

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION IN SOCIAL SERVICES
SYSTEMS: A TWO - CITY COMPARISON

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

ANN WORKMAN SHELDON

1975



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION IN SOCIAL SERVICES
SYSTEMS: A TWO-CITY COMPARISON

presented by

Ann Workman Sheldon

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Sociology

Philip M. Marcus
Major professor

Date December, . 1975

STUDIOS CITY, CALIF.

DD - 5061

195581

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION IN SOCIAL SERVICES
SYSTEMS: A TWO-CITY COMPARISON

By

Ann Workman Sheldon

This study investigates interorganizational relationships within the social service systems of two middle size metropolitan areas. The focus is the network of interacting organizations, and the analysis examines: (1) the types and extensiveness of interorganizational relationships of 68 social service agencies and the patterns of organizational interactions in two social service networks; (2) the relationships of organizational characteristics and resources and the agency's position in the hierarchy of organizations in the local system (its power) to interaction behaviors; and, (3) the effect of competition for resources on the pattern of interorganizational relationships established by social service agencies and within local systems.

The study emphasizes power relationships using a causal model which assumes that competitive relationships in the process of seeking resources determine organization and system interaction patterns. Social service organizations seek resources for service delivery through exchange relationships with other agencies, but the primary stimulus for interrelationships is competition to acquire and keep the resources needed for survival and/or growth. Power is a key ingredient in the interactions.

The research incorporates an exchange theory approach and the organization-set concept. The system is conceptualized as the collection of organization-sets of all the social service organizations

in each community and is measured using sociometric techniques and aggregated organization variables. The data came from lengthy, structured interviews and self-administered questionnaires from the directors of all the formally established social service organizations meeting minimal size and policy-making criteria (System A, N=33; System B, N=35) and from organization records. The independent variables of sponsorship, type of work, age, size, staffing patterns, and service diversity came from records and responses to questions about agency operations. Two types of competition were measured by asking directors to identify organizations and groups involved with the agency in four types of competitive relationships and to estimate the extent of the competitive pressures experienced by the agency. Directors reported interorganizational ties (dependent variables) with the organizations and groups sharing the pool of commonweal resources for 14 different types of non-competitive relationships. Organization power, or network position was derived from the number of sociometric choices received for these 18 different types of resource relationships.

The twenty hypotheses tested concern (1) relationships among the independent variables, or conditions connected with network position (incoming, or Target, interactions), and (2) the relationships of the independent variables to several kinds of outgoing (Actor) interactions (e.g., simple exchanges, reference-group relationships, and cooperative interactions). The two systems are compared for service emphases, organizational composition, organizational hierarchy, competitiveness, and types and patterns of interactions. In addition, the system position, competitiveness, and interaction behaviors of 21

pairs of organizations -- offices or chapters of national and/or state organizations similar in work and resources -- are compared.

Analysis shows work-related interactions are minimal; all types of interactions, including those connected with the division of labor characteristic of the social service sector, are primarily stimulated by competition for resources. Further, interorganizational relationships involving cooperation and coordination principally depend upon power or system position and to a lesser extent reflect organization service delivery needs. Without command over those resources valued by system members, the Actor organization cannot develop cooperative exchanges with other organizations even when stimulated by high competition. There are no consistent patterns of relationships of the various charter-domain characteristics, specific organizational resources, or perceptions about competitive pressures with outgoing interactions. Differences between the two systems in the positions of various types of agencies within the systems and of the 21 pairs indicates system conditions as well as organizational characteristics are important determinants of interaction patterns.

The findings strongly support the general political economy perspective. Regardless of system differences in types of organizations considered important, those organizations high in both competition and system power have the most extensive and the most varied interorganizational relationships. System differences in competition and interaction parallel the causal relationship between competition and interaction; the system with higher competition also has more extensive relationships among members, fewer system isolates, and more cooperative and reciprocal relationships.

The report includes discussion of (1) the implications of the findings for increasing coordination among autonomous social service organizations and (2) the contribution of the design to problems of methodology in interorganizational relations research.

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION IN SOCIAL SERVICES

SYSTEMS: A TWO-CITY COMPARISON

By

Ann Workman Sheldon

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1975

© Copyright 1975 by
Ann Workman Sheldon.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This dissertation deals with central aspects of a larger research project conducted over a period of several years by a team of graduate and undergraduate students working under the overall supervision of Philip M. Marcus. I am grateful for the help of all the members of the Organization Relations Research Unit but especially thank Margaret J. Adams who trained and supervised the interviewers in both cities and has continued to provide invaluable help with data preparation and analysis problems. Bernard J. Offerman carried a major share of the interviewing in both cities and helped with the necessarily tedious aspects of the data preparation and preliminary analysis. As project secretary, Jackie Kron not only coped with the many drafts of questionnaires, memos and working papers, but remained efficient and enthusiastic. Tom Nichol's help with analysis suggestions and computer programming was invaluable.¹

The research was a cooperative project between two local United Way organizations, the College of Social Science, and the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University. It was made possible by generous direct and indirect contributions from these organizations and the extensive cooperation of the directors of these 68 local agencies.

I want to thank the members of my committee, Philip M. Marcus as Chairman and Richard Child Hill, James B. McKee and Harry Perlstadt for their encouragement of the research and their helpful, critical comments. I am particularly indebted to Harry Perlstadt for his extensive suggestions which helped improve the written report and clarified several points for me.

1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
1372
1373
1374
1375
1376
1377
1378
1379
1380
1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1494
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
1540
1541
1542
1543
1544
1545
1546
1547
1548
1549
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620
1621
1622
1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
16

10

More than the usual student acknowledgement of help and guidance from the major professor is due Philip M. Marcus. Throughout all stages of this research and my graduate education at Michigan State University, he has been a superb teacher. Both craftsmanlike and creative himself, with high personal standards of scholarship, dedicated to research and excited by new ideas, he created for me a constantly challenging and satisfying learning environment. My debt to him is great.

It is a pleasure to thank my children and my husband, Horace, for their unflagging support, cooperation, and encouragement. In a reversal of the usual pattern, Horace cheerfully took over many home-making chores permitting me to tackle the adventures of graduate education and certainly provided for our three children a marvelous example of a flexible, adaptable and loving person.

¹I am also indebted to the following members of our research group: Susan Anthony, Judith Bates, Werner Cheng, Clarence Chien, Linda Dammers, Joseph Davia, Nancy Grassmick, Robert Hughes, Reed Kendall, Peggy Koebernick, Allen Kornow, Jean Kozak, Laurel Larson, Kerry McBride, Marc Rideout, Cathy Sheldon, Janice Spodarek, and Joseph Yankech.

[illegible]

100

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING	1
Introduction	1
Characteristics of the social services sector	6
Review of the organization-environment literature	15
The political economy perspective	26
The research design	30
Summary of variables	42
Summary of research hypotheses	44
Work-related hypotheses	44
Sponsorship and age-related hypotheses	45
Ability-related hypotheses	48
Competition-related hypotheses - the relationship of competition and other conditions	50
The relationship between competition and styles of interaction	52
Plan of the report	52
CHAPTER II METHODS	55
Source of the data - the larger research project	55
Research instruments - design and testing	58
Data collection	59
Respondent organizations	61
Development of variables	66
Independent variables	66
Dependent variables	71
Variable independence	74
Data analysis problems	75
Procedures	78
Embedded measures	79
Significance tests	80
CHAPTER III SOCIAL SERVICE SYSTEMS AND COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS	81
Introduction	81
City demographic characteristics	84
Distribution of social service resources	91
Organizational composition of systems	95
Counterpart organizations	101
Differences in agency characteristics	107
System integration	109
Summary	110

CHAPTER IV ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN TWO SYSTEMS	116
Introduction	116
Comparison of the two systems	117
System comparisons by type of work	124
Comparisons by auspices and age	134
Interaction of charter-domain factors	143
Relationships among the independent variables - resources .	153
Competition and other variables	160
The powerful organizations	163
Hypotheses related to independent variables	170
The relationship of competition and other conditions	187
Summary	193
CHAPTER V ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION STRATEGIES	198
Introduction	198
System difference in interactions	198
Charter-domain characteristics and interactions	202
Resources and interactions	224
General resources	224
Specific resources	229
Attitudes about competition and interactions	237
Competition and interaction	242
Test of the general model	243
Summary	252
CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	256
Introduction	256
System differences and interorganizational relationships . .	258
Power, competition, and interorganizational relationships .	270
Competition and social service systems	273
Implications for social planning	275
Problems in interorganizational research	278
APPENDICES	287
A DEFINITIONS	287
B QUESTIONS USED IN DATA COLLECTION	289
C DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	292
LIST OF REFERENCES	293

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Demographic Characteristics	85
2. Comparison of Cities by Relative Emphasis Given to Types of Social Services, Selected Categories	92
3. Provision of Services	94
4. Agency Composition of Social Services Systems	96
5. Characteristics of Types of Agencies	97
6. Comparison of Composition of High Importance Groups, By Types	100
7. Position of Counterpart Organizations in Local Service Systems	102
8. Comparison of Counterpart Organizations with all Organizations by Importance to Others and Outgoing Choices, Mean Scores	104
9. Correlations between Cities by Characteristics of Counterpart Organizations	106
10. Characteristics of Social Service Agencies	108
11. System Integration Differences	111
12. Distribution of Variables, by City	119
13. Resource Levels of very Small Organizations Compared with System Resource Levels, Mean Scores	121
14. Comparison of Counterpart Organizations, Mean Scores . .	123
15. Comparison of Organizations by Mode of Work, System A . .	125
16. Comparison of Organizations by Mode of Work, System B . . .	126
17. Inter-City Differences in Independent Variables for Treatment Organizations	127

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

2031

2032

2033

Table	Page
18. General Resources and Organization Types	135
19. Comparison of Public and Private Organizations, System A .	136
20. Comparison of Public and Private Organizations, System B .	137
21. Inter-City Differences in Independent Variables for Public Organizations	139
22. Resource and Competition Levels, by Age	142
23. Resources and Competition, by Age and Auspices, Mean Scores	144
24. Resources and Competition by Age and Mode of Work, Mean Scores	148
25. Distribution of Variables by Auspices and Mode of Work, System A	150
26. Distribution of Variables by Auspices and Mode of Work, System B	151
27. Correlations among Independent Variables, All Organizations	154
28. Correlations among Independent Variables for Treatment Organizations	156
29. Correlations among Independent Variables for Distributive Organizations	157
30. Resources and System Importance	164
31. Resources, Competition, and System Importance by Mode of Work, Mean Scores	166
32. Highest and Lowest System Members	168
33. Counterpart Organizations and Network Position	172
34. Network Position and Mode of Work, by Auspices	174
35. Staffing Patterns and Network Position	182
36. Relationship between Service Diversity and Network Position, by Mode of Work and Auspices	185
37. Organizational Interactions, by City	199
38. Interactions of Counterpart Organizations, Mean Scores . .	201

Table	Page
39. Organizational Interactions, by Mode of Work	203
40. Organizational Interactions, by Auspices	204
41. Organizational Interactions by Auspices and Mode of Work, System A	205
42. Organizational Interactions by Auspices and Mode of Work, System B	206
43. Mode of Work and Interactions, by Auspices, System A . . .	207
44. Mode of Work and Interactions, by Auspices, System B . . .	208
45. Organizational Interactions, by Age	211
46. Zero-Order Correlations of Independent and Selected Interorganizational Relationships, All Organizations . . .	212
47. Correlations of Independent Variables and Types of Inter- organizational Relationships, All Organizations	213
48. Zero-Order Correlations among Independent and Selected Dependent Variables for Treatment Organizations	214
49. Correlations of Independent Variables and Types of Inter- organizational Relationships for Treatment Organizations .	215
50. Zero-Order Correlations among Independent and Selected Dependent Variables for Distributive Organizations	216
51. Correlations of Independent Variables and Types of Inter- organizational Relationships for Distributive Organizations	217
52. Organizational Interactions by Mode of Work and Network Position, Mean Scores	218
53. Age and Interactions, by Network Position	221
54. Relationships between Network Position and Interactions, by Age	223
55. Relationships between Network Position and Interactions, by Auspices	227
56. Relationships between Professionalization and Inter- actions, by Size	233
57. Relationship between Diversity and Target Interactions, by Mode of Work	235
58. Competition and Interactions, by Auspices	239

Table		Page
59.	Organization Characteristics and Interaction Levels, by Network Position and Competition, Mean Scores	249
60.	Multiple Correlations	251
61.	Strong Reciprocal-Resource Exchange Interactions, by System	264

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Strong reciprocal interactions, System A	266
2. Strong reciprocal interactions, System B	267

CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Social structure in advanced industrial societies rests on relationships among organizations and on organizational ties across institutional sectors and across societies (Baron, 1971; Bell, 1973; Galtung, 1970; O'Connor, 1971; and Stinchcombe, 1965). For this reasons the interorganization network is a fundamental unit of macro-sociological analysis, and information about linkages among organizations is increasingly recognized as important to understanding both organizations and society. The sociology of organizations has been heavily oriented toward the study of intraorganizational phenomena, of organization development, administration, and worker attitudes, while neglecting the relational linkages between large-scale organizations and the study of power. These issues have been the province of students of power in the polity including Birnbaum (1969), Galbraith (1967), Hunter (1953), Keller (1968), and Mills (1956). Yet, organizations do not exist in isolation from the larger society. The general environment and the patterns of organization-organization relationships affect the internal characteristics of organizations.¹ This means an examination of organizational interaction patterns can provide needed information about the structure of organizations.

In addition, the analysis of interorganization networks seems of paramount importance in understanding the larger society because

¹This has been discussed by a large number of scholars. For reviews of research see B. Aldrich, 1972; Guetzkow, 1966; and Heydebrand, 1973b. Some examples in the literature include Aiken and Hage, 1968; Chandler, 1963; Dill, 1958; Emery and Trist, 1965; Form and Nosow, 1958; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Litwak, 1961; Terreberry, 1968; and J. D. Thompson, 1967. A collection of articles can be found in Brinkerhoff and Kunz, 1972.

the distribution of organizational resources affects the allocation of resources in society as a whole (Pondy, 1970). Political decision-making often occurs through concerted interactions among organizations or organization decision systems (Warren, 1972), and those interested in social change find organizations crucial to attain their goals (Gamson, 1974). The distribution of services, including medical care, education, rehabilitation, and social welfare, occurs through a multifaceted system of organizations and groups linked together in an intricate pattern of interdependence. As Miller and Roby (1970) point out, these services are important gate-keepers and integral to the stratification system in the U. S. Benson (1974: 1) concludes that "increasingly, societal problems . . . are framed in organizational and interorganizational terms."

The analysis of interorganizational relationships, then, clearly has theoretical significance. In addition, those interested in social change, in improvements in the delivery of human services, and social planning problems consider information about organizational interactions to have practical or applied importance (e.g., B. Aldrich, 1972; Guetzkow, 1966; Hall, 1974; Reid, 1971; Turk, 1970; and Warren, 1967). Information about the social service delivery system is very limited and largely without theoretical foundation. Each community provides its particular package of social services through a set of autonomous agencies, and the pattern of relationships or the structure of the agency network affects community life. It is important to actual and potential service consumers and to those whose work is the provision of these services, of course. But it is also of concern to those who pay for the services. Those interested in improvement of

this area of community life find little useful information about how the social services system actually operates in the body of empirical evidence to date.

Many social planners are convinced that increased coordination can improve services without increasing costs, and pressure for increased integration come from federal, state, and local sources.² The newer national programs (e.g., Office of Economic Opportunity, Model Cities, programs funded by the Older Americans Act, etc.) frequently require joint planning and expect extensive agency coordination. Although officials responsible for program development assume work integration between autonomous organizations can be achieved, in pilot projects staff from diverse organizations find organization-related difficulties prevent coordination, and those projects which do begin tend to flounder.³ When difficulties abound and programs dissolve, the responses from planners and lay leaders in this field are exhortation, appeals to service ideals, attitude change efforts, and new attempts with different personnel. But integration and inter-agency coordination remain elusive goals. There is little information about organizational barriers to cooperation to assist in these efforts.

At present, research on organizational interrelationships is increasing, but the theoretical approaches and existing empirical

²Local planners may force mergers of youth-serving agencies; federal programs require coordinated components; and Human Service Coordinating Councils have been set up in several states to pull together various state departments in order to increase efficiency by avoiding service duplication (e.g., Mott, 1968).

³This assessment comes from interviews with HEW personnel, state officials, and metropolitan and non-metropolitan area social planners. Empirical evidence can be found in an investigation of the Work Incentive Program (Marcus, 1973b).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
84

findings are weak, and there is general agreement the field suffers from the lack of an integrative framework. In recent surveys and literature searches scholars lament the absence of theory and conclude this field lacks precision in conceptual definition and agreement on relevant variables (Adamek, 1975; Benson, 1974; Gillespie and Kim, 1974; Milio, 1972). Rieker et al (1974) complain about the conceptual and methodological confusion, the lack of a dominant paradigm and consensus about a useful framework for interpreting organization-environment relationships. "Everyone seems to lament the lack of an overarching theory or perspective that can serve . . . as a guide to research" (H. Aldrich, 1973: 1).

Few analysts relate issues of resource distribution and power to the patterns of interlocking organizations.⁴ Instead, the focus is on cooperation rather than competition, on mutual reciprocal exchanges rather than dominance and the organizational hierarchy. There is emphasis on consensus of values and attitudes and agreement about agency work or domain as causal factors in interactions (e.g., Braito et al, 1972; Halpert, 1974, and Warren et al, 1973). research to date has a narrow, very concrete focus, and a major omission is any examination of the effects of the local organizational stratification system on the structure and behavior of member organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965). In the limited research the primary focus has been the individual organization as Actor rather than on the organization as a member of a set of organizations. Although in the last few years many papers have been presented which stress the need for

⁴The works of Benson (1974), Turk (1973a), and Zald (1970b) are notable exceptions.

concentration of research efforts on the network level (e.g., H. Aldrich, 1974; Benson, 1974; Hall, 1974; Rieker et al, 1974; Warren, 1967), the field remains in its beginning stages.

The focus on consensus and cooperation is unfortunate. Research on interorganizational relations provides a way to study power and the distribution of resources, linking micro and macro-sociology and increase understanding of the structure of highly complex societies (Crozier, 1973). More narrowly, since relations with other organizations are an important aspect of organization life, knowledge of environmental factors could increase the theoretical understanding of intra-organizational phenomena.

This reseach, examining patterns of interactions among local social service organizations in two middle size cities, attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What sorts of relationships with similar organizations do various types of social agencies develop? What are the interaction patterns in local agency networks?
2. What are the relationships between organizational resources, agency position in the organizational stratification system, and interactions with other similar agencies?
3. How does competition for resources affect the pattern of interorganizational relationships?

The study emphasizes power relationships. The research uses a causal model which assumes that competitive relationships in the process of seeking resources determine organizational interaction patterns (Benson, 1974; Marcus, 1972; Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Zald,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

1970a). The design and analysis incorporates an exchange theory approach (Levine and White, 1961), the organization-set concept (Evan, 1966), and generally fits into the political economy framework for network research proposed by Benson (1974). The research focuses on the network of social service organizations in the local community, the effect of their immediate environments on the behavior of Actor organizations, and the relationships of organizational characteristics to interactions. The organizations internal structures are not examined.

This chapter first presents information about some characteristics of the social service sector and gives background information about social agencies which are important in the research design. Next, the interorganization relations and the organization literature is reviewed briefly to identify various ideas, approaches, and variables, and the political economy perspective as it applies to interorganizational research is summarized. The final section explains the research design and gives the variables used and the hypotheses tested.

Characteristics of the social services sector

Information about the social service delivery system is fairly limited, and the literature tends to be speculative and anecdotal. The case study approach is the primary research tool, and a great deal of the writing has an applied orientation. Much of the available information is collected by social planning agencies to assess need or identify gaps in services and consider problems rather than to understand the organizations, the nature of their work, and interactions.

In local communities social services are provided by a number of privately supported, voluntary agencies, usually joined in a loose

federation for fund-raising purposes (United Way), a few privately-funded non-United Way agencies which are primarily non-profit organizations, several local or county public agencies, and branch offices of state and/or federal departments. In addition, local voluntary associations and churches sponsor programs, and other organizations in the community may include social service departments within their organizations, e.g., the criminal justice system, hospitals, and schools.

Local decisions about needs and services are made by funding organizations (United Way, foundations, various levels of government) and a formal system of problem-oriented committees sometimes sponsored by United Way or by local groups (e.g., League of Women Voters, Civic Action League, local unions, etc.). Informal discussions and ad hoc planning groups also contribute to the decision process. In other instances heads of the major public agencies may work together to plan services either informally or formally through a council or committees. The formal and informal process may include private and public organizations and involve both elites and challenge groups (Gamson, 1974). National and state policies and service trends affect local decisions and the level of both publicly funded and privately funded services. Decision-making occurs through interactions among many participants (i.e., individuals, groups, and organizations) at local and non-local levels.

Through a collection of diverse organizations, the community's residents are provided with a wide variety of programs including services for children and youth (e.g., day care, protective services, recreation, counseling, adoption and foster care, and special

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

education); services for individuals and families (e.g., homemaker help, nursing care, emergency help, crisis intervention, employment assistance, long-term financial support, legal assistance, marital and personal counseling, leisure time activities, health care, etc.); and services directed toward groups or the larger community (e.g., help in disasters, neighborhood improvement projects, advocacy projects, or programs directed toward the poor or to minorities). Agencies are highly specialized. No single agency covers the range of services established in the community, and most offer from three to six related services.

These are all people-processing organizations (Hasenfeld, 1972), but the basic approach to work varies. One type seeks to change people by effecting new modes of behavior, different self images, new and somehow different statuses (Vintner, 1963). The output goal is a "new" person. The other type provides an array of programs for users with no commitment to try to directly change the client, although the services and programs are considered highly beneficial to the consumer. The first type (Treatment) uses a clinical model; the second (Distributive) resembles a supermarket. (These types are discussed more in a later section of this chapter.) Thus, social service agencies differ in their involvement with their clients. Some have long-term broad lateral interests, while others are interested only in a limited aspect of the user (Lefton and Rosengren, 1966).

Communities vary in their service emphasis, and decisions about programs are frequently political in nature rather than reflections of need (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Cloward and Piven, 1969; Kramer, 1965; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965b).

Definitions of needs and fashions in services change. For example, the anti-poverty thrust in services in the 1960's gave way to a heavy emphasis on mental health programs in the early 1970's. Styles of service and interests of elites shift and once popular youth-serving agencies such as Scouts and Camp Fire are now less valued and women's centers or crisis centers attract interest and support. Because agencies must depend on a continuing resource base, any potential shifts are of significance to organization leaders, and protection of service areas or domain is highly important. The political process involved in resource distribution and domain establishment means local organizations need to influence the allocations of service areas or domain among member agencies to insure their own survival (Warren, 1974).

The collection of local services are not directed only to the disadvantaged or the troubled. Many users or clients are middle class and come to the agency for help with a specific problem (e.g., home health care, adoption, or training) or to participate in general agency programs (Sheldon, 1973). Thus, agency constituencies vary widely; some serve a somewhat stigmatized population (the mentally ill, the elderly, the poor, and minority group members) and experience low community support, while others which serve the general public are more favorably perceived (Marcus, 1973a).

The social services sector is a collection of different organizations, each relatively autonomous with its own objectives, charter, staff, decision-making system, and general domain. The delivery of services is accomplished by individual organizations and through interorganizational efforts (Hall, 1974). The single organization

seeks its own objectives, but must also serve the larger system and its objectives (Wren, 1969). Each agency is embedded in a service system in which interaction with other agencies is part of their work. Many cannot attain their own objectives without interactions with other similar organizations; others are involved with other agencies through referrals, information exchanges, and service planning even though their own work requires few services other than those available within their own array of programs.

Thus, as a group or network of agencies, they are functionally interdependent and serve as input and output sources for each other, to use Parson's imagery (1956). An agency secures inputs of raw material (clients) through direct and indirect actions of other agencies. Without a steady stream of referrals and connections, the rehabilitation agency cannot continue its work; the mental health clinic needs a steady supply of suitably disturbed individuals; and without agreement within the group or family of social agencies about the desirability of homemaker service for clients, the service agency will have few clients. In addition, agencies depend upon each other for resources to produce their own output (i.e., served people, altered people). Hence, the family counseling agency with a troubled client may need money and health care for this person in order to enable him to use their counseling services and seek use by him of the programs of the Department of Social Services or the Visiting Nurse Association to produce organization output. The youth-serving agencies such as scouting may need to use another agency's space and facilities, and the local anti-poverty commission needs local agencies to establish out-reach programs in their neighborhood centers.

The resource interdependence and organizational division of labor within the social services sector is well recognized by social service professionals (Kahn, 1969; Romanyshyn, 1971; Wilensky and Lebeaux, (1965a). Within the sector domain (i.e., the package of services and programs deemed necessary, needed, or preferred) the member organizations have individual areas of responsibility (organization domains) of varying importance to the other members of the system. Of importance is that the agencies are formally separate and relatively autonomous, but in their work they are subunits of the multi-organizational system.

In local communities formal and informal procedures exist to allocate funds and service areas to the cluster of public and private agencies. Resources are allocated through both the command or administrated model and a market-based, social choice model to provide the specific cluster of services to meet the currently legitimate needs as determined by those who provide the funds and administer the programs. Resources are finite and potential programs readily identifiable as "needs." Further, allocations within the sector are frequently made by intra-system members. Thus, a variety of forms of resource interdependence exists.

In summary, this sector of society is characterized by interconnectedness and interdependence (Baker and O'Brien, 1971), but it is not a unified system. Instead, it exhibits characteristics of double contingency (Ramsøy, 1968), since the choices of one actor constrain the choices of another in the same field.

Like other organizations, social service agencies require a wide variety of tangible and intangible resources to survive,

to accomplish their objectives, and to expand. These include funds, personnel, facilities, equipment, information, skill, knowledge, buyers (clients), prestige, legitimacy, a valued product, etc. These fall into two broad resource categories, money and authority (Benson, 1974).

Social service resources are part of a larger set of commonweal resources, and in any community such resources can be used for many purposes and by various types of organizations. Commonweal resources are relatively scarce, controlled by a number of organizations and desired by a wide variety of agencies and groups (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962). Every organization depends on its environment for resources, and organizations with similar purposes compete for the same resource elements (Eichhorn and Wysong, 1968: 185). The resources which can be used by the social service agency are wanted by other organizations and groups, and the allocation of resources results from a process of competition (Eichhorn and Wysong, 1968: 24). The inevitable outgrowth of work and resource interdependence and scarcity of resources is conflict between organizations (Assael, 1969: 573).

Realistically, social service organizations are in competition with each other and with other types of organizations as well. Although this aspect of organization life is frequently downplayed because professional norms and agreements about domain restrict expression of conflict and competition (Warren, 1974), latent conflict undergirds the system and sporadically becomes manifest. Professional ideals stress client service, interagency cooperation, and consensus.⁵ Organizations of this type seek ways to manage

⁵Romanyshyn (1971) includes many examples of this.

conflict and dependency without excessive risk or loss of autonomy (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Litwak and Rothman, 1970; Pondy, 1969). Professional ideals are one mechanism, and specific interagency organizations (e.g., United Ways, Councils of Social Agencies, various planning task forces and coordinating councils) help turn the competitive situation into a non-zero sum game.⁶

The complex pattern of interdependencies for this set of organizations sometimes stems from mutual dependence on limited resources; sometimes it flows from the division of labor within the system; sometimes it is tied to the decision process. Their interactions are based on these interdependencies. Some are part of the agency's work; others are the result of efforts to insure legitimacy and a secure service area. Decisions about work and service areas as well as resource allocations are to a great extent made by the group of social service agencies or through bargaining for shares of a variety of resources within the system or with funding organizations. The organizations exist under conditions of uncertainty and seek resources in a negotiated environment (Milio, 1972).

Social service agencies differ in significant ways from business or industrial concerns. They are non-profit and usually quite small. Instead of working with inert raw materials, they deal with people, and thus they have non-routine work and a complex technology (Perrow, 1967). Further, they rarely buy or sell input or output, and interactions are primarily non-monetary. Their raw material is not value neutral, and client backgrounds, wishes, and values are important

⁶Litwak and Hylton (1962) describe the development of Councils of Social Agencies. Pfeffer and Leong (1975) examine United Way organizations and show this process in action.

aspects of their work (Hasenfeld and English, 1974). They are responsive to political constraints rather than to the price system as are enterprises (Dahl and Lindbloom, 1964). Further, their base of power is primarily normative (Etzioni, 1961) and rooted in professional hierarchy; their goals are ambiguous; and there is rarely a clear definition of output or ways to assess effectiveness (Demone and Harshberger, 1974). Finally, the forms for legitimate competition are restricted. These characteristics of social service organizations affect the interaction patterns within the local network of such organizations.

Presumably, social service agencies resemble other organizations and operate under a norm of rationality (Thompson, 1967). Seeking to manage their environments, maximize rewards, and minimize costs, they become involved with other organizations in these efforts. Interactions with other agencies within the network of social service organizations are ways to gain resources, both directly and indirectly. Agency interactions are: (1) aspects of their immediate work; (2) concerned with short-run resource acquisition; and (3) directed toward long-run survival related resources.

In conclusion, local social service agencies form a system which is characterized by function and resource interdependence. Agencies have different approaches to providing social services which affect their needs for a variety of tangible and intangible resources. The system is hierarchically organized because some organizations obtain more of the needed resources than others. Resource conflict undergirds the system although professional norms and values restrict expression.

Page 1

Page 2

Page 3

Page 4

Page 5

Page 6

Page 7

Page 8

Page 9

Page 10

Page 11

Page 12

Page 13

Page 14

Page 15

Page 16

Page 17

Page 18

Page 19

Page 20

Page 21

Page 22

Page 23

Page 24

Page 25

Page 26

Page 27

Review of the organization-environment literature

Theory and research about organizational relationships is fragmented and non-cumulative (White and Vlasek, 1973), and while there are many attempts to develop an overall perspective (e.g., Benson, 1974; Evan, 1966, Gillespie and Kim, 1974; Hall, 1974; Levine, White, and Paul, 1963; Litwak et al; Marrett, 1971; Rieker et al, 1974), the number of practical conceptual schemes is limited, and the body of empirical findings is slim. Very little empirically grounded theory exists. The rapidly growing body of literature largely consists of articles discussing how research might be done rather than presentation of empirical findings for theory development. Further, the grand conceptual schemes are often highly impractical; concepts are difficult to measure in the real world; assumptions about data availability are naive.

Theorists often work at different levels of analysis. In some cases the dependent variables are internal characteristics including formalization, centralization, complexity, etc., and environmental factors and interorganizational linkages are the independent variables. In other cases the interrelationship itself is the dependent variable, and organizational characteristics are independent variables.

In a few instances, characteristics of the environment are hypothesized as affecting the interorganization network (e.g., Turk, 1970). According to Rieker et al, no single conceptual and perceptual framework exists. Within the two major approaches, the organizational and relational, there is a wide variety of methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation, and this serves

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

"to create a research area which is closer to anarchy than to a process of systematic growth of knowledge (Rieker et al, 1974: 2)." Further,

the term "interorganizational relations" is far from analytically precise . . . (and) the level of analysis is very dissimilar. To suggest that the performance of an organization . . . is in part a consequence of its links with the larger system is quite different from arguing that the internal relations between community organizations has consequences for the performance of the entire community (B. Aldrich, 1972: 6).

In a recent review of twenty-five studies, Adamek (1975) identifies over 160 independent and 90 dependent variables thought to be relevant to an understanding of interorganizational relations.

Research and theory are focused on patterns of cooperation and limited because the general approaches are directed to different levels with few common elements. It is usually impossible to link such research into a larger body of knowledge concerned with social organization and power, or issues of macrostructure. Too often there is no integrative framework to provide "analytical boundaries and linkages that would permit the accumulation of complementary findings (Benson, 1974: 2)."

The interorganizational field is an outgrowth of organizational analysis, and issues of interorganizational relationships have been included in a broad body of literature about organization-environment questions. Thinking and research in that general area fall into five major categories:

1. The effect of the environment on the organization's behavior and structure, including the effects of organizational interactions on intra-organizational characteristics. Some examples are: Aiken and Hage, 1968; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Dill, 1958; Heydebrand and Noell, 1973; Jurkovich, 1974; Kreisberg, 1973; Kunz, 1972; Osborn and Hunt, 1974;

Pfeffer, 1972a; Selznick, 1949; Simpson and Gulley, 1962; and Thompson and McEwen, 1958.

2. Patterns of interactions between organizations including interagency conflict, cooperation, exchanges, etc. Examples are: Barth, 1963; Black and Kase, 1963; Braito et al, 1972; Carter, 1974; Clark, 1965; Friesema, 1970, Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Meyer, 1966; Marcus, 1973b; Miller, 1958; Pruden, 1969; Reid, 1964; and Starkweather, 1971.
3. Factors affecting specific patterns of organization-organization interactions. Some examples are: Adamek and Lavin, 1974; Eichhorn and Wysong, 1968; Form and Nosow, 1958; Halpert, 1974; Lefton and Rosengren, 1966; and Warren, 1974.
4. Management of environments by organizations. Examples include: Elling and Halebsky, 1961; Milio, 1972; Pfeffer, 1972b; Starbuck, 1965; Thompson, 1967; and Zald, 1970b.
5. Characteristics of the interorganizational network. Some examples are: H. Aldrich, 1974; Anderson, 1967; Beal and Klonglon, 1967; Benson, 1974; Hall, 1974; Marcus, Sheldon, and Adams, 1974a; Turk, 1970, 1973a and 1973b; Richard Warren et al, 1974; and Roland Warren et al, 1973.

Human service agencies, especially in the health care field, are a **major** research focus, but research has involved different types of **organizations**, including manufacturer-dealer system, union-management relations, and international relations.

Much of this writing is descriptive, and authors list interactions including informal contacts between directors, specific information exchanges including consultation, cooperative agreements, mutual planning, formalized referral procedures, and informal or formal arrangements to share staff. Some attempt to order these interactions into guttman-type scales by degree of intensity. Examples of this descriptive literature include: Black and Kase, 1963; Friesema, 1968; Johns and Demarche, 1951; Klongdon and his co-authors; Levine, White and Paul, 1963.

Many bases for interaction are described such as shared values and attitudes, similar perceptions and expectations, similar approaches to work, overlapping interests and goals, need for resources, characteristics of leadership, types of clients, consensus about goals and functions (domain consensus), similarity of organizational structure and the like. Characteristics of the organizations often considered as bases for interaction include training and viewpoints of the staffs, orientation to and level of interest in clients, type of work, structural complexity, communication channels, authority system, and the relationship of the local agency to national organizations and national policies. Domain consensus is considered a key ingredient.

In general, authors agree that some interactions among human service agencies are related to aspects of their work, the type of clients and their needs, the basic work approach (i.e., people processing or people changing), and to the division of labor within this sector. Relationships can involve the normal sequence of processing people, but usually they are pictured as involving exchanges. This

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34
 35
 36
 37
 38
 39
 40
 41
 42
 43
 44
 45
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51
 52
 53
 54
 55
 56
 57
 58
 59
 60
 61
 62
 63
 64
 65
 66
 67
 68
 69
 70
 71
 72
 73
 74
 75
 76
 77
 78
 79
 80
 81
 82
 83
 84
 85
 86
 87
 88
 89
 90
 91
 92
 93
 94
 95
 96
 97
 98
 99
 100
 101
 102
 103
 104
 105
 106
 107
 108
 109
 110
 111
 112
 113
 114
 115
 116
 117
 118
 119
 120
 121
 122
 123
 124
 125
 126
 127
 128
 129
 130
 131
 132
 133
 134
 135
 136
 137
 138
 139
 140
 141
 142
 143
 144
 145
 146
 147
 148
 149
 150
 151
 152
 153
 154
 155
 156
 157
 158
 159
 160
 161
 162
 163
 164
 165
 166
 167
 168
 169
 170
 171
 172
 173
 174
 175
 176
 177
 178
 179
 180
 181
 182
 183
 184
 185
 186
 187
 188
 189
 190
 191
 192
 193
 194
 195
 196
 197
 198
 199
 200
 201
 202
 203
 204
 205
 206
 207
 208
 209
 210
 211
 212
 213
 214
 215
 216
 217
 218
 219
 220
 221
 222
 223
 224
 225
 226
 227
 228
 229
 230
 231
 232
 233
 234
 235
 236
 237
 238
 239
 240
 241
 242
 243
 244
 245
 246
 247
 248
 249
 250
 251
 252
 253
 254
 255
 256
 257
 258
 259
 260
 261
 262
 263
 264
 265
 266
 267
 268
 269
 270
 271
 272
 273
 274
 275
 276
 277
 278
 279
 280
 281
 282
 283
 284
 285
 286
 287
 288
 289
 290
 291
 292
 293
 294
 295
 296
 297
 298
 299
 300
 301
 302
 303
 304
 305
 306
 307
 308
 309
 310
 311
 312
 313
 314
 315
 316
 317
 318
 319
 320
 321
 322
 323
 324
 325
 326
 327
 328
 329
 330
 331
 332
 333
 334
 335
 336
 337
 338
 339
 340
 341
 342
 343
 344
 345
 346
 347
 348
 349
 350
 351
 352
 353
 354
 355
 356
 357
 358
 359
 360
 361
 362
 363
 364
 365
 366
 367
 368
 369
 370
 371
 372
 373
 374
 375
 376
 377
 378
 379
 380
 381
 382
 383
 384
 385
 386
 387
 388
 389
 390
 391
 392
 393
 394
 395
 396
 397
 398
 399
 400
 401
 402
 403
 404
 405
 406
 407
 408
 409
 410
 411
 412
 413
 414
 415
 416
 417
 418
 419
 420
 421
 422
 423
 424
 425
 426
 427
 428
 429
 430
 431
 432
 433
 434
 435
 436
 437
 438
 439
 440
 441
 442
 443
 444
 445
 446
 447
 448
 449
 450
 451
 452
 453
 454
 455
 456
 457
 458
 459
 460
 461
 462
 463
 464
 465
 466
 467
 468
 469
 470
 471
 472
 473
 474
 475
 476
 477
 478
 479
 480
 481
 482
 483
 484
 485
 486
 487
 488
 489
 490
 491
 492
 493
 494
 495
 496
 497
 498
 499
 500
 501
 502
 503
 504
 505
 506
 507
 508
 509
 510
 511
 512
 513
 514
 515
 516
 517
 518
 519
 520
 521
 522
 523
 524
 525

type of interaction is work-based or operational. Other relationships which concern institutional maintenance activities involving issues of domain consensus and long-run agency survival, based on values according to B. Aldrich (1972), are sometimes described.

Some studies suggest that organizations interact to lessen their dependence and increase their bargaining power relative to their organization-set (Milio, 1972: 164).

Interagency relationships are considered to be voluntary activities and to involve exchanges of tangible resources. For example, exchange is the dominant basis for interaction, and resource exchanges can be formal or informal (Levine and White, 1961); joint programs are means to get resources (Aiken and Hage, 1968); exchanges involve dependence but it does not have to be direct (Jacobs, 1974).

Linkages are categorized in several ways: as functional, normative, and diffuse (Blase, 1973); as involving resources or recognition (Ross and Smith, 1974); directed toward coordination, communication or conflict (Hall, 1974); as facilitative, competitive, adjudicative, or communicative (Litwak and Rothman, 1970); involving providing services or interchange of clients, exchange of material resources (money, space), or as about policy, goals, or the future (Rieker et al, 1974); and as immediate economic transactions or long-range resource-acquisition in nature (Benson, 1974).

For the most part, cooperation and consensus are stressed, and few authors relate organization position within the system, or power, to interactions. Further, little information is available to suggest the proportion of relationships which fit into the various conceptual categories. Findings describe the range of interactions

2. 1000

3. 1000

4. 1000

5. 1000

6. 1000

7. 1000

8. 1000

9. 1000

10. 1000

11. 1000

12. 1000

13. 1000

14. 1000

15. 1000

16. 1000

17. 1000

18. 1000

19. 1000

20. 1000

21. 1000

22. 1000

23. 1000

24. 1000

25. 1000

26. 1000

27. 1000

28. 1000

29. 1000

30. 1000

and seek to connect interaction patterns, but give little information about numbers of interactions or the proportion of interactions of various types.

Although not directly expressed, underlying these ideas are several important assumptions: (1) that needed elements exist in the system somewhere; (2) that organizations can obtain these desired resources through interaction, or that others will share regardless of potential for return on investment or scarcity; and (3) the system generally operates under the norm of reciprocity, and sharing is welcomed. Following the exchange perspective, organizations are pictured as in partial interdependence and partial conflict (Hall, 1974).

Most of this literature has the organization as the unit of analysis although the research of Turk and Warren illustrate efforts to attack the interorganization field or the network of similar agencies. Some recent articles imply that one cannot seek information about the system itself through a focus on patterns of organization-organization linkages (Benson, 1974; Rieker et al, 1974; Warren, 1974). Problems of using organization level data to predict network characteristics and the technical difficulties involved in moving past the dyadic interaction are discussed as interest in the field increases and researchers attempt to develop ways to investigate interorganizational phenomena.

There are many difficulties in developing a workable approach. Heydebrand (1973b) states there is general agreement that prevailing concepts and theories concerned with intraorganizational phenomena are inadequate when one shifts to the interorganization level. Conceptual schemes for thinking about the problems are limited. Two

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

perspectives have prevailed in the pre-1970 literature and much of recent work as well. The first is the exchange perspective developed by Levine and White, and the second is the organization-set model posed by Evan. In this extension of Merton's role-set idea,

instead of selecting a status as the unit of analysis and charting a complex of role relationships in which the status occupant is involved . . . let us take as the unit of analysis an organization or a class of organizations and trace its interactions with the various organizations in its environment, viz its organization-set . . . the organization or class of organizations that is the point of reference is referred to as the "focal organization" . . . As in the case of role-set analysis, the focal organization interacts with a complement of organizations in its environment, i.e., its "organization-set." . . . We partition the organization-set into an "input-organization-set" and an "output-organization-set." By an input organization-set . . . a complement of organizations is meant that provides resources to the focal organization . . . (and) which receive the goods and/or services, including organizational decisions, generated by the focal organization (Evan, 1972: 183).

In Evan's model the members of the organization-set are all those organizational entities with which the focal organization is directly and fairly frequently involved for input and output connected activities. Collections of organization-sets make up the inter-organizational network. The network, then, is a relatively closed system. The organizations' interactions are with organizations in their task environment (Dill, 1958). The interactions are managed by boundary spanning personnel (Evan, 1966). Extending this, organizational relations are the input-output activities of single organizations (Rieker et al, 1974) or all of the group organizations with which the focal (Actor) organization is directly and frequently involved.

Following Turk (1973b), "system" is interpreted as linkage among units. Thus, the imagery can be extended and the collection of linked organizations, i.e., those in each others organization-sets, considered to make up the interorganization network. Using this cluster of sets idea, the network is the same as the "interorganizational field" (Warren, 1967). Using Rieker's useful discussion of this perspective,

When an organizational network itself is the unit of analysis, environment will refer to forces or factors external to that network. When the organization is the unit of analysis, environment will generally be used to include a part of the organizations which have relationships with the organization of interest (Rieker et al, 1974: 5).

Evan uses the concept of organization-set, and others used the idea of the network (or collection of sets) to distinguish between the interorganization network in which a particular organization is involved and environmental factors external to the network, i.e., the local community. The organization-set members are the primary environment for the organization. The environment outside the network is considered the organization's secondary environment (Rhenman, 1973). In this model properties of the network which affect the individual organization can be considered (i.e., the impact of the primary environment on the focal or Actor organization,) and properties of the secondary environment, (i.e., the larger society), which affect the network and thus the organization as well, can be identified.

As this model is extended (by Evan himself in his 1972 paper, and by Rhenman's contribution of the idea of the secondary environment), the referent is still the single organization. The primary environment, the network, is viewed as the collection of organization-

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

sets, and presumably all network members are linked directly or indirectly with fairly immediate consequential implications for the focal organization. As Rieker points out, this model does not attack important questions of the network itself, and research in this tradition is not currently directed toward network properties.

Research using the relational perspective, or the network itself, is almost non-existent. In fact, only very recently has systematic attention tried to develop an interorganizational perspective and work toward an integrative theory. To date only Turk has done comparative network analysis, although Anderson (1967), Erickson (1974), Marcus, Sheldon, and Adams (1974a), and Warren (1974) have investigated properties of networks of organizations. Interorganization level research is frustrated by the extremely high cost of collecting information about a sizable number of networks as well as by problems of conceptualizing.

Although approaches used for intraorganization research may be inadequate when one shifts to the interorganization level, a body of highly useful information exists connecting environment factors with organization structure and behavior. Information about intraorganization phenomena provides useful leads to important variables. An extensive body of literature indicates size and technology are major determinants of structure and organization behavior (e.g., Anderson and Warkow, 1973; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Harvey, 1968; Klatsky, 1970; Pugh et al, 1968; Terrien and Mills, 1973; Woodward, 1965; and Zwerman, 1970.)

