

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
MONROE DOCTRINE IN TWO SELECTED INSTANCES

A Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

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
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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE IN TWO SELECTED INSTANCES

by Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

Body of Abstract

This study, as indicated by the title, is an examination into the application of the Monroe Doctrine in two selected cases during the 1860's. These two cases are the Spanish interference in Chile and the Spanish, French, and British intervention in Mexico.

Various secondary writers have categorized the two situations as similar, both cases being examples of European imperialism. An effort will be made to demonstrate that this was in fact not so.

Since Spain was the instigator of the conflict with both of these countries, Chile and Mexico, it was deemed necessary first to give some brief consideration to the internal political and economic conditions within Spain during this decade. Thus, the first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the background situation in Spain. The

following two chapters consist of detailed examinations into the origins and developments of the disputes of Spain with these two Latin American nations.

In these examinations, newspaper accounts have been utilized to a great extent along with the pertinent United States diplomatic correspondence. In his work treating with the Monroe Doctrine for this period Mr. Dexter Perkins, perhaps the leading contemporary authority on the subject, has also dealt with the two situations. Mr. Perkins has given much credit to the impact of public opinion upon the application of the Doctrine. With this the present writer is in full agreement. The point of disagreement is in Mr. Perkins' use of secondary sources as a measurement of public opinion. Newspapers, with the precautions herein noted, have been selected as a more precise indicator of this opinion. Hence, the newspapers have served the dual function of providing both qualitative and quantitative material. The methodology of the use of the papers is discussed fully in the fourth chapter along with a presentation of the findings in both graphic and tabular form. The differences between Perkins' conclusions and the findings for this paper, the results of the above-described methodology, are also discussed. The final chapter contains

an analysis of President Monroe's address of December, 1823, which embodied the principles now known as the Monroe Doctrine. This supports the contention that the basis of the Doctrine was one of self-interest. Therefore, was it in the interest of the United States to invoke the Doctrine in either or both of these situations? A comparison shows that although there were similarities between the two cases, the dissimilarities were far more basic. No vital United States concern was at stake in Chile, and the issue here was essentially one over a point of honor. The republican government was in no actual danger of overthrow by Spanish forces. In Mexico, however, the situation was one of invasion and usurpation of the established republican form of government. This was of prime concern to the United States, and with popular approval steps were taken to implement the Doctrine as soon as it was possible to do so.

Since the Monroe Doctrine continues to play such an integral and prominent role in United States foreign policy and because of the misconceptions still extant today in regard to the true import of the Doctrine, it is hoped that this study will contribute to a clearer understanding of this traditional keystone of American policy.

The Michigan State University

The Graduate School

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in Two Selected Instances

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by

Donald C. Henderson, Jr.

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Harold B. Fields
Professor of History
Walter R. Fee
Head of Department

931771
3-1-65

In
Dedication
To
My Wife
Dolly,
For Her Constant
Help,
Criticism,
and
Encouragement
in the
Preparation
of This Study

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INTRODUCTION

This study is an examination of the application of the Monroe Doctrine in two particular situations that occurred during the years 1861 to 1866. The situations are the Spanish-Chilean War and the French intervention in Mexico.

It might be well to state at this point that the prime interest of the writer is in Chilean history, and particularly the mid-nineteenth century during which time the Chilean Republic was able to organize and achieve the position of one of the leading nations of South America. Compared to her sister republics, Chile had experienced relatively little turmoil, external or internal, and had continued on the path of economic and political progress and stability. This was due to a number of factors which had been suggested many years before by Simón Bolívar. The most important of these factors were the isolation of the country and the character of the people; but the constitution of 1833 and the leadership of the nation from that time forward were also elements that contributed to Chile's achievements.

Following the conclusion of the wars for independence, Chile enjoyed a period of nearly fifty years free from serious conflict with other powers, aside from that with the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation in the 1830's. However, this situation was ended abruptly in 1865 with the outbreak of hostilities between Chile and Spain.

While the origins of the Spanish-Chilean War are to be found in the relations of Peru with Spain; still it was Chile that played the decisive role in the military as well as in the diplomatic field. This war of 1865-66, although not of world-wide interest, because of the consequences was of particular significance to both participants. Self-confident after her victories, Chile, when pushed to the extreme by her neighbors, Peru and Bolivia, went on to wage successfully the War of the Pacific. In a sense, the conflict with Spain was not only a precursor of the one with Peru and Bolivia, but one which was to carry with it more serious implications. For Spain, on the other hand, this was one of a series of blunders which eventually was to lead to the overthrow of Queen Isabel II. The uncoordinated manner with which Spain pursued her aggressions could be considered a reflection of the unstable and corrupt internal situation in that unhappy country. One further interesting aspect of this first period of conflict is to

be found in the attitude of the United States toward both parties and the interpretation given by Secretary of State Seward to the Monroe Doctrine. In this regard, there were two main factors to consider, (1) did Chile's difficulties with Spain fall within the scope of the enunciated principles of the Monroe Doctrine; and (2) was the United States in a position to implement the Doctrine? These factors will be considered at a later point.

In preliminary investigation, the writer has found that on this subject there exists a paucity of material in English, although various Chilean and Spanish historians have naturally given it fuller consideration. One other interesting, although not surprising, finding is that a more extensive coverage was given to the foreign interference which Mexico also experienced during this decade of the 1860's.

Unlike Chile, Mexico had enjoyed only sporadic internal peace since the gaining of her independence. Shortly after Mexico became independent, the reins of government were seized by a would-be emperor. This was symbolic of the difficulties that Mexico was to encounter in establishing an effective republican form of government. In addition, Mexico had been subjected to innumerable pressures by many of the major powers, including the United States. Mexican-United States conflict had culminated in the war of 1848. At the time of the tri-

partite intervention, Mexico's internal condition was aptly described as anarchical as a result of years of civil strife.

Both the Chilean and the Mexican situations took place at about the same time. According to many, the United States, on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, could and should have taken positive steps in both instances. Nevertheless, the United States seems to have reacted to and dealt with the cases differently. Thus a comparative study of the incidents in which the two countries were involved, with emphasis on United States' reaction, both official and unofficial, seemed to the writer to be a most worthwhile study.

This comparative study will include an inquiry into the origins of the conflicts mentioned, the development of them, the methods used to obtain settlements, and the role played therein by the Monroe Doctrine. It seems appropriate also to include a section on Spain in the 1860's, as Spain was the instigator of aggressive action toward both Chile and Mexico.

One recognized writer of Chilean history, William R. Sherman, in reference to the war of 1865-66 has stated that "Spanish intervention, similar to that of the French in Mexico, played a considerable part as the cause of the war."¹

¹William R. Sherman, The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the United States and Chile, 1820-1914 (Boston: Gorham Press, 1926), p. 101.

While it is undoubtedly true that imperialism was an important factor in both instances, the similarity between the two seems more open to debate, and an attempt will be made to point out some of these differences. Dexter Perkins, perhaps the leading authority on the Monroe Doctrine, has made a distinction between the two instances. He attributes the more vigorous stand taken by the United States toward the Mexican intervention to the pressures of public opinion. Public opinion, as the term is used in current research, embraces the ideas or attitudes of a people or a nation as a whole as expressed through such media of communication as the press, private letters and diaries, and in speech, both public and private.

In the final section, after having described and compared the two cases, and shown that essential differences did in fact exist between them, there will be an examination of the relationship between public opinion in the United States and the policy of the United States as it applied to the two Latin countries. Newspapers have been utilized as indicators of public opinion for several reasons which will be elucidated in the appropriate section of the study. The papers used have been selected on the basis of both geography and political orientation. The methods of selection will be discussed in more detail in the section that deals with this topic.

SPAIN

"Europe could do Spain a service by dissuading her from her rash obstinacy thus sparing her the costs she is incurring and the blood she is expending. And if she will fix her attention on her own precincts, she can build her prosperity and power upon more solid foundations than doubtful conquests, precarious commerce, and forceful exactions"¹

This might well have been written during the period of 1861-66. As Spain once again expended men and money in vain attempts to play the role of a world power, the discontent of the Spanish people was reflected in repeated demonstrations in many parts of the country.²

Proud of her history, traditions, and beloved queen, Spain was a nation whose growing spirit of liberalism, combined with a promising financial situation, seemed to assure her of a position among the first-rate powers. This belief was held not only by the Spanish but by many Europeans and even Americans.³

¹Harold A. Bierck, Jr. (ed.), Selected Writings of Bolívar, compiled by Vicente Lecuna (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), Vol. I, p. 107.

²New York Tribune, August 22, 1864, p. 55.

³Detroit Free Press, February 8, 1862, p. 3.

"Nowhere do politics run higher or excite more keenly the attention of all classes; nowhere is the desire for reform and progress more general. The all-prevailing intellectual activity is attested to by the number of political parties and clubs. The talent in the country is nearly all on the liberal side. This liberal talent is well represented in the press."⁴

It was believed by reliable sources that the economic situation of Spain during this period would have been a favorable one under proper guidance. The period following the Carlist Wars had been a prosperous one for Spain. However, due to the frequent changes of ministers, lack of a consistent internal policy, and the drain for military operations abroad the nation was not long in reaching a state of financial and political chaos.

Queen Isabel II had had little training or experience to prepare her for the crown; she had grown up during a turbulent era, and in 1836, when six years of age, she was proclaimed Queen of Spain, with her mother as regent. The many indiscretions in her personal life and her susceptibility

⁴Detroit Free Press, August 5, 1866, p. 4.

to the advice of her counselors, who, more often than not, were furthering their own interests at the expense of Spain's, resulted from this lack of training. The rapid turnover of her ministers is illustrative of the chaotic internal situation of the country. Yet in spite of all this, it seems that Isabel was generally beloved by her people, and warmly received when she traveled among them.⁵

The two powerful ministers that dominated the 1860's in Spain were General Leopoldo O'Donnell of the Union Liberal Party and General Ramón María Narváez of the Moderate Party. The policy of Narváez was essentially one of inactivity and subordination to Crown and Church. For this reason he was forced by the opposition a number of times to cede power to his rival O'Donnell. The latter was an astute politician; he had served as Minister of State from 1858 to 1863, a ministry outlasting any since the time of King Ferdinand. He was successful in attracting most of the political malcontents into his party. His success in so doing was reportedly due to the flexibility and eclecticism of his policy. His ability to stir an enthusiastic following was reflected even in the American press.⁶

⁵New York Tribune, August 2, 1861, p. 3.

⁶The article cited in fn. 3 is illustrative of this point.

Given an enthusiastic following, and control of the government, it is difficult to see why O'Donnell was unable to maintain order so as to prevent the sporadic uprisings that continued throughout this whole period. A typical incident occurred in the summer of 1861 in the city of Loja where there was an insurrection which resulted in the imprisonment of 339 persons.⁷ Loja was not an isolated case. In August of 1864, there was such fear of a political movement in Madrid that the troops were called out to maintain order, not only in the capital but in other principal cities throughout the country.⁸ On January 4, 1866, the Progresistas, with General Prim in charge, attempted an uprising against the government in Madrid. Two weeks later in Barcelona there was an uprising replete with cries of "Down with the Bourbons."⁹

One must also wonder why a man such as O'Donnell with his country's interests at heart, a man with the necessary power, whose desire was to improve the condition of the country, allowed the financial situation to deteriorate as it did. While it is true that much money was spent, a great

⁷New York Tribune, August 15, 1861, p. 8.

⁸Ibid., August 22, 1864, p. 5.

⁹New York Herald, January 26, 1866, p. 1.

deal of it was used for unproductive projects. Over-all planning was definitely lacking. This lack is exemplified by the importation of 10,000 Irish laborers to work on the railroads at a time when Spain herself was experiencing a good bit of labor unrest.¹⁰ Quite naturally the financial situation was self-aggravating, funds were not available for loan and foreign capital was withdrawn for lack of confidence.¹¹ This dire economic scene, along with the great degree of political unrest, by early 1866 had led to an unprecedented number of suicides and robberies throughout Spain.

In an attempt to distract the attention of his fellow countrymen from domestic problems, O'Donnell decided to embark upon a series of foreign adventures. During the early part of this period O'Donnell had widespread support for this course of action from Spaniards of all ranks and classes. As late as January, 1864, a vocal segment of Spanish opinion was urging that Spain demand the restoration of Gibraltar.¹² The various expeditions into Morocco, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Chile, rather than contributing to the

¹⁰New York Tribune, November 4, 1861, p. 7.

¹¹The Times (London), October 4, 1865, p. 5.

¹²New York Tribune, January 20, 1864, p. 6.

greater glory of Spain, merely caused a further drain on the treasury. By the end of 1864, "The clamor of the public urges the settlement of the Santo Domingo problem by Spain's preserving only the towns of Santo Domingo, Saineram, and Prieta plata and abandoning the rest of the island."¹³ The Morocco expedition finally terminated with a treaty of commerce that was ratified in December of 1861. The involvement in Santo Domingo dragged on for a period of years before it was resolved by a treaty. The Mexican intervention cost Spain the least in prestige, thanks to the common sense and realistic policy of General Prim who commanded the Spanish forces there. The war with Chile grew out of the scientific expedition that O'Donnell sent to visit the principal ports of Latin America.

Even as early as 1860, O'Donnell was convinced that much benefit would be derived from the sending of such an expedition. It took about two years to assemble the necessary men and materiel for the expedition. The Spanish squadron, composed of the frigates Resolución, Triunfo, and the gunboats Covadonga and Vencedora, sailed from the bay of Cádiz on August 10, 1862. There were six scientists aboard

¹³New York Tribune, October 12, 1864, p. 8.

In command of the expedition was Luis Hernández Pinzón. The purpose of the expedition was questioned at the time, and is still open to speculation. To still the apprehension of the Latin American republics, O'Donnell sent a circular to the various nations that were to be visited. In essence this circular reiterated that the purpose of the expedition was scientific and friendly, that no aggression was intended. This circular appeared in several of the Latin American newspapers. The prime factor that remains open to question is that of O'Donnell's actual intent. The so-called secret instructions that were given to Pinzón are open to interpretation. True, Spain had recognized the independence of most of the Latin American republics and apparently intended to respect this independence. Madrid had been upset, however, by incidents involving Spanish subjects, incidents such as those of the workers at Talambo in Peru, and of the wealthy residents in Mexico. Pinzón's instructions were to respect the integrity of the former colonies, whether or not Spain had formally recognized them, to strengthen relations with them, and at the same time to protect Spanish nationals. "If by chance something serious should happen . . . the [Spanish] subjects abroad will find in the chief of these naval forces immediate cooperation and help for prompt

reparation."¹⁴ The Admiral was to use forceful measures if necessary since "the Spanish government will never consent to any violence committed against her subjects. Intervention may be employed to put an end to vexations once and for all."¹⁵

If there were some ambiguity as to the underlying motivation for the scientific expedition, clearly there had been no such problem in regard to the Mexican intervention of the previous year. When the Spanish fleet anchored off Vera Cruz in December of 1861, it was obvious that they were there to carry out an occupation. Whether or not Spain had sufficiently serious complaints against Mexico to justify occupying the country is questionable. These complaints consisted of the expulsion of the Spanish Minister Pacheco in January of 1861, the denunciation of the Mon-Almonte Treaty by the Juarez government, and complaints by Spanish subjects of ill-treatment that ranged from robberies and lack of adequate protection to being forced to make loans to the Juarez government. Despite O'Donnell's desire for unilateral action in Mexico, it seems probable that he felt that Spain would acquire an aura of legitimacy for her own

¹⁴Francisco A. Encina, Historia de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1950), Vol. 14, p. 285.

¹⁵Pedro de Novo y Colson, Historia de la Guerra de la España en el Pacífico (Madrid: Imprenta de Fortanet, 1882), p. 86-7.

complaints by joining with Britain and France in the tri-partite convention.¹⁶

"The Spanish Monarchy is not in a satisfactory condition."¹⁷ Queen Isabel II, in an address to the Cortes, made this statement in reference to the specific problem of Santo Domingo. The same statement could have been generalized. Confusion, expediency, opportunism, a lack of communication between civil and military leaders that at times bordered on insubordination, a myriad of unanswered, possibly unanswerable, questions characterized the Spain of this era.

When the divers disasters became known at home, O'Donnell was forced to resign. It is important to note, however, the emphasis which he placed on overseas undertakings, because whenever he was in office this was the policy which Spain pursued. Although Isabel herself apparently feared O'Donnell, because of popular support for him she was often forced to call upon him to form a government.

Notwithstanding Spain's aggressive actions in the western hemisphere, relations between the United States and Spain remained surprisingly amicable throughout the whole period

¹⁶ Detroit Free Press, October 22, 1861, p. 4.

¹⁷ New York Herald, November 5, 1865, p. 5.

under consideration. Certainly one of the most obvious reasons for this was that, regardless of the ministerial hand at the helm, Spain refused to grant recognition to the Confederate States of America. In fact, Spain was very careful not to encourage the Confederacy in any way. Early in the Civil War when it was rumored that the Captain-General of Cuba was considering a commercial arrangement with the rebels, Spanish Minister Tassara hastened to assure Secretary Seward that such was not the case.¹⁸ Later, when the Confederate representative, Mr. Rost, presented himself in Madrid the Queen refused to see him.¹⁹

Secretary Seward's assiduous pursuit of neutrality, of which innumerable examples throughout this whole period could be cited, was equally appreciated by Spain. In regard to the situation in Peru, Secretary Seward said, "There is reason to suppose that Spain will press the matter [Talambo]. This is regrettable to us who have interests in the welfare of these countries. We scrupulously abstain from interfering in disputes between other nations . . . and have no disposition

¹⁸New York Tribune, September 16, 1861, p. 5.

¹⁹Ibid., March 26, 1862, p. 6.

to deviate from that policy."²⁰

Among several factors of varying importance were General Prim's popularity in the United States as attested by his warm reception in New York and the favorable press that he enjoyed from papers representing all points on the political continuum. This friendly attitude was extended, at least in part, to Spain as well. This favorable image was further enhanced by pro-Union articles written by Prim for some of the Spanish newspapers. The friendship between Secretary Seward and Minister Tassara aided in the communication and facilitated the settling of minor irritations that arose between Spain and the United States. Further, Mr. Seward deliberately cultivated Spanish amity by such means as his trip to Cuba and the toasts of friendship that he exchanged with the Captain-General.

"Spain does not have sufficient forces available, nor does she have the means to transport them in order to again subjugate all South America and Mexico. Her present attempt to do so is futile. She will not gain possession of any place of importance; much less will she achieve victory through the cudgel and fierce conduct she has adopted toward hapless Americans, whom she has held subject to her ignominious and unbearable yoke."²¹

²⁰U.S., Dept. of State, Messages and Documents of the President, 1864-65, Pt. 4, #78, Koerner to Seward, April 1, 1864. Hereafter referred to as Mess. and Doc.

²¹Bierck, Selected Writings of Bolívar, Vol. I, p. 125. In addition to the sources noted in the documentation of this

section, the appropriate sections of the several following works have been consulted for a more complete understanding of the political and economic background of Spain during this decade: Jerónimo Becker, Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores de España durante el Siglo XIX (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico, 1924); Henry B. Clarke, Modern Spain, 1815-1898 (Cambridge: University Press, 1906); and Carmen Llorca, Isabel II y Su Tiempo (Valencia: Editorial Marfil, n.d.).

CHILE

"The Kingdom of Chile is destined, by the nature of its location, by the simple and virtuous character of its people, and by the example of its neighbors, the proud republicans of Arauco, to enjoy the blessings that flow from the just and gentle laws of a republic. If any American republic is to have a long life, I am inclined to believe it will be Chile. There the spirit of liberty has never been extinguished; the vices of Europe and Asia arrived too late or not at all to corrupt the customs of that distant corner of the world. Its area is limited; and, as it is remote from other peoples, it will always remain free from contamination. Chile will not alter her laws, ways, and practices. She will preserve her uniform political and religious views. In a word, it is possible for Chile to be free."¹

During the 1860's, José Joaquín Pérez was president of Chile. An experienced politician, he tended to be conciliatory and moderate to a fault. Pérez reportedly did not take a firm stand on any issue until forced to do so by his ministers or public opinion pressures. Pérez' dismissal of Tocornal in 1865 could be cited as an exemplification of this trait. This was scarcely the man to head his country's government during a period of crisis, a period that required the utmost of diplomacy and statecraft.

For several years prior to the Spanish-Chilean War, a smoldering disagreement had been extant between Chile and Bolivia over the demarcation of the boundary between the two

¹ Rierck, Selected Writings of Bolívar, Vol. I, p. 117.

countries. In spite of the President's passive character and his desire for peace, almost at any price, most writers on this period seem to feel that war between Chile and Bolivia would have resulted had it not been for the trouble that arose with Spain. Although Chile had indicated a willingness to accept United States' arbitration in February of 1864, due to the exigencies of the time the settlement of continental issues was postponed for several years. During these years Chile was to gain more confidence in herself.

By the time the Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral Pinzón had arrived at Valparaíso on May 5, 1863, much of the alarm occasioned by the approaching visit of the scientific expedition had died down. It was an opportune moment for the arrival. The Spanish withdrawal from Mexico had served to reassure the other Latin American countries as to the sincerity of Spain's avowals of peaceful intent.

Chilean good will and hospitality were shown to the fleet both in Valparaíso and in the capital. There were numerous receptions at which the sailors were royally entertained.² At one of the banquets Pinzón made a contribution for the unfortunate Mexico and condemned the usurpation of

² New York Tribune, June 16, 1863, p. 2.

Napoleon there.³ While in the capital, Pinzón wrote to his government, "The welcome has been as wonderful and warm in Santiago as in Valparaiso. We have great esteem for the Chileans All hates are over and we are brothers."⁴

At the farewell banquet at Santiago one member of the Spanish colony requested that the Admiral relay the following message. "I would like, when you return to Spain, to tell our illustrious sovereign . . . that her subjects are as happy in Chile as is possible [to be] outside of Spain. We love Chile; she does more for us than we for her, and we owe her a great debt."⁵ At this same banquet Pinzón made an unfortunate, possibly inadvertant, statement that the good will and friendliness shown to the Spanish by the Chileans was not sincere.⁶ From this point on there was, naturally a noticeable cooling of Spanish-Chilean relations, although the press was quite circumspect in avoiding mention of the situation. When the squadron sailed from Chile for Peru it was without the fanfare with which it had been greeted.

³Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, Historia de la Guerra de Chile con España (Santiago: Imprenta Victoria, 1883), p. 22.

⁴Novo y Colson, Historia, p. 116.

⁵Ibid., p. 120.

⁶Ibid., p. 121.

II

Manuel Vivanco, Peruvian Minister to Chile, had urged that his government extend an official invitation to Pinzón to visit Peru. This was done, and the Spanish fleet arrived in Callao, the chief Peruvian port, on July 10, 1863.⁷ During the fleet's two week stay in Peru the festivities and the courtesy extended to the crews were nearly the equal of those received in Chile, and no incident such as that in Santiago took place. There was apparently no action on the part of Pinzón in pursuance of the harsh tone of the instructions that he supposedly had received from his government. The Spaniards did not remain long enough to join in the celebrations on the Peruvian Independence Day, July 29, but sailed northward on the twenty-seventh of July.

While the rest of the Spanish fleet remained in Mexican waters, Pinzón's flagship Resolución, accompanied by the Triunfo, sailed north. They arrived in San Francisco late in September. On the return trip south, Pinzón stopped in Acapulco long enough to take on board a Spaniard, Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo, who might be termed the instigator of

⁷New York Tribune, October 24, 1863, p. 10.

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the war which was soon to develop between Spain and her former colonies.

By November 13, 1863, the Spanish were once again in Callao. The fact that the fleet remained in the vicinity reinforced the fear of Spain's designs that had been prevalent among many Peruvian opinion leaders even prior to the squadron's first visit in July. Although Pinzón had received his orders from Gabriel Tassara, the Spanish Minister in Washington, to proceed to Cuba, the recent events at Talambo,⁸ and pressure from the Spanish consul in Lima, Juan de Ugarte, as well as from Salazar, influenced the Admiral to stay.

⁸At the end of July, 1860, a group of laborers arrived in the port of Callao en route to the hacienda of Talambo in the Peruvian province of Chiclayo. The workers, chiefly Basques, had been recruited by the hacienda owner, Manuel Salcedo, but Spain had never looked with favor upon the undertaking since she felt it degrading to her honor that Spaniards should work as common laborers in a foreign country. Some time later, in August of 1863, there was an uprising against Salcedo for the alleged ill-treatment of his cotton workers; this was put down by force and several of the Basques were killed. Court proceedings were long and involved. The Primary Court of Chiclayo sentenced two of the Spaniards to short prison terms, but the Superior Court, on October 31, reversed this decision and sentenced Salcedo instead. In January, the case finally went to the Supreme Court which annulled both of the previous decisions and returned the case to the judge of the Primary Court of Chiclayo.

From the records of the court proceedings it appears that Salcedo was not guilty of cruelty to his workers.

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The Talambo incident was but the culmination of years of misunderstanding between Spain and Peru. The bases of most of the friction were the failure on the part of Spain to recognize Peru's independence and on the part of Peru to acknowledge her debts to Spain. After several unsuccessful attempts to conclude a treaty, much to Spain's chagrin, Peru failed to ratify the treaty that had been negotiated in 1853. To the ill-will engendered by the aforementioned diplomatic maneuvering, the Spaniards resident in Peru added fuel by exaggerating the Talambo episode. The Spanish government was assured that the affair would be handled impartially and quickly, but this was not satisfactory to the new Mon ministry. Alejandro Mon, who shared O'Donnell's interest in overseas ventures, would undoubtedly have found some pretext for intervention.

The Talambo affair provided the excuse for this intervention. Salazar's actual role was a combination of courier, intermediary, and diplomat. From an historical point of view, Salazar seems to have been a somewhat Machiavellian figure. Due either to some mental aberration or to an unreported specific grudge against Peru, Salazar seems deliberately to have precipitated the crisis with Peru. A function of his office as Spanish Commissioner was to review existing problems

with the government of Peru. His written review of the situation which he presented to the Peruvians concluded with virtually an ultimatum. Further, of the two sets of instructions that he had carried from Madrid, he gave Pinzón the second set which was to have been followed only as a last resort and claimed to have lost the first. On the basis of the instructions received, Pinzón seized the unfortified Chincha Islands.

Peruvian public opinion was so outraged as a result of the loss of the Chinchas, which they attributed to President Pezet's handling of relations with Spain, that the government was in immediate danger of overthrow. That Pezet was held responsible for the loss of the Chinchas by governmental leaders, as well as the Peruvian public, was illustrated on the occasion of his address to the Senate. It was the first time in the country's history that a president had been hissed while delivering a message before the Senate. This remarkable happening was widely reported in the press of the United States.⁹

⁹New York Tribune, September 5, 1864, p. 4. While this article appeared in all of the leading dailies, it is particularly noteworthy as the Tribune carried less Latin American news than the other leading New York papers.

III

Chilean demonstrations in protest of the Spanish seizure of the Chincha so annoyed the Spanish Minister, don Salvador de Tavora, that he expressed his displeasure by compiling a list of grievances against Chile. These complaints, usually referred to as the eleven points, formed the foundation for subsequent Spanish action against Chile. The individual complaints, background information, and, in brief, Chile's reply to each follow.

The first accusation was sent in a note to the Chilean Foreign Ministry on May 4, 1864. This note was unanswered due to a change in the Chilean ministry, Alvaro Covarrubias having replaced Manuel Tocornal. Receiving no immediate response, Tavora dispatched a second, more strongly worded, note on May 13. Tavora's notes protested the sympathy that had been manifested for Peru in the public demonstrations when word of the seizure had reached Chile. Tavora also stated that his host country had taken no steps to prevent an insult to the Spanish flag on that same day, and further, that a municipal battalion stationed opposite the Spanish

legation had remained impassive during the outrage.¹⁰ Tavira's second note apparently crossed with the reply from Covarrubias to the first note, in which the Chilean Minister disavowed the statement that there had been any alteration in the friendliness of his country toward Spain. However, upon receipt of Tavira's second note, Covarrubias' reply was less courteous than had been his first. In his reply he expressed approval of his countrymen's demonstrations as being perfectly natural.

Tavira's next complaint to the Chilean Foreign Office was an objection to the circular condemning the seizure of the Chinchas. On May 4, 1864, the former Chilean Foreign Minister Tocornal had sent this circular to the governments of the other Latin American republics along with an invitation for them to join Chile in expressing disapproval of the Spanish action. Covarrubias answered that the circular was not of a hostile nature, but at the same time he refused to recall it.

Yet another grievance was that the Chilean government had taken no steps to soften the pro-Peruvian tone of the press. The obvious answer to this charge was to cite the

¹⁰Chile, Chilean Foreign Ministry, Counter Manifest of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile on the Present War Between the Republic and Spain (Washington: McGill and Withe-brow, 1866), pp. 17-29 discuss all the 11 points. N.B. Both Spanish and Chilean sources concur as to these 11 points.

freedom of the press that was permitted in Chile.

