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Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

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answer

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE HONROE DOCTRINE
IN TWO SELECTED INSTANCES

by Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

MM-

Body of Abstract

This study,flas indicated by thetitle, is an exami-
nation into the application of the Monroe Doctrine in two
selected cases during the:1060's. These two cases.are the
Spanish interference in Chile and the Spanish, French, and
British intervention in Hexico.

T T'Various secondary‘writers have categorized the two
situations as similar; both cases being examples of Euro-
pean imperialism. An effort will be made to demonstrate
that this was in fact not so.

Since Spain was the instigator of the conflict with
both of these countries, Chile and Mexico, it was deemed
necessary first to give some brief consideration to the
internal political and economic conditions'within Spain
during this decade. Thus, the first chapter is devoted

to a discussion of the background situation in Spain. The

Donald 0. Henderson, Jr.

following two chapters consist of detailed examinations into
the origins and developments of the disputes of Spain with
these two Latin American nations.

In these examinations, newspaper accounts have been
utilized to a great extent along with the pertinent United
States diplomatic correspondence. In his work treating with
the Monroe Doctrine for this period Mr. Dexter Perkins. per-
haps the leading contemporary authority on the subject, has
also dealt with the two situations. Mr. Perkins has given
much credit to the impact of public opinion upon the appli-
cation of the Doctrine. 'With this the present‘writer is in
full agreement. The'point of disagreement is in Mr. Perkins'
use of secondary sources as a measurement of public opinion.
newspapers, with the precautions herein noted, have been
selected as a more precise indicator of this opinion. Hence,
the newspapers have served the dual function of providing both
dualitative and quantitative material. The methodology of the
use of the papers is discussed fully in the fourth chapter along
with a presentation of the findings in both graphic and tabular
form. The differences between Perkins' conclusions and the
findings for this paper, the results of the above-described

nethodology, are also discussed._ The final chapter contains

2

Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

an analysis of President Monroe's address of December, 1823,
which embodied the principles now'known as the Monroe Doctrine.
This supports the contention that the basis of the Doctrine
was one of self-interest. Therefore, was it in the interest
of the United States to invoke the Doctrine in either or both
of these situations? A.comparison shows that although there
were similarities between the two cases, the dissimilarities
were far more basic. No vital United States concern was at
stake in Chile, and the issue here was essentially one over

a point of honor. The republican government was in no actual
danger of overthrow by Spanish forces. In NbxiCO. however,
the situation was one of invasion and usurpation of the
established republican form of government. This was of

prime concern to the United States, and*with popular approval
steps were taken to implement the Doctrine as soon as it was
possible to do so.

Since the Monroe Doctrine continues to play such an
integral and prominent role in United States foreign policy
and because of the misconceptions still extant today in regard‘
to the true import of the Doctrine, it is hoped that this
study will contribute to a clearer understanding of this

‘traditional keystone of American policy.

The Michigan State University

The Graduate School

A Comparative Study in the
Application of the Mbnroe Doctrine
in Two Selected Instances

A.dissertation
by

Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

January, 1964‘

Approved :

Profs sor of History

M 733-9;—

Head of Department

In
Dedication
To
My'Wife
Dolly,
' For Her Constant
Help,
Criticism,
and
Encouragement
in the
Preparation
of This Study

11

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my thanks and gratitude to
my advisor, Dr. Harold B. Fields, for his time in the read-
ing of this manuscript, for his suggestions,and for his
patience and understanding during the course of this study.

The co-operation of the numerous libraries and other
organizations in the lending of their books and microfilm
has been greatly appreciated. In particular, I am grateful
for the assistance of Miss Mildred Treworgy of the Pattee
Library, Pennsylvania State University, in obtaining said
material.

I am indebited to Sefihrita Fioria‘Serani of Santiago,
Chile, for her time and effort in the verification of many
of the articles from the Ferrocarril.

.Finally, I wish to thank.Mrs. Paulyne Fisher for her

help in the proofreading and the editing of this work.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DE DICAT ION e s e s e e e e e e e e s e

ACKNOWLEWEMENTS O s s s e e e e s 'e s e

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . .

mauve T ION O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Chapter
1. SPAIN...........
II.-ICHILE...........
III._MEXICO...........-
IV. THEORY...........
v.smmmr..........

BIBLIWRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O 0

iv

Page

17
79

'154

192

217

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Table

l. A Comparison of the Total Combined Frequencies
of Items of All Categories . . . . . . . . .

2a. Cumulative Totals, All Categories, Mexico . . .
2b. Cumulative Totals, All Categories, Chile . . .

3. Frequencies of Total Mentions for Mexico and
Chile from the New'York Tribune . . . . . .

4. Frequencies of Total Mentions for Mexico and
Chile from the Detroit Free Press . . . . .

5. Frequencies of Total Mentions for Mexico and

. Chile from the Washington Evening Star . . .

6. Frequencies of Total Mentions for Mexico and
Chile from the New'York Herald . . . . .‘. .

7. united States Importsfrom Mexico and Chile for
the years 1861 through 1866 . . . . . . . . .

Page

185
186
186

187

O 188

l. Valparaiso Just Prior to the Bombardment . . . .

2. The Destruction at Valparaiso . . . . . . . . .

3.1 The Reported Situation in Mexico as of 1865 . .

FEigure

1. Public Opinion Flow'Chart . . . . . . . . . . . .

189

190

191

68
78
153

184

INTRODUCTION

This study is an examination of the application of
the Menroe Doctrine in two particular situations that
occurred during the years 1861 to 1866. The situations
are the Spanish-Chilean War and the French intervention in
Mexico.

It might be well to state at this point that the
prime interest of the writer is in Chilean history, and
particularly the mid-nineteenth century during which time
the Chilean Republic was able to organize and achieve the
position of one of the leading nations of South America.
Compared to her sister republics,Chile had experienced
relatively little turmoil, external or internal, and had
continued on the path of economic and political progress
and stability. This was due to a number of factors which
had been suggested many years before by Simon Bolivar. The
inost important of these factors were the isolation of the
country and the character of the people; but the constitu-
tion of 1833 and the leadership of the nation from that tflme
forward were also elements that contributed to Chile's

achievements .

.J

’0-

-2-

Following the conclusion of the wars for independence,
Chile enjoyed a period of nearly fifty years free from
serious conflict with other powers, aside from that with ~
the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation in the 1830's. However,
this situation was ended abruptly in 1865 with the outbreak
of hostilities between Chile and Spain.

While the origins of the Spanish-Chilean'war are to
be feund in the relations of Peru with Spain; still it was
Chile that played the decisive role in the military as well i
as in the diplomatic field. This war of 1865-66, although
not of world-wide interest, because of the consequences
was of particular significance to both participants. Self-
confident after her victories, Chile, when pushed to the
extreme by her neighbors, Peru and Bolivia, went on to
'wage successfully the'War of the Pacific. In a sense, the
conflict with Spain was not only a precursor of the one
with Peru and Bolivia, but one which was to carry with it
more serious implications. For Spain, on the other hand,
this was one of a series of blunders which eventually was
to lead to the overthrow'of Queen Isabel II. The uncoordi-
nated manner with which Spain pursued her aggressions
could be considered a reflection of the unstable and corrupt
internal situation in that unhappy country. One further

interesting aspect of this first period of conflict is to

-3-

be found in the attitude of the United States toward both
parties and the interpretation given by Secretary of State
Seward to the Monroe Doctrine. In this regard, there were
two main factors to consider, (1) did Chile's difficulties
with Spain fall within the scope of the enunciated principles
of the Monroe Doctrine; and (2) was the United States in a
position to implement the Doctrine? These factors will be
'considered at a later point.

In preliminary investigation, the writer has found that
on this subject there exists a paucity of material in English,
although various Chilean and Spanish historians have naturally
given it fuller consideration. One other interesting,
although not surprising, finding is that a more extensive
coverage was given to the foreign interference which Mexico '
also experienced during this decade of the 1860's.

unlike Chile, Mexico had enjoyed only sporadic internal
peace since the gaining of her independence. Shortly after
Mexico became independent. the reins of government were seized
by a would-be emperor. This was symbolic of the difficulties
that Mexico was to encounter in establishing an effective
republican form of government. In addition, Mexico had been
subjected to innumerable pressures by many of the major powers,
including the united States. Mexican-United States conflict

had culminated in the war of 1848. At the time of the tri-

 

-4-
partite intervention, Mexico's internal condition was aptly
described as anarchical as a result of years of civil strife.

Both the Chilean and the Mexican situations took place
at about the same time. According to many, the United States,
on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, could and should have
taken positive steps in both instances; Nevertheless, the
United States seems to have reacted to and dealt with the
cases differently. Thus a comparative study of the incidents
in which the two countries were involved, with emphasis on
United States' reaction, both official and unofficial, seemed
to the writer to be a most worthwhile study.

This comparative study will include an inquiry into
the origins of the conflicts mentioned, the development of
them, the methods used to obtain settlements, and the role
played therein by the Monroe Doctrine. It seems appropriate
also to include a section on Spain in the 1860's, as Spain
was the instigator of aggressive action toward both Chile
and Mexico.

One recognized writer of Chilean history, William R.
Sherman, in reference to the war of 1865-66 has stated that
"Spanish intervention, similar to that of the French in I

‘Mexico, played a considerable part as the cause of the war."1

 

1William R. Sherman, The Diplomatic and Commercial

Relations of the United States and Chile, 1820-1914 (Boston:
Corham Press, ”26), p. 101. “

 

-5-
While it is undoubtedly true that imperialism.was an important
factor in both instances, the similarity between the two seems
more open to debate, and an attempt will be made to point out
some of these differences. Dexter Perkins, perhaps the leading.
authority on the Monroe Doctrine, has made a distinction
between the two instances. He attributes the more vigorous
stand taken by the united States toward the Mexican inter-
vention to the pressures of public opinion. Public opinion,
as the.term is used in current research, embraces the ideas
or attitudes of a people or a nation as a whole as expressed
through such media of communication as the press, private
letters and diaries, and in speech, both public and private.

In the final section, after having described and

compared the two cases, and shown that essential differences
did in fact exist between them, there will be an examination
of the relationship between public Opinion in the United
States and the policy of the united States as it applied to
the two Latin countries. Newspapershave been utilized as
indicators of public opinion for several reasons which will
be elucidated in the appropriate section of the study. The
papers used have been selected on the basis of both geography
and political orientation. The methods of selection will be
discussed in more detail in the section that deals with this

topic.

SPAIN

"EurOpe could do Spain a service by dissuading her from
her rash obstinacy thus sparing her the costs she is incurring
and the blood she is expending. And if she will fix her
attention on her own precincts, she can build her prosperity
and power upon more solid foundations than doubtful ionquests,
precarious commerce, and forceful exactions . "

This might well have been written during the period
of 1861-66. As Spain once again expended men and money in
vain attempts to play the role of a world power, the dis-
content of the Spanish peOple was reflected in repeated
demonstrations in many parts of the country.2

Proud of her history, traditions, and beloved queen,
Spain was a nation whose growing spirit of liberalism,
combined with a promising financial situation.seemed to
assure her of a position among the first-rate powers. This

belief was held not only by the Spanish but by many Europeans

and even Americans.3

 

1Harold A. Bierck, Jr. (ed.), Selected writings of
Bolivar, compiled by Vicente Lecuna (New York: Colonial
Press, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 107.

2New York Tribune, August 22, 1864, p. 55.

3Detroit Free Press, February 8, 1862, p. 3.

-5-

-7-

"Nowhere do politics run higher or excite more keenly
, the attention of all classes; nowhere is the desire for
reform and progress more general. The all-prevailing
intellectual activity is attested to by the number of
political parties and clubs. The talent in the country
is nearly all on the liberal side. This liberal talent is
well represented in the press."4

It was believed by reliable sources that the economic
situation of Spain during this period would have been a
favorable one under proper guidance. The period followirg
the Carlist wars had been a prosperous one for Spain. How-
ever, dueto the frequent changes of ministers, lack of a
consistent internal policy, and the drain for military
operations abroad the nation was not long in reaching a

state of finanCial and political chaos.

Queen Isabel II had had little training or experience
to prepare her for the crown; she had grown up during a
turbulent era, and in 1836, when six years of age, she was
proclaimed Queen of Spain, with her mother as regent. The

many indiscretions in her personal life and her susceptibility

 

 

4Detroit Free Press, August 5, 1866, p. 4.

-3-

to the advice of her counselors, who, more often than not,
were furthering their own interests at the expense of Spain's,
resulted from this lack of training. The rapid turnover of
her ministers is illustrative of the chaotic internal situation
of the country. Yet in spite of all this, it seems that
Isabel was generally beloved by her people, and warmly
received when she traveled among them.5

The two powerful ministers that dominated the 1860's
in Spain were General Leopoldo O'Donnell of the union Liberal
Party and General Ram6n,Mar{a Narvéez of the Moderate Party.‘
The policy of Narvéez was essentially one of inactivity and
subordination to Crown and Church. For this reason he was
forced by the opposition a number of times to cede power to
his rival O'Donnell. The latter was an astute politician;
he had served as Minister of State from 1858 to 1863, a
ministry outlasting any since the time of King Ferdinand.
He was successful in attracting most of the political
malcontents into his party. His success in so doing was
reportedly due to the flexibility and eclecticism of his

policy. His ability to stir an enthusiastic following was

reflected even in the American press.6

 

5New York Tribune, August 2, 1861, p. 3.

6The article cited in fn. 3 is illustrative of this point.

-9-

Given an enthusiastic following, and control of the
government, it is difficult to see why O'Donnell was unable
to maintain order so as to prevent the sporadic uprisings I
that continued throughout this whole period. A typical
incident occurred in the summer of 1861 in the city of Loja
where there was an insurrection which resulted in the
imprisonment of 339 persons.7 Loja was not an isolated
case. In August of 1864, there was such fear of a political
‘movement in Madrid that the troops were called out to maintain
order, not only in the capital but in other principal cities
throughout the country.8 On January 4, 1866, the Progresistas,
with General Prim in charge, attempted an uprising against
the government in Madrid. Two weeks later in Barcelona there
was an uprising replete with cries of "Down with the Bourbons."9

One must also wonder why a man such as O'Donnell with
his country's interests at heart, a man with the necessary
power, whose desire was to improve the condition of the
country, allowed the financial situation to deteriorate as

it did. While it is true that much money was spent, a great

 

7New'York Tribune, August 15, 1861, p. 8.
81bid., August 22, 1864, p. s.

9New'York Herald, January 26, 1866, p. 1.

-10-
deal of it was used for unproductive projects. Over-all
planning was definitely lacking. This lack is exemplified
by the importation of 10,000 Irish laborers to work on the
railroads at a time when Spain herself was experiencing a
good bit of labor unrest.lo Quite naturally the financial
situatiah was self-aggravating, funds were not available for
loan and foreign capital was withdrawn for lack of confidence.11
This dire economic scene, along with the great degree of
political unrest, by early 1866 had led to an unprecedented
number of suicides and robberies throughout Spain.

In an attempt to distract the attention of his fellow
countrymen from domestic problems, O'Donnell decided to
embark upon a series of foreign adventures. During the
early part of this period O'Donnell had widespread support
for this course of action from Spaniards of all ranks and
classes. As late as January, 1864, a vocal segment of
Spanish opinion was urging that Spain demand the restoration
of Cibralter.12 The various expeditions into Morocco, Santo

Domingo, Mexico, and Chile, rather than contributing to the

 

10New York Tribune, November 4, 1861, p. 7.
11The Times (London), October 4, 1865, p. S.
12NewYork Tribune, January 20, 1864, p. 6.

-11-
greater glory of Spain, merely caused a further drain on the
treasury. By the end of 1864, "The clamor of the public
urges the settlement of the Santo Domingo problem by Spain's
preserving only the towns of Santo Domingo, Saineram, and
Prieta plate and abandoning the rest of the island."13 The
‘MOrocco expedition finally terminated with a treaty of
commerce that was ratified in December of 1861. The
involvement in Santo Domingo dragged on for a period of
years before it was resolved by a treaty. The Mexican
intervention cost Spain the least in prestige,thanks to the
common sense and realistic policy of General Prim who
commanded the Spanish forces there. The war with Chile
grew out of the scientific expedition that O'Donnell sent
to visit the principal ports of Latin America.

Even as early as 1860, O'Donnell was convinced that
much benefit would be derived from the sending of such an
expedition. It took about two years to assemble the
necessary men and materiel for the expedition. The Spanish
squadron, composed of the frigates Resoluci6n, Triunfo, and
the gunboats Covadonga and Vencedora, sailed from the bay of

Cfidiz on August 10, 1862. There were six scientists aboard

 

13NewYork Tribune, October 12, 1864, p. 8.

 

-11-
In command of the expedition was Luis Hernandez Pinz6n. The
purpose of the expedition was questioned at the time, and is
still open to speculation. To still the apprehension of the
Latin American republics, O'Donnell sent a circular to the
various nations that were to be visited. In essence this
circular reiterated that the purpose of the expedition was
scientific and friendly, that no aggression was intended._
This circular appeared in several of the Latin American news-
papers. The prime factor that remains open to question is
that of O'Donnell's actual intent. These-called secret
instructions that were given to Pinz6n are open to interpre-
tation. True, Spain had recognized the independence of most
of the Latin American republics and apparently intended to
respect this independence; Madrid had been upset, however,
by incidents involving Spanish subjects, incidents such as
those of the workers at Talambo in Peru, and of the wealthy
residents in Mexico. Pinz6n's instructions were to respect
the integrity of the former colonies, whether or not Spain
had formally recognized them, to strengthen relations with
them, and at the same time to protect Spanish nationals.
‘"If by chance something serious should happen . . . the
ESpanisH] subjects abroad will find in the chief of these

naval forces immediate cooperation and help for prompt

-13-
reparation."14 The Admiral was to use forceful measures if
necessary since "the Spanish government will never consent
to any violence committed against her subjects. Intervention
may be employed to put an end to vexations once and for all."15

If there were some ambiguity as to the underlying
‘motivation for the scientific expedition, clearly there had
been no such problem in regard to the Mexican intervention
of the previous year. ‘When the Spanish fleet anchored off
Vera Cruz in December of 1861, it was obvious that they were
there to carry out an occupation. Whether or not Spain had
sufficiently serious complaints against Mexico to justify
occupying the country is questionable. These complaints
consisted of the expulsion of the Spanish Minister Pacheco
in January of 1861, the denunciation of the Men-Almonte
Treaty by the Juarez government, and complaints by Spanish
subjects of ill-treatment that ranged from robberies and
lack of adequate protection to being forced to make loans
to the Juarez government. Despite O'Donnell's desire for
unilateral action in Mexico, it seems probable that he felt

that Spain would acquire an aura of legitimacy for her own

 

14Francisco A. Encina, Historia de Chile (Santiago:
Editorial Nascimento, 1950), Vol. 14, p. 285.

.~ 15Pedro de Novo y Colson, Historia de la Guerra de la
Espana en el Pacifico (Madrid: lmprenta de Fortanet, 1882),
p0 -7s #

-14-
complaints by joining with Britain and France in the tri-
partite convention.16
' "The Spanish Menarchy is not in a satisfactory
condition."17 Queen Isabel II, in an address to the 923535,
made this statement in reference to the specific problem of
Santo Domingo. The same statement could have been generalized.
Confusion, expediency, opportunism, a lack of communication
between civil and military leaders that at times bordered on
insubordination, a myriad of unanswered, possibly unanswerable,
questions characterized the Spain of this era.'

When the divers disasters became known at home, O'Donnell
was forced to resign. It is important to note, however, the
emphasis which he placed on overseas undertakings, because
whenever he was in office this was the policy which Spain
pursued. Although Isabelherself apparently feared O'Donnell,
because of pepular support for him she was often forced to
call upon him to form a government.

Notwithstanding Spain's aggressive actions in the western
hemisphere, relations between the United States and Spain

remained surprisingly amicable throughout the whole period

 

l6
Qgtroit Free Press, October 22, 1861, p. 4.

17New'York Herald, November 5, 1865, p. 5.

-15-
under consideration. Certainly one of the most obvious reasons
for this was that, regardless of the ministerial hand at the
helm, Spain refused to grant recognition to the Confederate
States of America. In fact, Spain was very careful not to
encourage the Confederacy in any way. Early in the Civil war
when it was rumored that the Captain-General of Cuba was
considering a commercial arrangement with the rebels,Spanish
Minister Tassara hastened to assure Secretary Seward that such
was not the case.18 Later, when the Confederate representative,
Mr. Rest, presented himself in Madrid the Queen refused t0-
see him.19

Secretary Seward's assiduous pursuit of neutrality, of
which innumerable examples throughout this whole period could
be cited, was equally appreciated by Spain. In regard to the
situation in Peru, Secretary Seward said, "There is reason
to suppose that Spain will press the matter [Talambo]. This
is regrettable to us who have interests in the welfare of
these countries. ‘We scrupulously abstain from interfering

in disputes between other nations . . . and have no disposition

 

18New’York Tribune, September 16, 1861, p. 5.

19Ibid., March 26, 1862, p. 6.

-15-
to deviate from that policy."20
Among several factors of varying importance were General
Prim's papularity in the United States as attested by his
warm reception in New'York and the favorable press that he
enjoyed from papers representing all points on the political
continuum. This friendly attitude was extended, at least in
part, to Spain as well. This favorable image was further
enhanced by pro-union articles written by Prim for some of
the Spanish newspapers. The friendship between Secretary
Seward and Minister Tassara aided in the communication
and facilitated the settling of minor irritations that arose
between Spain and the United States. Further, Mr. Seward
deliberately cultivated Spanish amity by such means as his

trip to Cuba and the toasts of friendship that he exchanged

with the Captain-General.

"Spain does not have sufficient forces available, nor
does she have the means to transport them in order to again
subjugate all South America and Mexico. Her present attempt'
to do so is futile. She will not gain possession of any place
of importance; much less will she achieve victory through the
cudgel and fierce conduct she has adepted toward hapless
Americans, whom she has held subject to her ignominious and
unbearable yoke." .

 

20U. S. , Dept. of State, Messages and Documents of the
President, 1864- 65, Pt. 4, #78, Koerner to Seward, April 1,

1864. Hereafter referred to as Mgss. and Doc.

21Bierck, Selected writings of Bolfwar, Vol. I, p. 125.
In addition to the sources noted in the docuentation of this

9168-

section, the appropriate sections of the several following
works'have been consulted for a more complete understanding

of the political and economic background of Spain during this
decade:~,Jer6nimo Becker, Historia de 1as Relaciones Exteriores
de Es ana durante e1 Si lo XIX (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipo-
ngfico, 1924); Henry 8. Clarke, Modern Spain,_l8lS-1898 (Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1906); and Carmen Llorca, Isabel II
1 Su Tiggpg (Valencia: Editorial Marfil, n.d.).

 

CHILE

"The Kingdom of Chile is destined, by the nature of its
location, by the simple and virtuous character of its people,
and by the example of its neighbors, the proud republicans of
Arauco, to enjoy the blessings that flow from the just and
gentle laws of a republic. If any American republic is to
have a long life, I am inclined to believe it will be Chile.
There the spirit of liberty has never been extinguished; the
vices of EurOpe and Asia arrived too late or not al all to
corrupt the customs of that distant corner of the world. Its
area is limited; and, as it is remote from other peoples, it
‘will always remain free from contamination. Chile will not
alter her laws, ways, and practices. She will preserve her
uniform political and religious views. In a word, it is
possible for Chile to be free."1

During the l860's,José Joaqufn Pérez was president of
.Chile. An experienced politician, he tended to be concilatory
and moderate to a fault. Pérez reportedly did not take a firm
stand on any issue until forced to do so by his ministers or
public opinion pressures. Pérez' dismissal of Tocornal in
1865 could be cited as an exemplification of this trait. This
‘was scarcely the man to head his country's government during
a period of crisis, a period that required the utmost of
diplomacy and statecraft.

For several years prior to the Spanish-Chilean War, a
smoldering disagreement had been extant between Chile and

Bolivia over the demarcation of the boundary between the two

 

1
Bierck, Selected Writings of Bclfvar, Vol. I, p. 117.
_-17-

i-ts-
countries. In spite of the President's passive character and
his desire for peace, almost at any price, most writers on
this period seem to feel that war between Chile and Bolivia
wOuld have resulted had it not been for the trouble that arose
with Spain. Although Chile had indicated a willingness to
accept United States' arbitration in February of 1864, due
to the exigencies of the time the settlement of continental
issues was postponed for several years. During these years
Chile was to gain more confidence in herself.

By the time the Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral
Pinz6h had arrived at Valparaiso on May 5, 1863, much of the
alarm occasioned by the approaching visit of the scientific
expedition had died down. It was an opportune moment for
the arrival. The Spanish withdrawal from Mexico had served
to reassure the other Latin American countries as to the
sincerity of Spain's avowals of peaceful intent.

Chilean good will and hospitality were shown to the
fleet both in Valparaiso and in the capital. There were
numerous receptions at which the sailors were royally enter-
tained.2 At one of the banquets Pinzdh made a contribution

fer the unfortunate Mexico and condemned the usurpation of

 

2NewYork Tribune, June 16, 1863, p. 2.

-19-

Napoleon there.3 While in the capital, Pinzdh wrote to his
government, "The welcome has been as wonderful and warm in
Santiago as in Valparaiso. ‘We have great esteem for the
Chileans . . . . All hates are over and we are brothers."4

. At the farewell banquet at Santiago one member of the
Spanish colony requested that the Admiral relay the following
message. "I would like, when you return to Spain, to tell
our illustrious sovereign . . . that her subjects are as
happy in Chile as is possible E9 be] outside of Spain.
We love Chile; she does more for us than we for her, and we

5 At this same banquet Pinz6n made an

owe her a great debt."
unfortunate, possibly inadvertent, statement that the good
wdll and friendliness shown to the Spanish by the Chileans
was not sincere.6 From this point on there was, naturally
a noticeable cooling of Spanish-Chilean relations, although
the press was quite circumspect in avoiding mention of the

situation. ‘When the squadron sailed from Chile for Peru it

was without the fanfare'with which it had been greeted.

 

3ngjamfn Vicufia Mackenna, Historia de la Guerra de Chile
con Espana (Santiago: lmprenta Victoria, 1883), p. 22.

“Have y Colson, Historia, p. 116.
‘ 51b1d., p. 120.

6Ibid., p. 121,

II

Manuel Vivanco, Peruvian Minister to Chile, had urged
that his government extend an official invitation to Pinzdh
to visit Peru. This was done, and the Spanish fleet arrived
in Callao, the chief Peruvian port, on July 10, 1863.7 During
the fleet's two week stay in Peru the festivities and the
courtesy extended to the crews were nearly the equal of those
received in Chile, and no incident such as that in Santiago
took place. There was apparently no action on the part of
Pinzdh in pursuance of the harsh tone of the instructions
that he supposedly had received from his government. The
Spaniards did not remain long enough to join in the celebra-
tions on the Peruvian Independence Day, July 29, but sailed
northward on the twenty-seventh of July.

While the rest of the Spanish fleet remained in Mexican
'waters, Pinzdn's flagship ResoluciSn, accompanied by the
Triunfo, sailed north. They arrived in San Francisco late
in September. On the return trip south PinzSn storped in
Acapulco long enough to take on board a Spaniard, Eusebio

Salazar y Mezarredo, who might be termed the instigator of_

 

7New'York Tribune, October 24, 1863, p. 10.

-20-

the \

V
£313!

Calla
:einf
mg
::, ,
5:3: 1

Fracee

-21.;

the war which was soon to develop between Spain and her former
colonies. C

By November 13, 1863, the Spanish were once again in
Callao. The fact that the fleet remained in the vicinity
reinforced the fear of Spain's designs that had been prevalent
among many Peruvian opinion leaders even prior to the squadron's
first visit in July. Although Pinzdn had receiVed his orders
from Gabriel Tassara, the Spanish Minister in Washington, to
proceed to Cuba, the recent events at Talambo,8 and pressure
from the Spanish consul in Lima, Juan de Ugarte, as well as

from Salazar, influenced the Admiral to stay.

 

8At the end of July, 1860, a group of laborers arrived

in the port of Callao en route to the hacienda of Talambo in
the Peruvian province of Chiclayo. The workers, chiefly
Basques, had been recruited by the hacienda owner,.Manuel
Salcedo, but Spain had never looked with favor upon the
undertaking since she felt it degrading to her honor that
Spaniards should work as common laborers in a foreign country.
Some time later, in August of 1863, there was an uprising
against Salcedo for the alleged ill-treatment of his cotton
workers; this was put down by force and several of the Basques
were killed. Court proceedings‘were long and involved. The
Primary Court of Chiclayo sentenced two of the Spaniards to
short prison terms, but the Superior Court, on October 31,
reversed this decisiOn and sentenced Salcedo instead. In
January, the case finally went to the Supreme Court which
annulled both of the previous decisions and returned the case
to the judge of the Primary Court of Chiclayo.

From the records of the court proceedings it appears
that Salcedo was not guilty of cruelty to his workers.

I).
“L,

I b

:‘J’

C
L»-—

-22.

The Talambo incident was but the culmination of years
of misunderstanding between Spain and Peru. The bases of most
of the friction were the failure on the part of Spain to
recognize Peru's independence and on the part of Peru to
acknowledge her debts to Spain. After several unsuccessful
attempts to conclude a treaty, much to Spain's chagrin, Peru
failed to ratify the treaty that had been negotiated in 1853.
To the ill-will engendered by the aforementioned diplomatic
maneuvering, the Spaniards resident in Peru added fuel by
exaggerating the Talambo episode. The Spanish government was
assured that the affair would be handled impartially and
quickly, but this was not satisfactory to the new“Mon ministry.
Alejandro Mon, who shared O'Donnell's interest in overseas
ventures, would undoubtedly have found some pretext for inter-
vention.

The Talambo affair provided the excuse for this inter-
vention. Salazar's actual role was a combination of courier,
intermediary, and diplomat. From an historical point of view,
Salazar seems to have been a somewhat Machiavellian figure.
Due either to some mental aberration or to an unreported
specific grudge against Peru, Salazar seems deliberately to
haveprecipitated the crisis with Peru. A function of his -

office as Spanish Commissioner was to review existing problems

-23-

with the government of Peru. His written review of the
situation which he presented to the Peruvians concluded with
virtually an ultimatum. Further, of the two sets of instruc-
tions that he had carried from.Madrid, he gave Pinz6n the
second set which was to have been followed only as a last
resort and claimed to have lost the first. On the basis of
the instructions received, Pinz6h seized the unfortified
Chincha Islands.

Peruvian public opinion was so outraged as a result of
the loss of the Chinchas, which they attributed to President
Pezet's handling of relations with Spain, that the government
was in immediate danger of overthrow. That Pezet was held
responsible for the loss of the Chinchas by governmental
leaders, as well as the Peruvian public, was illustrated on
the occasion of his address to the Senate. It was the first
time in the country's history that a president had been.
hissed while delivering a message before the Senate. This
remarkable happening was widely reported in the press of

‘ the'United States.9

9New‘York Tribune, September 5, 1864, p. 4. ‘While this
article appeared in all of the leading dailies, it is par-

Heularly noteworthy as the Tribune carried less Latin American
xwws than the other leading New York papers.

III

Chilean demonstrations in protest of the Spanish seizure
of the Chinchas so annoyed the Spanish Minister, don Salvador-
de Tavira, that he expressed his displeasure by compiling a
list of grievancesaagainst Chile. These complaints, usually
referred to as the eleven points, formed the foundation for
subsequent Spanish action against Chile. The individual
complaints, background information, and, in brief, Chile's
reply to each follow.

. The first accusation was sent in a note to the Chilean
Poreign‘Ministry on May 4, 1864. This note was unanswered.
due to a change in the Chilean ministry, Alvaro Covarrubias
having replaced Manuel Tocornal. Receiving no immediate
response, Tavira dispatched a second, more strongly worded,
note on May 13. Tavira's notes protested the sympathy that
had been manifested for Peru in the public demonstrations
when word of the seizure had reached Chile. Tavira also
stated that his host country had taken no steps to prevent
an insult to the Spanish flag on that same day, and further,

that a municipal battalion stationed opposite the Spanish

-2‘-

.25-

legation had remained impassive during the outrage.10 Tavira's
second note apparently crossed with the reply from Covarrubias
to the first note, in which the Chilean Minister disavowed
the statement that there had been any alteration in the
friendliness of his country toward Spain. However, upon
receipt of Tavira's second note, Covarrubias' reply was less
courteous than had been his first. In his reply he expressed
approval of his countrymen's demonstrations as being perfectly
natural.

