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# SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA

by

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A THESIS

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MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

#### **ABSTRACT**

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This thesis deals with the social inequalities between and within the "racial groups" in Windhoek, Namibia.

In the first chapter the historical background of Namibia is reviewed beginning with its official declaration as a German colony during the "Scramble of Africa." The war of resistance of the indigeneous population of Namibia waged to resist colonialism, and their subsequent defeat and genocide also are reviewed.

In the second chapter I review the literature and the methodology utilized in the construction of the thesis. I review the caste-class model literature, arguing that because of the apartheid system, the stratification between the "racial groups" in Windhoek (Namibia), resembles the caste-class theoretical perspective. I describe the methodology utilized and why it was chosen.

In chapter three I deal with Namibia's peripheral position in the global capitalist system, from the day Namibia was colonized by Germany to the occupation of Namibia by South Africa. I deal with Namibia's position in

the global capitalist system, arguing that the oppression and exploitation of the Africans in Namibia is inextricably linked to the development of capitalism. I also deal with the development of the castes in this chapter.

In chapter four I describe the caste stratification between the "racial groups" in Windhoek and detail the mechanisms which are used under the apartheid system to maintain the castes. The hierarchical ordering of the castes, endogamy, restricted mobility, and geographical segregation with unequal facilities are such mechanisms.

In chapter five I review the class stratification within the "racial groups" in Windhoek, including the social classes within each caste. Three social classes are distinguished in the White caste, two in the Coloured caste, and three in the African caste.

Finally, chapter six is the conclusion of the entire thesis.

To the memory of my late father and all those Namibians who died for the liberation of their mother country.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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#### CHAPTER ONE

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE STUDY

## A. Introduction

This thesis concerns the inequalities between and within the different racial groups in Windhoek, Namibia. These specific racial inequalities in Namibia are caused and maintained by apartheid -- the rigid structuring of society along strictly racial lines.

This thesis utilizes a broad socio-historical approach to research the hypothesis that the current racial inequalities, oppression, and exploitation of the Africans in Namibia are inextricably linked to the development of capitalism in Namibia. I will demonstrate with documentary and case-study evidence that because of the apartheid system, applied to Namibia by South Africa, the stratification of the population of Namibia may be understood utilizing the caste-class model, as previously conceptualized in analyzing race relations in the Deep South of the United States.

Taking into consideration the controversy surrounding the development of the caste-class model as a sociological framework, this will be a first attempt to apply a theoretical sociological model of social stratification to the Namibian

society.

However, at this point it is imperative for me to make it categorically clear that the classifying of the Namibian people in races is not something I originally formulated. Apartheid creates arbitrary divisions of Whites, Coloured and African which are relatively evenly graded in various physical characteristics. These racial cleavages are artificially defined and constructed by the system; however, they are treated as real. One's life chances depend on how one is racially classified in Namibia. Consequently, sociologists cannot ignore the classifying of the people in races when dealing with the social stratification of Namibia.

Namibia is small in population but not in land. 2

Namibia is also rich in diamonds and semi-prescious stones; in minerals, particularly copper, uranium, tin, and zinc, and in fishing and wool industries. These products from Namibia are sold all over the world; however, the majority of the Namibian population does not enjoy the wealth these products generate. The wealth is enjoyed by a small group of wealthy businessmen, most of whom are not Namibians by nationality.


Also, many multinational corporations conduct business in Namibia, (see Appendix B) because of the extraordinary profit-rate due to the super-exploitation of the African labour. Therefore, it is justifiable to do a social stratification study on Namibia. The super-exploitation of the African labour in Namibia is epitomized by the contract

labour system. From the time when the German flag was raised in 1884 and throughout the entire South African occupation of Namibia, the African there has been regarded solely as a "labour unit". He would be allowed in the so-called "White area" only under terms which are acceptable and profitable for Whites. The contract labour system was therefore devised as the most efficient and effective way of controlling the Africans' movements and exploiting them for the Whites' convenience. The Africans exist only for one thing: to work for the white overlord for the minimum cost with the aim of producing the maximum profit.

Under the apartheid system trade unions for Africans are illegal; therefore, the Africans have no bargaining power. If the Africans dare to strike or refuse to carry out an order, they are committing a criminal offense. They can be prosecuted and then be deported to their so-called "Homelands". Therefore, the Africans in Namibia are completely at the mercy of their White employers and are forced to work for starvation-level wages.

Besides the economic rationalizations there are academic justifications. Stratification is an important and recognized sociological framework as well as a world issue. Before we can analyze the social formation of any society it is imperative to know something about the stratification of that society.

There are very few studies done in and about Namibia, especially in the social science discipline. The few



MAP OF NAMIBIA, Source, O. Levinson, South West Africa.

studies which have been conducted about Namibia are biased in one way or another.

It is also important to study the social inequalities in Namibia today, since the country is about to gain its political independence from South Africa, and as we have seen in many independent African countries, the social stratification during colonialism has important implications for future development. It is true that countries are unique and nobody can predict what is going to happen in one country from experiences in another country; however, there are some similarities.

Besides the mineral wealth of Namibia, the commercialization and exploitation of the African labour make investing in Namibia very lucrative for foreign investors. Namibia has a state and private capitalism unmoderated by social welfare consideration. In many other countries, the government usually tries to protect the workers against private business by taxing the company, for example, but it is not the case in Namibia. The government encourages the superexploitation of the workers in order to lure foreign investment to the country. This situation gives Namibia an interesting stratification along colour lines that justifies this study. When I was in Namibia, for example, in 1980, African workers at Rossing Mine were complaining that they were constantly exposed to uranium and that uranium causes cancer. To my knowledge, no steps have been taken to ease the danger or to protect the workers. mine is still operating and the government is not forcing

the company that runs the mine to respond to the African workers' complaints.

The rest of the thesis consists of the following chapters: (Chapter 1.B) historical background of Namibia, (Chapter 2) literature review and methodology, (Chapter 3) Namibia's peripheral position in the global capitalist system, (Chapter 4) caste stratification between the "racial groups" in Windhoek, (Chapter 5) class stratification within the "racial groups" in Windhoek.

## B. Historical Background of Namibia

With the infamous General Act Declaration of the Berlin Conference in 1885, which opened up the colonial movement, popularly known as the "scramble for Africa." Namibia, then known as South West Africa, was officially given to Germany as a colony.

However, when the Germans started to move into their newly acquired colony, they encountered African resistance under the military leadership of Chiefs like Maharero, Kahimemua and Kahitjene. Throughout the period of African struggle against European conquest, African leaders continued to develop and strengthen their contacts and cooperation through regular exchange of emissaries and joint military training. Societies that were adversaries hastily came to terms with one another and signed peace treaties under the common threat of European invasion. The Germans made numerous attempts to consult with individual African leaders

in their effort to destroy African unity. Their transparent maneuvers led one African leader, Captain Witbooi, to remark, "What is protection? From what are we to be protected? And from what danger and difficulty and need is one king protected against another?" (Quoted in Kerina 1981: 4). The Nama War of 1903 began with the destruction of Warmbath Fort, which was a refuge for European settlers in the south and continued for over a year as a guerilla war. This started a chain reaction against German imperialism and culminated in the Ohamakari, a national revolutionary armed struggle of the people involving the entire Herero people which became known as the Herero-German War of 1904-1907.

Throughout the war, the Hereros were led by their great Chief Hosea Katuka, who lived to be 100 years old. Towards the end of the war he led several thousand people away from the German massacres in Namibia across the border into Botswana, where he found a place of temporary settlement for the Herero people under the protection of King Khama.

Much of the extermination of Africans was carried out under General Von Trotha and Heinrich Goering, the father of the notorious Nazi Hermann Goering, who in later years helped to carry out Hitler's extermination policy against the so-called inferior races of Europe. General Von Trotha, the representative of the Kaiser, declared to the Herero people on his arrival in Namibia:

"I, the Great General of German soldiers, send this letter to the Herero Nation. The Herero are no longer German citizens. They have murdered and robbed wounded soldiers. Whoever brings one of the chieftans as a prisoner to one of my stations shall receive 1,000 marks and for Samuel Maharero, (their leader) I will pay 5,000 marks. The Herero Nation must now leave the country. If the people do not do it, I will compel them with the big tube. Within the German frontier every Herero, will be shot. I will not take over any more women and children, but I will either drive them back or have them fired on." (Quoted in Kerina 1981: 5)

In Berlin, Dr. Paul Rehrback of the German colonial office wrote at the same time: "The Hereros' development into a class of labourers in White service is a law of existence in the highest degree." (Ibid.)

This was not a war but an indiscriminate massacre by bayoneting, burning, and poisoning of young and old. Within a year, out of a population of 97,000 Hereros, there remained 20,000 starving fugitives and of 130,000 Namas and Damaras only 37,743 remained.

At the outbreak of World War I, the British and Cape governments appealed to the African people of Namibia to help them defeat the German occupation forces in the country with the promise that after the German defeat the stolen African lands would be restored. The British encouraged the Africans to use their own arms, to minimize their expenditure for their campaign, and to exhause African military resources which might well be used by the Africans against the British and South Africans themselves at the end of the war should their promises to return African lands not be fulfilled. The story of this deception is only one page of a thick catalogue of British imperialist intrigues and betrayals in the territory in the name of His Britannic Majesty, upon whom the mandate

for Namibia was eventually conferred.

In the north, the Ovambo people had successfully, but with heavy loss of life, stemmed the tide of Portuguese invation from Angola. All along, for military as well as political reasons, the Germans had always been reluctant to invade Ovamboland, which they considered a reservoir of cheap labour for future exploitation. In spite of Portuguese claims to the territory, Ovamboland, for many years was free of European occupation.

However, in 1917, when the Europeans learned that hunger and famine has weakened the Northerners, the Cape government sent a joint British-South African punitive military expedition with the sole purpose of conquering the Northerners.

When this expedition was about to capture him and subdue his people, the great Ovambo chief, Mandume, requested his bodyguard to end his life (Mandume's) honourably rather than being captured. South Africa and Portugal, as a compromise solution to their disputed claims and to safeguard the interest of one another, agreed to partition Ovamboland, cutting through the heart of the territory and splitting the people down the middle.

After the German withdrawal during World War I and the complete occupation of Namibia by South Africa through the British Crown under the mandate terms, bitterness of the African people mounted sharply. Ever since, spontaneous revolts have been a common phenomenon.

By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, South
Africa was given the responsibility of administering Namibia
under a "C" type mandate from the League of Nations. Namibia
was supposed to be a "sacred" territory to be governed by
South Africa until the people of Namibia were ready to
govern themselves. However, South Africa neglected her
responsibilities; instead of developing the territory and .
the indigenous people, South Africa exploited and oppressed
the African people of Namibia.

After the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, the newly formed United Nations requested South Africa to relinquish and turn over the administration of the territory to them. South Africa refused to comply with this request, arguing that the United Nations was not the legitimate successor of the League of Nations, hence the United Nations had no authority to tell South Africa what to do with Namibia. It was going to be only up to South Africa to decide what she was going to do with Namibia, and according to South Africa what was best for Namibia was for Namibia to become an integral part of South Africa.

During this feud between the United Nations and South Africa, concerning the future of Namibia, the International Court of Justice at the Hague on July 18, 1966 took a verdict which strengthened the South African position. Under great pressure, exerted by European nations, the Court decided that they did not have the power to decide in the

the Namibian case. However, at a later date, with pressure from the Third World bloc, the Court issued an advisory opinion that the South African occupation of Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under obligation to withdraw from Namibia immediately. Again, South Africa refused to comply.

Even today South Africa continues to exploit and oppress the Namibian people, but on the other hand, Namibians are not idle. They are fighting vigorously for their independence on both the diplomatic and military fronts.

At the military front since 1966 the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), one of the few revolutionary movements, has been fighting a guerilla war against South African forces which are occupying Namibia today. Diplomatically, different political organizations have been petitioning at the United Nations, and since 1980 SWAPO has been involved in negotiations with the five Western members of the U.N. Security Council (United States, U.K., Canada, France, and Germany) seeking a solution to the issue of the future of Namibia.

In the meantime, South Africa has been trying to cultivate a political movement which will perpetuate the South African interest in Namibia if they come to power by forming the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). But after the embarrassing defeat of Rev. Muzorewa in Zimbabwe, South Africa is having second thoughts about permitting the elections in Namibia as proposed by the United Nations and the Western Contact Group. South Africa is now following



MAP OF WINDHOEK (with Katutura and Khomasdal included)

a two-track strategy, trying to buy time. On one hand, they are participating in the negotiations, but not seriously, in order to forestall international sanctions, and on the other hand continuing to prosecute the war against SWAPO, while building up the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance as a strong political organization to stand against SWAPO if elections take place in the future.

The reasons why South Africa does not want to withdraw from Namibia are both political and economic. Politically, the South African settler regime, with its practice of apartheid, is very unpopular and under fire at home. African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa have been waging a guerilla war against the South African forces from neighboring independent African countries. Consequently, South Africa is using Namibia as a buffer zone to keep the fighting away from home, or utilizing South African government terms, to keep communism away from South Africa. It is becoming obvious now that due to international pressure, as well as pressure from SWAPO and international threat with economic sanctions, the South African government knows that sooner or later they must give up Namibia; however, they want to give Namibia its independence under certain conditions. First of all, the want the D.T.A. to be the future ruling party of Namibia, and, more important, they want an insurance that the future government of Namibia is not going to provide military bases to the ANC of South Africa. This is exactly why South

Africa claims the port of Walvis Bay is an integral part of South Africa. South African top officials camouflage their opposition to democracy and self-determination in Namibia with a fearful vision of the Big Red Bear. Defense Minister Magnus Malan flatly declared that his government will not accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay.

Besides the political considerations, South African domination of Namibia is paying South Africa and the Western Capitalists' Countries great profits.

A complete account of the Western economic stake in Namibia is beyond the scope of this introductory chapter, but few facts are needed to gain proper perspective of what Namibia economically means to South Africa. Namibia's Rossing uranium mine (the largest in the world) is controlled by Rio Tinto Zinc, a British multinational which has counted among its directors the current Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Charteris, former secretary of the Queen. 7 The British, French, West German, and South African governments all are dependent on Namibian uranium to fuel their nuclear-power programs. Tsumeb Corporation, the largest foreign enterprise in Namibia, accounted for 80% of all base mineral production and 20% of export earnings, is controlled by two corporations, American Metal Climax (AMAX)<sup>8</sup> and Newmont Mining. Namibia is also one of the biggest producers of gem diamonds in the world, which are controlled by De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. of South

Africa. Other companies which benefit from the coerced labour condition of Namibia include U.S. Steel, Phelps Dodge, Falconbridge Nickel and Bethlehem Steel. Western investment in Namibia is directly linked to South African private and state capital, as well as being dependent on the South African military and police.

This short and brief historical background is intended to give an idea of the situation which led to the current social inequalities in Namibia, and specifically in Windhoek, which is the setting of this thesis.

## C. Windhoek: The Setting of the Study

Besides being the largest city in the country,
Windhoek is the administrative, economic, political, and
social capital of Namibia. According to Southall's (1961:
6) typology of African towns, Windhoek is a type B town,
meaning it is a town which is a product of the colonial era
whose development was initiated by the German colonists.
In that respect it has much in common with many other
cities or towns in contemporary Africa.

However, many African towns have become capitals of independent countries, where colonial powers at least no longer rule directly, but Windhoek and Namibia remain in the colonial era. The country is still administered, controlled, and ruled by the White minority government of South Africa on the basis of a mandate received from the League of Nations in 1920. Windhoek is the centre of

South Africa's control.

In its administration of Namibia, the South African government has extended and implemented its apartheid system. This racial and ethnic segregationist policy has made the distinction between African, White, and Coloured a fundamental definition in Windhoek's social structure. This structure influences every aspect of the people's lives. The three racial groups are segregated in the residential areas, and the quality of the housing enjoyed by the three racial groups reflects the overall inequalities among the racial groups. Windhoek with the best housing is for Whites, Khomasdal with the second best for Coloureds, and Katutura with the poorest of all is for Africans.

Official urban population data are wrapped by legal definitions of compulsory racism. For example, official estimates of the population of Windhoek at 85,000 include only Whites and not all the other non-White people in the metropolitan area of Windhoek. According to the South African policy of "Homelands", the non-White people in Windhoek are not permanent residents of Windhoek; consequently, they are not counted as part of the population. They are supposedly citizens of their respective "Homelands" and should be counted in their respective Homeland's census.

However, according to a United Nations' Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka, Zambia publication in 1978, the population of the metropolitan area of Windhoek, including Klein Windhoek, Khomasdal, and Katutura is roughly 170,000.

However, since the December 1978 internal election, the South African authorities in Nambia, together with the representatives of the "internal government", have frequently claimed that apartheid has been "abolished" in Namibia. In their effort to gain international recognition, South Africa abolished officially some of the obvious discriminatory laws. Together with the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance No. 19 of 1934, influx control was officially abolished by Act (No. 3 of 1979) of the National Assembly. (Quoted Focus p. 9; WA 2 10. 81).

