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ABSTRACT

GEORGES SOREL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

BY
Thomas C. Smith

A comprehension of the depth and diversity of the
thought of Georges Sorel presents a formidable challenge.
The biblioqraphy of Sorel's writings, speeches and cor-
respondence has not reached its final, definitive form;
amiwithout a thorough examination of these sources a
Smnmetic view would be without credibility. The current
Suns of knowledge as represented by the secondary accounts
0fthe thought of Georges Sorel is characterized by
Obscurity and complicated by contradictory conclusions.
Diorder, therefore, to provide a more reliable perspec-
thm from.which to proceed to a more credible conclusion
WiUIrespect to Georges Sorel, it is necessary to re-
mmmine Sorel's original statements and to include in
ads examination the widest sampling of his thought.

In the course of the ensuing study, new data
Mme been uncovered and presented for analysis with the
Hmult that the ultimate conclusions which are set forth

hIChapter Ix are based upon the most complete bibliography

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”42% Thomas C . Smith

(7‘0
of the writings of Georges Sorel currently available. The
organizational format adheres rigorously to a chronologi-
cal presentation which methodically explores the writings
of Sorel as they appear in the expanded bibliography of
his works. The choice of a chronological arrangement of
analysis was made on the basis of expediency and in the
hope that it would provide a convenient order of develop-
ment such that the reader, who might wish to consult
only certain of Sorel's works, could by reference to the
bibliography of his works, turn immediately to the
appropriate chapter. No explicit conclusions or evalu-
ations are offered in the course of this study until the
complete bibliography has been examined. To counter the
implicit subjectivity of selection and juxtaposition, I
have provided very extensive documentation such that my
analysis might be easily evaluated by a researcher with
access to the original works. Any particular work by
Sorel which has been analyzed in this study is available
for consideration as an isolated entity and although I
have attempted in the final chapter to provide a synthetic
analysis of Sorel's thought as a whole, I have also under-
taken to illuminate each work as an individual expression
Of his mind.

The major findings of this research include the
deve10pment of the most complete and accurate bibliography

Of Sorel's works, a bibliography which will be of use to

.1244

 

  
   

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Thomas C. Smith

future students of Sorel. Based upon a study of this
extended bibliography in the first eight chapters, I

have drawn conclusions about the thought of Georges Sorel
which have appeared in no previous account of his works
and which represent a major reinterpretation. I have
concluded that epistemology, understood as that branch
oflummn inquiry concerned with the problems of the
nature, limits, and validity of human knowledge and
belief, forms the central and most persistent concern in
the intellectual preoccupations of Georges Sorel. The
precise outlines of Sorel's epistemological formulations
can be detected in speculations which occur throughout
his entire writing career and include his preoccupations
Wifllthe subjective and psychological aspect of all
fbnmflations of the human mind, his vision of the arti—
fhfial and natural milieux, and his rejection of deter-
mhfism in any form. I do not believe that it would be
Possible, based on an analysis of his writings, to com-
Pumend Sorel's other speculations on science, sociology,
history, pessimism, tradition, linguistics and myth,
whmout a thorough understanding of these epistemological
jMMments. The great confusion which is characteristic
Ofunst secondary accounts of Sorel's ideas results from
Um attempt to consider a particular Sorel formulation

out of the context of his epistemological convictions.

 

 

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Thomas C. Smith

There is another equally valid experience of
Georges Sorel's thought, one which perhaps he would have
considered more important than the reinterpretation which
I have attempted. Sorel wanted to stimulate thought.
Hewfished to stir personal speculation. I have attempted
maretain this aspect of Sorel's thought by presenting
anaumlysis sufficiently detailed to provide the needed
context for an appreciation of his habits of mind. To
preserve the style and syntax of his speculations, I have
reuflned his original French in the body of the text while

the English translations appear in the footnotes.

 

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GEORGES SOREL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

BY

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Thomas C. Smith

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1974

 

 

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DEDICATION

There is no one to whom I owe

more, for this work, for the past

and the future, than to Ginger.

ii

 

 

 

 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the members
of my Guidance Committee who have each provided helpful
influence in the formation of this research project.
Dr. William J. Brazill as Chairman has exhibited a
sophisticated sensitivity to the special conditions of
intellectual historiography which has been of great
value to me in determining the epistimological ground
from which to approach this research. Dr. Paul R. Sweet
as a Diplomatic historian has taught me the incomparable
value of primary source material for establishing the
integrity of a thesis which is reflected in the extent
to which Georges Sorel's own writings form the basis for
the conclusions which I draw about his thought. Dr.
Donald N. Baker whose course in French Social Thought
was the occasion for my first encounter with Sorel and
whose previous course in Historiography awakened in me
an interest in the epistemological problems confronting
contemporary historians.

I wish to also thank the History Department of
MiChigéln State for the three-year National Defense

Fellowship and the one-year Teaching Assistantship

iii

 

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which together helped to finance my studies at East
Lansing, and thanks to the Department of Humanities of

Michigan State University for the position of Instructor

which provided the funds for my Paris research. While

in Paris I was able to benefit from the fine cooperation
of the staff and the facilities of the Bibliotheque
Nationale, the Bibliotheque de l'Universite de Paris
Sorbonne and the Bibliotheque Cujas De Droit Et Sciences
Economiques, for which I express my appreciation.

And
to countless other people and institutions I am grate-

fully indebted .

iv

 

 

 

 

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INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A NEW PERSPECTIVE

ON GEORGES SOREL

Too often in the history of ideas, complex and
difficult thinkers are systematically reduced to a kind
of summary coherence for the sake of convenient presen-
tation. The danger of such an approach is that the desire
for logic and coherence, which often impels it, may pro-
duce errors of interpretation which only the closest
examination of minute details, however contradictory
they might be, could resolve. Because of the diversity
of his interests and the very style of his thought,

Georges Sorel has proven to be a thinker who has inspired
a great variety of interpretation. To a large extent

this diversity is attributable to the provocative nature
0f the problems and the solutions which Sorel elaborated.
There is a great tendency to argue with various of the
Sorel speculations, to ignore the attempt to reproduce

his thought while opting instead for the more rhetorically
satiSinng refutation of it. Unfortunately this approach

has not led to a comprehension of the thought of Georges
Sorel.

 

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The following study of the thought of Georges
Sorel seeks to avoid the dangers of premature judgment
in the interest of providing what appears to be so needed
in the case of Sorel--an exposition of his thought. That
this exposition is needed became apparent to me in the
early stages of my study of the secondary accounts of his
ideas following a comparison of these to my reading of
Sorel's original works. The contradictions between what
Sorel appeared to be saying and the analysis of his ideas
in the secondary accounts (some of which are detailed in
a concluding review of secondary accounts in Chapter IX)
were often based on incomplete or inaccurate representations
of Sorel's writings. These were the observations which
caused me to seek a more accurate picture of Sorel and to
present this picture in such a way that a credible and
comprehensive vision might slowly materialize. The
integrity of the following study resides upon the extent
to which I have fairly reproduced the major themes as they
occurred in Sorel's writings, speeches, and correspondence.
To this end I have provided sufficient documentation such
that my analysis might easily be reviewed and evaluated.
In the preparation of this analysis, I have also been
influenced by Henri Bergson's concept of the "experience
intégrale" which I believe has special application to an
interpretation of Sorel and could serve as a salutary

antidote to all analysis which is made suspect by

vi

 

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over-generalization. Bergson believed that an integral
experience could not emerge without an exhaustive exposure
to the most minute facts which only after having been
massively accumulated could be fused to obtain an integral
comprehension. In the instance of Georges Sorel, previous
studies have failed to accumulate sufficiently the frag-
ments of his thought as it was elaborated over time.

I place before the reader the following study
which reproduces my research process almost exactly as it
unfolded during the eight months I spent working in the
Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. As a remedy to premature
judgment, I withheld until the final chapter any pre-
sumption about the ultimate conclusion to which this
study might lead. I also resisted the inclination to
argue with Sorel's interpretations or to judge their
moral, social, or historical worth, in order to pursue
more directly my goal of discovery--and also because I
believe the reader is better served by a work which
allows these normative evaluations a spontaneous and
Personal birth. To this extent I invite the reader to
become a student of Sorel and to participate in what
Ultimately is a process of research. I believe that the
detailed analysis of the writings, speeches, and letters
of Georges Sorel which comprise the first eight chapters
of this study will suffice to justify the conclusions

I have reached in the final chapter. In my attempt to

vii

 

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reproduce the. thought of Sorel--to illustrate as directly
as possible his habits of mind--I have produced a study
which remains laborious and tedious, characteristics
which I have found unavoidably associated with the dis-
covery of the thought of Georges Sorel.

The conclusions to which this study led call into
mnmtion the validity of much of the interpretative work
<xISorel which is currently available. These conclusions,
mnflined in the Abstract, represent a fundamental rein-
Unpretation of the thought of Georges Sorel and to the
mfient that they can be shown to reside upon Sorel's own
wnflfings they must be of immediate interest to any of
lfis students. Only by seeking the complexity and diversity
ofSorel and by avoiding the inclination to generalize
annturely or to debate normative issue with him has it
been possible to advance through what at first appears

a labyrinth of detail to an integral interpretation of

his thought .

viii

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON

GEORGES SOREL . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Chapter
I. GEORGES-EUGENE SOREL 1847 - 1894 . . . . . 3
Part 1
Origins: 1847 - 1889. . . . . . . . 3

APPENDIX A: LIVRES EMPRUNTES PAR
GEORGES SOREL A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
MgNICIPALE DE PERPIGNAN DURANT LA

PERIODE 1884-1891 . . . . . . . . 11
Part 2

The Trial of Socrates: 1889 . . . . . 14
Part 3

Le Socrate du Quartier latin:

1892 - 1894 . . . . . . . . . . 54
Essai Sur La Philosophie De Proudhon. . . 55
Karl Marx. . . . . . . . . . . . 61
La Nouvelle Metaphysique. . . . . . . 63
La Ruine Du Monde Antique . . . . . . 76

II. LE DEVENIR SOCIAL: 1895 - 1897 . . . . . 93
Les Théories De M. Durkheim. . . . . . 95
The Psychological Laws of Symbolism . . . 99
Psychologie Des Foules . . . . . . . 102
La Science Dans L'Education. . . . . . 105
L'Idéalisme De M. Brunetiere . . . . . 112
Etude Sur Vico . . . . . . . . . . 113

APPENDIX A: LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1895;
CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL . . . . 130

APPENDIX B: LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1896;
CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL . . . . 131

ix

 

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IV.

V.

Page

APPENDIX C: LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1897;
CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL . . . . 133

APPENDIX D: LE DEVENIR SOCIAL: 1894 -
1897; EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES
SOREL TO BENEDETTO CROCE: 1895 - 1897 . 135

SYNDICALISM, REVISIONISM AND MORALITY:
1897 - 1900 o o o o o o o o o o o o 139

L'Avenir Socialiste Des Syndicats. . . . 139
La Science Et La Morale . . . . . . . 148
Les Facteurs Moraux De L'Evolution . . . 152
L'Ethique Du Socialisme . . . . . . . 153
Les Polémiques Pour L'Interprétation

Du Marxisme . . . . . . . . . . 162
Formes Et Essence Du Socialisme . . . . 163

APPENDIX A: SYNDICALISM, REVISIONISM

AND MORALITY: 1898 - 1900; EXTRACTS OF
LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO BENEDETTO

CROCE: 1898 - 1900. . . . . . . . 171

AESTHETICS, SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY AND PHYSICS:
1901 - 1905 o o o o o o o o o o o o 176

LE

La Valeur Sociale De L'Art . . . . . . 176
Jean Coste . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Introduction a L'Economie Moderne. . . . 194
Le Systeme Historique De Renan. . . . . 200
Les Préoccupations Métaphysiques Des

Physiciens Moderne . . . . . . . . 210

APPENDIX A: AESTHETICS, SOCIOLOGY,

HISTORY AND PHYSICS; EXTRACTS OF

LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO BENE-

DETTO CROCE: 1901 - 1905. . . . . . 214

MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE, 1906 - 1908. . . . 219

Réflexions Sur La Violence . . . . . . 219
Les Préjugés Contre La Violence . . . . 224
La Gréve Générale Prolétarienne . . . . 229
La Gréve Générale Politique. . . . . . 237
La Moralité De La Violence--La Morale

Des Producteurs . . . . . . . . . 239

Les Illusions Du Progres. . . . . 247
La Classe Conquérante Au XVIII Siecle . . 252

 

 

 

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L'Audace Novatrice Du Tiers-Etat . . . . 256
Les Théories Modernes Du Progrés . . . . 261
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. . . . . .. . . 266
‘La Crise Morale Et Religieuse . . . . . 271
L'Evolution Créatrice. . . . . . . . 273

APPENDIX A: LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE:
1906 CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL . . 279

APPENDIX B: LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE
1907 - 1908 CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES
SOREL C O O O C O O O O O O O 280

VI. MARX, DREYFUS; RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY:
1907 - 1918 o o o o o o o o o o o o 283

La Decomposition Du Marxisme . . . . . 283
La Revolution Dreyfusienne . . . . . . 297
La Religion D'Aujourd'Hui . . . . . . 303
Vues Sur Les Problémes De La Philosophie . 308

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER v, LE MOUVEMENT

SOCIALISTE: 1906 - 1908 AND CHAPTER

VI, MARX, DREYFUS, RELIGION AND

PHILOSOPHY: 1907 - 1910; EXTRACTS

OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO

BENEDETTO CROCE: 1906 - 1910 . . . . 318

VII. PRE-WAR REVALUATIONS: 1910 - 1914 . . . . 325

Declaration De La Cité Frangaise . . . . 325
Grandeur Et Decadence. . . . . . . . 326
L'Indépendance . . . . . . . . . . 329
Le Monument De Jules Ferry . . . . . . 331
L'Abandon De La Revanche. . . . . . . 333
Sur La Magie Moderne . . . . . . . . 334
Si Les Dogmes Evoluent . . . . . . . 336
Un Critique Des Sociologues. . . . . . 338
A La Mémoire De Cournot . . . . . . . 339
Trois Problemes. . . . . . . . . . 342
La Rivolta Ideale . . . . . . . . . 344
Les Méfaits Des Intellectuel . . . . . 346

APPENDIX A: L'INDEPENDANCE, MARCEL
RIVIERE ET CIE PARIS, 1911 - 1913
ESSAYS BY GEORGES SOREL . . . . . . 350

xi

 

 

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APPENDIX B: L'INDEPENDANCE 1911 -
1913 BOOK REVIEWS SUBMITTED BY
GEORGES SOREL WITH SELECTED
EXCERPTS OF SOREL'S COMMENTS . . . . 351
APPENDIX C: PRE-WAR REVALUATIONS:
1910 - 1914; EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM
GEORGES SOREL TO BENEDETTO CROCE:
1910 - 1914. o o o o o o o o o 357
VIII. FINAL WRITINGS; PRAGMATISM, PAIN
AESTHETICS AND ASCETICS: 1914 - 1922. . . 361
Matériaux D'une Théorie Du Prolétariat . 361
De L'Utilité Du Pragmatisme . . . . . 365
Introduction A L'Economie Moderne . . . 381
L'Humanité Contre La Douleur. . . . . 384
Lénine D'Aprés Gorki . . . . . . . 395
APPENDIX A: FINAL WRITINGS: PRAGMA-
TISM, PAIN, AESTHETICS AND ASCETICS:
1914 - 1922; EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM
GEORGES SOREL TO BENEDETTO CROCE:
1914 "’ 1921. o o o o o o o o o 398
IX. REFLECTIONS ON GEORGES SOREL. . . . . . 409
Part 1
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . 409
Part 2
Secondary Accounts . . . . . . . . 478
BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O O O 5 0 5
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A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER I

Perhaps by design but certainly in fact, Georges
Sorel's personal past, preceding the launching of his
writing career in 1886, remains virtually unknown. Pierre
Andreu, whose study of Sorel was published in 1952, pro-
vided the first documented account of Sorel's educational
background and his family life as well as his relation-
ship with the intriguing Marie David. Part 1 of Chapter I
relates these details for the sake of establishing an
initial point of departure for the analysis of Sorel's
writings which follow. The story is not greatly detailed
and it appears probable that Sorel intended to keep this
part of his life as private as possible--in all of his
writings he avoided linking his thought to a personal
past.

Sorel himself suggested the best approach to the
comprehension of his thought when he noted that a reader
would have difficulty understanding an innovative self-

educated writer such as himself " . . . because one can

only attain it by rediscovering the inventor's path.”1

 

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Part 2 of Chapter I is a detailed analysis of Sorel's
first book-length study entitled The Trial of Socrates,
and as such represents an attempt to rediscover not only
the content of his early thought but also to know his
methodology, which together represent the "inventor's
path."

Part 3 of Chapter I depicts Sorel's evaluation of
certain aspects of the thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon
and Karl Marx as well as early formulations of his ideas
on epistemology, linguistics, history and the impact of
ideologies on human action. His notions of the sexual
basis of Christian mysticism and his call for the liber-
ation of women from their traditional subservient status

appear in the concluding analysis of Chapter I, Part 3.

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CHAPTER I
GEORGES-EUGENE SOREL 1847 - 1894
Part 1

Origins: 1847 - 1889

What little is known about the life of Georges

Sorel prior to the commencement of his public life as a

writer is contained in the first biography of his thought
written by Pierre Andreu and published in 1953 in Paris

under the title of Notre maitre M. Sorel. The depiction

of Sorel's origins, his family and educational pursuits
contains a valuable appendix which includes a list of

books borrowed by Sorel from the Bibliotheque de Perpigan

during the formative period of his writing career.

Georges Sorel was born in Cherbourg on November 2,

1847. His maternal grandfather, Pierre Salley, had been an

officer in the Grande Armée and had been decorated on the

battle-field by Napoleon.l His father, Pierre Gustave

Sorel, was a merchant, so absorbed in business affairs that,

according to George Sorel's German cousin Albert Emile

Pierre Andreu, Notre maitre M. Sorel (Paris:
Bernard Grasset, 1953), p. 24. (Hereinafter referred to
as M. Sorel.)
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Sorel: . . . la devotion maternelle l'initiait a une
piété qui devait impregner son caractere de mysticisme."2
Georges had three brothers of whom Anatole and Ernest
would enter the Ecole Polytechnique some years later.
A third brother, Henri, died at the age of three in 1848.
In the same year the fortunes of the Sorel family were
undermined. Pierre Gustave Sorel, suffering reversals in
his business, was faced with severe financial difficulties.
The family confronted the austerity of these new conditions
with what a neighbor recalled as "heroic acceptance which
resulted in the rehabilitation of Pierre Gustave Sorel."3
Pierre Andreu speculated that "these financial difficul-
ties, by isolating Georges Sorel from his class, may have
predisposed him later to accept socialist ideas."4

The Sorel family moved from Cherbourg to Paris in
the hope of finding a more favorable commercial climate.
Writing in 1872 to a friend in Cherbourg, Nathalie Sorel,
Georges' mother, offered a typical Parisian lament: "Que
pourrais-je dire de Paris? Rien autre chose qu'il pleut
tous les jours et que les rues sont remplies de boue."5

Very little beyond this letter remains to suggest the

 

Andreu, M. Sorel, p. 24, from an article which
appeared in 1e Figaro written by Albert Emile Sorel a
few days after Georges Sorel had died.

3Andreu, M. Sorel, p. 26.

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character of life for the Sorel family during its lengthy
sojourn in Paris. By 1879, Georges had lived several
years of partial separation from his family. Absorbed
in studies and later a career, his life gradually became
more and more independent.

Georges Sorel was an excellent student. At the
college de Cherbourg he completed his baccalaureate
examinations at the age of seventeen, and in 1864, he
won first prize in elementary mathematics at an academic
gathering of six lycées and eight colleges under the
jurisdiction of Caen. In a preparatory class in the
8cole de Marine he received first prize in algebraic
arithematic and trigonometry, and in the preparatory
class of Saint-Cyr he again won first prize in mathe-
matics as well as natural history, cosmography and
mechanics. To prepare for entry into the E’:c01e Poly-
technique in Paris, he studied for one year at the
College impérial Rollin. Here his mentors described him

as an "excellent éleve a tous égards . "6 In

October, 1865, he was admitted to his first course in the
école Impériale Polytechnique. He completed two years of
study, passed his final examinations and in 1867 was
admitted into the Ponts' et Chaussées. In 1870, Sorel's

formal education was completed and he was assigned a

Post in Corsica.

Shortly after his departure from Paris

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the Franco-Prussian war began. The empire of Napoleon III

fell, the city of Paris was under siege, the commune rose
and fell and finally, amid disarray and confusion a new
French Republic was declared. How these events effected
Sorel is unknown. He remained on the island of Corsica
for the duration of the war. And his activities up to
1886, when his public career as a writer was launched,
are largely unknown. He had been, during his days at

the Polytechnique, an ardent royalist in his support for
the Comte de Chambord whom he predicted would capture
Paris "by force at the head of an army of volunteers."7
At the head of his school papers he delighted in writing:
"Vive Henry V."

Georges Sorel became a brilliant administrator,
and his career was marked by the recognition of his co-
professionals. In 1891, he was nominated Chevalier de
la Légion d'honneur, and in 1892 he was named Ingénieur
en Chef de premiere Classe. The death of his mother in
1887, and a resulting inheritance, led to his early
resignation from the Ponts et Chaussées in 1892. Sorel
retired to Paris, moving a few months later to Boulogne-
sur-Seine where he remained until his death in 1922. The
muniCiPal council of the village of Perpignan extended
their warm thanks to him for his work in their behalf

and recorded their gratitude in a letter dated August 29,

7Ibid., p. 32.

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1892. This document commemorated the conclusion of
Sorel's administrative career. The municipal library of
Perpignan also recorded the work of the Ingénieur en Chef
of the village between 1884 and 1891. These records
marked the origins of Sorel's career as a writer. They
provide a rare glimpse of the intellectual roots of what
students of Sorel have termed the beginning of his
second life.8
In 1897, Sorel wrote a letter to Benedetto Croce
in which he described his great sorrow at the death of
a woman who had been his companion for twenty-two years.
He first encountered Marie David in 1875 in a hotel in
Lyon where he was recuperating from an illness. Born in
Chanay on June 6, 1845, Marie David's life had been dif-
ficult and austere. She had worked as a laborer in
several factories prior to her move to Lyon where she
was employed in the hotel where Sorel had fallen ill.
Pierre Andreu speculated that Sorel would not have
inclined toward Socialism but for the influence of Marie
Invid on his life and thought.9 Sorel himself left ample
testimony to his deep affection and great admiration for

her. "She has been my companion through 22 years of

 

81bid., pp. 320-23. See also Appendix A which is
a reproduction of the original record of the Municipal
Library of Perpignan .

9Andreu, M. Sorel, pp. 39-40.

 

 

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work," he wrote to Croce, "during which time I was bound
to her with the ardor of first love. Her memory will
remain the best part of me for she remains the true soul
of my life."10
Almost illiterate when they met, Marie made rapid
progress in the daily instruction which Sorel provided.
Sorel's niece recounted Marie David's intellectual growth
and her great devotion to the relief of poverty and
misery, and her despair of injustice which she longed to

mitigate.11 Sorel later dedicated his most influential

work, Reflections on Violence, to her memory and wrote

 

in a letter to Agostino Lanzillo that she " . . . fait
partie de ma vie d'écrivain socialiste . . . Je l'ai
perdu en 1897, en depuis lors je puis dire que j'ai tra-
vaillé pour élever un monument philosophique digne de sa
mémoire."12
Sorel's family refused to accept Marie David as
a daughter-in-law, viewing the potential marriage as a
horrible déclassement. And Georges Sorel, following the
death of both of his parents, remained bound by their

will. He and Marie were unwed and childless through the

duration of their union. "Happy is the man," he wrote in

 

1°Ibid., p. 38. llIbid., p. 41.
12 . n . .
Ibid., p. 40. . . . made part of my soc1alist

‘writer's life. . . . I lost her in 1897, since then I
can say that I worked to raise a philosophical monument
worthy of her memory."

 

 

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an article devoted to Rousseau, "who has encountered an
energetic and proud woman whose love keeps him forever
young, and who prevents his spirit from resting in idle-
ness by recalling to him the obligations of his tasks,
and sometimes even revealing to him his highest

13

potential."

Writing in the introduction to the Reflections on

 

Violence, Sorel described the labor of self-education
which he had undertaken during the period of his tran-
sition from a career as an administrator to that of a
thinker and writer.

I am neither a professor [he wrote] nor a popular-
iser of knowledge, nor a candidate for party
leadership. I am a self-taught man exhibiting to
other people the notebooks which have served for my
own instruction. . . . During twenty years I have
worked to rid myself of what I retained of my edu—
cation. I read books not so much to learn as to
erase from my memory the ideas which had been
pressed upon it. . . . I have had to be my own
master and in a way to educate myself. . . . I put
before my readers the working of a mental effort
which is continually attempting to break through the
bonds of what has been previously constructed for
common use, in order to discover what is truly per-
sonal and individual. . . . A reader has great dif-
ficulty in grasping the thought of an inventor
because one can only attain it by rediscovering the
inventor's path.l4

 

l3Andreu, M. Sorel, p. 40.

 

l4Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.
bY'Th E. Hulme and J. Roth—TGlencoe, 111.: The Free
Press, 1950), pp. 32-33.

 

 

 

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10

13121889, Sorel published his first books: Le

Procés de Socrate and Contribution a l'étude de la Bible.

 

 

While the Third Republic was celebrating the centennial

of the Revolution, Sorel showed himself unsympathetic

to the revolutionaries of old and fearful of the intentions
of the republicans of his day. More revealing, however,
than a summary treatment of his contentions would be,

as he advised, to grasp the thought of the inventor by

rediscovering his path.

 

.‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

'i

APPENDIX A

IV
LIVRES EMPRUNTES PAR GEORGES SOREL A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
MUNICIPALE DE PERPIGNAN DURANT LA PERIODE 1884-1891.
HALEVY. --Mélanges de critique et d' histoire (3- -25 avril
1884). ,
RENAN.--Les Evangiles. Les Apotres. L'Eglise chréf
tienne (3’voI.) (I4 mars-Ier mai 1885T.
VACHEROT.--Histoire critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie
(5-13 mai 1885).
Revue philosophique, janvier-juin 1877 (16 octobre 1885).
-- 2e année, t. IV (17 --
-- -- t. V (24 --
-- -- t. VI (31 --
-- -- t. VII, janvier-juin 1879
(4 novembre 1885).
-- juillet-décembre 1880 (II novembre

 

 

 

 

1885).

-- juillet—décembre 1881 (14 novembre
1885).

—— juillet—décembre 1882 (25 novembre
1885).

-- janvier - juin 1883 (28 novembre
1885).

-- juillet-décembre 1883 (Ier décembre
1885).

ANNEXES
Emvue philosophique, juillet-décembre 1884 (2 décembre

1885).

-- juillet-décembre 1880 (4 décembre
1885).

\HOLLET-LE-DUC.--Dictionnaire del'architecture, t. VII
(10 décembre 1885f.

CHOISY.--L'Art de batir chez les Byzantins (12 decembre
1885).

\HOLLET-LE-DUC.--Entretiens sur l'architecture, t. II
(15 decembre 1885).

0L BLANC.--Grammaire des arts du dessin (l9 decembre
1885).

VKHLET-LE—DUC.--Dictionnaire, t. I (29 decembre 1885).

11

 

 

   
 

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12

VHflJET-LE-DUC.--Dictionnaire, t. IX (6 janvier 1886).

-- -- t. VIII (13 janvier 1886).

Dundonnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines (9 fasc.)
(l6,janvier 1886).

IEfl}--Etude sur les monuments de l'architecture des
Croisés en Syrie. Documents sur l’Histoire de France
(Iconographie chrétienne. Architecture monastique)
(9-10 février 1886).

VTOLLET-LE-DUC.--Dictionnaire, t. III (13 février 1886).

FRESNEL.--Euvres, t. I (II mars 1886).

SPENCER.--Philosgphie positive (12 mars 1886).

Revue philosophique, janvier-decembre 1885 (16 mars

1886).

-- janvier-decembre 1884 (18 mars
1886).

-- 2e semestre 1881 (23 mars 1886).

-- janvier-decembre 1878 (25 mars
1886).

P. JANET.--Euvres philosophiques, t. I (25 mars 1886).

ALFERNA (?).--Le Son et‘la musique (6 mai 1886).

VIOLLET-LE-DUC.--Dictionnaire, t. IX.

Eitretiens sur l'architecture, t. I.

Nbvum Testamentum. Vetus Testamentum (I4imai 1886).
Flavien Josephe (5 V611).

NOTRE MAITRE, M. SOREL

ImmAN.--Vie de Jésus (18 mai 1886).

-- Nouvelles études d'histoire religieuse (15 juin
1886).

Revue des Deux Mondes, 1884 (17 juin 1886).

IAPLACE.--Euvres, t. VII (22 juin 1886).

ggyue des Deux Mondes, 1872 (29 juin 1886).

EEWAN.--Histoire critique des livres de 1'Ancien Tes-
tament (30 juin 1886).

Ifictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines (fasc. 4,
5,96, 7) 73 juillet 1886).

Egyue des Deux Mondes, 1869 (7 juillet 1886).

-- -- Ier-15 mars 1886 (7 octobre 1886).

IMVAISSON.--Métaphysique d'Aristote (2 vol.) (9 octobre
1886).

IKMTARQUE.--Euvres morales, t. II (12 octobre 1886).

IEyue philosophique, janvier-juin 1885 (16 octobre 1886).

IAPLACE.--Euvres, t. VII (19 octobre 1886).

Ies Sarcophages chrétiens de la Gaule (21 octobre 1886).

USBLANC.--Les Sarcophagés d'ArIes (22 octobre 1886).

lgflmegphilosophique, juillet-dECembre 1884 (27 octobre
1886).

Wmu%.--Dictionnaire de Chimie A. B. (3 novembre 1886).

IHECARTES.--Lettres, t. I et II (10 novembre 1886).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-- Discours de la méthode (11 novembre 1886).
-- Passions de l'ame (12 novembre 1886).

 

Métaphysigue d'ARISTOTE (16 novembre 1886).
HARTMANN.--Le Darwinisme (27 novembre 1886) .

'7

 

‘ u
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13

Revue philosophique, 1883 (7 décembre 1886).
CourS de Philosophie positive, t. III (8 janvier 1887).
TYLOR.8-;;La Civilisation primitive, t. I (13 janvier

18 .
FUSTEL DE COULANGES.--La Cité antique (20 janvier 1887) .
Annales de Chimie et Physique, Se s€rie, 26 (Ier février

1887) .

ANNEXES
ARISTOTE.--La Génération (3 février 1887) .

-- Le Ciel (17—fevr1er 1887).
WUNDTumflPhysiologie humaine (Ier mars 1887).
COMTE.--Cours de philosophie positive (8 mars 1887).
DESCARTES.--Passions de l'ame. Le Monde (9 mars 1887).

-- Lettres, t. VI (12 mars 1887).

-- Pr1nc1pes de philosophie (17 mars 1887).
COMTE.--Philosophie positive, t. III (2 avril 1887).

t. I (19 avril 1887).
ARISTOTE. --Métaphysique (3 volumes) (12 mai 1887).

-- Le C1e1. La Génération (24 novembre 1887).

-- Le Ciel (23 fevr1er 1888).

Le Sentiment religieux en Grece (12-26 avril 1888).
ARISTOPHANE.--Comédies (c0111 Didot) (10 octobre 1888).
XENOPHON.--O era (8 novembre 1888).
Xenophon (Didot) (6 fevrier-3 mai 1889).
Revue_philosophique, juillet-decembre 1882 (9 aofit 1889).
1879 et 1883 (11 aofit 1889)

-- 1879-1881-1884 (l6 aofit 1889).

-- 1881-1886 (24 aofit 1889).
SAINT THOMAS, t. III (19 novembre 1889-30 janvier 1890).
Revue philosophique, 28 semestre, 1885-1886; 23 semestre

I887 (30 janvier 1890).

BLANC.--Grammaire des arts du dessin (Ier au 11 février

1890).
VIOLLET-LE-DUC.--Entretiens . . .

DESCARTES.--Lettres (3 tomes) (18 au 21 mars 1890).
Anciens Monileur, 1793 (2 vol.) 16, 17 (21 au 29 mars

1890). Convention (4 vol.) (29 mars-8 mai 1890).
ARISTOTE.--Traité de la Production at de la destruction

des choses (9 aout 1890).
la Moniteur, 1794 (11 septembre 1890).

Revue historique, Ier trimestre 1886, t. XXX (13 sep—

tembre 1890).

IXWPET.--Memoires de la Revolution (11 decembre 1890-24
janvier 1391).

 

 

 

 

 

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14

Part 2

The Trial of Socrates: 1889

TWue following examination of Sorel's The Trial of

 

Socrates seeks to discover the path which this thinker
chose a: follow and to elaborate the positions which he
embraced. It is not meant to be a criticism of Sorel;
it is a process which aims first at discovery. The object
is to know the thinker, his methodology and his conclusions.
This will suffice to satisfy the need to become aware of
the intellectual dimensions of the work of Georges Sorel.
I am content to leave to others, the readers of this
analysis in particular, to apply their own criteria to
the usefulness, value and truth of Georges Sorel's con-
clusions. My purpose is to find the path and to observe,
as faithfully as possible, its twists and turns.

Who was the real Socrates? What were his teach-
ings? What was his influence? These questions and others

were posed by Sorel in the preface to The Trial of Socrates

 

published in 1889. His views are stated in an unequiv-
ocable manner. "There has been, " wrote Georges Sorel, "a
conspiracy among philosophers and historians deliberately
to’misrepresent Greek history and especially the figure

ofSocrates."l The philosophers, he believed, by

1Georges Sorel, 1e Proces de Socrate (Paris:
Ezflix Alcan, 1889), pp. 5, 18. (Hereinafter referred to
as Socrate . )

 

 

 

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15

defending Socrates as a martyr to freedom of thought, had
acted in their own interests in so far as they too were
often in conflict with authority. But, he stated, their
motives are even more specific: in the 18th and early
19th centuries Socrates was celebrated as the alleged
victim of the Athenian priests; a deliberate distortion
which'was perpetrated as a means of attacking the
influence of the contemporary clergy.2 The historians,
tOOq had falsified the moral theories of the Socratic
teachings, and had hidden the vices of their Greek
heroes.3

Georges Sorel admired Socrates as a thinker of
unquestioned stature. In concluding his study he wrote:
" 1e monde salua en lui 1e créateur de la philosophie.
Jamais hommage rendu a un homme ne fut plus legitime.

. . . le monde gréc semblait dater de Socrate."4

 

2Ibid., p. 6.

3Ibid., p. 18. In connection with this accusation,
Sorel made EHe following observation: "Nous comprenons
leur réserve, s'ils ont agi ainsi par respect pour la
pudeur de leurs lectrices. . . . L'histoire de l'antiquité

ne doit pas étre mise entre les mains de jeunes filles."
Ibid., p. 18.

4Ibid., p. 280. "the world saluted him as the
creator of philosophy. Never was hommage rendered to a

man more legitimate. The Greek world seemed to date
from Socrates."

 

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16

In fact, Sorel stated, one would wish that Socrates had
been the apostle and martyr of liberty, but in this hope
one could not be more completely disappointed. For in
the state which Socrates had envisioned, Sorel believed,
the mind of man would have been supervised, directed and
oppressed.5 His state would have been ecclesiastic. The
only freedom which the citizen could have claimed would
have been the freedom to do what was considered good.6
The ideal of Socrates was a state transformed into a
church, with everything tending toward the good, such as

the leaders understood the word.7

To accomplish this end, Socrates8 set out to
break the chains which bound the citizens to the ancient
city of Athens. These bonds were those of military
discipline. The citizen was primarily a soldier. He
participated in a system of education destined to train
and prepare him for war. The Socratics, Sorel wrote,

demanded the freedom to destroy this ancient society,

 

51bid., p. 7.

6Ibid. Sorel gave special emphasis to "la
liberté du Bien."

7Ibid., p. 9. Here Sorel chided the revolu-
‘tionaries whom he seemed to have in mind while writing
the passage: "La fraternité ou la mort, hurlaient les
liaJlucines de '93." Ibid., p. 9.

8Sorel blamed Plato along with Socrates whom he
stated had, "renchéri sur son maitre, mais il a suivi ses
principes.” Ibid., p. 7.

 

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17

but they intended to replace it with a distasteful tyranny.
Like the French philosophers at the end of the eighteenth
century Sorel recalled, who once attaining a semblance
of power, attacked and persecuted the Christian Church
and fabricated new dogma to be forcefully imposed, the
Socratics sought an opportunity to establish their pre-
ponderance.9

One of the principle errors of Socrates, Sorel
continued, was his confusion of morality, law and science.
And this had a continuing debilitating effect as the
influence of Socrates grew. The trial of Socrates, added
to this allegation, the charge of contributing to moral
corruption, and Sorel believed that the morals of Socrate's
disciples were strongly suspect, especially those of Plato.
By expostulating the separation of soul and body, Socrates
so elevated the soul (which was synonomous with intel-
ligence or perhaps mind) that it became possible to con-
sider as indifferent those actions in which intelligence

10 Plato seemed to have been especially

played little part.
guilty of exaggerating this dimension of his master's

teaching and Sorel therefore rejected Plato as a

 

9Ibid., p. 8. Sorel compared also the Calvinists
to his Socratics: "Calvin demandait le droit d'enseigner
ce qu'il prétendait étre 1a vérité; mais i1 entendait que
.ses adversaires fussent réduits au silence, comme per-
‘turbateurs scandaleux de l'ordre divine." Ibid.

 

loIbid., p. 10.

 

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18

trustworthy transmitter of Socratic doctrines, though he

remained worthy of blame for disseminating a pernicious

influence.11 In fact, Sorel concluded that Plato's The

Banguet and The Republic were two books which had dis-
12

 

honored the Greek genius.
Prior to Socrates, Sorel wrote, the Sophists had
worked to ruin Greek society. But Socrates exposed the
error of their false reasoning, thereby ruining their
schools. Why, Sorel asked, could he not then found
morality on a solid basis? Is morality an insoluble
problem, he asked? The followers of Socrates, he con-
tinued, did even less. Plato ended in reverie. And the
Stoics, whose morality Sorel found closest to that of
Socrates in the ancient world, produced nothing good;
the ancient world was therefore consumed by corruption.
It remained for the Christian Church to offer a way out

13

of what Sorel called l'abime. Socrates further failed,

Sorel wrote, to understand the meaning of work. He did

 

11Ibid. Sorel wrote: "Nous utiliserons 1e moins
possible 1e tEmoinage de Platon, qui nous semble avoir
défiguré 1a pensée du maitre." Ibid.

lzIbid.

l3Sorel noted that the Christian Church had a
morality. "This morality has become so deep-seated in
us today that we imagine it to have been drawn out of
can own being. This is not the case, as the corruption
of the first century showed." Ibid., p. 11.

 

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19

not grasp its "ethical importance," and this was one of
the more regrettable lapses in his doctrine, which pre-
vented him.from saying anything correct or rational about
politics.14
We are in a better position than the Athenians,
Sorel stated, to evaluate the errors of the Socratic
philosophy. Yet those men who brought him to trial,
distinguished the dangers which he brought to the city
of Athens: "(They) . . . crurent en frappant Socrate,
frapper tout les écoles philosophique, décourager les
novateurs et faire revivre les idées des héros de Mara-
thon."15
Since Socrates, the idea of the proper composition

of the state had been in continual flux, and Sorel stated,

as a result: "Nous passons d'un despotisme a l'autre,

 

14Ibid., p. 12.

15Ibid., p. 13. Sorel noted further his orien-
tation toward the present as a motive for the study of
Socrates: "I believe that the study of ancient philo-
sophical theories must not be confined to a simple labor
of erudition. It is of sufficiently little interest to
know what the Sophists and the predecessors of Socrates
thought. Their theses have long since disappeared. It
is not the same with ideas of Socrates. . . . All con-
temporary guestions have their origin in his teaching.
The methods which he inaugurated are still those which
must occupy the educated today." Ibid., p. 14. "
believed that in knocking Socrates, they knocked all the
phiIOSOphical schools, discouraged innovators and made
the ideas of the heroes of Marathon relive."

’7

 

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20

. . . l6
sans que nous puissons v01r de terms a nos maux." In

addition, Socrates scorned the physicists of his day and
taught his followers not to bother with science. Instead
he proposed "une conception artistique du monde de
maniere a débarrasser la science du Bavardage pédant
des cosmogonistes."l7 The ethics of Socrates included
numerous contradictions and could therefore not endure,
but Socrates had furnished the dialectician an " . . .
arsenal inépuisable pour ruiner toutes les fausses
morales."18
From this beginning Georges Sorel proceeded to
an examination of the trial of Socrates and especially
to a consideration of the accusations against him in the
areas of morals, politics and religion. It is clear that
Sorel assumed the role of prosecuter and judge, yet his
deep respect for Socrates is equally clear:
Nous n'aurions pas donné une idée assez élevée de
l'enseignement de notre philosophe, si nous n'avions

pas fait connaitre l'importance de la dialectique
dans l'étudie des causes. Nous espérons que nos

 

16Ibid., p. 14. "We pass from one despotism to
another without being able to see the end of our evils."

17Ibid., p. 15. "An artistic conception of the
world in a manner to rid science of the pedantic chatter
of the cosmogonists."

18Ibid., p. 17. " . . . inexhaustible arsenal
to ruin alI false moralities."

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21

lecteurs reconnaitront, avec nous, qu'on peut par-

donner a Socrate bien des erreurs, par reconnais-

sance des services qu'il a rendus a la science.19
A final remark in the preface suggests Sorel's posture
with respect to the study of Socrates and its bearing on
contemporary life: "Nous serions heureux si nous par-
venions a ranimer dans quelques ames 1e feu sacré des
études philosophique et a convaincre quelques personnes
des dangers que court notre civilisation, par suite de
20

l'indifférence en matiere de moral et de droit."

The opening chapter of The Trial of Socrates

 

called upon the testimony of the Greek poet-comedien
Aristophanes and was entitled "The Witness of Aristo-
phanes."2l According to Sorel, the great poet was the
first to dare attack the Socratics. Here his interpre-

tation differed with those of his contemporaries who

 

lgIbid., p. 20.
We would not have given a well enough raised idea
of the teaching of our philosophy, if we had not
made known the importance of the dialectic in the
study of causes. We hope that our readers will
recognize with us that one can pardon Socrates for
his errors, by recognizing the services that he
rendered to science.

20Ibid., p. 21. "We would be happy if we suc-
ceeded in reanimating in some souls the sacred fire of
philosophical studies and to convince some people of the
dangers that our civilization runs, consequently of the
indifference in material of morality and law."

21Georges Goriely, 1e Pluralisme dramatique de

Georges Sorel (Paris: Marcel Riviere et Cie, 1962). On
;page 32 M. Goriely estimated this chapter to be the most
brilliant of the book.

 

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22

argued that the comedies exercised an evil and degener-
ating influence on the Athenian mind. Some claimed,
Sorel noted, that if there ever was an Athenian who no
longer believed in the gods of Greece it was Aristophanes,
because of the bitter and ridiculing way he treated them.
But Sorel questioned these judgments. He preferred to
see comedy as the "war of literature and eloquence in the
name of the good old times of ignorance when the Athenian
mariner knew only how to ask for barley cake and cry ho!
ho!"22 For Sorel the representation of moral depravity
was a consequence of the intellectual progress of the
epoch.

The comedies had shown that Aristophanes preferred
the old Athens in spite of its vices to the new, which
for him had ceased to be purely Hellenic. Aristophanes

was an enemy both of the demogogues and the new oligarchy.

Quoting from The Birds, Sorel identified Aristophanes as

 

chiding the new philosophy: " . . . weak mortals attached
to the earth, creatures of clay . . . unfortunate race
whose life is only darkness, listen: we who are to be
immortal, airy, always young, always occupied with

eternal ideas, we will teach you all the celestial

 

things."23 Sorel discovered numerous examples of ironic
22mm” p. 23.
23

Ibid., p. 35. Sorel's reference: Les Oiseaux,

 

v. 685.

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23

deprecation directed at the Sophists and Socrates in par-

ticular by the mordant comedian. In The Clouds, for

 

example, Socrates was made to appear suspended in a
basket while explaining that he needed to remain suspended
in the air to find the truth, and that contact with the
earth would prevent him from rising to lofty conceptions.24
The new Socratic school called for new laws, which Sorel
saw as a transvaluation of Athenian morality with destruc-
tive consequences: "All that which is shameful on the
earth and condemned by the law is honorable with the
birds."25
Sorel then demonstrated that Aristophanes had
denounced in his plays the incredulity of the new philo-
sophical schools and he proceeded to a comparison of the
old and new generations.
The old generation had been raised into an admir-
ation for the old Hellenic heroes. Homer and
Aschylus had sung of the combats of these marvelous
men and the gods of Olympus. They believed that
this form of education was essential to the for-
mation of good citizens. The Sophists changed
all that. The people who had not learned the new
teaching were regarded as foolish.26
The result of this change was a disaster for Athens:

"In the new Athens, the country gentleman, the old

 

24£2£Q., p. 36. Sorel's reference: Nuées v. 223.

25$§£§.: P. 37. Sorel's reference: Les Oiseaux,

'v. 755.

261bido' p. 41.

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24

soldier, was inferior to the lofty Sophists, because he

could not engage in discourse, because he could not

27 Sorel, perhaps casting an eye towards

conduct a trial."
the rhetorically inclined French Parliament, complained
of the new order in bitter terms:
In an assembly of idle and talkative people an
eloquent and subtle advocate always gets the better
of an old soldier. Here is why ancient civilization,
heroic and religious surrendered.28

Thus Sorel concluded Aristophanes' comedy The Birds was

 

” . . . une satire des plus virulent et des plus amusantes
contre les nouvelles écoles philosophique."29
Socrates had rendered a great service to philOSOphy
by creating precise definitions, but from this had derived
the need to discuss the meaning of each word and thus to
enter often into grammatical subtleties. This was, in
Sorel's view, precisely the side of Socrates which Aris-
tophanes attacked. The Greek mind was too much inclined

30

to discussions of words, Sorel concluded. To read the

dialogs of Plato, he stated, would show how very often

 

 

27Ibid. 28Ibid.
29Ibid., p. 42. " . . . a most virulent and

amusing satire against the new philosophical schools."

30In an interesting footnote Sorel expanded on the
dangers of the dialectic: " . . . le danger de la dialec-
thIue est la confusion qui s'établit trés facilement entre
les genres simples et naturels et les genres complexes
et artificiels: La distinction a poser entre ces deux
classes de résultats n'a pu étre bien faire par les
anciena, c'est pourquoi ils ne purent, en général arriver
a découvrir les lois de la nature." Ibid., p. 66.

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25

Plato wins over his adversaries by encumbering them in

a labyrinth of words.

But these were superficial problems compared to
what Georges Sorel considered the central evil of Greek
society: slavery; a vice which he found to have been

encouraged and rationalized by the new schools of phil-

31

osophy. Slavery, which Sorel referred to as " . . .

cette institution diabolique," would destroy "

société qui la pratique."32 Slavery corrupted all, he

"33

. . . toute

wrote, and " . . . the master more than the slave.
Nevertheless, slavery was " . . . regardé par les philo-

sophes anciens comme essential a une société policée,

parce qu'il dispensait du travail."34 This concept of

an ideal society based on virtue strengthened, among the

thinkers, the thesis of slavery.35 To the free men

 

311bid.,.p. 83.

32Ibid. " . . . this diabolical institution
would destroy every society which practiced it."

33Ibid., p. 84.

34Ibid. " . . . regarded by ancient philosophers
as essential in a policed society because it disPensed
with work . "

35Here Sorel quoted Aristotle in an interesting

statement on slavery, "Quand on est inférieur a ses sem-
blables autant que le corps l'est a l'éme, la brute a
1'home, et c'est la condition de tous ceux chez qui

1 emphfi.des forces corporelles est le seul et le meil-
leur parti a tirer de leur étre, on est esclave par
natun%n Politique Livre I, Chapitre II traduction de
M- Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, as quoted by Sorel.

 

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26

belonged the exercise of reason, to the slaves that of
the body. This thesis, according to Sorel, was based

on the principle of the absolute separation of the mind
and the body, a doctrine which he believed Socrates had

completely accepted . 3 6

Thus in the city of Athens, the citizens did not
work much. And because of his conviction of the ethical
value of work, Sorel believed, it would be easy to imagine
the evil consequences to which this idle life led.37
Social classes, on the Athenian model, which did not
work were able to maintain themselves only by force, the
result being an extreme demoralization in the dominant
class. Sorel did not consider this to be a casual obser-
vation. He wrote: "11 en a été ainsi dans tous les
siecles, et c'est la une loi de la nature humaine."38

On the subject of the ethical value of work,
Sorel was greatly influenced by Proudhon whom he believed
had very well stated the problem:

Not only is work necessary to the conservation of
our bodies, it is indispensable to the development

of our minds. . . . As much as the law of con-
sumption humiliates us, so much the law of work

 

36Sorel, Socrate, p. 85.

37Sorel saw the same conditions in contemporary

society. "Aurourd'hui encore il suffit de regarder

autour de nous pour reconnaitre l'influence des méme
causesfl' Ibid.

 

38Ibid. "It has been thus in all centuries, and

1t is a law of human nature."

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27

lifts us .up. We do not live exclusively the life
of the mind because we are not pure-mind, but by
work we spiritualize more and more of our existence.
Can we thus pity ourselves for it?39
Sorel could find no one in antiquity who recog-
nized the fundamental vice of slavery, but he boasted,

Aristophanes had had the wisdom to rank the peasant above

the sophist. From The Frogs he quoted the plea of the

 

chorus: "Guard us from talking with Socrates, and from
scorning the sublime nuances of the tragic muse; from
passing an idle life debating emphatic declamations of
subtle foolishness: this is to have lost all meaning."40

This quotation is found in Chapter II of The Trail of

 

Socrates entitled "The Socratic Morals" and signals the

 

beginning of Georges Sorel's attack on what he believed
the corrupting moral influence of Socrates.

It was in Socrates' distinction between two types
of love that Sorel located the origins of morally disrup-
tive and reprehensible influences on first the Greeks and
especially Plato and enduring late into the nineteenth
century. Pure love, Socrates taught, was that which

addressed itself to the soul and was inspired in the

 

. 39Quoted by Sorel: Proudhon, layguerre et la
PalX,livre Iv, Chapitre VI in Socrate, p. 85.

 

40
V- 1491.

Ibid., p. 86, quoted by Sorel as Grenouilles,

 

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28

Socratic lexicon by Venus Uranie.41 One could give it
free reign without danger. Theoretically one scorned
Venus Pandéme as the representative of physical fulfill-
ment. Sorel found in The Banquet by Xenephon a statement
of Socrates‘ pernicious conception of love. Here Socrates
had declared that it was admirable that a man love a hand-
some boy. He found it completely natural that the boys
"sont célébrée et admirée comme s'il s'agissait d'une

"42

fille. Sorel added that Socrates counseled moderation,

and did not approve that males embrace one another; he
recognized " . . . the passionate character of the Greeks
and understood the dangers of homosexual relations."43
Plato's account of these events was entirely rejected by
Sorel who preferred Xenephon and found Plato a morally
degenerate, unscrupulous disciple of Socrates: "Nous

ne consulterons pas le Banquet de Platon parce que nous
pensons qu'il faut en laisser toute responsabilité a

l'auteur, qui nous semble avoir été beaucoup moins chaste

 

41Grudgingly Sorel allowed " . . . nous confor-
merons a l'usage, et nous appelerons . . . l'ame' la
substance supérieur: cependant, a notre avis, ce mot peut

donner souvent lien a des confusions." Sorel, Socrate,
p. 87.

42Sorel, Socrate, p. 88. " . . . are celebrated

and admired as if He were a girl."

431bid.

 

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29

, 4 .
que Xenophon." 4 According to Sorel, Plato must have

written The Banquet in "Sicily where the morals were
very corrupt. "45
The theories of Socrates also removed men from
their homes, for it was not with a woman that an Athenian
could consummate the union of souls so vaunted by Socrates.
Sorel concluded: "L'amour que personifie la Vénus Uranie
est nécessairement unisexuel. Socrate commit un véritable
crime en donnant au monde une théorie si parfaite et si

"46 Thus the ancients came

poétique de l'amour unisexuel.
to scorn conjugal love and with it all physical relations
with women, and gradually fell into an "oriental mysti-

cism."47

Erotic mysticism was not in the pure Greek mind,

Sorel affirmed, it was the Orient which had at all times

 

44Ibid., p. 93. In a footnote, Sorel stated:
"Platon expose complaisamment ses theses sodomitiques;
l'auteur lui fait célébrer l'amour unisexuel comme une
chose tres honnéte." Ibid. "We do not consult the Banquet
of Plato because we think it necessary to leave all
responsibility to the author, who seems to us to have
been much less chaste than Xenophon."

45Sorel, Socrate, p. 93.

46Ibid., p. 95. "Love that Venus and Uranus per-
sonified is necessarily unisexual. Socrates committed a
real crime in giving to the world a theory so perfect
and so poetic of unisexual love."

47Ibid., p. 99.

 

 

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30

inspired it. It was a product of the influence of
Asiatic religions and of a certain overworked intellect
which led to hysteria. It seemed clear to Sorel that
Socrates borrowed principles long honored on the other side
of the Aegean Sea; and Plato had simply exaggerated the
faults of his teacher.48 Therefore, Socratism proved
to be deadly: it contributed powerfully to vulgarization
and to the development of an unhealthy and erotic culture.49

In Chapter III entitled "The Religion of Socrates"
Sorel considered the complaints launched against Socrates
on the question of religion. He found that Socrates
seemed above reproach in that he regularly sacrificed to
the gods, participated in all the feasts and showed him-
self, if not zealous, at least decent. The Greeks, Sorel
noted, were embued with a deep respect for ancient tra-
ditions; they had an almost superstitious admiration for
Homer.50

Yet Socrates believed himself to be inspired by

Divinity, and his disciples had the same opinion.51

Socrates believed that he possessed an oracle which gave

 

48Ibid., p. 100. Sorel complained in a footnote
that."philosophy is not to blame for the play of the
imagination, but philOSOpherS should combat their influ-
ence, as Socrates did not." Ibid.

49 50

Ibid., p. 101. Ibid., pp. 106-08.

511bid., p. 127.

 

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31

him spontaneous, precise and unfailing counsel. As a
result, Socrates found himself in a position very dif-
ferent from that of the Sophists: he was not only a
profound dialectician and an eloquent professor, " . . .
il était prophete, il était inspiré par la Divinité; la
vérité était incarnée en lui; ses decisions étaient
infaillibles."52 Socrates had a religious mission. Was
it this mission which accounted for the accusation
against Socrates that he sought to overthrow the national
religion and to replace it with demonic superstitions?
In the opinion of Georges Sorel: "Socrate ne craignaint
rien tant que de manquer aux devoirs que les Dieux lui
imposaient. Sa conduite était marquée au sceau du fana-

53 . . .
" It was a consequence of his m1551on

tisme doctrinal.
that Socrates refused to accept payment for his teaching.
He believed his teachings had to be freely dispensed, for
the good was an object of science which could be taught;

that which he had received as a revelation must not com-

mand payment from others. Sorel concluded:

 

52Ibid., p. 129. Sorel noted: "En Asie, cette
situation n'aurait rien de choquant, il y avait eu, de
tout temps, des prophetes dans ce pays; mais en Grece il
en était tout autrement. Ibid. " . . . he was a prophet,
he was inspired by Divinity; the truth was embodied in
him; his decisions were infallible."

53Sorel, Socrate, p. 135. "Socrates feared
nothing so much as missing the duties that the gods had
imposed on him. His conduct was marked by the seal of
doctrinal fanaticism."

 

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32

C'est 15 une doctrine purement réligieux.54 . . .
Le philosophe ne doit pas étre confondu avec un

. l} ;
SimpleAmaitre de morale ou d'eloquence. ll 55

apparait comme un hiérophante et un révélateur.

Socrates regarded the stars as divine beings and
addressed prayers to the sun. Socrates felt that the
astrological theories of his time would lead to nothing
because these divine beings were beyond the science of
man.56

Sorel again complained of the influence of Asia
upon Greece, an influence which he felt had marked to
some extent the Socratic teaching--an influence which
was morally detrimental to the Hellenic mind. All that
was known about the morals of the populations of ancient
Asia, he said, was unfavorable, and seemed to derive from
the religious systems and those who practiced them. Cas-
tration, sacred prostitution, the pederasty of the priests

57

he noted were common things in these religions. The

 

54

d ”Ibid., p. 136. "That is a purely religious
octrine.

55Ibid., p. 137. "The philosopher must not be
confused with a simple master of morality or eloquence.
He seems like a hierOphant and revealor."

56Ibid., p. 142. Sorel observed with respect to
man's propensity to believe the incredible: "D'apres
une loi de notre nature, nous voulons quelque chose
d'indémontrable a croire. Le 'Credo quia absurdum'
appartient a toutes les époques et a toutes civilisations."
Ibid., p. 146.

57Sorel, Socrate, P. 152.

 

   

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33

Jewish religion escaped these demoralizing influences
because "it was," Sorel believed, "essentially virile."58

In Chapter IV entitled "The Oligarchs" Sorel
discussed comparatively the aristocracy of Greece before
Socrates and that which came to influence during and
after his time. The old aristocracy of Greece was
centered on military institutions. There was very little
distance between the soldier and the officer. Tactics
were developed through practice. The school of command
was based on obedience. Each city had its own armament
and its manner of combat. The principle occupation was
agriculture. The people were frugle and sober.59 They
were soldiers whose existence was tied to the glory of
the city. Their education had been a preparation for war;
it was not complex and thus it was accessible to all the
citizens. The development of the schools of the Sophists
completely changed this situation. A new aristocracy--
an aristocracy of the word and of intelligence slowly
came into being. It was this development which Aris-
tophanes so often attacked.

The Greeks, Sorel said, were endowed with an

intelligence so alive and a genius so free that the men

 

SBIbid.

59Sorel noted here: "These citizens were not
merchants demanding guaranteed exchanges, protection for
their industries or soliciting governmental favors, they
were superior to our present day bourgeoisie." Ibid.,
p. 172.

 

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34

of the city, under the influence of the new schools, soon
showed themselves very superior to the country gentlemen
(campagnards). The old soldiers of Marathon, Sorel

charged, were exposed to ruinous trials because they were

incapable of advancing their arguments with the finess

of the city dwellers.60 The lower ranks of the urban

plebs raised themselves by the oratorical skills which
ruled the city.

The Sophists taught the art of debate. The evil
in their doctrine was its unprincipled and amoral goal--
success. To succeed by domogogic flattery in a democratic
society or by more refined flattery in the court of a
tyrant such were the goals that the students were taught
to pursue. They were " . . . donc completement indif-
.iérent aux principes des divers gouvernements: ils

.2apprenaient a se tirer d'affaire dans toutes les con-

61

4fi3itions possibles." To persuade without regard for

aginYImual end, Sorel concluded, was the prostitution of

eloquence, logic and knowledge.62

-

I

601bid., p. 177.

61Ibid., p. 178. In a footnote to this complaint
Sonfl.stated “Dans le Gorgias, 1e sophiste explique que
sonart net en état de persuader les juges, les sénateurs,
1? Peuple. Il est trés clairement avoué que la rhétorique
n a d'autre but que la persuasion." Ibid. " . . . thus
completely indifferent to the principles of diverse

govef‘nments: they learned to manage in all possible
conditions . "

62:npid.

 

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35

Yet from this point of View, Socrates had been
different than the Sophists, because he sought to demon-
strate the truth. But his disciples did not always follow
him in all his teachings. And the demogogues did in fact
become a sort of oligarchy based on the small shops and
artisans of Athens: haughty, sly, lying and boastful,
they directed the affairs of the city to the detriment
of the country.63

At this point in his narration, the question of
inequality of talent seemed especially perplexing to
auel. He referred to the discussions of the philoso-
mmms whom he called "utopian" and concluded that the
fimnders of utopias usually made talent an important
aflxibute, though he chided them by suggesting that they

. . . agissaient ainsi, en partie, pour se réserver

tum belle prébend dans la société réorganisée."64
What of the problem of reconciling very great

superiorities? Sorel noted the Opinion of Aristotle who

had written: "It would be ridiculous to try to submit

them to the constitution because they would respond as the

 

63Ibid., p. 179. In reference to his contemporary
France, SoreI noted, " . . . today people are disposed to
admit the legitimacy of an hierarchy of knowledge. But
the modern socialist knows that equality is only a mis-

leading lie in a society of unequal cultural opportunity."
Ibid.

64Ibid., p. 194. " . . . acted thus, in part, to

reserve for themselves a good cushy job in the reorganized
soc1ety."

 

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36

lions would to a decree rendered by an assembly of
rabbits on the general equality of animals."65 Aristotle
had proclaimed the absolute right of genius: "It is
equitable neither to murder nor to punish by ostracism

such a person, nor to submit him to the common level .

it remains therefore to obey this man and to recognize in

him a perpetual power."66 This proposition was rejected

kw Sorel in favor of a statement of political right which

he found in the writings of Taine:

La chose commune est a la communauté passée, présente
et futur. Chaque génération n'est que la gérante
temporaire et la dépositaire résponsable d'un
patrimoine précieux et glorieux qu'elle a recu de

la précédente a charge de le transmettre a la sui-
vante. . . . La constitution n'est qu'une machine.

. . . La plus savante est illégitime, la ou elle
dissout l'Etat. Il n'y en a pas qui soit de droit
antérieur, universel et absolu.67

 

65Sorel quoted Aristotle, Politique, livre III,
Chapitre VIII.

 

66Ibid.; livre III, Chapitre XI. Sorel complained

of this adv1ce in the same footnote, "Inutile de remarquer
1e vice de ce raisonnement qui néglige completement
l'histoire." Sorel, Socrate, p. 197.

67Sorel quoted from Taine, La Revolution, Tome

I p. 187, p. 197.
The common thing is the community past, present and
future. Each generation is only the temporary man-
ager and the responsible trustee of a precious and
glorious patrimony that it has received from the
pueceding generation in charge of transmitting it
‘UJthe following. The constitution is only a
nmchine. The most knowledgeable is illegitimate,
cu it dissolves the State. There is none of it
‘fluch is anterior, universal and absolute right.

 

 

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37

For the new philosophical schools in Greece,
Sorel suggested, there seemed to be a motive for justi-
fying the special privilege of the superior person.
Certainly the philOSOphers themselves could benefit from
it, and when this claim was extended to the talented a
new oligarchic principle was posed. The metaphysical
conceptions to which Socratism was attached, Sorel said,
were conducive to the development of still more conse-
quences of this doctrine of privilege. Although Socrates
was an exceptional man, Sorel wrote, nevertheless he
cflaimed that equal abilities could be acquired by pious
and wise men through exercise and study.68 This con-
cmption divided the ancient Greek city into two cate-
gories of citizens. Those who participated in an ele-
1mted intelligence enjoyed a sort of grace;69 they were
evidently better equipped to discover the truth. They
could, better than the others, analyze phenomena and
formulate natural laws which the Divinity had written in
nature. But the government of the cities did not always
follow the theoretical guidelines submitted by philoso-
phers. "Le plus souvent, ceux qui possedent 1a puissance

de la pensée et de la volonté, nécessaire a l'administration

 

681bid., p. 198.

69This word received special attention from Sorel
thassociated it with the Greek idea of "1'Intellect
dunn." See Socrate, p. 198.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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38

des Btats, sont laissés de cdté."70 And in this cir-

cumstance the Socratic thesis became almost subversive
if not revolutionary.

The dialectical ladder was raised to new heights.
By ignoring the savants, by refusing them their privi-
leges it could be assumed that democracy not only made
a mistake it committed a crime against the Divinity.
It had overthrown " . . . toutes les lois de la Providence,

71 Those who had

elle se met elle meme hors 1e droit."
tmen prevented from assuming their rightful places in
government now had a mission to accomplish. Genius and
talent had duties to fulfill. They could not allow them-
mflves to cross their arms and laugh at the stupidity of
fbols. They were " . . . nés pour l'action, ils doivent
agir."72
In this regard Socrates had given very clear
advice. He had said that: " . . . if one were capable

of winning the crown and of rendering glory upon himself

and his birthplace, and yet he refused to fight, it is

 

70Ibid., p. 199. "The most often, those who
possess the power of thought and will necessary for the
administration of States are left aside."

. 71Ibid. " . . . all laws of Providence, it put
itself even outside of right."

72Ibid. " . . . born for action, they must act."

 

 

 

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39

clear that he would be a sissy and a coward."73 Socrates

posed the following questions: Could a government founded
on the domination of the ignorant over the wise call
itself legitimate? Was it not in this case a social
ulcer which must be cured by fire and iron? Was not

the right superior to a legality purely of form? Are
not the good called upon to sacrifice their lives to
combat evil and to rehabilitate the divine order when
obstacles exist to its pacific realization?74 These
questions, Sorel said, conformed to the principles of
the Socratic system. They were the logical consequences
of his teaching.

Can philosophic doctrines be blamed for revolu-
tionary movements, Sorel asked? It is doubtless, he
amswered, that economic conditions play an important
role, but it would be a serious error to ignore the study
of the impact of ideas on revolutionary change. In fact,

" . . . aucun mouvement important ne peut se produire

75 Thus one must demand

dans la société sans une Idée."
an accounting of the phiIOSOphers such as Socrates for

the impact of their doctrines. This had been done by all

 

73Ibid., p. 200. Sorel quoted Socrate, Mémoires,
livre III, Chapitre VII.

 

74Ibid.

 

751bid., p. 203. " . . . no important movement
canpmoduce itself in a society without an Idea."

 

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40

the historians who condemned the evil influence of the
Sophists and their contribution to the unhappiness of
Athens.

It is striking to note, Sorel continued, how rare
it is that thinkers become involved actively in political
life. Their timidity contrasted dramatically with the
hmld radicalism of their thought. Men who resort to
violence, Sorel said, were the weakest of theoreticians.76

It is of no consequence that the theoretician might pro-

test against the extremism of their disciples he concluded.

(me would respond to them that a book is to be read and
cmmmented upon and that it was regrettable that the author

77

fwd so badly explained himself. The thinker must be

rmld accountable. ‘

Of all forms of government, Sorel continued, the
worst was that in which the rich and the talented share
pmwer. Most historians, he charged, blinded by their

prejudice against the nobility, had ignored the vices

of plutocratic constitutions. In this type of government,

 

76Ibid., p. 204. In support of this observation,
Sorel referred to the revolutionary assemblies in France,
a pejorative aside.

77Ibid. Students of Sorel who have refused the
validity omaming the thinker for the actions of his
followers have not expaciated upon this statement. See
George Meizel, The Genesis of Georges Sorel.

 

 

 

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41

Sorel wrote, success justified everything.78 The evil

of plutocratic systems according to Sorel rested on the
principle of exchange: men did not count. The dominance
of economic ideas obscured the moral law and corrupted
political principles. This was not the way the old
Athenian democracy comprehended things: it seemed
impossible to them, Sorel said, that one could become a
good citizen without having received a virile education.
This "virile education" Sorel compared to the Sophistic
and Socratic studies which could make a savant out of

mientirely unscrupulous person but it could not "
79

hu.donner l'ame d'un homme libre."
The ancient Greeks, Sorel continued, gave an
:Mmortant place to Homer in their education. Homer was
Imm.admired as an artist but as an excellent teacher.
In:was through him that the Greeks were awakened to
themselves, he was the center of the national conscience,
the distinctive mark of the Greeks. The works of Homer
bound the Greek present to its past. The morals of the

epic of the Greek kings were celebrated with enthusiasm,

 

78Ibid., p. 210. In a footnote, Sorel quoted
Renan who wrote, "The Roman Empire by deprecating the
nobility . . . augmented instead the advantages of chance.
Far from establishing effective equality among the citi-
zens, the Roman Empire created profound differences: the
notable and the rich, and the poor. By proclaiming politi-
cal equality for all, inequality was introduced into the
law.“ Sorel quoted Renan Marc-Auréle, p. 598.

 

79$orel, Socrate, p. 212. " . . . give to him

the soul of a free man."

 

 

 

 

 

 

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42

and this sentiment survived even into the Greek democra-
tic era. Eschylus, Sorel believed, was hardly less con-
servative than Homer, but he lived in a revolutionary
age, and in that age he entered a plea for the cause
of the old morals. But the innovators scorned the old
poets. And the Socratic philosophers shared this point
of view.80
Why did the new schools move away from the study
of the ancient poems? They were offended, said Sorel, by
tme manner in which the questions were presented. They
finmd absurd the naive anthropomorphism of Homer. The
&xmatic idea of providence was almost the exact opposite
cm the passionate gods of ancient Greece.81 But an even
more profound difference between the old and the new
culture, Sorel identified as the essence of melancholy--

82 This characterized the ancient

fonds de tristesse.
cheeks who in the midst of their most brilliant triumphs
recalled that one must fear a reversal of fortune. This
was the concern of Agamemnon who turned away from the
glory of victory to conclude that " . . . He is only

happy who passes his life to its end in an untroubled

prosperity. If thus in the future I may hope to emerge

 

801bid., p. 213. 8lIbid.
82 . II "
Ibid., p. 216. base of sadness.

 

 

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43

as triumphant as today."83 Nothing is more touching,

said Sorel, than this sentiment of moderation, so purely
Hellenic. The Greek poets wanted their heroes to implore
the gods not to make them pay for a victory with a future
disaster.84 The Greek poet did not know the false pessi-
mism of disappointed pride: "Si le malheur est toujours
prét a nous frapper, si le bonheur complet est une illusion
décevante, le monde n'en est pas moins aussi excellent et

aussi parfait que possible."85

No people, Sorel believed,
had so strongly sensed the grandeur and the beauty of

life as the Greeks. He especially vaunted their great
love of activity. Greek heroes loved life and nature was
entirely animated by their genius; a genius which was
ibound to the earth.

The poetic melancholy of the Greek poets was best

:represented for Sorel in Aristophanes' The Persians which

 

he called a master work of dramatic art. In this play
-tflu:soldier poet was depicted as never abandoning himself
to exaggerations of chauvinism. Before each campaign he
celebrated the victory of Salamis; but with never a bitter

word for the victors, for he had learned to respect his

83Sorel quoted Eschyle, Agamemnon, v. 928.

 

84Sorel, Socrate, p. 217.

85Ibid. "If unhappiness is always ready to
Shake us, if happiness is a deceiving illusion, the
World is not less excellent and perfect than possible."

 

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44

adversary. He knew that everything was controlled by
the gods. Had they not punished the pride of Xerxes?
No Persian poet, said Sorel, had painted with so much
grandeur and profound sorrow the misfortunes of the prince.
But the Sophists were optimists. And Socrates
shared their optimism. The poetic melancholy of the
ancients was thought to be an injury to science: had
not intelligence been given to man to lift himself above
the miseries of the world? Was not intelligence sovereign?
In this perspective Sorel saw an implicit decadence. "The
man who contents himself with probablism," he wrote, "the
person who believes in the absolute independence of reason
has no cause to accept pessimism. He lets things go, does
Ins task as well as he can and encloses himself in a safe
éand warm retreat. And if he has attained a sufficient
(Segree of optimism," Sorel continued, "he will regard
'tzhe unfolding panorama of the world as an interesting
1t:ableau and will end by believing that everything was
Irtiade to amuse him."86
Thus two things were especially offensive to the
patriotic and honest part of the Athenian population with

respect to Socrates, Sorel concluded in a final chapter

—_

86Ibid., p. 219. Sorel noted: "We think the
Optimistic period in France is tending towards its end:
true awakening of pessimism in certain milieux seems to
announce the revival of morality. For a sufficiently
longtime the cult of success has dominated among us; the

time has come to see life in a more philosophical way."
Ibid.

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45

entitled "The Death of Socrates." First, were the claims
of Socrates to prophetic inspiration, and secondly his
advocacy of a withdrawal from life as contained in his
doctrine of renunciation. Socrates encouraged the moral
decline in Athenian life through the doctrine of love
which he taught. Unhealthy morals, Sorel said, were
" . . . se développaient déja assez vite sans que le
philosophe vint en donner une théorie aussi poétique,
aussi séduisante et aussi perfidement dangereuse."87
On the subject of education Socrates, like all
the Sophists, worked to ruin the ancient morality. The
conservatives were dismayed by this because they believed
that heroic generations could only be formed by nourishing
the young on the heroic poems. And after the disasters
of the civil war, Sorel stated, all sensible men came to
share this point of view. The choice seemed to be
between the restoration of the old or the complete
destruction of Greek civilization. Had not Socrates,
himself, Sorel asked, admitted the necessity of the
restoration by advising the sons of Pericles that they

Inusttake up once more the morals of their ancestors?88

87Ibid., p. 234. ” . . . already developing
Ummselves quickly enough without the philosopher coming

Ungive a theory as poetic, seductive and treacherously
dangerous . "

88Ibid., p. 236.

 

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46

Ancient Greek society, Sorel reaffirmed, was
founded upon the requisite military discipline which the
preparation for war required. Among the unarmed soldiers
a kind of equality had been engendered, an equality
which was itself based on the condition of being a
soldier-citizen. These soldier-citizens formed the
government. But, Sorel complained, Socrates claimed
that legitimate government belonged to the savants.89
And the tyranny of the union between the intellectuals
and the talented, Sorel believed, had fostered the amoral
opportunism of the sophist ethic and the demise of the
ancient bonds which held the old civilization together.
In periods of calm, Sorel continued, people had admired
the utopian ideas of the sophists: what happiness might
they hOpe to discover if their assemblies could be com-
posed, not of old marines and warriors, but of dialec-
tficians.90 In these conditions, the natural laws of
government could be found and correct decisions could be
nude. But, Sorel affirmed, the new oligarchy ruined the
city, oppressed all the citizens and united all the
honorable men against it in a sentiment of reprobation.
And for most of the people Socrates symbolized this new

point of view .

The Athenians had passed through the harsh and

mmuliating experience of war and privation. The future

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47

seemed gloomy; the city was poor. It was necessary,

Sorel wrote, to appeal to the sentiments of heroism of

the peasants, merchants and planters, who knew little of
philosophy but who recalled that their fathers had been
heroes during the Persian Wars. Because, Sorel continued,
people have need of a symbol to reify their ideas,

Socrates came to symbolize the new and unhappy education.91
Socrates had vaunted his superiority over his contemporaries
saying: "I say that the voice of a god has given under-
standing to me."92 Sorel also found that Socrates made

it known that an oracle had declared him the most wise of

men.93 Could this impiety have escaped the judges who

condemned Socrates to death?

It was in death that Socrates, Sorel believed,

reached his true stature as a Greek, and to some extent

 

911bid., p. 250.

92Ibid., p. 257. Sorel stated his strong prefer-
ence for Xenophon over Plato as a source for the life of
&xuates in the following interesting statement: "Xeno-
pmmihad been a soldier, his soul was better tempered than
that of Plato who had a delicate nature. . . . Xenophon
had seen death up close. He knew to what heights the
mnfl.was raised when man voluntarily exposed himself to
dagger." And again quoting Proudhon, la Guerre et la
EEUH he lists the following excerpt: “It is especially
fl’the exaltation of the virile person that war shows
itspuestige. Man under arms appears greater than nature;
efeels himself more worthy, more proud, more sensible

Egogonor, more capable of virtue and of self sacrifice."
1 .

 

93Ibid., p. 274.

 

 

 

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48

separated himself from the other less noble philosophers
of his time. Once again acknowledging Proudhon, Sorel
observed that death was the decisive proof of the value
of education and the morality of a society. Because
Socrates had died in such a noble fashion recognizing
that the destiny of man should be to spend himself
entirely for his natural and spiritual progeny, why,
Sorel asked, had no religion come out of his teaching ?
Socrates was perfectly gifted as a religious founder:
enthusiastic, eloquent, and apparently superior to other
religious prophets. Yet why had no religion ensued?
The milieu was decisive, Sorel concluded. Because the
old traditions were not broken a new religion could not
impose itself. In order for the local divinities to be
dethroned, it was necessary, Sorel concluded, for the
Roman conquest to splinter the ideas of patriotic soli-
darity and to level conditions generally.94

But the great weakness of the Socratic schools,
Sorel found, was their optimism: the masses could not,
helxflieved, be roused by praising the order, harmony and
rationality of existing things. All great religious

movements, he concluded, were based on a pessimistic

conception of 1i fe .

94Ibid., p. 277.

 

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49

Also Socrates was not a man to create symbols
which are important in the religious systems of a
people.95 Socrates conceived of a purely intellectual
being, Sorel wrote, and his ethics rested upon this
untenable hypothesis.96 Thus the Socratic theory was
anti-scientific in the highest degree: it was super-
natural.97 It omitted the motive causes which formed
a most obscure and vital area of philosophy.98 For-
tunately, Sorel observed, in the contemporary world the
problem of motive causes had been studied by a new,

fecund method which was based on observation and clas-

sification. The moral sciences, he noted, were not

 

95Ibid., p. 278. Sorel also mentioned here his
idea that me old Greek polytheism could not be rein-
thmated through a scientific explanation of its myths,
because these "drew their force from the freedom with
whhfllthey had been formed in the national poetry. To
reconcile them was impossible. To explain them by
allegory or by history would destroy them." Ibid., p. 275.

, 96£§i§,, p. 294. "This is why, Sorel observed,
Aristotle reproached Socrates: for not taking account
0f the principle of action." Ibid., p. 295.

97Sorel introduced his definition of religion

here as "A collection of dogma, accepted by popular faith,

Whyflxdefines the supernatural role of man in the world."
£123.. p. 298.

981bid., p. 314.

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50

absolute. Motive causes depended on history.99 Nothing

is perfectly logical in society, he concluded.100

On this important idea Sorel terminated his work

The Trial of Socrates,101 and opened his career as a

Speculative writer--a career which has thus far resisted
all efforts of categorization and which has in addition

caused a flow of pejorative comments concerning his style

as a writer.

"Georges Sorel is one of the most provocative
and baffling figures in modern thought," wrote Richard
Humphrey in 1951. "It is strange that his reputation

should be so great, and in another sense, strange too,

that it should not be greater."102

Sorel himself writing in a letter to his friend
Enniel Halevy, which was to become the introduction to his
Reflections on Violence, stated what he felt to be the

core of the problem of the writer:

99Ibid., p. 330.

100Ibid., p. 346. Sorel termed Plato's myths in

The Republic, "phenomenological essays on the creations
0 reason. Ibid.

1011bid., p. 349.

102Richard Humphrey, Georges Sorel Prophet Without
Eflkmy A Study in Anti-IntellectualiSm (Eambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 1. Note: Humphrey
Stated Sorel " . . . married a girl of peasant stock";

31error corrected later by Pierre Andreu in Notre maitre
- Sorel. _‘

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51

The communication of thought is always very difficult
for anyone who has strong metaphysical preoccupations;
the words themselves somehow spoil the most important
thoughts. Verbal communication is easier than
written, because spoken words act on the feelings in
a mysterious way which helps to establish a current
of sympathy between people.103

If Sorel had difficulty as a writer, his conver-

sational powers were reputed to have been prodigious.

Georges Valois in 1921 recalled that:

. . . lorsque Sorel entrait, il y avait un frémis-
sement de l'intelligence chez tous les assistants
et l'on se taisait. Nous écoutons, ce n'étaient
pas ses cinquante ans qui nous tenaient en respect,
c'était sa parole. Sorel pouvait parler pendant

des heures sans que l'on songeat a l'interrompre. 04

This opinion is confirmed by R. Johannet who drew the

following ironic comparison:

Comme beaucoup de grands esprits, comme Socrate
qu'il abomine, cest par la parole que M. Sorel a
exercé le plus d'influence. . . . Oui, c'est

par la conversation, et son oeuvre c'est de
parler, c'est de parler de tout, de tout, de
mathématiques, d'exégese, de la C.G.T., des
épicuriens, de Dreyfus, du sweating—systeme, de

 

103Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.

 

beL.E. Hulme and J. Roth (Glencoe, III.: The Free

Press, 1950), pp. 33-34. (Hereinafter referred to as
nglections.)

104Georges Valois, D'un siecle a l'autre (Paris:

Nouvelle Librairie nationale, 1921T, p. 134.

. . . when Sorel entered there was rustling of
intelligence among all the assistants and we kept
quiet. We listened, it was not his fifty years
which held our respect, it was his word. Sorel
could talk for hours without anyone dreaming to
interrupt him.

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52

Bergson, de Byron, de Léon XIII, du Caillou

michaux, de Dante, de Barthou, de Péricles, d'en
parler avec précision, avec tenue, avec sagesse,
avec brio, je dirais avec originalité, si ce mot
dforigiJmalité n'était cent fois trop pale, comme

s‘il les avait tous inventés, créés, mis au monde
et nourris.105

Jean Variot quoted Sorel as having compared him-

self to Cézanne, saying:

Je n'aime pas non plus ma maniere d'écrire. Je
ne peux pas arriver, depuis tant d'années que

j'écris, a acquérir cette habileté si utile que
Cezanne ne peut pas acquérir non plus. . . . Je
sens chez lui ce que je sens chez moi: l'homme

qui cherche l'art parfait de s'exprimer et qui
n'arrive qu'a un imparfait.106

Sorel came to recognize that his manner might restrict

his readership. He wrote:

The defects of my manner of writing will prevent me
from getting access to a wide public, but I think
that I must be content with the place that nature
and circumstance has assigned me. . . . And mine

is not the worst lot because I am not in danger of
becoming my own disciple as has so often happened

 

105R. Johannet, Itinéraires d'Intellectuels
(Paris: Nouvelle Libraire nationale, 1921), pp. 178-80.
Note: Has Johannet correctly stated Sorel's attitude
toward Socrates here? Does a careful reading of The
Trial of Socrates support the " . . . qui il abomiHE"
assertion?
Like many great spirits, like Socrates that he
abhorred it is by the word that M. Sorel exercised
the most influence. . . . Yes, it is by conversation
and his work is to talk, to talk of everything--
mathematics, exegesis, the C.G.T. [union] epicurians,
Dreyfus, sweating-system, Bergson, Byron, Leon XIII,
Caillou Michaux, Dante, Barthou, Pericles, of talking
with precision, with behavior, with wisdom, with
vigour, I would say with originality if this word
cuiginality were not 100 times too pale, as if he

hmiinvented, created, put into the world and
nourished them all.

. 106Jean Variot, Propos de Georges Sorel (4th éd.;
Parls: 1935), p. 172.

 

 

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53

to those thinkers who have attempted to give perfect
symmetrical form to their intuitions. . . . It is

my ambition to be able to stir up personal research;
to awaken the fire from the aches of ready made
doctrines, to liberate the spirit of invention in

my readers. For me this is better than to repeat

formulas and to enslave the mind in the disputes
of dOgmatic disciples.107

 

I don't like, either, my manner of writing. I
can't succeed, during the many years that I write,
to acquire this useful ability that Cezanne cannot
acquire either. . . . I feel with him as I feel
with me: the man who searches for the perfect art
to express himself and only reaches the imperfect.

107Sorel, Reflections, pp. 34-35.

 

 

 

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54

Part 3

Le Socrate du Quartier latin:
1892 - 1894

 

By 1892, Georges Sorel was settled in his petite
\dlla of Boulogne-sur-Seine. Two or three times a week
hecxossed the Bois de Boulogne on his way to the Bib—
lhnmeque nationale, or to attend the lectures of Henri
Bergson then underway at the Collége de France. Often
Imewould visit the Société de philosophie, or Peguy's
bookstore or that of a militant syndicalist named Dele-
mflie. Sorel, always in the company of young students,
(nuckly became known to those around the CollEge de France
amila Sorbonne as "1e Socrate du Quartier latin."l
Vhiting as one who first encountered Sorel at this time,
Enniel Halevy recalled that he and his friends in the
Circle around Peguy
. . . étions tres mal renseignés sur le passé de ce
bizarre nouveau Socrate qui nous était tombé des
cieux sur la Montagne—Sainte-Genevieve. Nous
savions de maniere imprecise que Sorel avait été
ingénieur des Ponts-et-Chausées en diverses regions
méditerranéennes, et nous aimions qu'il occupSt ses
années de loisir a nous donner l'exemple d:un

étudiant volontaire qui choisissait ses maitres et
ignorait les preparations d'examen.2

1Georges Goriely, Le Pluralisme dramatique de
Geor es Sorel (Paris: MarceI Riviere et Cie., 1962) ,
EN 5%. (Hereinafter referred to as Le Pluralisme.)

2Pierre Andreu, Notre Maitre M. Sorel, preface
filhniel Halery (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1953), pp. 13-

 

 

 

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55

In 1892, Sorel published an article on Proudhon,
"Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon." In 1893, he
associated himself with a group of young radicals who had
recently discovered Marxism, among whom was a Rumanian
rmmed Diamandy " . . . le marxiste le plus confit en
raisons incessament absorbé par les soins d'une apolo-
gétique frémissante."3 It was Diamandy who founded the

review called L'Ere nouvelle to which Sorel contributed

tmoimportant studies: la Fin dugpaganisme and L'ancienne
4

 

etle.nouvelle Métaphysique in 1894.

Essai Sur La PhiIOSOphie De Proudhon
Sorel's "Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon"

appeared in June 1892 in 1a Revue milosophique de la

‘

. . . were very badly informed on the past of this
bizarre Socrates who had fallen to us from the skies
on the mountain Sainte-Genevieve. We knew in an
imprecise manner that Sorel had been an engineer

of Bridges and Roadways in diverse Mediterranean
regions and we liked that he occupied his years of
leisure to give us the example of a voluntary
student who chose his masters and ignored the
preparations of exams.

