LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEVELOPMENT LAG IN GUATEMALA:
SPATIAL AND PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
TERRY L. McINTOSH
1974

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEVELOPMENT LAG IN GUATEMALA:
SPATIAL AND PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

presented by

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has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

__Ph. D.__ degree in _Geography_

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Date _May 15, 1974_

O-7639

ABSTRACT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT
LAG IN GUATEMALA: SPATIAL AND
PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

By

Terry L. McIntosh

While a substantial amount of social science re-
search in Latin American politics and economic development
exists, only a small portion of it is the result of
scientific field research aimed at a greater understanding
of development processes. Consequently, there has been
little progress in the formulation and testing of develop-
ment theory in the Latin America context.

Guatemala is selected as the site for this study,
which has three objectives: 1) an examination of the role,
real and potential, of local government in Guatemalan
development; 2) a determination of the image of the central
government which local officials possess and an explanation
of variations in it; and 3) a search for signs of cultural
and rural development lag as measured by local development
priorities.

Interviews with alcaldes (mayors) of 108 randomly
selected municipios (counties) form the core of the data

collected to meet these objectives. In terms of the role of local government in development, it was found that the current role is not significant in either improving the quality of local life or institutionalizing political behavior and spatially integrating the country. Seven barriers to a more meaningful role for local government in the development process are examined: 1) the caliber of local officials, 2) restrictions on the tenure of office of many popularly elected officials, 3) the generally lethargic attitude of the local population, 4) a dearth of local government finances, 5) the centralization of authority within the executive branch of the central government, 6) the size and organization of the central government bureaucracy, and 7) the lack of significant means whereby local officials seek to influence central government decision-makers. The basic structure exists, however, for local government to play an increasingly important role in Guatemalan development. The problem is that the mechanism is not sufficiently defined and does not function effectively.

Alcaldes hold a generally favorable image of the central government. Efforts to explain variations in the image among alcaldes give mixed results. Feelings of political efficacy prove important, while the feeling of past development progress and optimism with regard to future development prove of less import. The frequency of

communication between local and national officials, the distance of a _municipio_ from Guatemala City, the party affiliation of the _alcalde_ interviewed, and the population of a _municipio_ do not prove to be significant variables in explaining the image.

Neither do local development priorities prove useful instruments to measure development lag, cultural or rural, for analysis of the data collected suggests that no lag exists. It does exist, however, but the author now believes that lag cannot be measured by employing _alcalde_ opinions pertaining to local development. This is because while both urban and rural areas of the country are lacking in basic services, many _alcaldes_ do not have a concept of development priorities.

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Geography

1974

To Mary Lee, Jud, and the future

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

In the mid-1960's, K. H. Silvert observed that "un-
predictable" and "unstable" were the two most commonly used
adjectives referring to Latin American politics.[1] In more
recent years perhaps no word with political connotations is
more used in the Latin American context than "revolution,"
which both adjectives at least indirectly imply. Frank
Tannenbaum has noted: "It is difficult for the people of
the United States to understand why Latin American govern-
ments are so unstable, revolutions so numerous, tyrannies
so frequent and, occasionally, so bloody and heartless."[2]

Revolution

What is meant by revolution? A. T. van Leeuwen
maintains that the word has been used in so many contexts

[1]K. H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and
Revolution in Latin America (New York: American Univer-
sities Field Staff, Inc., 1966), p. 19.

[2]Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New
York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 141.

as to make its use in scientific analysis questionable.[3]
Definitions of the term vary considerably, but there are
four widely held characteristics of revolution: 1) it is
not only the transference of political power to a new
political elite heretofore more or less excluded from
seats of power, but also an event which has major social
and economic consequences; 2) the political transference
is rapid in the temporal sense; 3) the act of the trans-
ference involves mass participation, and 4) violence is
associated with it. Although these are commonly held
notions of revolution in general, there is unanimity in
thought on only one of them. A revolution involves the
transference of political power to a new elite, with wide-
spread social and economic effects.[4]

The Latin American Need

There is little dispute among contemporary writers
about Latin American affairs over the need for the change
which revolution implies. The need appears to be uni-
versally accepted, and the reasons are not difficult to
detect. One factor in need of revolutionary change is the
distribution of national income, which Lipset noted as

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[3]Arend Theodoor van Leeuwen, Development Through
Revolution (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1970), p. 27.

[4]It is this dichotomy between commonly held and
universally held notions of revolution which leads Samuel
Huntington to differentiate between revolutions and "great
revolutions." See his work, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264.

one of the three major political issues arising from the

formation of democracies in Western nations.[5] There is

little doubt about the growth of GNP's in Latin America

during the 1960's either. What is disputable is the dis-

tribution of wealth involved in this growth.[6] Although

reliable statistics on income distribution are lacking, it

is possible to make some estimates. Alba, for example,

estimates that while the 5 to 25 percent of society which

forms the oligarchy in Latin American countries accounts

for 50 percent of the income, only 20 percent of the

national income remains for distribution within the 65

percent to 90 percent of the population which forms the

lowest strata in the social pyramid.[7] It is statistics

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[5]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960), p. 71.

[6]The Rockefeller Report on the Americas (New York Times Edition, 1969) notes the growth in GNP's, adding that the 2 percent rate of economic growth per capita was not high enough. There is no mention of income distribution. See especially pp. 65-70. By the end of the decade, the GNP for the region as a whole was growing at the rate of 2.8 percent per capita annually. Much of this, however, was due to the substantial growth of the Brazilian economy, and only six countries were growing, economically, at a rate equal to or greater than the 2.5 percent per capita target of the Alliance for Progress. Between 1965 and 1971, the Guatemalan average annual per capita growth was 2 percent. See United Nations, Economic Commission on Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971 (New York, 1973).

[7]Victor Alba, The Latin Americans (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1969), pp. 141-42.

such as these which Shils sees as a major barrier to
modernity.[8]

Income distribution is not the only indicator of
the need for revolutionary change. There is also the all-
pervasive question of land distribution. The land dis-
tribution problem is acute, not only for economic reasons
but also for social reasons. Land is looked upon as a key
indicator of wealth, as well as a means of keeping up with
the often horrendous rates of inflation. Gerassi has
estimated that 1 percent of the Latin Americans own 71.6
percent of the farmland, and MacEoin claims that in
Guatemala 60 percent of the cultivated land is owned by
2 percent of the landowners.[9]

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[8]Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political
Development of New States," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 17. There
appears to be a high correlation between underdevelopment
and the unequal distribution of wealth. See: Bruce
Russett et al., Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 292.

[9]John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America
(London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1965), p. 33. Gary
MacEoin, Revolution Next Door (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p. 96. There is a wealth of material
published on the agrarian problem and its economic, social,
and political effects. For a general view of peasant
society, see: Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Subsistence Agri-
culture and Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine Pub-
lishing Co., 1969). In the Latin American context, inter-
esting and informative works include: Solon L. Barraclough
and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin
American Countries," Land Economics, XLII (1966), 391-424;
C. W. Minkel, "Programs of Agricultural Colonization and
Settlement in Central America," Revista Geográfica, LXVI
(1967), 19-53; Ernst Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1971); and Rodolfo Stavenhagen

There are substantial social indicators of the need
for revolutionary change. One need only glance at a few
vital and literacy statistics to realize that something
must be done.[10]

Rapid increases in population throughout the
region make the needed economic growth and social changes
difficult, if not impossible, to attain. At the same time
they bring considerable forebodings vis-a-vis the political
situation, particularly in view of the rapid pace of urban-
ization resulting from internal migration.[11] The increasing

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(ed.), Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin
America (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970). On Guatemala
see: Thomas and Marjorie Melville, Guatemala: The
Politics of Land Ownership (New York: Free Press, 1971).

[10]According to the Demographic Yearbook, 1971
(New York: United Nations Statistical Office of the
Department of Economic and Social Welfare, 1972), the life
expectancy in Guatemala, for example, as of the mid-1960's
was 49 years. Infant mortality is so high that life
expectancy actually is higher for children one to ten years
of age range than it is for infants. See Table 34, p. 752,
and Table 28, p. 668. In 1968, 60.6 percent of all deaths
in Guatemala were attributed to infections and parasitic
diseases or gastritis, duodenitis, enteritis, or colitis,
all of which are stomach or intestinal inflammations. See,
World Health Organization, World Health Organization,
World Health Organization Statistics Report, 1972 (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 1973), Table 2.4, p. 29. The
1964 Guatemalan census showed a literate population of
887,622 in a total population of 4,287,999. Of the total
number, 2,338,024 were more than fifteen years of age.
Dirección General de Estadísticas, Censo de Población,
1964. Recent analysis of educational data in Guatemala
indicates that the situation is deteriorating rather than
improving. See: "Dramática situación de la educación
básica: Hay un elevado deficit en todo," La Tarde,
March 10, 1973, p. 4.

[11]During the 1960's, Latin America's population
grew at an average rate of 2.9 percent per annum, although
some countries, e.g., Costa Rica, averaged well above that.

awareness of the growing masses in Latin America, coupled with their primary concern for their health and economic status, makes revolutionary change that much more imminent.[12]

Which Way the Revolution?

Two questions arise from the conclusion that revolution will occur. First, will this revolution be peaceful or violent?

> Revolution in Latin America, economic, social, and political, cannot be prevented or halted. The only question is whether it will be peaceful and democratic or violent and possibly communistic. Since violence can produce political revolution overnight, and since communism can spur social and economic revolution with maximum speed, in however distorted a context, this kind of revolution is

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Guatemala, which has had a population growth of 3 percent or more each year since 1960, has had population growth from 1,633,000 in 1940 to 5,211,926 in 1973, according to preliminary data from the recent census. See: Kenneth Ruddle and A. Oderman (eds.), Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1971 (Los Angeles: Latin American Studies Center of the University of California at Los Angeles, 1972), Table 2, pp. 38-39, and Table 19, pp. 88-89; and Consulate General of Guatemala, "News from Guatemala," X, No. 10 (October, 1973), 2. For a brief overview of possible political implications of the rapid population growth in Latin America, see: Richard Lee Clinton, "Portents for Politics in Latin American Population Expansion," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXV (1971), 31-46. For an analysis of population growth in Latin America, see: J. Mayone Stycos, Human Fertility in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968). On migration to Guatemala City, see: Robert N. Thomas, "Estudio de la migración interna hacia la ciudad de Guatemala" (Guatemala: Sección de Estudios Geográficos de la Dirección General de Obras Públicas, 1969).

[12]For a close examination of the chief fears and aspirations of the populations of four Latin American countries, see: Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

likely to grow in appeal as the patience of the people
steeped for centuries in feudalism and oppression,
wears thin.[13]

Kurzman, it appears, is not very optimistic over the pos-

sibility of peaceful revolution. He is not alone. Among

current writers who see violent revolution as inevitable,

or at least probable, are Gerassi, Horowitz, Debray, and

Petras.[14] Yet, not all viewers rule out the possibility

for peaceful, yet quite rapid and fundamental, change.

Needler considers this a strong possibility, although he

adds that such a process is doubtful in the highly Indian

countries of the region. Alba, while admitting that

revolutions will be of necessity illegal, and possibly,

accompanied by some limited violence, does not see mass

violence as inevitable. Szulc believes that there are some

modernizing forces evolving which may be able to run the

tide against violence, while Clinton points to the Peruvian

military and Lodge views Venezuelan party politics as signs

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[13]Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 10.

[14]Gerassi, op. cit., and John Gerassi, "Violence, Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America," in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi (eds.), Latin American Radicalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 471-95. In the same volume see Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of Latin America," pp. 3-28; and Regis Debray, "Latin America: Some Problems of Revolutionary Strategy," pp. 499-531. Also see Debray's Strategy for Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); and James Petras, "Revolutions and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru," in Petras and Maurice Zeitlan (eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1968), pp. 329-69.

of hope that the needed changes can be brought about
without the necessity of resorting to violence, at least
on a massive scale.[15]

The question of peaceful revolutionary change is
disputed, as is the question arising out of the inevita-
bility of it, i.e., who are the revolutionaries? The
volume of material produced which relates to this question
is extensive and need not be reviewed here.[16] Disagreement

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[15]Martin Needler, Political Development in Latin
America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change
(New York: Random House, 1968). See especially pages
145-48. Alba, op. cit.; Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolu-
tion (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), pp. 21-24;
Richard Lee Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case
of Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIV (1971),
43-66; and George C. Lodge, "Revolutions in Latin America,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIV (1966), 173-97.

[16]Among the more interesting works relating to this
question are Needler, op. cit.; Petras and Zeitlan, op.
cit.; Tannenbaum, op. cit.; Frederick B. Pike (ed.), Free-
dom and Reform in Latin America (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1967); Andre Gunder Frank, Latin
America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1969); Seymour Martin Lipset and
Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967); Irving Louis Horowitz
(ed.), Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1970); J. David Singer, "Individual Values,
National Interests, and Political Development in the
International System," Studies in Comparative International
Development, VI (1970-71), 197-210; Roger Vekemans and
Jorge Guisti, "Marginality and Ideology in Latin American
Development," Studies in Comparative International Develop-
ment, V (1969-70), 221-34; Orlando Fals Borda, "Margin-
ality and Revolution in Latin America; 1809-1969," Studies
in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-71),
63-89; Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin
American Politics," Vanderbilt University: The Graduate
Study Center for Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper
No. 2, 1964; John J. Johnson (ed.), Continuity and Change
in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1964); Jason L. Fink and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political

reigns. We are told that students must be the vanguard of the revolution, yet some studies deny them revolutionary status. We are told that modernization lies in the hands of the evolving middle class, but we are also told that this strata of society in Latin America is more oriented toward the existing oligarchies. In the view of some the military is the key to modernization, while others doubt the possibility of needed changes without the desecration of it. Some praise the Church for its emerging progressivism, as others soundly condemn it for its continued conservatism and identification with the oligarchy.

We cannot and need not seek to answer the questions relative to revolution in Latin America. But, an understanding of the need for revolutionary change, the problems it presents, and the two basic questions which arise from it, are useful for an understanding of the direction of this research. We should, however, bear in mind Pike's

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Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Silvert, op. cit.; Charles W. Wagley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle Class," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVII (1964), 2-10; Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Joan M. Nelson, "Migrants, Urbanization, and Instability in Developing Nations," Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, Occasional Paper in International Affairs No. 22, 1969; Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 833-57; and Daniel Goldrich, "Toward an Estimate of the Probability of Social Revolutions in Latin America: Some Orienting Concepts and a Case Study," Centennial Review, VI (1962), 394-408.

comment that " . . . there is no Latin America: there are only different Latin American nations."[17]

The Tradition

It is true that if revolution is defined as simply an illegal change in government leaders, Latin America does have a revolutionary tradition. Pike has noted that revolution may be the only important political institution developed in Latin America.[18] This revolutionary image and tradition are enhanced by reflecting on the sheer number of Latin American constitutions. No country in Latin America which was independent before the turn of the century has had fewer than four constitutions, and most have had more than ten. Both Venezuela and the Dominican Republic have had twenty-four constitutions.[19] But, the previous statements belie the facts. If we accept the widely held notion of revolution and what this implies, Latin America has experienced only two revolutions, with two abortions of potentially great revolutions, those of Bolivia and Chile.[20] Latin America, therefore, does not

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[17]Pike, op. cit., p. 10.

[18]Ibid., p. 28.

[19]Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1968), pp. 121-22. The 1965 constitution of Guatemala is the country's sixth.

[20]Although the Bolivian revolution is widely held to have been a true revolution at the outset, there is considerable doubt as to what extent the initial changes envisioned have been brought about. See K. H. Silvert,

really have a revolutionary tradition. Its tradition is
one of recurrent or constant political instability charac-
terized by golpes de estado, a tradition which Anderson
has attributed directly to the lack of revolution in the
region.[21]

The golpes de estado which characterize the politi-
cal instability of Latin American systems are themselves
characterized by the lack of significant change resulting
from them. Golpes are military takeovers, often, but not
always, stimulated by pressures from the oligarchy, and
are usually of two types: 1) veto, where the military
steps in to stop the implementation of a measure, series
of measures, or rise to power of an individual or party
looked upon as being of questionable merit, and 2) pre-
ventative, where a series of events leads the military to
conclude that the current elites are not capable of govern-
ing and that it must step in to prevent a complete collapse

Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York:
Random House, 1963), pp. 95-126; and Richard Patch,
"Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution," Annual of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCXXXIV
(1961), 123-32. John Dunn considers the Mexican and Cuban
revolutions two of the eight great revolutions of this
century. See Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1972).

[21]Anderson, op. cit., The root causes of this in-
stability are an issue of wide debate. Needler, op. cit.,
pp. 24-25, sees the problem as one of seeking to apply
Western models in basically non-Western societies. Kling
places the blame on the incompatibility between the
economic and political systems. See Merle Kling, "Toward
a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin
America," Western Political Quarterly, VII (1956), 21-35.

of the government structure. In either case, the result

is seldom revolutionary change, but merely a releasing

of pressure within the political hierarchy and possible

readjusting of the political power of the elites.[22] For

generals and politicians alike, governing becomes a

juggling act, with the president or junta seeking to

balance and offset various political elite groups outside

and within the military. Repeated failures of such systems

are evidenced by such scenes as the election of Velasco

Ibarra as President of Ecuador five times and his failure

to complete even a single term, and the nearly legendary

instability of Bolivia which has averaged one government

per year for nearly all of its 150 years of existence,

including three golpes in as many days during 1970.[23]

<p style="text-align:center">Enter the Alliance</p>

After nearly constant involvement of the United

States in Latin American affairs for more than a century,

a series of events in the late 1950's led to a reappraisal

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[22]José Enríque Miguens, "The New Latin American Military Coup," Studies in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-71), 3-15; Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in Glenn H. Beyer (ed.), The Urban Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 215-54; and Charles C. Cumberland, "Twentieth Century Revolutions in Latin America," Centennial Review, VI (1962), 279-96.

[23]For a brief analysis of political theory in Latin America, see Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin American Political Thought and Ideology (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 335-57.

of United States policy in the area. The events surrounding then Vice President Nixon's trip to Latin America, and particularly the Caracas affair, put the United States government and people on notice that something was very wrong with their Latin American relations. A year later, the rise of Castro in Cuba and his subsequent conversion to Marxism hastened the reappraisal, and soon after the 1961 inauguration of a new administration in Washington the Alliance for Progress was proclaimed with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este. The Alliance was, to a large extent, a light in the dark.[24] It was so for two basic reasons. First, it recognized the need for social change as well as economic growth. Second, it emphasized planning within the development scheme and stressed self-help by the governments of the Latin American countries when it placed the responsibility for the design and implementation of projects, as well as partial financial responsibility, on these governments themselves. The days of a dam here and a road there were supposedly gone, and a massive program of integrated development was to begin.

Such major innovations as tax and land reforms were confirmed by all signatories of the Charter as necessities for development of the region and the success

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[24]For an interestingly critical look at pre-Alliance United States involvement in Latin American affairs, as seen through the eyes of a former Guatemalan president, see Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961).

of the Alliance program. The Charter itself recognized

the need for concomitant social and economic changes, with

both taking place on a pathway leading to the establish-

ment of stable, democratic governments in the region. The

Alliance could be seen as an equation: massive United

States financial aid and technical assistance + broad,

planned, integrated domestic self-help programs = economic

growth + social justice = prosperity + stability =

bolstering of democracy.[25]

The Faltering Alliance

By the mid-1960's it became increasingly clear

that the Alliance was in trouble. Indeed, some had al-

ready proclaimed it dead.[26] This is not to maintain that

the Alliance has failed to contribute in some positive

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[25]Adapted from Szulc, op. cit., p. 233. A copy
of the Charter of Punta del Este is found in Jerome
Levinson and Juan de Onís, The Alliance that Lost Its Way
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 352-71.

[26]The wealth of literature dealing with the
Alliance for Progress cannot be reviewed here. Among
some of the more thought-provoking works, however, are:
Levinson and de Onís, op. cit.; Victor Alba, Alliance
Without Allies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965);
Simon G. Hanson, Dollar Diplomacy Modern Style (Washington:
Inter-American Affairs Press, 1970); MacEoin, op. cit.,
pp. 84-107; Gerassi, The Great Fear, op. cit., pp. 262-92;
Harvey S. Perloff, Alliance for Progress: A Social
Invention in the Making (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press
for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1969); Szulc, op.
cit., pp. 233-81. Also, see the Government Documents
section, "Second Thoughts on the Alliance for Progress,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXVII (1973), 85-96.

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respects to the development of the region. But, if we measure gains in relation to the goals set, the failure becomes clear. There have been few significant changes in the land tenure or tax systems prevalent throughout the region, social reform continues to be sadly lacking rather than an accomplished fact, and the list of elected regimes which have fallen victim to the military axe continues to grow as the political musical chairs proceeds seemingly unabated.

The shortcomings of the Alliance with respect to its goals are the result of numerous circumstances. To some extent, the faltering was due to idealism and over-optimism in Washington. The founders of the Alliance sought to overcome the development barriers with too little money in too short a time. Still, more could have been accomplished with the money and time expended had not other problems arisen, some of them within the Washington bureaucracy itself.[27]

There were numerous and serious shortcomings. After the increasing awareness and hope the Alliance instigated within the Latin American masses, little was done to reach them and involve them in the programs and

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[27]Levinson and de Onís, op. cit., pp. 112-31, have written that " . . . the U.S. government was divided among the warring bureaucratic and political fiefdoms, each pursuing its own special interests. The Congress was at war with the executive; the Treasury was at war with AID; and AID was at war with itself [p. 112]."

projects supposedly for their benefit. It was a
government-to-government, not a government-to-people,
effort.[28] In addition, the Latin American governments,
with few exceptions, never viewed the Alliance as the
Washington bureaucrats and politicians did. Most of them
had no intention of seeking to innovate the sweeping
reforms called for in the Charter. A Mexican delegate, who
had just returned to his capital from an Alliance confer-
ence, referred to the other Latin American delegates pre-
sent by noting that, "They seem to think of the Alliance
for Progress as a huge strongbox raining money. That is
what it means to them."[29]

As a government-to-government program, the Alliance
was chiefly one of dealing with oligarchies, not democra-
cies. Yet, the programs envisioned were intended to
correct that relationship. In short, the oligarchies were
supposed to institute reforms which would lead to their
downfall. As Alba puts it, "The history of the Alliance
reads like a monumental joke. It is the story of a mute
who wanted a deaf man to listen to him; of a bureaucracy
which did not know how to convince the people to lend it
their voice, and which tried to convince the oligarch,
always deaf, to listen to a voice it did not have."[30] The
Alliance was doomed from the outset.

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[28]Alba, Alliance Without Allies, op. cit.,
pp. 182-226.

[29]Ibid., p. 58.   [30]Ibid., p. 127.

Development

The Alliance experiences of the 1960's demonstrated that revolution from above, with "political liberty" and in "democratic societies," is, at best, unlikely. But what of revolutionary development from below in a democratic framework? There has been an increasing awareness of the need for popular involvement in the development process. If development is truly for the Latin American masses, why not involve them in it?

The continuing goal of the development process is an improvement of life for all. It means more than per capita income and improved income distribution. It means more than schools, health facilities and roads. It involves all of these but also involves more basic matters--such as better diets, greater opportunities for self-improvement based on achievement rather than ascription, and equal justice for all.

An important feature of development is its multi-dimensional character. For years, and especially during the 1950's, development was seen as a largely economic problem, including more dams, more roads, more GNP, more production. Only belatedly has development been seen not as a reconstruction program, a la the Marshall Plan, but as a construction program. Development is not only an economic maturation, but also involves social and political

modernization.[31] Of primary concern in the current work

are the political aspects of development.