Tavira's next complaint to the Chilean Foreign Office
awas an objection to the circular condemning the seizure of
the Chinchas. On May 4, 1864, the former Chilean Foreign.
Minister Tocornal had sent this circular to the governments
of the other Latin American republics along with an invitation
for them to join Chile in expressing disapproval of the
Spanish action. Covarrubias answered that the circular was
not of a hostile nature, but at the same time he refused to
recall it.

Yet another grievance was that the Chilean government
had taken no steps to soften the pro-Peruvian tone of the

press. The obvious answer to this charge was to cite the

k

10Chile, Chilean Foreign'Ministry, Counter Manifest of
the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile on the Present War
Between the Republic and Spain (Washington: McGill and Withe-

brow, 1866), pp. 17-29 discuss all the 11 points. N.B- Both
Spanish and Chilean sources concur as to these 11 points.

-25.
freedom of the press that was permitted in Chile.

In June, Tavira charged that preferential treatment
had been rendered to the adversary. The Peruvian ship,
Lerzundi, had been permitted to take on.board coal, food,
and other supplies, and even Chilean volunteers for Peru.
Whereas, all manner of difficulties had been imposed when
the Spanish ships had attempted to take supplies on board.
Tavira wanted to know'why the ships of his nation were.not
allowed the same privileges as those of the Peruvian nation.
Covarrubias replied that to grant Spain's request would
have constituted an unfriendly act to Peru, a good neighbor,
and have run counter to Chile's own best interests. Covarrubias
later elaborated on this explanation by saying that as long
as there did not exist a state of declared waz.his country
was not obliged to observe the laws of neutrality. He also
stated that only limited provisions and crewmen sufficient
to enable her to continue her voyage on to Peru had been
taken on by the Lerzundi.

Minister Tavira charged that Chile had refused to
investigate a Spanish report that a group of armed, uniformed
Chilean volunteers were preparing to sail to join the Peruvian
revolutionary movement. To this somewhat questionable complaint,

Covarrubias delivered a rather ambiguous reply. He first

:15 ‘

.27.
implied that no armed persons would have been allowed to
clear port, and then again mentioning that as long as no
declared war existed, Spain had no legal grounds for complaint.

The next two charges against Chile were related to
Spain's logistical problems. In mid-September the Spanish
frigate Vencedora arrived in Chilean waters en route to join
the squadron in the Chinchas. At the port of Lots she attempted
to purchase coal and other provisions and to make minor
repairs before continuing on north. The Chileans refused to
allow the spanish to buy any coal, basing their refusal on
flimsy pretexts. ‘When Minister Tavira protested, Covarrubias
replied that the Chilean Constitution guaranteed to the
individual businessman the right to sell to whomsoever he
pleased.

Subsequent to this first protest, President Perez, on
September 27, declared coal to be an item of contraband of
war. Despite vigorous objections from the Spanish.Minister,
Chile upheld her declaration on the grounds that hostilities
idid exist, although there had been no formal declaration of
imar.

The next two Spanish complaints had to do with the
scandal sheet named the San Martin. This paper, published

in Valparaiso and having, at best, a limited circulation,

.13-
aroused Spanish antipathy by the nature of its contents. The
San Martin attacked Spain's corrupt internal situation and
overseas policy. The paper's principal target was the Queen.
and her scandalous private life. As would be. expected, Tavira
’protested against the editorial policies of the San Martfn,~
basing his protest on the grounds of public morals and
decency. Tavira felt that Chile should take severe repressive
measures against the paper. Covarrubias' reply that the
Chilean government did not find it advisable to take such
action simply furthered the increasingly tense situation.

The irate Spanish Minister said that if some action
were not taken, his government might consider this as just
cause for the suspension of diplomatic relations. The Chilean
Minister answered that if Spain wished to institute judicial
proceedings, such would be permissible, but that his govern-
ment neither could nor would do anything more to help bring
the matter into court. 4

To complete the list of charges against Chile, one
rather absurd complaint remains to be mentioned. Spain cited
a shipment of horses that Chile had sent to Peru as being a
violation of neutrality. Chile replied by pointing out to
her accuser that Peru had long been accustomed to buying horses

in Chile, not only for the army but also for farm wOrk.

.29-

Further, horses would be of questionable value in naval war-
fare.

Tavira seemed to accept many of the Chilean explanations,
so that by the beginning of 1865 relations were on a much .
smoother plane. There were several additional factors that
helped to account for this. With the conclusion of the
Vivanco-Pareja Treaty, most of the Chilean volunteers had
by February of 1865, returned home. Spanish ships were once
again permitted to coal in Valparaiso. The intermittent
publications of the objectionable San Martin had ceased.
Also, early in that year a visit was paid to Valparaiso by
the Spanish ironclad Nunancia. She was said to be the largest.
ship. ever to plough the Chilean waters until that time, and
she was received with a good deal of admiration and enthusiasm.11
This new feeling of conciliation was not to be of long duration.

On December 7 of 1864, Admiral Pinzdn had been replaced
as comander of the Spanish Pacific fleet by Jose Manuel

Pareja.12 Pareja had also been endowed with full diplomatic

.powers in order to effect the settlement with Peru. Pinzc’m's

 

11New York Tribune, June 9, 1865, p. 4.

12It should be noted that although Pareja's appoint-
meat was issued in Madrid in the last week of September,
he did not arrive in Peru to assume actual comand until _

December , 1864.

~30?
stand was not considered sufficiently firm by Madrid. As
Pareja had harbored a life-long grudge against the Pacific
republics, and especially Chile, it was felt that his policy
would not err in the same direction as had Pinz‘h's. Nor did
it, as the terms of peace with Peru amply demonstrate. The
terms of the treaty are not of great interest here except to
note that by signing Peru surrendered completely to Spanish
terma. She also agreed to pay a large indemnity of three
‘million pesos which‘Madrid had not stipulated that Pareja
demand. The unpopularity of these terms precipitated the
overthrow'of the Pezet government.

' Admiral Pareja had long held a personal grudge against
the Republic of Chile as his father had been killed fighting
there. In addition, Pareja was greatly irritated over the
Chilean activities that had transpired while he had been
occupied with the situation in Peru. Therefore, he wrote
to Tavira in Santiago that adequate satisfaction and reparation
for these actions must be ,obtained from that nation. He
insisted upon a twenty-one gun salute to the Spanish flag,
whichiwould be answered by one from.the Spanish to the .
Chilean.13 Pareja also demanded the payment of three million

 

13N’ew'Y’ork Herald, June 9, 1865 (copied from the
Mercurio of Valparaiso, May 1, 1865), p. 4.

-31-
reales from Chile for refusing to supply the Spanish ships
with coal and other provisions. The Admiral also desired
that a Chilean envoy be sent to Madrid to make satisfactory
explanations to the charges which Tavira had formulated
against the Republic, and to conclude a new treaty, which
was to include a most favored nation clause, between the
two nations.

Pareja seemed to feel that the Spanish Minister in
Chile was not taking a firm enough stand against that country.
Consequently, he suggested that Tavira leave Chile on some
pretext, so that he, Pareja, could come to Chile and settle
the difficulties. Tavira declined to leave Chile, despite
Pareja's increasingly hostile attitude. Pareja then sent
the Vencedora south to encourage Tavira to press for satis-
faction from.Chile. Pareja did not sail at once for Chile
because he lacked instructions from‘Madrid for such action.

During the interim required for Admiral Pareja to
communicate‘with Madrid, Tavira took advantage of the respite
to settle, or so he thought, the points of disagreement
between Chile and Spain. Having resided in Chile since
1848, Minister Tavira was highly regarded by people both
in and out of the government. That he himself was deeply

concerned about the well-being of Chile, as well as of Spain,

-32-
there can be no doubt. In March of 1365, Tavira had a meeting
with Domingo Santa Maria, VicedPresident of the Chilean
Chamber of Deputies. At this meeting he told Santa Maria
that he was certain that the Chilean explanations to the
eleven charges would be accepted by his government and that
only a twenty-one gun salute might be asked. Santa Maria
seemed pleased, but answered that his countrymen would first
resort to hostilities as they would never pay a salute to
the Spanish flag for offenses that they had not committed.

Tavira was not alone in his desire to avoid war. In
Spain, too, there were advocates of peaceful settlement. The
Spanish under-Secretary of State, Miguel Bafibelos, in a
personal letter of February 24, 1865, wrote to Tavira that
the Spanish government desired to settle all the problems
quietly, not to make humiliating demands, nor to look for
quarrels.14

Unfortunately for all concerned, Bafihelos' private
views did not reflect the official policy of the spanish
government. In early ApriL,Tavira received from the Spanish
Minister of State Benavides a royal decree that said, in

effect, that a salute to the Spanish flag was essential.

 

14Novo y Colson, Historia, p. 318.

.33-
Further, that Spain would require that acceptable explanations
be given and that a new Spanish-Chilean treaty of friend-
ship be concluded were de rigueur. If these stipulations
'were not agreed to peacefully, Tavira was to break relations
‘with the Republic. A .

In accord with his instructions, on May 13,1865, Tavira
again presented a note listing the eleven complaints to the
Chilean government. In his reply three days later,-Cova-
rrubias elaborated upon the explanation he had given earlier
and expressed the hope that cordiality would again be restored
between the two countries. Tavira's gracious reply to
Covarrubias' note of explanation seemed to be an assurance
that the matter was settled and peace and friendship restored.

So might it have been had it not been for Pareja. As
‘was mentioned earlier, Admiral Pareja held a personal grudge
against Chile. He did not want the Spanish-Chilean problem
to be settled by quiet negotiation, but by Spanish might.
IDuring the early months of 1865, while Tavira was diligently
striving to restore amity, Pareja was carrying on an insist-
ently inflammatory correspondence with his friends in the
government at Madrid. Pareja's interpretation of the inter-
national situation evidently was more influential with the

Spanish government than was Tavira's. Although the instructions

-34-
that required a salute to the Spanish flag as one of the terms
of settlement did not reach the Pacific coast until the last
week of March, two weeks earlier papers in the United States
had published accounts of Pareja's threats.15 The Admiral's
pleasure at the new'instructions was undoubtedly equalled
only by Tavira's dismay. Tavira was aware of the extent of
Chilean nationalistic pride, and his interview'with Santa
Maria had left no room for doubt that the demanded salute
would mean war. Pareja's threats against Chile that continued
to be reported throughout the Americas did nothing to mitigate

the intensity of Chilean sentiment}6

On the strength of this
knowledge, Tavira gambled that a fait accompli would be
accepted in Madrid. He, therefore, concluded the afore-
‘mentioned agreement with Chile on the terms enumerated in
his earlier instructions.

In June, O'Donnell was again head of the Spanish govern-
ment. Tavira was ordered back to Spain, and Pareja was
appointed plenipotentiary to deal with Chile. Tavira had

lost:his gamble, due primarily to Pareja's determination to

lnnniliate Chile, and Pareja, Tavira, Chile, and Spain were

 

15New’York Herald, March 8, 1865, p. 1.

16Ibid., may 6, 1865, p. 5.

-35-
all to lose as a result.

Admiral Pareja on his flagship, the Villa de Madrid,
reached Valparaiso on September 17, 1865. One supposes that
he might even have planned his arrival on this date as a
further humiliation since September eighteenth is the Chilean
Independence Day. Making no attempt to negotiate as he had
been instructed to do, Pareja immediately informed Chile
that the explanations accepted by Tavira could never satisfy
Spain, and that because of his conduct the former represen-
tative of the Queen had been relieved of his post. The same
eleven complaints were again stated along*with the demand
for adequate explanations and the twenty-one gun salute which

,‘would then be returned by an equal number by one of the
Spanish ships.17 The Chileans were allowed four days in
‘which to give satisfaction. Otherwise, the personnel of
the Spanish legation would retire to the ships of the Admiral
and forceful measures would be applied.

The Chilean government was quite naturally offended
by the demands as well as by the manner in which Admiral
Pareja had presented them. There then followed an exchange

of notes between Covarrubias and Pareja. Covarrubias ended

 

17

Chile and Spain, notes Interchanged between Admiral
W of Foreign Relations n.p.: n. pl! .,
'n.d. , pp. - .

.-35-
this series of communications with his note of the twenty-
fourth reiterating the refusal to yield to Spanish pressure.
Chile "would not buy peace at the cost of Chef] dignity . . .
and Spain, in no case, should expect indemmity of the Republic."18
Upon learning of the ultimatum to the Chilean Republic,
the diplomatic corps in Santiago were hopeful that their
influence might be of use in preventing a needless war.
Thomas Nelson, dean of the corps, exchanged messages with
Pareja, but to no avail. To the American Minister's great
disappointment, the Spanish Admiral considered that hostilities
had cammenced with the break in diplomatic relations.19
' Chileans of all political convictions rallied at once
to the cause, and various plans were discussed in the Chamber
of Deputies in a special session that was convened on Sunday,
September 24, 1865. Authorization for a declaration of war
against Spain was requested. The size of the army and the
navy was to be increased, roads and telegraph facilities were

to be extended, and a loan of twenty million dollars was.

. 20
authorized by Congress. Every measure passed unanimously.

 

18Chile and Spain, Notes Interchanged, p. 12-14.

19lbid., p. 21.

20New'Y'ork Herald, November 11, 1865, p. 8.

-37-

Following the institution of the blockade by Pareja
and Chile's declaration of war, diplomatic pressure was
brought to bear on Pareja to modify the conditions of the
blockade. As.a result of these protests the Commander
agreed to permit ships coming from EurOpe with only passen-
gers and mail to enter Chilean ports provided that they
also carry his correspondence.21

Actually, Pareja could not possibly enforce a blockade
of more than forty ports with his small squadron of five ,
ships. His problems were intensified when Chile, in October,
declared thirty-five of her ports duty-free. This action
by Chile, plus repeated reminders from the diplomatic corps
that, according to international agreements, a blockade must
be effective and constant to be valid, resulted in the reduc-
tion of the blockade to six specified ports.22

Chile's economy had been flourishing prior to the
institution of the blockade. After an initial drop, it

.recovered rapidly. As the blockade had not caused any

significant loss to Chile, many in the country, especially,

 

21Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 1, Tassara to Seward,
December 14, 1865, pp. 583-84.

22New'York Herald, December 3, 1865, p. 8.

-33-
foreigners with commercial interests, speculated as to the
probable nature of Pareja's next move. Fear of a Spanish

23 .This

bombardment of Valparaiso was widely articulated.
fear was accentuated by the ominous ambiguity of Pareja's
communications regarding the question.

The members of the diplomatic corps, who had done their
best to prevent the state of hostilities, now'turned their
efforts toward a settlement of the difficulties. Covarrubias
rejected the offer of arbitration extended by the diplomats
and pointed out that this method of settlement is customarily
employed prior to the outbreak of hostilities, while the
two parties are still on terms of equality. If the situation
could be restored to the 55552; M an}; M, and by this
he meant a'withdrawal of the Spanish fleet and the return to
Chile of all prizes taken, then the offer of arbitration
‘would be accepted.24

On October 19, United States Minister Nelson, accompanied
by several other members of the diplomatic corps, visited the

Villa de Madrid in order to offer their good offices to Pareja.

The Admiral refused to avail himself of their services. He

 

2w” mum. Decanter 2. 1865. p. 2.

24Mess. and Doc.,1866-67,Pt. 2, #229, Nelson to Seward,
October 31, 1865.

-39-

said that his instructions did not allow'arbitration. He
added that he had heard from Spain that the United States
had proposed arbitration in Madrid through her representative
there, Mr. Perry, and that the offer had been refused. There-
fore, he must also decline. He reinforced his statement of. .
refusal by explaining that while questions regarding only
material interests could be settled by the arbitration of a
friendly power, those regarding national honor could not.
The conflict with Chile, he said, most certainly was an issue
of honor.25

Arbitration had been refused by both belligerents. The
blockade had been proven ineffective; trade had actually
increased. There was a growing reaction among the Spanish
against their government's embroilment in Chile. Popular
opinion in both Europe and the United States was increasingly
anti-Spanish.26

In the face of an apparent stalemate, the O'Donnell
Government accepted the British offer to assist in the
projected conciliation of Spain and Chile as a possible

‘means of resolving the international entanglement. The.

 

25Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, Nelson to Seward,
#229, October 5f, [865.

26N'ewYork Tribune, January 20, 1866, p. 6. (European opinion)
New'York Herald, December 4, 1865, p. 4. (0.8. opinion)

«.0;

news of the capture of the Covadonga by the Chilean ship
Esmeralda, and particularly the manner in which it was
accomplished, served to galvanize Spanish‘opinion in support
of O'Donne11.27

The Chilean capture of the Covadonga was of prime
significance in two respects. First, it was the most impor-
tant, if not the only, real military action that had trans-
pired during the opening months of the war. From the time
that the Esmeralda and the HELP! had steamed out of the harbor
at Valparaiso, past the Spanish squadron, on September 17, 1865,
until the capture of the Covadonga on November twenty-six,
their whereabouts had been unknown. No naval engagements
peg.gg_had occurred. The Spanish ships did manage to inter-
cept a few'small vessels that belonged to Chilean nationals.
Thus, the Esmeralda's capture of the smaller Covadonga was
hailed by Chileans and, indeed, all Americans as an event of
the greatest moment. From an overview'the whole question of
the Spanish-Chilean trouble, the second main effect of the
Covadonga's capture was the more important. Confronted with

the additional loss of dignity and national honor that the

capture seemed to imply, O'Donnell had no choice as to the

 

27New'York Herald, February 24, 1866, p. 4.

~41-
(continuance of hostilities. The opportunity for arbitration
had passed.

Pareja received the first inkling as to the Covadonga's
fate on November twenty-eighth, probably from.Mr. Clark, the
United States consul at Valparaiso.28 This, the final mis-
fortune of an unhappy series, was more than the conscience-
stricken Admiral could bear. He had disregarded his original
orders to negotiate with Chile. As Pareja considered the
results that had followed from this original disobedience,
his sense of guilt must have been compounded. The blockade
that he had instituted had proven to be ineffective. Approx-
' imately $175,000 had been discovered missing from the squadron
treasury. 0n the day that Admiral Pareja received the news
of the Covadonga's capture he also had word from Peru of the
success of the anti-Spanish revolutionary group. .The Admiral
knew'that this meant the probable revocation of the Vivanco-
Pareja Treaty and the formation of a Peruvian-Chilean alliance.
In case of this eventuality Spain would be facing increased
naval forces and at the same time, would be cut off from

supply sources for nearly the whole length of the Pacific

COIBt e

 

28From the many versions of the events that transpired

aboard the Villa on Nov. 28, 1865, it is clear that the U.S.
consul did visit the Admiral, and that Pareja learned of the
capture on that day. As the Villa also communicated*with a

mail boat on the same day, it is possible that the news was
received in this fashion.

-42- '

Admiral Pareja remained pensive the rest of that day.
The following day Mr. Clark returned with further details
for the Admiral; after the consul's departure Pareja dined
and retired to his cabin. Shots were heard, and upon investi-
gation the Admiral was found dead, lying on his bed with his
pistol still clutched in his right hand. In a note addressed
to his nephew, Pareja admonished all his crew'to conduct them-
selves with honor. He requested that they not bury him in
Chilean waters. In a separate note to the Spanish govern-
ment, Pareja asked forgiveness for his treatment of Tavira.
In this note, the unfortunate Admiral not only admitted that
he had been unjust in his actions toward Tavira, but that
Tavira had actually been right and that it would be in Spain's
interest to make peace*with Chile as soon as possible.29

The news of Pareja's suicide was kept secret from the
crew, and the Villa headed out to open sea to fulfill the
Admiral's last request that he be buried outside of Chilean
waters. It was December nineteenth before the Chileans learned
of Admiral Pareja's death. Minister Covarrubias at once wrote
to the acting commander of the squadron to express sympathy

on behalf of the government of Chile and to offer "a resting

 

29Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #240, Nelson to
Seward, December 31, 1865.

 

-43-
place in the cemetery of this city until the Government of
Spain wishes to make other arrangements."30 The captain of
the'glgggg responded with appreciation for the offer which
was not accepted. He said that an official answer would soon
be sent by the new'commander, Casto Mendez Nfihez of the

Numancia. The war in the Pacific had entered a new phase.
IV

Commodore Mendez Nflhez arrived in Valparaiso on December
19, 1865.31 The next day he proclaimed that only the ports
of Valparaiso and Caldera would be subject to the blockade.32
Apparently Mendez had not received instructions from Madrid
and was uncertain as to a course of action. According to
divers sources, there was a concensus of opinion that the
new'commander felt that it would be best for Spain to effect
a settlement‘with Chile as expediently as possible. Rumor

was current at this time that Spain was so concerned as to

the possible consequences of the recently contracted offensive-

 

3oMess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #240, Nelson to
Seward, December 31, 1865.

31

 

New'York Tribune, January 13, 1866, p. 8.

32Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #246, Nelson to
Seward, January 31, 1866.

-44-

defensive Chilean-Peruvian alliance that the blockade of Chile
would soon be lifted entirely.33

The British and French representatives in Santiago were
still interested in a settlement such as had been outlined in
the memorandum of the previous November, and to which O'Donnell
had agreed. Hopeful that the recent deve10pments might have
produced some modifications in the official Chilean attitude,
the two ministers decided to pay a visit to Covarrubias. He
received them politely, but was evasive, saying that he must
first consult with President Perez on the matter.

The United States minister next attempted to bring
about a settlement, but with no more success than the British
and French. Nelson had received a note from Seward in which
the Secretary commissioned him to renew'the offer of good
(offices.l In this note, dated December 5, 1865, Seward
cautioned Nelson to treat the two belligerents with equal
consideration. The communication was closed with the following
observation, "We believe that representations made by the'
united States alone without the other powers are more in

harmony with our own national character and institutions."34

 

33New York Herald, February 10, 1866, p. 1.

3"Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, Seward to Nelson,
#117, December 5, 1865.

-45-

Nelson responded on January sixteenth that he should
neglect no opportunity to renew'the offer, but that it had
been impossible for him during the past few months to deal
equally with the two powers. "Spain is aggressive, and
unfair to neutral interests . . . Chile is only defensive.
As you say, Spain demanded only a salute, but Chile couldn't
yield to . . . an arrogant threat. It is impossible for me
to stand by without remonstrance against the injustice of

d."35' In this

the aggressor and sympathy for the aggrieve
same communication the Minister also voiced his concern for
the safety of the vast commercial interests of his country-
men in Chile; and on these bases he determined to pay a visit
to the Spanish Commander.

Nelson reported that Méndez received him with a spirit
of conciliation and showed a desire for peaceful solution
which was in marked contrast to the attitude of Pareja.
Following his talk‘with the Spanish Commander, Nelson next
approached Covarrubias to determine whether the good offices
of the united States would be accepted by him. The Chilean

Minister replied that he was always ready for peace with

honor and dignity and was willing to allow'the arbitration.

 

35Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #245, Nelson to
Seward, January 16, 1866.

-45-

However, Covarrubias said that he thought that there might
be complications as Britain and France had also offered their
good offices, an offer which Spain had accepted but Chile
had not. He stipulated that Peru would also have to be
willing to accede to the proposal as she was bound to Chile
by the treaty of the previous month?6 There was one further
obstacle. This was the great feeling of confidence in Chile
which was the result of additional.naval successes over the
Spanish. The general Opinion was that Chile would not be
willing to settle unless some decisive victory were soon
won by the Spanish.37

Chilean intransigence, for neither the first nor the
'last time, had precluded the possibility of peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute. Obviously Chile must have believed that
her positien had become vastly improved relative to that of
Spain. Peruvian ports were now closed to the Spanish. The
Peruvian frigates Amazonas and Apurimac and the smaller
corvettes Qgiég and America had been placed under the unified
command of Chile. While the combined squadron was still not

the equal of the eaversary's, it was of sufficient size to

cause the enemy much trouble.

 

36Mess. and 925., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #248, Nelson to

Seward, February 15, 1866. .
37New'York Tribune, January 20, 1866, p. 6.

-47-

The Chilean government expected that Chile would soon
have some new'ships that would be the equal of, if not superior
to, the Spanish ships in speed. The sources of such ships
‘were to be two. The Peruvian government had commissioned for
several ships in England prior to the declaration of war by
Peru on Spain. Following the declaration, a complaint was
made in London by the Spanish representative that the ships
were being constructed for service in Chile. The British
declared, however, that there were no grounds for interference
and the ships cleared port with no action having been taken
against them. The Independencia and the Huascar arrived in
Valparaiso early in June of 1866.38

The second source of new'ships for Chile was to be the
United States. To purchase ships was one of the main reasons

for the special mission of Vicuhi Mackenna.39

 

38New York Herald, July 22, 1866, p. 2.

39This illustrious Chilean patriot could count among
his ancestors many of the leading families of Chile, but perhaps
none was more famous than.don Benjamih himself. Born in 1831 in
Stgo. and educated there, he was one of the capital's leading
figures. Imprisoned and condemned to death for writing against
the government, he escaped and spent six years in exile. During
these years, he made the most of his time traveling in Europe
and in the U.S. gathering manuscript material for later his-
torical works. By 1856 he was back again in Chile publishing
prolifically and writing for the newspapers, including the
Ferrocarril. In 1863 he became editor of the Mercurio of
Valparaiso. He also served in Congress where he sponsored
projects for the improvement and beautification of Santiago and

‘Valparaiso.

-48- ‘

On the last day of September, 1865, a week after the
declaration of war on Spain, don Benjamin Vicunh Mackenna
had received a call from the Chilean Foreign Minister for a
conference in the Meneda. Covarrubias told him that he was
going.to require a great sacrifice. The government wanted
to send him to the United States on an unusual, but most
important, mission. He was to get to the United States as
quickly as possible; to gain American sympathy for the Chilean
cause, principally through the press; to establish contact
with the wealthy and influential refugees who had come to
‘the United States from Cuba and,Puerto Rico in order to
obtain their cooperation; finally, he was to acquaint him-
self with the ship owners so as to secure the best terms for
the purchase of ships to be used against Spain. In closing,
Covarrubias authorized his agent to "resort to any device."l'o

Vicufih's position was to be neither an official nor a
diplomatic one; he was simply designated an a itator, or
confidential agent, and the nature of his mission was to be
kept secret even from his family. Thomas Nelson must certainly
not have been informed as to the portion of the mission that

was planned as an outright violation of united States neutrality

 

40Benjamin Vicu33 Mackenna, Diez Meses de Misibn a los
Estados Unidos de Norte America (Santiago: lmprenta de la
libertad, 1867), Vol. I, pp. 12-16.

-49-
laws since he presented Vicufih with letters of introduction
to various influential persons in the united States. Among
these influential persons were Schuyler Colfax, Montgomery
Blair, Henry Raymond of the New'York Times, Horace Greeley
of the New York Tribune, and Secretary of State William H.
Seward. -

En route to the United States, Vicufie Mackenna made
stops in Peru and Panama. During his stop in Peru he was
the recipient of unpleasant tidings as to the probable out-
come of his mission. Mk. Robinson, United States Minister
in Lima, warned Vicuna of the prevailing attitude of modera-
tion in the United States. Robinson added that the success
of the mission would depend on the mood of the press and
whatever measures Congress might approve. An American
businessman who had recently come to Peru from the United
States told Vicufia Mackenna that it would not be easy to
obtain ironclads, because the United States had very few'and
would not want to sell those that she had on hand. The
businessman also reported that in the united States there
was a great desire to avoid foreign entanglements. Vicuhh,
after reading various of the United States newspapers for the
preceding month, was inclined to agree that the feeling in

the United States was indeed one favoring moderation. None-

-50-
theless, Vicufia was hopeful that the Congress which was to
reconvene on December fourth would initiate a somewhat changed
foreign policy.41

The implications of this statement, as well as Cova-
rrubias' instructions to Vicufih as to the means to be employed
in enlisting the aid of the newspapers, "It is probable that
the papers of the United States will not lend their whole-
hearted support to our cause gratuitously. Thus, a subsidy
of money will overcome their lukewarmness and indifference,
and you can resort to this means as long as the importance
of the paper, that is its circulation and respectability,
provides a guarantee that its publications will gain support
for our cause and condemnation for that of Spain,"42 most
naturally raise some questions. One must wonder just how
'well this Chilean special agent understood the actual structure
and operations of the United States government. Further, the
Chilean Foreign Minister would seem not to have fathomed the
role played by the free press in the United States.

Vicuha Mackenna arrived in New'York on November 20, 1865.
The situation looked bleak indeed. He had been told that the

 

41Vicuaa Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, pp. 110-11.

“21bid., p. 13.

-51-
types of ships that he was seeking were not available in the
United States, and even if they were he had little money at
his disposal and Chilean credit was practically unknown. In
addition it was clear that official United States policy was
not going to be sympathetic. The note from Secretary Seward
which Chilean Minister Asta-Buruaga showed Vicunh when he
met him in New York seemed to him to confirm Chile's appre-
hension as to the position of the United States. In the note,
Seward commented that the war "up to a point has concerned
this government. . . . since the war is already under way
. . . discussion of its merits by this government would not
be compatible with the respect which we profess toward two
friendly nations. Nevertheless, I am confident that each of
these two*will permit the Uhited States to say . . . that
war should have been avoided as the issue is nothing more
than whether one nation will make a salute to the flag of
the other. . . . ‘While the war lasts, this government will
observe the neutrality prescribed by its own and by inter-
national law; No ship of either country will be allowed to
bring its booty into any port of the United States. I have

written the Spanish minister to the same effect . . . ,"43

 

43Vicu33 Mackenna, Diez Meses, Seward to Asta-Buruaga,
November 17, 1865, Vol. I, pp. 186-87.

.-52-

To Vicuga, who was hopeful of accomplishing so much for
his country, Seward's note was a great disappointment. To
Asta-Buruaga it was less so as he had been aware of United
States policy for approximately two months. On September 28,
in a special interview, Asta-Buruaga had requested that Seward
present him with a clear outline of United States policy.
Seward then obliged the Chilean Minister by advising him that
the Chileans had best not expose themselves unless they were
confident of beating the Spanish, and that in case of war a
policy of neutrality would be followed. Minister Asta-
Buruaga's conclusion was that since his country's indepen-
dence was already assured and the Latin American market open
to the Uhited States, Seward felt it unnecessary to grant
assistance.4A This seems to have been a natural assumption
for Asta-Buruaga to have reached. In his disillusionment,
Vicufih claimed that Seward's policy was not one of neutrality,
but rather of partiality to Spain. Seward's failure to send
a delegate to the American conference in Lima is one of the
points that Vicuah‘Mackenna cites as evidence of this asser-

tation.
In a sense, much of Vicufih's bitter reaction to the

slight success of his mission to the United States had its

 

44Vicufia Mackenna, Diez Meses, Asta-Buruaga to Cova-
rrubias,September 30, 1865, Vol. I, pp. 195-96.

S53-
origin in cross-cultural ignorance. For, while to many
people in the United States it was foolish to wage war over
a point of honor?5 to many Latin Americans it was equally
difficult to appreciate Yankee practicality and thereasons
for it. Even more to the point, there seems to have been an
incredible lack of comprehension of the scope and toll of the
Civil‘War in the United States and the immensity of the prob-
lems of Reconstruction. Further, there must have been a
lack of awareness of the diplomatic problems between the
[united States and Great Britain arising out of Civil War
claims. .

The special agent lost no time in initiating his public
relations campaign on behalf of Chile. ‘Within less than two
weeks of his arrival in New York he had visited the main news-
papers in order to present his letters of introduction. He
had a pleasant talk with Mr. Raymond of the 1M» and Mr.
.Bennett of the figgglg invited Vicuna to dine at his home.

VicuahMackenna, in his Diez Meses, relates a strangely
interesting set of events that transpired during this period.
He was apparently so impressed by the pro-Chilean posture of

the London Times that he wrote to Messrs. Bennett, Raymond,

 

AsNew'York Herald, January 5, 1866, p. l.~
New York Times, January 8, 1866, p. 4.