In June, Tavira charged that preferential treatment had been rendered to the adversary. The Peruvian ship, Lerzundi, had been permitted to take on board coal, food, and other supplies, and even Chilean volunteers for Peru. Whereas, all manner of difficulties had been imposed when the Spanish ships had attempted to take supplies on board. Tavira wanted to know why the ships of his nation were not allowed the same privileges as those of the Peruvian nation. Covarrubias replied that to grant Spain's request would have constituted an unfriendly act to Peru, a good neighbor, and have run counter to Chile's own best interests. Covarrubias later elaborated on this explanation by saying that as long as there did not exist a state of declared war, his country was not obliged to observe the laws of neutrality. He also stated that only limited provisions and crewmen sufficient to enable her to continue her voyage on to Peru had been taken on by the Lerzundi.

Minister Tavira charged that Chile had refused to investigate a Spanish report that a group of armed, uniformed Chilean volunteers were preparing to sail to join the Peruvian revolutionary movement. To this somewhat questionable complaint, Covarrubias delivered a rather ambiguous reply. He first

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implied that no armed persons would have been allowed to clear port, and then again mentioning that as long as no declared war existed, Spain had no legal grounds for complaint.

The next two charges against Chile were related to Spain's logistical problems. In mid-September the Spanish frigate Vencedora arrived in Chilean waters en route to join the squadron in the Chinchas. At the port of Lota she attempted to purchase coal and other provisions and to make minor repairs before continuing on north. The Chileans refused to allow the Spanish to buy any coal, basing their refusal on flimsy pretexts. When Minister Tavira protested, Covarrubias replied that the Chilean Constitution guaranteed to the individual businessman the right to sell to whomsoever he pleased.

Subsequent to this first protest, President Pérez, on September 27, declared coal to be an item of contraband of war. Despite vigorous objections from the Spanish Minister, Chile upheld her declaration on the grounds that hostilities did exist, although there had been no formal declaration of war.

The next two Spanish complaints had to do with the scandal sheet named the San Martín. This paper, published in Valparaiso and having, at best, a limited circulation,

aroused Spanish antipathy by the nature of its contents. The San Martín attacked Spain's corrupt internal situation and overseas policy. The paper's principal target was the Queen and her scandalous private life. As would be expected, Tavira protested against the editorial policies of the San Martín, basing his protest on the grounds of public morals and decency. Tavira felt that Chile should take severe repressive measures against the paper. Covarrubias' reply that the Chilean government did not find it advisable to take such action simply furthered the increasingly tense situation.

The irate Spanish Minister said that if some action were not taken, his government might consider this as just cause for the suspension of diplomatic relations. The Chilean Minister answered that if Spain wished to institute judicial proceedings, such would be permissible, but that his government neither could nor would do anything more to help bring the matter into court.

To complete the list of charges against Chile, one rather absurd complaint remains to be mentioned. Spain cited a shipment of horses that Chile had sent to Peru as being a violation of neutrality. Chile replied by pointing out to her accuser that Peru had long been accustomed to buying horses in Chile, not only for the army but also for farm work.

Further, horses would be of questionable value in naval warfare.

Tavira seemed to accept many of the Chilean explanations, so that by the beginning of 1865 relations were on a much smoother plane. There were several additional factors that helped to account for this. With the conclusion of the Vivanco-Pareja Treaty, most of the Chilean volunteers had by February of 1865, returned home. Spanish ships were once again permitted to coal in Valparaíso. The intermittent publications of the objectionable San Martín had ceased. Also, early in that year a visit was paid to Valparaíso by the Spanish ironclad Numancia. She was said to be the largest ship ever to plough the Chilean waters until that time, and she was received with a good deal of admiration and enthusiasm.¹¹ This new feeling of conciliation was not to be of long duration.

On December 7 of 1864, Admiral Pinzón had been replaced as commander of the Spanish Pacific fleet by José Manuel Pareja.¹² Pareja had also been endowed with full diplomatic powers in order to effect the settlement with Peru. Pinzón's

¹¹New York Tribune, June 9, 1865, p. 4.

¹²It should be noted that although Pareja's appointment was issued in Madrid in the last week of September, he did not arrive in Peru to assume actual command until December, 1864.

stand was not considered sufficiently firm by Madrid. As Pareja had harbored a life-long grudge against the Pacific republics, and especially Chile, it was felt that his policy would not err in the same direction as had Pinzón's. Nor did it, as the terms of peace with Peru amply demonstrate. The terms of the treaty are not of great interest here except to note that by signing Peru surrendered completely to Spanish terms. She also agreed to pay a large indemnity of three million pesos which Madrid had not stipulated that Pareja demand. The unpopularity of these terms precipitated the overthrow of the Pezet government.

Admiral Pareja had long held a personal grudge against the Republic of Chile as his father had been killed fighting there. In addition, Pareja was greatly irritated over the Chilean activities that had transpired while he had been occupied with the situation in Peru. Therefore, he wrote to Tavira in Santiago that adequate satisfaction and reparation for these actions must be obtained from that nation. He insisted upon a twenty-one gun salute to the Spanish flag, which would be answered by one from the Spanish to the Chilean.¹³ Pareja also demanded the payment of three million

¹³New York Herald, June 9, 1865 (copied from the Mercurio of Valparaiso, May 1, 1865), p. 4.

reales from Chile for refusing to supply the Spanish ships with coal and other provisions. The Admiral also desired that a Chilean envoy be sent to Madrid to make satisfactory explanations to the charges which Tavira had formulated against the Republic, and to conclude a new treaty, which was to include a most favored nation clause, between the two nations.

Pareja seemed to feel that the Spanish Minister in Chile was not taking a firm enough stand against that country. Consequently, he suggested that Tavira leave Chile on some pretext, so that he, Pareja, could come to Chile and settle the difficulties. Tavira declined to leave Chile, despite Pareja's increasingly hostile attitude. Pareja then sent the Vencedora south to encourage Tavira to press for satisfaction from Chile. Pareja did not sail at once for Chile because he lacked instructions from Madrid for such action.

During the interim required for Admiral Pareja to communicate with Madrid, Tavira took advantage of the respite to settle, or so he thought, the points of disagreement between Chile and Spain. Having resided in Chile since 1848, Minister Tavira was highly regarded by people both in and out of the government. That he himself was deeply concerned about the well-being of Chile, as well as of Spain,

there can be no doubt. In March of 1865, Tavira had a meeting with Domingo Santa María, Vice-President of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. At this meeting he told Santa María that he was certain that the Chilean explanations to the eleven charges would be accepted by his government and that only a twenty-one gun salute might be asked. Santa María seemed pleased, but answered that his countrymen would first resort to hostilities as they would never pay a salute to the Spanish flag for offenses that they had not committed.

Tavira was not alone in his desire to avoid war. In Spain, too, there were advocates of peaceful settlement. The Spanish Under-Secretary of State, Miguel Bañuelos, in a personal letter of February 24, 1865, wrote to Tavira that the Spanish government desired to settle all the problems quietly, not to make humiliating demands, nor to look for quarrels.¹⁴

Unfortunately for all concerned, Bañuelos' private views did not reflect the official policy of the Spanish government. In early April, Tavira received from the Spanish Minister of State Benavides a royal decree that said, in effect, that a salute to the Spanish flag was essential.

¹⁴Novo y Colson, Historia, p. 318.

Further, that Spain would require that acceptable explanations be given and that a new Spanish-Chilean treaty of friendship be concluded were de rigueur. If these stipulations were not agreed to peacefully, Tavira was to break relations with the Republic.

In accord with his instructions, on May 13, 1865, Tavira again presented a note listing the eleven complaints to the Chilean government. In his reply three days later, Covarrubias elaborated upon the explanation he had given earlier and expressed the hope that cordiality would again be restored between the two countries. Tavira's gracious reply to Covarrubias' note of explanation seemed to be an assurance that the matter was settled and peace and friendship restored.

So might it have been had it not been for Pareja. As was mentioned earlier, Admiral Pareja held a personal grudge against Chile. He did not want the Spanish-Chilean problem to be settled by quiet negotiation, but by Spanish might. During the early months of 1865, while Tavira was diligently striving to restore amity, Pareja was carrying on an insistently inflammatory correspondence with his friends in the government at Madrid. Pareja's interpretation of the international situation evidently was more influential with the Spanish government than was Tavira's. Although the instructions

that required a salute to the Spanish flag as one of the terms of settlement did not reach the Pacific coast until the last week of March, two weeks earlier papers in the United States had published accounts of Pareja's threats.¹⁵ The Admiral's pleasure at the new instructions was undoubtedly equalled only by Tavira's dismay. Tavira was aware of the extent of Chilean nationalistic pride, and his interview with Santa María had left no room for doubt that the demanded salute would mean war. Pareja's threats against Chile that continued to be reported throughout the Americas did nothing to mitigate the intensity of Chilean sentiment.¹⁶ On the strength of this knowledge, Tavira gambled that a fait accompli would be accepted in Madrid. He, therefore, concluded the aforementioned agreement with Chile on the terms enumerated in his earlier instructions.

In June, O'Donnell was again head of the Spanish government. Tavira was ordered back to Spain, and Pareja was appointed plenipotentiary to deal with Chile. Tavira had lost his gamble, due primarily to Pareja's determination to humiliate Chile, and Pareja, Tavira, Chile, and Spain were

¹⁵New York Herald, March 8, 1865, p. 1.

¹⁶Ibid., May 6, 1865, p. 5.

all to lose as a result.

Admiral Pareja on his flagship, the Villa de Madrid, reached Valparaiso on September 17, 1865. One supposes that he might even have planned his arrival on this date as a further humiliation since September eighteenth is the Chilean Independence Day. Making no attempt to negotiate as he had been instructed to do, Pareja immediately informed Chile that the explanations accepted by Tavira could never satisfy Spain, and that because of his conduct the former representative of the Queen had been relieved of his post. The same eleven complaints were again stated along with the demand for adequate explanations and the twenty-one gun salute which would then be returned by an equal number by one of the Spanish ships.¹⁷ The Chileans were allowed four days in which to give satisfaction. Otherwise, the personnel of the Spanish legation would retire to the ships of the Admiral and forceful measures would be applied.

The Chilean government was quite naturally offended by the demands as well as by the manner in which Admiral Pareja had presented them. There then followed an exchange of notes between Covarrubias and Pareja. Covarrubias ended

¹⁷ Chile and Spain, Notes Interchanged between Admiral Pareja and the Minister of Foreign Relations (n.p.: n. pub., n.d.), pp. 1-5.

this series of communications with his note of the twenty-fourth reiterating the refusal to yield to Spanish pressure. Chile "would not buy peace at the cost of [her] dignity . . . and Spain, in no case, should expect indemnity of the Republic."¹⁸

Upon learning of the ultimatum to the Chilean Republic, the diplomatic corps in Santiago were hopeful that their influence might be of use in preventing a needless war. Thomas Nelson, dean of the corps, exchanged messages with Pareja, but to no avail. To the American Minister's great disappointment, the Spanish Admiral considered that hostilities had commenced with the break in diplomatic relations.¹⁹

Chileans of all political convictions rallied at once to the cause, and various plans were discussed in the Chamber of Deputies in a special session that was convened on Sunday, September 24, 1865. Authorization for a declaration of war against Spain was requested. The size of the army and the navy was to be increased, roads and telegraph facilities were to be extended, and a loan of twenty million dollars was authorized by Congress.²⁰ Every measure passed unanimously.

¹⁸Chile and Spain, Notes Interchanged, p. 12-14.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 21.

²⁰New York Herald, November 11, 1865, p. 8.

Following the institution of the blockade by Pareja and Chile's declaration of war, diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on Pareja to modify the conditions of the blockade. As a result of these protests the Commander agreed to permit ships coming from Europe with only passengers and mail to enter Chilean ports provided that they also carry his correspondence.²¹

Actually, Pareja could not possibly enforce a blockade of more than forty ports with his small squadron of five ships. His problems were intensified when Chile, in October, declared thirty-five of her ports duty-free. This action by Chile, plus repeated reminders from the diplomatic corps that, according to international agreements, a blockade must be effective and constant to be valid, resulted in the reduction of the blockade to six specified ports.²²

Chile's economy had been flourishing prior to the institution of the blockade. After an initial drop, it recovered rapidly. As the blockade had not caused any significant loss to Chile, many in the country, especially

²¹Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 1, Tassara to Seward, December 14, 1865, pp. 583-84.

²²New York Herald, December 3, 1865, p. 8.

foreigners with commercial interests, speculated as to the probable nature of Pareja's next move. Fear of a Spanish bombardment of Valparaiso was widely articulated.²³ This fear was accentuated by the ominous ambiguity of Pareja's communications regarding the question.

The members of the diplomatic corps, who had done their best to prevent the state of hostilities, now turned their efforts toward a settlement of the difficulties. Covarrubias rejected the offer of arbitration extended by the diplomats and pointed out that this method of settlement is customarily employed prior to the outbreak of hostilities, while the two parties are still on terms of equality. If the situation could be restored to the status quo ante bellum, and by this he meant a withdrawal of the Spanish fleet and the return to Chile of all prizes taken, then the offer of arbitration would be accepted.²⁴

On October 19, United States Minister Nelson, accompanied by several other members of the diplomatic corps, visited the Villa de Madrid in order to offer their good offices to Pareja. The Admiral refused to avail himself of their services. He

²³Washington Evening Star, December 2, 1865, p. 2.

²⁴Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #229, Nelson to Seward, October 31, 1865.

said that his instructions did not allow arbitration. He added that he had heard from Spain that the United States had proposed arbitration in Madrid through her representative there, Mr. Perry, and that the offer had been refused. Therefore, he must also decline. He reinforced his statement of refusal by explaining that while questions regarding only material interests could be settled by the arbitration of a friendly power, those regarding national honor could not. The conflict with Chile, he said, most certainly was an issue of honor.²⁵

Arbitration had been refused by both belligerents. The blockade had been proven ineffective; trade had actually increased. There was a growing reaction among the Spanish against their government's embroilment in Chile. Popular opinion in both Europe and the United States was increasingly anti-Spanish.²⁶

In the face of an apparent stalemate, the O'Donnell Government accepted the British offer to assist in the projected conciliation of Spain and Chile as a possible means of resolving the international entanglement. The

²⁵Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, Nelson to Seward, #229, October 31, 1865.

²⁶New York Tribune, January 20, 1866, p. 6. (European opinion)
New York Herald, December 4, 1865, p. 4. (U.S. opinion)

news of the capture of the Covadonga by the Chilean ship Esmeralda, and particularly the manner in which it was accomplished, served to galvanize Spanish opinion in support of O'Donnell.²⁷

The Chilean capture of the Covadonga was of prime significance in two respects. First, it was the most important, if not the only, real military action that had transpired during the opening months of the war. From the time that the Esmeralda and the Maipu had steamed out of the harbor at Valparaíso, past the Spanish squadron, on September 17, 1865, until the capture of the Covadonga on November twenty-six, their whereabouts had been unknown. No naval engagements per se had occurred. The Spanish ships did manage to intercept a few small vessels that belonged to Chilean nationals. Thus, the Esmeralda's capture of the smaller Covadonga was hailed by Chileans and, indeed, all Americans as an event of the greatest moment. From an overview the whole question of the Spanish-Chilean trouble, the second main effect of the Covadonga's capture was the more important. Confronted with the additional loss of dignity and national honor that the capture seemed to imply, O'Donnell had no choice as to the

²⁷ New York Herald, February 24, 1866, p. 4.

continuance of hostilities. The opportunity for arbitration had passed.

Pareja received the first inkling as to the Covadonga's fate on November twenty-eighth, probably from Mr. Clark, the United States consul at Valparaiso.²⁸ This, the final misfortune of an unhappy series, was more than the conscience-stricken Admiral could bear. He had disregarded his original orders to negotiate with Chile. As Pareja considered the results that had followed from this original disobedience, his sense of guilt must have been compounded. The blockade that he had instituted had proven to be ineffective. Approximately \$175,000 had been discovered missing from the squadron treasury. On the day that Admiral Pareja received the news of the Covadonga's capture he also had word from Peru of the success of the anti-Spanish revolutionary group. The Admiral knew that this meant the probable revocation of the Vivanco-Pareja Treaty and the formation of a Peruvian-Chilean alliance. In case of this eventuality Spain would be facing increased naval forces and at the same time, would be cut off from supply sources for nearly the whole length of the Pacific coast.

²⁸ From the many versions of the events that transpired aboard the Villa on Nov. 28, 1865, it is clear that the U.S. consul did visit the Admiral, and that Pareja learned of the capture on that day. As the Villa also communicated with a mail boat on the same day, it is possible that the news was received in this fashion.

Admiral Pareja remained pensive the rest of that day. The following day Mr. Clark returned with further details for the Admiral; after the consul's departure Pareja dined and retired to his cabin. Shots were heard, and upon investigation the Admiral was found dead, lying on his bed with his pistol still clutched in his right hand. In a note addressed to his nephew, Pareja admonished all his crew to conduct themselves with honor. He requested that they not bury him in Chilean waters. In a separate note to the Spanish government, Pareja asked forgiveness for his treatment of Tavira. In this note, the unfortunate Admiral not only admitted that he had been unjust in his actions toward Tavira, but that Tavira had actually been right and that it would be in Spain's interest to make peace with Chile as soon as possible.²⁹

The news of Pareja's suicide was kept secret from the crew, and the Villa headed out to open sea to fulfill the Admiral's last request that he be buried outside of Chilean waters. It was December nineteenth before the Chileans learned of Admiral Pareja's death. Minister Covarrubias at once wrote to the acting commander of the squadron to express sympathy on behalf of the government of Chile and to offer "a resting

²⁹ Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #240, Nelson to Seward, December 31, 1865.

place in the cemetery of this city until the Government of Spain wishes to make other arrangements."³⁰ The captain of the Blanca responded with appreciation for the offer which was not accepted. He said that an official answer would soon be sent by the new commander, Casto Méndez Núñez of the Numancia. The war in the Pacific had entered a new phase.

IV

Commodore Méndez Núñez arrived in Valparaíso on December 19, 1865.³¹ The next day he proclaimed that only the ports of Valparaíso and Caldera would be subject to the blockade.³² Apparently Méndez had not received instructions from Madrid and was uncertain as to a course of action. According to divers sources, there was a consensus of opinion that the new commander felt that it would be best for Spain to effect a settlement with Chile as expediently as possible. Rumor was current at this time that Spain was so concerned as to the possible consequences of the recently contracted offensive-

³⁰Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #240, Nelson to Seward, December 31, 1865.

³¹New York Tribune, January 13, 1866, p. 8.

³²Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #246, Nelson to Seward, January 31, 1866.

defensive Chilean-Peruvian alliance that the blockade of Chile would soon be lifted entirely.³³

The British and French representatives in Santiago were still interested in a settlement such as had been outlined in the memorandum of the previous November, and to which O'Donnell had agreed. Hopeful that the recent developments might have produced some modifications in the official Chilean attitude, the two ministers decided to pay a visit to Covarrubias. He received them politely, but was evasive, saying that he must first consult with President Pérez on the matter.

The United States minister next attempted to bring about a settlement, but with no more success than the British and French. Nelson had received a note from Seward in which the Secretary commissioned him to renew the offer of good offices. In this note, dated December 5, 1865, Seward cautioned Nelson to treat the two belligerents with equal consideration. The communication was closed with the following observation, "We believe that representations made by the United States alone without the other powers are more in harmony with our own national character and institutions."³⁴

³³New York Herald, February 10, 1866, p. 1.

³⁴Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, Seward to Nelson, #117, December 5, 1865.

Nelson responded on January sixteenth that he should neglect no opportunity to renew the offer, but that it had been impossible for him during the past few months to deal equally with the two powers. "Spain is aggressive, and unfair to neutral interests . . . Chile is only defensive. As you say, Spain demanded only a salute, but Chile couldn't yield to . . . an arrogant threat. It is impossible for me to stand by without remonstrance against the injustice of the aggressor and sympathy for the aggrieved."³⁵ In this same communication the Minister also voiced his concern for the safety of the vast commercial interests of his countrymen in Chile; and on these bases he determined to pay a visit to the Spanish Commander.

Nelson reported that Méndez received him with a spirit of conciliation and showed a desire for peaceful solution which was in marked contrast to the attitude of Pareja. Following his talk with the Spanish Commander, Nelson next approached Covarrubias to determine whether the good offices of the United States would be accepted by him. The Chilean Minister replied that he was always ready for peace with honor and dignity and was willing to allow the arbitration.

³⁵ Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #245, Nelson to Seward, January 16, 1866.

However, Covarrubias said that he thought that there might be complications as Britain and France had also offered their good offices, an offer which Spain had accepted but Chile had not. He stipulated that Peru would also have to be willing to accede to the proposal as she was bound to Chile by the treaty of the previous month.³⁶ There was one further obstacle. This was the great feeling of confidence in Chile which was the result of additional naval successes over the Spanish. The general opinion was that Chile would not be willing to settle unless some decisive victory were soon won by the Spanish.³⁷

Chilean intransigence, for neither the first nor the last time, had precluded the possibility of peaceful settlement of the dispute. Obviously Chile must have believed that her position had become vastly improved relative to that of Spain. Peruvian ports were now closed to the Spanish. The Peruvian frigates Amazonas and Apurimac and the smaller corvettes Unión and América had been placed under the unified command of Chile. While the combined squadron was still not the equal of the adversary's, it was of sufficient size to cause the enemy much trouble.

³⁶ Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #248, Nelson to Seward, February 15, 1866.

³⁷ New York Tribune, January 20, 1866, p. 6.

The Chilean government expected that Chile would soon have some new ships that would be the equal of, if not superior to, the Spanish ships in speed. The sources of such ships were to be two. The Peruvian government had commissioned for several ships in England prior to the declaration of war by Peru on Spain. Following the declaration, a complaint was made in London by the Spanish representative that the ships were being constructed for service in Chile. The British declared, however, that there were no grounds for interference and the ships cleared port with no action having been taken against them. The Independencia and the Huascar arrived in Valparaíso early in June of 1866.³⁸

The second source of new ships for Chile was to be the United States. To purchase ships was one of the main reasons for the special mission of Vicuña Mackenna.³⁹

³⁸New York Herald, July 22, 1866, p. 2.

³⁹This illustrious Chilean patriot could count among his ancestors many of the leading families of Chile, but perhaps none was more famous than don Benjamín himself. Born in 1831 in Stgo. and educated there, he was one of the capital's leading figures. Imprisoned and condemned to death for writing against the government, he escaped and spent six years in exile. During these years, he made the most of his time traveling in Europe and in the U.S. gathering manuscript material for later historical works. By 1856 he was back again in Chile publishing prolifically and writing for the newspapers, including the Ferrocarril. In 1863 he became editor of the Mercurio of Valparaíso. He also served in Congress where he sponsored projects for the improvement and beautification of Santiago and Valparaíso.

On the last day of September, 1865, a week after the declaration of war on Spain, don Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna had received a call from the Chilean Foreign Minister for a conference in the Moneda. Covarrubias told him that he was going to require a great sacrifice. The government wanted to send him to the United States on an unusual, but most important, mission. He was to get to the United States as quickly as possible; to gain American sympathy for the Chilean cause, principally through the press; to establish contact with the wealthy and influential refugees who had come to the United States from Cuba and Puerto Rico in order to obtain their cooperation; finally, he was to acquaint himself with the ship owners so as to secure the best terms for the purchase of ships to be used against Spain. In closing, Covarrubias authorized his agent to "resort to any device."⁴⁰

Vicuña's position was to be neither an official nor a diplomatic one; he was simply designated an agitator, or confidential agent, and the nature of his mission was to be kept secret even from his family. Thomas Nelson must certainly not have been informed as to the portion of the mission that was planned as an outright violation of United States neutrality

⁴⁰ Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses de Misión a los Estados Unidos de Norte America (Santiago: Imprenta de la Libertad, 1867), Vol. I, pp. 12-16.

laws since he presented Vicuña with letters of introduction to various influential persons in the United States. Among these influential persons were Schuyler Colfax, Montgomery Blair, Henry Raymond of the New York Times, Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune, and Secretary of State William H. Seward.

En route to the United States, Vicuña Mackenna made stops in Peru and Panama. During his stop in Peru he was the recipient of unpleasant tidings as to the probable outcome of his mission. Mr. Robinson, United States Minister in Lima, warned Vicuña of the prevailing attitude of moderation in the United States. Robinson added that the success of the mission would depend on the mood of the press and whatever measures Congress might approve. An American businessman who had recently come to Peru from the United States told Vicuña Mackenna that it would not be easy to obtain ironclads, because the United States had very few and would not want to sell those that she had on hand. The businessman also reported that in the United States there was a great desire to avoid foreign entanglements. Vicuña, after reading various of the United States newspapers for the preceding month, was inclined to agree that the feeling in the United States was indeed one favoring moderation. None-

theless, Vicuña was hopeful that the Congress which was to reconvene on December fourth would initiate a somewhat changed foreign policy.⁴¹

The implications of this statement, as well as Covarrubias' instructions to Vicuña as to the means to be employed in enlisting the aid of the newspapers, "It is probable that the papers of the United States will not lend their wholehearted support to our cause gratuitously. Thus, a subsidy of money will overcome their lukewarmness and indifference, and you can resort to this means as long as the importance of the paper, that is its circulation and respectability, provides a guarantee that its publications will gain support for our cause and condemnation for that of Spain,"⁴² most naturally raise some questions. One must wonder just how well this Chilean special agent understood the actual structure and operations of the United States government. Further, the Chilean Foreign Minister would seem not to have fathomed the role played by the free press in the United States.

Vicuña Mackenna arrived in New York on November 20, 1865. The situation looked bleak indeed. He had been told that the

⁴¹Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, pp. 110-11.

⁴²Ibid., p. 13.

types of ships that he was seeking were not available in the United States, and even if they were he had little money at his disposal and Chilean credit was practically unknown. In addition it was clear that official United States policy was not going to be sympathetic. The note from Secretary Seward which Chilean Minister Asta-Buruaga showed Vicuña when he met him in New York seemed to him to confirm Chile's apprehension as to the position of the United States. In the note, Seward commented that the war "up to a point has concerned this government. . . . since the war is already under way . . . discussion of its merits by this government would not be compatible with the respect which we profess toward two friendly nations. Nevertheless, I am confident that each of these two will permit the United States to say . . . that war should have been avoided as the issue is nothing more than whether one nation will make a salute to the flag of the other. . . . While the war lasts, this government will observe the neutrality prescribed by its own and by international law. No ship of either country will be allowed to bring its booty into any port of the United States. I have written the Spanish minister to the same effect"43

⁴³Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Seward to Asta-Buruaga, November 17, 1865, Vol. I, pp. 186-87.

To Vicuña, who was hopeful of accomplishing so much for his country, Seward's note was a great disappointment. To Asta-Buruaga it was less so as he had been aware of United States policy for approximately two months. On September 28, in a special interview, Asta-Buruaga had requested that Seward present him with a clear outline of United States policy. Seward then obliged the Chilean Minister by advising him that the Chileans had best not expose themselves unless they were confident of beating the Spanish, and that in case of war a policy of neutrality would be followed. Minister Asta-Buruaga's conclusion was that since his country's independence was already assured and the Latin American market open to the United States, Seward felt it unnecessary to grant assistance.⁴⁴ This seems to have been a natural assumption for Asta-Buruaga to have reached. In his disillusionment, Vicuña claimed that Seward's policy was not one of neutrality, but rather of partiality to Spain. Seward's failure to send a delegate to the American conference in Lima is one of the points that Vicuña Mackenna cites as evidence of this assertion.

In a sense, much of Vicuña's bitter reaction to the slight success of his mission to the United States had its

⁴⁴Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Asta-Buruaga to Covarrubias, September 30, 1865, Vol. I, pp. 195-96.

origin in cross-cultural ignorance. For, while to many people in the United States it was foolish to wage war over a point of honor,⁴⁵ to many Latin Americans it was equally difficult to appreciate Yankee practicality and the reasons for it. Even more to the point, there seems to have been an incredible lack of comprehension of the scope and toll of the Civil War in the United States and the immensity of the problems of Reconstruction. Further, there must have been a lack of awareness of the diplomatic problems between the United States and Great Britain arising out of Civil War claims.

The special agent lost no time in initiating his public relations campaign on behalf of Chile. Within less than two weeks of his arrival in New York he had visited the main newspapers in order to present his letters of introduction. He had a pleasant talk with Mr. Raymond of the Times, and Mr. Bennett of the Herald invited Vicuna to dine at his home.

Vicuña Mackenna, in his Diez Meses, relates a strangely interesting set of events that transpired during this period. He was apparently so impressed by the pro-Chilean posture of the London Times that he wrote to Messrs. Bennett, Raymond,

⁴⁵New York Herald, January 5, 1866, p. 1.
New York Times, January 8, 1866, p. 4.

and Greeley suggesting that they would do well to follow the lead of the British press in their editorial treatment of the Spanish-Chilean War. Vicuña wrote these letters on November 29, 1865, and requested that the editors have something in the paper before December first, as that was the sailing date of the mail for Chile. In his book Vicuña Mackenna said that all of the papers, because of anti-British bias and in response to his letter, carried editorials on "No Entangling Alliances" the very next day, November 30, 1865.⁴⁶ That this was not the case is readily established by the simple expedient of examining the three papers for that date. The New York Times was the only one with an editorial opposing entangling alliances. From the content of the editorial it does not seem to have been directly related to Vicuña's letter.