Political Development

While the current level of knowledge concerning

political development processes is not high from the point

of view of scientific investigation, it is considerably

improved over the limited knowledge which existed prior to

1960. During the past decade a substantial increase in

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[31]As the 1960's progressed, a myriad of writings
and analyses of this fact came into print. Among the more
significant are: Hélio Jaguaribe, Desenvolvimiento
Económico e Desenvolvimiento Político (Rio de Janeiro:
Editôra Fundo de Cultura, 1962); Jaguaribe, Problemas do
Desenvolvimiento Latino Americano (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra
Civilizacão Brasileira, S.A., 1967); and Jaguaribe,
Economics and Political Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968). The latter is largely an English
re-write of the first two in Portuguese. Also, see Lodge,
op. cit.; W. W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Charles W.
Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American Economic
Development," Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966),
235-53; Victor L. Urquidi, The Challenge of Development
in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964);
Edward Swerdlow (ed.), Development Administration: Con-
cepts and Problems (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1963); Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change
in Latin America (Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
1967); Fink and Gable, op. cit.; T. Lynn Smith, Studies
of Latin American Societies (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1970); Hugo Romero Degrefal, "Integración y politización
en un sociedad compuesta," Aportes, XVII (1970), 32-49;
Peter Ranis, "Modernity and Political Development in Five
Latin American Countries," Studies in Comparative Inter-
national Development, IV (1968-69), 19-40; Peter Nehemkis,
Latin America: Myth and Reality (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1964); Martin C. Needler, "Political Develop-
ment and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin
America," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968),
889-97. On problems of Guatemala in particular, see
Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1970).

attention was given to problems of political development and to the analysis of political systems, most of it the work of political scientists.

Although a number of researchers have been involved in an effort to clarify the processes and problems of political development, a few works are of particular note. Among these are the Studies in Political Development series sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.[32] Other works resulting from the rise of interest in political development include those of G. A. Almond with G. B. Powell and S. Verba.[33] Also in the mid-1960's Samuel Huntington introduced the concept of political decay and the fact that in the highly mobilized transitional societies, rather than the more traditional societies, such decay results in political instability.[34] It is Huntington's

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[32]This series consists of seven volumes published between 1963 and 1966. This author found three volumes of particular pertinence to this research: Lucian Pye (ed.), Communication and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[33]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); and Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

[34]Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (1965), 386-430. Also see his volume, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit.

thesis that the increasing awareness and mobilization of expectations and participation resulting from the development process results in political instability, due to the inability or unwillingness of the existing political systems in developing countries to deal with them. Such a thesis relates closely to the efforts of David Easton in his development of an embryo of systematic methodology for the study of political systems.[35] The basic goal of systems analysis is to explain how political systems persist by examining what Easton terms inputs and outputs, the former consisting of demands made on the system and supports placed at the disposal of the authorities to meet them, while the latter consists of actions taken, if any, to meet the demands.

A key concern of political development is the institutionalization of participation so that needed changes are brought about peacefully by working within the political system and, thus allowing for the continued existence of the system itself, a strengthening of it, and an increasing stability of the system. Such a situation allows for more effective and less disruptive changes within the context of economic and social development, as well as political development. Scott has observed the crux

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[35]David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), and Easton, A Systematic Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

of the problem.[36] Improvements in the communication and transportation systems of a developing country are among the first elements to receive substantial attention and are among the easiest improvements to attain. The result of such improvements, however, is to increase the awareness of the body politic to the need for more improvements and changes and to demand them. The problem thus becomes one of incorporating the newly activated populace into the political system, creating channels whereby demands and supports can be communicated to the decision-making authorities, and relaying the output from this process to the politicized masses without overloading the political system and thus causing it to deteriorate and lead to an era of instability.

Political Research and Latin America

A primary concern of this paper is to examine the role of local government, real and potential, in the development process and as a node for the political integration of the state. Although the literature on Latin American politics is extensive, little of it is the result of field efforts to apply concepts of political development in the Latin American context.[37]

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[36]Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties and Policy-Making in Latin America," in La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., pp. 331-67.

[37]Almond and Verba, op. cit., did, however, include Mexico as one of the five countries in their study.

The lack of published works which are the direct result of systematic field research is probably due, in large part, to the difficulties of conducting political research in Latin America. The unstable character of politics in most of the countries has made it a topic which natives are reluctant to discuss frankly. Limitations on such basic freedoms as those of speech, the press, and travel in some countries further limit the possibilities of productive field research. Due to the historical involvement of the United States in Latin American political affairs, "gringos" are particularly suspect when making political inquiries.

Political geographers have failed to meet the need for more systematic research in Latin America, although the region has not been particularly slighted by political geographers generally.[38] The status of political geography research in the region reflects the underdeveloped state of the subdiscipline which is just commencing to recover from the onerous reputation resulting from the geo-politics of World War II. Calls for a revival and new directions

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[38]For an overview of political geography and its state of research in Latin America, see Stanley D. Brunn et al., "The State of Political Geography Research in Latin America," in Barry Lentnek et al. (eds.), Geographic Research in Latin America: Benchmark 1970 (Muncie: Ball State University, 1971), 265-87.

have gone out, however, and it appears that political

geography may be on the rebound.[39]

As systematic field studies of Latin American

politics are lacking, so too is there a dearth of infor-

mation concerning local government in the region. This is

probably due to the historically insignificant role of

municipal government within the political structure.

However, in view of recent gains related to political

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[39]K. W. Robinson, "Diversity, Conflict, and
Changes: The Meeting Place of Geography and Politics,"
Australian Geographer, VIII (1970), 1-15; and Ad Hoc
Committee on Geography, "Studies in Political Geography,"
in The Science of Geography (Washington: Division of
Earth Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council, 1965). Reprinted in Roger E.
Kasperson and Julian Minghi (eds.), The Structure of
Political Geography (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
1969), pp. 57-65. Among some of the more encouraging
recent works in political geography are Stanley D. Brunn,
"A 16-State Nation?" National Observer, July 28, 1973,
p. 1, as reported by David W. Hacker; Roger E. Kasperson,
"Environmental Stress and the Municipal Political System:
The Brockton Water Crisis of 1961-1966," in Kasperson and
Minghi, op. cit., pp. 481-96; Robert W. Mc Coll, "The
Insurgent State: Territorial Basis of Revolution,"
Annals, Association of American Geographers, LIX (1969),
613-31; Mc Coll, "A Geographic Look at Guerrilla Wars and
Urban Riots" (Lawrence: University of Kansas: Department
of Geography, Occasional Paper No. 2); Howard Salisbury,
"The State Within a State: Some Comparisons Between the
Urban Ghetto and the Insurgent State," Professional
Geographer, XXIII (1971), 105-12; Charles O. Collins, "The
Basis for La Violencia in Colombia" (Lawrence: University
of Kansas, Department of Geography, Occasional Paper No. 1);
Edward W. Soja, The Political Organization of Space
(Washington: Association of American Geographers, Resource
Paper No. 8, 1971); Bryan H. Massam, The Spatial Structure
of Administration Systems (Washington: Association of
American Geographers, Resource Paper No. 12, 1971); and
Daniel W. Gade, "Spatial Displacement of Latin American
Seats of Government: From Sucre to La Paz as the
National Capital of Bolivia," Revista Geográfica, LXXIII
(1970), 43-57.

development and systems theory, local government as a
means of aiding in the process of political development
by institutionalizing participation and acting as a
channel of inputs and outputs, warrants closer
examination.[40]

The Direction

Facts, theories, suppositions, and myths concerning
social organization that have been accumulated from
centuries of study have been grouped into ill-defined,
heterogeneous categories called "disciplines," each
of which tends to view the modernization process
through its own vocabulary, concepts, and analytical
tools. Serious students of one of the disciplines
would readily admit that theirs can only be a partial
view of the total modernization process, and that the
total analysis is far more complex than mere addition
of partial analyses.[41]

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[40]The author knows of only one published volume
which is concerned solely with local government in a
single Latin American country. See Brian C. Lawrence,
Local Government in Jamaica (Kingston: University of the
West Indies, 1968). The International Union of Local
Authorities is the only organization which gives consid-
erable publicity to local government. See especially
Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin, The Structure of Local
Government (The Hague: IULA, 1969); and IULA, Local
Government in the Twentieth Century. Proceedings of the
IULA Jubilee Congress, Brussels, 1963 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964). The state of research on local government
in Latin America is reflected in the fact that in the first
eleven issues of the journal Studies in Administrative
Local Government, also published by the IULA, only one
article concerned local government in Latin America.
Volumes of the Area Handbook series published by the
United States Government Printing Office usually include
sections with an overview of local government. More en-
couraging is the rather extensive examination of municipal
government in T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institu-
tions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1972), pp. 569-87.

[41]Agehananda Bharati, "Cultural Hurdles in
Development Administration," in Swerdlow, op. cit., p. 103.

A discipline is of little import. What is far more important is the calibre of research carried on within the discipline. Kling has observed the underdeveloped character of political research in Latin America and called for a more rigorous methodology in examining the region's political phenomena.[42] Speaking for geographers, J. J. Parsons has criticized the tendency to avoid theory and the "tired" methodology vis-á-vis research in Latin America, and Wagner has made a call for more operational and applicable political geographic research.[43]

This work seeks to bring together some concepts of the two disciplines known as geography and political science, and examine in depth a subject long overlooked in Latin America: Local government, its structure, functioning, role in the development process, and significance in terms of institutionalizing political behavior and integrating the state.

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[42]Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pp. 1-36.

[43]James J. Parsons, "The Contribution of Geography," in Charles Wagley (ed.), Social Science Research on Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 33-85; Phillip L. Wagner, "The Hemisphere Revisited," East Lakes Geographer, VI (1970), 26-47.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM AND SITE

Improvements in the transportation and communica-
tion networks in a developing country cause an increased
awakening of the masses. This leads to an increase in the
demands for change and improvement, which the enlarged body
politic places on the political system. To prevent
development-hindering political instability, this increas-
ing participation must be effectively encompassed within
the political system, i.e., institutionalized, and the
resulting demands must be channeled effectively to the
decision-making authorities.

Problem

This dissertation is an effort to examine the role
of local government in the development process, especially
as a means of integrating the state by institutionalizing
political behavior as a communication node between the
central authorities and the masses. Specifically, there
are three objectives:

1. To analyze local government, with special

    emphasis on its organization and function within

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the political system, and to evaluate the role, real and potential, of local government in the development process.

2. To determine the image of the central government as seen through the eyes of local government officials in regard to local development, and the relationship between this image and the following factors: the feeling of political efficacy; the frequency of communication with central authorities; the degree of positive feelings in regard to past local development; the degree of optimism with reference to future local development; physical distance from the power center, i.e., the capital city; political affiliation; and the size of the community.

3. To identify rural and cultural lag in development by an examination of variations in development priorities.

Hypotheses

In 1934, Teixeira de Freitas recognized the poor state of local government as one of the chief barriers to modernization in Latin America and T. Lynn Smith, writing thirty-five years later, viewed the situation as basically

unchanged.[44] Local government does not play a key role

in national integration. Thus, while there has been an

increasing number of efforts at regional integration of

the Latin American countries, the alcalde of Coatepeque,

in Quezaltenango Department, has noted that it is not

possible to seriously attempt such schemes when there is

not, in fact, even national integration.[45]

It may be hypothesized that local government has

not reached its full potential in terms of expediting the

development process. Almond and Powell, for example, have

stated that there is a dire need in developing societies

for the articulation and aggregation of interests and

their communication into the political system.[46] While

local government would seem to be in a position to play a

vital role in this conversion process, our hypothesis

states that it is not playing such a role.

[44]M. A. Tiexeira de Freitas, "Educacão Rural," Revista Nacional de Educacão, XVIII-XVIX (1934), as found in T. Lynn Smith, Studies of Latin American Societies, op. cit., pp. 213-14.

[45]For an example of regional integrationists' writings, see Felipe Herrera, "Disunity as an Obstacle to Progress," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 230-52. "Primero integración nacional y después la centroamericana," Prensa Libre, November 3, 1972, p. 24.

[46]Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 10-12, and chapters 4, 5, and 7.

Our second objective introduces us to the concept

of perception.[47] As Boulding notes, one's perception of

an object is based upon past experiences and the image

which results from them, which is subjective knowledge.[48]

In truth, it is not what is real which is important, but

what we think is real. Thus, Tannenbaum gives considerable

emphasis to the need for a government in Latin America to

have an image of legitimacy as the symbol of authority if

the system is to function.[49] In this regard, one of the

observations of the Rockefeller Report is as follows:

"With the disintegration of old orders which lacked a

popular base, newly emerging domestic structures have had

difficulty in establishing their legitimacy. This makes

the problem of creating a system of political order in

the Western Hemisphere more difficult."[50]

The concept of perception has become of increasing

importance as social scientists have sought to remove man

as a "black box" in their research and make him, as Downs

puts it, an "intervening variable" in explaining

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[47]The complexity of the concept of perception is reflected in the fact that the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences dedicates fifty pages to the subject and recognizes seven types of perception.

[48]Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

[49]Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 145-53.

[50]Rockefeller Report, op. cit., p. 23.

environment-to-behavior relationships.[51] Within the social

sciences, therefore, perception is becoming increasingly

a key element of explanation. Almond and Powell have

recognized the role of perception in interests articulation,

and Abu-Laban has recognized its import in terms of social

change.[52] More recently, perception has come to be of some

significance in organization theory.[53]

In geography, the initial emphasis on natural

hazard perception has bloomed in less than ten years into

what is now almost a subdiscipline of the field. Indeed,

Hudman denotes perception as one of forty basic concepts

in geography, and Moore has observed that, "We [social

scientists] cannot do without some conception of how

people perceive the world and what they do or do not want

to do about it."[54]

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[51]Roger M. Downs, "Geographic Space Perception:
Past Approaches and Future Prospects," in Christopher
Board et al. (eds.), Progress in Geography: International
Reviews of Current Research, II (1970), 27-42.

[52]Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
Baha Abu-Laban, "Social Change and Local Politics in
Sidon, Lebanon," Journal of Developing Areas, V (1970),
27-42.

[53]See, for example, Robert B. Duncan, "Charac-
teristics of Organizational Environment and Perceived
Environmental Uncertainty," Administrative Science Quar-
terly, XVII (1972), 313-27. Also, although perception is
not specifically referred to, it plays a crucial role in
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970).

[54]Lloyd E. Hudman, "Geographic Concepts: The Need
to be Explicit," Journal of Geography, LXXI (1972), 520-25,
and Thomas F. Saarinan, Perception of Environment
(Washington: Association of American Geographers, Resource

In regard to the second objective, this research has sought to determine the image of the central government as seen through the eyes of local officials in regard to the problems of local development. The image variable actually consists of two factors, the perceived effectiveness of the central government in dealing with local development and the perceived level of discrimination, i.e., the degree to which the central government is perceived as not giving equal attention to the _municipios_ of the country.

Once the image has been determined, efforts to explain variations in it are made by relating it to seven variables:

1. _Political efficacy_: Political efficacy is the degree to which one is able to influence political decision-making. We are concerned with perceived efficacy for, as Almond and Verba have observed, the key factor to the civic culture is not that the political masses do affect the political system. Rather, the key is that they must have a feeling of being able to do so should they so desire.[55] It is hypothesized that as the feeling

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Paper No. 5, 1969). See also Barrington Moore, Jr., _Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy_ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 487.

[55]Almond and Verba, _op. cit._, pp. 344-54. Also see the analysis of the role of the feeling of political powerlessness in political systems in Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," _American Political Science Review_, LXIV (1970), 389-410.

of political efficacy increases, so too does the image of the central government.

2. Communication: The strategic role of communication in development is indisputable and has received extensive attention.[56] It is hypothesized that as the frequency of communication with central government increases, the image of the central government also increases.

3. Past progress: It is hypothesized that as positive feelings of past progress in local development increase the image of the central government increases.

4. Optimism: The expectations of local officials are hypothesized to be positively related to the image of the central government, i.e., as optimism in regard to future local development improves, so too does the image of the national government.

5. Travel time: The notion of distance decay is well established in the social sciences. In general, as distance between local officials and the capital

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[56]Pye, op. cit.; Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Phillip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII (1963), 253-64; Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., 120-21; and Edward W. Soja, "Communications and Territorial Integration in East Africa: An Introduction to Transaction Flow Analysis," East Lakes Geographer, IV (1968), 39-57.

city increases, interaction can be expected to
decrease. A proportionate reduction of the image
of the central government is hypothesized as dis-
tance from the capital city increases.

6. Size of community: Urban areas have a larger pool
   from which to attract effective local leaders, and
   a more politically aware electorate.[57] And, since
   there appears to be a direct relationship between
   the size of a community and the feeling of political
   efficacy, it is hypothesized that there is a direct
   relationship between the size of a community and
   the image of the central government among local
   officials.[58]

7. Political affiliation: It is hypothesized that
   members of the same political party as that which
   controls the central government will have a more
   favorable image of it than will members of opposi-
   tion parties.

The third objective of this dissertation is to
search for evidence of rural and cultural lag. The notion
of rural lag in the development process is widely

[57]See, for example, Irving Louis Horowitz, "Elec-
toral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development," in
Beyer, op. cit., pp. 215-54.

[58]Finifter, op. cit., pp. 404-5.

accepted.[59] If lag exists, it should be reflected in the types of priorities which exist in rural versus urban areas. It is hypothesized, therefore, that an analysis of development priorities will indicate that there is a difference between those of rural and those of urban areas.

A second aspect of development lag involves the cultural variable. In the case of Guatemala, the lag notion in regard to Indian areas is commonly accepted.[60] Thus, it is hypothesized that Indian areas will have different development priorities than non-Indian areas.

Selection of the Site

The numerous problems surrounding political research have been mentioned.[61] The objectives of this

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[59]Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," in Petras and Zeitlan, op. cit., pp. 14-18; Benjamin Higgins, "Urbanization, Industrialization, and Economic Development," in Beyer, op. cit., pp. 117-55; Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military . . ., op. cit., pp. 23-24; Marcio Moreira Alves, A Grain of Mustard Seed (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 47-48; and Huntington, Political Order . . ., op. cit., pp. 72-78.

[60]See especially, K. H. Silvert, Conflict Society, op. cit., p. 37; Nathan L. Whetten, Guatemala: The Land and the People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Richard N. Adams, "Politics and Social Anthropology in Spanish America," Human Organization, XXIII (1964), 1-4. There seems to be an increasing awareness of the Indian-ladino disparity in Guatemala within both elements of the society. See Félix Loarca Guzmán, "El Indígena: Factor decisivo para el desarrollo del país," La Tarde, February 21, 1973, p. 4; and "Mejores médios de vida piden los indígenas en el día de Tecún Umán," El Gráfico, February 17, 1973, p. 3.

[61]See page 22.

research make certain attributes of the study site required, or at least desirable. Among these are freedom of travel. More important, perhaps, are a significantly high degree of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. This is especially so in the case of the latter since the research involves some probing questions, the answers to which must be candid if the analysis of data is to be of value.

The study site should be a country which appears to be both modernizing and seeking to incorporate expanding participation within the existing political system. Also, since local government is the primary organ of the political system to be scrutinized, a country in which local government officials are popularly elected and in which there appears to be some concern among these officials over their rights and role in development is also desirable.

If an elimination process is employed, first eliminating countries in which basic freedoms are highly restricted and then eliminating countries in which local government fails to possess even a modicum of independence, the remaining list of possible sites is discouragingly brief: Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Venezuela. Jamaica is too much of an anomaly to study in the Latin American context, and the small number of local units, thirteen parishes, makes statistical inference from any data collected difficult. Of the remaining three possible

GUATEMALA

DEPARTMENTS

BELICE

MEXICO

EL PETEN

Gulf
of
Honduras

ALTA VERAPAZ

IZABAL

HUEHUETENANGO

EL QUICHE

SAN MARCOS

BAJA VERAPAZ

ZACAPA

HONDURAS

1.

EL PROGRESO

QUEZALTENANGO

SOLOLÁ

2.

CHIQUIMULA

RETALHULEU

SUCHITEPEQUEZ

3.

GUATEMALA

JALAPA

ESCUINTLA

SANTA ROSA

JUTIAPA

PACIFIC OCEAN

EL SALVADOR

1. TOTONICAPÁN
2. CHIMALTENANGO
3. SACATEPÉQUEZ

FIG I

study sites, Guatemala was chosen because there appeared to be authentic party competition, as well as the fact that there would be relative freedom to conduct the research. In addition, Guatemala offers an exceptional opportunity to test for cultural lag.

Methodology

The research involved in this dissertation was completed in both formal and informal manners. First, a random sample of the 324 municipios listed in the 1964 census was taken and 108 municipios were selected as research targets (see Appendix B).[62] The alcalde of each of these municipios was interviewed, using an interview schedule (see Appendix C). Key components of the interview schedule are:

A. Communication variable, questions 10-13
B. Channels of communication, question 19
C. Development priorities, question 14
D. Feeling of past development progress and optimism in regard to future development, questions 16 and 17
E. Political efficacy, question 18
F. Image of the central government, question 20

It is important to note that this is not a questionnaire sent to, or handed to, alcaldes for their attention. Rather, it was applied in a conversation-like atmosphere. This format allowed alcaldes to expand upon answers and present their own questions, and permitted the

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[62]For definitions of all Spanish terms used in this dissertation, see the glossary, Appendix A.

GUATEMALA

SURVEY MUNICIPIOS

Municipios in which Alcaldes were interviewed

SACATEPÉQUEZ

SOLOLÁ

FIG. 2

interviewer to probe for a deeper understanding of the community, its problems and its government.

This system also permitted other local officials, especially the secretario, to participate actively in the interview if the alcalde so desired, which, in most instances, he did. Indeed, in three cases the responses to the interview schedule represent almost exclusively the views of the secretario. This does not, however, negate the validity of the data for two reasons. First, secretarios often have more experience within the local government than does the alcalde. Second, the degree to which secretarios responded to interview questions probably reflects accurately the degree to which they actually manage the local government, with the alcaldes dependent on them for advice and action.

Concern with interviewing the alcalde does not necessarily center upon conversing with the most knowledgeable individual in the municipio. Rather, alcaldes were selected for interviews on the basis of their being citizens of the villages or cities which they serve (many secretarios are not), and because they are popularly elected by the citizens. They represent the highest popularly elected officials of the towns.

Informal aspects of the research included the collection of information from numerous libraries and government offices, and attendance at national and regional meetings and conferences of municipal officials.

More important, the author traveled extensively throughout Guatemala where urban and rural landscapes were observed, as well as the facilities of the various towns and cities and the genre de vie of the people. Above all, in terms of educational experiences were the innumerable conversations and discussions with people throughout the country.

Ethnocentricity

There is a clear and present danger whenever one seeks to perform research activities in an alien environment, the danger of ethnocentricity. Kenneth Johnson, for example, in an analysis of the 1966 Guatemalan election, observed: "In nearly every respect, the population is weak, ineffectual, and at the mercy of monopolistic interests. Herein lies a major source of political alienation and instability."[63]

In regard to the above quotation two weaknesses appear which are basically ethnocentric in character. The first sentence is the subjective judgement of its author, since no evidence is provided to actually illustrate that the population is in fact politically weak. This does not mean that the statement is necessarily untrue, but neither should it be accepted as fact simply because it appears in

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[63]Kenneth F. Johnson, "Analysis of the 1966 Presidential Election in Guatemala: March, 1966," Election Analysis Series, Comparative Studies in Political Systems (Operations and Policy Research, Inc., 1966).

print. Second, Johnson's reference to this ineffective-
ness causing alienation and instability is dependent upon
two factors which must be questioned until proof is pro-
vided to substantiate them: that the population wants and
is seeking a greater political role, and that the percep-
tion of the ineffectiveness of the population is that of
the people who make up that population, not simply that of
Johnson. It is well to beware of assuming that others,
particularly others in a foreign environment, see things
the way we do.[64]

It has been observed that:

> One of the serious limitations of the American mind
> is its lack of comprehension of the psychological
> attitudes of other societies. . . . One of the
> great American illusions is the assumption that if
> only other people would understand our point of
> view, they would adopt it readily.[65]

We need not elaborate in great detail on the
problem of ethnocentricity. Needler has made this one of
his major critiques of the labors of United States polit-
ical scientists in political development research.[66] The
author is aware of the problem, and this is the basis for

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[64]The danger of casually applying Anglo-American
and Western European political concepts in the Latin
American context has been recognized by researchers for
more than a generation. See William S. Stokes, "Violence
as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western
Political Quarterly, V (1952), 467-68.

[65]Nehemkis, op. cit., p. 49.

[66]Needler, Political Development in Latin America,
op. cit., p. 3.

the rather large role perception plays in the research involved in this dissertation. Although it is doubtful that ethnocentricity can be completely eliminated, as, for example, in the design of instruments of measurement, efforts have been made to minimize it.

Guatemala

Guatemala's 1964 population was ethnically divided into two major groups, Indians, who comprised 42 percent of the population, and ladinos.[67] The latter comprise approximately 2 percent of the population which is of European ancestry, the less than 1 percent of the population which is black, and the 55 percent mestizo population. While the blacks are largely concentrated in coastal areas, the Indians, who have seldom taken an active part in national politics, are concentrated in the western highlands (Figure 3).