Interaction is innovative behavior, and in the organization literature such behavior is linked to a variety of internal characteristics including the nature of the work, staff diversity, autonomy,

200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

and complexity (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Corwin, 1969; Heydebrand, 1973a; Lefton and Rosengren, 1966; Wilson, 1966; and Wren, 1969). Both Corwin (1969) and Pondy (1967) provide support for ideas connecting internal characteristics such as heterogeneity, specialization, complexity, and size to styles of conflict management, and these ideas seem applicable to the management of competition as well as internal conflict.

A smaller body of literature concerns charter and domain conditions. Sponsorship serves to differentiate organizations and to connect them to segments of the community which offer varying amounts of support (Elling and Halebsky, 1961: 185). Sponsorship differences involve varying constituencies and entail dissimilar rules for operation and levels of decision-making. According to Wamsley and Zald (1973), organizations with public funding have distinctive characteristics including different policy sub-systems and perceptions of 'ownership' and face different resource constraints than do profit-making or private organizations. Age is another potentially significant characteristic. Rosengren (1968) shows that age is related to orientations to patrons. Crum (1953), Starbuck (1965), and Stinchcombe (1965) describe the probable effects of period of establishment on organization structure; Stinchcombe ties resource levels to age in discussing "the liability of newness." The general work of the organization is another charter-related important factor, because it affects staffing patterns, orientation of staff to work, the resources needed, staff autonomy, and hence, communication and authority structures, and size (Zwerman, 1970).

Even with the network itself as the research focus, characteristics of member organizations require consideration. For example,

[illegible]

a group of well-funded large public people-processing organizations may have different patterns of relationships than a group of organizations offering very diverse services. Accordingly, some structural variables in the comparative organization literature such as age, sponsorship, technology, complexity, centralization, size, and staffing patterns should probably be included in interorganizational research.

The interorganization literature is dominated by research within the human services sector, especially health care systems and social services. Perhaps this accounts for the heavy emphasis on consensus. Much of the research is problem oriented, and perhaps this explains the concentration on coordination and cooperation and on improving service integration. The relationships between conflict and cooperation is not a major focus, although the dominant approach, the exchange model, assumes competition for scarce resources stimulates interactions. Conflict-based interactions are largely ignored, and competition is rarely, if ever, not measured.

In addition, although a great deal of the sociology of organizations literature emphasizes cooperation and coordination and the minimization of conflict, some are examining power and conflict. For example, Thompson (1967) states many power-related propositions; Zald (1970a) examines power relationships as a stimulus to organization behavior, as does Selznick (1949); Pondy (1967) argues the concept of conflict needs a prominent place in organization theory as do Assael (1969), Corwin (1969), Walton et al (1969) and others; and some interested in service organizations explore conflict (Adamek and Lavin, 1974; Barth, 1963; Hage and Aiken, 1974; and Litwak, 1961). A series of fairly recent articles urges a focus on power and conflict

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

in interorganizational research (B. Aldrich, 1972; Benson, 1974; Hall, 1974; Rieker et al, 1974; Wamsley and Zald, 1973), and a few empirical studies are now reported including Adamek and Lavin (1974), Halpert (1974), and Turk (1970).

The political economy perspective

Benson proposes a theoretical perspective on interorganizational relations that focuses on resources and power within a single general framework incorporating many of the diverse concerns of interorganizational relations research (1974: 2). He views the interorganization network as an emergent phenomenon that should be the unit of analysis, not the formal organization and its environment or set. The network consists of organizations engaged in a significant amount of interaction that ranges from extensive, reciprocal exchanges of resources to intense hostility and conflict. Some networks may be a set of organizations linked by multiple direct ties, while others may cluster linkages around a few mediating or controlling organizations and have indirect links as well. Interactions can be reciprocal or relatively one-sided, dependent relationships. Through linkages organizations pursue two general types of resources; those related to money, and those related to authority.

Network analysis frequently examines only those interaction patterns which are concerned with the actual work of the organization (i.e., for social service organizations making and receiving referrals, providing information about agencies to clients, sharing specific services and programs), but Benson argues phenomena on this level are really dependent on a second, deeper mode of analysis focused on

the processes of resource acquisition or the activities undertaken in pursuit of an adequate supply of organizational resources. He emphasizes that interactions may occur at either level in the delivery of services or in the acquisition of resources, but:

Interactions at the level of service delivery are ultimately dependent upon resource acquisition . . . Considerations of resource adequacy determine, within fairly restrictive limits, the nature of the interactions in the performance of mandated functions. Phenomena at the level of service delivery are partially autonomous in the sense that orderly patterns of dependence linking variables at that level may be discovered. For example, common or consensual domain conceptions may be associated with cooperative work relationships (and) reasonably precise and accurate theoretical models may be applied to phenomena at the level of service delivery. Nevertheless, it is argued that interactions must be explained ultimately at the level of resource acquisition (emphasis added) (1974: 3).

Benson argues that organization decision-makers are principally oriented to acquiring and defending an "adequate" supply of resources. Thus, "abstract purposes, charter goals, and the like come to be translated into ongoing programs, established structures, and trained personnel . . . and decision-makers are responsible for maintaining or expanding this established 'organizational machine' (1974: 4)." Organization decision-makers seek to acquire and defend a secure supply of the key resources, money and authority. Benson uses authority to refer to the legitimation of activities, the right and responsibility to carry out programs dealing with a broad problem area or domain. Money is the road to needed material resources, i.e., staff, space, services, etc. "Money and authority are interrelated . . . (in that) authority to conduct activities is generally assumed to imply a claim upon money adequate to performance in the prescribed sphere (1974: 4)."

Many different interagency actions may be compatible with the broad assertion that organizations pursue an adequate supply of money and authority, and Benson describes four: (1) to fulfill program requirements; (2) to maintain a clear domain of high social importance; (3) to maintain orderly, reliable patterns of resource flow; and (4) to secure and defend the agency's way of doing things or, as he puts it, a defense of the agency's paradigm or its technological commitment (1974: 6).

Within networks, organizations differ in power, and some gain power over others because of network characteristics, e.g., they may provide services vital to a large number of other organizations and so have central function, or they may control access to clients. "Power may be said to derive from the central organization's control over 'strategic contingencies' confronted by the peripheral organizations . . . (and) strategic location gives the central organization enhanced bargaining power vis-a-vis the peripheral organizations (1974: 6)." Another source of power is the linkage of organizations to the larger pattern of social dominance or the secondary environment (Rhenman, 1973).

Interorganizational power may have a variety of effects upon network relationships, and the primary effects of interorganizational power lie in control of network resources, including the flow of resources to other organizations. The secondary expression of interorganization power is in the process of negotiation between organizations since the powerful organization can force others to accept its terms and can permit an organization to determine the policies in the weaker organization.

Within the network, specific ties are fixed by the structure of political and economic forces. Money and authority go to the organization on the basis of its sphere of activities and its technology. Differentially powerful organizations interact in pursuit of scarce resources -- money and authority. Power in these interactions is said to derive from two sources: (1) Network structure, or patterns of direct linkage between agencies in a specific network, e.g., control by one network agency over contingencies vital to resource acquisition by another network agency; (2) Extra-network structure, or patterns of linkages between network agencies and organizations, officials, and public in the network environment, e.g., ties of any agency to important interest groups in the society (1974: 24).

The political economy perspective has several major advantages. First, it is relatively simple with a minimum set of assumptions. Second, the basic ideas can be tested and empirically based propositions developed. Third, it connects interorganizational research to macro-theory and deals with basic issues of power and the distribution of resources. Although the words used are different, this perspective is really an extension of the evolutionary ecological framework and draws freely from economic models of imperfect competition (e.g., Caves, 1967; Duncan, 1964; Lenski, 1966). Finally, although Benson sees this as "an integrative framework which establishes a genuinely interorganizational level of analysis because its focus is on the characteristics of networks and their environments (1974: 25)," this approach can be used to study network members as well (Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Zald, 1970b).

The Research Design

This research is within the general political economy perspective described by Benson (1974). It seeks to test hypotheses about the relationships between organizational characteristics and resources, organization position in the interorganizational network, and competition for resources (independent variables) and styles of interaction with system members (dependent variables) using information about the social service systems in two middle size midwestern cities. Information about the respondent organizations which is used comes from agency records, interviews with key informants, the agency directors, and questionnaires completed by the directors. Chapter II describes the project and discusses the method of data collection and processing.

Because information about the primary environments of social agencies (i.e., the network) is limited, in addition to testing the general model and the specific hypotheses which are part of that model, the analysis includes descriptive information about networks, system similarities and differences, and, within systems, the relationship of competition to other network factors. In addition, the design and analysis tests other major ideas about interorganizational relationships in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of the political economy model in contrast to other approaches.

The design uses organization characteristics of technology, age, sponsorship, size, staffing patterns, and diversity of services identified as significant in the organization-environment literature, network position indicators, and two measures of competition to test a series of hypotheses about agency interactions. Two general

approaches from the organizational literature, the exchange perspective and the organization-set model, are basic aspects of the design.

The causal model predicts that competitive pressures stimulate interactions with other organizations because interactions are ways to secure both material and authority resources (Benson, 1974). Because of the function interdependence in the social services sector some interactions are part of the regular or "normal" work of the agency. This means not all the interagency relationships are stimulated by resource seeking or competition.

Organizations seek resources through interactions with other organizations in their primary environment (i.e., in the network), but since success in developing resource-based interactions requires an ability to offer valued resources in exchange, the resources the organization has to trade are key determinants of its interactions with system members. Further, the network or interagency system is hierarchically organized with some members controlling resources for others. The organization's position within the stratification system affects its attractiveness to potential interaction partners. Since need for resources is a stimulant to interaction and valued resources a prerequisite, some organizations may have resources needed by others but engage in few interactions as Actors because they have few needs. Others may have valued resources and be stimulated by competitive pressures and need for more resources to seek interactions with system members and as Actors engage in a large number of varied interactions. Still others may be stimulated by

100-443886-1
 100-443886-2
 100-443886-3
 100-443886-4
 100-443886-5
 100-443886-6
 100-443886-7
 100-443886-8
 100-443886-9
 100-443886-10
 100-443886-11
 100-443886-12
 100-443886-13
 100-443886-14
 100-443886-15
 100-443886-16
 100-443886-17
 100-443886-18
 100-443886-19
 100-443886-20
 100-443886-21
 100-443886-22
 100-443886-23
 100-443886-24
 100-443886-25
 100-443886-26
 100-443886-27
 100-443886-28
 100-443886-29
 100-443886-30
 100-443886-31
 100-443886-32
 100-443886-33
 100-443886-34
 100-443886-35
 100-443886-36
 100-443886-37
 100-443886-38
 100-443886-39
 100-443886-40
 100-443886-41
 100-443886-42
 100-443886-43
 100-443886-44
 100-443886-45
 100-443886-46
 100-443886-47
 100-443886-48
 100-443886-49
 100-443886-50
 100-443886-51
 100-443886-52
 100-443886-53
 100-443886-54
 100-443886-55
 100-443886-56
 100-443886-57
 100-443886-58
 100-443886-59
 100-443886-60
 100-443886-61
 100-443886-62
 100-443886-63
 100-443886-64
 100-443886-65
 100-443886-66
 100-443886-67
 100-443886-68
 100-443886-69
 100-443886-70
 100-443886-71
 100-443886-72
 100-443886-73
 100-443886-74
 100-443886-75
 100-443886-76
 100-443886-77
 100-443886-78
 100-443886-79
 100-443886-80
 100-443886-81
 100-443886-82
 100-443886-83
 100-443886-84
 100-443886-85
 100-443886-86
 100-443886-87
 100-443886-88
 100-443886-89
 100-443886-90
 100-443886-91
 100-443886-92
 100-443886-93
 100-443886-94
 100-443886-95
 100-443886-96
 100-443886-97
 100-443886-98
 100-443886-99
 100-443886-100

competitive pressures and resource needs but have little to offer trading partners and, thus, be limited in Actor interaction behavior because of these factors. And a fourth group may have few valued resources but because of low needs and/or few competitive pressures engage in a small number of interactions.

In summary, the model assumes interorganizational relationships are caused by (1) work-related needs for the resources of other agencies, and (2) resource scarcity and the subsequent competition for resources. The interdependence in the system and procedures for conflict management legitimate resource acquisition through organizational exchanges. These exchange interactions need not be balanced or reciprocal, but sustained direct resource exchanges probably require rough reciprocity. Thus, some interactions require that the Actor organization have valued resources. Further, the system or interagency network is not a collection of members of equal status, but is hierarchically organized with some members controlling resources for others.

The principal research focus is the Actor organization in the interagency network, but characteristics of the primary environment, the network, are analyzed because these affect the Actor organizations behavior. The analysis considers types of organizations interacting within the organizational system. Because the system is embedded in the city, some characteristics of the agency's secondary environment are considered as these probably affect the agency's primary environment, the network. Because data come from only two cities, causal relationships between city characteristics and network and organization factors are not tested.

Because information about interaction patterns is limited, the research is designed to collect data about the extent of interactions and the types of interactions. In addition, the relationships of organization and network factors to interactions involving interagency cooperation are examined.

Following Evan (1966), the network is viewed as a cluster of interacting organization-sets, and the model is expanded to include four different types of sets: competitive, reference-group, simple exchanges about normal work, and coordinated exchanges. As an Actor the focal organization (ego) may have a variety of interaction partners and a single partner may be involved in several of its sets. With some partners interaction may be restricted to one type of set. Each respondent is potentially a set-member for other organizations; it is involved in interaction as a Target (alter). When respondent organizations are selected by system members as interaction Targets for a variety of exchanges, the organization is clearly a source for valued and needed resources. The types and number of Target interactions are, therefore, a measure of position in the organizational hierarchy, and an organization which is chosen as a Target in interactions by a large number of organizations for a variety of types of exchanges is an organization which is powerful within the system because it has command over resources others want.

Expanding on Levine and White's exchange approach (1961), agency interactions are considered to involve the exchange of intangible as well as tangible elements, or to use Benson's words, to involve both money and authority interactions. In this highly interdependent system, agencies depend on other social service organizations for

customers, a market for their product, a share of money, suitably trained staff, and other concrete resources. To survive they need resources such as recognition, support, goodwill, legitimacy, prestige, a clear, valued domain, and information. A list of interactions (Appendix B) covers the different types of exchanges used. These interactions are grouped into four types: competitive (i.e., for money, resources, domain), reference-group (i.e., involving recognition and support), simple exchange interactions (i.e., referrals, exchanges of information), and cooperative interactions (i.e., those requiring planning and commitment of resources and involving agency autonomy).

The type of work is an important aspect of interactions, as the mode of production affects both internal characteristics and interactions (Woodward, 1965; Zerman, 1970). There are two broad types of social service organizations. Treatment agencies, seeking to change people somehow, generally have a clinical model of work. Some Treatment agencies try to change groups or neighborhoods. The second type, Distributive agencies, provide an array of services and programs from which the user selects. There is no commitment to directly change or immediately affect the client, although there is the idea that the user will be better off as he uses the services, and they are planned to be beneficial. Distributive agencies are vaguely people changing, but their focus is on long-range development of the person.

According to Lefton and Rosengren (1966), organizations have varying degrees of interest in the client as a person; some have continuing broad lateral interests (Treatment), and for others the interest in client biography is more limited (Distributive). Wilensky

and Lebeaux (1965a) state that professional social workers have broad lateral interests in clients and consider they are primarily people or group-changing professionals. Eichhorn and Wysong (1968: 21) demonstrate that orientation toward clients is a dynamic factor in contact among agencies at both the administrative and operational levels, and organizations which differ in the nature of their interest in clients also differ in their propensity for interorganizational collaboration. Those with broad lateral interests are more likely to seek cooperation of other service organizations to realize them and, by doing so, contribute to the overall integration of agencies and services.

The range of Treatment agencies in a local community can include a Child Guidance Clinic, Mental Health Center, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Office of Economic Opportunity, Family Service Agency, Big Brothers, Center for Retarded Children, Model Cities, Urban League, Community Development League, Substance Abuse Center, and Employment Training Center. Examples of Distributive agencies are YMCA and YWCA, scouts, Legal Aid, Visiting Nurses, Department of Welfare, Employment Security Board, Health Department, American Red Cross, Day Care for Children, Housing Department, Veteran's Center, and the local Social Security office.

These two approaches to social service differ in the degree of complexity of the necessary technology (Perrow, 1967). Treatment agencies do work which requires highly trained professionals to deal with the non-routine needs of the clients. Each case has to be diagnosed and a plan of care devised. These organizations require a larger number of professional and/or highly trained workers than

Distributive organizations. Those Treatment agencies which provide a variety of different services following the clinical model require staff with a variety of professional training. Diverse Treatment agencies, then, have the most complex technology. As Hall shows in his summary of the literature on professionalism (1972), such organizations develop different communication and decision systems which may affect interaction patterns. The needs clients bring to Treatment agencies can stimulate service delivery exchanges (simple exchanges and cooperation), but if such agencies can meet clients needs internally, there is less stimulus to seek resources externally. Thus, high diversity of services may lead to low outgoing interactions, but may increase the organizations attractiveness to other agencies who need to refer clients to it.

Distributive agencies are a diverse group. Some provide services which require a high degree of training (e.g., home nursing care); some are very specialized, and/or serve a single type of client. Others offer fairly routine services (e.g., recreation, camping, income maintenance) to a wide range of people. In general, their technology is simpler than Treatment agencies; but since people are involved, it is still somewhat non-routine. Considering technology of this type of organization as varying in degree of non-routiness, the least non-routine are non-diverse Distributive agencies. Diverse Distributive are second; non-diverse Treatment, third; and diverse Treatment are the most non-routine.

As the number of services offered by the Distributive agency increases, the technology tends to become more complex because new skills are required, a more varied population is served, etc. As

Treatment agencies are more diverse they are not necessarily also more complex because they continue to counsel and prescribe, expanding the number of problems with which they deal but continuing the clinical model. Thus, these two types of organizations may respond differently to varying internal characteristics, and these differences may translate into varying service delivery interactions.

Because of these important differences, the local agencies in each system were categorized as either Treatment or Distributive agencies, and the analysis compares the two Mode of Work types.

Other important characteristics are age and auspices. The younger, 1960's era group of agencies were established with an emphasis on effecting a redirection of services. Many were charged with developing new patterns of service relationships among local agencies. Funding requirements and survival needs stimulate them to develop extensive interagency interactions. But, these younger agencies may suffer the "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965) as they have had little time to develop a firm place in the system. Their long-term survival may be uncertain because they deal with stigmatized clients, and thus, other organizations may not find them attractive interaction partners. The pre-1960's group is a collection of many types of agencies; some are very small, privately funded organizations which offer very few services; others are large, public agencies providing essential income support programs. The nature of their work will affect interactions, but information about the effect of period of establishment on structure and behavior indicates they will respond differently in resource exchanges than will younger organizations regardless of their work. Two age categories, Old and Young, are used in this work.

Sponsorship is another important condition. In each city, there are both public and private agencies, and organizations of both work types and of varying ages are funded within each sponsorship (Auspices) category. Although Auspices is interrelated with Age, it has a direct effect on relationships as well. As compared to private agencies, public agencies have a monopoly of the key services and important resources because they provide the major income support and other expensive services. Thus, they are the target for many types of interactions and are high in the hierarchy in the system. Having public sponsorship is probably an indicator of high resources. Like age, Auspices is an important charter-domain or situational variable, but it is not an organization type as is Treatment or Distributive.

In this model of interorganizational relationships, resources are a necessary condition for the development of extensive interactions. In the organization literature size of staff, type of staff, and service diversity are associated with organization structure and behavior. For this reason these variables are included in the design. In addition, for social service agencies, size reflects important resources such as money, staff, and a domain valued enough to be allocated a large amount of resources. Size is evidence of success in the competitive struggle. Professional staff are an added resource in that many clients require skilled help, and organizations with such staff may attract interactions and increase their power in the system. Further, the literature indicates boundary spanning roles are primarily assigned to professionals. Service diversity may be a specific resource for organizations as variety

increases the possibility of attracting interaction partners. These three variables are considered to be resources agencies can use in bargaining for resource exchanges and important because they affect agency position within the network.

Competition is a major independent variable. Since needed resources are in scarce supply, and the list of needed services readily expandable, these organizations exist in a competitive environment. But acceptable forms of competition are limited. The norms of the social work profession discourage expression of the competition which undergirds this system. Thus, it is difficult to measure competition by asking about it. Competitive pressures may be strong, and directors may report low pressure. The agency may compete with others for funds and other resources; the director may recognize this and be willing to report competitive interactions but report low competitive pressures, or vice versa. Actual competitive interactions seem a better measure of competition than perceived pressures. In a test of this two measures are used, Felt Competition based on reports of competitive pressures, and Actual Competition based on reported competitive interactions.

Organizations vary in the degree they depend on other agencies for needed resources. They vary in internal resources and system position or power. As discussed earlier, in order to develop resource exchange relationships, the organization must have some assets. Thus, some organizations with a lot of what other agencies need will have greater ability to engage in resource exchange relationships than those with few valued resources. As noted earlier, agencies need information, services, expertise, facilities, good will, legitimation,

etc. The kinds of services they provide will affect both resource needs and attractiveness as a partner. Further, the nature of the services provided by the whole group of agencies, by the system, will affect the type of services system members need and provide and will affect the local hierarchy of organizations. Agencies in a network with heavy emphasis on recreation services may not value the services of the rehabilitation agencies as highly as a system stressing remedial services. Hence, standing in the hierarchy will depend upon the combined needs of system members as well as on the specific resources of the agency.

If an organization is named by many others as a provider of a variety of resources, it is an attractive trading partner. Thus, the organization's position in the sociometric picture reflects its relative status in the system and its relative level of valued resources. Power or influence is dependent on possession of resources such as expertise, information, or rewards which can be exchanged for compliance (Rice and Mitchell, 1973). A major independent variable is Importance (i.e., position) which is measured by the number and variety of nominations the agency receives. This is an indicator of power within the system; it is an indicator of general ability to exchange.

The dependent variables are aspects of agency interaction patterns and include the number of set-members, the number of choices of interaction partners, the variety of interactions, reciprocalness, and extensiveness of the several types of interactions, e.g., reference-group interactions, simple exchanges, and cooperative interactions. In addition, the agency position in the network (Importance) is used

as a dependent variable as well as an independent variable in order to test the relationships between competition, organizational characteristics, and charter-domain conditions which may affect both the organization's ability to develop interactions and the whole pattern of interactions in the network.

A series of specific hypotheses (described below) about inter-organizational relations test the general political economy-competition and power model and other ideas about cooperation and interactions based on a review of the literature in field which concentrates on the importance of charter-domain and organization factors. The network itself is an important emphasis, and the research seeks to connect network conditions to organizational behaviors and to begin to examine the social organization of networks rather than continue the focus on the Actor organization.

In this the research breaks away from the existing body of empirical findings which concentrates on the specific characteristics of the Actor organization as an independent entity which relate to interorganizational relationships. Here, both the organization and the system are considered, but because data are available for only two cities, causal hypotheses about system characteristics are not possible.

In addition to testing hypotheses about competition and power and interactions, by testing a series of other hypotheses the data are used to show the low explanatory power of other approaches to the problem of interorganizational relations. Therefore, as hypotheses based on the other views are tested and found unsupported and the political economy-competition and power-based hypotheses find support,

the explanatory power of the model used here is demonstrated.

The limitations on analysis because of the size (i.e., number of organizations) and the highly differentiated nature of social service systems are described in Chapter II. These limitations affect the extensiveness of some of the hypotheses.

Summary of variables

Chapter II includes information about the operational definitions of the following variables and Appendix B gives wording of questions used to develop these variables.

I Independent variables

A. Characteristics connected to domain and charter

1. Mode of Work. Two categories, Treatment and Distributive.
2. Age. Two categories, Young and Old.
3. Auspices. Two categories based on funding sources, Public and Private.

B. Specific resources

1. Size. Number of employees
2. Degree professional. The proportion of the total staff with professional training.
3. Service Diversity. The number of distinct services the agency provides.

C. Competition

1. Felt Competition. Reports by the directors of the extent the agency experiences competition from different sources.
2. Actual Competition. The number of competitive interactions reported for the agency.

D. Network position (i.e., power, ability)

1. Overall Importance (or Position). The number of times the agency is nominated as an interaction partner by system members; a measure of system power.
2. Scope of Importance. The number of different interactions for which the agency is named as an interaction partner by system members; a measure of extensiveness of influence.

II Dependent variables

- A. Organization-set. The number of agencies identified as interaction partners in all types of relationships.
- B. Network, Sector, and Community interactions. Number of different interactions reported with various types of organizations and groups (described in Chapter II).
- C. Variedness. The number of different types of interactions reported by the organization. See Appendix B.
- D. Reciprocity. The number of organizations with which the agency is involved for both outgoing and incoming choices, i.e., mutual set members.
- E. Reference-group interactions. These relationships include intangible resources such as good will and support.
- F. Simple exchanges. The number of relationships reported which involve direct exchanges without requiring planning or commitment.
- G. Cooperative interactions. These relationships involve planning, some commitment of resources, and require sharing autonomy.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Work-related hypotheses

Needs related to their general type of work and function stimulate agencies to develop relationships with other social service organizations and with community groups. They seek resources to meet specific client needs or are stimulated by agency users. These work-related needs are different for Treatment and Distributive organizations. Since their work follows the clinical model, Treatment agencies require a variety of services to meet complicated client needs (e.g., emergency aid, medical or nursing care, financial assistance, child care help, physical rehabilitation services, vocational training, legal assistance, etc.). In their customary work activities, Treatment agencies with non-routine technology are stimulated toward relationships with both Distributive organizations and other Treatment agencies. Work requirements stimulate a need for consistent sources for needed resources, which can be secured by planned interactions (cooperation).

For Distributive agencies the type of clients served affects the need for such services. For example, the welfare and unemployment offices serve a more "needy" population than do scouts or the Y's, since the majority of users of such Distributive organizations are non-problem families. Therefore, it is expected that, although some Distributive organizations have extensive relationships, perhaps stimulated by client diversity or the type of services provided, many Distributive organizations will not be highly involved with others

and will have less need for reliable sources for needed resources.

Therefore, the interaction patterns of the two work types of organization will vary because of work-related factors.

H₁ As compared to Distributive organizations, Treatment agencies will have:

- a. More non-competitive or resource exchange interactions with other organizations;
- b. More varied relationships with other organizations;
- c. More cooperative relationships with other organizations.

Local social services systems require functions or services related to both Treatment and Distributive types of work. Thus:

H₂ Type of work is not a determinant of organizational position in local systems of social service organizations.

Sponsorship and age-related hypotheses

Sponsorship is an important factor in system position and agency behavior. The essential and expensive service, needed by a variety of clients from many agencies, are supported by tax funds, and Public agencies, as a group, are usually more important to other members of the system than the Private agencies. Further, because they often have large budgets and authorization to contract, Public agencies are a source of material resources for other organizations. On the other hand, some Public agencies are small, highly specialized, and have limited budgets and are not attractive sources of resources for many agencies.

The Private agency group is highly differentiated. Private organizations exist for varied reasons; some suit the needs of particular constituencies and continue because they are popular with certain

types of givers; others are considered to serve general community needs or to have a preventive function (e.g., youth-serving agencies, recreation centers, the Red Cross, etc.); and still others meet specialized service needs (e.g., day care, services for the elderly, family and youth counseling, help for the handicapped and retarded, etc.). Users of many of the Private agencies do not think of themselves as clients, as "needing service" but, as participants in activities which are agency programs. Agencies with such clients do not need other agencies for client services but for resources such as legitimation, information, clients, etc.

Age is an additional factor. The post-1960's group of agencies customarily are charged with developing new service patterns and seek to affect the delivery system through increased coordination with other agencies and redirection of services into difficult areas (e.g., crisis intervention, services to poor, community organization, etc.). The voluntary sector has some outreach agencies, but the public sector has responsibility for the more expensive and complex new efforts. These newer Private agencies, frequently created in response to pressure from special groups or stimulated by public or foundation funds, are innovative but limited in financial resources and community standing.

Because of distinctly different service emphases, general functions and clients, both Public and Private agencies vary widely in specific resource levels, and depending upon the type of work, vary in level of professionalization. Overall, public sponsorship is a sign of resources and is an important indicator of system position, but within Auspices types there are wide variations.

23

—

...

55,

⋮

;

...

10

22

2000

10

1

...

The highly differentiated nature of these systems and the restrictions imposed by the small number of cases limit the testable hypotheses.

- H₃ As compared to Private agencies, Public agencies:
- a. Are more important to other agencies (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance);
 - b. Have more specific resources (size, services, professional staff).

Because of the nature of their work (e.g., multiple-problem users, newer outreach services) and age-related factors,

- H₄ In comparison to Private-Treatment agencies, Public-Treatment agencies are:

- a. Higher in Resource Exchanges;
- b. More varied in relationship with other organizations.

Because of the nature of their work and higher resource levels,

- H₅ In comparison to Private-Distributive agencies, Public-Distributive agencies are:

- a. Lower in Resource Exchanges;
- b. Lower in Cooperativeness.

For organizations like these, age reflects a press toward interactions and cooperation. But, successful development of interactions requires the ability to attract interaction partners. In the general competition for resources over the years, older agencies acquire system position and resources which are important factors in developing interactions. As mentioned, the limited number of cases prohibits examining the joint effect of Mode/Auspices/Age and, without this, interaction pattern data are difficult to interpret. This limits the hypotheses dealing with age.

- H₆ As compared to Old organizations, Young agencies:
- a. Have fewer resources;
 - b. Are lower in Overall Importance and in Scope of Importance.
- H₇ When general resource levels are the same, as compared to Old organizations, Young agencies will:
- a. Have higher levels of Resource Exchanges;
 - b. Have more varied relationships with other organizations.

Ability-related hypotheses

Agencies are able to develop relationships with other organizations and groups to the extent they have generally valued resources (e.g., perform needed functions, offer valued services, are sources for various intangible as well as tangible resources). Although systems may differ in the specific resources generally valued, within systems organizations vary in overall attractiveness to others as interaction partners. System valued resources are prerequisites for extensive interorganizational relationships. Thus:

- H₈ The higher the level of generally valued resources (network position),
- a. The greater the number of Resource Exchanges;
 - b. The more varied the relationship with other organizations;
 - c. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

Regardless of their Mode of Work, for social service organizations employees are resources and an important determinant of network position and interaction behavior. Since many needed services are only provided by highly trained professionals, a large number of professionals in the staff is a further resource. To establish inter-agency relationships, an organization needs appropriate staff to

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

•

222

100

100

22

...

•

○

20

...

10

10

•

22

100

...

perform boundary-spanning work, and usually this is handled by professionals. If an organization is small, professional staff members are needed for organizational maintenance and immediate client related work and cannot be used to develop complex relationships with other organizations, thus limiting the development of cooperative relationships.

- H₉ Regardless of the Mode of Work, the larger the organization,
- a. The more it is valued by other organizations (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance);
 - b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges;
 - c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations.

- H₁₀ Regardless of Mode of Work, the higher the Professional Ratio,
- a. The more it is valued by other organizations (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance);
 - b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges;
 - c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations;
 - d. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

The number of services offered is another important resource affecting system position and interactions. A large number of services attracts a variety of interaction partners and so increases agency network position. As a stimulus to agency interactions the effect of Service Diversity varies by Mode of Work. For Treatment agencies, the more services provided internally, the less the need to seek needed resources from other agencies. Diversity stimulates other agencies to use the organization as a source for services and resources. The clinical model of work means Treatment agencies require stability in resource exchanges, and they will invest resources in

cooperative relationships to a greater extent than will Distributive agencies. For Distributive organizations, Service Diversity stimulates interactions because it is connected with a more varied client population (e.g., varied in interest, age, race, or place of residence). Because the type of work does not require long lasting exchange relationships, these organizations do not commit resources to cooperative relationships but primarily limit interactions to exchanges.

H₁₁ Regardless of the Mode of Work, the higher the Service Diversity, the more the agency is valued by other organizations (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance).

H₁₂ For Treatment agencies, the higher the Service Diversity,

- a. The higher the Resource Exchanger level (Target);
- b. The lower the level of Resource Exchanges (Actor);
- c. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

H₁₃ For Distributive organizations, the higher the Service Diversity,

- a. The higher the Resource Exchanger level (Target);
- b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges (Actor);
- c. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

Competition-related hypotheses - the relationship of competition and other conditions

Competition is connected with agency resources. Resource levels are the result of two major types of factors: (1) past success in the competition for valued domain and resources; and (2) the value of the services the agency provides. Value may be related to the extent of need in the community or to demands from leaders of involved community groups. In addition, the opinions of elites are important determinants of value or demands. Demands do not need to

reflect needs and are stimulated by popularity of the service, personal opinions, and national fashions in services. Although it may be logical to expect directors of organizations engaged in a high number of competitive interactions with other agencies to also report high feelings of competition, data from other fields finds an unreliable relationship between attitudes or opinions and behavior. Because the norms in the social welfare field support expression of ideals of partnership, cooperation, consensus, devotion to clients, and unselfishness, competition is rarely discussed. This means directors may easily report both high Actual Competition and low Felt Competition. Accordingly,

H₁₄ There is a low positive correlation between Actual Competition and Felt Competition.

Resource levels are connected with success in competition. Thus, instead of high resources leading to high security and limited competitive behavior,

H₁₅ The higher the general and specific resource levels, the higher the competitive interactions.

Organizational security is a factor in perceptions about competitive pressures. Because funding patterns differ, Public and Private agencies experience different competitive pressures. Older organizations have greater security than newer agencies. Thus:

H₁₆ The higher the position in the network, the lower the Felt Competition.

H₁₇ Public agencies have lower Felt Competition than Private agencies.

H₁₈ As compared to Old organizations, Young organizations have higher Felt Competition.

H₁₉ Because interorganizational relationship require resources,
Felt Competition level is unrelated to interaction level.

The relationship between competition and styles of interaction

The basic assumptions of this research are: (1) Interactions are stimulated by need for resources which are related to the normal or customary work of the organization and the nature of the interdependence in the social services system. A certain minimal level of interaction is expected regardless of other factors. (2) Interactions require resources or ability. Hence, the higher the resource level, the larger the number of relationships. (3) When work-related interactions and ability-related interactions are considered, competition for resources will stimulate additional interactions. Thus:

H₂₀ Considering work needs and resource levels, the higher the level of competition:

- a. The more extensive the interactions with other organizations;
- b. The higher the level of Cooperativeness;
- c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations.

Plan of the report

Chapter II describes the research methods and analysis techniques, including details of operationalization of measures, distributions of measures, and statistical tools and factors about the data collection which affect the usefulness of the findings. Chapter II includes demographic information about the settings for these systems (the cities) and describes various aspects of the two social service systems which relate to variations in the patterns of relationships among the independent and dependent variables. The

relationships among the independent variables are considered in Chapter IV, and hypotheses relating to system position, or ability (Target interactions) are tested. Chapter V tests the relationships of the independent variables to specific aspects of the dependent variable, interaction patterns.

The final chapter, building on the political-economy framework, focuses on system factors and discusses the relationships of system differences to the organization's power or system position and system differences in competitiveness, power, and patterns of organizational interactions. The data are used to explore the process by which competition for resources determines the hierarchy of dominance in social service system.

As noted earlier in this chapter, this research has both theoretical and applied value. Accordingly, Chapter VI includes a section discussing the implications of these findings for social planning and the findings describing existing interactions are presented in considerable detail, because of their value to planners and policy makers.

This is exploratory research, designed to test a number of ideas which the literature indicates may be determinants of interaction patterns. One purpose is to show the weakness of many of the prevailing approaches and the power of the parsimonious power and competition model. Therefore, two main data chapters (IV and V) test various hypotheses from the literature as well as those hypotheses based on the political-economy framework. Because the body of empirical findings in interorganizational research is so severely limited, a great deal of evidence is included in this report,

probably more than the reader will welcome. It is presented because future development of theory requires rich detail. Hopefully, others can use these very detailed and complex data for future work and begin to develop an integrated body of empirical findings.

Finally, Chapter VI includes a discussion of the contributions of this research to issues in research on interorganizational relationships.

200

100

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

CHAPTER II METHODS

Source of the data - the larger research project

The data used in this report come from a larger study of social service systems in two middle size cities in a midwestern state. The project was under the overall supervision of Philip M. Marcus and directed by Ann W. Sheldon with help from Margaret J. Adams. This report describes one important aspect of the larger project, the relationships social service agencies have with similar organizations in the immediate environment, i.e., within the local set or system of social service agencies. Because the nature of the larger research program affects the quality of the information used in this report and, hence, the nature of the conclusions which can legitimately be drawn from these data, information is presented now about the larger project.

The larger study, conducted between October, 1972 and July, 1974, collected information about many aspects of social service organizations and organization-environment relationships. These include:

- (1) Organization structure factors of size, staffing patterns, decision-making processes, communication channels, and staff autonomy and conflict;
- (2) Attitudes and opinions of agency directors about the provision of social services, inter-agency competition and cooperation, resource needs, community relationships, and agency problems;
- (3) Social support networks and the social and economic exchange relationships, or transactions, among social service organizations in these local communities, including agency and services integration;
- (4) Budgets, funding sources, and resources allocations;

- (5) Details of agency work including number and types of staff, number and types of clients, number and kinds of services, work complexity, and referral practices; and,
- (6) Competition with other organizations for needed resources.

The information was collected for two purposes: first, to test major ideas in the organizational and inter-organizational literature which seem relevant to organization-environment questions and, second, to provide information about existing local patterns of cooperation, conflict, and services integration to the primary sponsors, the local United Way organizations, and to the service agencies who participated.

An important consideration is that both theoretical and applied aspects of the project focused on interorganizational relationships. Research procedures including the preliminary field work, selection of the respondent organizations, design of the data collection instruments, and details of administration and data preparation were planned to concentrate on interaction patterns. Further, the research was designed and these data were collected and prepared within the general model of competition for resources as a cause of interorganizational relationships outlined in the previous section. Although using only part of the available information, the material presented is a key part of the total research project and not appended for other purposes and then adapted to the study of interorganizational relationships.

Preliminary work on the research design began early in the summer, 1972, after an extensive review of existing research, the various anecdotal and speculative writings, and the different models of interorganizational relationships proposed in the limited literature in this field. In addition, both investigators had prior experience in the social

services sector useful in evaluating the existing literature and roughing out initial plans.

An opportunity to do a community attitudes survey for social agencies was used to develop entree to agencies and collect preliminary information about the set of agencies in the first city. The field work-developmental phase, October, 1972 through March, 1973, included a thorough review of the type of written records used by these agencies, interviews with public and private planning officials and with agency personnel at several levels, and contact with agency clients, community leaders, and local agency board members. During this period, the field work was combined with progress on the conceptual level through preparation of background papers, regular meetings of the research group, and with members of several graduate seminars.

Links to informants permitted discussions about the nature of organizational life, agency interaction, and important agencies in the community. These discussions were valuable because they permitted an on-going exploration of the tentative research hypotheses with those directly involved in this field and helped work out the practical aspects of the research plan (e.g., meaning of words and phrases for respondents, length of interviews and questionnaires, selection of organizations for the interaction questions list, and details of securing simultaneous access to a large number of different organizations).

Although the preliminary field work and the development of the basic research plan were developed in one city, the research was planned from the beginning to be a comparative study. When funds permitted study in the second city, background interviews with local community leaders, agency board members and personnel, and planning officials were

conducted and the original instruments were refined to meet the particular conditions in the second city. Agency and planning personnel were involved in developing those parts of the instruments connected to interaction choices for that city, local information was used to select respondent agencies, and local informants helped with access questions and the preliminary interpretation of interaction patterns in that city. Thus, extensive fieldwork preceded data collection in both cities. There was a continual interchange between those concretely involved and those with a more abstract interest in the general problem. The instruments were developed for comparative research but with the peculiar needs of each city in mind. Of central importance, the primary purpose of the larger project was theory testing.

Research instruments - design and testing

Three instruments were used: first, a highly structured formal interview with agency directors lasting about one hour conducted by a project-trained mature interviewer; second, a self-administered questionnaire requiring about 30 minutes to complete left with respondents and returned by mail; third, as supplement to agency records, a short questionnaire developed later to ensure comparability of record-based data.

As noted earlier, work on these instruments and data collection plans began after several months of field work. Various drafts were developed with help and advice of local officials and people at Michigan State University interested in interorganizational relations, and the instruments were pre-tested in the spring, 1973 under the expected research conditions in a city very similar to possible target cities in population and work-force characteristics and the family of social

agencies. Information was collected in the first city from May through July, 1973. In the second city field work occurred between October, 1973 and March, 1974 with interviews held during the spring, 1974.

Copies of all the instruments used in the overall project are available from the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University. Appendix B gives the questions used to collect the specific information used in this analysis.

Data collection

Because social service agencies are interdependent and hierarchically organized, management of access is an important aspect of securing sound information. The preliminary information about system dominants was used to develop access procedures and interviewing techniques because agency interdependence can lead to normative responses as well as to low response rates. These organizations are in an uncertain environment and staff are subjected to a variety of external pressures. Accordingly, personnel are sensitive and suspicious. To obtain useful information, the data collection process must insure respondents feel secure enough to respond fully and accurately. To gain cooperation, directors and involved personnel received written and oral guarantees of confidentiality. In addition, the need these organizations have for this highly useful information, agency involvement in research planning, and agreements to supply reports which fully insure agency anonymity to all agencies are further procedures which give confidence in data adequacy.

The success of access plans is shown by the excellent response rate. One hundred per cent of the 68 organizations gave full information to the interviewer and only one organization did not complete the shorter self-administered questionnaire. This single missing case affects only

two variables used in this report, Felt Competition and Professional Ratio. (The missing case was assigned the mean score of organizations similar to it for these variables.) All other information used was available for all respondent organizations from interview-questionnaire responses or existing records.

A potential source of difficulty in research like this is the interview itself. These data were collected through a long session with agency directors. Such elite respondents require well-trained interviewers, informed about the social services sector, and able to establish sufficient rapport with the directors to insure trust (and hence, accurate answers) and cooperation in all the phases of the research--a considerable commitment of time and agency resources. Criteria for selecting interviewers were familiarity with the community and social services in general, non-student appearance, previous contact with policy-makers or elites or high self-assurance, willingness to work under very close supervision, and overall interest in the research. The same person, Margaret J. Adams, was the Interview Supervisor in both cities and participated in the general planning, design of instruments, and testing procedures. She was, therefore, fully familiar with the research and the nature of the organizational scene in each city. All interviewers received at least four hours of training and both males and females were used. Interviewers involved in the pre-test assisted in developing training guidelines for the interviewers in both cities.

Close contact was maintained by the Interview Supervisor to ensure common techniques were used in all cases. Completed interviews were reviewed immediately to spot missing information and clear up ambiguities. Interviewers prepared a report after each interview which described

interpersonal aspects of the interview, potential areas of misunderstanding, and recorded information volunteered by the directors and any contradictions, hesitancies, or areas of confusion were noted. Review of these reports indicates a high level of rapport was established in almost every case, and the high response rate shows this to be the case. In summary, the careful supervision and thorough training of the interviewers gives additional confidence in the information collected.

Respondent organizations

At the community level social services are delivered through a variety of groups and organizations. Some limit themselves to social services while others have different primary objectives (e.g., religion, education, health care, crime control, or political action) but have social service sub-units to help with major work objectives. Some programs are provided by groups of unpaid workers; others operate through the activities of voluntary associations within generally non-social service programs. Further, some agencies are well-established, secure organizations while others are very transitory. Since this research concerns the behaviors of formally established, on-going organizations whose primary purpose is providing social services, criteria for the selection of respondent organizations were essential. Unfortunately, there is little agreement in the literature about what is an organization. Most research does not seek to include the universe of social service organizations, but instead studies a specific subset without formally describing criteria for inclusion. Clearly, not all groups which provide social services are really formal organizations. Further, what is a social service? Again, research into organizations in the general field does not provide guidance as to selection of a

universe of such organizations.

For budgeting purposes local and national funding organizations in the social welfare field have developed standard service categories or 'functional budgeting' categories and these were used to define social services. If an organization is considered by local social planning professionals to have as its primary task objective provision to local residents of one or more of the services included in the funding-based categories, it was listed as a potential social service organization. Lists of such groups were developed from directories in each community and from interviews with informed local planners. This list was used to delineate the boundaries of the social service sector for interaction list purposes and to identify respondent organizations.

Because the research goal was to study formal organizations, additional criteria were developed to select agencies from this pool of potential organizations. Detailed criteria for designation as an organization for this research are in Appendix A. The operational definition sought to include all local formal organizations of sufficient size to develop characteristics such as a hierarchy of authority and formal rules. Some of the very small private agencies are recognized as a formal organization for funding purposes and these were included if United Way members. All the small United Way agencies met the minimum budget part of the operational definition and had policy-setting boards. Non-United Way groups which did not meet staff size and budget criteria were excluded.

Public and private agencies have different policy decision procedures and varying degrees of independence. The existence of an identifiable policy-setting body can be used as a basic criterion for both types of organizations, although the policy-setting body may not exist

at the local level. The policy criteria were designed to exclude organizations with non-social service primary objectives and those which are units within other organizations or formed to reflect the work of another organization, e.g., a church or union welfare office, probation office, or hospital social service department.

