, LoscAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENE}: f~ g} ‘*
AND DEVELOPMENT mam 'GUAEMALAi' :' .-  . ‘
SPATlALV AND PROCESS consmamons‘. _ ;

‘DiSsertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
r ‘M'ECHEGAEQ STATE UNiVERSiTY
.- TERRY L. McENTGSH .
‘ 1974 "

 

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Michigan State
University

    

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEVELOPMENT LAG IN GUATEMALA:
SPATIAL AND PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

presented by

TERRY L. MCINTOSH

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D . degree in Geography

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ABSTRACT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT
LAG IN GUATEMALA: SPATIAL AND
PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

BY

Terry L. McIntosh

While a substantial amount of social science re-
search in Latin American politics and economic deve10pment
exists, only a small portion of it is the result of
scientific field research aimed at a greater understanding
of development processes. Consequently, there has been
little progress in the formulation and testing of develop-
ment theory in the Latin America context.

Guatemala is selected as the site for this study,
which has three objectives: 1) an examination of the role,
real and potential, of local government in Guatemalan
development; 2) a determination of the image of the central
government which local officials possess and an explanation
of variations in it; and 3) a search for signs of cultural
and rural develOpment lag as measured by local development
priorities.

Interviews with alcaldes (mayors) of 108 randomly

selected municipios (counties) form the core of the data

 

Terry L. McIntosh

collected to meet these objectives. In terms of the role
of local government in development, it was found that the
current role is not significant in either improving the
quality of local life or institutionalizing political be-
havior and Spatially integrating the country. Seven bar-
riers to a more meaningful role for local government in
the development process are examined: 1) the caliber of
local officials, 2) restrictions on the tenure of office
of many pOpularly elected officials, 3) the generally
lethargic attitude of the local population, 4) a dearth
of local government finances, 5) the centralization of
authority within the executive branch of the central
government, 6) the size and organization of the central
government bureaucracy, and 7) the lack of significant
means whereby local officials seek to influence central
government decision-makers. The basic structure exists,
however, for local government to play an increasingly
important role in Guatemalan development. The problem is
that the mechanism is not sufficiently defined and does
not function effectively.

Alcaldes hold a generally favorable image of the
central government. Efforts to explain variations in
the image among alcaldes give mixed results. Feelings of
political efficacy prove important, while the feeling of
past development progress and Optimism with regard to

future development prove of less import. The frequency of

Terry L. McIntosh

communication between local and national officials, the

distance of a municipio from Guatemala City, the party

 

affiliation of the alcalde interviewed, and the population

of a municipio do not prove to be significant variables in

 

explaining the image.

Neither do local development priorities prove
useful instruments to measure development lag, cultural or
rural, for analysis of the data collected suggests that no
lag exists. It does exist, however, but the author now
believes that lag cannot be measured by employing alcalde
Opinions pertaining to local development. This is because
while both urban and rural areas of the country are lacking
in basic services, many alcaldes do not have a concept of

development priorities.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT
LAG IN GUATEMALA: SPATIAL AND

PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

BY

Terry L? McIntosh

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Geography

1974

 

_ ”WW-

-.~ “or .-v -'- gr ,—~w

-s1,'“~\' ‘ "-3 m—«

 

Copyright By
TERRY L. MCINTOSH
I974

 

To Mary Lee, Jud, and the future

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful thanks are extended to Dr. Robert N.
Thomas, Dr. Stanley D. Brunn, and Dr. C. W. Minkel of the
Department of Geography, and Dr. E. Spencer Wellhofer of
the Department of Political Science for their cooperative
assistance in serving as my advisers and members of my
graduate committee. Dr. Robert I. Wittick of the Depart-
ment of Geography and Dr. Ada Finifter of the Department
of Political Science are also owed a debt of gratitude
for their assistance.

During the year of residency in Guatemala involved
in this research the cooperation of Ing. José Lopez Toledo,
Chief of the Office of Geographic Studies of the Department
of Public Works, aided the author immeasurably. The
hospitality of him and his family is gratefully
acknowledged.

Finally, I wish to thank the Computer Institute for
Social Science Research for a grant pertaining to the use

of the computer facilities of Michigan State University.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . .
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . .
Chapter
I. PROLOGUE . . . . . .
Revolution . . . . .

II.

III.

The Latin American Need
Which Way the Revolution?
The Tradition . . . .
Enter the Alliance . .

The Faltering Alliance

Development . . . . .
Political Development .

Political Research in Latin

The Direction . . . .
THE PROBLEM AND SITE . .
Problem . . . . . .
Hypotheses . . . . .

Selection of the Site .
Methodology . . . . .
Ethnocentricity . . .
Guatemala . . . . .

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GUATEMALA:

National Government . .

Local Government: History .

iv

Page
vi

vii

10
12

l4

17
18

21
24
26
26
27
34
37
4O
42
56

56
65

Chapter

Local Government: Composition .
Local Government: ReSponsibilities
Myths and Contrary Legal Restrictions

Municipal Financing and the Myth

of Responsibilities . .

Myths and Municipal Officials

IV. THE HYPOTHESES EXAMINED . . .

People, Local Government, and
Development: The Squeeze .

Local Government: Potential

The Image . . . . . .

The Image: A Search for Explanations

The Search for Lag . . . .

V. CONCLUSIONS 0 O O O O O 0

Local Government: Reality and

Potential . . . . . .

Caliber of Local Officials

Tenure of Office . . . .
Lethargic Population . .
Problems of Money . . .
Centralization of Authority
The Central Bureaucracy .
Pressure Points . . . .

The Problem of the Image . .
The Search for Lag . . . .

VI. EPILOGUE . . . . . . . .
APPENDICES
A. GLOSSARY . . . . . . .

B. SURVEY MUNICIPIOS . . . . .
C. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE . . . .

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . .

O O O O

Page

67
74
76

80
88

90

90
110
117
129
136

144

144

150
151
153
153
155
156
159

168
172

‘174

177
179
183

189

Table

1.

LIST OF TABLES

Employment Background of Alcaldes . . .
Pressure Points for Guatemalan Alcaldes .
Municipios With Only One Pressure Point .

Alcalde Opinions on Means for Improving
ReIations With the Central Government .

Images of Central Government Effectiveness
in Resolving Local Development Problems
(By Category and Ethnic Population) .

Image of Central Government Discrimination
in Resolving Local Development Problems

Image of the Central Government . . .

Correlation Matrix for the Image and
Seven Variables . . . . . . . .

Alcalde Views of Development Priorities .

Results of Hierarchical Grouping . . .

vi

Page
88
100

105

115

119

121
124

131
138
140

LIST OF FIGURES

 

Figure Page
1. Guatemala: Departments . . . . . . . . 36
2. Guatemala: Survey Municipios .. . . . . . 38
3. Guatemala: Indian POpulation, 1964 . . . . 43

4. Five Tiers of Political Involvement
in Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . 112

5. Guatemala: The Image . . . . . . . . . 127

6. Guatemala: Hierarchical Groups Based
on Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . 141

vii

CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

In the mid-1960's, K. H. Silvert observed that "un-
predictable" and "unstable" were the two most commonly used
adjectives referring to Latin American politics.1 In more
recent years perhaps no word with political connotations is
more used in the Latin American context than "revolution,"
which both adjectives at least indirectly imply. Frank
Tannenbaum has noted: "It is difficult for the people of
the United States to understand why Latin American govern-
ments are so unstable, revolutions so numerous, tyrannies

so frequent and, occasionally, so bloody and heartless."2

Revolution

 

What is meant by revolution? A. T. van Leeuwen

maintains that the word has been used in so many contexts

 

1K. H. Silvert, The Conflict Society} Reaction and

Revolutign in Latin America INew York: American Univer-
sities Field Staff, Inc., 1966), p. 19.

2Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New
York: Vintage Books, 1962), p.I141.

 

as to make its use in scientific analysis questionable.3
Definitions of the term vary considerably, but there are
four widely held characteristics of revolution: 1) it is
not only the transference of political power to a new
political elite heretofore more or less excluded from
seats of power, but also an event which has major social
and economic consequences; 2) the political transference
is rapid in the temporal sense; 3) the act of the trans-
ference involves mass participation, and 4) violence is
associated with it. Although these are commonly held
notions of revolution in general, there is unanimity in
thought on only one of them. A revolution involves the
transference of political power to a new elite, with wide-

spread social and economic effects.4

The Latin American Need

 

There is little dispute among contemporary writers
about Latin American affairs over the need for the change
which revolution implies. The need appears to be uni-
versally accepted, and the reasons are not difficult to
detect. One factor in need of revolutionary change is the

distribution of national income, which Lipset noted as

 

3Arend Theodoor van Leeuwen, Development Through
Revolution (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1970), p. 27.

4It is this dichotomy between commonly held and
universally held notions of revolution which leads Samuel
Huntington to differentiate between revolutions and "great
revolutions." See his work, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, I968), p» 264.

 

 

 

one of the three major political issues arising from the
formation of democracies in Western nations.5 There is
little doubt about the growth of GNP's in Latin America
during the 1960's either. What is disputable is the dis-
tribution of wealth involved in this growth.6 Although
reliable statistics on income distribution are lacking, it
is possible to make some estimates. Alba, for example,
estimates that while the 5 to 25 percent of society which
forms the oligarchy in Latin American countries accounts
for 50 percent of the income, only 20 percent of the
national income remains for distribution within the 65
percent to 90 percent of the population which forms the

glowest strata in the social pyramid.7 It is statistics

 

SSeymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1960), p. 71.

6The Rockefeller Report on the Americas (New York
Times Edition, 1969) notes the growthgin GNP‘s, adding
that the 2 percent rate of economic growth per capita was
not high enough. There is no mention of income distribu-
tion. See especially pp. 65-70. By the end of the decade,
the GNP for the region as a whole was growing at the rate
of 2.8 percent per capita annually. Much of this, however,
was due to the substantial growth of the Brazilian economy,
and only six countries were growing, economically, at a
rate equal to or greater than the 2.5 percent per capita
target of the Alliance for Progress. Between 1965 and
1971, the Guatemalan average annual per capita growth was
2 percent. See United Nations, Economic Commission
on Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971
(New York, 1973).

 

 

7Victor Alba, The Latin Americans (New York:
Frederick Praeger, 1969): pp. 141—42:

 

such as these which Shils sees as a major barrier to
modernity.8

Income distribution is not the only indicator of
the need for revolutionary change. There is also the all-
pervasive question of land distribution. The land dis-
tribution problem is acute, not only for economic reasons
but also for social reasons. Land is looked upon as a key
indicator of wealth, as well as a means of keeping up with
the often horrendous rates of inflation. Gerassi has
estimated that 1 percent of the Latin Americans own 71.6
percent of the farmland, and Machin claims that in
Guatemala 60 percent of the cultivated land is owned by

2 percent of the landowners.9

 

8Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political
Development of New States," in John J. Johnson (ed. ), The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Prince-
ton: Princeton University4 Press ,vl962), p. 17. There
appears to be a high correlation between underdevelopment
and the unequal distribution of wealth. See: Bruce
Russett et al., Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 292.

9John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America
(London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., I965), p. 33. Gary
Machin, Revolution Next Door (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p. 96. There is a wealth of material
published on the agrarian problem and its economic. social,
and political effects. For a general view of peasant
society, see: Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Subsistence Agri-
culture and Economic DevelOpment (Chicago: Aldine Pub-
Iishing Co., 1969?: In the Latin American context, inter-
esting and informative works include: Solon L. Barraclough
and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin
American Countries," Land Economics, XLII (1966), 391-424;
C. W. Minkel, "Programs of Agricultural Colonization and
Settlement in Central America," Revista Geografica, LXVI
(1967), 19- 53; Ernst Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1971); and Rodolfo Stavenhagen

 

 

 

 

 

There are substantial social indicators of the need
for revolutionary change. One need only glance at a few
vital and literacy statistics to realize that something
must be done.10

Rapid increases in population throughout the
region make the needed economic growth and social changes
difficult, if not impossible, to attain. At the same time
they bring considerable forebodings vis-a—vis the political

situation, particularly in View of the rapid pace of urban-

ization resulting from internal migration.11 The increasing

 

(ed.), A rarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin
America Garden City: Anchor BoEks, 1970). :On Gfiatemala
see: Thomas and Marjorie Melville, Guatemala: The
Politics of Land Ownership (New York: FreefiPress, 1971).

10According to the Demographic Yearbook, 1971
(New York: United Nations Statistical Office of the
Department of Economic and Social Welfare, 1972), the life
expectancy in Guatemala, for example, as of the mid-1960's
was 49 years. Infant mortality is so high that life
expectancy actually is higher for children one to ten years
of age range than it is for infants. See Table 34, p. 752,
and Table 28, p. 668. In 1968, 60.6 percent of all deaths
in Guatemala were attributed to infections and parasitic
diseases or gastritis, duodenitis, enteritis, or colitis,
all of which are stomach or intestinal inflammations. See,
World Health Organization, World Health Organization,
World Health Organization Statistics Report, 1972 (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 1973), TabIe 2.4, p. 29. The
1964 Guatemalan census showed a literate population of
887,622 in a total population of 4,287,999. Of the total
number, 2,338,024 were more than fifteen years of age.
Direccidn General de Estadisticas, Censo de Poblacidn,
1964. Recent analysis of educational data in Guatemala
indicates that the situation is deteriorating rather than
improving. See: "Dramética situacidn de la educacidn
basica: Hay un elevado deficit en todo," La Tarde,
March 10, 1973, p. 4.

 

 

 

 

 

 

1During the 1960's, Latin America's population
grew at an average rate of 2.9 percent per annum, although
some countries, e.g., Costa Rica, averaged well above that.

awareness of the growing masses in Latin America, coupled
with their primary concern for their health and economic

status, makes revolutionary change that much more

. . 12
imminent.

Which Way the Revolution?
Two questions arise from the conclusion that
revolution will occur. First, will this revolution be
peaceful or violent?

Revolution in Latin America, economic, social,
and political, cannot be prevented or halted. The
only question is whether it will be peaceful and
democratic or violent and possibly communistic.
Since violence can produce political revolution
overnight, and since communism can Spur social and
economic revolution with maximum speed, in however
distorted a context, this kind of revolution is

 

Guatemala, which has had a pOpulation growth of 3 percent
or more each year since 1960, has had population growth
from 1,633,000 in 1940 to 5,211,926 in 1973, according to
preliminary data from the recent census. See: Kenneth
Ruddle and A. Oderman (eds.), Statistical Abstract of
Latin America, 1971 (Los Angeles: Latin American Studies
Center of the University of California at Los Angeles,
1972), Table 2, pp. 38-39, and Table 19, pp. 88-89; and
Consulate General of Guatemala, "News from Guatemala,"

X, No. 10 (October, 1973), 2. For a brief overview of
possible political implications of the rapid population
growth in Latin America, see: Richard Lee Clinton,
"Portents for Politics in Latin American Population
Expansion," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXV (1971),
31-46. For an analysis of popuIatIon growth in Latin
America, see: J. Mayone Stycos, Human Fertility in#Latin
America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, I968). On
migration to Guatemala City, see: Robert N. Thomas,
"Estudio de la migracidn interna hacia la ciudad de
Guatemala" (Guatemala: Seccidn de Estudios Geograficos de
la Direccidn General de Obras Pfiblicas, 1969).

12For a close examination of the chief fears and
aspirations of the populations of four Latin American
countries, see: Hadley Cantril, The Patterngf Human
Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

 

 

 

 

likely to grow in appeal as the patience of the people

steeped for centuries in feudalism and oppression,

wears thin.13
Kurzman, it appears, is not very optimistic over the pos-
sibility of peaceful revolution. He is not alone. Among
current writers who see violent revolution as inevitable,
or at least probable, are Gerassi, Horowitz, Debray, and
Petras.l4 Yet, not all viewers rule out the possibility
for peaceful, yet quite rapid and fundamental, change.
Needler considers this a strong possibility, although he
adds that such a process is doubtful in the highly Indian
countries of the region. Alba, while admitting that
revolutions will be Of necessity illegal, and possibly,
accompanied by some limited violence, does not see mass
violence as inevitable. Szulc believes that there are some
modernizing forces evolving which may be able to run the

tide against violence, while Clinton points to the Peruvian

military and Lodge views Venezuelan party politics as signs

 

l3Dan Kurzman, SantO Domingo: Revolt Of the

Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,‘l965), p. 10.

 

4Gerassi, Op. cit., and John Gerassi, "Violence,
Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America," in
Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi
(eds.), Latin American Radicalism (New York: Vintage
Books, 1969), PP. 471-95. In the same volume see Horowitz,
"The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of
Latin America," pp. 3-28; and Regis Debray, "Latin America:
Some Problems of Revolutionary Strategy," pp. 499-531.
Also see Debray's StrategyAfor Revolution (New York:
Monthly Review Press{II969); and James Petras, "Revolu-
tions and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela,
Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru," in Petras and Maurice
Zeitlan (eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution?
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1968),
pp. 329-69.

 

 

 

Of hope that the needed changes can be brought about

without the necessity Of resorting to violence, at least

. 15

on a maSSive scale.
The question Of peaceful revolutionary change is

disputed, as is the question arising out of the inevita-

bility Of it, i.e., who are the revolutionaries? The

volume Of material produced which relates tO this question

is extensive and need not be reviewed here.16 Disagreement

 

5Martin Needler, Political Development in Latin
America: Instability, ViOIence, and Evolutionary Changg
(New York: Random House, 1968). See especially pages
145-48. Alba, gp. git}; Tad Szulc, The Winds Of Revolu-
tion (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), pp. 21-24;
Richard Lee Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case
of Peru," later-American Economic Affairs, XXIV (1971),
43-66; and George C. Lodge, 1fRevolutions in Latin America,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIV (1966), 173-97.

16Among the more interesting works relating to this

question are Needler, O . git.; Petras and Zeitlan, gp.
cit.; Tannenbaum, gp. g$£.; Frederick B. Pike (ed.), Free-
355 and Reform in Latin America (Notre Dame: University
Of Notre Dame Press, 1967); Andre Gunder Frank, Latin
America:rgUnderdeveIOpment or Revolution? (New York:
Monthly ReView Press, 1969); Seymour Martin Lipset and
Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967); Irving Louis Horowitz
(ed.), Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1970); J. David Singer, "Individual Values,
National Interests, and Political Development in the
International System," Studies in Cogparative International
Development, VI (1970-71), 197-210; Roger Vekemans and
Jorge Guisti, "Marginality and Ideology in Latin American
Development," Studies in Comparative International Develop-
ment, V (1969-70), 221-34; Orlando Falsfiorda,‘“Margin-
aIity and Revolution in Latin America; 1809-1969," Studies
in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-7I),
63-89; Charles W. Anderson, 1"I‘Oward aTheory Of Latin
American Politics," Vanderbilt University: The Graduate
Study Center for Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper
No. 2, 1964; John J. Johnson (ed.), Continuity and Change
in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

; Jason L. Pink and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C .
A."

 

U

Iii

reigns. We are told that students must be the vanguard
Of the revolution, yet some studies deny them revolutionary
status. We are told that modernization lies in the hands
Of the evolving middle class, but we are also told that
this strata Of society in Latin America is more oriented
toward the existing oligarchies. In the view of some the
military is the key to modernization, while others doubt
the possibility Of needed changes without the desecration
Of it. Some praise the Church for its emerging progres-
sivism, as others soundly condemn it for its continued
conservatism and identification with the oligarchy.

We cannot and need not seek to answer the questions
relative to revolution in Latin America. But, an under-
standing Of the need for revolutionary change, the problems
it presents, and the two basic questions which arise from
it, are useful for an understanding Of the direction of

this research. We should, however, bear in mind Pike's

 

Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1966); Silvert, gp. giE.; Charles W. Wagley,
"The Dilemma Of the Latin American Middle Class," Pro-
ceedin s of the Academy of Political Science, XXVII_T1964),
2-10; C audio Veliz (ed.), The POliEics of”Conformity in
Latin America (New York: OxfOfd University Press, 1967);
Joan M. NeIson, "Migrants, Urbanization, and Instability
in Developing Nations," Center for International Affairs
Of Harvard University, Occasional Paper in International
Affairs NO. 22, 1969; Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbaniza-
tion as an Agent in Latin American Instability: The Case
Of Mexico," American Political Science Review, LXIII
(1969), 833-57} and Daniel Goldrich, 1'Toward an Estimate
Of the Probability Of Social Revolutions in Latin America:
Some Orienting Concepts and a Case Study," Centennial
Review, VI (1962), 394-408.

 

 

10

comment that " . . . there is no Latin America: there

are only different Latin American nations."17

The Tradition

 

It is true that if revolution is defined as simply
an illegal change in government leaders, Latin America does
have a revolutionary tradition. Pike has noted that revo-
lution may be the only important political institution
develOped in Latin America.18 This revolutionary image
and tradition are enhanced by reflecting on the sheer
number of Latin American constitutions. NO country in
Latin America which was independent before the turn of the
century has had fewer than four constitutions, and most
have had more than ten. Both Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic have had twenty-four constitutions.19 But, the
previous statements belie the facts. If we accept the
widely held notion of revolution and what this implies,
Latin America has experienced only two revolutions, with
two abortions Of potentially great revolutions, those Of

Bolivia and Chile.20 Latin America, therefore, does not

 

17Pike, 92. cit., p. 10.

lgIbid., p. 28.

19Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1968), pp. 121-22. The 1965
constitution Of Guatemala is the country's sixth.

20Although the Bolivian revolution is widely held
to have been a true revolution at the outset, there is
considerable doubt as tO what extent the initial changes
envisioned have been brought about. See K. H. Silvert,

 

11

really have a revolutionary tradition. Its tradition is
one of recurrent or constant political instability charac-

terized by gglpes de estado, a tradition which Anderson

 

has attributed directly to the lack Of revolution in the

region.21

The golpes de estado which characterize the politi-

 

cal instability Of Latin American systems are themselves
characterized by the lack Of significant change resulting
from them. GOlpes are military takeovers, Often, but not
always, stimulated by pressures from the oligarchy, and

are usually of two types: 1) veto, where the military
steps in to stop the implementation Of a measure, series

Of measures, or rise to power of an individual or party
looked upon as being Of questionable merit, and 2) pre-
ventative, where a series Of events leads the military to
conclude that the current elites are not capable Of govern-

ing and that it must step in to prevent a complete collapse

 

Expectant PeOples: Nationalism and Development (New York:
Random House, 1963), pp. 95-126; and Richard Pitch,
"Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution," Annual Of the
American Academ of Political and SociaI_§ciences, CCCXXXIV
(I96I), I23-32. JOhn Dunn considers the Mexican and Cuban
revolutions two Of the eight great revolutions of this

century. See Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1972).

21Anderson, gp. cit., The root causes of this in-
stability are an issue Of_w1de debate. Needler, gp. giE.,
pp. 24-25, sees the problem as one Of seeking to apply
Western models in basically non-Western societies. Kling
places the blame on the incompatibility between the
economic and political systems. See Merle Kling, "Toward
a Theory Of Power and Political Instability in Latin
America," Western Political Quarterly, VII (1956), 21-35.

 

 

 

 

12

Of the government structure. In either case, the result
is seldom revolutionary change, but merely a releasing

Of pressure within the political hierarchy and possible
readjusting of the political power Of the elites.22 For
generals and politicians alike, governing becomes a
juggling act, with the president or 122Eg_seeking tO
balance and Offset various political elite groups outside
and within the military. Repeated failures Of such systems
are evidenced by such scenes as the election of Velasco
Ibarra as President Of Ecuador five times and his failure
to complete even a single term, and the nearly legendary
instability Of Bolivia which has averaged one government
per year for nearly all Of its 150 years Of existence,

including three golpes in as many days during 1970.23

Enter the Alliance

 

After nearly constant involvement Of the United
States in Latin American affairs for more than a century,

a series of events in the late 1950's led to a reappraisal

 

22José Enrique Miguens, "The New Latin American
Military Coup," Studies in Com arative International
Development, VI (1970-715, 3-IE; Irving Louis Horowitz,
1'Electorél Politics, Urbanization, and Social DevelOpment
in Latin America," in Glenn H. Beyer (ed.), The Urban
Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1967), pp. 215-54; and Charles C. Cumberland,

"Twentieth Century Revolutions in Latin America,"
Centennial Review, VI (1962), 279-96.

23For a brief analysis Of political theory in
Latin America, see Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin
American Political Thought and Ideolo (Chapel Hill:
University Of North Carolina Press, 0), pp. 335-57.

 

 

 

 

 

 

13

Of United States policy in the area. The events surround-
ing then Vice President Nixon's trip to Latin America, and
particularly the Caracas affair, put the United States
government and people on notice that something was very
wrong with their Latin American relations. A year later,
the rise of Castro in Cuba and his subsequent conversion
to Marxism hastened the reappraisal, and soon after the
1961 inauguration Of a new administration in Washington
the Alliance for Progress was proclaimed with the signing
Of the Charter Of Punta del Este. The Alliance was, to a
large extent, a light in the dark.24 It was so for two
basic reasons. First, it recognized the need for social
change as well as economic growth. Second, it emphasized
planning within the develOpment scheme and stressed self-
help by the governments Of the Latin American countries
when it placed the reSponsibility for the design and
implementation Of projects, as well as partial financial
responsibility, on these governments themselves. The days
Of a dam here and a road there were supposedly gone, and
a massive prOgram Of integrated development was to begin.
Such major innovations as tax and land reforms
were confirmed by all signatories of the Charter as

necessities for development of the region and the success

 

24For an interestingly critical look at pre-

Alliance United States involvement in Latin American
affairs, as seen through the eyes of a former Guatemalan
president, see Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the
Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961).

 

14

Of the Alliance program. The Charter itself recognized
the need for concomitant social and economic changes, with
both taking place on a pathway leading tO the establish-
ment Of stable, democratic governments in the region. The
Alliance could be seen as an equation: massive United
States financial aid and technical assistance + broad,
planned, integrated domestic self-help programs = economic
growth + social justice = prosperity + stability =

bolstering Of democracy.25

The Faltering Alliance

 

By the mid-1960's it became increasingly clear
that the Alliance was in trouble. Indeed, some had al-
ready proclaimed it dead.26 This is not to maintain that

the Alliance has failed to contribute in some positive

 

25Adapted from Szulc, gp. cit., p. 233. A OOpy

Of the Charter of Punta del Este is found in Jerome
Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance that Lost Its Way
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 352171.