During the nearly three centuries of Spanish domination which preceded independence in 1821, power was concentrated largely in the Crown and its representatives, as well as in a small group of aristocratic peninsulares living in the capital. Such a situation precluded any significant functioning of local government, although in Indian areas the council of elders often played influential roles in local political as well as religious activities.

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[67] Dirección General de Estadísticas, VII Censo de Población, 1964.

GUATEMALA

INDIAN POPULATION - 1964

QUARTILES

- < 7.5%
- 7.5 - 46.8%
- 46.9 - 88.2%
- > 88.3%

SACATEPÉQUEZ

SOLOLÁ

SOURCE: XII Censo de Población, 1964

FIG. 3

Guatemala did not join Mexico's initial movement for independence, but in 1821 the Crown authorities and the peninsulares, declared Guatemala's independence, a move followed by the remaining Central American countries. A decision was made to join Iturbide's Mexican empire, and the emperor commenced to use the country as a staging area for forcibly incorporating the remainder of Central America into his domain.

When Iturbide fell from power, in 1823, Guatemala left its Mexican orbit and cast its fate with the other Central American republics in the United Provinces of Central America. But local and regional differences and jealousies constantly disrupted the functioning of this union, which all but ceased to exist by the mid-1830's. Guatemala officially withdrew from the organization in 1839 and proclaimed itself an independent state.

Between 1839 and 1944, Guatemala's political history revolved largely around four dictators, although elections were held periodically to verify the legitimacy of the regime in power. These four dictators and the era of their rule were: Rafael Carrera, an illiterate, con- servative Indian, 1839-1865; Justo Rufino Barrios, a liberal, 1873-1885; Manuel Estrada Cabrera, 1898-1920; and General Jorge Ubico Cantañeda, who governed until 1944 after his initial election in 1931. Throughout this century of dictatorships, little was accomplished in

changing the face or society of Guatemala, although Barrios

did encourage the introduction of plantation agriculture

and weaken the political authority of the Church to the

point that it has never fully recovered, and Ubico made

significant improvements in the transportation system.[68]

Ubico, as a knowledgeable Guatemalan noted in a

conversation with this author, ". . . managed Guatemala as

if it were his own big finca."[69] Not all was well on the

"finca," however, and in June of 1944 repeated student

demonstrations led the dictator to suspend the Constitution.

This inflamed the students, whose demonstrations grew when

they were joined by railroad workers and bank employees.

On June 30, 1944 military and police efforts to halt a pro-

test rally ended in numerous deaths. The following day

Ubico resigned, turning power over to a military govern-

ment. This regime, however, was overthrown by a "young

Turks" golpe and a new triumvirate took over in October

consisting of Jorge Toriello, a civilian, and colonels

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[68]For this brief overview of Guatemalan political
history the author has relied heavily on John Dombrowski
et al., Area Handbook for Guatemala (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1970); and Hubert Herring, A History
of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968),
pp. 464-80.

[69]Although Ubico remains outside official recogni-
tion as a great president of Guatemala, this author was
repeatedly intrigued by the number of citizens of all
social strata who, being old enough to remember the Ubico
period, recalled it with considerable feeling and fondness.
There appears to be, at least within the forty or older
age group, a widespread belief that Guatemala needs a
benevolent dictator a la Ubico, not a true democracy.

Fransisco J. Arana and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. Thereafter, Ubico was exiled, a call for free elections and a constitutional assembly was made, and Dr. Juan José Arévalo, who had previously been forced into exile by Ubico, returned to seek the presidency. In the first free election in Guatemalan history, Arévalo won a six-year term as President, easily defeating his four opponents.[70]

Under Arévalo, significant social changes were made. A sincere effort was made to incorporate the Indian population into Guatemala's social and economic fabric, and, at least legally, Indians became equal to ladinos. Furthermore, work codes were made into law and enforced; labor was allowed, indeed encouraged, to organize; and a revigorated education program was started. More important, perhaps, were the political changes the Arévalo government brought. The formation of political parties was encouraged and they became a focal point of politics, while local and national offices were made elective. Combined with widened suffrage, these reforms caused a political awakening among the populace heretofore largely ignored. Yet the problem with the new powers and rights thus gained remained all pervading, for the formerly inert political forces depended

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[70]John W. Sloan, "Electoral Frauds and Social Change: The Guatemalan Example," Science and Society, XXXIV (1970), 78-91.

on derived rights, i.e., dependent upon the central
government, and not independent power.[71]

Unfortunately, the 1950 election ended Guatemala's
string of honest and free elections at one. In the pre-
vious year, Colonel Arana was assassinated in what was
widely held to be an act to eliminate him from contention
for the presidency, thus thrusting Arbenz into that posi-
tion as the government party candidate. General Ydígoras
Fuentes appeared capable of offering Arbenz considerable
competition, but the central government refused to recog-
nize two of the political parties backing him, and a
warrant was issued for his arrest on the basis that he was
plotting to overthrow the government. Ydígoras first went
underground, and later fled into exile. With the cards
thus stacked, and military trucks available to carry the
largely ignorant Indian voters to the polls, Arbenz won an
easy victory in November, 1950, over nine other candidates.
Problems soon developed, however. It became apparent that
the Arbenz regime was being infiltrated by communists, and
when a revolutionary (for Guatemala) land reform act was
pressed into law, the previously divided rightist elements

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[71]Adams, Crucifixion by Power, op. cit., pp. 144-45.
For an interesting analysis of the effect of the 1944 to
1954 revolutionary period on Indian peoples, see Adams,
Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian Communities: A
Symposium (New Orleans: Middle America Research Institute
of Tulane University, 1957), and Ruben E. Reina, Chinautla:
A Guatemalan Indian Community (New Orleans: Middle America
Research Institute of Tulane University, 1960).

began to organize their resistance. The United Fruit

Company had lost its lands in Tiquisate and was in danger

of losing its remaining lands on the east coast. Finally,

the Arbenz government purchased a sizeable amount of arms

from the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia, much of which

was to prove useless.[72]

In June, 1954, a disgruntled Colonel Castillo

Armas, who had fled Guatemala after the Arana assassina-

tion, launched an invasion of Guatemala from Honduras,

possibly supported by the United States government and the

United Fruit Company. After four days of light, sporadic

fighting, Arbenz was forced to resign by a military junta

which commenced negotiations with the Armas insurgents.

In July, Armas became Guatemala's ruler. The revolutionary

period ended. But, although the agrarian reform law was

rescinded, the clock could not now be turned back to 1944.

Other changes were more permanent, including a more widely

aware and politically active populace.

Three years after the ascension to power by Armas,

he was assassinated. An election held in October, 1957,

and from which the Partido Revolucionario (PR) was banned,

ended in nullification when the now-returned Ydígoras

claimed that the provisional government had rigged it

against him. This stimulated another round of

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[72]"Useless Weapons and Duds Sent Guatemalans by
Reds, Officer Says," New York Times, July 9, 1954, p. 1.

demonstrations and strikes. The provisional government was overthrown and replaced by a military regime. A second round of voting in January, 1958, in which the PR was allowed to participate, ended after considerable jockeying and Ydígoras was proclaimed the victor.

The Ydígoras regime was plagued by rebellion within the military, the unsuccessful rebellion of November, 1960, leading to the formation of a guerrilla movement, spreading corruption, and an image of inability to govern. Student demonstrations erupted in March, 1962, and the violence associated with them led to an army takeover of the capital city. Another unsuccessful golpe attempt was followed by larger and more numerous strikes and demonstrations. Finally, Ydígoras was overthrown by a military troika led by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia in 1963.

At the time of Peralta's rise to power, the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT), outlawed since the Castillo Armas rise to power in 1954, was weak and ineffectual. Also in existence, however, was a guerrilla band known as the Movimiento Revolucionario-13 (MR-13) which was led by Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa, a United States-trained military officer who, with other junior officers, went underground after an unsuccessful golpe attempt against Ydígoras in 1960. Initially, the guerrillas, operating

mainly in the eastern provinces of Izabal and Zacapa, were of little political or military consequence.[73]

In 1965, Luis Augusto Turcios broke away from the MR-13 and established a second guerrilla operation, the Fuerza Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), which established close relations with the PGT, although like the MR-13 it remained a separate entity. Both guerrilla groups sought to inspire peasant-based revolution and were particularly outspoken opponents of the extensive influence of the United States government and business interests in Guatemala.

During the three-year Peralta reign, little effort was made to combat the guerrillas, whose operations were limited in number, scope, and success. Thus, relative calm was restored to the country, a new constitution was proclaimed, and elections were announced for March, 1966.[74] Three political parties were verified by the Electoral Registry as having the minimum of 50,000 signatures neces- sary to name a candidate for the presidency: The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), which had been formed in 1958 by the Castillo Armas followers from his Movemiento

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[73]Petras, "Revolutions and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America," op. cit.; and Eduardo H. Galeano, Guatemala: Occupied Country (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

[74]For an analysis of the Guatemalan military with special reference to the Peralta era, see Richard Adams, "The Development of the Guatemalan Military," Studies in Comparative International Development, IV (1968-69), 91-110.

Democrático Nacional, and which was rightist; the Partido
Instituto Democrático (PID), a rightist party founded in
1965 and considered the government party; and the Partido
Revolucionario (PR), established in 1958 from the remnants
of the leftist elements of the Arévalo era.

The left-of-center Democracia Cristiana Guatemal-
teca (DC), originally founded in 1955, was not allowed to
name a candidate in view of the claim by the Electoral
Registry that its petitions for recognition as a party did
not contain the minimum of 50,000 valid signatures required
by law.

When the Guatemalan people went to the polls in
March, 1966, they gave a plurality of votes to the PR
candidate, Julio Méndez Montenegro, standing in for his
brother, Mario, who had committed suicide under mysterious
circumstances. The MLN and PID split the rightist vote.
As the results of the elections became clear, tension
increased because the willingness of the military to allow
Méndez Montenegro to take charge of the government came
into doubt. Since he had not received a majority of the
votes, the President would have to be elected by the
fifty-five seat unicameral Congress from among the two top
vote getters. The PR had won control of the Congress.

There appears to have been considerable negotiation
between the apparent victor and the military, the latter
apparently being pressured by the United States government

to work out an agreement to allow Méndez Montenegro to assume the presidency.[75] Such an agreement was finally formulated, Méndez Montenegro apparently making three promises to his military foes: he would choose his Minister of Defense from a list of three nominees of the military, civilians would not be allowed to meddle in military affairs, and the military would be given a free hand to deal with the guerrilla problem.

Thus, in June, 1966, Julio Méndez Montenegro was installed as Guatemala's second honestly elected president.[76] General Arriaga Bosque was named Minister of Defense and Colonel Arana Osorio was placed in command of the Zacapa garrison, whose primary responsibility became one of eliminating the guerrillas with considerable material assistance and technical aid, in the form of advisers, from the United States. The military efforts against the guerrillas were increased with considerable success and the death of Turcios in an automobile crash in October, 1966, denied the FAR movement one of its key leaders. With the situation worsening in the countryside, the guerrillas turned to the cities, especially the capital. Political kidnappings and assassinations came with increasing

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[75]Kenneth F. Johnson, "Guatemala: From Terrorism to Terror," _Conflict Studies_, XXIII (1972), 12.

[76]For comments on the 1966 election, see especially Sloan, _op. cit._; K. Johnson, _op. cit._; and Kenneth Johnson, "Guatemala: From Terrorism to Terror," _op. cit._, pp. 1-17.

frequency as 1967 passed. To carry on an official policy of conciliation while, in actuality, seeking to annihilate the terrorists, two right-wing extremist groups were formed, the Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista Organizado (MANO), which was created in 1966 and became known as the "white hand," and the Nueva Organización Anticommunista (NOA), which was formed in 1967.[77]

The pace of violence increased in 1968 as the virtual civil war between paramilitary leftist and rightist groups continued. In August, the United States ambassador, attempting to flee from his would-be kidnappers, was murdered. In the same year, the Archbishop of Guatemala was kidnapped. The resulting furor was but little reduced with his release and accusation of rightist elements as guilty of the deed. Obviously Méndez Montenegro had to act. The "founding fathers" of the right-wing groups, General Arriaga Bosque and Colonel Arana were given new assignments, the former as consul in Miami, a popular post for exiling troublesome individuals, and the latter as ambassador to Nicaragua.

By 1970, the MR-13 and FAR had been practically eliminated as guerrilla movements, but terrorism continued. New elections were scheduled for March, despite the terrorism which was becoming less discriminate in terms of its victims. Again, there were three parties involved. The

[77]Ibid.

right, having learned the lesson of splitting the rightist vote in 1966 was represented by a MLN-PID coalition and nominated now-returned Colonel Arana for president. But, while the right was now united at the national level, the leftists were split as a result of the recognition of the DC as a party in 1968. With the leftist vote thus split between the DC and the PR, and the population generally tired of terrorism and eager for law and order, the choice was clear. Arana, his image enhanced by the creation of a death squad known as Ojo por Ojo, won a plurality of the votes and was easily elected President by the now dominant MLN-PID coalition in Congress.[78]

Since Arana's inauguration an intense anti-guerrilla campaign has been largely successful in destroying the terrorist movement, although the pace of killing increased during the first year of his regime. The rightist extremists have been effective in the cities. In the countryside, the death of Yon Sosa in a skirmish with a Mexican patrol force near the border denied the rural guerrilla movement of its second leader.

As this dissertation is being written, Guatemalans are approaching a new election. The MLN-PID coalition continues and has nominated ex-Minister of Defense General Kjell Laugerud for the presidency with Mario Sandoval

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[78]Kenneth Johnson, "The 1966 and 1970 Elections in Guatemala: A Comparative Analysis," World Affairs, CXXXIV (1971), 34-50.

Alarcón as nominee for vice-president. Both men are veteran leaders of the right wing extremists groups. The PR and DC, both of which were initially badly torn by internal disputes between would-be civilian nominees, have finally nominated military men for the presidency. General Efraín Rios Montt is the candidate of the DC-based Frente de Oposición Nacional, and Colonel Ernesto Paíz Novales will be the PR nominee.[79]

Whether the nomination of military officers represents an elaborate military ploy to control and split the opposition, or is really a reflection of factions within the military itself is not clear. What is clear is that the violence, while lessened in its intensity, is not over. Mysterious disappearances, kidnappings, and robberies continue, as does the appearance of clandestine cemeteries.[80]

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[79]"Guatemala: Heads I Win," Latin America, November 2, 1973, pp. 348-49.

[80]For an early analysis of the terrorism in Guatemala, see James Nelson Goodsell, "Guatemala: Terrorist Territory," The Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 1966, p. 9. For more recent developments, see Henry Goethals, "Arana Still in Trouble," The Times of the Americas, July 21, 1971, p. 1; "Dos Cadaveres más y suman doce los muertos del km. 21," La Tarde, March 9, 1973, p. 1; "Diputado Solís Jaurez, acribillado a balazos," La Tarde, June 4, 1973, p. 1; and "Encuentros armados," Prensa Libre, June 15, 1973, p. 8.

CHAPTER III

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GUATEMALA: REALITY

Local government, while having a long history in
Guatemala, is but a small portion of the total governmental
machinery.   Power, both political and economical, is con-
centrated at the top, in the executive branch of the
central government.[81]

National Government

Although Guatemala's central government consists of
the three traditional branches, the concentration of power
lies in the hands of the President.   He dominates the
governmental power structure, due largely to the ineffec-
tiveness of the legislative branch.   This fact is recog-
nized not only by foreign researchers, but also by Deputies

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[81]Harry Kantor, Patterns of Politics and Political
Systems in Latin America (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.,
1967, pp. 72-97; and Kenneth Thompson and Herman Lujan, "El
sistema administrativa nacional de Guatemala," in Lujan
(ed.), Estudios Sobre Administración Pública en Guatemala
(Guatemala: Instituto Nacional de Administración para el
Desarrollo, 1969), pp. 15-57.

of the Congress.[82] While the President and the deputies

are elected by separate ballots, few voters change parties

in the voting process. Thus, both Méndez Montenegro,

elected President in 1966, and Arana Osorio, the current

President elected in 1970, have had substantial majorities

in the Congress, which has never proved to be a barrier to

legislation the President earnestly sought. Though justices

for the highest courts of the country are, according to the

Constitution, appointed by the Congress, they are in fact

appointed by the President and approved by Congress. Bona

fide appointments by the President are not subject to re-

view by, or the approval of, Congress. Guatemala's fifty-

five seat unicameral Congress, therefore, is not an active

innovator nor participant in the national development

process, being totally subservient to the President. Such

a situation is indicative of a low degree of political

maturity, and severely restricts the ability of members of

Congress to act as a means of communication for local

officials.[83]

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[82]Weston H. Agor, Latin American Legislators:
Their Role and Influence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1971), pp. 193-324; and "Rapapolvo a diputados que no
trabajan bien," Prensa Libre, February 23, 1973, p. 17.

[83]Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber (Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1960), p. 444. According to Weber a politically
mature system requires a legislative branch in which great
problems are not only debated but also decided.

Each of Guatemala's twenty-two departments has a governor who is appointed or removed by the President and who, both legally and in reality, represents the President within the department. Until recently, no governor was allowed to serve in any given department for more than three successive years. This law was changed in 1973 to lift all restrictions on a governor's tenure of office. The primary duty of governors is to ensure the enforcement of national laws and presidential decrees, and there has been a noticeable tendency to appoint military figures to these positions. During the first three years of the Arana administration, only two of the more than forty governors appointed were civilians. Department government, therefore, offers another example of the centralization of authority in the national system. Because of its character it, too, fails to form a major two-way channel of communication between local authorities and the central government decision-makers. No departmental legislature or other governmental authority exists.

Municipalidades seeking technical or financial assistance from the central government are confronted with a bureaucracy characteristic of Latin American countries— large, uncontrolled, generally inept, and corrupt.[84]

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[84]The notoriety of Latin American bureaucracies is such as to need no detailed analysis here. For recent works dealing with the Guatemalan bureaucracy, see Lujan, op. cit.; and Jerry L. Weaver, "Bureaucracy During a Period of Social Change: The Guatemalan Case" (Austin: The Latin

Guatemala's central bureaucracy, consisting of more than 43,000 personnel, consumes nearly 50 percent of the total national budget and is manned almost exclusively by people who have spent most of their lives in Guatemala City.[85]

Not only is there a wasteful lack of coordination and cooperation among agencies of the central government, but also there is jealous rivalry and competition among them. With no civil service protection, the myriad of government agencies scramble to prove their worth to the President and his ministers by producing a vast array of studies and reports which often mean little and usually lead to nothing. As could be expected in a developing country, there are mountains of reports and plans dictating what should be done and, while researchers seem to abound, money and implementors appear to be notably scarce.

The size of the bureaucracy is the result of several factors, among them the low productivity per worker, political patronage, and the haunting problem of high

American Development Administration Committee of the Department of Government, University of Texas, Occasional Papers, Series 2, No. 2, 1971. An earlier study is that of K. H. Silvert, A Study of Government: Guatemala (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, 1954).

[85]Joel G. Verner, "Characteristics of Administration Personnel: The Case of Guatemala," Journal of Developing Areas, V (1970), 73-86. Verner's analysis of data collected from 327 decision-makers and supervisory personnel in 1967 shows that 88 percent of them had spent most of their life in Guatemala City. Respondents to this survey averaged forty-one years of age and had an average of fifteen years of public service.

unemployment. Since members of the bureaucracy invariably view themselves as being sadly underpaid, they rationalize their low productivity and widespread graft. Both of these factors contribute to the largely uncontrolled nature of the bureaucracy, but there are other considerations.

Although the upper echelons of the bureaucracy appear to be apportioned to competent administrators, the caliber of personnel tends to decrease considerably in the lower strata, a common characteristic of bureaucracies in developing countries with high rates of illiteracy and a generally poorly educated populace. Furthermore, with no civil service protection, bureaucrats tend to stabilize their own positions first and only secondarily concern themselves with the development progress. No matter how capable and well intentioned the decision-maker at the top, the decisions seem to lose their force and urgency as they percolate down through the bureaucracy to the implementors. Disgruntled alcaldes, caustically critical of the slowness with which solicitations to the central government are handled, usually place responsibility for this lack of interest beyond the reach of the President and his ministers and blame the bureaucracy. Within the central government there are three agencies of particular pertinence to this research in that they deal primarily with municipios. These are INFOM, INAD, and FYDEP.

Created in 1965, INFOM, the Instituto Nacional de
Fomento Municipal, is the chief central agency concerned
with municipal affairs. In part, it is financed by funds
collected from the tax on liquor and by direct contribu-
tions on the part of the central government. The law
creating INFOM requires the national government to allot
a certain, but undetermined, percentage of the national
budget to the institute. In reality, this has not been
enforced, and INFOM is therefore funded largely at the
whim of the President, although theoretically it functions
as an autonomous agency of the Ministry of Public Finances.

A Board of Directors governs INFOM. The Board
consists of three members appointed by the President, the
Monetary Board, and the Associación Nacional de Municipal-
idades (ANAM). The appointee of the President automatically
becomes president of the Board of Directors. A manager
elected by the Board has charge of the day-to-day func-
tioning of the agency.

The primary objective of INFOM is to plan and
finance municipal public works and service projects. In
addition, it offers technical assistance to municipal
governments in budgetary matters, bookkeeping, and taxa-
tion policies. The institute also has responsibility to
oversee the spending of municipal monies, especially with
regard to municipal funds gained from taxes on gasoline,

beer, liquor and coffee, since the use of these funds is restricted by national law.

All municipios seeking loans must borrow from the Institute or have the Institute's approval of its loans from other sources. According to law, the interest rate on loans may not exceed 5 percent per annum, although the Institute often adds a service charge of up to 10 percent of the loan value for a variety of technical services.[86]

In addition to the funds gained from the liquor tax, INFOM receives funds directly from the central government. The 1973 national budget earmarked $1.8 million for INFOM, a sum which was later raised to $2.8 million when the Congress approved the issuance of $17 million in bonds, $1 million of which was assigned to INFOM.[87] A final source of capitalization is the repayment

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[86]This has led to some interesting developments. Although INFOM has a generally good image among alcaldes, the practice of charging a service fee for technical assistance has ired some and appears to result in increasing discontent with the agency. See, for example, "Gestiones de las municipalidades de Huehuetenango," Prensa Libre, May 30, 1973, p. 8.

A second result of the service charge has been a virtual deluge of request to Peace Corps volunteers for technical advice and service in an apparent effort by municipalidades to skirt the INFOM service charge. To offset this, the agency has recently begun to insist that plans not designed by INFOM technicians be approved by them before a loan for the project can be granted.

[87]Close scrutiny of the 1973 national budget reveals some interesting facts, one of which regards the budget for the Public Relations Bureau of the Presidency ($485,400) in relation to the central government commitment to INFOM ($2.8 million). Yet, INFOM fairs better than the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria

of previous loans. This resulted in an increase of the institute's budget to $4.5 million in 1973.

As to the disbursement of funds, INFOM determines a debt capacity for each municipio of the country, based upon the municipio's income from taxes on gasoline, coffee, beer, and liquor, its population, and the current municipal debt. This does not mean that each municipio actually obtains funds up to its debt capacity, since the limited capital funds of INFOM could not provide for such a sum. Rather, these calculations establish the limit within which loans may be approved.

Although the municipalidad of Guatemala has sought loans from INFOM in the past, it now has only one outstanding debt with the institute. In recent years, the city, badly in need of vast sums of money, has sought loans through the issuance of bonds, an act which requires the approval of Congress. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the miniscule resources of INFOM are not drawn upon it by the capital city.

A second agency of the central government of key importance to local government is INAD, the Instituto Nacional de Administración para el Desarrollo. INAD was created in 1964 and represents a noteworthy, positive contribution of the Alliance for Progress to Guatemalan

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(INTA), which is primarily responsible for land redistribution and colonization projects. INTA was budgeted only $400,000 from the central government in 1973.

government. An autonomous agency of the Ministry of Education, the primary purposes of INAD are to: 1) examine, and offer solutions to, development administration problems; 2) offer technical assistance to national and municipal government employees; and, 3) train students for future government employment.