Some agencies spin off highly autonomous units which operate as independent organizations although not legally separate and dependent upon the sponsor for funding. Several recently established agencies are organized with component agencies as units (e.g., Model Cities, Community Mental Health Board). Because the operating procedures and structure of these agencies are very similar to the legally autonomous organizations, when components met other size and minimum budget criteria they were included in this study. Because this aspect of social service organizations was not fully understood initially, unfortunately, some were not identified as organizations in the beginning phases of the study in the first city and thus were not included on the interaction list. Although data were collected later, the limitation of network analysis which require all Targets to also be Actors, or a closed chain, means these organizations' data cannot be used in this analysis which relies on sociometric measures. All eligible components were included in the second city. This limits the size of the sample by eight organizations in City A, i.e., there are 41 organizations which meet the criteria for inclusion but only 33 can be used because of the limits of network analysis and missing sociometric measures for the other eight. Since all of the included component organizations are supported from tax funds, they are considered part of the group of public organizations.

In each city only one non-United Way, privately funded organization met the modest size and budget criteria. The category Private is largely made up of the group of United Way or voluntary agencies as these are the organizations which have developed powerful enough constituencies to continue over time and gain sufficient support to employ full-time staff. Most of the Private organizations are the old, well-established agencies represented in hundreds of local communities. None of the newer privately established organizations met the very low budget and size criteria so the research does not include such groups as privately sponsored local crisis centers, emergency aid projects, or community organization programs. Such groups were included in the list of interaction Targets as part of the social welfare sector but very few in either city received more than eight nominations which indicate they are unimportant elements in local networks.

In summary, the organizations included in this research are all the privately funded agencies in each city that are members of the local United Way or sufficiently large enough to be included, all the major public agencies, primarily offices of state agencies or county organizations, and most of the component agencies. Data were collected from the universe of organizations meeting these specifications rather than a sample of such organizations. Hence, statistical tests of significance are presented only to indicate the magnitude of associations or differences.

Data were collected from agency records and reports of agency directors. Obviously, the director is not the organization and differences probably exist among organization members and between staffing levels. The need to develop organizational level variables requires the

use of informants for some measures as well as manipulations of responses for all or a sample of members to develop aggregative measures. The task is to construct organization indicators which are not aggregations of member perceptions, attitudes, or opinions. One solution is to rely heavily on records and measures integral to the organization level of data; another is to use key informants.

In this research the director was interviewed as the key informant and, while not always fully informed about every aspect of organizational behavior, the director is the chief executive officer authorized to speak for the organization in interactions. At the top of the communication and authority chains, with multiple responsibilities, he or she is more informed about the various subunits than the second level staff with limited responsibilities. In small organizations such as these, the director can be in fairly regular touch with the several parts of the organization and thus an informed reporter. He or she is a major influence (and usually the major influence according to Demarche and Johns, 1951) on organizational behavior with powers to hire /fire staff, allocate funds, direct planning for new programs, and reallocate resources. For these reasons, the responses of the director are used as measures of the organization.

For the most part, the variables used avoid the difficulties of measures based on perceptions. Only one variable, Felt Competition, is based on director opinions, and other variables come from agency records. Director reports of agency interactions are used as organization measures, and, although replies to questions about inter-agency transactions may fail to report every organization in the organization set, the design limits analysis to a maximum of five Targets

for each interaction question, it seems safe to assume the director will know these major transaction partners.

Development of variables

In this research, four general groups of independent variables are used to examine eight aspects of the general dependent variable, interaction behavior. Chapter I includes a description of the variables and Appendix B gives the exact wording of the questions used to collect the information. This section is limited to a description of the development of variables and discusses analysis-related factors. Summary information about distributions is provided in Appendix C.

Independent variables

1. Characteristics connected to domain and charter¹
 - a. Age Agencies are categorized either Young or Old based on period of national establishment of organizations with similar general functions and objectives. The early 1960's is used as the Age cutting point because that period was a critical point of change in the general direction of social welfare services. Necessary information for categorization comes from interviews with planning professionals, social work literature (e.g. Romanyshyn, 1971), and personal experience.
 - b. Auspices Based on the characteristics of the policy making body and the source of the major portion of the agency's regular allocation (core funding) agencies are called

¹ Although this approach to organization level indicators raises questions of validity and reliability, much of the comparative research uses the key informants strategy, e.g., Meyer, 1966; Pugh et al, 1968 and the anthropology research methods literature. In two careful reviews, Heydebrand (1973b) and Price (1972) conclude this approach is sound. It does avoid other difficulties such as excessive aggregation.

either Public or Private. Information for classification came from organization records. (See also Appendix A giving operational definitions of an organization for information about policy-making board criterion.)

- c. Mode of Work Two basic types of work are used, Treatment and Distributive. Information about the basic differences in these two types is in Chapter I. Classification information comes from: (1) written descriptions of program objectives in local directories, United Way service priority material, and budget application forms; (2) interviews with local planners and officials; and (3) author's own experience.

Table 4 in Chapter III gives the number of agencies in each city in the general charter-domain categories.

2. General resource variables

- a. Overall Importance (or Network Position) This variable is based on the total number of nominations the organization receives for all the transaction questions listed in Appendix B. Each respondent named up to five organizations and groups in the local social welfare sector as Interaction Targets from a list prepared for each community. Nominations as Targets indicate the organization has valued resources; this variable is an indicator of within-system power or influence. As distributions show, scores fall at the low end of the possible distributions and in System B are more skewed than in System A (Appendix C). Each city has five organizations with high scores; in System A, one-half of the organizations received between 21 and 42 choices, and in System B one-half of the

cases have scores from 14 to 29. These scores are approximately linear, but the distributions limit analysis, and the high variances within each city or system need recognition. Data analysis uses these scores three ways: (1) actual scores in correlations and t-tests; (2) ranks in the system for Counterpart organization comparisons, using Spearman rank order correlations; and (3) cut at System median to form High and Low Importance (or Position) categories. Additional information about the distribution of scores by city is in Appendix C and Table 10.

- b. Competitor and Resource Supplier These variables are the two parts of Overall Importance and are Target or sociometric choice measures. Nominations received for the four competitive transaction questions (Appendix B) form the Competitor score. Nominations received for all non-competitive transaction questions (Appendix B) make up the Resource Supplier score. Distributions for both variables are in Appendix C and are approximately linear with some skewness. The agency's actual score is used in the analysis.
- c. Scope of Importance The organization's score for this variable is the total number of interaction questions for which it receives nominations from the respondent organizations. Distributions are linear. Other information is in Appendix C. Only the actual score is used.

Overall Importance (or Position) and Scope of Importance are two analytically distinct measures of position in the systems' organizational hierarchy and are based on different manipulations of the data.

3. Specific resources

- a. Size This is the number of full-time and full-time equivalent employees reported in written records of funding organizations or in response to specific questions (Appendix B). As distributions in Appendix C show, these respondent organizations are small. Only 12 of the 68 agencies have 40 or more employees, and 35 have fewer than 20 (Table 10). The distributions in Appendix C show extremely high standard deviations, an indication of the wide variations in staff size, but data are approximately linear. Size is used in two ways: (1) actual scores in correlations and t-tests; (2) rankings within each system for Counterpart organization comparisons using Spearman rank-order correlations.
- b. Degree professionalized (or Professional Ratio) This variable is computed from organization records or responses to specific questions (Appendix B) and is the proportion of the whole staff who hold administrative and professional positions. Organization Size affects the variable and limits its usefulness as very small agencies may have a high Professional Ratio because the director will be included as a professional without also having the boundary-spanning resources usually assumed to be connected with professionalized staffing. Distributions are in Appendix C and Table 10 and are approximately linear. The higher mean and median scores in System B probably reflects Size differences rather than a significantly greater degree of professionalization. The actual score is used in the analysis.

- c. Service Diversity Directors described the services provided by the agency, and the number of different services reported is used to develop this variable. A standardized system, Functional Budgeting, used by local United Way organizations to describe social services, provided a list of services that helped to determine if a program mentioned is indeed a distinct service. A maximum of eight services were coded for each agency. In the very few instances in which more than eight services were mentioned, the director clearly was describing related programs rather than identifying distinctly different services. Distributions are in Appendix C and are linear.

4. Competition measures

- a. Actual Competition The agency's score is the total of Actor (outgoing) choices for the four competitive transaction questions (Appendix B). Distributions are in Appendix C. For System A scores four and five are the modal categories and the remaining scores are well spread out. In System B the modal category is three. The distribution is very flat -- 63 per cent report scores from three to seven -- but not bimodal. In analysis this variable is used in three ways: (1) actual scores are used in correlations and comparisons of means; (2) rankings within systems are used for comparisons of Counterpart agencies; (3) cut at system median to form High and Low Competition categories.
- b. Felt competition This variable uses eight questions about competition (Appendix B). These items are highly

intercorrelated and form one general cluster in the cities.² Distributions are in Appendix C.

Inter-city differences in the independent variables are discussed further in the narrative associated with Tables 9 through 12. All of the measures are sufficiently linear to use Pearsonian product-moment correlations but the sociometric measure Overall Importance (or Position) is negatively skewed, particularly in City B, and both cities have high variances for the Size, Actual Competition, and two Position measures, Competitor and Resource Supplier.

Dependent variables

All of these measures are developed using outgoing (Actor) choices for all or groups of interaction questions. Directors reported interactions with agencies and groups using an extensive list of organizations and groups in the social services sector in each community. One to five responses were coded for each transaction. Directors rarely reported more than five Targets for a question. Interviewers did not probe for five, and frequently fewer than five were mentioned. If more than five were named, a random number table was used to select from those mentioned the five for recording. Coding procedures counted global responses (e.g., "all on the list," "all United Way agencies") but did not select specific agencies for recording. Organizations or groups named which were not on the sector list but in the general health-welfare field were counted as Section interactions. Global responses and non-health and welfare groups were included in the Community interaction variable. Thus, Actor behavior within the sampled organizations (network), interactions with others in the

²Standard score coefficient alphas are .86 and .85.

general social welfare sector, and general responses are three ways of summarizing reported interactions. Community interaction is the most inclusive variable. Distributions of the dependent variables are summarized in Table II.

5. Interaction variables

- a. Set This score is the number of different organizations named as partners in all the transactions questions (Appendix B). It includes only interactions with named organizations; global responses are excluded. The Actor organization may have several different relationships with a single partner. Inclusion of an additional interaction question in City B permits slightly higher scores than for City A, but this is generally unimportant because interaction patterns are limited to a relatively few agencies although organizations do report a variety of transactions with these same organization-set members. The additional question elicited few nominations.
- b. Network interactions This is the number of choices the Actor organization reports for all interaction questions or the total number of interaction ties of any kind the organization has with agencies which met the criteria for inclusion in the research (Appendix A). This Actor variable is similar to Overall Importance or Position, a Target variable.
- c. Sector Interactions An agency's score is the number of choices made from the interaction list or other organizations in the general health and welfare field identified by name by respondents. This variable includes the Network interaction count.

- d. Community interactions The most inclusive interaction score, this variable uses up to five responses for each interaction question, and choices of any sort of group in the community (e.g. schools, League of Women Voters, Police Department, Garden Club, etc.) are added to the Sector variable. Because it does not reflect the organizations and groups directly sharing a resource pool, this variable is not important for hypothesis testing but is reported for comparisons.
- e. Variedness This is the number of different interactions or transactions reported by the agency. The maximum is 18 in City A and 19 in City B. All questions eliciting a response of some sort are included. This Actor variable resembles the Target variable Scope of Importance.
- f. Reciprocity The agency's score is the number of organizations with which it has relationships both as Actor and Target, or the number of organization-set members which also include the agency in their organization-set. Reciprocity is not limited to an exchange of the same resources between agencies but involves any mutual interactions across all the interaction questions. This is a descriptive measure and not used in hypotheses.
- g. Resource Exchanges The number of choices of specific organizations made for the non-competitive interactions (14 in A, 15 in B) is the organization's score for this variable. This Actor variable is similar to the Target variable Resource Supplier. There are three sub-variables in this inclusive variable -- Reference-group exchanges, Simple Exchanges, and

Cooperativeness (see below). Questions used for each sub-variable are in Appendix B.

- h. Cooperativeness The score is the choices made for all interaction questions that involved planned action and some commitment of agency resources and autonomy. Scores include reported interactions with any named organization in the sector or general health and welfare field.

Variable independence

Network and Sector interactions include the measures Actual Competition and Resource Exchanges; Resource Exchanges includes Cooperativeness; and Reciprocity is embedded in Set. Set is not part of the larger interaction measures and thus not part of Resource Exchanges or Actual Competition. To avoid correlations using embedded variables, in a few instances the Competitive-set score is substituted for Actual Competition. Although based on different counts the correlation between choice-based Actual Competition and organization-based Competitive-set is high -- System A $r = .84$; System B $r = .80$ -- as would be expected. Thus, when necessary, organization-based information is used for Actual Competition rather than choice-based data. Organization-set is never substituted for Network interactions. Choice-based Actual Competition can legitimately be used with Organization-set and, of course, with Resource Exchanges and Cooperativeness. If the Actual Competition measure is based on organizations rather than choices, it is footnoted in the table. When not noted, the measure is always based on choices.

Data analysis problems

Because social service systems have a small number of members, research such as this is limited by the relatively few cases.³ Combining data from individual cities is one way to increase the N, but this is unwise as it may obscure important characteristics of these systems. Although here there is no real attempt to test hypotheses relating community characteristics to organizational behavior because data are available from only two cities, the preliminary examination of the data indicated important community differences exist.

Accordingly, data from each city are kept separate, and the N is small. Agency characteristics and behaviors are described separately for each city, and cities are compared in selected instances. Criteria appropriate for the particular city are used to develop categories (e.g., the organizations above the median 35 are High Importance in City A; in City B the category includes those above the median of 20).

Even though multiple regression techniques are sometimes used with small N's, this is not sound, particularly for these kinds of data. When such measures are inappropriately used, the findings are misleading. As a further consideration, zero-order correlations are of limited help in testing the major hypotheses in this study, although they are useful in describing interrelationships especially among the various independent variables. What is required is a method to consider work-related or 'normal' interaction levels, the added effects of variations in resources (or the ability to interact), and competition (a stimulus to interact). These three conditions are interrelated. There is no base of earlier findings which permits estimating how many

³Even in large metropolitan areas the number of distinct social service organizations is probably under 150.

interactions are part of the organization's customary work, but field experience indicates some interactions are part of the normal work. Individual agencies supply specific segments of the community's package of services and their work requires interactions (e.g., receiving referrals and giving information). Other interactions are the result of the high interdependence of these organizations (e.g., getting money from the same sources, receiving referrals) and not specifically initiated by the organization to seek resources. Thus, there is a certain interaction level not specifically related to the kinds of resource exchanges described in the interorganizational literature. There is no way to identify the extent of these interactions using these data.

Organizations may experience strong competition and some 'press' for interactions but not have resources valued by others to use in exchanges. Competition and Overall Importance must be considered together as well as separately. Further, organizations may have highly valued resources but be self-sufficient and need few services from other agencies because of the nature of their work and resources. All three factors -- work-based needs, valued resources, and competition -- produce interactions. It is difficult to separate 'normal' interactions from those stimulated by other factors because it is unwise to use second or third order partials.

Preliminary analysis indicates these systems are highly differentiated. Some agencies are highly specialized in work, type of clients served, and niche in the overall system. This means there are only a few agencies of a particular type. Thus, there are only three Small-Public agencies in City A, and only one is a Treatment

organization; there are five Large-Private agencies, but again only one is a Treatment agency. The cities differ in the members in multiple-variable categories, and some cells are empty -- a serious limitation for comparative research.

In addition, although the independent variables are approximately linear, there are some extreme values for certain important variables. The components of the sociometric measures (i.e., the separate interaction questions) have skewed distributions. Pooling questions produces a more even distribution, but the measures remain somewhat skewed and there is high variance. Dichotomizing at the median seems the sensible way to handle this, although correlations are also presented to illustrate general trends in the data.

Finally, since the community social setting may be significant, Network Importance or Position must be determined by standards of the separate communities. A high number of Target nominations in City B is not high in City A, if the general level of integration is considered, and it should be. This complicates the comparison of Counterpart organizations (about two-thirds of the system) because relative size, position, interaction levels, etc. must be considered.

Previous research can give no guidance as to the meaning of size for these agencies or indicate what is a high professional ratio. Interpretations are difficult. Most research on the effects of Size considers an organization with 100 employees as small; here that is very large. Agencies with fewer than ten employees may operate like small groups rather than develop the organization characteristics described in the literature; yet these are autonomous formal organizations. In this research large organizations are not large by the thinking in the

organizational literature, and data about the effect of Size needs to be interpreted cautiously. To handle this problem, system ranks are used to make comparisons for the Counterpart agencies. When variables are dichotomized, the median for the city is used, not a general median.

Additionally, the base for computing variables which use the interaction questions is slightly different in these two cities. Nineteen rather than 18 questions were used in City B. Consequently, scores can be slightly higher in B than A, yet indicate similar interaction levels. System B mean scores for all sociometric questions (both Actor and Target) are, in fact, much lower than System A's. Thus, the p .10 level of significance is used instead of the p .05 level.

Procedures

There are no really satisfactory solutions for the problems posed by the small number of cases, the interrelationships among the three charter-domain conditions, differentiation, and uneven distributions. Two techniques are used -- zero-order correlations by system and by single variable type and comparison of means (t-test).

In most instances, correlations are by Mode of Work, as this is a primary characteristic of social service organizations. Some comparisons are by sponsorship (Auspices) but other variables such as Age or Size are conditions associated with organizations, not types. It is tempting to develop Mode/Auspices types for correlations, but the number of cases in the smallest category is only six.

In order to examine a variety of two-variable types, categories are developed and mean scores compared. Mode and Auspices are considered together and types compared through t-tests. Importance is cut at the median to create High and Low categories and used with other variables

to create types. Although some N's are small, in most cases this technique can be successfully used. In an extension of this approach, types are compared by competition level. Actual Competition is cut at the median to create High and Low Competition and used as a category. In a limited way, this begins to examine the three interrelated factors, type of work, valued resources, and competition. Again, comparisons of means are used and, although some cells have only a few cases, the data are used to describe general trends in each city.

Embedded measures

As noted earlier, some variables are actually parts of other variables. Actual Competition is a component of Sector interactions. Cooperativeness is a part of Resource Exchanges as well as Sector interactions, but it is possible to compare Actual Competition (a choice measure) with Size of Set or use Competitive set in correlations with Network interactions without correlating a measure with part of itself. Extreme care was exercised when using Actual Competition. In almost every instance, the choice measure is used and is never correlated with the larger interaction level variables. It is used with Resource Exchanges as it is not embedded in that variable. In the few cases when Actual Competition was used with the larger interaction measures, the Competitive set score has been substituted for the choice based measure. When this is done in tables, it is footnoted. There is no problem relating Actual Competition to Resource Exchange or Cooperativeness.

Cooperativeness is embedded in all interaction-level variables and in Resource Exchanges. It is not part of Actual Competition. Thus, one can examine the relationships between Competition and Cooperation but

not describe the relationship between general involvement in resource exchanges and cooperation.⁴

Although high correlations exist between Interaction levels and Variedness and between Overall Importance and Scope of Influence, these variables are analytically distinct and not affected by any embeddedness. Naturally, as the types of interactions reported increases, some increase occurs in the total number of choices of organizations for interaction partners; as organizations are attractive Targets for a variety of transactions their overall popularity also increases. Overall Importance and Scope of Importance are different aspects of organizational position. The number of choices and the variety of interactions are two different ways to measure interactions.

Significance tests

When data are not from a sample, assessing the meaning of correlations is difficult. To help in interpretation, significance levels for sample data for 'r' with appropriate N's are used following a table in Bruning and Kintz. For correlation interpretations and t-test measures, the p .10 level, one-tailed test, is used as the minimum because of the exploratory nature of this research; Table D Distribution of 't' from Blalock is used.

⁴This means a test of Levine and White's ideas are impossible at this point.

CHAPTER III SOCIAL SERVICE SYSTEMS AND COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Introduction

In the United States the social service system is highly fragmented, multi-leveled, and complicated.¹ Although decisions about the appropriate ways to meet needs are often made within local communities, national and state officials also initiate policies and allocate resources which establish programs and affect local delivery systems. The complex process of decision-making about policy and fund allocations may be semi-visible, but, in addition, there is a process of redefinition of needs, goals, and priorities that occurs through an historical mixture of the work of voluntary associations, formal organizations, 'crusades,' influential writings, and changing national trends.² The local social service delivery system is the product of decisions at several levels, including decisions by local elites. Since these systems have evolved over many decades, local differences may be very important.

Many public and private agencies are locally planned, administered, and funded. Some are affiliated with national agencies while others are not, but their equivalents in hundreds of local communities offer similar

¹Information about the organization and historical development of the social welfare sector is very limited. Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965b) show the development of the mix of public and voluntary sponsorship; Piven and Cloward (1971) provide evidence about the combination of nation-state-local levels in decision-making; Morris and Randall (1965) show the fragmented nature of services provided to a particular needy group; and various texts in community organizations, e.g. Brager and Specht (1973) also provide some support for the following statements. Decision research in related areas (e.g. Hayes, 1972; Ripley, 1972; Wolman, 1971; Zurcher, 1969, and others) coupled with the community-decision literature illustrates a pattern which seems similar to the situation in the social welfare field.

²How something gets on the decision 'agenda' is poorly understood -- see for example Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Cobb and Elder (1972).

programs. Across the country the community social service system has local chapters of national agencies (e.g. YMCA, Girl Scouts, Visiting Nurses, Urban League, American Red Cross) plus a group of locally unique agencies generally providing a roughly similar package of services including youth programs, settlement houses, crisis centers, rehabilitation centers and the like.³

Regardless of how they are organized, agencies providing local services reflect national and state definitions of appropriate needs and services as well as local definitions. Local service patterns are determined within a larger institution framework (Sills, 1957; Zurcher and Bonjean, 1970). As community organizers soon learn, local public agencies partially operate within state guidelines; offices of major Federal and state basic services agencies are governed by a complicated series of Federal as well as state regulations and policies. The newer cluster of public agencies (e.g. Office of Economic Opportunity, Model Cities, Community Mental Health Board) are developed by local officials, use the existing local organizational system, but are heavily influenced by non-local guidelines, restrictions, and funding policies.⁴ In addition, for some types of services there is a filtering up as well

³The Functional Budgeting manual of National United Way of America is a good illustration of this aspect of these systems.

⁴The Older Americans Act gives an interesting example of this. Federal funds are channeled through state agencies which, upon evidence of local initiative, fund local planning groups. These are inter-agency Councils with some citizen representatives which must work within state and Federal guidelines to plan programs suitable and politically feasible in local areas. Without local initiative the funds will not enter the community, but the planning process itself, and the programs eventually offered, are due to non-local factors coupled with local demands.

as a trickle down pattern of decision-making, and national policies are partially determined by the sum of local decisions.⁵

The material available about this sector is primarily case study research and how-to-do-it texts, but the picture that emerges from the available evidence is of a loosely joined system. Many local agencies are tied, at least partially, to non-local organizations although they seem autonomous. The agencies operate within the set of agencies, service resources, demands, and the pool of available clients in the local community. They are part of the local organizational hierarchy (Stinchcombe, 1965), limited by the local structure while at the same time forming it. Local agencies must be understood in the context of the interdependent set of agencies and the overall life conditions in their respective setting.

Although empirical work demonstrates a variety of local conditions affecting social services outputs, (e.g. Bonjean et al, 1971; T. Clark, 1968; Fowler, 1964; Lineberry, 1971; Turk, 1970; and many others), it is not clear how selected factors affect the system itself, and it is far from clear just what the major factors are. Further, the information is often contradictory.

Because this research involves only a two-city comparison, a causal model with city characteristics as independent variables is inappropriate. Yet, considering characteristics of local delivery systems, one must proceed under the assumption that factors such as variations in financial resources, definitions of problems and needs, the local group

⁵This is particularly true for those national voluntary agencies with a federated decision structure such as Family Service Association, Urban League, Camp Fire, YWCA.

of clients and customers, and the orientation of community leaders, as well as non-social service factors such as the local tax base, the age of the community, the composition of the population, political characteristics, etc. do affect the local system, although how this process occurs may not be understood. It is reasonable to assume community differences may very likely affect the way agencies are organized, the way they seek resources, and the way they interact. Although an analysis of city factors is not the primary focus of the research, this chapter presents information about the two cities and the pool of services and agencies which make up the local social services systems as a basis for understanding system differences detailed later.

City demographic characteristics

Information about these cities is limited, and it is difficult to know which factors relate to social services. Accordingly, Table 1 presents some demographic characteristics of these two cities which seem likely to influence the nature of the two social service systems. City B is much smaller than City A and, although service needs may be similar in the two cities, the smaller population means fewer consumers of these services are available for each agency and the supply of private and public dollars is smaller, although per capita figures may be the same. As will be shown later, the cluster of agencies in the cities is very similar, and the smaller City B provides 82 per cent of the services provided in City A. This may translate into different interaction patterns because agency operation costs may require a larger proportion of available dollars and staff in the smaller city. This should affect client services, outreach efforts, and inter-agency coordination. Time, efforts, and funds needed to develop cross-agency programs and planning

TABLE 1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS*

	City A SMSA	City B SMSA
<u>General population (1970)</u>		
Total population	378,423	201,550
Per cent white	95.5%	94.7%
Per cent Negro	3.8%	4.7%
Per cent with Spanish heritage	2.2%	.7%
Per cent foreign born or with foreign or mixed parentage	15.0%	11.0%
Per cent population change, 1960-1970	26.6%	18.8%
Net in-migration	9.9%	5.3%
Per cent families with female head	8.6%	8.5%
Median age	23.4 years	24.5 years
Per cent under 5 years	9.4%	8.5%
Per cent 65 years and older	6.9%	7.8%
<u>Education (1969)</u>		
Median school years completed by persons 25 years and older	12.4 years	12.3 years
Per cent with less than five years schooling	2.0%	2.5%
Per cent with high school degree or more	63.1%	60.7%
Per cent with four years of college or more	14.9%	14.5%
Percent elementary and secondary school enrollment is in private schools	16.2%	20.0%
<u>Income (1969)</u>		
Median family income		
White families	\$11,313	\$11,162
Negro families	8,435	7,659
Per capita money income	3,343	3,355
Negro per capita money income	2,400	1,976
Spanish per capita money income	2,228	2,807
Families with income (per cent)		
Under \$3,000	6.2%	6.1%
\$3,000 - \$4,999	7.0	6.8
\$5,000 - \$6,999	8.3	8.8
\$7,000 - \$9,999	19.8	20.8
\$10,000 - \$14,999	31.7	31.9
\$15,000 - \$24,999	22.0	20.2
\$25,000 and more	5.0	5.4

TABLE 1--Continued

	City A SMSA	City B SMSA
<u>Poverty (1969)</u>		
Per cent all families below poverty level	6.1%	5.9%
Per cent families below 125% of poverty level	8.6%	8.3%
Per cent of population receiving Public Assistance	6.2%	4.2%
Per cent persons below poverty level are under 18 years old	32.9%	28.5%
Per cent persons below poverty level are 65 years and more	17.1%	19.0%
Per cent Negro families below poverty level	20.5%	18.5%
Per cent Negro families below 125% of poverty level	26.4%	25.2%
Per cent Negro families receiving Public Assistance	17.2%	13.3%
Per cent Spanish families below poverty level	9.9%	10.4%
Per cent Spanish families below 125% of poverty level	13.9%	14.2%
Per cent Spanish families receiving Public Assistance	6.5%	13.1%
<u>Employment (over 16 years, 1970)</u>		
Total labor force	157,737	85,039
Per cent labor force is female	38.4%	38.1%
Per cent female workers are married with husband present	55.8%	56.3%
Per cent unemployed (1970)	5.1%	4.7%
Types of employment (per cent)		
Manufacturing	24.8%	33.4%
Wholesale/retail trade	18.8%	19.7%
Services	5.8%	5.8%
Education	16.2%	12.9%
Government	26.5%	17.3%
Construction	5.8%	4.5%
Per cent white collar	51.4%	49.7%
Per cent professional/managerial	24.3%	24.4%
Per cent sales/clerical	27.1%	25.3%
Per cent craftsmen and foremen	13.0%	12.7%

TABLE 1--Continued

	City A SMSA	City B SMSA
<u>Local government finances (1967)</u>		
Tax rate per \$1,000 State		
Equalized Valuation	\$48.47	\$59.47
Property tax per capita	\$129.00	\$140.00
Expenditures (per cent)		
Public welfare	3.1%	3.9%
Health care and hospitals	4.9%	2.1%
Education	55.6%	55.7%
<u>Political behavior</u>		
Votes cast for President (1968)		
Per cent Republican	53.2%	53.9%

* Sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1972; Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973; U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970 General Social and Economic Characteristics; Final Report PC(1)-C24 Michigan Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

may be limited because of on-going maintenance needs for City B organizations.

Further, both cities are overwhelmingly white. Although the proportion of non-white residents is slightly greater in City B than in City A, City A has a more heterogeneous non-white population. Thirty-seven per cent of City A's non-white population reports a Spanish heritage as compared to only 13 per cent in City B. The existence of two minority groups, generally lower in income and requiring more social services than the white population, but with differences (e.g. discrimination, migration rates, skill levels) translates into different pressures (and perhaps more pressure) for services than found in City B.

Services-related pressures may stem from migration patterns and poverty. City A has experienced a higher rate of population change between 1960 and 1970 (a period of rapid expansion of social service organizations), and net in-migration is much higher than in City B. In addition, the per cent of the population which is foreign born or with foreign or mixed parentage is higher in City A. Another measure of heterogeneity, enrollment in private schools, presumably reflecting religious heterogeneity, shows City B with a higher proportion of its population in private schools.

City A has a slightly greater proportion of its population with incomes below the poverty level and a larger proportion receiving Public Assistance. A larger proportion of Negro families are receiving Public Assistance in City A than in City B; for Spanish families, a much larger proportion receives Public Assistance in City B. This factor indicates some important differences exist between the two cities. There is a much higher proportion of residents with Spanish heritage in City A than

in City B. The difference between the two cities in the per cent of the Spanish population who are poor is very slight, i.e. about .5 per cent. Yet, the per cent of Spanish families receiving Public Assistance is twice as high in City B as in City A. A different pattern exists for Negroes. A somewhat greater proportion of the Negro population are poor in City A than in City B, i.e. about 2 per cent, yet the per cent receiving Public Assistance is almost four points higher in City A than in City B. Further, Table 1 shows that a higher per cent of the population received Public Assistance in City A than in City B although the overall proportion of needy families is similar. These factors show a different assistance climate exists in the two cities.

Additional evidence of differences in the local services climate is shown in allocations of local public funds. Although the form of government and political preferences are similar in the two cities, local public monies are allocated differently as Table 1 shows. (Later tables will show differences in service patterns.)

Reasons for different allocations of public funds are not known. Presumably some combination of factors and pressures leads to these differences in treatment of low income families. Although there are differences between the two cities in education levels, occupation patterns, and income distribution, these do not seem sufficiently great to account for this. The median school years completed by adults is similar in each city and, while City A has approximately three per cent more people with at least a high school education, the differences in college-educated residents are slight. The per cent of families headed by a female (frequently associated with poverty) is the same in the two cities.

The overall distribution of employment between white collar categories and skilled/unskilled blue collar workers is very similar but, when work setting is considered, differences appear. A much higher proportion of the work force in City A is employed in education and in government. In City B a higher proportion is employed in manufacturing enterprises, and there are more large manufacturing enterprises employing over 100 workers than in City A (Consumer's Power Company, 1970).

Additional work force differences are indicated in income level comparisons but these are not substantially dissimilar in the two cities. In City B 42.5 per cent of the families have incomes under \$10,000 yearly as compared to 41.3 per cent in City A; in City B 25.6 per cent have incomes of \$15,000 or more as compared to 27 per cent in City A. The overall per capita income in the two cities is very similar.

Perhaps of importance, the gap between white and black income is greater in City B than in City A. In City A Negro family income is 75 per cent that of white family income and in City B this drops to 69 per cent.

Since target groups vary in general popularity (Marcus, 1973) the age composition of the populations in these two cities may be an important factor in differences in the organization of the social services system. In City B there is a larger proportion of residents who are elderly and when low income families are considered, in City A a higher per cent are under 18 years of age, while in City B a higher per cent are elderly. To the extent services for children and youth are more generally approved than services for the elderly, these population differences should be a factor in the development of services such as Scouting, local Y's and Boy's Clubs in contrast to senior citizen services.

Whether these differences are causally related to the nature of interaction patterns in these two cities is, of course, unknown. From the fragmentary data and anecdotal evidence in the limited human services literature, they seem to be important considerations. Additional research is required to permit more complete discussion of these factors.

Distribution of social service resources

Table 2 presents information about services differences which also may affect interaction patterns. When services are grouped into general types, there is a different pattern of services between City A and City B. City A uses 21 per cent of the pool of social service workers to provide mental health services as compared to 10 per cent in City B. Although the number of agencies is similar, the amount of service provided must be different given the allocation of workers. In each city the basic public services (public assistance, social security, health, and employment) are provided and about the same proportion of staff is committed to these services. An important difference between these two cities is the focus on physical rehabilitation. City B has both more agencies and more employees working in this general area, yet it seems unlikely that a significantly larger per cent of the population suffers from physical handicaps or mental retardation in that city. Although the minority population proportion is similar in each city, City A allocates a larger proportion of its resources to that broad service area, perhaps reflecting the more heterogeneous minority population in City A. Although a smaller per cent of the population is young in City B, more weight is given to leisure time, character-building organizations whose primary constituency is youth. The focus on substance abuse (alcohol, drugs) is another point of difference.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF CITIES BY RELATIVE EMPHASIS GIVEN TO
TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICES, SELECTED CATEGORIES^a

	City A			City B		
	Number of agencies	Number of em- ployees	Network staff commit- ment ^b %	Number of agencies	Number of em- ployees	Network staff commit- ment %
Mental health	7	262	21%	6	78	10%
Physical rehabili- tation	2	45	4	5	93	12
Substance abuse	1	15	1	4	63	8
Minority clients	5	146	12	3	25	3
Character- building, leisure- time, group work	5	116	9	6	126	17
Basic public services	4	451	36	4	294	39
Other	9	201	16	7	71	9
Total	33	1236	99% ^c	35	750	98 %

^aAlthough City B has only 56 per cent as large a population as City A, the number of employees within the social services organizations studied is 61 per cent of City A. City B has approximately 3.7 social service employees per 1000 population and City A has 3.3 employees per 1000.

^bNetwork staff commitment is the per cent of employees of whole system employed in each service type.

^cFigures may not add to 100% in this and subsequent tables due to rounding.

Spearman r_s between cities by number of agencies = .25

Spearman r by network staff commitment = .36 (significance level $p. 05 = .31$)⁸.

On balance, Table 2 shows considerable difference exists between the two cities concerning the relative emphasis given to types of social services. There is a low inter-city correlation by number of agencies providing these general types of services (Spearman $r_s = .25$) and by network staff commitments (Spearman $r_s = .36$). In a later section the data show the general mode of work for an organization is an important determinant of interorganizational relationships. The different service emphases affect differences in mode of work and are, thus, a factor in interaction patterns at the system level.

In addition to different service emphases in the two cities, the number of different services and service units also varies. As Table 3 shows, City A has a larger number of different services and a larger number of service locations than does City B. City B is 56 per cent as large as City A, has 61 per cent as many social service workers, yet offers 82 per cent as many different services in 87 per cent as many service locations. In each city there is some duplication since many services are provided by more than one agency, and in fact, fewer than one-third of local services are given at only one service location in both cities. Although City B provides slightly fewer services, the degree of duplication is greater than in City A. To the extent there is competition within systems for domain and clients, then City B agencies experience a greater degree of resource uncertainty.

Without information about what level of services exists in local communities (or what is 'normal'), the meaning of these differences is not known. Perhaps the lower interaction level (described later) is tied to this situation about services. Agency staff may be spread thin in an effort to provide the large number of services existing in City B; perhaps this does not matter since the number of potential clients for

TABLE 3

PROVISION OF SERVICES

	City A	City B
Number of different services provided	67	55
Number of service units ^a	181	158
Per cent of services offered by only one agency	31%	29%
Per cent of services offered by two agencies	21	31
Per cent of services offered by three to four agencies	31	18
Per cent of services offered by five or more agencies	<u>16</u>	<u>22</u>
Total	99% (67)	100% (65)
Extent of duplication ^b		
Mean score	2.70	2.87
Standard deviation	1.68	2.16
Coefficient of variability	.62	.75
Range	6	8

^aService units are the number of times the package of different services is provided. It is equal to the sum of Service Diversity for each agency.

^bDuplication reflects the degree of overlap of domains among agencies in each city.

each service is smaller. It is impossible to judge from available information. These data are presented to indicate another point of difference in the milieu in which the agencies operate.

Organizational Composition of Systems

Table 4 shows the percentage of each system accounted for by the major types of agencies and, when Auspices, Mode of Work, and Age are considered, the two systems are fairly similar. In both systems there are more Private agencies than Public, more Distributive agencies than Treatment, and more Old agencies than Young. In both cities Public agencies are more likely to be Treatment and Private agencies more likely to be Distributive. More Distributive agencies are Old, but Treatment agencies are approximately evenly divided in terms of Age.

However, the more detailed examination of agency types shows considerable variation between cities. If 10 per cent is used as a criterion for significant differences between cities, then there are many such differences (Table 5). In a later section the impact of public auspices is discussed in greater detail. In brief, as the social services sector developed, expensive, widely needed, and basic services were shifted from private to public auspices. Through a series of decisions made over several generations, public dollars are allocated to primary services and private dollars to less important services, as supplementary funding, or for innovation. In addition, some private agencies have influential supporters and/or are important in federated fund-raising and have continued regardless of user need for such services. In general, public agencies offer more important services, have larger staffs, more money, are less affected by local

TABLE 4

AGENCY COMPOSITION OF SOCIAL SERVICES SYSTEMS

	City A		City B	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Total number of agencies	33	100%	35	100%
<u>Auspices</u>				
Public	14	42	15	43
Private	19	58	20	57
<u>Mode of work</u>				
Treatment	14	42	15	43
Distributive	19	58	20	57
<u>Age</u>				
Old (Pre-1964)	20	61	23	66
Young (Post-1964)	13	39	12	36
<u>Auspices/Mode of work</u>				
Public-Treatment	8	24	10	29
Private-Treatment	6	18	5	14
Public-Distributive	6	18	5	14
Private-Distributive	13	39	15	43
<u>Age/Mode of work</u>				
Old-Treatment	6	18	8	23
Young-Treatment	8	24	7	20
Old-Distributive	14	42	15	43
Young-Distributive	5	15	5	14
<u>Auspices/Mode of work/Age</u>				
Public-Distributive-Young	1	3	--	--
Public-Distributive-Old	5	15	5	14
Public-Treatment-Young	6	18	6	17
Public-Treatment-Old	2	6	4	11
Private-Distributive-Young	4	12	5	14
Private-Distributive-Old	9	27	10	29
Private-Treatment-Young	2	6	1	3
Private-Treatment-Old	4	12	4	11

TABLE 5

CHARACTERISTICS OF TYPES OF AGENCIES

	City A	City B
	%	%
Public agencies		
Per cent treatment	57	67
Per cent old	50	60
Per cent large	79	67
Per cent important	71	67
Total number	14	15
Private agencies		
Per cent treatment	32	25
Per cent old	68	70
Per cent large	26	35
Per cent important	37	40
Total number	19	20
Treatment agencies		
Per cent public	57	67
Per cent old	43	53
Per cent large	57	47
Per cent important	79	60
Total number	14	15
Distributive agencies		
Per cent public	32	25
Per cent old	74	75
Per cent large	42	50
Per cent important	32	45
Total number	15	20
Large agencies		
Per cent public	69	59
Per cent treatment	50	42
Per cent old	69	82
Per cent important	62	65
Total number	16	17
Small agencies		
Per cent public	18	28
Per cent treatment	65	61
Per cent old	53	50
Per cent important	41	39
Total number	17	18

level community factors, and are charged with meeting essential needs, e.g., income maintenance, health care, and employment, or expensive needs, e.g., psychiatric help and long-term rehabilitation. Thus, having public auspices differentiates agencies in several ways more fully described later. Inter-city differences in public agencies are important aspects of the general community differences which affect individual agency behavior.

In City A, Public agencies are more often Large than in City B; in City B they are more often Treatment-oriented and Old. In both cities, Private agencies are primarily Distributive, Old, Small, and unimportant to others. In both systems Treatment agencies are more important than Distributive ones but the importance is greater in City B than in City A, and in B Distributive agencies are more frequently important than in A. Since size is connected with resource-levels (shown later), the differences between the two cities in terms of characteristics of large and small agencies is important. In City A Large agencies are more likely to be Public, and hence they have two important general clusters of resources. Further, more City A Public agencies are young than in City B. Young agencies, established under charters intended to stimulate coordination, should seek more inter-agency interactions when work requirements and their overall bargaining position permit, and this factor may affect city inter-action levels.

Table 5 shows a considerable degree of similarity between cities about which agencies are unimportant to others. In each case, Private, Distributive, and Small agencies are less important than Public, Treatment, and Large organizations. Thus, although the

examination of single variable types of agencies indicates general similarities across city type, when the several two-variable types of agencies are analyzed, important differences are clear. Unfortunately, because of the limitations imposed by the small number of organizations in each city, these two-variable types cannot be analyzed sufficiently. Under these limits, of particular note is the difference in importance to other organizations of Treatment agencies; e.g., in City A 79 per cent of them are in the top half of all agencies in terms of importance to others as compared to 60 per cent in City B. It seems the nature of the cluster of services and characteristics of agencies in City A somehow translates into a greater system-level dominance of Treatment organizations.

Table 6 provides more information about which agencies are important within the local network of agencies and group of services in each city. When the top half of agencies on Overall Importance are analyzed, Treatment agencies make up 65 per cent of this group in City A as compared to 50 per cent in City B, and most of the difference is due to the greater importance Private-Treatment agencies have in City A. When size is considered, Large-Treatment agencies are more important than Small-Treatment agencies in each city, but in City A both Large-Public and Small-Private-Treatment agencies are more important than in City A. In City B Distributive agencies are more often important than in City A, and this is particularly evident in the case of Private-Distributive agencies, Small as well as Large. Interestingly, in City B Private-Distributive agencies are a larger part of the top importance group than in City A. A later section provides information about the characteristics of Public-Treatment, Private-Treatment, Public-Distributive, and

TABLE 6

COMPARISON OF COMPOSITION OF
HIGH IMPORTANCE GROUPS, BY TYPES^a

	City A (N=17)		City B (N=18)	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Public-Treatment	7	41	7	39
Public-Distributive	3	18	3	17
Private-Treatment	4	24	2	11
Private-Distributive	3	18	6	33
Large-Public	9	53	8	44
Large-Private	1	6	3	17
Small-Public	1	6	1	6
Small-Private	6	35	5	28
Large-Public-Treatment	6	35	5	28
Small-Public-Treatment	1	6	2	11
Large-Private-Treatment	1	6	1	6
Small-Private-Treatment	3	18	1	6
Large-Public-Distributive	3	18	3	17
Small-Public-Distributive	0	0	0	0
Large-Private-Distributive	0	0	2	11
Small-Private-Distributive	3	18	4	22
Old	9	53	10	56
Young	8	47	8	44

^aImportant agencies are those in the top half of number of received choices for all interaction questions, dichotomized separately for each city. Median in City B is much lower than in City A.

Private-Distributive agencies connected to the relationships among resource levels, competition, and interaction patterns. Since Overall Importance or Position is a major determinant of interaction level, one reason for the different intensity of interactions between City A and City B (presented later in Table 10) is probably connected to city differences in types of agencies comprising the top importance group as shown in Table 6.