-54-

and Greeley suggesting that they would do well to follow'the
lead of the British press in their editorial treatment of the
Spanish-Chilean'War. Vicuna wrote these letters on November
29, 1865, and requested that the editors have something in
the paper before December first, as that was the sailing
date of the mail for Chile. In his book Vicuxa Mackenna said
that all of the papers, because of anti-British bias and in
response to his letter, carried editorials on "No Entangling
Alliances" the very next day, November 30, 1865.46 That
this was not the case is readily established by the simple
expedient of examining the three papers for that date. The
New'York Times was the only one with an editorial opposing
entangling alliances. From the content of the editorial it
does not seem to have been directly related to Vicufia's letter.

The editorial was addressed to the issue as to whether
or not the united States should join with England and France
in order to Oppose Spain in the Pacific. The conclusion.
reached was a resounding "No." "When, . . . we go into an
alliance with France and England to drive Spanish men-of-

war out of the Pacific ports, the chances are that one of the

conditions of such a convention would be a demand for the

 

l'6Vicu‘3’a Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, p. 249.

-55-

evacuation of Mexico by the French."47

Vicuna'wrote of having spoken before numerous groups
while he was in the United States. The talks that have been
reported most extensively were those that he gave before the
Travelers Club on December 2, 1865, to the Union League Club
the same week, and at the the Cooper Union meeting on January
6, 1866. The Cooper union meeting was byfar the largest and
most‘widely reported propaganda effort of Vicuna Mackenna's
career. It will be discussed in a later section. For the
moment, it will suffice to say that neither his letter-
writing nor his speech-making produced the results that he
had anticipated. His goal seems to have been to obtain
active official United States aid for Chile. 'As for securing
editorial suppOrt, no special agent was needed to attain that
which had been freely given. The overwhelming majority of
the Chilean related articles and editorials that appeared in
United States newspapers, regardless of party, between 1861
and 1866 were favorable to Chile. For the most part, those
few'articles that could not be termed actually pro-Chile
were at least anti-Spain.

The special agent's other activities on behalf of Chile

can be included in three general categories: meeting or

 

h7New‘York Times, November 30, 1865, p. 4.

-55-
attempting to meet influential pe0ple, recruiting trained
military personnel, and attempting to purchase ships. In
all three types of endeavors his success was, at best, ques-
tionable. The large group of rich, influential Cuban and
Puerto Rican refugees that he thought he was going to meet
proved to be but a small group so poor that Vicufia made a
contribution to their meager treasury. In late January,
Vicufia went to Washington where he met a number of the promi-
nent man of the day, including General Grant, Secretary
of the Navy'welles,_and even President Johnson, of whom the
Chilean commented that his suit looked home-made. He was
disappointed that he was unable to meet Secretary Seward.
who was vacationing in the Caribbean at the time. Simply
being introduced to famous people at various social events
yielded no new'support for Chile.

The Chilean agent's recruitment program.resulted in a
small naval expedition of six persons being sent to Chile.
The men had all been in the service of the Confederate States
of America, and were all versed in the use of the most modern
weapons}.8 The expedition arrived in Chile at the end of
January, but due to a misunderstanding concerning remuneration

for their services they were still in Valparaiso at the time

 

48vicuge'Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vicuaa to Covarrubias,

December 10, 1865, Vol. I, p. 319-27. Also New York Tribune,
January 13, 1866, p. 8.

-57-

of the bombardment of that city by the Spaniards."9

Most of
them.subsequently returned to the United States.

Vicuna's attempt to purchase ships for Chile culminated
in a fiasco as far as public relations were concerned. Prior
to the arrival of Vicd’fl'a, Asta-Buruaga had begun negotia-
tions to purchase the 11929;, but not having received the
necessary authorizations or money, and war having been declared
by Chile on Spain, he suspended the arrangements. Vicufih
thought that it would be easier to purchase a different ship,
and therefore, he instituted negotiations for several others.
The prime reason for the failure of fruition of the many
ship-buying plane was the Chilean's lack of cash.

On New'Year's Day 1866, Vicufih received the good news
of the capture of the Covadong . He had judged, most correctly,
that when the word of the Covadonga's fate reached Spain that
the Spanish would deem retaliation a necessity in order to
restore the honor of the monarchy. Vicuna then determined
that it was absolutely essential to obtain the 59.53.93. for
Chile. He established contact with intermediaries to arrange
for the purchase of the FEE-325° }

On January 15, 1866, Vicufia'wrote to inform Asta-Buruaga

 

l‘9VicuWa Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, p. 321.

-53-
that he had concluded the purchase of the M55525, He happily
reported that the details of the transaction favored Chile,
particularly the proviso that Chile would not have to pay
for the ship until six months after it would have arrived to
Chile. The vessel at this time was privately owed.

' The §E££g£_was to have sailed for Chile on January 22,
1866, but she was not ready for sea. The following day the
_M£_t_e_g£ was detained in port by United States authorities.

The Spanish consul in New'York had reported that Vicuna and
others were conspiring to violate the neutrality laws of the
United States. On February sixth, Vicuna was arrested on
the charge of plotting a military expedition detrimental to
a power friendly to the United States. Although later this
special agent complained at great length about this whole
episode, at the time he managed to emerge relatively unscathed.
True, he did have to testify in a court case that was avidly
followed by all of the newspapers. Thanks to Asta-Buruaga,
however, Viovfie Mackenna was provided with diplomatic innmmity
and the United States allowed him to remain in the country.
From the time of the M2522; trial until his departure
for Chile, Vicuga devoted most of his efforts to writing for
La Voz de la America which he had founded the previous December.

For the time, it would seem then that the second source of

-59-

Chile's anticipated naval reinforcements had proven fruitless.

At the very time that Vicuaa'Mackenna was striving to
purchase the Meteor, Covarrubias was refusing to consider a
suspension of hostilities in order to negotiate with Spain.
Méndez Nflhez' original orders had been explicit in that he
was to stay in the Pacific until peace was concluded‘with
Chile. He was instructed to attain peace githgg_by hostilities
g£,by other means.50 . .

When it was clear that again Chile would not negotiate,51
Mendez Nflaez, unlike Pareja, proceeded in a business-like
fashion to wage hostilities so as to bring the war to a close.
First, as was mentioned above, the Spanish blockade was reduced
to only the port of Valparaiso. .Thus,‘Méndez N663: was able

to enforce, and therefore validate, the declared blockade.

By blockading the main port, and the one in which foreign

 

soThe accepted, standard Spanish references on this
period, Novo y Colson and Becker, give Nov. 23, 1865, as the
date of the royal decree that ordered Méndez Nflflez to carry
on until peace with Chile was concluded. Vicuh'a Mackenna
cites the date from Nova, and neither Encina nor Edwards gives
a date. It seems most curious that in almost 100 years
no one has hypothesized that Pareja was to have been replaced,
possibly to facilitate reaching a peaceful settlement.

51New'l'ork Herald, March 8, 1866, p. 6.

-50-
investors were so heavily represented, he could hope to reduce
the income to the Chilean government and to induce the diplo-
matic corps to exert pressure on Covarrubias to negotiate with
Spain.

Once an effective blockade had been established, two
other problems'claimed‘Méndez' attention: first, the enemy
fleet, and second, the matter of necessary supplies. Within
a week he had instituted measures to deal with both. He
declared coal a contraband of‘war,52 and later, seized it
as his ships needed fuel. On January 21, 1866, the Villa,-
and the m left Valparaiso and steamed south in search
of the allied'ships.S3 They rejoined the squadron at Val-
paraiso in the middle of February. A small engagement at the
island of Abato near Chiloé,54 from which the Spanish had
emerged somewhat damaged without having incapacitated the
allies, was all that they had to report. Mendez NGhez then
decided that it was his duty to restore the national honor
by searching out and destroying the allied fleet. Therefore,

on the seventeenth of February the Numancia and the Blanca

 

5ZNew'York Tribune, March 24, 1866, p. 8.
53Ibid., February 26, 1866, p. 5.
5l‘New‘Iork Herald, April 1, 1866, p. l. '

-51-
departed for the south. The Commander returned to Valparaiso
almost a month later having enjoyedlittle more success than
had his squadron-mates on the previous trip. The only contact

55 Thanks to Chilean

with the enemy had occurred near Huite.
strategy and heavy fogs the Spanish had been unable to employ
their superior firepower. During the return trip north they
captured the Paguete gel Mauls, S6 and seized some foreign
coal transports at Lota.57 .
While the coal thus acquired had been more than enough
to enable the E13229. and the Nlnancia to return to Valparaiso,
it did not relieve the urgent problem of providing fuel for
the squadron. The whole question of supplies of all types
use daily becoming more pressing. There had been a great
decrease in Spanish shipping because of a very real fear of
Chilean privateers.58 For the most part, the reduced voluss
of Spanish shipping was being carried by neutrals. Sending
supplies via neutral bottoms proved of little aid to l‘ndes

lfigez, as the Chilean government, on March 16, 1866, decreed

 

55m York Herald, April 10, 1866, p. 1.

“New York Tribune, April 10, 1866, p. 8.

”lien. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #255, Nelson to
Seward, lurch 13, 1866.

”New York Herald, February 1, 1866, p. lo, and Feb-
ruary 18, 1835, p. 8. . .

-52-
that any neutral ships having contact with the Spanish fleet
or supplying them with coal and/or other provisions would be
prohibited from entering any Chilean ports.59

Thus, with his European sources of supplies being rapidly
diminished and with virtually the whole Pacific coast closed
to him, if M‘ndez Huger were to obey his orders to stay in
the Pacific until peace was achieved, then clearly, it was

time to employ new tactics.

By mid-March when the Spanish ships had returned to
Valparaiso from their unsuccessful attempt to wage war with
the allied fleet, they found that the situation in the port
had changed somewhat with the arrival of the American squadron.6o
The squadron, commanded by Coinsodore . John Rodgers, consisted
of the monitor Monadnock, and the steamers Vanderbilt, Tuscarora,
Powhatan, and Mohong . In addition, United States Minister
Nelson had been replaced by General Judson Rilpatrick on March

twelfth.

 

59Mass. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #3 Rilpatriek to
Seward, April 2, 1866.

60New York Tribune, April 3, 1866, p. l.

-63-

For a few days following the arrival from Europe of the
last mail steamer on March twelfth, there was generalized
apprehension among the people of Valparaiso that a bombard-
ment was imminent. This fear was augmented by the apparent
preparation of the British fleet for withdrawal from the
harbor. When, with the exception of one frigate, the British
fleet remained quietly at anchor, rumors of the bombardment
subsided.

During this lull the North Americans were doing what
they could to arrive at a peaceful settlement. They suggested
several plans to both sides, but neither was willing to secede.
Chile demanded that Spain abandon the was unconditionally;
naturally Spain refused. Spain favored a suspension of hos-
tilities to allow time for negotiation. Chile would not agree
to a suspension, ostensibly from fear of giving Spain time to
strengthen her squadron.61

On March nineteenth Rodgers and Kilpatrick met with
Foreign Minister Covarrubias in Santiago to suggest that the
two belligerents fire a mutual salute. Covarrubias said that
while a mutual salute would have been possible at the begin-

ning of the war, that now Chile deemed herself the offended

party. When Kilpstrick asked what terms Chile would accept

 

61W, March 27, 1355, p. 1.

-54-
the Foreign Minister reiterated that which he had declared
in his manifesto of the preceding October, that his nation
preferred war rather than submit to the demands of Spain.“
Two days later, the twenty-first, Rodgers and Kilpatrick were
back in Valparaiso and visited andez Nu'l'lez aboard the Numancia.
The Spanish Admiral's cordial and sincere manner made a very
favorable impression on the two men. On the twenty-third,
hinder hose. again talked with Kilpatrick and Rodgers, this
time in a visit to the Vanderbilt. While stating that it was
his wish-to avoid further war, he also said that his instruc-
tions from Madrid left him no choice, if Chile refused to
negotiate. At this time he showed them his credentials that
empowered him to sue for peace as envoy extraordinary and

63 To avert the impending bombard-

minister plenipotentiary.
ment, M’endez Nfifi'ez stated that there were three stipulations
with which Chile must comply. These were as follows: (1) Chile

was to give a note to Mandez NG‘nez stating that Chile had had

 

62M.... and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #3, Kilpatrick to
Seward, April 2, 1866. This particular report included many
enclosures that encompassed the main meetings and interviews
in which Rilpatrick participated, as' well as the principal
proclamations of both sides for the last two weeks of March.

63P'errocarril, March 27, 1866, p. 1. In the same lead
article wherein Covarrubias is cited as saying that M‘ndez'
offers to negotiate were without official character and that
his orders precluded such arrangements, Méndez is later de-
scribed as minister plenipotentiary. As Covarrubias, presumably
and logically, was the source for the story, a question must be
raised as to the sincerity of the Chilean Foreign Minister.

-65-

no intention nor wish to insult Spain in the actions complained
of, and that the treaty between the two countries had not been
broken, but only interrupted by the declaration of war. Chile
was also to deliver up to Spain the Covadonga, together with her
crew, armaments, and officers; (2) Spain, in return, was then
to give a note to Chile stating that she did not desire to
humiliate that country nor to seize any of her territory and
that she held in great respect the independence of the South
American republics. In exchange for the Covadonga Spain would
return to the republic the twelve prizes captured in Chilean
waters along with all of her Chilean prisoners; (3) Spain and
Chile were to fire a reciprocal salute of twanty-one guns,
Chile firing the first gun from one of her forts, and some
vessel of the Spanish fleet replying, gun for gun. If this
were agreed to, Mendez NGa'ez said that he would then proceed
to Santiago in his capacity as diplomatic representative for
the purpose of consummating a new treaty of peace. After
stating his proposition to Kilpatrick and Rodgers, Mendez
Nu’nez said that he would wait for a reply until eight o'clock
on the morning of the twenty-seventh. If there were no satis-
factory response by that time, more stringent measures were to
be employed. M‘ndez further impressed upon the two Americans

that. this was not an official government communication,

but that he had had orders to transmit these conditions

-55-

verbally in order to find out whether or not they would be
accepted by the Chilean government if he‘were to present them
formally.

Minister Covarrubias on the twenty-fifth in Santiago
informed Kilpatrick that his country could not accept the
proposed terms. Among other reasons that he gave for his
refusal, he said that Chile could not accept peace while her
sister republics were threatened, "nor could she exchange the
Covsdonga, a prize won in fair and open battle on open sea
for any number of merchant vessels picked up by Spain in
undefended ports."64 Mendez Nfifiez, when informed of the
Chilean attitude the following day, expressed his sympathy
but said that his instructions left him no alternative other
than to carry out a bombardment of Valparaiso which would
take place in four days, on March 31, 1866.

In Santiago too, the atmosphere was tense, and according
to observers a war psychology prevailed.65 On every street
corner and in every place of business all talk was of the
impending catastrOphe and there was a determination to sacrifice

every port on the coast rather than yield to Spanish demands.

 

64Ferrocarril,‘March 27, 1866, p. 1.
New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 3.

65Nsw York Tribune, May 10, 1866, p. 8.

L‘

If

-57-

Such great determination to sacrifice a beautiful city
rather than fire a mutual salute! A student of history must
admire the spirit, yet his next reaction must be one of curi-
osity. Precisely how much did the people know of the latest
Spanish terms? Were the Chileans aware that their own govern-
ment had rejected flatly every proposal that Mendez NGh’ez had
extended? An examination of the country's leading newspaper
supports the contention that the people were not told of the
conciliatory tone adopted by Mendez.

The young men of Santiago, especially the aristocrats,
formed military organizations for the purpose of going to
Valparaiso. "Everywhere the same spirit of devotion to the
cause of Chile was displayed and the government was offered
from all quarters men and material to prosecute the war."66
Yet, at no time prior to the bombardaent did the government
make any serious effort to fortify the coast towns or to
resist the enemy.

Hope still existed that the bombardment might be averted
through the intervention of the diplomatic corps. In Santiago
a special train was assigned to transport the diplomatic corps

to Valparaiso, and the special Chile correspondent of the Le!

York Herald accompanied the group. As they approached Valparaiso,

 

66New York HeraldJ May 2, 1866, p. 3.

h

I,‘

-53-
they saw other trains full of people fleeing from the coast.
There was evidenced considerable alarm, but no panic. Carts
and every other means of transport were being utilized to
move property to safety. The harbor appeared quiet with the
American fleet close to shore, the British beyond, and the

Spanish still further out. (See Map l.) The American

Valparaiso just rior
to the bombardme t.

M 3m:

$4 435‘ ”‘1‘ VALPARA/SO
\ J

 

Map 1.
Commander Rodgers had been given to understand by the British
captain that he, Denman, would not permit the bombardment.
This was the situation on the night of the twenty-sixth.
The following morning Rilpatrick visited Mandez Nfifiez

on the Numancia to inform him that the Chileans had declined

-59-
to accept his propositions.67 The Spanish Comander then
addressed a note to the consular corps, giving them official
notification of the impending bombardment.68 By this action,
as many others, M‘ndez' attitude provided “a definite contrast
to the behavior of Pareja, as when the late Comander announced
his brus'que ultimatum directly to the Chilean government. In
his note to Kilpatrick, Minder reiterated the complaints of his
country. He stated that Spain would have been justified in
this resort to force even at an earlier period, but that in
keeping with the proverbial generosity of the Spanish people
a last attempt to reach a solution by diplomatic means had
been made. He further claimed that the justice of Spain's
cause had been recognized by the two leading powers of Europe
in their offer of good offices to reach an amicable settle-
ment. Spain had accepted this offer in her desire, to establish
the peace, but the attitude of Chile had precluded this possi-
bility. If Chile were to suffer as the result of the bombard-
ment, she must take the blame for having provoked such action.
When Spain had attempted to carry on legitimate warfare with
Chile, the allied ships had persisted in hiding in small coves
where the Spanish ships could not get at them to fight. MCndez

 

67W, March 27, 1866, p. 2.

688mbardement de Val raiso, Docments Officiels (Paris:
Imprimerie Vallie, 1866), p. 21.

-70..
wrote that while he personally felt that the bombardment was
a terrible thing, that it was legitimate and the only means
open to spain. Any consequent damage to neutral interests
would be the responsibility of the republic. Rilpatrick felt
that the bombardment would be an act of vandalism, and he did
all in his power to prevent it. Later, headvised Secretary.
Seward that he did not feel that the United States could risk.
the certainty of war with Spain when the United States had so
recently emerged from its own bloody Civil War. It might be
noted that Kilpatrick having been a general in the Civil War
would naturally have been more aware of and antipathetical to
useless destructions. .

On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh the members of
the diplomatic body were invited to asemble in the rooms of
Rilpatrick to consider what steps might next be taken to pre-
vent the bombardment, especially in view of the fact that most
of the interests in the defenseless city were those of Europeans
and Americans. Up to this point it had been the British who
had taken the strongest stand in insisting that the bombard-
msnt'would not be allowed to take place. "The Chilean Govern-
ment declare that Mr. Thomson had assured them that as long
as Valparaiso remained undefended it could not be attacked,

and that if any fortifications were built or arms used, England

-71-
would make Chili answerable for all the property of British

"69 It now’appeared

subjects that might be lost or destroyed.
that they were not willing to backup their words with action.
The newspapers reported the situation to be one of great disap-
pointment, but this seems a mild term. British.merchants par-
ticularly resented this backing off; they paid taxes to their
government and felt, with justification, that they were an-
titled to protection in return.70 ‘While this diplomatic ac-
tivity was trsnspiring the population continued to evacuate

the port. The atmosphere of impending doom‘was heightened

by a minor earthquake that occurred about mid-night on the
twenty-seventh.

The next morning at another meeting of the diplomats,
Eilpatrick received petitions from various consuls requesting
his interference and protection, but he made it explicit that
the united States fleet would not act alone to prevent the
action of the Spanish squadron. The British‘Minister,‘Mr.

Thomson, failed to attend this meeting and an interesting

description of his activities was painted by the Herald

 

5911223. (London). May 15. 1866. p. 13.

70Evidence was assembled by the British merchants of
'Valparaiso attempting to prove the duplicity of Thomson and
Denman. This was presented in the House of Commons on May
15, 1866, in a speech by the under secretary of state for
foreign affairs. As a result Thomson was removed from his post.

-72-
correspondent. ". . . at the very hour when he promised to
meet the other ministers, he took the feeble old French minister
under his arm, and ran away by train to Santiago. . This conduct
is rendered more ridiculous by the fact that he had bored the
intendente until after mid-night with importunities for a
special train to carry him off in the dark. Bis departure,
although intended by him to be very sly, did not escape the
notice of the citizens, a large number of whom, including
many British merchants, hissed him as he entered the can"?1
V On the morning of March twenty-eighth Kilpatrick, in

the name of the United States government, addressed a final
.communication to the Spanish Admiral protesting the forth-
coming bombardment. There was no answer. Later in the morning .
all themembers of the diplomatic corps that were in Valparaiso
called on the American Minister to thank him for his efforts in
attempting to arrange a peaceful settlement. The foreign con-
suls also addressed petitions for protection to Commodore Rodgers.
He replied that, unfortunately, without British cooperation he
felt that there was little to be done.

_ Two days before the scheduled bombardment, the comander
of the American naval forces paid another visit to Mendez. It

is not clear from either the diplomatic sources or the newspaper

 

71New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 3.

-73-
accounts whether this preceded his reply to the consular body
or not, but in any case it must have been an interesting inter-
view. The report of this meeting was sent by Méndes to the

.. Spanish minister in Washington. It appeared soon after in .
La Cr6nica, a Spanish paper printed in New York, and a few
days after in the 3.93.11.9- According to the Spanish account,
Rodgers said at this time that although he was opposed to the
bombardment he was now convinced that Spain was in the right
since the Chileans had refused in no uncertain terms the satis-
faction asked by Spain. In essence, this satisfaction had
amounted to nothing more than that Chile was to fire the first
shot which was to be answered by the Spanish. Rodgers said
that he intended to move his ships out of the way, but that

he first insisted on proposing one last plan?2 According to
this plan, Méndes was to write a manifesto stating that nothing
could prevent the bombardment; nevertheless, the action would
not be carried out and Valparaiso would be saved. The Spanish
Admiral said that by so doing he would incur heavy responsi-
bility, but that for the sake of peace he would try it on the
condition that some member of the Chilean government would
guarantee to him personally in the presence of the United

States minister that such generosity would be appreciated and

 

75m Kilpatrick's dispatch to Seward, of April 2, 1866,
Kilpatrick appears to credit this plan to Mendez.

-74-
reciprocated. Rodgers presented the plan to the Chilean govern-
ment, but it was bluntly refused. Covarrubias, well aware of
the irritation of the Spaniards at not having been able to en-
gage in naval warfare with the allied fleet in the south, made
a counterproposal for a naval duel between the forces of the.
two sides. This was to take place ten miles from shore, with-
out the participation of the Numancia. and with. the American
comander acting as umpire. The result of the combat was to
determine the close of the war. Rodgers apparently found this
reply by Covarrubias on the thirtieth as disgusting as did
Mendez fines.” Rodgers felt that Mendez had done all that
he could to arrange a settlement and had acted in a dignified
way, but that his instructions now left him no other alterna-
tive. He expressed warm admiration for the conduct of the
Admiral.” f

The last hope for the city had been abandoned, and by
the night of the thirtieth there was nothing to do but wait.
, Total silence reigned in the city. Foreign Minister Covarrubias

and President Pérez had come dorm from Santiago on the

 

“New York Herald, May 10, 1866, p. 3.

7“Bombardment de Val raiso, Mendez Néfies to the Spanish
foreign minister, March 57, 1533, pp. 42-43.

-75-
twenty-ninth. The latter in his proclamation to the Chilean
people said that the bombardment would be the scandal of the
nineteenth century, that the glory of ancient Spain would
vanish by such a deed, but that the Chileans would know how
to comport themselves with honor to their nation.” The moon
was bright that night, but at 10:00 P.M. a total eclipse added
to the gloom of the city.

Saturday morning, the thirty-first, dawned clear and
beautiful with the bay still, "thousands covered the hills
'while the city was as still as if the plague had cleared it

of inhabitants . "76

At 7:00 A.M., an hour before the action
was to begin, the Spanish ships had their steam up to move

in as the British ships, followed by the American, moved out
of the harbor. (See Map 2.) At the appointed hour, white
flags flying over the hospitals and churches as MEndez Nfihes
had instructed, the Chilean flag waving from the fortress on
the hill overlooking the town, the Spanish fired two blank
shots to signal that the bombardment was to begin. The attack

was carried out in much the same way as a tactical bombing

r'aid by a plane. The Spanish ships moved in firing with their

 

75Bcnubardement de Valparaiso, Proclamation of President
Perez, March 25, 1865, pp. 42-43.

76New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 4.

-75-
starboard guns upon the customs houses. They followed the arc
of the beach, hitting next the Bolsa, then the governor's
palace and other public buildings. As soon as their guns were
out of range, they turned and circled back.firing_indiscrime
inately with their port guns on the city. 'The Villa de Madrid,
the flagship of the late Admiral Pareja, and the glangg,kept
up the heaviest fire, and according to the Herald's eye-
wdtness account these two ships even had to raise their guns
in order to bring down the Chilean flag waving from the fortress.
It was at this time that many of 'the churches and hospitals
.were shelled. As soon as MEndez NGBez realized that this was
happening, he ordered his squadron to complete the destruction
of the customs houses and then to cease with the bombardment.
Immediately after the firing stopped, firemen rushed out
to extinguish the flames that were spreading rapildy. The in-
habitants who had been watching the scene from the hills
streamed back down into the city. The British and American
ships returned to their former positions in the harbor as the
Spanish sailed out. Remarkable order was reported in the city
‘where seven hundred United States sailors assisted in quelling
the blazes. One hundred British sailors also tendered their

77
aid, but this was refused. On April 1, 1866, the day

 

77The Bombardment of Valparaiso, Rear-Admiral Denman,

-77-

following the bombardment ConInodore Rodgers want on board the
mimancia. Mendez Méfl’ez informed him at this time that there
would be no imediate repetition of the bombardment. The
alarm of the city died don, the street cars were soon run-
ning again, as were the trains to the capital, and the Sunday

Easter services were celebrated in the churches as usual.

 

Mr. Layard, and the British Connnunity of Valparaiso (Liverpool:
n. pr., 1555), pp. 23-24. In a letter oE'KI'Ip' aErIck to U.S.
Consul Clerk in Valparaiso on July 28, 1866, the former quoted
Denman as saying that ". . . when time comes for action I will
cooperate with the American navy and go as far as .you." Later,
however, in his published report Denman claimed that he had
never given any positive assurance to interfere. Chilean

feeling was extremely anti-British at this time because of
the vacillating policy of Denman.

-78-

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Map 2.-This map shows the burned
portions of the city, the locations of most of the public
buildings, and the positions of the various fleets.

MEXICO

"It would be easier for two continents to meet than to
reconcile the spirits of the two countries Spain and Mexico .
. . . There [Mexico] the struggle continues by dint of human
and every other type of sacrifice, for the Spaniards spare
nothing that might enable them to subdue those who have had
the misfortune of being born on this soil, which appears to
be destined to flowwwith the blood of its offspring. In spite
of everything, Mexicans will be free.. . . . The time has
come at last to repay the Spanish torture for torture and to
drawn that race of annihilators in its own blood or in the sea."

In Mexico the year 1861 opened on the hopeful note of
the triumph of constitutional government over usurpation.
Benito Juarez had Victoriously returned to the capital in
December of 1860. The liberal success was hailed as the pre-
cursor of great changes and improvements for Mexico. People
were hopeful that the power of the clergy would be reduced,
and that‘Mexico would now'be able to encourage investments,
develop her resources, and realize her potential as a united,
progressive nation.2 Although this study begins'with Janu-
ary l, 1861, it is vital to realize that for over a year just
prior to this there had been almost constant strife between

an anti-republican coalition and the liberal forces. The

 

1Bierck, Selected'writings of Bolivar, Vol. 1, pp. 105-107.

2N’ew'Y’orkTimes, January 9, 1861, p. 4.
-79-

-go-
anti-republican coalition was composed of Miramon, Church,
and conservative groups and was aided and encouraged by outs
siders such as the Spanish.Minister Pacheco. Of all the dis-
sident groups in Mexico the most powerful was the Church party
that Juarez had alienated irrevocably by the confiscation of
their property. This move that had made the situation more
difficult for him in his own country, and was to ease the
opposition forces' task of convincing Louis napoleon to inter-
vene, had at the same time gained Juarez much support in the
United States.3

Despite the presence of the constitutional government,
the government £3.1235, in Mexico City, the country was any-
thing but a smoothly functioning republic. It was not safe
to travel from one city to another. Travelers were attacked
so regularly that such an occurrence was scarcely newsworthy.
Bands of guerrillas lived off the countryside. There were
seventy to eighty generals in the country, many of whom were
not loyal to Juarez. In actuality, for more than half a cen-
tury‘Mexico had not been free of at least some degree of civil
strife.

During the period that Benito Juarez, the legal presi-

dent, had been forced to reside in Vera Cruz, the usurper

 

‘ 3New York Times, February 21, 1861, p. 4.

-31-
. Miguel Miramon had incurred certain international obligations
for which Mexico and Juarez were to be held accountable. The
intervention that was the outgrowth of the British, French,
and Spanish claims, and the reaction of the United States to
that intervention. comprise the international incident with
which this section is concerned. .

Spain's specific complaints against Mexico were based
on the repudiation of theMon-Almonte Treaty and the expul-
sion of the Spanish minister, Joaquin Pacheco, by the Juarez
government. The Mon-Almonte Treaty, signed on November 26, 1859,
had been denounced by the liberals as an outrage from the time
that its terms had become known. The most offensive provisions
seem to have been those that dealt with recognition of the
claim of Spanish citizens againstthe Mexican government,
and the reactivation of the Mexican-Spanish Treaty of 1853.
As for Pacheco, according to the London 11:29.9. , with the ex-
ception of Spain, "The conduct of the Juarez Government in
handing to Se'n’or Pacheco his passport has been universally
approved; he had so completely identified with the Miramon
faction that there was no other course left open to them."4

The Jecker transactions provided France with an excuse

to pressure the Juarez government. Miramon had attempted to

 

l‘Timea (London), March 9, 1861, p. 9.

-32-
remedy an ever-present deficit by means of a relatively in-
volved loan from.the adventuring, unscrupulous banker Jecker.
The crux of the arrangement was that the‘Miramon government
‘was to receive approximately $600,000, for which the total
repayment would amount to $15,000,000. naturally, the liberal
government refused to consider Mexico liable for any such
obligation.

Due to the conditions of near-anarchy that prevailed
in the country, British citizens had long been concerned for
the safety of large investments in'Mexico, as well as over
twelve million pounds sterling that was owed to Englishmen
by the Mexican government.5 The British government itself
became involved in the Mexican situation when a large sum of
money was stolen from the British Embassy by the Miramon forces
late in 1860.

All three countries proposed intervention as a way of
establishing order and enabling the Mexican government to
institute the controls necessary for the protection of the
.lives and property of their subjects.

Occupied as she was with her own disturbed internal
conditions in the 1860's, it is not surprising that the united-

States focused so little attention on the state of affairs of

 

5Times (London), September 18, 1861, p. 10.

-33-
_her sister republic in the early part of the decade. Rumors
of anarchy and revolution in‘Mexico were rife, but the situa-'
tion was quite imperfectly understood according to Secretary
Seward.. That Seward was cognizant of Mexico's internal situa--
tion and of the widely current rumors of possible European
intervention is shown by his dispatch of April 6, 1861, to'
Thomas Corwin, United States Minister to Mexico. "For a few
years past the condition of Mexico has been so unsettled as
to raise the question on both sides of the Atlantic whether
the time has not come when some foreign power ought, in the
general interest of society, to intervene to establish a pro-
tectorate or some other form of government in that country
and guaranty its continuance there. Such schemes may even

. now’be held under consideration by some European nations, and
'thera is also reason to believe that designs have been con-
ceived in some parts of the united States to effect either a
partial dismemberment or a complete overthrow of the Mexican,
goverunent, with a view to extend over it the authority of
'the newly projected confederacy which a discontented part of
our people are attempting to establish in the southern part

of our own country."6

AM

60. 8. Congress, H. R. ,The Present Condition of vexico,
Serial 1136, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, H. R. Ex. Doc. T100,
#2, Seward to Corwin, April 6,1861. Hereafter cited as Serial
1136.

