DIMENSIONS & PATTERNS OF RELATIONS AMONG INTEREST GROUPS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.

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Robert Leslie Ross

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DIMENSIONS AND PATTERNS
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By

Robert Leslie Ross

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

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Intergroup relations have many dimensions. This paper has focused chiefly on two types of relationships among interest groups: (1) cooperative activities among groups, and (2) shared policy preferences among groups. Two kinds of data were assembled and analyzed to provide information on these relationships. First, interview data concerning cooperation among national interest groups were obtained from spokesmen for a random sample of groups having offices in Washington, D. C. Second, "clusters" of groups were identified based on common policy preferences. The policy preferences of groups were recorded from the testimony of 119 groups at hearings on 145 bills considered by selected House committees during the period 1945-60.

These data were interpreted using two conceptual frameworks, pluralism and integration, and several hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups. The usefulness of two other frameworks, system and conflict, for the study of intergroup relationships was also

discussed.

The findings of this research fit more easily into the integration than the pluralist mode of thought. Much of the scholarly and journalistic literature on interest groups stresses such terms and concepts as the following: the group struggle, a diversity of groups in constant competition, shifting alignments of groups for limited objectives, an open interest group system, and a competitive balance among contending interest groups. The data in this research point away from these formulations toward the following: very limited movement of groups into and out of the interest group system, enduring policy preferences of groups over many years, the dominance of some policy sectors by groups of a single type, restricted competition among groups, and limited dynamics in the relationships among groups in the active group population during a period of several years.

In general, the most recurrent theme from the different facets of this investigation has been the notion of "order" in the universe of active interest groups at the congressional level. The interview data showed there is much cooperation among group leaders but it is carried on chiefly by informal rather than formal methods. This informal relating of group to group helps to explain the order among the hundreds of active groups. Another powerful variable in explaining the order in the interest group

system is the policy preference of the group. Group respondents indicated that shared policy preferences tend to promote cooperation among groups more than any other factor. And the policy preferences of groups tend to stay put. Very little change was discernible in the policy preferences of groups during a sixteen-year period.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Emergence of the Interest Group Concept

The attention given to group interpretations of politics in the United States in the past decade represents one of the most significant shifts in perspective in political science since the emergence of the political party as a major subject of study.[1]

Inspection of the titles of articles in the most prestigious political science journal that includes articles on American government and politics, the American Political Science Review, reveals that prior to 1950 few studies of interest groups were published. In the decade of the forties, this journal contained, at most, six articles on interest groups.[2] Three of the articles focused on interest groups in political systems abroad. In the decade of the fifties, sixteen articles

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[1]Samuel J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," Interest Groups on Four Continents, Henry A. Ehrmann, editor (International Political Science Association, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1958), p. 173.

[2]There is some uncertainty in the classification of a few articles.

were published in the same journal on the subject. Seven of these were concerned with interest groups abroad. Five of the remaining nine articles were concerned with the group interpretation of politics. The contents of another political science journal seem to bear out this increased attention to groups. The index of the Western Political Quarterly from 1952 to 1962 contains more than fifteen articles classified under the subject, pressure groups. Many of these are concerned with interest groups abroad.

This revisionist movement in the study of American politics has gained considerable prominence in several areas of specialization. In recent books, Bertram Gross, Donald Blaisdell, and David Truman describe the legislative process as the forging of compromises among groups. Two specialized studies, one focused on the United States House of Representatives and the other on the United States Senate, also lay heavy stress on the importance of interest group activities.[3]

The impact of interest groups on the administrative process is extensively recorded in volumes by E. P. Herring, Marver Bernstein, and Avery Leiserson. Three studies which discuss particular administrative agencies in terms which

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[3]Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, The House of Representatives (New York: D. McKay, 1963); Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); See also William J. and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, Congress and the States (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

highlight the role played by interest groups are Philip Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, William Block's book on the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service, and the study of conflict over water in California by Arthur Maass.[4]

Although the importance assigned to interest groups in the study of political parties and elections varies substantially among scholars, Wilfred Binkley, E. P. Herring, and David Truman assign considerable importance to groups in this area. Samuel Lubell has long based his analyses of political parties and elections on the premise that interest groups and blocs are the dynamic forces in the election process.

Although the attention of scholars to interest groups has become popular chiefly since World War II, several political scientists reported in the 1920's on the important role played by such groups.[5] Groups continued to become increasingly important in national politics in the

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[4]Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1949); William J. Block, The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 47 (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1960); Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters, The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[5]E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); Harwood Childs, Labor and Capital in National Politics (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1930); E. Logan, "Lobbying," Supplement to The Annals, CXLIV (July, 1929).

decade of the thirties.[6] By 1944 Ernest S. Griffith observed that:

> In the United States and in England there were always special groups wishing government to make their private objectives its own. By 1940, this . . . type of governmental activity had grown enormously, so much so that the special groups had virtually superseded individuals as the extra-governmental source of public policy.[7]

Before 1940, studies of interest groups made few claims for the important role which is now recognized for them in politics.[8] Research on interest groups consisted almost entirely of a few descriptive case studies that were written with little emphasis on a place for interest groups in the theoretical analyses of politics. For example, Clarence Bonnett's Employers Associations in the United States, published in 1922, is fundamentally a chronicle on the formation, growth, and activities of numerous trade associations.[9] No systematic effort was made by Bonnett

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[6]The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 179, May, 1935, is devoted entirely to pressure groups and propaganda.

[7]Ernest S. Griffith, "The Changing Pattern of Public Policy Formation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 38 (June, 1944), 451-2.

[8]There are four major exceptions: E. P. Herring, op. cit.; E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure and the Tariff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935); Dayton D. McKean, Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, Inc., 1949).

[9]Clarence E. Bonnett, Employers Associations in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922).

to generalize either from the specific facts of the different associations or their role in politics. The same comment applies to Solon Buck's The Granger Movement, Arthur Capper's The Agricultural Bloc, and to Peter Odegard's Pressure Politics.[10]

Nevertheless, a few studies, such as E. P. Herring's Group Representation Before Congress and E. E. Schattschneider's study of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, focused systematically on general and theoretical considerations.[11] Herring, for example, sees important implications for theories about representation and public opinion in the

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[10]Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Movement; A Study of Agricultural Organization and Its Political, Economic, and Social Consequences, 1870-80 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913). This is a historical treatment of the formation, activities, and impact of one of the earlier farm movements. It is well written history but it is not designed to permit generalization to other cases.

Arthur Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1922). This volume is a treatise on the farmer's needs in the post-world war years and how senators and farm leaders attempted to meet them. In no sense is this a study of any particular farm organization or coalition of farm organizations. Although the National Agricultural Conference of 1922 is mentioned and discussed generally, there is no attention to the group base of it or of its attempts to influence Congress or public opinion.

Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); See also Orville M. Kile, The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades (Baltimore: The Waverly Press, 1948) which, even though written by a representative of the American Farm Bureau Federation, places that farm organization and its activities in the post-war years more clearly in political context. Kile writes as one who is aware of the authority of a representative of a million-member organization. It is, however, a chronological case study that has no theoretical design and few generalizations emerge from it.

[11]Herring, op. cit.; Schattschneider, op. cit.

rise of national associations in the United States and their involvement in politics. Schattschneider tests some propositions concerning the relation between economic interests and political behavior. Both of these books are concerned with the proposition that groups occupy a central place in the study of politics and both discuss interest groups as devices for representation of specialized clienteles.[12] Edward B. Logan's monograph on lobbying, which appeared in 1929, is another of the early attempts to examine the political activities of interest groups in Washington in terms of the functions they perform for their members and for congressmen.[13]

Prior to the Second World War, citizen opinion had traditionally regarded the effects of lobbying as a corrupting of the will of the people as it is expressed in electoral majorities. Lobby groups were condemned as selfish private intruders into public democratic processes.[14] In the prevailing concept of democracy, interest groups were not assigned a legitimate standing since the representatives of the people must act only in terms of the public

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[12]Herring's study presents evidence to document the proposition that in national politics "the individual, as such, is of slight importance . . . He has become a mere cipher in a larger and emergent unit: the organized group." p. 5-6. Schattschneider devotes Part IV to a discussion of the representative character of pressure of groups.

[13]Logan, op. cit.

[14]Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958).

interest.[15] Two other factors also contributed to the low status of lobbying, (1) the revelations by reformers and journalists of the abusive power exercised by big business, and (2) three congressional investigations of lobbying, in 1913, 1929, and 1935, each following the exposure of culpable acts.[16]

As scholarly studies of political interest groups augmented the expose and reformist literature, it became clear that the major kind of interest group lobbying in the Capital, and the character of lobbying activities, had changed. As the "old lobby" of corporation representatives and "wire-pullers" was replaced by the highly organized and respected national associations who came as petitioners by their memberships, congressional and public tolerance of group activity gradually increased.[17]

The extent of this change is clear if one compares some of the articles on interest groups from popular journals around the turn of the century with articles in comparable publications today. Two similarities in the

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[15]Alfred DeGrazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958) 118; Herring, op. cit., p. 4.

[16]Edgar Lane, "Some Lessons from Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1950) 14-30.

[17]Herring, op. cit., pp. 40-41; An engrossing account of a coalition of wire-pullers and legislators is found in an article entitled "Is There Anything in It?" Continental Monthly, Vol. 3 (June, 1863) 688-93. (No author listed)

articles of both periods deserve comment. First, the authors, early and recent, are inclined to frame their reports in terms of immediate news events concerning lobbying. Bribery, deception, power manipulation in lobbying, or charges asserting that these conditions may exist, are the events that trigger the publication of feature articles on lobbying in popular magazines.[18] Second, both sets of authors tend to describe lobbyists and their activities in normative terms, usually negative terms.[19]

An illustration of the second difference between the older and newer treatments was written in response to the lobby investigation of 1913 and is, perhaps, a good guide to some of the limiting norms which define what is unacceptable activity by lobbyists.

> President Pope, (president of the NAM) says that his body has opposed only "the most flagrant and partisan species" of labor legislation, that it has never directly or indirectly proposed a measure of any kind in Congress . . .[20]

This statement suggests that interest groups and

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[18]Charles S. Thomas, "My Adventures With the Sugar Lobby," World's Work (September, 1913); T. H. Caraway, "The Third House," The Saturday Evening Post (July 7, 1928); J. A. Morris, "The Paralyzing Power of Washington Lobbies," Readers Digest, 82:127-32 (May, 1963).

[19]Edward Ross, "Political Decay--An Interpretation," The Independent (July 19, 1906); "Smoking Out Invisible Government," The Literary Digest (July 12, 1913). (No author listed)

[20]"Smoking Out the Invisible Government," Ibid., p. 44.

lobbyists attempted to defend their conduct on grounds that it constituted minimal and justifiable involvement and that they usually did not prepare legislation for which they openly solicited legislative sponsors and support. Today many national interest groups are regularly described as continually active and as the sources of much legislation. Certain groups are expected to bring forward a legislative program for consideration by congressional committees.

A recent survey by Al Toffler published in Redbook on "How Congressmen Make Up Their Minds" states:

> No aspect of Washington politics is less understood by the ordinary American today than the lobby . . .
>
> Many people seem to think that a lobby is necessarily evil and greedy. The truth is that Washington is full of lobbies that work hard for public rather than selfish ends.
>
> When working with a senator or representative friendly to his cause, for instance, the lobbyist just makes himself as helpful as possible. He feeds the legislator a flow of information to use in debate. He drafts speeches for him. He may actually draft proposed laws.[21]

There is continuing but sporadic journalistic attention to lobbying today. Many of the articles are still concerned with the bad effects of lobbying but there is sometimes a statement included that reveals the changed perspective of the popular observers of the contemporary political scene from earlier writers. Thus, even a highly value-laden article by J. A. Morris that is critical of the power that the author says is exerted by many interest

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[21]Al Toffler, "How Congressmen Make Up Their Minds," Redbook (February, 1962) Preprint, p. 5.

groups includes the following:

> In general, Congressmen don't object to the kind of lobbying designed to influence them and not the electorate. They look upon most lobbyists as essential to the orderly conduct of business . . .[22]

The place of lobbying on the contemporary political scene is summed up in the remarks of House members who served on the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of 1950:

> The Chairman . . . "The word 'lobbying' has developed unfavorable connotations over the years. One reason for that may be that most congressional investigations of lobbying activities in the past were designed to show up fraud or corruption or sinister or evil practices. I personally look upon lobbying as necessary and essential.
>
> We must keep before us at all times the spirit and letter of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States wherein the right of petition is expressed!"[23]

> Mr. Halleck . . . "I am happy to hear the words of your opening statement, particularly at the conclusion where you refer to that definition of 'lobbying' which certainly does not give it the sinister, vicious, selfish aspect that sometimes I think people are inclined to attribute to it."[24]

> Mr. Lanham . . . "Mr. Chairman . . . I see you take the same position I do; that lobbying in and of itself is not an evil.
>
> I am sure, that a lobbyist can be of great help to the busy congressman because he has the facts at his fingertips and can readily be of great help to a congressman as he tries to find out what the facts are on the many problems that face him."[25]

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[22]Morris, op. cit., p. 128.

[23]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, Lobbying Direct and Indirect, Hearings before Subcommittee, 31st Congress, 2d Session, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 2.

[24]Ibid., p. 11.

[25]Ibid.

> Mr. O'Hara . . . "I think that what we should do, this committee, is to find out the views of the people as to what they consider legal lobbying and what is improper lobbying . . . I think that it is perfectly proper that we have lobbying and that it is one of the constitutional guarantees under the first amendment . . . and I think that it is perfectly proper for the citizen to present to Congress his views upon legislation."[26]

E. P. Herring is credited with the documentation of the proposition that what distinguishes the "new lobby" from the old is its representation of groups with mass memberships and its use of mass media to mobilize public opinion. United States Senator Charles Thomas writing in 1913 also noted the basic change in the character of lobbying over several years, though he regarded it more threatening to wise law-making than Herring did.[27]

The Group Theory of Politics

In the early nineteen-fifties, the application of the methods, concepts, and theories from physical and biological sciences as well as from sociology, economics, and psychology to politics became popular and extremely influential. The publication of David Truman's The Governmental Process is often cited as a landmark in the establishment of the new perspective--the group theory

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Thomas, op. cit.; See also "The Invisible Government Becoming Visible," The World's Work (March, 1922); and Fred D. Shelton, "Unofficial Representation at Washington," The Independent (January 2, 1926).

of politics.[28] This theory was associated with the rediscovery of Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government which was based on conceptual and theoretical materials from other disciplines than political science.[29] The debt the group theorists avow to Bentley is substantial but controversial.[30]

The advocates of the group interpretation of politics mingled numerous and diverse elements in their new approach. Such concepts as "equilibrium," "transaction," "interaction," "primary group," and "attitude" have proved useful to group theorists. Surprisingly, what was generally neglected in discussions of group theory was the organized interest group that had been the only type of group that had claimed the attention of political scientists before 1940.

The neglect of the organized interest group by group theorists was partly due to the inability to fit it easily into the new conception of "group" which they advanced. As defined by Bentley and others, the new

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[28]David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

[29]Bentley, op. cit.

[30]See the following for contrasting interpretations. Richard W. Taylor, "Arthur F. Bentley's Political Science," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. v, No. 2 (June, 1952) 214-30; R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December, 1960) 944-54; W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," Political Studies, Vol. 3 (1955) 247-55.

"group" is a segment of goal-centered activity.[31] It is not the same type of concept as the pressure group. It is an analytic concept as distinguished from a concrete concept. Marion J. Levy states:

> . . . concrete structures are . . . those patterns capable of physical separation (in time and/or space) from other units of the same sort . . . Analytic structures are . . . patterned aspects of action that are not even theoretically capable of concrete separation from other patterned aspects of action.[32]

An organized interest group (e.g., American Legion) is a concrete concept. Different interest groups may be physically separated from each other and from other groups, such as families. A "segment of goal-centered activity" cannot be physically separated from other goal-centered activity.

R. E. Dowling makes a similar distinction between a "real political factor" and a "conceptual factor." He notes that Bentley begins with "a conceptual entity called 'group' and then, when saying that in politics only 'groups' are admissible, thinking that one is referring to actual groups."[33] According to group theorists, this concept

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[31]Bentley, op. cit.; Philip Monypenny, "Political Science and the Study of Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 2 (June, 1954), pp. 183-201; Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in Political Science," Approaches to the Study of Politics, Roland Young, editor (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958); Taylor, op. cit.

[32]Marion J. Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).

[33]Dowling, op. cit., p. 949.

is both more discriminating and more inclusive in its scope than the organized interest group. It is more inclusive, the theorists state, because the group is the sole concept needed in the analysis of political behavior. It is more discriminating because only the relevant behavior of individuals and institutions is included in the analysis of a particular political event.[34] Therefore, the theorists state, individuals and institutions are not neglected by group theory; they are only dismantled for the purpose of more accurate description and analysis.

Thus the principal merit claimed for the new conception of group is that it breaks down the barriers to thought, investigation, and understanding that exist when individuals, institutions, and groups (e.g., organized interest groups) are used in their customary ways, and reveals the full range of relevant behavior of a given event in the wider environment in which it occurs.[35] The analytic group is purported to provide a more accurate formulation of behavior in a particular research project because it permits a more precise division of individual or institutional acts in terms of those for an objective and those against it, and it excludes the remainder as irrelevant. The use of conventional concepts, such as

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[34]Hagan, op. cit., ". . . Individuals have meaning only as participants in the decision and only that part of them that operates in the decision-making is relevant to the analysis." pp. 41-2.

[35]Taylor, op. cit., p. 222.

organized interest groups, institutions, and individuals, tends to promote the acceptance of the apparent boundaries of these concepts.

For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation at a congressional committee hearing states that it is opposed to federal aid to education. But actually only a small number of leaders and members are opposed. The group theorists in the course of their research would divide the members in the organization into those whose behavior supports the proposal, those whose behavior opposes it, and those who are inactive. In similar fashion each individual who is active might be considered in terms of how his numerous group affiliations affected his action. Not all of them would add positive force to his position on this issue; some would constitute negative force.

Institutional acts would be analyzed in similar fashion, according to their positive or negative contributions to the event or their non-involvement. It is possible to go even farther with this frame of reference. In this framework, the notion of "overlapping membership of groups" has a broader meaning than merely the affiliation of an individual with two or more organized groups.[36] The concept of

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[36]At some point in this phase of the discussion, Bentley and Truman go their separate ways.

"reference group" is implied.[37] A reference group is a group whose norms, values and behavior constitute cues for the behavior of an individual whether he is a member of the group or not. Thus the boundaries of organized interest groups, indicated by membership or non-membership, may not provide an accurate guide to the real alignments of individuals both within and outside the group on an issue in which the group is interested. In the illustration above, even though a member of the congressional committee may not be a member of the Farm Bureau, he still may take his cues on how to vote in committee on the bill from the position expressed by the spokesmen for this farm group.

The difficulty of the task of integrating different conceptions of "group" found in the literature on interest groups into a single theoretical framework can be seen by noting the different frames of reference of what may be called the group "theorists," who argue for studies of goal-centered activity, and the "analysts" of organized interest groups (e.g., American Legion). Using this distinction, the writings of Bentley, Hagan, Monypenny, and Taylor constitute the literature of the group theorists; and the works of Odegard, Herring, Garceau, and Schattschneider represent fairly, perhaps, the literature of the group analysts. Several scholars, such as Truman, Latham, and

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[37]Tamotsu Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60 (May, 1955), 562-9.

Blaisdell, tour both camps.

One major difference between these two positions concerning the meaning of "group" vitally affects the scope of political behavior which that concept is used to explain. The theorists, directly or by implication, claim all political behavior can be adequately explained by the use of their concept alone; the group analysts are more modest in their claim. They regard their concept as an essential one for explaining some types of political behavior but not the only one for explaining all political behavior.

Unfortunately, the distinction between "theorists" and analysts" has limited utility. The confusion surrounding "group" exists not only between but also within each camp.[38] The core of the term "interest group" has been used to mean, (1) a goal-centered segment of activity (Bentley, Hagan, Monypenny, Latham), (2) interaction on the basis of shared attitudes (Truman, Gross), (3) interest groupings, such as farmers, (Binkley, Lubell), (4) organized interest groups, such as the National Grange, (Herring, Schattschneider, Blaisdell, Zeigler). It is not difficult to show that some of these authors, although avowedly holding to one of the above meanings, do not restrict the meaning of "group" to it. Bentley, for example, appears

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[38]Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February, 1961), 25-45.

to use meanings (1), (3), and (4).[39]

David Truman's The Governmental Process, that is widely acknowledged as the outstanding volume on the subject of interest groups, also reveals the difficulties inherent in the definition and systematic use of "group." In Part I of the volume, Truman, an avowed disciple of Bentley, undertakes the task of defining the concept "group" and demonstrating its comprehensiveness in explaining political behavior.

He begins his discussion by noting that the individual is shaped less "by the society as a whole than differentially through various of its subdivisions or groups."[40] Here he is referring to such groups as the sex group, the peer group, the family, the religious group, and the locality grouping. Next he notes the importance of primary groups on the development and behavior of individuals. Finally, he discusses "institutionalized groups" such as legislatures and courts, and then voluntary associations. Using all of these types of groups, he defends the notion that a group interpretation of politics is comprehensive in its scope: nothing important is left beyond the reach of the "group." We do not, in fact, find individuals otherwise

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[39]See Golembiewski's interpretation of Bentley's "group." Robert Golembiewski, "The Group Basis of Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (December, 1960), 962-71; and in Bentley, op. cit., p. 211, 354, 369-70.

[40]Truman, op. cit., p. 15.

than in groups.[41] Truman defines an interest group as:

> . . . a group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.[42]

By stressing interaction on the basis of shared attitudes in his discussion of interest groups, he includes all of the above types of groups within his definition.

Thus in Part I of the book, his use of the term "group" encompasses much, if not all, of the individual's social experience, In Part II, however, in his discussion of the operation of the American political system, he focuses chiefly on voluntary associations. He sometimes refers to "legislative groups" or to courts as groups but he also refers to the legislatures and the courts as institutions. He describes the political party as an "instrumentality."[43] Clearly, he does not find the term "interest group," as he defined it in Part I, as useful in discussing the functioning of American government as he does in discussing the group nature of human experience.[44]

It is also obvious that Truman does not have much taste for describing groups as goal-centered activity as

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[41]Ibid., p. 48. [42]Ibid. p. 33. [43]Ibid., p. 270.

[44]Shifts in the usage of terms of this kind have prompted E. E. Schattschneider to note that group theory begins as general theory but ends "with a defense of pressure politics as inherent, universal, permanent and inevitable." E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 28.

group theorists have urged. His categories of analysis in Part II of the book are the familiar ones: congressional committees, sub-committees, political parties, administrative bureaucracies, and voluntary associations.

Given both the tendency of Truman to describe all patterned interaction as groups and his tendency to describe the work of interest groups chiefly in terms of voluntary associations, it is easy to understand why certain critics, in addition to Schattschneider, base some of their attacks on group theory on the notion that group theory rests on the behavior of leaders and members of voluntary associations.[45]

Truman has really written two books, instead of two parts, that are not closely integrated or related to each other. There can be little doubt that in Part I he constructed an elaborate theoretical argument and conceptual apparatus that he seldom applies in Part II.

There are only five authors that attempt to make a systematic effort to discuss the role of political groups in American society.[46] Four of these describe and analyze

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[45]Roy Macridis, for example, has discussed the writings of the group theorists at times as if the theorists defined interest groups as voluntary associations. Macridis, op. cit., p. 26-7.

[46]Truman, op. cit.; V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964); Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Bentley, op. cit.; Donald Blaisdell, American Democracy Under Pressure (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1957).

the political system in terms of voluntary associations, conventionally called "pressure" or "interest" groups.[47]

The most recent volume, Interest Groups in American Society, by Harmon Zeigler, begins with a brief chapter discussing group theory but does not base the remainder of the chapters on it.[48] Zeigler bows in the direction of the theorists in stating that group interests are separate from organized interest groups. In this assertion he accepts the wisdom of the group theorists' point that the boundaries of organized groups do not encompass all individual and institutional acts in support of a specific interest. Nevertheless, he quickly turns to discuss organized groups from which he rarely deviates in subsequent chapters.

At present it seems more appropriate to describe the new work on groups as a group "approach" rather than a theory.[49] This distinction acknowledges the existence of a new perspective or frame of reference for the study of political behavior, but it does not claim the existence of

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[47]The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 319 (September, 1958) is almost entirely devoted to American interest groups and lobbies. The contributors to it are heavily committed in usage to the discussion of interest groups in terms of organized interest groups.

[48]Zeigler, op. cit., Chapter 1.

[49]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 188; Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February, 1960), 36.

a theory in the sense of a system of related variables. An explicit statement of a group theory of politics has not been written except in the form of the assertion that politics can best be understood through the study of groups.

Despite the fact that group theory has been discussed for fifteen years, no published research in political science makes much use of its conceptual apparatus. The chief conceptual contributions of the new group approach have been: (1) a new conception of "group," (2) the potential interest group, (3) the notion of overlapping membership in groups, (4) an equilibrium of groups. Of these concepts only item four has been consistently mentioned in monographs on interest groups, and its use has conveyed different meanings.[50] In general the "equilibrium of groups" that is often mentioned in group studies, but seldom discussed in detail, chiefly seems to be a loose analogical model of the scientific meaning of equilibrium.[51] It is worth noting that none of the group theorists has

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[50]Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," Political Behavior, Heinz Eulau, et. al. editors (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956) p. 239; Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

[51]See Peter Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September, 1958), 687-702; David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 271; Golembiewski, op. cit., p. 968; See also Heinz Eulau's review of Lester Milbrath's book, "Lobbyists: The Wasted Profession," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1964) p. 27-38.

published a research venture using the apparatus of group theory.[52]

In fact, the similarity of concepts and the basic assumptions of some of the earliest interest group studies by Childs, Herring, and Schattschneider are remarkably like those of Zeigler, McConnell, Baker, Ehrmann, Riggs, and Stewart.[53] Both groups of investigators have studied organized interest groups and their place in politics. The principal difference is that a more detailed conceptualization of certain types of groups has been developed, such as "catalytic group."[54] But there is little evidence for concluding that the latter group of

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[52]Latham, of course, has published a study but he has not been classified in this paper as a group theorist and there is evidence from his study to support the judgment that his research does not use the group theorists' framework. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics, A Study in Basing-Point Legislation (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952).

[53]Childs, op. cit.; Herring, op. cit.; Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, op. cit.; Harmon Zeigler, The Politics of Small Business (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961); Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1953); Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954); Henry A. Ehrmann, Organized Business in France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); J. D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

[54]Fred Riggs, Pressures on Congress (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950) p. 43 ff.

studies could not have been written without the conceptual and theoretical work of the group theorists.

The recent increased consideration given to groups in the political process seems to be chiefly a product of the research on organized interest groups mentioned above. There is clearly a growing awareness of the pervasiveness of group involvement directly or indirectly, in administration, legislatures, public opinion, and, to some extent, in our courts.[55]

It may be true, as Robert Golembiewski states, that interest in a group theory of politics is ebbing.[56] No defense or elaboration of it has appeared in published form since 1958.[57] The critics of group theory, however, continue to increase. These critics have centered their attacks chiefly on three points: (1) that the comprehensive scope claimed for the new concept of

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[55]Most of the recent college textbooks on American government include one or more chapters on the role of interest groups in these areas. See Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962); Charles R. Adrian, and Charles Press, The American Political Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965); Alfred De Grazia, The American Way of Government (London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

[56]Golembiewski, op. cit., p. 962.

[57]Hagan, op. cit. But Alfred De Grazia is optimistic about the possibility of constructing a "new theory of associational democracy." Alfred De Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," op. cit., p. 122.

group is not supported by the evidence, (2) that group theory is a crude form of determinism, and (3) that it makes extra-ordinarily heavy demands on scholars engaged in research.

One of the recent critics, Stanley Rothman, raises two criticisms which challenge the comprehensiveness claimed for the new conception of group. He objects to Truman's "ad hoc" use of the concept of "status-role" as a supplementary concept to handle "a dimension of experience that cannot be handled" by the "group" concept.[58] He also rejects the concept of potential interest group as a "deus ex machina" which can be used to explain anything "but fundamentally explains nothing."[59]

Odegard, in replying to the notion that "group" is a comprehensive concept for studying politics concludes:

> If every casual relation, direct or indirect, between individuals constitutes a group, then virtually every human act is a group, and the term becomes tautological and useless for scientific purposes.[60]

David Smith is convinced that something very important is left out when one relies exclusively on the group approach, namely elements of commonality within a

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[58]Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March, 1960), 19.

[59]Ibid., p. 23.

[60]Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," op. cit., p. 694; Garceau and La Palombara make the same point. See Garceau, op. cit., p. 105; La Palombara, op. cit., p. 36.

nation which make a populace.[61] He believes the unifying factors in the political system cannot be accounted for in terms of organized interest groups.[62]

Roy Macridis raises numerous questions which, he contends, require the use of other categories than "group," such as political parties, institutions, and cultural values.[63] He states that if groups are compelled to operate within enduring cultures or subcultures which shape political behavior, as studies of interest groups abroad show, then the groups are subject to them and the cultural norms constitute independent variables in the political system.[64]

In regard to the second criticism, Macridis states "It would seem to me that group analysis is . . . a crude form of determinism."[65] He believes that the theorists rely exclusively on group interest as the "propelling force" in all action and therefore "the content of decisions are determined by the Bentleyian parallelogram of group forces."[66] Joseph La Palombara and R. E. Dowling raise similar points. They contend that the activity of

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[61]David Smith, "Pragmatism and the Group Theory of Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (September, 1964), 600-10.

[62]Ibid.; Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society, op. cit., also feels this criticism is justified.

[63]Macridis, op. cit., p. 34-6.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid., p. 31-2.

[66]Ibid.

groups tends to fall too readily into the Marxian framework of analysis with groups locked in unceasing struggle.[67]

The problems of conducting research on the basis of group theory appear to be extremely difficult if not insurmountable given its present conceptual framework. Joseph La Palombara reports:

> The policy process, as I have researched it in Italy, does not respond to the kind of explication of phenomena toward which most of group "theory" is directed.[68]

It is worth noting that none of the theorists has published research based on this conception of group. Unless some case studies of particular bills in the legislative process are accepted as examples of the group approach, the theorists' universe of "activity" has not been used in published research at all.[69] It appears that the type of questions in which most political scientists are currently interested cannot be advantageously studied by the new concept of group.[70] The gap between group theory and research has been noted by many scholars.[71]

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[67]La Palombara, op. cit., p. 32; Dowling, op. cit., p. 949.

[68]La Palombara, loc. cit.

[69]There may be some studies in the area of small groups that make use of this concept of group.

[70]See the essays and discussion in Henry A. Ehrmann, editor, Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1958).

[71]Garceau, op. cit., p. 108; Rothman, op. cit., p. 15; Macridis, loc. cit.

Other critics, such as Myron Hale, have challenged group theory on different grounds, namely, that it sanctifies "the actual" and therefore the Bentleyian scheme of thought is conservative.[72] Joseph La Palombara has stated nine middle-range propositions regarding interest groups and the political process.[73] It is significant that only one of these propositions has a connection with group theory, and none makes use of any of its concepts so that it must be regarded as a product of group theory.

Studies of interest groups abroad have neglected the discussion of a group interpretation of politics and few traces of its influence on group research are evident.[74] Contrary to the position of group "theorists" in this country, the scholars who reported at the round-table conference on interest groups sponsored by the International Political Science Association showed no inclination to exorcise ideas, institutions, individuals, or interests.[75]

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[72]Myron Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (December, 1960), 955-61. Also, Leo Weinstein, "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley," Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, Herbert J. Storing, editor (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962). Weinstein in discussing Bentleyian theory launches a broad attack on the notion of the "science" of politics.

[73]La Palombara, op. cit., p. 42.

[74]This judgment is based on those studies of interest groups abroad which have been published in English.

[75]Hagan, op. cit., p. 41.

Perhaps through the development or the reforging of its concepts, the group approach will prove to be as comprehensive and useful in analysis as its advocates contend. For the present, however, it appears that research on interest groups may be profitably continued based on the concrete concept of interest group (e.g., American Legion). The present study rests upon this premise. Such research can proceed a step at a time beginning with relatively simple descriptions and hypotheses that extend to a universe of groups of clearly defined and manageable size. The groups on which the present study is based are organized interest groups that were active at the congressional level of government in any session of Congress during the period 1944-60. The hypotheses to be tested are concerned with relations among these interest groups.

CHAPTER II

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

This investigation is focused on the identification, description, and analysis of several kinds of relations among interest groups. The data used in this research consist chiefly of group testimony presented at House committee hearings and information obtained from interviews with representatives of groups that have offices in Washington. This chapter reports the relevance of certain conceptual frameworks--"system," "pluralism," "integration," and "conflict,"--to the study of interest groups, and shows how intergroup relations may be more fully understood by using them. The literature on these concepts makes it clear that each is concerned with the relations among entities in a population of entities. This chapter is concerned with the discussion and illustration of the usefulness of these concepts for understanding relations among interest groups. A subsequent chapter describes some of the characteristics of the interest group population at the congressional level that were identified in this inquiry that permit some conclusions about the applicability of these conceptual frames of reference for the

study of interest groups.

The major portion of the chapter is concerned with the theoretical framework known as "pluralism" in which the role of interest groups is especially important. The discussion of the characteristics of pluralism provides the setting for the statement of the specific hypotheses concerning intergroup relations that were investigated in this research. This chapter attempts to show that new and different perspectives on interest groups emerge when groups are studied from these conceptual frames of reference; these perspectives reveal dimensions of the subject that seldom have been developed in the literature.

Throughout this study, distinctions are made between several "universes of interest groups." All of these universes are composed of groups whose spokesmen were active in the hearings process of fourteen House committees during the period, 1945 through 1960. The most important universe of groups, the select universe, includes 119 interest groups whose representatives provided testimony most frequently to selected House committee hearings. Another universe of groups, constructed in an early phase of the research, was used to obtain a sample of groups whose representatives were to be interviewed. From this universe, a stratified sample of fifty groups, representing ten types of groups, was drawn on a random basis. The term

"group population" as used in this paper refers to all groups whose representatives have participated in the hearings process at the national level.

Systems

One conceptual framework that may be helpful in seeing national interest groups in a new perspective is systems analysis. The interactions of the interest group population at the congressional level of government can be conceived as a "system." In this formulation, the concept "system" serves as a heuristic frame of reference for studying interest groups in relation to each other and to their environment. Authors sometimes speak of the interest or pressure group "system" without defining this term or justifying the use of it to describe relationships among groups.[1] Nevertheless, the idea that there is an interest group system is a useful approach since it tends to turn attention toward aspects of interest groups that have been neglected.

Until recently the concept of system has not been widely used in political science. Economists, and to a lesser extent sociologists, have given more attention to it. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils' Toward a General Theory of Action is one of the most ambitious and

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[1]Edgar Lane, Lobbying and the Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964) p. 110; Fred W. Riggs, Pressures on Congress (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950) pp. 198-9; Milbrath, op. cit., p. 17.

comprehensive attempts to apply systems theory to the analysis of human behavior.[2] Among political scientists, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and Morton Kaplan have made extensive use of the concept.[3]

The notion of system is used in two different ways: first, as an analytical concept in the study of relationships between components; second, as a descriptive concept in referring to a functioning set of arrangements.[4] In this chapter, the term is used in the first sense. The interest group process is viewed as a "closed system."[5]

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[2]Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[3]Easton, The Political System, op. cit.; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Morton A. Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

[4]Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Society: A Unified Approach (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963); Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., argues that this distinction is not a useful one and that all systems are analytic.

[5]"For use in analysis, a system must be 'closed.' A system which is interacting with its environment is an 'open' system: all systems of 'real' life are therefore open systems. For analysis however, it is necessary to assume that contact with the environment is cut off so that the operation of the system is affected only by given conditions previously established by the environment and not changing at the time of analysis, plus the relationships among the elements of the system." Everett E. Hagen, "Analytical Models in the Study of Social Systems," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 2 (September, 1961) 145.

A simple model of the interest group system as it is defined in this study, for example, might consist of interest groups, the components of the system, that have representatives appearing at House committee hearings. The interactions among these groups, such as the kinds and frequencies of interaction, constitute the variables of the system. The degree of apathy among the persons affiliated with the interest groups in the system is one parameter of the system.[6] The provisions of the Lobby Registration Act establish another parameter of the system. The inputs of the system flow from the environment of which the system is a part. For example, the communications and the expressed demands of the members of the interest groups that are received by group leaders are inputs. The outputs of the system take the form of group information and requests that are communicated to receptors in the environment, such as Congress, other political structures, the leaders of other groups, or the members of groups.

According to most scholars, a system is defined in terms of three properties: (1) boundaries that separate the components of the system from the environment in which they are set, (2) mutually dependent relationships of these entities with each other, and (3) tendencies toward

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[6]*Ibid.*, p. 145.

self-maintenance.[7] The adaption of this frame of reference in appraising the interest group population prompts the formulation of new questions about interest groups. The notion of "boundaries" turns the attention of the investigator to such factors as the degree to which the interest groups may readily enter or depart from the system. The idea of interdependency among groups in the system alerts the researcher to the patterns of interaction among groups within the system and to the differing types and rates of interaction among them. The concept of tendencies-toward-self-maintenance in systems raises a question concerning the possible identification of some form of self-regulation or governance in the interest group population. David Easton notes that:

> Self-regulation by the members of a political system, even to the point of self-transformation in structure and goals, represents critical capabilities of all social systems.[8]

The notion of all of these properties, boundaries, interdependence of components, and tendencies toward self-maintenance, also suggests the importance of the notion of the "growth" of the number of groups in the population. The possibility that growth in population may occur points

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[7]Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities," Behavioral Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1958); Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit.

[8]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 87.

to the need for information concerning the strains of adjustment that may accompany growth. James G. Miller notes that ". . . growth in size, number and complexity of components often compels a system to reorganize relationships among its parts."[9] If we view the interest group system as a subsystem of a larger political system encompassing decision-making by the presidential administration and the Congress, the impact of growth in components in the subsystem may increase the volume or intensity of group demands on the Congress. On this type of problem David Easton states:

> Stress may occur because too many demands are being made, or their variety and content may be such that the conflict they stimulate requires an excessive amount of time to process.[10]

How autonomous are groups of each other? What kinds of structured relationships exist among them? Do the groups in a given population have a consciousness of mutual interests? These questions have been raised only infrequently and have been researched even less. The literature on interest groups has tended to focus heavily on the relationships between interest groups and official actors in the political decision-making process, chiefly

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[9]James G. Miller, "Living Systems: Structure and Process," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October, 1965) 373; See also Kenneth Boulding, The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953) p. 22-25.

[10]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 120.

congressmen. One scholar, for example, has asserted that the general relation of groups to officials, especially elective officials, is one of dependence: the groups are dependent on the parties.[11]

But perhaps the relations of groups to each other constitute an equally important condition of dependence. It would be significant if the size, stability, composition, activities, and methods of groups in the population were not affected in important ways by the relationships of the groups to each other. The leaders of each group are informed of the presence and activities of many other groups that are also interacting with congressmen. This information about other groups is certain to have an impact on the behavior of the group receiving it. If the dissemination of common knowledge about group behavior and methods is widespread in the group population, group leaders will find their freedom of action more limited than otherwise. Thus each group in the population is denied control over its own affairs, to some degree, as the interdependency of the entities in the system is developed.

What occurs when representatives of two groups first interact may be a great deal like what happens when interaction is begun by individuals in a dyad relationship. Voluntary interaction between two individuals, even in its earliest phase, consists of exploratory behaviors by each

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[11]Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, op. cit., p. 42-3.

individual designed to gather information about the other. This exchange of actions consists of a reconnaissance by each concerning the other, and one effect of it is to structure to some degree the relationship between them. If the costs of the behavior transaction are low and the rewards high for both individuals, each is likely to develop the relationship further, perhaps at the sacrifice of exploring the environment for other individuals with whom rewarding relationships might be established.[12] Or each individual may continue to explore the environment for other satisfying relationships but not at the cost of sacrificing the first rewarding relationship. Thus, the interaction leads to a relationship that tends to restrict or exclude interactions with others and usually leads to the development of relatively stable expectations by each concerning the behavior of the other on events in which both have an interest.

It is a tenable hypothesis that leaders of an interest group behave toward the leaders of other interest groups in the same way as the individual discussed above. The leaders of a new national interest group must explore the group population in Washington for potential allies and threatening enemies. The

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[12]John W. Thibault, and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959) p. 64-66.

congressional environment of interest groups is not equally friendly to all groups. Many studies of groups in Washington show that group success often depends on coalition-building among groups in the population.[13] Group leaders in formulating strategy estimate the support and hostility of other groups. It is this shaping of the group leaders' behavior choices in the light of the estimated behavior choices of the leaders of other groups in the population that makes the hypothesis of the group population as a system credible. Thomas Schelling in a discussion of strategy between adversaries stresses this interdependency.

> . . . strategy . . . focuses on the fact that each participant's "best" choice of action depends on what he expects the other to do, and that "strategic behavior" is concerned with influencing another's choice by working on his expectation of how one's own behavior is related to his.[14]

This research does not attempt to define all the variables pertaining to intergroup relationships among the interest groups in the group population at the congressional level. Parsons and Shils indicate what must be done in determining the interdependence of the entities

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[13]Riggs, op. cit.; Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-Point Legislation, op. cit.; Thomas K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

[14]Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 15.

in the interest group system:

> Interdependence consists in the existence of determinate relationships among the parts or variables as contrasted with randomness of variability. In other words, interdependence is order in the relationship among the components which enter a system.[15]

This study does not undertake the demonstration of all the dimensions of interdependency among interest groups, nor does it attempt to construct a model of the interest group system. This research seeks only to determine and appraise a few dimensions of the relationships between groups at one level of government while at the same time it stresses the heuristic value of the concepts of systems analysis for this subject. It is appropriate to use the vocabulary and constructs of systems analysis in this discussion insofar as these terms seem likely to contribute to accurate description and fruitful analysis.

In using the concept "system" to gain a new perspective about the interest group population at the congressional level, it is clear that no case need be made (1) that each group is unaffected in important ways by the environment of the groups, or (2) that the relations of each group with others are more vital to group survival than the relations of the group with government officials or with the individuals affiliated with the group. It is feasible to study the circulatory system of man in medicine even though that system is not a system independent

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[15]Parsons and Shils, op. cit., p. 107.

of the functioning of other organs, and even though some of the elements in that system are also elements of other systems.[16]

The application of the system frame of reference to interest groups seems promising because it focuses on the aspects of intergroup relations that have not been fully studied. A few case studies of specific bills have reported on intergroup relationships but the language used to describe these relations does not facilitate comparisons with the findings of other group studies.

Some authorities have asserted that the survival of democratic industrial societies is dependent on the adaptability of these systems to changes within the systems and in the environment. For example, technological change in the field of armaments and warfare has made the selective service system, as it currently exists, inadequate for some national security situations. We do not know if the activities or relationships of the interest groups in the group population are becoming dysfunctional for the political system because we do not have even the most rudimentary general information about the group population and the relationships among groups within it to determine this.

Systems and communications theorists cite the importance of the concepts "noise," "distortion," and

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[16]Kuhn, op. cit.

"overload."[17] Would it be surprising if our interest group system became overloaded with excessive numbers of messages from groups that have resources to spend to attain legislative objectives?[18] We do not have any conception about the functional limits of the present arrangements because there has been no attention given to the notion that the present arrangements operate under limiting factors. It will not be persuasive if observers conclude that the systems approach does not seem to be useful because the interest group system in this country, or in any known political system, has never broken down. The strains from noise, distortion, or overload in the communication system may help to explain changes in the relationships among groups and the relations between groups, legislators, and administrators.[19]

Since changes in relationships that are the result of communications difficulties are not likely to be sudden or highly visible, they may occur unnoticed. Adjustments

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[17]James G. Miller, "Living Systems: Basic Concepts," Behavioral Science, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July, 1965), 193-234; Dan McLachlan, Jr., "Communication Networks and Monitoring," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (Summer, 1961), 197; Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963) p. 150 and 162.

[18]Lester Milbrath reports that: "The competition for the attention of officials has taken a new turn, however, . . . Decision-makers are deluged with messages from constituents." Milbrath, op. cit., p. 239.

[19]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 66.

by the principal actors are likely to be slow and incremental because they tend to be made on a day-by-day basis. Some of the existing group relationships to congressmen may not be as functional as traditional interpretations have held. For example, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter, in a recent case study of the legislative process, assert that the excessive volume of communications directed at congressmen contributes to the freedom of the congressman to take a position on a bill according to his predispositions toward it.[20]

The transformation of an agrarian society into an industrial society is a revolution in human relationships as well as in technology. The growth of the group population may cause a transformation in relationships, too, because it impinges on the environment within which the population is set and with which it is related. Changes in these relations seem likely under circumstances of growth but no discussion of growth can be found in the recent literature on interest groups.[21]

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[20]Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press, 1964) p. 421.

[21]The subject is raised by Milbrath but given only brief attention. Milbrath, op. cit., p. 239.

These remarks show that the vocabulary of systems analysis may, by itself, serve as a stimulus in reordering our thought so that a new perspective emerges. To talk in terms of system is to converse in a language different from those now employed by interest group theorists.[22] The apparent dead end at which interest group theory now stands may reflect an inadequate set of conceptual terms to describe some kinds of relationships which characterize the group population.[23] It may be fruitful to utilize the concepts of different conceptual vocabularies so that we may become aware of features of the field under study that are obscured by other conceptual approaches. For example, in the early decades of this century, public administration was chiefly centered on formal organization structure. The literature and research in administration has changed markedly with the discovery of the importance of informal organization. Today the implications of research findings in social psychology are important for theory building in public administration.

There is some evidence to indicate that many

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[22]Except for "equilibrium" that is used by some group theorists.

[23]It may also be a product of other factors, such as its inadequacy for general theory construction or difficulties of making its concepts operational for research.

of the studies of interest groups were designed and executed with a vocabulary that does not lead to fruitful research. Almost all of these studies are terminal in nature, not cumulative. A review of the literature on interest groups makes clear the fact that certain questions about the interest group population and the relationships within it have not been raised. In The Governmental Process, for example, Truman does not discuss, even in general terms, how many interest groups are active at any level of government; nor does he ever imply that the number of active groups may be a factor of importance in interpreting the roles or methods of groups in politics. Truman says, in effect, that interest groups are ubiquitous. But only when some answers, though imprecise, are provided to the questions "How many?" and "How often?" is one likely to turn to the questions concerning the impact different numbers of groups and changing numbers of groups have on each other, and on the arrangements through which groups relate themselves to each other and to governmental structures. For example, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and his staff cannot operate in the same way toward the leaders and members of twenty groups and 120 groups. When we discover the magnitude of the group population, the notion of indirect access may prove more useful for interpreting group behavior at

the congressional level. Thus intergroup relations emerges as a subject of study because of the importance that group alignments have for the effective mobilization of support.

By using the concept system and asking some fundamental questions about the relationships among groups, the stability of these relationships, and the size of the population, a body of general information about interest groups at a given level of government can be assembled that may yield broad generalizations. For these reasons a later chapter is concerned with some estimates of the size and composition of the population of groups that are active at the congressional level. Consideration is also given to indicators of stability and change in this population.

Pluralism

A second general conceptual framework to which this research has relevance is pluralism. Pluralism is used by historians, sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists to refer to the numbers of many different kinds of significant entities within a defined universe. It frequently is used to denote the diversity of religious, ethnic, and racial subgroups in a society. Sociologists also refer to social classes as entities in a pluralistic society. Other types of groups such as families and clans are also frequently included as entities.

Political scientists, however, and some sociologists also, have taken the voluntary association as the basic entity in discussing pluralism in modern political systems.

In the general discussion of pluralism that follows, authors will be cited who refer broadly to all these groups as entities in social and political pluralism. Nevertheless, there seems to be growing attention to the role of associations at the expense of some of these other groupings.[24] There is general agreement among students of the family and, to a lesser extent, social classes, that these entities, the family and class, have suffered a loss of control over their members in this century, and there are few signs which indicate a resurgence for them in the shaping of the behavior of their members. On the other hand, there have never been so many associations competing for the allegiance of individuals, both youth and adult, as there are now. The prospects for continued increases are also favorable.[25]

In this research, the discussion of the entities in pluralist political systems will refer only to associations. The basic types of associations that are included are the following: business, financial business, agricultural business, small business, labor, professional, agriculture,

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[24]The term association is used interchangeably with the term interest group throughout the discussion of this research.

[25]Richard W. Gable, "Political Interest Groups as Policy Shapers," The Annals, Vol. 319 (September, 1958), p. 92; See also Truman, op. cit., p. 52.

religious, citizen and veteran. Family and social class are not included.

Pluralism is a societal condition to which great importance is assigned by many social scientists. The importance attributed to it by political scientists and sociologists is seen in the numerous references made to it in theories of democracy, totalitarianism, political parties, and in studies of power and decision-making in community and nation.

The simple notion of "individualism" on which the classical theory of democracy is based has generally been modified in recent decades, or replaced, by the concept "pluralism." The classical formulation of democracy was a product of assumptions inherited from the philosophers and the history of classical Greece, the philosophers of the European Enlightenment, the individualism of nineteenth century economic thought and practice, and from American frontier experience. Classical democratic thought is based on assumptions concerning the civic virtue, rationality, and high political motivation of each citizen. Each citizen had a political will based on a conception of the public interest that he communicated to public servants or candidates for public offices. Few institutions and no groups, such as interest groups, were needed to facilitate consultation, communication, or mediation between the sovereign citizen and the public servant.

The inadequacy of this model became increasingly apparent following the efforts of reformers to repair American democracy by statutes that were based on classical democratic premises. Among the writers who refused to accept the individualistic premises of the classical model was A. D. Lindsay. He proceeds from pluralistic premises in his discussion of democracy.

> We make a great mistake if in considering political democracy we think only of individuals on the one hand, of the political organizations on the other, and neglect the enormous importance in the production of real public opinion of the innumerable voluntary associations of all kinds which exist in modern democratic society.[26]

Recent students of democracy, noting the gap between classical democratic thought and the behavior of citizens who are members of functioning democratic societies, have attempted to determine the empirical foundations of operating democracies and then to reformulate democratic theory on the basis of classical concepts and empirical research. This reformulation was hastened and assisted by the observations and research findings of sociologists and psychologists who repeatedly confirmed the notion that the individual is a product of social experience. Nearly all of the concepts with which individualism was formerly defended have become instruments of the social psychologists

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[26]A. D. Lindsay, The Essentials of Democracy (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1929) p. 39-40. Charles Merriam takes a similar position. Charles Merriam, Public and Private Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

and sociologists in defense of the notion that social groups are vital in understanding individual behavior, society, and democracy. Such terms as personality, self, conscience, and ego were reduced, at least in part, to perceptions of self based on the response of others to the self.[27]

These research results received special attention because of the relevance they had to the emergence of the dictatorships in European democracies. The rise of dictatorship was inexplicable on the assumptions of the classical model of democracy. It was made credible by the analyses and interpretations of students from many intellectual disciplines whose studies of totalitarianism tend to converge on certain facts. Emil Lederer, Erich Fromm, and Sigmund Neumann are, perhaps, representative of these students of society and politics who saw that the disintegration of subcenters of influence, such as classes, voluntary associations, and families meant the destruction of satisfying personal relationships among individuals.[28] The political policy of restructuring

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[27]George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, Charles W. Morris, editor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) Part III, pp. 135-226.