Counterpart organizations

Since local social service systems are part of the national social services sector, there are inter-city similarities in their agencies. Each city has the major state offices and a group of affiliates or chapters of some major private agencies (e.g. American Red Cross, Scouts, Y's, Visiting Nurses, etc.), and about two-thirds of the group of agencies in each city are these Counterpart organizations (N=21). These local outlets do much the same work regardless of the city, and, of course, are the same in terms of Age and Auspices. If units of state and/or Federal agencies, they operate under the same policies and regulations, and some Private agencies are not fully autonomous. These common factors should be connected with similar positions in the separate community networks and perhaps with similar interaction patterns if other factors associated with organizational characteristics (e.g. Size, Diversity, staffing, etc.) are similar. Table 7 describes the positions of these Counterpart organizations in the systems. From this table the importance of these organizations to the systems is clear. They make up about two-thirds of the cluster of agencies and the employees of these organizations form a very substantial portion of the total pool of social service workers in each city. Further, they provide a large

TABLE 7

POSITION OF COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS IN LOCAL SERVICE SYSTEMS

Total number of Counterpart organizations	21
Counterparts as per cent of systems	62%
Employees as per cent of total work-force	
City A	68%
City B	74%
Number of Public-Counterpart organizations	7
Public-Counterparts as per cent of all	
Public organizations	48%
Employees as per cent of total work-force	
City A	43%
City B	46%
Number of Private-Counterpart organizations	14
Private-Counterparts as per cent of all	
Private organizations	72%
Employees as per cent of total work-force	
City A	25%
City B	28%
Per cent of all local service units provided	
by Counterpart organizations	
City A	70%
City B	65%
Counterpart organizations as per cent of the top	
quarter of all organizations in each system in	
Overall Importance (N=8)	75%
Counterpart organizations as per cent of the top	
half of all organizations in each system in	
Overall Importance (N=17)	47%

proportion of all the local service units. Although the group of Public-Counterpart organizations are less than one-half of the group of Public agencies, they are an even smaller proportion of the family of agencies in each city, or about 20 per cent. But, the employees of these Public Counterpart organizations comprise over 40 per cent of the system workers. The Private Counterpart agencies make up 40 per cent of the local agencies in each city, but the number of employees working in such organizations is smaller, or about 25 per cent. When the two cities are compared as to the group of agencies which are highly important in the local systems (i.e. are in top quarter of agencies by number of received choices for all interaction questions), the same six agencies are in the highly important group in each city. When the top half of agencies in Overall Importance are examined, there is somewhat less agreement between cities; the same agencies make up a little less than one-half of the group called Important.

Table 8 gives additional evidence of the importance of Counterpart agencies by showing mean score comparisons for Public agencies as a group with the Public-Counterpart group and the Private agencies group with the Private-Counterpart agencies. As compared to Public agencies as a whole, Public-Counterparts are higher in both Overall Importance and Network interactions. They are more important to the system of organizations and engage in more outgoing behavior within the network than do the group of Public agencies. As compared to the group of Private agencies, Private-Counterparts are more important in City A and slightly less important in City B. In City A, they are more involved in outgoing behavior than the Private group but in City B they are slightly less outgoing.

TABLE 8

COMPARISON OF COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS WITH ALL ORGANIZATIONS
BY IMPORTANCE TO OTHERS AND OUTGOING CHOICES, MEAN SCORES

City A	All Public	Public Counter- parts	All Pri- vate	Private Counter- parts
Overall Importance	54.5	70.7	27.4	32.0
Network interactions	41.1	46.1	37.2	41.2
City B				
Overall Importance	36.8	45.3	23.2	22.6
Network interactions	31.9	33.1	26.5	20.1

The Public-Counterpart organizations are more dominant than the Public. The Private-Counterparts resemble the Private agencies in general and are much less important in both Actor and Target Positions within the whole network than Public-Counterparts.

Turning next to the correlation between cities of the characteristics of these Counterpart organizations, Table 9 shows the high correlations on some organizational variables for the whole Counterpart group, but interesting differences when the effect of Auspices is examined and very important differences in the dependent variable, Network interactions. As compared to Private-Counterpart agencies, Public-Counterparts are similar in Size, Service Diversity, and Overall Importance, with lower correlation for professional staffing. Private-Counterpart organizations are highly similar in Service Diversity and staffing patterns, with a lower but still significant correlation for Size. The major differences in the independent variables appear when the two competition variables are compared. The Counterpart agencies show little similarity in Felt Competition level; the inter-city relationship for Actual Competition shows an important negative correlation of $-.52$ for the Public agencies. The competitive interaction patterns for the Private-Counterpart agencies are somewhat similar. An indicator of inter-city differences is the high negative correlation between cities in interaction levels of Public-Counterpart agencies. The insignificant positive correlation of $.30$ for Private-Counterpart agencies again indicates the lack of agreement across cities.

These data are presented to illustrate an important difference in the overall organizational milieu in the two cities, namely the differences in the competitive behaviors of organizations which are very

TABLE 9
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CITIES BY CHARACTERISTICS
OF COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS

Variables	All Counter- part organi- zations N=21	Public Counter- part organi- zations N=7	Private Counter- part organi- zations N=14
Size	.70***	.89***	.48*
Degree professional	.63***	.47	.71**
Service Diversity	.93***	.95***	.92***
Overall Importance	.69***	.89***	.39
Actual Competition	.13	-.52*	.43
Felt Competition	.20	.21	.18
Interactions	.31	-.70**	.30

Spearman rank order correlation coefficients

*Two-tailed test, significance level .10

**Two-tailed test, significance level .05

***Two-tailed test, significance level .01

similar in each city. Not only are there city-level differences for all organizations in terms of the various independent variables (see Table 11 later), but these Counterpart agencies, identical in Auspices, general charter, Mode of Work, and Age, and very similar in relative position within each system for Size, Service Diversity, and professional staffing are somehow located in social space differently in these two cities. The Private agencies differ in importance to other agencies. Both Public and Private agencies differ in interaction levels across the city types. In terms of the causal model for this research it is important to point out the major difference in competition levels echoed by differences in interactions, and this point is discussed further in subsequent sections.

In sum, considering the degree to which these Counterpart organizations form the majority of organizations within these two systems and the extent their staffs comprise the pool of available social service workers, these data provide additional information about the differing organization mix and overall climates in the two cities.

Differences in agency characteristics

Continuing this examination, Table 10 shows differences in agency characteristics in the two cities. A much larger proportion of agencies in City B are very small, i.e., have under ten employees. City A has many more organizations with 30 or more employees. Probably city size affects agency size. Smaller cities have fewer welfare dollars and fewer clients. But, although as Table 10 will show later, the mean size of agencies in City A is larger than in City B (37.5 employees as compared to 21.4), the difference between these cities does not reach the $p .10$ level of significance using the t -test. The larger number of very

TABLE 10

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES

	City A		City B	
	Number	per cent	Number	per cent
<u>Size of staff</u>				
Under 10	5	15%	13	37%
10 - 19	11	33	6	17
20 - 29	3	9	9	26
30 - 39	5	15	4	11
40 and over	9	27	3	9
Total	33	99%	35	100%
Median	25		17	
<u>Number of services offered</u>				
Under 3	2	6%	6	17%
3 - 4	8	24	12	35
5 - 6	13	39	13	37
7 and over	10	30	4	11
Total	33	99%	35	100%
Median	6		5	
<u>Degree staff professional</u>				
Under 20%	3	9%	1	3%
20% - 39%	8	24	8	23
40% - 59%	18	55	16	46
60% and over	4	12	10 ^a	29
Total	33	99%	33	101%
Median	.46		.50	
<u>Overall importance</u>				
(number choices received from other agencies)				
Under 20	8		17	
20 - 29	6	42%	9	74%
30 - 39	8		1	
40 - 59	6	42	3	11
60 and over	5	15	5	14
Total	33	99%	35	99%
Median	35		20	

^aHigh per cent professional staff is affected by small staff size for many City B agencies.

small agencies in City B is important because these very small agencies have a different overall profile as compared to those somewhat larger or large. (This is fully described in a later chapter.)

In addition, more agencies in City B offer only one or two services than in City A. Sixty-nine per cent of the agencies in City A are very diverse as compared to 48 per cent in City B. Although the cities differ in terms of professionalization of agency staffs, when the effect of Size on Professionalization is considered, the cities are very similar in this characteristic.

System Integration

As Table 10 shows, a much larger number of agencies in City B are fringe members of the system than in City A. In City B 74 per cent of the agencies received fewer than one interaction choice per system member while in City A only 42 per cent were as limited. In addition, twice as many agencies received fewer than 20 choices in City B than in City A. The low choice agencies are social isolates, and their number suggests System B is less integrated than System A.

On the other hand, in each city five organizations received about two choices per system member (Table 5) and the top agencies are the 'same' organizations in each city (Table 7). Taken as a whole, this information shows that both cities have social services systems dominated by few organizations, but System A has a group of 14 moderately well integrated agencies, a much larger number than in System B. Table 11 gives additional information about system differences in the distributions of several network position variables and includes data about Actor interaction pattern differences as well.

The data presented in Table 11 provide support for the idea that the two cities differ in system integration. Because an additional question was asked in City B, interaction mean scores should be slightly higher than for City A. Instead, A's scores for Position and Interaction are higher than B's, and t-test scores show significant system level differences.

The number of different organizations in agencies' organization-sets does not differ between these cities. Apparently, as interaction increases types of exchanges with customary partners increase rather than a wider web of relationships being established. The differences in Reciprocity scores vividly illustrate this point. Further, Cooperativeness, an indicator of planned, committed interactions, is lower in City B.

When the cities are compared by the number of organizations involved in Resource Exchanges, in City B 37 per cent of the agencies are involved in .5 choices or less per system member as compared to 15 per cent in City A. Further, 89 per cent of City B organizations report one or fewer Resource Exchanges per system member as compared to 58 per cent in City A. Thus, from both vantage points, Actors and Targets, organizations are in much less contact with each other in City B.

These findings show different system level interaction patterns exist. There is a small clique of dominants in each city, tightly integrated, but a general theme of social isolation for many other members, especially in City B.

Summary

Clearly, the social services systems in these communities are different. Thus, the setting, the primary environment in which agency

TABLE 11
SYSTEM INTEGRATION DIFFERENCES

	City A		City B		
Variables	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	t-test
Network Position characteristics					
Overall Importance	38.9	32.5	29.0	22.4	1.449*
Resource Supplier	32.1	29.7	23.5	20.8	1.349*
Scope of Importance	13.4	4.1	12.0	3.9	1.414*
Interaction characteristics					
Set-size	11.1	3.5	10.5	3.0	.633
Network interactions	38.8	16.9	28.6	12.7	2.811***
Sector interactions	44.3	18.5	37.3	17.1	1.591*
Community interactions	53.2	15.6	49.7	15.5	.921
Variedness	12.0	3.7	13.5	3.3	1.744**
Reciprocity	6.4	3.2	3.6	2.2	4.118***
Resource Exchanges	32.1	13.8	23.1	11.3	2.903***
Cooperativeness	11.3	7.7	7.9	6.7	1.943**

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

behaviors occur, is dissimilar and agency actions probably are affected by characteristics of the communities and of the local family of social service agencies. Although in this research demographic differences cannot be causally linked to system variations or agency actions, and system variations cannot be directly tied to agency behaviors, the weight of the evidence reported here, and in other research findings connecting community characteristics to policy outputs, gives reason to conclude the general community milieu -- the secondary environment -- is an important determining factor in agency actions and interorganizational relationships.

There are three important general factors which relate to this major point. First of all, for reasons not now known, both public and private funds are used differently in these two cities. Some combination of historical circumstances, dissimilar local conditions, probably reflecting varying perspectives and goals of local community leaders, and previous interorganizational linkages has led to variations in service emphases in both public and private sectors. These cities have different local priorities, definitions of needed programs, and valued agency actions and services. The differences in local emphases are shown by the different allocations of personnel (the equivalent of money) without strong indications of unusual needs. One expects a generally similar group of services in local communities in the U. S. unless the population and work-force characteristics are very dissimilar. Indeed, a comparison of available services shows 82 per cent of the services provided in City A are also available to City B residents, although City B is only 56 per cent as large as City A in population. But, as Table 2 shows, existing manpower resources are used to

provide a different overall mix of services. The pool of services, which seems similar at first, particularly since two-thirds of the agencies in each community are the 'same' or Counterpart agencies, is actually dissimilar. In both cities there is about the same emphasis on the basic public services and offices of the same major public agencies are system dominants. But, in contrast to City B, City A's system stresses mental health programs and services to minorities, while in City B there is a different allocation of personnel (i.e., funds) and instead, resources go to leisure-time, character building services and programs for the physically disabled. Is it reasonable to think there really is three times the need for physical rehabilitation personnel in City B than in City A? Are residents of City A somehow much more prone to mental illness? Probably not.

A second general factor is the make up of the community set of agencies. Although cities have many of the same agencies, and the systems have similar proportions of organizations with Public-Private Auspices and Treatment-Distributive Modes of Work, there are variations associated with agency type and characteristics of the Counterpart organizations which reflect differences in the inter-agency context in which these Actor organizations operate. The differences within types illustrate different system characteristics. As examples of this, more Treatment agencies are under public auspices in City B than in City A; Treatment agencies as a group are more likely to be important to the other system members in City A than in City B; Large agencies are more often Old in City B than in City A (Table 5). Further, when High-Importance organizations are compared by type characteristics in City A, Private-Treatment agencies are a more important part of this group, but

in City B Private-Distributive agencies are more significant (Table 6). In general, Treatment organizations seem to provide valued resources to other agencies in City A; in City B the Distributive organizations are more important. Probably this difference stems from the dissimilar service priorities in the two cities, and later chapters discuss this.

The Counterpart organizations form a major part of the family of social agencies in each city. Differences in this important part of the systems point to basic system variations. The Counterpart organizations are of primary importance in each city. Two-thirds of the members of each system are these equivalent organizations. The Counterpart group has over two-thirds the worker resources and is assigned responsibility for about two-thirds of all the service units. Significantly, they make up 75 per cent of the top quarter of agencies in terms of Overall Importance and these very important organizations in each city are the Public-Counterparts (Table 7). These agencies are, of course, the same in Auspices, Mode of Work, and Age. As the data in Table 9 demonstrate, the inter-city correlations of characteristics of these agencies show many areas of similarity, e.g. in size of staff, service diversity, staffing patterns. As mentioned, the network position of Public-Counterpart agencies is highly similar in each city, but the position of the Private-Counterparts is not the same. The major differences are the level of Actual Competition and interaction levels. Such differences between system dominants affects the general interaction levels in each city and should be an important factor in the possible agency interaction patterns because interaction requires both needs and resources from the participants.

Third, the systems have different characteristics. City B has a larger proportion of very small member organizations and many are non-diverse. Further, members are less well integrated within the system in City B. A greater number are very low in importance as interaction Targets (Table 10) and in outgoing relationships or Actor behavior (Table 11). Although a greater proportion of members are relatively isolated in City B, in both cities the Large-Public organizations are well integrated. The contrast between cities in degree of system integration is great. This report does not try to include other types of data which may also be connected to system integration, e.g., perceived barriers to coordination, ideas of overall profitability of interaction, internal conflict, demands of funding organizations, willingness of top staff to innovate, etc. Here the emphasis is on organization structure characteristics (i.e. professionalization, diversity, and type of work) as these relate to two measures of system integration, Actor behavior and organization position (Target status).

These general differences at the system and community level have been described because they relate to the apparent differences in general interaction patterns between these two cities. These differences should be considered as background data when organizational characteristics and behavior are examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER IV ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN TWO SYSTEMS

Introduction

Chapter III discussed some significant similarities and differences in the two social services systems because the environment for agency actions is presumed to affect agency behavior. In this chapter the focus is the organizations that make up the two systems. Chapter V describes interaction patterns and the relationships among organizational characteristics and agency behaviors within these two different systems.

This chapter describes interrelationships among the independent variables. There are four sections. The first compares the two systems by resources and competition levels and shows the distribution of independent variables by several charter-domain organization types. A detailed discussion of these characteristics is needed to understand the effects of interactions among variables on organizational interaction patterns. The second section describes the relationships among the various independent variables and includes an examination of the relationships among the various resources and competition measures for different organization types. The third section examines importance in the systems, or power, and section four tests the specific hypotheses which relate to the independent variables.

Throughout, analysis is restricted by the nature of social services systems. As Table 4 illustrated, in local communities the group of social agencies form a highly differentiated system, and there are few cases of any particular type of agency. Yet, the combination of charter-domain characteristics, coupled with resource and competition factors seem highly important determinants of agency interaction patterns. As an

example, Young-Public-Treatment organizations occupy a different general position or niche in the overall system than do Old-Private-Distributive organizations. Their impetus for transactions differ and so does their ability to attract interaction partners. Further, competition varies by type. The general model predicts interaction results from an impetus to interact stemming from work-related needs and competition for resources, and further specifies ability (i.e. system valued resources) to attract trading partners is required. Therefore, the cluster of factors associated with various organization types needs to be examined, but the joint effects of the various charter-domain variables are difficult to examine because the number of cases is small. To manage under these limitations, the following approach is used: first, the systems are compared to each other using all the members; second, the relationship between either Mode of Work or Auspices and various other organizational characteristics is described; and finally, as possible and/or desirable, distributions of variables and interrelationships by two-variable organization types are provided (e.g. Auspices/Mode of Work, Age/Auspices, etc.). Two general themes link the various portions of this material: (1) the relationships among the various ability measures (resources) and agency type; and (2) variations in competition level by type of organization.

Comparison of the two systems

Chapter III detailed important differences in the two cities' social services systems. However, the distribution of types of agencies within the systems is roughly similar. When the relative network positions of the group of Counterpart organizations is considered, then there are high inter-city correlations for the system positions of these agencies for the various resource measures (Table 9). The major

positional differences for Counterpart agencies are in Competitiveness and Interaction levels. As noted, when the systems are compared, there are significant differences in degree of system integration (Table 9).

Table 12 gives the distributions of the independent variables in each system. Although the Counterpart organizations are similar, when all system members are considered, there are important differences between the cities. Agencies in System A are more diversified, but those in System B are more highly professionalized.¹ Although directors in each city report about the same perceptions of competition, Actual Competition is higher in System A than in System B. Network position measures (repeated from Table 11) are indicators of valued resources (see Chapter I), and it is clear resource transactions are greater in both number and variety in System A than in System B. Of particular interest is the greater variety of exchange transactions reported for System A (Scope of Importance measure).

Organizations in A are larger than in B even though the t-test score fails to indicate significant differences due to the extreme variances in size within the systems in each city. In fact, the high standard deviations for Size provide additional evidence of the highly differentiated nature of these two systems. Table 10 gave size differences. The median size in A is 25 employees, and in B the median is 17. In A 27 per cent of the agencies have 40 or more employees while in B this drops to nine per cent. More importantly, in B 72 per cent of the below-the-median agencies have fewer than ten employees as compared to

¹This is probably related to the large number of very small agencies in City B. This point is discussed further below.

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES, BY SYSTEM

Variables	System A (N=33)		System B (N=35)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	37.5	44.7	21.4	26.2	.943
Service Diversity	5.5	2.4	4.5	1.7	2.128**
Degree professional	.43	.17	.49	.16	1.463*
Competition					
Actual Competition	6.8	4.5	5.5	3.4	1.327*
Felt Competition	2.41	.91	2.45	.87	N.S. a
Network Position					
Overall Importance	38.9	32.5	29.0	22.4	1.449*
Scope of Importance	13.4	4.1	12.0	3.9	1.414*
Competitor	6.8	4.1	5.5	3.6	1.368*
Resource Supplier	32.1	29.7	23.5	20.8	1.349

*Significance level, one tailed test, p .10

**Significance level, one tailed test, p .05

^aN.S. is entered in this and subsequent tables when score is very low, not significant.

29 per cent for A.

Table 13 compares the very small organizations with the total group of agencies. The very small agencies in System B are less diverse than the system average while in System A they are more diverse. Professional Ratio also differs. A probable explanation is the variation in Mode of Work for the smallest organizations. In A three of the five are Distributive agencies but in B the proportion drops somewhat and 54 per cent are Distributive. As will be discussed later, a positive correlation exists between Size and Diversity, particularly for Treatment organizations. The nature of treatment work requires differently trained staff members if different services are offered. This factor is less true for Distributive agencies. One important difference between Systems is the number of very small organizations. As for larger agencies, the Mode of Work and general and specific resources are related to interaction patterns. The large number of very small agencies in System B probably is one explanation for system differences in interaction levels.

When the two cities are compared according to resource levels, System A has more specific resources than System B (Table 12). Further, the differences in competitive behaviors are important. Both Actual Competition (Actor-based score) and Competitor (Target-based score) are higher in System B. Not only are organizations more involved in resource exchanges in System A, but they are involved in competition with more organizations also. As noted in Chapter II, because one additional interaction question was asked in City B than in City A, if interaction levels were similar, then System B should show a higher mean score than System A. Quite the reverse is the case. The number of exchanges (indicated by number of nominations) and the range of interactions

TABLE 13

RESOURCE LEVELS OF VERY SMALL ORGANIZATIONS
 COMPARED WITH SYSTEM RESOURCE LEVELS, MEAN SCORES

	System A		System B	
	Very small	All	Very small	All
General resources				
Overall Importance	25.8	38.9	21.1	29.0
Scope of Importance	10.7	13.4	10.2	12.0
Specific resources				
Size	6.4	37.5	6.0	21.4
Service Diversity	6.3	5.5	3.9	4.5
Degree professional	.32	.43	.53	.49

(Scope of Importance) is higher for A. When the systems are compared without using any charter-domain variables the pattern which emerges is this -- System A has more resources, a higher degree of system integration, and generally is higher in competitive behaviors than is System B. Clearly, competition does not disrupt system integration.

As discussed earlier, the group of Counterpart organizations (N=21) are a major portion of system members and their characteristics are important in understanding these systems. There are inter-city similarities in Counterpart positions within the system (except for Actual Competition), but interactions levels are lower in System B than in System A (Table 14). There are two major differences: (1) Public-Counterpart organizations are more diverse than the average for the system as a whole in A (Table 14), but in B the Counterpart organizations are similar in number of services offered and do not stand out when the whole system is considered (Tables 12 and 14); (2) although the general level of competitive behavior is higher in System A, the much higher level for the Public-Counterpart agencies is very important.² In B this same group of organizations has a score lower than the system average. In contrast to City A, in City B the type of Counterpart organization reporting more competitive behaviors is the Private-Counterpart. One additional point, the Private-Counterpart agencies in City B are remarkably less involved in a variety of transactions than those in City A, as shown by their low Scope of Importance score. This probably means they are much less needed by other organizations than their equivalents in System A. The different composition of services offered in City B is one explanation. Perhaps

²This group dominates the system in both communities. This is discussed in a subsequent section which describes the High Importance organizations.

TABLE 14

COMPARISON OF COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS, MEAN SCORES

System A	All Counter- parts (N=21)	Public- Counter- parts (N=7)	Private- Counter- parts (N=14)
Variables			
Organizational character- istics			
Size	36.6	65.4	22.1
Service Diversity	5.6	7.0	4.9
Degree professional	.44	.42	.45
Actual Competition	7.4	7.9	7.2
Network position			
Overall Importance	44.9	70.7	32.0
Scope of Importance	14.6	16.1	13.9
System B			
Variables			
Organizational character- istics			
Size	29.2	50.4	18.6
Service Diversity	4.4	4.6	4.4
Degree professional	.47	.43	.49
Actual Competition	5.2	4.8	6.0
Network position			
Overall Importance	30.1	45.3	22.6
Scope of Importance	11.5	14.9	9.9

the services they provide are not needed by the non-counterpart agencies in B but are needed in A, or the agencies may be inaccessible to others for some reason, e.g. staff attitudes, waiting lists, etc.

System comparisons by type of work

In general, the two systems are roughly similar in the proportion of members involved in the two major types of work, Treatment and Distributive, but when resources and competition levels are considered, there are differences by Mode of Work and differences between cities in resource distribution patterns. And, these are related to variations in agency interaction behaviors which will be shown later in Chapter V. Tables 15, 16, and 17 summarize this material.

Turning first to a description of differences in specific resources by Mode of Work, there are interesting variations in the two systems. In both systems, a group of Public-Distributive agencies (six in A, five in B) provide basic services to local residents (e.g., welfare, unemployment assistance, social insurance, and health care). These agencies are well established and very large. Because of this, Distributive agencies as a group should be larger than Treatment agencies in each city. Instead, while this is true for City B, in City A there is less of a size differential between the two types of work. There are some large Treatment agencies in City A but not in City B. Since Treatment agencies are expected to have more interactions with other agencies because of more complex client needs (tested later) and because Size affects both importance to other system members or Position and outgoing interactions, these differences need to be kept in mind.³

³In fact, in System A Treatment agencies have slightly fewer interactions than do Distributive organizations and in System B they have more. I think this is because of the different effects of Service Diversity and Size by Mode of Work which is described and discussed in Chapter V.

TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONS BY MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM A

Variables	Treatment Organizations (N=14)		Distributive Organizations (N=19)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	41.16	53.10	32.64	28.84	N.S.
Service Diversity	5.58	2.80	5.43	1.59	N.S.
Degree professional Competition	.35	.16	.54	.11	3.958***
Actual ties	6.21	4.84	7.57	3.83	1.186
Felt Competition	2.20	.94	2.69	.79	1.613*
Network Position					
Overall Importance	36.05	38.96	42.71	19.90	N.S.
Competitor	6.00	4.08	7.93	3.88	1.310*
Resource Supplier	30.05	35.97	34.79	17.60	N.S.
Scope of Importance	12.21	4.75	15.07	2.25	2.265**

*p .10

**p .05

***p ,01

TABLE 16

COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONS BY MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM B

Variables	Treatment Organizations (N=15)		Distributive Organizations (N=20)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	15.60	8.16	25.80	33.29	1.285
Service Diversity	3.87	1.26	4.90	1.84	1.852**
Degree professional Competition	.58	.12	.42	.15	3.556***
Actual ties	6.73	3.87	4.55	2.66	1.736**
Felt Competition	2.70	.76	2.26	.90	1.549*
Network Position					
Overall Importance	30.73	18.44	27.75	24.82	N.S.
Competitor	5.73	3.40	5.40	3.69	N.S.
Resource Supplier	25.00	16.08	22.35	23.72	N.S.
Scope of Importance	13.53	3.42	10.80	3.87	2.109**

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 17

INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR TREATMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Variables	System A (N=14)		System B (N=15)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	41.16	53.10	15.60	8.16	1.718**
Service Diversity	5.58	2.80	3.87	1.26	2.024**
Degree professional Competition	.35	.16	.58	.12	4.259***
Actual ties	6.21	4.84	6.73	3.87	N.S.
Felt Competition	2.20	.94	2.70	.76	1.515*
Network Position					
Overall Importance	36.05	38.96	30.73	18.44	N.S.
Competitor	6.00	4.08	5.73	3.40	N.S.
Resource Supplier	30.05	35.97	25.00	16.08	N.S.
Scope of Importance	12.21	4.75	13.53	3.42	N.S.

TABLE 17-- Continued

INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR DISTRIBUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Variables	System A (N=19)		System B (N=20)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	32.64	28.84	25.80	33.29	N.S.
Service Diversity	5.43	1.59	4.90	1.84	.909
Degree professional Competition	.54	.11	.42	.15	2.727***
Actual ties	7.57	3.83	4.55	2.66	2.797***
Felt Competition	2.69	.79	2.26	.90	1.552*
Network Position					
Overall Importance	42.71	19.90	27.75	24.82	2.027**
Competition	7.93	3.88	5.40	3.69	2.000**
Resource Supplier	34.79	17.60	22.35	23.72	1.813**
Scope of Importance	15.07	2.25	10.80	3.87	4.135***

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

Another specific resource, professionalized staff, again has an unexpected distribution, but this may be due to differences in agency size (noted in Chapter II). In System A, unlike what would be expected from the nature of the work, Treatment organizations have a smaller proportion of staff with professional standing than do Distributive agencies, while in System B the pattern is as expected and the Professional Ratio is higher for Treatment agencies than for Distributive ones.

In Table 17 inter-city differences by Mode of Work for professional staff resources are tested, and the differences are large for each type of organization. Treatment agencies in System B are more professional but also much smaller. When the Distributive organizations are compared, then System A has a higher Professional Ratio, although the differences in Size are not significant. One conclusion drawn from these data is that Distributive organizations in System A do have more professional staff capacity than in System B and hence more ability to commit the agency to cooperative exchanges.⁴ For Treatment organizations the data are more difficult to understand. It is hard to know how much of the high Professional Ratio is due to Size and how much to real staffing differences. Treatment agencies in City B probably have staff-related resources which tend to cancel each other out. There are more professionals per agency per number of employees, but the agencies are much smaller. If professionals do play both direct-service and boundary-spanning roles for organizations, then a high professional component handicapped by small size is not as useful for developing extensive interactions as it is for organizations with more employees to assume interaction roles.

⁴Data presented in Chapter V show this is the case.

To further complicate things, the third specific resource, Service Diversity, also varies by Mode of Work in the two systems. Given some stimulus (e.g., resources, service popularity, and client demand), Distributive organizations can more easily diversify than can Treatment agencies because of the relative ease with which a Distributive organization can provide different programs or the same programs to a varying client population (both aspects of Service Diversity). Of course this is not true for programs that distribute money), but most Distributive agencies do not perform this function because that is limited to only a few very large major public organizations, (e.g. Social Security, Department of Welfare). Treatment services are more complex. Providing different services or similar services to varying clients requires specially trained staff and, because of the nature of the work, agency personnel costs will be higher for Treatment services.

In City B, Distributive agencies are more diverse than Treatment ones. In System A the two different types of agencies are similar in diversity. Further it is clear that the entire system is generally less diverse in City B (Tables 3, 10, and 12) and the least diverse group of all is the System B Treatment type. Note these are primarily small organizations, and they are significantly smaller in B than in A. Because of the interaction between type of work and Service Diversity which is described in the next section, the differences by system are important and may be one factor which helps explain the system-level differences in interactions patterns.

Both Overall Importance and Scope of Importance are measures of valued resources. Because of the mix of programs and services offered by these two types of organizations, the type of work is not an

indicator of its importance to others, or of system position. Some Distributive organizations provide very needed services including health assistance, emergency services, financial aid, day care, etc., while others provide what might be considered fringe services such as group and leisure time activities and recreational facilities. Clients of Treatment organizations may require a variety of additional services and the clinical model under which such agencies work implies tailoring services to particular combinations of needs. If Treatment organizations do not provide the required services themselves, they may then refer clients to specialized agencies. Further, depending upon the services provided and characteristics of their client population, Distributive agencies may also be involved in referrals to both Distributive and Treatment organizations.

Rather than stemming from work type, system position (Overall Importance) is tied to the value to other organizations of the resources the organization has -- to the primacy of its services, the variety of services, and capacities. Mode of Work is not an indicator of system position; instead a combination of independent variables including specific resources and type of work, coupled with system requirements, are determinants of network position and agency power in the system. This is described further in the next section.

To survey the characteristics of different types of organizations, Table 15, 16, and 17 show that when types of organizations are compared within cities, A's Distributive organizations generally have more valued resources. They receive interactions for a greater variety of items than do Treatment agencies, and their Overall Importance scores are higher but, because of the variance within the category, the difference does not reach

minimum significance levels. B's Treatment organizations are generally more valued by system members than are Distributive ones. They have higher Scope scores and are somewhat higher in Overall Importance. Table 17 compares the two systems and shows the greater difference between systems for Distributive organizations. The much higher Scope score for System A is especially noteworthy. All of this material provides additional evidence that the combination of services offered in the system is an important aspect of the exchange relationships which develop. The Network Position measures are indicators of ability to interact, located outside the organization in the community and the network of social service organizations but also related to internal characteristics and resources of the organizations.

Both measures of competition also follow this same general pattern. In System A, Distributive agencies name more organizations as involved with them in competitive relationships and their directors report a higher feeling of competition. For System B, Treatment agencies are higher in both measures than Distributive organizations. From Table 17 one sees that directors of organizations of the same broad type do not perceive their organizations as experiencing the same levels of competition.⁵ For Directors of Treatment organizations those in City B report a higher level of Felt Competition and, in the case of Distributive agencies, those in City A are higher. This is further indication of differences within the networks in the two cities.

Tables 15, 16, and 17 show a fairly consistent pattern within the systems of the distribution of variables by types of organizations.

⁵The differences for Counterpart organizations shown in Table 9 mean directors of very similar organizations report dissimilar perceptions.

Of interest, though, are the differences by type of work between these two cities. Unlike City B, in City A Distributive agencies are more valued by system members than are Treatment agencies for both general resources measures (Importance and Scope). They are also higher in competition levels and, with their higher professionalization, have greater staffing capacity. For other specific resource measures there is no difference by type in System A. In System B the type valued is Treatment organizations, a group that has a much higher Scope of Importance score although only slightly higher Overall Importance score. Again, the valued type is higher in competition and staffing capacity but, unlike System A, the valued organizations are not larger or more diverse.

When inter-city comparisons by type of work are made, Treatment organizations are larger and more diverse in System A than System B, but are lower in Degree professionalized and Felt Competition. Interestingly, although Treatment agencies are smaller in City B than City A they are involved in somewhat more diverse interaction relationships (see Scope scores) and the number of nominations received is not smaller although Service Diversity is less. One explanation may be the greater professional staffing capacity which seems to reflect a real difference even when the effects on this measure of very small size are considered. Looking at Distributive organizations across city-type, City A Distributive agencies consistently have greater resources than do City B's. They are somewhat larger and more diverse, have much higher level of professionalization, and more general resources. Unlike Treatment organizations, in City A Distributive organizations report higher Felt Competition and more competitive ties.

One interpretation of this material is that it indicates differences in the requirements of the entire network of organizations coupled with resource allocations which differ in the systems by type of work of the organization.

Comparisons by Auspices and Age

The relationships of sponsorship and age with the general work climate of social service agencies and variations in the nature of competition for organizations which have different types of sponsorship is important because these factors affect interactions among system members. This section is a comparison of the two systems in terms of resource and competition levels associated with sponsorship and age differences.

Beginning with the relationship between Auspices and importance to system members, Table 18 compares High and Low Importance agencies in each city. Sixty per cent of the High Importance organizations have Public sponsorship, and the Low Importance agencies are primarily Private. Further, Public-Treatment agencies make up over 40 per cent of the High Importance group, and almost 50 per cent of the Low Importance group are Private-Distributive agencies.

More information is in Tables 19 and 20. In both systems the Public organizations, regardless of type of work or age, are much higher in Overall Importance and Scope scores, measures of general resources. The differences in Resource Supplier scores shows a much greater number of system linkages are toward Public organizations rather than to Private organizations. Public agencies are not significantly higher than Private agencies in Competitor scores but they do dominate the systems as sources of many resources.

TABLE 18

GENERAL RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION TYPES

	System A	System B
High Overall Importance		
Public	%	%
Young, Distributive	--	--
Young, Treatment	31	22
Old, Distributive	19	17
Old, Treatment	12	17
Private		
Young, Distributive	12	22
Young, Treatment	--	--
Old, Distributive	6	11
Old, Treatment	<u>19</u>	<u>11</u>
	99%	100%
Total	(16)	(18)
Low Overall Importance		
Public		
Young, Distributive	6	--
Young, Treatment	6	12
Old, Distributive	12	12
Old, Treatment	--	6
Private		
Young, Distributive	12	6
Young, Treatment	12	6
Old, Distributive	47	47
Old, Treatment	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>
	101%	101%
Total	(17)	(17)

TABLE 19

COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, SYSTEM A

Variables	Public Organizations (N=14)		Private Organizations (N=19)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	61.64	56.29	19.79	19.65	2.933***
Service Diversity	6.50	2.74	4.79	1.70	2.000**
Degree professional Competition	.44	.13	.42	.19	N.S.
Actual ties	7.36	4.22	6.37	4.64	.625
Felt Competition	2.10	.76	2.64	.95	1.800**
Network Position					
Overall Importance	54.50	40.85	27.37	16.93	2.258**
Competitor	7.71	4.71	6.16	3.45	.974
Resource Supplier	46.50	37.92	21.42	14.33	2.272**
Scope of Importance	15.07	2.66	12.21	4.60	2.197**

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 20

COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, SYSTEM B

Variables	Public Organizations (N=15)		Private Organizations (N=20)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	31.80	35.82	13.65	9.98	1.850**
Service Diversity	4.27	1.77	4.60	1.62	N.S.
Degree professional Competition	.54	.11	.48	.17	1.818**
Actual ties	6.20	4.10	4.95	2.66	.960
Felt Competition	2.32	.87	2.55	.86	.767
Network Position					
Overall Importance	36.80	26.60	23.20	16.29	1.700**
Competitor	5.67	3.30	5.45	3.76	N.S.
Resource Supplier	31.13	24.93	17.75	14.72	1.787**
Scope of Importance	13.60	3.59	10.75	3.71	1.697**

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

In both systems Public agencies are larger than Private agencies, and in System A Public agencies are also more diverse, but there is no difference by sponsorship in staffing patterns. In System B Public organizations have more professionalized staffs but are not more diverse. These data confirm earlier statements that Public agencies as a group have more resources than Private agencies even when variations in work and age factors are considered.

In both systems Public organizations report more competitive ties with other organizations and, as expected, directors of Private agencies report higher levels of Felt Competition than do directors of Public agencies, although this difference is less in System B. This is probably because competition is much more localized and specific for Private agencies than Public.

The comparison of organizations with the same sponsorship across systems, shown in Table 21, indicates again the highly differentiated nature of the social services systems in these communities. Public agencies in both communities vary widely in Size and the various Network Position measures. In System B, Public organizations have more professional staff resources, but in System A they have higher Service Diversity scores, and this is tied to differences in Mode of Work described earlier. Public organizations are very similar in competition measures in the two systems.

Private agencies seem to occupy similar system niches in the two cities and to possess very similar resources and competition levels. Reflecting the generally higher rate of exchange in System A, Private agencies have slightly higher Resource Supplier and Scope of Importance scores.

TABLE 21
INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Variables	System A (N=14)		System B (N=15)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	61.64	56.29	31.80	35.82	1.242
Service Diversity	6.50	2.74	4.27	1.77	2.472**
Degree professional	.44	.13	.54	.11	2.128**
Competition					
Actual ties	7.36	4.22	6.20	4.10	.984
Felt Competition	2.10	.76	2.32	.87	.815
Network Position					
Overall Importance	54.50	40.85	36.80	26.60	1.298
Competitor	7.71	4.71	5.67	3.30	1.266
Resource Supplier	46.50	37.92	31.13	24.93	1.238
Scope of Importance	15.07	2.66	13.60	3.59	1.230

TABLE 21 - Continued

INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

Variables	System A (N=19)		System B (N=20)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	19.79	19.65	13.65	9.98	1.197
Service Diversity	4.79	1.70	4.60	1.62	N.S.
Degree professional Competition	.42	.19	.48	.17	.938
Actual ties	6.37	4.64	4.95	2.66	1.136
Felt Competition	2.64	.95	2.55	.86	N.S.
Network Position					
Overall Importance	27.37	16.93	23.20	16.29	.769
Competitor	6.16	3.45	5.45	3.76	N.S.
Resource Supplier	21.42	14.33	17.75	14.72	.755
Scope of Importance	12.21	4.60	10.75	3.71	1.066

**p .05

To summarize, within the two systems Public agencies are generally more important to system members than Private agencies. This lends support to the earlier discussion about the impact of sponsorship upon social service agencies. Further, although the systems differ markedly when Mode of Work types are considered, there are few differences in system positions and resource allocations which are directly tied only or consistently to Auspices. Yet, because Auspices is associated with resources (and resources with ability to interact) it is an important consideration and is expected to affect interaction patterns.

Age is another important factor for social service agencies because of service shifts begun in the mid-1960's period. Table 22 gives information about resources and competition by Age. If agencies do suffer the liability of newness described by Stinchcombe, then one expects lower levels of resources for younger agencies regardless of other considerations. In System A, when only Age is considered, Young organizations are not particularly different from Old agencies in resource levels. Although older agencies have a larger average size than younger agencies, for both groups there are wide differences. Older agencies are somewhat more diverse which is as expected. There is little difference in generally valued resources by Age.

In contrast, in System B Age is connected to resources; older agencies are larger and somewhat more diverse. In addition, older agencies have much higher Overall Importance scores than do younger ones, but Young organizations are involved in a greater variety of interactions, unlike the situation in System A.

TABLE 22

RESOURCE AND COMPETITION LEVELS, BY AGE

System A Variables	Young Organizations (N=13)		Old Organizations (N=20)		T-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	29.5	31.5	43.7	51.9	.947
Service Diversity	4.9	2.2	4.9	2.3	1.220
Degree professional Competition	.42	.14	.44	.19	N.S.
Actual ties	4.5	4.2	8.6	3.8	2.733***
Felt Competition	2.77	2.0	2.55	.93	N.S.
Network Position					
Overall Importance	37.0	23.9	41.0	37.5	N.S.
Scope of Importance	13.5	4.9	13.5	3.6	N.S.
System B (N=12) (N=23)					
Organizational characteristics					
Size	11.7	6.6	26.5	30.8	2.144**
Service Diversity	4.0	1.7	4.7	1.7	1.129
Degree professional Competition	.51	.17	.48	.15	N.S.
Actual ties	4.7	4.7	4.9	2.3	N.S.
Felt Competition	2.94	.84	2.19	.77	2.885***
Network Position					
Overall Importance	31.2	19.6	64.9	85.6	1.755**
Scope of Importance	13.1	4.0	11.4	3.8	1.172

**p .05

***p .01

When competition is reviewed, Young agencies in System A are less involved in competitive exchanges than Old agencies but this is not the case in System B. In A there is virtually no difference in level of Felt Competition by Age, but in B, Directors of younger organizations report a much higher level of Felt Competition.

In summary, when Auspices and Age are considered separately, it appears that, in general, Public agencies are more important to the system as a whole and that Auspices is a clue to resources. When the Age factor is considered, about half of the Young organizations in both systems are Public. Although younger and older agencies have differences to a significant extent, these seem to be due to both Auspices and Age.

Interaction of charter-domain factors

To handle the interactions between the charter and domain variables within the limits imposed by the small number of cases in each system, several tables are presented which give mean scores (Tables 23 and 24). Although there may be wide variances within organization types due to the differentiated nature of these systems, the means are given to indicate general patterns in these data and several correlation-based tables included later give additional information.

As Table 23 shows, when Age is held constant, the influence of Auspices on resource levels and competition is clearer. In both systems, Public agencies are consistently higher than Private agencies in level of system valued or general resources (i.e., Overall Importance and Scope of Importance). Further, in System A Old-Public agencies have generally higher resource levels than the other three types. They are larger, more diverse, and higher in Overall Importance. The Old-Private agencies are larger, more diverse, and more

TABLE 23

RESOURCES AND COMPETITION, BY AGE AND AUSPICES, MEAN SCORES

	Young agencies		Old agencies	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
System A	(N=7)	(N=6)	(N=7)	(N=13)
General resources				
Overall Importance	43.6	29.8	65.3	26.2
Scope of Importance	14.8	11.8	15.3	12.4
Specific resources				
Size	32.1	9.7	76.9	24.0
Service Diversity	5.7	4.0	7.3	5.2
Degree professional	.45	.36	.44	.43
Competition				
Actual ties	6.7	2.0	8.0	8.0
Felt Competition	2.33	1.81	1.16	3.15
System B	(N=6)	(N=6)	(N=9)	(N=14)
General resources				
Overall Importance	34.0	29.2	38.7	20.6
Scope of Importance	14.8	11.3	12.8	10.5
Specific resources				
Size	14.5	8.8	43.0	15.7
Service Diversity	3.0	5.2	5.1	4.4
Degree professional	.59	.43	.45	.50
Competition				
Actual ties	9.2	4.2	4.2	5.3
Felt Competition	2.80	3.20	1.86	2.39

professionalized than the Young-Private agencies and, although Young-Private agencies in System A are somewhat more important to other system members than in System B, there is no real difference for Scope scores. Looking at System B, regardless of Age, Public agencies are larger than Private agencies, and have more generally valued resources as well, but Young-Private agencies are higher in professional staff than Old-Public organizations.

When comparing organizations of similar sponsorship but different ages, in both cities the older Public organizations are larger, more diverse, and higher in Overall Importance than younger Public agencies. The pattern for Private agencies is less consistent. Although in both cities older Private agencies are larger, the older Private agencies do not seem to have more resources than the younger Private group. This is probably due to the nature of the mix of services older agencies provide. For the most part, Old-Public agencies are the basic service suppliers while Old-Private agencies are traditional agencies such as Scouts, Y's, American Red Cross, etc. with a heavily middle class clientele. Young-Public agencies are more specialized in services and directed toward innovative programs meeting complex needs, while the Young-Private agencies serve minority group members and have specialized clientele, but do not offer specialized services.

Such differences in agency function are related to differences in the two competition measures (Table 23). Looking first at System A, the marked difference in Actual Competition scores for Young-Public and Young-Private organizations is noteworthy. Both types of older agencies have very high levels of Actual Competition. The responses of agency directors in System A are interesting, also. Two groups of

directors (Young-Private and Old-Public) feel their agencies experience low competition although they report a high level of existing competitive interactions. Old-Public organizations are relatively free from perceived competitive pressures indicating the high stability of their environments described in Chapter I. Young-Public agencies are less secure and constantly threatened by new legislation or budget cut-backs at the Federal level. The Old-Private agencies are members of the local United Way organization and have shared a common pool of money for many years. This is clearly related to the high Felt Competition levels these directors report, and shown in System B as well. In City A, Young-Private agencies are organizations which serve minority people (N=2), and children needing unique service (N=2), or provide education and information about specialized problems (N=2). When system members and functions are analyzed,⁶ it is clear the Young-Private agencies in City A do not have competitors offering the same services and have very secure domains.

