor in integration is based on the notion that the shared attributes Of the members of the population tend tO lead tO common attitudes, values, and behavior. For the study of interest groups, the question is: How homogeneous is the pOpulation Of interest groups in terms of such attributes as wealth or income, status in the society, experiences in lobbying, and age? The design of this research did not provide for systematic collection of different kinds of data to test for homogeneity among interest groups. Nevertheless, some observations concerning the age of groups in the popula- tion, the ideological posture of active interest groups, k 83-Jacob and Toscano, pp. 9333,, pp. 1-45. The authors do not discuss the question Of the exclusiveness of each of these factors. It seems likely that some Of them may involve similar concepts that tap the same data. It is also true that this conceptual framework partly overlaps the pluralist framework. 85 and group membership are presented. Proximity The assumption is that the proximity Of entities to eachotherfosters Opportunities for contact. The expectation is that a greater number Of Opportunities for contact fosters more integration than a lesser number. In this investigation one question is: Does location Of a group's office in Washington, rather than in other cities, foster integration Of the group into the group population? There are few indicators Of this criterion for the interest group pOpulation. One indicator Of the importance of proximity in integration is the extent to which the groups that do not maintain a representative in Washington tend to have fewer appearances at congressional committee hearings. Since hearings constitute communication opportunities for groups, the groups that testify are not as likely to see the implications for mutual cooperation or support with the nontestifying group than otherwise. The reverse is also true. Interaction The expectation is that the greater the amount Of interaction among leaders Of different groups the greater the integration Of the groups. This research analyzes two kinds of data that provide indicators Of the degree of group interaction. First, the interview schedule contained questions aimed at the disclosure Of the number 9.. .4 .... - - I‘- ‘> ,. .,. n . . »- r 4 no. . .h‘h . o 1,: .. I 'a' . ‘s 86 and kinds of COOperative activities among groups. Second, group testimony was examined to determine the frequency of interaction among groups Of different types. Mutual Knowledge It is hypothesized that the greater the knowledge groups have about each other and the environment they share, the greater the tendencies toward integration. The extent to which Congress may regulate by law phases Of group activities such as lobbying, or investigate them, makes groups aware they share a common fate. Thus, they may be integrated by this mutual knowledge. Uncertainty and lack of knowledge tend to limit contact. The interviews with spokesmen for groups provide considerable data concerning the extent to which group leaders practice the same types of cooperation with other groups and share attitudes, such as perceptions Of how to succeed in dealing with Congress. Structure in the Group Population The formal and informal structural relationships among interest groups reflect the degree of integration among groups in the population. There is nO visible institutional structure that makes decisions for the entire interest group pOpulation. But formal structures Of governance are only the most Obvious devices for control in a social system. Therefore, the degree Of informal structuring of relations among groups and the Openness of 87 the group population to a reordering of relationships are important in assessing the degree Of integration. There is a scarcity Of positions Of authority among members Of an interest group pOpulation, as in other populations. Few groups have all the advantages their members want. Every kind of structuring Of relationships affects the distribu— tion of advantages and disadvantages in the interest group system.82 This research examines four indicators Of the degree Of structured relationships among groups: (1) the openness of the interest group system, (2) the extent to which a small number of active groups dominate the hearings process, (3) the stability of the relative volume Of testimonies presented by groups during a long time span. Previous Integrative Experience The assumption is that rewarding cOOperative group ventures are integrative experiences. The expectation is that these experiences incline the leaders Of the groups that participated toward future cOOperative ventures. The interview schedule contains one question that asked respondents to evaluate the importance Of COOperative group experience in promoting further cooperation. Another question in the schedule is aimed at determining the 82The similarity or this point to what Jacob and Toscano refer to as the "functional interest factor“ is clear. These two indicators seem to be testing the same or similar things and are treated in this research as one indicator. .... .. .. _ A-‘ | Q ..... 'm. .- ‘ ‘.o . .. ,__. . . “ ’n . ‘ I Q. ._ ‘ r ., . "‘nu I .l 'i ‘ I “ . o. .‘ -... u 88 degree to which a group OOOperated repeatedly with the same groups. The findings of the cluster analyses stated in Chapter IV will yield relevant information also. It will be possible to discern the extent to which group clusters in an earlier period Of years persist and the extent to which the groups in the clusters for a given time span tend to participate in clusters in subsequent periods. It is also possible to determine the extent to which the previous cluster experience of groups is not followed by clustering in a later period. M So far the discussion Of the interdependence Of entities in a system has been in terms Of factors that promote integration. But the interdependence character- istic of entities in a system is not restricted to cOOperative relationships. Competitive and conflictive relationships also bring interdependence to participants. James ,3. Coleman in a study Of controversy within communi- ties notes that "community disagreements are also a measure of community life."83_ The notion Of conflict as a relation Of dependency between parties has been most extensively discussed in the works of Georg Simmel and 83James 3. Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957). -. ... ., ' v I I-vo I‘I. .’ .- I . r . ... .. ‘s._ u -' l. “on “ I'd. . fl. . ‘0 t ‘1- 5. _ '1 . " ..; .__ '-. ‘ ..l e ‘. . n ~ ‘- \. . -I ’K .4 u . ' . 89 LeMs Coser.84 Conflict cannot be carried on by one party alone; it is a mode of interaction. Interaction implies awareness by one entity of another and awareness tends to raise questions about what behavior to expect from the other party in the interaction situation. Awareness, then, by two parties of each other even though they do not interact directly, may involve the accommodation of behavior of each to the other because Of confirmed expectations about the other's behavior or because of uncertainties about what to expect from the other. Such a relationship is an ordered relationship as surely as if they had a face-to- face encounter. Lewis Coser defines social conflict as: . . . a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponentés are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. 5 This definition stresses the factor Of mutual awareness among rivals and deliberate action by them to limit or control the behavior of each other. What emerges from A 84ceorg Simmel, Conflict the Web of Group Affili- ations, Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard—BEn‘d—fif't'ranslators and editors (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955); Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1956 )7— 85Coser, Ibid., p. 8; Clark Kerr distinguishes between competition and conflict. "In competition, two or more parties seek to gain from a third party or parties . . In conflict, two or more parties seek to gain from each . other." Kerr, pp. 933., pp. 168-9. ,fi " ...: .. on -..A . .. . . _ .... . ... .-. nu .. "r' . - . ....a ... ---..,, o..., ‘ -. -. I. I. .. - - 'bu . n '- n h, c a. 'c I '- 90 continued conflict is a series Of action strategies by which each party limits its own conduct in the light Of the expected conduct Of its antagonist. In addition, the behavior of each is designed to influence his antagonist's perception of him.86 In general in a conflictive relation- ship, each party finds, on the basis of its perception Of the enemy and the conflict, that the range Of behaviors ' formerly available to him is reduced. It is possible, Of course, that the parties may have inaccurate perceptions of each other's strategies and that the strategy of each will miss its target. Nevertheless, every expenditure Of energy, every change of position, every strategy has its costs. Combatants tend to reduce these costs while also attempting to increase gains. Therefore, the tendency is for each party to revamp its information-gathering and dissemination facilities and strategy for the purpose Of more effective attacks on its Opponent. More accurate information about the Opponent tends to give greater structure to the hostile relationship through the develOpment of strategies that are more likely to hit the target. In this process each develops more knowledge and expectations about the enemy, his resources, his special skills and consequently the behavior Of each antagonist becomes increasingly controlled by the other; that is, the range of alternative behaviors from which each can choose becomes M 86Schelling, _op. cit., p. 15. ‘1‘ 91 more determined by the strategy Of his enemy. Thus the combatants tend tO become integrated in a conflictive system. Many general propositions about social conflict have been develOped and, to some extent, tested. The best- known formulations, perhaps, are those of Georg Simmel, reorganized and developed by Lewis Coser, and the work of James S. Coleman.87 Few Of these prOpositions have been applied to relations among interest groups. A brief inspection of some of these prOpositions makes it clear that they may be useful for discovering information about relations among interest groups, and Specifically about the existence of the degrees of interrelationship among groups. The case studies of interest groups and legisla- tive process are written in the language Of conflict, but no generalizations or hypotheses are formulated in these studies. The following propositions about conflict are especially relevant to intergroup relations: 1. Conflict among groups varies inversely with their mutual permeability.88 2. In community conflict, the poorly integrated members of the community are the most likely to aggravate _._ 87Simmel, _p. cit.; Coser, 92' 22333 Coleman, 92 Cit. 88Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) p.76. 0.,." . on... ‘- ‘- . ,-_» '- . .v u . ‘ '\ V ,v‘ . I ", u . o “... 92 the conflict beyond the bounds Of normal disagreement.89 3. Social conflict is more intense the more uncertain or unstable the rules by which the conflict is supposed tO be resolved.90 4. Conflict within a community tends to cause (1) the polarization Of personal relations around the issue in controversy, and (2) an increase in the number Of personal contacts within each camp.91 The interest group system seems tO be a system where there is not only the integration Of cooperation for the attainment of mutual or similar goals (collaboration), or integration through bargaining for different goals (logrolling), but also integration through competition and conflict. In this research, one hypothesis advanced is that the analysis Of interest groups in terms Of their policy statements on bills at House committee hearings will reveal some stable relationships based on continuing policy differences . This will be a test of the degree Of disagreement between interest groups or clusters Of interest groups rather than agreement. James S. Coleman has noted the tendency for a_ concrete disagreement between two parties to broaden out to encompass numerous relations between _ 89Coleman, _op. cit., p. 21. 90Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior A}; Ingentory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt Brace 8c World,-Tnc., 1961?), p. 62. 9lcoleman, pp. cit., p. 14. ..>.,. .4)... . -'u--. In- \. q‘. ‘. s“ v' _ 93 them under certain conditions.92 The result may be a tendency for a group to gravitate, in the future, toward a position Of conflict with another group even though the interests of the group do not seem to require such a posture. For example, Bertram Gross in his discussion Of the legislative process notes that the diverse sources supporting the legislation for the Marshall Plan might not have held together if the labor supporters had been aware how much support was being provided by conservative busines smen . 93 Summary In this chapter, intergroup relations were discussed in the context of four conceptual frameworks: pluralism, integration, conflict, and system. Specific hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups to be tested in this investigation were also stated. In the next three chapters, the data assembled in this research are analyzed in terms Of the hypotheses and the pluralist and integration conceptual frameworks. 921bid. 93Bertram Gross, The Legislative Struggle (New York: MoGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 238; See also Lloyd G. Reynolds' discussion of the personal relations between William Green and Philip Murray as a major barrier to merger talks between the Arnerican Federation Of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor- Economics and Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New "' Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949) p. 55. "uv. n.__ CHAPTER III METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS The research design of this study required the selection and definition Of many terms and the develOpment Of rules for the use Of these terms. Some Of the data described and ordered by these terms required categoriza- tion and manipulation for which few guidelines were available from the literature on interest groups. This chapter discusses the concepts and methods used in the collection, ordering, and analysis Of the data. It also provides a brief discussion of some Of the factors that influenced the decisions made in the exploratory stage of the investigation. The exploratory stage Of the investigation required decisions about three tasks for which little information is available in the. scholarly literature: (1) the determina- tion of the interest groups that are active at the congressional level of government, (2) the selection of a universe Of the most active groups, and (3) the selection of congressional committee hearings to yield information about the policy preferences expressed by the spokesmen 94 95 for interest groups.1 The major steps in preparation for the analysis of statements by group spokesmen are: (1) selection of a time span for the study Of the testimony presented by group representatives, (2) discussion of congressional committee hearings as forums for group policy statements, (3) determination Of a universe of interest groups, (4) determination Of a universe Of hearings for analysis, (5) preparation and application of rules for recording the statements by group spokesmen, (6) discussion of the computer program for the identification Of clusters Of groups, and (7) description Of the procedures used in the interview phase of the research. The Time Span,L 1945-60 This investigation Of interest group activity at the congressional level is limited to the sixteen-year period beginning in 1945 and extending through 1960, inclusive. This time span was selected for three reasons: 1In describing and analyzing the data in this research it is necessary to refer repeatedly to groups in the context Of such things as the presentation of testimony by group representatives and the means of ratings by group Spokesmen on interview questions. In discussing these sub- Jects, it is difficult to write lucid prose and still repeatedly state that the behavior under study is the behavior of group leaders, representatives, or spokesmen and not the behavior of a group. Therefore, in some por- tions of the discussion that follows, the convention has been adOpted of referring to group testimony, group means 01‘ ratings, and other topics in which group leaders are involved, and not specifically to the leaders or Spokesmen 0f the group. Thus, at no time is the concept Of group Peified. . «v. .v. "‘s-. "'5. -‘ I -". , “1.- ‘u ‘ ..‘.‘ . ...; .. - .‘._ " "... . . I v ..' llv . ~,‘ ‘.' '1 l ... x n ‘- u 1 ,. . ~. ‘. v, . "i ‘. ‘. . .. .I . ._ ‘F\‘ .I ,,. .. . v N" ‘. . u “ ~a \‘ ',- 'I t l . “- V“. .‘ '« . I. v \ A. \n ‘0 ._I . . ‘ A u “ I I‘ i \ .\ . ~ ~ v . «- h A. . v \ “at—_— 96 (1) it includes two national administrations under presidents from each major political party, nearly eight years under Truman and eight years under Eisenhower, (2) it seemed to be sufficiently long to reveal all the major patterns of testimony by interest groups at House committee hearings, and (3) it did not appear to be an unmanageably long period of time. During this period many different kinds Of major events occurred: the nation restructured its foreign policy, fought a lengthy military engagement abroad, and sustained periods Of prosperity and two periods of economic recession. In addition, many important dOmestic policy questions were discussion in Congress: full-employment policy, labor-management relations, federal aid to educa- tion, medical assistance to the aged, benefits tO war veterans, programs of assistance to agriculture, urban renewal and housing, tax revision, federal assistance for scientific research and develOpment, and many others. The diversity of the substantive policy questions considered in Congress in this period provides abundant Opportunities to identify the public activity of organized interest groups on almost every kind Of policy. During a sixteen-year period, every congressional committee with a substantive policy concern might be expected to hold hearings on the subjects within its jurisdiction. In many instances the time span permits the assessment Of group relations on a continuing basis so that generalization may 'pu‘ .... , .. '1. , 97 be possible on the basis Of numerous events distributed throughout the time period. Relations Among_Interest Groups This research is primarily concerned with the identification Of certain types Of relations among national interest groups. Scholarly research on American interest groups has focused chiefly on: (1) the organization and behavior of one interest group, or (2) the visible active coalitions Of interest groups. The coalition or alliance of interest groups discussed in Chapter II, is a type of relation among groups that rests on deliberate collabora- tion among interest group representatives. Research that is focused on the description and analysis of group coali- tions is useful and should be continued. Nevertheless, this type Of intergroup relation has not been frequently researched and the few scholars who have written on the subject seem to have investigated group coalitions only as a subsidiary objective to other concerns. The litera- ture shows the primary concern of scholars has been with the impact Of interest groups on the legislature and not with the relations of groups to each other. In the area of legislative lobbying few inquiries have been made that disclose the specific kinds of activities in which collaborating groups engage. The only discussion of collaboration among interest groups, apart from case studies, was published by Lester ‘--..v '0‘...‘ ‘,v. . so.“ ‘o ‘1 . II > , . s . . . . \ '-‘ ‘l 4 a 98 Milbrath in his research on lobbyists in Washington, D. 0.2 He reports frequent collaboration among groups that have the same policy concerns. Milbrath uses the term to denote several behaviors: communications among group representatives, the joint planning of strategy, and division of labor among group leaders. NO figures are provided concerning the frequency with which group leaders collabo- rate. Milbrath asked the 114 lobbyist respondents to rate the importance of collaboration in their work. Ten made no response to the item, and an additional ten lobbyists indicated it was "probably important but we don't use it." Five more respondents described it as "of no importance ,"A and nine others ascribed to it only "slight importance." Twelve respondents cited collaboratiOn as the most . important factor in their work, fifty-two described it as ' and sixteen rated it as of of "considerable importance,’ "moderate importance."3 V This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that collaboration is commonly practiced by many Washington lobbyists. On the other hand, the fact that ten lobbyists made no response to the item and ten others stated they did not use it, raises some questions about how widely collabor- ation among groups is practiced. A total of fifty Of Milbrath's respondents assigned to collaboration a rating 2Milbrath, pp. cit. 31bid., p. 175. 99 no more than "moderate importance."4 Some reflection on what may be required of groups in collaboration suggests some reasons why it would not be surprising if a considerable number Of groups did not engage in it with much frequency. First, many interest groups do not have either permanent Offices or spokesmen in Washington, and therefore, they have fewer chances to collaborate than the groups that have them. Nevertheless, the leaders of groups that are located outside the nation's capital may frequently file or present the policy positions of the group at congressional committee hearings. Groups without a Washington spokesman may send accredited group members or leaders to Washington to testify at hearings. The presentation of testimony does not require the group to register under the Federal Regulation Of Lobbying Act, so these groups would not have been included in the universe of groups from which Milbrath's sample Of lobbyists was selected. Second, some group leaders may be inhibited from participating in visible coalitions Of interest groups by ”Milbrath states that twenty-two or the fifty-two lobbyists who regard it as of "considerable importance" are representatives of small tradeassociations, and so are seven of the twelve who described it as the "most important factor" in their work. Since the number Of organizations in some of his categories of organizations is quite small, it is not possible to speak conclusively concerning the PI‘Oportion of farm, labor, religious, and citizens' organizations that engaged in collaboration. For example, only five farm organizations, and six large citizens' Organizations are includedin these two categories of Organizations . o ...- ‘ l ,....— «...-4. . .-. A. -..... ...... .... r I l ...... ‘ ...... p I u... 0..., C c I. ., .. ‘I- , - 'o. 0.. -~ ‘ . , n n V. C ... . ’- ... - n .. '1 'o ' 'Iv. ‘Ou. . ‘> u‘ ._ ., § . a a '9. - s y I o n v M .‘ '- . H \ I". v i .i’. . , I 4., r -. . . _n . n . v . l . ‘ l . . -" . '. \ \ ..- -.. or“..- ...—a..-“ .-. 100 the existence Of unfavorable attitudes Of citizens toward lobbying. The three major lobby investigations in American history before 1950 seemed to teach that the major implications for democratic government Of lobbying are inherently sinister.5 Third, another attitude that Observers Of American society have noted is the tendency Of large numbers Of citizens to regard any large organization or aggregation of organizations with suspicion on the grounds that they are too powerful. It is difficult to know how widely such a norm may be accepted and how much importance should be attached to it. The strength and recurrence, sporadically, of citizen support for antitrust movements are especially noteworthy since the struggle against monopolies never became an important issue in the politics of the indus-- trial democracies Of Europe prior tO World War II.6 Another factor that may limit participation by group representatives in coalitions is that the members of the group may develOp unfavorable attitudes toward such intergroup relationships. If a group member believes that the function Of the group is to achieve its announced legislative goals, any relation with another group, such “...—1 5See Chapter I, p. 6-7. 60a the latter point see Edward H. Chamberlin, Mono 01 and Com etition and Their Regulation (London: 5 T9511) Macmi an and o. , . 1-, 101 as a temporary alliance, that is perceived to be a sign Of weakness, may undermine the commitment Of the member to it. Finally, the leaders of a group may see more disadvantages in collaboration than advantages. Collabora- tion may appear undesirable tO a large established group because it may induce smaller interest groups tO "lobby" it increasingly with little promise or benefits fer the large organization.7 In summary, some Of the disadvantages Of collabora- tion may cause group leaders to remain aloof from group coalitions. These reasons may also explain why collabora- tion among groups, when it exists, is likely to be informal, temporary, and involve minimal and intermittent participation by group representatives.8 This research chiefly focuses on a different type of relation. Webster‘s New International Dictionary Offers the following definition Of "relation": "The mode in which one thing stands to anOther, or'the'mode in which 7The spokesman for one well—known national interest group stated in a personal interview that the constitution of his group prohibited collaboration with any groups. 8The discussion and quotations from the literature on interest groups concerning group coalitions on pages 65- 67, Chapter II, provide support for this conclusion. Of course, proof confirming or refuting the notion that extensive collaboration occurs is not required to justify the exploration or relationships between groups that are non-collaborative. Non-collaborative relationships may also be important for interpreting interest group relations. .- ... -- .. I. ...- u..,_' . Iva. .‘ u l‘A’A v 'v .,_ ~ . '- u u I. .. ‘._-“. ... - ‘- I‘o - s n‘. , . . .~‘ A r 1 R ’d _ - u 'l ..w ‘l . . n . \ . - . , . . _. ‘I. - '. \‘. _ . . ‘n‘N . I ~ 1 102 two or more things stand to one another."9 Broadly conceived, then, a relation between two interest groups is what is seen as pertaining to both Of them. In this definition no awareness by the representatives Of two groups that something pertains to both Of them is neces- sarily implied. Each Of two groups may possess a common policy preference but the leaders may not know that the other has that attribute. Yet both may express this policy preference. The primary relationship between groups that is studied in this research is defined in terms of common policy preferences expressed by the spokesmen Of interest groups at House committee hearings. The term denoting this relation among interest groups in this research is the "cluster Of interest groups." A "group cluster" consists Of three or more groups that, to a certain extent, have taken the same positions for or against bills or issues under consideration at selected House committee hearings during a sixteen-year period.10 The extent of the agreement among interest groups at and beyond which the term "group cluster" is used, is discussed in Chapter IV. *— 9Webster's New International Dictionary, unabridged Second Edition, William A. Neilson, editor-in-chief (Spring- field, Massachusetts: G. and C. Merriam CO., 1959). 10The subjects of hearings on which group positions were recorded are classified as bills, and issues. Resolutions are subsumed under the term "bills." Hereafter, no distinction will be made between these terms, .A .,. I. Vi u-.-. no..._ I‘- ... ‘0. . \A.’ ... ... o 1 '~ l .%‘ v. r o ‘t o u‘ . n - I . '. w. . . -, D. . 4 a A . a. '- “ . .a ‘ . ._ . ‘4 . \ '.‘ ‘. .' v u « n ‘V ‘. t u '~ g. z 103 The record of each group consists Of its support or Opposition to bills and issues considered in hearings. On a bill the spokesmen for the groups in the cluster state the legislation should be passed or defeated; on an issue they express favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward it.11 The spokesmen for groups in a cluster do not necessarily have the same motives in urging passage or defeat Of a measure. The members Of a committee who are listening to the testimony cannot always be sure of the motives of group spokesmen in supporting a measure, but the fact of the strong support for it by many groups is care- fully noted. The cluster relation is a broader relation among interest groups than a collaborative relation because it does not require any interaction between the leaders Of the groups before they present their statements at the hearings. The cluster is not predicated on the awareness by the leaders Of different groups that they share common policy preferences on legislative subjects before the committee, but it seems likely that this awareness of common positions will occur frequently during committee 11The issues used are concrete, specific issues, such as federal aid to states for public elementary and secondary education, federal funds to fight juvenile delinquency, and United States support for the United Nations and its agencies. The attitudes recorded on the issue are those expressed by group spokesmen for or against it, or ambiguous on it. The problems of recording group policy preferences on bills and issues are discussed later in this chapter. 104 hearings.12 The groups identified as members of a cluster may in fact engage in cooperative relations with each other but this does not alter the definition Of the cluster relation. The cluster relation among interest groups is distinct from the collaborative relation. The term group cluster is based on only one dimension Of intergroup relations: the public declaration of common policy preferences by the leaders Of three or more interest groups.13 It is a term denoting a more loose relation among interest groups than the term coalition, but a more precise one. The concept group cluster, as defined in this research, is useful for several reasons. First, it is concerned with a facet Of intergroup relations that is more commonly found at the national level than cooperation among groups. Second, it is easier to Operationalize. Third, it can handle a larger number Of groups more economically, in terms Of time and analysis, than the concept coalition. Finally, the identification Of a group cluster provides a rough estimate Of the amount of influence resources an aggregation Of non-OOOperating w 12Milbrath reports that all lobbyists attempt to become informed about the activities Of the lobbyists Of competing groups. Milbrath, _p. cit., p. 208. BR may also be useful to distinguish between different dimensions Of collaboration among interest groups. The literature that discusses collaboration among group leaders clearly indicates that there are different types of collaborative activity. Some Of the types are discussed in Chapter V. an «A ll . ... ‘. ... .- . a... '_ ....“ "1.". .u‘.. no,» - ‘3 ..., 7., n .5 I I. I Q.‘ "\ '. . .. - . 7“ ‘r x I 'V ~ .‘ .7 1 ~ v ‘5 .- ., .. . "x » ‘ 's . § . v 105 groups may have.14 The identification and analysis Of group clusters will help to describe the relations among interest group representatives on bills and issues in many instances when no cooperation is discernible. The identification Of the policy preferences of interest groups on a legislative subject permits an assessment Of the amount Of group support, neutrality, and Opposition that have developed for it at a particular time, as well as for a stipulated period of time. By studying the distributions of policy preferences Of groups for a period of several years, the stability or change in the patterns Of this type Of intergroup relationship can be determined. This study will provide some systematic generalizations about this type Of intergroup relation. National Interest Groups There are no published records Of attempts tO enumerate the universe of national interest groups active in the political system of the United States for a particular time span. In some respects the concept 14This is a very general instrument for assessing influence or support for a legislative measure. The dis- tribution of influence resources is extremely difficult to assess but we know it differs sharply among interest SPOUps. A policy preference expressed by a group leader tells very little about the extent to which the resources 01’ the group will be mobilized and used to secure its enact- ment. It is also apparent that if a group that is offensive to a congressman is added to a group cluster composed of groups toward whom he is friendly, the effect may be the reduction Of the influence of the group cluster on him. cl: ‘._ "o. . ~..x_. -. ‘v o 'v~ ... I . .'_" I ~ . ..x. ‘ ‘>‘.' . - . ..l'. ‘ ... 1 ‘. 5 . I r . ‘I ' . I . u '1' ., u u‘, l v L—Pha - 106 "pOpulation Of interest groups“ is like the concept Of "the peOple" as a corporate body. There is nO precise way to number it because groups are constantly being formed and others are being disbanded or cease to function. But unlike the case Of a nation's pOpulation, we do not have complete demographic information on the entrance or disappearance of interest groups from the group popula- tion. Furthermore, there is little information concerning how frequently interest groups move intO and out Of the arena of political decision-making at the federal or state level of government on a particular issue or set of issues. The most authoritative compilation of national associations in the United States is contained in the National Organizations 2;: the United States, that lists over 12,500 associations that are national in scOpe.15 This volume, however, is incomplete since the publisher must rely on the cooperation of the Officials of interest groups to submit the information that is compiled and published. Certain groups, such as the National Women's Trade Union league and the National Association Of Con- sumers, have testified before congressional COMttees but they are not listed in this volume. Both of these groups are included in the universe Of groups used in this ———.—— 15Nationa1 Organizations 93 the United States, Vol. I, Enc cIO edia of Associations, 4th edition, __ Frederick G. Ruffner,—J'r., editor (Detroit: Gale Research CO., 1964). . . A., . ">A. "v- A... ‘\- \ _ . . I.‘-. I .‘_ '4 '- .b ‘4 . ', ~'~ I.‘ A .' . . ‘-. .‘ ‘t I \v , . ._ .. 107 research. Furthermore, sixty additional groups included in the second universe Of groups were not listed in it. The predecessors of the National Orggnizations _o_f _t_h_e_ United States, the National Associations _o_f_ the United States, and the still earlier Trade and Professional Associations 93 the United States, are also incomplete though they are very helpful in providing information about thousands of groups.16 Although this inquiry is concerned with a smaller universe of national interest groups, the groups active at the congressional level during a sixteen-year period, no list of these groups has ever been compiled. An examination of the literature on interest groups yields only one volume since 1940 that discusses the problem of the size of the active group population in Washington.17 The Federal Regulation Of lobbying Act is Of limited use in considering this question since many groups in Washington do not regard themselves as lobby 16C. J. Judkins, Trade and Professional Associa- tions 9;: the United States, Bureau of Foreign and Domfitic Commerce,—Ufiited States Department of Commerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942); Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States, United States Department figmerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, 9 . - 17Milbrath used the 614 lobbyists who registered under the Federal Regulation Of Lobbying Act during the first two quarters of 1956 as the universe from which he drew his sample of lobbyists. Milbrath, o .-_<_:_i_’_c_., p. 21-2, Robert Brady briefly cites the growth of usiness associa- tions in the United States in his Business _a_s_ g S stem of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 194 , p. I5, o.- p g " av -. .. .. .I ’0 .. , y a . n‘ .. "\- . no ., .,. _ “.u,” n . _ . It .' ~" '1..‘_ I _ '~.‘ I n n q I-.' . ' . s”. ..‘ '0 to. . ‘_ ‘\ . e ,_ I . 108 groups and do not file reports.18 It is significant that the number Of interest groups reporting under the act has decreased substantially since 1950.19 In 1948 the number of organizations reporting was 340. This figure declined to 295 in 1951 and fell to 197 in 1953, the smallest number for any year during the period 1950-60. The largest number reporting in the decade Of the fifties was 289 interest groups in 1960; the average number of groups reporting annually for the ten-year period since 1950 is 261. Under the law, organizations are not required to register but if they are engaged in lobbying they must file quarterly spending and receipt statements. If the numbers of lobbyists are used in place of the numbers Of groups reporting, the conclusion stated above remains unchanged. In 1947, 731 lobbyists registered; the number varied erratically during the next three years but from 1951 through 1960, the largest number of registrants was 413.20 It does not seem likely that the number of interest groups active at the congressional level decreased in the decade of the 1950's. One explanation for the small numbers Of groups filing reports in the 1950's and there- after is suggested by the Supreme Court decision in the w 18See the section on lobby registrations for each Year since 1947 in the Congressional Quarterly Almana_c_ (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service). l9Ibid., 1948 through 1961. 2OIbid. u,... ib-It ....fl .. ~31.- I 4,. _‘I . "--M I‘.‘ ‘ u '. '- u '1 o g i a , . ‘£ ‘. v‘ ‘v \'\ '1 o D I .Q ‘1 s' t A I I ‘, § 109 Harriss case.21 Although this case was not heard by the Court until 1953, it is not unlikely that following a three- or four-year period Of uncertainty concerning the interpretation of the Federal Regulation Of Lobbying Act, lobbyists and organization leaders began to see the SCOpe of the Act in more limited terms and hence registrations and reports declined. The decision Of the Supreme Court in the Harriss case made it clear that the Act did not reach those groups engaged only or chiefly in "indirect" lobbying?2 Thus the Court excluded from the coverage Of the Act groups whose activities were in the public opinion field. An additional disadvantage Of relying on the list of organizations reporting under the lobby law is that a spokesman for a group can present testimony at congres- sional committee hearings and remain exempt from the provisions of the Act. Therefore, it seems likely that some national or regional associations that do not have offices in Washington but that do present testimony at congressional committee hearings, either through a personal representative or by a filed statement, may be overlooked.23 (1953) 21United States v. Harriss, 33. gl_., 347 U. s. 612 22Rice, 92. cit., p. 111. 