 

26The wealth Of literature dealing with the

Alliance for Progress cannot be reviewed here. Among
some of the more thought-provoking works, however, are:
Levinson and de Onis, gp. cit.; Victor Alba, Alliance
Without Allies (New York: _Efederick A. Praeger, 1965);
Simon G. Hanson, Dollar Diplomacy Modern Style (Washington:
Inter-American Affairs Press, 1970); Machin, gp. cit.,
pp. 84-107; Gerassi, The Great Fear, gp. 313., pp._262-92;
Harvey S. Perloff, Alliance for Progress: A Social
Invention in the Making (Baltimore: JOhns Hopkins Press
for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1969); Szulc, gp.
cit., pp. 233-81. Also, see the Government Documents
EEEtion, "Second Thoughts on the Alliance for Progress,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXVII (1973), 85-96.

 

 

 

15

respects to the development of the region. But, if we
measure gains in relation to the goals set, the failure
becomes clear. There have been few significant changes in
the land tenure or tax systems prevalent throughout the
region, social reform continues to be sadly lacking rather
than an accomplished fact, and the list Of elected regimes
which have fallen victim to the military axe continues to
grow as the political musical chairs proceeds seemingly
unabated.

The shortcomings Of the Alliance with respect to
its goals are the result of numerous circumstances. To
some extent, the faltering was due to idealism and over-
Optimism in Washington. The founders Of the Alliance
sought to overcome the development barriers with tOO little
money in too short a time. Still, more could have been
accomplished with the money and time expended had not other
problems arisen, some Of them within the Washington bureau-
cracy itself.27

There were numerous and serious shortcomings.
After the increasing awareness and hope the Alliance
instigated within the Latin American masses, little was

done to reach them and involve them in the programs and

 

27Levinson and de Onfs, gp. gig., pp. 112-31, have
written that " . . . the U.S. government was div1ded among
the warring bureaucratic and political fiefdoms, each pur-
suing its own special interests. The Congress was at war
with the executive; the Treasury was at war w1th AID; and
AID was at war with itself (p. 112]."

16

projects supposedly for their benefit. It was a
government-to-government, not a government-to-people,
effort.28 In addition, the Latin American governments,
with few exceptions, never viewed the Alliance as the
Washington bureaucrats and politicians did. Most of them
had no intention of seeking to innovate the sweeping
reforms called for in the Charter. A Mexican delegate, who
had just returned to his capital from an Alliance confer-
ence, referred to the other Latin American delegates pre-
sent by noting that,"They seem to think of the Alliance
for Progress as a huge strongbox raining money. That is
what it means to them."29
As a government-to-government program, the Alliance
was chiefly one of dealing with oligarchies, not democra-
cies. Yet, the programs envisioned were intended to
correct that relationship. In short, the oligarchies were
supposed to institute reforms which would lead to their
downfall. As Alba puts it, "The history of the Alliance
reads like a monumental joke. It is the story Of a mute
who wanted a deaf man tO listen to him; Of a bureaucracy
which did not know how to convince the people to lend it
their voice, and which tried to convince the oligarch,

30

always deaf, to listen to a voice it did not have." The

Alliance was doomed from the outset.

 

28Alba, Alliance Without Allies, gp, cit.,

pp. 182-226.

291bid., p. 58. 3OIbid., p. 127.

 

17

DevelOpment

 

The Alliance experiences of the 1960's demonstrated
that revolution from above, with "political liberty" and
in "democratic societies," is, at best, unlikely. But
what of revolutionary development from below in a demo-
cratic framework? There has been an increasing awareness
Of the need for pOpular involvement in the development
process. If development is truly for the Latin American
masses, why not involve them in it?

The continuing goal of the development process
is an improvement of life for all. It means more than per
capita income and improved income distribution. It means
more than schools, health facilities and roads. It in-
volves all Of these but also involves more basic matters--
such as better diets, greater Opportunities for self-
improvement based on achievement rather than ascription,
and equal justice for all.

An important feature Of development is its multi-
dimensional character. For years, and especially during
the 1950's, development was seen as a largely economic
problem, including more dams, more roads, more GNP, more
production. Only belatedly has development been seen not
as a reconstruction program, g_lg the Marshall Plan, but
as a construction program. Development is not only an

economic maturation, but also involves social and political

18

modernization.31 Of primary concern in the current work

are the political aspects Of development.

Political Development
While the current level Of knowledge concerning
political development processes is not high from the point
Of view of scientific investigation, it is considerably
improved over the limited knowledge which existed prior to

1960. During the past decade a substantial increase in

 

31As the 1960's progressed, a myriad Of writings

and analyses of this fact came into print. Among the more
significant are: Hélio Jaguaribe, Desenvolvimiento
EconOmico e Desenvolvimiento Politico (Rio de Janeiro:
Editdra:EundO’de Cultura, I962); Jaguaribe, Problemas do
Desenvolvimiento Latino Arnericano (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
CiviIizacaOBrasileira, S. A., 1967); and Jaguaribe,
Economics and Political DevelOpment (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968). The Iatter is largely an English
re-write Of the first two in Portuguese. Also, see Lodge,
g2. cit.; W. W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages Of Growth
amhfidge: Cambridge University Press, 197I); Charles w.
Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American Economic
DevelOpment," Journal Of International Affairs, XX (1966),
235- 53; Victor L. Urquidi, The Challenge of Development
in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964);
Edward Swerdlow (ed. ), Development Administration: Con-
cepts and Problems (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1963); Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change
in Latin America (Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
Fink and Gable, gp. cit.; T. Lynn Smith, Studies
Of Latin American Societies (Garden City: Anchor BOOKS,
1970); Hugo Romero Degrefal, "Integracién y politizaciOn
en un sociedad compuesta," A ortes, XVII (1970), 32-49;
Peter Ranis, "Modernity and POIitical DevelOpment in Five
Latin American Countries," Studies in Com arative Inter-
national Development, IV (1968- 69), I9-40; Peter Nehemhis,
Latin America: Myfh and Reality (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1964); Martin C. Needler, "Political Develop-
ment and Socioeconomic DevelOpment: The Case Of Latin
America," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968),
889-97. On problems of Guatemala in particular, see
Richard Adams, Crucifixion byAPower (Austin: University
of Texas Press,'1970)l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l9

attention was given to problems of political development
and to the analysis of political systems, most Of it the
work of political scientists.

Although a number of researchers have been in-
volved in an effort to clarifytflmaprocesses and problems
of political development, a few works are of particular

note. Among these are the Studies in Political Develop—

 

ment series sponsored by the Committee on Comparative

32

Politics of the Social Science Research Council. Other

works resulting from the rise of interest in political

development include those of G. A. Almond with G. B. Powell

33

and S. Verba. Also in the mid-1960's Samuel Huntington

introduced the concept of political decay and the fact
that in the highly mobilized transitional societies,
rather than the more traditional societies, such decay

34

results in political instability. It is Huntington's

 

32This series consists of seven volumes published
between 1963 and 1966. This author found three volumes Of
particular pertinence to this research: Lucian Pye (ed.),
Communication and Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, l963);303eph La Palombara
(ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963); and La Palombara and
Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

33Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic
Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); and
AImond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

34Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and
Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (1965), 386-430.
Also see his volume, POiitical Order in Changing Societies,

op, cit.

 

 

 

 

 

20

thesis that the increasing awareness and mobilization of
expectations and participation resulting from the develop-
ment process results in political instability, due to the
inability or unwillingness of the existing political
systems in developing countries to deal with them. Such a
thesis relates closely to the efforts Of David Easton in
his development of an embryo Of systematic methodology

for the study of political systems.35

The basic goal of
systems analysis is to explain how political systems per-
sist by examining what Easton terms inputs and outputs, the
former consisting of demands made on the system and sup-
ports placed at the disposal of the authorities to meet
them, while the latter consists of actions taken, if any,
tO meet the demands.

A key concern Of political development is the
institutionalization of participation so that needed
changes are brought about peacefully by working within the
political system and, thus allowing for the continued
existence of the system itself, a strengthening of it, and
an increasing stability of the system. Such a situation
allows for more effective and less disruptive changes

within the context Of economic and social development, as

well as political development. Scott has Observed the crux

 

35David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), and Easton, A
Systematic Analysis Of Political Life (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

 

 

21

Of the problem.36 Improvements in the communication and
transportation systems of a developing country are among
the first elements to receive substantial attention and

are among the easiest improvements to attain. The result
of such improvements, however, is to increase the aware-
ness Of the body politic to the need for more improvements
and changes and to demand them. The problem thus becomes
one of incorporating the newly activated populace into the
political system, creating channels whereby demands and
supports can be communicated to the decision-making author—
ities, and relaying the output from this process to the
politicized masses without overloading the political system
and thus causing it to deteriorate and lead to an era of

instability.

Political Research and Latin America

A primary concern of this paper is to examine the
role Of local government, real and potential, in the
development process and as a node for the political inte-
gration Of the state. Although the literature on Latin
American politics is extensive, little of it is the result
Of field efforts to apply concepts Of political develop-

ment in the Latin American context.37

 

36Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties and Policy-
Making in Latin America," in La Palombara and Weiner,
op. cit., pp. 331-67.

37Almond and Verba, op. cit., did, however, include
Mexico as one of the five countries in their study.

22

The lack of published works which are the direct
result Of systematic field research is probably due, in
large part, to the difficulties of conducting political
research in Latin America. The unstable character Of
politics in most Of the countries has made it a topic
which natives are reluctant to discuss frankly. Limita-
tions on such basic freedoms as those of speech, the press,
and travel in some countries further limit the possibili—
ties of productive field research. Due to the historical
involvement Of the United States in Latin American politi-
cal affairs, "gringos" are particularly suspect when
making political inquiries.

Political geographers have failed to meet the need
for more systematic research in Latin America, although
the region has not been particularly slighted by political
geographers generally.38 The status of political geOgraphy
research in the region reflects the underdeveloped state
Of the subdiscipline which is just commencing to recover
from the onerous reputation resulting from the geo-politics

Of World War II. Calls for a revival and new directions

 

38For an overview of political geography and its
state of research in Latin America, see Stanley D. Brunn
et al., "The State Of Political Geography Research in
Latin America," in Barry Lentnek et al. (eds.), Geographic
Research in Latin America: Benchmark—1970 (Muncie: Ball
State University, 1971), 265-87.

 

 

23

have gone out, however, and it appears that political
geography may be on the rebound.39
As systematic field studies of Latin American
politics are lacking, so too is there a dearth Of infor-
mation concerning local government in the region. This is
probably due tO the historically insignificant role Of

municipal government within the political structure.

However, in view of recent gains related to political

 

39K. W. Robinson, "Diversity, Conflict, and
Changes: The Meeting Place of Geography and Politics,"
Australian Geographer, VIII (1970), l-lS; and Ad Hoc
Committee on Geography, "Studies in Political Geography,"
in The Science Of Geography (Washington: Division Of
Earth Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council, 1965). Reprinted in Roger E.
Kasperson and Julian Minghi (eds.), The Structure Of
Political Geo ra h (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
I969), pp. 57-65. Among some of the more encouraging
recent works in political geography are Stanley D. Brunn,
"A lG—State Nation?" National Observer, July 28, 1973,
p. l, as reported by David W. Hacker; Roger E. Kasperson,
"Environmental Stress and the Municipal Political System:
The Brockton Water Crisis of 1961-1966," in Kasperson and
Minghi, op. oit,, pp. 481-96; Robert W. Mc Coll, "The
Insurgent State: Territorial Basis of Revolution,"
Annals, Association of American Geographers, LIX (1969),
6I9-3I; Mc Coll, "A Geographic Look at Guerrilla Wars and
Urban Riots" (Lawrence: University of Kansas: Department
Of Geography, Occasional Paper No. 2); Howard Salisbury,
"The State Within a State: Some Comparisons Between the
Urban Ghetto and the Insurgent State," Professional
Geographer, XXIII (1971), 105-12; Charles 0. Collins, "The
Basis for La Violencia in Colombia" (Lawrence: University
Of Kansas, Department of Geography, Occasional Paper NO. 1”
Edward W. Soja, The Political Organization of Space
(Washington: Association of American Geographers, Resource
Paper NO. 8, 1971); Bryan H. Massam, The Spatial Structure
of Administration Systems (Washington: Association of
American Geographers, Resource Paper No. 12, 1971); and
Daniel W. Gade, "Spatial Displacement of Latin American
Seats Of Government: From Sucre to La Paz as the
National Capital Of Bolivia," Revista Geografica, LXXIII
(1970), 43-57.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

24

development and systems theory, local government as a
means Of aiding in the process of political develOpment
by institutionalizing participation and acting as a
channel of inputs and outputs, warrants closer

O I 40
exam1nat1on.

The Direction

 

Facts, theories, suppositions, and myths concerning
social organization that have been accumulated from
centuries of study have been grouped into ill-defined,
heterogeneous categories called "disciplines," each
of which tends to view the modernization process
through its own vocabulary, concepts, and analytical
tools. Serious students of one of the disciplines
would readily admit that theirs can only be a partial
view Of the total modernization process, and that the
total analysis is far more complex than mere addition
of partial analyses.4

 

40The author knows Of only one published volume

which is concerned solely with local government in a
single Latin American country. See Brian C. Lawrence,
Local Government in Jamaica (Kingston: University of the
West indies, I968). The International Union of Local
Authorities is the only organization which gives consid-
erable publicity to local government. See especially
Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin, The Structure of Local
Government (The Hague: IULA, 1969); and IULA, Local
Government in the Twentieth Century. Proceedings of the
IULA Jubilee Congress, Brussels, 1963 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964). The state of research on local government
in Latin America is reflected in the fact that in the first
eleven issues of the journal Studies in Administrative
Local Government, also published‘by theiULA, only one
articie concerned local government in Latin America.
Volumes Of the Area Handbook series published by the
United States Government Printing Office usually include
sections with an overview of local government. More en-
couraging is the rather extensive examination Of municipal
government in T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institu-
tions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
I972), pp. 569-87.

41Agehananda Bharati, "Cultural Hurdles in
Development Administration," in Swerdlow, op. cit., p. 103.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

25

A discipline is Of little import. What is far
more important is the calibre of research carried on within
the discipline. Kling has observed the underdeveloped
character Of political research in Latin America and called
for a more rigorous methodology in examining the region's
political phenomena.42 Speaking for geographers, J. J.
Parsons has criticized the tendency to avoid theory and
the "tired" methodology vis-a-vis research in Latin
America, and Wagner has made a call for more Operational
and applicable political geographic research.43
This work seeks to bring together some concepts
of the two disciplines known as geography and political
science, and examine in depth a subject long overlooked
in Latin America: Local government, its structure, func-
tioning, role in the development process, and significance

in terms Of institutionalizing political behavior and

integrating the state.

 

42Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin
America," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics
in Latin America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1967), pp. l-36.

43James J. Parsons, "The Contribution of Geographyfl'
in Charles Wagley (ed.), Social Science Research on Latin
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 196477
pp. 39-85; Phillip L. Wagner, "The Hemisphere Revisited,"
East Lakes Geographer, VI (1970), 26-47.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM AND SITE

Improvements in the transportation and communica-
tion networks in a developing country cause an increased
awakening of the masses. This leads to an increase in the
demands for change and improvement, which the enlarged body
politic places on the political system. TO prevent
development-hindering political instability, this increas—
ing participation must be effectively encompassed within
the political system, i.e., institutionalized, and the
resulting demands must be channeled effectively to the

decision—making authorities.

Problem

This dissertation is an effort to examine the role
of local government in the development process, especially
as a means of integrating the state by institutionalizing
political behavior as a communication node between the
central authorities and the masses. Specifically, there
are three Objectives:

1. To analyze local government, with special

emphasis on its organization and function within

26

27

the political system, and to evaluate the role,
real and potential, of local government in the

development process.

2. TO determine the image Of the central government
as seen through the eyes of local government
Officials in regard to local development, and
the relationship between this image and the
following factors: the feeling Of political
efficacy; the frequency Of communication with
central authorities; the degree of positive
feelings in regard to past local development; the
degree Of Optimism with reference to future local
development; physical distance from the power
center, i.e., the capital city; political affilia—

tion; and the size of the community.

3. To identify rural and cultural lag in development
by an examination of variations in development

priorities.

Hypotheses

 

In 1934, Teixeira de Freitas recognized the poor
state of local government as one of the chief barriers to
modernization in Latin America and T. Lynn Smith, writing

thirty-five years later, viewed the situation as basically

28

unchanged.44 Local government does not play a key role
in national integration. Thus, while there has been an
increasing number of efforts at regional integration of
the Latin American countries, the alcalde of Coatepeque,
in Quezaltenango Department, has noted that it is not
possible to seriously attempt such schemes when there is
not, in fact, even national integration.45

It may be hypothesized that local government has
not reached its full potential in terms of expediting the
development process. Almond and Powell, for example, have
stated that there is a dire need in developing societies
for the articulation and aggregation of interests and

46 While

their communication into the political system.
local government would seem to be in a position to play a
vital role in this conversion process, our hypothesis

states that it is not playing such a role.

 

44M. A. Tiexeira de Freitas, "Educacao Rural,"
Revista Nacional de Educacao, XVIII—XVIX (1934), as found
in T. Lynn Smith, Studies of Latin American Societies,
op, git}, pp. 213—14.

45For an example of regional integrationists'
writings, see Felipe Herrera, "Disunity as an Obstacle to
Progress," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in
Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),

 

 

 

 

 

pp. 230-52. "Primero integracién nacional y después 1a
centroamericana," Prensa Libre, November 3, 1972, p. 24.
46

Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 10-12, and
chapters 4, 5, and 7.

29

Our second objective introduces us to the concept
Of perception.47 As Boulding notes, one's perception of
an Object is based upon past experiences and the image
which results from them, which is subjective knowledge.48
In truth, it is not what is real which is important, but
what we think is real. Thus, Tannenbaum gives considerable
emphasis to the need for a government in Latin America to
have an image of legitimacy as the symbol of authority if
the system is to function.49 In this regard, one of the
Observations Of the Rockefeller Report is as follows:
"With the disintegration Of old orders which lacked a
popular base, newly emerging domestic structures have had
difficulty in establishing their legitimacy. This makes
the problem Of creating a system Of political order in
the Western Hemisphere more difficult."50

The concept of perception has become of increasing
importance as social scientists have sought to remove man

as a "black box" in their research and make him, as Downs

puts it, an "intervening variable" in explaining

 

47The complexity of the concept of perception is
reflected in the fact that the International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences dedicates fifty pages to the subject
and recognizes seven types Of perception.

48Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1956).

49Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 145-53.

 

 

 

50Rockefeller Report, op, cit., p. 23.

 

30

51 Within the social

environment-to-behavior relationships.
sciences, therefore, perception is becoming increasingly

a key element Of explanation. Almond and Powell have
recognized the role of perception in interests articulation,
and Abu-Laban has recognized its import in terms of social

52

change. More recently, perception has come to be Of some

significance in organization theory.53
In geography, the initial emphasis on natural
hazard perception has bloomed in less than ten years into
what is now almost a subdiscipline of the field. Indeed,
Hudman denotes perception as one of forty basic concepts
in geography, and Moore has Observed that, "We [social
scientists] cannot do without some conception Of how
people perceive the world and what they do or do not want

to do about it."54

 

51Roger M. Downs, "Geographic Space Perception:

Past Approaches and Future Prospects," in Christopher
Board et al. (eds.), Progress in Geography: International
Reviews of Current Research, II (1970), 27-42.

52Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
Baha Abu-Laban, "Social Change and Local Politics in
Sidon, Lebanon," Journal Of Developing Areas, V (1970),
27-42.

 

 

 

53See, for example, Robert B. Duncan, "Charac-
teristics of Organizational Environment and Perceived
Environmental Uncertainty," Administrative Science Quar-
terly, XVII (1972), 313-27. Also, although perception is
not specifically referred to, it plays a crucial role in
Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970).

54Lloyd E. Hudman, "Geographic Concepts: The Need
to be Explicit," Journal Of Geography, LXXI (1972), 520-25,
and Thomas F. Saarinan, Perception of Environment
(Washington: Association of American Geographers, Resource

 

 

 

 

31

In regard to the second objective, this research
has sought to determine the image of the central govern-
ment as seen through the eyes Of local officials in regard
to the problems of local develOpment. The image variable
actually consists of two factors, the perceived effec-
tiveness of the central government in dealing with local
developmentaand the perceived level Of discrimination,
i.e., the degree to which the central government is per-

ceived as not giving equal attention to the municipios

 

of the country.

Once the image has been determined, efforts to
explain variations in it are made by relating it to seven
variables:

1. Political efficacy: Political efficacy is the

 

degree to which one is able tO influence political
decision-making. We are concerned with perceived
efficacy for, as Almond and Verba have Observed,
the key factor to the civic culture is not that
the political masses do affect the political
system. Rather, the key is that they must have a
feeling Of being able to do so should they so

desire.55 It is hypothesized that as the feeling

 

Paper NO. 5, 1969). See also Barrington Moore, Jr., Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966), p. 487.

55Almond and Verba, op, oio., pp. 344-54. Also see the
analysis of the role of the feeling of political powerless-
ness in political systems in Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions
Of Political Alienation," American Political Science
Review, LXIV (1970), 389-410.

 

 

32

of political efficacy increases, so too does the

image of the central government.

2. Communication: The strategic role Of communica-

 

tion in develOpment is indisputable and has re-
ceived extensive attention.56 It is hypothesized
that as the frequency of communication with

central government increases, the image of the

central government also increases.

3. Past progress: It is hypothesized that as posi-

 

tive feelings Of past progress in local develop-
ment increase the image of the central government

increases.

4. Optimism: The expectations of local officials are
hypothesized to be positively related to the image
of the central government, i.e., as Optimism in
regard to future local develOpment improves, so

too does the image of the national government.

5. Travel time: The notion Of distance decay is well

 

established in the social sciences. In general,

as distance between local Officials and the capital

 

56Pye, op. cit.; Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of
Government (New York7_ The Free Press, 1963); Phillip
Cutright, "National Political DevelOpment: Measurement
and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII
(1963), 253-64; Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis,
op. cit., 120-21; and Edward W. Soja, “Communications and
TerriEErial Integration in East Africa: An Introduction
to Transaction Flow Analysis," East Lakes Geographer, IV
(1968), 39-57.

 

 

 

 

 

33

city increases, interaction can be expected to
decrease. A proportionate reduction of the image
of the central government is hypothesized as dis-

tance from the capital city increases.

Size of community: Urban areas have a larger pool

 

from which to attract effective local leaders, and

a more politically aware electorate.57

And, since
there appears to be a direct relationship between
the size Of a community and the feeling of political
efficacy, it is hypothesized that there is a direct
relationship between the size of a community and

the image of the central government among local

Officials.58

Political affiliation: It is hypothesized that

 

members of the same political party as that which
controls the central government will have a more
favorable image of it than will members of Opposi-

tion parties.

The third Objective of this dissertation is to

search for evidence of rural and cultural lag. The notion

of rural lag in the develOpment process is widely

 

57See, for example, Irving Louis Horowitz, "Elec-

toral Politics, Urbanization, and Social DevelOpment," in
Beyer, QB. Cit. ' pp. 215-54.

58Finifter, op. cit., pp. 404-5.

34

accepted.59 If lag exists, it should be reflected in the
types Of priorities which exist in rural versus urban
areas. It is hypothesized, therefore, that an analysis
of develOpment priorities will indicate that there is a
difference between those of rural and those of urban areas.
A second aspect of development lag involves the
cultural variable. In the case Of Guatemala, the lag
notion in regard to Indian areas is commonly accepted.60

Thus, it is hypothesized that Indian areas will have dif-

ferent development priorities than non-Indian areas.

Selection of the Site

 

The numerous problems surrounding political re-

search have been mentioned.61 The objectives Of this

 

59Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About
Latin America," in Petras and Zeitlan, O . cit., pp. 14-18;
Benjamin Higgins, "Urbanization, Industrialiaation, and
Economic Development," in Beyer, op, cit., pp. 117-55;
Edward Shils, "The Military in the POIitical Development
Of New States," in Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military
. . ., op. cit., pp. 23-24; Marcio Moreira Alves, A Grain

 

 

 

Of Mustard Seed (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 97-987
and Huntington, Political Order . . ., op. cit., pp. 72-78.
60

See especially, K. H. Silvert, Conflict Sociepy,
op, cit., p. 37; Nathan L. Whetten, Guatemala: ’The Land
and EH? People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961);
Richard N. Adams, "Politics and Social Anthropology in
Spanish America," Human Organization, XXIII (1964), 1-4.
There seems to be an increasing awareness Of the Indian-
ladino disparity in Guatemala within both elements Of the
society. See Felix Loarca Guzman, "El Indigena: Factor
decisivo para el desarrollo del pais," La Tarde,

February 21, 1973, p. 4; and "Mejores m§d1os de vida piden
los indigenas en el dia de Tecfin Uman," El Grafico,
February 17, 1973, p. 3.

 

 

 

 

 

61See page 22.

35

research make certain attributes of the study site re-
quired, or at least desirable. Among these are freedom of
travel. More important, perhaps, are a significantly high
degree Of freedom Of the press and freedom Of speech. This
is especially so in the case of the latter since the re-
search involves some probing questions, the answers to
which must be candid if the analysis Of data is to be Of
value.

The study site should be a country which appears
to be both modernizing and seeking to incorporate expanding
participation within the existing political system. Also,
since local government is the primary organ Of the politi-
cal system to be scrutinized, a country in which local
government Officials are popularly elected and in which
there appears to be some concern among these officials
over their rights and role in development is also
desirable.

If an elimination process is employed, first elim-
inating countries in which basic freedoms are highly re-
stricted and then eliminating countries in which local
government fails to possess even a modicum of independence,
the remaining list of possible sites is discouragingly
brief: Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Venezuela. Jamaica
is too much of an anomaly to study in the Latin American
context, and the small number of local units, thirteen
parishes, makes statistical inference from any data

collected difficult. Of the remaining three possible

36

 

 

GUATEMALA

DEPARTMENTS

 

 

BELICE

nexuco "- um

 

 

 

 

 

37

study sites, Guatemala was chosen because there appeared
to be authentic party competition, as well as the fact
that there would be relative freedom to conduct the re-
search. In addition, Guatemala offers an exceptional

Opportunity to test for cultural lag.