With the official "abolition" of influx control many people have been coming to Windhoek in search of employment as well as seeking safety from the war, especially in the north. Consequently, the population of Windhoek has grown rapidly recently, but the exact statistics are unknown because most people are squatters due to the housing shortages. The "abolition" of official influx control has made the unemployed vagrants and destitute much more visible than in the past. Previously, such persons would simply be deported to the "Homelands" where they would be concealed from the eyes of the White community and the press.

Also, within the segregated residential areas, there are differences in the sections, reflecting the stratification within the different racial groups. Katutura, for example, is first of all divided into "ethnic" sections and within the "ethnic" divisions there are also class divisions. However, unlike among the Whites, there is no correlation

between "ethnicity" and class. There are proportionally as many Ovambos, Hereros, Namas, and Damaras who can be considered to be from the high classes among the Africans. Likewise, there are proportionally as many people from among the different societies who can be considered to be from the lower classes.

Dolamp which means "lamp made out of a can" (because there is no electricity and the people are too poor to buy a kerosene lamp, they make their own lamps from a can) is, for example, the low class area in the Damara section.

Donkerhoek, which means "the dark corner" is the low class area of the Ovambo section. The area called Beverly Hills or Soweto is the latest area, with better housing with an indoor toilet, indoor running water, and electricity. However, in this high class area, the people are not divided according to "ethnicity". What counts in Soweto is the level of income.

Unlike among the Africans, the Whites and Coloureds are not divided into "ethnic" sections. Among the Whites for example, there are no German, English, or Afrikaner section. They all live in the same sections. The only divisions are according to income. Suburbs like Pioneerspark, Olympia, Suiderhof, Eros are for all well-to-do Whites, regardless of their "ethnicity." There is no official segregation policy among the Whites according to "ethnicity". If there is any segregation among the Whites along "ethnic" lines, it is only a matter of personal choice.

Similarly, the Coloured sections are divided along class lines but not along "ethnic" lines. There are no specific sections set aside for only <u>Kleurlinge</u>, <u>Basters</u>, or Cape Coloureds. The only division which exists in Khomasdal are along class lines.

#### CHAPTER TWO

#### LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

## A. Literature Review

Probably, many other theoretical models can be utilized to analyze the racial inequalities in the cosmopolitan area of Windhoek, in Namibia; however, for my study the caste-class model and the internal colonialism model are the most appropriate models.

The South African Race Classification Board had arbitrarily created three "races" in Namibia; namely, Whites, Coloureds and Africans. This stratification is absolutely artificial because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish, for example between a Coloured and an African, or between a Coloured and a White person. However, this artificial classification is dealt with as if it is reality; once one is classified as being a member of a certain "race", there is absolutely no way of changing from one "race" to another. Therefore, it is legitimate to refer to the three "races" in Namibia as castes, because one's membership in a particular caste is ascribed, but not achieved. However, there are also different classes within the different castes (elaborated in Chapter 5).

Secondly, the three racial castes are ranked with the White caste on top of the hierarchy, the Coloured caste in the middle, and at the bottom the African caste (Pendleton 1974: 165). This hierarchy of the racial caste is maintained and justified by the ideology of apartheid. Apartheid provides the rationalization for the unequal distribution of wealth and resource allocation. This ideology stresses the assumed distinctness of the different castes and in particular the "inferiority" of the African caste.

Warner, (1945) who Cox describes as the admitted leader of the caste-class movement, believes that Blacks in America were no- assimilable because of the prevalence of prejudice which would be effective in not allowing such processes to develop. Also, he alludes to the idea that although Blacks possessed a culture, it was not firmly developed as hereditarily as many European cultures. According to Warner, for prior to slavery, Blacks were culturally an underdeveloped human species. In terms of a perspective, the caste-class school maintained that there were two castes, one formed with Blacks and the other composed of Whites, Whereas social relations were developed in the context of social distance defined within the caste system and corresponding superordinate and subordinate relations as typified in the economic arrangements. To further complicate the stratifying system, a class system developed and was also an intricate part of the caste arrangements. However, the stratification ideology for class was antithetical to

that of caste. In class stratification, ideally, one can move up from a lower class to a higher class; whereas in the caste stratification, mobility is virtually nonexistent. Warner defines class as essentially:

"A status group whose ranking is determined by the evaluation of members in the community. By class is meant two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and accordingly ranked by members of the community, in socially superior and inferior positions. Closely associated with status definitions in his concept of class are two other factors of requirements: participation and acceptance." (Gordon 1958: 89-90).

Warner developed a conceptual scheme in his "Yankee City Series", the following status hierarchy were used: upper-upper (UU), lower-upper (LU), middle-upper (MU), lower-middle (ML), upper-lower (UL), and lower-lower (LL). Each stratum denoted the status position with each ethnic group having its own social subsystem oriented around the ethnic church, ethnic association, family and language, all of which are vital aspects necessary for the assimilation process to begin. Warner defines ethnic as following:

"Ethnic refers to any individual who considers himself, or is considered to be, a member of a group with a foreign culture and who participates in activities of the group." (Warner 1945; 90).

Consequently, ethnics can be either foreign or native by birth. For example, a Greek born in the United States who regularly attended the Greek coffee house, participates in Greek associations and served on the school and church committees of the Greek community is classified as a member of the Greek group. However, one of the major distinctions

that Warner makes is between ethnic and racial groups.

Ethnic groups physically resemble the White Americans or the dominant group in American society which the "Mongoloid" and racially mixed Blacks do not. Thus the ethnic culture does not deviate (similarities that are biological and cultural) from the dominant American culture as significantly as racial groups. In fact, the Blacks possessing the same culture cannot be ranked as a subvariety, because they are, as a result of biological determinants, inferior to "Caucasoid" people regardless of cultural deviation. far as assimilation is concerned, the American class system functions to destroy the ethnic subsystem to increase assimilation. Therefore, the mobile ethnics are perceived as more likely assimilable, unless they retain the social characteristics of their homeland, while the inferior Blacks and "Mongolois" are a colour caste, a system patterned after the Indian system, and are viewed as non-assimiliable.

Allison Davis, et al., (1941) agreed with the position that the stratification between the races resembled the Hindu caste system, when empirically involving themselves in an anthropological study of caste and class in the "Deep South". As an ethnology of the South, it gave special attention to the invention, accumulation, diffusion, and transmission of behavioral patterns.

Davis operationalizes caste as:

"Describing a theoretical arrangement of the people of a given group in an order in which the privileges, duties, obligations, opportunities, etc., are unequally distributed between the groups which are considered to be higher and lower. There are also social sanctions which tend to maintain this unequal distribution. A caste organization, however, must be further defined as one where marriage between the two groups is not sanctioned and where there is no opportunity for members of the upper to fall in the lower one." (Allison et al. 1941: 9).

The distinction between caste and class according to these authors are as follows:

"In class there is a certain proportion on interactions, marriage between lower and higher groups; and there are, in the very nature of the class organization, mechanisms established by which people move up and down the vertical extension of society." (Ibid)

Accordingly both elements were considered essential to their analysis in attempts to determine the extent of prejudicial attitudes from Whites toward the social and economic position in the deep south. Various sanctions developed in the region which were very instrumental in the perpetuation of social distance as inherent within the caste model. The model suggests that Blacks have accommodated themselves to their social and economic positions, and if conflict develops, it is considered minimal.

Basically the caste system functions as a mechanism designed for the sole purpose of "keeping the Negro in his place", wherein Blacks are depicted as inherently inferior to Whites and are known to have originated from a lower form of organism, biologically more primitive, mentally inferior and emotionally underdeveloped. This ideology legitimates the paternalistic behavioral patterns necessary for the

perpetuation of such a social system.

John Dollard (1937) also supports the notion of the caste-class model. He agrees with the idea of a caste operating in the South and focuses on the commonality of groups in accordance with the demands of their concrete social position. Inasmuch as all slaves had a recognizable common psychology and all middle-class Whites would have a common emotional response. Dollard also focused on endogamous marital and sexual patterns developing as one of the more significant factors as an indicator of caste-class relationships in the South.

However, Oliver Cox, (1945) is in opposition to the caste-class position, he argues that one of the main pitfalls of the idea is that none of the supporters ever studied the caste system as it exists in India and therefore have a severe misconception of its structure. According to Cox, caste has reference to the internal social order of society; race suggests a whole people, wherever found on the globe. While racial antagonism tends to divide the society vertically, the caste system tends to stratify it into a status hierarchy.

In response to Cox, Breeman (1960) argues that the caste system in India is antagonistic and may not be as socially rigid as Cox proposes. He feels that there is a commonality because in both cases institutionalized inequalities are the fundamental features. Also both caste systems require separate dwelling areas, occupations, place

of worship, and cultural behavior, which becomes important symbols associated with caste status. Based on this assumption the caste system is a hierarchy of endogamous division in which membership is hereditary and permanent.

According to Robert Blauner, (1972) there are three conditions which are typical of internal colonialism:

- 1) forced entry into the larger society.
- 2) subjection to various forms of unfree labour that greatly restrict the physical and social mobility of the group and its participation in the political arena.
- 3) the destruction of the original values, orientations, and ways of life.

Colonialism and immigration are the two major ways by which plural societies develop. In the case of colonialism, powerful nations acquire new territories or people through involuntary processes such as conquests, capture, and other forms of force or manipulation. Through immigration, new people enter a host society more or less freely. These definitions are basically ideal-types, the polar ends of a continuum.

For Cox (1948), the socio-economic matrix of racial antagonisms involved the commercialization of human labour at a time of European expansion. As the influence of the Church declined, competition among businessmen of different Western European cities for the exploitation of resources increased, as did the development of nationalism as European nations consolidated.

As capitalism developed it was necessary for the masses of people to become proletarianized, their capacity

to work was to become a commodity. Such a process involves conceptualizing, consciously or not, as sub-human, human vehicles of labour power, to behave towards people according to the system imperatives of the market. The capitalist is constrained to regard "his" labour power as an impersonal commodity, an item in the cost of production rather than as an aggregate of human beings. In the course of production a cheap source of labour is both an immediate and a practical end.

In so far as labour can be manipulated as a commodity void of human qualities, the entrepreneur is free to pursue his primary objective: maximization of profit. For the full, profitable exploitation of a people, the dominant group must devise ways of limiting assimilation. Slavery, in capitalist society, presents the best possible situation, Cox argues, for the manipulation of labour. So it becomes in the immediate interest of the capitalist to develop an ideology, a worldview which would facilitate the process of proletarianization of labour in every stage and form.

Within such an ideology, ethnocentrism is developed and exploited to show that the European working class and whole people of other races, whose labour is being exploited, are at best inferior humans.

#### B. Methodology

Namibia today is basically still under colonialism, and the people there are fighting for their freedom. As a result, the minority colonizers are paranoid; they are

desperate to maintain the status quo.

Consequently, Namibia has become a police state.

Therefore, very few independent scholars go to Namibia to do research there. The political atmosphere is very tense and scares scholars away. The few who do want to do research there in spite of the tense atmosphere, are discouraged.

As a result, very little is written in and about Namibia, especially in the social sciences area. Most of the little available literature about Namibia is government controlled, propagandistic, biased, and very weak from a sociological perspective.

As a result of the tense political atmosphere, as well as the nature of the thesis (basically against the status quo in Namibia), it is impossible for me to go to Namibia to collect primary data for this thesis. Therefore, this thesis will be a description and a conceptualization on Windhoek's social stratification, based on secondary analysis of the little literature there is about Namibia and my own experiences as a Namibian utilizing the caste-class models.

As a result, I will rely exclusively on documentary research methods for this thesis. I will make use of other scholars' work about Namibia, newspaper articles, magazine articles, anything available which contains relevant information. Since there is little written material about Namibia, I will also make use of some work about South Africa, because there are so many similarities between the two countries.

#### CHAPTER THREE

# NAMIBIA'S PERIPHERAL POSITION IN THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM

Although the main focus of this thesis deals with the contemporary inequalities between and within the "races" in Windhoek, Namibia, it is important to keep in mind that Namibia has been part of the global capitalist system since the German conquest. Consequently, taking a broad socio-historical approach, my hypothesis is that the current racial inequalities, oppression, and exploitation of the Africans in Namibia are inextricably linked to the development of capitalism in Namibia.

#### A. Informal German Colonialism

The evolution of the principal stages of colonial exploitation in Namibia was telescoped into a twenty year period under German rule. For over half a century, after the declaration of Namibia as a German colony in 1884, there was only informal German colonialism in Namibia. The chief agents of this informal colonialism were itinerant traders of various nationalities, and missionaries, usually from Germany. The traders exchanged consumer goods and arms with the African chiefs in return for commodities like ivory and

ostrich feathers, for which there was a market in Europe. However, the limited extension of these capitalist market relations to the region was to have harmful consequences for the local economies for two reasons: first, because the profits from these transactions were realized in Europe, reinvestment of resources in Namibia did not occur; and second, because of the changes that occurred in the composition of export from the area (Moorson 1977: 3-50)... However, at that historical conjunction social classes, in Western class terms, were non-existent among the indigenous population of Namibia. However, this does not mean that the Namibian population was egalitarian. On the contrary, there were traditional differences of status between commoners and chiefs in some Namibian societies.

#### B. Formal German Colonialism

The informal colonial period ended in the 1890's with the intervention of the German military power in Namibia. The incorporation of Namibia under the aegis of German imperialist state facilitated the expansion of capitalist relations in the colony. In particular, settler farmers and land and mineral speculators from Germany, supported by the Colonial power, began to expropriate land from the indigenous population in the more sparsely populated southern parts of the colony. In an effort to defend parts of themselves against this expropriation first the Herero and then most of the Nama groups rose in armed revolt against

the state in 1904. It was not until these societies had been decisively defeated in 1907 that the colonial power was able to exert control over the southern part of Namibia. The defeat of these societies in the south and the confiscation of their lands was thus a major step forward in the struggle waged by the German state capital to secure favourable conditions for the expansion of capitalism in Namibia. The defeat of these African communities and the subsequent confiscation of their land enabled the colonial state to delimit a vast area in the south of Namibia, the so-called Police Zone, within which capitalist production relations could be established. The expansion of commercial agricultural production was accompanied by the commencement in 1906 of capitalist production in copper and, two years later, in diamonds.

None of the sectors of capital which developed during this period had more than a marginal interest in the human resources of the country, except as labour-power. Its recruitment, distribution, and control was from the start a principle function of the colonial administration. Despite the early success of its military strategy, the German state did not, however, seek to extend the process of military conquest throughout the whole of Namibia. The indigenous population in the south had been virtually decimated by the extermination campaigns of the 1904-1907 war and consequently the state turned its attention northwards to try and meet the relatively limited labour requirements of German capital.

However, the military strength of the Ovambo and Okavango communities in the north, which had been proven in the defeats they had inflicted on the Portuguese, encouraged the state to seek other forms to secure labour for capital. particular, the state sought to encourage the growing drift of migrant workers from these northern communities, which the process of underdevelopment had generated (through cattle and slave trade), by securing the collaboration of . the chiefs. Over the years a system gradually evolved whereby chiefs selected migrants from among their subjects to labour for capital and then taxed them on their returns. Thus, instead of selling these men as slaves, the chiefs now sold them as wage-slaves to capital. As a result the total number of migrants moving south each year rose from less than 1,500 in 1907 to an average of over 10,000 per year between 1910 and 1914 (Moorson 1977: 3-50).

As a result of these measures the capitalist economy underwent an initial period of major expansion: between 1900 and 1910 the value of imports (mainly machinery, tools, and equipment) rose from 7,000 Marks to 44,000 Marks, while the value of exports rose from 8,000 Marks to 79,000 Marks (almost all copper and diamonds) over the same period (Goldblatt 1971: 198).

For the German colonial administration, as well as for the international capitalists who had interest in the exploitation of the Namib desert diamonds deposits and the Tsumeb copper, the use of migrant contracted labour was

ideal. For the capitalists, migrant labour meant superprofits. In the long-term, the use of migrant labour would enable the mines to devolve the cost of social maintenance and reproduction of their work-force upon the subsistence mode of production from which it was recruited, thereby paying the worker little more than the cost of the worker's immediate subsistence.

However, the proletarianization of the migrant
labourers had undesirable contradictions for the capitalists.
The loss of the active adult males for the most part of the
year from subsistence production, touched indispensable
areas of that mode of production such as heavy field work,
repairs and stock supervision, and eventually caused its
underdevelopment.

No statistical data was kept of the proletarianized Africans during that time. However, in 1981 it was estimated that the number of Africans away from their "Homelands" with the contract labour system was about 110,000 out of 150,000 "Homeland" households. Thus up to two-thirds of the "Homeland" households are broken up at any one time and almost all over a three-to-five year period (Green and Kiljunen 1981: 100).

The devastating continent-wide rinderpest epidemic, which reached the north of Namibia in 1879, killed off 90% of the cattle, and recovery was retarded by an abnormal sequence of droughts, floods and pestilence after 1900, culminating in the terrible famines of 1911 and 1915

(Moorson 1977: 29).