3Goriely, Le Pluralisme, p. 56. See also Anatole
de Monzie L'entrée au Forum, p. 43. " . . . the marxist
the most steeped in reason incessantly absorbed by the
cares of an apologetic quivering."

, 4"la Fin du paganisme" was published in book form
In 1901, under the title: 1a Ruine du monde antique,
Sfllception matérialiste de l'histoire, andfiTancienne
?t1a nouvelle métaphysiquewfiwas published in book form
1n1935 under the title: D'Aristotle a Marx.

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56

France et de l'étranger,5 the concluding part of which
appeared in the same publication in the July 1892 issue.
There are several references in this study to what Sorel
found to be the close, though perhaps unconscious relation-
ship between Proudhon and the ancient Greeks: " . . . il
faut observer la liaison étroite, qui existe entre l'esprit
de Proudhon et le génie grec: cette parenté est si forte
que, d'ordinaire, notre auteur ne s'apercoit pas de ses
reminiscences et qu'il reproduit presque textuellement

des theories empruntées a l'antiquité."6 And showing

his continuing interest in the influence of Greek civili-
zation, Sorel asked: "Where has our civilization drawn
that which is best in our minds? The contact with Hellenic
genius has given our thinking an entirely distinctive

7

Shape which we are no longer able to abandon." And the

~

5Félix Alcan, éditeur, Revue philosophique de la
France et de l' etranger (Paris: Ancienne librairie Germer
Bailliere et Cie. ). (Hereinafter referred to as Revue
Lhilosophique. )

 

6Alcan, Revue philosophique XXXIV, 1892, p. 44.
In a direct reference to his study of Socrates, Sorel
remarked in a footnote: "C'est 1e résultat auquel nous
Sommes arrive, i1 y a quelques années, en étudiant
Socrate; nous cherchions un génie moderne, qui comprit
les theses du vieux maitre; il n' y a guere que Proudhon
un'. soit dans ce cas." Ibid. " . . . it is necessary
to observe the narrow liaison which existed between the
§Pirit of Proudhon and the Greek genius: this kinship
18 so strong that ordinarily our author did not himself
Perceive his recollections and that he reproduced nearly
exactly the theories borrowed from antiquity."

 

7A1can, RevueAphilosophique XXXIV, 1892, p. 45.

 

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57

central conception of Hellenic society, Sorel reaffirmed,
tad been based on war, unity and discipline.8

Man, Sorel continued in his essay on Proudhon,
vms not the metaphysical being which the eighteenth century
Emilosophers had imagined. Man lived within natural ele-
nmnts, limited by organic laws. Man, he wrote, " . . .
se produit dans le monde armé de resources, en possession
<k3forces économique de tout genre."9 While this activity
rad been regulated by legislators, their delimitation of
legality was not based on an abstract metaphysical concept
dfjustice, it had been based on an estimation of forces
hiconflict. Quoting Proudhon Sorel wrote: "L'histoire,
mmnzentiere, temoigne de la réalité du droit de la
finne."lo And the cause of war, Sorel wrote, according

UJProudhon was deprivation:

Sous toutes ses formes, la cause profonde de la
guerre reste la meme . . . difficulté de vivre,
manque du nécessaire chez le pauvre . . . en un
mot, la faim. Le dieu des armées et le dieu de la
misere sont un seul et meme dieu.11

81bid., p. 46.

9Ibid., p. 47. " . . . produces himself in the
World armed with resources in possession of economic
forces of every type."

loIbid. Reference is to la Guerre et la_paix,
t-l.p. 225. "History, in its entirety, witness the
reality of the law of force."

llAlcan, Revue philosophique XXXIV, 1892, p. 50,

13 Guerre et la paix, E. II, p. 282.
[hi er all its fOrms, the profound cause of war
remains the same . . . difficulty of living, lack

 

 

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The contradictions which led to economic depri-
vation, Sorel wrote, originated in: " . . . la faculté
que nous avons désignée sous le nom de liberté,"12 which
was an absolute concept. It did not correspond to
reality precisely because of this absolutism. The
illusion of this dangerous absolutism could be dis-
pelled only through an education which inculcated the
value of work, and which rejected the selfish individu-
eflism engendered by the false teachings of the classical
economists. One of Proudhon's important contributions
‘u>human betterment, Sorel believed, was his powerful
attack on the anti-science of the classical economists,
especially Adam Smith, David Ricardo and J. B. Say.13

Proudhon showed, according to Sorel, that the
political economists misunderstood the concept of value,
Which properly belonged to the domain of psychological
Phenomena: "le travail se trouve ainsi place dans le

Sphére des concepts psychologiques; et le raisonnement

of necessities among the poor . . . in a word,
hunger. The god of armies and the god of misery
are one and the same god.

12Alcan, Revue philosophique XXXIV, 1892, p. 53.
. . . the faculty Which we’have designated under the
name of liberty."

 

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14

de Proudhon nous semble, ici irrefutable." Society,

Sorel believed, was not made up of absolutely free indi-
viduals each seeking his own private well being:

. . . la société est un étre vivant, dont la per-
sonnalité est aussi certaine que celle de l'étre
individuel. L'étre social est a la fois producteur
et consommateur: chacun des membres apporte son
contingent de travail et entre en échange avec

tous les autres.

Sorel's pessimism, partly derived from Proudhon,
resulted from his belief that although work was a funda-
nmntal consequence of the human constitution, there
existed also in man " . . . un défaut d'equilibre: la

faculté de consommer est illimitée, tandis que celle de

subduire ne l'est pas."l6 But, Sorel added, if it is

mnxect to assign work to the category of psychological
Phenomena, we must also consider consumption from the
Same point of view. While economic progress had

ameliorated somewhat the physical life Sorel complained,

‘

14Ibid., p. 626. " . . . work finds itself thus

Placed in the sphere of psychological concepts, and the
reasoning of Proudhon here seems to us irrefutable."

15Ibid., p. 628. Sorel referred here to Proud-
}Kxfls Contradictions, t. I, pp. 92, 98.
. . . society is a living being, whose personality
is as certain as that of an individual being. The
social being is both producer and consumer: each
of its members brings his work contingent and
enters an exchange with all others.

16Alcan, Revue philosophique XXXIII, 1892, p. 629.
fiee also Proudhon's Ia Guerre et la_paix, t. II, p. 126.
,~ . . a defect of equilibrium: the faculty of consuming
18 unlimited while that of production is not."

 

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60

the mind of man had been largely ignored. Men have,
Sorel wrote, feared physical poverty, and thus failed to
appreciate the impact of spiritual starvation:
. . . la pauvreté n'est point un objet d'effroi.
pour l'homme pénétré de l'idée de justice; celle
a été célébrée par l'antiquité et par la religion
chrétienne. Le héros est pauvre, tempérant et
entouré d'une famille nombreuse. . . 17
Sorel concluded that, "L'homme ne peut se passer d'idéal;

non seulement 11 1e crée, mais i1 tend a le réaliser.

Lorsque l'homme n'est pas entierement dominé par la justice,

11 produit d'autres idées."]'8

Sorel summarized his observations from his study
of Proudhon when he concluded that an economic science
must have for its object the rational study of the value
Produced by human industry. Economic work, he believed,
was a psychological phenomena, in the same sense that
consumption was dominated by psychological states.
Therefore, economic equilibrium did not depend only on
biological laws; work alone would not ameliorate poverty.
History proved that man had the ability to conceive ideas

and to act upon them. The idea of absolute individual

—‘

l7Ibid., p. 633.
- . . poverty is not an object of fright for man

penetrated by the idea of justice; this has been
celebrated by antiquity and the Christian religion.
The hero is poor, temperate and surrounded by a

large fami 1y .

18Ibid., p. 638. "Man cannot pass the ideal;
not {Duly hE'E'feated it but he tries to realize it. When
man is not entirely dominated by justice, he produces
other ideas."

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61

lwarty had led, he said, to industrial war, and self-
seekingp which caused man to scorn justice and pursue
illusions. Education, Sorel believed, was the most
powerful means of establishing equilibrium, but this
education must have manual work as its basis. "Education
must be a life-long process," he concluded, "which would
continually elevate man toward an equilibrium between

knowledge and the needs of human industry."19

Karl Marx

Georges Sorel's first reference to Marx appeared
in a letter written to the director of the Revue philoso-
phique. It was published in May, 1893, one year after
the publication of his essay on Proudhon.20 In his
letter, Sorel attacked such sociologists as Gabriel Tarde
and other of "les détenteurs des chairs officielles" for
having attempted to debunk and ridicule the theories of
Karl Marx through the use of arguments which he termed
" . réveries idéalistes incapables de résoudre les

problemes modernes."21 Karl Marx, Sorel insisted, was

 

19Alcan, Revue philosophique XXXIV, 1892, pp. 67,

68.

20Georges Goriely wrote: "C'est en juin 1893
<;ue nous trouvons le premier text de Sorel portant sur
lezlnarxisme." However, the letter, which he then quoted
extensively, appeared in May, 1893. See le Pluralisme
dramatique de Georges Sorel, p. 57. See also Revue

philosophique, XXXV, , ”Science et Socialisme," p. 509.

 

21Ibid. " . . . idealistic dreams incapable of
resolving modern problems."

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62

not a mediocre thinker. Capital by Marx was not written
for the sake of amusing the reader, and the complaint
against its complexity was as absurd, Sorel said, as it

would be to make the same complaint against Aristotle's

22

Politics. One of the merits of Marx, Sorel added

" . . . a été de placer la science sociale sur le seul

terrain qui lui convienne, en admettant qu'il existe une

23

science sociale." Many intelligent people, Sorel com-

plained, thought of Socialism only as a dangerous radi-
calism which would do violence to the bourgeoisie, but
Sorel observed: " . . . tout changement doit se faire

24

par la force." What does Socialism demand, he asked?

Socialism, Sorel continued, had claimed to
establish an economic science and if its claims were
founded, its theories should be applied: " . . . ce qui

25

est rationel et démontré doit devenir réel." The belief

 

221bid., p. 509.

23Ibid. " . . . had been to place social science
on the sole ground which suited it, in admitting that a
social science existed."

24Ibid., p. 510. " . . . all change must make
itself by force."

25Ibid. Sorel admitted that all absolute con-
clusions were forbidden to the enlightened men of his
day because reason and science were known to be mental
constructions. The moralists were affected by the same
skepticism. But he added: "N'est-ce pas un spectacle
admirable que de voir les plebes rester fideles aux vieux

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63

of modern Socialism that it has discovered a true economic
science, Sorel concluded, has not been successfully
refuted. Karl Marx seemed to believe that economics
were susceptible of scientific investigation. Sorel was
uncertain: "Voila longtemps que je cherche, en vain,
la solution de cette question capitale et je n‘ai encore

trouvé de réponse nulle part."26

La Nouvelle Metaphysique
In 1894, Sorel wrote a lengthy essay which
appeared in L'Ere nouvelle and was entitled "la Nouvelle
Metaphysique." A few years later in 1898, Edouard Berth,
while a student at the Sorbonne, read the essay and became
a life-long admirer of its author, Georges Sorel. Berth,
writing in 1935, noted that Sorel had written this essay
immediately after having studied Marx and " . . . dans la
"27

toute premiere ferveur marxiste. . . . A more

resolute Sorel had emerged from his reading of Marx:

 

quand ceux qui devraient les diriger n'y croient plus?"
Ibid. ” . that which is rational and demonstrated

must become real."

26Ibid. "For a long time I've searched in vain,
the solution to this capital question, I have yet found
_ a response anywhere."

27Georges Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx (Paris: Marcel
Rdmxiere, 1936), avant-propos de Edouard Berth, p. l.
(Hereinafter referred to as D'Aristote a Marx.) This work
is the book-length republication of SoreITs earlier
article which first appeared as "L'Ancienne et la Nou-
ll

velle Métaphysique" in L'Ere nouvelle, 1894. . . .
in the first marxist fervor.ll

 

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64

"I believe," he wrote in the Opening lines of "la
Nouvelle Metaphysique," "that the theories of Karl Marx
represent the most important innovation in the last
several hundred years of philosophy. All of our ideas
today must center around the new principles posed by

' C I O C 2
soientific soc1alism." 8

Sorel, whose preoccupation with the role of work
inhuman life had already emerged, stated in "la Nou-
velle Métaphysique" that in order to establish a rational
knowledge of man: " . . . il est toujours nécessaire
de le considerer tout entier, comme travailleur, et de

ne jamais le séparer des appareils avec lesquels i1

gagne sa vie."29 Richard Humphrey discovered in this

inclination toward the concrete and tangible approach to

understanding, the impact of Sorel's career as an engi-

neer 3

Like the engineer he accepted abstract theory of
any kind only with considerable reserve. His
epistemology might well be described as prehensile:
the way of perception he most trusted was through
the hand; the kind of people he most trusted were
those who used their hands to deal with the world--
working people and artists.30

 

28Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 94.

29Ibid., p. 96. " . . . it always necessary
tx: consider Him in entirety, as worker, to never separate
hdJn from the apparatus with which he gains his life."

3oRichard Humphrey, Georges Sorel Prophet without
Honor, a Study in Anti-Intellectualism (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1951) , p.74.

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65

sore]- stated that he had entitled his article

. . . ‘ l‘ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique',
parce que je vais passer en revue les méthodes
employees dans les diverses branches de con-
naissances, discuter les principes, signaler les
illusions sur lesquelles vit 1a métaphysique
officielle, découvrir les sources des délires
spirituelistes, rechercher les rélations de la
science et du milieu économique et dégager enfin
le principe social, si longtemps négligé, grace
auquel il est possible d'établir une connaissance
rationnelle de l'homrne.31

'rhe economists who studied philosophy according
to the classical method introduced by Adam Smith, Sorel
observed, had great difficulties with the theories of

Karl Marx. To them, Marx attempted " . . . a introduire

dans la science moderne une de ces entités scolostiques
régénérées dans la nuageuse Germaine."32 The same
resistance was offered by "les savants francais” in the
seventeenth century when they encountered the theories

of Newton.33 The classical economists, supported by such

 

3J'Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 96.

. . . 'the old and new metaphysic', because I am
going to review the methods employed by in diverse
branches of knowledge, discuss principles, signal
the illusions upon which the official metaphysics
lives, discover the sources of spiritualist
delirium, research the relations of science and
the economic milieu and to finally redeem the
social principle, so long neglected, thanks to

which it is possible to establish a rational
knowledge of man.

32Ibid., p. 244. " . . . to introduce to modern
science one of these scolastic entities regenerated into
the cloudy Germaine."

331bid.

 

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66

philosophers as John Stuart Mill, Sorel claimed, had
denied the existence of social characteristics: "Les
hommes dans l‘état de société sont toujours des hommes,
leurs aetions et leurs passions obéissent aux lois de la
nature humaine individuelle."34 Yet, Sorel complained,
no science of individual human acts existed in 1894 and
thus the reference to laws of individual human nature was
without meaning. The classical economists believed that
society was a "collection historiquement formée" in which
nothing social in itself existed.3S Thus, work was con-
ceived as an individual act; exchange was an act which
concerned only two persons; and law "intervient .

pour prévenir certains abus pouvait engender 1e

36

désordre." But in real life, men rarely execute their

projects alone, Sorel noted, and the resulting literary,
religious, scientific and moral associations were there-
fore of great interest to philosophy. With respect to
the existence of the state Sorel wrote: "Jamais les

psychologues n'en donneront 1a raison d'étre, car c'est

 

34Ibid. John Stuart Mill is credited with this
{observation But the reference is incomplete and the source
is thus uncertain. "Men in the state of society are
always men, their actions and passions obey the laws of
individual human nature."

3SIbid., p. 246.

3659gg, " . . . intervened to prevent certain
abuses able to engender disorder."

 

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67

37 John Stuart Mill had

chose étrangére a leurs études."
said that man did not change in society, but Sorel
objected " . . . ou donc l'homme est-i1 autrement qu'en
société? Si on 1e considere a 1'état individuel, c'est
par une abstraction scientifique. . . . "38
Edna awakener to the dual nature of human existence
for Sorel was language, which, he believed gave to all
human actions a double character: individual and social.
Aristotle, Sorel wrote, defined man as a rational and
social animal, but this definition could be extended
"car 1e mot travailleur comprend pour les modernes les
deux expressions d'étre vivant et d'étre raisonnable;
nous disons donc que l'homme est un travailleur social."39
Sorel thus believed that human actions could be
examined from a double point of View. Because personal
processes had no common measure, Sorel thought they could

only be examined within the individual, but the objective

effects caused by material transformations constituted

 

37l§i§31 P. 251. In a footnote Sorel adds:
" . l'Etat n'a pas été historiquement produit avec

des attractiona psychologiques." Ibid. "Never will
psychologists give the reason of being, for it is a strange

thing to their studies."

38Ibid. " . . . where is man other than in
society? If one considers him in an individual state,
.it is by a scientific abstraction."

39Ibid., p. 253. "for the word worker understands

for moderns two expressions to be living and to be
reasonable; we say then that man is a social worker."

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for him a domaine of comparison. There were, for him,
two realms of objective and subjective human life, closely
interlaced and difficult to separate, especially Sorel
wrote: "dans 1e domaine éthique, les distinctions du
social et de l'individuel sont fort délicats. . . . "40
The cause of behavior was complex and often unpredictable
movements, Sorel wrote, "sont déterminés par l'appétit
qui se dirige vers un bien présent ou vers un bien con-
sidéré comme un futur désirable; l'appétit est subordonné
lui-meme 3 nos états affectifs au moment de l'action."41

In the Middle Ages each individual had been con-
sidered as an "unité isolée"; an individual who was placed
before a sovereign judge. Today it was necessary to
reject this individualism, so planted in the European
mind, and to " . . . reconnaitre comme base de tous nos
raisonnements un caractere social dans les actes

42

humaines." In this regard Karl Marx had recognized

the importance of industrial tools, and the machine:

 

40Ibid., p. 255. "Today the goal of education,"
Sorel wrote, " . . . est de constituer un systeme d'appétits

dirigeant l'homme d'apres les regles qui caractérisent 1e
milieu." Ibid. " . . . in the ethical domain, the dis-
tinctions of social and individual are strongly delicate."

41Ibid., p. 256. " . . . are determined by the
appetite which directs itself toward a present good or
good considered a desirable future; appetite is subordi-

rated itself to our emotional states in the moment of
action."

42Ibid., p. 258. " . . . to recognize as base of

all our reasoning a social character in human acts."

 

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"L‘anaIYse du machinisme et de ses effets nous fournit
1e moyen, dans tous les ordres d'idées, de passer des
apercus subjectifs, personnels, grossiers, d'une phil—
osophie livrée au hasard--aux données objectifs, sociales,
abstraites, de la science."43 Thus Sorel concluded that
all the formations of the human mind, including moral
ideas, myths and legends had their own histories:

. . . ces illusions se traduisent dans la conscience

par certains manieres de sentir; elles ont leur

cdté subjectif et psychologique. . . . C'est par

leur forme psychologique que les illusions se sou-

tiennent le plus longtemps et qu'elles exercent leur
influence morbide.

The duty of science was, Sorel said, " . . . de déterminer
l'entité métaphysique cachée, qui donne la traduction
abstraite des impulsions internes et enfin de signaler
l'illusion, si elle existe."45 When this was done, Sorel
believed, it would be discovered that the system of senti-

mental illusions was always the reflection of the economic

 

43Ibid., p. 261. "The analysis of mechanism
and its effects furnish us the means, in all orders of
ideas, to pass from subjective, personal, general
glimpses of a society delivered by chance--to objective,
abstract, and social givens of science."

44Ibid., p. 262.
. . . these illusions translate themselves in con-
science by certain types of feeling; they have their
subjective and psychological side. . . . It is by
their psychological form that illusions sustain

themselves the longest and exercise their morbid
influence.

45Ibid. " . . . to determine the hidden metaphysi-
cal entity, which gives the abstract translations internal
impulses and finally to signal the illusion, if it exists."

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70

system. To judge a body of moral doctrines, Sorel advised,
the psychological approach must be abandoned, and follow-
ing Marxist.materialism one must recognize the existence

. . . d'un milieu artificiel, que nos efforts tendent

a modifier constamment."46

The existence of this 'milieu artificiel' was,
according to Sorel, the fundamental condition of human
freedom: "Nous sommes libres en ce sens que nous pouvons
construire des appareils qui n'ont aucun modele dans le
milieu cosmique; nous ne changeons rien aux lois de la
nature, mais nous sommes maitres de créer des séquenses
ayant une ordonnance qui nous est propre."47 What might
be accomplished in this circumstance, Sorel concluded,
would be " . . . une connaissance progressif, en rapport
avec l'étendue de notre activité industrielle."48 But
our ambitions for complete understanding must be limited,
Sorel wrote: "Non, le monde n'est pas limité, en ce sens

que nous pouvons dire ou il s'arréte; et la limitation

A
amt un non-sens; mais nous ne pouvons connaitre que les

 

46Ibid., p. 264. " . . . of an artificial milieu,
that our efforts constantly try to modify."

47Ibid. "We are free in the sense that we are
able to construct apparatuses which have no model in the
cosmiC‘world; we change nothing of the laws of nature,
butzwe are masters to create sequences having an order
which is proper to us.”

. 481bid., p, 266. " . . . a progressive knowledge,
in harmony with the extent of our industrial activity."

 

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71

choses appartenant au milieu artificiel."49 Extend the

activity of man, Sorel advised, " . . . inventez de
nouvelLes machines et vous gagnerez quelque chose sur le
domaine de l'inconnu, en agrandissant sur le champ de
la cooperation de l'homme et des énergies naturelles dans
le milieu artificiel.“50

The domain of the unknown, the realm beyond science,
was an area in which philosophers had said, according to
Sorel, ” . . . notre nature est constituée de telle sorte
que nous ne pouvons nous désintéresser. . . . "51 And no
serious objection could be offered to the "philosophes
spiritualistes" when they entered the territory which
had been abandoned by science, said Sorel, because " . . .
il n‘y a point, en effet, de limits de la connaissance.

«52

. . . Sorel believed that mankind commenced its

intellectual life by asking metaphysical questions with

 

491bid., p. 267. "No, the world is not limited,
in.the sense that we are able to say where it stops: and
limitation is nonsense: but we can only know the things
felonging to the artificial milieu."

50Ibid. " . . . invent new machines and you will
gain something in the domain of the unknown, in enlarging
culthe field of cooperation of man and his natural ener-
gies in the artificial milieu."

51Ibid., p. 152. " . . . our nature is consti-
tuted such that we cannot disinterest ourselves."

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a lahut of knowledge. . . . "

   
  

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72

the result that theology preceded science. Both were,

he said, attempts to penetrate the unknown by a system of
constructions which he called "paraphysiques." Each

such system had its own unique history, " les

auteurs les ont pris dans le milieu, sans se rendre un
compte exacte de ce qu'ils faisaient."53 The true meta-
physician, Sorel believed, must never separate a doctrine
from the circumstances of its birth or from the images
which exist in what Sorel called "l'air ambiant." The
philosophers mistakenly believed, Sorel thought, that
their new hypotheses were the product of their own intel-
lectual genius, but in reality they had, according to
Sorel, converted impressions of their milieu and thus

" . . . nous pouvons donc dire que la vraie critique
métaphysique est foundée sur la determination des con-
ditions matérielles données dans le milieu."54

Therefore, to understand modern metaphysics,

Sorel advised, one must investigate its principle directing

 

53Ibid., p. 165. " . . . the authors have taken
them in the milieu, without realizing exactly what they
were doing . "

54Ibid. " . . . we can thus say that the true
metaphysical critique is founded on the determination
of material conditions given in the milieu."

 

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73

forcemss And in the 1890's Sorel believed that a par-
ticular type of individualism had become so powerful that
jJLformed the basis of psychological studies. This
individualism took the intensely personal form of what
Sorel called "le moi" defined as: " . . . l'ensemble

de nos émotions; ce qui est vraiment personnel dans
l'homme c'est le sentiment."S6 Instead of considering
the individual as a part of the larger human species,

"le moi" represented for Sorel the " . . . invasion

des émotions dans le domaine des représentations."57

This narrow conception of "le moi" was broadened
considerably, according to Sorel, by the teachings of
Henri Bergson, whom he characterized as "a vigorous tree

which raised itself above the desolated steppes of

 

55In a footnote, Sorel offered the following

materialist interpretation: "11 y aurait a montrer que
ces directions sont commandées par les relations econo-
miques: cela ne présente pas une sérieuse difficulté, au
moins pour notre époque, caractérisee par la concentration
industrielle, la rapidité vertigineuse avec laquelle se
forment les grandes fortunes des spéculateurs, le dévelop-
pement des moyens de jouissance." Ibid., pp. 165-66.

56Ibid., p. 166. " . . . the totality of our

emotions; that which is truly personal in man is senti-
ment."

. 571ggg, " . . . the invasion of emotions in the
domain of representations."

 

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74

contemporary philosophy."58 Bergson, Sorel stated, had

discovered "deux mois différent"; the first was dis-
covered through deep reflection which revealed the
internal state of being, but these moments of internal
self-awareness were very rare and thus for the most part

Sorel wrote: "we live externally to ourselves"; " .

nous n'apercevons de notre moi que son fantome décoloré."59

Thus, Sorel believed, we live for the external world more
than for ourselves; we speak more than we think. For
Henri Bergson, Sorel continued, the fundamental "moi" was
the internal self totally agitated by emotion, relieved
of all which originated from the exterior. For Sorel
that which was truly individual was discovered in the.

emotional side of human life.60

And it was this realm
which produced indeterminism in human affairs: an
indeterminism which Sorel believed would always escape

exact scientific representation; " . . . toute étude

sérieuse de l'homme doit Etre basée sur l'impossibilité

 

58£§£§., p. 168. This represents the first
Infierence to Henri Bergson in the work of Georges Sorel.

. 59Ibid. Quoted from Essai sur les données immé-
diates de Ia conscience, Henry Bergson, p. 31} " . . .
we notice our me only as its discolored phantom."

 

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75

61 Nevertheless,

de représenter les états affectifs."
Sorel believed that human activities could be studied in
a more exact manner than had been practiced in the past.
" . . . on peut espérer faire . . . un ensemble de
systématiques descriptives, qui doivent étre révisées

de temps a autre, en tenant compte des modifications

62 This study was a necessary component of

des milieux."
human education which had as its goal, the object of
directing life such that certain acts would be found
agreeable and attractive while others would be found
disagreeable or repulsive. Education acted, Sorel wrote,
to " . . . superposer a notre affectivité naturelle des
habitudes morales, qui sont, en quelque sorte, l'impression
sur nous des systemes moraux regus comme bons dans le

63 The work of education would be impossible,

milieu.“
Sorel observed, in the conclusion of his essay "la

nouvelle Métaphysique," if the education had no method

 

61Ibid., p. 179. " . . . all serious study of
man must be Based on the impossibility of representing
the emotional states."

62Ibid., p. 188. " . . . we can hope to make a
group of systematic descriptions, which must be revised
from time to time, taking into account modifications of
the milieu."

63Ibid., p. 189. Sorel also noted the origins
<3f this idea in Aristotle's Ethics. " . . . to super-
impose on our natural emotion of moral habits, which are
iJl some way, the impression on us of moral systems
received as good in the milieu."

 

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76

for studying individually the characteristics of each
student--this method Sorel believed could only be fur-
nished by experimental psychology which must become:

" . . . la science critique des méthodes vraies propres

a l'éducation de la volonté."64

La Ruine Du Monde Antique

 

la Ruine du monde antique was first published by
65

 

Sorel in 1894 in "L'Ere nouvelle." It represented an

anxempt to study the Christian ideology within the con-
text of the late Roman Empire. Far from having restored
vigor to the Roman organism, Sorel wrote of the Christian

influence: " . . . on pourrait dire qu'elle l'a saigné

"66

armanc. The Christian ideology, according to Sorel,

weakened the structure of the Roman world: it cut the

lines between the social system of the Romans and the minds

64Ibid., p. 190. " . . . the critical science of
txhe methods proper to the education of the will.”

65Sorel called L'Ere nouvelle the "revue de

§OCialisme scientifique.“ It was founded by M. Diamandy
in July, 1893, and became defunct by November, 1894, at
which time the publishers initiated "1e Devenir social"
fGiard and Briere, editors) in August, 1895, the final
1Ssue appeared in December, 1898. Georges Sorel, La ruine
“ monde antique (Paris: Librairie G; Jacques et Cie.,
901), p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as la Ruine
QEmende antique.)

 

 

66Ibid., p. 37. " . . . we could say that it

bled it to white."

 

 

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77

of its citizens, and Sorel continued, it planted every-
where the " . . . germes de quiétisme, de désespérance
et de mort."67
One of the most serious consequences for Roman
civilization, Sorel continued, which " . . . contribué
a précipiter la ruine de l'Empire romain . . . " was the
clear understanding which Christianity gave of the " . . .
incoherence qui existait entre la réalité et l'édifice
juridique traditionnel."68 When such an understanding
comes into being, Sorel said, even those institutions
yflflch appear most solid are in danger of collapsing.

Sorel defined law as an organized system of forms

vfluch, like language, experienced an evolution which
69
II

. . . se dissocier de ses principes génerateurs.
Fbr this reason, Sorel believed, judicial constructions
outlived their originating motives, and lost their

cuiginal meaning with the result that they became very

cfijficult to interpret. This "dissociation," Sorel added,

67Ibid., PP. 37-38. Sorel compared this impact
tolfis conception of scientific socialism: "Le marxisme
39 present, an contraire, comme une doctrine de vie,
b'OIlne‘pour les peuple forts: i1 réduit l'idéologie au
r018 d'artifice pour l'exposition abrégée de la realité."
3223,. p. 38. " . . . seeds of quiet, despair, and death."

 

b. 68Ibid., p. 39. " . . . incoherence which existed
6tween reaIity and the traditional judicial edifice."

69Ibid. " . . . disassociated itself from its
<3"‘merating principles . "

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78

could not be explained away by legalistic metaphysics;

it was necessary to take account of " . . . l'infra-

structure économique" and also of history because all

fbrmal social systems endured on the basis of " . . . le

systeme des opinions recues."70 But these systems them-

selves, he said, were always full of contradictions,

thanks to which evolution was facilitated. When a new

fact was produced, Sorel believed, it was judged in two

different ways: the public power applied judicial formulae,

while the general public relied upon a system of received

opinion. There is always, Sorel noted, a certain contra-

diction between these two points of view. The system of

received opinion was the more flexible; it always followed

transformations in economic conditions of life. The dif-

ference between the formal law and the milieu of received

opinion, according to Sorel, accounted for the disassoci-

ation between law and morality. The jury system, Sorel

observed, was the " . . . organe des opinions regues

. . . " in France.71
The original Christians who did assume a revo-

lutionary aspect, Sorel noted, did so because of the class

to which they belonged. This heroic time was the period

 

70Ibid., p. 40. Note that in this discussion
Sorel does not tie the climate of opinion thesis to a
particular class. " . . . the system of received
opinions."

71$2£§¢u Po 43. " . . . organ of received Opinions."

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79

in which " . . . la clientele de la nouvelle religion
était en majorité formée de gens sans respectabilité."72
But during the ensuing centuries, the new Christianity
made important concessions to the usages of Roman society,
and, Sorel noted, the Christians became Roman.
Nevertheless, Sorel observed in Christian ideology,
" . . . une création chrétienne originale, dont l'impor-
tance fut grande: la vie religieuse est opposée a la
vie mondaine, non seulement comme plus parfaite théorique-

. . 7
rent, mais ausSl comme plus heureuse." 3

By their renun-
ciation, the early Christians and later the monastics
cfifered living examples of their convictions; the effect
of this drama, Sorel observed, could be very powerful in
certain milieu, but the Christians failed to appreciate
the degree to which class affiliation would effect the
Sentimental impact of renunciation. Also Sorel thought
that few peOple were capable of a life of renunciation:

"Le monde ne vit pas uniquement pour la gloire, le bonheur

on l'extase de quelques saints, la société est chose trés

‘

72Here Sorel accepted the opinion rendered by M.
G. Boissier, La fin du paganisme, Etude sur les dernieres
1nttes réligieuses en Occident au IVe siecle, Hachette,
diteur, Paris, 1894. " . . . the clienteI of the new
religion was formed by a majority of people without
respectability,"

73Sorel, 1a ruine du monde antique, p. 57.
. . . an original Christian creation, whose importance
Wés great: the religious life is opposed to the worldly
life, not only as theoretically more perfect, but also
as more happy."

 

 

 

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80

74

prosaique." Christianity succeeded in establishing

that the pagan system was not viable, Sorel concluded,

by demonstrating the incoherence which existed in the
Roman system but it failed to provide a viable alternative
and this " . . . concluait a la destruction de toute

société humaine possible."75

The educational system, always a principle concern

for Sorel, was also discussed in la Ruine du monde

antique.76 What was the fundamental character of edu-

 

cation in Rome, he asked? Sorel believed that the char-
acter of education was directly related to the ends which
the system sought. Cicero had demanded, according to
Sorel, that the orator give himself totally to his art;
he must study everything and know everything in law,

Iustory, philosophy and the sciences. This encyclopedic

g

74Ibid., p. 62. Note the same complaint against
the Socratic ethic throughout 1e proces du Socrate.
"The world does not live only for glory, thefihappiness

and ecstasy of some saints, society is a very prosaic
thing."

 

75Sorel, la Ruine du monde antique, p. 63.

. . . concluded the destruction of all possible human
SOCiety."

76From Edouard Berth who became interested in

Sorel after reading D'Aristote a Marx and la Ruine du monde
antique, comes the suggestion that educationalfreform was

s very current topic around la Sorbonne and this element

In Sorel greatly interested him. " . . . la question du
latin et de l'école unique . . . des événements récents

.. . donnent un regain d'acuité et d'actualité . . . "
D'Aristote a Marx, avant-propos, p. 8.

 

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81

education was, Sorel believed, the identical principle

of modern education and he scorned it as an enterprise
without end, a veritable insanity.77 In its place he
demanded an educational system which prepared the young
for the real struggles of economic life. The Romans too
often subordinated everything to rhetoric, Sorel wrote.
The goal of education for them was to form "argumen-
tateurs." In Rome, he continued, the schools of rhetoric
had prospered; the professors of rhetoric became important
and widely respected. The Christian church, after its
triumph, failed to change this system of education,
tmcause its goal was to form men of talent capable of
subducing subtle arguments to counter metaphysical
errors: " . . . elle ne pouvait pas mieux faire que de
suivre l'exemple des Remains, qui avaient excellé dans

78 Such an education, Sorel charged, resulted

Ce genre."
in what he called a "état de dissociation idéologique"—-
in which the sense of the reality of things was lost.

And the Christians, he noted, by adopting this system
encouraged the development of a monstrous egotism which
caused the student to consider the intellectual resources

Placed at his disposal as a feeble tribute rendered to

his talent. This classical education, Sorel wrote:

k

77Sorel, la Ruine du monde antique, p. 69.

 

78Ibid., p. 70. " . . . it cannot do better than
'FDfollow the example of the Romans, who have excelled
In this genre."

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82

"Constitue un milieu factice de beaux esprits dans lequel
le principe des droits du talent est accepté sans con-
testation; elle donne a ceux qui l'ont recu, un sentiment
de leur supériorité qui les empéche de voir la vraie
nature des choses."79 And of all the aristocracies,
Sorel believed, the most treacherous, the harshest, and
the least accessible to scientific conceptions was the
aristocracy of talent because it could achieve such a
level of intellectual corruption that it never doubted
the legitimacy of its acts.

The exploitation of social resources by men of
talent was only possible, Sorel thought, when society gave
a privileged place to the lovers of things purely intel-
lectual. This happened in Rome, Sorel charged, and was
transmitted to the modern world by the ecclesiastical
tradition: "L'Eglise a done été la grande protectrice
des préjugés qui ont permis aux talents de prendre une

Si grande importance dans le monde."80

‘_

79Ibid., p. 74. "Constitutes an artificial milieu
of beautifuI spirits in which the principle of the rights
of talent is accepted without dispute; it gives to those
Who have received it, a sentiment of their superiority
which prevents them from seeing the true nature of things."

80Ibid., p. 76. Is this the anti-intellectualism
9f Georges Sorel? He writes further: "La corruption
lnéluctable des hommes de plume n'a jamais été sérieuse-
“Ent discutée; les écrivains de la Renaissance prati-
Querent avec une souplesse charmante l'art de se faire
entretenir par les grands." Ibid. "The Church has thus
been the great protector of prejudices which has permitted
talents to take such a great importance in the world.

 

 

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83

The Christian church, Sorel charged, again
followed the example of the Romans who had constructed
luxurious edifices and had spent enormous sums to amuse
and nourish a population of "fainéants." The Christians
too raised monuments whose objective was to strongly
strike the imagination; to inspire astonishment; and to
manifest the disproportion which existed between its
work and that of the laique world. As in the instance of

81

Versailles, the Christian church " . . . ne veut pas

seulement que les choses qu'elle fait, soient une marque

de puissance; mais elle veut encore qu'elles soient un

témoinage de la servitude volontaire des fideles."82

This, Sorel observed, was an example of the stupid luxury

83

of ”parvenus"; such expenditures occurred in the

 

81Sorel, 1a Ruine du monde antique, p. 80. Sorel
scorned the structure at Versailles: " . . . quelle est
l'utilite du palais de Versailles?" Ibid.

 

82Ibid., p. 81. Sorel here quoted Renan, Histoire
d'Israél, tome V p. 265 as a source for his perspective in
F is lscussion. Sorel's evaluation of gothic architecture
18 especially hostile when he compares it to "l'art civique
des républiques grecques." He wrote, "Lorsque l'art
gothique se fut pleinement développé, qu'il se fut dégagé
@es traditions primitives et des timidités du début, alors
ll devint un ramassis d'extravagances et la decadence
marcha a pas de géant.‘I See also Taine, Philosophie de
l'art, tome I, p. 97, upon which Sorel reliedifor this
Pelnt of view. " . . . doesn't only wish the things it
does to be a mark of power but it wishes still that they
be a testimony of the voluntary servitude of the faithful."

 

83Sorel referred to "archéoligie chrétienne" for
ids assertion and mentioned a work by A. Péaté, Archéologie
<fiuétienne, p. 180. See Sorel, la Ruine du monde antique,
P. . the newly rich."

 

 

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84

IV century, a century in which the Roman Empire had great
need of its resources. "Under the Christian influence,"
Sorel wrote, " . . . men became less and less occupied
with social ends; an idealistic economy developed simul-
taneously with a monkish asceticism, and social relation-
ships became purely mystical."84

Georges Sorel believed that the Christian ideology
during the IV century was gradually altering the system
of received opinions which had served to maintain the
moral and social system of the Romans. During periods
of transition he observed: " . . . hypocrisy is for a

85

time an agent of social preservation." Renan, whose

Ifistoire d'Israél had influenced Sorel's conception of

 

the role of fictions in the maintenance of received moral
systems, was quoted by Sorel on the relationship between
these fictions and the faculty of reason: "La moralité

d'un peuple demande d'énormes sacrifices a la raison; les

Progrés de la raison nuisent a la moralité des masses

86

Qui se gouverent par l'instinct." These sentimental

‘H

84Without explaining these terms, Sorel noted
Parenthetically that if not mystical " . . . je dirais
Presque magiques." Ibid., p. 90.

851bid., p. 92.

86Ibid., pp. 92-93. See also Renan, Histoire
d'Israél, tome IV, p. 359. "The morality of a peopIe
eman s enormous sacrifices to reason; the progress of
reason harms the morality of masses who govern themr
Selves by instinct."

 

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85

fictions, Sorel wrote, form barriers to critical thinking;
they enclose us in a narrow circle whose limits are deter-
mined by the milieu. The Roman organization of life
rested on such fictions, which could impose themselves
only on the condition of never being discussed; the
ancient things were reputed good by the single fact of
their antiquity: " . . . la conquéte avait été une

87

oeuvre surhumaine, échappant a toute critique." Saint

Augustine in The City of God, Sorel stated, engaged in

 

a polemic against the contradictions which he found in
the Roman fictions and against the ridiculous and immoral
elements in the Roman legends. The idea of the super-
human right of the Roman conquests, Sorel wrote, was
gradually surplanted by a providential conception which
the Christians had borrowed from the Hebrew writers:
it taught that the revolution of empires was directed
by God in view of the prosperity of the church.88
The ecclesiastical authors then took the position,
SOrel continued, of defending the rights of religion
represented by the Christian church, against what they

89

Called the despotisms of the Roman state. The

g

87£2£9.' Po 98. " . . . the conquest has been
a superhuman work, escaping every critique."

88Ibid., p. 105.

89From this Renan concluded that: "Rome est
ldhtat laique, elle ne s'occupe pas de religion, elle
busse cette question a la liberté de chacun; voila son

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86

Christians also transformed the philosophical idea that
reason was the true sovereign in human life, into a
personalized theory of reason represented by a sovereign
judge: " . . . d'un Dieu réel et sensible, ayant chair
et sang."90 This disrupted the social bonds between
citizen and state, because Sorel stated, the faithful
ceased to regard himself as uniquely tied by civic
obligation; he became aware of the idea that it was
better to obey God than man. But the Christian was not
truly isolated, the Christian church was close to him:

" . . . c'est pourquoi cette prétendue indépendance va

se changer en une servitude absolue."91 The theologians
claimed, Sorel continued, that they possessed a science
fibre certain than any other--a science which was necessary
for the salvation of the souls of individuals and for the

prosperity of states; this science was absolute-~outside

Of which was only error and deception. It was natural

¥

immense supériorité." Quoted by Sorel, la Ruine du monde

anti ue, p. 108. From Renan, Histoire dTIsraél, tome IV,
P. 129 and tome V, p. 144.

 

90Sorel, la Ruine du monde antique, p. 134.

b . . . of a God, real and sensitive, having flesh and
lood."

91Ibid., p. 135. Here Sorel is responding to M.
Boissier, Fin du paganisme, Etude sur les dernieres
lgttes réligieuses en Occident au IVe siecle. M. Boissier
had credited ChriStianity with the development of indi-
Vidual liberty; Sorel disagreed. " . . . it is why
‘Qfis pretended independence is going to change itself
Into absolute servitude."

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87

that these theologians would become dogmatic and intol-
erant, Sorel concluded: "L'intolérance est une nécessité
pour toute théologie sérieuse."92
The Roman world was perfectly ready to accept
mystical superstitions, Sorel wrote, because like all
skeptical historical epochs which exhalt the seeking
after pleasure, Rome, too, prepared its own ruin.93
Those who always speak of happiness, Sorel stated, and
who do not find it in the accomplishment of their ordinary
tasks, are symptoms of a true social malaise. It is
certain, Sorel wrote, " . . . que durant les premiers
siécles de notre ere, le monde romain a été sous l'influence
de ce malaise."94 And it was in this context that the
Emmans turned toward the cults of Isis, of Sérapis, of
bfithro; they had " . . . quelque chose de plus tendre,
de plus dévot que les cultes grecs et latin, si grossiers,
95

Si arides." The pursuit of happiness through the means

y

92Ibid., p. 137. "Intolerance is a necessity
for every serious theologian."

93Ibid., p. 156.

9422223: P. 154. " . . . during the first cen-
turies of our era, the Roman world was under the influence
Of this malaise."

95£2$§,, p. 156. This quote from Renan, Histoire
d'Israél, tome V, p. 243. In a footnote Sorel too

exception to the inclusion of Mithra: " . . . mithraisme
était une religion austére et dure. . . . " Ibid.

. . . something most tender, most devout of tHe Greek
and Latin cults, so coarse, so dry. "

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88

of an ultra-scientific savior is the great force of

occultism in all its instances, Sorel concluded. Some-

times, Sorel believed, this pursuit is unconscious;
people accept superstitions without taking account of

the emotional attractions involved--but Sorel wrote,

there is a law of psychology which applies: .

qu'aucune de ces croyances ne peut s'introduire en nous

s'il n'y a pas une émotion qui lui ouvre 1e chemin et

gene notre faculté critique."96

A11 discussions of morality by metaphysical

Philosophers have failed to result in action, Sorel
(nancluded, because these thinkers have not undertaken

an examination of the role played by the emotions in

hlnman life. The philosophers have created formal

timeories, Sorel wrote, but they have had no efficacity.

I11 this respect, Christianity had created something new:

n O O O O O C
1L£e chr1st1anisme invent un pu1ssant moyen de determi-

'1511:ion."97 The powerful emotion of love was disciplined,

" . 1e fidéle arrive a développer dans son coeur,

a. tan degré extraordinaire, l'amour pour Jésus, qu'il

c=<>xigoit comme un étre sensible semblable a lui, ayant

96Ibid., p. 154. " . . . none of these beliefs

Ciajn introduce themselves in us if there is not an emotion
which opens the path to it and bothers our critical
iaCUltY."

"Christianity invented a power-

97Ibid., p. 255.
iul means of determination."

 

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89

98

une humanité identique a la sienne." In order to

please the God whom he loved, the faithful Christian,

consented to deprive himself and to suffer in behalf of

the poor whom he believed Jesus had loved; this privation

seemed to the faithful to be good in itself. This aspect

of the religious life, Sorel believed, was identical with

that which could be found in human sexual relations:

" . . . 1a grande découverte du christianisme a été de

trouver 1e moyen d'utiliser des facteurs de l'érotisme

détournés vers la mystique."99 Is there no way, Sorel

asked, to utilize this discovery of Christianity without
recourse to its mystical or supernatural embellishments?

SOrel purposed a moral reform which would liberate the

Power of sexual love, and to this end he wrote,

‘3 'est vers une amelioration des rapports sexuels que doit
100

Se porter toute l'attention du moraliste. . . . "
SC>3:~e1 believed that as a consequence of this sexual

1:‘e\rolution it would be possible for "l'amour normal 3

 

\

98Ibid. ”.. . . the faithful arrives to develop

Ln his heart, to an extraordinary degree, love for Jesus,
‘1 at he conceives to be a sensitive being similar to him,

ha.\ring a humanity identical to his own."

99Ibid. See also Humphrey, Georges Sorel,
W

Prophet Without Honor, pp. 75, 80.. the great
:Lscovery o C rist1anity has been to find the means to

utilize factors of eroticism channeled toward the mysti-

cal ."
100 .
Ibid., p. 256. " . . . it is towards an ameli—

oration of sexual relations that all the attention of
moralists must be carried. "

 

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90

developper en nous les sentiments de délicatesse et de

101 The moral reform of man, Sorel

bienveillance."
stated, was inseparable from reform in the status of
woman. He suggested it was necessary " . . . de com-
pleter le systéme primitif de Marx par une théorie de 1a

102 Sorel believed that the liberation 0f women

famille."
from their traditional status would reveal " . . . chez
la femme une éducatrice qui nous apprendrait a voir des
fréres dans les déshérites."103
Having completed his study of the ideological
clash between the Roman civilization and the emerging
Christian world view, Sorel speculated on the utility of
lustorical studies. He did not believe that the past
cmuld be used to predict the future. His goal had been

. . . une interpretation philosophique des causes pro—

fondes des actions humaines."104

The question of his
historical method was never openly discussed because
SOrel believed that the reader must judge for himself

‘

101Ibid. " . . . normal love to develop in us
Sentiments of delicacy and benevolence."

102Ibid. " . . . to complete the primitive sys-
tem of Marx By a theory of family."

103Ibid. " . . . the woman as educator who would
teach us to see our brothers among the underprivileged."

. 1“Ibid.. intro. 9. 24. " . . . a philosophical
lJaterpretatIEE—of the profound causes of human actions."

 

 

 

 

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91

if the method employed had produced useful results. He

wrote, "L'essential n'est pas de prouver que le mouvement

existe, mais de le produire."105

105Ibid. Georges Goriely drew the conclusion

that 1a Ruine du Monde antiqge, showed Sorel to be anti-
catholic and " . . . franchement anti-chrétiennes." Le
3P1uralisme dramatique de Georges Sorel, Goriely, pp. 75-

1. According to Michael Freund, Sorel's "hostility"
toward Pope Leo XIII accounted for his anti-catholicism:
'VLeo XIII is for Sorel the incarnation of the entire
epoch . . . Pope Pius Ix had been a warrior pope (Kreiger-
Papst) . . . who had been succeeded by orator (Redner-
piBPSt). Vittorio Klostermann, Der Revolutionare Konserva-
tzismus (Francfort a/M: 1932), p. 43. The value of either
opinion seems highly suspect to me. "The essential is not
t1) Prove that the movement exists but to produce it."

 

 

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER II

Between 1894 and 1897, Georges Sorel produced a
prodigious flow of essays most of which appeared in the

periodical 1e Devenir social. Chapter II presents a

 

comprehensive review of these studies together with a
complete bibliography for the three-year period 1895 -
1897 in appendix form at the end of the chapter. The
varied subjects which interested Sorel during this period
suggest the breadth and diversity of his mind. He dis-
cussed the sociology of Emile Durkheim as well as Gustave
IeBon's book: The Psychology of Crowds. He conducted

an inquiry into the psychological basis of human thought,
and he produced a lengthy study of the seventeenth
Century Italian philosopher of law and cultural history:
Giambattista Vico. This chapter also features extracts
of the correspondence between Sorel and Benedetto Croce
which coincided with this period of Sorel's career

(1894-1897).

92

"l

CHAPTER II

LE DEVENIR SOCIAL: 1895 - 1897

From 1894 to 1897, Georges Sorel dedicated

almost all of his time to writing for two Marxist

revues: l'Ere nouvelle and 1e Devenir Social. When

 

l'Ere nouvelle ceased publication in November, 1894,

 

most of its collaborators became associated with the

new 1e Devenir social which was founded by Paul Lafargue,
Gabriel Deville, Alfred Bonnet and Georges Sorel in 1895.
This was the year in which a friendship and life-long
correspondence was initiated between Sorel and Benedetto
Croce.1 Of the friendship, Georges Goriely wrote, "11
n'est personne avec qui Sorel ait ressenti une affinité
Plus profonde qu'avec 1e philosophe napolitain."2
Through Croce, Sorel became known to a circle of Italian

Marxists, among whom was Antonio Labriola, a former

1The letters addressed by Sorel to Benedetto Croce
‘Nere published by Croce in Critica, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930.

2Goriely, La Pluralisme dramatique de Georges
Sorel, p. 81.

93

 

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94

teacher of Croce who had been since 1890 a principle
Marxist spokesman in Italy. Sorel encouraged several

Italians to collaborate in 1e Devenir social, and himself

 

too became a contributor to several Italian periodicals.

As a collaborator in the production of le Devenir

 

social between April, 1895, to October, 1897, Sorel pro-
duced a prodigious flow of essays and book reviews, many
of whiCh he signed with pseudonymes such as: B, D, F,

G, H, X, J, and David.3 These writings provide additional
insight into the mind of Georges Sorel, for as Georges
Goriely observed, " . . . nous pouvons y suivre sa pensée
4

en plein effort."

The first issue of le Devenir social, subtitled

 

"Revue internationale d'économie histoire et de philoso-
phie," appeared in April, 1895. Suggestive of the tone
Of this new periodical was a quotation from Karl Marx
Which was reprinted on the title page each of the ensuing
issues and stated that: "le mode de production de la vie

matérielle domine en générale le développement de la vie

3Sorel published a monthly review of Italian books
‘Under the name "David" after-Marie-David. See also Pierre
Ikndreu, Notre Maitre M. Sorel, p. 56, and Legpluralisme
Qggmmtigpe, p. 83.

 

4Lepluralisme dramatiqge, p. 84. " . . . we
sure able to follow there His thought in full effort."

1""-

 

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95

sociale, politique et intellectualle."5 Contributors to
this April, 1895, issue included: Enrico Ferri, Karl

Kautsky, Antonio and Arturo Labriola, and several others
including, of course, Georges Sorel whose essay entitled

”Les théories de M. Durkheim" appeared on page one.

Les Théories De M. Durkheim

Georges Sorel was interested in Emile Durkheim's
thesis on the division of labor which Durkheim had pro-
pagated in 1893 at which time he was a professor of
sociology and a member of the faculté des lettres de
Bordeaux. In 1895, Emile Durkheim published Les regles
de la méthode sociologique which was, according to Sorel,
a statement of the essential parts of Durkheim's doctrines.
Though dissatisfied with Durkheim for having " . . . se
{monounce, avec une grande force, contre le socialisme,"
Sorel did not conceal his respect for this " . . .
théoricien, qui est, a la fois, un métaphysicien d'une
Subtilité rare et un savant parfaitement armé pour la

lutte."7

\

5The reference for this quote was simply: "Karl
Marx, Le Capital.”

 

6Emile Durkheim, Les régles de la méthode sociolo-
gigue (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1895). (Hereinafter referred
to as Les regles.)

7Georges Sorel, "Les théories de M. Durkheim,"
Le Devenir social, No. 1 (April, 1895), l, 2. (Herein-
aafter referred to as "Les théories.") " . . . theoretician
who is at the same time a metaphysician of a rare subtlety
and a scholar perfectly armed for the struggle."

 

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96

According to Sorel, Durkheim sought to discover
empirical relationships founded on an examination of
verifiable facts to serve as the basis of generalizations
about sociological conditions. Morality for Durkheim,
Sorel wrote, was attached to an empirical notion of fre-
quency: " . . . il a fondé sa morale, en grande partie,
sur l'appréciation du degré de généralité."8 Thus,
sociology, as understood by Durkheim, according to Sorel,
no longer claimed to determine the nature of society and
its institutions; it took things as they were and
attempted to study their changes. This study was conducted
in an empirical manner and the new school of sociology,
Sorel said, was content to discover proximate rules.

This investigation of sociological phenomena showed,

Sorel wrote: " . . . l'étonnante régularité avec laquelle
ils se reproduisent dans les méme circonstances."9 But
SOrel objected to this type of quantitative analysis
because he believed that it falsely assumed homogeneity:
"En sociologie, il n'y a aucune raison pour supposer que

des phénomenes éloignés les uns des autres dans le temps

8Ibid., p. 4. " . . . he founded his morality,
for the most part, on the appreciation of the degree of
generality. "

9Quoted from Les régles, p. 117, by Sorel in
"1&5 théories," p. 9. " . . . the astonishing regularity

Vviim.which they reproduce themselves under the same cir-
cumstances . ”

 

 

 

 

 

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97

et l'espace soient homogénes."10 The authors of such
research, Sorel charged, construe their observations
according to their personal opinions. This caused a ten-
dency, he noted, to consider as most general, ideas which
were most familiar. He wrote: "C'est la cause de presque
toutes nos erreurs dans l'investigation scientifique."ll
In Sociology, Sorel believed, the goal was not to search
for numerical relationships alone; instead it was neces—
sary, he thought, to know the general dispositions and
principle qualities of social movements. Sorel believed
that statistics had a great importance to sociology though
not an unqualified importance: " . . . mais a la con-
dition qu'on les emploie dans un esprit vraiment scien-
tifique, qu'on les interprEte comme des signes secondaires
et qu'on ne prétende pas en faire la base d'une sociologie

algébrique."12 Thus, Sorel concluded, if the approach of

 

loSorel, "Les théories," p. 13. "In sociology,
there is no reason to suppose that phenomena distant from
each other in time and space are homogeneous."

ll;§£§., p. 14. "It is the cause of nearly all
of our errors in scientific investigation."

12Ibid., p. 168. Sorel added an interesting com-
parison: "II est manifeste que tous les hommes ne par-
ticipant pas également aux mouvements; 11 y en a qui font
les lois, qui gouvernent, administrent, dirigent les
industries, agissent sur les marchés;--il y en a d'autres
<nfl.obéissent et sont réduits a un r61e passif, sinon
servile. I1 est impossible de méler tous ces groupes
etéven faire une masse facticement homogéne, pas plus
Tflil n'est raisonnable de considérer les temperatures
atcmmpositions moyennes dans un mélange tres compliqué

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98

Durkheim were accepted, if sociology adopted a nomen-
clature borrowed from physics, it must be cautioned that
there was more to be known about movements than general
characteristics and tendencies: it was vital, Sorel
believed, to determine the tensions of these groups as
well as their density and their masses.l3
In spite of his criticisms, Sorel stated that he
strongly admired the scientific inclination which he saw
in Emile Durkheim. Sorel thought that Durkheim had made
a truly important discovery in the utilization of the
concept of frequency which " . . . a ouvert a la socio-
logie empirique une voie féconde."l4 He concluded his
essay with the hope that Durkheim might yet find his way
to the acceptance of Karl Marx: " . . . ce serait pour
la philosophie sociale un heureux événement; je serais

. . ¢ 15
1e prem1er a acclamer en lu1 mon maitre."

 

de gaz réagissant les uns sur les autres." Ibid. " . . .
but in the condition that they are employed 1n a truly
scientific spirit, that they are interpreted as secondary
signs and that we‘don't try to make of them the base of

an algebraic sociology."

13In a footnote Sorel stated that "clearly these
groups are more or less ardent; this characteristic
neglected by Durkheim has always been placed in evidence
by historians." "Les théories," p. 168.

14Ibid., p. 175. " . . . has opened to empirical
sociology a fruitful path."

. 15Ibid., p. 180. " . . . this would be for social
Philosophy a Happy event; I would be the first to pro-
claim him my master."

lr—fl "‘

99

The Psychological Laws of Symbolism
In June, 1895, Georges Sorel wrote a review of

a book by M. G. Ferrero entitled The Psychological Laws

16

of Symbolism. "M. Ferrero," Sorel wrote in le Devenir

 

social, "is one of the most ingenious philosophers of our
time."17 Sorel's high regard for Ferrero was partially
due to a definition which they shared of the role of the
scientist in the contemporary world. Ferrero had written
that "C'est un devoir moral de l'homme de science de
s'exposer a commettre des erreurs--pour que la science
avance toujours. . . . "18 Sorel admired Ferrero's dis-
dain for the false vanity of the savants: "Cette théorie
place les raisons de la science bien au-dessus de la
misérable vanité et du mesquin amour-propre du savant."19

In addition to his admiration of Ferrero's defi-

nition of the role of the scientist, Sorel believed that

 

16G. Ferrero, Les lois psychologiques du Sym-

bolisme (Paris: Alcan éditeur, 18957. (Hereinafter
referred to as Les lois psychologiques.)

17Georges Sorel, "Les lois psychologiques du

Symbolisme," 1e Devenir social, No. 3 (June, 1895), 275.
(Hereinafter referred to as "Les 1018.")

l81bid. "It is the moral duty of the men of
science to expose himself to commit some errors--in
cmder that science advances always."

19Ibid. "This theory places the reasons of science

well above miserable vanity and the petty pride of the
scholar."

‘ J
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100

this study of symbolism represented what he called " . . .
one of the first serious attempts to provide a psychologi-
cal interpretation of history."20 The role played by
symbols in history was of such interest to Sorel that he
emphasized the value of even the " . . . hypotheses

"21 which

témpéraires et de syntheses prématurées .
Ferrero had advanced. The evolution of human institutions,
according to Sorel's interpretation of Ferrero, did not
follow the abstract laws of logic, and to understand the
past it was necessary to reject the purely logical
approach. To this end Ferrero advanced an hypothesis

which he called the "Loi de l'inertie logicienne" which
according to Sorel " . . . a une importance capitale

dans l'histoire."22 Ferrero had stated, Sorel noted,

that pure logic was originally preferred to observation

and experience because it was a " . . . processus psy-

23 Human institutions were

chologique moins fatigant."
not created according to a preconceived plan; they did

not, according to Sorel's account of Ferrero, follow a

2°1bid., p. 279.
21 - n
Ibid. . . . temporary hypotheses and pre-

nmture syntheses . . . "

. 22Ibid., p. 277. " . . . had a capital importance
in history."

23
.. . a less fatiguing psychological process."

Sorel quoted from Les lois psycholggiques, p. 162.

 

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101

single idea and there was no clear understanding of the
final results to which human activity would lead. Such
activity originated as provisional expedient which was
subject to a slow evolution, with the result that,
according to Ferrero, man " . . . ne comprend pas dans
son ensemble ce qu'il a créé peu a peu par des modifi-
cations successives."24 Thus in the course of time,

the inventions of man took on symbolic values which were
capable of provoking the birth of certain states of con-
sciousness whose intensity was determined by the degree
to which the symbol conformed to the psychological laws
which governed human consciousness. The psychological
laws which Ferrero discussed were premature according to
Sorel, and at the conclusion of his essay Sorel com-

plained that Ferrero had not sought the nature of this

excitation caused by symbols and Sorel's continuing

 

24Sorel quoted from Les lois psychologiques,

p. 166. Sorel remarked that-Ferrero may have neglected
too much the role of reason in symbolic transformations:
"Il est regrettable aussi que M. Ferrero n'ait pas tenu
plus compte de ce que Hégel a ecruit sur le symbolisme et

sur son opposition avec l'adaptation des moyens aux fins,"

Les loisgpsychologiques du Symbolisme, p. 275. Sorel
shared with Hegel a conception also of the role which art
puayed in the development of science: "La conception
hegelienne est toujours vraie: l'art est un intermedi-
aire entre la nature et la science." 1e Devenir social,
No. 2 (Mai, 1895). "Les premieres formes de’la religion
em.de la tradition dans 1' Inde et la Grece," P. Regnaud,
Revue Critique par Georges Sorel, p. 195. " . .

doesn' t‘understand in its totality that which he has
cueated little by little by successive modifications."

 

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102

interest in the emotional dimension of human behavior
again surfaced: " . . . 11 me semble que cette exci-

tation est d'ordre affectif."25

Psychologie Des Foules
In addition to the emotional impact of symbols,
Georges Sorel became interested in the psychology of
crowds after having read and critically examined a book
written by Gustave LeBon entitled Psychologie des Foules

in 1895.26 According to Sorel's understanding of LeBon,

 

the individual within a crowd underwent striking changes:
"L'individu en foule acquiert, par le seul fait du nombre,
un sentiment de force invincible qui lui permet de céder
a des instincts que seul il efit forcément réprimés."27
According to LeBon, Sorel reported, the individual in a
crowd became a more primitive being, capable of sponta-
neity, violence, ferocity, heroism, and great enthusiasm.
And in the center of a crowd, Sorel reported from LeBon:

. . . 1e savant et l'ignorant sont également incapables

 

25Sorel, "Les lois," p. 276. " . . . it seems

to me that this excitation is of an affective nature."

26Gustave LeBon, Psychologie des Foules (Paris:

FR Alcan, editeur, 1865). Reviewed’by Sorelfin le Devenir

 

social, No. 8 (Novembre, 1895). (Hereinafter referred to
as "Psychologie des Foules.")

271bid., p. 765. "The individual in a crowd
ammfixes, By the single fact of number, a feeling of
undhcible force which permits him to yield to instincts
whnfllhe alone had forcibly repressed."

 

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103

d'observation."28 Crowds are susceptible only to ideas,

Sorel continued, having " . . . revétir une forme tres
simple . . . pour les conduire, il faut employer une
logique spéciale; elles ne sont vraiment pas influencables
par un raisonnement."29 The conceptions of the crowd,
Sorel added, take on a religious character; and he
believed that this religiosity characterized the faith
which crowds could place in formula or in their leaders-—
a religiosity which explained their intolerance, their
fanaticism and their blind submission.3O

Sorel found the most fundamental aspect of crowd
psychology to be the sense of " . . . l'impuissance
intellectuelle," in which condition he believed the
individual lost little by little all the "artificial"
supports of education. The first of these to fall,

Sorel noted, was " . . . l'idée de responsabilité."31

 

28£2$§-. P. 766. ” . . . the scholar and the
ignorant are equally incapable of observation."

29Ibid. " . . . to recloth a very simple form
. . . in order to lead them, it is necessary to employ
a special logic. They are truly not influenced by
reasoning."

30These ideas are largely credited to G. LeBon,
Egychologie des Foules, pp. 61, 54, 61, 62. Sorel added:
"Cette domination des instincts, ce retour aux formes
sauvages peuvent étre . . . bien 11 y a surexcitation de
la vie affective." Psychologie des Foules, p. 766.

31

Ibid., p. 767. " . . . the idea of responsi-
bility."

......1

104

Sorel referred in this regard to the "petit stock de
formules" which, he believed, education had provided,
and he charged that these formula were empty abstractions.
Sorel found here an application for what he called " . . .
une loi psychologique tres importante . . . c'est la

"32 Under " . . .

loi de la permanence des abstraits.
l'influence magique des mots," Sorel charged, the minds
of children were weakened by the educators "surtout dans

33 But the individual in a crowd was

les races Latines."
not susceptible, Sorel noted, to subtle distinctions of
language; the example of action was more persuasive than
words alone because, Sorel claimed, " . . . l'action est
plus pres de l'expression émotionelle que ne l'est la
parole."34
In political life, Sorel observed, individuals
do not present themselves as they truly are, each wears
a mask and for this reason parliaments do not resemble
crowds. In parliaments, Sorel discovered, the domain

of the word from which resulted ” . . . de mensonges et

de conventions,” and he concluded his review of LeBon's

 

32Ibid. " . . . a very important psychological
law . . . 1t is the law of the permanence of abstracts."

33Ibid. " . . . the magical influence of words
.. . especially the Latin races."

34E§£§~p P- 769. " . . . action is closer to
emptional expression than the word."

 

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105

book by charging that " . . . notre éducation nous
prépare a jouer la comédie et tue notre initiative."35
By December, 1895, le Devenir social had issued
its ninth monthly publication. Georges Sorel had been
a heavy contributor with three major articles and thir-
teen detailed book reviews.36 Writing to Croce in
December, 1895, he described the difficulty of sustaining
the fledgling publication with articles of continuing

interest.37 Sorel asked Croce to contribute " des

études précises sur des faits historiques ou des phé-

noménes économiques bien délimités."38

La Science Dans L'Education
In February, 1896, Sorel wrote a major article
for 1e Devenir social entitled "la Science dans l'édu-

cation" in which he again criticized the assumptions of

 

35Ibid., p. 770. " . . . our education prepares
us to play the comedy and kills our initiative.”

36See Appendix A for a complete listing of
Sorel's contributions to la Devenir social, 1895.

 

37Sorel concealed his heavy participation in 13
Qeyenir social by signing his articles often with a
variety of initials.

38diretta da B. Croce, "Lettere Di Georges Sorel
aIL Croce," 1a Critica, Vol. XXV, 1927 (December 20,
1895), 38. (Hereinafter referred to as 1a Critica.)
Intessay was submitted by Croce entitled "Les theories
idstoriques de M. Loria" in 1e Devenir social, November,
1995: pp. 881-906. " . . . some precfse studies on
tustorical facts or well delimited economic phenomena."

 

 

 

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106

the French educational system. Chiding the sons of
"familles nobles" who could permit themselves the luxury
of seeking in education a preparation for "la vie de
salon," Sorel charged that their only industry was to
become perfect "gentilhommes," and he added scornfully:
" . . . leurs parents ont raison de les éléver pour une

39 This education

profession qui doit étre si lucrative."
designed to teach manners, to inculcate a taste for
literature was, according to Sorel, designed for the
student who wished to present a "belle figure dans le
monde," but was useless to those who had no prospects
that " . . . ils trouveront sur leur chemin de riches
héritiéres qui leur apporteront des millions en échange
de leur gentilhommerie."40

Sorel believed that the concept of education
comprehended all of Sociology because at each instant
what he called "le milieu artificial" acted upon the
individual with the effect of modifying experience and

personality. Addressing himself to the schools of his

day, Sorel stressed that contemporary conditions were

 

39Georges Sorel, "la Science dans l'education,"
lggDevenir social, No. 2 (Fevrier, 1896), 110. (Herein-
after referred to as "la Science dans 1'education.")
“ . . . their parents are right to raise them for a pro-
fession‘which must be so lucrative."

. 40Ibid. " . . . they will find on their path of
riches heiresses who will bring them millions in exchange
for their gentle manliness."

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107

greatly changed from those of the past. Yet, he com-
plained, a great labor remained before the present
system would be able to liberate itself from the edu-

cational ideas of pre-revolutionary France which were

. . . fondé sur la supériorité de la culture romaine."41

The old system had failed in the present, Sorel believed,
because people were graduating from the colleges insuf-
ficiently prepared for life: their general knowledge
did not prepare them for a role in industrial society
and this lack of harmony was critical because: "Un
systéme educational ne vaut qu'en raison de son harmonie
avec une organisation donnée."42
In the realm of human knowledge, Sorel, in his
essay on science in education, distinguished two parts;
the first he called formal or abstract, the second he
believed was living and concrete. He believed that the
prestige which geometry and logic possessed at the begin-

ning of speculative philosophy had led thinkers to believe

 

41Ibid., p. 117. Writing on the role of the
Christian church in the maintenance of this idea, Sorel
noted that it had transmitted two things to the successive
generations: some rudiments of ancient philosophy and
the preconception of " a . . 1a superiorité intellectuelle
incontestée du monde paien sur la société du temps. Des
ces deux chose, c'est la seconde qui est la plus impor-
tante." p. 116." . . . founded on the superiority of
the Roman culture."

_ 42Ibid., p. 111. "An educational system is worth-
‘flule by reason of its harmony with a given organization."

 

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108

that a science was all the more perfect when it included
a great number of abstractions and sylogismes.43 It was
this abstract and formal point of view which, according
to Sorel, formerly dominated all scientific instruction.
But it was necessary, Sorel believed, to understand that
scientific relationships belonged " . . . au milieu
artificiel et non au milieu cosmique."44 Science had
become, Sorel wrote, " . . . un admirable systeme de
ruses destinées a mesurer indirectement ce que nous ne
pouvons mesurer directement."45 This doctrine was,
according to Sorel, " . . . une hypothese anthropocen-
trique."46 The formal part of science, he believed, had
acquired an importance of such magnitude that it had

almost separated itself from the philosophy of nature.

This development rested upon, Sorel wrote: " . . . du

 

43Sorel, in a footnote, said that this was espe-
cially manifest in the transcendental idealisme of Kant.
Ibid., p. 129.

44

Ibid., p. 136. " . . . to the artificial
milieu and not to the cosmic milieu."
45Ibid. " . . . an admirable system of ruses

destined to measure indirectly that which we cannot
measure directly."

46Ibid. Sorel also charged that some "wise"
authors cla1med that the definition of morality was that
which was of an entirely human design " . . . at on sait
que le morale est l'ensemble des regles que doivent
suivre les hommes pour rendre l'exploitation capitaliste

supportable." p. 137. " . . . an anthropocentric hypothe-
sis."

 

 

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109

fanatisme intellectualiste."47 In contemporary education,

Sorel believed, the "true" was defined as an ensemble
of very clear and distinct propositions closely bound
together by logic, capable of being applied to the phe-
nomena of the world, as made known to the senses aided

48 The "real," according to

by man-made instruments.
Sorel, was outside of this ensemble and thus not sus-
ceptible to any exact science.

Concerning metaphysics, Sorel observed that
" . . . metaphysiciens anciens et moderne ne jamais
poser de problémes sur le monde réel, mais sur un monde
purement subjectif plus parfait."49 But in nature, Sorel

believed, there existed a complexity so extraordinary and

so little decipherable that one always allowed for chance,

 

4‘7Ibid., p. 216. " . . . some intellectual
fanaticism.

48Ibid.

49Ibid. Here Sorel made reference to M. Fer-

rero's idea that "man is inclined toward logical con-
structions by the laziness of his mind, or the desire to
devote the least possible effort to research," p. 217.
See also previous discussion of lois psychologique du
symbolisme, M. G. Ferrero. Sorel disagreed with this
hypothesis somewhat saying: " . . . il faut tenir compte,
dans une trES large mesure, de ce sentiment de subjec-
tionsme, qui nous fait aimer et venerer, les produits de
notre esprit, " "la Science dans 1' Education," p. 217.

. . . ancient and modern metaphysicians never posed
problems about the real world but about a world purely
subjective and most perfect."

 

 

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110

and he believed it was precisely this element of chance
which was repugnant to the habits of the men of abstract
science. Their dogmatic states of mind led, according

to Sorel, to the formation of utopian ideas in the social
realm and to " . . . la purgation complete des systemes
sociaux, l'élimination de tout ce qui est obscur, impar-
fait, inintelligible telle est l'oeuvre qui semble
possible depuis deux siecles, depuis que l'homme ne

cesse plus d'admirer les produits de son esprit et les

victoires qu'il remporte sur la matiere."SO

In his day,
Sorel believed that sociologists had become a little less
ambitious but he warned that a serious self-examination
would reveal a sleeping utopian in all contemporary
sociologists; in fact, according to Sorel, a kind of
structural error seemed to dominate human minds: " . . .
nous ne pouvons comprendre la réalité du réel qu'en la
subordonnant a l'existance des caprices de notre imagi-

nation manipulant 1e formel."51

 

50Ibid., p. 219. Sorel concluded that the scien-
tific educat1on had exercised a great influence on the
development of utopian social thought. " . . . the com-
plete purging of social systems, the elimination of all
which is obscure, imperfect, unintelligible, such is the
work which seems possible since two centuries, since man
no longer ceases to admire the products of his spirit
and the victories that he achieves on matter."

51Ibid., p. 221. " . . . we can only understand
the reality of the real in subordinating it to the exis-
tence of caprices of our imagination manipulating the
formal."

 

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111

This structural error was not, Sorel believed,
inherent in human nature. And it was here, he thought,
that education could intervene to expose our stupidity
but he concluded: " . . . malheureusement, c'est plut6t

1e contraire qui se produit, parce que l'enseignement est

52

entierement fondé sur le formel." The success of

utopian ideas was tied very closely to sentimental

affinities: "Comme toujours, on trouve au fond de ces

53

mouvements de l'esprit un élément affectif." And

Sorel ascribed much of the success of Fourier to arti-
fices of language: " . . . il était donné d'un talent

tres remarquable pour trouver des expressions imagées,

symboliques. . . . "54 Is this not usually the case, he

asked? Does not the form often prevail over the content?55

 

52Ibid. Sorel recalled that after 1870 the
republican party of France saw its mission to give France
the "benefits" of a purely scientific education and that
Gambetta had declared that Comte: "a donné la philosophie
scientifique de la Republique," p. 223. " . . . unhappily,
it is rather the contrary which produces itself, because
teaching is entirely founded on the formal."

53Ibid. Sorel found this element very active in
Fourier. "As always, we find at the base of these move—
ments of spirit an affective element."

54Ibid. " . . . he was given a very remarkable
talent for finding vivid expressions, symbolic . . . "

55Sorel stated the principle: "la forme l'a
emporte sur la fond," Ibid., p. 233.

 

 

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112

The impact of reading new words, he observed, created the
illusion that one was in the presence of extraordinary
new novelties, and this, Sorel charged, was one of the
consequences of the emphasis on the formal and abstract
in education.56

Sorel believed that a truly scientific education
could only be given when theory and practice could become
united. This unity was, Sorel noted, a central theme in
the work of Karl Marx. The liberation of mankind, Sorel
wrote: " . . . comporte, comme premiere condition, une
idéele identification de la matiere et de l'esprit dans
le milieu artificiel, une complete intelligibilité de
toute operation, une parfaite illumination du monde

économique par la pensée."57

L'Idéalisme De M. Brunetiere
A doctrine of Socialism was stated by Sorel in

another essay written in 1896 for le Devenir social

 

 

56In a footnote Sorel noted: "Cette deformation
peut avoir l'avantage de faire voir tres nettement cer-
tains phénomenes qui restent ordinairement peu accessibles
aux observateurs," Ibid., p. 233.

57Ibid., p. 457. " . . . requires, as a first
condition, an ideal identification of matter and spirit
in the artificial milieu, a complete intelligibility of
every operation, a perfect illumination of the economic
world by thought." ‘

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113

entitled "l'idéalisme de M. Brunetiere."58

The socialists
are materialists, he admitted, in the sense that they did
not believe in the march of humanity toward " . . . la
Lumiere divine, vers l'Esprit, ou toute autre expression
de l'actualité de la Vérité et de la Justice."59 In
saying this, Sorel did not wish to deny the highly ideal-
istic character of the socialist doctrine, but he cautioned
against the false prophecy of the future based solely

on imagination. According to Sorel, Marx saw the economic
forms not as a resistance but as precisely that which
caused successive protests, which for the sake of con-
venience were classified under the general term "justice."
But the general terms of justice and truth did not, he

believed, exist outside of the world which was constructed

by mankind in its successive labors.

Etude Sur Vico

 

In October, 1896, Georges Sorel completed, for
1e Devenir social, a detailed study of the seventeenth
century Italian philosopher of law and of cultural

history, Giambattista Vico. Sorel was highly interested

 

58The essay appeared in le Devenir social, No. 6,
Juin, 1896, "L'idéalisme de M. Brunetiere," Georges Sorel,
pp. 500-16. (Hereinafter referred to as "L'idéalisme
de M. Brunetiere.")

 

59Ibid., p. 516. " . . . the divine Light, toward
Spirit, or all other expressions of the reality of the
Truth and of Justice."

 

114

in what had seemed to Vico an incontestable truth of
history, whose apprehension could help to clarify the
origins of history which otherwise would remain obscure.
That law was simply: "Le monde social est certainement
l'ouvrage des hommes."60 Sorel believed that this
conception of the construction of history by man, con-
stituted the original part of the work of Vico. The
other conception popularly associated with the work of
Vico, the conception of an ideal history with an eternal
succession of political forms, Sorel chided as a super-
ficial accessory and an obstacle to an appreciation of
Vico's value.61
According to Sorel in his essay on Vico, Karl
Marx noted that Darwin had drawn attention to the history
of " . . . la technologie naturelle," meaning by this
the formation of the organs of plants and animals con-

sidered as means of production for their lives.62 Marx

then asked, according to Sorel, would not the history of

 

60Georges Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," le Devenir
social, No. 10 (Octobre, 1896), 809. "The social world
is certainly the work of men."

 

61Ibid., p. 786. Sorel wrote: "Mais pour appre-
cier toute la valeur des theses, auxquelles Marx fait
allusion, il faut débarrasser, tout d'abord, le chemin
des obstacles; il faut enlever toutes les parties super—
ficielles du systeme, surtout celle qui est la plus
connue, mais qui est accessoire."

62

Ibid.

 

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115

the productive organs of social human life be worthy of
similar researches? And had not, Sorel asked, Vico
observed that the history of man distinguished itself
from the history of nature in that man had made the former
and not the latter? Because of his interest in science,
Vico was, according to Sorel, very struck by the social
and historical nature of human development. Sorel wrote:
Une chose frappe fortement Vico: la science n'est
pas née d'hier; elle a une histoire derriere elle;
c'est en consultant cette histoire, qu'on peut
seulement 1a bien connaitre. Elle n'est pas un
objet qui réclame la croyance ou l'adhésion per-
sonelle; elle intéresse la vie de l'homme comme
espece et la développement de l'humanité; elle n'est
pas individuelle, elle est sociale. . .

Sorel agreed with Vico. For him science repre-
sented an immense labor of cooperation among successive
generations. From this perspective Sorel respected the
authority of tradition: " . . . i1 n'est donc pas con-
forme a la raison de négliger l'autorité de la tradition:

64

celle-oi doit étre étudiée et discutée." Sorel believed

 

63Ibid., p. 812. Sorel added: "Voile une belle
pensée qui peut entrer telle quelle dans la philosophie
moderne.” _
One thing strongly struck Vico: science Was not
born yesterday; it has a history behind it; it is
only in consulting this history that one can know it
well. It is not a thing which demands belief or
personal adherence; it interests the life of man as
species and the development of humanity; it is not
individual, it is social. . . .

 

64Ibid., p. 813. " . . . thus it is not conformed

to reason to neglect the authority of tradition: this
[tradition] must be studied and discussed."

 

116

that the intellectual worked with material which had
been furnished by preceding generations and this material,
Sorel reiterated, " . . . appartient a ce que nous appel-
lons aujourd'hui 1e milieu artificel; c'est donc dans un
milieu fait par l'humanité que nous pratiquons l'induction
.et non dans 1e milieu cosmique."65 The new science of
Vico was thus for Sorel a history of human ideas, "

d'apres laquelle semble devoir procéder la métaphysique
de l'esprit humain."66 In this evolution of the human
mind, Sorel insisted: "Nous ne sortons jamais du milieu
artificiel; la connaissance se perfectionne suivant la
loi de progression métaphysique, propre a l'esprit humain;
mais elle reste toujours sociale comme aujourd'hui

l'humanité est son oeuvre a elle-méme."67

 

65Ibid., p. 814. " . . . belongs to that which
we call today the artificial milieu; it is thus in a
milieu made by humanity that we practice induction and
not in the cosmic milieu."

6622;2- " . . . from which seems ought to pro-
ceed the metaphysic of human spirit."

67Ibid. Sorel whose knowledge of Vico was based
on a translation of his works by Michelet (in the edition
of 1894) referred to "le grand historien francais" who
had a very high regard for Vico and wrote: " . . . la
science sociale date an jour oh cette grande idée a
été exprimée pour la premiere fois. Jusque 1a l'humanité
croyait devoir ses progres aux hasards du génie indi-
viduel." Quoted by Sorel in a footnote, pp. 814-15.
“We will never get out of the artificial milieu; knowl-
edge perfects itself following the 1aw of metaphysic
progression, appropriate to human spirit; but it always
remains social as today humanity is its work to itself."

 

117

Sorel believed that what he called "le monde
cosmique" could never be known by mankind in any cer-
tainty. But mankind could know "le monde artificiel,"
because it was constructed by human beings. Quoting
from Marx, Sorel noted: "La technologie met a nu 1e mode
d'action de l'homme vis-e-vis de la nature, 1e proces de
production de sa vie matérielle et, par suite, l'origine
des rapports sociaux et des idées ou conceptions intel-
lectuelles qui en découlent."68

To comprehend the meaning of Vico, Sorel believed,
it was necessary to become aware of the special conditions
in which he lived; to take into account what Sorel called
the "milieu intellectuel" in which his mind was formed.

In this regard, Sorel noted, " . . . on doit surtout

remarquer, dans Vico, l'éloignement qu'il éprouve pour

les theses purement intellectualistes et spiritualistes
9

. . . , . 6 .
qui dom1na1ent alors toute 1a pensee europeene." V1co,

according to Sorel, was especially antagonistic toward

 

68Sorel referred this idea to Ca ital, Karl Marx
in an incomplete reference. "Technology makes naked the
mode of action of man with regard to nature, the process
of production of his material life, and consequently,
the origin of social relations and intellectual ideas
or conceptions which flow from it."

69Sorel, “Etude sur Vico," p. 810. . . .
We must, above all, notice in Vico, the distance he felt
for purely intellectual and spiritual theses which domi-
nated at the time all European thought."

 

118

the doctrines of Rene Descartes,70 whose thinking, Sorel
noted, represented " . . . des tendances, depuis longtemps,
latentes dans le monde."71 Sorel believed that what he
called the "conceptions spiritualistes" of Descartes,
especially that of dualism, had substituted in the
eighteenth century for the " . . . ancienne théorie

72 The result of this had been

unitaire de l'homme."
the conception of an isolated intelligence reasoning only
on itself. Vico strongly attacked the Cartesian doubt

which, " . . . semblait a Vico un véritable leurre."73
This appeal to individual sentiment was a pretention to
reconstruct, by a single individual, that which the pre-
ceding generations had elaborated in an enormous collec-

tive human undertaking. Vico, Sorel reported, had seen

 

70Sorel noted the agreement of Michelet with
"l'illustre Napolitain": "Nulle part, les abus de la
nouvelle philosophie n'ont été attaqués avec plus de
force et de moderation: l'éloignement pour les études
historique, 1e dédain du sens commun de l'humanité, la
maniere de réduire en art ce qui doit etre laissé a la
prudence individuelle, l'application de la méthode
géometrique aux choses qui comportent 1e moins une
demonstration rigoureuse . . . " Sorel's reference here
was simply Michelet, Discours sur le systeme et la vie de
Vico, p. 14, in "Etude sur Vico," p. 810.

71Ibid., p. 811. " . . . tendencies, since a
long time, latent in the world."

72$2£§o " . . . the former unitary theory of man."

73E§1§° " . - . seemed to Vico a veritable lure."

 

 

 

‘8

 

119

in this new school the potential destruction of all
science and Vico scorned the concept of the clear and
distinct idea: " . . . l'expérience avait montré déje
qu'entre cartésiens aux-memes, l'idée claire et dis-

tincte pour l'une est souvent pour l'autre obscur et

confusé."74

Vico was preoccupied with science, Sorel dis-
covered, and especially with the historical nature of
accumulated scientific knowledge. It was not by consult-
ing a personal perspective, according to Sorel, that an
individual could arrive at an understanding of science
because: "Elle n'est pas individuelle, elle est sociale
. . . elle intéresse se la vie de l'homme comme espece et

le développement de l'humanité."75

Vico had additionally posed what Sorel called
"un principe extremement fécond." He had taught that the

origins of metaphysical constructions must be sought in

 

74Ibid., p. 812. Vico also charged, according to
Sorel, that Descartes had " . . . prétendait avoir fait
table rase du passé et ses partisans négligerent la
lecture des anciens auteurs; mais lui-meme était fort
savant." Sorel quoted from a letter by Vico: "Lettre
a G. L. Esperti," p. 177, translated by Michelet whose
publication of 1894 included "la science nouvelle,
l'autobiographie de Vico, and quelques opuscules." This
reference appears "Etude sur Vico," pp. 812, 785. " .
experience has already shown that between cartesians
themselves, the clear and distinct idea for one is often
obscure and confused for the other."

751bid., p. 812. "It is not individual, it is

Social . . . 1t interests the life of man as species
and the development of humanity."