23Since some Of these groups may have concentrated membership within certain cities, states, or regions, they may be influential with certain congressmen even though v. , 0'! - ‘~.. 4 U. . »-.- "- ... u . Ihl’ I .>' I u ! .,_‘W ... . "‘. . 'V... . u... M1 ... l“ b ‘v . ., - ‘g' it ‘I . I .h . ‘l 4 ‘ . s v ~‘c o D. ‘ I t I. .‘ "\ .,. ‘4 '- x. \. v . v '.‘_ A '~ . . - ‘- b ‘e. '~ on ‘. n E . V. ‘e i v .'. . e n .y .‘ . 110 Congressional Committee Hearings Inspection of the printed hearings of House and Senate committees since 191m in the exploratory stage of this research revealed it would be impossible to study all of them. The perusal of more than 60 hearings of Senate committees and an equal number for the House committees, seemed to indicate that reliance on the hearings of only one house would not create a serious problem for identi- fying the interest groups that presented testimony most frequently at congressional hearings.24 During the process of examining the hearings of both House and Senate committees the same groups were noted repeatedly on the witness lists. Thus, there is evidence that studies of the hearings of committees in both houses would reveal the same groups providing testi- mony most frequently, with perhaps a small number of exceptions . 25 As a check on this impressionistic Judgment, tabulations of witnessesrepresenting groups were recorded the groups do not have representatives domiciled in Wash- ington, D. C. Of course, these groups may be influential for other reasons than membership factors. 21LN’evertheless, the leaders of a few groups stated in interviews that they received more favorable treatment from one house than the other. 25It is true that a certain committee may be regarded as more influential than its counterpart in the other house, for instance, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and some group leaders may not wish to spend :carce resources for the presentation of the same position wice. {1 .-D’~ I~I‘ I’A—gv sun .1 ...; u ‘i.-.. “‘v—, .V.. ... . -.lv. V!‘ A. u. . in v n n , ‘. . o o.~ <‘ . .4' ‘ t -. '- '\ . n I. ‘ '-. x V‘ .M ‘I n . a a | ‘A . . - . | v u v ,-. u . 111 for the hearings on thirteen bills concerned with agricul- ture, housing, education, the minimum wage, price controls and international relations that were considered by the committees in both houses. The examination of the hearings showed that usually a large number of group representatives testify at both Senate and House hearings. However, at every hearing except one there were some group representa— tives that testified at only the hearing in one house and not at the hearings in both houses. 0n eight of the thirteen bills the representatives of more national interest groups, in the universe of groups, testified at the House hearings than at the Senate hearings. 0n the remaining five measures, testimony was presented for more interest groups at the Senate hearings. Many factors may contribute to these differing numbers of group witnesses. For example, group leaders-may believe they have a chance to defeat a measure in only one of the two houses, and therefore, they present testimony only at the committee hearing of that house. The smallest number of group spOkesmen appearing at both Senate and House hearings on one of the thirteen bills was at a 1947 hearing on a bill concerned with price supports for wool. Five group: representatives presented testimony at the House hearing and four witnesses appeared at the Senate hearing, but only one group was represented at both hearings. On eleven of the other twelve measures, however, over half the number of group witnesses appearing at the least .'..., 4 - ....Vlr .....‘i of”. w; hvn p —‘n . j. . <—.——- 4”._:_,._..._r 112 vmfll-attended of the two hearings—~Senate or House-- ;nesented testimony at the hearings of the committees in both houses. For example, at the 1946 hearing on a bill concerned with the extension of price controls, testimony was received from thirty-three groups at the House hearing and from fifty-four groups at the Senate hearing, but twenty-four groups were represented at both hearings. 0n the basis of these findings it appears likely that there are not many groups that present testimony exclusively at one house and never at the other. It seems fair to generalize that the groups testifying most fre- quently at House hearings are also the groups represented most frequently at Senate hearings. Only House hearings were studied in this research. Theifiuee reasons for selecting House hearings were: (1)be considered. Nevertheless, the hearings on bills that are considered important by the leaders of several conflicting interest groups may play a significant partixlthe legislative struggle over a controversial mewmue since, (1) the nature and extent of the informa- thnlsUpplied by many interest groups is likely to be recorded fully only at the hearings, (2) the hearings mnnesent the only occasion at which committee members and grmn)spokesmen are confronted with the full range of inunested parties who are publicly active, and (3) the wanings' testmmony and discussion may be considered by Ukzcourts in writing a decision pertaining to the bill.34 Hearings usually reveal the cleavages between the 32m1brath, 93. cit., p. 213. Milbrath states the memareting for personal presentation was 8.M3. It was 7JK>for research results and 6.55 for testifying at hearings. 33Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the W. pp. 93.. p. 13. 34Chamberlain, op, cit., p. 79-80. ..aAv v ....- y .‘n‘ -. ‘u-‘A. u . .~’ 'uA‘. n.5‘ _ .... ~ 1 117 supporting and opposing groups, and in building a hearings' record the character and the extent of the public commit- ments of interested groups are most fully articulated. Congressional hearings afford the opportunity for many groups to appear as witnesses. It is customary for a group to be granted an Opportunity to testify when it has expressed a desire to do $0.35 On important bills, there are always a large number of witnesses who want to be heard. At each of the recent hearings on Federal aid to education, and the Economic Opportunity Act, for example, more than fifteen national interest groups presented statements, including the groups of recognized stature in the areas of business, labor, and agriculture.36 The second criticism of relying on hearings' testimony is based on the fact that in public statements group leaders must combine strategy and tactics with the 35A brief set of questions was mailed to the chair- men of the House and Senate committees whose hearings are studied in this research. The response revealed that although procedures of giving notice of hearings and the scheduling of witnesses vary somewhat from committee to committee, the customary practices are quite similar. In general, notice of hearings is usually given by the follow- ing: (1) announcement on the floor of the chamber and publication in the Congressional Record, (2) a press release, (3) a form letter sent to groups who have filed a request with the committee to be notified when hearings on specific kinds of issues are held. Most committee chair- men state that they allow all groups requesting time an Opportunity to be heard. For a more complete discussion 01‘ Opportunities to testify see Chapter V. 360hited States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Federal Aid _tg Schools, Hearings before General Sub-committee, 8'7tH-C'on ress, 131; Session, Parts I and II, March 13-17, 20, 1961 Washington; on» “..., ... I: ‘ '9‘. ‘ " 4.. .‘ ‘v. ». ,. ,j-. I I‘..‘ lo... "a. u .0 1'. '- ~.' I“".. ....“ ... ‘ . \.' 1 ~.. u u \3‘ M \ x '. n -_t u ‘ a. 'n ‘. u .‘ _.’ u, M .' ~ c ..- ‘. \ A” “ 118 discussion of any single goal. Therefore, a group may appear to support what they truly oppose and opposition to a bill may not be indicative of the group's real desires. There is some merit in this position. For example, Group A may support Bill 2 in order to accomplish an objective that may become obtainable if Bill 2 is supported, even though the leaders of Group A are opposed to the major objective of Bill 2. It may also be true that a group states for the hearing record that it has no views on a bill or a title of a bill when it really has a position it does not want to disclose. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that a group representative would often assert that his group supports a bill when the group is actually opposed, or that he would state the group is opposed to a bill when it is in favor of it. These acts would be not merely refusals to dis- close group views but deceptions. Deception can be extremely risky for a group leader who must answer probing questions from uncommitted or hostile committee members. It might also be imprudent for a group to engage in deception because it is difficult and often undesirable to deceive all the publics that may examine the hearings record. Group spokesmen realize that a public statement Government Printing Office, 1951); United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Economic Opportunity Act of l 64 Hearings before Sub- committee on the War on Pover' y Program, 89th Congress, lst Session, Parts I and II, March 17-20; April 7-10, 13, 14, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964). 119 Of their views must be defensible not only at a given point in time and to a limited audience but for many years and to a vast audience Of listening publics, including the leaders Of Opposition groups and newsmen who have powerful incentives to expose deception.37 In short, there seem to be important factors limiting the extent to which interest group spokesmen will attempt to deceive. For this study it is irrelevant whether group strategy and tactics conceal the "real views" of the group leaders on bills or whether they do not. Whatever position and whatever views are publicly expressed are interpreted as functioning for the group to the publics who are listening.38 The emphasis in this research is not with how the leaders of a group would like to behave in public, but how they do behave. If a group representative speaks for the passage Of a bill, the effect Of the statement on those listening, except those privileged to know any deception that may be involved, is tO add weight to the forces seeking passage Of the measure. This research does not tabulate or estimate the motives Of particular 37Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 92. 2.43.. pp. 132-4. 38A1fred 8. Cleveland, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 26, NO. 2 (May, 1953), 254-71. Cleveland states that the NAM regularly reports in its publications for members the testimony its leaders present at committee hearings. Examination Of Nation's Agriculture, the American Farm Bureau Federation's Journal, and the National Grange Monthly reveals that they also carry brief reports on the testimony presented by group leaders at hearings. «vb. . ~v‘ - ‘nv’- ' o ... ‘ n.4, . . . I... ‘. - w., ..u v. o ll "‘ JV e «'5‘, - 1.." 1‘. ‘- 'l c . ' \v .I . v \ o“ 4 I 5“ b . .. ‘1‘. - ~ . ‘V K, m“..- .‘ _ U ‘n f"; \‘4 .D u .- \,-:‘~. I -.“‘V-. ~~ ‘I § .0 .p,_ I .A VQ.‘J ‘~ .- v V! ’1- § ' 120 witnesses at hearings. The third Objection to the use of hearings is more formidable. No doubt, it is desirable to study inter- group relations by Observing the consultations between group representatives or examining the communicatiOns between them.39 The investigations of the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the House Of Representatives, often identified as the Buchanan Committee, produced a large amount of data on the communications between certain interest groups that was extremely useful in assessing the relations among them.”0 But as a model for the use of scholars in researching relations among interest groups, the procedures used by the committee are extremely diffi— cult tO execute. Most interest group leaders are reluctant to permit access to their internal affairs.”1 The Objection to reliance on hearings testimony is that group statements are inferior tO other types Of data. There is little evidence, however, for believing that the verbal expression Of facts, ideas, and Opinions are necessarily less meaningful than other activity. One accusation that some of the group theorists make is that 3gBailey,___p_. 9312'.) p. 133- “ounited States Congress, House of Representatives, Lobbyigg Direct and Indirecj'g 93. 913-: PP- 4'90 41The Washington representative Of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies refused to allow this researcher to talk with her about the congressional lobbying activities Of the Association. ,.- 0". 0."- ~ ...... a . ov'n‘.- u ...... A. - - ..... v. v .- ...-..- . r ‘“I¢. ‘I-.-. .... I"~ OA._ . e ‘v. u . a ‘ 121 "manifest" activity has been tOO readily accepted as the "real“ Orsignificant activity.“2 This is reflected in theirderogation Of "talk" and "ideas." For these scholars, activity that is "underlying" is real; .it is causative and, therefore, has great explanatory power. They assert that manifest behavior, such as making speeches, is merely "representative" Of underlying activity. Until the notion Of separating "manifest" activity from “underlying” activity passes beyond the impressionistic stage, and the linkage between these kinds of activity and “cause" is clarified, the Objection that the analysis Of verbal'activity is less useful than other types Of behavior remains a matter Of judgment. Leaving aSide the question Of causation, tO analyze verbal activity apart from other activity is clearly legitimate research.43 All authorities agree that the public expression Of policy preferences function for the groups making them and for some of the publics listening to them. One Of the major Objectives Of this research is to assess relations among interest groups in terms Of common policy preferences. The Objectives Of the investigation determine the kind Of data to be examined. A 8 42Bentley, 22. cit., p. 205-6; Hagan, gp_. cit., p0 7" o 43M. B. Smith, J. Bruner, and R. White, ginions gag Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1955), Chapter Three--a discussion Of the "action ten- dencies" Of Opinions. . ,.,.. -,. In. a . :1». ‘.‘ - one 0 ’p- -. “‘3 . \" .. . . 9 s 'H- L .V. .. v" . § \.. ’-. ~ .. .‘v. . I. “ ‘ , t 'A ~ . I-‘. ~ ~. ! « 11" ”w '1 O ‘7 . . ‘V . 122 The fourth major criticism of the hearings process states that a congressional hearing is not an arena in which a policy is put on trial. The argument states that many hearings are carefully staged by those in charge of them, and therefore they are not arranged or executed for the purpose of searching for all the facts. There is evidence to justify this description Of many hearings but this fact does not impair the use Of the hearings records for the purposes Of this investigation. The examination of group testimony is not premised on the contention that every group has the same chance to make its case as every other, or that the group representatives are articulating fresh original hitherto undisclosed views to committee members who are completely unbiased about the bill before them.‘44 The Universe of Interest Groups In this research the term "national interest group“ excludes the following: state andlocal associations, specific business corporations, individuals that speak only for themselves, congressmen, Federal administrators, and state administrators who speak only for themselves or for the state in which they are employed. Thus, state, city and county officials are excluded except where they speak for a group with membership in more than one state. The term "national interest group" includes any group ! _i 4l‘lChapter V contains a discussion of the differ- ences in the Opportunities that particular groups have in the hearings process. 4 -o.. 'V‘ 00". ,. .... a... r~~. n..- ' “u. t - ~w... L N w A - 123 whose title or testimony indicated its membership was enrolled from two or more states. Thus all regional groups such as the Southern States Industrial Council were included. However, no regional organizational unit that is affiliated with a national interest group was included. Also included in the term "national interest group" are those groups whose title seemed to include membersOfrom more than one state};5 What emerges when this definition is used in examining the lists Of witnesses at House hearings is an aggregation Of groups usually described as voluntary associations. Most of the major labor unions, trade associations, professional, citizens, and veterans groups are included. There are several reasons for focusing on the voluntary association at the national level and excluding the kinds of witnesses mentioned above. Most important is the fact that individual citizens and representatives Of business firms do not appear in significant numbers as witnesses at congressional committee hearings."L6 Pendle- ton Herring notes that the composition of the Washington ASIt was not feasible to investigate the membership of each group. The limited information published on asso- ciations in the EncyclOpedia 93 Associations did not justify an extensive search. 46The number of individual citizens and represen- tatives Ofbusiness firms at hearings varies, Of course, according to the committee under consideration and the subject Of the hearing. n‘ “a to .4 a.‘_. v. 0‘ i... ““v. 5‘.- " — 'vu,._ . h’ 59“- ....- I- V I." n.._: . . o‘e- ..H . _ i n ‘1‘. ‘o . '\ q. \ r 124 lobbyists changed drastically during the first three decades of this century.47 Individual citizens and businessmen, and the lobbyists who did not represent a membership declined in numbers and importance as the representatives Of national voluntary associations increased. An inspection of the lists of witnesses appear- ing at congressional committee hearings since World War I reveals one fundamental fact: the number Of national associations in Washington that have mass memberships has increased rapidly}1L8 An examination of the hundreds of House hearings since 1945 reveals that the overwhelming proportion of witnesses at nearly all hearings are either spokesmen for voluntary associations or government officials.49 This is explained partly by the fact that the number Of voluntary associations is expanding, and particularly, by the fact that an increasing number of them have permanent offices in Washington.50 These associations tend to pre-empt the time available at committee hearings. This applies with greatest force to hearings focused on controversial questions and questions that are important 47Herring, Group Representation Before Copgress, 92- all" pp. 40-59. “81bid., p. 11-12. 49Congressmen and Federal Officials from the execu- tive branch appear in large numbers at certain committee hearings. For example, the hearings Of the House Armed Services Committee generally are dominated by the testi- mony Of civilian and military Officials of the Department of Defense. 50These facts are discussed in detail in Chapter V. . on..... D>.. _ ‘7‘: 125 to several sectors Of the society. Another factor of importance in explaining the absence Of individual businessmen and representatives of business firms from the witness lists, and from the filed materials in the hearings' records, is the belief of some businessmen that they and their companies should remain "non-political." There is evidence from diverse sources to support the statement that such a belief exists.51 A recent documentation of it is found in. the statements of anonymous representatives of business firms residing in Washington who participated in a series Of round-table discussions at the Brookings Institution.52 Apparently the executives of most businesses see their Washington offices as service outposts where marketing and intelli- gence functions are performed, assistance to customers is provided, and sales and general missionary work is carried on. The business representatives who staff these Washington outposts for their forms regard lobbying as a slightly Off-color function. Perhaps a typical attitude of these representatives toward legislative work is the —__ 51Congressional Quarterly states that many rou 3 object to being considered lobbyists" and file repgrtspin compliance with the law "under protest." 1965 Congres- sional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington: ,Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 680. 52Paul W. Cherrington and Ralph L. Gillen, The Business Rgpresentative in Washington (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 19.627: ~-.-. . '1'- ,u. . 126 following: Usually . . . our work is done through trade associa- tions, and they, of course, work to the point where jointly they come to a conclusion as to what their attitude is going to be.53 It seems clear that even as legislative listening gmmts many business representatives defer to or rely on their trade associations and business groups. One participant stated: (Hten.we will be alerted to a piece of legislation first by the NAM, or the U. S. Chamber. They will catch it first because they can follow these things even more closely than we do; and, along with the copy of the bill, we will report (to the company) the feelings of one or more organizations.5 Cherrington and Gillen conclude: The reluctance Of companies to adopt a policy on a bill and an active program in support or Opposition appeared to stem.primarily from the pressure Of other business. There was a definite tendency not to participate, especially on legislation that would affect the company only indirectly. Instead, companies preferred to let business organizations represent their interests.55 Several participants in the Brookings discussions reported that the top executives in the company define the :fixmtions and activities of the firm quite narrowly, as pnxhwtion, distribution, and sales, and take a conde- scending attitude toward active legislative programs.55 Another reason for excluding the testimony of indhdduals and business firms is that they seldom appear WIUlregularity or frequency even on a single recurring 53Ibid., p. us. a 541bid.. p. us. 55Ibid., p. 50. 56Ibid. .u: - i‘n‘ u-‘s. 4~~.. ‘v- on. ‘e. “c... 127 issue. Furthermore, many of the letters and statements filed with the committees by individual businessmen may have been prompted by trade association activity, in the same manner that letter campaigns are organized by trade associations for influencing individual congressmen. A final factor that deserves mention is that many of the letters Of businessmen and individuals to committees on a bill or issue do not speak to the bill directly but contain what is essentially technical information that has little or no relevance to the major policy provisions of the legislation. In conclusion, communications from these sources seem to be chiefly single-shot, technical communications and therefore, they are not readily classifiable in terms Of support or Opposition to a bill. On the basis of these factors the decision was made to define "national interest group" in terms broader than a single firm. The universe of national interest groups that was developed according to rules stated above, would seem to include most of the active, permanent, privately organized forces in Washing- ton and throughout the nation. The Preliminary_Universe_Of Interest_Groups In the preparation of the universe of national interest groups, two criteria were used: (1) a sufficient number of groups representing each of the major types of interest groups must be included in order to facilitate the process of generalization, if evidence warranted it, ‘1 . . n - ow ....- - ....., -.._. . v.|' . I ... . .... I ‘2'.. V..." ‘5'.” _ ..." | . 128 about specific types of groups, and (2) within each type the groups that presented testimony most frequently must be included. The classification of groups by types did not impose a restriction on the process of identifying clusters among the final universe of groups. A search was made for clusters among all groups of the universe with no restric- tions as to types of groups. In constructing the universe of groups, the objec- tive was to include all interest groups that testified with considerable frequency during the sixteen-year period. Since no prior information was available concerning how many times any group testified in this period, no standard was available in advance of the examination of hearings to aid judgment concerning how many presentations by a group should be accepted as a minimum for inclusion in the uni- verse of groups. The second fundamental problem was the lack of information concerning how many groups would be found testifying one or more times during the sixteen-year period. These problems made it necessary to build the universe of interest groups by stages. But because the researcher could not be sure that a group was being seen for the first time after many volumes of hearings had been examined, errors Of omission were possible. In nearly every hearing volume, one or more groups testified that were not included in the universe of groups and were therefore passed over. In the examination of subsequent '-~ .n_“ -—A - un- .- Quit t. ‘iq I l.. - “..— --.-flfl . 129 volumes of hearings, these groups passed over earlier were sometimes listed as witnesses. When this occurred these groups were added to the preliminary universe. But it was not possible to be sure a group had been listed a second time and not merely the first time, when there were literally hundreds of groups outside the universe that had to be remembered. Thus it is not possible to state that all groups that testified two or more times are included in the second universe. The second criterion, the degree of activity of a group, was necessary because it was clear in the GXplOI'a- tory stage of the research that the task of enumerating every national interest group at every hearing would result in an unmanageable project due to the time it would require. Therefore, a few hearings held during the years 1945-60 from each House committee included in the research were used to build up a preliminary universe Of national interest groups. The following rules were used in determining the national interest groups to be included in the universe in conformance with the criterion of frequency of group testimony. First, groups that were found testifying at more than two hearings during this preliminary examina- tion Of hearings were included. Second, groups were included that testified only once but claimed in their testimony to represent a large constituency and, therefore, might be expected to have testified repeatedly during the ...-. st. ~- n l‘ , no ..‘ 1 ., ..- o-. .,, nu. ., 'ov‘ " s... ‘-.‘,\ ‘Ix .. - ~u... c 130 sixteen-year period. Third, groups were included that testified only once but were familiar because of descrip- tions of them in the literature on interest groups and might be expected to testify again during a long period of time. Fourth, groups were included that were mentioned in the testimony of other group spokesmen if the mentioned groups seemed to have strong credentials and, therefore, might have testified at hearings other than the ones examined in the preliminary study. For example, the spokesman of Group A in presenting the views of his group also refers to the research on the subject at hand that was carried on by Group B. Thus, Group B was included in the preliminary universe Of groups since it seemed likely that it would be represented at other hearings. In addition to the groups listed in the preliminary universe Obtained from the hearings‘ records, a few groups discussed in the literature on interest groups were added. For example, from the hearings record of the Buchanan Committee, America's Future and the National Industrial Conference Board, were added to the universe Of groups,57 The universe of groups compiled under these rules con- tained the following numbers of groups listed by type in Table l. The use of types of groups in the compilation of records of testimony by group spokesmen facilitated greatly *—-—-——— 57United States Congress, House of Representatives, Lobbying Direct and Indirect, pp. cit. 131 TABLE 1 FIRST UNIVERSE OF GROUPS Number of Type of Groups Groups Business . . . . . . . . . . 80 Citizen 0 O 0 O O O O O O O 62 Agriculture . . . . . . . . 45 Professional . . . . . . . . 35 Labor . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Financial Business . . . . . 22 Agricultural Business . . . 20 Religious . . . . . . . . . 16 Small Business . . . . . . . 10 veterans . . . . . . . . . . 8 Total 329 the tabulation process during the examination of the twarings. The major importance of the classification of groups, however, was that it helped to assure representa- tflon for certain types of interest groups in the universe fiat might have different policy preferences than other groups. For example, the deliberate selection of every national small business group for inclusion in the pre- liminary universe Of groups, might make it possible to eXplore certain hypotheses about the frequency with which small business groups distinguish themselves from other business groups in statements presented at hearings. If Unzcategories had not been used, the probability of (mutting some Of the groups in the narrowly defined categories, such as Small Business, would have increased since the other criterion used in determining which groups inns to be included in the universe of groups is the u n.., .6... .. ’ ‘- ..__ . ,‘ 'Au .... . e. 1. ...v- .,'_‘ u.“ u A. ‘ ‘0. 'I ‘§." I.'~ .... . .‘V “A, , ._ I - u "\.“ . ~-., . __ . n 'h ‘ V... . .‘. ‘I ,._ . 'V 132 frequency with which group testimony is presented.58 Five of the types of interest groups, Business, Labor, Agriculture, Citizen, and Professional groups, are conventional categories of interest groups used in the literature on the subject. Two Of the remaining types, Religious and Veterans groups, seemed likely to have very few groups assigned to them unless a deliberate effort was made to include all Of them. Such a small number Of groups would qualify for inclusion under the criterion of frequency Of testimony that conclusions concerning these categories of interest groups could not be made.59 The decision to use the three special classifications of business groups, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business groups, was based on the hypothesis that the policy preferences of groups in each of these types of groups can be distinguished from those of other business groups. A related factor was the fear that only a few groups in these categories would testify at hearings and therefore, every group, even if it was only mentioned once in the hearings, should be included in the prelimi- nary universe in the hope that a sufficient number Of them could be found to permit generalizations about the L 58It should be noted that the classification of groups into types that were assumed to contain few groups did not mean that any groups testifying more than twice in other classifications were excluded. 59This was an erroneous assumption for Religious groups but accurate concerning Veterans groups. 133 policy preferences of these types of groups. The classification of groups into types was based on two criteria: (1) groups described in the literature as belonging to one of these categories was assigned according to that description unless a different assign- ment was suggested by the hearings' record, and (2) groups that in their testimony described themselves as belonging to a certain category were classified according to that description if no information in the hearing record suggested a different category. The Second Universe_of Groups Since these 329 groups were obtained from the literature on the subject and from the hearings' records, it was assumed that all groups that testified most fre- quently during the sixteen-year period would be included in the universe. Once the systematic examination of hear- ings began, however, it was obvious that the preliminary universe of groups was not as adequate as had been assumed. Groups testifying more than twice were dis- covered that had not been listed in the preliminary universe of groups. Therefore, in the first systematic examination Of House hearings for the sixteen-year period, the decision was made to add to the universe any group that had been omitted from the preliminary universe but for whom a spokesman was listed more than twice in the hearings' records . 134 The systematic examination of the selected House committee hearings for the sixteen-period resulted in the addition and deletion of many groups from the universe. It was discovered that some groups that had been included in the earlier universe of 329 groups presented no other testimonies during the sixteen-year period. In some cases, interest groups that had been added to the preliminary universe from the literature and from the testimony of other group witnesses never were recorded as testifying at all. For example, no testimony was found for America's Future, the Foundation for Economic Education, and the National Council for Industrial Peace. The greatest number of additions were to the categories of Business and Citizens groups, but every category was enlarged by some additions. The altered universe of groups that emerged, referred to hereafter as the second universe of groups, consisted Of the number of groups listed by category (in Table 2. Since groups were added to the universe as the examination of hearings progressed, it is possible that some groups were overlooked that testified more than twice. Furthermore, the likelihood of omitting a group testifying at a hearing that was listed in the universe was always present since the universe on which tabulations were being kept was very large, more than 300 groups. Some errors of omission may be present, 135 TABLE 2 SECOND UNIVERSE OF GROUPS Number of Type of Groups Groups Business . . . . . . . . . . 112 Citizen . . . . . . . . . . 87 Agriculture . . . . . . . . 50 Professional . . . . . . . . 41 Labor . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Financial Busine s . . . . . 27 Agricultural Business . . . 22 Religious . . . . . . . . . 20 Small Business . . . . . . . 13 Veterans . . . . . . . . . . 14 Total 428 but it seems unlikely that many groups that testified nmre than a few times were omitted. The Third Universe of Interest Groups The third and final universe of interest groups was partly determined by the reduction of the number of hearings to be included in the cluster analyses. It was (near that to include groups testifying no more than two cn'three times would greatly enlarge the number of groups 1x>be analyzed and yield such low relation scores among gmnmm that few generalizations could be made with con- fidence. It was necessary to reduce substantially the runner Of groups for analysis since the difficulties of constructing and using a single matrix, containing more ixmn 70,000 cells, or even two or three matrices, contain- inglmne than 20,000 cells each was not feasible. There- fibre,efll groups were eliminated from the universe that had 136 less than four appearances at the thirty-seven hearings at which twenty or more groups testified pro or con.60 These alterations reduced the size of the universe from A28 groups to 119 groups. The select universe of groups, therefore, consists of 119 groups classified by types in Table 3. The 119 interest groups included in the final TABLE 3 SELECT UNIVERSE OF GROUPS Number of Type of Groups Groups Business . . . . . . . . . . 37 Citizen . . . . . . . . . . 17 Agriculture . . . . . . . . 10 Professional . . . . . . . . 9 Labor . .~. . . . . . . . . 16 Financial Business . . . . . 6 Agricultural Business . . .— 10 Religious . . . . . . . . . 7 Small Business . . . ... ... 2 veterans . . . . . . . . . . 5 Total 119 tunverse Of groups are listed in Table 9 at the end of this chapter. The previous discussion of the process of selecting gnnups for the universe Of groups made it clear that the possflnlity of errors of omission during the tabulation cn‘group testimony was not remote. It is not possible Unassert confidently that the universe includes the 119 gmnmm that testified most frequently. In addition, as .—_ 60The discussion of the universe of hearings is found on page 137. 137 noted previously, there is no way to discover the exact fiequency with which the representatives of a group testify in a given period of time except by enumerating every presentation at every committee hearing. It should be noted that the only hearings for which tabulations of group testimony were made were those at which two or more groups testified that were listed in the preliminary universe of groups. Consequently, many brief hearings at which only one listed group was a witness were not tabu- lated. Also, it is not possible to be sure all the groups Inesenting testimony most frequently are included in the Ixuyerse of groups. Where only one group testified, or none, from the preliminary universe, no record was made cfi‘the policy preferences of any of the unlisted groups that testified. Thus the final universe of groups used in the calculation of interest group clusters was a twice-revised Inuverse of groups compiled on the basis of the frequency cu‘group testimony before selected HOuse committee hearings _ A , ‘_ -...- _ _H 140 witnesses was the amount of money to be authorized for foreign aid. In this instance it was impossible to categorize the groups for or against the bill except in terms of the differing amounts of aid requested. To divide the group on the basis of different amounts of aid desired is meaningful since it shows the extent of the consensus or dissensus among the group witnesses on the single question before them. On this question, the policy preferences of the groups can be compared. This procedure may Obscure differences among groups, but any dichotomy among numerous groups may conceal differences that exist among the groups that are categorized together.63 Often group representatives speak directly to the bill under consideration and state explicitly they endorse the measure or oppose it. At other hearings, the state- ments Of spokesmen are less clear and may range from endorsement with amendments to no commitment on the measure. At some of the hearings, the impact of an amendment on the measure under consideration was clear. When this was the case, the hearing was included in the universe and the positions expressed by group representatives were recorded. For example, if an amendment proposed by a group represen- tative who supported the bill under consideration was 63This is true of votes cast by members of a legislative body. All the "aye" votes on a bill that is voted in the U. S. House of.Representatives are categorized together, but Often there are important distinctions that could be made among them. "I-v 1n... Ova w _ s... .