By 1920 there were already almost 5,800 Africans employed on mines alone in Namibia (Bazar 1972: 95). It was through the continuing exploitation of this migrant labour force that the wealth from Namibia's resources would be created -- a wealth which over the years was to fuel capitalist expansion not only in Europe, but in South Africa as well.

At this point, as in all the other colonies, social classes, in Western class terms, started to emerge among the Africans who were recruited into the colonial capitalist economy. Clerks, translators, priests, foremen, and middlemen were some of the people who were members of what can be called the emerging African bourgeoisie. Porters, domestic servants, miners, agricultural labourers were the people in the African proletariat. A class stratified society, where mobility from one stratum to the next through education or wealth was possible, was clearly emerging in Namibia. However, the German colonial administration introduced racial segregation and discrimination in order to stop the African's mobility. This racial segregation was later legalized under the South African administration in 1922, as the Native Administration Proclamation. However, the racial segregation served the same purpose under both administrations. of this Proclamation, Africans were legally confined to the limited geographical areas within the Police Zone, the Reserves, which effectively reduced their existing landholdings quite considerably and denied them access to new land on which they could rebuild their declining economies. All land outside the Reserves became legally recognized as the domain of European capitalism, while the Reserves themselves were to become the labour reservoirs for the expansion of capitalism (Wellington 1967: 275).

#### C. From "Reserves" to "Homelands"

For decades South Africa has tried to incorporate Namibia and representatives elected by Namibian Whites sat in South Africa's all-white parliament. But pressures created by political changes in Southern Africa and demands from the international community that Namibia be granted its independence forced South Africa to abandon the idea of outright annexation. Instead South Africa set about creating its own version of an independent Namibia.

The blueprint for the balkanization of Namibia was published in the Odendaal Report in 1964. According to the report, the Africans were to be divided into ten "indigenous peoples", each of whom was to be given a "Homeland". This was South Africa's policy of "separate development".

The terminology was changed in an effort to disguise the truth of the matter; reserves were now called "Homelands". These "Homelands" were to cover 39.6% of the total area of the country. The urbanized Coloureds were to be given separate residential areas in the major towns. The Whites were to have 44% of the total area and the government was



MAP C

# NAMIBIA'S "HOMELANDS" ACCORDING TO THE ODENDAAL REPORT

SOURCE: G. Hovey, Namibia's Stolen Wealth, p. 7.

to retain 16% as government areas (the coastal diamonds fields, wildlife, and National Park areas). Expressed as proportions of the latest South African estimates of population, the country was to be divided as follows:

% of Population	% of Land
11.5	60.4
88.5	39.6
	11.5

SOURCE: Green and Kiljunen, Namibia: The Last Colony, p. 96.

The "Homelands" scheme is a better mockery of the historical rationale on which it supposedly rest, for the so-called "Homelands" have been sited in precisely these areas which were shunned before colonization by the very people for whom they are now designated. The Herero, for example have been dealt the crowning insult -- a "Homeland" in the very Omaheke in which over three-quarters of their people perished of hunger and thirst in the German genocide.

While the proposed reorganization of "reserves" into "Homelands" would have increased both total African land allocation and the fragmentation of groups among isolated pieces of land, it would not have made the African population any more able to live in land alloted. In fact, it would have reduced the quantity of even moderately useable land outside areas reserved for White ranchers. For example, the Hereros, who are traditionally cattle farmers, are dispersed in eleven reserves. Many would have to move to an area in the northern part of the Kalahari Desert, which is probably of poorer quality than any of their old "reserves".

Only about one-fifth of the land is suitable for grazing. The protein and phosphorous content of the grass is so low that cattle are prone to many diseases. The fact that neither "Hereroland" or any other "Homeland" would be economically viable or self-sustaining was quite openly stated in the Odendaal Report (Green and Kiljunen 1981: 97).

In fact, in respect of the three "Homelands" outside the Police Zone, "Ovamboland", "Kavangoland" and eastern.

Caprivi, the present lack of viability relates in large measures to deliberate non-development or prevention of development, not just to land availability and quality. For example, "Kavangoland" probably has the highest crop-cultivation potential in the country but the present situation there is hardly impressive. The variety of crops, maize, millet, sorghum, and vegetables grown with the help of simple tools and cattle manure is larger than in any part of the country, but in some years the region is completely dependent on imported food.

In this way, the chief function of the "Homelands" in apartheid's grand design, to convert the peasants' areas into pools of cheap labour, has been fully achieved. Two supporting clamps complete the regime's iron grip on the Namibian peasantry. It had to ensure that no-one could escape by becoming independent commercial farmers themselves, but also that no-one became completely landless and destitute -- otherwise, either wages for migrant workers would have to be raised or their families would simply starve

to death.

The South Africans have blocked any chance of Namibian African peasants buying their way to selfsufficiency in two ways. First, they made sure that Africans had very little opportunity to gain access to their ancestral lands, which the government converted to private ownership and distributed to its subsidized White settlers. Although there is no absolute ban on African ownership of private farmland, the state has the legal power to stop the transfer of such land from Whites to Africans. In reality, only a handful of Africans, most D.T.A. adherents, returned exiles, and many other puppets of the government, have been allowed to be farms in the "White areas". In any case, with no access to the lavish credit which the state gives to the White farmers, Africans have been virtually denied any chance of accumulating sufficient funds to buy commercially viable farms, which today cost an average R200 each (Rl = U.S. \$1.40).

Second, the government saw to it that no sizeable group of peasants could ever rise to commercial self-sufficiency by selling cash crops. Land in the "Homelands" is not owned by the peasants, either individually or communally, but by a state institution, the South African Native Trust, which distributes and controls it through the South African appointed hierarchy of chiefs and headmen. Official regulations ensure that there is no security of tenure -- peasants are given their plots for life but can be thrown off

on a number of pretext -- and impose a ceiling on the number of stock or area of land any individual may hold. In some parts of the country, even when peasants have produced a surplus despite these handicaps, they have found it impossible to sell. Cattle exports are banned, ostensibly because of disease -- in other words to guarantee that there is no risk of competition to the settlers' cattle. Grain crops are too expensive to export to the towns because the government has deliberately never completed the railway to Ovamboland which the Germans began in 1914. And whenever African traders have tried to run vegetables and other food supplies through to urban markets by road, their lorries have been harassed and driven off the highways by the police (Department of Publicity and Information, SWAPO of Namibia 1981: 63-64).

In addition, taxes were to be paid in cash (Grazing Tax, Dwelling Tax, Hut Tax, and even a Dog Tax in some cases) added to the pressure on Africans to seek paid work outside the "Homelands" (Green and Kiljunen 1981: 91).

#### D. The United Kingdom's Capital in Namibia

Unfortunately for Germany, Namibia changed hands and German capital was never to benefit fully from the exploitation of the commodities it had begun to extract. The outbreak of World War I, South Africa's invasion of Namibia in 1915, at the request of the allies, and the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 put an end to German colonial

rule in Namibia, and effectively transferred it to the British capitalist sphere of influence. British capitalist domination was effectively entrenched in Namibia.

However, during the negotiations that followed the war, Britain's plans for the new colony (which she wished to see annexed to her dominion, South Africa) were nearly thwarted by the United States. The United States, whose aims during the negotiations were to try to weaken the power of British capitalism, opposed the annexation of Namibia to South Africa. Eventually, a compromise was agreed upon whereby South Africa was designated the mandatory power in Namibia, responsible for the territory to the League of Nations. Thus, although Namibia still fell under British capitalist domination, political control was mediated through South Africa.

South Africa, in its own and British capital interest, acted swiftly to transfer control of Namibia's diamond resources to a British-oriented company so as to secure the world market for diamonds for British interests. Immediately after the peace treaty of Versailles had been concluded the Anglo-American Corporation, a British-owned company registered in South Africa, gained control over the most important diamond mines in the country, forming the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (C.D.M.) to control the operations. British capital had thus secured for itself control over Namibia's primary source of internationally marketable mineral wealth.

At the same time European settlers, farmers, traders, and entrepreneurs from South Africa flocked in to establish themselves in the country while many Germans were repatriated. By 1921 there were only 8,000 German settlers left in the country, while the British and South African settlers numbered 11,000 (Wellington 1967: 275).

#### E. Namibia Under South African Colonialism

By the time of South Africa's official occupation of Namibia, the capitalist mode of production was the dominant mode of production in Namibia. The subsistence mode of production was almost completely destroyed, except on a very small scale. Most of the best farming land (60%) (Green and Kiljunen 1982: 96) was already under White control, by 1920 (Police Zone) and 6-7% of active men in 1914, from Ovamboland, where over 46% of the Namibian population lives, where already migrants in the contract labour system (Moorson 1977: 37). The figure was actually somewhat higher than the 6-7% over a longer period, given that many men did not re-engage in the subsistence mode of production within one year.

As a result the advantage of using migrant labourers whose reproduction needs were met by the subsistence mode of production was lost by the capitalists. The migrant workers were now exclusively dependent on wages. However, the capitalists were not ready to give up their superprofits by increasing the workers' wages. Consequently, to oppress and

exploit the African workers, the notorious apartheid system was implemented by the South African government. Among all the many discriminatory functions of apartheid is this particular case, apartheid was implemented to deny the workers of Namibia their rights to organize themselves in trade unions. It also was implemented to protect the White workers from the African workers' competition. However, despite the great risk to individuals and their families inherent in a confrontation with authorities, industrial action by Namibian workers in defense of their rights has a long history. Strikes or threatened work stoppages have occurred throughout the colonial period. Table 8 shows the recorded strikes in Namibia from 1915-1972. The list is almost certainly incomplete, and the original compiler of the table concluded that there may in fact have been over 80 strikes by Namibian workers over nearly 67 years since South African rule began in 1915.

As a periphery of South Africa, Namibian mineral wealth has contributed significantly to the development of South Africa. South Africa has encouraged the expansion of the profitable primary sectors, which are predominantly controlled by South Africa, while preserving the country as a market for South Africa's manufactures.

In looking at the list of names of all the international companies which are involved in exploiting Namibia's mineral riches, it is quite obvious that Namibia is a pheripheral country in the capitalist global system. Namibian investments

have been very profitable for the foreign firms involved. Between 1946 and 1962, it has been estimated that about a third of the national income was shipped out of the country in the form of profits, interest, and dividends. Profit alone totalled \$125 million in 1971, about a fifth of the national income (Seidman 1977: 169).

South Africa, together with international firms, has been extracting and shipping mineral wealth out of Namibia, but has not built the facilities to refine the metals there. For example, the Tsumeb copper mine has increased the capacity of its concentrator in Namibia to reduce the shipping of the ores, but it has not built facilities to refine the metals there. In fact, Tsumeb and O'oKiep announced plans to build a refinery in South Africa itself, near Cape Town, to produce 120,000 tons of cathode copper from Namibian concentrates. Apparently they planned to follow the pattern of neo-colonial powers all over the world, by refining crude ores shipped from the periphery to their factories in the semi-periphery or center. However, because of mounting pressure from the United Nations, these plans have been shelved for the time being (Seidman 1977: 166).

## l) Fishing

Namibia's fishing grounds are historically among the richest in the world. Pilchards or sardines were the most imported fish, followed by maasbanker, anchovies, tuna, and mackerel. The fishing industry is South African owned and

managed with Namibian Africans supplying the labour. In 1975 Namibia was the largest producer of canned pilchards in the world, and in the mid-1970s the industry contributed as much as 13% of the GDP and 15% of all exports. After mining, fishing was the second major industry in the country (Cooper 1982: 76).

Ironically, fish is not a source of protein for most of the coastal people in spite of an extreme protein deficiency in the area. The tinned fish is too expensive for Africans, and most has been sold in South Africa, the U.K., Japan, France, the United States, Netherlands, and Australia.

Today, the industry is in ruins; massive overfishing reduced the catch from a record 1.5 million tons of pilchards in 1968 to a mere 12,000 tons in 1980. Early warnings were ignored and quick profits took precedence over the need to protect a vital national resource. In 1976, 5,000 Africans had jobs in the fishing industry at Walvis Bay, but by 1980 fewer than 500 jobs remained. In 1981 pilchard fishing was finally banned (Hovey 1982: 25-26).

### F. The Development of a Caste in Namibia

The lucrative profits the foreign private and parastal firms reap in Namibia are the result of the low wages they pay to their African labourers, as well as the relative free hand they have been given to extract Namibian mineral wealth. Wages and working conditions are worse than in South Africa

itself.

As already mentioned, apartheid was also implemented to protect White workers from African workers' competition, and as a result some jobs are reserved only for Whites, and Whites received sometimes up to ten times more money than Africans for comparable jobs. As a result of these differences in pay and lifestyle, looking at the stratification of Namibia today it resembles the caste-class model, as developed by Cox, Warner, Allison David, Dollard, Pettigrew and others, when they were dealing with race relations in the Deep South of the United States. A quick glance at the wage differences between African and White workers at the Tsumeb mine makes the point clear:

TABLE 1

U.S. Dollars	African	White
Minimum	\$ 24	\$300
Maximum	\$146	unavailable
Average	<pre>\$ 39 in cash \$ 32 in kind</pre>	\$490

SOURCE: Siedman, 1977.

Showing that the stratification of the population of Namibia resembles the caste-class model is the major focus of the thesis. My major point of contention is that the caste-class stratification of the population of Namibia is inextracibly linked to the development of capitalism in Namibia.

The locus of the analysis of this thesis will concern only Windhoek, which is the largest town in the country, where all the elements of the Namibian population are represented. However, I feel that it is valid to generalize from Windhoek's findings to all of Namibia.

Before the arrival of Europeans in Namibia, the indigeneous populations had their own stratification systems, varying from society to society. However, through the German colonialism, the British neo-colonialism, and the internal colonialism imposed by South African settlers, new models of stratification and inequalities were provided and imposed. In the same cases, the stratification systems of the indigeneous population were submerged by the power of the new symbols of power, mechanisms of control, organization of status, and hierarchies of office and position. Thus, the indigeneous population was re-formed and ordered into new labour and social systems, and were socialized to the new symbols and positions of power and authority.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

## CASTE STRATIFICATION BETWEEN THE "RACIAL GROUPS" IN WINDHOEK

Stratification may be viewed in a general sense as how a society solves the problem of allocation of resources; how sources of wealth, power, and opportunities are distributed and made more available to individuals and groups. Man has not yet solved the problem of how to make everything equally available to all people in the society; thus resource allocation is a fundamental problem.

Stratified societies share certain features in common.

Pendleton (1974: 163-164) has summarized them as follows:

- 1) Social groups are relatively permanent, ranked hierarchically, and usually individuals have a feeling of group consciousness.
- 2) Political, religious, economic and other major institutions are associated with social groups.
- 3) Social distance is maintained between groups, and there is an ideology which rationalize the hierarchical ordering of groups.

Two types of stratified societies are often distinguished; namely class and caste stratification. A class stratified society consists of different strata in the society made up of groups which have group consciousness, a particular life style related to occupation, wealth and

control of resources. The ideology of socioeconomic class is that of mobility from one stratum to the next, depending on individual achievement; at least that is the ideal. The ideology of caste stratification is rather different.

Mobility is restricted to the social groups of one's birth; social distance between groups is maintained by the concept of pollution; groups are endogamous and occupationally stratified.

In the metropolitan area of Windhoek, as well as in all of Namibia, the stratification system exhibits aspects of both caste and class.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, and even more so since 1948, South Africa has regarded and treated Namibia as the fifth province of South Africa. Apartheid has been as much a part of the policy pursued in Namibia as it has been in South Africa. As a result, in 1950 when the Population Registration Act was passed in South Africa, which for the first time contained a racial classification of the population, it was applied automatically to Namibia also. At a press conference after the Act was passed, the South African Minister of Interior remarked;

"Until this moment many people had lived all their lives in a state of unease because it was uncertain to which racial group they belonged. But now, after the enactment of the Population Registration Act, certainty had been given, and the clouds which hovered over them had disappeared." (Quoted in the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva 1960: 21).

The enactment of the Population Registration Act of 1950 in South Africa was intended to provide the foundation

for the strict implementation of the policy of apartheid. The Act actually introduced a rigid and inflexible system of racial classification with the underlying purpose of determining the racial group of every individual once and for all. According to the Act, the population of South Africa, including Namibia, was to be classified as White, Coloured or Native (African). In South Africa there is also another category; namely Asian, but since there are no people of Asian descent in Namibia, that category is not applicable.

- a) a "White" person means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously is a white person, who is generally accepted as a Coloured person;
- b) "Native" means a person who in fact is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal or tribe of Africa;
- c) a "Coloured" person means a person who is not "White" or "Native". (Quoted in the International Commission of Jurists, 1960: 20).

Unlike statuses in the southern United States, which gave a more or less definition of blacks as any person having more than a specific percentage of African blood (1/16, 1/32, etc.), no such workable definition exists under apartheid. This lack of a workable definition is reflected in the fact that different criteria (e.g. blood, ancestry, hair texture, shape of facial features and complexion) are used to classify the population. Thus, borderline cases present many problems. Sometimes people

who have the same parents are racially classified in different "races".

