1.4 and: Vivi”, . lot ondnmrlr: (“aracfifl‘c‘nln “v f . fut!“ “I. in I r3241}: vnvla via: 2 I.A.,.. p.:.l..lorl.r:\. :51 I.... .it: 1 . r. ...Ao.t: I oat ’ .42....) .tiv .1.)v‘aax|f 1. 1-1.: .If : I..vlr r 1a.: . .34.»; 1'0. Il‘l;..9u. ullv IP13 .2.- v... .. {If (I. «1.91.1952? fire . ‘0 I! J In . . . :1... «3 ... .. .9151!!!) . , . . , Elf-Aft}. £1. . L. . ‘ . A . . . , , ‘ m. A -. ‘ . . ‘ _ I. u .. : 1 _ «a L K” . Ha. . 1h. W.“ .. 3.. , fi..:¢_-irl..nr. : . . i 2.1333» . ifl;fimnmu. 3.23%? sf. .1 mumEWI} L . ..:.. $.25; 2. : . . .1... 9...»... 3.24"»! :3..- . 1.5.5.7.. 2...! I.’ I’ ‘ I lllllll lllllllllllllllll 1293 01001 6743 This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Drive to an Automobile—Dependent Society presented by Deborah E. Kosina has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Masters degree in Soc 101 OCIY BJOI pr 68801 Date [3”? 4V / / 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution J i LIBRARY ;Mlchlgan State : University | __l PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE v 0 5 til-E ;‘ .1 JUOL 5”? 2. ’3 I" 29 501%— » ’57 '1‘ l MSU I. An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunlty Institution emails-c THE DRIVE TO AN AUTOMOBILE-DEPENDENT SOCIETY BY Deborah Ellen Kosina A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Sociology 1992 ABSTRACT THE DRIVE TO AN AUTOMOBILE-DEPENDENT SOCIETY BY Deborah Ellen Kosina Despite growing traffic congestion, environmental polution, and national defense concerns, the United States maintains a jpolicy' that almost exclusively relies on a dangerous, inefficient and costly system for transportation, the automobile. To understand the automobile's grip upon society involves a study of the key individuals and groups, the historical events, and the government policy(ies) that led to a "car" dependency. Although, the automobile appealed to the American values of greater personal mobility, privacy and status, its increased use was not entirely by free choice. The auto industry and special interest groups influenced policy and manipulated the physical and social environment to eliminate transportation options and promote automobile dependency. Understanding the developments that have led up to the present system of automobile dependency are imperative when planning for the future. To Marc and John iii TABLE OF CONTENTS IntrOductj-ODOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0. ...... 00.0.0000000001 Chapter One: Theoretical Background........................5 Chapter Two: Socialization into a Car Culture: The Perfect Time and Place.....................13 The Mass Market Appeal...............................13 Appealing to the American Spirit.....................16 The Auto as a Status Symbol..........................19 The Automobility of Social Patterns..................24 Down on the Farm ......... ............................26 Changing Settlement Patterns: Suburbia...............31 Chapter Three: The Real Power Behind the Automobile: Interest Groups and Political Ties.............35 The Early Push for Automobiles.......................35 The Drive for More Roads: An Example of Special Interest.............................................36 Buying Up Mass Transit...............................44 Influence on the Economy and Employment..............52 The UAW: Continuing the Momentum.... ...... ...........55 Recruiting the Military..............................59 Examples of Power............... ............. ........65 Petr01eum0 ........... O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 66 safetYOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 0.0.0007]- Chapter Four: Conclusion ....... ..... .................... ....76 List of References ............. . ..... ....... .............. 85 iv INTRODUCTION Late on a portentous June night in 1896, Henry Ford axed down the brick wall of his backyard shed and unleashed his "quadricycle" on an young and unsuspecting country (wright 1988:19). Almost 100 years later, Americans, five percent of the ‘world's population, have 33 percent of the world's automobiles and log in 2 trillion miles behind the wheel each year--about as many miles as the rest of the world combined (MacKenzie et a1. 1992:vii; Flavin et a1. 1989:8). American society is unique in its automobile orientation. The country's landscape has been carved to the vehicle's specifications and scale and the people have adopted a drive- through approach to living with their restaurants, hotels, movies, banks, liquor stores and churches. The walkable villages and markets found in Europe have been translated by Americans into isolated islands of shopping malls. However, in a world fraught with crises--energy, environmental, urban and economic, to name only a few--the energy inefficiency and problems of automobile dependency are only too clear. Driving accounts for approximately 25 per cent of 0.8. carbon dioxide emissions that, exacerbated by controversial oil drilling, contribute to environmental 2 destruction (MacKenzie et a1. 