 

120

the empirical conditions of social life. And Vico taught
that the origins of science could be discovered in the
technical observations found in art. Thus Vico, accord-
ing to Sorel, had recognized the preexistence of "la
sagesse vulgaire" when he wrote that "les auteurs des
nations sont antérieurs de plus de mille ans aux auteurs
des livres."76
Vico's estimation of the condition of Europe
during the eighteenth century was portentous; Vico
observed that the genius of Europe seemed to be exhausted.
Vico noted the departure from classical studies which he
felt had been so brilliant during the epoch of the Renais-
sance. The experimental method, Vico observed, was
scorned by the eighteenth century: " . . . on ne
s'occupe que de rédiger des abréges et des dictionnaires,
pour remplacer les travaux personnels."77 In opposition
to these trends Vico suggested a new scientific history

of the evolution of human ideas whose goal would be to

discover their nature, origins and motive forces. Vico

 

76$orel quoted from Vico, Michelet,,Paris, 1894
edition, Book I, chapter IV, p. 364. See "Etude sur Vico,"
p. 801. "The authors of nations are anterior by more
than a thousand years to the authors of books."

77"Etude sur Vico," pp. 791-92. In a footnote

on page 791 Sorel stated the Vico view that Descarte's
success depended upon the " . x . siecle de légéreté
eédaigneuse, ou l'on veut paraitre éclairé sans étude."
- . . they only concerned themselves with writing
summaries and dictionaires, replacing personal works."

 

121

failed in this project, Sorel believed, partly because
of his reliance upon the intervention of a supernatural

force in human history: " . . . la science nouvelle

une théologie civile de la providence divine . .
commence at finit par le miracle."78 However, Sorel
believed that Vico was one of the important thinkers who
shared the good fortune that their errors were fruitful,
and thus deserved to be studied with great care.

Vico's idea that the formation of philosophy
occurred under the influence of practical social forms
including economics and politics was so in conformity
with Sorel's predispositions in 1896, that he called
this speculation a law and gave it a special designation:
"L'importance de cette loi est des plus grandes et 11 y
aurait toute une branche de la psychologie a constituer
sur cette base; aussi je propose de lui donner le nom de
loi idéogénétique de Vico."79 But Vico's conception of
an eternally repeated cycle was completely rejected by

Sorel who believed this conception to be an idealistic

fantasy and concluded: "Le mouvement historique ne consiste

 

78"Etude sur Vico," p. 795. Sorel added: "I1
parait donc que vico a fort bien vu quel est le fondement
métaphysique de son histoire idéale; c'est pour lui 1e
principe providentiel." " . . . the new science . . .
a civil theology of divine Providence . . . begins and
finishes by the miracle."

79Ibid., p. 906. "The importance of this law is

the greatest—3nd there would be an entire branch of psy-
?h010gy to constitute on this base also I propose to give
It the name ideogenetic law of Vico."

 

 

 

 

.44

122

pas dans un developpement homogene; on ne peut meme pas

dire que les causes produisent des effets immédiats,

comme en physique: i1 y a une grande complexité de change-

ments réagissant les uns sur les autres; et l'un des

objets les plus considérables de la sociologie est

l'étude des retards et des accelerations."80
Sorel carefully detailed his own conception of

history, and attacked the supernaturalism of those whom

he called "idealistic historians." He insisted that

history did not proceed according to any abstract or

logical formula. "History shows us," he wrote, "decisive

persons whose character, tendencies, and genius could be

81 The historian

made the object of a special study."
could not know the cause which produced a Caesar at a
given date, according to Sorel, but an historian could
seek the causes which rendered a Caesar decisive in given
circumstances. Instead of the uniform cyclical evolution
envisioned by Vico, Sorel wrote:

. . . nous avons un enchevétrement d'évolutions,

qui ne sont susceptibles d'aucune definition

générale, parce qu'e un instant donné on les
trouve a tous les moments de leur developpement.

 

8°1bid., pp. 930-31. "Historical movement does
not consist in a homogeneous development one could not even
say that causes produce immediate effects, as in Physics:
there is a great complexity of changes reacting on each
other; and one of the moSt considered objects of
sociology is the study of delays and accelerations."

81Ibid., p. 937.

 

 

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123

Mais les conditions économiques, les rapports

sociaux, tous les complexes historiques agissent

sur ces évolutions pour favoriser certains

développements.82

Sorel discovered another principle in Vico which

he believed to be of such importance that he entitled it
the second "loi idéogénétique," and claimed that: "Cette
théorie réduirait a néant la pretention des moralistes
qui veulent basser la réforme sociale sur l'amélioration
morale de l'individu. . . . "83 This law stated that the
constitution of the family under the influence of pre-
vailing political circumstances was the principle source
of moral ideas. Thus, for Sorel, social reform could not

wait upon the moral reform of the individual; it was

rather a precondition of individual morality.

 

82Ibid., p. 911. Sorel attacked Jean Jaures who
had written 1n a periodical Jeunesse socialiste (janvier,
1895) an essay entitled "Idéalisme de’I' histoire" that
. . . tout le monde est d'accord pour admettre que le
mouvement humain a une direction déterminé" (p. 20).
Sorel disagreed saying: "Sans doute, par ce procedé on
rend l'histoire intelligible, mais on 1a falsifie . . . "
p. 912. In another related statement Sorel wrote: "Nous
ne cherchons plus l'unité dans les tendances immanentes
de l'homme, que l'on imagine pour donner un corps aux
apparences de l'histoire,--mais dans les évolutions psy-
chologiques, qui sont cachées sous 1e manteau des lois
historiques," pp. 913-14.
. . . we have a tangling up of evolutions, which
are not susceptible to any general definition,
because at a given instant we find them at all
moments of their development. But the economic
conditions, social relations, all the historic
complexes act on these evolutions in order to favor
certain developments.

 

83Ibid., p, 925. "This theory reduces to nothing-
ness the pretentions of moralists who wish to base social
reform on the moral amelioration of the individual. . . . "

 

 

 

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124

Vico had also noticed a characteristic of the
evolution of political institutions which, according to
Sorel, demonstrated that when change occurred there was
always a preservation of the old in the new. In light
of this observation, Sorel concluded, that a state's
political institutions were linked with the past, and to
this extent he believed that "

rétrograde."84 This connection with the past was a

. . . l'Etat est un étre

consequence of the compromise which for most men was
the more respectable solution to the dynamic agent for
change--forces in conflict. But Sorel cautioned,
"L'histoire ne montre pas, toujours, des transformations
faites par ce procédé transactionnel. . . . "85 Compro-
mise or what Sorel called "la transaction," was, he
believed, characterized by a struggle between two minori-
ties in active conflict; compromise, he believed, assured
continuity by providing a new synthesis among the com-
peting elements--a synthesis which did not totally dis-
inherit the old or the new. However, Sorel expected that
the proletariat in his day could:

. . . arrive a étre, dans l'industrie, la seule

organisation vivante: s'il ne reste a cdté de lui

qu'une infinie minorité impuissante et nuisible;
s'il ne renferme dans son sein aucune forme

 

8422;23: p. 931. " . . . the State is a backward
being."

BSEEEQ-I p. 934. "History does not always show
transfozumations made by this transactional procedure."

 

|3

us.“

 

125

hiérarchique, susceptible de se séparer de sa

masse pour former une faction gouvernante; si enfin

le développement de la législation sociale l'a

pénétré de droit:--la continuité économique et

juridique sera assurée sans transaction. On peut

méme ajouter . . . que la plus grande révolution

que l'esprit puisse concevoir sera la plus

pacifique.8

There was, Sorel believed, another important area

of synthesis over which the past maintained a large
influence, which Vico had noticed in the longevity of
the Hellenic fables and had attributed to the evolution
of language. The Greek poems, Vico noted, were "true"
histories and had at their origin a serious character.
The epoch of the phiIOSOphers, according to Sorel, had
given interpretations to the fables having no relation-
ship to their historic origins but, Vico had noted the
fables provided the philosophers the facility of express-
ing the most sublime ideas in a language which was con-
secrated by the authority of poetic wisdom and associated
with an ancient religious sanction. By introducing into

their dissertations many known fragments, Sorel noted,

"les philosophes transportaient a leurs oeuvres une

 

86Ibid., p. 935.
. . . come to be, in industry, the only living
organization: if it.does not remain beside it an
infinite, powerless and harmful minority, if it
doesn't close in its breast any hierarchical form,
susceptible of separating itself of its mass to form
a governing faction; if finally the development of
social legislation has penetrated it by right:--the
economic and juridic continuity will be assured with
transaction. We could even add that the greatest
revolution that the spirit can conceive will be the
most peaceable.

 

“h

 

126

partie des sentiments que ces fragments avaient évoqués."87

From this Sorel concluded that an innovator must seek
the means of developing the sympathies of his readers,
because, he believed, no philosophic system could become
influential solely on the logical value of its arguments:
"Sans doute la foi cherche a se justifier devant la
raison, mais les raisons qui les justifient n'auraient
aucune valeur s'il n'existait pas des états affectifs
profonds donnant de la consistance a un commencement

de croyance."88

According to Sorel, Vico had discovered a doctrine
which could become important in the study of what Sorel
called "des interpretations mythologique." Vico had
speculated that the thinking process of human beings
developed only very recently the facility of reflective
thought; originally, Vico noted, it had been impossible
to separate "1e chose et son simulacre" and therefore

figures, images and fictions did not exist because

 

87$§i§., p. 940. "The philosophers conveyed in
their works a part of the sentiment that these fragments
have evoked."

88Ibid. Sorel referred in a footnote to his
source for this idea: " . . . lire a ce sujet 1e Chapitre
III du troisieme livre de la Cro ance de M. J. Payot."
"Without a doubt, faith searches to justify itself before
reason, but the reasons which justify it would not have
any value if they did not exist in the deep emotional
States giving to the consistency a beginning of belief."

 

r’

 

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K2:

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)

127

everything was real in the same degree. Sorel believed
that this condition existed in the present, especially
in children, and referred to it as "une loi générale de
notre imagination créatrice," and he observed that the

. . . permanence d'un pareil préjugé, qui renait toujours,
montre quelle force posséde la logique de l'imagination."89
Thus for Sorel the "logic of the imagination" was a pre-
rational cognative process. It was impelled by powerful
emotional forces and although with the development of
rational cognition, which Sorel believed was an accomplish-
ment of the Greek philosophers, a new cognitive process
came into being, the "logic of the imagination" remained
capable of dominating the human mind. An intense

emotional excitation could, Sorel believed, overwhelm

the rational facilities to such an extent that man could
be dominated by passion--a phenomenon which Sorel thought
played a vital role in the lives of children, crowds,

and action oriented mass movements. At the conclusion

of his study of Vico, Sorel complained of the superficial
understanding in his own day of this emotional, pre-
rational element in human life and he praised Vico for

his insight into this largely unexplored realm, as well

as for his recognition of the historical development of

 

aglEiQ-r PP- 1022! 1023. " . . . permanence of
a similar prejudice, which is always reborn, shows what
force the logic of imagination possesses."

 

i’

 

 

n,

128

the artificial social and intellectual milieu as being
entirely the construction of man as an historical species.
At the conclusion of 1896,90 Sorel had worked for

two years on Is Devenir social. Yet at the beginning

 

of 1897, his prolific writing continued at the same rapid
pace. In February, he published an essay entitled "la
science de la population"91 in which he expressed the view
that science was not sufficiently advanced to produce an
appropriate analysis of population. Concurrently, Sorel

reviewed a book by M. J. Payot entitled De la croyance92

 

in which he found a definition of science with strong
affinities to his own. According to Payot, science was
a collection of methods designed to classify phenomena
and to suitably represent that phenomena; science " . . .
laisse la réalité hors de ses prises, tout son effort

"93 Science

est dirigé vers l'utile et non vers le vrai.
according to this definition, as Sorel understood it, was

not a knowledge of what Sorel called the "reel"; science

 

90See Appendix B for a list of Sorel's contri-
butions to 1e Devenir social for 1896.

 

91See Appendix C for a list of Sorel's contri-
butions to 1e Devenir social for 1897.

 

92M. J. Payot, De la croyance (Paris: Alcan

éditeur, 1896), reviewed by Sorel in le Devenir social,
No. é, février, pp. 181-86.

 

 

93Ibid., p. 181. " . . . leaves reality outside
of its hold, all its effort is directed towards the use-
ful and not towards the true."

 

 

94!

m.
‘i

.

4‘.

§
‘1

129

was only " . . . un appauvrissement et un symbolisme."94

To this extent Sorel believed that science, a human
invention belonging to the artificial milieu, " . . .
tourne 1e dos a la réalité, elle est un ensemble de

ruses, de subterfuges destinés a dominer le monde, mais
non a pénétrer l'essence."95 Therefore for man, Sorel
believed, the true reality was that realm over which man
could effect the greatest voluntary control, and it was

in the context of this reality that science could become
an expression of the reasoned work of man. Man could

thus become aware of his self-made tools and their cor-
responding developments in a degree of certainty far
exceeding that which he can attain concerning what Sorel
called the "cosmic milieu," of which the artificial milieu
remained a fragmentary aspect.

Sorel's busy writing career was painfully inter-
rupted on April 28, 1897, when, according to an official
extract, Marie Euphraise David died at the age of fifty-
one. Her death was attested to according to the "Extrait
du Registre des Actes de Décés," by Georges Eugene Sorel,
who was described as being fifty-one years old and with-

out profession.

 

94

Ibid. " . . . an impoverishment and a sym-
bolism."

 

95Ibid., p. 182. " . . . turns its back to
reality, it is an ensemble of ruses, of subterfuges

intended to dominate the world, but not to penetrate its
essence.

 

APPENDIX A

LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1895; CONTRIBUTIONS
BY GEORGES SOREL

Numéro 1 - Avril

"Les theories de M. Durkheim"

Revue critique:
la vie sociale, la morale, et 1e progres, by Dr. Julien
PiOger

 

 

Numéro 2 - Mai

TrIes théories de M. Durkheim" (fin)

Revue critique:
Les premieres formes de la religion et de la tradition
dans 1'Inde et Ia Gr55éfwby P. Reynaud

 

 

Numéro 3 - Juin
Revue critique:
Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme, Ferrero

 

Numéro 5 - Aout

Revue critique:
Du travail et de ses conditions, Hector Depasse
EESais et Etudes, E. de Laveleye

rx

Ia propriéte a Rome, en France, en Roumanie; Geblesco

 

 

 

 

Numéro 6 - Septembre
1f1a Metaphysique évolutionniste de M. Brunetiere"
Revue critique:

L'église et 1e travail manuel, M. Sabatier

 

 

ggméro 7 - Octobre
Revue critique:
Dégénérescence et alcoolisme, Dr. Legrain
Science et Religion, G. de Molinari
Les questions agricoles d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, D. Zolla

 

 

 

 

Numéro 8 - Novembre
I'Superstition socialiste?"
Revue critique:
Bgychologie des foules, G. LeBon
L'enseignement élEmentaire en Rousillon depuis ses
origins jusqu'au XIX siecle, Ph. ToreilIes et E.
Desplanque
Etudie sur la chambre du commerce de Guienne, J. A.
Brutails

130

 

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APPENDIX B

LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1896: CONTRIBUTIONS
BY GEORGES SOREL

Numéro l — Janvier

"EEuaes d'économie rurale d'apres M. Zolla"

Revue critique:
Annales de L'Institut International de Sociologie, Les
EbonomiStes cIassiques et Ieur adversaires, R. Sohfiler

Numéro 2 - Février

"la Science dans l'éducation"

Revue critique:
Problémes d'économie politique et de statistique, G.
.Rumelin
1a Femme devant la science contemporaine, J. Lourbet

Numéro 3 - Mars
Wfrogrés et developpement"
"la Science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique:
Critique de combat, G. Renard

Numéro 4 - Avril
"i3 Science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique:
Paradoxes psychologiques, Max Nordan

Numéro 5 - Mai
Wia’Science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique:
Contre le socialisme, L. Say
Cours dVéconomie poIitique, Pareto

Numéro 6 - Juin
"L'idEaIisme de M. Brunetiere"
Revue critique:

Sélections sociales, De Lapouge

Numéro 7 - Juillet

Revue critique:
1e mouvement idéaliste et la réaction contre la science
positive, A. Fouillée

131

132

Numéros 8-9 - Aout-Septembre
1ries sentiments sociauxW
Revue critique:
Del materialimo storico, Antonio Labriola
AnnaIes ae l'institut international de Sociologie

Numéro 10 - Octobre
"Etude sur Vicofiii
"Economie sociale catholique"

Numéro ll - Novembre
fiEtude sur Vico"
"1a dépression économique"

Numéro 12 - Décembre
"Etude sur VicoIr
Revue critique:
Socialisme et science positive, Ferri

 

APPENDIX C

LE DEVENIR SOCIAL, 1897: CONTRIBUTIONS
BY GEORGES SOREL

Numéro l - Janvier
Revue critique:
Le mécanisme de la vie moderne, G. d'Avenel

Numéro 2 - Février

"la science de la population"

Revue critique:
L'économie de l'effort, Yves Guyot
Le mouvement poéitiviSte et la conception sociologique
du monde, A. Fouiilee
De Ia croyance, J. Payot
L'état comme organisation coercitive de la société
politique, S. Bilicki

Numéro 3 - Mars
Revue critique:
La viriculture, G. de Molinari

Il gergo nei normaliLgnei degenerati e nei criminali,
A. Neceforo

Numéro 4 - Avril
Revue critique:

Statistique des greves et de la conciliation, office
du travail

Numéro 5 - Mai

"Contre une critique anarchiste"

Revue critique:
L'Europa grovane, G. Ferrero
Cours d'économié’politigue, V. Pareto
Il socilismo e la sua tattica, G. Lerda

Numéro 6 - Juin
Revue critique:
L'emploi de la vie, John Lubbock

Numéro 7 - Juillet
ala loi des revenus"
Revue critique:

§3_questione siciliana degli zolfi, Caruso-Rasa

133

 

 

134

Numéros 8-9 - Aoflt-Septembre
“Sociologie et suggestion"
Revue critique:

lo sciopero nella vita moderna, F. Virgilii
Numéro 10 - Octobre
Revue doctrinale:

Pro e contro il socialismo, Saverio Merlino

 

 

APPENDIX D

LE DEVENIR SOCIAL: 1894 - 1897
EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO
BENEDETTO CROCE: 1895 - 1897

20 décembre 1895
" . . . nous avons 1e défaut, en France, de vouloir
regarder les choses de trop haut et de voir a la
Napoléon: aujourd'hui il est devenu tres dangereux

d'opérer ainsi." p. 39

14 janvier 1896

"Je ne suis pas aussi convaincu que vous que l'Utopie

de Morus soit une oeuvre politique sérieuse; je pense

que c'est une oeuvre renfermant des allusions utiles

pour l'histoire. . . . Si les utopistes décrivaient

un certain état social, c'était plutot pour ridiculiser

ce qui existait que pour dire ce qu'ils désiraient . . .
J'ai beaucoup gofité votre livre sur l'histoire, qui

me montre que l'Italie finit par abandonner 1e culte

de Spencer. En France, il y a encore des gens qui

croient a la science de ce "fumiste" (je ne dis pas

'sophiste,‘ car les sophistes savaient beaucoup.") p. 40

2 juin 1897
. . j' ai perdu ma chere et dévouée femme, qui avait

été la compagne de 22 ans de travaux et a qui j 'etais
lié par 'la forza del primo armore." Son souvenir, je
l'espere restera 1a meilleure partie de moi-meme et la
vraie ame de ma vie." p. 44

" . . . 1e marxisme est loin d'étre la doctrine et
la méthode de Marx; entre les mains des disciples
dépourvus de connaissances historiques et de critique
philosophique suffisante, 1e marxisme est devenu une
caricature." p. 45

27 décembre 1897
” . . . 11 me semble que Engels . . . a beaucoup con-
'tribué a lancer 1e matérialisme historique dans la
\naie de l'évolutionisme, et 5 en faire une 'dogmatique
absolue' . . . c' est ainsi qu 'il a introduit 1a notion
dxi 'facteur décisif'--qu' il a nié 1' action de la
force immédiate par des arguments d'avocat--qu' i1

135

 

 

 

136

a exposé l'histoire comme une évolution fatale. . . .
Plus d‘une fois, il a été ainsi amené a formuler des
paradoxes, que nos marxistes ont transformé en dogmes
indiscutables." p. 51

" . .,. les formules par lesquelles Marx a marqué sa
position sont tres obscures; mais ce qui me semble
surtout obscur c'est la 'méthode dialectique': . . .
plus je vois, moins je comprends; . . . je crois aussi
que Marx n‘a jamais cherché a preciser sa pensée sur
ce point. . . . Ne conviendrait-il pas de supprimer
cette expression 'la dialectique' et tout ce qui se
rapporte a la 'négation de la négation? . . . 81 non,
on s'expose a faire de son oeuvre l'origine d'une
mythologie fondée sur les 'maladies du langage.'" p. 52

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER III

Between 1897 and 1900, the writings of Georges
Sorel reveal the extent to which the moral dimension of
Socialism had become an element of critical importance
to him. His own Syndicalist revision of Marxism which
is the Opening theme of Chapter III reveals the depth of
his rejection of the dogmatic propensities of the
Marxists of his day. He also criticized utopian socio-
logists for their optimistic view of the human condition
and insisted that suffering and pain were more fundamental
to the human condition and that pessimism was a more valid
assumption for social planners. Sorel also exposed in
Chapter III his concept of the historical basis of
:morality and called again for a new morality based on
new forms of union between men and women to be based on
«devotion, reciprocity and respect. He condemned politi-
cal parties as exploiters of the power of state government
.and.saw in the state a power-center for the domination
(If the many by the few. Syndicalism was the moral
mechanism which could restore the revolutionary dynamic

to Marxism, he concluded; and Chapter III ends with

137

 

 

   

138

Sorel calling for the workers' movement to isolate itself
from both the contemporary state and its parliamentary
parties.

The extracts of the letters to Croce which appear
in the appendix to Chapter III and which cover the period
1898 - 1900 amplify Sorel's characteristic revision of
Marxism and his support for the anti-dogmatic views of
Bernstein in his famous debate with Kautsky over the

pr0per interpretation of Marx.

 

 

 

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CHAPTER III

SYNDICALISM, REVISIONISM AND

MORALITY: 1897 - 1900

L'Avenir Socialiste Des Syndicats

In 1898, Georges Sorel became concerned with what
he called the increasing confusion between the theories
of Karl Marx and the programs of the various groups which
claimed to be Marxist. To this extent Sorel believed the
Communist Manifesto had to be used very prudently because
of the character of the document which was according to
him, " . . . souvent présentés sous une forme symbolique."l
Sorel noted that the dogmatic use of Marx was often a
misrepresentation, and he cautioned that " . I1 ne
faut pas, non plus, croire que tous les fruits du labeur
de Marx puissent se résumer en quelques lambeaux de

phrases ramassées dans ses oeuvres, réunies en formulaire

dogmatique et commentées comme des textes évangéliques

 

lGeorges Sorel, "L'avenir socialiste des syndi-
cats," L'Humanité nouvelle (Paris: Libraire C. Reinwald,
1898), p. 5. This reference appeared in a footnote in
Which Sorel discussed M. Labriola's Essais sur la con-
ception materialiste de l'histoire. (Hereinafter referred
to as "L'avenir socialisteffi) CW_T . . often presented
Under a symbolic form."

 

139

 

 

140

par des théologiens."2 In place of this religious
devotion.to aspects of the writings of Marx, Sorel
believed, the time had come to undertake an extension of
Marx, as well as an examination of the fundamental ideas
of Socialism, This work had been undertaken in France,

according to Sorel, by the periodical to which he had

 

contributed so heavily between 1895 and 1897, la Devenir

 

social, and yet, Sorel believed, much confusion remained,
especially with respect to the conception of historical
materialism.

According to Sorel the proper formulation of the
doctrine of historical materialism stated that the mode
of production of material life dominated, in general, the
development of the social, political and intellectual
life.3 The more rigid interpretations of this idea,
Sorel noted, replaced the word "dominated" with "deter-
mined" and thus falsified a concept which Marx had of
the interplay between economics and the other realms of
human life. Sorel believed that " . . . l'organisation

économique doit étre considerée, a la fois, comme effet

 

2Sorel, "L'avenir socialiste," p. 5. " . . .

It is not necessary, either, to believe that all th
fruits of Marx's labor can be summed up in some scraps
(bits) of phrases, gathered in his works, reunited in

dogmatic formula, and annotated like evangelical texts
by theologians.“

31bid., p. 6.

 

'IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII-Ill-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-Il

   

141

et.comnua cause."4 Sorel concluded that the sociological
structure could be thought of as an organism whose ele—

ments had a certain independence and he advised "

il ne faut pas non plus, a l'imitation de quelques ultra

marxistes, réduire 1e droit et la morale a de simples

fanthes.”5

Sorel believed that it was legitimate to compare
the history of early Christianity with that of modern
Socialism. He speculated that if the Christian church
had been simply a school of philosophy advocating a
”morale pure" it would have disappeared as a movement.
But for Sorel, the Christian church was " . . . une
société, travaillant a développer entre ses membres des

relations juridiques nouvelles et gouvernant d'apres une

constitution nouvelle."6 Also with respect to contemporary

 

4Ibid., p. 7. In this respect Sorel stated his

acceptance of Benedetto Croce' s belief that Marx's con-
cept of history was quite close to the theories of Pareto

on the interdependence of phenomena. " . . . economic
organization must be considered as both cause and effect."
5

Ibid., p. 8. " . . . it is not necessary
either, in the imitation of some ultra marxists to reduce
law and morality to simple phantoms."

6Ibid., p. 9. Sorel further noted that the pro-

clamation of the Edict of Milan represented in reality

. . l'existance d'une hiérarchie plus forte que la

hiérarchie impériale et institua un Etat dans l'Etat. "
. . . a society, working to develop between its members

new juridic relations and governing according to a new
constitution."

 

 

r
11:
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142

Syndicalism, Sorel insisted, it was necessary to consider
the consequences of syndicalist organizations as a social
movement: "Nous allons chercher quelles sont les con-
sequences de l'organisation syndicale telle qu'elle est
pratiquée aujourd'hui et les considerer au point de vue
de la preparation."

According to Sorel, Durkheim, whom he considered
the most skillful university sociologist of his day,
recognized the importance of corporate or federalist
social organizations, although Durkheim had insisted that
these groups remain " . . . soumises a l'action général

de l'Etat."8

But for Sorel the state could not become
what the Saint-Simonians had called an "administration
of things." The nineteenth century had shown, he noted,
that all attempts to constitute an administration inde-

pendent of the interests of factions or parties had

failed, and the bourgeois democracy of late nineteenth

 

7Ibid., p. 10. Sorel observed that Marx had
correctly noted that all historical movements had been
movements of minorities for the profit of minorities to
which Sorel added: "Cette loi empirique s'explique
facilement quand on se rappelle ce qu'a été la possession
de l'Etat dans l'histoire moderne." "We are going to
search for the consequences of syndical organization such
as it is practiced today and consider them from the point
of view of preparation."

8Ibid. Sorel' 3 reference here is incomplete; he
merely cit ma 1e Suicide, Etude de sociologie, p. 439.
. . . submitted to the general action of the state. "

 

 

143

century France was for Sorel an example of the degree
to which professional politicians became corrupted by
special interests.9
Sorel observed further that the distinction

between intellectual and manual labor was entirely
arbitrary and politically dangerous, especially when that
distinction became qualitative, as he believed it had in
his time. The state or the public power, Sorel charged,
was based on this claimed superiority of the intellectuals
whose corrupt elitism was a threat to the workers move-
ment. The solution for the worker, he advised, was to
develop its own internal organization and to avoid
coming under the domination of a state whose professional
leadership had become corrupt, exploitative and opportun-
istic. In France, Sorel claimed, the intellectuals such
as Jaures,

. . . prétendent que leur vraie place est dans 1e

Parlement et que le pouvoir dictatorial leur
reviendrait de plein droit en cas de succes.

 

9Sorel, "L'avenir socialiste," pp. 101, ll, 12.

In an especially scornful statement Sorel wrote: "La
democratie bourgeoise se raccroche, avec l'énergie du
désespoir, a la théorie des capacités et s'efforce
d'utiliser 1e respect superstitieux que 1e peuple a
instinctivement pour la science;--elle emploie les moyens
les plus charlatanesques pour rehausser son prestige,
multiplie les brevets et s'efforce de transformer 1e
moindre lettré en un mandarin;--les parasites se distin-
guent par un enthousiasme immodéré pour la science afin de
jeter de la poudre aux yeux, se mettent a la remorque

de grands pontifes scientifiques, leur servent de

hérauts, réclaiment pour eux de grasses pensions, espérant
obtenir ainsi la consideration des gens naifs et en tirer
profit," p. 13.

 

7i

 

 

144

C‘est contre cette dictature representative du pro-
létariat que protestent les syndicaux; ils pensent
que cela était tout autre chose que la dictature du
proletariat.l
The true vocation of the intellectuals, Sorel concluded,
was the exploitation of politics; they want, he wrote,
" . . . persuader aux ouvriers que leur intérét est de
les porter au pouvoir et d'accepter la hiérarchie des
capacités, qui met les travailleurs sous la direction des
hommes politiques."ll But Sorel warned the syndicats must
recognize that if the worker accepts the guidance of
those outside of the productive corporation he will
remain incapable of governing himself and exploitation
will continue, though perhaps under a different termi-
nology.
The task of transforming the masses of proletariat
into a self-conscious class required according to Sorel
an " . . . immense travail de decomposition et recom-

position."12 This transformation, Sorel thought, must be

 

loIbid., p. 15.
. . . pretend that their true place is in Parliament
and that the dictatorial power in full right would
return to them in case of success. It is against
this representative dictatorship of the proletariat
that the syndicals protested; they thought that was
entirely another thing than the dictatorship of the
proletariat.

 

11Ibid., p. 16. ” . . . to persuade to the
workers that their interest is to carry them to power
and to accept the hierarchy of capacities, which put
‘workers under the direction of political men."

12Ibid., p. 17. " . . . an immense work of
decomposition and recomposition."

 

145

produced by the proletariat itself: " . . . c'est dans
le sein du prolétariat, c'est un moyen de ses ressources

13 The

propres, que doit se créer 1e droit nouveau."
proletariat, Sorel believed, must demand from the public
power to accord facilities which would allow the people
themselves to proceed with this transformation, and
this should be the goal which the workers pursue in the
public arena. Sorel asserted that experience had demon—
strated that in this battle between the workers and the
bourgeois state the need for solidarity and unity among
the proletariat was essential. The totality of workers,
he believed, " . . . forme un corps; les intéréts de tous
sont solidaires; nul ne peut abandonner la cause de ses
camarades sans étre considéré comme un traitre."14
The syndicats, according to Sorel, pursued
general results which would benefit all workers; their
ends were not egoistic, they did not seek special exclu-
sive privilege. Yet, he advised, their role must not be

one of passive resistance because that would only expose

them to the " . . . influence prépondérante des démagogues

 

13Ibid., p. 18. " . . . it is in the breast of
the proletariat, it's a means of its own resources,
which must create for itself the new law."

14Ibid. " . . . form a body; the interests of
all are bound together; no one can abandon the cause of
his comrades without being considered a traitor."

 

146

bourgeois."15 The socially divisive capitalistic cate-

gories of buyer and seller must be eliminated and
replaced, Sorel believed, by the new social concept of
mutuality for which the proletariat engaged all its
energies.

The question of morality remained critical for
Sorel who wrote that it would be criminal to undertake
a social revolution which " . . . aurait pour résultat
de mettre en péril 1e peu de moralité existant."l6 Sorel
added that the economic transformations envisioned by
Marx could not be realized " . . . si les travailleurs
n'ont pas acquis un degré supérieur de culture morale."l7
Certain followers of Marx, according to Sorel, had ignored
the moral question, and their skepticism had been sup-
ported, he believed, by Durkheim's conclusion that pre-

conceived methods for moralizing the people had been

largely ineffective. For Sorel the question was not

 

15Ibid., p. 21. " . . . preponderant interest
of bourgeois demagogues. "

16Ibid., p. 27. Sorel credited Durkheim for
having produced the thesis which he believed consolidated
the concept of historical materialism from a moral point
of view. His reference is incomplete: 1e Suicide, Etude
sociologique; See "L' avenir socialiste, " p. _——__
would have for a result the putting in peril of the little
existing morality. "

17Ibid., p. 28. " . . . if the workers have not

acquired a superior degree of moral culture. "

‘"i1

 

147

" . . . de savoir quelle est la meilleure morale, mais
seulement de determiner s'il existe un mécanisme capable

18 This

de garantir le développement de la morale."
mechanisme, according to Sorel, might be found in the

trade union movement, which had in several instances made
progress in combating alcoholism--a problem which, he
.noted: "L'éxperience a montre que la legislation et la
police officielle sont impuissantes pour arréter. . . . "19
A strong and disciplined syndicat, Sorel suggested, would
have the advantage of providing a constant reinforcement
among the membership which could encourage a particular
type of behavior. Women and children also would find

more protection and security, Sorel believed, in the
context of a workers movement which followed what he

called "la premiére regle": to remain exclusively worker--
which for Sorel required the exclusion of the intellectuals
whose role was to remain auxiliary. In its battle with

the state, Sorel reaffirmed that the syndicats must attempt
only to obtain a " . . . legislation sociale, favorable

a son developpement."20

 

l81bid. " . . . to know what is the best morality,
but only to determine if there existed a mechanism capable
of guaranteeing the development of morality."

lg;§i§,, p. 29. "Experience has shown that
legislation and the official police are powerless to stop
it."

20Ibid., p. 30. " . . . social legislation,

favorable to its development."

 

 

148

La Science Et La Morale

 

During the winter of 1899, Georges Sorel partici-
pated in a conference at the College libre des Sciences
sociales in Paris, which was devoted to the presentation
of theories concerning moral problems. On January 9,
1900, Sorel delivered an address to this body which was
entitled "La science et la morale" in which he enlarged
upon his conception of morality. Opening his address
with a reference to the ancient Greeks, Sorel affirmed
his belief that moral questions were social in nature
and could be best approached by metaphysicians, who were
" . . . seuls competent pour discuter les questions
sociales, d'une maniere utile."21

Western civilization, according to Sorel,
retained the postulate of Greek philosophy which assumed
an identity in the laws of the mind and which led to
attempted reasonings on human industry and institutions.
This Sorel called the " . . . influence bienfaisante de

22

la culture classique." Recently, Sorel stated, the

 

21G. Belot and M. Bernés, Questions de morale
(Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Bailliére et Cie.,
Félix Alcan, editeur, 1900), p. 1. This was the pub-
lished version of the "Le ons professées au College libre
des Sciences sociales" ans will hereinafter be referred
to as Questions de morale. " . . . alone were competent
to discuss social questions in a useful manner."

 

22Ibid., p. l. " . . . beneficient influence of
classical culture."

 

 

149

goal of science had been imagined as the total allevi-

 

ation of suffering and human misery, and many doctrines
of social reform had been founded on this assumed goal.
As a result of this perspective, Sorel believed, the
social question had become not a question of justice but
a question of happiness. The authors of utopian ideas
of the nineteenth century were, according to Sorel,

" . . . sous l'influence de préjugés scientifiques,—-

de proposer des solutions fondées sur une conception

23 But the result of this scientific

optimiste du monde."
optimism was, according to Sorel, a profound discourage-
ment.

Georges Sorel asserted that it was a fundamental
error to consider pleasure and pain the two poles of
human life, especially when the interpretation of the two
states was exclusively quantitative. The result of this
false conception, Sorel noted, was to employ the images
of mathematics in a realm of psychology " . . . sous
prétexte de rigueur scientifique, remplacent ce qui est
d'une observation facile par ce qui est d'une observation
difficile ou méme impossible, qui prétendent expliquer

I C O I 2
ca qu1 se v01t par ce qu1 ne se v01t pas." 4

 

23Ibid., p. 17. " . . . under the influence of
scientific prejudgements,--to propose solutions founded
on an optimistic conception of the world."

24Ibid., p. 18. Sorel credited this observation
to Wilhelm Wundt without reference to a specific text.
" . . . under the pretext of scientific rigor, replacing

 

—1

 

*1
v—r —
w

...—1

 

'I'

‘7.

150

The state of pain (douleur) according to Sorel
was varied and appeared in all aspects of human life.
It was, he affirmed, " . . . 1a manifestation primordiale
de la vie, celle qui nous fournit la preuve irrefutable
(pour la conscience) de notre mélange au monde physique,
qui nous démontre a la fois, notre existence et l'existence

25 The states of pleasure were so varied that

du monde."
Sorel believed it was useless to attempt giving general
descriptions, however he observed: "Dans le plaisir,
nous nous séparons du monde: nous le considérons comme
un jouet fait pour nous amuser; nous croyons que tout
devrait étre arrangé pour nous plaire."26
In the realm of moral life, Sorel stated that

the sentiments, which united pleasure and pain in what

he called "une profonde combinaison," could exercise a

 

that which is from an easy observation by that which is
from a difficult or even impossible observation, which try
to explain that which is seen by that which isn't seen."

25Ibid. " . . . the primary manifestation of
life, that which furnishes us with irrefutable proof
(for the conscience) of our mixture in the physical world,
which demonstrates to us both our existence and the exis-
tence of the world."

26Ibid., p. 19. Sorel added: "C'est pour cette
raison que Ie plaisir se manifeste surtout en présence
des objets d'art créés a notre intention." "In pleasure,
‘we separate ourselves from the world; we consider it as
a game made to amuse us; we believe that all should be
arranged to please us."

 

151

considerable influence on behavior.27 Love, for Sorel,
belonged to this category of sentiments because, he
believed, it engendered a sacrifice which could be
accomplished with joy. "L'amour maternal, he asked,
est-i1 autre chose qu'on long et joyeux martyre?"28
Sorel chided social reformers whom he believed had failed
to comprehend how a sentiment as fugitive as love could
endure and provide the basis for the family as a social
unit. These writers, he charged, had confused "l'amour
avec l'érotisme." The mystics, Sorel concluded, " . . .
qui ont été si habiles observateurs de la nature humaine,
nous apprennentque si l'ame a été vraiment saisie par
l'amour, si elle a connu cette combinaison de plaisir

et de douleur, il est extremement rare qu'elle brise les
liens qu'elle a, une fois, acceptés."29 Sorel concluded
that pain played an important role in the world and he
complained that philosophies exclusively founded on the
consideration of enhancing pleasure ended by glorifying

passion and sanctifying individual cynicism.

 

27This idea Sorel related to Theodule Ribot who had
used the term "sublime" in Psychologie des sentiments,
p. 43, and Karl von Hartmann, PhilOsophie ae ITinconscient,
p. 395. These incomplete references are Sorel's. Ibid.?

28Ibid. “Maternal love, is it something else
than a long joyous martyr?"

29Ibid., p. 20. " . . . who have been such able
observors of Human nature, teach us that if soul has
truly been seiged by love, if it has known this combi-
nation of pleasure and pain, it is extremely rare that
it will break the ties once accepted."

I»

 

152

Les Facteurs Moraux De L'Evolution

 

Pessimism was therefore for Sorel an extremely
important and effective perspective. In an address
delivered on January 30, 1900, once again at the College
libre des Sciences sociales, he reaffirmed this point of
view: "Au premier rang des sentiments efficaces, je
place ceux qui se rapportent a la conception pessimiste

3O Sorel speculated that one of the reasons

des futurs."
the civilizations of antiquity had not produced a moral
reform in the world had been the lack of a sufficiently
pessimistic spirit. In the instance of Christianity,

Sorel noted, the idea that the world was the natural realm
of evil exercised more influence in behalf of Christianity's
growth and endurance than did its ideas of sublime charity.
The expansion of Socialism, Sorel believed, depended upon
the hypothesis that things moved " . . . de mal en pis

en vertu de tendances immanentes et que cette déchéance

ne peut étre arrétée que par la force organisée des

. 31
classes ouvr1eres."

Social theories had, Sorel
believed, less influence on the human mind when they

were fundamentally optimistic. Reformist socialists

 

30"Les facteurs moraux de L'évolution" also
appeared in Questions de morale, p. 94. (Hereinafter
referred to as "Les facteurs moraux de L'évolution.")
"In the first row of efficacious sentiments, I place
those that relate to the pesSimistic conception of futures."

 

31Ibid. " . . . from bad to worse in virtue of
immanente tendencies and that this decline can only be
stopped by the organized force of working classes."

153

were forced to take an optimistic position, Sorel noted,
because they were obliged to vaunt the benefits of their
reforms and this indirectly weakened the worker's move-

ment.

L'Ethique Du Socialisme

 

 

With respect to ethics, Sorel observed that
Socialism in his day recognized two opposed conceptions.
The first, he called the natural rights tradition, which
he believed was attached to the liberal bourgeoisie, and
associated with the French Revolution. The second was
that of historical right, which Sorel said had been
developed principally under the influence of Karl Marx
" . . . puise ses principes dans l'étude des conditions
sociales produits par la grande industrie."32 However,
Sorel warned, neither was a pure school. In most cases,
he believed, socialists drew upon both positions in
elaborating their ethical ideas. The true socialist
movement, he interjected, was both a revolt and an
organization. Its revolt was directed against hierarchy
and property, and its organization was based on mutual

aid, common resistance and cooperation. This movement

claimed, according to Sorel, " . . . imposer a la société

 

32Georges Sorel, "L'éthique du Socialisme,"
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (Paris: Armand Colin
et Cie.,41899), p. 281. (Hereinafter referred to as
"L'éthique du Socialism.") " . . . taking his principles
in the study of social conditions produced by big
industry."

 

—.

154

de l'avenir les principes qu'il élabore dans son sein
pour sa vie sociale propre; il espere faire entrer la
raison dans l'ordre social en supprimant 1a direction
de la société par les capitalistes."33
While admitting the difficulty of accounting for
the formation of the concept of historical right, which
he believed Karl Marx had opposed to the doctrine of
natural rights, Sorel complained that the followers of
Marx, in their battles against their adversaries, had
often ridiculed all ethical preoccupations, while placing
all of their emphasis on the material side of the argu-
ment. These Marxists had reached the point, Sorel
observed, of considering judicial institutions " . . .
comme procédés machiavéliques, employés par les classes
dirigeantes en vue d'assurer 1e maintien de l'ordre a

leur profit."34

The result of this approach, Sorel
believed, had been to ignore the moral basis of the
mission of Marx: only the victory of the proletariat was
discussed, he charged, without any preoccupation with

the ethical qualities of the conflict. Yet Marx, according

to Sorel, had been strongly interested in class conflict

 

33Ibid., pp. 280-81. " . . . to impose on future
society the principles that it elaborated in its breast
for its own social life; it hoped to make reason enter
the social order in suppressing the direction of society
by the capitalists."

34Ibid., p. 286. " . . . as machiavellian pro-
cedures, employed by the directing classes in view of
assuring the maintenance of order for their profit."

 

155

which resulted in the introduction of new moral concepts,
and Sorel pointed to the example of the struggle for the
lO-hour workday for women and children in England as an
event which Marx had praised in Capital: " . . . le bill
des dix heures, ne fut pas seulement un succés pratique,
que ce fut 1e triomphe d'un principe, qu'une nouvelle
conception de l'économie avait été introduite dans la
société anglaise."35 Sorel concluded that the battle

of the classes had an important bearing on judicial sys-
tems; it was, he believed, a battle between two principles
in which each system was characterized by the political
idea that each class had of the role of the law.

The driving force of the entire socialist move-
ment, according to Sorel, was the opposition between law
and morality. Change was forthcoming, he predicted, when
men reflect upon the disparity between their moral senti-
ments and the statements of judicial regulations

. . . il arrive toujours des cas ou les plaintes de
l'individu opprimé nous semblent plus sacrées que
les traditions, les nécessités de l'ordre et les
principes sur lesquels repose la société; a cet
instant 1e droit historique est ébranlé et con-
sidéré comme indigne de l'homme. La morale ne nous

fournit aucun moyen pour construire un systéme
juridique nouveau: elle n'apporte que des négations;

35Ibid. " . . . the bill of 10 hours, was not

only a practical success, it was the triumph of a prin-
c1Pal, a new conception of the economy had been intro-
duced to English society."

 

156

suivant nos habitudes d'esprit, notre éducation

et nos tendances générales nous ébauchons de

nouvelles formes de droitj6

The historical origins of this "1a reclamation

obstinée pour la justice individuel," according to Sorel,
originated in the people of Israel. He accepted the
historical thesis of Renan, whom he believed had truly
understood the importance in history of the opposition
between law and morality, and he agreed with Renan that
Rome and Greece had founded the state, law, philosophy
and science, and that ” . . . l'origine de cette oeuvre

37 These

de protestation morale ffit vraiment israélite."
moral elements, Sorel believed, did not derive from human
nature, but were derived from certain historical con-

ditions and in this sense he reiterated his continuing

belief that "Nous vivons sur des ressources accumulées

 

361bid., p. 291.

. . . it always comes in cases where the complaints
of oppressed individuals seem to us more sacred
than traditions, the necessity of order and the
principles on which society rests: at this instant
historic law is shaken and considered unworthy of
man. Morality furnishes no method for constructing
a new juridic system; it only brings negations:
following our spiritual habits, our education and
general tendencies, we sketch new forms of law.

37Ibid. Sorel's reference here is simply

Histoire d'IsraEI, t. III, p. 251, Renan. " . . . the
orilgin Of this work of moral protestation was truly
israelite."

 

157

38 The socialists had often believed that

par nos peres."
the milieu acted upon man in an automatic manner, Sorel
charged, and this explained their failure to consider
the conditions necessary for the perfection of moral
sentiments: "I1 y a une lacune grave dans l'éthique
socialiste."39

Sorel asserted that even the most beautiful theory
had value only in application, and to this extent he felt
that Aristotle had correctly sought to consider morality
as part of politics. Thus he believed that it was neces-
sary to act to enlarge the scope of moral ideas received
from the past. Socialism, he noted, had undergone an
historical development in which it had passed from dreams
of a perfect life to the immediate desire to practice a
tolerable life: it had passed he said " . . . de l'utopie

a la science."40 But the movement retained an internal

 

38Sorel, "L'éthique du Socialisme," p. 292. Sorel
asked the additional question: " . . . il faut savoir
si nous entretenons suffisamment la moralité dans le
monde moderne. Je crois que beaucoup de socialistes
regardent aujourd'hui l'avenir avec une certaine méfiance;
car presque tous les marxistes regrettent vivement
l'exagération avec laquelle on a longtemps vante les
beautés du matérialisme." ”We live on the resources
accumulated by our fathers."

39Ibid., p. 294. "There is a grave hole in the
socialist ethic."

40Ibid., p. 296. Sorel referred to Marx who had
ruyted that "a problem is only posed in the epoch when
the solution has become possible." No specific work
cited by Sorel. " . . . from utopia to science."

 

158

aspect which relied for its force on a collection of psy-
chological states which were always inseparable from the
external social conditions. He referred to the Christian
education as an example of the powerful influence which
these internal psychological states exerted: "L'éducation
chrétienne a pris pour base bien plus les légendes des
hagiographes que les récits des historiens critiques."
These legends, he believed, furnished illustrations of
Christian virtues elevated to an heroic dimension in

order that the desired habits could be clearly presented.
Sorel thought it would be possible to conceive socialist
intentions in a similar way: by imagining a government
where bourgeois traditions no longer existed, where
hierarchy and property had disappeared. It was not
necessary to have a detailed idea of this final state,
according to Sorel, " . . . i1 suffit de nous en repré-
senter seulement l'allure générale pour que nous puissions
apprécier l'identité des états psychologiques corres-
pondant a ce régime avec nos états psychologiques

42

actuels." The final regime imagined by the socialists,

Sorel stated, was not susceptible of being fixed at some

 

41Ibid., p. 297. "Christian education has taken
for a base more the hagiographical legends than the
reports of historical critiques."

42Ibid. " . . . it suffices for us to represent
only the general allure in order that we might appreciate
the identity of psychological states corresponding to
this regime with our present psychological states."

 

159

determinate date by a prophetic sociology " . . . il est
dans le présent: il n'est pas en dehors de nous: il est

43 The object of Socialism,

dans notre propre coeur."

Sorel insisted, must not be a partial emancipation of

the proletariat, it must remain opposed to the maintenance

of all traditional claims to special title; it must be

a battle for the abolition of all government by class.

It was this ethical principle, Sorel believed, which was

to direct all socialist thinking and action.44
The question of the study of relationships between

men and women and their children--the family unit—-had

also been too often ignored by socialists, according to

Georges Sorel. He agreed with Le Play, that the family

sentiments exercised an enormous influence on the general

demeanor of a society.45 In the more advanced industrial

 

43Ibid., p. 298. " . . . it is in the present;
it is not outside of us; it is in our own heart."

44Jaurés, often scorned by Sorel, is given a
generous treatment at the conclusion of this essay which
balances other less flattering earlier references: "Avec
les prolétaires socialistes on a vu marcher le grand
orateur, qui a montré que dans les classes bourgeoises
il y a toujours des hommes capables de comprendre 1e
:mouvement socialiste et de le representer aux heures des
crises décisives: la conduite admirable de Jaurés est la
plus belle preuve qu'il y a une éthique socialiste."
Ibid., p. 301.

45In this regard Sorel wrote: "Ce sera l'honneur
de le Play d'avoir reconnu l'importance capitale des
sentiments familiaux sur l'allure générale des sociétés:
suivant le régime établi dans la famille on peut avoir
des sociétés misonéistes ou des sociétés inquietes.
. . . " Ibid., p. 292.

 

—___

160

countries, Sorel found that the workers were very pre-
occupied with the future of their children. They sought,
he wrote, " . . . a les faire instruire et veulent leur
assurer un sort meilleur que le sort qu'ils ont connu."46
Because of this desire for improvement which he believed
originated in the family, Sorel attached great importance
to the role of women in the development of Socialism.

The sentiment of improvement, he believed, was much more
highly developed in women than in men. Returning to an
earlier position, Sorel reiterated his belief that the
woman was the great educator of the human genre, and not
only with respect to children but even more with respect
to men. "It is the woman who moralizes us," he wrote.
"Man is transformed through love which disciplines his
instincts, and because of this, respect for women is the
most essential element in the march towards Socialism."47
The sentiment of love, Sorel believed, demonstrated how
energetically man could execute actions in the absence

of any legal obligations. At the nexus of the moralizing
influence of love, Sorel found the need for relationships

based on freedom and the absence of external restraints:

" . . . tandis que l'histoire de la jurisprudence est

 

46193g. " . . . to make them instructed and
wanted to assure them a better lot than they had known."

471bid., p. 293.

 

161

l'histoire des ruses imaginées pour se soustraire aux
régles juridiques, l'histoire de la morale nous montre
que la notion de vertu s'identifie avec la soumission

48 Agreeing with Engels,

absolue aux engagements libres."
Sorel believed that a new morality would be born when new
forms of sexual union came into being, a union based on

devotion, reciprocity and respect. Writing in the preface

to Le Socialisme, by M. N. Colajanni in 1900, Sorel stated

 

that " . . . the woman demands the right to not be trans-

formed into a reproductive beast."49 He further noted:

Les socialistes ont donc raison de considérer
l'affranchissement de la femme comme une partie tres
essentielle de tout réforme profonde de la société.
. . . I1 ne devrait exister qu'une seule morale pour
les deux sexes; mais il ne faudrait pas que les
femmes imitassent les mauvais exemples que leur ont
donnés jusqu'ici les hommes.5

 

48Ibid., p. 285. " . . . while the history of
jurisprudence is the history of imagined ruses in order
to avoid juridic rules, the history of morality shows us
that the notion of virtue identifies itself with the
absolute submission to free engagements."

49M. N. Colajanni, le Socialisme (Paris: V.
Girard et E. Briére, 1900), translated from the Italian
by M. Tacchella with a preface by Georges Sorel, p. xx.

 

50Ibid. It is in the context of this position
that Sorel's statement in behalf of chastity was made:
. . . 1e monde ne deviendra plus juste que dans la
mesure ou i1 deviendra plus chaste."
The socialists are thus right to consider the liber—
ation of women as a very essential part of any pro-
found reform of society. There should only exist
one single morality for the two sexes: but it would
not be necessary that women imitate the bad examples
that men have given them up to now.

 

_

 

162

Les Polemiques Pour L'Interprétation
Du Marxisme ‘

The crisis of Marxist socialism, represented by
the debate between Bernstein and Kautsky, became the
subject of an analysis by Georges Sorel which first
appeared in the Revue Internationale de Sociologie and
was later published in Paris by Giard and Briere in 1900.
The debate centered around a book published by Bernstein
which produced what Sorel called " . . . un effet analogue
a celui d'une prédication protestante éclatant au milieu

51 Bernstein had, Sorel

de populations catholiques."
reported, invited the socialists to disregard strict
formula and observe the world instead with the object

to understand it, and thus to play a more effective role
therein. Georges Sorel concluded that the Marxian analy-
sis contained what he called "un grand fond de subjec-
tivisme," and this, he believed, accounted for the dis-
agreement between Bernstein and Kautsky in its interpre-
tation. The difference between the two thinkers Sorel
found was the direction of their thought. Bernstein

looked to the future and wished to revive Marxism by

disregarding dogmatic formula; he was a revisionist who,

 

51Georges Sorel, Lesypolémiques pour l'interpré—
tation du Marxisme (Paris: Giard and Briére, 1900T,
p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as "Les polémiques"
originally published in the Revue Internationale de
Sociologie, 1900.) " . . . an analogous effect to that
of a protestant sermon bursting in the middle of a
catholic population."

 

 

163

Sorel wrote, " . . . se préoccupait surtout des résultats

52 If the Socialist Democratic Party of

pratiques."
Germany were itself emancipated from superstition, Sorel
speculated, the book of Bernstein would be welcomed as a
deliverance. But the more conservative position of
Kautsky was, according to Sorel, likely to be successful
with the German masses. Kautsky was, he concluded: "Le
conservateur des vieux symboles, le défenseur des vieilles
abstractions, le maitre des vieilles sentences . . . il ne
faut pas se dissimuler que le triomphe de M. Kautsky
voudrait dire 1a ruine définitive du marxisme, dépouillé

desormais de tout intérét scientifique."53

Formes Et Essence Du Socialisme
Sorel noted what he considered a great change in
Socialism since the time that the movement had given birth
to permanent and influential parliamentary parties. The
socialists had undergone, according to Sorel, a division
of labor which separated the theoretically inclined
socialists who now followed what Sorel termed "les

progrés de la sociologie" from "les hommes d'action"

 

52Sorel, "Les polémiques," p. 45. . . .
occupied himself, above all, with practical results."

53Ibid. "The conservator of old symbols, the
defender of old abstractions, the master of old maxims
. . . it is not necessary to hide that the triumph of
M. Kautsky would like to tell the definitive ruin of
Marxism, deprived henceforth of all scientific interest."

 

_.

 

164

who, Sorel affirmed, engaged in battles in public life
and " . . . surtout, prenant a tache de développer les
institutions (syndicats, cooperatives, etc.) par les-

é."54 The

quelles 1e socialisme affirme sa réalit
socialists, Sorel charged, were wrong in their attempt
to build a doctrinaire party; especially since as he

believed it was widely recognized " . . . qu'il faut

procéder a un révision rigoureuse de la doctrine laissé
par Marx et Engels."55

What was essential in Marx, Sorel insisted, was

his conception of a "social mechanism formed by classes"
whose conflict would utterly transform society.56 How-
ever, Sorel warned, it was vital to know what scientific

value Marx attached to this scheme, and he wrote " . . .

 

54Salverio Merlino, Formes et essence du Social-

isme, with a preface by Georges Sorel (Paris: Giard and
Briere, 1899), P. I. (Hereinafter referred to as Formes
et essence.) This work, which Sorel especially admired,
bore the following thematic inscription on the title page:
"11 est deux socialismes: 1' un métaphysique, l'autre
pratique, experimental et, dans ces limites, positif. "

. . . especially, taking to task to develop institutions
(syndicals, cooperatives, etc.) by which socialism affirms
its reality."

 

55Ibid., p. III. Sorel made reference to the
agreement of Benedetto Croce in this regard and cited
his work by title only: Per 1e interpretazione e la
critica di alcuni concetti del marxismo, p. 44} "v? . .
it is necessary to proceed to a rigorous revision of the

doctrine left by Marx and Engels."

56Merlino, Formes et essence, p. V.

165

d'ordinaire, les formules abstraites employees par lui

ne doivent pas étre prises dans un sens trop précis."57
One must not forget, Sorel cautioned, that the battle

of the classes could not explain all history and this, he
believed, was an important hole in the Marxian theory.
Sorel turned instead to a more empirical and less abstract
analysis: " . . . we see only men grouped in classes,
acting under the influence of observable sentiments;

we can verify daily the march of phenomena, and determine
how conditions are changed and we can correct our ideas

of the future as the facts become more numerous."58 It
was Sorel who wrote, " . . . 1e mécanisme humain par
lequel se produisent les changements dans le monde actuel,
d'apres les impulsions données par des volontés humaines,

59 The spirit

dans les conditions historiques données."
of the method of Marx had been misunderstood, Sorel
observed, because so many had believed in the "fatilité"

of the solution announced by Marx. This dogmatic

 

57Ibid., p. VI. Sorel also noted: " . . . plus
ses (Marx) expressions sont générales moins il leur
accordait d'importance." " . . . ordinarily, the
abstract formulas employed by him must not be taken in
too precise a sense."

58Ibid., p. VII.

59Ibid., p. VIII. " . . . the human mechanism

by which the changes in the present world produce them-
selves, according to the given impulses by human wills,
in the given historic conditions."

 

166

determinism, Sorel thought, replaced real history by a
succession of forms engendered by causes independent of
human action. This falsification of the Marxist principle
Sorel blamed on Engels who had introduced, according to
Sorel, a philosophy of history which he called "dialecti- F-

60

cal." This position was never justified by Engels,

Sorel charged, and it was almost impossible to comprehend.

Sorel remained convinced that " . . . il n'y a rien de

déterminé dans l'histoire."61

Since the appearance of Capital, Sorel believed,
the world had changed, and he insisted that " . . . on a
reconnu que les phénoménes ne se produisent pas suivant
1e schéma donné par Marx."62 The future was always an
unpredictable possibility for Sorel who emphatically
stated: " . . . nous ne connaissons pas le mécanisme
social qui existera dans un certain hombre d'années et
nous ne pouvons déja que tres difficiliemnt raisonner

63

sur le présent." Sorel concluded that the man of

 

601bid., pp. IX and x.

61Ibid., p. X. " . . . there is nothing deter-
mined in history."

62Ibid. " . . . we have recognized that phenomena
doesn't.produce itself following the scheme given by Marx."

63Ibid., p. XI. To the contrary, Sorel found
indeterndnism in Marx, which he believed historical
materialism had only served to obstruct: "Il y a une
grande indétermination dans le systeme historique de
Marx: .le mouvement, dit-il dépend de la culture sociale;

 

167

action could only discover indications, not certainties,
from sociological studies, and these indications could
provide him with the means to freely construct tentative
guidelines for action.

The worker's movement, Sorel concluded, must not

be content with the pursuit of purely material ends.

 

To seek these ends exclusively would deliver the movement
into the hands of the political opportunists whom, Sorel
believed, were always ready to lead an army of partisans
who could be tempted by the hope of immediate pleasures.
These political opportunists who Sorel named "les
démogogies," constituted the greatest danger to the
worker's movement. Sorel believed the only safeguard
against "les démogogies" was the sentiment of justice

in the masses of the workers which included the principle
that "En s‘émancipant, le prolétariat doit émanciper tous

64 This posture, Sorel thought,

ceux qui souffrent."
would produce the impression in the minds of even the
bourgeois victims of the social order, of the militant

proletariat as the only soldier, armed and capable of

 

mais on ne sait pas comment il en dépend; il n'existe
aucun moyen de définir cette dépendance d'une maniere
générale, si on reste fidele aux principes du matérialisme
historique." " . . . we don't know the social mechanism
which will exist in a certain number of years and we

can already only with great difficulty reason on the
present."

64£2£§" p. XVI' "In freeing itself, the pro-
letariat must free all those who suffer."

 

168

defending justice and truth: "C'est le prolétariat qui,
aujourd'hui, devient 1e champion de tous les intéréts
généraux contre les intéréts particuliers."65 The
unified workers, Sorel thought, could bring about a
moral transformation which would have profound judicial
implications. He complained that Marx had ignored this
necessary "la préparation juridique," which Sorel held
was indispensable for the realization of the socialist
regime. Sorel referred to this preparation as the moral
unification of society brought about by the proletariat.
He wanted the proletariat to engage itself in " . . .
tous les débats qui s'ouvert, afin de développer dans

les classes ouvriers des sentiments de justice et de
désintéressement; mettre en évidence l'opposition irré-
ductible qui existe entre les nouvelles conceptions sur
le droit et la division en classes."66 Sorel envisioned
the proletariat as the hope of all victims of the current
social organization and as a means to make concrete the

incorrigible vices of that organization. To this extent

the proletariat, he believed, by sustaining general

65ILid., p. XVIII. "It is the proletariat who
today, becomes the champion of all general interests
aSainst the special interests."

66Ibid., p. XIX. " . . . all the debates opened,
in Order to develop in the working class sentiments of
jUStice and disinterest; put in evidence the irreducible
Opposition which exists between the new conception on
rights and the division of classes."

 

169

interests, would become an indispensable advocate of all
exploited and mistreated elements, and by exposing the

discrepancy between the moral and the legal could thereby

initiate a new social organization.

Marx taught, according to Sorel, that the trade

unions were the first foundations of the proletarian

edifice; they were not destined to endure forever, but

they would serve to develop sentiments of mutuality and

solidarity which would become the functioning basis of

the institutions of the future. Thus Sorel observed

that Marx, like himself, appreciated the role of workers
unions in the development of new sentiments, and he

concluded that in the view of Marx as well as his own,

the unions " . . . ont moins pour résultat de faire

A
monter les salaires que d'accroitre 1a solidarité entre

les travailleurs."67 The emphasis which many socialists

placed on the material transformation of life seemed to

Sorel a failure of interpretation. He believed that

socialism was a moral question in the sense that it would
bring to the world a new manner of judging all human acts,

" . pour employer une célebre expression de Nietzche,

¥

67Ibid., p. XXV. A way to measure the value of

:EStitutions Sorel stated was to apply the following

re andard: "Tout ce qui tend a diminuer l'esprit de

1 , :Ponsabilité, la valeur de la dignité personnelle,
nergle de l'initiative, doit étre condamné; car cela

tel'Icirait a diminuer ce qui doit étre exalté dans la

Société future," p, XXVI. " . . . have less for a result

0 - . . . .
w ralse salaries than to 1ncrease the solidarity between
Orkers . n

 

¥

170

une nouvelle évaluation de toutes les valeurs."68

Because socialism did not accept any of the solutions

given by the current civilization, Sorel compared it to

Christianity before Constantine. Socialism, he wrote,

" . se pose devant le monde bourgeois comme un

.adversaire irréconciliable, 1e menacant d'une catastrophe
Inorale, plus encore que d'une catastrophe matérielle."69

"It is the transvaluation of all values," Sorel concluded,

'“to be introduced by the militant proletariat, which is
tile highest originality of contemporary socialism."70

68Ibid., p. XLII. " . . . to employ a celebrated

exPression of Nietszche, a new evaluation of all values."

69Ibid. " . . . puts itself before the bourgeois

Zorld as an 1I rreconciliable adversary, threatening it
s a moral catastrophe, more than a material catastrophe."

7°lbid. , p. XLV.

 

 

APPENDIX A

SYNDICALISM, REVISIONISM AND
MORALITY: 1898 - 1900
EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO
BENEDETTO CROCE: 1898 - 1900

7 janvier 1898
"VOus avez apporté une contribution de tout premier

ordre a l'étude du marxisme en montrant que les for-
mules d'apparence tres générale n'ont, le plus
souvent, qu'une valeur tres circonstanciée." p. 102

l avril 1898
"Je n'écris plus an Devenir depuis six mois et je ne

crois pas y écrire a l'avenir; je voudrais bien
trouver quelque part des revues acceptant mes
articles . . . je voudrais continuer ce que j'avais
tenté dans le Devenir; c'ést-a-dire compléter et
améliorer 1e marxisme suivant les principes de Marx,

en suivant plut6t la méthode que la lettre.
. . . les questions sur la morale et la religion ne

peuvent plus étre traitées avec le dédain des anciens
marxistes. . . . L'absence de directions dans la '
morale et la religion est une des faiblesses du

socialisme moderne." p. 107

23 avril 1898
"Je crois qu'il faudrait poser comme principe empirique

que l'histoire n'est susceptible d'aucune prévision,
parce que les faits n'arrivent point pour rendre
rationnels des rapports qui semblent contradictoires
aux contemporains. Cette absence de toute prévision
me semble étre essentielle pour le matérialisme
historique, tandis qu'elle serait un scandale pour

1 ' idealiste . " p. 170

9 mai 1898
"Il faut que le socialisme marche dans le voie

reconnue bonne par Bernstein ou qu'il devienne une
Simple scolastique." p. 17

171

 

172

19 octobre 1898
"Pour bien comprendre Marx il faut se placer, comme
lui, au point de vue métaphysique . . . j'ai été
amené a penser qu'il y a entre Marx et Hégel beaucoup
plus de Frapprochements formels' qu'on ne pense gén-
éralement. Beaucoup d'expressions marxistes sont
inintelligibles si on ne les rapproche par
d'expressions hégeliennes." p. 174

27 decembre 1898
"Au fond, 1e matérialisme historique ne serait-11
pas une des lubies d'Engels? Marx aurait 'indique'
une voie, Engels a prétendu transformer cette
indication en théorie et il l'a fait avec le dogmatisme
pedant et parfois burlesque de l'écolier. . . . C'est
pour cela qu'il faut revenir a Marx lui-meme et
laisser de c6té tous les faux-savants que la social-
démocratie a produits." p. 176

3 juin 1899

"Je crois que pour Marx (au moins a une certaine periode
cie sa vie) 1e matérialisme historique a été autre chose
(qu'une indication historiographique . . . La réforme

(in socialisme aurait pour effet d'empécher l'exploi-
1:ation des masses par les Charlatans qui tant6t préchent
143 communisme, tant6t font du socialisme administratif,
CIUi sont aussi peu consciencieux que les cléricaux
dans les moyens d'arriver au pouvoir." p. 300

27 mai 1899
".Je vous ai envoyé hier ma conférence sur l'Ethique
(it: socialisme; j'ai un peu moralisé Marx et Engels,
peut-Etre; je crois qu'ils n'ont jamais beaucoup
réfléchi a ces questions, mais je crois avoir
développé mes theses dans un esprit marxiste." p. 304

 

7 juin 1899
'911 me semble que les Allemands reculent beaucoup:
\NDila Kautsky qui écrit que Marx a enfermé l'histoire
dans la regne de la nécessité. L'article de Kautsky

dans la Neue Zeit indique une complete inintelligence
de l'histoire." p. 307

30 juin 1399
.31 les marxistes s'adonnaient un peu a ces études
118 venaient toute de suite que le matérialisme

hiStorique doit étre complété par beaucoup d'autres
Vues sur les relations humaines." p. 309

   

 

173

23 aofit 1899
"La grande question est 1e proces de Rennes; je crois

que Dreyfus sera encore condamné; 1e ministére tombera
et en avant la reaction." p. 311

9 septembre 1899
"Bernstein vient de m'écrire qu'il a indiqué dans la

Neue Zeit qu'il avait été inspiré, en une certaine
mesure, par vos travaux. Cela est intéressant parce
que les Allemands ne sont pas faits pour indiquer des

sources etrangeres a leurs idées." p. 311

 

:17 decembre 1899
"J'ai en avec Bernstein une correspondance qui m'a

appris beaucoup de choses sur la social-démocratie
allemande: c'est l'enfance d'un mouvement ouvrier.
11 y a beaucoup de bonnes choses dans son livre." p. 312

18 mars 1900
"Je vois publié dans la Revue de sociologie un article

.sur Bernstein de Kautsky; ce dernier est déCidément
un sot." p. 361

 

 

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER IV

The relationship between work and aesthetics
was announced by Sorel to be of major significance to

the modern world in a speech delivered in 1901 which

opens Chapter IV. He forecasts that utility will come

to dominate modern art and that the Greek concept of work
as .an expression of slavery and degradation will be
replaced by a consideration of the necessary relation-
ship between work and aesthetics.

A book review of Antonin Lavergne's Jean Coste
follows Sorel's discussion of aesthetics in Chapter IV
and presents his view of the personal necessity of
becoming aware of the fatality of human life-~unrelieved

by what he called "concealing illusions." Human sub-

jectivity and its impact on science, sociology, history
and political theory are also discussed in this chapter,
as well as speculations on the role and the composition
Of myth in human thinking.

The chapter concludes with Sorel's examination

of the metaphysical preoccupations of modern physics

W17116311 includes his important epistemological distinction

174

 

175

between the artificial and natural milieux. As in pre-
ceding chapters, the letters to Croce which correspond
to this period in Sorel's writing career (1901-1905)

amplify his characteristic positions.

 

 

r

 

CHAPTER IV

AESTHETICS, SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY AND

PHYSICS: 1901 - 1905

La Valeur Sociale De L'Art

In 1901, Georges Sorel again participated in a
conference at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales in Paris
where he discussed his ideas on the social value of art.1
Sorel stated his belief that the multiplicity of philo-
sophical points of view with respect to aesthetic
questions was proof that no single theory could be
universally applied to the subject of artistic appreci-
ation. The appreciation of any work of art, he suggested,
required the possession of a very clear vision of the
milieu in which the artist lived. Sorel regarded this
need to be aware of the milieu in which the art was pro-
duced as even more important than the details of the

artist's personal life. Having rejected the universalist

approach to aesthetics, Sorel proceeded to suggest that

—

l .. lLa Valeur sociale de l'Art; Conference made at

Ecgle des Hautes Etudes Sociales by Georges Sorel and

pule-Shed in Paris by Librairie G. Jacques et Cie, 1901.
Hereinafter referred to as La Valeur.)

176

——

   

177

" . l'oeuvre d'art est, en effet, 1e résultat de

l'explosion de forces latentes, qui se sont lentement

accumulées dans l'ame de l'auteur sous l'influence des

sentiments généraux de son temps." Psychology, Sorel
r

believed, was unable to penetrate into the mind of the

artist, and it was powerless to provide reasons which would

explain the art which was produced. Yet a study of

history, he suggested, might be able to explain why a

work of art was acclaimed as a masterpiece. Although

Sorel concluded that no historical law could be discovered

which could categorically explain the artist, whose genius

he noted " . est trop personnel pour tomber sous un

loi . . . he nonetheless believed that there was an

important relationship between the judicial-economic life

of a people and the art produced among them and acclaimed

as a masterwork .

 

2Ibid., p. 5. " . . . the work of art is, in

effect, the result of the explosion of latent forces,
which have slowly accumulated in the soul of the author
under the influence of general sentiments of his time."

3Sorel noted that Renan in his PhilOSOphie de
l'art had attempted to provide a guide forjuistorians in
11518 research by developing a collection of fixed rules
t? be followed: " . . . un ensemble de regles fixant
1 ordre des caractéres a observer." Ibid., p. 6. Sorel

CiQubted that such universal rules would have value to
"Qu'il soit possible de

ghe same extent in all epochs:
Onner des definitions utilisables de ce genre, cela est

déja fort douteux. . . . " Ibid.

 

4Ibid., p. 7. " . . . is too personal to fall

under a law.

 

 

 

_ —

 

178

The history of art, Sorel believed, showed
itself to be closely related to manifestations of force
and he underlined the great role which military triumphs,
heroic legends and the "fantaises des princes" had played
in all art.5 There were also, Sorel noted, profound
differences between ancient and modern art. The most
striking aspect of ancient art, he found to be the pre-
dominant role of groups who converged to form complex
as well as useful works of art, " . . . ainsi étaient
l'architecture du temple, des tombeaux et des citadelles;--
les rites religieux,--la pédogogie."6 In the Greek
republics, Sorel believed, these complex arts generally
served collective ends. But the art which served to
ornate the palaces of Persian or Assyrian kings he
insisted, " . . . n'avait rien de social."7 These were
as particularist, he added, as those which decorated the
palaces of the Renaissance princes. When the artist later
closed himself in his own workshop and sought to perfect
his own particular technique, the history of art began

what Sorel called its "la deuxieme moment." The academic

 

5Ibid. Sorel mentioned that Hippolyte Taine had,
more than anyone else, insisted on the enormous influence
of Italian anarchy on the Renaissance.

6Ibid., p. 14. " . . . thus were the architec-

ture of tempIes, tombs and citadels;--religious rites,
education."

7Ibid. " . . . had nothing social."

 

 

 

179

schools, founded at the end of the Renaissance, insured
this separation and isolation of the artists. This was

for him " . . . une rupture de ces ensembles
8

. . . on
peut dire que l'art devint abstrait."
The forming of academic schools led to the

development of new techniques, then to new schools, and
although each school wished to be free of former dog-
matics, Sorel charged, they too, little by little developed
their own scholastic pureilities: "Echapper a toute
regle fut le mot d'ordre de beaucoup d'écoles, qui
aboutissaient cependant a de nouvelles scholastiques

. . . ”9 Thus we have come, concluded Sorel, to no
longer believe in the existence of a general law which
could serve to regulate art and we are disposed to accept
all art that demonstrates an ingenious talent for
invention or combination in the artist. Sorel concluded
that 100 years before his time, when the academic art
reigned supreme in France, the painters and sculptors,

bound by the formula of the schools, worked without

taking account of the monuments which would enclose

 

8Ibid. " . . . a rupture of these groups .
one could say art became abstract."

9Ibid., p. 15. Sorel added: " . . . l'esprit
s'émancipait au fur et a mesure que le nombre des voies
ouvertes devant notre action devenait plus grand." "To
escape from all rules was the word of order of many
schools, which led however to new scholastics."

 

 

 

 

 

180

their works, not because they lacked good taste but
because they lacked the freedom which Sorel believed the
contemporary artists enjoyed.

It is said, Sorel continued, that art completely
emancipated is merely a means of flattering the tastes
of the general public, and with the disappearance of the
old rules, art had become dependent on the instincts of
amateurs: " . . . condamné a plaire a tout prix, il a
perdu toute son indépendance, sa dignité et sa vraie
liberté."10 Some philosophers had insisted on this
point and sustained that art lost all raison d'etre when
it thus subordinated itself to pleasure. These objections
were, according to Sorel, in large part founded.

Free or individualistic art had been criticized
for being too preoccupied with effect, according to
Sorel.ll It had been reproached for seeking the bizarre,
the extraordinary and sometimes the extravagant: for
wanting to astonish the mind rather than to seduce the
sentiments by grace and force. We want, Sorel believed,

for the creator to show us something personal, something

that does not occur in the course of vulgar life.

 

loIbid. " . . . condemned to please at any

price, it Iost all its independence, its dignity and its
true liberty."

11Sorel's reference for this criticism was to

Tolstoi in a work cited as Qu'est-ce que l'art? pp. 138-
67, 178-93, 210-34. The incomplete reference appears
In La Valeur in a footnote, p. 16.

 

—

181

Speculating further, Sorel suggested that perhaps art
enclosed within itself what he called " . . . un germe
profond d'immorality" and he complained that " . . . la
psychologie contemporaine n'a guere étudié cette question;
cependant on s'est demande, dans ces derniers temps,

s'il n'existe pas un certaine affinité entre la pro-
duction artistique et l'instinct sexuel. . . . "12

Sorel further observed that with persons having the
artistic temperament, the sense of beauty was generally
tied very subtly to what he called "surexcitation
voluptueuse." Referring to a work by M. Brunetiere
entitled Discours de combat, Sorel underlined his agree-
ment with the observation that the most beautiful Greek
statues did not possess that chastity which many theore-
ticians had attributed to them and he added that " . . .
si leur nudité ne nous choque point, c'est que nous les

considérons comme des pieces d'une collection scientifique

et surtout c'est que nous ne comprenons pas bien ce

 

leorel had found in Proudhon the suggestion that

art had been in almost all its periods, an agent for cor-
ruption. His reference for this thought is incomplete:
Proudhon, Du principe de l'art, p. 255. (Ibid., p. 17,
footnote) In his reference to the sexual roIe in artistic
production he mentions Ribot, Essai sur l'imagination
créatrice, pp. 62-65 and refers additionally to " . . .

1a théorie du métaphysicien Froschammer," in La Valeur,

P. 17. " . . . a profound seed of immorality" . . .
”contemporary psychology has scarcely studied this
question: however they asked themselves, in its last time,

if there did not exist a certain affinity between artistic
production and sexual instinct."

 

 

182

qu'elles représentent."13

"We wonder," Sorel continued,
“if this beauty, created by the Greek artists during the
golden age did not, as Proudhon observed in his book

entitled Du principe de l'art, end by inspiring impure
l4

 

 

ideas."
Many writers on the subject of art had, according

to Sorel, drawn the same conclusion as had Tolstoi,

namely that art in the social context had many parasitic

characteristics. An evolution had caused a change in

the relationship between the artist and his work. In

aristocratic times it was essential, he continued, for

the artist to be aware of the sentiments which his work

produced in those who paid for it. But today we no

longer understand, he stated, a society organized for

the pleasure of the privileged classes and thus, Sorel

believed, it was necessary to consider how art might

become adapted to the essential conditions of modern life.

Must not art tend to universalize itself, he asked? It

was incontestable to Sorel that: " . . . 1e public se

considere, de moins en moins, comme une reunion d'amateurs

passifs: il commence a intervenir d'une maniere active

 

13Ibid., p. 18. The Brunetiere reference was
simply Discours de combat, p. 68. " . . . if their
nudity dOes not shock us, it is that we consider them
llke pieces of a scientific collection and especially
that we do not understand well what it represents."

14£2£§., and Proudhon, Du principe de l'art,

 

P. 327.

 

 

183

dans l'art» et je crois que ce fait est de nature a nous
éclairer beaucoup sur l'évolution de plusieurs des arts
contemporains.“15
One of the most remarkable phenomena of con-
temporary artistic history was, Sorel believed, the
great importance which was being attributed to music.
This growth in the realm of music, Sorel attributed to
the great variety of the means of execution which music
offered to a public which wanted to regard itself as

. . . plus qu'un simple amateur."16 Likewise, Sorel

u
found that the modern theater contained extremely varied
forms. We are mixed in the action of the modern theater,
Sorel observed, " . . . nous sommes comme 1e choeur
antique, . . . officiellement, nous ne sommes pas des

exécutants, mais, en fait, nous discutons et nous agis-

sons en nous-memes au fur et a mesure que le drame se

développe."17

 

15Sorel, La Valeur, p. 20. " . . . the public

considers itself less and less as a reunion of passive

amateurs; it begins to intervene in an active manner in
art; and I believe this fact by nature makes very clear
to us the evolution of several contemporary arts."

 

16

Ibid., p. 21. " . . . more than a simple
amateur."

l7Ibid. Sorel qualified this observation: "c'est-
é-dire que ceIa n'est vrai que pour certaines especes
de drame, pour celles qui ne sont pas un simple jeu
divertissant." " . . . we are like the ancient chorus,
. . . officially, we are not the executors, but in fact,
we discuss and we act in proportion as the drama develops."

bl

184

Georges Sorel believed that his contemporary
world was under the influence of a universalizing force
which had not been present to the same extent in any
previous historical epoch. He called this force "le
travail," and believed that modern man was bound to an
incessant labor and was " . . . uniquement préoccupée
d'agrandir incessamment 1e champ de la puissance humaine."
Because of this fact of modern life, Sorel believed
modern art would become totally different from that art
which had for its object the pleasure of a society whose
art patrons were those who lived in luxury. The present
world witnessed the increasing universalization of work
which itself, Sorel believed, was ceaselessly becoming
more intense and more absorbing. Because the modern world
was constantly seeking to avoid the loss of time, Sorel
added, it had become important to employ human effort in
as complete a manner as possible. Such a system would
be intolerable and would end in intellectual exhaustion
or in enervation, Sorel affirmed, if it were not accom-
panied by distractions (délassements) which would inter-
rupt what he called "le travail de l'esprit" and allow a
period during which purely psychological forces could
become dominant. It had been observed, Sorel noted,

. . . que les hommes d'affaires éprouvent le besoin de

g

18Ibid., p. 22. ” . . . uniquely preoccupied to

agrandize incessantly the field of human power."

 

18

i

 

185

rompne brusquement avec leurs habitudes de travail
excessif en assistant a des spectacles d'une bouffon-
nerie enfantine."19 Sorel added that he thought the
greatest cause of the malaise produced by intellectual
labor resulted from the impossibility of stopping by a
simple exercise of the will. He charged that insufficient
account of these needs had been considered by those who
produced works for the popular theater and who based their
dramatic presentations on esoteric philosophy: " . . .
il faut nous donner les spectacles qui amusent les
peuples enfants."20
Sorel believed it was possible to explain by
this need for distraction (délassement), the great
admiration which he thought the contemporary world would
increasingly feel before the spectacles of nature. The
taste for nature, even in its brute forms, had not,

Sorel felt, been sufficiently explained by contemporary

psychologists, although it represented a relatively new

 

19Ibid., p. 23. Sorel added a note on the psy-
chology of Iaughter: " . . . les psychologistes ont
remarqué que le rire est, dans beaucoup de cas, un fait
presque completement physique at on comprend, des lors,
facilement, comme gette explosion de la nature matérielle
peut faire disparaitre une fatigue intellectuelle qui
résulte de l'impossibilité ou nous sommes de nous arréter
dans le cours de nos réflexions." " . . . that business-
men felt the need to break brusquely with their excessive
work habits in assisting with spectacles of infantile
buffoonery."

20Ibid., p. 24. " . . . we must give spectacles
which amuse child-people."

186

phenomena. He thought that such natural wonders as the
”untamed beauty of mountains" had only been appreciated
since the time of Rousseau, and he believed it was
possible to render an account of what he called " . . .
cette extension de la sympathie."21 He thought the
explanation was based on the fact that these spectacles
were especially interesting to highly intellectual
people who by plunging themselves into worlds heretofor
unknown to their minds, felt a sedating and thus bene-
ficial effect. Thus Sorel concluded the old art of
luxury had become a new art of distraction which seemed
to be absolutely necessary for the intellectual health
" . . . des travailleurs de plus et plus absorbé."22
Modern art was equally unique, Sorel believed,
because of the extent to which the idea of beauty was
associated with utility. He attributed this confluence
with what were, according to his view, new economic
realities. The ancient dualism of mind and body, of head
and hand, on which Sorel believed " . . . reposait
l'économie ancienne" had tended to vanish. Action,

which in the economic realm took the form of manual

 

labor, Sorel wrote, " . . . est reconnu pour ce Qu'il
ZIEEEQ' " - - . this extension of sympathy."
22

Ibid. " . . . more and more absorbed workers."

 

‘ ....

 

187

est réellement, dans l'histoire, 1e commencement et la
fin de toute notre vie. . . . "23 All which remained

in the domain of pure speculation and which did not
translate itself into any practical result Sorel viewed
as a " . . . sorte d'amputation intellectuelle de
l'homme."24 If our everyday works, Sorel speculated,
were marked by an inventive intelligence, could we

not consider these productions as aesthetic? Sorel
objected to the notion that only exceptional productions
made in "les ateliers académique" and destined to
decorate palaces or museums could be considered as art.
Many people defined the productions of such institutions
as des Beaux-Arts as beauty, Sorel charged, precisely
because of their inutility and he concluded: "Ce
snobisme a été érigé en théorie et on a soutenu que

l'art est par nature une inutilité."25

Notwithstanding
these schools, Sorel believed that the contemporary
world would come to comprehend the aesthetic value of

the practical and useful productions of humanity, and

 

ZBEQEQ. " . . . is recognized for what it really
is, in history, the beginning and end of our life."

24Ibid., p. 25. This idea Sorel credited to
Proudhon and cited simply Proudhon, Justice, t. II,
p. 314. " . . . a sort of intellectuaI amputation of
man."

25Sorel, La Valeur, p. 27. "This snobism had
been erected in theory and they supported that art is
by nature unuseful."

 

188

he observed: " . . . 1e travail est mieux fait quand
26

tout ce qui entoure l'ouvrier est traité avec art."
Sorel concluded that if things occurred as he had

anticipated, and if art became more and more mixed in

the life of a society dominated by work, the artist

would be forced to concern himself primarily with the

use which would be made of his work; the art must, he

wrote, " . . . d'abord aboutir a un bon résultat pratique

27

s'il veut qu'on s'intéresse a son travail." To this

extent Sorel concluded that the nature of modern art

would become " . . . la révélation de l'esprit dans le

28

travail." "The artist," Sorel wrote, "is truly an

artist only in so far as he becomes aware of the energy

of his spiritual independence."29

 

26ggig. " . . . work is better made when all
that surrounds the worker is treated with art."

27£2£§-, P- 29. " . . . first to reach a good
practical result if it wishes that we have interest in
his work."

28Ibid. " . . . the revelation of the spirit in

 

work."

29Ibid. Sorel added that: " . . . si tous les
hommes dev1ennent travailleurs et travaillent avec art,
on peut espérer que l'éducation esthétique qui leur sera
donnée, aura pour effet de developper l'individualisme
dans le monde." Noting that artists had formerly been
" . . . personnels d'une maniere exagérée et égoiste,"
Sorel wrote: ” . . . c'est la caricature d'un sentiment
qui peut étre excellent et qui nous manque que trop."