— ‘1- I .4. ‘4'. a“. ...,- 4 has. «..., ... I... .P’« .. - ...- NI:- -.,.' \ \. _ I '. t '. _.. 141 judged to be a minor one, if it was so regarded by the group spokesman and was not the target of criticism by other group representatives or by members of the committee, the group was recorded "for" the bill.64 If the amendment was judged to be a major one that affected the principal provisions of the bill but no clear assessment could be made in terms Of the positive or negative effect of it, the position Of the group was recorded as ambiguous. If the amendment was clearly negative to one or more of the major provisions of the bill, or if the witness requested that the interest he represented be exempted from the control of the bill, the group was recorded as against the measure.65 Some hearings do not focus on a single bill. A committee may have before it several bills on a single subject and each group may speak to a different bill. In this instance the hearing is included in the universe if the testimony of the different groups can be categorized 64All examinations and tabulations of the hearings were conducted by the researcher. 65The best illustration Of bills on which a large number of the group witnesses each requested exemption of the group's clientele from the scope of the act were the bills and amendments extending the Defense Production Act Of the 1950's. A group was recorded as against the measure if its spokesmen stated the group was Opposed to the appli- cation of the law to the interests of its members. For example, an apartment owners' association requests that apartments be exempted from rent controls. To categorize groups in this way produced a meaningful distinction between those groups supporting the extension of the law and those Opposing it as it applied to their members or to the economy. 142 on a single standard--support or opposition to a single legislative objective. Not infrequently several congress- men introduce similar bills that contain the same basic provisions but differ in minor ways. In such an instance, the discussion Of witnesses Often is centered on the single basic Objective contained in the major provisions of all the bills. The spokesmen may not cite the bills specif- ically, although frequently they do, but instead Speak for or against the basic objective common to all bills. Where this occurs and tabulations can be made for, against, or ambiguous on the basic contents of the similar bills, the testimony of witnesses is comparable and the hearings are included in the universe. Some hearings consider several bills on a legisla- tive subject, such as the sale conditions Of oleomargarine, but most of the testimony discusses only one bill. When this condition exists, the recording of group policy preferences is made on the basis of the bill discussed. At some hearings on a single bill, a group representative did not take a position for or against the measure but spoke to specific provisions of the bill and commented favorably or unfavorably on each. If a majority of the spokesmen focused attention on one or two major provisions‘of a bill and gave little attention to the other provisions, or left their position on the other provisions undisclosed, the one or two provisions discussed were selected as the basis for recording the 143 groups as for or against it, or ambiguous on it. On one bill, five provisions received extensive discussion by more than thirty group spokesmen and members of the committee. A group was recorded for the bill if its representative spoke for one or more of the major provisions without opposing any of the other provisions. A group was recorded against the bill if its representative spoke against one or more of the major provisions. The bill was the Labor-Management Relations Bill of 1953. The five provisions that were discussed are: (1) support for rune employer freedom of speech, (2) support for the elimin- ation of secondary boycotts, (3) Opposition to the union shOp, (4) Opposition to industry-wide bargaining, (5) support for injunctive relief from certain labor practices. The spokesmen for most groups stated support or opposition to several or all of these provisions. If a spokesman for a group stated he was presenting the views of several groups and the record contained the names Of those groups, each group mentioned, if it was included in the universe, was recorded for, against, or ambiguous on the bill. Other hearings that ostensibly focus on a bill really focus on an issue, such as federal aid for slum clearance. Many of the hearings were used by group representatives to speak on a general issue, rather than 1x>discuss the specific provisions of a single bill. If Hume was no single issue on which at least half of the ‘.-. ‘ .-.. 1 vs. 144 group spokesmen focused, the hearing was not included in the universe.66 However, if a single issue is discussed tw'a majority of the group spokesmen in terms of support and opposition, the hearing is included in the universe and the positions of the spokesmen for the groups included in the universe Of groups are recorded for, against, or ambiguous. The general practice that was followed in examining and tabulating hearings' testimony was to rely on the policy guidelines contained in the testimony of group spokesmen (withe bill and the committee members' discussion Of it. The general Objective was to make the most meaningful statement Of the group support, the group Opposition, or the division of support and Opposition by group represen- tatives on the bill or issue under consideration. The findings of the research will disclose how groups are related to one another in terms of their public statements focused on a single measure or set of related bill provisions. All the hearings that focus on bills and issues sue listed in Table 10 at the end of this chapter. This. mflfle shows that for 124 hearings, the groups' policy Ineferences were recorded on the basis of a bill, and for __ 66The term "group spokesmen" refers only to the nunesentatives of those groups listed in the universe of Srmnmsthat presented testimony and does not include representatives of groups that testified but were not hxfluded in the select universe of groups. .... — us... .... ~«--. 1.. , 3.. en- ‘I I . . ... Av -. A H ”7H. Me- “- 145 twenty-one hearings, the testimony of group spokesmen centered on an issue. Nineteen hearings could not be used because of the reasons stated above or because they focused on technical material which defied interpretation.67 In stage one of the research, tabulations were made of testimonies on every bill at which two or more groups in the universe testified. Thus data were compiled on hearings that later were excluded from the 145-bill universe. These data permit some statements about a much larger volume Of testimonies by groups than those for or against the 145 bills in the universe of bills. The Second Universe of Hearings With the second universe of grOtps assembled, the House hearings of the selected committees were examined a second time. The hearings re-examined were only those hearings at which the representatives of at least five groups had testified for or against a bill, plus the hearings that needed a complete re-examination on the grounds that the new universe of groups might bring the total number of groups presenting testimony on them to seven or more. For determining which hearings had the potentiality for five witnesses from the universe of groups the followirg _— 67The following titles of hearings cover the major technical topics: Renegotiation of Contracts; Technical Amendments to Internal Revenue Code; Administration and Operation Of Customs, Tariff Laws and Trade Agreements Program; Tax Treatment. of Earnings of CO-Operatives. ,4»: ._ _.’.~_ .»~~. 4.4, \ I ... .. a» u v. .. .... . s...- y-. v-. "va- 146 factors were used: the subject of the hearings, the number of days the hearing continued, and the number of witnesses representing groups in the first examination cfi‘the hearing. Every hearing with testimony from four groups in the first examination of all House hearings was rechecked to determine if the second universe of groups resulted in any changes. At the conclusion of the re- examinations, the universe consisted of 237 hearings. The classification of the 237 hearings according to the committee conducting the hearing is shown in Table 4. TABLE 4 SECOND.UNIVERSE OF HEARINGS Number of Committee Hearings Ways and Means . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Education and Labor . . . . . . . . . 36 Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Banking and Currency . . . . . . . 27 Interstate and Foreign Commerce . . . 27 Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Foreign Affairs . . . . . . . . 18 Post Office and Civil Service . . . . 8 Government Operations . . . . . . . . 5 Public Works . . . . . . . 7 Merchant Marine and Fisheries . . . . 3 Armed Services . . . . . . . . . . . 6 veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . 3 Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Total Hearings in Universe 237 Since the identification of group clusters among mmxethan 200 groups for 237 hearings seemed unmanageable, hmefollowing steps were taken to reduce the number of handngs in the universe. The hearings were classified ‘II‘. runpl \ .4... ye»... tn... , ‘— v ‘1. -, 147 according to the number of groups that presented supporting or Opposing testimonies on the bill under consideration. The classified hearings were then divided into three "rounds" for purposes of analysis by computer. Each round contains hearings at which different numbers of groups testified. No hearings were included in the universe at which less than ten groups testified. The use of a ten-testimony minimum standard for inclusion of a hearing in the universe was essential to reduce substantially the universe of 237 hearings. If 237 hearings were used, this would enlarge the universe Of groups considerably. If the universe Of groups was enlarged to 140 groups, the matrix necessary to identify clusters would consist of almost 20,000 cells. The MMPA computer program was not designed to handle a matrix with more than approximately 17,000 cells. The use of a ten-testimony standard instead Of the five-testimony standard mentioned on pages 145- 146 also reduces the probabilities that a certain kind of error will occur in building the universe of hearings. In the discussion of the re-examination of hearings having five group testimonies, the possibility of not; including some hearings in the universe because Of inadvertently omitting the testimonies of a few groups was noted. The use of a ten—testimony standard-~instead ... s .... . fife..- yuan. . .u ‘ v “ ... A ‘eeu. ya "w... "‘1'. 148 of a five-testimony standard-u-reduces the likelihood of having omitted a hearing from the universe because the testimonies of a few groups were overlooked. The first round of hearings includes only those hearings at which twenty or more groups in the universe testified--thirty-seven hearings. The second round of hearings includes only the thirty-one hearings at which fifteen through nineteen groups in the universe testified. The third round Of hearings includes the seventy-seven hearings at which ten through fourteen groups in the universe testified. When the hearings in the three rounds are combined they total 145. By distinguishing between the hearings that attracted the largest numbers Of testimonies by groups and those that attracted smaller numbers, the possibili- ties for identification Of the largest more cohesive clusters are improved. A group that submits classi- fiable testimony, for or against a bill, at only three hearings in a sixteen-year period could hardly be described as a member of a cohesive cluster even if all three testimonies were in accord with the policy preferences Of the other groups in the cluster. In general the bills that attract the most group testimony at hearings are those that appear to have a broad impact on the society. Such bills, if enacted, would not impinge narrowly on one interest clientele but would seem to have general consequences ‘ pm. 0.! I .._ , swua. ... . v 149 forrnmerous interest clienteles and for the larger society. The bills on reciprocal trade, mutual secu- Idty, and minimum wage, housing, education, and social security coverage and benefits are examples. In Table 5, the kinds of bills included in the first round are arranged in categories.68 The hearings contained in Rounds Two and TABLE 5 FIRST-ROUND BILLS Number of Policy Categories Bills Price Controls . . . . . Housing . . . . . . . . Defense Production Acts . . . MinimumWage .0000... Education and School Assistance Labor-Management Relations and U ployment Compensation . . . . Oleomargarine Tax . . . . Trade . . Social Security Act Amendments Miscellaneous . . . . :5 .....3000.. e FWCDI’DR) PONm-P‘m Total DJ .4 (Hues are listed in Tables 6 and 7. Cluster Analysis Procedures The primary Objective of this research is to sums one type of relation among national interest gmnmm active in presenting testimony at selected Hume committee hearings. Although different techniques 68The first round consists of the hearings at whhnltwenty or more groups in the universe presented testimony. 150 TABLE 6 SECOND-ROUND HEARINGS Policy Categories Housing, Rent Control 0 O O O 0 Labor, unemployment, Labor— Management Relations . . . . Education, Scholarships, Juvenile Delinquency . Taxes and Revenue Revision Foreign Affairs . . Women's Status and Rights NHscellaneous . . . Total TABLE 7 THIRD-ROUND HEARINGS Policy Categories Housing, Community Development Labor, Unemployment Trade . . . . . . Civil Rights . . . . O O O O O Anti-Trust, Fair Trade, Regulation Of Business Mutual Security . . Agriculture . . . Taxes . . . Social Security . Miscellaneous . . Total exist for the identification pODUlation, the large number Imecluded the use Of many of of clusters of entities Number of Bills . 5 \mekm 0\ 31 of entities in a in this research them.69 The techniques used :hlthis research were developed by Louis L. McQuitty and 69See the discussion in John G. Grumm, "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVIII 151 combined into a single computer program by the staff at the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University. The program is designed for the CDC 3600 which can analyze projects involving large numbers Of entities. The computer program utilizes three different analytic techniques: Elementary Linkage Analysis (ELA), Similarity Analysis (SA), and Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA). These techniques will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV. Interview Procedures The sample of group spokesmen to be interviewed was selected from a universe of 175 groups whose spokesmen had presented eight or more testimonies during the sixteen-year period, 1945-60. These 175 groups were part of the second universe of 428 groups that was constructed during the first complete examination of all the hearings of the selected committees. A stratified sample of fifty groups was selected from the 175-group universe. The percentage of groups of each type in the sample, such as Agriculture groups, was determined by the percentage that the total number Of groups of each type was of the total universe of 175 groups. The distribution of groups in the sample according to type is presented in _— (June, 1965), 350. Grumm's computer program is designed for the IBM 650 computer and cannot handle more than 115 variables. ....-. In. ‘- § \ _9- I c s ~,~ - _-_ _ __‘ A"; ..a 1‘. 2" ~ 152 Table 8. TABLE 8 GROUP REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED CLASSIFIED BY TYPE Number Type of Group of Groups Business . . . . . . . . 13 Financial Business . . . 4 Agricultural Business . . 3 Agriculture . . . . . . . 4 Professional . . . . . . 5 Labor . . . . . . . . . . 5 Citizen . . . . . . . . . 2 Religious . . . . . . . . 3 Veterans . . . . . . . . 2 Small Business . . . . . l 42 Total Each of the forty-two interviewees was assured ixet the information provided by him would not be attributed to him Or to the group by whom he was employed. The leaders of three groups refused to be interviewed, the Washington representatives of two groups could not be located, and one representative was out cu‘town during the entire interview period. The numbers Of respondents for most types Of gueups are so small that no statistical tests can be performed'with the data Obtained. It is important te recall, however, that these groups are a sample of Unegroups that were most active in presenting pro (n‘con testimony during this period. Certain combinations of types Of groups could -— ——<* "aw—firi 153 be made to provide larger numbers of groups for a smaller number of types. The discussion in later chapters, however, suggests that the Obvious combinations, such as the classification Of Financial Business, Agricultural lhminess, and Small Business groups with general Business groups would have introduced distortions in the single Imminess category and would at the same time have obscured some worthwhile distinctions among business groups. The data from the interviews that are discussed in later chapters are not ordered and analyzed solely on the basis of type of group. Certain analyses search the data gnevided by all group spokesmen without regard to type cfi‘group. The interviews ranged in length from twenty to rflnety-five minutes. The mean length was approximately fifty minutes. 154 TABLE 9 FINAL UNIVERSE OF INTEREST GROUPS FOR CLUSTER ANALYSIS Business Groups American Hotel Association American Merchant Marine Institute American Mining Congress American Paper & Pulp Association American Retail Federation American Tariff League American Transit Association American Truckers Association American Waterways Operators Associated General Contractors of America Association Of American Railroads Council Of State Chambers of Commerce Independent Petroleum Association Of America Nhnufacturing Chemists Association National Apartment Owners Association National Association of Home Builders bhtional Association of Manufacturers National Association of Real Estate Boards National Association of Retail Druggists National Association Of Retail Grocers National Automobile Dealers Association National Coal Association National Cotton Compress and Cotton Warehouse Associa- tion, Inc. National Council of American Importers hetional Editorial Association National Foreign Trade Council AMtional Metal Trades Association National Retail Furniture Association National Retail Hardware Association National Retail Merchants Association Nationwide Committee for Import-EXport Policy Pacific American Steamship Association Rubber Manufacturer's Association Southern States Industrial Council 1L S. Chamber of Commerce 14 S. Independent Telephone Association 1L S. Wholesale Grocer's Association Financial Business Groups American Bankers Association American Life Convention Idfe Insurance Association of America Nbrtgage Bankers Association of America National Savings and Loan League [L 3. Savings and Loan League 155 TABLE 9--Continued Agricultural Business Groups American Butter Institute American Cotton Manufacturing Institute Dairy Industry Committee Millers National Federation National Association of Wool Manufacturers National Canners Association National Cotton Council National Lumber Manufacturers Association Uhited Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association Western State Meatpackers Association Agriculture Groups American Farm Bureau Federation American National Cattleman's Association Cooperative League of the U. S. A. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives National Creameries Association National Farmers Union National Grange National Milk Producers Federation National Wool Growers Association Vegetable Growers Association Labor Groups Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America Amalgamated Meatcutters & Butcher Workers American Federation of Labor American Federation of Teachers Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Communication Workers of America Congress of Industrial Organizations International Association Of Machinists International Ladies Garment Workers Union International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union National Women's Trade Union League Textile Workers Union of America Ikuted Automobile Workers United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers United Mine Workers United Steelworkers Of America Small Business Groups National Federation of Independent Business National Small Businessmen's Association 156 TABLE 9--Continued Citizen Groups American Coalition of Patriotic Societies American Council on Human Rights American Parents Committee Americans for Democratic Action Committee for Constitutional Government Consumers Union Of the U. S. General Federation of Women's Clubs League Of Women Voters National PeOple National National National National National National National Association for the Advancement of Colored Association Of Consumers Child Labor Committee Congress Of Parents and Teachers Consumers League Economic Council Housing Conference Labor-Management Council on Foreign Trade Council People's American American American American National National National Lobby Professional Groups Association of Social Workers Association of University Women Municipal Association Public Welfare Association Association of Social Workers Education Association Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs National Federation of Settlements U. S. Conference of Mayors Religious Groups Council for Social Action, Congregational Church Friends Committee on National Legislation National National National Catholic Welfare Conference Conference of Catholic Charities Council of Churches YWCA, National Council American American American Veterans Groups Legion Veterans Committee Veterans of World I and II, and Korea Jewish War Veterans Veterans of Foreign Wars 157 TABLE 10 THE SUBJECTS OF HEARINGS ON WHICH GROUP SPOKESMEN TESTIFIED First Round Amend the Constitution Relative to Equal Rights for Women Amend Minimum Wage Act Cooperative Housing Defense Production Act Defense Production Act Fair Employment Practices Commission Fair Labor Standards Act ' Federal Aid to States for School Constructiona Further Participation in UNNRRA General Housing Hospital, Nursing Home & Surgical Benefits Housing Act Housing Amendments Labor-Management Relations Act mebership and Participation by the U. S. in IT0 Minimum Wage Minimum Wage Munimum Wage Minimum Wage National Labor Relations Act Oleomargarine Tax Repeal Oleomargarine Tax Repeal Organization for Trade Cooperation Price Controls Public School Assistance Acta Reciprocal Trade Reciprocal Trade Reciprocal Trade Reciprocal Trade Reciprocal Trade Regulating Recovery of Portal to Portal Pay Renewal Of Trade Agreements Social Security Act Amendments Social Security Act Amendments Social Security Legislation Trade Agreements Unemployment Compensation aHearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked. 158 TABLE 10--Continued Second Round Admission of 400,000 DP's into the U. S. Bretton Woods Agreements Commission on Legal Status of Womena Emergency Home Ownership Act Equal Pay for Equal Work for Women Excess Profits Tax on Corporationsa Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program Extension of Rent Control Extension of Rent Control Full Employment Act General Revenue Revision Government in Business Housing Act Housing Stabilization Act Labor Education Extension Service Labor Extension Act Labor-Management Reform Legislation Legislation to Relieve Unemployment Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under U. S. Laws Local Public Health Units Juvenile Delinquency, Prevention and Controla Natural Gas Act Reorganization Plan 27 Revenue Revisiona St. Lawrence Seaway Scholarship and Loan Program Suspension of Federal Grading of Lamb and Mutton Trip Leasing Unemployment Compensation Act of 1945 U. S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program Universal Military Training Third Round Advertising Alcoholic Beverages Advertising Alcoholic Beverages Amendments to Antidumping Act Amendment to Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments to National Labor Relations Act Application of Anti-Trust Laws Area Redevelopment Act Civil Rights Civil Rights3 Civil Rightsa Community Facilities Act t Compulsory Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Produe 3 Customs Simplification aHearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked. 159 TABLE 10--Continued Third Round--Continued Customs Simplification Act Defense Housing and Community Facilities Defense Production Act Amendments Emergency Extension of Federal Unemployment Compensation Benefits Equal Pay Equal Work for Women Excess Profits Tax Extentiona Extension of Emergency Price Control and Stabilization Act Extension of Public Law 480 Extension of Rent Controls Fair Trade Farm Labor Federal Grants to States for Educationa Food Drug and Cosmetic Act Foreign Investment Incentive Act General Farm Programa General Revenue Revision '53a General Revenue Revision '53a Great Lakes--St. Lawrence Basin Highway Revenue Act Highway Trust Fund and Federal Aid Highway Financing Program? Hospital Construction Act Housing Act Housing Amendments Housing Act '563 Housing and Rent Control India Emergency Assistance Act Individual Retirement Act International Organizations and Movementsa International Organizations and Movementsa International Technical Cooperation Act Interstate Commerce Act legislation to Relieve Unemployed Inbrary Service in Rural Areas . Longshoremen's Harbor Workers Compensatlon ACt Meatpackers , Mexican Farm Labor Mexican Farm Labor Minimum Resale Prices Mutual Security Acta Mutual Security Acta Mutual Security Acta National Forest Mining Claims National Forests: Multiple Use aHearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked. 160 TABLE 10--Continued Third Round-~Continued Natural Gas Act Passenger Train Service Postal Rate Revision Postal Rate Revision Pro-merger Notification Public Assistance Titles of Social Security Act Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act Readjustment Benefits for Individuals Entering Services after 1955 Reorganization Plans No.'s l, 2, 3 St. Lawrence Seaway Social Security Act Amendments Study of Monopoly Power Surface Transportation To Seek Development of the U. N. into a World Federation Transportation Diversificationa Trip Leasing unemployment Insurance Unemployment Insurance Universal Military Training Veterans Housing in Rural Areasa aHearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked. CHAPTER IV TWO KINDS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS The identification and assessment of relationships between groups is the primary concern of this investiga- tion. The most frequently researched relationships reported in the literature on interest groups are the cooperative ventures among group leaders directed toward common legislative goals. To explore this dimension of intergroup relations, interview data were obtained from spokesmen for groups in Washington concerning factors that promote OOOperation among groups, as well as the frequency and types of cOOperative practices used by group leaders. There are few studies of interest groups that report in detail the OOOperative relationships between interest groups beyond one decision-making event, such as the passage Of a bill. Several factors help to eXplain the dearth of information on this subject. First, this information is not readily accessible to social scien- tists. Interest group leaders and members may not want to disclose either the methods Of relating their group to others or the groups to which they relate themselves. Second, the design and execution of this kind of research 161 ......q \ s . v>1v .qu-v‘ * ,. «'1‘ u. a ova-5o v- 0.1.7 ‘t on ..J 9.- p F . I .. ‘. v n. ."‘ A 4“*-i d ‘I ' n ‘4“ F M 162 seems to be especially difficult because many of these OOOperative relationships are not formalized and may be present in unrecognizable forms, or the relationships may exist in different forms at different times. Third, the relationships between groups have seemed less vital than an exploration of the relation Of groups to Congress and administrative agencies. Fourth, many group leaders, political Observers and researchers perceive relations among group leaders as persisting only for the duration of a specific decision-making event, after which there is either a cessation Of cOOperative relations by the group or a change in the alignment of the groups for the attain- ment Of a different Objective. Thus, there do not seem to be many opportunities for systematic research to obtain general findings that would have validity for groups over a long period of time. Frequency of Cooperation Among Interest Groups Representatives of forty-two national groups with offices in Washington were interviewed concerning coopera- tion among groups. Each group spokesman was asked orally in an open-ended question to state the number of instances on which his group had cooperated with other groups during the current session of Congress, the second session of the Eighty-seventh Congress. This question was asked near the end of the interview after each respondent had completed the questionnaires on types of cooperation and factors 163 that promote cooperation among groups. Most of the forty respondents who replied stated a specific number of OOOperative projects or a numerical range, such as "fifteen to twenty times"; a few stated their responses in non-numerical terms such as "on many occasions," or "a few." 'It is significant that none Of the forty respon- dents denied that his group cooperated with other groups during the current session or that the OOOperation in which they were involved was an exception from their behavior in other sessions. Table 11 contains the responses of the interviewees classified by frequency of cooperation for groups organized by types. The numerical categories used to classify the responses were established to show the general distribution of responses. The numbers in the table that state the frequency of coopera- tion by each group should not be stressed because some respondents could not recall precisely how many instances of cooperation had Occurred. Therefore, no great weight should be placed on the fact that three respondents reported their groups cooperated only once or that nine additional respondents OOOperated from two to five times. Another reason for minimizing numerical compari- sons among groups is that the groups represented by some respondents devote their attention and energies for an entire session, or even several sessions, to a few or just one legislative subject. The single subject on 164 TABLE 11 FREQUENCY OF COOPERATION ON LEGISLATIVE SUBJECTS REPORTED BY FORTY GROUP SPOKESMEN Frequency Of COOperation Two to Six to Ten or Type of Group Once Five Times Nine Times More Times Business (l2)a O 4 4 4 Financial Emsiness (3) 1 0 1 1 Agricultural Business (3) O l O 2 Small Bumness (1) O O l 0 Labor (5) 0 O 2 3 Agriculture (4) O 1 O 3 Professional (5) O O 2 3 Citizens (2) O l o 1 Religious (3) o 2 1 o veterans (2) 2 O O 0 Totals 3 9 ll 17 aThe total number of groups of a type. lunch a group cooperates with others may be a subject that involves periodic intergroup cooperative activity for mmnths or even years. It is also true that for a given session a group may have few or many legislative subjects :hlwhich it is interested. Nevertheless, it is worth Imming that groups of seven different types OOOperated ten 165 or more times during this session of Congress. The most important conclusion from.these data is that COOperation among groups is a common experience for all the group representatives who were interviewed. The respondents were also asked orally to indicate whether the group they represented tended to cooperate with the same groups repeatedly or to cooperate with different groups on different legislative subjects. Thirty-four of the thirty-nine respondents who replied stated they tended to cooperate with the same groups or the same "core of groups" repeatedly. Only five respondents stated they cOOperated with different groups on different legislative subjects or said they "did not necessarily" OOOperate with the same groups. Types Of Cooperation Most Frequently Practiced py_Interest Groupp Each of the group spokesmen who was interviewed was asked to complete the following written questionnaire. Score each of the following types of COOperation according to the extent to which each is practiced by your organization in relation to other organiza- tions. Score each item by writing the number Of the best response in the space provided. Frequently practiced Occasionally practiced Rarely practiced Never practiced llll Hmwr: __A. Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, Opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill. __B. Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill (or to defeat a d. v. 166 bill) such as contacting "doubtful" Congressmen prior to a vote. C. Jointly plan the strategy for passage or defeat of a bill. D. Loan, exchange, or share association mailing lists for publicity on a bill. E. Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage or defeat of a particular measure. Add any other types of cooperation not included above and score them. Table 12 lists these types of cooperation accord- ing to the size of the means of the ratings assigned to TABLE 12 FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CERTAIN TYPES OF COOPERATION ARE PRACTICED BY GROUPS Mean of Respondent's Ratings 3.55 A Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill. 3.14 C Jointly plan the strategy for passage of a bill. 3.05 B Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill or to defeat it. 2.19 E Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage of a particular measure. 1.50 D Loan, exchange, or share association mail- ing lists for publicity on a bill. emnlby respondents. The most frequently practiced type of cooperation is the exchange of information between ,. U N 167 associations. The mean of the ratings for this type of cooperation is 3.55 Of a possible 4.00. The second most frequently practiced type of COOperation is type C, jointly planning the strategy for passage of a bill, with a mean rating of 3.14. Next, with a mean rating of 3.05, is type B, the division of work to be done among the cooperating groups. The distribution of ratings by respondents on types A, B, and C stated in Table 13 exhibit a common pattern. For each of these three types of cooperation, the "frequently practiced" rating was used by more inter- viewees than any other rating. Type E, however, is much less frequently practiced, and type D is rarely practiced. Table 13 also shows that for each type of cooperation, the overwhelming majority Of ratings are in only two of the four rating categories. The smallest percentage Of ratings recorded in two rating categories is on type E, 68 per cent. For all four of the remaining types of cooperation, 70 per cent of the ratings are in two rating categories. The ratings for each type Of cooperation are concentrated in the two rating categories adjacent to each other. Thus, the over-all mean of ratings by all respondents that has been used above does not conceal an actual wide dispersion between the ratings as it would if the ratings were concentrated in categories adjacent to each other. -HI—u‘ 168 .co O>Hpmamawoa pom oovaEEoo hhmnOQEop m ppOQQSm no ONfiemwnO MWWMIIm .mpmaa moaaame coapmfioommm women no owes Oxo .ss In Haam m mo umomoo no owmmmso pom szpsnpm one cmflm hapoawwlum dado spew coapooscoo ea mQSOpw moose Moo: mo coama>flmnum mcoapmHOOmmm soozpmn coapmenoucfi mo owcmnoxm|u¢ n @6006 amp s 0H we m m mow H m ma mm o ems mH me o m 0 Raw ma NH m z m mam Hm m m a as mmfinowopmo weapon mapcosoonm adamcoammooo haonmm nosoz soapmpooooo can once Hana An.av Aa.wv An.mv an.ev no noose been awesome Has no owsueoonmm mononc mo muonEDZ hp oOOHpOmem ma pH Scans spa: hocoooopm ll|ll «III mBZMonmmmm Mm QmOHBO No.m H H o H mSOHmHHOm om.m o H H o souHuHo ON.N O H i O MOQQH 0:.m H H m H HHQOHmmomonm mN.N O m H H OHSDHSOthd mm.H o o H m mmoCHmom HmoSszOHnwd mm.H o o H m mmochsm HmHoemsHm ma.m m m s H anodHnsm coo: Hooks theopoonm HHHosOHmmOOo hHonsm ho>oz osoeo Am.:v Am.mv Am.mv Am.Hv no make mosoum mo newnesz hp oOOHpoopm mH pH SOHSB 39H; hoeozoonm m mmNB «MBH>HBU< m>HBHpOOnoO osHpmHmHmOH so compo some an3 oopmpooooo osmn msOHpsHOommm weenie .mOCOHpm Hssomnoo ops mCOHpsHOOmmm on» mo mosHpmpeomoeoop COpmcHnmmz onannm .mpsoh home mom mo>Hpoohno O>Hp anmHmOH omHHEHm no memo on» no Home poocm>om o>mn msOHpmHOOmms seeing "coco am.e H n me an a tosses hm.m : HH om h m condom mm.m mm d o o Q monomm wo.m eH Hm m H o nOpOmm 0:.m m :H mm m m scream m:.m mm mH N H < condom wHBOUQOQmom monoppooeH oosmpnooEH oocmpnooEH oocmucooEH :OHpmsOQooo HHO Ho hoo> memooooz (AOCHE oz MQHpoeonm mwsHpsm coo: Am.ev Am.mv Hm.mv Am.Hv mnOpomm mmbomw wzozd ZOHB¢mmmOOO wZHBOSOMm mmoeo¢m m0 meHemm mezmmzommmm mH mqm<8 176 The uniformly high ratings assigned to Factor D can be interpreted from three related perspectives. First, and most important, the respondents indicate it is the sharing of the same position on a bill that is the most powerful factor in promoting cooperation among groups. This is clear not only from the ratings assigned to Factor D but also from the ratings assigned to Factor A that refers to the sharing of the same Objectives in the past. Both of these factors, A and D, were regarded as more important than past cooperation among groups, personal friendship between the representatives Of the groups, or other factors. Second, the range between the mean ratings for Factor D and Factor A indicates that COOperation between groups is preeminently an event Of the present. The power of contemporary agreement on policy preferences in promoting cooperation suggests that new groups entering the hearings' process for the first time can probably enter most easily and be integrated into the governmental environment in Washington most quickly if they espouse policy preferences that are in harmony with the existing preferences of several prestigious groups.‘ These data suggest an interesting hypothesis: only new groups that articulate customary policy objectives already supported by prestigious national groups tend to achieve accredited status in the group population and governmental environ— ment easily and quickly. Research is needed to discover u no...