The editorial was addressed to the issue as to whether or not the United States should join with England and France in order to oppose Spain in the Pacific. The conclusion reached was a resounding "No." "When, . . . we go into an alliance with France and England to drive Spanish men-of-war out of the Pacific ports, the chances are that one of the conditions of such a convention would be a demand for the

⁴⁶Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, p. 249.

evacuation of Mexico by the French."⁴⁷

Vicuña wrote of having spoken before numerous groups while he was in the United States. The talks that have been reported most extensively were those that he gave before the Travelers Club on December 2, 1865, to the Union League Club the same week, and at the the Cooper Union meeting on January 6, 1866. The Cooper Union meeting was by far the largest and most widely reported propaganda effort of Vicuña Mackenna's career. It will be discussed in a later section. For the moment, it will suffice to say that neither his letter-writing nor his speech-making produced the results that he had anticipated. His goal seems to have been to obtain active official United States aid for Chile. As for securing editorial support, no special agent was needed to attain that which had been freely given. The overwhelming majority of the Chilean related articles and editorials that appeared in United States newspapers, regardless of party, between 1861 and 1866 were favorable to Chile. For the most part, those few articles that could not be termed actually pro-Chile were at least anti-Spain.

The special agent's other activities on behalf of Chile can be included in three general categories: meeting or

⁴⁷New York Times, November 30, 1865, p. 4.

attempting to meet influential people, recruiting trained military personnel, and attempting to purchase ships. In all three types of endeavors his success was, at best, questionable. The large group of rich, influential Cuban and Puerto Rican refugees that he thought he was going to meet proved to be but a small group so poor that Vicuña made a contribution to their meager treasury. In late January, Vicuña went to Washington where he met a number of the prominent men of the day, including General Grant, Secretary of the Navy Welles, and even President Johnson, of whom the Chilean commented that his suit looked home-made. He was disappointed that he was unable to meet Secretary Seward who was vacationing in the Caribbean at the time. Simply being introduced to famous people at various social events yielded no new support for Chile.

The Chilean agent's recruitment program resulted in a small naval expedition of six persons being sent to Chile. The men had all been in the service of the Confederate States of America, and were all versed in the use of the most modern weapons.⁴⁸ The expedition arrived in Chile at the end of January, but due to a misunderstanding concerning remuneration for their services they were still in Valparaíso at the time

⁴⁸Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vicuña to Covarrubias, December 10, 1865, Vol. I, p. 319-27. Also New York Tribune, January 13, 1866, p. 8.

of the bombardment of that city by the Spaniards.⁴⁹ Most of them subsequently returned to the United States.

Vicuña's attempt to purchase ships for Chile culminated in a fiasco as far as public relations were concerned. Prior to the arrival of Vicuña, Asta-Buruaga had begun negotiations to purchase the Meteor, but not having received the necessary authorizations or money, and war having been declared by Chile on Spain, he suspended the arrangements. Vicuña thought that it would be easier to purchase a different ship, and therefore, he instituted negotiations for several others. The prime reason for the failure of fruition of the many ship-buying plans was the Chilean's lack of cash.

On New Year's Day 1866, Vicuña received the good news of the capture of the Covadonga. He had judged, most correctly, that when the word of the Covadonga's fate reached Spain that the Spanish would deem retaliation a necessity in order to restore the honor of the monarchy. Vicuña then determined that it was absolutely essential to obtain the Meteor for Chile. He established contact with intermediaries to arrange for the purchase of the Meteor.

On January 15, 1866, Vicuña wrote to inform Asta-Buruaga

⁴⁹Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, p. 321.

that he had concluded the purchase of the Meteor. He happily reported that the details of the transaction favored Chile, particularly the proviso that Chile would not have to pay for the ship until six months after it would have arrived in Chile. The vessel at this time was privately owned.

The Meteor was to have sailed for Chile on January 22, 1866, but she was not ready for sea. The following day the Meteor was detained in port by United States authorities. The Spanish consul in New York had reported that Vicuña and others were conspiring to violate the neutrality laws of the United States. On February sixth, Vicuña was arrested on the charge of plotting a military expedition detrimental to a power friendly to the United States. Although later this special agent complained at great length about this whole episode, at the time he managed to emerge relatively unscathed. True, he did have to testify in a court case that was avidly followed by all of the newspapers. Thanks to Asta-Buruaga, however, Vicuña Mackenna was provided with diplomatic immunity and the United States allowed him to remain in the country.

From the time of the Meteor trial until his departure for Chile, Vicuña devoted most of his efforts to writing for La Voz de la América which he had founded the previous December. For the time, it would seem then that the second source of

Chile's anticipated naval reinforcements had proven fruitless.

At the very time that Vicuña Mackenna was striving to purchase the Meteor, Covarrubias was refusing to consider a suspension of hostilities in order to negotiate with Spain. Méndez Núñez' original orders had been explicit in that he was to stay in the Pacific until peace was concluded with Chile. He was instructed to attain peace either by hostilities or by other means.⁵⁰

When it was clear that again Chile would not negotiate,⁵¹ Méndez Núñez, unlike Pareja, proceeded in a business-like fashion to wage hostilities so as to bring the war to a close. First, as was mentioned above, the Spanish blockade was reduced to only the port of Valparaíso. Thus, Méndez Núñez was able to enforce, and therefore validate, the declared blockade. By blockading the main port, and the one in which foreign

⁵⁰The accepted, standard Spanish references on this period, Novo y Colson and Becker, give Nov. 23, 1865, as the date of the royal decree that ordered Méndez Núñez to carry on until peace with Chile was concluded. Vicuña Mackenna cites the date from Novo, and neither Encina nor Edwards gives a date. It seems most curious that in almost 100 years no one has hypothesized that Pareja was to have been replaced, possibly to facilitate reaching a peaceful settlement.

⁵¹New York Herald, March 8, 1866, p. 6.

investors were so heavily represented, he could hope to reduce the income to the Chilean government and to induce the diplomatic corps to exert pressure on Covarrubias to negotiate with Spain.

Once an effective blockade had been established, two other problems claimed Méndez' attention: first, the enemy fleet, and second, the matter of necessary supplies. Within a week he had instituted measures to deal with both. He declared coal a contraband of war,⁵² and later, seized it as his ships needed fuel. On January 21, 1866, the Villa and the Blanca left Valparaíso and steamed south in search of the allied ships.⁵³ They rejoined the squadron at Valparaíso in the middle of February. A small engagement at the island of Abato near Chiloé,⁵⁴ from which the Spanish had emerged somewhat damaged without having incapacitated the allies, was all that they had to report. Méndez Núñez then decided that it was his duty to restore the national honor by searching out and destroying the allied fleet. Therefore, on the seventeenth of February the Numancia and the Blanca

⁵²New York Tribune, March 24, 1866, p. 8.

⁵³Ibid., February 26, 1866, p. 5.

⁵⁴New York Herald, April 1, 1866, p. 1.

departed for the south. The Commander returned to Valparaíso almost a month later having enjoyed little more success than had his squadron-mates on the previous trip. The only contact with the enemy had occurred near Huite.⁵⁵ Thanks to Chilean strategy and heavy fogs the Spanish had been unable to employ their superior firepower. During the return trip north they captured the Paquete del Maule,⁵⁶ and seized some foreign coal transports at Lota.⁵⁷

While the coal thus acquired had been more than enough to enable the Blanca and the Numancia to return to Valparaíso, it did not relieve the urgent problem of providing fuel for the squadron. The whole question of supplies of all types was daily becoming more pressing. There had been a great decrease in Spanish shipping because of a very real fear of Chilean privateers.⁵⁸ For the most part, the reduced volume of Spanish shipping was being carried by neutrals. Sending supplies via neutral bottoms proved of little aid to Méndez Núñez, as the Chilean government, on March 16, 1866, decreed

⁵⁵New York Herald, April 10, 1866, p. 1.

⁵⁶New York Tribune, April 10, 1866, p. 8.

⁵⁷Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #255, Nelson to Seward, March 16, 1866.

⁵⁸New York Herald, February 1, 1866, p. 4, and February 18, 1866, p. 8.

that any neutral ships having contact with the Spanish fleet or supplying them with coal and/or other provisions would be prohibited from entering any Chilean ports.⁵⁹

Thus, with his European sources of supplies being rapidly diminished and with virtually the whole Pacific coast closed to him, if Méndez Núñez were to obey his orders to stay in the Pacific until peace was achieved, then clearly, it was time to employ new tactics.

V

By mid-March when the Spanish ships had returned to Valparaíso from their unsuccessful attempt to wage war with the allied fleet, they found that the situation in the port had changed somewhat with the arrival of the American squadron.⁶⁰ The squadron, commanded by Commodore John Rodgers, consisted of the monitor Monadnock, and the steamers Vanderbilt, Tuscarora, Powhatan, and Mohongo. In addition, United States Minister Nelson had been replaced by General Judson Kilpatrick on March twelfth.

⁵⁹Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #3 Kilpatrick to Seward, April 2, 1866.

⁶⁰New York Tribune, April 3, 1866, p. 1.

For a few days following the arrival from Europe of the last mail steamer on March twelfth, there was generalized apprehension among the people of Valparaiso that a bombardment was imminent. This fear was augmented by the apparent preparation of the British fleet for withdrawal from the harbor. When, with the exception of one frigate, the British fleet remained quietly at anchor, rumors of the bombardment subsided.

During this lull the North Americans were doing what they could to arrive at a peaceful settlement. They suggested several plans to both sides, but neither was willing to accede. Chile demanded that Spain abandon the war unconditionally; naturally Spain refused. Spain favored a suspension of hostilities to allow time for negotiation. Chile would not agree to a suspension, ostensibly from fear of giving Spain time to strengthen her squadron.⁶¹

On March nineteenth Rodgers and Kilpatrick met with Foreign Minister Covarrubias in Santiago to suggest that the two belligerents fire a mutual salute. Covarrubias said that while a mutual salute would have been possible at the beginning of the war, that now Chile deemed herself the offended party. When Kilpatrick asked what terms Chile would accept

⁶¹Ferrocarril, March 27, 1866, p. 1.

the Foreign Minister reiterated that which he had declared in his manifesto of the preceding October, that his nation preferred war rather than submit to the demands of Spain.⁶²

Two days later, the twenty-first, Rodgers and Kilpatrick were back in Valparaíso and visited Méndez Núñez aboard the Numancia. The Spanish Admiral's cordial and sincere manner made a very favorable impression on the two men. On the twenty-third, Méndez Núñez again talked with Kilpatrick and Rodgers, this time in a visit to the Vanderbilt. While stating that it was his wish to avoid further war, he also said that his instructions from Madrid left him no choice, if Chile refused to negotiate. At this time he showed them his credentials that empowered him to sue for peace as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.⁶³ To avert the impending bombardment, Méndez Núñez stated that there were three stipulations with which Chile must comply. These were as follows: (1) Chile was to give a note to Méndez Núñez stating that Chile had had

⁶²Mess. and Doc., 1866-67, Pt. 2, #3, Kilpatrick to Seward, April 2, 1866. This particular report included many enclosures that encompassed the main meetings and interviews in which Kilpatrick participated, as well as the principal proclamations of both sides for the last two weeks of March.

⁶³Ferrocarril, March 27, 1866, p. 1. In the same lead article wherein Covarrubias is cited as saying that Méndez' offers to negotiate were without official character and that his orders precluded such arrangements, Méndez is later described as minister plenipotentiary. As Covarrubias, presumably and logically, was the source for the story, a question must be raised as to the sincerity of the Chilean Foreign Minister.

no intention nor wish to insult Spain in the actions complained of, and that the treaty between the two countries had not been broken, but only interrupted by the declaration of war. Chile was also to deliver up to Spain the Covadonga, together with her crew, armaments, and officers; (2) Spain, in return, was then to give a note to Chile stating that she did not desire to humiliate that country nor to seize any of her territory and that she held in great respect the independence of the South American republics. In exchange for the Covadonga Spain would return to the republic the twelve prizes captured in Chilean waters along with all of her Chilean prisoners; (3) Spain and Chile were to fire a reciprocal salute of twenty-one guns, Chile firing the first gun from one of her forts, and some vessel of the Spanish fleet replying, gun for gun. If this were agreed to, Méndez Núñez said that he would then proceed to Santiago in his capacity as diplomatic representative for the purpose of consummating a new treaty of peace. After stating his proposition to Kilpatrick and Rodgers, Méndez Núñez said that he would wait for a reply until eight o'clock on the morning of the twenty-seventh. If there were no satisfactory response by that time, more stringent measures were to be employed. Méndez further impressed upon the two Americans that this was not an official government communication, but that he had had orders to transmit these conditions

verbally in order to find out whether or not they would be accepted by the Chilean government if he were to present them formally.

Minister Covarrubias on the twenty-fifth in Santiago informed Kilpatrick that his country could not accept the proposed terms. Among other reasons that he gave for his refusal, he said that Chile could not accept peace while her sister republics were threatened, "nor could she exchange the Covadonga, a prize won in fair and open battle on open sea for any number of merchant vessels picked up by Spain in undefended ports."⁶⁴ Méndez Núñez, when informed of the Chilean attitude the following day, expressed his sympathy but said that his instructions left him no alternative other than to carry out a bombardment of Valparaíso which would take place in four days, on March 31, 1866.

In Santiago too, the atmosphere was tense, and according to observers a war psychology prevailed.⁶⁵ On every street corner and in every place of business all talk was of the impending catastrophe and there was a determination to sacrifice every port on the coast rather than yield to Spanish demands.

⁶⁴Ferrocarril, March 27, 1866, p. 1.
New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 3.

⁶⁵New York Tribune, May 10, 1866, p. 8.


Such great determination to sacrifice a beautiful city rather than fire a mutual salute! A student of history must admire the spirit, yet his next reaction must be one of curiosity. Precisely how much did the people know of the latest Spanish terms? Were the Chileans aware that their own government had rejected flatly every proposal that Méndez Núñez had extended? An examination of the country's leading newspaper supports the contention that the people were not told of the conciliatory tone adopted by Méndez.

The young men of Santiago, especially the aristocrats, formed military organizations for the purpose of going to Valparaíso. "Everywhere the same spirit of devotion to the cause of Chile was displayed and the government was offered from all quarters men and material to prosecute the war."⁶⁶ Yet, at no time prior to the bombardment did the government make any serious effort to fortify the coast towns or to resist the enemy.

Hope still existed that the bombardment might be averted through the intervention of the diplomatic corps. In Santiago a special train was assigned to transport the diplomatic corps to Valparaíso, and the special Chile correspondent of the New York Herald accompanied the group. As they approached Valparaíso,

⁶⁶New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 3.

they saw other trains full of people fleeing from the coast. There was evidenced considerable alarm, but no panic. Carts and every other means of transport were being utilized to move property to safety. The harbor appeared quiet with the American fleet close to shore, the British beyond, and the Spanish still further out. (See Map 1.) The American



Commander Rodgers had been given to understand by the British captain that he, Denman, would not permit the bombardment. This was the situation on the night of the twenty-sixth.

The following morning Kilpatrick visited Méndez Núñez on the Numancia to inform him that the Chileans had declined

to accept his propositions.⁶⁷ The Spanish Commander then addressed a note to the consular corps, giving them official notification of the impending bombardment.⁶⁸ By this action, as many others, Méndez' attitude provided a definite contrast to the behavior of Pareja, as when the late Commander announced his brusque ultimatum directly to the Chilean government. In his note to Kilpatrick, Méndez reiterated the complaints of his country. He stated that Spain would have been justified in this resort to force even at an earlier period, but that in keeping with the proverbial generosity of the Spanish people a last attempt to reach a solution by diplomatic means had been made. He further claimed that the justice of Spain's cause had been recognized by the two leading powers of Europe in their offer of good offices to reach an amicable settlement. Spain had accepted this offer in her desire to establish the peace, but the attitude of Chile had precluded this possibility. If Chile were to suffer as the result of the bombardment, she must take the blame for having provoked such action. When Spain had attempted to carry on legitimate warfare with Chile, the allied ships had persisted in hiding in small coves where the Spanish ships could not get at them to fight. Méndez

⁶⁷Ferrocarril, March 27, 1866, p. 2.

⁶⁸Bombardement de Valparaiso, Documents Officiels (Paris: Imprimerie Vallée, 1866), p. 21.

wrote that while he personally felt that the bombardment was a terrible thing, that it was legitimate and the only means open to Spain. Any consequent damage to neutral interests would be the responsibility of the republic. Kilpatrick felt that the bombardment would be an act of vandalism, and he did all in his power to prevent it. Later, he advised Secretary Seward that he did not feel that the United States could risk the certainty of war with Spain when the United States had so recently emerged from its own bloody Civil War. It might be noted that Kilpatrick having been a general in the Civil War would naturally have been more aware of and antipathetical to useless destructions.

On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh the members of the diplomatic body were invited to assemble in the rooms of Kilpatrick to consider what steps might next be taken to prevent the bombardment, especially in view of the fact that most of the interests in the defenseless city were those of Europeans and Americans. Up to this point it had been the British who had taken the strongest stand in insisting that the bombardment would not be allowed to take place. "The Chilean Government declare that Mr. Thomson had assured them that as long as Valparaiso remained undefended it could not be attacked, and that if any fortifications were built or arms used, England

would make Chili answerable for all the property of British subjects that might be lost or destroyed."⁶⁹ It now appeared that they were not willing to back up their words with action. The newspapers reported the situation to be one of great disappointment, but this seems a mild term. British merchants particularly resented this backing off; they paid taxes to their government and felt, with justification, that they were entitled to protection in return.⁷⁰ While this diplomatic activity was transpiring the population continued to evacuate the port. The atmosphere of impending doom was heightened by a minor earthquake that occurred about mid-night on the twenty-seventh.

The next morning at another meeting of the diplomats, Kilpatrick received petitions from various consuls requesting his interference and protection, but he made it explicit that the United States fleet would not act alone to prevent the action of the Spanish squadron. The British Minister, Mr. Thomson, failed to attend this meeting and an interesting description of his activities was painted by the Herald

⁶⁹Times (London), May 15, 1866, p. 13.

⁷⁰Evidence was assembled by the British merchants of Valparaiso attempting to prove the duplicity of Thomson and Denman. This was presented in the House of Commons on May 15, 1866, in a speech by the under secretary of state for foreign affairs. As a result Thomson was removed from his post.

correspondent. ". . . at the very hour when he promised to meet the other ministers, he took the feeble old French minister under his arm, and ran away by train to Santiago. This conduct is rendered more ridiculous by the fact that he had bored the intendente until after mid-night with importunities for a special train to carry him off in the dark. His departure, although intended by him to be very sly, did not escape the notice of the citizens, a large number of whom, including many British merchants, hissed him as he entered the car."⁷¹

On the morning of March twenty-eighth Kilpatrick, in the name of the United States government, addressed a final communication to the Spanish Admiral protesting the forthcoming bombardment. There was no answer. Later in the morning all the members of the diplomatic corps that were in Valparaíso called on the American Minister to thank him for his efforts in attempting to arrange a peaceful settlement. The foreign consuls also addressed petitions for protection to Commodore Rodgers. He replied that, unfortunately, without British cooperation he felt that there was little to be done.

Two days before the scheduled bombardment, the commander of the American naval forces paid another visit to Méndez. It is not clear from either the diplomatic sources or the newspaper

⁷¹New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 3.

accounts whether this preceded his reply to the consular body or not, but in any case it must have been an interesting interview. The report of this meeting was sent by Méndez to the Spanish minister in Washington. It appeared soon after in La Crónica, a Spanish paper printed in New York, and a few days after in the Herald. According to the Spanish account, Rodgers said at this time that although he was opposed to the bombardment he was now convinced that Spain was in the right since the Chileans had refused in no uncertain terms the satisfaction asked by Spain. In essence, this satisfaction had amounted to nothing more than that Chile was to fire the first shot which was to be answered by the Spanish. Rodgers said that he intended to move his ships out of the way, but that he first insisted on proposing one last plan.⁷² According to this plan, Méndez was to write a manifesto stating that nothing could prevent the bombardment; nevertheless, the action would not be carried out and Valparaíso would be saved. The Spanish Admiral said that by so doing he would incur heavy responsibility, but that for the sake of peace he would try it on the condition that some member of the Chilean government would guarantee to him personally in the presence of the United States minister that such generosity would be appreciated and

⁷²In Kilpatrick's dispatch to Seward, of April 2, 1866, Kilpatrick appears to credit this plan to Méndez.

reciprocated. Rodgers presented the plan to the Chilean government, but it was bluntly refused. Covarrubias, well aware of the irritation of the Spaniards at not having been able to engage in naval warfare with the allied fleet in the south, made a counterproposal for a naval duel between the forces of the two sides. This was to take place ten miles from shore, without the participation of the Numancia, and with the American commander acting as umpire. The result of the combat was to determine the close of the war. Rodgers apparently found this reply by Covarrubias on the thirtieth as disgusting as did Méndez Núñez.⁷³ Rodgers felt that Méndez had done all that he could to arrange a settlement and had acted in a dignified way, but that his instructions now left him no other alternative. He expressed warm admiration for the conduct of the Admiral.⁷⁴

The last hope for the city had been abandoned, and by the night of the thirtieth there was nothing to do but wait. Total silence reigned in the city. Foreign Minister Covarrubias and President Pérez had come down from Santiago on the

⁷³New York Herald, May 10, 1866, p. 3.

⁷⁴Bombardement de Valparaiso, Méndez Núñez to the Spanish foreign minister, March 27, 1866, pp. 42-43.

twenty-ninth. The latter in his proclamation to the Chilean people said that the bombardment would be the scandal of the nineteenth century, that the glory of ancient Spain would vanish by such a deed, but that the Chileans would know how to comport themselves with honor to their nation.⁷⁵ The moon was bright that night, but at 10:00 P.M. a total eclipse added to the gloom of the city.

Saturday morning, the thirty-first, dawned clear and beautiful with the bay still, "thousands covered the hills while the city was as still as if the plague had cleared it of inhabitants."⁷⁶ At 7:00 A.M., an hour before the action was to begin, the Spanish ships had their steam up to move in as the British ships, followed by the American, moved out of the harbor. (See Map 2.) At the appointed hour, white flags flying over the hospitals and churches as Méndez Núñez had instructed, the Chilean flag waving from the fortress on the hill overlooking the town, the Spanish fired two blank shots to signal that the bombardment was to begin. The attack was carried out in much the same way as a tactical bombing raid by a plane. The Spanish ships moved in firing with their

⁷⁵Bombardement de Valparaíso, Proclamation of President Pérez, March 29, 1866, pp. 42-43.

⁷⁶New York Herald, May 2, 1866, p. 4.


starboard guns upon the customs houses. They followed the arc of the beach, hitting next the Bolsa, then the governor's palace and other public buildings. As soon as their guns were out of range, they turned and circled back firing indiscriminately with their port guns on the city. The Villa de Madrid, the flagship of the late Admiral Pareja, and the Blanca kept up the heaviest fire, and according to the Herald's eye-witness account these two ships even had to raise their guns in order to bring down the Chilean flag waving from the fortress. It was at this time that many of the churches and hospitals were shelled. As soon as Méndez Núñez realized that this was happening, he ordered his squadron to complete the destruction of the customs houses and then to cease with the bombardment.

Immediately after the firing stopped, firemen rushed out to extinguish the flames that were spreading rapidly. The inhabitants who had been watching the scene from the hills streamed back down into the city. The British and American ships returned to their former positions in the harbor as the Spanish sailed out. Remarkable order was reported in the city where seven hundred United States sailors assisted in quelling the blazes. One hundred British sailors also tendered their aid, but this was refused.⁷⁷ On April 1, 1866, the day

⁷⁷The Bombardment of Valparaiso, Rear-Admiral Denman,

following the bombardment Commodore Rodgers went on board the Numancia. Méndez Núñez informed him at this time that there would be no immediate repetition of the bombardment. The alarm of the city died down, the street cars were soon running again, as were the trains to the capital, and the Sunday Easter services were celebrated in the churches as usual.

Mr. Layard, and the British Community of Valparaiso (Liverpool: n. pub., 1885), pp. 23-24. In a letter of Kilpatrick to U.S. Consul Clark in Valparaiso on July 28, 1866, the former quoted Denman as saying that ". . . when time comes for action I will cooperate with the American navy and go as far as you." Later, however, in his published report Denman claimed that he had never given any positive assurance to interfere. Chilean feeling was extremely anti-British at this time because of the vacillating policy of Denman.



Map 2.-This map shows the burned portions of the city, the locations of most of the public buildings, and the positions of the various fleets.

MEXICO

"It would be easier for two continents to meet than to reconcile the spirits of the two countries Spain and Mexico . . . There [Mexico] the struggle continues by dint of human and every other type of sacrifice, for the Spaniards spare nothing that might enable them to subdue those who have had the misfortune of being born on this soil, which appears to be destined to flow with the blood of its offspring. In spite of everything, Mexicans will be free. . . . The time has come at last to repay the Spanish torture for torture and to drown that race of annihilators in its own blood or in the sea."¹

In Mexico the year 1861 opened on the hopeful note of the triumph of constitutional government over usurpation. Benito Juarez had victoriously returned to the capital in December of 1860. The liberal success was hailed as the precursor of great changes and improvements for Mexico. People were hopeful that the power of the clergy would be reduced, and that Mexico would now be able to encourage investments, develop her resources, and realize her potential as a united, progressive nation.² Although this study begins with January 1, 1861, it is vital to realize that for over a year just prior to this there had been almost constant strife between an anti-republican coalition and the liberal forces. The

¹Bierck, Selected Writings of Bolívar, Vol. 1, pp. 105-107.

²New York Times, January 9, 1861, p. 4.

anti-republican coalition was composed of Miramon, Church, and conservative groups and was aided and encouraged by outsiders such as the Spanish Minister Pacheco. Of all the dissident groups in Mexico the most powerful was the Church party that Juarez had alienated irrevocably by the confiscation of their property. This move that had made the situation more difficult for him in his own country, and was to ease the opposition forces' task of convincing Louis Napoleon to intervene, had at the same time gained Juarez much support in the United States.³

Despite the presence of the constitutional government, the government de jure, in Mexico City, the country was anything but a smoothly functioning republic. It was not safe to travel from one city to another. Travelers were attacked so regularly that such an occurrence was scarcely newsworthy. Bands of guerrillas lived off the countryside. There were seventy to eighty generals in the country, many of whom were not loyal to Juarez. In actuality, for more than half a century Mexico had not been free of at least some degree of civil strife.

During the period that Benito Juarez, the legal president, had been forced to reside in Vera Cruz, the usurper

³New York Times, February 21, 1861, p. 4.

Miguel Miramon had incurred certain international obligations for which Mexico and Juarez were to be held accountable. The intervention that was the outgrowth of the British, French, and Spanish claims, and the reaction of the United States to that intervention comprise the international incident with which this section is concerned.

Spain's specific complaints against Mexico were based on the repudiation of the Mon-Almonte Treaty and the expulsion of the Spanish minister, Joaquín Pacheco, by the Juarez government. The Mon-Almonte Treaty, signed on November 26, 1859, had been denounced by the liberals as an outrage from the time that its terms had become known. The most offensive provisions seem to have been those that dealt with recognition of the claims of Spanish citizens against the Mexican government, and the reactivation of the Mexican-Spanish Treaty of 1853. As for Pacheco, according to the London Times, with the exception of Spain, "The conduct of the Juarez Government in handing to Señor Pacheco his passport has been universally approved; he had so completely identified with the Miramon faction that there was no other course left open to them."⁴

The Jecker transactions provided France with an excuse to pressure the Juarez government. Miramon had attempted to

⁴Times (London), March 9, 1861, p. 9.

remedy an ever-present deficit by means of a relatively involved loan from the adventuring, unscrupulous banker Jecker. The crux of the arrangement was that the Miramon government was to receive approximately \$600,000, for which the total repayment would amount to \$15,000,000. Naturally, the liberal government refused to consider Mexico liable for any such obligation.

Due to the conditions of near-anarchy that prevailed in the country, British citizens had long been concerned for the safety of large investments in Mexico, as well as over twelve million pounds sterling that was owed to Englishmen by the Mexican government.⁵ The British government itself became involved in the Mexican situation when a large sum of money was stolen from the British Embassy by the Miramon forces late in 1860.

All three countries proposed intervention as a way of establishing order and enabling the Mexican government to institute the controls necessary for the protection of the lives and property of their subjects.

Occupied as she was with her own disturbed internal conditions in the 1860's, it is not surprising that the United States focused so little attention on the state of affairs of

⁵Times (London), September 18, 1861, p. 10.

her sister republic in the early part of the decade. Rumors of anarchy and revolution in Mexico were rife, but the situation was quite imperfectly understood according to Secretary Seward. That Seward was cognizant of Mexico's internal situation and of the widely current rumors of possible European intervention is shown by his dispatch of April 6, 1861, to Thomas Corwin, United States Minister to Mexico. "For a few years past the condition of Mexico has been so unsettled as to raise the question on both sides of the Atlantic whether the time has not come when some foreign power ought, in the general interest of society, to intervene to establish a protectorate or some other form of government in that country and guaranty its continuance there. Such schemes may even now be held under consideration by some European nations, and there is also reason to believe that designs have been conceived in some parts of the United States to effect either a partial dismemberment or a complete overthrow of the Mexican government, with a view to extend over it the authority of the newly projected confederacy which a discontented part of our people are attempting to establish in the southern part of our own country."⁶

⁶U.S. Congress, H.R., The Present Condition of Mexico, Serial 1136, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, H.R. Ex. Doc. #100, #2, Seward to Corwin, April 6, 1861. Hereafter cited as Serial 1136.