1992:vii). The growing dependence on imported oil also leaves the U.S. vulnerable to one of the most politically volatile areas in the world and necessitates costly military presence there. More immediate repercussions of automobile dependency are felt on the roads. Automobile use continues to be one of the most dangerous means of travel, causing a death every 11 minutes and an injury every 18 seconds, according to the U.S. National Safety Council (1988). And, ironically, ownership of an automobile no longer guarantees mobility as those‘who commute through the congested "expressways" of large metropolitan areas will attest. But. transforming’ American society into a less automotive and, therefore, a less consumptive and dangerous society presents a formidable, if not seemingly impossible, task. The automobile and its related industries are embedded in all societal institutions including government, defense, employment, education and the economy. The automobile has also found its way into the social institution of family and its cycle of life: many of us were conceived in autos, it is the carriage to and from our hospital births, the wheeled davenport upon which we do our courting, it whisks us from our weddings, carts our groceries home, enables us to vacation from Acadia to Yosemite and carries us to our graves. How is it that such a machine was unquestioningly embraced and literally brought into the American home--by way of attached garages--as an invaluable family member? Were the 3 paths that led to automobile dependency chosen freely by the American public? The history of the automobile-dependent society is the history of an evolving, or expanding, system presented in phases in which the activity named predominates: invention, development, innovation, transfer, and growth, competition and consolidation (Hughes 1987:56). This paper will focus on the latter half of these phases (growth, competition and consolidation) and discuss the influences and processes that shaped U.S. society and led to the country's second-rate transportation status (Snell 1973:340). The discussion will begin with a theoretical background that helps explain the diffusion of new technology in society --in this case, the automobile--and discusses the elements that escalated that diffusion and created a system that perpetuated that technology's greater use. The second chapter will discuss the characteristics of the young, dynamic country and its people that fostered the growth of an automobile- dependent society--that is, why Americans were so receptive to the automobile's qualities. The third chapter will assess the powerful interest groups and the government policy that aided in the proliferation of the automobile and its related industries. True understanding comes not from observing the current order, but by looking back to see what has led to those developments. If future transportation planning is to be effective and efficient, it is necessary to appreciate the 4 American propensity for the automobile and the historical processes that amplified these tendencies and eliminated other transportation options. Becoming dependent on automobile use was not a natural process but one that involved manipulation of the physical and social environment. Although technology may have ultimately shaped the landscape and refashioned people's expectations, underlying social forces promoted this dependency. This thesis attempts a discussion of this social orchestration to enable a comprehensive understanding of current U.S. transportation. patterns and. to discern 'the obstacles for future policy. T eo at on Back round In order to understand the phenomenon known as the automobile, one must consider the interest groups and their subsequent social, cultural and economic influences that promoted the auto's dissemination and widespread acceptance in the United States. Within each of these groups, the automobile had taken on certain meanings and had become a part of some goal. In the case of the automobile, industrial companies like General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (the Big Three); unions, highway and construction associations, lobbies, the military, and farmers, to name a few, were all groups that developed interest in the artifact. In fact, any collection of "consumers" or "users" of the automobile, could also be seen as a significant social group. Even anti- automobile groups could be considered relevant because the artifact has taken on meaning even for them (Pinch and Bijker 1987:30-32). For each of these significant groups the automobile served a function, created a concern and/or held meanings or values--such as profits, defense, employment, political office, or an improved lifestyle that included greater personal mobility. It is also important to understand why each group thought the automobile was a viable answer to a perceived "problem"--regardless of whether the problem was 6 real or fabricated (Pinch and Bijker 1987:35-39).1 In respect to the automobile, most "problems" were in the form of obstacles: the need for more roads which would facilitate a better life away from deteriorating urban centers, permit swift evacuation in national emergencies, and allow access to potential markets; the isolation of rural living; access to energy and competition from alternative transportation. These groups solved their "problems," or fulfilled their goals by reordering the social and physical world in ways considered useful and desirable (Hughes 1987:53). This involved using whatever means were available and appropriate: marketing a lifestyle that focused on consumerism, playing upon national security fears, emphasizing the automobile as a status symbol, destroying alternative modes of transportation or securing powerful positions in government. According to a social constructivist approach, the sociocultural and political situation of a social group shapes its norms and values which, in turn, influence the meaning given to the artifact (Pinch and Bijker 1987:46). Keeping within this framework, the automobile was valued because it meant personal mobility and the American Dream of a better life in the open spaces of the suburbs. However, these values and norms created greater physical distance in work and social 1A problem is defined as such only when there is a social group for which it constitutes a "problem" (Pinch and Bijker 1987:30). 