In City B, the agencies reporting the largest number of competitive ties are Young-Public organizations and, interestingly, this group has the highest scores of the four groups in the two systems. This may be because more Component agencies are included in City B than City A (see Chapter II). Members of the younger Public group are the most vulnerable to shifts in public funding. Differences in competition scores seem related to the different collection of functions served by the two types of Young organizations in each city. Although in System A

⁶ Respondent organizations were guaranteed confidentiality and promised that reports would not identify individuals, groups, or organizations. Thus, identifying details are not included.

the Young-Private agencies seem to have secure domains, in System B these organizations primarily serve disadvantaged groups, e.g., minority people (N=1), the poor (N=3), the old (N=1); only one of six cases serves children needing unique service, a marked contrast to City A. In City B, all the Young-Public group members are Treatment agencies serving multiple problem clients needing relatively complex and intensive care (e.g., substance abuse problems, crisis intervention, and mental illness). The Young-Public group is similar in City A but additionally includes Distributive organizations working with disadvantaged clients.

The weight of the information presented about Age and Auspices shows the highly differentiated nature of these systems but generally supports the notion that both Age and Auspices are important indicators of ability to attract interactions. In each system the agencies with highest resources have Public sponsorship, not Private. Young agencies may be limited by lack of resources but they also are heavily influenced to seek interactions by their type of work.

Table 24 presents information by Age and Mode of Work. Again, there is a mixed picture, and the data generally echo the findings presented earlier for Mode of Work alone. Young and Old Treatment agencies are not very different from each other in City A except the older agencies have much higher professionalization scores, and the younger Treatment agencies are involved in a greater variety of interactions. For both types of Treatment agencies, there are high competitive interaction scores. Differences are more apparent when Distributive agencies are compared. Old-Distributive agencies are much larger (because they are Public), more diverse, and generally more important to other system members than Young-Distributive agencies. The older Distributive

TABLE 24

RESOURCES AND COMPETITION BY AGE AND MODE OF WORK, MEAN SCORES

	Young agencies		Old agencies	
	Treatment	Distributive	Treatment	Distributive
City A	(N=8)	(N=5)	(N=6)	(N=14)
General resources				
Overall Importance	43.4	27.4	41.7	39.0
Scope of Importance	15.6	10.0	14.3	13.0
Specific resources				
Size	40.6	11.6	35.2	51.4
Service Diversity	5.6	3.8	5.3	6.2
Degree professional	.49	.31	.61	.36
Competition				
Actual ties	7.3	2.0	9.5	5.6
Felt Competition	2.54	1.38	2.61	2.40
City B	(N=7)	(N=5)	(N=8)	(N=15)
General resources				
Overall Importance	30.3	32.4	29.2	25.5
Scope of Importance	14.0	11.8	12.9	10.5
Specific resources				
Size	14.0	17.6	18.0	31.3
Service Diversity	3.0	5.6	4.8	4.3
Degree professional	.60	.39	.58	.39
Competition				
Actual ties	4.6	4.4	5.4	8.3
Felt Competition	2.90	2.68	2.27	2.14

agencies report higher competitive interactions than Young-Distributive but scores are lower than for Treatment agencies. Young-Distributive agency directors have very low Felt Competition scores.

In City B, Treatment agencies do not vary much by Age, although Old-Treatment agencies are more diverse and Young-Treatment agencies involved in more types of interactions. As compared to Old-Distributive agencies, Young-Distributive organizations are smaller, more diverse, and high in Scope and Overall Importance scores. Young-Distributive agencies are markedly lower in Actual Competition than are Old-Distributive ones, although slightly higher in Felt Competition. Unlike System B Young-Distributive organizations, in System A these directors report high Felt Competition scores.

A final series of two variable charter-domain tables gives the differences by Auspices and Mode of Work as these seem from the preceding data to be the critical variables. Tables 25 and 26 show resource levels for these four categories, including t-test figures. It is useful to imagine there is some 'normal' amount of interaction based on work of the agency, not stimulated by resources or by competition-based pressures. When resources (i.e. ability) are added to this 'normal' interaction level, then the measured interaction level should increase, and Tables 25 and 26 test this idea using Target interactions. In System A the pattern is clearly as expected for Treatment agencies (Table 25). Public-Treatment organizations have significantly more specific resources than do Private-Treatment agencies, they are involved in more interactions as Resource Suppliers, and the range of interactions is broader. For System A Distributive agencies the pattern is similar but not quite as vivid. Public-Distributive agencies are larger and

TABLE 25

DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES BY AUSPICES
AND MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM A

Variables	Public- Treatment (N=8)		Private- Treatment (N=6)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	45.0	34.9	16.2	7.3	2.118**
Service Diversity	6.2	1.2	4.3	1.6	2.259**
Degree professional	.50	.14	.59	.07	1.406*
Competition					
Actual ties	7.9	4.3	7.2	3.8	N.S.
Felt Competition	2.23	.74	3.01	.64	1.950**
Network position					
Overall Importance	50.1	23.2	32.7	12.5	1.675*
Competitor	8.8	4.8	6.8	2.7	.909
Resource Supplier	41.4	20.7	26.0	10.2	1.702*
Scope of Importance	16.0	2.0	13.8	2.3	1.719*
Variables	Public- Distributive (N=6)		Private- Distributive (N=13)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Organizational characteristics					
Size	83.8	78.3	21.0	24.2	1.769**
Service Diversity	6.8	4.4	5.0	1.8	.882
Degree professional	.36	.09	.34	.19	N.S.
Competition					
Actual ties	6.7	4.8	6.0	5.2	N.S.
Felt Competition	1.63	.70	2.36	.98	2.154**
Network position					
Overall Importance	60.2	62.2	24.9	19.2	1.247
Competitor	6.5	5.1	5.5	4.0	N.S.
Resource Supplier	53.3	57.6	19.3	16.3	1.298
Scope of Importance	13.8	3.4	11.5	5.4	1.065

*p .10

**p .05

TABLE 26

DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES BY AUSPICES
AND MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM B

	Public- Treatment (N=10)		Private- Treatment (N=5)		
Variables	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	t-test
Organizational characteristics					
Size	16.3	7.2	14.2	11.0	N.S.
Service Diversity	3.8	2.3	4.0	1.4	N.S.
Degree professional	.55	.34	.64	.03	N.S.
Competition					
Actual ties	7.5	3.2	5.2	2.4	.846
Felt Competition	2.57	1.98	2.57	.57	N.S.
Network position					
Overall Importance	31.0	17.3	27.2	20.4	N.S.
Competitor	6.4	3.6	4.4	3.2	.980
Resource Supplier	25.8	16.3	23.4	18.6	N.S.
Scope of Importance	14.3	2.8	11.6	3.8	1.286
	Public- Distributive (N=5)		Private- Distributive (N=15)		
Variables	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	t-test
Organizational characteristics					
Size	62.8	53.8	13.5	10.2	1.826**
Service Diversity	5.2	2.5	4.9	1.7	N.S.
Degree professional	.41	.12	.42	.16	N.S.
Competition					
Actual ties	3.6	2.1	4.9	3.6	.909
Felt Competition	1.57	.57	2.40	.94	2.051**
Network position					
Overall Importance	46.0	40.9	21.8	15.8	1.158
Competitor	7.8	12.1	5.8	4.1	N.S.
Resource Supplier	41.8	38.7	15.7	14.0	1.325
Scope of Importance	12.2	5.2	10.3	4.5	.706

**p .05

somewhat more diverse; interaction levels as Target organizations are higher but with high variances.⁷

Table 26 gives this same information for City B, but the material is not as straightforward. For Treatment agencies Auspices is largely unrelated to resources or interactions, although somewhat important for Scope. For Distributive agencies sponsorship is a factor, and as in System A, Public-Distributive agencies are larger and higher in Overall Importance and Resource Exchanges, but again there are large variances within type.

In System A Private-Treatment and Private-Distributive organizations have significantly higher Felt Competition scores than those agencies with Public sponsorship. In System B Private-Distributive agencies also follow this predicted pattern but there is no difference for Private-Treatment and Public-Treatment organizations.

Taken as a whole, these data show important differences in organizational positions in each system according to variations in type of work, sponsorship, and organizational age. Further, the systems are different in important respects. The cluster of agencies and services is associated with different positions and characteristics for similar charter-domain types of agencies. Considering the weight of the evidence, clearly system-level differences affect how resources are allocated. One cannot conclude that organizations that appear similar in charter-domain characteristics, and even have similar specific resources, will have the same ability to attract interaction partners or the same level of competition.

⁷ Clearly, there are types within these types, e.g., Small, or Young, etc. which affect these scores and the high standard deviations.

Relationships among the independent variables - resources

Information presented in the preceeding section indicates that the interactions among charter-domain characteristics and other independent variables are related to system differences as well as to organization characteristics. The interrelations among the resource indicators and various organization types affects both need for resources of other agencies and ability to interact with fellow system members. This section describes these interrelationships using three correlation matrices. To help gauge the meaning of the correlations the p .10 level of significance for r with a sample is used as an indication of significant relationship even though the research subjects form the population of such organizations in each city. The small number of cases precludes examining interrelationships among variables for Auspices/Mode types although that would be the most useful. Accordingly, in the material which follows information is given first for all the organizations, and for the two Mode of Work types second. Based on the previous section, Auspices is considered a general indicator of system status and resources. Throughout this section the focus is on the relationships of charter-domain factors with both resources and competition and the association between resources and competition. Material which repeats findings of previous sections is not described again.

In both cities the two measures of general resources are strongly associated (Table 27). Yet, the differences in the correlations of these measures with other independent variables shows the measures are tapping into different aspects of importance to others or Position in the system. Apparently, if the number of different transactions in which an organization is involved with other agencies as Target is high, then the

TABLE 27

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, ALL ORGANIZATIONS

System A (N=33)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Size	6								
2. Degree professional	61***	-14							
3. Service Diversity	27	20	15						
4. Actual Competition	-14	44**	-20	32*					
5. Felt Competition	67***	11	48***	19	-22	62***			
6. Overall Importance	27	36**	34*	23	20	4	-1		
7. Scope of Importance	15	4	20	40**	20	41**	34*	-19	
8. Age	46***	7	36**	11	-29	10	34*	-31	26
9. Auspices	-9	55***	-3	15	27				
10. Mode of Work									

System B (N=35)

1. Size	-9								
2. Degree professional	18	-31*							
3. Service Diversity	-10	11	-3						
4. Actual Competition	-14	5	-4	32*					
5. Felt Competition	62***	1	31*	36**	-9	80***			
6. Overall Importance	32*	23	14	48***	9	-8	-20		
7. Scope of Importance	27	-10	19	-25	-41**	30*	36**	-10	
8. Age	34**	9	-10	18	-13	7	34**	-23	42***
9. Auspices	-19	50***	-30*	17	24				
10. Mode of Work									

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

number of different organizations which include it in their organization-sets is also high. For an organization to be high in Importance, it must be identified by fellow members in the system of agencies as being a supplier of a variety of resources. A variety of resources attracts a variety of interaction partners. This relationship holds when Treatment and Distributive organizations are considered separately (Tables 28 and 29).

Specific resources, e.g., size of staff and number of services offered, are associated with the general resource measures in both systems but the third specific resource, professional staff, is not associated with Overall Importance in either system and is related to Scope only in A. Table 28 shows the figures for Treatment agencies, and Table 29 for Distributive agencies. It is difficult to understand the relationship of professional staffing to Network Position and interaction patterns. In System A the relationships between professionalized staff and Overall Importance are negligible for both Treatment and Distributive agencies. For Treatment agencies the Scope-professionalized correlation is positive (.36); for Distributive agencies it is negative (-.29). Service Diversity is not connected with high Professional Ratio.

In City B professionalized staff has a negligible correlation with Overall Importance for Distributive agencies and a higher but negative relationship for Treatment agencies (-.33). The association with Scope is very weak. Although the correlations do not reach the $p .10$ level of significance, note that the relationships are in the opposite directions by agency type in the two cities. As in System A, in System B there is a low negative correlation between professional staff and Service Diversity for both types of organizations.

TABLE 28

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR TREATMENT ORGANIZATIONS

System A (N=14)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Size	12							
2. Degree professional	67***	-11						
3. Service Diversity	32	13						
4. Actual Competition	-21	28	5					
5. Felt Competition	81***	9	-15	52*	-26			
6. Overall Importance	41	36	43	32	26	60**		
7. Scope of Importance	33	14	38	34	52*	13	28	
8. Age	55**	7	30	52*	-29	42	23	15
9. Auspices				6				

System B (N=15)

1. Size	2							
2. Degree professional	31	-16						
3. Service Diversity	6	-16	-31					
4. Actual Competition	-27	36	-38	17	-38			
5. Felt Competition	38	-33	-17	54**	-32	88***		
6. Overall Importance	55**	-16	-17	51*	-43	-2	-13	
7. Scope of Importance	27	-9	75***	-37	-43	11	32	-38
8. Age	12	33	-7	28	-3			
9. Auspices								

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 29

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR DISTRIBUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

System A (N=19)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Size	20							
2. Degree professional	33	-28						
3. Service Diversity	20	17	49**					
4. Actual Competition	12	56**	-34	-18				
5. Felt Competition	8	1	27	-28	-26			
6. Overall Importance	-14	-29	5	-34	-34	77***		
7. Scope of Importance	-13	49**	-14	44*	2	-5	-28	
8. Age	49**	-37	60***	9	-53**	44*	48**	-42*
9. Auspices								
System B (N=20)								
1. Size	1							
2. Degree professional	12	-21						
3. Service Diversity	-8	4	36	37				
4. Actual Competition	-8	-33	-14	11				
5. Felt Competition	74***	12	54**	36	2			
6. Overall Importance	46**	19	47**	3	19	1.00***		
7. Scope of Importance	28	10	-22	3	-34	-10	-15	
8. Age	64***	-3	9	-21	-42	42*	21	
9. Auspices								33

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

There are further contrasts between the two systems in the relationships between Service Diversity and the general resources or Position measures. Table 28 shows System A Treatment agencies have strong positive correlations between Service Diversity and general resources (.55 and .43) but the relationship does not hold for System B Treatment organizations (-.17 and -.17). From Table 29, for System A Distributive agencies the Service Diversity-general resources association is very low (.27 and .05) but strong for System B Distributive agencies (.54 and .47).

From Table 26 it appears agencies which are large are also higher in Overall Importance in each city but the relationship with Scope is less strong. But, turning to Tables 27 and 28, the correlation between Overall Importance and Size is very strong for System A Treatment agencies (.81), low for System B Treatment agencies (.38), negligible for System A Distributive agencies (.08), and strong again for System B Distributive agencies (.74). Although the numbers vary for the two general resources measures, for three of the four categories Size is generally associated with high network Position. The notable exception is the System A Distributive group.

On the whole, Table 27 confirms earlier tables showing that in City A Public agencies are usually larger, more diverse, and generally more important for system members than are Private agencies. In City B, Public organizations are larger, as compared with Private agencies, and generally more important, but Service Diversity correlation is low (-.10).

Turning to Tables 28 and 29, in City A Public-Treatment agencies are larger than Private-Treatment, and there is a moderate positive relationship between Auspices and Overall Importance (.42). For

Distributive agencies, Public agencies are also larger, more diverse, and have a higher network position but they are lower in professional staffing than Private agencies ($-.37$). For City B's system, Public-Treatment agencies are not higher in specific or general resources than are Private-Treatment agencies. Public-Distributive agencies are larger and higher in Overall Importance than Private-Distributive, but the relationships for other specific resources are negligible.

Although information was given in Table 24 about the relationship between Age and Mode of Work, it is important to reexamine these relationships using the information from Tables 28 and 29 because the variance within types could not be considered in Table 24. Tables 28 and 29 show that Age is not associated with network Position for either type of agency; the correlations are all under $.29$ although in both positive and negative directions. For System A Distributive agencies Age has a low negative association with Size ($-.13$) and the reverse is the case in City B ($.28$). In System A Age is strongly associated with Professional Ratio but not in System B, and in both systems it has no relationship with Service Diversity for Distributive agencies. In the case of Treatment organizations, older agencies are somewhat more likely to be larger but the correlations are fairly low ($.33$ and $.27$). There is no difference by Age for Professional Ratio but there is an association for Service Diversity, and it is especially strong in City B ($.75$).

In general, Age is not consistently associated with resource levels when the different types of work are considered. Age is a factor for a few specific resources but since it is not connected to the generally valued resources (or network Position) for these general types

of work it is more important to consider Age in combination with particular agency functions. Hence, the relationship between Age and Auspices is probably important.

Competition and other variables

Findings from a variety of other fields, (e.g., social psychology, attitude change, public opinion polling, race relations, industrial psychology, etc.) show there is an unreliable relationship between attitudes and behavior and these data restate the familiar. In both systems the correlation between Actual Competition and Felt Competition is .32 but when type of work is held constant, the relationships are different. In System A, for Treatment agencies the correlations between the two competition measures is .52, but -.18 for Distributive agencies; for System B Treatment agencies the correlation is .17 and for Distributive agencies it is .37.

There is some reason to expect that organizations with secure domains will feel less pressured by general competition within the system. Thus, although the agencies may report a variety of competitive relationships with system members, the perceived competitive pressure may be low. There is no measure of domain security but Overall Importance seems to be, at least partially, an indicator of this, as is public sponsorship. There should be positive relationships for resources and Actual Competition. The model for this research requires longitudinal data to test the general hypothesis that success in getting resources requires developing extensive competitive transactions, but some evidence should be visible in these cross-sectional data. Note, this model does not assume staff members will voice perceptions of the competition under which they work.

Earlier tables gave competition scores by Auspices/Mode types and, at this point, only the relationship between competition and general and specific resources by type of work is described. Supporting the research model, for Treatment agencies the higher the Actual Competition level, the higher the general resources in both systems but the relationship is much stronger in System B than in System A. For Distributive agencies the pattern is not consistent, and System A Distributive agency data show a moderate negative relationship between Actual Competition and general resources ($-.28$ and $-.34$) while City B Distributive agency data show low positive or moderate positive correlations ($.11$ and $.36$).

When relationships between Actual Competition and specific resources are examined, an inconsistent pattern is found. In both cities, for Distributive organizations Actual Competition is associated with Service Diversity. For Treatment agencies there is little relationship between specific resources and Actual Competition, although there is a moderate negative relationship between Service Diversity and Actual Competition for City B Treatment agencies ($-.31$).

In terms of resources and perceived competition, for Treatment agencies four of the six correlations are low-moderate negative (for Size and Service Diversity), and correlations for Professional Ratio and Felt Competition are low-moderate positive. For Distributive agencies patterns are less consistent across city-type, and for A there is a strong positive correlation between Felt Competition and Professional Ratio while in B this is $-.33$. In both cities high Service Diversity is somewhat associated with low Felt Competition ($-.34$ and $-.14$).

Clearly, there are no consistent trends in these data relating competition to specific resources -- the pattern varies by type. These cross-sectional data do support the idea that having generally valued resources is related to competitive behaviors for most organizations. Those in the upper section of the community's organizational hierarchy are not sitting in isolation at the top of the pyramid. They are actively competing.

These data show that without information about the network, it is not possible to make sound estimates about which specific agencies will have higher competition levels or high Position in social service systems using organizational characteristics alone. Systems seem to vary, and it is difficult to identify which resources will be generally valued by the system itself. Size and Service Diversity seem to matter, but the agency's function (domain) seems equally important. Certain functions or services are needed by many system members, others are valued by fewer organizations seeking services to complement their own domains. For example, almost all agencies have at least some clients needing material assistance and will seek resources from the major public agencies. An adoption agency on the other hand, may receive few transactions and be low in system Position as its services are specialized and needed by relatively few people.

The services pool in communities has common basic features, but communities also have specific characteristics, and the hierarchy in the social service systems reflect differing local factors. Thus, ability (network Position) and competitive behavior reflect community differences as well as specific organizational characteristics.

The powerful organizations

An organization's ability to participate with other organizations in resource exchanges is severely restricted if it has low standing with other system members. Without resources required by others or bargaining power it is difficult to see how organizations can develop external relationships regardless of the stimuli of need and competition. Although exchanges are not, and need not be, directly reciprocal (e.g., A may send clients to B and get back information or honor) a rough sort of reciprocity over time is probably necessary. Thus, an important determinant of interaction patterns within systems is the types of organizations needed by the other members, stemming from the combination of services and agencies in the locale. To expand on this point, this section compares the characteristics of the High and Low Importance agencies in each system and gives information about system dominants, or those in the top 25 per cent in Overall Importance, and the system's fringe members, or those in the bottom 25 per cent.⁸

There are general similarities between the systems in the types of organizations most involved with others (Tables 6 and 18). In both systems Private-Distributive agencies are unimportant and Public-Treatment agencies are important. As Table 30 shows, in both systems the High Importance group is larger and more diverse than the Low Importance group, and in City B High Importance agencies have more competitive ties as well but this is not the case in City A. As expected, a characteristic of High Importance organizations is to be selected by others for a greater variety of exchanges.

⁸ Those agencies receiving above the median number of nominations for all interaction questions are High Importance.

TABLE 30
RESOURCES AND SYSTEM IMPORTANCE

	High Importance		Low Importance		
System A	(N=16)		(N=17)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	t-test
Scope of Importance	15.9	1.8	11.1	3.9	5.053***
Size	51.2	59.0	24.4	21.2	1.654*
Degree professional	.37	.19	.49	.14	1.091
Service Diversity	6.3	2.4	4.8	2.2	1.829**
Actual Competition	6.9	3.9	6.6	4.1	N.S.
Felt Competition	2.27	.89	2.36	.86	N.S.
System B	(N=18)		(N=17)		
Scope of Importance	14.7	2.6	8.8	2.6	6.629***
Size	28.7	34.1	16.5	4.4	1.470*
Degree professional	.50	.12	.48	.28	N.S.
Service Diversity	5.1	1.7	3.8	1.5	2.321**
Actual Competition	10.4	3.8	4.6	2.9	4.957***
Felt Competition	2.18	1.15	2.40	.97	N.S.

*p .10
**p .05
***p .01

In social service systems, both Treatment and Distributive agencies have valued resources and provide services required by other organizations. Table 31 shows the relationship between resources and system importance for the two different Modes of Work. The High Importance Distributive organizations in each system have more specific resources than the Low Importance Distributive agencies. But System A Treatment agencies in the Low Importance group are only slightly smaller than those in the High Importance Treatment group, somewhat lower in professional staff resources, and slightly more diverse. In System B they are quite a lot smaller but otherwise do not have fewer resources than High Importance Treatment agencies. In addition, in B both types of High Importance agencies are also higher in Actual Competition but this is not the case in A. These data indicate the relevance of the types of services provided to system Position. If systems vary in emphasis and mix of service (and these do), then the services associated with system-level needs will be the valued ones, and organizations with such services in their domain will be important to other system members.

In both systems, four large Public-Counterpart and two Private-Counterpart agencies are dominants. One large Public-Counterpart agency is in the top group in B and the lowest half in A. The powerful organizations are primarily large; in both cities only about one-third are small. In each city there are two small powerful agencies, and they have similar functions in each city.

As expected, both Distributive and Treatment agencies are important in the systems, but almost all of the dominant Treatment

TABLE 31

RESOURCES, COMPETITION, AND SYSTEM IMPORTANCE
BY MODE OF WORK, MEAN SCORES

	Treatment Agencies		Distributive Agencies	
	Low Import- ance	High Import- ance	Low Import- ance	High Import- ance
System A	(N=3)	(N=11)	(N=13)	(N=6)
Resources				
Size	22.3	26.0	27.0	72.3
Service Diversity	6.0	5.4	4.8	6.8
Degree professional	.48	.55	.32	.41
Competition				
Actual Competition	8.7	8.1	6.2	6.8
Felt Competition	2.48	2.46	2.28	1.68
System B	(N=6)	(N=9)	(N=11)	(N=9)
Resources				
Size	10.8	19.6	17.0	36.6
Service Diversity	3.8	4.0	4.4	5.7
Degree professional	.63	.56	.39	.45
Competition				
Actual Competition	5.8	7.3	4.0	5.2
Felt Competition	2.98	2.22	2.08	2.40

organizations are also large.⁹ In both cities over two-thirds of the powerful agencies have Public sponsorship. In each system the most important group has one Private-Treatment agency which provides a variety of counseling services, and one Private Distributive agency.¹⁰

In both cities the tax-supported system dominants are those organizations which provide the basic or foundation services. As Table 2 showed, these systems both use over one-third their total social welfare personnel for such services. Thus, this is an important point of similarity between the systems. These two systems are amazingly alike in terms of the dominant agencies, and since the greater proportion of these dominant agencies also provide the same types of services and have pretty much the same resources in each city, this general similarity reflects a similar press for certain important services even though the system's cluster of services is somewhat different.

Are they also similar in terms of their weakest members? The answer is somewhat, but the similarities are not as strong when specific agencies are considered. Most of the fringe group are Private agencies and almost all of this group are small and most are very small. Well over half are the smaller Private agencies (Table 32). However, the least powerful group does not have members with the same general functions as the dominant group does.¹¹

⁹The exception is a large-budget agency which contracts for service with other organizations and is, thus, an important source for added resources although it is both small and new.

¹⁰This is a community center which provides a place for local agencies to operate de-centralized services. This explains its importance to system members.

¹¹The Private-Counterpart agencies have low inter-city correlations (Table 9).

TABLE 32

		System A		System B	
		Top quarter		Top quarter	
		%		%	
Public					
Large		62%		56%	
Small		12		11	
Private					
Large		--		11	
Small		25		22	
Total		99% (8)		100% (9)	
		Bottom quarter		Bottom quarter	
		%		%	
Public					
Large		11%		11%	
Small		22		--	
Private					
Large		11		11	
Small		56		78	
Total		100% (9)		100% (9)	

Both systems have only a few weak organizations which are Large-Distributive or Small-Treatment. In each city there is one Treatment agency and it is small, offers few services, and has a very low Professional Ratio. These fringe members provide a variety of services, and it is impossible to identify a consistent pattern for their functions which explains their weak position. In City A six of the organizations offer very specialized services to a limited client population. Three are fairly diversified in terms of the types of people served, and their low positions do not seem to be due to the type of client served, even though some members of this group do serve undesirable people (e.g., the poor and the handicapped). Three of them are primarily directed toward serving 'normal' people but ones with very specialized needs. Two are old-line agencies offering a variety of programs for 'normal' people. In City B three of the agencies provide very specialized services. Only two primarily serve undesirable people, and four are group and leisure time agencies serving a varied population with 'character-building' services.¹²

Analyses of system positions show high inter-city correlations for Public-Counterpart agencies and divergent rankings for Private-Counterparts.¹³ A very lengthy search of the network position rankings revealed little correlation between systems when agency functions are

¹²City B commits more of its social welfare personnel resources to this type of service than does City A (Table 2), but of the six agencies involved, four are extremely unimportant within the system. These same agencies are higher in Importance in City A.

¹³As a further contrast, one of the dominant Public-Counterpart agencies in City B is in the lowest quarter in terms of system importance in City A.

compared for the non-counterpart groups. Apparently, although the top group in each system is very similar, and the Public-Counterparts hold similar rankings, the rest of the members are located differently within the two systems. When this information is coupled with other material about system differences, it helps explain the differences between systems in interrelationships of independent variables and in interaction patterns.

Hypotheses related to independent variables

H₂ Type of work is not a determinant of organizational position in local systems of social service organizations.

There are two indicators of network position, Overall Importance and Scope of Importance. Overall Importance, which has two parts, Competitor and Resource Supplier, measures the number of times other organizations choose the Respondent as an interaction partner. Scope, the range of types of interactions for which an organization is named a partner by others, measures the variety of different types of exchange relationships. In interpreting these findings it is important to recognize that Overall Importance is a measure of dependency, while Scope is a measure of extensiveness of influences. These two variables are highly correlated (Tables 27, 28, and 29).

When Treatment and Distributive organizations in these two systems are compared, t-test scores show no significant differences for the Overall Importance measure (Tables 15 and 16). In System A Distributive organizations are more important as Competitors than are Treatment organizations but this is not the case in System B. In both cities there is no difference by type of work for the Resource Supplier measure. There are significant inter-city differences for the Scope

measure. In System A Distributive agencies are chosen by other members in a greater variety of exchanges than are Treatment agencies; in System B the situation is reversed. But, variations in the same association of these two with the other variables indicate they are not measures of the same thing but empirically as well as conceptually distinct.

These inter-city differences tend to support the general idea that differences in the characteristics of these systems lead to dissimilar values for the visible output of system members, i.e., served people. Local factors dictate which system members are important and network positions will reflect these factors in addition to agency characteristics. In these two systems both general types of social service organizations provide services valued by system members, but the systems differ in the values attached to the various types of resources which the Distributive agencies have.

One way to get more information about this is to look at the scores for Counterpart agencies (Table 33).¹⁴ The Counterpart scores for these two network position measures show no difference in Overall Importance by Mode of Work in either city but the Scope of Importance scores are an interesting supplement to the data in Tables 15 and 16. The Counterpart agencies follow the overall pattern in System B, described earlier, and Treatment-Counterparts report higher Scope scores than Distributive-Counterparts. However, in System A the group of non-counterpart Treatment agencies (N=7) are much lower in Scope and this depresses the systems' scores; the non-counterpart Distributive agencies (N=5) have higher scores. Fifty per cent of the Treatment agencies in

¹⁴Counterpart organizations make up two-thirds of the organizations in each city.

TABLE 33

COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORK POSITION

	Treatment- Counterparts (N=7)		Distributive- Counterparts (N=14)		
System A	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	t-test
Overall Importance	43.9	18.8	45.5	41.3	N.S.
Scope of Importance	15.3	2.8	14.3	3.1	.741
System B					
Overall Importance	37.9	23.3	30.3	28.5	.618
Scope of Importance	15.0	3.0	10.5	4.2	2.320**

**p .05

System A follow the System B pattern of higher Scope scores for Treatment organizations.¹⁵ Five of the seven non-counterpart Treatment organizations are younger Public agencies which serve one particular client group, minority people, the poor, or mentally ill.

Since organizations cannot interact with other agencies only on their own -- they have to consider the wishes of potential interaction partners -- basic agency domain is an important factor in system position. There is no information about what broad types of services are most important, but basic life-support programs would seem more important than character building or even counseling services. Since these basic services are more often provided through Public agencies, Auspices is an indicator of the essentialness of the agency's functions. Table 34 compares Treatment and Distributive agencies within the same type of sponsorship on the two network position measures and shows there are no significant differences by Mode of Work when Auspices is controlled even for Scope of Importance scores.

Considering all these pieces of evidence, it seems clear that factors unconnected to organizational type are important determinants of agency position in the system's hierarchy. Considering the important effect of public sponsorship on salience of agency domain for other system members, it seems type of work is not the controlling factor in determining the organizations position in the network. Although there seem to be differences in the extensiveness of agency influence by Mode of Work, when Auspices is considered these are less important. The inter-city differences in Scope scores for Distributive-Counterpart

¹⁵ Note the similarity in mean scores across systems.

TABLE 34

NETWORK POSITION AND MODE OF WORK, BY AUSPICES

	Public- Treatment		Public- Distributive		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
System A	(N=8)		(N=6)		
Overall Importance	50.1	23.2	60.2	62.2	N.S.
Scope of Importance	16.0	2.0	13.8	3.4	1.309
System B	(N=10)		(N=5)		
Overall Importance	31.0	17.3	46.0	40.9	.704
Scope of Importance	14.3	2.8	12.2	5.2	.750
	Private- Treatment		Private- Distributive		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
System A	(N=6)		(N=13)		
Overall Importance	32.7	12.5	24.9	19.2	1.013
Scope of Importance	13.8	2.3	11.5	5.4	1.186
System B	(N=5)		(N=15)		
Overall Importance	27.2	20.4	21.8	15.8	N.S.
Scope of Importance	11.6	3.8	10.3	4.5	.673

agencies is another piece of evidence pointing to the importance of system needs to network position.

H₃ As compared with Private agencies, Public agencies:

- a. Are more important to other agencies (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance);
- b. Have more specific resources.

In both systems Public organizations, as a group, are much higher in both measures of network position than the Private organization group (Tables 19, 20 and 27). In System A, Public agencies provide more services than do Private agencies but this is not the case in System B. This is probably because the System A Public group includes organizations with domains which are not included in System B. In City A there are two young, well-funded, innovative, and diverse organizations which have not been established in City B. In City B the Public agencies have higher professional resources but in City A the differences by Auspices are negligible (Tables 19 and 20).

Because different system-level combinations are significant, information about the Counterpart organizations is used to explore this hypothesis (Table 14). In both systems, Public-Counterparts are much higher in both network position measures and are larger. In A they are more diverse but there are no differences in diversity by Auspices in B. The apparent differences in Professional Ratio for System B Private agencies is probably due to the large number of very small agencies in that city. Most of the differences visible in Table 14 are related to the larger population served by System A. When within-system ranks on resource measures are considered, the resource levels for the different types of Counterpart agencies are very similar and

Public-Counterparts are higher than Private-Counterparts in the position measures (Table 9).

The small number of cases makes it meaningless to examine the Counterpart agencies by both Auspices and Mode of Work, but when Mode of Work is held constant for the systems, in A Public-Treatment agencies are higher in network position and all specific resource measures, but the differences for Distributive agencies are less (Table 25). This is because of the high differentiation within Auspices/Mode types. Table 25 shows Public-Distributive agencies are more important and have more specific resources but with considerable within-category variation. Tables 27, 28, and 29 show generally strong positive correlations between Auspices and Size for both types of organizations in City A, but the relationships between sponsorship and level of professionalization is weak for both types of organizations.

In City B there are fewer differences between Public and Private agencies when Mode of Work is controlled (Table 26). Again, there is high differentiation within categories. Although the t-test scores for the resources measures in the Distributive comparison do not reach the p .10 level (except for Size) because of the within-category variation, the Public-Distributive agencies are considerably higher in Overall Importance than the Private-Distributive type. An explanation for the comparatively low network position measures for City B Public-Treatment agencies is that 50 per cent of them are Young and highly specialized.

Unlike the situation in System A, in System B correlations for Treatment agencies show no relationship between Auspices, network

position or specific resources, but the pattern of relationships is similar for System B Distributive organizations. For Distributive agencies Size and Overall Importance are highly correlated with Public sponsorship, but Professional Ratio and Service Diversity are unrelated to Auspices (Tables 28 and 29).

On balance, the weight of the evidence strongly supports this hypothesis -- the conclusion that the generally higher valued resources within systems are located in the Public agency group. The data support the idea that the most important functions are usually within the domain of the Public organizations although within cities this will vary, particularly according to the period of time in which agencies were established. Auspices is then an important indicator of ability to be involved with other agencies in interactions, either as the interaction Target (incoming transactions) or as Actor (outgoing transactions).

H₆ As compared to Old organizations, Young agencies:

- a. Have fewer resources;
- b. Are lower in Overall Importance and Scope of Importance.

When Young and Old organizations are compared in City A, there are no differences in network position or specific resources. In City B, Old agencies are higher in Overall Importance than Young and somewhat lower in Scope of Importance scores (Tables 22 and 27).

Age is not a characteristic apart from its effect in tandem with agency domain or sponsorship and type of work. Table 23 is used to examine effect of Age on resources level by Auspices. Although Table 23 does not provide t-test scores, these findings are congruent with Pearson product-moment correlations by Auspices (not shown). In System A, when agencies are under the same sponsorship, the Old-Public agencies

are higher in network position measures than the Young-Public, but the differences for Scope scores are very slight. Old-Public agencies are larger and more diverse than Young-Public, but there is little difference in Professional Ratio. For the System A Private group Age is not associated with network position although Old-Private agencies are larger, more diverse, and professionalized. This is probably because their resources are not generally needed by other agencies.¹⁶

In contrast, City B Old-Public agencies are only slightly larger than the Young-Public, and Young-Public have more extensive influence than Old-Public even though the Old-Public agencies provide the basic services. The situation in City B clearly shows the effects of the charter-related press for service. Although Old-Public agencies are larger and more diverse than Young-Public, there is little difference in Overall Importance between the two types in this system. Although the Young-Public agencies are less diverse, they have higher Professional Ratio because they are primarily Treatment agencies. Old-Public agencies are primarily Distributive.

In System B, as in System A, the Young-Public agencies are somewhat more important to others in the system than the Old-Private agencies. Although they are smaller, they are more diverse and have fewer professional staff. Given the distortions introduced by very small size in City B, these organizations are really heavily non-professionalized which makes their higher network position scores most interesting. These six Young-Private agencies (five are Distributive) all serve

¹⁶ Note earlier discussion of the divergent organizations within the Private agency sector -- the group is made up of strange bed-fellows!

special groups -- three are community centers serving the poor or minority population, one gives specialized service to the poor, one serves a special population with a range of services, and one serves youth.

To test the relationships of resources and Age holding Mode of Work constant, Tables 28 and 29 show a consistent pattern between cities for Distributive organizations. Both Young and Old organizations are important to others and, on balance, Age is not connected to system position for Distributive agencies. Looking at specific resources, the picture is inconsistent. City A's Old-Distributive organizations are smaller (because they are Private) but much higher in Professional Ratio than Young agencies; City B's Old-Distributive organizations are more likely to be Large but the correlation is only .28, and Professional Ratio is not connected with Age. In both cities, Age is not associated with diversity. The major difference, the higher level of professionalization for Old-Distributive organizations in City A, is relatively unimportant. For Treatment agencies there is little association between Age and network position in either city, although Old agencies are somewhat larger and more diverse. Professional Ratio is unconnected with Age.

Using Table 24 system-level differences are clear. In one city Old-Distributive agencies are the more generally valued while in the other the valued group are Young-Distributive.

In both cities the Young-Distributive organizations are primarily under Private sponsorship (only one of the ten in this total group is Public) and provide highly specialized services to a particular client population. In City A this group includes those agencies serving a

special need but without the outreach focus found in the City B group (see previous section). The differences by city in the positions of Young-Distributive organizations are due to the dissimilar specific organizations which make up the type in each city. The City A organizations do very different work than those in the same category in City B.

When Young agencies are compared to Old agencies they generally do not have fewer resources or lower system position, and thus these data do not support the hypothesis. But sponsorship and work need to be considered when the effect of age on resources is considered. When this is done, an uneven pattern is found. The differences between types and between systems are due to the different specific agencies which make up the types in each city. Here again, the effect of the whole system upon organizational positions in the network is visible. In each city Old-Public agencies have higher network positions than Young-Public; Young-Private are higher in Overall Importance scores than Old-Private; Age is not associated with network position when Mode is held constant although specific resources vary. In conclusion, in each system some younger agencies have high network positions even with lower levels of specific resources, and Age is not consistently associated with higher resources.¹⁷ Accordingly, the hypothesis is rejected.

¹⁷ It would be helpful if Age/Mode/Auspices types could be compared, but in City B there are no Young-Distributive-Public agencies and only one Young-Treatment-Private.

H_{9a} Regardless of the Mode of Work, the larger the organization, the more it is valued by other organizations (higher Overall Importance and wider Scope of Importance).

In general, large organizations are more important to others than small organizations with the notable exception of Distributive organizations in System A. Tables 28 and 29 show strong or fairly strong correlations between Size and network position for Treatment agencies in both system and for System B Distributive agencies.¹⁸ The correlations between Size and the network position measures is negligible for System A Distributive agencies and, in explanation of this difference, Table 35 gives some additional information.¹⁹ For the Public agency group in both systems there is a strong positive correlation between Size and Overall Importance but a much lower relationship between Size and Scope of Importance. Unlike the situation in System A, in B the Private agencies show a higher correlation between Size and both network position measures (.31 and .35).²⁰

In both systems over two-thirds of the Private agencies are Distributive organizations. It seems from this that many of the Private agencies in A are fringe members of the system. However, when the information in Table 25 is considered, it is clear that within the Distributive organization group there are wide variations in Overall Importance within the two sponsorship types. In a later section

¹⁸The correlation between Size and Scope of Importance in City A is .41 which is somewhat lower than the p .10 level (df13=.48). In City B the correlation between Size and Overall Importance is .38, again slightly below the p .10 level (df14=.46).

¹⁹Complete information on correlations by auspices is not included.

²⁰For df19, p .10=.39.

TABLE 35

STAFFING PATTERNS AND NETWORK POSITION

	System A		System B	
	Private agencies	Public agencies	Private agencies	Public agencies
	(N=19)	(N=14)	(N=20)	(N=15)
Correlations of Size with:				
Overall Importance	3	71***	31	68***
Scope of Importance	15	20	35	24
Correlations of Degree professional with:				
Overall Importance	31	-5	2	-6
Scope of Importance	40*	26	16	29

*p .10

***o ,01

Actor interaction patterns are analyzed and those data show no differences between Public and Private Distributive organizations in outgoing interaction behavior in either city. Further, since integration is higher in System A than in System B, what is low for A is moderate for B. (Note the higher Overall Importance scores for City A Private-Distributive agencies, Table 25 and 26.)

This information about Distributive agencies in System A points to the importance of the particular services or agency function within the system for network position. In A some small agencies apparently have very needed domains, particularly when the differences in the Scope of Importance scores are considered. In B the Private agencies with extensive influence (almost all are Distributive) are more likely to have large staffs. In System A the relationship between staff size and extensiveness of influence is low regardless of sponsorship, but for the Distributive agencies as a whole (almost all Private), there is a low negative relationship between Size and Scope.²¹ It is certainly unfortunate the small number of cases prevent adequate exploration of these relationships.

In summary, in most cases organizational size does seem to be a factor in how valued the agency is by others within the system. But, clearly domain somehow matters, too, and in some cases organizations with high value to other agencies are small. The weight of the evidence tends to support this hypothesis and indicates size is an important factor.

²¹It is tempting to think Age is an explanation and that as these organizations get older their staff resources will increase. Unfortunately, only 4 of the 13 in City A Private-Distributive agencies are Young, and two of these are highly specialized and system isolates based on sociogram data.

H_{10a} Regardless of Mode of Work, the higher the Professional Ratio, the more the organization is valued by other organizations.

The evidence about the relationship of Professional Ratio to network position fails to support this hypothesis. In Tables 28 and 29, none of the correlations between Professional Ratio and Overall Importance or Scope, reach the $p .10$ level of significance and three of the relationships are negligible. For System B Treatment organizations the correlation is moderate negative ($-.33$). Turning to Scope of Importance, none of the correlations reach $p .10$ level although there is a moderate positive correlation between Professional Ratio and Scope for System A Treatment organizations ($.36$). For System A Distributive agencies there is a low-moderate negative correlation of $-.29$. Table 35 shows the correlations between Professional Ratio and Scope by Auspices showing only one case in which the correlation reaches the $p .10$ level (i.e., System A Private agencies).

In conclusion, the evidence fails to support the hypothesis but does not suggest an alternative one. On the whole, the evidence is very inconclusive. One factor affecting these relationships is the unreliableness of the Professional Ratio measure. The meaning of boundary-spanning staff seems to be lost when agencies are very small.

H₁₁ Regardless of the Mode of Work, the higher the Service Diversity, the more the agency is valued by other organizations.

The data about the relationship between Service Diversity and network position show divergent patterns in these two cities (Table 36). Both System A Treatment organizations and System B Distributive agencies have a strong relationship between the number of services they offer and their attractiveness to other organizations but the other categories

TABLE 36

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SERVICE DIVERSITY AND
NETWORK POSITION, BY MODE OF WORK AND AUSPICES

	System A	System B
Correlations of Service Diversity and Network position for		
Treatment agencies		
Overall Importance	55**	-17
Scope of Importance	43 ^a	-17
Distributive agencies		
Overall Importance	27	54**
Scope of Importance	5	47**
Public agencies		
Overall Importance	46*	22
Scope of Importance	59**	1
Private agencies		
Overall Importance	23	55**
Scope of Importance	6	33 ^b

^a_p .10 = .46

^b_p .10 = .38

*_p .10

**_p .05

show little relationship between these two variables. When the Public/Private material is examined, the same divergent pattern exists. Although without more sophisticated tools it is impossible to know if the relationship between diversity and position holds for System A Public-Treatment and System B Private-Distributive agencies, these data are highly suggestive.²²

The inter-city correlation (Spearman rank-order) for Treatment-Counterparts is .804 and for Distributive-Counterparts it is .612, both scores p .10 level of significance. Table 9 gives correlations by Auspices showing high inter-city correlations for Public agencies but much lower correlations for Private organizations.

Since the inter-system positions are similar for the counterpart agencies, the differences are probably connected with the non-counterpart agencies and part of the overall pattern of differences in the thrust of the systems in each city. In System A the non-counterpart Public-Treatment agencies are all Young and definitely founded to seek innovation and redirection of services. They are all above the median in Size and well-funded. The non-counterpart Private-Distributive agencies are very small and highly specialized. In System B, three of the five Private-Distributive non-counterparts are new, outreach organizations involved in multi-service projects;

²²Of the eight Public-Treatment agencies in A, six are above the median and none are below the median on both measures. The Private-Distributive group in A have six cases below the median and one case above for both measures. In City B, the ten Public-Treatment agencies have two above the median and two below the median on both variables and the 15 Private-Distributive agencies have six above and seven below the median for both measures.

the non-counterpart Public-Treatment agencies are primarily small and very specialized. Although many are post-1960 agencies, they are spin off agencies, collectively part of newer efforts in services but with few resources individually. In short, they are very different from the System A group.