 

 

189

Sorel believed that his contemporary France was
entirely dominated by what he called ideas of servitude,
and he charged that it was precisely those people who
lacked the heart to become free (qui n'ont pas assez de
coeur pour étre libres) who taught that the love of
liberty was a vice. But when the worker and the artist
became united, Sorel forecast, the workers would " . . .
cesse alors de considérer la loi du travail comme une loi
d'esclavage et de degradation."3o Art, Sorel believed,
thus offered a means of ennobling that which ancient
civilizations regarded as servile. At the same time,
Sorel noted, work executed with an artistic sentiment

" . . . est non seulement plus parfait, mais encore plus

abondant en quantité."31 Sorel concluded his analysis

of the social value of art by stating his conviction that
"L'éducation artistique, au lieu d'étre destinée a faire
la joie des oisifs, devient, pour nous, la base de la
production industrielle; c'est a elle que nous nous

adresserons pour faire aimer le travail, pour faire

comprendre a l'homme la grandeur de sa destinée et pour

 

30ILid., p. 31. " . . then stop to consider
the work law a law of slavery and degradation. "

31Ibid. Sorel concluded that it was necessary
that a worker finds " . . . que son travail lui apparaisse
comme revétu d'un charme esthétique," p. 32. " . . .
is not only more perfect but also more abundant in
quantity."

 

ti

 

190

assurer le progres matériel, sans lequel i1 n'y aurait,

sans doute aucun progres moral solide rélisable

 

aujourd'hui."32
Jean Coste
Georges Sorel's aesthetic observations also I
extended into the realm of literature, and in September, 1

1901, he composed a literary critique of a novel by

33

Antonin Lavergne entitled Jean Coste. Referring to

 

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Confessions, Sorel praised those

 

writers whom he believed were capable of reproducing in
their works " . . . beaucoup de contacts pénetrent
jusqu'au fond dernier de notre personne et se combinent

34

avec notre coeur." Such a writer Sorel considered

Antonin Lavergne and he derided the critics whom he

 

32ILid. "Artistic education, instead of being
designed to glve joy to the idle, becomes for us the
base of industrial production; we will address it to make
us like work, to make man understand the greatness of his
destiny and to assure material progress without which
there will not be, no doubt, any solid, realisable, moral
progress today.”

33This critique appeared in the September, 1901,
issue of Le mouvement socialiste, Société nouvelle de
Libraire et d'Edition, Paris, pp. 295-99. (Hereinafter
referred to by the name of Sorel's article: Jean Coste.)

 

34Sorel, Jean Coste, p. 293. He observed that
"the ordinary novel was full of observations which left
on the reader only mechanical impressions and this was
why the work of Zola was generally so lifeless."
. . . many contacts penetrating to the depths of our
person and combining with our heart. "

 

 

 

 

191

called "des éditeurs habitués" for having failed to

recognize the merit of Jean Coste. Sorel suggested

 

that this unfavorable reception was attributable to the
fact that there were very few literary critics who were
capable of interesting themselves in a work which con-
fessed the misery of the human condition. Sorel admired
what he called the truth and sincerity which he found in
the character of Jean Coste whom he noted did not par-
ticipate in any "tirades cornéliennes"; Jean Coste, he
noted, was " . . . trop pauvre et trop malheureux pour
pouvoir étre un stoicien et un révolté, ce luxe est permis
seulement aux riches."35 When one lives in a rich hotel,
Sorel charged in reference to the critics, when one
writes in an office heavy with works of art, the per-
spective of Jean Coste might seem weak; but for himself,
Sorel affirmed: " . . . moi je trouve qu'il est homme."36
What Jean Coste had realized, Sorel believed,
was a truth which had escaped the critics, who he charged

were corrupted by their mundane lives. Jean Coste recog-

nized that " . . . civilisation organise tout un systeme

 

35Ibid., p. 296. Sorel observed the plight of
the poor an nd the silent in a poignant reference: " . .
tous les jours ne voyons-nous pas avec quelle simplicité
les petites gens quittent la vie sans songer a rien briser
dans ce monde qui a été si mauvais!" " . . . too poor
and too unhappy to be able to be a stoic and a rebel,
that luxury is only permitted the wealthy."

36%, I! . . o I find that he is man."

 

 

IIIIIL-

192

A 37
de ruses pour nous empecher de regarder en nous-meme."

It was the experience of poverty, Sorel asserted, which
caused this superficial structure to fall to pieces.
The first contact with what he called "la misere," Sorel
insisted, would open to us the mysteries hidden in the
soul. Rousseau was capable of discovering "la nature,"
Sorel affirmed, precisely because his genius had been
awakened by a life always bordering on "la misere."
How many men of talent, Sorel asked, have extinguished
themselves, when they have participated in the conventional
lives of "la societé bourgoise?"38
Sorel's critique became an examination of the
internal existence of man. The internal strength of each
man, he noted, measured itself in those moments of crisis
when alone one confronts all which is horrible and
inexorable in human existence. At this moment the weak
seek to hide from the vision of pain: " . . . il ferme

39

les yeux ou s'étourdit de paroles vengeresses." The

 

37lgig. " . . . civilization organizes an entire
system of ruses to prevent us from looking at ourselves."

38Ibid., p. 297.

39Ibid. The passage in the original: "La force
intérieur 3e I'homme se mesure dans les crises oh 11 se
trouve seul en présence de lui-meme, au moment oh i1
connait tout ce qu'a d'horrible et d'inexorable l'exis-
tence. Un faible cherche a se cacher la vue du calice.

. . . ” " . . he closes his eyes or deafens himself to

vengeful words."

 

193

strong descended to the foundations of themselves and
asked themselves: "Quel est mon droit?" For Jean Coste
the question was even more basic because he had asked:

"Have I the right to kill myself?"40

It required a
courage beyond that of the "héros cornéliens," Sorel
affirmed, to submit without any concealing illusion to
the fatality of life. This was "l'affreuse pensee"
which Antonin Lavergne had revealed with what Sorel
called "sincére et véridique"; Sorel concluded " . . .
le hasard est grand maitre en ce monde."41

In a final paragraph Sorel referred to another

teaching which Jean Coste had furnished, which he claimed

 

to be equally important. The character of Jean Coste,
Sorel observed, showed the unhappiness of a man who had
" . . . n'a pas rencontré la femme forte qui aurait d0
lui révéler sa destinée et lui donner du coeur dans les
jours de défaillance."42 It was the love of such a com-

panion, Sorel asserted, that was engendered in the soul

of those who triumph over all obstacles.

 

40Ibid. Sorel noted that this terrible question
" . . . a falt trembler d'effroi plus d'un malheureux
résolu a se délivrer d'un fardeau trop lourd."

41Ibid. " . . . chance is the great master in
this world."

42Ibid. " . . . had not met the strong woman who
should have revealed to him his destiny and given to him
heart in days of defiance."

 

 

 

 

194

Introduction a L'Economie Moderne
The subjective, personal aspect of human social
life became by 1903 an idea which dominated Georges
Sorel's sociological considerations. Writing in a work

entitled Introduction 5 l'économie moderne, Sorel

 

observed that many sociologists retained a total faith
in the sovereign power of science and " . . . s'imaginent
la possibilité de déduire de propositions scientifiques

des programmes pratiques."43

According to Sorel, this
position was entirely incorrect. It was necessary, he
believed, that sociology adopt at the outset of its
projects, what he called a frankly subjective aspect,
that it understand " . . . ce qu'elle veut faire et
qu'elle subordonne ainsi toutes ses recherches au genre

44 All classifi-

de solution qu'elle veut préconiser."
cations, and all relationships which were established

among phenomena, Sorel believed, depended upon the pursuit

 

43Georges Sorel, Introduction 5 l'économie
moderne (2nd ed.; Paris: Marcel Riviere,‘1922), p. 386.
First edition published in 1903; all quotes are taken
from those parts of the second edition which remained
unchanged following a revision by Sorel in 1919, and will
be hereinafter referred to as: Introduction 3 l'économie
moderne.) " . . . imagines the possibility of deducting
scientific propositions from practiced programs."

 

44Ibid., p. 386. It was Sorel's opinion that the
great advantage to Socialism in the field of social theory
was that it " . . . aborde toutes les questions dans un
esprit bien déterminé et qu' i1 sait ou il veut aboutir."
. . . what it wants to do and that it thus subordinates
all research in the genre of solution that it wants
advocate."

 

195

of a practical goal, and to this extent he advised that
it would be very prudent to always place this goal in
evidence. Sorel considered this approach as an important
rule (regle) which he believed was fundamental for the
study of social phenomena. Faced with what he saw as the
innumerable economic and social systems which followed
" . . . le fantOme d'une science qui s'éloigne d'eux
toujours et qui toujours les trompe . . . ," Sorel
speculated that what was occurring among his contempo-
raries was " . . . une véritable aliénation mentale."45
The ancient Greeks, Sorel continued, adopted the
conceptual approach of geometry to study what were
essentially unchanging entities (les choses immuables),
but this approach to knowledge was, he thought, especially
inappropriate for the study of sociological facts. Henri
Bergson, whom Sorel believed to be one of the masters of
contemporary philosophy, had, according to Sorel, specu-
lated on the value of abandoning the old Greek method in
order to " . . . atteindre la réalité, le mobile et le

continu."46 The means for approaching an understanding

 

45Ibid., p. 385. Sorel rejected the explanation

that sociaI science was still young as "de mauvaise
excuse" saying that reasoning on human society was
"hundreds of years old." " . . . a true mental alien-
ation."

46Ibid., p. 387. "The criticisms launched by
Bergson, SoreI noted, " . . . trouvent surtout leur appli-
cation dans la sociologie." " . . . attain reality,
driving power, and continuity."

 

 

 

196

of social phenomena required, Sorel suggested, the use
of a new system of images which he called "projections
stylisées."47 This system of images would require,
Sorel continued, an artful arrangement sufficient to
create the impression of an auxiliary reality (des
réalités auxiliaires) possessing its own principle of
life and development. However, Sorel warned: " . . .
aucun ensemble d'images n'a une valeur absolue; une
juxtaposition des 'projections stylisées' qui a rendu
les plus grands services pour l'examen de certains

problemes, peut se trouver inefficace pour d'autres

questions; 11 y a beaucoup de subjectivisme dans le

sociologie."48

One of the least debatable merits of Karl Marx
was, according to Sorel, that he had shown an extra-
ordinary dexterity in the organization of these ”pro-
jections stylisées" to such an extent that he often
appeared to have exhausted all the variety of human

activity, through such categories of analysis as class

 

47Ibid., p. 388.

48Ibid. "If this approach has remained so often

sterile," Sorel wrote, "it is because it has been culti-
vated by those who are deprived of a creative imagination. "

. . . no group of images has an absolute value; a jux-
taposition of stylized projections which has rendered
the greatest services for the examination of certain
Problems can find itself inefficacious for other questions;
there is much subjectivism in sociology."

 

 

197

conflict. The many errors of others who studied social
questions from a philosophical point of view, Sorel
charged, occurred in large part because they did not
recognize " . . . que leur philosophie ait quelque chose
a apprendre de l'art."49 A more profound study of the
laws of the mind would teach them, Sorel believed, "that
philosophy and art are two very related activities."50
Ideological constructions were necessary, Sorel con-
tinued, but they were also the most frequent cause of

error. Therefore, he recommended the rejection of all
systems of analysis which were not the product of reflection
on institutions, usages and empirical rules, which acquired
through practice their final form. This meant, Sorel noted,
that reflection on the forms of social life and analysis
followed a direction completely opposed to the real move-
ment: " . . . c'est ce qui se présente le dernier dans

le monde, qui explique l'antérieur."51 Thus Sorel

 

49Ihid., p. 389. " . . . that their philosophy
had something to learn from art."

50Ibid. Painters and sculptors know, Sorel added,
that stylizatlon permits a transformation such that the
tension of immobility gives a clear idea of mobility:
. . . cet artifice est si ancien qu 'il est surprenant
que les sociologues ne se soient pas avisés de 8' en
inspirer pour venir a bout du réel."

51ILid., p. 391. Sorel referenced this idea to

Karl Marx, Capital, tome I, p. 30. (This incomplete
reference is to a French translation, though the edition
and translator are unmentioned.) Sorel also credited
Vico, who he recalled had stated that " . . . une

 

 

 

198

concluded, the moralists who attempted to see into the
future, and to construct it by thought could end only

in reveries. The fundamental character of the future
society, Sorel suggested, would only be clearly conceived
and usefully introduced into what he called "judicial
logic" the day when that society will have disappeared
and given place to a new organization.

Georges Sorel terminated his concluding chapter
of Introduction 3 l'Economie moderne, which was entitled
”General Observations," with a question which he thought
was relevant to the subject of Socialist propaganda.

"I wonder," he asked, "if it is possible to furnish an
intelligible exposition of the passage from principles

to action without employing myths?"52

It did not seem,
he claimed, that the historians of philosophy had yet
succeeded in producing a very clear idea of the con-
siderable role: " . . . que les mythes ont joué dans la

53

pensée humaine." The theory of the Platonic myths,

Sorel noted, had not yet been completed and thus he felt

 

sagesse vulgaire qui sent les choses et les exprime
poétiquement, avant que la pensée réfléchie arrive a les
comprendre théoriquement," p. 390. " . . . it is that
which presents itself last in the world that explains the
anterior."

521bid., p. 394.
53Ibid. " . . . that myths have played in human
thought."

 

199

reluctant to enter into what he called " . . . une dis-

cussion si ardu." Sorel purposed to limit himself
" . . . a émettre quelques appreciations sur les dif-
ficultés que rencontre le socialisme contemporain et qui
pourraient peut-étre se résoudre par une théorie des

mythes sociaux."54

In contemporary Socialism, Sorel observed, there
were many theses which the savants had become reluctant
to defend but which the propagandists considered as
essential. These discussions without end, Sorel believed,
had become fruitless debates but the experience had been
instructive. He drew the conclusion that these "famous
dogmas" contained something essential to the life and
progress of Socialism.55 And Sorel stated his belief
that it would be impossible to abandon completely what
he called "la conception catastrophique." It might be
necessary, Sorel speculated, to treat as myths the
theories which the savants no longer admit and which the

militants regard as vital and beyond controversy.56 Marx,

 

54Ibid. " . . . to emit some appreciations on
the difficulties that contemporary socialism met and that

would perhaps be able to resolve itself by a theory of
social myths."

55These dogmas included, Sorel noted: the iron

law of wages and the resulting increase in human misery;
the law of capitalistic concentration; the law of the

connection between economic and political power. Ibid.,
pp. 394-95.

551hid., p. 396.

 

 

 

200

Sorel observed, " . . . n'avait présenté la conception
catastrophique que comme un mythe, illustrant d'une
maniere tres claire la lutte de classe et la révolution
sociale."57 Sorel concluded that myths were necessary
to expose in an exact manner the conclusions of a social
philosophy whichdid not claim to operate according to
the rules of scientific logic, but rather was motivated
by the realization that the "contested theories" were
necessary for modern revolutionary action. On the other
hand, Sorel charged, " . . . les constructions savantes,
juridiques et pratiques, pr6nées a l'heure actuelle par
des sociologues plus ou moins socialistes, ne sont que

58 Sorel concluded that

tromperies et fausse science."
the old revolutionary Socialism was infinitely more
penetrated with the philosophic spirit than was the
"hyper-judicial" Socialism of the professors and advo-

cates of lofty political reformism.

Le Systeme Historique De Renan

 

In 1905 Georges Sorel published the results of

his study of the historical work to which Ernest Renan

 

57Ibid. " . . . only presented the catastrophic
conception as a myth, illustrating in a very clear manner
the class struggle and the social revolution."

58Ibid. " . . . the savant's constructions,
judicial and practical, extolled at the present hour by
sociologists more or less socialist, are only fraud and
false science."

 

 

201

had devoted thirty years of his life--the history of the
origins of the Jews and the Christians.59 According to
Sorel's opening analysis, there were several possible
approaches to the study of the past. Most often, he
believed, historians were occupied with the birth of the
future, which caused them to seek in the past the early
beginnings of this future, explaining its genesis by an
exact knowledge of the men who at that time were dominant
in the world. This first system, Sorel observed, placed
itself " . . . au point de vue d'une génération due a

des hommes déterminés."60 Another historical methodology
considered the past as a congealed mass (une masse figee)
whose general demeanor was susceptible of a schematic
sketch in which one would seek relations which existed
among the dominant principles of institutions as well as
the sentiments of classes during a particular period.
Differing from the first system which focused on the
activities of determined men, the second system, Sorel
wrote: " . . . regarde les hommes plut6t comme des por-

61

teurs de symboles que comme des créateurs." The first

 

59Georges Sorel, Le systeme historique de Renan,
ed. by G. Jacques (Paris, 1905). (Hereinafter referred
to as Lesysteme historique de Renan.)

 

 

Goiéiéop P. 5. " . . . at the point of view of
a generation owed to determined men."

61Ibid. " . . . regards men rather as carriers
of symbols than as creators."

 

202

system claimed that thanks to psychology it could penetrate
to the roots of living reality and thereby "l'expliquer
tout entier," whereas the second claimed only to provide

a clarification of the past " . . . de jeter de la

62 The first

lumiere sur certains aspects des choses."
system Sorel designated by the term "psychological";
the second he named "scientific."

The psychological system of historiography, Sorel
claimed, purposed to explain facts by their antecedents
which was held to be the same procedure followed in the
science of physics. There was, however, Sorel warned,

a great difference between the two procedures: " . . .
en physique on arrive a découvrir des lois qui gouvernent
l'apparition des phénoménes, tandis qu'en histoire aucune
loi de ce genre ne peut étre soupconnée."63 Furthermore,
it was necessary to note, according to Sorel, that it
would be impossible to know all the psychology of a
nation in any determined epoch: "Cette totalité qui
comprend tout l'ensemble des motifs et des caracteres

des acteurs du drame, cette réalité profonde dont la

psychologie parle avec tant d'emphase parce qu'elle

 

GZEQEQ-I p. 5- " . . . to throw some light on
certain aspects of things."

63Ibid. " . . . in physics we happen to discover
laws which govern the appearance of phenomena, while
in history any law of this genre can be suspected."

 

 

203

l'ignore, c'est la mystérieuse 'chose en soi'--que les
physiciens renoncent a poursuivre dans la nature."64
The sources of history available in archives,
Sorel observed, rarely teach us what we need to know in
order to comprehend the acts of important persons. The
determinations, therefore, which historians draw are
often inspired by friendly or hateful motives. We
possess, he believed, many more tiny details of the past
than those which appear in the'pages of our histories;
consequently Sorel questioned the basis of the historian's
choice: "N'y a-t-il pas beaucoup de petites raisons qui
peuvent avoir eu une influence disproportionnée a leur
importance normale? Dans la masse des faits négligées se
trouvent peut-étre ceux qui furent décisifs?"65 Renan

had noted, Sorel reported, that in many instances acci-

dents had been able to alter the course of history, and

 

64Ibid., p. 7. Sorel noted a more narrow scope
for psychology: "La connaissance psychologique ne serait
possible qu'a la condition de se borner aux exploits de
quelques hommes," p. 8. "This totality which understands
all the motives and character of actors of drama, this
profound reality of which psychology speaks with so much
emphasis because it is unaware of it, it is the mysterious
thing in itself--that physicians forego to follow in
nature."

65Ibid., p. 8. Sorel concluded that a truly
scientific discernment " . . . entre les les causes est
manifestement impossible," p. 9. "Are there not many
little reasons that are able to have had a disproportionate
influence to their normal importance? In the mass of
neglected fact perhaps are found those that were decisive."

 

 

 

204

although he fund been reproached for lowering the scien-
tific dignitY’cxf history as a result of this affirmation,
Sorel concluded that " . . . on arrive a voir que les
plus grands événements peuvent avoir dépendu de ces
petits accidents. . . . "66 In reality, Sorel believed
that historians proceeded by making arbitrary choices
which they tactfully identify as their "historical
sense," with the result that " . . . ce qui est
essentiel pour l'un devient secondaire pour l'autre."67
The second historical system which Georges Sorel
entitled "systeme scientifique," was incapable of being
applied to all the epochs of the past. This system
required for its application the existence of "

une grande régularité dans les aspects que présent le
passé."68 It assumed that the accidents which excited
ancient spectators had little interest for the new
generations, and it assumed that the important personnages
were founded upon the masses. Sorel likened what he

called the "apparent regularity or order" to that which

resulted from a calculation of probabilities; it was not

 

6622£Q3r P- 9. " . . . we happen to notice that
the greatest events can have depended on these little
accidents."

67Ibid. " . . . that which is essential for one
becomes secondary for the other."

681bid., p. 15. " . . . a great regularity in
the aspects that present the past."

 

#—

 

205

a regularity which could be explained but an order
which was observed:
. . . c'est la combinaison d'une infinité de hasards
dans le désordre le plus absolue des causes qui
produit l'ordre apparent. Mais tous les hasards ne
se combinent pas de la meme maniere; c'est ce qui
savent toutes les personnes qui se sont occupées
du calcul des probabilités.6
When this regularity existed, Sorel continued, history
appeared as giving birth to something which remained an
acquisition of civilization. These events were studied
and explained formerly as the intervention of a super-
natural force, " . . . pour corriger les hasards dus a
l'activité désordonnée de l'homme."70
According to Sorel, Renan had believed that three
such providential histories had existed: the histories
of Greece, Israel, and Rome. In the tableau of Renan,
as it appeared to Sorel, Greece had founded, in its
epoch, in addition to "l'humanisme rationnel et pro-

gressive," science, art, literature, philosophy, morality,

politics, strategy, diplomacy and international-maritime

 

69Ibid., p. 16. Sorel wrote: "Je n'insiste pas

sur les raisons de cette régularité." His reference,
however, for this conception was to Engels in his study
on Feuerbach which he noted simply as Engels, Religion,
philosophie, socialisme, p. 233 in a footnote in £3
systeme historique de Renan, p. 16.

. . . it is the combination of an infinity of chances

in the most absolute disorder of causes which pro-

duces the apparent order. But all chances do not

combine together in the same manner; it is that‘

which is known by everyone who occupied themselves

with calculating the probabilities.

 

7oIbid. " . . . in order to correct the chances
due to the disordered activity of men."

 

 

 

206

law. The lacuna in the Greek experience was, according
to Sorel's reading of Renan, ” . . . elle méprisa les
humbles et n'éprouva pas le besoin d'un Dieu juste."71
This lacuna had been filled by Judaism and later Chris-
tianity, Renan believed, and Rome, thanks to its civic
virtues, created the force which " . . . a servi a
propager l'oeuvre grecque et l'oeuvre juive."72 Sorel
disagreed with this tableau. In terms of historical
epistemology he remained convinced that the origins of
these movements were other than supernatural: " . . .
c'est toujours du hasard qui engendre l'histoire."73
For Sorel there was no inherent conflict between
theology and the desire scientifically to study morals,
institutions and ideas. The question for Sorel was not
the "truth" of, for example, the resurrection of Jesus,
but the potent image of Jesus which the belief in the

resurrection engendered: "Le grand fait du christianisme

naissant est la croyance a la resurrection, comment une

 

71%., p0 17o I! o o o it Scorned the humble
and did not feel the need of a just God."

72Ibid. " . . . has served to propagate Jewish
and Greek work."

73Ibid., p. 20. Elaborating further Sorel
observed: "L'instinct proteste cependant contre cette
identification; c'est que les origines . . . nous semblent
appeller intervention de forces supérieurs . . . mais pour
histoire scientifique tous . . . sont des hasards."
" . . . it is always chance which breeds history."

 

 

—I——T’”

 

207

telle croyanse s'est-elle formée, il est fort inutile

74

de se le demander." Sorel insisted that the historian

 

must constantly battle against what he called the pre-
judice of total causality; historical studies, he believed,
could never be exhausted. His advice was for the his-
torian to confine himself to " . . . ce que l'on juge
digne d'interesser et d'instruire le monde moderne."75
In contrast, the modern theologian, Sorel noted, did not
want to accept this subjective limitation, he wanted the
objective and complete truth. "The sociological historian,
Sorel charged, who wants to reveal the future is obliged
to introduce supreme, occult forces such as: the progress
of the human mind, the democratic evolution, the tendency

76 All these

toward equality, immanent justice, etc.“
"marionnettes," Sorel warned, were designed to replace
the ancient idea of providence; they had become the new

irresistable motive forces of history.

 

74Ibid., p. 21. Referring to the story of the
resurrection of Lazarus, Sorel wrote: "Il est donc
inutile de discuter sur les incidents qui peuvent avoir
donné naissance a la croyance relative a la resurrection
de Lazare; la question est de savoir si cette croyance
a produit quelque chose dans l'histoire du christianisme.
. . . " p. 37. "The great fact of dawning Christianity
is the belief in the resurrection, how such a belief is
formed, it is strongly useless to ask."

75Ibid. " . . . that which they judge worthy to
interest and instruct the modern world."

76

Ibid., p. 23.

 

 

 

208

Renan, Sorel continued, had the idea that history
was an art of invention, and in the opening pages of his

Vie de Jésus, Sorel quoted Renan as writing that for

 

history " . . . une part de divination et de conjecture
doit étre permise."77 Sorel was astonished to discover
from reading the manuals of the professional historians
that they had failed to comprehend what he agreed was the
aesthetic nature of their studies: "Ils ne paraissent
point savoir que toutes les regles de la critique n'ont
de sens que sous la réserve que leur application est
subordonnée a un consideration esthétique."78 He
applauded Renan for having the "bon sens" to realize
that historical texts had need of interpretation in the
light of taste, (l'interprétation du gofit) and Sorel
ventured the suggestion that the hypercriticism (l'hyper-
critique) which he believed had spoiled many professional
historians could only be effectively combatted by an
improved sense of aesthetics.

In order for the study of history to be scientific,

Sorel concluded, it must rid itself of the pretention of

satisfying all of the curiosities of the reader. The

 

77Ibid., p. 26. Sorel's reference: Renan, Vie
de Jésus, pp. C-CI. " . . . a part of divination and
conjecture must be permitted."

78Sorel, Le systeme historique de Renan, p. 27.

"They do not seem t5 know that all rules of critique have
sense only under the reservation that their application
is subjected to a aesthetic consideration."

 

 

209

historian, like the physicist, Sorel observed, must
reject the ambitions of Plato and Descartes and accept
the limitations of his research. This scientific honesty,
Sorel believed, would permit " . . . un concordat entre
la théologie et la science."79 Historical explications,
he believed, were simple clarifications: " . . . elle
consiste a grouper en systeme les conditions au milieu
desquelles se produisent les événements, sans jamais

80 The generation

atteindre la génération elle-meme."
itself Sorel insisted could be imagined in an infinite
number of ways and historians were not capable of dis-
cerning the accidents, combinations and illusions which
constituted the past reality. The theologians, he
believed, were not happy with this admission because they
sought to separate the human and the divine in the world,
and because of this search for divinity they rejected
what they called the "exterior" side of things. But the
problems which the theologians posed, Sorel considered

81

" . . . étrangers a l'histoire." The historian, Sorel

added, had no need of such theologic ground; the question

 

79Ibid., p. 457. " . . . an agreement between
theology and science."

80Ibid., p. 458. " . . . it consists to group in
a system the conditions in the midst of which events are
produced, without ever attaining the generation itself."

81

Ibid. " . . . strangers to history."

 

 

 

210

of origins, he concluded, was extremely problematical
for historians, because of this impossibility of con-
structing explicative systems.

Les Préoccupations Métaphysiques Des
Ehysiciens Moderne

 

 

Writing in an essay of 1905, entitled "The
Metaphysical Preoccupations of Modern Physics,” Sorel
reaffirmed certain anxieties in the various branches
of knowledge over the nature of the relationships which
at that moment existed between science and nature.82
Each branch of science, Sorel believed, must formulate
its own response to this anxiety, and his interest in
physics was directed to the possibility of applying
mathematics to the understanding of nature. Sorel noted
that contemporary physicists " . . . ont trouvé qu'il
est impossible de connaitre l'essence des choses."83
They had, he continued, come to recognize that the sys-

tem of mathematics was situated between phenomena and

the physicist and further that the images by means

 

82Georges Sorel, "Les preoccupations métaphysiques
des physiciens modernes," Revue de Métaphysique et de
Morale, XIII (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1905}.
(Hereinafter referred to as ”Les préoccupations.”)

 

83Ibid., p. 860. Sorel commented that these con-
clusions were quite similar to those of Kant although he
noted it was doubtful they had " . . . viennent de la
lecture de la Criti ue,” instead he thought that " . . .
c'est la technique du calcu infinitesimal qui les a
conduit 5 cette doctrine." " . . . have found that it
is impossible to know the essence of things."

 

 

211

of which reality was represented were chosen because of
their simplicity and convenience. Sorel concluded that
" . . . des raisons plut6t esthétique que scientifiques

qui dirigent dans le choix des hypotheses."84

Following
a logic of ideas, Sorel reported, Henri Poincaré had
wondered " . . . if the savant had not been duped by his
own definitions and if the world which he believed to
discover was not simply the creation of his own
caprice?"85 Sorel believed that what he called a
"mobile-harmony" existed between nature and science, and
he identified the goal of experimental science as the
construction of " . . . une 'nature artificielle' (si

on peut employer ce terme) a la place de la 'nature

86 But this conclusion included the

naturelle.'”
assumption, Sorel insisted, that there were no necessary

hypotheses because " . . . toute hypothése est

 

adléiépr Po 354. " . . . reasons, aesthetic
rather than scientific which directed the choice of
hypotheses."

85Ibid. Sorel quoted simply Poincaré, La Science
et l'hypothése, p. 3. Full of admiration for this work
Sorel wrote: "Je me reporterai tres souvent a ce livre,
dans lequel le grand géometre a groupé, d'une maniere
particuliérement claire, toutes les difficultés que ren-
contre la théorie de la science moderne." "Les pré-
occupations," footnote 1, p. 862.

 

aéfihiég: Po 380- " . . . an 'artificial nature'
(if one can employ this term) in the place of 'natural
nature.'"

 

 

 

 

212

l'introduction d'un méchanisme étranger a la nature."87

Sorel speculated that an hypothesis would be more perfect
in so far as it made no claim to imitate nature. It had
been an error, Sorel charged, to seek to conceal the con-
tradiction which existed between science and nature.
Science was for Sorel as infinite as the inventive
genius of human beings which he noted " . . . ne semble
comporter aucune limite; chaque pas que nous faisons dans
la voie du progres; nous montre que nous n'avons encore
trouvé que tres peu de choses et que nous aurions la
possibilité de réaliser beaucoup de combinaisons impré-

vues."88

Comparing his own time to the eighteenth century
Sorel noted, "Although we possess a mechanics so pro-
digiously rich in comparison with that of the last
century, we have nevertheless acquired the sense of our
ignorance; while our fathers had on the contrary a

singular sense of their knowledge and they believed that

the domaine of the unknown receded rapidly before their

 

87Ibid. Sorel credited Poincaré with this
conclusion. " . . . every hypothesis is the introduction

of a mechanism foreign to nature."

88Ibid., pp. 881-82. Quoting from M. J. Bertrand,
D'Alembert, p. 41 (Sorel's incomplete citation) Sorel
added: "Plus une methode est nouvelle et féconde, plus
elle étend 1e champ de l'inconnu," p. 882. " . . .
seemed to carry no limit; each step that we make on the
path of progress shows us that we have still only found
very little of things and that we will have the possi-
bility to realize many unforeseen combinations."

 

213

efforts."89 Sorel believed that what he called the
natural world and the artificial world were constituted
according to "des principes opposés" and that this oppo-
sition would become more and more clear as science
advanced.

Georges Sorel concluded his observations on the

 

metaphysical anxieties of modern physicists with the
speculation that there existed between nature and science
what he called "la zone du hasard." He wrote: "A
vraiment parler, il n'y a pas de loi de la nature," and
he charged that modern physicists " . . . n'osent pas
généralement s'avouer a eux-mémes, d'une maniere bien
explicite, que la science et la nature forment deux
mondes séparés par les phénomenes irréversibles."90
Sorel concluded that there were only relative movements
in the world, and he thought that the savants of his day
no longer believed in determinism, although he complained
of the lingering prejudices of a discredited determinism

and demanded of science to openly avow the new doctrine

which corresponded to its contemporary practice.

 

89Ibid. In a footnote, Sorel chided the idea of
progress of the eighteenth century: "De la vient l'extra-
ordinaire naiveté de la théorie du progrés chez Condorcet."

9°Ihid., pp. 887-88. ”Truly speaking there is no
law of nature," ”or generally do not dare to avow to them-
selves, in a very explicit manner that science and nature
form two separate worlds by irreversible phenomena."

 

 

APPENDIX A

AESTHETICS, SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY
AND PHYSICS
EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO
BENEDETTO CROCE: 1901 - 1905

30 avril 1901
"Je vous remercie de votre note sur Vico . . .
(G. B. Vico primo scopritore della scienza estetica;
Napdli,’l901Y, p. 363

4 janvier 1902
"Je n'ai pas de tirage a part de mon article sur Vico;
il n'en a pas été faite." p. 366

24 octobre 1902
"Je vous ai envoyé quelques exemplaires du prospectus
de Péguy (nous avons été ensemble 5 son bureau a
Paris); son oeuvre est tres intéréssante et ce qu'il
écrit mérite d'étre lu; d'ailleurs, il est du petit
nombre des dreyfuistes qui ne réclament pas la
liberté uniquement pour eux et leurs amis." p. 370

30 mars 1903
" . . je n'aime pas beaucoup les théories générales

sur l'évolution; mais c'est une mode a laquelle peu
de gens osent se soustraire." p. 371

28 avril 1903
" . . . je ne me suis jamais posé, moi-meme, la
question de savoir quelle serait la synthese de mes
écrits divers. J'écris au jour le jour suivant 1e
besoin du moment." p. 372

9 mai 1903

" . . . a mon avis, le socialisme ferait bien de
dormir quelque temps: les classes ouvrieres ne sont
guere en état de s'affranchir de la domination,
qu'exercent sur elles les bavards." p. 32

214

 

 

215

21 mai 1903
" . . . 1a sociologie, en voulant traiter 'physique-
ment' la science sociale, n'aboutit a rien; il faut se
resoudre a considérer les notions avec leur mobilité
et leur varieté." p. 32

25 septembre 1903
"Ici la politique anticléricale s'accuse de plus en
plus et elle réussit beaucoup plus facilement qu'on ne
pensait; elle a des racines tres profondes dans le
pays. L'Eglise mettra cinquante ans pour réparer le
desastre ou elle s'est jetéé elle-meme par suite de
la politique folle de Leon XIII." p. 34

30 octobre 1903
"Il me semble que votre gouvernement veut singer le
notre, en se rapprochant des socialistes: l'experience
a été chez nous funeste a tout le monde et a con-
tribué a abaisser beaucoup la moralité déja fasse des
partis politiques." p. 34

4 decembre 1903
"La science grecque offre a qui l'étudiera scientifi-
quement bien des surprises; l'esprit grec ne ressemble
nullement au n6tre et je crois fort que cette dif-
férence tient, pour beaucoup, a l'economie." p. 35

20 decembre 1903
"Je me demande ce que pense la cour de Rome de tout

ce qui se passe en France; les catholiques ne semblent
pas comprendre la gravité des événements; nous marchons
tres vite a une seperation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat,
plein de tiraillements mesquins." p. 35

23 janvier 1904
" . . . je crois que la politique sociale de Léon XIII

était une farce." p. 35

28 novembre 1904
"11 me semble que L'Italie marche un peu--comme nous
d‘ailieurs--a la maniere d'un ivrogne qui ne connait
plus bien les rues par lesquelles il passe. 11 y a
partout en Europe une légéreté intellectuelle vraiment

singuliere." p. 38

27 decembre 1905
"les idées que j'ai exposées dans l'Introduction (Lg

systeme historique de Renan) que vous ayez lu ne
plaisent pas aux savants: il leur parait scandaleux
de regarder 1e jugement esthétique comme la loi cachée
de toute la critique historique. . . . P. Semera

 

__ __-i__—---‘

 

216

m'écrit pour me signaler qu'elle est fort dangereuse
il prend au sérieux la 'science des critiques'l
J'espere qu'il y aura quelques bons esprits pour
protester; comme moi, contre cette science fal-
lacieuse que les Allemands ont fabriquéé pour épater
les Latins. L'histoire n'est utile et sérieuse qu'a
la condition de bien reconnaitre son caractére d'art
constructif subordonné a des fins extrascientifiques

et dans lequel les faits sont la partie la plus
inutile." p. 93

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER V

Essays published by Georges Sorel between 1906

and 1908 in Le mouvement socialiste and considered in

 

this chapter were later combined to form his two most

widely known books: Reflections on Violence and The

 

Illusions of Progress. In the Opening analysis, Sorel
discusses the Marxian concept of class conflict and the
need to maintain opposition between the proletariat and
the bourgeoisie through the use of what he called "pro-
letarian violence," which he distinguished from the
state's use of force and coercion. Major concepts
elaborated include Sorel's idea of Syndicalism and his
notion of the general strike as the insulating and uni-
fying myth of the proletariat. He proceeds to analyze
myth from the social and epistemological standpoint and
concluded that the parliamentary parties which advocated
social peace were the greatest potential danger to the
workers movement. Only Syndicalism, armed with the myth
of the general strike, could develop the separation
needed for the production of a morality based on

mutuality--a stance which was in opposition to the

217

 

218

values of the contemporary bourgeois state. Sorel next
undertakes a critique of the idea of progress and sug-
gests its historical development as an aspect of a
rising bourgeois oligarchy which the French monarchy
had created for its service.

Sorel concludes Chapter V with an analysis of
Jean Jacques Rousseau, whom he approaches from an aes-
thetic point of view, and Henri Bergson whose Creative
Evolution Sorel conceives as a turning point in modern

philosophy.

 

 

CHAPTER V

LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE,

1906 - 1908

Réflexions Sur La Violence

 

In January, 1906, an essay appeared in Le mouve-

ment socialiste, entitled "Réflexions sur la Violence"

 

by Georges Sorel.1 In a brief introduction, Sorel
described to the readers of this periodical what he
noticed to be an oversight by certain "wise sociologists"
whom, he charged, concealed (dissimuler) the role which
violence played in the normal evolution of strikes.

Sorel suggested that it was vital " . . . chercher quel
est le réle qui appartient a la violence dans les
rapports sociaux actuels;"2 especially in view of his
belief that revolutionary syndicalism was tending to

dominate contemporary socialism. Sorel purposed to

 

lGeorges Sorel, "Réflexions sur la Violence,"
Le mouvement socialiste, XVIII (Paris: Edouard Cornély
et Cie., January 15,91906). (Hereinafter referred to as
"Réflexions sur la Violence."

2Ibid., p. 5. " . . . to find what the role of
violence IS in present social relations."

219

 

220

examine the confluence of feelings which dominated

masses, and to avoid the psychological examination of

important individuals which he noted was not a useful

undertaking: " . . . pour l'historien philosophe . . .

c'est l'ensemble des choses et non la génération des ‘

états de conscience qui importe."3 Violent activities

which occurred outside the law were from certain points

of view considered meritorious. The perpetrators of these

acts could more easily be appreciated as great men by

the directors of government and law when they were no

longer alive: " . . . on a toujours plus de vertus que

les gens qui restent et qui peuvent étre des concurrents."4
Sorel proceeded to a consideration of what he

called "la lutte de classe et la violence," and insisted

there could be no understanding of Socialism until the

concept of "la lutte de classe" was given a precise

 

3Ibid., p. 6. Reflections on Violence, trans-
lated into English by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, The Free
Press, 1950, must be read with extreme caution; this
quote has been completely omitted from their version
(see p. 68) and their claim to having translated the
"Introduction to the First Publication" (see p. 67) as
it appeared in Le mouvement socialiste, does not explain
the presence of footnotes in their version which do not
occur in the original. Therefore, I have relied on the
original French consulting the Hulme-Roth translations
only in Chapter I of this study. " . . . for the philo-
sophical historian . . . it is the totality of things
and not the generating of states of conscience which
are of consequence."

 

 

4Sorel,"Réflexions sur la Violence," p. 7.
. . . they always have more virtue than people who
remain and who are able to be competitive."

 

 

221

meaning. The misunderstanding of this Marxian concept
he attributed largely to the great role which the

. . . idolétrie des mots joue . . . dans l'histoire

de toutes les idéologies."5

Contemporary socialism,
Sorel charged, had, because of its electoral tactics

and because of its willingness to become the arbitor of
social peace, contributed to an anti-Marxist transfor-
mation. To comprehend the potential consequences of this
transformation, Sorel insisted " . . . il faut se reporter
aux conception que se faisait Marx sur le passage du
capitalisme au socialisme."6 Marx, Sorel believed, had
assumed a long, continuous and energetic period of capi-
talist construction whose termination was to be the work
of the proletariat who would conserve the acquisitions

of the capitalist economy while at the same time it would
" . . . rompre tout lien avec l'idéologie des temps

actuels."7

The socialists, therefore, Sorel concluded,
must disavow the search for the means of leading the
bourgeoisie to an enlightened sense of a superior law;

their sole function must be to clarify for the proletariat

 

5Ibid., p. 12. " . . . idolatry of words plays in
history in aIl ideologies."

6Ibid., p. 42. " . . . it is necessary to refer
to the conception Marx made on the passage from capitalism
to socialism."

71bid., p. 43. " . . . break all ties with the
ideology df_present time."

 

222

the grandeur of its revolutionary role. The proletariat
must, in Sorel's conception, be insulated from the cor-
ruption of "la pensée bourgeoise," and it must " . . .
developper des formations embryonnaires qui apparaissent
dans les sociétés de resistance, pour arriver a con-
struire des institutions qui n'ont point de modele dans
l'histoire de la bourgeoisie."8 This goal could not be
accomplished, Sorel warned, if the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat were not rigorously opposed to one another
with all the power at their disposal: " . . . plus la
bourgeoisie sera ardemment capitaliste, plus 1e prolé-
tariat sera plein d'un esprit de guerre et confiant dans
la force révolutionnaire, plus le mouvement sera assuré."9

But if the two opposing classes were to accept
the idea of social peace, Sorel believed, the development
of both would be hindered and " . . . le hasard s'introduit
10

et l'avenir du monde est completement indéterminé."

Sorel conceived of Socialism as " . . . une philosophie

8Ibid. " . . . develop embryonic formations
which appear in resistant societies in order to succeed
in constructing institutions which have no model in
bourgeois history."

91bid., pp. 43-44. " . . . the more the bourgeoisie
is ardentIy capitalist, the more the proletariat will be
full of war spirit and confident in revolutionary force,
the more the movement will be assured."

1032;23: P. 45. " . . . chance introduces itself
and the future of the world is completely undetermined.“

 

223

particuliere de l'histoire."ll

The Socialist, he con-
tinued, " . . . imagines that he has been transported
into a distant future such that present events can be
considered as elements in a long development."12 That
this procedure implied an important use of hypothesis,
was frankly accepted by Sorel who evaluated the role of
hypothesis as indispensable: " . . . il n'y a point de
philoSOphie sociale, point de consideration sur l'évolution
et méme point d'action importante dans le présent, sans
grandes hypotheses sur l'avenir."13 The movement away
from conflict represented for Sorel what he called "the
double movement of degeneration," and it was here he
believed that violence could play a singularly great role
in history: " . . . car elle peut opérer, d'une maniere
indirecte, sur les bourgeois, pour les rappeller au

sentiment de leur classe."14 However, Sorel noted,

these actions could have historical value only if they

 

11Ibid., p. 6. " . . . a particular philosophy
of history.’'

lzIbid.

 

131bid. " . . . there is no social philosophy,
no consideration on evolution, and even no important
present action, without great hypotheses on the future."

14Ibid., p. 46. " . . . for it can operate in
an indirect manner on the bourgeoisie to recall to them
their class sentiment."

 

 

224

were the clear and brutal expressions of class conflict.
Sorel (who often used the term "employers" [patrons]
interchangeably with the bourgeoisie) accepted the need
to deflect the bourgeoisie from "ill-advised compromise,"
and to return them to the creation of productive economic
forces,15 and to this end violence seemed to him a par-
ticularly effective tool. Proletarian violence was the
needed antidote to social peace, because it could restore
the separation of the classes and thus recover the
dynamic opposition necessary to insure the future
revolution. Proletarian violence had become for Georges

Sorel " . . . un facteur essentiel du marxisme."16

Les Préjugés Contre La Violence
In February, 1906, Sorel published an essay
entitled "Les Préjugés contre la Violence" in ES

mouvement socialiste in which he tried to distinguish

 

between the revolutionary violence which France had

known in 1793 and his conception of Syndicalist

 

15Thus the inadequacy of the translation by Hulme
and Roth (see note 3), who render "la bourgoisie" as
"the middle class," throughout.

16Ibid., p. 43. Behind this call for a restored
and reinvigorated bourgeoisie was Sorel's fear that the
revolution might have quite different consequences if it
did not occur while the economic system was at its
highest point of capitalistic development--thus the need
for the bourgeoisie to complete what Sorel saw as its
historical mission. " . . . an essential factor of
Marxism."

 

225

violence.17 The civil uprisings of the great revolutionary

days of July 14 and August 10 had, Sorel believed, lost
their epical appeal because of " . . . the battles which
bloodied (ensanglanterent) Paris in 1848 and in 1871."
There could be no popular epic, Sorel speculated " . . .
de chose que le peuple ne peut se représenter comme

18

reproduisible dans un avenir prochain." And Sorel

was persuaded that the experiences of 1848 and 1871 had
taught the people that the government could not be over-
thrown " . . . par des émeutes sembables au 14 juillet

19 What remained, Sorel charged, was the use

et 10 aoflt."
of the power of the state: police operations, pro-
scriptions and servile courts. Political justice in

a country so often placed in upheavel by changes in

 

17See Appendix A for a complete list of Sorel's
contributions to Le mouvement socialiste during 1906.
The several essays whichdlater became the book-length
study Réflexions sur la Violence, Riviere, Paris, 1908,
are noted there.

18Georges Sorel, "Les Préjugés contre la Violence,"
1e mouvement socialiste (Fevriér, 1906), p. 145. Sorel
also believed’that‘ . . . la poésie populaire s'applique
bien p1ut6t au futur qu' au passé. " Ib__i__d., p. 145.
. . . a thing that people can represent as repro-
ducable in a near future."

19Ibid. " . . . by similar riots of July 14 and
August 10."

 

 

 

226

government was especially odious to Sorel " . . . parce

que la criminel d'aujourd'hui peut devenir le juge de

demain."20

The famous law of the 22nd Prairial of Robespierre,
which detailed that the proof necessary to condemn the
"enemies of the people" consisted of any document:

. . . soit matérielle, soit morale, soit verbale,
soit écrite, qui peut naturellement obtenir
l'assentiment de tout esprit juste et raisonnable.
La regle des jugements est la conscience des jurés
éclairés par l'amour de la patrie; leur but est

le triomphe de la République et la ruine de ses
ennemis. 1

This law according to Sorel was the strongest expression
of the theory of the predominance of the state. Sorel
expressed the belief that people of his time were less
dominated by what he called "la superstition du Dieu-
Etat"; but in the Dreyfus affair he noted there was a

tendency among officers and priests to " . . . trouvait

20Ibid. This explained why Parliamentary
Socialists, Sorel noted, make such a great effort to
persuade the public of their hatred for violence: "Ils
se donneraient volontier pour les protecteurs de la
bourgeoisie . . . " p. 146. " . . . because the criminal

of today can become the judge of tomorrow."

211bid., p. 153.
. . . either material or moral or verbal or
written which can naturally obtain the assent of
every just and reasonable spirit. The rule of
judgments is the conscience of juries illuminated
by love of country; their goal is the triumph of
the Republic and the ruin of its enemies.

 

 

 

 

227

tout naturelle une condemnation pour raison d'Etat."22

The Dreyfus case was hardly concluded, he charged, when

the government of Republican Defense initiated its own
political prosecution in the name of "la raison d'Etat."
Thus experience had demonstrated that " . . . nos
révolutionnaires arguent de la raison d'Etat des qu'ils
sont parvenus au pouvoir."23 The Parliamentary Socialists,
as well, he charged, had preserved the ancient cult of

the state and were thus prepared to commit the same crimes
as the Ancien Régime; if they achieved power, Sorel

speculated, " ils se montreraient de bons suc-

cesseurs de l'Inquisition, de 1'Ancien Regime et de

Robespierre."24

Sorel distinguished between these acts and pro-

letarian violence which served to mark the separation of

classes. Proletarian violence was, he believed, ” . . .

purement et simplement des actes de guerre," carried on

*without.hate and without the spirit of vengeance.25

22Ibid., p. 156. " . . . find entirely natural
a condemnation for reasons of State."

2322;23: P. 158. " . . . our revolutionaries
argue from reasons of State as soon as they have come to

power."

24Ibid., p. 161. ” . . . they would show them-
selves to he good successors of the Inquisition, the Old
Regime and Robespierre,"

251hid.

 

 

228

The goal of Syndicalism, Sorel insisted, was to realize
Marx's idea of the Socialist revolution and did not aim
to replace one governing minority with another. Syn-
dicalism did not, he believed, aim to possess the state's
power, but to eliminate that power and in this it could
be distinguished from Parliamentary Socialism which,
Sorel believed, committed the error of " . . . attaquent
plutOt les hommes au pouvoir que le pouvoir lui-méme."26
And because the national army was, according to Sorel,
the clearest most tangible manifestation of the state,
Syndicalism was engaged in anti-militarist propaganda.
Whereas those who sought the power of the state for
themselves would, he insisted, become aware on the day
that they took control of the government that " . . . ils
auraient besoin d'une armée; ils feraient de la politique
etrangere et, par suite, auraient, eux aussi, a vanter

le dévoument a la patrie."27

But for Syndicalism there
was an absolute opposition against the state which took
the concrete form of anti-patriotism. Sorel concluded

by distinguishing between what he called the "acts of

savagery" committed during the bourgeois revolution in

1893, which he claimed resulted from a superstitious

 

262222;: P. 163. " . . . attacking the men in
power rather than power itself."

2‘7Ibid. " . . . they would need an army; they

would make foreign policy and consequently would have
to praise the devotion to the fatherland."

 

 

,_ ___A—:""-‘q

 

 

229

conception of the state which the bourgeoisie had
"inherited from the Christian church and the monarchy,"
and the violence perpetrated in the course of strikes by

proletarians who sought the overthrow of the state.28

La Greve Générale Prolétarienne

In March, 1906, Sorel published "1a Greve Générale
prolétarienne," an essay in which he introduced his
influential conception of the general strike as that
which characterized the true current of the proletarian
revolutionary movement. Instead of confusing such con-
cepts as class conflict by adhering at the same time to
ideas of national solidarity and sacred patriotic duty
as Sorel charged the parliamentary Socialists had done,
the Syndicalists, he believed, should find the means to
clarify and emphasize the opposition between the classes.
Yet ordinary language, he believed " . . . ne saurait
suffire pour produire de tels résultats; il faut faire
appel a des ensembles d'images capables d'evoquer en bloc
et par la seule intuition, avant toute analyse réfléchie,.
la masse des sentiments qui correspondent aux diverses

manifestations de la guerre engagée par le socialisme

A

281bid., p. 164.

 

230

contre la société moderne."29 The drama of the general

strike, Sorel believed, would serve this purpose per-
fectly.30
Sorel continued to believe that the future was
beyond the scope of scientific analysis. It remained
beyond the capacity of man to know in advance the success
of various hypotheses. Nevertheless, he noted, man con-
tinued to reason as if he could project himself into the
future and experience demonstrated, he insisted that
these constructions could have great efficacity. These
anticipations of the future, Sorel continued, could be
regarded as myths, " . . . comme des compositions faites
avec art, en vue de donner un aspect de réalité a des

espoirs sur lesquels s‘appuie la conduite présente."31

 

29Georges Sorel, "La Gréve Générale proletar-
ienne," Le mouvement socialiste (Mars, 1906). (Hereinafter
referred to as "La Gréve Générale."), p. 260. " . . .
would not know how to produce such results; it is neces-
sary to call the totality of images capable of evoking
in mass and by a single intuition, before all reflected
analysis, the mass of sentiments which correspond to
diverse manifestations of the war engaged in by socialism
against modern society."

 

3oSorel noted that this conception was in accord
with what he perceived as Henri Bergson's thesis of the
superiority of "la connaissance totale" over analysis.
Ibid., p. 261.

31Ibid., p. 263. " . . . like compositions made
with art, in view of giving an aspect of reality to the
hopes upon which present conduct rests."

 

 

 

231

Among the historical examples which demonstrated
the role of myths, Sorel emphasized the first Christian's
expectation of the return of Christ and the ensuing ruin
of the pagan world. This catastrophe, expected at the
end of the first Christian generation, did not occur,
but the "mythe apocalyptique," according to Sorel, was
a great benefit to the early Christian movement. Sorel
concluded that a detailed knowledge of what the myth
contained which would actually form the history of the
future was of little importance. Admitting that a myth
could remain totally unfulfilled, Sorel nevertheless
insisted: " . . . Il faut juger les mythes comme des
moyens d'agir sur le présent et toute discussion sur la
maniere de les appliquer matériellement sur le cours de

32 If, he asserted,

l'histoire est dépourvu de sens.”
the imaginary picture of the general strike were totally
wrong, it might still prove to have been " . . . un
élément de force de premier ordre" by giving a precision
and rigidity to revolutionary thought that no other
lnanner of thinking could have effected; and Sorel added:

" . . . l'idée de greve générale est si bien adaptée a

1.'ame ouvriere qu'elle peut 1a dominer de la maniere

 

32Ibid., p. 265. " . . . it is necessary to judge
myths as means to act on the present and all discussion
on the manner of applying them materially on the course
of history is senseless."

 

232

la plus absolue et ne laisser aucune place aux désirs
que peuvent satisfaire les parlements."33
The incorporation of the concept of the general
strike into the Marxian system of thought was aided,
Sorel believed, by the identity of methodology which he
found in both. The true method of Marx, Sorel believed,
recognized a principle which had been stated by Henri
Bergson, namely that " . . . des idées vraies et
fécondes . . . sont autant de prises de contact avec

34 There were no intuitions

des courants de réalité."
of reality and no intellectual sympathy with its most
intimate parts, Sorel noted agreeing with Bergson, with-
out an exhaustive exposure to the facts which only begin
to appear superficial when they have been massively
accumulated and fused to obtain what Bergson called "une
expérience intégrale." What had nullified every attempt

in Germany to perfect Marxism, Sorel charged, was " . . .

1e respect superstitieux voué par la social-démocratie

 

33Ibid., p. 268. " . . . the idea of the general
strike is so well adapted to the worker's soul that it
can dominate in the most absolute manner and leave
no place to the desires which can satisfy parliaments."

34Sorel referenced this quote to an article by
.Henri Bergson entitled ”Introduction a la metaphysique"
Ipublished in 1903 in Cahiers de la Quinzaine, 12th cahier
<>f the 4th series, p. 21. '7. . . true and fertile ideas
Eire so much solidified by contacts with currents of

rQalityfl'

 

233

a la scolastique de ses doctrines."35 But Marx had said,

according to Sorel, that on the day of the revolution,
the proletariat would be disciplined, united and
organized. Sorel thought that the terms which Marx used
to describe the preparation for the decisive combat were
not to be taken literally. Marx sought to provide the
understanding that the preparation of the proletariat

" . . . dépend uniquement de l'organisation d'une
résistance obstinée, croissante et passionnée contre

l'ordre de choses existant."36

To support this analysis,
Sorel noted that it would be impossible to conceive the
disappearance of capitalistic dominance without supposing
an ardent sentiment of revolt. But this sentiment, he
believed was weakened by vanity and materialistic desires
leading to "scandaleuses conversions.” The concept of
the catastrophic general strike, Sorel asserted, would
make of every conflict a symptom of a state of war, and
through it every strike would ” . . . engendre la per-

37

spective d'une catastrophe totale." Thanks to the

 

35Sorel, "La Gréve Générale," p. 271. " . . .
the superstitious respect vowed by social democrats to
the scholastics of their doctrines."

36Ibid., p. 277. " . . . depends uniquely on
the organization of an obstinate growing and passionate
resistance against the order of existing things."

37Ibid., p. 275. " . . . engender the perspec-
tive of totaI catastrophe."

 

 

234

concept of the general strike, the necessary line of
cleavage would never be in danger of disappearing.

Marx's thought, Sorel noted, was hampered by the absence
of knowledge gained from experience--he had not seen the
great and numerous strikes which the future had in store,
and thus Sorel believed Syndicalism was a formal adjust-
ment within Marxism.

Sorel also recognized an epistemological bias,
produced by what he called an insufficient education,
which would hinder the acceptance of the syndicalist
position which he was elaborating. Because eighteenth
century astronomy had been able to calculate the tables
of the moon, Sorel charged, the goal of all science was
taken to be the accurate forecasting of the future.
Science was seen, he continued, as the remedy of all
social defects as well. The followers of "la science
vaine et fausse . . . supposait que toute chose est
susceptible d'étre rapportée d une loimathématique."38
Yet Sorel charged there were many illusions in a
sociology which believed that when it had attained
clarity of expression it had attained truth. The Posi-

tivists, whom Sorel charged had believed that philosophy

 

381bid., p. 285. They believed, Sorel added,
. . . suivant une fameuse formule de Kant il y a de
scientifique dans toute connaissance exactement ce que
celle-ci renferme de mathématique." Ibid. " . . . vain
and false science suppose that everything is susceptible
to be related to a mathematical law."

 

 

235

*would be eliminated by their science, had been dis-
illusioned, he believed by Henri Bergson whose methodology
was opposed to that of science. Through Bergson, Sorel
believed, metaphysics had regained lost ground " . . . en
montrant a l'homme l'illusion de prétendues solutions
scientifiques et en ramenant l'esprit vers la région
mystérieuse."39 Religion, Sorel added, contrary to the
Positivist's forecasts, was not on the point of dis-
appearing. And in the realm of art, Sorel noted, the
impotence of speech to describe paintings was an important
revelation; art, he believed, flourished best on mystery,
half-shades, and indeterminate outlines; " . . . plus le
discours est methodique et parfait, plus il est de
nature 3 supprimer tout ce qui distingue un chef-
d'oeuvre."40
The limitations of scientific epistemology and
scientific sociology were, according to Sorel, a function
of the fact that in every complex body of knowledge a
clear and an obscure region could be detected. It was
his belief that the obscure region might be the most

important: "L'erreur de médiocres consiste a admettre

 

39Ibid., p. 286. " . . . in showing man the
illusion of pretended scientific solutions and to bring
spirit back to the mysterious region."

40Ibid., p. 288. " . . . the more perfect and
methodical the discourse, the more natural it is to
suppress all that distinguishes a masterpiece.”

 

236

que cette deuxieme partie doit disparaitre par le progres

des lumiéres."41

Yet Sorel indignantly refused to excuse
this assumption in the realm of art and especially in
modern painting which he thought expressed combinations
of nuances to which no attention had been paid formerly
due to their lack of stability and the difficulty of

expressing them in words.42

Socialism too, Sorel believed,
was necessarily obscure: " . . . aucun effort de la
pensée, aucun progres des connaissances, aucun induction
raisonnable ne pourront jamais faire disparaitre 1e

mYStére QUi enveloppe le socialisme."43

This obscurity
was the result, Sorel believed, of the words with which
one attempted to express the ends of socialism and therein
he saw the importance of that construction of the pro—

letarian mind which he called the general strike.

 

41Ibid. "The error of mediocres consists in
admitting that this second part must disappear by the
progress of enlightenment."

42In a footnote, which did not occur in the
original essay in Le mouvement socialiste but which
appeared in the English edition cited in footnote number
3, Sorel is quoted as saying: "It is to the credit of
the Impressionists that they showed that these fine
shades can be rendered by painting," p. 164.

43Sorel, "La Gréve Générale," p. 293. " . . .
no effort of thought, no progress of knowledge, no
reasonable induction could ever make the mystery which
surrounds socialism disappear."

 

 

 

237

La Gréve Générale Politique

In April, 1906, Georges Sorel published "la
greve Générale politique" in Le mouvement socialiste in
which he suggested a distinction between the conceptions
of force and violence. Sorel believed that force, in
his analysis, had as its object the imposition of a
certain social order, while violence tended to the
destruction of that order. To this extent he concluded:
" . . . 1a bourgeoisie a employé la force depuis le
début des temps modernes, tandis que le prolétariat
réagit maintenant contre elle et contre l'Etat par la

44 According to Sorel, the capitalist system

violence."
came into being through the exploitation of the power

of the state by the bourgeoisie; quoting from Marx he
reported: "Quelques unes de ces méthodes reposent sur
l'emploi de la force brutale; mais toutes, sans
exception, exploitent 1e pouvoir de l'Etat, la force
{concentrée et organisée de la société, afin de précipiter
‘violemment le passage de l'ordre économique féodal a

].'ordre économique capitaliste, et d'abréger les phases

de transition."45 This evolution represented for Sorel

 

44Georges Sorel, "La Greve Générale politique,"
1e mouvement socialiste (Avril, 1906), p. 418. (Herein-
after referred to as fia Greve Générale politique.")
" . . . the bourgeoisie has used force since the beginning
(of Inodern times, while the proletariat reacts now against
it and against the state by violence."

45Ibid., p. 421. Sorel reference: Capital,
Itvne ‘1, vol. 1, p. 336. "Some of these methods rest on

 

238

the history of bourgeoisie force, and he credited Marx
with having uncovered its details, while at the same time
complaining of the gap in Marx's work on the subject of

the organization of the proletariat. Thus the followers

of Marx who prided themselves on being orthodox, Sorel
charged, had never suspected that a distinction should

have been drawn " . . . entre la force qui marche vers
l'authorité et cherche a réaliser une obéissance auto-
matique, et la violence qui veut briser cette authorité."46
They mistakenly believed, he charged, that the proletariat
must acquire force as the bourgeoisie did, and must finally
end by establishing a socialist state to replace the
bougeois state; to accomplish these ends a parliamentary
Socialist party was formed.

Contrary to this conception, Sorel could not
accept the idea that the historical mission of the pro-
letariat was to imitate the bourgeoisie, and he insisted
<on the distinction between "proletarian violence" as
:symbolized by the concept of the general strike, and

'Fbourgeoisie force" which operated, he believed, through

 

time use of brutal force; but all without exception exploit
‘tkua power of the State, concentrated and organized force
<>f' society in order to violently precipitate the passage
caf’ the feudel economic order to capitalist economic
order and to shorten the phases of transition."

46Sorel, "La Gréve Générale politique," p. 423.
" . . . between force which moves toward authority and
tries to realize automatic obedience and violence which
wishes to break this authority."

 

239

the mechanism of the state. In the context of this
analysis, Sorel reaffirmed his distrust of the parlia-
mentary Socialists who, he believed, sought political
power and turned their backs on the general strike: "On
peut encore dire que le grand danger qui menace le syn-

dicalisme serait toute tentative d'imiter la démocratie."47

La Moralité De La Violence--La
Morale Des Producteurs

 

 

Georges Sorel's ethical reservations with respect
to violence formed the subject of a two-part essay
entitled "La moralité de la violence--la morale des
producteurs" which concluded his "Réflexions sur la
Violence" and appeared in the joint-issue of Le mouvement

socialiste dated May and June, 1906. He admitted that

 

violence, when it passed certain limits, could become a
danger to morality, but nonetheless he insisted on the
need to consider violence from the point of view of its
influence on social theory, and especially as an agent
for the maintenance of " . . . la scission des classes

.'48

qui est la base de tout le socialisme. Without this

cleavage, Sorel feared, Socialism would be unable to

 

47Ibid.. p. 426. "We could further say that the
great danger which threatens syndicalism would be every
attempt to imitate democracy."

48Georges Sorel, "La moralité de la violence--La
Inorale des producteurs," Le mouvement socialiste (May-
;Tune, 1906), p. 36. (Hereinafter referred'to as "La
fluoralite de la violence.”) " . . . the class division
Vihich is the base of all socialism."

 

 

 

 

240

fulfill what he believed was its historical mission. Yet
offenses of brutality, Sorel asserted, had come to be
looked upon as something abnormal, to the extent that
when the brutality was great one immediately wondered if
the culprit was sane. This had not occurred because
criminals had become more moral, Sorel noted. Their
methods of operation had changed to suit the new economic
conditions. Many sociologists discovered progress, Sorel
charged, in so far as " . . . la férocité ancienne tend

49 Because money losses

5 étre remplacée par la ruse."
could easily be made good again, fraud had come to be
regarded as less serious than brutality. This was
especially true, Sorel noted, in a rich community like
America where business was conducted on a large scale
and in which everyone was wide awake in defense of his

own interests. This explained for Sorel why " . . . les

Américains supportent, sans trop se plaindre, les exces

50

de leurs politiciens et de leurs financiers." The

 

49Ibid., p. 48. Sorel obviously disagreed, and
quoting Hartmann, he noted: " . . . i1 ne faut pas
oublier que la droiture, la sincerité, 1e vif sentiment
de la justice, 1e pieux respect devant la sincérité des
moéurs caractérisent les anciens peuples; tandis que nous
voyons régner aujourd'hui 1e mensonge, la fasseté, la
perfidie, l'esprit de chicane." Sorel's reference was
simply: Hartman, Philosophie de l'inconscient, trad.
:francais. t. II, pp. 464-65. Quote appeared in "La
Inoralité de la violence," p. 48. " . . . former ferocity
tends to be replaced by ruse."

50Ibid., p. 50. " . . . the Americans support,
without too much complaint, the excesses of their
politicians and financiers."

241

industrial system, Sorel concluded, had gradually
created a new and extraordinary indulgence for all
crimes of fraud in the great capitalist countries.51
Chiding the parliamentary politicians of capi-
talist democracy, Sorel pointed to their doctrine of
social peace and the elimination of class conflict as
theories which had not produced an ethic worthy of
acknowledgement, and he purposed to consider proletarian
violence as a counterforce to the established system.
In order to suppress the tendencies against which
morality struggled, Sorel believed, each consciousness
must be dominated by a conviction of such power that
action would precede the calculations of reflection.
Religious ethics had claimed to possess this source of
action, but Sorel complained "La masse des chrétiens ne

52

suit pas la vraie morale chrétienne." And additionally,

Sorel believed, theoretical Christianity had never been a

 

51Agreeing again with Hartmann, Sorel noted:
''We are already approaching the time when theft and lying
condemned by law will be despised as vulgar errors, as
gross clumsiness, by the clever cheats who know how to
preserve the letter of the law while infringing the
rights of other people. For my part, I would rather live
among the ancient Germans, at the risk of being killed
on occasion, than be obliged, as I am in modern cities,
to look upon every man as a swindler or a rogue unless
I have evident proof of his honesty." Hartmann, Philo-
sophie de l'inconscient, p. 465 quoted in "La moraIitd de
Ia violence,“*p. 52.

 

52Sorel, "La moralité de la violence," p. 72.
"The mass of Christians do not follow true Christian
morality."

 

242

religion suited to worldly people. He agreed with Renan
who had observed that the monastery came into being so
that the precepts of Jesus might be carried out somewhere,
and Sorel characterized the lives of the great hermits as
material struggles against "les puissances infernales"
which pursued them everywhere. Lofty moral convictions,
Sorel concluded, never depended on reasoning " . . .

elles dépendent d'un état de guerre auquel les hommes

53 This observation was vali-

acceptent de participer."
dated for Sorel by LePlay's discovery that in Protestant
countries, the more vigorously the established church

was assailed by dissident sects the greater the moral
fervor was developed. Sorel concluded that conviction

was founded on that competition in which each regarded
itself as an army of truth fighting the armies of evil.
Thus with respect to Socialism, Sorel agreed with Kautsky
who believed that the ethics of the proletariat grew out

of its revolutionary aspirations: "C'est l'idée de la
révolution qui a relevé 1e prolétariat de l'abaissement."54

In a country where the conception of the general strike

existed, Sorel believed, the battles between workers and

 

53Ibid., p. 73. " . . . they depend on a state
of war in which men accept to participate."

54Sorel's reference for the quote was incomplete:
Kautsky, Le mouvement socialiste (October, 1902), p. 1891.
"It is the idea of the revolution which has raised the
proletariat from sinking."

 

 

 

 

243

representatives of the bourgeoisie could have far-
reaching consequences. By adapting the spirit of Marx
to conditions which were capable of assuming a revolu-
tionary aspect, the general strike had become for Sorel,
vital to Socialism.

In addition to the general strike, Sorel felt
that contemporary Socialism in its Syndicalist form could
be easily distinguished " . . . du socialisme officiel
en reconnaissant la nécissité de perfectionner les

moeurs."55

According to Sorel, Syndicalism considered
the moral progress of the proletariat to be a necessity
of great importance. And because it desired to know this
process of moral perfection, Sorel asserted, Syndicalism
sought to know how to create in the present what he
called the ethic of the producers of the future. To
examine the qualities which would be required of these
producers, Sorel noted the importance of analyzing the
component parts of morality without falling under the
influence of the false philosophers who " . . . ils
s'imaginent . . . que leur devoir serait de tout ramener

56

a l'unité." On the contrary, Sorel believed in what

 

SSSorel, "La moralité de la violence," p. 90.
" . . . from official socialism in recognizing the
necessity of perfecting morals.”

56Ibid., p. 99. " . . . they imagine that their
duty would he to bring everything into unity."

 

244

he called the "fundamental heterogeneity" of all civilized
morality and he stated his conviction that " . . . the
best way of understanding any group of ideas in the
history of thought was to bring all the contradictions
into sharp relief."57
Sorel Opened his analysis of morality by applying
Nietzsche's identification of the values constructed by
a superior class of warriors called masters to the master-
type which Sorel believed existed in his day--this type,
Sorel asserted, had created the extraordinary greatness
of the United States. The Yankee was the master-type
personified, and he quoted M. P. de Rousiers who wrote:
"To become and remain an American one must look upon life
as a struggle and not as a pleasure, and seek in it
victorious effort, energetic and efficacious action,

58 Sorel forecast that this

rather than pleasure."
"Archaean type" of indomitable hero who was confident
in his strength and who placed himself above rules would
not disappear in the future. And many moral evils, he

believed, would forever remain unremedied ” . . . si

 

57Ibid.

58Sorel's reference: De Rousier's: La vie
américaine: l'éducation et la société, p. 325. See
"La moralité’de’la violence," p. 103.

 

245

quelque personnage révolté ne forcait 1e peuple a
rentrer en lui-meme."59
To the values created by the master-type, Sorel
continued, Nietzsche opposed the system constructed by
the sacerdotal castes and their ascetic ideal. But these
ascetic values, Sorel believed, were transformed by forces
alien to Christianity and Judaism. The family structure
was responsible, he believed, for the production of
ethical values such as respect for the human person,
fidelity and devotion to the weak. Beyond these, Sorel
classified under the general heading "civil relations"
those values which he believed escaped Nietzsche's
treatment. The civilization of Greek antiquity because
it was based on slavery had influenced later generations
to think of workers as children and passive instruments
who did not need to think, and Sorel insisted that
" . . . le socialisme révolutionnaire serait impossible
si le monde devait avoir une telle morale de faibles."60
Thus for Sorel the task was to transform the workers of

his day into future free producers who no longer labored

under the rule of a class of masters.

 

59Sorel, "La moralité de la violence,” p. 103.
" . . . if some revolted person did not force the people
to return into itself."

60$2£§~p P. 108. " . . . revolutionary socialism
would be impossible if the world had had such a morality
of weak people."

 

246

The conditions of the hoped for transformation of
the workers, Sorel conceived as necessarily linked to the
idea of the catastrophic battle in which each worker would
imagine his role as vital: "Les batailles ne sauraient
donc plus étre assimilées a des jeux d'échec dans lesquels
l'homme est comparable a un pion; elles deviennent des
accumulations d'exploits héroiques, accomplis par des
individus qui puisent dans leur propre enthousiasme les
motifs de leur conduite."61 Like the soldiers in the
Napoleonic wars, Sorel believed the workers would attach
an almost superstitious importance to the execution of
even the smallest task. This striving which would mani-
fest itself, Sorel insisted, in spite of the absence of
any personal immediate and proportionate reward, consti-
tuted for him " . . . la vertu secrete qui assure 1e

62 There was only one

progrés continu dans le monde."
force, Sorel concluded, which could produce this enthu-
siasm, without which he felt morality would be impossible--
and that was the force resulting from propaganda in favor

of a general strike.

 

61Ibid., p. 112. "The battles would thus no
longer be assimilated in chess games in which man is com-
parable to a pawn; they become accumulations of heroic
exploits, accomplished by individuals who draw from their
own enthusiasm the motives of their conduct."

62Ibid., p. 122. " . . . the secret virtue which
assures continued progress in the world."

 

247

Les Illusions Du Progres

 

In the August and September joint-issue of E2

mouvement socialiste, 1906, Georges Sorel published a

 

critique of the idea of progress entitled "Les illusions
du progrés." Noting his agreement with Le Play who had
commented on the degree to which people were more
governed by the magical power of certain fashionable
words than by ideas, Sorel advanced the hypothesis

" . . . que l'idéologie moderne est toute pleine de con-

63 Sorel asserted that the thinking of his day

fusion."
was dominated by prejudices and dogma rather than by
doctrines founded on the observation of facts. He
attached a special significance to the idea of progress
as being a conception which could most easily clarify a
certain characteristic of what he called "la pensée
bourgeoise." And in the spirit of Le Play Sorel purposed
an examination of this concept which he insisted was

" . . . une sorte de labyrinthe imaginé pour tromper les
hommes simples et fournir aux sophistes des ressources
infinies, leur permettant d'éviter toute discussion

64

sérieuse." Fearing that it was almost impossible to

 

63Georges Sorel, "Les illusions du progrés," Le
mouvement socialiste (August-September, 1906), p. 290‘Tsee
note 11. Sorel’s reference to Le Play was: Organisation
du travail," 3rd edition, pp. 339, 340-42. " . . .
modern ideology is full of confusion."

 

 

 

64Sorel, "Les illusions du progrES," p. 290.
. . . a sort of labyrinth imagined in order to fool sim—
ple men and furnish the sophiste infinite resources, per-
:mitting them to avoid all serious discussion."

 

 

 

248

know the meaning of the idea of progress, Sorel concluded
that only by describing the history of its development
could such a confused concept be clarified. At the
beginning of this historical analysis Sorel speculated
that the doctrine of progress was not a discovery of modern
science but an apology developed " . . . au hasard des
circonstances."6S And he saw in the study an opportunity
to apply the historical conception of Marx with respect
to the relationships which could be discovered between
ideology and the conditions of existence of a particular
class--in this instance the bourgeoisie.

Sorel noted that the origins of the doctrine of
progress could be traced to what was essentially a literary
quarrel over the relative superiority of the ancient or
the then contemporary French writers--a debate which
occurred during the last years of the seventeenth century.
The figure of Nicolas Boileau, according to Sorel, repre-
sented " . . . l'esprit bourgeois s'opposant d l'esprit
des salons et des ruelles."66 French taste, Sorel
believed, had remained faithful to Boileau's principles
of good sense, clarity and natural language, which for

Boileau had characterized ancient literature. When the

 

65Ibid., p. 291. " . . . by the chance of cir-
cumstances." " . . . by the chance of circumstances."

66Ibid., p. 294. " . . . the bourgeois spirit
opposing the spirit of drawing rooms and lanes."

 

 

249

debate between the ancients and the moderns began,
Boileau, who favored the ancients, was opposed, Sorel
reported, by those who found his aesthetic " . . . trop

génante Pour les médiocres."67

The most numerous support
took the side of the moderns and Sorel chided the role

of "les jésuites" in the defeat of Boileau: " . . . les
jésuites ont toujours soutenu 1e parti de la médiocrité,
parce qu'ils étaient ainsi assurés d'avoir de leur caté

le plus grand nombre des gens du monde; ils avaient
défendu la médiocrité morale contre les jansenistes;

ils défendirent la médiocrité litteraire contre Boileau."68
By the end of the seventeenth century, Sorel noted, French
society had abandoned itself to the search for happiness;
fear of sin, the respect for chastity and pessimism, he
believed, slowly disappeared while the moral force of
Christianity faded. The origin of the doctrine of pro-

gress was born because society felt obliged to prove that

it had the right to ignore the ancient maxims:

 

67Ibid., p. 297. Sorel was astonished to see
" . . . parml les partisans des modernes un homme aussi
savant que Bayle." Ibid. " . . . too disturbing for
mediocre people."

 

68Ibid., p. 299. He added scornfully ” . . . et
je crois bien que, de tout temps leur colleges ont été
institués pour produire la médiocrité scientifique."
Ibid., p. 2. " . . . the jesuits have always supported
the mediocre party because they were thus assured of
having the greatest number of people on their side; they
defended moral mediocrity against the jansenists; they
defended literary mediocrity against Boileau."

 

250

" . . . Fontenelle eut le mérite de révéler d ses con-
temporains la possibilité d'une telle philosophie."69
Central to this theory of progress, Sorel believed,
was the idea of the stability of the laws of nature, which
he noted, Fontenelle popularized. But the idea of the
stability of the laws of nature, Sorel asserted, could
not be explained by seventeenth century physics, but was
uniquely the result of historical conditions, the most
important of which was the sense of the increasing sta-
bility and power of royal institutions in France. These
institutions were regarded, Sorel wrote " . . . comme
étant une force constante qui ajoutait Chaque jour quelque
nouvelle amélioration aux ameliorations déja acquises."70
In addition, Sorel noted, the idea of progress was depen-
dent upon two important ideas of Descartes which envisioned
science as inseparable from practice, and as always
increasing in scope. Fontenelle, whom Sorel labeled a
skilled vulgarizer and "un cartésien fanatique" was able to
exercise an influence on the movement of ideas which Sorel
found to be " . . . en singuliere contradiction avec sa

médiocrité."71

 

69Ibid., p. 305. ”Fontenelle had the merit to
reveal to his contemporaries the possibility of such a
philosophy."

7OIbid., p. 306. " . . . as being a constant
force which added each day some new amelioration to the
ameliorations already acquired."

71Ibid., p. 308. " . . . the singular contra-
diction wiEh'his mediocrity."

 

251

Concerned with the reasons why Cartesianism could
become a philosophy acceptable to those he called "gens
du monde," Sorel speculated that this acceptance repre-
sented a remarkable example of the adoption of an ideology
by a class which found in it formula capable of expressing
its tendencies.72 And Sorel charged that by formulating
his famous rule of methodical doubt Descartes only intro-
duced into philosophy the habits of the aristocratic mind.
A close look at the fundamental conceptions of Carte-
sianism, Sorel concluded, would demonstrate their perfect
correspondance to the state of mind of the people of the
time. Cartesianism, he believed, was resolutely optimis-
tic, and thus pleased a society which wanted to amuse
itself freely and which rejected the rigor of Jansenism.
Additionally, Sorel continued, there was no Cartesian
morality, and this was suitable to the time since moral
standards had become less severe. To discover the truth,
Sorel wrote, it sufficed for the Cartesian " . . . de se
rendre attentif aux idées claires que chacun porte en

73

lui." Thus science became a manner of inventing nature

 

72Sorel admitted that " . . . it was very rare
that one could discover a solid line between a philosophi-
cal system and contemporary events, because the creator
operated like an artist in interpreting sensations which
he felt; but if the system lasted it found itself adapted
to the needs of a particular society." Ibid., p. 309.

73Ibid., p. 314. " . . . to render himself
attentive to Ehe clear ideas that each person carries in
himself."

 

252

according to the method of Descartes and the history of
humanity was seen as a pedagogical progression leading
from the savage state to the aristocratic life. The

eighteenth century, he concluded, accepted and extended

this conception of inevitable progress.

La Classe Conquérante Au XVIII SiECle

 

To comprehend the ideas which were formed in
eighteenth century France, Sorel added, writing in
October, 1906, in an essay entitled "la classe con-
quérante au XVIII siécle," " . . . it must be understood
that France was being slowly conquered by a ‘oligarchie
bourgeoise' which the monarchy had created for its ser-

vice."74

The ideology of eighteenth century France, he
continued, was more and more related to the conditions

of life of this class of auxiliaries to the monarchy.

Its ideology, Sorel wrote: " . . . tend d prendre le
caractere de consultations données par des juristes, des
historiens ou des savants sur des problémes qui leur sont

75 It was this historical development, Sorel

soumis."
affirmed, which created the habit in France of making all

opinion depend on abstract formula, general theories and

 

74Georges Sorel, "La classe conquérante au XVIIIe
siecle," Le mouvement socialiste (October, 1906), P. 65
(see notefl). (Hereinafter referred to as "La classe
conquérante au XVIlIe Siécle.")

 

75Ibid., p. 77. ” . . . tends to take the char-
acter of consultations given by jurists, historians or
scholars on problems submitted to them."

 

253

abstract philosophical doctrines. This new class which
Sorel identified as the "Tiers-Etat," was economically
based, he believed, upon merchants and manufacturers,

a section of which had become involved with administrative
and judicial functions and had assumed the character of a
bourgeois oligarchy. This new oligarchy acted to
regularize, reinforce and extend the power of the state,
which, Sorel noted, it came more and more to regard as
its property. But the Tiers-Etat, Sorel charged, came

to feel the need to imitate the aristocracy: " . . . le
Tiers-Etat n'est pas satisfait de la richesse et da la

76 The important

puissance, i1 lui faut des honneurs."
position which literary figures held in the eighteenth
century, Sorel attributed to this seeking after honor.
The Third-Estate, he wrote " . . . aspire au bel esprit
et accorde une confiance absolue a des hommes qu'elle
voit changés par la plus haute noblesse et par des sou-

. 7
veralns."7

 

76Ibid., p. 83. " . . . the Third-Estate is not
satisfied with riches and power, it is necessary that they
have honors."

77Ibid., p. 99. Noting VOltair's experience in
Berlin, and the extent to which he became "un tres grand
personnage" after his return to Paris, Sorel concluded,
" . . . la haute société francaise était fort sensible
aux.jugements que l'étranger portait sur ses grands hommes
et.la bourgeoisie devait avoir pour eux un respect
presque superstitieux," Ibid., " . . . aspires to the
beautiful spirit and accords absolute confidence to men
that.it sees changed by the highest nobility and by
sovereigns . "

 

254

The doctrine of progress developed naturally out
of the aspirations of this conquering class, Sorel
insisted; but a comprehension of its thinking required
an understanding of its idea of science. The narrow
specialization of individual scientists which Sorel saw
in his contemporary world, would have been regarded by
the men of the eighteenth century as a degradation of the
mind. Turgot regarded curiosity as the great force for
progress, and this view, Sorel insisted: " . . . cor-
respond parfaitement aux sentiments de ses contemporains
qui sont toujours a la recherche de connaissances
nouvelles et ne consentant jamais a s'enfermer dans les
étroites frontiéres d'une spécialité scientifique."?8
From Diderot's Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature
(1754) Sorel concluded that Diderot could not imagine a
scientific culture which extended beyond that which
was pleasing to amateurs. And Sorel found this cur-
iosity, which characterized so much of eighteenth century
thought, to be in perfect accord with the preoccupations
of the bourgeois oligarchy. To be an excellent adminis-

trator, he wrote: " . . . il n'était nullement nécessaire

 

781bid., p. 111. ” . . . perfectly corresponded
to the sentiments of his contemporaries who are always
researching for new knowledge and never consent to enclose
themselves in the narrow frontiers of a scientific
specialty."

 

255

de posséder une connaissance de spécialiste."79 In

Condorcet, Sorel found an author who stated a goal which
he believed was entirely directed by practicality. Con-
dorcet had insisted that to render an evaluation of a
discovery, an important theory, a new system of law or
even a political revolution, it was necessary to determine
its results with respect to the most numerous part of
society. This idea, Sorel believed, characterized the
Physiocrats as well as all other reformers of the
eighteenth century; " . . . c'est la seulement qu'on
peut juger du véritable perfectionnement de l'espece
humaine."80
The administrative and utilitarian character
of science in the eighteenth century, Sorel believed,
explained the inability of what he called "l'occultisme"
to become an important aspect of human knowledge. It

could satisfy the curiosity of the salons, he admitted,

" . . . mais il ne pouvait entrer dans les préoccupations

 

79Ibid., pp. 115-16. Noting the influence of the
Enc clo edia, he wrote: "Pendant assez longtemps aprés
Ia RdvoEution l'Encyclopédie semble avoir servi aux
fonctionnaires pour prendre une vue générale des choses
qu'ils devaient contréler." Ibid., p. 116. " . . . it
was not at all necessary to possess a specialized knowl-
edge."

 

8°Ibid., p. 118. In a footnote Sorel added: "Il
s'agit donc ici de statistique." " . . . it is only
there that one can judge with true perfection the human
species."

 

256

des hommes qui dirigeaient les grandes affaires."81 Had

occultism exercised a great influence during this period,
Sorel added, it would have been a remarkable example of
an ideology deprived of any economic basis. The men of
the eighteenth century, on the contrary, Sorel insisted,
always placed themselves in the perspective of an oli-
garchy which sought to govern in the name of reason.

The bourgeois oligarchy assumed that the citizens would
allow their individual points of view to be directed
toward conformity with those of enlightened administra-
tors, and these administrators he noted were " . . . the
first in history to be disposed to admit the extension
of a mathematical calculus to political and moral

problems."82

L'Audace Novatrice Du Tiers-Etat

 

Continuing his attack on what he called "l'audace
novatrice du tiers-Etat," Georges Sorel, writing in

November, 1906, noted the rash audacity with which they

83

approached problems of social reform. Approvingly

 

8112i§.. P. 122. " . . . but it cannot enter in
the preoccupations of men who direct big business."

82Ibid., p. 129. Sorel complained of the same
methodology among his contemporaries who were " . . . si
dévotement a la sociologie."

83Georges Sorel, "L'audace novatrice du Tiers-
Etat," Le mouvement socialiste (November, 1906), p. 219
(see notefil). (Hereinafter referred to as "L'audace
novatrice du Tiers-Etat.")