Methodology

 

The research involved in this dissertation was
completed in both formal and informal manners. First, a

random sample of the 324 municipios listed in the 1964

 

census was taken and 108 municipios were selected as re-

search targets (see Appendix B).62 The alcalde of each

 

Of these municipios was interviewed, using an interview

 

schedule (see Appendix C). Key components Of the inter-
view schedule are:
A. Communication variable, questions 10-13
B. Channels Of communication, question 19
C. Development priorities, question 14
D. Feeling Of past development progress and
Optimism in regard to future develOpment,
questions 16 and 17

E. Political efficacy, question 18
F. Image Of the central government, question 20

It is important to note that this is not a
questionnaire sent to, or handed to, alcaldes for their
attention. Rather, it was applied in a conversation-like
atmOSphere. This format allowed alcaldes to expand upon

answers and present their own questions, and permitted the

 

62For definitions of all Spanish terms used in
this dissertation, see the glossary, Appendix A.

38

 

 

GUATEMALA

SLRVEY MICIPIOS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

H02

 

39

interviewer to probe for a deeper understanding of the
community, its problems and its government.
This system also permitted other local Officials,

especially the secretario, to participate actively in the

 

interview if the alcalde so desired, which, in most
instances, he did. Indeed, in three cases the responses
to the interview schedule represent almost exclusively the

views of the secretario. This does not, however, negate

 

the validity of the data for two reasons. First, secre-
tarios Often have more experience within the local govern-
ment than does the alcalde. Second, the degree to which

secretarios responded to interview questions probably

 

reflects accurately the degree to which they actually
manage the local government, with the alcaldes dependent
on them for advice and action.

Concern with interviewing the alcalde does not
necessarily center upon conversing with the most knowl-

edgeable individual in the municipio. Rather, alcaldes

 

were selected for interviews on the basis of their being
citizens of the villages or cities which they serve (many

secretarios are not), and because they are pOpularly

 

elected by the citizens. They represent the highest
popularly elected officials of the towns.

Informal aspects Of the research included the
collection of information from numerous libraries and
government Offices, and attendance at national and

regional meetings and conferences of municipal Officials.

40

More important, the author traveled extensively throughout
Guatemala where urban and rural landscapes were Observed,
as well as the facilities Of the various towns and cities

and the genre_de vie of the people. Above all, in terms

 

Of educational experiences were the innumerable conversa-

tions and discussions with people throughout the country.

Ethnocentricity

 

There is a clear and present danger whenever one
seeks to perform research activities in an alien environ-
ment, the danger of ethnocentricity. Kenneth Johnson,
for example, in an analysis of the 1966 Guatemalan elec-
tion, Observed: "In nearly every respect, the population
is weak, ineffectual, and at the mercy Of monopolistic
interests. Herein lies a major source of political
alienation and instability."63

In regard to the above quotation two weaknesses
appear which are basically ethnocentric in character. The
first sentence is the subjective judgement of its author,
since no evidence is provided to actually illustrate that
the population is in fact politically weak. This does not

mean that the statement is necessarily untrue, but neither

should it be accepted as fact simply because it appears in

 

63Kenneth F. Johnson, "Analysis Of the 1966

Presidential Election in Guatemala: March, 1966," Elec—
tion Analysis Series, Comparative Studies in Political
Systems (OperatiOns and Polidy Research, Inc., 1966).

 

41

print. Second, Johnson's reference to this ineffective-
ness causing alienation and instability is dependent upon
two factors which must be questioned until proof is pro-
vided to substantiate them: that the population wants and
is seeking a greater political role, and that the percep-
tion Of the ineffectiveness Of the pOpulation is that of
the peOple who make up that population, not simply that Of
Johnson. It is well to beware of assuming that others,
particularly others in a foreign environment, see things
the way we do.64
It has been Observed that:

One of the serious limitations Of the American mind

is its lack of comprehension of the psychological

attitudes of other societies. . . . One of the

great American illusions is the assumption that if

only other people would understand our point of

View, they would adopt it readily.65

We need not elaborate in great detail on the

problem Of ethnocentricity. Needler has made this one Of
his major critiques of the labors of United States polit-

66

ical scientists in political develOpment research. The

author is aware of the problem, and this is the basis for

 

64The danger of casually applying Anglo-American
and Western European political concepts in the Latin
American context has been recognized by researchers for
more than a generation. See William S. Stokes, "Violence
as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western
Political Quarterly, V (1952), 467-68.

65

 

Nehemkis, op. cit., p. 49.

66Needler, Political Development in Latin America,
op, cit., p. 3.

42

the rather large role perception plays in the research
involved in this dissertation. Although it is doubtful
that ethnocentricity can be completely eliminated, as, for
example, in the design Of instruments Of measurement,

efforts have been made to minimize it.

Guatemala

 

Guatemala's 1964 pOpulation was ethnically divided
into two major groups, Indians, who comprised 42 percent

Of the population, and ladinos.67

The latter comprise
approximately 2 percent Of the population which is Of
European ancestry, the less than 1 percent of the popula-
tion which is black, and the 55 percent mestizo pOpulation.
While the blacks are largely concentrated in coastal areas,
the Indians, who have seldom taken an active part in
national politics, are concentrated in the western high-
lands (Figure 3).

During the nearly three centuries of Spanish domi-
nation which preceded independence in 1821, power was

concentrated largely in the Crown and its representatives,

as well as in a small group of aristocratic peninsulares

 

living in the capital. Such a situation precluded any
significant functioning of local government, although in
Indian areas the council of elders often played influential

roles in local political as well as religious activities.

 

67Direcci<5n General de Estadisticas, VII Censo de
POblaciOn, 1964.

 

 

43

 

 

GUATEMALA

INDIAN POPULATION

- l964

 

 

 

 

CIIMCmW

 

 

44

Guatemala did not join Mexico's initial movement
for independence, but in 1821 the Crown authorities and

the peninsulares, declared Guatemala's independence, a

 

move followed by the remaining Central American countries.

A decision was made to join Iturbide's Mexican empire, and

the emperor commenced to use the country as a staging area

for forcibly incorporating the remainder of Central America
into his domain.

When Iturbide fell from power, in 1823, Guatemala
left its Mexican orbit and cast its fate with the other
Central American republics in the United Provinces of
Central America._ But local and regional differences and
jealousies constantly disrupted the functioning Of this
union, which all but ceased to exist by the mid-1830's.
Guatemala officially withdrew from the organization in
1839 and proclaimed itself an independent state.

Between 1839 and 1944, Guatemala's political
history revolved largely around four dictators, although
elections were held periodically to verify the legitimacy
of the regime in power. These four dictators and the era
Of their rule were: Rafael Carrera, an illiterate, con-
servative Indian, 1839-1865; Justo Rufino Barrios, a
liberal, 1873-1885; Manuel Estrada Cabrera, 1898-1920;
and General Jorge Ubico Cantafieda, who governed until
1944 after his initial election in 1931. Throughout this

century of dictatorships, little was accomplished in

45

changing the face or society of Guatemala, although Barrios
did encourage the introduction of plantation agriculture
and weaken the political authority Of the Church to the
point that it has never fully recovered, and Ubico made
significant improvements in the transportation system.68
Ubico, as a knowledgeable Guatemalan noted in a
conversation with this author, ". . . managed Guatemala as
if it were his own big finca."69 Not all was well on the
“finca,” however, and in June of 1944 repeated student
demonstrations led the dictator to suspend the Constitution.
This inflamed the students, whose demonstrations grew when
they were joined by railroad workers and bank employees.
On June 30, 1944 military and police efforts to halt a pro-
test rally ended in numerous deaths. The following day
Ubico resigned, turning power over to a military govern-
ment. This regime, however, was overthrown by a "young

Turks" golpe and a new triumvirate took over in October

consisting of Jorge Toriello, a civilian, and colonels

 

68For this brief overview of Guatemalan political
history the author has relied heavily on John Dombrowski
et al., Area Handbook for Guatemala (Washington: Govern-
mEnE—Printing Office, 1970); and Hubert Herring, A Histopy
Of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968),
pp. 464-80.

69Although Ubico remains outside official recogni-
tion as a great president Of Guatemala, this author was
repeatedly intrigued by the number of citizens of all
social strata who, being old enough to remember the Ubico
period, recalled it with considerable feeling and fondness.
There appears to be, at least within the forty or Older
age group, a widespread belief that Guatemala needs a
benevolent dictator o lo Ubico, not a true democracy.

 

 

 

46

Fransisco J. Arana and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Thereafter,
Ubico was exiled, a call for free elections and a con-
stitutional assembly was made, and Dr. Juan Jose Arévalo,
who had previously been forced into exile by Ubico, re-
turned to seek the presidency. In the first free election
in Guatemalan history, Arévalo won a six-year term as
President, easily defeating his four Opponents.70
Under Arévalo, significant social changes were
made. A sincere effort was made to incorporate the Indian
population into Guatemala's social and economic fabric, and,
at least legally, Indians became equal to ladinos. Fur-
thermore, work codes were made into law and enforced; labor
was allowed, indeed encouraged, to organize; and a
revigorated education program was started. More important,
perhaps, were the political changes the Arévalo government
brought. The formation of political parties was encouraged
and they became a focal point of politics, while local and
national Offices were made elective. Combined with widened
suffrage, these reforms caused a political awakening among
the populace heretofore largely ignored. Yet the problem
with the new powers and rights thus gained remained all

pervading, for the formerly inert political forces depended

 

70John W. Sloan, "Electoral Frauds and Social
Change: The Guatemalan Example," Science and Society,
XXXIV (1970), 78-91.

 

47

on derived rights, i.e., dependent upon the central
government, and not independent power.71
Unfortunately, the 1950 election ended Guatemala's
string Of honest and free elections at one. In the pre-
vious year, Colonel Arana was assassinated in what was
widely held to be an act to eliminate him from contention
for the presidency, thus thrusting Arbenz into that posi-
tion as the government party candidate. General Ydigoras
Fuentes appeared capable of Offering Arbenz considerable
competition, but the central government refused to recog-
nize two Of the political parties backing him, and a
warrant was issued for his arrest on the basis that he was
plotting to overthrow the government. Ydigoras first went
underground, and later fled into exile. With the cards
thus stacked, and military trucks available to carry the
largely ignorant Indian voters to the polls, Arbenz won an
easy victory in November, 1950, over nine other candidates.
Problems soon developed, however. It became apparent that
the Arbenz regime was being infiltrated by communists, and
when a revolutionary (for Guatemala) land reform act was

pressed into law, the previously divided rightist elements

 

71Adams, Crucifixion by Power, Op. cit., pp. 144-45.
For an interesting analySis of the effeEE'of—Ehe 1944 to
1954 revolutionary period on Indian peoples, see Adams,
Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian Communities: A
Symposium (New Orleans: Middle Amefica Research Institute
Of Tulane University, 1957), and Ruben E. Reina, Chinautla:
A Guatemalan Indian Community (New Orleans: Middle America
Research Institute of Tulane University, 1960).

 

 

 

 

 

48

began to organize their resistance. The United Fruit
Company had lost its lands in Tiquisate and was in danger
of losing its remaining lands on the east coast. Finally,
the Arbenz government purchased a sizeable amount of arms
from the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia, much Of which
was to prove useless.72

In June, 1954, a disgruntled Colonel Castillo
Armas, who had fled Guatemala after the Arana assassina-
tion, launched an invasion of Guatemala from Honduras,
possibly supported by the United States government and the
United Fruit Company. After four days of light, sporadic
fighting, Arbenz was forced to resign by a military loopo
which commenced negotiations with the Armas insurgents.
In July, Armas became Guatemala's ruler. The revolutionary
period ended. But, although the agrarian reform law was
rescinded, the clock could not now be turned back to 1944.
Other changes were more permanent, including a more widely
aware and politically active populace.

Three years after the ascension to power by Armas,
he was assassinated. An election held in October, 1957,

and from which the Partido Revolucionario (PR) was banned,

 

ended in nullification when the now-returned Ydigoras
claimed that the provisional government had rigged it

against him. This stimulated another round of

 

72"Useless Weapons and Duds Sent Guatemalans by
Reds, Officer Says," New York Times, July 9, 1954, p. l.

 

49

demonstrations and strikes. The provisional government was
overthrown and replaced by a military regime. A second
round of voting in January, 1958, in which the PR was
allowed to participate, ended after considerable jockeying
and Ydigoras was proclaimed the victor.

The Ydigoras regime was plagued by rebellion within
the military, the unsuccessful rebellion of November, 1960,
leading to the formation of a guerrilla movement, spreading
corruption, and an image of inability to govern. Student
demonstrations erupted in March, 1962, and the violence
associated with them led to an army takeover of the capital
city. Another unsuccessful golpo attempt was followed by
larger and more numerous strikes and demonstrations.
Finally, Ydigoras was overthrown by a military troika led
by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia in 1963.

At the time of Peralta's rise to power, the Partido

Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT), outlawed since the

 

Castillo Armas rise to power in 1954, was weak and ineffec-
tual. Also in existence, however, was a guerrilla band

known as the Movimiento Revolucionario-l3 (MR-13) which was

 

led by Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa, a United States-trained
military Officer who, with other junior Officers, went
underground after an unsuccessful golpe attempt against

Ydigoras in 1960. Initially, the guerrillas, Operating

50

mainly in the eastern provinces Of Izabal and Zacapa,

were Of little political or military consequence.73
In 1965, Luis Augusto Turcios broke away from the

MR-l3 and established a second guerrilla Operation, the

Fuerza Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), which established close

 

relations with the PGT, although like the MR-l3 it remained
a separate entity. Both guerrilla groups sought to inSpire
peasant-based revolution and were particularly outspoken
opponents Of the extensive influence of the United States
government and business interests in Guatemala.

During the three-year Peralta reign, little effort
was made to combat the guerrillas, whose Operations were
limited in number, scope, and success. Thus, relative
calm was restored to the country, a new constitution was
proclaimed, and elections were announced for March, 1966.74
Three political parties were verified by the Electoral

Registry as having the minimum of 50,000 signatures neces-

sary to name a candidate for the presidency: The Movimiento

 

de Liberacién Nacional (MLN), which had been formed in 1958

 

by the Castillo Armas followers from his Movemiento

 

 

73Petras, "Revolutions and Guerrilla Movements in

Latin America," op, 915,; and Eduardo H. Galeano,
Guatemala: Occupied Country (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1969).

74For an analysis of the Guatemalan military with
special reference to the Peralta era, see Richard Adams,
"The Development of the Guatemalan Military," Studies in
Comparative International Development, IV (1968-69),
9l-ll0.

 

 

 

51

Democratico Nacional, and which was rightist; the Partido

 

Instituto Democratico (PID), a rightist party founded in

 

1965 and considered the government party; and the Partido

Revolucionario (PR), established in 1958 from the remnants

 

of the leftist elements of the Arévalo era.

The left-Of-center Democracia Cristiana Guatemal-

 

poop (DC), originally founded in 1955, was not allowed to
name a candidate in view Of the claim by the Electoral
Registry that its petitions for recognition as a party did
not contain the minimum Of 50,000 valid signatures required
by law.

When the Guatemalan peOple went to the polls in
March, 1966, they gave a plurality Of votes to the PR
candidate, Julio Méndez Montenegro, standing in for his
brother, Mario, who had committed suicide under mysterious
circumstances. The MLN and PID split the rightist vote.
As the results of the elections became clear, tension
increased because the willingness of the military to allow
Mendez Montenegro to take charge Of the government came
into doubt. Since he had not received a majority of the
votes, the President would have to be elected by the
fifty-five seat unicameral Congress from among the two top
vote getters. The PR had won control of the Congress.

There appears to have been considerable negotiation
between the apparent victor and the military, the latter

apparently being pressured by the United States government

52

to work out an agreement to allow Méndez Montenegro to
assume the presidency.75 Such an agreement was finally
formulated, Méndez Montenegro apparently making three
promises to his military foes: he would choose his
Minister Of Defense from a list of three nominees of the
military, civilians would not be allowed to meddle in
military affairs, and the military would be given a free
hand to deal with the guerrilla problem.

Thus, in June, 1966, Julio Méndez Montenegro was
installed as Guatemala's second honestly elected presi-
dent.76 General Arriaga Bosque was named Minister Of
Defense and Colonel Arana Osorio was placed in command of
the Zacapa garrison, whose primary responsibility became
one of eliminating the guerrillas with considerable material
assistance and technical aid, in the form Of advisers, from
the United States. The military efforts against the guer-
rillas were increased with considerable success and the
death of Turcios in an automobile crash in October, 1966,
denied the FAR movement one of its key leaders. With the
situation worsening in the countryside, the guerrillas
turned to the cities, especially the capital. Political

kidnappings and assassinations came with increasing

 

75Kenneth F. Johnson, "Guatemala: From Terrorism
to Terror," Conflict Studies, XXIII (1972), 12.

 

6For comments on the 1966 election, see especially
Sloan, op, cit.; K. Johnson, op. cit.; and Kenneth Johnson,
"Guatema a: From Terrorism to Terror," op, cit., pp. l-l7.

53

frequency as 1967 passed. To carry on an Official policy
Of conciliation while, in actuality, seeking tO annihilate
the terrorists, two right-wing extremist groups were

formed, the Movimiento de AcciOn Nacionalista Organizado

 

(MANO), which was created in 1966 and became known as the

"white hand," and the Nueva OrganizaciOn Anticommunista
77

 

(NOA), which was formed in 1967.

The pace of violence increased in 1968 as the
virtual civil war between paramilitary leftist and rightist
groups continued. In August, the United States ambassador,
attempting to flee from his would-be kidnappers, was
murdered. In the same year, the ArchbishOp of Guatemala
was kidnapped. The resulting furor was but little reduced
with his release and accusation of rightist elements as
guilty of the deed. Obviously Méndez Montenegro had to
act. The "founding fathers" of the right-wing groups,
General Arriaga Bosque and Colonel Arana were given new
assignments, the former as consul in Miami, a popular post
for exiling troublesome individuals, and the latter as
ambassador to Nicaragua.

By 1970, the MR-l3 and FAR had been practically
eliminated as guerrilla movements, but terrorism continued.
New elections were scheduled for March, despite the terror—
ism which was becoming less discriminate in terms of its

victims. Again, there were three parties involved. The

 

77Ibid.

 

54

right, having learned the lesson Of splitting the rightist
vote in 1966 was represented by a MLN-PID coalition and
nominated now-returned Colonel Arana for president. But,
while the right was now united at the national level, the
leftists vnare split as a result of the recognition of the
DC as a party in 1968. With the leftist vote thus split
between the DC and the PR, and the population generally
tired of terrorism and eager for law and order, the choice
was clear. Arana, his image enhanced by the creation of a

death squad known as Ojo por Ojo, won a plurality Of the

 

votes and was easily elected President by the now dominant
MLN-PID coalition in Congress.78

Since Arana's inauguration an intense anti-
guerrilla campaign has been largely successful in destroy-
ing the terrorist movement, although the pace Of killing
increased during the first year of his regime. The
rightist extremists have been effective in the cities. In
the countryside, the death of Yon Sosa in a skirmish with
a Mexican patrol force near the border denied the rural
guerrilla movement of its second leader.

As this dissertation is being written, Guatemalans
are approaching a new election. The MLN-PID coalition

continues and has nominated ex-Minister Of Defense General

Kjell Laugerud for the presidency with Mario Sandoval

 

78Kenneth Johnson, "The 1966 and 1970 Elections

in Guatemala: A Comparative Analysis," World Affairs,
cxxx1v (1971), 34-50.

 

55

Alarcdn as nominee for vice-president. Both men are veteran
leaders Of the right wing extremists groups. The PR and DC,
both of which were initially badly torn by internal disputes
between would-be civilian nominees, have finally nominated

military men for the presidency. General Efrain Rios Montt

is the candidate of the DC-based Frente de Oposicién

 

Nacional, and Colonel Ernesto Paiz Novales will be the PR
nominee.79
Whether the nomination of military Officers repre-
sents an elaborate military ploy to control and split the
Opposition, or is really a reflection of factions within
the military itself is not clear. What is clear is that
the violence, while lessened in its intensity, is not over.
Mysterious disappearances, kidnappings, and robberies con-

tinue, as does the appearance Of clandestine cemeteries.80

 

79"Guatemala: Heads I Win," Latin America,
November 2, 1973, pp. 348-49.

80For an early analysis of the terrorism in Guate-
mala, see James Nelson Goodsell, "Guatemala: Terrorist
Territory," The Christian Science Monitor, January 21,
1966, p. 9. _EOr more recent developments, see Henry
Goethals, "Arana Still in Trouble," The Times of the
Americas, July 21, 1971, p. l; "Dos Cadaveres mid y suman
doce los muertos del km. 21," La Tarde, March 9, 1973,
p. l; "Diputado Solis Jaurez, acr1billado a balazos," £2
Tarde, June 4, 1973, p. l; and "Encuentros armados," Prensa
Libre, June 15, 1973, p. 8.

 

 

 

CHAPTER III

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GUATEMALA: REALITY

Local government, while having a long history in
Guatemala, is but a small portion of the total governmental
machinery. Power, both political and economical, is con-
centrated at the tOp, in the executive branch of the

central government.81

National Government
Although Guatemala's central government consists of
the three traditional branches, the concentration Of power
lies in the hands of the President. He dominates the
governmental power structure, due largely to the ineffec-
tiveness of the legislative branch. This fact is recog-

nized not only by foreign researchers, but also by Deputies

 

81Harry Kantor, Patterns of Politics and Political

Systems in Latin America (Chicago: Rand McNallyiand Co.,
1967, pp. 72-97; and Kenneth Thompson and Herman Lujan, "El
sistema administrativa nacional de Guatemala," in Lujan
(ed.), Estudios Sobre AdministraciOn Pfiblica en Guatemala
(Guatemala: Instituto Nacional de AdminiStraciOn para el
Desarrollo, 1969), pp. 15-57.

56

57

Of the Congress.82 While the President and the deputies
are elected by separate ballots, few voters change parties
in the voting process. Thus, both Méndez Montenegro,
elected President in 1966, and Arana Osorio, the current
President elected in 1970, have had substantial majorities
in the Congress, which has never proved to be a barrier to
legislation the President earnestly sought. Though justices
for the highest courts of the country are, according to the
Constitution, appointed by the Congress, they are in fact
appointed by the President and approved by Congress. Bong
tide appointments by the President are not subject to re-
view by, or the approval of, Congress. Guatemala's fifty-
five seat unicameral Congress, therefore, is not an active
innovator nor participant in the national development
process, being totally subservient to the President. Such
a situation is indicative of a low degree of political
maturity, and severely restricts the ability Of members of
Congress to act as a means of communication for local

officials.83

 

82Weston H. Agor, Latin American Legislatopo:
Their Role and Influence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1971), pp. 193-324; and "Rapapolvo a diputados que no
trabajan bien," Prensa Libre, February 23, 1973, p. 17.

 

 

 

83Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber (Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1960), p. 444. According to Weber a politically
mature system requires a legislative branch in which great
problems are not only debated but also decided.

 

58

Each of Guatemala's twenty-two departments has a
governor who is appointed or removed by the President and
who, both legally and in reality, represents the President
within the department. Until recently, no governor was
allowed to serve in any given department for more than
three successive years. This law was changed in 1973 to
lift all restrictions on a governor's tenure of Office.

The primary duty of governors is to ensure the enforcement
Of national laws and presidential decrees, and there has
been a noticeable tendency to appoint military figures to
these positions. During the first three years of the Arana
administration, only two of the more than forty governors
appointed were civilians. Department government, therefore,
Offers another example of the centralization of authority
in the national system. Because of its character it, too,
fails to form a major two-way channel Of communication
between local authorities and the central government
decision-makers. NO departmental legislature or other
governmental authority exists.

Municipalidades seeking technical or financial

 

assistance from the central government are confronted with

a bureaucracy characteristic of Latin American countries--

large, uncontrolled, generally inept, and corrupt.84

 

84The notoriety Of Latin American bureaucracies

is such as to need no detailed analysis here. For recent
works dealing with the Guatemalan bureaucracy, see Lujan,
op, cit.; and Jerry L. Weaver, "Bureaucracy During a Period
0 SSEial Change: The Guatemalan Case" (Austin: The Latin

59

Guatemala's central bureaucracy, consisting of more than
43,000 personnel, consumes nearly 50 percent Of the total
national budget and is manned almost exclusively by people
who have spent most Of their lives in Guatemala City.85

Not only is there a wasteful lack of coordination
and cooperation among agencies of the central government,
but also there is jealous rivalry and competition among
them. With no civil service protection, the myriad Of
government agencies scramble to prove their worth to the
President and his ministers by producing a vast array Of
studies and reports which often mean little and usually
lead to nothing. As could be expected in a developing
country, there are mountains Of reports and plans dictating
what should be done and, while researchers seem to abound,
money and implementors appear to be notably scarce.

The size of the bureaucracy is the result of
several factors, among them the low productivity per worker,

political patronage, and the haunting problem of high

 

American Development Administration Committee Of the
Department of Government, University of Texas, Occasional
Pa ers, Series 2, NO. 2, 1971. An earlier study is that
Of K. H. Silvert, A Study Of Government: Guatemala

(New Orleans: Middle American Research Ihstitute, 1954).

85Joel G. Verner, "Characteristics of Administra-
tion Personnel: The Case of Guatemala," Journal of
Developing_Areas, V (1970), 73-86. Verner‘s analysis of
data collected from 327 decision-makers and supervisory
personnel in 1967 shows that 88 percent of them had spent
most Of their life in Guatemala City. Respondents to
this survey averaged forty-one years of age and had an
average Of fifteen years of public service.

 

 

 

 

60

unemployment. Since members of the bureaucracy invariably
view themselves as being sadly underpaid, they rationalize
their low productivity and wideSpread graft. Both of these
factors contribute to the largely uncontrolled nature Of
the bureaucracy, but there are other considerations.
Although the upper echelons of the bureaucracy
appear to be apportioned to competent administrators, the
caliber of personnel tends to decrease considerably in the
lower strata, a common characteristic of bureaucracies in
develOping countries with high rates of illiteracy and a
generally poorly educated pOpulace. Furthermore, with no
civil service protection, bureaucrats tend to stabilize
their own positions first and only secondarily concern
themselves with the development progress. NO matter how
capable and well intentioned the decision-maker at the
tOp, the decisions seem to lose their force and urgency as
they percolate down through the bureaucracy to the im-
plementors. Disgruntled alcaldes, caustically critical
Of the slowness with which solicitations to the central
government are handled, usually place responsibility for
this lack of interest beyond the reach Of the President
and his ministers and blame the bureaucracy. Within the
central government there are three agencies of particular
pertinence to this research in that they deal primarily

with municipios. These are INFOM, INAD, and FYDEP.