These data do not support the idea that simple diversity increases network position. When the general importance of the domain (indicated by sponsorship) is coupled with diversity, then there is some relationship but it differs in the two systems. In System A diversity of the type of services offered by the Public-Treatment agencies increases network position, but in System B it is those services associated with the Private-Distributive agencies which increase position. In sum, diversity of valued services does increase position, but the value attached to services varies by system.

The relationship of competition and other conditions

H₁₄ There is a low positive correlation between Actual Competition and Felt Competition.

When the organizations in each system are considered as a group, the hypothesis seems to be supported. Table 27 shows correlations of .32 (p .10 level of significance) between Actual Competition and Felt Competition in both cities, but when the different Mode of Work types are considered, the picture shifts. In System A, Treatment organizations have a .52 correlation between Actual and Felt Competition (reaching the p .10 level) but Distributive organizations have -.18 for the same

variables. In System B the correlations vary less dramatically, and for both types of agencies there are low-moderate positive correlations (Tables 28 and 29). The only information available to shed any light on these differences are the correlations for Public-Private agencies. When these are considered, in System A Private agencies have a .57 correlation ($p .05$) between Felt and Actual Competition, but Public agencies have a negligible $-.01$. In System B, for Private agencies the correlation is .13 and for Public agencies it is .56 ($p .05$).

No satisfactory explanation exists for these relationships. As mentioned previously, it seems reasonable to expect that Private agencies experience competition more directly and both the salience of competitive pressures and competitive interactions will be higher. The material in Tables 19 and 20 show this is the case only in A. In neither system are Private agencies engaged in significantly more competitive interactions than Public agencies. Perhaps in System B the sense of competition for United Way money is lower. There is some interview evidence that supports this idea, and in System B the member agencies do receive a lower proportion of their total regular allocations from United Way than member agencies do in System A. In B, agencies more often solicit funds directly and although they are tapping the same pool of potential givers, perhaps some have a strong constituency and funds are easy to raise.

When competition levels are examined by Mode of Work, in System A Distributive organizations are higher and in System B Treatment organizations are higher (Tables 15 and 16).

In conclusion, when all the evidence is considered, the hypothesis receives only moderate and mixed support, and these data tend to support

earlier findings indicating an unreliable relationship between behavior and attitudes.

H₁₅ The higher the general and specific resource levels, the higher the competitive interactions.

The correlations between general resource levels and Actual Competition for Treatment agencies support this hypothesis but, unfortunately, relationships are not the same for Distributive organizations. As Table 28 shows, for System B Treatment agencies there are strong positive correlations between general resources as indicated by the two network position measures (.54 and .51). In System A the correlations are lower (.32 and .34) but indicate moderate association. Turning to Distributive organizations, the correlations in A are moderately negative (-.28 and -.34) and in B the correlation between Overall Importance and Actual Competition is negligible (.11) and somewhat higher for Scope of Importance (.36) (Table 29).

When the specific resource measures are considered, the only relationship which reaches the minimum level is between Actual Competition and Service Diversity for System A Distributive agencies. Of the other 11 correlations between specific resources and Actual Competition, seven are under .20 (both positive and negative) and only one is as high as .36. The correlations are inconsistent between system by type of organization.

Public sponsorship is associated with valued resources but there is no evidence that Public agencies, regardless of Mode of Work, have significantly higher levels of Actual Competition (Tables 19, 20, and 25). The evidence is mixed. When Mode type is ignored, then the relationship in System B between general resources and Actual Competition

is strong enough to reach the $p .05$ level (Table 27). It is low-moderate in System A. The correlations between the specific resources measures and competitive interaction is low in A and negligible in B. One part of the hypothesis should be rejected; there is no relationship between specific resources and competitive interactions. This cross-sectional data provides limited support for the other part, the higher the general resource levels, the higher the competitive behavior. Success in securing resources in the past does not lead to diminished competition, and high status agencies continue to compete.

H₁₆ The higher the position in the network, the lower the Felt Competition.

In general, these data give only very limited support to this hypothesis. In no case do the correlations reach the minimum level of significance but for the two Mode of Work types, the relationship between Overall Importance and Felt Competition for Treatment organizations in both cities is low moderate ($-.26$ and $-.38$), while for Distributive organizations the correlation in A is $-.26$ but only $.02$ in B.

H₁₇ Public agencies have lower Felt Competition scores than Private agencies.

This seems to be the case for System A organizations. Table 19 shows the t-test score reaching the $p .05$ level but in System B the difference by Auspices is not large (Table 20). When Auspices and Mode are both considered, in System A both Public-Treatment and Public-Distributive have significantly lower Felt Competition scores than Private-Treatment and Private-Distributive (Table 25). In System B there is no difference by Auspices for Treatment agencies but Private-Distributive agencies have higher scores than Public-Distributive ones.

When the correlations between Auspices and Felt Competition by Mode of Work are examined in Tables 28 and 29, Distributive agencies in both systems show negative correlations indicating Public agencies have lower Felt Competition scores but System B Treatment agencies show no relationship between Auspices and Felt Competition although the System A Treatment agencies show low-moderate association (-.29).

When all the evidence is considered, it tends to support this hypothesis. Public organizations do not report the same perceptions about competition as Private agencies. In contrast, the Public agencies in each system report more competitive interactions than Private agencies although the differences do not reach the p .10 level of significance because of wide variations within types (Tables 19 and 20). Although director perceptions about competitive pressures are lower in Public agencies, more of the agencies are actively engaged in a large set of competitive relationships than are the Private organizations.

H₁₈ As compared to Old organizations, Young organizations have higher Felt Competition.

Table 22 gives the Felt Competition scores by Age and in System B the data support the hypothesis but not in A. The between systems contradictions in these data can be seen quite vividly in Tables 28 and 29. In A, Old-Treatment agencies are higher in Felt Competition than Young-Treatment organizations, but in B Old-Treatment group members have lower Felt Competition scores. This same relationship is found for System B Distributive agencies and the correlation between Age and Felt Competition is -.34, not as high as for Treatment agencies but still indicating older agencies have lower scores, as expected. In System B

the Distributive group shows no relationship between Age and Felt Competition.

In two of the four major types, Young organizations have higher Felt Competition scores than Old, but the correlations are significant in only one case (System A Treatment agencies), and Table 24 shows mean differences are quite small in the other three cases. Apparently, the directors of some pre-1960 agencies perceive many competitive pressures, and the directors of some of the newer agencies have a sense of security or low competition. Young-Public agencies in City A have higher Felt Competition scores, but for other Auspices types scores are higher for Old agencies (Table 23).

On balance, the data do not justify concluding that the hypothesis is supported.

As the evidence pertaining to these five hypotheses about Actual and Felt Competition is considered, the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is very difficult to know just what types of organizations will experience high levels of competition. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, these are highly differentiated systems. There are important differences in the nature of the systems in the two different cities, and competition factors are not consistent either within or across systems. Although there are no inter-system differences in level of Felt Competition (Table 12), when the Counterpart organizations are examined, the systems have very low correlations for both types of Counterpart agencies on the Felt Competition measure indicating that for Counterpart organizations the climate is different in each city (Table 9). Further, when the Public-Counterparts are considered, there is a fairly strong negative correlation (-.52) between cities and

moderate positive correlations for Private-Counterpart agencies for Actual Competition (.43).¹⁸

The next chapter presents extensive evidence linking high Actual Competition with extensive interactions, particularly when organizations have high ability (indicated by network position measures). This section has demonstrated that the relationship between organizational characteristics and competition levels is difficult to specify. Thus, although competition is apparently strongly related to an organization's outgoing or Actor-based relationships with other organizations, it is difficult to identify consistent factors connected to competitive behaviors.

Summary

This chapter examined system differences in the distributions of the independent variables and the interrelationships among these variables. The overall model for this research assumes the relationship between competition and interaction is affected by organizational ability to attract partners, or by resources wanted by other system members. Thus, the several sections in this chapter sought to identify consistent relationships among the independent variables which help in unraveling the connections between work-related conditions and ability related characteristics and to explore factors connected with variations in competition which relate to the interaction patterns to be described in Chapter V.

Although the causes of the system differences described in this chapter and Chapter III are unclear at this point, the significant point

¹⁸ This score is adjusted for different means for Actual Competition in two cities because it is based on rankings.

is that the data show important differences in the social organization of these systems and the distribution of resources within the systems. In turn, these differences are related to member organizations' ability and motivation to develop interaction strategies. As discussed in Chapter I, the major purpose of this research is to test some of the most popular explanations for organizational interactions to demonstrate their inadequacy and the power of the competition/conflict political economy perspective. The data presented in this chapter make it clear that system needs are important determinants of agency power or system position. Thus, if interaction requires system-valued resources, agency behavior will be importantly determined by system characteristics as well as by organizational factors. Chapters III and IV have documented extensive system differences, and Chapter V connects these differences to interorganizational relationships. As system differences are related first to agency needs, ability, and competitiveness and then to interactions, the limitation of the assumptions so prevalent in the inter-organizational relations literature, which regards internal organizational characteristics as the key determinants of interrelationship, are apparent. Further, the relationships between agency position and competition, and system-level competition and extent of system integration, provide considerable support for the competition model in contrast to other perspectives described in Chapter I which focus on interactions at the service delivery level and assume cooperation undergirds the sector.

The data presented in this chapter show the hierarchical arrangement of organizations in these two systems is different. This is dramatically shown when the Counterpart organizations are compared but

other data show consistent variation in system position connected to Mode of Work, Auspices, and resources. Given the similarity in services and programs for the Counterpart organizations and the similar levels of resources, one expects generally similar interaction behavior. But, although the status of the top-quarter group, the major public organizations, is highly similar in the two systems, the other Counterpart members are dissimilar in status, and the non-Counterpart organizations are ranked differently also.

Further, it seems clear that position within the set of local agencies is not related to the general type of work or to specific resources. This means predictions about interaction patterns based on these internal characteristics fail to receive support. In both systems position is tied to sponsorship. The Public agencies generally are higher in the hierarchy, and as these are primarily large organizations, size is related as well. But, when one examines position for those Public agencies which are not responsible for providing the expensive basic services such as income maintenance, then sponsorship is less clearly connected with position, and there are wide variations between the systems.

In both systems services within the two basic types of work are valued by system members, but when the two Mode of Work groups are compared by system position, then there are significant variations between the systems, e.g., Public-Distributive agencies are valued in one system but Public-Treatment agencies in the other. In sum, the patterns of relationships among the independent variables are inconsistent in the two cities but there is a fairly consistent pattern within each system.

Although the levels of specific resources (i.e. size, service diversity and professional staffing) are higher in System A than in System B, the important finding, which is related to the interaction patterns described in Chapter V, is that the systems vary in the resources assigned to the different types of organizations. There are differences by Mode of Work for these specific resources and for the general resource measures of Overall Importance and Scope of Influence as well. Age is connected with resources differently by system, and this means the potentially important press for interaction connected to age translates into position and interaction levels differently in the two systems. Thus, an important point of system difference is the variation in interrelationships among the charter-domain variables and the several resource measures.

In addition, there are differences in the extent and the location of Actual Competition and Felt Competition both within and across systems. Competition is higher in System A than in System B, and integration is greater in System A as well. Competition varies widely by charter-domain and resource characteristics, and it is impossible to predict competitiveness from any of the other variables although there is some relationship between high system position and high actual competition. The differences in competition scores for the Counterpart organizations further illustrate this point.

Finally, the significant differences in interaction levels in the two systems is evidence of important variations in the general environment for individual organizations. These differences parallel differences in competition levels but probably are also connected with characteristics of member organizations such as the kind of work

performed, since only some services require interactions, or the number of very small organizations, since organizations without sufficient slack cannot commit staff to the work required to develop interactions. Perhaps system norms support interactions in System A to a greater extent than in System B; perhaps there are more incentives from funding organizations or more opportunities for informal interactions in one city than the other which set the stage for future interactions. The important point is that the systems do stimulate very different degrees of interorganizational interactions.

In conclusion, it seems the high degree of differentiation and specialization, together with the relatively small number of local social service agencies and the high resource interdependence, means organizations tend to occupy specific niches within the systems. It is difficult to find consistent patterns relating agency characteristics to either system position or competitiveness. The set or family of agencies form different systems in each city, and in turn this seems related to which organizations are needed by the others. This factor affects the organization's ability to interact with system members. System conditions are important determinants of interorganizational relationships as are organizational characteristics.

CHAPTER V ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTION STRATEGIES

Introduction

This chapter describes the relationships between organizational characteristics and interaction behavior to test the hypotheses about Actor interaction patterns. The material about system differences and organizational characteristics presented in Chapters III and IV serves as the foundation for the material presented now. Additionally, Chapter V presents supplementary evidence about some similarities and differences between these two systems.

The first section of this chapter is a comparison of interaction patterns in the two systems. Next, the hypotheses about interactions are tested, and some information about various aspects of Resource Exchanges is included although the specific hypotheses are directed only to Cooperativeness. A final section describes the relationship between competition and interaction strategies in a test of the research model.

System difference in interactions

In System A, agencies are involved in Resource Exchanges with each other and other groups in the social welfare sector and the community to a greater extent than are members of System B (Table 37). In each system, organizations tend to have about the same number of organizations as interaction partners or organization-set members, but in A they are generally more involved with these organizations. Since the three general interaction measures include competitive as well as non-competitive interactions, the differences in the Resource Exchanges are better indicators of exchange transactions, and the data show important inter-system differences. In addition, in System A

TABLE 37
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS, BY CITY

Variables	City A		City B		t-test ^a
	(N=33)		(N=35)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction characteristics					
Size of set	11.1	3.5	10.5	3.0	N.S
Network interactions	38.8	16.9	28.6	12.7	2.811***
Sector interactions	44.3	18.5	37.3	17.1	1.591*
Community interactions	53.2	15.6	49.7	15.5	.921
Variedness	12.0	3.7	13.5	3.3	1.744**
Reciprocity	6.4	3.2	3.6	2.2	4.118***
Resource Exchanges	32.1	13.8	23.1	11.3	2.903***
Cooperativeness	11.3	7.7	7.9	6.7	1.943**
Reference-group interactions	7.6	3.7	4.1	3.2	4.069***
Simple Exchanges	13.4	4.1	10.9	4.2	2.451**

^aOne-tailed test is used because prediction that System B has higher scores than System A is determined by number of questions asked in B.

*p .10
**p .05
***p .01

there are more cooperative relations than in System B, and since such transactions involve some surrender of agency autonomy, the between-system differences show there are more planned interactions in System A than in B. These differences are also shown in higher reciprocity scores in System B. There is a significant exception in that the Actors in City B report a greater variety of types of transactions with their interaction partners than do City A's agencies (Table 37).

Table 38 shows the interaction scores for the Counterpart group. In System A the organization-set scores are lower for the Public-Counterparts than for Private-Counterparts, but the reverse is the case for System B. In both systems the Public-Counterparts have more Resource Exchanges than the Private-Counterparts, but the differences are slight in System A. In comparison to other members of the system, System A Counterparts are more involved with other organizations and groups than are those in System B, and the between system differences in Resource Exchanges and Variedness scores for the Private-Counterparts are especially striking.

Table 14 showed the incoming interactions or Target scores for these same organizations, and in both systems the Public-Counterpart agencies receive many more nominations than they make choices. Their exchange relationships are lopsided, and others depend upon them for resources to a greater extent than they depend on fellow system members. In contrast, the Private-Counterparts tend to have more balanced exchanges and incoming and outgoing choices are roughly similar.

TABLE 38

INTERACTIONS OF COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS, MEAN SCORES

System A	All Counter- parts (N=21)	Public- Counter- parts (N=7)	Private- Counter- parts (N=14)
Variables			
Interaction character- istics			
Size of set	11.7	10.3	12.4
Network interactions	42.9	46.1	41.2
Sector interactions	47.9	54.0	44.8
Community interactions	53.1	57.6	50.9
Variedness	12.6	13.6	12.7
Resource Exchanges	35.2	37.7	34.0
System B			
Interaction character- istics			
Size of set	10.1	12.3	9.1
Network interactions	24.5	33.1	20.1
Sector interactions	33.9	48.4	26.6
Community interactions	44.4	55.6	38.8
Variedness	10.6	12.4	9.6
Resource Exchanges	20.0	29.4	15.4

When the higher potential interaction scores for System B are considered, the higher actual Resource Exchanges scores in System A are more important.¹ These data show two important inter-system differences that are related to the general theoretical model of this research. The system with the higher competition also has the larger numbers of Resource Exchanges and a greater number of Cooperative interactions (compare Tables 12 and 37; see Table 9.)

Charter-domain characteristics and interactions²

1. Mode of Work and Auspices

The general type of work affects the number of outgoing interactions only in System B. In that system, Treatment organizations are involved in more Resource Exchanges, relationships are more varied, and they are involved in more Cooperative relationships than are Distributive organizations. In System A there are fewer differences, but Distributive agencies tend to have higher interaction levels than do Treatment organizations (Table 39). In both systems Public agencies have more Sector interactions and more varied ties than Private agencies, and in System B they have larger organization-sets. In neither system do the differences in Resource Exchanges reach the minimum level of significance (Table 40).

Tables 41 through 44 give comparisons for interaction scores by Auspices and Mode of Work, and in System A there are no differences in outgoing relationships when both variables are considered (Tables

¹In City B, 15 non-competitive interaction questions were used and in City A, 14.

²In the next two sections, discussion of data ranges over a variety of tables. Tables are introduced in groups as near as possible to appropriate place in narrative.

TABLE 39
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS, BY MODE OF WORK

	Treatment organizations		Distributive organizations		t-test
	(N=14)		(N=19)		
System A	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Variables					
Interaction characteristics					
Size of set	10.79	3.32	11.50	3.66	N.S.
Network interactions	36.53	17.93	42.00	14.88	.932
Sector interactions	40.58	19.30	49.43	16.07	.973
Community interactions	50.05	16.96	57.50	12.14	1.445*
Variedness	11.21	3.66	13.14	3.42	1.484*
Reciprocity	6.05	3.28	6.86	2.97	.789
Resource Exchanges	30.32	14.84	34.43	11.76	.856
Cooperativeness	10.79	8.24	11.93	6.90	N.S.
System B	(N=15)		(N=20)		
Interaction characteristics					
Size of set	11.13	2.63	10.00	3.11	1.111
Network interactions	33.67	10.69	24.75	12.79	2.176**
Sector interactions	45.07	16.18	31.50	15.30	2.442**
Community interactions	57.27	11.33	44.00	15.77	2.812***
Variedness	14.87	2.22	12.45	3.53	2.444**
Reciprocity	3.87	1.96	3.45	2.40	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	26.93	8.35	20.20	12.33	1.861**
Cooperativeness	9.67	5.71	6.65	7.02	1.361*

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 40
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS, BY AUSPICES

	Public organizations		Private organizations		t-test
	(N=14)		(N=19)		
System A	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Variables					
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	10.50	2.06	11.53	4.18	.877
Network interactions	41.14	15.09	37.16	17.97	.661
Sector interactions	50.21	15.63	40.00	19.28	1.619*
Community interactions	56.71	13.56	50.63	16.39	1.129
Variedness	13.00	2.95	11.32	4.00	1.360*
Reciprocity	7.50	2.53	5.58	3.36	1.792**
Resource Exchanges	33.79	11.20	30.79	15.27	.630
Cooperativeness	12.93	5.43	10.05	8.85	1.133
System B	(N=15)		(N=20)		
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	11.27	2.82	9.90	2.95	1.372*
Network interactions	31.93	12.29	26.05	12.46	1.356*
Sector interactions	44.07	19.00	32.25	13.37	1.983**
Community interactions	55.87	14.06	45.05	14.91	2.137**
Variedness	14.60	2.82	12.65	3.32	1.887**
Reciprocity	4.07	2.05	3.30	2.19	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	25.73	9.04	21.10	12.38	1.230
Cooperativeness	9.40	6.20	6.85	6.78	1.145

*p .10

**p .05

TABLE 41

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS BY AUSPICES AND MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM A

Variables	Public- Treatment		Private- Treatment		t-test
	(N=8)		(N=6)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	10.2	2.3	13.2	5.1	N.S.
Network interactions	41.1	13.7	43.2	18.8	N.S.
Sector interactions	51.6	15.6	43.7	18.7	N.S.
Community interactions	60.4	9.2	53.7	16.2	N.S.
Variedness	13.8	3.1	11.2	4.6	1.098
Resource Exchanges	33.2	9.7	36.0	15.8	N.S.
	Public- Distributive		Private- Distributive		
	(N=6)		(N=13)		
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	10.8	2.4	10.8	3.8	N.S.
Network interactions	41.2	19.4	34.3	25.3	N.S.
Sector interactions	48.3	18.4	37.0	20.1	N.S.
Community interactions	51.8	18.6	49.2	17.6	N.S.
Variedness	12.0	3.0	10.8	4.1	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	34.5	20.3	28.4	15.6	N.S.

TABLE 42

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS BY AUSPICES AND MODE OF WORK, SYSTEM B

Variables	Public- Treatment		Private- Treatment		t-test
	(N=10)		(N=5)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	11.4	3.0	10.6	2.1	N.S.
Network interactions	48.9	18.6	35.8	6.5	1.790**
Sector interactions	54.7	13.6	40.4	9.7	2.097**
Community interactions	59.9	10.6	52.0	13.3	1.039
Variedness	14.3	2.6	11.8	2.8	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	27.9	9.3	25.0	7.7	1.286
	Public- Distributive		Private- Distributive		
	(N=5)		(N=15)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	11.0	2.9	9.7	3.3	N.S.
Network interactions	32.8	18.4	31.1	15.4	N.S.
Sector interactions	40.0	16.9	33.9	15.9	N.S.
Community interactions	47.8	19.2	42.7	12.8	N.S.
Variedness	11.4	6.4	10.5	3.9	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	21.4	8.7	19.8	14.0	N.S.

**p .05

TABLE 43

MODE OF WORK AND INTERACTIONS, BY AUSPICES, SYSTEM A

Variables	Public-Treatment		Public-Distributive		t-test
	(N=8)		(N=6)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction characteristics					
Size of set	10.2	2.3	10.8	2.4	N.S.
Network interactions	41.1	13.7	41.2	19.4	N.S.
Sector interactions	51.6	15.6	48.3	18.4	N.S.
Community interactions	60.4	9.2	51.8	18.6	N.S.
Variedness	13.8	3.1	12.0	3.0	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	33.2	9.7	34.5	20.3	N.S.
	Public-Treatment		Private-Distributive		
	(N=6)		(N=13)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction characteristics					
Size of set	13.2	5.1	10.8	3.8	N.S.
Network interactions	43.2	18.8	34.3	25.3	N.S.
Sector interactions	43.7	18.7	37.0	20.1	N.S.
Community interactions	53.7	16.2	49.2	17.6	N.S.
Variedness	11.2	4.6	10.8	4.1	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	36.0	15.8	28.4	15.6	N.S.

TABLE 44

MODE OF WORK AND INTERACTIONS, BY AUSPICES, SYSTEM B

Variables	Public- Treatment		Public- Distributive		t-test
	(N=10)		(N=5)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	11.4	3.0	11.0	2.9	N.S.
Network interactions	48.9	18.6	32.8	18.4	1.450*
Sector interactions	54.7	13.6	40.0	16.9	1.547*
Community interactions	59.9	10.6	47.8	19.2	1.186
Variedness	14.3	2.6	11.4	6.4	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	27.9	9.3	21.4	8.7	1.226
	Private- Treatment		Private- Distributive		
	(N=5)		(N=15)		
Interaction character- istics					
Size of set	10.6	2.1	9.7	3.3	N.S.
Network interactions	35.8	6.5	31.1	15.4	N.S.
Sector interactions	40.4	9.7	33.9	15.9	N.S.
Community interactions	52.0	13.3	42.7	12.8	1.240
Variedness	11.8	2.8	10.5	3.9	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	25.0	7.7	19.8	14.0	N.S.

*p .10

41 and 43). In System B, Public-Treatment agencies make more Actor choices than the Private-Treatment agencies, but Auspices does not affect interactions for Distributive agencies (Table 42).

When agencies with the same Auspices are compared in System B Public-Treatment agencies are higher in interaction levels than Public-Distributive organizations, but there are no differences in the two Private groups (Table 44).

As discussed in Chapter IV, agencies doing both general types of work are important to other agencies. One indicator of valued domain is sponsorship. When sponsorship is held constant, there are very few differences in outgoing interactions between Treatment and Distributive organizations (Tables 43 and 44).

The following hypotheses are related to charter-domain characteristics:

H₁ As compared to Distributive organizations, Treatment agencies will have:

- a. More non-competitive or resource exchange interactions with other organizations;
- b. More varied relationships with other organizations;
- c. More cooperative relationships with other organizations.

H₄ In comparison to Private-Treatment agencies, Public-Treatment agencies are:

- a. Higher in Resource Exchanges;
- b. More varied in relationship with other organizations.

H₅ In comparison to Private-Distributive agencies, Public-Distributive agencies are:

- a. Lower in Resource Exchanges;
- b. Lower in Cooperativeness.

When only Mode of Work is considered, these data show support for H_1 in one city but not the other. When the sponsorship information is considered, the hypothesis clearly is not supported. The conclusion is that the general type of work of the organization, even when domain is highly valued (e.g. is publicly funded), is not a determinant of extensive Actor relationships, although charter-domain characteristics usually do affect Target-based interactions (Overall Importance). Organizations providing system-valued services, especially if they are diverse, may not need to seek resources through interorganizational exchanges (especially through cooperative relationships) but will attract interactions. Thus, they may be uninvolved in cooperative relationships but will be important to other system members for Simple Exchanges and Reference-group transactions and, therefore, be high in network position (i.e. have high Overall Importance and/or Scope of Influence scores) (Tables 25 and 26).

Comparisons in Tables 43 and 44, which examine Mode of Work holding Auspices constant, also lead to a rejection of both parts of H_4 and H_5 . In addition, Tables 48 and 49 show that Public-Treatment organizations are not higher in either Resource Exchanges (.19 and .16) or Variedness (.15 and .34) than Private-Treatment agencies, and Tables 50 and 51 give very low correlations between Auspices and both Resources Exchanges and Variedness for Distributive organizations (System A, -.12 and .21, System B, .06 and .09).

From this information it seems neither the type of work or the general value of the services as indicated by Auspices is a determinant of outgoing (or Actor) interaction behaviors.

TABLE 45
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS, BY AGE

	Young Organizations		Old Organizations		t-test
	(N=13)		(N=20)		
System A	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Variables					
Size of set	10.1	2.7	11.9	.9	2.250**
Network interactions	32.7	14.1	44.3	16.6	2.071**
Sector interactions	40.1	19.2	47.1	18.5	1.000
Variedness	10.7	4.1	13.1	3.0	1.714**
Resource Exchanges	26.5	15.1	34.6	15.2	1.446*
Cooperativeness	9.7	7.7	12.6	7.7	1.017
System B	(N=13)		(N=22)		
Size of set	11.6	3.3	9.9	2.6	2.463***
Network interactions	36.2	15.5	24.6	8.6	2.417***
Sector interactions	43.3	24.2	32.3	12.6	1.333*
Variedness	14.9	3.2	12.7	3.0	1.964**
Resource Exchanges	27.3	15.2	19.7	8.9	1.583*
Cooperativeness	11.2	8.3	6.2	4.8	1.923**

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 46

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT AND SELECTED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES FOR ALL ORGANIZATIONS

System A (N=33)	Number of organiza- tions in set	Network inter- actions	Sector- inter- actions	Community- inter- actions	Varied- ness of inter- actions
Size	-4	18	23	27	20
Degree professional	8	29	29	42**	41**
Service Diversity	3	12	22	16	21
Actual Competition ^a	--	75***	72***	66***	73***
Felt Competition	32*	29	24	33*	31*
Overall Importance	12	32*	35**	40**	23
Scope of Importance	26	43**	50***	51***	46***
Age	23	29	19	11	29
Auspices	-15	12	27	19	23
Mode of Work	10	16	24	24	26
System B (N=35)					
Size	23	-5	-4	16	10
Degree professional	-1	16	23	21	36**
Service Diversity	25	1	-4	15	11
Actual Competition ^a	--	55***	55***	49***	47***
Felt Competition	19	31*	32*	21	26
Overall Importance	58***	34**	32*	56***	44***
Scope of Importance	49***	47***	46***	69***	64***
Age	-27	-44***	-41**	-37**	-32*
Auspices	23	23	34**	35**	30*
Mode of Work	19	35**	39**	42***	37**

^aOrganization measures is substituted for choice measure.

*p .10
**p .05
***p .01

TABLE 47

CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND TYPES
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, ALL ORGANIZATIONS

	Competitive interactions	Reference- group interactions	Simple exchange interactions	Cooperative interactions	Resource exchanges
System A (N=33)					
Size	27	3	20	10	14
Degree professional	20	43**	12	22	29
Service Diversity	15	-7	15	12	11
Actual Competition	-	56***	32*	61***	65***
Felt Competition	32*	26	6	24	25
Overall Importance	19	20	31*	27	33*
Scope of Importance	23	32*	36**	42**	45***
Age	40**	30*	11	16	23
Auspices	11	-2	14	18	11
Mode of Work	15	17	17	7	15
System B (N=35)					
Size	-10	-26	-3	6	-3
Degree professional	11	17	12	8	14
Service Diversity	-3	-24	1	12	2
Actual Competition	-	36**	-6	39**	37**
Felt Competition	32*	50***	11	14	25
Overall Importance	29*	-8	11	44***	29*
Scope of Importance	48***	23	7	50***	39**
Age	-25	-47***	-25	-36**	-41**
Auspices	18	17	8	19	20
Mode of Work	32*	39**	14	22	29*

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 48

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT AND SELECTED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES FOR TREATMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Number of organiza- tions in set	Network inter- actions	Sector- inter- actions	Community- inter- actions	Varied- ness of inter- actions
System A (N=14)					
Size	4	25	29	32	22
Degree professional	-10	23	24	43	39
Service Diversity	-4	2	10	2	10
Actual Competition ^a	--	73***	74***	71***	68***
Felt Competition	27	39	32	40	51*
Overall Importance	19	47*	50*	43	38
Scope of Importance	45	63**	50*	43	68***
Age	21	26	27	30	46*
Auspices	1	18	27	7	15
System B (N=15)					
Size	-6	-28	-5	27	12
Degree professional	-37	-30	-12	-29	-3
Service Diversity	-3	-43	-50*	-20	-27
Actual Competition ^a	--	60**	46*	61**	54**
Felt Competition	-24	12	17	-23	0
Overall Importance	62**	30	25	55**	31
Scope of Importance	35	14	23	71***	57**
Age	5	-30	-44*	-27	-36
Auspices	14	23	40	33	34

^aOrganization measures is substituted for choice measure.

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 49

CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND TYPES
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR TREATMENT ORGANIZATIONS

	Competitive interactions	Reference- group interactions	Simple exchange interactions	Cooperative interactions	Resource exchanges
System A (N=14)					
Size	32	11	29	12	20
Degree professional	13	43	-8	23	23
Service Diversity	5	-15	11	0	1
Actual Competition	--	47*	15	60**	61**
Felt Competition	52*	30	-1	36	30
Overall Importance	32	37	47*	36	47*
Scope of Importance	34	51*	56**	58**	65**
Age	52*	19	-3	16	15
Auspices	6	13	42	17	19
System B (N=15)					
Size	6	-40	-48*	-4	-38
Degree professional	-16	-10	-16	-27	-31
Service Diversity	-31	-50*	-26	-22	-41
Actual Competition	--	36	-13	65***	42
Felt Competition	17	43	11	-12	8
Overall Importance	54**	-18	-33	49**	14
Scope of Importance	51**	-26	-56**	42	-6
Age	-37	-57**	7	-15	-22
Auspices	28	36	-7	13	16

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 50

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT AND SELECTED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES FOR DISTRIBUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

System A (N=19)	Number of organiza- tions in set	Network inter- actions	Sector- inter- actions	Community- inter- actions	Varied- ness of inter- actions
Size	-20	7	20	23	30
Degree professional	25	29	13	16	23
Service Diversity	18	45*	62***	68***	57**
Actual Competition ^a	--	77***	73***	44*	81***
Felt Competition	38	1	-5	6	-16
Overall Importance	-5	-20	-17	22	-23
Scope of Importance	-25	-32	-22	2	-34
Age	35	52**	30	6	34
Auspices	-39*	7	16	27	21
System B (N=20)					
Size	36	6	7	30	21
Degree professional	2	13	14	12	32
Service Diversity	48**	37	41*	51**	41*
Actual Competition ^a	--	46**	56***	36	48**
Felt Competition	35	31	31	28	26
Overall Importance	56***	35	36	60***	50**
Scope of Importance	53**	55**	48**	62***	60***
Age	-44**	-46**	-28	-34	-22
Auspices	19	1	5	14	9

^aOrganization measure is substituted for choice measure.

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 51

CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND TYPES OF
INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR DISTRIBUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

	Competitive interactions	Reference- group interactions	Simple exchange interactions	Cooperative interactions	Resource exchanges
System A (N=19)					
Size	20	-6	3	8	2
Degree professional	17	34	27	19	31
Service Diversity	49**	19	28	47**	41*
Actual Competition	--	74***	62***	63***	72***
Felt Competition	-18	6	7	-2	7
Overall Importance	-28	-44*	-22	0	-16
Scope of Importance	-34	-57**	-40*	-6	-29
Age	44*	69**	46**	24	52**
Auspices	9	-41*	-38	18	-12
System B (N=20)					
Size	-8	-19	7	15	8
Degree professional	4	0	20	8	12
Service Diversity	36	2	21	38*	31
Actual Competition	--	20	-10	10	29
Felt Competition	37	47**	6	20	24
Overall Importance	71***	-2	34	41*	34
Scope of Importance	36	32	39*	48**	49**
Age	3	-33	-48**	-46**	-49**
Auspices	-21	-23	10	9	6

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

TABLE 52

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS BY MODE OF WORK
AND NETWORK POSITION, MEAN SCORES

	Treatment Organizations		Distributive Organizations	
	Low Import- ance	High Import- ance	Low Import- ance	High Import- ance
System A	(N=3)	(N=11)	(N=13)	(N=6)
Resource Exchanges	48.7	34.3	26.3	36.3
Sector interactions	66.3	49.1	35.5	48.3
Network interactions	58.0	41.7	32.2	42.5
Variedness	15.7	11.9	10.5	12.2
System B	(N=6)	(N=9)	(N=11)	(N=9)
Resource Exchanges	27.8	26.3	12.7	29.3
Sector interactions	45.3	53.0	26.3	46.7
Network interactions	43.3	45.3	23.1	42.0
Variedness	13.3	13.6	8.8	13.4

2. Age

In System A Old organizations are higher in the number of organization-set members, Resource Exchanges, and Cooperativeness, but in System B the Young agencies are higher on these interaction measures than the Old (Table 45 and 47). The evidence about Age and other independent variables (discussed in Chapter IV, H_6) showed there is an inconsistent relationship between Age, network position, and specific resources. As mentioned earlier, these data show Age is not an independent characteristic of organizations, and therefore it should be considered in connection with other charter-domain factors.

When the two Mode of Work types are considered, in System A Old-Treatment agencies have more varied relationships and higher competitive interactions than Young-Treatment, but there is no relationship between Age, Resource Exchanges, or Cooperativeness (Tables 48 and 49). System A Old-Distributive agencies have more Network interactions and more Reference-group and Simple Exchange interactions than do Young-Distributive, but there is only a low-moderate correlation between Age and Cooperation for Distributive agencies (Tables 50 and 51). For Treatment agencies there is little relationship between Age and the various types of relationships. In explanation, nine of the 13 Private-Distributive agencies are Old, and only one Public-Distributive agency is Young. Three of the Young-Distributive agencies are highly specialized and in the middle third in Overall Importance.

In System B for both Treatment and Distributive agencies the correlations between Age and interaction measures are negative.

Although there is no relationship between Age and size of organization-set for both types of agencies, Young organizations have higher interaction levels, and there is a low-moderate correlation for Variedness (Tables 48 and 50). System B Treatment organizations show a significant negative correlation between Age and Reference-group interactions, and Distributive agencies show sizable negative correlations in Simple Exchanges and Cooperative interactions as well as in Resource Exchanges.

Age affects interactions differently in these systems because of the characteristics of the Young group. In System B Young agencies are smaller and less diverse than in System A. With fewer internal resources and more charter-related pressures to interact, they seek resources externally. In System A most Young-Public agencies are very diverse and well funded, and therefore, probably need fewer external resources; the other Young agencies are small and highly specialized, requiring fewer resources from other system members.

If ability to attract interaction partners requires valued resources, then unless resource levels are somewhat the same, the effect of Age, or the press for coordination and service integration growing out of the shift in social welfare services in the mid-1960's, cannot be explored. Table 53 compares Young and Old agencies under similar general resource levels (i.e. Overall Importance scores). In both systems when Low Importance agencies are compared by Age, there are no differences in four of the interaction measures, partially because of the wide variations in scores in the several categories. When High Importance agencies are considered, in System A Old agencies are higher in the two general interaction measures and have more

TABLE 53

AGE AND INTERACTIONS, BY NETWORK POSITION

System A

Low Importance

Variables	Young (N=5)		Old (N=11)		t-test
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Network interactions	29.2	13.3	37.7	22.6	.876
Sector interactions	35.4	19.1	40.7	17.9	N.S.
Variedness	10.0	4.4	11.9	3.2	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	25.0	10.2	30.0	16.9	N.S.

High Importance

	Young (N=8)		Old (N=9)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Network interactions	43.0	14.2	53.7	15.0	1.427*
Sector interactions	34.9	17.3	49.7	12.8	1.850**
Variedness	11.1	3.9	14.1	2.4	1.765**
Resource Exchanges	30.1	10.7	40.2	11.3	1.772**

System B

Low Importance

	Young (N=4)		Old (N=13)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Network interactions	37.5	17.5	28.0	10.4	N.S.
Sector interactions	38.8	17.5	31.2	10.1	N.S.
Variedness	11.8	4.5	9.3	4.8	N.S.
Resource Exchanges	23.0	8.3	16.5	8.4	1.204

High Importance

	Young (N=8)		Old (N=10)		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	
Network interactions	51.6	20.2	37.9	9.9	1.651*
Sector interactions	58.0	14.7	43.3	12.1	N.S.
Variedness	15.0	2.9	12.3	2.4	1.259
Resource Exchanges	32.9	13.4	23.8	7.1	1.596*

*p .10

**p .05

Resource Exchanges as well as more varied ties. In System B, the Young agencies are higher on these same measures. The specific agencies making up these Importance categories in each city are fairly similar. In System A five of the eight are fairly large, diverse agencies, and three are mental health agencies. Four serve the poor and/or minorities, and one is a youth-serving organization. In System B three are community centers serving the poor and/or minority population, one serves the elderly, and four offer mental health services. The System B agencies in this category are smaller than those in System A.

Table 54 shows the correlations between the two network position measures and three types of exchanges for Young and Old agencies. Several correlations are of interest. For Old agencies in A, as Overall Importance goes up, so do Simple Exchanges, but the difference occurs in B for Young agencies. In all instances, as the Scope of Importance scores increase so do Cooperative exchanges, and as network position increases, the Variedness of outgoing interactions also increases.²

The following hypothesis concerns Age and interactions:

- H₇ When general resource levels are the same, as compared to Old organizations, Young agencies will:
- a. Have higher levels of Resource Exchanges;
 - b. Have more varied relationships with other organizations.

There is some support for this hypothesis but it is not consistent or very strong. Clearly this is the case for High Importance agencies in City B. For the other three Age/Importance

²Exchange theory predicts this behavior for individuals (Blau, 1964).

TABLE 54

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NETWORK POSITION AND INTERACTIONS, BY AGE

	System A		System B	
	Young	Old	Young	Old
	(N=13)	(N=20)	(N=12)	(N=33)
Correlations of Overall				
Importance with:				
Reference-group exchanges	7	21	3	-28
Simple exchanges	-16	42*	12	-44**
Cooperative exchanges	44	18	20	32
Variedness	25	21	28	70***
Correlations of Scope of				
Importance with:				
Reference-group exchanges	43	56***	30	5
Simple exchanges	10	43*	7	0
Cooperative exchanges	44	65***	33	61***
Variedness	41	58***	70***	57***

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

categories the relationship does not hold. In general, as resource levels (indicated by Overall Importance and Scope of Importance) increase then cooperative exchanges and the variety of exchanges also increase, and this is especially true for the Scope of Importance indicator. (Some Young agencies are in favorable environments and will interact heavily but others are more isolated even though they may have valued resources.) The stimulus to interaction for the post-1960's group apparently depends on local system factors including needs of other agencies, resources allocated, and probably on general standing in the community.³

Resources and interactions

1. General resources

An important general hypothesis in this research is that system-valued resources are prerequisites for extensive interorganizational relationships. Although systems differ in what resources are valued (see Chapter IV) given a domain which includes these services, the organization's ability to interact is enhanced. Table 46 through 52 and Table 55 describe the relationships in these cities.

Considering all the organizations, in both cities the two network position measures are generally highly correlated with the various interaction variables. In System B the relationships are very strong; in System A they are slightly less strong (Tables 46 and 47). Regardless of variations in domain and age, the highly

³City A has two large anti-poverty organizations; City B had one but it 'died' just as our research began. From interview information it seems serving the poor is not as respectable in City B as in City A, and it's not too well regarded in A. (Marcus, 1973).

differentiated nature of the systems or inter-system differences, organizations with valued resources generally have extensive Actor relationships. In both cities, Scope of Importance is highly correlated with Cooperative interactions, although the correlation for Overall Importance with Cooperativeness reaches the specified level only in City B (Table 47).

When Mode of Work is considered, the picture changes. In System A Treatment agencies show positive correlations between ability (position) measures and Sector interactions and Resource Exchanges (Tables 48 and 49). The relationships are very different for Distributive agencies--the correlations are primarily negative and, although only a few reach minimum significance levels, the pattern is consistent (Tables 50 and 51).

In contrast, in City B the relationships between the general resource measures and interactions are in a positive direction for Distributive organizations and less consistent, indeed sometimes negative, for Treatment agencies. As exceptions, there are positive correlations between position measures and Community interactions and Cooperativeness; for Simple Exchanges the relationships are high negative for Treatment agencies and moderately positive for Distributive agencies.

These patterns of differences by Mode by city shown in Table 5 largely parallel those in Table 36 and extensively described in both narrative and tables in Chapter IV when differences by system are discussed. This material will not be restated here but when it is considered with the information in Tables 48 through 55, the system differences are apparent. Even when network position (and presumably

valued domain) is considered, these consistent inter-city differences in characteristics associated with various organization types reappear in the interaction patterns.

Auspices is one indicator of system-valued domain. Table 55 gives the correlations for network position (general resources) and interactions showing the extreme differences between these two systems when only Auspices is controlled. In A, the correlations between the two position measures and the various interaction variables are very high for Private agencies and generally negligible for Public agencies. In B only a few of the correlations for Private organizations are important, but the relationships are very high for Public organizations.

It is difficult to explain these differences, but the inter-system correlations of the Counterpart organizations provide an important clue. As Table 9 indicated, the correlations for the Public-Counterparts--and these are the system dominants in each city--are $r_s = -.70$ and for Private-Counterparts $r_s = .30$. These correlations directly parallel inter-system differences in Actual Competition. This is discussed more in a later section. The following hypothesis concerns general resources.

TABLE 55

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NETWORK POSITION AND INTERACTIONS, BY AUSPICES

	Private Organizations	Public Organizations
System A		
Correlations of Overall Importance with:		
Network interactions	44*	27
Sector interactions	50**	18
Variedness	44*	-1
Resource Exchanges	49**	27
Cooperativeness	47**	9
Simple Exchanges	40*	28
Correlations of Scope of Importance with:		
Network interactions	52**	17
Sector interactions	55**	19
Variedness	51**	14
Resource Exchanges	54**	24
Cooperativeness	47**	1
Simple Exchanges	46**	34
System B		
Correlations of Overall Importance with:		
Network interactions	14	43
Sector interactions	6	54**
Variedness	44**	37
Resource Exchanges	22	49*
Cooperativeness	39*	55**
Simple Exchanges	-9	62**
Correlations of Scope of Importance with:		
Network interactions	32	58**
Sector interactions	18	59**
Variedness	57**	64***
Resource Exchanges	22	59**
Cooperativeness	39*	58**
Simple Exchanges	-9	52**

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

H₈ The higher the level of generally valued resources:

- a. The greater the number of Resource Exchanges;
- b. The more varied the relationships with other organizations;
- c. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

A summary of the relationships shows:

Part a--Resource exchanges and network position

- City A Treatment - general support
- City B Treatment - negligible correlations
- City A Distributive - low-moderate negative correlations
- City B Distributive - general support

Part b--Variedness and network position

- City A Treatment - general support
- City B Treatment - general support
- City A Distributive - moderate negative correlations
- City B Distributive - general support

Part c--Cooperativeness

- City A Treatment - general support
- City B Treatment - general support
- City A Distributive - negligible correlations
- City B Distributive - general support

In two cases there are moderate negative correlations which are in the $-.16$ to $-.34$ range, indicating that some organizations in each type show relationships between valued domain and outgoing interactions and two cases of negligible correlations can be interpreted this way, too.⁴ This means that there is a particular group of agencies (specifics unknown) for whom high network position is fairly strongly associated with low outgoing interaction levels. Considering these findings, the data tentatively support all parts of this hypothesis, and, in general, organizations with high ability to provide valued services, indicated by high number of nominations as interaction

⁴There is evidence for this interpretation in correlations by Auspices: Overall Importance - Resource Exchanges, B Public = .49; B Private = $-.17$; Overall Importance - Cooperativeness, A Public = .09; A Private = .47.

partners and by extensive influence in types of interactions, also are engaged in extensive interorganizational relationships. This is discussed again when the joint effects of ability and competition are considered.