7 relationships that necessitated a growing dependence on the automobile. We may look at the automobile industries and interest groups as interacting artifacts that engineered the auto- dependent society, or system, we now live in. The components of the system--the inventors, engineers, managers, financiers, workers, lobbyists, sympathetic government officials, construction interests, automobile enthusiasts, road promoters, the tourist industry, car buyers and others--tied their assembled forces to one another to build a machine, or system. In this case, that machine was a car-dependent society (Latour 1987:128-9). This systematic interaction of all the e1ements--either physical or nonphysical--contributed directly or through other components to the common system goal of continued access to and growing use of the automobile. Within this system, as components were removed and/or its characteristics changed, the other artifacts in the system also altered their characteristics (Hughes 1987:51) . For example, the dismantling of mass transit lines led to more cars purchased and.more road construction. Once a system has gathered a mass of technical and organizational components that possesses direction or goals it begins to display a rate of growth suggesting velocity and acquires "momentum" (Hughes 1987:76): The system of automobile production created by Henry Ford and his associates provides a classic example of a high-momentum system. Coordinated to ensure smooth 8 flow from raw material to finished automobile ready for sale, interconnected production lines, processing plants, raw material producers, transportation and materials-handling networks, research and development facilities, and distributors and dealers made up the Ford system (Hughes 1987:79). Similar to this "momentum" found in the physical production of the automobile, there was a momentum found in the social production of an automobile-dependent society. This momentum was energized in a variety of ways. Management within the system reinforced its advantageous position by aligning itself with (or supporting) other components (military, politicians, lobbies) that bolstered the structure, or organizational form, and its own management (Hughes 1987:52) . The cohesiveness of these newly-formed interacting groups was enhanced by threats from concocted adversaries-- such as a national defense argument--and marketing a lifestyle dominated by consumption. While the automobile industry may not have controlled all activities and resources, it came very near to the ideal of enjoying a completely closed system (Hughes 1987:53) . Over time, it increasingly managed to incorporate factors of the environment--government, energy sources, mass transit, patterns of housing construction--into the system, thereby controlling the environment and eliminating sources of uncertainty or competition. Of course, the goal of the auto industry--like all technological enterprise--was and is to attract consumers and orient them toward a positive consumptive decision. The 9 ultimate consumers can either be located in the consumption domain (as car owners are) or in some other domain (i.e. , car dealerships, automobile production, or road construction) (Cowan 1987:273). In order to increase the elements involved with the product and, thus, gain wider acceptance, promotion and consumption of the product, others must be enrolled in the construction of what is held as fact--the automobile as a necessity--and their behavior must be controlled in order to make their actions predictable (Latour 1987:108) . In American society, this required a reorganization or a redirecting of physical and social structures in order to enmesh more elements into the use of automobiles (Cowen 1987:263). There were many ways in which the American people were enrolled into the construction and investment of a car- dependent society. But in some instances, little provocation was necessary and the needs of the consumer were "piggybacked" onto the goals of the automakers. This was the case with American farmers whose isolation was alleviated and whose social lives were enhanced by the vehicle. Hence, the farmer willingly enrolled in a system that seemed to further his own interests while, subsequently, promoting the industry's growth (Latour 1987:108-110).2 2"Interests” are what lie in between actors and their goals, thus creating a tension that will make actors select only what, in their own eyes, helps them reach these goals amongst many possibilities (Latour 1987:108-9). 