-34-

Seemingly, the Lincoln administration displayed an appre-
ciation of the importance of Mexican-United States relations
by appointing an unusually able man to fill the post of minis-
ter. Thomas Corwin was politically knowledgeable, had a back-
ground in international relations, was accustomed.to dealing
with all types of people, was experienced in financial matters,
and was aware of the need to guard against activities of agents
of the Confederate States of America. The following quote-
tions from a dispatch to Seward, written after Corwin had been
in Mexico less than three months, are as illustrative of the
author as they are of the situation in Mexico.

After giving an over-all description of the military,
political, and social picture in the Federal District and
the surrounding states, he wrote "Still, I do not dispair of
the final triimph of free government in Mexico. Progress has
been made. The signs of regeneration, though few, are still
visible. Had the present liberal party enough money at com-
mand to pay an army of ten thousand men, I am satisfied it
could suppress the present opposition, restore order, and pre-
serve internal peace. These once achieved, the leaders of
this party would adhere to the written constitution and enforce
obedience to law; . . . I am persuaded that the pecuniary re-

sources to effect these objects at this time must come from

-35-
abroad."7 Other information in this.same dispatch from Corwin
reinforced Seward's suspicions as to European intentions to-
ward Mexico. "Spain, in her rising fortunes, can not but
desire to repossess herself of her lost American colonies.

. . . France and England now have under consideration the
project of intervention in Mexican affairs."

As Mexico's most immediate need was money, both for
daily functioning and to fulfill foreign obligations, Corwin
hoped to negotiate a treaty for the loan of United States
funds to enable Mexico to meet the interest payments on her
debts to Britain and to France. At the same time he was
sufficiently realistic to predict that such a proposal would
meet with little favor in his own country. ' He realized that
domestic problems were, quite properly, the prime concern of
the people in the United States. Y He felt, however, that the
Union cause would be served by promoting the cause of human
progress throughout the western hemisphere.

The United States Minister was also anxious to ascertain
to what extent the Lincoln administration would support the
position taken by the previous administration vis-d-vis Mexico.
The most recent enunciation of that stand had been stated in

a circular of December 1860, which said that while the United

 

7§91131 1135, #2, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861‘.

. -86-
States did not deny to any nation the right to demand redress
for injuries suffered, that the right to interfere directly
or indirectly with the political independence of Mexico was
denied. Further, the United States would, to the extent 'of
its power, defend the nationality and independence of Mexico.8
Clearly, in the light of the events which had transpired
in the United States between December of 1860, and July of 1861,
it is obvious that the Lincoln administration a. unable to
seems the same tone toward Mexico at that maintained by the
Buchanan administration. Nonetheless, President Lincoln was
aware of and sympathetic to the position of the Juarez govern-
ment and said that he believed that "the safety, welfare, and.
happiness" of the United States and of the other American nations
would best be assured by Mexican retention of her own indepen-
dence and integrity.9
Corwin was empowered to negotiate a loan treaty by which
the United States, upon the pledge by Mexico of certain of her
mineral lands as security, would assinne the interest payments

to Britain and France on the Mexican debt. The principal of

this debt was understood to be about sixty-two million dollars.

 

83erial 1136,}3, Corwin to Seward, July 3, 1861, with
enclosure of La Reintrie to the ministers of the other foreign
powers in Mexico, December 20,1860.

91bid., #2, Seward to Corwin, April 6,1861.

-37-
Such an agreement between the United States and Mexico was to
be subject to the approval of Britain and France. Corwin feared
that the pledge of Mexican land would be unpalatable to the Euro-
pean nations who might use such an arrangement as an additional
excuse for intervention in order to preclude the deveIOpment of
a predominant American influence in Mexico. Yet at the same
time, in a second dispatch, Corwin, too, had shown a realization
that the only chance of obtaining Congressional approval for a
Mexican loan would be by offering attractive security. As ra-
gards the terms of the proposed Mexican loan, there seems to
have been a concensus among the top members of the administra-
tion. Seward was unwilling to attempt to secure a loan under
_ any other conditions, nor. did President Lincoln feel that any
other action would be feasible at that time.10
Some understanding of the limitations that hampered the
Secretary of State in attempting to aid the Juarez government
can be gained from the following excerpts from one of his early
dispatches to Corwin. "We are now necessarily paying out of
the treasury nearly a million a day, rendered necessary for
the organization, all of a sudden, of a great army and a con-

siderable navy. We could not hope to satisfy the country that

it would be expedient to send five or ten millions of money into

 

—- v vvv w V

108erial 1136, #23, Seward to Corwin, October 2, 1861.

-33-

‘Mexico until our own military and naval preparations shall
have been perfected and we shall begin to see the insurrec-
tionary movement distinctly recoil or subside. . . . The
Congress of the united States, . . . are justly jealous of
executive attempts . . . to enter into engagements with foreign
countries which may have a bearing upon the export trade of
our country. If it should be thought'wise to institute nego-
tiations of either kind, it would be best to ask the Senate

for its advice in the first instance, and not to negotiate a
treaty first and afterwards ask the Senate for its ratifica-
tion."11

.In the same dispatch from which the above was cited, a
note of premonition can be detected in the Secretary of State's
comment that explanations of their rumored armed expedition
against Mexico would be asked of the European powers.

The rumored intervention had been brought nearer reali-
zation by the action taken by the Mexican Congress on July 17,
1861, when they passed a decree suspending for a period of two
years the payments on all debts due to Britain and France. This

suspension of payments was the result of dire necessity. not

only was all of Mexico in a state of turmoil in the general

 

11Serial 1136, #23, Seward to Corwin, October 2, 1861.

-39-
sense, but there were no tax assessors or tax collectors, nor
could most of the people have paid taxes even had there been.

.At this particular time even the forced loan had lost some of
its dependability; that is, as a measure utilizable by the
formal government, armed bands were still finding the forced
loan a profitable form of fund-raising. Under these conditions,
the Mexican Congress could see no way of handlingthe foreign
debt. Sir Charles Wyke, British Minister, and M. Saligny,
French Minister, protested that they had no confidence in the
'Mexican remedy and both threatened to break relations if the

decree were not repealed at once.12

They remained firm;on
Ithis point, despite the recognized principles of international
law'that were cited by Mexican Poreign‘Minister Zamacona in
order to justify the measure.13. Zamscona felt morally as well
as legally justified in his position as he gave much of the

credit for the political difficulties then extant in Mexico to

 

12Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, September 21, 1861,
.Bnc. 16, Saligny to Zamacona, July 25, 1861, and Bnc. 18,‘Wyke
to Zamacona, July 25, 1861 , pp. 86-87.

13M. Bmerich‘Vattel, The Law'of nations, ed. Joseph Chitty
(Philadelphia: Johnson & Co., 1866), p. 450. In reference to
breaking treaties or individual articles of treaties, Vattel
said, "But, if a real impediment stand in the way, time must be
allowed; for no one is bound to perform impossibilities. And
for~the same reason, if any insurmountable obstacle should
render the execution of an article not only impracticable for
the present, but forever impossible, no blame is imputable to
him who had engaged for the performance of it; nor can his in-

ability furnish the other party with a handle for annulling
the treaty. "

-90-

the foreign diplomats. He said that Mexican public Opinion
*was that these diplomats were guilty of recognizing and giving
‘moral support to the rebels.

From mid-summer of 1861 on. tension continued to build.
There was a supposed attempt against the life of the French
minister in Mexico. While at the time this created much ex-
citement and resentment, subsequent investigation proved that
the whole incident had been accidental. From the tone of her
press, Britain was also desirous of action against Mexico.‘ It
is interesting to note that the London‘zgmgg,placed mmch mm-
phasis upon making the whole intervention intrigue acceptable
to the united States, evidently in order to minimize the possi-
bility of interference.14 .Aside from Spanish annoyance‘with
the Juarez government in connection with the two previously
mentioned questions, the expulsion of Pacheco-and the repudiar
tion of the‘Mon-Aimonte Treaty, it was rumored that she had
other motives for wanting to take definite action against
Mexico. As early as May 13, 1861, the London T_it_n_e_g had car-
ried an article to the effect that "Spain's opportunity has
come-~another prodigal child may be returned to the fold as

1
has been Santo Domingo." 5 These same sentiments were also

 

14Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, September 21,1861,
Enc. 26, Fuente to Zamacona, September 5, 1861, p. 99.

ISNew York Herald, May 28, 1861, p. s.

-91-
current in official circles. In November, Minister Corwin wrote,
"I agree with Schurz QJnited States minister to Spain] that it
is the desire of Spainto regain her dominion over this country
and to establish here a monarchy . . . I think that Spain will
desire to seize the entire government of Mexico and re-estab- ~
lish her power here."16 On September 30, 1861, Romero had
written to Seward that it seemed certain that these three
powers were determined to combine in taking aggressive action
against his country.17

Matias Romero, the Mexican minister to the United States,
proved tobe extraordinarily successful in fulfilling his in-
structions "to cultivate with care the sympathies of the govern-
ment, and to strengthen the conviction in regard to the simi-
larity of interests," which bound the United States and Mexico.18
These instructions bear a remarkable similarity to those given
to Vicuna Mackenna prior to his departure from Chile in 1865.
One indication of the extent of Romero's success was that he
was kept informed of what transpired during secret cabinet

meetings. This accomplishment alone would have been considered

 

16Serial 1136, #8, Corwin to Seward, November 29, 1861.
. New York Tribune, September 29, 1861, p. 4.

17_S_¢_;_r_i__a_1_1;_1_':o_‘.§,’Romero to Seward, September 30, 1861,
pp. 101-103.

lglbid” Romero to Seward, September 21, 1861, Ban. 1,
Zuacona‘tnomero of July 29, 1861, p. 52.

-92-
quite a feat even for a more experienced diplomat.19 he a

means of keeping the United States informed about the prob-

lems of the Mexican government,‘Mr. Romero transmitted copies

of much of the Mexican correspondence to Secretary Seward. By
so doing, Romero permitted the United States to gain a deeper
insight into Mexican affairs than it would have been possible

to gain from the Corwin dispatches alone.

At-the end of October, 1861, the anticipated tri-partite
treaty was signed. In it the three signatories, Britain, France,
and Spain, bound themselves to exercise no influence over in-
ternal affairs in Mexico, and to allow Mexico free choice and
determination of her form of government.20 Romero inter-
preted this treaty as an action by enemies of the republic who,
having failed in an attempt to overthrow'the constitution, were

now'seeking outside aid to attain their goal.21

19Dexter Perkins, The‘Mbnroe Doctrine 1826- 1867 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 424.

20Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, November 23,1861,
Enc. of London Convention of October 31, 1861, p. 135.

21Ibid., Romero to Seward, Nevember 28, 1861, p. 138.

II

Due to the lack of dependable, rapid means of communi-
cation, the opinions about the tri-partite convention and
subsequent intervention that were reported by United States
diplomats that were assigned to the several countries were
of particular aid to Seward. This supplementary information
also assists the student in gaining a more complete picture
of the time.

Prior to the three power meeting in London, Minister
Charles Francis Adams had reported to Seward that there
existed great demand from those with commercial interests
in Mexico for British intervention on their behalf. Adams
predicted that Spain, encouraged by her successes in Santo
Domingo,‘would probably be the main instigator in any aggres-
sive undertaking, and that a monarchy could be established .
only with the cooperation of large forces. He further proph-
esied that the effect of this would be, inevitably, a closer
alliance of the American republics,22 and that much vigilance

would be necessary on the part of the united States.23 A: the'

 

22The Pan-American idea was frequently set forth by U.S.
opinion leaders of the era as a goal to be desired and very
likely soon to be attained by the South American countries.

23Serial 1136, #46, Adana to Seward, September 19, 1861.
-93-

-94-
same time, the British were concerned as to what action the
United States might take. Lord Russell, British Foreign Minister,
wrote to. Mr. Wyke in September that the British government was
Opposed to forcible interference in the internal affairs of
Mexico. "Without yielding to the extravagant pretention im-
plied by what is called the Monroe Doctrine . . . it would be
unwise to provoke the ill-feeling of North America unless some
paramount object were in prospect and tolerable sure of attain-
ment."24
Minister Adams substantiated Mr. Corwin's opinion that
the European nations were distrustful of any loan from the
United States to Mexico. "The customary view . . . is that
the United States in due course expects to absorb the whole

25

country." Certain items in the United States press would

tend to support this assertion. In an editorial, Mr. Barns
of the Detroit Free Press advocated the extension of the Union

26

from the Gulf of Mexico to the St. Lawrence River. A few

months earlier Mr. Bennett of the New York Herald had a slightly

 

2“Serial 1136, #45, Russell to Wyke, September 30, 1861.
25Ibid., #66, Adams to Seward, November 1, 1861.

26Detroit Free Press, February 7, 1862, p. 3.

-95-

different suggestion, he suggested that Mexico become a Negro
nation, as freed slaves from the United States could move there
and populate the country.” .

Early in 1862 Mr. Adams reported that Britain had avi-
dently become more deeply involved in the intervention than
the country cared to be. He wrote that many of the people in
Great Britain were indicating an unwillingness to continue
with the Mexican venture.28 The United States' position on
the intervention was clarified for Adams by Seward's next
dispatch, wherein President Lincoln's views were set forth.
The President, wrote Seward, did not doubt the sincerity of
the allies, but he felt it to be his duty to express to them
that a monarchicsl government that was founded in Mexico by
foreign navies and armies had no prospect of security or
permanency. ThePresident felt that the emancipation of this
continent from European control had been the principle feature
, in its history. The fact that the Senate had not yet given
official sanction to the proposed Mexican loan was, according
to the Secretary, purely a domestic question. It would there-

fore, be erroneous to question the support of the Merican

 

27New York Herald, July 20, 1861, p. S.

28Serie1 1136, #115, Adams to Seward, February 14. 1852.

-95-
people for the republican system in Mexico.

The sentiments that Minister Uilliam Dayton reported
from Paris were similar to those described in the earlier
Adams dispatches cited above. The French, while opposing any
United States loan to Mexico, were continually stressing that
they had no territbrial designs but sought only due redress.
It is interesting to note the change which took place within
a few months, as may be seen from Seward's dispatches to
Dayton. In November of 1861, Seward expressed deep concern
over the proceedings in Spain, France, and Great Britain in
regard to the Mexican situation, but commented that the "affects
on our own interests are likely to be only incidental."31 By
March of 1862, Seward was writing, "We cannot shut our eyes to.
the indications . . . France . . . proposes to subvert the
republican Anerican system in Mexico and to set up a throne."32

Carl Schurz, United States Minister in Madrid, reported.

 

”Serial 1136, #198, Seward to Adams, March 3. 1862.
As the Senate had rejected the proposal on February 25, 1862,
this seems to have been an instance of Seward using regular
diplomatic channels for propaganda purposes.

30%, #51, Dayton to Seward, February 27, 1861.

31Ibid., #79. Seward to Dayton, November 4, 1861. One
must wonder if the consent in fn. 29 might not be equally
applicable here, especially in view of the negotiations for
a U.S. loan to Mexico that were in progress.

32Ibid., #135, Seward to Dayton, March 31, 1862..

-97-
that the public opinion in Spain sanctioned warlike measures
for redress, as Mexico had refused to fulfill her treaty obli-
gations. He wrote that most of the Spanish journals favored
action.” Perhaps because Spain assmned a somewhat more bel-
ligerent attitude at this time than did either Britain or
France, in writing to Schurz, Secretary Seward said, ”I will
add only that in any case, whether Spain shall proceed alone
or in conjunction with other powers in her hostility to Mexico,
on account of the nearness of that country to our own, we
shall expect the utmost care to be taken on her part that no
rights of American citizens in Mexico, nor any rights of this
government and territories contiguous to the seat of war,
shall be disturbed or affected. with that view we shall al-
ways have a naval force near the scene of possible conflict."3l'

Spain's desire and intention to regain hegemony over
Mexico was supported by documents transmitted to Secretary
Seward by Romero. One of these was the copy of an address
by Sea’or Martinez de la Rosa to Queen Isabel II on November
19, 1862, in which he said that the ”Spanish soldiers, crowned

with abundant laurels on the African coast . . . are now pre-

paring . . . if necessary to hoist again in Mexico the stan-

 

33Serial 1136, #15, Schurz to Seward, September 7, 1861.
34Ibid., #37, Seward to Schurz, October 14, 1861.

-93-
dard of Hernan Cortes." This same tone can be observed in
another speech, one given by the president of the Spanish
Senate, the Marquis del Duero. The Marquis expressed his
pleasure in hearing that energetic measures were to be taken
for "the necessity of having a government [in Mexico] really
in harmony with the requirements of so rich a country."35

Contemporaneously with the tri-partite negotiations,
Thomas Corwin was attempting to conclude a loan treaty with
Mexico. Apparently the main obstacle in the treaty negotia-
tions was the reaction of the Mexican Congress to the security
demanded by the United States.‘ Thus, after he received the
announcement of the signing of the London Convention, Corwin
notified Secretary Seward that he had discontinued discussions
on the proposed united Statedeexican treaty. In explanation ,
of his action, Corwin said (1) that he understood that the
loan was to have been a means for preventing foreign inter-
vention in Mexico; and (2) that the Mexican Congress had by
a two to one vote rejected a mutually beneficial BritishrMexican
treaty.36

The Mexican Congress granted virtually all governmental

power to Juarez and the cabinet and then adjourned after

 

3sSerial 1136, Romero to Seward, Enclosures, November
28, 1861, p. 161.

35Ibid., #8, Corwin to Seward, November 29, 1861.

-99-
repealing the decree of July seventeenth. The repeal had
come too late, for Minister‘wyke had demanded his passport
and departed for London.

Thomas Corwin thought that it was likely that the inter-
vention would result in treaties with Britain, France, and
Spain that would give away a large part of’Mexico's revenue
in order to pay the interest on her debts to the three counr
tries. Corwin requested that he be informed as to whether or
not he were still at liberty to loan Mexico about the same
amount as before, as he wrote Seward, "Such a loan‘will be
absolutely necessary to the very existence of government and
law'in‘M’exico."37 He emphasized that the loan would be eSpe-
cially important to protect Mexican independence if the Mexican
Congress were to treat all the countries as they did the pro-
posed treaty‘with Great Britain; this treaty, he said, had
been "madly rejected" by that body.

Corwin then drew up a treaty for two million dollars
less than the original and’submitted it to the Mexican cabinet
to determine if they would pass it if it were to be proposed.
On December twenty-fourth, Corwin again requested instructions
as to United States policy regarding a loan to Mexico.

Seward remained cautiously hopeful that the Mexican

 

”Said 1136, #11, Corwin to Seward, December 24. 1861.

-100-

question could be resolved*without war, and that Mexico could
.retain its independence, if necessary,*with the aid of a loan
from.the United States. Early in December,‘writing to Corwin
in reference to the original treaty, Seward said, "I amxhoping
every day to receive that convention, and though I have only
a very imperfect knowledge of the stipulations which it‘will
contain, I willingly hope and am ready to believe that it may
find speedy favor*with the President and the Senate."38

Late the following month Seward informed Corwin that
early in the (then) present session of Congress President
Lincoln had submitted to the Senate Corwin's project of a
treatyiwith.Mexico and had asked for the Senate's advice on
the matter. Seward added that the Senate had delayed action
on the issue in order to get more information from Corwin as
to the state of the country. In mid-February, Seward expressed
approval of whatever Corwin deemed possible to aid Mexico with
‘her financial problems; yet on February twenty-eighth Seward
had to inform.Corwin that the Senate felt that any action in-
volving loans would be inadvisable._

Both Lincoln and Seward, while most anxious to help
Mexico, were forced by the exigencies of the internal condi-

tions of the United States to give prime consideration to

 

38Serial 1136, #32, Seward to Corwin, December 5. 1861.

-lOl-
retaining the cooperation of the Congress. The Civil‘war was
also the reason for dealing so circumspectly'with Britain,
France, and Spain.

United States concern for‘Mexico was exemplified by
Seward's reaponse to the European powers at the time of their
invitation to the United States to join the tri-partite pact.

In his note of refusal in which he set forth President Lincoln's
‘ views on the anticipated intervention, Seward stated that the
President did not question the right of countries to resort to
war for the redress of grievances, nevertheless, the United
States had a deep interest in Mexico. Seward indicated plea-
sure that the intervening powers had neither territorial designs
nor any intention of'impairing the right of“Mexico to choose

her own government. In this same note he also explained that
Minister Corwin had been empowered to grant aid to Mexico not
because of antipathy toward those seeking redress, but rather

in the hope of avoiding hostilities.

III

The first week in December, six thousand Spanish troops,
destination Mexico, boarded ship in Havana amid the enthusiastic
cheers of the Cuban populace. The British and French fleets,
although invited to sail with the Spanish, had not received
their orders and so were unable to accompany them.

The Spanish, whose arrival had been expected for the
previous seven months, appeared in Vera Cruz on December 14,
1861. They took possession of the port without a shot being
fired. In the name of Spain the intendente was ordered to
surrender the port within twenty-four hours. There had been
no formal declaration of war, nor was there to be one. The
Spanish comander emphasized that there would be no inter-
ference in internal issues. He also stipulated that Mexico
must provide protection for the foreign residents of the city
until the occupation had been effected. The day following
this ultimatum, the governor of Vera Cruz sent word that he
would retire from the city.. Deepite the peaceful withdrawal
from Vera Cruz, the Mexicans were determined to resist the
invasion. When the British and the French forces did arrive,
they were surprised to observe the Spanish flag flying over

-102-

-103-
the fortress of San Juan de Ulloa.

In recounting the details of the intervention, Minister
Corwin wrote that the Spanish advances seemed to have been
made without the consent of the French and the British, and
that the British minister was. quite surprised to learn of the
turn of events.40

President Juarez did not declare war but simply stated
that force would be met with force, and decreed that the port
of Vera Cruz was closed to foreign. cmerce as of December
14, 1861. ‘The tone of his. proclamation was softened-by the
statement that since 1836 the Spanish government had always
been looked upon as a friendly power despite the expulsion of
the Spanish Minister Pacheco. Juarez also said that the
Spaniards resident in Mexico would continue to enjoy the same
protection and consideration as they had prior to the Spanish
landing; and that they would be punished only if they aided
the invader.“

The Mexican flag was again hoisted over Vera Cruz in

February subsequent to the movement of the allied troOps to

 

39W. January 15. 1862. p. s.
40W, #11, Corwin to Seward, December 24, .1861.

“Ibid., Doblado to Seward, December 20, 1861, Enc. of
Decree of President Juarez to the Governors of the Mexican
States of December 17, 1861, p. 43-44.

-104-
the interior. The forces of the invading armies in Mexico had
suffered greatly from the unhealthy conditions that were ex-
tent in the Vera CrUz area; thus, on February 19, 1862, the
agreement of La Soledad was signed with the Mexicansallowing
the allies to advance from‘Vera Cruz to the cities of Orizaba,
Cordoba, and Techuacan.

While the humanitarian gesture embodied in the Soledad
agreement gained favorable united States public mention for
Juarez, it was also termed weak by some. Aside from.the humanl-

tag‘ian considerations, however, Juarez might well have had
other motives in signing the agreement. Even as the French
Admiral Jurien de la GrajviEre claimed to have signed at

Soledad only to gain time, so might have Juarez. Another
possibility might have been that Juarez knew'that a gesture

of such magnanimity would be appreciated by the Spanish. That
this is so, that it was well received, is attested to by

General Prim, Commander of the Spanish forces. "Soledad was

not merely a political expediency, but did save us much, many
lives were saved. One does not make friends withweapons."42

In addition to the two possible reasons mentioned above,
Soledad, seemingly. yielded definite, immediate political bene-
fits for Mexico. The allies agreed to the recognition of the

42Genaro Estrada, Don Juan Prim su Labor Di lomético
en an... v.1. xxv: MW W

xico: n.p., 1928), p. 179.

 

~105-
legitimate beican government, to no internal interference,
and to withdraw'again to the coast in the event that the dif-
ficulties between the countries were not soon resolved by the
conference that was to open at Orizaba on April fifteenth. The
commander of at least one of the invading forces, Spain's
General Prim, approached the Orizaba meeting with the sincere
intent of abiding by the Soledad agreement. "Our purpose in.
addition to indemnity, is to help stabilize the country. It
is not right, therefore, to lend aid to the opposition parties.
If France thinks that it will be easy to set up a monarchy here,
she is mistaken. Only a small number of men favor it and they
are not the capable ones of the country. ‘Wc should deal with

the existing government, Juarez is recognized by nineetentha
43
I!

of the population.
The French position soon proved to be the stumbling block
to any settlement. Her intention to establish a monarchy was
already a matter of common gossip. She created further illdwill
by taking General Almonte, one of the_opposition leaders, into
the interior of the country under her protection. She fomented
trouble in every possible way; for example, the day after La

Soledad, Minister Saligny and the French Admiral sent a note

 

43Estrada,Don Juan Prim, p. 77-78.

-106-
to Mexican Foreign Minister Doblado complaining of renewed
annoyances that had been inflicted on their countrymen. When
Doblado requested specific details, the French were unable to
give any. The French note of complaint also accused the Mexicans
of carrying out violent measures designed to stifle the “true
public opinion" of the nation and they were warned not to take
steps that would make a sham of French honor.A4

Whereas the allies would, despite their discomfiture at
France's plans to establish a monarchy, support such a move;
they became adamant in the matter of the Jecker claims. The
extent of allied disaffection is best shown by again citing
from General Prim. "If France does not support the London
agreement then the conferences are ended. If France continues
thus, Spain might retire. If I stay here to follow'the trail
of France it will be a disgrace to my Queen, a great expense
to my countrymen, and subject.us to the criticism of Britain
and the united States . . . it would compromise the lives of
the Spanish here. I would rather have France complaining and
.45

satisfy my duty as a good Spaniard.‘ Britain, too, threatened

withdrawal if France continued on her announced course.

 

440.8. Congress, H.R., The Present Condition of Mexico,
Serial 1162, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863, H.R. Ex. Doc. #54,
Romero to Seward, May 10, 1862, Enc. 5 Saligny and Jurien to
Doblado, April 9, 1862, p. 42. Hereafter cited as Serial 11oz.

asEstrada, Don Juan Prim, pp. 131-44.

-lO7- .

In Washington, Minister Romero was loud in his denunci-
ation of French action, attributing to France the intention to
impose upon Mexicans institutions which they repudiated.
Romero warned Seward that if democratic institutions were to
perish in Mexico and his country to remain under the domina-
tion of Europe that the American Union would then find itself
threatened with complications and dangers which.might yet be
avoidable.

It was natural that Seghr Romero, the representative

of the Juarez government, should have complained of the plans
and the activities of the allies. More unexpected was the
following declaration of some French citizens resident in
Mexico. "News of the rupture of the London Convention of
October causes us astonishment . . . the note of the French
commissioners has made us blush . . . their conduct is odious,
and a blunder . . . . The French Revolution established the
right of nations to choose governments suitable to them.
. . . How can France assume to speak in the name of Europe
‘when she enters on a course that Spain and Britain would not
follow'. . . Juarez was elected as freely as Napoleon III."46

France's oft-rumored plans to establish a monarchy in

Mexico were even more antipathetical to official opinion in

 

46Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, June 2, 1862, Enc. 7,
Declaration of Impartial French Democrats Resident in Mexico,
April 15, 1862, p. 66.

-108-

the united States than they had proven to be to her allies.y
'"A.monarchy in Mexico would fail without the support of Euro-
pean alliances, and the United States is opposed to it . . . .
These views are grounded on some knowledge of political senti-
ments and habits in America. It is not to be doubted that the
permanent interests and sympathies of this country would be
with the other American republics."47

Despite the obvious concern of Secretary Seward and
President Lincoln regarding France's plans, the United States
was then in no position to give Juarez the concrete assistance
which he required, as alreadymentioned on page one hundred.
. In view'of the fact that the total amount owed France by
‘Mexico was approximately two hundred thousand dollars, aside
from the Jecker claims, it would seem to have been a simple
‘matter to have negotiated a loan for that amount. Senate
opposition to a Mexican loan was said to be of three types,
(1) those who feared that a loan would result in beico being
,brought into the Union, (2) those who felt it was beneath the
national honor of the united States to treat at all*with foreign
“nations regarding Mexico, and (3) those who feared that it

would be harmful to the public credit to provide subsidies to

 

47Seria1 1136, # 198, Seward to Adams, March 3, 1862.

-109-
foreign states.

- The refusal of the United States Senate to approve a
loan treaty removed Juarez' last hope of eliminating all pre-
text for French troopsto remain in Mexico. On April tenth.
Saligny refused to deal any longer with the Juarez government.
Britain and Spain accused France of violating the London Con-
vention and. refusing to lend support to the French stand, with-
drew their troops from the country.

.A large section of the French press reported the with-
drawal of the British and Spanish troops most unhappily; the
United States press, however, was delighted. Reactions ranged
'from editorials to the effect that France would soon be with-
drawing to predictions of a new Moscow for the Napoleon family.
The predilections of the United States press undoubtedly account
in part for the extensive coverage given to General Prbm's
Delmonico speech in New York, as well as to selected bits of
his correspondence with Emperor Napoleon. With evident relish,
the excerpt which follows was prominently reported in papers
of all political tones. "It is a great honor for the Spanish
to march with the French soldiers, but I prefer a greater
challenge than Mexico--we are not justified in our action here,
in my opinion, nor in bringing in Almonte, nor in bringing in

others, nor in supporting Maximilian. Not many here favor

-110-

monarchy. . . . Closeness to the United States . . . has
brought about a hatred of monarchy. It has been a republic
for more than forty years. . . . far be it from me to suppose
that you do not have the power to set up a monarchy--but there
will not be any support for it."48

The French and Spanish papers were not, however, at all
pleased with Prim's speech; many were openly hostile. The
hostile tone was muted somewhat when Queen Isabel made it
known in both Paris and Madrid that she favored Prim's actions.
Upon his return home, Prim expanded upon his position and
clarified his policies in a speech to the Spanish Senate, some
quotations from which follow. "Fortunately I speak of Mexico ‘
after several months, thus with" a more temperate attitude. As
French policy did not suit the interests of my country, I left.
Spain does not have. to be the instrument of any other power
. . . the real situation is not known in Spain, even the press
is unaware of it. . . . Many suppose the existence of a secret
treaty, the Spanish government and documents refute this. It
has been asked if I knew of the scheme for Maximilian before I
left for Mexico. Yes, the government knew of it and I had I
instructions, but who would think of France wanting to impose

him by cannon? . . . Many think there should have been no

¥

48Estrada, Don Juan Prim, pp. 107-109.

-lll-
dealing'with the Juarez government, this is senseless, we had
to, if not it would have constituted intervention. To create
another government would have been to declare war. The second
day after our arrival at Vera Cruz the representatives of the
three allied countries began stating their claims to each other.
They did not know'each other's claims until then. It was then
that the Jecker claims were made, I did not know'about them--
they are impossible.

"The belief in Spain that the conservatives in‘Mexico
are the same as the ones here is not so. The Spanish there
are mainly in the conservative party, but not all are good
‘men. We here are too willing to believe what Spaniards write
us from.America, if one is maltreated, there are a hundred
voices raised yelling for help from the government. Further,
it is not true that the conservative party is Spanish and

the liberal party Indian. Indians belong to no party . . .

Juarez is Indian, but Almonte is Indian too. In his address,

JPrim specified the instructions that he had received prior to
embarcation. In addition he cited the main tenets of the London

Convention, and recounted the details of the whole intervention

and subsequent negotiations’ that led to the withdrawal of the

British and the Spanish forces.

 

49£strada, Don Juan Pm, pp. 149-174.