 

 

 

257

quoting Tocqueville, he complained that this rising
class believed that the total and sudden transformation
of an old and complicated society could occur smoothly
through the use of reason alone; a project which Sorel

evaluated Simply: "les malheureux!"84

Turgot represented
this movement toward what Sorel called recklessness (la
témérité), a movement which he believed could not be dis-
tinguished from the rise of a bourgeois oligarchy which
sensed that the hour of its dictatorship was near. The
belief which supported the contention of this rising class
that a radical change in institutions would be easy to
effect, Sorel insisted, was rooted in their ideas on the
nature of man. Turgot had stated the central idea in a
letter to the king, in language which Sorel found similar
to Rousseau: "Les droits des hommes ne sont point fondés

. . . 5
sur leur hist01re, mals sur leur nature."8

Pointing to
the eighteenth century authors who wrote on the physical
organization of the human body, Sorel noted their accep-

tance of the idea of final causes upon which rested their

_-

84Sorel's reference was simply TOCqueville,
L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution, p. 242 in "l'audace
novatrice du Tiers-Etat," p. 220.

85Sorel quoted Correspondance inédite de Condorcet
et de Turgot, edited by M. Ch. Henry, p. 503, in:‘L'audace
novatriCe’du Tiers-Etat," p. 228. "The rights of men
are not founded on their history, but on their nature."

 

 

 

258

idea that the human organism demonstrated that nature
had resolved in a perfect manner all the problems which
could be posed.

The influence of Descartes according to Sorel
contributed to the mood of confidence and the disdain
for authority which became part of the ideology of the
eighteenth century bourgeois oligarchy. Condorcet summed
up this Cartesian influence, Sorel noted, citing a quote

from Tableau historique: "Il (Descartes) dit aux hommes

 

de secouer le joug de l'authorité, de ne plus reconnaitre
que celle qui serait avouée par la raison. . . . "86
In addition, Sorel continued, the eighteenth century
philosophers believed that all the old social institutions
depended upon the Christian church; and because they
believed that these institutions were responsible for

evil and error it seemed a simple and easy thing to

transform them by destroying the Christian church. Taine

was right, according to Sorel, when he wrote that "the

 

86Ibid., p. 233. Sorel quoted Condorcet,
Tableau historique (no page reference), and in a further
footnote, SoreI quoted from the same source Condorcet's
statement that Descartes had given ” . . . 1a méthode
de trouver de reconnaitre la vérité." "He said to men
to throw off the yoke of authority, to recognize only
that which would be acknowledged by reason."

 

 

‘—

 

 

259

philosophy of the eighteenth century could be summed
up in the maxim: 'Ecrasons l'Inféime.”87
But it was the Christian church, Sorel noted
ironically, which had provided the philosophers with
their ideas of the transformational power of education.
The Christian missionaries had spoken of the extraordinary
results which had been experienced among what they con-
sidered to be less advanced people and this had convinced
the philosophers that the progress had been rapid " . . .
parce que les Européens apporteraient d ces peuples le
résultat de recherches qui ont été longues et fastidi-

88 Thus when Turgot became a royal minister,

euses."
Sorel continued, he proposed a plan of popular education
to the king, a plan which almost completely imitated,
Sorel charged, the clerical approach to education. It

was to be directed at forming virtuous and useful people

in all classes of society. Turgot had written:

 

87Ibid., p. 232. Sorel quoted from La conquéte
jacobine, Taine, p. 302. He also quoted Conddrcet in
a—letter to Turgot: "Le colosse est a moitié détruit,
mais i1 faut achever de l'écraser." Correspondance
inédite de Condorcet et de Turgot, editedfihy M. Ch.
Henry, pp. 205-06. 1Crush the Ififamous.”

 

 

88Sorel, "L'audace novatrice du Tiers-Etat,"
p. 234. " . . . because the Europeans would bring to
these people the result of long and fastidious research."

 

260

L'éducation civique que ferait donner 1e conseil de
l'Instruction, les livres raisonnables qu'il ferait
rédiger et qu'il obligerait tous les professeurs
d'enseigner contribueraient a former un peuple
instruit et vertueux. Ils sémeraient dans le
coeur des enfants des principes d'humanité, de
justice, de bienfaisance et d'amour pour l'Etat,
qui, trouvant leur application a mesure qu'ils 89
avanceraient en age, s'accroitraient sans cesse.

"These philosophers of France, Sorel noted caustically,
lacked the experience of the present which might have

taught them that such an education would only effectively

facilitate the dominion of Charlatans."90

Turning to economic influences in the eighteenth
century, Sorel noted that although the century had begun
poorly by the 1750's there was a decided economic
improvement associated with agriculture and commerce.
Although all classes did not share equally in this
economic improvement, Sorel believed the bourgeoisie was

greatly influenced by its rapid economic rise.

89Ibid., p. 235. Sorel quoted Correspondance
inédite de Condorcet et de Turgot, p. 549} In an aside
Sorel noted that Democracy in'his day " . . . a conservé
toutes ces opinions de l'oligarchie du Tiers-Etat; elle
a con u, elle aussi, l'instructionuprimaire comme un
moyen d'enseigner un catéchisme laique, patriotique bour-
geois," p. 236.
Civic education that would make the counselor of
Instruction give reasonable books, would contribute
to form an instructed and virtuous people. They
would plant principles of humanity, justice, charity
and love for state in the hearts of children, who
finding their application in proportion as they
advance in age, would grow without ceasing.

90
p. 236.

Sorel, "L'audace novatrice du Tiers-Etat,"

 

261

Tocqueville, according to Sorel, observed that by 1780
Personne ne prétend plus que la France est en
décadence; on dirait au contraire qu'il n'y a an
ce moment plus de bornes a ses progres. C'est
alors que la doctrine de la perfectibilité continue
et indéfinie de l'homme prend naissance. Vingt ans
auparavant on n'espérait rien de l'avenir; maintenant
on ne redoute rien.91

With respect to this theory of limitless progress, Sorel

noted: "Comme toujours i1 se trouve des idéologues

pour continuer a penser d'apres les conditions antéri-

eures."92 Nevertheless, he concluded, the great rapidity

of the economic amelioration had the effect of producing

the belief in the eighteenth century that everything

was possible.

Les Théories Modernes Du Progres
Continuing into the period of the early nineteenth
century, Sorel, in an essay entitled "Les théories
modernes du progres," examined the ideas of Mme. de

Stadl, whom he believed had attempted to establish the

 

91Ibid., p. 245. Sorel quoted Tocqueville,

L'Ancien_§égime et la Révolution, p. 292.
No one pretends any IOnger that France is in
decadence; one would say on the contrary that there
is at this moment no more limits to its progress.
It is thus that the doctrine of continued and
indefinite perfectability of man takes birth.
Twenty years before we hOped for nothing from the
future now we fear nothing.

92Sorel, "L'andace novatrice du Tiers-Etat,"
p. 245. "As always it finds ideologists in order to
continue to think according to anterior conditions."

 

262

superiority of her epoch through literary considerations.
The new literary criticism of Mme. de Stael, Sorel
believed was motivated by her desire to prove that a
specifically republican literature was possible under the
condition that it liberate itself from the rules of
ancient classical literature. Sorel concluded that
Mme. de Stael must be understood in the context of her
desire to defend the work of the French Revolution and
he added: "Toutes les theses nouvelles de ce livre fameux
sont ainsi déterminées par les conditions historiques."94
The post-revolutionary developments in the realm
of historiography as represented in the first instance by
Savigny were according to Sorel, weakened conceptually
because of a desire to maintain an assumption of future
progress. Unlike Mme. de Staél who sought to defend the
present over the past, Sorel wrote: " . . . les theses
de l'école historique . . . a voulu conserver l'espérance
d'un mouvement futur, ce qui obligeait d introduire une

95

force créatrice, une puissance de progrés." But this

 

93Georges Sorel, "Les théories modernes du pro-
gres, Le mouvement socialiste (December, 1906), (see note
1). (Hereifiafter reférred to as "Les théories modernes
du progrés.")

 

94Ibid., p. 330. "All the new theses of this
famous booE are thus determined by historical conditions."

95Ibid., p. 333. Sorel complained that the school
did not " . . . tenue rigoureusement a cette étude scien-
tifique d'un passé achevé, délimité, solidifié. " . . .
the theses of the historical school wished to conserve the
hope of a future movement which obliged to introduce a
creative force, a power of progress."

93

 

 

 

263

creative force, Sorel charged, was not itself subject to
any formulation and to this extent the historical school,
he continued, was similar to the Darwinian school of
evolution " . . . qui ne peut pas dire quelles sont les
causes qui déterminent les changements dans les espECes;
elle constate seulement, une fois la sélection achevée."96
During the years after the restoration of the French
monarchy in the early nineteenth century, Sorel observed,
the doctrine of progress could maintain itself only by
borrowing heavily from that of evolution. Henceforth,
this organic conception engendered several important
theses. A special importance was attached to the slowness
and regularity of historical movement; and the idea of
necessity was strongly reinforced. Institutions them-
selves came to be regarded as if they were organs of a
living being.

Sorel found Tocqueville's Démocratie en Amérique
(1834) a remarkable application of these new points of
view. Tocqueville, according to Sorel, regarded the
movement toward equality of conditions as a world-wide
phenomenon in which all people " . . . ont été poussés

péle-mele dans la méme voie et tous ont travaillé en

 

96Ibid. Sorel added " . . . on dit que la con-
currence vitaI donne la victoire aux plus aptes; mais
quels sont les plus aptes?" " . . . which cannot say
what are the causes that determine changes in the species;
it only verifies once the selection is finished."

 

 

264

commun, les uns malgré eux, les autres a leur issue,
aveugles instruments dans la main de Dieu."97 The
movement, Sorel observed, was represented by Tocqueville
as organic and irresistible; democracy was presented as
the necessity of the future. And the work of Proudhon
which appeared prior to 1848, Sorel noted, was highly

influenced by these ideas of Tocqueville--especially

Proudhon's Contradictions économiques which Sorel called

 

" . . . une philosophie du devenir égalitaire démontrée

98

par les lois économique." But Sorel agreed with Marx

who rejected this position, and sustained that this ten-
dency toward equality appeared only in the present.99
The defenders of the ideas of equality, Sorel speculated,
justified these ideas to affirm a desired future. They

wanted to make it known that equality was not an accident

of modern times: "C'est la point de vue de la création

 

97Quoted by Sorel from Tocqueville, Democratie en
Amérique, no page number cited only ” . . . aux premiéres
pages d5 son livre, la premiere édition en 1834. ” . .
have been pushed pell-mell in the same path and have all
worked in common, the ones despite the others, the others

at their conclusion blind instruments in the hand of God."

 

98Sorel, "Les théories modernes du progrES,"
p. 337. " . . . a philOSOphy of becoming egalitarian
demonstrated by economic laws."

99Sorel referred here to Marx, Mi§Ere de la
philosophie, p. 165.

 

 

265

qui gatait leurs vues sur le passé; l'étude de l'évolution

était troublée par une idée préconcue sur l'avenir."loo
As democracy came to feel assured of its future,

Sorel continued, it no longer felt the need to justify

its right to power through philosophy of history because

it reposed on a very solid hierarchy. The former champions

of the idea of the necessity of the state had built the

modern state, Sorel charged, on the basis of ideas which

101 Sorel

pertained to "l'héritage de l'ancien régime."
concluded his study of the idea of progress by identifying
the immediate task of contemporary Socialism, which was

he wrote: " . . . de démolir tout cet échafaudage de

 

looSorel, "Les théories modernes du progrés,"
p. 339. Sorel admired Proudhon's definitions in his book
entitled Justice where Proudhon stated that there were
both epochs of regression and progress, whose alternation
was closely related to the morality of each epoch. Pro-
gress occurred, according to Proudhon " . . . lorsque
. . . la justification ou le perfectionnement de l'humanité
par elle-meme, lorsque 1a liberté et la justice s'accrois-
sent, que l'homme si'éléve au-dessus de ce qu'il y a de
fatal; la decadence est la corruption ou la dissolution
de l'humanité par elle-meme, manifestée par la perte
successive des moeurs, de la liberté, du génie, par la
diminution du courage, de la foi, l'appauvrissement des
races." Proudhon, De la 'ustice dans la Revolution et
dans l'Eglise, t. III, p. 27I. "It is the point of_view
of creation which spoils their views on the past; the
study of evolution was troubled by a preconceived idea
of the future."

 

 

101Sorel, "Les théories modernes du progrés,"
p. 345. " . . . heritage of the former regime."

 

266

mensonges conventionnels et de ruiner le prestige dont
jouit encore la métaphysique des gens qui vulgarisent la

vulgarisation du XVIII siecle."102

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

 

Jean-Jacques Rousseau remained for Sorel a pro-
vocative and intriguing figure. In response to a study

entitled Jean-Jacques Rousseau by Jules Lemaitre (Calmann—

 

Lévy, Paris, 1907), Georges Sorel prepared and published

a rebuttal which appeared in June, 1907, in Lg;mouvement

 

socialiste. Sorel complained that Lemaitre had based most

 

of his analysis on the psychology of Rousseau, an approach
which he labeled " . . . l'ordinaire salut des auteurs
embarrassés, dépourvus d'idées, mais désireux de paraitre

103 The place which Rousseau occupied in the

profonds."
history of French literature was enormously important,

Sorel believed; but the source of his unexcelled lyricism
was, he insisted, quite different from that which Lemaitre

had identified. While admitting with Lemaitre that "son

temperament, son état physique" played a part in the

 

102Ibid., p. 346. " . . . to demolish this entire
edifice of conventional lies and to ruin the prestige
that is still enjoyed by the metaphysics of the
people who vulgarize the vulgarization of the eighteenth
century."

103Georges Sorel, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," Lg
mouvement socialiste (June, 1907), p. 509. (Hereinafter
referred to as 1rdean-Jacques Rousseau.") " . . . the
ordinary salvation of embarrassed authors, devoid of
ideas but desirous of appearing profound."

 

 

267

quality of Rousseau's lyricism, Sorel charged that

" . . . Lemaitre oublie cependant l'essentiel, la raison
d'art qui domine la formation de ces solutions: Rousseau
cherchait a dire ce qui lui paraissait 1e mieux convenir

104 This talent, according to Sorel, made

a son talent."
Rousseau the most powerful orator in the French language
since Bossuet. But unlike Bossuet, Sorel insisted,
Rousseau often replaced reason with eloquence “ . . .
ce n'est pas la science qui détermine la these a
développer mais l'art."105
Sorel saw in Rousseau a romanticism which he
believed had a very limited preoccupation with reality.
But the post-revolutionary romantic movement, Sorel
believed, was not the responsibility of Rousseau because
it did not immediately succeed him. The intervening
revolution and its historical impact, Sorel believed,

served to definitively separate Rousseau from the later

romanticism and he concluded that the role of Rousseau

 

104Ibid., p. 518. Sorel noted the historical
paradox which Rousseau presented: " . . . mais le XVIIIe
siecle, si complétement intellectualisé, était rebelle
avec une telle renaissance; l'exemple de Rousseau nous
montre qu'un ricorso litteraire peut se produire pour un
étre isolé et c'est la une experience fort remarquable,"
p. 517. "M. Lemaitre, however, forgot the essential,
the reason of art which dominates the formation of these
solutions: Rousseau sought to say that which seemed to
him.the most convenient to his talent."

105Ibid., p. 518. "It is not science that deter-
mines the thesis to develop but art.”

 

268

was to leave the masterpieces which broke with the tra-
ditions of the XVIII century. The later romanticism,
Sorel added, was characterized by a Christian renaissance
quite distinct from the position of Rousseau who " . . .
n'admettait pas que les miracles évangéliques soient
certains, ni surtout qu'ils soient des preuves."106
Rousseau represented to Sorel a thinker without
a comprehensive system, who borrowed his ideas from those
which were in general circulation. His conception of
property as the source of all unhappiness, Sorel noted,
was very old and well known having derived from Plato's
Republic and from the Renaissance humanists. Nevertheless,
by making a choice among shared opinions and by giving
them authority, Sorel believed Rousseau had given them a
new historical importance. And he speculated that
" . . . 1e r61e du grand homme est presque toujours de
mettre de nouvelles notes sur d'anciennes valeurs."lo.7
To the widespread literature on newly developing people,
Sorel attributed the influence for Rousseau's ideas on
liberty, property, and the happiness of people living

according to nature. Sorel criticized Lemaitre who he

believed had intended to demonstrate the evil consequences

 

lOGIbid., p. 522. " . . . did not admit that
evangelical miracles are certain, nor, especially, that
they are proof."

107Ibid., p. 524. " . . . the role of a great
man.is nearIy always to put new notes on old values."

 

269

of the ideas of Rousseau through such expedients as
insisting that the Terror was the result of the Social
Contract. This thesis was rejected by Sorel who observed
that the entire history of the French Revolution was in
contradiction with a fundamental thesis of the Social
Contract: " . . . cette histoire est dominée par les
luttes entreprises par les jacobins . . . et Rousseau
avait écrit: Il n'y a plus de volonté générale quand une
des associations partielles est si grande qu'elle l'emporte
sur toutes les autres."108
Sorel speculated that one reason the work of
Rousseau was so little understood by the revolutionaries
was because of the style in which it was written: " . . .
c'est qu'elle est, pour la plus grande partie, dans la
tradition de l'éloquence sacrée et que ce genre comporte

109

de grandes exagérations." Rousseau wanted, Sorel

affirmed, in the tradition of religious oratory (oratories

 

108Ibid., p. 528. Sorel gave no citation for his
quote from the Social Contract; Sorel noted that only a
complete misunderstanding of Rousseau could lead to an
interpretation which would justify the reign of terror:
and he noted additionally: "Nous avons vu, de nos jours,
l'oeuvre de Marx donner naissance a des commentaires aussi
ineptes que ceux qu'on fit alors de l'oeuvre de Rousseau."
" . . . this history is dominated by struggles undertaken
by the Jacobins . . . and Rousseau wrote: 'there is no
more general will when one of the partial associations is
so big that it carries its will on all the others.'"

 

1°9Ibid., p. 529. " . . . it is that it 18' for
the most part, in the tradition of sacred eloquence and
that this genre carries great exaggerations."

 

270

des prédicateurs catholiques), to produce in his contem-
poraries an emotion capable of engendering " . . . des
réflexions utiles, mais indéterminées, au sujet de leur

110 Thus Rousseau, Sorel continued,

maniere de vivre."
presented strongly colored images " . . . qu'il faut
prendre en bloc comme des masses indivisibles et non con-
sidérer comme des modeles proposes a l'empirisme qui en
tirera ce qu'il pourra."lll Rousseau himself, Sorel

insisted, had warned against the absurdities which would

be produced by mixing Emile and the Social Contract into

 

the life of the century, and yet this is what the revo-
lutionaries attempted, Sorel charged, and to this extent
they failed to comprehend the work of Rousseau. This
error, Sorel concluded, was exactly like those committed
by numerous heritical sects of the Middle Ages who wanted
to put into practice the thesis on poverty which they had
found in the fathers of the Christian church. Thus

Sorel concluded that "Le spectacle de Robespierre

relisant constamment le Nouvelle Héloise, pour se tenir

 

llqlbid., p. 531. " . . . useful but undetermined
reflections, on the subject of their manner of living."

111Ibid. " . . . that it is necessary to take
in a block, as indivisible masses and not considered
like models proposed to empiricism which will pull from
1t what it can."

 

271

au niveau de l'éloquence émue, me semble étre un des

plus burleques de l'histoire.n112

La Crise Morale Et Religieuse
In July, 1907, Georges Sorel wrote an essay
entitled "la crise morale et religieuse" in which he

quoted from Rousseau's Confessions to illustrate a con-

 

temporary religious paradox. In the sixth book of the

Confessions, Sorel noted the appearance of Madame de

 

Warens whom, he noted, remained totally faithful to her
religious beliefs even when an examination of the articles
of that faith revealed her beliefs to be in opposition

to those of her church. Her response particularly
interested Sorel: "I am a good Catholic, she said, and

I always want to be. I am not the mistress of my faith,
but I am of my will. I submit without reservation, and

113 Sorel believed that

I want to believe everything."
the religious basis of morality as exemplified by Madame
de Warens was losing its force in the modern world, and

this crisis for morality was aggravated, he contended,

 

112Ibid. Sorel's reference for this image was
cited as Chuquet, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 196. "The
spectacle of Robespierre constantly rereading the New
Heloise, in order to hold himself at the level of
affected eloquence, seems to me to be one of the most
burlesque of history."

113Georges Sorel, "La Crise morale et religieuse,"
JLe mouvement socialiste (July, 1907). Sorel's reference
in: Rousseauls Conf§s§ions is not documented.

 

272

because contemporary bourgeois institutions were power-
less to provide an alternative: "Tout le monde sent,
d'une maniere plus ou moins précise, qu'on ne peut fonder
la morale sur l'Etat, sur le droit, sur l'économie et,
par suite sur aucune des institutions bourgeoises."ll4
Morality, he believed, required " . . . quelque chose
de mystérieux, ou tout au moins d'étranger aux insti-

115 The question for Sorel

tutions de notre société."
had become where to find what he called "ce quelque
chose"?

Sorel was convinced that the bourgeoisie was
destined to live without morality. In the contemporary
bourgeoisie, Sorel noted, there was only a preoccupation
with immediate interests: " . . . elle se contente d'un
arbitraire mitigé par des considerations d'opportunité."116
This condition would not, Sorel believed, lead to the

immediate fall of the bourgeoisie which he forecast would

be able to find resources to defend itself for a very

 

114Sorel, "La Crise morale et religieuse," p. 27.
"Everyone feels, in a more or less precise manner, that
we cannot found morality on the state, on law, on economy
and consequently on any bourgeois institution."

115Ibid. " . . . something mysterious or at

least strange to the institutions of our society."

1161bid., p. 35. " . . . it contents itself with
an arbitrariness mitigated by considerations of opportunity."

273

long time against the revolutionary proletariat. A
society, Sorel observed, could prosper materially without
possessing moral values, and he advanced the speculation
that morality was more independent of the economic system
than were judicial, political and religious ideologies.

He further believed that a class could create for itself

" . . . des conceptions morales qui soient en complet
désaccord avec tout l'ensemble de la structure sociale."117
This possibility, he affirmed, was one of the postulates
of Socialism founded on the basis of class conflict.
Thus he believed it was important to disallow the moral
teachings of bourgeois philosophy from penetrating the
proletariat because its philosophers would be necessarily
led " . . . d inventer des ombres de morale sophistique,
qui sont de nature a porter 1e trouble dans les ames et

a conduire 1e peuple a la corruption."118

L'Evolution Créatrice

 

In April, 1908, Georges Sorel completed the fifth
in a series of essays devoted to the analysis and evalu-

ation of the theories advanced by Henri Bergson in his

 

117Ibid., p. 36. " . . . moral conceptions which
are in complete disaccord with the entire social structure."

118Ibid., p. 37. " . . . to invent shadows of
moral sophistry, which naturally carry trouble in souls
and to lead the people to corruption."

274

119 Sorel expressed

book entitled L'Evolution créatrice.
the hOpe that the ideas developed by Bergson would not
be confined to the natural sciences where he believed
their application had little value, instead he affirmed
the great value which the insights of Bergson would have
for understanding " . . . les grands mouvements sociaux
qui requierent une grande liberté."120
Bergson had, according to Sorel, identified the
raison d'étre of metaphysics as intuition which Bergson
conceived as a sort of revelation " . . . sur notre per-
sonnalité, sur notre liberté, sur la place que nous
occupons dans l'ensemble de la nature, sur notre origin

121

et peut-étre aussi sur notre destinée." This intuition

was properly understood from the perspective of the work

 

119Georges Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," Lg
mouvement socialiste (April, 1908). (See Appendix B for
a complete list of Georges Sorel's contributions to Le
mouvement socialiste in the years 1907 and 1908.) This
concluding essay will hereinafter be referred to as:
"l'Evolution créatrice," April, 1908; others in the series
will be designated in a similar fashion, distinguished
by the appropriate date of appearance in Le mouvement
socialiste.

 

 

120Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," April, 1908,
p. 294. " . . . the great social movements which demand
great liberty."

121Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," January, 1908,
p. 49. Sorel's reference is to l'Evolution créatrice,
Henri Bergson, pp. 290, 291. " . . . of our personality,
liberty, of the place we occupy in nature, on our origin
and perhaps, also, on our destiny."

 

275

of an artist who created by an invention which was uniquely
personal. Intuition was, Sorel believed, a form of
invention; and he accepted Bergson's observation: "C'est
une lampe presque éteinte, qui ne se ranime que de loin

122 Inventions

en loin, pour quelques instants a peine."
played a role even in the development of modern physics,
Sorel noted, because each invention enlarged human
horizons, but this progress was paradoxical, because it
had revealed " . . . un trou noir toujours plus vaste

123 Sorel speculated that

qui se manifeste a nos yeux."
in all fields the inventors were poets and he praised
the immense services which the poetic imagination of
certain savants had rendered. And because he believed
that the poetic faculties played a preponderant role in
the sciences, he questioned the wisdom of what he called
"nos méthodes pédogogique" which he charged had tended
to ruin "toute faculté poétique" in the students of his
124

day. The capacity for criticism as well as for

invention had been stifled, Sorel believed, because of

 

122Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," January, 1908,
p. 50, and L'Evolution créatrice, Bergson, p. 298. "It
is a nearly extinguihhed lamp, which only revives itself
at long intervals, for scarcely a few seconds."

 

123Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," January, 1908,
p. 51. " . . . a black hole always more vast which shows
itself to our eyes."

124Ibid., p. 52.

276

a false and exaggerated confidence which students had
been taught to feel when presented with ideas which
appeared too simple and obvious to be worthy of a pro-
found examination. Bergson had found, according to Sorel,
that in philosophy this condition was due to an illusion
of language.

In terminating his study of Bergson, Sorel
attempted to distinguish between two modes of represen-
tation. On the one hand, he identified the pursuit of
what he called " . . . une connaissance impersonnelle,
scientifique, destinée a des applications déterministes;"125
which he believed corresponded to Kant's designation of
phenomena in that it represented an area of scientific
investigation in the context of time and mathematics.
The second mode of representation was that in which
" . . . nous construisons une connaissance personnelle,

126 which cor-

poétique, faite en vue d'actes libres;"
responded to Kant's designation of noumenon which was
outside of time and was, Sorel added, the realm of moral
philosophy.

The procedure which was employed for the purpose

of exercising personal freedom, Sorel affirmed, required

 

125Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice," April, 1908,
p. 286. " . . . an impersonal, scientific knowledge
destined to determinist applications."

126Ibid. " . . . we construct a personal, poetic
knowledge made in view of free acts."

 

277

the creation of an imaginary world projected into the
future; it was he continued " . . . formé de mouvements
qui dépendent de notre psychologie profonde; nous nous
sentons mélés, d'une maniere active, 5 cette agitation,
et cependant on peut dire que ce monde est a nous st

127 These

qu'il est entierement contenu dans notre ame."
constructions which served to initiate free acts, Sorel
believed, were representations which appeared "en bloc"
and were constructed according to " . . . 1e désir de

128 Contrary to an atomistic science which

notre ame."
regarded the whole as the sum of its parts, Sorel
insisted, here only the whole matters " . . . parce qu'il
est l'intention de notre conscience créatrice et que les
parties ne sont que des manifestations accessoires de

cette conscience, produits qui sont changés, avec la

plus grande facilité quand ils ne paraissent plus

 

127Ibid., p. 287. In a footnote, Sorel added
"This world is placed in a future which has no determined
date or chronology; such a world could be thus regarded
as being outside of time and this corresponds well to
Kant's noumenon." " . . . formed from movements which
depend on our profound psychology} we feel mingled, in
an active manner, with this agitation, and we can say,
however, this world is ours and it is entirely contained
in our soul."

128Ibid. "There was unity in these constructions,
Sorel added . . . parce qu'en derniere analyse, c'est
nous-memes qui sommes en jeu dans ce tableau." “ . . .
the desire of our soul."

278

répondre suffisamment 5 nos intentions."129 The critic,

Sorel concluded, can refute a representation of the
scientific order, but is powerless before a construction

which was imagined for the purpose of free action.

129Ibid., p. 288. ” . . . because it is the
intention of our creative conscience and that parts are
only accessory manifestations of this conscience--products
which are changed with the greatest ease when they no
longer appear to sufficiently answer our intentions."

......-

APPENDIX A

LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE: 1906
CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL

15 janvier 1906 *
"Réflexions sur la Violence," pp. 5-56.

15 février 1906 *
"les Préjuges contre la violence," pp. 140-64.
"les déclin du parti socialiste international"

pp. 194-202.

15 mars 1906 *
"La Greve Générale prolétarienne," pp. 256-93.

15 avril 1906 *
"La Greve Générale politique," pp. 390-427.
Revue critique:
les Droits Acquis, de Lassalle, pp. 476-85.

 

15 mai et 15 juin 1906
"La moralité de la violence-La morale des producteurs,"

pp. 33-124o*

juillet 1906
Revue critique:
Grandeur et décandence de Rome par Gugliemo Ferrero

‘pp. 244-68.

aoflt et septembre 1906
”Les Ilusions du progrES," pp. 289-328.

octobre 1906
"Les Illusions du progres," pp. 65-129.

novembre 1906
"Les Illusions du progres,” pp. 219-50.
Revue critique:
Le caractére reli ieux de socialisme, par Edouard

Dolléans, pp. 28 -90.

decembre 1906
”Les théories modernes du progresé, pp. 314-46.

*
These essays were combined to form the influ-

ential book Reflections on Violence, lst edition published

in French Reflexions surlla Violence, Riviére, Paris, 1908.

279

APPENDIX B

LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE 1907 - 1908
CONTRIBUTIONS BY GEORGES SOREL

février 1907
Revue critique:
Grandeur et decadence de Rome: Antoine et Cléopétre
tome IV, par Gugliemo Ferrero, pp. 171-93.

avril 1907
“Le prétendu Socialisme juridique," pp. 321-48.

mai 1907 Revu
Revue critique:
Les cahiers de Jeunesse de Renan, pp. 456-79.

 

juin 1907
"Jean-Jacques Rousseau," pp. 507-33.

juillet 1907
”La crise morale et religieuse," pp. 13-38.

aoflt et semtembre 1907
"Lettre 5 M. Daniel Halévy " pp. 137-66.

octobre 1907
"L'Evolution créatrice," pp. 257-83.

décembre 1907
"L'Evolution créatrice" (suite) pp. 478-95.

janvier 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice (suite)" pp. 34-53.

mars 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice (suite)" pp. 184-95.

avril 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice (fin)" pp. 276-95.

juin 1908
"la politique américane," pp. 449-57.

juillet 1908
Revue critique:
Grandeur et Décadence de Rome Tome V, pp. 36-52.

 

septembre 1908
”Les Intellectuels a Athénes," pp. 214-36.

280

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER VI

This chapter opens with Georges Sorel's analysis

entitled The Decomposition of Marxism in which he

 

attacked the dogmatic use of Marx by contemporary
Marxists. He examines revolutionary and utopian
Socialism and condemned the desire to seek control of
the state's power, while advocating the adoption of
Syndicalism and the myth of the general strike as a
means to reinvigorate Marxism. He then proceeds to the
Dreyfus affair which he considered from the standpoint
of a revolution whose major importance was its anti-
clerical result.

The role of religion in the modern world is the
subject of Sorel's study entitled "Religion Today" in
which he discussed the impact of William James on the
conflict between science and religion. Chapter VI con-
cludes with an analysis of Sorel's lengthy study ”Per-
spectives on the Problems of Philosophy" in which he
contrasted the Greek and Christian approach to morality
and discussed the role of metaphysics in the modern

‘world. He concluded with a statement of the importance

281

282

of Henri Bergson for the future of philoSOphy and
restated his conception of the artificial and the
natural milieux.

The letters to Croce in the appendix shed addi-
tional light on Sorel's valuation of William James and

Henri Bergson.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI

MARX, DREYFUS; RELIGION AND

PHILOSOPHY: 1907 - 1918

La Decomposition Du Marxisme

During the period of Georges Sorel's prolific
contributions to Le mouvement socialiste, between 1906
and 1908, he delivered an address entitled "la Décom-
position du Marxisme" to an international conference of
syndical-socialists who had gathered in Paris to con-
sider the contemporary Socialist agenda.l On April 3,
1907, Sorel opened his address with a denunciation of
Marx's disciples whom he charged " . . . a beaucoup
contribué a rendre stérile toute critique."2 This

dogmatism was unacceptable with respect to the study of

 

l"1a Decomposition du Marxisme" was first
delivered as an address by Georges Sorel in Paris on
.April 3, 1907, before a meeting of syndical-socialists
‘which included Victor Griffuelhes, Arturo Labriola,
Roberto Michels, Boris Kritchewsky and Herbert Lagardelle.
The address was published under the title La Décom osition
dgLMarxisme (Georges Sorel, Marcel Riviére, Paris, l908)
and it is this lst edition which has served as the
reference for all direct quotes.

 

2Ibid., p. 6. " . . . contributed much to
:render all critiques sterile."

283

284

Marx, who, Sorel believed, had failed to present a
didactic expository form in his work, and especially
Capital had presented a " . . . mélange bizarre de
théories général, de polémiques et de satires ameres,
d'illustrations et de digressions historiques."3 The
purpose of criticism was, according to Sorel, to develop
Marx's insights, although many of his disciples had

chosen instead to repeat vague formula, and adopt senti-
ments of almost religious piety before his works. It
would be better, Sorel affirmed, to follow the advice of
Benedetto Croce who had written that the " . . . thought
of Marx must be freed (débarrasser) from the literary

form which he adopted, so that the questions which he
asked could be studied more completely on the basis of new
historical developments."4 Too many Marxists had rejected
this advice, Sorel complained, with the result that they
had produced only résumés which were more obscure than
Marx's original text. To counter these tendencies, and

to search for a possible renaissance of Socialism, Georges

Sorel purposed to reexamine Marxism; to seek what he

 

3Ibid., p. S. From Benedetto Croce, Matérialisme
historique et économie marxiste, Paris, 1897, p. 94,lin
La Decomposition du Marxisme, p. 5. " . . . bizarre
mixture ofgenerdl theories, polemics and bitter satire,
illustrations and historic digressions."

 

 

 

4Ibid., p. 8. From Croce, Matérialisme historique
et économle marxiste, p. 114.

 

 

 

 

 

 

285

called "1e marxisme de Marx," and to demonstrate through
this study " . . . comment je congois cette nouvelle
maniere de comprendre 1a decomposition du marxisme."5
Sorel's analysis began with a consideration of
what he called "utopistes" in whom he noted a consistent
tendency to " . . . appel aux sentiments de justice quand
ils prOnaient des reconstructions de la société."6 Dis-
tinguishing the utopian from the real, Sorel stated his
conviction that all social organizations presented situ-
ations in which the established law (droit) was offensive
because no matter how perfected a judicial system might
be, it could not be applied perfectly in every instance
" . . . pas plus que la science ne saurait étre parfaite-
ment adéquate a la nature."7 Even such apparently rigid
systems as law and science, he observed, required flexi-
bility. This required, Sorel believed, a certain arbitrary
additive to the law to operate as empiricism did to

soften the rigidity of science. Reforms came about, he

noted, when offended public opinion demanded the

 

5Sorel, La Decomposition du Marxisme, p. 12.
" . . . how I conceive this new manner cf understanding
the decomposition of marxism."

6Ibid., p. 13. " . . . call to sentiments of
justice when they preach reconstructions of society."

7Ibid. " . . . not more than science would know
how to be perfectly adequate to nature."

 

286

elimination of the discord which disturbed it, and in
this process, he believed, changes in judicial decrees
consolidated the existing system by increasing respect
for the law.

Because public opinion was greatly influenced by
men of letters, Sorel believed " . . . on peut dire
qu'il y a toujours d caté de la justice des juristes une
justice romanesque, pleine d'arbitraire et de paradox,
dans laquelle peuvent puiser tous les hommes qui ont du
gofit pour imaginer des changements sociaux."8 All the
historical movement of law, Sorel believed, could be
explained in terms of the conflict between an existing
body of judicial formula and the prevailing sense of
morality. The utopians had failed to appreciate the
operation of this conflict and with it the need for
judicial flexibility and therefore " . . . ils cherchent
a créer un monde tout d fait logique; mais . . . leurs
projets engendreraient des consequences qui choqueraient
bien plus fréquemment nos sentiments que ne les choquent

les usages actuels."9

 

8Ibid., p. 14. " . . . we can say that there is
always on the side of justice of jurists a romantic
justice, full of arbitrariness and paradox, in which all
Inen who have the taste for imagining social changes can
draw. "

9Ibid. " . . . they seek to create an entirely
logical world; but . . . their projects would engender
consequences that would shock our sentiments much more
frequently than present usages."

287

The successors to the utopians of the nineteenth
century had been more conservative in that they did not
call for a complete break with the past as he believed
Charles Fourier had done. Sorel quoted Proudhon who had
rejected Fourier's disregard for the value of tradition
and history: "Quoi! cet immense travail de l'humanité
serait non avenu, l'histoire n'aurait aucun sens et tout
ce mouvement n'aurait été qu'une longue déceptionl"10
In the period just before 1848, such socialists as
Frangois Vidal (Répartition des richesses: on De la
justice distributive en économie sociale, Paris, 1846)
sought to live in what Sorel called the real world; they
hoped to lead all the political parties to adopt their
projects for reform.‘ Sorel noted a characteristic
Socialist view of this epoch: "Les socialistes ne veulent
point transformer d'un seul coup la société, bouleverser

1e monde; leur pretention serait de le convertir."ll

 

10Sorel quoted from a letter by Proudhon to Con-
siderant entitled "Avertissement aux propriétaires' in
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Oeuvres, Paris, 1866 - 1883,
tome II, pp. 55-56. lhid., p. 15. Sorel added the
observation: "Nous venons de voir se produire une
evolution, qui semble nécessaire, de l'utopie a la pra-
tique; cette évolution peut étre encore regardée comme
se produisant de l'imagination a l'intelligence, du
romanesque au droit, de l'absolu au relatif, de la sim-
plicité a la complexité." La Decomposition du Marxisme,
p. 16. "What! this immense work oflhumanlty would be
cancelled, history would have no sense and this whole
:movement would only have been a long deception.“

11Sorel quoted from Francois Vidal, Répartition
‘des richesses, pp. 464-65. (See note 10.) In La

 

288

The Socialists of this time preached social peace, and
contemporary writers who were concerned with social
reform, Sorel charged, had added little to what ”les
anciens socialistes" had said.

A second element which Sorel found to have
entered into modern Socialism he identified as the
"revolutionary idea" which he believed had been iden-
tified since antiquity with the concept of the battle of
the poor against the rich and as such, he noted, was a
rudimentary form of class conflict. An entire body of
literature had been devoted to giving the poor an
absolute confidence in their power by exalting their
virtues and " . . . en ruinant 1e prestige des classes

12 The men who came to represent this

dominantes."
revolutionary tradition, Sorel insisted, were the street
fighters whom Bernstein had labeled "blanguistes." The
manner by which they came to power, Sorel continued, was
not important to them, but the possession of power was
represented as the solution of all their difficulties.
This historic movement acquired a new and unexpected

aspect, with the intervention of a party which would

lead the revolution. It was henceforth no longer the

 

Decomposition du Marxisme, p. 17. "Socialists do not
‘want to transform society in a single blow, overturning
the world; their pretention is to convert it."

 

12Ibid., p. 22. " . . . in ruining the prestige
of dominant classes."

289

circumstance, Sorel charged, " . . . a une classe de
pauvres agissant sous l'influence d'instincts, mais a les
hommes instruits qui raisonnent sur les intéréts d'un

parti."13

According to Georges Sorel, political parties
were coalitions formed for the purpose of obtaining
advantages which would lead to the control of the state.
The party leadership was characteristically a small staff
of men who " . . . appartiennent a l'aristocratie que la
revolution va atteindre d'une maniere tres directe."l4
The impact of the introduction of political parties into
a revolutionary movement had the result that the mass,
upon whom the movement depended, would come to accept

the leadership of men whose interests were distinct from
their own. These men wanted to render the mass a service,
Sorel observed, " . . . mais a la condition que les

masses leur livreront l'Etat, objet de leur convoitise."15

 

13Ibid., p. 24. " . . . of a poor class acting
under the influence of instincts, but of instructed men
who reason on the interests of a party."

14Ibid. Sorel added: " . . . c'est que ces
hommes, n'ayant pas trouvé dans leur classe les moyens de
s'emparer du pouvoir, ont dfi recruter une armée fidele
dans des classes dont les intéréts sont en opposition
avec ceux de leur famille." " . . . belong to the aris-
tocracy that the revolution is going to overtake in a
very direct manner."

lsIbid., p. 25. Sorel's idea that the masses were
the true historical agents who advanced the interests of
the world was drawn from a study by Paul Guiraud, Fustel
de Coulanges, p. 202. The citation was incomplete.
'1. . . butlunder the condition that the masses deliver
them the state, object of their covetousness."

 

290

In this manner, Sorel concluded, the revolt of the poor
" . . . peut servir de base A la formation d'un 'Etat
populaire,‘ formé de bourgeois qui désirent continuer
la vie bourgeoise, qui maintiennent les idéologies bour-
geoises, mais qui se donnent comme les mandataires du
proletariat."16
The tendency of the popular state, Sorel con-
tinued, was continuously to enlarge the scope of its
activity with the result that it must constantly increase
the number of its employees. A large civil servant group
with interests different from those of the proletariat,
Sorel believed, would thus come into being and would
" . . . renforce ainsi la défense de la forme bourgeoise."l7
This was the realm of what Sorel called "le monde gouverne-
mental," which he believed had transformed many revolu-
tionary sympathizers: " . . . il devient un excellent

é."18 This popular

bourgeois avec la plus grande facilit
government, he charged, would henceforth be preoccupied
with the incorporation of the proletariat into the bour-

geoisie.

 

16Sorel, La Decomposition du Marxisme, p. 25.
" . . . can serve as the base of the formation of a 'popu-
lar state,‘ formed of bourgeois who desire to continue
bourgeois life, who maintain bourgeois ideologies but who
give themselves as mandatories to the proletariat."

17Ibid., p. 26. " . . . thus reinforce the
defense of Bourgeois form."

18Ibid. " . . . it becomes an excellent bour-
geoisie with the greatest ease."

 

291

Sorel complained further that The Communist Mani-

 

festo contained postulates which had not been precisely
defined as a result of which it had been the source of
both utopian and revolutionary conclusions. The verbal
imagery of Marx and Engels had influenced utopians to
condemn the bourgeoisie in the name of eternal justice
and on the other hand it had been the source of an incite-
ment toward a revolt of the poor. The need to reconcile
these positions had led to the decomposition of Marxism,
and Georges Sorel purposed to undertake a study of this
problem which he charged had long been ignored by the
Marxists. Was there not, he asked, something in Marxism
other than the quoted formula whose value seemed to be
more and more Open to question? Marxism, Sorel concluded,
was a philosophical conception designed to clarify social
struggles, and not a collection of political precepts.19
The concept of the revolt of the poor conducted
under the leadership of a revolutionary general staff
which Sorel identified as "1e blanquisme," would, he
charged, create the condition in which the future would
depend upon the good will of the leaders. This hypothesis,
he insisted, was unacceptable to Marx who considered that

the revolution would be made by a proletariat of producers

 

19Ibid., p. 33. Sorel asked: "Ne serait-cc
point plutdt une conception philosophique propre d
éclairer les luttes sociales qu'un recueil de précepts
politiques?"

 

 

 

El

 

 

292

" . . . qui ont acquis la capacité économique, l'intel-
ligence du travail et le sens juridique sous l'influence

20 Sorel insisted

méme des conditions de la production.”
that the proletariat must proceed from discipline toward
organization, which implied a juridicial constitution
without which the class could not become fully developed.
Marx, Sorel continued, as a result of his historical per-
spective could not acquire the working class experience
needed to formulate a clear picture of how the proletariat
could attain the degree of maturity requisite to its
emancipating revolution. Thus Marx, according to Sorel,

" . . . s'est généralement borné a donner des formules

21 It was in the realm of

sommaires et symboliques."
action that Marx was less adept, Sorel noted, and he
speculated that action most usually occurred when pro-
pelled by memories which were more vivid in the mind than

was immediate reality.22

 

20Ibid., p. 45. Sorel noted also that the revolt
of the poor under the leadership of a small party " . . .
peut appartenir a n'importe quelle époque; elle est
indépendante du régime de la production." " . . . who
had acquired the economic capacity, intelligence of work,
and judicial sense under the very influence of production
conditions."

21Ibid., p. 47. " . . . generally restricts
himself to giving summary and symbolic formulae."

22Ibid. Sorel wrote: "11 ne faut pas oublier
que nous n'agissons guere que sous l'action de souvenirs
qui sont beaucoup plus présents a notre esprit que les
faits actuels."

 

293

Sorel concluded that Marxism differed from
Blanquism especially in its discounting of the idea of
party, and in its reliance upon the idea of class.

Party objectives, Sorel complained, were always directed
toward the conquest of state power which was then utilized
in behalf of the party and its allies. Marx wished to
suppress the state, which, Sorel concurred, was not an
entity to be perfected, but to be abolished. Bernstein
who had attacked Marx's conception of the revolution as
a single act seeing in this the influence on Marx of the
Hegelian dialectic was reprimanded by Sorel: "S'il
(Bernstein) avait été au fond de choses, il aurait
reconnu quelque chose de plus important encore: c'est
que son maitre a toujours congu la révolution sous une

23 This revolutionary claim as well as

forme mythique."
Marx's hypothetical description of the general direction
of capitalism in Capital (Volume I; "The Historical Ten-
dency of Capitalist Accumulation") represented what Sorel

called "une mythe sociale." "We have here, he wrote, a

vivid sketch which gives a very clear idea of change . . .

 

23Ibid., p. 54. Bernstein was concerned, Sorel
noted, " . . . that the idea of a revolution in a single
act seemed incompatible with the necessity of political
life in modern countries." "If he had been at the heart
of things, he would recognize something more important
still: that his master always conceived the revolution
under mythic form."

294

mais dont aucun détail ne saurait étre discuté comme un
fait historique prévisible."24
In seeking to explain how minds were prepared
for revolution, Sorel insisted that history demonstrated
a constant recourse to social myths whose form varied
from epoch to epoch. Because Marx realized that the con-
temporary age required more sober propaganda than former
times, he freed his revolutionary myth " . . . de toutes
les fantasmagories qui ont trop souvent fait chercher un

pays de Cocagne."25

The Marxian philosophy had one thing
in view: to lead the working class to an understanding
that its future hinged on the idea of class struggle, and
to organize itself for this struggle such that it could
eventually dispense with its masters. Only this idea,
that the proletariat must organize itself separately from
the bourgeoisie was, according to Sorel, capable of
reviving Marxism as a revolutionary movement. This was

the role which the anti-political revolutionary Syndicalist

organization must assume.26 But the parliamentary

 

24Ibid., p. 55. " . . . but whose every detail
would not Know how to be discussed as a forseeable historic
fact."

25Ibid. " . . . of all phantasmagoria that has
too often made us seek the land of milk and honey."

26Sorel identified Fernand Pelloutier as the anti-
politician and propagandist of revolutionary syndicalism
who " . . . avait un sens tres net de la nécessité qui
s'impose de fonder 1e socialisme sur une absolue sépar-
ation des classes et sur l'abandon de toute espérance
d'une renovation politique." Ibid., p. 58.

295

Socialists denounced this counter offensive, Sorel

noted, because some anarchists entered the Syndicalist
movement, seemingly in contradiction with Marxian dogma.
The cult of words, and dogmatic adherence to formula,
Sorel noted scornfully, was " . . . des etiquettes . . .
pour les parlementaires . . . mais les mots importent

peu d celui qui veut aller au fond des choses."27 Writers
who criticized Marx, Sorel added, had often reproached

him for having spoken in " . . . un langage plein
d'images" which they did not consider suitable for
scientific investigation. Sorel disagreed: "Ce sont

les parties symboliques, regardées jadis comme ayant une
valeur douteuse, qui représentent, au contraire, la valeur

28 The teachings of Henri Bergson demon-

de l'oeuvre."
strated, Sorel concluded " . . . que le mouvement
s'exprime surtout au moyen d'images que les formules
mythiques sont celles dans lesquelles s'enveloppe la
pensée fondamentale d'un philosophe, et que la métaphy-
sique ne saurait se servir du langage qui convient a la

science."29

 

2‘7Ibid., p. 59. " . . . etiquette . . . for par-
lementarians . . . but words bring little to him who
wishes to go to the heart of things."

28Ibid., p. 60. "These are symbolic part,
formerly regarded as having a doubtful value, who repre-
senting, on the contrary, the value of the work."

29Ibid. Inexplicably Irving Horowitz's English
translation of "The Decomposition of Marxism" in

296

Sorel concluded that Marx's idea of apocalypse
(la catastrophe) corresponded perfectly to the concept
of the general strike, which symbolized the advent of
the new world to revolutionary Syndicalists. And only
unified, militant workers' organizations, Sorel added,
could serve to clarify the idea of class struggle. How-
ever, Sorel warned, it must not be expected that the
revolutionary movement could ever follow a pre-determined
direction. It could only be studied in its own develop-
ment up to the present: "Tout en lui est imprévisable."3O
But one must, Sorel repeated, look with suspicion on
political revolutions, and he concluded his analysis of
the decomposition of Marxism by suggesting for study the
Dreyfus affair which he noted: " . . . peut étre com-

parée fort bien a une révolution politique."31

 

Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1962) does not translate this important
statement. See Horowitz, p. 251. " . . . that the move-
ment expresses itself especially by means of images, that
mythical formula are those in which fundamental thought
of a philosophy envelops itself, and that metaphysics
would not know not to use language that fits science."

 

30Sorel, La Decomposition du Marxisme, p. 62.
"Everything in it is unforseeable."

 

31$§£§3 " . . . Perhaps strongly compares to a
political revolution."

297

La Revolution Dreyfusienne

 

Ernest Renan's final judgment of the French
Revolution, Sorel noted in his 1909 study of the Dreyfus
affair, envisioned it as " . . . une oeuvre aussi incon-
sciente qu'un cyclone emportant sans choix tout ce qui

"32 Georges Sorel believed that, dis-

est 5 sa portée.
encumbered of "ces formules magnifiques des images" which
Renan employed in his discussion of the French Revolution,
it would be possible to obtain what he called "conclusions
prosaiques" with important application to "l'affaire
Dreyfus." But the historian who wished to study such
cataclysms must be warned in advance, Sorel believed,
against resorting to the claimed genius of certain great
men to account for the change in the course of events.
Agreeing with Renan, Sorel noted that if these protago-
nists were studied closely the shadow which concealed

their mediocrity would vanish " . . . pour montrer que

leur prétendu génie est une illusion engendrée par la

 

32Quoted by Georges Sorel as: Ernest Renan,
Feuilles détachees, pp. 242-43, in la Révolution Drey-
fusienne, by Georges Sorel (Paris: Marcle Rihiere,dl909),
p. 4. Renan also wrote that the men of the revolution
were " . . . des inconscients sublimes, amnistiés par
leur jeunesse, leur inexpérience, leur foi . . . Ces hommes
ne furent pas grands! ils furent les ouvriers d'une
grande heure," in Feuilles détachees, pp. 245-48. " . . .
a work as unconscious as a cycloneT—bringing without
choice everything in its reach."

 

 

 

 

298

gravité des troubles au milieu desquels ils ont vécu."33

Sorel scoffed at the value of the detailed analysis of
personalities in the Dreyfus affair as being interesting
only as a serialized novel, but he insisted that if the
Dreyfus affair were to be studied as a revolution it
would then become interesting from a philosophical point

of view. La Revolution Dreyfusienne, published in Paris

 

in 1909, was therefore introduced by Georges Sorel as

his attempt to analyze the affair from a philosophic

perspective: "Je veux surtout appeller l'attention sur

les analogies qui existent entre nos récents bouleverse-

ments at nos anciennes révolutions politiques; ces analogies

peuvent servir: soit a mieux comprendre notre devenir

social, soit d mieux analyser le passé."34
In an initial discussion of the general compo-

sition of political revolutions, Geroges Sorel distin-

guished two periods. The first period, he believed, was

characterized by the problems connected with the fall of

the old government: battles without mercy, often bloody,

 

33Sorel, la Révolution Dreyfusienne, p. 6.
" . . . in order to show that their pretended genius is
an illusion engendered by the seriousness of troubles
in the middle of which they lived."

 

34Ibid., pp. 10-11. "I especially wish to call
attention to the analogies that exist between our recent
upheavals and our former political revolutions; these
analogies can serve either to better understand our
social future or to better analyze the past."

299

instituted by those who sought power, followed by a
ferociously partial legislation which sought to destroy
the power of the defeated. Because these episodes were
more passionate than those of ordinary times, Sorel
believed they were especially appealing to talented
writers who " . . . habiles dans l'art d'extraire des
documents les récits les plus aptes a intéresser un
public étendu, trouvent donc dans l'étude d'une telle
épogue de belles occasions pour exercer leur adresse."35
The second period of a political revolution, Sorel char-
acterized as one of calm constraint and authoritarianism.
This period appeared colorless compared to the first
period so much so that historians had difficulty
believing that these calm times could belong to the

same epoch as the preceding to which the name revolution
was exclusively assigned. Sorel believed that it was a
mistake to attach an exaggerated importance to the acts
of force which marked the initial stage of political
revolutions, because he asserted, that this allowed "les
chroniqueurs" to dispense with seeking the true causes
of change: "Ce qu'il y a de vraiment essentiel, c'est

la transformation qui se produit dans le cours des

 

35Ibid., p. 11. " . . . able in the art of ex-
tracting from documents the accounts most apt to interest
an extended public, thus find in the study of such an
epoch beautiful occasions to exercise their direction."

 

300

idees."36

The cycle was closed, Sorel concluded, when
the hopes which filled the hearts of the first promoters
of revolution no longer excite a passionate following
and when these exhausted hopes came to be denounced as
dangerous illusions. The victors, he added, seek to
erase as quickly as possible the memory of the tyrannical
measures which they employed during the crisis. The
results achieved during the calm period were represented
as constituting all which was essential in the first.
Finally when calm was widespread and the future seemed
assured, the new leadership " . . . s'occupe d'élever
la nouvelle generation dans l'idée que la nouvelle regime
est fondé sur des théories de droit public incontes-
tables."37
The Dreyfus affair demonstrated, Sorel believed,
the great role which literary figures always played in
revolutions. He noted that Anatole France, who had been
a former supporter of the order of the day, upon taking

up the dreyfusard cause and finding himself in the

company of Emile Zola, whose writing he had formerly

 

36Ibid., p. 12. "What is truly essential is the
transformation which produced itself in the course of
ideas."

37Ibid., p. 15. " . . . occupies itself with
raising the new generation in the idea that the new
regime is founded on theories of public, uncontestable
law."

 

fl

 

 

301

characterized as "mauvaise," came to change these
literary appreciations. Anatole France thus came to
discover high moral intentions in the books which had
previously appeared so detestable to him. The letter
"J'accuse," Sorel speculated, " . . . changeait les

38 But the writings

valeurs de tous les écrits de Zola."
of Zola, according to Sorel, did not justify his assumed
position as the leader of the "école réaliste" because
" . . . en fait i1 (Zola) ne soupgonna jamais ce qui con-
stitue 1a réalite; il n'apercevait des choses que de
grossiers contours."39
One of the most striking discoveries of his
study of the period of the Dreyfus affair was the scorn
which the dreyfusards felt for the law officers and the
judges (la magistrature) of the state. Without respectable
magistrates he asked, what becomes of the law? The French
Republic, he charged, did not possess such a magistrature:
"On pourrait multiplier les exemples pour montrer qu'aux

yeux des dreyfusards la servilité, la sottise et 1a

A
mauvaise foi sont les qualités maitresses des magistrats

 

3822393: P. 23. " . . . changed the value of all
the writings of Zola."

39Ibid., p. 29. " . . . in fact, he (Zola) never
suspected what constitutes reality; he only noticed things
in rough outlines."

302

40 The role of the

que nous a donnés la République."
Catholic church in France during this period, Sorel

found to be initially ambiguous. The ultimate anti-
dreyfusard position which it assumed, he believed, was
directed by the pope in Rome: "I1 y a de bonnes raisons
de penser que les catholiques suivirent des indications
venant du Vatican et que le vrai chef de l'antidreyfusisme

fut Léon XIII."41

The effect of this participation,

Sorel believed, was to demonstrate that the "laique"
associations, so long feared by the legislators, offered
no serious danger, while at the same time it appeared
necessary to take extreme precautions against the clerical
associations. A tragic consequence of the anti-clerical
campaign in France in the wake of the Dreyfus affair,
Sorel concluded, was the introduction of arbitrary pro-
cedures in the administration of justice, a characteristic
which he noted eSpecially in Combes about whom he

observed with irony: "On pourrait supposer que son

éducation cléricale ne fut pas étrangere a cette

 

40Ibid., p. 45. Sorel noted that Aristide Briand
" . . . pourrait, a bon droit, parler de 'ses juges' et
de 'ses domestiques judiciarires." Ibid., p. 48. "We
could multiply the examples to show that in the eyes of
dreyfusards servility, stupidity and bad faith are the
master qualities of magistrates which the Republic has
given us.”

41Ibid., p. 51. ”There are good reasons to think
that the Catholics followed the directions coming from
the Vatican and that the true chief of anti-dreyfusism
was Leon XIII.”

303

attitude; 1e prétre n'a déjd pas 5 un haut degré le
respect du droit, mais le prétre défroque applique dans

42 When the

la vie le rationalisme le plus mesquin."
history of the Dreyfus affair was written, Sorel believed,
a great importance would be attached to the anticlerical
struggle which, he charged, had resulted in the dimunition
of respect for "la sflreté du droit" without which he

warned " . . . i1 n'y a pas de liberté."43

La Religion D'Aujourd'Hui

 

Georges Sorel believed that the role of religion
in his contemporary world was an unresolved problem which
would continue to perplex future generations, and having
concluded his study of what he called the Dreyfus "revo-
lution," Sorel submitted in 1909 an essay entitled "la

Religion d'aujourd'hui" for publication in the Revue de

 

Métaphysique et de Morale.44 Impressed by an observation

 

which Ribot had made in 1907 which affirmed that: "Depuis

que l'homme a une histoire . . . aucun des besoins et

 

42Ibid., p. 55. "One could suppose that his
clerical education was not foreign to this attitude; the
priest did not already have a high degree of respect from
the law, but the defrocked priest applied in life the most
paltry rationalism."

43£2£Q-a P. 56. " . . . the certainty of law"
" . . . there is no liberty."

44Georges Sorel, "la Religion d'aujourd'hui,"
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (Paris: Librairie
Armand Colin, 1909), pp. 240-73 and May, 1909, pp. 413-
47.

304

désirs qu'il a manifestés des l'origine n'a disparu, et
les religions, ont tenu un si grand rOle dans le monde
qu'il faut bien admettre qu'elles sont profondément

O 0 4
enrac1nées dans la nature humaine." 5

Sorel proceeded
to inquire into the nature of this religious sentiment
which, he agreed, was not in the process of dissolution.
Under the influence of Renan, whom Sorel believed was an
excellent witness to the religious developments of the
nineteenth century, Sorel noted the tendency " . . .
réserver le nom de religion aux systemes qui offrent de
tres grandes analogies avec le christianisme."46 In
this context the nineteenth century, he continued, thought
of Judaism, Islamism and Buddhism as religions with con-
nections to Christianity. August Comte, Sorel observed,

did not represent the spirit of the nineteenth century

but rather was more in harmony with the ideas of the

 

45Sorel quoted from an essay by Ribot which
appeared in Mercure de France, April 15, 1907, pp. 578-
79 in "la Religion d’aujourd‘hui," p. 240. "Since man
has a history . . . none of the desires and needs that
he has manifested from the origin have disappeared, and
religions have held so great a role in the world that it
is very necessary to admit that they (religions) are
profoundly deep-rooted in human nature."

 

46Ibid., p. 244. Renan had written: "Christian-
isme est devenir presque synonyme de religion. Tout ce
qui se fera en dehors de cette grande et bonne tradition
chrétienne sera sterile." Sorel documented this quote
as Renan, Vie de Jésus, pp. 461-62, in la Religion
d'aujourd'hfii, p. 244. " . . . to reserve the name of
religion to—systems that offer very large analogies to
Christianity."

 

305

eighteenth century, and thus Comte's ideas, Sorel con-
cluded, " . . . pourraient étre considérés comme non
existantes pour les philosophes."47 To August Comte
who Sorel believed had attempted to suppress the super-
natural in religion and who emphasized ideas relative to
immortality, Sorel opposed the work of William James whom
he believed had sought experimental knowledge of the
supernatural experience and regarded ideas on immortality
as secondary.48
In his analysis of the religious experience,
Sorel reported, William James had advanced the thesis
that this experience was the result of the subliminal
introducing itself into consciousness, and in this con-
dition, Sorel added, it would be impossible to know if
the subliminal was entirely " . . . a nous ou bien s'il
ne contient point parfois, a notre insu, quelques puis-

49

sances extérieures." What occurred in the religious

 

47Ibid., p. 246. Sorel added: " . . . rien
n'est moins religieux que la prétendre religion d'A.
Compte," p. 247. " . . . would be able to be considered
as non-existant for philosophers."

48This appears to be the first reference by
Sorel to William James whom he characterized as "l'il-
lustre psychologue américain."

49Ibid., p. 264. Sorel referenced William James,
L'expérience religieuse, p. 205. ” . . . in us or even
If it does not contain sometimes, without our knowledge,
some exterior powers."

306

experience, according to Sorel's understanding of James,

was an expansion of consciousness:
L'homme voit clairement que son moi supérieur et
potentiel est son veritable moi. Il arrive a se
rendre compte que ce moi supérieur fait partie de
quelque chose de plus grand que lui, mais de meme
nature; quelque chose qui agit dans l'univers en
dehors de lui, qui peut lui venir en aide, et
s'offre d lui comme un refuge sugréme, quand son
étre inférieur d fait naufrage.5

Science, Sorel believed, had no basis to oppose this idea

of the religious experience, which he noted, could occur

in complete ignorance of the Christian doctrine.

Sorel confided his own inclination to regard a
very particularized pantheistic system with sympathy,
and he advanced a formula which he believed represented
this doctrine: "La religion est une sorte de synthese
ou plutOt d'union intime et spirituelle de l'instinct et
de l'intelligence, dans laquelle chacun d'eux, fondu
avec l'autre et par 13 meme transfiguré et exalté, pos-

sede une plénitude et une puissance créatrice qui lui

échappe quand i1 agit séparément."51 Sorel additionally

 

SOSorel, La Religion d'aujourd'hui, p. 265.
Man sees cleafly that his superior and potential me
is his true me. He comes to realize that this
superior me is part of something bigger than him,
but of the same nature; something who acts in the
universe outside of him who can come and aid him
and offer itself to him as a supreme refuge, when
his inferior being is shipwrecked.

 

51Ibid., p. 438. Sorel admitted that this defi-
nition could-he understood in another sense than panthe-
istic: " . . . mais elles perdraient alors quelque
chose de leur profondeur." "Religion is a sort of

307

asserted that he tended to regard religious dogma and
sacraments as "populaires et provisoires" symbolic con-
structions. These symbolic constructions, which, he
believed, the theologians had misrepresented as unal-
terable dogma, Sorel believed were only approximations
based on imagination which served " . . . donner un corps

a la foi."52

What seemed essential in the religious
experience as identified by William James was a profound
feeling of the extraordinary power of adversity against
which one could not prevail without help. Religious
movements which denied this adversity in the world, he
concluded, would be incapable of producing the religious
experience as defined by James and to this extent Sorel
believed such movements would fail to attract a following.
Sorel scoffed at those who predicted the future
role of religion in human life and insisted that the move-
ment of human things was too complicated to be determined

in advance. Confining his observations to conditions

in contemporary France in the wake of the Dreyfus

 

synthesis or rather intimate and spiritual union of
instinct and intelligence, in which each of them, melted
with the other and transfigured and exalted by it,
possesses a plenitude and creative power which escapes
it when it acts separately."

52Ibid., p. 441. Quoting from Hartmann, Sorel
noted: "Le panthéisme seul réalise le réve le plus hardi
des mystiques sans heurter la raison." Sorel quoted:
Hartmann, la religion deil'avenir, p. 166, in La Religion
d'aujourd'hui, p. 442. ” . . . to give a body to faith."

 

 

308

revolution, Sorel observed that as the institutions in
which the Christian church had been influential were
gradually laicized, there would be a corresponding
diminution in the polemic between science and theology:
"L'esprit scientifique régnera dans son domaine propre
. . . dans les laboratoires; l'esprit religieux régnera
dans le sanctuaire; chacun s'occupera de ses affaires,

sans vouloir empiéter sur la spécialité d'autrui."53

Vues Sur Les Problemes De La Philosophie

 

Having relegated science to the laboratory and
religion to a sanctuary, Sorel turned his attention to
a summary analysis of the history of European philosophy
which appeared under the title "Vues sur les problémes
de la philosophie" in the September, 1910, and January,

1911, issues of Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.54

 

Initially Sorel attacked an illusion which he believed
had greatly obstructed the European mind with respect to
its understanding of the nature and function of philosophy.

This false idea of philosophy, he stated, " . . . consiste

 

53Ibid., p. 581. "The scientific will reign in
its own domain . . . in the laboratories; the religious
spirit will reign in the sanctuary; each will occupy itself
with its own affairs, without wishing to encroach on the
specialty of the other."

54Georges Sorel, "Vues sur les problemes de la
philosophie," Revue de Méta hysique et de Morale (Paris:
Librairie Armand Colin, l9lE-1911).

 

309

d prendre la philosophie pour une sorte de science, ayant
son domaine propre, decouvrant des principes et aboutis-
sant, par la déduction, a des propositions que nous

55 According to Sorel this

devirons tous accepter."
represented a "perversion de la réflexion" which resulted
from the attempt of the ancient Greek philosophers to
submit ideas to "la discipline de leur logique." This
was especially true in the moral realm where Socrates

and many other Greek philosophers were occupied in
teaching the Greeks " . . . des codes de l'éducation
civique, destinés a leur apprendre comment ils pour-
raient se constituer une nature morale propre d leur
assurer une vie que ne pourraient critiquer les gens
raisonnables. . . . "56 The Greek moralists, Sorel
believed, imputed moral faults to ignorance and they
assigned to the realm of intelligence what Sorel observed
" . . . nous sommes habitués d les rapporter 3 la

57

volonté." This is why, Sorel concluded, the Greek

 

55Ibid., p. 581. " consists of taking philosophy
for a sort of science, having its own domain, discovering
principles and bordering, by deduction, on propositions
that we predict to accept all."

56Ibid., pp. 582-83. " . . . codes of civic edu-
cation, destined to teach them how they could form a
moral nature appropriate to assure them a life that
reasonable people could not criticize."'

57Ibid., p. 583. " . . . we are used to relating
them to will."

 

310

philosophers conceived that morality could be reduced
to a code of education which could be learned as any
other métier.

Christianity, according to Sorel, augmented this
Greek idea, by attributing great value to the affirmation
of certain dogma and by subordinating all to theology.
Sorel wrote " . . . la morale devint une jurisprudence
des tribunaux pénitentiels, propre d conduire l'ame sur

58 These scholastic theories of the

la voie du salut."
Middle Ages were rejected by the Renaissance, whose
leading thinkers sought salvation in the monuments of
antiquity; especially in the Roman jurists and the Stoic
philosophers. Here the thinkers of the Renaissance found
the materials for constructing a concept of natural
rights, which they believed would be capable of imposing
moral rules. But the nineteenth century applications of
the natural rights doctrine had demonstrated that " . . .
59

1e droit naturel peut servir 5 justifier l'arbitraire."

Jurisprudence, Sorel complained, had become the docile

 

58Ibid. In a footnote Sorel added: "Les chré-
tiens qui suivaient les principes de la vie spirituelle,
s'inspiraient plus directement des moralistes grecs,
puisque toute leur philosophie consistait dans un code ce
l'ascétisme, destiné d rendre l'homme parfait chrétien et
5 lui procurer la paix parfaite." " . . . morality becomes
a jurisprudence of penitential courts, appropriate to
conduct the soul on the path of salvation.”

59Ibid., p. 587. "‘. . . natural rights can
serve to justlfy the arbitrary."

 

311

servant of the passions of the leaders of political
parties, with the result that respect for the law had
greatly declined. Only recently, Sorel continued, had
research been conducted on the relationship between the
morals and institutions of various peoples. In this
approach, Sorel concluded, resided the possibility of
limiting what he called the "fantaisies des docteurs
en droit naturel."60
Philosophy itself had become a questionable
activity in the nineteenth century, according to Sorel,
who chided John Stuart Mill for having claimed to produce
the canons of induction to govern the methods of rational
experiments: " . . . il n'y a rien de plus vain que son
'Organon,‘ dont jamais aucun physicien n'a tenu compte."61
Sorel concluded that philosophy must give up its claim to
verify the credibility of scientific assumptions, and
should instead occupy itself with the principles which
science employed-~philosophy, he believed, should seek

to utilize the teachings which the sciences furnished.

Philosophy must renounce the claim to provide solutions,

 

and he added: "Une philosophie ne vaut donc qu'en raison
60Ibid. " . . . fantasies of doctors in natural
rights."
61 . n . .
Ibid., p. 589. . . . there is noth1ng more

vain than his 'Organon' to which no physicist paid
attention."

 

312

des résultats qu'elle provoque indirectement."62 A

philosophical system would be admirable even if it
contained great holes, contradictions and errors, if it
succeeded in suggesting useful tactics which might lead
others to what Sorel called "1e siege de la réalité."
Systems of philosophy noted for their prudent and sym-
metrical construction, Sorel charged, were Often fruitless
and obstructed the mind from the discovery of new paths.
He concluded "En un mot une philosophie ne vaut seulement
que comme moyen de favoriser l'invention."63
The work of Nietzsche, Sorel believed, was of
great value. The reader who wished to study the modern
world outside of the context of "des idées regues,”
Sorel asserted, would find extremely profitable the work
of Nietzsche, whom he characterized as one of the most
eminent thinkers the European world had produced.
Nietzsche was especially gifted from the literary point

of view. His " . . . puissance étonnante de pénétration"

was beyond the understanding of " . . . contemporains

 

GZEBEng P. 592. "A philosophy is thus only
worth the results it provokes indirectly."

63Ibid., p. 593. "In a word, a philosophy is
only worthwhile as a means of favoring invention."

 

313

qui ont perdu l'usage du langage métaphysique."64 Com-
paring Nietzsche with Herbert Spencer, whom Sorel noted
Gustave Flaubert had praised in 1878 as a thinker with
whom Germany had none to compare, Sorel praised Benedetto
Croce's judgment that Spencer was the symbol of philo-
sophical mediocrity.65
Henri Bergson, according to Sorel, had taken a

decisive step for speculative philosophy with his book

l'Evolution créatrice.

 

Bergson had proposed to trace a line of demar-
cation between the inert and the living. The inorganic
world was for Bergson, Sorel reported, the domain of
science-—the realm of intelligence and matter. But
Bergson had contended that if one was not content with
simply describing the species and wished to reason on
evolution, it was necessary to go beyond that which could
be determined scientifically; it was necessary, Sorel
added, to invent " . . . un principe dont nous pouvons
seulement nous rendre compte en pensant d ce que nous

savons de notre conscience; une cause créatrice qui ne

 

64Ibid., p. 65. (This is the continuation of
"Vues sur les —problemes de la philosophie" in Revue de
Métaphysiq_e et de Morale, Janvier, 1911, pp. 64-99.}
. . . astonishing power of penetration" . . . con-
temporaries who have lost usage of metaphysical language."

 

65Sorel quoted as follows: Flaubert, Correspon-
dance, t. IV., p. 306 and Benedetto Croce, Il concetto
della storia, p. 19, p. 65 in "Vues sur les problems
de la philosophie."

 

 

 

 

314

se lasse jamais de faire du nouveau en dépit des forces
physiques qui travaillent d défaire l'oeuvre de la vie."66
The work of Bergson, according to Sorel, opened a new
vista for modern philosophy and had thereby affirmed its
right to exist.

The nineteenth century, Sorel concluded, had
been remarkable for its abundance of scientific dis-
coveries while at the same time it was the century during
which had been expressed serious doubts on the reality
of science. The mathematicians and the moralists, " . . .
ont également écrit pour engager leurs contemporains a
n'avoir qu'une confiance médiocre dans les lois que les
physiciens énoncaient, a la suite de leurs minutieuses

67

recherches." The science of nature reduced itself

therefore to "une fantaisie" adapted by men of genius

68

to the conditions of experience. The modern world would

 

66Ibid., p. 67. Sorel referred to Bergson
Evolution créatrice, p. 269. ” . . . a principle which
we can only realize in thinking of what we know of our
conscience; a creative cause which never tires itself
to make again, in spite of physical forces that work to
defeat the work of life."

 

67Sorel, "Vues sur les problémes de la philoso-
phie," p. 80. " . . . have written equally to engage
their contemporaries in only having a mediocre confi-
dence in the laws that physicists stated following their
scrupulously careful research.”

68In support of this observation, Sorel quoted,
in a footnote: "les théories mathématique n'ont pas
pour objet de nous révéler la véritable nature des choses.
Leur but uniqueAest de coordonner les lois que l'experience
nous fait connaitre." H. Poincaré, la science et

 

 

315

commit a grave error, if it were to continue to follow
what Sorel called "ces traditions grecques" which sup-
posed that human understanding could separate in things
the scientific essences and the accidents. The human
organs which play a preponderant role in observation, he
wrote: " . . . sont des appareils tres chargés de

variations accidentelles."69

Even the more sophisticated
experimental apparatus of the laboratory produced reasonings
based upon an "artificial nature" which was forever con-
tained within the limits of the tools of observation.

Thus between this artificial nature and "1a nature
naturelle" there was a lacuna. The idea of unity, Sorel
concluded, " . . . que l'on a regardée pendant 31 long-
temps comme étant fondamentale dans la constitution de

la science, n'aurait plus de raison d'étre."70

When the thought of an epoch was as filled with

contradictions as was that of the nineteenth century,

 

l'hypothese, p. 245. Sorel also quoted from the French
translation of Mach, La connaissance et l'erreur, p. 374:
"Les lois de la nature sont un produit du’besoin psy-
chologique que nous avons de nous retrouver dans la
nature, de ne pas rester étranger et embarrassés devant
les phénoménes." Both in "Vues sur les problémes de
philosophie," p. 81.

 

 

69Ibid., p. 82. " . . . are instruments very
charged with accidental variations."

7OIbid., p. 86. " . . . that has been regarded
during so long a time as being fundamental in the con-
stitution of science, would no longer have a reason
for being."

 

316

Sorel continued, it generally occurred that a genius
would come forth who could produce an insight which
would serve to provide some order to contemporary ideas.
'Such a genius would allow the old dogmatics to die and
would orient itself in new directions. For Georges
Sorel, this genius was Henri Bergson, whose book ligyg-

lution créatrice he believed was comparable in importance

 

to the Critique of Pure Reason in the history of phil-

 

osophy.71 Bergson had reproached the Greek philosophers
for having had an exaggerated confidence in the power

of the individual mind. The idea that philoSOphy must

be a unique, total, global vision, Bergson rejected and
insisted instead, according to Sorel, that the enterprise
of philOSOphy " . . . ne pourra plus s'achever tout d'un
coup; elle sera nécessairement collective et progres-

sive."72 Creative Evolution was, according to Sorel,

 

essentially a statement to modern thinkers to the effect
that the principal preoccupation of philosophers ” . . .
doit étre de réfléchir sur les mystéres de la vie."73

A consequence of this new attitude of philosophy, Sorel

 

71Ibid., p. 89.

721bid-r P. 98. The reference to Bergson was to
l'Evolution créatrice, pp. 208-09. " . . . will no
lOnger he able‘fo Siddenly end; it will necessarily be
collective and progressive."

 

73$ore1, "Vues sur les problémes de philosophic,"

p. 99. " . . . ought to be to reflect on the mysteries
of life."

 

317

insisted, would be to draw it closer to art and religion,

and he concluded " . . . nous retrouvons ainsi une des

plus féconds intuitions de Hegel.u74

 

74Ibid., p. 99. " . . . we thus refind one of
Hegel's most fertile intuitions."

 

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V, LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE:
1906 - 1908 AND CHAPTER VI, MARX, DREYFUS,

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY: 1907 - 1910

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO
BENEDETTO CROCE: 1906 - 1910

21 mai 1906
"Je vous écris pour vous recommander une revue socialiste
dans laquelle j'écris depuis le commencement de l'anée
et qui représente en France l'esprit syndicaliste: Le
Mouvement socialiste . . . J'y publie les articles sh?
la viOlence. Je compte y donner une tres longue col-
laboration et l'ensemble est original . . .

Nos élections sont fanatiquement anticléricales;

que va-t-il en sortie?” p. 95

 

3 aofit 1906
"Mon but (dans Systeme historique de Renan) était de
montrer que l'histoire des fondateurs est inaccessible

et inutile." p. 95

31 décembre 1906
"Ici nous sommes en un temps curieux; a l'étranger on
doit de faire une idée, beaucoup plus dramatique qu'il
ne convient, de la guerre religieuse de France; en
général le clergé voudrait bien ne pas étre engagé dans
cette guerre et i1 n'aurait pas mieux demandé qu'a
vivre au jour le jour; i1 ne comprend rien aux
resolutions du pape, qui croit a l'héroisme d'une
bourgeoisie catholique infiniment peu héroique." p. 97

10 janvier 1907
"J'avoue que le 'pragmatisme' m'inspire les plus grands
doutes et qu'il a produit (avec Blondel, Laberthon-
niere, etc.) beaucoup plus de galimatia's que toute
l'ancienne philosophic." p. 98

15 janvier 1907
"La précision a laquelle je m'efforce de parvenir, au
moyen de ma méthode qui met en relief les aspects
divers et contradictoires res des choses, ne leur convient
pas autant que le galimatias. . . . On neppeut atteindre
1a précision scientifique qu'a la condition de sacrifier
beaucoup de questions et qu'an acceptant l'impossibilité

318

 

319

de faire des syntheses; il faut se contenter de vues
distincts et partielles--Si vous écrivez sur mes der-
niers travaux . . . de la greve générale . . . 1e texte
francais (est) beaucoup plus développé, qui a paru dans
le Mouvement socialiste." p. 98

 

février 1907

" . . . 1e renouvellment des abonnements n'a pas été
bon cette année, par suite de la suavage campagne
enterprise contre le Mouvement socialiste par les amis
de Jaures: mes articles sur la vidlence ont déplu d
beaucOup de personnes qui n'aiment pas d voir clair,
et qui ont été fachées d'apprendre que le socialisme
n'était pas un genre litteraire." p. 99

 

mai 1907

"Vous avez notamment tres bien reconnu quelle est la
grande preoccupation de toute ma vie: la genesse
historique de la morale.

J'accepte parfaitement les observations que vous
faites au sujet de mes théories sur les deux méthodes
historiques; je sais bien qu'il serati impossible de
trouver jamais l'une ou l'autre méthode exactement
appliquée; mais pour expliquer, d'une maniere claire,
les activités humaines (qui sont toujours bien plus
complexes que ne peut dire 1e langage) il est tres
utile de former des types parfaitment simples.

. . . Je suis effrayé, quand je lis les livres des
prétendus libre-penseurs, de voir qu'ils sont aussi
dominés par leur théologie anti-chrétienne, que les
prétres les plus fanatiques peuvent l'étre par leur
scolastique. Cependant pour traiter convenablement
l'histoire du christianisme, il faut faire effort pour
s'affranchir de la fureur théologique.

Je crois notamment qu'il est fort inutile de savoir
si les grandes miracles, générateurs de grandes insti-
tutions, se sont produits ou n'ont existé que dans
l'imatination . . . La vie posthume de Jésus peut avoir
existé ou n'avoir été qu'une illusion spiritique;
qu'importe? je cherche d raconter sans prendre parti
sur la réalité de ces faits générateurs; c'est la
génération seule qui me parait appartenir d l'histoire.

. . . Bien evidemment 11 me sera jamais possible de
s'affranchir d'une certaine conception du monde; si
on le faisait, on se rendrait sourd et aveugle; on ne
pourrait plus rien comprendre. Je ne crois pas que
le physicien lui-meme puisse se dispenser d'étre quelque
peu philosophe . . . Je crois bien en effet que mes
analyses se ressentent de ce qu'on nomme souvent
l'immanentisme . . . Tous les hommes qui sont tres
fortement préoccupés de morale réelle et surtout de
genese de la morale ne sont-ils pas, plus ou moins,
immanentistes?" pp. 100-01

 

320

10 juin 1907
"Le public francais est persuadé que Hégel est archimort
et entérré; il faudrait 1e détromper, en montrant qu'il

y a des théories hégéliennes qui sont bien vivantes
et agissantes." p. 102

23 octobre 1907
"11 me semble que le pape a parfaitement raison de
rappeler aux Catholiques que l'Eglise est une 'insti-
tution historique,‘ que ne dépend point du caprice de
quelques modernes." p. 104

27 mai 1908
"11 y a quelque chose d'effrayant dans cette idée (de
William James) de faire du succes la preuve de la
légitimité d' une croyance . . . C' était la sophistique

grecque, qui a été 1e signe (ou peut-etre la cause) de
la décadence antique." p. 106

24 juin 1908
"Certes Bergson ne sera jamais le philosophe de la
bourgeoisie contemporainte; il ne fait rien que celle-
ci l'adopte; mais les cartésiens ont beaucoup fait
pour se faire adopter. . . . Je me suis, tout a fait,
retiré du Mouvement socialiste je n'approuve pas qu'on
se transforme en courtisans dTaucune faction . . . il

faut beaucoup de courage pour écrire des choses utiles."
p. 108

19 septembre 1908

" . . . les écoles . . . recherchent plut6t les for-
mules que des développements de pensée . . . je ne
peux étre chef d'école . . .

. . . le clergé, sous l'influence de J. de Maistre,
a regardé la science moderne comme une chose dan-
gereuse. De catholiques instruits sont aujourd'hui
effrayes de l'ignorance que les theses de J. de Maistre
ont favorisée; ils attaquent ces théses, en signalant
le danger et les tournant au besoin en ridicule." p. 188

24 octobre 1908
" . . . 11 me semble de plus et plus certain que
l'historien fait beaucoup plus acte de philosophe que
de savant; il faut . . . que le philosophe se mele de
discuter les faits et qu'il ne les recoive pas humble-
ment des mains du savant . . . Si la philosophie est
un grand élément des récits historiques, il ne faut
donc plus donner ce récit pour la science, et la
théologie peut, sans se mettre en conflit avec la
science, s'appuyer a une philosophie qui a conduit a
un récit particulier aux croyants.

 

321

. . . la lecture de l'Evolution créatrice m'a beaucoup
éclairé sur ce point. Il me semble qu'il est tres
important, dans l'intérét de la science, aussi bien que
dans celui de la philosophie, de ne pas confondre
science et philosophie comme on l'a fait si longtemps;
c'etait l'erreur fondamentale du rationalisme." p. 191

4 mai 1909
" . . . je viens de publier sur La révolution drey-
fusienne. Je ne crois pas qu'ellelfasse Beaucoup
plaiSir aux gens qui détiennent l'opinion et le
pouvoir." p. 195

 

 

10 mai 1909
"Ma brochure sur l'affaire Dreyfus commence a me valoir
beaucoup d'ennuis; parce que je n'ai pas voulu parler
de l'innocence ou de la culpabilité de Dreyfus, je
trouve beaucoup de gens disposé 5 me boycotter et a me
faire mal; mais je suis habitué d ce traitement et
je continue monchemin." p. 195

5 juillet 1909
"Je doute fort qu'il y ait de réels antécédents francais
pour la pensée de Bergson . . . " p. 196

22 aofit 1909
"G. Valois est un employé de commerce, dont la valeur
littéraire est sérieuse; i1 s'illusionne certainement
sur le consequences que peuvent-avoir les relations de
quelques syndicalistes révolutionnaires avec les
royalistes de l'Action francaise." p. 334

 

27 novembre 1909
"On va publier incessamment une traduction du Pluralisme
de W. James; il parait que ce livre est bien curieux;
11 me semble que le 'pluralisme' a pour objet, dans
l'esprit de W. James, d'expliquer 1e mal dans le monde
le mal n'est pas tres facile dcomprendre pour les
philosophes a tendances optimistes (comme sont les
Anglais et les Americans) . . . D'une maniere générale
1e probleme du mal est la pierre d'achoppement de la
pensée moderne, qui ne veut pas entendre parler de ce
qui supprime son optimisme." p. 336

 

10 avril 1910
"Je me demande s'il faut regarder comme un simple
accident 1e fait que Hégel n'a eu de vrais successeurs;
en serait-ce point que sa philosphie serait le dernier
systeme qui ait pu étre construit? On n'avait pro-
bablement jamais vu un pareil phénomene; un systeme
tombait vaincu par un autre systeme; celui de Hégel n'a

322

pas été remplacé. Est-ll vraiment d remplacer? Peut-
étre Marx aurait vu clair en ne cherchant pas d faire
un systeme et le 'pragmatisme' est évidemment le
'signe' de quelque chose dans l'histoire de la pensée."

p. 338

28 juin 1910
" . . . la significat on historique de Hegel est la
suppression des anciennes philosphies dogmatiques et
l'ouverture d'une nouvelle ére. Ce que vous demandez
qu'on retienne dans Hegel c'est un ensemble d'attitudes
que l'esprit doit prendre en présence de la réalité
pour en acquérir une maitrise; et 11 me semble que
c'est bien ce qu'il y a eu d'essentiel dans les
philosophies; quand elles veulent dogmatiser, elles
font une science fallacieuse." p. 341

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER VII

Between 1910 and 1914, Georges Sorel developed
his conceptions of grandeur and decadence in human
history concluding that decadence is a natural tendency.
In this period he also discussed the educational program
of Jules Ferry and the waning of the French desire for
revenge following the defeat by Germany in 1870. He
analyzed a book by Gustave LeBon entitled Opinions and
Belief, announced a pragmatic test of "truth" and criti-
cized the "science" of sociology of his day. He then
examined the thought of Cournot and advocated an his-
torical reevaluation of rationalism while praising
Cournot's concept of "transrationalism." In his essay
"Three Problems," he discussed the special role of
"aesthetic intuition" in the development of ideas and
concluded by praising the work of Henri Bergson and
William James as strongly anti-dogmatic.