[28]Emil Lederer, State of the Masses: The Threat of Classless Society, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1940); Eric Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Rinehard and Co., 1941); Sigmund Neumann, "Germany," European Political Systems, Taylor Cole, editor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953) pp. 322-36.

human relationships to exclude autonomous associational centers of influence is now commonly regarded as a factor that contributes to the success of totalitarianism within a political system. Thus the institutions and groups of pluralistic societies were assigned an increasingly important place in the discussion of democracy. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture state:

> These findings strongly support the proposition . . . that the existence of voluntary associations increases the democratic potential of a society. Democracy depends upon citizen participation, and it is clear that organizational membership is directly related to such participation . . . Pluralism, even if not explicitly political pluralism, may indeed be one of the most important foundations of political democracy.[29]

Specific attention is given to the role of voluntary associations in politics by William Kornhauser in The Politics of Mass Society.[30] According to Kornhauser, the functions of associations in a democratic society are three: (1) provide psychological security to their members as organizations with which they can identify, (2) protect the governing elites from the impulsive ideas and whimsical desires of the mass by serving as arenas of criticism, and (3) serve as structures of access to decision-making. The destruction of mediatory groups contributes to the atomization of society. Each individual tends to become isolated

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[29]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 318 and 322.

[30]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

from meaningful relations with others and more susceptible to recruitment by social and political mass movements.

David Truman, in his discussion of forces contributing to cohesion in a democracy, assigns an important place to the overlapping memberships of individuals in numerous groups. He states that when an individual's allegiance is divided among several groups, this tends to prevent recruitment of him by a group urging extremist solutions to problems. Thus, the overlapping membership of the individual in several groups is a factor that fosters cohesion in the society.[31] Joseph R. Gusfield makes a similar point in distinguishing between "linked pluralism"--in which individual memberships in one group cut across individual memberships in others--and "superimposed segmentation" in which individual memberships in one group coincide with membership in others.[32]

Today it is common for writers on democracy to look beyond the constitutional and legal structures in order to assess the sources of strength in democratic political systems. Bernard Berelson notes that one of the conditions for the survival of political democracy is a

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[31]Truman, op. cit., p. 508-24.

[32]Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February, 1962), 19-30; See also Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Unity and Diversity in Modern America," Social Forces, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October, 1957, 1-8.

pluralistic social organization.[33] Leonard J. Fein, in an essay on American democracy, states that:

> . . . to the simple majority rule definition of democracy, several amendments must be made that provide for the legal right of opposition groups to exist, and also speak of the need for a pluralistic society. In the absence of such pluralistic competition, whether overwhelming social consensus or legal restrictions are the cause, democracy becomes a meaningless concept.[34]

The literature on political parties also reveals heavy attention to the effect of a pluralist social environment on our political parties. One of the standard works on American parties and politics for many years has been E. P. Herring's The Politics of Democracy in which he explains our decentralized non-ideological party system largely in terms of the diversity of interests in our society and the proliferation of associations active in the advocacy of these interests.[35] Wilfred Binkley and Lubell tend to describe the parties in terms of the groups and groupings, such as laborers, wheat farmers, and small

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[33]Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) p. 313.

[34]Leonard J. Fein, American Democracy: Essays on Image and Realities (New York: Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, Inc., 1964) p. 13-14; See also Hilda W. and Joseph P. Parker, "Democratic Principles in Social Problems," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 4 (July, 1957), 369-78. Other writers have also stressed the importance of voluntary associations in the maintenance of democracy. Charles Frankel, The Democratic Prospect (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

[35]E. P. Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1940).

businessmen, that support certain parties.[36]

All of these descriptions and theories about the role of groups in democracy, totalitarianism, and political parties draw attention to the usefulness of formulating some empirical hypotheses about pluralism in the United States. Much of the literature citing the importance of pluralism regards the factual basis of it as self-evident or proceeds on the basis of limited data. More detailed studies describing the size and composition of the pluralistic universe, analyzing the relationships among the entities in the universe, and stating with what degree of permanency entities are related, would be useful. In this way it may be possible to get some new leverage on the validity of some of the assertions about the connections between voluntary associational life and democracy, totalitarianism, and various types of decision-making in political institutions such as legislatures, bureaucracies, and political parties.

The use of a pluralistic framework in this research requires a brief review of pluralist thought as it developed in the modern period. Perhaps the most important work on pluralism prior to the nineteenth century was that

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[36]Wilfred Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper, 1952).

of Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society.[37] In this work Gierke attempts to show the "naturalness" of some groups and corporations in the society and notes especially the spontaneity with which they arise.[38] He also asserts that these corporations develop group wills that transcend the individual wills of the members of the group.[39] The chief thrust in the writings of Gierke and of other pluralists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is against the concept of sovereignty for the state. James Madison used a pluralist argument in advocating a federal union of states to control factions within the nation. Pluralist arguments frequently have been useful for individuals and groups who find the occupants of centralized authority a barrier to their interests and who have little hope of capturing power through the election process, such as the guild socialists in England in the early decades of this century.[40]

The difficulty of relying upon pluralism as it was discussed by writers prior to the 1930's for interpreting

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[37]Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, translator, Ernest Barker (Boston: Beacon Press, 1917).

[38]Ibid.; See also Francis Coker, "Techniques of the Pluralist State," American Political Science Review, Vol. XV, No. 2 (May, 1921), 186-213.

[39]Gierke, Ibid.; See also Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism, A Study in Contemporary Political Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1927).

[40]Francis W. Coker, Recent Political Thought (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1934), pp. 263-4.

contemporary Western politics is that it was a mixture of normative and empirical theories. In part, it was a prescriptive theory based on the values of its advocates who postulated the desirability and possibility of attaining them, but it was also, in part, a description of features of past and contemporary societies. Therefore, the writings of pluralism in this period suffer from the failure to always distinguish fact from value. Ellen Ellis, in writing about the European pluralists, states:

> Comparatively little of their (the pluralists') polemic is concerned with the denial that the state can or does control everything within its jurisdiction. By far the greater part of it is taken up with a discussion not of fact, but of right . . . it becomes very difficult to know in the specific case whether one is within the realm of fact or of theory.[41]

Nevertheless, these discussions of pluralism are, to some extent, centered on certain common premises about societies. A few premises of pluralism that have empirical referents are repeatedly mentioned and implied.

To a considerable degree these characteristics of pluralism are accepted and used by contemporary students of pluralism. The recent literature on the subject, though not voluminous, is more complete in delineating pluralistic theory in empirical terms. Examination of the literature yields four basic characteristics that are repeatedly mentioned directly or by implication by

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[41]Ellen D. Ellis, "The Pluralistic State," American Political Science Review, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (August, 1920), 400.

writers as the essential characteristics that constitute pluralism. Some of the writers whose statements on the empirical foundations of pluralism are most comprehensive are Robert Presthus, William Mitchell, William Kornhauser, Robert A. Dahl, Donald Blaisdell, Nelson Polsby, Henry Kariel, Robin Williams, Clark Kerr, Mary Parker Follett, Joseph Gusfield.[42] Only a few of these authors stated, directly or indirectly, all four of the basic characteristics that follow. This is not surprising since only a few of them, the most recent students of the subject, concerned themselves specifically with the enumeration of empirical characteristics of pluralism. Many other authors briefly discuss one or two characteristics of pluralism in

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[42]Some of the authors listed here, such as Henry Kariel, have discussed pluralism in a framework of their own normative judgments and do not present original supporting empirical data. They are cited because they discuss a model of pluralism, sometimes critically, in terms of characteristics that have empirical referents. Robert Presthus, Men at the Top; A Study in Community Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); William C. Mitchell, The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962); Henry Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961; Blaisdell, op. cit.; Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (August, 1960), 474-84; Williams, op. cit.; Mary Parker Follett, The New State, Group Organization, The Solution of Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920); Gusfield, op. cit.; Robert A. Dahl, "The Politics of Planning," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XI, No. 3, (1959), 341-50; Kornhauser, op. cit.; Clark Kerr, Labor and Management in Inductrial Society (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc, 1964) p. 3-42.

writings that are concerned with a different though related subject.[43]

It is useful to formulate an empirical model of pluralism because it helps to bring a stable core of meaning to the term and, therefore, permits theories and hypotheses that are premised on pluralism to be appraised from a single standard. If pluralism is as vital to a free society as many authors say it is, we must try to find out what is subsumed in the term that makes it vital. As a model of politics, pluralism consists of a set of significant entities related to each other in certain ways. The nature of these relationships is stipulated in the four basic characteristics on which general agreement among authors is found.

The most recent and comprehensive effort to state an empirical model of pluralistic society is presented by Robert Presthus in Men at the Top.[44] Presthus constructed a model of the pluralist society that consists of six elements or characteristics. When his statements are combined with the discussions of other students, an instructive model emerges that can be used as a standard in determining to what extent our political system, or

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[43]For example, see John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927); See also the "Realists" view of the public interest in Glendon Schubert's The Public Interest (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960); V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

[44]Presthus, op. cit.

subsystems within it, is pluralistic.

The first characteristic of the pluralist society is that there are numerous competing centers of power within the society. This feature is in the historical tradition of pluralist thought. No author fails to mention the criterion of dispersed power as opposed to centralized power. This is the core characteristic of the pluralist society on which there is universal agreement. Even so, it is vague and difficult to apply as an empirical standard. None of the sources discuss this characteristic in terms of numerical quantities; but every author uses language that suggests a larger number of entities than two is essential. It is possible to become bogged down in a search for quantitative guidelines, but it would be foolish to dismiss the numerical dimensions of the characteristics of pluralism as unimportant. In this research the numerical dimensions of the characteristics of pluralism are described as accurately as possible and some possible consequences of variations in the numbers are noted.

Nor is there any indication from the literature concerning the degree of competition that must exist to validate the existence of the characteristic. Among the sources, only Presthus and Kariel show much sensitivity to this problem. Presthus expresses concern with a recent tendency to regard this characteristic as fulfilled when competition is present only among massive groups dominating their respective areas. He seems to have in mind the kind

of dominance of a field by a single organization that is characteristic of the medical profession, and, to some degree, of organized labor as illustrated by the AFL-CIO. Henry Kariel is also troubled by what he concludes is the decline in the number of power centers in certain areas and the ascendancy of a few dominant power centers.[45]

A second characteristic of the pluralist society is the opportunity for access to decision-making by entities. To some extent, this characteristic may be regarded as a remnant of the insistence by pluralists of an earlier period that groups within the society be treated as autonomous for many purposes.[46] Thus, even though contemporary groups have lost some degree of autonomy over certain of their affairs to public officials, they insist on the right to organize and to present their views to them.[47] Robert Horn and Charles Rice have shown that there is a substantial body of law in this country based on court cases involving the right of freedom of association.[48]

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[45]Kariel, op. cit., p. 2.

[46]Coker, Recent Political Thought, op. cit., p. 261.

[47]In illustration of this condition, both the guild socialist claims to autonomy and the AFL-CIO seeking pro-labor legislation through lobbying can properly be described as efforts to extend control over their fate--that is, preserve or enlarge the sphere in which they are autonomous.

[48]Robert A. Horn, Groups and the Constitution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956); Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association (New York: New York University Press, 1962).

Opportunity for access is a variable that can be studied in terms of three kinds of problems for groups in the society: (1) the problems of the financial and social support needed by groups seeking to communicate with the decision-makers, (2) the problems of mediating the structural barriers, formal and informal, that prevent or tend to impede certain groups and individuals in their efforts to influence officials, (3) the problems of permitting and limiting access on the basis of certain attributes of the groups that seek it. The costs for a group of attaining and maintaining a strong associational identity that has standing with one's members and their non-member interest clientele can be very high. Not every group that wants to influence decision-making can afford to open an office in Washington or even retain a person to attend to their interests on a part-time basis.

Identifying the structural barriers that groups must surmount enroute to influencing decision-makers is a relatively unexplored task. The existing literature deals mostly with groups that are able to run the maze successfully; sometimes these successful groups report there are no barriers at all to inhibit any group from pursuing the same course. But it is known that such seemingly innocuous restraints as the Lobbying Registration Act affect the mode of operation of some groups. The Buchanan Committee investigations revealed that both the fund-raising and the expenditure policies of the Committee for Constitutional

Government, for example, were tailored to that law.[49] In this case access was not prevented, but the law had the effect of limiting the range of alternative behaviors from which the group felt it could select one to attend to its interests.

Many groups have attributes that serve as credentials for some degree of access to decision-making. In general, as Truman has noted, groups that enjoy great prestige in the society also enjoy a great degree of access to congressmen. Technical competence in an area of consequence to the functioning of the society, such as medicine, usually assures a group of considerable access.

The third characteristic in the pluralist society requires the use by entities of the opportunities that exist for them to influence decision-makers. Modern pluralist thought stresses the exercise of influence and not merely the possession of resources of influence. By defining a pluralist society as a going concern and not one in the stage of "becoming," the essential conditions are more readily identifiable in empirical terms.

A fourth characteristic in the pluralist model is that relationships among entities are dynamic and not static. Most descriptions of the United States as a

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[49]Blaisdell, op. cit., p. 104. See also Karl Schriftgeisser, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1951) pp. 161-66.

pluralist society include the statement that group alignments are for limited purposes, and therefore, these alignments may be transitory when these purposes are realized or appear to become unattainable.[50] There is a continuing process of changing relationships among groups; yesterday's allies may be tomorrow's opponents. There are no stable coalitions of entities as majorities or minorities. In many discussions of pluralism, these dynamics are coupled with the assertion that American society is an open society in which the universe of entities is never fixed. There are few guidelines in the literature, however, that provide clues to the amount of change in the relationships among entities within a stipulated period of time that suffice to discriminate between a static and a dynamic condition. Some observers have expressed uneasiness because of signs in American society that seem to them to indicate a slowing down in these dynamics. Kenneth Boulding, Robert Presthus, William H. Whyte and Henry Kariel have all noted tendencies toward the emergence of massive organizational complexes that seem headed toward greater integration, common identity, and stability for the future.[51]

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[50]See the discussion on pages 65-68 of this chapter.

[51]Boulding, op. cit.; Robert V. Presthus, The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Kariel, op. cit.; See also Blaisdell, op. cit.; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). Other

One of the paramount difficulties in interpreting the fifth characteristic is the uncertainty of the meaning of the terms "alignment" and "alliance of entities." Many of the analysts of interest groups regard the concepts "group alliance," "group coalition," and "group combination" as fundamental in understanding the role of interest groups in the legislative process. Truman, McKean, Blaisdell, Kesselman and Riggs specifically acknowledge the importance of these concepts, but only Riggs includes in his work an analysis of any one relationship, the catalytic group, among interest groups.[52] The usual treatment given alliance and similar concepts is entirely too facile, casual, and incomplete to warrant any general conclusions. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that these concepts have been used chiefly as self-evident

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authors see no threat, for example, see: David Lilienthal, "The Case for Big Business," Readings in Politics and Economics, H. C. Harlan, editor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 85-94; Peter Drucker, The New Society: The Anatomy of the Industrial Order (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949); Adoph A. Berle, Jr., The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1954.

[52]Truman, op. cit., p. 362-3. Using a list of fourteen different tactics or techniques of lobbying, Lester W. Milbrath reports that Washington lobbyists (a sample of 100) ranked "collaboration with other groups" as the third most effective technique in their work. Kesselman and Riggs do focus upon particular webs of intergroup relations. The problem is that they do not use a set of categories or hypotheses that sharpen their inquiries to discriminate among the data for significant and insignificant dimensions of the relationships in a systematic fashion so that replication is possible. The result is that each set of findings appears unique and generalization from several studies is arduous and risky, if not impossible. See Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 189-90.

terms that do not require careful definition or research.

In the literature on interest groups, it is sometimes difficult to separate the assumptions and hypotheses regarding alliances from the conclusions. Since most of the studies of interest groups are case studies, the findings seem to have limited application to other group relationships. When a list of statements regarding alliances and coalitions, both premises and conclusions, from group studies is assembled, the results are suggestive but somewhat confusing. The following partial list illustrates the point.

1. Alliances are protean entities, with unstable shifting and fluctuating memberships.[53]

2. The same group may be involved in two or more alliances.[54]

3. Normally groups encounter shifting opposition as one policy after another comes up.[55]

4. Alliances are temporary and often exist only for a single objective.[56]

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[53]Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," op. cit.

[54]Truman, op. cit., p. 364.

[55]Milbrath, op. cit., p. 49.

[56]Bailey, op. cit., p. 236; Blaisdell, op. cit., p. 29.

5. Alliances are both temporary and informal, and permanent and formal.[57]

6. Alliances are composed chiefly of groups serving the same type of constituency (e.g., an alliance of farm groups).[58]

7. Alliances are sometimes made by groups that are usually opposed to each other.[59]

8. Groups often cancel each other out, though this is not a certainty.[60]

9. There is so much "natural self-balancing" among groups it almost amounts to a law.[61]

10. Most major bills in Congress are backed by one coalition of interest groups and opposed by another.[62]

11. Not more than a third of the groups before the (New Jersey) legislature have any organized opposition.[63]

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[57]Truman, op. cit.; McKean, op. cit., p. 233; Herring, Group Representation Before Congress, op. cit., p. 75.

[58]McKean, op. cit.

[59]Ibid., p. 264; Truman, op. cit.

[60]Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, op. cit., p. 150.

[61]Milbrath, op. cit., p. 345.

[62]Mathews, op. cit., p. 186.

[63]McKean, op. cit., p. 234.

12. Each party attracts an entourage of groups that tend to regularly support it.[64]

13. Generally, those groups that can form the best alliances are the most effective groups.[65]

14. Usually, natural lobbying allies (such as different farm groups) are in competition with one another to represent the same clientele.[66]

15. A "hierarchizing . . . of groups may be taking place over time, with reference to particular policy issues."[67]

16. Established active groups tend to develop stable relationships with other groups such as facing common opposition.[68]

In summarizing the principal objections to existing studies of intergroup relations from the perspective of this research design, the following points are important. (1) Research on interest groups has seldom been focused systematically on the dimensions of a given type of intergroup relationship. (2) Interest group relationships have not been studied in a time dimension beyond a single

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[64]Schattschneider, Semisovereign People, op. cit., p. 57; Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, op. cit. p. 156-7.

[65]McKean, op. cit., p. 233.

[66]Matthews, op. cit., p. 187.

[67]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 192.

[68]Monypenny, op. cit., p. 198-9.

goal-directed event. (3) The concepts applied to the study of intergroup relations are ambiguous and are concerned with a few physical interactions among groups. (4) The reliance on case studies of a single group or a single alliance of groups has yielded unique rather than general findings. (5) The case studies that investigated a particular type of intergroup relationship (e.g., catalytic group) have proceeded without a set of specific hypotheses that would sharpen the focus of research and yield findings that might be compared with those obtained in other studies.

A fifth characteristic of pluralism is that a consensus exists on what may be called the "rules of the game" for entities in the society. This characteristic implies that there are limits to the amount of unregulated competition and conflict between groups that a society can bear and still continue to function as a unity. The term "consensus" itself denotes multiple meanings. The term is a general one that usually refers to a fundamental agreement on certain means and ends in the society. The concept underscores the importance of stable mutual expectations by groups as to the range of acceptable behavioral choices by groups and the sanctions for compliance or noncompliance.

Although the most frequent use of pluralist theory in empirical studies of politics has been at the local level, in certain respects the search for the

characteristics of pluralism in the society may be carried on with greater expectation of success by observing the operations of voluntary associations in national politics. The weakness of attempting to trace the workings of pluralism at the local level stems from the greater importance and pervasiveness of primary relations between individuals there. There is less formal structuring of relations between citizens and public officials at the local level than at the national level. Personal relationships among individuals often make formal interaction unnecessary. Leaders of voluntary associations, at the local level, also frequently interact with each other, with city officials, and with other influential people in non-official roles, such as at social events. This greater intersection of roles for association leaders and officials at the local level facilitates communication, and perhaps negotiation, about group goals without the formal institutions and procedures, such as public hearings, that seem to be necessary at the national level. The pressure, deference, negotiation, and coalition-building among groups is probably less overt and therefore less discernible at the local level than it is where such relations are more formal and impersonal.

At the national level, group spokesmen are apt to interact more frequently in the single role of group representative. This assertion does not undermine the findings of observers and students of the legislative

process who have shown that there is a world of primary relations that are important.[69] But, in addition to personal contacts, formal contacts by group representatives with the Congress and administration must be maintained, as Lester Milbrath reports in his discussion of lobbyists in Washington.[70]

For these reasons the examination of the activities of associations at the congressional level of government may provide new perspectives concerning the degree to which the characteristics of pluralism are found in decision-making at other levels of government in American society as well as at the congressional level.

This research provides several kinds of information that can serve as indicators in assessing the presence or absence of pluralism at the congressional level. The first characteristic of a pluralist system is that competing centers of power exist within the community. The characteristic requires that (A) multiple centers of power are (B) in some degree of competition with each other. Item A stipulates that there is more than one center of power and that these centers are, in some degree, independent of each other. Item B requires that these centers be

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[69]Matthews, op. cit.; Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (June, 1962), pp. 310-52.

[70]Milbrath, op. cit., p. 228.

not only independent of each other but in some degree competitive. In the literature, no standards are stated for either independence or competition. Usually some competition among groups is accepted as evidence of independence of at least some of these centers of power.

At the congressional level, one indicator that this characteristic is present in some degree is the number of hearings at which groups espouse contradictory positions on legislative subjects. Examination must be made of all the major policy sectors to determine if conclusions about the pluralism of the political system have generality over the entire system. If competition between numerous groups is found on all issues but foreign affairs, this fact illumines one of the policy sectors where visible limits on the degree of pluralism exist. In determining the existence of competition, the number of instances at which groups appear without opposition from any other group, and the division of groups for or against legislation are also helpful indicators. By examining several different kinds of bills, it is possible to state the extent to which competition among groups varies according to policy sector.

To discover if the first characteristic of pluralism is present, the extent to which the scope of interests of each group is large or small is determined. If the findings show, for example, that there are ten major groups that frequently present testimony in a united front on bills in all major policy categories, this is

important information in assessing the state of competition among groups. Pluralistic competition requires that there be no dominant aggregation of groups or pair of power coalitions.

The second characteristic in the pluralist model is the opportunity for access to decision-making by individuals and organized groups. The term "opportunity for access" in this research, refers to the degree of absence of restraining structures, practices, or other inhibiting factors. To test for the presence of this characteristic at the national level, it is necessary to determine the degree of situational structure that groups must understand and manipulate, the extent to which traditional norms exist that groups must honor, and the other situational prerequisites to access by groups. A superficial judgment might lead to the conclusion that access is, in practical terms, open to all. Closer inspection of the literature on Congress and the documents of congressional committee hearings will not permit such a judgment to stand.

This research does not explore all of these facets of situational structure. No conclusive assessment of the presence or absence of this characteristic is possible. Nevertheless, the volume of testimony presented at committee hearings by over 100 groups of different types provides useful information concerning the ease of group access. In addition, inquiries were made by correspondence

with all House committee chairmen concerning the rules they follow in announcing the scheduling of hearings and practices regarding limiting group testimony.

Another indicator of the opportunity for access is the extent to which new groups enter the system over a period of years. The pluralist model is a dynamic model and is conceived in terms of an indeterminate group population. Therefore, the hypothesis is that new groups will enter the group population occasionally and seek to influence congressional decision-making. Given the increase in population, the economic growth of the nation, and the tendencies toward the elevation of conflicts between groups--and between groups and local and state units of government--to the national level, it would be a remarkable commentary on a pluralist system if no changes occurred in the group population. If the group population is stable over sixteen years during which a major war was fought and several economic recessions and booms occurred, there are grounds for thinking the interest group process is not as open as some have assumed. The entrance and departure of groups is also relevant to the integration conceptual framework. This concept is applied to the data of this investigation in the chapter on integration even though it has relevance to both concepts.

The pluralist system also requires, as a third characteristic, that use is made of the opportunities for access that exist. One indicator of this characteristic is

the interview data on the extent to which laws and amendments are prepared by group leaders and staffs for introduction by congressmen. A second indicator is the evidence concerning the frequency with which groups seek to have hearings scheduled.

The fourth characteristic in the pluralist model is that there are changing alignments of groups in the political system. Aside from a few case studies of very limited scope and impressionistic judgments by skilled observers of the legislative process, no discussion has made clear even in general terms any standard against which "changing alignments of groups" may be compared. Since "change" has not been operationally defined, it is impossible to say how much change in alignments is necessary to confirm or deny the presence of this characteristic in the interest group system. The discussion on pages 65-67 has already noted that the existing literature offers a wide range of assertions on intergroup relationships.

The discussions of intergroup relationships in scholarly studies tend to be centered on physical interactions among groups as the most important variable in group cooperation. Fred Riggs was chiefly concerned with physical interactions among groups in his study of the Chinese Exclusion Act.[71] The Buchanan Committee's

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[71]Riggs, op. cit.

investigation of lobbying in 1950 revealed the informal consultation practices of several interest groups.[72] Case studies by Bailey and Kesselman have been informative in terms of interest group cooperation but they offer limited possibilities for generalization.[73]

Judging from the four sources mentioned above, Riggs, Bailey, Kesselman, and the Buchanan Committee, it seems clear that group "coalitions" develop very little formal organizational apparatus. Furthermore, the coalitions in these studies, excluding the Buchanan findings, seemed to be temporary and limited to a single objective. The extent to which more stable informal relationships exist among groups is largely unexplored, but some case studies imply the existence of relationships more stable than the temporary catalytic organizations discussed. Such relationships may constitute a foundation on which visible relationships, more fluid in character--such as temporary coalitions--can be hastily built and disassembled.

The analysis of data to determine to what extent group alignments exist in the group population receives the most careful attention in this investigation. The sixteen-year period for which House committee hearings are studied in this research permits some leverage on the

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[72]United States House, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, op. cit.

[73]Bailey, op. cit.; Louis Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948).

question of the degree of permanency of group alignments. The matter of defining an "alignment" of groups in this research is undertaken by using a cluster analytic technique that is described below.

The search for group alignments, or clusters, is carried on for several populations of groups and sets of bills as follows: (1) a search for general clusters among all active groups on all kinds of bills combined that were processed by fourteen House committees, (2) a search for specialized clusters based on a single subject area, such as farm bills, or minimum wage bills, (3) a search for clusters within the types of groups, such as Agriculture or Business groups. The results should provide not only general information about the group membership of clusters and their stability through time, but also about the extent to which certain groups do not align themselves with any other groups.

The approaches used to test for the third characteristic of pluralism focus on a very limited number of dimensions of relationships among groups and provide only a partial exposition of them. The dimensions explored are: (1) publicly stated positions of groups on legislative bills and issues at House committee hearings, and (2) consultations between groups reported by group spokesmen in interviews. The following hypotheses about intergroup relations at the congressional level constitute the primary objectives of this research.

Hypothesis I.[74] Given the existence of clusters of interest groups during a time span, the sum of the group members of the clusters does not include the majority of the interest groups in the universe.

Definition: A "cluster" is three or more groups in which every member is more like every other member than it is like any non-member.[75]

Definition: The "time span" may be varied from a term of Congress to the entire sixteen-year period, 1945-60.

Definition: The term "universe" refers to a stipulated number of groups. Universes of different sizes are used. The most frequently used universe consists of 119 groups.

Hypothesis II. The group composition of a cluster in the first phase, T_1, of a time span will be the same for a succeeding phase, T_2, of the time span.

Definition: The time span, "T_1, T_2" may be varied from a term of Congress to the entire sixteen-year period under investigation.

Hypothesis III. If two or more interest groups enroll individuals as members from the same interest clientele, these groups do not all become members of the same cluster.

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[74]Italics used for emphasis.

[75]See Chapter IV, p. 182-183.

Definition: The term "interest clientele" refers to the aggregation of individuals that share a concern for one of the following types of subjects according to which all the interest groups in the study are classified: business, financial business, agricultural business, labor, agriculture, veterans, professions, citizens, religion, small business.

Hypothesis IV. When two or more clusters are opposed to each other they do not oppose one another on bills from more than one policy category.

Definition: The term "policy category" refers to the unit of classification that is used to classify all bills considered in the study. The classification scheme has ten policy categories.

Definition: One cluster is "opposed" to another cluster when half of the members of the cluster, but at least three members, take a position on a bill that is opposed by half of the members, but at least three members, of another cluster, and neither cluster has any members that disagree with the position taken by these group members.

Hypothesis V. When two or more clusters exist during a time span, on some bills no cluster will be active.

Definition: Several universes of bills of different sizes are used in this research. The term "some bills" means one or more bills in the universe under study.

Definition: An "active cluster" is one in which half of the members, but at least three members, take the same position either for or against the bill at hand, and no member of the cluster disagrees.

Hypothesis VI. The range of the bills on which one or more clusters are opposed to other clusters in the first phase, T_1, of a time span is less than it is in a succeeding phase, T_2, of the time span.

Definition: The term "range of bills" refers to the number of different policy categories into which the bills are classified.

Hypothesis VII. The number of the bills on which one or more clusters are opposed to other clusters in the first phase, T_1, of a time span is less than it is in the succeeding phase, T_2, of the time span.

The final characteristic of the pluralist model is that a consensus among the groups in the population exists on what may be called the "rules of the game." Most discussions of pluralism explicitly mention this characteristic without describing the rules in specific terms and without discussing either the range of possible behaviors under the functioning rules or the range of behaviors that constitute violations of these rules. This research is not able to make comprehensive conclusions about this characteristic at the congressional level.

The problem of locating the limits of acceptable behaviors of groups that are either self-imposed or

imposed by features of the environment is an extremely provocative problem. As a population is subject to fewer and fewer limits on group behaviors, the survival of the system tends to become a secondary goal behind the priority of total victory in unregulated struggle and the term pluralism no longer applies. A sudden massive disintegration of the customary expectations about what other groups can or will do may reduce the intergroup relationships, at least temporarily, to chaos.

Equally perplexing is the question of how much agreement among groups is necessary to make the term "consensus" appropriate. That is, how many and which rules must be agreed on--reducing the range of behaviors deemed acceptable--before the system may be described as pluralist? This much seems clear, if at the congressional level there are groups whose values, policies, and activities deviate from the prevailing tendencies of the group population, the distinctions that can be made between them are worth-while even if they can only be stated in general terms.

The utility of the pluralist model in this research is related to the general assertions and assumptions about pluralism and its importance in American society. To look at one phase in the legislative process--the hearings process--is a limited approach on which only further hypotheses concerning the larger political system may be based, not firm conclusions.

The pluralist model is also helpful in highlighting the usefulness of general information about the diversity, stability, growth, and relations among groups in the active interest group population at the congressional level. In effect, each of the basic characteristics of the pluralist model becomes the basis of a hypothesis about the interest group population that can be tested empirically.

Integration

The difficulty has been noted of determining even the approximate magnitudes of the characteristics of pluralism that warrant the use of the term pluralism in describing a political system. By shifting from pluralism to two other concepts, "integration" and "conflict," it is possible to continue the examination of intergroup relations at the congressional level along other lines. Relations between interest groups may be quite complex and have many dimensions. Other conceptual frameworks may provide additional insights about intergroup relations that have not been considered so far.[76]

Integration is a concept that stresses the cohesive interrelations of entities. It is concerned with mutual adjustment or coordination of entities into a

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[76]Harvey M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960).

unity.[77] Sociologists have used it chiefly in the study of societies, cultures, and cities. William Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff say integration has three component parts, "interdependent or common activity, consensus, and morale."[78]

In exploring the idea that the population of interest groups at the congressional level can be appraised in terms of integration, the literature on interest groups is of little assistance. Scholars rarely have used this concept in reference to interest groups. Many authors assume that group leaders take their behavioral cues from their definition of the group's interests and from the definitions of the group's interests communicated to them by the members of the group. Often no consideration is given to the constraints on the behavior of the leaders of groups that exist in the environment within which these groups must operate. Here, again, the notion of the interest group process as a system has merit. Communications are carried on between the interdependent groups as well as between the groups and congressmen and committees.

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[77]Chandler Morse, "The Functional Imperatives," The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, Max Black, editor (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 100-52.

[78]William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). Myron Weiner notes five customary uses of the term, but he accepts the notion that integration is what holds a system together. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals, Vol. 358 (March, 1965), 52-5.

The kinds and rates of intergroup communications and their stability constitute variables in the system.

In applying some tests of integration to the universe of groups and the group population, it seems likely that only a small increment of knowledge will result. But given the present stage of our knowledge of intergroup relations, it may be worth-while. New directions for fruitful research may also emerge.

Increasing attention is being given to the study of integration in different types of political communities. One recent volume that is helpful in appraising the methods and determining the degree of integration in a community is a collection of essays edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, The Integration of Political Communities.[79] The contributors focus on integration of communities at the metropolitan and international levels.[80] In an introductory essay, the editors discuss ten integrative factors that hold promise for appraising degrees of integration. They state that not all of these factors may be important at any given level of community. The ten integrative factors are: (1) proximity, (2) homogeneity, (3) transactions, (4) mutual knowledge, (5) functional

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[79]Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964) Chapter 19.

[80]For an earlier discussion of community at the international level, see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1953).

interest, (6) political structure, (7) sovereignty, (8) communal character, (9) governmental effectiveness, (10) integrative experience.[81]

One of the serious problems in locating and describing the amount of integration within a given community is in finding indicators of these integrative factors. The following discussion focuses on the suitability of some of the integrative factors for the assessment of integration among interest groups and the indicators of them in this research.

Homogeneity

The importance of this factor in integration is based on the notion that the shared attributes of the members of the population tend to lead to common attitudes, values, and behavior. For the study of interest groups, the question is: How homogeneous is the population of interest groups in terms of such attributes as wealth or income, status in the society, experiences in lobbying, and age? The design of this research did not provide for systematic collection of different kinds of data to test for homogeneity among interest groups. Nevertheless, some observations concerning the age of groups in the population, the ideological posture of active interest groups,

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[81]Jacob and Toscano, op. cit., pp. 1-45. The authors do not discuss the question of the exclusiveness of each of these factors. It seems likely that some of them may involve similar concepts that tap the same data. It is also true that this conceptual framework partly overlaps the pluralist framework.

and group membership are presented.

Proximity

The assumption is that the proximity of entities to each other fosters opportunities for contact. The expectation is that a greater number of opportunities for contact fosters more integration than a lesser number. In this investigation one question is: Does location of a group's office in Washington, rather than in other cities, foster integration of the group into the group population? There are few indicators of this criterion for the interest group population. One indicator of the importance of proximity in integration is the extent to which the groups that do not maintain a representative in Washington tend to have fewer appearances at congressional committee hearings. Since hearings constitute communication opportunities for groups, the groups that testify are not as likely to see the implications for mutual cooperation or support with the nontestifying group than otherwise. The reverse is also true.

Interaction

The expectation is that the greater the amount of interaction among leaders of different groups the greater the integration of the groups. This research analyzes two kinds of data that provide indicators of the degree of group interaction. First, the interview schedule contained questions aimed at the disclosure of the number

and kinds of cooperative activities among groups. Second, group testimony was examined to determine the frequency of interaction among groups of different types.

Mutual Knowledge

It is hypothesized that the greater the knowledge groups have about each other and the environment they share, the greater the tendencies toward integration. The extent to which Congress may regulate by law phases of group activities such as lobbying, or investigate them, makes groups aware they share a common fate. Thus, they may be integrated by this mutual knowledge. Uncertainty and lack of knowledge tend to limit contact. The interviews with spokesmen for groups provide considerable data concerning the extent to which group leaders practice the same types of cooperation with other groups and share attitudes, such as perceptions of how to succeed in dealing with Congress.

Structure in the Group Population

The formal and informal structural relationships among interest groups reflect the degree of integration among groups in the population. There is no visible institutional structure that makes decisions for the entire interest group population. But formal structures of governance are only the most obvious devices for control in a social system. Therefore, the degree of informal structuring of relations among groups and the openness of

the group population to a reordering of relationships are important in assessing the degree of integration. There is a scarcity of positions of authority among members of an interest group population, as in other populations. Few groups have all the advantages their members want. Every kind of structuring of relationships affects the distribution of advantages and disadvantages in the interest group system.[82]

This research examines four indicators of the degree of structured relationships among groups: (1) the openness of the interest group system, (2) the extent to which a small number of active groups dominate the hearings process, (3) the stability of the relative volume of testimonies presented by groups during a long time span.

Previous Integrative Experience

The assumption is that rewarding cooperative group ventures are integrative experiences. The expectation is that these experiences incline the leaders of the groups that participated toward future cooperative ventures. The interview schedule contains one question that asked respondents to evaluate the importance of cooperative group experience in promoting further cooperation. Another question in the schedule is aimed at determining the

[82]The similarity of this point to what Jacob and Toscano refer to as the "functional interest factor" is clear. These two indicators seem to be testing the same or similar things and are treated in this research as one indicator.

degree to which a group cooperated repeatedly with the same groups.

The findings of the cluster analyses stated in Chapter IV will yield relevant information also. It will be possible to discern the extent to which group clusters in an earlier period of years persist and the extent to which the groups in the clusters for a given time span tend to participate in clusters in subsequent periods. It is also possible to determine the extent to which the previous cluster experience of groups is not followed by clustering in a later period.

Conflict

So far the discussion of the interdependence of entities in a system has been in terms of factors that promote integration. But the interdependence characteristic of entities in a system is not restricted to cooperative relationships. Competitive and conflictive relationships also bring interdependence to participants. James S. Coleman in a study of controversy within communities notes that "community disagreements are also a measure of community life."[83] The notion of conflict as a relation of dependency between parties has been most extensively discussed in the works of Georg Simmel and

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[83]James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957).

Lewis Coser.[84]

Conflict cannot be carried on by one party alone; it is a mode of interaction. Interaction implies awareness by one entity of another and awareness tends to raise questions about what behavior to expect from the other party in the interaction situation. Awareness, then, by two parties of each other even though they do not interact directly, may involve the accommodation of behavior of each to the other because of confirmed expectations about the other's behavior or because of uncertainties about what to expect from the other. Such a relationship is an ordered relationship as surely as if they had a face-to-face encounter.

Lewis Coser defines social conflict as:

> . . . a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.[85]

This definition stresses the factor of mutual awareness among rivals and deliberate action by them to limit or control the behavior of each other. What emerges from

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[84]Georg Simmel, Conflict, the Web of Group Affiliations, Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, translators and editors (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955); Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956).

[85]Coser, Ibid., p. 8; Clark Kerr distinguishes between competition and conflict. "In competition, two or more parties seek to gain from a third party or parties . . . In conflict, two or more parties seek to gain from each other." Kerr, op. cit., pp. 168-9.

continued conflict is a series of action strategies by which each party limits its own conduct in the light of the expected conduct of its antagonist. In addition, the behavior of each is designed to influence his antagonist's perception of him.[86] In general in a conflictive relationship, each party finds, on the basis of its perception of the enemy and the conflict, that the range of behaviors formerly available to him is reduced. It is possible, of course, that the parties may have inaccurate perceptions of each other's strategies and that the strategy of each will miss its target. Nevertheless, every expenditure of energy, every change of position, every strategy has its costs. Combatants tend to reduce these costs while also attempting to increase gains. Therefore, the tendency is for each party to revamp its information-gathering and dissemination facilities and strategy for the purpose of more effective attacks on its opponent. More accurate information about the opponent tends to give greater structure to the hostile relationship through the development of strategies that are more likely to hit the target. In this process each develops more knowledge and expectations about the enemy, his resources, his special skills and consequently the behavior of each antagonist becomes increasingly controlled by the other; that is, the range of alternative behaviors from which each can choose becomes

[86]Schelling, op. cit., p. 15.

more determined by the strategy of his enemy. Thus the combatants tend to become integrated in a conflictive system.

Many general propositions about social conflict have been developed and, to some extent, tested. The best-known formulations, perhaps, are those of Georg Simmel, reorganized and developed by Lewis Coser, and the work of James S. Coleman.[87] Few of these propositions have been applied to relations among interest groups. A brief inspection of some of these propositions makes it clear that they may be useful for discovering information about relations among interest groups, and specifically about the existence of the degrees of interrelationship among groups. The case studies of interest groups and legislative process are written in the language of conflict, but no generalizations or hypotheses are formulated in these studies. The following propositions about conflict are especially relevant to intergroup relations:

1. Conflict among groups varies inversely with their mutual permeability.[88]

2. In community conflict, the poorly integrated members of the community are the most likely to aggravate

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[87]Simmel, op. cit.; Coser, op. cit.; Coleman, op. cit.

[88]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) p. 36.

the conflict beyond the bounds of normal disagreement.[89]

3. Social conflict is more intense the more uncertain or unstable the rules by which the conflict is supposed to be resolved.[90]

4. Conflict within a community tends to cause (1) the polarization of personal relations around the issue in controversy, and (2) an increase in the number of personal contacts within each camp.[91]

The interest group system seems to be a system where there is not only the integration of cooperation for the attainment of mutual or similar goals (collaboration), or integration through bargaining for different goals (logrolling), but also integration through competition and conflict. In this research, one hypothesis advanced is that the analysis of interest groups in terms of their policy statements on bills at House committee hearings will reveal some stable relationships based on continuing policy differences.

This will be a test of the degree of disagreement between interest groups or clusters of interest groups rather than agreement. James S. Coleman has noted the tendency for a concrete disagreement between two parties to broaden out to encompass numerous relations between

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[89]Coleman, op. cit., p. 21.

[90]Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior, An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 62.

[91]Coleman, op. cit., p. 14.

them under certain conditions.[92] The result may be a tendency for a group to gravitate, in the future, toward a position of conflict with another group even though the interests of the group do not seem to require such a posture. For example, Bertram Gross in his discussion of the legislative process notes that the diverse sources supporting the legislation for the Marshall Plan might not have held together if the labor supporters had been aware how much support was being provided by conservative businessmen.[93]

Summary

In this chapter, intergroup relations were discussed in the context of four conceptual frameworks: pluralism, integration, conflict, and system. Specific hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups to be tested in this investigation were also stated. In the next three chapters, the data assembled in this research are analyzed in terms of the hypotheses and the pluralist and integration conceptual frameworks.

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[92] Ibid.

[93] Bertram Gross, The Legislative Struggle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 238; See also Lloyd G. Reynolds' discussion of the personal relations between William Green and Philip Murray as a major barrier to merger talks between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949) p. 55.

CHAPTER III

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The research design of this study required the selection and definition of many terms and the development of rules for the use of these terms. Some of the data described and ordered by these terms required categorization and manipulation for which few guidelines were available from the literature on interest groups. This chapter discusses the concepts and methods used in the collection, ordering, and analysis of the data. It also provides a brief discussion of some of the factors that influenced the decisions made in the exploratory stage of the investigation.

The exploratory stage of the investigation required decisions about three tasks for which little information is available in the scholarly literature: (1) the determination of the interest groups that are active at the congressional level of government, (2) the selection of a universe of the most active groups, and (3) the selection of congressional committee hearings to yield information about the policy preferences expressed by the spokesmen

for interest groups.[1]

The major steps in preparation for the analysis of statements by group spokesmen are: (1) selection of a time span for the study of the testimony presented by group representatives, (2) discussion of congressional committee hearings as forums for group policy statements, (3) determination of a universe of interest groups, (4) determination of a universe of hearings for analysis, (5) preparation and application of rules for recording the statements by group spokesmen, (6) discussion of the computer program for the identification of clusters of groups, and (7) description of the procedures used in the interview phase of the research.

The Time Span, 1945-60

This investigation of interest group activity at the congressional level is limited to the sixteen-year period beginning in 1945 and extending through 1960, inclusive. This time span was selected for three reasons:

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[1]In describing and analyzing the data in this research it is necessary to refer repeatedly to groups in the context of such things as the presentation of testimony by group representatives and the means of ratings by group spokesmen on interview questions. In discussing these subjects, it is difficult to write lucid prose and still repeatedly state that the behavior under study is the behavior of group leaders, representatives, or spokesmen and not the behavior of a group. Therefore, in some portions of the discussion that follows, the convention has been adopted of referring to group testimony, group means of ratings, and other topics in which group leaders are involved, and not specifically to the leaders or spokesmen of the group. Thus, at no time is the concept of group reified.

(1) it includes two national administrations under presidents from each major political party, nearly eight years under Truman and eight years under Eisenhower, (2) it seemed to be sufficiently long to reveal all the major patterns of testimony by interest groups at House committee hearings, and (3) it did not appear to be an unmanageably long period of time.

During this period many different kinds of major events occurred: the nation restructured its foreign policy, fought a lengthy military engagement abroad, and sustained periods of prosperity and two periods of economic recession. In addition, many important domestic policy questions were discussion in Congress: full-employment policy, labor-management relations, federal aid to education, medical assistance to the aged, benefits to war veterans, programs of assistance to agriculture, urban renewal and housing, tax revision, federal assistance for scientific research and development, and many others. The diversity of the substantive policy questions considered in Congress in this period provides abundant opportunities to identify the public activity of organized interest groups on almost every kind of policy. During a sixteen-year period, every congressional committee with a substantive policy concern might be expected to hold hearings on the subjects within its jurisdiction. In many instances the time span permits the assessment of group relations on a continuing basis so that generalization may

be possible on the basis of numerous events distributed throughout the time period.

Relations Among Interest Groups

This research is primarily concerned with the identification of certain types of relations among national interest groups. Scholarly research on American interest groups has focused chiefly on: (1) the organization and behavior of one interest group, or (2) the visible active coalitions of interest groups. The coalition or alliance of interest groups discussed in Chapter II, is a type of relation among groups that rests on deliberate collaboration among interest group representatives. Research that is focused on the description and analysis of group coalitions is useful and should be continued. Nevertheless, this type of intergroup relation has not been frequently researched and the few scholars who have written on the subject seem to have investigated group coalitions only as a subsidiary objective to other concerns. The literature shows the primary concern of scholars has been with the impact of interest groups on the legislature and not with the relations of groups to each other. In the area of legislative lobbying few inquiries have been made that disclose the specific kinds of activities in which collaborating groups engage.

The only discussion of collaboration among interest groups, apart from case studies, was published by Lester

Milbrath in his research on lobbyists in Washington, D. C.[2] He reports frequent collaboration among groups that have the same policy concerns. Milbrath uses the term to denote several behaviors: communications among group representatives, the joint planning of strategy, and division of labor among group leaders. No figures are provided concerning the frequency with which group leaders collaborate. Milbrath asked the 114 lobbyist respondents to rate the importance of collaboration in their work. Ten made no response to the item, and an additional ten lobbyists indicated it was "probably important but we don't use it." Five more respondents described it as "of no importance," and nine others ascribed to it only "slight importance." Twelve respondents cited collaboration as the most important factor in their work, fifty-two described it as of "considerable importance," and sixteen rated it as of "moderate importance."[3]

This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that collaboration is commonly practiced by many Washington lobbyists. On the other hand, the fact that ten lobbyists made no response to the item and ten others stated they did not use it, raises some questions about how widely collaboration among groups is practiced. A total of fifty of Milbrath's respondents assigned to collaboration a rating

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[2]Milbrath, op. cit.

[3]Ibid., p. 175.

no more than "moderate importance."[4]

Some reflection on what may be required of groups in collaboration suggests some reasons why it would not be surprising if a considerable number of groups did not engage in it with much frequency. First, many interest groups do not have either permanent offices or spokesmen in Washington, and therefore, they have fewer chances to collaborate than the groups that have them. Nevertheless, the leaders of groups that are located outside the nation's capital may frequently file or present the policy positions of the group at congressional committee hearings. Groups without a Washington spokesman may send accredited group members or leaders to Washington to testify at hearings. The presentation of testimony does not require the group to register under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, so these groups would not have been included in the universe of groups from which Milbrath's sample of lobbyists was selected.

Second, some group leaders may be inhibited from participating in visible coalitions of interest groups by

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[4]Milbrath states that twenty-two of the fifty-two lobbyists who regard it as of "considerable importance" are representatives of small trade associations, and so are seven of the twelve who described it as the "most important factor" in their work. Since the number of organizations in some of his categories of organizations is quite small, it is not possible to speak conclusively concerning the proportion of farm, labor, religious, and citizens' organizations that engaged in collaboration. For example, only five farm organizations, and six large citizens' organizations are included in these two categories of organizations.

the existence of unfavorable attitudes of citizens toward lobbying. The three major lobby investigations in American history before 1950 seemed to teach that the major implications for democratic government of lobbying are inherently sinister.[5]

Third, another attitude that observers of American society have noted is the tendency of large numbers of citizens to regard any large organization or aggregation of organizations with suspicion on the grounds that they are too powerful. It is difficult to know how widely such a norm may be accepted and how much importance should be attached to it. The strength and recurrence, sporadically, of citizen support for antitrust movements are especially noteworthy since the struggle against monopolies never became an important issue in the politics of the industrial democracies of Europe prior to World War II.[6]

Another factor that may limit participation by group representatives in coalitions is that the members of the group may develop unfavorable attitudes toward such intergroup relationships. If a group member believes that the function of the group is to achieve its announced legislative goals, any relation with another group, such

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[5]See Chapter I, p. 6-7.

[6]On the latter point see Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation (London: Macmillan and Co., 1954).

as a temporary alliance, that is perceived to be a sign of weakness, may undermine the commitment of the member to it.

Finally, the leaders of a group may see more disadvantages in collaboration than advantages. Collaboration may appear undesirable to a large established group because it may induce smaller interest groups to "lobby" it increasingly with little promise of benefits for the large organization.[7]

In summary, some of the disadvantages of collaboration may cause group leaders to remain aloof from group coalitions. These reasons may also explain why collaboration among groups, when it exists, is likely to be informal, temporary, and involve minimal and intermittent participation by group representatives.[8]

This research chiefly focuses on a different type of relation. Webster's New International Dictionary offers the following definition of "relation": "The mode in which one thing stands to another, or the mode in which

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[7]The spokesman for one well-known national interest group stated in a personal interview that the constitution of his group prohibited collaboration with any groups.

[8]The discussion and quotations from the literature on interest groups concerning group coalitions on pages 65-67, Chapter II, provide support for this conclusion. Of course, proof confirming or refuting the notion that extensive collaboration occurs is not required to justify the exploration or relationships between groups that are non-collaborative. Non-collaborative relationships may also be important for interpreting interest group relations.

two or more things stand to one another."[9] Broadly conceived, then, a relation between two interest groups is what is seen as pertaining to both of them. In this definition no awareness by the representatives of two groups that something pertains to both of them is necessarily implied. Each of two groups may possess a common policy preference but the leaders may not know that the other has that attribute. Yet both may express this policy preference. The primary relationship between groups that is studied in this research is defined in terms of common policy preferences expressed by the spokesmen of interest groups at House committee hearings. The term denoting this relation among interest groups in this research is the "cluster of interest groups." A "group cluster" consists of three or more groups that, to a certain extent, have taken the same positions for or against bills or issues under consideration at selected House committee hearings during a sixteen-year period.[10] The extent of the agreement among interest groups at and beyond which the term "group cluster" is used, is discussed in Chapter IV.

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[9]Webster's New International Dictionary, unabridged Second Edition, William A. Neilson, editor-in-chief (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1959).

[10]The subjects of hearings on which group positions were recorded are classified as bills, and issues. Resolutions are subsumed under the term "bills." Hereafter, no distinction will be made between these terms.

The record of each group consists of its support or opposition to bills and issues considered in hearings. On a bill the spokesmen for the groups in the cluster state the legislation should be passed or defeated; on an issue they express favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward it.[11] The spokesmen for groups in a cluster do not necessarily have the same motives in urging passage or defeat of a measure. The members of a committee who are listening to the testimony cannot always be sure of the motives of group spokesmen in supporting a measure, but the fact of the strong support for it by many groups is carefully noted.