Seemingly, the Lincoln administration displayed an appreciation of the importance of Mexican-United States relations by appointing an unusually able man to fill the post of minister. Thomas Corwin was politically knowledgeable, had a background in international relations, was accustomed to dealing with all types of people, was experienced in financial matters, and was aware of the need to guard against activities of agents of the Confederate States of America. The following quotations from a dispatch to Seward, written after Corwin had been in Mexico less than three months, are as illustrative of the author as they are of the situation in Mexico.

After giving an over-all description of the military, political, and social picture in the Federal District and the surrounding states, he wrote "Still, I do not despair of the final triumph of free government in Mexico. Progress has been made. The signs of regeneration, though few, are still visible. Had the present liberal party enough money at command to pay an army of ten thousand men, I am satisfied it could suppress the present opposition, restore order, and preserve internal peace. These once achieved, the leaders of this party would adhere to the written constitution and enforce obedience to law; . . . I am persuaded that the pecuniary resources to effect these objects at this time must come from

abroad."⁷ Other information in this same dispatch from Corwin reinforced Seward's suspicions as to European intentions toward Mexico. "Spain, in her rising fortunes, can not but desire to repossess herself of her lost American colonies. . . . France and England now have under consideration the project of intervention in Mexican affairs."

As Mexico's most immediate need was money, both for daily functioning and to fulfill foreign obligations, Corwin hoped to negotiate a treaty for the loan of United States funds to enable Mexico to meet the interest payments on her debts to Britain and to France. At the same time he was sufficiently realistic to predict that such a proposal would meet with little favor in his own country. He realized that domestic problems were, quite properly, the prime concern of the people in the United States. He felt, however, that the Union cause would be served by promoting the cause of human progress throughout the western hemisphere.

The United States Minister was also anxious to ascertain to what extent the Lincoln administration would support the position taken by the previous administration vis-à-vis Mexico. The most recent enunciation of that stand had been stated in a circular of December 1860, which said that while the United

⁷ Serial 1136, #2, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861.

States did not deny to any nation the right to demand redress for injuries suffered, that the right to interfere directly or indirectly with the political independence of Mexico was denied. Further, the United States would, to the extent of its power, defend the nationality and independence of Mexico.⁸

Clearly, in the light of the events which had transpired in the United States between December of 1860, and July of 1861, it is obvious that the Lincoln administration was unable to assume the same tone toward Mexico as that maintained by the Buchanan administration. Nonetheless, President Lincoln was aware of and sympathetic to the position of the Juarez government and said that he believed that "the safety, welfare, and happiness" of the United States and of the other American nations would best be assured by Mexican retention of her own independence and integrity.⁹

Corwin was empowered to negotiate a loan treaty by which the United States, upon the pledge by Mexico of certain of her mineral lands as security, would assume the interest payments to Britain and France on the Mexican debt. The principal of this debt was understood to be about sixty-two million dollars.

⁸Serial 1136, #3, Corwin to Seward, July 3, 1861, with enclosure of La Reintrie to the ministers of the other foreign powers in Mexico, December 20, 1860.

⁹Ibid., #2, Seward to Corwin, April 6, 1861.

Such an agreement between the United States and Mexico was to be subject to the approval of Britain and France. Corwin feared that the pledge of Mexican land would be unpalatable to the European nations who might use such an arrangement as an additional excuse for intervention in order to preclude the development of a predominant American influence in Mexico. Yet at the same time, in a second dispatch, Corwin, too, had shown a realization that the only chance of obtaining Congressional approval for a Mexican loan would be by offering attractive security. As regards the terms of the proposed Mexican loan, there seems to have been a consensus among the top members of the administration. Seward was unwilling to attempt to secure a loan under any other conditions, nor did President Lincoln feel that any other action would be feasible at that time.¹⁰

Some understanding of the limitations that hampered the Secretary of State in attempting to aid the Juarez government can be gained from the following excerpts from one of his early dispatches to Corwin. "We are now necessarily paying out of the treasury nearly a million a day, rendered necessary for the organization, all of a sudden, of a great army and a considerable navy. We could not hope to satisfy the country that it would be expedient to send five or ten millions of money into

¹⁰Serial 1136, #23, Seward to Corwin, October 2, 1861.

Mexico until our own military and naval preparations shall have been perfected and we shall begin to see the insurrectionary movement distinctly recoil or subside. . . . The Congress of the United States, . . . are justly jealous of executive attempts . . . to enter into engagements with foreign countries which may have a bearing upon the export trade of our country. If it should be thought wise to institute negotiations of either kind, it would be best to ask the Senate for its advice in the first instance, and not to negotiate a treaty first and afterwards ask the Senate for its ratification."¹¹

In the same dispatch from which the above was cited, a note of premonition can be detected in the Secretary of State's comment that explanations of their rumored armed expedition against Mexico would be asked of the European powers.

The rumored intervention had been brought nearer realization by the action taken by the Mexican Congress on July 17, 1861, when they passed a decree suspending for a period of two years the payments on all debts due to Britain and France. This suspension of payments was the result of dire necessity. Not only was all of Mexico in a state of turmoil in the general

¹¹Serial 1136, #23, Seward to Corwin, October 2, 1861.

sense, but there were no tax assessors or tax collectors, nor could most of the people have paid taxes even had there been. At this particular time even the forced loan had lost some of its dependability; that is, as a measure utilizable by the formal government, armed bands were still finding the forced loan a profitable form of fund-raising. Under these conditions, the Mexican Congress could see no way of handling the foreign debt. Sir Charles Wyke, British Minister, and M. Saligny, French Minister, protested that they had no confidence in the Mexican remedy and both threatened to break relations if the decree were not repealed at once.¹² They remained firm on this point, despite the recognized principles of international law that were cited by Mexican Foreign Minister Zamacona in order to justify the measure.¹³ Zamacona felt morally as well as legally justified in his position as he gave much of the credit for the political difficulties then extant in Mexico to

¹²Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, September 21, 1861, Enc. 16, Saligny to Zamacona, July 25, 1861, and Enc. 18, Wyke to Zamacona, July 25, 1861, pp. 86-87.

¹³M. Emerich Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. Joseph Chitty (Philadelphia: Johnson & Co., 1856), p. 450. In reference to breaking treaties or individual articles of treaties, Vattel said, "But, if a real impediment stand in the way, time must be allowed; for no one is bound to perform impossibilities. And for the same reason, if any insurmountable obstacle should render the execution of an article not only impracticable for the present, but forever impossible, no blame is imputable to him who had engaged for the performance of it; nor can his inability furnish the other party with a handle for annulling the treaty."

the foreign diplomats. He said that Mexican public opinion was that these diplomats were guilty of recognizing and giving moral support to the rebels.

From mid-summer of 1861 on, tension continued to build. There was a supposed attempt against the life of the French minister in Mexico. While at the time this created much excitement and resentment, subsequent investigation proved that the whole incident had been accidental. From the tone of her press, Britain was also desirous of action against Mexico. It is interesting to note that the London Times placed much emphasis upon making the whole intervention intrigue acceptable to the United States, evidently in order to minimize the possibility of interference.¹⁴ Aside from Spanish annoyance with the Juarez government in connection with the two previously mentioned questions, the expulsion of Pacheco and the repudiation of the Mon-Almonte Treaty, it was rumored that she had other motives for wanting to take definite action against Mexico. As early as May 13, 1861, the London Times had carried an article to the effect that "Spain's opportunity has come--another prodigal child may be returned to the fold as has been Santo Domingo."¹⁵ These same sentiments were also

¹⁴Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, September 21, 1861, Enc. 26, Fuente to Zamacona, September 5, 1861, p. 99.

¹⁵New York Herald, May 28, 1861, p. 5.

current in official circles. In November, Minister Corwin wrote, "I agree with Schurz [United States minister to Spain] that it is the desire of Spain to regain her dominion over this country and to establish here a monarchy . . . I think that Spain will desire to seize the entire government of Mexico and re-establish her power here."¹⁶ On September 30, 1861, Romero had written to Seward that it seemed certain that these three powers were determined to combine in taking aggressive action against his country.¹⁷

Matias Romero, the Mexican minister to the United States, proved to be extraordinarily successful in fulfilling his instructions "to cultivate with care the sympathies of the government, and to strengthen the conviction in regard to the similarity of interests," which bound the United States and Mexico.¹⁸ These instructions bear a remarkable similarity to those given to Vicuña Mackenna prior to his departure from Chile in 1865. One indication of the extent of Romero's success was that he was kept informed of what transpired during secret cabinet meetings. This accomplishment alone would have been considered

¹⁶Serial 1136, #8, Corwin to Seward, November 29, 1861. New York Tribune, September 29, 1861, p. 4.

¹⁷Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, September 30, 1861, pp. 101-103.

¹⁸Ibid., Romero to Seward, September 21, 1861, Enc. 1, Zamacona to Romero of July 29, 1861, p. 52.

quite a feat even for a more experienced diplomat.¹⁹ As a means of keeping the United States informed about the problems of the Mexican government, Mr. Romero transmitted copies of much of the Mexican correspondence to Secretary Seward. By so doing, Romero permitted the United States to gain a deeper insight into Mexican affairs than it would have been possible to gain from the Corwin dispatches alone.

At the end of October, 1861, the anticipated tri-partite treaty was signed. In it the three signatories, Britain, France, and Spain, bound themselves to exercise no influence over internal affairs in Mexico, and to allow Mexico free choice and determination of her form of government.²⁰ Romero interpreted this treaty as an action by enemies of the republic who, having failed in an attempt to overthrow the constitution, were now seeking outside aid to attain their goal.²¹

¹⁹Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 424.

²⁰Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, November 23, 1861, Enc. of London Convention of October 31, 1861, p. 135.

²¹Ibid., Romero to Seward, November 28, 1861, p. 138.

II

Due to the lack of dependable, rapid means of communication, the opinions about the tri-partite convention and subsequent intervention that were reported by United States diplomats that were assigned to the several countries were of particular aid to Seward. This supplementary information also assists the student in gaining a more complete picture of the time.

Prior to the three power meeting in London, Minister Charles Francis Adams had reported to Seward that there existed great demand from those with commercial interests in Mexico for British intervention on their behalf. Adams predicted that Spain, encouraged by her successes in Santo Domingo, would probably be the main instigator in any aggressive undertaking, and that a monarchy could be established only with the cooperation of large forces. He further prophesied that the effect of this would be, inevitably, a closer alliance of the American republics,²² and that much vigilance would be necessary on the part of the United States.²³ At the

²²The Pan-American idea was frequently set forth by U.S. opinion leaders of the era as a goal to be desired and very likely soon to be attained by the South American countries.

²³Serial 1136, #46, Adams to Seward, September 19, 1861.

same time, the British were concerned as to what action the United States might take. Lord Russell, British Foreign Minister, wrote to Mr. Wyke in September that the British government was opposed to forcible interference in the internal affairs of Mexico. "Without yielding to the extravagant pretention implied by what is called the Monroe Doctrine . . . it would be unwise to provoke the ill-feeling of North America unless some paramount object were in prospect and tolerable sure of attainment."²⁴

Minister Adams substantiated Mr. Corwin's opinion that the European nations were distrustful of any loan from the United States to Mexico. "The customary view . . . is that the United States in due course expects to absorb the whole country."²⁵ Certain items in the United States press would tend to support this assertion. In an editorial, Mr. Barnes of the Detroit Free Press advocated the extension of the Union from the Gulf of Mexico to the St. Lawrence River.²⁶ A few months earlier Mr. Bennett of the New York Herald had a slightly

²⁴Serial 1136, #45, Russell to Wyke, September 30, 1861.

²⁵Ibid., #66, Adams to Seward, November 1, 1861.

²⁶Detroit Free Press, February 7, 1862, p. 3.

different suggestion, he suggested that Mexico become a Negro nation, as freed slaves from the United States could move there and populate the country.²⁷

Early in 1862 Mr. Adams reported that Britain had evidently become more deeply involved in the intervention than the country cared to be. He wrote that many of the people in Great Britain were indicating an unwillingness to continue with the Mexican venture.²⁸ The United States' position on the intervention was clarified for Adams by Seward's next dispatch, wherein President Lincoln's views were set forth. The President, wrote Seward, did not doubt the sincerity of the allies, but he felt it to be his duty to express to them that a monarchical government that was founded in Mexico by foreign navies and armies had no prospect of security or permanency. The President felt that the emancipation of this continent from European control had been the principle feature in its history. The fact that the Senate had not yet given official sanction to the proposed Mexican loan was, according to the Secretary, purely a domestic question. It would therefore, be erroneous to question the support of the American

²⁷New York Herald, July 20, 1861, p. 5.

²⁸Serial 1136, #115, Adams to Seward, February 14, 1862.

people for the republican system in Mexico.²⁹

The sentiments that Minister William Dayton reported from Paris were similar to those described in the earlier Adams dispatches cited above. The French, while opposing any United States loan to Mexico, were continually stressing that they had no territorial designs but sought only due redress.³⁰ It is interesting to note the change which took place within a few months, as may be seen from Seward's dispatches to Dayton. In November of 1861, Seward expressed deep concern over the proceedings in Spain, France, and Great Britain in regard to the Mexican situation, but commented that the "affects on our own interests are likely to be only incidental."³¹ By March of 1862, Seward was writing, "We cannot shut our eyes to the indications . . . France . . . proposes to subvert the republican American system in Mexico and to set up a throne."³²

Carl Schurz, United States Minister in Madrid, reported

²⁹Serial 1136, #198, Seward to Adams, March 3, 1862. As the Senate had rejected the proposal on February 25, 1862, this seems to have been an instance of Seward using regular diplomatic channels for propaganda purposes.

³⁰Ibid., #51, Dayton to Seward, February 27, 1861.

³¹Ibid., #79. Seward to Dayton, November 4, 1861. One must wonder if the comment in fn. 29 might not be equally applicable here, especially in view of the negotiations for a U.S. loan to Mexico that were in progress.

³²Ibid., #135, Seward to Dayton, March 31, 1862.

that the public opinion in Spain sanctioned warlike measures for redress, as Mexico had refused to fulfill her treaty obligations. He wrote that most of the Spanish journals favored action.³³ Perhaps because Spain assumed a somewhat more belligerent attitude at this time than did either Britain or France, in writing to Schurz, Secretary Seward said, "I will add only that in any case, whether Spain shall proceed alone or in conjunction with other powers in her hostility to Mexico, on account of the nearness of that country to our own, we shall expect the utmost care to be taken on her part that no rights of American citizens in Mexico, nor any rights of this government and territories contiguous to the seat of war, shall be disturbed or affected. With that view we shall always have a naval force near the scene of possible conflict."³⁴

Spain's desire and intention to regain hegemony over Mexico was supported by documents transmitted to Secretary Seward by Romero. One of these was the copy of an address by Señor Martínez de la Rosa to Queen Isabel II on November 19, 1862, in which he said that the "Spanish soldiers, crowned with abundant laurels on the African coast . . . are now preparing . . . if necessary to hoist again in Mexico the stan-

³³Serial 1136, #15, Schurz to Seward, September 7, 1861.

³⁴Ibid., #37, Seward to Schurz, October 14, 1861.

dard of Hernan Cortés." This same tone can be observed in another speech, one given by the president of the Spanish Senate, the Marquis del Duero. The Marquis expressed his pleasure in hearing that energetic measures were to be taken for "the necessity of having a government [in Mexico] really in harmony with the requirements of so rich a country."³⁵

Contemporaneously with the tri-partite negotiations, Thomas Corwin was attempting to conclude a loan treaty with Mexico. Apparently the main obstacle in the treaty negotiations was the reaction of the Mexican Congress to the security demanded by the United States. Thus, after he received the announcement of the signing of the London Convention, Corwin notified Secretary Seward that he had discontinued discussions on the proposed United States-Mexican treaty. In explanation of his action, Corwin said (1) that he understood that the loan was to have been a means for preventing foreign intervention in Mexico; and (2) that the Mexican Congress had by a two to one vote rejected a mutually beneficial British-Mexican treaty.³⁶

The Mexican Congress granted virtually all governmental power to Juarez and the cabinet and then adjourned after

³⁵Serial 1136, Romero to Seward, Enclosures, November 28, 1861, p. 161.

³⁶Ibid., #8, Corwin to Seward, November 29, 1861.

repealing the decree of July seventeenth. The repeal had come too late, for Minister Wyke had demanded his passport and departed for London.

Thomas Corwin thought that it was likely that the intervention would result in treaties with Britain, France, and Spain that would give away a large part of Mexico's revenue in order to pay the interest on her debts to the three countries. Corwin requested that he be informed as to whether or not he were still at liberty to loan Mexico about the same amount as before, as he wrote Seward, "Such a loan will be absolutely necessary to the very existence of government and law in Mexico."³⁷ He emphasized that the loan would be especially important to protect Mexican independence if the Mexican Congress were to treat all the countries as they did the proposed treaty with Great Britain; this treaty, he said, had been "madly rejected" by that body.

Corwin then drew up a treaty for two million dollars less than the original and submitted it to the Mexican cabinet to determine if they would pass it if it were to be proposed. On December twenty-fourth, Corwin again requested instructions as to United States policy regarding a loan to Mexico.

Seward remained cautiously hopeful that the Mexican

³⁷Serial 1136, #11, Corwin to Seward, December 24, 1861.

question could be resolved without war, and that Mexico could retain its independence, if necessary, with the aid of a loan from the United States. Early in December, writing to Corwin in reference to the original treaty, Seward said, "I am hoping every day to receive that convention, and though I have only a very imperfect knowledge of the stipulations which it will contain, I willingly hope and am ready to believe that it may find speedy favor with the President and the Senate."³⁸

Late the following month Seward informed Corwin that early in the (then) present session of Congress President Lincoln had submitted to the Senate Corwin's project of a treaty with Mexico and had asked for the Senate's advice on the matter. Seward added that the Senate had delayed action on the issue in order to get more information from Corwin as to the state of the country. In mid-February, Seward expressed approval of whatever Corwin deemed possible to aid Mexico with her financial problems; yet on February twenty-eighth Seward had to inform Corwin that the Senate felt that any action involving loans would be inadvisable.

Both Lincoln and Seward, while most anxious to help Mexico, were forced by the exigencies of the internal conditions of the United States to give prime consideration to

³⁸Serial 1136, #32, Seward to Corwin, December 5, 1861.

retaining the cooperation of the Congress. The Civil War was also the reason for dealing so circumspectly with Britain, France, and Spain.

United States concern for Mexico was exemplified by Seward's response to the European powers at the time of their invitation to the United States to join the tri-partite pact. In his note of refusal in which he set forth President Lincoln's views on the anticipated intervention, Seward stated that the President did not question the right of countries to resort to war for the redress of grievances, nevertheless, the United States had a deep interest in Mexico. Seward indicated pleasure that the intervening powers had neither territorial designs nor any intention of impairing the right of Mexico to choose her own government. In this same note he also explained that Minister Corwin had been empowered to grant aid to Mexico not because of antipathy toward those seeking redress, but rather in the hope of avoiding hostilities.

III

The first week in December, six thousand Spanish troops, destination Mexico, boarded ship in Havana amid the enthusiastic cheers of the Cuban populace. The British and French fleets, although invited to sail with the Spanish, had not received their orders and so were unable to accompany them.

The Spanish, whose arrival had been expected for the previous seven months, appeared in Vera Cruz on December 14, 1861. They took possession of the port without a shot being fired. In the name of Spain the intendente was ordered to surrender the port within twenty-four hours. There had been no formal declaration of war, nor was there to be one. The Spanish commander emphasized that there would be no interference in internal issues. He also stipulated that Mexico must provide protection for the foreign residents of the city until the occupation had been effected. The day following this ultimatum, the governor of Vera Cruz sent word that he would retire from the city. Despite the peaceful withdrawal from Vera Cruz, the Mexicans were determined to resist the invasion. When the British and the French forces did arrive, they were surprised to observe the Spanish flag flying over

the fortress of San Juan de Ulloa.³⁹

In recounting the details of the intervention, Minister Corwin wrote that the Spanish advances seemed to have been made without the consent of the French and the British, and that the British minister was quite surprised to learn of the turn of events.⁴⁰

President Juarez did not declare war but simply stated that force would be met with force, and decreed that the port of Vera Cruz was closed to foreign commerce as of December 14, 1861. The tone of his proclamation was softened by the statement that since 1836 the Spanish government had always been looked upon as a friendly power despite the expulsion of the Spanish Minister Pacheco. Juarez also said that the Spaniards resident in Mexico would continue to enjoy the same protection and consideration as they had prior to the Spanish landing; and that they would be punished only if they aided the invader.⁴¹

The Mexican flag was again hoisted over Vera Cruz in February subsequent to the movement of the allied troops to

³⁹New York Herald, January 15, 1862, p. 5.

⁴⁰Serial 1136, #11, Corwin to Seward, December 24, 1861.

⁴¹Ibid., Doblado to Seward, December 20, 1861, Enc. of Decree of President Juarez to the Governors of the Mexican States of December 17, 1861, p. 43-44.

the interior. The forces of the invading armies in Mexico had suffered greatly from the unhealthy conditions that were extant in the Vera Cruz area; thus, on February 19, 1862, the agreement of La Soledad was signed with the Mexicans allowing the allies to advance from Vera Cruz to the cities of Orizaba, Cordoba, and Techuacan.

While the humanitarian gesture embodied in the Soledad agreement gained favorable United States public mention for Juarez, it was also termed weak by some. Aside from the humanitarian considerations, however, Juarez might well have had other motives in signing the agreement. Even as the French Admiral Jurien de la Gravière claimed to have signed at Soledad only to gain time, so might have Juarez. Another possibility might have been that Juarez knew that a gesture of such magnanimity would be appreciated by the Spanish. That this is so, that it was well received, is attested to by General Prim, Commander of the Spanish forces. "Soledad was not merely a political expediency, but did save us much, many lives were saved. One does not make friends with weapons."⁴²

In addition to the two possible reasons mentioned above, Soledad, seemingly, yielded definite, immediate political benefits for Mexico. The allies agreed to the recognition of the

⁴²Genaro Estrada, Don Juan Prim y su Labor Diplomático en México, Vol. XXV: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano (México: n.p., 1928), p. 179.

legitimate Mexican government, to no internal interference, and to withdraw again to the coast in the event that the difficulties between the countries were not soon resolved by the conference that was to open at Orizaba on April fifteenth. The commander of at least one of the invading forces, Spain's General Prim, approached the Orizaba meeting with the sincere intent of abiding by the Soledad agreement. "Our purpose in addition to indemnity, is to help stabilize the country. It is not right, therefore, to lend aid to the opposition parties. If France thinks that it will be easy to set up a monarchy here, she is mistaken. Only a small number of men favor it and they are not the capable ones of the country. We should deal with the existing government, Juarez is recognized by nine-tenths of the population."⁴³

The French position soon proved to be the stumbling block to any settlement. Her intention to establish a monarchy was already a matter of common gossip. She created further ill-will by taking General Almonte, one of the opposition leaders, into the interior of the country under her protection. She fomented trouble in every possible way; for example, the day after La Soledad, Minister Saligny and the French Admiral sent a note

⁴³Estrada, Don Juan Prim, p. 77-78.

to Mexican Foreign Minister Doblado complaining of renewed annoyances that had been inflicted on their countrymen. When Doblado requested specific details, the French were unable to give any. The French note of complaint also accused the Mexicans of carrying out violent measures designed to stifle the "true public opinion" of the nation and they were warned not to take steps that would make a sham of French honor.⁴⁴

Whereas the allies would, despite their discomfiture at France's plans to establish a monarchy, support such a move; they became adamant in the matter of the Jecker claims. The extent of allied disaffection is best shown by again citing from General Prim. "If France does not support the London agreement then the conferences are ended. If France continues thus, Spain might retire. If I stay here to follow the trail of France it will be a disgrace to my Queen, a great expense to my countrymen, and subject us to the criticism of Britain and the United States . . . it would compromise the lives of the Spanish here. I would rather have France complaining and satisfy my duty as a good Spaniard."⁴⁵ Britain, too, threatened withdrawal if France continued on her announced course.

⁴⁴U.S. Congress, H.R., The Present Condition of Mexico, Serial 1162, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863, H.R. Ex. Doc. #54, Romero to Seward, May 10, 1862, Enc. 5 Saligny and Jurien to Doblado, April 9, 1862, p. 42. Hereafter cited as Serial 1162.

⁴⁵Estrada, Don Juan Prim, pp. 131-44.

In Washington, Minister Romero was loud in his denunciation of French action, attributing to France the intention to impose upon Mexicans institutions which they repudiated. Romero warned Seward that if democratic institutions were to perish in Mexico and his country to remain under the domination of Europe that the American Union would then find itself threatened with complications and dangers which might yet be avoidable.

It was natural that [~]Señor Romero, the representative of the Juarez government, should have complained of the plans and the activities of the allies. More unexpected was the following declaration of some French citizens resident in Mexico. "News of the rupture of the London Convention of October causes us astonishment . . . the note of the French commissioners has made us blush . . . their conduct is odious, and a blunder The French Revolution established the right of nations to choose governments suitable to them. . . . How can France assume to speak in the name of Europe when she enters on a course that Spain and Britain would not follow . . . Juarez was elected as freely as Napoleon III."⁴⁶

France's oft-rumored plans to establish a monarchy in Mexico were even more antipathetical to official opinion in

⁴⁶Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, June 2, 1862, Enc. 7, Declaration of Impartial French Democrats Resident in Mexico, April 15, 1862, p. 66.

the United States than they had proven to be to her allies.

"A monarchy in Mexico would fail without the support of European alliances, and the United States is opposed to it These views are grounded on some knowledge of political sentiments and habits in America. It is not to be doubted that the permanent interests and sympathies of this country would be with the other American republics."⁴⁷

Despite the obvious concern of Secretary Seward and President Lincoln regarding France's plans, the United States was then in no position to give Juarez the concrete assistance which he required, as already mentioned on page one hundred. In view of the fact that the total amount owed France by Mexico was approximately two hundred thousand dollars, aside from the Jecker claims, it would seem to have been a simple matter to have negotiated a loan for that amount. Senate opposition to a Mexican loan was said to be of three types, (1) those who feared that a loan would result in Mexico being brought into the Union, (2) those who felt it was beneath the national honor of the United States to treat at all with foreign nations regarding Mexico, and (3) those who feared that it would be harmful to the public credit to provide subsidies to

⁴⁷Serial 1136, # 198, Seward to Adams, March 3, 1862.

foreign states.

The refusal of the United States Senate to approve a loan treaty removed Juarez' last hope of eliminating all pretext for French troops to remain in Mexico. On April tenth, Saligny refused to deal any longer with the Juarez government. Britain and Spain accused France of violating the London Convention and, refusing to lend support to the French stand, withdrew their troops from the country.

A large section of the French press reported the withdrawal of the British and Spanish troops most unhappily; the United States press, however, was delighted. Reactions ranged from editorials to the effect that France would soon be withdrawing to predictions of a new Moscow for the Napoleon family. The predilections of the United States press undoubtedly account in part for the extensive coverage given to General Prim's Delmonico speech in New York, as well as to selected bits of his correspondence with Emperor Napoleon. With evident relish, the excerpt which follows was prominently reported in papers of all political tones. "It is a great honor for the Spanish to march with the French soldiers, but I prefer a greater challenge than Mexico--we are not justified in our action here, in my opinion, nor in bringing in Almonte, nor in bringing in others, nor in supporting Maximilian. Not many here favor

monarchy. . . . Closeness to the United States . . . has brought about a hatred of monarchy. It has been a republic for more than forty years. . . . far be it from me to suppose that you do not have the power to set up a monarchy--but there will not be any support for it."⁴⁸

The French and Spanish papers were not, however, at all pleased with Prim's speech; many were openly hostile. The hostile tone was muted somewhat when Queen Isabel made it known in both Paris and Madrid that she favored Prim's actions. Upon his return home, Prim expanded upon his position and clarified his policies in a speech to the Spanish Senate, some quotations from which follow. "Fortunately I speak of Mexico after several months, thus with a more temperate attitude. As French policy did not suit the interests of my country, I left. Spain does not have to be the instrument of any other power . . . the real situation is not known in Spain, even the press is unaware of it. . . . Many suppose the existence of a secret treaty, the Spanish government and documents refute this. It has been asked if I knew of the scheme for Maximilian before I left for Mexico. Yes, the government knew of it and I had instructions, but who would think of France wanting to impose him by cannon? . . . Many think there should have been no

⁴⁸Estrada, Don Juan Prim, pp. 107-109.

dealing with the Juarez government, this is senseless, we had to, if not it would have constituted intervention. To create another government would have been to declare war. The second day after our arrival at Vera Cruz the representatives of the three allied countries began stating their claims to each other. They did not know each other's claims until then. It was then that the Jecker claims were made, I did not know about them-- they are impossible.