10 Enrollment into a automobile society was also increased by marketing strategies that played on people's beliefs and values. Rhetorical approaches, whether planned or not, told people what to believe, how to behave and how to persuade others. Advertising became a powerful persuader that promoted the automobile as a status symbol whether one wanted to be seen as rich and successful or youthful and sporty (Latour 1987:30-44). Another rhetorical approach was the advantageous placement of pro-automobile and pro-highway people into influential government positions. These alliances allowed for policymaking that advanced the objectives of the automobile industry under the guise of sagacious state decisions. This "argument from authority" was a tactic used to promote the interstate highway system (Latour 1987:30-44). Another way rhetoric was used to influence the American people was through the seeming "disappearance" of problems because of automobile use. The problem may not have been solved--it needed to only be seen as solved by the relevant social groups. For instance, similar to the "safety controversy" surrounding the high-wheeler bicycle in the late 18003 (Pinch and Bijker 1987:44) , the automobile-~particu1arly the Corvair and Pinto--was presented as a safe means of transportation and any damaging information was suppressed (Nader 1965; Dowie 1977). Another tactic was to redefine the key problem. That is, the new problems associated with automobile use were 11 acceptable since they constituted a solution to quite another problem. For instance, automobiles meant an escape from the unsanitary conditions created by horse "emissions" and increased personal mobility; however, the new problems it created--carbon dioxide emissions, land loss to roads, increasing accidents and traffic jams--were downplayed (Pinch and Bijker 1987:46). Through this series of translations and transformations, U.S. society has become intensely dependent on an inanimate object that did not exist only a century ago (Latour 1987:128). This explosion of growth was driven by relatively stable directing social interests (Law 1987:113) that tied together more and more elements coming from less and less expected resources (Latour 1987:162) . The automobile industry enrolled allies from such unexpected sources as the Department of Defense, construction associations, the Board of Education, farmers, and suburban residents (Latour 1987:121). But along with this concerted effort to enroll, organize and systematize an automobile-dependent society, the adoption of the motor vehicle in the U.S. was advanced by another factor; Just as timing is important in the functioning of the automobile's engine, so it was important to American society's receptiveness to the automobile. These intricately-woven and systematic interactions developed when American society was most malleable and its people most receptive. With guile and the proper individuals steering through historical events, it was possible to enlist an entire nation into expanding 12 automobile use until the artifact became indispensable in American society. Before long, it was the automobile owners who were doing the moving, the begging, the compromising and the negotiating. At first seduced by the perceived freedom and advantages the automobile seemed to offer, they then became enslaved by it. Whatever they did, wherever they went, they had to utilize, subsidize and advance the interests of the automobile manufacturers (Latour 1987:120). Oftentimes, it is these social, cultural and political influences that are overlooked when considering the growth of both science and technology and planning for the future, as Latour (1987:156) observes: If you get inside a laboratory, you see no public relations, no politics, no ethical problems, no class struggle, no lawyers; you see science isolated from society. But this isolation exists only so far as other scientists are constantly busy recruiting investors, interesting and convincing people. So, too, is this analogous of the beloved automobile. Inching along at rush.hour, we do not see the social, business and political factors that were able to shape, influence, direct or slow our path down the hot asphalt. We do not see the calculated destruction of mass transit, the obstruction of safety legislation nor do we see any option for energy efficient alternatives. What we do see is the plush interior of our status symbol and the need for more roads. 9292511.!!2 a a is i to a r Cu ture° b er ect m d P as The Haas Market Appeal After a couple of false starts, Ford founded the present Ford Motor Company in 1903 with the backing of 12 investors. Unlike the carriage industry and the motor cars in Europe and New England which were being hand-built one at a time, Ford began to perfect a manufacturing foundation laid by Ransom E. Olds to mass produce cars. On October 1, 1908, Ford introduced the Model T, a car that was both cheap and reliable (Wright 1988:15-21). Ford offered very little in the way of custom design to his customers, but he could sell millions of his black $500 cars because his innovative assembly line had reduced the costs.3 This manufacturing technique was important for two reasons. First, its low production costs allowed the automobile to be accessible to the majority of Americans and, by the early 1920s, the widespread acceptance of the installment plan made automobile purchases even more popular (Berger 1979:44).