The cluster relation is a broader relation among interest groups than a collaborative relation because it does not require any interaction between the leaders of the groups before they present their statements at the hearings. The cluster is not predicated on the awareness by the leaders of different groups that they share common policy preferences on legislative subjects before the committee, but it seems likely that this awareness of common positions will occur frequently during committee

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[11]The issues used are concrete, specific issues, such as federal aid to states for public elementary and secondary education, federal funds to fight juvenile delinquency, and United States support for the United Nations and its agencies. The attitudes recorded on the issue are those expressed by group spokesmen for or against it, or ambiguous on it. The problems of recording group policy preferences on bills and issues are discussed later in this chapter.

hearings.[12] The groups identified as members of a cluster may in fact engage in cooperative relations with each other but this does not alter the definition of the cluster relation. The cluster relation among interest groups is distinct from the collaborative relation. The term group cluster is based on only one dimension of intergroup relations: the public declaration of common policy preferences by the leaders of three or more interest groups.[13] It is a term denoting a more loose relation among interest groups than the term coalition, but a more precise one.

The concept group cluster, as defined in this research, is useful for several reasons. First, it is concerned with a facet of intergroup relations that is more commonly found at the national level than cooperation among groups. Second, it is easier to operationalize. Third, it can handle a larger number of groups more economically, in terms of time and analysis, than the concept coalition. Finally, the identification of a group cluster provides a rough estimate of the amount of influence resources an aggregation of non-cooperating

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[12]Milbrath reports that all lobbyists attempt to become informed about the activities of the lobbyists of competing groups. Milbrath, op. cit., p. 208.

[13]It may also be useful to distinguish between different dimensions of collaboration among interest groups. The literature that discusses collaboration among group leaders clearly indicates that there are different types of collaborative activity. Some of the types are discussed in Chapter V.

groups may have.[14]

The identification and analysis of group clusters will help to describe the relations among interest group representatives on bills and issues in many instances when no cooperation is discernible. The identification of the policy preferences of interest groups on a legislative subject permits an assessment of the amount of group support, neutrality, and opposition that have developed for it at a particular time, as well as for a stipulated period of time. By studying the distributions of policy preferences of groups for a period of several years, the stability or change in the patterns of this type of intergroup relationship can be determined. This study will provide some systematic generalizations about this type of intergroup relation.

National Interest Groups

There are no published records of attempts to enumerate the universe of national interest groups active in the political system of the United States for a particular time span. In some respects the concept

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[14]This is a very general instrument for assessing influence or support for a legislative measure. The distribution of influence resources is extremely difficult to assess but we know it differs sharply among interest groups. A policy preference expressed by a group leader tells very little about the extent to which the resources of the group will be mobilized and used to secure its enactment. It is also apparent that if a group that is offensive to a congressman is added to a group cluster composed of groups toward whom he is friendly, the effect may be the reduction of the influence of the group cluster on him.

"population of interest groups" is like the concept of "the people" as a corporate body. There is no precise way to number it because groups are constantly being formed and others are being disbanded or cease to function. But unlike the case of a nation's population, we do not have complete demographic information on the entrance or disappearance of interest groups from the group population. Furthermore, there is little information concerning how frequently interest groups move into and out of the arena of political decision-making at the federal or state level of government on a particular issue or set of issues.

The most authoritative compilation of national associations in the United States is contained in the National Organizations of the United States, that lists over 12,500 associations that are national in scope.[15] This volume, however, is incomplete since the publisher must rely on the cooperation of the officials of interest groups to submit the information that is compiled and published. Certain groups, such as the National Women's Trade Union League and the National Association of Consumers, have testified before congressional committees but they are not listed in this volume. Both of these groups are included in the universe of groups used in this

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[15]National Organizations of the United States, Vol. I, Encyclopedia of Associations, 4th edition, Frederick G. Ruffner, Jr., editor (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1964).

research. Furthermore, sixty additional groups included in the second universe of groups were not listed in it. The predecessors of the National Organizations of the United States, the National Associations of the United States, and the still earlier Trade and Professional Associations of the United States, are also incomplete though they are very helpful in providing information about thousands of groups.[16]

Although this inquiry is concerned with a smaller universe of national interest groups, the groups active at the congressional level during a sixteen-year period, no list of these groups has ever been compiled. An examination of the literature on interest groups yields only one volume since 1940 that discusses the problem of the size of the active group population in Washington.[17]

The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act is of limited use in considering this question since many groups in Washington do not regard themselves as lobby

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[16]C. J. Judkins, Trade and Professional Associations of the United States, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, United States Department of Commerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942); Jay Judkins, National Associations of the United States, United States Department of Commerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949).

[17]Milbrath used the 614 lobbyists who registered under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act during the first two quarters of 1956 as the universe from which he drew his sample of lobbyists. Milbrath, op. cit., p. 21-2. Robert Brady briefly cites the growth of business associations in the United States in his Business as a System of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 10.

groups and do not file reports.[18] It is significant that the number of interest groups reporting under the act has decreased substantially since 1950.[19] In 1948 the number of organizations reporting was 340. This figure declined to 295 in 1951 and fell to 197 in 1953, the smallest number for any year during the period 1950-60. The largest number reporting in the decade of the fifties was 289 interest groups in 1960; the average number of groups reporting annually for the ten-year period since 1950 is 261.

Under the law, organizations are not required to register but if they are engaged in lobbying they must file quarterly spending and receipt statements. If the numbers of lobbyists are used in place of the numbers of groups reporting, the conclusion stated above remains unchanged. In 1947, 731 lobbyists registered; the number varied erratically during the next three years but from 1951 through 1960, the largest number of registrants was 413.[20] It does not seem likely that the number of interest groups active at the congressional level decreased in the decade of the 1950's. One explanation for the small numbers of groups filing reports in the 1950's and thereafter is suggested by the Supreme Court decision in the

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[18]See the section on lobby registrations for each year since 1947 in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service).

[19]Ibid., 1948 through 1961. [20]Ibid.

Harriss case.[21] Although this case was not heard by the Court until 1953, it is not unlikely that following a three- or four-year period of uncertainty concerning the interpretation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, lobbyists and organization leaders began to see the scope of the Act in more limited terms and hence registrations and reports declined. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Harriss case made it clear that the Act did not reach those groups engaged only or chiefly in "indirect" lobbying.[22] Thus the Court excluded from the coverage of the Act groups whose activities were in the public opinion field.

An additional disadvantage of relying on the list of organizations reporting under the lobby law is that a spokesman for a group can present testimony at congressional committee hearings and remain exempt from the provisions of the Act. Therefore, it seems likely that some national or regional associations that do not have offices in Washington but that do present testimony at congressional committee hearings, either through a personal representative or by a filed statement, may be overlooked.[23]

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[21] United States v. Harriss, et. al., 347 U. S. 612 (1953).

[22] Rice, op. cit., p. 111.

[23] Since some of these groups may have concentrated membership within certain cities, states, or regions, they may be influential with certain congressmen even though

Congressional Committee Hearings

Inspection of the printed hearings of House and Senate committees since 1944 in the exploratory stage of this research revealed it would be impossible to study all of them. The perusal of more than 60 hearings of Senate committees and an equal number for the House committees, seemed to indicate that reliance on the hearings of only one house would not create a serious problem for identifying the interest groups that presented testimony most frequently at congressional hearings.[24]

During the process of examining the hearings of both House and Senate committees the same groups were noted repeatedly on the witness lists. Thus, there is evidence that studies of the hearings of committees in both houses would reveal the same groups providing testimony most frequently, with perhaps a small number of exceptions.[25]

As a check on this impressionistic judgment, tabulations of witnesses representing groups were recorded

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the groups do not have representatives domiciled in Washington, D. C. Of course, these groups may be influential for other reasons than membership factors.

[24]Nevertheless, the leaders of a few groups stated in interviews that they received more favorable treatment from one house than the other.

[25]It is true that a certain committee may be regarded as more influential than its counterpart in the other house, for instance, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and some group leaders may not wish to spend scarce resources for the presentation of the same position twice.

for the hearings on thirteen bills concerned with agriculture, housing, education, the minimum wage, price controls and international relations that were considered by the committees in both houses. The examination of the hearings showed that usually a large number of group representatives testify at both Senate and House hearings. However, at every hearing except one there were some group representatives that testified at only the hearing in one house and not at the hearings in both houses.

On eight of the thirteen bills the representatives of more national interest groups, in the universe of groups, testified at the House hearings than at the Senate hearings. On the remaining five measures, testimony was presented for more interest groups at the Senate hearings. Many factors may contribute to these differing numbers of group witnesses. For example, group leaders may believe they have a chance to defeat a measure in only one of the two houses, and therefore, they present testimony only at the committee hearing of that house. The smallest number of group spokesmen appearing at both Senate and House hearings on one of the thirteen bills was at a 1947 hearing on a bill concerned with price supports for wool. Five group representatives presented testimony at the House hearing and four witnesses appeared at the Senate hearing, but only one group was represented at both hearings. On eleven of the other twelve measures, however, over half the number of group witnesses appearing at the least

well-attended of the two hearings--Senate or House--presented testimony at the hearings of the committees in both houses. For example, at the 1946 hearing on a bill concerned with the extension of price controls, testimony was received from thirty-three groups at the House hearing and from fifty-four groups at the Senate hearing, but twenty-four groups were represented at both hearings.

On the basis of these findings it appears likely that there are not many groups that present testimony exclusively at one house and never at the other. It seems fair to generalize that the groups testifying most frequently at House hearings are also the groups represented most frequently at Senate hearings.

Only House hearings were studied in this research. The three reasons for selecting House hearings were: (1) on the basis of exploratory comparisons of the hearings of committees in both houses, the House hearings generally had a few more group witnesses than the Senate hearings, (2) there are two more committees with substantive jurisdictions in the House than in the Senate, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and the Committee on Veterans Affairs, and (3) since the membership of the House is more than four times as large as the membership of the Senate, it seemed probable that more committee and subcommittee hearings would be held since House members have fewer committee assignments and often seek opportunities to gain experience and publicity through committee-hearing service.

The Analysis of Group Statements at Hearings

In addition to providing one useful approach to the composition of the active interest group population at the congressional level, congressional committee hearings offer excellent opportunities for the study of relations among interest groups. The utility of the hearings record is based on the traditional practice of holding hearings in each house on every major piece of legislation introduced in Congress.

The scheduling of committee or subcommittee hearings at which spokesmen of interest groups, government officials, and interested individuals may testify on legislative subjects is a practice that developed largely after World War I. The growth of the practice of scheduling hearings on all major legislative measures signalled the shift in lobbying that Herring describes as the replacement of the "old lobby" with the "new lobby."[26] The new lobby, Herring points out, is distinguished by its attention to the importance of the opinions of various publics and recognition that communicating the needs of these publics is vitally important in the accomplishment of the objectives of group leaders.[27] The publics with which a group representative may be concerned include: (1) congressional committees and Congress, (2) administrative agencies

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[26]Herring, Group Representation Before Congress, pp. 30-77.

[27]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 193-4.

and administration leaders, (3) the officials in the regional, state, or local affiliated organizations, (4) the enrolled membership of the group, (5) the leaders and members of other groups, (6) newsmen, (7) the larger citizenry.[28]

The principal functions of hearings for group leaders are: (1) to transmit information, both facts and opinions, to the various publics, and (2) to serve as a "safety-valve" for the relief of group tensions and disturbances.[29] The first function embraces both educational and propagandistic purposes through which group leaders may speak, first to the committee, but also to their own memberships and other groups that are potentially allies or opponents.[30] The second function of hearings, that they permit the discharge of strongly felt desires, frustrations, and fears, is concerned primarily with the internal affairs of the group.

The testimony and discussion at congressional hearings are sometimes regarded as unworthy of careful attention in research because, allegedly: (1) participants do not place a high value on them, (2) the statements of witnesses at hearings often do not reflect their real

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[28]Milbrath, op. cit., p. 230-1.

[29]Truman, op. cit., p. 372-6.

[30]One distinction between education and propaganda is that the educator aims to narrow and close the information gap between himself and his student while the propagandist does not seek to close this gap.

views on issues, (3) statements presented at hearings by spokesmen for groups are inferior data as compared with activity between groups, (4) the hearing is not a policy on trial--not a search for facts and information.

The first objection to hearings mentioned above is stated by Wesley McCune in The Farm Bloc:

> Farm congressmen who have packed both committees . . . learn quickly that one phone call or abbreviated caucus is often more effective than a dozen official hearings.[31]

McCune tends to view the hearings as sheer ritual without significant effect. Undoubtedly, personal and confidential communications and consultations are extremely effective for certain purposes. However, this overlooks some of the peculiar functions of hearings mentioned above. The critical question that arises from McCune's statement concerns his use of the word "effective": Effective at doing what? Communication with only one or two publics does not necessarily answer the needs of the group or the leadership in reference to other publics who may be listening. Lester Milbrath, in his study of lobbyists, reports that Washington lobbyists rate appearances at congressional hearings as less effective than personal presentation of viewpoints or presentation of research

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[31]Wesley McCune, The Farm Bloc (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1943), p. 2.

results, but fairly close to them in importance.[32]

Schattschneider, in his study of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, states that in studying the activities of economic groups in tariff-making "we may confine our attention to the public hearings, the decisive step in the course of the bill through Congress."[33] This is a special case since it involves the testimony of several hundred witnesses, almost 20,000 pages of public testimony and thousands of items to be considered. Nevertheless, the hearings on bills that are considered important by the leaders of several conflicting interest groups may play a significant part in the legislative struggle over a controversial measure since, (1) the nature and extent of the information supplied by many interest groups is likely to be recorded fully only at the hearings, (2) the hearings represent the only occasion at which committee members and group spokesmen are confronted with the full range of interested parties who are publicly active, and (3) the hearings' testimony and discussion may be considered by the courts in writing a decision pertaining to the bill.[34]

Hearings usually reveal the cleavages between the

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[32]Milbrath, op. cit., p. 213. Milbrath states the mean rating for personal presentation was 8.43. It was 7.40 for research results and 6.55 for testifying at hearings.

[33]Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, op. cit., p. 13.

[34]Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 79-80.

supporting and opposing groups, and in building a hearings' record the character and the extent of the public commitments of interested groups are most fully articulated. Congressional hearings afford the opportunity for many groups to appear as witnesses. It is customary for a group to be granted an opportunity to testify when it has expressed a desire to do so.[35] On important bills, there are always a large number of witnesses who want to be heard. At each of the recent hearings on Federal aid to education, and the Economic Opportunity Act, for example, more than fifteen national interest groups presented statements, including the groups of recognized stature in the areas of business, labor, and agriculture.[36]

The second criticism of relying on hearings' testimony is based on the fact that in public statements group leaders must combine strategy and tactics with the

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[35]A brief set of questions was mailed to the chairmen of the House and Senate committees whose hearings are studied in this research. The response revealed that although procedures of giving notice of hearings and the scheduling of witnesses vary somewhat from committee to committee, the customary practices are quite similar. In general, notice of hearings is usually given by the following: (1) announcement on the floor of the chamber and publication in the Congressional Record, (2) a press release, (3) a form letter sent to groups who have filed a request with the committee to be notified when hearings on specific kinds of issues are held. Most committee chairmen state that they allow all groups requesting time an opportunity to be heard. For a more complete discussion of opportunities to testify see Chapter V.

[36]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Federal Aid to Schools, Hearings before General Sub-committee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Parts I and II, March 13-17, 20, 1961 (Washington:

discussion of any single goal. Therefore, a group may appear to support what they truly oppose and opposition to a bill may not be indicative of the group's real desires. There is some merit in this position. For example, Group A may support Bill 2 in order to accomplish an objective that may become obtainable if Bill 2 is supported, even though the leaders of Group A are opposed to the major objective of Bill 2. It may also be true that a group states for the hearing record that it has no views on a bill or a title of a bill when it really has a position it does not want to disclose.

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that a group representative would often assert that his group supports a bill when the group is actually opposed, or that he would state the group is opposed to a bill when it is in favor of it. These acts would be not merely refusals to disclose group views but deceptions. Deception can be extremely risky for a group leader who must answer probing questions from uncommitted or hostile committee members. It might also be imprudent for a group to engage in deception because it is difficult and often undesirable to deceive all the publics that may examine the hearings record. Group spokesmen realize that a public statement

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Government Printing Office, 1961); United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Hearings before Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Parts I and II, March 17-20; April 7-10, 13, 14, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964).

of their views must be defensible not only at a given point in time and to a limited audience but for many years and to a vast audience of listening publics, including the leaders of opposition groups and newsmen who have powerful incentives to expose deception.[37] In short, there seem to be important factors limiting the extent to which interest group spokesmen will attempt to deceive.

For this study it is irrelevant whether group strategy and tactics conceal the "real views" of the group leaders on bills or whether they do not. Whatever position and whatever views are publicly expressed are interpreted as functioning for the group to the publics who are listening.[38] The emphasis in this research is not with how the leaders of a group would like to behave in public, but how they do behave. If a group representative speaks for the passage of a bill, the effect of the statement on those listening, except those privileged to know any deception that may be involved, is to add weight to the forces seeking passage of the measure. This research does not tabulate or estimate the motives of particular

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[37]Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, op. cit., pp. 132-4.

[38]Alfred S. Cleveland, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1953), 254-71. Cleveland states that the NAM regularly reports in its publications for members the testimony its leaders present at committee hearings. Examination of Nation's Agriculture, the American Farm Bureau Federation's Journal, and the National Grange Monthly reveals that they also carry brief reports on the testimony presented by group leaders at hearings.

witnesses at hearings.

The third objection to the use of hearings is more formidable. No doubt, it is desirable to study intergroup relations by observing the consultations between group representatives or examining the communications between them.[39] The investigations of the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the House of Representatives, often identified as the Buchanan Committee, produced a large amount of data on the communications between certain interest groups that was extremely useful in assessing the relations among them.[40] But as a model for the use of scholars in researching relations among interest groups, the procedures used by the committee are extremely difficult to execute. Most interest group leaders are reluctant to permit access to their internal affairs.[41]

The objection to reliance on hearings testimony is that group statements are inferior to other types of data. There is little evidence, however, for believing that the verbal expression of facts, ideas, and opinions are necessarily less meaningful than other activity. One accusation that some of the group theorists make is that

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[39]Bailey, op. cit., p. 133.

[40]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Lobbying Direct and Indirect, op. cit., pp. 4-9.

[41]The Washington representative of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies refused to allow this researcher to talk with her about the congressional lobbying activities of the Association.

"manifest" activity has been too readily accepted as the "real" or significant activity.[42] This is reflected in their derogation of "talk" and "ideas." For these scholars, activity that is "underlying" is real; it is causative and, therefore, has great explanatory power. They assert that manifest behavior, such as making speeches, is merely "representative" of underlying activity.

Until the notion of separating "manifest" activity from "underlying" activity passes beyond the impressionistic stage, and the linkage between these kinds of activity and "cause" is clarified, the objection that the analysis of verbal activity is less useful than other types of behavior remains a matter of judgment. Leaving aside the question of causation, to analyze verbal activity apart from other activity is clearly legitimate research.[43] All authorities agree that the public expression of policy preferences function for the groups making them and for some of the publics listening to them. One of the major objectives of this research is to assess relations among interest groups in terms of common policy preferences. The objectives of the investigation determine the kind of data to be examined.

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[42]Bentley, op. cit., p. 205-6; Hagan, op. cit., p. 47-8.

[43]M. B. Smith, J. Bruner, and R. White, Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), Chapter Three--a discussion of the "action tendencies" of opinions.

The fourth major criticism of the hearings process states that a congressional hearing is not an arena in which a policy is put on trial. The argument states that many hearings are carefully staged by those in charge of them, and therefore they are not arranged or executed for the purpose of searching for all the facts. There is evidence to justify this description of many hearings but this fact does not impair the use of the hearings records for the purposes of this investigation. The examination of group testimony is not premised on the contention that every group has the same chance to make its case as every other, or that the group representatives are articulating fresh original hitherto undisclosed views to committee members who are completely unbiased about the bill before them.[44]

The Universe of Interest Groups

In this research the term "national interest group" excludes the following: state and local associations, specific business corporations, individuals that speak only for themselves, congressmen, Federal administrators, and state administrators who speak only for themselves or for the state in which they are employed. Thus, state, city and county officials are excluded except where they speak for a group with membership in more than one state. The term "national interest group" includes any group

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[44]Chapter V contains a discussion of the differences in the opportunities that particular groups have in the hearings process.

whose title or testimony indicated its membership was enrolled from two or more states. Thus all regional groups such as the Southern States Industrial Council were included. However, no regional organizational unit that is affiliated with a national interest group was included. Also included in the term "national interest group" are those groups whose title seemed to include members from more than one state.[45]

What emerges when this definition is used in examining the lists of witnesses at House hearings is an aggregation of groups usually described as voluntary associations. Most of the major labor unions, trade associations, professional, citizens, and veterans groups are included.

There are several reasons for focusing on the voluntary association at the national level and excluding the kinds of witnesses mentioned above. Most important is the fact that individual citizens and representatives of business firms do not appear in significant numbers as witnesses at congressional committee hearings.[46] Pendleton Herring notes that the composition of the Washington

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[45]It was not feasible to investigate the membership of each group. The limited information published on associations in the Encyclopedia of Associations did not justify an extensive search.

[46]The number of individual citizens and representatives of business firms at hearings varies, of course, according to the committee under consideration and the subject of the hearing.

lobbyists changed drastically during the first three decades of this century.[47] Individual citizens and businessmen, and the lobbyists who did not represent a membership declined in numbers and importance as the representatives of national voluntary associations increased. An inspection of the lists of witnesses appearing at congressional committee hearings since World War I reveals one fundamental fact: the number of national associations in Washington that have mass memberships has increased rapidly.[48] An examination of the hundreds of House hearings since 1945 reveals that the overwhelming proportion of witnesses at nearly all hearings are either spokesmen for voluntary associations or government officials.[49] This is explained partly by the fact that the number of voluntary associations is expanding, and particularly, by the fact that an increasing number of them have permanent offices in Washington.[50] These associations tend to pre-empt the time available at committee hearings. This applies with greatest force to hearings focused on controversial questions and questions that are important

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[47]Herring, Group Representation Before Congress, op. cit., pp. 40-59.

[48]Ibid., p. 11-12.

[49]Congressmen and Federal officials from the executive branch appear in large numbers at certain committee hearings. For example, the hearings of the House Armed Services Committee generally are dominated by the testimony of civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense.

[50]These facts are discussed in detail in Chapter V.

to several sectors of the society.

Another factor of importance in explaining the absence of individual businessmen and representatives of business firms from the witness lists, and from the filed materials in the hearings' records, is the belief of some businessmen that they and their companies should remain "non-political." There is evidence from diverse sources to support the statement that such a belief exists.[51] A recent documentation of it is found in the statements of anonymous representatives of business firms residing in Washington who participated in a series of round-table discussions at the Brookings Institution.[52] Apparently the executives of most businesses see their Washington offices as service outposts where marketing and intelligence functions are performed, assistance to customers is provided, and sales and general missionary work is carried on.

The business representatives who staff these Washington outposts for their forms regard lobbying as a slightly off-color function. Perhaps a typical attitude of these representatives toward legislative work is the

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[51]Congressional Quarterly states that many groups object to being considered "lobbyists" and file reports in compliance with the law "under protest." 1965 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 680.

[52]Paul W. Cherrington and Ralph L. Gillen, The Business Representative in Washington (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962).

following:

> Usually . . . our work is done through trade associations, and they, of course, work to the point where jointly they come to a conclusion as to what their attitude is going to be.[53]

It seems clear that even as legislative listening posts many business representatives defer to or rely on their trade associations and business groups. One participant stated:

> Often we will be alerted to a piece of legislation first by the NAM, or the U. S. Chamber. They will catch it first because they can follow these things even more closely than we do; and, along with the copy of the bill, we will report (to the company) the feelings of one or more organizations.[54]

Cherrington and Gillen conclude:

> The reluctance of companies to adopt a policy on a bill and an active program in support or opposition appeared to stem primarily from the pressure of other business. There was a definite tendency not to participate, especially on legislation that would affect the company only indirectly. Instead, companies preferred to let business organizations represent their interests.[55]

Several participants in the Brookings discussions reported that the top executives in the company define the functions and activities of the firm quite narrowly, as production, distribution, and sales, and take a condescending attitude toward active legislative programs.[56]

Another reason for excluding the testimony of individuals and business firms is that they seldom appear with regularity or frequency even on a single recurring

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[56] *Ibid.*

issue. Furthermore, many of the letters and statements filed with the committees by individual businessmen may have been prompted by trade association activity, in the same manner that letter campaigns are organized by trade associations for influencing individual congressmen.

A final factor that deserves mention is that many of the letters of businessmen and individuals to committees on a bill or issue do not speak to the bill directly but contain what is essentially technical information that has little or no relevance to the major policy provisions of the legislation.

In conclusion, communications from these sources seem to be chiefly single-shot, technical communications and therefore, they are not readily classifiable in terms of support or opposition to a bill. On the basis of these factors the decision was made to define "national interest group" in terms broader than a single firm. The universe of national interest groups that was developed according to rules stated above, would seem to include most of the active, permanent, privately organized forces in Washington and throughout the nation.

The Preliminary Universe of Interest Groups

In the preparation of the universe of national interest groups, two criteria were used: (1) a sufficient number of groups representing each of the major types of interest groups must be included in order to facilitate the process of generalization, if evidence warranted it,

about specific types of groups, and (2) within each type the groups that presented testimony most frequently must be included. The classification of groups by types did not impose a restriction on the process of identifying clusters among the final universe of groups. A search was made for clusters among all groups of the universe with no restrictions as to types of groups.

In constructing the universe of groups, the objective was to include all interest groups that testified with considerable frequency during the sixteen-year period. Since no prior information was available concerning how many times any group testified in this period, no standard was available in advance of the examination of hearings to aid judgment concerning how many presentations by a group should be accepted as a minimum for inclusion in the universe of groups.

The second fundamental problem was the lack of information concerning how many groups would be found testifying one or more times during the sixteen-year period. These problems made it necessary to build the universe of interest groups by stages. But because the researcher could not be sure that a group was being seen for the first time after many volumes of hearings had been examined, errors of omission were possible. In nearly every hearing volume, one or more groups testified that were not included in the universe of groups and were therefore passed over. In the examination of subsequent

volumes of hearings, these groups passed over earlier were sometimes listed as witnesses. When this occurred these groups were added to the preliminary universe. But it was not possible to be sure a group had been listed a second time and not merely the first time, when there were literally hundreds of groups outside the universe that had to be remembered. Thus it is not possible to state that all groups that testified two or more times are included in the second universe.

The second criterion, the degree of activity of a group, was necessary because it was clear in the exploratory stage of the research that the task of enumerating every national interest group at every hearing would result in an unmanageable project due to the time it would require. Therefore, a few hearings held during the years 1945-60 from each House committee included in the research were used to build up a preliminary universe of national interest groups.

The following rules were used in determining the national interest groups to be included in the universe in conformance with the criterion of frequency of group testimony. First, groups that were found testifying at more than two hearings during this preliminary examination of hearings were included. Second, groups were included that testified only once but claimed in their testimony to represent a large constituency and, therefore, might be expected to have testified repeatedly during the

sixteen-year period. Third, groups were included that testified only once but were familiar because of descriptions of them in the literature on interest groups and might be expected to testify again during a long period of time. Fourth, groups were included that were mentioned in the testimony of other group spokesmen if the mentioned groups seemed to have strong credentials and, therefore, might have testified at hearings other than the ones examined in the preliminary study. For example, the spokesman of Group A in presenting the views of his group also refers to the research on the subject at hand that was carried on by Group B. Thus, Group B was included in the preliminary universe of groups since it seemed likely that it would be represented at other hearings.

In addition to the groups listed in the preliminary universe obtained from the hearings' records, a few groups discussed in the literature on interest groups were added. For example, from the hearings record of the Buchanan Committee, America's Future and the National Industrial Conference Board, were added to the universe of groups.[57] The universe of groups compiled under these rules contained the following numbers of groups listed by type in Table 1.

The use of types of groups in the compilation of records of testimony by group spokesmen facilitated greatly

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[57]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Lobbying Direct and Indirect, op. cit.

TABLE 1

FIRST UNIVERSE OF GROUPS

Type of Groups	Number of Groups
Business	80
Citizen	62
Agriculture	45
Professional	35
Labor	31
Financial Business	22
Agricultural Business	20
Religious	16
Small Business	10
Veterans	8
Total	329

the tabulation process during the examination of the hearings. The major importance of the classification of groups, however, was that it helped to assure representation for certain types of interest groups in the universe that might have different policy preferences than other groups. For example, the deliberate selection of every national small business group for inclusion in the preliminary universe of groups, might make it possible to explore certain hypotheses about the frequency with which small business groups distinguish themselves from other business groups in statements presented at hearings. If the categories had not been used, the probability of omitting some of the groups in the narrowly defined categories, such as Small Business, would have increased since the other criterion used in determining which groups were to be included in the universe of groups is the

frequency with which group testimony is presented.[58]

Five of the types of interest groups, Business, Labor, Agriculture, Citizen, and Professional groups, are conventional categories of interest groups used in the literature on the subject. Two of the remaining types, Religious and Veterans groups, seemed likely to have very few groups assigned to them unless a deliberate effort was made to include all of them. Such a small number of groups would qualify for inclusion under the criterion of frequency of testimony that conclusions concerning these categories of interest groups could not be made.[59] The decision to use the three special classifications of business groups, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business groups, was based on the hypothesis that the policy preferences of groups in each of these types of groups can be distinguished from those of other business groups. A related factor was the fear that only a few groups in these categories would testify at hearings and therefore, every group, even if it was only mentioned once in the hearings, should be included in the preliminary universe in the hope that a sufficient number of them could be found to permit generalizations about the

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[58]It should be noted that the classification of groups into types that were assumed to contain few groups did not mean that any groups testifying more than twice in other classifications were excluded.

[59]This was an erroneous assumption for Religious groups but accurate concerning Veterans groups.

policy preferences of these types of groups.

The classification of groups into types was based on two criteria: (1) groups described in the literature as belonging to one of these categories was assigned according to that description unless a different assignment was suggested by the hearings' record, and (2) groups that in their testimony described themselves as belonging to a certain category were classified according to that description if no information in the hearing record suggested a different category.

The Second Universe of Groups

Since these 329 groups were obtained from the literature on the subject and from the hearings' records, it was assumed that all groups that testified most frequently during the sixteen-year period would be included in the universe. Once the systematic examination of hearings began, however, it was obvious that the preliminary universe of groups was not as adequate as had been assumed. Groups testifying more than twice were discovered that had not been listed in the preliminary universe of groups. Therefore, in the first systematic examination of House hearings for the sixteen-year period, the decision was made to add to the universe any group that had been omitted from the preliminary universe but for whom a spokesman was listed more than twice in the hearings' records.

The systematic examination of the selected House committee hearings for the sixteen-period resulted in the addition and deletion of many groups from the universe. It was discovered that some groups that had been included in the earlier universe of 329 groups presented no other testimonies during the sixteen-year period. In some cases, interest groups that had been added to the preliminary universe from the literature and from the testimony of other group witnesses never were recorded as testifying at all. For example, no testimony was found for America's Future, the Foundation for Economic Education, and the National Council for Industrial Peace. The greatest number of additions were to the categories of Business and Citizens groups, but every category was enlarged by some additions. The altered universe of groups that emerged, referred to hereafter as the second universe of groups, consisted of the number of groups listed by category in Table 2.

Since groups were added to the universe as the examination of hearings progressed, it is possible that some groups were overlooked that testified more than twice. Furthermore, the likelihood of omitting a group testifying at a hearing that was listed in the universe was always present since the universe on which tabulations were being kept was very large, more than 300 groups. Some errors of omission may be present,

TABLE 2

SECOND UNIVERSE OF GROUPS

Type of Groups	Number of Groups
Business	112
Citizen	87
Agriculture	50
Professional	41
Labor	42
Financial Business	27
Agricultural Business	22
Religious	20
Small Business	13
Veterans	14
Total	428

but it seems unlikely that many groups that testified more than a few times were omitted.

The Third Universe of Interest Groups

The third and final universe of interest groups was partly determined by the reduction of the number of hearings to be included in the cluster analyses. It was clear that to include groups testifying no more than two or three times would greatly enlarge the number of groups to be analyzed and yield such low relation scores among groups that few generalizations could be made with confidence. It was necessary to reduce substantially the number of groups for analysis since the difficulties of constructing and using a single matrix, containing more than 70,000 cells, or even two or three matrices, containing more than 20,000 cells each was not feasible. Therefore, all groups were eliminated from the universe that had

less than four appearances at the thirty-seven hearings at which twenty or more groups testified pro or con.[60] These alterations reduced the size of the universe from 428 groups to 119 groups. The select universe of groups, therefore, consists of 119 groups classified by types in Table 3. The 119 interest groups included in the final

TABLE 3

SELECT UNIVERSE OF GROUPS

Type of Groups	Number of Groups
Business	37
Citizen	17
Agriculture	10
Professional	9
Labor	16
Financial Business	6
Agricultural Business	10
Religious	7
Small Business	2
Veterans	5
Total	119

universe of groups are listed in Table 9 at the end of this chapter.

The previous discussion of the process of selecting groups for the universe of groups made it clear that the possibility of errors of omission during the tabulation of group testimony was not remote. It is not possible to assert confidently that the universe includes the 119 groups that testified most frequently. In addition, as

[60]The discussion of the universe of hearings is found on page 137.

noted previously, there is no way to discover the exact frequency with which the representatives of a group testify in a given period of time except by enumerating every presentation at every committee hearing. It should be noted that the only hearings for which tabulations of group testimony were made were those at which two or more groups testified that were listed in the preliminary universe of groups. Consequently, many brief hearings at which only one listed group was a witness were not tabulated. Also, it is not possible to be sure all the groups presenting testimony most frequently are included in the universe of groups. Where only one group testified, or none, from the preliminary universe, no record was made of the policy preferences of any of the unlisted groups that testified.

Thus the final universe of groups used in the calculation of interest group clusters was a twice-revised universe of groups compiled on the basis of the frequency of group testimony before selected House committee hearings during the period 1945-1960. It seems fair to conclude that the third universe of groups includes all or nearly all of the groups who testified with considerable frequency.

The Selection of the Committee Hearings

The selection of House committees whose hearings are analyzed in this research and the selection of the particular hearings that are analyzed were based on the

following considerations. Since the principal focus of the research is on the relations among interest groups as revealed in voluntary presentations of policy preferences, only the standing committees of the House of Representatives, or their subcommittees, that openly invite interest groups to testify were included in the analysis.[61] This criterion excluded from the universe nearly all investigative hearings, even if they were conducted by standing committees, since in nearly all investigations the interest groups that appear are asked or subpoened to appear and groups that are not invited to testify are not permitted to do so. No hearings conducted outside Washington, D. C., were included in the universe of hearings. Hearings held in the field rarely have the spokesmen of national interest groups as witnesses. At these hearings, the witnesses are almost entirely individual citizens and representatives of state or local associations, business firms, or unions. Sometimes hearings are conducted in the field for the explicit purpose of enabling local interest groups, businesses, and citizens to testify. The fourteen committees whose hearings are included in the universe of hearings are as follows:

Agriculture	Judiciary
Armed Services	Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Banking and Currency	Post Office and Civil Service
Education and Labor	Public Works

[61]This decision eliminated from the universe of hearings the hearings of the Rules, House Administration, Appropriations, and Un-American Activities Committees.

Foreign Affairs
Government Operations
Interior and Insular Affairs
Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Veterans Affairs
Ways and Means

Each hearing of these committees for the sixteen-year period, from 1945 through 1960, was examined to determine if more than one of the groups in the second universe of groups was recorded as taking a "yes" or "no" position on the bill or issue under consideration. No distinctions were made between oral testimony, statements submitted, letters, or telegrams received by the committee on the subject of the hearing.[62] If two or more groups from the second universe of groups took a "yes" or "no" position on the bill under consideration, the hearing was included in the universe.

Guidelines for the Examination of Hearings Testimony

Many degrees of ease and difficulty in determining the position of a group on a bill were encountered in the testimony of different groups. To illustrate the type of problem that was present in some hearings, the following example may be helpful. At a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a foreign aid bill was under consideration and the major point of conflict among the

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[62]This decision was based on the fact that groups without representatives in Washington may be powerful groups in the area where the membership of the group is concentrated, or where the interest they represent is vital. A communication from leaders of a group in the home district of a congressman, therefore, should not be neglected.

witnesses was the amount of money to be authorized for foreign aid. In this instance it was impossible to categorize the groups for or against the bill except in terms of the differing amounts of aid requested. To divide the group on the basis of different amounts of aid desired is meaningful since it shows the extent of the consensus or dissensus among the group witnesses on the single question before them. On this question, the policy preferences of the groups can be compared. This procedure may obscure differences among groups, but any dichotomy among numerous groups may conceal differences that exist among the groups that are categorized together.[63]

Often group representatives speak directly to the bill under consideration and state explicitly they endorse the measure or oppose it. At other hearings, the statements of spokesmen are less clear and may range from endorsement with amendments to no commitment on the measure. At some of the hearings, the impact of an amendment on the measure under consideration was clear. When this was the case, the hearing was included in the universe and the positions expressed by group representatives were recorded. For example, if an amendment proposed by a group representative who supported the bill under consideration was

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[63]This is true of votes cast by members of a legislative body. All the "aye" votes on a bill that is voted in the U. S. House of Representatives are categorized together, but often there are important distinctions that could be made among them.

judged to be a minor one, if it was so regarded by the group spokesman and was not the target of criticism by other group representatives or by members of the committee, the group was recorded "for" the bill.[64] If the amendment was judged to be a major one that affected the principal provisions of the bill but no clear assessment could be made in terms of the positive or negative effect of it, the position of the group was recorded as ambiguous. If the amendment was clearly negative to one or more of the major provisions of the bill, or if the witness requested that the interest he represented be exempted from the control of the bill, the group was recorded as against the measure.[65]

Some hearings do not focus on a single bill. A committee may have before it several bills on a single subject and each group may speak to a different bill. In this instance the hearing is included in the universe if the testimony of the different groups can be categorized

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[64]All examinations and tabulations of the hearings were conducted by the researcher.

[65]The best illustration of bills on which a large number of the group witnesses each requested exemption of the group's clientele from the scope of the act were the bills and amendments extending the Defense Production Act of the 1950's. A group was recorded as against the measure if its spokesmen stated the group was opposed to the application of the law to the interests of its members. For example, an apartment owners' association requests that apartments be exempted from rent controls. To categorize groups in this way produced a meaningful distinction between those groups supporting the extension of the law and those opposing it as it applied to their members or to the economy.

on a single standard--support or opposition to a single legislative objective. Not infrequently several congressmen introduce similar bills that contain the same basic provisions but differ in minor ways. In such an instance, the discussion of witnesses often is centered on the single basic objective contained in the major provisions of all the bills. The spokesmen may not cite the bills specifically, although frequently they do, but instead speak for or against the basic objective common to all bills. Where this occurs and tabulations can be made for, against, or ambiguous on the basic contents of the similar bills, the testimony of witnesses is comparable and the hearings are included in the universe.

Some hearings consider several bills on a legislative subject, such as the sale conditions of oleomargarine, but most of the testimony discusses only one bill. When this condition exists, the recording of group policy preferences is made on the basis of the bill discussed.

At some hearings on a single bill, a group representative did not take a position for or against the measure but spoke to specific provisions of the bill and commented favorably or unfavorably on each. If a majority of the spokesmen focused attention on one or two major provisions of a bill and gave little attention to the other provisions, or left their position on the other provisions undisclosed, the one or two provisions discussed were selected as the basis for recording the

groups as for or against it, or ambiguous on it.

On one bill, five provisions received extensive discussion by more than thirty group spokesmen and members of the committee. A group was recorded for the bill if its representative spoke for one or more of the major provisions without opposing any of the other provisions. A group was recorded against the bill if its representative spoke against one or more of the major provisions. The bill was the Labor-Management Relations Bill of 1953. The five provisions that were discussed are: (1) support for more employer freedom of speech, (2) support for the elimination of secondary boycotts, (3) opposition to the union shop, (4) opposition to industry-wide bargaining, (5) support for injunctive relief from certain labor practices. The spokesmen for most groups stated support or opposition to several or all of these provisions.

If a spokesman for a group stated he was presenting the views of several groups and the record contained the names of those groups, each group mentioned, if it was included in the universe, was recorded for, against, or ambiguous on the bill.

Other hearings that ostensibly focus on a bill really focus on an issue, such as federal aid for slum clearance. Many of the hearings were used by group representatives to speak on a general issue, rather than to discuss the specific provisions of a single bill. If there was no single issue on which at least half of the

group spokesmen focused, the hearing was not included in the universe.[66] However, if a single issue is discussed by a majority of the group spokesmen in terms of support and opposition, the hearing is included in the universe and the positions of the spokesmen for the groups included in the universe of groups are recorded for, against, or ambiguous.

The general practice that was followed in examining and tabulating hearings' testimony was to rely on the policy guidelines contained in the testimony of group spokesmen on the bill and the committee members' discussion of it. The general objective was to make the most meaningful statement of the group support, the group opposition, or the division of support and opposition by group representatives on the bill or issue under consideration. The findings of the research will disclose how groups are related to one another in terms of their public statements focused on a single measure or set of related bill provisions.

All the hearings that focus on bills and issues are listed in Table 10 at the end of this chapter. This table shows that for 124 hearings, the groups' policy preferences were recorded on the basis of a bill, and for

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[66]The term "group spokesmen" refers only to the representatives of those groups listed in the universe of groups that presented testimony and does not include representatives of groups that testified but were not included in the select universe of groups.

twenty-one hearings, the testimony of group spokesmen centered on an issue. Nineteen hearings could not be used because of the reasons stated above or because they focused on technical material which defied interpretation.[67]

In stage one of the research, tabulations were made of testimonies on every bill at which two or more groups in the universe testified. Thus data were compiled on hearings that later were excluded from the 145-bill universe. These data permit some statements about a much larger volume of testimonies by groups than those for or against the 145 bills in the universe of bills.

The Second Universe of Hearings

With the second universe of groups assembled, the House hearings of the selected committees were examined a second time. The hearings re-examined were only those hearings at which the representatives of at least five groups had testified for or against a bill, plus the hearings that needed a complete re-examination on the grounds that the new universe of groups might bring the total number of groups presenting testimony on them to seven or more.

For determining which hearings had the potentiality for five witnesses from the universe of groups the following

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[67]The following titles of hearings cover the major technical topics: Renegotiation of Contracts; Technical Amendments to Internal Revenue Code; Administration and Operation of Customs, Tariff Laws and Trade Agreements Program; Tax Treatment of Earnings of Co-operatives.

factors were used: the subject of the hearings, the number of days the hearing continued, and the number of witnesses representing groups in the first examination of the hearing. Every hearing with testimony from four groups in the first examination of all House hearings was rechecked to determine if the second universe of groups resulted in any changes. At the conclusion of the re-examinations, the universe consisted of 237 hearings. The classification of the 237 hearings according to the committee conducting the hearing is shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

SECOND UNIVERSE OF HEARINGS

Committee	Number of Hearings
Ways and Means	44
Education and Labor	36
Agriculture	33
Banking and Currency	27
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	27
Judiciary	19
Foreign Affairs	18
Post Office and Civil Service	8
Government Operations	5
Public Works	7
Merchant Marine and Fisheries	3
Armed Services	6
Veterans Affairs	3
Interior	1
Total Hearings in Universe	237

Since the identification of group clusters among more than 200 groups for 237 hearings seemed unmanageable, the following steps were taken to reduce the number of hearings in the universe. The hearings were classified

according to the number of groups that presented supporting or opposing testimonies on the bill under consideration. The classified hearings were then divided into three "rounds" for purposes of analysis by computer. Each round contains hearings at which different numbers of groups testified. No hearings were included in the universe at which less than ten groups testified.

The use of a ten-testimony minimum standard for inclusion of a hearing in the universe was essential to reduce substantially the universe of 237 hearings. If 237 hearings were used, this would enlarge the universe of groups considerably. If the universe of groups was enlarged to 140 groups, the matrix necessary to identify clusters would consist of almost 20,000 cells. The MMPA computer program was not designed to handle a matrix with more than approximately 17,000 cells.

The use of a ten-testimony standard instead of the five-testimony standard mentioned on pages 145-146 also reduces the probabilities that a certain kind of error will occur in building the universe of hearings. In the discussion of the re-examination of hearings having five group testimonies, the possibility of not including some hearings in the universe because of inadvertently omitting the testimonies of a few groups was noted. The use of a ten-testimony standard--instead

of a five-testimony standard--reduces the likelihood of having omitted a hearing from the universe because the testimonies of a few groups were overlooked.

The first round of hearings includes only those hearings at which twenty or more groups in the universe testified--thirty-seven hearings. The second round of hearings includes only the thirty-one hearings at which fifteen through nineteen groups in the universe testified. The third round of hearings includes the seventy-seven hearings at which ten through fourteen groups in the universe testified. When the hearings in the three rounds are combined they total 145.

By distinguishing between the hearings that attracted the largest numbers of testimonies by groups and those that attracted smaller numbers, the possibilities for identification of the largest more cohesive clusters are improved. A group that submits classifiable testimony, for or against a bill, at only three hearings in a sixteen-year period could hardly be described as a member of a cohesive cluster even if all three testimonies were in accord with the policy preferences of the other groups in the cluster.

In general the bills that attract the most group testimony at hearings are those that appear to have a broad impact on the society. Such bills, if enacted, would not impinge narrowly on one interest clientele but would seem to have general consequences

for numerous interest clienteles and for the larger society. The bills on reciprocal trade, mutual security, and minimum wage, housing, education, and social security coverage and benefits are examples. In Table 5, the kinds of bills included in the first round are arranged in categories.[68] The hearings contained in Rounds Two and

TABLE 5

FIRST-ROUND BILLS

Policy Categories	Number of Bills
Price Controls	2
Housing	4
Defense Production Acts	2
Minimum Wage	6
Education and School Assistance	4
Labor-Management Relations and Unemployment Compensation	2
Oleomargarine Tax	2
Trade	8
Social Security Act Amendments	3
Miscellaneous	4
Total	37

Three are listed in Tables 6 and 7.

Cluster Analysis Procedures

The primary objective of this research is to study one type of relation among national interest groups active in presenting testimony at selected House committee hearings. Although different techniques

[68]The first round consists of the hearings at which twenty or more groups in the universe presented testimony.

TABLE 6

SECOND-ROUND HEARINGS

Policy Categories	Number of Bills
Housing, Rent Control	5
Labor, Unemployment, Labor-Management Relations	6
Education, Scholarships, Juvenile Delinquency	2
Taxes and Revenue Revision	4
Foreign Affairs	3
Women's Status and Rights	2
Miscellaneous	9
Total	31

TABLE 7

THIRD-ROUND HEARINGS

Policy Categories	Number of Bills
Housing, Community Development . .	10
Labor, Unemployment	8
Trade	3
Civil Rights	3
Anti-Trust, Fair Trade, Regulation of Business	10
Mutual Security	8
Agriculture	7
Taxes	7
Social Security	2
Miscellaneous	19
Total	77

exist for the identification of clusters of entities in a population, the large number of entities in this research precluded the use of many of them.[69] The techniques used in this research were developed by Louis L. McQuitty and

[69]See the discussion in John G. Grumm, "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVIII

combined into a single computer program by the staff at the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University. The program is designed for the CDC 3600 which can analyze projects involving large numbers of entities.

The computer program utilizes three different analytic techniques: Elementary Linkage Analysis (ELA), Similarity Analysis (SA), and Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA). These techniques will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV.

Interview Procedures

The sample of group spokesmen to be interviewed was selected from a universe of 175 groups whose spokesmen had presented eight or more testimonies during the sixteen-year period, 1945-60. These 175 groups were part of the second universe of 428 groups that was constructed during the first complete examination of all the hearings of the selected committees. A stratified sample of fifty groups was selected from the 175-group universe. The percentage of groups of each type in the sample, such as Agriculture groups, was determined by the percentage that the total number of groups of each type was of the total universe of 175 groups. The distribution of groups in the sample according to type is presented in

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(June, 1965), 350. Grumm's computer program is designed for the IBM 650 computer and cannot handle more than 115 variables.

Table 8.

TABLE 8

GROUP REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED
CLASSIFIED BY TYPE

Type of Group	Number of Groups
Business	13
Financial Business . . .	4
Agricultural Business . .	3
Agriculture	4
Professional	5
Labor	5
Citizen	2
Religious	3
Veterans	2
Small Business	1
Total	42

Each of the forty-two interviewees was assured that the information provided by him would not be attributed to him or to the group by whom he was employed. The leaders of three groups refused to be interviewed, the Washington representatives of two groups could not be located, and one representative was out of town during the entire interview period.

The numbers of respondents for most types of groups are so small that no statistical tests can be performed with the data obtained. It is important to recall, however, that these groups are a sample of the groups that were most active in presenting pro or con testimony during this period.

Certain combinations of types of groups could

be made to provide larger numbers of groups for a smaller number of types. The discussion in later chapters, however, suggests that the obvious combinations, such as the classification of Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business groups with general Business groups would have introduced distortions in the single Business category and would at the same time have obscured some worthwhile distinctions among business groups. The data from the interviews that are discussed in later chapters are not ordered and analyzed solely on the basis of type of group. Certain analyses search the data provided by all group spokesmen without regard to type of group. The interviews ranged in length from twenty to ninety-five minutes. The mean length was approximately fifty minutes.