The decision with respect to all racial classification is taken by the Director of Census on the basis of information in his possession and supplemented where necessary by additional information obtained by officials of the Department of Interior. It must be emphasized, however, that his decision is by no means final. At any time after the person has been classified in the Population Register this classification can be altered by the Director of the Census. He is not compelled to state what has led him to reconsider his previous decision. It may therefore well be that he gets his information from informers. The fact that he is not obliged to disclose his sources of information opens the door to informers whose motive in denouncing people who are already classified may be to eliminate more successful business rivals, or merely sheer malice.

I personally know a man in Windhoek who is in appearance obviously Coloured but his sons and daughters were nearwhite. His sons, in fact, served as whites in the "all white" South African Army, but after some time it was discovered that they were Coloureds. They now live in Khomasdal and are classified as Coloureds. However, their father does business in Katutura, and he is classified as an African.

Furthermore, there are many Namibians whose appearance does not furnish conclusive evidence as to which "race" they belong. Their classification therefore depends very much on

the question of general acceptance. Some whites, for example, have found themselves downgraded because they have been classified as Coloureds due to their friendly relations with Africans and Coloureds and their general behavior, which leads to the acceptance that they actually belonged to another group than to that they claimed to belong. This lack of formal precision about the most basic single principle on which society is organized is only one of the paradoxes. of apartheid.

The lack of a scientific criterion and the presence of some Namibians whose appearance does not furnish conclusive evidence as to which "race" they belong, have made the whole classification process an arbitrary one.

However, although these cleavages are artifically created, the distinctions between the "races" are fundamental in Windhoek's social structure and influence every aspect of the people's lives. Thus, there is a racial consciousness among the "races" in Windhoek giving the confusing and nebulous term "race" in Namibia the same meaning as defined by van den Berghe:

"A human group that defines itself or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate immutable physical characteristics which are in turn believed to be intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other nonphysical attributes or abilities." (van den Berghe 1967: 9).

Besides the racial consciousness among the racial groups, the three "races" also satisfy other definitions of caste. They are (a) hierarchical, (b) almost entirely endogamous, (c) mobility between the "races" is, with a few

exceptions, virtually impossible, (d) the residential areas are geographically segregated, and (e) apartheid rationalizes the status quo. Therefore, it is legitimate to refer to the "racial groups" in Windhoek (Namibia) as racial caste.

Like all other statistical data in Namibia, reliable population figures are virtually impossible to find. As a result of the tense political atmosphere, many impartial social scientists avoid doing social research in Namibia, and the few who want to do research there, in spite of the political conditions, are discouraged. Consequently, most of the social research done in Namibia is done by social scientists who are supportive of the status quo. As a result, their findings are extremely biased and warped. For example, official estimates of the population of Windhoek at 85,000 relate only to the white city and not the whole metropolitan area. Katutura and Khomasdal are excluded; thus migrant workers and permanent township residents are excluded.

With the above paragraph in mind, according to a census taken by South African authorities in May 1974, which for political reasons overcounted the whites and undercounted the other "racial groups" (Serfontein 1976: 16), 11.6% of Namibia's total population was classified as whites (O'Callaghan 1974: 49) Also, according to Pendleton (1974: 70) 47.7% of Windhoek's population was classified as whites. Whatever the true figures are, Windhoek is demographically unusual, since in most African towns, as

well as in the rest of Namibia, Africans outnumber the whites.

#### A. Hierarchical Order of Windhoek's Castes

#### 1) Discrimination in Hiring Practice

Regardless of the actual population figures, the Whites are clearly on top of the hierarchy in Namibia. Not only do they enjoy a much higher standard of living, education, and health than the other racial groups, but they virtually monopolize all occupations beyond the level of semi-skilled workers. They are the only "racial group" to have political rights and enjoy countless other legal and customary privileges.

Windhoek is a boom town where fortunes are made at a frantic get-rich-quick pace -- the only qualification is that you have to be classified as White to make them (Winter 1977: 35). It is by no means unusual for the young immigrant mechanic from West Germany to find himself a business owner after only one or two years in Windhoek. After four or five years, he can easily own a farm the size of an English county.

The occupational structure of most employment in Namibia is sharply divided between a majority of unskilled, mainly manaul, African workers, and a White clerical, technical, supervisory and managerial superstructure. There is little statutory job reservation in Namibia, but an impenetrable wall exists in the hiring practice of most employers. Not only are there no training facilities for Africans, but also very few firms take on Africans as

apprentices. There are very few African managers and administrators, and in white-collar jobs, except for teachers and nurses, many of whom have been able to get only the most basic training and are not sufficiently qualified for their posts.

For the South African government, realizing that there are not sufficient Whites, has given the Coloureds a more privileged position than the Africans, although still subordinate in the apartheid hierarchy. They are tolerated because they have skills which the Whites use and do the type of work which most Whites find unattractive or physically too demanding. The men are skilled bricklayers, carpenters, painters and stone masons employed by the booming building industry. The women work as shop assistants, pack clothing in the dry cleaners, work in the storerooms of the supermarkets, or press and iron clothes in local laundries (Winter 1977: 60). Because of lack of training facilities, many of the Coloureds are actually recent immigrants from South Africa, attracted by the high wages and the many jobs which are made available to them. But in reality their "privileges" are small and do not amount to much difference between Coloureds and Africans in economic terms.

In fact, 80% of the Coloureds are only semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Whites hold nearly all senior, middle management and civil service posts and form over 90% of senior supervisory, professional, technical and scientific staff. Over 70% of artisans and 40% of clerical staff are

TABLE 2

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY ESTIMATES (1977),
(% OF TOTAL LABOUR FORCE IN THE CATEGORY)

Category	White	"Coloured"	African	Total (000)
Managerial/administrative	97	2	1	10
Professional/technical/ para-professional	60	15	25	17
Clerical/secretarial	42	25	33	6
Supervisory/foremen	32	16	52	12.5
Skilled - non-supervisory	60	20	20	5
Semi-skilled	5	15	80	50
Unskilled	2	9	89	90
Domestic	-	17	83	75
Small-scale non-agricultural self-employment	20	28	52	12.5
Small agricultural	-	4	96	240
Total (000) rounded	365	485	433	518

SOURCE: Green and Kiljunen, Namibia The Last Colony, p. 104.

White. Actually only 12.5% of White employees are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, and most of these are simply there to direct the labour of African workers (Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia 1981: 66-67).

#### 2) Discrimination in Wages

Whites in Windhoek, as well as in all of Namibia, enjoy employment opportunities which cover practically the full range of educational and salary opportunities, from professional to unskilled jobs, with an estimated annual salary in 1968 of \$4,565 for men and \$1,896 for women.

Table 2 lists job categories and annual salaries for all White workers.

Government, railways, municipality, and all private businesses have a way policy which pay Whites the best salaries, Coloureds the second best, and Africans the least of all (Cronje 1979: 43). Sometimes this relates to better training and qualifications which Whites have because of better educational and training facilities. However, in some instances salary scales vary according to "race" and sex. In the teaching profession for example, there are separate scales for Whites, Coloureds, and Africans.

African teachers generally make 32% to 46% of White teachers' pay, and Coloured teachers make 52% to 60% of White teachers' salaries. Women make between 10% to 20% less than men, depending on category and race (Pendleton 1974: 55).

Coloureds, numbering 13.1% (Pendleton 1974: 70), are

TABLE 3 1968 Windhoek Job Categories and Average Salaries for Whites

	White		White Woman		
Job Category	Percent of Total	Mean Annual Salary	Percent of Total		
Professional and Technical	14.7%	\$6,583	15.8%	\$2,418	
Executive and Managerial	9.3	8,373	1.6	3,662	
Clerical	22.5	3,646	61.2	1,819	
Transportation Worker	9.7	5,543	11.1	1,911	
Craftsman, Production Worker, and Labourer	28.4	3,626	2.9	1,676	
Service Worker, e.g., Waiter, Maid	9.3	3,091	7.4	1,707	
	TOTAL MEN	6,595	TOTAL WOMEN	3,152	

SOURCE: W. Pendleton, Katutura: A Place Where We Do Not Stay, p. 54.

nearest to the Whites insofar as they suffer fewer vexations and disabilities than the Africans; in the sense that they do not need to carry a pass, and they are not viciously hounded by the police (Winter 1977: 61), but in terms of education and income, they are closer to the Africans. Coloureds thus occupy a middle position in the hierarchy between Whites and Africans, but are nearer to the latter than the former. They are tolerated by the Whites, because they have useful skills, but they are not accepted by the Whites. Neither do Whites have any meaningful social contacts with them. The Coloured men are primarily employed as craftsmen, production workers, and labourers, especially in construction, and the Coloured women are primarily employed in the service industries as waitresses, hotel maids, and domestic servants. The estimated income in 1968 was about \$1,424 for Coloured men and about \$634 for Coloured women (Pendleton 1974: 55).

Africans numbering about 81.9% (Serfontein 1976: 10) of the country's total population but only 39% of Windhoek's population (Pendleton 1974: 1) have the lowest standard of living, occupational status, education, and are the targets of the most discrimination.

Among the three racial castes, the African caste approaches the Windhoek job market at a great disadvantage. An austere Poverty Datum Line (P.D.L.<sup>2</sup>) for Windhoek, which is the biggest and wealthiest town in the country, estimated a minimum of R50.82 as necessary in 1967 for a family of

five to live on per month. A sample survey conducted during the same year revealed that only 13% of the city's African workers earned over R50.00 a month, only 5% over R60.00, while 80% earned between R20-49, 63% under R40.00 and 7% under R20.00 (Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia 1981: 74).

Employers and South African officials have always made much of the non-cash supplement which many employers add to the cash wages they pay. In hard reality this is little more than a humiliating and patronizing way of making the cost of labour cheap. The "wage in kind" is usually simply basic accommodation and food, which employers lay on so as not to have to pay their workers enough to provide these things for themselves. The accommodation provided is often no more than a corner of a shed or a corrugated iron shanty for house servants, and grim, overcrowded barracks for contract workers in the towns and mines. The "food" may be nothing more than sacks of maize and bleak canteen meals in the compounds. It is no coincidence that the employers paying the lowest cash wages are the ones who provide the most in kind.

In practice, the supposed benefits of these cheap provisions to the workers are illusory. The quantity of food and housing is often appallingly bad -- so bad that the worker must spend part of their precious cash wage to compensate.

Certainly wage rates vary a great deal among the

small urban businesses, even in the same industry. However, even today not one employer, state or private, pays its general labourers over 85% Africans, a cash rate above the poverty line.

Apart from the few African businessmen whose monthly income ranged from \$100-400 monthly, the average income for African men was estimated at \$592 per year in 1968. this mean income figure is very misleading. Migrant workers, for example, make much less than the \$592 estimated annual income (Pendleton 1974: 57). The only relatively well-paid African workers are those with skills or trades such as lorry and bus drivers, sales and clerical staff, and teachers. Even here, the rates are mostly less than 50% above the P.D.L. (Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia 1981: 76). In other words, few African households can hope to avoid degrading and crippling poverty on the wages of one worker alone, and many struggle to avoid it even on the wages of two. Most families must send out all their able-bodied members, including the old, those in poor health, youths, and even children, in order to scrape together a bare subsistence.

No reliable statistics exist for the salaries of
African women, but what is certain is that African women have
few opportunities for employment in Windhoek's economy. In
colonial society women carry a double burden of disabilities:
First, as in most forms of society known in history, they
suffer exploitation on the grounds of sex; second, under

colonial capitalism, they are subject to discrimination by race and class. The two kinds of oppression interact and reinforce each other.

The key factors in the particular form of oppression suffered by women in Windhoek are the influx control laws. By systematically denying women the right to settle in Windhoek, as well as the other towns in the country, the majority of the women are denied the right to work for wages. Of the few who do manage to slip through the influx control net and secure residential rights in Windhoek, most can only retain those rights through dependence on a male worker who himself qualifies. Even this possibility is increasingly problematic as apartheid officials endorse out women and children as superfluous appendages, who once deported never return.

Few jobs are open to African women outside domestic service and those who do find wage-labour have to tolerate the worst pay and conditions of all. Many women manage to augment their wages by operating shebeens (illegal beerhouses), selling handicrafts or taking in washing. But their services are mostly paid for out of the meagre earnings of their fellow workers, and always the government officials and police are on the watch to stamp out any form of livelihood which reduces people's dependence on wages.

### 3) Discrimination in Health Services

During 1981, a relatively large amount of information relating to the health of the Namibian population, health care, and medical services appeared in the Namibian press. Unfortunately, no statistical information relating only to Windhoek's population was made available. However, looking at the detailed statistical information on health and health services in the whole country, we can clearly see that the Whites are on top and the Africans at the bottom.

An official inquiry into the Health Service by Dr.

Kenneth Abrahams, a returned exile and medical practitioner
in Khamasdal, the Coloured township outside Windhoek,
revealed that the main causes of sickness and disease among
the African population are poverty, malnutrition, overcrowded
living conditions, lack of preventive services such as
innoculation programs, and an acute shortage of doctors,
nurses, and clinics in the rural areas (Quoted in International Defense and Aid Fund Briefing Paper Number 4, March
1982).

These are social problems that could be attacked by a conscientious governmental system, but the very system that should tackle these problems has instead made them worse. Access to health services in Namibia is determined by the regime's racial and ethnic classification of the population. Medical facilities have not only been racially segregated for many years under South African occupation, but are also geographically concentrated in urban areas, where most of

most of the White population live.

According to Dr. Abrahams findings, the state of health and the provision for treatment continue to vary clearly according to race. He calculated for example, that the life expectancy for Whites was between 68 and 72 years, while for Africans and Coloureds, it was between 42 and 52 years. The infant mortality rate for Whites was 21.6 per 1,000 children under the age of one, 145 per 1,000 for Coloureds and 163 per 1,000 for Africans. According to Dr. Abrahams, alcoholism among Africans and Coloureds had reached alarming proportions. In his practice, 20% of all Africans and Coloureds came for medical attention suffering from alcohol-related ailments (International Defense and Aid Fund Briefing Paper Number 4, March 1982).

In 1980-81, the annual per capita expenditure on health services for Whites was \$270, compared to \$65.84 for Africans in the Kavango "Homeland"; \$43 in Caprivi; \$30 in Ovamboland; \$17 in Damaraland, and a meager \$5.40 in Rehoboth (Coloureds' "Homeland"). Of 152 doctors in Namibia, 80% of them practice in the urban areas where most Whites live. With only 20% of the doctors in the rural areas where about one-half of the population lives, the doctor/patient ratio was about one doctor for every 17,000 people (Hovey 1982: 10). Between 1973-75 there were 162 African patients per one hospital bed, compared to 88 White patients per one hospital bed (Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia 1981: 93).

#### 4) Discrimination in Education

One of the most visible aspects of apartheid, and a key factor in its (apartheid) perpetuation, is the educational system, especially the so-called Bantu education. Bantu education is based on an official white educational theory that the purpose of African education is to bring up Africans to accept their oppressed social status and to be content with modest needs and access limited to the "less demanding duties" in the society. In 1953, the South African Minister of Bantu Education, introducing the Bill in Parliment, made the following statement:

"Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live; Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state." (International Labour Office in Geneva 1977: 42-43).

Like everything else, schools in Windhoek, as well as in the whole of Namibia, are racially segregated and differentiated by law in terms of content and operational framework. There are three unequal curricula; the best one being for Whites, and the most inferior one for Africans.

Teachers' qualifications and salaries are also different, with the Africans always at the bottom. Unfortunately, educational statistics relating only to Windhoek are non-existent consequently, I will make use of the national statistics to illustrate the hierarchical ordering of the Nambian people according to "race". However, I believe that the national statistics are more or less representative

of the situation in Windhoek, also.

In African primary education, the main emphasis is on manual skills; other subjects include natural science, biblical knowledge, history, and geography. Biology, chemistry, and mathematics are of secondary importance. In all African schools, teaching for the first four years is in the vernacular. Although this is a positive point in developing cultural identity, in Namibia it is at the same time part of a policy of emphasizing racial and ethnic differences, and making it more difficult for Namibians to communicate with each other. The language question is serious, especially as the majority of Africans never go back to school after the first four years and thus never acquire fluency in any of the official languages of the country (Afrikaans, English, German) (Green, Kiljunen 1981: 107).

There is a shortage of African teachers and the pupil/
teacher ratio is extremely high for Africans, especially
during the years of primary education. Table 4 gives the
number of African (including Coloureds) and White schools,
the number of teachers and pupils, and the pupil-teacher
ratio in these schools.

For Africans there are not enough schools; classes are large, distance from home to school are long; rarely are there organized school meals. The level of education of most African teachers is inadquate; a third of African teachers have only a primary school background without any vocational training.