 

61

Created in 1965, INFOM, the Instituto Nacional de
Fomento Municipal, is the chief central agency concerned
with municipal affairs. In part, it is financed by funds
collected from the tax on liquor and by direct contribu-
tions on the part of the central government. The law
creating INFOM requires the national government to allot
a certain, but undetermined, percentage of the national
budget to the institute. In reality, this has not been
enforced, and INFOM is therefore funded largely at the
whim of the President, although theoretically it functions
as an autonomous agency Of the Ministry Of Public Finances.

A Board of Directors governs INFOM. The Board
consists of three members appointed by the President, the
Monetary Board, and the Associacién Nacional de Municipal-
idades (ANAM). The appointee Of the President automatically
becomes president of the Board Of Directors. A manager
elected by the Board has charge Of the day-to-day func-
tioning of the agency.

The primary Objective Of INFOM is to plan and
finance municipal public works and service projects. In
addition, it Offers technical assistance to municipal
governments in budgetary matters, bookkeeping, and taxa-
tion policies. The institute also has responsibility to
oversee the spending Of municipal monies, especially with

regard to municipal funds gained from taxes on gasoline,

62

beer, liquor and coffee, since the use Of these funds is
restricted by national law.

All municipios seeking loans must borrow from the

 

Institute or have the Institute's approval of its loans
from other sources. According to law, the interest rate
on loans may not exceed 5 percent per annum, although the
Institute Often adds a service charge of up to 10 percent
of the loan value for a variety of technical services.86
In addition to the funds gained from the liquor
tax, INFOM receives funds directly from the central
government. The 1973 national budget earmarked $1.8
million for INFOM, a sum which was later raised to $2.8
million when the Congress approved the issuance of $17
million in bonds, $1 million of which was assigned to

INFOM.87 A final source of capitalization is the repayment

 

86This has led to some interesting developments.
Although INFOM has a generally good image among alcaldes,
the practice Of charging a service fee for technical
assistance has ired some and appears to result in increas-
ing discontent with the agency. See, for example,
"Gestiones de las municipalidades de Huehuetenango,"
Prensa Libre, May 30, 1973, p. 8.

A second result of the service charge has been a
virtual deluge Of request to Peace Corps volunteers for
technical advice and service in an apparent effort by
municipalidades to skirt the INFOM service charge. TO
offset this, the agency has recently begun to insist that
plans not designed by INFOM technicians be approved by
them before a loan for the project can be granted.

87Close scrutiny of the 1973 national budget
reveals some interesting facts, one of which regards the
budget for the Public Relations Bureau of the Presidency
($485,400) in relation to the central government comm1t-
ment to INFOM ($2.8 million). Yet, INFOM fairs better
than the Instituto Nacional de TransformaciOn Agraria

 

 

63

of previous loans. This resulted in an increase Of the
institute's budget to $4.5 million in 1973.
As to the disbursement Of funds, INFOM determines

a debt capacity for each municipio of the country, based

 

upon the municipio's income from taxes on gasoline, coffee,

 

beer, and liquor, its population, and the current municipal

debt. This does not mean that each municipio actually

 

Obtains funds up to its debt capacity, since the limited
capital funds of INFOM could not provide for such a sum.
Rather, these calculations establish the limit within which
loans may be approved.

Although the municipalidad of Guatemala has sought

 

loans from INFOM in the past, it now has only one outstand-
ing debt with the institute. In recent years, the city,
badly in need Of vast sums Of money, has sought loans
through the issuance of bonds, an act which requires the
approval Of Congress. For all intents and purposes, there-
fore, the miniscule resources of INFOM are not drawn upon
it by the capital city.

A second agency of the central government of key
importance to local government is INAD, the Instituto
Nacional de Administracién para el Desarrollo. INAD was
created in 1964 and represents a noteworthy, positive con-

tribution of the Alliance for Progress to Guatemalan

 

(INTA), which is primarily responsible for land re-
distribution and colonization projects. INTA was budgeted
only $400,000 from the central government in 1973.

64

government. An autonomous agency of the Ministry of
Education, the primary purposes Of INAD are to: l) examine,
and offer solutions to, development administration problems;
2) Offer technical assistance to national and municipal
government employees; and, 3) train students for future
government employment.

INAD has develOped an effective series of courses
in development administration and offers a limited number
of scholarships to interested and qualified students. In
addition, the Institute has begun a series of regional work-

shops for alcaldes, secretarios, and tesoreros in an

 

 

 

effort to acquaint them with effective and efficient ad-
ministrative procedures and Offer suggestions for the im-
provement of municipal financing. While programs such as
these are limited by financial and personnel considerations,
they appear to be effective and should be expanded.

Although the municipios of the Department of E1

 

Petén seek loans and technical assistance from INFOM and
INAD, the economic development of this sparsely pOpulated
northern third of Guatemala is the responsibility of
another central government agency which deals intimately

with the municipios, Fomento y Desarrollo EconOmicO de El

 

 

Petén (FYDEP). Created in 1959 in an effort to give
Special emphasis to the region, the agency is wrought with

problems. Both alcaldes and the citizenry generally con-

 

demn the agency for its ineptness and corruption. Its

65

responsibilities for road construction bring it into con-
flict with the Ministry Of Communications and Public Works,
while its agrarian development policies conflict with those
of the Instituto Nacional de Transformacién Agraria (INTA).
Finally, FYDEP's total budget for 1973 was $1.8 million,

of which 35 percent was destined for payment of the agency's
debts. Of the total budget, only $304,000 came as capital—
ization from the central government. The bulk Of the re-
maining funds were derived from the sale of wood on national
lands and a tax on the export Of chicle. In view of the
local reputation of FYDEP and the other problems it con-
fronts, the need for substantial reform, if not outright
abolition, is clear.

INFOM, INAD, and FYDEP currently form the principal
points Of contact between the national and local govern-
ments of Guatemala. The function of local government and
its relationship to the central government in terms of
development are better understood, however, with some

historical perspective.

Local Government: Histogy

 

When the Spanish began their drive to regain land
from the Moorish invaders during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, it established a two-step procedure.
First, a fort was built and manned. Later, peasants were
enticed to settle land which surrounded the fort. One of

the inducements to attract settlers was the establishment

66

of local governments to deal with strictly local affairs
and the election Of Officials by heads of households in
Open meetings. As the Crown's hold on the land and its
people became more secure, however, local government be-
came increasingly more restricted and less powerful.88

A similar pattern appeared in the Spanish colonies
Of the New World. In the most established, populous, and
accessible settlements, the Crown placed authority in the
hands Of a few appointees. By 1520, the Crown was appoint-
ing members of the municipal councils, and by 1560 such
positions were being sold as a means of gaining revenue.
Only in the more remote and isolated or Indian communities,
which in Guatemala frequently coincide, did a significant
degree of local autonomy exist.89

The successful independence movements of the
Spanish colonies in the early decades of the 19th century

did not noticeably alter the situation. Caudillos and

 

their representatives merely replaced the Crown and its
representatives as the symbols of authority. And, as the
country's infrastructure developed and communication between
settlements and the capital city increased, local autonomy

and self-reliance decreased. After World War II, the rise

 

88Harold F. Alderfer, Local Government in DevelOp-

ing Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 17-20.

89John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Municipality
Deteriorates," Inter-American Economic Affairs, V
(1951), 26-27.

 

 

 

67

of concern for economic develOpment further stimulated this
movement toward centralization. The almost universal view
was that the needed changes and programs could only be
instituted by a strong central government. As a result,
the pace toward centralization quickened and local govern-
ment became an obvious victim of this trend.90 In the

case of Guatemala, the continued centralization of author-
ity is widely recognized as a development problem even by

members of the central government.91

Local Government: Composition

 

Guatemala's 324 municipios vary considerably in

 

both area and population. The smallest municipio is

 

Sumpango, in the Department of Sacatepéquez, which has
an area of only 3.1 square miles. San Andres, in the
Department of El Petén, with an area of 5,502 square miles
(about equal to the State of Connecticut), is the country's

largest municipio. These two municipios also Offer a

 

 

clear example of the uneven character of the population

distribution in that Sumpango, with a population of more

 

9°Ibid., p. 24.

91See, for examples, Secretaria General del
Consejo Nacional de PlanificaciOn EconOmica, ”Papel de los
gobiernos locales en el desarrollo agrario y urbano del
pais y fortalecimiento del gobierno municipal a través
del desarrollo regional" (Guatemala, 1970); and Instituto
Nacional de Administracién para el Desarrollo, Informe
del Primera Seminario Nacional Sobre Administracidn para
el Desarrollo Municipal (Guatemala, 1967).

 

 

68

than 8,000 in 1964, has nearly four times the population
Of San Andrés.

With the possible exception of those municipios
adjacent to other countries, Article 8 of the Municipal

Code indicates that municipios should possess a minimum

 

Of 5,000 inhabitants. However, this law has not been
enforced, primarily due to the myriad of problems which
would result from the political reforms necessary to meet
this legal requirement. Thus, the 1964 census indicates

that more than one-third Of Guatemala's municipios con-

 

tained less than 5,000 peOple, and seven contained less

than 1,000. The population of Santa Ana, El Petén (311)
contrasts sharply with the nearly one million population
Of Guatemala City.

In each municipio, the largest settlement is the

 

capital (cabecera municipal), while the hinterland is

 

composed of aldeas, small clusters Of houses, caserios,
areas Of scattered settlement, and finca, farm, settle-

ments. Municipios themselves are divided into four cate-

 

gories according to the basis outlined in the Municipal
Code. These categories are:

Category I: Municipios which are department capitals
the population of which exceeds 100,000,
and those which the President feels
are of such importance as to warrant
this classification. There are twenty-
two Category I municipios, each Of
them a department capital.

 

 

69

Category II: Municipios with a population of more
than 10,000 and ports, regardless of
their population. There are eighty-
nine Category II municipios.

 

 

Category III: Municipios with a population of 5,000-
10,000. This category contains 103
municipios.

 

 

Category IV: Municipios with fewer than 5,000
inhabitants. Category IV municipios
number 110.

 

 

The chief elected Official of the municipalidad,

 

the municipal corporation which governs the municipio, is

 

the alcalde. In addition to being charged with the day-
to-day functioning of the government, the alcalde also
has reSponsibility for presiding over meetings of the
town council, formulating the budget and overseeing its
disbursement, appointing and removing employees of the

town except for the secretario and tesorero, overseeing

 

the construction of municipal projects and maintenance
Of municipal services, and the maintenance of an inventory
Of all municipally owned goods and lands.

Until recently, the alcaldes of most Category II,

III, and IV municipios also acted as the local Justice of

 

the Peace. Category I and some Category II municipios had

 

a separate individual to serve in this capacity. A recent
change in the law has placed responsibility for the
appointment and payment of Justices of the Peace in the
hands Of the judicial branch of the central government.

To what degree this act will alter the current

7O

alcalde-Justice of the Peace relationship which dominates

in most municipios is not clear.

 

Legislative activities Of local government are
performed by the town council (consejo) which consists of
one, or possibly two, sindicos and a number Of councilmen.
A sindico (trustee) differs from a councilman in that he
is considered the leader of the council itself with re-
sponsibility for signing all important documents regarding
municipal affairs, seeing that the alcalde carries out
the duties assigned by the council, and representing the
municipal government in cases brought before civil tri-
bunals. In the case of the last-mentioned charge, few
sindicos actually fulfill it. They usually turn to the
Associacién Nacional de Municipalidades (ANAM) for legal
advice and assistance. A sindico also often oversees the
functioning of some of the more important local activities,
such as education and the use Of municipally owned lands.

Article 30 of the Municipal Code limits the number

Of council members as follows: municipios of the first

 

category may have as many as twenty council members, those
Of the second and third categories may have up to fourteen

councillors, and municipios Of the fourth category may

 

have as many as eight members on their council.
Alcaldes, sindicos, and councilmen compose the

municipal corporation (municipalidad), and are pOpularly

 

elected for terms Of four years in municipios Of the first

 

71

and second categories, and for terms Of two years in the

smaller municipios. NO member of the municipalidad may

 

 

serve successive terms in the same office, although many
leave Office for a period and return. In Indian areas, the
Council of Elders often selects the candidates for elective
positions and the pOpular election which follows is a mere
formality.

The municipalidad has six basic responsibilities:

 

1) the establishment of local ordinances, 2) the determina-
tion Of local taxes and tax rates within the limits set by

national law, 3) the selection Of a secretario and a

 

tesorero to serve the municipio, 4) the selection Of

 

municipal improvement projects, 5) the establishment of

the annual budget of the municipio, and 6) the maintenance

 

of local services.

The pay Of corporation officials varies considerably
and usually depends on the financial status of the local
treasury. Only a very few of the larger and wealthier

municipalidades pay councilmen or sindicos. Alcaldes re-

 

 

 

ceive some payment for their services since they occupy
full-time positions, although in the smallest and poorest
communities the salary may be as little as fifteen dollars
per month. Sometimes months pass without this payment
being made, due to the lack of municipal funds. However,
since most alcaldeo consider it an honor and obligation to

serve the municipio, the poor pay does not appear to affect

 

the manner in which they perform their duties.

72

Municipal corporations are usually dominated by

men who live in the capital of the municipio, inasmuch as

 

members of it are elected on an at-large basis. One of the
methods whereby contact with the inhabitants Of the out-

lying settlements Of the municipio is maintained is via

 

alcaldes auxiliares. These men, appointed by the alcalde,
act as a means Of communication between the peOple and the
municipal corporation and enforce the laws and ordinances
of the municipio. They may also collect local taxes.

Each aldea of a municipio has at least one alcalde

 

auxiliar. Some have two, with each serving in alternate

 

months. In addition, the alcalde may appoint alcaldes

 

auxiliares in any caserios or finca settlements which he

 

feels warrants such a post. Alcaldes auxiliares serve

 

without pay and have an assistant who also serves without
PaY-
Each municipal government has at least two other

appointed Officers, the secretario and the tesorero.

 

 

Appointed by the town council, these salaried Officers
have no civil service protection and serve indefinite
terms of Office.

The secretario has responsibility for the day-to-day

 

functioning of the alcalde's Office. He transmits all
communications, posts new municipal ordinances and notices,
and maintains municipal records. In addition, he attends

all corporation meetings, takes the minutes, and carries out

73

a variety of other duties assigned to him by the council or
alcalde. He also prepares, for the President of the

country, an annual report which summarizes municipio

 

activities.
The tesorero collects and disburses tax monies and

maintains the financial records for the municipalidad,

 

and, in conjunction with the alcalde, formulates the annual
budget of the local government. Additionally, he prepares
an annual report to inform two agencies of the central

government, the Controlaria de Cuentas and INFOM, Of the

 

municipio budget for the ensuing year and the actual ex-

 

penditures Of the previous year. Finally, he informs the

Direccién General de Estadisticas each month of what funds

 

have been collected and disbursed for the previous month.
All of the previously denoted positions are found

in every monicipio. Municipal governments in larger

 

municipios, however, often have additional Officers

 

appointed by the alcalde. Such positions may include a
civil registrar, who records the permanent movement of

citizens into and out Of the municipio and births and deaths

 

within it. He also maintains the local voting lists.92

 

92Legal provisions make it mandatory that two
separate voting lists be maintained, one for literate and
one for non-literate voters. By law, all literate citizens
eligible to vote in elections must do so. The law is not,
in fact, enforced. In addition, Article 27 of the Electoral
Law requires that no less than 20 percent of the signees
of petitions presented for the authorization of the
formation Of a political party be literate.

74

While almost all municipios have some form Of police

 

protection provided by the national government, many
munipalidades also maintain a small local police force.
Very few municipal corporations can afford the luxury Of
other, usually technical, officials such as a lawyer to
serve as Justice of the Peace or an engineer to supervise
municipal projects.

Appointed Officers of municipal government usually
are better educated than elected Officials and consequently,
Often play strategic roles in municipal affairs. This is

particularly true of the secretario. Therefore, while sub-

 

stantial change in the composition of elective offices
takes place following each election, it is common for non-
elected Officials to remain in their positions. This allows

for some degree Of continuity in municipal government.

Local Government: Responsibilities

Guatemalan law endows the municipalidad with

 

autonomy to deal with all affairs which are strictly local
in nature. This includes everything from taxation to plan-
ning for national and local holidays. According to the
Municipal Code, the primary objectives of municipal govern-
ment are to decentralize authority and provide for local
services.

Article 22 of the Municipal Code lists the major
service responsibilities of local government and divides

them into two categories. First are the essential services,

75

which include provision of the municipio with potable

 

water, a sewerage system, a slaughtering house, a market,
a plaza, and street cleaning. For these services, local
citizens may not be taxed or assessed an amount in excess
Of the actual costs Of construction and maintenance Of the
service. Assessments for discretionary services, however,

may be made in such manner as to allow the municipalidad

 

to make a profit. Such services include a transportation
system, electricity and public lighting, public baths,
recreation fields and parks, and public theatres and social

salons. Municipalidades also are reSponsible for fire

 

protection in the municipios, although few Of them actually

 

have fire fighting equipment or an organized fire fighting
force. Finally, the provision and maintenance Of ceme-

teries are the responsibility of the individual municipios.

 

The Municipal Code requires, under Article 60,

that each municipalidad form such local committees as are

 

necessary to oversee the functioning Of local government
and services. The law requires the local government to
form five such committees to deal with l) municipal
finances and municipal property, 2) public health, 3) urban-
ization, public works, and municipal roads, 4) education,
culture, and tourism, and 5) agriculture and forestry.

Municipal government in Guatemala Operates under
two myths. One is the myth, now disappearing, that

municipal government can fulfill its responsibilities,

76

particularly within the bounds set by the second myth,
the myth Of local autonomy. In regard to autonomy,
Article 1 of the Municipal Code clearly states:

The municipio is the entity Of Public Law which
constitutes all residents Of a municipal district.
It possesses autonomy to give its authorities, and
to exercise by means of them, the governing and
administration of its own interests.

 

The myth is further propagated by Article 233 of the 1965

Constitution:

An autonomous regime for the government of the

municipios is established which comprises the

fights tO use its own resources, to accomplish

its own ends, and to administer local public

services.
The 1966 Panajachel conference Of central and local govern-
ment Officials further promoted the myth and formulated
the motto "socios para el desarrollo" (partners for
develOpment) to describe the relationship between local
and central government in Guatemala in regard to develOp-
ment.93 Autonomy and local government reSponsibilities
are myths for three basic reasons, 1) contrary legal re-

strictions, 2) the manner in which local government is

financed, and 3) the caliber of local government Officials.

Myths and Contrary Legal Restrictions
The legal barriers that prevent local government

from assuming its responsibilities and legal restrictions

 

93For a complete report Of the Panajachel con-

ference, see Instituto Nacional de Administracion para
el Desarrollo, op. cit.

 

 

77

on local autonomy are many. The Municipal Code requires
that within the first fifteen days of each year, the

secretario municipal forward to the President of the

 

Republic, by way of the department Governor, a report Of

events and acts Of the municipalidad during the past year

 

year.94 In addition, all agreements between a municipali-

 

ooo_and a private individual or company that provides for
a public service must be approved by the Executive. Both
of these actions impinge upon municipal autonomy, although
it may be interpreted as a protective rather than a re-
strictive form of infringement. Far more pervading than
these restrictions, however, are those which deal with the

number and form Of municipios and questions of municipal

 

autonomy in terms Of financing.
While the Constitution recognizes the right Of

municipios to associate, the Executive must approve all

 

merger agreements. This is a blatant incursion on munici-
pal autonomy which is surpassed only by Article 230 Of

the 1965 Constitution which grants to the Congress the
power to alter and modify all municipal boundaries. The

Congress has legal power to redraw the political map of

 

94The actual terms used in the Municipal Code is
"the Executive," rather than the President. This term
appears in many laws regarding municipal government, and
is only hazily defined in that the Executive consists of
not only the President, but also his ministers and the
Council of State, an advisory body. Therefore, papers
and solicitations sent to the Executive may actually
require action on the part of the President, or he may
prefer to refer them to a lesser official of the executive
branch of government.

78

Guatemala by redefining municipal boundaries. This fact,
above all others, is what makes the concept Of municipal
autonomy a myth. It should not be construed that such
restrictions on municipal government and its autonomy are
invariably negative. However, the perpetuation Of the
myth of autonomy does little to enhance the develOpment
of Guatemala or relations between the local and national
levels of government.

Of almost equal weight to political matters in
terms Of municipal limitations are financial restrictions
and requirements. Presently, the law requires each

municipalidad to submit to an annual examination Of its

 

expenditures by the Controlaria de Cuentas, an autonomous
agency Of the central government. Furthermore, the
Municipal Code outlines the means whereby municipal budgets
are to be formulated. Such budgets must also be approved
by INFOM. Again, one could consider such requirements as
protective and beneficial rather than restrictive, but the
balance between the two tends to fall more heavily on the
restrictive side. Laws passed by the Congress not only
limit the types Of taxes a municipal corporation may
impose, they also limit the rates of local taxation.
Article 235 of the Constitution, for example, clearly
states that the creation of municipal excise taxes re-
quires the approval of the Executive. An example of rate

restrictions is found in Article 98 of the Municipal Code,

79

which proclaims that under no circumstances should the
beneficiaries of a municipal improvement project be
forced to pay more than 70 percent Of the actual cost Of
a project.

A further restriction on municipal Spending con-

cerns the use of funds distributed to the municipalidades

 

by the central government from taxes on gasoline, coffee,
beer, and liquor. The use Of these monies is restricted
largely to municipal public works projects. Thus, for

example, the funds a municipalidad gains from the tax on

 

gasoline may not be used to pay a doctor. Finally, while
municipal corporations have the power to borrow money in

the name of the municipio, all such loans must be made

 

with, or with the approval of, INFOM.

It would be difficult to contend that all Of the
restrictions on municipal government are negative. Few
would doubt the validity of formulating some means whereby
national government Officials are informed of events and

actions taking place within the municipios of the country.

 

However, it is clear that municipal government is not
autonomous to manage even strictly local affairs, and one
wonders what is to be gained from continuing the propa-
ganda maintaining the myth. Nor are municipal governments
capable Of meeting the responsibilities assigned to them

by the laws passed by the central government.

80

Municipal Financing and the Myth
Of ReSponsibilitieS

 

Municipal Spending rose from less than ten million
dollars in 1957 to a peak of forty-two million in 1969.
During the current (Arana) administration, municipal
Spending has decreased each year, reaching a low Of less
than twenty-four million in 1972. In part, fluctuations
in municipal revenues and spending may be related to the
overall national economy. There is, however, an interesting
pattern of a substantial increase in municipal Spending in
the years immediately preceding national elections, a pat-
tern which may be repeated under the present regime.95

National government Spending, as Opposed to
municipal Spending, has been consistently on the rise in
recent years, increasing from $112,555,523 in 1968 to
$250,945,826 in 1972. Central government expenditures
for 1973 almost topped the $300,000,000 mark.96 Thus,

whereas municipal Spending accounted for approximately 25

percent of all government eXpenditureS in the late 1960's,

 

95See "Podra gestiones la comuna préstamo por
Q3 millones," La Hora, February 8, 1973, p. 1; "Pres-
upuesto municipal," Prensa Libre, November 23, 1972, p. 2;
"Aprobados lOS presupuestos del FYDEP e intendencia de
bancos," El Grafico, March 20, 1973, p. 8; "Ejecutivo
solicita emisidh de bonOS por Ql7 millones," Prensa Libre,
May 30, 1973, p. 39; and "Q18 millones en bonos, autofizo
e1 Congreso hoy," La Hora, July 5, 1973, p. l.

96DirecciOn Técnica del Presupuesto, Presupuesto
de Ingresosoy Egresos del Estado, Ejercicio 1973
TGuatemala: Ministerio de Finanzas Pfiblicas, 1973). One
Guatemalan Quetzal equals 1 U.S. dollar.

 

 

 

 

81

by 1973 it had dropped to about 10 percent of total
government Spending. Inasmuch as development progress is
largely dependent upon money, it is clear that the trend
toward centralization continues despite extensive pro-
nouncements on the need for decentralization and the vir-
tues of municipal government.

An examination of 1971 municipal finances provides
an overview of the sources of municipal revenues and the
manner in which these monies are expended.97 In that
year, municipal governments in Guatemala spent a total Of
$24,544,022. On the basis of 1970 population estimates,
this amounts to approximately $4.62 per capita.98 Con-
sidering the national government restrictions on the
forms and rates Of municipal taxation, it seems pertinent

to ask how local governments can possibly meet their

service responsibilities to the municipios with such a

 

limited sum. The obvious answer is, they cannot. More-
over, the per capita figure is misleading due to substan-

tial differences in inter-municipio per capita Spending

 

rates. While the municipalidad Of Guatemala City, for

 

example, spent $19.32 per capita in 1971, the

 

7DirecciOn General de Estadisticas, Finanzas
Municipales, 1971 (Guatemala, 1972). At the time Of this
study, 1971 was the latest year for which complete data

was available.

98Population estimates used in these calculations
were taken from SecciOn de Estudios Geograficos de Obras
Pfiblicas, "PoblaciOn de Guatemala por departmento y
municipio, 1950, 1964, 1970, y 1980." (Mimeographed.)

 

82

municipalidades of 102 of the country's municipios ex-

 

 

pended less than $1 per capita. The department capitals,
which account for 28.3 percent of the population of
Guatemala, accounted for 75.3 percent Of all the municipal

government expenditures. Ten municipios, not all Of them

 

containing department capitals, which contain 24.5 percent
Of the population of the country expended 73.3 percent Of
all municipal funds in 1971.

There is a tendency to place responsibility for the
unequal distribution of municipal funds on the taxation
policies enforced by the central government, and to some
degree this is where the responsibility lies. For example,
the national government maintains no mechanism whereby the

funding Of the poorest municipios is regularly subsidized.

 

There are limiting factors to consider other than
those for which the central government is responsible.
First, the sources of municipal revenue must be considered.
Approximately 5 percent Of the income for Guatemala's 324

municipios in 1971 resulted from the ornato. Although the

 

rate of this head tax varies among the municipios, most

 

commonly it consists of a tax Of $1 per year for each

adult male Of the community. A few of the more populous

 

municipios, however, maintain a graduated ornato based on

income. Most municipio laws state that a citizen must

 

demonstrate proof of payment of the ornato before request-

ing the services of municipal Officials. Another 30

83

percent of municipal income is derived from taxes for
municipal services such as water and electricity. Also
included in this category of revenue are charges for use

of the market(s) of the municipio and its slaughtering

 

house(s). For the most part, charges for these facilities
and services may not exceed the actual cost of main-
tenance. Another 4 percent of all municipal income in
1971 was the result of commercial taxes, a tax levied

upon business, such as stores and bars, and public trans-
portation vehicles. While the rate of taxation varies

among the municipios and the types of commercial activity,

 

a small municipio seldom taxes a small general store more

 

than $2 per month.