The appendix provides a comprehensive list of
Sorel's writings between 1910 and 1914 including a

massive list of book reviews which appeared in the

323

324

periodical L'Indépendence 1911 - 1913. His letters to

 

Croce for this period, included in Appendix C, provide

additional background for Sorel's pre-war activities.

CHAPTER VII
PRE-WAR REVALUATIONS: 1910 - 1914

Declaration De La Cité Francaise

 

In 1910, Georges Sorel participated in an abortive
attempt to launch a new periodical under the title "la
Cité Frangaise." Although publication was never achieved,
a declaration of objectives, which was entitled "Déclar-
ation de la Cité Frangaise," provided an insight into the
intentions of its founders who were in addition to Georges
Sorel, Edouard Berth, Jean Variot, Pierre Gilbert and
Georges Valois.1 The statement called for a free organi-
zation of the new periodical and avowed the necessity
to liberate itself as well as what it identified as
"l'intelligence frangaise" from all ideologies. The
founders affirmed their absolute agreement on the need
" . . . détruire les institutions démocratique . . . si

l'on veut résoudre dans un sens favorable 5 1a civili-

sation les questions qui se posent dans le monde

 

lGeorges Sorel, Edouard Berth, Jean Variot,
Pierre Gilbert, and Georges Valois, Declaration de la
"Cité Frangaise," reproduced in Notre Maitre, M. Sdrel
lParis: Pierre Andreu, Bernard Grasset,l953), PP. 327-
28.

 

 

325

 

326

moderne."2 Democracy, the declaration continued, was
clearly the greatest social peril for all classes and
especially for the working classes because of the con-
fusion which it created and for the ensuing opportunity
it presented for the exploitation of producers by " . . .
bandes de politiciens, associés a des financiers ou
dominés par eux."3 This condition required, the state-
ment continued, an organization outside of democratic
ideas with the object of awakening in the classes their
proper sense of virtue in order that each might fulfill
its historical mission. To this end a battle was
declared by "la Cité Francaise" against democratic ideas,
against economic systems which ruined the workers and
against the work of false historians " . . . qui font de

l'histoire une genese démocratique."4

Grandeur Et Décadence

 

In an essay entitled "Grandeur et decadence" also
published in 1910, Georges Sorel affirmed what he believed

was the necessary relationship between mediocrity and

 

2Ibid., p. 327. " . . . to destroy democratic
institutions . . . if they want to resolve the questions
posed by the modern world in a favorable sense to civili-
zation."

3Ibid. " . . . bands of politicians, associated
with or dom1nated by financiers."

4Ibid., p. 328. " . . . who make of history a
democratic genesis."

327

democracy.5 Examining his contemporary French milieu,
Sorel noted additionally the extent to which the par-
liamentary Socialists had increased their representation
in government, and he associated this increase with what
he believed to be an increasing aversion which French
society had come to feel for legally conferred rights
(1e droit). He noted " . . . qu'il existe, a l'heure
présente, une dégénérescence générale du droit qui cor-
respond aux nouvelles directions des moeurs."6 This
moral decline, Sorel attributed to the increasing
influence which commercial practices exercised on civil
jurisprudence and he wrote: " . . . je trouve dans ce
fait une des causes principales qui ont affaibli le
sentiment juridique chez nos contemporains."7 The rich
bourgeoisie, he charged, was losing more and more the

sentiment of the principles of civil law.

 

5Georges Sorel, Grandeur et Decadence, originally
written for inclusion in IIla Citd Franqaiseiw the essay
was published as an appendix to the third edition of Les
illusions du progres, Georges Sorel (Paris: Marcel
Riviere, l92l), Appendice I, pp. 285-336.

 

 

6Ibid., p. 296. " . . . that there exists pre-
sently a general degeneration of law corresponding
to the new direction of morals."

7Ibid., p. 302. " . . . I find in this fact one
of the prlnc1ple causes which has weakened the judicial
sentiment among our contemporaries."

328

The conception of grandeur and decadence, Sorel
continued, corresponded to the ideas of genius and
mediocrity, and pertained especially to what he called
the " . . . activités de l'esprit libre, c'est-d-dire a
l'art, a la religion et a la philosophie."8 He believed
that chance favored some epochs over others and that
humanity was occasionally lifted out of the state of
mediocrity only under the energetic pressure of certain
constraints, but that it returned naturally to a mediocre
state which Sorel believed to be a reflection of "ses
propres tendances." This cycle, Sorel designated as the
"law of apparent regression." A great error of Marx,
Sorel observed " . . . a été de ne pas se rendre compte
du pouvoir énorme qui appartient a la médiocrité dans
l'histoire."9 The present, Sorel asserted, was not
favorable to the idea of grandeur but he believed better
times would come: " . . . l'histoire nous apprend que la
grandeur ne saurait faire indéfiniment a cette partie
de l'humanité qui possede les incomparables trésors de

la culture classique et de la tradition chrétienne."10

 

8Ibid., p. 318. " . . . activities of free spirit,
that's to say art, religion and philosophy."

9Ibid., p. 332. " . . . was to not realize the
enormous power belonging to mediocrity in history.“

10Ibid., p. 335. " . . . history teaches us that
grandeur would be indefinately made by this part
of humanity that possesses the incomparable treasures
of classical culture and the Christian tradition."

329

L'Indépendance

 

On March 1, 1911, Georges Sorel once again found
himself a founding member of a committee which had intro-

duced a new periodical. L'Indépendance, which was pub-

 

lished the lst and 15th of each month from March 1, 1911,
until February 15, 1913, announced in its premier issue,
the intentions of its founders. This statement affirmed

that L'Indépendance would not be the instrument of a

 

political party or of any literary group; its language
was reminiscent of the declaration of the ill-fated "La

11 All periods of history had

Cité Francaise" of 1910.
their errors, the thematic statement asserted, but certain
aspects of the heritage of the past remained vital for

the present, and those who preserved this heritage
deserved praise. If France had been able to transmit,

the statement continued, " . . . en l'enrichissant,
l'héritage classique de la Grece et de Rome, c'est que,

durant plusieurs siecles, ses penseurs, ses poetes, tous

ses artistes se sont gardés de confondre 1e désordre

 

11L'Indépendance, founded by Emile Baumann, René
Benjamin, Vincent D'Indy, Paul Jamot, Ernest Laurent,
Emile Moselly, JerOme and Jean Tharaud, Jean Variot and
Georges Sorel (Paris: Marcel Riviere, March 1, 1911),
Numéro I. The thematic statement immediately preceded
page 1, and will be hereafter referred to as "Statement"
with a page designation of I. Interestingly the cost of
L'Indépendance was designated: France, Alsace-Lorraine:
12 francs par an. Etranger: 15 francs. For the com-
mittee, the "lost provinces" were placed in a special
category.

 

 

 

330

avec la liberté, l'originalité avec le manque de gofit."12

L'Indépendance was envisioned as an instrument " . . .

capables de lutter contre une telle aberration."l3 To

 

neglect or regret the past, the statement concluded
" . . . sont également stériles, mais la tradition, loin
d'étre une entrave, est le point d'appui nécessaire qui

14 All members of the

assure les élans les plus hardis."
founding committee signed the statement whose publication
signaled the commencement of a two-year life-span for

L'Indépendance, during which time its principle con-
15

 

tributor was Georges Sorel.

 

12"Statement," p. I. " . . . while enriching it,
the classical heritage of Greece and Rome, lasting
several centuries, it is because its thinkers, poets,
all of its artists kept themselves from confusing disorder
with liberty, originality with lack of taste.”

13EEEQ, " . . . capable to struggle against
such an aberration."

14Ibid. The statement promised to its future
contributors an independance of expression, and insisted
that L'Indépendance "ne leur demandera ni sacrifice, ni
concessiOn qui’diminue leur personnalité." " . . . is
equally sterile, but tradition, far from being a shackle,
is the necessary point of support that assures the most
hardy outbursts."

 

15See Appendix A for a complete list of the
essays submitted by Georges Sorel to L'Indépendance
1911 - 1913, and Appendix B for a list of boOk reviews
which he submitted.

 

331

Le Monument De Jules Ferry

 

The opening essay of the March 1, 1911, inaugural

issue of L'Indépendance was entitled "le monument de

 

Jules Ferry" by Georges Sorel. The picture of Jules
Ferry which Sorel presented suggested that Ferry was one
of the last representatives of the old provincial bour-
geoisie--a class which Sorel characterized as being

" . . . pleine d'orgueil . . . se regardait comme
appelée a utiliser les institutions crées par la mon-
archie; elle croyait avoir droit au pouvoir en raison

16 The

d'une sorte de 'droit divin de l'intelligence.'"
colonial policy with which Ferry had been associated,
Sorel believed, had not produced the results which were
expected of it, yet he noted no political party had been
able to decide to abandon even a fragment of the empire.
The educational program of Ferry, Sorel continued, had
results quite different from what its promoters had
planned. The definitive establishment of the republican
regime, Sorel noted, coincided with the desire on the
part of this newly established Republic " . . . imiter

. . . 1e systeme d'éducation primaire obligatoire . . .

en Allemagne . . . de developper dans les classes

 

6Georges Sorel, ”le Monument de Jules Ferry,"
L'Indépendance (March 1, 1911), p. 3. " . . . full of
pride . . . seeing itself called to utilize the insti-
tutions created by the monarchy; it believed it had the
right to power by reason Of a sort of divine right of
intelligence."

 

 

 

 

332

inférieur de la population un profond sentiment de

17 Jules Ferry, according

respect pour le souverain."
to Sorel, sincerely wanted the priests and the lay teachers
to cooperate in the realm of popular education--a cooper-
ation which, if it had succeeded, Sorel insisted, would
have protected the republican bourgeoisie from the more

18 But the battle between the church

radical politicians.
and the state produced problems which Sorel believed Jules
Ferry did not fully comprehend. Thus Ferry's legislation
and the intransigence of the Catholics, Sorel noted, led
to open conflict. In this confrontation, Sorel wrote,
"Ferry manquait totalement de souplesse; i1 voulut
effrayer ses adversaires et se donna le vilain rOle de
persécuter, bien qu'il ait toujours affirmé qu'il ne
voulait pas persécuter la religion."19 From this exper-

ience, Sorel concluded that the bourgeoisie could not be

anticlerical with impunity.

 

17Ibid., p. 14. " . . . to imitate the primary
obligatory education system . . . in Germany . . . to
develop in the inferior classes of the population a pro-
found feeling of respect for the sovereign power."

18Ibid., p. 15. In this evaluation of Ferry's
desire for cooperation, Sorel followed the Opinion of
Gabriel Hanotaux who advanced the idea in Histoire de la
France contemporaine, Tome IV, pp. 599, 613.

 

 

19Sorel, "le Monument," p. 15. "Ferry totally
lacked flexibility; he wished to frighten his adversaries
and gave himself the villain role of persecutor, although
he had always affirmed that he did not want to persecute
religion."

333

L'Abandon De La Revanche

 

On the question of the existence of the desire
for revenge in France toward Germany, Sorel wrote an
essay entitled "L'abandon de la revanche" which appeared

in the April 1, 1911, issue of L'Indépendance. The

 

French elections of 1877, he noted, had resulted in a

20 Although he believed that

plebecite against revenge.
the French were always moved by what he called "la musique
de l'éloquence patriotique," Sorel concluded " . . . ils
désirent avec ardeur qu'on leur permette de demeurer
pacifiques spectateurs des événements qui se produisent

21 Both the fall of Boulangerism and the

dans le monde."
victory of the Dreyfusards he attributed, in large part,
to the power of these sentiments. The masses, he wrote,
" . . . ont abandonné les directeurs des agitations
nationalistes quand elles ont soupconné qu'on les menait
a la revanche."22 The explanation of this disposition,

Sorel found in Renan's observation that, "uniquely pre-

occupied with well-being, France had become the most

 

0Georges Sorel, ”L'abandon de la revanche,"
L'Indépendance (April 1, 1911), p. 90.

 

21Ibid. " . . . they desire with ardor that they
be permitted to remain pacifist bystanders to events pro-
duced in the world."

22Ibid., p. 91. " . . . abandoned the directors
of nationalist agitations when they suspected that they
were led in revenge."

334

23 The search for material

pacific country in the world."
prosperity, Sorel believed, agreeing with Renan, had led
France henceforth to adapt itself to a "fundamental

mediocrity," which he characterized as being " . . . sans

originalité, ni hardiness."24

Sur La Magie Moderne

 

On September 1, 1911, Georges Sorel published an
essay entitled "Sur la magie moderne" in which he pro-
posed to examine a newly published book by Gustave LeBon:

Les opinions et les croyances.25 LeBon had written,

 

according to Sorel, that modern credulity was as great
as it had been in the ancient world, and further that
observations of history as well as psychology convinced
him that " . . . l'humanité est condamnée a subir éter-
nellement la dualité de la croyance et de la connais-

26

sance." Sorel affirmed that he regarded this opinion

 

23lgid. Sorel referenced Renan, Réforme intel-
lectuelle et morale, p. 23.

 

 

24Ibid. Renan, pp. 25,26.

25Georges Sorel, "Sur la magie moderne," L'Indé-
pendance (September 1, 1911). The work examined 5y Sorel
was Les opinions et les croyances, Gustave LeBon (Paris:
Flammarion, 1911).

 

 

26Sorel quoted from Les opinions et les croyances,
pp. 328- 29, in "Sur la magie moderne," p. 4. " . .
humanity is condemned to eternally submit to the duality
of belief and knowledge."

 

335

as perfectly correct, and noted the essentially magical
forms in political, economic and social life, but the
question, he insisted " . . . est de savoir si nous
sommes désarmes devant cette fatalité."27 It was
obvious to Sorel that a more complete development of
rationalism could not eliminate this aspect of human
consciousness and he chided the "fallacieuse métaphysique"
of the eighteenth century for having believed that all
the illusions of past civilizations would vanish before
the progress of enlightenment--ideas which he noted

" . . . sont encore enseignées aux primaires au nom de

la Sorbonne."28

Sorel suggested this condition of
duality, while potentially dangerous, could point the
way to the development of mentally more satisfying con-
structions by recognizing the need for what he called

29 Such a method,

"des racines puissantes dans le coeur."
Sorel believed, had been utilized in Christianity. By

meditating on the means which Christianity employed to

 

27Ibid. " . . . is to know if we are disarmed
before this fatality."

28Ibid., p. 3. " . . . are still taught in the
primary schools in the name Of the Sorbonne."

29Ibid., p. 4. Sorel wrote: " . . . mais peut-
étre pourrait-on engloutir, en quelque sort, ces tendances
funestes, en accaparant toute 1a conscience au profit de
constructions satisfaisantes pour l'esprit et ayant des
racines puissantes dans le coeur." " . . . powerful roots
in the heart."

336

dominate natural tendancies, Sorel believed, one could
discover the extent to which it benefited from what he
called these "dispositions fondamentales." Science
itself, Sorel concluded, did not derive certainty from
logic, but from the experimental mechanism it had at its
disposal, and he agreed with LeBon who had suggested the
precarious nature of this certainty: "Toute leur instru-
mentation scientifique servit seulement a leur donner d
certaines illusions, dont les fideles eux-mémes n'étaient
pas toujours tres sflrs, une apparence de certitude,

qu'elles n'auraient jamais acquise autrement,n30

Si Les Dogmes Evoluent

 

The spectacle of the battle between the Christian
church and the French state caused Sorel to speculate in
an article entitled "Si les dogmes évoluent,” (L'Indépen—
dance, September 15, 1911) " . . . que la ruine des croy-
ances chrétiennes laisse l'Européen du XXe siecle sans

31

religion." Sorel charged that his contemporary Repub-

licans were engaged in an effort to discredit Christianity

 

30Sorel quoted from Les opinions et les croyances,
pp. 282- -83, in "Sur la magie moderne, p. 7. "All Eheir
scientific instrumentation only served to give them certain
illusions, of which the faithful themselves were not
always very sure, an appearance of certainty that they
otherwise would never acquire."

 

31Georges Sorel, "Si les dogmes évoluent,"
L' Indépendance (September 15,1911), p. 34. ” . .
that the ruin of Christian beliefs left the European of
the twentieth century without religion."

 

 

337

using their control of education as the principle means
of attack. Their approach at the primary level of edu-
cation, Sorel charged, was to simply teach that science
had rendered impossible the belief in the supernatural.
To convince the university students, he continued, they
used a more serious argument: " . . . c'est l'histoire
qui devra servir en Sorbonne a ruiner l'armature idéolo-

32 In spite of the disdain for

gique de la religion."
tradition which the Republican writers against Christianity
showed, Sorel insisted that a new philosophical conception
had posed a rule which stated that " . . . quand i1 existe
un tradition ancienne, féconde en grande résultats et
illustrée par des hommes de génie, ses affirmations con-
stituent, pour le moins, des 'vérités pragmatiques', que
l'intelligence a le devoir de toujours contrOler, mais
qu'on ne saurait rejeter sous le seul prétexte qu'il n'en

est pas donné de demonstrations 'scientifiques."‘33

 

BZIQid. " . . . it is history which should serve
the Sorbonne to ruin the ideological armor of religion."

33Ibid., p. 38. " . . . when there exists an
ancient tradifion, rich in great results, and illustrated
by men of genius, its affirmations constitute, at the
least, pragmatic truths, that intelligence has the duty
to always control but that we could not reject under
the sole pretext that it had not given scientific
demonstrations of them."

338

Un Critique Des Sociologues

 

In the category of writers defined by Sorel as
"faithful representatives of that rationalism which has

34 Sorel included certain

so long troubled French brains,"
sociologists whose work formed the subject of his essay

entitled "Un critique des sociologues," (L'Indépendance,

 

October 1, 1911). Lévy-Bruhl, who was in 1911 a professor
at the Sorbonne, had claimed, according to Sorel, that
all moral philosophy was a sham and that the time had come
to construct a rational morality which would eliminate
obscurity and lead to human happiness. Had Lévy-Bruhl
read Aristotle, Sorel charged, " . . . il ne parlerait
point, avec tant d'assurance, d'une science des moeurs,
alors qu'il n'en peut formuler aucune proposition."35
Even Durkheim, whom Sorel admired, had never, he charged,

succeeded in defining what he meant by society and Sorel

concluded by chiding sociologists who spoke of ”their

 

34Ibid.

35Georges Sorel, "Un critique des Sociologues,“
L'Indé endance (October 1, 1911), p. 79. Sorel wrote:

L vy-Bru excelle dans l'art de rendre la réalité dif-
ficilement saisissable aux gens qui sont dénués d'un sens
critique puissant," p. 74. " . . . he would not talk
with so much assurance of a science of morals when he is
able to formulate no proposition from it."

339

science" which he believed was based on " . . . des
definitions vague de maniere a pouvoir créer un monde

. . . 36
lmaglnalre."

A La Mémoire De Cournot

 

On October 15, 1911, Sorel dedicated an essay to
the memory of Cournot, whom he believed to be an indepen-
dent thinker whose teachings were " . . . beaucoup plus
utiles que ceux d'aucun autre philosophe francais du
XIXe siecle."37 Cournot, Sorel noted, had rejected the
dogmatic philosophies of such thinkers as Renouvier and
Comte, and Sorel emphasized that " . . . aujourd'hui, 1a
nullité du dogmatisme devient tous les jours plus évi-

38 Sorel found particularly valuable a book

dente."
which Cournot had completed at the age of 74 entitled

Matérialisme, vitalisme, rationalisme. This book pro-

 

vided a summary of Cournot's teachings and included

 

36Ibid., p. 77. Writing of Durkheim, Sorel noted:
"Son réalisme socail est comme une de ces plantes
stérilisées, qu 'il est devenu de mode de placer dans les
appartements manquant d'air et de lumiere," p. 84.
. . . vague definitions in a manner to be able to
create an imaginary world. ”

 

37Georges Sorel, "A la mémoire de Cournot,"
L'Indépendance (October 15, 1911), p. 97. " . . . much
more useful than those of any other nineteenth century
French philoSOpher."

 

38Ibid., p. 100. " . . . today the nullity of
dogmatism Becomes more evident everyday."

340

entirely new ideas which according to Sorel were of the
highest importance on the subject of "transrationalisme."
Cournot used this term, Sorel noted, " . . . pour rem-
placer le terme mysticisme pris souvent dans un sens pré-

39 The champions of experimental science who

joratif."
had failed to accord sufficient attention to experience,
Sorel believed, posed a great danger for the progress of
human understanding. The work of Cournot, Sorel insisted,
took account of the realities contained in nature and in
history and rejected the categories of "unity" and
"infinity" which Cournot believed were merely "cartes
métaphysiques dressées avec symetre et élégance."40 A
study of human understanding, Sorel concluded, demon-
strated to Cournot that these categories were subject to
continuous modification " . . . aux divers étages du

41 Thus the mind,

systeme des connaissances humaines."
Sorel believed, constructed special systems for each

genre of knowledge.

 

39Ibid., p. 101. Sorel referenced Cournot,
Matérialisme, vitalisme, rationalisme, p. 384. " . . .
in order to replace the term mysticism often taken in
a pejorative sense."

 

40Sorel, "A La mémoire de Cournot," p. 103.
" . . . metaphysical maps dressed with symmetry and
elegance."

41Ibid., p. 104. " . . . in diverse stages of
the system of human knowledge."

341

Based on his study of Cournot, Sorel concluded
that a satisfying critique of human understanding relied
upon a critique of rationalism by historians: "Une cri-
tique satisfaisante de la connaissance ne pouvait étre
tentée avant que le prestige ancien du rationalisme

42 This

n'eflt été abaissé . . . par les historiens."
conclusion had also been reached by Cournot, according

to Sorel, who had believed this critique would entail the
study of the philosophy of languages, and all the
religious, political and judicial institutions by which
human life manifested itself. This would occur, accord-
ing to Cournot, " . . . quand l'ecole historique a prévalu
sur les écoles de théoriciens."43 Cournot did not attempt
to formulate a new morality for his contemporaries,

Sorel noted, because he believed " . . . ce n'est que par
la culture sociale et la tradition historique que se

développent . . . les facultés supérieurs de l'homme."44

 

42Ibid., p. 111. "A satisfying critique of
knowledge was not able to be tried before the former
prestige of rationalism had been lowered . . . by his-
torians."

43Ibid. Sorel quoted Cournot, Materialisme,
p. 592. " . . . when the historical school prevailed
over schools of theorists."

 

44Sorel, "A La mémoire de Cournot," p. 112.
Chiding the sociologists, Sorel added: "Cournot jugeait
inutile de suivre les speculations des moralistes qui
ont disserté sur l'homme abstrait," p. 111. " . . . it
is only by social culture and historical tradition that
the superior faculties of man develop."

342

Sorel concluded his essay by suggesting a union between
reason and experience which he designated by the term

45 The pragmatically constructed systems,

"pragmatisme."
Sorel believed, had shown themselves in the history of
science to be stable even in the face of serious cri-
ticisms, because the innovators " . . . ne peuvent les
faire disparaitre qu'en proposant des systemes manifeste-

ment beaucoup plus avantageux."46

This apparent conser-
vatism led Sorel to the Speculation that “ . . . il existe
donc dans la science une présomption historique fort

analogue aux présomptions du droit."47

Trois Problemes

 

In an essay entitled ”Trois problemes" (L'Indépen—

 

dance, December 1, 1911) which was devoted to an analysis

 

of Daniel Halévy's Luttes et problémes: Apologie pour

 

notre passé (Marcel Riviere, Paris, 1911), Georges Sorel

 

stated his conviction that the duty of all honest men,

 

45Sorel in a footnote wrote: "Je crois que
William James n'aurait pas contesté 1e droit que je
prends ici de donner au mot pragmatisme un sens beaucoup
plus noble que celui que lui donne l'usage.” Ibid., p. 113.

46£Bi§fr P. 114. " . . . are only able to make
them disappear in proposing systems manifestly much more
advantageous.”

47Ibid. Cournot, Sorel added, holds "une place
éminente parmi les penseurs qui ont cherché a régénérer
la philosophie par la réflexion historique.” " . . .
there exists, thus, in science a strong historic pre-
sumption analogous to presumptions of law."

343

regardless of party was " . . . de travailler a l'edu-

. 48
cation des masses."

But regular discourse and argumen-
tation was, Sorel believed, almost powerless to liberate
minds which had come under the influence of superficial
conceptions which appeared to be sound but which were in
fact unfounded. This intellectual slavery could only be
destroyed by employing a procedure capable of populariz-
ing a powerful experience in which " . . . la réalité se
manifesterait en opposition absolue avec les abstractions
que les masses acceptent comme vérités incontestables."49
Such a work had been produced by Thomas More whose
Utopia, Sorel believed, affirmed the triumph of the
aesthetic intuition over what he called "les mécanismes
scolastiques." Such a procedure would merit complete
admiration, Sorel added, " . . . s'il a mis en bonne
lumiere 1e mode d'action de quelques-unes de ces forces
cachées dont n'aiment guere s'occuper les gens qui

redoutent les criailleries des rhéteurs a la mode."50

 

48Georges Sorel, "Trois problemes," L'Indépendance
(December 1 and December 15, 1911), p. 262. “*. . . to
work to educate the masses."

 

49Ibid., p. 270. " . . . reality manifests
itself in ahsolute Opposition to the abstractions that
the masses accept as uncontestable truths."

50Ibid., p. 271. " . . . if it put in a good
light the mode of action of some these hidden forces
which people scarcely like to be occupied with who fear
the cries of popular rhetor."

344

La Rivolta Ideale

 

The Italian writer, Alfredo Oriani, whom both
Sorel and Croce admired as a romantic novelist and pro-
found social philosopher, became the subject of Sorel's

essay entitled "La rivolta ideale" (L'Indépendance,

 

April 15, 1912). Like Thomas More, Sorel believed that
Oriani combined an aesthetic intuition with philosophic
insight. His work, Sorel noted: " . . . été assez
clairvoyant pour prévoir le désastre des scientistes et

a contribué a maintenir la noble tradition hégélienne."51
The Hegelian philosophy, Sorel believed, had been among
the most fecond influences on nineteenth century thought
but he warned against what he believed was the sterile
and abstract approach to Hegelian ideas adopted by the
contemporary university professors, whom he charged were
" . . . beaucoup trop habitués d réduire l'histoire des
idées a des rapprochements d'abstractions infiniment

52

ténues." The true successors of Hegel, Sorel believed,

 

1Georges Sorel, "La rivolta ideale," L'Indépen-
dance (April 15, 1912), p. 166. Croce had written
favorably of Oriani in la Critica, January 20, 1909.
Oriani (1852-1909) who Between 1876 - 1908 published 13
novels, a book of poetry, a drama, and 5 histories, had
authored la rivolta ideale whose 1908 edition was being
used by Sorel'in’his essay. " . . . was clear enough to
foresee the disaster of scientists and contributed to
the maintenance of the noble hegelian tradition."

 

 

 

52Sorel, "La rivolta ideale," p. 167. " . . .
much more used to reducing the history of ideas to recon-
ciliations of infinitely held abstractions."

345

interested themselves little in " . . . la scolastique
compliquée, souvent arbitraire, parfois méme puérile
de'ce grand barbare'."53 They sought instead, Sorel
insisted, the prodigious intuitions which abounded in
his work. Alfredo Oriani, according to Sorel, sought to
penetrate reality by means of intuitions suggested to
him by a study of the works of Hegel. From this study,
Oriani concluded that the philosophy of history had as
much importance for the nineteenth century as the
astronomy of Copernicus had had for the opening of the
modern era. Influenced by Vico, Sorel noted, Oriani
believed that mankind moved fatally toward a decompo-
sition which could be a prelude to barbarism or renais-
sance. In this decomposition, Oriani h0ped for " . . .
la veritable révolution populaire" and to this end

" . . . i1 enseigne aux hommes que les grands peuples
sont appelés a subir de tres sanglants sacrifices pour

accomplir la mission que l'histoire leur a confiée."54

5352;2- " . . . complicated scholastic, often
arbitrary sometimes even puerile of 'this great barbarian.'"

54Ibid., p. 169. " . . . the true popular revo-
lution" " . . . he taught men that the great people are
called to submit to very bloody sacrifices in order to
accomplish the mission history confided in them."

346

Les Méfaits Des Intellectuels

 

In January, 1914, Georges Sorel wrote a letter
to Edouard Berth, which became the preface to a book by

Berth entitled Les Méfaits des Intellectuels. In this

 

letter, Sorel complained of the unwillingness of those

he called "nos universitaires" who had, he observed,
failed to appreciate the importance of Henri Bergson and
William James.55 The plight of the philosopher, Sorel
added, was often incomprehensible because " . . . son ame
n'est point sensible aux illusions des succes politiques,

56 But the study of the past

littéraires ou mondains."
revealed, Sorel asserted, that without the brilliance of
metaphysics, the proudest creations of the present
culture would not exist. The role of metaphysics, which
Sorel feared had been neglected by an epoch which had
produced the posivitism of August Comte, was to expand

human understanding and to produce the conditions in

which " . . . un état métaphysique a pris 1a place d'un

55Edouard Berth, Les Méfaits des Intellectuels
(Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1926), 2nd éd. With an intro-
ductory preface by Georges Sorelx Barth's work bore the
following dedication: "A mon maitre Georges Sorel en
témoignage de ma profonde gratitude intellectuelle."

56Ibid., p. V. Sorel noted that Anatole France
had condemned Bergson " . . . comme un corrupteur des
nouvelles generations," p. III. " . . . his soul is
not sensitive to illusions of political, literary or
worldly success.“

347

57

état positiviste." But the immediate present was, for

Sorel, discouraging: " . . . 1e sol de l'histoire con-
temporaine est jonché de débris de vanités."58
Sorel believed that a schism had occurred between
the manner of thinking which dominated the nineteenth
century--a century which was, he wrote: " . . . tyran-
nisé par le dogmatisme de scientistes," and the approach
toward understanding represented by the genius of Pascal.59
These two realms which Sorel conceptualized as material
and moral, had in the past, he believed, been represented
by the conflict between science and religion. Philosophy
would henceforth be dominated, Sorel believed, by the
question of how the two realms could coexist. The answer
to this question, Sorel believed, could be approached
through the realization that " . . . les deux absolus

présentent entre eux de remarquables analogies."60 In

 

57Ibid., p. VII. " . . . a metaphysical state
took the place of a positivist state."

583213. " . . . the ground of contemporary
history is scattered with debris of vanities."

59Ibid., p. VIII. Sorel employed the “image"
of Pascal because he believed "le génie de Pascal . . .
marque d'une image psychologique, plus clairement qu'on
ne pourrait le faire par n'importe quelle dissertaion
abstraite, 1a scission que nous voyons se produire . . . "
" . . . tyrannized by the dogmatism of scientists."

60Ibid., p. XIII. " . . . the two absolutes
present remarhable analogies between them."

348

the course of the development of science and religion
and law (which Sorel added as "un terme moyen entre la
science et la théologie"), Sorel wrote " . . . les con-
siderations esthétiques de simplicité, de convenance,
d'harmonie ayant eu une influence tres notable sur 1e
choix des solutions adoptées."61
Bergson, Sorel continued, had demarked a line
"entre l'inerte et le vivant" and had attributed the
inert realm to logic, while recommending " . . . de
n'accorder qu'une valeur métaphorique aux déductions qui

62 All the research made

portent sur l'autre domaine."
on the origins of Christianity, Sorel added, had shown
that history could not attain a dogmatic statement of

the facts which took place and this state of knowledge

did not permit the denial of “ . . . la possibilité de

la création, des miracles ou des experiences mystiques."63

Sorel concluded his preface with the prediction that the

 

61Ibid., XVII. " . . . aesthetic considerations
of simplicity, convenience, harmony having had a very
notable influence on the choice of adOpted solutions."

62Ibid., XVIII, XIX. Sorel quoted Bergson,
Evolution crdatrice, pp. 216, 231-32. " . . . to accord
only a metaphorical value to deductions that bear on
the other domain."

 

63Berth, les Méfaits des Intellectueles, p. xx.
" . . . the possibility ofcreation, miracles or mystic
experiences."

 

349

anti-dogmatics of Pascal reinforced by Bergson would
produce a new generation " . . . débarassée, . . . des
fantOmes construits par les philosophies intellectualistes

depuis Descartes."64

 

64Ibid., XXXVII. " . . . free of phantoms con-
structed by intellectual philOSOphers since Descartes."

APPENDIX A

L'INDEPENDANCE, MARCEL RIVIERE ET CIE PARIS, 1911 - 1913
ESSAYS BY GEORGES SOREL

Mars-Aofit 1911
"le Monument de Jules Ferry," pp. 1-28
"L'abandon de la revanche," pp. 71-107
"lyripipii Sorbonici moralisationes," pp. 111-50
"Responsabilités de 1870," pp. 167-90
"L'Otage de Paul Claudel," pp. 391-436

Septembre 1911 - Février 1912
"Sur la magie moderne,” pp. 1-11
"Si les dogmes évoluent," pp. 33-70
"Un critique des sociologues," pp. 73-92
"A la mémoire de Cournot," pp. 97-134
"Trois problemes," pp. 221-40
"Trois problemes," (fin) pp. 261-92
"Urbain Gohier," pp. 305-28

Mars-Aofit 1912
"D'un écrivain prolétaire," pp. 19-37
"la rivolta ideale," pp. 161-78
"Quelques pretentions juives," pp. 217-37
"Quelques pretentions juives" (suite), pp. 277-96
"Quelques pretentions juives" (fin), pp. 317-37

Octobre 1912 - Février 1913
"Aux temps dreyfusiens," pp. 29-57

350

APPENDIX B

L'INDEPENDANCE 1911 - 1913
BOOK REVIEWS SUBMITTED BY GEORGES SOREL WITH
SELECTED EXCERPTS OF SOREL'S COMMENTS

Mars - Aoflt 1911”

Le mythe vertuiste et la littérature immorale, Vilfredo
Pareto
"Les philosophes politiques actuels sont tres
effrayés des dangers que court 1a démocratie; mais
ils ne sont pas de force a approfondir les problemes
qu'ils se posent; les plus savants d'entre eux sentent
vaguement que les moeurs des démocraties devraient
quelque peu rappeler celle des communautés protestantes
qui servirent de modeles aux premiers théoriciens du
droit public moderne." p. 29

 

Antipragmatisme, Albert Schinz
D s qu'on ne tient plus compte de ces caracteres
essentiels, on s'eXpose a faire du pragmatisme un
grand danger: soit qu'on 1e transforme en dogme de
l'infaillibilité democratic, soit qu'on y voie une
apologie du succes." p. 30

 

Le Christianisme a la croisée des chemins, Georges Tyrrel
Impérialisme ancien et moderne, Lord Cromer
Entre deux servituees, Jean Bourdeau
L'interprétation_Economique de l'histoire, Edwin
Seligmah’
Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort dans la philoso-
phic de Hegel, Benedetto Croce
Presque tout le monde croit chez nous que la
philosophie de Hegel n'existe plus que dans les
livres d'histoire, . . . c'est une grave erreur." p. 33

 

 

 

 

 

Quelques remarques sur l'Orpheus de M. Salomon Rernach,

__R.P.M.ST Lagrange r

Harnack et le miracle, Hermann van Laak‘

La science des religions et la foi chrétienne, J. Bricout

Pragmhtisme, modernisme, protestantisme, Albert Leclere

_—W. . . l'influence incontesthble des tendances
pragmatiques dans la pensée contemporaine . . . je ne

 

351

352

peux la regarder comme due aux écrits de Guyan, de
Secrétan, de Blondel ou d'autres génies du bavardage
philosophique; je la rattache aux preoccupations
historiques que Hegel a inspirées au XIXe siecle.

Je dirai donc pour définir les tendances pragmatiques:
certaines choses doivent étre appelées vraies, parce
que leur fecondité a été révélée par 1e developpement
historique." p. 108

Cooperation et socialisme en Angleterre, Barrault et
Alfassa

Psychologie de l'education, Gustave Le Bon

Les jardins de l'histoire, Emile Gebhart

La vieille église, Emile Gebhart

La philosophie de M. Bergson, Pierre Lasserre

-“VOici comment je rESume’l'Evolution créatrice. Le
transformisme, enseigné aujourdrhui par—les
naturalistes, est inintelligible si on n'admet pas
que du surnaturel accompagne la vie; dans l'animal,
l'instinct a quelque chose de devin; l'intelligence
humaine s'est formée au cours de la fabrication des
instruments de travail, en sorte que l'homme est
devenu géometre parce qu'il était artisan. Le vrai
domaine de l'intelligence est l'étude des corps bruts;
dans ce domaine, elle est soveraine. . . . Quand on
sort de ce domaine; i1 faut prénare beaucoup de pre-
cautions en appliquant les procédés du raisonnement
scientifique, parce que la science n'est plus ade-
quate a la réalité." pp. 191-92

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hyponotisme et suggestion, César Lombroso

Les anciennes démocraties des Pays-Bas, Henri Pirenne

L'Angleterre moderne. Son évolution, Louis Cazamian

Souvenirs d'un vieil Athénier, Emile Gebhart

Saints d'autrefois, Newman

Praeterita. Souvenirg_de jeunesse, Ruskin

Louis II de Baviére, Jacques Bainville

Les grands courants de la pensée contemporaine, Roudolf
Euchén
" . . . quand on considere l'ensemble d'un long passé,
chez le grands peuples, on trouve les choses achevées,
la science, l'histoire, le déterminisme; mais quand
on se tourne vers l'avenir, on trouve la vie, l'imagi-
nation, le mythe, la liberté." p. 231

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rome et le clergé frangais sous la Constituante, Albert
Mathiez '

L'erreur primaire, Maze-Sencier

Nouvelles études anglaises, André Chevrillon

__m'. . . il me semble qu'il est nécessaire d'employer
des expositions mythologiques pour parler correctement

 

 

353

de la société, de la patrie, de la famille, des
sanctions de la vie; les idéolgues commettent un
étrange contresens lorsqu'ils reduisent ces choses
a des abstractions scolastiques . . . " p. 338

Ce que mes yeux ont vu, Arthur Meyer

Lapensée contemporaihe, Paul Gaultier

Barbey d' Aurevilly, Ernest Seilliere

Histoire partiale et histoire vraie, Jean Guiraud

LTAngleterre d‘Edouard_VII, Augustin Filon

la catholicisme liberal, Dom Besse

Un prétre marie, Albert Rontu

La poesie et le symbolisme dans l' histoire des insti-
tutions humaines, Jacques Flach

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Septembre 1911 - Février 1912

Pour le droit naturel, G. Platon

L' Etat et ses agents, Pierre Harmignie

Armand Carrel et Emile de Girardin, Louis Fiaux
LEmpire liberal, Emile Olliver

Les mystiques dd neo-romantisme, Ernest Seilliere

Archives et papiers personnels de Crispi, traduction de
Mme. Jean Carrére

Lé réalisme de Bouald, Leon de Montesquiou

Etude sur le XVIII fisiecle, Ferdinand Brunetiere

L' Afrique noire, Capitaine O. Meynier

William James, Emile Boutroux

Positivisme et catholicisme, Laberthonniere

Domination et colonisation, Jules Harman

Le régionalisme, Charles-Brun

De Panurge 3 Sancho Panca, Emile Gebhart
“Il est fort difficile de faire rire un monde
civilisé, aussi les gens qui parviennent a le faire
rire obtiennent-ils une immense réputation . . .
on a peut-étre 1e droit de penser qu'il faut plus de
génie pour produire un chef-d'oeuvre grotesque que
pour produire un chef-d'oeuvre sérieux." p. 165

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

les maitres de l'heure, Victor Giraud

Pages chOiSies‘des mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, Victor Giraud

Aypropos de 1' histoire des reli ions, Alfred Loisy

Lettres de combat, Ferdinand Brunetiere

Histoire de l‘Affaire Dreyfus, Tome VII, Joseph Reinach

Lettres de jeunesse, Charles-Louis Philippe

A l'enseigne de 1' Ideal. _Quarante-cinq_ans de ma vie,
Louise de Prusse, princesse Antoine Radziwill

Les idées révolutionnaires dans les campagnes du Bour-
bonnais, LEOpold’Bernardid

Les sciences et les humanités, Henri Poincaré

Lettres inédites de Proudhohla Gustave Chaudey et a
divers Comtois

Les odes de Salomon, Labourt et Batiffol

 

 

 

354

Mars-Aout 1912

1e Nouveau Testament dans 1' Eglise chrétienne, E.
Jacquier

Renouvier, P. Archimbault
"Tout ce que j'ai lu de Renouvier m'a donné l'opinion
que c'était un excellent primaire, dont l'intelli-
gence avait été un peu troublée par une education
mathématique trop forte pour lui: il trouva de la
philosophie dans Victor Hugo." p. 39

 

LaAguestion bretonne, Comte de lantivy-Trédion

LT imperialisme br1tannique, John Bridge

Gobel, Gustave Gautherot

Pages chosies de Jules Lemaitre, André du Fresnoy
"En publicant ce florilege lTAction francaise a
évidemment voulu montrer, par I‘exemple de Jules
Lemaitre, quelle puissante attraction exerce l'idée
royaliste sur les hommes . . . les jeunes amis de
Charles Maurras n'ont pas l'air de s'apercevoir que
leur mouvement pourrait bien servir a préparer une
restauration bonapartiste, s'ils ne prennent pas
quelques précatuions." p. 42

 

 

 

Jésus et les apotres, C. Piepenbring
Beethoven, Vincent—d‘Indy
"Les artistes, comme tous les inventeurs, sont
obligés de tenter beaucoup d'essais hasardeux avant
de trouver la voie qui conduit 3 une realité ayant une
valeur esthétique." p. 89

 

Etudes de critigue et d' histoire religieuse, E. Vacandard

JeanChapelain, Georges Collas

Le miroir de 1a_perfection du bienheureux Francois
d'Assise, Orere Leon

les sciences de la nature an XVIII siecle, D. Mornet

Contes et fantaisies, Emile Gébhart

Quételet, statiSticien et sociologue, Joseph Lottin

'__W. . . aujOufd'hui on a peine a comprendre comment
Durkehim peut appeler pathologique ce qui s'eloigne
de la moyenne." p. 146

 

 

 

En flannant 1a Provence, André Hallays

Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiguité chretienne, Abbé
Tixeront

Nouvelles orientations de la morale, F. Palhories
"Aussi beaucoup de personnes raisonnables estiment
qu'il conviendrait de modifier certaines regles
juridiques relatives 5 la condition de la femme, pour
les mettre mieux en rapport avec les conditions de la
vie actuelle; mais ces personnes sont abusivement
qualifiées de 'feministes,‘ car le vrai 'féministe'
se propose de developper la liberté des ralations
sexuelles." p. 251

 

 

355

I1 materialismo storics in Frederico Engels, Rodolfo
Mondolio

Bersot et ses amis, Gelix Hémon

gistoire de ia Commune de 1871, Edmond Lepelletier

Les notes d'un_voyage en Grece, Charles Demaurge

__i. . . une métaphysique nTESt point faite pour ali-
menter les harangues du dialecticien, mais pour
diriger nos travaux de recherche."

 

 

 

 

Mémoires sur les sciences occultes, Schopenhauer

le gouvernement de Pie X, Aventino

Michel Bakounine, Marc de Preaudan

la philosophie de M. Henri Bergson, René Gillouin
Nouvelles études sur Chateaubriand, Victor Giraud
Llobjet intégral de lrapologEtique, P. A. de Poulpiquet
Newmann catholique, Paul Thureau-Dangin

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Octobre 1912 - Février 1913

les papes d'Avignon, G. Mollat

Comment naissent les dogmes, Jules deGaultier

-—1Admirer la puissance de l'esprit d'Alfred Fouilée
et parler avec dédain de William James, aussi bien
que de Bergson; c'est se donner un brevet d'incom-
pétence philosophique." p. 98. "Tout le monde sait
aujourd'hui que les idées que Nietzsche a émises sur
le role historique du christianisme, ont juste
autant de valeur que les facéties voltairiennes."
p. 99

 

 

la crédibilite et l'apologétique, A. Gardeil
"L'expérience établit'que les—hommes arrivent a des
convictions tres fermes, capables de commander sou-
verainement toute leur conduite par un travail dans
lequel l'intelligence discursive joue un r61e assez
attenue; quand les principes ont été arrétés, nous
cherchons a voir 51 le monde physique et l'histoire
sont ordonnés d'un facon conforme a ces principes;
lorsque cette critique n'aboutit pas a un résultat
satisfaisant, l'individu découragé devient sceptique
et le plus souvent est incapable de retrouver de
nouvelles convictions." p. 157

 

 

Histoire du modernisme catholique, Albert Houtin

_—W. . . un grandmouvement social ne réussit que s'il
a pu s'incorporer, d'une facon intime, une idéologie
originale et puissante." p. 162

Annales de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie de
Louvaih, Essais sur latsensibilitédcontemporaine,
fiaphaeICor
"Bergson est résolument (et avec raison) anti-

intellectualiste, car i1 n'admet point que les choses

 

356

de la vie puissent etre connues par une science
construite soit a l'imitation de la mecanique
celeste, soit a l'imitation de la biologie peripa-
teticienne qui pose la constance des circuits de
l'evolution vitale comme une loi imperative du
changement; l'avenir est dans l'inconnu." p. 164

la Basilique de Fourviere, son symbolisme, Saint-Marie
Perrin

la Russie moderne, Gregoire Alexinsky

Pourguoi on a etouffe l'affaire Valensi, Maurice Pujo

L'Etat m5derne et l'organisation internationale,
David Joyne Hiil

Eistoire artistique des ordres mendiants, Louis Gillet
"La grande question pour I‘artiste n‘est pas de
savoir que la nature renferme des puissances pro-
digieusement fecondes, mais de se sentir en mesure
de creer, dans la matiere brute, des formes capables
de nous faire aimer les forces vivantes." p. 240

 

 

 

 

 

Maitres d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui, Victor Giraud

les siecles de‘bronze, EmiIe Gebhart

L'art de tromper, dTintimider et de corrompre l'electeur,
Charles Marcault
"Les elections ne sont pas etablies pour nommer des
mandataires du public, mais pour dire quelle faction
jouira provisoirement des avantages que procure 1e
pouvoir. . . . tous les gens qui ont reflechi sur les
illusions de l'esprit, savent qu'il existe beaucoup
de sophismes analogues a celui de la democratie:
11 en existe meme dans les sciences." p. 305

 

 

 

Blancs, bleus et rouges, G. Lenotre

Saint Bonaventure, G. Palhories

—W. . . je crois qu'on a commis plus d'une fois des
contresens serieux quand on a essaye de meler quelque
chose de la pensee moderne a ces systemes anciens;
pour rendre l'oeuvre . . . intelligible dans la mesure
du possible, il conviendrait de la traiter uniquement
comme une formation historique." p. 389

 

 

Les democraties latines de l'Amerique, F. Garcia
Calderon ‘—
Fouquier-Tinville, Alphonse Dunoyer

 

APPENDIX C

PRE-WAR REVALUATIONS: 1910 - 1914

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO
BENEDETTO CROCE: 1910 - 1914

 

S septembre 1910
"Je vous envoie 1e prospectus d' une revue qui commencera
a paraitre le ler novembre. . . . Nous voudrions donner
a cet e revue une bonne allure litteraire et philoso-
phique . . . le monde universitaire francais nous sera
donc en totalité etranger." p. 342

13 novembre 1910
" . . . tout ce qui touche qu 'pragmatisme' est tres
peu clair; je me demande si les 'pragmatistes' ne
cherchent pas a embrouiller leur doctrine." p. 343

28 novembre 1910
"J'ai vu hier Bergson qui m'a dit que votre livre sur
Hegel l'avait convaincu du profit qu'il y aurait pour
lui a lire Hegel, plus attentivement qu'il ne l'avait
fait autrefois.
. . . 1a revue, dont je vous avais envoyé le pro-

gramme, ne paratra pas, i1 y a eu trop de complications."
p. 343

25 janvier 1911

"Je vous prie de jeter un coup d'oeil sur le chapitre
que j'ai ajouté aux Illusions du progres; je crois
avoir ouvert une voiedeCOnde pourides recherches
philosophiques sur l'histoire, en montrant que les
mouvements vers la grandeur sont toujours 'forcés' et
les mouvements vers la decadence toujours naturels;
notre nature est invinciblement portée 3 ce que les
philosophes de l'histoire regardent comme mauvais; que
ce soit barbarie, ou que ce soit décadencex

. . . 1a revue la Cité fran§_ise ne paraitra pas;
les deux fondateurs, qu1 appartiennent a 1' Action
francaise, ont trop voulu faire les maitres, j'aurais
été impuissant, tout en ayant 1a veritable resonsa-
bilité morale . . .

Je vous envoie 1e programme d'une autre revue que
fond un de mes anciens associés, Jean Variot . . .
Les hégéliens convenaient bien qu'un moment ne

 

357

 

358

détruisait pas ce qui avait précédé, au sens qu'il ne
croyaient pas que l'histoire fasse jamais table rase;
les révolutions sont conservation de certaines choses
et destruction d'autres. Marx entendait que 1e
socialisme conservait les acquisitions de l'économie
capitaliste; mais si on conserve l'organisation démo-
cratique, on conserve le pouvoir des politiciens sur
toutes choses, et cela est certainement contraire a
l'idée que le marxisme s'est faite de la révolution

. . . je suis tres persuadé que . . . un mouvement
social manque de force durable quand il n'est pas
soutenu par une idéologie puissante, capable de

s 'imposer. Le socialisme, en tourant a la politique,
perd 1e moyen de se former une telle idéologie; le
syndicalisme a pu, un moment, paraitre propre a avoir
une idéologie élevée; mais il est tombé entreles mains
'd'hyperdemagogues' qui ne comprennent pas 1a valeur
des idées.

C'est en constatant cette situation que j'ai résolu
de ne plus rien écrire sur le syndicalisme. 11 y a
des questions plus intéressantes a examiner, depuis
que le mouvement ouvrier ne fournit plus d'expériences
propres a s'adapter a une idéologie . . . " pp. 343,
344, 345.

février 1911

"En France on a crée a la Sorbonne un enseignement de
l'histoire des religions, en vue de faire mal au
christianisme; . . . nous verrons bient6t peut-étre
la science des religions entrer dans l'enseignement
secondaire." p. 346

19 février 1911

"Le socialisme devient une démogogie, aussi bien dans
les syndicats que dans les luttes politiques. Il
n'offre donc plus rien d'intéressant pour les
philsophes; c'est pourquoi je me suis résolu a ne
plus jamais écrire sur ce sujet." p. 347

17 avril 1911

" . . . les sociologues, ont-ils quelques succes? Le
temps de leur gloire doit étre bien pres de finir."
p. 348

juillet 1911

. . . on a en France une idée fort inexacte des
valeurs des divers auteurs; on les juge moins d'apres ce
qu'ils sont, que d'apres l'authorité des écrivains
qui les introduisent a Paris." p. 432

359

27 juillet 1911
" . . . 'sincérité absolue': c'est une qualité rare

pour le temps actuel," p. 433

25 février 1912
"Les observations de G. P. (G. Papini, Gnoseologia di
G. B. Vico) sur Vico sont d'une scolaritédqui frise
I‘absurdité; personne ne serait novateur si on lui
défendait de rien voir appris; ce que je crois com-
prendre, c'est que beaucoup d'italiens actuels ne
voient pas 1a valeur éducative de Vico, ils n'y cher-
chent que des motsll" p. 435

 

16 mars 1912
" . . . il faudrait cesser de discuter et passer a

l'application; c'est 1e seul moyen de rendre clair ce
qui est demeuré obscur dans la pensée de Marx." p. 435

6 septembre 1913 A
"Bergson n'a pas en de maitres en France: voila la

vérité vraie." p. 47

3 mars 1914
"L'élection de Bergson a l'Académie est un fait con-
siderable, parce que beaucoup de forces avaient été
mise en mouvement contre lui; Barres était le grand
meneur de l'attaque." p. 49

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER VIII

A critique of the rationalist prejudices of
historians and sociologists in the opening of this
chapter is followed by a comprehensive statement of
Sorel's evaluation of the role of pragmatism in modern
philosophy. Considering the impact of tradition in
human affairs, especially physics, Sorel then examines
the epistemological impact of the ideas of Claude
Bernard and restates his conception of the artificial
and natural milieux. In the context of this discussion
he underlines the special role of the philosopher and
the historian as regulators of human intellectual
activity.

Chapter VIII concludes with Sorel's analysis of
the struggle of mankind against pain and suffering
through its use of religion, art and asceticism. In
the final essay Sorel considers the special qualifi-
cations of Lenin as a Socialist leader.

The appendix of Chapter VIII contains the last
of the Croce letters which detail Sorel's reaction to
the war, the future of Socialism and the French intel-

lectual scene generally from 1914 - 1921.

360

CHAPTER VIII

FINAL WRITINGS; PRAGMATISM, PAIN
AESTHETICS AND ASCETICS:

1914 - 1922

Matériaux D'une Théorie Du Prolétariat

 

In July, 1914, Georges Sorel completed an intro-
duction to a collection of his earlier writings which

appeared in 1919 under the title Matériaux d'une théorie

 

du proletariat.l Sorel announced his intention to address

 

some thoughts to those speculative thinkers who sought

to understand the means by which the human mind could
become aware of " . . . le fonctionnement des organismes
crées par l'histoire, les tendances des groupes prépon-
dérants, les idées de réforme qui sont, en quelque sorte
diffuses dans l'atmosphere d'une époque."2 This under-
standing, Sorel believed, was based on interpretations

of historical development which he noted always contained

a great deal of subjectivity. Historians, Sorel wrote,

 

lGeorges Sorel, Matériaux d'une theorie du pro-
létariat (Paris: Marcel Riviére etCie, 1919).

 

 

2Ibid., p. l. " . . . the functioning of organisms
created by History, the tendencies of preponderant groups,
the ideas of reform which are somehow diffused in the atmos-
phere of an epoch."

361

362

" . . . les utilisent d'ordinaire sans en connaitre par-
faitement le signification; les metaphysiciens doivent
chercher quels principes forment l'ame de ces systemes."3
For Sorel, the primary historical force which was capable
of motivating a determined human movement in the direction
of producing a future appropriate to their hopes was the
faith that these groups had " . . . dans une mission qui
leur aurait été confiée, 1a certitude d'un succes pour-
suivi a travers une multitude d'obstacles.“4 Rome had

had, according to Sorel, an idea of its mission of domi-
nation and, he believed that this idea had been efficacious.
And Renan's suggestion that the Book of Daniel was a docu-
ment of primary importance for the philosophy of history
because it suggested to the Christian mind one of its

most compelling myths was accepted by Sorel who noted

approvingly that Renan had disdain for the Greeks for

 

3Ibid. " . . . use them ordinarily without recog-
nizing their significance; metaphysicians must seek which
principles form the soul of these systems."

4Ibid., p. 11. Such a movement Sorel had noted
in Judiasm: "Lorsque la monarchie salomonienne se fut
effondrée, le judaisme puisa dans les merveilleuses pro-
messes popularisées par les livres de ses prophetes et
de ses psalmistes que lisaient avec avidité les exiles,
de tels éléments de vie qu'il n'a jamais été aussi sflr
de sa foi mosaique qu'apres la ruine de son statut
territorial," p. 12. " . . . in a mission which
has confided in them the certainty of success in spite
of many obstacles."

363

making of the philosophy of history a simple tracing
" . . . des tableaux schématiques pour définir les
successions de formes politiques."5

Historical interpretation, Sorel believed, must
take account " . . . du contrale qu'une philosophie est
capable d'exercer sur les réalités vivantes de l'histoire."6
And he chided his contemporaries who were persuaded that
by following "1e rationalisme commun" which speculated
on morphological evolutions that it was possible to
render "scientifically" an account of the general move-
ment of history. Such aberrations, Sorel wrote, " . . .
nous font deviner que les succes du scientisme historique
tiennent a des impulsions psychologiques puissantes qui
poussent l'homme a vouloir étre trompé."7 The theories
of the rational state, Sorel noted with irony, placed
the demagogues in the position of opposing logic to
history; their paradoxical goal was to persuade the

masses " . . . que les lois de l'histoire imposent la

realisation des projets formés par les destructeurs de

 

5Ibid., p. 13. Sorel quoted from Renan, Histoire
du peuple d'Israel, tome V, pp. 356,359. " . . . sche-
matic pictures to define the succession of political forms."

 

 

6Sorel, Matériaux, p. 13. " . . . of the control
which a philos0phy is capable of exercising on the living
realities of history."

 

7Ibid., p. 16. " . . . make us aware that the
success of scientific history is connected with powerful
psychological impulses which cause man to want to be
misled."

364

l'histoire."8 And the scientific sociologists, Sorel
continued, who were themselves closely tied to the
rational state, were firmly convinced that their under-
standing of the past permitted them to obtain a very
probable perception of the future. This approach, Sorel
noted, in reference to William's James schematic tableau
of philoSOphic conceptions arranged around the two poles
of rationalism and empiricism, was anti-emperical because
empiricism " . . . ne consentira jamais a annoncer
l'avenir."9 It was absurd, Sorel concluded, to operate
in the manner of the rationalists ” . . . qui, hallucinés
par leurs préjugés unitaires, mélent les deux genres
(rationalisme et empiricisme), prétendent imposer au
second les conditions du premier et s'égarent ainsi dans

le scientisme historique."10

 

8Ibid., p. 17. " . . . that the laws of history
impose the realization of projects formed by the destroyers
of history."

9Ibid., p. 23. Sorel referred to William James,
Le Pragmatisme, ler chapitre. " . . . will never consent
to forecasting the future."

 

10Ibid., p. 24. William James, Sorel noted
" . . parait avoir été surtout choqué par la suppres-
sion du monde réel qu 'effectuent les rationalistes au
profit d'un monde idéal, bien ordonné, ou tout est net,"
p. 24. Sorel noted in a concluding note of the Avant-
propos that the war had delayed publication of Matériaux
d'une théorie du proletariat until 1918 although 1t was
prepared’byJ July, 1914. Speaking of the intervening war,
he noted, "la sanglante 1e on de choses qui se produira
en Russie fera sentir a togs les ouvriers qu'il ya
une contradiction entre la démocratie et la missia du

 

 

 

 

 

365

De L'Utilité Du Pragmatisme

 

Writing in the avant-propos to De l'utilité du

 

Pragmatisme, which was to be the final book-length study

 

of his career, Georges Sorel continued his attack on what
he called "les préjugés scientistes" and charged that the
statesmen (hommes d'Etat) of his day were working to con-
stitute a political art which would permit " . . . de
Charlatans, de réveurs et d'étourdis" to dominate the

11 William James, Sorel believed, had conducted

future."
a battle against "les servants du scientisme"; and he
praised James for having developed a philosophy ”d'un
robuste bon sens" which showed James to be " . . . capables
d'interpréter sérieusement les pratiques de la méthode

12 Sorel praised what he called ”prag-

expérimentale.“
matisme militant" for having engaged in the difficult
battle against "scientisme" and he charged that it was

an anomoly of language to label pragmatisme

 

prolétariat; l'idée de constituter un gouvernement de
producteurs ne périra pas," p. 53. " . . . who deluded

by their unitary prejudices, mix the two genres (rationalism
and empiricism), claiming to impose on the second the con-
ditions of the first thus misleading scientific

history."

11Georges Sorel, De l'utilite du Pragmatisme
(Paris: Marcel Riviere, I921}: p. 1. This work was com-
pleted in 1917 although its publication was delayed until
1921.

12Ibid., p. 2. Sorel recommended a study he had
read which was dedicated to William James and Henri Berg-
son entitled "Les critiques du rationalisme" by André
Chaumeiux in Revue hebdomadaire (Paris, January 1, 1910).
" . . . capable of seriou§ly understanding practices of
the experimental method."

 

366

anti-intellectual: "Par une de ces anomalies du langage
qui sont nombreuses dans la philosophie, on nomme sou-
vent: doctrines anti-intellectualistes celles qui
voudraient écarter les confusions engendrées par le
'scientisme' en vue de donner pleine confiance dans les
résultats du travail légitime de l'intelligence."l3
Sorel admitted, however, there had been many confused
attempts to state the doctrine of pragmatism with the
result that pragmatism had been celebrated by some as

"la vérité transatlantique" and this "enthousiasme
inquiétant" had caused many to wonder " . . . si 1e
pragmatisme renferme assez de matiere propre pour mériter
d'étre classe parmi les systemes qui comptent dans le
dévelOppement de l'intelligence."14 Sorel believed that
a prOper understanding of the pragmatic approach to truth

would justify his conclusion that pragmatism would become

one of the essential elements of modern thought.

 

13Ibid., footnote 2. "By one of those anomolies
of language which are numerous in philosophy one often
calls anti-intellectual those doctrines which would
eliminate the confusion engendered by "scientisme" for
the purpose of giving full confidence to the results of
the legitimate work of the intelligence."

14Ibid., p. 4. " . . . if pragmatism includes
sufficient material proper to merit it being classed
among the systems which contribute to the development
of intelligence."

367

Pragmatism, Sorel believed, was born of the need
to protest against "la superstition de la dialectique."15
William James, according to Sorel, had provided no con-
centrated or complete definition of pragmatism but he had
recognized that it was launched as a movement by Charles
Peirce in 1878. Peirce, Sorel continued, had invited his
readers to desert "les chapelles oh l'on célébre les
mysteres des abstractions, pour . . . le vaste domaine

de la variété concrete."l6

To obtain perfect clarity in
ideas relative to an object, Peirce believed it was
necessary to consider the practical effects to which

the idea seemed capable of leading. To the conception
of these immediate or long-term effects, Sorel continued,
are reduced our complete conception of the object itself.
These considerations led Charles Peirce to say, Sorel

noted, that Catholics and Protestants should not debate

transubstantiation ” . . . quand ils sont d'accord sur

 

15Ibid. Sorel noted his own rule of criticism
which he beI1eved was closely related to the ideas of
William James: "La vériatable méthode a suivre pour
connaitre les défauts, les insuffisances et les erreurs
d'une philosophie considerable, consiste a la critiquer
d'apres ses propres principes." footnote 1.

16Ibid., p. 5. The article by Peirce had
appeared in French in la Revue philosophique, in January,
1879, and Sorel believed its ideas 1ri. . . avoir en
d'influence avant l'époque oh les idées de William James
eurent pénétré chez nous." footnote 1. " . . . the
churches where one celebrates the mysteries of abstrac-
tions for the vast domain of the concrete variety.”

 

368

les effets de la présence réelle."17 Sorel remarked that

it had occurred to him long before reading Peirce that

" . . . nous éprouvons d'autant moins le besoin de

définir un principe 'en forme' que nous sommes devenus

plus habiles dans ses applications, en sorte qu'on aurait

le droit de dire que la veritable définition d'un principe

réside dans l'usage que nous en faisons journellement."18
Georges Sorel did not believe that pragmatism

could be weakened by charges of subjectivity. He

insisted that the pragmatic conception of reality as

presented by William James would answer the attacks of

the rationalist adversaries who had charged that the

 

l7Sorel, De l'utilite du Pragmatisme, p. 5. Sorel
quoted Charles PeiECe from la Revue phiiosophique (Jan-
uary, 1879) p. 48. And SoreI further noted that it was
probable that Edouard Le Roy in his interpretation of
dogma entitled Dogme et criti ue had borrowed the follow-
ing observation—from Charles Peirce: " . . . ceux-oi
imposeraient aux fideles des regles strictes de coun-
duite, mais laisseraient a chacun une tres grande liberté
pour se faire une representation intellectuelle de
choses," pp. 19-23, 32 (Sorel's notation). " . . . when
they are in agreement on the effects of the real presence."

 

 

 

18Sorel, De l'utilité du Pragmatisme, p. 6. Both
Karl Marx and Williamifiames were passionate writers,
Sorel added, and thus their " . . . affirmations . . . ne
peuvent étre utilisés qu'apres avoir été fortement
réduites par un long travail de revision," p. 7. "Pour
William James, comme pour Marx, i1 faut reprendre toutes
les formules, en les regardant p1ut6t comme des sug-
gestions que comme des expressions de theses applicables,"
p. 8. " . . . we feel so much the less the need to define
a principle 'in form' that we became more able in its
applications so that we would have the right to say that
the true definition of a principle resides in the daily
usage that we make of it."

 

369

spirit of pragmatism was "barbarement prosaique.n19

James' conception of reality, according to Sorel, con-
ceived the truth as being essentially a relationship
between two things: an idea on one hand and a reality
exterior to the idea on the other. This relationship
according to James composed a matrix which included
elements which were both psychological and physical.

The pragmatist proposed, Sorel continued, to verify ideas
by a process which was subordinated to the experience

" . . . que les conditions de notre developpement nous

20

incitent a interpreter." This process, Sorel noted,

did not lead to a unitary interpretation of reality but
instead provided for "plusieurs genres de réalités."21
If this conception were the basis of the charge of sub-
jectivity against pragmatism, Sorel concluded, the same
could be said of the procedure by which a physicist

developed explanations: " . . . il les corrige au fur

et a mesure que ses recherches personnelles 1e con-

duisent a des découvertes que ses prédécesseurs n'avaient

 

lgIbid., p. 81.

20Ibid. " . . . that the conditions of our
development incite us to interpret."

21Ibid. Sorel added: "C'est . . . une . . .
conception muItiforme de la réalité." " . . . several
genre of realities.”

370

pas soupgonnées."22 It was by this cumulative and his-

torical development, Sorel believed, " . . . nous
arrivons a organiser une 'nature artificelle.”23 The
pragmatic conception of truth, Sorel concluded " . . .

est . . . que la relation de vérité est une relation
susceptible d'expérience définie et, par conséquent, sus-
ceptible d'étre décrite aussi bien que nommée, qu'elle
n'est pas unique en son genre et qu'elle n'est ni invar-
iable ni universelle."24
Through pragmatism Sorel discovered what he
believed to be a much more satisfying idea of tradition.
For pragmatism, Sorel wrote " . . . la tradition est un
25

élément de premier ordre dans la connaissance." Sorel

cautioned, however, that tradition was a productive force

 

22Ibid. " . . . he corrects them in proportion
as his personal research directs him to discoveries that
his predecessors had not suspected."

23Ibid., p. 85. " . . . we come to organize an
'artificiaI nature.'"

24Ibid., p. 173. Sorel quoted: William James,
L'idée de vgrité, p. 205. " . . . is . . . that the
relation of truth is a relation susceptible to defined
experience and, consequently, susceptible to being des-
cribed as well as named, that it is not unique in its
genre and that it is neither invariable nor universal."

25Sorel, De l'utilité du Pragmatisme, p. 185.
. . . traditionTIs an element of first order in
knowledge."

 

371

only " . . . ou . . . existent ces libres concurrences

26 To those of his contemporaries

de volontés éclairées."
who used tradition in their political and religious
polemics, and to whom " . . . la tradition n'est pas
nourrie de liberté, mais enregistre les décisions de
authorité," Sorel responded, " . . . 1e pragmatisme n'a
donc rien a débattre avec l'idée réactionnaire de la
tradition qui fleurit en Europe . . . pour parler comme
il convient du pragmatisme, i1 ne faut jamais séparer

1a liberté et la raison . . . "27 The tradition to which
Sorel recognized the right of participation in the for-
mation of the contemporary mind was that which was

" . . . 1e fruit des efforts libres et raisonnés de nos

28

peres." On this heritage, he concluded, " . . . tra-

vaillent notre liberté et notre raison en vue d'améliorer
nos conditions actuelles de vie et de transmettre, si

faire se peut, quelque chose d'utile 5 nos successeurs."29

 

26Ibid. " . . . where these free concurrences
of enlightened will exist.”

27Ibid., pp. 185-86. " . . . tradition is not
nourished 5y Iiberty but makes the decisions of authority."
Sorel responded, " . . . pragmatism, thus, has nothing
to debate with the reactionary idea of tradition that
flourished in Europe . . . in order to talk as it suits
pragmatism, liberty and reason must never be separated."

281bid., p. 186. " . . . the fruit of the free
and reasoned efforts of our fathers."

29Ibid. " . . . our liberty and reason work in
view of ameIiorating our present conditions of life and to
transmit, if possible, something useful to our successors."

372

Modern physics represented for Sorel a realm of
human knowledge whose recent turbulations had major
implications for the acceptability of pragmatism. Claude
Bernard, who Sorel regarded as ”le principal législateur
de la methode expérimentale," had, Sorel believed, been
greatly influenced by Vico's doctrine which stated that
man can know geometry in an absolute fashion because
geometry was a work of his intelligence, " . . . mais
non la nature, qui est une oeuvre de Dieu."30 The ele-
ments of mathematical certainty, Sorel added, were human
products and constituted creative operations. The truth,
according to Sorel's understanding of Claude Bernard,
appeared to be defined as a necessary and absolute
relationship, but Sorel cautioned " . . . ce rapport ne
peut étre absolu qu'autant que les conditions en sont
simples et subjectives, c'est-a-dire que l'esprit a la
conscience qu'il les connait toutes (c'est ce qui a lieu

31

pour les mathématiques).” When, instead of concerning

himself with what Sorel called "des rapports subjectifs

 

3°Ibid., pp. 288-89. Sorel noted that Claude
Bernard had studied Michelet's 1835 translation entitled
Oeuvres choisis de Vico, p. 236, see footnote in 22
ITutilité du Pragmatisme, p. 289. " . . . but not
nature which is a work of God."'

 

3lIbid., pp. 289—90. " . . . this relation is
only able to he absolute when the conditions of it are
simple and subjective, that is to say that mind has
the conscience that it knows all of them (that which
took place for mathematics)."

373

dont son esprit a crées les conditions," man wanted to
know the objective relationships of nature which he has
not created " . . . immediatement le critérium intérieur
et conscient lui fait défaut."32 Man assumed, Sorel con-
tinued, that in the objective or "extérieur" world the
truth was equally constituted by necessary relationships
but knowledge of the conditions of these relationships
escaped him. It was necessary in these conditions,
Sorel wrote " . . . qu'il efit créé ces conditions pour
en posséder 1a connaissance et la conception absolues."33
Claude Bernard noted, according to Sorel, that in these
conditions " . . . l'homme devient un inventeur de phé-
nomenes, un véritable contremaitre de la création. . . . "34
Georges Sorel prOposed to group under "la rubrique
de nature artificielle," the organization of the exper-
iences of the laboratory which had, he believed, estab-
lished many useful theories. The distinction between

"la nature artificielle" and "la nature naturelle," Sorel

wrote " . . . dépend évidemment des idées de Vico qui

 

32Ibid., p. 290. " . . . immediately the interior
criterion and awareness made him default."

33Ibid. Sorel credited this thought to Claude
Bernard, Introduction a 1' étude de la médecine ex eri-
mentale, pp. 51, 52, in Pragmatisme, p. . . .
Ehat he had created these conditions to possess from them
knowledge and the Absolute conception. "

 

 

34Ibid., p. 291. " . . . man becomes an inventor
of phenomena, a true counter master of creation."

374

déniait a l'homme 1a possibilité de posséder la science
de ce qu'il n'a pas fait."35 Although Sorel noted that
Vico's thought had not had a notable influence on modern
thought, he affirmed that " . . . 1e moment est venu de
dévelOpper 1e systeme de Vico, en l'application a une
physique dont 1e XVIIIe siecle ne soupgonnait pas encore

la constitution."36

For a long time, Sorel observed, a
number of savants had noted that their studies concerned
less the world which was given to man than that which man
had created in the world. The pragmatist openly stated,
Sorel asserted, that "la nature artificielle" interests
human life at least as much as "la nature naturelle”:

" . . . i1 admire sa (la nature artificielle) fécondité
qui lui parait devoir etre indéfiniment croissante; i1

se demande comment l'homme peut avoir des ambitions

assez insensées pour croire que la "nature artificielle"

ne suffit pas a occuper son genie."37

 

35Ibid., p. 336. Sorel referred to Michelet's
translation: OEuvres choises de Vico, pp. 218-19, in a
footnote in Pragmatisme, p. 333. " . . . evidently
depends on thé’ideas of Vico who denied man the possi-
bility of possessing the science of that which he has
not made."

 

 

 

36Ibid.: pp. 336-37. " . . . the moment has come
to develop the system of Vico, in the application to a
physics of which the eighteenth century did not yet
suspect the constitution."

37Ibid., p. 337. Sorel noted additionally
. . . nous serions condamnés a abandonner l'idée de
certitude qui avait domine la science antique." " . . .

375

But to concentrate on "1a nature artificielle"
at the expense of "1a nature naturelle" would arouse
complaints from both the spiritualists, Sorel noted, who
would consider this a blasphemy of the all-powerful
creator, and the materialists who would see in it a
denial of " . . . la raison immanente qui soutient,

38 The critique

croient-ils, 1e cours de l'Univers."
of such "préjugés," Sorel concluded, could only have
efficacious results if it were conducted pragmatically
" . . . c'est-a-dire en examinant leur principales
applications."39
Sorel assumed that "la nature artificielle" was
separated from "1a nature naturelle" by something " . . .

40

chargé d'irréversibilité." This zone of separation

appeared to Sorel to be " . . . une zone rebelle a la

 

he admires its fertility which seemed to him ought to be
growing indefinitely; he asks himself how man is able to
have ambitions so senseless to believe that artificial
nature does not suffice to occupy his genius."

38Ibid., p. 338. In a footnote, Sorel added:
"Les matérialistes manifestent autant de fanatisme dans
leur admiration de cette raison immanente que les spirit-
ualistes en ont jamais manifesté dnas leur culte du
créateur." " . . . the imminent reason that they believed
supports the course of the Universe."

39Ibid. " . . . that is to say in examining
their princ1pal applications."

40
bility."

Ibid., p. 341. " . . . charged with irreversi-

 

376

loi des mathématiques" and he added that " . . . on doit
regarder 1a premiere (la nature naturelle) comme con-
taminée par de 1Findétermination."41 Sorel noted that
many eminent geometers did not agree with the opposition
of chance to the laws of physics. They always insisted
on a perfect determinism whose difficulty of proof was
the result only of a temporary ignorance. These meta-
physicians represented the strong devotion which Sorel
identified as " . . . l'actuel fanatisme moniste" among
his contemporaries.42 The idea that determinism was
hidden under that which the common language called chance
(hasard) rendered important services to those Sorel called
"notre bourgeoisie" who wanted, he believed, to advance
the power of the rational state and who thus had " . . .

43 The prag-

peu de gofit pour les légends mystiques."
matist who had no interest in favoring hypocrisy, Sorel
asserted, rejected this explanation of chance (hasard)

" . . . parce qu'il ne voit point qu'elle ait rendu aucun

service aux savants qui ont eu, durant 1e XIXe siecle,

 

41Ibid., p. 343. "The two systems, he concluded,
. . . n 'appartiennent donc pas, en consequence, a un meme
genre . . . . . . a rebel zone to the law of mathe-
matics" " . . . one must regard the first (natural nature)
as contaminated by indetermination."

 

421bid., p. 347.
43Ibid. " . . . little taste for mystic legends.”

 

377

a faire de si vastes applications du calcul de probabili-
tés.'.'44 The pragmatist, Sorel added, wanted to find in

a philoSOphy those theses which served to sustain human
creative activity and thus the pragmatist did not com-
prehend the value of hiding considerations with respect
to a world separated from that which was man's own con-
struction.

The only "donnée veritable" which existed in the
history of science, Sorel affirmed, " . . . est la nature
artificielle a laquelle nous ne cessons d'ajouter chaque
jour quelque construction en vue de conquérir plus de
pouvoir sur la matiere; nous avangons au milieu de
l'inconnu sans nous douter ordinairement de ce que nous

45

pourrons faire 1e lendemain." This advance of human

knowledge had the paradoxical effect of increasing the

 

44Ibid., p. 349. " . . . because he did not see
that it had rendered service to scholars who during the
nineteenth century had had to make from so vast appli-
cations the calculation of probabilities."

451bid., p. 350. The study of the past played a

special role in this process; Sorel wrote: . . . les
bons professeurs tirent un excellent parti de 1' examen
du passé, pour formuler des regles de prudence, capables
de rendre de grands services aux inventeurs d'hypotheses."
In a footnote, he noted the value of rejecting the thesis
of progress in consideration of the past: "Depuis que
les doctrines illusoires du progres sont abandonnées,
tous les monuments historiques sont considérés de la méme
maniere," p. 350, footnote 2. " . . . given truth"
" . . is artificial nature to which we do not cease to
add everyday some construction in view of conquering more
power over matter; we advance in the field of the unknown
without ordinarily suspecting what we will be able to do
the next day."

378

sense of relative ignorance, a state of mind which Sorel
did not believe existed in the ancient civilizations which
had mistakenly believed that they had reached the peak
of the philOSOphy of nature. This new manner of thinking
Sorel attributed to the new conditions of what he called
the capitalist regime and its ceaseless process of
revolutionizing production. This activity which Sorel
noted occurred in the "artificial nature" as did all
human creations, had begun to displace "la nature
naturelle" in human preoccupations. He concluded by
observing that careful reflection on the course of the
development of the artificial milieu would prove to be
"audessus des fantaisies des idéalistes" who speculated
on "la nature naturelle."46
The constitution of the artificial milieu sug-
gested, Sorel noted, that humanity had become capable
of imposing on the movement of things, directions opposed
to those which would have existed without this inter-
vention. But Sorel warned " . . . nous ne pourrons jamais
soumettre completement les phénoménes . . . a notre
intelligence."47 It was necessary, he added, to destroy

an enormous mass of accumulated forces to create new

 

46$Ei§~r P- 356. " . . . above idealist fantasies."

47l§i§fi P. 426. " . . . we will never be able
to subject completely phenomena to our intelligence."

379

forces which could be organized for human profit. Point-
ing to the waste of stored energy in coal he observed:
"Cela est surtout frappant dans les appareils thermiques
qui ne rendent qu'une fraction bien minime de l'énerge
qui était dans le charbon."48 Sorel concluded that

" . . . la nature ne cesse de travailler, avec une lenteur
sournoise, a la ruine de toutes nos oeuvres."49 Only

by incessant labor could humanity provide itself with the
means to maintain the artificial milieu--to stop even

for a short time would tend to cause a return to what
Sorel called "l'ordre ancien." He concluded: " . . . on
peut dire que la matiere impose ses lois des que l'esprit

50

se retire." The true comprehension of the relationship

between the two realms, Sorel wrote " . . . est celle qui

oppose 1a nature naturelle a la nature artificielle."51

 

48Ibid., footnote 1. ”That is especially striking
in thermal 1nstruments which only return a minimal
fraction of energy in coal."

9 .
4 Ibid. " . . . nature does not cease to work,
with a sly slowness, in the ruin of all our works."

50Ibid., pp. 426-27. In a footnote, Sorel empha-
sized that " . . . tout permet de supposer que le travail
ira toujours en s'intensifiant. Nous pouvons encore
observer que ce pessimisme tend a renforcer le sentiment
de la réalité," p. 426, footnote 1. " . . . we can say
that matter imposes its laws as soon as spirit withdraws."

Slléiég: P. 427. " . . . is that which opposes
natural nature to artificial nature."

380

The role of the philosopher in the contemporary
world, Sorel reiterated, was " . . . réfléchir sur les
mysteres de la vie."52 Human intelligence, Sorel noted,
in reference to a suggestion made by Henri Bergson, was
not at all that which Plato had claimed in the "Allegory
of the Cave." Human intelligence was " . . . néces-

53 Like human

sairement collective et progressive."
science, philosophy required multitudes of research and
collaboration. Henceforth, Sorel believed, history would
become the great regulator of human intellectual

activity with the result that "Celui qui se place an
point de vue des historiens, n'admettra plus de theories
extra-expérmentales de la physique, de droit naturel,

de philosophie permanente; l'humanité construit des doc-
trines dont la valeur est constatée par l'utilité qu'on
leur reconnait au cours d'une longue experience; nous

I o O 54
sommes a1n51 amenés au pragmat1sme."

 

52Ibid., p. 444. In a footnote Sorel called
attention to his essay in Revue de métaphysi¥§e et de
morale, January, 1911, p. . . . . to re ect on the
mysteries of life."

 

53Sorel, De l'utilité du Pragmatisme, p. 446 and
Henri Bergson, Evolution créatrice, p. 124. In an inter-
esting note Sorel advancedian undeveloped speculation:
"11 me parait tres vraisembleble que les muSiciens ont,
plus ou moins vaguement, discerné les affinités qui
existent entreleurs manieres de sentir et les conceptions
du monde qu'on trouve dans l'Evolution créatrice," Prag-
matisme, p. 450.

 

 

 

54Ibid., p. 462. The impact of this development

would be great in the realm of theology where Sorel

381

Introduction A L'Economie Moderne

 

By October, 1919, Georges Sorel was convinced
that the new and difficult conditions in which the
European states found themselves following the war pro-
vided an opportune moment for the publication of a third
edition of his study entitled Introduction 5 l'économie

55 O O O I I
moderne. The 1mmense material and moral miseries wh1ch

 

the war had produced had provoked what Sorel called "une

épidémie d'hystérie communiste."56

The people, he
observed, had been stricken with panic by four years

of horrible carnage, and they had come to believe that
there could be no peace, no national order and no happi-
ness until "1e capitalisme classique” had been overturned.

The phenomena of government intervention into affairs,

formerly regarded as private, suggested to Sorel that

 

speculated "On peut dire que tout ce qui n'est pas sus-
ceptible d'étre contr81é pragmatiquement, disparait

pen a peu . . . " p. 464. "Those who place themselves in
the point of view of historians will no longer admit extra-
experimental theories of physics, natural rights, perma-
nent phi1050phy; humanity constructs doctrines whose

value is confirmed by the usefulness that is recognized

in them in the course of a long experience; thus we are

led to pragmatism."

55Georges Sorel, Introduction a l'économie
moderne (3rd éd. revue et augmentée; Paris: Marcel
F1v1§re, 1922). All references to this work are based
on Sorel's "Avertissement pour la troisieme édition"
which was completed in October, 1919, and will be cited
hereinafter as "Avertissement."

 

56Ibid., p. II.

382

socialization had become a possibility in spite of its
conflict with what he called "des anciennes valeurs"
of the bourgeoisie. In this atmosphere Sorel suggested
to his readers " . . . qu'il y a plusieurs genres par-
faitement distincts de socialisation."S7
Sorel disputed the claims of those whom he labeled
"les archimandrites de l'Entente, les Poincaré, les
Clemenceau, les Wilson" who had widely proclaimed that
the defeat of Germany had assured the definitive triumph
of "une merveilleuse Justice." Sorel compared "les
bourgeoisies démocratiques," who had claimed their
capacity to safeguard modern civilization, to the
imperial autocracy which presided over the fall of the
Roman Empire. These whom Sorel called "nos bourgeoisies
plutocratiques" had " . . . pas de hautes ambitions . . .

58 The capitalists,

elles demandent seulement a durér."
he charged, believed they had no reason to fear the
future as long as the present regime was capable of
producing abundant riches. But all philoSOphers, Sorel

insisted, had taught that humanity needed to combine with

its daily bread "une nourriture spirituelle."

 

57Ibid. " . . . that there are several perfectly
distinct types of socialization."

58Ibid., p. IV. " . . . no high ambitions . . .
they only ashed to endure."

383

During the war the leaders of the Entente,
Sorel continued, had ceaselessly provided the unhappy
combattants with a discourse on their future happiness:
" . . . prenez patience, disait-on aux soldats, vos
souffrances préparent une ere de bonheur universel; quand
les méchants Hohenzollern ne tyranniseront plus l'Europe
centrale, des fleuves de lait et de miel couleront pour

S9

les défenseurs de la Justice." In response to these

exhortations, Sorel observed, there arose a widespread
demand for a life of greater ease, for labors less crush-
ing, and for more accessible pleasures: " . . . de toutes
les poitrines populaires s'éleve une effrayante protes-

60

tation contre la permanence de la douleur." These

hopes would remain unfulfilled, Sorel believed, because

the promise had been false: “ . . . la douleur est

61

accrochée aux racines de la vie." Only by adopting

 

59Ibid., p. XV. " . . . take patience, they said
to the soldiers, your sufferings prepare an era of uni-
versal happiness; when the wicked Hohenzollern no longer
tyrannize central Europe, rivers of milk and honey will
flow for the defenders of justice."

60%. ' pp' XVI XVI 0 II o o o in all pOPUIar
chests arose a frightening protest against the permanence
of suffering."

61Sorel, "L'Humanite contre la douleur,“ Georges
Sorel added as an "Appendice" to Introduction a l'économie
moderne in October, 1919. Sorel notedihis Sbjective in
this essay: "Je voudrais monterer ici que l'on peut
établir une psychologie riche en résults pratiques, en
partant de la consideration de la lutte que soutient
l'humanité contre la loi naturelle qui la condamne a la
douleur," p. 400. " . . . suffering is attached to the
roots of life."