TABLE 9

FINAL UNIVERSE OF INTEREST GROUPS
FOR CLUSTER ANALYSIS

Business Groups
- American Hotel Association
- American Merchant Marine Institute
- American Mining Congress
- American Paper & Pulp Association
- American Retail Federation
- American Tariff League
- American Transit Association
- American Truckers Association
- American Waterways Operators
- Associated General Contractors of America
- Association of American Railroads
- Council of State Chambers of Commerce
- Independent Petroleum Association of America
- Manufacturing Chemists Association
- National Apartment Owners Association
- National Association of Home Builders
- National Association of Manufacturers
- National Association of Real Estate Boards
- National Association of Retail Druggists
- National Association of Retail Grocers
- National Automobile Dealers Association
- National Coal Association
- National Cotton Compress and Cotton Warehouse Association, Inc.
- National Council of American Importers
- National Editorial Association
- National Foreign Trade Council
- National Metal Trades Association
- National Retail Furniture Association
- National Retail Hardware Association
- National Retail Merchants Association
- Nationwide Committee for Import-Export Policy
- Pacific American Steamship Association
- Rubber Manufacturer's Association
- Southern States Industrial Council
- U. S. Chamber of Commerce
- U. S. Independent Telephone Association
- U. S. Wholesale Grocer's Association

Financial Business Groups
- American Bankers Association
- American Life Convention
- Life Insurance Association of America
- Mortgage Bankers Association of America
- National Savings and Loan League
- U. S. Savings and Loan League

TABLE 9--Continued

Agricultural Business Groups
- American Butter Institute
- American Cotton Manufacturing Institute
- Dairy Industry Committee
- Millers National Federation
- National Association of Wool Manufacturers
- National Canners Association
- National Cotton Council
- National Lumber Manufacturers Association
- United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association
- Western State Meatpackers Association

Agriculture Groups
- American Farm Bureau Federation
- American National Cattleman's Association
- Cooperative League of the U. S. A.
- National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
- National Creameries Association
- National Farmers Union
- National Grange
- National Milk Producers Federation
- National Wool Growers Association
- Vegetable Growers Association

Labor Groups
- Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
- Amalgamated Meatcutters & Butcher Workers
- American Federation of Labor
- American Federation of Teachers
- Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
- Communication Workers of America
- Congress of Industrial Organizations
- International Association of Machinists
- International Ladies Garment Workers Union
- International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union
- National Women's Trade Union League
- Textile Workers Union of America
- United Automobile Workers
- United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
- United Mine Workers
- United Steelworkers of America

Small Business Groups
- National Federation of Independent Business
- National Small Businessmen's Association

TABLE 9--Continued

Citizen Groups
- American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
- American Council on Human Rights
- American Parents Committee
- Americans for Democratic Action
- Committee for Constitutional Government
- Consumers Union of the U. S.
- General Federation of Women's Clubs
- League of Women Voters
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
- National Association of Consumers
- National Child Labor Committee
- National Congress of Parents and Teachers
- National Consumers League
- National Economic Council
- National Housing Conference
- National Labor-Management Council on Foreign Trade Council
- People's Lobby

Professional Groups
- American Association of Social Workers
- American Association of University Women
- American Municipal Association
- American Public Welfare Association
- National Association of Social Workers
- National Education Association
- National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs
- National Federation of Settlements
- U. S. Conference of Mayors

Religious Groups
- Council for Social Action, Congregational Church
- Friends Committee on National Legislation
- National Catholic Welfare Conference
- National Conference of Catholic Charities
- National Council of Churches
- YWCA, National Council

Veterans Groups
- American Legion
- American Veterans Committee
- American Veterans of World I and II, and Korea
- Jewish War Veterans
- Veterans of Foreign Wars

TABLE 10

THE SUBJECTS OF HEARINGS ON WHICH GROUP SPOKESMEN TESTIFIED

First Round

- Amend the Constitution Relative to Equal Rights for Women
- Amend Minimum Wage Act
- Cooperative Housing
- Defense Production Act
- Defense Production Act
- Fair Employment Practices Commission
- Fair Labor Standards Act
- Federal Aid to States for School Construction[a]
- Further Participation in UNNRRA
- General Housing
- Hospital, Nursing Home & Surgical Benefits
- Housing Act
- Housing Amendments
- Labor-Management Relations Act
- Membership and Participation by the U. S. in ITO
- Minimum Wage
- Minimum Wage
- Minimum Wage
- Minimum Wage
- National Labor Relations Act
- Oleomargarine Tax Repeal
- Oleomargarine Tax Repeal
- Organization for Trade Cooperation
- Price Controls
- Public School Assistance Act[a]
- Reciprocal Trade
- Reciprocal Trade
- Reciprocal Trade
- Reciprocal Trade
- Reciprocal Trade
- Regulating Recovery of Portal to Portal Pay
- Renewal of Trade Agreements
- Social Security Act Amendments
- Social Security Act Amendments
- Social Security Legislation
- Trade Agreements
- Unemployment Compensation

[a]Hearing focused on an <u>issue</u>. Hearings that focused on <u>bills</u> are unmarked.

TABLE 10--Continued

Second Round
- Admission of 400,000 DP's into the U. S.
- Bretton Woods Agreements
- Commission on Legal Status of Women[a]
- Emergency Home Ownership Act
- Equal Pay for Equal Work for Women
- Excess Profits Tax on Corporations[a]
- Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program
- Extension of Rent Control
- Extension of Rent Control
- Full Employment Act
- General Revenue Revision
- Government in Business
- Housing Act
- Housing Stabilization Act
- Labor Education Extension Service
- Labor Extension Act
- Labor-Management Reform Legislation
- Legislation to Relieve Unemployment
- Limiting the Time for Bringing Certain Actions Under U. S. Laws
- Local Public Health Units
- Juvenile Delinquency, Prevention and Control[a]
- Natural Gas Act
- Reorganization Plan 27
- Revenue Revision[a]
- St. Lawrence Seaway
- Scholarship and Loan Program
- Suspension of Federal Grading of Lamb and Mutton
- Trip Leasing
- Unemployment Compensation Act of 1945
- U. S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program
- Universal Military Training

Third Round
- Advertising Alcoholic Beverages
- Advertising Alcoholic Beverages
- Amendments to Antidumping Act
- Amendment to Federal Trade Commission Act
- Amendments to National Labor Relations Act
- Application of Anti-Trust Laws
- Area Redevelopment Act
- Civil Rights
- Civil Rights[a]
- Civil Rights[a]
- Community Facilities Act
- Compulsory Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products
- Customs Simplification

[a]Hearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked.

TABLE 10--Continued

Third Round--Continued
- Customs Simplification Act
- Defense Housing and Community Facilities
- Defense Production Act Amendments
- Emergency Extension of Federal Unemployment Compensation Benefits
- Equal Pay Equal Work for Women
- Excess Profits Tax Extention[a]
- Extension of Emergency Price Control and Stabilization Act
- Extension of Public Law 480
- Extension of Rent Controls
- Fair Trade
- Farm Labor
- Federal Grants to States for Education[a]
- Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
- Foreign Investment Incentive Act
- General Farm Program[a]
- General Revenue Revision '53[a]
- General Revenue Revision '53[a]
- Great Lakes--St. Lawrence Basin
- Highway Revenue Act
- Highway Trust Fund and Federal Aid Highway Financing Program[a]
- Hospital Construction Act
- Housing Act
- Housing Amendments
- Housing Act '56[a]
- Housing and Rent Control
- India Emergency Assistance Act
- Individual Retirement Act
- International Organizations and Movements[a]
- International Organizations and Movements[a]
- International Technical Cooperation Act
- Interstate Commerce Act
- Legislation to Relieve Unemployed
- Library Service in Rural Areas
- Longshoremen's Harbor Workers Compensation Act
- Meatpackers
- Mexican Farm Labor
- Mexican Farm Labor
- Minimum Resale Prices
- Mutual Security Act[a]
- Mutual Security Act[a]
- Mutual Security Act[a]
- National Forest Mining Claims
- National Forests: Multiple Use

[a]Hearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked.

TABLE 10--Continued

Third Round--Continued
- Natural Gas Act
- Passenger Train Service
- Postal Rate Revision
- Postal Rate Revision
- Pre-merger Notification
- Public Assistance Titles of Social Security Act
- Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
- Readjustment Benefits for Individuals Entering Services after 1955
- Reorganization Plans No.'s 1, 2, 3
- St. Lawrence Seaway
- Social Security Act Amendments
- Study of Monopoly Power
- Surface Transportation
- To Seek Development of the U. N. into a World Federation
- Transportation Diversification[a]
- Trip Leasing
- Unemployment Insurance
- Unemployment Insurance
- Universal Military Training
- Veterans Housing in Rural Areas[a]

[a]Hearing focused on an issue. Hearings that focused on bills are unmarked.

CHAPTER IV

TWO KINDS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS

The identification and assessment of relationships between groups is the primary concern of this investigation. The most frequently researched relationships reported in the literature on interest groups are the cooperative ventures among group leaders directed toward common legislative goals. To explore this dimension of intergroup relations, interview data were obtained from spokesmen for groups in Washington concerning factors that promote cooperation among groups, as well as the frequency and types of cooperative practices used by group leaders.

There are few studies of interest groups that report in detail the cooperative relationships between interest groups beyond one decision-making event, such as the passage of a bill. Several factors help to explain the dearth of information on this subject. First, this information is not readily accessible to social scientists. Interest group leaders and members may not want to disclose either the methods of relating their group to others or the groups to which they relate themselves. Second, the design and execution of this kind of research

seems to be especially difficult because many of these cooperative relationships are not formalized and may be present in unrecognizable forms, or the relationships may exist in different forms at different times. Third, the relationships between groups have seemed less vital than an exploration of the relation of groups to Congress and administrative agencies. Fourth, many group leaders, political observers and researchers perceive relations among group leaders as persisting only for the duration of a specific decision-making event, after which there is either a cessation of cooperative relations by the group or a change in the alignment of the groups for the attainment of a different objective. Thus, there do not seem to be many opportunities for systematic research to obtain general findings that would have validity for groups over a long period of time.

Frequency of Cooperation Among Interest Groups

Representatives of forty-two national groups with offices in Washington were interviewed concerning cooperation among groups. Each group spokesman was asked orally in an open-ended question to state the number of instances on which his group had cooperated with other groups during the current session of Congress, the second session of the Eighty-seventh Congress. This question was asked near the end of the interview after each respondent had completed the questionnaires on types of cooperation and factors

that promote cooperation among groups. Most of the forty respondents who replied stated a specific number of cooperative projects or a numerical range, such as "fifteen to twenty times"; a few stated their responses in non-numerical terms such as "on many occasions," or "a few."

It is significant that none of the forty respondents denied that his group cooperated with other groups during the current session or that the cooperation in which they were involved was an exception from their behavior in other sessions. Table 11 contains the responses of the interviewees classified by frequency of cooperation for groups organized by types. The numerical categories used to classify the responses were established to show the general distribution of responses. The numbers in the table that state the frequency of cooperation by each group should not be stressed because some respondents could not recall precisely how many instances of cooperation had occurred. Therefore, no great weight should be placed on the fact that three respondents reported their groups cooperated only once or that nine additional respondents cooperated from two to five times.

Another reason for minimizing numerical comparisons among groups is that the groups represented by some respondents devote their attention and energies for an entire session, or even several sessions, to a few or just one legislative subject. The single subject on

TABLE 11

FREQUENCY OF COOPERATION ON LEGISLATIVE SUBJECTS REPORTED BY FORTY GROUP SPOKESMEN

Type of Group	Frequency of Cooperation			
	Once	Two to Five Times	Six to Nine Times	Ten or More Times
Business (12)[a]	0	4	4	4
Financial Business (3)	1	0	1	1
Agricultural Business (3)	0	1	0	2
Small Business (1)	0	0	1	0
Labor (5)	0	0	2	3
Agriculture (4)	0	1	0	3
Professional (5)	0	0	2	3
Citizens (2)	0	1	0	1
Religious (3)	0	2	1	0
Veterans (2)	2	0	0	0
Totals	3	9	11	17

[a]The total number of groups of a type.

which a group cooperates with others may be a subject that involves periodic intergroup cooperative activity for months or even years. It is also true that for a given session a group may have few or many legislative subjects in which it is interested. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that groups of seven different types cooperated ten

or more times during this session of Congress. The most important conclusion from these data is that cooperation among groups is a common experience for all the group representatives who were interviewed.

The respondents were also asked orally to indicate whether the group they represented tended to cooperate with the same groups repeatedly or to cooperate with different groups on different legislative subjects. Thirty-four of the thirty-nine respondents who replied stated they tended to cooperate with the same groups or the same "core of groups" repeatedly. Only five respondents stated they cooperated with different groups on different legislative subjects or said they "did not necessarily" cooperate with the same groups.

Types of Cooperation Most Frequently Practiced by Interest Groups

Each of the group spokesmen who was interviewed was asked to complete the following written questionnaire.

> Score each of the following types of cooperation according to the extent to which each is practiced by your organization in relation to other organizations. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided.
>
> Frequently practiced - 4
> Occasionally practiced - 3
> Rarely practiced - 2
> Never practiced - 1
>
> __A. Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill.
> __B. Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill (or to defeat a

bill) such as contacting "doubtful" Congressmen prior to a vote.

__C. Jointly plan the strategy for passage or defeat of a bill.

__D. Loan, exchange, or share association mailing lists for publicity on a bill.

__E. Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage or defeat of a particular measure.

Add any other types of cooperation not included above and score them.

Table 12 lists these types of cooperation according to the size of the means of the ratings assigned to

TABLE 12

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CERTAIN TYPES OF COOPERATION ARE PRACTICED BY GROUPS

Mean of Respondent's Ratings		
3.55	A	Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill.
3.14	C	Jointly plan the strategy for passage of a bill.
3.05	B	Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill or to defeat it.
2.19	E	Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage of a particular measure.
1.50	D	Loan, exchange, or share association mailing lists for publicity on a bill.

each by respondents. The most frequently practiced type of cooperation is the exchange of information between

associations. The mean of the ratings for this type of cooperation is 3.55 of a possible 4.00. The second most frequently practiced type of cooperation is type C, jointly planning the strategy for passage of a bill, with a mean rating of 3.14. Next, with a mean rating of 3.05, is type B, the division of work to be done among the cooperating groups.

The distribution of ratings by respondents on types A, B, and C stated in Table 13 exhibit a common pattern. For each of these three types of cooperation, the "frequently practiced" rating was used by more interviewees than any other rating. Type E, however, is much less frequently practiced, and type D is rarely practiced.

Table 13 also shows that for each type of cooperation, the overwhelming majority of ratings are in only two of the four rating categories. The smallest percentage of ratings recorded in two rating categories is on type E, 68 per cent. For all four of the remaining types of cooperation, 70 per cent of the ratings are in two rating categories. The ratings for each type of cooperation are concentrated in the two rating categories adjacent to each other. Thus, the over-all mean of ratings by all respondents that has been used above does not conceal an actual wide dispersion between the ratings as it would if the ratings were concentrated in categories adjacent to each other.

TABLE 13

TYPES OF COOPERATION PRACTICED BY RESPONDENTS

Types of Cooperation	Frequency with Which It is Practiced by Numbers of Groups				
	(4's) Never	(3's) Rarely	(2's) Occasionally	(1's) Frequently	Percentage of all ratings that fall into two rating categories
A[a]	1	2	8	21	94%
B	4	8	12	18	71%
C	2	9	12	19	76%
D	23	13	5	1	86%
E	9	18	10	4	68%

[a]Code:
A--Exchange of information between associations.
B--Division of work among groups in connection with bill.
C--Jointly plan the strategy for passage or defeat of a bill.
D--Loan, exchange or share association mailing lists.
E--Help organize or support a temporary committee for legislative action.

The most frequently practiced type of cooperation is type A, the exchange of information between associations, such as information on the supporters and opponents of a particular bill. The representatives of three groups, a Religious group, a Veterans group, and a Professional group, report that their groups rarely or never practice this type of cooperation. But since none of these groups practices any of the other types of cooperation more than rarely, the explanation of these ratings should probably be made in terms of their groups' rejection of nearly all the stated types of cooperation and not in terms of rejection of this specific type. The conclusion concerning the remaining thirty-nine respondents is obvious; they are in close agreement in practicing this type of cooperation occasionally or frequently.

A second type of cooperation that is widely used, type C, involves collective planning by groups of a strategy for passage or defeat of a bill. This type of cooperation seems to require a greater degree of commitment by participating groups to the collective venture than is involved in type A. The joint planning of a strategy suggests the sharing of certain kinds of strategic knowledge that was not necessarily implied in type A. Joint planning may involve compromise: groups may be expected to abandon their approaches in order to build united support for a single plan. The preparation of a joint plan clearly involves a greater degree of integration

among the cooperating groups than the relationship implied in type A. This type of cooperation is widely practiced among groups of almost all types; nearly half of the forty-two groups practice it frequently.

The cooperative action identified as type B consists of the division among groups of work to be done to pass or defeat a bill. This type of cooperation seems to require a much greater degree of integration among the cooperating groups than type A. Each group may be compelled to rely on the good faith and competences of the other groups. The interdependency of the participating groups is pronounced: all groups may be denied the goal if one or a few groups fail to perform adequately. A group that agrees to confine its activities to a particular phase or set of targets in an over-all strategy is, by the design of the cooperative venture, limiting to some extent its control over the outcome. Given the implications of this type of cooperation, it is significant that the mean rating of it is 3.05.

A fourth type of cooperation, type E, consists of helping to organize, or support a temporary organization for mobilizing support for or opposition to a legislative proposal. The mean rating for this type is 2.19; it is rarely practiced. The relationship involved in this type, and implied in the response printed on the questionnaire--"Help organize or support,"--may not require such an extensive commitment as types B and C. A temporary

organization may or may not attempt to adopt a common strategy or divide up work among the cooperating groups. The fact that such an organization is temporary may prevent fears by group leaders that participation would constitute a continuing entanglement that might impair its maneuverability or effectiveness in the future. But the notion of a "committee or organization" does suggest the creation of a formal intermediary structure beyond the informal relating of groups on a leader-to-leader basis. If the existence of the committee is reported by the press or known informally in Washington, it may be perceived by the leaders of other groups and government officials as a deeper more intense commitment than would be true if the cooperation remained informal and unstructured. Also, fears may deter some groups from cooperating because the probable ordering of groups within the committee appears disadvantageous.

Type E has been mentioned frequently in the literature on interest groups as an important mode of relationship among groups. The relatively low frequency with which it is practiced, therefore, is surprising. Ten of the forty-two respondents report their groups never use it and eighteen more rarely practice it. Table 14 shows there is considerable variation in usage by groups of certain types. For example, four of the five Professional groups reported using this type of cooperation with different degrees of frequency.

TABLE 14

RESPONDENTS RATINGS OF COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY: TYPE E

Type of Group	Frequency with Which It is Practiced by Numbers of Groups				
	(1's) Never	(2's) Rarely	(3's) Occasionally	(4's) Frequently	Typal Mean
Business	1	7	3	2	2.46
Financial Business	3	1	0	0	1.25
Agricultural Business	2	1	0	0	1.33
Agriculture	1	1	2	0	2.25
Professional	1	2	1	1	2.40
Labor	0	4	1	0	2.20
Citizen	0	1	1	0	2.50
Religious	1	0	1	1	2.67
Veterans	1	0	1	0	2.00
Small Business	0	1	0	0	2.00

The type of cooperation that is practiced least by the groups, according to these respondents, is type D, the loaning or exchanging of association mailing lists for publicity on a bill. It is not difficult to account for the infrequent practice of this type of cooperation. The mailing lists of an association may be among its most treasured possessions. To loan such lists may also eliminate an important reason other groups have for cooperating with the lending group in the future--access to their members. It is not surprising, therefore, that Table 13 shows that twenty-three groups state they never practice this type of cooperation. Only one group, a Small Business group, reports practicing it frequently, and four other groups, of three different types, practice it rarely.

In summary, these data show that cooperative interaction is common among groups of all types. There are, however, important variations in the frequency with which different types of cooperative activities are practiced. The types of cooperation practiced also vary considerably among the groups of a single type. In general, informal modes of cooperation, such as exchanges of information and joint planning activities are more frequently practiced than more formally structured interactions.

Factors That Promote Cooperation Among Interest Groups

To determine the relative importance of factors that promote cooperation between associations, the spokesman of each group was asked to complete the following written question.

> On the basis of your experience in Washington, evaluate the importance of each of the following factors in promoting cooperation between two or more organizations on a single bill. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided.
>
> Very important factor - 4
> Moderately important factor - 3
> Minor factor - 2
> A factor of no importance - 1
>
> __A. The associations have advanced many of the same or similar legislative objectives for many years.
> __B. The Washington representatives of the associations are personal friends.
> __C. The associations have cooperated with each other on legislative objectives in the past.
> __D. The associations share the same position toward the single bill at hand.
> __E. The associations are drawn together by a third organization that organizes many associations for the support of the single bill at hand.
> __F. The associations can work together as part of an exchange of support (log-rolling) in which Association A helps Association B even though A is not interested in the bill at hand in return for an assurance that Association B will help A at a later time on a bill it wants.

Table 15 contains a frequency count of the ratings by respondents of each factor. Inspection of this table shows that the respondents assign most importance to Factor D: the associations share the same position toward the single bill at hand. The mean rating for this factor is 3.88 of a possible 4.0, an extremely high rating.

TABLE 15

RESPONDENTS RATINGS OF FACTORS
PROMOTING COOPERATION AMONG GROUPS

Factors Promoting Cooperation	(1's) No Importance	(2's) Minor Importance	(3's) Moderate Importance	(4's) Very Importance	Mean Ratings by all Respondents
Factor A	1	2	16	23	3.45
Factor B	3	22	14	3	2.40
Factor C	1	5	21	14	3.07
Factor D	0	0	4	38	3.88
Factor E	7	20	11	4	2.27
Factor F	21	18	2	1	1.59

Code:

A--The associations have advanced many of the same or similar legislative objectives for many years.

B--The Washington representatives of the associations are personal friends.

C--The associations have cooperated with each other on legislative objectives in the past.

D--The associations share the same position toward the single bill at hand.

E--The associations are drawn together by a third organization that organizes many associations for the support of the single bill at hand.

F--The associations can work together as part of an exchange of support (log-rolling).

The uniformly high ratings assigned to Factor D can be interpreted from three related perspectives. First, and most important, the respondents indicate it is the sharing of the same position on a bill that is the most powerful factor in promoting cooperation among groups. This is clear not only from the ratings assigned to Factor D but also from the ratings assigned to Factor A that refers to the sharing of the same objectives in the past. Both of these factors, A and D, were regarded as more important than past cooperation among groups, personal friendship between the representatives of the groups, or other factors.

Second, the range between the mean ratings for Factor D and Factor A indicates that cooperation between groups is preeminently an event of the present. The power of contemporary agreement on policy preferences in promoting cooperation suggests that new groups entering the hearings' process for the first time can probably enter most easily and be integrated into the governmental environment in Washington most quickly if they espouse policy preferences that are in harmony with the existing preferences of several prestigious groups. These data suggest an interesting hypothesis: only new groups that articulate customary policy objectives already supported by prestigious national groups tend to achieve accredited status in the group population and governmental environment easily and quickly. Research is needed to discover

and correlate: (1) how many new groups establish themselves in Washington over a period of years, (2) how much difficulty each has in becoming integrated into the group population and the governmental environment, and (3) what kinds of policy preferences they declare and seek to attain.

Third, although the respondents stressed the present harmony among groups on policy preferences as a factor that promotes cooperation between them, judging from these data the best predictor of future cooperation between groups is the sharing of policy goals in the past. The sharing of policy preferences in the past appears to be a better predictor of intergroup cooperation then past cooperative experience. A comparison of the mean ratings on Factor A and B shows that greater importance in promoting cooperation is assigned by respondents to a history of common policy preferences than a history of cooperation among groups. The study of the patterns of common policy preferences among groups, therefore, seems to be a dimension of intergroup relationships that is more powerful in accounting for the ordering of groups in the population than the physical interactions involved in intergroup collaboration. If the policy preferences of groups remain stable through time, it might help explain the apparent ease with which "temporary coalitions" can be assembled and dissembled. It may also result in a diminution of the importance attributed to them.

That personal relationships are of some importance in group cooperation is shown by the 2.40 mean rating of Factor B. The least important factor in promoting cooperative relations among groups is Factor F, the associations can work together as part of an exchange of support: log-rolling. Only three respondents attributed minor importance to this factor, and half the respondents assigned no importance to it. The evidence is clear: among the most active groups--including groups of many different types--very few regard log-rolling as important in intergroup cooperation. This rating for log-rolling is consistent with the importance assigned to common policy preferences as a factor promoting cooperation.

Factor E, an organization brings many associations together to support a single bill, received a mean rating of 2.27. This factor deserves special comment because it encompasses the formation of temporary or permanent committees to promote cooperative relationships among groups. This rating is unexpectedly low. The literature on interest groups assigns importance to the temporary and institutionalized alliances in the legislative process.[1] The ratings, shown in Table 16, indicate that among groups of certain types, structured relationships are more important than for other types of groups. Religious, Citizens, Veterans and Labor groups regard it

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[1]Riggs, op. cit., p. 43; Milbrath, op. cit., p. 170; Truman, op. cit., p. 364; Blaisdell, op. cit., p. 112-114.

TABLE 16

RESPONDENTS RATINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMAL STRUCTURES IN PROMOTING COOPERATION AMONG GROUPS: TYPE E

Type of Group	(1's) No Importance	(2's) Minor Importance	(3's) Moderate Importance	(4's) Very Important	Typal Mean
Business	1	9	2	1	2.23
Financial Business	3	1	0	0	1.25
Agricultural Business	2	1	0	0	1.33
Agriculture	0	4	0	0	2.00
Professional	1	3	1	0	2.00
Labor	0	2	3	0	2.60
Citizen	0	0	2	0	3.00
Religious	0	0	1	2	3.67
Veterans	0	0	1	1	3.50
Small Business	0	0	1	0	3.00

as moderately important, but for Financial Business, Agricultural Business, Professional and Agriculture groups, it is a factor of minor importance.

Cluster Analyses of Interest Group Relationships

The group population is not an unpredictable swarm of groups struggling with each other. There is no history of intermittent unrestrained conflict among them. Very rarely is evidence reported of scandalous abuse by groups of one another or abuse of law. Yet the group population has no visible structure to govern itself, and no governmental authorities perform duties of surveillance. Given our present knowledge about the relationships between groups it would be easy to understand an environment more chaotic and marked by intergroup upheavals than presently exists. If group coalitions are only sporadically active and relatively small, how are the hundreds of other groups able to accomplish their objectives: What provides the order in the relations among these groups?

This research was designed on the premise that one basic dimension in the relationships among groups is the amount of agreement and disagreement among them in terms of their policy preferences. It was expected that the study of groups in terms of their policy preferences would yield numerous clusters of groups that show little change through time. In the previous section of this chapter,

it was hypothesized that the orderly manner in which groups relate themselves to each other and to government officials can be partly explained in terms of the known and relatively stable policy preferences of the groups. In this section analyses are performed to appraise policy preferences of interest groups at the congressional level.

In the analyses that follow, the statements of national groups presented at House committee hearings were coded as declarations of policy preferences. The record of policy preferences for the 119 groups that were most active in the hearings process during sixteen years is analyzed to identify groups that cluster together in support or opposition to specific policy proposals. The general objectives of the analyses of hearings are: (1) determine if patterns of agreement and disagreement among groups on bills can be identified, (2) assess the stability of these patterns through time, and (3) identify the policy bases of the clusters of groups. The search for clusters is performed on the record of group testimonies for or against bills considered at hearings conducted by fourteen House committees during the years 1945-60. The testimony of each group on each bill was classified as "for" the bill, "against" it, or "ambiguous." In this analysis all ambiguous testimony is excluded from consideration.

The computer program used to analyze the data employs three different cluster techniques developed by

Louis L. McQuitty: Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA), Similarity Analysis (SA), and Elementary Linkage Analysis (ELA).[2] In Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis and Similarity Analysis, groups are classified so that every group in a cluster is more like every other group of that cluster than it is like any group of any other cluster.[3]

The procedure is begun by clustering groups into reciprocal pairs. A reciprocal pair consists of two groups that have more agreements with each other than with any other group. Reciprocal pairs are identified by counting the number of agreements of each group with every other. The result of this exercise is a matrix, 119 variables (groups) by 119 variables, of agreement scores. In the second phase of the procedure, each of the reciprocal pairs is collapsed into a "constructed variable" and a

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[2]The discussion of the techniques is drawn from the following materials: F. Forss, J. M. Hafterson and F. M. Sim, "McQuitty's Methods of Pattern Analysis (MMPA) on the CDC 3600," mimeo, Technical Report 8, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Computer Institute for Social Science Research) February 17, 1964; Louis L. McQuitty, "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. XX, No. 2, (1960) p. 293-303; Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Educational and Psychological Measurement, (Summer, 1957) p. 207-229; Louis L. McQuitty, "A Method of Pattern Analysis for Isolating Typological and Dimensional Constructs," mimeo, Research Report (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command) December, 1955.

[3]McQuitty, "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," op. cit., p. 295.

search is conducted again for new reciprocal pairs. These new reciprocal pairs may consist of a raw variable (one non-paired group) and a constructed variable (a collapsed reciprocal pair) or two constructed variables. This process is continued until: (1) all variables are clustered together, or (2) no variable, raw or constructed, shares any agreement with any other variable.[4]

Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis estimates the number of agreements between any pair of variables on the basis of the smallest number of agreements between any pair of raw variables, one from each set. Similarity Analysis estimates the agreement of a constructed variable with a raw variable by taking the mean of the number of agreements of the groups of which the constructed variable is composed and the number of agreements of the raw variable (one non-paired group).[5] The same procedure is followed in estimating the agreement between constructed variables.

Analysis One

The first analysis was performed on the thirty-seven bills on which twenty or more groups presented testimonies during the period 1945-60. The universe of groups consisted of the 119 groups that testified most

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[4]Forss, et. al., op. cit., p. 7.

[5]Ibid.

frequently for or against legislation during this period. Seven clusters of four groups or more were identified using HSA when the enlargement of the cluster is terminated at an index of 4.0. The largest cluster consists of ten groups, a second cluster consists of five groups, and a third cluster has six members. These are the most important clusters because the index of estimated agreements, hereafter referred to as the "index" or "level," for the three or more members of each is higher than for the four additional clusters identified. The group members of each cluster are listed in Table 17.

TABLE 17

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN ANALYSIS ONE (HSA)[a]

Cluster One (Ten Members)
- 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
- 25L American Federation of Labor
- 25C General Federation of Women's Clubs
- 30C League of Women Voters
- 3P American Association of University Women
- 16R National Council of Jewish Women
- 28F National Farmers Union
- 5R Friends Committee on National Legislation
- 2V American Veterans Committee
- 6V Jewish War Veterans

Cluster Two (Five Members)
- 23 Chamber of Commerce of the United States
- 62 National Retail Merchants Association
- 11A National Cotton Council
- 5 American Hotel Association
- 4F American Farm Bureau Federation

Cluster Three (Six Members)
- 1L Amalgamated Clothing Workers
- 13L International Ladies Garment Workers Union
- 10L International Association of Machinists
- 18L Textile Workers Union of America
- 31L United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
- 19L United Automobile, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

TABLE 17--Continued

Cluster Four (Five Members)
4C Americans for Democratic Action
39C National Consumer's League
26P National Federation of Settlements
8P American Public Welfare Association
2L Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen

Cluster Five (Four Members)
30F National Grange
9 American Paper and Pulp Association
34F National Milk Producers Federation
31 Independent Petroleum Association of America

Cluster Six (Four Members)
75 National Association of Manufacturers
17 American Truckers Association
3A American Textile Manufacturing Institute
45 National Coal Association

Cluster Seven (Four Members)
15 American Tariff League
6F American National Cattlemen's Association
38F National Wool Growers Association
9A National Association of Wool Manufacturers

Cluster Eight (Three Members)
15R Young Women's Christian Association
9R National Council of Churches
36L National Women's Trade Union League

Cluster Nine (Three Members)
43 National Auto Dealers Association
60 National Retail Furniture Association
15A United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association

[a]Clusters enlarged to 4.0 index of agreements.

Tables 18, 19 and 20 show the bills on which all members of each of the clusters with four or more members were unanimous at different stages in the enlargement of the cluster. For example, in Table 18, the three most cohesive members of Cluster One registered unanimity on thirteen bills, but with the addition of a fourth group, the members of the cluster are unanimous on only nine bills.

TABLE 18

BILLS ON WHICH MEMBERS OF CLUSTER ONE ARE AGREED (HSA)[a]

Three-Member Cluster Groups 23L, 25L, and 16R +	Four-Member Cluster 30C +	Five-Member Cluster 3P +	Six-Member Cluster 25C +	Seven-Member Cluster 28F +	Eight-Member Cluster 5R +	Nine-Member Cluster 2V +	Ten-Member Cluster 6V
Price Controls, 1945	X	X	X	X			
General Housing, 1948	X	X					
Housing Act, 1949	X						
Minimum Wage, 1945							
F. E. P. C., 1949							
Minimum Wage, 1955							
Minimum Wage, 1960							
Oleo Tax Repeal, 1948	X	X					
Participation in UNRRA, 1945	X	X	X	X	X		
Reciprocal Trade, 1951	X	X	X	X	X		
Organization for Trade (GATT), 1956	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public School Assistance Act, 1949	X						
Provide Equal Rights, Women, 1945	X	X					
Total agreements among all members	9	6	4	4	3	1	1
Total testimonies by each member	15	14	13	20	8	13	12

[a]Group members are clustered at the 4.0 index level.

TABLE 19

BILLS ON WHICH MEMBERS OF CLUSTER TWO ARE AGREED[a]

Reciprocal Pair: Groups 23 and 62 +	Three-Member Cluster 4F +	Four-Member Cluster 11A +	Five-Member Cluster 5
Price Controls, 1945			
Defense Production Act, 1951			
Defense Production Act, 1952	X	X	
Minimum Wage, 1947	X		
Minimum Wage, 1949	X	X	X
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1953	X	X	
Minimum Wage, 1955	X	X	
Fair Labor Standards Act, 1957	X	X	X
Minimum Wage, 1960	X	X	X
Regulating Portal-to-Portal Pay, 1947			
Reciprocal Trade, 1947			
Reciprocal Trade, 1949			
Reciprocal Trade, 1953			
Renewal of Trade Agreements, 1958	X		
Social Security Legislation, 1958			
Unemployment Compensation, 1959	X		
Total agreements among all members	9	6	3
Total testimonies by each member	11	10	7

[a]Using Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis. Group members are clustered at the 4.0 index level.

TABLE 20

BILLS ON WHICH MEMBERS OF CLUSTER THREE ARE AGREED (HSA)[a]

Reciprocal Pair: Groups 1L and 31L plus	Three-Member Cluster 18L plus	Four-Member Cluster 10L plus	Five-Member Cluster 13L plus	Six-Member Cluster 19L
Minimum Wage, 1945	X	X	X	
Minimum Wage, 1947	X	X	X	
Minimum Wage, 1949				
F. E. P. C., 1949				
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1953	X	X		
Minimum Wage, 1955	X			
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	X			
Social Security Act Amendments, 1949	X	X	X	X
National Labor Relations Act, 1949	X	X		
Provide Equal Rights for Women, 1945				
Total agreements among bloc members	7	5	3	1
Total testimonies by each new bloc member	14	8	7	8

[a]Group members are clustered at the 4.0 index level.

The cluster is an eight-member cluster at the 5.0 level but the members are unanimous on only three bills.[6]

Table 19 contains a list of the bills on which the positions of the members of Cluster Two were unanimous. As a four-member cluster at the 4.0 index level, the members are unanimous on six bills. It is noteworthy that the third member of the cluster agreed with the reciprocal pair on nine of the eleven testimonies its leaders presented, and the fourth member agreed with the three members on six of ten testimonies presented by its spokesmen. Table 20 contains the same kind of information for Cluster Three.

It is important to note that the cohesiveness of each cluster is not based solely on the number of unanimous agreements among all members of the cluster. Figure 1 contains the matrices of agreement scores for the reciprocal pairs in the three most cohesive clusters. These scores are fairly high when assessed in terms of the number of testimonies presented by each group. Figure 2 contains the matrices of disagreements among members of each cluster. The analytic procedures do not incorporate the data on disagreements among groups into their calculations before the index of estimated agreements is computed. The matrix for the groups in Cluster Three

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[6]HSA tends to overestimate the agreements among clusters of three members or more. McQuitty, "Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis," op. cit., p. 298.

FIGURE 1

AGREEMENT SCORES OF PAIRS IN THREE COHESIVE CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN ANALYSIS ONE[a]

Cluster One (ten members)

	23L	25L	16R	30C	28F	3P	25C	5R	2V	6V
23L		27	16	13	17	12	10	7	12	11
25L	27		15	10	12	11	8	5	11	10
16R	16	15		14	11	10	9	6	8	6
30C	13	10	14		12	11	9	6	6	5
28F	17	12	11	12		10	9	7	5	6
3P	12	11	10	11	10		8	5	5	6
25C	10	8	9	9	9	8		7	4	5
5R	7	5	6	6	7	5	7		4	5
2V	12	11	8	6	5	5	4	4		7
6V	11	10	6	5	6	6	5	5	7	
Total Testimonies	32	30	15	14	19	20	13	8	13	12

Cluster Two (five members)

	23	4F	11A	62	5
23		16	8	11	6
4F	16		9	9	6
11A	8	9		6	4
62	11	9	6		5
5	6	6	4	5	
Total Testimonies	27	23	10	11	7

Cluster Three (six members)

	1L	10L	13L	18L	31L	19L
1L		7	7	9	10	6
10L	7		5	7	6	4
13L	7	5		5	6	4
18L	9	7	5		8	4
31L	10	6	6	8		5
19L	6	4	4	4	5	
Total Testimonies	13	8	7	14	16	8

[a]The members of each of these clusters cohere at 4.0 index level.

FIGURE 2

DISAGREEMENT SCORES OF PAIRS IN THREE COHESIVE CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN ANALYSIS ONE

Cluster One (ten members)

	23L	25L	25C	30C	3P	16R	28F	5R	2V	6V
23L		1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
25L	1		1	0	0	0	2	1	0	1
25C	2	1		1	1	1	2	1	0	1
30C	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	0	0
3P	0	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	0
16R	0	0	1	0	0		1	0	0	0
28F	1	2	2	0	0	1		0	0	0
5R	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	0
2V	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
6V	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Cluster Two (five members)

	23	62	4F	11A	5
23		0	3	0	0
62	0		0	0	0
4F	3	0		0	0
11A	0	0	0		0
5	0	0	0	0	

Cluster Three (six members)

	1L	13L	10L	18L	31L	19L
1L		0	0	0	0	0
13L	0		0	0	0	0
10L	0	0		0	0	0
18L	0	0	0		0	0
31L	0	0	0	0		0
19L	0	0	0	0	0	

shows there were no disagreements among any pair of members of the cluster. Only two members of Cluster Two had any disagreements with each other, and for Cluster One, no pair of groups had more than two disagreements, most pairs had none.

Table 21 shows that the members of the three most cohesive clusters identified using HSA are practically

TABLE 21

MEMBERS OF CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED BY
THREE DIFFERENT ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

Cluster One (HSA)	Cluster One (SA)	Cluster One (ELA)	
23L	23L	23L	1V
25L	25L	25L	3V
25C	25C	25C	20R
30C	30C	30C	1L
3P	3P	3P	5L
16R	16R	16R	18L
28F	28F	28F	31L
5R	5R		39C
2V	2V	2V	36P
6V[a]	6V	6V	
	4C	4C	
	26P	26P	
	15R	15R	
	9R[a]	9R	

Cluster Two (HSA)	Cluster Two (SA)	Cluster Two (ELA)	
23	23	23	12
62	62	62	56
4F	4F	4F	71
11A	11A	11A	84
5[a]			6S
	30F		25
	34F		109
	17		1B
	45		
	75	75	
	42C	42C	
	14A	14A	
	3A[a]		

Cluster Three (HSA)	Cluster Three (SA)	Cluster Three (ELA)
1L	1L	30F
13L	13L	34F
10L	10L	7
18L	18L	9
31L	31L	28L
19L[a]	19L	3A
	9L	
	39C[a]	

[a]Clustering was terminated at the 4.0 index level.

Group Code:

A--Agricultural Bus.	F--Agricultural	R--Religious
B--Financial Bus.	L--Labor	S--Small Business
C--Citizen	P--Professional	V--Veterans

No letter--Business

identical with those identified using SA. Since this is true, a detailed discussion of the latter clusters will not be presented. The same groups, with a few exceptions and additions, also are identified using ELA. Elementary Linkage Analysis, as developed in the computer program, does not compute an index of agreements in its clusters. Furthermore, its definition of a cluster is much less satisfactory for this research than HSA and SA. ELA defines a cluster as an aggregation of groups in which each member has its highest number of agreements with some other member or members of the cluster. This explains the larger size of the clusters using ELA.

Figure 3 shows the step-by-step construction of the clusters to the 5.0 level. The figure should be read from the bottom of the graph to the top. The most cohesive pairs and clusters, those with the highest indexes, are linked at the bottom of the figure; the less cohesive pairs and clusters, with smaller indexes, are linked toward the top of the figure. The solid lines in the figure indicate the relation between two groups that are a reciprocal pair; the broken lines indicate the relationships between reciprocal pairs. Where two pairs are joined by a broken line the two pairs have one member in common, and the broken line indicates that the other member of the one pair is an "associate" of the second pair. An "associate" of a reciprocal pair is a group that is more like both of the members of the reciprocal pair

FIGURE 3

ANALYSIS NUMBER ONE HSA; 119 GROUPS--37 BILLS



Each number or number letter symbol on the horizontal axis represents one national interest group.

FIGURE 3

ANALYSIS NUMBER ONE HSA; 119 GROUPS--37 BILLS



Each number or number letter symbol on the horizontal axis represents one national interest group.

than it is like any other pair but it has a smaller number of agreements with members of the pair than the members have with each other. Figure 4 presents a

FIGURE 4

THE ENLARGEMENT OF CLUSTER ONE[a]

Index of Estimated Agreements	
4.0[b]	23L--25L--16R--30C--28F--3P--25C--5R--2V--6V
5.0	23L--25L--16R--30C--28F--3P--25C--5R
8.0	23L--25L--16R--30C--28F--3P--25C
10.0	23L--25L--16R--30C--28F--3P
15.0	23L--25L--16R
27.0	23L--25L

[a]Cluster One as identified by HSA from a matrix of agreement scores among 119 groups on thirty-seven bills.

[b]The distance between the index numbers is not proportionate.

simplified illustration of the enlargement of Cluster One from a reciprocal pair to a ten-member cluster.

Figure 3 shows that the reciprocal pair with the largest number of agreements between them, twenty-seven, is composed of Group 23L, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Group 25L, the American Federation of Labor.[7] One member of this pair, Group 23L, is also a member of a reciprocal pair with Group 16R, the National

[7]These two groups merged in 1955 but for all analyses in this investigation the group identity of each is preserved by crediting to each, all of the testimonies

Council of Jewish Women. The two pairs are joined by a broken line to indicate that the constructed variable, the collapsed pair composed of Groups 23L and 16R, is an associate of the more cohesive pair composed of Groups 23L and 25L. Thus the cluster is composed of three groups with an index of 15.0. At an index of 10.0 it is a six-member cluster. The figure also reveals, in addition to the clusters, eight reciprocal pairs that are not linked to any cluster.

The composition of clusters in terms of the groups of different types is instructive. A hypothesis that the typal classification of groups used in these analyses is a good index to cluster membership is rejected for most types according to the results of HSA. Table 22 indicates the degree to which the groups of each type are members of different clusters. The groups of four types were widely dispersed among several clusters. For example, five clusters had Business groups as members; Labor groups were identified in four clusters, as were Agriculture and Agricultural Business groups. The distribution of the groups in the latter two types are particularly interesting since there were only ten Agriculture groups and ten Agricultural Business groups in the universe.

---

presented by the unified organization, the AFL-CIO, after 1954. This prescription partly explains why this reciprocal pair had a much larger number of agreements than any other pair in the universe.

TABLE 22

GROUP MEMBERS OF CLUSTERS CLASSIFIED BY TYPE (HSA)[a]

Type of Group	Clusters								
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Business		3			2	3	1		2
Financial Business .									
Agricultural Business		1				1	1		1
Agriculture	1	1			2		2		
Professional	1			2					
Labor	2		6	1				1	
Citizens	2			2					
Religious	2							2	
Veterans	2								
Totals	10	5	6	5	4	4	4	3	3

[a]These data are from Analysis One.

It is easier to explain the divergence in policy preferences among the Agricultural Business groups than it is for the other types. The Agricultural Business type was used in this research on the assumption that Agricultural Business groups might exhibit policy preferences that differentiated them from other business groups. The evidence in Table 22 does not support this notion; three of the clusters that have one Agricultural Business group as a member have two Business groups as members. The fact that each of the four Agricultural Business groups is a member of a different cluster strongly suggests that for the study of policy preferences at least, these groups do not constitute a type. The same conclusion seems

justified for Agricultural groups, and to a lesser degree for Business groups. No final judgment can be given on the relationships among groups of a type, however, until separate analyses are examined of the policy preferences for all groups of each type. These analyses are discussed later in this section.

One of the important features of HSA is that the most cohesive pair of a cluster, and all additional groups that become associated with it, are linked by agreement on a particular "set" of bills. It is the agreement of the groups in their positions "for" or "against" these bills as a set that defines the basis of the cluster. The positions taken by the members of each cluster on their set of bills differentiates it from the other clusters and pairs in the universe.

Table 23 lists the bills on which differing numbers of cluster members are agreed. For example, there is only one bill on which all ten members of Cluster One are unanimous, but there are a total of six bills on which eight or more members are agreed. Three of these bills are concerned with trade. Inspection of the remainder of the bills, those on which seven and six cluster members are agreed, shows three additional bills are concerned with trade. The cluster members' positions on the bills in this set constitute the bases of the cluster. Even though the most cohesive pair on which the formation of the cluster is based are the two peak labor

TABLE 23

BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS ARE BASED

Cluster One	Position on Bill	No. of Cluster Members Agreed
Participation in GATT, 1956	For	10
Trade Agreements Act, 1958	For	8
Reciprocal Trade, 1951	For	8
Public School Assistance, 1949	For	8
General Housing, 1948	For	8
Participation in UNRRA, 1945	For	8
Price Controls, 1945	For	7
Participation in I.T.O., 1950	For	7
Trade Agreements, 1955	For	7
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	For	6
Oleomargarine Tax, 1948	For	6
Housing Act, 1949	For	6
Cluster Two		
Minimum Wage, 1949	Against	5
Fair Labor Standards Act, 1957	Against	5
Minimum Wage, 1960	Against	5
Defense Production Act, 1952	Against	4
Labor-Management Relations, 1953	Against	4
Minimum Wage, 1955	Against	4
Social Security, 1958	Against	4
Unemployment Compensation, 1959	Against	4
Minimum Wage, 1947	Against	3
Reciprocal Trade, 1953	Against	3
Trade Agreements, 1958	For	3
Hospital, Surgical Benefits, 1959	Against	3
Cluster Three		
Social Security Amendments, 1949	For	6
Minimum Wage, 1945	For	5
Minimum Wage, 1947	For	5
Minimum Wage, 1949	For	5
National Labor Relations Act, 1949	For	5
Minimum Wage, 1960	For	5
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	For	4
Women's Rights, 1945	Against	4
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1953	Against	4

TABLE 23--Continued

Cluster Four	Position on Bill	No. of Cluster Members Agreed
Fair Labor Standards Act, 1957	For	5
Social Security, 1958	For	5
Minimum Wage, 1960	For	5
Social Security Amendments, 1949	For	4
Minimum Wage, 1955	For	4
Unemployment Compensation, 1959	For	4
Women's Rights, 1945	Against	3
Social Security Amendments, 1945	For	3
Cluster Five		
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	Against	4
Reciprocal Trade, 1947	Against	4
Reciprocal Trade, 1951	Against	4
Minimum Wage, 1945	Against	3
National Labor Relations Act, 1949	Against	3
Participation in I.T.O., 1950	Against	3
Defense Production Act, 1952	Against	3
Cluster Six		
Minimum Wage, 1945	Against	4
Minimum Wage, 1949	Against	4
Portal-to-Portal Pay, 1947	For	3
National Labor Relations Act, 1949	Against	3
Defense Production Act, 1951	Against	3
Defense Production Act, 1952	Against	3
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1953	For	3
Cluster Seven		
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	Against	4
Trade Agreements, 1955	Against	4
Participation in GATT, 1956	Against	4
Trade Agreements, 1958	Against	4

federations, this is definitely not a pro-labor cluster. Its members are in support of expanding trade, federal housing programs, federal aid to education, United States participation in UNRRA and repeal of the tax on oleomargarine.

Cluster Two, as Table 23 indicates, is chiefly an anti-labor cluster. Seven of the twelve bills on which most cluster members are agreed are labor bills. A minor policy feature of this cluster may be termed an anti-welfare dimension; the cluster was opposed to two welfare bills.

Cluster Three is obviously a pro-labor cluster: six of the nine bills on which most cluster members are agreed are labor bills. It is apparent why these groups do not cluster with the groups in Cluster One. The members of Cluster Three support only one trade bill and one welfare bill.

Cluster Four has two policy dimensions of approximately equal importance, a pro-labor stand, and a pro-welfare stand. Cluster Five has a pronounced anti-trade dimension and a minor anti-labor dimension. Cluster Six and Seven are both based on one policy dimension. All seven of the positions taken by the members of Cluster Six are anti-labor, and all four of the positions taken by the members of Cluster Seven are anti-trade.

Hypotheses About Intergroup Relations

Since Analysis One is based on the testimonies by groups on the thirty-seven bills that attracted the most group support or opposition, most of the hypotheses concerning intergroup relationships stated in Chapter II may be tested on these data as well as for the data on

145 bills. Hypotheses VI and VII cannot be tested by the data in Analysis One because the number of bills is insufficient.

Hypothesis I states:

> Given the existence of clusters of interest groups during a time span, the sum of the group members of the clusters does not include the majority of the interest groups in the universe.
>
> Definition: A "cluster" is three or more groups in which every member is more like every other member than it is like any non-member.[8]
>
> Definition: The term "universe" refers to a stipulated number of groups. Universes of different sizes are used in this research. The one most frequently used consists of 119 groups.

This hypothesis is based on the notion that in terms of policy preferences the universe of interest groups at the congressional level is a partially ordered population of groups. Most of the case studies that describe interest group activities on a single bill seem to be relatively small, temporary aggregations. No scholars have reported or postulated that the population of groups can be meaningfully ordered in terms of any one variable. Accordingly, the expectation is that the policy preferences expressed by group spokesmen at hearings do not order a majority of the interest groups in the universe.

Table 21, page 192, shows the enlargement of the clusters by the addition of new members to an index of 4.0. The table indicates that at the 4.0 level, less than half

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[8]See pages 182 and 183 in this chapter for an explanation of clustering procedures.

of the 119 groups in the universe are members of clusters. The largest number of groups clustered by the analytic techniques is forty-three using ELA.

The problem of assessing the data in terms of this hypothesis is a result of the fact that each of the analytic techniques clusters variables until nearly every variable is clustered. Thus, the techniques are designed to continue to cluster variables to a very low level of agreement. There is no cut-off procedure developed as a part of the technique to indicate an index of agreements beyond which the relations among variables in the cluster are no longer significant. In this research the 4.0 level was adopted as the termination point for the enlargement of clusters. At this level the number of agreements among groups linked into clusters is large enough to permit more adequately supported generalizations about the policy preferences that are characteristic of the cluster members than at lower indexes. Clusters at this level also show more adequately the policy preferences on which clusters disagree than would a lower index.

Some of the clusters gain additional members, and other clusters are joined together, when the clustering is continued to the lowest level possible. Using HSA six of the nine clusters identified originally maintained their identity at the 2.0 level. Table 24 shows the number of groups in each cluster and the group type of each member when each cluster is enlarged to its maximum size using

TABLE 24

CLUSTERS OF GROUPS IDENTIFIED AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF COHESION (HSA)

Cluster One (1.0)	Cluster Two (1.0)	Cluster Three (1.0)	Cluster Six (2.0)	Cluster Five (1.0)	Cluster Eight (2.0)
23L	23	1L	75	34F	15R
25L	62	13L	17	30F	9R
16R	11A	10L	3A	9	36L
30C	4F	18L	45	45C	8R
28F	5	31L	10A	31	
3P	6	19L	6A	33	
25C	12	2L	20	108	
5R	16	9L			
2V	19	14L			
6V	60	21L			
78	61	4C			
36P	22F	32C			
	42F	39C			
	16A	8P			
	43	26P			
Total Groups 13 +	15 +	15 +	7 +	7 +	4 = 61

Code:

A--Agricultural Business
B--Financial Business
C--Citizen
F--Agricultural
P--Professional
R--Religious
S--Small Business
V--Veterans
No letter--Business

HSA. For four of the clusters in the table, the index is 1.0 agreement. This means that using HSA it was estimated that each cluster had one agreement on which all members were agreed. The fifth cluster receives its last member at the 2.0 level. Several new clusters, not identified at the 4.0 level, emerge at the 1.0 level. There is little point in stressing the clusters formed at these levels for this research, however, since the basis of the clustering is insignificant when compared to the significant distinctions among members that are obscured at such low indexes. Similarity Analysis goes even further since it estimates the agreements among groups using the means of constructed variables. Therefore, the final cluster calculated by SA is a cluster that includes every group in the 119-group universe. The index is 0.257 agreements.

Table 24 shows that for Analysis One, using HSA to the 1.0 level, the combined membership of the most cohesive six clusters is sixty-one groups. This number is two groups more than half of the groups in the universe. Thus, the enlargement of the most cohesive clusters must proceed to a level where there is very low cohesion before 50 per cent of the groups in the universe are included in clusters.