INAD has developed an effective series of courses in development administration and offers a limited number of scholarships to interested and qualified students. In addition, the Institute has begun a series of regional workshops for alcaldes, secretarios, and tesoreros in an effort to acquaint them with effective and efficient administrative procedures and offer suggestions for the improvement of municipal financing. While programs such as these are limited by financial and personnel considerations, they appear to be effective and should be expanded.

Although the municipios of the Department of El Petén seek loans and technical assistance from INFOM and INAD, the economic development of this sparsely populated northern third of Guatemala is the responsibility of another central government agency which deals intimately with the municipios, Fomento y Desarrollo Económico de El Petén (FYDEP). Created in 1959 in an effort to give special emphasis to the region, the agency is wrought with problems. Both alcaldes and the citizenry generally condemn the agency for its ineptness and corruption. Its

responsibilities for road construction bring it into con-
flict with the Ministry of Communications and Public Works,
while its agrarian development policies conflict with those
of the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria (INTA).
Finally, FYDEP's total budget for 1973 was $1.8 million,
of which 35 percent was destined for payment of the agency's
debts. Of the total budget, only $304,000 came as capital-
ization from the central government. The bulk of the re-
maining funds were derived from the sale of wood on national
lands and a tax on the export of chicle. In view of the
local reputation of FYDEP and the other problems it con-
fronts, the need for substantial reform, if not outright
abolition, is clear.

INFOM, INAD, and FYDEP currently form the principal
points of contact between the national and local govern-
ments of Guatemala. The function of local government and
its relationship to the central government in terms of
development are better understood, however, with some
historical perspective.

Local Government: History

When the Spanish began their drive to regain land
from the Moorish invaders during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, it established a two-step procedure.
First, a fort was built and manned. Later, peasants were
enticed to settle land which surrounded the fort. One of
the inducements to attract settlers was the establishment

of local governments to deal with strictly local affairs
and the election of officials by heads of households in
open meetings. As the Crown's hold on the land and its
people became more secure, however, local government be-
came increasingly more restricted and less powerful.[88]

A similar pattern appeared in the Spanish colonies
of the New World. In the most established, populous, and
accessible settlements, the Crown placed authority in the
hands of a few appointees. By 1520, the Crown was appoint-
ing members of the municipal councils, and by 1560 such
positions were being sold as a means of gaining revenue.
Only in the more remote and isolated or Indian communities,
which in Guatemala frequently coincide, did a significant
degree of local autonomy exist.[89]

The successful independence movements of the
Spanish colonies in the early decades of the 19th century
did not noticeably alter the situation. Caudillos and
their representatives merely replaced the Crown and its
representatives as the symbols of authority. And, as the
country's infrastructure developed and communication between
settlements and the capital city increased, local autonomy
and self-reliance decreased. After World War II, the rise

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[88]Harold F. Alderfer, Local Government in Develop-
ing Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 17-20.

[89]John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Municipality
Deteriorates," Inter-American Economic Affairs, V
(1951), 26-27.

of concern for economic development further stimulated this

movement toward centralization. The almost universal view

was that the needed changes and programs could only be

instituted by a strong central government. As a result,

the pace toward centralization quickened and local govern-

ment became an obvious victim of this trend.[90] In the

case of Guatemala, the continued centralization of author-

ity is widely recognized as a development problem even by

members of the central government.[91]

<div align="center">Local Government: Composition</div>

Guatemala's 324 municipios vary considerably in

both area and population. The smallest municipio is

Sumpango, in the Department of Sacatepéquez, which has

an area of only 3.1 square miles. San Andrés, in the

Department of El Petén, with an area of 5,502 square miles

(about equal to the State of Connecticut), is the country's

largest municipio. These two municipios also offer a

clear example of the uneven character of the population

distribution in that Sumpango, with a population of more

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[90]Ibid., p. 24.

[91]See, for examples, Secretaría General del
Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica, "Papel de los
gobiernos locales en el desarrollo agrario y urbano del
país y fortalecimiento del gobierno municipal a través
del desarrollo regional" (Guatemala, 1970); and Instituto
Nacional de Administración para el Desarrollo, Informe
del Primera Seminario Nacional Sobre Administración para
el Desarrollo Municipal (Guatemala, 1967).

than 8,000 in 1964, has nearly four times the population of San Andrés.

With the possible exception of those municipios adjacent to other countries, Article 8 of the Municipal Code indicates that municipios should possess a minimum of 5,000 inhabitants. However, this law has not been enforced, primarily due to the myriad of problems which would result from the political reforms necessary to meet this legal requirement. Thus, the 1964 census indicates that more than one-third of Guatemala's municipios contained less than 5,000 people, and seven contained less than 1,000. The population of Santa Ana, El Petén (311) contrasts sharply with the nearly one million population of Guatemala City.

In each municipio, the largest settlement is the capital (cabecera municipal), while the hinterland is composed of aldeas, small clusters of houses, caserios, areas of scattered settlement, and finca, farm, settlements. Municipios themselves are divided into four categories according to the basis outlined in the Municipal Code. These categories are:

Category I: Municipios which are department capitals the population of which exceeds 100,000, and those which the President feels are of such importance as to warrant this classification. There are twenty-two Category I municipios, each of them a department capital.

Category II: Municipios with a population of more
                 than 10,000 and ports, regardless of
                 their population. There are eighty-
                 nine Category II municipios.

Category III: Municipios with a population of 5,000-
                 10,000. This category contains 103
                 municipios.

Category IV: Municipios with fewer than 5,000
                 inhabitants. Category IV municipios
                 number 110.

The chief elected official of the municipalidad,
the municipal corporation which governs the municipio, is
the alcalde. In addition to being charged with the day-
to-day functioning of the government, the alcalde also
has responsibility for presiding over meetings of the
town council, formulating the budget and overseeing its
disbursement, appointing and removing employees of the
town except for the secretario and tesorero, overseeing
the construction of municipal projects and maintenance
of municipal services, and the maintenance of an inventory
of all municipally owned goods and lands.

Until recently, the alcaldes of most Category II,
III, and IV municipios also acted as the local Justice of
the Peace. Category I and some Category II municipios had
a separate individual to serve in this capacity. A recent
change in the law has placed responsibility for the
appointment and payment of Justices of the Peace in the
hands of the judicial branch of the central government.
To what degree this act will alter the current

alcalde-Justice of the Peace relationship which dominates in most municipios is not clear.

Legislative activities of local government are performed by the town council (consejo) which consists of one, or possibly two, síndicos and a number of councilmen. A síndico (trustee) differs from a councilman in that he is considered the leader of the council itself with responsibility for signing all important documents regarding municipal affairs, seeing that the alcalde carries out the duties assigned by the council, and representing the municipal government in cases brought before civil tribunals. In the case of the last-mentioned charge, few síndicos actually fulfill it. They usually turn to the Associación Nacional de Municipalidades (ANAM) for legal advice and assistance. A síndico also often oversees the functioning of some of the more important local activities, such as education and the use of municipally owned lands.

Article 30 of the Municipal Code limits the number of council members as follows: municipios of the first category may have as many as twenty council members, those of the second and third categories may have up to fourteen councillors, and municipios of the fourth category may have as many as eight members on their council.

Alcaldes, síndicos, and councilmen compose the municipal corporation (municipalidad), and are popularly elected for terms of four years in municipios of the first

and second categories, and for terms of two years in the smaller municipios. No member of the municipalidad may serve successive terms in the same office, although many leave office for a period and return. In Indian areas, the Council of Elders often selects the candidates for elective positions and the popular election which follows is a mere formality.

The municipalidad has six basic responsibilities: 1) the establishment of local ordinances, 2) the determination of local taxes and tax rates within the limits set by national law, 3) the selection of a secretario and a tesorero to serve the municipio, 4) the selection of municipal improvement projects, 5) the establishment of the annual budget of the municipio, and 6) the maintenance of local services.

The pay of corporation officials varies considerably and usually depends on the financial status of the local treasury. Only a very few of the larger and wealthier municipalidades pay councilmen or síndicos. Alcaldes receive some payment for their services since they occupy full-time positions, although in the smallest and poorest communities the salary may be as little as fifteen dollars per month. Sometimes months pass without this payment being made, due to the lack of municipal funds. However, since most alcaldes consider it an honor and obligation to serve the municipio, the poor pay does not appear to affect the manner in which they perform their duties.

Municipal corporations are usually dominated by
men who live in the capital of the _municipio_, inasmuch as
members of it are elected on an at-large basis. One of the
methods whereby contact with the inhabitants of the out-
lying settlements of the _municipio_ is maintained is via
alcaldes auxiliares. These men, appointed by the _alcalde_,
act as a means of communication between the people and the
municipal corporation and enforce the laws and ordinances
of the _municipio_. They may also collect local taxes.

Each _aldea_ of a _municipio_ has at least one _alcalde_
auxiliar. Some have two, with each serving in alternate
months. In addition, the _alcalde_ may appoint _alcaldes_
auxiliares in any _caserios_ or _finca_ settlements which he
feels warrants such a post. _Alcaldes auxiliares_ serve
without pay and have an assistant who also serves without
pay.

Each municipal government has at least two other
appointed officers, the _secretario_ and the _tesorero_.
Appointed by the town council, these salaried officers
have no civil service protection and serve indefinite
terms of office.

The _secretario_ has responsibility for the day-to-day
functioning of the _alcalde_'s office. He transmits all
communications, posts new municipal ordinances and notices,
and maintains municipal records. In addition, he attends
all corporation meetings, takes the minutes, and carries out

a variety of other duties assigned to him by the council or alcalde. He also prepares, for the President of the country, an annual report which summarizes municipio activities.

The tesorero collects and disburses tax monies and maintains the financial records for the municipalidad, and, in conjunction with the alcalde, formulates the annual budget of the local government. Additionally, he prepares an annual report to inform two agencies of the central government, the Controlaría de Cuentas and INFOM, of the municipio budget for the ensuing year and the actual expenditures of the previous year. Finally, he informs the Dirección General de Estadísticas each month of what funds have been collected and disbursed for the previous month.

All of the previously denoted positions are found in every municipio. Municipal governments in larger municipios, however, often have additional officers appointed by the alcalde. Such positions may include a civil registrar, who records the permanent movement of citizens into and out of the municipio and births and deaths within it. He also maintains the local voting lists.[92]

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[92]Legal provisions make it mandatory that two separate voting lists be maintained, one for literate and one for non-literate voters. By law, all literate citizens eligible to vote in elections must do so. The law is not, in fact, enforced. In addition, Article 27 of the Electoral Law requires that no less than 20 percent of the signees of petitions presented for the authorization of the formation of a political party be literate.

While almost all <u>municipios</u> have some form of police protection provided by the national government, many <u>munipalidades</u> also maintain a small local police force. Very few municipal corporations can afford the luxury of other, usually technical, officials such as a lawyer to serve as Justice of the Peace or an engineer to supervise municipal projects.

Appointed officers of municipal government usually are better educated than elected officials and consequently, often play strategic roles in municipal affairs. This is particularly true of the <u>secretario</u>. Therefore, while substantial change in the composition of elective offices takes place following each election, it is common for non-elected officials to remain in their positions. This allows for some degree of continuity in municipal government.

Local Government: Responsibilities

Guatemalan law endows the <u>municipalidad</u> with autonomy to deal with all affairs which are strictly local in nature. This includes everything from taxation to planning for national and local holidays. According to the Municipal Code, the primary objectives of municipal government are to decentralize authority and provide for local services.

Article 22 of the Municipal Code lists the major service responsibilities of local government and divides them into two categories. First are the essential services,

which include provision of the <u>municipio</u> with potable

water, a sewerage system, a slaughtering house, a market,

a plaza, and street cleaning. For these services, local

citizens may not be taxed or assessed an amount in excess

of the actual costs of construction and maintenance of the

service. Assessments for discretionary services, however,

may be made in such manner as to allow the <u>municipalidad</u>

to make a profit. Such services include a transportation

system, electricity and public lighting, public baths,

recreation fields and parks, and public theatres and social

salons. <u>Municipalidades</u> also are responsible for fire

protection in the <u>municipios</u>, although few of them actually

have fire fighting equipment or an organized fire fighting

force. Finally, the provision and maintenance of ceme-

teries are the responsibility of the individual <u>municipios</u>.

The Municipal Code requires, under Article 60,

that each <u>municipalidad</u> form such local committees as are

necessary to oversee the functioning of local government

and services. The law requires the local government to

form five such committees to deal with 1) municipal

finances and municipal property, 2) public health, 3) urban-

ization, public works, and municipal roads, 4) education,

culture, and tourism, and 5) agriculture and forestry.

Municipal government in Guatemala operates under

two myths. One is the myth, now disappearing, that

municipal government can fulfill its responsibilities,

particularly within the bounds set by the second myth,

the myth of local autonomy. In regard to autonomy,

Article 1 of the Municipal Code clearly states:

> The municipio is the entity of Public Law which
> constitutes all residents of a municipal district.
> It possesses autonomy to give its authorities, and
> to exercise by means of them, the governing and
> administration of its own interests.

The myth is further propagated by Article 233 of the 1965

Constitution:

> An autonomous regime for the government of the
> municipios is established which comprises the
> rights to use its own resources, to accomplish
> its own ends, and to administer local public
> services.

The 1966 Panajachel conference of central and local govern-

ment officials further promoted the myth and formulated

the motto "socios para el desarrollo" (partners for

development) to describe the relationship between local

and central government in Guatemala in regard to develop-

ment.[93] Autonomy and local government responsibilities

are myths for three basic reasons, 1) contrary legal re-

strictions, 2) the manner in which local government is

financed, and 3) the caliber of local government officials.

Myths and Contrary Legal Restrictions

The legal barriers that prevent local government

from assuming its responsibilities and legal restrictions

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[93]For a complete report of the Panajachel con-
ference, see Instituto Nacional de Administracion para
el Desarrollo, op. cit.

on local autonomy are many. The Municipal Code requires that within the first fifteen days of each year, the secretario municipal forward to the President of the Republic, by way of the department Governor, a report of events and acts of the municipalidad during the past year year.[94] In addition, all agreements between a municipalidad and a private individual or company that provides for a public service must be approved by the Executive. Both of these actions impinge upon municipal autonomy, although it may be interpreted as a protective rather than a restrictive form of infringement. Far more pervading than these restrictions, however, are those which deal with the number and form of municipios and questions of municipal autonomy in terms of financing.

While the Constitution recognizes the right of municipios to associate, the Executive must approve all merger agreements. This is a blatant incursion on municipal autonomy which is surpassed only by Article 230 of the 1965 Constitution which grants to the Congress the power to alter and modify all municipal boundaries. The Congress has legal power to redraw the political map of

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[94]The actual terms used in the Municipal Code is "the Executive," rather than the President. This term appears in many laws regarding municipal government, and is only hazily defined in that the Executive consists of not only the President, but also his ministers and the Council of State, an advisory body. Therefore, papers and solicitations sent to the Executive may actually require action on the part of the President, or he may prefer to refer them to a lesser official of the executive branch of government.

Guatemala by redefining municipal boundaries. This fact, above all others, is what makes the concept of municipal autonomy a myth. It should not be construed that such restrictions on municipal government and its autonomy are invariably negative. However, the perpetuation of the myth of autonomy does little to enhance the development of Guatemala or relations between the local and national levels of government.

Of almost equal weight to political matters in terms of municipal limitations are financial restrictions and requirements. Presently, the law requires each municipalidad to submit to an annual examination of its expenditures by the Controlaría de Cuentas, an autonomous agency of the central government. Furthermore, the Municipal Code outlines the means whereby municipal budgets are to be formulated. Such budgets must also be approved by INFOM. Again, one could consider such requirements as protective and beneficial rather than restrictive, but the balance between the two tends to fall more heavily on the restrictive side. Laws passed by the Congress not only limit the types of taxes a municipal corporation may impose, they also limit the rates of local taxation. Article 235 of the Constitution, for example, clearly states that the creation of municipal excise taxes re- quires the approval of the Executive. An example of rate restrictions is found in Article 98 of the Municipal Code,

which proclaims that under no circumstances should the beneficiaries of a municipal improvement project be forced to pay more than 70 percent of the actual cost of a project.

A further restriction on municipal spending concerns the use of funds distributed to the municipalidades by the central government from taxes on gasoline, coffee, beer, and liquor. The use of these monies is restricted largely to municipal public works projects. Thus, for example, the funds a municipalidad gains from the tax on gasoline may not be used to pay a doctor. Finally, while municipal corporations have the power to borrow money in the name of the municipio, all such loans must be made with, or with the approval of, INFOM.

It would be difficult to contend that all of the restrictions on municipal government are negative. Few would doubt the validity of formulating some means whereby national government officials are informed of events and actions taking place within the municipios of the country. However, it is clear that municipal government is not autonomous to manage even strictly local affairs, and one wonders what is to be gained from continuing the propaganda maintaining the myth. Nor are municipal governments capable of meeting the responsibilities assigned to them by the laws passed by the central government.

Municipal Financing and the Myth
of Responsibilities

Municipal spending rose from less than ten million

dollars in 1957 to a peak of forty-two million in 1969.

During the current (Arana) administration, municipal

spending has decreased each year, reaching a low of less

than twenty-four million in 1972. In part, fluctuations

in municipal revenues and spending may be related to the

overall national economy. There is, however, an interesting

pattern of a substantial increase in municipal spending in

the years immediately preceding national elections, a pat-

tern which may be repeated under the present regime.[95]

National government spending, as opposed to

municipal spending, has been consistently on the rise in

recent years, increasing from $112,555,523 in 1968 to

$250,945,826 in 1972. Central government expenditures

for 1973 almost topped the $300,000,000 mark.[96] Thus,

whereas municipal spending accounted for approximately 25

percent of all government expenditures in the late 1960's,

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[95]See "Podrá gestiones la comuna préstamo por
Q3 millones," La Hora, February 8, 1973, p. 1; "Pres-
upuesto municipal," Prensa Libre, November 23, 1972, p. 2;
"Aprobados los presupuestos del FYDEP e intendencia de
bancos," El Gráfico, March 20, 1973, p. 8; "Ejecutivo
solicita emisión de bonos por Q17 millones," Prensa Libre,
May 30, 1973, p. 39; and "Q18 millones en bonos, autorizó
el Congreso hoy," La Hora, July 5, 1973, p. 1.

[96]Dirección Técnica del Presupuesto, Presupuesto
de Ingresos y Egresos del Estado, Ejercicio 1973
(Guatemala: Ministerio de Finanzas Públicas, 1973). One
Guatemalan Quetzal equals 1 U.S. dollar.

by 1973 it had dropped to about 10 percent of total government spending. Inasmuch as development progress is largely dependent upon money, it is clear that the trend toward centralization continues despite extensive pronouncements on the need for decentralization and the virtues of municipal government.

An examination of 1971 municipal finances provides an overview of the sources of municipal revenues and the manner in which these monies are expended.[97] In that year, municipal governments in Guatemala spent a total of $24,544,022. On the basis of 1970 population estimates, this amounts to approximately $4.62 per capita.[98] Considering the national government restrictions on the forms and rates of municipal taxation, it seems pertinent to ask how local governments can possibly meet their service responsibilities to the municipios with such a limited sum. The obvious answer is, they cannot. Moreover, the per capita figure is misleading due to substantial differences in inter-municipio per capita spending rates. While the municipalidad of Guatemala City, for example, spent $19.32 per capita in 1971, the

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[97]Dirección General de Estadísticas, Finanzas Municipales, 1971 (Guatemala, 1972). At the time of this study, 1971 was the latest year for which complete data was available.

[98]Population estimates used in these calculations were taken from Sección de Estudios Geográficos de Obras Públicas, "Población de Guatemala por departmento y municipio, 1950, 1964, 1970, y 1980." (Mimeographed.)

municipalidades of 102 of the country's municipios ex-
pended less than $1 per capita. The department capitals,
which account for 28.3 percent of the population of
Guatemala, accounted for 75.3 percent of all the municipal
government expenditures. Ten municipios, not all of them
containing department capitals, which contain 24.5 percent
of the population of the country expended 73.3 percent of
all municipal funds in 1971.

There is a tendency to place responsibility for the
unequal distribution of municipal funds on the taxation
policies enforced by the central government, and to some
degree this is where the responsibility lies. For example,
the national government maintains no mechanism whereby the
funding of the poorest municipios is regularly subsidized.

There are limiting factors to consider other than
those for which the central government is responsible.
First, the sources of municipal revenue must be considered.
Approximately 5 percent of the income for Guatemala's 324
municipios in 1971 resulted from the ornato. Although the
rate of this head tax varies among the municipios, most
commonly it consists of a tax of $1 per year for each
adult male of the community. A few of the more populous
municipios, however, maintain a graduated ornato based on
income. Most municipio laws state that a citizen must
demonstrate proof of payment of the ornato before request-
ing the services of municipal officials. Another 30

percent of municipal income is derived from taxes for
municipal services such as water and electricity. Also
included in this category of revenue are charges for use
of the market(s) of the municipio and its slaughtering
house(s). For the most part, charges for these facilities
and services may not exceed the actual cost of main-
tenance. Another 4 percent of all municipal income in
1971 was the result of commercial taxes, a tax levied
upon business, such as stores and bars, and public trans-
portation vehicles. While the rate of taxation varies
among the municipios and the types of commercial activity,
a small municipio seldom taxes a small general store more
than $2 per month.

Current revenues comprised 39 percent of all
municipal incomes and include fines levied by the alcalde
and fees collected for permits. Far more important, how-
ever, are taxes collected on economic activities. Many
municipios, for example, maintain a livestock head tax.
More lucrative for other municipios are taxes on commer-
cial goods, such as cotton, milk, sugar, and logs which
are produced within the municipio but marketed outside of
it. Also included in this category are revenues collected
for the use of municipally-owned lands.

In 1971, 22 percent of municipal government
revenues came from extraordinary revenues such as grants
and loans from the central government. Also included were

taxes collected by the central government but destined

for municipal governments, of which there are four:

Decree No. 580, February 29, 1956

The gasoline tax. Each month Guatemala City receives
2¢ directly from the gasoline companies for each
gallon of gasoline sold in the municipio. Also, on
a monthly basis, gasoline companies must pay to INFOM
2¢ for each gallon of gasoline sold outside of
Guatemala City. This money is then divided among the
remaining 323 municipios on a per capita basis, and
their accounts at INFOM are credited. The municipal
use of these funds is limited to the payment of
interest and loans, the maintenance of municipal
services, or public works projects approved by INFOM.
The Controlaría de Cuentas is charged with a monthly
audit of the books of the gasoline companies.

Decree No. 114, September 9, 1963

The coffee tax. Coffee destined for export is taxed
at the rate of 15¢ per pound. The tax is collected
by the exporter and forwarded to INFOM in the name
of the municipio in which the coffee was produced.
INFOM, in turn, credits the account of the respective
municipio. The municipalidad must apply to INFOM
for permission to use these funds, and their use is
limited to the payment of interest and loans, municipal
public works projects, or the purchase of equipment
related to such projects, and efforts at municipal
planning. Municipal corporations are prohibited from
increasing this tax or taxing coffee in transit
through the municipio.

Decree No. 230, June 23, 1964

The beer tax. Breweries are taxed 21¢ for each liter
of beer produced, the tax being paid monthly. Of
this sum, 2¢ per liter is paid to INFOM which, in
turn, credits the account of each municipio, dis-
tributing the funds on the basis of population.
These funds may be used for the payment of interest
and loans, the maintenance of municipal services,
and municipal public works projects. Municipalidades
may not tax beer again.

Decree No. 334, February 25, 1965

The liquor tax. A tax on liquor is collected from
distillers at the rate of 10¢ per liter. This sum
is divided as follows: Guatemala City receives
credit for all liquor manufactured within the
municipio. Of the remaining sum, 80 percent is
used for the capitalization of INFOM and 20 percent
is credited to the individual accounts of the remain-
ing 323 municipios, being distributed on the basis
of population. These funds may be used to pay
interest and repay loans, for the maintenance of
public services, for municipal public works projects,
and for ordinary administrative expenses.

In 1971, salaries and employee benefits consumed
41.8 percent of all municipal revenues. The maintenance
and purchase of municipal equipment and the maintenance
of municipal services accounted for another 21.5 percent
of all local government expenditures, and 23.1 percent
was spent to repay loans. This left a total of 13.5
percent, or $3,321,904, for municipal public works pro-
jects, an average of 62¢ per capita per municipio.
Eleven municipios expended nothing for municipal works
in 1971, and ninety-one municipios expended less than
$1,000.