-112-

Some aspects of the situation in Mexico as they were in
June of 1862 were highlighted in a dispatch from Romero to
Seward. Romero described how, after signing at Soledad, Mexico
had removed the greater part of her troops, about sixteen
thousand men, from Vera Cruz, thus demonstrating her faith in
a peaceful settlement. He mentioned that the French residents
of Puebla had witnessed their good treatment by sending a note
of thanks to the Mexican government. Romero pointed out. that
despite a pledge not to interfere in the internal matters,
according to article two of the London Convention, that the
French had 'sent a warship to the island of Carmen in the state
of Yucatan for the purpose of overthrowing the local authorities.
The documents from the governors of Zacatecas and Jalisco that
he enclosed showed that the opinion of the people of Mexico
was decided, marked, and definitely in favor of the republican
form of government. He concluded, "even plenipotentiaries of
Britain and Spain who went to Mexico so convinced that the
people wanted a monarchy, came to the realization that the
existing government was sustained by public opinion and sup-
ported by the free will of the Mexicans."50

Following the withdrawal of the British and Spanish

trOOps, the French forces had returned to Vera Cruz where they

 

soSerial 1162, Romero to Seward, June 28, 1862, p. 111.

-ll3-
awaited the arrival of reinforcements. From time to time there
were small skirmishes between the Juaristas and bands of Mexican
troops who had gone over to the French side. Thesewere all .
duly reported as victories by both sides. The French were
doing so little that some united States papers reported that
they (the French) were on the verge of leaving the country.
While the French were awaiting their reinforcements, Juarez
used the time to fortify Puebla which he intended to use as
the main bastion for the defense of Mexico City. Militarily
speaking, the balance of 1862 in Mexico can beqsummarized as
a series of intermittent conflicts of small units; of appoint-
ments, changes, and reappointments of Mexican generals; o‘f
arrivals of troops and equipment for the French; of illness
'among the French troops; and of French attempts to conquer

Puebla. The year ended with the French laying siege to Puebla.

IV

January 1, 1863, was the effective date of the Emanci-
pation Proclamation in the United States. ,Thus, as increasing
numbers of Mexicans were losing their freedom, increasing
nunbers north of the border were gaining theirs.

The French forces, now under the comand of General
Forey, held Jalapa and Tampico' in addition to maintaining
Puebla under siege. The French were having difficulties in
attempting to maintain comunication lines between Orizaba
and Vera Cruz. They found it necessary to keep guards posted
at all times to keep Mexican guerrillas from cutting the lines.
In addition to enemy-caused troubles, the French general was
faced with the problem of epidemic smallpox among his troops.
The seriousness and extent of the question of maintaining
troop morale was pointed up,by the frequent reports of French
soldiers deserting and making application to become Mexican
citizens.

While the French troops were awaiting reinforcements ,
their dispatches reported, with monotonous regularity, skirmishes
With and defeats of Mexican troops, difficulties with morale,

and a lack of support from the Mexican natives. These reports,

 

512M, Romero to Seward, January 28, 1863, pp. 467-69.
-ll4-

-115-

while disappointing to Louis Napoleon, were avidly seized and
printed all over the United States. Editorial comment was not
slow'to follows "There are moral laws against which physical
means are powerless. France had no right to intervene in
Mexico. . . . Meanwhile the people [Eexicafi] are as effectually
fighting our battles as they are their own."52

The last sentence in the immediately preceding quota-
tion could well be an indication of the effectiveness with
which Seaor Romero had carried out his work in the United States.
While in Washington, Romero had been doing his best to secure
some sort of United States assistance by operating on the
realistic assumption that this help would be most easily
secured if it could be made evident that it was a matter of
self-protection for the United States. The following is an
example of Romero's efforts to establish this climate of
opinion. "Payment of French claims can not have been the
cause of the war. . . . it is indubitable that one of the objects
of the expedition was to acquire a base of operations against
the united States for the purpose of developing projects which

the Emperor may have conceived against this country . . . he

‘put off the expedition until such time as the United States

 

52NewYork Herald, February 2, 1863, p. 4.

-1l6-
‘would have been unable to prevent it."53

France was not alone in attempting to maintain a diffi-
cult position. Mexico's military picture had been rendered
increasingly difficult by the executive order of President'
Lincoln on the preceding November twentieth that no arms or
ammunition of any sort were to go out of the United States
until further notice. Incidentally, muchof Romerois public
relations activities were for the purpose of having this decree
repealed.

In addition to the military problems, which were aggra-
vated by internecine strife amongthe generals, Juarez was
endeavoring to carry on an orderly civil government in a
chaotic country that had been in a state of turmoil for many
years.. The cost of living was rising, and the owners of large
estates complained that they were no longer able to bear the
ever-increasing costs of the government.

As a matter of policy, in order not to offend France
during this particular phase of the Civil War, the adminis-
tration was forced to maintain an ostensibly neutral posture
toward the Mexican intervention. The same considerations did

not prevent some members of Congress from becoming vociferously

pro-Mexican .

 

.53Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, December 27, 1862, p. 443.

-ll7-

Senator MbcDougal, on January 19, 1863, introduced a
strongly worded resolution that was condemnatory of French
actions in Mexico. In this resolution MacDougal also advocated
that the United States aid Mexico so that Mexico would be able
to prevent the future recurrence of a similar event. James
Gordon Bennett,in an editorial,referred to the MacDougal reso-
lution as one which expressed a view held by all of us. He _
did feel, however, that it was ill-timed. "We have always
maintained that the true safeguard of Mexico--as well as of
all the South American republics--against European aggression,
and the only safeguard, is to be found in the preservation of
the territorial integrity, and consequently the power, of the
United States."54 .Sympathy for‘Mexico notwithstanding, the
newspaperman's sentiment found reinforcement in the halls of
Congress. Senator Summer had tried to keep MacDougal from
speaking on French movements in Mexico; he said that it would
be almost a declaration of war. While Senator Sumner did not
prevent the introduction of the resolution, as chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee he was able to see that it
was not reported out of committee.

Despite the somewhat testy tone of one note in which

Drouyn Lhuys said that if the war with Mexico were unpleasant

 

54New'York Herald, January 23, 1863, p. 4.

~118-
to the United States, that we should remember that our war
was injurious and unpleasant to them Ehe French]; France
seemed particularly anxious during the. first half of 1863 to
_develop and retain favorable opinion in the United States.
"Drouyn Lhuys said again that it would be bad policy for the
United States to identify the policy of France with that of
Britain, he knows our exasperation with Britain, and says that
heretofore France has done nothing that we could complain of."55
Seward's response reflected his necessary policy of ~
nonantagonism. "Tell Drouyn . . . that the United States
has no purpose to interfere in any way with the French-Mexican
war. . . . It is notorious, that insurgents of the United
“States derive munitions of war, etc., chiefly through the
British, carried in on vessels which pretend not a. direct ‘
idestination of our country . . . but to neutral ports . . .
Matamoros is chief among these."56
Contemporaneously, the French were achieving, at long
last, military success at Puebla. It was an expensive success;

the first fort that they captured there cost them 4,000 killed

and wounded. The French capture of the city of Puebla on

 

”Mesa. and Doc., 1863-64, Pt. 2, #302, Dayton to
Seward, April 27, 1863.

551nm, #341, Seward to Dayton, May a, 1863.

-ll9-

'May sixteenth ended the formal Juarista resistance to French
troops. At the time there were reportsthat Mexico City would
be defended street by street. In order to spare the capital'
and to save the people needless suffering, it was decided not
to defend the city. President Juarez, the members of the govern-
ment, and the loyal troops evacuated the city prior to the
arrival of the French. Once again the capital of the Republic
of’Mexico was wherever Benito Juarez happened to be.

united States response to this situation was succinctly
stated in this editorial from the New'York Herald, "It is a‘
smatter of course that the sympathies of the American people
are wholly with the Mexicans, who are fighting a patriotic
war. . . . The interests of this government are tightly bound
up in the fate of the Mexican republic."57

.After obtaining control of Mexico City, which they
occupied on June tenth, the French.lost no time in implementing
their long-delayed plans. They convened the Council of Notables
on July 10, 1863. This Council, composed of reactionaries,
traitors, and wealthy landowners, declared that as represen-
tatives of the Mexican people they were electing Maximilian

of Austria as their emperor. In event of his refusal, they

would petition the French Emperor Louis Napoleon to select an

_—

57New York Herald, June 14, 1863, p. 4.

-120-
emperor for Mexico.

- These developments were met with editorial outbursts
throughout Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The
editorial tone taken by the W was characteristic.
The July twenty-eighth issue that carried the story of the
meeting of the Council of Notables contained a furious edi-
torial that accused the Emperor of France of having conquered
Mexico for reasons other than those alleged when the war started.
In this editorial it was claimed that the balance of power in
Europe had been upset by this movement of the French. I: was
also stated that this intervention constituted interference
with the United States. It was postulated that the united
States would arm against France. Four days later the editor
sounded an even stronger tone. He felt that we should warn
the French that we would drive them out if they did not leave
Mexico. Yet at the same time he expressed grave fears that
Napoleon wanted to extend his paternal influence over the
united States. Incidentally, this latter idea was accepted
in official circles as being sufficiently feasible that the
union attempted to prepare for such a contingency by rapidly
moving to establish national authority in Texas.

As in many other instances, Secretary Seward most aptly

summarized the policy of the administration in a dispatch to

-121-
the United States diplomatic representative in the country
most directly involved. He wrote to Minister Dayton that the
united States had neither the right nor the disposition to
intervene by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether
to establish and maintain a republic or to overthrow an imperial
form of government if Mexico chose to accept one. Seward said
that the United States had been and was practicing that non-
intervention which we had asked all foreign powers to observe
toward the problems of the united States. He added that this
government knew full well that the inherent normal opinion of
iMexico favored the republican form of government, and that we
knew that this resulted largely from the influence of popular
opinion in this country. ."The united States'own safety is
dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions
throughout America. If France should adopt a policy in‘Mexico'
that is adverse to American opinions and sentiments, that
policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful
of jealousies which might ultimately ripen into collision be-
tween France and the united States and other American republics.
An illustration of this danger has already occurred. Political
rumor ascribes to France the purpose to seize the Rio Grande
and to wrest Texas from the United States; another rumor advises

us to watch the Mississippi."58

 

58Mesa. and Doc., 1863-64,1’t. 2, #406, Seward to
Dayton, September 26,1863.

I

-122-

In Dayton's response to this dispatch he quoted the
French as again disclaiming interest in Texas or permanent
control in Mexico. He said that the French expressed the
opinion that the greatest danger to Maximilian would be from
the United States, and'therefore, that the removal of French
troops from.Mexico would probably be contingent on united
States recognition of Maximilian.59 Seward's reply was, "hap-
pily the French government has not been left uninformed of
United States opinion that the permanent establishment of
foreign and monarchicsl government in-Mexico‘will be neither
easy nor-desirable."6

American opinion lending moral support to the republican
government in Mexico was extended not only by the press and
the administration but by many well-known public figures. .A
banquet 'that'Romero attended at Delmonico's in early December
provides an example of this latter sort of support. Some of
' the other guests were William C. Bryant, John Van Buren, and
Hiram Barney. {At this time Romero said, "internal conditions
of“Mexico are scarcely understood or appreciated here or in

7 Europe. The general impression is that we are an uncivilized

59U.S. Congress, Senate, Papers Relating to Mexican.A
Affairs, Serial 1209, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, Sen. Ex.

Doc. #11, #361, Dayton to Seward, October 9,1863. Hereafter
cited as Serial 1209.

60Ibid., #417, Seward to Dayton, October 23, 1863.

-123-

people--always making pronunciamientos--unfitted for self-gov-
ernment. ‘Never was a judgement more unfounded." iMr. Barney's
reply epitomized the sentiments of the group. He said, "My
official position Ca Republican--at this time collector at
custom house in New Yorla doesn't let me express my sentiments
and sympathies for Mexico. . . .I need not say that the sym-
pathies of our people are in favor of Mexico."61

To all intents and purposes, the moral support of the
united States was not reflected in the Mexican scene. Commerce
at Vera Cruz had been cut off. ‘Mexicans, encouraged by bribeséz
‘were joining the French army. Further, it was known that more
French troops were being sent into the country. These actions‘
of the French military caused counteractions within the
United States. General Banks was sent south, as there was
actual fear of a French advance into the United States.63
This unrest in the United States prevailed for a long period
of time and was kept alive by intermittent reports regarding

Napoleon's plans.

By January of 1864, the American press was reporting

 

“Serial 1222.. Romero to Seward. May 28. 1864. pp. 397-423.
52W. December 12. 1863. p. a.
63%, December 21, 1863, p. a.

-124-

that the Mexican guerrillas had grown bolder, that they had
burned outlying homes even in the Tampico area. Due to ill-
ness, especially fever, only about one fourth of the troops
at Tampico were fit for duty. Therefore, despite having held
the city for quite some time, the French there were particu-
larly vulnerable. The French were so uneasy about security
for the city that civilians were required to be blindfolded
before they were allowed to enter. The position of the French
'military was made even more difficult by reports that had cir- '
culated among the Mexicans to the effect that there would be
no clemency if they were to be captured; and that if they were
to surrender, the French troops could not be trusted to ful-
fill the stated conditions of surrender.64 -

Conditions such as those described above were the rea-
son that General Forey informed Napoleon that it would be im-
possible to take and hold Mexico except with a large body of
troops and many years of time. Reports emanating from.Mexico
substantiated Forey's opinion. Fighting in Mexico continued
to be a matter of a city at a time, now'Aguascalientes, now
Guadalajara; and in February, Zacatecas was under attack.

The French reiterated reports to the effect that there were

no large republican forces and that the Mexicans were being

 

“W. January 1. 1864. p. 6.

-125-

rapidly pacified. This was belied by effective resistance
on the part of the Juaristas. President Juarez himself was
active in encouraging this resistance, traveling almost con-
stantly to do so.' Zacatecas had still not been taken a month
after the French attack had begun. It is true, the populace
of the towns through which the French troops passed were prompt
in their declarations for Maximilian, and remained loyal at
least as long as the troops were there. .

Military problems notwithstanding, Maximilian officially
accepted the offer to become emperor of Mexico. One of his
first edicts was an order to confiscate all united States ,
holdings in Sonora.65 This, of course, did nothing to in-
crease his popularity in the united States. It did have a
favorable effect in Europe, where "European bankers readily
take up the imperial Mexican loan, though refusing to invest
in United States securities."66

Regardless of party, the union press held Seward and
Lincoln responsible for these developments, condemned them
for having abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, and even went so

far as to accuse. them of having made deals with Napoleon.67

 

55W. Apr11 13. 1864. p. 2.
“1.6.1.1... May 6. 1864. p. 2. '
67%, May 21, 1864, p. 2.

-126-

The Confederate States of America hastened to take advantage
of this supposed opportunity. General‘William Preston went as
plenipotentiary to‘Mexico to make a treaty with Maximilian.
The treaty was to have been based on mutual recognition and
reciprocal trade rights. The Atlanta Register editorialized
that recognition of the Confederacy by Maximilian would be
tantamount to recognition by France.68 As is now known, this
viewrwas perhaps overly optimistic in its estimate of both the
Confederacy and the Mexican Empire. Northern opinion predicted
correctly when it stated that if the Confederacy were to sue-
cumb that the Mexican Empire could not stand sixmonths.69
This belief was even echoed in some parts of the South.

Had‘Maximilian been fully cognizant of the multi-faceted
‘Mexican situation, one wonders if he would have approached the
throne in so confident a fashion. At the same time as he was
paying his farewell respects to the various European courts,
the Mexican liberals inflicted another defeat on the French
forces, and then, in May, captured Tabasco. Eight states,
comprising one half of the territory of'Mexico and containing

one fifth of the population, remained free of even nominal

 

68New York Herald, March 7, 1864, p. 4.
69New'York Tribune,‘May 7, 1864, p. 6.

-127-

control by the French. Juarez' public image was being pre-
served and even strengthened by the press of the United States
on the basis of his anti-European, pro-American reputation.
Juarez' attitude toward the united States was expressed very
'well in a letter written to MeLane in early 1861, in which the
Mexican President said, "It is for the true interests of the
united States and Mexico that the reciprocal relations be those
of sister republics. In this way, also, the political prin-
ciples which distinguish them from the great powers of Europe
can best be subserved. . . . I take this occasion, also, . . .
to express the hope that peace may continue unbroken as before
in the United States, and that, if it be necessary, the con-
stitution may be remodeled in a legal way, always respecting
the dignity of the people and the peace of the world, as only
by this can liberty and the rights of man be preserved."70
As Thomas Corwin said, this attitude on the part of Juarez
"is remarkable when we regard the deep prejudices in the
‘Mexican mind over the loss of Texas, which is attributed to
our citizens."71

While there is no proof that would establish a causal

relationship, certainly it would seem logical to assume that

 

7ONew'York Tribune, January 7, 1861, p. 3.
New'York Times, January 7, 1861, p. 5.

71Serial 1136, #2, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861.

-128-

the pro-Juarez attitade of the press might well have exercised
a positive influence on the unanimous vote that was received
by the Davis resolution. This resolution, introduced in the
House of Representatives on April 4, 1864, stated in essence,
that the United States could neither recognize nor tolerate
a monarchy in Mexico. Seward, in writing to united States
Minister Dayton in Paris, said that the Davis resolution truly
interpreted the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United
States regarding Mexico.72 .

With all due pomp, including a 101 gun salute, Maximilian
and Carlotta landed at Vera Cruz on May 29, 1864. From the
time of their ceremonious but cool reception at Vera Cruz
until their elaborate and carefully staged "enthusiastic"
reception in Mexico City, a period of about three weeks, the
progress of the Maximilian entourage was closely followed by
United States correspondents.73 While public attention was
thus focused on Maximilian's trip to the capital, more signifi-
cant action was taking place in other parts of the country. '
On June second,French forces landed at Acapulco, previously

fortified by the liberals.74 Juarez installed his government

 

720.8. Congress, H.R., The Present Condition of Mexigg,
Serial 1294, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867, 8.3. Ex. Doc. #76,
#525, Seward to Dayton, April 4, 1864. Hereafter Serial 1294.

73W. July 7. 1864. p. 1.

74Washington Evening_8tar, June 28, 1864, p. 1.

-129-
at Mbnterey, and a liberal army*was preparing to march on
San Luis Potosf.

As Seward had said earlier in the year, "the war of
France against Mexico wears on the patience of the American
peOple."75 American patience was worn even more by stories
of French atrocities and inhumanities to defeated Mexican
troops, and by rumors of connivance beaveen Mexican traitors
and united States rebels, such as the plot to seize the states
on the west coast of Mexico for privateering purposes. Re-
actions in the United States ranged from blistering editorials
to the formation of illegal filibustering expeditions.. Greeley
spoke for most of the United States when he referred to the
imposition of Maximilian on Mexico as "one of the most glaring
'violations of international law'in modern times."76 Signifi-
cantly, even the Radical Republicans in convention at Cleve-

77

land emphatically endorsed the Mbnroe Doctrine, and a few

days later in Baltimore, one of the planks voted into the

national Republican platform was enforcement of the Monroe

78

Doctrine. A group known as the Defenders of the Monroe

 

75U.S. Congress, H.R., Mexican Affairs, Serial 1262,
39th Cong., lst Sess., 1865-66, H.R. Ex. Doc. #73, Pt. 2,
#355, Seward to Adams, February 25, 1864. Hereafter Serial 1262.

76New York Tribune, July 16, 1864, p. 4.1

77Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1864, p. 2.

73New'York Herald, June 9, 1864, p. 5.

-l30-
Doctrine had gathered in New’Orleans intending to join the
Juarez forces, but, unfortunately from their point of view,
their ringleaders were detained by federal agents on the charge
of violation of United States neutrality laws.79 This group
had been formed without the prior knowledge of President
Juarez who much earlier "had made known his resolution to de-

fend himself to the last inch of ground solely with Mexicans."80

The admiration and respect which so often was shown for
Juarez by the press of the United States was increased by in-
cidents such as the following. As part of his plan to form
a cabinet that would, by including leading Mexican political
figures, aid in uniting and ruling the country, Maximilian
invited Benito Juarez to come to Mexico City. Juarez' letter
. of refusal is a classic. 'Briefly, but with great dignity,
Juarez declined Maximilian's invitation on the grounds that
his duties as president of the Republic of Mexico precluded
any such meeting.

Maximilian received his best press in the Moniteur, the

reflector of French governmental attitude. ‘Many of the articles

from the Mbniteur were reprinted by the London Times and the

 

79New‘York Herald, June 3, 1864, p. 1.
3°Ibid., June 3, 1864, p. 1.

-131-

New York papers.81 An example of this practice is the apti-
mistic news which appeared during the last week of July, to
the effect that customs receipts were up, that it was now'safe
to travel from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, that electric*wire
was going up in Tierra Caliente, that amnesty had been granted
to all political prisoners, that General uraga had defected
to Maximilian, and that French forces were successful in an
amazing percentage of their engagements.82 This rosy picture
'was dimmed a bit, however, by news items reported by United
States correspondents. "The arrival of Maximilian has not
changed the atmosphere from that of the good old days of repub-
licanism. Pigmy battles and the usual number of guerrilla
skirmishes continue."83 The following day the same editor
stated that news of’Maximilian was relatively unimportant,
"as sooner or later we shall have to drive him from this con-
tinent."

Illustrative of the Vpigmy battles and guerrilla skir-

mishes" --a combined force of French and reactionaries moved

 

81During this period it was common practice for news-
papers to reproduce whole columns copied verbatim from other
papers. Within the United States most papers took their
foreign news items from the three leading New York papers.

82New'York Tribune, July.29, 1864, p. 8.
83New’York Herald, August 4, 1864, p. 4.

34Ibid., August 5, 1864, p. 4.

' -132-
from San Luis Potosf and took Saltillo; French troops occupied
Monterey; Juarez' troops were triumphant in Sinaloa; French
troops defeated Cortinas; later Cortinas defeated the French
troops; and Monterey changed hands twice. This is but a sample
of the activities of this type that occurred in the course of
about a month's time.

In light of such happenings it is not surprising that
observers felt that Maximilian had made little progress in
pacification. It remained dangerous to travel as the high-
ways were full of robbers. "Journey from Vera Cruz to Mexico
City made only at risk of one's life."85 Reportedly, French
deserters accounted for some of the increasing brigandage.86
" . . . Condition of the country under the Imperial Regime
deplorable. Commerce is stagnant and agricultural operations
so much interrupted that . . . the most necessary articles are
in the greatest scarcityJ‘87

The political condition was as confused as the military

and social. Within this same period, the fall of 1864, Miramdn,

*with the full backing of the church party, pronounced against

 

”W. December 15. 1.864, p. 4.
89;2;9,, November 10, 1864, p. 7.

87Detroit Free Press, December 2, 1864, p. 3.

-1..-

Maximilian; some of the clerical party joined the exiled liberals;
many Juaristas, such as Cortinas, declared allegiance to
Maximilian; and Mathilian reportedly was freeing himself from
French influence. "Mexico is as confused under the new'regime
as under the old."88

The continued state of unrest at all levels of society
'was bound to cause repercussions. "Uprisings are only minor--
but are continuing--military operations prOper are stopped
for the time. Mexico is far from quiet under her new'ruler--
there is a turbulence that is frightful--civil officers have
had to be removed from many areas and replaced by military.
There is an imperial government on one side and a whole people
on the other. Every shout may be the signal of insurrection,
and so the people must keep quiet. There was a disturbance
near San Luis Potosf. It appears to have been simply a drunken .
brawl. Three hundred persons were arrested, and thirty-five
‘were shot'without the formality of a trial. ‘What do such con-
ditions mean? They mean that there is still a teen vitality
and national spirit in the Mexican people; that they hate
"89

this new. government and will not how to it.

The confiscation of church property by the imperialists

 

88New York Herald, October 8, 1864, p. 4.

891bid., January 6, 1865, p. 4.

-134-
further aggravated Maximilian's difficulties. 'At the same
time,the Juarez government stepped up its recruitment of
soldiers from the united States, reportedly offering a bounty
of nine hundred dollars to any foreign soldier. Sporadic
successes of the imperial forces notwithstanding, Maximilian
and his empire were on the wane from this time on, as was the
Confederacy--the predictions made earlier were right. In
February of 1865, the Empire was said to consist only of
Matamoros, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz, Alvarado, Tampico, and Mexico
City. The liberal forces were reported to have increased to
60,000.90 On the surface it is difficult to comprehend why
the Maximilian government deliberately antagonized the Federal
government of the united States by the expulsion of the United
States consul from Matamoros. ‘At the time the reason given
was that as the consul was accredited to the republican govern-
ment, the imperial government could not recognize him. There-

fore, the Maximilian government would not allow'Union ships

to land at Matamoros.91

 

90Detroit Free Press, February 19, 1865, p. 4.

91W. March 1. 1865, p. a.

There were recurring rumors that the United States had
secret agreements with Napoleon and/or Maximilian to extend
recognition to Maximilian, always at some future date, from
the time of Maximilian's "election" in July of 1863. These
rumors became specific in December-of 1864, when it was claimed
that the United States was going to grant recognition the
following March.92 A

This climate of opinion is particularly interesting as
there are indications that there actually existed some sort
of understanding between Washington and Jtlraz; due to Seward's
caution in desiring to avoid involvements with the Powers, aid
rendered to Juarez was quiet and "unofficial." As some of the
stories describing the supposed agreements for Maximilian's
recognition were carried in administration-connected papers,
one wonders if the stories were planted deliberately to serve
as decoys.

As this latest report of the impending recognition was
gaining credence in the United States, Bazaine was reporting

that "the government at‘Washington has just taken measures in

 

92Detroit Free Press, January 19, 1865, p. 2.
-l35-

California that certainly were conceived with the intent of

"93. The first of these

being hostile to the intervention.
measures, effective as of January 20, 1865, absolutely pro—
hibited the exportation of rations from any port of the United
States. Bazaine said that this was aimed directly against
the imperial army, because, as the French Commander pointed
out, the French trOOps on the Pacific side of Mexico had been
getting their supplies from San Francisco. The second direc-
tive, of February 11, 1865, prohibited peOple who did not have
special permission from leaving San Francisco to go to Mexico.
The main reason for this second regulation, according to the
United States administration, was to prevent Confederate troops
from meeting in Mexico for the purpose of attacking Arizona.
Bazaine, however, interpreted this directive to be a means of
blocking imperial recruitment of Confederate troops.

V Union assistance to the Juarez government consisted of
more than these two directives; ties were much closer than
was commonly recognized at the time. Bazaine himself in an
official report said, "there is no doubt according to certain

dependable informants that Juarez' agents are working, organi-

zing resistance all along the northern frontier in agreement

93Franqpis Bazaine, Documentos lneditos 0 MM Raros Para
la Mistoria de‘México: La Intervencian Francesa en Minco

. xico: Carranza e Hijos, 1909), Pt. 8, p. 96.

 

~137-

"94 Two months later in another

'with the emissaries of the Union.
official report Bazaine again referred to the intrigues of the
North Americans and all the many efforts that their agents were
making for Juarez. Bazaine claimed that the result of a con-
ference between President Johnson and‘Minister Romero was the
"visible protection" conceded to General Ortega for enlisting
so-called emigrants. He reported that such enlistments were
being carried on in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and even in
Washington, D.C. This recruitment program was sufficiently
successful to cause Bazaine to alter the disposition of his
troops. .

In Mexico discords in the royal happy family continued
to grow; Bitter feelings between French and Austrian troops
became a matter of general knowledge. The prevalent feeling
of French officials toward Americans became one of animosity.96
The number of imperial troops was approximately 30,000; sup-
posedly there were no republican armies left. During the first
week of April, the French officers were reporting that the south

97

of Mexico was settled. The imperialists than planned to

 

948azaine, La Intervencién Francesa, Pt. 8, p. 94.
95%, Pt. :9, pp. 2-3.

96New’Y’ork Tribune, April 13, 1865, p. l.
97New’York Herald, April 6, 1865, p. 4. .

-138-
pacify the north. As a first step in this process, Maximilian
directed that the black flag be hoisted. The story that the _
'south had been settled would seem to have been belied by ime
perialist troops marching into Yucatfin less than a week after
the former report.

Even as Maximilian's problema'were not all military, so
neither were his efforts. Clearly, in many instances steps
that were taken because of military considerations were contra-
indicated by social, economic, or political questions. Can-

versely, attempts to palliate one ill often aggravated another.
In February he decreed Catholicism the state religion; prior
to that he had promulgated laws confiscating church property.
He divided Mexico into eight military districts, ordered rail-
road building, and established lines of communication. As was
mentioned earlier, in Mexico the financial picture had long
been drastically disorganized. The position of the imperial
,government had been rendered even more difficult by the ruling
of the French government that'Mexico was to be assessed for

the cost of the French occupation forces. In an attempt to

benefit from Mexico's natural resources and thus to relieve the

financial straits in which he found himself, Maximilian granted

oil privileges to two New'Yorkers. Less than a year earlier,

however, Maximilian had confiscated all the property-held in

-139-

Sinaloa by united States citizens. The imperial loan was re-
pudiated in London; the London Igmgggwas rumored about ready
to support the Monroe Doctrine against him.98 In addition to
the nondmilitary problems, Cortinas revolted against Maximilian
and attacked Matamoros; guerrilla warfare was increasing in
Sinaloa, and Mbnterey had been occupied by the liberals.
President Johnson's foreign policy statement of April 21, 1865,
held out no promise of help to Maximilian. Johnson said that
he was "in favor of the Monroe Doctrine throughout, and that
the time is not far distant when, with the rebellion crushed,
'we shall say to Napoleon that he cannot establish a monarchy
in Mexico."99

Maximilian's efforts to attain order had not gone un-
.noticed, even in the United States. In a rather lengthy and
complimentary editorial that appeared in April of 1865, it
'was stated that Maximilian's intentions were good and that
many of the programs that he had advocated were sound and
obviously_for the benefit of the Mexican peOple. Unfortunately
for the success of the programs, not to mention the empire,

Maximilian had offended both the clergy and the army. These

two groups had since repudiated him and_joined the Juaristas,

 

' 98NewYork Herald, May 1, 1865, p. 4, frdm the London
correspondent. *

99Ibid., April 23, 1865, p. 4.

-l40-

therefore, "should it ever be found expedient to vindicate
the principles laid down in the Monroe Doctrine," the United
States would not have to fight, but merely lend moral support
to- the factions opposed to Maximilian.100

That more than moral support had indeed been rendered
to Juarez by the union over a period of time, and that Maxi-
milian had been supported by the Confederacy can be seen from
some of the correspondence of General James E. Slaughter,
C.S.A. In July of 1865, the New York Herald carried documented
stories that revealed the extent of the cooperation that had
existed between the imperialists and the Confederates. It
‘was also shown that such cooperation was a matter of govern-
‘mental policy rather than chance. It was further demonstrated
that the Confederate states‘were able to obtain arms and pay
for them by means of the cotton trade that was carried on
through Mexico. The following letter from James E. Slaughter,
Brigadier General Comanding, to Colonel Thomas M. Jack is
self-explanatory. "The imperial commander of the port of
Baghdad (a Belgian) informs me he has private instructions
to permit all arms, ammunition, and munitions of war, etc.,

to be introduced and passed for the use of the Confederacy

which are desired." The General went on to say that this was

 

100Detroit Free Press, April 23, 1865, p. 2.

-141-

similar to an earlier arrangement with Mejia and showed a
real feeling for the rebel cause. He continued that both he
and the Emperor knew of communications between Juarez and
the United States Federal government. Slaughter sent a large
number of scouts to try to intercept one such messenger in
order to "complicate matters between Hexico and the United
States to such a degree as to work to our advantage." He
continued, "feeling of imperial officers on this frontier is
strongly in our favor. They consider the two causes to be
strongly allied."101

Following the defeat of the Confederate States of
America, Bazaine started reinforcing his posts in the interior,
"as a daily flareup is expected, and Louis Napoleon's endeavor
to work cornerwise into the United States and upset the Monroe
Doctrine‘will prove a failure."102 In an attempt to improve
security measures, the imperialists established a pass system.
"The policy pursued by the imperialists seems to be an insane
one. There are now only 13,000 troops and they are divided

into 100 different bodies, now'together, now separated. There

is not one protected highway in Mexico. The only reinforcements'

 

101New York Herald, July 2, 1865, p. 4.
1021bid., July 4, 1865, p. 8.