“ l "".4 III..- 1....- '91.,“ , 0A..' . ...” “v, ... _ ..v ‘ . ... ‘ .. ‘k " - A. . . ‘ ... ‘,~_ . I.,} , , ‘I.‘_ J ‘ u. g, n .‘, I '|_' . ‘. ' » '. ~ 177 and correlate: (1) how many new groups establish them- selves in Washington over a period of years, (2) how much difficulty each has in becoming integrated into the group population and the governmental environment, and (3) what kinds of policy preferences they declare and seek to attain. Third, although the respondents stressed the present harmony among groups on policy preferences as a factor that promotes COOperation between them, judging from these data the best predictor of future cOOperation between groups is the sharing of policy goals in the past. The sharing of policy preferences in the past appears to be a better predictor of intergroup COOperation then past COOperative experience. A comparison of the mean ratings on Factor A and B shows that greater importance in promoting COOperation is assigned by respondents to a history of common policy preferences than a history of COOperation among groups. The study of the patterns of common policy preferences among groups, therefore, seems to be a dimension of intergroup relationships that is more powerful in accounting for the ordering of groups in the pOpulation than the physical interactions involved in intergroup collaboration. If the policy preferences of groups remain stable through time, it might help explain the apparent ease with which "temporary coali- tions" can be assembled and dissembled. It may also result in a diminution of the importance attributed to them. 178 That personal relationships are of some importance in group COOperation is shown by the 2.40 mean rating of Factor B. The least important factor in promoting cOOpera- tive relations among groups is Factor F, the associations can work together as part of an exchange of support: log-rolling. Only three respondents attributed minor importance to this factor, and half the respondents assigned no importance to it. The evidence is clear: among the most active groups--including groups of many different types-~very few regard log-rolling as important in intergroup COOperation. This rating for log-rolling is consistent with the importance assigned to common pmlicy preferences as a factor promoting cooperation. Factor B, an organization brings many associations together to support a single bill, received a mean rating of 2.27. This factor deserves special comment because it encompasses the formation of temporary or permanent committees to promote COOperative relationships among grmnxh This rating is unexpectedly low. The literature miihterest groups assigns importance to the temporary muiinstitutionalized alliances in the legislative pmocess.1 The ratings, shown in Table 16, indicate that emmng groups of certain types, structured relationships zne more important than for other types of groups. leigious, Citizens, Veterans and Labor groups regard it —_ 1Riggs, op, cit., p. 43; Milbrath, 22, cit. p, 170. Truman, .2. cit., p.—36743 Blaisdell, o . cit., fligqlu. ’ u... ~o~<.~. 179 oo.m o H o o mmmchsm HHmEm om.m H H o o mcmpmum> wm.m m H o o mSOHmHHmm oo.m o m o o amNHpHo om.m o m m o momma oo.m o H m H HmQOHmmomonm oo.m o o z o mnSpHSOHmw¢ mm.H o o H m mmmmHmsm HMQSQHSOHmw< mm.H o o H m mmmchzm HMHonch mm.m H m m H mmmCHmzm smmz Hanks unappoasH moQMQLOQEH mocmpMOQSH mocmpLOQEH QSOLw hnm> wumnmpoz hocHS 02 no make 3.3 3.3 A93 3.3 m mee "mmbomw UZOZ< ZOHBoH mecH 0.: on» us UmLopmSHo ohm mLoQEoE asopwm w ON MH m s a :H mH >© LopmsHo Lenses Inca ... >N LopmzHo Lenses nosaz ><>< ><>< ><>< x N + mm + mwm + 0mm + hopmsHo memzHo LoprHo poncho: poncho: Lenses uenwam usosom -xam ><><><>< K N mm memsHo honed: tosam + ><><><><><>< >4><>< 00m LopmsHo Loose: :nzom Lenses some an moHcoEHpmop Hmpoe mLmnEmE HHm wcoEm mpCmEmmpwm proa mama .sosoz .nesmam Hesse osasoai mama .poa moss upnanma Hoosom oaansm mmmH .Aesauv momma Low GOHQMNHwaao HmmH sewage HmooLQHoom mama .«mmz: CH COHpmaHoprwm mama .Hsoaom see ooHo ommH .owsz assess: mmma .owsz assess: msmH ..o .m .m .m mzmH «own: ESEHGHS mHmH .eoa wsamsom m3mH wchsom Hmnocmo mama .nHospsoo means + mmH ass .qmm .qmm mQSOLu LopmsHo ponemznmohsa wa¢mmv Qmmm0< mm< MZO mmBmDHO m0 mmmmzmz $0Hm3 20 quHm mH SMdB la. '1 187 TABLE 19 BILLS ON WHICH MEMBERS OF CLUSTER TWO ARE AGREEDa Three- Four- Five- Member Member Member Reciprocal Pair: Cluster Cluster Cluster Groups 23 and 62 + 4F + 11A + 5 Price Controls, 1945 Ibfense Production Act, 1951 kaense Production Act, 1952 Minimum Wage, 1947 Minimum Wage, 1949 labor-Management Relations Aet: 1953 Munimum Wage, 1955 Fair Labor Standards Act,1957 Minimum Wage, 1960 Regulating Portal-to- Portal Pay, 1947 Reciprocal Trade, 19147 Reciprocal Trade, 1919 Reciprocal Trade, 1953 Renewal of Trade Agree- ments, 1958 X Social Security Legisla- tion, 1958 Unemployment Compensa- tion, 1959 X >4><><>< >4><>< >4><><>< >4 >< ><>< Total agreements among all members 9 6 3 Total testimonies by each member 11 10 7 aUsing Hierarchical Szrndrome Analysis. Group members are clustered at the .0 index level. car 188 #H qu LopmzHo Loose: IKHm N K nsHa qu LopmsHo honed: loses msHQ x N AOH LopmSHo mzHQ pupae: razom N><>4><>< MN HmH LopmzHo Lenses Immhfie Ho>mH Noch 0.: exp pm pommpdeo mam mLoQEoE msonum Lenses ooHn so: none hp moHcoEHpmop proe eschews ooHn wcoem mucoaoonwm Hapoe msmH .cosoz pom muame Hmsdm opH>OLm mama .eo¢ mGOHpmHom momma HMQOHpmz msmH .nesosososa use seasooom Hsaoom mimH sundae Hwooanoom mmma .owsz assess: mama .poa nQOHpmHom pcosmwmcmzunonmn mama ..o .m .m .m mama .owos assess: ssmfl .owsz assess: mama .owsz assess: msHQ HHm new HH masonu "Lme Hmooanoom sAsmmv nmmmsa was mamas anemone mo mmmmzmz monz 20 mqum ON Eméfi. .A an» .... ~A~ 9A.. in. a...‘ ... .‘ Q" r I ' . 1 . . '- .. . 4 . . I ‘\ o _. t ‘- § “ A . . 189 The cluster is an eight-member cluster at the 5.0 level but the members are unanimous on only three bills.6 Table 19 contains a list of the bills on which the positions of the members of Cluster Two were unanimous. As a four-member cluster at the 4.0 index level, the members are unanimous on six bills. It is noteworthy that the third member of the cluster agreed with the reciprocal pair on nine of the eleven testimonies its leaders presented, and the fourth member agreed with the three members on six of ten testimonies presented by its spokesmen. Table 20 contains the same kind of information for Cluster Three. It is important to note that the cohesiveness of each cluster is not based solely on the number of unanimous agreements among all members of the cluster. Figure 1 contains the matrices of agreement scores for the reciprocal pairs in the three most cohesive clusters. These scores are fairly high when assessed in terms of the number of testimonies presented by each group. Figure 2 contains the matrices of disagreements among members of each cluster. The analytic procedures do not incorporate the data on disagreements among groups into their calcu- lations before the index of estimated agreements is computed. The matrix for the groups in Cluster Three -_-___ 6HSA tends to overestimate the agreements among clusters of three members or more. McQuitty, "Hierarch- ical Syndrome Analysis," 93. cit., Do 298- . 190 FIGURE 1 AGREEMENT SCORES 0F PAIRS IN THREE COHESIVE CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN ANALYSIS ONEa Cluster One (ten members) 23L 25L 16R 3oc 28F 3P 25C 5R 2V 6V 23L 27 16 13 17 12 10 7 12 11 25L 27 15 10 12 ll 8 5 ll 10 16R 16 15 14 11 10 9 6 8 6 30C 13 10 14 12 11 9 6 6 5 28F 17 12 11 12 10 9 7 5 6 BF 12 11 10 11 10 8 5 5 6 25C 10 8 9 9 9 8 7 A 5 5R 7 5 6 6 7 5 7 4 5 2V 12 11 8 6 5 5 4 4 7 6V 11 10 6 5 6 6 5 5 7 Total Testimonies 32 3O 15 l4 19 20 13 8 13 12 Cluster Two (five members) 23 4F 11A 62 5 23 16 8* ll 6 4F 16 9 9 6 11A 8 9 6 4 62 ll 9 6 5 5 6 6 A 5 Total Testimonies 27 23 10 ll 7 Cluster Three (six members) 1L loLgigL 18L 31L 19L 1L 7 7 9 10 o 10L 7 5 7 6 A 13L 7 5 5 6 4 18L 9 7 5 8 A 31L 10 6 6 8 5 19L 6 A 4 A 5 Total 7 14 16 8 Testimonies l3 8 aThe members of each of these clusters cohere at 4.0 index level. 191 FIGURE 2 DISAGREEMENT SCORES OF PAIRS IN THREE COHESIVE CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN ANALYSIS ONE Cluster One (ten members) 23L 25L 25C 30C 3P 16R 28F SR 2V 6V 23L' 1 2 O O O l O O O 25L 1 l O O O 2 l O 1 25C 2 1 l 1 l 2 l O 1 30C 0 O l O O O O O O 3? 0 O l O O O O O O 16R 0 O l O O l O O O 28F l 2 2 O O l O O 0 5R 0 1 l o o o o o 0 2V 0 O O O O O O O 0 6V 0 O O O O O O O O Cluster Two (five members) 23 62 4F 11A 5 23 ("'7‘ o 3 o o 62 O O O O “F 3 O O 0 11A 0 O O O 5 O O 0 O Cluster Three (six members) 1L 13L lOL 18L 31L 19L 1L 0 O O O O 13L 0 O O O O 10L 0 O O O O 18L 0 O O O O 31L 0 O O O O 19L 0 O O O O shows there were no disagreements among any pair of members of the cluster. Only two members of Cluster 'I‘vvo had any disagreements with each other, and for Cluster One, no pair of groups had more than two disagreements, most pairs had none. Table 21 shows that the members of the three most cohesive clusters identified using HSA are practically 192 TABLE 21 MEMBERS OF CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED BY THREE DIFFERENT ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES Cluster One (HSA) Cluster One (SAQ_ Cluster One (FLA) 23L 23L 23L 1V 25L 25L 25L 3V 25C 25C 25C 20R 30C 30C 30C 1L 3P 3P 3P 5L 16R 16R 16R 18L 28F 28F 28F 31L 53 5R 39C 2V 2V 2V 36F 6Va 6V 6V 4C 40 26F 26F 15R 15R 9Ra 9R Cluster Two (HSA) Cluster Two (SA)_ Cluster Two (ELA) 23 723' 23 12 62 62 62 56 4F 4E 4F 71 11A 11A 11A 84 5a 63 30F 25 34F 109 17 1B 45 75 75 42C 42C 14A 14A 3A3 gluster Three (HSA)_Cluster Three_(SA)_Cluster Three (ELA) 1L 1L 30F 13L 13L 34F 10L 10L 7 18L 18L 9 31L 31L 28L 19La 19L 3A 9L 39Ca aClustering was terminated at the 4.0 index level. Group Code: A--Agricultural Bus. F-—Agricultural R--Religious B--Financia1 Bus. L--Labor S--Small Business C--01t1zen P—-Professional V--Veterans No letter--Business 193 identical with those identified using SA. Since this is true, a detailed discussion of the latter clusters will not be presented. The same groups, with a few exceptions and additions, also are identified using ELA. Elementary Linkage Analysis, as developed in the computer program, does not compute an index of agreements in its clusters. Furthermore, its definition of a cluster is much less satis- factory for this research than HSA and SA. ELA defines a cluster as an aggregation of groups in which each member has its highest number of agreements with some other member or members of the cluster. This explains the larger size of the clusters using ELA. Figure 3 shows the step-by-step construction of the clusters to the 5.0 level. The figure should be read from the bottom of the graph to the top. The most cohesive pairs and clusters, those with the highest indexes, are linked at the bottom of the figure; the less cohesive pairs and clusters, with smaller indexes, are linked toward the top of the figure. The solid lines in the figure indicate the relation between two groups that are a reciprocal pair; the broken lines indicate the relationships between reciprocal pairs. Where two pairs are Joined by a broken line the two pairs have one member :hicommon, and the broken line indicates that the other member of the one pair is an "associate" of the second pair. An "associate" of a reCiprocal pair is a group that is more like both of the members of the reciprocal pair l .....Vr— _ 194 0 Am ..r em ..." a: W; .3 aim: ...v .msonw ummnopcu Hmcoapmc mco mpcmmmhmon mHNm HMpGONHLo: on» :0 Honsmn LoppmH Lopes: Lo nonssc comm LOO .urfl 1m. 5 0.. an. 4:. at aw. 0+. azflm grad... >« : a a? Ad. HO J. fi. J3. 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P , \\\\ o \ m manoEooLw¢ pomeHpnm mHHHm meummbomc mHH mHpom was nonmzfio 02» scans no HHHQ zone so mcflhmapmmp mmmnEOE nmpmzflo mo assess cap 303m Op ma when mmomnzm one .mHHHn mean 0:» BHHaMmmOOOC no: one has» 959 stanzas comm pom Ono song vastness was mHHfin 0:90 .mpOHme O>Hp50mmcoo O3» we» now manfimmoa mm m>mnom mm: smumsflo one goes mwcanmmn m0 masses: fiasco hands: mm ocfi>oma on ma Om penance Ohm B Una Hen .mmmmwmmflc nopmsfio esp mo Lenses 0: new was: on HHHQ map pmsflmwm so now nonpam :OHpHmom mean 0:» exam .mmmnEmE moms» no ESEAQHE s pmmwa on p59 .mnmnEoE mpfi MO was: ma wnfimmos a pm =0>Hpom: ma smumSHo 4m m coco. m m 000.. w w coco. WH m ...-o N. m .0... NH .3 co... m m 0.... man m ”HUN” 0 m Nico... HH m on... m MH 0... mm m w 0.... w .3 no... .3 on... OH .3 no... .3 .0... 0.0”” .3 0.... N... m .000. m .3 .0000 m .3 co... m m 000.. NH 0 ”HMO. m m co... m .3 no... N m .0000 w m .900. N m 000.. HH m N m 00... m m OOOOOOH m 0.000 F m OOOOOOH F 0900. OH N cocoooH omumema .oz meamema .oz omummma .oz mmumsmfl .oz omuommfl .oz meumema .oz a flash 9 HHHm a mafia Ha Hash awe Adam He HHEm tonne mmpmzav 039 mmpmsHO: Ono nepmsflo l!‘ 1: meOHMMm M>HBDDMmZOO 036 2H mmmembqo W>HBO< 2H QMHmHBmmB Same mmbomw m0 mmmEDz mma m0 ZomHmdmzoo < mm mqm<8 209 TABLE 26 A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF TESTIMONIES BY EACH CLUSTER MEMBER IN TWO CONSECUTIVE PERIODS Cluster One Group T T2 Cluster Two Group T1 T2 Cluster Three Group T1 T2 l 23L 9 6 23 6 6 1L 4 4 25L 7 5 4F 6 5 31L 4 4 16L 9 4 62 5 5 18L 3 4 28F 6 5 11A 5 3 10L 2 5 2V 4 4 5 l 5 13L 3 3 6v 4 5 19L 2 4 3P 5 6 30C 8 4 250 5 6 5R 2 5 Hearings Hearings Hearings at which cluster was activea 9 7 at which cluster was active3 6 6 at which cluster was activea 4 5 3A cluster is "active" at a hearing if half of its:members, but at least a minimum of three members, takes the same position either for or against the bill at hand and no member of the cluster disagrees. clustered by HSA except at a very low index.9 9Of course, it impossible to assert that other groups in the universe would not have been clustered on these newly defined sets of bills. 1'4 bun .,.' ‘4: DA. um, v- - ... 2,. c.“ (r‘. ’1! 210 Using a criterion of three testimonies or more as an estimate of significant agreement with a cluster, Table 26 indicates that one group each in Clusters One and Two, 5R, Friends Committee on National Legislation and 5, the American Hotel Association, do not become members of their clusters until T2. The number of their agreements with the clusters increased from two and one respectively in T1 to five each in T2. For Cluster Three two groups, 10L, the International Association Of thhinists and 19L, the Uhited Automobile, Agriculture Implement Workers Uhion, testified only twice in T1 although they testified five and four times respectively in T2. In summary, Hypothesis II is rejected for each of the three major clusters. Clusters One and Two each gained one member in T2 over'the membership they had in Ta, and Cluster Three gained two members in T2, although the total numbers of bills on which each Of the clusters Was active in T1 and T2 were not large. Hypothesis III states: If two or more interest groups enroll individuals as members from the same interest clientele, these groups do not all become members of the same cluster. Definition: The term "interest clientele" refers to the aggregation of individuals that share.a concern for one Of the following types of subjects according tO which all the interest groups in the study are Classified: Business, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, Labor, Agriculture, Veterans, Professions, Citizens, Religious, Small Business. 211 The hypothesis is based on the notion that there is a limited amount of "life space" available for organized groups that serve the same clientele and articulate the same policy preferences. The expectation is that a second, third, or ...nth group will seek to distinguish its record of service to its members and to potential members in the clientele including, to some degree, its policy preferences, from.the record of competing groups. The leaders and members of organized groups often tend to justify the existence of their organization on grounds that it performs unique services or proposes different solutions for the problems of the clientele it seeks to enroll. Table 27 contains a list of groups that were identified by HSA as members of one of nine clusters with a 4.0 index. The table contains six sets Of groups that, to some extent at least, attempt to enroll members from the same clienteles. Perhaps the most striking feature cu'this list is the small number of competitive sets. According to this listing, most groups that are cluster members are not faced with a competing group. Twenty-six cuithe forty-four groups in clusters have no groups com- peting with them for members. Table 27 shows that the major Agricultural groups are members of different clusters. The American Farm lineau Federation, the National Farmers Union, the National Change and the American National Cattlemen's Association 212 TABLE 27 CLUSTER MEMBERS THAT SERVE THE SAME CLIENTELE Member of Set One Cluster American Farm Bureau Federation . . . . . . . II National Grange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V National Farmers Union . . . . I American National Cattlemen' 3 Association . . VII Set Two Chamber of Commerce of the Uhited States . . II National Association of Manufacturers . . . . VI American Tariff League . . . . . . . . . . . VII Set Three American Federation of Labor . . . . . . . . I Congress of Industrial Organizations . . . . II Set Four International Ladies Garment Workers Union . III Textile Workers Union of America . . . . . . III Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America . . . III Set Five General Federation Of Women's Clubs . . . . . I League of Women VOters . . . . . I American Association of university Women . . I Set Six American veterans Committee . . . . . . . . . I Jewish War veterans . . . . . . . . . . . . . I are all members of different clusters. The Business groups listed in Set 2 are also widely dispersed. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Tariff league are members of three different clusters. On the other hand, the American Federation of hflxu*and the Congress of Industrial Organizations consti- tnwe the reciprocal pair of Cluster One with the highest index, 27.0, of any pair in the universe. Also, three 213 international unions that appear to compete to some degree with each other; the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Textile Workers Union of America, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America belong to the same cluster. Furthermore, the groups listed in Sets 5 and 6 are all members of Cluster One. . Although a more complete assessment is made later in this chapter using the data of 145 bills instead of the thirty-seven used in Analysis One, the evidence for Analysis One is inconsistent when the entire universe of 119 groups is surveyed. For groups of particular types, however, the findings are less ambiguous. The hypothesis is confirmed for Agricultural and the general Business groups listed in Sets One and Two; it is rejected for Labor and women's Citizen groups, Sets Three through Five. A.judgment concerning veterans groups would be premature since the three groups with the largest memberships are not identified with any cluster using HSA in Analysis One. Hypothesis Iv states: When two or more clusters are opposed to each other they do not oppose one another on bills from more than one policy category. Definition: The term "policy category" refers to the unit of classification that is used to classify all bills considered in the study. The classification system has ten policy categories. Definition: One cluster is "Opposed" to another cluster when half of the members of the cluster, but at least three members, take a position on a bill that is opposed by half of the members, but at least three members of another cluster; and neither cluster has any members that disagree with the position taken by these group members. _‘r-w-——> ‘9. "",mr'-—-————v w. q.-. ,___ 214 This hypothesis is based on the premise that intergroup cooperation and conflict occurs on a bill- by-bill basis. Therefore, when cleavages occur among aggregations of groups during a time span, these aggrega- tions will be found opposed only on bills of one policy category. It is expected that when different lines of cleavage develop among groups in the pOpulation, they intersect with each other. Thus the division among groups within the universe on bills in one policy category does not coincide with the division of groups on bills in a second, third, or ...nth policy category. The assessment of Hypothesis IV requires that the extent to which clusters are Opposed to one another be Figure 5 containsa matrix in which the cells determined. FIGURE 5 NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLUSTERS Total Conflicts of Cluster I II III IV v VI VII Each Cluster I l 1 O O 4 l 4 10 II 1 4 5 O O 1 10 III 0 4 O 2 4 1 11 IV 0 5 O O O O 5 V 4 O 2 O O O 6 VI 1 O 4 O O O 5 V1114 1 1 o O 0 6 indicate the number of bills on which conflict occurs between pairs of clusters with four members. The matrix shows that Clusters One, Two, and Three are involved in the most conflicts, ten, ten, and eleven respectively. 215 A count of the cells in which two or more conflicts are recorded reveals there are six cases in which Hypothesis IV may be tested. Table 28 shows the bills on which TABLE 28 BILLS ON WHICH CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLUSTERS OCCURRED: ANALYSIS ONE (HSA) Cluster vs. Cluster Bills Defense Production Act, 1952 I II I V Defense Production Act, 1952 I VI Defense Production Act, 1952 I V Participation in ITO 1950 I V Reciprocal Trade, 1945 I VII Reciprocal Trade, 1945 I V Reciprocal Trade, 1951 I VII Trade Agreements, 1955 I VII GATT, 1956 I VII Trade Agreements, 1958 II III Minimum Wage, 1947 II III Minimum Wage, 1949 II III Labor-Management Rekitions, 1953 II IV Minimum Wage, 1955 II IV Fair Labor Standards, 1957 II III Minimum Wage, 1960 II IV Minimum Wage, 1960 II VII Trade Agreements, 1958 II IV Social Security, 1958 II IV unemployment Compensation, 1959 III VI Minimum Wage, 1945 III VI Minimum Wage, 1949 III VI Labor-Management Relations, 1953 III v Reciprocal Trade, 1945 III VII Reciprocal Trade, 1945 111 v National Labor Relations Act, 1949 III VII National Labor Relations Act, 1949 IV None V None VI .None VII NOne conflicts occurred and the cluster antagonists. Inspec- tion of the table discloses that most of the multiple 216 conflicts between two clusters involve bills from one policy category. For example, Cluster II has four conflicts with Cluster III but each of these conflicts concerns a labor bill. It is also striking that twenty- six of the twenty-seven conflicts listed in the table constitute bills from only three policy categories: labor, trade, and defense. The table shows there are three pairs of clusters in Opposition whose members are Opposed on bills from two different policy categories. NO pairs of clusters are Opposed on bills from more than two policy categories. The clusters in conflict on bills from more than one policy category are involved in many conflicts. The matrix in Figure 5, referred to earlier, shows each cluster had at least four conflicts with other clusters and three of them had seven.or more. There were seventeen possibilities for conflicts between clusters on bills from two or more policy categories; conflicts occurred in only three instances. Thus, multiple policy conflicts between two clusters constitute a small portion of the total Inmmer of conflicts to which a cluster is a paPPY- On this'basis Hypotheses IV'is affirmed; many more inter- cluster conflicts involve bills from only one POIiCy Category than bills from two policy categories. If a more I’igorous testing of the hypothesis is called for, the rW'Dothesis is rejected since in three intercluster con- flictS, the antagonists were Opposed on bills from tWO 217 policy categories. Hypothesis V states: When two or more clusters exist, on some bills no Cluster will be active. Definition: An "active cluster" is one in which at least half of the members, but at least three members, take the same position either for or against the bill at hand, and no member of the cluster disagrees. . Definition: Several universes of bills of different size are used in this research. The term "some bills" means one or more bills in the universe of bills under study. This hypothesis is based on the assumption often implied in discussions of national interest groups that group alliances are usually temporary and that the stable relationships among groups are not highly developed. It is consistent with the notion that the hearings activities of most groups are generally limited to bills in a few policy categories. Broadly conceived this hypothesis is directed toward the discovery of the frequency of cluster activity on the bills that attracted the testimony Of groups most frequently. Table 29 lists the bills on which different degrees of cluster activity occurred. The table shows that on three of the thirty-seven bills, no clusters were active. One cluster was active on fifteen bills and two clusters were active on an additional twelve bills. The hypothesis is confirmed but the finding is striking: on approximately 92 per cent of the bills, (”m or more clusters were active. Thus: the bills that 218 TABLE 29 CLUSTER ACTIVITY ON THIRTY-SEVEN MAJOR BILLS Bills on Which no Cluster Was Active Housing Amendments, 1949 COOperative Housing, 1950 Oleomargarine Tax Repeal, 1949 Bills on Which One Cluster Was Active Reciprocal Trade, 1947 Reciprocal Trade, 1949 Reciprocal Trade, 1953 Public School Assistance Act, 1949 Social Security Amendments, 1954 Federal Aid to Public Schools, 1957 Hospital, Surgical Benefits, 1959 General Housing, 1948 Housing, 1949 Price Controls, 1947 Defense Production Act, 1951 Fair Employment Practices Act, 1949 Portal-to-Portal Pay, 1947 Oleomargarine Tax Repeal, 1948 UNRRA, 1945 Bills on Which Two Clusters Were Active Minimum Wage, 1945 Minimum Wage, 1947 Minimum Wage, 1955 Fair Labor Standards, 1957 Unemployment Compensation, 1959 Participation in TT0, 1950 Reciprocal Trade, 1951 Trade Agreements, 1955 Participation in GATT, 1956 Women's Rights, 1945 Social Security Amendments, 1949 Social Security, 1958 Bills on Which Three Clusters Were Active Minimum Wage 1949 National LabOr Relations Act, 1949 Labor-Management Relations, 1953 Minimum Wage, 1960 Trade Agreements, 1958 Bills on Which Four Clusters Were Active Defense Production Act, 1952 Reciprocal Trade, 1945 .ra ..J J m Aw. Ax» an. up» A i v c .7... A: a u I:\ ... . ..a -....-—— fi-———- “wt-".1. —.--' “w—r—M ' —’ --4- --h - 219 attract the most testimony of groups nearly always attract one or more of these aggregations of groups. This indicates a greater degree of structure in the testimony patterns of clusters than was expected. Identification and Appraisal of Typal Clusters A second approach to assess intergroup relation- ships is to define the groups within each type as a sepa- rate universe and compute the amount of clustering for each. This exercise is not a mere repetition of Analysis One because the procedures used in clustering cannot reveal all the degrees of interrelationships among groups. For Analysis One the clustering is based on the agreements between the groups that constitute the most cohesive pairs in the universe of 119 groups. Since a group can be a part of only one cluster, many relationships among groups that occur at moderate levels remain undisclosed. Inspection of Table 30 reveals the extent to which the groups within the types are cohesive in terms cfl'policy preferences, at the 4.0 level. Cohesive relationships among groups of a type are shown in the table in two ways: (1) the identification of one cluster composed of all or nearly all the groups of that type at cn'above the 4.0 level, and (2) the existence of one cluster with three or more members that was formed at a level substantially above 4.0 and no isolated pairs 220 TABLE 30 CLUSTERS AND PAIRS OF GROUPS OF EACH TYPE Final Cluster Index of Business Clusters Indexa Three-Member Cluster 5--25--23--62--75 12.0 47--52 6--99 7--17--45 35--37--38 9--6O 40--72 5--12 #UTUIUTUI O\\'l\'l OOOOOOOO UT Labor Clusters 1L--9L--1OL—-l3L--18L-- l9L—-23L--25L--31L 7L--36L -I='U‘| 00 Agricultural Clusters 4F--llF--28F--30F 9. 6F-~22F--34F--38F--42F 4. 00 Citizens Clusters 42C"'620 7 o 4C--39C--32C 5 25C--38C--30C 5. Religious Clusters 8R--9R--l5R--16R 4.0 10.0 veterans Clusters 1v--2v--3v——6V--7v 4.0 8.0 Financial Business Clusters 3B--11B 8.0 lB--26B--22B 4.0 4.0 Professional Clusters 2P--8P--26P 6 O 3P--36P 6.0 l3P--31P 4 0 Agricultural Business Clusters No Clusters at 4.0. 8.For each cluster, the index is the lowest level above 3.0 at which it could be identified. Each cluster is shown at its maximum size at the 4.0 level. 221 emerge with an index of 4.0. Lack of cohesion among groups of a type is shown by the identification of more than one cluster at the 4.0 level and also by the identi- fication of only small three-member clusters that are formed at a relatively low level, such as 4.0. The table reveals that no clusters existed among the ten Agricultural Business groups even at the 4.0 level. The Professional groups are also divided. There is only one three-member cluster of Professional groups identified at or above the 3.0 level, and two isolated pairs exist. Almost as divided are the seventeen Citizen groups and the six Financial Business groups. At the 4.0 level there are two, three-member clusters among the Citizens groups and two isolated pairs. Three Financial Business groups form a cluster at the 4.0 level, a relatively low level to form a three-member cluster, and one pair remains isolated. A nine—member cluster of Labor groups, the largest cluster among groups of any single type, is cohesive at the 5.0 level. The five veterans groups formed one cluster at the 4.0 level but one three-member Veterans (muster and one pair were formed at the 8.0 level and their identities were maintained until the 4.0 level was reached. Five of the seven Religious groups are members Cfi‘a cluster that originated at the 10.0 level. The Agricultural groups are divided into two Clusters that do rum merge even at the 2.0 level. The divisions among the 222 thirty-seven Business groups are pronounced; there are three clusters and also five isolated pairs of groups at the 4.0 level. The clusters of two types of groups, the Veterans cluster and Agricultural cluster No. 1, require comment. The clusters identified in Analysis One showed two Of the five Veterans groups in one cluster and the remainder isolated. Also, each of the three most prestigious Agricultural groups appeared in a different Cluster in Analysis One. But when the search for typal clusters was completed among Veterans groups, all groups were in one cluster. The analysis of Agricultural groups put the three major Agricultural groups into a single cluster with a fairly high index. The answer to both of these inconsistencies is that in the identification of typal clusters, the number of disagreements between groups within a cluster was not taken into account. The matrices of disagreements for the six largest typal clusters are shown in Figure 6. For the Labor cluster and the Religious cluster, the matrices show virtually no disagreements between cluster members. The Veterans cluster and Agricultural cluster No. 1, however, Show large numbers of disagreements. When the disagreements 0f pairs are subtracted from their agreements, the cohesiveness of 2V, the American Veterans Committee, and IV, the American Legion, and 1V and 6V, the Jewish War veterans, is substantially reduced. When these adjustments 223 FIGURE 6 DISAGREEMENTS AMONG GROUPS FOR SIX TYPAL CLUSTERSa TALLIED FOR PAIRS Labor Cluster 1L 9L 10L 13L 18L 19L 23L 25L 31L 1L 0 O O O 0 O O 0 9L 0 O 0 O 0 O O O 10L 0 0 0 O 0 O O O 13L 0 O O 0 O O O O 18L 0 O O O O O O O 19L 0 O O O O O 0 O 23L 0 O 0 O O O 2 l 25L 0 O O O 0 O 2 2 31L 0 O O 0 O O 1 2 Religious Cluster Veterans Cluster Business Cluster , 8R 9R 15R 16R 1V 2V 3v 6V TV 112,25 23_62 75 8R 0 O 0 1V 4 2 5 2 5 O l O 0 9R 0 O 0 2V" 4 l O 2 25 O O O O 15R 0 O 0 3V 2 l O 2 23 l O l 2 16R 0 O 0 6V 5 O O l 62 O 0 l 0 7v 2 2 2 l 75 O 0 2 0 Agricultural Cluster No. 1 Agricultural Cluster No. 2 4? 11F 28F _34F 6F 22F 34F 38F 42F 4F 2 ll 7 6F 0 1 1 0 11F 2 l O 22F O O O O 28F 11 1 13 34F l O l 0 30F 7 0 l3 38F l O 1 o 42F 0 O O O aThe six largest typal clusters. are made, the linkage between.2V and 6V remains, but neither of these groups coheres significantly with 1V 0? 7V. The decline in cohesion is even more pronounced fer the pair 4F and 28F, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Uhion, the pair 4F and 30F, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange, 224 and 28F and 30F. The nine bills on which the three- member cluster 4F, 28F and 30F are agreed is counter- balanced by a large number of disagreements between the groups in each pair. This finding is consistent with the cluster alignments identified in Analysis One: these three prestigious Agricultural groups did not cohere Significantly on the policy preferences they stated at the thirty-seven hearings. For no typal cluster or typal pair except those shown in Figure 6 did two groups disagree more than once. In summary, these data on typal clusters show two significant patterns. First, there are moderate levels of agreements among groups of a single type, shown chiefly as three-member clusters, for groups of several types. These agreements are not revealed in the cluster patterns identified in Analysis One. Second, the groups of most types do not cohere together in a single cluster even at relatively low indexes. There are not many policy proposals on which a large number of groups of one type will be unanimous in their testimonies even over a period of many years. Thus, the most cohesive clusters are not typal clusters but are clusters that include groups of different types. Analyses of Bills in Policy Sectors The third search for clusters was conducted on bills within policy sectors. The ten policy sectors 225 used in the classification of bills for analysis were: trade, housing, labor, foreign affairs, education- welfare, agriculture, civil rights, business, taxes, and defense. The analyses of the bills in the last three policy sectors did not reveal any clusters above the 3.0 level; The three major reasons for the minimal clustering on these three sets of bills are: (l) the heterogeneous character of the bills classified together, 8(2) the small number of bills in some policy sectors, and (3) the lack of sustained hearings activity by groups on subjects within these policy sectors. In regard to the last point there is evidence that groups are not con- sistently active on the subjects on which they testify most frequently. For example, Labor groups are irregular in their activity on labor bills. Similarly, groups that testify mostly on trade bills do not present testimonies on all of the major trade bills. Of course, some groups may not choose to testify at both the Senate and House committees and may appear only at the former. In general, the data of this investigation indicate that the coverage many groups give the hearings on subjects in many policy areas, even narrow ones, is incomplete. Analysis of Twenty-Six Labor Bills Table 31 lists the members of the four clusters identified at or above the 4.0 level using HSA. Clusters Cme and Two are the largest and most cohesive clusters. 226 TABLE 31 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED ON LABOR BILLS (HSA)a Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 14.0 level. 25L American Federation of Labor 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations 18L Textile Workers Union of America 13L International Ladies Garment Workers Uhion 9L Communication Workers of America 10L International Association of Machinists 1L Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America 19L United Automobile and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (An eight-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 11.0 level. 23 Chamber of Commerce, United States 4F American Farm Bureau Federation 75 National Association of Manufacturers 62 National Retail Merchants Association 12 American Retail Federation 5 American Hotel Association (A six-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level. 17 American Truckers Association 14A National Lumber Manufacturers Association 34F National Milk Producers Federation (A three-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Four: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level. 14L International Longshoremen's Association 31L United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers 39C National Consumers League aThe analysis is based on twenty-six labor bills. Cluster Two originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 11.0. Clusters Three and Four never grow beyond three members and originated at levels of 5.0 and 4.0 respectively. It is noteworthy there are no dis- agreements among the cluster members of three clusters. ' .-MfiW—V ‘— 227 Disagreement on one bill was registered among members Of Cluster Two. Table 31 shows that Cluster One is a typal cluster; the eight members are Labor groups. Cluster Two is a cluster composed entirely of Business groups except for one Agriculture group. Clusters Three and Four have members from two types of groups. Table 32 shows the sets of bills on which each of the four clusters was based. A bill is not included in the set unless more than 50 per cent of the cluster members supported it. For example, Cluster One is an eight-member cluster; no bill is included in its set of bills unless the bill attracted agreed testimonies from five cluster members and no disagreement on it was registered from any other cluster member. Table 32 shows that the one legislative subject inducing the widest and most frequent participation by the members of each cluster is the minimum wage. It is also important to note that Cluster One, a pro-labor cluster, was only active on eleven of the twenty-six labor bills. Furthermore, on twelve of the bills no rune than three members of Cluster One testified. The nembers of Clusters Two, Three, and Four have even smaller numbers of bills in their sets. Thus, no cluster appears on even half of the labor bills that attracted the most testimonies during the sixteen-year period. 