It is undeniable that national government re-
strictions on municipal sources of revenue and spending
explain a large portion of the bleak picture of municipal
finances. But there are other culprits too. The people,
citizens of the municipios, are not guiltless. In Latin
American cases, social scientists have long flogged the
rich for their resistance to paying their fair share of

taxes, but the rich are not alone. The <u>municipalidad</u> of Quezaltenango did little less than plead with its citizens to pay the annual <u>ornato</u> in 1973. At stake was an estimated $30,000 which 21,800 citizens failed to pay.[99]

In a <u>municipio</u> of eastern Guatemala, both the <u>secretario</u> and <u>alcalde</u> agreed that the central government should assume the costs of maintaining a diesel motor recently installed to provide water for irrigation because the <u>municipalidad</u> could not afford it. The sum amounted to approximately $40 per month. When it was suggested that perhaps the beneficiaries of this system should be taxed to help defray the costs, the response was simple and quick: "They refuse to pay."

The <u>alcalde</u> of a <u>municipio</u> in Santa Rosa department, in responding to a query regarding the taxation of bus service to the <u>municipio</u>, indicated that a tax was assessed on the bus but that the owner-driver never paid it. When asked why he was not forced to pay the tax, the <u>alcalde</u> noted that the <u>municipio</u> was only served by this one bus and he feared that efforts to enforce the tax would result in the loss of what little bus service the <u>municipio</u> had.

The people of Guatemala are becoming increasingly quick to make demands for services on their government,

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[99] "$21,800 vecinos se resisten a pago de boleto de ornato," <u>La Tarde</u>, March 28, 1973, p. 8.

both nationally and locally. Unfortunately for all con-
cerned, they are not as quick in responding to the tax
needs of government to pay for these services. But, the
problem of municipal financing also lies with the municipal
government. In many municipios there is little evidence
that the municipalidad pressures the citizens to pay taxes.
Indeed, their payment often appears optional. Proof of
payment of the ornato is not required before a building
permit is issued, water users are not taxed the full cost
of maintaining the water system, and stores remain open
despite the owner's failure to pay the commercial tax. It
may be a question of a 10¢ "tip" paid to the secretario, an
"I can't do anything" attitude on the part of the alcalde,
or the fact that the store is owned by the sindico or
perhaps his cousin. The reality remains, however, that
many municipalidades do not enforce the tax laws of the
municipio.

The fact that there is no single cause of the
financial squeeze in which municipal governments find
themselves makes the solution to the problem that much
more complex. It is not simply a question, for example,
of ridding the Executive of its authority to control local
excise taxes. Even if it were that simple, all barriers
to rapid progress in terms of development would not dissi-
pate, for not all barriers are financial.

Myths and Municipal Officials

Since the elected office of alcalde is non-permanent, usually it is filled by people who must have other employment.

There is little in terms of employment background which would seem to prepare alcaldes for the efficient management of municipal affairs. Furthermore, since the educational opportunities are severely restricted in most municipios, many alcaldes have fewer than five years of education. There is little reason to believe that the backgrounds of the síndicos and councilmen are significantly different from those of alcaldes. How are such people, regardless of good intentions, to deal with the sophisticated problems and responsibilities of municipal government and development?

TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND OF ALCALDES

Type of Work	Number of Mentions
Farmer	46
Businessman	25
Teacher or Professor	3
Bus Driver	2
Other (Mason, Barber, Tailor, etc.)	8
None	24

The actual functioning of municipal government and the thrust for development is dependent upon the more professional, better educated employees of the municipal corporation, particularly the secretario. In many cases, however, municipal corporations must recruit these officials from outside the municipio. While most secretarios appear to be earnestly concerned with the development of the municipio in which they labor, this is not always the case, particularly where the secretario is not a native or resident of the municipio which he serves.

That the poor quality of municipal officials as a barrier to local development is not a new discovery. On the contrary, it has been a widely made observation for more than a decade.[100] Nor has the need for better qualified local officials gone unnoticed in Guatemala.[101] The problem has been recognized, and efforts are being made, particularly by INAD, to overcome it. But, the problem of the caliber of local officials, both elected and appointed, is of such dimensions as to require years and probably decades to resolve.

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[100] Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin, The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1961), p. 166; and Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration," in Swerdlo (ed.), op. cit., p. 8.

[101] David Jickling, "Needs for Municipal Development in Guatemala" (Guatemala: Agency for International Development, 1968). (Mimeographed.) Also, see the report of the Panajachel Conference by the Instituto Nacional de Administración para el Desarrollo, op. cit.

CHAPTER IV

THE HYPOTHESES EXAMINED

Local government in Guatemala faces a number of
problems, conflicts, and restrictions. Within its current
framework, the role of local government in Guatemalan
development is limited.

People, Local Government, and Development: The Squeeze

There are many vistas of the development process
which often depend on one's perspective. Thus, while a
member of the National Economic Planning Council tends to
think in terms of increased productivity, transportation
flows, and the balance of payments, the individual in the
countryside is concerned with employment opportunities, an
acceptable income, and the health of his family. Alcaldes,
to complicate the picture, measure progress in development
largely in terms of more physical projects such as water
and drainage systems, schools, and access highways. While
these points of view seem to conflict in reality they are
compatible since they seek the same goal: a better use of
the resources available and a better life for the

population. Substantial increases in individual produc-
tivity cannot be expected without a significant improvement
in individual health, and the increased funds gained from
the improvement of both may be used to improve the water
and sewer system serving the people. These, in turn,
could well result in improved health and better produc-
tivity. Thus, no point of view is wrong, at least up to
the point where it totally excludes considerations of the
other points of view.

National development must be a team effort. The
paradox of the Guatemalan situation is that it will take
a team effort to create the necessary environment to spur
development. In both creation of the team and its subse-
quent functioning, local government can play an important
role. But local government is not playing this role. Key
problems center on the general dearth of municipal finances,
public apathy which may well be a partial result of this
lack of financing, and the impossibility of most municipali-
dades to meet the responsibilities placed upon them. The
latter is particularly related to the generally poor qual-
ity of local government officials and the organization and
size of the central bureaucracy. But, there are other
factors to consider. Included are the relationship between
the national and local levels of government, the relation-
ship between the people and local government, and local
government itself in terms of the development process.

Although no universally accepted standard exists to measure the level of development, direct observation and statistics provide adequate evidence of development progress. The per capita GNP continues to rise, although at a retarded pace due to the high rate of population growth; trade and monetary reserves are at an all-time high; and mortality rates are declining, albeit painfully slow. Other, more personal, signs of progress also abound. Guatemala City, the sprawling capital, is now dotted with privately financed high rise apartment and commercial buildings, and its streets are clogged by imported German and Japanese automobiles despite the heavy import tax. On the highways, trucks and buses loaded with goods and people on the move force private vehicles to slow down as they ply their way over the country's expanding network of roads. In the countryside, the use of mechanized irrigation projects, fertilizers, and hybrid seeds and pesticides is common not only on the large commercial fincas, but also on many small peasant-owned plots and cooperatives. Nearly all villages now have satisfactory facilities and personnel to offer the people at least a rudimentary education, and an increasing number of persons take advantage of improved local health services.

Most progress has been the direct or indirect result of programs and policies instituted by the central government. The question, therefore, is not whether or not

there has been progress, but, rather, the rate of progress
and the degree to which the masses benefit from it. Also,
it would be useful to know the means whereby, through
local government, the rate of development progress can be
increased and the degree to which the political behavior
of individuals can be increasingly institutionalized so
as to provide for increased stability of the political
system.

There is an element of distrust between local and
national government. Local government is often looked
upon by national government officials, and with some justi-
fication, as inefficient, inept, and corrupt. The reverse
is also true. Beyond doubt, the central government has
erected substantial barriers to the participation of local
government in the development process. Yet, not all
actions by the central government toward local government
have been negative. While it contains numerous restric-
tions, the 1957 decree establishing the Municipal Code
does form a legal basis for local government and outline
the <u>raison</u> <u>d'être</u> of it. A second example of beneficial
central government action toward municipal government
lies in the fact that three key sources of tax revenue,
and a portion of a fourth, have been specifically ear-
marked for use by municipal governments. Although the use
of the funds is restricted by national law, at least it is
largely restricted for the use of municipal improvement

projects. In 1964, INAD was the moving force behind the
strengthening of the Asociacion Nacional de Municipali-
dades (ANAM), a nationwide, non-governmental body with
responsibilities not only for offering technical advice
and services to the municipalidades of Guatemala, but also
for improving relations between the two levels of govern-
ment and acting as a voice for the municipio before the
central government. In this example of positive govern-
ment action is a situation where the central authorities
created a pressure group to enable local government
officials to deal more effectively with the central
bureaucracy. The fact remains, however, that the nation's
municipios continue to depend heavily on the central
government for development assistance. It is also true
that the general populous is not entirely free of blame.

The great majority of Guatemalans make major
demands on their governmental system and yet oppose the
implementation of adequate taxation policies. There seems
to be a widespread belief that government can meet these
demands without popular funding. But surely, Guatemala
is not an anomoly in this regard. Does anyone, any-
where, like to pay taxes? There is, of course, a strong
argument for the many poor to the effect that they simply
cannot afford to pay taxes. But are they forced to assume
a major proportion of the tax burden? While one may pose
some difficult questions in regard to the rate at which

the various economic strata of Guatemala pay taxes, a
brief glance at the 1973 national budget reveals some
interesting facts. That budget of $291.8 million included
the following figures: Tax revenue, $206.7 million;
capital revenue (bonds, loans, etc.) $85.1 million. Of
the $206.7 million in tax revenues projected for collection
in 1973, 93.7 percent consisted of taxation on imports,
exports, cigarettes, liquor, beer, and gasoline. Who is
paying these taxes? Who will be taxed to repay the loans,
bonds, and notes? The answer, clearly, is not the poor.
It is the rich and middle class Guatemalans, particularly
those who wish to purchase imported luxury goods, who are
paying. There may be doubt as to the rate at which wealthy
and middle class Guatemalans pay taxes. Perhaps they can
pay more than they currently do. But, there is little
doubt that they are the people funding Guatemalan develop-
ment, and what little the poor contribute is largely the
result of their purchase of luxury goods.

The inequity of income distribution in Guatemala
is apparent despite the lack of reliable statistics to
prove it. Therefore, the fact that most people are poor
and do not contribute significantly to finance the
country's development, is not particularly disturbing.
What is disconcerting is the lack of initiative the
people, and especially those of the poor municipios,
demonstrate in terms of active participation in community

development projects. Villagers are quick to complain about the open sewer in the middle of the street and want the central government to install a sewer system. But, what efforts have the villagers made to dig a small trench and thus confine the sewage? The answer in many cases is none. Villagers and alcaldes bewail the fact that this same sewage is polluting their source of drinking water. Again, they want the central government's attention. In the meantime, what efforts have villagers and local officials made to divert the sewage away from the water supply? The people of a municipio have need for a small road to connect the municipal capital with several nearby aldeas, but the Minister of Communication and Public Works refuses to give the project priority. In the meantime, what will the citizens of these settlements do? The most common answer is "nada." People in the village want a recreation field. Why not clear the grass and bushes from the vacant land next to the school? The query is not answered.

The urge for participation in community development at the local level is sadly lacking throughout the country. In the more than 100 municipios visited during this research, no more than a half-dozen of them had significant projects of self-improvement in progress. There is a recurring inclination by the people to leave development projects to the central government, an inclination which is probably due, at least in part, to the policies of the central government which fail to stimulate self-help.

The lack of community spirit and initiative is
reflected in the formation and functioning of local
committees. Although the Municipal Code requires that
five citizen-councilman commitees be formed by each
municipal corporation, only a few municipios have such
committees on paper, and still fewer actually have func-
tioning committees. Most municipios do maintain a develop-
ment committee charged with helping municipal officials
determine local needs and organize municipal projects. The
frequency with which such committees function effectively,
however, is open to doubt. Many alcaldes, in answering
inquiries concerning local committees, seemed dismayed
while relating their failure in efforts to stimulate the
formation of such committees. There simply was not enough
community interest.

The causes of the lack of citizen participation
in local development are not entirely clear. Surely the
fact that the municipalidad is seldom financially or tech-
nically able to sponsor local projects dampens the spirit
for local participation in such projects. Also, the
central government has not energetically sought to stimu-
late such participation. In some municipios poor Indian-
ladino relations are a factor, while differences between
the urban and rural population appear to be significant
in others. Furthermore, municipio boundaries are not
always functional, and there are instances in which aldeas

of one municipio are more closely affiliated with a neigh-
boring municipio than with their own. Explanations for
the lack of local spirit vary greatly among Guatemalans.
A middle class opinion contends that Guatemalans in general
are basically lazy. A university student, however, main-
tains that citizens fear the wrath of the military in the
form of reprisals and repression if they establish an
aggressive self-help program.

Local government in Guatemala is sandwiched
between an almost omnipotent central government, and an
increasingly demanding, but largely non-participant, local
population. Until the local citizenry becomes actively
involved in community development on a large scale, the
ability of municipal government to institutionalize polit-
ical behavior and increase the pace of development will
remain limited. Such widespread participation is not
likely to materialize until it becomes clear that municipal
government can carry out significant local development
schemes. This, in turn, depends upon sizable reforms by
which the central government allows the local governments
to exercise more authority and develop financial stability.

Local pressures for services and development pro-
jects, in conjunction with the generally low public works
budgets of the municipalidades, forces the municipal
governments to solicit assistance from the central govern-
ment. Petitions for municipal projects almost invariably

are made to INFOM. However, petitions for projects which are the responsibility of the central government are usually made directly to the ministry involved, although frequently such petitions are initially sent to the President.

There is not enough money allotted by the central government for all of the solicitations of the <u>municipali-dades</u> to be satisfied. It becomes essential, therefore, for all <u>municipalidades</u> to have a means of influencing the decisions taken on its petitions. It is interesting to note the responses to question 19 of the interview schedule which deals with the agents, by role, to whom municipal officials resort in efforts to hasten affirmative action on their solicitations to the central government (Table 2). These are pressure points or channels whereby <u>alcaldes</u> seek to apply pressure on the central bureaucracy to expedite the processing of its petitions.

INFOM clearly dominates as a pressure point, accounting for 36 percent of all responses and 56 percent of all first-choice responses. Also important are the efforts of local government officials to pressure the central government agencies by dealing directly with them. <u>Alcaldes</u> generally seek to pressure the agency which is the recipient of municipal petitions. Such a process does not indicate a significant degree of sophistication in terms of municipal dealings with the central bureaucracy.

TABLE 2

PRESSURE POINTS FOR GUATEMALAN <u>ALCALDES</u>

Pressure Point	Times Mentioned	Mentioned First	Mentioned Second	Mentioned Third
INFOM	80	61	16	3
President	37	20	14	3
Proper government agency	30	6	13	11
ANAM	21	4	9	8
Governor	17	8	6	3
Deputy	15	6	2	7
A friend in the government	7	-	3	4
INAD	5	1	3	1
Agency for International Development	4	1	2	1
A party official	3	1	1	1
Total	219	108	69	42

Analysis of data gathered through the interview

schedule indicates that there is little political bias

in use of the President as a pressure point. In 1973,

MLN-PID alcaldes governed in 72 percent of the municipios

of Guatemala, and they accounted for 68 percent of the

alcaldes included in the survey. Analysis of data regard-

ing pressure points in relation to party affiliation

indicates that MLN-PID alcaldes account for 68 percent of

the total responses in which the President was indicated

as a pressure point.[102] There exists, however, a signifi-

cant bias in terms of those alcaldes who mentioned the

President as their first priority pressure point. Sixteen

of the twenty first-choice responses originating from

MLN-PID alcaldes. Government party alcaldes, therefore,

turn first to the President for aid more often than do

opposition party alcaldes, while opposition party alcaldes

appear more inclined to turn to the President as a second

or third alternative in this process. Government party

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[102]Due to the fact that nearly every agency of the
central government appears to have at least a small fund
for loans, grants, or technical assistance directly to
municipios, efforts to measure the overall flow of cen-
trally controlled funds to them were unsuccessful. Even
with this information, the complexity of accurately identi-
fying the expenditures of funds on projects which benefit
more than one municipio would make the results of any
search for political bias in the flow of such development
funds of dubious reliability. There is widespread belief
among alcaldes of opposition parties that there is indeed
political motivation behind central government priorities
of local development, a belief for which there is con-
siderable, although not necessarily quantifiable, evidence.
See, for example, "Q2 millones invierten in Chiquimula,"
La Tarde, March 30, 1973, p. 1.

alcaldes, therefore, have a strong tendency to turn to the President first as a pressure point or not turn to him at all.

Not until the fourth most commonly mentioned pressure point do responses move outside the boundaries of the central government. ANAM, created to be a voice for the municipios before the central government, has played that role with increased frequency and effectiveness, probably because municipalidades are increasingly uniting behind the organization. Responses to inquiries concerning ANAM were almost in unanimous support of it. Only two alcaldes indicated that the municipalidad had nothing to do with the organization, and only one alcalde termed the effects of it as being negative in terms of municipal development.

Of equal interest to the most common pressure points illustrated in Table 1 are the potential pressure points which do not appear as key channels of influence. Businessmen, local landowners, and church leaders do not serve this function, nor do party officials, worker organizations, or peasant groups prove of significance. A high degree of impersonality in the pressuring process is in evidence. A person becomes a pressure point not because of who he is, but what he is.

The most disconcerting element of the pressuring process, especially concerning political development, are

the comparatively insignificant roles that department
governors and deputies to the national Congress perform
to serve local authorities and their constituencies. They
do not act as significant pressure points and channels of
communication. Still worse, most alcaldes who indicated
that they seek to use them doubt that it does any good.
Governors are usually colonels and, as representatives
of the President, are not usually native to the depart-
ments in which they preside. Communication between the
Executive and the municipalidades which takes place through
a governor's office is largely concentrated in one direc-
tion, from the Executive down.

Deputies to the Congress are almost universally
considered useless by alcaldes. Most alcaldes who were
directly asked the names of their deputies in Congress did
not know them, and a few alcaldes did not even know how
many representatives their department had in the Congress.
While these facts may reflect badly on the caliber of the
alcaldes, it certainly does little to enhance the image
of the deputies.

There is no spatially distinct pattern to the
terribly poor image of Guatemala's deputies among the
alcaldes. Only thirteen alcaldes rated deputies as being
of significant assistance in terms of municipal programs,
while seventy-three of them indicated that the deputies
were totally ineffective. A majority of the alcaldes in

every department consider deputies useless, and all of the
alcaldes in the departments of Izabal, San Marcos, Santa
Rosa, Sololá, Totonicapán, and Escuintla indicated that
deputies were of no help to them.

It is obvious that there are pronounced communica-
tion problems between local and national officials in terms
of municipal development. This bears directly on political
development, for if municipal government is to play a key
role in the institutionalization of political behavior,
it must satisfy local demands from local resources or be
able to obtain the assistance of the central government
to meet them. Today, in most cases, the system makes it
almost mandatory for local officials to turn to the central
government in efforts to satisfy local needs and demands.
Yet, channels of communication and pressure points are not
only highly concentrated within the central government,
they are highly concentrated among a very few officials or
agencies of it. Inasmuch as many of these officials are
not elected by the people, it is quite possible that they
feel no need to answer to them. Thus, the size of the
central government bureaucracy, its level of efficiency,
and the bureaucrat's chief concern with his own position
remain as formidable problems.

Despite the size of the bureaucracy and the number
of agencies involved in Guatemalan development, the
alcaldes of thirty-nine municipios denoted only a single

pressure point through which they sought to expedite action on their petitions to the central government.[103] This is another indication of the lack of maturity within the political system.

Not surprisingly, the alcaldes of small, Indian municipios, who probably need the most pressure points, have the fewest. Thirty-one of the thirty-nine municipios with only one pressure point are Category III or Category IV municipios (Table 3). Despite the fact that slightly more than half of Guatemala's municipios have a ladino population majority, Indian municipios account for twenty-six of the thirty-nine municipios with only one pressure point. Finally, of the thirty-nine municipios with only one pressure point, twenty-four depended on INFOM as that point, two-thirds of them Indian municipios.

TABLE 3

MUNICIPIOS WITH ONLY ONE PRESSURE POINT

Majority Population	Category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
Indian	1	6	7	12	26
Ladino	1	-	6	6	13
Total	2	6	13	18	39

[103]Instituto Nacional de Administración para el Desarrollo, Guía de las Instituciones de Desarrollo, Guatemala, 1971. This guide lists 148 private and public agencies involved in Guatemalan development.

Of equal importance, only 40 percent of the municipios
have three or more pressure points. Clearly, municipal
government, forced to interact with the central government,
is largely unable to cope effectively with it.

While both the central government in general and
INFOM in particular establish a list of priorities for
municipal development, neither limits its participation in
municipal development of these priorities.[104] Both pride
themselves on efforts to consider the priorities of each
municipio individually. President Arana, in 1973, ful-
filled a campaign promise to personally visit each
municipio to talk with local officials about their devel-
opment needs.[105] Unfortunately, efforts to consider local
development priorities by listening to local officials
does not aid the process of effective development planning.
Such efforts assume that local officials have priorities,
or at least have the ability to determine them. Also,

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[104]The Arana government, while sponsoring a
variety of municipal projects, has been primarily con-
cerned with the provision of improved health facilities
and services in the municipios. For 1973, the Board of
Directors of INFOM designated the construction of markets
as the top priority in granting loans to municipios.

[105]The alcalde of one municipio who is a member
of the government party was terribly affronted when the
President, upon arriving in the municipio for his much
proclaimed visit, passed the first two hours at the estate
of a finquero patronizing local landowners. Only after
this did the President venture into town to meet with
local officials and speak before the townspeople.

there is the assumption that even if an accurate list of priorities is determined by local and/or national government officials it will be adhered to. It is an error, however, to pursue development on the basis that these two assumptions can be taken as fact.

More than 100 conversations with various municipal officials have led the author to conclude that most often they have neither priorities nor a concept of priorities. Even if they did entertain such a concept, political expediency or the personal drive to accomplish something for the municipio would work against adhering to a list of development priorities as a guide to development. Two examples illustrate the problem. Both the alcalde and secretario of a municipio in eastern Guatemala agree unequivocally that the primary need of the town is an expansion of the water system. Studies have estimated the cost of such a project at approximately $12,000. The total budget of the municipio, however, was less than $5,000, and efforts to procure a loan from INFOM or the assistance of the Director General of Public Works have proved fruitless. Thus, the citizens of the town appear doomed to a continuation of the existing water policy under which the east side of the town has water on even-numbered days and the west side of town receives water on odd-numbered days. Particularly in view of the crucial character of this service, it would seem that a local austerity program to conserve capital funds

should be combined with repeated efforts to gain central government assistance that would enable the town to expand the water system. But such a policy has not been established. Rather, when INFOM refused to grant a loan for the water project, the municipalidad decided to seek the construction of a new town hall. The cost of this project was set at $7,000 and a request to INFOM for a loan in that amount was approved. Consequently, the municipio went further in debt, and committed a substantial proportion of its capital funds for the next twenty years to a project which was of secondary importance to the community.

A municipio in San Marcos obtained an INFOM loan in the amount of $27,000 for the construction of a new six-room school and library. Yet, only two years prior to this the municipalidad had expended $3,000 to refurbish the existing five-room school, which is sound and appears to be well maintained. A brief examination of the school and the surrounding area made it clear that all that is really needed is approximately $3,000 for the addition of two rooms to the existing school. The land for such an expansion is available and owned by the municipal corporation. After these facts were discussed, the alcalde and secretario were asked why, if a $3,000 expansion was all that is really needed, has the municipal corporation assumed a $27,000 debt for a new school. Their answer was simple: they want a new school and do not want to use the old one.

The fact that the old school is perfectly usable seemed
to be irrelevant.

Municipal officials cannot be relied upon to
accurately determine and carry out a system of develop-
ment priorities. This is related to the caliber of local
officials. Also significant is the fact that popularly
elected officials, while legally prohibited from serving
successive terms of office, often settle for a second or
third best project in terms of priorities so as to have a
material accomplishment to offer as evidence of effective-
ness should they seek reelection to public office at a
later date. For some less selfish officials, it is not
merely a political question. Some genuinely seek to
accomplish something for the municipio during their tenure
of office, and the fact that this is politically wise is
only of secondary importance to them. Such officials seek
to fund projects which they think can be accomplished,
rather than projects which are urgently needed. Thus, the
alcalde of one municipio who admitted that the most urgent
need of the community was a better access road, also ad-
mitted that the municipal corporation had not sought such
a project because they did not believe they would receive
a favorable response from the central government. They
had, therefore, settled for a small fountain near the town
hall and construction of a plaza with a basketball court.