Current revenues comprised 39 percent Of all
municipal incomes and include fines levied by the alcalde
and fees collected for permits. Far more important, how-
ever, are taxes collected on economic activities. Many
municipios, for example, maintain a livestock head tax.

More lucrative for other municipios are taxes on commer-

 

cial goods, such as cotton, milk, sugar, and logs which

are produced within the municipio but marketed outside Of

 

it. Also included in this category are revenues collected
for the use of municipally-owned lands.

In 1971, 22 percent Of municipal government
revenues came from extraordinary revenues such as grants

and loans from the central government. Also included were

84

taxes collected by the central government but destined
for municipal governments, Of which there are four:
Decree No. 580, February 29, 1956

The gasoline tax. Each month Guatemala City receives
2¢ directly from the gasoline companies for each
gallon of gasoline sold in the municipio. Also, on

a monthly basis, gasoline companies must pay to INFOM
2¢ for each gallon of gasoline sold outside Of
Guatemala City. This money is then divided among the
remaining 323 municipios on a per capita basis, and
their accounts at INFOM are credited. The municipal
use Of these funds is limited to the payment of
interest and loans, the maintenance Of municipal
services, or public works projects approved by INFOM.
The Controlaria de Cuentas is charged with a monthly
audit of the books of the gasoline companies.

 

 

 

Decree NO. 114, September 9, 1963

The coffee tax. Coffee destined for export is taxed
at the rate of 15¢ per pound. The tax is collected
by the exporter and forwarded to INFOM in the name

of the municipio in which the coffee was produced.
INFOM, in turn, credits the account of the respective
municipio. The municipolidad must apply to INFOM

for permission to use thesedfunds, and their use is
limited to the payment of interest and loans, municipal
public works projects, or the purchase of equipment
related to such projects, and efforts at municipal
planning. Municipal corporations are prohibited from
increasing this tax or taxing coffee in transit
through the municipio.

 

 

 

 

Decree NO. 230, June 23, 1964

The beer tax. Breweries are taxed 21¢ for each liter
of beer produced, the tax being paid monthly. Of
this sum, 2¢ per liter is paid to INFOM which, in
turn, credits the account Of each municipio, dis-
tributing the funds on the basis OprOpulation.

These funds may be used for the payment Of interest
and loans, the maintenance Of municipal services,

and municipal public works projects. Municipalidades
may not tax beer again.

 

 

85

Decree NO. 334, February 25, 1965

The liquor tax. A tax on liquor is collected from
distillers at the rate of 10¢ per liter. This sum
is divided as follows: Guatemala City receives
credit for all liquor manufactured within the
municipio. Of the remaining sum, 80 percent is

used for the capitalization of INFOM and 20 percent
is credited to the individual accounts Of the remain-
ing 323 municipios, being distributed on the basis
Of population. These funds may be used to pay
interest and repay loans, for the maintenance of
public services, for municipal public works projects,
and for ordinary administrative expenses.

 

 

In 1971, salaries and employee benefits consumed
41.8 percent of all municipal revenues. The maintenance
and purchase of municipal equipment and the maintenance
Of municipal services accounted for another 21.5 percent
Of all local government expenditures, and 23.1 percent
was spent to repay loans. This left a total of 13.5
percent, or $3,321,904, for municipal public works pro-

jects, an average of 62¢ per capita per municipio.

 

Eleven municipios expended nothing for municipal works

 

in 1971, and ninety-one municipios expended less than

 

$1,000.

It is undeniable that national government re-
strictions on municipal sources of revenue and Spending
explain a large portion of the bleak picture of municipal
finances. But there are other culprits too. The people,

citizens of the municipios, are not guiltless. In Latin

 

American cases, social scientists have long flogged the

rich for their resistance to paying their fair share Of

86

taxes, but the rich are not alone. The municipalidad of

 

Quezaltenango did little less than plead with its citi-
zens to pay the annual ornato in 1973. At stake was an
estimated $30,000 which 21,800 citizens failed to pay.99

In a municipio of eastern Guatemala, both the

 

secretario and alcalde agreed that the central government

 

should assume the costs of maintaining a diesel motor
recently installed to provide water for irrigation because

the municipalidad could not afford it. The sum amounted

 

to approximately $40 per month. When it was suggested
that perhaps the beneficiaries of this system should be
taxed to help defray the costs, the response was Simple

and quick: "They refuse to pay."

 

The alcalde Of a municipio in Santa Rosa depart-
ment, in responding to a query regarding the taxation Of

bus service to the municipio, indicated that a tax was

 

assessed on the bus but that the owner-driver never paid
it. When asked why he was not forced to pay the tax, the

alcalde noted that the municipio was only served by this

 

one bus and he feared that efforts to enforce the tax
would result in the loss of what little bus service the

municipio had.

 

The people of Guatemala are becoming increasingly

quick to make demands for services on their government,

 

99"$21,800 vecinos se resisten a pago de boleto
de ornato," La Tarde, March 28, 1973, p. 8.

87

both nationally and locally. Unfortunately for all con-
cerned, they are not as quick in responding to the tax
needs of government to pay for these services. But, the
problem of municipal financing also lies with the municipal

government. In many municipios there is little evidence

 

that the municipalidad pressures the citizens to pay taxes.

 

Indeed, their payment Often appears Optional. Proof Of
payment of the ornato is not required before a building
permit is issued, water users are not taxed the full cost
of maintaining the water system, and stores remain Open
deSpite the owner's failure to pay the commercial tax. It

may be a question Of a 10¢ "tip" paid to the secretario, an

 

"I can't do anything" attitude on the part Of the alcalde,
or the fact that the store iS owned by the sindico or
perhaps his cousin. The reality remains, however, that

many municipalidades do not enforce the tax laws Of the

 

municipio.

 

The fact that there is no single cause Of the
financial squeeze in which municipal governments find
themselves makes the solution to the problem that much
more complex. It is not simply a question, for example,
of ridding the Executive of its authority to control local
excise taxes. Even if it were that simple, all barriers
to rapid progress in terms of development would not dissi-

pate, for not all barriers are financial.

88

Myths and Municipal Officials

 

Since the elected office of alcalde is non-
permanent, usually it is filled by people who must have
other employment.

There is little in terms of employment background
which would seem to prepare alcaldes for the efficient
management of municipal affairs. Furthermore, Since the
educational Opportunities are severely restricted in most
municipios, many alcaldes have fewer than five years of
education. There is little reason to believe that the
backgrounds of the sindicos and councilmen are signifi-
cantly different from those of alcaldes. How are such
people, regardless Of good intentions, to deal with the
sophisticated problems and reSponsibilitieS of municipal

government and develOpment?

TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND OF ALCALDES

 

Type of Work Number Of

 

Mentions
Farmer 46
Businessman 25
Teacher or Professor 3
Bus Driver 2
Other (Mason, Barber, Tailor, etc.) 8

None . 24

 

89

The actual functioning Of municipal government
and the thrust for develOpment is dependent upon the more
professional, better educated employees of the municipal

corporation, particularly the secretario. In many cases,

 

however, municipal corporations must recruit these Offi-

cials from outside the municipio. While most secretarios

 

 

appear to be earnestly concerned with the development of

the municipio in which they labor, this is not always the

 

case, particularly where the secretario is not a native

 

or resident Of the municipio which he serves.

 

That the poor quality of municipal Officials as
a barrier to local development is not a new discovery.
On the (nontrary, it has been a widely made Observation

for more than a decade.100 Nor has the need for better

qualified local Officials gone unnoticed in Guatemala.101
The problem has been recognized, and efforts are being
made, particularly by INAD, to overcome it. But, the

problem of the caliber Of local Officials, both elected

and appointed, is of such dimensions as to require years

and probably decades to resolve.

 

100Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin, The Structure

of Local Government Throughout the World (The Hague:
Martinus Hijhoff, 1961), p. 166; and Merle Fainsod,

"The Structure of Development Administration," in Swerdlo
(ed.), op, oip., p. 8.

101David Jickling, "Needs for Municipal Develop-
ment in Guatemala" (Guatemala: Agency for International
Development, 1968). (Mimeographed.) Also, see the report
of the Panajachel Conference by the Instituto Nacional de
AdministraciOn para el Desarrollo, op. 213'

 

 

CHAPTER IV

THE HYPOTHESES EXAMINED

Local government in Guatemala faces a number Of
problems, conflicts, and restrictions. Within its current
framework, the role Of local government in Guatemalan
develOpment is limited.

People, Local Government, and
Development: The Squeeze

There are many vistas of the development process
which Often depend on one's perspective. Thus, while a
member Of the National Economic Planning Council tends to
think in terms of increased productivity, transportation
flows, and the balance Of payments, the individual in the
countryside is concerned with employment Opportunities, an
acceptable income, and the health Of his family. Alcaldes,
to complicate the picture, measure progress in development
largely in terms of more physical projects such as water
and drainage systems, schools, and access highways. While
these points of view seem to conflict in reality they are
compatible since they seek the same goal: a better use of

the resources available and a better life for the

90

91

pOpulation. Substantial increases in individual produc-
tivity cannot be expected without a Significant improvement
in individual health, and the increased funds gained from
the improvement of both may be used to improve the water
and sewer system serving the people. These, in turn,
could well result in improved health and better produc-
tivity. Thus, no point of view is wrong, at least up tO
the point where it totally excludes considerations Of the
other points Of view.

National development must be a team effort. The
paradox Of the Guatemalan situation is that it will take
a team effort to create the necessary environment to spur
development. In both creation Of the team and its subse-
quent functioning, local government can play an important
role. But local government is not playing this role. Key
problems center on the general dearth of municipal finances,
public apathy which may well be a partial result of this

lack Of financing, and the impossibility of most municipali-

 

ooooo to meet the reSponsibilities placed upon them. The
latter is particularly related to the generally poor qual-
ity of local government officials and the organization and
size Of the central bureaucracy. But, there are other
factors to consider. Included are the relationship between
the national and local levels of government, the relation-
ship between the people and local government, and local

government itself in terms of the development process.

92

Although no universally accepted standard exists
to measure the level of development, direct Observation
and statistics provide adequate evidence of develOpment
progress. The per capita GNP continues to rise, although
at a retarded pace due to the high rate of population
growth; trade and monetary reserves are at an all-time
high; and mortality rates are declining, albeit painfully
slow. Other, more personal, signs Of progress also abound.
Guatemala City, the Sprawling capital, is now dotted with
privately financed high rise apartment and commercial
buildings, and its streets are clogged by imported German
and Japanese automobiles deSpite the heavy import tax. On
the highways, trucks and buses loaded with goods and peOple
on the move force private vehicles to Slow down as they ply
their way<3ver the country's expanding network of roads.
In the countryside, the use of mechanized irrigation pro-
jects, fertilizers, and hybrid seeds and pesticides is
common not only on the large commercial fincas, but also
on many small peasant—owned plots and OOOperativeS. Nearly
all villages now have satisfactory facilities and personnel
to Offer the people at least a rudimentary education, and
an increasing number of persons take advantage of improved
local health services.

Most progress has been the direct or indirect
result Of programsanxipolicies instituted by the central

government. The question, therefore, is not whether or not

93

there has been progress, but, rather, the rate of progress
and the degree to which the masses benefit from it. Also,
it would be useful to know the means whereby, through
local government, the rate of develOpment progress can be
increased and the degree to which the political behavior
Of individuals can be increasingly institutionalized so

as to provide for increased stability of the political
system.

There is an element of distrust between local and
national government. Local government is often looked
upon by national government officials, and with some justi-
fication, as inefficient, inept, and corrupt. The reverse
is also true. Beyond doubt, the central government has
erected substantial barriers to the participation of local
government in the development process. Yet, not all
actions by the central government toward local government
have been negative. While it contains numerous restric-
tions, the 1957 decree establishing the Municipal Code
does form a legal basis for local government and outline
the raison ofoppo of it. A second example of beneficial
central government action toward municipal government
lies in the fact that three key sources of tax revenue,
and a portion Of a fourth, have been Specifically ear-
marked for use by municipal governments. Although the use
Of the funds is restricted by national law, at least it is

largely restricted for the use of municipal improvement

94

projects. In 1964, INAD was the moving force behind the
strengthening Of the Asociacion Nacional de Municipali-
§E§E§.(ANAM)I a nationwide, non-governmental body with
reSponSibilities not only for offering technical advice

and services to the municipalidades Of Guatemala, but also

 

for improving relations between the two levels Of govern-

ment and acting as a voice for the municipio before the

 

central government. In this example of positive govern-
ment action is a situation where the central authorities
created a pressure group to enable local government
Officials to deal more effectively with the central
bureaucracy. The fact remains, however, that the nation's

municipios continue to depend heavily on the central

 

government for development assistance. It is also true
that the general populous is not entirely free Of blame.
The great majority Of Guatemalans make major
demands on their governmental system and yet Oppose the
implementation of adequate taxation policies. There seems
to be a widespread belief that government can meet these
demands without pOpular funding. But surely, Guatemala
is not an anomoly in this regard. Does anyone, any-
where, like tO pay taxes? There is, of course, a strong
argument for the many poor to the effect that they simply
cannot afford tO pay taxes. But are they forced to assume
a major proportion Of the tax burden? While one may pose

some difficult questions in regard to the rate at which

95

the various economic strata of Guatemala pay taxes, a
brief glance at the 1973 national budget reveals some
interesting facts. That budget of $291.8 million included
the following figures: Tax revenue, $206.7 million;
capital revenue (bonds, loans, etc.) $85.1 million. Of
the $206.7 million in tax revenues projected for collection
in 1973, 93.7 percent consisted of taxation on imports,
exports, cigarettes, liquor, beer, and gasoline. Who is
paying these taxes? Who will be taxed to repay the loans,
bonds, and notes? The answer, clearly, is not the poor.
It is the rich and middle class Guatemalans, particularly
those who wish to purchase imported luxury goods, who are
paying. There may be doubt as to the rate at which wealthy
and middle class Guatemalans pay taxes. Perhaps they can
pay more than they currently do. But, there is little
doubt that they are the people funding Guatemalan develOp-
ment, and what little the poor contribute is largely the
result of their purchase of luxury goods.

The inequity of income distribution in Guatemala
is apparent despite the lack of reliable statistics to
prove it. Therefore, the fact that most peOple are poor
and do not contribute significantly to finance the
country's development, is not particularly disturbing.
What is disconcerting is the lack of initiative the

peOple, and especially those of the poor municipios,

 

demonstrate in terms of active participation in community

96

development projects. Villagers are quick to complain
about the Open sewer in the middle Of the street and want
the central government to install a sewer system. But,
what efforts have the villagers made to dig a small trench
and thus confine the sewage? The answer in many cases is
none. Villagers and alcaldes bewail the fact that this
same sewage is polluting their source of drinking water.
Again, they want the central government's attention. In
the meantime, what efforts have villagers and local offi-
cials made to divert the sewage away from the water supply?

The peOple Of a municipio have need for a small road to

 

connect the municipal capital with several nearby aldeas,
but the Minister of Communication and Public Works refuses
to give the project priority. In the meantime, what will
the citizens Of these settlements do? The most common
answer is "2293," PeOple in the village want a recreation
field. Why not clear the grass and bushes from the vacant
land next to the school? The query is not answered.

The urge for participation in community development
at the local level is sadly lacking throughout the country.

In the more than 100 municipios visited during this

 

research, no more than a half-dozen of them had Significant
projects of self-improvement in progress. There is a re-
curring inclination by the people tO leave development
projects to the central government, an inclination which

is probably due, at least in part, to the policies of the

central government which fail to stimulate self-help.

97

The lack Of community spirit and initiative is
reflected in the formation and functioning of local
committees. Although the Municipal Code requires that
five citizen-councilman commitees be formed by each

municipal corporation, only a few municipios have such

 

committees on paper, and still fewer actually have func-

tioning committees. Most municipios do maintain a develop-

 

ment committee charged with helping municipal officials
determine local needs and organize municipal projects. The
frequency with which such committees function effectively,
however, is Open to doubt. Many alcaldes, in answering
inquiries concerning local committees, seemed dismayed
while relating their failure in efforts to stimulate the
formation Of such committees. There Simply was not enough
community interest.

The causes of the lack of citizen participation
in local development are not entirely clear. Surely the

fact that the municipalidad is seldom financially or tech-

 

nically able to Sponsor local projects dampens the spirit
for local participation in such projects. Also, the
central government has not energetically sought to stimu-

late such participation. In some municipios poor Indian-

 

ladino relations are a factor, while differences between
the urban and rural pOpulation appear to be Significant

in others. Furthermore, municipio boundaries are not

 

always functional, and there are instances in which aldeas

98

of one municipio are more closely affiliated with a neigh-

 

boring municipio than with their own. Explanations for

 

the lack of local spirit vary greatly among Guatemalans.

A middle class Opinion contends that Guatemalans in general
are basically lazy. A university student, however, main-
tains that citizens fear the wrath of the military in the
form of reprisals and repression if they establish an
aggressive self-help program.

Local government in Guatemala is sandwiched
between an almost omnipotent central government, and an
increasingly demanding, but largely non-participant, local
population. Until the local citizenry becomes actively
involved in community develOpment on a large scale, the
ability of municipal government to institutionalize polit-
ical behavior and increase the pace Of develOpment will
remain limited. Such widespread participation is not
likely to materialize until it becomes clear that municipal
government can carry out significant local development
schemes. This, in turn, depends upon sizable reforms by
which the central government allows the local governments
to exercise more authority and develop financial stability.

Local pressures for services and develOpment pro-
jects, in conjunction with the generally low public works

budgets of the municipalidades, forces the municipal

 

governments to solicit assistance from the central govern-

ment. Petitions for municipal projects almost invariably

99

are made to INFOM. However, petitions for projects which
are the responsibility of the central government are usually
made directly to the ministry involved, although frequently
such petitions are initially sent to the President.

There is not enough money allotted by the central

government for all of the solicitations of the municipali—

 

BEQE§.t° be satisfied. It becomes essential, therefore,
for all municipalidades to have a means of influencing the
decisions taken on its petitions. It is interesting to
note the reSponses to question 19 Of the interview schedule
which deals with the agents, by role, to whom municipal
Officials resort in efforts to hasten affirmative action
on their solicitations to the central government (Table 2).

These are pressure points or channels whereby alcaldes seek

 

to apply pressure on the central bureaucracy to expedite
the processing Of its petitions.

INFOM clearly dominates as a pressure point,
accounting for 36 percent Of all responses and 56 percent
of all first-choice responses. Also important are the
efforts Of local government officials to pressure the
central government agencies by dealing directly with them.

Alcaldes generally seek to pressure the agency which is

 

the recipient of municipal petitions. Such a process does
not indicate a Significant degree of SOphistication in

terms Of municipal dealings with the central bureaucracy.

100

TABLE 2

PRESSURE POINTS FOR GUATEMALAN ALCALDES

.———..
.—

 

Pressure Times Mentioned Mentioned Mentioned
Point Mentioned First Second Third
INFOM 80 61 16 3
President 37 20 14 3
Proper govern-
ment agency 30 6 13 11
ANAM 21 4 9 8
Governor l7 8 6 3
Deputy 15 6 2 7
A friend in the
government 7 - 3 4
INAD 5 l 3 1
Agency for Inter-
national
Development 4 l 2 l
A party Official 3 l 1 l

 

Total 219 108 69 42

 

101

Analysis Of data gathered through the interview
schedule indicates that there is little political bias
in use Of the President as a pressure point. In 1973,

MLN-PID alcaldes governed in 72 percent of the municipios

 

 

Of Guatemala, and they accounted for 68 percent of the

alcaldes included in the survey. Analysis of data regard-

 

ing pressure points in relation to party affiliation

indicates that MLN-PID alcaldes account for 68 percent Of

 

the total reSponseS in which the President was indicated

0 102 O O I O
as a pressure p01nt. There ex1sts, however, a Signifi-

cant bias in terms of those alcaldes who mentioned the

 

President as their first priority pressure point. Sixteen
of the twenty first-choice responses originating from

MLN-PID alcaldes. Government party alcaldes, therefore,

 

 

turn first to the President for aid more Often than do

Opposition party alcaldes, while Opposition party alcaldes

 

 

appear more inclined to turn to the President as a second

or third alternative in this process. Government party

 

102Due to the fact that nearly every agency of the

central government appears to have at least a small fund
for Sloans, grants, or technical assistance directly to
municipios, efforts to measure the overall flow of cen-
trally controlled funds to them were unsuccessful. Even
with this information, the complexity of accurately identi-
fying the expenditures of funds on projects which benefit
more than one municipio would make the results of any
search for political bias in the flow Of such development
funds Of dubious reliability. There is widespread belief
among alcaldes of Opposition parties that there is indeed
political motivation behind central government priorities
Of local development, a belief for which there is con-
siderable, although not necessarily quantifiable, evidence.
See, for example, "Q2 millones invierten in Chiquimula,"
La Tarde, March 30, 1973, p. 1.

 

 

 

 

102

alcaldes, therefore, have a strong tendency to turn to the
President first as a pressure point or not turn to him
at all.

Not until the fourth most commonly mentioned
pressure point do reSponses move outside the boundaries
Of the central government. ANAM, created to be a voice

for the municipios before the central government, has

 

played that role with increased frequency and effective-

ness, probably because municipalidades are increasingly

 

uniting behind the organization. Responses to inquiries
concerning ANAM were almost in unanimous support of it.

Only two alcaldes indicated that the municipalidad had

 

nothing to do with the organization, and only one alcalde
termed the effects Of it as being negative in terms of
municipal develOpment.

Of equal interest to the most common pressure
points illustrated in Table l are the potential pressure
points which do not appear as key channels Of influence.
Businessmen, local landowners, and church leaders do not
serve this function, nor do party officials, worker organ-
izations, or peasant groups prove Of significance. A high
degree of impersonality in the pressuring process is in
evidence. A person becomes a pressure point not because
of who he is, but what he is.

The most disconcerting element of the pressuring

process, especially concerning political develOpment, are

103

the comparatively insignificant roles that department
governors and deputies to the national Congress perform

to serve local authorities and their constituencies. They
do not act as significant pressure points and channels of
communication. Still worse, most alcaldes who indicated
that they seek to use them doubt that it does any good.
Governors are usually colonels and, as representatives

of the President, are not usually native to the depart-
ments in which they preside. Communication between the

Executive and the municipalidades which takes place through

 

a governor's office is largely concentrated in one direc-
tion, from the Executive down.

Deputies to the Congress are almost universally
considered useless by alcaldes. Most alcaldes who were
directly asked the names of their deputies in Congress did
not know them, and a few alcaldes did not even know how
many representatives their department had in the Congress.
While these facts may reflect badly on the caliber of the
alcaldes, it certainly does little to enhance the image
Of the deputies.

There is no spatially distinct pattern to the
terribly poor image Of Guatemala's deputies among the
alcaldes. Only thirteen alcaldes rated deputies as being
of significant assistance in terms of municipal programs,
while seventy-three Of them indicated that the deputies

were totally ineffective. A majority of the alcaldes in

104

every department consider deputies useless, and all of the

alcaldes in the departments of Izabal, San Marcos, Santa

 

Rosa, Solola, Totonicapan, and Escuintla indicated that
deputies were of no help to them.

It is Obvious that there are pronounced communica-
tion problems between local and national Officials in terms
of municipal development. This bears directly on political
development, for if municipal government is to play a key
role in the institutionalization of political behavior,
it must satisfy local demands from local resources or be
able to Obtain the assistance Of the central government
to meet them. Today, in most cases, the system makes it
almost mandatory for local Officials to turn to the central
government in efforts to satisfy local needs and demands.
Yet, channels Of communication and pressure points are not
only highly concentrated within the central government,
they are highly concentrated among a very few Officials or
agencies of it. Inasmuch as many Of these officials are
not elected by the people, it is quite possible that they
feel no need to answer to them. Thus, the Size of the
central government bureaucracy, its level of efficiency,
and the bureaucrat's chief concern with his own position
remain as formidable problems.

Despite the Size of the bureaucracy and the number
Of agencies involved in Guatemalan develOpment, the

alcaldes Of thirty-nine municipios denoted only a Single

 

105

pressure point through which they sought to expedite
action on their petitions to the central government.103
This is another indication Oftflualack of maturity within
the political system.

Not surprisingly, the alcaldes of small, Indian

municipios, who probably need the most pressure points,

 

have the fewest. Thirty-one of the thirty-nine municipios

 

with only one pressure point are Category III or Category

IV municipios (Table 3). DeSpite the fact that slightly

 

more than half Of Guatemala's municipios have a ladino

 

population majority, Indian municipios account for twenty-

 

Six Of the thirty-nine municipios with only one pressure

 

point. Finally, of the thirty-nine municipios with only

 

one pressure point, twenty-four depended on INFOM as that

point, two-thirds of them Indian municipios.

 

TABLE 3

MUNICIPIOS WITH ONLY ONE PRESSURE POINT

 

 

 

 

 

 

Majority Category
Population Total
I II III IV
Indian 1 6 7 12 26
Ladino l - 6 6 13
Total 2 6 13 18 39
103

Instituto Nacional de Administracién para el
Desarrollo, Guia de las Instituciones de Desarrollo,
Guatemala, 1971. This guide lists 148 private and public
agencies involved in Guatemalan development.

 

106

Of equal importance, only 40 percent of the municipios

 

have three or more pressure points. Clearly, municipal
government, forced to interact with the central government,
is largely unable to COpe effectively with it.

While both the central government in general and
INFOM in particular establish a list of priorities for
municipal develOpment, neither limits its participation in

municipal development of these priorities.104

Both pride
themselves on efforts to consider the priorities Of each
municipio individually. President Arana, in 1973, ful-
filled a campaign promise to personally visit each
municipio to talk with local Officials about their devel-
Opment needs.105 Unfortunately, efforts to consider local
develOpment priorities by listening to local officials
does not aid the process of effective development planning.