 

384

a perspective which recognized that humanity was engaged
in a constant struggle against a natural law which con-
demned it to pain and suffering (1a douleur) would it be
possible, he concluded, to comprehend " . . . les pro-

blemes essentiels de notre espece."62

L'Humanité Contre La Douleur

 

Metaphysicians, Sorel continued, had constructed
hypothesis to justify the existence of "la douleur" which
had relied too exclusively on supernatural intervention
or an assumption of biological perfection. Sorel pro-
posed to reconsider what he believed was the common
interpretation that humanity avoided pain (1a douleur)
and sought pleasure: " . . . je prOpose de dire que,
sous l'aiguillon de la douleur, l'esprit invente des
manieres de vivre susceptibles de procurer du plaisir,
qui recouvrer assez la douleur pour que celle-ci semble
seulement un incident dont nous pourrions débarraser

63 When this occurred in animals,

l'ordre naturel."
Sorel believed, instinct and education left little
latitude for choice--but with humanity the options were

wider and freedom was more dominant. The perspective

 

62Ibid., p. 399.

63Ibid., p. 404. " . . . I propose to say that,
under the goad of suffering, spirit invents ways of living
susceptible to procuring pleasure, that covers suffering
well enough provided it seems only an incident which we
will be able to separate from the natural order."

385

of pleasure was sometimes so attractive, Sorel wrote:
" . . . que l'homme accepte, pour parvenir au bonheur,
les épreuves d'une longue carriere de dangereuses
pérégrinations."64 That which permitted humanity to
escape from "la loi de la douleur," Sorel believed,
were inventions which belonged to diverse genres of
human activity. Sorel concluded that if the reaction
of man against "la douleur" could be traced to its roots
one would find the point of contact between mind and
body: " . . . La douleur correspondant au sentiment le
plus complet que nous ayons de notre corps, on peut voir
en elle une sorte du synthese . . . L'intervention con-
secutive a la douleur, est le premier centre sprituel
organisateur de la psychologie active."65
Examining the history of civilizations, Sorel

identified various practices which he believed had been

motivated by the desire to overcome "la douleur." He

 

64Ibid. Sorel wrote: "Chez l'homme, . . . 1a
liberté est dominante, celle-oi entraine avec elle des
préoocupations parfois tres vives, comme cela a lieu
danstous les essais nouveaux que nous tentons." " . . .
that man accepts, in order to arrive at happiness, the
proof of a long career of dangerous peregrinations."

65Ibid., p. 405. To this Sorel added, "Si les
metaphysiciens n'ont su rien dire de vraiment utile sur
cette jonction, c'est qu'ils n'ont pas aper u la portée
de la lutte engagée par l'humanité contre la douleur.”
"Suffering corresponds to the most complete feeling we
have of our body, we can see in it a sort of synthesis.
. . . Consecutive intervention of suffering is the first
central spiritual organizer of active psychology."

386

noted the practice of oriental asceticism which seemed

to provide the means of rising above "la loi de la douleur."
Ascetics, he observed, had been looked upon as "des

favoris des dieux" by those who, especially in rich

countries, feared pain and suffering.66

The accomplished
sages, Sorel concluded, had served to give an extremely
high idea of happiness " . . . procuré par . . . les
effroyables mortifications que ces ascetes s'imposaient."67
By hearing these "personnages privilégés" recount their
dreams, Sorel continued, the philosophers were led to
think that ascetic discipline permitted the soul to pass
from the darkness of human life to the celestial light:

" . . . en s'associant au corps, l'ame aurait subi une
déchéance, étant désormais condamnée a la douleur: mais
l'ame pourrait se racheter, en s'affranchissant de tous
les besoins matériels auxquels sont assujetis les humains

. . 68
ordinaires."

 

66Ibid., p. 406.

671bid. " . . . procured by frightful mortifi-
cations that these ascetics imposed on themselves.'.

68Ibid. "The physical meagerness of ascetics,
Sorel wrote, gave birth to the idea that the just man
is very thin and from this was born numerous legends
relative to levitation of saints who floated in the air,
legends which Catholicism has absorbed." "It is probable,
Sorel speculated, that this idea gave birth to the prac-
tice of the ordeal of water in which the accused must
float to prove his innocence," p. 406. " . . . in
associating with the body, the soul would have undergone
downfall, being henceforth condemned to suffering; but

387

The Greeks attempted to accommodate the ideas of
the oriental ascetics to their civilization. The program
of Socrates, Sorel speculated: " . . . était probable-
ment de permettre aux Atheniens de s'affranchir des
charges de la matiere."69 He wanted to create an edu-
cation of temperance but " . . . ses lecons ne parve-
naient malheureusement a avoir d'efficacité que sur des

ames d'élite."70

The stoics, Sorel continued, also
sought to defend humanity against "1a douleur" and they
reinforced the education of temperance but they " . . .
n'oserent pas aller jusqu'a conseiller d'imiter les
exces des ascetes orientaux qui aurait trop blessé

l'esthétique de leur compatriotes."7l

Stoicism produced,
Sorel concluded, an abundance of literary consolations

but did not produce any practical results.

 

soul could rebuy itself, in freeing itself of all material
needs to which ordinary humans are subjected."

69Ibid. " . . . was probably to permit the
Athenians to free themselves of material requirements."

70Ibid., p. 407. " . . . its lessons, unhappily
only succeeded in having efficacity on the souls of
elites."

71Ibid. " . . . will not dare to go up to
counselling an imitation of the excesses of oriental
ascetics who would have wounded too much the aesthetics
of their compatriots.”

 

388

In Christianity, Sorel found the ascetic movement
against "la douleur," " . . . a pris son plein developpe-

72

ment." Not only did Christianity excite numerous

"héros de l'ascétisme" but also the concept of " . . .

73 Sorel

l'union divine remplace 1e délire des grandeurs."
believed that the resulting religious experiences of
Christianity, which he called " . . . des formes de
mystique atténuéé," had played a considerable role in

74 He noted especially

the battle against "la douleur."
the Anglo-Saxon Protestants who he observed had split
their existences into two very independent zones: " . . .
l'une est consacrée aux affaires industrielles et com-
merciales; l'autre est vouée a la méditation biblique."75
As long as these scriptural experiences remained important
in Protestant communities, Sorel believed, they would

provide an effective means of combatting "1a douleur."

 

72Ibid., p. 408. " . . . took its full develop-
ment."
73Ibid. " . . . the divine union replacing the

delirium of grandeur.‘

74Ihid., p. 409.

7SIbid. " . . . one is consecrated to industrial
and commerCiaI business; the other is vowed to biblical
meditation."

389

With the Catholics, Sorel believed, " . . .
l'experience scripturaire est remplacée par l'experience
sacramentelle que renferme le culte eucharistique."76
This more mystical element of Catholicism made it easier
to practice than Protestantism: "Les illuminations
étincelantes des églises, le décor sompteur, les vétements
qui donnent aux officients un aspect fabuleux; les gestes,

les evolutions cérémonielles, les declamations solenelles,

la musique; tout cela donne au culte catholique une

remarquable ressemblance avec les merveilles de l'opéra."77
The Catholic church, Sorel added, conserved the use of
incense, which had served the Orient so well as a means
of producing intoxication, because ” . . . elle sait a

78

quel point les parfums peuvent assoupir l'intelligence."

 

76Ibid. " . . . the scriptural experience is
replaced by sacramental experience that surrounds the
eucharistic cult."

77Ibid., p. 410. Sorel added: "Les apologistes
du clergé catholique vantent, sans toujours 1a bien com-
prendre, l'habile esthétique cléricale . . . ils n'osent
guerer analyser les raisons de son succés." "The glitter-
ing illuminations, the sumptuous decor, clothing which
gives the officials a fabulous aspect: the gestures,
ceremonial evolutions, solemn oratory, the music; all
that gives the Catholic cult a remarkable resemblance to
Opera marvels."

78Ibid. Sorel noted in a humorous footnote:
"C'est ce que savent aussi les femmes galantes qui se
parfument pour s'imposer plus facilement aux hommes,
en leur faisant perdre une partie de leur liberté de
jugement," footnote 1. " . . . it knows to what point
perfumes can soften intelligence."

 

390

Those who lived in capitalist societies, Sorel concluded,
who were fatigued by a very demanding business life,
found an important relief in this Catholic cult and this
explained, Sorel believed, the capacity of Catholicism
to endure in such societies.

Agreeing with Renan, Sorel suggested that instead
of attempting to suppress this desire for intoxication

. . . ne vaudrait-il pas mieux essayer de la rendre
douce, aimable, accompagnée des sentiments moraux."79
Sorel noted that of all the means which humanity possessed
to overcome "la douleur" alcoholic intoxication was the
most accessible to the masses, and he rejected the tem-
perance movement currently active in the United States
noting " . . . 1e régime de la temperance légale semble
avoir pour effet la vulgarisation de l'éther, de la

80

cocaine et de l'Opium." Renan had observed that, for

many, the time of intoxication was second only to "l'heure

 

79Ibid., p. 411. Sorel referred to Renan,
Feuilles dEtachees, pp. 383-84. " . . . would not it be
better to render it soft, amiable, accompanied by moral
sentiments."

 

80Sorel, "L'Humanite contre la douleur," p. 412.
Sorel believed that the use of opium would be more dan-
gerous for the Europeans than the Asiatics because it was
so incompatible with the current European life-style:
" . . . la vie de nos classes riches a été jusque'ici
trop active pour qu'elles se laissent aller a un vice qui
convient surtout a des classesindolentes." ” . . . the
regime of legal temperance seems to have as an effect
the popularization of ether, cocaine and opium.”

 

 

391

de l'amour," to which Sorel added that from intoxication
" . . . nous passons, tout naturellement a la gourmandise
qui a pris un si deplorable developpement a la suite de
la derniere guerre."81 Sorel believed that "les fétes

de la gourmandise" occupied a place of honor among the
rich classes of all civilizations.

Libidinal excitation (la lubricité) which Sorel
believed accompanied "la gourmandise" in Oriental civili-
zations was accomplished in the European world in the
theaters and the concerts of the large cities and through
literature: "Dans nos grandes cités les theatres et les
concerts tiennent la place que l'Orient attribuait aux
danses lubriques . . . Nos romains n'obtiendraient pas
grand succes s'ils n'étaient pas composes de maniere a
produire une sérieuse élévation des désirs sexuels."82

Sorel considered that this literature constituted a

defense against "la douleur."

 

81The quote from Renan is from Feuilles détachées;
Sorel's observation appeared in "L'humafiite contre la
douleur," p. 412. " . . . we pass naturally to gluttony
which took so deplorable a develOpment following the
last war."

 

82Ibid., p. 414. Sorel noted the creative role
of humanity in the production of " . . . des inventions
érotiques qui constituent un moyen d'une extreme puissance
pour vaincrela loi de la douleur." "In our large cities,
theatres and concerts hold the place that the Orient
gives to lubric dancers. . . . Our novels would not
obtain great success if they were not composed in a manner
to produce a serious elevation of sexual desires.“

392

Music, which Sorel thought had the capacity to
relieve the tensions of anxiety, had played, he believed,
an important role in the life of the Second Empire. The
music of Offenbach, he speculated, had corresponded per-
fectly to the needs of a society troubled by an economy

" . . . enragée de speculation."83

The bourgeoisie, with
its need for relief from intense economic activity, had

a special musical inclination: ”I1 me parait probable
que des melodies faciles a retenir, adaptées a des
situations bouffonnes et douées d'un rythme entrainant,
constitueront longtemps encore 1e fond de l'art lyrique

84

de notre bourgeoisie.” Sorel defended these diversions

noting his conviction that: ” . . . le monde actuel est
condamne a la tristesse; il ne faut pas lui refuser les
moyens qui sont a sa disposition pour éviter d'étre sub-

85

mergé par la douleur.” Music had shown itself capable

 

83£2£Q., p. 415, n . . . enraged with speculation."

84Ibid. "It seems probable to me that easy
melodies to retain, adapted to farcical situations and
endowed with an engaging rhythm will constitute for a
long time the base of lyric art of our bourgeoisie."

85Ibid. Sorel added: " . . . les poetes et les
musiciens qui travaillent pour donner quelques instants
de plaisirs aus travailleurs, peuvent rendre de tres
sérieux services a la civilization en calmat des douleurs
qui leur paraissent d'autant plus intolérables que
l'éducation moderne a aiguisé leur sensibilité," p. 416.
" . . . the present world is condemned to sadness; one
must not refuse it the means which are at its disposition
in order to avoid being submerged by suffering."

 

393

of reaching the masses and was no longer to be in the
domain of the savants, but the plastic arts, as long as
this term was applied exclusively to painting and
sculpture, would remain, Sorel wrote, " . . . réservée a

86 Sorel rejected this narrow

une infinie minorité."
definition and insisted that the plastic arts must be
given "un sens plus étendu que celui . . . qu'enseignent

les écoles dites des Beaux-Arts."87

He suggested that
sports could be considered a modern extension of Greek
gymnastics and thus should be considered as a kind of
"esthétique populaire," which also served as " . . . des
moyens inventés pour lutter contre la douleur."88
Sorel proceeded to purpose an even broader under-
standing of the term "plastic arts," suggesting that an
artfully formed copper cooking pot could require more
talent " . . . qu'un pompeux édiface élevé sur nos
places publiques en l'honneur de quelque gloire

89

nationale." Manual labor employed for the needs of

 

86Ibid.

872222;: P. 417. " . . . a more expanded sense
than that taught at schools called Beaux-Arts (fine arts)."

88Ibid., p. 418. " . . . invented means to
struggle against suffering."

89Ibid. " . . . than a pompous ediface raised
on our public places in honor of some national glory."

394

common life ” . . . a 1e droit d'étre rangé dans la meme
classe que les sculptures."90 Those who possess creative
genius, Sorel insisted, would feel a fraternal sympathy
for the worker who had left modest monuments of incon-
testable value in the battle against "la douleur.”

But the worker by division of labor had been
reduced to the role of a beast and had tragically lost
" . . . toute trace de sentiment artistique."91 For
these, Sorel concluded "L'alcoolisme et l'érotisme furent
les seules ressources qui restent a ces malheureux pour

92

lutter contre la douleur." The solution, Sorel

believed, was to encourage invention in the accomplishment

of work and " . . . se rapproche de 1'art."93

The great
opportunity for the present economic system was to "Faire

que le travail manuel constitue, grace a cette marche

 

9022223: P- 419. " . . . has the right to be
put in the same class as sculpture."

91Ibid.

 

92Ibid. "Alcoholism and eroticism were the sole
resources that remain for these unhappy people to
struggle against suffering."

93Ibid., p. 420. " . . . to approximate art."

395

de la production vers l'art, le moyen par excellence
que l'humanité emploiera desormais pour surmonter la

douleur."94

Lénine D'Apres Gorki

 

Writing in La Revue communiste in January, 1922,

 

Sorel recalled that Renan, at the end of his life, had
wondered when Socialism after searching so long,

. . . réclamerait sa place an soleil."95 The day

u
had come, Sorel announced. Socialism which had seemed

to so many critics to be incapable of directing the
thinking of the masses had, Sorel wrote: " . . .
aujourd'hui, grace au bolchevisme, devenu un des facteurs

principaux du mouvement historique actuel."~96

Lenin
had come, noted Sorel quoting Gorki, " . . . comme un
attila . . . pour détruire la Rome du bien-etre et du

confort bourgeois, basés sur l'esclavage, le sang et 1e

 

94Ibid. "To make manual labor constitute (thanks
to this move of production toward art) the means that
humanity will employ henceforth to surmount suffering."

95Georges Sorel, "Lénine d'apres Gorki," la Revue
Communiste (Paris: Directeur, Charles Rappoport, January,
1921), pp. 401-13. " . . . would demand its place in
the sun."

 

961bid., p. 405. " . . . today, thanks to
bolchevism, hecame one of the principal factors of the
present historical movement."

396

pillage."97 A capital point to note, Sorel insisted, was
that Lenin had the taste for a temperate life: that he
lived as simply and modestly in the Kremlin as he had
lived when he had immigrated to Paris, and in this regard,
Sorel affirmed: " . . . je crois que l'ascétisme a
toujours été le principal caractere qui a désigné les

98 The taste for the ascetic life,

saints au peuple."
Sorel continued, " . . . 1e dévoument désintéressé a
la cause des classes pauvres, 1a pitié sincere pour la
misere humaine, sont des choses qui deviennent bien
rares de nos jours; mais nous avons le droit de penser
que, maintenant comme autrefois, ces qualités attirent
aux hommes qui les possedent, 1e respect admiratif de
leurs semblables, le monde ne cesse pas de désirer que

de tels héros lui indiquent 1a voie de sa libération."99

 

97Sorel quoted from Gorki's "Vladimir Ilfitch
Lenin" a brochure which L'Humanité had published in
translation by André Pierre. Nogfurther publishing
date or page references were given by Sorel. The quote
appeared in "Lénine d'apres Gorki," p. 409. " . . . like
an Attila . . . in order to destroy Rome of well-being
and bourgeois comfort, based on slavery, blood and pillage."

 

98Ibid., p. 410. " . . . I believe that asceti-
cism has always been the principal characteristic desig-
nating saints to the peOple."

99Ibid., p. 413. " . . . the disinterested
devotion to the cause of poor classes, and the sincere
pity for human misery are the things that become very
rare in our days; but we have the right to think that,
now as formerly, these qualities attract in the men who
possess them, the admirative respect of their fellow

creatures, that the world does not cease desiring such-heroes
indicates to it the path of its liberation."

397

In 1921, Georges Sorel sold his small house in

 

Boulogne and moved to a nearby apartment. Continuing
financial need caused him to sell his personal library

in 1922. At the age of 75 and in ill health he died on
100

 

August 27, 1922.

 

100A more detailed accounting of these events

can be found in Notre Maitre, M. Sorel, Pierre Andreu,
pp. 109-12.

APPENDIX A

FINAL WRITINGS: PRAGMATISM, PAIN,
AESTHETICS AND ASCETICS:
1914 - 1922

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM GEORGES SOREL TO BENEDETTO CROCE:
1914 - 1921
ALL LETTERS FROM LA CRITICA, VOLUMES XXV, XXVI, XXVII,
XXVIII, XXIX (1927 - 1931)

23 septembre 1914
"J'ai quitté ma maison comme beaucoup d'autres, sur les
conseils de gens autorisés. . . . Les événements
m'accablent: je sens que nous entrons dans une ere
plus nouvelle que n'a été celle de la Revolution . . .
l'EurOpe entiere est occupée a rejeter ce qui lui
restait des institutions que Renan aimait: les politi-
ciens jacobins, les financiers et les noceurs des
grandes métropoles ne trouveront plus aucune force
vivante qui leur reproche leur bassesse. La vieille
Prusse qui se sentait absorbée par la nouvelle Alle-
magne industrielle me semble vouloir mourir au milieu
des flots de sang; nous allons revoir quelque chose
d'analogue a la guerre de Judée: quel sera 1e poéte,
l'historien ou le philosophe de cette effroyable catas-
trophe? . . . Je suis un homme du passé, je n'ai plus
rien a dire a des hommes qui vont pouvoir affirmer
hautement leurs principes jacobins." p. 51

26 octobre 1914
"En général les terribles événements actuels n'ont pro-
voque qu'une literature miserable . . . las position
de Cournot comme métaphysicien me semble fort difficile
a bien préciser; son probabilisme pourrait bien etre
une forme de pragmatisme. . . . i1 me semble que la
guerre actuelle aura, entre autres résultats, de
liquider 1e socialisme qui n'a pu rien dire d'original."
p. 52

14 novembre 1914
"Le grand probleme actuel est bien probablement celui
que vous indiquez dans votre lettre: "Vivre sans
religion'; l'histoire parait montrer que cela est
possible, . . . mais l'art et la philosophic ne sont-ils
pas gravement compromis par la ruine des religions

398

399

populaires? . . . j'ai peur en effet, que l'influence
de Bergson soit passagére chez nous. . . . Je suis
effrayé en constatant la nullité de ce que cette guerre
fait écrire et je me demande si la philosophie n'a

pas besoin d'une base populaire, artistique et religi-
euse, que nous manque totalement." p. 114

28 novembre 1914
"Ce sera un fait bien digne d'attirer les esprits
philosophiques de l'avenir que l'extréme contradiction
qui existe entre les prodigieux événements actuels et
la littérature qu'ils font naitre. Maurice Barres
est chez nous un remarquable exemple de ce contraste:
car i1 n'y a pas d'homme moins accessible aux senti-
ments tragiques." p. 115

19 janvier 1915
"Avez-vous lu 1e discours de notre président du Sénat
Dubost, qui veut supprimer tous les despotismes en
Europel! Nous sommes revenus au Directorre." p. 117

30 janvier 1915
"Ici nous vivons dans la caverne de Platon: la censure
ne laisse rien passer: . . . L'avenir est immensément
sombre; qu'est devenue cette fameuse 'Opinion publique'
qui était censée gouverner le monde? 11 y a moins
d'opinion publique que sous Louis XV. D'ailleurs, a
quoi bon une Opinion publique dans une democratie?
Les élus sont les seuls qui aient a penser." p. 117

8 avril 1915
" . . . nous vivons dans un monde d'intrigues misera-
bles; i1 faudra beaucoup de temps pour qu'on puisse
clouer les événements actuels a leur place historique:
la littérature engendrée par cette guerre est d'une
platitude extreme. . . . D'Annunzio est plein de génie
a coté de Barres, qui n'a méme pas l'émotion de
l'artiste." p. 120

28 juillet 1915
"Elémir Bourges explique l'art moderne en disant que
nous sommes devenus 'satanistes': nous admirons les
horreurs du sabbat apres avoir admiré les anges
d'Angelico. . . . En géneral, les événements actuels
me semblent annoncer 1e sommeil intellectuel de
l'EurOpe." p. 122

18 juillet 1915
"11 me semble que l'heure actuelle est celle de la
révolte universelle des esclaves." p. 123

 

400

l septembre 1915
" . . . Dans la révolte si générale qui se produit
aujourd'hui en France et en Italie contre tout ce qui
est germanique, on retrouve beaucoup d l'esprit qui
animait apres 1815 les conservateurs de l'esprit
gaulois, voltairien et bourgeois. La guerre actuelle
assurera probablement pour tres longtemps le triomphe
de cet esprit--comme la guerre de 1813-1815 avait con-
tribué notablement a le faire mépriser par les roman-
tiques. . . . L'enthousiasme avec lequel nos socialistes
ont accueilli la guerre montre qu'eux aussi sentaient
1e besoin de se retremper dans le vieux fleuve de la
'latinité bourgeoise' . . . " p. 4

 

26 septembre 1915
"La belle civilization néo-latine se résont tout bonne-
ment en une exploitation de foules aveugles par des
cateries d'avocats, de gens de plume et d'hommes
d'intrigues. . . . L'histoire de l'italie contemporaine
ne me semgle pas rassurante. . . . Je ne vois aucun
indice permettant de supposer que nous soyons capables
d'éventer 1a domination des intellectuels qui ruinent
notre patrie: on pourrait meme se demander so notre
victoire n'accroitra pas leur tyrannie.

. . . 1e monde sem 1e n'avoir pas encore assez de
sang. J mais on ne vit une telle soif de carnages chez
les gouvernements et autant de servilisme chez les
peuples qui se laissent entrainer dans des guerres dont
1a fin s’eloigne Chaque jour." pp. 292-93

5 novembre 1915
"Les affaires ne semblent pas aller tres bien pour
nous; je n'aime pas beaucoup les fanfaronnades, surtour
dans un moment on tant de monde souffre de tant de
devils. Il parait que l'affaire de Champagne nous a
couté 110.000 tués et blesses, dont 30.000 tués a peu
pres; 1e résultat est regarde par les Officiers
sérieux comme insignifiant." p. 293

24 novembre 1915
" . . . i1 semble vraiment que cette guerre soit
destinée a libérer tous les instincts de grossiereté

qui étaient accumulés dans l'humanité depuis un siecle."
p. 294

5 décembre 1915
" . . . 1a guerre produit dans toutes les cervelles
bourgeoises un grand derangement. . . . Cette guerre
montre dans les peuples plus de resignation que
d'héroisme; tous les Européens sont en train de devenir
semblables a des Asiatiques qui se font tuer quand on
le leur commande. . . . On me dit que les socialistes

401

esperent tirer de grands avantages de cette guere.

C'est tres possible, car 11 estprobable que partout un

ceratin socialisme gagnera du terrain; partout en effet,

il a fallu, pour les besoins de la guer e, monopoliser

des les commerces importants; 1e souvenir de cela

demeura tres-fort dans le peuple pendant longtemps . . .
. . . la presse est non seulement s umise a une

censure sévere, mais encore appartient en partie a

des groupes de gens d'affaires ayant intérét a la

prolongation de la guerre. Les founisseurs militaires

gagnent tant d'argent qu'ils peuvent en dépenser un

peu pour entretenir les journaux." pp. 295-96

 

 

9 janvier 1916 ,
" 3 . . Les gens qui parlent du droit international
SOlt vraiment bien amusants." p. 354

28 janvier 1916
" . . . il est drOle do voir aujourd'hui les franc—
macons de France et d'Italie demander au pape de
s'ériger en juge européen. . . . 11 y a quelques annéés
l'abbé Vaconduid publiait . . . ses Etudes de critique
et d'histoire religieuse . . . ; dans laquelle . . . il
aurait natamment reconnu que les papes n'ont pas a
juger les souverains pour leurs abus de pouvoir et leurs
dominations injustes. Voila donc les franc-macons qui
deviennent untramontains parce qu'ils sont scolastiques."
p. 355

 

26 février 1916
"Barres est horriblement creux et bavard; Claudel est
un arrangeur de phrases (obscures a dessin) dans
lesquelles 11 y a peu de choses. . . . i1 ne faut pas
écrire quand on n'a rien a dire a ses contemporains."
p. 355

26 mars 1916
" . . . J'ai peur qu'en Italie regne la culte de
l'insanité de l'homme du monde comme chez nous."
P. 356

5 avril 1916
" . . . i1 faut bien se rendre dompte que Renan n'était
pas dans le mouvement démocratique, libre-penseur et
maconnique. Ici il est évident que tous 1e changemen
s que l'on pouvait croire acquis par l'influence de
Renan et de Taine sont définitivement perdus; nous
sommes revenus a l'intellectualisme du XVIIIe siecle."
p. 357

402

21 mai 1916
" . . . ici Descartes est dieu et son cult est encore
rajeuni par le besoin que nos professeurs éprouvent
d'affirmer la culture exclusivement fran aise. Je
crains fort que Bergson ne soit destiné a demeurer
étranger aux idées historique son education universi-
taire 1e condamne a accepter les blagues du droit
naturel; j'ai constaté que la notion historique du
droit lui est tout a fait étrangere. Vous avez en
I alie l'advantage d'avoir en Vico." p. 357

 

8 juillet 1916
"On est arrive dans ce monde a identifier la réaction
cléricale et l'Allemagne, en sorte que la victoire de
l'Entente est déja escomptée comme le triomphe de la
civilisation libre-penseuse. Cette manifestation me
semble bien caractériser la question idéologique
actuelle; nous revenons, pour un siecle et pent-etre
pour plus longtemps encore, aux insanités de la bour-
geoisie voltairienne. Je ne vois pas quelle force
pourrait s'opposer a cette renaissance de ce qu'il
y a de plus malsain dans l'héritage du XVIIIe siecle."
p. 359

 

7 octobre 1916
"Il semble bien que dans la médievale Italie, comme en
Grece, l'art a eu pour condition d'existence des
républiques d'artisans que le régime moderne devait
transformer en masses ouvrieres gagnant leur vie par
des industries qu'entre tiennent de riches et
fastueuses Oligarchies." p. 360

5 novembre 1916
“Quelques personnes croient que ce (les socialistes)
sont eux qui tireront seuls quelques profits de cette
guerre." p. 438

16 novembre 1916
"Je vous remerice des deux volumes de Freitschke que
vous avez eu l'obligeance de me faire envoyer
(Croce's note: La Francig;dal Primo Imperg a1 1871);
ils me paraissent pleins d'observations justes sur
l'état des exprits en France de 1825 a 1870." p. 439

10 janvier 1917
" . . . Nous ne marchoss sflrement pas vers l'Etat
hégélien, mais ver 3 l'Etat jacobin, jésuitique et
plutocratique . . . a l'heure actuelle les relations
historiques se dissolment . . . le libérallsme
supposait un régime respectueux des droits que
l'individu peut avoir a soutenir; l'idée de droit

403

meurt sous les coups de la démocratie triomphante dans
le monde entier. . . . les libéraux croient-ils encore
au droit? J'en doute." p. 141

20 janvier 1917
"S'il n'est pas impossible que se produise une réforme
intellectuelle et morale dans une société bouleversée,
il est entendu qu'un tel résultat ne peut-étre obtenu
que si les peuples acceptent de suivre une voie de
penitence, comme l'avait déclaré Renan en 1871. Or a
l'heure actuelle je ne vois nulle part de signe
annoncant qu'on veuille se corriger des défauts qu'on
a le plus aimés; tout au contraire, on exalte ces
défauts comme des qualités supérieurs de la civili-
sation latine. . . . L'absence universelle de sin
cérité, d'examen de conscience et par suite de désir
de pénitence seront les traits incontestables et
effrayants de notre civilisationde demain." p. 442

24 janvier 1917
" . . . Je pense que les Instituts francais d'Italie
n'ont pas d0 contribuer a répandre les idées de
Bergson, car ici les universitaires ne leur sont pas
favorables." p. 442

28 mars 1917
"Ne pensez-vous pas que Bergson pourrait bien etre un
solaro maestro' de Schopennauer: il me semble que
l'Evolution créatrice est un essai de conciliation
de la doctrine as 1a 'VOlonté' et du 'Jahvéisme';
cette conciliation est plus facile a effectuer que
celle de la Volonté et du christianisme, qui a une
notion de Dieu beaucoup plus précise que celle des
Juifs.

. . . Je suis frappe de la haine que William James
avait avouée a Hégel; cela devait te ir a une income
patibilité existant entre les idées hégéliennes et le
temperament américain, toujours disposé a se contenter
d'apercus sommaires, 'sans notion du mal,‘ tres-pen
porté vers la réflexion historique (les américains
n'ont pas, en effet, d'histoire propre)." p. 443

 

16 avril 1917
" . . . De tous les oeuvres de Proudhon, celle qui est
la plus facile de comprendre aujourd'hui, . . . est
Laguerre et la paix. Puisque toutes ses idées
essentielles s‘y trouvent." p. 443

 

juillet 1917 (incomplete date in la Critica)
" . . . Plus 1a guerre se prolonge et plus l'avenir
intellectuel de l'Europe me semble menacé. Je ne

 

I “L.

404

crois pas que beaucoup de personnes aient jusqu'ici
reconnu ce danger d'une longue depression philosophique."
p. 445

21 juillet 1917
"Tout ce qui se passe me montre que l'intelligence subit
une éclipse." p. 446

 

15 aoflt 1917
"Mais qujourd'hui il y a bien peu de catholiques
vraiment chrétiens. Je crois que Huysmans était plus
sincérement chrétien que Claudel: la fond de sa
religion était la musique grégorienne; mais cette
musique entretenait chez lui des sentiments élévés."
p. 446

7 septembre 1917
"Hier j'ai recontré Bergson qui a reconnu que la
philosophie moderne souffrai t beaucoup de la separation
absolue qui s'est établie entre elle et l'art; il
n'en était pas ainsi chez les Grecs; si les scolastiques
ont si mal compris Aristote souvent, cela tient, je
crois, en bonne partie, a ce qu'ils n'avaient aucun
sens de l'art. Descartes n'est pas non plus du tout
artiste." p. 42

 

17 septembre 1917
"Beaucoup de catholiques actuels pensent que, la con-
fession lavant tous les péchés, la morale n'est
obligatoire que pour les pietres gens qui se tiennent
en dehors de l'Eglise; les dévots ont 1e droit de tout
oser, pourvu qu'ils affirment leur croyance aux sacre-
ments." p. 43

25 octobre 1917
"On vient de traduire en francais un livre d'un pro-
fesseur de Harvard: L'erreur de la philosophie alle-
mande (Egotisme in German Philosopgi) par—Santayana.
. . . Cets ouvrage me semble indiquer une tendance
'irréstible' qui va entrainer la philosophie vers un
journalisme quisoit a la portée des boutiquiers,
lecteurs des feuilles avancées. . . . L'Europe serait-
elle mflre pour recevoir la grande pensée americaine:
'mediums et christian science?" p. 43

9 décembre 1917
"Allons-nous voir la pensee européene tomber au niveau
de la pensée américaine et la spiritisme devenir une
métaphysique? J'en ai grand peur!” p. 43

405

5 février 1918
"Le voya e 5 Sparte de Barres est bien propre a montrer
que cet educateur du nationalisme est un bourgeois
incapable de comprendre la grandeur antique; i1 cor-
respond tres-bien aux tendances de la France moderne
qui n'est plus ni classique, ni chrétienne." p. 44

 

15 mai 1918
"Les événements de Russie me semblent constituer les
funérailles du socialisme que nous avaient fait les
déclamateurs bourgeois depuit une vingtaine d'années."
p. 45

 

6 décembre 1918
" . . . ici i1 h'y a que le vide le plus absolu de la
pensee. . . . Nous entrons dans la période la plus
haissable de toute décadende, celle de la pure pluto-
cratie, a l'américaine. . . . J'ai appris par un jeune
Officier d'état-major que les Américains ignorent
généralement l'existence de W. James, 1e seul phil-
osophe américain dont 1e nom avait traversé l'océan.
Les catholiques francais croient que cette guerre va
assurer 1e triomphe de leur esprit sur l'esprit protes
ant (c'est-a-dire de Goethe, Kant, Hégel);" p. 48

20 décembre 1918
"La grande question est celle-c1: que représente
qujourd'hui l'Allemagne en Europe? Je crois qu'on
s'est beaucoup trompé en supposant que l'Empire allemand
représentait l'oligarchie militaire; i1 me semble que
l'empereur Guillaume était le chef des capitalistes;
au fond la défaite n'a pas atteint autant les allemands
qu'on aurait pu le croire, parce que c'est la bourgeoisie
capitaliste qui est vaincue; les Junkers ont encore
bon espoir." p. 48

l février 1919
"Le probleme que je pose est tres-grave; a quelle
philOSOphie 1e socialisme va-t-il se rattacher pour
profiter des experiences rédoutables d'aujourd'hui?
Je serais bien heureux d'avoir votre avis sur

l'avenir du bolchevisme, considéré comme une insti-
tution propre a la Russie. Ici la censure supprime
tous les renseignements relatifs a la Russie . . . "
p. 50

21 février 1919
" . . . nos socialistes francais sont des hommes
d'affaires . . . " p. 51

406

16 aofit 1918
" . . . je crois que nous allons tres-rapidement au
XVIIIe siecle, sans, cependant, que nos écrivans aient
rien du style de Voltaire. Ce sera 1e chef d'oeuvre
de l'esprit bourgeois." p. 119

29 septembre 1919
"Le génie de Barres est un dogme accepté par tous les
'partis de l'intelligence.‘ . . . L'intelligence
francaise 'Organisée' est d'une espece tres-mauvaise."
p. 120

 

20 mars 1920
" . . . l'idée de creation occupe dans sa (Bergson)
philOSOphie une place plus grance que ne le d t l'auteur
(Malavasi sur l'Esthétique bergsonienne) de l'article.
Je crois que le musique est l'art que Bergson comprend
le mieux et cet art est tout de creation; 11 m'imite
pas la nature." p. 190

 

11 avril 1920
" . . . Je me demande comment on peut parler de l'ame
sans faire appel a chaque instant a l'experience.
Les philosophes se sont imagines qu'ils pourraient
s'élever au dessus de la psychologie, parce qu'ils ont
prodigieusement appauvri les sujets qu'ils traitaient.
Et je suis persuade que dans le plus grand nombre des
cas, 1e rationalisme est un amincissement de la
réalite.

. . . Je crois que Bergson a bien raison d'abandonner
les spheres Oh se renferment les philosophes quiparlent
de l'ame, pour faire appel a l'experience. Je trouve
ses conceptions de la conscience-mémoire irréfutables;
mais je me demande s'il a démontre (dans Matiere et
mémoire) que la conscience dépasse les limitesPHu corps.
Sur ce point l'experience peut seule nous instruire;
Aristote ne mettait pas en doute que l'ame est une
maniere d'étre des corps organisés et, en consequence,
il n'admettait pas l'immortalité, qu'il regardait pro-
bablement comme une superstition antique . . .

. . . a mon avis, il est tres probable que Bergson
a été fort influencé par des écrits de Schopenhauer."
p. 191

 

l3 aoflt 1920
"J'ai lu avec beaucoup d'intérét votre critique
d'Oswald Spengler. . . . Tous les sociologues ont eu
pour ambition depouvoir pfaire de telles predetermi-
nations en s'appuyant sur les données su passé. Que
telles conceptions aient en du succes en Allemagne,
cela prouve que beaucoup d'Allemands actuels se mettent
a la reporque du 'scientisme' anglo-francais.

407

Les affaires européen ne semblent pas encore
s'orienter vers la paix; i1 y a trop de gens qui
croient avoir intérét a brouiller les cartes. . . . il
n'y a plus trace de bonne foi dans le monde socialiste
officiel; le gouvernement peut acheter les socialistes
comme les maguignons achetent des boeufs. . . . Ceux-
ci ont une peur effoyable du 'bolchévisme' qu'ils
redoutent de voir gagner de l'importance chez les pro-
létaires. . . . Ce qu'il y a de plus triste c'est la
decadence des intelligenses." p. 193

25 mars 1921
"J'ai été tres-souffrant dans ces derniers temps, 1e
coeur marche d'une facon desordonée quand j'eprouve
quelque fatigue, méme intellectuelle." p. 194

 

8 juillet 1921
"Nulle part i1 n'y a de réforme intellectuelle en
Europe. Quel triste avenir nous avons devant nous!
Il est vrai que j'acheve mes 74 ans et que avec ma
maladie de coeur, je ne puis pas avoir beaucoup
d'années a vivre; je ne verrai pas les plus mauvais
jours." p. 195

26 aofit 1921
"Les temps étant devenu plus doux, je me sens moins
fatigue; mais je ne peux pas entreprendre grand travail
exigeant une longue preparation." p. 195

 

A FOREWORD TO CHAPTER IX

Without attempting to judge the moral, historical
or social value of Sorel's mind, Chapter IX Offers a
concluding vision of the structure and unity Of the
thought of Georges Sorel. The results are then placed
in the context of the major secondary accounts Of Sorel's
ideas, which are reviewed in Part 2 Of this concluding
chapter. The call for a re-evaluation of Georges Sorel
is the consequence Of the conclusions set forth in
Chapter IX. These conclusions represent an interpre-
tation of Sorel's thought which is unduplicated in, and
in many instances contradictory of, the major secondary
accounts of his thought. The concluding bibliography
Of Sorel's writings, upon which these conclusions are
based, is the most complete list of his works which has

been compiled.

408

CHAPTER IX

 

REFLECTIONS ON GEORGES SOREL

Part 1

Conclusions

 

Epistemology, defined as that branch Of human
inquiry which is concerned with the problems of the
nature, limits and validity of knowledge and belief,

forms the central and most persistent concern in the

 

intellectual preoccupations of Georges Sorel. I do not
believe, based on an analysis of his writings, that it
‘would be possible to understand his speculations on
science, sociology, history, pessimism, tradition,
language or myth-fabrication, without a thorough com-
prehension Of his epistemological judgments. As early
as 1894, Sorel made the Observation that all the for-
:mations of the human mind had a "subjective and psycho-
logical aspect"1 and he reasoned that the desire for
complete knowledge must be abandoned. The cosmos, he

observed, appeared to be unlimited, in that he could not

 

1Georges Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 62.

409

410

conceptualize its end, but the realm of human knowledge
seemed to be confined to precisely the activities of
human beings.2 It was in the realm of human creations,
which Sorel referred to as the artificial or man-made
milieu, that the cooperative aggrandizement Of human
knowledge was possible.3 The influence of Henri Bergson,
who had emphasized the emotional side Of human life, led
Sorel to conclude that human affairs and therefore human
knowledge itself even within the context of the artificial
milieu would necessarily be characterized by indeter-
minism.

Writing in 1896, Sorel distinguished two cate-
gories of human knowledge, naming the first "formal or

5 Thinkers

abstract" and the second "living and concrete."
had been overly impressed with geometry and logic because
of their great prestige in Greek philosophy, Sorel thought,
and this had led to a predisposition to believe that
sylogisms and abstractions marked the most elevated and

perfect systems of knowledge. But these systems belonged

to the artificial milieu and not to the cosmic.6 Sorel

 

2 3

Ibid., p. 267. Ibid.

4Ibid., p. 179.

5Georges Sorel, "la science dans l'education,"
p. 111.

61bid., p. 136.

 

 

411

concluded that these so-called scientific systems were

an admirable collection Of ruses which contained an
anthropocentric hypothesis.7 As a result of this pre-
judice, the "true" had become defined as an ensemble of
clear and distinct propositions bound together by logic.
This ensemble was placed between humanity and the 'nature"

which it claimed to depict. But in nature, which Sorel

 

designated as the natural milieu to distinguish it from
the man-made, artificial milieu, there existed a com-

plexity so extraordinary that it could not be deciphered.

 

The error of attempting to subordinate this unknowable
to the caprices of the human imagination could only be
overcome through an education which did not conceal the

8 The

epistemological limitations Of the human mind.
process of the cumulative increase of human knowledge
was confined to the artificial milieu, to which succes-
sive generations of humanity had contributed. The
natural milieu, which Sorel referred to as "le monde
cosmique" could never be known by mankind in any cer-
tainty.

In 1905, Sorel Observed that the epistemological

limitations of human knowledge had caused certain anxie-

ties in contemporary physics.9 The impossibility of

 

7 8

Ibid. Ibid., p. 221.

9Georges Sorel, "Les preoccupations des physi-
ciens modernes." See also Chapter IV, note 82.

412

acquiring a knowledge of the essence Of things was causing
a recognition among scientists that mathematics was a
system of images situated between phenomena and the

physicist and that these images by means of which reality

 

was represented were chosen because of their convenience

 

and simplicity. This use of an "aesthetic standard"
caused Sorel to agree with Henri Poincaré who suggested
that the world the scientist believed he had discovered
was the creation of his own caprice.10 Sorel concluded
that all hypotheses introduced a system which was foreign
to the natural milieu and that it was an error to conceal
11

the necessary contradiction between science and nature.

He speculated that the natural and the artificial milieux

 

were constructed according to "des principes Opposes"

and that this opposition would become more clear as

. . . 12
sc1ence advanced toward the sense of its Own ignorance.

In a letter to Benedetto Croce, Sorel Observed: "Je ne
crois pas que 1e physicien lui-meme puisse se dispenser

d'étre quelque peu philosophe."l3

 

10Ibid., p. 864. See alSO Chapter IV, note 85.

11£Q£Q., p. 880. See also Chapter IV, note 87.

12£§£§., p. 882. See also Chapter IV, note 89.

13Letter to Croce, 6 mai 1907.

413

Sorel observed in 1906 that in every complex body
of human knowledge he detected both clear and obscure
regions, and he rejected the assumption that an advance
in knowledge would be marked by a gradual disappearance

14 On the contrary, he insisted

of the obscure region.
that the obscure region might prove to be the more impor-
tant. Rejecting the position of those whom he called
false philosophers who sought unity in all things, Sorel
stated his belief in the "fundamental heterogeneity" Of

15 The advance of human knowledge, Sorel

all things.
believed, would have the effect of increasing human
awareness Of a perpetually enlarging domain Of the
unknown.16 Even within the human-made artificial milieu,
Sorel insisted in an essay written in 1909, the movement
of human things was itself far tOO complicated to allow
for predictability--the future was necessarily unknown,
and those who ventured tO predict futures were over-
reaching the epistemological possibilities of human

knowledge.17

 

l4Georges Sorel, "La Gréve générale," p. 288.
See also Chapter V, note 41. .

15Georges Sorel, "La moralité de la violence,"
p. 99. See also Chapter V, note 57.

16Georges Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice" (Jan.,
1908), p. 51. See also Chapter V, note 123.

l7Georges Sorel, "La religion d'aujourd'hui,"
p. 441. See also Chapter VI, note 54.

 

 

 

B
to think
to the do
osophers
Mill's ni
induction
had demon
claim to
The most
had Often
Philosoph:
Speculati,
better Se
invention
Sorel War]
ditions w]
separate e

ObServer

 

414

By 1910, Sorel was convinced that it was an error
to think Of philosophy as a science and to submit thought
to the domination of logic as he believed Greek phil-

18 The complete failure of John Stuart

osophers had done.
Mill's nineteenth century attempt to produce canons Of
induction tO govern the methods Of rational experiments
had demonstrated that it was useless for philosophy to
claim to direct the activities Of scientific investigation.
The most symetrical philosophical systems, he charged,

had Often served to obstruct the mind, and he renounced
philosophy's traditional quest for truth in favor of
speculation which while incomplete and Obscure might
better serve to provoke creativity and a spirit Of

19 The modern world would commit a grave error,

invention.
Sorel warned, if it continued to follow the Greek tra-
ditions which supposed that human understanding could
separate essences from accidents because the human
Observer and his instruments were both " . . . tres

20 Between the

charge de variations accidentelles."
artificial milieu of human works and Observations and

the natural milieu there was what Sorel called a lacuna,

 

18Georges Sorel, "Vues sur les problemes de la
philOSOphie," p. 581. See also Chapter VI, notes 55, 56.

19£E£§.. p. 593. See also Chapter VI, note 64.

20£239., p. 82. See also Chapter VI, note 70.

 

415

and the idea Of unity, Sorel concluded " . . . que l'on
a regardée pendant Si longtemps comme étant fondamentale
dans la constitution de la science, n'aurait plus de
raison d'étre."21
The most significant influence of Henri Bergson
on the thought of Georges Sorel was in the area Of the
formation of his epistemological convictions. Sorel

recognized Bergson's place in the history of epistemology

by ranking his Creative Evolution as comparable in impor-

 

tance to Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason.22 Bergson to

 

Sorel was that genius who, faced with the contradictions
of nineteenth century thought, had produced an insight
which allowed the Old dogmatics to die and which oriented
contemporary thought in new directions. Bergson had,
Sorel believed, reproached the Greek philosophers for
their exaggerated confidence in the power Of the indi-
vidual mind, and emphasized instead the limited and cumu-
lative nature Of human understanding. The occupation of
philosophy, Bergson taught, was not to seek a unique,
total, global vision, but rather to meditate on the

mysteries of life.23

 

212233.. p. 86. See also Chapter VI, note 71.

22£2£Q.. P. 89. See also Chapter VI, note 72.

23Ibid., p. 98. See also Chapter VI, note 73.

416

In 1911, Sorel was influenced by Gustave LeBon

(Les opinions et les croyances) to conceptualize an

 

epistemological duality which both a study of history

and psychology seemed to confirm: the human mind,

Sorel wrote, " . . . est condamnée a subir eternellement
la dualité de la croyance et de la connaissance."24 He
rejected what he called the "fallacieuse métaphysique"
which assumed that rationalism would gradually eliminate
human credulity and proposed instead that human certainty
resided upon a combination of knowledge and the will to
believe and thus he concluded that the mentally more
satisfying constructions could be shown to have "des

25 Several months

racines puissantes dans le coeur."
later, Sorel announced what he believed to be a conception
Of truth which he found compatible with this duality:

"the pragmatic truth of certain ideas, he wrote, was
demonstrated by those ideas which could be shown to have

26 These prag-

produced "féconde et grands résultats."
matic truths, which Sorel believed abounded in human
history, were not verifiable by any scientific demon-

strations. Their validity, he believed, could only be

 

24Georges Sorel, "Sur la magie moderne," p. 4.
See also Chapter VII, note 26.

25Ibid. See also Chapter VII, note 29.

26Georges Sorel, "Si les dogmes évoluent," p. 38.
See also Chapter VII, note 33.

417

discovered in retrospect. Verifiability he envisioned

as determined by historical experience. It was pre-
cisely the failing of contemporary science, Sorel argued,
to have paid insufficient attention to these realities
contained in history and experience and he praised
Antoine Cournot for having attacked the artificial cate-
gories of "unity" and "infinity" as " . . . cartes méta-
physiques, dressées avec symetre et élégance."27 The
human mind, Sorel concluded, constructed special systems
for each genre of knowledge and he called upon historians
to launch a critique of rationalism which was the pre-
requisite for a comprehensive epistemological reorien-
tation: "Une critique satisfaisante de la connaissance
ne pouvait étre tentée avant que 1e prestige ancien du
rationalisme n'eOt été abaissé par les historiens."28
This reorientation would involve a historical examination
Of the philosophy of language and all the religious,
political and judicial institutions by which human life
manifested itself. Cournot had coined the term "trans-
rationalisme" to suggest the direction Of his epistemo-
logical considerations. Sorel opted instead for the

label "pragmatisme" to designate a new union between

reason and experience.

 

27Georges Sorel, "A la mémoire de Cournot,"
p. 103. See also Chapter VII, note 40.

ZBIbid.p p. 111, See also Chapter VII, note 42.

418

Pragmatism, Sorel wrote in 1917, was born of the
need to protest against the superstition of the dialec-

29 The true definition of an idea or principle

tic.
resided, according to the pragmatic system, in its prac-
tical effects. The truth was thus conceived as a
relationship between an idea and a reality exterior to
the idea which composed a matrix of psychological and
physical dimensions. The pragmatist proposed to verify
ideas, Sorel wrote, "by a process which subordinated

the experience to the conditions in the mind of the per-
ceiver."30 This process, Sorel asserted, rejected the
unitary interpretation Of reality and provided instead
for " . . . plusieurs genres de réalités."31 The prag-
matic conception Of truth, Sorel concluded, accepted

" . . . que la relation de vérité est une relation
susceptible d'éxperience définie et par conséquent,
susceptible d'étre dé crite aussi bien que nomenée,
qu'elle n'est pas unique en son genre et qu'elle n'est ni

. . . . 32
invariable n1 universelle."

 

29Georges Sorel, 2e l'utilité du Pragmatisme,
p. 4. See also Chapter VIII, note 15.

 

30;§i§., p. 81. See also Chapter VIII, note 20.

315239, See also Chapter VIII, note 21.

321bid., p. 173, See also Chapter VIII, note 24.

419

The pragmatist recognized that the world Of
human construction--the artificial milieu--was an Object
Of epistemological concern Of at least equal importance
to that of the natural milieu, and Sorel criticized the
prejudices of "the spiritualists" who concentrated on the
unknown (the natural milieu) to the exclusion Of the
artificial milieu, and "the materialists" who had made
a dogma Of " . . . 1a raison immanente qui soutient,
croient-ils, le cours de l'Univers."33

Sorel concluded his epistemological Observations
by speculating that the natural and the artificial milieux
were separated by something " . . . chargé d'irréversi-
bilité";34 a zone Of separation which was not susceptible
to the laws Of mathematics and which appeared to be char-
acterized by indetermination. Those physicists who held
to the doctrine of perfect determinism in nature, whose
present difficulty of proof for them was the result of a
temporary ignorance, Sorel scorned as devotees to a

35 The pragmatist, Sorel believed,

"fanatisme moniste."
had no interest in favoring a position which held that
determinism was hidden within indeterminism, because it

appeared an hypocrisy to Obscure the limits of the human

 

33Ibid., p. 333, See also Chapter VIII, note 38.

34$§i§., p. 341. See also Chapter VIII, note 40.

3512i§,. p. 347. See also Chapter VIII, note 42.

 

 

mind. T

 

of scie

ficielle
jour."36
into the
awarenes
sense of
on the c
that the
Which hu
own deve
Sorel be
Complete
rePresel
inCesSa]

420

mind. The only true given which existed in the history
Of science, Sorel affirmed, was " . . . la nature arti-

K

ficielle a laquelle nous ne cessons d'ajouter Chaque

"36 The advance Of human knowledge was an advance

jour.
into the unknown which produced quantitatively greater
awareness while at the same time served to increase the
sense of relative ignorance. It was by careful reflection
on the course of the development Of this artificial nature
that the human mind could become aware Of the extent to
which humanity was capable Of effecting the course of its
own development. The natural milieu whose phenomena,
Sorel believed, " . . . nous ne pourrons jamais soumettre
completement . . . a notre intelligence," he warned,
represented a threat to the works of man, and only by an
incessant labor could humanity provide itself with the
means to maintain what Sorel regarded as its zone Of
relative freedom--the artificial milieu. Thus Sorel
praised the epistemological insight Of Henri Bergson who
had taught that human intelligence was necessarily collec-
tive and progressive37 and he concluded that history would
become the great regulator of human mental activity with
the result that " . . . celui qui se place au point de

vue des historiens, n'admettra plus de théories

 

361bid., p. 350, See also Chapter VIII, note 45.

37Ibid., p, 446. See also Chapter VIII, note 53.

421

extra-experimentales de la physique, de droit naturel,
de philosophie permanente; l'humanité construit des doc-
trines dont 1a valeur est constatée par l'utilite qu'on
leur reconnait au cours d'une longue expérience; nous
sommes ainsi amenés au pragmatisme."38
Contained within a world of its own construction,
Sorel visualized humanity as constantly faced with the
enormous task of maintaining what the generations had
acquired in the face of an unknown and threatening natural
milieu which was in dogged opposition to its projects.
In this context, optimism seemed an unrealistic perspec-
tive of false confidence. A pessimism which would alert
humanity to the fragile condition of its life and con-

quests was for Sorel a necessary precondition for human

survival. In 1889, writing in The Trial of Socrates,

 

he contrasted the noble pessimism Of the ancient Greek
warrior kings with the facile and dangerous optimism of
the fifth century schools Of the Sophists. In contrast
the Greek poetry, which he admired so greatly, contained
an essence of melancholy which signalized to the ancient
Greeks that even in the midst of their most brilliant
triumphs they must anticipate a reversal of fortune:

" . . . Si 1e malheur est toujours prét a nous frapper,

 

38Ibid., p. 462. See also Chapter VIII. note 54.

422

si le bonheur complet est une illusion décevante, le
monde n'en est pas moins aussi excellent et aussi parfait
que possible."39

In Proudhon's la guerre et la paix, Sorel dis-

 

covered further support for his early conception Of pessi-
mism as a necessary posture with respect to the conditions

of human life. Writing in 1892 in reference to Proudhon,

 

Sorel noted that there existed in the human constitution
what he called "un défaut d'equilibre." The faculty for
consumption according to Sorel was unlimited in humanity,

40 The drive for a con-

but that of production was not.
stant increase in happiness, so long as it was defined
in terms of the acquisition of material wealth and
increasing levels Of consumption therefore appeared tO
Sorel to be destined to failure. The pessimistic view
Of life which Sorel advanced to counter the false faith
Of the Optimist, who assumed boundless supplies of
material wealth, was based on his conception that pain
and suffering (la douleur) was "1a manifestation pri-
mordiale de la vie . . . qui nous fournit la preuve

irrefutable (pour la conscience) de notre mélange au

monde physique, qui nous demontre a la fois notre

 

39Sorel, leprocés de Socrate, p. 217. See also
Chapter I, Part 2, note 87}

 

40Georges Sorel, "Essai sur la philosophie de
Proudhon," p. 629.

423

41 The state of

existence at l'existence du monde."
pleasure, Sorel emphasized in an essay published in
1900, separated humanity from reality and caused the
belief that all in life existed for the purpose Of pro-
ducing amusement. Philosophies founded exclusively on
considerations of enhancing pleasure, Sorel charged,
ended by glorifying passion and sanctifying individual
cynicism. In a speech delivered on January 30, 1900,
Sorel reaffirmed that he considered a pessimistic senti-
ment to be of primary efficacity: " . . . Au premier
rang des sentiments efficaces, je place ceux qui se
rapportent a la conception pessimiste des futurs."42
Sorel believed the historical example Of Christianity had
demonstrated the strength of a pessimism which visualized
the world as the natural realm of evil. This pessimism,
according to Sorel, had far greater influence in behalf
Of Christianity's growth and endurance than did its more
Optimistic ideas of sublime charity. He concluded that
social theories would have less influence on the human

mind if they were fundamentally Optimistic.43

 

41Georges Sorel, "la science et la morale," p. 18.
See also Chapter III, note 24.

42Georges Sorel, "Les facteurs moraux de l'évo-
lution," p. 94. See also Chapter III, note 29.

43Ibid., p, 94. see also Chapter III, note 29.

 

424

Writing in September, 1901, Sorel revealed an
almost existential analysis of the roots of his pessimism,
while discussing a novel by Antonini Lavergne entitled

Jean Coste. Civilization, Sorel wrote, had been recog-

 

nized by Jean Coste to be a system of ruses which pre-
vented self-examination. The mysteries which remained
hidden in the soul were only revealed by contact with
"1a misere," whose impact caused the superficial structure

Of life to fall away.44

The internal strength of each
man was measured in those moments Of crisis when, alone,
each confronted all which was horrible and inexorable in
human existence. Coste's speculations on suicide repre-
sented for Sorel his courage without any concealing
illusion to consider the fatality Of life. This was,
Sorel wrote, "l'affreuse pensée" which caused him to re-
affirm that "le hasard est grand maitre en ce monde."45
Writing in 1910 in an essay entitled "Grandeur
et décadence," Sorel reiterated his conviction that chance
played an important role in determining that some epochs
would be characterized by grandeur and others by decadence.

He visualized a cycle of growth and decline in human

development which he believed Operated according to what

 

44Georges Sorel, Jean Coste, p. 296. See also
Chapter IV, notes 37, 39. ‘—

 

45£2£Q-: p. 297. See also Chapter IV, note 41.

425

46

he called a "law of apparent regression." This law

recognized the great power " . . . qui appartient a la

médiocrité dans l'histoire."47

Humanity was occasionally
lifted out of its natural state Of mediocrity only under
the pressure of the most energetic constraint, but there
was, he insisted, a natural tendency to return to a
mediocre state which Sorel labeled "ses propres tendances."
Writing to Croce on January 25, 1911, Sorel referred to

these conclusions which he had added to a new edition of

his Illusions du progrés: "I hope you will glance at the

 

chapter which I have added to The Illusions of Prggress;

 

I believe to have Opened a fecond avenue for philosophical
research on history by showing that movements toward gran-
deur are always forced and those toward decadence are
always natural; our nature is invincibly born toward that
which the philosophers of history regard as evil, barbaric
or decadent."48
Following the first world war, in 1919, Sorel
chided the leaders Of the Entente who had promised a uni-

versal happiness to those who had suffered from the

carnage of combat. To the promise that "rivers Of milk

 

46Georges Sorel, "Grandeur et decadence," p. 332.
See also Chapter VII, note 9.

47Ibid. See also Chapter VII, note 9.

48Letter to Croce 25 janvier 1911.

426

and honey would flow" and to the resulting popular hope
that life might become easy, Sorel contrasted his con-
viction that humanity was engaged in a constant struggle
against a natural law which condemned it to pain and
suffering and uncertainty (la douleur) and which he
identified as " . . . les problemes essentiels de notre
espece."49
The human condition, as Sorel envisioned it, was
epistemologically confined to the domain Of specifically
human activity--the artificial, man-made milieu. In
addition to the adversary opposition of the unknown
natural milieu which threatened mankind with extinction,
Sorel conceived the hard-won artificial milieu as subject
to regressive pressures which seemed to inhere in man as
species, while man as individual faced the assured
fatality Of his personal life. In the context of these
ideas, Sorel assumed that the labor of generations past
provided an important heritage for the present. He was
led by this valuation for tradition, to reject what he
believed were contemporary tendencies toward selfish
individualism and to adopt a position which asserted the
ethical value of human work, a cooperative effort under-

taken tO preserve and enlarge the domain of human activity.

 

49Georges Sorel, "L'Humanite contre la douleur,"
p. 399. See also Chapter VIII, note 62.

427

The diabolical institution of slavery, Sorel
wrote in 1889, was the central evil of Greek society,
and he attacked Aristotle whom he believed had provided
a philosophical justification for it by teaching: "Quand
on est inférieur a ses semblables autant que le corps
l'est a l'ame, la brute a l'homme, et c'est la condition
de tous ceux chez qui l'emploi des forces corporelles
est le seul et le meilleur parti a tirer de leur etre,

50 Slavery, Sorel asserted,

on est esclave par nature."
would destroy any society which practiced it. Because
of slavery the dominant citizen-class of Athens did not
work and as a consequence relied upon force to maintain
themselves. The lack Of work led to an extreme demorali-
zation of the Athenian citizenry, an occurrence which
Sorel regarded as a necessary consequence Of this
avoidance of work: "11 en a été ainsi dans tous les
siecles, et c'est la une loi de la nature humaine."51
For Sorel, Proudhon had properly understood the role of
work in human life:

Not only is work necessary to the conservation Of

our bodies [Proudhon wrote] it is indispensible to

the development of our minds. . . . As much as the
law Of consumption humiliates us, so much the law

 

50Georges Sorel, 1e proces de Socrate, p. 85.

 

Slgggg. See also Chapter I, Part 2, note 40.

428

of work lifts us up. We do not live exclusively
the life of the mind, but by work we spiritualize
more and more our existence.52
Writing in 1894, Sorel Observed that it would be extremely
useful for the study Of humanity to accept the perspec-
tive Of man as worker and not to separate him from the
activities which were necessary for the preservation Of
life.53 Thus Sorel insisted on extending Aristotle's
conception of man as a rational and social animal by
noting that the word "worker" comprehended " . . . les
deux expressions d'étre vivant et d'étre raisonnable;
nous disons donc que l'homme est un travailleur sociale."54

In 1901, Sorel continued his examination Of the

role of work in human life in an essay entitled The Social

 

Value of Art. The contemporary world, he believed, was

 

under the influence of a universalizing force which he

labeled "1e travail." The role Of modern man, he wrote,
was to be one of incessant labor " . . . uniquement pré-
occupée d'agrandir incessament le champ de la puissance

55

humaine." The ancient dualism of mind and body on which

Sorel believed the ancient economy had reposed had been

 

52Ibid.

53Georges Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 96.

 

54Ibid., p. 253.

55Georges Sorel, La valeur sociale de l'Art,
p. 22. See also Chapter IV, note I8.

 

429

replaced by intense and absorbing action. Sorel charac-

terized this action as " . . . le commencement et la fin

56 All that which remained in the

de toute notre Vie."
domain of pure speculation and did not translate itself
into any practical work, Sorel viewed as a " . . . sorte

d'amputation intellectuelle de l'homme."57

Work, which
the ancients had regarded as servile, could through an
association with aesthetics, Sorel forecast, allow the
worker to " . . . cesse alors de considérer la loi du
travail comme une loi d'esclavage et de degradation."58
Manual labor, Sorel wrote in 1919, which was employed for
the means Of the common life " . . . a le droit d'étre

”59 The

rangé dans la méme classe que les sculptures.
great Opportunity for the present generation, Sorel con-
cluded, would be to "Faire que le travail manuel con-
stitue, grace a cette marche de la production vers l'art,
1e moyen par excellence que l'humanité employera désor-

. 60
mais pour surmonter la douleur."

 

56£§i§., p. 24. See also Chapter IV, note 23.

57£Eiégp Po 25. See also Chapter IV, note 24.

58;pgg,, p. 31. See also Chapter IV, note 30.

59Georges Sorel, "L'humanité contre la douleur,"
p. 419. See also Chapter VIII, note 90.

GOIbid., p. 420, See also Chapter VIII, note 94.

430

The work of humanity, which for Sorel comprised
the artificial milieu, was for him necessarily collective.
It employed the labors of past generations and, in the
present, had become an ever more intense and cooperative
undertaking under the influence of increasingly indus-
trialized life. The joint-effort of the human species,
perpetually threatened by an enveloping, unknown cosmos
and subject to its own internal uncertainties, caused
Sorel to look with suspicion upon concepts which empha-
sized individualism. The classical economists, Sorel
Observed, in 1894, believed that society was an histori-
cally formed collection in which nothing social in itself

61 Supported by such philosophers as John Stuart

existed.
Mill, these economists denied the existence Of social
characteristics by asserting that "les hommes dans l'état
de société sont toujours des hommes, leurs actions et
leurs passions Obéissent aux lois de la nature humaine."62
This allowed the classical economists to conceive Of work
as an individual act, but in real life, Sorel asserted,
men can rarely execute their projects alone and thus the
resulting literary, religious, scientific associations

were, for him, of great interest. To John Stuart Mill's

assertion that man does not change when he is in society

 

61Georges Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 246.

 

62£§i§., p. 244. See Chapter I, Part 3, note 34.

 

431

Sorel replied: " . . . Ou donc l'homme est-i1 autrement
qu'en société? Si on 1e considere a l'état individuel,
c'est par une abstraction scientifique."63
The Middle Ages had conceived man as an isolated
entity, Sorel continued, but this individualism which
was so rooted in the European mind, must, he asserted,
be replaced by a concept which " . . . reconnaitre comme
base de tous nos raisonnements un caractere social dans

64 All the formations of the human

les actes humains."
mind, Sorel concluded, had their own histories which
occurred in the social context of the artificial milieux.
The concept of an isolated, individual intelligence
reasoning on itself which Sorel charged had been advanced
by René Descartes was, he asserted in 1896 in his Study.
Of Vico, "un véritable leurre."65 This appeal tO indi-
vidual sentiment, Sorel charged, was a pretention to
reconstruct by a single individual that which the pre-
ceding generations had elaborated in an enormous collec-
tive human undertaking. Science as a human activity,

Sorel believed, was social and not individual; it had a

history behind it and could only be well understood by

 

63Ibid., p. 251. See Chapter I, Part 3, note 38.

64$§i§., p. 256. See Chapter I, Part 3, note 41.

65Georges Sorel, Etude sur Vico, p. 811.

 

 

432

consulting this history which " . . . intéresse la vie
de l'homme comme espece et le développement de
l'humanité."66
Having accepted a concept of humanity as a social
species whose joint-labor had produced an artificial
milieu which served as the basis upon which human life
could be preserved and extended, Sorel emphasized the
central importance of tradition as a freely accumulated

life-sustaining heritage whose value must not be under-

estimated. As early as 1889 he wrote in The Trial Of

 

Socrates that Aristotle's proclamation in behalf Of an

 

absolute right of individual genius must be rejected
in favor of a conception which Sorel attributed tO Taine:

The community past, present and future is held in
common. Each generation is only the temporary
guardian and the responsible depository of a pre-
cious and glorious patrimony which it has received
from the preceeding and is charged to transmit to
the following. . . . There is no such thing as an

a priori universal and absolute individual right.67

Society, Sorel insisted, was not made up of absolutely
free individuals each seeking his own private well being:

. . . la société est un étre vivant, dont la per-
sonnalité est aussi certaine que celle de l'étre
individuel. L'étre social est a la foi producteur
et consommateur: chacun des membres apporte son
contingent de travail et entre en échange avec tous
les autres.68

 

66Ibid., p. 812.

67Georges Sorel, Le proces de Socrate, p. 197.

 

8Georges Sorel, "Essai sur la philOSOphie de
Proudhon," p. 628.

433

This interchange for Sorel was transtemporal: "Where
has our present civilization," he asked, "drawn that
which is best in our minds? Has not contact with Hellenic
genius given our thinking an entirely distinctive shape?"69
Although Sorel's acceptance of that which the past had
created was not absolute, and he rejected the development
of a dogmatic rationalism on the grounds of its anti-
historical bias, he staunchly affirmed the vital role
Of past epochs in the elaboration of the artificial
milieu, whose existence he insisted was the fundamental
condition of human freedom: "Nous sommes libres en ce
sens que nous pouvons constriure des appareils qui n'ont
aucun modele dans le milieu cosmique; nous ne changeons
rien aux lois de la nature, mais nous sommes maitres de
créér des sequences ayant une ordonnance qui nous est
propre."70
When Georges Sorel completed his study Of Vico
in 1896, his conception of the social and historical
nature of human development was reaffirmed. Vico,
rejecting Descartes, was interested in the development
of man as species--humanity was for him social and not

individual. To these Observations, Sorel added his own

on the subject of the importance Of the study of the past:

 

69Ibid., p. 45.

7oSorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 264. See Chapter I,
Part.3, note 47.

 

434

" . . . il n'est donc pas conforme a la raison de
négliger l'authorité de la tradition: celle-ci doit

71 The new science Of Vico

étre étudiée et discutée."
was thus for Sorel a history of human ideas which
depicted an evolution prOper to what Sorel called "la

72

métaphysique de l'esprit humain." This historical

development, Sorel wrote, " . . . reste toujours sociale
comme aujourd'hui l'humanité est son oeuvre a elle-meme."73
Moral elements, such as the demand for individual
justice did not derive from human nature. They were
derived from certain historical conditions, and Sorel
accepted the thesis of Renan that " . . . la reclamation
obstinée pour la justice individuelle" originated in the

74 "We live on the resources accumulated

people of Israel.
by our fathers," Sorel wrote in 1898, and following Renan
he affirmed that Rome and Greece had founded the state,
law, philosophy and science.75
In a speech delivered in 1907, Sorel defended the

importance of tradition against the utopian socialists

 

71Georges Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," p. 813. See
Chapter II, note 64.

72 73

Ibid., p. 814. Ibid.

74Georges Sorel, "L'Ethique du Socialisme," p. 291.
See also Chapter III, note 37.

75£§i§3, p. 292. See also Chapter III, note 38.

 

435

of the nineteenth century who he believed, signaling
the work of Fourier, had called for a complete break

with the past.76

He quoted Proudhon in rebuttal of what
he believed was Fourier's disregard for the value Of tra-
dition and history: "Quoi! cet immense travail de
l'humanité serait non avenu, l'histoire n'aurait aucun
sens et tout ce mouvement n'aurait été qu'une longue

deception!"77

In March, 1909, Sorel quoted from an
essay by Ribot a statement which affirmed the lasting
influence Of man's historical experience: "Depuis que
l'homme a une histoire . . . aucun des besoins et
désirs qu'il a manifestés des l'origine n'a disparu
. . . "78 TO comprehend the nature of man became for
Sorel synonymous with an understanding Of his history.

By 1911, Sorel was associated with the founding
of a periodical whose statement of purpose affirmed the
necessity of preserving the heritage Of the past although
this affirmation was qualified with the admission that all

79

periods Of history had their errors. Certain aspects

 

76Georges Sorel, La decomposition du Marxisme,
p. 15. See also Chapter VI, note 10.

 

77l§i§gp P. 16. See also Chapter VI, note 10.

78Georges Sorel, "La religion d'aujourd'hui,"
p. 240. See also Chapter VI, note 45.

9Georges Sorel, "Statement," p. I. See also
Chapter VII, note 12.

 

436

of the heritage of the past, the statement continued,
were Vital for the present and their preservation was
praiseworthy. Tradition, the statement asserted, " . . .
loin d'étre une entrave, est le point d'appui nécessaire

qui assure les élans les plus hardis_n80

The problems of
distinguishing between those elements of the past which
merited preservation and study and those which did not
was confronted by Sorel in 1917 in his study entitled

The Utility of Pragmatism. For the pragmatist, Sorel

 

affirmed " . . . la tradition est un élément de premier

81

ordre dans la connaissance." However, Sorel cautioned,

tradition has a productive force only " . . . on . . .
existent ces libres concurrences de vonlontés éclairées."82
To those who used tradition in political and religious
polemics and to whom " . . . 1a tradition n'est pas
nourrie de liberté, mais enregistre les décisions de
authorité," Sorel responded that " . . . 1e pragmatisme
n'a donc rien a débattre avec l'idée réactionnaire de la

tradition . . . pour parler comme i1 convient du prag-

matiSme, il ne faut jamais séparer 1a liberté et la

 

801bid.: p. I. See also Chapter VII, note 14.

81Georges Sorel, "De l'utilité du Pragmatisme,"
p. 185. See also Chapter VIII, note 25.

82Ibid. See also Chapter VIII, note 26.

 

437

. 3
raison."8

The tradition to which Sorel recognized the
right Of participation in the formation of the contemporary
world was, he wrote, that which was " . . . 1e fruit des

84 On this

efforts libres et raisonnés de nos peres."
heritage, he concluded, " . . . travaillent notre liberté
et notre raison en vue d'améliorer nos conditions
actuelles de vie et de transmettre, si faire se peut,

85 Human

quelque chose d'utile a nos successuers."
intelligence, Sorel concluded in reference to Henri
Bergson, because it was collective and progressive,
required multitudes Of research and collaboration. Prag-
matism had the value of indicating that " . . . l'humanité
construit des doctrines dont la valeur est constatée par
l'utilite qu'on leur reconnait au cours d'une longue

86 These constructions of humanity, whose

experience."
survival value had been demonstrated by history, were
precisely those elements which collectively and cumula-
tively comprised the specifically human formulation which

Sorel designated as the artificial milieu.

 

 

 

83Ibid., pp. 185-86. See also Chapter VIII,
note 27.
84$§i§., p. 186. See also Chapter VIII, note 28.
85Ibid. See also Chapter VIII, note 29.
86

Ibid., p. 462. See also Chapter VIII, note 54.

438

It was in the context Of the artificial milieu,
whose epistemological limits have already been examined,
that Sorel evaluated the human disciplines of science,
sociology, and history. His pronouncements were typi-
cally anti-dogmatic; absolute and universal truth, he
believed to be false concepts. In 1895, in the course
of a book review, Sorel noted his agreement with the
conclusion that it was the duty of the man of science
to expose himself to error and to abandon the false
vanity of the savants who held to more absolutist con-
cepts.87 An understanding Of the history of science,
Sorel believed, would defy a purely logical approach.
Pure logic, Sorel charged, had been historically pre-
ferred to observation and experience because it was a
psychologically less fatiguing process. Science, like
all human activities had a history; and it was only by
consulting this history that science could be compre-

hended. In 1897, Sorel reviewed a book by M. J. Payot

entitled De la croyance in which he found a definition

 

of science with strong affinities to his own. Science
was, according to Payot, a collection of methods designed
to classify phenomena and to suitably represent that
phenomena; science " . . . laisse la réalité hors de

ses prises, tout son effort est dirigé vers l'utile et

 

87Georges Sorel, "Les lois psychologique du Sym-
bolisme," p. 275.

 

 

 

 

439

88 Science was, Sorel concluded,

89

non vers le vrai."
" . . . un appauvrissement et un symbolisme." Although
it could not penetrate the cosmic, Sorel added, science,

as an expression Of the reasoned activity Of man, could
become, in the artificial milieu, a tool for self-
awareness. Sorel speculated further that the hegelian
conception of the close relationship between art and
science seemed especially fecond.

Sorel concluded in 1905 that each branch of human
knowledge must formulate its own approach to understanding
and he emphasized that the tools developed in one branch
were not necessarily applicable to the others. Mathe-
matics as utilized by the contemporary physicist was
merely a system of images chosen for the aesthetic
reasons Of simplicity and convenience which as a con-
struction within the artificial milieu had taken the
place of an unknowable natural milieu.90 Every hypothesis,
he wrote in 1905, " . . . est l'introduction d'un

91

méchanisme etranger a la nature." Science was thus

 

88De la croyance, reviewed by Georges Sorel,
p. 181. See Chapter II, note 94.

 

89Ibid.

 

90Georges Sorel, "Les preoccupations," p. 880.
See also Chapter IV, note 86.

91Ibid. See also Chapter IV, note 87.

 

 

 

 

 

 

440

as infinite as the inventive genius of human beings.
Sorel thus rejected the concept of laws which governed
the cosmos, suggesting that faith in the stability of
these assumed laws could be traced to purely social
origins. In 1908, Sorel emphasized the great service to
human understanding as well as to the various branches
Of science which was rendered by the poetic imagination,
and he strongly criticized the contemporary pedagogues
who he charged had stifled this capacity for invention
in their students.92
Science, Sorel wrote in 1910, must appreciate
that its investigations are confined to the limits of an
artificial milieu by the human origins of its Obser-
vations. Science did not derive certainty from logic,
but from the experimental mechanism it had at its disposal
and he agreed with LeBon who had indicated the precarious
nature Of this certainty: "Toute leur instrumentation
scientifique servit seulement a donner a certaines
illusions, dont les fideles eux-memes n'étaient pas
toujours tres sfirs, une apparence de certitude, qu'elles

93

n'aurait en jamais acquise autrement." The champions

Of experimental science, Sorel charged in 1911, who

 

92Georges Sorel, "L'Evolution créatrice" (Jan.
1908), p. 52. See also Chapter V, note 124.

93Georges Sorel, "Sur la magie moderne," p. 7.
See also Chapter VII, note 30.

 

 

 

 

 

 

441

failed to accord sufficient attention to experience posed
a great danger for the progress of human understanding.94
The alternative which Sorel proposed under the influence

of the writings Of Cournot (Materialisme, vitalisme,

 

rationalisme) was to reject absolutism and to consider

 

the realities of nature and history. Ultimately, Sorel
concluded, the veracity of a scientific explanation must
be determined pragmatically, and he Observed that the
historical study of the sciences would reveal a realm

of relativity and flux.

Georges Sorel was especially disturbed by the use
to which mathematics was directed by sociologists Of his
time. He saw in these applications an attempt to extend
the tools of physics to the study of human relationships
and he rejected the attempt of such sociologists as Emile
Durkheim to thereby produce a more "scientific" study
of human society. Each branch of human knowledge, Sorel
believed, must develop the tools proper to its unique
concerns; and the application of mathematics to the
study Of human relations awakened his concern. In 1895,
he complained that Durkheim had reduced the concept Of
morality to an empirical notion Of frequency: " . . . il

a fondé sa morale . . . sur l'appréciation du degré de

 

94Georges Sorel, "A la mémoire de Cournot," p. 7.
See also Chapter VII, note 39.

 

 

 

 

 

442

généralité."95

This quantitative analysis was Objectionable
to Sorel because he believed it falsely assumed homo-
geneity: "En sociologie i1 n'y a aucune raison pour
supposer que des phenomenes éloignés les uns des autres

96 The

dans le temps et l'eSpace soient homogenes."
authors of such research, Sorel charged, construed their
Observations according to their personal Opinions. Sta-
tistics had a role to play in sociology, Sorel affirmed,
but it was wrong to borrow a nomenclature from physics

and make it the basis Of what he labeled "une sociologie
algébrique." The result Of this approach Sorel wrote in
1900 was to employ the images of mathematics in a realm
Of psychology " . . . sous prétexte de rigueur scientif-

ique, remplacent ce qui est d'une Observation difficile

Ofi méme impossible, qui prétendent expliquer ce qui se

voit par ce qui ne se voit pas."97
In May, 1903, in a letter to Croce, Sorel

Observed that " . . . la sociologie, en voulant traiter

'physiquement' la science sociale, n'aboutit a rien; il

faut se resoudre a considérer les notions avec leur

 

SGeorges Sorel, "Les théories de M. Durkheim,"
p. 4. See Chapter II, note 8.

96Ibid., p. 13. See Chapter II, note 10.

97G. Belot at M. Bernes, Questions de Morale,
p. 18. See also Chapter III, note 23.

 

 

443

98

mobilité et leur variété." In the same year Sorel

published his Introduction a l'économie moderne in which

 

he complained that many sociologists retained a total
faith in the sovereign power of science and who " . . .
s'imaginent la possibilité de déduire des propositions
scientifique des programmes pratique."99 For Sorel this
position was entirely incorrect. It was necessary, he
asserted, that sociology adopt at the outset of its
projects a frankly subjective aspect; that it clearly
understand " . . . ce qu'elle veut faire et qu'elle
subordonne ainsi toutes ses recherches au genre de
solution qu'elle veut préconiser."100 Because Sorel
believed that all classifications and all relationships
established among phenomena depended upon the pursuit Of
a practical goal, he advised that it would be prudent tO
place this goal in evidence. The conceptual approach of
geometry as developed by the ancient Greeks was appro-
priate to the study of unchanging entities but not for
the study of sociological facts. He therefore recom-
mended the rejection Of all systems of sociological

analysis which were not the product of reflection on

 

98Letter to Croce 21 mai 1903.

99Georges Sorel, Introduction a l'économie
moderne, p. 386. See also Chapter IV, note 43}

 

100Ibid. See also Chapter IV, note 44.

 

 

 

 

 

444

institutions, usages and empirical rules having acquired
their final forms through practice. This suggested to
Sorel an essentially historical perspective, " . . . c'est
ce qui se présente 1e dernier dans le monde, qui explique

101

l'antérieur." In a review Of Joseph Lottin's Quételet,

 

statisticien et sociologue Sorel reaffirmed his dissatis-

 

faction with what he considered the abstract approach Of
Durkheim: " . . . aujourd'hui on a peine a comprendre
comment Durkheim peut appeler pathologique ce qui
s'eloigne de la moyenne."102

NO less than science and sociology, the field of
history was visualized by Sorel as a realm Of human
knowledge which posed its own unique requirements. The
purely logical approach seemed unsuitable for the histori-
cal study of the evolution of human institutions. Sorel,
in his study Of Vico in 1896, additionally rejected the
cyclical concept Of an ideal history composed Of an
eternal succession Of political forms. However, because,
as Vico had taught, history was man-made it presented for
Sorel a unique opportunity for human understanding, but
the undertaking required an appreciation of its great

complexity: " . . . Le mouvement historique ne consiste

pas dans un developpement homogéne; on ne peut méme pas

 

lOlIbid., p. 391. See also Chapter IV, note 51-

102Quételet, statisticien et sociologue, reviewed
by Georges Sorel, p. 146.

 

 

 

 

445

dire que les causes produisent des effets immédiate."103

In place of the uniform cyclical evolution envisioned by
Vico, Sorel wrote:

. . . nous avons un enchevétrement d'évolutions,

qui ne sont susceptibles d'aucune definition

générale, parce qu'a un instant donné on les trouve

a tous les moments de leur developpement. Mais les

conditions économiques, les rapports sociaux, tous

les complexus historiques agissent sur ces evolutions

pour favoriser certains développements.104
Disagreeing with Jean Jaures who had written in an essay
entitled "Idéalisme de l'histoire" that " . . . everyone
agreed that the historical movement had a determined
direction," Sorel responded that " . . . doubtless this
assumption could render history intelligible but it was
a falsification."105

Writing in 1905, following his study Of the

historical work of Renan, Sorel elaborated his Objections
to the psychological approach to historical analysis
which reduced history to the actions Of a few great men.
Instead, Sorel wrote, it would be more useful to " . . .
regarde les hommes plutOt comme des porteurs de symbols

106

que comme des créateurs." TO deemphasize the role Of

 

103Georges Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," pp. 930-31.
See Chapter II, note 80.

104Ibid., p. 911.

105Ibid. See Chapter II, note 82.

 

106Georges Sorel, Le systeme historiqge de Renan,
p. 5. See also Chapter IV, note 61.

 

 

 

 

446

single individuals and to recognize the role Of chance
in human events, Sorel believed, would not weaken the
prestige Of historical studies. If there was an order
to be found in the past, Sorel continued, it was an order
which, similar to a calculation of probabilities, could
not be explained but which could only be observed:

. . . c'est la combinaison d'une infinité de

hasards dans le désordre le plus absolu des causes

qui produit l'ordre apparent. Mais tous les

hasards ne se combinent pas de la méme maniere;

c'est ce que savent toutes les personnes ui se

sont occupées du calcul des probabilités. 07
Thus he concluded " . . . c'est toujours du hasard qui
engendre l'histoire."108

The historian, according to Sorel, must constantly

battle against the prejudice of total causality and he
insisted that historical studies could never be exhausted.
He advised the historian to be guided by present needs
when studying the past; the historian, he wrote, should
confine himself to " . . . ce que l'on juge digne
d'interesser et d'instruire le monde moderne."109
Agreeing with Renan, Sorel emphasized the aesthetic

element in historical studies and was surprised to notice

the extent to which professional historians had failed to

 

107Ibid., p. 16. See also Chapter IV, note 69.

108Ibid., p. 20. See also Chapter IV, note 73.

logxbid,, p. 21. See also Chapter IV, note 75.

447

comprehend this: "Ils ne paraissent point savoir que
toutes les regles de la critique n'ont de sens que sous

la reserve que leur application est subordonnée a un

consideration esthétique."llo Writing to Croce in

December, 1905, Sorel Observed:

Les idées que j'ai exposée dans l'Introduction (1e
systeme historique de Renan) . . . ne plaisent p35
aux savants: ’Il leur paraIt scandaleux de regarder
1e jugement esthétique comme la loi cachée de toute
1a critique historique. . . . L'histoire n'est utile
et sérieuse qu'a la condition de bien reconnaitre
son caractere d'art constructif subordonné a des
fins extrascientifiques et dans lequel les faits
sont 1a partie la plus inutile.111

In 1909 in an essay entitled la Révolution_prey-

 

fusienne, Sorel continued his attack on those historians
who wished to explain cataclysmic historical events by
resorting tO the claimed genius of certain great men.
Again accepting the Opinion of Renan, he asserted that
if these protagonists were studied closely, the shadow
which concealed their mediocrity would vanish " . . .
pour montrer que leur prétendu génie est une illusion
engendrée par la gravité des troubles au milieu desquels

ils ont vécu."112 The men of the French Revolution,

 

llOIbid-p p. 27, See also Chapter IV, note 78.

111Letter to Croce December 1905.