228 TABLE 32 SETS OF LABOR BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE BASED Cluster One (Eight Members) No. of Cluster Mem- bers in Agreement Minimum Wage 1945 6 Unemployment Compensation 1945 5 Minimum Wage ' 1947 7 Labor Education Extension 1948 6 Labor Extension 1949 6 Minimum Wage 1949 7 National Labor Relations Act 1949 7 Unemployment Insurance 1952 6 labor—Management Relations 1953 6 Minimum Wage 1955 5 Minimum Wage 1950 8 Cluster Two (Six Members) Minimum Wage 1949 6 labor-Management Relations 1953 5 Fair Labor Standards 1957 4 Extend Unemployment Benefits 1958 4 Labor-Management Relations 1959 6 Unemployment Compensation 1959 6 Minimum Wage 1960 5 Cluster Three (Three Members) Minimum Wage 1945 3 Minimum Wage 1949 3 National Labor Relations Act 1949 3 Labor—Management Relations 1953 3 Minimum Wage 1960 3 Cluster Four (Three Members) NUnimum Wage 1945 3 Minimum Wage 1947 3 Fair Labor Standards 1957 3 Table 33 shows that none of the clusters was active on more than eleven bills, and only one cluster was active on each of eight bills. On seven bills two or more clusters were active and for six of these bills two or more clusters were in conflict. The table also reveals that Clusters (km and Four were pro-labor and Clusters Two and Three were anti-labor. Clusters One and Four had two 229 TABLE 33 LABOR BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE (HSA) Cluster Labor Bills One Two Three Four AHnimum Wage 1945 F5a A3 F3 Unemployment Compensation 1945 F5 Full Employment 1945 IL 8. Employment Service 1946 Minimum Wage 1947 F7 F3 Portal Pay 1947 Amend National Labor Relations Act 1947 Railroad Unemployment 194 Labor Education Extension 194 F6 Labor Extension 1949 F5 Minimum Wage 1949 F7 A5 A3 National Labor Relations Act 1949 F7 43 Unemployment Insurance 1952 F6 Labor-Management Relations 1953 F6 F5 F3 Unemployment Insurance 1954 Minimum Wage 1955 F5 Fair Labor Standards 1957 A4 F3 Legislation on Unemployment 1958 Relieve Unemployment 1958 Longshoremen's Compensation 1958 Extend unemployment Benefits 1958 A4 Area Redevelopment 1959 Community Facilities 1959 labor-Management Relations 1959 A5 Unemployment Compensation 1959 A6 Minimum Wage 1960 F8 A5 A3 aCode: F--For the bill; A--Agalnst the bill The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill. agreements and no conflicts and Clusters Two and Three registered three agreements and no conflicts. Hypothesis II states that the group composition of a.cluster remains unchanged through two consecutive H...“ ... .-4- -- ..~v...__ |._,_._..~ -- -‘ 230 periods of time. Table 34 shows that when the bills on which at least four members of Cluster One were active are equally divided, Tl has seven bills and T2 has seven bills. The table discloses that every member of Cluster One in T had at least three testimonies, and 1 each member presented two or more testimonies in T If 2. separate cluster analyses had been performed on the bills in T1 and T2, it appears that each group would have been clustered for T1 but not for T2. Two groups, 10L and 9L, would not have been clustered since they agreed with the cluster only twice out of seven times. Thus, on this basis, Cluster One lost two members in T2. Table 35 indicates that Cluster Two--defining the cluster as active when three members testified-- gained two members in T2, over its members in T Groups 1' 15 and 5 registered only two agreements with the cluster out of a possible seven in {El but increased their testimonies to four and five respectively in T2. Clusters Three and Four had too few agreements during the sixteen- Vear period to permit analysis. Analysis of Sixteen Trade Bills Table 36 shows that four clusters were identified at the 4.0 level or above in the analysis of the sixteen trade bills. The largest and most cohesive cluster was composed of eight groups that originated as a three- nember cluster with an index of 7.0. Clusters Two, -..... “...-.... _— __ _-_. ‘\ ~—.. - ?' 231 III N I, N b. m @4251. 3 [Ir-«F14 m b Endthf-"Iafnmfn m fimfimfipmop oco poundao mo mamQEoE meow pmmoa pm Scans no mHHHQ osem s N OOQH o o o o o o o o 0 mm“: §EHQ§ mmma . . sofipmmsoesoo pcoEBOHQEosD mmmfi . . . . . . psoEQoHo>opom swam wmma . . . . . usoEBOHQEosD O>OHHOm mmmfi . . . . . . . . . mez ESEHQHS mmma . . msoapmaom psoEomeQZILOQBQ mmma . . . . oonLSmCH psoEBOHQEOED Cradifiufiumfnfi-o C14GH cwaowom m m m m m m m wmma momma swarm a a smma meanssoapsa m m m m m a m m mmma .e .9 .4 .o m m m mmma mucoEoowwd worse a a a mama :.eaeaaesam ascenso m m mama n.6HmaHaeHm mEOPmSQ m m mmma hmzwom monthzmq .pm a 4 a a mmma ovate amooneaoom m amma anamom OOGOLZQH .pm a a m m a m m a Hmma moans Hmoonoaoom m a omma noses noose a m a m m a a meme memes asoonoaoom m a m m a a same moans Heooneaoom a a m a m m as meme moans Hmooeoaoom saw a: Ema as am com 0mm amm madam moose moo LopmsHo mAAHm madme zo mmmmzmz mmembqo mo mmHZOSHBmME Sm mamas 235 Heap one encammenue dean one nomuum “ooooc m m mmma om: as coancoewm mmma pcoEumo>QH swfioaom a a a a a a a a mmma cease zooms a a e emma mnaossoaoea a a a a a a a a < mmma .e .e .e .o a a a a a a mmma neeosooeme means a a a a mmma c.oaeaaosam nsoemso mama r.oaeaaesam msopmso mmma hmswom monomzmq .pm 4 < a a m mmma cease Heooneeoom m Hmmfi hmzmmm Coconsmq .pm a < a e a a Hmma moses Hmoonoaoom a a a a a omma meson emote a a a meme ovens Hmooneaoem a a a a same comes Hooonaaoom m a a a a e a mama cease Hoooneaoom >6 em mm mwm arm ma am EOm am Laom nopmsflo tonne ampmsao 039 ampmsflo 236 TABLE 38 TRADE BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE Cluster Trade Bills One Two Three Four Reciprocal Trade 1945 F73 A3 A3 Reciprocal Trade 1947 F6 A3 Reciprocal Trade 1949 F7 A3 Reciprocal Trade 1951 F8 A3 Reciprocal Trade 1953 A3 Trade Agreements 1955 F3 G. A. T. T. 1956 F8 A3 F3 Renew Trade 1958 F7 A3 F3 aCode: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill. The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill. Although the clusters made too few testimonies to test Hypothesis II concerning changing cluster member- ship, it is interesting that Cluster Two presented four testimonies prior to 1952 and none after that date, and Cluster Four appeared for the first time in 1953. The pattern for Cluster Two, shown in Table 37, deserves comment because it is the only Cluster in this series of analyses in which a cluster member reverses its earlier positions on bills dealing with.a single subject. Group 30F in Cluster Two testified against the bills providing fer freer trade on four occasions prior to 1953 along with the other two members of Cluster Two. Beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Bill of 1953, 30F testified four times in the next eight years for freer trade. On three 237 of the latter occasions it was Opposed by one or both of the members of Cluster Two. Thus, without question the members of Cluster Two split in the years after 1951. The pattern of testimonies for Cluster Four is also noteworthy because it clearly originated in 1953. Prior to 1953 the three groups that later formed it presented a total of only two testimonies even though the same basic kinds of trade bills were considered in hearings on four occasions prior to 1953. Analysis of Housing Bills The analysis of the sixteen housing bills identi- fied three clusters with indexes of 4.0 or above. The members of these clusters are listed in Table 39. The TABLE 39 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED ON HOUSING BILLS (HSA) Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 10.0 level. 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations 25L American Federation of Labor 40 Americans for Democratic Action 43C National Housing Conference 6V Jewish War veterans (A five-member cluster is formed at 6.0 level.) Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level. 37 National Association of Home Builders 38 National Association of Real Estate Boards 23 Chamber Of Commerce, United States 22B United States Savings and Loan League (A four-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level. 18L Textile Workers Union of America 7V Veterans of Foreign Wars 1V American Legion 238 largest and most cohesive cluster, was Cluster One composed of five members. It originated as a three- member cluster with an index of 10.0. Clusters Two and Three originate and remain three-member clusters with indexes of 5.0 and 4.0 respectively. There were no intracluster disagreements between members of any of these clusters. None of these clusters may be regarded as a typal cluster, although three of the four members of Cluster Two are Business groups and the fourth member is a Financial Business group. Table 40 indicates the sets of housing bills on which the clusters are based are addressed to two TABLE 40 SETS OF HOUSING BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE BASED Cluster One (five members) Cluster Members Housing Stabilization . . . . 1945 3 General Housing . . . . x . . 1948 4 HousingACt. 0 00000001949 5 Housing Amendments . . . . . 1949 4 Extension Rent Control . . . 1949 A COOperative Housing . . . . . 1950 5 Defense Housing . . . . . . . 1951 5 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1954 4 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1959 5 Emergency Homes . . . . . . . 1950 5 Cluster Two (four members) General Housing . . . . . . . 1948 3 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1949 A Cooperative Housing . . . . . 1950 4 Defense Housing . . . . . . . 1951 3 Housing Amendment . . . . . . 1955 4 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1955 4 Cluster Three (three members) HouSing A01: 0 o o o o o o o o 1949 3 Housing Amendment . . . . . . 1949 3 . . 1950 2 Cooperative Housing . . . 239 subjects: (1) construction of public housing, slum clearance, urban renewal, and assistance to the groups with special housing needs such as veterans, and (2) rent controls. Table 41 shows that, unlike the testimony TABLE 41 HOUSING BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE M Cluster Housing Bills One TWO Three Housing Stabilization . . . . 1945 F3a Housing Rent Control . . . . 1947 Eatension Rent Control . . . 1948 General Housing . . . . . . . 1948 F4 A3 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1949 F5 A4 F3 Housing Amendment . . . . . . 1949 F4 F3 Extension Rent Control . . . 1949 F4 Extension Rent Control . . . 1950 COOperative Housing . . . . . 1950 F5 A4 F3 Defense Housing . . . . . . . 1951 F5 A3 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1954 A4 Housing Amendment . . . . . . 1955 ' A4 Housing Act . . . . . . . . . 1956 A4 Housing Act . .-. . . . . . . 1959 F5 Emergency Home Owne ship . . 1960 F5 Veterans Housing . . . . . . 1959 aCode: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill. The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill. Patterns for labor and trade bills, only one-fourth of the bills did not receive attention from at least one Cluster. The table also shows that on seven bills, one Cluster was active; and on five bills, two or.more Clusters appeared. For every bill on which two clusters 240 TABLE 42 TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON HOUSING BILLS IN THE SETS OF THE CLUSTERSa *— _____ u ____- Cluster One Set of Housing Bills 23L 25L 4C 430 6V Housing Stabilization 1945 F F F General Housing 1948 F F F F Housing Act 1949 F F F F F Housing Amendment 1949 F F F F. Extension Rent Control 1949 F F F F U‘I UI r0 4:- 4:- COOperative Housing 1950 F F F F F Defense Housing 1951 F F F F F Housing Act 1954 A A A A Housing Act 1959 F F F F F Emergency Home Own'shp 1960 F F F F F 5 5 A 5 5 Cluster Two 37 38 23 22B Li General Housing 1949 A A A Housing Act 1949 A A A A Cooperative Housing 1950 A A A A 3 3 2 3 Defense Housing 1951 A A A A Housing Amendment 1955 A A A A Housing Act 1956 A A A 3 3 3 2 ‘— aThe bills on which at least three members of Cluster One (or Two) teStified. 241 appeared, except one, there were two clusters in conflict. Inspection of Table 42 reveals that unlike the groups active on trade policy, no groups disappear from or join the cluster during the latter portion of the sixteen-year period. Analysis of Sixteen Education-Welfare Bills This is the only analysis in which only one cluster appeared. The cluster originated as a three- member cluster at 8.0. Table 43 indicates this cluster TABLE 43 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION-WELFARE BILLS Cluster One: ori inated as three-member cluster at .0 level. 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations 25L American Federation of Labor 4C Americans for Democratic Action 28F National Farmers Union 110 American Parents Committee (A five-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) is not a typal cluster, since it has members from three types of groups. This cluster was active on eleven of the sixteen bills. For no other policy sector was one cluster so active. This is somewhat surprising since the bills Classified in this policy category seem more hetero- Seneous than the trade, housing, or labor bills. Table 44 shows that this cluster was active throughout the sixteen- year Period. No groups either departed or joined the 242 TABLE 44 TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON EDUCATION-WELFARE BILLSa' IN THE SET OF CLUSTER ONE Set of Bills 23L 25L 4C 28F 11C Social Security Amendment 1949 F F F F Public School Assistance 1949 F F F F Reorganization of HEW 1950 A A A A A Public Health 1951 F F F Library Service 1952 F F F Social Security Amendments 1954 F F F 5 5 2 5 5 Social Security Act 1956 F F F Scholarships and Loans 1957 F F F F F Aid for School Constrctn 1957 F F F F F Social Security 1958 F F g F F F F Juvenile Delinquency 1959 M 5 5 4 3 4 aThe bills on which at least three members of Cluster One testified. cluster in the latter portion of the period. Ahalysis of Thirteen Foreign Affairs Bills Table 45 shows two clusters were identified in the analysis of the thirteen foreign affairs bills. Cluster Cme, the largest and most cohesive cluster, was composed c>f'five members. It originated as a three-member cluster at 6.0 and registered an index of 5.0 as a five-member Cluster. Cluster Two originated as a three-member cluster With an index of 4.0. Both clusters have members from 243 TABLE 45 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BILLS Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 6.0 level. 23L Congress for Industrial Organizations 25L American Federation of Labor 5R Friends Committee on National Legislation 9R National Council of Churches 4C Americans for Democratic Action (A five-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Two: ori inated as three-member cluster at .0 level. 300 League of Women Voters 28F National Farmers Union 3P American Association of University Women three type of groups. The bills in this policy category are quite heterogeneous. But Table 46 reveals that Cluster One is TABLE 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE Cluster Foreign Affairs Bills One TWO Bretton Woods Agreements . . . . 1945 F3a F3 U. No R. R. A. o o o o o o o o o 1945 F4 F3 Admit Displaced Persons . . . . . 1947 F3 IL 3. Foreign Policy . . . . . . 1948 F3 PErticipation in ITO . . . . . . 1950 F4 India Emergency . . . . . . . . . 1951 F” F International Orgs. . . . . . . . 1954 4 3 Mutual Security Act . . . . . . . 1958 F4 Mutual Security Act . . . . . . . 1959 F AMtual Security Act . . . . . . . 1960 F3 aCode: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill. The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill. 244 active on nine Of the thirteen bills; no bill attracts all five members of the cluster. This is the only policy category in which two clusters are active and both are agreed on every bill on which they present testimonies. Both of these clusters may be described as taking a position in support Of participation by the United States in international organizations. The members of both clusters are consistently active throughout the sixteen-year period. Analysis of Agricultural Bills Table 47 shows two clusters were identified in the analysis of nine agricultural bills. Both were three- TABLE 47 CLUSTERS ACTIVE ON AGRICULTURAL BILLS Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level. 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations 25L American Federation of Labor 390 National Consumers League Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level. 4F American Farm Bureau Federation 22F National Council of Farmer Cooperatives 30F National Grange member clusters that originated at the 4.0 level. Cluster Two is a typal cluster. Table 48 indicates that both clusters are based almost entirely on bills concerned with one specific subject, farm labor. These two clusters are Opposed on every bill on which both present 245 TABLE 48 AGRICULTURE BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE Cluster Cluster Agricultural Bills One Two General Farm Program . . 1949 A38 Mexican Farm Labor . . . 1954 A3 F3 Mexican Farm Labor . . . 1955 A3 Farm Labor . . . . . . . 1958 A3 F3 Mexican Labor . . . . . . 1960 F3 A3 aCode: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill. The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill. testimonies. Four bills attracted no clusters. There are too few bills to permit generalizations concerning the stability of the membership of the cluster. Analysis of Civil Rights Bills Two clusters were identified in the analysis of eight civilrights bills. Table 49 shows both are three- TABLE 49 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL RIGHTS BILLS Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level. 19L United Automobile Workers 16R National Council of Jewish Women 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level. 30C League of Women Voters 3P American Association of University Women 39C National Consumers League member clusters and each is composed of groups of two different types. Cluster One originates and remains a 7 . . , .- - .1 7‘ 0 o M H M' — m—va—— T 246 three-member cluster with an index of 5.0. Cluster Two originates as a three—member cluster at 4.0. Conclusions Several generalizations emerge from this series of analyses of bills in policy sectors. First, the extent to which clusters can be identified on the basis of stable policy preferences varies substantially among the bills in different policy categories. In general, however, the analyses of the policy categories in which the bills are relatively homogeneous reveal a recurring pattern consist- ing of two clusters that are opposed to each other on most bills where they both appear. Second, for most of the analyses, Hypothesis V, which states that on some bills no cluster will be active, is confirmed. In fact for every policy category at least one-fourth of the bills did not attract a cluster. Third, in general, Hypothesis II--that the group composition of a cluster will be unchanged during two consecutive periods--is confirmed. There is considerable stability in both the activity rates of the clusters through the sixteen-year period and in the testimonies of cluster members. There was only one cluster out of the seventeen identified in the seven analyses, that disappeared because of a change in the policy preference of a cluster member. One additional cluster sustained a loss of two members in the latter portion of the sixteen-year period 247 because Of a low volume of testimonies, and another cluster gained one member. But the latter two instances do not represent reversals in the policy positions of these groups. The consistency with which dozens of groups avow policy preferences over a Sixteen-year period gives much order to the relations among groups at the congres- sional level. Fourth, the conflicts among clusters on bills within policy categories are unbroken by any occasional agreement between them. There is no instance in these analyses of two clusters that are in opposition on one bill agreeing on a different bill. Either two clusters will be in agreement on every bill on which they both appear, or they will be in conflict on every one. Comprehensive Analysis This analysis was performed on the testimonies of the entire universe of 119 groups and 145 bills. The bills in this analysis include the thirty-seven bills on which twenty or more groups testified (Round one) in Analysis One, plus thirty-one bills that attracted testimonies from fifteen to nineteen groups (Round Two), and the seventy-seven bills that received testimonies from ten to fourteen groups (Round Three). Eight clusters originated as three-member clusters at or above the 5.0 level. In addition eight three-member clusters originated with indexes of 6.0, 5.0, or 4.0. 248 The latter clusters are not discussed because of their small membership and low indexes. This section will focus on the five Clusters that originated above the 4.0 level and that had at least four members at the 4.0 level. Table 50 lists the membership of these clusters. TABLE 50 CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 32.0 level. 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations 25L American Federation of Labor 28F National Farmers Uhion 36L National Women's Trade Union League 250 General Federation of Women's Clubs 300 League of Women Voters 3P American Association of University Women 9R National Council of Churches 15R YWCA, National Council 16R National Council of Jewish Women 36P National Federation of Business and Professional Women (An eleven-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 10.0 level. lL Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America 9L Communication Workers of America 10L International Association of Machinists 13L International Ladies Garment Workers Union 18L Textile Workers Union of America 19L united Automobile Workers 31L united Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 390 National Consumers League (An eight-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.) Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 14.0 level. 4F American Farm Bureau Federation 22F National Council of Farmer Cooperatives 30F National Grange 34F National Milk Producers Federation 42F Vegetable Growers Association 15A united Fresh Fruit and vegetable Association (A six-member cluster is formed at 6.0 level.) 249 TABLE 50--Continued Cluster Four: originated as three-member cluster at 12.0 level. 5 American Hotel Association 25 Council of State Chambers of Commerce 23 U. 3. Chamber of Commerce 62 National Retail Merchants Association National Association of manufacturers (A five-member cluster is formed at 7.0 level.) Cluster Five: originated as three-member cluster at l#.0 level. AC Americans for Democratic Action 5R Friends Committee on National Legislation 11F COOperative League of the U. S. A. 2V American Veterans Committee 6V Jewish War Veterans (A five-member cluster is formed at 8.0 level.) Two of the clusters may be regarded as typal clusters: Cluster Four, composed of five Business groups, and Cluster Two composed of seven Labor groups and one Citizen group. The largest and most cohesive cluster is Cluster One; its members represent five types of groups. Cluster One originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 32.0. Tables 51, 52, 53, and 54 show the sets of bills on which the clusters are based. As expected, using a universe of 145 bills of ten policy categories, each cluster is based on bills from more than one policy category. Nevertheless, each cluster has one or two policy sectors in which it is most active at hearings. For example, Cluster One appeared most frequently on trade and foreign policy bills. Clusters Two and Four are interested chiefly in labor bills. 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SooH :0 ccHqumce m m o o o o o o m m mHHHn me» me . . .uom so ccHOHpmce m m m H H H H o a : mHHHn was ac . . .ums :0 ecHqumce mH NH m m NH m a m SH m mHHHn can so . . .mom :0 ccHqumce em mm mH mm mm em mm HH mm om cmHHHn map so . . .Smm so BCHoHcch so mm am mm me mm mm om me am cmCHccsHpmcu OLOE no Ono HGL €08 8V6 ELI GET SET HIT HHI HHI 8W8 mHEEETg 1.9 I.Tr Tron TWO TOCc T99 TrJg TrnrO T09 T.. 9 IJ IA IJ I Id IW IE IS In IO. Is It. II. T. .L/ I ID. It. Is IO 80 SI SO S Suv S8 SS SU STr SJ S o To TL 9 U a H To 1.. S on Q a . S S S mmmemaz Bomhmpm .Nm QMHmHmmquo mqum 03H 20 GZHEHBWMB mmbomm m0 mummzbz om mqmdwfi 275 every policy category has thirty- testimony, agente testifying on one or more bills in pr three t during th Since more groups r o sixteen-year period. 6 i the number of bills in the policy categories n defense bills to twenty-six labor bills, eve 138 from S var e tabulations were made of the bills on which ntag are8 P cup presented Supporting or Opposing testimony. eaCh gr F example: Table 61 shows that thirty groups testified or TABLE 61 FREQUENCY OF GROUP TESTIMONY,a CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP, ON BILLS CLASSIFIED BY POLICY CATEGORY % of Bills on Which Total Testimony Was Given Groups B FB AB SB A L P C R v Labor Bills (26) 25%»Or more 6 bills) 3 11 50% or more 13 bills 2 1 75% or more 19 bills 2 90% or more 23 bills NNNH Housing Bills (15) 25% or more 4 bills 26 50% or more 7 bills PM“) .5: or more 11 bills 90% or more 13 bills 3 Business Bills (19% H :- IHFJEnt to [UNION or more 5 bills h) I-‘ I\)U'| EN» 1 or more 9 bills 3 75% or more 14 bills 0 or more 17 bills 0 Trade Bills 16 25% or more 4 Ailgs) 35 50% or more 8 bills) 7 1 or more 12 bills 1 90% or more 14 bills; 1 prm to 276 TABLE 61-—99ntinued % on Groups B FB AB SB A L p C R v Testimo _____ Bills (15) d elfgge 4 bills 2% i i 3 5 7 2 1 25 or more 8 bills 1 l 1 5 or more 12 bills 1 75% or m 14 bills 0 ' ffairs (13) 25%oggifigrg 3 bills 26 4 3 2 5 50% or more 6 bills 1? 75% or more 10 bills 0 90% or more 12 bills l—JU) 41‘U'l Tax Bills (10) 25% or more 2 bills 33 50% or more 5 bills 3 l O HID-42' 75% or more 7 bills 90% or more 9 bills Agricultural Bills 9) 25% or more 2 bills 50% or more 4 bills 75% or more 7 bills 90% or more 8 b1113 Civil Rights Bills 95% or more 2 bills 50% Or more 4 bills 75% or more 6 bills 90% or more 7 bills 8) U) NNOH Defense Bills (7) 25% or more 2 bills 50% °P more 3 bills 75% °r more 5 bills 90% Or more 6 bills __~ N) O\ H 1..) [.1 1.: U? i—‘l-JU'ICD HNNUT I—-’ h) aTestimony for or against a bill; it does n°t include ambiguous testimony. These data are based On a universe Of 119 groups and a universe of 145 b1113- COde: B--Business Groups L--Labor Groups FB-e Financial Business P--PP0f9331°na1 AB“Agricultural Business C--Citizen Groups SB--Small Business Groups R--Religious Groups A--Agricu1ture Groups V-—Veteran Groups 277 on 25 per cent of the twenty-six labor bills. The decline in the number of groups that testified on 25 per cent of the bills from the number that testified on one or more bills is very large-~more than 40 per cent-- for every policy category but one, civil rights bills. Even greater declines emerge when the number of groups that presented testimony on 50 per cent of the bills is compared with the number testifying on 25 per cent of the bills. Under the criterion of testimony on 75 per cent or more of the bills in a policy category, the eighty- four groups testifying once or more on labor bills are reduced to four groups. NO more than four groups testi- fied on 75 per cent of the bills in any policy category. For six policy categories, no group testified on as many as 90 per cent of the bills. No group testified on 100 per cent of the bills in any policy category. The major conclusion that emerges from the interpretation of these data is that for no policy category is there a large number of groups that testified on most Of the bills. Part Of the explanation for the rapid decline in the numbers of groups that presented testimony under the more demanding criteria, 70 per cent and 90 per cent, may be due to the fact that some of the policy categories used in the classification of bills are not rigorous in excluding bills that are not focused sharply on a single legislative policy. For example, the 278 business policy category includes several different kinds of bills that were of interest to different types of groups. However, the bills in some policy categories are more homogeneous. For example, the bills in the agricul- ture, housing, and trade categories are each addressed to a single policy sector. But the data in Table 60 show that not on half of the bills in each of these three categories did as many as fifteen groups present support- ing or Opposing testimonies. Thus, there are not numerous centers of power that testify repeatedly on most bills in a single policy category. Nevertheless, there is one or a small number of groups that each testify on 50 per cent or more Of the bills in each policy category. Table 62 contains a list of the number of groups, classified by type of group, that presented testimony on 50 per cent or more of the bills in each policy category. Groups that testified at the 50 per cent level, or higher, on bills in a policy category will be identified in this chapter as the "active groups" in a policy category. Table 62 does not indicate whether the active groups on bills in one category are the same groups of that type that are active on bills in a second category. For example, the table does not show whether the two Labor groups that were active on labor bills are the same two Labor groups that were active on housing bills, trade bills, and bills in other policy categories. 279 pom mH hooeHomOp moodeo m HHHHo m pmonwo no pom mH use» screecc .OOpcooo mH hooEHmeem O H O O O O O O O O O O O O O O H O O O H O O 0 O 0 0 O O 3 O O O O mumpmpm> o o o o o o H o o o o o o o o o o H o o o o c o o o o o o o o o o o o o ”SOHwHHQm o N o o o .3 o o o N o o o o o o .3 o o o H. o o o o o o o o N o o o o cmNHpHO o o o o o o H o o o o o o o o o o H o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ngOHmmmrHOnHm O N O 0 O m 0 I O N O O N O O N O O O N O O N O 0 H O N O O N 0 h0g3 o l: o o o o o o o .3 o o o o o o N o o o H o o m o o N o o o o H o whzgflfiofigg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mmOonom HHmEm O O O O O o O O O O 0 O 0 O O O O O O O O O I 0 O 0 O O O O O O O O O O mama-“ma HomopHdOHLwd o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o c o N o o o o mmmgnfimdfim HOHooOCHm O m 0 o 0 0 O O 0 O O 0 ch 0 O H O O O H 0 O H O O O 0 j 0 O N O mmmgHmH-Pm snowmen mpsmHm onszzo use mLHth< mush moose who: wcH moped moose no make HHeHo -Huwa stcAcm -ch\em -Hmsm uesom Showmpmo %OHHom mmse_sm omHmHmmaHo .smoemsHn thpocH: huHAOCHz thnocHz hanOCHz ZOHBHmOm MBHmOZHS mme OZHMmm mmchmms kcoEHpmmpame mmcHmec hcofifipmmplm>fim mwchwmz hcoEHpmmplmsom mquLMmz AcoEHpmmpnmmmze mmcHnmms hcoEHpmmpnoze COHmH>HQ Hmsvm hsom mouse 039 who wo mo go mpHnocHz thLOCHS thLocHz szLOCHz ..HO mzoEHcmCD meHmmmm pm Umpcmmmpm moHcoEHpmme mo monssz mmDBQDOHmwd ZO mmBBHEZOO mmbom mme m0 WUZHmdmm Qmeomqmm OOH BmZH¢O¢ mo mom QmHmHBmme B<$B mmbomc OZOZ< mO<>¢MQO 92¢ WBHSHZH on» CH mosoow mop mo HHm mo monmo mEo: on» on econ mm: mnHm220Hpmmzv mmHno < .szopm mHH mo mmhm>Hcd poWHmm on» mp3 masopw mo mmnm>Hcs on» mmnH mp3 mHHHn mo mmnm>HQ5 one .pH UHMSOp nSOSmHQEm no HHHQ m pmonwm no non mm: pH Hooves: mo mmmHonmmmp poundoo mm; hcoEHpmop Hng III?! 0.0 . . . . . nesaeeo> 0.5H m w.mw W . . . . mSOHwHHom 0.:H m m.mm : . . . . . :oNHnHo 0.0 0 0.0 0 . mmochsm HHmEm m.mH m 0.0m m . . . mASpHsoHnw< 0.0 0 m.:H m . . . mmmszdm HmHocmsHm m.0H m m.mH m . . . mmmchsm HmnSpHSOHpm¢ 0.mm H w.mH m . . HmCOHmmmmonm OoMH m momm OH 0 o a o o o “00.3 m.m s H.Hm mm . . . . nameHmsm . ommH on LOHnm .nmwz CH ommwm p02 manage mo mchoE qummB mo .02 .w>< ommH on LOHom @5090 no some 20pmcH£mm3 CH mmOHmmo psossz masonw no .02 man on nOHnm coo CHnmmz cH venom masonc no mchoE -Hemee to .oz .wsa mzmH on LOHnm cOpwcHnmmz CH mmonmo anz masono no .02 @802 on B¢m B¢MB WADomO Mm NZOEHBmmB ho MEDHO> MES mo ZOmHmdeOO < mm mamdB 305 years, they develop rapport and skill in representing their groups in Washington. Second, both of these groups have their offices in New York City within easy travel of Washington, D. C. A second approach to assessing the importance of proximity in fostering interaction among groups is to identify the groups that established offices in Washington during the middle of the period, 1945-60, and to compare the number of testimonies presented before the Washington office was established with the number presented afterwards. Table 67 shows the number of testimonies presented by each of eleven groups that established an office in Washington from 1949 through 1956. All but two of these groups presented substantially more testimonies after the Washing- ton office was opened than in the earlier period. On the basis of this evidence most groups that are active in the hearings process are in close physical proximity to each other. Proximity does foster contact among groups, as measured by volume of testimony at hearings, and therefore, these groups are likely to be more integrated than groups that are located farther away. Interaction Among_Groups A third indicator of the degree of integration in an aggregation of entities is the volume of interaction among the entities. The premise is that the greater the amount of interaction, the greater the integration of the 306 .mOHmmo CowmcHnmmE mpH mo mCHcho ecu on HOHLQ kcoEHpmop and 0mm c>m£ poc UHsoo pH .mnommnmnp q0mmH CH UmanHQmpmo was osoow mHSBm mH MH :mQH . . . . . . . . mcmnmpm> nmz gmHsmh H MH mmmH . mosHo a.ceEoz HmQOHmmcmonm one mmonHmsm mo COHpmnoUmm HmCOHpnz 0H 0 :mmH . . . COHpmHOOmm¢ HmQHOHcdz CMOHnmE< @ H HmmH . . . COHpmHOOmm< mumsono mHnmnomc> h m mmmH . . COHpmHoomm¢ mmHneemmno HmQOprz HH w mmmH . . . . . . . opSpHpmcH wcHLSpommscmz oHproB cmoHnmE< HH m 0mmH . . . . . . nOHnmE¢ mo COHpmHQOmm< mocmASmCH mmHH m m 0mmH . . . . . . COHpCm>noo mMHH QMOHLmE¢ w o sommH . . . . . . soHHoa psoaxmueeooeH no noan one .mnSszoHnw¢ .znpmSUCH .mo moppHEEoo mUHZQOprz o m :mQH . . . . . . COHHmHoowmd QHSmEnmpm cmOHnoE¢ OHOHomm NH m mmmH . moSpHpmsH ocHnmz pcmnopmz cmoHnmE< mOHmuo eOHmmo copwcH nonwcHnmmz 050nm mo mEmz couwcHzmmz mo wchogo ooch mmHGOEHpmmB Ignaz mCHCmQO CH monmo Op LOHnm UmcmHHnmpmm mchoEHpmoB ZOBOZHmm¢3 2H MOHmmO Zd szmmo mo¢m mMBm¢ Qz¢ mmommm mmbomc wm mmHZOEHEOME m0 mZDHO> mme m0 zomHmUJH Cfiwmfies .838 538 538 833 Egg None . . . . . . . . . . O l 4 20 36 One Category . . . . . . 19 43 53 57 Two Categories . . . . . 12 31 32 24 15 Three Categories . . . . 21 25 19 8 4 Four Categories . . . . 20 13 8 3 1 Five Categories . . . . 23 15 2 3 2 Six Categories . . . . . l4 3 5 3 1 Seven Categories . . . . 8 4 1 l O Eight Categories . . . . lO 4 2 2 1 Nine Categories . . . . 2 O l O 0 Ten Categories . . . . . 3 1 O 1 2 Eleven Categories . . . 4 3 2 l 0 These data are based on a universe of 119 groups and a universe of 145 bills. All testimony included in this table is for or against bills; ambiguous testimony is not included. aThe One Testimony Criterion means that a group was counted in the cell of 'One Category" if its leaders presented one testimony or more on bills in only one policy category. _ bThe Two Testimony Criterion means that a group was counted in the cell Of 'One Category" if its leaders presented two or more testimonies on bills in one policy category, and so on for the other criteria. 311 policy categories falls sharply from the number testifying on bills in three, four, and five categories. Only 23 per cent of the groups presented testimony on bills in seven or more policy categories. The large number of groups that testified on bills in three, four, and five cate- gories, using the one-testimony criterion, reveals that interaction between groups of different types is fairly frequent. However, the use of a one~testimony criterion for measuring interaction provides an incomplete picture of the distribution of group testimonies among the bills in the different policy categories. The presentation of testimony on only one bill out of seven or more bills in one policy category during a sixteen-year period is not a sound basis on which to generalize about group interaction. Six policy categories each contain thirteen or more bills and the smallest number of bills in any policy category is seven. Therefore, to rely on one testimony as the standard for measuring the degree of interaction among groups on bills in different policy categories is unsatisfactory. Columns Two, Three, Four, and Five in Table 68 show how rapidly the numbers of groups providing testimony on bills in five, four, three, and two policy categories decline as the criterion for counting a group as having testified on a bill increases from one to five testimonies. For example, the table shows that the number of groups that presented testimony on bills in four policy 312 categories declines from 20 to 13 to 8 to 3 to l, as the criterion is changed from one to five testimonies. Under the three-testimonies criterion, 79 per cent Of the 119 groups testified on bills in three policy categories or less. Under the five-testimonies criterion, fifty-seven of the groups, almost half of the universe, testified on bills in only one policy category and only 10 per cent of the groups are active in testifying on bills in more than two categories. The large numbers Of groups in the NOne row of cells under the four--and five-testimonies criteria, twenty and thirty-six respectively, are partly due to the fact that many groups did not testify very frequently over the sixteen-year period, and partly because the testimonies of these infrequent witnesses Often were scattered among bills from more than two policy categories. It is significant that eleven interest groups recorded as having testified on bills in three or more policy categories under the five-testimony criterion are of seven different types Of interest groups. These groups, shown in Table 69 are distributed among the types of groups as follows: four Agriculture groups, two labor groups, and one each of the following types of groups, Business groups, Citizens groups. Religious groups. Professional groups, veterans groups. Thus, there is at least one group from each of seven of the ten types of groups that has a fairly broad range of legislative 313 TABLE 69 THE ELEVEN GROUPS IN THE SELECT UNIVERSE THAT PRESENTED TESTIMONIES ON BILLS IN THREE OR MORE POLICY CATEGORIES Policy Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Grp Category A B C D E F G H I J K labor . . . . 2O 25 25 15 O 7 5 8 4 7 4 Housing . . . 8 l4 14 l 4 3 l 7 5 6 8 Business . . 8 9 8 ll 5 4 10 2 O O 0 Trade . . . . 7 10 8 l3 7 10 11 3 5 l 5 Education Welfare . ll ll 13 7 4 lO 6 7 4 6 3 Foreign Affairs .. 6 8 9 7 5 6 4 6 4 l 6 Tax . . . . . 5 5 7 3 O 2 4 l 2 2 1 Agriculture . 2 6 6 7 1 6 7 O O l O Civil Rights 1 7 5 O O 2 O 4 6 O 3 Defense . . . 