2. Specific resources

a. Size is related to network position (except for City A Distributive organizations) and seems frequently to be a determinant for Target interactions (Tables 27, 28, and 29). The correlations for Size with the various Actor interaction measures show largely negligible or low relationships, and there are only a few significant relationships (Tables 46 to 51). In System B some correlations are negative, indicating smaller organizations have more interaction, and for B Treatment agencies, the correlation between Size and Simple Exchanges is $-.48$. Correlations for Reference-group interactions with Size is also fairly high ($-.40$) in B. For System A Treatment agencies, the correlations are low but positive. One reason may be that the small agencies in City B are primarily Young.

There are several reversed correlations by agency type. For Distributive agencies, the correlations between Size and Size of Set is $-.20$ in A and $.36$ in B; for Treatment agencies Size-Resource Exchanges correlation is $.20$ in A and $-.38$ in B; and when Size and Network interactions are considered, the relationship in A is $.25$ and in B $-.28$. Variedness does not seem related to large size; indeed, for the only correlation over $.30$, size is negatively correlated with Variedness. The next hypothesis is related to the resource of staff size.

H₉ The larger the organizations:

- b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges;
- c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations.

These data do not support either part of this hypothesis. Part a relating size to network position was generally supported (Chapter IV). Certainly the data described above indicate size is connected to interactions in conflicting ways and the conclusion is that although size is an important condition for Target-based interactions, it is not consistently important as a determinant of Actor interactions.

b. Professional staff are considered an important resource because, unlike lower echelon staff, they may be empowered to negotiate for the agency. Material in Chapter IV showed no real relationship between professionalization and network position (Tables 27, 28 and 29). When Tables 46 to 51 are considered, in System A professionalization does seem related to Community interactions and Variedness, and the relationship, while low or low-moderate, does not change when Mode of Work is considered. In System B professionalization is associated with Variedness (Table 46) but when Mode is considered, the relationships are lower. The relationships with Variedness is consistent, but on balance, the relationships shown in Tables 46 to 51 are weak.

Chapter II explained the distortion introduced by the small size of many organizations, and in Chapter IV it was indicated that Professional Ratio as a real resource in interactions may be relatively meaningless for the very small agencies. To amplify that discussion,

Table 56 gives the correlations of Professional Ratio and other measures with Size held constant. The correlations for the large agencies in System B shows high Professional Ratio is related to extensive interactions of several types, but the relationships in System A for large organizations show an opposite trend although the correlations are not very high. For small agencies in A, professional staff is related to interaction levels, but for B small agencies (these are primarily under ten employees) the relationships are low or negative. Forty-four per cent of the System A large agencies are Public-Treatment agencies as compared to 29 per cent Public-Treatment in System B. Further, A's Public-Treatment agencies are more diverse than B's (Tables 25 and 26). For Treatment agencies diversity is not a stimulus for interaction, and this seems to be a reason for the pattern of relationships for the large agencies shown in Table 56.

A very high proportion of System B agencies are very small. Indeed, 72 per cent of the small agencies have under ten employees. In System A average organization size is higher, and only 29 per cent of the small agencies are in the under ten employee category. Thus, for small agencies in A, Professional Ratio has more meaning as a measure, and the data show it is a factor in interorganizational relationships.

These data, combined with extensive material in previous chapters show distribution of organizations in the systems and other system differences, indicate that when agencies need to seek resources from other sources, professional staff is an important factor in establishing these relationships. In System B large agencies are

less diverse, and may need other agencies' services for their clients. This is particularly true for these primarily low diversity agencies. Many are Young and seek service integration. A professionalized staff enables them to do that. In System A the large agencies provide more services internally and have less need for resources from the other agencies. The small System A agencies are not so handicapped by size as in System B, and professional staff seem to be a resource in developing inter-agency relationships, especially Cooperative relationships. The following hypotheses relate to the resource of professionalized staff.

- H₁₀ Regardless of Mode of Work, the higher the Professional Ratio:
- b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges;
 - c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations;
 - d. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

Professional Ratio is a resource only when other conditions stimulate interactions (Table 56). When organizations need resources, then having a high proportion of professionals seems to increase interactions. If agencies can meet service-related needs using their own resources, have secure sources of funds (Public), and are sufficiently large to release staff from organizational maintenance and direct service responsibilities, then the higher the Professional Ratio the more interactions established. Professional Ratio is consistently associated with Variedness.

In summary, when the very small organizations are excluded, the data tend to support the idea of the value of professional employees in developing cooperative relationship and increasing agency interactions generally, but probably organizations must have some

TABLE 56

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROFESSIONALIZATION
AND INTERACTIONS, BY SIZE

	System A (N=16)	System B (N=17)
Large organizations		
Correlations of Degree professional with:		
Overall Importance	-17	37
Network interactions	-27	52**
Variedness	2	55**
Reference-group interactions	4	23
Simple Exchanges	-26	16
Cooperativeness	-25	46*
Actual Competition	-32	40
Small organizations	(N=17)	(N=18)
Correlations of Degree professional with:		
Overall Importance	34	-43*
Network interactions	58**	-12
Variedness	50**	15
Reference-group interactions	72***	11
Simple Exchanges	33	2
Cooperativeness	42*	-21
Actual Competition	42*	-14

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

slack for this to be an important factor.

c. When Service Diversity as a resource is considered, the data related to H_{11} described in Chapter IV show that diversity of valued services is a determinant of system position but that the two systems differ in the value placed on services offered by the two Modes of Work. In one system Treatment Diversity is tied to high incoming interaction, while in the other Distributive Diversity is related to high Target interactions. The effect of Service Diversity on Actor interactions is expected to show higher incoming resource exchange interactions for diversified Treatment agencies, but a lower level of outgoing interactions since diverse Treatment agencies need fewer services from external sources. H_{12} and H_{13} are considered together and test ideas about the resource of services.

H_{12} For Treatment agencies, the higher the Service Diversity:

- a. The higher the Resource Exchanger level (Target);
- b. The lower the level of Resource Exchanges (Actor);
- c. The lower the level of Cooperativeness.

H_{13} For Distributive organizations, the higher the Service Diversity:

- a. The higher the Resource Exchanger level (Target);
- b. The higher the level of Resource Exchanges (Actor);
- c. The higher the level of Cooperativeness.

Table 57 gives the correlations between Service Diversity and Resource Supplier measures for the different Modes of work.

These data repeat the findings presented earlier showing a high relationship between Service Diversity and the Target-based variable Resource Supplier for System A Treatment and System B

TABLE 57

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND TARGET
INTERACTIONS, BY MODE OF WORK

	Treatment Organizations	Distributive Organizations
System A	(N=14)	(N=19)
Correlations between Service Diversity and Resource Supplier	53**	23
System B	(N=15)	(N=20)
Correlations between Service Diversity and Resource Supplier	13	49**

**p .05

Distributive organizations and much lower, although positive, correlations for the other types. As discussed earlier, some System A Distributive and System B Treatment agencies are diverse but not needed by other agencies, and hence do not attract nominations for non-competitive interactions. No information is presently available to additionally clarify these relationships.

With increased diversity Treatment agencies are expected to have fewer outgoing non-competitive interactions (Resource Exchanges), and the data in Tables 49 and 51 show a fairly high negative correlation ($-.41$) for System B Treatment agencies which almost reaches the minimum significance level ($df\ 14\ p.10=.46$). The negligible correlation of $.01$ for System A Treatment agencies, when considered with negligible correlations for these variables by Auspices (not shown), means the hypothesis is not supported with System A data. Again, for System A Treatment agencies there is no relationship between Diversity and Cooperativeness, and the relationship in City B is low-moderate but in the expected direction.

In summary, these data do not consistently or strongly support H_{12} and do not suggest an alternative hypothesis.

Considering interactions for Distributive agencies, there is somewhat stronger support for H_{12a} , and in both cities diversity of Distributive services is related to more incoming non-competitive interactions, although the correlations are weaker in A than in B (Table 57). The data for A show strong support for H_{13b} and H_{13c} ; Tables 49 and 51 show high correlations between Service Diversity and both Resources Exchanges and Cooperativeness ($.41$ and $.47$). For B the relationships are in the expected direction but are moderate ($.31$ and $.38$).

These data consistently support the idea that diversity of services for Distributive agencies is a stimulus to the development of interorganizational relationships.

Attitudes about competition and interactions

Feelings about competitive pressures may stimulate agency directors to seek exchange relationships with other organizations, but expressed attitudes may be a highly inadequate basis for predicting behavior, particularly when professional norms support ideals of agency teamwork to meet client needs and limit expressions about competition. Two measures of competition are required, one attitudinal and the other behavioral. This model of interorganizational relationships assumes ability to contribute valued resources is a necessary ingredient for inter-agency relationships or exchange transactions. Competition may be considered but if organizational ability is low, interactions will be minimal. Thus,

H₁₉ Because interorganizational relationships require resources, Felt Competition level is unrelated to interaction level.

Some agencies are high in perceptions of competitive pressures as well as in actual competitive interactions. With the limited number of cases in each city it is impossible to separate these effects. Table 27 shows the correlation between Actual Competition and Felt Competition for all agencies is .32, but when Mode of Work is considered the relationships change. Correlations between the two competition measures are fairly strong for System A Treatment organizations (.52); but only moderate for System B Distributive agencies (.37), low positive for System B Treatment agencies (.17), and low negative for System A Distributive organizations (-.18). The correlations between Actual and Felt Competition may account for some of the relationship between Felt Competition and interaction levels for

System A Treatment and System B Distributive agencies. Therefore, comparisons should be between Felt Competition and types of Resource Exchanges for categories with minimal relationship between the two measures.

The two categories which had low correlations between Actual and Felt Competition, A Distributive and B Treatment, also have negligible correlations for the various types of transactions and Felt Competition, with only one exception--B Treatment agencies have a fairly high correlation between Felt Competition and Reference-group interactions. For A Treatment organizations there are some moderate correlations with Resource Exchanges and two components, Cooperative and Reference-group interactions; for B Distributive agencies the correlation with Reference-group interactions is strong but low for other exchange types (Tables 49 and 51).

Testing the relationship of Felt Competition with interaction measures requires considering both organization ability and the interrelationship of competition measures. Since organizations under Public sponsorship generally provide resources more valued by the other agencies in the local network, one way to get around the limitation imposed by small number of cases is to examine the relationship between Felt Competition and interaction behaviors for Public and Private agencies separately. This permits estimates of the effect of ability coupled with competition. Table 58 gives correlations between the competition measures and interactions by Auspices. Note that in two instances there are high correlations between Felt Competition and Actual Competition which affect the apparent relationships between Felt Competition and interactions.

In the System A Public group (i.e. the high resource group) the correlations for Felt Competition and these same measures are very low. Turning to System B Public agencies, the same strong pattern of high correlations

TABLE 58

COMPETITION AND INTERACTIONS, BY AUSPICES

System A	Public (N=14)		Private (N=19)	
	Actual	Felt	Actual	Felt
	Compe-	Compe-	Compe-	Compe-
Correlations of:	tition	tition	tition	tition
with interaction measures				
Size of set	42	-9	38	42*
Network interactions	81**	-3	72***	53**
Sector interactions	79***	5	70***	49**
Community interactions	62**	15	68***	54**
Variedness	85***	23	67***	48**
Resource Exchanges	79***	-4	59***	45*
Cooperative interactions	76***	6	55**	41*
Simple Exchanges	71***	-17	14	22
Reference-group interactions	82***	-6	41*	44*
Actual Competition	---	-1	---	57**

System B	Public (N=15)		Private (N=20)	
Correlations of:				
with interaction measures				
Size of set	57**	1	13	38*
Network interactions	84***	38	31	33
Sector interactions	75***	40	35	40*
Community interactions	60**	35	44**	22
Variedness	54**	58**	38*	14
Resource Exchanges	79***	27	13	30
Cooperative interactions	64***	21	11	15
Simple Exchanges	38	-2	-32	18
Reference-group interactions	63**	53*	0	54**
Actual Competition	---	56**	---	13

*p .10

**p .05

***p .01

appears between Actual Competition and the interaction measures. The high correlation between Actual and Felt Competition probably explains these scores (Table 58).

As shown in Chapter IV, Private agencies on the whole offer less valued services than Public agencies. In System A the correlation between Actual and Felt Competition for Private agencies is very high (Table 58). The correlations between the competition measures and interaction variables are generally high but the relationships between Actual Competition and the various interaction behavior measures are much stronger than those between Felt Competition and interactions, indicating that the interactions between these two measures leads to the apparent relationship.

For System B Private organizations the relationship between Actual and Felt Competition is very low. For the most part the competition variables are not highly related to interaction levels in this group. Felt Competition is associated with Size of Set and Sector interactions, and the correlation between Felt Competition and Reference-group interactions is strong. No relationship exists between Actual Competition and Reference-group interactions. Actual Competition is related to Community interaction and Variedness, and there is an interesting moderate negative relationship between Actual Competition and Simple Exchanges (Table 58). This set of data about Private agencies when considered with other information about resources for Private agencies shows the intervening effect of ability on the relationship between Competition and interactions. This is discussed more in a later section.

In System B 62 per cent of the Private agencies are small, and these small agencies are generally very small. As Table 13 showed, the very small agencies in System B are extremely low in the general resource measures. Further, the Private-Counterpart agencies also are low in resources (Table 14); 71 per cent of the low importance group are Private (Table 18); the Private agencies are very low in Resource Supplier scores (Table 20); and the Private-Distributive type (sixty-five per cent of System B Private are Distributive) is the lowest group in terms of position as Resource Supplier (Table 26). Certainly there is sufficient evidence about the general weakness of most System B Private agencies. Although in both systems Private agencies are lower in the network position measures, the Private group in A is higher in ability than the B group.

Considering these findings, when Felt Competition is coupled with resources and not correlated with Actual Competition (System A Public), then the relationships between Felt Competition and interactions are negligible. Even when the High Competition, high ability agencies are also high in Felt Competition (System B Public), Felt Competition is not as strongly correlated with interactions as is Actual Competition. Low ability agencies (System B Private) show lower correlations between both competition measures and interactions than do somewhat higher ability agencies (System A Private), and for System A Private agencies it is impossible to identify the effect of Felt Competition because of the high correlations between the two competition measures. These findings support the idea that expressed attitudes about competition is not a good predictor of interorganizational relationships. Thus, if only perceptual measures are used,

the importance of competition as a cause of interorganizational relationships is missed.

The weight of evidence about the relationship of Felt Competition and interaction patterns fails to support H_{19} . Ability is an important factor in developing such interactions.

Competition and interaction

This research model of interorganizational relationships among social service agencies assumes relationships are caused by (1) work-related, service delivery needs for the resources of other agencies, and (2) scarcity and competition which stimulates interaction to gain resources by exchange with others in the group of agencies sharing the local pool of tangible and intangible resources connected with social services. Exchange theory predicts exchanges will not continue over time unless there is a balance between rewards and costs. When cross-sectional instead of longitudinal data are used, then this rewards-minus-costs-equals-profit idea can be partially tested by assuming ability to exchange valued resources is required to establish extensive relationships, or that probable rewards are needed to make profit seem possible.

The model assumes some interactions will occur regardless of competition or ability because the local social services sector is made up of interdependent parts. Each part, the agency, is responsible for one or more pieces of the whole local services package. This interdependence produces some interactions. How many is not known, but for this type of relatively passive interaction, competition is probably of minimal importance. Competition without ability may lead agencies to seek exchange relationships, and they may have

Reference-group and/or Simple Exchange interactions which stem from system interdependencies. But without generally valued resources and the requisite staff, extensive relationships, particularly cooperative interrelationships which require planning and commitment, cannot be established.

Test of the general model

To support the thrust of this model, these data need to show: (1) work-related factors do affect interaction patterns; (2) ability is related to outgoing interactions; and (3) competition stimulates increases in interaction levels when ability exists.

Reviewing the general pattern of the findings to this point, there is no relationship between the type of work (Mode) and network position (i.e., measures of generally valued resources), but there is a relationship between sponsorship and importance. Thus, Auspices is an indicator the organization has system-valued resources. As shown, Mode of Work alone does not affect outgoing interaction levels, but, in general, outgoing interactions do increase as importance to other organizations increases, i.e., as position in the hierarchy increases. Hence, ability is an important factor in interactions.

Work-related factors stimulate varying degrees of outgoing interactions. When Treatment organizations are diverse and can provide many system-valued services, they do not need to seek resources outside their own boundaries. In contrast, diversity stimulates Distributive agencies to establish more extensive relationships. Staff size affects the organization's position when its' domain is generally valued but is of limited importance for low position

agencies. A highly professionalized agency can develop extensive interactions when its work stimulates such transactions and the resources it has are needed by other agencies, but professional staffing does not lead to interaction unless other conditions are met. These data provide no direct information about the specific service delivery needs agencies have which stimulate exchanges with particular agencies but do show work is a factor in interaction patterns.

Age is another clue to the interaction pressures generated by work or charter-domain factors. When Age is coupled with system importance and resources, then recently established agencies tend to have more interorganizational ties than the older group, but ability is a determining factor as well as Age. The data have shown that younger agencies cannot develop extensive interorganizational linkages only because of staff perspectives and desires or in response to stimuli from parent organizations or funding sources.

In summary, these data have supported the first two parts of the model -- various aspects of service delivery and work-related stimuli are connected with agency interactions, but ability (i.e., system-valued resources) is required before extensive interactions occur.

Further, there is not a consistent relationship between organizational characteristics and either competition measure. Many organizations with valued resources are high in Actual Competition but other high ability agencies are not involved in a large number of competitive ties. This permits examining the effect of competition when ability is held constant. If competition is the spur to

interaction, high ability agencies with high competitiveness will be involved in more outgoing interactions than the ability group with low competition scores. Thus:

- H₂₀ Considering work needs and resource levels, the higher the level of competition:
- a. The more extensive the interactions with other organizations;
 - b. The higher the level of Cooperativeness;
 - c. The more varied the relationships with other organizations.

Table 46 showed consistently very high positive correlations between Actual Competition and the three general interaction categories, and high correlations between competition and Variedness.⁵ These relationships hold when Mode of Work is considered (Tables 48 and 50).

Competition stimulates extensive interactions with other organizations, but it is particularly a factor in reference-group and Cooperative interactions (Tables 47, 49, and 51). The association with Simple Exchanges is less clear because these interactions are frequently part of the normal work of the organization and may not require purposive action by the agency or indicate dependency. Reference-group ties involve intangible transactions of influence, cooperation, support, and favorable opinion -- all resources needed to ensure legitimacy within the set of agencies and valued domain. Cooperation does require commitment of resources and at least partial surrender of autonomy, and thus clearly involves purposive and

⁵In these tables the organization-based measure is substituted for the choice-based measure of Actual Competition when needed to avoid the embeddedness problem discussed in Chapter II.

tangible exchanges.⁶

There are high positive correlations between Actual Competition and Cooperativeness in both cities, and when Mode is considered, this relationship holds for all cases except System B Distributive organizations (Tables 49 and 51). Ten of these are small Private agencies which are very low in valued resources (discussed above). For such agencies, competition cannot stimulate interactions. The relationships shown in Table 51 for Distributive agencies are reflected in the Public-Private scores shown in Table 58. These findings strongly support the idea that competition leads to planned interactions involving commitment of organizational resources. The more competitive the organization, the more likely it is to establish cooperative interactions and to develop highly varied interactions.⁷

There are high positive correlations between Actual Competition and Cooperativeness in both systems, and when Mode is considered, the relationship continues except for System B Distributive organizations, and in B this type is very low in valued resources.⁸

For most agencies high Competition also leads to high Reference-group interactions, as expected, although the correlation for these variables for System B Treatment agencies is moderate, (.36), and for B Distributive agencies it is low (.20). These low correlations seem suprising as weak agencies might seek cooperation and support and

⁶Appendix B gives the questions used in these three aspects of the Resource Exchanges variable.

⁷Because of the nature of the design and the character of the variable Variedness, a high score indicates high number of cooperative interactions.

⁸Reasons for these relationships were discussed in the previous section describing Public-Private correlations shown in Table 58.

might want the good opinions of other organizations to gain stature. But information about the specific agencies involved leads to a different interpretation. The System B Distributive group (N=20) includes nine agencies which are low in Overall Importance and very low in Sector choices -- they make fewer than 35 choices for the 19 interaction questions. They are very isolated. All but one of these agencies have either very strong private constituencies or an extremely secure public funding base. Three others are young and well funded. Thus, sixty per cent are very secure agencies, with minimal motivation toward the kinds of dependencies involved in Reference-group interactions.

As discussed in the previous section, Table 58 gives additional confirmation of the general model. For organizations with generally valued resources, i.e., important to others in the set of agencies, high Actual Competition is very strongly correlated with the interaction measures, and even in System B the Private agencies have high correlations between Actual Competition and Variedness, although the association with Cooperativeness is low. As noted in Chapter IV, these are the generally powerless organizations in that system. Thus, for System B organizations with ability, Actual Competition is highly correlated with interactions. The data for the Private agencies in City A do not permit concluding that ability is an intervening variable permitting high competition to lead to extensive interactions, because it is impossible to disentangle the valued resource factor for Private agencies or compare High and Low Importance Private agencies. When all the information about resources of System A Private agencies as compared with System B Private

organizations is considered, the data do suggest ability is the determinant.

The Counterpart data provides additional information permitting inferences. Table 9 gave the between-system correlations and showed high negative correlations for Public-Counterparts in both Actual Competition and Network interaction. System B's major public agencies are lower in both Actual Competition and interactions than A's, yet they have approximately the same resources when the general differences between the cities are considered. Differences in competitive interactions are associated with differences in the extensiveness of network relationships.

Table 59 gives the mean scores for organizational characteristics and interaction levels under similar network position or importance by varying levels of competition. Although the figures do not permit t-tests, the pattern of the mean scores is highly suggestive. For High Importance organizations both Network and Sector interaction levels are considerably higher in the High Competition state than in Low Competition, and the pattern of variances in other tables indicates these differences, except for Variedness, are probably significant. In System A the High Competition-High Importance agencies are larger but in System B they are considerably smaller, showing that the major Public-Distributive agencies in B fall in the Low Competition group, in contrast to A. When competition is high, Low Importance agencies in System A also have much higher interaction scores than the Low Competition group. In System B the differences between the High and Low Competition groups are much less, and this seems to be related to ability.

TABLE 59

ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS AND INTERACTION LEVELS,
BY NETWORK POSITION AND COMPETITION, MEAN SCORES

	High Importance		Low Importance	
	High Actual Compe- tition	Low Actual Compe- tition	High Actual Compe- tition	Low Actual Compe- tition
System A	(N=9)	(N=8)	(N=7)	(N=9)
Organizational characteristics				
Size	60.3	35.1	17.7	22.8
Service Diversity	6.0	5.9	5.3	4.8
Degree professional	.55	.46	.42	.29
Felt Competition	2.43	2.19	2.95	1.82
Interaction characteristics				
Network interactions	56.2	30.5	49.0	24.2
Sector interactions	59.4	37.2	54.3	27.8
Variedness	14.9	10.2	14.3	9.0
Resource Exchanges	42.3	27.8	37.9	21.1
System B	(N=12)	(N=6)	(N=7)	(N=10)
Organizational characteristics				
Size	19.5	45.3	10.6	17.0
Service Diversity	4.6	5.2	4.3	3.5
Degree professional	.52	.47	.48	.47
Felt Competition	2.39	2.17	2.60	2.25
Interaction characteristics				
Network interactions	50.3	31.3	34.6	27.2
Sector interactions	53.9	41.7	36.1	30.8
Variedness	13.9	12.7	11.9	9.4
Resource Exchanges	30.1	23.3	17.4	18.5

These data consistently provide strong support for the hypothesis. When ability is present, the higher the competition, the higher the interaction level. Further, when coupled with ability, competition leads to cooperation, to deliberately planned resource acquisition transactions. The other two types of interactions, i.e., Reference-group and Simple Exchanges, seem to be the result of regular work or interdependence; cooperative transactions involve active, seeking behavior by the organizations.

Blalock suggests we focus upon the "explanatory power of a number of independent variables taken together, rather than in the relationship between the dependent variable of each of the independent variables taken separately (Blalock, 1972: 454)." Table 60 presents squared multiple correlations for independent variables which seem to have the greatest significance. When Competition is combined with Importance (ability), a sizable percentage of the variation in interaction patterns is explained. The combination of Importance, Competition, Auspices, and Size has more explanatory power in City A than in City B, but in both cities the combination of Importance and Competition has the greatest explanatory power.

Considered together, these findings about the relationship of competition and interaction levels strongly support the general model and the specific hypothesis about the causal effect of high competition on extensive interactions (H_{20}). All social service agencies are involved in some inter-agency transactions. When an agency has resources others seek, outgoing interactions also are higher but outgoing interactions increase to an even greater extent when the organization is involved in a highly competitive environment.

TABLE 60
MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS

	City A	City B
Independent Variables to Sector Interactions	R^2	R^2
Importance	12	10
Plus Actual Competition	55	38
Plus Auspices	57	40
Plus Size	61	45

Competition alone is not a sufficient stimulus for developing extensive ties with other social agencies, but when the organization has bargaining power, then high competition leads to very extensive relationships, including establishing Cooperative exchanges which involve a commitment of agency resources.

Summary

This chapter examined system differences in interaction patterns and the relationship of the independent variables to the organizations' interaction strategies. When the systems are compared, the data show two major differences between these systems: (1) Competitiveness is much higher in System A than in B as measured by Actual Competition although reported competitive pressures are similar (Table 12). Even when very similar agencies are considered, there are sizable system differences in competitiveness (Tables 9 and 14). (2) Interaction levels are much higher in System A than in System B, including higher Resource Exchanges scores and higher Cooperativeness, and this is true for the highly similar Counterpart organizations as well. Thus, there is a system level relationship between competitiveness and the patterns of interorganizational relationships.

One idea in the literature is that work-related factors stimulate interorganizational relationships. This analysis assumes some interactions are part of the division of labor in this sector of local communities. Other interactions may be related to aspects of service delivery but are not primarily stimulated by client considerations. Instead, extensive interactions occur because of resource interdependence and needs of organizations for material and authority

resources. Thus, a series of hypotheses tested the importance of various charter-domain factors. As the pattern of the findings shows, the general type of work is not connected with the level of outgoing exchange relationships (Actor interactions), although it is a factor when incoming interactions (Target interactions) are considered and is, therefore, an important aspect of the organization's position within the system. Apparently, there is no group of organizations in either system which is stimulated by service delivery and client service pressures to be involved in an extensive pattern of both incoming and outgoing relationships. (See Tables 39 through 44.)

For many younger agencies there are pressures from funding organizations and their general orientation to service delivery to develop new patterns of services for clients and coordinated or integrated services. These data show that only some of these newer style agencies are involved in extensive interactions and cooperative relationships because some of them have very few resources other agencies value. They lack the ability to engage in interaction even when stimulated by service ideals (Tables 45 through 51). Whether these newer agencies develop extensive resource exchanges depends upon system conditions and their general standing in the community in addition to their specific programs and resources.

An important part of this general model is that ability to attract interaction partners is a prerequisite to interactions. Further, even when ability is present, competition is the major stimulus for interagency cooperation and extensive interorganizational relationships. In general, these data show that ability is an important determinant of interaction strategy, and organizations with command

over valued resources, or those with power, tend to be involved in more ties with other organizations than those with fewer resources (Tables 52 through 55).

There are some organizations which do not fit this pattern; they have resources others want (high system position) but are relatively uninvolved with other members of the system. Some of these are the system dominants.

The influence of staff on interaction patterns is difficult to judge. Clearly, the size of the organization is not related to its interaction strategy, but the degree the staff is professional does seem to be an important determinant. Because System B has so many very small agencies, it is best to test the relationship between staffing patterns and interaction strategy only in System A, and the data show that a professionalized staff is an important factor in establishing varied relationships with other conditions which stimulate interaction are also present (Tables 46 through 51 and 56). Knowing that an organization has a high proportion of professional employees does not help identify its interaction strategy.

In order to test the general model it is necessary to examine the effect of competition without considering ability. A series of steps in the analysis explored the relationship between competition pressures, reported by directors, the competitive behaviors of the organizations; and interaction strategies. (See Tables 58 through 60.) Because there are high correlations between Actual and Felt Competition for some types of agencies and because of the relationship between Actual Competition and ability (or power), it is complex to examine the effect of competition alone.

But, regardless of the difficulties, it is possible to see a consistent theme running through these findings which shows competition by itself does not lead to extensive interactions. Competitive pressures are not a factor in stimulating interrelationships. When Felt Competition is coupled with resources, but not with Actual Competition, then there are negligible relationships with interaction levels. When agencies are low in resources, neither high Felt Competition, nor high Actual Competition is related to interaction patterns. Although there are high positive correlations between Actual Competition and Cooperativeness, one reason for this is the correlation between power (ability) and Actual Competition. Organizations which are high in power and low in competitiveness have lower levels of interorganizational relationships than those high in power and high in competitiveness. The explanatory value of the two variables of competition and power considered together is very great (Table 60). By itself competition is not a sufficient stimulus to the development of extensive ties with other agencies. By itself ability or power stimulates some interactions and even when competition is low, the interaction level is higher for organizations with system-valued resources than for those with fewer resources but high competition. Significantly, when the organization has bargaining power, then high competition leads to extensive relationships. Thus, the pattern of relationships shown by these data provide very strong support to the general model for this research (Chapter I).

CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The problems under investigation in this study were the patterns and determinants of organizational interactions in two social service systems. Using information about 68 agencies in two middle size cities collected from interviews with the agency director, organizational records and a self-administered questionnaire completed by the director, a series of hypotheses about interorganizational relationships were tested. The general model for the research assumes power and competition for resources determine interorganizational relationships in the social services sector, although it is recognized that some interactions occur because of the division of labor in this sector.

Three general questions guided this analysis.

1. What relationships with similar organizations do social agencies develop? What are the interaction patterns in local agency networks?
2. What are the relationships between organizational resources, agency position in the organizational stratification system, and interactions with similar organizations?
3. How does competition for resources affect the pattern of interorganizational relationships in local social service systems?

The research emphasized power relationships. Although the major focus of the analysis was on the interaction behavior of types of organizations within these two systems, characteristics of the systems were considered as well.

The findings provide very strong support for the general political economy framework, and the research strategy developed provides a basis for additional work within this powerful integrative perspective. A series of hypotheses derived from major trends of past empirical work in this field received little support. Although organization size and domain are, to some extent, related to system power, when systems are compared, it is evident that similar organizations are positioned differently in social space or have different ecological niches within the systems. Conditions characteristic of the network as a whole are important determinants of agency inter-organizational relationships because system factors affect the organization's needs and its ability to attract interaction partners. The data provided strong support for the idea that the configuration of an interorganizational network affects the interactions of individual member organizations (H. Aldrich, 1974).

By using organization indicators and measures developed from sociometric choice questions, this research provides a workable way to conceptualize and measure a population of organizations in network terms and to develop network-level indicators. The pattern of these findings illustrates the need to move from a focus on individual organizations, perceptual measures, and internal characteristics and develop a body of data about the organization's primary environment, the network, and the impact of the group of loosely integrated members on the focal organization.

This chapter reexamines some important aspects of system differences as these relate to organizational interaction behaviors and discusses the effects of power and competition on the structure

of local social service systems. Some implications of these data for social planning are considered, and a final section considers the contribution of this research to the thorny problems of methodology in interorganizational research.

System differences and interorganizational relationships

The limited body of empirical findings in the interorganizational literature primarily focuses on Actor organizations seeking material and authority resources through exchange relationships with other social service organizations. There is little attention to relationships within systems of organizations or the impact of the system on the organization's interactions. This focus, by directing attention to the individual organizations, develops specific ideas about the effect of organization characteristics on exchange relationships rather than considering the organization's social setting as well.

Yet, the literature pictures social service organizations embedded in a network of similar agencies, interacting with each other in the process of service delivery and seeking material and authority resources through exchange relationships with each other. The organizations are considered to be in function interdependence (i.e., interacting to attain work objectives) and to have resource interdependence because of resource allocation procedures. Thus, the network of other social service agencies is a key factor as organizations seek to meet work and maintenance needs. But, if these organizations are members of interdependent systems, then characteristics of the network (their primary environment) will not only influence aspects of the organization's internal characteristics but will set the conditions under which interactions can occur regardless of organizational factors.

The focus on organizational characteristics is very limited. There is no reason to assume agencies can or do act unaffected by the social setting in which they operate. The open-system perspective on organizations assumes the environment influences organizational structure and process. These data go further to show the environment influences their external behavior.

Further, there is no reason to assume social service systems are similar. These local systems are emergent phenomena and may very well differ in important characteristics. The pattern of inter-organizational relationships may be reciprocal or lopsided; the system may be dominated by a few members with subordinates interacting by indirect ties through the dominants, or there may be few dominants and members in contact with most other members of the system (Benson, 1974). The collection of services and programs offered by the system to local residents may vary since these reflect a series of historical decisions, and the system's domain produces a collection of needs and resources which may affect the ability of the Actor organization to develop resource exchanges with system members. The point is, the nature of the systems may vary, and variations in system characteristics will necessarily affect the individual organization's interaction behavior. Both the social setting and agency characteristics are related to interorganizational relationships.

This research assumes both the larger society and the local community affect the characteristics of the systems and that system characteristics affect the individual organization in interaction. Because data come from only two systems, no hypotheses about the effect of community characteristics on the systems are tested. Instead, the

data are used to show there are important differences between these systems in service emphases, the allocation of resources within the systems, the relative position within the local hierarchy of similar agencies, degree of competitiveness, and the extensiveness of resource exchanges.

These network differences relate to organizational power, and power is importantly related to interaction patterns. To illustrate, as the mix of services offered by systems varies, the resources needed by system members may differ. The agency's position in the organizational hierarchy will be tied to the nature of its work, its function in terms of system needs, and does not depend only upon internal resources. The needs of the system as a whole have an important impact on the organization's ability to develop resource exchanges.

Chapter III described certain demographic differences which seem to be factors in the evident difference in service emphases, including: pressure from two minorities in City A instead of one as in City B; the different emphases in expenditures of public funds; various population differences in age, heterogeneity, and employment sites; and the unusual relationships between income and public assistance payments for Negro and Spanish families.

These system differences in service emphases lead to a different set of needed resources for member agencies. The systems are similar in organizational composition (Tables 4 and 9) but differ in the relative importance to the system of the various types of agencies (Table 6). System importance, or power, indicates ability to provide valued services and is a better predictor of interactions than the specific organization characteristics of size, staffing patterns, service diversity, age, or sponsorship (Chapter V).

When the body of evidence is considered, it is clear that the agency's level of specific resources is not a determinant of either its power or its interactions, although size is a factor when coupled with valued functions. Neither type of work (Mode) or age is consistently related to network position or interactions. Public sponsorship is an important factor, and generally Public agencies are higher in position than the Private agencies, but this is because a large number of the Public group are those agencies which are the only source for key, basic, expensive services. Even when sponsorship is considered, system differences in the service mix seem to produce a different distribution of the variable Overall Importance (system position). For example, public sponsorship is not associated with Importance for Treatment agencies in System B but is in System A (Chapter IV). Several pieces of evidence in Chapter IV show that the type of services offered by the Treatment agencies in System B are not as required by system members as those services offered by the Distributive agencies, and the opposite pattern consistently appears in System A and Treatment agency services are more valued.

The study includes data from 21 agencies in each system which are chapters or offices of the major state and/or national agencies, and the differences associated with the system positions of these Counterpart agencies provide additional evidence about significant system differences. Although some of the Public Counterparts are very important in each system, when the other Public-Counterparts and the Private-Counterparts are considered, there are wide variations in system positions and interaction patterns. These Counterpart agencies provide similar services in each city and have the same general

domain, but for many their functions are differently valued by the other members of the system.

System position, an indicator of system valued resources, is a measure of power showing command over resources. Throughout this analysis the data have shown differences in the types of resources valued by the members of these different systems, and this is connected to differences in the ability of organizations to develop resource exchanges. Thus, differences in needs within the systems translate into different interaction patterns for the member agencies. System characteristics as well as organizational characteristics determine interactions. Thus, the data support the idea that "within networks organizations differ in power, and some gain power over other members because of characteristics of the network (Chapter I, page 28)."

As Benson (1974) argues, there may be system-level differences in interaction patterns. These data show significant differences between these two systems. First, System B has a much lower level of interactions than does System A (Tables 10 and 11). In both systems a few large public agencies have high Target interaction scores (i.e., receive many sociometric choices) but in System B twice as many agencies receive fewer than 20 nominations as compared to System A (Table 10; A=8, B=17). System A is characterized by a large number of social isolates. In addition, System A has significantly higher Actor interaction scores (Table 11).

As noted in Chapter I, the exchange perspective developed by Levine and White (1961), and widely discussed and utilized, assumes

the needed resources exist in the system and can be obtained through interactions, that organizations will share resources, and that the system is roughly balanced. These data do not support that view of social service systems. Unless organizations are willing and able to exchange, resources cannot be obtained through interactions. These data show that relationships are very one-sided in both systems. Organization-set size in both systems is about 11 (Table 11), but the number of reciprocal relationships is much smaller (Table 61). In System A the mean number of organizations with which Actor organizations have reciprocity is about 6 and in System B only 3.5.¹ Relationships are very one-sided in both systems. Some high position organizations make few outgoing choices, e.g., high diversity Treatment agencies and the major Public-Distributive agencies. Many organizations are rarely chosen by others.

When linkages involving the mutual exchange of three or more of the 14 different resource exchange items are considered, the mean number of this type of strong reciprocal exchange is 2.48 for members of System A and 1.75 for System B members. Forty-eight per cent of the System A organizations are involved in three or more strong reciprocal resource exchanges as compared to 23 per cent in System B. In addition, the number of strong reciprocal interactions is larger in System A than in System B (A=82, B=62).

¹Reciprocity is not limited to an exchange of the same resources between agencies. It is measured by the mutual set memberships over the entire range of interaction questions and does not imply similar resources are exchanged, e.g., information can be the resource identified in A's choice of B as a partner, but B may report A is a partner in competition or referrals.

TABLE 61

STRONG RECIPROCAL RESOURCE EXCHANGE INTERACTIONS, BY SYSTEM


	System A		System B	
Number of strong reciprocal interactions ^a	82		62	
Mean number of strong reciprocal interactions	2.48		1.75	
Distribution of reciprocal scores	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
None	4	12%	5	14%
1-2	13	39	22	63
3-4	12	36	6	17
5 or more	4	12	2	6
Total	33	99%	35	100%

^aThis measure of strong reciprocal interactions uses three or more mutual choices, or two-way exchanges, made for all the 14 (15 in B) resource exchange interaction questions. Reciprocity (Table 11) is based on one or more mutual choices.

Sociograms of the strong reciprocal ties among system members show both systems have inter-member linkages through a few dominant organizations (Figures 1 and 2).² The dominant organizations in System B have clusters of satellites which are rarely linked directly to other organizations (Figure 2). The pattern in System A also shows linkage through dominant organizations, but there are many more lines connecting member organizations which do not pass through the central members (Figure 1). In both systems when Public agency linkages are examined, sociograms (not included) show an elaborate maze but the Private agency interaction patterns are clustered around a few agencies. Private agencies are relatively unimportant to the Public agencies, and Public agencies are the major interaction Targets for Private agencies.

The evidence from these two systems is that only some social agencies operate in a condition of high function interdependence. Sharing is not a widespread phenomena. A few agencies dominate the systems and can control access to needed resources. The overwhelming majority of agencies in both systems are involved in some resource exchange interactions and indicate they are in competition with other agencies for resources. This confirms the view that social service organizations operate within a system, serving as input and output sources for each other (Parsons, 1956; Thompson, 1967), but members are not equally interdependent. Instead, the situation is one of subordination and dependency for a large proportion of system members.

²I am indebted to Werner Cheng for the preparation of these sociograms.



01-19, 37 = PRIVATE AGENCIES
 30-60 = PUBLIC AGENCIES

Figure 1. Strong reciprocal interactions, System A.




Figure 2. Strong reciprocal interactions, System B.

Competitiveness is another major point of difference between the two systems. Although they report similar perceptions about competitive pressures (Felt Competition), the level of Actual Competition is much higher in System A than in B (Table 12). There are large system differences in the competitiveness of the Counterpart organizations, and the inter-system differences reported by the Public-Counterparts are very great (e.g., A Public-Counterparts, 7.9; B Public-Counterparts, 4.8 (Table 14)). System variation is visible when organizations in the same Mode of Work are compared. In both systems Treatment agencies report a similar number of competitive relationships, but System A Distributive organizations are higher in Actual Competition than are System B's.

Consistently, high competitiveness is associated with high interaction, and the effect of competition on interactions seems to hold regardless of system differences in the general level of competition or the particular resources valued by system members. When the systems are compared, the system with the higher competitiveness is the one with more resource exchanges. Thus, at the system level the effect of competition on interorganizational relationships is apparent.

A final point of difference. According to the political economy perspective, interactions stem from service delivery requirements and needs for material and authority resources. These two systems differ very significantly in the level of Reference-group interactions as well as in cooperativeness and competitiveness (Table 37). Thus, the systems differ in the extent agencies are in autonomy-related interactions. Since two-thirds of the agencies in each system have the same

general service areas (i.e., the Counterpart agencies), service delivery interactions should probably be roughly similar, and the differences for the Counterpart agencies is further support for the idea that competition leads to more interactions in general. It seems to increase the normal work-related relationships, too.

However, the number of planned interactions in either system is low. The social welfare literature leads one to expect a larger number of resource-seeking coordinated programs, but the number of joint programs and cooperative relationships is very low in these two systems. From the directors' descriptions of their agency's joint programs (data not included), the level of commitment and months of involvement in these programs seems extremely low.³ The evidence indicates interactions are quite minimal for some agencies but are extremely high for a small number.

These data cannot explain why these systems differ. The significant point is they do differ. Most scholars describe the social service sector assuming there are similarities in agency behavior regardless of the agency's primary environment. For example, they assume family counseling agencies establish consistent links with youth service agencies and the courts and develop planned referrals and consultative agreements because of complementarity of functions. (See Black and Kase, 1963; Friesema, 1970; and the Klongdon-Beal series of papers for examples.) In this comparison of two systems these ideas are not supported; instead, the importance of system needs for agency behavior is clear. Although complementarity seems logically to lead

³This information is supplied by Bernard J. Offerman; see his forthcoming analysis of agency characteristics and joint programming.

to interactions, the low level of cooperation found indicates these expected links occur infrequently even though complementarity seems evident when lists of services organizations provide are examined.

In summary, knowledge about characteristics of social service systems is essential in understanding the interorganizational relationships developed by social service agencies. The system itself, their primary environment, is an important determinant of each agency's interaction behavior. The traditional focus on the individual Actor organization misses the importance of organizational power which is determined by system needs as well as by agency characteristics. The social organization of organizations cannot be ignored as we seek understanding of organization-organization linkages.

Power, competition, and interorganizational relationships

This research shows power is an important determinant of interorganizational relations. Some agencies have valued resources and are high in the organizational stratification system in the two cities. Command over resources, or power, is clearly a prerequisite for establishing relationships with other organizations, although agency work and resource needs as well as competitiveness influence resource-seeking exchange behavior. Those agencies high in Overall Importance (the measure of position or power) can establish extensive relationships as they desire, and they seem particularly able to be involved in long-range resource acquisition relationships rather than the more limited service delivery exchanges. Those agencies at the upper end of each system are the ones which are high in reciprocity scores and

enter into cooperative relationships involving some surrender of organizational autonomy and an investment of agency resources (Chapter V). But, power does not seem to inevitably lead to extensive interorganizational interaction, as some organizations high in importance engage in a relatively low number of outgoing interactions (e.g., high diversity Treatment agencies and Public-Distributive agencies). Their work needs do not involve many outgoing (or Actor) relationships.

Except for the top dominant group, power is not a condition consistently associated with particular agency characteristics (Chapter IV). Instead, it is determined to a large extent by system requirements. Some service areas, and the organizations mandated to provide them, are consistently powerful in these systems (i.e., the major public organizations responsible for income maintenance, employment, rehabilitation, health care, and psychiatric treatment). For the other organizations, network power is affected by the system's general characteristics and probably by conditions in the community, the secondary environment.

These data strongly support Stinchcombe's model of an organizational stratification system in which a limited number of dominants control resources and can determine the behavior of subordinate members and entry to the system.