112Georges Sorel: La Revolution dreyfusienne,

p. 6. See also Chapter VI, note 33}

 

448

Sorel agreed " . . . ne furent pas grands! ils furent

les ouvriers d'une grande heure."113
Interpretations Of historical developments, Sorel

wrote in 1914, always contained a great deal of subjec-

tivity and he concluded that it was better to admit this

subjective element than to follow "le rationalisme commun"

 

which believed that a "scientific" account of the general
movement of history could be rendered by speculations on

114 It was by a careful

morphological evolutions alone.
study of the past that the inadequacies of these claimed
scientific schools could be discredited, Sorel concluded.
It was paradoxically the historians themselves, he
insisted in 1917, who could provide the most effective
critique of the dogmatisms Of rationalism, logic, natural
right and permanent philosophy by demonstrating that
humanity had historically constructed doctrines whose
value could be measured pragmatically by considering
their utility in terms of duration.115
Thus the realms of human knowledge represented by

science, sociology and history were placed by Sorel in

the context Of the humanly fabricated artificial milieu,

 

ll31bid., p. 4. See also Chapter VI, note 32-

114Georges Sorel, Matériaux d'une théorie du pro-
létariat, p. 13. See also Chapter VIII, note 6.

 

 

115Georges Sorel, "De l'utilité du Pragmatisme,"
p. 462. See also Chapter VIII, note 54.

449

which would admit of no dogmatism and no universally
valid principles. All the discoveries Of human intel-
ligence, he believed, were necessarily limited by the
subjective origins of human Observation. To deny this
condition by asserting universally valid principles,
Sorel rejected as dangerous to the continued life Of
the human species; it suggested to him an Optimism sus-
tained by pride in the face Of a more realistic pessimism
which epistemologically envisioned man as severely limited
to a world of his own fabrication which was enveloped
by an unknowable cosmic milieu. Sorel's reflections on
the limitations of language and his lengthy analysis Of
the impact of what he called myths on human behavior
reinforced his contention that human activity could not
be reduced to a purely logical analysis.

Language, Sorel Observed in 1894, awakened man
to the dual nature--social and individua1--Of human

existence.116

His study Of Vico revealed the ability

of words to acquire authority and to excite even the most
sublime sentiments. He noted how the Greek philosophers
had incorporated many known fragments from ancient poetry

for the purpose of " . . . transportaient a leurs oeuvres

une partie des sentiments que ces fragments avaient

 

116Sorel, D'Aristote a Marx, p. 252.

 

 

450

117 From this he concluded that no philosophical

évoqués."
system could become influential solely on the basis of
the logical value Of its arguments: "Sans doute 1a foi
cherche a se justifier devant la raison; mais les raisons
qui les justifient n'auraient aucune valeur s'il n'exis-
tait pas des états affectifs profonds donnant de la con-
sistance a un commencement de croyance."118
Writing in 1906, Sorel noted the great role which
the " . . . idolatrie des mots joue . . . dans l'histoire
de toutes les ideologies" and he emphasized that ordinary
language " . . . ne saurait suffire pour . . . projette

119 He concluded that

sur les chose une pleine lumiere."
to be effective an ideology must seek to employ means of
expression which could " . . . faire appel a des ensembles
d'images capable d'evoquer en bloc et par la seule
intuition, avant toute analyse réfléchie, la masse des

120 Sorel, who believed that it was an error

sentiments."
to consider clarity Of expression to be synonymous with
truth, asserted that in certain instances words like art

could flourish best in mystery, half-shades, and

 

117Georges Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," p. 940.

118Ibid. See also Chapter II, note 87.

119Georges Sorel, "1a greve générale," p. 260.
See also Chapter V, notes 28, 29.

120Ibid. See also Chapter V, note 30.

 

451

indeterminate outlines. Pointing to the example of
Rousseau, Sorel Observed in 1907 that the lyrical form
Of his writings was the result of "la raison d'art."
Rousseau, Sorel wrote, " . . . cherchait a dire ce qui
lui paraissait 1e mieux convenir a son talent."121
Rousseau, whom Sorel regarded as the most powerful
orator in the French language since Bossuet, Often
replaced reason with eloquence: " . . . ce n'est pas
la science qui determine 1a these a developper, mais
l'art."122
In 1907, Sorel delivered a speech on Marxism in
which he emphasized his conviction that the cult Of dog-
matic adherence to a specifically literal interpretation
Of words " . . . importent peu a celui qui veut aller an

123 And to those writers who had cri-

fond des choses."
ticized Marx for having spoken in "un langage plein
d'images" which they did not consider suitable for
scientific investigation, Sorel expressed a diametrically

opposed view: "Ce sont les parties symboliques, regardées

jadis comme ayant une valeur douteuse, qui répresentent,

 

121Georges Sorel, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 518.
See also Chapter V, note 104.

122Ibid. See also Chapter V, note 105.

 

123Georges Sorel, ”1a decomposition du Marxisme,"
p. 59. See also Chapter VI, note 27.

 

452

124 Henri Bergson

au contraire, 1a valeur de l'oeuvre."
had taught, Sorel concluded, " . . . que le mouvement
s'exprime surtout au moyen d'images que les formules
mythique sont celles dans lesquelles s'enveloppe la
pensée fondamentale d'un philosophe, et que la métaphy—
sique ne saurait se servir du langage qui convient a la

125 Sorel found in Nietzsche, whom he regarded

science."
as one Of the most eminent thinkers the European world
had produced, a thinker especially gifted from a literary
point of View, whose "puissance étonnante de pénétration"
was beyond the understanding of his " . . . contemporains
qui ont perdu l'usage du langage métaphysique."126
Regular discourse and argumentation, Sorel Observed
in 1911, was almost powerless to liberate minds which had
come under the influence of conceptions which appeared
to be sound superficially but which were in fact unfounded.
This intellectual slavery could only be destroyed, Sorel
insisted, by employing a procedure capable Of producing
a powerful experience in which " . . . 1a réalité se
manifesterait en Opposition absolue avec les abstractions

que les masses acceptent comme vérités incontestables."127

 

124Ibid.. p. 50, see also Chapter VI, note 28.

125Ibid. See also Chapter VI, note 29.

 

126Sorel, "Vues sur les problémes de philOSOphie,"
p. 65. See also Chapter VI, note 66.

127Sorel, "Trois problémes," p. 270.

 

453

 

Sorel believed that Thomas More's Utopia was such a work,
and he praised it for having affirmed the triumph of the
aesthetic intuition over what he called "les mécanismes
scolastiques."

Closely related to Sorel's observations on lin- 1
guistics were his persistent speculations on the pro-
pensity of the human mind to be motivated to action by
undemonstrable constructions which he termed myths. The
characteristics of these constructions together with their
individual and social impact were Of recurring interest
to Sorel throughout his writing career. Writing in the

Trial of Socrates in 1889, he took note Of a phenomenon

 

which marked the origins Of his fascination with the human
propensity tO believe the incredible: "D'apres une lOi

de notre nature, nous voulons quelque chose d'indémon-
trable a croire. Le 'credo quia absurdum' appartient a
toutes les époques et a toutes civilisations."128 He
found evidence of the power Of such myths in the Old

Greek polytheism, which in its decline, he believed could
not be reinvigorated by a scientific explanation Of its
myths because " . . . they drew their force from the

freedom with which they had been formed in the national

poetry; to reconcile them was impossible; to explain them

 

128Sorel, 1e proces de Socrate, p. 142. See also
Chapter I, Part 2, note 58.

 

 

 

by
189
nou
conq
impo
he W‘
diri
comm

meme

 

454

by allegory Or by history would destroy them."129 By

1894, writing in an essay entitled "L'Ancienne et la
nouvelle métaphysique" he affirmed the unpredictable and
complex motives of human action which he suspected was
importantly effected by emotional states. Human actions,
he wrote " . . . sont déterminés par l'appétit qui se
dirige vers un bien présent ou vers un bien considéré
comme un futur desirable; l'appétit est subordonné lui-
méme a nos états affectifs au moment de l'action.”130
On the basis Of these Observations, Sorel rejected
the "abstract science" of the sociologists whom he charged
had formulated utopian ideas in the social realm. Con-
demning these practices, he wrote in 1896 that this
state Of mind led to " . . . la purgation complete des
systemes sociaux; l'élimination de tout ce qui est
obscur, imparfait, inintelligible . . . "131 An exces-
sive reliance on the rational and the logical had caused
the utopians to undervalue what Sorel called "une loi

générale de notre imagination créatrice," which he

defined as a pre—rational cognitive process which was

 

129Ibid., p. 278.

130Sorel, QlAristote a Marx, p. 256. See also
Chapter I, Part 3, nOte 4I.

 

l3lsorel, "la science dans l'education," Po 219-

 

455

132 The development

impelled by powerful emotional forces.
of rational cognition, which Sorel attributed to Greek
philosophy, had introduced a new cognitive process but,
Sorel insisted, " . . . 1a logique de l'imagination"
remained capable of dominating the human mind. An intense
emotional excitation he believed could overwhelm the
rational facilities--a phenomenon which he thought
played a vital role in the lives Of children, crowds,
and action-oriented mass movements. To ignore this
dimension Of the human experience would result, Sorel
believed, in an overly abstract and false analysis of
human actions, as he believed had occurred among the
utopian sociologists of the past and the positivists
of his day.

In 1903, Sorel questioned if it would be possible
to furnish an intelligible exposition Of human action

133 He complained

without employing the concept Of myths.
that the philosophers of history had not succeeded in
producing a very clear idea of the considerable role

" . . . que les mythes ont joué dans la pensée humaine."134

Sorel affirmed his conception that an understanding Of

 

132Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," pp. 1022-23.

133sorelv Introduction a l'économie moderne, p. 394.
See also Chapter IV, note 52.

 

134Ibid. See also Chapter IV, note 53.

456

myths was necessary to expose in an exact manner the
conclusions of his own social philosophy which did not
claim to operate according to the rules of scientific
logic. Although the future was for Sorel necessarily
unknowable, man continued to produce speculative con-
structions as if he could project himself into the
future--and these imaginings, Sorel insisted, could have
great efficacy. Such constructions, Sorel regarded as
myths which he defined as " . . . des compositions faites
avec art, en vue de donner un aspect de réalité a des
espoirs sur lesquels s'appuie la conduite présente."135
Among the historical examples which demonstrated the
efficacy Of myths, Sorel emphasized the expectation Of
the early Christians of the return Of Christ and the
ensuing ruin of the pagan world. Although this catas-
trophic event, expected at the end Of the first century,
did not occur, the "mythe apocalyptique" Sorel insisted
was a great value to the early Christian movement. From
this he concluded "Il faut juger les mythes comme des
moyens d'agir sur 1e présent et toute discussion sur la
maniere de les appliquer matériellement sur le cours de

136

l'histoire est dépourvu de sens." In the writings Of

Rousseau, Sorel discovered a similar use of strongly

 

135801'81; Illa gréve générale," p. 263. See also
Chapter V, note 31.

136Ibid., p. 265. See also Chapter V, note 32.

457

colored images utilized for the purpose Of stimulating
among his contemporaries an emotion capable of engender-
ing " . . . des reflexions utiles mais indéterminées,

au sujet de leur maniere de vivre."137

The proper
understanding of the images of Rousseau, Sorel concluded,
required " . . . qu'il faut prendre en bloc, comme des
masses indivisibles et non considérer comme des modeles
proposés a l'empirisme qui en tirera ce qu'il pourra."138

It was an error to believe, Sorel wrote in 1911,
that a more complete development Of rationalism would
diminish the credulity of modern man which on the contrary
he believed was as great as it had been in the ancient
world. Knowledge of the existence Of this prOpensity to
believe should enhance, he speculated, the capacity for
the develOpment of mentally more satisfying constructions
which would recognize the human need for ideas which had
139

" . . . des racines puissantes dans le coeur." In

1912, while reviewing 1a crédibilité et l'apologétique

 

by P. A. Gardeil, Sorel concluded: "L'expérience établit

que les hommes arrivent a des convictions tres fermes,

 

137Sorel, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 531. See
also Chapter V, note 110.

138Ibid. See also Chapter V, note 111.

 

139Sorel, "Sur la magie moderne," p. 4. See
also Chapter VII, note 29.

458

capables de commander souverainement toute leur conduite
par un travail dans lequel l'intelligence discursive joue
un rOle assez atténué."140
The political dimension of Georges Sorel's thought,
including his View of Marxism and Syndicalism, is strongly
colored by his general epistemological assumptions as
well as his appraisal of language and his conception of
the role of myth in human affairs. Antecedent to the
influence of Marx, however, in the speculations Of
Georges Sorel, are his ideas concerning the state and the
historical origins of its domination by men of superior
talent--the intellectuals. Aristotle, according to
Sorel writing in 1889, had proclaimed an almost unlimited
political right to men of genius by insisting that such
men should not be submitted to ostracism, nor should
they be punished or submitted to the common level:
" . . . it remains therefore, Aristotle wrote, to Obey
this man and to recognize in him a perpetual power."141
When this claim was extended to the talented, Sorel
charged, a new oligarchic principle was posed which
served to divide the ancient Greek city into two categories

Of citizens with the result that those who participated

in an elevated intelligence enjoyed a position of special

 

1401a crédibilité et l'apologétiquer reviewed by
Sorel, p. 157-

 

141Sorel, 1e proces de Socrate, p. 197.

 

 

459

privilege. Socrates himself, according to Sorel, had
posed a question which assumed the special claim advanced
in behalf of the wise: "Could a government founded on
the domination of the ignorant over the wise call itself

legitimate?"142

Sorel rejected this claim, and concluded
that the worst of all forms of government was that in
which the rich and the talented shared power. The history
Of the Roman Empire had shown, Sorel Observed agreeing
with Renan, that by proclaiming political mastery for
those talented enough to become rich and powerful,

143 The bias in

inequality was introduced into the law.
favor of the aristocracy Of talent also marked Roman
education, Sorel continued, subordinating everything to
rhetoric, the goal of Roman education was directed to

144 This system of

the formation of "argumentateurs."
education, which Sorel believed was transmitted to the
present by the Christian church because Of its desire to
produce men of talent capable Of producing subtle argu-
ments to counter theological errors, led tO the develop-
ment of a monstrous egotism. The quality Of mind which
made the aristocracy Of talent so dangerous and Objection-

able, Sorel affirmed, was that it never doubted the

legitimacy of its acts.

 

142 143

Ibid., p. 200. Ibid., p. 210.

144Sorel, la ruine du monde antique, p. 70.

 

 

460

Writing in 1898, Sorel Observed that the dis-
tinction between intellectual and manual labor appeared
to him to be entirely arbitrary, and he rejected the
qualitative distinction which he believed was the basis
of the intellectual's claim of the right to possess the
power of the state in late nineteenth century France.145
The true vocation Of the intellectuals, he concluded, was
the exploitation of politics based on "1a hiérarchie des
capacités" the result of which in France had been an
elite professional leadership which had become corrupt,
exploitative and Opportunistic. It was not only the
qualitatively false valuation Of intellectual over manual
labor which had produced this result, according to Sorel.
The history Of the nineteenth century had shown that all
attempts to constitute an administration of state power
independent Of the special interests of factions or
parties had failed--the state could not become, Sorel

146 The state had

concluded, an administrator Of things.
been historically an instrument in the hands of minorities

for the profit Of minorities and he added: "Cette loi

 

145Sorel, "L'avenir socialiste," p. 15. See also
Chapter III, note 10.

146Ibid., pp, 10, 11, 12. See also Chapter III,

note 9.

461

empirique s'explique facilement quand on se rappelle ce
qu'a été 1a possession de l'Etat dans l'histoire
moderne."147
Sorel announced his conclusions with respect to
political parties in 1907 when he Observed that political
parties were coalitions formed for the purpose of Obtain-
ing advantages which would lead to the control Of the
state. The impact Of the introduction of political
parties into a revolutionary movement he believed had
the result that the mass, upon whom the movement depended,
would accept the leadership Of those whose interests were
different from those of the mass. The party leadership
hoped, Sorel wrote, " . . . que les masses leur liveront

148 Party Objectives,

l'Etat, objet de leur convoitise."
Sorel believed, were always directed toward the conquest
Of state power which was to be utilized in behalf Of the
party and its allies. The state, Sorel concluded, was
not an entity to be coveted; it must be abolished, and

to this end he called for an anti-political revolutionary

movement. Scorning the electoral process, Sorel in 1913,

wrote in review of L'artfide tromper, d'intimider et de

 

corrompre l'électeur by Charles Marcault, " . . . les

 

élections ne sont pas établies pour nommer des mandataires

 

147Ibid. See also Chapter III, note 7.

148Sorel, La decomposition du Marxisme, p. 25.
See also Chapter VI, note 15.

 

 

462

du public, mais pour dire quelle faction jouira provi—
soirement des avantages que procure 1e pouvoir."149
Georges Sorel first mentioned Karl Marx in a

letter written to the director of the Revue philosophique

 

in May, 1893. He complained in this letter that certain
French sociologists, especially those who were " . . .

les détenteurs des chairs officielles" such as Gabriel
Tarde, had failed to appreciate the value of the thought
Of Karl Marx and had attempted to dismiss it without
seriously considering its merit. By 1894, Sorel had
completed a study of Marx and concluded that his thought
was Of central importance to an understanding of the con-
temporary world. Marx had conceived Of man, according to
Sorel, in the context Of those activities which were
fundamental to sustain life--man was a worker who in the
attempt to preserve his life had constructed a human
milieu. Writing in 1896, Sorel discussed what he
identified as a central theme in the work Of Karl Marx--
"the liberation of mankind," Sorel wrote, " . . . comporte,
comme premiere condition, une idéale identification de

la matiere et de l'esprit dans 1e milieu artificiel."150

These were the circumstances in which, Sorel added, theory

and practice became united. The importance Of the study

 

149See Chapter VII, Appendix B.

150Sorel, "la science dans 1'Education," Po 457-

 

463

of the productive organs Of social human life, had also
been emphasized by Marx who shared this idea with Vico.’
Marx had taught, Sorel continued, that this study, which
must be confined to the world which was constructed by
mankind in its successive labors, would ” . . . met a nu
1e mode d'action de l'homme vis-a-vis de la nature, 1e
proces de production de sa vie matérielle et, par suite,
l'origine des rapports sociaux et des idées ou con-
ceptions intellectuelles qui en découlent."151
Writing to Croce in 1897, Sorel indicated, how-
ever, that certain aspects Of Marx's thought were
unacceptable: " . . . les formules par lesquelles Marx
a marqué sa position sont tres obscures; mais ce qui me
semble surtout obscur c'est la 'méthode dialectique':
. . . je crois aussi que Marx n'a jamais cherche a pré-

152 He also complained to

ciser sa pensee sur ce point."
Croce in the same year that Engels had made a "dogmatique
absolue" of historical materialism which had led certain
Marxists to think of history as "une évolution fatale"
and he warned that this tendency to regard such doubtful

interpretations as "dogmes indiscutables" was dangerous

to Marxism which " . . . entre les mains des disciples

 

151Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," p. 814. See Chapter
II, note 65.

152Letter to Croce 27 décembre 1897.

 

464

. 153
. . . est devenu une caricature."

By 1898, Sorel
became increasingly preoccupied with the confusion which
he observed between the theories of Karl Marx and the
programs Of the various groups which claimed to be
Marxist. The dogmatic use of Marx, he concluded, was

a misrepresentation: "Il ne faut pas, non plus, croire
que tous les fruits du labeur de Marx puissent se résumer
en quelques lambeaux de phrases ramassées dans ses
oeuvres, réunies en formulaire dogmatique et commentées
comme des textes évangeligues par des théologiens."154
In place of this religious devotion to certain aspects

of the writings of Marx, Sorel recommended an extension

of his ideas and a rejection of Engel's fatalistic
interpretation of historical materialism which had
falsified Marx's concept of the interplay between
economics and the other realms of human life. The mode

of production of material life, Sorel insisted, dominated
in general, but did not determine, the development of
social political and intellectual life: " . . . l'organi-

K

sation éconimique dOit étre considerée, a la fois comme

effet et comme cause."155

 

153Letter to Croce (2 juin 1897) (27 decembre 1897)

154Sorel, "l'avenir socialiste," p. 5. See also
Chapter III, note 2.

lsslbid., p, 7. See also Chapter III, note 4-

 

465

In 1899, Sorel published an essay entitled
"L'ethique du Socialisme" in which he complained that
the followers of Marx in their battles against their
adversaries had Often ridiculed ethical preoccupations
while placing all of their emphasis on the material side
of the argument. These Marxists had ignored the moral

basis of the mission of Marx by concentrating only on

 

the victory of the proletariat and ignoring the ethical
qualities of the conflict. Marx, on the contrary, Sorel
insisted, had been strongly interested in class conflict
which resulted in the introduction of new moral concepts
and thus had praised the struggle for the 10-hour work
day for women and children in England as " . . . pas
seulement un succés pratique, que ce fut 1e triomphe
d'un principe, qu'une nouvelle conception de l'économie

156 For Sorel

avait été introduite dans la société."
class conflict had an important bearing on judicial
systems in that it represented a battle between two
principles characterized by the idea that each class
had of the role Of law. The failure to recognize the
moral dimension Of class conflict caused Sorel to con-
clude: "Il y a une lacune grave dans l'éthique

157

socialiste." Writing to Croce in 1898, he Observed,

 

15650re1, "L'ethique du socialisme," Po 286-
See also Chapter III, note 34.

157Ibid., p. 294, See also Chapter III, note 39.

466

" . . . les questions sur la morale ne peuvent plus etre
traitées avec le dédain des anciens marxistes."158
The crisis of Marxist Socialism represented by
the debate between Bernstein and Kautsky was for Sorel a
confrontation between dogmatism and revision. Bernstein
had, Sorel believed, invited socialists to disregard
strict formula and revive Marxism by looking toward the
future. Kautsky was, Sorel wrote, "le conservateur des
vieux symboles, 1e défenseur des vieilles abstractions,
. . . il ne faut pas se dissimuler que le triOmphe de M.
Kautsky voudrait dire la ruine definitive du marxisme."159
In a letter to Croce in 1898 he Observed: "Il faut que
le socialisme marche dans le voie reconnue bonne par
Bernstein, ou qu'il devienne une simple scolastique."160
This hardening of Marxism into a scholastic dogma
together with the development Of permanent and influ-
ential parliamentary Socialist parties were both viewed
by Sorel as serious threats to the revolutionary potential
of Marxism. Instead of building a doctrinaire political

party which Sorel believed would necessarily degenerate

into a quest by the party elite for possession Of the

 

158Letter to Croce 1 avril 1898.

159Georges Sorel, "Les polémiques," p. 45. See
also Chapter III, note 54.

160Letter to Croce 9 mai 1898.

 

467

power of the state, Sorel proposed that " . . . il faut
procéder a un revision rigoureuse de la doctrine laisse
par Marx et Engels."161
What remained essential in Marx, according to
Sorel, was his conception of a social mechanism formed
by classes whose conflict would transform society. This
did not mean, Sorel insisted, that the battle Of classes
could explain all history and he attacked Engels for
attempting to replace real history with a succession of
forms engendered by causes independent of human action;
and he concluded: " . . . i1 n'y a rien de déterminé

dans l'histoire."162

The future, Sorel reaffirmed, was
necessarily unknown " . . . nous ne connaissons pas le
mécanisme sociale qui existera dans un certain nombre
d'années et nous ne pouvons déja que tres difficilement

163 In the present, Sorel

raisonner sur le présent."
viewed the pursuit of purely material ends as a great
danger to Marxist Socialism because he feared that to
seek these ends exclusively would deliver the movement

into the control Of the political opportunists. Only by

emphasizing the moral dimension of class conflict--and by

 

161Salverio Merlino, Formes et essence du
Socialisme, preface by Sorel, p. III. See also Chapter
III, note 55.

 

 

leIbid., p. x, See also Chapter III, note 61.

163Ibid., p. XI. See also Chapter III, note 63.

468

making of the proletariat "le champion de tous les
intéréts généraux contre les intéréts particuliers" . . .
Sorel concluded, could socialism initiate a new social
organization. Marx had believed that trade unions were
the first foundations of the proletarian edifice but he
had failed to appreciate, Sorel asserted, their indispen-

164 The trade

sable role Of "la preparation juridique."
unions, Sorel concluded, must not exist primarily to
raise wage levels but should serve to develop sentiments
of mutuality and solidarity which could become the
functioning basis of the institutions of the future.

By 1906, Sorel believed that Socialism was
threatened by an anti-Marxist transformation caused by
the political participation Of contemporary Socialist
parties. This political development, Sorel believed,
would make the fulfillment of Marx's call to " . . .
rompre tout lien avec l'idéologie des temps actuel"165
an impossibility. Against this tendency Sorel reiterated
his conviction that for the proletariat to complete its
revolutionary goal it must become insulated from "la
pensée bourgeoise." It was thus vital, in Sorel's View,

that the opposition between the bourgeoisie and the pro-

letariat be maintained. Marx had taught, according to

 

164Ibid., p. XIX. See also Chapter III, note 66.

165Sorel, "Réflexions sur la violence," Po 43-
See also Chapter V, note 7.

469

Sorel, that the preparation of the proletariat for its
revolutionary mission " . . . dépend uniquement de
l'organisation d'une resistance obstinée, croissante et
passionée contre l'ordre de choses existant."166
For Sorel the Socialist movement was both a
revolt and an organization. Thus while he admired the
theoretical power of the insights which Karl Marx
develOped, he complained Of Marx's inability to formulate
a clear picture of how the proletariat could attain the
degree of maturity requisite to its emancipating
revolution. Writing in 1898, he speculated that the
form of this needed organization must be federalist and
he praised Durkheim for having pointed out the importance
of such social entities while at the same time rejecting
Durkheim's belief that such groups should remain ” . . .

167 Precisely

soumises a l'action général de l'Etat."
to avoid coming under the domination of a state, Sorel
believed, the proletariat must develop its own internal
structure. The Syndical organization, which Sorel came
to advocate as the mechanism of revolutionary preparation

for the proletariat, must reject, he believed, outside

guidance if the capacity for self-direction were tO be

 

166Sorel, "la gréve générale," p. 277. See also
Chapter V, note 36.

16750re1, "L'avenir socialiste," p. 10. See also
Chapter III, note 8.

470

fulfilled: " . . . c'est dans le sein du proletariat,
C'est un moyen de ses ressources prOpres, que doit se

créer le droit nouveau."168

In the struggle between the
Syndicate and the state which he envisioned, Sorel
insisted on the need for solidarity and unity among

the proletariat: the totality of workers, he wrote,

. . . forme un corps; les intéréts de tous sont soli-

daires."169

The goals pursued by the Syndicats, he
believed, must be general; their ends were not to be
egoistic; they did not seek exclusive privilege. The
socially divisive capitalistic categories of buyer and
seller must be replaced by a new social concept of
mutuality. The Syndicalist organization, Sorel believed,
would complete Marx's theory of class conflict by pro-
viding the mechanism which would insure that "union of
minds and hearts" which for Marx was the most fully

170 By producing its

developed characteristic of a class.
own moral sentiments based on mutuality, the Syndicalist
proletariat could enhance the Opposition between the

existing law and its new morality, an Opposition which

Sorel believed was the driving force Of the entire

 

168Ibid., p. 18. See also Chapter III, note 133.

169Ibid. See also Chapter III, note 11.

 

170Sorel, "L'ethique du socialisme," p. 288.
See also Chapter III, note 35.

 

471

Socialist movement. Change was forthcoming, Sorel wrote,
when men reflect upon the disparity between their moral
sentiments and the statements of judicial regulations:

" . . . i1 arrive toujours des cas ofi les plaintes de
l'individu Opprimé nous semblent plus sacrées que les
traditions, les nécessités de l'ordre et les principes

171 The Object of Syndi-

sur lesquels repose la société."
calism, Sorel concluded, must not be a partial emanci-
pation of the proletariat, it must remain Opposed to the
maintenance of all traditional claims to special title,

it was a battle for the abolition of all government by
class.

Georges Sorel's Syndicalist revision Of Marxism
was the outcome of his reflections on the historical
development of human morality. To the natural rights
tradition which he believed was attached to the liberal
bourgeoisie and associated with the French Revolution, he
Opposed the concept Of historical right which had been
developed, he believed, under the influence Of Karl Marx.
"The Socialists are materialists, he observed in 1896,
in the sense that they do not believe in the march of
humanity toward, " . . . la Lumiere divine, vers l'Esprit,

ou toute autre expression de l'actualité de la Vérité et

 

1711bid., p. 291, See also Chapter III, note 36.

472

de la Justice."172

The general terms "justice" and
"truth" were classifications based on convenience and
not universal truths, Sorel concluded, they signified
that which had been constructed by mankind in its suc—
cessive labors. Thus for Sorel the development Of moral
concepts was a historical phenomena which belonged to
the heritage of the human species. It was necessary to
proceed, he believed, on the basis Of the accumulated
experience Of the past, toward an enlargement of this
moral heritage and he warned that it would be criminal
to undertake a social revolution which " . . . aurait
pour résultat de mettre en péril le peu de moralité

existant."173

Rejecting Durkheim's conclusion that
preconceived methods for moralizing the people had been
largely ineffective, Sorel sought to introduce a mechanism
of moral preparation for the proletariat. For Sorel the
question was not " . . . de savoir quelle est la meilleure
morale, mais seulement de determiner s'il existe un
mécanisme capable de garantir le développement de la

174

morale." Syndicalism, he believed, could become the

necessary mechanism, and to this extent it represented

 

172Sorel, "L'idéalisme de M. Brunetiere," Po 515-

173Sorel, "L'avenir socialiste," p. 28. See also
Chapter III, note 17.

174Ibid. See also Chapter III, note 18.

 

 

473

the addition of an explicitly moral dimension to the
Marxian conception of class conflict. Socialism, he
insisted, " . . . se pose devant le monde bourgeois comme
un adversaire irréconciliable, le menagant d'une catas-
trOphe morale; plus encore que d'une catastrophe matér-

"175 Writing to Croce in 1899, Sorel noted the

ielle.
extent to which he had altered the system of Marx: "Je

vous ai envoyé hier ma conférence sur l'Ethique du

 

socialisme; j'ai un peu moralisé Marx et Engels, peut-

 

étre; je crois qu'ils n'ont jamais beaucoup réfléchi a

ses questions; mais je crois avoir développé mes these

dans un esprit marxiste."176
Because of Sorel's conception of the state as a

power center for which all political parties contested

and which served as the bases for the exploitation of

that power by corrupt minorities, he rejected the par-

liamentary Socialists as treacherous traitors. Class

conflict, he believed, was necessary for the insulation

Of the proletariat during the period Of its moral prepar-

ation. Parliamentary Socialists who Offered the proletariat

material amelioration represented for Sorel the greatest

threat to the development Of a new social order which he

175Salverio Merlino, Formes et essence du
socialisme, preface by Sorel, p. XLII. See also Chapter
III, note 68.

 

 

176Letter to Croce 27 mai 1899.

474

hoped would displace hierarchy and divisive individualism
with mutuality and cooperation. He concluded that the
opposition Of the classes was indispensible to the
workers movement. TO this end, Sorel believed, Socialism
must disavow the search for the means of leading the
bourgeoisie to an enlightened sense Of a superior law and
concentrate instead on finding the means of defending the
revolutionary role of the proletariat. Instead of con-
fusing such concepts as class conflict by adhering at

the same time to ideas of national solidarity and sacred
patriotic duty, as Sorel charged the parliamentary
Socialists had done, the Syndicalist, he believed, must
find the means to clarify and emphasize the oppositions
between the classes. Yet ordinary language, he believed,
" . . . ne saurait suffire pour produire de tels
résultats; i1 faut faire appel a des ensembles d'images
capables d'evoquer 'en bloc et par la seule intuition,‘
avant toute analyse réfléchie, la masse des sentiments
qui correspondent aux diverses manifestations de la
guerre engagée par le socialisme contre la société

moderne."177

A social myth--the drama Of the general
strike, Sorel concluded, would serve this purpose per-
fectly because " . . . l'idée de gréve générale est si

bien adaptée a l'ame ouvriere qu'elle peut la dominer

 

177Sorel, "la greve générale," p. 260. See also
Chapter V, note 34.

475

de la maniere la plus absolue et ne laisser aucune place
aux désirs que peuvent satisfaire les parlements."l78
The ardent sentiment of revolt necessary to proletarian
solidarity would be strengthened by the myth Of a catas-
trophic general strike which could make Of every conflict
a symptom Of a state of war and through it every strike
would " . . . engendre la perspective d'une catastrophe

totale."179

Thanks to the myth of the general strike,
Sorel believed, the necessary line Of class cleavage
would never be in danger of disappearing because at each
instant the proletarian would imagine " . . . that he
had been transported into a future such that present
events could be considered as elements in a long develop-
ment."180
The struggle of the proletariat was, according
to Sorel, actively resisted by a class which had the
power Of the state at its disposal. The operations of
the police, proscriptions, and what he called "servile
courts" were for Sorel examples of the use Of force to

maintain the status quo, and he deplored "1a superstition

du Dieu-Etat" which for both the bourgeoisie and the

 

178Ibid., p. 253, See also Chapter V, note 33.

l791bid.v p. 275, See also Chapter V, note 37.

180Sorel, "Réflexions sur la violence," p. 6.
See also Chapter V, note 12.

 

476

parliamentary Socialists, he charged, had resulted in the
justification of political prosecutions in the name Of
"la raison d'Etat." Sorel distinguished between these
acts of proscription and proletarian violence which were,
he believed, " . . . purement et simplement des actes

de guerre" carried out without hate and without the

181

spirit of vengeance. Acts of proletarian violence,

 

he insisted, must be the expression of class conflict to
have historical value, their goal was to defend the
separation of the classes without which Socialism would
be unable to fulfill its historical mission. Thus Sorel
considered violence from the standpoint of its influence
on social theory as an agent for the maintenance Of

" . . . la scission des classes qui est la base de tout

182 He rejected unlimited violence as a

le socialism."
danger to morality, and stressed that in violent confron-
tations "the defeated were not to be killed and non-
combattants were not to be made to suffer."183
The foregoing analysis represents my synthetic

view of the intellectual career of Georges Sorel. Its

 

181Sorel, "les préjuges contre la violence,"
p. 161. See also Chapter V, note 25.

182Sorel, "la moralité de la violence," p. 36.
See also Chapter V, note 48.

18350re1, "les préjugés contre la violence," p. 161.
See also Chapter V, note 25.

 

477

sole claim to validity resides upon the extent to which
it can be verified by the documents which I have studied.
There is another equally valid experience Of Sorel's
thought, one which perhaps he would have considered more
important than the synthetic recapitulation which I have
attempted. Sorel wanted to stimulate thought. He wished
to stir the reader to personal speculation. I have
attempted to retain this aspect Of Sorel's work by pre- -’
senting a sufficiently detailed documentary analysis to
provide the needed context for an appreciation of his
habits Of mind.

I believe, however, that it is useful to proceed
beyond an isolated experience of a Sorel idea which might
provoke the birth Of introspection which he characterized
as the kindling of a mental fire, to a conception of the
essentials of his thought as a whole, based on a
methodology which could inspire the confidence that the
ultimate synthesis is not unrelated to the documentary
evidence. This formulation is prerequisite to an evalu-
ation Of the secondary literature on Sorel and must pre-
cede any attempt tO criticize his thought if the cri-
ticism is to have the minimal validity of corresponding

to the reality Of his mind.

478

Part 2

Secondary#Accounts

 

Irving Louis Horowitz, Radicalism and the Revolt Against
Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel (New York:
The Humanities Press, 1961).

 

 

Irving Horowitz based his attempt "to gain
entrance into Sorel . . . through an investigation of
his cultural milieu. . . . " upon the doubtful assumption
that "intellectual epochs have distinctive features by
which they are known to all" (p. 5). The evidence which
supports such a contention is not provided. The enormous
task Of constructing the cultural milieu (what Horowitz
called "fin de siecle") is thus pursued simultaneously
with the attempt to locate Sorel's ideas within this
complex. The unfortunate results of this approach, which
does not seek the milieu through the writings of Sorel,
but seeks, almost by intuition, Sorel through the milieu--
are numerous. Horowitz wrote: "Violence in all its forms
was sanctioned. . . . For Sorel, the rules of war, which
really came down to the absence of rules, were to govern
the conduct and the aims of the general strike" (p. 32).
This falsification of Sorel's doctrine is only the first
of many. An example Of the extent to which this milieu
approach is deflected from a study of Sorel concerns the
Horowitz treatment Of the influence of Bergson on Sorel.

He wrote: "Whether Sorel took only fragments from

 

479

Bergson, applying them in patchwork fashion to meet his
own intellectual needs, or simply viewed Bergson's doc-
trine of the unconscious as a necessary pre-condition of
a rounded political philosophy is a critical issue only
if a causalist sequence Of moving from idea to idea is
considered a completely valid criterion" (p. 41). What-
ever the meaning of such confused reasoning, Horowitz

decided to let Jacques Maritain (la Philosophie Berg-

 

sonienne) Speak for Sorel: "What Maritain says Of Berg-

 

sonism is assuredly no less the case for Sorel" (p. 42).
What Sorel himself had written was incredibly dismissed:
"The comments of Sorel and Bergson upon one another are,
after all, in the nature of afterthoughts" (p. 42).
This methodology resulted in an utterly false conclusion
about the relationship between Bergson and James in

Sorel's thought: "De l'utilite du pragmatisme is a

 

statement Of staunch support for James at the expense

of Bergson" (p. 43). When the question Of Bergson and
Sorel becomes unanswerable for Horowitz, there is always
recourse to the cultural milieu. "Whether Sorel would
have developed his political sociology in quite the same
way independent Of Bergson is an issue of little portent.
It is enough to say that both were responding to a
cultural milieu" (p. 43). But the milieu, which is to
provide understanding Of Sorel, takes on characteristics

very opposed to his thought: "The quest for certainty

 

480

informed the spirit of the age" (p. 44). Despite the
fact that Sorel's epistemology would refute any con-
nection with such a quest for certainty cannot be known
from an analysis which considers the milieu as a primary
source.

I believe that this study exemplifies the potential
dangers of a milieu approach which Offers itself as a tool
of analysis for the thought of Georges Sorel. This does
not deny the potential value of such a general study, but
the object of a work which attempts to encompass an
epoch is, I believe, necessarily destructive Of the
concrete individuality of its component individual parts.
I suggest that if such a milieu were to be constructed
for the purpose of knowing Sorel it would be rigidly
confined to the references which occur in Sorel's writings.
Are not these the verifiable elements Of Sorel's intel-
lectual milieu? On the basis Of what methodology could
other ideas than those which he elaborated be included?

These questions about procedure are vital when
a work such as this by Irving Horowitz sets out to produce
a milieu analysis Of Sorel while failing tO comprehend
the dominant role of major influences in Sorel's work.
Perhaps this explains Horowitz's failure to present the
epistemological significance of Sorel's own ideas on
milieux: artificial and natural. The influence Of

Proudhon, Renan, Taine, and Poincaré are left to the side

 

481

in a study which seems preoccupied with larger evalu-
ations. I cannot evaluate the milieu which Horowitz
ultimately produced in so far as it concerns thinkers
and intellectual historical movements other than those
which directly and specifically occurred in the writings
Of Georges Sorel. I do believe, however, that the
thought of Sorel is sacrificed by such an approach.
Horowitz's citations alone show the extent to which
Sorel's own work has been limitedly represented.

James H. Meisel, The Genesis of Georges Sorel (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: The George Wahr Publishing CO., 1951).

 

Georges Sorel is "the man who introduced the term
'myth' into the language of political science" according
to James Meisel (p. 15). But, Meisel added, if he him-
self has become the object of mythification, . . . that
is partly his own fault. . . . Sorel did his worst to
confuse the reader" (p. 16). In Meisel's ensuing list
of those who influenced the development Of Sorel's thought
the name of Henri Poincare is notably absent, as is any
reference to Sorel's study entitled "The Preoccupations
Of Modern Physics." This oversight perhaps stems from
the absence of any attention directed by Meisel to the
epistemological basis upon which Sorel's thought appears
to rest. Thus while having produced the most thoroughly
documented analysis Of Sorel's original writing cur-

rently available, Meisel remained confused about the

 

482

direction of Sorel's thought. "Is it necessary," he
wrote, "to insist that a servant of so many masters is
most likely to be the servant of none? There still
remains, of course, the possibility that Georges Sorel,
while able to digest his immense erudition, still did not
succeed in giving his own work the unity on which we
insist in an author even if we grant him the right to
mercurial changes and protean restlessness" (p. 17).
Meisel concluded: "In order to understand his thought
one must search with him, grope with him" (p. 17).

That the searching and groping yielded no concluding
synthesis, Meisel attributed to Sorel's defects as a
writer: " . . . the diffusion Of interests and the
difficulty of streamlining the evidence are not the only
Obstacles that make it so hard to penetrate through the
crowd of Sorels tO Sorel. The truth will out; he was
not a good writer" (p. 17). A reading of Meisel against
the background of a thorough familiarity with the docu-
ments which Sorel produced suggests, however, that the
inconclusiveness of his lengthy study may be attributed
to an unsound methodology. The "crowd of Sorels" which
the body of Sorel's writings produce, can be seen from a
perspective which allows a coherent and synthetic state-
ment, as I believe my study has demonstrated. Meisel
mixed these primary Sorels with visions of Sorel which

emerged from distinctly secondary accounts without

483

suggesting to his reader (and perhaps to himself) the
need to assign qualitatively different values to such
very different sources. The second difficulty which I
believe prevents this study from being as valuable as

its prodigious research would seem to justify is the
vitiating effect of Meisel's distracting and facile
editorializing. Georges Sorel is not allowed to state
his ideas with sufficient context to allow the reader to
discover the movement of his provocative mind or the true
direction Of his ideas. For example Sorel's important
study on Vico is misrepresented by Meisel as a dialectic
between Vico and Marx: "His preoccupation with Marx

. . . colors the whole essay and adds to it . . . a
fourth dimension. Marx and Vico are pitted against one
another, with Sorel reaping the benefit" (p. 67). A
study Of Sorel's essay on Vico does not support such an
Observation, and the Observation itself distracts the
reader from an evaluation of Sorel based on an examination
of his writings, an examination which Meisel had promised
would lead to "the actual Sorel . . . by discovering his
totality in the very diffusion Of his authentic outpour-
ings" (p. 47). Had Meisel followed the dictates of his
own methodology, and had he resisted the unqualified
mixing of secondary sources and his own premature judg-
ments perhaps the reader would have discovered the uni-
fying threads which I believe are apparent in Sorel's

unadulterated words.

484

The lack of any comprehension of direction in
Sorel's thought unhappily effects Meisel's selections
from Sorel's letters to Croce. I suggest that this
difficulty could have been avoided had Meisel conducted
a thorough study Of Sorel's complete works prior to the
attempt to select from the Croce letters those items for
inclusion in his analysis. If this procedure, which has
proven useful to my work, had been adopted, much of the
irrelevant detail which now Obfuscates those sections of
Meisel's book devoted to the correspondence could have
been better evaluated. Instead the letters are weakened
by the apparent lack Of criterion for selection which
resulted in the inclusion Of lengthy accounts Of Sorel's
technical problems with editors and translations, the
state of his health and the unchecked urge on the part
of Meisel to editorialize: "Like the German Thomas Mann
. . . ," Meisel observed while introducing a letter from
Sorel to Croce, "Sorel, the Frenchman from Germanic Nor-
mandy, fights against the type Setterbrini who wants to
make the world safe for his supposedly superior Latin
civilization" (p. 194).

Meisel, whose bibliographical work on Sorel was
excellent, thus failed to present an account of "the
genesis Of Georges Sorel" in spite of his enormous
research primarily, I believe, because he did not

rigorously follow the empirical methodology which he

485

believed had served as the basis Of his analysis. Had

he been more faithful to this technique which he
announced as "a chronological treatment of Sorel's

works" (p. 47) he might have discovered in the complexity
of Sorel's thought "the essential unity Of purpose" which
he believed "informed his writings" (p. 47).

Richard Humphrey, Georges Sorel Prophet Without Honor
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

 

I believe that this study is the most complete
and accurate account Of the thought Of Georges Sorel
which I have read. Its weaknesses are the result Of a
desire on the part Of Humphrey to place Sorel's ideas in
a larger intellectual historical context which is skill-
fully drawn though over categorical. His understanding
Of many of Sorel's concepts, however, seems quite justi-
fied to me, and the depth Of analysis is impressive.

The most suspect chapter is entitled "Philosophy Of Syn-
dicalism" which fails to establish Sorel's position with
respect to the state and the roots of his attitude toward
intellectuals who exploit state power through political
parties. The moral basis of the anti-political Syndi-
calist movement which Sorel believed could derive from
the mechanism of Syndicalism is also overlooked. The
intensely anti-individualist position of Sorel is also
misrepresented by Humphrey who believed that Sorel wanted

the proletariat "aroused to a passionate sense of

486

individualism by the revolutionary myth" (p. 209). In
fact Sorel believed Syndicalism was a moral mechanism

and would produce an anti-individualist ethic Of mutuality
and cooperation. The myth was needed for solidarity and
was to serve as a faith in the catastrophy. Humphrey also
ignored Sorel's persistent preoccupation with the
historical nature of morality and the conflict between
established legal systems and the moral dispositions which
serve as the basis upon which legalisms come to seem
inadequate: Sorel viewed this as a dynamic for change
which caused him to visualize class conflict in highly
moralistic terms. Humphrey does not discuss these ideas.

Nor does this work develop Sorel's linguistic
observations which together with his epistemological
position shed important light on an accurate understanding
Of myth. There are also no references to Sorel's Obser-
vations on history and sociology as realms of human
knowledge nor to the important role Of pessimism which
Sorel expresses so often.

Therefore, although the work is the most accurate
exposition to date of certain Of Sorel's ideas, it fails
to suggest the depth and breadth of his interests.
Documentation hardly intrudes on the rapid and thus
artificial flow of ideas attributed to Sorel which, with
the limitations I have noted, while faithful to the sub-

stance of parts of Sorel's thought does not Offer the

487

reader any frame of reference from which to judge their
accuracy and from which to experience the characteristic
movement of Sorel's seemingly insatiable mind. In
Humphrey's work, the reader must be content to listen.
There is no opportunity to search and evaluate.

Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. by T. E.

Hulme and J. Roth with an Introduction by Edward A. Shils
(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950).

 

It is unfortunate that the English translation
Of the collections of essays which formed Sorel's

Reflections on Violence were introduced by an author so

 

unschooled in Sorel's thought as Edward Shils. His obser-
vations on the structure Of Sorel's thought and the
assumptions upon which it was based are great Obstacles
to an evaluation of the essays for which this intro-
duction was to have prepared the reader. Nothing could
be more distant from Sorel than the following unsub-
stantiated assertions: "The (radical socialist) belief
that there would come about a total and drastic trans-
formation of society that would bring with it a total
alleviation of life's ills . . . " (p. 14). "Their
Opposition has been derived from a feeling Of being out-
side the existing society. They have felt little or no
kinship with the rest of society. . . . This view is
well embodied in the doctrine Of 'art for art's sake.‘

. . . In Sorel, this political separatism reached its

488

highest point" (p. 16). This spate of analysis fails to
comprehend Sorel's View of the artificial milieu outside
Of which man did not exist. It ignores his respect for
tradition which was the origin of morality, and the con-
cept Of historical right. It ignores his View Of the
proletariat as champion Of all sections and all classes.
It fails to appreciate his View of mutuality. Separatism
was part of the class dynamic for Sorel--it did not assert
the assumption that " . . . moral duty entails in sub-
stance, hostility tO those outside one's grouP" (P. 17).
The overstatements continue: "Sorel's ethic . . . is the
ethic of crisis which is resolved ultimately only by an
apocalyptic transformation in which everything is totally
changed" (p. 18). Had Shils been aware Of Sorel's concept
that change occurs in the open tension between judicial
rules and emerging moral ideas and had he understood

that separatism was viewed as necessary for that moral
preparation, and that the apocalyptic myth merely sus-
tained the conflict between two moral entities, he would
perhaps not have so completely misunderstood the political
thought Of Sorel. The idea of total change is distant
from all of Sorel's assumptions. The distortions con-
tinue: "His hatred of professional intellectuals, moti-
vated by his hatred of whatever was rationalistic, instru-
mental and isolated from the tribal round Of life, has

sharpened our eyes to the moral cleavage between the

489

modern professional intellectual and primary insti-
tutions" (p. 21). Was Sorel's fear of the intellectuals
really motivated by his hatred of whatever was rational-
istic? What impression is such an assertion likely to
create in the mind of a reader who has not been made
aware of Sorel's epistemological assumptions? Is this
an introduction to the thought of Sorel or an attack on
a completely straw man?

In spite of Sorel's later writings, which were
distinctly anti-authoritarian and undogmatic, Shils,
ignoring the context of Sorel's writings attempted to
discredit Sorel by association: " . . . he collaborated
in a number Of extremist authoritarian reviews, to which
monarchists, nationalists, militarists and anti-democrats
and anti-humanitarians of all sorts contributed" (P. 25).
What did Sorel write during this period? What were his
concrete Views, proposals, observations? What of his

resignation from L'Indépendence precisely because he

 

would not be dictated tO by Paul Bourget and Maurice
Barres? These details are pushed to the side by Shils who
continues his guilt by association attack: "Paul Bourget
and Maurice Barres," he wrote, "two of the most extreme
traditionalist authoritarians and nationalists in France,

were on the editorial council of L'Indépendence Of which

 

Sorel was co-editor from 1911 to 1913" (p. 25). Sorel

died in 1922, Shils concluded " . . . a little before

490

the march on Rome by his Italian admirers and their
barbarous cohorts" (P. 26). The conclusion to this

preparation for a reading of Reflections on Violence

 

charged that

Sorel gave moral legitimacy to the characteristic
procedures Of apocalyptic politics . . . extremists
and dissidents of every sort have found something
congenial in his writings. . . . Reflections on
Violence discloses a morally and politicaIly per-
nicIOus standpoint. Its republication in America
. . . will have its justification if it makes us
aware of the many ways in which the present
political attitudes and actions of those who
place themselves on the side Of the free society
are corrupted by the apocalyptic View of history
and society. (p. 29)

 

 

A more tragically inept introduction to the thought Of

Georges Sorel would be hard to imagine.

Preston King, Fear of Power, AnjAnalysis Of Anti-Statism
in Three French Writers—TFrank Cass and CO.,19677}

 

 

This study of Tocqueville, Proudhon and Sorel
is confined in the case of the latter to an elaboration
of Sorel's concept Of Syndicalism. It properly indi-
cates Sorel's rejection Of the notion Of inevitable pro-
gress but does not indicate the vital epistemological
basis of his sense of indeterminancy. This causes an
immediate failure Of interpretation when Preston King
asserted that " . . . Sorel preached that a proletarian
revolution could be made inevitable by inducing the pro-
letariat to accept the frank myth of its inevitability"
(p. 75). On the contrary, Sorel always insisted that

the myth acted on the present, its fulfillment was

491

unknowable and certainly not inevitable. The future was
always unknown and chance played an enormous role in
human affairs. The myth of the imagined future was to
be efficacious on the present. Nothing could make,
according to Sorel, the future inevitable.

Once again, failing to appreciate Sorel's epis-
temology and its inherent pessimistic conclusions, Preston
King draws a false conclusion " . . . Sorel could not
logically escape belief in the idea of progress" (p. 75).
Had King understood Sorel's view of logic in the context
of the artificial milieu this statement might not have
been made. The balance of the essay on Sorel is confined
to the political dimension of his thought, which is
largely confined to his writings on Syndicalism, as
contained in the essays which compose Reflections on
Violence. The elaboration of Sorel's thought over this
ground appears to be accurate but the conclusion which
Preston King draws is highly suspect. "Sorel was . . .
very like Michael Bakunin, who was more enamoured Of
revolutionary upheaval as an activity than as a vehicle
of reform" (p. 91). For Sorel who constantly affirmed
the value of tradition and the historical development Of
human morality, the application of Syndicalism to
Marxian class conflict was the addition of a mechanism
for preparing among the proletariat the development Of

an ethic of mutuality and cooperation. He sought

492

through the dynamic of myth to insulate this mechanism
such that it could develop an ethical alternative to the
present system. The end he sought was not revolutionary
activity per se but rather the reverse of Preston's
observation appears true: he sought a vehicle of reform.

Michael Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel,
Barres, and Maurras (Princeton University Press, 1959).

 

 

Sorel so decidedly anti-individualist, whose
conception of human life was one of cooperation which
emphasized the role of past generations in the accumu-
lation of human works within the man-made artificial
milieu hardly fits the characterization which Michael
Curtis assigns him in the introduction Of his highly
suspect analysis: "Sorel," Curtis wrote, " . . .
stressed the importance of individual action" (p. 7).
"The need for dictatorship," he continued, " . . . the
stress on action, even purposeless action, the cult of
energy, the concept of the elite . . . even the idea
of national socialism-~all are to be found in the works
of the three (Sorel, Barres, Maurras) writers" (p. 8).
All that is lacking to make this convincing is the docu-
mentary evidence, which had it been sought by Curtis
would have revealed that Sorel did not advocate dictator-
ship--his work is distinctively anti-authoritarian; Sorel

did not advocate purposeless action or national socialism.

493

Sorel for Curtis was a confusing unsystematic
thinker: "It is not every book on economic problems, he

complained, that ends as did Sorel's Introduction a

 

l'économie moderne, with a disquisition on suffering"

 

(p. 52). Thus Sorel's essay which presented the ultimate
conclusions of his epistemological valuations was irrele-
vant to Curtis who considered Sorel's work from a con-
descending perspective: "All his writings were rough
drafts for a book he never wrote" (p. 52). The ensuing
discussion of Sorel by Curtis was not as superficial as
this remark might indicate. He presents an accurate
account of Sorel's political views and understands the
concept of myth as Sorel presented it. The attempt tO
draw Sorel together with Barres and Maurras is often
renounced and special exceptions are given for the dis-
cussions which develOp Sorel's ideas. As a study which
suggests the unity and breadth of Sorel, this work is a
failure. His ideas are presented out Of the context of
their reliance upon carefully studied epistemology and
thus they appear random and incoherent. Perhaps Michael
Curtis envisioned his project as something other than an
attempt to produce an integral account of Sorel's thought.
However the value of his attempt to integrate Sorel with
Maurras and Barres is diminished to the extent that his

View of Sorel is so partial and thus misleading.

494

Georges Goriely, Le Pluralisme dramatique de Georges
Sorel (Paris: MarceI RIVIere et Cie, I962).

 

Perhaps the most knowledgable Of the French
writers on Sorel, Georges Goriely has produced a highly
systematic, chronological study of Sorel which attempts
a synthesis Of his thought. Unfortunately Goriely gave
up the attempt at the half-way point in Sorel's intel-
lectual career and ended his analysis with a hopelessly
confused conclusion:

. . . 1e concept de pluralisme est sans doute le
plus général sous lequel i1 soit possible de définer
l'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Sorel. . . . Il est vrai-
ment multiple en tout: multiplicité et irreduc-
tibilité des choses, multiplicité des liens entre
elles, multiplicité de manieres des les con-
sidérer; multiplicité des principes moraux,
multiplicité des consciences, multiplicité
groupements humains, multiplicité des dévelop-
pments historiques. (p. 215)
This conclusion was drawn by Goriely after having examined
Sorel's work up to the year 1906! The rest of his intel-
lectual career was dismissed by Georges Goriely (which
includes all the material which I have presented in
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII) with the following appraisal:
"Avounons-le franchement: c'est peu servir la diffusion
des idées de Sorel que de s'appesantir sur les écrits des
douze dernieres années de sa vie" (P. 233). "Rather
than communicate to the reader," Goriely concluded, "the
irritation, the boredom or the discouragement Of the

contact with these texts, we have preferred to conclude

our detailed analysis with Reflections on Violence"

 

i
I '19 .4!!!

495

(p. 223). Thus the study remains a beginning without an
end. And the analysis which is presented is weakened by
the tendency on the part Of the author to see the work
of Sorel culminating in Syndicalism. There is a gOOd
chapter on Sorel's concept Of myth entitled "Mythe et
Violence," but it is the last chapter as well. I believe
this study may have produced other results had Goriely
not visualized Sorel so totally from the perspective of
political theory. This narrow view caused, I believe,
the exclusion from consideration of many specifically
epistemological works by Sorel. His linguistics as well
as his views on history, sociology and science are largely
ignored.

As a strictly political interpretation it is a
sound study, though truncated. The bibliography for the
early Sorel is excellent, for the latter part Of Sorel's
career however it is full of inaccuracies. I enter this
complaint along with the admission that the definitive
bibliography Of Sorel's writings has yet to be produced.
I have only succeeded in adding somewhat to the work of
Georges Goriely in this regard and am indebted to him
as well as to James Meisel and Of course to Paul Dele-

salle whose bibliography of 1930 in the International

 

Review for Social History remains the starting point Of

 

all later bibliographic work on Sorel.

496

Pierre Andreu, Notre Maitre, M. Sorel (Paris: Grasset,
1953).

 

This is the only source Of detailed and docu-
mented information about the life of Georges Sorel prior
to the commencement of his writing career. In its
analysis of his writings themselves its tone is partisan
and Andreu's conclusions are doubtful. Sorel is con-
sidered by Andreu as one Of " . . . les penseurs profond
du siecle dernier" a category which he reserved for two
other French thinkers: LePlay and Proudhon (p. 291).
Sorel's pessimism is rooted, according to Andreu in
" . . . son education chrétienne . . . ses reflexions et
son expérience de la vie . . . " (p. 293) as well as
"les vues pessimistes de Proudhon et de Renan” (p. 293).
The epistemological roots of his pessimism are not
uncovered by Andreu, who nevertheless is well aware Of
the recurrent force of the idea in Sorel's speculations.
The failure to locate this perspective in Sorel's con-
ception Of the possibilities of human existence within
the artificial milieu and the limits therein of human
knowledge caused Andreu to misunderstand the direction
Of Sorel's thought which was decidedly anti-dogmatic
and which rejected the pursuit of absolute certainty
or truth; Andreu believed that Sorel was engaged in a
"recherche de la vérité" (p. 302).

This study has the merit Of presenting a

favorable interpretation of Sorel to counter the more

497

antagonistic English treatments in so far as it rejects
the tendency to see Sorel as a man of the authoritarian

right-wing: "Maurras ne le range jamais parmi les

 

maitres extérieurs de l'Action frangaise et 11 enseigna
toujours a ses disciples a se méfier de lui, comme s'il
avait craint qu'ils n'apprissent dans ses oeuvres cette
liberté d'esprit que le chef royaliste n'aimait pas

beaucoup" (p. 309).

 

Jean Deroo, Le rgnversement du matérialisme historique;
L'Expérience de Georges Sorel (Paris: Marcel RiVi re,
I946).

 

This study advanced the surprising thesis that:
"Il faut dire, en effet, que Nietzche a d0 inspirer
Sorel. Bien que Sorel ne 1e cite que rarement, toute
son oeuvre s'en ressent. La pensée de Nietzche est a la
base de presque toutes les prOpositions méme sociologiques
de Sorel" (p. 222). Why Sorel, who so faithfully
reported, throughout his career, the thinkers whose
works he had followed, would conceal the most basic
influence of all is not explained. This undocumented
assertion represents an intuition on the part Of Jean
Deroo, who thinking to draw the parallel between the two
wrote: "Les maitres créent leur morale" (P. 224).
Could this idea be associated with Sorel who repudiated
precisely such an idea in his rejection Of Aristotle's
defense of the man of genius as above the law? The

masses for Sorel were the historical fabricators of

498

morality. Although the value of this study is weakened
by the unsuccessful attempt to force the thesis to a
demonstration, its discussion of Sorel's rejection Of
historical materialism appears accurate: ” . . . la
conception méthodologique du matérialisme historique
chez Sorel montre l'impossibilité de ramener tous les
facteur idéologiques a l'argument économique" (P. 226).

Gernand Rossingnol, Pour connaitre lapensée de G. Sorel
(Paris: Bordas, 1948).

 

This work is most striking for its organizational
approach to Sorel. Chapter II entitled "Intentions fon-
damentales et themes permanents," however, disappoints
the expectation that it will provide a comprehensive
frame of reference for the lengthy exposition which
follows. The "theme du pessimisme" in Chapter II is
explained as follows: " . . . c'est aussi sur le plan
des valeurs spirituelles et morales que se développe le
theme si important" (p. 24). The very material condition
of the human species and the intellectual limits Of human
knowledge are not associated in this treatment Of Sorel's
perspective of the human condition.

In Chapter IV entitled "la philosophie générale
de G. Sorel" I was surprised to find no statement Of
epistemology, and only the slightest reference to the
concept Of the artificial and natural milieux. Yet

almost every idea with which Sorel dealt is present,

499

though in a very disassociated way. I am surprised that
a study which appears so thorough can produce such an
inconclusive effect. Perhaps this results from a defect
of style which gives the thought of Sorel a new context:
the ideas march like soldiers; they pass in review chapter
by chapter, their intensity of presentation which only
occurs in the original context is lost in favor Of a
categorical organization--the persistence of Sorel's
preoccupations is never brought to light. Sorel's
thought, which exists in the thousands Of pages of his
articles and books, speeches and letters, is Obviously
fragmented even when all these parts are juxtaposed,

but here in la pensée de Georges Sorel even these fragments

 

have been exploded into ideas which have then been formed
into strict categories: all the pieces seem to be there,
but the context is missing. There is no active evaluative
prospect for the reader of such a work; the book is a
funnel flowing with thousands Of equally valued facts
which results in a most atomized experience of Sorel.
Perhaps this explains the synthetic incertainty which
characterizes its discussion Of "fundamental intentions

and permanent themes."

Jean Wanner, L'idée de Decadence dans la pensée de Georges

Sorel (Lusanne: LIbrairIe deDrOit, F. Roth et Cie.,

 

This study was a doctoral thesis presented at

the Université de Lusanne. Wanner concluded that "L'idée

500

de decadence a été . . . le fil d'Ariane qui nous a permis
de cheminer sans trop nous égarer a travers le labyrinthe
de la pensée sorélienne" (p. 84). The study was admit-
tedly modest in its concentration of this aspect Of
Sorel's work: "Nous n'avons pas l'illusion d'avoir
trouvé l'idée qui permette de découvrir entierement
Sorel" (p. 84). Wanner's hope was to establish that
Sorel's career was dominated by a battle against what

he viewed as decadence. Another benefit which could be
attained through a study Of Sorel, Wanner believed, was
that " . . . 11 force a la réflexion, a la meditation

. . . il est capable de nous mener a une revision pro-
fonde de notre maniere de penser" (p. 84).

Sorel's pessimism, according to Wanner, grows
out of his belief that "la douleur" is inherent in human
life (p. 30). The epistemological roots of this per-
spective are not traced. The pessimistic view is pre-
sented as the primary fact by Wanner. Sorel's dis-
tinctions between the artificial and the natural
milieux-—which provide a comprehension Of the limits
of human knowledge--together with his critique Of the
duality Of the human mind itself (its dual capacity for
belief and knowledge)--are not discussed in a work
which thus artificially isolates the idea of decadence
in Sorel's mind. This isolation makes decadence seem

the central preoccupation rather than an auxiliary Of

501

more basic perspectives. The study is further weakened
by the fact that its citations are limited to the book-
length works by Sorel--the myriad articles, letters and
speeches are not included. Thus the work, while modest
in its pretentions remains superficial in its treatment
of what appears to be a useful approach to the thought

of Sorel.

Max Ascoli, Georges Sorel (Paris: Librairie Paul Deles-
salle, 1921).

 

This study was the result Of a conference held
at the Université populaire de Ferrare, March 11, 1920.
The object of the publication was, according to Max
Ascoli, " . . . de vous aider a lire Sorel" (p. 18).
Thus as a scholarly study this introduction tO Sorel
is of little value, there are no footnotes and the
references to Sorel's thought are not associated with
any specific writing. Sorel is depicted as a man Of
great integrity who, then at the age of 74, was still
involved in the quest for truth. "Sorel," wrote Max
Ascoli, "ne pouvait etre réformiste, son action ne
pouvait étre qu'une révolte idéale . . . il devait
naturellement prendre position . . . comme philosophe"
(p. 27). "La préoccupation essentielle de Sorel fut
toujours une preoccupation d'ordre moral, son but,
decouvrir et lutter contre toutes les formes de la

décadence" (p. 28). Sorel's Socialism with its

502

Syndicalist emphasis was part of what Ascoli envisioned
as his battle against decadence in which violence was a
tOOl and not an end. Sorel for Ascoli is thus " . . . un
fondateur et chef d'ordre monastique" (p. 44). "Sorel

a cru que le socialisme pouvait devenir une philosophie
des moeurs" (p. 44).

This narrow moral-political vision Of Sorel
represents the partisan view Of a man who feared that
Sorel had become forgotten in his own country. His
Object was not to elaborate in a careful study the depth
and diversity of Sorel's Speculations but rather to
enhance Sorel's reputation by eulogizing certain aspects
of his thought. The result Of such an effort has been
the production Of a short essay which advocates but which
does not demonstrate its judgments Of Sorel's motive-

ideas. Its value as a study of Sorel is highly suspect.

 

 

Victor Sartre, Georges Sorel, élites s ndicalistes et
revolution prolEEarienne (Paris: Editions Spes,_l937).

 

In an attempt to clarify Sorel's thought Victor
Sartre undertook an analysis Of its philosophical foun-
dations in a chapter entitled "Les fondements philoso-
phique." Initially Sartre wrote: "Nous rencontrerons
. . . le pessimisme, pierre fondamentale de l'édifice"
(p. 56). Unfortunately the basis of this pessimism
Sartre discovered in Sorel's View of human nature, a

position distinctly opposed to Sorel's epistemology and

503

his hostility to the tendency to visualize humanity in
terms of human nature: Sartre wrote: "Sorel ne pardonne
pas volontiers les vices humains qu'il observe la nature
de l'homme" (p. 57).

The subject of the influence Of Vico on the
thought Of Sorel is the least justifiable. In a chapter
entitled "la conception de l'histoire," Sartre suggested
that Sorel had been especially attracted to Vico's
cyclical View of historical recurrence; " . . . Sorel
a faire sienne la théorie des renouvellements ou ricorsi
de Vico . . . la société entiere est soumise a des lois
fixes" (p. 96). It was in fact this element in Vico
which Sorel most categorically rejected.

The characteristic failing of this study of
Sorel is a result of the extent to which certain major
themes which Sorel developed are shown to be primary
assumptions (pessimism, decadence, myth) their episte-
mological ground (Sorel's theory of knowledge, his
bifurcated conception Of the natural and artificial
milieux, his critique of language) is not elaborated
and thus the whole edifice Of his thought appears
superficial--a collection Of unfounded prejudices.

This complaint does not deny all value to Sartre's
study, which contains many very excellent Observations

in the domain of Sorel's political thought, however

504

the general synthetic view of Sorel is so uncertain
without the frame of reference which Sorel so persis-

tently insisted upon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

1886.

1887.

1888.

1889.

1890.

1891.

1892.

1893.

1894.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Writings of Georges Sorel

 

Revue philosophique, XXII
"Sur les appIications de la psychophysique"

 

Revue philosophique, XXIII:
Le calcul dés probabilités et l'experience"

 

Revue philosophique, XXIV:
La cause en physique"

 

Contribution a l'étude profane de la Bible (Paris,
GhIO).
Le proces de Socrate (Paris, Alcan).

 

Revue philosophique, XXIX and XXX:
Contributions psycho-physiques a l' étude
esthétique"

 

Revue philosophique, XXXI:
Sur Ia géometrie non-euclidienne"
Bulletin de la Société agricole, scientifique et
litteraire desPyrénEes OrIenEaIes (Perpignan):
"Les Girondins du RoussIlIOh‘

 

 

 

Revue philosgphique, XXXIII and XXXIV:
“Essai sur la philOSOphie de Proudhon"

 

Revue scientifique, LI and LII:

aLa position du probleme de M. Lombroso"
"Le crime politique d'apres M. Lombroso"
"La femme criminelle"

Revue philosophique, XXXV:

1rSCIence et sociaIisme"

 

 

L'Ere nouvelle:

"La fIn an paganisme"

La Ruine du monde antique (published in 1901 in a
vquméby Jacques, Paris; 2nd edition, completed
in 1920, published by Riviere, Paris).

 

 

505

506

"L'ancienne et la nouvelle métaphysique" (pub-
lished in a volume under the title: D'Aristote
a Marx in 1935 by Riviere, Paris).
Archivio di Psichiatria e scienze penali, XV:
WLaPsychologIe dujuge1r

 

 

1895. Le Devenir Social:
TrLes théOries de M. Durkheim" (no. 1 - April)
Revue critique:
la Vie sociale, la morale et le progres,
Dr. Julien Pioger
Number 2 - May
"les théories de M. Durkheim" (fin)
Revue critique: Les primieres formes de la
religion et de la tradition dans l'Inde et
la Gréce, P. Regnaud.
Number 3 - June
Revue critique: Les lois psychologiques du
symbolisme, Ferrero
Number 5 - August
Revue critique: Du travail et de ses conditions,
HectorDepasse
Essais et Etudes, E. de Laveleye.
I5’propriéfé‘h Rome, en France,
en Roumanie, GebIescO.

 

 

 

 

 

Number 6 - September
"1a Métaphysique évolutioniste de M. Brune-
tiere"
Revue critique: L'église et 1e travail manuel,
M. Sabatier.
Number 7 - October
Revue critique: Dégénérescence et alcoolisme,
Dr. Legrain.
Science et Religion, G. de
MolIhari.
Les questions agricoles d'hier
et dTaujourdrhui, 5. ZOIIa

 

 

 

Number 8 - November
"Superstition socialiste?"
Revue critique: Psychologie des foules, G.
-—LeBon
ELSnseignement élémentaire en
RouSSilIOn depuIs ses ori ins
igsqgfau XIX siecle, Ph.
TorailIes et E. Desplanque
Etude sur la chambre du commerce
de Guienne, J.-A. Brutails.
Archivio di Psichiatria e szienze enali, XVI:
"Les theories pénales MM. Durhheim etwrarde"
Revue scientifique, 4th serie III:
1'Ifc’évolution moderne de l'architecture"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1896.

507

Le Devenir social:
Number I - January
"Etudes d'économie rurale d'apres M. Zolla"
Revue critique: Annales de L'Institut Inter-
national de SociOIOgIe, and
Les éconOmIStes classiques et
Ieur adVersaIres, R. Schfiler.

 

 

 

 

 

Number 2 - February
"la science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique: Problemes d'économiepoliti ue
et de statistique, G. RumeIin.
La femme devant la science con-
temporaine, J. Lourbet.

 

 

 

 

Number 3 - March
"Progres et developpement" .
"la science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique: Critique de combat, G. Renard.
Number 4 - April
"la science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique: Paradoxes psychologiques, Max
Nordau.

 

 

Number 5 - May
"la science dans l'éducation"
Revue critique: Contre le socialisme, L. Say.
Cours d'économie politique,
—Pareto.

 

 

Number 6 - June
"L'idéalisme de M. Brunitiere"
Revue critique: Selections sociales, DeLaponge.
Number 7 - July
Revue critique: 1e mouvement idéaliste et la
reaction contre la science
positive, A.IFouillée.
Numbers 8-9 - August-September
"les sentiments sociaux"
Revue critique: Del materialimo storico,
Antonio LabrIOIa
Annales de l'institut inter-
nationéI'de sociologi_.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number 10 - October
"Etude sur Vico"
"Economie sociale catholique"
Number 11 - November
"Etude sur Vico"
"la depression économique"
Number 12 - December
"Etude sur Vico"
Revue critique: Sepialisme et sciencepositive,
Berri

 

1897.

508

"Preface aux: Essais sur la conception matérialiste
de l'histoire, Antonio Labriola.

Paris, Giard et Briere.

Le Devenir social:

 

 

Number 1 - January
Revue critique: Le mécanisme de la vie moderne,
G. drAvenel.
Number 2 - February
"la science de la population"
Revue critique: L'économie de l'effort, Yves
Guyot.

Le mouvement positiviste et la
conceptIon sociologique du
monde, A. FouiIlée.

De la croyance, J. Payot.

L'état comme organisation
coercitive de la société
politique, S. Balicki.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number 3 - March
Revue critique: la viriculture, G. de Molinari.
Il gergo nei normali, nei
degenerati e nei criminali,
A. NecefOrO.

 

Number 4 - April
Revue critique: Statistique des greves et de
Ia_COnciIiation, office du
travaiI.

 

Number 5 - May
"Contre une critique anarchiste"
Revue critique: L'Europagrovaire, G. Ferrero.
Churs d'éCOnomIe politique,
V. Pareto.
Il socialismo e la sua tattica,
G._Lerda.

 

Number 6 - June
Revue critique: L'em'loi de la vie, John
Luboock.

 

 

Number 7 - July
“La loi des revenus"
Revue critique: 1a questione siciliana degli
zOlfi,C§Efi§6:R§sa.
Number 8-9 - August-Septefiher
"Sociologie et suggestion"
Revue critique: LO scigpero nella Vita
moderna, F. VIrgiIu

 

Number 10 - October
Revue dOCtrinale: Pro e contrO il socialismo,
SaverIo MerlInO.
Journal des Economistes:
1'Sur la théOrIe marxiste de la valeur"
Sozialistische Monatshefte, I:
1Thor Ursprung desIStaatssocialismus in Deutsch-
land"
"Die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus"

 

 

 

1898.

1899.

1900.

509

"Preface" a Formes et essence du socialisme, de
Saverio MerIinO.

Humanité nouvelle:

“LTavenir socialiste des syndicats" (republished in
Matériaux d'une theorie du proletariat).

Revue politique et parlementaire, XVIII:

1'La crise du socialisme1r

Riforma sociale, VIII:

1TLa necessita e il fatalismo nel Marxismo"

Sozialistische Monatshefte, II:

TrBetrachtungenfiber die materialistische Geschicht-
sauffassung"

"Was man von Vico lernt"

"Ein sozialistischer Staat?"

"Der amerikanische Kapitalismus. Ein Beitrag zur
AnalySe der Kartellierung"

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rivista critica del Socialismo:

1'Dove va i1 Marxismoii'r

"Dommatismo e pratica"

"Il vangelo, la Chiesa e il socialismo" (republished
in original language, as appendix to La Ruine du
monde antique).

"I1 socialismo e la teoria delle razze"

"La scissione socialiste in Francia”

"Socialismo e democrazia. Conclusione sulla
facenda Dreyfus."

Revue de Méta h si ue et de Morale, VII:

1rY a-t-il de I'utopie dans Ie Marxisme?"

"L'ethique du socialisme" (Lecture done at the
College Libre des Sciences Sociales and repub-
lished also in the collected volume: La Morale
Sociale).

La Science sociale, XXVIII:

TrLes divers types de sociétés cooperatives"

Riforma sociale, IX:

"L'evoluziOne del Sozialismo in Francia"

Mouvement socialiste:

1'Morale et SOCiaIisme"

Rivista di storia e filosofia

“Le Idee giurIdiche del MarXISmo"

Humanité nouvelle:

TIQuelques Objections au matérialisme économique"

Rivista italiana di sociologia, III:

"Marxismo e scienza sociaIer_—

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"Préface" to Le Socialisme by Napoleone Colajanni
(republished in Matériaux d'une théorie du pro-
létariat).

Revue pOIItique et parlementaire, XXIII:

FEES dissensions de la Social-democratie en Alle-
magne"

 

 

 

 

1901.

1902.

510

Revue Internationale de Sociologie:

TrLes polémiques pourI'interprétation du Marxisme"

Riforma sociale:

"Construzione del sistema dellastoria secondo Marx"

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, VIII:

1rLe systeme deMathématiques"

Mouvement socialiste:

TrL'économie sociale—a l'Exposition"

Revue socialiste, XXXII:

TrLes aspectsjuridiques du socialisme"

La Science sociale:

“Les—graves“

Conference held at COllége Libres des Sciences
Sociales collected in the volume
Questions de Morale:

"LaScience et la Morale"

"Les Facteurs moraux de l'évolution"

Sozialistische Monalshefte, IV:

TrUber diekapitalistische Konzentration"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cahiers de la Quinzaine:

 

Essai sur 1'E lise etII'Etat (published in brochure
form in 190 , Jacques)

"Les greves de Montceau-les-Mines et leur sig-
nification"

"Proudhon"

"A propos de Proudhon"

Revue de Métaph sique et de Morale, IX:

1"La vaIeur sociaIeJde l'art'r

Revue socialiste, XXXIII:

1rEconomie et Agricfilture"

"L'église et l'état"

Mouvement socialiste:

“Conseil du travaiI_et paix sociale"

"Jean Coste"

"La propriété fonciere en Belgique"

 

 

 

 

 

 

Saggi di critica del Marxismo (Palerme, Sandron)
"PrEface" EO I'Histoire desfiurses du Travail by
Ferdinand PeIIoutier. (ParIs,SChleicherI.
"Préface" to: Le Socialisme et 1'Agriculture by
Gatti (Paris,IGiard et_BriéreI (fepublished in
Matériaux d'une théorie du rolétariat).
BuIletin de Ia SociEte francaise de PhIIOsophie,
II, 5:
"Le Matérialisme historique"
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, X:
1rLa crise de la pensée cathoquue"
Revue socialiste, XXXV:

1‘Id'ées socialistes et faits économiques au XIXe
siécle“

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

511

"Les syndicats industriels et leur signification"
Rivista italiana di sociolo ia, VI:

"Storia e Scienza sociale

Sozialistische Monatshefte, VI, 2:

“SozIale Ideen undOrganisation der Arbeit"

 

 

Introduction a l'Economie moderne (Paris, Jacques;
2nd edition in I922, RiViere)

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale:

1TSur les—HIVers aspectsdela mecanique"

 

 

 

T'rNouveaux requisitoires de M. Brunetiere"

"Observations sur le Régime des Chemins de fer"
"A propos de l'anticléricalisme"

Rivista popolare di politica:
1"(Due anni dIIanEICIericalismo in Francia“
"La morte di Waldeck-Rousseau"

 

Le systeme historique de Renan (Paris, Jacques).
"Prgface”:to: La douleurphysiue de Georges Castex,
(republished as an appendix in Introduction a
l'Economie moderne).
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale XIII:
1; T r . .
Les preoccupations métaphySIques des phy81c1ens

 

 

 

 

 

 

1rCoh'clusions aux Enseignements sociaux de l'Economie

 

"Notes additionnelles a l'avenir socialiste des

"Le syndicalisme révolutionnaire:

 

1*La lotta di CIassi e la violenza"

Rivista popolare di politica:
WLa restaurazione giacobina in Francia"

 

Insegnamenti sociali della economia contemporanea
(Palerme, Sandron).

 

 

"Reflexions sur la Violence" pp. 5-56.*

 

*
These essays were combined to form the influential

1903.

Etudes Socialistes:

"Le compagnonnage"

"Léon XIII"

1904.
1905.
modernee"

Mouvement socialiste:
modernes"
Syndicats"

Il Divenire sociale:

"lo sciopero generale"

1906.

Mouvement socialiste:

January 15, 1905

book:

Reflections on Violence, lst edition published in

 

French Reflexions surIa ViOIence (Paris: Riviere, 1908).

 

 

512

February 15, 1906 *
"les Préjugés contre la Violence" pp. 140-64.
"les déclin du parti socialiste international"

March 15, 1906 *
"la Greve générale prolétarienne" pp. 256-93.
April 15, 1906 *

"la Greve Générale politique" pp. 390-427.
Revue critique: les Droits Acquis, de Lassalle,
pp. 476-€50
May 15 and June 15, 1906
"la moralité de la violence-la morale des pro-
ducteurs" pp. 33-124.*
July, 1906
Revue critique: Grandeur et décadence de Rome,
GuinemO Ferrero, pp. 244-68.
August and September, 1906
"les Illusions du progres" pp. 289-328.
October, 1906
"les Illusions du progres" pp. 65-129.
November, 1906
"les illusions du progrés" pp. 219-50.
Revue critique: "le caractere religieux du
socialisme," Edouard Dolléans, pp. 283-90.
December, 1906
"les théories modernes du progres" pp. 314-46.
Cahiers de la Quinzaine, XII, l6:
“Quelques mots sur Proudhon"
Il Divenire sociale, II:
"LS storia ebraica emil materialismo storica"
"Le elezioni in Francia"
"L'Unita dei riformisti e dei 'rivoluzionari'
tradizionali"
"A proposito del Congresso di Roma"
"I Cattolici contrO la Chiesa"

 

 

 

 

 

Revue critique: Grandeur etdécadence de Rome:
Antoine et CléOpatre, vol. 4,
Gugliemo Ferrero, pp. 171-93.

 

 

"1e prétendu Socialisme juridique" pp. 321-48.

Revue critique: Les cahiers de Jeunesse de Renan,
pp. 456-79.

 

 

*
These essays were combined to form the influential

1907. Mouvement socialiste
February, I907
April, 1907
May, 1907

book:

Reflections on Violence, lst edition published in

 

French REIIexions surIIa Violence (Paris: Riviere, 1908).

 

1908.

1909.

1910.

513

June, 1907

"Jean-Jacques Rousseau" pp. 507-33.
July, 1907

"La crise morale et religieuse" pp. 13-38.
August and September, 1907

"lettre a M. Daniel Halévy" pp. 137-66.
October, 1907

"L'Evolution créatrice" pp. 257-83.
December, 1907

"L'Evolution créatrice" (suite) pp. 478-95.
Bulletin de la Société francaise de_philosophie:
T‘Le pragmatismefi'rw ’

 

Reflexions sur la Violence. (lst edition in "Pages
Libres," multiples reedItions by Riviere).
Les Illusions du Progrés. (Riviere).
La Decomposition du Marxisme. (Riviera).
Movement socialISte:
January, 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice" (suite) pp. 31-53.
March, 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice" (suite) PP. 184-95.
April, 1908
"L'Evolution créatrice” (fin) pp. 276-95.
June, 1908
"la politique américaine" pp. 449-57
July, 1908
Revue critique: Grandeur et Décadence de Rome,
vOI. V, pp. 36-52.

 

 

 

 

 

September, 1908

"les intellectuels a Athenes" pp. 214-36.
Revue critique des livres et des idées I:
1rMOdernisme dans Ia religion et dans—Ie socialisme"
Le Matin
WApologie de la violence"

 

 

 

La Revolution dreyfusienne (Paris, Riviera).
Revue de MétaCh siqge et5de Morale, XVII:
"La ReIigIon S'aujourd'huI‘

"Preface" to Karl Marx, by Arturo Labriola.
(Paris, RivIEre).
"Preface" to Les Ob'ectifs de nos luttes de classes,
by GriffuelhE§T_T%aris, la_PthIcatiOnISOEIEIETT-'
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, XVIII-XIX
(19II):
"Vue sur les Problemes de la Philosophie"
"Grandeur et Decadence" (Appendix in Illusions du
Pro res).
Action Fran aise 14. IV. 1910:
1fLé—mystereide Ia Charité de Jeanne d'Arc, de Péguy"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

514

1911. L'Indépendance:
March - August, 1911
"le Monument de Jules Ferry" pp. 1-28.
"L'abandon de la revanche" pp. 71-107.
"Lyripipii Sorbonici moralisationes" pp. 111-50.
"Responsabilités de 1870" pp. 167-90.
"L'Otage" de Paul Claudel, pp. 391-436.
September, 1911 - December, 1911
"Sur la magie moderne" pp. l-ll.
"Si les dogmes évoluent" pp. 33-70.
"On critique des sociologues" pp. 73-92.
"A la mémoire de Cournot" pp. 97-134.
"Préface"to L'Interprétation Economi ue de
l'Histoire (Paris, Riviere) by SeIigmann.
BulIetin de la Semaine:
1'PsychOlogIe poIitique"

 

 

 

1912. L'Indépendance:
January - February, 1912
"Trois problemes" pp. 221-40.
"Trois problemes" (fin) pp. 261-92.
"Urbain Gohier" pp. 305-28.
March - August, 1912
"D'un écrivain prolétaire" pp. 19-37.
"la rivolta ideale" pp. 161-78.
"Quelques pretentions juives" pp. 217-96.
"Quelques pretentions juives" (suite) pp. 277-96.
"Quelques pretentions juives" (fin) pp. 317-37.
October, 1912 - February, 1913
"Aux temps dreyfusiens" pp. 29-57.

 

1913. "Préface" to a translation of Réforme intellectuel
et Moral, appeared in 1931 under the title:
Germanesimo Storicismo di Ernesto Renan in
Critica

 

 

 

1914. "Préface" to Méfaits des Intellectuels, by Edouard
Berth (Paris, Riviére)

 

1915. "Preface" to Il_papa in guerra, by Mario Missiroli.

 

1917. Resto del Carlino:
1'VIOlence et folIes de la ploutocratie"

 

1919. Matériaux pour une théorie du proletariat (Riviere)
La Ronda:
"Charles Péguy"
"Proudhon"

 

 

515

1920. "Exégeses proudhonniennes" (found in Matériaux,

2nd edition).

"La Marche au Socialisme" (Appendix to Illusion du
PrOgres).

La Revue Communiste:

WLe BOlchévisme en Egypt"

"La Chine"

"Le travail dans la Grece antique"

 

1921. De l'Utilité du_pragmatisme (Paris, Riviere).
Revue Communiste:
1rLénine drapres Gorki"
"La génie du Rhin"

 

 

1922. La Ruine du monde antique (2nd edition, with new
fOrward, Riviére).
Le Mercure de France:
“Jeremy Bentham et I'indépendance de l'Egypt"
"Préface" to the reedition Of l'Introduction a
l'Economie moderne (Riviere)

 

 

 

 

"Lettres" to Benedetto Croce (Critica 1927-1930).
Pro 03 de Georges Sorel, collected by Jean Variot
Paris, Gallimard 1935).

Lettres a Paul Delesalle, presented by André
Prudhommeaux; preface by Robert Louzon (Paris,
Grasset 1947).

"Deux lettres" to Daniel Halévy, Fédération no. 34 -
November, 1947.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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