'142-

to their force is the arrival of 500 men mostly from France.
No force less than 100,000 men will ever subjugate this coun-
try."103

The French policies toward the Mexican natives were as
ill-advised as some of the French military actions. The French
accused Mexican patriots of being robbers, tried them in courts
martial, and then shot them. By thus making martyrs of the
liberals, the French were helping the cause of Mexican nation-
.113m The French forces also burned sugar plantations, whole
villages, and many crops in various states. Michaela: suffered
particularly heavy damage from the French troops. This last
fact undoubtedly accounts for the much publicized resignation
of Antonio de Moral, political prefect of Michoacan. His letter,
in which he was requesting for the m time to be allowed
to resign,stated that the liberals were going to win, not
because of their strength but because of the weakness of the
Maximilian government . 104

The political and social situation is well summarized
in the following short article. "The City of Mexico corres-

pondent of the Times says that the arrest of liberals and

those- suspected of liberalism are so numerous that it will

 

103Detroit Free PreSS, September 9a 1355: P- 3-

104§ew York Herald, August 9, 1865, p. 1.

-143-
soon take half the nation to guard the prisoners. The most
barbarous orders are issued by the French commanders. One
is that every man wearing leather shall be hanged.

"The occupation of Tehuacan caused a great sensation,
owing to its importance. It was feared that all the Austrian
detachments on the road would be captured.

"The liberals held the road between Monterey and Matamoros.
,The'French General Brincount, at Chihuahua, demanded reinforce-
'ments as his column was not strong enough for Regrel's forces.

"The French garrison is kept shut up in the State of
Durango by the liberal General Patony. .A.French.colunm.of
1,200 men were unable to move out of their encampment, forty
:miles from Tampico, as the guerrillas had captured all their
mmles and horses.

"The liberals hold the main towns in the State of Mexico.
NO one dares to go a league outside the City of Mexico. There
is no submission in these people. The coming winter will show
an even greater struggle."105

Certain United States actions at this time were certainly
contributing factors to the uneasiness evinced by the imperialists.

General Sheridan, in a letter to a friend, said that the presence

of Maximilian in Mexico was part of the rebellion and that the

 

105Washington Evening Star, October 3, 1865, p. 2.

-144-

rebellion would not be over until he was thrown out.105 Lt.
General Grant said that the army of 100,000 men on the Rio
Grande was just an army of observation.106 Consensus in the
United States seemed to have been that Napoleon's alternative
was reinforcement or abandonment of his undertaking. As the
attitude of the American people might have made reinfdrcement
difficult, many peOple suggested that he save face by taking
advantage of the break between Maximilian and the Pape and
use this as an excuse for withdrawing his troops.

The liberals, too, were faced with many problems in the
fall of 1865. True, they had been making political and mili-
tary gains in various parts of the country, but as General
De Leon said, "they have no money, arms, ammunition, clothing
nor even provisions." This loyal Juarista general said that
the liberals needed help then and that if the united States
‘waited there might not be any liberal party to help.107

The first step toward alleviating the most pressing want
of the liberal forces was President Johnson's revocation of
the order prohibiting the export of arms and munitions. The

second step followed logically, when during the first week in

November the financial agency of the Republic of Mexico opened

 

106New'York Herald, August 7, 1865, p. 4.

1°7Washington Evening Star, September 7, 1865, p. 1.

-145-

k.108 Some Californians decided to aid Juarez more

"109

in NCW’YOI
directly and shipped rifles to him in boxes marked, "pianos.
In July of 1865, French Minister Mbntholon gave Secretary
Seward a cOpy of a letter of Maximilian that was addressed to
the president of the United States. The next day Seward re-
turned it with the answer, after consultation with President
Johnson, that the United States were then as formerly in friendly
relations with the Republic of Mexico and that this government
could not depart from its usual course in the matter and, there-
fibre, reception of the letter was declined. After the_exchange
of several notes, in December of 1865, Seward received a com-
munication from the French government that expressed an apparent
'willingness on the part of the French to withdraw their troops
from Mexico. Evidently the only condition that was stipulated
by France was that she first receive from the united States an
assurance that the United States would maintain a friendly and
tolerant disposition toward the Maximilian government. Secre-
tary Seward then wrote to assure Mentholon that while President
Johnson was gratified at the friendly regards expressed by
France toward the United States, he regretted that the condition

could not be fulfilled. Seward explained to the French minister

 

108Washington EveninLStar. November 2. 1865. p- 1.

1091bid., November 4, 1865, p. 1.

-l46-

that the nature of the discontent of the people of the united
States was not well understood by the French government.110
Seward said that the chief cause of United States displeasure
"is not that there is a foreign army in Mexico; much less that
it is a French one. . ....The real cause of national discontent
is the French army invading a domestic republican government
‘which was established by her people,‘with whom the United
States sympathizes most profoundly, for the avowed purpose
of suppressing it and establishing on its ruins a foreign
monarchicsl government whose presence there as'long as it
should endure could not but be regarded by the peOple of the
United States as injurious, and menacing to their own chosen
and endeared republican institutions . . . on the other hand
‘we maintained, and still do, that the people of every state
on the American continent have the right to secure for them-
selves a republican government if they choose."111

Seward had expressed very well the pro-Juarez sentiment
of the American people that had culminated in the relaxation
-of the interpretation of the neutrality laws as they applied

to the Mexican liberals. One might say that Seward's own

biases were expressed in action as well as in words. As soon

 

110Serial 1261, Seward to Mentholon, December 6, 1865, p. 284..

111Washington Evening Star, January 10, 1866, p. 2.

-147-
as word of the activities of the Maximilian Express Company
which had been established in New'York reached him, the Secre-
tary of State notified the United States district attorney in
that city to scrutinize carefully all ships bound for Mexico

112

and to seize all contraband items. This must have encouraged

Juarez greatly.
VI

In addition to the problem of securing specific sup-
plies from the'United States, the biggest problem that Maxi-
milian faced and had been facing for the past year was an
empty treasury. During 1865, income was about $20,000,000
and expenditures amounted to $42,000,000; much of this out-
lay went for imperial pomp and show. Predictions were that
if a loan of $100,000,000 did not come from France there

would be a forced loan and a subsequent uprising.1
the basis of the commerce figures it would seem reasonable
to assume that chances for obtaining such a loan should have
been relatively good. During the course of the previous

eighteen months,commerce between France and‘Mexico had in-

creased from twenty-one million to almost seventy-seven

 

112Washington Evening Star, January 2, 1866, p. 1.
113Detroit Free Press, February 19, 1866, p. l.

-l48-

unnamm‘

0n the other hand, however, the French bankers
cannot be blamed for their lack of enthusiasm; experience
had taught them that they were more likely to loss than to
gain money in dealings with Mexico. Aside from the original
debt which had catalyzed the French intervention, it was
stated that in less than four years France had expended
seventy-five million dollars in Mexico.us ‘
Actually one would have difficulty in finding a
pro-Maximilian story throughout the whole year of 1866. 0a
the lighter side, but nevertheless a problem, the governor
of Lower California found it advisable to leave the country
after attempting unsuccessfully to persuade the people to
declare their submission to Maximilian.116
A dispatch from San Francisco early. in March said that
the French troops in the northern and western parts of Mexico
had been. driven to the sea and had taken refuge in a few
small towns. Some Americans had enlisted with the liberal
forces and this might have been, at least in part, the reason
for themsltreamnent by the imperialists of American citizens,

many of whom were shot or imprisoned. The situation became

sufficiently alarming that Californians urged the United

 

11“Washington Evening Star, February 7. 1855. P- 2-
115Detroit Free Press, Msrch 9, 1866, p. 3.

115Washington Evening Star, February 8, 1866, p. l.

-149-
States to send ships to protect American citizens and the
honor of the American flag.117 The whole Tampico area was
soon in liberal hands; open recruiting for the liberal army
‘was being carried on in New’Orleans; and the liberals crowned
a whole series of military successes by capturing a train of
specie worth a reported one and one-half to two million

118 The imperialists retaliated by their seizure

119

dollars.
of the Frances Palmer, an American bark, in July. The
situation was so serious for the French that in September
Napoleon ordered General Castelnau to Mexico.

The following month President Johnson dispatched
General Sherman, Mr. Plumb, and Mr. Campbell to Mexico. The
instructions given to these gentlemen delineate quite clearly
the American position regarding Mexico. General Sherman was
to remain in Mexico only until Juarez' government would have
been re-established. He was to order in United States troops,
if they were needed, to convince any who objected to the legal
government taking over again.120 Seward's orders to Mr. Camp-

bell specified, among other things, "First, as the representa-

tive of the United States you are accredited to the republican

 

117Washington EveningiStar, March 6, 1866, p. 2.
1131bid., July 2, 1866, p. 1.
119Ibid., September 1, 1866, p. l.

IZODetroit Free Press, November 9, 1866, p. 6.

-150-
government of Mexico of which Mr. Juarez is president.
Your coumunications as such representative will be made to
him, wheresoever he may be, and in no event will you offi-
cially recognize Prince Maximilian, who claims to be emperor,
or any other person, chief, or combination as exercising
authority in Mexico without first having reported to this
department and received instructions from the president of
the United States." Secondly, Mr. Campbell was to do nothing
that would embarrass the French officers who presumably
would be departing with their troops. Thirdly, Mr. Campbell
was to enter into no agreement with anyone that could possibly
hinder the restoration of the authority of the Juarez govern-
ment. "0n the other hand, it may possibly happen that the
president of the Republic of Mexico may desire the good
offices of the United States or even some effective pro-
ceedings on our part to favor and advance the pacification
of the country so long distracted by foreign combined with
civil war and thus gain time for the re-establishment of
national authority upon principles consistent with a repub-
lican and domestic system of government. It is possible,
moreover, that some disposition might be made of the land
and naval forces of the United States without interfering

within the jurisdiction of Mexico or violating laws of

-151~

neutrality, which wouldbe useful in favoring the restoration
of law; order, and republican government in that country.
You are authorized to confer upon this subject‘with the
republican government of Mexico and its agents . . . ."121

The following letter should be sufficient to dispel
any lingering doubts as to the position of the united States
administration. On October 23, 1866, General P. H. Sheridan
addressed this note to General T. L. Sedgewick, Brownsville,
Texas, "I am satisfied that there is only one way in which
the state of affairs on the Rio Grande can be battered, and
that is by giving hardiest support to the only government in
Mexico recognized by our own--the only one really friendly
to us. .The neutrality laws are to be enforced against ad-
herents of the imperial buccaneers--also against Ortega and
Santa Ana. Juarez is the acknowledged head of the liberal
government."122

When the rest of the world had given up hope for him,
Maximilian was still clinging to his throne. He stated that
a true Hapsburg never gave up his post.w He declared his re-

solve to head personally the army to fight againit the

 

IZISerial 1294, #3, Seward to Campbell, October 20, 1866.

122New'York Herald, October 27, 1866, p. 1. This letter
was dated October 23, 1866. Per it to have appeared in a news-
paper‘within four days it would almost seem to have been a
deliberate leak, tantamount to a clear announcement of policy.

~152-

1iberals and his announced plans were to make a strong
stand at Vera Cruz.123

However, brave words were not enough to stem the tide.
Within the next two weeks, first Acapulco and then the rest
of the whole west coast were evacuated by the French. On
October 23, 1866, Maximilian resigned verbally in favor of
General Bazaine and departed from Mexico City.124 Thus, for
all practical purposes, ended the reign of Maximilian I of
Mexico although a few months more were. required to terminate

the actual French intervention. 125

123Washington Evening Star, October 4, 1866, p. 1.

124New York Herald, November 6, 1866, p. l.
Emit Free Press, November 6, 1866, p. 1.
Washington Evening Star, November 6, 1866, p. 1.

125Many of the events which transpired during those

months were of great interest to contemporaries. Within the
context of this study, however, one event of particular in-
terest occurred late in November. General Sedgwick, comaander
of the army of the Rio Grande, occupied Matamoros with a con-
tingent of U.S. troops. He subsequently yielded in favor of
General Escobeda. As Sedgwick had carried out this occupation
without consulting President Johnson, even though it was done to

protect American citizens, he was removed from his command.

-153-

 

// L
'
ke/\dfl<:f“s
dunes
TINUWP'C

Map 3.-This map shows the potential
danger to the United States as of early 1865,when the French
forces were reportedly in control of the Mexican states of
Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, and Lower California.
Proximity to the United States has also been indicated.

THEORY

"Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment -
nothing can fail; without‘it nothing can succeed. Consequent-
ly he who molds public sentiment is more powerful than he who
enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes
and decisions possible or impossible to be executed."1

‘Much has been said about public opinion and its influence
on foreign policy. Seward, Corwin, Romero, and Vicuna Mackenna are
but a few of the public men of the period who considered and
discussed public opinion as a recognizable force. Philoso-
phers, politicians, and writers have duly noted the potency of
this force. Historians have also written of this Opinion as
a concrete factor that must be accounted for in evaluating
foreign policy and diplomatic relations, particularly of the
united States. Hume said, "As force is always on the side of
the governed,the governors have nothing to support them but
opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that government is
founded."2 Alexander Hamilton said very much the same thing,

"Opinion whether well or ill-founded is the governing principle

 

1
Quincy wright (ed.), Public Opinion and World Politics
(Chicago: University of-Chicago Press, 1933), p. 3.

2
Ibid., p. 4.
-154-

~155-

"3

of human affairs. In 1837, Harriet Martineau remarked that

"The worship of opinion at this day is the established religion
of the united States."4 '
The especial importance of public opinion in.the United
States could be explained by Defoe's definition of public
opinion "as an expression of dominant conviction backed by
an intention to give effect to it." For in the United States
the citizens were able to subject the government to the dic-

tates of opinion more consistently than in other countries.

In the united States the press has existed, in some form, for

~n almost three hundred years. During the greater portion of

this time public opinion has been considered the best way to
reduce the authority of the government, to attack the privi-
leges of the higher classes, and to vindicate freedom of the -
citizens.5 If "Popular government . . . may be said to
consist of the control of political affairs by public opinion,"6
then the importance of the role of the press in the United
States immediately becomes obvious.

Yet of all the factors comprising a particular policy,

 

3 .
‘Wright, Public Opinion and World Politics, p. 3.
“Ibid., p. 12.
5;bid., p. 33.

“Ian-ac- A- Low-11. Public Opinion agd Popular Govern-
ment (New York: Iongmens, Green and Co., 19135, p. 4.

p-156-
concrete attempts to evaluate this aforementioned opinion have
- been most lacking. Attempts of past scholars to employ some
sort of evaluation and estimation of public opinion in.con-
junction with the interpretation of united States policies,
domestic and foreign, have been open to serious question on
three counts. First, rigorous, systematic methods of measur-
ing public opinion only recently have been applied in the '
field of history. All too often in the past the "public opin-
ion" about any particular topic has been that which the par-
ticular author felt it to be. Secondly, some of the analyses
of the opinion-policy relationship have been even less rigor-
ous, if possible, than the estimate of public opinion. ‘As
Rosenau said, "All too often they Chistoriané] interpret the
I strengths and‘weaknesses of a policy in terms of untested as-
sumptions about the impact of an indifferent or an aroused
public upon the behavior of officials. No less frequently
do they evaluate the end product of the policy-making process
in terms of unsubstantiated notions about the way in which
presidential leadership contributes to the level of public
comprehension and commitment."7 In addition to the two
problems enumerated above, the tendency to equate opinion

and influence has been a common pitfall for workers in this

 

7James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreigp Policy
(New York: Random House, 1961), p. 4. .

-157-
area. There is no gainsaying the fact that it is difficult
to measure and to analyze public opinion in one's own time,
let alone in times past. Nonetheless, within certain defi-
nite boundaries, this is precisely what is attempted herein.
‘Whether or not startling new interpretations result therefrom
seems less important than that a contribution be made toward
the development of a truly scientific method of historical
research.

In this study the three most common problems are.being
avoided by the following means. Opinion and influence are
treated as two separate but related concepts, which they are.
Opinion is measurable. Influence is not. Influence is dis-
cernable, imputable, traceable, but is not actually measurable
pgg_gg, In behavioral terms, "We cannot observe the influences
that underlie the formation of public opinion and its effect
upon public policies; we can only observe behavior and ipggp
therefrom‘which influences are operative."8 As for conclu-
sions regarding the relationship between public opinion and
governmental policy-making, one can only point out correlations.
On the basis of present knowledge no attempt can be made to

attribute causality. In the sphere of "estimation and

 

8Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreigp Policz, p. 11.

-158-
evahlsdon," actuate masurement of the most available expression
of public opinion has been used.

Before proceeding further*with this discussion of method-
ology, it might be well to define the basic terms as they are
used herein. Opinion is constituted of any set of ideas,
either informational or judgmen tel. "Opinion-holders are
those persons in the society who, on a given issue or in gen-
eral, cannot circulate Opinions to persons with whom they are
not acquainted. Opinion~makers are those who, by virtue of
their position of leadership in the society, have access to
the impersonal channels. . . , Quality media are those which
treat foreign-policy issues seriously, extensively, and con-
tinuously; whereas popular media are those which treat these
matters in a simplified, abridged, and erratic fashion if they
deal with them at all. . . .treat a foreign-policy situation
in the same vein as they would treat a sex scandal or a sport-
ing event."9

"The quality media take an active part in the structur-
ing of issues. They participate in foreign policy discussions

continually. They reach into the formal governmental agencies

and among the non-government leaders. They help create a kind

 

9Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreigp Policy, p. 28.‘

~159-

of laboratory atmosphere in which foreign policy ideas can
be tested out through the use of responsible speculation and
imagination. They constitute a 'feed-back' on the consequences
of policy decisions and furnish the necessary basis for the
constant process of modifying and adapting decisions which
have already been made."10 1 4

The mass public comprises the bulk of the adult popu-
lation. For the most part this public isrelatively uninformed
and uninterested in foreign policy and/or international hap-
penings. Impassivity characterizes this public's usual stance
toward foreign affairs. The mass public's major, if not sole,
channel of information on foreign happenings is the mass, as
differentiated from the quality, media. Due to the lack of
accurate background information and to the sensational aspect
of foreign news that does penetrate the mass public's usual
indifference, there is a tendency toward over-reaction. In
contrast to the mass public, the attentive public is consti-
tuted of a very minor segment of the population, estimates
varying from five to ten per cent. The attentive public can
be differentiated from the mass public qualitatively, as well

as quantitatively, in that the members of the attentive public

 

10Rosenau,_Public Opinion and Foreigp Policy, p. 83.

~160-

tend to be better educated and better informed. The quality
media tend to constitute their main sources of informatiOn.

Not only does the attentive public appear to be more knowl-
edgeabLe regarding the backgrounds of various foreign problems,
but the members of this public are frequently active compon-
ents of the opinion molding and submitting sequence. In other
words, these people tend to be the influentials, the elites.

As was stated in the introduction, public Opinion is
’ the totality of ideas and attitudes held by a public. As it
~ is seldom feasible or possible to ascertain exactly what each
idea is that is held by each individual at any given moment,
the method of sampling has evolved. While there are a variety
of sources of expression of Opinion available toan historian,
for this study selected newspapers have been employed to pro-
vide a measurable expression of public Opinion. Further, as
one of the variables stated in the original prOposition per-
tains to information pgg_g£, newspapers have been used to
fulfill a double role.

As, even today, newspapers are considered both molders
and reflectors of public opinion, they are used as the indi-
cators of public opinion during the period of 1861 to 1866.
For this measure to be meaningful, clearly defined rigorous
standards, to be described, have been employed in the use of

the newspapers.

-l6l-

First, the papers selected were all significant as
leaders in their areas on the basis of both total and compara-
tive circulations. They were chosen from locations of high.
newspaper concentration. No Southern papers were used as the
South was not part of the actual Official decisionamaking .
body of the United States during the period under considera-
tion. Even after the cessation of hostilities, due to radical
Republican policies, Southern leaders were still excluded
from high United States office. The newspapers that were em-
ployed were representative of the Democratic, Independent,
and Republican points of view. Further, while the East is
over-represented in that two of the four are New York papers,
the East was also most influential in the national government
during this period. There is one Midwest paper and one that
is representative of sentiment in the border states.

All issues of the newspapers from January 1, 186l,through
December 31, 18%, were subjected to analysis. The contents
have been treated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since
the validity and reliability of the qualitative analysis are
‘more difficult to establish, the exact criteria employed are
specified in the appropriate section.

Before discussing the four base papers, a description of
the makeup of American newspapers in the 1860's would be ap-

propriate., Daily papers were from four to sixteen pages long.

~162-
For the most part there were no pictures, sketches, or car-
toons. Occasionally a map or drawing of a fOrtification or
harbor defense was published, and normally appeared on the
front page. The papers were composed of either six or eight
columns; during the period the trend seemed to be toward the
six column format. Banner headlines were not used, but an
individual column would have eight or ten headings. These
headings often pertained to different stories and were set
in various type faces, thus serving as a sort of table of
contents. The stories described therein Often appeared on
other pages and occasionally did not appear at all. Two to
four of the columns on the first page and also on the general
news page or pages would be set up in this fashion. Other'
news items would have small captions of the same sort of type
as that used in the story,or no caption, particularly in the
smaller papers. Advertisements formed one fourth to one third
of each paper, at times appearing on the front page. There
was proportionately greater coverage than is given today to.
the meetings of the city council and those of the state legis-
lature. Addresses of various governors and federal officials
‘ware printed in full. Frequently, diplomatic correspondence
of general interest was also printed in its entirety.

In the united States of the 1860's, the newspaper

constituted the only mass medium. The newspaper was the

-l63-
prime educational and informational link to the rest of the
world for a predominately agricultural population. The politi-
cal views of the editor and publisher were proudly and
vehemently proclaimed and often reflected in news stories as
well as the editorial columns. Seemingly, the editors were
conscious of the dual functions, opinion-molding and opinion-
reflecting, that were performed by the papers. For this
reason, content analysis can provide a measure of public
sentiment on specific issues. At the same time,care must
be taken in basing conclusions upon that which is read in
the papers. As news items often consisted of only one or
two lines, the story of the actual happening might well have
been exactly the Opposite in connotatiOn as the following so
'well illustrates. On December 4, 1866, United States Senator
Zack Chandler of Michigan moved to take up his resolution that
he had submitted the previous day, said resolution referring
to the presence of French troops in Mexico. Nonetheless,
Senator Sumner requested that the resolution be referred to
the committee on foreign relations (as soon as committee
should be formed) particularly to smooth out some of the
language in which the resolution had been couched. Senator
Saulsbury then spoke in support of referring the resolution

to committee; but he stated that he did so only because of

-l64-

the language, on the basis of its being undiplomatic, and
that he supported the thought behind the resolution. Because
of the question of the wording the Senate voted against the
‘motion to take up the resolution at that time. In essence,
the Senate by that vote supported Senator Summer's request
and ostensibly defeated Senator Chandler. In the newspapers
of the time this exchange might have been summarized as,
"Senate refuses to consider resolution on Mexico." In actuality,
the ideas embodied in the Chandler resolution were supported by
a majority in the Senate.

In addition to editorial bias and brief, possibly mis-
leading items, there are other pitfalls to be avoided in
using the content analysis of newspapers to obtain a picture
of public Opinion. One must be aware of the sources used by
the papers themselves in their foreign news. The employment
of foreign correspondents was just beginning during this era.
It was still a common practice to consider letters from friends
or stories purchased from sailors as accurate foreign news
coverage. Further, plagiarism was almost universal. Therefore,
if an inaccurate story were printed in a major European or
New'York paper it might gain national circulation. Thus, by
appearing in papers with known dissimilarities of editorial

policy the substance of the news item would seem to be true.

-165-

The most intriguing incident of this type that was uncovered
during the research for this study involved a story that
appeared in l'Europe on August 21, 1863.

In this page one story it was stated that the people
of Frankfort had viewed with some astonishment the fact that
the United States consul general had been flying the beican
flag beside the American. At first it was assumed that this
was simply the result of excessive personal zeal on the part
of Mr. Murphy, the consul general. 0n the day that the story
appeared, however, the writer said that he had ascertained
that several months earlier M. Juarez had written to the
cabinet in Washington and had requested that United States
agents represent Mexico abroad in case the legal authority
should be temporarily overthrown in Mexico. The item con-
tinued with the statement that Secretary Seward, in Murch of
1863, had sent a notice to the United States consuls in which
he had said that if Mexico fell into foreign hands that the
United States consuls would have to represent Mexico abroad.
In this same dispatch it was stated explicitly that the United
States would not, under any conditions, tolerate the intro-
duction into Mexico of any form of government other than the
republican.

On August twenty-fourth, three days later, an exact

-166-
translation, with the exception of one word, appeared on page
four of the London 2133;. Both the New‘York Herald and the
New York Tribune carried the story on September second, the
former on page three and the latter on page two. The Tribune
added that immediate war was anticipated if Napoleon did not
limit his demands on Mexico to indemnity. The story took a
few days longer to travel to the midwest. The Detroit Free
Egggg_printed the story on page three on September ninth. All
of these papers credited the story to l'Europe. While the.
‘writer of the original story claimed to have ascertained the
fact, still he did not quote any traceable sources.

Despite diligent efforts, this researcher has been un-
able to verify the existence of the alleged dispatches. It
is known that the editor of l'Europe,‘M. Ganesco, and the
consul general, Mr. MMrphy, were close friends. Such circum-
stantial support is far too tenuous to allow'of other than
hypothesizing.

This concludes the discussion of the general description
of newspapers in the 1860's as well as the mention of a few of
the special cautions to be observed in their use. Before be-
ginning the section devoted to the specifics of the base papers
used in this study, respectful consideration of the following

quotation seems most appropriate. In The Newspaper and

-167-

Periodical Press, S.N.D. North said, "These poor journals of,
today, which everybody is ready to stigmatize as trash not
worth the room to store or the money to bind, are the very
materials which the man of the future will search for with
eagerness, and for some of which he'will be ready to pay
their weight in gold. l.. - No historian or other‘writer on
any subject who would write conscientiously or with full
information can afford to neglect this fruitful mind of the
journals, where his richest materials are frequently to be
found."11

The four papers that were used as base papers were the
New'York HeraldI the New York Tribune, the Detroit Free Press,
and the‘washington Evening Star. According to the united
States census information on newspapers per capita, only
cities‘with the highest concentration of papers are repre-
sented.

The New'York Herald was edited and published by James
Gordon Bennett. Although listed as an independent paper,
almost without exception the M supported the Democratic

position on the questions of the day. The New'York Herald-

 

11U. 8. Congress, Dept. of Interior, Census Office, The
‘History and Present Condition of the NewSpaper and Periodical
Press of the United States, by S. N. D. North, Serial 2136, 49th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1884, Mia. Doc. 42, Pt. 8, p. 164.

-l68-

was an eight page, six column paper. At irregular inter-
vals a twelve page triple sheet edition was published. It
‘was a daily morning paper; there was a weekly edition which
appeared on Saturday; on‘Wednesday the European edition was
published. The daily circulation was around 85,000 capies
and the‘weekly about 25,000.12 In l865,the‘§g§g;g_received
$662,192.00 from advertising.13 The gegglg_was evidently
an innovator in the use of a large corps of reporters, of
war correspondents, and of foreign correspondents as these
terms are understood today. These large corps maintained
by J.G. Bennett far surpassed those of the other newspapers.
Further, as has already been mentioned, the figgglg_was also
an innovator in the extensive use of maps and diagrams.

There seems to have been some connection between
James Gordon Bennett and Chile as he had far more coverage
of happenings in Chile than did his rivals. His tone toward
Mexico was one which strongly favored Santa Ana as the remedy
for her many ills. ‘With regard to the united States adminis-
tration, he was extremely anti-Seward and frequently referred

to "Seward's toadyism." This was a constant factor. However,

 

IZDetroit Free Press, April 5, 1862, p. 2.

13Washington Eveninngtar, April 10, 1866, p. 2.

-l69-

it might be well to mention at this point that inconsistency
upon nearly every issue was characteristic of Bennett. In
spite of this, the influence of the flggglg and its editor
was considerable. "Have we not seen almost every man who
has held or run for the Presidency during the last ten or
fifteen years paying assiduous and servile court, directly‘
or indirectly, or both to the editor of thquggglg,"14

The New'York Tribune was edited by Horace Greeley and
Charles A. Dana. It was owned by a joint stock company.
.According to an opposition paper of the time the stock
holders inquested Dana's resignation in the spring of 1862,
but Greeley was retained*with the proviso that he moderate
the abolitionist tone of the paper.{ The Tribune was not
only a Republican paper, it was radically Republican. The
daily circulation was about 40,000, about 20,000 for the
semidweekly edition, and 192,000 for the weekly issue. For
1861 and.a part of l862,its format was eight columns, and
then it switched to six. At the beginning of this period
the front page consisted of advertisements, but'within a
short time this changed and the make-up of the Tribune was
very similar to that of the figgglg, It also published triple

sheet editions, usually on the same days on which the Herald

 

143. K. Hunt. "The New York Herald," North American Re-
viewF V01. 102 (1866), p. 412.

 

-l70-
appeared with triple sheets. The most outstanding charac-
teristic of the Tribune of this era was Horace Greeley. Not
only was he a staunch abolitionist, he believed in, wrote
about, and fought for the individual rights of all human
beings. He favored universal free education. He was an
early and firm advocate of woman suffrage as well as women's
rights. He believed in freedom of religion and tolerance
for all; he himself was a Universalist and filled the pulpit
on more than one occasion. He was a member of the platform
committee at the 1860 Republican party convention. In 1864,
he was a presidential elector. He published The American I
Conflict, a history of the Civil War, in 1864.

The Detroit Free Press, published and edited by Walker
and Seitz, was so rabidly Democratic that it was termed by
‘many of the time a copperhead paper. In December of 1861.
Seitz was replaced by Taylor and Barns. In February of 1864.
it became simply Walker, Barns and Company. It was a morning
paper published daily, tri-weekly, and weekly. The daily
circulation was about 6,000, the tridweekly about 1,700,
and the weekly around 15,000. The Detroit Free Press was
an eight column, eight page paper. It changed its format
and make-up late in 1865, but even somewhat prior to this a

' gradual moderation in tone was noticeable. The greatest part

-l71-
of the foreign news which was carried in this paper was re-
printed from the New York papers.

The Washington EveningStar was edited by W.D. Wallach.
The Evening Star Newspaper Company was listed as editor and
publisher. The §£§§ termed itself an Independent, but in
general it reflected a mildly Democratic point of view. This
four-page paper printed both a daily and a weekly issue; the
circulation of the former was about 10,500 and about 2,500
for the latter. It did not publish a Sunday edition. From
April 25, 1861 to May 24, 1861, the §£§5_published one sheet
issues at irregular intervals, owing to a shortage of paper.
The first page for this period contained only advertisements
and fiction; the news and editorials were usually on the
second page.

Several additional papers, termed herein as auxiliary
ones, were utilized in addition to the four base papers.
These were the NeW'York Times, The Times of London, the
Ferrocarril of Santiago, and l'Europe of Frankfort.

The New York Times was a Republican paper published
and edited by H.J. Raymond and Company. The circulation
figures for the daily issue were around 35,000, for the
semidweekly about 4,000, and 20,000 for the weekly edition.

There was also an edition, The Times for California, which

-l72-
was designed for circulation in Spanish America, California,
and the other western parts of the United States. This
edition included a complete digest of happenings in America
and in Europe for the previous ten days. The Timeg published
a European edition, but circulation figures for it were not
available. Like the Tribune and the Herald, the 11139.9. was
an eight page, six column paper. There was a decided simi-
larity in the distribution of the contents of these three
leading New York papers. Iews items not contained on the
front page were most likely to be found on page four with
the editorials,or sometimes on the last page of the paper.

The Times of London, under the management of Mewbray
Morris for this period, was the most influential of the
British dailies. It varied in length from twelve to six-
teen pages. Palmer's Index to the Times Newspaper was a
useful guide to articles and editorials pertaining to this
study.

The Ferrocarril of Santiago was the largest daily of
Chile. It was a six column paper which varied from four to
eight pages in length. Commonly referred to as the "govern-
ment paper," this was so only in the sense that for the most
part it printed the official government "line." So far as

could be learned there was no official link to the government.

-l73-
President Perez tolerated more dissent in the papers than
had some of his predecessors. Undoubtedly due to its loca-
tion in the capital, the Ferrocarril carried a more complete
coverage of foreign news than did the other contemporary
Chilean papers. In general,the make-up of this paper was
not unlike that of the North American papers.

Published in Frankfort, l'Europe was a four page daily.
Investigation has shown it to be a reputable paper. It en-
joyed a wide circulation, and along with all the European
it carried much American news. This may well be the result,
as mentioned, of the close friendship of the American consul,
WQW. Murphy, and Gregory Ganesco, the editor of l'Europe.