"The belief in Spain that the conservatives in Mexico are the same as the ones here is not so. The Spanish there are mainly in the conservative party, but not all are good men. We here are too willing to believe what Spaniards write us from America, if one is maltreated, there are a hundred voices raised yelling for help from the government. Further, it is not true that the conservative party is Spanish and the liberal party Indian. Indians belong to no party . . . Juarez is Indian, but Almonte is Indian too."⁴⁹ In his address, Prim specified the instructions that he had received prior to embarkation. In addition he cited the main tenets of the London Convention, and recounted the details of the whole intervention and subsequent negotiations that led to the withdrawal of the British and the Spanish forces.

⁴⁹Estrada, Don Juan Prim, pp. 149-174.

Some aspects of the situation in Mexico as they were in June of 1862 were highlighted in a dispatch from Romero to Seward. Romero described how, after signing at Soledad, Mexico had removed the greater part of her troops, about sixteen thousand men, from Vera Cruz, thus demonstrating her faith in a peaceful settlement. He mentioned that the French residents of Puebla had witnessed their good treatment by sending a note of thanks to the Mexican government. Romero pointed out that despite a pledge not to interfere in the internal matters, according to article two of the London Convention, that the French had sent a warship to the island of Carmen in the state of Yucatán for the purpose of overthrowing the local authorities. The documents from the governors of Zacatecas and Jalisco that he enclosed showed that the opinion of the people of Mexico was decided, marked, and definitely in favor of the republican form of government. He concluded, "even plenipotentiaries of Britain and Spain who went to Mexico so convinced that the people wanted a monarchy, came to the realization that the existing government was sustained by public opinion and supported by the free will of the Mexicans."⁵⁰

Following the withdrawal of the British and Spanish troops, the French forces had returned to Vera Cruz where they

⁵⁰Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, June 28, 1862, p. 111.

awaited the arrival of reinforcements. From time to time there were small skirmishes between the Juaristas and bands of Mexican troops who had gone over to the French side. These were all duly reported as victories by both sides. The French were doing so little that some United States papers reported that they (the French) were on the verge of leaving the country. While the French were awaiting their reinforcements, Juarez used the time to fortify Puebla which he intended to use as the main bastion for the defense of Mexico City. Militarily speaking, the balance of 1862 in Mexico can be summarized as a series of intermittent conflicts of small units; of appointments, changes, and reappointments of Mexican generals; of arrivals of troops and equipment for the French; of illness among the French troops; and of French attempts to conquer Puebla. The year ended with the French laying siege to Puebla.

IV

January 1, 1863, was the effective date of the Emancipation Proclamation in the United States. Thus, as increasing numbers of Mexicans were losing their freedom, increasing numbers north of the border were gaining theirs.

The French forces, now under the command of General Forey, held Jalapa and Tampico in addition to maintaining Puebla under siege. The French were having difficulties in attempting to maintain communication lines between Orizaba and Vera Cruz. They found it necessary to keep guards posted at all times to keep Mexican guerrillas from cutting the lines. In addition to enemy-caused troubles, the French general was faced with the problem of epidemic smallpox among his troops. The seriousness and extent of the question of maintaining troop morale was pointed up by the frequent reports of French soldiers deserting and making application to become Mexican citizens.⁵¹

While the French troops were awaiting reinforcements, their dispatches reported, with monotonous regularity, skirmishes with and defeats of Mexican troops, difficulties with morale, and a lack of support from the Mexican natives. These reports,

⁵¹Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, January 28, 1863, pp. 467-69.

while disappointing to Louis Napoleon, were avidly seized and printed all over the United States. Editorial comment was not slow to follow. "There are moral laws against which physical means are powerless. France had no right to intervene in Mexico. . . . Meanwhile the people [Mexican] are as effectually fighting our battles as they are their own."⁵²

The last sentence in the immediately preceding quotation could well be an indication of the effectiveness with which Señor Romero had carried out his work in the United States. While in Washington, Romero had been doing his best to secure some sort of United States assistance by operating on the realistic assumption that this help would be most easily secured if it could be made evident that it was a matter of self-protection for the United States. The following is an example of Romero's efforts to establish this climate of opinion. "Payment of French claims can not have been the cause of the war. . . . it is indubitable that one of the objects of the expedition was to acquire a base of operations against the United States for the purpose of developing projects which the Emperor may have conceived against this country . . . he put off the expedition until such time as the United States

⁵²New York Herald, February 2, 1863, p. 4.

would have been unable to prevent it."⁵³

France was not alone in attempting to maintain a difficult position. Mexico's military picture had been rendered increasingly difficult by the executive order of President Lincoln on the preceding November twentieth that no arms or ammunition of any sort were to go out of the United States until further notice. Incidentally, much of Romero's public relations activities were for the purpose of having this decree repealed.

In addition to the military problems, which were aggravated by internecine strife among the generals, Juarez was endeavoring to carry on an orderly civil government in a chaotic country that had been in a state of turmoil for many years. The cost of living was rising, and the owners of large estates complained that they were no longer able to bear the ever-increasing costs of the government.

As a matter of policy, in order not to offend France during this particular phase of the Civil War, the administration was forced to maintain an ostensibly neutral posture toward the Mexican intervention. The same considerations did not prevent some members of Congress from becoming vociferously pro-Mexican.

⁵³Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, December 27, 1862, p. 443.

Senator MacDougal, on January 19, 1863, introduced a strongly worded resolution that was condemnatory of French actions in Mexico. In this resolution MacDougal also advocated that the United States aid Mexico so that Mexico would be able to prevent the future recurrence of a similar event. James Gordon Bennett, in an editorial, referred to the MacDougal resolution as one which expressed a view held by all of us. He did feel, however, that it was ill-timed. "We have always maintained that the true safeguard of Mexico--as well as of all the South American republics--against European aggression, and the only safeguard, is to be found in the preservation of the territorial integrity, and consequently the power, of the United States."⁵⁴ Sympathy for Mexico notwithstanding, the newspaperman's sentiment found reinforcement in the halls of Congress. Senator Sumner had tried to keep MacDougal from speaking on French movements in Mexico; he said that it would be almost a declaration of war. While Senator Sumner did not prevent the introduction of the resolution, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he was able to see that it was not reported out of committee.

Despite the somewhat testy tone of one note in which Drouyn Lhuys said that if the war with Mexico were unpleasant

⁵⁴New York Herald, January 23, 1863, p. 4.

to the United States, that we should remember that our war was injurious and unpleasant to them [the French]; France seemed particularly anxious during the first half of 1863 to develop and retain favorable opinion in the United States.

"Drouyn Lhuys said again that it would be bad policy for the United States to identify the policy of France with that of Britain, he knows our exasperation with Britain, and says that heretofore France has done nothing that we could complain of."⁵⁵

Seward's response reflected his necessary policy of nonantagonism. "Tell Drouyn . . . that the United States has no purpose to interfere in any way with the French-Mexican war. . . . It is notorious, that insurgents of the United States derive munitions of war, etc., chiefly through the British, carried in on vessels which pretend not a direct destination of our country . . . but to neutral ports . . . Matamoros is chief among these."⁵⁶

Contemporaneously, the French were achieving, at long last, military success at Puebla. It was an expensive success; the first fort that they captured there cost them 4,000 killed and wounded. The French capture of the city of Puebla on

⁵⁵Mess. and Doc., 1863-64, Pt. 2, #302, Dayton to Seward, April 27, 1863.

⁵⁶Ibid., #341, Seward to Dayton, May 8, 1863.

May sixteenth ended the formal Juarista resistance to French troops. At the time there were reports that Mexico City would be defended street by street. In order to spare the capital and to save the people needless suffering, it was decided not to defend the city. President Juarez, the members of the government, and the loyal troops evacuated the city prior to the arrival of the French. Once again the capital of the Republic of Mexico was wherever Benito Juarez happened to be.

United States response to this situation was succinctly stated in this editorial from the New York Herald, "It is a matter of course that the sympathies of the American people are wholly with the Mexicans, who are fighting a patriotic war. . . . The interests of this government are tightly bound up in the fate of the Mexican republic."⁵⁷

After obtaining control of Mexico City, which they occupied on June tenth, the French lost no time in implementing their long-delayed plans. They convened the Council of Notables on July 10, 1863. This Council, composed of reactionaries, traitors, and wealthy landowners, declared that as representatives of the Mexican people they were electing Maximilian of Austria as their emperor. In event of his refusal, they would petition the French Emperor Louis Napoleon to select an

⁵⁷New York Herald, June 14, 1863, p. 4.

emperor for Mexico.

These developments were met with editorial outbursts throughout Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The editorial tone taken by the Detroit Free Press was characteristic. The July twenty-eighth issue that carried the story of the meeting of the Council of Notables contained a furious editorial that accused the Emperor of France of having conquered Mexico for reasons other than those alleged when the war started. In this editorial it was claimed that the balance of power in Europe had been upset by this movement of the French. It was also stated that this intervention constituted interference with the United States. It was postulated that the United States would arm against France. Four days later the editor sounded an even stronger tone. He felt that we should warn the French that we would drive them out if they did not leave Mexico. Yet at the same time he expressed grave fears that Napoleon wanted to extend his paternal influence over the United States. Incidentally, this latter idea was accepted in official circles as being sufficiently feasible that the Union attempted to prepare for such a contingency by rapidly moving to establish national authority in Texas.

As in many other instances, Secretary Seward most aptly summarized the policy of the administration in a dispatch to

the United States diplomatic representative in the country most directly involved. He wrote to Minister Dayton that the United States had neither the right nor the disposition to intervene by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish and maintain a republic or to overthrow an imperial form of government if Mexico chose to accept one. Seward said that the United States had been and was practicing that non-intervention which we had asked all foreign powers to observe toward the problems of the United States. He added that this government knew full well that the inherent normal opinion of Mexico favored the republican form of government, and that we knew that this resulted largely from the influence of popular opinion in this country. "The United States' own safety is dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America. If France should adopt a policy in Mexico that is adverse to American opinions and sentiments, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies which might ultimately ripen into collision between France and the United States and other American republics. An illustration of this danger has already occurred. Political rumor ascribes to France the purpose to seize the Rio Grande and to wrest Texas from the United States; another rumor advises us to watch the Mississippi."⁵⁸

⁵⁸Mess. and Doc., 1863-64, Pt. 2, #406, Seward to Dayton, September 26, 1863.

In Dayton's response to this dispatch he quoted the French as again disclaiming interest in Texas or permanent control in Mexico. He said that the French expressed the opinion that the greatest danger to Maximilian would be from the United States, and therefore, that the removal of French troops from Mexico would probably be contingent on United States recognition of Maximilian.⁵⁹ Seward's reply was, "happily the French government has not been left uninformed of United States opinion that the permanent establishment of foreign and monarchical government in Mexico will be neither easy nor desirable."⁶⁰

American opinion lending moral support to the republican government in Mexico was extended not only by the press and the administration but by many well-known public figures. A banquet that Romero attended at Delmonico's in early December provides an example of this latter sort of support. Some of the other guests were William C. Bryant, John Van Buren, and Hiram Barney. At this time Romero said, "internal conditions of Mexico are scarcely understood or appreciated here or in Europe. The general impression is that we are an uncivilized

⁵⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, Papers Relating to Mexican Affairs, Serial 1209, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. #11, #361, Dayton to Seward, October 9, 1863. Hereafter cited as Serial 1209.

⁶⁰Ibid., #417, Seward to Dayton, October 23, 1863.

people--always making pronunciamientos--unfitted for self-government. Never was a judgement more unfounded." Mr. Barney's reply epitomized the sentiments of the group. He said, "My official position [a Republican--at this time collector at custom house in New York] doesn't let me express my sentiments and sympathies for Mexico. . . . I need not say that the sympathies of our people are in favor of Mexico."⁶¹

To all intents and purposes, the moral support of the United States was not reflected in the Mexican scene. Commerce at Vera Cruz had been cut off. Mexicans, encouraged by bribes,⁶² were joining the French army. Further, it was known that more French troops were being sent into the country. These actions of the French military caused counteractions within the United States. General Banks was sent south, as there was actual fear of a French advance into the United States.⁶³ This unrest in the United States prevailed for a long period of time and was kept alive by intermittent reports regarding Napoleon's plans.

By January of 1864, the American press was reporting

⁶¹Serial 1209, Romero to Seward, May 28, 1864, pp. 397-423.

⁶²New York Herald, December 12, 1863, p. 4.

⁶³Ibid., December 21, 1863, p. 4.

that the Mexican guerrillas had grown bolder, that they had burned outlying homes even in the Tampico area. Due to illness, especially fever, only about one fourth of the troops at Tampico were fit for duty. Therefore, despite having held the city for quite some time, the French there were particularly vulnerable. The French were so uneasy about security for the city that civilians were required to be blindfolded before they were allowed to enter. The position of the French military was made even more difficult by reports that had circulated among the Mexicans to the effect that there would be no clemency if they were to be captured; and that if they were to surrender, the French troops could not be trusted to fulfill the stated conditions of surrender.⁶⁴

Conditions such as those described above were the reason that General Forey informed Napoleon that it would be impossible to take and hold Mexico except with a large body of troops and many years of time. Reports emanating from Mexico substantiated Forey's opinion. Fighting in Mexico continued to be a matter of a city at a time, now Aguascalientes, now Guadalajara; and in February, Zacatecas was under attack. The French reiterated reports to the effect that there were no large republican forces and that the Mexicans were being

⁶⁴New York Herald, January 1, 1864, p. 6.

rapidly pacified. This was belied by effective resistance on the part of the Juaristas. President Juarez himself was active in encouraging this resistance, traveling almost constantly to do so. Zacatecas had still not been taken a month after the French attack had begun. It is true, the populace of the towns through which the French troops passed were prompt in their declarations for Maximilian, and remained loyal at least as long as the troops were there.

Military problems notwithstanding, Maximilian officially accepted the offer to become emperor of Mexico. One of his first edicts was an order to confiscate all United States holdings in Sonora.⁶⁵ This, of course, did nothing to increase his popularity in the United States. It did have a favorable effect in Europe, where "European bankers readily take up the imperial Mexican loan, though refusing to invest in United States securities."⁶⁶

Regardless of party, the Union press held Seward and Lincoln responsible for these developments, condemned them for having abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, and even went so far as to accuse them of having made deals with Napoleon.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Detroit Free Press, April 13, 1864, p. 2.

⁶⁶Ibid., May 6, 1864, p. 2.

⁶⁷Ibid., May 21, 1864, p. 2.

The Confederate States of America hastened to take advantage of this supposed opportunity. General William Preston went as plenipotentiary to Mexico to make a treaty with Maximilian. The treaty was to have been based on mutual recognition and reciprocal trade rights. The Atlanta Register editorialized that recognition of the Confederacy by Maximilian would be tantamount to recognition by France.⁶⁸ As is now known, this view was perhaps overly optimistic in its estimate of both the Confederacy and the Mexican Empire. Northern opinion predicted correctly when it stated that if the Confederacy were to succumb that the Mexican Empire could not stand six months.⁶⁹ This belief was even echoed in some parts of the South.

Had Maximilian been fully cognizant of the multi-faceted Mexican situation, one wonders if he would have approached the throne in so confident a fashion. At the same time as he was paying his farewell respects to the various European courts, the Mexican liberals inflicted another defeat on the French forces, and then, in May, captured Tabasco. Eight states, comprising one half of the territory of Mexico and containing one fifth of the population, remained free of even nominal

⁶⁸New York Herald, March 7, 1864, p. 4.

⁶⁹New York Tribune, May 7, 1864, p. 6.

control by the French. Juarez' public image was being preserved and even strengthened by the press of the United States on the basis of his anti-European, pro-American reputation. Juarez' attitude toward the United States was expressed very well in a letter written to McLane in early 1861, in which the Mexican President said, "It is for the true interests of the United States and Mexico that the reciprocal relations be those of sister republics. In this way, also, the political principles which distinguish them from the great powers of Europe can best be subserved. . . . I take this occasion, also, . . . to express the hope that peace may continue unbroken as before in the United States, and that, if it be necessary, the constitution may be remodeled in a legal way, always respecting the dignity of the people and the peace of the world, as only by this can liberty and the rights of man be preserved."⁷⁰ As Thomas Corwin said, this attitude on the part of Juarez "is remarkable when we regard the deep prejudices in the Mexican mind over the loss of Texas, which is attributed to our citizens."⁷¹

While there is no proof that would establish a causal relationship, certainly it would seem logical to assume that

⁷⁰New York Tribune, January 7, 1861, p. 3.
New York Times, January 7, 1861, p. 5.

⁷¹Serial 1136, #2, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861.

the pro-Juarez attitude of the press might well have exercised a positive influence on the unanimous vote that was received by the Davis resolution. This resolution, introduced in the House of Representatives on April 4, 1864, stated in essence, that the United States could neither recognize nor tolerate a monarchy in Mexico. Seward, in writing to United States Minister Dayton in Paris, said that the Davis resolution truly interpreted the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States regarding Mexico.⁷²

With all due pomp, including a 101 gun salute, Maximilian and Carlotta landed at Vera Cruz on May 29, 1864. From the time of their ceremonious but cool reception at Vera Cruz until their elaborate and carefully staged "enthusiastic" reception in Mexico City, a period of about three weeks, the progress of the Maximilian entourage was closely followed by United States correspondents.⁷³ While public attention was thus focused on Maximilian's trip to the capital, more significant action was taking place in other parts of the country. On June second, French forces landed at Acapulco, previously fortified by the liberals.⁷⁴ Juarez installed his government

⁷²U.S. Congress, H.R., The Present Condition of Mexico, Serial 1294, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867, H.R. Ex. Doc. #76, #525, Seward to Dayton, April 4, 1864. Hereafter Serial 1294.

⁷³New York Herald, July 7, 1864, p. 1.

⁷⁴Washington Evening Star, June 28, 1864, p. 1.

at Monterey, and a liberal army was preparing to march on San Luis Potosí.

As Seward had said earlier in the year, "the war of France against Mexico wears on the patience of the American people."⁷⁵ American patience was worn even more by stories of French atrocities and inhumanities to defeated Mexican troops, and by rumors of connivance between Mexican traitors and United States rebels, such as the plot to seize the states on the west coast of Mexico for privateering purposes. Reactions in the United States ranged from blistering editorials to the formation of illegal filibustering expeditions. Greeley spoke for most of the United States when he referred to the imposition of Maximilian on Mexico as "one of the most glaring violations of international law in modern times."⁷⁶ Significantly, even the Radical Republicans in convention at Cleveland emphatically endorsed the Monroe Doctrine,⁷⁷ and a few days later in Baltimore, one of the planks voted into the national Republican platform was enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.⁷⁸ A group known as the Defenders of the Monroe

⁷⁵U.S. Congress, H.R., Mexican Affairs, Serial 1262, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, H.R. Ex. Doc. #73, Pt. 2, #355, Seward to Adams, February 25, 1864. Hereafter Serial 1262.

⁷⁶New York Tribune, July 16, 1864, p. 4.

⁷⁷Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1864, p. 2.

⁷⁸New York Herald, June 9, 1864, p. 5.

Doctrine had gathered in New Orleans intending to join the Juarez forces, but, unfortunately from their point of view, their ringleaders were detained by federal agents on the charge of violation of United States neutrality laws.⁷⁹ This group had been formed without the prior knowledge of President Juarez who much earlier "had made known his resolution to defend himself to the last inch of ground solely with Mexicans."⁸⁰

The admiration and respect which so often was shown for Juarez by the press of the United States was increased by incidents such as the following. As part of his plan to form a cabinet that would, by including leading Mexican political figures, aid in uniting and ruling the country, Maximilian invited Benito Juarez to come to Mexico City. Juarez' letter of refusal is a classic. Briefly, but with great dignity, Juarez declined Maximilian's invitation on the grounds that his duties as president of the Republic of Mexico precluded any such meeting.

Maximilian received his best press in the Moniteur, the reflector of French governmental attitude. Many of the articles from the Moniteur were reprinted by the London Times and the

⁷⁹New York Herald, June 3, 1864, p. 1.

⁸⁰Ibid., June 3, 1864, p. 1.

New York papers.⁸¹ An example of this practice is the optimistic news which appeared during the last week of July, to the effect that customs receipts were up, that it was now safe to travel from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, that electric wire was going up in Tierra Caliente, that amnesty had been granted to all political prisoners, that General Uraga had defected to Maximilian, and that French forces were successful in an amazing percentage of their engagements.⁸² This rosy picture was dimmed a bit, however, by news items reported by United States correspondents. "The arrival of Maximilian has not changed the atmosphere from that of the good old days of republicanism. Pigmy battles and the usual number of guerrilla skirmishes continue."⁸³ The following day the same editor stated that news of Maximilian was relatively unimportant, "as sooner or later we shall have to drive him from this continent."⁸⁴

Illustrative of the "pigmy battles and guerrilla skirmishes" --a combined force of French and reactionaries moved

⁸¹During this period it was common practice for newspapers to reproduce whole columns copied verbatim from other papers. Within the United States most papers took their foreign news items from the three leading New York papers.

⁸²New York Tribune, July 29, 1864, p. 8.

⁸³New York Herald, August 4, 1864, p. 4.

⁸⁴Ibid., August 5, 1864, p. 4.

from San Luis Potosí and took Saltillo; French troops occupied Monterey; Juarez' troops were triumphant in Sinaloa; French troops defeated Cortinas; later Cortinas defeated the French troops; and Monterey changed hands twice. This is but a sample of the activities of this type that occurred in the course of about a month's time.

In light of such happenings it is not surprising that observers felt that Maximilian had made little progress in pacification. It remained dangerous to travel as the highways were full of robbers. "Journey from Vera Cruz to Mexico City made only at risk of one's life."⁸⁵ Reportedly, French deserters accounted for some of the increasing brigandage.⁸⁶ " . . . Condition of the country under the Imperial Regime deplorable. Commerce is stagnant and agricultural operations so much interrupted that . . . the most necessary articles are in the greatest scarcity."⁸⁷

The political condition was as confused as the military and social. Within this same period, the fall of 1864, Miramón, with the full backing of the church party, pronounced against

⁸⁵New York Tribune, December 15, 1864, p. 4.

⁸⁶Ibid., November 10, 1864, p. 7.

⁸⁷Detroit Free Press, December 2, 1864, p. 3.

Maximilian; some of the clerical party joined the exiled liberals; many Juaristas, such as Cortinas, declared allegiance to Maximilian; and Maximilian reportedly was freeing himself from French influence. "Mexico is as confused under the new regime as under the old."⁸⁸

The continued state of unrest at all levels of society was bound to cause repercussions. "Uprisings are only minor--but are continuing--military operations proper are stopped for the time. Mexico is far from quiet under her new ruler--there is a turbulence that is frightful--civil officers have had to be removed from many areas and replaced by military. There is an imperial government on one side and a whole people on the other. Every shout may be the signal of insurrection, and so the people must keep quiet. There was a disturbance near San Luis Potosí. It appears to have been simply a drunken brawl. Three hundred persons were arrested, and thirty-five were shot without the formality of a trial. What do such conditions mean? They mean that there is still a real vitality and national spirit in the Mexican people; that they hate this new government and will not bow to it."⁸⁹

The confiscation of church property by the imperialists

⁸⁸New York Herald, October 8, 1864, p. 4.

⁸⁹Ibid., January 6, 1865, p. 4.

further aggravated Maximilian's difficulties. At the same time, the Juarez government stepped up its recruitment of soldiers from the United States, reportedly offering a bounty of nine hundred dollars to any foreign soldier. Sporadic successes of the imperial forces notwithstanding, Maximilian and his empire were on the wane from this time on, as was the Confederacy--the predictions made earlier were right. In February of 1865, the Empire was said to consist only of Matamoros, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz, Alvarado, Tampico, and Mexico City. The liberal forces were reported to have increased to 60,000.⁹⁰ On the surface it is difficult to comprehend why the Maximilian government deliberately antagonized the Federal government of the United States by the expulsion of the United States consul from Matamoros. At the time the reason given was that as the consul was accredited to the republican government, the imperial government could not recognize him. Therefore, the Maximilian government would not allow Union ships to land at Matamoros.⁹¹

⁹⁰Detroit Free Press, February 19, 1865, p. 4.

⁹¹New York Herald, March 1, 1865, p. 4.

There were recurring rumors that the United States had secret agreements with Napoleon and/or Maximilian to extend recognition to Maximilian, always at some future date, from the time of Maximilian's "election" in July of 1863. These rumors became specific in December of 1864, when it was claimed that the United States was going to grant recognition the following March.⁹²

This climate of opinion is particularly interesting as there are indications that there actually existed some sort of understanding between Washington and Juarez; due to Seward's caution in desiring to avoid involvements with the Powers, aid rendered to Juarez was quiet and "unofficial." As some of the stories describing the supposed agreements for Maximilian's recognition were carried in administration-connected papers, one wonders if the stories were planted deliberately to serve as decoys.

As this latest report of the impending recognition was gaining credence in the United States, Bazaine was reporting that "the government at Washington has just taken measures in

⁹²Detroit Free Press, January 19, 1865, p. 2.

California that certainly were conceived with the intent of being hostile to the intervention."⁹³ The first of these measures, effective as of January 20, 1865, absolutely prohibited the exportation of rations from any port of the United States. Bazaine said that this was aimed directly against the imperial army, because, as the French Commander pointed out, the French troops on the Pacific side of Mexico had been getting their supplies from San Francisco. The second directive, of February 11, 1865, prohibited people who did not have special permission from leaving San Francisco to go to Mexico. The main reason for this second regulation, according to the United States administration, was to prevent Confederate troops from meeting in Mexico for the purpose of attacking Arizona. Bazaine, however, interpreted this directive to be a means of blocking imperial recruitment of Confederate troops.

Union assistance to the Juarez government consisted of more than these two directives; ties were much closer than was commonly recognized at the time. Bazaine himself in an official report said, "there is no doubt according to certain dependable informants that Juarez' agents are working, organizing resistance all along the northern frontier in agreement

⁹³François Bazaine, Documentos Ineditos o Muy Raros Para la Historia de México: La Intervención Francesa en México (México: Carranza e Hijos, 1909), Pt. 8, p. 96.

with the emissaries of the Union."⁹⁴ Two months later in another official report Bazaine again referred to the intrigues of the North Americans and all the many efforts that their agents were making for Juarez. Bazaine claimed that the result of a conference between President Johnson and Minister Romero was the "visible protection" conceded to General Ortega for enlisting so-called emigrants. He reported that such enlistments were being carried on in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and even in Washington, D.C. This recruitment program was sufficiently successful to cause Bazaine to alter the disposition of his troops.⁹⁵

In Mexico discords in the royal happy family continued to grow. Bitter feelings between French and Austrian troops became a matter of general knowledge. The prevalent feeling of French officials toward Americans became one of animosity.⁹⁶ The number of imperial troops was approximately 30,000; supposedly there were no republican armies left. During the first week of April, the French officers were reporting that the south of Mexico was settled.⁹⁷ The imperialists then planned to

⁹⁴Bazaine, La Intervención Francesa, Pt. 8, p. 94.

⁹⁵Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 2-3.

⁹⁶New York Tribune, April 13, 1865, p. 1.

⁹⁷New York Herald, April 6, 1865, p. 4.

pacify the north. As a first step in this process, Maximilian directed that the black flag be hoisted. The story that the south had been settled would seem to have been belied by imperialist troops marching into Yucatán less than a week after the former report.

Even as Maximilian's problems were not all military, so neither were his efforts. Clearly, in many instances steps that were taken because of military considerations were contraindicated by social, economic, or political questions. Conversely, attempts to palliate one ill often aggravated another. In February he decreed Catholicism the state religion; prior to that he had promulgated laws confiscating church property. He divided Mexico into eight military districts, ordered railroad building, and established lines of communication. As was mentioned earlier, in Mexico the financial picture had long been drastically disorganized. The position of the imperial government had been rendered even more difficult by the ruling of the French government that Mexico was to be assessed for the cost of the French occupation forces. In an attempt to benefit from Mexico's natural resources and thus to relieve the financial straits in which he found himself, Maximilian granted oil privileges to two New Yorkers. Less than a year earlier, however, Maximilian had confiscated all the property held in

Sinaloa by United States citizens. The imperial loan was repudiated in London; the London Times was rumored about ready to support the Monroe Doctrine against him.⁹⁸ In addition to the non-military problems, Cortinas revolted against Maximilian and attacked Matamoros; guerrilla warfare was increasing in Sinaloa, and Monterey had been occupied by the liberals. President Johnson's foreign policy statement of April 21, 1865, held out no promise of help to Maximilian. Johnson said that he was "in favor of the Monroe Doctrine throughout, and that the time is not far distant when, with the rebellion crushed, we shall say to Napoleon that he cannot establish a monarchy in Mexico."⁹⁹

Maximilian's efforts to attain order had not gone unnoticed, even in the United States. In a rather lengthy and complimentary editorial that appeared in April of 1865, it was stated that Maximilian's intentions were good and that many of the programs that he had advocated were sound and obviously for the benefit of the Mexican people. Unfortunately for the success of the programs, not to mention the empire, Maximilian had offended both the clergy and the army. These two groups had since repudiated him and joined the Juaristas,

⁹⁸New York Herald, May 1, 1865, p. 4, from the London correspondent.