TABLE 4
EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA, 1960-73

	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of Pupils	Pupil-Teacher Ratio
Africans				
1960	313	1 310	43 624	33.3
1966	415	2 071	78 295	37.8
1970	526	2 713	112 006	41.3
1973	592	3 453	138 890	40.2
Europeans				
1960	63	666	16 257	24.4
1966	77	979	19 893	20.3
1970	80	1 105	22 349	20.2
1973	85	1 233	23 195	18.8

SOURCE: J.H.P. Serfontein, Namibia, p. 39.

TABLE 5

EDUCATIONAL STANDARD OF AFRICAN TEACHERS
IN NAMIBIA, 1975

	"Col	loured"		В	lack
University degree Matriculation	16 233	2.1% 30.8%		12 51	0.4%
Junior Certificate or equivalent Std. 6 (8 years school)	359	47.5%		304	10.2%
Technical or other vocational No qualification	27 121	3.6% 16.0%	1	004	 33.7%
	756	100.0%	2	977	100.0%

SOURCE: Green and Kiljunen, Namibia the Last Colony, p. 107.

In 1975-76 nine times as much money was spent per White as per African child. Education is compulsory for all 7-16 year-old White children, and 7-14 year-old Coloured children, but not for Africans. In 1977, the percentage of 5-19 year-old African children attending school was recorded at 55%, the figure being as high as 72% for the 5-14 year-old age group.

However, these figures are based on the number of children registered for school. In practice, it is not uncommon for children to be absent for long periods. Table 6 shows the government expenditures on education for the three racial castes in 1975-76.

The drop-out rate for Africans is high throughout the whole educational system. Three-quarters of African children drop-out during the first four years and only 2% continue beyond eight years.

In 1975, only 631 (0.4%) African and Coloured children attended the sixth form, as compared to 2,711 (11%) White children. It should be noted that a very large number of Africans in Namibia have never been to school; illiteracy is common, 19% for Coloureds and 69% for Africans in 1977 (Green and Kiljunen 1981: 107-109).

The high drop-out rate among African students is caused by the apartheid system. As a rule, African men do unskilled work, and most get the same kind of employment irrespective of their educational achievement. Furthermore, the low income of most African families puts pressure on




TABLE 6

EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION IN THE 1975-76 BUDGET

	White	"Coloured"	African	
Total (Rand)	1 445 000	4 160 000	9 135 000	
% of the total	52	15	33	
per pupil (rand)	615	163	68	

SOURCE: Green and Kiljunen, Namibia the Last Colony, p. 108.

TABLE 7
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN NAMIBIA IN 1975

	African	"Coloured"	White	Total
Lower primary	98 926	15 160	8 623	128 709
	74.1	59.4	36.7	67.2
Higher primary	31 001 23.2	8 471 33.2	8 130 34.6	47 608 26.1
Secondary level	3 65 <b>4</b>	1 893	6 747	12 294
	2.7	7.4	28.7	6.7

SOURCE: Green and Kiljunen, Namibia the Last Colony, p. 108.

young men to start making their contribution as soon as possible. Also, although education is provided at a low cost, few Africans can afford higher education (Pendleton 1974: 54).

#### B. Endogamy as a Mechanism to Maintain the Castes

Endogamy, another essential characteristic of caste, is likewise found in the three racial groups of Windhoek (Namibia). The inter-marriage between Whites and the other two racial groups was, although socially taboo, not prohibited by law prior to 1949. However, the situation changed completely after 1949 with the introduction of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act. Although this Act was introduced for the population of South Africa, it was also applied to Namibia without any changes. Thus, a complete compulsory endogamy between Whites on the one hand, and Coloureds and Africans on the other, was introduced. Even miscegenation outside marriage was a criminal offense under the Immorality Act of 1927 and amended in 1950 and 1957.

Marriages between Africans and Coloureds were not prohibited by law, and the racial taboo was not as strong as among Whites, but other factors such as religion, language, and income hindered exogamy to a great extent. Some conjugal unions between Africans and Coloureds do take place.

Coloured women are sought after as conjugal partners by some African men. To marry a Coloured woman is for some African men a way of gaining prestige. It is also a way to win

mobility for his children if he can get them classified as Coloureds instead of Africans.

I know some wealthy African businessmen in Katutura, the African Township, who are married to Coloured women. Their children attend school in Khomasdal, the Coloured Township, where the quality of education is better than that offered to African children. The children are encouraged to speak only Afrikaans and to socialize and play only with Coloured children.

Among some young African men there is a certain amount of social status in the man's peer group if he has a conjugal union with a Coloured woman. On the other hand, an African may be ostracized, especially by older Africans, for having a conjugal union with a Coloured woman. Some Coloureds, especially the well-to-do ones have historically been looking down upon the Africans, and as a result some Africans resent them. Also, most of the uneducated Africans who cannot speak Afrikaans have no way of communicating with Coloureds, since most Coloureds do not spead the African languages. Also, because Coloureds are given better opportunities than Africans under the apartheid system, and because they speak the same language as some Whites (Afrikaners), they are to an extent associated with the Afrikaners. Some Africans even refer to the Coloureds, in a pejorative way, as the "nephews" of the Afrikaners. This is why some African men may be ostracized by fellow Africans for having conjugal unions with Coloured women (Pendleton 1974: 153).

In their attempt to convince the opponents of South Africa that the latter has granted genuine independence to Namibia, South Africa and her puppets (DTA) "abolished" some of the obviously discriminatory laws. This so-called new "Namibian government" came into existence in 1978, after the so-called internal elections, which were sponsored and supervised by South Africa herself. Among others, two of the legislative changes which took place after the "internal elections" were the "abolishment" of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the "abolishment" of Racial Discrimination in the Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities (Internal Defense and Aid Fund Briefing Paper Number 4, March 1982).

However, all this "abolishment" of discriminatory laws was only a facade. This limited legislation contained many important loopholes and was open to abuse. The Abolishment of Discrimination Act, for example, permitted restaurant owners to restrict admission to "protect civil standards". The Apollo, a well-known restaurant in Windhoek for example, has continued to refuse entry to Africans, despite considerable public criticism (Internal Defense and Aid Fund Briefing Paper Number 4, March 1982).

Similarly, the abolishing of the Immortality Act did not change the attitude of the people. Whites still look down upon the other races, and to my knowledge no conjugal unions have occurred across racial lines. The only noticeable change, when I went back to Namibia, was the increase in prostitution among African and Coloured women catering to some adventurous, wealthy White businessmen, looking for

exotic entertainments. Some young African and Coloured men who had the desire to date White women, had no access to them. The very few who had a chance feared for their lives, because White men had formed an organization called White Resistance to attack African and Coloured men who were mixing socially with Whites. In fact in 1980, when I visited Namibia, a young African woman was shot by the White Resistance Movement, but nobody, to my knowledge, was prosecuted.

### C. Restricted Mobility and Ascribed Membership in the Castes

The racial groups in Windhoek (Namibia) also satisfy the minimum definition of caste, in that membership in them is ascribed at birth and mobility is virtually nonexistent, except through surreptitious "passing". After the passing of the Population Registration Act of 1950, one is classified at birth either as White, Coloured, or African and there is no legal way of changing from one racial caste to another. However, some light-skinned Coloureds manage to be accepted as Whites and some brown-skinned Africans as Coloureds. It is a painful process to change from one racial caste to another, and it involves some sacrifice. Usually, one must move to a different area or town, where one is not know, and/or must deny their parents in order to conceal their true identity successfully.

Some Coloureds can pass as White, and although they live under great strain of possible detection, it is

financially and socially well worth the risk. I personally know a Coloured man, though married to a Coloured woman, had near-white skin. This, together with a gift for repairing machinery, he was hired as a manager of a factory. He rarely mixed with his Coloured neighbors, but chose instead friends from the White community. Eventually, the strain of this dual existence took its toll, and such was his fear of detection that he left his wife and children and slept on the floor of the factory. He did not want to be seen in Khomasdal anymore, but he could not move his "Coloured-looking" family to the White area of Windhoek.

Passing is a painful and abhorred process, especially among Africans, but given the restrictions of apartheid, it is the only available way for some ambitious, young men to improve their life chances and that of their offspring.

The incidence of passing is, of course, impossible to determine accurately or even approximately. However, the racial groups in Windhoek (Namibia) are anything but "pure" after years of miscegenation. A number of Whites have a "touch of the tar brush" and a number of Africans have genealogical connections with White families, either in Namibia or somewhere else in the world.

Special boards are entrusted with the task of deciding the racial membership of marginal persons who contest their classification. Meanwhile, although on a very small scale, passing continues.

## D. Geographic Segregation and Unequal Facilities

Residentially, the three racial castes are also segregated. The Group Areas Act (1950) provided that each racial group should live in a specially demarcated area (Unesco Press 1977: 74). The differential allocation in the society of resources, wealth and power, results in the maintenance of different lifestyles by members of the different racial groups. The greater income of Whites enables them to enjoy a larger percentage of everything material which the society has to offer. Besides income, education and health, the quality of housing enjoyed by the three racial castes reflect the overall stratification.

The best houses in Windhoek are for Whites, Khomasdal houses for Coloureds, and Katutura housing, poorest of all, for Africans.

All Africans are required to live in Katutura. The only Africans exempted from this regulation are domestic servants who live on their White employer's premises.

Katutura is about two and one-half miles from the center of Windhoek, and the majority of Africans commute to go to work.


Katutura is a new type of location for Africans; in all previous locations residents built their own houses. In Katutura the municipality built the houses and rents them to qualified applicants. These two, three, and four room individual houses have unfinished walls, no ceilings, no inside doors and toilets. The only exceptions are the new four-room houses built very recently; for the well-to-do

among the Africans.

The most striking thing about the physical appearance of Katutura is that all houses look alike, although they are painted different colours. Each house has approximately the same size plot which has a fence around it.

The majority of the houses are four rooms and are arranged in a similar pattern. The sitting room usually has a table and four chairs. Visitors are entertained in the sitting room or in the backyard. If people cook inside, there is a woodstove or a small primus burner in the kitchen. Otherwise meals are prepared outside on an open fire in the backyard. Very few people can afford to have electricity in their houses which can be connected at an extra cost. Also, very few people have any kind of appliances (Pendleton 1974: 4). Until very recently, no Africans were allowed to purchase any plot or house in Katutura. The usual pattern of arrangements in a four room African house is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 1.

In contrast to Katutura, Khomasdal, the Coloured township, is much more like a White suburb. The standard of Khomasdal housing is better than Katutura. A variety of accommodation is available, from one bedroom houses either fully furnished (walls plastered, ceilings, doors) or unfurnished. Coloureds are allowed to purchase plots in Khomasdal and to build their own houses if they so desire. Since the socioeconomic gap between Coloureds and Whites is less than the one between Africans and Whites, Coloureds tend



Street

FIGURE 1

DIAGRAMMATICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE PATTERN OF OF A FOUR ROOM AFRICAN HOUSE IN KATUTURA

to decorate their houses like Whites, especially Afrikaners, who are culturally similar to them. <sup>5</sup> Unlike the Africans, Coloureds can live in the urban areas even if they are not working anymore due to old age or health reasons. Coloureds have essentially the same resident status as Whites, i.e., they may enter, leave, and take up residence in town at their own discretion (Winter 1977: 61).

There are individual differences to these customs, but when Whites treat Africans and Coloureds politely, they are viewed with suspicion, and more often than not, they are ostracized from the White communities. 6

Besides the properties of racial castes already
mentioned, being a member in a given race entails many other
consequences. To be White in Namibia entails full humanity
and citizenship plus many other privileges restricted only
to the Whites. All Whites over eighteen years of age
(except convicted criminals) have the franchise at all levels
of government. White workers are protected from African and
Coloured competition, insofar as they retain a virtual
monopoly of skilled manual jobs, as well as higher clerical,
managerial, civil service, and professional posts. Whites
are the only racial group who have the right to organize in
trade unions, to go on strike, to bear arms, to own land in
most of the country (except in the Bantustans), to move
freely in the country without carrying a pass, and to stand
for elective office.

On the other hand, being an African in Namibia means

being deprived of all the privileges the Whites enjoy and being treated as an unwelcome intruder in one's own country. The only thing Africans are needed for is their labour power. If somehow Whites could come up with a more successful formula of exploiting African labour without dealing with their other needs, they would be happy to use it. In fact, besides the other considerations, the "Homeland" scheme is a way of exploiting African labour without caring for their . needs.

Housing for Whites is best of all. They have houses with all the modern facilities as in any other Western country. The quality and size vary from social class to social class. However, almost all families have an African servant, and almost all Whites, except the very poor, have large backyards with swimming pools and tennis courts.

In addition, social distance between the racial groups is marked by other customs as well. Whites, Africans, and Coloureds do not normally eat or drink together. In shops where Africans make the tea and coffee, the Whites take theirs together; the Africans usually go in the back or out to take theirs. There are few occasions where the three races come together, and when they do, such as sports contests, they are still spatially segregated and given differential treatment. Many businesses, municipal, government, and administration offices have separate facilities and counters for the different races. Even at companies where the races work together, there are separate

toilets, eating, and drinking utensils. When Whites and Africans ride in cars and trucks together, Africans usually sit by themselves in the back seat of the car. There is even a particular way to offer a cigarette to an African. Whites take the cigarette out of the box and give it to an African, but when other Whites are offered cigarettes, the box is opened and extended forward for the White to pick out the cigarette himself. Whites do not usually shake Africans' hands when greeting. However, if it happens Africans do not extend their hands first in fear that they might be refused (Pendleton 1974: 99). Africans are allowed to live in the "White areas" as long as they are working, but when they are disabled due to accidents or old age, and not in service anymore, they are forced to move to the "Homelands" (Pendleton 1974: 43).

After all the years in White service, Africans do not receive any pension or any other aid such as social security and/or welfare. They are left in the barren "Homelands" during their unproductive years to starve to death. Since they are in so-called independent states, the South African government releases itself of the responsibility of caring for older and disabled Africans, and the so-called "Homeland" governments are unable and/or unwilling to care for such people.

Africans and Coloureds are not only segregated but almost invariably given inferior services and facilities, or no facilities at all in practically every sphere of life.

Until very recently, racial segregation was the rule in all

the social facilities, restaurants, hotels, cinemas, hospitals, schools, waiting rooms, parks, taxis, beaches, ambulances, trains, buses, picnic areas, post offices, elevators, banks, toilets, entrances to public buildings and even cemetaries. However, the internal elections of 1978 changed things somewhat; petty apartheid, such as segregated entrances to public buildings is not practiced anymore. But the main structure of apartheid has not changed at all. African and Coloured servants accompanying their masters are tolerated among Whites, provided their servile status is unambiguous. No African or Coloured may bear arms, stand as a candidate for government office, or live anywhere else, but in special sites as designated by the Group Area Act.

Technically, of course, Whites are subjected to racial segregation too, as are Africans and Coloureds. Whites are not allowed to use facilities designated for Africans or Coloureds or to live in African or Coloured areas. However, in practice, such restrictions are irksome only to a small minority of liberal Whites who reject segregation in principle and who resent the possession of racial privileges. For the majority of Whites, these "restrictions" are in fact advantages because Whites monopolize the lion's share of existing facilities and resources in both quality and quantity.

The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act passed in 1953 states categorically that facilities for Whites on the

one hand, and Africans and Coloureds on the other hand, should not only be separate but also unequal in both quality and quantity (Tuden and Plotnicov 1970: 355).

In this chapter I describe how discriminatory laws of apartheid are employed to maintain the caste system in Namibia. Discrimination in hiring practices, in wages, in education, in housing, and laws such as the Group Area Act and the Immorality Act, are some of those mechanisms employed to perpetuate the inequalities between the races. As a result of all this legalized discrimination, the stratification of the population in Windhoek resembles a caste-class type of stratification.

#### CHAPTER FIVE

# CLASS STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE "RACIAL GROUPS" IN WINDHOEK

According to McKee (1981: 194), the fact that class is somehow related to economic organization leads some people to define class simply in terms of income. However, income alone does not adequately define class. Sometimes skilled and semi-skilled unionized workers in the large, mass-production industries earn as much, or even more, than many white collar workers. As a result social scientists specified the source of income as a criterion of class. Occupation, property, and income can therefore, give a sufficient and revealing conception of stratification in economic terms.

Karl Marx also defined class in terms of social economics: "In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of other classes, and put them into hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class" (Quoted in McKee 1981, 196). In addition Marx emphasized consciousness as an important criterion for class. A social class, in his conception, exists only insofar as

an economic stratum is aware of and is prepared to struggle for its economic interest against another class. Hence, his conception of social class is very much political.

Max Weber on the other hand took into account the complexity of stratification in suggesting the multidimensionality of stratification. He took into consideration such forms as class, status and party. For Weber status is distinct from class. Status refers to the ranking of social groups by prestige and honor. (McKee 1981: 196). When individuals occupy a similar position in the prestige ranking of their community, and recognize each other as equals, they are a status group. They form friendship circles, dine together, belong to the same organizations, encourage the intermarrying of their children, and exhibit a common lifestyle.