The evidence does support the idea that social service organizations are in resource competition and engage in interactions to secure resources. Agencies vary in involvement in competitive relationships, and some report few competitors. In both cities Treatment agencies report more competitive relationships than do Distributive

organizations. Competition level does not vary by Auspices, although there are differences in reported competitive pressures between Public and Private agencies. Public agencies apparently are part of the general resource interdependence in this sector. Some Private agencies, expected to report high direct competition because of their funding base actually are low in competitive interactions, perhaps because of a secure area of work and minimal dependence on the others for resources.

Although Actual Competition is not consistently related to specific organizational characteristics, there is evidence from these cross-sectional data that organizations with high resources also are high in competition.

The overall model for this research assumes some interactions will occur regardless of either competition or ability because of the nature of the division of labor within the sector. It seems this level is minimal, and some organizations are very isolated from system members. Although competition is a stimulus to seek resources through interactions, because many relationships require ability or bargaining power before the organization is an attractive partner, unless the organization has something to offer exchanges will necessarily be limited, and probably they will primarily be Simple Exchanges or Reference-group interactions. The idea that valued resources are a necessary ingredient in establishing sustained resource acquisition relationships is strongly supported by these data. In general, outgoing interactions increase as importance within the system increases. Some agencies, low in system position and with few specific resources, may report fairly high competitiveness and be stimulated to

seek relationships but, because they have little to offer in return, engage in few interactions. (See System B Private agencies (Table 58).) The data presented to test H_{20} showed consistently high positive correlations between competitiveness and interaction strategies and strongly support the idea that competition leads to resource exchange relationships in which social service agencies seek both material and authority resources. Competition stimulates extensive interorganizational relationships at the individual organization level and the system level as well. Even when variations in work-related needs and ability are considered, clearly competition is the spur for exchange-based interactions and undergirds these systems. The Counterpart organization data provide the best test of these ideas at the system level (Table 9), but the clear pattern is shown in other tables as well (e.g., Tables 11, 17, 37, and 60). Further, at the organization level those powerful agencies which are high in competitiveness have the highest interaction levels (Table 59). Thus, the data provide strong support for the general causal model relating competition for resources and organizational power within the system (the ecological niche) to interaction strategies. Longitudinal data are needed to show the relationship of competition to system position, but these cross-sectional data do show success in garnering valued resources does not mean the organization ceases to be involved in the competitive struggle.

Competition and social service systems

The model for this research is an extension of the evolutionary ecological framework and assumes a hierarchy of dominance will emerge from competition among organizations. Some of the organizations in local systems, unsuccessful in the competition for resources, will

merge with others or die. Others will become suppliers to the dominants as they successfully differentiate and develop the ability to provide other organizations in the system with needed resources. The dominants will need the resources of the subordinate suppliers and in response to the interdependence competition produces, organizations will develop coalitions (Marcus, Sheldon, and Adams, 1974a).

These data show this process in two differing systems. In both there is a hierarchy of dominance; a few organizations are extremely powerful and can set the social situation of others (Hawley, 1950). (See Table 10 showing the distribution of Overall Importance scores and Table 30 showing relationship of dominance to specific resources.) Some organizations have succeeded in developing a strategic position through differentiation and provide the dominant organizations with needed resources. The sociograms illustrate this pattern of dominants and suppliers (Figures 1 and 2), but it is also apparent in the interaction scores of the important organizations which are non-diverse and the correlations between both network position measures and Resource Exchanges. (See Tables 47, 52, and 59.) Interdependence is produced by this process of differentiation in response to competition; it leads to coalition formation among competitors as shown in the correlations between competition and cooperative exchanges (Tables 47 and 58).

By showing the relationships between competitiveness and cooperative resource exchanges, these data extend the model proposed by Benson and show how function interdependence results from an on-going struggle for resources, or competition. Conflict and competition may not be as dysfunctional for these systems as some fear. Competition is a stimulus to interaction and coordination.

Implications for social planning

Increasingly, those interested in improving local human service delivery systems urge increased coordination among the various autonomous organizations which comprise such systems. Planners seek increased coordination for more efficient utilization of existing resources and more effective provision of services to users. The presumption is that integration of services will benefit both clients and those who must pay for the services.⁴ However, many, if not most, efforts at integrating the programs of autonomous organizations fail, and there is little information about the pattern of interorganizational interactions available for social engineering purposes. Thus, one purpose of this research has been to provide information about external and internal factors which may stimulate or prevent agency interaction to serve people.

A great deal of information about agency interaction patterns has been included. These have shown that many organizations are involved in a wide variety of types of relationships with others and that organization-set relationships are complex. In contrast to the Litwak et al model, organizations are involved simultaneously in a variety of competitive, reference-group interactions, work-related exchanges, and coordinated relationships and have few reciprocated relationships. In general, there is a low level of cooperation in both systems when the ideals prevalent within the social work profession, the encouragement of policy makers and funding organizations, demands

⁴ A minority consider that coordination may lead to a stifling of initiative, rigid delivery patterns, and tighter, more oppressive social control through the central regulation of needed services.

from the general public and clients, and the function interdependence characteristic of this sector are considered. Agencies do not frequently surrender autonomy to others. It takes the strong stimulus of competition to establish service integration.

The interorganizational relations literature frequently emphasizes the importance of values, shared perspectives, domain consensus, and opinions about the complementarity of programs as determinants of interactions. Many efforts to increase system integration are built on the idea that educating staff members about the value of coordination, establishing communication links, and generally developing shared views about client needs will lead to more coordination among agencies. That approach assumes staff attitudes, especially the directors' perceptions, are important determinants of interactions.⁵ This research examined internal and external factors at the organization level which affect cooperation rather than examining social-psychological characteristics.⁶ Attitudes about the general profitability of coordination may affect interaction patterns, but attitudes about competition are not particularly good predictors of actual interactions, although competitive behavior is an excellent predictor. These data suggest that positive attitudes about cooperation may be a stimulus when the other conditions which lead to interactions are also present. Two primary variables, system power and number of current competitive relationships, do account for an impressive amount of the variance in interaction behavior (Table 60).

⁵Data about director and staff attitudes are not included in this analysis but will be reported in other papers.

⁶If the focus had been on social-psychological characteristics, the important relationships between competitiveness and cooperation would not be revealed because Felt Competition is a very unstable measure.

These data show the hierarchical arrangement of these local systems. Efforts to stimulate increased coordination need to recognize the dominance of these systems by a few major agencies, and use the patterns of dependency described in the analysis to stimulate greater service integration. Only a few agencies in the local systems are important. As their behavior is changed, the system can be changed. Appeals to service ideals made to the powerless, generally the private agencies, do not seem productive approaches or likely to lead to higher system integration.

Knowledge of the impact of the period of establishment is important for social planning. It seems the post-1960's group of agencies do develop more extensive relationships with the other agencies if they have sufficient resources to attract interactions. If newer model agencies provide services valued by the other members in the system (and this may differ from system to system) and/or if they are a source for resources such as special contracts, they are able to establish extensive cooperating relationships. Without resource clout they do not succeed in developing coordinated programs even when charged with that task.

Establishing new agencies, with resources, seems to be one means to increase service integration within local systems. It may not be necessary to establish new out-reach agencies. Providing existing organizations with the resources needed in the general competitive struggle would seem an equally fruitful approach. The dominant organizations can stimulate differentiation. There is a group of agencies in each system high in competition but low in resources, and as they are made attractive trading partners, integration will increase

as long as competition does not diminish. Competition can be used to stimulate differentiation. It may not be necessary to establish rigid delivery systems and increased central regulation which some fear. Instead, the nature of the systems can be utilized to stimulate greater differentiation and thus better service for local residents.

Building upon these data about the hierarchical nature of social service systems and the effect of competition upon system integration, social planners should consider increasing competition within these systems by channeling additional resources through the dominant organizations with the requirement that funds be used for special contracts or differentiation. It is doubtful that an increase in coordinated services will develop as supplier budgets are merely increased and/or competition decreased. The importance differences between these two systems, if supported by additional research on other local systems, indicate planning cannot occur solely at the Federal and/or state level but must build on knowledge of the local system.⁷ The hierarchical nature of these systems and the value of competition, then, have important implications for social planning and should be recognized and used.

Problems in interorganizational research

In the past several years a series of papers have (1) reviewed the same limited body of empirical findings about interorganizational

⁷ In the field work phase of this study, I asked two planners in City A and one in City B to tell me the important agencies, asking "What agencies must be considered? Which might have a significant say in how things are done here?" The organizations they identified in these two systems are in the top group in the sociometric analysis, although in both cities two organizations were identified which our analysis indicates are low in importance.

relations and commented about various theoretical speculations; (2) bemoaned the missing theory base and the lack of agreement about concepts, levels of measurement, point of attack, etc.; and (3) urged more work in this field, extolling its significance for understanding modern society and for applied purposes. Few have collected data to test the theoretical assumptions or grappled with the difficult problems of methodology and research strategy. To date there seems to be no other research which compares social service systems. This design and analysis provides some workable approaches to data collection in this field and illustrates solutions to certain methodological issues.

The problems facing researchers attempting such system comparisons are formidable.⁸ In addition to the problems of theory, fully discussed in Chapter I, this field presents very difficult problems of research strategy, methodology, and analysis procedures. First, the interdependent nature of the systems is difficult to manage. Almost simultaneous access to all members is required; agency personnel are frequently fearful of the way information will be used by research sponsors and fellow system members. The hierarchical nature of the systems requires enlisting the help of the dominant organizations to open doors to the subordinate agencies, but access is required to identify these agencies. The necessary field work involved in access questions is expensive. In addition, the familiar problems of research legitimacy, persuasion at several levels, etc., amply described in the literature on organizations, are multiplied tenfold when simultaneous access to the entire system is attempted.

⁸Some of these are more fully described in an earlier paper which goes into more detail about practical difficulties and possible solutions (Marcus, Sheldon, and Adams, 1974b).

Second, costs are high. This is true of all comparative research, but most of the comparative organization research examines a group of organizations (i.e., 50-300). For interorganizational system research, a sizable number of systems, each with many members, is required. This research strategy required extensive field work to identify possible organizations, develop a comprehensive list of possible target organizations, adjust the instruments to local conditions, and translate the organizations' records into usable form. Data preparation is expensive as available computer programs for sociometric analysis require considerable hand preparation of the data, and the development of organization-level variables frequently requires hand processing.

Third, selection of systems is difficult. What criteria should be used? Clearly, since the research target is the interorganizational field, community environment must be considered. Turk's (1970) work indicates community structure significantly affects the structure of interorganizational relationships. The network probably responds to demands that vary over time and across cities. When data collection is restricted to a few cities, analysis requirements which relate to networks can conflict with a desire to examine the effect of community structure. And that means the cities selected should be dissimilar in some respects -- but in what respects? To insure comparability of networks the variance in types of demand should be minimal -- but how is this estimated?

Finally, funding presents problems. Obtaining funds and sponsorship for such research is difficult because there are few precedents to guide benefactors as to the importance of the work.

Possible funding sources include supra-organizations with an interest in affecting the network somehow; an applied emphasis must be built in. The aegis of the client may help access but hinder data gathering because resource shortages make agency personnel suspicious they will be negatively evaluated in comparison to other agencies. Suppressed animosities emerge; hidden agendas become visible; the findings can become weapons. There are difficult questions of feedback and confidentiality at the respondent organization level, but it is more complex than that. Local umbrella organizations and public officials seem to fear comparison between cities, and system confidentiality becomes a problem.

These are some of the research strategy questions. Of more importance are methodological issues. This design tackled a series of difficult questions. What is interorganizational level data? What are useful organization variables? How do you use information from one or a few respondents to develop organization-level variables, or do you sample the staff? How do you move past the dyadic level to focus on the network itself? What are valid indicators of inter-organizational linkages? How can processes and properties of interlocking populations be studied? How do you handle the relative values of exchanges, or do you? What should be the focus -- the linkage itself or the organizations in interaction? What analysis techniques are suitable when you have a limited number of organizations and a very long list of seemingly important independent variables, or when you need partial correlations?

This has been exploratory research. The goal was to investigate a wide range of phenomena which the literature indicates might be

connected to organizational interaction patterns. It uses organizational variables to concentrate on both system and organizational characteristics yet seeks to avoid the loss of richness and specificity needed for theory development which sometimes is part of comparative research.

For this project, local umbrella organizations and community leaders helped secure agency involvement and provided informants during the field work phase, but because their financial support was minimal made few demands on the design. Guarantees of agency and system confidentiality and promises of full reports helped with access (Chapter II). After one set of data (City A) was in hand, the second selection sought to minimize community differences. Unfortunately, funds were not available for extension to other cities.

Although the research would be greatly improved if more systems were included, the decision to compare two systems rather than analyze the first and use data from the second for replication seems a sound one. It stimulated the development of system-level variables using aggregated organization-level data; it forced attention to variations in systems as these relate to organizational behavior; and required consideration of networks rather than organization-organization linkages. Thus, these data from two systems can form a basis for additional studies examining system properties using these data for comparison purposes.

Several aspects of this design are significant advances in the study of interorganizational relationships. The use of sociometric measures makes it possible to examine organizational power as a complex phenomena and use the system members perspective rather than

using the reputation or decision approaches. In addition, getting reports about other organizations from the respondent organizations avoids the problem of Actor distortions of their own behaviors. Interestingly, preliminary analysis showed directors describe outgoing ties which go unreported by the identified partner. Sociometric measures seem to have greater validity than ego-organization reports.

Second, the two measures of competition, perceptions and behavior, yield different findings. The behavior measure gets around the problem of acknowledging competition. Directors seem to experience no difficulty describing their competitive interactions and identifying competition-set members. While this approach may not include all the important aspects of the general state of competition underlying such systems, it is workable and seems to measure the concept fairly well. Further, the Target variable Competitor can be used to identify important system dominants, and systems can be compared using sociological data rather than self-reports.

Aggregating organization reports permits designing inter-organizational variables for system comparisons, e.g., services emphasized and extent of duplication, distributions of financial and staff resources, prevailing attitudes and opinions (service climate, system norms, system needs), nature of linkages within the system (reciprocal, sequential, indirect, etc.) patterns of coalitions, prevailing patterns of interactions and organizational composition of systems. Once the focus is the system and data come from all members, the range of possible variables is extensive.

The device of considering the network to be the collection of organization-sets is very useful. Instead of focusing on characteristics of two partners, which tends to keep the analysis and interpretation on organizational characteristics instead of the organization-environment problem which is the subject of the research, the Actor organization's interaction pattern is translated into patterns at the system level.

This research did not try to assess the values of exchanges but did try to identify types of resources. The focus in this analysis was the interacting organizations rather than the linkages. These data can be used to examine the linkages but this poses problems because of inflated Actor reports. An effective device is to examine the Target linkages. (See Marcus, Sheldon, and Adams, 1974a.)

As part of the overall project, data were collected from agency staff to supplement the information supplied by the director as key informant. Getting a random sample of the employees of all these organizations proved to be very difficult and unless data are secured from all the organizations, analysis using the important sociometric measures is impossible. The practical route is to use the director, supplement that information with use of agency records as possible, and add a few additional key informants in large organizations.

At this point in the development of the field there are few guidelines about useful organization variables. The high multiple correlations produced by using system position, competitiveness, sponsorship, and size indicate these are useful. Characteristics of staffing (i.e., professional ratio, administrative-clerical ratio, etc.)

can be used with organizations of 20 or more members but these local social services agencies are small, and these traditional measures are distorted. In addition, it is difficult to know how to examine the internal structure of such small organizations, although this seems an important research approach not attempted at this time. This research avoided using opinion/attitude/perception measures such as domain-consensus, attitudes about problems in coordination, etc. because these do not seem to be organizational variables. A needed measure is service complementarity, but this is difficult to operationalize.

One obvious limitation of these findings is that they do not permit longitudinal analysis, and the model obviously assumes competition and differentiation occur over time. In addition, it may seem from this analysis that organizations are pictured dependent upon network factors, passively responding to environmental conditions, drifting, masterless (Perrow, 1972). However, the overall project assumes an interplay between internal and external factors shapes the community's social service system. Analysis of internal structures is the subject for another report.

To conclude, this exploratory project collected data about interorganizational relationships and social service systems from two middle-size communities. The findings provide a base for others to use for comparison purposes. Replication of this design could be a way to secure comparative data within current funding restrictions. The difficulties of comparative research on systems are obvious but the need for system data is equally obvious. Meyer (1972) seeks to extend the information collected about 254 finance departments by

using "the most different systems" method advocated by Przeworski and Teune (1970) comparing social systems (organizations, communities, societies) which are maximally different with respect to theoretically significant variables. In this model, if "similar patterns of relationships among variables hold across maximally different systems, it is presumed these relationships hold for all systems (Meyer, 1972: 104)." Without a larger data base it is difficult to see how this approach could be used -- what are the theoretically significant variables? Information from more systems is required.

In this research a series of interorganizational level variables were developed and a start made on conceptualizing systems and identifying and measuring system characteristics as well as organizational interaction patterns. The general theoretical model received strong support from the data indicating this approach, which builds on a body of empirical work and parsimonious economic and ecological theory, is a productive one.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

Organization or agency

Criteria for inclusion as an organization in the study of private and public social agencies include:

Private Agencies - The agency must be a formally organized, task-oriented group which provides at least one social service as defined in the functional budgeting guide of the United Way of America (UWA). The agency should be generally regarded by local social planning professionals as having its main objective providing social services to people. The services can be at the individual or group level and can include helping individuals and families in solving problems, working with groups to attack common problems, or responsibility for planning for the provision of social services. Since the primary purpose of the organization must be directed toward the type of services described in UWA guide, for purposes of this project, organizations and agencies primarily offering services and programs in the field of health, education, recreation, and law enforcement are excluded even though such agencies may also offer social services. All members of the local United Way organization are included regardless of the orientation of the services they offer.

In other cases, the organization must have a paid, full-time-equivalent staff of at least five persons and an annual budget of at least \$10,000. The work of the staff must be primarily directed toward the provision of social services (see above) and the staff must work directly for this organization in carrying out the policies and programs determined by this organization's governing body.

The organization must have its own policy making body (Board, Commission, Council, Committee) with power to hire and fire the top staff and to determine allocation of funds. The policy making body must be independent from other Boards or Commissions in allocation of funds and making staff decisions without review. It must be composed of people from more than one organizational source or elected from some governmental jurisdiction through a formal process. This means an organization with Board members from a single source is excluded (e.g., church organization, union agency).

Public Agencies - Organizations primarily dependent upon tax funds, federal, state, regional or local which have as their major function provision of social services as described in the UWA guide are included. Funding sources may also include contributions and grants from non-public sources. Agencies which are local offices of federal and state agencies are included as are local organizations considered by local planning professionals as meeting the definition of social agency detailed in the definition of private agencies.

Component programs identified as organizations for this study - The program must employ five full-time-equivalent paid staff and have a yearly budget of at least \$10,000. The director must have the power to hire and

fire staff without consultation with the parent organization and considerable freedom to determine funding allocations. There may be a semi-autonomous governing body and must be some sort of Advisory Board with representatives selected according to details under private agencies.

A generally recognized community visibility as an agency is important in determining qualification. This means agencies which once were independent organizations and which are now included within the new umbrella-type public agency are considered separate organizations for purposes of this study. New organizations which are considered agencies by local planning professionals with representatives involved in community efforts to develop services are included also.

Organization-set

The group of organizations in an organization's environment with which it interacts as it seeks to attain its own objectives and to secure resources. More narrowly, the other local social service organizations a focal or Actor organization identifies as linked to it by transactions, exchanges, or relationships involving one or more resources.

Resources

Resources are the tangible and intangible elements an organization needs to continue to exist and to achieve its specific objectives. For social service organizations these include clients, money, staff with necessary skills, space, equipment, information, a valued domain, as well as less tangible elements as community support, prestige, political leverage, and recognized domain.

Transactions or relationships

Reports of exchanges of tangible and/or intangible resources between two or more agencies. Organizations are involved in these transactions as --

Actors: Focal organizations; reporters of choice-of-others behaviors in the various transactions; as 'ego';

Targets: Recipients of the choice behaviors of other organizations in the research; the 'alter' role.

Types of transactions are: Competitive, Cooperative (requiring planning and commitment of some agency autonomy), and other Non-competitive exchanges involving reference-group type relationships (exchanges of influence) and simple exchange relationships (those which do not require planning or surrender of agency autonomy and limited to client referrals, information exchanges, and help for agency in delivery own program.)

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS USED IN DATA COLLECTION

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS USED IN DATA COLLECTION

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Questions</u>
Size and Professional Ratio	Part III: 1. a. How many paid staff positions does your agency have? (Please express part-time positions in full-time equivalents) _____ b. How many are administrative positions? _____ c. How many are professional positions? _____ d. How many are clerical-technical positions? _____
Auspices	Part III: 15. Approximately what percentage of your total income or revenue came from public sources? _____ 16. Approximately what percentage of your total income came from non-public sources? _____ 18. What percentage of your 1972 regular allocation: a. Came from federal funds? _____ b. Came from state funds? _____ c. Came from local (city or county) funds? _____ 19. During 1972 did your regular allocation include any non-public funds? ____ Yes ____ No If YES, please identify the sources and proportion of total in each case (Estimate if necessary) (list of private sources was given with room to indicate if each was a source and proportion)
Service Diversity	Part I: 1. What are the major services and programs offered by this agency? (up to 8 programs were codes)

APPENDIX B (continued)

Felt Competition

II: 3. To what extent is there competition between your agency and others for the following resources? CHECK ONE ON EACH LINE

responses included: very great extent, great extent, some extent, slight extent, no extent

- a. money from United Way
- b. professional staff
- c. prestige in the community
- d. good board members
- e. technical assistance
- f. funds from the state
- g. funds from the federal government
- h. clients
- i. money from the community
- j. other programs of sponsoring organizations

Interaction questions
Competitive inter-
actions

I: 9. Which agencies compete with yours for resources in this community? (five responses coded)

- 14. Which of these agencies are most likely to get money from the same sources as you do?
- 5. Which agencies provide services that are similar to those provided by your agency?
- 26. Which agencies on the list have Board/Commission members also on your Board/Commission?

Cooperative inter-
actions

- 15. Do you share staff with any other organizations? IF YES, which ones?
- 16. Do you share facilities with other organizations? IF YES, which ones?
- 17. With which organizations do you jointly seek funds?
- 23. With which agencies do you do joint planning?
- 18. Please identify any agencies you run programs with.

APPENDIX B (continued)

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| | 19. And any that run programs for your agency? |
| | 24. Which of these agencies have upper echelon staff serving with you on community or regional committees? |
| | 20. With which organizations do you have formal contracts? (City B only) |
| Reference-group interactions | 8. Which agencies provide you with cooperation and support for your programs? |
| | 10. Which agencies have influence over what goes on in your agency? |
| | 11. Which agencies' good opinion of your work is important to you? |
| Simple Exchanges | 4. Which of these agencies are the ones to which you refer most people? |
| | 7. Which agencies make referrals to your agency? |
| | 6. Which agencies do you rely on to provide services that help you deliver your own programs to people? |
| | 12. With which agencies do you exchange opinions, information and ideas? |

APPENDIX C

DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

APPENDIX C DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	Coefficient of Variability	Median	Range	range of middle 50%	skew*
Overall Importance							
City A	38.9	32.4	.83	35	3-181	21-42	.36
City B	29.0	22.4	.77	20	7-103	14-29	1.21
Scope of Importance							
City A	13.4	4.1	.31	14	7-17	9-16	.43
City B	12.0	3.9	.32	11	4-19	10-15	.77
Importance as Competitor							
City A	6.8	4.1	.60	7	0-17	3-10	---
City B	5.5	3.6	.66	5	0-28	4-8	.42
Importance as Resource							
Supplier							
City A	32.1	29.7	.93	29	2-166	16-38	.72
City B	23.5	20.8	.86	17	2-97	9-33	.94
Size							
City A	37.5	44.7	1.19	25	3-218	12-43	.84
City B	21.4	26.2	1.22	17	3-156	8-25	.50
Degree professional							
City A	.43	.17	.40	.46	.10-.74	.29-.58	.53
City B	.49	.16	.33	.50	.09-.86	.43-.62	.19
Service Diversity							
City A	5.5	2.4	.44	6	1-13	4-7	.62
City B	4.5	1.7	.38	5	1-9	4-6	.88
Felt Competition							
City A	2.41	.91	.38	2.44	100-400	144-311	.10
City B	2.45	.87	.36	2.24	100-377	188-311	.72
Actual Competition							
City A	6.8	4.5	.66	6.0	0-16	4-10	.53
City B	5.5	3.4	.62	5.5	0-14	3-6	----

$$\text{*Skewness} = \frac{(3\bar{X}-M_d)}{S}$$

LIST OF REFERENCES

REFERENCES

- Adamek, Raymond J.
 1975 "Interorganizational Research: Some Perspectives and Findings," Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the North Central Sociological Association, Columbus, Ohio (May).
- Adamek, Raymond J. and Bebe F. Lavin.
 1974 "Interorganizational Exchange: A Note on the Scarcity Hypothesis," mimeographed.
- Aiken, Michael and Jerald Hage.
 1968 "Organizational Interdependence and Intra-organizational Structure," American Sociological Review 33: 912-30.
- Aldrich, Brian.
 1972 "Relations between Organizations: A Critical Review of the Literature," International Associations 24: 26-29.
- Aldrich, Howard.
 1973 "Interorganizational Analysis: Some Problems and Issues Facing the Field," Remarks presented at Annual Meeting of Organizations and Occupations Section, American Sociological Association, New York (August).
- Aldrich, Howard.
 1974 "The Environment as a Network of Organizations: Theoretical and Methodological Implications," Paper presented at International Sociological Association Meetings, Toronto, Canada (August).
- Anderson, Robert C.
 1967 "A Sociometric Approach to the Analysis of Interorganizational Relations," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California (August).
- Anderson, Theodore R. and Seymour Warkow.
 1973 "Organizational Size and Functional Complexity: A Study of Administration in Hospitals," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Assael, Henry.
 1969 "Constructive Role of Inter-organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly 14: 573-82.
- Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz.
 1970 Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Baker, Frank and Gregory O'Brian.

- 1971 "Intersystem Relations and Coordination of Human Service Organizations," American Journal of Public Health 61: 130-37.

Baran, Paul A.

- 1971 "On the Political Economy of Backwardness," in Robert I Rhodes (ed.) Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Barth, Ernest A. T.

- 1963 "The Causes and Consequences of Interagency Conflict," Sociological Inquiry 33: 51-56.

Beal, George and Gerald E. Klongon.

- 1967 System Linkages Among Women's Organizations. Ames, Iowa: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Iowa State University.

Bell, Daniel.

- 1973 The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

Benson, J. Kennth.

- 1974 "The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy," Paper prepared for the Eighth World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Canada (August).

Bidwell, Charles E. and Rebecca S. Vreeland.

- 1963 "Authority and Control in Client-Serving Organizations," The Sociological Quarterly 4: 231-42.

Birnbaum, Norman.

- 1969 The Crisis of Industrial Society. London: Oxford University Press.

Black, Bertram J. and Harold M. Kase.

- 1963 "Interagency Cooperation in Rehabilitation and Mental Health," Social Service Review 37: 26-32.

Blalock, Hubert M. Jr.

- 1972 Social Statistics 2nd edition New York: McGraw-Hill.

Blase, Melvin G.

- 1973 Institution Building. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Blau, Peter M.

- 1964 Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley.

Blau, Peter M. and Richard A. Schoenherr.

- 1971 The Structure of Organizations. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Brager, George and Harry Specht.

1973 Community Organizing. New York: Columbia University Press.

Braitto, Rita, Steve Paulson and Gerald Klonglon.

1972 "Domain Consensus: A Key Variable in Interorganizational Analysis," in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (eds.) Complex Organizations and Their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co., Publishers.

Brinkerhoff, Merlin B. and Phillip Kunz. (eds.)

1973 Complex Organizations and their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co.

Bruning, James L. and B.L. Kintz.

1968 Computational Handbook of Statistics. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Burns, T. and G. M. Stalker.

1961 The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock Publishers.

Carter, Reginald K.

1974 "The Effect of Domain Consensus on Exchange Rates and Goal Attainment: A Study in Interorganizational Relations," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).

Caves, Richard.

1967 American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance. 2nd edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Chandler, Alfred D.

1963 Strategy and Structure. Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday & Company.

Clark, Burton R.

1965 "Interorganizational Patterns in Education," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (September): 224-37.

Clark, Terry N. (ed.)

1968 Community Structure and Decision-making: Comparative Analyses. Scranton, Pa.: Intext-Company.

Clark, Terry N.

1972 "The Structure of Community Influence," in Harlan Hahn (ed.) People and Politics in Urban Society. Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage Publications.

Cloward, Richard A. and Frances Fox Piven.

1969 "The Professional Bureaucracies: Benefit Systems as Influence Systems," in Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Specht (eds.) Readings in Community Organization Practice. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

- Cobb, Roger W. and Charles D. Elder.
1972 Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
- Coleman, James S.
1974 Power and the Structure of Society. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.
- Consumers Power Company.
1970 Data on Cities of Michigan. Jackson, Michigan: Consumers Power Company.
- Corwin, Ronald G.
1969 "Patterns of Organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly 14: 507-21.
- Crozier, Michael.
1972 "The Relationship between Micro and Macrosociology: A Study of Organizational Systems as an Empirical Approach to Problems of Macrosociology," Human Relations 25: 239-51.
- Crum, William L.
1953 The Age Structure of the Corporate System. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dahl, Robert and George Lindbloom.
1964 Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Political-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes. New York: Harper and Row.
- Demone, Harold W. Jr. and Dwight Harshbarger. (eds.)
1974 A Handbook of Human Service Organizations. New York: Behavioral Publications.
- Dill, William R.
1958 "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly 2: 409-43.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley.
1964 "Social Organization and the Ecosystem," in Robert E. Faris (ed.) Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Eichhorn, Robert L. and Jere A. Wysong.
1968 Interagency Relations in the Provision of Health Services: Tuberculosis Control in a Metropolitan Region. Institute Monograph Series Number 2, Lafayette, Indiana: Institute for the Study of Social Change, Purdue University.
- Elling, Ray H. and Sandor Halebsky.
1961 "Organizational Differentiation and Support: A Conceptual Framework," Administrative Science Quarterly 6: 185-209.

- Emery, F.W. and E.L. Trist.
1965 "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," Human Relations 18: 21-31.
- Erickson, Bonnie H.
1974 "International Networks," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).
- Etzioni, Amitai.
1961 A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and their Correlates. New York: The Free Press.
- Evan, William M.
1966 "The Organization-set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," in James D. Thompson (ed.) Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Evan, William M.
1972 "An Organization-set Model of Interorganizational Relations," in Matthew Tuite (ed.) Interorganizational Decision-making. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
- Form, William H. and Sigmund Nosow.
1958 Community in Disaster. New York: Harper and Row.
- Fowler, Irving A.
1964 Local Industrial Structures, Economic Power, and Community Welfare: Thirty Small New York State Cities, 1930-1950. New Jersey: Bedminster Press.
- Friesema, H.P.
1970 "Interjurisdictional Agreements in Metropolitan Areas," Administrative Science Quarterly 15: 242-52.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth.
1967 The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Galtung, Johan.
1970 "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," International Peace Research Institute, University of Oslo, Norway.
- Gamson, William A.
1975 The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press.
- Gillespie, David F. and Sil D. Kim.
1974 "An Integrated Framework for Interpreting Organization-Environment Relationships," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).

Guetzkow, Harold.

- 1966 "Relations among Organizations," in Raymond V. Bowers (ed.) Studies in Behavior in Organizations. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press.

Hage, Jerald and Michael Aiken.

- 1974 "Organizational Conflict and Consensus," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).

Hall, Richard H.

- 1972 Organizations: Structure and Process. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Hall, Richard H.

- 1974 "Interorganizational Relationships," Paper presented at Eighth World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Canada (August).

Halpert, Burton P.

- 1974 "Interorganizational Relationships: Some Theoretical and Empirical Notes on Power, Conflict and Cooperation," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association Montreal, Canada (August).

Harvey, Edward.

- 1968 "Technology and the Structure of Organizations," American Sociological Review 33: 247-59.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel.

- 1972 "People Processing Organizations: An Exchange Approach," American Sociological Review 37: 256-63.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel and Richard A. English.

- 1974 "Human Service Organizations: A Conceptual Overview," in Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Richard A. English (eds.) Human Service Organizations: A Book of Readings. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Hawley, Amos H.

- 1950 Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure. New York: Ronald Press.

Hayes, Edward C.

- 1972 Power Structure and Urban Policy: Who Rules in Oakland. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

Heydebrand, Wolf V.

- 1973a "Autonomy, Complexity and Non-Bureaucratic Coordination in Professional Organizations," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Heydebrand, Wolf V.

- 1973b "The Study of Organizations," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Heydebrand, Wolf V. and James J. Noell.

- 1973 "Task Structure and Innovation in Professional Organizations," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Hunter, Floyd.

- 1953 Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Jacob, Charles E.

- 1966 Policy and Bureaucracy. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

Jacobs, David.

- 1974 "Dependency and Vulnerability: An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 19: 45-59.

Johns, Ray and David Demarche.

- 1951 Community Organization and Agency Responsibility. New York: Association Press.

Jurkovich, Ray.

- 1974 "A Core Typology of Organizational Environments," Administrative Science Quarterly 19: 380-394.

Kahn, Alfred J.

- 1969 Studies in Social Policy and Planning. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Keller, Suzanne.

- 1968 Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society. New York: Random House.

Klatsky, S.R.

- 1970 "Relationship of Organizational Size to Complexity and Coordination," Administrative Science Quarterly 15: 428-438.

Klonglton, Gerald E., Benjamin Yep, Charles L. Mulford and Donald Dillman.

- 1973 "The Nature and Impact of Interorganizational Relations," in P.H. Smith (ed.) Voluntary Action Research. Toronto: D.C. Heath Co., Lexington Books.

Kramer, Ralph M.

- 1965 "Ideology, Status, and Power in Board-Executive Relationships," Social Work 10: 108-14.

Kriesberg, Louis.

- 1973 "Organizations and Interprofessional Cooperation," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Kunz, Phillip R.

- 1972 "Sponsorship and Organizational Stability: Boy Scout Troops," in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (eds.) Complex Organizations and Their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co.

Lawrence, Paul and Jay Lorsch.

- 1967 Organization and Environment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Lefton, Mark and William Rosengren.

- 1966 "Organizations and Clients: Lateral and Longitudinal Dimensions," American Sociological Review 31: 802-10.

Lenski, Gerhard.

- 1966 Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Levine, Sol and Paul E. White.

- 1961 "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relations," Administrative Science Quarterly 5: 583-601.

Levine, Sol, Paul E. White and Benjamin D. Paul.

- 1963 "Community Interorganizational Problems in Providing Medical Care and Social Services," American Journal of Public Health 53: 1183-1195.

Lineberry, Robert L.

- 1971 "Approaches to the Study of Community Politics," in C.M. Bonjean, T.N. Clark, and R.L. Lineberry (eds.) Community Politics: A Behavioral Approach. New York: The Free Press.

Lineberry, Robert L. and Ira Sharkansky.

- 1971 Urban Politics and Public Policy. New York: Harper & Row.

Litwak, Eugene.

- 1961 "Models of Bureaucracy which Permit Conflict," American Journal of Sociology 67: 177-84.

Litwak, Eugene and Lydia Hylton.

- 1962 "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly 6: 395-420.

Litwak, Eugene and Henry J. Meyer.

- 1966 "A Balance Theory of Coordination between Bureaucratic Organizations and Community Primary Groups," Administrative Science Quarterly 11: 31-58.

Litwak, Eugene and Jack Rothman.

- 1970 "Toward the Theory and Practice of Coordination between Formal Organizations," in William R. Rosengren and Mark Lefton (eds.) Organizations and Clients: Essays in the Sociology of Service. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.

Marcus, Philip M.

- 1972 "Organizational Change: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature," mimeographed.

Marcus, Philip M.

- 1973a Survey of Perceptions of Capital Area United Way, Givers and Non-givers. mimeographed.

Marcus, Philip M.

- 1973b An Organizational Study of the Functioning and Needs of the Work Incentive Program. Technical Report, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.

Marcus, Philip M., Ann Workman Sheldon, and Margaret J. Adams.

- 1974a "The Dynamics of Interorganizational Networks," Paper presented at Annual Meeting North Central Sociological Association, Windsor, Canada (May).

Marcus, Philip M., Ann Workman Sheldon, and Margaret J. Adams.

- 1974b "The Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Relationships: Problems and Prospects." Paper presented at Annual Meeting North Central Sociological Association, Windsor, Ontario (May).

Meyer, Marshall.

- 1972 Bureaucratic Structure and Authority: Coordination and Control in 254 Government Agencies. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.

Milio, Nancy.

- 1972 "Health Care Organizations and Innovation," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 12: 163-73.

Miller, S.M. and Pamela Roby.

- 1970 The Future of Inequality. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Miller, Walter B.

- 1958 "Inter-institutional Conflict as a Major Impediment to Delinquency Prevention," Human Organization 17: 20-23.

Mills, C. Wright.

- 1956 The Power Elite. New York: Harper and Row.

Morris, Robert and Ollie A. Randall.

- 1965 "Planning and Organization of Community Services for the Elderly," Social Work 10: 96-102.

- Mott, Basil J.F.
 1968 An Anatomy of a Coordinating Council. University of Pittsburg Press.
- O'Connor, James.
 1971 "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.) Readings in U.S. Imperialism. Boston: P. Sargent.
- Osborn, Richard N. and James G. Hunt.
 1974 "Environment and Organizational Effectiveness," Administrative Science Quarterly 19: 231-46.
- Parsons, Talcott.
 1956 "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," Parts I and II. Administrative Science Quarterly 1:63-85; 225-39.
- Perrow, Charles.
 1967 "A Framework for Comparative Study of Organizations," American Sociological Review 32: 194-208.
- Perrow, Charles.
 1972 Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey.
 1972a "Merger as a Response to Organizational Interdependence," Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 382-394.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey.
 1972b "Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and Its Environment," Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 218-228.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Anthony Leong.
 1975 "Allocating Resources in an Interorganizational Association: The Case of the United Way," mimeographed.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward.
 1971 Regulating the Poor: The Function of Public Relief New York: Random House.
- Pondy, Louis R.
 1967 "Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models," Administrative Science Quarterly 12: 296-320.
- Pondy, Louis R.
 1969 "Varieties of Organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly 14: 499-501.
- Pondy, Louis, R.
 1970 "Toward a Theory of Internal Resource-allocation," in Mayer N. Zald (ed.) Power in Organizations. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Price, James L.

- 1972 Handbook of Organizational Measurement. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company.

Pruden, Henry O.

- 1969 "Interorganizational Conflict, Linkage, and Exchange: A Study of Industrial Salesmen," Academy of Management Journal 12: 339-50.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune.

- 1970 The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley.

Pugh, D.S., D.J. Hickson, C.R. Hinings and C. Turner.

- 1968 "Dimensions of Organization Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 13: 65-105.

Ramsø, O.

- 1963 Social Groups as Systems and Subsystems. New York: The Free Press.

Reid, William J.

- 1964 "Interagency Coordination in Delinquency Prevention and Control," Social Service Review 38: 418-28.

Reid, William J.

- 1971 "Interorganizational Cooperation: A Review and Critique of Current Theory," in Paul E. White and George J. Vlasak (eds.) Proceedings: Interorganization Research in Health. U.S. H.E.W. Public Health Service, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Rhenman, Eric.

- 1973 Organization Theory for Long Range Planning. New York: Wiley.

Rice, Linda E. and Terence R. Mitchell.

- 1973 "Structural Determinants of Individual Behavior in Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 18: 56-69.

Rieker, Patricia, Joseph Morrissey and Patrick Horan.

- 1974 "Interorganizational Relations: A Critique of Theory and Method," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).

Ripley, Randall B.

- 1972 The Politics of Economic and Human Resource Development. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc.

Romanyshyn, John M.

- 1971 Social Welfare: Charity to Justice. New York: Random House.

Rosengren, William R.

- 1968 "Organizational Age, Structure, and Orientations to Clients," Social Forces 47: 1-11.

Ross, G. Alexander and Martin H. Smith.

- 1974 "The Emergence of an Organization and an Organization Set: A Study of an Inter-Faith Disaster Recovery Group," Preliminary Paper #16 Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University.

Selznick, Philip.

- 1949 TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sheldon, Ann Workman.

- 1973 "Survey of Voluntary Agency User Perceptions of Capital Area United Way," mimeographed.

Sills, D.L.

- 1957 The Volunteers. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

Simpson, R.L. and W.H. Gulley.

- 1962 "Goals, Environmental Pressures and Organization Characteristics," American Sociological Review 27: 344-51.

Starbuck, William H.

- 1965 "Organizational Growth and Development," in James G. March (ed.) Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Starkweather, David B.

- 1971 "Health Facility Merger and Integration: A Typology and Some Hypotheses," in Paul E. White and George J. Vlasak (eds.) Proceedings: Interorganization Research in Health. U.S. H.E.W. Public Health Service, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L.

- 1965 "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March (ed.) Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Terreberry, Shirley.

- 1968 "The Evolution of Organizational Environments," American Sociological Review 12: 590-613.

Terrien, Frederic and Donald L. Mills.

- 1973 "The Effect of Changing Size upon the Internal Structure of Organizations," in Wolf V. Heydebrand (ed.) Comparative Organizations: The Results of Empirical Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Thompson, James D.

- 1967 Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Thompson, James and William McEwen.

- 1958 "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review 23: 23-31.

Turk, Herman.

- 1970 "Interorganizational Networks in Urban Society: Initial Perspective and Comparative Research," American Sociological Review 35: 1-19.

Turk, Herman.

- 1973a "Comparative Urban Structure from an Interorganizational Perspective," Administrative Science Quarterly 18: 37-55.

Turk, Herman.

- 1973b Interorganizational Relations: Deductions from the Concept of System. Washington, D.C. American Sociological Association.

U.S. Bureau of the Census.

- 1972 Census of Population: 1970. General Social and Economic Characteristics. Final Report. Washington, D. C. U.S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. Bureau of the Census.

- 1973 County and City Data Book, 1972. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Vintner, Robert D.

- 1963 "Analysis of Treatment Organizations," Social Work 8: 3-15.

Walton, Richard E., John M. Dutton and Thomas P. Cafferty.

- 1969 "Organizational Context and Interdepartmental Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly 14: 522-542.

Wamsley, Gary and Mayer N. Zald.

- 1973 "The Political Economy of Public Organizations," Public Administration Review 33: 62-73.

Warren, Richard D., Gerald Klomglon, J.M. Winkelpleck and S.K. Paulson.

- 1974 "Interorganizational Measurement: Differences between Types of Organizations," Paper presented at Annual Meeting American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada (August).

Warren, Roland L.

- 1967 "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus of Investigation," Administrative Science Quarterly 12: 396-419.

Warren, Roland L.

- 1972 "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction," in Matthew Tuite, (ed.) Interorganizational Decision Making. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

Warren, Roland L., A.F. Burgunder, J.W. Newton and S.M. Rose.

- 1973 "The Interaction of Community Decision Organizations: Some Conceptual Considerations and Empirical Findings," in Anant Negandi (ed.) Modern Organizational Theory. The Kent State University Press.

Warren, Roland L.

- 1974 The Structure of Urban Reform: Community Decision Organizations in Stability and Change. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

White, Paul E. and George J. Vlassek.

- 1973 "Substantive Problems in Interorganizational Relationships in Health: Main Characteristics of the Literature," mimeographed.

Wilensky, Harold L. and Charles N. Lebeaux.

- 1965a "Conceptions of Social Welfare," in Mayer N. Zald (ed.) Social Welfare Institutions. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Wilensky, Harold L. and Charles N. Lebeaux.

- 1965b Industrial Society and Social Welfare, 2nd edition, New York: The Free Press.

Wilson, James Q.

- 1966 "Innovation in Organizations: Notes toward a Theory," in James D. Thompson (ed.) Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Wolman, Harold.

- 1971 Politics of Federal Housing. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.

Woodward, Joan.

- 1965 Industrial Organization. London: Oxford University Press.

Wren, Daniel A.

- 1969 "Interface and Interorganizational Coordination," in William G. Scott (ed.) Organization Concepts and Analysis. Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc.

Zald, Mayer N. (ed.)

- 1965 Social Welfare Institutions: A Sociological Reader. New York: Wiley.

Zald, Mayer N.

- 1970a Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Zald, Mayer N.

- 1970b "Political Economy: A Framework for Comparative Analysis," in Mayer N. Zald (ed.) Power in Organizations. Vanderbilt University Press.

Zurcher, Louis A. Jr.

- 1969 "Implementing a Community Action Agency," in Milton Shore and F.V. Mannino (eds.) Community Mental Health: Problems, Programs, and Strategies. New York: Behavioral Publications.

Zurcher, Louis A. Jr. and Charles M. Bonjean (eds.)

1970 Planned Social Intervention: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co.

Zwerman, William L.

1970 New Perspectives in Organizational Theory: An Empirical Reconsideration of the Classical and Marxian Analyses. Minneapolis: Greenwood Publishing Company.