6 6 5 4 O 2 4 l 2 2 2 Miscellaneous 3 3 4 l O 2 l O O O 0 Total 77 104 104 69 26 54 53 39 32 26 32 These data are based on a 119-group universe and a universe of 145 bills. The criterion for counting a group as having testified on bills in each policy category is five testimonies. Code: A--U. S. Chamber of Commerce B--Congress of Industrial Organizations C--American Federation of Labor D--American Farm Bureau Federation E--Cooperative League Of the U. S. A. F--Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union Of America (NFU) G--National Grange H--Americans for Democratic Action I--National Council of Jewish Women J--National Federation of Settlement Houses K--American Veterans Committee interests even under the five-testimony criterion. If the four kinds of business groups--Business, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business--are combined into 314 one type of group, every type has one group testifying on bills in three or more policy categories. Table 70 shows the number of groups of different types that were represented at hearings on bills in different policy categories. The cells Of the table show the number of bills in each policy category that attracted testimonies from groups of different types. For example, Table 70 shows there were ten bills on which groups of nine different types presented testimony. All ambiguous testimonies are excluded from this table; only testimonies that could be classified for or against bills are counted. Table 70 shows that when using a one-testimony criterion, there were no bills on which groups of only one or two types presented testimony. The smallest number of groups of different types that presented testi- monies for any bills was three. Nine bills from five policy categories were considered at hearings at which groups of only three different types presented testimony. Groups of at least six different types testified on every defense bill and on one defense bill testimonies were presented by groups from nine of the ten types. At the hearing on one labor bill, and also at the hearing on one education/welfare bill, groups of all ten types presented testimony. These data provide firm support for the conclusion that groups of three or more types interact at every hearing that attracts a substantial 315 .mHmOSOCOLOQ c .mneoncoo noon: NMH on» NO anomopmo some CH mHHHo mo nonssc prow WWWMpm mH OOH» .HHHQ mSu so eeHeraoe msHese he essence nH Ozone no been peer .aboweeso s OH hHHHn egos no Ono so OOHmHommp some n no macaw moo MHIICOHnopHno hcoermOBamcow .mHHHD OMH mo mmLm>Hcs m can masonw OHH mo omnO>HCS n so Osman Ohm sumo omens O O O H m s H O O O meanness H H m z z N o H 0 0 . AOHv OHMMWO3\cwwpwwfiom 0 H N H m N 0 H 0 0 . . . . . . . . AOHV was O O m m H m O O O O . . AmHV maHsooa smHeaom O H m H m O O O O O . . . . . . Asv thereto 0 m N m 0 m s H 0 0 . . . . . . . AOHV momma 0 0 0 H m m w m o 0 . . . . . AmHv mmmchsm H N m m m m d m 0 o . . . . . . . A NV Honmq O O O O O O N O O O . . . . A v nnsmHm HH>HO O m m m a H O O O O . . .onHm nHHHm wansom OH m w e m m s m m H nHHHm no neHsowersO OOOHNHOOOB page monks pOOLOMMHQ mo masons mo nonssz mmHMOUMBdo NOHHOm BzmmmmMHQ m0 mHHHm ZO mmmwe 92mmWEMHQ mo OMDomO mo NZOEHBOMB Oh mqmdfi 316 number of witnesses for national groups. Although only a few bills in approximately half of the policy categories attracted groups of most types, in general, there is at least a moderate degree Of interaction among groups of different types at hearings. Interaction among groups Of several types tends to contribute to the increasing integration of these groups if they testify fairly frequently. Table 71 is designed like Table 70 and contains the same kind of data. The difference between them is that the criterion for counting different types of groups as having presented testimony is changed from the testi- mony of one group of each type to three groups of each tYpe. For example, the type, Business group, will not be counted as providing testimony on a bill unless three Business groups provide testimony on it. This is a more demanding criterion. By definition it eliminates the Small Business type, since only two Small Business groups are included in the select universe Of 119 groups. Three other types of groups also have a small number of representatives in the select universe; there are five Veterans groups, six Financial Business groups, and seven Religious groups. The tabulations in Table 71 show the effects of Changing the criterion. At only one hearing, a hearing On a housing bill, were testimonies received from groups of eight types. The hearings on only seven bills, from 317 .mHmmeCOCmQ CH omumpm mH knowmpmo Como CH mHHHo mo CODES: anOp OCBQ .HHHQ 0:» Co UOHMHpmmu mCH>mC mm OOCCCOO mH CCOCN mo Oahu COCO .znommpwo hOHHOC m CH HHHQ O CO OOHmemop nah» m mo masonw OOCCO NHIICOHCOOHCO mCoEHpmmenomCCBm ll 0000000000 0000000000 HOOOOOOOOO HOOONNOONO HOHOOOOHNO HOSOMHNONO \OHKOONNNMr-lm :f-d’d‘d‘NNLnN-d'm r-{NCD O\L(\O«:f (\l L03 OHMKONOONOH .nHHHC mmH mo mmCO>HCC m OCn mCCOCw mHH mo OmCO>HCC O CO comma OCm memo Omens . . . HOV enspHOOHaw< AOHV oasaHo3\eMHewosem O O O O 0 O OH ”we . AmHv mCHmmmd CmHmCom . . . . “by omCmmOQ o o o o o o wmfiv mUMQpH. . . . . AmH mmmCHmCm o o o o o o AWNV ..HOQS . . . Amy no: Hm HH>HO . . . . nHmHv wCHmCOm ON OH m n O m a m OOOHHHOOOB pOCB mQCOCO mo momma HCOCONMHQ no Conesz mmHCowoumo %OHHON mmHmOUMB e0.m s0.w s0.m wmum mm.H >0.m OO.m OO.m Amy nOOHwHHcm OO.: mwum Om.m OO.m OO.H OO.:. Om.m OO.m ANOCONHrHO mmum ow.m OO.m OO.m mwum O0.m om.m OO.m Amy CooeH OO.: om.m OO.m om.m om.H OO. om.m om.m Amv HssoHnnoooaa Om.m mm.m OO.: mm.m OO.H OO.m O .m me.m HBO enerHsoHama OO.H H0.H mn.m mm.m OO.H mm.m Mmum aMm.m Amy neceHnsm HOCCOHCOHCwH mum on. a wmum om.m sliced “Mum RH smwnm 3 steamer HmHonCHm HO.m mm.m m0.m OO.m OO.H se.m mm.m wO.m HmHO mmeansm e O a n O O m 2 Ozone no case mCOponm mmmmczoo mBHB mZOHBHBOmmmm mMBmom BmC mCmoE Hmmhp pCmH>00 umos 039 0C» nouns mCmoE Hmmhp pmosoH 0C0 umoCmHC OCH Coospon oown 0:» OH oown omHnHooE OCBO .mCHH chonfl m hp OOCHHnOOCS mH came Hanna prH>oo pmos OCOoom OCBQ .OCHH meonnCs Cm hp OOCHHnOOCC wH nouonn Como non pmoe mopmH>mo mep Coca Hmnhp Ones .COprHCmmz CH mOOHnnO OOC pMCp masonw pmonopCH HwCOHme osouhpnon non CosmoxOQw OCO CpHs m30H>nOpCH CO comma one sumo OmOCB om. OO.H om. om. um.N mO.N NO. OO.H Oh. OO.H m:. NH.m omCmos pwmon OCO pmonHC Coozpmp cown OOHMHOOE anoE pmmon 0C0 pmewHC Coosuoo menm mpCOUCOQmon N: no COOS HHmInOOO 329 the most deviant mean for more than one factor was Agriculture. The second most deviant typal means for the eight factors encompassed six different types of groups, but one type of group, Financial Business, had the second most deviant mean for three factors. NO other type of group had the second most deviant mean for more than one factor. A count of the two most deviant typal means for each factor yields a total of eighteen means instead of sixteen; because for two factors, two types of groups have the same mean. Of these eighteen deviant means, nine of them are the means of groups of two types, Agricultural Business and Financial Business. Two other types of groups, Agriculture and Labor have two deviant means each. The remaining deviant means are those of five different types. A total of six of the ten types of groups have no more than one of the eighteen most deviant means, Business (none), Professional (one), Citizen (one), Religious (one), Veterans (one), Small Business (one). The only question that remains unanswered concern- ing these data is the extent to which the spokesmen of specific groups of a type agree among themselves in rating these factors. Inspection of the data compiled in Table 76 reveals that group respondents within each of certain types differ substantially among themselves in the assign- ment of ratings. 330 TABLE 76 DEVIANT RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS ON FACTORS THAT FOSTER EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratingsa Avg. NO. of No. of Deviant Rat- Deviant ing for Each Type of Group 0 l 2 3 4 5 Ratings Respondent Business (l3)b 4 4 l 2 l l 21 1.61 Financial Business (4) 2 O 2 O 0 O 4 1.00 Agricultural Business (3) o 1 0 1 o 1 9 3.00 Small Business (1) 0 l 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 Labor (5) 1 3 o 1 0 0 6 1.20 Agriculture (4) 1 0 o 3 o 0 9 2.25 Professional (5) 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 Citizens (2) 1 0 1 o 0 0 2 1.00 Religious (3) 1 1 o 1 0 o 4 1.33 Veterans (2) 1 1 0 o o 0 1 .50 Total 57 These data are based on the interviews with forty-two spokesmen for national interest groups. There are eight factors that were rated by each respondent. aA deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean rating of all forty-two respondents. bNumber of groups within each type. Table 76 shows the number of groups within each type that registered zero, one, two, three, four, or five deviant ratings on the eight factors that foster effective relations with Congress. A deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean of the 331 ratings for all forty-two respondents. The table also contains the average number of deviant ratings, of a pos- sible eight ratings, for each respondent in each type. The highest number of deviant ratings for groups of one type was for Agricultural Business, with an average of three deviant ratings for each group; the next highest number was for Agriculture with an average of 2.25 deviant ratings for each group. More important, however, is the extent to which the groups of a type disagreed among themselves in rating these factors. The five Professional groups constituted Ithe only type that failed to register at least one deviant rating. The distribution of deviant ratings is, in general, uneven among groups within each type. The greatest dis- persion of ratings for groups in one type is registered for Business groups. There is at least one Business group in each of the columns denoting the number of deviant ratings. Thus, Business groups were widely split in their ratings of these factors. An even greater split occurs for the Agricultural Business groups; one group has one deviant rating, a second group has three deviant ratings, and a third group has five deviant ratings. The large number of deviant ratings registered by a few groups in some types distorted the average number of deviant ratings for the groups of that type. For example, the thirteen Business groups registered a combined total 0f twenty-one deviant ratings but the table shows that nine 332 of the twenty-one deviant ratings were registered by only two Business groups, and six more of the twenty-one deviant ratings were registered by two additional Business groups. When these four most deviant groups are eliminated from consideration the nine remaining Business groups registered only five deviant ratings out of forty-five ratings and the average number of deviant ratings is reduced from 1.61 for thirteen Business groups to .55 for nine Business groups. The elimination of the group with the most deviant ratings from the calculation of the typal means for Religious and Labor groups also reduced the average number of deviant ratings for each considerably. This exercise indicates that except for Profes- sional groups and perhaps Agriculture groups, the variable "type of group" is not very useful in explaining the number of deviant ratings. It is more meaningful to focus on the specific groups having three or more deviant ratings each. These eight groups, excluding Agriculture groups, are of four different types: four Business, two Agricul- tural Business, one Labor, and one Religious. These eight groups with the most deviant ratings account for twenty-nine of the fifty-seven deviant ratings of the forty—two respondents. In other words, thirty-six respondents registered a combined total of only twenty- eight deviant ratings, an average per group of .78 of a possible 8.0. If the three Agricultural groups with the most deviant ratings are also included, the eleven most 333 deviant groups account for thirty-eight of the deviant ratings and the remaining thirty-one respondents regis- tered only nineteen. When the forty-two respondents are divided into the most deviant and the least deviant groups--in terms of these ratings--the groups within each of five types are split with one or more group in the non—deviant groups and one or more group in the deviant grouping. In Chapter IV, the Opinions of interviewees were discussed on both the factors that promote COOperation and the types of COOperation practiced by the groups they represent. The tabulation of the typal means revealed a remarkable consistency in the way group representatives from ten types of groups evaluated factors that promote cooperation and the types of COOperation practiced. It is worth-while to consider some of the major findings that emerge when the typal means are compared with each other. First, Table 77 reveals that the ranges between the highest and lowest typal means on the factors promoting cooperation are very small when the most deviant and the second most deviant typal means have been eliminated from consideration. That is, when the eight non-deviant typal means are considered, the range between the highest and lowest means for four of the six factors is .75 or less of a possible 3.0. The ranges of the means for the fifth and sixth factors were 1.00 and 1.67. This is a fairly high level of agreement among the thirty-five to forty 334 TABLE MEANS OF RATINGS ON FACTORS THAT PROMOTE COOPERATION ARRANGED BY TYPE OF GROUP 77 0F RESPONDENTS Type Of Group and Number of Groups Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor within Each Aa B C D B F Business (13) 3.46 2.77 3.38 3.92 2.23 1.46 832322;:l(14) 3.25 2.25 2.50 4.00 1.25 1.50 BigiggiguI31 3.00 1.67 2.67 4.00 1.33 1.00 Agriculture (4) 3.75 2.00 2.75 3.50 2.00 1.00 Professional (5) 4.00 2.40 3.40 4.00 2.00 1.60 Labor (5) 3.40 2.20 3.40 3.40 2.60 2.00 Citizen (2) 4.00 1.50 4.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 Religious (3) 3.33 2.67 3.00 4.00 3.67 1.33 veterans (2) 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 Small Business (1) 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 Over-all Mean 3.45 2.40 3.07 3.88 2.27 1.59 Range between gigggitnggs 2.00 1.50 1.50 .60 2.42 2.50 Modified Rangeb .75 1.00 .73 .12 1.67 .50 aSee pages 165-6 Chapter IV. bRange between highest and lowest means after the most deviant and next most deviant means have been elimin- ated from consideration. Rating Code: Very important factor--4 Moderately important factor-~3 A factor of no importance--1 Minor factor--2 335 respondents representing eight different types of groups. The total number of ratings by all respondents on all factors is 209. Only thirty of these 209 ratings are deviant ratings. This is a considerably smaller number of deviant ratings than would be expected if ratings were determined by chance but it is not so small as to be statistically significant.5 Inspection of the table reveals that no single type of group accounts for as many as one-fourth Of the deviant ratings, but since the number of group respondents within the types of groups varies from one to thirteen this generalization has little merit. The average number of deviant ratings for each respondent in each type is more useful. Table 78 below contains these averages for each type of group. It shows that although Business groups had a large number of deviant ratings, this is a result of the large number Of business groups. Only one Business group has as many as two deviant ratings; four Business groups have one deviant rating each and eight Business groups have no deviant ratings. Thus, the average number of deviant ratings for each Business group is less than .50. The highest average number of deviant ratings for each group, classified by type of group, was registered by veterans groups, 2.50, Financial Business groups, 1.50, _— 5That is, the probability of getting this distri- bution, 30 and 179, would occur by chance on approximately 14 out of 100 times. 336 TABLE 78 DEVIANT RATINGS 0F RESPONDENTS ON FACTORS THAT PROMOTE COOPERATION CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratingsa Avg. No. of No. of Deviant Rat- _5 Deviant ing for Each Type of Group 0 1 2 3 4 5 Ratings Respondent Business (13)b 8 4 1 O O 0 6 .46 Financial Business (4) l o 3 0 o o 6 1.50 ricultural Ag Business 3) l l O l 0 O 4 1.33 Agriculture 4 2 2 0 O 0 O 2 .50 Professional (5) 3 2 0 o o o 2 .40 Labor (5 3 2 o o o 0 2 .40 Citizen 22 l l O 0 O O l .20 Religious ) 1 2 O O O O 2 . 7 Veterans (2 O l O O l O 5 2.50 Small Business (1) l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 Total 30 * These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups. utside a range of 238 ggzézggdrggigfieigegnrgzigggf8313II Party-two respondents. and Agricultural Business groups, 1.33. Only these three types of groups had averages exceeding 1.00 per group. Table 78 also indicates one group accounts for the high average number of deviant ratings for veterans groups and ASriculturalBusiness groups; the most deviant veterans d group had four deviant ratings out of a possible six, an 337 the most deviant Agricultural Business group had three deviant ratings. The variable "type of group" is useful in discriminating between deviant and non-deviant groups only for Financial Business groups. Three of the four Financial Business groups had two deviant ratings each. If the number of deviant ratings for the six respondents having the most deviant ratings are totaled, fifteen of the deviant ratings, 50 per cent of the total, are accounted for. In other words, thirty-six respondents had fifteen deviant ratings out of a total of 209 ratings. This is a high level of agreement among groups representing ten types. Table 79 shows a high level of agreement among respondents also exists on the frequency with which certain types of cooperation are practiced. When the two most deviant typal means are eliminated from consideration for each type of cooperation, the range between the highest and lowest typal means for each of the five types of cooperation is 1.25 or lower. The modified range for two of the types of cooperation was .80 and .67. Thus, when the ratings of respondents from grouPs of eight types are considered, involving from thirty-two t0 thirty-nine respondents, a high level of agreement on the types Of cooperation practiced is disclosed. Table 80 contains tabulations on the number or deviant ratings of respondents, classified by type 0f 338 TABLE 79 RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FIVE TYPES OF COOPERATION AMONG GROUPS Types of COOperation Type of Group A B C D E Business (13)a . . . . . 3.69C 3.23 3.38 1.53 2.46 Financial Business (4) . 3.75 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.25 Agricultural Business (3) 4.00 3.67 4.00 1.00 1.33 Small Business (1) . . . 4.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 Labor (5) . . . . . . . . 3.80 3.20 3.60 2.20 2.20 Agricultural (4) . . . . 4.00 2.50 2.75 1.50 2.25 Professional (5) . . . . 3.20 2.60 3.20 1.80 2.40 Citizen (2) . . . . . . . 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.50 Religious (3) . . . . . . 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.67 2.67 Veteran (2) . . . . . . . 3.00 2.50 1.50 1°00 2°00 RangioggggeggagighES? 3n? 1.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 1.42 Modified Range between Eéigggt 3n? 30383t. . . .80 1.17 1.25 1.00 .67 aThe total number of groups within a type. b the range between the The modified range is . hiShest and lowest means after the two most deVIant means have been eliminated. Frequently practiced-~4.0 Occasionally practiced-~3.0 Rarely practiced--2.0 Never practiced--l.0 Rating Code: 339 TABLE 80 DEVIANT RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS ON TYPES OF COOPERATION PRACTICED CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratingsa Avg. No. of NO. of Deviant Rat- Deviant ing for Each Type of Group 0 l 2 3 4 5 Ratings Respondent Business (l3)b 8 l 3 1 O 0 10 1.25 Financial Business (4) l 2 0 1 0 0 5 1.25 Agricultural - Business (3) 1 2 O 0 O O 2 .67 Small Business (1) 0 O O l O 0 3 3.00 Labor (5) 4 O 1 O O O 2 .40 Agriculture (4) 2 O l 1 0 0 5 1.25 Professional (5) 0 4 O 1 O O 7 1.40 Citizens (2) l l O O O O 1 .50 Religious (3) l l O O l 0 5 1.67 Veterans (2) O l 0 O l 0 5 2.50 Total 45 These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups. aA deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean rating of all forty-two respondents. bThe total number of groups represented by respondents in a type. group, concerning the types of cooperation practiced. Of the 210 ratings by respondents on all types of cooperation, forty-five are deviant ratings. Inspection of the table reveals that the groups of no single type have as many as One-fourth of the total deviant ratings. Business groups 340 have the largest number of deviant ratings, but this seems to be due to the larger number of Business groups. The types Of groups with the highest average number of deviant ratings per respondent are Small Business, 3.00, Veterans, 2.50, Religious, 1.67, and Professional groups, 1.40. Although the number of groups in the first three types is too small to assume they represent adequately the groups in the pOpulation Of that type, Table 80 indicates the type of group is not a useful variable in explaining deviancy, except perhaps for Veterans groups, since there is one group of almost every type that has more than one deviant rating. The ratings of groups from different types account for most Of the deviant ratings. For instance, seven types each have one group with three or more deviant ratings. But no type has two groups with three or more deviant ratings. Furthermore, the impact of the deviations of the most deviant group in each type is clarified when deviant ratings of groups are totaled. The seven groups with the most deviant ratings, represent- ing seven different types, account for twenty-three of the forty-five deviant ratings of all respondents. In other words, thirty-five respondents had among them a total or twenty-two deviant ratings of a possible 165 ratings. This is an average of .63 deviant rating for each group or a possible 5.0. 341 In conclusion, for the groups represented by thirty—five respondents from nine types of groups, there is a large degree of agreement concerning the frequency with which the different types of cooperation are prac- ticed. The most startling feature of Table 80 is the presence of one group in almost every type whose practices differ sharply from the other groups of that type. This finding suggests that within each type, there may be an ordering of groups in terms of the extent to which they relate themselves to other groups for cooperative activi- ties. This may indicate that the groups with deviant views have perceived that there are a limited number of positions for groups of their type that can successfully practice the prevailing style of the prestigious groups. Therefore, the only positions that seem to be Open require roles that are characterized by deviant practices. Structure in the Group Population Individuals in a population tend to relate themselves to each other in an orderly manner. It is eXpected that the leaders and representatives of different groups having goals in the same policy sectors also tend to become related to each other in orderly ways. The Character and the extent of these relationships constitute one measure of the degree to which integration exists among the groups in the population. The literature on interest groups indicates there are few visible formal 342 arrangements or processes that reveal the degree or form of structure in the group pOpulation at the congressional level. One approach to the problem of discovering struc- ture is the analysis of aggregate data on the behavior of a large number of grOups in the population over a long period of time. In this investigation, four indicators of the degree of structure among groups are used: (1) the extent to which new groups enter and incumbent groups depart from the interest group system, (2) the extent to which hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee are dominated, in terms of numbers of groups testifying, by the highly active incumbent groups as compared with the groups that testify infrequently and irregularly, (3) the degree to which the hearings of the House Agricul- ture Committee are dominated by the active Agriculture groups or groups of other types, and (4) the extent to which the relative positions of the active groups-- measured in terms of volume of testimonies-~remain stable over a long period of time. The Openness of the Interest Group System The greater the rate at which new groups enter the system at the congressional level and incumbent groups depart from it, the less the structure in the group pOpula- tion. It is assumed that time is required for new entrants to become integrated into an ordered population and an 343 unfamiliar environmental system and for incumbent groups to adjust to the departure of incumbents and the entrance of new groups. On the other hand, the less change in the group pOpulation, the greater the probability that a structured pattern of relations, either formal or informal, will be developed. Thus, the expectations are that the greater the turnover of groups in the population during a given time span, the less the degree of integration. The extent to which interest groups enter and depart from the interest group system at the congressional level is difficult to measure. The notion that there are boundaries on the interest group system that cannot be quickly or easily permeated, at least not by most groups, has not been formulated in the literature on interest groups. The approach used in this research was to identify the frequency of testimony by groups in two consecutive time spans and establish criteria for defining the entrance of groups into the interest group system and departure from it. In this research the entrance of groups into the system is conceived in terms of two stages. The first stage begins with the establishment of the group and ends With the first presentation of testimony at hearings by the leaders of the group. The second stage begins with the first presentation of testimony by the group leaders and ends when the group becomes integrated into the interest group system. This process may be compared to 344 the process by which individuals are socialized into the roles of a political culture. The leaders and members of a new group usually do not emerge onto the political scene in Washington with fully developed skills and knowledge that enable them to attain their legislative objectives, nor do they have the rapport with congressional committee members, staff, or with the leaders of the many other groups that are also interested in the same policy sectors. Most new groups probably have only partial knowledge of the formal and informal expectations associated with the role of an interest group seeking legislative Objectives. Some of the prerequisites for effective relations with Congress and cooperation among groups have been discussed earlier in this chapter. When a high level of knowledge, experience, and rapport is obtained, the group is "integrated" into the interest group system. Thus, the term "interest group system" is conceived in terms of a high degree of related- ness among groups through interaction with each other and with the staffs and members of congressional committees. Such a system does not necessarily include all of the "most influential groups" that pursue legislative objec- tives. But insofar as a group needs certain skills, current information, experience, rapport with other groups, and knowledge of groups that oppose its objectives, it seems likely that the group will become integrated into 345 the system either by deliberate actions of its leaders or involuntarily. The entrance and departure of groups is analyzed both for the interest group system as a unity-~for all bills combined--and for specific subsystems within it that are defined in terms of the testimonies on bills in certain policy categories, such as labor bills. For both kinds of analyses, the sixteen-year period, 1945-60, must be divided into two time spans in a manner that provides a relatively even distribution of the hearings in each. The division of the time span into two equal periods, one from 1945—52, and the second from 1953-60, also divides the hearings satisfactorily as shown in Table 81. Although the number of hearings in the two periods varies greatly from committee to committee, when the numbers of hearings for all committees are totaled sixty-eight hearings, 47 per cent of the total, were held in the period 1945-52, and seventy-seven hearings, 53 per cent Of the total, were held in the later period. The definition of group "entrance" into the interest group system is made in terms of how many testimonies a group presented during two successive eight-year periods. For the eight-year period. 1945-52. data were collected on sixty-eight hearings. It seems clear that one or two testimonies during an eight-year period is not an indication that a group is established 346 TABLE 81 NUMBERS OF GROUPS TESTIFYING ON BILLS IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES FOR TWO TIME SPANS Number of Groups Testifying Number of Policy - Categories 1945-52 1953-60 NO Categories 16 6 One Category 23 32 Two Categories 31 52 Three Categories 42 38 Four Categories 23 25 Five Categories 15 19 Six Categories 12 7 Seven Categories 10 3 Eight Categories 5 0 Nine Categories 5 3 Ten Categories 7 4 Total 189 189 These data are based on a universe of 189 groups and a universe of 145 bills. Testi- mony is counted if it is for or against a bill, or ambiguous toward it. within the system. Even if each group confined its testi- mony to bills in one policy category during the period it seems reasonable to use a three-testimony standard in defining group entrance. A four-testimony standard seems reasonable if many groups did not present all their testi- monies on bills in one policy category. The stress given in this discussion to the numbers of policy categories in which groups are active is based on the assumption that frequent testimonies on bills in one policy category does 347 not necessarily assure that a group will have standing with a different committee and with a different set of groups on bills in a different policy category. The distribution of testimonies by the 189 groups for the two periods is compiled in Table 81. It shows that during the period 1945-52, twenty-three groups confined their testimonies to bills in one policy category, and thirty-one additional groups testified at hearings on bills in two policy categories. The mode and the median of the number of policy categories within which group spokesmen presented testimony on bills during this period are both three. Since testimonies on bills in three or more policy categories are characteristic of 119 of the 189 groups, the number of groups used to define the entrance and departure of groups from the system must reflect this fact. For this analysis, five different standards were prepared for assessing the number of groups within the interest group system for the period 1945-52. The most demanding standard is five testimonies for the eight- year period. This standard allows a group that presented only five testimonies to concentrate all of them on bills in one policy category. This is probably enough testi- monies to indicate a group is within the system. It would be unlikely, however, given the tendency of nearly all groups to present testimonies on bills in at least two or three policy categories, that many groups presented 348 only five testimonies and presented all of them on bills of one policy category. An examination of the pattern of testimony by the twenty-three groups that testified on only one type of bill verified this notion. Only four of the fifty-four groups that testified on bills in one or two policy categories, testified on four or more bills in a single category. Therefore, a five-testimonies standard for defining groups as "within" the system is a standard tolerating very few groups that” made a small number of testimonies that were all presented on bills in one policy category. In general, the usual testimony pattern for groups that presented a total of four or five testimonies was to divide them between bills in two or more policy categories. Therefore, the five- testimonies standard for entrance of a group into the system is not as exclusive 3 standard as it appears. The rationale for the five-testimonies standard is that in general at least three testimonies on bills in one policy category are necessary to indicate the group is within the system. The dispersion of testimonies on bills in different policy categories by groups presenting four and five testimonies makes the five-testimonies standard seem appropriate. This investigation does not disclose how many groups "inside" the system in the period 1945-52 entered it in a previous time span. But since the number of inside groups was identified, using several different standards, for the 349 period 1945-52, it is possible to determine the number of groups entering the system in the subsequent time span, 1953-60. Table 82 contains the list of groups that entered the system in the period 1953-60 under the six-testimonies standard. It also indicates the number of testimonies each of these entrants had in the previous period. Table 82 shows a total of twenty-seven groups entered the system in the period 1953-60. This seems to be a very large number of entrants. The table indicates why. Under the six-testimonies criterion, entrance is defined in a way that permits some groups to be classified as entering the system in the second period by making only one more testimony in the second period than the group made in the preceding period. Because this defini- tion of entrance does not discriminate satisfactorily between outside and inside groups, it seems reasonable to reduce the number of testimonies for defining groups within the system in the first period and to require an increase of three of four testimonies in the second period to denote group entrance. Furthermore, some groups within the system in the period 1945-52 undoubtedly established themselves within the system in the years preceding 1945. For these groups a five-testimonies standard seems too demanding, since although five testimonies might be an acceptable indica- tion that a new group had attained entrance, three testi- monies seems reasonable to enable a group to maintain its 350 OOQH nnnnnn mnoxnoz ens: oceans II‘. .lllll waH COEXLOZ nmfiopdm UGO mnvafioumwz Umpmfimewfid MM M OCOH COHpmHoonnd mnmzono OHQmpoww> N m mmmH COHpCHOOOOC OOHnOEnono HOCOHpmz h m OOOH COHn084 no COHpmH00mm¢ ooCOnSnCH OMHH OH m OomH COHpCo>Coo onHH COOHnosd m m oomH COHanoomm< OnonsponnCan nonosm O m CZOCBCD mnoxnoz OCHCOOE OCO HOOanOOHm .OHomm no COHCD HOCOHpOCnopCH b N ONOH COEhnomndz no COHpmHoommd COOHnOE< m N >:mH COHpmHOOmm< HOOHOOz CmOHnOEC b N O:mH COHpmHoommd mnmxomapmmz mopwpm Cnopmoz N N NomH COHpOnooom HOCOHpmz manHHz O N mHmH COHpmHOOmm< QHCmEmmpm COOHnosd OHnHosm O N ONOH COHpmHOOmm< nmm COOHnOE< mm H momH mnOmemoe no OOOCnOCponm HOCOHuanOpCH O 0 NHmH COHpmHOOmm< mnmxcmm pCOEpmoan O 0 OOCmHHompmm 0O|mmmH Nmnm:mH nwow OOHCoaprOB OOnmmOH .amnmnm asome nmmmmnzn men oszmnzm masons Nw MHm¢B 351 OCH CH CCOanO CO mm OOHmHmmOHO OD poCCOO UCO OOHnOQ lem:mH OCHOWCMWWW WMWMWM OCH CHCpHs COOC O>OC EOE masonw OmOCp .OnomOnOCB .Nmim:mH «OOHnOC COOSICCOHO OCC CH mOHCOsHOmOp Onoe no OOnCO OOOCOmOnC O>OC EOE no OCOmOnC 0H0 nOCpHO .Onon IOnOCp .OCO .mmmH on nOHnC OEOC pCOnOONHO O COOCC hnOpmHC mCOH>OnC O OOC OCCOnw OmOCp mo Comm .OOImOOH OOHnOQ OCH CH mOHnoerwOp OnOe no KHm OCO .lem:mH OOHnOC OCH CH hCOermOp OCO no onON OOOCOwOnC mesonw HOCOHOHOOO nCOmO OOOH COHCHHOOOOO m.COEOprOO HOCOHCOZ COOHnOEC N m wmmH COHCOHoomm< m_COEmmOCHmCm HHOEm HOCOHCOZ h m m:OH mmOCHmsm CCOUCOQOOCH m0 COHpOnOUOm HOCOHPOZ O m BOOH eoHesHooana cHnsnemo> ess nHzna sheen eaneO O m OOOH OpSpHmeH OCHnOZ pCmConOE COOHnOE< NH O mOOH mnOOCHOCm O>HposoooH no oooCnOCoonm S : NmmH mnohmz no OoCOnOnCoo .m .D O : OOOH COHCOHOOOOC mOmnCz COOHnOfid O : N:OH OCOOOH mnOme>CH m : ::OH mnOpOnOQO nhOBnOpOB COOHnOE< O : NNOH COHCOHOOOO< m.pmHEOC0 OCHnSHOOMCCOZ OH : OOOH OCOOOH MMHCOB COOHnOsd _ N : ___ ,“A _.. 352 status within the system after it had entered the system in a previous period. Therefore, under a second definition a group is recorded as having entered the system in the second period if it had two or less testimonies in the first period and registered an increase of at least four testi- monies to a total of six. Under a three-testimonies standard for defining the number of groups within the system in the period 1945-52, there are 140 inside groups. During the second eight-year period, 1953-60, ten groups that were outside the system using a three-testimonies standard entered it using a six-testimonies standard. Using this definition of entrance, there is little move- ment by groups into the system. Table 82 also shows only three groups entered the system in the period 1954-60 without having testified at least once in the preceding period, and only one entrant testified once in the preced- ing period. These data suggest that there is a tendency for groups outside the system, who will later gain entrance, to increase gradually their testimonies from one period to the next before they attain entrance. Few groups emerge at the hearings process making frequent testimonies. These data tend to confirm the notion that integration into the system is usually a gradual process. Some of the groups that are listed as entrants in the period 1953-60 are nationally known prestigious groups. The small number of testimonies presented by the American 353 Medical Association and the American Bar Association during the first period might seem to indicate that the rate of testimonies at hearings is a poor measure of the degree of integration achieved by these groups with other active groups and with congressional committee members and staff. Perhaps this is true. But when a group testifies on only one or two bills of virtually all the major bills in an eight-year period it does not seem wise to conclude that the group is interacting with the groups that testify frequently at current legislative hearings. It is not unlikely that some prestigious groups may deliberately remain outside the interest group system part of the time. A group may choose this position because it can better resist the importunities of other groups, many of them less influential groups, that hOpe to induce participation by the prestigious group in behalf of their objectives. A group also may strengthen its influence with congressmen in the major policy sector with which it is concerned by confining its legislative activities to a few specific professional goals that are widely and intensely supported by its members. In this way its reputation with congressmen for representing only the direct and vital interests of its members remains unsullied, but this behavior tends to isolate it from the continuing interactions of the participants in the interest group system. 