⁹⁹Ibid., April 23, 1865, p. 4.

therefore, "should it ever be found expedient to vindicate the principles laid down in the Monroe Doctrine," the United States would not have to fight, but merely lend moral support to the factions opposed to Maximilian.¹⁰⁰

That more than moral support had indeed been rendered to Juarez by the Union over a period of time, and that Maximilian had been supported by the Confederacy can be seen from some of the correspondence of General James E. Slaughter, C.S.A. In July of 1865, the New York Herald carried documented stories that revealed the extent of the cooperation that had existed between the imperialists and the Confederates. It was also shown that such cooperation was a matter of governmental policy rather than chance. It was further demonstrated that the Confederate states were able to obtain arms and pay for them by means of the cotton trade that was carried on through Mexico. The following letter from James E. Slaughter, Brigadier General Commanding, to Colonel Thomas M. Jack is self-explanatory. "The imperial commander of the port of Baghdad (a Belgian) informs me he has private instructions to permit all arms, ammunition, and munitions of war, etc., to be introduced and passed for the use of the Confederacy which are desired." The General went on to say that this was

¹⁰⁰Detroit Free Press, April 23, 1865, p. 2.

similar to an earlier arrangement with Mejia and showed a real feeling for the rebel cause. He continued that both he and the Emperor knew of communications between Juarez and the United States Federal government. Slaughter sent a large number of scouts to try to intercept one such messenger in order to "complicate matters between Mexico and the United States to such a degree as to work to our advantage." He continued, "feeling of imperial officers on this frontier is strongly in our favor. They consider the two causes to be strongly allied."¹⁰¹

Following the defeat of the Confederate States of America, Bazaine started reinforcing his posts in the interior, "as a daily flareup is expected, and Louis Napoleon's endeavor to work cornerwise into the United States and upset the Monroe Doctrine will prove a failure."¹⁰² In an attempt to improve security measures, the imperialists established a pass system. "The policy pursued by the imperialists seems to be an insane one. There are now only 13,000 troops and they are divided into 100 different bodies, now together, now separated. There is not one protected highway in Mexico. The only reinforcements

¹⁰¹New York Herald, July 2, 1865, p. 4.

¹⁰²Ibid., July 4, 1865, p. 8.

to their force is the arrival of 500 men mostly from France. No force less than 100,000 men will ever subjugate this country."¹⁰³

The French policies toward the Mexican natives were as ill-advised as some of the French military actions. The French accused Mexican patriots of being robbers, tried them in courts martial, and then shot them. By thus making martyrs of the liberals, the French were helping the cause of Mexican nationalism. The French forces also burned sugar plantations, whole villages, and many crops in various states. Michoacan suffered particularly heavy damage from the French troops. This last fact undoubtedly accounts for the much publicized resignation of Antonio de Moral, political prefect of Michoacan. His letter, in which he was requesting for the fourth time to be allowed to resign, stated that the liberals were going to win, not because of their strength but because of the weakness of the Maximilian government.¹⁰⁴

The political and social situation is well summarized in the following short article. "The City of Mexico correspondent of the Times says that the arrest of liberals and those suspected of liberalism are so numerous that it will

¹⁰³Detroit Free Press, September 9, 1865, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴New York Herald, August 9, 1865, p. 1.

soon take half the nation to guard the prisoners. The most barbarous orders are issued by the French commanders. One is that every man wearing leather shall be hanged.

"The occupation of Tehuacan caused a great sensation, owing to its importance. It was feared that all the Austrian detachments on the road would be captured.

"The liberals held the road between Monterey and Matamoros. The French General Brincourt, at Chihuahua, demanded reinforcements as his column was not strong enough for Negrel's forces.

"The French garrison is kept shut up in the State of Durango by the liberal General Patony. A French column of 1,200 men were unable to move out of their encampment, forty miles from Tampico, as the guerrillas had captured all their mules and horses.

"The liberals hold the main towns in the State of Mexico. No one dares to go a league outside the City of Mexico. There is no submission in these people. The coming winter will show an even greater struggle."¹⁰⁵

Certain United States actions at this time were certainly contributing factors to the uneasiness evinced by the imperialists. General Sheridan, in a letter to a friend, said that the presence of Maximilian in Mexico was part of the rebellion and that the

¹⁰⁵Washington Evening Star, October 3, 1865, p. 2.

rebellion would not be over until he was thrown out.¹⁰⁵ Lt. General Grant said that the army of 100,000 men on the Rio Grande was just an army of observation.¹⁰⁶ Consensus in the United States seemed to have been that Napoleon's alternative was reinforcement or abandonment of his undertaking. As the attitude of the American people might have made reinforcement difficult, many people suggested that he save face by taking advantage of the break between Maximilian and the Pope and use this as an excuse for withdrawing his troops.

The liberals, too, were faced with many problems in the fall of 1865. True, they had been making political and military gains in various parts of the country, but as General De Leon said, "they have no money, arms, ammunition, clothing nor even provisions." This loyal Juarista general said that the liberals needed help then and that if the United States waited there might not be any liberal party to help.¹⁰⁷

The first step toward alleviating the most pressing want of the liberal forces was President Johnson's revocation of the order prohibiting the export of arms and munitions. The second step followed logically, when during the first week in November the financial agency of the Republic of Mexico opened

¹⁰⁶New York Herald, August 7, 1865, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷Washington Evening Star, September 7, 1865, p. 1.

in New York.¹⁰⁸ Some Californians decided to aid Juarez more directly and shipped rifles to him in boxes marked, "pianos."¹⁰⁹

In July of 1865, French Minister Montholon gave Secretary Seward a copy of a letter of Maximilian that was addressed to the president of the United States. The next day Seward returned it with the answer, after consultation with President Johnson, that the United States were then as formerly in friendly relations with the Republic of Mexico and that this government could not depart from its usual course in the matter and, therefore, reception of the letter was declined. After the exchange of several notes, in December of 1865, Seward received a communication from the French government that expressed an apparent willingness on the part of the French to withdraw their troops from Mexico. Evidently the only condition that was stipulated by France was that she first receive from the United States an assurance that the United States would maintain a friendly and tolerant disposition toward the Maximilian government. Secretary Seward then wrote to assure Montholon that while President Johnson was gratified at the friendly regards expressed by France toward the United States, he regretted that the condition could not be fulfilled. Seward explained to the French minister

¹⁰⁸Washington Evening Star, November 2, 1865, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., November 4, 1865, p. 1.

that the nature of the discontent of the people of the United States was not well understood by the French government.¹¹⁰ Seward said that the chief cause of United States displeasure "is not that there is a foreign army in Mexico; much less that it is a French one. . . . The real cause of national discontent is the French army invading a domestic republican government which was established by her people, with whom the United States sympathizes most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing on its ruins a foreign monarchical government whose presence there as long as it should endure could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious, and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions . . . on the other hand we maintained, and still do, that the people of every state on the American continent have the right to secure for themselves a republican government if they choose."¹¹¹

Seward had expressed very well the pro-Juarez sentiment of the American people that had culminated in the relaxation of the interpretation of the neutrality laws as they applied to the Mexican liberals. One might say that Seward's own biases were expressed in action as well as in words. As soon

¹¹⁰Serial 1261, Seward to Montholon, December 6, 1865, p. 284.

¹¹¹Washington Evening Star, January 10, 1866, p. 2.

as word of the activities of the Maximilian Express Company which had been established in New York reached him, the Secretary of State notified the United States district attorney in that city to scrutinize carefully all ships bound for Mexico and to seize all contraband items.¹¹² This must have encouraged Juarez greatly.

VI

In addition to the problem of securing specific supplies from the United States, the biggest problem that Maximilian faced and had been facing for the past year was an empty treasury. During 1865, income was about \$20,000,000 and expenditures amounted to \$42,000,000; much of this outlay went for imperial pomp and show. Predictions were that if a loan of \$100,000,000 did not come from France there would be a forced loan and a subsequent uprising.¹¹³ On the basis of the commerce figures it would seem reasonable to assume that chances for obtaining such a loan should have been relatively good. During the course of the previous eighteen months, commerce between France and Mexico had increased from twenty-one million to almost seventy-seven

¹¹²Washington Evening Star, January 2, 1866, p. 1.

¹¹³Detroit Free Press, February 19, 1866, p. 1.

million.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, however, the French bankers cannot be blamed for their lack of enthusiasm; experience had taught them that they were more likely to lose than to gain money in dealings with Mexico. Aside from the original debt which had catalyzed the French intervention, it was stated that in less than four years France had expended seventy-five million dollars in Mexico.¹¹⁵

Actually one would have difficulty in finding a pro-Maximilian story throughout the whole year of 1866. On the lighter side, but nevertheless a problem, the governor of Lower California found it advisable to leave the country after attempting unsuccessfully to persuade the people to declare their submission to Maximilian.¹¹⁶

A dispatch from San Francisco early in March said that the French troops in the northern and western parts of Mexico had been driven to the sea and had taken refuge in a few small towns. Some Americans had enlisted with the liberal forces and this might have been, at least in part, the reason for the maltreatment by the imperialists of American citizens, many of whom were shot or imprisoned. The situation became sufficiently alarming that Californians urged the United

¹¹⁴Washington Evening Star, February 7, 1866, p. 2.

¹¹⁵Detroit Free Press, March 9, 1866, p. 3.

¹¹⁶Washington Evening Star, February 8, 1866, p. 1.

States to send ships to protect American citizens and the honor of the American flag.¹¹⁷ The whole Tampico area was soon in liberal hands; open recruiting for the liberal army was being carried on in New Orleans; and the liberals crowned a whole series of military successes by capturing a train of specie worth a reported one and one-half to two million dollars.¹¹⁸ The imperialists retaliated by their seizure of the Frances Palmer, an American bark, in July.¹¹⁹ The situation was so serious for the French that in September Napoleon ordered General Castelnau to Mexico.

The following month President Johnson dispatched General Sherman, Mr. Plumb, and Mr. Campbell to Mexico. The instructions given to these gentlemen delineate quite clearly the American position regarding Mexico. General Sherman was to remain in Mexico only until Juarez' government would have been re-established. He was to order in United States troops, if they were needed, to convince any who objected to the legal government taking over again.¹²⁰ Seward's orders to Mr. Campbell specified, among other things, "First, as the representative of the United States you are accredited to the republican

¹¹⁷Washington Evening Star, March 6, 1866, p. 2.

¹¹⁸Ibid., July 2, 1866, p. 1.

¹¹⁹Ibid., September 1, 1866, p. 1.

¹²⁰Detroit Free Press, November 9, 1866, p. 6.

government of Mexico of which Mr. Juarez is president. Your communications as such representative will be made to him, wheresoever he may be, and in no event will you officially recognize Prince Maximilian, who claims to be emperor, or any other person, chief, or combination as exercising authority in Mexico without first having reported to this department and received instructions from the president of the United States." Secondly, Mr. Campbell was to do nothing that would embarrass the French officers who presumably would be departing with their troops. Thirdly, Mr. Campbell was to enter into no agreement with anyone that could possibly hinder the restoration of the authority of the Juarez government. "On the other hand, it may possibly happen that the president of the Republic of Mexico may desire the good offices of the United States or even some effective proceedings on our part to favor and advance the pacification of the country so long distracted by foreign combined with civil war and thus gain time for the re-establishment of national authority upon principles consistent with a republican and domestic system of government. It is possible, moreover, that some disposition might be made of the land and naval forces of the United States without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico or violating laws of

neutrality, which would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, order, and republican government in that country. You are authorized to confer upon this subject with the republican government of Mexico and its agents"121

The following letter should be sufficient to dispel any lingering doubts as to the position of the United States administration. On October 23, 1866, General P. H. Sheridan addressed this note to General T. L. Sedgewick, Brownsville, Texas, "I am satisfied that there is only one way in which the state of affairs on the Rio Grande can be bettered, and that is by giving hardiest support to the only government in Mexico recognized by our own--the only one really friendly to us. The neutrality laws are to be enforced against adherents of the imperial buccaneers--also against Ortega and Santa Ana. Juarez is the acknowledged head of the liberal government."122

When the rest of the world had given up hope for him, Maximilian was still clinging to his throne. He stated that a true Hapsburg never gave up his post. He declared his resolve to head personally the army to fight against the

¹²¹Serial 1294, #3, Seward to Campbell, October 20, 1866.

¹²²New York Herald, October 27, 1866, p. 1. This letter was dated October 23, 1866. For it to have appeared in a newspaper within four days it would almost seem to have been a deliberate leak, tantamount to a clear announcement of policy.

liberals and his announced plans were to make a strong stand at Vera Cruz.¹²³

However, brave words were not enough to stem the tide. Within the next two weeks, first Acapulco and then the rest of the whole west coast were evacuated by the French. On October 23, 1866, Maximilian resigned verbally in favor of General Bazaine and departed from Mexico City.¹²⁴ Thus, for all practical purposes, ended the reign of Maximilian I of Mexico although a few months more were required to terminate the actual French intervention.¹²⁵

¹²³Washington Evening Star, October 4, 1866, p. 1.

¹²⁴New York Herald, November 6, 1866, p. 1.

Detroit Free Press, November 6, 1866, p. 1.

Washington Evening Star, November 6, 1866, p. 1.

¹²⁵Many of the events which transpired during those months were of great interest to contemporaries. Within the context of this study, however, one event of particular interest occurred late in November. General Sedgwick, commander of the army of the Rio Grande, occupied Matamoros with a contingent of U.S. troops. He subsequently yielded in favor of General Escobeda. As Sedgwick had carried out this occupation without consulting President Johnson, even though it was done to protect American citizens, he was removed from his command.



Map 3.-This map shows the potential danger to the United States as of early 1865, when the French forces were reportedly in control of the Mexican states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, and Lower California. Proximity to the United States has also been indicated.

THEORY

"Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who molds public sentiment is more powerful than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed."¹

Much has been said about public opinion and its influence on foreign policy. Seward, Corwin, Romero, and Vicuña Mackenna are but a few of the public men of the period who considered and discussed public opinion as a recognizable force. Philosophers, politicians, and writers have duly noted the potency of this force. Historians have also written of this opinion as a concrete factor that must be accounted for in evaluating foreign policy and diplomatic relations, particularly of the United States. Hume said, "As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that government is founded."² Alexander Hamilton said very much the same thing, "Opinion whether well or ill-founded is the governing principle

¹ Quincy Wright (ed.), Public Opinion and World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 4.

of human affairs."³ In 1837, Harriet Martineau remarked that "The worship of opinion at this day is the established religion of the United States."⁴

The especial importance of public opinion in the United States could be explained by Defoe's definition of public opinion "as an expression of dominant conviction backed by an intention to give effect to it." For in the United States the citizens were able to subject the government to the dictates of opinion more consistently than in other countries. In the United States the press has existed, in some form, for almost three hundred years. During the greater portion of this time public opinion has been considered the best way to reduce the authority of the government, to attack the privileges of the higher classes, and to vindicate freedom of the citizens.⁵ If "Popular government . . . may be said to consist of the control of political affairs by public opinion,"⁶ then the importance of the role of the press in the United States immediately becomes obvious.

Yet of all the factors comprising a particular policy,

³ Wright, Public Opinion and World Politics, p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 33.

⁶Lawrence A. Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), p. 4.

concrete attempts to evaluate this aforementioned opinion have been most lacking. Attempts of past scholars to employ some sort of evaluation and estimation of public opinion in conjunction with the interpretation of United States policies, domestic and foreign, have been open to serious question on three counts. First, rigorous, systematic methods of measuring public opinion only recently have been applied in the field of history. All too often in the past the "public opinion" about any particular topic has been that which the particular author felt it to be. Secondly, some of the analyses of the opinion-policy relationship have been even less rigorous, if possible, than the estimate of public opinion. As Rosenau said, "All too often they [historians] interpret the strengths and weaknesses of a policy in terms of untested assumptions about the impact of an indifferent or an aroused public upon the behavior of officials. No less frequently do they evaluate the end product of the policy-making process in terms of unsubstantiated notions about the way in which presidential leadership contributes to the level of public comprehension and commitment."⁷ In addition to the two problems enumerated above, the tendency to equate opinion and influence has been a common pitfall for workers in this

⁷James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 4.

area. There is no gainsaying the fact that it is difficult to measure and to analyze public opinion in one's own time, let alone in times past. Nonetheless, within certain definite boundaries, this is precisely what is attempted herein. Whether or not startling new interpretations result therefrom seems less important than that a contribution be made toward the development of a truly scientific method of historical research.

In this study the three most common problems are being avoided by the following means. Opinion and influence are treated as two separate but related concepts, which they are. Opinion is measurable. Influence is not. Influence is discernable, imputable, traceable, but is not actually measurable per se. In behavioral terms, "We cannot observe the influences that underlie the formation of public opinion and its effect upon public policies; we can only observe behavior and infer therefrom which influences are operative."⁸ As for conclusions regarding the relationship between public opinion and governmental policy-making, one can only point out correlations. On the basis of present knowledge no attempt can be made to attribute causality. In the sphere of "estimation and

⁸Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 11.

evaluation," accurate measurement of the most available expression of public opinion has been used.

Before proceeding further with this discussion of methodology, it might be well to define the basic terms as they are used herein. Opinion is constituted of any set of ideas, either informational or judgmental. "Opinion-holders are those persons in the society who, on a given issue or in general, cannot circulate opinions to persons with whom they are not acquainted. Opinion-makers are those who, by virtue of their position of leadership in the society, have access to the impersonal channels. . . . Quality media are those which treat foreign-policy issues seriously, extensively, and continuously; whereas popular media are those which treat these matters in a simplified, abridged, and erratic fashion if they deal with them at all. . . . treat a foreign-policy situation in the same vein as they would treat a sex scandal or a sporting event."⁹

"The quality media take an active part in the structuring of issues. They participate in foreign policy discussions continually. They reach into the formal governmental agencies and among the non-government leaders. They help create a kind

⁹Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 28.

of laboratory atmosphere in which foreign policy ideas can be tested out through the use of responsible speculation and imagination. They constitute a 'feed-back' on the consequences of policy decisions and furnish the necessary basis for the constant process of modifying and adapting decisions which have already been made."¹⁰

The mass public comprises the bulk of the adult population. For the most part this public is relatively uninformed and uninterested in foreign policy and/or international happenings. Impassivity characterizes this public's usual stance toward foreign affairs. The mass public's major, if not sole, channel of information on foreign happenings is the mass, as differentiated from the quality, media. Due to the lack of accurate background information and to the sensational aspect of foreign news that does penetrate the mass public's usual indifference, there is a tendency toward over-reaction. In contrast to the mass public, the attentive public is constituted of a very minor segment of the population, estimates varying from five to ten per cent. The attentive public can be differentiated from the mass public qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, in that the members of the attentive public

¹⁰Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 83.

tend to be better educated and better informed. The quality media tend to constitute their main sources of information. Not only does the attentive public appear to be more knowledgeable regarding the backgrounds of various foreign problems, but the members of this public are frequently active components of the opinion molding and submitting sequence. In other words, these people tend to be the influentials, the elites.

As was stated in the introduction, public opinion is the totality of ideas and attitudes held by a public. As it is seldom feasible or possible to ascertain exactly what each idea is that is held by each individual at any given moment, the method of sampling has evolved. While there are a variety of sources of expression of opinion available to an historian, for this study selected newspapers have been employed to provide a measurable expression of public opinion. Further, as one of the variables stated in the original proposition pertains to information per se, newspapers have been used to fulfill a double role.

As, even today, newspapers are considered both molders and reflectors of public opinion, they are used as the indicators of public opinion during the period of 1861 to 1866. For this measure to be meaningful, clearly defined rigorous standards, to be described, have been employed in the use of the newspapers.

First, the papers selected were all significant as leaders in their areas on the basis of both total and comparative circulations. They were chosen from locations of high newspaper concentration. No Southern papers were used as the South was not part of the actual official decision-making body of the United States during the period under consideration. Even after the cessation of hostilities, due to radical Republican policies, Southern leaders were still excluded from high United States office. The newspapers that were employed were representative of the Democratic, Independent, and Republican points of view. Further, while the East is over-represented in that two of the four are New York papers, the East was also most influential in the national government during this period. There is one Midwest paper and one that is representative of sentiment in the border states.

All issues of the newspapers from January 1, 1861, through December 31, 1866, were subjected to analysis. The contents have been treated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since the validity and reliability of the qualitative analysis are more difficult to establish, the exact criteria employed are specified in the appropriate section.

Before discussing the four base papers, a description of the makeup of American newspapers in the 1860's would be appropriate. Daily papers were from four to sixteen pages long.

For the most part there were no pictures, sketches, or cartoons. Occasionally a map or drawing of a fortification or harbor defense was published, and normally appeared on the front page. The papers were composed of either six or eight columns; during the period the trend seemed to be toward the six column format. Banner headlines were not used, but an individual column would have eight or ten headings. These headings often pertained to different stories and were set in various type faces, thus serving as a sort of table of contents. The stories described therein often appeared on other pages and occasionally did not appear at all. Two to four of the columns on the first page and also on the general news page or pages would be set up in this fashion. Other news items would have small captions of the same sort of type as that used in the story, or no caption, particularly in the smaller papers. Advertisements formed one fourth to one third of each paper, at times appearing on the front page. There was proportionately greater coverage than is given today to the meetings of the city council and those of the state legislature. Addresses of various governors and federal officials were printed in full. Frequently, diplomatic correspondence of general interest was also printed in its entirety.

In the United States of the 1860's, the newspaper constituted the only mass medium. The newspaper was the

prime educational and informational link to the rest of the world for a predominately agricultural population. The political views of the editor and publisher were proudly and vehemently proclaimed and often reflected in news stories as well as the editorial columns. Seemingly, the editors were conscious of the dual functions, opinion-molding and opinion-reflecting, that were performed by the papers. For this reason, content analysis can provide a measure of public sentiment on specific issues. At the same time, care must be taken in basing conclusions upon that which is read in the papers. As news items often consisted of only one or two lines, the story of the actual happening might well have been exactly the opposite in connotation as the following so well illustrates. On December 4, 1866, United States Senator Zack Chandler of Michigan moved to take up his resolution that he had submitted the previous day, said resolution referring to the presence of French troops in Mexico. Nonetheless, Senator Sumner requested that the resolution be referred to the committee on foreign relations (as soon as committee should be formed) particularly to smooth out some of the language in which the resolution had been couched. Senator Saulsbury then spoke in support of referring the resolution to committee; but he stated that he did so only because of

the language, on the basis of its being undiplomatic, and that he supported the thought behind the resolution. Because of the question of the wording the Senate voted against the motion to take up the resolution at that time. In essence, the Senate by that vote supported Senator Sumner's request and ostensibly defeated Senator Chandler. In the newspapers of the time this exchange might have been summarized as, "Senate refuses to consider resolution on Mexico." In actuality, the ideas embodied in the Chandler resolution were supported by a majority in the Senate.

In addition to editorial bias and brief, possibly misleading items, there are other pitfalls to be avoided in using the content analysis of newspapers to obtain a picture of public opinion. One must be aware of the sources used by the papers themselves in their foreign news. The employment of foreign correspondents was just beginning during this era. It was still a common practice to consider letters from friends or stories purchased from sailors as accurate foreign news coverage. Further, plagiarism was almost universal. Therefore, if an inaccurate story were printed in a major European or New York paper it might gain national circulation. Thus, by appearing in papers with known dissimilarities of editorial policy the substance of the news item would seem to be true.

The most intriguing incident of this type that was uncovered during the research for this study involved a story that appeared in l'Europe on August 21, 1863.

In this page one story it was stated that the people of Frankfort had viewed with some astonishment the fact that the United States consul general had been flying the Mexican flag beside the American. At first it was assumed that this was simply the result of excessive personal zeal on the part of Mr. Murphy, the consul general. On the day that the story appeared, however, the writer said that he had ascertained that several months earlier M. Juarez had written to the cabinet in Washington and had requested that United States agents represent Mexico abroad in case the legal authority should be temporarily overthrown in Mexico. The item continued with the statement that Secretary Seward, in March of 1863, had sent a notice to the United States consuls in which he had said that if Mexico fell into foreign hands that the United States consuls would have to represent Mexico abroad. In this same dispatch it was stated explicitly that the United States would not, under any conditions, tolerate the introduction into Mexico of any form of government other than the republican.

On August twenty-fourth, three days later, an exact

translation, with the exception of one word, appeared on page four of the London Times. Both the New York Herald and the New York Tribune carried the story on September second, the former on page three and the latter on page two. The Tribune added that immediate war was anticipated if Napoleon did not limit his demands on Mexico to indemnity. The story took a few days longer to travel to the midwest. The Detroit Free Press printed the story on page three on September ninth. All of these papers credited the story to l'Europe. While the writer of the original story claimed to have ascertained the fact, still he did not quote any traceable sources.

Despite diligent efforts, this researcher has been unable to verify the existence of the alleged dispatches. It is known that the editor of l'Europe, M. Ganesco, and the consul general, Mr. Murphy, were close friends. Such circumstantial support is far too tenuous to allow of other than hypothesizing.

This concludes the discussion of the general description of newspapers in the 1860's as well as the mention of a few of the special cautions to be observed in their use. Before beginning the section devoted to the specifics of the base papers used in this study, respectful consideration of the following quotation seems most appropriate. In The Newspaper and

Periodical Press, S.N.D. North said, "These poor journals of today, which everybody is ready to stigmatize as trash not worth the room to store or the money to bind, are the very materials which the man of the future will search for with eagerness, and for some of which he will be ready to pay their weight in gold. . . . No historian or other writer on any subject who would write conscientiously or with full information can afford to neglect this fruitful mine of the journals, where his richest materials are frequently to be found."¹¹

The four papers that were used as base papers were the New York Herald, the New York Tribune, the Detroit Free Press, and the Washington Evening Star. According to the United States census information on newspapers per capita, only cities with the highest concentration of papers are represented.

The New York Herald was edited and published by James Gordon Bennett. Although listed as an independent paper, almost without exception the Herald supported the Democratic position on the questions of the day. The New York Herald

¹¹U.S. Congress, Dept. of Interior, Census Office, The History and Present Condition of the Newspaper and Periodical Press of the United States, by S.N.D. North, Serial 2136, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1884, Mis. Doc. 42, Pt. 8, p. 164.

was an eight page, six column paper. At irregular intervals a twelve page triple sheet edition was published. It was a daily morning paper; there was a weekly edition which appeared on Saturday; on Wednesday the European edition was published. The daily circulation was around 85,000 copies and the weekly about 25,000.¹² In 1865, the Herald received \$662,192.00 from advertising.¹³ The Herald was evidently an innovator in the use of a large corps of reporters, of war correspondents, and of foreign correspondents as these terms are understood today. These large corps maintained by J.G. Bennett far surpassed those of the other newspapers. Further, as has already been mentioned, the Herald was also an innovator in the extensive use of maps and diagrams.

There seems to have been some connection between James Gordon Bennett and Chile as he had far more coverage of happenings in Chile than did his rivals. His tone toward Mexico was one which strongly favored Santa Ana as the remedy for her many ills. With regard to the United States administration, he was extremely anti-Seward and frequently referred to "Seward's toadyism." This was a constant factor. However,

¹²Detroit Free Press, April 5, 1862, p. 2.

¹³Washington Evening Star, April 10, 1866, p. 2.

it might be well to mention at this point that inconsistency upon nearly every issue was characteristic of Bennett. In spite of this, the influence of the Herald and its editor was considerable. "Have we not seen almost every man who has held or run for the Presidency during the last ten or fifteen years paying assiduous and servile court, directly or indirectly, or both to the editor of the Herald."¹⁴

The New York Tribune was edited by Horace Greeley and Charles A. Dana. It was owned by a joint stock company. According to an opposition paper of the time the stock holders requested Dana's resignation in the spring of 1862, but Greeley was retained with the proviso that he moderate the abolitionist tone of the paper. The Tribune was not only a Republican paper, it was radically Republican. The daily circulation was about 40,000, about 20,000 for the semi-weekly edition, and 192,000 for the weekly issue. For 1861 and a part of 1862, its format was eight columns, and then it switched to six. At the beginning of this period the front page consisted of advertisements, but within a short time this changed and the make-up of the Tribune was very similar to that of the Herald. It also published triple sheet editions, usually on the same days on which the Herald

¹⁴B. K. Hunt, "The New York Herald," North American Review, Vol. 102 (1866), p. 412.

appeared with triple sheets. The most outstanding characteristic of the Tribune of this era was Horace Greeley. Not only was he a staunch abolitionist, he believed in, wrote about, and fought for the individual rights of all human beings. He favored universal free education. He was an early and firm advocate of woman suffrage as well as women's rights. He believed in freedom of religion and tolerance for all; he himself was a Universalist and filled the pulpit on more than one occasion. He was a member of the platform committee at the 1860 Republican party convention. In 1864, he was a presidential elector. He published The American Conflict, a history of the Civil War, in 1864.

The Detroit Free Press, published and edited by Walker and Seitz, was so rabidly Democratic that it was termed by many of the time a copperhead paper. In December of 1861, Seitz was replaced by Taylor and Barns. In February of 1864, it became simply Walker, Barns and Company. It was a morning paper published daily, tri-weekly, and weekly. The daily circulation was about 6,000, the tri-weekly about 1,700, and the weekly around 15,000. The Detroit Free Press was an eight column, eight page paper. It changed its format and make-up late in 1865, but even somewhat prior to this a gradual moderation in tone was noticeable. The greatest part

of the foreign news which was carried in this paper was re-printed from the New York papers.