Hypothesis I, that the combined group members of the clusters do not include the majority of the groups in the universe, can be affirmed only if the level of agreement among cluster members is not regarded as a

significant variable. As soon as it is recognized that the utility of the "cluster" concept depends on the distinction between significant and insignificant cohesion, the hypothesis is rejected. It is not necessary to stipulate the precise index at which the significant clustering ends. If a moderate level of cohesion among groups is stipulated for the analysis, such as an index of 5.0, most groups in the universe of national interest groups will not be clustered.

Hypothesis II states:

> The group composition of a cluster in the first phase, T_1, of a time span will be the same for a succeeding phase, T_2, of the time span.
>
> Definition: The time span, "T_1, T_2" may be varied from a term of Congress to the entire sixteen-year period under investigation.

Since Analysis One includes only thirty-seven bills for the sixteen-year period, this hypothesis can be tested only for the entire period. A change in the membership of a cluster is measured by the addition or departure of cluster members, or both, and by a change in the number of testimonies each member of a cluster presented in each of the two phases, T_1 and T_2. It is assumed that each cluster member must have opportunities to be active on approximately the same number of bills in the earlier phase, T_1, as in the later phase, T_2. To meet this assumption it was necessary to make T_1 and T_2 different for each cluster. For example, for Cluster One the first phase, T_1, is five years, 1945-9, during which

fifteen hearings were held; and the later phase, T_2, is ten years, 1950-60, during which twelve hearings were held. It is impossible to divide the time span to provide a more equal division of hearings without dividing the hearings that occurred within the year 1949; seven hearings were held in 1949. For Cluster Two, T_1 is eleven years, 1945-55 and T_2 is five years, 1955-60.

Table 25 contains the number of cluster members that testified on each bill on which each of the three major clusters was active in T_1 and T_2. A comparison of the numbers of cluster members testifying at the hearings in T_1 and T_2 shows that there may have been some small change in the size of Clusters One and Three. In T_2 at one hearing, ten members of Cluster One testified; therefore, Cluster One may have been larger in T_2 than in T_1. Also, five members of Cluster Three testified on bills in T_2 but no more than four members of the cluster testified at any hearing in T_1.

Table 26 lists the number of testimonies presented by each member of each cluster for T_1 and T_2. Every member of each cluster testified at least once in each of the two periods. Only one group in Cluster Two, Group 5, the American Hotel Association, testified only once in either T_1 or T_2. It is apparent that if two separate cluster analyses were performed on the testimonies of the 119 groups presented in T_1 and T_2, that groups testifying only once with the cluster in T_1 or T_2 would not be

TABLE 25

A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF GROUPS THAT TESTIFIED IN ACTIVE CLUSTERS IN TWO CONSECUTIVE PERIODS[a]

Cluster One				Cluster Two				Cluster Three			
Bill No.	T_1 1945-49	Bill No.	T_2[b] 1950-60	Bill No.	T_1 1945-55	Bill No.	T_2 1956-60	Bill No.	T_1 1945-48	Bill No.	T_2 1949-60
1[c]	7	10	7	1[c]	3	7	5	1[c]	3	5	5
2	8	11	8	2	5	8	3	2	4	6	5
3	6	12	5	3	4	9	4	3	3	7	4
4	8	13	7	4	4	10	3	4	4	8	5
5	6	14	10	5	3	11	4				
6	6	15	5	6	4	12	5				
7	5	16	8								
8	5										
9	8										

[a]A cluster is "active" at a hearing if half of its members, but at least a minimum of three members, take the same position either for or against the bill at hand and no member of the cluster disagrees.

[b]T_1 and T_2 are defined so as to provide as nearly equal numbers of hearings when the cluster was active as possible for the two consecutive periods.

[c]The bills are numbered from one for each cluster but they are not necessarily the same bills. The purpose here is to show the number of cluster members testifying on each bill on which the cluster was active.

TABLE 26

A COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF TESTIMONIES BY EACH CLUSTER MEMBER IN TWO CONSECUTIVE PERIODS

Cluster One			Cluster Two			Cluster Three		
Group	T_1	T_2	Group	T_1	T_2	Group	T_1	T_2
23L	9	6	23	6	6	1L	4	4
25L	7	5	4F	6	5	31L	4	4
16L	9	4	62	5	5	18L	3	4
28F	6	5	11A	5	3	10L	2	5
2V	4	4	5	1	5	13L	3	3
6V	4	5				19L	2	4
3P	5	6						
30C	8	4						
25C	5	6						
5R	2	5						
Hearings at which cluster was active[a]			Hearings at which cluster was active[a]			Hearings at which cluster was active[a]		
	9	7		6	6		4	5

[a]A cluster is "active" at a hearing if half of its members, but at least a minimum of three members, takes the same position either for or against the bill at hand and no member of the cluster disagrees.

clustered by HSA except at a very low index.[9]

[9]Of course, it impossible to assert that other groups in the universe would not have been clustered on these newly defined sets of bills.

Using a criterion of three testimonies or more as an estimate of significant agreement with a cluster, Table 26 indicates that one group each in Clusters One and Two, 5R, Friends Committee on National Legislation and 5, the American Hotel Association, do not become members of their clusters until T_2. The number of their agreements with the clusters increased from two and one respectively in T_1 to five each in T_2. For Cluster Three two groups, 10L, the International Association of Machinists and 19L, the United Automobile, Agriculture Implement Workers Union, testified only twice in T_1 although they testified five and four times respectively in T_2.

In summary, Hypothesis II is rejected for each of the three major clusters. Clusters One and Two each gained one member in T_2 over the membership they had in T_1, and Cluster Three gained two members in T_2, although the total numbers of bills on which each of the clusters was active in T_1 and T_2 were not large.

Hypothesis III states:

> If two or more interest groups enroll individuals as members from the same interest clientele, these groups do not all become members of the same cluster.
>
> Definition: The term "interest clientele" refers to the aggregation of individuals that share a concern for one of the following types of subjects according to which all the interest groups in the study are classified: Business, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, Labor, Agriculture, Veterans, Professions, Citizens, Religious, Small Business.

The hypothesis is based on the notion that there is a limited amount of "life space" available for organized groups that serve the same clientele and articulate the same policy preferences. The expectation is that a second, third, or ...nth group will seek to distinguish its record of service to its members and to potential members in the clientele including, to some degree, its policy preferences, from the record of competing groups. The leaders and members of organized groups often tend to justify the existence of their organization on grounds that it performs unique services or proposes different solutions for the problems of the clientele it seeks to enroll.

Table 27 contains a list of groups that were identified by HSA as members of one of nine clusters with a 4.0 index. The table contains six sets of groups that, to some extent at least, attempt to enroll members from the same clienteles. Perhaps the most striking feature of this list is the small number of competitive sets. According to this listing, most groups that are cluster members are not faced with a competing group. Twenty-six of the forty-four groups in clusters have no groups competing with them for members.

Table 27 shows that the major Agricultural groups are members of different clusters. The American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Farmers Union, the National Grange and the American National Cattlemen's Association

TABLE 27

CLUSTER MEMBERS THAT SERVE THE SAME CLIENTELE

	Member of Cluster
Set One	
American Farm Bureau Federation	II
National Grange	V
National Farmers Union	I
American National Cattlemen's Association . .	VII
Set Two	
Chamber of Commerce of the United States . .	II
National Association of Manufacturers	VI
American Tariff League	VII
Set Three	
American Federation of Labor	I
Congress of Industrial Organizations	II
Set Four	
International Ladies Garment Workers Union .	III
Textile Workers Union of America	III
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America . . .	III
Set Five	
General Federation of Women's Clubs	I
League of Women Voters	I
American Association of University Women . .	I
Set Six	
American Veterans Committee	I
Jewish War Veterans	I

are all members of different clusters. The Business groups listed in Set 2 are also widely dispersed. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Tariff League are members of three different clusters.

On the other hand, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations constitute the reciprocal pair of Cluster One with the highest index, 27.0, of any pair in the universe. Also, three

international unions that appear to compete to some degree with each other; the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Textile Workers Union of America, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America belong to the same cluster. Furthermore, the groups listed in Sets 5 and 6 are all members of Cluster One.

Although a more complete assessment is made later in this chapter using the data of 145 bills instead of the thirty-seven used in Analysis One, the evidence for Analysis One is inconsistent when the entire universe of 119 groups is surveyed. For groups of particular types, however, the findings are less ambiguous. The hypothesis is confirmed for Agricultural and the general Business groups listed in Sets One and Two; it is rejected for Labor and women's Citizen groups, Sets Three through Five. A judgment concerning Veterans groups would be premature since the three groups with the largest memberships are not identified with any cluster using HSA in Analysis One.

Hypothesis IV states:

> When two or more clusters are opposed to each other they do not oppose one another on bills from more than one policy category.

> Definition: The term "policy category" refers to the unit of classification that is used to classify all bills considered in the study. The classification system has ten policy categories.

> Definition: One cluster is "opposed" to another cluster when half of the members of the cluster, but at least three members, take a position on a bill that is opposed by half of the members, but at least three members of another cluster; and neither cluster has any members that disagree with the position taken by these group members.

This hypothesis is based on the premise that intergroup cooperation and conflict occurs on a bill-by-bill basis. Therefore, when cleavages occur among aggregations of groups during a time span, these aggregations will be found opposed only on bills of one policy category. It is expected that when different lines of cleavage develop among groups in the population, they intersect with each other. Thus the division among groups within the universe on bills in one policy category does not coincide with the division of groups on bills in a second, third, or ...nth policy category.

The assessment of Hypothesis IV requires that the extent to which clusters are opposed to one another be determined. Figure 5 contains a matrix in which the cells

FIGURE 5

NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLUSTERS

Cluster	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	Total Conflicts of Each Cluster
I		1	0	0	4	1	4	10
II	1		4	5	0	0	1	10
III	0	4		0	2	4	1	11
IV	0	5	0		0	0	0	5
V	4	0	2	0		0	0	6
VI	1	0	4	0	0		0	5
VII	4	1	1	0	0	0		6

indicate the number of bills on which conflict occurs between pairs of clusters with four members. The matrix shows that Clusters One, Two, and Three are involved in the most conflicts, ten, ten, and eleven respectively.

A count of the cells in which two or more conflicts are recorded reveals there are six cases in which Hypothesis IV may be tested. Table 28 shows the bills on which

TABLE 28

BILLS ON WHICH CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLUSTERS OCCURRED: ANALYSIS ONE (HSA)

Cluster	vs. Cluster	Bills
I	II	Defense Production Act, 1952
I	V	Defense Production Act, 1952
I	VI	Defense Production Act, 1952
I	V	Participation in ITO, 1950
I	V	Reciprocal Trade, 1945
I	VII	Reciprocal Trade, 1945
I	V	Reciprocal Trade, 1951
I	VII	Trade Agreements, 1955
I	VII	GATT, 1956
I	VII	Trade Agreements, 1958
II	III	Minimum Wage, 1947
II	III	Minimum Wage, 1949
II	III	Labor-Management Relations, 1953
II	IV	Minimum Wage, 1955
II	IV	Fair Labor Standards, 1957
II	III	Minimum Wage, 1960
II	IV	Minimum Wage, 1960
II	VII	Trade Agreements, 1958
II	IV	Social Security, 1958
II	IV	Unemployment Compensation, 1959
III	VI	Minimum Wage, 1945
III	VI	Minimum Wage, 1949
III	VI	Labor-Management Relations, 1953
III	V	Reciprocal Trade, 1945
III	VII	Reciprocal Trade, 1945
III	V	National Labor Relations Act, 1949
III	VII	National Labor Relations Act, 1949
IV	None	
V	None	
VI	None	
VII	None	

conflicts occurred and the cluster antagonists. Inspection of the table discloses that most of the multiple

conflicts between two clusters involve bills from one policy category. For example, Cluster II has four conflicts with Cluster III but each of these conflicts concerns a labor bill. It is also striking that twenty-six of the twenty-seven conflicts listed in the table constitute bills from only three policy categories: labor, trade, and defense.

The table shows there are three pairs of clusters in opposition whose members are opposed on bills from two different policy categories. No pairs of clusters are opposed on bills from more than two policy categories. The clusters in conflict on bills from more than one policy category are involved in many conflicts. The matrix in Figure 5, referred to earlier, shows each cluster had at least four conflicts with other clusters and three of them had seven or more. There were seventeen possibilities for conflicts between clusters on bills from two or more policy categories; conflicts occurred in only three instances. Thus, multiple policy conflicts between two clusters constitute a small portion of the total number of conflicts to which a cluster is a party. On this basis Hypotheses IV is affirmed; many more inter-cluster conflicts involve bills from only one policy category than bills from two policy categories. If a more rigorous testing of the hypothesis is called for, the hypothesis is rejected since in three intercluster conflicts, the antagonists were opposed on bills from two

policy categories.

Hypothesis V states:

When two or more clusters exist, on some bills no cluster will be active.

Definition: An "active cluster" is one in which at least half of the members, but at least three members, take the same position either for or against the bill at hand, and no member of the cluster disagrees.

Definition: Several universes of bills of different size are used in this research. The term "some bills" means one or more bills in the universe of bills under study.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption often implied in discussions of national interest groups that group alliances are usually temporary and that the stable relationships among groups are not highly developed. It is consistent with the notion that the hearings activities of most groups are generally limited to bills in a few policy categories. Broadly conceived this hypothesis is directed toward the discovery of the frequency of cluster activity on the bills that attracted the testimony of groups most frequently.

Table 29 lists the bills on which different degrees of cluster activity occurred. The table shows that on three of the thirty-seven bills, no clusters were active. One cluster was active on fifteen bills and two clusters were active on an additional twelve bills. The hypothesis is confirmed but the finding is striking: on approximately 92 per cent of the bills, one or more clusters were active. Thus, the bills that

TABLE 29

CLUSTER ACTIVITY
ON THIRTY-SEVEN MAJOR BILLS

Bills on Which no Cluster Was Active
- Housing Amendments, 1949
- Cooperative Housing, 1950
- Oleomargarine Tax Repeal, 1949

Bills on Which One Cluster Was Active
- Reciprocal Trade, 1947
- Reciprocal Trade, 1949
- Reciprocal Trade, 1953
- Public School Assistance Act, 1949
- Social Security Amendments, 1954
- Federal Aid to Public Schools, 1957
- Hospital, Surgical Benefits, 1959
- General Housing, 1948
- Housing, 1949
- Price Controls, 1947
- Defense Production Act, 1951
- Fair Employment Practices Act, 1949
- Portal-to-Portal Pay, 1947
- Oleomargarine Tax Repeal, 1948
- UNRRA, 1945

Bills on Which Two Clusters Were Active
- Minimum Wage, 1945
- Minimum Wage, 1947
- Minimum Wage, 1955
- Fair Labor Standards, 1957
- Unemployment Compensation, 1959
- Participation in ITO, 1950
- Reciprocal Trade, 1951
- Trade Agreements, 1955
- Participation in GATT, 1956
- Women's Rights, 1945
- Social Security Amendments, 1949
- Social Security, 1958

Bills on Which Three Clusters Were Active
- Minimum Wage, 1949
- National Labor Relations Act, 1949
- Labor-Management Relations, 1953
- Minimum Wage, 1960
- Trade Agreements, 1958

Bills on Which Four Clusters Were Active
- Defense Production Act, 1952
- Reciprocal Trade, 1945

attract the most testimony of groups nearly always attract one or more of these aggregations of groups. This indicates a greater degree of structure in the testimony patterns of clusters than was expected.

Identification and Appraisal of Typal Clusters

A second approach to assess intergroup relationships is to define the groups within each type as a separate universe and compute the amount of clustering for each. This exercise is not a mere repetition of Analysis One because the procedures used in clustering cannot reveal all the degrees of interrelationships among groups. For Analysis One the clustering is based on the agreements between the groups that constitute the most cohesive pairs in the universe of 119 groups. Since a group can be a part of only one cluster, many relationships among groups that occur at moderate levels remain undisclosed.

Inspection of Table 30 reveals the extent to which the groups within the types are cohesive in terms of policy preferences, at the 4.0 level. Cohesive relationships among groups of a type are shown in the table in two ways: (1) the identification of one cluster composed of all or nearly all the groups of that type at or above the 4.0 level, and (2) the existence of one cluster with three or more members that was formed at a level substantially above 4.0 and no isolated pairs

TABLE 30

CLUSTERS AND PAIRS OF GROUPS OF EACH TYPE

	Final Cluster Index[a]	Index of Three-Member Cluster
Business Clusters		
5--25--23--62--75	7.0	12.0
47--52	7.0	
6--99	6.0	
7--17--45	5.0	5.0
35--37--38	5.0	5.0
9--60	5.0	
40--72	5.0	
5--12	4.0	
Labor Clusters		
1L--9L--10L--13L--18L--19L--23L--25L--31L	5.0	26.0
7L--36L	4.0	
Agricultural Clusters		
4F--11F--28F--30F	9.0	16.0
6F--22F--34F--38F--42F	4.0	6.0
Citizens Clusters		
42C--62C	7.0	
4C--39C--32C	5.0	5.0
25C--38C--30C	5.0	5.0
Religious Clusters		
8R--9R--15R--16R	4.0	10.0
Veterans Clusters		
1V--2V--3V--6V--7V	4.0	8.0
Financial Business Clusters		
3B--11B	8.0	
1B--26B--22B	4.0	4.0
Professional Clusters		
2P--8P--26P	6.0	6.0
3P--36P	6.0	
13P--31P	4.0	
Agricultural Business Clusters		
No Clusters at 4.0.		

[a]For each cluster, the index is the lowest level above 3.0 at which it could be identified. Each cluster is shown at its maximum size at the 4.0 level.

emerge with an index of 4.0. Lack of cohesion among groups of a type is shown by the identification of more than one cluster at the 4.0 level and also by the identification of only small three-member clusters that are formed at a relatively low level, such as 4.0.

The table reveals that no clusters existed among the ten Agricultural Business groups even at the 4.0 level. The Professional groups are also divided. There is only one three-member cluster of Professional groups identified at or above the 3.0 level, and two isolated pairs exist. Almost as divided are the seventeen Citizen groups and the six Financial Business groups. At the 4.0 level there are two, three-member clusters among the Citizens groups and two isolated pairs. Three Financial Business groups form a cluster at the 4.0 level, a relatively low level to form a three-member cluster, and one pair remains isolated.

A nine-member cluster of Labor groups, the largest cluster among groups of any single type, is cohesive at the 5.0 level. The five Veterans groups formed one cluster at the 4.0 level but one three-member Veterans cluster and one pair were formed at the 8.0 level and their identities were maintained until the 4.0 level was reached. Five of the seven Religious groups are members of a cluster that originated at the 10.0 level. The Agricultural groups are divided into two clusters that do not merge even at the 2.0 level. The divisions among the

thirty-seven Business groups are pronounced; there are three clusters and also five isolated pairs of groups at the 4.0 level.

The clusters of two types of groups, the Veterans cluster and Agricultural cluster No. 1, require comment. The clusters identified in Analysis One showed two of the five Veterans groups in one cluster and the remainder isolated. Also, each of the three most prestigious Agricultural groups appeared in a different cluster in Analysis One. But when the search for typal clusters was completed among Veterans groups, all groups were in one cluster. The analysis of Agricultural groups put the three major Agricultural groups into a single cluster with a fairly high index. The answer to both of these inconsistencies is that in the identification of typal clusters, the number of disagreements between groups within a cluster was not taken into account. The matrices of disagreements for the six largest typal clusters are shown in Figure 6. For the Labor cluster and the Religious cluster, the matrices show virtually no disagreements between cluster members. The Veterans cluster and Agricultural cluster No. 1, however, show large numbers of disagreements. When the disagreements of pairs are subtracted from their agreements, the cohesiveness of 2V, the American Veterans Committee, and 1V, the American Legion, and 1V and 6V, the Jewish War Veterans, is substantially reduced. When these adjustments

FIGURE 6

DISAGREEMENTS AMONG GROUPS FOR SIX TYPAL CLUSTERS[a]
TALLIED FOR PAIRS

Labor Cluster

	1L	9L	10L	13L	18L	19L	23L	25L	31L
1L		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9L	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10L	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
13L	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
18L	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
19L	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
23L	0	0	0	0	0	0		2	1
25L	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		2
31L	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	

Religious Cluster

	8R	9R	15R	16R
8R		0	0	0
9R	0		0	0
15R	0	0		0
16R	0	0	0	

Veterans Cluster

	1V	2V	3V	6V	7V
1V		4	2	5	2
2V	4		1	0	2
3V	2	1		0	2
6V	5	0	0		1
7V	2	2	2	1	

Business Cluster

	5	25	23	62	75
5		0	1	0	0
25	0		0	0	0
23	1	0		1	2
62	0	0	1		0
75	0	0	2	0	

Agricultural Cluster No. 1

	4F	11F	28F	34F
4F		2	11	7
11F	2		1	0
28F	11	1		13
30F	7	0	13	

Agricultural Cluster No. 2

	6F	22F	34F	38F	42F
6F		0	1	1	0
22F	0		0	0	0
34F	1	0		1	0
38F	1	0	1		0
42F	0	0	0	0	

[a]The six largest typal clusters.

are made, the linkage between 2V and 6V remains, but neither of these groups coheres significantly with 1V or 7V.

The decline in cohesion is even more pronounced for the pair 4F and 28F, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union, the pair 4F and 30F, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange,

and 28F and 30F. The nine bills on which the three-member cluster 4F, 28F and 30F are agreed is counter-balanced by a large number of disagreements between the groups in each pair. This finding is consistent with the cluster alignments identified in Analysis One: these three prestigious Agricultural groups did not cohere significantly on the policy preferences they stated at the thirty-seven hearings. For no typal cluster or typal pair except those shown in Figure 6 did two groups disagree more than once.

In summary, these data on typal clusters show two significant patterns. First, there are moderate levels of agreements among groups of a single type, shown chiefly as three-member clusters, for groups of several types. These agreements are not revealed in the cluster patterns identified in Analysis One. Second, the groups of most types do not cohere together in a single cluster even at relatively low indexes. There are not many policy proposals on which a large number of groups of one type will be unanimous in their testimonies even over a period of many years. Thus, the most cohesive clusters are not typal clusters but are clusters that include groups of different types.

Analyses of Bills in Policy Sectors

The third search for clusters was conducted on bills within policy sectors. The ten policy sectors

used in the classification of bills for analysis were: trade, housing, labor, foreign affairs, education-welfare, agriculture, civil rights, business, taxes, and defense. The analyses of the bills in the last three policy sectors did not reveal any clusters above the 3.0 level. The three major reasons for the minimal clustering on these three sets of bills are: (1) the heterogeneous character of the bills classified together, (2) the small number of bills in some policy sectors, and (3) the lack of sustained hearings activity by groups on subjects within these policy sectors. In regard to the last point there is evidence that groups are not consistently active on the subjects on which they testify most frequently. For example, Labor groups are irregular in their activity on labor bills. Similarly, groups that testify mostly on trade bills do not present testimonies on all of the major trade bills. Of course, some groups may not choose to testify at both the Senate and House committees and may appear only at the former. In general, the data of this investigation indicate that the coverage many groups give the hearings on subjects in many policy areas, even narrow ones, is incomplete.

Analysis of Twenty-Six Labor Bills

Table 31 lists the members of the four clusters identified at or above the 4.0 level using HSA. Clusters One and Two are the largest and most cohesive clusters.

TABLE 31

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED ON LABOR BILLS (HSA)[a]

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 14.0 level.

25L American Federation of Labor
23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
18L Textile Workers Union of America
13L International Ladies Garment Workers Union
9L Communication Workers of America
10L International Association of Machinists
1L Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
19L United Automobile and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(An eight-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 11.0 level.

23 Chamber of Commerce, United States
4F American Farm Bureau Federation
75 National Association of Manufacturers
62 National Retail Merchants Association
12 American Retail Federation
5 American Hotel Association
(A six-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level.

17 American Truckers Association
14A National Lumber Manufacturers Association
34F National Milk Producers Federation
(A three-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Four: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.

14L International Longshoremen's Association
31L United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
39C National Consumers League

[a]The analysis is based on twenty-six labor bills.

Cluster Two originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 11.0. Clusters Three and Four never grow beyond three members and originated at levels of 5.0 and 4.0 respectively. It is noteworthy there are no disagreements among the cluster members of three clusters.

Disagreement on one bill was registered among members of Cluster Two.

Table 31 shows that Cluster One is a typal cluster; the eight members are Labor groups. Cluster Two is a cluster composed entirely of Business groups except for one Agriculture group. Clusters Three and Four have members from two types of groups.

Table 32 shows the sets of bills on which each of the four clusters was based. A bill is not included in the set unless more than 50 per cent of the cluster members supported it. For example, Cluster One is an eight-member cluster; no bill is included in its set of bills unless the bill attracted agreed testimonies from five cluster members and no disagreement on it was registered from any other cluster member.

Table 32 shows that the one legislative subject inducing the widest and most frequent participation by the members of each cluster is the minimum wage. It is also important to note that Cluster One, a pro-labor cluster, was only active on eleven of the twenty-six labor bills. Furthermore, on twelve of the bills no more than three members of Cluster One testified. The members of Clusters Two, Three, and Four have even smaller numbers of bills in their sets. Thus, no cluster appears on even half of the labor bills that attracted the most testimonies during the sixteen-year period.

TABLE 32

SETS OF LABOR BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE BASED

		No. of Cluster Members in Agreement
Cluster One (Eight Members)		
Minimum Wage	1945	6
Unemployment Compensation	1945	5
Minimum Wage	1947	7
Labor Education Extension	1948	6
Labor Extension	1949	6
Minimum Wage	1949	7
National Labor Relations Act	1949	7
Unemployment Insurance	1952	6
Labor-Management Relations	1953	6
Minimum Wage	1955	5
Minimum Wage	1960	8
Cluster Two (Six Members)		
Minimum Wage	1949	6
Labor-Management Relations	1953	5
Fair Labor Standards	1957	4
Extend Unemployment Benefits	1958	4
Labor-Management Relations	1959	6
Unemployment Compensation	1959	6
Minimum Wage	1960	5
Cluster Three (Three Members)		
Minimum Wage	1945	3
Minimum Wage	1949	3
National Labor Relations Act	1949	3
Labor-Management Relations	1953	3
Minimum Wage	1960	3
Cluster Four (Three Members)		
Minimum Wage	1945	3
Minimum Wage	1947	3
Fair Labor Standards	1957	3

Table 33 shows that none of the clusters was active on more than eleven bills, and only one cluster was active on each of eight bills. On seven bills two or more clusters were active and for six of these bills two or more clusters were in conflict. The table also reveals that Clusters One and Four were pro-labor and Clusters Two and Three were anti-labor. Clusters One and Four had two

TABLE 33

LABOR BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE (HSA)

Labor Bills		Cluster			
		One	Two	Three	Four
Minimum Wage	1945	F6[a]		A3	F3
Unemployment Compensation	1945	F5			
Full Employment	1945				
U. S. Employment Service	1946				
Minimum Wage	1947	F7			F3
Portal Pay	1947				
Amend National Labor Relations Act	1947				
Railroad Unemployment	1947				
Labor Education Extension	1948	F6			
Labor Extension	1949	F6			
Minimum Wage	1949	F7	A6	A3	
National Labor Relations Act	1949	F7		A3	
Unemployment Insurance	1952	F6			
Labor-Management Relations	1953	F6	F5	F3	
Unemployment Insurance	1954				
Minimum Wage	1955	F5			
Fair Labor Standards	1957		A4		F3
Legislation on Unemployment	1958				
Relieve Unemployment	1958				
Longshoremen's Compensation	1958				
Extend Unemployment Benefits	1958		A4		
Area Redevelopment	1959				
Community Facilities	1959				
Labor-Management Relations	1959		A6		
Unemployment Compensation	1959		A6		
Minimum Wage	1960	F8	A5	A3	

[a]Code: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill

The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill.

agreements and no conflicts and Clusters Two and Three registered three agreements and no conflicts.

Hypothesis II states that the group composition of a cluster remains unchanged through two consecutive

periods of time. Table 34 shows that when the bills on which at least four members of Cluster One were active are equally divided, T_1 has seven bills and T_2 has seven bills. The table discloses that every member of Cluster One in T_1 had at least three testimonies, and each member presented two or more testimonies in T_2. If separate cluster analyses had been performed on the bills in T_1 and T_2, it appears that each group would have been clustered for T_1 but not for T_2. Two groups, 10L and 9L, would not have been clustered since they agreed with the cluster only twice out of seven times. Thus, on this basis, Cluster One lost two members in T_2.

Table 35 indicates that Cluster Two--defining the cluster as active when three members testified--gained two members in T_2, over its members in T_1. Groups 15 and 5 registered only two agreements with the cluster out of a possible seven in T_1 but increased their testimonies to four and five respectively in T_2. Clusters Three and Four had too few agreements during the sixteen-year period to permit analysis.

Analysis of Sixteen Trade Bills

Table 36 shows that four clusters were identified at the 4.0 level or above in the analysis of the sixteen trade bills. The largest and most cohesive cluster was composed of eight groups that originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 7.0. Clusters Two,

TABLE 34

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON BILLS
IN THE SETS OF THE CLUSTERS[a]
CLUSTER ONE

Set of Labor Bills		23L	25L	18L	13L	19L	1L	10L	9L
Minimum Wage	1945	F	F	F	F		F	F	-
Unemployment Compensation . .	1945	F	F			F	F	F	
Minimum Wage	1947	F	F	F	F		F	F	F
Labor Education Extension . .	1948	F	F		F	F		F	F
Labor Extension	1949	F	F		F	F		F	F
Minimum Wage	1949	F	F		F	F	F	F	F
National Labor Relations Act .	1949	F	F	F		F	F	F	F
		7	7	3	5	5	5	7	5
Unemployment Insurance	1952	F	F	F	F	F	F		
Labor-Management Relations . .	1953	A	A	A			A	A	A
Minimum Wage	1955	F	F	F	F		F		
Relieve Unemployment	1958	F	F	F		F			
Area Redevelopment	1959	F	F	F		F			
Unemployment Compensation . .	1959	F	F	F			F		
Minimum Wage	1960	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
		7	7	7	3	4	5	2	2

[a]The bills on which at least four members of Cluster One testified.

TABLE 35

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON BILLS IN THE SET OF CLUSTER TWO

Set of Labor Bills		23	4F	75	62	15	5
Minimum Wage	1945		A	A			A
Unemployment Compensation	1945	A		A	A		
Minimum Wage	1947	A	A		A		
Portal Pay	1947	F	F	F			
Amend National Labor Relations Act	1947	F	A	F			
Minimum Wage	1949	A	A	A	A	A	A
Unemployment Insurance .	1952	A	A	A			
Labor-Management Relations	1953	F	F	F	F	F	
		7	7	7	4	2	2
Unemployment Insurance .	1954	A		A	A		
Minimum Wage	1955	A	A		A		
Fair Labor Standards . .	1957	A	A		A		A
Relieve Unemployment . .	1958	A	A	A			
Extend Unemployment . . .	1958			A	A	A	A
Area Redevelopment . . .	1959	A	A	A			
Labor-Management Relations	1959	A	A	A	A	A	A
Unemployment Compensation	1959	A	A	A	A	A	A
Minimum Wage	1960	A	A		A	A	A
		8	7	6	7	4	5

[a]The bills on which at least three members of Cluster Two testified.

Three, and Four originated as three-member clusters with analyses of 4.0. None of the clusters is a typal cluster. Cluster One has members representing six different types of groups. Clusters Two and Three are each composed of members from three types; Cluster Three has members of two types of groups.

TABLE 36

CLUSTERS ACTIVE ON TRADE BILLS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 7.0 level.
- 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
- 25C General Federation of Women's Clubs
- 30C League of Women Voters
- 3P American Association of University Women
- 47 National Council of American Importers
- 16R National Council of Jewish Women
- 4F American Farm Bureau Federation
- 28F National Farmers Union

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
- 31 Independent Petroleum Association
- 30F National Grange
- 9A National Association of Wool Manufacturers

Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
- 15 American Tariff League
- 34F National Milk Producers Federation
- 38F National Wool Growers Association

Cluster Four: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
- 5R Friends Committee on National Legislation
- 8A Millers National Federation
- 6V Jewish War Veterans

Table 37 reveals the sets of bills that form the bases of each cluster. Every bill on which each cluster is based is concerned with the same subject: trade agreements with foreign nations. Table 38 shows that on only eight of the sixteen trade bills was one or more clusters active. Conflict between clusters was marked. Table 38 indicates that only two bills received attention from a single cluster; the remaining six bills attracted two or more clusters. Two of the clusters were for freer trade and two clusters were opposed to this position.

TABLE 37

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON TRADE BILLS

Trade Bills		Cluster One							
		23L	25C	30C	3P	47	16R	4F	28F
Reciprocal Trade	1945	F[a]	F	F	F	F	F		F
Reciprocal Trade	1947	F		F	F	F		F	F
Reciprocal Trade	1949	F	F	F		F	F	F	F
Great Lakes	1950							F	F
Reciprocal Trade	1951	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
St. Lawrence Seaway	1951							F	
Reciprocal Trade	1953	A	F					A	A
St. Lawrence Seaway	1953	F						F	
Customs Simplific'n	1953					F		F	
Customs Simplific'n	1955					F		F	F
Trade Agreements	1955	F	F		F				
G. A. T. T.	1956	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Antidumping	1957					A		A	
Renew Trade	1958		F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Foreign Investment	1959	A						A	
Extension PL 480	1959	F						F	F

		Cluster Two			Cluster Three			Cluster Four		
		31	30F	9A	15	34F	38F	5R	8A	6V
Reciprocal Trade	1945	A	A	A	A	A	A		F	
Reciprocal Trade	1947	A	A	A		A				
Reciprocal Trade	1949	A	A	A						
Great Lakes	1950		F			F		A	A	A
Reciprocal Trade	1951	A	A	A	A	A		A		
St. Lawrence Seaway	1951		F							
Reciprocal Trade	1953		F				F	A	A	A
St. Lawrence Seaway	1953									
Customs Simplific'n	1953									
Customs Simplific'n	1955		F	A	A		A			
Trade Agreements	1955		F		A		A	F	F	F
G. A. T. T.	1956	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
Antidumping	1957				F	A	A			
Renew Trade	1958		F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
Foreign Investment	1959									
Extension PL 480	1959		F			F				

[a]Code: F--For the bill
A--Against the bill

TABLE 38

TRADE BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE

Trade Bills		Cluster			
		One	Two	Three	Four
Reciprocal Trade	1945	F7[a]	A3	A3	
Reciprocal Trade	1947	F6	A3		
Reciprocal Trade	1949	F7	A3		
Reciprocal Trade	1951	F8	A3		
Reciprocal Trade	1953				A3
Trade Agreements	1955				F3
G. A. T. T.	1956	F8		A3	F3
Renew Trade	1958	F7		A3	F3

[a]Code: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill.

The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill.

Although the clusters made too few testimonies to test Hypothesis II concerning changing cluster membership, it is interesting that Cluster Two presented four testimonies prior to 1952 and none after that date, and Cluster Four appeared for the first time in 1953. The pattern for Cluster Two, shown in Table 37, deserves comment because it is the only cluster in this series of analyses in which a cluster member reverses its earlier positions on bills dealing with a single subject. Group 30F in Cluster Two testified against the bills providing for freer trade on four occasions prior to 1953 along with the other two members of Cluster Two. Beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Bill of 1953, 30F testified four times in the next eight years for freer trade. On three

of the latter occasions it was opposed by one or both of the members of Cluster Two. Thus, without question the members of Cluster Two split in the years after 1951.

The pattern of testimonies for Cluster Four is also noteworthy because it clearly originated in 1953. Prior to 1953 the three groups that later formed it presented a total of only two testimonies even though the same basic kinds of trade bills were considered in hearings on four occasions prior to 1953.

Analysis of Housing Bills

The analysis of the sixteen housing bills identified three clusters with indexes of 4.0 or above. The members of these clusters are listed in Table 39. The

TABLE 39

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED ON HOUSING BILLS (HSA)

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 10.0 level.
- 23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
- 25L American Federation of Labor
- 4C Americans for Democratic Action
- 43C National Housing Conference
- 6V Jewish War Veterans

(A five-member cluster is formed at 6.0 level.)

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level.
- 37 National Association of Home Builders
- 38 National Association of Real Estate Boards
- 23 Chamber of Commerce, United States
- 22B United States Savings and Loan League

(A four-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
- 18L Textile Workers Union of America
- 7V Veterans of Foreign Wars
- 1V American Legion

largest and most cohesive cluster, was Cluster One composed of five members. It originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 10.0. Clusters Two and Three originate and remain three-member clusters with indexes of 5.0 and 4.0 respectively. There were no intracluster disagreements between members of any of these clusters. None of these clusters may be regarded as a typal cluster, although three of the four members of Cluster Two are Business groups and the fourth member is a Financial Business group.

Table 40 indicates the sets of housing bills on which the clusters are based are addressed to two

TABLE 40

SETS OF HOUSING BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE BASED

		Cluster Members
Cluster One (five members)		
Housing Stabilization	1945	3
General Housing	1948	4
Housing Act	1949	5
Housing Amendments	1949	4
Extension Rent Control . . .	1949	4
Cooperative Housing	1950	5
Defense Housing	1951	5
Housing Act	1954	4
Housing Act	1959	5
Emergency Homes	1960	5
Cluster Two (four members)		
General Housing	1948	3
Housing Act	1949	4
Cooperative Housing	1950	4
Defense Housing	1951	3
Housing Amendment	1955	4
Housing Act	1956	4
Cluster Three (three members)		
Housing Act	1949	3
Housing Amendment	1949	3
Cooperative Housing	1950	2

subjects: (1) construction of public housing, slum clearance, urban renewal, and assistance to the groups with special housing needs such as veterans, and (2) rent controls. Table 41 shows that, unlike the testimony

TABLE 41

HOUSING BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE

Housing Bills		Cluster		
		One	Two	Three
Housing Stabilization	1945	F3[a]		
Housing Rent Control	1947			
Extension Rent Control	1948			
General Housing	1948	F4	A3	
Housing Act	1949	F5	A4	F3
Housing Amendment	1949	F4		F3
Extension Rent Control	1949	F4		
Extension Rent Control	1950			
Cooperative Housing	1950	F5	A4	F3
Defense Housing	1951	F5	A3	
Housing Act	1954	A4		
Housing Amendment	1955		A4	
Housing Act	1956		A4	
Housing Act	1959	F5		
Emergency Home Ownership	1960	F5		
Veterans Housing	1959			

[a]Code: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill.

The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill.

patterns for labor and trade bills, only one-fourth of the bills did not receive attention from at least one cluster. The table also shows that on seven bills, one cluster was active; and on five bills, two or more clusters appeared. For every bill on which two clusters

TABLE 42

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON HOUSING BILLS IN THE SETS OF THE CLUSTERS[a]

Set of Housing Bills		Cluster One				
		23L	25L	4C	43C	6V
Housing Stabilization	1945	F	F		F	
General Housing	1948	F	F		F	F
Housing Act	1949	F	F	F	F	F
Housing Amendment	1949	F	F		F	F
Extension Rent Control	1949	F	F	F		F
		5	5	2	4	4
Cooperative Housing	1950	F	F	F	F	F
Defense Housing	1951	F	F	F	F	F
Housing Act	1954	A	A		A	A
Housing Act	1959	F	F	F	F	F
Emergency Home Own'shp	1960	F	F	F	F	F
		5	5	4	5	5
		Cluster Two				
		37	38	23	22B	
General Housing	1949	A	A		A	
Housing Act	1949	A	A	A	A	
Cooperative Housing	1950	A	A	A	A	
		3	3	2	3	
Defense Housing	1951	A	A	A		
Housing Amendment	1955	A	A	A	A	
Housing Act	1956	A	A	A	A	
		3	3	3	2	

[a]The bills on which at least three members of Cluster One (or Two) testified.

appeared, except one, there were two clusters in conflict. Inspection of Table 42 reveals that unlike the groups active on trade policy, no groups disappear from or join the cluster during the latter portion of the sixteen-year period.

Analysis of Sixteen Education-Welfare Bills

This is the only analysis in which only one cluster appeared. The cluster originated as a three-member cluster at 8.0. Table 43 indicates this cluster

TABLE 43

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION-WELFARE BILLS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 8.0 level.
23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
25L American Federation of Labor
4C Americans for Democratic Action
28F National Farmers Union
11C American Parents Committee
(A five-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

is not a typal cluster, since it has members from three types of groups.

This cluster was active on eleven of the sixteen bills. For no other policy sector was one cluster so active. This is somewhat surprising since the bills classified in this policy category seem more heterogeneous than the trade, housing, or labor bills. Table 44 shows that this cluster was active throughout the sixteen-year period. No groups either departed or joined the

TABLE 44

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON EDUCATION-WELFARE BILLS[a] IN THE SET OF CLUSTER ONE

Set of Bills		23L	25L	4C	28F	11C
Social Security Amendment	1949	F	F		F	F
Public School Assistance	1949	F	F		F	F
Reorganization of HEW	1950	A	A	A	A	A
Public Health	1951	F			F	F
Library Service	1952	F	F		F	
Social Security Amendments	1954		F	F		F
		5	5	2	5	5
Social Security Act	1956	F	F			F
Scholarships and Loans	1957	F	F	F	F	F
Aid for School Constrctn	1957	F	F	F	F	F
Social Security	1958	F	F	F	F	
Juvenile Delinquency	1959	F	F	F		F
		5	5	4	3	4

[a]The bills on which at least three members of Cluster One testified.

cluster in the latter portion of the period.

Analysis of Thirteen Foreign Affairs Bills

Table 45 shows two clusters were identified in the analysis of the thirteen foreign affairs bills. Cluster One, the largest and most cohesive cluster, was composed of five members. It originated as a three-member cluster at 6.0 and registered an index of 5.0 as a five-member cluster. Cluster Two originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 4.0. Both clusters have members from

TABLE 45

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BILLS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 6.0 level.
23L Congress for Industrial Organizations
25L American Federation of Labor
5R Friends Committee on National Legislation
9R National Council of Churches
4C Americans for Democratic Action
(A five-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
30C League of Women Voters
28F National Farmers Union
3P American Association of University Women

three type of groups.

The bills in this policy category are quite heterogeneous. But Table 46 reveals that Cluster One is

TABLE 46

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE

Foreign Affairs Bills		Cluster	
		One	Two
Bretton Woods Agreements	1945	F3[a]	F3
U. N. R. R. A.	1945	F4	F3
Admit Displaced Persons	1947	F3	
U. S. Foreign Policy	1948	F3	
Participation in ITO	1950	F4	
India Emergency	1951	F4	
International Orgs.	1954		F3
Mutual Security Act	1958	F4	
Mutual Security Act	1959	F4	
Mutual Security Act	1960	F3	

[a]Code: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill.

The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill.

active on nine of the thirteen bills; no bill attracts all five members of the cluster. This is the only policy category in which two clusters are active and both are agreed on every bill on which they present testimonies. Both of these clusters may be described as taking a position in support of participation by the United States in international organizations. The members of both clusters are consistently active throughout the sixteen-year period.

Analysis of Agricultural Bills

Table 47 shows two clusters were identified in the analysis of nine agricultural bills. Both were three-

TABLE 47

CLUSTERS ACTIVE ON AGRICULTURAL BILLS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
25L American Federation of Labor
39C National Consumers League

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
4F American Farm Bureau Federation
22F National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
30F National Grange

member clusters that originated at the 4.0 level. Cluster Two is a typal cluster. Table 48 indicates that both clusters are based almost entirely on bills concerned with one specific subject, farm labor. These two clusters are opposed on every bill on which both present

TABLE 48

AGRICULTURE BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE

Agricultural Bills		Cluster One	Cluster Two
General Farm Program . .	1949		A3[a]
Mexican Farm Labor . . .	1954	A3	F3
Mexican Farm Labor . . .	1955	A3	
Farm Labor	1958	A3	F3
Mexican Labor	1960	F3	A3

[a]Code: F--For the bill; A--Against the bill.

The cell indicates the number of members in each cluster in agreement on the bill.

testimonies. Four bills attracted no clusters. There are too few bills to permit generalizations concerning the stability of the membership of the cluster.

Analysis of Civil Rights Bills

Two clusters were identified in the analysis of eight civil rights bills. Table 49 shows both are three-

TABLE 49

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN THE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL RIGHTS BILLS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 5.0 level.
19L United Automobile Workers
16R National Council of Jewish Women
23L Congress of Industrial Organizations

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 4.0 level.
30C League of Women Voters
3P American Association of University Women
39C National Consumers League

member clusters and each is composed of groups of two different types. Cluster One originates and remains a

three-member cluster with an index of 5.0. Cluster Two originates as a three-member cluster at 4.0.

Conclusions

Several generalizations emerge from this series of analyses of bills in policy sectors. First, the extent to which clusters can be identified on the basis of stable policy preferences varies substantially among the bills in different policy categories. In general, however, the analyses of the policy categories in which the bills are relatively homogeneous reveal a recurring pattern consisting of two clusters that are opposed to each other on most bills where they both appear.

Second, for most of the analyses, Hypothesis V, which states that on some bills no cluster will be active, is confirmed. In fact for every policy category at least one-fourth of the bills did not attract a cluster.

Third, in general, Hypothesis II--that the group composition of a cluster will be unchanged during two consecutive periods--is confirmed. There is considerable stability in both the activity rates of the clusters through the sixteen-year period and in the testimonies of cluster members. There was only one cluster out of the seventeen identified in the seven analyses, that disappeared because of a change in the policy preference of a cluster member. One additional cluster sustained a loss of two members in the latter portion of the sixteen-year period

because of a low volume of testimonies, and another cluster gained one member. But the latter two instances do not represent reversals in the policy positions of these groups. The consistency with which dozens of groups avow policy preferences over a sixteen-year period gives much order to the relations among groups at the congressional level.

Fourth, the conflicts among clusters on bills within policy categories are unbroken by any occasional agreement between them. There is no instance in these analyses of two clusters that are in opposition on one bill agreeing on a different bill. Either two clusters will be in agreement on every bill on which they both appear, or they will be in conflict on every one.

Comprehensive Analysis

This analysis was performed on the testimonies of the entire universe of 119 groups and 145 bills. The bills in this analysis include the thirty-seven bills on which twenty or more groups testified (Round one) in Analysis One, plus thirty-one bills that attracted testimonies from fifteen to nineteen groups (Round Two), and the seventy-seven bills that received testimonies from ten to fourteen groups (Round Three).

Eight clusters originated as three-member clusters at or above the 5.0 level. In addition eight three-member clusters originated with indexes of 6.0, 5.0, or 4.0.

The latter clusters are not discussed because of their small membership and low indexes. This section will focus on the five clusters that originated above the 4.0 level and that had at least four members at the 4.0 level. Table 50 lists the membership of these clusters.

TABLE 50

CLUSTERS IDENTIFIED IN COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS

Cluster One: originated as three-member cluster at 32.0 level.

23L Congress of Industrial Organizations
25L American Federation of Labor
28F National Farmers Union
36L National Women's Trade Union League
25C General Federation of Women's Clubs
30C League of Women Voters
3P American Association of University Women
9R National Council of Churches
15R YWCA, National Council
16R National Council of Jewish Women
36P National Federation of Business and Professional Women

(An eleven-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Two: originated as three-member cluster at 10.0 level.

1L Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
9L Communication Workers of America
10L International Association of Machinists
13L International Ladies Garment Workers Union
18L Textile Workers Union of America
19L United Automobile Workers
31L United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
39C National Consumers League

(An eight-member cluster is formed at 5.0 level.)

Cluster Three: originated as three-member cluster at 14.0 level.

4F American Farm Bureau Federation
22F National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
30F National Grange
34F National Milk Producers Federation
42F Vegetable Growers Association
15A United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association

(A six-member cluster is formed at 6.0 level.)

TABLE 50--Continued

Cluster Four: originated as three-member cluster at 12.0 level.

5 American Hotel Association
25 Council of State Chambers of Commerce
23 U. S. Chamber of Commerce
62 National Retail Merchants Association
75 National Association of Manufacturers
(A five-member cluster is formed at 7.0 level.)

Cluster Five: originated as three-member cluster at 14.0 level.

4C Americans for Democratic Action
5R Friends Committee on National Legislation
11F Cooperative League of the U. S. A.
2V American Veterans Committee
6V Jewish War Veterans
(A five-member cluster is formed at 8.0 level.)

Two of the clusters may be regarded as typal clusters: Cluster Four, composed of five Business groups, and Cluster Two composed of seven Labor groups and one Citizen group. The largest and most cohesive cluster is Cluster One; its members represent five types of groups. Cluster One originated as a three-member cluster with an index of 32.0.

Tables 51, 52, 53, and 54 show the sets of bills on which the clusters are based. As expected, using a universe of 145 bills of ten policy categories, each cluster is based on bills from more than one policy category. Nevertheless, each cluster has one or two policy sectors in which it is most active at hearings. For example, Cluster One appeared most frequently on trade and foreign policy bills. Clusters Two and Four are interested chiefly in labor bills. In short, there

TABLE 51

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON BILLS
IN THE SET OF CLUSTER ONE[a]

Set of Bills		Cluster One										
		23L	25L	16R	28F	30C	3P	25C	9R	15R	36R	36L
Housing Stabilization	1945	F	F	F	F		F		F			F
Reciprocal Trade	1945	F		F	F	F	F	F				F
U. N. R. R. A.	1945	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F		F
Price Controls	1945	F	F	F	F	F	F	F				
Bretton Woods Agreements	1945	F	F		F	F	F		F	F	F	
Full Employment Act	1945	F	F	F	F					F		
Admit Displaced Persons	1947	F	F					F	F	F		
U. S. Foreign Policy	1948		F				F	F	F	F	F	F
General Housing	1948	F	F	F	F	F	F			F		F
Reciprocal Trade	1949	F		F	F	F		F	F	F		F
Public School Assistance	1949	F	F	F	F	F		F	F		F	F
Repeal Oleo Tax	1949		F	F		F	F			F		F
		10	10	9	9	8	8	7	7	8	3	8

Participation in I. T. O.	1950	F		F	F	F		F	F	F	F	F
Equal Pay for Women	1950	F		F		F				F	F	F
Reciprocal Trade	1954	F	F	F	F	F	F	F				
Trade Agreements	1955	F	F				F	F		F	F	
G. A. T. T.	1956	F	F	F	F	F	F	F			F	
Renew Trade	1958			F	F	F	F	F	F			
Mutual Security Act	1958	F	F	F		F		F	F			
		6	4	6	4	6	4	6	3	3	4	2

[a]The bills on which at least six members of Cluster One testified.

TABLE 52

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON BILLS IN THE SETS OF CLUSTER TWO AND THREE[a]

Set of Bills	Cluster Two							
	1L	9L	19L	13L	18L	19L	31L	39C
Minimum Wage 1945	F		F	F	F		F	F
Women's Rights 1945	A			A		A	A	A
Minimum Wage 1947	F	F	F	F	F		F	F
Equal Pay for Women 1948	F	F				F	F	F
Minimum Wage 1949	F	F	F	F		F	F	F
National Labor Relations Act 1949	F	F	F		F	F	F	
Social Security Amendments . 1949	F		F	F	F	F	F	F
	7	4	5	5	4	5	7	6
Equal Pay for Women 1950	F	F			F	F		F
Minimum Wage 1955	F			F	F		F	F
Minimum Wage 1960	F	F	F	F	F	F		F
	3	2	1	2	3	2	1	3

	Cluster Three					
	4F	22F	30F	34F	42F	15A
Minimum Wage 1945	A	A	A	A		
Minimum Wage 1949	A		A	A		A
General Farm Program 1949	A	A	A	A		A
Defense Production Act . . . 1951	A	A	A	A		
Defense Production Act . . . 1952	A	A	A	A	A	A
Trip Leasing 1953	F	F	F		F	F
	6	5	6	5	2	4
Mexican Farm Labor 1954	F	F	F			F
Trip Leasing 1956	F	F	F	F	F	F
Interstate Commerce Act . . 1958	A	A	A	A	A	A
Extension of PL 480 1959	F	F	F	F		
Minimum Wage 1960	A	A		A	A	A
Extension, Mexican Farm Labor 1960	A	A	A		A	A
	6	6	5	4	4	5

[a]The bills on which at least five members of Cluster Two testified, and four members of Cluster Three.