INFOM does not effectively enforce a priority system for development at the _municipio_ level. Inasmuch as INFOM performs a strategic role in municipal development, and especially since it virtually controls the capital budgets of most _municipalidades_, such a shortcoming is expensive in both time and money. A few moments of an INFOM official's time at the school site in a _municipio_ in San Marcos would have made it obvious that expansion of the existing school facilities, and not the construction of a new school, was in order. This could have saved the _municipio_ $24,000 and left that amount uncommitted in INFOM coffers to finance other municipal projects. Perhaps personal attention is too much to expect from a central government agency, but the fact remains that even in INFOM officials sought personal involvement in municipal pro-jects, their manpower resources would probably be inade-quate to effectively implement such a policy. The end result, of course, is waste and a slow-down of the development process.

Local Government: Potential

Although the current role of local government in institutionalizing behavior and spurring local development is not significant, the future is not a total loss. The basic mechanism whereby local government can play a more strategic role in the future development program exists.

The problem is that the present mechanism does not function properly. What is sadly lacking are effective pressure groups for individuals and municipios, such as worker organizations, peasant groups, and viable political parties. In the case of political parties, they are neither capable of coming to grips with, the bureaucracy nor serve as effective channels of communication or pressure points for local authorities. Still, the basic structure appears to be sound and could prove effective if it functioned properly. The lack of capital funds controlled by municipal officials in all but a few municipios, forces these officials to turn to the central government in efforts to meet municipal and popular needs. Although the council makes the decisions as to the particular projects to be solicited, in most cases the alcalde has the responsibility to make the solicitations. Thus, communication within the first three tiers of political involvement is quite clear and simple (Figure 4). To the point where they exit from the alcalde's office, communication flows are especially well defined, but then the picture blurs. Because of the lack of authority and/or effectiveness of regional (Tier IV) elements, they are usually bypassed both as channels of solicitation and as pressure points. This forces alcaldes into direct contact with the bureaucracy of the central government (Tier V). Alcaldes, however, are not commonly knowledgeable or influential enough to deal with this bureaucracy,

Figure 4.--Five Tiers of Political Involvement in Guatemala.

particularly since no central "clearing house" exists
within the central government to deal with municipal needs.
Also important in this regard is the dearth of pressure
points. The only major non-government pressure point and
channel of communication between local and national author-
ities is ANAM. Consequently, local municipal leaders are
largely confined to pressuring the decision-makers by
working within the agencies these decision-makers govern.
There is little opportunity for recourse outside of the
system. This in itself would not necessarily be disastrous
if there were a definite process within the central govern-
ment whereby municipal solicitations are processed, but no
such system exists. Thus, for example, an _alcalde_ who
seeks improved health facilities for his _municipio_ could
find himself trying to deal with any or all of the follow-
ing: the President, the Agency for Community Development
of the Presidency, INFOM, the Minister of Public Health
and Social Assistance, the Civic Action Corps of the Army,
the Guatemalan Rehabilitation Association, the Minister of
Communications and Public Works, the National Bank, the
regional office of the World Health Organization in Guate-
mala City, the Minister of Public Finances, the Agency for
International Development, the regional office of the Pan
American Health Organization, or any of a number of
missionary groups. He also might be actively seeking the
assistance of ANAM as a pressure point.

Most alcaldes are probably not aware of some of the organizations potentially useful to them, and few of them have the expertise to deal with the agencies directly or know the necessary pressure points to which they can turn for assistance. This fact, combined with the lack of coordination between agencies dealing with municipal development, and the fact that no agency has the responsibility for such coordination, results in a slow response, if any, to municipal petitions for help. Municipal government officials, therefore, become frustrated. The local populace, seeing its local government as ineffective, becomes increasingly less willing to support that government with its energies and tax dollars, even if it can afford to do so.

During interviews each alcalde was asked how, in his opinion, relations between the local government and the central government could be improved. Although almost every municipalidad experiences financial problems, this is not considered the most urgent need in order to improve relations between the two levels of government (Table 4). There is a widely held belief among alcaldes that if central government officials would visit their municipios to discuss local development problems, these problems would receive more immediate attention and be more quickly overcome. Also, of considerable interest are recommendations that the central government create either one central

TABLE 4

ALCALDE OPINIONS ON MEANS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS
WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Item	Times Mentioned
1. There should be more direct contact between local and central government officials, particularly more visits by central government officials to the municipio.	40
2. The central government should respond more promptly to solicitations of the municipalidad.	23
3. The central government should allot more money for municipal finances.	14
4. Central government authorities should demonstrate more interest in municipal affairs and development.	13
5. ANAM should be strengthened.	6
6. The central government should create one central agency, or regional agencies, to process solicitations from all municipios.	3
7. Other	7
8. No response	2
Total	108

agency to deal with all municipio petitions, or a series

of regional agencies to process them. Alcaldes do not

feel that the decision-makers of the central government

understand their problems. They seem to believe that if

this barrier can be overcome, preferably through more fre-

quent visits to the municipios by these decision-makers,

all other problems will likewise be overcome. They may

be correct. It is obvious that one or both of the follow-

ing should take place:

1. Municipal governments should have more capital
   funds placed at their disposal, even though such
   monies should be supervised by INFOM or some
   similar agency of the central government; or

2. An effective means to increase contact between
   local and national officials and bring a more
   prompt response to local petitions should be
   created. At the very minimum, some agency should
   be held responsible for: a) evaluating all
   petitions presented to the central government by
   local governments; b) comparing these petitions
   with local, regional, and national development
   priorities; and 3) determining what agency or
   agencies will meet each solicitation and when.
   If such positive action is not taken, the reasons
   for the rejection of the petition should be
   clearly explained to the proper municipal
   officials to avoid the presentation of non-
   priority solicitations in the future. ANAM is
   now partially fulfilling this role, but it
   lacks the personnel, money, or authority to do
   so effectively.

A combination of elements offers the best solution

to upgrade the role of municipal government in the de-

velopment process and thereby increase its potential for

institutionalizing political behavior in the future.

Serious doubt remains as to how well local officials in many municipios could efficiently manage substantial sums of capital funds intended for municipal development. To have a central government agency oversee the use of these funds would reduce the risk of their being poorly spent, increase the pace of municipal development, and avoid the flood of petitions for loans and assistance which now swamp the central government agencies. As an essential element, such an agency should have a definite idea of the development needs of each municipio and region of the country, and these needs would require examination in relation to national development goals and priorities.

The Image

Despite the problems alcaldes face in their efforts to deal with the central bureaucracy and the frustrations many of them experience, the overall image of the central government possessed by alcaldes is reasonably good.

The image variable involved in this research consists of two components, 1) an effectiveness value as measured by responses to question 20a of the interview schedule, and 2) a feeling of discrimination value which was measured by question 20b. Although municipios with a majority Indian population account for 45 percent of the sample and 48 percent of the municipios in which the central government has a good image of effectiveness, there does not appear to be a substantial overall cultural

dichotomy in this regard (Table 5). Closer analysis, however, reveals that while exactly one-half of the alcaldes of Category I and II ladino municipios possessed a good image of central government effectiveness, 60 percent of the alcaldes of Indian municipios in these categories maintain a positive effectiveness image. Significant differences among the municipios by population category also appear in a general analysis of data relating to the image of effectiveness. Forty-three percent of all alcaldes gave the central government a good evaluation in terms of effectiveness. However, this figure varies considerably among the four categories of municipios. Thus, alcaldes of Category I and II have a substantially better image of central government effectiveness than do alcaldes of Category III and IV. Although Category III and IV municipios account for 62 percent of the sample, their alcaldes account for 68.8 percent of the municipios in which the central government has a poor image of effectiveness. The central government, therefore, has the best image of effectiveness in the most populous Indian municipios and its poorest image in ladino municipios which are small in population.

The patterns determined in analyzing feelings of discrimination offer some variation from that of the image of effectiveness. The central government's image of treating all municipios equally is somewhat better. This

TABLE 5

IMAGES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN
RESOLVING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
(BY CATEGORY AND ETHNIC POPULATION)

Category Majority Population	Interview Responses Concerning Image			Total
	Poor	Fair	Good	
I. Department Capitals				
Indian	–	1	–	–
Ladino	3	–	4	7
II. Pop. >10,000 and Ports				
Indian	3	3	10	16
Ladino	5	4	8	17
III. Pop. 5-10,000				
Indian	2	4	4	10
Ladino	11	3	7	21
IV. Pop. <5,000				
Indian	4	9	8	21
Ladino	7	3	5	15
Total	35 (32%)	27 (25%)	46 (43%)	108

is due to the fact that some alcaldes who feel that the central government has not been effective locally, do not feel that this is due to discrimination. Rather, they feel that the central government is doing a generally poor job of dealing with municipal needs throughout the country (Table 6). Thus, 51 percent of the alcaldes interviewed felt that their municipio was receiving as much central government attention as any of the other 323 municipios.

It is among the alcaldes of the department capitals that the image of discrimination is most negative. Many of them feel that the central government is simply not sufficiently concerned with their development problems. This feeling does not reflect solely political differences. There appears to be a general feeling among these alcaldes that their problems are larger in scope, and of greater urgency, than are those of smaller municipios, and that the central government is not giving them the attention needed to resolve these problems. Additionally, alcaldes of department capitals complain that the priorities of the central government do not reflect the real needs of their communities or departments. The alcalde of one department capital was irate because the regional hospital contains only seventy-eight beds to serve a half-million people. His efforts to procure central government action to expand these facilities have come to naught because he was told by

TABLE 6

IMAGE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION
IN RESOLVING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Category	Interview Responses Concerning Image			Total
Majority Population	Poor	Fair	Good	
I. Department Capitals				
Indian	–	1	–	1
Ladino	2	3	2	7
II. Pop. >10,000 and Ports				
Indian	4	1	11	16
Ladino	5	3	9	17
III. Pop. 5-10,000				
Indian	4	3	3	10
Ladino	6	3	12	21
IV. Pop. <5,000				
Indian	7	2	12	21
Ladino	5	4	6	15
Total	33 (30%)	20 (19%)	55 (51%)	108

central government authorities that the necessary funds were not available. Yet, he pointed out, funds were available for the construction of a new national theatre in his municipio. He then bitterly asked, "What good is a new theatre when so few of the people live long enough to enjoy it?" In another instance, the alcalde of a department capital related how his numerous efforts to gain central government funding for an irrigation project had been systematically rebuffed. Each time he raised the issue he was told that no money existed for such a project because capital investment in the area was being concentrated in a program to reforest badly overcut hills of the local basin. Vociferously he asked: "Look! Look! Where are the trees?" There were none in evidence. This situation may be one in which long-term central government action conflicts with more immediate local needs. The fact remains, however, that the alcalde saw no action taken to satisfy his priorities nor those of central government officials. Such a situation obviously influences strongly his image of the central government.

Category II alcaldes maintain the best image of central government fairness in dealing with the municipios of the country. Within this group, however, alcaldes of Indian municipios maintain a considerably better image of the central government's attention than do alcaldes of ladino municipios. The same basic pattern appears among

alcaldes of Category IV municipios. In Category III

municipios, however, the pattern is substantially differ-

ent. Within this group a pronounced dichotomy exists

between alcaldes of ladino municipios, who possess a posi-

tive image of the central government fairness, and those

of Indian municipios. The cause of the shift in patterns

between Category II, III, and IV municipios is not clear.

Efforts to relate it to such considerations as the forms

and frequency of communication, distance from Guatemala

City, and feelings of political efficacy have proven

fruitless. There does appear to be some relationship

between the low image of discrimination of the central

government among alcaldes of Category III Indian municipios

and their party affiliation. However, in view of the

generally low level of party identification among alcaldes

in Guatemala, it seems unlikely that this is the sole

factor influencing the low image of the central government,

in terms of discrimination, among alcaldes of Category III

municipios with an Indian population majority.

A combination of the effectiveness and discrimina-

tion elements provides a general image of the central

government (Table 7). The image is reasonably satisfactory

in each category holding a positive image. The central

government's image is best among Category II municipios,

with eighteen of the thirty-three alcaldes maintaining a

TABLE 7

IMAGE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Category		Interview Responses Concerning Image			Total
	Majority Population	Poor	Fair	Good	
I.	Department Capitals				
	Indian	-	1	-	1
	Ladino	2	2	3	7
II.	Pop. >10,000 and Ports				
	Indian	2	5	9	16
	Ladino	4	4	9	17
III.	Pop. 5-10,000				
	Indian	2	5	3	10
	Ladino	4	5	12	21
IV.	Pop. <5,000				
	Indian	4	6	11	21
	Ladino	6	4	5	15
	Total	24 (22%)	32 (30%)	52 (48%)	108

favorable image. Only in Category II municipios do a

majority of the alcaldes maintain such a positive image.

Just as substantial variations in the image pat-

tern are lacking among categories of municipios, so too

are they lacking in the overall ethnic pattern. Alcaldes

of Indian municipios, which account for 45 percent of the

survey, compose 44.4 percent of the total number of

alcaldes with a favorable image of the central government.

In analyzing category and ethnic elements jointly, however,

a distinct dichotomy emerges. This concerns Category III

and IV municipios. In the former, alcaldes of ladino

municipios possess a considerably better image of the

central government than do alcaldes of Indian municipios.

Among Category IV municipios this pattern is reversed,

with alcaldes of Indian municipios maintaining a decidedly

more positive image of the central government than do

alcaldes of ladino municipios. Although the reason for

this shift in patterns of the image is not clear, it may

well be directly related to a bureau of the Presidency,

the Agency for Community Development. This agency is

particularly concerned with the development of small Indian

communities, and its diverse program allows it to aid such

settlements in everything from the establishment of coopera-

tives for the marketing of native crafts to the construc-

tion of schools and sewage systems.

Although a pronounced spatial pattern is not

discernible, it is obvious that the image of the central

government is poorest in the eastern portions of the
country, except for the Department of Chiquimula, and in
the highlands of western Guatemala (Figure 5). None of
the alcaldes interviewed in the Departments of Izabal, El
Progreso, or Sacate-péquez have a favorable image of the
central government, and in the Departments of Guatemala,
Jutiapa, Chimaltenango, Sololá, and Tononicapán such
evaluations are in a decided minority. Adams has observed,
in the case of Jutiapa, that the department has received
little attention from the central government.[106] While
the basis for this statement is not indicated, it is clear
that the central government has a rather negative image
among alcaldes of the department.

The image of the central government is most
favorable among municipios of the Pacific coastal plain
and the Department of Quiché. Indeed, Quiché was the only
department in which all alcaldes interviewed held a favor-
able image of the central government. Several factors may
influence this positive attitude. First, all of the
alcaldes in Quiché had a moderately strong feeling of
political efficacy, i.e., ability to influence central
government decision-makers. All of them rated the accessi-
bility of such officials as good. In addition, alcaldes
in this department universally maintain a moderate level of

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[106]Adams, Crucifixion by Power, op. cit., p. 221.

GUATEMALA

THE IMAGE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

GOOD

FAIR

POOR

NOT INCLUDED IN SURVEY

SACATEPÉQUEZ

SOLOLÁ

FIG 5

expectation. All expect life to improve in their municipio, but none of them expect miracles. Finally, although the reason for this high regard of the central government is not entirely understood, in Quiché more than in any other department, alcaldes appear to view development progress in more than physical terms. The only material improvement mentioned more than once by the five alcaldes interviewed concerned an improved road network, a project which the central government currently has in progress. More commonly mentioned were such needs as agricultural technical assistance, sources of employment, and the need to form organizations to join Indian and ladino elements in the community in a joint effort to develop the municipio.

Most of the people contacted in El Petén have a poor image of FYDEP. Here, two of the three alcaldes interviewed in the department possess a poor image of the central government, and none of them have used FYDEP as a pressure point despite the fact that the agency has an office in Flores, the department capital. Only one of the three alcaldes could mention three pressure points. El Petén alcaldes are not optimistic with regard to the development of their municipios and do not feel that the central government is responsive to their needs. In one municipio, for example, a diesel generator was installed, and poles and wires placed throughout the small municipio capital to distribute the electricity it produced. The

system was three years old at the time of interviews and
had been out of service for four months because of the
need for repairs. The municipio, with a total budget of
slightly more than $5,000, was hard pressed to meet anti-
cipated expenses. Thus, the municipalidad requested offi-
cials of FYDEP to send someone to the municipio to repair
the generator. FYDEP authorities, however, viewed this
as a municipal responsibility and thus refused to pay for
the repairs. With the municipalidad and DYDEP thus locked
in dispute as to who would pay the expenses, the community
was totally without electricity. The capital invested in
the generator, as well as the poles and lines, was lying
unproductive. Quite obviously, this situation colored the
image of the central government in the eyes of the alcalde
and other municipal officials, particularly since FYDEP
is the chief representative of the central government in
the department.

The Image: A Search for Explanations

In an effort to determine the factors which affect
the image alcaldes have of the central government, data on
feelings of political efficacy, the frequency of communica-
tion between local and national government authorities, the
feeling of development progress during the past five years,
and optimism for progress in the next five years, were
analyzed. Also considered in this attempt to construct a

viable model to explain the image were variables consisting
of travel time between the municipios and Guatemala City,
the size of a community as measured by its category, and
the political affiliation of the alcalde interviewed.

After verifying the normality of the distribution
of data by employing the Kolmororov-Smirnov test, a step-
wise multiple regression analysis was performed (Table 8).
Most of the seven variables initially hypothesized as key
factors in explaining the image of the central government
are not significant. These seven factors explain less
than 32 percent of the variation. The progress and opti-
mism variables explain only 5 percent and 3 percent of the
variation, respectively, while political efficacy is the
single most important variable, explaining 23 percent of
the variation of the image.

Four variables prove to be of no significance in
explaining the image alcaldes hold of the central govern-
ment. They are, 1) political affiliation, 2) population
category, 3) communication, and 4) distance from the
capital city. The failure of political affiliation to
prove a key variable is not surprising since political
parties are not pressure groups and are only loosely knit
political entities. Also important is the low level of
party identification which prevails in Guatemalan politics.
Nor does the population size of a municipio prove to be of
significance. The fact that many alcaldes of small

TABLE 8

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE IMAGE AND SEVEN VARIABLES

Variable								
Image	1.000							
Political Efficacy[a]	.477	1.000						
Communication[b]	.008	.125	1.000					
Progress[c]	.174	.146	.043	1.000				
Optimism[d]	.228	.162	.157	.895	1.000			
Travel Time	.054	-.116	-.318	-.101	-.090	1.000		
Category of Municipio	-.073	.081	-.424	.013	-.121	.059	1.000	
Political Affiliation	.007	.044	-.036	.078	.083	.006	.059	1.000

[a]Refers to the four parts of question 18 of the interview schedule.

[b]Refers to questions 10 through 13 of the interview schedule.

[c]Refers to the sum of the difference in the responses to questions 16a and 16b, and 17a and 17b, of the interview schedule.

[d]Expectations. Refers to the sum of the difference between questions 16a and 16c, and 17a and 17c.

municipios consider themselves "olvidados" (forgotten) by
central authorities is apparently offset by the fact that
many alcaldes of more populous municipios do not believe
they receive attention commensurate with the scale of
population and problems of development. Obviously,
therefore, the category to which a municipio belongs does
not influence the image the alcalde maintains of the cen-
tral government.

The inconsequential value of the travel time and
communication variables as elements affecting the image
is more bewildering. A distance decay factor does not
appear to be associated with the number of times alcaldes
meet with officials of the central government in Guatemala
City nor the number of times such officials visit the
municipios. Neither is there distance decay in the fre-
quency of communication between the two levels of govern-
ment as measured by telephone conversations or telegrams.
Even if the communication variable is divided into direct
communication and indirect communication, the correlations
between them and the image are not significant, .031 and
.059 respectively. The low coefficients of correlation
between the image and communication indicate that the
original hypothesis, namely that the image of the central
government improves as communication between the two levels
of government increases, should be rejected. Indeed, there
appears to be no relationship between the frequency of

communication and the image <u>alcaldes</u> hold of the central

government. It may be that with some <u>alcaldes</u> increasing

communication with central government authorities increases

their frustration because their rising expectations are

not met. The key, therefore, may be the difference between

the frequency of communication and the frequency of effec-

tive communication, i.e., the frequency with which commu-

nication stimulated by the local government leads to

affirmative action by the central government in the

<u>municipio</u>. If less than one-third of the variation in the

image of the central government is explained by the seven

variables selected, what are some other factors, pre-

viously unconsidered, which may affect the image <u>alcaldes</u>

possess? One is prosperity. There is little doubt that

recent cotton, cattle, and coffee expansion on the Pacific

coastal plain and the piedmont area of southern Guatemala

have resulted in a period of prosperity. This is especially

true in the Departments of Escuintla, Suchitepéquez, and

Retalhuleu. Grand <u>fincas</u> largely dedicated to the produc-

tion of cotton and cattle now dominate the Pacific coastal

area. The expansion of cotton cultivation has been

meteoric, the area dedicated to it increasing from 64,000

acres in 1960 to 173,000 acres in 1971. Production of

cotton over the same period rose from 95,000 bales to

350,000 bales, 90 percent of which was exported. Exports

of red meat have also risen sharply, from 3.4 million

pounds in 1961 to 50.7 million pounds in 1971.[107] It seems

likely that the prosperity resulting from this economic

growth has some effect on the image local officials hold

of the central government.

A second factor that may support a favorable image

of the central government among alcaldes is the flow of

funds from the central government to the individual

municipios. Chiquimula, for example, received a substan-

tial input of central government funds and technical

assistance during the Arana administration. Party affil-

iation may play some part, since all alcaldes of the de-

partment are members of the MLN-PID coalition, but the

fact that this is the region where President Arana made

his fame fighting guerrillas may not be incidental. The

disproportionate share of central government funds flowing

to the Department of Chiquimula has been noted in Guate-

mala's newspapers.[108] Included is a large-scale plan for

the development of the department and its capital.[109]

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[107] Foreign Agricultural Service, United States
Department of Agriculture, "World Agricultural Production
and Trade: Statistical Report" (Washington, 1973), pp. 4
and 6; and Foreign Agricultural Service, "Central America
Aims at Increased Cotton Production," Foreign Agricultural
Circular No. FC 14-72 (June, 1972), p. 6.

[108] "Q2 millones invierten en Chiquimula," op. cit.

[109] Dirección General de Obras Públicas, Departa-
mento de Chiquimula: Plan de Desarrollo, 1970-1975
(Guatemala, 1972).

The ambitions of the _alcaldes_, both personal and for their _municipios_, may also be factors affecting the image pattern. If the _alcalde_ has neither of these types of ambition, he is easier to please and consequently may have a better image of the central government than an _alcalde_ who holds great concern that his _municipio_ may remain undeveloped. The _alcalde_ of a small _municipio_ in central Guatemala, for example, possesses a very positive image of central government responsiveness to local needs, despite the fact that no progress has been made toward the construction of a badly needed irrigation project which he considers top priority. The _alcalde_ had not promoted the project, however, since he believes the cost would result in rejection by the central government. Instead, the _municipalidad_ has settled for a petition which requests a new dispensary for the town. Thus, with the new health facility set for inauguration at the time of the inter-view, the _alcalde_ held that the central government was very responsive to local development needs.

The young _alcalde_ of a _municipio_ in eastern Guatemala does not hold a positive view of the central government. Having recently been presented with a report outlining plans for the development of his _municipio_, one would expect that he would have such an image. On the contrary, the presentation of plans to the _alcalde_ merely whetted his appetite for action, and he became thoroughly irked when he discovered that the funds to implement the

plans of the central government would not be provided in the forthcoming national budget.

Considerations such as ambition are difficult, if not impossible, to measure precisely. The limited significance of the hypothesized factors in explaining the image alcaldes possess concerning the central government, with the noteworthy exception of political efficacy, raises some pertinent questions for future research. How, for example, can the effectiveness of communication be measured? What instrument can measure the ambition an official has for himself and his community? How can the current degree of prosperity in a municipio be determined? These questions cannot be answered at this point, for they demand considerable thought and field testing. Questions such as these must be adequately answered, however, before future research along these lines can be successful.