‘ The second reason assembly-line production was so 3The Model T received only minor changes during its l9-year production. When production ended in 1927, more than 15 million had been built and, in some years, it accounted for more than half the cars sold in the U.S. costing as low as $265 in the mid-19209 (Wright 1988:21-39). ‘ By 1925, almost three-quarters of all automobiles sold were sold on credit. This trend still holds true today (Wright 1988:39). 13 14 successful was its timing with mass immigration. The simplicity of mass production was employment particularly suited for the unskilled workers with little language skills who were pouring into the country. It was a place anyone could get a job and eventually buy into the new-fangled American Dream. The mass-produced automobile had some obvious advantages. The automobile had an indefinite range of travel and storage space compared to both the horse and the bicycle. It offered affordable travel without the constraints of public transportation, provided privacy and a means of status. Fortunately for automobile manufacturers, the inexpensive vehicle inundated a young country that was in the throes of development. and. was Ihighly‘ susceptible 'to influences on patterns of lifestyle and settlement. General Motors, under William Durant, quickly took over the leadership in car sales by combining Ford's assembly line innovations with unsurpassed marketing skills that included the yearly model change. Henry Ford had not developed the automatic transmission because he didn't think it was necessary; G.M., on the other hand, included it in a plan to make the car more marketable and more convenient.5 The objective was to standardize and simplify the vehicle in order 5Henry Ford's "give them any color that they want as long as it's black" philosophy so pervaded Ford Motor Company and became a part of its (corporate) culture, that, even today, the firm is slow to respond to demands in the marketplace, and has maintained a consistent second place among domestic auto makers (Bennie, Benne and Chin 1985:165). 15 to reach the lowest common denominator of driving ability and increase the market for cars. G.M. planners managed to put driving across as a privilege, a luxury and something to which to aspire. Their advertisements sought to set the car's function aside from the glory of the machine itself, to make driving seem like a less technical matter (Lord 1976:31). But there was more than automobiles rolling off the assembly line. With those vehicles came the beginnings of a new culture. Robert and Helen Lynd's sociological study, Middletown--A Study in American Culture, found that automobile ownership in one mid-sized Midwestern city was approximately 2 cars for each 3 families by 1923 (Smith & Black 1986:183). By 1930, 26 million automobiles were registered in the U.S. No longer an object of curiosity nor considered a "plaything of the rich," the motor car had become an integral part of the daily lives of most American families (Davies 1975:8). In fact, automobile usage was further encouraged by early automobile proponents who were making extraordinary claims about the benefits of the automobile and the social ills it would alleviate. Cars were welcomed as a panacea that would reduce the serious congestion problems caused by horse-drawn carriages and street cars. Motor vehicles were expected to help with the vast quantities of manure that was making city streets unpleasant as well as causing health problems (Brown et a1. 1979:65). By 1910, American planners were heralding the "salvation" of the city, and predicting that passenger cars would soon render urban congestion a thing of the past 16 (Brown et a1. 1979:8). In a 1923 issue of .Motor, Irvin Cobb proposed an outlandish idea that World War I might have been avoided if all of Europe had an abundance of inexpensive automobiles. He reasoned that the malevolence between peoples would disappear if common men could drive around and see that those of foreign lands were essentially good, peace-loving people like themselves. Cobb's universal solution for peace: "Give to every people of every land better roads and more automobiles and we shall do away with most of the ill-will that exists among human beings" (Smith & Black 1986:179). Appealing to the American Spirit The key players in the automobile industry filled a void in a young country without its own folk heroes and royalty. Henry Ford, in particular, came as close to the perfect icon as anyone could get. Here was a man who had an idea, pursued it and played by his own rules. He represented all that Americans held dear: individualism, innovation and the unlimited power of the creative mind and.technologyu Here was a man of humble beginnings who, through his own drive, now socialized with presidents and influenced the lives of others. He epitomized the American spirit and the opportunities to be had in the developing nation. So, too, the automobile was attractive to the American people because it offered mobility to a country built by migratory people; they were restless by their very nature. 