TABLE 53

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS ON BILLS IN THE SET OF CLUSTER FOUR[a]

Set of Bills		Cluster Four				
		5	25	23	62	75
Unemployment Compensation	1945			A	A	A
Minimum Wage	1949	A		A	A	A
Excess Profits Tax on Corporations	1950	A	A		A	A
Revenue Revision	1951	A	A	A	A	
Defense Production	1952			A	A	A
Labor-Management	1953			F	F	F
General Revenue Revision	1953	F	F	F		
Unemployment Insurance	1954		A	A	A	A
Pre-merger Notification	1957	A		A		A
		5	4	8	7	7
Social Security Act	1958	A	A	A		A
Revenue Revision	1958	F			F	F
Legislation on Unemployment	1958	A	A		A	
Relieve Unemployment	1958		A	A		A
Extension Unemployment Compensation	1958	A	A		A	A
Unemployment Compensation	1959	A	A	A	A	A
Hospital Benefits	1959	A	A	A	A	A
Labor-Management Reforms	1959	A		A	A	A
Minimum Wage	1960	A	A	A	A	
		8	7	6	7	7

[a]The bills on which at least three members of Cluster Four testified.

TABLE 54

TESTIMONIES OF CLUSTER MEMBERS
ON BILLS IN THE SET OF CLUSTER FIVE[a]

Set of Bills		4C	5R	11F	2V	6V
Housing Act	1949	F			F	F
F. E. P. C.	1949	F			F	F
Extension of Rent Controls . .	1949	F			F	F
U. N. into World Federation .	1949	F		F	F	
Cooperative Housing	1950	F		F	F	F
Reorganization Plan	1950	A		A	A	
Participation in I. T. O. . .	1950	F	F		F	
		7	1	3	7	4
Trade Agreements	1955	F	F	F	F	F
G. A. T. T.	1956		F	F	F	F
International Organizations .	1956		F	F	F	F
Renew Trade	1958	F	F	F	F	F
Mutual Security Act	1958	F		F	F	F
Civil Rights	1959	F			F	F
Mutual Security	1959	F		F	F	F
Juvenile Delinquency	1959	F	F		F	
Emergency Home Ownership . . .	1960	F		F	F	F
		7	5	7	9	8

[a]The bills on which at least three members of Cluster Five testified.

is no cluster that testifies on a balanced array of bills of four or more policy categories.

Hypotheses Concerning Intergroup Relations

Hypothesis I states that a majority of the groups in the universe will not be members of clusters. If all clusters of three-members or more, with indexes of 4.0 or higher, are totaled, sixty-three of the 119 groups are

affiliated with clusters. The hypothesis is rejected but by a narrow margin. The essential point is that no clustering is discernible using HSA for nearly half of the most active groups.

Hypothesis II states that the group composition of clusters does not change during two consecutive time periods. The expectation concerning this hypothesis was that some clusters would have more than twenty or thirty bills on which they were active. Since the most active cluster testified at only eighteen hearings, it is impossible to test this hypothesis with the confidence that was expected. Nevertheless, a few clusters can be analyzed in terms of membership changes; Clusters One, Four, Five, and Three are considered.

For the analysis of Cluster One, let T_1 represent the years 1945-49 and let T_2 include the years 1950-58. These time spans divide the bills on which the cluster was active into two sets of approximately equal size, as Table 51 indicates. The group membership of Cluster One is quite stable through T_1 and T_2. No group member testifies so few times during T_1, and increases its testimonies in T_2, that it can be described as joining the cluster in T_2. However, 36L departs from Cluster One during T_2. It presented eight testimonies during the four years of T_1 but presented only two testimonies during T_2, and both were in the first year of the time span.

Table 53 reveals even greater stability in the composition of Cluster Four during T_1 and T_2. Each group presents approximately the same number of testimonies in each time span. The group composition of Cluster Five, shown in Table 54, is changed in T_2 by the addition of one member, 5R, that presented only one testimony during T_1. In T_2, 5R presented five testimonies.

Although Cluster Three appeared on only twelve bills, Table 52 indicates that with one possible exception the group composition of the cluster was stable during the two periods. Only the membership of 42F remains in doubt for T_1. This group presented only two testimonies in T_1, both in the last two years of the period, and increased its testimonies to four in T_2.

In general, the findings on Hypothesis II tend to confirm the existence of a pattern of stability over a period of several years. There is little support here for the idea that active groups readily and frequently shift their policy preferences. Most cluster members have been members of their clusters during the entire sixteen-year period under study, and they rarely disagree with other groups in their cluster.

Hypothesis III states that if interest groups enroll individuals as members from the same interest clientele, these groups do not all become members of the same cluster. Table 50, listing the group members of each cluster, reveals almost the same pattern of

affiliation among groups that compete for members that was discussed in Analysis One: (1) the major Agriculture groups are split, (2) the Labor groups are members of Cluster Two except for the two peak federations, and (3) the three women's Citizen groups are members of the same cluster. The two Veterans groups that are clustered are members of the same cluster, but it is important to note that the four largest Veterans groups, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Veterans of Foreign Wars and Korea, and the Disabled American Veterans were not identified with any cluster. In general, the findings on this hypothesis are inconclusive.

Hypothesis IV states that clusters do not oppose one another on bills from more than one policy category. Table 55 lists the disagreements between pairs of clusters. For example, Cluster Two had the most disagreements with other clusters but each disagreement concerned a minimum wage bill. Hypothesis IV is confirmed: there are no disagreements between clusters on bills from more than a single policy category.

Table 55 also shows the agreements between clusters. It is interesting that a hypothesis stating that two clusters do not agree on bills from more than a single policy category would be rejected according to the data at hand. Two pairs of clusters, Clusters One and Six, and Clusters Three and Four both have agreements on bills from two different policy categories.

TABLE 55

BILLS ON WHICH CLUSTERS WERE ACTIVE

Bills	Clusters 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Agreements and Conflicts Between Clusters[a]
Minimum Wage		F6[b]	A3[c]					Ø
Reciprocal Trade	F7				A4			Ø
U. N. R. R. A.	F10							
Women's Rights		A5						
Price Controls	F7							
Bretton Woods Agreements	F8							
Unemployment Compensation				A3				
Full Employment Act	F6							
Housing Stabilization	F7							
Admission of D. P.'s	F6							
Minimum Wage		F7						
Reciprocal Trade					A3			
General Housing	F8							
Equal Pay for Women		F5						
Foreign Policy	F7							
Social Security							F3	
General Farm Program			A3					
Extension Rent Control						F3		
Housing Act						F3		
Minimum Wage		F7	A4	A4				X Ø Ø
National Labor Relations Act		F6						
Social Security Amendments		F7					F3	X
Reciprocal Trade	F8							
Public School Assistance	F9							
Oleo Tax Repeal	F6							
F. E. P. C.						F3		
Equal Pay for Women	F6	F5						X
Cooperative Housing						F4		
Participation in ITO	F9				A3	F3		X Ø Ø
Excess Profits Tax on Corporations				A4				
Reorganization Plan						A3		
Defense Production			A4					
Revenue Revision				A4				
Reciprocal Trade	F7				A4			Ø

TABLE 55--Continued

Bills	Clusters 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Agreements and Conflicts Between Clusters[a]
Unemployment Insurance		F4						
Defense Production			A6	A3				X
Labor-Management Relations				F3				
Trip Leasing			F5					
Unemployment Insurance				A4				
Mexican Farm Labor			F4					
Minimum Wage		F5					F3	X
Trade Agreements	F6					F5		X
G. A. T. T.	F8				A3	F4		X Ø Ø
Trip Leasing			F6					
International Organizations						F4		
Extension Unemployment Compensation				A4				
Interstate Commerce Act			A6					
Mutual Security Act	F6					F6		X
Social Security				A4				
Renew Trade	F6					F5		X
Revenue Revision				F3				
Legislation on Unemployment				A3				
Labor-Management Reform				A4				
Juvenile Delinquency						F3	F3	X
Unemployment Compensation				A5				
Hospital Benefits				A5				
Mutual Security Act						F4		
Extension of PL 480			F4					
Minimum Wage		F7	A5	A4				X Ø Ø
Emergency Home Ownership						F4		
Extension Mexican Labor			A5					

[a]Code for Symbols: X--Agreement, Ø--Conflict

[b]F6--Seven members of the cluster are for the bill.

[c]A3--Three members of the cluster are against the bill.

Hypothesis V states that on some bills no cluster will be active. The list of bills in Tables 51, 52, 53, and 54 on which each cluster is based makes it clear that the hypothesis is confirmed. No cluster is active on more than eighteen of the 145 bills. Eighty-four of the 145 bills failed to attract one or more clusters. This large number of bills is directly related to the number of groups that testified on the bills. Only seven bills in Round One did not attract at least one cluster. Thirteen of the thirty-one bills in Round Two did not receive testimony from a cluster. Seven of the seventy-seven bills in Round Three attracted a cluster.

The opportunity for aggregations of like-minded groups to appear at hearings provides an index of the extent to which countervailing aggregations of groups oppose each other. The hypothesis may be stated as follows: the testimonies of one aggregation of active groups on bills in a policy sector tends to foster the development of an opposing aggregation. As stated in the analyses of bills in certain homogeneous policy sectors, there is some evidence to support this position. If the proposition is tested more broadly, however, such as on the thirty-seven bills on which the most groups testified, it will not stand. Two or more clusters appeared in opposition on only seven of the thirty-seven bills. On five bills two clusters appeared in agreement and were

unopposed by any cluster. On eighteen bills one cluster appeared unopposed.

Hypothesis VI states that clusters tend to become opposed on a larger number of bills of different policy categories throughout a period of time. This hypothesis is concerned with the degree of change in relations between clusters. As new issues receive congressional attention and new groups enter the hearings process, it is expected that existing clusters will tend to expand the range of legislative subjects on which they are opposed. This hypothesis was based on the premise that a large number of disagreements between clusters would be discovered. The few disagreements between clusters have already been discussed. The hypothesis is rejected. There is no pair of clusters in disagreement in either an earlier or later time span that shows disagreements on bills from more than one policy category.

Hypothesis VII states that clusters tend to be opposed to one another on a larger number of bills as time passes. The premise here, as for Hypothesis VI, was that perhaps twice the number of disagreements shown in Table 55 would be discovered. The listings in the table do not disclose any tendency to confirm this hypothesis, but the number is too small to permit meaningful generalization.

In conclusion, it is apparent that some of the premises on which the hypotheses were formulated were not

warranted. First, there were more policy sectors in which no clusters were active than was expected. Second, the premise of pluralism concerning pervasive competition among clusters--measured by the number of disagreements between them--was not borne out. Third, the pluralist premise of transient alignments among groups--dynamics in the relations among groups--is rejected. The disagreements among clusters that exist seem to be stable confrontations. In general, the cluster analyses are quite consistent in yielding a map of stable policy preferences for both clusters and cluster members. These findings suggest that an integration model probably offers a better "fit" for describing the group system than the pluralist model. The exploration of relations among interest groups continues in Chapters V and VI within the conceptual frameworks of pluralism and integration.

CHAPTER V

PLURALISM IN THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM

The effectiveness of pluralism in sustaining democratic government is widely acclaimed. The contributions of pluralism to democracy are not attributed solely to the number and the nature of the entities in the pluralist system, but also to the relations between these entities. The presence in a social system of a large diverse population of autonomous entities is necessary but not sufficient to classify it as pluralist. The entities must be in competition and any intergroup alignments in this competition must be impermanent. The relations among groups in a pluralist system are characterized by change--dynamics.

In this chapter and Chapter VI, the term "interest group system" refers to the national interest groups that present testimony at House committee hearings with some frequency during a given period. No precise boundaries to the system, in terms of frequency of testimony, can be stated; but the entrance, maintenance of status, and departure of groups are discussed in Chapter VI.

Firm and consistent evidence of the presence of pluralism in the interest group system would be reassuring

to those who see, or who want to see, in the present arrangements a representative population of groups, articulating an expanding range of interests, and negotiating with each other and with other actors and intermediaries for the control of decisions on public policy in an environment hospitable to all groups.

The evidence presented in this chapter is too fragmentary to warrant a final judgment on either the degree of pluralism that exists in the interest group system or on the specific modes of relation between interest groups. But the kinds of data and the modes of relation explored are sufficient to justify the formulation of tentative conclusions.

Characteristics of a Pluralist System

The first characteristic of a pluralist system is that numerous centers of power exist within it. No objective standard is available for judging whether a given community possesses this characteristic.[1] The discussion in Chapter III concerning the large numbers of the interest groups that have communicated with congressional committees about bills under consideration during the period 1945-60 suggests that this characteristic of

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[1]No attempt is made in this research to determine the relative power of different interest groups. The assumption accepted in this investigation is that the communication of a statement concerning a bill by a national group to a congressional committee is a power act. Therefore, each national group that testifies at hearings is regarded as a "center of power."

the pluralist community exists in the interest group system at the congressional level of government. But the length of the time span, sixteen years, during which the testimonies of these several hundred groups were recorded may conceal great disparities in the distribution of group testimony for shorter periods within the years 1945-60. It is also necessary to show that each of the major policy sectors, such as education or foreign trade, with which Congress is concerned has many groups active within it. There is no evidence for believing that the large number of groups active at the national level are all active in a given policy sector or that there is a balanced distribution of groups active within all policy sectors.

Table 56 shows the number of testimonies presented on 145 bills by different numbers of groups in a universe of 189 of the groups that presented the most testimony during the sixteen-year period, 1945-60. Two groups presented more than 100 testimonies. Eighteen additional groups testified on from twenty-five to forty-nine bills. Only twenty-five groups of the 189 groups under consideration, 13 per cent of the total, testified on twenty-five or more of the 145 bills. Seventy-seven groups, 41 per cent of the total, testified less than ten times each. Since these 189 groups were the most active groups in the group population during the sixteen-year period, and the bills on which testimony is tabulated in

TABLE 56

DISTRIBUTION OF TESTIMONY BY 189 GROUPS ON 145 BILLS DURING THE PERIOD, 1945-60

Number of Testimonies	Number of Groups Presenting Testimonies	Per Cent of Groups Presenting Testimony
100 or more	2	1
50 to 99	5	3
25 to 49	18	9
20 to 24	15	8
10 to 19	72	38
1 to 9	77	41

The universe consists of 189 of the groups that presented the most testimony during the sixteen-year period.

Table 56 are the bills attracting the most groups, it is clear that a very small portion of the groups in the population presented testimony on a large portion of major bills. The average number of testimonies for each group in the 189-group universe was 15.2, the mode was five testimonies, and the median number of testimonies was eleven.

When the apparently large universe of 189 groups is placed in its time perspective, sixteen years, it is obvious that for a shorter time span, such as two, three, or four years, many of the groups would disappear or be recorded with only one testimony. The data in Table 56 are not impressive in showing a large number of active groups during the sixteen-year period. The significance of these data is primarily in terms of the unequal

distribution of testimonies among the groups and the implication that a much smaller number of centers of power exist for shorter time spans. The most active twenty-five groups, 13 per cent of the 189-group universe, presented a total of 1,125 testimonies, 39 per cent of the total.

Inspection of Table 57 reveals that the generalizations that apply to the total universe of 189 groups

TABLE 57

DISTRIBUTION OF GROUPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES AMONG THE TWENTY-FIVE MOST ACTIVE GROUPS[a] IN THE PRESENTATION OF TESTIMONY

Types of Groups	No. of Groups in Universe	Twenty-Five Most Active Groups in the Universe
Business	54	5
Labor	23	5
Agricultural	13	5
Citizens	31	3
Professional	22	2
Religious	10	1
Veterans	7	4
Agricultural Business	14	0
Financial Business	11	0
Small Business	4	0

[a]The universe consists of 189 of the groups that presented the most testimony on 145 major bills during the sixteen-year period, 1945-60.

also apply to almost all of the types of groups. The table shows that for only two types of groups were there more than thirty groups active in the sixteen-year period. Table 58 shows that the most active 30 per cent of the

TABLE 58

DISTRIBUTION OF TESTIMONY
BY THE MOST ACTIVE GROUPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES

Type of Group	No. of Groups in Universe	Per Cent of Total Testimonies Provided by Most Active 30% of Groups of Each Type
Business	54	60
Labor	23	67
Agriculture	13	65
Citizens	31	61
Professional	22	54
Religious	10	52
Veterans	7	42
Agricultural Business .	14	47
Financial Business . .	11	39
Small Business	4	36

The universe consists of 189 of the groups that presented the most testimony on 145 major bills during the sixteen-year period, 1945-60.

groups in each of six types presented more than 50 per cent of the total testimonies. For groups in each of four types, the most active 30 per cent of the groups presented 60 per cent or more of the total testimonies.

A subject of collateral interest in addition to the question concerning the number of power centers in the interest group system, is the distribution of the most active groups among types of groups. The twenty-five groups that presented the most testimonies on the 145 major bills are classified by types in Table 57. The table shows a remarkably equal distribution of groups of different types among the twenty-five most active groups

in the 189-group universe. Five types of groups were represented by three or more groups among the most active groups. Only the specialized business groups, such as Agricultural Business, Financial Business, and Small Business, are not represented among the most active groups. These data suggest there is no dominance of the interest group system by groups of one or two types.

A second way to appraise the number of centers of power in the interest group system is to tabulate the number of groups in the select universe that presented testimony on each of 140 bills, classified by policy category, in the select universe. The evaluation of this characteristic of pluralism is undertaken for both the entire range of bills during the sixteen-year period, and for the bills in specific policy categories. Separate consideration is given to the bills in different policy categories because within certain categories, such as defense or tax policy, some of the bills are concerned with different specialized subjects. Only one hearing may be called for two years or more on a specialized subject. Therefore, the study of a single bill may also be a useful way to assess the presence of this pluralist characteristic in a narrow policy area.

Table 59 shows that at only one hearing, a hearing on a defense bill, did more than fifty of the 119 groups in the select universe present testimony for or against a bill during the period 1945-60. For only five of the 140

TABLE 59

VOLUME OF TESTIMONY BY GROUPS ON 140 BILLS
IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES

Policy Category	Number of Bills on Which Different Numbers of Groups Testified[a]								
	50 or More Groups	49 to 45 Groups	44 to 40 Groups	39 to 35 Groups	34 to 30 Groups	29 to 25 Groups	24 to 20 Groups	19 to 15 Groups	14 to 10 Groups
Labor	0	1	2	2	3	0	2	6	10
Business	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	15
Trade	0	0	1	1	2	3	1	1	7
Ed/Welfare	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	4	6
Housing	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	5	7
Foreign Affairs . .	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	8
Tax	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	5
Agriculture	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
Civil-Rights . . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	4
Defense	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
Total	1	1	3	4	12	7	9	31	72

[a]Select universe composed of 119 groups. The testimony counted in this table is only testimony for or against bills; ambiguous testimony is not counted.

bills did forty or more groups present testimony. Most of the bills in five policy categories received testimony from no more than fourteen groups. Most of the bills in the other five policy categories received testimony from no more than nineteen groups.

From the perspective of the entire system, 51 per cent of the 140 bills received testimony from no more than fourteen groups. Thus, most bills fall into the category, testimony by ten-to-fourteen groups: the category with the smallest number of groups for which tabulations were kept. Since all bills that had less than ten groups testifying on them were excluded from the universe, it is possible an even larger number of bills received testimony from nine groups or less. The sharp increases in the number of bills in the last two columns in Table 59 suggest that this is a reasonable hypothesis. If the several hundred bills considered at hearings in this period, not merely the bills receiving the most testimony for or against them, were classified by the number of groups presenting testimony on them, it seems likely that the median and the mode would be less than ten groups. But even the data in Table 59, based on the bills receiving the most testimony, shows that large numbers of groups testify on only a small proportion of the bills. Only 27 per cent of the 140 bills received testimony from more than nineteen groups.

The table also shows that on bills in certain policy categories, many fewer groups testified than on

bills in other categories. None of the agriculture bills or the business bills attracted more than nineteen groups, and only two of the eight civil rights bills attracted more than nineteen groups. When it is recalled that the bills under consideration are only those bills that received the most testimonies, it is clear, judging from the number of groups presenting testimony, that the prospects for discovering pluralism in these policy sectors are dim. In contrast, the major portion of the bills in the labor, trade, and education-welfare policy sectors show a much heavier rate of group activity. In general, however, if specialized bills in the select universe were studied separately as a test of whether large numbers of groups testified on them or not, some of them would not qualify.

Table 60 shows the number of groups that testified for and against the 140 bills that are classified into ten policy categories. The table reveals that eighty-four groups in the select universe of 119 groups made one or more testimonies on the twenty-six labor bills examined. The eight civil rights bills attracted the smallest number of groups making one or more testimonies, thirty-three groups. The table shows that the number of groups with one or more testimonies on bills in each policy category is partly but not consistently related to the number of bills in each category. Using the criterion of one or more testimonies for enumerating a group as having

TABLE 60

NUMBER OF GROUPS TESTIFYING ON 140 BILLS CLASSIFIED BY SUBJECT MATTER[a]

Testimonies	26 Labor Bills	16 Housing Bills	19 Business Bills	16 Trade Bills	16 Ed/Welf. Bills	13 For/Affrs. Bills	10 Tax Bills	9 Agric. Bills	8 Civil Rts. Bills	7 Defense Bills
One or more testimonies[b] . . .	84	48	60	68	66	48	58	34	33	64
Testified on 25% of the bills[c] . . .	30	26	11	35	24	26	33	15	26	37
Testified on 50% of the bills . . .	5	14	3	7	6	12	3	8	12	15
Testified on 75% of the bills . . .	4	4	0	1	1	1	1	2	3	3
Testified on 90% of the bills . . .	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Testified on 100% of the bills . . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

[a]The universe of groups on which the tabulations in this table were based is the select universe of 119 groups. The testimony counted was only testimony for or against bills; ambiguous testimony was not counted.

[b]A group is counted as testifying on a bill if it presents testimony on one or more bills in a category of bills.

[c]A group is counted as testifying on a bill if it testified on 25% or more of the bills in one category of bills. The same rule for counting a group as testifying applies to the other percentages as well, 50%, 75%, 90%, 100%.

presented testimony, every policy category has thirty-three or more groups testifying on one or more bills in it during the sixteen-year period.

Since the number of bills in the policy categories varies from seven defense bills to twenty-six labor bills, percentage tabulations were made of the bills on which each group presented supporting or opposing testimony. For example, Table 61 shows that thirty groups testified

TABLE 61

FREQUENCY OF GROUP TESTIMONY,[a] CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP, ON BILLS CLASSIFIED BY POLICY CATEGORY

% of Bills on Which Testimony Was Given	Total Groups	B	FB	AB	SB	A	L	P	C	R	V
Labor Bills (26)											
25% or more (6 bills)	30	11		1		3	11	1	3		
50% or more (13 bills)	5	2				1	2				
75% or more (19 bills)	4	2					2				
90% or more (23 bills)	2						2				
Housing Bills (15)											
25% or more (4 bills)	26	4	6			1	2	4	2	2	5
50% or more (7 bills)	14	4	2				2		2		4
75% or more (11 bills)	4	1					2		1		
90% or more (13 bills)	3	1					2				
Business Bills (19)											
25% or more (5 bills)	11	2			1	5	3				
50% or more (9 bills)	3					2	1				
75% or more (14 bills)	0										
90% or more (17 bills)	0										
Trade Bills (16)											
25% or more (4 bills)	35	12		3		8	4	1	2	2	3
50% or more (8 bills)	7	1				3	2				
75% or more (12 bills)	1					1					
90% or more (14 bills)	1					1					

TABLE 61--Continued

% of Bills on Which Testimony Was Given	Total Groups	B	FB	AB	SB	A	L	P	C	R	V
Ed/Welfare Bills (16)											
25% or more (4 bills)	24	2				4	3	5	7	2	1
50% or more (8 bills)	6	1				1	2		1		1
75% or more (12 bills)	1						1				
90% or more (14 bills)	0										
Foreign Affairs (13)											
25% or more (3 bills)	26	3				4	3	2	5	4	5
50% or more (6 bills)	12	1				2	2	1	4	1	1
75% or more (10 bills)	1									1	
90% or more (12 bills)	0										
Tax Bills (10)											
25% or more (2 bills)	33	12		4	2	3	4	3	3	1	1
50% or more (5 bills)	3	1					2				
75% or more (7 bills)	1						1				
90% or more (9 bills)	0										
Agricultural Bills (9)											
25% or more (2 bills)	15	1		3		5	3		2	1	
50% or more (4 bills)	8					4	2		2		
75% or more (7 bills)	2					2					
90% or more (8 bills)	0										
Civil Rights Bills (8)											
25% or more (2 bills)	26	1				1	11	2	6	3	2
50% or more (4 bills)	12						6	1	4	1	
75% or more (6 bills)	3						2			1	
90% or more (7 bills)	2						2				
Defense Bills (7)											
25% or more (2 bills)	37	8		5		7	5	3	4	1	4
50% or more (3 bills)	15	5				4	2	1	2		1
75% or more (5 bills)	3	1					2				
90% or more (6 bills)	2	1					1				

[a]Testimony for or against a bill; it does not include ambiguous testimony. These data are based on a universe of 119 groups and a universe of 145 bills.

Code:
B--Business Groups
FB-- Financial Business
AB--Agricultural Business
SB--Small Business Groups
A--Agriculture Groups
L--Labor Groups
P--Professional
C--Citizen Groups
R--Religious Groups
V--Veteran Groups

on 25 per cent of the twenty-six labor bills.

The decline in the number of groups that testified on 25 per cent of the bills from the number that testified on one or more bills is very large--more than 40 per cent--for every policy category but one, civil rights bills. Even greater declines emerge when the number of groups that presented testimony on 50 per cent of the bills is compared with the number testifying on 25 per cent of the bills. Under the criterion of testimony on 75 per cent or more of the bills in a policy category, the eighty-four groups testifying once or more on labor bills are reduced to four groups. No more than four groups testified on 75 per cent of the bills in any policy category. For six policy categories, no group testified on as many as 90 per cent of the bills. No group testified on 100 per cent of the bills in any policy category.

The major conclusion that emerges from the interpretation of these data is that for no policy category is there a large number of groups that testified on most of the bills. Part of the explanation for the rapid decline in the numbers of groups that presented testimony under the more demanding criteria, 70 per cent and 90 per cent, may be due to the fact that some of the policy categories used in the classification of bills are not rigorous in excluding bills that are not focused sharply on a single legislative policy. For example, the

business policy category includes several different kinds of bills that were of interest to different types of groups.

However, the bills in some policy categories are more homogeneous. For example, the bills in the agriculture, housing, and trade categories are each addressed to a single policy sector. But the data in Table 60 show that not on half of the bills in each of these three categories did as many as fifteen groups present supporting or opposing testimonies. Thus, there are not numerous centers of power that testify repeatedly on most bills in a single policy category. Nevertheless, there is one or a small number of groups that each testify on 50 per cent or more of the bills in each policy category.

Table 62 contains a list of the number of groups, classified by type of group, that presented testimony on 50 per cent or more of the bills in each policy category. Groups that testified at the 50 per cent level, or higher, on bills in a policy category will be identified in this chapter as the "active groups" in a policy category. Table 62 does not indicate whether the active groups on bills in one category are the same groups of that type that are active on bills in a second category. For example, the table does not show whether the two Labor groups that were active on labor bills are the same two Labor groups that were active on housing bills, trade bills, and bills in other policy categories.

TABLE 62

GROUPS THAT PRESENTED TESTIMONY[a] ON FIFTY PERCENT OR MORE OF THE BILLS IN EACH POLICY CATEGORY, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE

Type of Group	Policy Category									
	Labor	Housing	Business	Trade	Ed/Welfare	Foreign Affairs	Tax	Agriculture	Civil Rights	Defense
Business	2	4		1	1	1	1			5
Financial Business		2								
Agricultural Business										
Small Business										
Agriculture	1		2	3	1	2		4		4
Labor	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	6	2
Professional						1			1	
Citizen		2			1	4		2	4	2
Religious						1			1	
Veterans		4			1	1				1

[a]Testimony is counted that is for or against a bill; ambiguous testimony is not counted.

Table 62 shows that the types of groups that had the most active groups in one policy category were often the types that had active groups in other policy categories. The most consistently active groups in all policy categories were Labor, Business, Citizens, and Agricultural groups. Two types of groups, Small Business and Agricultural Business, had no active groups in any policy categories. Financial Business groups were active in only one policy category and Religious groups were active in only two policy categories.

Another characteristic of the pluralist society is that the numerous centers of power within it compete with each other. One indicator of this characteristic is the extent to which the groups whose spokesmen testify at hearings present opposing views.

In this research a hearing is classified as non-competitive if it has a minority of 30 per cent or less of the total groups that testified. At a hearing of minimum size in the universe, a hearing at which ten groups presented testimony, the division of seven groups opposed to three groups is defined as a non-competitive hearing. This standard seems acceptable if two assumptions are granted. The first assumption is that each group, whether more or less powerful, is as likely to be in a minority as in a majority at a hearing. The second assumption, based on the first, is that a seven-group majority is one against which a minority of three will

have difficulty competing successfully.

If 30 per cent seems to be a large minority, it is noteworthy that there are not many non-competitive hearings that have a minority as large as 30 per cent. A breakdown of the thirty-six bills on which the number of groups in the minority ranged from 21 per cent to 30 per cent reveals there are only nine bills that have minorities of 29 or 30 per cent. The remaining twenty-seven bills have minorities of 28 to 21 per cent.

Table 63 shows the number of bills on which majorities were opposed by minorities of different sizes. On fifteen of the 140 bills, the majority was unopposed. On twenty-seven additional bills, the per cent of the total witnesses in the minority was 20 per cent or less. On thirty-six bills the percentage of groups taking a minority position ranged from 21 to 30 per cent. The remaining sixty-two bills had minorities from 31 to 50 per cent of the total number of groups that testified. Thus, 55 per cent of the hearings were non-competitive and forty-five per cent were competitive. These data show there is only a small amount of competition among groups on a large proportion of bills. These findings are important since these 140 bills were the bills receiving the largest numbers of testimonies from groups during the sixteen-year period.

Another indicator of competition among groups at hearings is the extent to which cleavage among groups

TABLE 63

BILLS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF GROUPS TAKING THE MINORITY POSITION

Policy Category	No Minority	Minority of 1% to 10%	Minority of 11% to 20%	Minority of 21% to 30%	Minority of 31% to 40%	Division of 41% to 50%	Total Bills
Labor	0	3	3	5	7	8	26
Business	3	0	2	6	3	5	19
Trade	1	0	1	4	3	7	16
Education/Welfare	4	0	1	5	4	2	16
Housing	0	1	0	5	6	4	16
Foreign Affairs .	3	0	1	4	3	2	13
Tax	1	4	0	4	1	0	10
Agriculture . . .	1	0	3	1	2	2	9
Civil Rights . . .	2	2	3	1	0	0	8
Defense	0	0	3	1	2	1	7
Total Bills	15	10	17	36	31	31	140

occurs on bills in a single policy category. Table 64 contains data on the 100 hearings conducted by the House Committee on Agriculture at which from two to nine groups in the preliminary universe of groups testified for or against a bill. The hearings are classified according to the number of groups that testified. The cells show the number of bills on which the group testimony was unanimous, equally divided, or divided into minority-majority divisions of different size.

Table 64 reveals that in 49 per cent of the 100 hearings, no cleavage existed among the groups testifying. There were fifty-two hearings at which the number of groups for and the number of groups against a bill could have divided equally.[2] Only nine of the fifty-two hearings had an equal division of groups for and against the bill under consideration. There were seven hearings at which the minority-majority division was from one-to-four to one-to-eight. Thus, if "competitive hearings" are defined as those at which the division among groups was from one-to-three or closer, there are forty-four competitive hearings and fifty-six non-competitive hearings. This is not a high rate of competition among groups.

Table 64 shows the pattern of competition on minor bills that were excluded from the select universe. If the pattern of testimonies in other policy sectors is

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[2]The two-testimony, four-testimony, six-testimony, and eight-testimony hearings.

TABLE 64

UNANIMITY AND CLEAVAGE AMONG GROUPS THAT TESTIFIED FOR OR AGAINST 100 SELECTED HEARINGS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

Number of Testimonies Presented at Hearings	Unanimous	Minority of One	Minority of Two	Minority of Three	Minority of Four	Equal Division
Two-testimony hearings	16					6
Three-testimony hearings	19	6				
Four-testimony hearings	5	10				2
Five-testimony hearings	2	3	2			
Six-testimony hearings	1	2	1			1
Seven-testimony hearings	4	1	4	3		
Eight-testimony hearings	1		3	4		
Nine-testimony hearings	1		1	1	1	
Total	49	22	11	8	1	9

comparable to these data on agricultural hearings, competition is nonexistent on approximately half of the minor bills considered at all congressional hearings. Thus, though competition among groups is not frequent or vigorous on major bills, it is more commonly absent on minor bills. If the existence of pluralism in the hearings process is measured by the presence or absence of balanced competition between groups on each major bill separately, the hearings process fails to meet the criterion more often than it succeeds.

Table 65 shows competition is almost as infrequent

TABLE 65

COMPETITIVE AND NON-COMPETITIVE HEARINGS CLASSIFIED BY POLICY CATEGORY[a]

Policy Category	Non-Competitive Hearings	Competitive Hearings	Total Hearings
Labor	11	15	26
Business	11	8	19
Trade	6	10	16
Education/Welfare	10	6	16
Housing	6	10	16
Foreign Affairs	8	5	13
Tax	9	1	10
Agriculture	5	4	9
Civil Rights	8	0	8
Defense	4	3	7
Total	78	62	140

[a]A hearing is classified as "non-competitive" if it has a minority of 30 per cent or less of the total groups that testified.

for bills in each separate policy category. Only labor, trade, and housing bills have more competitive hearings than non-competitive hearings. All the civil rights hearings were non-competitive and only one of the ten hearings on tax bills was competitive. According to these data, the hearings process is not an arena where many richly diversified centers of power engage in vigorous competitive interaction with great regularity.

The second major characteristic of the pluralist society is that opportunities exist for access to decision-making by groups. It was stated in an earlier chapter that opportunities for access are not equally available to all groups. One indicator of the extent to which opportunities for access are available equally for all groups that attempt to use them is the responses of representatives of groups to the question: Are congressional committees equally receptive to all groups in your field that testify before them? The responses were classified as follows: sixteen, yes (yes, usually, generally), twenty-one, no, and five respondents gave no classifiable answer. The respondents who answered negatively were asked this additional question: How is the difference in receptivity shown? Several kinds of answers were given. The most frequently cited instances of difference in receptivity by congressional committees were the following: (1) the character of the questions asked by committee members--the spokesmen for some groups

get friendly questions; the spokesmen for other groups get hostile questions, (2) the inattendance of committee members when testimony is presented by group spokesmen--some group witnesses are heard by only one or two members of the committee, (3) the scheduling, and allotting of time during the hearings period for presentation of group testimony. The evidence is clear that some group spokesmen are given better opportunities to state their views than others.

In addition there is also evidence from the committee chairmen and staff that though equality of opportunity to testify is a declared policy of committees, this policy is not always practiced. A brief set of questions was mailed to the fourteen chairmen of House committees whose hearings were included in the study to learn the procedures used by committees in arranging for groups to testify. In general, all respondents indicated that their committees had an established policy of allowing all groups to testify at all hearings. Nevertheless, several of the respondents added comments that qualified this policy to some extent. Each chairman was asked if the committee had a policy of inviting specific groups to testify and if so which groups were invited. The typical response was that the committee had compiled a list of organizations that had previously indicated they wanted to be notified if hearings were scheduled on certain kinds of bills. Each of these groups receives advance

notice of the hearings. The groups whose leaders have not made a request to be notified may keep informed of scheduled hearings by reading the Congressional Record.

Although there is general agreement among the House committees on policies of notice to potential witnesses, specific practices are not the same in all committees. The chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture indicated that sometimes the general farm organizations are notified by telephone. The chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee stated for hearings on postal rates and federal pay, the policy is to limit testimony to the representatives of national organizations. This suggests the committees sometimes give privileged consideration to the well-known national organizations.

The House Armed Services Committee staff does not send any notice to any group but relies on the publication of future hearings in the Congressional Record to inform all interested parties. The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee states that invitations may be sent to a group "if the group is reputable and the subject relevant." The chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee stated that invitations may be sent to specific groups when the chairman thinks that a group has something to say, but such invitations are issued only on a "case by case" basis.

Only one respondent reported the deliberate exclusion of any specific groups. He indicated that "in the past" one chairman of the committee refused to hear spokesmen for the American Veterans Committee and a certain labor union. He added that they were subsequently heard. In addition to these exceptions to the assumed condition of equal opportunity for access, some respondents indicated that some group spokesmen on occasion could not be heard because of the limited time available for the hearings, and the necessity of avoiding repetitious testimony. Four House committees mentioned one of these factors that could disadvantage some groups.

From these responses from committee chairmen and staff, it seems fair to conclude that the committees attempt to allow most witnesses to appear but there is occasionally some discrimination. The groups most disadvantaged by these practices would seem to be the small groups with inadequate communication networks or groups that the chairman does not believe have any justification for committee time. Newly formed groups may suffer more than other groups from these disadvantages. Occasionally, the hearings record contains the statement of a group spokesman who was not permitted to appear personally before the committee and felt slighted by his exclusion. For example, Roy E. Webb, President of the American Association for the General Welfare,

wrote to the Ways and Means Committee,

> "Gentlemen: Inasmuch as the writer has not been invited by your honorable committee to attend the current social security hearings . . . I have adopted this means of presenting to the committee those facts, changes, and recommendations which I consider . . ."[3]

The third characteristic of a pluralist system is that use is made of the opportunities for access that exist. This implies a large, rather than a small, number of groups use opportunities for access. This research provides three kinds of evidence for appraising the extent to which this characteristic is found at the congressional level of government. First, interview data were obtained from representatives of groups with offices in Washington on the extent to which bills are prepared by their groups and presented to congressmen for introduction. Second, interview data show the frequency with which group spokesmen seek to induce committees to schedule hearings. Third, data indicate the extent to which large numbers of groups use their opportunities to appear at hearings.

Each group spokesman was asked if his group is able to get congressmen to introduce bills prepared by the group. Although there was some variation in the way the interviewees responded, the answers were coded into four categories. Thirty of the forty-two respondents

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[3]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee, Social Security Act Amendments. Hearings before subcommittee, 83rd Congress, Second Session, April 1, 2, 5-10, 12, 15, 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 635.

indicated they prepared or assisted in the preparation of bills and had no difficulty in getting congressmen to introduce them. Eleven respondents either stated their group does not seek to have legislation introduced or made an unclassifiable response. Some respondents, however, noted that introduction of a bill was not meaningful unless the legislator introducing it had stature and would support it.

Thirty group spokesmen stated they attempted to have committees schedule hearings. Twelve respondents either indicated they did not try to get hearings scheduled or their responses were unclassifiable. According to these data, a large percentage of groups with Washington representatives actively seek to use these opportunities for access.

Table 62, on page 279, for example, shows that only two Labor groups of the sixteen in the select universe of groups testified on as many as 50 per cent of the labor bills. Only four of the thirty-seven Business groups testified on 50 per cent of the housing bills, and only one Business group testified on 50 per cent of the trade bills. Only a few groups of each type testified on 50 per cent or more of the bills in one policy category. In Chapter VI data are discussed showing that hundreds of groups present only a few testimonies even though, apparently, opportunities to present more exist.

This pattern of groups presenting testimony on only a portion of the bills in a policy category that concerns them may be a commentary on the pragmatic attitude of the leaders of most of these groups: the group leaders and members seem to define narrowly the scope of the legislative interests of the group and study each bill separately. Such a practice would have the effect of reducing the different types of groups that confront each other at hearings. It might foster a norm of "self-government" by the groups most directly affected by the legislation.

The fourth characteristic of the pluralist system is that there are changing alignments of groups in the political system. One index of stable or changing alignments of groups is provided by the answers to the question: Does your group cooperate with the same groups repeatedly, or with different groups? Answers were classified into three categories: (1) responses indicating that the group cooperated in legislative work with the same groups, or that the group cooperated with the same "core" of groups, or that the tendency was to cooperate with the same groups rather than different groups on different occasions, (2) responses that stated the group cooperated with different groups rather than the same ones, or answers that stated the group did "not necessarily" cooperate with the same groups on different occasions, (3) responses that were not readily

classifiable in either of the two categories stated above.

The spokesmen for thirty-four groups gave answers indicating their group cooperated with the same groups on bills during the second session of the Eighty-seventh Congress. These data suggest a substantial amount of stability in patterns of cooperation among groups during this session. Several respondents commented that this pattern of cooperation with the same groups was characteristic for their group in previous legislative sessions. Only five respondents indicated they cooperated chiefly with different groups on each cooperative venture. Two respondents gave unclassifiable answers.

Summary

In this chapter, pluralism has been used as a conceptual framework for appraising the interest group system at the congressional level of government. The pluralist framework highlights chiefly four features of the interest group system: the size of the group population, the degree of diversity of the groups, the degree of competition among the groups, and the degree of permanence of the intergroup relations within it.

The evidence produced in this investigation is consistent for two levels of analysis: first, for the entire system; and second, for the examination of a few policy sectors within the system. The examination of the entire system--undertaken by studying group testimony at

all the hearings combined--shows no large population of active groups in the hearings process. Less than half of the groups in the 189-group universe, composed of the most active groups, testified as many as twelve times at the 145 major hearings during the sixteen-year period.

There is no evidence of dominance by an active unified elite of groups of one or a few types; instead, a few groups of many types are very active. But there is not much evidence of vigorous competition among groups on a large scale. Furthermore, the relations among the groups in the population seem to be stable rather than characterized by a continuous process of reordering and realignment.

Second, the examination of the hearings in each of a few policy sectors reveals that the presence of pluralism is not solidly confirmed. The bills in only a few of the ten policy sectors regularly attract many groups, even over a sixteen-year period. In the agriculture policy sector, the frequent presentations of testimonies by a few well-known Agriculture groups suggests a pattern of dominance of the hearings by these groups. There is little evidence that the group population active in this policy sector is characterized by much diversity, or that the relations among the groups are competitive on minor bills. The data tend to confirm the notion that in this phase of the decision-making process,

self-government by the groups most directly affected is far advanced and that the large prestigious organizations regularly play the leading roles.

CHAPTER VI

INTEGRATION AMONG INTEREST GROUPS

Introduction

A second frame of reference to appraise relationships among interest groups is integration. Although the pluralist frame of reference does not rule out cooperation among groups, it is characterized by concepts such as entity autonomy, diversity, and separateness. Distinctions between groups are stressed and intergroup relationships are discussed chiefly in terms of competition and conflict. The notion that interest groups may be integrated with each other is based on the premise that the interest groups within a common environment share, to some degree, a common fate. Integration connotes mutual dependency. Jacob and Teune state:

> Political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and self-awareness. Integration, therefore, is based on strong cohesiveness within a social group . . .[1]

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[1]Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, op. cit., p. 4.

Integration, broadly conceived, does not imply either cooperation or conflict, only interrelationships. Jacob and Teune state several indicators of the degree of integration that may be used in the analysis of the relations among groups in the interest group system. In this research the degree of integration among groups is studied in terms of the following indicators: shared attributes, common location, interaction, mutual knowledge, the structure in the group population, and shared experience.

Shared Attributes

The first indicator mentioned by Jacob and Teune is the extent of homogeneity among the groups in the population. Are there attributes possessed by groups active at the congressional level that make the group population homogeneous in some respects? The expectation is that the greater the homogeneity of the groups the greater the probability of integration among them. This investigation was not designed to collect and order data on this question. However, in the course of reading committee hearings, the literature on interest groups, and descriptive information on groups in reference works, certain common attributes were noted. No effort has been made to check a sample of groups that were not active in the hearings process to determine if they share the same attributes to the same extent. What follows, then, is

less a presentation of evidence than it is an impressionistic report on the degree of promise some characteristics of groups seem to have for the study of homogeneity and its impact on the integration of interest groups.

Data were not obtained to appraise the degree to which the groups in the system could be assessed in terms of financial resources, organization structure, or prestige in the society. Nevertheless, some fragmentary information and evidence concerning three shared characteristics are available in crude form for most of the interest groups in the select universe of 119 groups: (1) the age of the groups, (2) the kind of members, and the relations between members and leaders, and (3) the partisan ideological posture of the group.

Of the 119 groups in the select universe only five groups were established since 1945. Five additional groups date their origination after 1945 but each has a history before the post-1945 founding date. The new date of the establishment of each of these five groups marks a merger of two or more groups or a reorganization of the group and a change of name.[2] The small number of new groups that have testified frequently for or against bills since 1945 suggests that the most active groups in the group population

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[2]The five groups with histories prior to 1945 that use a post-1945 founding date are: The American Textile Manufacturing Institute, The National Association of Social Workers, The National Council of Churches of Christ, The American Council on Human Rights, and The Council on Christian Social Action.

at the congressional level are those that have existed for several years before their spokesmen became active witnesses at congressional committee hearings. These facts also point to the longevity of the active groups that were established prior to 1945, most of them prior to 1940. The subject of group entrance into the interest group system and departure from it are discussed later in this chapter.

It also may be significant that most of the groups in the 119-group select universe appear to share either of two similar types of membership.[3] Most of the groups are either individual membership groups, such as the Americans for Democratic Action, or organizations bringing together other independent organizations, business firms, or unions, such as the Independent Petroleum Producers Association or the National Housing Conference. Thus, the leaders of each of these groups seems to have a specifically defined membership constituency. It is possible, of course, that some of these groups are the creations of individuals, and that the groups are vehicles for the expression of the personal views of the leaders. The People's Lobby, founded and directed by Benjamin Marsh, is an illustration of this phenomenon.

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[3]This judgment is based on material published in the hearings of the Buchanan Committee, held in 1950, the Encyclopedia of National Associations, and the National Associations of the United States.

A few other groups in the universe have memberships about which little information is available. These groups are the National Economic Council, the Consumers Union of the United States, the Committee for Constitutional Government, and the American Parents Committee. Some of the latter groups seem to lack a membership base of the conventional type. The leaders of such groups as the National Economic Council and the Consumer's Union do not seem to have clear and continuing organizational responsibilities to a functioning membership. Differences among groups in terms of the responsibilities and powers of group members may affect the ability or willingness of group leaders to cooperate with other groups or become integrated into the system. In general, however, nearly all of the 119 groups are groups in which leaders are to some degree responsible to a defined membership.

A third characteristic that may be common to almost all of the 119 interest groups in the select universe is that their testimony at committee hearings is non-ideological. Of the 119 interest groups, not more than a few groups appear to promote as a primary objective a scheme of thought, such as "conservatism" or liberalism." This tentative judgment is a product of reading many testimonies presented by these groups and collateral reading in the literature on interest groups. Most testimonies presented by groups and most discussions between committee members and group representatives are character-

ized by statements concerning the specific impact of a bill on the clientele served by the group. Almost all of the groups have a professional identity regardless of the political identity their leaders and members may disclose during elections. The professional identity of most groups is very much in evidence in the presentation of testimony at hearings. Some apparent exceptions are the National Economic Council, the Committee for Constitutional Government, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies. It seems probable that when a group is perceived chiefly as an ideological or partisan group, the efforts of its leaders to influence congressmen and to secure cooperation or support from non-ideological groups are likely to be impaired or be effective only within a narrower circle than otherwise would be true. Therefore, when the population of groups is composed of both ideological and non-ideological groups, the expectation is that the former tend to find themselves in isolation from other groups and to have a low coalition potential.

If these three attributes are as widely shared by the active groups in the interest group system as this limited report indicates, it is not difficult to see how they foster the integration of the active groups. The respect for the experience of long-lived groups, the responsibilities that leaders owe to the affiliated members of the group, and the pragmatic, non-political,

even technical style of discourse used by group representatives at hearings--all of these characteristics seem to invest a group possessing them with legitimacy in the eyes of congressmen, the clientele served by the group, and the mass media. If legitimacy is bestowed on the most active groups by these sources, it will be easier for the leaders of these groups to accept each other as representatives of legitimate organizations, and intergroup cooperation will be possible on some bills between groups that stand opposed to each other on other bills.

Proximity of Groups to Each Other

A second indicator of integration mentioned by Jacob and Teune is the degree of proximity of the entities to each other in the system. The premise is that proximity fosters contact, and contact fosters greater integration. This indicator is measured in terms of the extent to which the groups in the universe have offices located in Washington, D. C., rather than in other cities. Thirty-three groups in the universe of 119 groups did not have an office in Washington in 1949, but sixteen of these established an office in Washington in the next decade. Therefore, only seventeen groups in the universe did not have an office in Washington at any time during the period, 1945-59.

One test of the impact of proximity on intergroup relations is the extent to which the groups that

have offices in Washington, as compared with groups without such offices, are more or less active in presenting testimonies at hearings. The expectation is that groups with offices in Washington present more testimony at hearings than groups without Washington offices.

Table 66 compares the average number of testimonies of groups that had offices in Washington before 1946 with the testimonies of groups that did not have an office in Washington at any time during the period, 1945-59. For the groups of every type except one, the average number of testimonies presented by groups domiciled in Washington is greater than those that were not. The exception is Professional groups but only one group, the National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, had no office in Washington during the period. For the groups of most types, the Washington-based groups presented substantially more testimony on the average than groups without offices in Washington. The two groups without offices in Washington that testified frequently at hearings during the period were the National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers and the National Wool Manufacturers Association. Two possible explanations for the many testimonies of these groups are worth noting. First, these groups are both long-established groups, founded in 1911 and 1864 respectively. Their leaders have had many years to acquire experience in working with congressional committees. Thus, gradually through the

TABLE 66

A COMPARISON OF THE VOLUME OF TESTIMONY BY GROUPS THAT HAVE OFFICES IN WASHINGTON AND THOSE THAT DO NOT[a]

Type of Group	No. of Groups With Offices in Washington Prior to 1946	Avg. No. of Testimonies of Groups Based in Washington Prior to 1946	No. of Groups Without Offices in Washington Prior to 1960	Avg. No. of Testimonies of Groups Not Based in Wash. Prior to 1960
Business	23	21.1	4	8.3
Labor	10	35.8	3	13.0
Professional . .	3	19.7	1	26.0
Agricultural Business . . .	6	12.3	2	10.5
Financial Business . . .	3	14.3	0	0.0
Agriculture . . .	6	50.0	2	15.5
Small Business .	0	0.0	0	0.0
Citizen	4	23.5	3	14.0
Religious	6	24.1	2	17.0
Veterans	2	25.5	0	0.0

[a]All testimony was counted regardless of whether it was for or against a bill, or ambiguous toward it. The universe of bills was 145; the universe of groups was the select universe of 119 groups.

A brief questionnaire was sent to the home office of all of the groups in the universe of 119 groups to determine the year their office in Washington was established. Eighteen groups did not return this information. Letters to some groups were returned marked "address unknown."

years, they develop rapport and skill in representing their groups in Washington. Second, both of these groups have their offices in New York City within easy travel of Washington, D. C.