Status and class are interlinked; status is never independent of class. Low status is always associated with lower-class position and high status groups usually hold higher-positions though the relations may not be perfect. On the other hand, people in the same social class may be in different status groups, for example in Namibia, a poor White is in a higher status group than a rich African or Coloured in the society at large. In a racist country such as Namibia, racial status plays an important role in the stratification of the population.

However, a class in the Namibian context I define as a ranked social category of persons identified by their levels of income and material consumption and their social status

based on the social honour and prestige of characteristics such as occupation, education, urbanization, language, and housing location.

In the previous chapter, I dealt with the caste stratification between the "races" in Windhoek, and in this chapter I am going to describe the class stratification within the "races".

The within-caste class stratification I am going to describe in this chapter is not based solely on economic criteria. It is based on the interplay of both class and status.

Although "race" is by far the most important criterion of status in Namibia, it is not the sole relevant factor in the system of social stratification, for each "racial group" has an internal socioeconomic stratification. However, it is important to mention that, because of the unjust and racist system of apartheid, internal class differences are secondary.

White artisans, for example, enjoy a legally protected position and a relatively high standard of living and lack explicitly any class consciousness of belonging to a proletariat opposed to the interest of the capitalist class. They also have no common interests with the proletariat of the other "races." Whites view themselves, first and foremost, as members of the dominant "racial group." Colour consciousness creates bonds of solidarity between all whites regardless of class and prevents the establishment of most

class ties across "racial lines." Colour overshadows and weakens class and class consciousness. For example, at the government controlled Augustineum High School in Windhoek, there are both White and African teachers; however, these teachers do not establish any friendships across "racial lines." They do not even act like colleagues. At the school they have different staff rooms, and they even belong to different teachers' associations. Since they are all high school teachers, one will expect them all, both White and Africans to be members of the same class and to have a common class consciousness. But in Namibia that is not the case. Colour is the overriding factor.

Racial consciousness among Coloureds also entails other consequences. As an intermediate "racial group", most Coloureds especially those who are relatively well-off, have traditionally been caught between their feelings of "racial" superiority vis-a-vis the Africans, and their constant frustrated hope of acceptance by the Whites. This has led to ambivalent attitudes towards the Whites, to political passivity, and to failure to identify with the Africans. Like South African Coloureds, Namibian Coloured proletariat have, just like the white manual workers, refused to identify with the African proletariat, which they view with feelings of superiority and hostility. (Tuden and Plotnicov 1970: 360).

Only very recently, after realizing that Namibia will eventually be African-ruled, have some Coloureds started to identify with Africans and join African political movements,

especially the lower class Coloureds.

Among the Africans in Windhoek, there are three distinguishable categories of Africans. There are African townsmen, born and raised in Windhoek. The people approximate to the ideal type of the townsman as the man who has all his important social ties bounded by the town and feels no pull from the rural area. Under them are those born in the rural areas ("Homelands") but who, in due course, will drop or lose their country connection. In the long-run, they too, do not feel the pull from the rural areas. Contrasted with all these "real townsmen" (whether they are such by birth or adoption) stand all the migrant workers who still have parents, wives, children, land, cattle, houses, group membership, and societal status outside the town and who are thereby subject to the rural area pull in more or less full force. This distinction among Africans plays an important role in the within-caste stratification of the African caste. (Mayer 1962: 585).

Unlike in South Africa, there is no statutory job reservation (Serfontein 1976: 41), but an impenetrable wall exists in the hiring practices. Very few white collar jobs are open for Africans. Teaching, clergy, clerks and nursing are almost the only white collar occupations available for Africans. As a result the above-mentioned occupations are considered prestigious among the Africans. By virtue of their education, occupation of prestigious jobs, and lifestyle,

teachers, clergy, clerks and nurses are considered to be members of the higher class among Africans. However, in terms of income, some migrant labourers, for example, might have higher income, but because of the blue collar work they do and its low status, the fact that they are uneducated, and live in the compound (male single quarters), they are considered to be members of the lower class among the African population of Windhoek.

Educational institutions for Africans in Namibia are concentrated in the urban areas, as a result, African townsmen tend to be the most educated Africans. Even if African townsmen do not have formal education, by staying in towns, they learn Afrikaans, the official language of Namibia today, and many other ways to survive in the urban milieu. Consequently, African townsmen usually have the best "African jobs" and the migrants the least desirable jobs. Therefore, the longer one has been living in Windhoek, the more one is perceived by others, as well as by himself, to be from a higher class. Therefore, class differences among Africans in Windhoek are determined by many factors. Education, wealth, duration of residence in the urban area, lifestyle, and knowledge of Afrikaans are all relevant variables; however, because of apartheid, which has not encouraged differentiation among the Africans (because all Africans are paid and treated nearly the same, and all Africans are forced to live in the same area) class differences among the Africans are compressed. However, once this compressing restriction of apartheid is removed, as it happened in all the other independent African countries, these compressed classes have the potential to develop into highly differentiated classes.

Political consciousness also militates against class differences and leads people to think in terms of "we Afriacns." As a group which carry the brunt of White oppression, Africans have a strong sense of brotherhood which also militates against class division. Brotherhood is a sentiment, which is much stronger among migrant workers and the poor Africans; however, because almost all Africans are poor as compared to the Whites, the brotherhood sentiment is present among all Africans, regardless of class and/or Brotherhood is the means by which Africans protect their own people. It emphasizes respect, trust, consultation and dignity, and delineates a distinct moral universe which specifically excludes all Whites and Africans who by their actions have proven to be non-brothers. Non-brothers are Africans like spies, policemen, informers, and other Africans associated with the government. The ideology of brotherhood provides the setting for a private culture in which Africans can be themselves and masters of their own actions. (Gordon 1977: 102).

Wealth as a principle criterion of status among

Africans does not play the role it plays among Whites. The

scope for capital accumulation among the Africans is

stringently limited, 4 yet status between them are exaggerated

due to compression.

Most Africans are more or less on the same level of capital accumulation, but occupational differences are used to differentiate individuals. For example, teachers are accorded higher status than taxi drivers, while taxi drivers may earn as much income if not more. Because of the compression of the social classes of African Namibians into the single "African caste" of low social honour, small status differences such as clothing and education, and material possessions take on much greater importance in differentiating the population between and within social classes.

According to apartheid policy in Windhoek an African may not acquire land or a business except in the African location (Katutura), and discrimination debars him from practically all better-paid jobs, no matter how qualified he is. The monotonous uniformity of municipal housing in Katutura imposes a common mold and standard of living on Africans of all classes. Except in clothing, furniture, and cars, there is little scope for conspicuous consumption and for material symbols of wealth.

#### A. The White Ruling Caste

The Whites are first segmented into three significant ethnic groups along linguistic and religious lines. In Windhoek, there are Afrikaners (60%), Germans (34%), and English (5%). (Pendleton 1974: 61). The remaining 1% of the White population in Windhoek is made up of small numbers

of Portuguese, Italians, and other immigrant groups.

Since Namibia still functions as a racial colony, it is very attractive for many Whites from all over the world, especially from other African countries where colonialism has just been eliminated. As a result, the distinction among Whites between those either born in the country or who have lived in the country for a long time as against recent arrivals is important. Recent arrivals are Whites who came to settle in Namibia not too long ago. They are mostly Whites who came during the 1960's when most African countries became independent, and the most recent arrivals are those Whites who came to settle in Namibia after the decolonization of Angola, Mozambique, and Guniea Bissau. Some recent arrivals are viewed with suspicion by other Whites because of the way they treat and relate to Africans. Usually Whites in Namibia do not shake hands with Africans when greeting, they do not eat with Africans, and when traveling in a car with an African, they usually let him sit alone in the back seat. Some recent arrivals such as British, Germans, Americans, and even some South Africans are usually not familiar with these customs, and some of them who are familiar with these customs violate them deliberately, sometimes as a way of protesting against the race relations in Namibia. The three White subgroups (Germans, Afrikaners, and English) are not hierarchically ranked per se, but there is some correlation between ethnicity and occupation. (Pendleton 1974: 165).

# 1) <u>Commercial and Professional Bourgeosie</u> (The White Elite or Upper Class)

At the apex of the hierarchy of Windhoek's White population are members of a class I will call the commercial and professional bourgeoisie. 1 This class is made up of mostly German and English-speaking Whites. The class consists of the wealthy and most successful businessmen, executives, professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and the so-called liberal White intelligentsia. With the assistance of the apartheid system, which makes the conditions in the country conducive for economic exploitation, the commercial and professional bourgeoisie has a virtual monopoly over the Namibian economy. Members of this class either own shares or/and are executives of the major retail stores such as the O.K. Bazaar, Model Supermarket, and Karoo which are branches of South African companies. Some are managers of the multinational corporations (MNC) or their subsidiaries such as Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Corporations, General Motors, American Motor Corporation, Boeing Company, Chase Manhattan Bank, IBM Corporations, Toyota, Barlows, who conduct business in Namibia. (See A. Cooper, 1982).

There is, however, resentment against this class from other lower classes of Whites. Even though some members of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie have been in Namibia for generations now, they are still considered "foreigners", especially by the Afrikaners, because they still have cultural, as well as social, ties with their

countries of origin in Europe. 2 (Winter 1977: 37). They also have a tendency to look down upon the less urbanized and poor Afrikaners. A clear evidence of the German and English condenscence is their refusal to speak the Afrikaans language. In spite of the fact that Afrikaans is really the lingua franca of Namibia, most Germans and English do not speak Afrikaans, and those who do know Afrikaans pretend that they do not know the language. Germans regard all Afrikaners as boorish and uncultured and even refer to them as "those white kaffirs." (Winter 1977: 39). In Windhoek for example, there are five daily newspapers printed in three different languages. "Die Suidwester" and "Die Suidwes Afrikaner" in Afrikaans, "Die Algemeine Zeitung" in German, and "The Windhoek Advertiser" and "The Observer" in English. When I was growing up in Windhoek, every afternoon after school, we used to go downtown and sell newspapers on the street for a few extra pennies. During that time we were experienced to distinguish between Afrikaners, Germans, and English among the Whites on the streets, because if you make the mistake of trying to sell a newspaper printed in Afrikaans to a German or an Englishman, you could receive a slap across your face, with remarks such as "Do I look like a Boer?"

On the other hand, some Afrikaners have developed feelings of cultural inferiority vis-a-vis the English and Germans as indicated by the Afrikaners efforts to marry Germans or English as a way to improve their social status. (Tuden and Plotnicov 1970: 358).

During vacations members of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie take cruises to Europe, not flying, because flying is considered an inappropriate way to travel when going on vacation. Usually one reads in the newspapers about the voyages of these well-to-do families to Europe.

Among the Africans, members of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie are considered as being not as racist as the other Whites. Unlike the poor Whites they do not delight in subjecting the Africans to petty humiliation in order to flaunt their power. Most Africans prefer to work for people in this social class. However, this does not mean that members of this social class are not in favor of apartheid. In the past, most Germans in South Africa supported the political, economic, and social policies of South Africa. Through this policy, the government of West Germany obtained preferential treatment in Namibia from the South African government, including an open-door policy which allowed settlement in Namibia by German immigrants. (Kerina 1981: 7). Even today, the racial policies of South Africa are endorsed by most Germans and their only consideration about the Africans is how their (African) labour potential could be exploited for the development and improvement of the White caste. Most Germans respect what they regard as a strong government provided by the Botha-regime. If they secretly find some of the laws irksome, if they believe that there could be concession to the Africans in certain areas, they nonetheless put up with these irritants, drink their

beer in their night clubs, and remember the size of their bank balance, allowing this to lull their conscience.

The only reasons why they are considered to be less racist by most Africans are, first and foremost, they have less contact with Africans, because they are primarily in high positions and are not employed in supervising African manual labourers. Also, unlike some poor Whites, they do not resort to naked racism to reaffirm their status; their wealth is a constant reminder to all that they are White, privileged, and insulated from any domestic change in government.

As a result of their liberalism as far as race relations are concerned, most of the anger and frustrations of the Africans are not directed against this social class; however, without any doubt, this social class is the major beneficiary of apartheid in economic terms. (Winter 1977; 41).

Members of this class belong to many different voluntary associations. They belong to youth movements, scientific and cultural groups, and business and professional associations. As far as the religious affiliation of this class is concerned, it depends mostly on ethnicity. The Anglican Church is attended by English, the Roman Catholic Church attended mostly by Germans and some English, and the Methodist Church attended mostly by English. (Pendleton 1974: 115).

# 2) Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie (The White Middle Class)

As already alluded to, it is extremely difficult to rank the top two classes of the White caste, because no particular class is high on both political power and economic power. The commercial and professional bourgeoisie for example, has economic power, but politically they are not that powerful. On the other hand, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie do not have that much economic power compared to the commercial and professional bourgeoisie; however, since 1948 they have held a virtual monopoly of political power through the Nationalist Party, which represents the vast majority of them.

The bureaucratic bourgeoisie consists predominantly of Afrikaans-speaking Whites, but not exclusively, the vast majority belonging to one of the Dutch Reformed Churches. This class is made up of people occupying the top positions in the administration, government, and municipality. Politically speaking, they belong to the "master race", and they know it. They have power, and at every opportunity they let the rest of the world know it. Most people in this class are wholeheartedly committed to the perpetuation of apartheid in Namibia at all costs.

Power corrupts. As a result of their powerful position, this class of Whites is notorious for its ill-treatment of Africans.

Usually Afrikaans-speaking Whites are the ones who work in all the municipality offices catering to Africans.

Most of them were known for their maltreatment of Africans.

One White office worker for example, at the Department of
Bantu affairs where work-seeking permits were issued for
Africans, was notorious for the maltreatment of Africans.

He used to make them stand all day in the hot sun of Namibia,
sometimes as hot as 85-90 degrees F, without serving them.

All day long he would growl, shout, and slap them for
supposedly being too noisy or for not standing in the queue
properly. This abuse went on for a long time, Africans
launched official protest, but nothing changed for a long
time.

In this class, together with the petty-bourgeoisie (the White class under it) are the Whites who cause Namibian Africans to view all Whites as dishonest, ambitious, untrustworthy, fearsome, and above all capricious and unpredictable. Or as one African aptly summarized it, "All Whites are policemen and in a colonial situation a policeman is someone to be feared." (Quoted in Gordon 1977: 90).

Economically, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is also well-off. Its style of life is more luxurious than that of the petty-bourgeoisie. Homes and motorcars are larger, newer, and more elegant than that of the petty-bourgeoisie, and the number of African servants often reaches three or four. Educationally, the class consists of people who have at least a secondary education, some with vocational training in technical fields, and some who have university degrees. Occupationally, this class is very diverse, however, the

majority of the people in this class have occupations which are related to the government. These Afrikaner bureaucrats may be working for the Police Department, Department of Water Affairs, Bantu Administration, the Post Office, Department of Railways or the Municipality.

As far as their relations are concerned with the commercial and professional bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is envious of them because of their capital, but they resent them for not learning Afrikaans, for being liberal with Africans, and for having cultural ties with their countries of origin. They also accuse the commercial and professional bourgeoisie of being unpatriotic especially, because members of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie do not make a career of being in the army. From the point of view of the Africans and Coloureds, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, together with the petty-bourgeoisie (mostly Afrikaners) are the perpetuators of the apartheid system. Consequently, they are associated the most with the oppression of Africans and Coloureds in Namibia.

Members of this class belong to the same voluntary associations as the commercial and professional bourgeoisie.

# 3) Petty Bourgeoisie (The White Lower Class)

At the bottom of the White hierarchy is a class of not so well-to-do Whites which I shall call the petty-bourgeoisie. This class consists of people in diverse occupations, such as petty civil servants, white-collar workers, railway

workers, police, public works and road employees, salesmen, clerks, semi- and unskilled artisans, and African labourers' supervisors. They are predominantly Afrikaners with very little or no formal education. Recently, many poor Whites from Angola have also become part of this class.

Politically, members of this stratum are as conservative as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, if not more so. They distinguish themselves from the other Whites, in particular the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, mostly by their lower income and education and through the taste and lifestyle differences which these imply. Rather than being a proletariat with a consciousness and opposed to the bourgeoisie, in the Marxian sense, the petty-bourgeoisie are supportive of the status quo. However, it is understandable, because the petty-bourgeoisie in Namibia enjoy a legally protected position under the apartheid system as well, a relatively high standard of living. They live in modest but comfortable houses in segregated suburbs, own a small motorcar, and employ, at least, one or two African servants.

One unique feature about Whites in Windhoek (Namibia) is the absence of paupers. The apartheid system is specifically designed to eliminate that problem. However, due to the relative poverty of this class, compared to the other classes, Whites in this class resort to unnecessary naked racism to reaffirm their White-ness. They constantly utilize the derogatory term "Kaffir" to refer to the Africans, do not talk to them or explain things to them. They are

antagonistic to and shout at the Africans and are very impersonal with them. (Gordon 1977: 90).

This class of Whites are envious of the two White classes above them. As a means of mobility, many of them try to marry into the higher classes and put a great deal of emphasis on educational attainment. Economic success is also a means for improving one's class. However, through government subsidies and the so-called civilized labour policy, it is rather common for Whites in the petty-bourgeoisie to move up, especially to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Mobility among Whites is rather commonplace.