The Washington Evening Star was edited by W.D. Wallach. The Evening Star Newspaper Company was listed as editor and publisher. The Star termed itself an Independent, but in general it reflected a mildly Democratic point of view. This four-page paper printed both a daily and a weekly issue; the circulation of the former was about 10,500 and about 2,500 for the latter. It did not publish a Sunday edition. From April 25, 1861 to May 24, 1861, the Star published one sheet issues at irregular intervals, owing to a shortage of paper. The first page for this period contained only advertisements and fiction; the news and editorials were usually on the second page.

Several additional papers, termed herein as auxiliary ones, were utilized in addition to the four base papers. These were the New York Times, The Times of London, the Ferrocarril of Santiago, and l'Europe of Frankfort.

The New York Times was a Republican paper published and edited by H.J. Raymond and Company. The circulation figures for the daily issue were around 35,000, for the semi-weekly about 4,000, and 20,000 for the weekly edition. There was also an edition, The Times for California, which

was designed for circulation in Spanish America, California, and the other western parts of the United States. This edition included a complete digest of happenings in America and in Europe for the previous ten days. The Times published a European edition, but circulation figures for it were not available. Like the Tribune and the Herald, the Times was an eight page, six column paper. There was a decided similarity in the distribution of the contents of these three leading New York papers. News items not contained on the front page were most likely to be found on page four with the editorials, or sometimes on the last page of the paper.

The Times of London, under the management of Mowbray Morris for this period, was the most influential of the British dailies. It varied in length from twelve to sixteen pages. Palmer's Index to the Times Newspaper was a useful guide to articles and editorials pertaining to this study.

The Ferrocarril of Santiago was the largest daily of Chile. It was a six column paper which varied from four to eight pages in length. Commonly referred to as the "government paper," this was so only in the sense that for the most part it printed the official government "line." So far as could be learned there was no official link to the government.

President Pérez tolerated more dissent in the papers than had some of his predecessors. Undoubtedly due to its location in the capital, the Ferrocarril carried a more complete coverage of foreign news than did the other contemporary Chilean papers. In general, the make-up of this paper was not unlike that of the North American papers.

Published in Frankfort, l'Europe was a four page daily. Investigation has shown it to be a reputable paper. It enjoyed a wide circulation, and along with all the European it carried much American news. This may well be the result, as mentioned, of the close friendship of the American consul, W.W. Murphy, and Gregory Ganesco, the editor of l'Europe.

The four base newspapers were those whose columns were studied as expressions of public opinion as well as indicators of the information that was available to the American people. The auxiliary papers were examined for two reasons. The first was as a source of information; and the second reason, particularly in the case of the New York Times, was to serve as a sort of check on the findings for the four base papers during periods of unusually heavy or light coverage of foreign news. The specific background information for each paper was deemed essential in order to analyze and to interpret more accurately the findings.

In classifying the data obtained from the base papers, news items about Chile and Mexico were categorized as first-page, lead, editorial, and Monroe Doctrine related. Thus, the total number of mentions encompasses the four categories named as well as simple mentions; the latter were all items which did not fit into the other groupings. The FIRST PAGE means precisely that, that the country was mentioned on that page. A LEAD article meant that the main caption over the column contained the name of the country, either Chile or Mexico, and that the column was either the far left or the far right news column on the page. At least half of the column must have dealt with news of the country concerned. First-page LEADS were counted as LEADS, as by definition a LEAD was a more informative and attention-attracting story than a simple mention on the first page. The term EDITORIAL was applied to those items that appeared on the editorial page and were clearly not news items. MONROE DOCTRINE related articles were those in which the Doctrine was mentioned by name and its application to the situation in either Chile, or Mexico, or both was either explicit or implicit. These categories were arbitrarily chosen, but the method seemed a logical one. For the purpose of simplification, the tables have not been set up to demonstrate this categorical breakdown.

A comparison of the quantity with the quality of the findings for this study shows a direct correlation between the two. As the tone of the press during this period under consideration became more vehement in its denunciations of European activities in Latin America, so the articles and editorials pertaining to both Chile and Mexico continued to increase in number as can be noted from the statistical tables. In both cases this increase, a reflection of public opinion and public interest, continued to be a rapid and a constant one from 1864 on.

With particular reference to Mexico, an eminent and contemporary historian has said, "The pressure to which the Secretary of State had been subjected in favor of a more vigorous policy was by June [1865] considerably increasing. . . . in the press and public hall the clamor for the vindication of the Monroe Doctrine grew louder. It is not strange, then, that his tone began to change" ¹⁵ Dexter Perkins himself has thus conceded recognition to the impact of opinion upon foreign policy formation. However, the results of the investigations for this work do not entirely coincide with those of Perkins. This is undoubtedly due to the type of source which one considers an accurate measure for opinion.

¹⁵Perkins, Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867, pp. 490-91.

In support of his assertions regarding opinion, Perkins has listed only secondary sources in his bibliography. Herein, the daily press was selected as a more precise measurement. This indicator corroborates that public pressure upon Seward and his seeming change of tone began in 1864, and not in the summer of 1865.

Illustrative of the sentiment, even early in 1864, is the following. ". . . if the administration has been so recreant to its promises of moral support to the Mexican national cause, its hitherto well-defined policy upon the subject, its professions of attachment to the Monroe doctrine, and the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country, as to enter into such an arrangement with the agent of the French Emperor . . . [it] will meet on every hand a spontaneous outburst of popular indignation. . . . The American people are . . . friends of republican Mexico" ¹⁶ Again, from the mid-west, "There exists everywhere in the country not merely a traditional, but a real and earnest determination to adhere to the principles of the Monroe doctrine." ¹⁷

The date given by Perkins for the beginning of this upsurge of interest in Mexico is closely related to the

¹⁶As quoted in the Detroit Free Press, February 5, 1864, p. 2, from the Commercial Bulletin of Boston.

¹⁷Detroit Free Press, April 8, 1864, p. 2.

cessation of hostilities in the United States. Obviously, active and open support could not have been given before this time. The necessary resources were needed for the war at home; further, Seward could not risk the possibility of direct European intervention in the United States Civil War. It was feared that the British would communicate with rebel forces in Brownsville; suspicions were that an invasion army was going to strike at the United States through Texas, and General Banks was sent south to forestall this contingency; finally, an American boat with ammunition for Mexico was actually seized by the Spanish in the port of Vera Cruz.¹⁸

Nonetheless, as has been noted throughout the Mexican section, encouragement and undercover aid, not widely publicized, were being given. Various stories in papers friendly to the administration hinted at the possible recognition of Maximilian's government by the United States. There seems a good likelihood that these articles may simply have been used for propaganda by the administration in attempting to conceal the fact that aid was being supplied to Mexico. Among other instances discussed, the reported orders of March, 1863, to Mr. Murphy in Frankfort and the embargo upon rations for Mexico

¹⁸New York Tribune, January 4, 1862, p. 5; January 20, 1862, p. 4; and January 23, 1862, p. 8.

New York Herald, December 21, 1862, p. 4.

in 1864 are illustrative of this earlier aid to Mexico.

It is worthy of note that, although not mentioned specifically by any of the secondary writers, the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were included as a part of the Democratic party platform even in 1860. The Republicans endorsed the Doctrine even more forcefully in their platform of 1864. "Resolved, That we approve the position taken by the Government that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European Power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the western continent and that they will view with extreme jealousy as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for Monarchical Government, sustained by foreign military force, in near proximity to the United States."¹⁹

The above becomes even more significant when one takes into account that ". . . platforms often reflect political trends. Developments of new economic, social, and political movements may be observed, and declarations contained in previous minor party platforms are occasionally adopted by the major parties when sufficient public opinion has been generated

¹⁹Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson (comp.), National Party Platforms (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 36.
New York Herald, June 9, 1864, p. 5.

to support the change."²⁰ Porter and Johnson have said that party "platforms usually . . . serve as a catalyst for the factions within the party and the voters represented by these factions."²¹ In this instance, it might even be stated that public opinion in support of the Monroe Doctrine served as a catalyst not only for one party, but for the whole North. The Democratic Detroit Free Press backed it, as did also the Republican Tribune of Greeley. In a sense, it became a sort of rallying point for the whole country as testified by some of the articles reprinted from the Southern papers.

In Congress as well as in the press, a growing concern over the situation in Mexico was evidenced by more frequent and more passionate discussion. The volume of discussion, however, lagged behind the noted upswing in coverage by the papers. In June of 1855, Mr. Stevens stated in the House of Representatives: "Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the time has arrived when the United States can calmly inquire whether that declaration of American policy called the 'Monroe doctrine,' which was once deemed so important and manly shall be a practical idea or a mere bravado. While we were engaged in civil war it was certainly not prudent to provoke a war with any

²⁰Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms, p. vi.

²¹Ibid., p. vii.

powerful nation

"If it is not intended to maintain the Monroe doctrine with the full energy of the nation, it ought to be abandoned with dignity as an inconsiderate error. If it be deemed important to the safety and honor of the country then there should be no yielding. . . . Juarez has persevered with a courage and a fortitude unparalleled in modern history."²² Thus can be noted the close sentiment as here expressed in the Congress and that of two years prior in the press.

Upon one occasion when the Mexican correspondence was called for in the House of Representatives, Thaddeus Stevens requested "especially any letters of the minister from said [Mexican] republic."²³ This is perhaps indicative of the sway which Minister Romero exercised upon opinion. Such mastery over opinion is almost in direct apposition to Vicuña's lack of effectiveness. So far as could be ascertained, no Chilean correspondence was called for in Congress. In the press, the only thing which he himself managed to accomplish successfully was the active propagation of a story to the effect that the seas were teeming with Chilean privateers

²²U.S., Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., June 16, 1866, Pt. 4, p. 3217.

²³Ibid., 39th Cong., 1st Sess., December 11, 1865, Pt. 1, p. 17.

ready to pounce upon Spanish shipping. For some time the New York papers carried articles regarding this situation; finally the question was dispelled by the Herald's revelation that the whole thing was a huge hoax and that Spain had spent \$30,000 in hunting imaginary privateers. Spain also sustained losses in her anticipated income from shipping.²⁴

Again, illustrative of the administration's preoccupation over Mexican affairs is the message of President Johnson to both houses of Congress at the end of 1866. Approximately one third of that section treating with foreign relations dealt with Mexico. There was no mention of any other Latin American country.²⁵ While serving as a partial degree of measurement of United States interest, this fact, at the same time, is a reflection of the relative amount of success which the two men, Romero and Vicuña, achieved in arousing United States sympathy for their respective national causes.

In an oversimplification of the case, it appears as though Romero's greater effectiveness is attributable in large part to his background. Although well educated, Romero

²⁴New York Herald, March 16, 1866, p. 10.

²⁵U.S., Congressional Globe Appendix, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 3, 1866, p. 1-5.

was part Indian and a man of the people as were Juarez and Lincoln. Moreover, proximity to the United States of his country had given Romero much insight into the diplomacy and way of life of his host country. In the barrage of correspondence with which he deluged Seward, this able Mexican skillfully and continually emphasized the many common concerns such as the United States' need to help Mexico as a self-protective measure and the commercial concerns. He seemed fully cognizant of the need for public support.

Vicuña Mackenna, on the other hand, was from a republic controlled by an aristocracy that had long held the reins of authority. Public support for a government, a person, or an issue was a variable of negligible consideration. Official appointment was often on the basis of reward, not ability. Witness the selection of Covarrubias as foreign minister in 1865. Instead of keeping Seward fully informed of events in Chile, Vicuña Mackenna behaved in an arrogant fashion, expected United States assistance as his due, made but slight effort to comprehend the domestic absorptions of Seward, and actually engaged in activities contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States. He paid lip service to the recognized need for public support, but did little to merit it. Indeed, it is surprising that he received as considerate treatment as

he did while in the United States and that the press retained its friendliness.²⁶

Of all the people who enacted active roles in the events described herein, those who were most sensible to public opinion and who, as a matter of policy, attempted to educate, use, and at times 'play' to this opinion--men such as Linco'n, Seward, Juarez, and others--these are the historically great men. Not that they are great simply because they were 'opinion men,' but rather it is because they were great that they were so aware of the need for the public's support.

The extent to which the papers molded as well as reflected the public's opinion should now be apparent. "Influence over opinion no paper can have which has itself no opinion, and cares for none."²⁷ However, as even today, opinion was generated and expressed at many different levels. The simple diagram which follows is an attempt to demonstrate visually the continuous interaction of opinion as depicted at

²⁶The tone of the press indicated a real interest in and concern over the happenings in Latin America. Typical of the commonly voiced solution suggested is an article from the New York Herald of June 1, 1862, p. 8. This expressed the hope and the belief that the Latin nations could and would band together for their mutual defense and interest. Friendliness for Chile, as expressed in the hope that she might lead in the formation of such a band, continued in spite of Vicuña's activities.

²⁷B. K. Hunt, "The New York Herald," North American Review, Vol. 102 (1865), p. 379.

these various levels. From it, the important and influential role of the newspaper should become even more obvious; although, as previously stated, care must be exercised in the use of this mass media.²⁸ (See Figure 1.)




Fig. 1.-Opinion Flow Chart


Seemingly, in much past historical research this source for both the coverage of news and the expression of opinion has not been fully utilized. Therefore, the following quotation will be a worthy note upon which to conclude this section. "The only true history of a country is to be found in its newspapers."²⁹

²⁸An interesting finding regarding an earlier statement of the effect of opinion on policy-making is the following. In the Tribune of 10/12/64, the Spanish press was clamoring for extrication from Santo Domingo. In the Herald of 4/17/65--six months later--Spain's decision to abandon the island appeared. In spite of an apparent correlation, without further knowledge of Spanish documents one cannot attribute this to causality.

²⁹Samuel Palmer, Palmer's Index to the Times Newspaper (London: Times, 1882), p. 3, quoted from Lord Macaulay.

Table I

A Comparison of the Total Combined
Frequencies of Items of
All Categories.



Mexico .-.-.-

Chile x-x-x

Tables II a & b

Table II a-Cumulative totals, all categories, Mexico.

	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	T
NYT	30	151	223	94	237	345	1080
DFP	23	55	105	57	137	158	535
WES	19	36	67	42	71	112	347
NYH	133	205	247	126	237	538	1486
T	205	447	642	319	682	1153	3448 Total


Table II b-Cumulative totals, all categories, Chile.

	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	T
NYT	5	8	17	12	43	102	187
DFP	0	0	0	2	7	34	43
WES	0	0	2	8	2	28	40
NYH	23	26	3	8	20	134	214
T	28	34	22	30	72	298	484 Total

Note: The abbreviations represent the four base papers, the New York Tribune, the Detroit Free Press, the Washington Evening Star, and the New York Herald.

Table III

New York Tribune




Mexico

Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

Table IV

Detroit Free Press




Mexico .-.-.-
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

Table V

Washington Evening Star




Mexico ----
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

Table VI

New York Herald




Mexico ----.
Chile x-x-x

Frequency of Total Mentions
for Mexico and Chile

Note: It might be of interest to add that from the observed frequency figures (which are given in Tables II a & b, and which serve as the basis for the other tables), the theoretical frequencies and the chi squares have been computed. The chi square (X^2) shows whether or not the distributions under consideration are simply chance ones. According to statistical tables, both of these distributions would occur about once in 10,000 instances. Therefore, the figures become even more significant.

Table VII



United States Import Trade
With
Chile and Mexico

SUMMARY

"The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of any unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

". . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."¹

The questions to be answered in this survey are: was the Monroe Doctrine applied as a result of either or both of the two situations?; was the United States capable of implementing the Monroe Doctrine?; if the United States were capable of applying the Doctrine, then what variables account for the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was, or was not, implemented?

¹James D. Richardson (comp.), Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1896-99), p. 218, from the address of President Monroe of December 2, 1823.

Before it can be stated with certainty that either or both of the situations should have caused the United States to implement the Monroe Doctrine, the incidents must be described, as they have been, then compared specifically for similarities and dissimilarities. Further, the limitations of the Monroe Doctrine itself must be established. On the basis of the available contemporaneous sources employed herein, the conclusion is inevitable that the situations were not the same. In Mexico the established form of government was usurped by a European prince backed by the Emperor of the French. In Chile there not only was no forceable attempt to overthrow the form of government, there was not even an attempt to invade the country. There seems to be no question that Secretary of State Seward also regarded these two situations as distinctly different. The following quotation from a dispatch from Seward to United States Minister Kilpatrick in Chile illustrates well Seward's opinion. "We concede to every nation the right to make peace or war for such causes other than politics or ambitions as it thinks right and best. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with us, if they are not pushed like the French in Mexico to the political point mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not

concede to the other and allowing nothing to one that we do not allow to the other."² This is but one of several dispatches in which Seward clearly expressed the opinion of the administration that the Spanish-Chilean War was simply one over a point of honor in which the only appropriate United States' action could be to extend its good offices.³ Even the bombardment of Valparaíso did not cause this opinion to be changed. "We infer Valparaíso could have been saved by the mutual firing of blank cartridges and that the only thing to have been settled was who was to fire the first shot."⁴

Whereas, in regard to Mexico, Seward wrote, "This government . . . in all its intercourse with that republic . . . has been impressed with the evidences of a high degree of virtue and enlightenment. That government deservedly enjoys not only the respect but the good wishes . . . and sympathy of the United States in its present unhappy embarrassments with foreign powers."⁵ Seward took a much stronger position in the fall of 1865, when he said, "The presence and operation of the

²Serial 1209, #9, Seward to Kilpatrick, June 2, 1866.

³Mess. and Doc., 1865-66, Pt. 2, Dept. of State, Seward to Tassara, p. 533.

⁴Serial 1209, #6, Seward to Kilpatrick, May 5, 1866.

⁵Ibid., #72, Seward to Corwin, April 15, 1863.

French army in Mexico, and its maintenance of authority there resting on force, not on the free will of the people, is the cause of serious concern to the United States. But the objection of the United States is still broader, and includes the authority itself which the French army there is maintaining. That authority is in direct antagonism to the policy of this government and the principle on which it is founded. Every day . . . adds . . . new confirmation of the justice of the views . . . of the United States government. . . . The effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico is disallowable and impracticable. The United States is not prepared to recognize nor pledged to recognize any political institutions in Mexico in opposition to the republican government with which we had amity and friendship."⁶

While to Seward the situations were really unlike, there were many at the time who did not agree with him, and there have been many since. Seward was addressing himself to the question of ultimate motives; therefore, he differentiated between the two situations on the basis of the aggressors' aims. Contemporary opinion leaders who suggested similarities between the two situations did not examine them in the same

⁶Serial 1261, #300, Seward to Bigelow, November 6, 1865.

depth, that is to say, at the same information level. Horace Greeley said, "The conduct of Spain toward Peru has been as wanton and unjustifiable as that of France toward Mexico."⁷

In an editorial against Spain and supporting the cause of the Latin American countries, Greeley made frequent use of the terms "Spanish aggression" and "unreasonable demands."⁸ In an editorial that appeared on December 14, 1865, Greeley said, "Spain looks longingly on the South American countries. . . . She went to Mexico for this purpose but was cheated by France. She captured Santo Domingo . . . she endeavored to provoke a war with Peru over the Chinchas and now desires a war with Chile."⁹

Not unexpectedly, neither Vicuña Mackenna nor Romero made any statements in which they compared the situations of their respective countries; but some reasonable assumptions can be drawn as to their estimates of the aggressors' designs from that which they did write. In mid-December of 1865, Romero wrote to Seward, "The French government protests that it will do nothing to induce the people of Mexico to proclaim a monarchy

⁷New York Tribune, November 17, 1864, p. 4.

⁸Ibid., July 7, 1864, p. 4.

⁹Ibid., December 14, 1865, p. 4.

but its acts are a contradiction. . . . If the present war is a just one of reparation for injuries why don't they confine it to that instead of trying to overthrow a constitutional government?"¹⁰ In a speech in Panama City in November of 1865, Vicuña said, "Spain is making war on my country because Chile attempted to uphold the honor and dignity of America with no other help or advice or power than her own dignity. The Chin-chas were a question of honor. Chile could not do otherwise. . . . Chile will avoid war at all cost except that of her honor."¹¹

As can be seen from the above quotations, many of Seward's contemporaries did not agree with him that the situations in Chile and Mexico were different. Apparently there has been no more unanimity in the views of those who have since written on the two incidents. As was mentioned in the Introduction, William R. Sherman referred to "Spanish imperialism, similar to that of France in Mexico, . . ."¹² In view of the fact that Mexico was actually invaded by a large army and the means of government literally seized by force, and in the light of Sherman's own account of Chile's involvement with Spain, the

¹⁰Serial 1162, Romero to Seward, May 18, 1862, p. 60.

¹¹Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, p. 126.

¹²Sherman, Diplomatic and Commercial Relations, p. 101.

question naturally arises as to the extent of his familiarity with the Mexican intervention. About the Spanish-Chilean War he says, "Chile later was virtually forced to enter on the side of the allies by Spain's aggressive attitude . . . Spain persisted and her admiral appeared off the Chilean coast with an arrogant ultimatum demanding a salute to the Spanish flag and guarantees against further lapse of neutrality. Chile considered this repugnant to her national honor and refused to accede."¹³

As Evans' work pertained only to the Chilean rather than to both the situations, obviously it is possible to examine his conclusions only as they pertain to the Spanish-Chilean conflict. Unfortunately, the value of his work as a reference is diminished by slantings and inaccuracies, some examples of which follow. Evans introduced Méndez Núñez to the reader with this statement, "He [Pareja] was succeeded by the fiery Méndez Núñez, who moved at once to bombard Valparaíso"¹⁴ While this is a small point, on the basis of all contemporary reports, Evans' presentation of Méndez Núñez is most unfair to the Spaniard. Bias is established in the use of only the adjective "fiery." Further, from a chronological point of view this

¹³Sherman, Diplomatic and Commercial Relations, p. 102.

¹⁴Evans, Chile and its Relations, p. 89.

statement is inaccurate, unless between two and three months is considered "at once." In discussing Vicuña's mission to the United States, Evans said that "an added duty fell to him after his arrival, that of buying warships."¹⁵ This is an error according to Vicuña's own book which Evans has listed in his bibliography. In reference to Thomas Nelson, Evans wrote, "His attitude seems to have met with the full approval of Washington, if it were indeed understood."¹⁶ The diplomatic correspondence from which Evans cites indicates that Seward understood Nelson's attitude only too clearly.

Had there not been similarities as well as dissimilarities, it is doubtful that there would have been such a variety of opinion on the two situations. What parallels did exist between these two instances of interference by European powers? The basic similarity is that two former Spanish colonies, now independent, were subjected to Spanish aggression. In both instances the aggression was precipitated by a question of honor. Spain, in both cases shortly after the inception of the conflict, demonstrated a willingness to negotiate. As Spanish plans became known to the public at large, it was reported that Spain was desirous of regaining her old colonies.

¹⁵Evans, Chile and its Relations, p. 91.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 92.

In both situations Spanish policy and the denouement were determined by the Spanish commanding officer.

Nonetheless, the similarities were superficial, whereas the dissimilarities were basic. Spanish action was unilateral in Chile, while in Mexico, Spain was but one member of a tripartite convention. In Mexico, Spain landed troops and was in a militarily feasible position to reinforce and supply them. In Chile, Spain was in a logistically untenable position to carry out even limited naval warfare. There was no attempt made to land troops in Chile. In Mexico there was no declaration of war, while in the other case it was Chile who was the first to declare war against Spain. There were vast differences in the internal situations of the two countries which, at least in part, account for the differences in tone that were taken by the leaders of Chile and Mexico. The former enjoyed a stable economic and political situation, while Mexico had been in a state of anarchy and internal strife for most of the previous twenty-five years. Mexico's need for peace might well account for the flexible and conciliatory tone of Juarez and his reference to the Spanish as "our old friends" in a speech made while the Spaniards were in occupation of the port of Vera Cruz. This is certainly in contrast to the rigid position taken by Pérez in his replies to Pareja and Nelson.

The crucial difference affecting the outcome, from the Spanish point of view, of Spain's adventures in these two countries can be found in the personalities, outlooks, prejudices and the backgrounds of the Spanish commanders in each case. General Prim spoke of and treated with respect President Juarez and the republican form of government, was desirous of reaching an understanding that would be mutually beneficial, and did so at the earliest opportunity. Pareja, on the other hand, entertained almost a fixation about punishing Chile and seemingly did everything that he possibly could to aggravate the situation and to offend the Chilean people. Much to her credit, Spain negotiated her differences with Mexico, signed a treaty, and withdrew her troops. The "resolution" of the Chilean situation caused the name of Spain to be looked upon with disrespect throughout the western hemisphere because of the useless destruction of property at Valparaiso. This latter was a vital factor in bringing to a halt Spanish pretensions to play again the role of a major power.

Before making a decision as to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine, the limitations and interpretations of the Doctrine itself must first be established. How was the Doctrine viewed in the 1860's? Quite naturally there is no one answer to this. The answers are as varied as the viewers. Far more important, the decade as a whole must not be considered, but

rather sentiment toward the Monroe Doctrine must be evaluated on a yearly basis. There is a definite pattern of change in the amount of support for the Doctrine as a concept as it evolved from 1861 to 1864, in particular. By 1864, support of the Monroe Doctrine had become bi-partisan as far as party platforms were concerned, and this support became even more vociferous during 1865 and 1866.

The New York Times, in an editorial in April of 1861, entitled, "The South and its Foreign Relations," quoted the following excerpt from The Charleston Mercury, "The Monroe Doctrine--the doctrine of Southern statesmen when ruling the counsels of the United States goes with the dissolution of the Union of the United States. Cuba is no longer of any use to the Southern States as a counterpoise to the growing and insolent ascendancy of the North. . . .the wider Spain can extend the institutions of Cuba over adjacent islands, the more worthy she becomes to be our ally."¹⁷ From being a doctrine of "Southern gentlemen," by 1863, the Southern view as expressed by The Richmond Enquirer was, "he [Napoleon] is setting at naught the 'Monroe doctrine,' a tradition which the Northern mind cannot part with, no more than with 'the Union as it was'. . . ."¹⁸

¹⁷New York Times, April 10, 1861, p. 4, as quoted from The Charleston Mercury.

¹⁸New York Herald, February 15, 1863, p. 2, as quoted from The Richmond Enquirer of February 6, 1863.

After the lapse of another two years an influential portion of Southern opinion was advocating that a combined North-South army enforce the Monroe Doctrine by marching against the French in Mexico.

The paucity of articles or editorials in which there was specific mention of the Monroe Doctrine in the base newspapers in 1861 is in itself substantive and lends support to the statement made at the opening of this section. The editorial position of the Detroit Free Press is illustrative of the traditional Democratic attitude. "From the days of Mr. Monroe it has been the settled policy of the United States to resist all interference by European nations with America. . . . Our government has declared that any attempt to colonize, or subjugate, or control the destinies, etc., is cause for war."¹⁹ The Free Press took this stand upon receipt of the word of the tri-partite alliance, although there was no great love for Mexico as was shown in another editorial the same week. In the second editorial the editor said that we, the United States, did not deny to other nations the right to make war for proper causes, but the United States would oppose any planned, permanent domination of Mexico. The editor said that the Powers had substantial ground for complaint against Mexico. Further, he

¹⁹ Detroit Free Press, October 11, 1861, p. 2.

opposed the loan that had been proposed by Corwin because he felt that "the Mexicans would embezzle it, or it would alienate the European Powers."²⁰ Northern Democratic point of view remained loyal to the Monroe Doctrine; thus, in 1865, in an editorial favoring the emigration scheme of General Ortega, the editor expressed the hope that France and all other countries would soon know that, "The Monroe Doctrine is practically a law which must govern the world."²¹

In 1865, there occurred the unusual phenomenon of James G. Bennett and Horace Greeley taking the same editorial position on a question. In January, Greeley wrote, "The Monroe Doctrine still lives. It will in due time be vindicated alike from domestic perversion and foreign opposition, and will long outlast the Empire whether of Napoleon or Maximilian."²² Bennett, in an editorial addressed to Louis Napoleon said, "The Monroe Doctrine is fully accepted by the Americans, and nothing can eradicate from their minds the idea that a foreign monarchy on this continent is an offense to the United States."²³

²⁰ Detroit Free Press, October 15, 1861, p. 1.

²¹ Ibid., May 12, 1865, p. 2.

²² New York Tribune, January 5, 1865, p. 4.

²³ New York Herald, July 7, 1865, p. 4.

Early in 1864, in an article headed, "The Mexican Question," in the Detroit Free Press, it was stated, "There exists everywhere in the country not merely a traditional, but a real and honest determination to adhere to the principles of the Monroe doctrine. The recent and unanimous expression of the House of Representatives that it does not hold with the sentiment of the people of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power, no doubt embodies the convictions of the people in regard to Napoleon's occupation of Mexico. . . .It is difficult to look at his Mexican maneuvers in any other light than that they are indirectly aimed to destroy the integrity of our government."²⁴

One of the major developments in the United States' attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine was widely published during 1865. The plan was summarized on the editorial page of the New York Herald. The article discussed the "manifest destiny of the Monroe doctrine," and expressed the hope that the Doctrine would become the basis for the policy of a united North and South.²⁵ Thus in a period of four years the Monroe Doctrine

²⁴ Detroit Free Press, April 8, 1864, p. 2.