A second approach to assessing the importance of proximity in fostering interaction among groups is to identify the groups that established offices in Washington during the middle of the period, 1945-60, and to compare the number of testimonies presented before the Washington office was established with the number presented afterwards. Table 67 shows the number of testimonies presented by each of eleven groups that established an office in Washington from 1949 through 1956. All but two of these groups presented substantially more testimonies after the Washington office was opened than in the earlier period.

On the basis of this evidence most groups that are active in the hearings process are in close physical proximity to each other. Proximity does foster contact among groups, as measured by volume of testimony at hearings, and therefore, these groups are likely to be more integrated than groups that are located farther away.

Interaction Among Groups

A third indicator of the degree of integration in an aggregation of entities is the volume of interaction among the entities. The premise is that the greater the amount of interaction, the greater the integration of the

TABLE 67

COMPARISON OF THE VOLUME OF TESTIMONIES BY GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER EACH OPENED AN OFFICE IN WASHINGTON

Name of Group	Established Office in Washington	Testimonies Prior to Opening Washington Office	Testimonies Since Opening of Washington Office
American Merchant Marine Institute .	1953	5	12
Pacific American Steamship Association	1954	2	6
Nationwide Committee of Industry, Agriculture, and Labor on Import-Export Policy	1950[a]	0	8
American Life Convention	1950	2	9
Life Insurance Association of America	1950	2	11
American Textile Manufacturing Institute	1952	7	11
National Creameries Association . .	1953	3	7
Vegetable Growers Association . . .	1951	1	8
American Municipal Association . . .	1954	6	10
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs .	1956	13	1
Jewish War Veterans	1954	13	13

[a]This group was established in 1950, therefore, it could not have had any testimony prior to the opening of its Washington office.

entities. This research provides two kinds of data that permit some assessment of the amount of interaction among interest groups at the congressional level: (1) the testimony of groups at hearings, and (2) the interview responses of group representatives domiciled in Washington.

The interview data on cooperative interaction among groups were presented in Chapter IV.[4] These data show that cooperative activities among groups of all types are common and for some groups very frequent. For example, one respondent stated that his group worked in cooperation with other groups on each of the twelve bills in which his group was interested during the session. Many respondents stated their group was cooperating more with other groups now than it did a decade ago. The evidence shows that cooperative interaction among groups is quite frequent, and has been increasing in recent years.

The presentation of testimony on a bill by a group representative at a hearing constitutes an interaction with the representatives of other groups that also present testimony at the hearing. Although it may be true that each group representative does not always become aware of all the groups represented at a lengthy hearing, in general, it is fair to assume the leaders of each group, to some extent, become aware of some of the groups supporting and opposing the bill under study by the committee.

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[4]See pages 162-173.

It is especially useful to learn how frequently the representative of a group interacts with the leaders of groups of a different type, since this may indicate the communication of different perspectives on policy among groups. Interaction may also communicate information about the organization, tactics, and style of operation of the group and its representatives. The increased knowledge gained by each group from interaction tends to promote greater integration. Information concerning another group may mark it as a potential ally or opponent, as a source of certain kinds of useful information, as an important source of research findings, as a group enjoying great respect from most members of a congressional committee, or as a group that is led by an effective spokesman.

By presenting testimony repeatedly at hearings, the group spokesman also learns more about the policies, modes of presentation, kinds of oral and written argument, and documentation that conform to the expectations of other interest group spokesmen and committee members. In this way he gets a better sense of what the established interest groups regard as legitimate and effective behavior at a hearing, what is the usual policy stance of each committee member, and what are the limits of each committee member's tolerance. With the accumulation of more knowledge, each group representative becomes more certain in his judgments about active groups and their representatives. These

items of information tend to integrate a group and its spokesman more completely into the circle of the most active groups. A second perspective on interaction among groups is presented in Table 68. This table shows the number of groups that presented testimony on bills in different policy categories. Five different criteria are used for counting a group as having presented testimony on one or more bills in a policy category.

Using one testimony as the criterion for counting a group as having presented testimony on bills in a policy category, as indicated in Column One in Table 5, only two groups confined their testimonies to bills in a single policy category, and only twelve additional groups testified on bills in two policy categories. Testimonies on bills in five policy categories is both the median and the mode for the 119 groups in the select universe. Sixty-six per cent of the 119 groups in the universe did not testify on bills in more than five policy categories. Thus, under the least stringent criterion for measuring the range of the legislative interests of groups, two-thirds of the most active groups did not testify on any bills in more than half of the policy categories. These data prove that most groups do not testify even once in a sixteen-year period on major bills in most of the different policy categories.

Under the one-testimony criterion the number of group representatives testifying on bills in six and seven

TABLE 68

DISTRIBUTION OF GROUP TESTIMONY
ON BILLS IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES
UNDER FIVE DIFFERENT CRITERIA

Number of Policy Categories	One Testimony Criterion[a]	Two Testimony Criterion[b]	Three Testimony Criterion	Four Testimony Criterion	Five Testimony Criterion
None	0	1	4	20	36
One Category	2	19	43	53	57
Two Categories	12	31	32	24	15
Three Categories	21	25	19	8	4
Four Categories	20	13	8	3	1
Five Categories	23	15	2	3	2
Six Categories	14	3	5	3	1
Seven Categories	8	4	1	1	0
Eight Categories	10	4	2	2	1
Nine Categories	2	0	1	0	0
Ten Categories	3	1	0	1	2
Eleven Categories . . .	4	3	2	1	0

These data are based on a universe of 119 groups and a universe of 145 bills. All testimony included in this table is for or against bills; ambiguous testimony is not included.

[a]The One Testimony Criterion means that a group was counted in the cell of "One Category" if its leaders presented one testimony or more on bills in only one policy category.

[b]The Two Testimony Criterion means that a group was counted in the cell of "One Category" if its leaders presented two or more testimonies on bills in one policy category, and so on for the other criteria.

policy categories falls sharply from the number testifying on bills in three, four, and five categories. Only 23 per cent of the groups presented testimony on bills in seven or more policy categories. The large number of groups that testified on bills in three, four, and five categories, using the one-testimony criterion, reveals that interaction between groups of different types is fairly frequent. However, the use of a one-testimony criterion for measuring interaction provides an incomplete picture of the distribution of group testimonies among the bills in the different policy categories. The presentation of testimony on only one bill out of seven or more bills in one policy category during a sixteen-year period is not a sound basis on which to generalize about group interaction. Six policy categories each contain thirteen or more bills and the smallest number of bills in any policy category is seven. Therefore, to rely on one testimony as the standard for measuring the degree of interaction among groups on bills in different policy categories is unsatisfactory.

Columns Two, Three, Four, and Five in Table 68 show how rapidly the numbers of groups providing testimony on bills in five, four, three, and two policy categories decline as the criterion for counting a group as having testified on a bill increases from one to five testimonies. For example, the table shows that the number of groups that presented testimony on bills in four policy

categories declines from 20 to 13 to 8 to 3 to 1, as the criterion is changed from one to five testimonies. Under the three-testimonies criterion, 79 per cent of the 119 groups testified on bills in three policy categories or less. Under the five-testimonies criterion, fifty-seven of the groups, almost half of the universe, testified on bills in only one policy category and only 10 per cent of the groups are active in testifying on bills in more than two categories. The large numbers of groups in the None row of cells under the four- and five-testimonies criteria, twenty and thirty-six respectively, are partly due to the fact that many groups did not testify very frequently over the sixteen-year period, and partly because the testimonies of these infrequent witnesses often were scattered among bills from more than two policy categories.

It is significant that eleven interest groups recorded as having testified on bills in three or more policy categories under the five-testimony criterion are of seven different types of interest groups. These groups, shown in Table 69 are distributed among the types of groups as follows: four Agriculture groups, two Labor groups, and one each of the following types of groups, Business groups, Citizens groups, Religious groups, Professional groups, Veterans groups. Thus, there is at least one group from each of seven of the ten types of groups that has a fairly broad range of legislative

TABLE 69

THE ELEVEN GROUPS IN THE SELECT UNIVERSE THAT PRESENTED TESTIMONIES ON BILLS IN THREE OR MORE POLICY CATEGORIES

Policy Category	Grp A	Grp B	Grp C	Grp D	Grp E	Grp F	Grp G	Grp H	Grp I	Grp J	Grp K
Labor	20	25	25	15	0	7	5	8	4	7	4
Housing . . .	8	14	14	1	4	3	1	7	5	6	8
Business . .	8	9	8	11	5	4	10	2	0	0	0
Trade	7	10	8	13	7	10	11	3	5	1	5
Education Welfare .	11	11	13	7	4	10	6	7	4	6	3
Foreign Affairs .	6	8	9	7	5	6	4	6	4	1	6
Tax	5	5	7	3	0	2	4	1	2	2	1
Agriculture .	2	6	6	7	1	6	7	0	0	1	0
Civil Rights	1	7	5	0	0	2	0	4	6	0	3
Defense . . .	6	6	5	4	0	2	4	1	2	2	2
Miscellaneous	3	3	4	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
Total	77	104	104	69	26	54	53	39	32	26	32

These data are based on a 119-group universe and a universe of 145 bills. The criterion for counting a group as having testified on bills in each policy category is five testimonies.

Code: A--U. S. Chamber of Commerce
B--Congress of Industrial Organizations
C--American Federation of Labor
D--American Farm Bureau Federation
E--Cooperative League of the U. S. A.
F--Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America (NFU)
G--National Grange
H--Americans for Democratic Action
I--National Council of Jewish Women
J--National Federation of Settlement Houses
K--American Veterans Committee

interests even under the five-testimony criterion. If the four kinds of business groups--Business, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business--are combined into

one type of group, every type has one group testifying on bills in three or more policy categories.

Table 70 shows the number of groups of different types that were represented at hearings on bills in different policy categories. The cells of the table show the number of bills in each policy category that attracted testimonies from groups of different types. For example, Table 70 shows there were ten bills on which groups of nine different types presented testimony. All ambiguous testimonies are excluded from this table; only testimonies that could be classified for or against bills are counted.

Table 70 shows that when using a one-testimony criterion, there were no bills on which groups of only one or two types presented testimony. The smallest number of groups of different types that presented testimonies for any bills was three. Nine bills from five policy categories were considered at hearings at which groups of only three different types presented testimony. Groups of at least six different types testified on every defense bill and on one defense bill testimonies were presented by groups from nine of the ten types. At the hearing on one labor bill, and also at the hearing on one education/welfare bill, groups of all ten types presented testimony. These data provide firm support for the conclusion that groups of three or more types interact at every hearing that attracts a substantial

TABLE 70

TESTIMONY OF GROUPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES ON BILLS OF DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES

Categories of Bills	Number of Groups of Different Types That Testified[a]									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Housing Bills (15)[b] . . .	0	0	0	0	1	4	3	5	2	0
Civil Rights (8)	0	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0
Labor (26)	0	0	3	4	3	5	5	3	2	1
Business (19)	0	0	3	7	5	3	1	0	0	0
Trade (16)	0	0	1	4	3	0	3	2	3	0
Defense (7)	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	1	0
Foreign Affairs (13) . .	0	0	0	0	5	1	5	2	0	0
Tax (10)	0	0	1	0	2	3	1	2	1	0
Education/Welfare (16) .	0	0	1	0	2	4	4	3	1	1
Agriculture (9)	0	0	0	1	4	3	1	0	0	0

These data are based on a universe of 119 groups and a universe of 139 bills.

[a]One-Testimony Criterion--If one group of a type testified on one or more bills in a category, that type of group is counted as having testified on the bill.

[b]The total number of bills in each category of the 139 under consideration is stated in parenthesis.

number of witnesses for national groups. Although only a few bills in approximately half of the policy categories attracted groups of most types, in general, there is at least a moderate degree of interaction among groups of different types at hearings. Interaction among groups of several types tends to contribute to the increasing integration of these groups if they testify fairly frequently.

Table 71 is designed like Table 70 and contains the same kind of data. The difference between them is that the criterion for counting different types of groups as having presented testimony is changed from the testimony of one group of each type to three groups of each type. For example, the type, Business group, will not be counted as providing testimony on a bill unless three Business groups provide testimony on it. This is a more demanding criterion. By definition it eliminates the Small Business type, since only two Small Business groups are included in the select universe of 119 groups. Three other types of groups also have a small number of representatives in the select universe; there are five Veterans groups, six Financial Business groups, and seven Religious groups.

The tabulations in Table 71 show the effects of changing the criterion. At only one hearing, a hearing on a housing bill, were testimonies received from groups of eight types. The hearings on only seven bills, from

TABLE 71

TESTIMONY OF GROUPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES
ON BILLS OF DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES

Policy Categories	Number of Different Types of Groups That Testified[a]									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Housing (15)[b]	0	1	4	6	1	1	1	1	0	0
Civil Rights (8)	1	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Labor (26)	3	8	4	6	4	1	0	0	0	0
Business (19)	6	9	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade (16)	2	5	2	2	3	0	2	0	0	0
Defense (7)	0	0	2	2	1	0	2	0	0	0
Foreign Affairs (13) . .	0	4	5	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Tax (10)	2	2	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
Education/Welfare (16) .	0	5	4	1	2	2	2	0	0	0
Agriculture (9)	1	4	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

These data are based on a universe of 119 groups and a universe of 139 bills.

[a]Three-Testimony Criterion--If three groups of a type testified on a bill in a policy category, that type of group is counted as having testified on the bill.

[b]The total number of bills in each category is stated in parenthesis.

four policy categories, attracted groups of seven types. On the other hand, at the hearings on fifteen bills, from six policy categories, testimony was presented by groups entirely of one type. This evidence suggests that at large numbers of hearings on major bills from many policy categories, the groups of two or three types provide most of the testimony. This is especially significant for business bills, civil rights bills, agriculture bills, foreign affairs bills, and tax bills.

The data in Table 71 confirm the findings in Chapter V that for each type of group there are rarely as many as three or four groups presenting testimony frequently on bills in different policy categories. In other words, it would be unusual to find three groups from each of six types interacting on more than a few bills during a period of two or four years, or even longer. Hearings on major bills tend to activate only a small number of groups from several different types. A majority of the groups of nearly all types are inactive on every major bill. Interaction among groups of different types is frequent enough to foster some integration but it is by no means comprehensive in the sense that hearings attract several groups of each type into presenting testimony.

Mutual Knowledge Among Groups

Another measure of integration among interest groups at the congressional level is the amount of mutual

knowledge the leaders of groups possess. The assumption is that the greater the knowledge about each other and their environment that Washington spokesmen for groups possess, the greater the tendencies toward integration. Thus, evidence of common attitudes, information, and practices among group leaders is evidence of the extent to which integration exists among groups.

In this research the Washington representatives of forty-two groups were interviewed concerning their perspectives on (1) factors that foster group effectiveness, with Congress, (2) factors that promote cooperation among groups and, (3) types of cooperation practiced among groups. The latter two sets of factors have already been discussed in Chapter IV. In this chapter the responses of the interviewees are re-examined for the purpose of noting the amount of consensus that exists among spokesmen from interest groups of the same and different types on the beliefs and practices stated above.

To discover if Washington spokesmen for groups tend to agree on factors that foster group effectiveness on Capitol Hill, the following exercise was completed by each respondent during the interview:

> I am interested in the problems that representatives of new organizations, those which have been recently formed, face in their efforts to make their association "effective" on Capitol Hill. Score each of the following factors according to its importance in assisting a new association to become effective on Capitol Hill. Score each item by writing the number of the best response:

Very important factor - 4
Moderately important factor - 3
A factor of minor importance - 2
A factor of no importance - 1

__A. Secure the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen.
__B. Secure the personal friendship of congressmen's and committee staff members.
__C. Present careful and thorough factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives.
__D. Provide entertainment and gifts for key committee members and other congressmen.
__E. Do favors for key committee members and other congressmen.
__F. Provide regular and able presentation of the association's stand on legislation at congressional committee hearings.
__G. Present resolutions or petitions adopted by the association's members showing their preferences on legislative issues.
__H. Secure the active support from the association's members throughout the country by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices.

Table 72 contains these factors ranked according to the importance assigned to them by respondents, based on the mean of the ratings for each factor. The factor receiving the highest mean rating of importance, was Factor C--the presentation of factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives, with a mean of 3.74 of a possible 4.00. Two factors shared the next most important rating with a mean of 3.62. These were Factor F--the presentation of the association's views on legislation at committee hearings, and Factor H--the securing of support from the association's members by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices. The fourth rated factor, Factor B, with a mean of 3.38, is the securing of the friendship of congressmen's and committee

TABLE 72

RESPONDENTS RATINGS OF FACTORS THAT FOSTER EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Mean of Respondent's Ratings	Factor	
3.74	C	Present careful and thorough factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives.
3.62	F	Provide regular and able presentation of the association's stand on legislation at congressional committee hearings.
3.62	H	Secure the active support from the association's members throughout the country by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices.
3.38	B	Secure the personal friendship of congressmen's and committee staff members.
3.17	A	Secure the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen.
2.57	G	Present resolutions or petitions adopted by the association's members showing their preferences on legislative issues.
2.05	E	Do favors for key committee members and other congressmen.
1.45	D	Provide entertainment and gifts for key committee members and other congressmen.

staff members. The only other factor with a mean above 3.00 is Factor A--the securing of the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen, with a mean of 3.17.

Table 72 shows that seven of the eight factors are assigned substantially different degrees of importance. Not only is the range between the most important factor and the least important factor very large, from 3.74 to 1.45, but the mean ratings of importance assigned to the factors within this range are not bunched but are dispersed except

for Factors F and H. This dispersion of the ratings, does not provide evidence that there is a large amount of agreement among the respondents in rating these factors except possibly for the high mean on Factor C. For the other seven factors, a mean rating might conceal widely differing ratings on a factor. Therefore, to reach a conclusion concerning consensus among the respondents, it was necessary to examine the distribution of respondent ratings for each factor.

Table 23 shows the number of respondents describing each factor as very important, moderately important, of minor importance, and of no importance. Inspection of this table reveals the ratings on each of the eight factors are overwhelmingly concentrated in two of the four rating categories. The lowest level of concentration of ratings in two rating categories is thirty-one of forty-two responses for Factor G. For three factors only three rating categories were used, and for three other factors all respondents except one used only three of the four rating categories. These data reveal a significant amount of agreement among group spokesmen on the importance and unimportance of certain lobbying techniques. The data in Table 73 lead the reader to expect few sharp differences between groups of different types in their evaluation of the importance of these techniques.

Table 74 contains the means of the ratings of respondents within each type on each of the factors. This

TABLE 73

RESPONENTS RATINGS OF FACTORS THAT FOSTER EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Factors That Foster Effectiveness	(1's) No Importance	(2's) Minor Importance	(3's) Moderate Importance	(4's) Very Important
A	0	9	17	16
B	0	7	19	16
C	1	4	4	33
D	26	13	3	0
E	13	19	6	4
F	1	1	11	29
G	5	14	17	6
H	1	2	9	30

These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups that had offices in Washington.

Code of Factors:

A--Secure the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen.

B--Secure the personal friendship of congressmen's and committee staff members.

C--Present careful and thorough factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives.

D--Provide entertainment and gifts for key committee members and other congressmen.

E--Do favors for key committee members and other congressmen.

F--Provide regular and able presentation of the association's stand on legislation at congressional committee hearings.

G--Present resolutions or petitions adopted by the association's members showing their preferences on legislative issues.

H--Secure the active support from the association's members throughout the country by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices.

TABLE 74

TYPAL MEAN RATINGS ON FACTORS
THAT FOSTER EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Type of Group	Factors							
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Business (13)	3.08	3.38	3.77	1.69	2.00	3.69	2.69	3.61
Financial Business (4)	3.50	3.25	3.25	2.00	2.50	3.25	2.50	3.75
Agricultural Business (3)	2.67	2.67	3.33	1.00	2.33	2.33	1.67	3.00
Agriculture (4)	2.75	2.50	3.00	1.00	2.25	4.00	2.25	3.50
Professional (5)	3.20	3.20	3.00	1.20	2.20	3.60	2.20	4.00
Labor (5)	3.00	2.80	3.60	1.80	2.00	3.60	2.80	3.20
Citizen (2)	3.00	3.50	4.00	1.00	2.00	3.50	3.50	4.00
Religious (3)	3.00	3.00	3.67	1.33	1.33	3.67	2.67	3.67
Veterans (2)	3.50	3.50	4.00	1.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Small Business (1)	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Over-all mean of 42 respondents	3.17	3.38	3.74	1.45	2.05	3.62	2.57	3.62
Range between highest and lowest means	.83	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.67	1.67	1.83	1.00
Modified Range between highest and lowest means[a]	.45	.70	.67	.69	.50	.50	.80	.50

These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups that had offices in Washington.

[a]The modified range is the range between the highest and lowest typal means after the two most deviant typal means have been eliminated from consideration.

will be referred to hereafter as the "typal mean." Inspection of this table reveals that for five of the factors, A, B, C, D, H, the differences between the lowest and the highest typal means do not exceed 1.00 out of a possible 3.00. This indicates a large amount of agreement on the importance of each of these factors among all forty-two respondents representing ten types of groups.

Close inspection of differences among the typal means for each factor in the table reveals that for all factors, the elimination of one or two typal means, that are located at either or both ends of the range of means, reduces the range considerably. In other words, with the exception of one or two of the typal means that are farthest from the others, the remaining eight typal means are quite close together.

For Factor H the range between the highest and lowest typal means is 1.00, a low range, but the elimination of the two typal means that deviate most from the others, the mean for Agricultural Business groups, 3.00, and the mean for Labor groups, 3.20, reduces the range to .50. When this exercise is completed the typal means encompassed by the modified range of .50 include the ratings of thirty-four group respondents representing eight different types of groups.

Even more significant is the effect of this procedure on the range between the highest and lowest typal means for Factor E. The elimination of the two

most deviant typal means, those of Religious groups, 1.33, and Small Business groups, 4.00, reduces the range from 2.67 to .50. This exercise reveals that the mean ratings of thirty-eight respondents representing eight types of groups are in very high agreement.

The range between the highest and lowest typal means for every factor in the table can be substantially reduced by this procedure. A range of 1.00 or smaller that encompases the means of nearly all of the forty-two respondents, representing many different types of groups, shows a high degree of consensus among the groups. The data in Table 74 indicate that the range of the typal means for every factor is reduced below 1.00 by the deletion of one or two means that include the ratings of no more than seven of the forty-two respondents.

It is also worth-while to note the types of groups whose means were farthest from those of the other types for each factor. Table 75 indicates the typal means that deviate most from other typal means. In this table the typal mean that deviates most for each factor is underlined with an unbroken line; the second most deviant typal mean is underlined with a broken line. The table shows that five types of groups account for all the most deviant means for the eight factors. One type of group, Agricultural Business, has the most deviant typal mean for four of these factors. The only other type of group that had

TABLE 75

TYPAL MEAN RATINGS ON FACTORS
THAT FOSTER EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Type of Group	Factors							
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Business (13)	3.08	3.38	3.77	1.69	2.00	3.69	2.69	3.61
Financial Business (4)	3.50[b]	3.25	3.25	2.00	2.50	3.25	2.50	3.75
Agricultural Business (3)	2.67[a]	2.67	3.33	1.00	2.33	2.33	1.67	3.00
Agriculture (4)	2.75	2.50	3.00	1.00	2.25	4.00	2.25	3.50
Professional (5)	3.20	3.20	3.00	1.20	2.20	3.60	2.20	4.00
Labor (5)	3.00	2.80	3.60	1.80	2.00	3.60	2.80	3.20
Citizen(2)	3.00	3.50	4.00	1.00	2.00	3.50	3.50	4.00
Religious (3)	3.00	3.00	3.67	1.33	1.33	3.67	2.67	3.67
Veterans (2)	3.50	3.50	4.00	1.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Small Business (1)	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00

Over-all mean of 42 respondents	3.17	3.38	3.74	1.45	2.05	3.62	2.57	3.62
Range between highest and lowest means	.83	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.67	1.67	1.83	1.00
Modified range between highest and lowest means[c]	.45	.70	.67	.69	.50	.50	.80	.50

These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups that had offices in Washington.

[a]The typal mean that deviates most for each factor is underlined by an unbroken line.

[b]The second most deviant typal mean is underlined by a broken line.

[c]The modified range is the range between the highest and lowest typal means after the two most deviant typal means have been eliminated from consideration.

the most deviant mean for more than one factor was Agriculture.

The second most deviant typal means for the eight factors encompassed six different types of groups, but one type of group, Financial Business, had the second most deviant mean for three factors. No other type of group had the second most deviant mean for more than one factor.

A count of the two most deviant typal means for each factor yields a total of eighteen means instead of sixteen; because for two factors, two types of groups have the same mean. Of these eighteen deviant means, nine of them are the means of groups of two types, Agricultural Business and Financial Business. Two other types of groups, Agriculture and Labor have two deviant means each. The remaining deviant means are those of five different types. A total of six of the ten types of groups have no more than one of the eighteen most deviant means, Business (none), Professional (one), Citizen (one), Religious (one), Veterans (one), Small Business (one).

The only question that remains unanswered concerning these data is the extent to which the spokesmen of specific groups of a type agree among themselves in rating these factors. Inspection of the data compiled in Table 76 reveals that group respondents within each of certain types differ substantially among themselves in the assignment of ratings.

TABLE 76

DEVIANT RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS
ON FACTORS THAT FOSTER
EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Type of Group	No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratings[a]						No. of Deviant Ratings	Avg. No. of Deviant Rating for Each Respondent
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Business (13)[b]	4	4	1	2	1	1	21	1.61
Financial Business (4)	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	1.00
Agricultural Business (3)	0	1	0	1	0	1	9	3.00
Small Business (1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1.00
Labor (5)	1	3	0	1	0	0	6	1.20
Agriculture (4)	1	0	0	3	0	0	9	2.25
Professional (5)	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Citizens (2)	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	1.00
Religious (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	1.33
Veterans (2)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	.50
Total							57	

These data are based on the interviews with forty-two spokesmen for national interest groups. There are eight factors that were rated by each respondent.

[a]A deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean rating of all forty-two respondents.

[b]Number of groups within each type.

Table 76 shows the number of groups within each type that registered zero, one, two, three, four, or five deviant ratings on the eight factors that foster effective relations with Congress. A deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean of the

ratings for all forty-two respondents. The table also contains the average number of deviant ratings, of a possible eight ratings, for each respondent in each type. The highest number of deviant ratings for groups of one type was for Agricultural Business, with an average of three deviant ratings for each group; the next highest number was for Agriculture with an average of 2.25 deviant ratings for each group.

More important, however, is the extent to which the groups of a type disagreed among themselves in rating these factors. The five Professional groups constituted the only type that failed to register at least one deviant rating. The distribution of deviant ratings is, in general, uneven among groups within each type. The greatest dispersion of ratings for groups in one type is registered for Business groups. There is at least one Business group in each of the columns denoting the number of deviant ratings. Thus, Business groups were widely split in their ratings of these factors. An even greater split occurs for the Agricultural Business groups; one group has one deviant rating, a second group has three deviant ratings, and a third group has five deviant ratings.

The large number of deviant ratings registered by a few groups in some types distorted the average number of deviant ratings for the groups of that type. For example, the thirteen Business groups registered a combined total of twenty-one deviant ratings but the table shows that nine

of the twenty-one deviant ratings were registered by only two Business groups, and six more of the twenty-one deviant ratings were registered by two additional Business groups. When these four most deviant groups are eliminated from consideration the nine remaining Business groups registered only five deviant ratings out of forty-five ratings and the average number of deviant ratings is reduced from 1.61 for thirteen Business groups to .55 for nine Business groups. The elimination of the group with the most deviant ratings from the calculation of the typal means for Religious and Labor groups also reduced the average number of deviant ratings for each considerably.

This exercise indicates that except for Professional groups and perhaps Agriculture groups, the variable "type of group" is not very useful in explaining the number of deviant ratings. It is more meaningful to focus on the specific groups having three or more deviant ratings each. These eight groups, excluding Agriculture groups, are of four different types: four Business, two Agricultural Business, one Labor, and one Religious. These eight groups with the most deviant ratings account for twenty-nine of the fifty-seven deviant ratings of the forty-two respondents. In other words, thirty-six respondents registered a combined total of only twenty-eight deviant ratings, an average per group of .78 of a possible 8.0. If the three Agricultural groups with the most deviant ratings are also included, the eleven most

deviant groups account for thirty-eight of the deviant ratings and the remaining thirty-one respondents registered only nineteen. When the forty-two respondents are divided into the most deviant and the least deviant groups--in terms of these ratings--the groups within each of five types are split with one or more group in the non-deviant groups and one or more group in the deviant grouping.

In Chapter IV, the opinions of interviewees were discussed on both the factors that promote cooperation and the types of cooperation practiced by the groups they represent. The tabulation of the typal means revealed a remarkable consistency in the way group representatives from ten types of groups evaluated factors that promote cooperation and the types of cooperation practiced. It is worth-while to consider some of the major findings that emerge when the typal means are compared with each other. First, Table 77 reveals that the ranges between the highest and lowest typal means on the factors promoting cooperation are very small when the most deviant and the second most deviant typal means have been eliminated from consideration. That is, when the eight non-deviant typal means are considered, the range between the highest and lowest means for four of the six factors is .75 or less of a possible 3.0. The ranges of the means for the fifth and sixth factors were 1.00 and 1.67. This is a fairly high level of agreement among the thirty-five to forty

TABLE 77

MEANS OF RATINGS OF RESPONDENTS
ON FACTORS THAT PROMOTE COOPERATION
ARRANGED BY TYPE OF GROUP

Type of Group and Number of Groups Within Each	Factor A[a]	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D	Factor E	Factor F
Business (13)	3.46	2.77	3.38	3.92	2.23	1.46
Financial Business (14)	3.25	2.25	2.50	4.00	1.25	1.50
Agricultural Business (3)	3.00	1.67	2.67	4.00	1.33	1.00
Agriculture (4)	3.75	2.00	2.75	3.50	2.00	1.00
Professional (5)	4.00	2.40	3.40	4.00	2.00	1.60
Labor (5)	3.40	2.20	3.40	3.40	2.60	2.00
Citizen (2)	4.00	1.50	4.00	4.00	3.00	2.00
Religious (3)	3.33	2.67	3.00	4.00	3.67	1.33
Veterans (2)	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.50	3.50
Small Business (1)	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	2.00
Over-all Mean	3.45	2.40	3.07	3.88	2.27	1.59
Range between highest and lowest means	2.00	1.50	1.50	.60	2.42	2.50
Modified Range[b]	.75	1.00	.73	.12	1.67	.50

[a]See pages 165-6 Chapter IV.

[b]Range between highest and lowest means after the most deviant and next most deviant means have been eliminated from consideration.

Rating Code:
Very important factor--4 A factor of no importance--1
Moderately important factor--3 Minor factor--2

respondents representing eight different types of groups.

The total number of ratings by all respondents on all factors is 209. Only thirty of these 209 ratings are deviant ratings. This is a considerably smaller number of deviant ratings than would be expected if ratings were determined by chance but it is not so small as to be statistically significant.[5] Inspection of the table reveals that no single type of group accounts for as many as one-fourth of the deviant ratings, but since the number of group respondents within the types of groups varies from one to thirteen this generalization has little merit. The average number of deviant ratings for each respondent in each type is more useful.

Table 78 below contains these averages for each type of group. It shows that although Business groups had a large number of deviant ratings, this is a result of the large number of business groups. Only one Business group has as many as two deviant ratings; four Business groups have one deviant rating each and eight Business groups have no deviant ratings. Thus, the average number of deviant ratings for each Business group is less than .50. The highest average number of deviant ratings for each group, classified by type of group, was registered by Veterans groups, 2.50, Financial Business groups, 1.50,

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[5]That is, the probability of getting this distribution, 30 and 179, would occur by chance on approximately 14 out of 100 times.

TABLE 78

DEVIANT RATINGS OF RESPONDENTS ON FACTORS THAT PROMOTE COOPERATION CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP

Type of Group	No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratings[a]						No. of Deviant Ratings	Avg. No. of Deviant Rating for Each Respondent
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Business (13)[b]	8	4	1	0	0	0	6	.46
Financial Business (4)	1	0	3	0	0	0	6	1.50
Agricultural Business (3)	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	1.33
Agriculture (4)	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	.50
Professional (5)	3	2	0	0	0	0	2	.40
Labor (5)	3	2	0	0	0	0	2	.40
Citizen (2)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	.50
Religious (3)	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	.67
Veterans (2)	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	2.50
Small Business (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total							30	

These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups.

[a]A deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean rating of all forty-two respondents.

and Agricultural Business groups, 1.33. Only these three types of groups had averages exceeding 1.00 per group. Table 78 also indicates one group accounts for the high average number of deviant ratings for Veterans groups and Agricultural Business groups; the most deviant Veterans group had four deviant ratings out of a possible six, and

the most deviant Agricultural Business group had three deviant ratings. The variable "type of group" is useful in discriminating between deviant and non-deviant groups only for Financial Business groups. Three of the four Financial Business groups had two deviant ratings each.

If the number of deviant ratings for the six respondents having the most deviant ratings are totaled, fifteen of the deviant ratings, 50 per cent of the total, are accounted for. In other words, thirty-six respondents had fifteen deviant ratings out of a total of 209 ratings. This is a high level of agreement among groups representing ten types.

Table 79 shows a high level of agreement among respondents also exists on the frequency with which certain types of cooperation are practiced. When the two most deviant typal means are eliminated from consideration for each type of cooperation, the range between the highest and lowest typal means for each of the five types of cooperation is 1.25 or lower. The modified range for two of the types of cooperation was .80 and .67. Thus, when the ratings of respondents from groups of eight types are considered, involving from thirty-two to thirty-nine respondents, a high level of agreement on the types of cooperation practiced is disclosed.

Table 80 contains tabulations on the number of deviant ratings of respondents, classified by type of

TABLE 79

RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FIVE TYPES OF COOPERATION AMONG GROUPS

Type of Group	Types of Cooperation				
	A	B	C	D	E
Business (13)[a]	3.69[c]	3.23	3.38	1.53	2.46
Financial Business (4) . .	3.75	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.25
Agricultural Business (3) .	4.00	3.67	4.00	1.00	1.33
Small Business (1)	4.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	2.00
Labor (5)	3.80	3.20	3.60	2.20	2.20
Agricultural (4)	4.00	2.50	2.75	1.50	2.25
Professional (5)	3.20	2.60	3.20	1.80	2.40
Citizen (2)	4.00	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.50
Religious (3)	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.67	2.67
Veteran (2)	3.00	2.50	1.50	1.00	2.00
Range between highest and lowest means	1.00	2.00	2.50	3.00	1.42
Modified Range between highest and lowest means[b]	.80	1.17	1.25	1.00	.67

[a]The total number of groups within a type.

[b]The modified range is the range between the highest and lowest means after the two most deviant means have been eliminated.

Rating Code: Frequently practiced--4.0
Occasionally practiced--3.0
Rarely practiced--2.0
Never practiced--1.0

TABLE 80

DEVIANT RATINGS BY RESPONDENTS ON TYPES OF COOPERATION PRACTICED CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP

Type of Group	No. of Groups With Different Numbers of Deviant Ratings[a]						No. of Deviant Ratings	Avg. No. of Deviant Rating for Each Respondent
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Business (13)[b]	8	1	3	1	0	0	10	1.25
Financial Business (4)	1	2	0	1	0	0	5	1.25
Agricultural Business (3)	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	.67
Small Business (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	3.00
Labor (5)	4	0	1	0	0	0	2	.40
Agriculture (4)	2	0	1	1	0	0	5	1.25
Professional (5)	0	4	0	1	0	0	7	1.40
Citizens (2)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	.50
Religious (3)	1	1	0	0	1	0	5	1.67
Veterans (2)	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	2.50
Total							45	

These data are based on interviews with the spokesmen for forty-two national interest groups.

[a]A deviant rating is a rating falling outside a range of 2.0 centered on the mean rating of all forty-two respondents.

[b]The total number of groups represented by respondents in a type.

group, concerning the types of cooperation practiced. Of the 210 ratings by respondents on all types of cooperation, forty-five are deviant ratings. Inspection of the table reveals that the groups of no single type have as many as one-fourth of the total deviant ratings. Business groups

have the largest number of deviant ratings, but this seems to be due to the larger number of Business groups. The types of groups with the highest average number of deviant ratings per respondent are Small Business, 3.00, Veterans, 2.50, Religious, 1.67, and Professional groups, 1.40. Although the number of groups in the first three types is too small to assume they represent adequately the groups in the population of that type, Table 80 indicates the type of group is not a useful variable in explaining deviancy, except perhaps for Veterans groups, since there is one group of almost every type that has more than one deviant rating.

The ratings of groups from different types account for most of the deviant ratings. For instance, seven types each have one group with three or more deviant ratings. But no type has two groups with three or more deviant ratings. Furthermore, the impact of the deviations of the most deviant group in each type is clarified when deviant ratings of groups are totaled. The seven groups with the most deviant ratings, representing seven different types, account for twenty-three of the forty-five deviant ratings of all respondents. In other words, thirty-five respondents had among them a total of twenty-two deviant ratings of a possible 165 ratings. This is an average of .63 deviant rating for each group of a possible 5.0.

In conclusion, for the groups represented by thirty-five respondents from nine types of groups, there is a large degree of agreement concerning the frequency with which the different types of cooperation are practiced. The most startling feature of Table 80 is the presence of one group in almost every type whose practices differ sharply from the other groups of that type. This finding suggests that within each type, there may be an ordering of groups in terms of the extent to which they relate themselves to other groups for cooperative activities. This may indicate that the groups with deviant views have perceived that there are a limited number of positions for groups of their type that can successfully practice the prevailing style of the prestigious groups. Therefore, the only positions that seem to be open require roles that are characterized by deviant practices.

Structure in the Group Population

Individuals in a population tend to relate themselves to each other in an orderly manner. It is expected that the leaders and representatives of different groups having goals in the same policy sectors also tend to become related to each other in orderly ways. The character and the extent of these relationships constitute one measure of the degree to which integration exists among the groups in the population. The literature on interest groups indicates there are few visible formal

arrangements or processes that reveal the degree or form of structure in the group population at the congressional level. One approach to the problem of discovering structure is the analysis of aggregate data on the behavior of a large number of groups in the population over a long period of time.

In this investigation, four indicators of the degree of structure among groups are used: (1) the extent to which new groups enter and incumbent groups depart from the interest group system, (2) the extent to which hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee are dominated, in terms of numbers of groups testifying, by the highly active incumbent groups as compared with the groups that testify infrequently and irregularly, (3) the degree to which the hearings of the House Agriculture Committee are dominated by the active Agriculture groups or groups of other types, and (4) the extent to which the relative positions of the active groups--measured in terms of volume of testimonies--remain stable over a long period of time.

The Openness of the Interest Group System

The greater the rate at which new groups enter the system at the congressional level and incumbent groups depart from it, the less the structure in the group population. It is assumed that time is required for new entrants to become integrated into an ordered population and an

unfamiliar environmental system and for incumbent groups to adjust to the departure of incumbents and the entrance of new groups. On the other hand, the less change in the group population, the greater the probability that a structured pattern of relations, either formal or informal, will be developed. Thus, the expectations are that the greater the turnover of groups in the population during a given time span, the less the degree of integration.

The extent to which interest groups enter and depart from the interest group system at the congressional level is difficult to measure. The notion that there are boundaries on the interest group system that cannot be quickly or easily permeated, at least not by most groups, has not been formulated in the literature on interest groups. The approach used in this research was to identify the frequency of testimony by groups in two consecutive time spans and establish criteria for defining the entrance of groups into the interest group system and departure from it.

In this research the entrance of groups into the system is conceived in terms of two stages. The first stage begins with the establishment of the group and ends with the first presentation of testimony at hearings by the leaders of the group. The second stage begins with the first presentation of testimony by the group leaders and ends when the group becomes integrated into the interest group system. This process may be compared to

the process by which individuals are socialized into the roles of a political culture. The leaders and members of a new group usually do not emerge onto the political scene in Washington with fully developed skills and knowledge that enable them to attain their legislative objectives, nor do they have the rapport with congressional committee members, staff, or with the leaders of the many other groups that are also interested in the same policy sectors. Most new groups probably have only partial knowledge of the formal and informal expectations associated with the role of an interest group seeking legislative objectives. Some of the prerequisites for effective relations with Congress and cooperation among groups have been discussed earlier in this chapter.

When a high level of knowledge, experience, and rapport is obtained, the group is "integrated" into the interest group system. Thus, the term "interest group system" is conceived in terms of a high degree of relatedness among groups through interaction with each other and with the staffs and members of congressional committees. Such a system does not necessarily include all of the "most influential groups" that pursue legislative objectives. But insofar as a group needs certain skills, current information, experience, rapport with other groups, and knowledge of groups that oppose its objectives, it seems likely that the group will become integrated into

the system either by deliberate actions of its leaders or involuntarily.

The entrance and departure of groups is analyzed both for the interest group system as a unity--for all bills combined--and for specific subsystems within it that are defined in terms of the testimonies on bills in certain policy categories, such as labor bills. For both kinds of analyses, the sixteen-year period, 1945-60, must be divided into two time spans in a manner that provides a relatively even distribution of the hearings in each.

The division of the time span into two equal periods, one from 1945-52, and the second from 1953-60, also divides the hearings satisfactorily as shown in Table 81. Although the number of hearings in the two periods varies greatly from committee to committee, when the numbers of hearings for all committees are totaled sixty-eight hearings, 47 per cent of the total, were held in the period 1945-52, and seventy-seven hearings, 53 per cent of the total, were held in the later period.

The definition of group "entrance" into the interest group system is made in terms of how many testimonies a group presented during two successive eight-year periods. For the eight-year period, 1945-52, data were collected on sixty-eight hearings. It seems clear that one or two testimonies during an eight-year period is not an indication that a group is established

TABLE 81

NUMBERS OF GROUPS TESTIFYING
ON BILLS IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES
FOR TWO TIME SPANS

Number of Policy Categories	Number of Groups Testifying	
	1945-52	1953-60
No Categories	16	6
One Category	23	32
Two Categories	31	52
Three Categories	42	38
Four Categories	23	25
Five Categories	15	19
Six Categories	12	7
Seven Categories	10	3
Eight Categories	5	0
Nine Categories	5	3
Ten Categories	7	4
Total	189	189

These data are based on a universe of 189 groups and a universe of 145 bills. Testimony is counted if it is for or against a bill, or ambiguous toward it.

within the system. Even if each group confined its testimony to bills in one policy category during the period it seems reasonable to use a three-testimony standard in defining group entrance. A four-testimony standard seems reasonable if many groups did not present all their testimonies on bills in one policy category. The stress given in this discussion to the numbers of policy categories in which groups are active is based on the assumption that frequent testimonies on bills in one policy category does

not necessarily assure that a group will have standing with a different committee and with a different set of groups on bills in a different policy category.

The distribution of testimonies by the 189 groups for the two periods is compiled in Table 81. It shows that during the period 1945-52, twenty-three groups confined their testimonies to bills in one policy category, and thirty-one additional groups testified at hearings on bills in two policy categories. The mode and the median of the number of policy categories within which group spokesmen presented testimony on bills during this period are both three. Since testimonies on bills in three or more policy categories are characteristic of 119 of the 189 groups, the number of groups used to define the entrance and departure of groups from the system must reflect this fact.

For this analysis, five different standards were prepared for assessing the number of groups within the interest group system for the period 1945-52. The most demanding standard is five testimonies for the eight-year period. This standard allows a group that presented only five testimonies to concentrate all of them on bills in one policy category. This is probably enough testimonies to indicate a group is within the system. It would be unlikely, however, given the tendency of nearly all groups to present testimonies on bills in at least two or three policy categories, that many groups presented

only five testimonies and presented all of them on bills of one policy category. An examination of the pattern of testimony by the twenty-three groups that testified on only one type of bill verified this notion.

Only four of the fifty-four groups that testified on bills in one or two policy categories, testified on four or more bills in a single category. Therefore, a five-testimonies standard for defining groups as "within" the system is a standard tolerating very few groups that made a small number of testimonies that were all presented on bills in one policy category. In general, the usual testimony pattern for groups that presented a total of four or five testimonies was to divide them between bills in two or more policy categories. Therefore, the five-testimonies standard for entrance of a group into the system is not as exclusive a standard as it appears. The rationale for the five-testimonies standard is that in general at least three testimonies on bills in one policy category are necessary to indicate the group is within the system. The dispersion of testimonies on bills in different policy categories by groups presenting four and five testimonies makes the five-testimonies standard seem appropriate.

This investigation does not disclose how many groups "inside" the system in the period 1945-52 entered it in a previous time span. But since the number of inside groups was identified, using several different standards, for the

period 1945-52, it is possible to determine the number of groups entering the system in the subsequent time span, 1953-60. Table 82 contains the list of groups that entered the system in the period 1953-60 under the six-testimonies standard. It also indicates the number of testimonies each of these entrants had in the previous period.

Table 82 shows a total of twenty-seven groups entered the system in the period 1953-60. This seems to be a very large number of entrants. The table indicates why. Under the six-testimonies criterion, entrance is defined in a way that permits some groups to be classified as entering the system in the second period by making only one more testimony in the second period than the group made in the preceding period. Because this definition of entrance does not discriminate satisfactorily between outside and inside groups, it seems reasonable to reduce the number of testimonies for defining groups within the system in the first period and to require an increase of three of four testimonies in the second period to denote group entrance.

Furthermore, some groups within the system in the period 1945-52 undoubtedly established themselves within the system in the years preceding 1945. For these groups a five-testimonies standard seems too demanding, since although five testimonies might be an acceptable indication that a new group had attained entrance, three testimonies seems reasonable to enable a group to maintain its

TABLE 82

GROUPS ENTERING THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM, 1953-60

Testimonies			
1945-52	1953-60		Year Established
0	8	Investment Bankers Association	1912
0	6	International Brotherhood of Teamsters	1903
1	9[a]	American Bar Association	1878
2	6	Pacific American Steamship Association	1919
2	6	Millers National Federation	1902
2	7	Western States Meatpackers Association	1946
2	7	American Medical Association	1847
2	9	American Association of Nurserymen	1875
2	7	International Union of Radio, Electrical and Machine Workers	Unknown
3	8	Rubber Manufacturers Association	1900
3	9	American Life Convention	1906
3	10	Life Insurance Association of America	1906
3	7	National Creameries Association	1933
3	7	Vegetable Growers Association	1908
3	11	Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen	1897
3	11	United Mine Workers	1890

4	7	American Tariff League	1885
4	10	Manufacturing Chemist's Association	1872
4	6	American Waterways Operators	1944
4	7	Investors League	1942
4	8	American Nurses Association	1896
4	6	U. S. Conference of Mayors	1932
4	7	Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers	1863
5	12	American Merchant Marine Institute	1905
5	9	United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association	1904
5	6	National Federation of Independent Business	1943
5	7	National Small Businessmen's Association	1937
5	7	American National Cattlemen's Association	1898

[a]Four additional groups presented zero or one testimony in the period 1945-52, and six or more testimonies in the period 1953-60. Each of these groups had a previous history under a different name prior to 1953, and, therefore, either did present or may have presented three or more testimonies in the eight-year period, 1945-52. Therefore, these groups may have been within the system during the 1945-52 period and cannot be classified as an entrant in the period 1953-60.

status within the system after it had entered the system in a previous period.

Therefore, under a second definition a group is recorded as having entered the system in the second period if it had two or less testimonies in the first period and registered an increase of at least four testimonies to a total of six. Under a three-testimonies standard for defining the number of groups within the system in the period 1945-52, there are 140 inside groups. During the second eight-year period, 1953-60, ten groups that were outside the system using a three-testimonies standard entered it using a six-testimonies standard. Using this definition of entrance, there is little movement by groups into the system. Table 82 also shows only three groups entered the system in the period 1954-60 without having testified at least once in the preceding period, and only one entrant testified once in the preceding period. These data suggest that there is a tendency for groups outside the system, who will later gain entrance, to increase gradually their testimonies from one period to the next before they attain entrance. Few groups emerge at the hearings process making frequent testimonies. These data tend to confirm the notion that integration into the system is usually a gradual process.

Some of the groups that are listed as entrants in the period 1953-60 are nationally known prestigious groups. The small number of testimonies presented by the American

Medical Association and the American Bar Association during the first period might seem to indicate that the rate of testimonies at hearings is a poor measure of the degree of integration achieved by these groups with other active groups and with congressional committee members and staff. Perhaps this is true. But when a group testifies on only one or two bills of virtually all the major bills in an eight-year period it does not seem wise to conclude that the group is interacting with the groups that testify frequently at current legislative hearings.

It is not unlikely that some prestigious groups may deliberately remain outside the interest group system part of the time. A group may choose this position because it can better resist the importunities of other groups, many of them less influential groups, that hope to induce participation by the prestigious group in behalf of their objectives. A group also may strengthen its influence with congressmen in the major policy sector with which it is concerned by confining its legislative activities to a few specific professional goals that are widely and intensely supported by its members. In this way its reputation with congressmen for representing only the direct and vital interests of its members remains unsullied, but this behavior tends to isolate it from the continuing interactions of the participants in the interest group system.

Table 82 also indicates that these entrants were, in general, not newly established groups. They were groups that were founded many years prior to 1953. Only one of the ten groups was founded in the decade of the 1940's, the Western States Meatpackers Association, and none was established in the 1950's. Table 82 reveals only three of the seventeen groups that presented three, four, or five testimonies in 1945-52 were founded as late as the decade of the 1940's. Thus, the four most recently established groups entering the system in 1953-60, using the criterion of five testimonies or less, were groups formed in 1946, 1944, 1943, and 1942. These data suggest that in recent years, at least, very few newly formed groups have entered the system. Of the 119 groups in the select universe, composed of the most active groups in the hearings process, only six groups were established since 1945 and only one of these ranked among the fifty most active groups. It appears that when new groups enter the system, they are not among the most active groups in presenting testimony for several years.

The definition of group departure from the interest group system involves additional problems. The most troublesome question concerns the number of testimonies that should be used to define the departure of a group in the time span 1953-60 after it was located within the system during the previous period, 1945-52.

The simplest solution is to define a group as departed if it presents no testimony during the eight-year period, 1953-60. This seems too stringent a standard because one testimony during an eight-year period would not indicate active involvement. On the other hand it does not seem reasonable to require a group to have six testimonies in the second period as an indication that its inside status is maintained, because once this status is attained a smaller volume of testimony will suffice to indicate its continuance than was necessary to achieve it.

The decision concerning the number of testimonies that best defines the departure of a group from the system must take into account the pattern of group testimony on bills of different types, as was mentioned earlier in the discussion of the entrance of groups into the system.

Thirty-two groups confined their testimonies to bills in one policy category. Nine of these groups testified six times or more. Fifty-two additional groups presented testimony on bills in two policy categories. Twenty-two of these groups testified five times or more. Thus, a total of thirty-one of the eighty-four groups that testified on bills in one or two policy categories may have presented four or more testimonies on bills in a single policy category. This would be a much higher concentration of testimonies on bills in one or two policy categories than in the period 1945-52. This information suggests that a more stringent definition of departure is

justified than was appropriate for the definition of group entrance.

Three different operational definitions are discussed here because the stipulation of a specific number of testimonies defining departure is difficult to justify. Using a six-testimony standard, ninety-two groups were identified within the interest group system for the time span 1945-52. Table 83 shows the number of groups that departed from the system during the period 1953-60 under the three different definitions. Under the most stringent definition of departure, the non-testimony definition, three groups left the system in the period 1953-60. Under the intermediate definition, zero through three testimonies, fifteen of the ninety-two inside groups left the system. Under the least-demanding definition, zero through five testimonies, thirty-four of the ninety-two inside groups left the system. Only when this least-stringent definition of departure is used, five testimonies or less, is there much movement out of the system by inside groups.