The Whites are overall a privileged caste in Namibia.

They control the lion's share of everything society has to offer. Most Africans are not even aware of the internal socioeconomic stratification of the White caste. Most Africans perceive all Whites as being wealthy without realizing that some Whites are poor compared to some other Whites. They compare all Whites only to themselves, and in that comparison they are right; most Whites are wealthier than most Africans.

# B. Classes Within the Coloured Interstitial Caste

The Coloured Caste is stratified along lines similar

to the Whites, but at a much lower socioeconomic level.

Whereas the lower class among the Whites is a small minority,
the vast majority of Coloureds constitute an impoverished

proletariat. However, the Coloured stratification system

is different from the White system in one important respect. As among Coloureds in South Africa, all things being equal, the more closely a Coloured resembles a White person in skin colour, hair texture, and facial features, the higher his/her status. Coloureds are on the average, at least, as colour-conscious as the majority of Whites. (Tuden and Plotnicov 1970: 360). The well-to-do coloureds, who almost resemble Whites and want to be accepted as Whites, are especially the most colour-conscious Coloureds.

Among Coloureds in Namibia, there is a clear distinction between Rehoboth Basters and Kleuringe. Basters are Coloureds who are descendants of concubinages or unions usually between African women, mostly Namas, and white men, whereas Kleuringe are Coloureds who are descendants of Coloured women's and white men's concubinage. Even though members of the original Rehoboth community are registered as Rehoboth Basters at their own request, (Serfontein 1976: 14) "Baster" is a somewhat derogatory way of saying someone is a descendant of mixed parents in Afrikaans. The literal English translation for the term "Baster" is "bastard". On the other hand, "Kleuringe" means exactly Coloured in Afrikaans, without any pejorative connotations attached. Most of the Kleuringe are relatively recent immigrants from South Africa, whereas the Basters came to settle in Namibia around 1868. From about 1871 the Basters were in de facto Possession of the Rehoboth Gebiet (Area). (Serfontein 1976: 15).

Besides the <u>Basters</u> and <u>Kleuringe</u> there are also some Cape Coloureds from South Africa, who are attracted by the high wages in Namibia and the many jobs made available to them. Most of them work only temporarily in Namibia, and after making their "fortune" they usually go back to the Cape. Some of them are even deported back to the Cape from time to time because they come into Namibia without the proper papers. (Winter 1977: 60).

and are also usually members of the lower class, whereas most of the <u>Kleuringe</u> are lighter in complexion and also usually in the higher class among Coloureds. It is an extreme liability for a Coloured to have an African mother is he/she wants to be accepted in the higher circles of the Coloured community because the majority of Coloureds look down upon Africans. As an intermediate caste, the Coloureds have traditionally been caught between their feelings of racial superiority vis-a-vis the Africans and their constantly frustrated hope of acceptance by Whites; however, in recent years socioeconomic criteria have become more important than physical traits in determining status among Coloureds even though appearance still plays an important role, especially among older and uneducated Coloureds.

Many young and educated Coloureds react very strongly against status differences based on physical characteristics and against the approval of concubinage with Whites among some members of the lower class to improve their "race". The

ideology of apartheid stresses the differences between the "races" and especially the superiority of the White "race".

As a result, some Coloured women, especially poor uneducated <a href="Basters">Basters</a>, prefer to have children by White men, even illegitimate children, as long as the biological father is a White man. By so doing, they hope to "improve" their "race". Like among South African Coloureds, in practice, the two sets of status criteria are difficult to disassociate, because there is still a fairly high correlation between physical traits and various indices of socioeconomic status within the Coloured caste of Windhoek (Namibia).

(Van der Merwe 1962: 302-311).

As a result of the small size of the Coloured population (13% in Windhoek) (Pendleton 1974: 70), and the economic restriction due to their apartheid system, there are only minute variations among the Coloured population, especially among the lower strata. In economic terms the lower classes are virtually on the same level, consequently, it is almost impossible to enumerate all the lower strata. There is not much differentiation among this stratum due to the compressing effect of apartheid. As a result, I will dichotomize the Coloured caste only to a higher class and a lower class.

# 1) The Coloured Bourgeoisie (The Coloured Elite)

The higher class of the Coloured caste, which I shall call the Coloured bourgeoisie, is much smaller than the lower class, the Coloured petty-bourgeoisie, but still

sizeable. It consists of occupations such as clerks, businessmen, and professionals like schoolteachers, doctors, and lawyers. As already indicated, this class is usually well-off, well-educated, and mostly light in complexion.

Some of them build their own modest homes in Khomasdal and do not live in the uniform municipality houses, expand their houses by building additional sections to their houses. Almost all members of this class own their own cars, some own brand new cars, and some even own expensive and elegant cars such as Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, and Jaguar.

Most of them have African domestic servants. This is the Coloured class which sometimes can "pass" as Whites.

They are also the people who traditionally have been fighting to be accepted as Whites. Consequently, through their repeatedly frustrated aspirations of being accepted as Whites, they have become the most apolitical statum in Namibia.

Most of them are members of the Labour Party, formerly known as the Federal Party, led by Mr. A.J.F. Kloppers, a schoolteacher, who had been in Namibia for over thirty years now (Sefontein 1976: 141). Through their aspiration to be accepted as Whites, Mr. Kloppers has always been a Government Pro-apartheid "stooge". However, over the years, he became embittered about the number of unfilfilled government Promises. At the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, Mr. Kloppers has proved to be one of the realistic leaders, by fully realizing that there could be no permanent solution to

the Namibian dispute without eventually involving SWAPO. However, because he has been a South African "stooge" for years, Mr. Kloppers and his followers have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. They do not condemn the illegal South African regime in Namibia, but neither do they support any of the revolutionary movements in the country. They are now politically dradsitters (neutral), ready to support whoever is have the upperhand in the Namibian dispute.

Besides tennis clubs, rugby clubs and soccer clubs, there are no other voluntary associations members of this class belong to.

# 2) The Coloured Petty-Bourgeoisie (The Coloured Working Class

Below the higher class of the Coloured caste, is a proletarian class which the vast majority of Coloureds constitute. This class, which I shall name the proletarian petty-bourgeoisie, consists mostly of Coloureds referred to as <u>Basters</u>, some poor Cape Coloureds, and some Africans, mostly Namas, who registered themselves as Coloureds.

They are usually less-educated compared to the other Coloured class, but they usually have certain needed technical skills. They include persons with occupations such as bricklayers, carpenters, mechanics, painters, plumbers, and electricians. This class of Coloureds perform technical jobs which White workers consider undesirable or physically too demanding. A good number of them also do manual unskilled labor like the Africans, but to eliminate any

solidarity between African workers and Coloured workers, the Coloured workers are paid about 20% more than the African workers (Pendleton 1974: 55). Also to foster division between African workers and Coloured workers, the two proletarian classes usually do not work side by side. Also to drive even a bigger wedge between the Coloured workers and the African workers, for the sake of divide and rule, the White authorities provided separate municipality houses for Coloureds in Khomasdal. Their homes were rather better constructed, more money is spent on their education, and they have a better choice of jobs and employment. They are also given a few privileges which are totally denied to Africans. They do not need to carry a pass, and they are not as viciously hounded by the police.

Some of the <u>Basters</u> who have relatives in Katutura (the Windhoek African township) visit and associate a great deal with the Africans. Many of them do not even have a negative attitude towards the Africans. They only classify themselves as Coloureds for economic reasons.

Politically members of this class have always been members of the Volkparty, but in 1975 there was a split in the party. Some of them under the leadership of Dr. Ben Africa joined the Turnhalle Conference (now the DTA), while some members under the leadership of Dr. Stellmacher and Mrs. Ford were supportive of SWAPO and eventually joined SWAPO (Serfontein 1976: 140).

Like the other Coloured class, members of this

class do not belong to any other voluntary associations besides rugby clubs and soccer clubs. Very few of them are members of the tennis clubs, because in Namibia tennis is considered an elite sport.

# C. The African Lower Caste

Among all the castes in the metropolitan area of Windhoek dealt with so far, the African caste has the most complicated stratification. Africans are stratified simultaneously into the emerging social classes in Western class terms, on the one hand, and into the traditional differences of status between commoners and chiefs which still play a significant role in the stratification of Africans in Windhoek. However, these traditional status differences between commoners and chiefs differ from society to society.

The Ovambo-speaking society, for example, a sedentary society after they settled in Namibia for years, gradually became subdivided into various sub-societies namely Ndonga, Kwanyama, Kwambi, Ngandjera, Mbalantu, Kwaluudhi, Nkolonkathi, and Eunda. Each sub-society had its own territory and political structure, but the Ndonga was recognized as the nucleus. Each sub-society had a chief, but the Ndonga chief was the paramount chief, and all the other chiefs received their power from him.

The political organization of the different subsocieties varied since some had hereditary chieftancies and others not. In the case of the Ndonga, Ngangjera, and Kwaluudi, there are still functioning chiefs known as Omkwanilwa or ondjeyi (Bruwer 1966: 23).

Apart from being pastorialists only, the Hereros differed substantially from the sedentary Ovambos and Okavangos. They never developed a political structure based upon a paramount central authority. The various Herero factions (Himba, Tjimba, Mbanderu, Herero) functioned independently under the leadership of priest-chiefs called omuhona, who derived their powers from the possession of a sacred fire and great herds of cattle. The basis of society was a bilateral system of descent, creating two entities of people in the community, namely the oruzo and ejanda. oruzo membership was inherited through the father; the oruzo was an entity founded on the ancestral sult and centered around the sacred fire. Each oruzo had its own possessions which passed from father to son. The membership of the ejanda on the other hand, was inherited through the mother (Bruner 1966: 25).

All the other African societies (Nama, Kavango, Damara, San) had their own different stratification also. However, to do into details about the stratification of the different societies is beyond the scope of this thesis. The limited details given about the Ovambo and Herero-speaking societies were meant to serve only as examples of the traditional African societies' stratification.

However, as already mentioned, class differences

among the Africans in Windhoek are determined by many factors. Education, wealth, duration of residency in the urban area, lifestyle, knowledge of the country's official languages, cars, and clothing are all relevant variables (Pendleton 1974: 86).

However, after being in Windhoek for years, and constantly exposed to the dominant White culture, most urban Africans have internalized some Western values. This does not mean that urban Africans want to be or behave "White", as the high class of the Coloured caste have been attempting historically, but rather that they have accepted some values of the Western culture. These urban Africans are called ovandu vozondua, (meaning those who behave like Whites) by the rural Africans (Pendleton 1974: 86).

However, in many ways, most of the urbanized retain a great deal of their traditional African ways. Most of the urbanized Africans can play roles according to the Western norms and also roles according to their respective African traditions. They can switch back and forth between the two worlds, depending on the situations (Mayer 1962: 579), found the same phenomena in his study about migrant African workers and towns Africans in East London, South Africa.

Therefore, when studying the stratification of the African population of Windhoek, criteria from both the African traditions and the Western culture must be taken into consideration.

Many traditional Africans from the rural areas enter

periodically into the urban areas and the Western economy in order to provide minimum subsistence to their families in the impoverished "Homelands". Some remain staunchly traditional, while some become urbanites after years of acculturation through exposure. As a result of their unfamiliarity with Western values these people are considered to be unsophisticated in manners, dress, lifestyle, and are referred to as ovandu vozofarama (meaning people from the · farms) by the urbanized Africans. They are also perceived as being from a lower class. Whites and the high class of the Coloured caste do not necessarily care about their class position because they look down upon all Africans, but Whites and Coloureds too can distinguish rural Africans from urban Africans. They derogatorily call the rural Africans "raw Natives" (meaning they are ignorant in the sense that they have not internalized some Western values) (Tuden and Plotnicov 1970: 363).

However, some of these Africans are from royal backgrounds in their respective rural areas and have high status in the eyes of the Africans who are from the same society, hence, are perceived to be from a higher class. For example, a Herero-speaking domestic servant who has a low status in the urban hierarchy may, in his traditional environment, be the son of a chief and a cattle owner, all factors making for a higher traditional status. To most urban Africans, such an individual will still be considered a member of the <u>lumpenproletariat</u>, but some Africans from

his rural society (or ethnic group) who know his royal background may not consider him as such. Therefore, when we are
considering the different classes among the Africans in
Windhoek, it is essential to keep in mind that an individual's
position in a certain stratum is not absolute. Many Africans
commute in time and space, meaning the same individual is
alternatingly incorporated into different systems of rank,
based on different criteria, and consequently his statuses
in the various systems may be quite discrepant. A Herero
domestic servant who is a son of a chief and a cattle owner
might be perceived to be from a low class, for example, by
the Ovambos, Namas, and Damaras in the urban area. But the
Herero-speaking Africans might perceive him to be from a
high traditional class.

However, all things equal, the more one has all the principal criteria of status among the urbanized Africans (education, wealth, occupation, clothing, etc.), the more status one is accorded regardless of his/her background. Since the setting of this study is in Windhoek, an urban area, the following description of the different African strata will be based on commonly utilized criteria in the urban areas of Namibia. However, it is essential to keep in mind that there is no consensus among all the different ethnic groups in Windhoek as to who belongs to which class. It is possible for the same individual to be perceived as being from different classes by different ethnic groups.

# 1) The Proletarianized Bourgeoisie: The African Upper Class

On top of the African caste hierarchy is a class I shall call the proletarianized bourgeoisie. This class consists of the few educated and wealthy Africans, including teachers, doctors, lawyers, nurses, school inspectors, some civil servants, employees of some foreign enterprises, and African businessmen. As Nkrumah (1970: 56) also observed about Africans in this class in other countries, they are politically divided into three main categories, depending on their relationships with the colonial government. First, there are those who are heavily committed to maintaining the status quo in Namibia, whose only aim is to defend the little wealth they have already acquired. These are usually people who work for the South African Police (SAP), African agents of the Department of National Security (DONS), to an extent, the municipality police, and employees of some foreign enterprises. Secondly, there are the revolutionary members of the proletarianized bourgeoisie, the nationals who are committed to end the colonial rule including primarily professionals such as lawyers, doctors, teachers and nurses. Thirdly, there are those who are politically indifferent. They are neutral about the political dispute in Namibia. Neither do they condemn nor support either the illegal South A frican government or the revolutionary movements in Namibia. They are only passive onlookers while in the meantime they continue making money. This category includes some of the African businessmen.

Although on the average, this class has more money than the rest of the African classes, because of many of the apartheid regulations such as being forced to live only in Katutura, there is little scope for conspicuous consumption and for other material symbols of wealth. Except in clothing, furniture, and cars this class has no other means of distinguishing itself from the other classes. As a result, as a way of asserting their social status, members of this class do not usually frequent shebeens (illegal beerhouses) because shebeens are considered to be places where troubles such as fighting and stabbing occur (Pendleton 1974: 85).

However, there is very little recognition of the internal racial stratification of the African caste by members of the other castes. The White caste is not significantly aware of elite statuses of many Africans and generally treat all Africans alike. Besides the soccer clubs, the African Teachers' Association, tennis club, and a boxing club, there are no other voluntary associations for this class or the other African classes. Most of the Africans, regardless of their social class, are members of either the Lutheran Church or the Roman Catholic Church.

# 2) The Proletarianized Petty-Bourgeoisie: The African Middle Class

Below the proletarianized bourgeoisie is a class of wage-earners who do all kinds of menial unskilled jobs. I shall call this class the proletarianized petty-bourgeoisie. This class consists of people such as taxi drivers, delivery

truck drivers, and service station attendants. The main distinction between this class and the one under it is the fact that most members of this class are usually born and/or raised in the urban area. Even though many of them do not have much formal good speaking knowledge of Afrikaans, and they are quite familiar with many of the Western values and behaviors. Compared to the Africans who are from the rural areas, they are much more sophisticated in their manners and dress.

Also, many of them know other Africans who are employed, and they usually help each other to find employment. For example, when a White or a friend of a White needs a new employee, very frequently the African in employment is asked to look around and see if he can find somebody dependable. Naturally, the African searches his own network for someone who might be in need of a job.

Also, many of these Africans work for the same employer, on the average, longer than the migrant workers, who always must leave after the expiration of their contract. As a result, after working for years for the same employer, some Africans manage to establish relationships with their employer, even though on the master/servant basis. Through these master/servant relationships many Africans in this class manage to make use of their White employer. Since every African knows that Whites treat other Whites better than Africans, and that an appeal from one White to another White probably stands a better chance for success than an

appeal from an African, the Africans make use of the White employers. If the police give him trouble, if the Katutura housing authorities try to evict him from his house or the area, if he wants to buy goods or services to which he knows the White has better access than he does, often at cheaper prices, then the White's assistance is requested. It is part of the relationships between Whites and Africans to lend assistance where possible. The Whites think the Africans are playing a game of maximizing possibilities in a society where they are at a disadvantage because of their skin colour.