The Search for Lag

The third objective of this research is to identify development lag, both rural and cultural. On the assumption that lag would be reflected in development priorities, each alcalde interviewed was asked to list the three most urgent needs of his municipio, bearing in mind that the basic goal of development is to improve life for the people.

Three observations regarding alcaldes and their priorities warrant consideration. First, there is a decided tendency for alcaldes to view development in

material terms. All of the items listed in Table 9 are basically material goods or services except for the five alcaldes who mentioned the need for technical agricultural assistance and the two who noted the need for more jobs. Included among "other" priorities mentioned are the opinions of an alcalde who viewed price stability as a key to improving life in his municipio, another alcalde who urgently seeks the means whereby he can bring Indian and ladino factions in his community together, and a third alcalde who spoke of land reform as pivotal to the development of his municipio. With these exceptions, however, alcaldes want physical goods or services. Their demands upon the central government are for goods and services, opportunities for self improvement. Second, alcaldes of seven municipios were unable to mention three needs of their municipios. In part, this is probably due to the inclination of alcaldes to think of development in largely physical terms. Some alcaldes also tend to think in terms of monuments to themselves, i.e., accomplishments which clearly reflect the success of their administration, at least as measured in aesthetically acceptable material goods. Finally, many alcaldes, lacking in both educational and travel opportunities, do not have a concept of priorities. They usually have an idea of what would be desirable to have in the municipio, but a concept of priorities does not always enter into this. Such a situation is reflective

TABLE 9

ALCALDE VIEWS OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

Item	First Priority	Second Priority	Third Priority	Total
Potable water	33	10	7	50
Sewerage system	23	16	9	48
Access road	8	15	14	37
Local roads	5	16	8	29
Educational facilities	6	10	12	28
Health facilities	6	10	12	28
Market	5	10	6	21
Electricity	6	6	9	21
Slaughter house	2	2	5	9
Town hall	3	3	2	8
Communications	-	-	6	6
Technical agricultural assistance	4	1	-	5
Social salon	1	1	2	4
Plaza	-	-	3	3
Irrigation system	2	-	1	3
Sources of work	1	1	-	2
Other	5	6	4	14
Total	108	108	101	317

of the need to better train local officials and oversee their actions.

On the basis of priorities related by the alcaldes, is there a definite pattern of cultural or rural lag? To answer this question priorities were standardized by using factor analysis, and the resulting factor scores were employed in performing a Hierarchical Grouping analysis. This program groups observations on the basis of within-group variance, i.e., the variation from the mean for a given group of observations is minimized. If cultural lag exists, the placement of municipios in two groups on the basis of development priorities should result in one group being composed largely of Indian municipios and the second group largely of ladino municipios. Similarly, rural lag should be reflected in most of the urban municipios forming one group and rural municipios combining in a second group. The results of the grouping leave little doubt. Clearly the municipios do not group, either by urban/rural standards (rows) or by cultural groups (columns), inasmuch as forty-eight of the survey municipios have predominantly Indian populations and fifteen have a predominantly urban population. Furthermore, efforts to designate cultural or rural groups by altering the definitions of these groups have proved equally fruitless. For example, if urban municipios are defined as those having a minimum urban population of 25 percent, eighteen of the forty-one

municipios which meet this definition fall into Group I
and twenty-five fall into Group II. In searching for
cultural lag, even considering only the thirty municipios
which are more than 80 percent Indian, fourteen fall into
Group I and the remaining sixteen in Group II. Further-
more, the department capitals do not group together, four
being in Group I and four in Group II.

TABLE 10

RESULTS OF HIERARCHICAL GROUPING*

Majority Population	Majority Population	
	Indian	Ladino
Urban	A: 1 B: 4	A: 6 B: 4
Rural	A: 18 B: 25	A: 23 B: 27

*A equals Group I. Total observations: 48.
 B equals Group II. Total observations: 60.

There is no mistake. The priorities of municipal
development as viewed by the alcaldes do not reflect any
cultural or rural dichotomy. Additionally, there are no
spatial groupings (Figure 6).

Something is badly amiss. Either rural and
cultural lag do not exist in Guatemala, or an inadequate
methodology was employed to measure them. Yet, direct
observation of life in the countryside and cities of

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HIERARCHICAL GROUPS BASED ON DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

GROUP I

GROUP II

NOT INCLUDED IN SURVEY

FIG 6

Guatemala reveals a definite rural lag, and that cultural lag, while possibly less apparent, is also present.

The problem with this unsuccessful search for signs of lag must lie in the methodology. There are two basic weaknesses in the use of priorities as evidence of lag. First, such a methodology assumes that the interviewees have priorities. This does not appear to be a valid assumption. Many alcaldes show little indication that they possess even a concept of priorities. Second, while life in the cities is generally better than life in rural areas, due to the immediate availability of more services and job opportunities, all municipios of Guatemala suffer to some extent from the lack of basic services. Guatemala City and Huehuetenango, for example, have inadequate water systems and supplies, just as do Fraijanes and Santiago Chimaltenango. It is an error, therefore, to assume that the alcaldes will have different priorities simply because two of the municipios are largely urban and two are largely rural.[110]

The question remains as to how development lag can be measured. Perhaps priorities can be used, but the opinions of more technically capable people, and the scale of the needs, should be considered. But who, if not the

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[110]The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, op. cit., estimated that only 50 percent of the urban population of Latin American countries would have potable water at their disposal by 1970, p. 129.

alcalde, can best interpret local needs and priorities, and is scale to be determined? Is an adequate supply of potable water less important to the citizens of Fraijanes than to the citizens of Guatemala City?

It is apparent that the use of development priorities as instruments to measure lag is fraught with dangers. As an alternative, perhaps an inventory of the services available in the municipios could be used to determine degrees of lag. But, this inevitably leads to the need to evaluate these services. How does one weight the difference between a health center in municipio "A," which has an adequate supply of medicine, and the health services of municipio "B," which has an inadequate supply of medicine? What is an adequate supply of medicine? These are methodological problems and questions which cannot be confronted here. It is clear, however, that the measurement of lag demands finer instruments than those now available.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

What has been learned through this research, in-
volving direct contact with many cities and towns, central
government agencies and town halls of Guatemala? Two
basic conclusions have been drawn. One concerns the need
for reform in the minds of Guatemalan citizens and the
machinery of Guatemalan government and politics. The
second involves methodological problems of social science
research.

Local Government: Reality and Potential

Local government in Guatemala possesses several
positive aspects which could make it a device for stimu-
lating the development of the country and for institution-
alizing the political behavior of its citizens. Local
government, therefore, can play a crucial role in integrat-
ing Guatemala both politically and spatially. The key
strength of local government is its structure. Although
the at-large local elections often lead to domination of
the municipal corporation by citizens of the municipal
capital, this is not always the case. Alcaldes auxiliares

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serve in all of the aldeas of a municipio, as well as in large caserios and finca settlements. This guarantees not only that the municipal corporation is represented in the hinterlands served by the municipal capital, but also that townspeople in these areas have a channel of communication, i.e., a means of input to their municipal government. Alcaldes auxiliares represent a two-way communication system. Other means whereby individuals can, and do, affect the local government is through local councilmen and participation in local development committees. While some municipios do not have such committees, others have active development committees at the aldea level. Whether or not most local citizens actually use this means of influencing local government and development is open to question. The fact remains that popular initiative can be effectively directed toward local development through such committees, if the people so desire.

Little doubt exists as to who has the responsibility for the management of the local government, namely the alcalde. In many cases he depends heavily on the secretario as an assistant and adviser, but the responsibility for local affairs is his even though major decisions require approval of the town council. Here, the síndico represents the leadership. However, as the leader of the municipal corporation, the alcalde chairs town council meetings and has the right to vote in them. While such a

system does not obliterate all points of friction between the council and the alcalde, it substantially reduces friction and permits joint decisions. Disruptive disputes between an alcalde and a town council are therefore minimized.

A second strength of local government is that all officials are directly or indirectly subject to the popular will. Alcaldes, síndicos, and councilmen are particularly vulnerable to popular dissatisfaction since they are popularly elected. But even those who fill appointive offices must keep in close touch with public opinion, since all appointive offices are filled by officials who are popularly elected. Consequently, no entrenched power blocs exist at the local level which are able to indefinitely thwart the popular will or the will of the municipal corporation.

ANAM represents a third strength of local government. Designed primarily as a national voice for the municipios, the organization has almost universal moral support among alcaldes, although some municipalidades do not meet their financial obligations to it. One of the weaknesses of the organization is its dependence on the municipalidad of Guatemala for leadership and financial backing.

The statutes of ANAM denote the alcalde of Guatemala City as the president of the association. This is a natural and beneficial regulation. The alcalde of Guatemala's capital wields considerably more influence than

do <u>alcaldes</u> of other <u>municipios</u>, commands more attention from the media, and clearly has better accessibility to central government agencies and decision-makers than do other <u>alcaldes</u>. Such an arrangement also places a substantial clerical and research staff at the disposal of the association.

Despite the limited budget, ANAM plays an increasingly significant role in representing the <u>municipios</u> before the central government. The organization has been instrumental in establishing regional municipal organizations and strengthening them. These regional organizations, which now number eighteen, vary in strength and effectiveness. The fact that nearly every <u>municipalidad</u> is now a member of a regional association as well as ANAM definitely represents a step in the right direction, and there is little doubt that these regional organizations and ANAM will become increasingly effective if permitted to do so by the national government.

A final strength of municipal government in Guatemala is the interest and concern local officials have for local development and for strengthening the municipal movement through efforts to increase the significance of local government in the country's development and political system. Such interests and concerns are not universal, but they certainly predominate. The sincere interest <u>alcaldes</u> possess in the municipal movement is exemplified

by an incident which occurred at the 1972 national
assembly of ANAM in Esquipulas, Chiquimula. At that
meeting a resolution was introduced by an MLN-PID alcalde
to alter the ANAM statutes so that the president of the
association would be elected by all alcaldes at the annual
meeting, rather than automatically have the position go
to the alcalde of Guatemala City. Such a reform would have
serious implications. It would decrease the strength of
local government in relation to the central government, as
well as strengthen rightist political elements at the ex-
pense of more reform oriented political forces. Initially,
this reform would introduce a potentially disruptive
political element into the association which does not now
exist, namely, campaigning for the association presidency.
In addition, it could mean that the presidency would leave
Guatemala City, the national center of political power.
Such a situation could further dilute the strength of the
organization by dividing it between two poles, one where
the officially elected president resides and a second where
the single most influential alcalde resides. The proposed
reform would also have important political implications
nationally.

National law prohibits a Vice President from
directly succeeding the President under whom he serves, and
since deputies are not allowed to seek re-election succes-
sively few if any of them have a power base from which to

seek the President's position. These facts help thrust
the alcalde of Guatemala City, who by his very position
commands considerable attention, into an excellent position
from which to make a move for the Presidency. Further-
more, as president of ANAM, the alcalde of Guatemala City
travels extensively throughout the country, visiting other
municipios and speaking at regional municipal meetings.
This increases his exposure to the citizenry in general,
and allows him an opportunity to increase his political
contacts throughout the country. Such activities add
substantially to his political base.

Since the citizens of Guatemala City have a history
of electing leftist officials to office, this spectre
disturbs the rightist political elements. If, however,
ANAM's statutes could be reformed to allow the election
of the organization's president, the alcalde's favorable
position in terms of national politics would be reduced.
The vote on the resolution, therefore, had implications
for both the municipal movement and national politics.
Despite the fact that more than two-thirds of the alcaldes
of Guatemala are members of the MLN-PID coalition parties,
the resolution was soundly defeated. This incident illus-
trates two facts. Clearly the party identification of
Guatemala's alcaldes is not such that MLN-PID bosses,
including the President of the country, could deliver the
needed votes. The party identification of alcaldes was

simply not strong enough. Second, the alcaldes realize
the advantages of having the alcalde of Guatemala City
at the head of the municipal movement and are not willing
to sacrifice those advantages to please party bosses.

Alcalde concern for municipal development does
little to overcome the basic problems that confront muni-
cipal government. In particular, seven problems hinder
local government maturation in Guatemala: 1) the caliber
of local officials, 2) restrictions on the terms of office
for elected officials, 3) the generally lethargic attitude
of the citizenry, 4) financial limitations, 5) the central-
ization of authority, 6) the size and organization of the
central bureaucracy, and 7) the lack of pressure points.

Caliber of Local Officials

Although most elected and appointed government
officials at the local level have good intentions, few
have the educational or professional background necessary
to manage local development. They are equally ill pre-
pared to deal with the central government, particularly in
view of the size and organization of the bureaucracy and
the centralization of authority in the Executive branch.

INAD, INFOM, and ANAM seek to aid municipal offi-
cials in resolving the problems they confront, but none of
these agencies is sufficient in scope to substantially
alter the present situation. In particular, INAD has
commenced a series of effective regional efforts to

improve the management capabilities of local officials

concerning local affairs. But, this program suffers from

a lack of the funds and sufficient personnel to operate

at an effective scale. There is also the problem of

tenure of office for local officials, especially those

popularly elected. What is the benefit derived from in-

structing an alcalde concerning good administrative prac-

tices when probably he will be out of office in less than

two years? What opportunity does an alcalde have to culti-

vate effective pressure points, both within and outside

of the central government?

Tenure of Office

National laws which prohibit elected officials

from succeeding themselves may be intended to prevent

entrenchment and the possibility of local groups estab-

lishing power bases from which to disrupt the political

system. To a degree, such measures may be beneficial.

In Guatemala, however, this is not entirely the case

because restrictions are taken to the extreme. With

Deputies of the Congress unable to succeed themselves,

what incentive do they have to take interest in the affairs

of the departments and municipios which they represent?

Clearly little such incentive exists. Furthermore, the

fact that Deputies may not succeed themselves neutralizes

any possibility that Congress will be able to play a

significant role in development politics. The complete turnover in Congress every four years prevents the formation of any power blocs to offset the concentrated power of the President and his appointees. The result is an ineffective Congress, unresponsive to local needs, which is little less than a puppet of the President. Consequently, Deputies do not act as pressure points for local government, and its very existence becomes inconsequential to them. Deputies are almost universally held in disrepute by alcaldes.

While there are clear advantages to prohibiting the powerful alcalde of Guatemala City from succeeding himself, the benefits gained from prohibiting the alcaldes of small municipios from succeeding themselves are less clear. Indeed, this limitation hinders the development of smaller communities because alcaldes elected to serve two-year terms of office are inclined to seek projects which have a high potential for successful completion within their tenure of office, regardless of how such projects relate to local priorities, or lethargically conclude that they really cannot accomplish anything and thus seek to do little or nothing for the municipio. The last thing Guatemalans need is a caretaker type of government at the local level.

Lethargic Population

The population of a municipio must not only be willing to make demands on the local government, but must also be willing to contribute at least a fair share of the resources necessary to meet these demands. Local officials often find themselves sandwiched between a generally lethargic, but increasingly demanding, local citizenry and a powerful central government which is largely monopolizing the financial resources whereby local demands can be met. The ability of many municipalidades to obtain an adequate response to local needs by central government officials clearly limits the support local officials maintain among the citizenry. The local population realizes that the municipalidad cannot meet the demands placed upon it. Accordingly, the citizenry becomes unresponsive to the needs of the municipalidad by failing to pay taxes and assessments. Individual citizens are also therefore less willing to contribute time and energy toward the solution of local development problems by serving on committees and assisting with special projects.

Problems of Money

Local government expenditures in Guatemala amount to less than five dollars per person per year. An average of less than one dollar per person is annually spent on municipal improvement projects. Moreover, little equity exists in the distribution of these monies, as some

municipios have little or no capital to invest in public projects once payments on previous loans have been made.

Not only are the finances available to local officials clearly insufficient to meet the responsibilities placed upon local government, but most tax monies destined for capital investment are collected and controlled by the central government. It is true that tax collection by the central government is probably the most efficient means to collect revenues, especially since few local governments are equipped to do it. Of equal validity is the need for some agency to oversee the spending of these capital funds. To perform its duties effectively, however, the overseer must have an idea of local needs and priorities, preferably formulated with the assistance of local offi- cials. In many cases, neither the local officials nor central government authorities maintain such priorities. As a consequence, the construction of a theatre takes place where an expanded hospital facility is needed, a new town hall is erected where the water system requires ex- pansion, and a new plaza is built where the primary need of the municipio is an improved access road.

The money problems confronted in stimulating municipal development involve more than mere availability of money. Granted, there are not sufficient funds at the disposal of local officials for the development of their municipios. Equally important, the limited funds which

are being expended on municipal development are often not spent effectively. Doubling or tripling the investment capital in municipal development will not solve all of the financial problems which hinder local progress. Some priority system of capital investment for each municipio needs to be established.

Centralization of Authority

The lack of financial self-sufficiency causes local governments to turn to the central government for action in order to satisfy most local needs. In doing this, they confront a national system where power is concentrated in the Executive branch of government. Very few alcaldes or other local officials have access to the few key decision-makers, specifically the President and his ministers. Few alcaldes who do have such power have the expertise or technical knowledge to influence the decisions these authorities make. Such situations obviously lead to strained relations between local and national levels of government, not only because the local officials must gain access to national decision-makers, but also because they must confront these authorities with hat in hand. They meet, not as equals, but more as peasants meet the finca owner.

Because decision-making is highly concentrated, the President and his ministers are under a constant

barrage of solicitations for meetings, conferences, and projects. With so many decisions to be made by so few people, the decision-making process and action on solicitations is obviously slow. This lack of action further frustrates local officials, especially those who have only a two-year term of office. Such periods of inaction delay local development and strain the relations between the two levels of government. The local population, seeing little or no progress to satisfy local needs, becomes increasingly reluctant to contribute to local development schemes, either with taxes, time, or muscle. The centralization of authority, therefore, does not increase the rate and efficiency of development, nor does it lead to the effective implementation of development planning.

The Central Bureaucracy

Compounding the problem of the centralized authority is the size and organization of the bureaucracy over which the few decision-makers reign. Guatemala's central government consists of more than 43,000 employees serving in ten ministries, averaging fifteen departments each, and twenty autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies.[111]

Although INFOM is designed specifically to deal with local development, it actually handles a very small proportion of all monies expended on local development.

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[111]Herman Lujan, "La hipertrofiado burocracia de Guatemala," in Lujan, op. cit., p. 5.

In truth, no central government agency exists to screen
and answer all solicitations for local development projects.
Consequently, an alcalde who seeks a new school for his
municipio may find it necessary to deal with several
government agencies, and few alcaldes have the expertise
to deal with such a system.

The vast central bureaucracy is often not respon-
sive to decisions made by a higher authority, for bureau-
crats attempt to solidify their own positions and reduce
their work load first. As a result, the decisions of high
authorities lose their effectiveness as they percolate
down through the bureaucracy, and little action results
unless the issue is followed up by the decision-makers.
Yet, few decision-makers have the time or interest to do
so. The obvious results are inactivity and a slow pace
of development.

The experience of a municipio in western Guatemala
offers an example of a problem which results from the
centralization of authority and the bureaucratic lack of
interest in local development. A small river approximately
thirty feet in width flows through this municipio, separat-
ing two aldeas on one side from the municipal capital on
the other. A foot bridge formed the only link between the
two sides of the river. Town officials and local citizens
decided to build a road from the aldeas to the municipal
capital. Inasmuch as the municipios contains a number of

productive coffee and cattle fincas, the municipal treasury

was reasonably well supplied. Town officials, therefore,

agreed to buy the road building material, and local citi-

zens volunteered their services to widen the now well-worn

path to road width and lay the stones which were to form

the road. The river posed a problem, however, since no

one locally had the expertise necessary to design and

supervise the construction of a bridge strong enough to

hold truck traffic. As a result, the municipalidad sent

a petition to the Minister of Communications and Public

Works and requested the construction of a bridge over the

river. As the municipio awaited a response to the request,

progress on the road construction continued. Two months

later, the alcalde received a letter from an engineer in

the Public Works department which stated that construction

of the bridge was impossible because initially a road

would have to be built to the site and total estimated

costs of such a project were $200,000. A letter sent to

the engineer by the alcalde indicating that the road was

being built by the townspeople and was now nearly com-

pleted brought no response. Local citizens then attempted

to construct a bridge themselves, but these efforts failed

due to the lack of equipment and technical know how.

Three months later, the President was driven over the now

completed road to the river, and the situation was ex-

plained to him while he was making a trip to municipios of

the area in fulfillment of a campaign promise to visit all
municipios of the country during his four years in office.
Within a month, a Public Works crew was at the site build-
ing the bridge. Total costs of the project were esti-
mated at $10,000. This instance illustrates that, with a
little local financing and incentive, citizens can be
instrumental in improving local life. Also, had the
Public Works engineer taken a day to venture to the site,
or requested the regional engineer of the Ministry to do
so, he could have seen that no more than a few thousand
dollars would solve the problem. Even when informed that
the road was already near completion and that all that was
needed was a small bridge, he did not reply. Such situa-
tions prove that presidential trips can be useful and
productive. The question remains, however, as to why it
took a personal visit by the President to obtain central
government action on the bridge. It should not have, and
if progress continues to be so heavily dependent on such
journeys the pace of local development in Guatemala will
remain substantially below its potential.

Pressure Points

Since adequate funds do not exist to satisfy all
local government demands some standard method for approv-
ing or rejecting solicitations should exist. Theoretically,
a system of priorities is of primary importance, but this
is not always developed. Consequently, decisions often

become subjective. When an _alcalde_ makes more "noise" he receives more attention. Such a situation reduces down to the ability an _alcalde_ has to make "noise." This, in turn, is largely reduced to a question of pressure points, i.e., channels through which _alcaldes_ can influence central authorities. For a few _alcaldes_ of larger _municipios_, or who have a concerned newspaper reporter as a friend, the press offers one such pressure point, although none of the _alcaldes_ interviewed specifically mentioned it. In the case of Guatemala, pressure points can be classified as existent, potential, or non-existent.

Existing pressure points are largely confined to the central government. Most notably, _alcaldes_ seek to influence the processing of their solicitations by informing the President of their needs and solicitations or by hounding the agency to which the petitions are made. As a result of this tendency to work within a few channels centered within the central government, only one non-government pressure point of any significance currently exists, ANAM. This national association of local governments does as well as can be expected, in view of its financial and personnel limitations, in aiding the _municipios_ with their solicitations. But, ANAM does not have the means to aid all _municipios_ in determining development priorities nor in effectively pressuring for all of the needed projects and reforms.

Several potential points exist but do not effectively function. These potential points include political parties, Deputies, Governors, and regional municipal organizations. Political parties do not function as effective pressure points largely because of their loose, often personal, structure. Conversely, since political parties do not prove instrumental to alcaldes in meeting their needs and desires, political identification with them is generally weak. This, in turn, weakens the structure of the party. From the local viewpoint, a vicious cycle exists: the party does little for the alcaldes and the alcaldes do little for the party.

Governors act only as representatives of the President in the departments. While they may occasionally relay the request of a municipalidad to the proper central government agency, they seldom act as pressure points for alcaldes. Few alcaldes interviewed believed that their department Governor has any interest in the development of the department or their municipio. They seldom seek intervention by the Governor on their behalf.

Deputies are viewed with equal disdain. Opposition party Deputies have little or no influence in the central government, while government party Deputies are seldom innovators of policy or responsive to local government needs. Alcaldes are nearly unanimous in their condemnation of Deputy impotence and disinterest in local development.

As of now, regional associations of <u>municipalidades</u> are not generally effective means of pressuring the central government. This is largely due to their youthfulness, the first having been created in 1971. The potential exists, however. Regular meetings, usually once every three months, are now held by nearly all regional associations. These bring <u>alcaldes</u> into frequent contact with each other and provide an opportunity for them to gain press coverage to air their complaints and speak in a unified voice, rather than in less significant individual voices. The <u>alcalde</u> of Guatemala, as president of ANAM, is almost always present at these meetings to speak for the national association and the municipal movement in general. Occasionally, Deputies also attend these meetings. More important, the manager of INFOM attends all such meetings, often accompanied by one or more ministers of the central government. Regional meetings are, therefore, fast becoming major communication links, not only between <u>alcaldes</u> but also between <u>alcaldes</u> and central government decision-makers. As the organizational and financial status of these organizations improve, their strength and influence should increase. Thus, although regional associations are largely potential pressure points today, they may soon become an effective means to influence the central government.