Only two of these thirty-four groups were among the twenty-eight most active inside groups in presenting testimony during the years, 1945-52--the groups that made fifteen or more testimonies during the period. The two most active departing groups were the National Women's Trade Union League, that presented testimonies on twenty bills, and the People's Lobby, that presented testimonies

TABLE 83

INSIDE GROUPS DEPARTING FROM THE SYSTEM DURING THE YEARS 1953-60 UNDER THREE DEFINITIONS OF DEPARTURE[a]

Type of Group	No Testimonies 1953-60	Three Testimonies or Less 1953-60	Five Testimonies or Less 1953-60
Business		2	7
Financial Business		1	4
Agricultural Business		1	1
Agriculture		0	0
Professional		1	2
Labor	1	3	7
Citizen	2	5	9
Religious		1	3
Veterans		1	1
Small Business		0	0
Departed groups total	3	15	34

[a]The population of groups inside the system for the years 1945-52 is ninety-two.

on sixteen bills. No evidence was found that these two groups are still functioning. Neither was listed in Gale's Encyclopedia of Associations.[6] Only one other group of the thirty-four, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, had more than twelve testimonies; it presented thirteen. It is still functioning and during the period 1953-60 presented four testimonies.

For reasons already discussed, the four- and five-testimonies definitions do not seem suitable to designate

[6]Gale Research Co., Encyclopedia of Associations, op. cit.

departure. Under the three-testimonies definition of departure, fifteen groups are excluded from the system. The data in Table 84 shows that five of these groups are not listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations and may have ceased to exist. The other ten groups are still functioning. Only two of these departed groups, whose continued functioning has been confirmed, testified ten times or more in the previous eight-year period. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union testified twelve times in the period 1945-52, and the Consumers Union of the United States testified ten times.

From these data it may be concluded that few groups, once they are inside, depart from the system. Furthermore, the groups that leave the system are rarely groups that are among the most active in the hearings process in the preceding several years. Many of the groups that presented the most testimony in the period 1945-52 were among the most active groups in the hearings process in the second eight-year period. Eight of the ten groups that presented the most testimonies in the first period also appeared in the list of the ten most active groups in the second period. Thus, the rates of group testimonies at hearings is fairly stable even over a period of many years. Finally, it is also clear that when groups leave the system under the intermediate definition of departure, three testimonies or less, only a few groups have ceased to function. Most of the groups

TABLE 84

GROUPS THAT DEPARTED FROM THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM, 1953-60

Testimonies			
1945-52	1953-60		Year Established
6	0	National Negro Council[a]	Unknown
16	0	People's Lobby[a]	1928
20	0	National Women's Trade Union League[a]	1903
7	2	National Savings and Loan League	1943
6	2	Dairy Industry Committee	1934
12	2	National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs	1919
10	2	Consumers Union of the United States	1936
9	2	National Association of Consumers[a]	Unknown
9	3	National Apartment Owners Association	1938
7	3	National Federation of American Shipping	1944
8	3	Disabled American Veterans	1921
12	3	International Ladies Garment Workers Union	1900
6	3	Railway Labor's Executive's Association	1926
7	3	Council for Social Action[a]	1934
7	3	Committee for Constitutional Government	1941
6	4	National Association of Retail Grocers	1893
8	4	National Automobile Dealers Association	1917
8	4	National Association of Mutual Savings Banks	1920

7	4	American Council on Education	1918
13	4	Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America	1914
11	4	National Catholic Welfare Conference	1919
20	4	Young Women's Christian Association, National Council	1855
6	4	American Council on Human Rights	1949
7	5	National Association of Retail Druggists	1898
10	5	National Foreign Trade Council	1914
7	5	United States Wholesale Grocer's Association	1892
7	5	Mortgage Bankers Association of America	1914
7	5	United States Savings and Loan League	1892
6	5	American Library Association	1876
8	5	Communication Workers of America	1938
6	5	International Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union	1937
6	5	United Steelworkers of America	1936
8	5	Committee for Economic Development	1942
6	5	National Child Labor Committee	1904

[a]Not listed in the 1964 edition of Gale's Encyclopedia of Associations. The Council for Social Action became the Council for Christian Social Action in 1957 following the merger of the Congregational Christian Churches and the United Church of Christ.

continue to function and therefore may re-enter the interest group system again.

A second way to appraise the dynamics of group behavior in the interest group system is to study the entrance and departure of groups from specific subsystems by examining numerous hearings on bills of one policy category for the eight-year time spans. The hearings on bills in only a few policy categories can be analyzed because most policy categories did not have as many as eleven hearings and the total hearings in one policy category are rarely divided equally between those held prior to 1953 and those held beginning that year.

Table 85 shows the policy categories that can be used to study the entrance and departure of groups. Because the number of bills in each policy category is small, entrance will be defined as three testimonies and departure as zero testimonies. The table shows the findings for each policy category. For example, hearings were held on thirteen of the twenty-six labor bills in the period 1945-52; the other thirteen hearings were held in the period 1953-60. A total of 133 groups presented one or more testimonies on these bills in the sixteen-year period, 1945-60. Under the three-testimonies definition for inclusion of a group in this interest group subsystem, forty groups were within it in the period 1945-52. Twenty-six groups entered the subsystem in the period 1953-60 under the three-testimonies definition.

TABLE 85

ENTRANCE AND DEPARTURE OF GROUPS FROM INTEREST GROUPS SUBSYSTEMS CONSISTING OF BILLS OF ONE TYPE

Policy Category	No. of Bills in Time Span 1945-52	No. of Bills in Time Span 1953-60	No. of Groups Testifying 1945-60	Inside Groups 1945-52	Entered System 1953-60	Departed System 1953-60
Labor bills (26)[a]	13	13	133	40	26	7
Trade bills (16)	6	10	88	20	29	1
Housing bills (16)	10	6	69	34	4	7
Foreign Affairs bills (13)	8	5	62	19	5	3
Welfare bills (11)	5	6	91	13	17	1

These data are based on a universe of 119 groups.

[a]Total bills in one policy category 1945-60.

Only seven of the forty groups within the subsystem from 1945-52 departed from it during the period 1953-60 under the zero-testimonies definition of departure. The first conclusion that emerges from Table 85 is that for bills of every policy category only a small percentage of the groups presenting testimony, always less than 50 per cent, meet the definition for including them within the interest group subsystem.

There are large differences in the numbers of groups entering different subsystems. For hearings on housing and foreign affairs bills, there are fewer groups entering the subsystems in the time span 1953-60 than for the other two subsystems. This difference seems to be related to the larger percentage of groups testifying that are within the subsystem in the period 1945-52. The subsystems having a small percentage of the total groups testifying that are inside, also have a larger number of entrants in the time span 1953-60 and a smaller number of groups leaving the subsystems during the latter period. When the number of groups departing from the subsystems is compared with the number of groups inside them during 1945-52, it is clear that only a small proportion of the groups with these subsystems depart even over an eight-year period.

Table 85 shows that for the bills concerned with labor, trade, and welfare policies, there was a much heavier rate of entrance by groups into the subsystems

than departure from them. For the bills concerned with trade policy, this might be explained partly in terms of the larger number of bills considered in the period 1953-60 as compared with the earlier period. But since twenty-nine groups entered the subsystem while only one group departed, the difference between the number of groups entering and departing cannot be adequately explained in this way. There was little growth in the number of groups within the subsystem focused on foreign affairs bills and a small decline in the number of groups concerned with housing bills.

The growth and decline of the groups within a particular subsystem may be related to such factors as the degree of controversy of the bills under discussion, the newness of the subject to which the bills are addressed, and the number of successful testimonies presented by groups to the committee in previous years. In terms of the dynamics within the interest group system there was, in general, a conspicuous imbalance in the number of groups coming into the system and the number of groups leaving it for most policy sectors. There seems to have been a trend toward growth in the group population within some subsystems during the period studied.

The Dominance of the Hearings Process by Incumbent Groups

Another measure of the amount of structure that exists in the relations among interest groups is the ratio

between the number of groups that testify frequently at hearings and the number that testify infrequently. Many groups enter the hearings process to testify once or a few times but not enough to warrant classifying them as inside groups that testify more frequently. This analysis, like the previous one on the entrance and departure of groups, is based on two premises: (1) there are important differences between the groups that are integrated into the system and those that are not, and (2) the volume of testimonies presented over a long period is a useful indicator of whether a group is integrated into the system or not.

In this research two sets of terms are used to distinguish between groups that participate frequently at hearings and those that do not. The terms "incumbent group" and "non-incumbent group" are general terms used to discriminate between groups that testify frequently and those that do not in any population or universe of groups. The term "inside group" is used to designate the groups in the select universe of 119 groups, and the term "outside group" refers to all other groups in the population. An "inside group" is a group that presented a stipulated number of testimonies on the 145 bills in the select universe of bills that qualified the group for inclusion in the select universe. An "outside group" is a group that presented at least one testimony but fewer than

the stipulated number.

For the thirty-two hearings conducted by the House Ways and Means Committee, an "incumbent group" is defined as one that provided three or more testimonies in the sixteen-year period, 1945-60. A "non-incumbent group" is one that provided less than three testimonies. The selection of three testimonies as the definition of incumbency is a tentative decision. Four or five testimonies might have been used instead. The intent of the distinction between incumbent and non-incumbent groups is to discriminate between the groups that are more integrated into the system and those that are less integrated. If most of the testimonies at hearings are presented by the most active groups--the incumbent groups--relations among the leaders of these groups will be more highly developed and the expectations of the leaders of each group concerning the behavior of the leaders of other groups will be more certain than they would be under different conditions.

It is assumed that a leader of a group that frequently testifies--a spokesman for an incumbent group--has numerous opportunities to appraise the behavior of leaders of other incumbent groups who usually present testimony on the same kinds of bills. To the degree that the leaders of the incumbent groups come to understand the resources, values, strategies, and policy preferences of each other, they possess knowledge that enables them to estimate, within limits what actions may be needed and

what actions are feasible to achieve a particular objective. In a sense, both proponents and opponents of a particular bill are integrated into a single web of relationships since the behavior of the leader of each group affects the behavior of the leaders of other groups. As the leaders of each group become informed about other groups, they may be able to use their limited resources more efficiently than they would without the knowledge they have gained about each other.

But when some of the group witnesses at hearings represent non-incumbent groups, the leaders of incumbent groups are faced with uncertainties and the existing relationships among the incumbent groups may be affected. For example, one of the objectives of the leaders of incumbent groups is to deliver persuasive messages to the members of congressional committees. The messages of spokesmen for groups that usually are not a part of the hearings process, non-incumbent groups, may constitute interferences with the communications of leaders of incumbent groups and may render these messages ineffective.

The messages from non-incumbent groups also may cause shifts in the alignments among incumbent groups. For example, the entry into the hearings process of many non-incumbent groups may compel the leaders of incumbent groups that are aligned to seek new groups for their alignment in order to win their objective. Thus incumbent groups may have to predict or plan with less certainty than

they would if non-incumbent groups remained outside the hearings process. From this perspective it is helpful to determine the extent to which the spokesmen for non-incumbent groups testify at hearings.

To gain insight into this subject a special examination was made of the thirty-two hearings held by the House Ways and Means Committee that were included in the select universe of 145 bills. The classification of these thirty-two bills by policy sectors produced the following distribution: twelve trade bills, eight tax bills, seven welfare bills, and five unemployment compensation bills. Tabulations were kept of all testimony presented by every national group, oral and written, regardless of whether the testimony was favorable, unfavorable, or ambiguous on the bill under consideration. The product of this exercise was a list of 745 national groups that presented communications on one or more of the thirty-two bills. It was difficult to know if some of these groups were national, state, or local groups. Only the groups that seemed to represent individuals or affiliated organizational units in more than one state were included. The individuals who spoke for themselves or for state or city groups were excluded.

Table 86 contains the tabulations of the number of testimonies presented by the 745 groups classified by type of group. The non-incumbent groups--groups that provided no more than two testimonies--are shown in

TABLE 86

GROUP TESTIMONIES PRESENTED TO THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE ON THIRTY-TWO SELECTED BILLS, 1945-60, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF GROUP[a]

Type of Group	No. of Testimonies by Groups						
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six or More	Total Groups
Business	217	66	51	22	14	27	397
Citizen	39	9	4	3	1	6	62
Professional	52	21	9	10	5	3	100
Labor	43	21	8	6	5	5	88
Financial Business	11	10	0	0	3	1	25
Religious	13	4	2	0	2	2	23
Agricultural Business	9	4	0	1	2	0	16
Agricultural	11	1	2	1	0	7	22
Veterans	1	0	0	4	0	0	5
Small Business	3	2	0	0	0	2	7
Total	399	138	76	47	32	53	745

These data are based on testimonies presented on thirty-two bills from the universe of 145 bills.

[a]Total testimonies includes all statements by spokesmen for national groups to the committee that were printed in the hearings record.

Columns One and Two of the table. Columns Three, Four, Five, and Six indicate the numbers of incumbent groups--groups that provided three or more testimonies.

There were 217 Business groups that presented testimony on only one of the thirty-two bills during the sixteen-year period, and sixty-six Business groups that presented testimony on only two of the thirty-two bills. This table presents a powerful case for the view that at the hearing on a major bill a large number of groups will likely provide testimony that usually do not make use of the hearings process. The large decline in the number of groups testifying on three or more bills as compared with the number testifying on one or two bills reveals the contrast between the number of testimonies provided by incumbent groups and non-incumbent groups. For groups of nine types the decline in the numbers of groups testifying is approximately 50 per cent or more.

The sharpness of the decline is seen most clearly when a comparison is made between the numbers in Column One in Table 86, groups presenting testimony on one bill, and the numbers in Column Six, groups presenting testimony on six or more bills. A total of 399 groups presented testimony on one bill, but only fifty-three groups presented testimony on six or more bills, a decline of 86 per cent. These data reaffirm conclusions stated earlier, that only a few groups testify with great frequency at hearings. There is, of course, some variation

in the patterns of testimonies from committee to committee.

The major disadvantage of compiling in a single table the data on these thirty-two bills is that the patterns of group testimony may differ for the tax, trade, welfare, and unemployment bills that are processed by the Ways and Means Committee. Table 86 may conceal important facts about the distribution of testimonies by incumbent and non-incumbent groups on the bills in different policy categories.

Table 87 contains the tabulations of testimonies by inside groups and outside groups on each of the twelve trade bills. Table 88 presents the same information for the five bills concerned with unemployment. In these two tables the terms "inside group" and "outside group" are used to differentiate these groups from the terms incumbent and non-incumbent groups. The term inside group refers to any group within the select universe of 119 groups, and the term outside group refers to all other groups that testified during the period. It will be recalled that the 119 groups in the select universe are the groups that presented testimony most frequently for or against the 145 bills in the universe of bills.[7]

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[7]The terms incumbent and non-incumbent groups cannot be used in Tables 87 and 88 because when the enumeration of the testimonies presented by non-incumbent groups was made, it was not made separately for each bill listed in the table. Table 86, where the terms incumbent and non-incumbent groups are used, presents only the total numbers of groups making one, two, or more testimonies. The names of the non-incumbent groups that testified on the

TABLE 87

NUMBERS OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE GROUPS THAT TESTIFIED ON TWELVE TRADE BILLS[a]

Trade Bills[b]	No. of Inside Groups	No. of Outside Groups	Total Groups
Reciprocal Trade, 1945	30	53	83
Reciprocal Trade, 1947	17	46	63
Reciprocal Trade, 1949	27	40	67
Reciprocal Trade, 1951	26	23	49
Reciprocal Trade, 1953	37	81	118
Trade Agreements, 1955	44	109	153
Organization for Trade Cooperation (GATT), 1956	33	62	95
Renewal of Trade Agreements, 1958	41	93	134
Customs Simplification, 1953	12	19	31
Customs Simplification, 1955	12	20	32
Amendments to Anti-dumping Act of 1921, 1957	11	16	27
Foreign Investment Incentive Act, 1959	10	12	22

[a]Testimonies include all statements by spokesmen for national groups that were printed in the hearings record.

[b]These data are based on testimonies presented on twelve trade bills from the universe of 145 bills.

TABLE 88

NUMBERS OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE GROUPS THAT TESTIFIED ON FIVE UNEMPLOYMENT BILLS

Unemployment Bills	No. of Incumbent Groups	No. of Non-Incumbent Groups	Total Groups
Unemployment Compensation, 1959	25	15	40
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1945	15	12	27
Unemployment Insurance, 1954	14	13	27
Emergency Extension of Federal Unemployment Compensation Benefits, 1958	13	4	17
Unemployment Insurance, 1952	10	4	14

Testimonies include all statements by spokesmen for national groups that were presented in the hearings record. These data are based on testimonies presented on five bills from the universe of 145 bills.

In Table 87 a comparison of the numbers of inside and outside groups that testified on each of the trade bills shows that on every bill except one, more outside groups testified than inside groups. For some bills the outside groups that presented testimony were more than twice as numerous as the inside groups. In general, the larger the total number of groups that testified the larger the proportion of the total groups that were outside groups. As the total number of groups testifying at a hearing declines, the greater is the

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Reciprocal Trade Bill for 1945, for example, were never identified. Therefore, the term non-incumbent group cannot be used in Tables 87 and 88 because it is not known on what specific bills each non-incumbent group presented testimony.

probability that the most active groups--inside groups--in the hearings process will be present, and the less is the probability that the outside groups will outnumber the incumbent groups.

The data in Table 87 indicate the problems that may confront the leaders of inside groups who plan strategies for passing or defeating legislation. When large numbers of outside groups present testimony at hearings the inside groups face increased uncertainties in selecting their strategies because they cannot be sure what the spokesmen for outside groups will ask of the committee, what evidence they will present, or what impact their presence at the hearings will have on the alignment of inside groups.

A different picture emerges, however, from the data on group testimony presented on the five unemployment bills shown in Table 88. For every hearing the number of inside groups presenting testimony exceeds the number of outside groups. For two of the hearings the number of outside groups is less than 50 per cent as large as the number of inside groups. The data in this table tend to confirm again the proposition that the smaller the total number of groups that present testimony the larger the proportion that inside groups are of the total.

The findings from the analyses of the testimony of inside and outside groups on these two categories of bills are difficult to reconcile. One possible explanation is

that many non-incumbent groups have assigned a lower priority to unemployment bills than to trade bills, and therefore, the leaders decide not to testify on them. This suggests that the bills in each policy category must be studied separately before firm conclusions can be stated. Another possible explanation is that since non-incumbent groups are not within the interest group system, they may not have the opportunity to become well informed about the scheduling of hearings on all bills in which they might be interested.

Table 89 shows the number of testimonies presented by inside groups of each type on the twelve trade bills. All testimonies for, against, and ambiguous are recorded in this table for the 119 groups in the select universe. These 119 groups in the population presented testimonies most frequently on all major bills in the period 1945-60.

Column One in the table shows that trade bills did not receive testimony from many groups of certain types. Among the least active groups were Financial Business groups, Professional groups, and Citizens groups. The most active groups were Agricultural groups, Business groups, Labor groups, Religious groups, and Agricultural Business groups. The most important conclusion indicated by the data in the table is that the variation in the number of testimonies among groups within each type is very large. A regular expression of views by nearly all of the groups of one or two types on bills in this single policy sector might be

TABLE 89

FREQUENCY OF TESTIMONIES[a] BY 119 SELECTED GROUPS AT HEARINGS OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE ON TWELVE SELECTED TRADE BILLS

Type of Group	None	One	Two	Three	Four
Business (37)[b]	18	5	0	3	1
Financial Business (6)	5	1	0		
Agricultural Business (10)	4	0	1	2	0
Small Business (2)	1	0	1		
Labor (16)	5	3	2	2	1
Agriculture (10)	0	0	1	0	3
Professional (9)	7	0	1	0	0
Citizen (17)	8	2	2	2	0
Religious (7)	2	0	1	1	1
Veterans (5)	2	0	1	1	1

[a]The testimony counted is all testimony for the bills, against them, ambiguous on them.

[b]The total number of groups of each type in the universe is stated in parentheses.

TABLE 89--Continued

Five	Six	Seven	Eight	Nine	Ten	Eleven	Twelve
1	1	0	4	1	2	1	0
							0
1	0	1	0	1			0
							0
0	1	0	1	1			0
1	1	1	0	2	0	1	0
0	1						0
1	0	1	1				0
1	1						0
							0

expected if a pattern of dominance by groups of one type or a few types existed.

None of the 119 groups testified on all twelve trade bills and only two groups, the National Council of American Importers and the American Farm Bureau Federation, testified on eleven of them. The types of groups that are most consistently active are Agriculture and Business. All but one of the ten Agriculture groups testified on four or more of the twelve trade bills. No Agriculture groups testified on less than two trade bills. Eight Business groups testified on eight or more of the twelve bills. However, eighteen of the thirty-seven Business groups did not present testimony on any trade bill. It is clear that with the exception of Agriculture groups there is sustained activity on trade bills by only a small proportion of groups of every type.

The data in Table 86 also show that for the House Ways and Means Committee, at least, there is a marked imbalance among the numbers of groups of different types that presented testimony. Of the total of 745 groups presenting one or more testimonies on the thirty-two bills, 397 groups, 53 per cent of the total, are Business groups. This is especially noteworthy because certain types of business groups, such as Financial Business groups, Agricultural Business groups, and Small Business groups, have been classified separately. Whether a comparison is made of the proportion of Business groups to the total of

all groups combined using the one-testimony criterion in Column One, or a comparison is made between Business groups and other types of groups using testimony criteria in other columns in the table, Business groups outnumber all others combined by nearly two to one for each testimony criterion. This is true for the non-incumbent groups that presented one testimony and for the incumbent groups that presented six or more testimonies. This pattern of group testimony is an important aspect of the structure of relations among groups interested in the bills that are processed by this committee. These data are relevant to the question of the extent of diversity of groups in the population discussed in Chapter V.

Another set of data that helps fill the information gaps concerning the degree of structure in the interest group population is presented in Table 90. This table contains compilations of all group testimony, regardless of whether it was for, against, or ambiguous on a bill, on 150 hearings on bills processed by the House Agriculture Committee from 1945 through 1960. These data were obtained during the preliminary stage of the hearings research. Therefore, the criterion used for inclusion of a bill in the preliminary universe of bills was less stringent than that used in the preparation of the final universe. The preliminary universe of groups, as mentioned in Chapter III, was a tentative universe prepared for use in the complete examination of all hearings. It was not regarded as of

TABLE 90

VOLUME OF TESTIMONY BY GROUPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES ON 150 AGRICULTURAL BILLS

Type of Group	No. of Groups Testifying	Total No. of Testimonies	Testimonies on Bills (percent)					
			2% or More	5% or More	10% or More	30% or More	60% or More	70% or More
Business	22	45	5	1				
Financial Business	2	12	1	1				
Agricultural Business	17	76	12	4				
Small Business	2	2	0	0				
Labor	18	64	8	4				
Agriculture	40	476	27	11	6	3	2	1
Professional	13	29	4	0				
Citizens	20	52	5	2				
Religious	9	25	5	0				
Veterans	4	6	0	0				

The testimony of every group in the universe of 428 groups was counted regardless of the position taken by the group on a bill: for, against, or ambiguous.

fixed size. During the examination of all hearings, groups were added to it because it became clear that certain groups that frequently presented testimony had been omitted from the preliminary universe of groups. The number of groups in the universe at the beginning of the examination of hearings was 329; at the end the number of groups was 428.

The examination of all hearings held by fourteen House committees resulted in the identification of all the hearings at which two or more groups testified that were listed in the preliminary universe. For the House Committee on Agriculture, 150 hearings were identified for the period 1945-60. Although the number of groups whose testimony is recorded in Table 90 does not include every group that presented testimony to the Committee, the error is one of understating the number of groups that testified. It seems likely, however, that nearly all of the groups that provided testimony frequently are included. It must be remembered also that the universe of bills used in the table may be incomplete due to the incomplete universe of groups that testified frequently. Nevertheless, the error is probably very small for bills on which many groups testified. This is a reasonable estimate because as the table indicates there are a few groups that testified with great frequency and all of these groups were in the preliminary universe from the beginning of the examination of hearings.

Table 90 shows that the hearings on each bill were dominated, in terms of numbers of groups that presented testimony, by Agriculture groups. This is true whether the criterion for judgment is the number of groups testifying, Column One, the total number of testimonies presented by groups of a type, Column Two, or the number of groups testifying on any given percentage of the 150 bills. The only other type that had more than eight groups that testified on 2 per cent or more of the bills was Agricultural Business, but there were twenty-seven Agriculture groups that testified on 2 per cent or more of the bills. No group of any type, except Agriculture groups, testified on as many as 10 per cent of the 150 hearings.

The second important fact established by the data in this table is that only a very small number of Agriculture groups testified very frequently at agricultural hearings. Only six of the forty Agriculture groups that made one testimony testified as frequently as at 10 per cent or more of the hearings. Three groups testified at 30 per cent or more of the hearings and two groups testified at 60 per cent or more of them. No group testified at 75 per cent or more of the hearings.

The Agriculture groups most active in presenting testimony at these 150 hearings and the number of testimonies of each were:

American Farm Bureau Federation 107
National Farmers Union 92

National Grange	85
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives . .	37
National Milk Producers Federation	18
National Wool Growers Association	15

In the literature on agricultural interest groups the first three groups listed above are often described as the "Big Three" farm organizations. These three groups presented a combined total of 284 testimonies, or, 60 per cent of all testimonies presented by the forty Agriculture groups. The six most active Agriculture groups presented a total of 354 testimonies, or, 75 per cent of all the testimonies provided by the forty Agriculture groups.

The data in this table strongly support the generalization that at the overwhelming majority of all hearings on agricultural bills one of the major Agriculture groups will present testimony. The generalization is also confirmed by inspection of the tabulations in Table 91. This table shows there were only six of 150 hearings at which no agricultural group testified. There were only eight hearings at which none of the six most active Agriculture groups testified.

The data also indicate that the larger the number of groups presenting testimony at an agricultural hearing, the greater the probability that one of the six most active Agriculture groups has testified. This assertion is supported by the data showing hearings at which only two, three, four, or five groups testified. Table 91 indicates that as the number of groups presenting testimonies at

TABLE 91

PATTERN OF TESTIMONIES BY AGRICULTURAL GROUPS ON AGRICULTURAL BILLS

Hearings Classified By No. of Groups Presenting Testimony	Total Hearings	Number of Hearings		
		Without Testimony From an Agricultural Group	Without Testimony From any of Six Major Agricultural Groups	Without Testimony From one of Big Three Farm Groups
Two testimonies	25	1	2	4
Three testimonies	35	3	4	5
Four testimonies	22	1	1	2
Five testimonies	18	1	1	1
Six testimonies	7	0	0	0
Seven testimonies	11	0	0	0
Eight testimonies	9	0	0	0
Nine testimonies	6	0	0	0

The testimony of every group in the universe of groups was counted regardless of the position taken by the group on a bill: for, against, or ambiguous.

hearings increases, there are fewer hearings at which there is no testimony presented by one or more of the six most active farm groups. The one exception is for three-testimony hearings. The table shows the numbers in the cells for the three-testimony hearings in all three columns are larger than for the two-testimony hearings. There were five three-testimony hearings that did not receive testimony from one or more of the three prestigious Agriculture groups. But there were only two four-testimony hearings and one five-testimony hearing that did not receive testimony from one or more of the Big Three farm organizations. Every hearing in the six-testimony classification, or the other larger classifications, received testimony from at least one of the three major farm organizations. Thus, the views of one of the three most active Agriculture groups are presented at virtually every hearing. These groups have demonstrated a commitment to a broader range of agricultural interests than any other groups.

The data show that non-agricultural groups present testimony at this committee's hearings infrequently and irregularly. The most testimonies presented by a non-agricultural group at the 150 hearings was fourteen by an Agricultural Business group, the National Cotton Council. The only other non-agricultural group to present more than nine testimonies was the American Federation of Labor that presented thirteen testimonies. No non-agricultural group can assert that it has actively presented its views for

open and full appraisal by all concerned groups on a consistent basis. No non-agricultural group can claim that it monitors and speaks out on the broad range of agricultural subjects. This is the most important fact about the structure of testimonies presented on agricultural legislation. The Agriculture groups are seldom challenged within it. And among the Agriculture groups there is a well-defined structure in terms of the volume of testimony presented at committee hearings during a period of many years.

The Persistence of Established Patterns of Group Testimony

The more stable the amount of testimony by each group in the system during a long time span, the greater is the probability that a structured pattern of roles for groups in their presentation of testimonies exists. The expectation is that the greater the development of the role structure in the system, as evidenced by the pattern of testimonies of groups, the greater the degree of integration among groups.

One test of the persistence of structure among groups in the population is to determine if the relative positions of the active groups, measured by frequency of testimony, continue without change through two successive periods. This test is conducted at two levels of analysis: (1) for the entire 119 groups in the select universe of groups on the 145 bills in the select universe of bills,

and (2) for the groups of certain types, considered separately, on the 145 bills.

In this exercise the 145 bills were divided into two parts, the sixty-eight bills considered at hearings in the period 1945-52, and the seventy-two bills considered at hearings in a second eight-year period, 1953-60. The volume of testimony for each group on each set of bills was tabulated and correlations were run on the two quantities for each of the 166 groups that were established no later than 1946.[8] The assumption on which this exercise is based is that each group had an opportunity to testify on each of the 145 bills considered in the two time spans. The correlations will show the extent to which the relative positions of the groups, in terms of the number of testimonies presented by each, remained stable for the two periods.

The correlation coefficient (r) of the volume of testimonies in the two periods for the entire population of 166 groups was .784, significant at the .05 level of confidence. This is a fairly high coefficient.

Several correlations were computed for groups of different types. The numbers of groups in some types were too small to reveal a pattern of order at the .05 level of confidence. Correlations were computed for the following: (1) all business groups combined, including the

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[8]The Pearson product-moment index of correlation (r) was used.

forty-nine Business groups, plus the Financial Business groups, plus the Agricultural Business groups, plus the Small Business groups, (2) the forty-nine Business groups separately, (3) the twenty Professional groups, (4) the thirteen Agriculture groups, (5) the twenty Labor groups, (6) the twenty-two Citizens groups. Table 92 contains the coefficients for each of these correlations. The coefficients vary markedly for the groups of different types. But even the lowest coefficients, the r's for the Professional and Citizens groups, are above .45. The other three coefficients, .924 for Agriculture groups, .880 for Labor groups, and .838 for Business groups, are very high and statistically significant. These analyses show there is a high degree of persistence in this dimension of the structure of testimonies by groups over a long period of time.

Another approach to assess the persistence of structure in the pattern of testimonies by groups is to examine the behavior of groups toward bills within specific policy categories. The testimonies of all groups on bills in three policy categories, housing bills, trade bills, and labor bills, were correlated separately for the two eight-year time spans. The results are contained in Table 93. None of the coefficients is extremely high, the highest is for the housing bills, r = .632; and none is low, the lowest is for trade bills, r = .566. Each of these coefficients is significant at the .05 level of

TABLE 92

CORRELATIONS OF THE VOLUME OF TESTIMONIES BY 166 GROUPS FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE EIGHT-YEAR PERIODS

Type of Group	Number of Groups	Correlation Coefficient (r)[a]	Significant at .05 Level of Confidence
All business groups combined (Business, Financial Business, Agricultural Business, and Small Business)	77	.792	Yes
Business groups	49	.838	Yes
Professional groups	20	.473	No[b]
Agricultural groups	13	.924	Yes
Labor groups	20	.880	Yes
Citizen groups	22	.493	Yes

The 166 groups used in this exercise were the groups from the 189-group universe of the most active groups for the period 1945-60 that were established no later than 1946.

[a]The index of correlation used in this exercise is the Pearson product-moment coefficient.

[b]The region of rejection of the hypothesis that r was not significantly different from zero, at the .05 level of confidence, is ± 1.96. The coefficient for Professional groups of .473 fell inside the region of rejection by a very small margin; the test result was 1.954.

TABLE 93

CORRELATIONS OF THE VOLUME OF TESTIMONIES
BY 116 GROUPS ON SELECTED BILLS
FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE TIME SPANS

Type of Group	Subject	Correlation Coefficient (r)	Significant at .05 Level of Confidence
All groups combined	Housing bills	.632	Yes
All groups combined	Trade bills	.566	Yes
All groups combined	Labor bills	.580	Yes

confidence. These results provide additional support for the conclusion that the structure of the relative rates of testimony of groups tends to persist through long periods of time.

Labor was the only policy category with a sufficiently large number of bills to compute correlations for groups of different types. Table 94 reveals that for the Labor groups the correlation is fairly high, r = .739; it is moderately high for Business groups, r = .565. Both of these coefficients are significant at the .05 level of confidence. The coefficient for Citizens groups is low, r = .261, and the coefficient is very low for the Professional groups, r = .027. Thus the extent to which the testimony patterns of groups persists over a long period of time, measured in terms of volume of testimonies, varies greatly for groups of different types.

An assessment of persistence in the patterns of testimonies by groups was also made in terms of the number of bills of different policy categories on which groups presented testimonies. Table 95 contains the correlation coefficients for several selected aggregations of groups. Although the coefficient for all groups combined was moderately high, r = .555, and statistically significant, there is great variation in the coefficients for the groups of different types. The highest r's were registered by Agriculture groups, r = .832, Business groups, r = .636, and Labor groups, r = .536. Each of

TABLE 94

CORRELATIONS OF THE VOLUME OF TESTIMONIES
BY SELECTED GROUPS ON LABOR BILLS
FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE TIME SPANS

Type of Group	Subject	Correlation Coefficient (r)	Significant at .05 Level of Confidence
All business groups	Labor bills	.538	Yes
Business groups	Labor bills	.565	Yes
Professional groups	Labor bills	.027	No
Labor groups	Labor bills	.739	Yes
Citizen groups	Labor bills	.261	No

TABLE 95

CORRELATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF TESTIMONIES ON BILLS IN DIFFERENT POLICY CATEGORIES BY SELECTED GROUPS FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE TIME SPANS

Type of Group	Correlation Coefficient (r)	Significant at .05 Level of Confidence
All groups combined	.555	Yes
All business groups	.550	Yes
Business groups	.636	Yes
Professional groups	.387	No
Agriculture groups	.832	Yes
Labor groups	.536	Yes
Citizen groups	.395	No
Agricultural Business groups	.147	No

these coefficients was statistically significant. In contrast Agricultural Business groups registered an r of .147 and both the Professional and Citizen groups had r's below .40; none of these three coefficients was statistically significant.

In general, all of these findings support the conclusion that there is a high degree of persistence in several dimensions of the testimony patterns of groups over a long period of time. This in turn tends to confirm the notion that the active interest groups are fairly well integrated.

Previous Integrative Experience

The assumption concerning this indicator of integration is that rewarding cooperative group ventures

tend to integrate the cooperating groups with each other. This, in turn, tends to incline the participating groups toward future cooperative activities. Thus, a cooperative experience is assumed to be an integrating experience that leaves a residue of knowledge, perhaps knowledge of persons as well as technical or professional knowledge, that tends to make future cooperation easier than it had been previously.

In an earlier portion of this chapter findings were reported from interview data concerning the extent to which past cooperative experiences among groups tend to promote more cooperation. According to the forty-two Washington representatives of groups who were interviewed, this factor ranked third in importance, based on a comparison of the means of respondents' ratings for six factors that promote cooperation. On the average it was regarded as a factor of moderate importance in promoting cooperation.

Interview data discussed earlier also indicate that cooperation between groups to attain a legislative objective is likely to be followed by cooperation with the same groups, rather than different groups. It seems likely that as the representatives of groups communicate, confer, and plan with each other repeatedly they tend to become integrated, at least for certain limited purposes.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter data on the interest group population and on the relations among interest groups were analyzed using an "integration" frame of reference. Several indicators of integration were applied to the data assembled in this investigation: (1) the degree of homogeneity among the active groups in the group population, measured in terms of certain shared attributes, (2) the extent to which the offices of groups were located in close proximity to each other, (3) the extent to which group leaders interacted with each other, and especially the extent to which the leaders of groups of different types interacted, (4) the degree to which group leaders held the same attitudes concerning intergroup cooperation, ways of working effectively with Congress, and the extent to which they engage in the same types of cooperative activity with other groups, (5) the degree to which the groups active in the hearings process were related to each other in orderly patterns that tended to persist for a long time span, (6) the amount of previous integrative experience of the groups.

The evidence presented on the extent to which the active groups constitute a homogeneous population was meager and inconclusive. Four of the other five indicators, however, are consistent: there is a fairly high degree of integration among the active groups in the interest group system. The conclusion concerning the

fifth indicator, the degree of interaction among groups, was that a moderate amount of interaction occurs, but there were no hearings at which many groups of each type testified. On any given bill the majority of active groups within most types do not testify. Thus, it appears these findings contravene others that point to substantial integration among the active groups.

A brief restatement of the meaning of integration may help to show how this finding is consistent with the other evidence. Integration does not imply that the immediate major goals of entities in an aggregation converge. It does imply that mutual concern by the active groups for the continuance of the existing arrangements is an objective of higher priority than the attainment of any immediate substantive group goal. Integration denotes the common understanding and the acceptance of the procedural arrangements that prevail within the system and a tolerance of, if not a commitment to, the norms that guide and limit the behavior of group leaders toward each other and members of Congress and their staffs. Integration denotes an awareness among groups that they share a common environment and, to some extent, a common fate. Groups support the system insofar as they attempt to operate in it according to the prevailing norms. In this sense, to state that the groups in the system are integrated means that it is expected that the norms and procedures of the system will be honored by all or nearly all the

groups--the well-known orderly processes will be used by groups in pursuit of their objectives.

The assertion that the active groups are integrated does not mean the behavior of the leaders of each active group has an equal impact on each of the other groups. This research has shown that within the interest group system--a system that encompasses goal oriented behavior in all policy sectors--are subsystems, such as the universe of groups that testify on agriculture bills. Such subsystems may have distinctive processes, conventions of discourse, populations composed of different groups, and different structural relationships among the groups within each population.

It was not possible to explore each of these subsystems in this investigation. But the findings of the analyses of many major and minor agricultural bills strongly suggest that within a specific subsystem, such as agriculture, the active groups behave in ways that might result in a loss of status or influence in a different subsystem. There can be little doubt, for example, that the active Agriculture groups dominate the agricultural policy sector or that the active Veterans groups are overwhelmingly dominant in the veterans policy sector. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is one of the few committees in which the discourse during hearings between the representatives of the prestigious Veterans groups and the committee members is carried on in terms

of the "American Legion's bill," or the "DAV's bill." Thus, the Veterans groups may constitute a subsystem in their testimonies on Veterans bills and be integrated with each other as well as within the larger population of groups in the interest group system. This explains why the findings that showed only a moderate degree of interaction among groups of different types do not discredit the notion of an integrated population of interest groups at the congressional level of government.

It seems likely that a full exploration of many subsystems would reveal that the structure of certain subsystems are more highly developed than others and that the degree of integration among groups in these subsystems varies. Within each subsystem the expectation is that patterned relationships among groups can be identified in terms of the degree of activity by each group at hearings on bills in a policy sector. This order is hierarchical and relatively permanent. It seems likely that the degree of permanency of the relative positions of active groups is linked to (1) the newness of the policy sector, and (2) the degree of controversy concerning specific bills under consideration. Thus, an integrated population does not imply an equally active role for each group; it only denotes relatively permanent relationships that are known and accepted by the groups within the population.

The principal purpose of using the integration frame of reference to analyze the data on interest groups

at the congressional level has not been to prove that, in general, integration exists among the groups, but to illumine and explore different relationships among groups. It appears that further research may profitably be focused on specific facets of interrelationships among groups. Some of the promising interrelationships are the degrees, kinds, and scope of interaction among interest groups, the degree to which group leaders hold common perceptions of intergroup cooperation, their legislative work, and the amount, kinds, and persistence of structure among groups.

The larger question concerns the usefulness of knowledge about intergroup relations. The possible implications for certain theoretical models of the legislative process and democracy have already been mentioned in an earlier chapter. One interesting line of inquiry follows from the premise that an integrated population is in some degree a controlled population. This premise is well established in the literature of sociology. It has been noted in earlier chapters that any set of repeated interactions between two or more entities can be usefully framed in terms of intergroup dependency. This is true whether the interactions are cooperative or conflictual. Each actor usually takes the behavior, and the estimated future behavior, of the other actors into account in making his own behavioral choices. The effect of this practice is to reduce the range of alternative behaviors

available to him in responding to the other actor if he wishes to continue the relationship.

It is well known that the groups at the congressional level have much knowledge about the goals, methods, and resources of many other groups. In this chapter additional evidence has been discussed that confirms the interrelatedness of groups. Though the existence of integration among groups is not difficult to perceive it is not so easy to see the functioning arrangements as a system of controls. Questions concerning the operation of this system of controls are not considered directly in this research. The analyses undertaken do, however, point clearly toward the view that the system is controlled chiefly by informal means such as the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of group leaders, members, congressmen, and the public. It appears that the group system, as it now functions, is monitored or policed largely by the active groups within it, and by the congressmen with whom they interact. The existing arrangements and the incumbent group population seem to be regarded as legitimate by the centers of power within the field of their impact.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Intergroup relations have many dimensions. This paper has focused chiefly on two types of relationships among interest groups: (1) cooperative activities among groups, and (2) shared policy preferences among groups. Two kinds of data were assembled and analyzed to provide information on these relationships.

First, interview data concerning cooperation among national groups were obtained from a random sample of spokesmen for groups having offices in Washington, D. C. The data indicated that cooperation among interest groups is nearly universal. There is a remarkable degree of consistency in the importance assigned by group spokesmen to specific cooperative practices. Also, most group spokesmen share the same beliefs concerning what factors promote cooperation among groups.

Second, the policy preferences of 119 groups publicly stated at selected House committee hearings were recorded on the 145 bills receiving the most testimonies during the period 1945-60. These policy preferences were analyzed using a computer program based on a technique for

the identification of types or clusters of entities called Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis developed by Louis McQuitty. Analyses were made of group testimony to identify general clusters of like-minded groups, clusters of groups within specific types of groups, and clusters of groups active within separate sectors of public policy. Several clusters of groups were identified in each of these analyses. Most of the clusters were not composed entirely of groups of one type. The cohesion among the groups in these clusters was moderately high for a few clusters but relatively low for others. Many groups were not associated with any cluster.

These data were interpreted using two conceptual frameworks, pluralism and integration, and several hypotheses concerning relations among interest groups. The usefulness of two other frameworks, system and conflict, for the study of intergroup relationships was also discussed. The basic characteristics of the pluralist model are five: (1) numerous centers of power exist in the society, (2) these centers compete with each other, (3) opportunities for access to decision-making are numerous and open to all, (4) the centers of power in the society use these opportunities, and (5) there is a measure of consensus on the rules of the game in the society. The integrationist framework stresses such properties of intergroup relationships as proximity, kinds and volume of interaction, mutual knowledge among group leaders,

shared experiences, and structural relationships among groups in the population.

The findings of this research fit more easily into the integration than the pluralist mode of thought. Much of the scholarly and journalistic literature on interest groups stresses such terms and concepts as the following: the group struggle, a diversity of groups in constant competition and conflict, shifting alignments of groups for limited objectives, an open interest group system, and a competitive balance among contending interest groups. The data in this research point away from these formulations toward the following: very limited movement of groups into and out of the interest group system, enduring policy preferences of groups over many years, the dominance of some policy sectors by groups of a single type, restricted competition among groups, and very limited dynamics during a period of several years in the relationships among groups in the population.

In general, the most recurrent theme from the different facets of this investigation has been the notion of "order" in the universe of active interest groups at the congressional level. The interview data showed there is much cooperation among group leaders but it is carried on chiefly by informal rather than formal methods. This informal relating of group to group helps to explain the order among the hundreds of active groups. Another powerful variable in explaining the order in the interest

group system is the policy preference of the group. Group respondents indicated that shared policy preferences tend to promote cooperation among groups more than any other factor. And the policy preferences of groups tend to "stay put." Very little change was discernible in the policy preferences during a sixteen-year period.

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APPENDIX A

Survey Schedules

1.. What is your official title in the organization?

2. How long have you served with this organization?

3. How many years have you worked in Washington?

4. Have you served with any other organizations?

5. What was your position before coming to this organization?

6. It is sometimes suggested that there are organizations in Washington that favor and oppose every major piece of legislation with the result that associations tend to cancel out each other's influence and a balance of viewpoints is maintained.

   Is this true of bills and issues in your field?

7. With what congressional committees do you work most?

8. Do you find, in general, that the committees of one house of Congress are more receptive to your organization's legislative objectives than the other?

9. Are congressional committees equally receptive to all groups in your field that testify before them? If not how is the difference in receptivity shown?

10. Are Democrat-led and Republican-led committees equally receptive to your association's objectives?

11. Are there any organizations that communicate with congressmen directly and do not testify at congressional committee hearings? Name some of them. Why don't these groups testify?

12. Is your organization actively interested in (1) more, (2) less, (3) the same categories of issues now as it was ten years ago?

13. Do you see a trend in the broadening or narrowing of association's interests?

14. Schedule No. 1 (Hand out)
I am interested in the problems that representatives of new organizations, those which have been recently formed, face in their efforts to make their association "effective" on Capitol Hill. Score each of the following factors according to its importance in assisting a new association to become effective on Capitol Hill.

Very important factor - 4
Moderately important factor - 3
A factor of minor importance - 2
A factor of no importance - 1

__A. Secure the personal friendship of key committee members and other congressmen.
__B. Secure the personal friendship of congressmen's and committee staff members.
__C. Present careful and thorough factual studies in support of the association's legislative objectives.
__D. Provide entertainment and gifts for key committee members and other congressmen.
__E. Do favors for key committee members and other congressmen.
__F. Provide regular and able presentation of the association's stand on legislation at congressional committee hearings.
__G. Present resolutions or petitions adopted by the association's members showing their preferences on legislative issues.
__H. Secure the active support from the association's members throughout the country by letters, wires, and visits to congressmen's offices.

15. Not counting your association, what organization in your field enjoys the best opportunity to achieve its legislative objectives with key committees members and other congressmen?

Does your association enjoy the same opportunities as this group? To the same extent as other groups in your field?

Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your judgment?

16. I am told that some groups are able to get congressmen to introduce bills for them. Is your group able to do this?

Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your judgment?

17. I am told that some groups are able to get congressional committees to schedule hearings on bills in which they are interested. Is your group able to do this?

    Is this practice more or less common than it was ten years ago, in your judgment?

18. Schedule No. 2 (Hand out)
    Here are some of the common TYPES OF COOPERATION among national associations in working to achieve legislative objectives. Score each of the following types according to the extent to which it is practiced by your organization in relation to other organizations. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided.

    Frequently practiced - 4
    Occasionally practiced - 3
    Rarely practiced - 2
    Never practiced - 1

__A. Exchange information between associations, such as information on the supporters, opponents and probable maneuverings on a particular bill.
__B. Divide among the groups the work which needs to be done in support of a bill (or to defeat a bill) such as contacting "doubtful" congressmen prior to a vote.
__C. Jointly plan the strategy for passage of a bill.
__D. Loan, exchange, or share association mailing lists for publicity on a bill.
__E. Help organize or support a temporary committee or organization for mobilizing support for passage or defeat of a particular measure.

Add any other types of cooperation not included above and score them.

__F. _____

19. One of the most interesting questions about the relations between national associations is what causes one association to cooperate with another on a particular bill.

    Schedule No. 3 (Hand out)
    On the basis of your experience in Washington, evaluate the importance of each of the following FACTORS IN PROMOTING COOPERATION between two or more organizations on a SINGLE bill. Score each item by writing the number of the best response in the space provided.

    Very important factor - 4
    Moderately important factor - 3

Minor Factor - 2
A factor of no importance - 1

__A. The associations have advanced many of the same or similar legislative objectives for many years.
__B. The Washington representatives of the associations are personal friends.
__C. The associations have cooperated with each other on legislative objectives in the past.
__D. The associations share the same position toward the single bill at hand.
__E. The associations are drawn together by a third organization that organizes many associations for the support of the single bill at hand.
__F. The associations work together as part of an exchange of support (log-rolling) in which Association A helps Association B even though A is not interested in the bill at hand in return for an assurance that Association B will help A at a later time on a bill it wants.

20. On approximately how many different occasions have you worked cooperatively with other organizations during this session?

Were the same groups involved each time?

In your recollection does your association cooperate (1) more, (2) less, (3) to the same extent, as it did ten years ago?

21. According to your knowledge which one of the following is more common.

Associations cooperate chiefly with groups in their own field.
Associations cooperate chiefly with groups outside their own field.
Associations cooperate equally often with groups in and outside of their field.

22. Schedule No. 4 (Hand out)
In your opinion, which one of the following is the most accurate appraisal of the way congressmen with whom you work generally regard the representatives of national associations who contact them. UNDERLINE the best answer.

Congressmen with whom you work hold representatives of national associations in:
(1) very high esteem
(2) high esteem
(3) low esteem
(4) very low esteem

In your opinion, how did congressmen with whom you worked regard representatives of national associations ten years ago?

(1) very high esteem
(2) high esteem
(3) low esteem
(4) very low esteem

Which one of the following is a most accurate appraisal of the extent to which congressmen with whom you work value the work done by national associations in regard to legislation.

Congressmen with whom you work place _____ on the work done by national associations.

(1) great value
(2) some value
(3) little value
(4) no value

In your opinion which one of the following is most accurate.

Congressmen with whom you work show _____ for the resolutions adopted by association members.

(1) great respect
(2) moderate respect
(3) little respect

In your opinion how did Congressmen with whom you worked regard the resolutions adopted by association members ten years ago?

(1) with great respect
(2) with moderate respect
(3) with little respect

In your opinion which one of the following is most accurate.

Congressmen with whom you work show _____ for the association's factual research studies.

(1) great respect
(2) moderate respect
(3) little respect

How does this compare with what congressmen thought ten years ago?

APPENDIX B

HEARINGS USED IN COMPUTER ANALYSES

Committee on Agriculture

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Oleomargarine Tax Repeal. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Oleomargarine Tax Repeal. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on General Farm Program. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on National Forest Mining Claims. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Poultry and Eggs of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Compulsory Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Farm Labor. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Extension of Public Law 480. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Forests of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on National Forests: Multiple Use. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Suspension of Federal Grading of Lamb and Mutton. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. Hearings on Extension of the Mexican Farm Labor Program. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960.

Committee on Armed Services

U. S. Congress. Committee on Military Affairs. Hearings on Universal Military Training. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Universal Military Training. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

Committee on Banking and Currency

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Price Controls. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Bretton Woods Agreement. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Stabilization Act. 79th Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, 1945-6.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Emergency Price Control and Stabilization Act of 1942. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing and Rent Control. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Rent Controls. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on General Housing. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Rent Control, 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Housing Amendments of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Extension of Rent Control, 1950. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Cooperative Housing. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Housing and Community Facilities. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

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U. S. Congress. Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Legislation to Relieve Unemployment. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Area Redevelopment Act. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Housing Act of 1959. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on the Community Facilities Act of 1959. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Hearings on Emergency Home Ownership Act. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960.

Committee on Education and Labor

U. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

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U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Minimum Wage Standards. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Equal Pay for Equal Work for Women. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Labor Education Extension Service. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

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U. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. Congress. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the National Labor Relations Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

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U. S. Congress. Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Amendments to the Minimum Wage. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

U. S. Congress. Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Federal Aid to States for School Construction. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

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