17 Unhappy with their homeland, these people (or their ancestors) had chosen not to stay but to move on, always looking for a better or less populated place. This passion for movement continues to be a big part of the fiercely-protected American lifestyle. Automobiles catered to those values placed on freedom and mobility along with the American fascination for power and technology. When it came to the area of personal mobility, many Americans held a faith bordering on religious conviction in technology and industrial solutions and saw hyper-mobility as an American birthright (MacKenzie et a1. 1992:1; Lord 1976:18). And the automobile reflected what the American people thought about themselves. The overseas victories of World War II seemed to reinforced the notions of Manifest Destiny and unlimited growth. The automobile industry capitalized on this triumphant, if not self-righteous, attitude and, consequently, cars got bigger, more luxurious and more powerful: After the War, with G.M. in charge and the spirit of technological conquest in the air, the V-8 became a symbol of power for the industry. A v-8 was less economical than a 6 (even though some advertisements claimed the reverse) but it was more powerful and it was destined to become the standard of the industry. The V-8 cost more and thus produced more profit for the automaker. It was the highest state of the art in a country that valued progress, and the V-8 emblem became an important symbol of power and prestige, attaching itself to hoods, fenders, and horn buttons. In post- War car ads the v-a emblem replaced the "buy war bonds" slogan. Could it be that v-8 was a subliminal reminder of the ”V" for victory sign? (Lord 1976:29). Critics labeled Detroit's products "insolent chariots," but the American public had come to love what vehicles symbolized. In 1949, the auto industry enrolled more than 4.8 18 million new car owners and finally topped the old record set before the stock market crashed in 1929 by almost a million units sold (Wright 1988:65). By 1955, horsepower was regarded as a sure bet for market percentage points. Acceleration was the newest fad, somehow the only measurement that seemed to mean anything to the public. The bigger engines were necessary to power the accessory-laden, ever longer-lower-wider-heavier-new cars that America wanted so badly (Jerome 1972:29). The automakers were more than happy to accommodate the American drivers penchant for heavy, gas-guzzling autos because, as Henry Ford II put it: "Minicars make miniprofits" (Commoner 1971).6 Profits were anything but small during the 19505--a decade that consumption became a sacrosanct area of American life and allowed one to experience power and control (Sobel 1981) . The marketing of a consumptive American Dream was essential to the country's economic well-being after the surge in technological production during WWII. With an expanded industrial capacity, American industrialists needed to keep factories full of workers and stores full of buyers. This "consumption junction" created the reorganization of such social structures as family, work and settlement patterns to accommodate technological production (Cowan 1987:263). The American Dream became the life in the suburbs. Because the 6Ironically, two decades earlier Hitler had the foresight and.wisdom to value the small car and ordered Ferdinand Porsche to design a "people's car” or "Volkswagen" (Wright 1988:45). 19 isolated nuclear family lifestyle provided the maximum consumption unit, romance, marriage and monogamy were celebrated like never before. The father's role became the sole provider while the family's job was to consume. Advertising, for the first time, played a critical role in motivating those consumers in what they bought and how they lived (Lord 1976:78). The Auto as a status Symbol By the end of the 1920s, just about every family had a car. There were literally hundreds of nameplates to choose from, but they all functioned in more or less the same way. Now automakers found themselves in a quandary--how to sell cars to buyers who already owned one. The answer existed in advertising and marketing. While the first phase of automobile manufacturing belonged to Henry Ford with his assembly line, replaceable parts, and rock-bottom prices that enabled everyone to have a Model T, the second phase belonged entirely to General Motors. GM became the experts in marketing and advertising to enroll the entire range of the diversified automobile market (Jerome 1972:28). GM product strategy emphasized "a car for every purse and purpose" (Leone 1986:98). Now that people had come to accept that they couldn't live without a car, it was time for them to accept the idea that they couldn't live without the latest model. General Motors even tagged a name on it: "dynamic obsolescence" 20 (Wright 1988:62). GM's stylist Harley Earl claimed that changing models annually would increase the demand for new cars and, consequently, fuel the economy. In practice, however, it became the abandonment of quality for novelty and succeeded in eliminating the smaller companies who found it increasingly difficult to meet the expense of annual model changeovers (Jerome 1972:55). This was no longer a world where Henry Ford's "give them any color as long as it's black" marketing philosophy could succeed. The automobile had a hold on people's emotions. .All the clinging Calvinist