354 Table 82 also indicates that these entrants were, in general, not newly established groups. They were groups that were founded many years prior to 1953. Only one of the ten groups was founded in the decade of the 1940's, the Western States Meatpackers Association, and none was established in the 1950's. Table 82 reveals only three of the seventeen groups that presented three, four, or five testimonies in 1945-52 were founded as late as the decade of the 1940's. Thus, the four most recently established groups entering the system in 1953-60, using the criterion of five testimonies or less, were groups formed in 1946, 1944, 1943, and 1942. These data suggest that in recent years, at least, very few newly formed groups have entered the system. Of the 119 groups in the select universe, composed of the most active groups in the hearings process, only six groups were established since 1945 and only one of these ranked among the fifty most active groups. It appears that when new groups enter the system, they are not among the most active groups in presenting testimony for several years. The definition of group departure from the interest EPOUp system involves additional problems. The most troublesome question concerns the number of testimonies that should be used to define the departure of a group in the time span 1953-6O after it was located within the system during the previous period, 1945-52. 355 The simplest solution is to define a group as departed if it presents no testimony during the eight-year period, 1953-60. This seems too stringent a standard because one testimony during an eight-year period would not indicate active involvement. On the other hand it does not seem reasonable to require a group to have six testimonies in the second period as an indication that its inside status is maintained, because once this status is attained a smaller volume of testimony will suffice to indicate its continuance than was necessary to achieve it. The decision concerning the number of testimonies that best defines the departure of a group from the system must take into account the pattern of group testimony on bills of different types, as was mentioned earlier in the discussion of the entrance of groups into the system. Thirty-two groups confined their testimonies to bills in one policy category. Nine of these groups testified six times or more. Fifty-two additional groups presented testimony on bills in two policy categories. Twenty-two of these groups testified five times or more. Thus, a total of thirty-one of the eighty-four groups that testified on bills in one or two policy categories may have presented four or more testimonies on bills in a single policy category. This would be a much higher concentration of testimonies on bills in one or two policy categories than in the period 1945-52. This information suggests that a more stringent definition of departure is 356 justified than was appropriate for the definition of group entrance. Three different operational definitions are dis- cussed here because the stipulation of a specific number of testimonies defining departure is difficult to justify. Using a six-testimony standard, ninety-two groups were identified within the interest group system for the time span 1945-52. Table 83 shows the number of groups that departed from the system during the period 1953-60 under the three different definitions. Under the most stringent definition of departure, the non—testimony definition, three groups left the system in the period 1953-60. Under the intermediate definition, zero through three testimonies, fifteen of the ninety-two inside groups left the system. Under the least-demanding definition, zero through five testimonies, thirty—four of the ninety- two inside groups left the system. Only when this least- stringent definition of departure is used, five testimonies or less, is there much movement out of the system by inside groups. Only two of these thirty-four groups were among the twenty-eight most active inside groups in presenting testimony during the years, l945-52--the groups that made fifteen or more testimonies during the period. The two most active departing groups were the National Women's Trade Union League, that presented testimonies on twenty bills, and the PeOple's Lobby, that presented testimonies 357 TABLE 83 INSIDE GROUPS DEPARTING FROM THE SYSTEM DURING THE YEARS 1953-60 UNDER THREE DEFINITIONS OF DEPARTUREa “*1 No Testi- Three Testi- Five Testi- monies monies or Less monies or Less Type of Group 1953-60 1953-60 1953-60 Business 2 7 Financial Business 1 4 Agricultural Business 1 1 Agriculture 0 0 Professional 1 2 Labor 1 3 7 Citizen 2 5 9 Religious l 3 Veterans l 1 Small Business 0 O Departed groups total - 3 15 34 8The pOpulation of groups inside the system for the years 1945-52 is ninety-two. on sixteen bills. No evidence was found that these two groups are still functioning. Neither was listed in Gale's EngycIOpedia g£_Associations.6 Only one other group of the thirty-four, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, had more than twelve testimonies; it presented thirteen. It is still functioning and during the period 1953-60 presented four testimonies. For reasons already discussed, the four- and five- testimonies definitions do not seem suitable to designate 6Gale Research 00., Encyclopedia g§_Associations, 92. cit. * 358 departure. Under the three-testimonies definition of departure, fifteen groups are excluded from the system. The data in Table 84 shows that five of these groups are not listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations and may have ceased to exist. The other ten groups are still functioning. Only two of these departed groups, whose continued functioning has been confirmed,testified ten times or more in the previous eight-year period. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union testified twelve times in the period 1945—52, and the Consumers Union of the United States testified ten times. From these data it may be concluded that few groups, once they are inside, depart from the system. Furthermore, the groups that leave the system are rarely groups that are among the most active in the hearings process in the preceding several years. Many of the groups that presented the most testimony in the period 1945-52 were among the most active groups in the hearings process in the second eight-year period. Eight of the ten groups that presented the most testimonies in the first period also appeared in the list of the ten most active groups in the second period. Thus, the rates of group testimonies at hearings is fairly stable even over a period of many years. Finally, it is also clear that when groups leave the system under the intermediate definition of departure, three testimonies or less, only a few groups have ceased to function. Most of the groups ONmH mxcwm meH>wm H6595: MO COHQOflOOmmd HOCOdeZ NHQH COHPMHoommAW maHmHmwnm QHHnogopgd Hanoufipwz H“ W mama OQOOOQU Hfimpwm MO QOHuwHOOmmd HOCOHPMZ : O Himfi quEflnm>OU HMCOHDSPHumCOO now OOPPHEEOO m P :MOfi MGOHPod deoom 90% Hdoflfioo m P Omma Goapwfioonmd m.®>H950me n.nonmq hmsadwm m O OOOH COHED mkGKhoz PCQEQGU mmfifimq HGCOHmePOPCH m NH Hmma msmnmpw> cmoanmsd owHQMmHQ m w sama wsaddanm swoanmsd no noapwnooom Hmnoapmz m s mmmfl SOHuMdOOmmd mnmcso pnmEpnma¢ Hmcoapmz m m nzonxnp smnmESmnoo no soapmaoomm¢ Hanoapmz m 0 Oman mmpmpm swung: mg» no cons: mnmssmcoo m 0n 9, mama mnsHo m.nmEoz HwGOHmmmnonm :5 can mmonamsm no soapwnmoom Hmcoapmz m NH 2. smmn mappaesoo snpmzecn snnsn m m mzma mammoq smog can mmnfi>mm Hmcoapwz m N momfi moswmmq coanb moans m.nm503 choapmz 0 ON mmmn cannon m.mndomn o on csocxcb masonsoo onmmz HMCOHpmz o O cosmHHQMpmm OOnmmmH mmnmzma nmom mmHnoEHpmme OOImmmH «Smemwm mbomw EmmmmBZH mmB 20mm mmemdmmm Edme mmbomo :w mam<9 .pmfinco no nonssc Umpwnb onp Una mononzno nmfipmfinno HwCOprwonmnoo on» no nownoE on» mnfisOHHon bmma .ICH coapo¢ HmeOm nmflpmnnzo non HHonsoo onp osmoon COHpo< Hmfioom non HHonsoo one .mCOprHoOmm< no mflpomoHomocm m.mHmu no coapfloo :Oma onp CH popmfifl uozm 360 :QOH moppHEEoo nonmq UHHQO HMQOHpmz O O mzmfi pcoEQoHo>oQ OHEOCOom non ooupaEEoo m w Ommfi onnmE¢ no mnoxnozfimopm oopHnD O O nmma COHCD m.nmEmmSoc Ionmz ocm m.cmEonosmwnoq HmcoapmnnoQCH m O Omma moanmE< no mnoxnoz coapmoHCSEEoo m w ONOH coapmHOOmm< hnmnnflq cacanmsd O O mama mswmoq smog onm mOCH>mm mopwpm oonfinb m b :Hma moanoE< no coflpmfioomm< mnoxcmm mmmmnnoz m N mama COHpmHOOmm¢ m.nmoonw onmoHosz mmpmpm oopHCD m n anon anocsoo ooone canonon noconooz m 0n moan momnmmsno nnopom no conomnoomma Hoconosz m n mima mpswfim nmEdm no afiondoo nooHnoE¢ : O HHocSOO HmCOHpmz mmwfi ”nonpmfioomm¢ cmfipmflnco n.2o503 mnsow : om mama monononcoo onmnaoz oaaosumo HQQOfinwz : HH :nmn sonnosa no mnoxnoz menspono sonossmnos< a ma mama COHpmoSUm no afionsoo sweanosd : b 361 continue to function and therefore may re-enter the interest group system again. A second way to appraise the dynamics of group behavior in the interest group system is to study the entrance and departure of groups from specific subsystems by examining numerous hearings on bills of one policy category for the eight-year time spans. The hearings on bills in only a few policy categories can be analyzed because most policy categories did not have as many as eleven hearings and the total hearings in one policy category are rarely divided equally between those held prior to 1953 and those held beginning that year. Table 85 shows the policy categories that can be used to study the entrance and departure of groups. Because the number of bills in each policy category is small, entrance will be defined as three testimonies and departure as zero testimonies. The table shows the findings for each policy category. For example, hearings were held on thirteen of the twenty-six labor bills in the period 1945-52; the other thirteen hearings were held in the period 1953-60. A total of 133 groups presented one or more testimonies on these bills in the sixteen- year period, 1945-60. Under the three-testimonies definition for inclusion of a group in this interest group subsystem, forty groups were within it in the period 1945-52. Twenty-six groups entered the subsystem in the period 1953-60 under the three-testimonies definition. 362 .OOlmde knowopmo %0HHOQ ono CH mfiHHp Hopoem .mdsonw maa no omnm>fin5 a no woman onm snap mmmne H sn mn no m m AHHV manna onmnnoz m m on mm m m Amnv manna wnawnn< nwfionom n : sm mm O OH Amnv manna monsoon H mm om mm 0H m AOHV manna moons s mm o: mmn mn ma onomv mnnnn nonoq om-mmmn omummmn mmumsmn omumamn omummmn mmnmsmn snomoooo sonnom Eopmnm Eopmmm mazono mnflhnfipmoe comm mEHE CH swam oEHB CH oopnmnmm nonmpnm mUHmnH masonw no .02 madam no .02 mHHHm no .02 mme mzo mo mqum mo wzHEmHmzoo OEMBOMWMDO mflbomu EmmmmBZH 20mm mmbomw mo mmDBman can EH muonm nn0>o no knoEHpmop one o o O : mnmnmpm> o m mm m nsonHHom m m mm on neonsoso o 3 mm MH HmEOHnmononm n m m m HH em on: o: onspHaoHnws : O :O OH nopdq o o m m mmmchsm HHmEm : NH On NH nnmansm HmnszsoHnmd H H NH m nnoansm HMHonmch H m m: mm mmmCHmzm one: onoz onoz mnoz mnoz onoz mmHnoE wCthHpnoB adonc no mane no no no no no no nHumoB no masonw eon new mom moH um um .oz Hsoon no .oz Apnoononv nHHHm no annoermoB QAAHm A¢MDBHDOHMG< OOH 20 mmnwfi BZMMHKRHQ mo mmbomu Hm wzozHBmmB m0 mzbqo> om mqmdfi 381 fixed size. During the examination of all hearings, groups were added to it because it became clear that certain groups that frequently presented testimony had been omitted from the preliminary universe of groups. The number of groups in the universe at the beginning of the examination of hearings was 329; at the end the number of groups was 428. The examination of all hearings held by fourteen House committees resulted in the identification of all the hearings at which two or more groups testified that were listed in the preliminary universe. For the House Com- mittee on Agriculture, 150 hearings were identified for the period 1945-60. Although the number of groups whose testimony is recorded in Table 90 does not include every group that presented testimony to the Committee, the error is one of understating the number of groups that testified. It seems likely, however, that nearly all of the groups that provided testimony frequently are included. It must be remembered also that the universe of bills used in the table may be incomplete due to the incomplete universe of groups that testified frequently. Nevertheless, the error is probably very small for bills on which many groups testified. This is a reasonable estimate because as the table indicates there are a few groups that testi- fied with great frequency and all of these groups were in the preliminary universe from the beginning of the examin- ation of hearings. 382 Table 90 shows that the hearings on each bill were dominated, in terms of numbers of groups that presented testimony, by Agriculture groups. This is true whether the criterion for judgment is the number of groups testifying, Column One, the total number of testimonies presented by groups of a type, Column Two, or the number of groups testifying on any given percentage of the 150 bills. The only other type that had more than eight groups that testified on 2 per cent or more of the bills was Agricultural Business, but there were twenty-seven Agriculture groups that testified on 2 per cent or more of the bills. No group of any type, except Agriculture groups, testified on as many as 10 per cent of the 150 hearings. The second important fact established by the data in this table is that only a very small number of Agriculture groups testified very frequently at agricul- tural hearings. Only six of the forty Agriculture groups that made one testimony testified as frequently as at 10 per cent or more of the hearings. Three groups testi- fied at 30 per cent or more of the hearings and two groups testified at 60 per cent or more of them. No group testi- fied at 75 per cent or more of the hearings. The Agriculture groups most active in presenting testimony at these 150 hearings and the number of testi- monies of each were: American Farm Bureau Federation . . . . . . 107 National Farmers union . . . . . . . . . . 92 383 National Grange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 National Council of Farme Cooperatives . . 37 National Milk Producers Federation . . . . 18 National Wool Growers Association . . . . . 15 In the literature on agricultural interest groups the first three groups listed above are often described as the "Big Three" farm organizations. These three groups presented a combined total of 284 testimonies, or, 60 per cent of all testimonies presented by the forty Agriculture groups. The six most active Agriculture groups presented a total of 354 testimonies, or, 75 per cent of all the testimonies provided by the forty Agriculture groups. The data in this table strongly support the gener- alization that at the overwhelming majority of all hearings on agricultural bills one of the major Agriculture groups will present testimony. The generalization is also confirmed by inspection of the tabulations in Table 91. This table shows there were only six of 150 hearings at which no agricultural group testified. There were only eight hearings at which none of the six most active Agri- culture groups testified. The data also indicate that the larger the number of groups presenting testimony at an agricultural hearing, the greater the probability that one of the six most active Agriculture groups has testified. This assertion is sup- ported by the data showing hearings at which only two, three, four, or five groups testified. Table 91 indicates that as the number of groups presenting testimonies at 384 .nsosznem no .umnHmwm «non "HHHQ a one no mmmenmwon Umpcsoo mm: masonm no mmnm>Hns on» n no nsonw esp he nmxmp GOHpHmon H nzonm nnm>m no knoEHpmmp one I'll o o o O annoEHpmmp mnHz o o o m noseosspnon Semen o o 0 HH mmHnoEHpmmp Gmsom o o o n mchoEHpmop NHm H H H OH noHcoernmp m>Hn m H H mm ancoEHnnmp nson m d m mm ancoaHpnop pence : m H mm moHnosHpmop 039 masonu snmn conga masonu HandeSoHnw< anon Hans» nwcHnmmm ncoEHpmmB wCHpnmmonn me no mco Bonn news: KHm no new Bonn IHSoHn 4 cm Eonn Hmpoe masonc no .02 nm ssosannoe paoeenz ssosspnoe esoeenz shoesnnoe Azores: oonnsnnsno nmesndom nwanmmm no nonsbz mAAHm AdMDBHDOHmwd zo mmDOmm Q m . . onpeopHmcH HHmn Mbd. no mnzonw HnCOHmmononn non pCOHOHnnooo one Omnw M mH soochHnEOQ no Ho>oH mo. ocp pm .onmn Eonn pnmnonnHU thnmoHnH H 90: mm: n ems» nHmosnonnz one no COHQoomon no QOmen osen .pnoHoHnnoOo nnoEoEIpUSUonn connmon esp mH owHonoxo man CH poms COHpmHonnoo no RTUCH ones I'll .msmn seen noan on nonneH o onnoch: unmpmo ones pmnp o um mH UOHnon o2» non masonw o>Hpom pmoe oSp n anonwume o£p Ewnndnnsonm can one: mnHonoXo man CH poms masonw OOH one masonm cmNHuHo Mww mmm. mm mQSOnw nonmq mow 3mm. MH masonw HonSpHSoHnwd 902 mn:. om masonw HMQOHmmononm mow wmw. m: masonw mmonHmSm mow mm». Nb AmmonHmzm HHmsm can enmoCHmsm HsnSpHSOHnw< «when uHmsm HMHonman ammonHmsmv pmanEoo masonw mmonHmsn HH< monoUanoo mAnv pcoHoHnnooo masonc no anono no mane no Ho>oq mo. COHpmHonnoo nonesz en nenonnnemnm mQOHmmm mdmwlemem m>HBDommzoo 039 mom mnbomo OOH wm mmHZOEHBmmB mo mSDHO> mme mo mZOHBoH mo. COHpmHonnoo on usnoennswsm mzasm mane m>nepomnzoo can mom. mqqnm emeomqmm zo mssome use nm_ mmnzozHemme so mzeqo> man so mzoneeqmmmoo mm mqm<9 391 confidence. These results provide additional support for the conclusion that the structure of the relative rates of testimony of groups tends to persist through long periods of time. Labor was the only policy category with a suffi- ciently large number of bills to compute correlations for groups of different types. Table 94 reveals that for the Labor groups the correlation is fairly high, r = .739; it is moderately high for Business groups, r : .565. Both of these coefficients are significant at the .05 level of confidence. The coefficient for Citizens groups is low, r = .261, and the coefficient is very low for the Professional groups, r : .027. Thus the extent to which the testimony patterns of groups persists over a long period of time, measured in terms of volume of testimonies, varies greatly for groups of different types. An assessment of persistence in the patterns of testimonies by groups was also made in terms of the number of bills of different poliqy categories on WhiCh groups presented testimonies. Table 95 contains the correlation coefficients for several selected aggrega- tions of groups. Although the coefficient for all groups combined was moderately high, r : .555, and statistically Significant, there is great variation in the coefficients ! for the groups of different types. The highest r s were reSistered by Agriculture groups, r : .832, Business groups, r = .636, and Labor groups, r : .536. Each of 392 oz new. nHHHn noesq neaonw sonneso new amp. mHHHQ nonmq masonw nonmq oz wmo. nHHHn nomad masonw HMCOHmmmnonn new mOm. nHHHQ nonmq masonm mmonHmsm mow wmm. mHHHQ nomad masonw mmonstn HH¢ oocoUHnnoo Anv pnoHoHnnooo poomnzm nsono no mane no Ho>oq mo. COHpmHmnnoo es esnonnnsmnm mz¢nm mEHB m>HBDOmmzoo 038 mom quHm momnq zo mmbomc ameomqmm Mm OMHZOZHBmmB mo MEDHO> mme mo OZOHeddmmmOo 3m mqm¢8 ___,-____,_ _— _ 393 TABLE 95 CORRELATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF TESTIMONIES ON BILLS IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES BY SELECTED GROUPS FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE TIME SPANS Significant at Correlation .05 Level of Type of Group Coefficient (r) Confidence All groups combined .555 . Yes All business groups .550 Yes Business groups .636 Yes Professional grOUps .387 No Agriculture groups .832 Yes Labor groups .536 Yes Citizen groups .395 No Agricultural Business groups .147 No these coefficients was statistically significant. In contrast Agricultural Business groups registered an r of .147 and both the Professional and Citizen groups had r's below .40; none of these three coefficients was statis- tically significant. In general, all of these findings support the conclusion that there is a high degree of persistence in several dimensions of the testimony patterns of groups over a long period of time. This in turn tends to confirm the notion that the active interest groups are fairly well integrated. Previous Integrative Experience The assumption concerning this indicator of integration is that rewarding cOOperative group ventures 394 tend to integrate the COOperating groups with each other. This, in turn, tends to incline the participating groups toward future COOperative activities. Thus, a cooperative experience is assumed to be an integrating experience that leaves a residue of knowledge, perhaps knowledge of persons as well as technical or professional knowledge, that tends to make future cooperation easier than it had been previously. In an earlier portion of this chapter findings were reported from interview data concerning the extent to which past cooperative experiences among groups tend to promote more cooperation. According to the forty-two Washington representatives of groups who were interviewed, this factor ranked third in importance, based on a com- parison of the means of respondents' ratings for six factors that promote COOperation. On the average it was regarded as a factor of moderate importance in promoting cOOperation. Interview data discussed earlier also indicate that cooperation between groups to attain a legislative objective is likely to be followed by COOperation with the same groups, rather than different groups. It seems likely that as the representatives of groups communicate, confer, and plan with each other repeatedly they tend to become integrated, at least for certain limited purposes. 395 Summary and Conclusions In this chapter data on the interest group popula- tion and on the relations among interest groups were analyzed using an "integration" frame of reference. Several indicators of integration were applied to the data assem- bled in this investigation: (1) the degree of homogeneity among the active groups in the group population, measured in terms of certain shared attributes, (2) the extent to which the offices of groups were located in close prox- imity to each other, (3) the extent to which group leaders interacted with each other, and especially the extent to which the leaders of groups of different types interacted, (4) the degree to which group leaders held the same atti- tudes concerning intergroup cooperation, ways of working effectively with Congress, and the extent to which they engage in the same types of cooperative activity with other groups, (5) the degree to which the groups active in the hearings process were related to each other in orderly patterns that tended to persist for a long time span, (6) the amount of previous integrative experience of the groups. The evidence presented on the extent to which the active groups constitute a homogeneous population was meager and inconclusive. Four of the other five indica- tors, however, are consistent: there is a fairly high degree of integration among the active groups in the interest group system. The conclusion concerning the I: I .1411! 396 fifth indicator, the degree of interaction among groups, was that a moderate amount of interaction occurs, but there were no hearings at which many groups of each type testified. On any given bill the majority of active groups within most types do not testify. Thus, it appears these findings contravene others that point to substantial integration among the active groups. A brief restatement of the meaning of integration may help to show how this finding is consistent with the other evidence. Integration does not imply that the immediate major goals of entities in an aggregation con— verge. It does imply that mutual concern by the active groups for the continuance of the existing arrangements is an objective of higher priority than the attainment of any immediate substantive group goal. Integration denotes the common understanding and the acceptance of the proce- dural arrangements that prevail within the system and a tolerance of, if not a commitment to, the norms that guide and limit the behavior of group leaders toward each other and members of Congress and their staffs. Integra- tion denotes an awareness among groups that they share a common environment and, to some extent, a common fate. Groups support the system insofar as they attempt to operate in it according to the prevailing norms. In this sense, to state that the groups in the system are integrated means that it is expected that the norms and procedures of the system will be honored by all or nearly all the 397 groups--the well-known orderly processes will be used by groups in pursuit of their objectives. The assertion that the active groups are inte- grated does not mean the behavior of the leaders of each active group has an equal impact on each of the other groups. This research has shown that within the interest group system~~a system that encompasses goal oriented behavior in all policy sectors--are subsystems, such as the universe of groups that testify on agriculture bills. Such subsystems may have distinctive processes, conven- tions of discourse, populations composed of different groups, and different structural relationships among the groups within each population. It was not possible to explore each of these sub- systems in this investigation. But the findings of the analyses of many major and minor agricultural bills strongly suggest that within a specific subsystem, such as agriculture, the active groups behave in ways that might result in a loss of status or influence in a different subsystem. There can be little doubt, for example, that the active Agriculture groups dominate the agricultural policy sector or that the active Veterans groups are overwhelmingly dominant in the veterans policy sector. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is one of the few committees in which the discourse during hearings between the representatives of the prestigious Veterans groups and the committee members is carried on in terms 398 of the "American Legion's bill," or the "DAV's bill." Thus, the Veterans groups may constitute a subsystem in their testimonies on Veterans bills and be integrated with each other as well as within the larger population of groups in the interest group system. This explains why the findings that showed only a moderate degree of inter- action among groups of different types do not discredit the notion of an integrated population of interest groups at the congressional level of government. It seems likely that a full exploration of many subsystems would reveal that the structure of certain sub- systems are more highly develOped than others and that the degree of integration among groups in these subsystems varies. Within each subsystem the expectation is that patterned relationships among groups can be identified in terms of the degree of activity by each group at hearings on bills in a policy sector. This order is hierarchical and relatively permanent. It seems likely that the degree of permanency of the relative positions of active groups is linked to (l) the newness of the policy sector, and (2) the degree of controversy concerning specific bills under consideration. Thus, an integrated population does not imply an equally active role for each group; it only denotes relatively permanent relationships that are known and accepted by the groups within the population. The principal purpose of using the integration frame of reference to analyze the data on interest groups 399 at the congressional level has not been to prove that, in general, integration exists among the groups, but to illumine and eXplore different relationships among groups. It appears that further research may profitably be focused on Specific facets of interrelationships among groups. Some of the promising interrelationships are the degrees, kinds, and SCOpe of interaction among interest groups, the degree to which group leaders hold common perceptions of intergroup cooperation, their legislative work, and the amount, kinds, and persistence of structure among groups. The larger question concerns the usefulness of knowledge about intergroup relations. The possible implications for certain theoretical models of the legis- lative process and democracy have already been mentioned in an earlier chapter. One interesting line of inquiry follows from the premise that an integrated population is in some degree a controlled population. This premise is well established in the literature of sociology. It has been noted in earlier chapters that any set of repeated interactions between two or more entities can be usefully framed in terms of intergroup dependency. This is true whether the interactions are cooperative or conflictual. Each actor usually takes the behavior, and the estimated future behavior, of the other actors into account in making his own behavioral choices. The effect of this practice is to reduce the range of alternative behaviors 400 available to him in responding to the other actor if he wishes to continue the relationship. It is well known that the groups at the congres- sional level have much knowledge about the goals, methods, and resources of many other groups. In this chapter additional evidence has been discussed that confirms the interrelatedness of groups. Though the existence of inte- gration among groups is not difficult to perceive it is not so easy to see the functioning arrangements as a system of controls. Questions concerning the operation of this system of controls are not considered directly in this research. The analyses undertaken do, however, point clearly toward the view that the system is controlled chiefly by informal means such as the attitudes, percep- tions, and beliefs of group leaders, members, congressmen, and the public. It appears that the group system, as it now functions, is monitored or policed largely by the active groups within it, and by the congressmen with whom they interact. The existing arrangements and the incumbent group population seem to be regarded as legitimate by the centers of power within the field of their impact. CHAPTER VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Intergroup relations have many dimensions. This paper has focused chiefly on two types of relationships among interest groups: (1) COOperative activities among groups, and (2) shared policy preferences among groups. Two kinds of data were assembled and analyzed to provide information on these relationships. First, interview data concerning COOperation among national groups were obtained from a random sample of spokesmen for groups having offices in Washington, D. C. The data indicated that cooperation among interest groups is nearly universal. There is a remarkable degree of consistency in the importance assigned by group spokesmen to Specific cooperative practices. Also, most group Spokesmen share the same beliefs concerning what factors Promote cooperation among groups. Second, the policy preferences of 119 groups publicly stated at selected House committee hearings were recorded on the 145 bills receiving the most testimonies during the period 1945-60. These policy preferences were analyzed using a computer program based on a technique for 401 the identification of types or clusters of entities called Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis developed by Louis McQuitty. Analyses were made of group testimony to identify general clusters of like-minded groups, clusters of groups within specific types of groups, and clusters of groups active within separate sectors of public policy. Several clusters of groups were identified in each of these analyses. Most of the clusters were not composed entirely of groups of one type. The cohesion among the groups in these clusters was moderately high for a few clusters but relatively low for others. Many groups were not associated with any cluster. These data were interpreted using two conceptual frameworks, pluralism and integration, and several hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups. The usefulness of two other frameworks, system and conflict for the study of intergroup relationships was also dis- cussed. The basic characteristics of the pluralist model are five: (1) numerous centers of power exist in the society, (2) these centers compete with each other, (3) Opportunities for access to decision-making are numerous and Open to all, (4) the centers of power in the society use these Opportunities, and (5) there is a measure of consensus on the rules of the game in the society. The integrationist framework stresses such properties of intergroup relationships as proximity, kinds and volume 0f interaction, mutual knowledge among group leaders, p-nu—p-u-uu-‘w'-D 403 shared eXperiences, and structural relationships among groups in the population. The findings of this research fit more easily into the integration than the pluralist mode of thought. Much of the scholarly and journalistic literature on interest groups stresses such terms and concepts as the following: the group struggle, a diversity of groups in constant competition and conflict, shifting alignments of groups for limited objectives, an open interest group system, and a competitive balance among contending interest groups. The data in this research point away from these formulations toward the following: very limited movement of groups into and out of the interest group system, enduring policy preferences of groups over many years, the dominance of some policy sectors by groups of a single type, restricted competition among groups, and very limited dynamics during a period of several years in the relationships among groups in the pOpulation. In general, the most recurrent theme from the different facets of this investigation has been the notion of "order" in the universe of active interest groups at the congressional level. The interview data showed there is much cooperation among group leaders but it is carried on chiefly by informal rather than formal methods. This informal relating of group to group helps to explain the order among the hundreds of active groups. Another power- ful variable in explaining the order in the interest 404 group system is the policy preference of the group. Group respondents indicated that shared policy preferences tend to promote cooperation among groups more than any other And the policy preferences of groups tend to factor. "stay put." very little change was discernible in the policy preferences during a sixteen-year period. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adrian, Charles, and Press, Charles. The American Polit- ical Process. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Almond, Gabriel and Coleman, James S. The Politics of DevelOping Areas. Princeton: Princeton UniversIIy Press, 1960. Almond, Gabriel, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Bailey, Thomas K. Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. Baker, Roscoe. The American Legion and American Foreign Policy. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. Bauer, Raymond A., de Sola Pool, Ithiel, and Dexter, Lewis Anthony. American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press, Bentley, A. F. The Process of Government. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia PFess, Inc., 1949. Berelson, Bernard R., Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and McPhee, William N. Votin : A Study 9f_0pinion Formation in .g Presidentia ampaign. hicago: University 6f'_— Chicago Press, 1954. Berelson, Bernard, and Steiner, Gary A. Human Behavior, Ag_Inventory 9§_Scientific Findings. New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1964. Berle, Adolph A., Jr. The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1954, Binkley, Wilfred. American Political Parties: Their Natural History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Blaisdell, Donald. American Democracy Under Pressure. New York: The Ronald Press 00., 1957. 405 Block, William J. The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service. Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 47. Urbana: The university of Illinois Press, 1960. Bonnett, Clarence E. Employers Associations ig_the United States. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Boulding, Kenneth. The Organizational Revolution: A $2 the Ethics of Economic Organization. New YorE} Harper andBrothers, 1953. Study Brady, Robert. Business §§_§_System o£_Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 19 3. Buck, Solon Justus. The Granger Movement; £_Study 9: Agricultural Organization and Ifs Political, Economic, and Social Consequences, 1870-89, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913T Capper, Arthur. The Agricultural Bloc. New York: Harcourt Brace, and Co., 1922. Chamberlain, Joseph P. Legislative Process. New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1936. Chamberlin, Edward H. 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The Nerves o£.Government: Models of Polit- ical Communication and Control. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953. Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927. Drucker, Peter. The New Society_: The Anato_y of the Industrial Order. New York: Harper and Br66hers, 1949. Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. En lewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19 5 Easton, David. The Political System. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. Easton, David. A Systems Anolysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. Ehrmann, Henry A. (ed. ) Interest Groups on Four Continents. International Political Science Association, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1958. Ehrmann, Henry A. Organized Business in France. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Fein, Leonard J. American Democracy_: Essays on Image and Realities. New York: Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, Inc., 1964. Follett, Mary Parker. The New State, Group Organization, the Solution of PopularFGovernment. New York: L6ngmans, Green and Co., 1920. Frankel, Charles. The Democratic Prospect. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Rinehart and Co., 19Al. Gierke, Otto. Natural Law and the Theory of Societ Ernest Barker (Translator) Boston: Beacon Press, 1917. Gross, Bertram. The Legislative Struggle. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953. Herring, E. Pendleton. Grou Representation Before Con- gress. Baltimore: Jofins Hopkins Press, 1 29. 408 Herring, E. Pendleton. The Politics of Democracy. New York: N. W. Norton and Co., 1940. Horn, Robert A. Groups and the Constitution. Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1956: Hsiao, Kung Chuan. Political Pluralism, §_Stud $2.00ntem- orar Political Theory. Lohdbn: Kegan aul TrencE, and Co., Ltd., 1927. . Irish, Marian D., and Prothro, James W. The Politics of_ American Democrac . En lewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-HalI, Inc., 19 2. Jacob, Philip E., and Toscano, James V. (eds.) The Inte- ration of Political Communities. Philadelphia: J. B. Eippin0066'60., I953. Johnson, Harvey M. Sociology; A_Systematic Introduction. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960. Kaplan, Morton A. Systems and Process ip_International Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957. Kariel, Henry. The Decline of_American Pluralism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Kerr, Clark. Labor and Management in Industrial Society. Garden City, Néw York: Anchor B60ks, DOUBleday and Co., Inc., 1964. Kesselman, Louis. The Social Politics of FEPC. Chapel Hill: University Of—North Carolina Press, 1948. Key, V. 0. Politics, Parties, and Pressure groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964. Key, V. 0. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1964. ‘—7 Kile, Orville. The Farm Boreau Through Three Deoades. Baltimore: The WaverIy Press, 9 . Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Sociegy. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, I959. Kuhn, Alfred. The Study of Societ : A Unified A roach Homewood, IIIInois: RIchard D. Irfiin, In67,7gfid The. Dorsey Press, Inc., 1953. Lane, Edgar Lobbying and the Law Berkele ' Univ . . . e of California Press, 1969: y rsity 409 Lasswell, Harold D., and Kaplan, Abraham. Power ano Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. Latham, Earl. The Group_Basis of_Politics, §_Study $9 BasingrPoint legislation. Ithaca, New York: Cornell university Press, 1952. Lederer, Emil. State o£_the Masses: The Threat of_the Classkmn Society. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1940. Levy, Marion J. The Structure o£_Society. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1952. Lindsay, A. D. The Essentials of Democracy. London: Humphrey Milford,Oxford UnIVersity Press, 1929. Lubell, Samuel. The Future o: American Politics. New York: Harper, 1952. Maass, Arthur. Muddy i'Jatersi The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. MacNeil, Neil. Forge o£_Democracy, The House of_Represen- tatives. New York: D. McKay, 1963. Matthews, Donald R. U, §, Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North’Carolina Press, 1960. McConnell, Grant. The Decline of_Agrarian Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. McCune, Wesley. The Farm Bloc. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1943. McKean, Dayton D. Pressures on the Legislature o£_New Jersey. New York: ColumBIa University Press, 1938. Mead, George H. Mind, Self, and Sociepy, Charles W. Morzis, (ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 193 . Merriam, Charles. Public and Private Government. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Milbrath, Lester. The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago: Rand McNally, 196H. Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. WW: _- .~~.._....+ a... W 410 Mitchell, William C. The American Politv: A Social and Cultural Interpretation. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962. National Orgenizations of the United States, Vol. I, Encyclopeaia of‘Associations, 4th Edition, Frederick G. Ruffner, Jr., (ed. ) Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1964. Odegard, Peter. Pressure Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. Ogburn, William F., and Nimkoff, Meyer F. Sociology. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. Ogul, William J., and Morris S. The American Legislative Process, Congress and the States. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Parsons, Talcott, and Shils, Edward. Toward o General Theory o§_Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Presthus, Robert. Men at the Top; A Study_ in Community Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Presthus, Robert. The Organizational Society: An Analysis and §_Theo§y. New Y6rk: Vintage Books, 1965. Reynolds, Lloyd G. Labor Economics and Labor Relations. En lewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19 9. Rice, Charles E. Freedom of Association. New York: New York University Press, 1962. Riggs, Fred. Pressures on Congress. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950. Schattschneider, E. E. Politics, Pressure and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-HaII, 1935. Schattschneider, E. E. The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Schriftgeisser, Karl. The Lobbyists: The Art and Boeiness o£_Influencing Lawmakers. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1951. 411 Schubert, Glendon. The Public Interest. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Selznick, Philip. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949. Simmel, Georg. Conflict, and Web g£_Group_Affiliations. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, translators and editors. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955. Smith, M. B., Bruner, J., and White, R. Opinions and Personality. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955. Stewart, J. D. British Pressure Groups. Oxford: Claren- don Press, 1958. Thibault, John W., and Kelley, Harold H. The Social Psychology_9£_Groups. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959. Truman, David. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition. William A. Neilson, editor—in-chief. Springfield, Massachusetts: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1959. White, William H. The Organization Man. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. Zeigler, Harmon. Interest Groups in_American Society. Engfiewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha 1, nc., 19 Zeigler, Harmon. The Politics 9£_Small Business. Washing- ton, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Articles and Periodicals The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science. vol. 179 (may, 1935)- The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social science. Vol. 319 (September, 1958). Campbell, Donald T. "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities," Behavioral Science, Vol. 3, No. l (1958), 14-25. 412 Caraway, T. H. "The Third House," The Saturday_Evening Post (July 7, 1928), p. 21. Cleveland, Alfred S. "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1953), 2514-71 0 0049?, Francis. "Techniques of the Pluralist State," American Political Science Review, Vol. XV, No. 2 (May, 1921); 185-213. Dahl, Robert A. "The Politics of Planning," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1959), 341-SO. DeGrazia, Alfred. "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958), 113-22. Dowling, R. E. "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December, 1960), 944-54. Ellis, Ellen D. "The Pluralistic State,"_American Polit- ical Science Review, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (August, 1920), 393-407 0 Eulau, Heinz. "Lobbyists: The Wasted Profession," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1964), 27-38. Fenno, Richard. "The House Appropriations Committee," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (June, 1962), 310-52. Gable, Richard W. "Political Interest Groups as Policy gflapers," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958), ‘93 o Garceau, Oliver. "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958), 10 “'12 o Golembiewski, Robert. "The Group Basis of Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (December, 1960), 962-71. Griffith, Ernest S. "The Changing Pattern of Public Policy Formation " American Pplitica1_Science Review, Vol. 38 (June, 1944), 445-59. Grumm, John G. "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior," Western Political _Quarterly, Vol. XVIII (June, 1965}, 350-362. 413 GUSf191d: Joseph R. "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociolqsical Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February, 1%27 1 19-30 a Hagen, Everett E. "Analytical Models in the Study of Social System," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 2 (September, 1951), 144:151. Hale, Myron. "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (December, 1960), 955-61. "The Invisible Government Becoming Visible," The World's Work (March, 1922), 464-5. . "Is There Anything in It?" Continental Monthly, Vol. 3 (June: 1963): 688'93. Lane, Edgar. "Some Lessons from Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1950), 14-30. LaPalombara, Joseph. "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," Journal g£_Politics, V01. 22, No. 1 (February, 1960), 29' 90 Logan, E. "Lobbying," Supplement to The Annals, CXLIV (July, 1929), 1-89. Mackenzie, W. J. M. "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," Political Studies, Vol. 3 (1955), 247—55. Macridis, Roy C. "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis,’ Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February, 1961), ZS-ZI'B o McLachlan, Dan, Jr. "Communication Networks and Monitor- ing," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (Summer, 19617; 194-209. McQuitty, Louis L. "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Educational and Psychological Measure- ment, (Summer, 1957), 207455?- McQuitty, Louis L. "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. XX, No. 2, (19607; 293~303. Miller, James G. "Living systems: Basic Concepts," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, N0. 3 (JU1Y: 1965): 193-234: .. ._-—_.-~ — — . “nu-q. -W_.._._u_ré 2' . ‘ Hm. #- 414 Miller, James G. "Living Systems: Structure and Process," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October, 1965), 337-411 . Monypenny, Philip. "Political Science and the Study of Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," Western Political_Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 2 (June, 1954), T83-201 0 Morris, J. A. "The Paralyzin. Power of Washington Lobbies," Reader§_Digest (May, 1963 , 127-32. Odegard, Peter. "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," Western Political QuarterLy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September, 1958}, 687-702: Parker, Hilda W., and Joseph P. "Democratic Principles in Social Problems," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, V01. 16, No. 4_(Ju1y, 1957), 369-78. Polsby, Nelson W. "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," The Journal 93 Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (August, 1960), 474484.;— Ross, Edward. "Political Decay--An Interpretation," The Independent (July 19, 1906), 123-125. Rothman, Stanley. "Systematic Political Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 54, No. 1 (March, 1960), 12-33. Shelton, Fred D. "Unofficial Representation at Washing- ton," The Independent (January 2, 1926), 17-26. Shibutani, Tamotsu. "Reference Groups as Perspectives," American Journal g£_Sociology, Vol. 60 (May, 1955), 562‘90 Smith, David. "Pragmatism and the Group Theory of P011. tics," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (September, 1964), 600-10. "Smoking Out Invisible Government," The Literary Digest (July 12, 1913), 43-44. . Taylor, Richard W. "Arthur F. Bentley"s Political SCience," Western_Political_Quarterly, Vol. V, No, 2 (June, 1952), 212+-3Oo Thomas, Charles S. "My Adventures With the Sugar Lobby," World's Work (September, 1913), 540-49. _ Toffler, A1. "How Congressmen Make Up Their Minds," Redbook (February, 1962), 56-57+. 415 Weiner, Myron. "Political Integration and Political DevelOpment,'I ‘The Annals, Vol. 358 (March, 1965) 52-5. Williams, Robin M., Jr. "unity and Diversity in Modern America," Social Forces, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October, 1957), 1-80 Essays and Articles in Collections Hagan, Charles B. ("The Group in Political Science," Approaches t9_the Study 93 Politics, Roland Young (edI7‘ Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958, pp. 38-51. Latham, Earl. "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," Political Behavior, Heinz Eulau, et, al., (eds.) Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956:" pp. 232-245. Lilienthal, David: "The Case for Big Business," Readings in Politics and Economics, H. C. Harlan, (ed.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 85-94. Morse, Chandler. "The Functional Imperatives," The Social Theories g£_Talcott Parsons, Max Black, (ed{)_" Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961, p. 100-52. Neumann, Sigmund. "Germany," Eurgpean Political Systems, Taylor Cole, (ed.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953, pp. 322-36. Weinstein, Leo. "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley," Essays 92 the Scientific Study gf Politics, Herbert J. Storing, (ed.) New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962, pp. 151-224. Public Documents Judkins, C. J. Trade and Professional Associations of the United States. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic‘bbfimerce, United States Department of Commerce, 1942. Judkins, Jay. Nationel_Associations 93 the United States, United States Department ofHCommerce, 191§f““‘”“*———— United States v. W, 212- a}... 347 U. S. 612 (1953), 416 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Economic Qpportunity Act 92 1964, Hearings before subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program. 89th Congress, lst Session Parts I and II, March 17-20; April 7-10, 13, 14, 1964. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Federal Aid tg_Schools Hear- ings before General Subcommittee. 87th Congress, lst Session, Parts I and II, March 13-17, 20, 1961. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, Lobb in Direct and Indirect, Hearings before subcommittee. glst Congress, 2d Session, 1950. Unpublished Material Forss, F, Hafterson, J. M., and Sim, F. M. "McQuitty's Methods of Pattern Analysis (MMPA) on the CDC 3600," Technical Report §, Report from Computer Institute- for Social Science Research. East Lansing: Michigan State University, February 17, 1964. (Mimeographed.) McQuitty, Louis L. A_Method of Pattern Analysis for Isolating_Typological and—Dimensional Constructs. Research report from Lackland Air Force Base, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and DevelOpment Command. December, 1955. (Mimeo- graphed.) 1 2. 3. 4. 5 6. 10. ll. 12. APPENDIX A Survey Schedules .. What is your official title in the organization? How long have you served with this organization? How many years have you worked in Washington? Have you served with any other organizations? What wassnnnlposition before coming to this organiza- tion? It is sometimes suggested that there are organizations in Washington that favor and oppose every major piece of legislation with the result that associations tend to cancel out each other's influence and a balance of viewpoints is maintained. Is this true of bills and issues in your field? With what congressional committees do you work most? Do you find, in general, that the committees of one house of Congress are more receptive to your organiza- tion's legislative objectives than the other? Are congressional committees equally receptive to all groups in your field that testify before them? If not how is the difference in receptivity shown? Are Democrat-led and Republican-led committees equally receptive to your association's objectives? Are there any organizations that communicate with congressmen directly and do not testify at congressional committee hearings? Name some of them. Why don't these groups testify? Is your or anization actively interested in (1) more, (2) less, %3) the same categories of issues now as it was ten years ago? 417 13. 14. 15. 16. 418 Do you see a trend in the broadening or narrowing of association's interests? Schedule No. 1 (Hand out) I am interested in the problems that representatives of new organizations, those which have been recently formed, face in their efforts to make their association "effective" oh Capitol Hill. Score each of the follow- ing factors according to its importance in assisting a new association to become effective on Capitol Hill. Very important factor - 4 Moderately important factor - 3 A factor of minor importance - 2 - l A factor of no importance Secure the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen. Secure the personal friendship of congressmen's and committee staff members. Present careful and thorough factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives. Provide entertainment and gifts for key committee mem- bers and other congressmen. Do favors for key committee members and other congress- men. Provide regular and able presentation of the associa- tion's stand on legislation at congressional committee hearings. Present resolutions or petitions adopted by the asso— ciation's members showing their preferences on legis- lative issues. Secure the active support from the association's members throughout the country by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices. Not counting your association, what organization in your field enjoys the best Opportunity to achieve its legislative objectives with key committees members and other congressmen? Does your association enjoy the same opportunities as this group? To the same extent as other groups in your field? Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your Judgment? I am told that some groups are able to get congressmen to introduce bills for them. Is your group able to do this? Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your Judgment? 17. 18. 419 I am told that some groups are able to get congres- sional committees to schedule hearings on bills in which they are interested. Is your group able to do this? Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your Judgment? Schedule No. 2 (Hand out) Here are some of the common TYPES OF COOPERATION among national associations in working to achieve legislative objectives. Score each of the following types according to the extent to which it is practiced by your organization in relation to other organizations. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided. Frequently practiced Occasionally practiced Rarely practiced Never practiced l—‘MUJ-I: Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, Opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill. Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill (or to defeat a bill) such as contacting "doubtful" congressmen prior to a vote. Jointly plan the strategy for passage of a bill. Loan, exchange, or share association mailing lists for publicity on a bill. Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage or defeat of a particular measure. Add any other types of cooperation not included above and ——F. 19. score them. One of the most interesting questions about the relations between national associations is what causes one association to COOperate with another on a particular bill. Schedule No. 3 (Hand out) On the basis of your experience in Washington, evalu- ate the importance Of each ofthe following FACTORS IN PROMOTING COOPERATION between two or more organizations on a SINGLE bill. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided. V very important factor - 4 Moderately important factor - 3 20. 21. 22. 420 Minor Factor - 2 A factor of no importance — 1 The associations have advanced many of the same or Similar legislative objectives for many years. The Washington representatives of the associations are personal friends. The associations have cooperated with each other on legislative Objectives in the past. The associations share the same position toward the single bill at hand. The associations are drawn together by a third organization that organizes many associations for the support of the single bill at hand. The associations work together as part of an exchange of support (log-rolling) in which Association A helps Association B even though A is not interested in the bill at hand in return for an assurance that Associa- tion B will help A at a later time on a bill it wants. On approximately how many different occasions have you worked COOperatively with other organizations during this session? Were the same groups involved each time? In your recollection does your association OOOperate (1) more, (2) less, (3) to the same extent, as it did ten years ago? . According to your knowledge which one of the following is more common. Associations cooperate chiefly with groups in their own field. Associations OOOperate chiefly with groups outside their own field. - Associations cooperate equally Often with groups in and outside of their field. Schedule No. 4 (Hand out) In your opinion, which one of the following is the most accurate appraisal of the way congressmen with whom you work generally regard the re resentatives of national associations who contact them. UNDERIINE the best answer. Congressmen with whom you work hold representatives of national associations in: 1 very high esteem 2 high esteem 3 low esteem 4 very low esteem 421 In your Opinion, how did congressmen with whom you worked regard representatives of national associations ten years ago? 1 very high esteem 2 high esteem 3 low esteem 4 very low esteem Which one of the following is a most accurate appraisal of the extent to which congressmen with whom you work value the work done by national associations in regard to legislation. Congressmen with whom you work place on the work done by national associations. 1 great value 2 some value 3 little value 4 no value In your opinion which one of the following is most accurate. Congressmen with whom you work Show for the resolutions adopted by association members. 1 great respect 2 3 moderate reSpect little respect In your opinion how did Congressmen with whom you worked regard the resolutions adopted by association members ten years ago? 1; with great respect 2 with moderate reSpect 3 with little respect In your opinion which one of the following is most accurate. Congressmen with whom you work show for the association's factual research studies. 1 great respect 2 moderate respect 3 little respect How does this compare with what congressmen thought ten years ago? APPENDIX B HEARINGS USED IN COMPUTER ANALYSES Committee on Agriculture S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Oleomargarine Tax Repeal. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Oleomargarine Tax Repeal. 8lst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on General Farm Program. 8lst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on National Forest Mining Claims. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., I954. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 84th Cong., lst Sess., I955. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Poultry and Eggs of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Compulsory Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products. 85th Cong” lst Sess., 1957. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Farm Labor. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Heerings on Extension of Public Law 480. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. . 8. Congress. Subcommittee on Forests of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on National Forests: Multiple Use. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. 422 423 S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Suspension of Federal Grading of Lamb and Mutton. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Extension of the Mexican Farm Labor Program. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., I960. Committee on Armed Services S. Congress. Committee on Military Affairs. Hearings on Universal Military Training. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Universal Military Training. 1947. Committee on Banking 80th Cong., lst Sess., nnd Currency S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Price Controls. 1945. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 8. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Bretton Woods Agreement. 79th Cong., lst Séss., 1945. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Stabiliz lst and 2diSessions, 1945J6. 8. Congress. Committee on Ba Hearings on Extension of Eme Stabilizatioanct of 1942. ation Act. 79th Cong., nking and Currency. rgency Price Control and 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing_and Rent 1st Sess., 1947. Control. 80th Cong., S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension Of Rent Controls. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. lflgarings on General Housing. 1948. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 424 U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Rent Control, 1949. 81st Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Act of 1949. 8lst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Amendments of 1949. Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Rent Control, 1950. 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. . S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on COOperative Housing. Blst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Housing and Community Facilities. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. 8. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1252. 682d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1953. 83d—Cong., lsthess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Act of 1954. Sess., 1954. 83d Cong., 2d U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. HQarings on Housing Amendments of 1955. 84th Cong., lst Sess., 1955. U. 3. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing_Act of 1956. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Legislation to Relieve unemployment. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958- 425 S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Area Redevelope ment Act. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Housing Act of 1959. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. l of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Communigy Facilities Act of 1959. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Emergency Home Ownership Act. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. Committee on Education and Labor S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the U. S. Employment Service. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. ‘BOth Cong., lst Sess., 1947f S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Minimum Wage Standards. 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearin s on Equal Pay for ngal Work for Women. Bth ong., 2d Sess., 1948. S. Congress. Subcommittee NO. 1 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Labor Education Extension Service. 80thCong., 2d Sess., 1948. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Labor Extension Act, 1249. 8lst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards net of 1938. 81st Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the National Labor Relations Act of 1949. 81st Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Federal Fair Employe ment Practice Act. Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the Public School Assistance Act of 1949. Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Egual Pay for Equal Work for Women. 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Library Service in Rural Areas. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Labor-Management Relations. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Amendments to the Minimum Wage. 84th Cong., lst SSSS 9) 19550 S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act. 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Federal Aid to States for School Construction. 85th Cong., 1St Sess., 1957. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the Scholarship_and Loan Program. 85th’Cong., lst and 2d Sessions, 1957-8. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Federal Grants to States for Education. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. S. Congress. Joint Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Labor Management Reform Legislation. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. 427 U. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Juvenile Delinquency, Preven- tionpnand Control. 86th Cong., lst—Sess., 1959. U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Minimnm Wage-Hour Legislation. 86th Cong., 2S'Sess., 1960. Committee on Enpenditures in the Executive Departments U. S. Congress. Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Hearings on the Full Employment Act of 1945. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. U. 8. Congress. Committee on EXpenditures in the Executive Departments. Hearings on Reorganization Plans No.'s l, 2, 3, of 1946. 79thCong., 2d Sess., 1946. U. S. Congress. Committee on Government Operations. Hearings on Reorganization Plan 27 of 1950 (Depart- ment of HealthL_Education, Security). Blst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. U. S. Congress. Committee on Government Operation. Hearings on Government in Business. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954. Committee on Foreign Affairs U. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on Further Participation in UNRRA. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. U. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on U. S. Foreign Policy for a Post-war Recovery Program. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948: U. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on the International Technical COOperation Act of _%%gg ("Point IV"Program]} _Blst Cong., lst Sess., U. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings to Seek Development of the United Nations into a World Federation. Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. U. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on Membership and Participationepy the U. S. in théf International Trade Organization, 181st Cong., 2d 3853., 1950. 428 S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on the India Emergency Assistance Act of 1951. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. S. Congress. Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on International Organizations and Movements. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1954. S. Congress. Subcommittee on International Organiza- tions and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on International Organizations and Movements. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1958. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1959. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1959. S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on the MUtual Security Act of 1960. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Appiica- tion of the Anti-Trust Laws to Agreements in Furtherance of the National Transpprtation Poliey. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. S. Congress. Subcommdttee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Hospital _gonstruction Act. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings to Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Railroad Unempleyment Insurance Act. 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947. 3. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Local Public Health Units. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. 429 S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter— state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Minimum Resale Prices. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. 83dCong., 1st Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Trip Leasing; Interstate Commerce Act. 83d Cong., lst Sess.,1953. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Natural Gas Act. 84th Cong., lst Séss., 1955. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Advertisingof Alcoholic Beverages. *84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1955. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Trip Leasing: Interstate Commerce_Act. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on thewNatural Gas Act: Regu- lation of ProducersTwPrices. 85th Cong.,ISt Sess., 1957. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Surface Transportation (Rate- making Legislation): 85th Cong., lstSess., 1957. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Meatpackers. 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on the Interstate Commerce Act: Agricultural Exemptions. 85th Cong., 2dSess., 1958. S. Congress. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Fair Trade, 1959. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. 430 U. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Passenger Train Service. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. U. S. Congress. Subcommittee Of the Committee on Inter- state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on Transportation Diversification. 86th Cong., 2d’Sess.,‘I960. Committee on Judiciary U. 3. Congress. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings pp Amend the Constitution Relative To Equal Rights for Women. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. U. S. Congress. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under the Laws of the United States. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. U. S. Congress. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Regulating Recovery of Portal to Portal Pay. 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947. U. S. Congress. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Permitting Admission of 400,000 Displaced Persons into the United States. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947. U. S. Congress. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution and Commission on the Legal Status of Women. BOth : Cong., 2d’Sess., I948?— U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly of the Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on the Study of Monopply Power. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Civil Rights. 84th Cong., lst and 2d Sessions, 1955-6. U. 8. Congress. Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Civil Rights. 85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957. U. S. Con ress. Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Pre-merger Notification. 85th Cong., lst Sess.,—I957. U. 3. Congress. Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on Civil Rights. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959. 431 Committee on Post Office and Civil Service U. S. Congress. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Hearings on Postal Rate Revision. 8lst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. U. S. Congress. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Hearings on Postal Rate Revision. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. Committee on Public Works U. S. Congress. Committee on Public Works. Hearings on the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Basin. 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. U. S. Congress. Committee on Public Works. Hearings on the St. Lawrence Seaway. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. U. 8. Congress. Committee on Public Works. Hearings on the St. Lawrence Seaway, 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. Committee on Veterans Affairs U. S. Congress. Committee-on Veterans Affairs. Hearings on Veterans Housing in Rural Areas, Small Cities, and Towns. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. U. 8. Congress. Committee on Veterans Affairs. Hearings on Readjustment Benefits for Individuals Entering the Service after January 31, 1955. '86th Cong.,Ed 888., 1960. Committee on Weys and Means U. 8. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Reciprocal Trade. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1946. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings en Unemployment Compensation Act of 1945. 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearin s on Reciprocal Trade. 80th Cong., lst Sess., 1947. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings en Social Security Act Amendments Of 1949. Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1949. .1. I I..||l.‘ll||ll|| 432 S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Reciprocal Trade. 81st Cong., lst Sess., 1949. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Excess Profits Tax on Corporations, 1950. Blst Cong., 2d Sess., 1950. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1951. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Reciprocal Trade. 82d Cong., lst Sess., 1951. 8. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Unemployment Insurance, 1952. 82d Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on General Revenue Revision, 1953. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Reciprocal Trade. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Customs Simplification. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. . 8. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Excess Profits Tax Extension. 83d Cong., lst Sess., 1953. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Social Security Act Amendments, 1954. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings en Unemployment Insurance. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Trade Agreements. 84th Cong., lst Sess., 1955. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings en the Customs Simplification Act Of_1955. 84th Cong., lst Sess., 1955. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Individual Retirement Act Of 1955. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955. 433 U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Highway Revenue Act of 1956. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Public Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act. 84th Cong.,2d Sess., 1956. U. 8. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. _84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956:- U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Amendments to the Antidumping_Act of 1921. ’85th Cong., lst Sess., 1957. U. 8. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Emergency Extension of Federal Unemployment Com- pensation Benefits. 85th Cong.,v2d Sess., 1958. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Renewal of Trade Agreements. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Social Security Legislation. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on General Revenue Revision, 1958. 85th Cong., 2d 8888., 1958. .3 S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Foreign Investment Incentive Act. 86th Cong., lst Sess., 1959. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on the Highwaijrust Fund and Federal Aid Highway Financing Program. 86th Ceng., lst Sess., 1959. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Unemployment Compensation. 86th Cong., lat Sess., 1959. U. S. Congress. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on Hospital,Nursing Home and Surgical Benefits. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959. \ "WWWWT