Such efforts assume that local Officials have priorities,

or at least have the ability to determine them. Also,

 

104The Arana government, while Sponsoring a
variety Of municipal projects, has been primarily con-
cerned with the provision of improved health facilities
and services in the municipios. For 1973, the Board Of
Directors of INFOM designated the construction Of markets
as the tOp priority in granting loans to municipios.

 

 

105The alcalde Of one municipio who is a member
Of the government party was terribly affronted when the
President, upon arriving in the municipio for his much
proclaimed visit, passed the first two’hours at the estate
Of a finquero patronizing local landowners. Only after
this did the President venture into town to meet with
local Officials and Speak before the townspeople.

 

 

 

107

there is the assumption that even if an accurate list of
priorities is determined by local and/or national govern-
ment Officials it will be adhered to. It is an error, how-
ever, to pursue development on the basis that these two
assumptions can be taken as fact.

More than 100 conversations with various municipal
Officials have led the author to conclude that most Often
they have neither priorities nor a concept Of priorities.
Even if they did entertain such a concept, political exped-
iency or the personal drive to accomplish something for the

municipio would work against adhering to a list of develOp-

 

ment priorities as a guide to development. Two examples

illustrate the problem. Both the alcalde and secretario

 

of a municipio in eastern Guatemala agree unequivocally

 

that the primary need Of the town is an expansion of the
water system. Studies have estimated the cost Of such a
project at approximately $12,000. The total budget of the

municipio, however, was less than $5,000, and efforts to

 

procure a loan from INFOM or the assistance of the Director
General of Public Works have proved fruitless. Thus, the
citizenscmfthe town appear doomed to a continuation of the
existing water policy under which the east side Of the town
has water on even-numbered days and the west side of town
receives water on Odd-numbered days. Particularly in view
of the crucial character of this service, it would seem

that a local austerity program to conserve capital funds

108

should be combined with repeated efforts to gain central
government assistance that would enable the town to expand
the water system. But such a policy has not been estab-
lished. Rather, when INFOM refused to grant a loan for

the water project,the municipalidad decided to seek the

 

construction of a new town hall. The cost of this project
was set at $7,000 and a request to INFOM for a loan in

that amount was approved. Consequently, the municipio

 

went further in debt, and committed a substantial propor-
tion of its capital funds for the next twenty years to a
project which was of secondary importance to the community.

A municipio in San Marcos Obtained an INFOM loan

 

in the amount of $27,000 for the construction Of a new
six-room school and library. Yet, only two years prior to

this the municipglidad had expended $3,000 to refurbish

 

the existing five-room school, which is sound and appears
to be well maintained. A brief examination of the school
and the surrounding area made it clear that all that is
really needed is approximately $3,000 for the addition Of
two rooms to the existing school. The land for such an
expansion is available and owned by the municipal corpora-
tion. After these facts were discussed, the alcalde and

secretario were asked why, if a $3,000 expansion was all

 

that is really needed, has the municipal corporation assumed
a $27,000 debt for a new school. Their answer was Simple:

they want a new school and do not want to use the old one.

109

The fact that the Old school is perfectly usable seemed
to be irrelevant.

Municipal Officials cannot be relied upon to
accurately determine and carry out a system of develop-
ment priorities. This is related to the caliber Of local
officials. Also Significant is the fact that popularly
elected Officials, while legally prohibited from serving
successive terms of Office, Often settle for a second or
third best project in terms of priorities so as to have a
material accomplishment to Offer as evidence Of effective-
ness Should they seek reelection to public office at a
later date. For some less selfish Officials, it is not
merely a political question. Some genuinely seek to

accomplish something for the municipio during their tenure

 

Of Office, and the fact that this is politically wise is
only of secondary importance to them. Such Officials seek
to fund projects which they think can be accomplished,
rather than projects which are urgently needed. Thus, the

alcalde of one municipio who admitted that the most urgent

 

need Of the community was a better access road, also ad-
mitted that the municipal corporation had not sought such
a project because they did not believe they would receive
a favorable response from the central government. They
had, therefore, settled for a small fountain near the town

hall and construction of a plaza with a basketball court.

110

INFOM does not effectively enforce a priority

system for develOpment at the municipio level. Inasmuch

 

as INFOM performs a strategic role in municipal development,
and eSpecially since it virtually controls the capital

budgets of most municipalidades, such a shortcoming is

 

expensive in both time and money. A few moments Of an

INFOM Official's time at the school Site in a municipio in

 

San Marcos would have made it Obvious that expansion of
the existing school facilities, and not the construction
Of a new school, was in order. This could have saved the

municipio $24,000 and left that amount uncommitted in INFOM

 

coffers to finance other municipal projects. Perhaps
personal attention is too much to eXpect from a central
government agency, but the fact remains that even in INFOM
Officials sought personal involvement in municipal pro-
jects, their manpower resources would probably be inade-
quate to effectively implement such a policy. The end
result, of course, is waste and a Slow-down of the

develOpment process.

Local Government: Potential

 

Although the current role of local government in
institutionalizing behavior and spurring local development
is not significant, the future is not a total loss. The
basic mechanism whereby local government can play a more

strategic role in the future development prOgram exists.

111

The problem is that the present mechanism does not function
properly. What is sadly lacking are effective pressure

groups for individuals and municipios, such as worker

 

organizations, peasant groups, and viable political parties.
In the case of political parties, they are neither capable
of coming to grips witthhe bureaucracy nor serve as effec-
tive channels Of communication or pressure points for local
authorities. Still, the basic structure appears to be

sound and could prove effective if it functioned prOperly.
The lack of capital funds controlled by municipal officials

in all but a few municipios, forces these officials to

 

turn to the central government in efforts to meet municipal
and pOpular needs. Although the council makes the'deci-
sions as to the particular projects to be solicited, in
most cases the alcalde has the responsibility to make the
solicitations. Thus, communication within the first three
tiers of political involvement is quite clear and Simple
(Figure 4). To the point where they exit from the alcalde's
office, communication flows are especially well defined,
but then the picture blurs. Because Of the lack of author-
ity and/or effectiveness Of regional (Tier IV) elements,
they are usually bypassed both as channels of solicitation
and as pressure points. This forces alcaldes into direct
contact with the bureaucracy Of the central government
(Tier V). Alcaldes, however, are not commonly knowledge-

able Or influential enough to deal with this bureaucracy,

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113

particularly since no central "clearing house" exists
within the central government to deal with municipal needs.
Also important in this regard is the dearth of pressure
points. The only major non-government pressure point and
channel of communication between local and national author-
ities is ANAM. Consequently, local municipal leaders are
largely confined to pressuring the decision-makers by
working within the agencies these decision-makers govern.
There is little Opportunity for recourse outside Of the
system. This in itself would not necessarily be disastrous
if there were a definite process within the central govern-
ment whereby municipal solicitations are processed, but no
such system exists. Thus, for example, an alcalde who

seeks improved health facilities for his municipio could

 

find himself trying to deal with any or all of the follow-
ing: the President, the Agency for Community Development
Of the Presidency, INFOM, the Minister of Public Health
and Social Assistance, the Civic Action Corps Of the Army,
the Guatemalan Rehabilitation Association, the Minister of
Communications and Public Works, the National Bank, the
regional Office of the World Health Organization in Guate-
mala City, the Minister of Public Finances, the Agency for
International Development, the regional Office Of the Pan
American Health Organization, or any of a number Of
missionary groups. He also might be actively seeking the

assistance of ANAM as a pressure point.

114

Most alcaldes are probably not aware Of some of

 

the organizations potentially useful to them, and few Of
them have the eXpertise to deal with the agencies directly
or know the necessary pressure points to which they can
turn for assistance. This fact, combined with the lack
of coordination between agencies dealing with municipal
develOpment, and the fact that no agency has the responsi-
bility for such coordination, results in a Slow response,
if any, to municipal petitions for help. Municipal govern-
ment Officials, therefore, become frustrated. The local
populace,seeing its local government as ineffective, be-
comes increasingly less willing to support that government
with its energies and tax dollars, even if it can afford
to do SO.

During interviews each alcalde was asked how, in
his Opinion, relations between the local government and
the central government could be improved. Although almost

every municipalidad experiences financial problems, this

 

is not considered the most urgent need in order to improve
relations between the two levels of government (Table 4).

There is a widely held belief among alcaldes that if

 

central government Officials would visit their municipios

 

to discuss local develOpment problems, these problems would
receive more immediate attention and be more quickly over-
come. Also, Of considerable interest are recommendations

that the central government create either one central

115

TABLE 4

ALCALDE OPINIONS ON MEANS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS

WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

Times
Item Mentioned

1. There Should be more direct contact

between local and central government

officials, particularly more visits

by central government Officials to

the municipio. 40
2. The central government should reSpond

more promptly to solicitations Of the

municipalidad. 23
3. The central government should allot more

money for municipal finances. l4
4. Central government authorities should

demonstrate more interest in municipal

affairs and development. 13
5. ANAM Should be strengthened. 6
6. The central government should create one

central agency, or regional agencies, to

process solicitations from all municipios. 3
7. Other 7
8. NO reSponse 2

Total 108

 

116

agency to deal with all municipio petitions, or a series

 

Of regional agencies to process them. Alcaldes do not
feel that the decision-makers Of the central government
understand their problems. They seem to believe that if
this barrier can be overcome, preferably through more fre-

quent visits to the municipios by these decision-makers,

 

all other problems will likewise be overcome. They may
be correct. It is Obvious that one or both of the follow-

ing should take place:

1. Municipal governments should have more capital
funds placed at their disposal, even though such
monies Should be supervised by INFOM or some
Similar agency of the central government; or

2. An effective means to increase contact between
local and national Officials and bring a more
prompt response to local petitions should be
created. At the very minimum, some agency should
be held responsible for: a) evaluating all
petitions presented to the central government by
local governments; b) comparing these petitions
with local, regional, and national development
priorities; and 3) determining what agency or
agencies will meet each solicitation and when.

If such positive action is not taken, the reasons
for the rejection of the petition should be
clearly explained to the prOper municipal
Officials to avoid the presentation of non-
priority solicitations in the future. ANAM is
now partially fulfilling this role, but it

lacks the personnel, money, or authority to do

SO effectively.

A combination of elements Offers the best solution
to upgrade the role of municipal government in the de-
velOpment process and thereby increase its potential for

institutionalizing political behavior in the future.

117

Serious doubt remains as to how well local Officials in

many municipios could efficiently manage substantial sums

 

of capital funds intended for municipal development. To
have a central government agency oversee the use of these
funds would reduce the risk Of their being poorly Spent,
increase the pace of municipal develOpment, and avoid the
flood of petitions for loans and assistance which now
swamp the central government agencies. AS an essential
element, such an agency Should have a definite idea of

the develOpment needs of each municipio and region of the

 

country, and these needs would require examination in

relation to national development goals and priorities.

The Image

 

Despite the problems alcaldes face in their efforts
to deal with the central bureaucracy and the frustrations
many Of them experience, the overall image of the central
government possessed by alcaldes is reasonably good.

The image variable involved in this research con-
sists of two components, 1) an effectiveness value as
measured by responses to question 20a of the interview
schedule, and 2) a feeling of discrimination value which

was measured by question 20b. Although municipios with

 

a majority Indian population account for 45 percent Of

the sample and 48 percent of the municipios in which the

 

central government has a good image Of effectiveness,

there does not appear to be a substantial overall cultural

118

dichotomy in this regard (Table 5). Closer analysis,
however, reveals that while exactly one-half of the

alcaldes of Category I and II ladino municipios possessed

 

a good image of central government effectiveness, 60

percent of the alcaldes of Indian municipios in these

 

categories maintain a positive effectiveness image. Signi-

ficant differences among the municipios by population

 

category also appear in a general analysis of data relating
to the image Of effectiveness. Forty-three percent of all
alcaldes gave the central government a good evaluation in
terms Of effectiveness. However, this figure varies con-

siderably among the four categories of municipios. Thus,

 

alcaldes Of Category I and II have a substantially better
image of central government effectiveness than do alcaldes
Of Category III and IV. Although Category III and IV

municipios account for 62 percent of the sample, their

 

alcaldes account for 68.8 percent of the municipios in

 

 

which the central government has a poor image of effective-
ness. The central government, therefore, has the best
image of effectiveness in the most populous Indian munici-

pios and its poorest image in ladino municipios which are

 

small in pOpulation.

The patterns determined in analyzing feelings of
discrimination Offer some variation from that Of the image
Of effectiveness. The central government's image of

treating all municipios equally is somewhat better. This

 

119

TABLE 5

IMAGES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN
RESOLVING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
(BY CATEGORY AND ETHNIC POPULATION)

 

Interview Responses

 

 

 

Category Concerning Image
. . Total
Majority
Population Poor Fair Good
I. Department Capitals
Indian — 1 - -
Ladino 3 - 4 7
11. Pop. >10,000 and
Ports
Indian 3 3 10 16
Ladino 5 4 8 17
III. Pop. 5-10,000
Indian 2 4 4 10
Ladino ll 3 7 21
IV. Pop. <5,000
Indian 4 9 8 21
Ladino 7 3 5 15
Total 35 27 46 108

(32%) (25%) (43%)

 

120

is due to the fact that some alcaldes who feel that the
central government has not been effective locally, do not
feel that this is due to discrimination. Rather, they

feel that the central government is doing a generally poor
job of dealing with municipal needs throughout the

country (Table 6). Thus, 51 percent of the alcaldes inter-

viewed felt that their municipio was receiving as much

 

central government attention as any Of the other 323

municipios.

 

It is among the alcaldes of the department capitals
that the image Of discrimination is most negative. Many
of them feel that the central government is Simply not
sufficiently concerned with their develOpment problems.
This feeling does not reflect solely political differences.
There appears to be a general feeling among these alcaldes
that their problems are larger in SOOpe, and Of greater

urgency, than are those of smaller municipios, and that

 

the central government is not giving them the attention
needed to resolve these problems. Additionally, alcaldes
Of department capitals complain that the priorities Of the
central government do not reflect the real needs of their
communities or departments. The alcalde of one department
capital was irate because the regional hospital contains
only seventy-eight beds to serve a half-million peOple.
His efforts to procure central government action to expand

these facilities have come to naught because he was told by

121

TABLE 6

IMAGE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION
IN RESOLVING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

 

Interview ReSponses

 

 

 

Category Concerning Image
Majority Total
Population Poor Fair Good

I. Department Capitals
Indian - 1 - 1
Ladino 2 3 2 7
II. POp. >10,000 and
Ports
Indian 4 1 ll 16
Ladino 5 3 9 17

III. POp. 5-10,000
Indian 4 3 3 10
Ladino 6 3 12 21

IV. Pop. <5,000
Indian 7 2 12 21
Ladino 5 4 6 15
Total 33 20 55 108

(30%) (19%) (51%)

 

122

central government authorities that the necessary funds
were not available. Yet, he pointed out, funds were
available for the construction of a new national theatre

in his municipio. He then bitterly asked, "What good is

 

a new theatre when so few of the people live long enough
to enjoy it?" In another instance, the alcalde of a
department capital related how his numerous efforts to
gain central government funding for an irrigation project
had been systematically rebuffed. Each time he raised the
issue he was told that no money existed for such a project
because capital investment in the area was being concen-
trated in a program to reforest badly overcut hills of the
local basin. Vociferously he asked: "Look! Look! Where
are the trees?" There were none in evidence. This situa-
tion may be one in which long-term central government
action conflicts with more immediate local needs. The
fact remains, however, that the alcalde saw no action taken
to satisfy his priorities nor those of central government
Officials. Such a situation Obviously influences strongly
his image Of the central government.

Category II alcaldes maintain the best image of

central government fairness in dealing with the municipios

 

Of the country. Within this group, however, alcaldes of

Indian municipios maintain a considerably better image of

 

the central government's attention than do alcaldes of

ladino municipios. The same basic pattern appears among

 

123

alcaldes of Category IV municipios. In Category III

 

municipios, however, the pattern is substantially differ-

 

ent. Within this group a pronounced dichotomy exists

between alcaldes of ladino municipios, who possess a posi-

 

 

tive image of the central government fairness, and those

of Indian municipios. The cause Of the shift in patterns

 

between Category II, III, and IV municipios is not clear.

 

Efforts to relate it to such considerations as the forms
and frequency of communication, distance from Guatemala
City, and feelings Of political efficacy have proven
fruitless. There does appear to be some relationship
between the low image of discrimination Of the central

government among alcaldes of Category III Indian municipios

 

 

and their party affiliation. However, in view of the

generally low level of party identification among alcaldes

 

in Guatemala, it seems unlikely that this is the sole
factor influencing the low image Of the central government,

in terms of discrimination, among alcaldes Of Category III

 

municipios with an Indian population majority.

 

A combination of the effectiveness and discrimina-
tion elements provides a general image of the central
government (Table 7). The image is reasonably satisfactory
in each category holding a positive image. The central

government's image is best among Category II municipios,

 

with eighteen of the thirty-three alcaldes maintaining a

 

124

TABLE 7

IMAGE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

 

 

Category Interview Responses
Concerning Image
Majority Total
Population Poor Fair Good

 

I. Department Capitals

 

Indian - l - 1
Ladino 2 2 3 7
II. Pop. >10,000 and
Ports
Indian 2 5 9 16
Ladino 4 4 9 17
III. POp. 5-10,000
Indian 2 5 3 10
Ladino 4 5 12 21
IV. Pop. <5,000
Indian 4 6 11 21
Ladino 6 4 5 15
Total 24 32 52 108

(22%) (30%) (48%)

 

125

favorable image. Only in Category II municipios do a

 

majority of the alcaldes maintain such a positive image.
Just as substantial variations in the image pat-

tern are lacking among categories of municipios, so tOO

 

are they lacking in the overall ethnic pattern. Alcaldes

Of Indian municipios, which account for 45 percent Of the

 

survey, compose 44.4 percent Of the total number Of
alcaldes with a favorable image of the central government.
In analyzing category and ethnic elements jointly, however,
a distinct dichotomy emerges. This concerns Category III

and IV municipios. In the former, alcaldes of ladino

 

municipios possess a considerably better image of the

 

central government than do alcaldes Of Indian municipios.

 

Among Category IV municipios this pattern is reversed,

 

with alcaldes of Indian municipios maintaining a decidedly

 

more positive image of the central government than do

alcaldes Of ladino municipios. Although the reason for

 

this shift in patterns Of the image is not clear, itmay
well be directly related to a bureau Of the Presidency,
the Agency for Community Development. This agency is
particularly concerned with the development Of small Indian
communities, and its diverse program allows it to aid such
settlements in everything from the establishment of OOOpera-
tives for the marketing Of native crafts to the construc-
tion of schools and sewage systems.

Although a pronounced spatial pattern is not

discernible, it is obvious that the image of the central

126

government is poorest in the eastern portions of the
country, except for the Department of Chiquimula, and in
the highlands of western Guatemala (Figure 5). None of

the alcaldes interviewed in the Departments of Izabal, E1
Progreso, or Sacate-péquez have a favorable image of the
central government, and in the Departments Of Guatemala,
Jutiapa, Chimaltenango, 801015, and Tononicapan such
evaluations are in a decided minority. Adams has Observed,
in the case of Jutiapa, that the department has received

106 While

little attention from the central government.
the basis for this statement is not indicated, it is clear
that the central government has a rather negative image
among alcaldes of the department.

The image Of the central government is most

favorable among municipios of the Pacific coastal plain

 

and the Department of Quiche. Indeed, Quiché was the only
department in which all alcaldes interviewed held a favor-
able image Of the central government. Several factors may
influence this positive attitude. First, all of the
alcaldes in Quiche had a moderately strong feeling of
political efficacy, i.e., ability to influence central
government decision-makers. All of them rated the accessi-
bility of such officials as good. In addition, alcaldes

in this department universally maintain a moderate level of

 

106Adams, Crucifixion by Power, op, cit., p. 221.

 

127

 

 

GUATEMALA

TIE IMAGE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .

 

 

 

 

‘
I
’ea..-.

 

 

- oooo
- nut

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I:) nor mcwoco m sunvn

    

Q on a; Q 9:- a...”

 

 

FIG 5

 

128

expectation. All expect life to improve in their municipio,

 

but none of them expect miracles. Finally, although the
reason for this high regard of the central government is
not entirely understood, in Quiche more than in any other
department, alcaldes appear to view develOpment progress
in more than physical terms. The only material improve-
ment mentioned more than once by the five alcaldes inter-
viewed concerned an improved road network, a project which
the central government currently has in progress. More
commonly mentioned were such needs as agricultural tech-
nical assistance, sources Of employment, and the need to
form organizations tO join Indian and ladino elements in

the community in a joint effort to develop the municipio.

 

Most of the people contacted in El Petén have a

poor image of FYDEP. Here, two of the three alcaldes

 

interviewed in the department possess a poor image of the
central government, and none of them have used FYDEP as a
pressure point despite the fact that the agency has an

office in Flores, the department capital. Only one of the

three alcaldes could mention three pressure points. E1

 

Petén alcaldes are not Optimistic with regard to the

 

development Of their municipios and do not feel that the

 

central government is responsive to their needs. In one

municipio, for example, a diesel generator was installed,

 

and poles and wires placed throughout the small municipio

 

capital to distribute the electricity it produced. The

129

system was three years old at the time of interviews and
had been out of service for four months because of the

need for repairs. The municipio, with a total budget of

 

slightly more than $5,000, was hard pressed to meet anti-

cipated expenses. Thus, the municipalidad requested Offi-

 

cials Of FYDEP to send someone to the municipio to repair

 

the generator. FYDEP authorities, however, viewed this
as a municipal responsibility and thus refused to pay for

the repairs. With the municipalidad and DYDEP thus locked

 

in dispute as to who would pay the expenses, the community
was totally without electricity. The capital invested in
the generator, as well as the poles and lines, was lying
unproductive. Quite obviously, this Situation colored the
image of the central government in the eyes Of the alcalde
and other municipal Officials, particularly since FYDEP

is the chief representative of the central government in

the department.

The Image: A Search for Explanations

 

In an effort to determine the factors which affect

the image alcaldes have Of the central government, data on

 

feelings of political efficacy, the frequency Of communica-
tion between local and national government authorities, the
feeling Of development progress during the past five years,
and Optimism for prOgress in the next five years, were

analyzed. Also considered in this attempt to construct a

130

viable model to explain the image were variables consisting

Of travel time between the municipios and Guatemala City,

 

the Size Of a community as measured by its category, and
the political affiliation of the alcalde interviewed.

After verifying the normality of the distribution
of data by employing the Kolmororov-Smirnov test, a step-
wise multiple regression analysis was performed (Table 8).
Most Of the seven variables initially hypothesized as key
factors in explaining the image of the central government
are not significant. These seven factors explain less
than 32 percent of the variation. The progress and Opti-
mism variables explain only 5 percent and 3 percent of the
variation, respectively, while political efficacy is the
Single most important variable, explaining 23 percent of
the variation of the image.

Four variables prove to be of no significance in
explaining the image alcaldes hold of the central govern-
ment. They are, 1) political affiliation, 2) population
category, 3) communication, and 4) distance from the
capital city. The failure Of political affiliation to
prove a key variable is not surprising since political
parties are not pressure groups and are only loosely knit
political entities. Also important is the low level of
party identification which prevails in Guatemalan politics.

Nor does the population size Of a municipio prove to be of

 

significance. The fact that many alcaldes Of small

131

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mdeH HEB mom XHmfidz ZOHB¢AWMMOU

132

municipios consider themselves "Olvidados" (forgotten) by

 

 

central authorities is apparently Offset by the fact that

many alcaldes of more populous municipios do not believe

 

they receive attention commensurate with the scale of
population and problems of development. Obviously,

therefore, the category to which a municipio belongs does

 

not influence the image the alcalde maintains of the cen-
tral government.

The inconsequential value Of the travel time and
communication variables as elements affecting the image
is more bewildering. A distance decay factor does not
appear to be associated with the number Of times alcaldes
meet with Officials Of the central government in Guatemala
City nor the number of times such Officials visit the

municipios. Neither is there distance decay in the fre-

 

quency of communication between the two levels of govern-
ment as measured by telephone conversations or telegrams.
Even if the communication variable is divided into direct
communication and indirect communication, the correlations
between them and the image are not significant, .031 and
.059 respectively. The low coefficients Of correlation
between the image and communication indicate that the
original hypothesis, namely that the image of the central
government improves as communication between the two levels
Of government increases, should be rejected. Indeed, there

appears to be no relationship between the frequency of

133

communication and the image alcaldes hold of the central

government. It may be that with some alcaldes increasing

 

communication with central government authorities increases
their frustration because their rising expectations are

not met. The key, therefore, may be the difference between
the frequency of communication and the frequency of effec-
tive communication, i.e., the frequency with which commu-
nication stimulated by the local government leads to
affirmative action by the central government in the
municipio. If less than one-third Of the variation in the
image Of the central government is explained by the seven
variables selected, what are some other factors, pre-
viously unconsidered, which may affect the image alcaldes
possess? One is prosperity. There is little doubt that
recent cotton, cattle, and coffee expansion on the Pacific
coastal plain and the piedmont area of southern Guatemala
have resulted in a period of prosperity. This is eSpecially
true in the Departments of Escuintla, Suchitepéquez, and
Retalhuleu. Grand fincas largely dedicated to the produc-
tion of cotton and cattle now dominate the Pacific coastal
area. The expansion of cotton cultivation has been
meteoric, the area dedicated to it increasing from 64,000
acres in 1960 to 173,000 acres in 1971. Production of
cotton over the same period rose from 95,000 bales to
350,000 bales, 90 percent of which was exported. Exports

of red meat have also risen sharply, from 3.4 million

134

pounds in 1961 to 50.7 million pounds in 1971.107 It seems

likely that the prOSperity resulting from this economic
growth has some effect on the image local Officials hold
of the central government.

A second factor that may support a favorable image
of the central government among alcaldes is the flow of
funds from the central government to the individual

municipios. Chiquimula, for example, received a substan-

 

tial input of central government funds and technical
assistance during the Arana administration. Party affil-

iation may play some part, since all alcaldes Of the de-

 

partment are members of the MLN-PID coalition, but the
fact that this is the region where President Arana made
his fame fighting guerrillas may not be incidental. The
disprOportionate share Of central government funds flowing
to the Department of Chiquimula has been noted in Guate-
mala's newspapers.108 Included is a large-scale plan for

the development of the department and its capital.109

 

107Foreign Agricultural Service, United States

Department Of Agriculture, "World Agricultural Production

and Trade: Statistical Report" (Washington, 1973), pp. 4

and 6; and Foreign Agricultural Service, "Central America

Aims at Increased Cotton Production," Foreign Agricultural
Circular NO. FC 14-72 (June, 1972), p. 6.