sensibilities of practicality, economy, and simplicity were discarded. This was the "Age of Accessories." Americans wanted more and they got it; even a car's weight was trumpeted as a virtue. Detroit found customers wanting "custom-like cars that would give them an illusion of having one-of—a-kind" (Jerome 1972:25-65). An example of one of the most curious and impractical styling fads in history is the tailfin. Inspired by the romance and style of the ace fighter pilots and by the technological look of the P-38, a twin fuselage WWII fighter plane, the fins had absolutely no function whatsoever but to sell cars: Tailfins were first introduced in 1948 on the Cadillac V-8, a car that offered a subliminal styling connection to the glory of the Air Force ace. Driving a v-e convertible (with automatic transmission) with the top down, his long scarf trailing in the wind, the pilot-consumer could capture or recapture the exhilarating feeling of flight and conquest. His radio left an audio trail behind him like the exhaust trail left in the sky by a jet fighter plane. This was one 21 of the memorable themes portrayed by ads in wartime issues of Life magazine (Lord 1976:25). The automobile was no longer seen only as a means of reasonable transportation. The emphasis on style and option further underscored the idea that what was really being sold was a dream, a part of the socially-constructed imagery and symbolism that affected American daily life. The make, model, and style of an automobile served as an expression of its owner's status as well as a reflection of his value system (Davies 1975:8). The automobile became a visual and an abbreviated definition of who the owner was in society. A century earlier, Karl Marx had speculated that who we were was what we did at our work; now, in the U.S., who we were was what we drove. Next to buying a house, buying an automobile is the largest investment many people make in their lives. But while stiff housing costs and restrictions may prohibit upward residential mobility among some socioeconomic groups, low interest rates and plentiful car loans allow many different groups to share the status of luxury cars. Thus, the car, a mobile status symbol, sometimes becomes more important than the home. "People will buy above their economic status," automotive consultant Thomas O'Grady has observed, "like 'dressing for success' in a car" (Weiss 1988:134-135). The Cadillac is one car that has been seen consistently as an ostentatious symbol of success. Called "the essence of all that is avaricious and trivial in our middle-class 22 lifestyle" (Jerome 1972:27), it has always been less susceptible to sales fluctuations and gas shortages because its owners usually aren't individuals who rely on cost-of- living pay raises (Lord 1976:86). Nonetheless, the Great Depression proved too trenchant even for the hardy Cadillac and GM seriously considered dropping the model. However, Nicholas Dreystadt, a Cadillac service manager at the time, noticed that the car was very popular with middle-class blacks, despite Cadillac's policy of not selling to blacks. Dreystadt pointed out that wealthy blacks had adopted Cadillac as a status symbol since they had limited access to high-status housing and other signs of success. He also pointed out that blacks paid a premium to white buyers to front for them. Demand like this should be exploited, he said, and the committee gave Dreystadt 18 months to develop the black market. By the end of 1934, Cadillac sales were moving up and the division was making money (Wright 1988:55). Today, automobiles continue to be an American status symbol. As the more than 752 different models of cars and trucks sold in the U.S. become increasingly similar under the hood, such issues as fuel economy, safety, reliability, and manufacturing quality are rapidly becoming "non-issues" (Naisbitt 1982:260). In the future, personality and image, more than anything else, will sell cars and trucks, according to one senior GM executive (Morris 1990:69). Even with today's small economy models, the single central goal is still 23 the appearance of luxury. Extremely expensive cars continue to serve as models and the features that make them exclusive are carefully scrutinized for possible adaptation (Jerome 1972:27). Even during the 19705 gas shortages, Americans were reluctant to resort to more energy efficient models. Consumers were unsure that everyone would make similar efforts to conserve and they feared the loss of status involved with driving a smaller car and doing without the energy-driven accouterments of the middle-class lifestyle (Cunningham and Lopreato 1977:26). Yet a status assigned to a particular model can be fleeting. Left to their own devices, automakers alter the profile of their customers by redesigning cars and targeting their advertising to different markets (Weiss 1988:136). In the past, this conscious targeting of markets also dictated the location of an automaker's dealers and led to regional biases. After World War II, General Motors made a marketing decision to follow consumers to the suburbs and concentrated their dealers accordinglyu Meanwhile, Chrysler-Plymouth carved out its turf in communities of Midwestern blue-collar 'workers and Ford opened dealerships t0ensure the success of alternative transit systems, they