²⁵ New York Herald, February 1, 1865, p. 4.

had gone from a dirty word attributed to slave-owning Democrats who wanted more slave territory (by the Northerners), or (by the Southerners) to expansionist Yankee traders who wanted new markets, to the respectable means by which many patriots of both North and South hoped to reunify their country. It could be hypothesized that for these people the Monroe Doctrine became a symbol that replaced abolitionism and states' rights as a rallying point for, in Lasswell's terms, an excess of political energy. Further, the Monroe Doctrine served as a means of directing the hostilities of the community outward, rather than inward, to problems such as the shortage of adequate housing and the increasing unrest of labor.

The Monroe Doctrine meeting, held at the Cooper Union Institute on January 6, 1866, sponsored by Chile's special agent Vicuña Mackenna, illustrates the extent to which support for the Monroe Doctrine had permeated the influential public. Interestingly enough, of the four base papers, the affair was best covered by the one which least supported the idea behind the meeting, the Washington Evening Star. About the meeting itself the Star said, "On Saturday night last there was a meeting at the Cooper Institute, New York, at which speeches were spouted and letters read, all aimed at the American Eagle and intended to incite that unhappy bird to whet its beak and spread its pinions, and soar and soar, and keep asoaring ready for a pounce in behalf of the Monroe doctrine, so called,

whenever and wherever that somewhat obscure piece of faith should seem to be pooh-poohed by any European power."²⁶

In spite of its negative editorial comment, the Star's story revealed the positive attitude that was becoming increasingly widespread. "Mr. William C. Bryant, who presided, said we had come to 'discourage the interference of European princes in the affairs of a sister American republic.' Congressman Van Horn writes, 'If a monarchy be established in Mexico, we shall be untrue to our duty, and will receive the execration of the lovers of freedom throughout the world.' (The editor inserted this comment: 'Mr. Van Horn is more Monroish than Monroe himself, for the latter tolerated 'monarchy' in Mexico, and Iturbide came to the throne just about the time that the Monroe doctrine was taking shape.") Mr. Montgomery Blair wanted 'an outspoken expression,' because European influence had culminated in the late attack upon Chile. He was sure that the Mexican expedition was odious to the French people, who loved their country and the first Napoleon, who also loved us. He thought we should remonstrate, and even 'resort to force to check the Emperor in his mad career.' Senator Nesmith declared that Louis Napoleon had 'stolen into Mexico.' He thought that our government should vindicate the Monroe doctrine

²⁶Washington Evening Star, January 9, 1866, p. 2.

even by the cannon's mouth. Mr. S. J. Randall of Pennsylvania, wrote that he was 'prepared to use all constitutional means to carry it (the Monroe Doctrine) into practical force and effect and assume any responsibility which may arise therefrom.' Mr. Kasson, of Iowa, thought that we had best give Europe a little time to think the matter over, meanwhile making our preparations complete. 'Then, if justice, honor, and respect for American principles do not retract the interference already initiated by Europe, let the blows fall, in the name of God and Liberty, until the interfering flags shall have been swept from the two oceans that embrace our continent.'--Speaker Colfax wrote that he had 'no hesitation in expressing his warmest sympathies with the struggling and unconquered Liberals of Mexico, and his faith that both the President and the Congress will so act and speak, that the whole world will understand and appreciate the deep interest we feel in the permanency, the tranquilization and the consequent prosperity of our neighboring republic.' . . . Mr. Theodore Tomlinson said that we ought to cry aloud to all the world 'we do not interfere with you, and it is necessary for our preservation that we allow no monarchies upon the continent of America.'"²⁷

²⁷Washington Evening Star, January 9, 1866, p. 2.

The resolutions and many of the speeches at the Cooper Union demonstrated some of the fallacious "reasoning" that even today centers around the Monroe Doctrine. Statements such as "we allow no monarchies" are quite irrelevant in that there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine that even implies that the Latin American nations cannot have monarchies or any other form of government that they desire. This is precisely the point; the governments must be what the people themselves desire, not governments that are imposed from outside.

The editorial opinion of the Star, although opposed to the chauvinistic character of the meeting and unrealistic employment of the symbol of the Monroe Doctrine, nevertheless expressed disapproval of Maximilian's position in Mexico. The editor explained his own reason for his position in these words, "The country [United States] just now needs recuperation after one of the most exhausting wars in the world, and the people have not the slightest idea of undertaking just yet the expensive experiment of policing the entire American continent. They prefer to rest awhile before tackling on with the 'next war,' contenting themselves meantime with advising Maximilian as a prudential measure to 'get out of that grass,' and indulging a quiet belief that the more we don't go to war just yet, the more we replenish our treasury

and granaries after a cool and undemonstrative sort of way-- the more Maximilian will be open to the conviction that on the whole the climate of Mexico don't [sic] agree with his constitution."²⁸

What did the man who sponsored the meeting have to say about the Monroe Doctrine? At the meeting itself Vicuña said, ". . . we also, gentlemen, have a Monroe doctrine of our own. But it is not such a Monroe doctrine as you have been proud of for forty years; to be sustained beneath the illuminated vault of this brilliant hall; to be talked of by great orators, or by the voice of the daily press, but a practical doctrine, real, to be supported by acts, by treaties, by alliances, and which, unlike you, we have always defended with our blood and our swords.

"And Chile, . . . I am proud to say is the republic of the south which has put itself at the head of this grand and generous movement of brotherhood in glory and sacrifice. . . . In the opinion of the people of South America, the Monroe doctrine does not mean conquest without right, invasion without justice; does not mean aught but respect for nationalities which God has created, or their institutions, ...

"It [Monroe Doctrine] is not a question of frontiers

²⁸Washington Evening Star, January 9, 1866, p. 2.

and territories, by which this or that State may extend itself at the expense of another. It is, on the contrary, the foundation of international right in America."²⁹ He closed his speech with the statement that he trusted that President Johnson would sustain the Doctrine and that the monarchical governments of Europe would not be permitted to interfere with the republican institutions in the new world.

In the account of his mission to the United States, published in 1867, the year after his return to Chile, there was a chapter devoted to the Monroe Doctrine. From this it is evident that his opinion of the Monroe Doctrine had changed very little and not for the better. He asked, "What is the Monroe Doctrine?" Then he answered as to what it was not. It was not an historic tradition, said Vicuña, because it had not been applied in Mexico under Polk, nor in several other instances which he mentioned. He went on to say that it was not a real system, a defined proposition, in short, "a doctrine" composed of a body of beliefs and aspirations because it had never been defined in a precise manner; it was simply left to each to understand it in his own way according to the needs of the moment. He stated further

²⁹Serial 1261, pp. 663-65. Vicuña Mackenna's speech to the Cooper Institute here appears in full. It is interesting to note that it is not included in his book. His mission was to gain good will for Chile, and his speech was not of that nature.

that it was not a logical derivation stemming from any geographical factor or from a national tradition of the American people. In don Benjamín's own words, "North America is the cruel stepmother of South America, never her friend, much less her protector." He asked whether the Doctrine were a truth, and then answered that it was not. The Doctrine, said Vicuña Mackenna, had never been seen to be implemented other than on paper or in court.³⁰

After this overview of a variety of opinions toward the content and pertinency of the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the situations under discussion, it would be well to return to President Monroe's address in order to evaluate precisely what it encompassed. The Doctrine can be said to include a logical sequence composed of a stated position, necessary conditions, and a statement of modifying circumstances that could affect the total sequence.

Considered in this manner, then, "It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense," is actually the keystone of the Doctrine. This is the stated position.

The necessary conditions, as far as the Doctrine is concerned, are the following: 1) "We should consider any

³⁰Vicuña Mackenna, Diez Meses, Vol. I, pp. 409-411.

attempt on their part [European powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety;" 2) "But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States;" 3) "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; . . . it is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

The following is a statement of modifying circumstances:
"In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."³¹

³¹The underscoring is the writer's emphasis.

This last point might be considered both as a modifying circumstance in the application of the Doctrine, and as a part of the original position. "It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."³²

As have been mentioned and/or discussed throughout the body of this work, innumerable reasons for the United States reaction to the Spanish-Chilean War and the French intervention in Mexico have been predicated. Depending on the person being cited, the reason or reasons that have been given are international politics, the Civil War, vested commercial interests, contiguity of Mexico, North American indifference to the Latin countries, United States friendship with European powers, and public opinion. While it is undoubtedly true that some of these factors played a role in influencing the position taken by the United States, others were peripheral, only casually related to the issues and their resolutions.

Rather, the basis for the United States position is to be found in the Doctrine itself and in the situations as they were viewed by the official United States decision-makers of the era. The basic tenet of the Doctrine is the peace, safety,

³²Richardson, Messages and Papers, Vol. II, p. 218, from the inaugural address of President Monroe.

and well-being of the United States. The intervention in Mexico clearly fulfilled the conditions that were specified within the Doctrine as constituting a danger to this peace and well-being. It is equally clear that the Chilean situation did not fulfill these conditions; there was no threat, not even an implied one, to the United States nor was there any attempt to subvert the independent government that had been established by the Chilean people. Vicuña Mackenna simply did not appreciate the premise upon which the Monroe Doctrine was founded. The Chilean imbroglio was left to the nations concerned for resolution; on the other hand, however, almost from the beginning Mexico enjoyed the encouragement and later what undercover aid the Union government was able to offer her. Finally, once United States' resources were freed from the exigencies of the Civil War, there was no longer any doubt as to her ability and determination to lend active assistance to Mexico.

One can not heap all of the blame for the misunderstanding of the Doctrine upon Vicuña. There were many others, and still are even today, who are equally unaware of the true import of this Doctrine. It is hoped, therefore, that this comparative study of the two cases will aid in attaining a more precise perception of this fundamental principle. Since

the Monroe Doctrine still continues to play such an integral and prominent role in United States foreign policy at the present time, a fuller awareness of how it evolved, how it was regarded by the people of the nineteenth century as reflected in the press of the period, and how it was interpreted by the policy-makers as observed from the contemporary diplomatic correspondence should contribute to a better understanding of the Doctrine.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

- U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Checklist of United States Documents 1789-1909. 1 Vol., 3rd ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911.

This index to the government serial sets has been a helpful aid for locating most of the Mexican diplomatic correspondence used in the preparation of this paper. The information and reports employed in the preparation of the trade tables were also found through this guide.

- U.S. House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1136. The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862.
- U.S. House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1162. The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 54, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863.
- U.S. House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial Nos. 1261 and 1262. Mexican Affairs. Doc. 73, Pts. 1 and 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66.
- U.S. House of Representatives Executive Document, Serial No. 1294. The Present Condition of Mexico. Doc. 76, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867.
- U.S. Senate Executive Document, Serial No. 1209. Papers Relating to Mexican Affairs. Doc. 11, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865.

The above contain the bulk of the Mexican diplomatic material utilized in the preparation of this work. These documents have the correspondence of Secretary of State Seward with United States Minister Corwin in Mexico and with Mexican Minister Romero in Washington. Also included are many of the Mexican government's official communications and decrees which were enclosed in the Romero notes. There is much of the correspondence with the United States

ministers in Spain, Britain, and France. Their dispatches bear reports of interviews with various governmental officials, records of debates from the official papers, and articles and editorials from other newspapers and journals relative to the French intervention in Mexico.

U.S. Senate Executive Document, Serial No. 1238. Message of the President . . . in Regard to the Seizure and Detention at New York of the Steamship Meteor. Doc. 39, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1866.

Apart from the diplomatic correspondence and commercial information, this is the only governmental item dealing with Chilean affairs which this writer has located for the six year period under consideration. It contains the correspondence of Secretary Seward with Spanish Minister Tassara and with the United States attorney general concerning the seizure of the Meteor and its legality. From these documents one sees the seizure from a different aspect than that described by Vicuna Mackenna.

. Message of the President . . . respecting General Order No. 17, issued by the commander of the department of California, prohibiting the exportation of arms or munitions of war over the frontier. Doc. 40.

This contains correspondence concerning the legal implications of the above. In the opinion of Attorney General Speed such action, if engaged in by private individuals, was lawful. The French consul in San Francisco protested vehemently over the exportation of arms into Mexico from California.

. Message from the President . . . in regard to the departure of troops from Austria for Mexico. Doc. 54.

Some additional correspondence of Seward with United States Minister Motley in Vienna which is not found elsewhere is included here. The period of December, 1865, to June of 1866, is covered in this document.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office, Serial No. 2136. The History and Present Condition of the Newspaper and Periodical Press of the United States, by S. N. D. North. Mis. Doc. 42, Pt. 8, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1884.

This document has provided much useful information and background material as to the growth and influence of the press in the United States. Many statistical tables and maps showing distribution and concentration of the papers in this country are included.

U.S. House of Representatives. Letter of the Secretary of State Transmitting a Report of the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations for the Year Ending September 30, 1861. Ex. Doc. 45, Pts. 1 and 2, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862.

U.S. House of Representatives. Letter of the Secretary of State Transmitting a Report of the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations for the Year Ending September 30, 1862. Ex. Doc. 63, Pts. 1 and 2, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863.

Abstracts of the consular reports from Chile and Mexico are contained in the above. In addition to the commercial information they supplement that of the diplomatic as to the internal situations of the two countries.

U.S. House of Representatives, Serial No. 1140. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report from the Register of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, p. 602.

U.S. Serial No. 1170. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Washington, 1864, pp. 270-271.

U.S. Serial No. 1197. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Washington, 1865, pp. 270-71.

U.S. House of Representatives, Serial No. 1231. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, p. 320.

U.S. Serial No. 1268. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report from the Register of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Washington, 1866, pp. 658-59.

U.S. Serial No. 1301. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report from the Director of Statistics on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Washington, 1867, pp. 394-95.

U.S. Serial 1348. Annual Report of the Director of the Bureau of Statistics on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Washington, 1868, pp. 236-87.

The preceding documents with pages indicated contain trade figures of the U.S. for the years 1861 through 1866. The information from these reports was used in the preparation of the trade tables for the two nations.

U.S. Department of State. Messages and Documents of the President of the United States Relating to Foreign Affairs. Washington, 1861-66.

This series, published annually, comprises the diplomatic correspondence of the United States. Very little material not found elsewhere is to be gleaned regarding Mexico in these volumes. However, this has been the principle source for diplomatic information on Chile and, where pertinent, on Spain, France, and Britain.

U.S. Congressional Globe:

37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 3, Washington, 1862.

38th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, Washington, 1864.

39th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1 and 4, Washington, 1866.

39th Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 1, Washington, 1866.

39th Cong., 2nd Sess., Appendix, Washington, 1866.

These volumes are a record of the happenings in the U.S. Congress for this period. They have been utilized for data concerning Mexico and the proposed loan to that country, and for background material on the U.S. itself during the period.

BOOKS

Álvarez, Alejandro. Rasgos Generales de la Historia Diplomática de Chile. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta "Barcelona," 1911.

This author presents a general view of a century of Chilean diplomatic history with some interesting observations concerning European public opinion toward his country. One can almost detect a feeling of inferiority in his writings expressed in behalf of all Latin America. This might well be due to European attitudes toward these countries.

Bancroft, Hubert H. History of Mexico, 1861-1867. Vol. VI. San Francisco: History Co. Publishers, 1888.

This source has for long been regarded as one of the chief authorities on Mexican history. For this reason it has been consulted, primarily as a reference book.

Bazaine, François. Documentos Inéditos o Muy Raros Para la Historia de México; La Intervención Francesa en México Según el Archivo del Mariscal Bazaine. México: Carranza e Hijos, 1909.

This source, consisting essentially of the correspondence of Bazaine with his home government in Paris, adds another dimension to an understanding of the French position in Mexico.

Bemis, Samuel F., and Griffin, Grace G. Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935.

Although printed in 1935, this guide to the available literature, primary and secondary, has been useful in locating a number of items concerning United States relations with these Latin American countries.

_____. (ed.) The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Vol. 7. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1923.

This volume deals with the policies of Secretary of State Seward. No mention is made of his Chilean policy, but the work is a useful one in placing United States policy toward Latin America in proper perspective with the domestic issues of that time.

Becker, Jerónimo. Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores de España durante el Siglo XIX. Vol. II, 1839-68. Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico, 1924.

This seems to be a carefully done work which traces Spanish foreign relations throughout the nineteenth century and utilizes material from the Spanish archives. Becker presents a thorough account, not too biased, of the Spanish-Chilean difficulties

Bierck, Harold A. (ed.) and Lecuna, Vicente (comp.) Selected Writings of Bolivar. Vol. I. New York: Colonial Press, 1951.

The accuracy of Bolivar's perceptions of and predictions for Latin America will be noted from the quotations taken from his writings of fifty years prior to this period.

Bombardment de Valparaíso (Documents Officiels) Suivi du Combat du Callao. Paris: Imprimerie Vallée, 1866.

This source, as indicated by its title, contains essentially documents such as pleas to the Spanish commander addressed by the various foreign consular and diplomatic bodies to stay the bombardment, proclamations of President Pérez and Foreign Minister Covarrubias, and official foreign opinion following the bombardment.

The Bombardment of Valparaíso, Rear-Admiral Denman, Mr. Layard (Late Her Majesty's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), And the British Community of Valparaíso. Liverpool: n. pub., 1866.

This source is useful in an understanding of the British view of the bombardment. It contains the evidence gathered by the British merchants in Valparaíso to show the duplicity of Denman's policy. This evidence was presented in a speech by Mr. Layard in the House of Commons.

Chile and Spain--Notes Interchanged Between Admiral Pareja and the Minister of Foreign Relations. n.p.: n. pub., n.d.

This book contains copies of the correspondence exchanged between Pareja and Covarrubias prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Also included is the correspondence of the diplomatic corps in Chile with Admiral Pareja.

Chile and Spain. The Whole Question Officially Stated. New York: n. pub., 1865.

Part I of this pamphlet contains the correspondence of Tavora with Covarrubias and covers the early attempt, in May of 1865, at peaceful settlement. Part II is concerned with the diplomatic negotiations in September to resolve the differences.

Chile. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Counter Manifest of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile on the Present War Between the Republic and Spain. Washington: McGill & Withebro, 1865.

In this document Covarrubias attempts to justify the stand which he assumed toward Spain during this period. It contains a brief outline of Chilean policy since the time of the seizure of the Chincha. The purpose of this document might well have been to gain stronger support of public opinion for his policy.

Clarke, Henry Butler. Modern Spain, 1815-1898. Cambridge: University Press, 1906.

This book, written by an author with a personal knowledge of Spain, gives a general over-all picture of conditions in that country during the nineteenth century.

Courcelle-Seneuil, Jean Gustav. Guerre de l'Espagne au Chili. Paris: n. pub., 1866.

This is a treatise on the bombardment of Valparaiso and the rights of neutrals under international law. The author is a Frenchman, resident in Chile at the time of the bombardment, and his work clearly favors the Chilean side. Some selected documents substantiating his view are included.

Davis, William C. The Last Conquistadores. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1950.

This narration of Spanish interference in South America during 1363 to 1866 is, seemingly, a carefully done work. As indicated by the title, the author displays a definite prejudice against Spain and implicitly places the full blame for the situation upon that nation. The findings of this writer do not bear out this conclusion of Davis.

Dodd, Walter F. Modern Constitutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909.

The translation of the Chilean constitution of 1833 included in this work was the one used for a comparison with the Mexican constitution of 1857.

Edwards, Agustin. Cuatro Presidentes de Chile. Vol. I. Valparaíso: Imprenta "Universo," 1932.

Volume I of this work is an account of happenings in Chile during the administration of President Pérez. It is a well written book, but presents little new material or interpretations on the conflict with Spain.

Encina, Francisco A. Historia de Chile. Vol. 14. Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1950.

Encina is considered by many as the foremost contemporary Chilean historian. In this volume much useful information and background material on the leading personalities such as Covarrubias and Tocornal is given. However, as is true of most of the other Chilean historians, Encina also assumes a nationalistic approach justifying Chilean policy in the dealings with Spain.

Estrada, Genaro. Don Juan Prim y su Labor Diplomático en México. Vol. XXV. Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano. México: n. pub., 1928.

It is interesting that this work containing the diplomatic correspondence of General Prim with his government, the governor-general of Cuba, the Mexican government, and with Napoleon was published in Mexico. The communications, often humorously worded, leave no doubt as to the sincerity and good will of Prim toward Mexico.

Evans, Henry Clay. Chile and its Relations with the United States. Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1927.

This book, a general study of United States-Chilean relations, has already been evaluated in the body of this paper. The author shows a strong prepossession for Chile against Spain and even against the United States. This latter most probably is due to the influence of Vicuña Mackenna's book in which the Chilean agent complained bitterly of his treatment in the United States and the predilection of Secretary Seward for Spain.

Galdames, Luis. A History of Chile. Translated and edited by Isaac Cox. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941.

This one volume work is perhaps the best one available on Chilean history. The approach to the subject is an honest one with no attempt made to cover governmental blunders or to glorify certain personages such as Vicuña Mackenna. As distinct from most of the other Chilean and Spanish historians, this work is carefully documented.

Hale, William H. Horace Greeley, Voice of the People. New York: Collier Books, 1961.

Since the New York Tribune, of which Greeley was editor, has been utilized to a great extent in the preparation of this paper, it was deemed essential to have as thorough an acquaintance as possible with this interesting and influential man. Greeley's early background of poverty and hard work was an important factor in the development of his strong belief in the equality and the dignity of man. He had definite opinions on almost every subject, including Latin America, and these opinions were followed avidly by the people of the time in his editorials.

Lanman, Charles. Biographical Annals of the Civil Government of the United States, From Original and Official Sources. New York: J.M. Morrison Publisher, 1837.

This work was used primarily for obtaining background information on the diplomats and other prominent and influential men of the United States of the era of the 1860's.

Leavitt, Joshua A. The Monroe Doctrine. New York: Sinclair Tousey, 1869.

This is a contemporaneous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by a Protestant minister of the period. He expressed a strong conviction that the Doctrine should be upheld in Mexico. As characteristic of many during these years, and even later in the nineteenth century, Leavitt attributed many of the difficulties in Latin America to the influence of "popery." The United States did not experience like difficulties, according to him, because of its Anglo-Saxon inheritance.

Llorca, Carmen. Isabel II y Su Tiempo. Valencia: Editorial Marfil, n.d.

This source elaborates upon the situation of turmoil and confusion extant in Spain during the 1860's. The author has attempted, with some success, to counteract the commonly held opinion that Isabel II was completely incompetent and immoral and that the Queen must be held responsible for the situation in Spain. Llorca holds, rather, that Isabel was simply a product of the time.

Lowell, Lawrence A. Public Opinion and Popular Government. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913.

Lawrence Lowell, a former president of Harvard University, was aware early in this century of the importance of public opinion and its relation to governmental

policy. The author attempts to explain what constitutes public opinion and to what extent it can be translated into action.

Moore, Joseph W. The American Congress, A History of National Legislation and Political Events, 1774-1895. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1895.

Used essentially as a reference book, this work deals more adequately than many later ones with the United States Congresses during the period of the 1860's. Internal problems as well as foreign policy are handled in a clear fashion.

Novo y Colson, Pedro de. Historia de la Guerra de España en el Pacífico. Madrid: n. pub., 1882.

This is the prime secondary source upon which all subsequent writers, Chilean, Spanish, and American, have based their works. Novo, a former naval officer, wrote with much style which might account for his success as a playwright. The Spanish archives have been used to some extent in the preparation of his book, but it would seem that further investigation in these archives might prove fruitful as there are still many questions unanswered.

Perkins, Dexter. Foreign Policy and the American Spirit. Edited by G.G. Van Deusen. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957.

A series of essays by the leading expert on the Monroe Doctrine is contained in this book. It is useful more for the manner in which Perkins treats with his material than for the content itself. As distinct from his earlier work, the author here takes into account more fully the element of public opinion, and to a limited extent he has applied it to the Seward period.

_____. The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933.

The intervention in Mexico is covered at some length in this study, but there is scarcely more than passing mention of the Chilean. In the Mexican section Perkins does speak of public opinion both in the body and in his bibliography, but not in the same sense in which he has employed the term in his more recent works nor as it has been used within the scope of this paper. Further, as has previously been said, certain statements made by Perkins do not fully agree with findings of this writer.

Platt, Donn. Memories of the Men Who Saved the Union. New York: Belford, Clark and Co., 1887.

Many helpful observations and evaluations on Lincoln, Seward, Stanton, and others are contained in this work written by an author who knew personally these men.

Poore, Ben Perley. The Political Register and Congressional Directory: A Statistical Record of the Federal Officials, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial of the United States. Boston: Houghton, Osgood and Co., 1878.

This is an excellent source for biographical material on the men who served in Congress during this decade. The scope of this directory is more restricted than is that of Lanman's book, but the coverage is a fuller one.

Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald B. (compilers) National Party Platforms. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956.

As the title indicates, this book contains the national party platforms for the years under consideration along with some pertinent comments on the political situation. The book is a most helpful one and extremely will put together; the major criticism of it would be the lack of any documentation.

Richardson, James D. (compiler) Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896-99.

The second volume of this ten volume work includes the messages of President Monroe of 1823 and 1824 in which United States policy toward Latin America was enunciated. It has been helpful to refer back to these speeches in order to determine more precisely the intention of the Monroe Doctrine.

Roeder, Ralph. Juarez and His Mexico. New York: Viking Press, 1947.

With emphasis primarily upon the personalities of Juarez and his generals, this is a carefully done work. However, some documentation would have made it more valuable.

Rosenau, James N. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1961.

This source, one of the most recent and best in its field, deals with the relationship between public opinion

and foreign policy. Rosenau speculates as to how foreign policy ideas circulate in the United States and the contribution that national leaders make to this process. He is also quite specific in his definitions, differentiating, for example, as to opinion makers and transmitters, and between opinion and influence.

Sherman, William R. The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the United States and Chile. Boston: Gorham Press, 1926.

As discussed in the body of the paper this source has been regarded by many as an authoritative one on this period. However, in addition to being poorly written the pro-Chilean bias and the numerous inaccuracies prevent it from being a reliable work.

Vicuña Mackenna, Benjamín. Diez Meses de Mision a los Estados Unidos de Norte América Como Ajente Confidencial de Chile. Santiago: n. pub., 1867.

The author, a well known Chilean historian and diplomat, has recorded his experiences in the United States during 1865-66, while on a special mission to secure aid for his country in the war against Spain. Vicuña lost no opportunity to express his bitterness toward the United States because of the but slight success of his efforts. His need to explain this failure to the Chilean public may in part account for this attitude. Also, there was the fact that Vicuña Mackenna did not really comprehend the seriousness of the internal situation in the United States at that time. Various subsequent writers, even some Americans, have taken a similar stand to that of Vicuña, no doubt because of the influence of his book.

_____. Historia de la Guerra de Chile con España. Santiago: Imprenta "Victoria," 1833.

Aside from a more pro-Chilean posture, this history differs little from Novo's work from which Vicuña has cited liberally.

Vattel, M. Emerich de. The Law of Nations. Edited by Joseph Chitty. Philadelphia: T. and J.W. Johnson Co., 1866.

Since, in both of the conflicts under consideration, various principles of international law were cited, the writer has found this source applicable for clarification of certain points as have been indicated.

Wright, Quincy. (ed.) Public Opinion and World Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.

This is another source showing the importance of public opinion. When this series of lectures first appeared in print, the book was not favorably reviewed. This might well be attributed to the fact that at this period of development in the United States there was relatively little interest in foreign affairs.

ARTICLES AND NEWSPAPERS

Johnson, John. "Pioneer Telegraph in Chile, 1852-1876,"
Stanford University Publications in History, Economics,
and Political Science, Vol. 6 (1943).

Thorough coverage of this important means of communications is presented in this book. The development of the telegraph as a ramification of the strong feeling of Chilean nationalism during this period has been helpful in obtaining a better understanding of Chilean foreign policy.

B. K. Hunt. "The New York Herald," North American Review,
Vol. 102 (1866).

This article is an extremely perceptive one which discusses the press of New York with particular emphasis on the New York Herald and its editor, James G. Bennett. Consideration is also given to the influence of the press in the United States.

Scholes, Walter V. "Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime,"
University of Missouri Studies (1957).

Much material from the Mexican newspapers and archives as well as memoirs have contributed to making this work a very fine study for the period 1855 to 1872. It is a well written work with a most helpful bibliography.

Detroit Free Press. 1861-1866.

New York Herald. 1861-1866.

New York Tribune. 1861-1866.

Washington Evening Star, 1861-1866.

All issues of these four papers for the six year period under consideration have been consulted, and the manner in which the findings have been utilized is fully discussed in the body of this work.

L'Europe.

Ferrocarril.

New York Times.

The Times (London).

These papers have also been discussed in the body of this work. As there specified, they have been utilized for extra coverage during various bulge periods. This is especially so in the use of the New York Times. L'Europe and the London Times were cited essentially as confirmatory sources of European opinion in regard to the several international problems.

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