108“02 millones invierten en Chiquimula," op. cit.

109DirecciOn General de Obras Pfiblicas, De arta-
mento de Chiquimula: Plan de Desarrollo, 1970-1976
(Guatemala, 1972).

135

The ambitions of the alcaldes, both personal and

for their municipios, may also be factors affecting the

 

image pattern. If the alcalde has neither of these types
Of ambition, he is easier to please and consequently may
have a better image of the central government than an

alcalde who holds great concern that his municipio may

 

remain undevelOped. The alcalde of a small municipio in

 

central Guatemala, for example, possesses a very positive

image of central government responsiveness to local needs,
despite the fact that no progress has been made toward the
construction of a badly needed irrigation project which he
considers top priority. The alcalde had not promoted the

project, however, since he believes the cost would result

in rejection by the central government. Instead, the

municipalidad has settled for a petition which requests

 

a new diSpensary for the town. Thus, with the new health
facility set for inauguration at the time of the inter-
view, the alcalde held that the central government was
very responsive to local develOpment needs.

The young alcalde of a municipio in eastern

 

Guatemala does not hold a positive view of the central
government. Having recently been presented with a report

outlining plans for the development Of his municipio, one

 

would expect that he would have such an image. On the
contrary, the presentation Of plans to the alcalde merely
whetted his appetite for action, and he became thoroughly

irked when he discovered that the funds to implement the

136

plans of the central government would not be provided in
the forthcoming national budget.

Considerations such as ambition are difficult, if
not impossible, to measure precisely. The limited Signi-
ficance of the hypothesized factors in explaining the
image alcaldes possess concerning the central government,
with the noteworthy exception of political efficacy,
raises some pertinent questions for future research. How,
for example, can the effectiveness Of communication be
measured? What instrument can measure the ambition an
Official has for himself and his community? How can the

current degree Of prosperity in a municipio be determined?

 

These questions cannot be answered at this point, for they
demand considerable thought and field testing. Questions
such as these must be adequately answered, however, before

future research along these lines can be successful.

The Search for Lag

 

The third Objective of this research is to identify
development lag, both rural and cultural. On the assump-
tion that lag would be reflected in development priorities,
each alcalde interviewed was asked to list the three most

urgent needs of his municipio, bearing in mind that the

 

basic goal of development is to improve life for the peOple.
Three Observations regarding alcaldes and their
priorities warrant consideration. First, there is a

decided tendency for alcaldes to view development in

137

material terms. All of the items listed in Table 9 are
basically material goods or services except for the five
alcaldes who mentioned the need for technical agricultural
assistance and the two who noted the need for more jobs.
Included among "other“ priorities mentioned are the Opin-
ions of an alcalde who viewed price stability as a key to

improving life in his municipio, another alcalde who

 

urgently seeks the means whereby he can bring Indian and
ladino factions in his community together, and a third
alcalde who spoke of land reform as pivotal to the develOp-

ment of his municipio. With these exceptions, however,

 

alcaldes want physical goods or services. Their demands
upon the central government are for goods and services,
Opportunities for self improvement. Second, alcaldes Of

seven municipios were unable to mention three needs Of

 

their municipios. In part, this is probably due to the

 

inclination Of alcaldes to think Of develOpment in largely
physical terms. Some alcaldes also tend to think in terms
Of monuments to themselves, i.e., accomplishments which
clearly reflect the success of their administration, at
least as measured in aesthetically acceptable material
goods. Finally, many alcaldes, lacking in both educational
and travel Opportunities, do not have a concept of prior-
ities. They usually have an idea of what would be desirabha

to have in the municipio, but a concept Of priorities does

 

not always enter into this. Such a Situation is reflective

138

TABLE 9

ALCALDE VIEWS OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

 

 

 

Item First Second Third Total
Priority Priority Priority
Potable water 33 10 7 50
Sewerage system 23 16 9 48
Access road 8 15 14 37
Local roads 5 l6 8 29
Educational facilities 6 10 12 28
Health facilities 6 10 12 28
Market 5 10 6 21
Electricity 6 6 9 21
Slaughter house 2 2 5 9
Town hall 3 3 2 8
Communications - - 6 6
Technical agricultural
assistance 4 l - 5
Social salon l 1 2 4
Plaza - - 3 3
Irrigation system 2 - 1 3
Sources of work 1 l - 2
Other 5 6 4 14
Total 108 108 101 317

139

of the need to better train local officials and oversee
their actions.

On the basis of priorities related by the alcaldes,
is there a definite pattern of cultural or rural lag? To
answer this question priorities were standardized by using
factor analysis, and the resulting factor scores were
employed in performing a Hierarchical Grouping analysis.
This program groups observations on the basis of within-
group variance, i.e., the variation from the mean for a
given group of observations is minimized. If cultural lag

exists, the placement of municipios in two groups on the

 

basis of development priorities should result in one group

being composed largely of Indian municipios and the second

 

group largely of ladino municipios. Similarly, rural lag

 

should be reflected in most of the urban municipios forming

 

one group and rural municipios combining in a second group.

 

The results of the grouping leave little doubt. Clearly

the municipios do not group, either by urban/rural

 

standards (rows) or by cultural groups (columns), inasmuch

as forty-eight of the survey municipios have predominantly

 

Indian populations and fifteen have a predominantly urban
population. Furthermore, efforts to designate cultural or
rural groups by altering the definitions of these groups
have proved equally fruitless. For example, if urban

municipios are defined as those having a minimum urban

 

population of 25 percent, eighteen of the forty-one

140

municipios which meet this definition fall into Group I

 

and twenty-five fall into Group II. In searching for

cultural lag, even considering only the thirty municipios

 

which are more than 80 percent Indian, fourteen fall into
Group I and the remaining sixteen in Group II. Further-
more, the department capitals do not group together, four

being in Group I and four in Group II.

TABLE 10

RESULTS OF HIERARCHICAL GROUPING*

 

Majority Population

 

 

Majority
Population
Indian Ladino
Urban A: l A: 6
B: 4 B: 4
Rural A: 18 A: 23
B: 25 B: 27

 

*A equals Group I. Total observations: 48.

B equals Group II. Total observations: 60.

There is no mistake. The priorities of municipal
development as viewed by the alcaldes do not reflect any
cultural or rural dichotomy. Additionally, there are no
Spatial groupings (Figure 6).

Something is badly amiss. Either rural and
cultural lag do not exist in Guatemala, or an inadequate
methodology was employed to measure them. Yet, direct

observation of life in the countryside and cities of

141

 

 

GUATEMALA

HERARCHICAL GROUPS BASED W MVELOPMENT
PRIORITIES

 

 

   

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I,..-- v
. .

       

.........

 

 

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-ml

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FIG 0

142

Guatemala reveals a definite rural lag, and that cultural
lag, while possibly less apparent, is also present.

The problem with this unsuccessful search for
signs of lag must lie in the methodology. There are two
basic weaknesses in the use of priorities as evidence of
lag. First, such a methodology assumes that the inter-
viewees have priorities. This does not appear to be a

valid assumption. Many alcaldes show little indication

 

that they possess even a concept of priorities. Second,
while life in the cities is generally better than life in
rural areas, due to the immediate availability of more

services and job opportunities, all municipios of Guate-

 

mala suffer to some extent from the lack of basic services.
Guatemala City and Huehuetenango, for example, have

inadequate water systems and supplies, just as do Fraijanes
and Santiago Chimaltenango. It is an error, therefore, to

assume that the alcaldes will have different priorities

 

simply because two of the municipios are largely urban and
110

 

two are largely rural.
The question remains as to how development lag can

be measured. Perhaps priorities can be used, but the

opinions of more technically capable people, and the scale

of the needs, should be considered. But who, if not the

 

110The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, op.
cit., estimated that only 50 percent of the urban popula-
EIBn of Latin American countries would have potable water
at their disposal by 1970, p. 129.

 

143

alcalde, can best interpret local needs and priorities,
and is scale to be determined? Is an adequate supply of
potable water less important to the citizens of Fraijanes
than to the citizens of Guatemala City?

It is apparent that the use of develOpment prior-
ities as instruments to measure lag is fraught with
dangers. As an alternative, perhaps an inventory of the

services available in the municipios could be used to

 

determine degrees of lag. But, this inevitably leads to
the need to evaluate these services. How does one weight

the difference between a health center in municipio "A,"

 

which has an adequate supply of medicine, and the health

services of municipio "B," which has an inadequate supply

 

of medicine? What is an adequate supply of medicine?
These are methodological problems and questions which
cannot be confronted here. It is clear, however, that
the measurement of lag demands finer instruments than

those now available.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

What has been learned through this research, in-
volving direct contact with many cities and towns, central
government agencies and town halls of Guatemala? Two
basic conclusions have been drawn. One concerns the need
for reform in the minds of Guatemalan citizens and the
machinery of Guatemalan government and politics. The
second involves methodological problems of social science

research.

Local Government: Reality and Potential

 

Local government in Guatemala possesses several
positive aSpects which could make it a device for stimu-
lating the development of the country and for institution-
alizing the political behavior of its citizens. Local
government, therefore, can play a crucial role in integrat-
ing Guatemala both politically and Spatially. The key
strength of local government is its structure. Although
the at-large local elections often lead to domination of
the municipal corporation by citizens of the municipal

capital, this is not always the case. Alcaldes auxiliares

 

144

145

serve in all of the aldeas of a municipio, as well as in

 

large caserios and finca settlements. This guarantees not

 

only that the municipal corporation is represented in the
hinterlands served by the municipal capital, but also that
townspeople in these areas have a channel of communication,
i.e., a means of input to their municipal government.

Alcaldes auxiliares represent a two-way communication

 

system. Other means whereby individuals can, and do,
affect the local government is through local councilmen
and participation in local development committees. While

some municipios do not have such committees, others have

 

active development committees at the aldg§_level. Whether
or not most local citizens actually use this means of in-
fluencing local government and develOpment is open to
question. The fact remains that popular initiative can

be effectively directed toward local development through
such committees, if the people so desire.

Little doubt exists as to who has the responsibility
for the management of the local government, namely the
alcalde. In many cases he depends heavily on the £22527
Earig as an assistant and adviser, but the responsibility
for local affairs is his even though major decisions re-
quire approval of the town council. Here, the sindico
represents the leadership. However, as the leader of the
municipal corporation, the alcalde chairs town council

meetings and has the right to vote in them. While such a

146

system does not obliterate all points of friction between
the council and the alcalde, it substantially reduces fric—
tion and permits joint decisions. Disruptive disputes be-
tween an alcalde and a town council are therefore minimized.
A second strength of local government is that all
officials are directly or indirectly subject to the popu-

lar will. Alcaldes, sfndicos, and councilmen are parti-

 

 

cularly vulnerable to popular dissatisfaction since they
are pOpularly elected. But even those who fill appointive
offices must keep in close touch with public Opinion, since
all appointive offices are filled by officials who are
popularly elected. Consequently, no entrenched power blocs
exist at the local level which are able to indefinitely
thwart the popular will or the will of the municipal
corporation.

ANAM represents a third strength of local govern-
ment. Designed primarily as a national voice for the

municipios, the organization has almost universal moral

 

support among alcaldes, although some municipalidades do

 

 

not meet their financial obligations to it. One of the
weaknesses of the organization is its dependence on the

municipalidad of Guatemala for leadership and financial

 

backing.

The statutes of ANAM denote the alcalde of Guate-
mala City as the president of the association. This is a
natural and beneficial regulation. The alcalde of

Guatemala's capital wields considerably more influence than

147

do alcaldes of other municipios, commands more attention

 

from the media, and clearly has better accessibility to
central government agencies and decision-makers than do
other alcaldes. Such an arrangement also places a sub-
stantial clerical and research staff at the disposal of
the association.

Despite the limited budget, ANAM plays an increas-

ingly significant role in representing the municipios

 

before the central government. The organization has been
instrumental in establishing regional municipal organiza-
tions and strengthening them. These regional organizations,
which now number eighteen, vary in strength and effective-

ness. The fact that nearly every municipalidad is now a

 

member of a regional association as well as ANAM definitely
represents a step in the right direction, and there is
little doubt that these regional organizations and ANAM
will become increasingly effective if permitted to do so

by the national government.

A final strength of municipal government in
Guatemala is the interest and concern local officials have
for local develOpment and for strengthening the municipal
movement through efforts to increase the significance of
local government in the country's development and political
system. Such interests and concerns are not universal,
but they certainly predominate. The sincere interest

alcaldes possess in the municipal movement is exemplified

148

by an incident which occurred at the 1972 national
assembly of ANAM in Esquipulas, Chiquimula. At that
meeting a resolution was introduced by an MLN-PID alcalde
to alter the ANAM statutes so that the president of the
association would be elected by all alcaldes at the annual
meeting, rather than automatically have the position go
to the alcalde of Guatemala City. Such a reform would have
serious implications. It would decrease the strength of
local government in relation to the central government, as
well as strengthen rightist political elements at the ex-
pense of more reform oriented political forces. Initially,
this reform would introduce a potentially disruptive
political element into the association which does not now
exist, namely, campaigning for the association presidency.
In addition, it could mean that the presidency would leave
Guatemala City, the national center of political power.
Such a situation could further dilute the strength of the
organization by dividing it between two poles, one where
the officially elected president resides and a second where
the single most influential alcalde resides. The proposed
reform would also have important political implications
nationally.

National law prohibits a Vice President from
directly succeeding the President under whom he serves, and
since deputies are not allowed to seek re-election succes—

sively few if any of them have a power base from which to

149

seek the President‘s position. These facts help thrust

the alcalde of Guatemala City, who by his very position
commands considerable attention, into an excellent position
from which to make a move for the Presidency. Further-
more, as president of ANAM, the alcalde of Guatemala City
travels extensively throughout the country, visiting other

municipios and Speaking at regional municipal meetings.

 

This increases his exposure to the citizenry in general,
and allows him an opportunity to increase his political
contacts throughout the country. Such activities add
substantially to his political base.

Since the citizens of Guatemala City have a history
of electing leftist officials to office, this spectre
disturbs the rightist political elements. If, however,
ANAM'S statutes could be reformed to allow the election
of the organization's president, the alcalde's favorable
position in terms of national politics would be reduced.
The vote on the resolution, therefore, had implications
for both the municipal movement and national politics.
Despite the fact that more than two-thirds of the alcaldes
of Guatemala are members of the MLN—PID coalition parties,
the resolution was soundly defeated. This incident illus-
trates two facts. Clearly the party identification of
Guatemala‘s alcaldes is not such that MLN-PID bosses,
including the President of the country, could deliver the

needed votes. The party identification of alcaldes was

150

simply not strong enough. Second, the alcaldes realize
the advantages of having the alcalde of Guatemala City
at the head of the municipal movement and are not willing
to sacrifice those advantages to please party bosses.
Alcalde concern for municipal development does
little to overcome the basic problems that confront muni-
cipal government. In particular, seven problems hinder
local government maturation in Guatemala: 1) the caliber
of local officials, 2) restrictions on the terms of office
for elected officials, 3) the generally lethargic attitude
of the citizenry, 4) financial limitations, 5) the central-
ization of authority, 6) the size and organization of the

central bureaucracy, and 7) the lack of pressure points.

Caliber of Local Officials

 

Although most elected and appointed government
officials at the local level have good intentions, few
have the educational or professional background necessary
to manage local development. They are equally ill pre-
pared to deal with the central government, particularly in
view of the size and organization of the bureaucracy and
the centralization of authority in the Executive branch.

INAD, INFOM, and ANAM seek to aid municipal offi-
cials in resolvingtfluaproblems they confront, but none of
these agencies is sufficient in sc0pe to substantially
alter the present Situation. In particular, INAD has

commenced a series of effective regional efforts to

151

improve the management capabilities of local officials
concerning local affairs. But, this program suffers from

a lack Of the funds and sufficient personnel to Operate

at an effective scale. There is also the problem Of

tenure of Office for local officials, especially those
popularly elected. What is the benefit derived from in-
structing an alcalde concerning good administrative prac-
tices when probably he will be out of Office in less than
two years? What opportunity does an alcalde have to culti-
vate effective pressure points, both within and outside

of the central government?

Tenure of Office

 

National laws which prohibit elected Officials
from succeeding themselves may be intended to prevent
entrenchment and the possibility of local groups estab-
1ishing power bases from which to disrupt the political
system. To a degree, such measures may be beneficial.
In Guatemala, however, this is not entirely the case
because restrictions are taken to the extreme. With
Deputies of the Congress unable to succeed themselves,
what incentive do they have to take interest in the affairs

of the departments and municipios which they represent?

 

Clearly little such incentive exists. Furthermore, the
fact that Deputies may not succeed themselves neutralizes

any possibility that Congress will be able to play a

152

significant role in development politics. The complete
turnover in Congress every four years prevents the forma-
tion of any power blocs to Offset the concentrated power
of the President and his appointees. The result is an
ineffective Congress, unresponsive to local needs, which
is little less than a puppet of the President. Conse-
quently, Deputies do not act as pressure points for local
government, and its very existence becomes inconsequential
to them. Deputies are almost universally held in dis-
repute by alcaldes.

While there are clear advantages to prohibiting
the powerful alcalde of Guatemala City from succeeding
himself, the benefits gained from prohibiting the alcaldes

of small municipios from succeeding themselves are less

 

clear. Indeed, this limitation hinders the development
of smaller communities because alcaldes elected to serve
two-year terms of office are inclined to seek projects
which have a high potential for successful completion
within their tenure Of Office, regardless Of how such
projects relate to local priorities, or lethargically
conclude that they really cannot accomplish anything and

thus seek to do little or nothing for the municipio. The

 

last thing Guatemalans need is a caretaker type of govern-

ment at the local level .

153

Lethargic Population

 

The population of a municipio must not only be

 

willing to make demands on the local government, but must
also be willing to contribute at least a fair Share of the
resources necessary to meet these demands. Local officials
Often find themselves sandwiched between a generally
lethargic, but increasingly demanding, local citizenry and
a powerful central government which is largely monopolizing
the financial resources whereby local demands can be met.

The ability Of many municipalidades to Obtain an adequate

 

response to local needs by central government Officials
clearly limits the support local Officials maintain among
the citizenry. The local pOpulation realizes that the

municipalidad cannot meet the demands placed upon it.

 

Accordingly, the citizenry becomes unresponsive to the

needs of the municipalidad by failing to pay taxes and

 

assessments. Individual citizens are also therefore less
willing to contribute time and energy toward the solution
of local development problems by serving on committees and

assisting with special projects.

Problems of Money

 

Local government expenditures in Guatemala amount
to less than five dollars per person per year. An average
of less than one dollar per person is annually Spent on
municipal improvement projects. Moreover, little equity

exists in the distribution of these monies, as some

154

municipios have little or no capital to invest in public
projects once payments on previous loans have been made.
Not only are the finances available to local
Officials clearly insufficient to meet the responsibilities
placed upon local government, but most tax monies destined.
for capital investment are collected and controlled by the
central government. It is true that tax collection by the
central government is probably the most efficient means to
collect revenues, especially since few local governments
are equipped to do it. Of equal validity is the need for
some agency to oversee the spending of these capital
funds. To perform its duties effectively, however, the
overseer must have an idea of local needs and priorities,
preferably formulated with the assistance Of local Offi-
cials. In many cases, neither the local Officials nor
central government authorities maintain such priorities.
As a consequence, the construction Of a theatre takes
place where an expanded hospital facility is needed, a new
town hall is erected where the water system requires ex-
pansion, and a new plaza is built where the primary need

Of the municipio is an improved access road.

 

The money problems confronted in stimulating
municipal develOpment involve more than mere availability
of money. Granted, there are not sufficient funds at the
diSposal of local Officials for the development of their

municipios. Equally important, the limited funds which

 

155

are being expended on municipal development are Often not
spent effectively. Doubling or tripling the investment
capital in municipal development will not solve all Of the
financial problems which hinder local progress. Some

priority system of capital investment for each municipio

 

needs to be established.

Centralization of Authority

 

The lack Of financial self-sufficiency causes
local governments to turn to the central government for
action in order to satisfy most local needs. In doing
this, they confront a national system where power is con-
centrated in the Executive branch of government. Very few
alcaldes or other local Officials have access to the few
key decision-makers, specifically the President and his
ministers. Few alcaldes who do have such power have the
expertise or technical knowledge to influence the deci-
sions these authorities make. Such situations Obviously
lead to strained relations between local and national
levels of government, not only because the local officials
must gain access to national decision-makers, but also
because they must confront these authorities with hat in
hand. They meet, not as equals, but more as peasants

meet the finca owner.

 

Because decision-making is highly concentrated,

the President and his ministers are under a constant

156

barrage of solicitations for meetings, conferences, and
projects. With so many decisions to be made by so few
peOple, the decision-making process and action on solicita-
tions is Obviously slow. This lack of action further
frustrates local Officials, especially those who have only
a two-year term Of Office. Such periods of inaction delay
local develOpment and strain the relations between the

two levels of government. The local pOpulation, seeing
little or no progress to satisfy local needs, becomes in-
creasingly reluctant to contribute to local development
schemes, either with taxes, time, or muscle. The central-
ization of authority, therefore, does not increase the
rate and efficiency of develOpment, nor does it lead to

the effective implementation of development planning.

The Central Bureaucracy

 

Compounding the problem of the centralized author-
ity is the size and organization of the bureaucracy over
which the few decision-makers reign. Guatemala's central
government consists of more than 43,000 employees serving
in ten ministries, averaging fifteen departments each,
and twenty autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies.111

Although INFOM is designed Specifically to deal

with local development, it actually handles a very small

proportion of all monies expended on local development.

 

11J'Herman Lujan, "La hipertrofiado burocracia de

Guatemala," in Lujan, op. cit., p. 5.

157

In truth, no central government agency exists to screen
and answer all solicitations for local develOpment projects.
Consequently, an alcalde who seeks a new school for his

municipio may find it necessary to deal with several

 

government agencies, and few alcaldes have the expertise
to deal with such a system.

The vast central bureaucracy is often not respon-
sive to decisions made by a higher authority, for bureau-
crats attempt to solidify their own positions and reduce
their work load first. As a result, the decisions Of high
authorities lose their effectiveness as they percolate
down through the bureaucracy, and little action results
unless the issue is followed up by the decision-makers.
Yet, few decision-makers have the time or interest to do
so. The obvious results are inactivity and a Slow pace
of develOpment.

The experience of a municipio in western Guatemala

 

Offers an example of a problem which results from the
centralization of authority and the bureaucratic lack of
interest in local development. A small river approximately

thirty feet in width flows through this municipio, separat-

 

ing two aldeas on one side from the municipal capital on
the other. A foot bridge formed the only link between the
two sides of the river. Town Officials and local citizens
decided to build a road from the aldeas to the municipal

capital. Inasmuch as the municipios contains a number of

 

158

productive coffee and cattle fincas, the municipal treasury
was reasonably well supplied. Town officials, therefore,
agreed to buy the road building material, and local citi-
zens volunteered their services to widen the now well-worn
path to road width and lay the stones which were to form
the road. The river posed a problem, however, since no

one locally had the expertise necessary to design and
supervise the construction of a bridge strong enough to

hold truck traffic. As a result, the municipalidad sent

 

a petition to the Minister of Communications and Public
Works and requested the construction of a bridge over the

river. As the municipio awaited a response to the request,

 

progress on the road construction continued. Two months
later, the alcalde received a letter from an engineer in
the Public Works department which stated that construction
of the bridge was impossible because initially a road
would have to be built to the Site and total estimated
costs Of such a project were $200,000. A letter sent to
the engineer by the alcalde indicating that the road was
being built by the townspeople and was now nearly com-
pleted brought no response. Local citizens then attempted
to construct a bridge themselves, but these efforts failed
due to the lack of equipment and technical know how.

Three months later, the President was driven over the now
completed road to the river, and the situation was ex—

plained to him while he was making a trip to municipios of

 

159

V”

the area in fulfillment of a campaign promise to visit all

municipios of the country during his four years in Office.

 

Within a month, a Public Works crew was at the site build-
ing the bridge. Total costs of the project were esti-
mated at $10,000. This instance illustrates that, with a
little local financing and incentive, citizens can be
instrumental in improving local life. Also, had the
Public Works engineer taken a day to venture to the site,
or requested the regional engineer Of the Ministry to do
so, he could have seen that no more than a few thousand
dollars would solve the problem. Even when informed that
the road was already near completion and that all that was
needed was a small bridge, he did not reply. Such Situa-
tions prove that presidential trips can be useful and
productive. The question remains, however, as to why it
took a personal visit by the President to Obtain central
government action on the bridge. It should not have, and
if progress continues to be so heavily dependent on such
journeys the pace of local develOpment in Guatemala will

remain substantially below its potential.

Pressure Points

 

Since adequate funds do not exist to satisfy all
local government demands some standard method for approv-
ing or rejecting solicitations should exist. Theoretically,
a system of priorities is of primary importance, but this

is not always developed. Consequently, decisions often

160

become subjective. When an alcalde makes more "noise" he
receives more attention. Such a situation reduces down
to the ability an alcalde has to make "noise." This, in
turn, is largely reduced to a question of pressure points,
i.e., channels through which alcaldes can influence
central authorities. For a few alcaldes of larger

municipios, or who have a concerned newspaper reporter as

 

a friend, the press Offers one such pressure point, al-
though none Of the alcaldes interviewed Specifically men-
tioned it. In the case of Guatemala, pressure points can
be classified as existent, potential, or non-existent.
Existing pressure points are largely confined to
the central government. Most notably, alcaldes seek to
influencetfluaprocessing of their solicitations by inform-
ing the President of their needs and solicitations or by
hounding the agency to which the petitions are made. As
a result of this tendency to work within a few channels
centered within the central government, only one non-
government pressure point Of any significance currently
exists, ANAM. This national association of local govern-
ments does as well as can be expected, in view of its
financial and personnel limitations, in aiding the

municipios with their solicitations. But, ANAM does not

 

have the means to aid all municipios in determining

 

development priorities nor in effectively pressuring for

all Of the needed projects and reforms.

":1.

F...