Groups which do not act as pressure points, such worker groups, peasant organizations and business

associations, are nevertheless important for local development. With the conservative army constantly in the background, the formation of peasant and worker organizations has been discouraged by the rightist-dominated central government. Business groups exist, but they consist largely of the more affluent business interests in and around the largest cities. They do not now act as pressure points for alcaldes and are not likely to be in a position to do so in the foreseeable future.

These, then, are the major problems that hinder local government in meeting its potential for local development and the integration of the country through the institutionalization of political behavior. Until such time as local government becomes an effective means of improving local life, it will not be influential in determining the direction of Guatemalan political or economical life. The question is, how can local government become a more effective means of stimulating local development? One obvious need is to increase popular participation in local government and local development programs. This is not apt to occur, however, until local government becomes more effective in meeting local needs and demands. Initially, such a reform in the effectiveness of local government depends on changes instituted at the national level of government which influence the functioning of local government. The following reforms are recommended:

1. Assuming the existence of honest and free elections, barriers that restrict the terms of office of Deputies should be removed, i.e., Deputies should be allowed to serve unlimited and successive terms. This would have three clear advantages for political development and the stimulation of development in general. First, such a reform would make Deputies more responsive to popular demands as well as those of local government officials. Second, this change in Guatemalan statutes would provide for continuity within the operation of the Legislative branch of government. Finally, an experienced Congress whose members are subject to popular vote every four years would be more alert and effective, hopefully becoming less dependent on Executive will.

   Restrictions that limit the terms of office of local officials should likewise be abolished and the positions become less obligatory in nature. Such a reform should result in greater continuity within local government, encourage long range planning, attract better qualified and prepared candidates for local public office, and relieve alcaldes of the pressure many now feel to accomplish something during their term of office, even if it is not relevant to current municipio needs.

2. The Constitution requires the Executive to allot a certain, unspecified, percentage of the national budget to be invested in municipal works. Article 237 clearly states that this is in addition to direct central government involvement in local and regional projects. However, the central government has never done this.[112] To improve upon the bleak financial situation municipalidades now face, the President must meet this stipulation either voluntarily or by force. This would increase the funds available to local government to meet its needs and raise the debt capacity of

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[112]This is an example of the omnipotent position of the President. Although alcaldes in general, and ANAM in particular, have been literally screaming protests to force the President into fulfilling this Constitutional requirement, they have not succeeded. To whom can they turn for help to enforce the law? The Congress, which is at the President's beck and call? The Judicial system which is equally at his command? In reality, the alcaldes and ANAM can turn to no one.

the municipios so that they may borrow capital
more easily and finance more expensive projects,
such as the expansion of water and sewer systems.
Alcaldes are currently seeking 10 percent of
the national budget, a figure which, on the basis
of the 1974 budget, would reach $35 million for
the current year.

3. The funds derived from budgetary reform should
    be largely dedicated to investment in municipal
    development and development planning. Consequently,
    they should be distributed between two agencies.
    Ten percent of these monies should be assigned to
    ANAM, and should be used to a) strengthen the
    national association through the employment of
    more technical personnel, and b) create a task
    force for each of the eighteen regional groupings
    of municipios. Such a task force should consist
    of technical specialists who would offer local
    officials needed services and aid them in deter-
    mining local development priorities. The task
    force should also be concerned with planning local
    development within a regional context. The re-
    maining 90 percent of the increased funds available
    for municipal development through the enforcement
    of Article 237 of the Constitution should be
    credited to the accounts of the individual muni-
    cipios with INFOM, which should continue to be
    charged with the supervision of these funds. The
    institute's technical staff should be required to
    work with regional task forces and local officials
    in determining local priorities for each municipio
    and financing local development projects. Once
    the financial aspects of a development project
    have been arranged with INFOM, municipalidades
    should not be forced to deal with only central
    government agencies regarding the implementation
    of the project. If, for example, construction
    can be performed at less expensive or more immed-
    iately by a private concern than by a central
    government agency, the municipalidad should have
    the option to select the private company to do
    the work.

4. No central government agency other than INFOM
    should be responsible for projects which involve
    only one municipio. The Ministers of Health and
    Education should be responsible for setting health
    standards, and leave the construction of buildings
    and implementation of programs to meet these
    standards to INFOM, regional task forces, and

local officials. Anytime an <u>alcalde</u> wants
something done which concerns only his <u>municipio</u>
he should not have to deal with more than one
central government agency.

5. INAD programs of technical assistance to municipal
    officials should be expanded. These should deal
    with administrative matters and problems including
    the initiation and collection of local **taxes**.

The changes recommended can be instituted quickly
and with little difficulty. By increasing the role of
local government in local and regional development, local
government can be expected to gain more broad-based popular
support and play an increasingly significant role in insti-
tutionalizing political behavior and integrating Guatemala
into a functional unit. The increased importance of
government at the local level and the removal of restraints
on the terms of office of local officials can be of key
importance in the attraction of more qualified members of
the community to serve in these positions. More popular
participation in, and support of, local government and
local development should also result.

There are additional problems more difficult to
overcome which local officials face in serving their com-
munities. Most perplexing is the development of pressure
points. These cannot be simply created but must be culti-
vated. Although implementation of the recommendations may
help meet the need for effective means to influence the
central political system, it will not resolve all such

needs. Allowing <u>alcaldes</u> to serve successive terms would grant them the opportunity to cultivate personal friends among decision-makers of the central bureaucracy, strengthen regional associations by allowing them to benefit more extensively from experience in the pressuring process, and encourage the formation of active development committees and groups at the local level. A similar reform pertaining to Deputies should make them more responsive to local pressures.

Essential to the proper functioning of the Guatemalan political system is a strong, stable party system. This is basic in political development to, 1) permit voters a free choice in elections, 2) enable the party in power to better manage the central bureaucracy and make it more responsive to the will of the party and high level decision-makers, and 3) establish political parties as pressure points for popular and local needs. Guatemala does not now have a strong, stable party system. The problem is that such a system requires considerable amounts of time and unselfish good will for the country to develop. It cannot be simply legislated.

Guatemalan local government does not meet its full potential in terms of the role it plays in development nor the institutionalization of behavior. Several significant steps can be taken immediately to increase the effectiveness of local government, all of which depend either

directly or indirectly upon action taken by the central
government. The Guatemalan political system, including
the development of local government as a key political
institution, will take many years to mature even with these
reforms.

The Problem of the Image

The image of the central government was determined
by measuring two components: 1) the degree to which
alcaldes feel the central government has been effective in
dealing with local development problems, and 2) the degree
to which alcaldes feel their municipio receives as much
central government attention in resolving local development
problems as do the other municipios of the country.

Initially, seven factors were hypothesized as in-
fluential in explaining the image: 1) the feeling of
progress in local development an alcalde possesses, 2) the
expectations alcaldes have for the future development of
their municipios, 3) feelings of political efficacy among
alcaldes, 4) the frequency of communication between local
and national officials regarding local development, 5) the
party affiliation of alcaldes, 6) the population of a
municipio as measured by its classification, and 7) the
distance between Guatemala City and a municipio as
measured by travel time.

Stepwise multiple regression analysis of the data
collected indicates that less than one-third of the

variation in the image is explained by the seven variables. Indeed, only three of the seven variables examined prove significant. These are political efficacy, which accounts for 23 percent of the variation; expectations for future development, which explains 5 percent of the variation; and positive feelings in regard to past development progress, which accounts for 3 percent of the variation.

The failure of party affiliation to prove significant is not surprising in view of the lack of party identification which prevails among alcaldes. As the Guatemalan political system matures and political parties become more stable and effective in managing the government machinery, the relationship between the image of the central government and party affiliation may become more pronounced.

The categories of municipios do not explain significant proportions of the image variation either. The population size of a municipio apparently has little effect on the manner in which alcaldes view the central government. An interesting ethnic difference in the perceptions of Category III (population of 5,000-10,000) and Category IV (population less than 5,000) municipios does exist, however. Whereas the alcaldes of ladino municipios of the third category have a much more positive view of the central government than do their counterparts in Indian municipios, in Category IV municipios this pattern is reversed. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the

central government has an agency which deals directly with small, Indian municipios in solving their development problems.

Distance decay does not appear instrumental in explaining the image. Indeed, there appears to be no relationship between the image an alcalde holds of the central government and the distance between his municipio and the seat of central government power in Guatemala City. Neither is there a distance decay factor involved in the frequency of contact between officials of the two levels of government and distance from Guatemala City. Actually, there exists a slight negative relationship, with contact tending to increase with distance from the capital.

The fact that the communication variable failed to prove of significance is perplexing inasmuch as communication is essential to development progress. The problem is apparently one of methodology, i.e., the means of measuring communication. This research indicates that frequency of communication is not an adequate measurement. What may be needed is a means whereby the effectiveness of communication can be measured. How this can be done is a problem for further research.

Three factors not considered in the research appear to influence the image alcaldes have of the central government: 1) the flow of central government funds, 2) local prosperity or the lack of it, and 3) the degree

of ambition an <u>alcalde</u> has for himself and his <u>municipio</u>.
All of these factors raise methodological problems.

In Guatemala, no centralized source of information
exists regarding the flow of central government assistance
to the individual <u>municipios</u>. To determine flow patterns,
therefore, would seem to entail efforts to gather appro-
priate data from the myriad of individual central agencies
which have programs being carried out at the <u>municipio</u>
level.

Prosperity and ambition factors raise difficult
measurement problems. The means whereby economic well
being can be measured are yet to be defined by social
scientists. What factors should be considered in efforts
to measure degrees of prosperity? How can the significance
of these factors be weighted? Similar problems arise with
regard to an <u>alcalde</u>'s personal ambition and ambitions for
his community. How does one measure these? Which of the
two is most significant in explaining perception values
in relation to such factors as expectations and the image
of the central government? These are methodological prob-
lems which social scientists who seek to measure percep-
tion and behavioral factors in field research of this
nature must face. Until questions of this nature can be
properly answered, such research must be considered in
its infancy.

The Search for Lag

The notion that urban areas form the vanguard of development in developing societies of Latin America is widely accepted. Indeed, it does not take years of field research to realize the veracity of it. Yet, how is development lag measured? In an effort at measurement, alcaldes were asked to indicate the three most urgent needs for improving life in their municipio. This was based on the assumption that rural areas, which clearly lag in the development process, would have different priorities than the more advanced urban areas.

Hierarchical Grouping analysis indicates that there is no rural lag in Guatemala. Neither does this analysis reveal signs of cultural lag, a concept equally professed in regard to Guatemala. But lag is clearly present. What is the problem? Again, the problem is one of methodology. Using the development priorities of alcaldes as a basis for measuring lag is not effective for two reasons. First, all of rural and urban Guatemala remains lacking in basic services such as water and sewage systems, and the assumption that urban areas, being more advanced, have development priorities different from rural areas is not a valid assumption. Equally invalid is the assumption that alcaldes have development priorities. Many of them do not possess even a concept of priorities.

An alternative to priorities as an instrument to measure lag, is an inventory of services available in the _municipio_. This, however, leads to the need to evaluate such services and raises another series of methodological problems. How does one measure the adequacy of a _municipio_'s health facilities and education program? How important is an access road as compared with a satisfactory water supply and system?

The concept of development lag has validity. Of that there is little doubt. How lag can be scientifically measured is a question which must await future field research before it can be satisfactorily answered.

CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE

It is painful to conclude that the hypotheses to explain the image of the central government and the use of priorities as a measurement of development lag proved to be less valid than was originally expected. However, the observations of Preston James as presented at the National Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers in 1970 offer consolation:

> No scholar should be criticized for formulating a hypothesis that turns out to be unacceptable. Each new hypothetical model challenges attack and produces innovative thinking. Any field of study advances across the wreckage of broken hypotheses, as once beautiful structures are destroyed by the observations they stimulated.[113]

The author contends that the methodological problems encountered in this research, and the methodological questions raised as a result of it, reflect the general quality of past research in Latin America. It is easy to see and describe lag. It is something else to accurately measure it.

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[113]Preston E. James, "Comentário," _Revista Geográfica_, LXXII (Junho, 1970), 91-92.

If social scientists are to contribute to an understanding of the development process and seek to apply the knowledge thus gained to increase the pace of it, it is time to concentrate more on efforts to apply scientific field research to the study of process in gathering knowledge of the reality of development, and less on solely descriptive studies. This is not to state that the latter type of research is valueless. Research techniques do not form a zero-sum equation, and thus one need not sacrifice one form of research for the other. What is needed, however, is an expansion of the inventory of the field tools available to the social scientist, and a greater emphasis on scientific studies of specific processes.

In the case of Guatemala, the potential for economic progress and the development of a stable political system exists. What is lacking is knowledge gained from methodologically sound inquiries which can be applied to quicken the pace of development without increasing economic and political instability. The time when often romantic studies of the Indians, or biased studies of land ownership, can dominate social science research in settings such as Guatemala is drawing to an end. It is time for a new era, new efforts to examine specific development problems, seek to understand the processes related to them, and offer specific recommendations of actions to be taken in overcoming them.

For Latin Americans the time has also come.
Bureaucracies must be more effectively managed, and bureau-
crats must be held responsible for their activity, or in-
activity. The people in general must stop complaining
about their plight and seek to do something about it, with
the government if they can, or without it if they must.
Finally, leaders of governments such as that of Guatemala
must place the interests of their country above their own
interests. It is time for them to stop screaming about
national poverty and to begin to implement reforms which
can aid in overcoming it.

Social scientists of all nationalities can contri-
bute to the development of Latin America by carefully
applied studies to determine the direction and extent of
needed changes. In the end, however, the future of Latin
America belongs to Latin Americans.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

alcalde: Mayor. In Guatemala, the highest popularly
          elected official.

alcalde auxiliar: An appointee of the alcalde, and
          representative of him, in the aldeas and other
          large settlements of a municipio.

aldea: A hamlet or small village of a municipio.

ANAM: Associación Nacional de Municipalidades. A
          nacional organization of municipal governments
          charged with representing local government
          before the central government.

cabecera municipal: The largest settlement of a municipio
          and the municipal capital.

caserio: Rural community of scattered houses in a
          municipio too small to be considered an aldea.

caudillo: Forceful leader or strongman. One who rules
          largely by force of personality rather than by
          formal law.

consejo municipal: Town council. In Guatemala, the size
          of the council varies on the basis of the category
          to which the municipio belongs.

finca: Farm or estate of variable size, but larger than
          a subsistence plot.

finquero: The owner of a finca.

FYDEP: Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo Económico
          de El Petén. An autonomous agency of the Ministry
          of Economy charged with the economic development
          of the Department of El Petén.

golpe de estado: Coup d'état. A sudden overthrow of a
government, usually by the military.

INAD: Instituto Nacional de Administración para el
Desarrollo. An autonomous agency of the Ministry
of Education responsible for studying administra-
tive problems of development and recommending
solutions to them.

INFOM: Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal. An
autonomous agency of the Ministry of Public
Finances charged with overseeing municipal spending
and development.

INTA: Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria. An
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture responsible
for carrying out land reform and colonization
schemes.

junta: Council, committee. In the political context, a
small group of men governing in the form of a
dictatorship.

ladino: All culture groups which are not Indian. In
Guatemala, while a majority of the ladino popula-
tion is mestizo, this group also includes blacks,
Asiatics, and acculturated Indians.

mestizo: A person of mixed Indian-Caucasian ancestry.

municipalidad: The municipal corporation, which consists
of the town council and alcalde. Also, the
town hall.

municipio: A political subdivision of a department.
Although municipios vary considerably in size and
population, they usually consist of a town and a
series of villages, as well as the land, which
surrounds them.

ornato: A head tax, usually assessed to all adult males
of a municipio on an annual basis.

peninsulare: Historically, a Spanish-born person living
in a Spanish colony.

secretario: The equivalent of a town or city clerk in the
United States. Official in charge of the day-to-
day functioning of the local government.

síndico: The judicial adviser to the municipal corporation
and leader of the town council.

tesorero: Treasurer.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY MUNICIPIOS

APPENDIX B

SURVEY <u>MUNICIPIOS</u>

Department Municipio	Category
Alta Verapaz	
San Juan Chamelco	2
San Miguel Tucurú	2
Senahú	2
Santa Cruz Verapaz	4
Tamahú	4
Baja Verapaz	
Salamá	1
Granados	3
San Miguel Chicaj	4
Chimaltenango	
Chimaltenango	1
Patzún	2
San Andrés Itzapa	3
San José Poaquil	3
Chiquimula	
Chiquimula	1
Esquipulas	2
Ipala	2
San Jacinto	3
Escuintla	
Tiquisate	2
La Democracia	3
Masagua	3
Siquinalá	3

Department Municipio	Category
El Petén	
San Luis	3
San Fransisco	4
San José	4
El Progreso	
Sanarate	2
Sansare	3
San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	4
El Quiché	
Sacapulas	2
Uspantán	2
San Pedro Jocopilas	3
Chinique	4
Patzité	4
Guatemala	
Amatitlán	2
San Juan Sacatepéquez	2
Chinautla	3
Chuarrancho	3
Fraijanes	3
Santa Catarina Pinula	3
Huehuetenango	
Cuilco	2
Chiantla	2
Santa Cruz Barrillas	2
Colotenango	3
Jacaltenango	3
Todos Santos Cuchumatanes	3
Santa Bárbara	4
San Rafael Petzal	4
Santiago Chimaltenango	4
Izabal	
Puerto Barrios	1
Los Amates	2
El Estor	4
Jalapa	
Jalapa	1
Mataquescuintla	2

Department Municipio	Category
Jutiapa	
Agua Blanca	2
Comapa	2
Jalpatagua	3
Yupiltepeque	3
Zapotitlán	4
Quezaltenango	
Coatepeque	2
Colomba	2
San Juan Ostuncalco	2
Salcajá	3
Huitán	4
Palestina de los Altos	4
San Fransisco la Unión	4
Retalhuleu	
Retalhuleu	1
Champerico	2
Nuevo San Carlos	2
Santa Cruz Muluá	4
San Martín Zapotitlán	4
Sacatepéquez	
Alotenango	3
Jocotenango	4
Magdalena Milpas Altas	4
Pastores	4
Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	4
San Miguel Dueñas	4
San Marcos	
San Marcos	1
Catarina	2
Concepción Tutuapa	2
Nuevo Progreso	2
El Rodeo	3
Tejutla	3
Esquipulas Palo Gordo	4
Sipacapa	4
San Cristóbal Cucho	4

Department Municipio	Category
Santa Rosa	
Pueblo Nuevo Viñas	2
Casillas	3
Guazacapán	3
Santa Cruz Naranjo	3
Santa Rosa de Lima	3
Sololá	
Santiago Atitlán	2
San Andrés Semetabaj	4
San Antonio Palopó	4
Santa Catarina Palopó	4
Santa Cruz La Laguna	4
San Juan La Laguna	4
Suchitepéquez	
Mazatenango	1
San Antonio Suchitepéquez	2
Santa Bárbara	2
Cuyotenango	3
San Francisco Zapotitlán	3
San José El Idolo	4
San Juan Bautista	4
Santo Tomás La Unión	4
Totonicapán	
Momostenango	2
San Cristóbal Totonicipán	2
San Andrés Xecul	3
Zacapa	
Cabañas	3
San Diego	4
Teculután	4

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Municipio:_____ 2. Date:_____

3. Person interviewed:_____

4. Place of birth:_____ 5. Elected:_____

6. Do you live in this municipio?   yes   no

        6a. If yes, how many years?_____

        6b. If no, where do you live?_____

7. What other occupation do you have?_____

        7a. Where?_____

8. What opinion do you have of ANAM, its organization
   and objectives?

   _____

   _____

9. Have you ever lived in Guatemala City?   yes   no

        9a. If yes, when?_____

        9b. If yes, how many years?_____

10.   How often do you speak by telephone with authorities
      of the central government?

        ___daily   ___at least once per
                                       month
        ___2-4 times per week
                                    ___from time to time
        ___once per week
                                    ___never
        ___every fifteen days
           more or less

11. How frequently do you communicate by telegraph with authorities of the central government?

   ___daily   ___at least once a month

   ___2-4 times per week   ___from time to time

   ___once per week   ___never

   ___every fifteen days more or less

12. How often do you speak with central government officials who have traveled to this municipio to discuss development problems with local officials?

   ___daily   ___at least once a month

   ___2-4 times per week   ___from time to time

   ___once per week   ___never

   ___every fifteen days more or less

13. How many times per year do you travel to the capital city to discuss affairs of interest to this municipio?

   ___daily   ___at least once a month

   ___2-4 times per week   ___from time to time

   ___once per week   ___never

   ___every fifteen days more or less

14. In your opinion, what are the three most urgent necessities of this municipio in order to improve life here?

   a._____

   b._____

   c._____

15. Do you think that natural or human resources exist in this municipio in order to improve upon the level of living?

          yes   no

16. Observe the diagram. The upper part represents a
    high standard of living; the lower part represents a
    low standard of living. Bearing in mind the natural
    and human resources of this municipio, indicate:

    16a. the level at which you believe the people
    of this municipio are living today?

        9   the highest level of life possible

        8

        7

        6

        5

        4

        3

        2

        1

        0   the lowest level of life possible

16b. the situation as of   16c. the situation as
     five years ago.   it will be five
                            years from now.

    9   the highest level of life possible   9

    8   8

    7   7

    6   6

    5   5

    4   4

    3   3

    2   2

    1   1

        0   the lowest level of life possible   0

17. Think of the municipio of the Republic which, in your
    opinion, has the highest standard of living and con-
    sider it at level 9 on the scale below. Now, think
    of the municipio of the Republic where the standard
    of living is lowest and consider it at level 0 on the
    scale below. In relation to these two extremes:

   17a. Indicate where you think (name of municipio)
        is today.

        9   municipio of Guatemala in which life is best

        8

        7

        6

        5

        4

        3

        2

        1

        0   municipio of Guatemana in which life is worst

   17b. Indicate where you   17c. Indicate where you
        think (name of   think (name of
        municipio) was five   municipio) will be
        years ago.   five years from now.

        9   municipio of Guatemala in which   9
             life is best

        8   8

        7   7

        6   6

        5   5

        4   4

        3   3

        2   2

        1   1

        0   municipio of Guatemala in which   0
             life is worst

18. Indicate with an "X" the response which you consider most just in reality.

   18a. Architects and engineers of the central government take your opinion into account when designing a service or building for this municipio.

Never   Always
: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :
1   (poor)   3 .   (fair)   7   (good)   9

   18b. If a conflict develops between the municipalidad and central authorities over the selection of a development project (market, potable water, sewage, etc.), are your opinions taken into account?

Never   Always
: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :
1   (poor)   3   (fair)   7   (good)   9

   18c. Deputies of the National Congress support the petitions and reforms presented to the central government by the alcaldes.

Never   Always
: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :
1   (poor)   3   (fair)   7   (good)   9

   18d. People in the central government are isolated from (the alcalde) and other officials of the municipalidad.

Never   Always
: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :
9   (good)   7   (fair)   3   (poor)   1

19. When you need a project in the municipio and have presented your petition to the central government, to whom do you turn for help?

___ a local businessman   ___ a local landowner

___ the Governor   ___ a Deputy

___ INFOM   ___ a priest

___ INAD   ___ ANAM

___ a local party chief   ___ the President

___ a friend or relative in the   ___ other (specify)
    central government   _____

20. The central government has many institutions inter-
    ested in development. Indicate with an "X" your
    opinion in regard to the following:

    20a. The central government has been effective in
         resolving the development problems of this
         municipio over the past five years.

yes   no
 :   :   :   :   :   :   :   :   :
 9   (good)   7   (fair)   3   (poor)   1

    20b. The central government gives as much attention
         to this municipio as it gives to the other
         municipios of the country.

yes   no
 :   :   :   :   :   :   :   :   :
 9   (good)   7   (fair)   3   (poor)   1

21. In order to respond to the preceding questions, did
    you have some particular institution of the central
    government in mind?

                yes   no

    21a. If yes, what institution?_____

22. Is there a particular institution of the central
    government which has been especially effective in
    resolving the development problems of (name of
    municipio)?

                yes   no

    22a. If yes, what institution?_____

23. In order to stimulate the development of this
    municipio, what do you recommend be done as a means
    of improving relations between the local government
    and national government?

    _____

    _____

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