This class virtually monopolizes all the well-paid and clean manual and unskilled jobs in the area, leaving the dirty, low-paying jobs for migrant workers and recent arrivals from the rural area. Since most migrant workers tend to be Ovambo-speaking, the dirty, low-paying manual labor is referred to as "Contract Ovambo jobs" and no Africans in this class will wish to accept "Ovambo jobs".

On weekends Africans in this class usually dress well and frequent shebeens. In shebeens they usually sit in the living room and enjoy beer, brandy, or wine. Unlike the migrant workers, people in this class are sophisticated. They know a great deal about modern dances, and unlike the lumpenproletariat, they do not frequently fall into fights. They usually tend to avoid the shebeens which are frequented by the lumpenproletariat.

Many people in the proletarianized petty-bourgeoisie

class enjoy soccer, and those who are not soccer players themselves are big supporters of soccer teams. There are many soccer teams in Katutura. African stars, Black Africa, Orlando Pirates, Pirates, Tigers, Flames, just to name a few, are some of the soccer teams in Katutura. Some members of this class are also members of the boxing club in Katutura.

Politically, members of this class tend to support the revolutionary movements such as SWAPO and SWANU.

# 3) Lumpenproletariat: The African Lower Class

The lumpenproletariat consists of people who are recent arrivals from the rural areas and those who come to Windhoek through the notorious Contract Labour System.

I name this class the lumpenproletariat because they are marginal in the capitalist economy of Namibia. They are underemployed and are the last to be hired and first to be fired. They have no rights, and like all the other Africans and Coloureds, they have no labour unions.

Most of the people who come to Windhoek through the Contract Labour System are Ovambo and Okavango-speaking Africans. Their so-called Homelands are out of the Police Zone, and the only way they can come to Windhoek and all the other urban areas is through the Contract Labour System. They stay in Windhoek for the duration of their contract -- usually twelve to eighteen months -- and immediately after the expiration of their contract, are sent back to their "Homelands". If they still want to continue working, they

still must go back to their "Homelands" and sign another contract.

In Windhoek, they are forced to live in the male single-quarters called compounds. They are not allowed to bring their wives and families with them. For twelve to eighteen months they do not see their families. Only some who are lucky see their families once or twice during the duration of their contract.

The quality of food and housing these people receive is appallingly bad. The compound in Windhoek's African township, Katutura, was described by a visiting journalist as one of "unspeakable bleakness". They quoted an African construction worker, formerly a shepherd on a White farm, as saying that he had seen animals housed in better conditions than the migrant workers of Katutura compound. The journalist added that high brick walls crowned with jagged pieces of broken glass, barbed wire and heavily guarded gates suggested a concentration camp rather than a compound (United Nations Council for Namibia 1975: 71).

The other recent arrivals from "Homelands" within the Police Zone (Hereros, Damaras, Namas) stay with their proletarianized bourgeoisie relatives. Some of them eventually find employment and stay in the urban area for some time, others migrate cyclically between the urban area and their village of origin. This explains why some Ovambos or Kavangos try to conceal their true identity and claim to be Hereros or Damaras, because Hereros and Damaras do not have

to come through the contract system to Namibia urban areas.

By virtue of the location of their so-called "Homelands"

in the Police Zone, they have better access to the urban

areas of Namibia.

People from the Lumpenproletariat are looked down upon even by other Africans. They are considered to be ignorant and unsophisticated, and they usually accept the most undesirable work for which the pay is the least. Usually they work under the constant supervision of poor, uneducated Whites, who delight themselves in subjecting their workers to petty humiliation and unnecessary abuse to flaunt their power. This class consists of workers such as streetsweepers, lorrie boys, construction manual labourers, railway workers, domestic servants, and various types of menial work.

As Cabral (1969: 62) observed about the lumpenproletariat of Guinea-Bissau, members of this class are very revolutionary. After being involved in the urban economy and subjectex to incessant exploitation, these people become very bitter about the oppressive apartheid system and are committed to contribute to its downfall. Some of the migrant labourers from the north leave Namibia for Angola and Zambia at the expiration of their contract and become members of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO.

# CHAPTER SIX

## CONCLUSION

My hypothesis has been that the racial inequalities in Namibia are intricably linked to the development of capitalism there. Reviewing the history of Namibia from the German colonialism to the present South African occupation, it is clear that the major motive for occupying the territory is economic.

The settler White population of South Africa and Namibia, together with their international partners, have used and are using cheap African labour to exploit the natural wealth of Namibia for their own economic benefit. To facilitate this exploitation, South Africa has divided the population of Namibia into "races". To justify the exploitation of the African "race", South Africa extended the apartheid system to Namibia, seeking to disguise this exploitation of Africans by arguing that they are only trying to maintain the identity of the different "races". South Africans argue that they are allowing every "race" to develop in its own way and place in order to maintain their separate culture, and that the underdevelopment of the African "race" is only due to their inferiority. However, a quick

glance at the laws of apartheid reveals clearly that apartheid is indeed implemented in Namibia to safeguard the economic interest of the Whites.

I have demonstrated both that the owners of the world system have been imported into Namibia where they have created new structures of class divisions, relationships, and identification. Other hierarchies of social relations in the foreign armies, religious missions, colonial services, police, and national differences (e.g. German, Afrikaner, British) provided new models of social status differentiation to which the local African and Coloured populations could be socialized.

Even though I used the caste-class theoretical perspective to describe the social stratification in Windhoek, Namibia, the situation is not straightforward such as when the caste-class system was used to analyze the race relations in the Deep South of the United States. In the United States, there is some modicum of agreement on the criteria of social class stratification, while in Namibia different racial groups and even different societies (ethnic groups) within the same racial group have different criteria of social stratification. However, if one keeps those differences in mind, the caste-class model can still be used successfully to describe the social inequalities in Namibia.

In pluralistic societies, however, where the non-Western segment of the population is in the process of entering a Western-type class system, the transitional situation

is much more complex. In the case of many first generation urbanites, socioeconomic status characteristics describe individuals rather than families, and individual status differences appear long before the crystallization of any well-defined class system. Thus, an African lawyer or doctor, who is very much middle-class or even elite by Western urban standards, will often have parents and siblings who are nonliterate and from rural areas. Even his own wife may have had little or no formal education, be quite traditionally oriented, and have few meaningful contacts with her husband's colleagues or associates. This cultural dualism may even be reflected in the household itself -- e.g., traditional die and eating customs may be followed within the family, utilizing Western customs only when outsiders are present; on the other hand, the front parlor may be furnished with prestigious Western items, while the kitchen and the bedrooms will reflect a more traditional approach.


Also as in any society, there are people who are on the margins of the different classes. If one uses certain criteria to determine their class, they appear to be in a certain class, but when other criteria are used, they seem to be in a different class. Sometimes when all criteria are taken into consideration simultaneously, it becomes virtually impossible to categorize certain people. Only if certain criteria are taken as the overriding ones, can these people be categorized. For example, if one must categorize an African townsman who is working as a service station attendant by virtue of his income and little formal

education, he can be categorized as a lumpenproletariat; however, if one takes into consideration that the same man has been living in the urban area for a long time and his lifestyle, one must classify him as proletarian pettybourgeoisie.

Even in a relatively simple caste and class system as in the Deep South of the United States, i.e., in a system where there is some modicum of agreement on the criteria of social class stratification within the various castes, class status between castes is not convertible because the castes themselves are hierarchized. Furthermore, class and caste are not commensurate; there is no single continuum, but rather there are two somewhat overlapping ones. in Namibia, one can say that Africans in general rank lower than Whites, but not that any African ranks lower than any particular White. With three racial castes in Namibia, these problems resulting from social or structural pluralism are even more complex. Does a poor White rank higher than a Coloured lawyer? Or does a Coloured salesman rank higher than an African doctor? There are simply no valid answers to that order of questions.

I have demonstrated that even though Namibia is not new in the Western capitalist orbit, the majority of its population has been in the capitalist system only as a marginal labour force; therefore, to analyze the social stratification of her population in terms of the Western class system presents many problems and limitations. However,

if one gives close attention to these limitations and problems, it is possible to paint a picture of the social stratification of the Namibian population in Windhoek, utilizing the Western class system as a model within the "racial caste".



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APPENDIX A

# WORKERS' STRIKES IN NAMIBIA 1915-1972

Year	Place	Other known details		
916		Migrant workers strike for issue of working clothes.		
1916	Kahn mine	Manager misleads Government in attempt to get police to intimidate workers.		
1918	Farms	Workers down tools in protest.		
1923	Luderitz mines	Workers retaliate when one of them assaulted by foreman. Seventeen workers fined.		
1925	Conception Bay	Strike threatened: 13 "ringleaders" arrested.		
1937	Oranjemund mine	Miners strike in protest over start of X-ray examina- tions for pilfered diamonds of departing migrant workers.		
1939	Tusumeb mine	Strike by workers who suspect not receiving pay they are entitled to.		
1939 Sept. 1948	Nageib mine Tsumeb mine	2,000 strike in protest when 13-year-old white shoots dead one African worker.		
1952	Luderitz	Cannery workers (?) Large stri		
1953	Luderitz	Fish cannery strikes; three workers shot dead by police.		
1953	Walvis Bay	Fish cannery strikes.		
.953	Tsumeb	Copper smelter workers strike over furnace working condition		
1954	A copper mine			
956	Brandberg mine	•		
1956	Otjisondu mine	·		
956	Windhoek	Laundry washerwomen strike.		
1959	Walvis Bay	Oceana Fish Cannery. Go-slow strike over (a) foreman's assaults and attempts to force workers to clean dangerous machinery while in motion; (b) wages; (c) 12 or 18 hour working day; (d) other working conditions.		
Sept. 1962	Walvis Bay	Large strike; 55 arrested; fin R30 or three months jail (R30 was then between 3-9 months wa		
1968	Walvis Bay	Fish cannery workers strike, over 1,000 for over three week Want night shift paid at overt rate.		
April 1971	Walvis Bay and Luderitz (?)	Cannery strikes.		
Dec. 13 1971	General strike	Over 13,500 mostly migrant wor strike against whole system of pass laws, migrant labour under criminal identure.		
Feb. 1972	Walvis Bay	Cannery workers against "pig for concrete beds and migrant labour system.		
Feb. 1972	Otjiwarongo	Municipal workers strike for w		

SOURCE: The Workers of Namibia, by Gillian and Suzanne Cronje, 1979.


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#### APPENDIX B

# A LIST OF SOME MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN NAMIBIA

General Motors Phelps Dodge Ford Motor Company Conoco Farrell Lines Phillips Petroleum Chrysler Aracca Moore McCormack Damson Oil Texasgulf Caltex Eastwood & Holt Milford Argosy Hudson Bay Mobil Oil Fouke Co. Holiday Inns Lykes Corporation Psycom Tsumeb Corporation Vinnell Corporation American Motors H. Merensky Woodford Oil Pan Am Goodyear Exxon Johnson & Johnson Weatherby Eastman Kodak Toyota British Petroleum Wilbur Ellis Richardson-Merrell Gemstone Namib Safaris Allis Chalmers Lindblad Travel Colgate Palmolive J. Walter Thompson Del Monte Corporation Bethlehem Steel Percival Trans-American Mining Waterford Oil IBM Dodgen Oil Uniroyal Zapata Star Kist Foods Continental Ore Parker Pen Engelhard General Electric Hanna Mining Quaker Oats Marcona Coca Cola Company O'Okeip Chase Manhattan Superior Oil **Brilund Mines Buell Engineering** Gaynor & Ducas Tri-State Zinc Artnell Bien Trading Texas Eastern SCM Caterpillar A & P Marine Diamond **Atalanta** Vincente Puig & Coik Getty Oil Standard Oil of California Vitarroz Texaco Nozaki Ocean Science & Engineering Mitsubishi Norwegian Fish Gulf Oil Consolidated Food Corporation Kennecott Pepsico Transamerica Boeing U.S. Steel Douglas Aircraft Teledyne Citibank Hertz EABC Avis Nord Resources Royal Crown Canada Dry Firestone Bic Pen General Tire International Harvester Singer Black & Decker Revlon 3M Cessna Aircraft Westinghouse Gillette Merriman Finnerty Arthur G. McKee Inc. Interspace Continental Can Burroughs Schering-Plough Galion Iron Textron National Cash Register Union Carbide Valvoline Delaware Nuclear Oshkosh Trucking Midwest Uranium Otis Elevators Southern Uranium Automated Building Tristate Nuclear Utah Mining Hoover Burns & Jacoby

SOURCE: U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982, by Allen D. Cooper, 1982.



# CHAPTER ONE

- The categories "Whites", "Coloureds", and "Africans" were originally formulated by the South African government and I do not accept them personally. However, to avoid confusion for the reader; when refering to these artifically created racial cleavages, I will use capital letters throughout the thesis.
- The actual population figures of Namibia are unknown due to the political situation in the country. South Africa, the current occupational force, estimates the population at 950,000, but according to the UNIN publication Manpower Estimates and Development Implication for Namibia (1978) in 1977 the population estimate was 1.25 million. Landwise, Namibia is 318,261 square miles, about the size of Texas and Louisiana combined. (Quoted in The Anglican Church in Namibia, Publication of July 4, 1979.)
- These figures are quoted in Dr. Kerina's book, Namibia, The Making of a Nation, but the original source is Encyclopedia of South Africa, New York, 1961, page 224. However, according to other unconfirmed sources these figures are conservative.
- 4Contrary to popular belief, SWAPO is not the only revolutionary political movement in Namibia. However, SWAPO is the only movement which has been waging a guerrilla war against South Africa, and consequently it is the only recognized movement in the country by the OAU and the U.N.
- <sup>5</sup>During the last Geneva Conference, Dirk Mudge, the white agribusinessman who leads the DTA, made the bizarre admission that his organization would not agree to elections until it was certain that the DTA had at least a 50-50 chance of beating SWAPO. (Monthly Review, January 1982: 43).
- <sup>6</sup>Walvis Bay is the major port city in Namibia, and although it is located hundreds of miles away from the South African border, South Africa claims that Walvis Bay is an integral part of South Africa (Cape Province).
- 7This information is quoted in the <u>Monthly Review</u> of January 1982, but the original source is <u>Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts: The Rossing File (London CANUC, 1980) by Jane Margolies.</u>

# CHAPTER ONE (cont'd.)

<sup>8</sup>For its \$1 million original equity investment in the Tsumeb mine, AMAX reaped net profits of \$38 million between 1967 and 1975. The source of these profits is not difficult to discover. Five thousand contract workers work in the Tsumeb mine, and in 1972 averaged \$30 per month for a sixday week, compared to \$550 per month for white employees. (Tanzer, 1980: 74).

<sup>9</sup>It is advisable to take SWAPO's figures with a grain of salt also, since these figures may be a bit exaggerated also. The true figures probably lie between those given by South Africa and those of SWAPO.

## CHAPTER FOUR

- South Africa has always tried to inflate the figures of the White population in Namibia, especially when they were trying to come up with their so-called internal settlement. They have always divided the Africans in many small groups according to "ethnicity" and presented the Whites as one big homogeneous group. Together with the exaggeration of the actual White population figures, that tactic has made the Whites the second largest "ethnic group" in Namibia. (Serfontein 1976: 10).
- <sup>2</sup>A crude device for estimating the minimum earnings at which a family can survive in passable health. It omits even minor luxuries, as well as many items most workers would regard as essentials. Below this level, workers do not die, but their babies do in large numbers, their children are stunted by malnutrition and their own health is badly damaged.
- <sup>3</sup>Personally, I know many young African men who claim to be Coloureds. In the presence of "other" Coloureds, they pretend like they do not know you and they pretend they do not know any African language. However, if you meet in the absence of "other" Coloureds, they will talk nicely to you in the African venacular.
- <sup>4</sup>Until very recently, after the so-called elections, no Africans were allowed to purchase any plot or house in Katutura. Qualified individuals had to rent them only, leaving the municipality with the power to evict them at any time.
- <sup>5</sup>Coloureds have no other mother tongue but Afrikaans. Culturally, they are also alike, but because they have some African or other races blood, they are not accepted as part of die Volk (the Nation).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>I can recall in 1974, when a young German tourist who was associated more frequently and openly with Africans was apprehended and eventually deported. He was suspected of being a United Nation's spy.


# CHAPTER FIVE

<sup>1</sup>The term was originally used by Issa Shivji in his work about Tanzania.

The Afrikaners (Boers), on the other hand, had severed their ties with their countries of origin. Today they are culturally different from any of the European countries they originated from. They are mostly rural people now, until recently, in fact the term Boer means "farmer" in Afrikaans. Linguistically they are different also. Afrikaans, their mother tongue, is spoken nowhere else in Europe. In fact Afrikaans is a mixture of several languages including Dutch, German, English and some African languages.

<sup>3</sup>The original meaning of "Kaffir" was infidel in Arabic, but in Southern Africa it is used as a derogatory term by Whites to refer to Africans.

<sup>4</sup>It is extremely difficult for Africans to accumulate wealth because of their extended family obligations. Once a man has accumulated some money, he is obliged to take care of all his not-so-well-off relatives. If he does not do it, he is somehow ostracized and looked down upon.



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