The four base newspapers were those whose columns were
studied as expressions of public opinion as well as indica-
tors of the information that was available to the American
people. The auxiliary papers were examined for two reasons.
The first was as a source of information; and the second
reason, particularly in the case of the New York Times, was
to serve as a sort of check on the findings for the four
base papers during periods of unusually heavy or light cover-
age of foreign news. The specific background information for
each paper was deemed essential in order to analyze and to

interpret more accurately the findings.

-l74-

In classifying the data obtained from the base papers,
news items about Chile and Mexico were categorized as first-
page, lead, editorial, and Monroe Doctrine related. Thus,
the total number of mentions encompasses the four categories
named as well as simple mentions; the latter were all items
which did not fit into the other groupings. The FIRST PAGE
means precisely that, that the country was mentioned on that
page. .A LEAD article meant that the main caption over the
column contained the name.of the country, either Chile of
Mexico, and that the column was either the far left or the
far right news column on the page. At least half of the
column must have dealt with news of the country concerned.
First-page LEADS were counted as LEADS, as by definition a
LEAD was a more informative and attention-attracting story
than a simple mention on the first page. The term EDITORIAL
was applied to those items that appeared on the editorial
page and were clearly not news items. MONROE DOCTRINE re-
lated articles were those in which the Doctrine was mentioned
by name and its application to the situation in either Chile,
or Mexico, or both was either explicit or implicit. These
categories were arbitrarily chosen, but the method seemed
a logical one. For the purpose of simplification, the tables

have not been set up to demonstrate this categorical breakdown.

-l75-

A comparison of the quantity with the quality of the
findings for this study shows a direct correlation between
the two. As the tone of the press during this period under
consideration became more vehement in its denunciations of
European activities in Latin America, so the articles and
editorials pertaining to both Chile and Mexico continued to
increase in number as can be noted from the statistical tables.
In both cases this increase, a reflection of public opinion
and public interest, continued to be a rapid and a constant
one from 1864 on.

With particular reference to Mexico, an eminent and
contemporary historian has said, "The pressure to which the
. Secretary of State had been subjected in favor of a more
vigorous policy was by June [1865] considerably increasing.
. . . in the press and public hall the clamor for the vindi-
cation of the Monroe Doctrine grew louder. It is not strange,
then, that his tone began to change . . . ."15 Dexter Perkins
himself has thus conceded recognition to the impact of opinion
upon foreign policy formation. However, the results of the
investigations for this work do not entirely coincide with

those of Perkins. This is undoubtedly due to the type of

source which one considers an accurate measure for opinion.

 

15Perkins, Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867, pp. 490-91.

-176-

In support of his assertions regarding opinion, Perkins has
listed only secondary sources in his bibliography. Herein,
the daily press was selected as a more precise measurement.
This indicator corroborates that public pressure upon Seward
and his seeming change of tone began in 1864.and not in the
summer of 1865.

Illustrative of the sentiment,even early in 186% is
the following. ". . . if the administration has been so
recreant to its promises of moral support to the Mexican
national cause, its hitherto well-defined policy upon the
subject, its professions of attachment to the Monroe doctrine,
and the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country, as to
enter into such an arrangement with the agent of the French
Emperor . . . Cit] will meet on every hand a spontaneous
outburst of popular indignation. . . . The American people
"16 Again,

from the mid-west, "There exists everywhere in the country

are . . . friends of republican Mexico . . . .

not merely a traditional, but a real and earnest determination
to adhere to the principles of the Monroe doctrine."17
The date given by Perkins for the beginning of this

upsurge of interest in Mexico is closely related to the

 

16As quoted in the Detroit Free Press, February 5, 1864,
p. 2, from the Commercial Bulletin of Boston.

17Detroit Free Press, April 8, 1864, p. 2.

-177-

cessation of hostilities in the United States. Obviously,
active and open support could not have been given before this
time. The necessary resources were needed for the war at
home; further, Seward could not risk the possibility of direct
European intervention in the United States Civil War. It was
feared that the British would communicate with rebel forces
in Brownsville; suspicions were that an invasion army was
going to strike at the United States through Texas, and
General Banks was sent south to forestall this contingency;
finally, an American boat with ammunition for Mexico was
actually seized by the Spanish in the port of Vera Cruz.18

Nonetheless, as has been noted throughout the beican
section, encouragement and undercover aid, not'widely publi-
cized, were being given. Various stories in papers friendly
to the administration hinted at the possible recognition of
Maximilian's government by the United States. There seems a
good likelihood that these articles may simply have been used
for propaganda by the administration in attempting to conceal
the fact that aid was being supplied to Mexico. Among other

instances discussed, the reported orders of March, 1863, to

Mr.‘Murphy in Frankfort and the embargo upon rations for Mexico

 

18NewYork Tribune, January 4, 1862, p. 5; January 20,
1862, p. 4; and January 23, 1862, p. 8.
New York Herald, December 21, 1862, p. 4.

~178-
in 1864 are illustrative of this earlier aid to Mexico.
It is worthy of note that, although not mentioned

specifically by any of the secondary writers, the principles
of the Monroe Doctrine were included as a part of the Democratic
party platform even in 1860. The Republicans endorsed the
Doctrine even more forcefully in their platform of 1864. "Re-~
solved, That we approve the position taken by the Government
that the people of the United States can never regard‘with in-
difference the attempt of any European Power to overthrow'by
force or to suppplant by fraud the institutions of any republi-
can government on the western continent and that they‘will view
‘with extreme jealousy as menacing to the peace and independence
of their own country the efforts of any such power to obtain
new'footholds for Monarchical Government, sustained by foreign
military force, in near proximity to the United States."19

' The above becomes even more significant when one takes
into account that ". . . platforms often reflect political
trends. Developments of new economic, social, and political
movements may be observed, and declarations contained in previ-
one minor party platforms are occassionally adopted by the

major parties when sufficient public Opinion has been generated

h

19Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson (comp.), National
Earty Platforms (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 36.

New York Herald, June 9, 1864, p. 5.-

-179-

"20 Porter and Johnson have said that

to support the change.
party "platforms usually . . . serve as a catalyst for the
factions within the party and the voters represented by these
factions."21 In this instance, it might even be stated that
public Opinion in support of the Monroe Doctrine served as
a catalyst not only for one party, but for the whole North.
The Democratic Detroit Free Press backed it, as did also the
Republican Tribune of Greeley. In a sense, it became a sort
of rallying point for the whole country as testified by some
of the articlesreprinted from the Southern papers.

In Congress as well as in the press, a growing concern
over the situation in Mexico was evidenced by more frequent
and more passionate discussion. The volume of discussion,
however, lagged behind the noted upswing in coverage by the
papers. In June of 1855, Mr. Stevens stated in the House of
Representatives: "Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the time
has arrived when the United States can calmly inquire whether
that declaration of American policy called the 'Monroe doctrine,‘
which.was once deemed so important and manly shall be a practi-

cal idea or a mere bravado. While we were engaged in civil

‘war it was certainly not prudent to provoke a war with any

 

20Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms, p. vi.

lebidn, p. vii.

-180-
powerful nation . . . . ‘

"If it is not intended to maintain the Monroe doctrine
with the full energy of the nation, it ought to be abandoned
‘with dignity as an inconsiderate error. If it be deemed imp
portant to the safety and honor of the country then there
should be no yielding. . . . Juarez has persevered‘with a
courage and a fortitude unparalleled in modern history."22
Thus can be noted the close sentiment as here expressed in
the Congress and that of two years prior in the press.

Upon one occasion when the Mexican correspondence was
called for in the House of Representatives, Thaddeus Stevens
requested "especially any letters Of the minister from.said

fidexican] republic ."23

This is perhaps indicative Of the

away which Minister Romero exercised upon opinion. Such
mastery over opinion is almost in direct apposition to Vienna's
lack of effectiveness. So far as could be ascertained, no
Chilean correspondence was called for in Congress. In the
press, the only thing which he himself managed to accomplish

successfully was the active prOpagation Of a story to the

effect that the seas were teeming with Chilean privateers

 

22U.S., Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess.,
June 16, 1866, Pt. 4, p. 3217.

23Ibid., 39th Cong., lst Sess., December 11, 1865,
Pt. 1, p. 17. ’

-181-

ready to pounce upon Spanish shipping. For some time the
New York papers carried articles regarding this situation;
finally the question was dispelled by the Herald's revelation
that the whole thing was a huge hoax and that Spain had spent
$30,000 in hunting imaginary privateers. Spain also sustained
losses in her anticipated income from shipping.24

Again, illustrative of the administration's preoccu-
pation over Mexican affairs is the message Of President
Johnson to both houses of Congress at the end of 1866. Ap-
proximately one third of that section treating with foreign
relations dealt with Mexico. There was no mention of any
other Latin American country.25 While serving as a partial
degree of measurement of United States interest, this fact,
at the same time, is a reflection Of the relative amount Of
success which the two men, Romero and Vicuna, achieved in
arousing United States sympathy for their respective national
causes.

In an oversimplification of the case, it appears as
though Romero's greater effectiveness is attributable in

large part to his background. Although well educated, Romero

 

24W. March 16. 1865. p. 10.

250.s., Congressional Globe Appendix, 39th Cong., 2nd
Sess., December 3, 1866, p. 1-5.

-182-

was part Indian and a man of the peOple as were Juarez and
Lincoln. Moreover, proximity to the United States Of his
'country had given Romero much insight into the diplomacy and
way of life of his host country. In the barrage of corre-
spondence with which he deluged Seward, this able Mexican
skillfully and continually emphasized the many canmon con-
cerns such as the United States' need to help Mexico as a self-
protective measure and the commercial concerns. He seemed
fully cognizant Of the need for public support.

Vicuna Mackenna, on the other hand, was from a republic
controlled by an aristocracy that had long held the reins of
authority. Public support for a government, a person, or an
issue was a variable of negligible consideration. Official

'appointment was Often on the basis of reward, not ability.
‘Witness the selection of Covarrubias as foreign minister in
1865. Instead of keeping Seward fully informed of events

in Chile, Vicufih Mackenna behaved in an arrogant fashion,
expected United States assistance as his due, made but slight
effort to comprehend the domestic absorptions of Seward, and
actually engaged in activities contrary to the neutrality laws
of the United States. He paid lip service to the recognized
need for public support, but did little to merit it. Indeed,

it is surprising that he received as considerate treatment as

-183-

he did while in the United States and that the press retained
its friendliness.26

Of all the peOple who enacted active roles in the events
described herein, those who were most sensible to public Opinion
and who, as a matter of policy, attempted to educate, use,
and at times 'play' to this Opinion-dmen such as Lincoln,
Seward, Juarez, and others--these are the historically great
men. nor that they are great simply because they were 'qoinion men,'
but rather it is because they were great that they were so aware
of the need for the public's support.

The extent to which the papers molded as well as re-
flected the public's Opinion should now be apparent. "Influ-
ence over Opinion no paper can have which has itself no

°P131°ne and cares for none."27

However, as even today,
'opinion was generated and expressed at many different levels.
The simple diagram.which follows is an attempt to demonstrate

visually the continuous interaction of opinion as depicted at

 

26The tone of the press indicated a real interest in

and concern over the happenings in Latin America. Typical of
the commonly voiced solution suggested is an article from the
New York Herald of June 1, 1862, p. 8. This expressed the hope
and the belief that the Latin nations could and would band to-
gether for their mutual defense and interest. Friendliness for
Chile, as expressed in the hOpe that she might lead in the for-
mation of such a band, continued in spite of Vicuna's activities.

273. K. Hunt , "The New York Herald," North American Mw,
Vol; 102 (1865). P- 379-

~184-
these various levels. From it, the important and influential
role of the newspaper should become even more obvious; although,

as previously stated, care must be exercised in the use of this

mass media.28 (See Figure l.)

 

 

 

 

 

“resident PA PE RS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    
   

 

Issuand
nag Pg: 5’

//
er ' n
wg‘fbip’hMO“, Per-‘1 0mm;

cu»
Fig. l.-Opinion Flow'Chart
Seemingly, in much past historical research this source
for both the coverage of news and the expression Of opinion
has not been fully utilized. Therefore, the following quo-
tation will be a worthy note upon which to conclude this
section. ‘"The only true history of a country is to be found

in its newspapers."29

 

28An interesting finding regarding an earlier statement
Of the effect of opinion on policy-making is the following. no
the Tribune of 10l12/64, the Spanish press was clamoring for
extrication from Santo Domingo. In the Herald of 4/17/65--six
months later-~Spain's decision to abandon the island appeared.
In spite of an apparent correlation, without further knowledge
of Spanish documents one cannot attribute this to causality.

29Samuel Palmer, Palmer's Index to the Times Newspaper
(London: Times, 1882), p. 3, quoted from Lord Macaulay.

-185-

Table I

A Comparison of the Total Combined
Frequencies of Items of
All Categories.

120

110

100
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
75
50
40

30 )k,//*K\\\ I”;x

20

 

 

1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866

Mexico '---°
Chile x-x-x

-186-

Tables 11 a & b

Table II a-Cumulative totals, all categories, Mexico.

1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 T

 

NYT 30 151 223 94 237 345 1080

0?? 23 55 105 57 137 158 535

WES 19 36 67 42 71 112 347

 

 

 

 

 

 

urn ‘_;;1_ 205 ngz_ 126 _gs7 538 1435

—-— “

 

T 205 447 642 319 682 1153

 

3448 Total

Table II b-Cumulative totals, all categories, Chile.

1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 T

 

NYT 5 8 17 12 43 102 187

DFP 0 0 0 2 7 34 43

WES 0 0 2 8 2 28 40

 

 

 

 

 

 

NYH .L—23___2§ 3 §J__ZQ__12&.__ZEE
r 23 34 22 30 72 29s

 

484 Total

 

Note: The abbreviations represent the four base papers,
the New Yerk.Tribune, the Detroit Free Press, the Washington
Evening_Star, and the New York Herald.

-187-

Table III

New York Tribune

 

 

1866
1865
/
1863 X
1
,1

o s.

 

 

40

60
80

100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280

Mexico ----°
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

300

320

340 ,

360

-188-

Table IV

Detroit Free Press

 

1866

1865

 

1864

1863

1862
1861 «//////
'c>

 

 

<3 c><3 <3 c><3 c><3 czco c><3 c»<: c><3
p:cu «v.3 U1~O h-(D o~<3 .4 olea.¢ us\o
HHHHHHH

Mexico ----- ~

Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

1866

1865

1864

1863

1862

1861

-189-

Table V

Washington Evening Star

 

 

 

 

10

OOOOOOOOOOO

Mexico -----
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

130

-190-

Table VI

New York Herald

 

 

 

 

1866 I
1865
1864
1863
- 1862
1861 _/
°388333333§§§§§§§§§§

Mexico .-.-.
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

 

Note: It might be of interest to add that from the
observed frequency figures (which are given in Tables II a & b,
and which serve as the basis for the other tables), the theo-
retical frequencifis and the ghi.squares have been computed.
The 22$ square (X ) shows whether or not the distributions
under consideration are simply chance ones. According to
statistical tables, both of these distributions would occur
about once in 10,000 instances. Therefore, the figures become
even more significant.

$8,000,000.

Figures

represent
millions
of dollars

Mexico -----
Chile x-x-x

7.75
7.50
7.25
7.00
6.75
6.50
6.25
6.00
5.75
5.50
5.25
5.00
4.75
4.50
4.25
4.00
3.75
3.50
3.25
3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00

.75

.50

.25

.00

-191-

Table VII

/ \"’\/

MM BMW
1861 1862 1863 1864 1855 1866

 

 

united States Import Trade

With
Chile and Mexico

SUMMARY

"The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments
the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of
their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of
the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have
never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so
to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our
defence. With the movements in this hemiSphere we are of
necessity more immediately connected. . ...We owe it, theree
fore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between
the United States and those powers to declare that we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to
any portion of this hemiSphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety. . . .But with the Governments who have declared their
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged,
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppres-
sing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny,
by any EurOpean power in any other light than as the manifes-
tation of any unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

". . . t” is impossible that the allied powers should extend
their political system to any portion of either continent
without endangering our peace and happiness . . . .It is
equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such
interposition in any form with indifference."

The questions to be answered in this survey are: was the
Monroe Doctrine applied as a result of either or both of the
two situations?; was the United States capable of implementing
the Monroe Doctrine?; if the United States were capable of
applying the Doctrine, then what variables account for the

fact that the Monroe Doctrine was, or was not, implemented?

 

1James D. Richardson (comp.), Compilation of Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897,(Washington, D. 0.:

Government Printing Office, 1896-99), p. 218, from the address
of President Monroe of December 2, 1823.

-192-

-l93-

Before it can be stated with certainty that either or
both of the situations should have caused the United States
to implement the Mbnroe Doctrine, the incidents must be de- '
scribed, as they have been, then compared specifically for
similarities and dissimilarities. Further, the limitations
of the Monroe Doctrine itself must be established. 0n the
basis of the available contemporaneous sources employed herein,
the conclusion is inevitable that the situations were not the
same. In Mexico the established form of government was usurp-
ed by a European prince backed by the Emperor of the French.
In Chile there not only was no forceable attempt to overthrow
the form of government, there was not even an attempt to in-
vade the country. There seems to be no question that Secre-
tary of State Seward also regarded these two situations as
distinctly different. The following quotation froma dispatch
from Seward to United States Minister Kilpatrick in Chile 11-
lustrates well Seward's Opinion. "We concede to every nation
the right to make peace or war for such causes other than poli-
tics or ambitions as it thinks right and best. In such wars
as are waged between nations which are in friendship with
us, if they are not pushed like the French in Mexico to the
political point mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain

neutral conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not

-l94-
concede to the other and allowing nothing to one that we do
not allow to the other."2 This is but one of several dis-
pamhes in which Seward clearly expressed the opinion of the ad-
ministration that the Spanish-Chilean War was simply one over
a point of honor in which the only appropriate United States'

3 Even the bomr

action could be to extend its good offices.
bardment of Valparaiso did not cause this opinion to be changed.
"We infer Valparaiso could have been saved by the mutual firing
of blank cartridges and that the only thing to have been set-
tled was who was to fire the first shot."4
Whereas, in regard to Mexico, Seward wrote, "This govern-
ment . . . in all its intercourse with that republic . . . has
been impressed with the evidences of a high degree of virtue
and enlightenment. That government deservedly enjoys not only
the respect but the good wishes . . . and sympathy of the
United States in its present unhappy embarassments with foreign

powers."5 Seward took a much stronger position in the fall

of 1865, when he said, "The presence and operation of the

 

28erial 1209,#9, Seward to Kilpatrick, June 2, 1866.

3Mess. and Doc., 1865-66, Pt. 2, Dept. of State, Seward
to Tassara, p. 533.

4Serial 1209, #6, Seward to Kilpatrick, May 5, 1866.
5Ibid., #72,Seward to Corwin, April 15, 1863.

-195-

French army in Mexico, and its maintenance of authority there
resting on force, not on the free will of the peeple, is the
cause of serious concern to the United States. But the ob-
jection of the United States is still broader, and includes
the authority itself which the French army there is maintain
ing. That authority is in direct antagonism to the policy
of this government and the principle on which it is founded.
Every day . . . adds . . . new confirmation of the justice
of the views . . . of the United States government. . . . The
effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial govern-
ment in Mexico is disallowable and impracticable. The United
States is not prepared to recognise nor pledged to recognize
any political institutions in Mexico in opposition to the
republican government with which we had amity and friendship."6

While to Seward the situations were really unlike, there
were many at the time who did not agree with him, and there
have been many since. Seward was addressing himself to the
question of ultimate motives; therefore, he differentiated
between the two situations on the basis of the aggressors'
aims. Contemporary opinion leaders who suggested similarities

between the two situations did not examine them in the same

 

6Serial 1261, #300,8eward to Bigelow, November 6, 1865.

-196-
depth, that is to san,at the same information level. Horace
Greeley said,"The conduct of Spain toward Peru has been as
wanton and unjustifiable as that of France toward Mexico."7
In an editorial against Spain and supporting the cause of the
Latin American countri£8.Greeley made frequent use of the terms

"8 In an edi-

"Spanish aggression" and "unreasonable demands.
torial that appeared on December 14, 1865, Greeley said, "Spain
looks longingly on the South American countries. . . . She
'went to Mexico for this purpose but was cheated by France-

She captured Santo Domingo . . . she endeavored to provoke a
war with Peru over the Chinchas and now desires a war with

Chile."9

Not unexpectedly, neither Vicufih Mackenna nor Romero made
any statements in which they compared the situations of their
respective countries; but some reasonable assumptions can be
drawn as to their estimates of the aggressors' designs from
that which they did write. In mid-December of 1865, Romero
wrote to Seward, "The French government protests that it will

do nothing to induce the people of Mexico to proclaim a monarchy

 

7New York Tribune, November 17, 1864, p. 4.

81bid., July 7, 1864, p. 4.

91616., December 14, 1865, p. 4.

-l97-

but its acts are a contradiction. . . . If the present war is
a just one of reparation for injuries why don't they confine
it to that instead of trying to overthrow a constitutional
government?"10 In a speech in Panama City in November of 1865,
Vicufia said, "Spain is making war on my country because Chile
attempted to uphold the honor and dignity of Merica with no
other help or advice or power than her own dignity. The Chin-
chas were a question of honor. Chile could not do otherwise.
. . . Chile will avoid war at all cost except that of her
honor."11

As can be seen from the above quotations, many of Seward's
contemporaries did not agree with him that the situations in
Chile and Mexico were different. Apparently there ha been
no more unanimity in the views of those who have since written
on the two incidents. As was mentioned in the Introduction,
William R. Sherman referred to "Spanish imperialism, similar
to that of France in Mexico, . . ."12 In view of the fact
that Mexico was actually invaded by a large army and the means
of government literally seized by force, and in ch. 1131;: of

Sherman's own account of Chile's involvement with Spain, the

 

10$erial 1162, Romero to Seward, may 18, 1862, p. 60.
11v1cu’r‘ia Mackenna, Diez Mesea. Vol. 1, p. 126.

128herman, Diplomatic and Commercial Relations, p. 101.

-l98-

question naturally arises as to the extent of his familiarity
with the Mexican intervention. About the Spanish-Chilean War
he says, "Chile later was virtually forced to enter on the.
side of the allies by Spain's aggressive attitude . . . Spain
persisted and her admiral appeared off the Chilean coast with
an arrogant ultimatum demanding a salute to the Spanish flag
and guarantees against further lapse of neutrality. Chile
considered this repugnant to her national honor and refused
to secede."13

As Evans' work pertained only to the Chilean rather than
to both the situations, obviously it is possible to examine
his conclusions only as they pertain to the Spanish-Chilean
conflict. Unfortunately, the value of his work as a reference
is diminished by slantings and inaccuracies, some examples
of which follow Evans introduced Méndez Nugez to the reader
with this statement, "He [Pareja] was succeeded by the fiery
MEndez Nfihez, who moved at once to bombard Valparaiso . . . ."14
‘While this is a small point, on the basis of all contemporary.
reporng Evans' presentation of Mendez N63EZ is most unfair to

the Spaniard. Bias is established in the use of only theiadjec-

tive "fiery." Further, from a chronological point of view this

 

13Sherman, Diplomatic and Commercial Relations, p. 102.

14Evans, Chile and its Relations, p. 89.

~199-

statement is inaccurate, unless between two and three months
is considered "at once." In discussing Vicuga's mission to
the United States, Evans said that "an added duty fell to him
after his arrival, that of buying warships."15 This is an
error according to Vicufia's own book which Evans has listed
in his bibliography. In reference to Thomas Nelson, Evans
‘wrote,"His attitude seems to have met*with the full approval
of Washington, if it were indeed understood."16 The diplo-
matic correspondence from which Evans cites indicates that
Seward understood Nelson's attitude only too clearly.

Had there not been similarities as well as dissimilarities,
it is doubtful that there would have been such a variety of
opinion on the two situations. What parallels did exist
between these two instances of interference by European powers?
The basic similarity is that two former Spanish colonies, now'i
independent, were subjected to Spanish aggression. In both
instances the aggression was precipitated by a question of
honor. Spain, in both cases shortly after the inception of
the conflict, demonstrated a willingness to negotiate. As
Spanish plans became known to the public at large,it was re-

ported that Spain was desirous of regaining her old colonies.

 

15Evans, Chile and its Relations, p. 91.

16Ib1d., p. 92.

-200-
In both situations Spanish policy and the denouement were
determined by the Spanish commanding officer.

Nonetheless, the similarities were superficial, whereas
the dissimilarities were basic. Spanish action was unilateral
in Chile, while in Mexico, Spain was but one member of a tri-
partite convention. In Mexico, Spain landed troOps and was
in a militarily feasible position to reinforce and supply
them. In Chile,Spain was in a logistically untenable posi-
tion to carry out even limited naval warfare. There was no
attempt made to land troops in Chile. In Mexico there was
no declaration of war, while in the other case it'was Chile
who was the first to declare war against Spain. There were
vast differences in the internal situations of the two coun-
tries which, at least in part, account for the differences
in tone that were taken by the leaders of Chile and Mexico.
The former enjoyed a stable economic and political situation,
while Mexico had been in a state of anarchy and internal strife
for most of the previous twenty-five years. Mexico's need
for peace might well account for the flexible and conciliatory
tone of Juarez and his reference to the Spanish as "our old
friends" in a speech made while the Spaniards were in occu-
pation of the port of Vera Cruz. This is certainly in contrast
to the rigid position taken by Perez in his replies to Pareja

and Nelson.

7201-

The crucial difference affecting the outcome, from the
Spanish point of view, of Spain's adventures in these two'
countries can be found in the personalities, outlooks, preju-
dices and the backgrounds of the Spanish commanders in each
case. General Prim spoke of and treated with respect Presi-
dent Juarez and the republican form of government, was desir-
ous of reaching an understanding that would be mutually bene-
ficial, and did so at the earliest opportunity. Pareja, on
the other hand, entertained almost a fixation about punishing
Chile and seemingly did everything that he possibly could to
aggravate the situation and to offend the Chilean people.
‘MUch to her credit, Spain negotiated her differences with
Mexico, signed a treaty, and withdrew her troops. The "reso-
lution" of the Chilean situation caused the name of Spain to
be looked upon with disrespect throughout the western hemisphere
because of the_useless destruction of property at Valparaiso.
This latter was a vital factor in bringing to a halt Spanish
pretensions to play again the role of a major power.

Before making a decision as to the applicability of the
Monroe Doctrine, the limitations and interpretations of the
Doctrine itself must first be established. HowHwas the Doctrine
viewed in the 1860's? Quite naturally there is no one answer
to this. The answers are as varied as the viewers. Far more

important, the decade as a whole must not be considered, but

-202-
rather sentiment toward the Monroe Doctrine must be evaluated
on a yearly basis. There is a definite pattern of change in
the amount of support for the Doctrine as a concept as it
evolved from 1861 to 1864, in particular. By 1864, support of
the Menroe Doctrine had become bi-partisan as far as party .
platforms were concerned, and this oupport became even more
vociferous during 1865 and 1866.

The New York Times, in an editorial in April of 1861,
entitled, "The South and its Foreign Relations," quoted the
following excerpt from The Charleston'Mercury, "The Mbnroe‘
Doctrine-~the doctrine of Southern statesmen when ruling the
counsels of the United States goes with the dissolution of the
Union of the United States.< Cuba is no longer of any use to
the Southern States as a counterpoise to the growing and inso-
lent ascendancy of the North. . . .the*wider Spain can extend
the institutions of Cuba over adjacent islands, the more worthy
she becomes to be our ally."17 From being a doctrine of
"Southern gentlemen," by 1863,the Southern view as expressed
by The Richmond Encnsirer wm, "he mapoleonj is setting at naught
the 'Monroe doctrine,’ a tradition which the Northern mind

18
cannot part with, no more than with 'the Union as it‘was'. . . .

 

17New York Times, April 10, 1861, p. 4, as quoted from
The Charleston Mercury.

18New'York Herald, February 15, 1863, p. 2, as quoted
from The RichmondvEnquire;,of February 6, 1863.

-203-
After the lapse of another two years an influential portion

of Southern opinion was advocating that a combined North-South
army enforce the Mbnroe Doctrine by marching against the French
in Mexico.

The paucity of articles or editorials in which there was
specific mention of the Mbnroe Doctrine in the base newspapers
in1861 is in itself substantive and lends support to the
statement made at the opening of this section. The editorial
position of the Detroit Freejggggg is illustrative of the
traditional Democratic attitude. "From the days of Mr. Monroe
it has been the settled policy of the United States to resist
all interference by EurOpean nations with America. . ....Our
government has declared that any attempt to colonize, or sub-
jugate, or control the destinies, etc., is cause for war."19
The Free Press took this stand upon receipt of the word of the
tri-partite alliance, although there was no great love for
Mexico as was shown in another editorial the same week. In

the second editorial the editor said that we, the United States,

did not deny to other nations the right to make war for proper

causes, but the United States would oppose any planned, permanent

domination of Mexico. The editor said that the Powers had

substantial ground for complaint against Mexico. Further, he

 

19petroit Free Press, October 11, 1861, p. 2.

~204-

opposed the loan that had been proposed by Corwin because he
felt that "the Mexicans would embezzle 1t, or it would alienate
the European Powers."20 Northern Democratic point of view
remained loyal to the Monroe Doctrine; thus, in 1865, in an
editorial favoring the emigration scheme of General Ortega,
the editor expressed the hope that France and all other coun-
tries would soon know that, "The Monroe Doctrine is practically
a lawthich must govern the world."21

In 1865, there occurred the unusual phenomenon of James
G. Bennett and Horace Greeley taking the same editorial position
on a question. In January. Greeley wrote, "The Monroe Doctrine
still lives. It will in due time be vindicated alike from
domestic perversion and foreign Opposition, and‘will long out-
last the Empire whether of Napoleon or Maximilian."22 Bennett,
in an editorial addressed to Louis Napoleon said, "The Mbnroe
Doctrine is fully accepted by the Americans, and nothing can
eradicate from their minds the idea that a foreign monarchy

23
,on this continent is an offense to the united States."

 

20«Detroit Free Preps, October 15, 1861, p. 1.

211616., May 12, 1865, p. 2.

22New York Tribune, January 5, 1865, p. 4.

q
2"New'York Herald, July 7, 1865, p. 4.

-205-

Early in 1864,in an article headed, "The Mexican Question," in
the Detroit Free Press, it was stated, "There exists everywhere
in the country not merely a traditional, but a real and honest
determination to adhere to the principles of the Monroe doc-
trine. The recent and unanimous expression of the House of
Representatives that it does not hold with the sentiment of
the people of the United States to acknowledge a monarchicsl
government erected on the ruins of any republican government
in America, under the auspices of any European power, no doubt
embodies the convictions of the people in regard to Napoleon's
occupation of Mexico. . . .It is difficult to look at his
Mexican maneuvers in any other light than that they are indi-
n¢1y aimed to destroy the integrity of our government."24

One of the major developments in the United States' at-
titude toward the Monroe Doctrine was widely published during
1865. The plan was summarized on the editorial page of the
New York Herald. The article discussed the "manifest destiny
of the Monroe doctrine," and emressed the hope that the Doctrine
‘would become the basis for the policy of a united North and

South. 25 Thus in a period of four years the Monroe Doctrine

 

24W. April 8. 1864. p- 2-
25New'York Herald, February 1, 1865, p. 4.

-206-

had gone from a dirty word attributed to slave-owning Demecrats
who wanted more slave territory (by the Northerners) , or (by
the Southerners) to expansionist Yankee traders who wanted

new markets, to the respectable means by which many peeriots of both
North and South hoped to reunify their country. It could be
hypothesized that for these 'people the Monroe Doctrine became
a symbol that replaced sbolitionism and states' rights as a
rallying point for, in Lasswell's terms, an excess of political
energy. Further, the Monroe Doctrine served as a means of
directing the hostilities of the commity outward, rather than
inward, to problems such as the shortage of adequate housing
and the increasing unrest of labor.