must be more popular, convenient and effective in meeting people's needs. This includes promoting settlement of fairly high residential densities combined with mixed zoning that not only supports public transportation but bicycling and walking as ‘well (MacKenzie et al. 1992:26). Fortunately, some planners like Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk of Miami are already involved in pedestrian-oriented design or low-rise, high density neighborhoods that allow residents to drive fewer cars fewer miles. Ideas like the electronic cottage that allows more work to be done within the home and four-day workweeks are other ways to lessen consumption and congestion. Since we cannot expect suburbs to go away nor rural areas to grow closer together, more energy efficient and alternative 81 energy vehicles must be supported by government policy. As an economic incentive to promote alternative uses and less wasteful behavior, petroleum prices must be allowed to increase as they have in other countries. A gallon of gasoline costs less today in real terms than it did in 1974 (Flavin et al. 1989:9). This artificial regulation is a part of the bias federal policies have been practicing to the advantage of the automobile industry. In the past, government policies have shifted the direct market costs away from drivers, therefore making driving personal vehicles seem cheaper and eliminating any strong economic incentive to buy energy efficient cars and use them less. A "polluter pays" principle of cost allocation would begin to shift the various costs associated with motor vehicle use to the drivers who impose them-~such as an increased fuel tax and trucking levies. Thus, the heaviest users would bear the greatest burden (MacKenzie et al. 1992:5-7, 24-25). A coupon program for the poor is one way to alleviate the burden from falling on those less able to pay. Federal funding formulas, too, must be changed to favor public transportation or at least not to disadvantage it. Policy should be redirected in the promotion of more energy- efficient forms of transportation such as rail cars that convert.to truck trailers and.bicycle commuting (Flavin et a1. 1989:11). The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 adopted some of these reforms. This landmark law 82 authorized $151 billion for highway and public transit over the following six years. Of this, $32 billion was specifically earmarked for mass transit--twice the previous annual spending and twice the amount recommended by President Bush. Except for the completion of a small portion of the interstate system--the same ratio of federal to local funding will apply to both highway and transit projects for the first time, removing the previous bias toward building roads (MacKenzie et al. 1992:26-27). These extrinsic changes can begin promoting a less automobile-dependent society, but the social-psychological obstacles rooted in a consumptive lifestyle that has been reinforced by past policy and events will take longer to modify (Katzev and Johnson 1987:79). First, it must be realized that these consumption changes do not mean a change in living conditions. In this issue, U.S. cities can take a lesson from European cities--proof that a high standard of living is compatible with a reduced need for cars. Sweden is an example of an industrialized country with a comparable standard of living, yet its residential energy consumption is 70 to 85 percent lower than U.S. rates (Erickson 1987). Because of government policy and public concern, Swedes use more mass transit, drive lighter cars and have fewer cars per capita--there is one automobile for every four Swedes as compared with one for every two U.S. citizens. Consequently, Swedes use 31% less energy for transportation (Schipper and 83 Lichtenberg 1976). The social and cultural factors Erickson (1987) found promoting energy conservation in Sweden--an ecological awareness and concern, a love of nature, a strong national and global identification, a moralistic outlook, and a code of moderation--stem from attitudes about community and nature.a’ But, unlike in Sweden, energy conservation has not been emphasized or rewarded in the U.S. In fact, in the past, government policy and special interests have disparaged these values. As this thesis has asserted, deliberate steps have been taken to exalt a consumptive lifestyle, reorganize or direct the physical world to promote automobile use and undermine less consumptive alternatives. It is important to understand the historical events and processes that have determined the particular transportation system that currently exists in American society in order to plan for the future. Old systems like old people tend to become less adaptable, but systems do not simply grow frail and fade away. Large systems with high momentum tend to exert a soft determinism on other systems and groups in society (Hughes 1987:54-5). A history of cheap and abundant energy, value placed on personal mobility and unlimited consumption, and the command of the auto industry and related interest 2"For example, Erickson (1987) found that Swedes chose walking or bicycling over driving mainly because it was ekont, or beautiful, to exercise, rather than in order to reduce gasoline consumption. 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