161

Several potential points exist but do not effec-
tively function. These potential points include political
parties, Deputies, Governors, and regional municipal organ-
izations. Political parties do not function as effective
pressure points largely because Of their loose, often
personal, structure. Conversely, since political parties
do not prove instrumental to alcaldes in meeting their
needs and desires, political identification with them is
generally weak. This, in turn, weakens the structure of
the party. From the local vieWpoint, a vicious cycle
exists: the party does little for the alcaldes and the
alcaldes do little for the party.

Governors act only as representatives of the
President in the departments. While they may occasionally

relay the request of a municipalidad to the proper central

 

government agency, they seldom act as pressure points for
alcaldes. Few alcaldes interviewed believed that their
department Governor has any interest in the development

Of the department or their municipio. They seldom seek

 

intervention by the Governor on their behalf.

Deputies are viewed with equal disdain. Opposi—
tion party Deputies have little or no influence in the
central government, while government party Deputies are
seldom innovators of policy or respOnsive to local govern-
ment needs. Alcaldes are nearly unanimous in their con-
demnation Of Deputy impotence and disinterest in local

development.

 

162

As Of now, regional associations of municipalidades

 

are not generally effective means of pressuring the central
government. This is largely due to their youthfulness, the
first having been created in 1971. The potential exists,
however. Regular meetings, usually once every three months,
are now held by nearly all regional associations. These
bring alcaldes into frequent contact with each other and
provide an opportunity for them to gain press coverage to
air their complaints and speak in a unified voice, rather
than in less significant individual voices. The alcalde
of Guatemala, as president of ANAM, is almost always present
at these meetings to Speak for the national association and
the municipal movement in general. Occasionally, Deputies
also attend these meetings. More important, the manager of
INFOM attends all such meetings, Often accompanied by one
or more ministers of the central government. Regional
meetings are, therefore, fast becoming major communication
links, not only between alcaldes but also between alcaldes
and central government decision-makers. As the organiza-
tional and financial status of these organizations improve,
their strength and influence should increase. Thus, al-
though regional associations are largely potential pressure
points today, they may soon become an effective means to
influence the central government.

Groups which do not act as pressure points, such

worker groups, peasant organizations and business

163

associations, are nevertheless important for local
development. With the conservative army constantly in the
background, the formation of peasant and worker organiza-
tions has been discouraged by the rightist-dominated
central government. Business groups exist, but they con-
sist largely of the more affluent business interests in
and around the largest cities. They do not now act as
pressure points for alcaldes and are not likely to be in

a position to do so in the foreseeable future.

These, then, are the major problems that hinder
local government in meeting its potential for local
develOpment and the integration of the country through the
institutionalization of political behavior. Until such
time as local government becomes an effective means of
improving local life, it will not be influential in deter-
mining the direction Of Guatemalan political or economical
life. The question is, how can local government become a
more effective means of stimulating local development? One
Obvious need is to increase pOpular participation in local
government and local development programs. This is not apt
to occur, however, until local government becomes more
effective in meeting local needs and demands. Initially,
such a reform in the effectiveness of local government
depends on changes instituted at the national level of
government which influence the functioning of local govern-

ment. The following reforms are recommended:

164

1. Assuming the existence of honest and free elec-
tions, barriers that restrict the terms Of
Office of Deputies Should be removed, i.e.,
Deputies should be allowed to serve unlimited and
successive terms. This would have three clear
advantages for political development and the
stimulation of development in general. First,
such a reform would make Deputies more responsive
to popular demands as well as those of local
government Officials. Second, this change in
Guatemalan statutes would provide for continuity
within the Operation of the Legislative branch
Of government. Finally, an experienced Congress
whose members are subject to popular vote every
four years would be more alert and effective,
hopefully becoming less dependent on Executive
will.

Restrictions that limit the terms of office

of local Officials should likewise be abolished
and the positions become less obligatory in nature.
Such a reform should result in greater continuity
within local government, encourage long range plan-
ning, attract better qualified and prepared candi-
dates for local public office, and relieve alcaldes
of the pressure many now feel to accomplish some-
thing during their term of Office, even if it is
not relevant to current municipio needs.

 

2. The Constitution requires the Executive to allot
a certain, unspecified, percentage Of the national
budget to be invested in municipal works. Article
237 clearly states that this is in addition to
direct central government involvement in local
and regional projects. Howeveri the central
government has never done this. To improve
upon the bleak financial situation municipalidades
now face, the President must meet this stipuIa-
tIOfi either voluntarily or by force. This would
increase the funds available to local government
to meet its needs and raise the debt capacity of

 

 

112This is an example of the omnipotent position

Of the President. Although alcaldes in general, and ANAM
in particular, have been literally screaming protests to
force the President into fulfilling this Constitutional
requirement, they have not succeeded. To whom can they
turn for help to enforce the law? The Congress, which is
at.the President's beck and call? The Judicial system
‘which is equally at his command? In reality, the
alcaldes and ANAM can turn to no one.

 

 

165

the municipios so that they may borrow capital
more easily and finance more expensive projects,
such as the expansion of water and sewer systems.
Alcaldes are currently seeking 10 percent of

the national budget, a figure which, on the basis
of the 1974 budget, would reach $35 million for
the current year.

 

The funds derived from budgetary reform should

be largely dedicated to investment in municipal
development and development planning. Consequently,
they should be distributed between two agencies.
Ten percent of these monies should be assigned to
ANAM, and should be used to a) strengthen the
national association through the employment Of
more technical personnel, and b) create a task
force for each of the eighteen regional groupings
Of municipios. Such a task force should consist
of technical Specialists who would offer local
Officials needed services and aid them in deter-
mining local development priorities. The task
force should also be concerned with planning local
development within a regional context. The re-
maining 90 percent of the increased funds available
for municipal development through the enforcement
of Article 237 of the Constitution should be
credited to the accounts of the individual muni-
ci ios with INFOM, which Should continue to he
charged with the supervision of these funds. The
institute's technical staff should be required to
work with regional task forces and local Officials
in determining local priorities for each municipio
and financing local develOpment projects. Once
the financial aspects of a development project
have been arranged with INFOM, municipalidades
should not be forced to deal with Ohly central
government agencies regarding the implementation
of the project. If, for example, construction

can be performed at less expensive or more immed-
iately by a private concern than by a central
government agency, the municipalidad should have
the Option to select the private company to do

the work.

 

 

 

 

No central government agency other than INFOM
should be responsible for projects which involve
only one munici io. The Ministers Of Health and
Education shouIE Be responsible for setting health
standards, and leave the construction of buildings
and implementation of programs to meet these
standards to INFOM, regional task forces, and

 

166

local officials. Anytime an alcalde wants
something done which concerns only his municipio
he should not have to deal with more than one
central government agency.

 

5. INAD programs of technical assistance to municipal
Officials Should be expanded. These should deal
with administrative matters and problems including
the initiation and collection of local taxes.

The changes recommended can be instituted quickly
and with little difficulty. By increasing the role Of
local government in local and regional development, local
government can be expected to gain more broad-based pOpular
support and play an increasingly significant role in insti-
tutionalizing political behavior and integrating Guatemala
into a functional unit. The increased importance of
government at the local level and the removal of restraints
on the terms of Office of local Officials can be Of key
importance in the attraction Of more qualified members of
the community to serve in these positions. More popular
participation in, and support of, local government and
local development should also result.

There are additional problems more difficult to
overcome which local Officials face in serving their com-
munities. Most perplexing is the develOpment of pressure
points. These cannot be simply created but must be culti-
vated. Although implementation of the recommendations may
help meet the need for effective means to influence the

central political system, it will not resolve all such

167

needs. Allowing alcaldes to serve successive terms would
grant them the opportunity to cultivate personal friends
among decision-makers Of the central bureaucracy, streng-
then regional associations by allowing them to benefit more
extensively from experience in the pressuring process, and
encourage the formation of active development committees
and groups at the local level. A similar reform pertaining
to Deputies should make them more responsive to local
pressures.

Essential to the proper functioning of the Guate-
malan political system is a strong, stable party system.
This is basic in political development to, 1) permit voters
a free choice in elections, 2) enable the party in power
to better manage the central bureaucracy and make it more
responsive to the will of the party and high level decision-
makers, and 3) establish political parties as pressure
points for popular and local needs. Guatemala does not now
have a strong, stable party system. The problem is that
such a system requires considerable amounts of time and un-
selfish good will for the country to develop. It cannot
be simply legislated.

Guatemalan local government does not meet its full
potential in terms of the role it plays in development nor
the institutionalization of behavior. Several significant
steps can be taken immediately to increase the effective—

ness of local government, all of which depend either

 

168

directly or indirectly upon action taken by the central
government. The Guatemalan political system, including

the development of local government as a key political
institution, will take many years to mature even with these

reforms.

The Problem Of the Image

 

The image of the central government was determined L
by measuring two components: 1) the degree to which
alcaldes feel the central government has been effective in
dealing with local develOpment problems, and 2) the degree

to which alcaldes feel their municipio receives as much

 

central government attention in resolving local develOpment

problems as do the other municipios of the country.

 

Initially, seven factors were hypothesized as in-
fluential in explaining the image: 1) the feeling of
progress in local development an alcalde possesses, 2) the
expectations alcaldes have for the future development of

their municipios, 3) feelings of political efficacy among

 

alcaldes, 4) the frequency of communication between local
and national Officials regarding local development, 5) the
party affiliation of alcaldes, 6) the population Of a

municipio as measured by its classification, and 7) the

 

distance between Guatemala City and a municipio as

 

measured by travel time.
Stepwise multiple regression analysis Of the data

collected indicates that less than one-third of the

169

variation in the image is explained by the seven variables.
Indeed, only three Of the seven variables examined prove
significant. These are political efficacy, which accounts
for 23 percent of the variation; expectations for future
development, which explains 5 percent of the variation;
and positive feelings in regard to past development
progress, which accounts for 3 percent of the variation.
The failure Of party affiliation to prove signifi-
cant is not surprising in view of the lack of party identi—
fication which prevails among alcaldes. As the Guatemalan
political system matures and political parties become more
stable and effective in managing the government machinery,
the relationship between the image of the central govern-
ment and party affiliation may become more pronounced.

The categories of municipios do not explain signi-

 

ficant proportions of the image variation either. The

population size of a municipio apparently has little effect

 

on the manner in which alcaldes view the central govern-
ment. An interesting ethnic difference in the perceptions
Of Category III (population of 5,000-10,000) and Category

IV (population less than 5,000) municipios does exist,

 

however. Whereas the alcaldes of ladino municipios of the

 

third category have a much more positive view Of the
central government than do their counterparts in Indian

municipios, in Category IV municipios this pattern is re-

 

 

versed. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the

If 4‘ v4“

170

central government has an agency which deals directly with

small, Indian municipios in solving their development

 

problems.
Distance decay does not appear instrumental in
explaining the image. Indeed, there appears to be no

relationship between the image an alcalde holds of the

. sz—E

central government and the distance between his municipio

 

it‘ll:

and the seat of central government power in Guatemala City.
Neither is there a distance decay factor involved in the
frequency Of contact between officials of the two levels
of government and distance from Guatemala City. Actually,
there exists a slight negative relationship, with contact
tending to increase with distance from the capital.

The fact that the communication variable failed to
prove of significance is perplexing inasmuch as communica-
tion is essential to development progress. The problem
is apparently one of methodology, i.e., the means of
measuring communication. This research indicates that
frequency of communication is not an adequate measurement.
What may be needed is a means whereby the effectiveness
of communication can be measured. How this can be done
is a problem for further research.

Three factors not considered in the research appear
to influence the image alcaldes have of the central
government: 1) the flow of central government funds,

2) local prosperity or the lack of it, and 3) the degree

171

of ambition an alcalde has for himself and his municipio.

 

All Of these factors raise methodological problems.
In Guatemala, no centralized source Of information
exists regarding the flow of central government assistance

to the individual municipios. To determine flow patterns,

 

therefore, would seem to entail efforts to gather appro—
priate data from the myriad of individual central agencies

which have programs being carried out at the municipio

 

level.

Prosperity and ambition factors raise difficult
measurement problems. The means whereby economic well
being can be measured are yet to be defined by social
scientists. What factors should be considered in efforts
to measure degrees of prOSperity? How can the significance
of these factors be weighted? Similar problems arise with
regard to an alcalde's personal ambition and ambitions for
his community. How does one measure these? Which of the
two is most significant in explaining perception values
in relation to such factors as expectations and the image
Of the central government? These are methodological prob-
lems which social scientists who seek to measure percep-
tion and behavioral factors in field research of this
nature must face. Until questions of this nature can be
prOperly answered, such research must be considered in

its infancy.

172

The Search for Lag

 

The notion that urban areas form the vanguard of
development in developing societies of Latin America is
widely accepted. Indeed, it does not take years of field
research to realize the veracity of it.' Yet, how is
develOpment lag measured? In an effort at measurement,
alcaldes were asked to indicate the three most urgent

needs for improving life in their municipio. This was

 

based on the assumption that rural areas, which clearly
lag in the development process, would have different
priorities than the more advanced urban areas.
Hierarchical Grouping analysis indicates that
there is no rural lag in Guatemala. Neither does this
analysis reveal Signs of cultural lag, a concept equally
professed in regard to Guatemala. But lag is clearly
present. What is the problem? Again, the problem is one
of methodology. Using the develOpment priorities Of
alcaldes as a basis for measuring lag is not effective
for two reasons. First, all of rural and urban Guatemala
remains lacking in basic services such as water and sewage
systems, and the assumption that urban areas, being more
advanced, have development priorities different from rural
areas is not a valid assumption. Equally invalid is the
assumption that alcaldes have development priorities.

Many of them do not possess even a concept of priorities.

173

An alternative to priorities as an instrument to
measure lag, is an inventory of services available in
the municipio. This, however, leads to the need to
evaluate such services and raises another series of
methodological problems. How does one measure the ade-

quacy of a municipio's health facilities and education

 

program? How important is an access road as compared with
a satisfactory water supply and system?

The concept of development lag has validity. Of
that there is little doubt. How lag can be scientifically
measured is a question which must await future field re-

search before it can be satisfactorily answered.

 

CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE

It is painful to conclude that the hypotheses to
explain the image of the central government and the use
of priorities as a measurement of development lag proved
to be less valid than was originally expected. However,
the Observations of Preston James as presented at the
National Conference of Latin Americanist GeOgraphers in
1970 offer consolation:

NO scholar Should be criticized for formulating

a hypothesis that turns out to be unacceptable.
Each new hypothetical model challenges attack and
produces innovative thinking. Any field of study
advances across the wreckage of broken hypotheses,
as once beautiful structures are destroyed by the
Observations they stimulated.113

The author contends that the methodological prob-
lems encountered in this research, and the methodological
questions raised as a result of it, reflect the general
quality of past research in Latin America. It is easy to

see and describe lag. It is something else to accurately

measure it.

 

113Preston E. James, "Comentério," Revista
Geografica, LXXII (Junho, 1970), 91-92.

 

174

175

If social scientists are to contribute to an
understanding Of the development process and seek to apply
the knowledge thus gained to increase the pace Of it, it
is time to concentrate more on efforts to apply scientific
field research to the study of process in gathering
knowledge of the reality of development, and less on solely ffl
descriptive studies. This is not to state that the latter
type of research is valueless. Research techniques do not
form a zero-sum equation, and thus one need not sacrifice
one form of research for the other. What is needed, how-
ever, is an expansion of the inventory of the field tools
available to the social scientist, and a greater emphasis
on scientific studies of specific processes.

In the case of Guatemala, the potential for
economic progress and the development of a stable political
system exists. What is lacking is knowledge gained from
methodologically sound inquiries which can be applied to
quicken the pace of development without increasing economic
and political instability. The time when often romantic
studies of the Indians, or biased studies of land owner-
ship, can dominate social science research in settings
such as Guatemala is drawing to an end.- It is time for a
new era, new efforts to examine specific development
problems, seek to understand the processes related to
them, and Offer specific recommendations of actions to be

taken in overcoming them.

176

For Latin Americans the time has also come.
Bureaucracies must be more effectively managed, and bureau-
crats must be held responsible for their activity, or in-
activity. The people in general must stop complaining
about their plight and seek to do something about it, with
the government if they can, or without it if they must.
Finally, leaders of governments such as that Of Guatemala
must place the interests of their country above their own
interests. It is time for them to stop screaming about
national poverty and to begin to implement reforms which
can aid in overcoming it.

Social scientists of all nationalities can contri—
bute to the development of Latin America by carefully
applied studies to determine the direction and extent of
needed changes. In the end, however, the future of Latin

America belongs to Latin Americans.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

alcalde: Mayor. In Guatemala, the highest popularly
elected Official.

'alcalde auxiliar: An appointee of the alcalde, and
representative of him, in the aIdeas and other
large settlements of a municipio.

 

 

aldea: A hamlet or small village of a municipio.

 

ANAM: Associacién Nacional de Municipalidades. A
nacional organization of municipal governments
charged with representing local government
before the central government.

cabecera municipal: The largest settlement Of a municipio
aaa the municipal capital.

 

 

caserio: Rural community of scattered houses in a
municipio too small to be considered an aldea.

 

caudillo: Forceful leader or strongman. One who rules
largely by force of personality rather than by
formal law.

consejo municipal: Town council. In Guatemala, the size
of the council varies on the basis of the category
to which the municipio belongs.

 

 

finca: Farm or estate of variable size, but larger than
a subsistence plot.

finquero: The owner of a finca.
FYDEP: Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo EconOmico
de El Petén. An autonomous agency of the Ministry

of Economy charged with the economic development
Of the Department Of El Petén.

177

"L

178

golpe de estado: Coup d'état. A sudden overthrow of a
government, usualIy’by the military.

 

INAD: Instituto Nacional de Administracién para el
Desarrollo. An autonomous agency of the Ministry
Of Education responsible for studying administra-
tive problems of development and recommending
solutions to them.

INFOM: Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal. An
autonomous agency of the Ministry of Public
Finances charged with overseeing municipal Spending
and develOpment.

INTA: Instituto Nacional de Transformacién Agraria. An
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture responsible
for carrying out land reform and colonization
schemes.

Council, committee. In the political context, a
small group of men governing in the form Of a
dictatorship.

junta

ladino: All culture groups which are not Indian. In
Guatemala, while a majority of the ladino popula-
tion is mestizo, this group also incIudes blacks,
Asiatics, and acculturated Indians. ~

mestizo: A person of mixed Indian—Caucasian ancestry.
municipalidad: The municipal corporation, which consists

of the town council and alcalde. Also, the
town hall.

 

municipio: A political subdivision of a department.
Although municipios vary considerably in size and
population, they usually consist of a town and a
series of villages, as well as the land, which
surrounds them.

 

 

ornato: A head tax, usually assessed to all adult males
of a municipio on an annual basis.

 

peninsulare: Historically, a Spanish-born person living
Tin a Spanish colony.

 

secretario: The equivalent of a town or city clerk in the
United States. Official in charge of the day—to-
day functioning Of the local government.

 

sindico: The judicial adviser to the municipal corporation
and leader of the town council.

tesorero: Treasurer.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY MUNICIPIOS

 

APPENDIX B

SURVEY MUNICIPIOS

 

 

Department
Municipio

Category

 

Alta Verapaz
San Juan Chamelco
San Miguel Tucurfi
Senahfi
Santa Cruz Verapaz
Tamahfi

Baja Verapaz
Salama
Granados
San Miguel Chicaj

Chimaltenango
Chimaltenango
Patzfin
San Andres Itzapa
San José Poaquil

Chiquimula
Chiquimula
Esquipulas
Ipala
San Jacinto

Escuintla
Tiquisate
La Democracia
Masagua
Siquinala

179

WNNH WOUND-J bWH bbNNN

WWWN

180

 

Department

Municipio

Category

 

E1

E1

E1

Petén

San Luis

San Fransisco
San José

Progreso
Sanarate
Sansare
San CristObal Acasaguastlan

Quiché

Sacapulas

USpantan

San Pedro Jocopilas
Chinique

Patzité

Guatemala

Amatitlan

San Juan Sacatepéquez
Chinautla

Chuarrancho

Fraijanes

Santa Catarina Pinula

Huehuetenango

Cuilco

Chiantla

Santa Cruz Barrillas
Colotenango

Jacaltenango

Todos Santos Cuchumatanes
Santa Barbara

San Rafael Petzal
Santiago Chimaltenango

Izabal

Puerto Barrios
Los Amates
El Estor

Jalapa

Jalapa
Mataquescuintla

ubUJN bbw

AbbNMWNNN WWWWNN hbWNN

bNH

+1

181

Department
Municipio

Category

 

Jutiapa
Agua Blanca
Comapa
Jalpatagua
Yupiltepeque
Zapotitlan

Quezaltenango
Coatepeque
Colomba
San Juan Ostuncalco
Salcaja
Huitan
Palestina de los Altos
San Fransisco la UniOn

Retalhuleu
Retalhuleu
Champerico
Nuevo San Carlos
Santa Cruz Mulua
San Martin Zapotitlén

Sacatepéquez
Alotenango
Jocotenango
Magdalena Milpas Altas
Pastores
Santa Lucia Milpas Altas
San Miguel Duefias

San Marcos
San Marcos
Catarina
ConcepciOn Tutuapa
Nuevo Progreso
El Rodeo
Tejutla
Esquipulas Palo Gordo
Sipacapa
San CristObal Cucho

fibNNH kkaNNN ubLUU-INN

fibhbbw

bbbwwNNNH

182

 

 

De artment
pMunicipio Category
Santa Rosa
Pueblo Nuevo Vihas 2
Casillas 3
Guazacapan 3
Santa Cruz Naranjo 3
Santa Rosa de Lima 3
801015
Santiago Atitlan 2
San Andrés Semetabaj 4
San Antonio Palopé 4
Santa Catarina PalopO 4
Santa Cruz La Laguna 4
San Juan La Laguna 4
Suchitepéquez
Mazatenango 1
San Antonio Suchitepéquez 2
Santa Barbara 2
Cuyotenango 3
San Francisco Zapotitlén 3
San JOSé El Idolo 4
San Juan Bautista 4
Santo Tomas La UniOn 4
Totonicapan
Momostenango 2
San CristObal Totonicipén 2
San Andrés Xecul 3
Zacapa
Cabanas 3
San Diego 4
Teculutan 4

 

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

M'—

10.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Municipio: 2. Date:

Person interviewed:

 

 

 

 

Place of birth: 5. Elected:

Do you live in this municipio? yes no
6a. If yes, how many years?
6b. If no, where do you live?

What other occupation do you have?

 

7a. Where?

 

What opinion do you have of ANAM, its organization

and Objectives?

 

 

 

 

Have you ever lived in Guatemala City? yes no
9a. If yes, when?
9b. If yes, how many years?
How often do you speak by telephone with authorities

of the central government?

daily at least once per

2-4 times per week month

once per week

every fifteen days ___never

more or less

183

from time to time

_v§

n=r

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

184

How frequently do you communicate by telegraph with
authorities of the central government?

daily at least once a month
2-4 times per week from time to time
once per week never

every fifteen days more or less

How Often do you speak with central government
officials who have traveled to this municipio to
discuss development problems with local Officials?

daily at least once a month
2-4 times per week from time to time
once per week never

every fifteen days more or less

How many times per year do you travel to the capital
city to discuss affairs of interest to this municipio?

daily at least once a month
2—4 times per week from time to time
once per week never

every fifteen days more or less

In your Opinion, what are the three most urgent
necessities of this municipio in order to improve
life here?

 

 

 

DO you think that natural or human resources exist in
this municipio in order to improve upon the level
Of living?

yes no

“fl

?

185

16. Observe the diagram. The upper part represents a
high standard of living; the lower part represents a
low standard of living. Bearing in mind the natural
and human resources of this municipio, indicate:

16a. the level at which you believe the people
Of this municipio are living today?

9 the highest level of life possible
8

0 the lowest level of life possible

16b. the situation as of 16c. the situation as
five years ago. it will be five
years from now.

9 the highest level of life possible 9
8 8
7 7
6 6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
l l

0 the lowest level of life possible 0

186

17. Think of the municipio of the Republic which, in your
Opinion, has the highest standard of living and con-
sider it at level 9 on the scale below. Now, think
Of the municipio of the Republic where the standard
of living is lowest and consider it at level 0 on the
scale below. In relation to these two extremes:

17a. Indicate where you think (name of municipio)
is today.

9 municipio of Guatemala in which life is best
8

7

0 municipio Of Guatemana in which life is worst

17b. Indicate where you 17c. Indicate where you
think (name of think (name of
municipio) was five municipio) will be
years ago. five years from now.
9 municipio Of Guatemala in which 9

life is best

OI—‘NWémem
OI—‘NubUlQO

municipio Of Guatemala in which
life is worst

In.“

187

 

18. Indicate with an "X" the response which you consider
most just in reality.
18a. Architects and engineers Of the central
government take your opinion into account when
designing a service or building for this
municipio. .
Never Always
l ’Tpoor) 3- (fair) 7 (good) 9

18b. If a conflict develops between the municipalidad
and central authorities over the selection of a
development project (market, potable water,
sewage, etc.), are your opinions taken into
account?

Never Always

1 (poor) 3

Ifair)h 7 (good) 9
18¢. Deputies of the National Congress support the

petitions and reforms presented to the central
government by the alcaldes.

Never

Always
l ’TpoorT 3

(fair) . 7 (960d) 9

18d. People in the central government are isolated
from (the alcalde) and other Officials of
the municipalidad.

 

 

Never Always
9 (good) 7 (faif) 3 (poor) 1
19. When you need a project in the municipio and have

presented your petition
to whom do you turn for

a local businessman
the Governor
INFOM

INAD

a local party chief

a friend or relative
central government

to the central government,
help?

__;a local landowner
___a Deputy
___a priest

ANAM

the President

in the other (Specify)

 

20.

yes

yes

21.

22.

23.

188

The central government has many institutions inter-
ested in development. Indicate with an "X" your
Opinion in regard to the following:

20a. The central government has been effective in
resolving the development problems of this
municipio over the past five years.

no

(960d) 7 . (fair) 3 (pOOr) l

.- _1_?:‘."
A

20b. The central government gives as much attention
to this municipio as it gives to the other
municipios of the country.

m1

no

(960d) 7’ (fair) ’3 (pOor) I

In order to respond to the preceding questions, did
you have some particular institution of the central
government in mind?

yes no

21a. If yes, what institution?

 

Is there a particular institution of the central
government which has been especially effective in
resolving the development problems of (name of
municipio)?

yes no

22a. If yes, what institution?

 

In order to stimulate the development of this
municipio, what do you recommend be done as a means
of improving relations between the local government
and national government?

 

 

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