The Monroe Doctrine mating, held at the Cooper Union
Institute on January 6, 1866, sponsored by Chile's special
agent Vicu'n’a Mackenna, illustrates the extent to which support
for the Monroe Doctrine had permeated the influential public.
Interestingly enough, of the four base papers, the affair was
best covered by the one which least supported the idea behind
the meeting, the Washington Evening__S_t_:g_g. About the meeting
itself the §_t_g_g said, "On Saturday night last there was a meet-
ing at the Cooper Institute, New York, at which speeches were
spouted and letters read, all aimed at the American Eagle and
intended to incite that unhappy bird to whet its beak and
spread its pinions, and soar and soar, and keep asoaring ready

for a pounce in behalf of the Monroe doctrine, so called,

-207-

whenever and wherever that somewhat obscure piece of faith
should seem to be pooh-poohed by any European power."26

In spite of its negative editorial comment, the m
story revealed the positive attitude that was becoming increas-
ingly widespread. "Mr. William C. Bryant, who presided, said
we had come to 'discourage the interference of European princes
in the affairs of a sister American republic.’ Congressman
Van Horn writes, 'If a monarchy be established in Mexico, we
shall be untrue to our duty, and will receive the execration
of the lovers of freedom throughout the world.’ (The editor
inserted this comment: "Mr. Van Horn is more Monroish than
Monroe himself, for the latter tolerated 'monarchy' in Mexico,
and Iturbide came to the throne just about the time that the
Monroe doctrine was taking shape.") Mr. Montgomery Blair
wanted 'an outspoken expression,’ because European influence
had culminated in the late attack upon Chile. He was sure
that the Mexican expedition was odious to the French people,
who loved their country and the first Napoleon, who also loved
us. He thought we should remonstrate, and even 'resort to
force to check the Emperor in his mad career. ' Senator Nesmith
declared that Louis Napoleon had 'stolen into Mexico.' He

thought that our government should vindicate the Monroe doctrine

 

zmasltirwtonitvcnin13tar Januar 9 1866, . 2.
.1 9 9

-208-
even by the cannon's mouth. ‘Mr. S. J. Randall of Pennsylvania,

'wrote that he was 'prepared to use all constitutional means

to carry it (the Monroe Doctrine) into practical force and
effect and assume any responsibility which may arise therefrom.’
iMr. Kasson, of Iowa, thought that we had best give Europe a
little time to think the matter over, meanwhile making our
preparations complete. 'Then, if justice, honor, and respect
for American principles do not retract the interference already
initiated by Europe, let the blows fall, in the name of God
and Liberty, until the interfering flags shall have been swept
from the two oceans that embrace our continent.'--Speaker
Colfax wrote that he had 'no hesitation in expressing his warms
est sympathies with the struggling and uneonquered Liberals of
Mexico, and his faith that both the President and the Congress
'will so act and speak, that the whole world will understand

and appreciate the deep interest we feel in the permanency,

the tranuilization and the consequent prosperity of our -
neighboring republic.' . ..qu. Theodore Tomlinson said that
'we ought to cry aloud to all the world 'we do not interfere
with you, and it is necessary for our preservation that we

allow'no monarchies upon the continent of America.'"27

 

27Washington Evening Star, January 9, 1866, p. 2.

-209~

The resolutions and many of the speeches at the Cooper
Union demonstrated some of the fallacious "reasoning" that
even today centers around the Monroe Doctrine. Statements
such as "we allow'no monarchies" are quite irrevelant in that
there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine that even implies that
the Latin American nations cannot have monarchies or any other
form of government that £231 desire. This is precisely the
point; the governments must be what the people themselves
desire, not governments that are imposed from outside.

The editorial opinion of the §£gg, although opposed to
the chauvinistic character of the meeting and unrealistic
employment of the symbol of the Monroe Doctrine, nevertheless
expressed disapproval of Maximilian's position in Mexico.

The editor explained his own reason for his position in these
words, "The country fiJnited States] just now needs recuperation
after one of the most exhausting wars in the world, and the
people have not the slighest idea of undertaking just yet

the expensive experiment of policing the entire American
continent. They prefer to rest awhile before tackling on

‘with the 'next war,' contenting themselves meantime with
advising Maximilian as a prudential measure to 'get out of

that grass, and indulging a quiet belief that the more we

don't go to war just yet, the more we replenish our treasury

-210-
and granaries after a cool and undemonstrative sort of way--
the more Maximilian will be open to the conviction that on
the whole the climate of Mexico don't [sic] agree with his
constitution."28

What did the man who sponsored the meeting have to
say about the Monroe Doctrine? At the meeting itself Vicu'n'a
said, ". . .‘we also, gentlemen, have a Monroe doctrine of
our own. But it is not such a Monroe doctrine as you have
been proud of for forty years; to be sustained beneath the
illuminated vault of this brilliant hall; to be talked of
by great orators, or by the voice of the daily press, but
a practical doctrine, real, to be supported by acts, by
treaties, by alliances, and which, unlike you, we have al-
‘ways defended with our blood and our swords.

"And Chile, . . . I am proud to say is the republic of
the south which has put itself at the head of this grand and
generous movement of brotherhood in glory and sacrifice. .

In the opinion of the people of South America, the Mbnroe
doctrine does not mean conquest without right, invasion with-
out justice; does not mean aught but respect for nationalities
which God has created, or their institutions, . . . .

"It [Monroe Doctrine] is not a question of frontiers

 

28Washington Evening,Star, January 9, 1866, p. 2.

-211-.

and territories, by which this or that State may extend it-
self at the expense of another. It is, on the contrary, the
foundation of international right in America."29 He closed
his speech with the statement that he trusted that President
Johnson would sustain the Doctrine and that the monarchicsl
governments of Europe would not be permitted to interfere
‘with the republican institutions in the new'world.

In the account of his mission to the United States,
published in 1867, the year after his return to Chile, there
was a chapter devoted to the Mbnroe Doctrine. From this it
is evident that his opinion of the Monroe Doctrine had changed
very little and not for the better. He asked, "What is the
Monroe Doctrine?" Then he answered as to what it was not.
It was not an historic tradition, said Vicuge, because it
had not been applied in Mexico under Polk, nor in several
other instances which he mentioned. He went on to say that
it was not a real system, a defined proposition, in short,
"a doctrine" composed of a body of beliefs and aspirations
because it had never been defined in a precise manner; it
was simply left to each to understand it in his own way

according to the needs of the moment. He stated further

 

29Serial 1261, pp. 663-65. Vicufi Mackenna's speech to the
COOper Institute here appears in full. It is interesting to
note that it is not included in his book. His mission was to

gain good will for Chile, and his speech was not of that nature.

-212-

that it was not a logical derivation stemming from any geo-
graphical factor or from a national tradition of the American-
pe0ple. In don Benjamin's own words, "North America is the
cruel stepmother of South America, never her friend, much
less her protector." He asked whether the Doctrine were a
truth, and then answered that it was not. The Doctrine,
said Vicunh Mackenna, had never been seen to be implemented
other than on paper or in court.30

After this overview of a variety of Opinions toward
the content and pertinency of the application of the Monroe
Doctrine in the situations under discussion, it would be
‘well to return to President Mbnroe's address in order to
evaluate precisely what it encompassed. The Doctrine can
be said to include a logical sequence composed of a staged
position, necessary conditions, and a statement of modifying

circumstances that could affect the total sequence.

 

Considered in this manner, then, "It is only when our
rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent in-
juries or make preparations for our defense," is actually
the keystone of the Doctrine. This is the stated position.

The necessary conditions, as far as the Doctrine is

 

concerned, are the following: 1) "We should consider any

 

30Vicufia Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, pp. 409-411,

-213-

attempt on their part [European poweri] to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety," 2) "But with the governments who
have declared their independence and maintained it, and
whose independence we have, on great consideration and on
just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter- A
position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling
in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States;" 3) "It is impossible
that the allied powers should extend their political system
to any portion of either continent without endangering our
peace and happiness; . . . it is equally impossible, there-
fore, that we should behold such interposition in any form
'with indifference."

The following is a statement of modifying circumstances:
"In the war between those new governments and Spain we de-
clared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and
to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, ro-
giggg,ng.ghgggg shall occur which, in the judgement of the
competent authorities of this government, shall make a corre-
sponding change on the part of the United States indispensable

to their security."31

 

31The underscoring is the writer's emphasis.

-214-

This last point might be considered both as a modifying
circumstance in the application of the Doctrine, and as a
part of the original position. "It is still the true policy
of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in
the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."32

As have been mentioned and/or discussed throughout
the body of this work, innumerable reasons for the United
States reaction to the Spanish-Chilean War and the French
intervention in Mexico have been predicated. Depending on
the person being cited, the reason or reasons that have
been given are international politics, the Civil war, vested
commercial interests, contiguity of Mexico, North American
indifference to the Latin countries, United States friend-
ship with EurOpean powers, and public opinion. ‘While it is
undoubtedly true that some of these factors played a role
in influencing the position taken by the United States,
others were peripheral, only casually related to the issues
and their resolutions.

Rather, the basis for the United States position is to
be found in the Doctrine itself and in the situations as they
were viewed by the official United States decision-makers of

the era. The basic tenet of the Doctrine is the peace, safety,

 

32Richardson, Messages and Papers, Vol. II, p. 218,
from the inaugural address of President Mbnroe.

-215-
and well-being of the United States. The intervention in
Mexico clearly fulfilled the conditions that were specified
within the Doctrine as constituting a danger to this peace.
and well-being. It is equally clear that the Chilean situ-
ation did not fulfill these conditions; there was no threat,
not even an implied one, to the United States nor was there
any attempt to subvert the independent government that had
been established by the Chilean people. Vleui‘a'a Mackenna
simply did not appreciate the premise upon which the Monroe
Doctrine was founded. The Chilean imbroglio was left to
the nations concerned for resolution; on the other hand,
however, almost from the beginning Mexico enjoyed the en-
couragement and later what undercover aid the Union govern-
ment was able to offer her. Finally, once United States'
resources were freed from the exigencies of the Civil war,
there was no longer any doubt as to her ability and deter-
mination to lend active assistance to Mexico.

One can not heap all of the blame for the misunder-
standing of the Doctrine upon Vicuhh. There were many others,
and still are even today, who are equally unaware of the true
import of this Doctrine. It is hOped, therefore, that this
comparative study of the two cases'will aid in attaining a

more precise perception of this fundamental principle. Since

-216-
the Monroe Doctrine still continues to play such an integral
and prominent role in United States foreign policy at the
present time, a fuller awareness of how it evolved, how it
was regarded by the people of the nineteenth century as re-
flected in the press of the period, and how'it was interpreted
by the policy-makers as observed from the contemporary diplo-
matic correspondence should contribute to a better under-

standing of the Doctrine.

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

AKNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

Superintendent of Documents, Checklist of United States
Documents 1789-1909. 1 Vol., 3rd ed. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1911.

This index to the government serial sets has been a
helpful aid for locating most of the Mexican diplomatic
correspondence used in the preparation of this paper.

The information and reports employed in the preparation
of thetrade tables were also found through this guide.

House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1136.
The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 100, 37th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1862..

House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1162.
The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 54, 37th Cong.,
3rd Sess., 1863.

House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial Nos.
1261 and 1262. Mexican Affairs. Doc. 73, Pts. 1 and 2,
39th Cong., lst Sess., 1865-63.

House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1294.
The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 76, 39th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1867.

Senate Executive Document, Serial Ho. 1209. Papers
Relating to Mexican Affairs. Doc. 11, 38th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1865.

The shave contain the bulk of the Mexican diplomatic
material utilized in the preparation of this work. These
documents have the correspondence of Secretary of State
Seward with United States Minister Corwin in Mexico and
'with Mexican Minister Romero in washington. Also included
are many of the Mexican government's official communica-
tions and decrees which were enclosed in the Romero notes.
There is much of the correspondence with the United States

-217-

-213-

ministers in Spain, Britain, and France. Their dispatches
bear reports of interviews*with various governmental offi-
cials, records of debates from the official papers, and
articles and editorials from other newspapers and jour-
nals relative to the French intervention in Mexico.

U.S. Senate Executive Document, Serial No. 1238. Message of
the President . . . in Regard to the Seizure and Deten-
tion at New York of the Steamship Meteor. Doc. 39, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., I866. -

Apart from the diplomatic correspondence and commer-
cial information, this is the only governmental item
dealing with Chilean affairs which this writer has located
for the six year period under consideration. It contains
the correspondence of Secretary Seward*with Spanish Minis-
ter Tassara and with the united States attorney general
concerning the seizure of the Meteor and its legality.
From these documents one sees the seizure from a different
aspect than that described by Vicuna Mackenna.

. Message of the President . . . res ectinngeneral
Order No. 17, issued by_the commander o the department
of California, prohibiting the exportation of arms or
munitions of war over the frontier. Doc. 55_‘

This contains correSpondence concerning the legal
implications of the above. In the Opinion of Attorney
General Speed such action, if engaged in by private in-
dividuals, was lawful. The French consul in San Fran-
cisco protested vehemently over the exportation of arms
into Mexico from California.

. Message from the President . . . in regard to the
departure of troops from Austria for Mexico. Doc. 54.

Some additional correspondence of Seward with United
States Minister Motley in Vienna which is not found else-
where is included here. The period of December, 1865, to
June of 1866, is covered in this document.

U.S. Department of' the Interior, Census Office, Serial No. 2136.
The History and Present Condition of the Newspaper and
Periodical Press of the United States, by S. N. D. North.
Mia. Doc. 42, Pt. 8, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1884.

This document has provided much useful information
and background material as to the growth and influence
of the press in the United States. Many statistical
tables and maps showing distribution and concentration

of the papers in this country are included.

4219-

U.S. House of Representatives. Letter of the Secretary of State
Transmitting a Repprt of the Commercial Relations of the

United States with Foreign Nations for the Year Ending
September 30I 1861. Ex. Doc. 45, Pts. 1 and 2, 37th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1862.

U.S. House of Representatives. Letter of the Secretary of State
Transmitting a Report of the Commercial Relations of the
United States with Foreign Nations for the Year Endipg
Sgptember 30, 1862. Ex. Doc. 63, Pts. 1 and 2, 37th Cong.,
3rd Sess., 1863.

Abstracts of the consular reports from Chile and
Mexico are contained in the above. In addition to the
commercial information they supplement that of the diplo-
matic as to the internal situations of the two countries.

U.S. House of Representatives, Serial No. 1140. Repprt of the
Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report from the
Rpgister of the Treasuryipn the Commerce and Navigation
of the United States. 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, p. 602.

U.S. Serial No. 1170. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
Washington, 1864, pp. 270-271.

U.S. Serial No. 1197. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
Washington, 1865, pp. 270-71.

U.S. House of Representatives, Serial No. 1231. Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation
of the United States. 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, p. 320.

U.S. Serial No. 1268. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
Transmitting a Report from the Rggister of the Treasury
on the Ceznerce and Navi ation of the United States.
Washington, 1866, pp.W658-5 .

U.S. Serial No. 1301. Report of the Secretarypof the Treasugy
Transmitting a Report from thg:Director of Statistics on
the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Wash-
ington, 18677pp. 395:95.

-220-

U.S. Serial 1348. Annual Repprt of the Director of the Bureau

of Statistics on the Commerce and Navigation of the
united States. Washington, 1868, pp. 286-87.

The preceding documents*with pages indicated contain
trade figures of the U.S. for the years 1861 through 1866.
The information from these reports was used in the prepa-

"rstien of the trade tables for the two nations.

U.S. Department of State. Messages and Documents of the Presi-

dent of the United States Relating to Foreigp Affairs.
Washington, 1861-66.

This series, published annually, comprises the diplo-
matic correspondence of the united States. Very little
material not found elsewhere is to be gleaned regarding
Mexico in these volumes. However, this has been the
principle source for diplomatic information on Chile
and, where pertinent, on Spain, France, and Britain.

 

U.S. Congpessional Globe:
37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 3, Washington, 1862.

38th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, Washington, 1864.

39th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1 and 4, Washington, 1866.
39th Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 1, Washington, 1866.

39th Cong., 2nd Sess.,Appendix,‘Washington, 1866.

These volumes are a record of the happenings in the
U.S. Congress for this period. They have been utilized
for data concerning Mexico and the proposed loan to that
country, and for background material on the U.S. itself
during the period.

BOOKS

Alvarez, Alejandro. Rasgos Generales de la Historia Diplo-
matica de Chile. Santiago de Chile: lmprenta "Barcelona,"
1911. -

This author presents a general view of.a century of

Chilean diplomatic history with some interesting obser-
vations concerning European public opinion toward his
country. One can almost detect a feeling of inferiority
in his writings expressed in behalf of all Latin America-
This might well be due to European attitudes toward these
countries.

Bancroft, Hubert H. History of Mexico, 1861-1867. Vol. VI.
San Francisco: History Co. Publishers, 1888.
This source has for long been regarded as one of the
chief authorities on Mexican history. For this reason
it has been consulted, primarily as a reference book.

Bazaine, Francois. Documentos Inéditos o Muy Raros Para 1a
Historia de México; La Intervencién Francesa en México
Segén e1 Archivo del Rariscal Bazaine. ngico: Carranza
e Hijos, 1909.

This source, consisting essentially of the correspond
ence of Bazaine with his home government in Paris, adds
another dimension to an understanding of the French posi-
tion in Mexico.

Bemis, Samuel F., and Griffin, Grace G. Guide to the Diploma-
tic History of the United States, 1775-19gg. ‘Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1935.

Although printed in 1935, this guide to the available
literature, primary and secondary, has been useful in
locating a number of items concerning United States rela-
tions with these Latin American countries.

(ed.) The American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy. Vol. 7. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1923.

This volume deals with the policies of Secretary of
State Seward. No mention is made of his Chilean policy,
but the work is a useful. one in placing United States
policy toward Latin America in prOper'perSpcetive with
the domestic issues of that time.

-221-

-222-

Becker, Jerénimo. Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores de

Espana durante el Siglo XIX. Vol. 11, 1839-68. Madrid:
Establecimiento Tipogréfico,1924.

This seems to be a carefully done work which traces
Spanish foreign relations throughOut the nineteenth cen-
tury and utilizes material from the Spanish archives.
Becker presents a thorough account, not too biased, of
the Spanish-Chilean difficulties

Bierck, Harold A. (ed.) and Lecuna, Vicente (comp.) Selected

Writings of Bolivar. Vol. I. New York: Colonial Press,
1951. ’

The accuracy of Bolivar's perceptions of and predic-
tions for Latin America will be noted from the quota-
tions taken from his writings of fifty years prior to
this period.

Bombardment de Valparaiso (Documents Oficials) Suivi du Combat

du Callao. Paris: Imprimerie Vallée, 1866.

This source, as indicated by its title, contains
essentially documents such as pleas to the Spanish
commander addressed by the various foreign consular
and diplomatic bodies to stay the bombardment, procla-
mations of President Pérez and Foreign Minister Cova-
rrubias, and official foreign opinion following the
bombardment.

The Bombardment of Valparaiso,_Rear-Admiral Denman,er. Layard

Chile

(Late Her Majesty's Under-Secretary of State for Foreigg
Affairs), And the British Comrunity_of Valparaiso.
Liverpool: n. pub., 1866.

This source is useful in an understanding of the British
view of the bombardment. It cantains the evidence gathered
by the British merchants in Valparaiso to show the duplicity
of Denman's policy. This evidence was presented in a speech
by MR. Layard in the House of Commons.

and Spain--Notes.lnterchanged Between Admiral Pareja and
the Minister of Foreign Relations. n.p.: n. pub., n.d.
This book contains cepies of the correspondence ex-
changed between Pareja and Covarrubias_prior to the out-
break of hostilities. Also included is the correspond-» »
ence of the diplomatic corps in Chile with Admiral Pareja.

-223-

Chile and Spain. The Whole Qgestion Officially Stated. New
York: .n. pub., 1865.

Part I of this pamphlet contains the correspondence
of Tavira‘with Covarrubias and covers the early attempt,
in May of 1865, at peaceful settlement. Part II is con-
cerned'with the diplomatic negotiations in September to
resolve the differences.

 

Chile. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Counter Manifest
of the Minister of Foreigp Relations of Chile on the
.Present War Between the Republic and Spain. Washington:
McGill & Withebrow, 1800.

In this document Covarrubias attempts to justify the

stand which he assumed toward Spain during this period.
It contains a brief outline of Chilean policy since the
time of the seizure of the Chinchas. The purpose of this
document might well have been to gain stronger support of
public opinion for his policy. ,

Clarke, Henry Butler. Modern Spain, 1815-1898. Cambridge:
University Press, 1905.
This book, written by an author with a personal knowl-
edge of Spain, gives a general over-all picture of con-
ditions in that country during the ninteenth century.

Courcelle-Seneuil, Jean Gustav. Guerre de l'Espagne au Chili.
Paris: n. pub., 1866.

This is a treatise on the bombardment of Valparaiso
and the rights of neutrals under international law. The
author is a Frenchman, resident in Chile at the time of
the bombardment, and his work clearly favors the Chilean
side. Some selected documents substantiating his View
are included.

Davis, William C. The Last Conquistadores. Athens: univer-

sity of Georgia Press, 1950.
This narration of Spanish interference in South America

during 1363 to 1866 is, seemingly, a carefully done work.
As indicated by the title, the author displays a definite
prejudice against Spain and implicitly places the full
blame for the situation upon that nation. The findings
of this writer do not bear out this conclusion of Davis.

Dodd, Walter F. Modern Constitutions. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1909.
The translation of the Chilean constitution of 1833

included in this work was the one used for a comparison
with the Mexican constitution of 1857.

~224-

Edwards, Agustin. Cuatro PreSidentes de Chile. Vol. I.
Valparaiso: lmprenta "Universe," 1932.
Volume I of tl.is work is an account of happenings
in Chile during the administration of President retez.
It is a'well written book, but presents little new'ma-
terial or interpretations on the conflict with Spain.

Encina, Francisco A.. Historia de Chile. Vol. 14. Santiago:
Editorial Nascimiento, 1950.

Encina is considered by many as the foremost contempo-
rary Chilean historian. In this volume much useful infor-
mation and background material on the leading personalities
such as Covarrubias and Tocornal is given. However, as is
true of most of the other Chilean historians, Encina also
assumes a nationalistic approach justifying Chilean policy
in the dealings with Spain.

Estrada, Genaro. Don Juan Prim su Labor Di lomatico en
México. Vol. XXV. Archi:o Histgrico Diplomatico Mexicano.
Mixico: n. pub., 1928.

It is interesting that this work containing the dip-
lomatic correspondence of General Prim with his govern-
ment, the governor-general of Cuba, the Mexican govern-
ment, and with Napoleon was published in Mexico. The
communications, often humorously worded, leave no doubt
as to the sincerity and good will of Prim toward Mexico.

Evans, Henry Clay. Chile and its Relations with the United
States. Durham: University of North Carolina Press,
1927.

This book, a general study of United States-Chilean

relations, has already been evaluated in the body of

this paper. The author shows a strong prepossession.

for Chile against Spain and even against the United
States. This latter most probably is due to the influence

of Vicuna Mackenna' a book in which the Chilean agent com-
plained bitterly of his treatment in the United States
and the predilection of Secretary Seward for Spain.

Galdames, Luis. A History of Chile. Translated and edited
by Isaac Cox. Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press, 1941.

This one volume work is perhaps the best one available
on Chilean history. The approach to the subject is an
honest one with no attempt made to cover governmental
blunders or to glorify certain personages such as Vicuna
Mackenna. As distinct from most of the other Chilean and

and Spanish historians, this work is carefully documented.

-225-

Hale, ‘William H. Horace Greeley, Voice of the Peogle. New
York: Collier Books, 1961.

Since the New York Tribune, of which Greeley was edi-
tor, has been utilized to a great extent in_the prepara-
tion of this paper, it was deemed essential to have as
thorough an acquaintance as possible with this interest-
ing and influential man. Greeley's early background of
poverty and hard work was an important factor in the de-
velopmt of his strong belief in the equality and the dig-
nity of man. He had definite Opinions on almost every
subject, including Latin America, and these Opinions were
followed avidly by the peOple of the time in his editorials.

Lanman, Charles. Biographical Annals of the Civil Government
of the United States, From Original and Official Sources.
New'York: J.M; Merrison Publisher, 1887.
' This work was used primarily for obtaining background
information on the diplomats and other prominent and in-
fluential men of the United States of the era of the 1860's.

Leavitt, Joshua A. The Monroe Doctrine. New'York: Sinclair
Tousey, 1869.

This is a contemporaneous interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine by a Protestant minister of the period. He ex-
pressed a strong conviction that the Doctrine should be
upheld in Mexico. As characteristic of many during these
years, and even later in the nineteenth century, Leavitt
attributed many of the difficulties in Latin America to
the influence of "popery." The United States did not
experience like difficulties, according to him,, because
of its Anglo-Saxon inheritance.

Llorca, Carmen. Isabel II,y Su Tiempo. Valencia: Editorial
Marfil, n.d.

This source elaborates upon the situation of turmoil
and confusion extent in Spain during the 1860's. The
author has attempted, with some success, to counteract
the commonly held opinion that Isabel II was completely
incompetent and immoral and that the Queen must be held
responsible for the situation in Spain. Llorca holds,
rather, that Isabel was simply a product of the time.

Lowell, Lawrence A. ‘gpblic Opinion and Popular Government.
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913.

Lawrence Lowell, a former president of Harvard Uni-
versity, was aware early in this century of the impor-
tance of public opinion and its relation to governmental

~226-

policy. The author attempts to explain what constitutes
public Opinion and to what extent it can be translated
into action.

Meore, Joseph W. The American Congress, A History of National
Legislation and Political Events, 1774-1895. New York:

. Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1895.‘

. Used essentially asva reference book, this work deals
more adequately than many later ones with the United
States Congresses during the period of the 1860's.
Internal problems as well as foreign policy are handled
in a clear fashion.

Novo y Colson, Pedro de. Historia de la Guerra de Espafie en
el Pacifico. Madrid: n. pub., 1882.

This is the prime secondary source upon which all
subsequent writers, Chilean, Spanish, and American, have
based their works. Novo, a former naval officer, wrote
with much style which might account for his success as
a playwright. The Spanish archives have been used to
some extent in the preparation of his book, but it would
seem.that further investigation in these archives might
prove fruitful as there are still many questions unanswered.

Perkins, Dexter. Foreign Policy and the American Spirit.
Edited by G.G. Van Deusen. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1957.

A series Of essays by the leading expert on the Mbnroe
Doctrine is contained in this book. It is useful more
for the manner in which Perkins treats with his material
than for the content itself. As distinct from his ear-
lier work, the author here takes into account more fully
the element of public Opinion, and to a limited extent he
has applied it to the Seward period.

. The Mbnroe Doctrine, 1826-1867. Baltimore: Johns
HOpkins University Press, 1933.

The intervention in Mexico is covered at some length
in this study, but there is scarcely more than passing
mention of the Chilean. In the Mexican section Perkins
does Speak of public opinion both in the body and in his
bibliography, but not in the same sense in which he has
employed the term in his more recent works nor as it has
been used within the scOpe of this paper. Further, as
has previously been said, certain statements made by
Perkins do not fully agree with findings of this writer.

-227-

Piatt, Donn. Memories of the Men Who Saved the Union. New
York: Belford, Clark and Co., 1887.
Many helpful observations and evaluations on Lincoln,
Seward, Stanton, and others are contained in this work
written by an author who knew'personally these men.

Poore, Ben Perley. The Political Register and Congressional
Directory: A Statistical Record of the Federal Officials,
ngislative,_Executive, and Judicial of the United States.
Boston: Houghton, Osgood and Co., 1878.

This is an excellent source for biographical material
on the men who served in Congress during this decade.
The scOpe of this directory is more restricted than is
that of Lanman's book, but the coverage is a fuller one.

Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald B. (compilers) National
Partnglatforms. Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1956. ‘

As the title indicates, this book contains the national
party platforms for the years under consideration along
with some pertinent comments on the political situation.
The book is a most helpful one and extremely will put
together; the major criticism of it would be the lack
of any documentation.

Richardson, James D. (compiler) Compilation of Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1896-99. ‘-

3 The second volume of this ten volume work includes
the messages of President Menroe of 1823 and 1824 in
which United States policy toward Latin America was
enunciated. It has been helpful to refer back to these
speeches in order to determine more precisely the inten-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. .

Roeder, Ralph. Juarez and His Mexico. New York: ‘Viking Press,
1947.
With emphasis primarily upon the personalities of
Juarez and his generals, this is a carefully done work.
Hewever, some documentation would have made it more
valuable.

Rosenau, James N. Public Opinion and Foreign Poli_y. New
York: Random House, 1961.

This source, one of the most recent and best in its
field, deals with the relationship between public opinion

-228-

and foreign policy. Rosenau speculates as to how foreign
policy ideas circulate in the United States and the con-
tribution that national leaders make to this process. He

is also quite specific in his definitions, differentiating,
for example, as to opinion makers and transmitters, and
between opinion and influence.

Sherman,‘William R. The Diplomatic and Commercial Relation;
of the United States and Chile. Boston: Corham.Press,
1926.

As discussed in the body of the paper this source has
been regarded by many as an authoritative one on this
period. However, in addition tobeing poor1y*written,
the pro-Chilean bias and the numerous inaccuracies prevent
it from being a reliable work.

Vicuna.Mackenna, Benjamin. Diez Meses de‘Mision a los Estados
Unidos de NOrte América Como Ajente Confidencial de Chile.
Santiago: n. pub., 1867.

The author, a well known Chilean historian and diplo-
mat, has recorded his experiences in the United States
during 1865-66,while on a special mission to secure aid
for his country in the war against Spain. Vicuflh lost
no Opportunity to express his bitterness toward the
United States because of the but slight success of his
efforts. His need to explain this failure to the Chilean
public may in part account for this attitude. Also, there
was the fact that Vicuna Mackenna did not really compre-
hend the seriousness of the internal situation in the
United States at that time. Various subsequent writers,
even some Americans, have taken a similar stand to that
of Vicuna, no doubt because of the influence of his book.

. Historia de la Guerra de Chile con Espana. Santiago:
1883.

lmprenta "Victoria,

Aside from a more pro-Chilean posture, this history
differs little from Novo' a work from which Vicuna has
cited liberally.

Vattel, M. Emerich de. The Law'of Nations. Edited by Joseph
Chitty. Philadelphia: T. and J;W. Johnson Co., 1866.
Since, in both of the conflicts under consideration,
various principles of international law were cited, the
writer has found this source applicable for clarifica-
tion of certain points as have been indicated.

-229-

Wright, Quincy. (ed.) Public Opinion and World Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.

This is another source showing the importance of
public Opinion. When this series of lectures first
appeared in print, the book was not favorably reviewed.
This might well be attributed to the fact that at this
period of development in the United States there was
relatively little interest in foreign affairs.

ARTICLES AND NEWSPAPERS

Johnson, John. "Pioneer Telegraph in Chile, 1852-1876,"
Stanford University Publications in History, Economics,
and Political Science, Vol. 6 (1943).

‘Thorosgh coverage of this important means of communi-

cations is presented in this book. The development of
the telegraph as a ramification of the strong feeling
of Chilean nationalism during this period has been helpful
in obtaining a better understanding of Chilean foreign
policy.

3. .x, Hunt. "The New York Herald," North American Review,
Vol. 102 (1866).

This article is an extremely perceptive one which
discusses the press of New York with particular emphasis
on the New York Herald and its editor, James G. Bennett.
Consideration is also given to the influence of the press
in the United States.

Scholes, Walter V. "Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime,"
University of Missouri Studies (1957).
Much material from the Mexican newspapers and archives
as well as memoirs have contributed to making this work
a very fine study for the period 1855 to 1872. It is
a well written work with a most helpful bibliography.

Detroit Free Press. 1861-1866.
New York Herald. 1861-1866.

New'York Tribune. 1861-1866.

'Washington Evening Star, 1861-1866.
All issues of these four papers for the six year period

under consideration have been consulted, and the manner in which
, the findings have been utilized is fully discussed in the body
of this work.

-230-

L'Euroge.

Ferrocarril.
New York Times .

The Times (London) .

These papers have also been discussed in the body
of this work. As there specified, they have been uti-
lized for extra coverage during various bulge periods.
This is especially so in the use of the New York Times.
L'Europe and the London Times were cited essentially as
confirmatory sources of EurOpean opinion in regard to
the several international problems.