THE PQLETECAL IKTEGRATECN OF A METROPOLITAN AREA Thesis {or- fhe Degree 0‘ pk. D. MECHLGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Vincent 1’... Marando 1967 (H 651. I. I3 R A R Y Michigan State University 1 . «11mm mun WNW mil L 3 1293 01013 5337 This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Political Integration of A Metropolitan Area presented by Vincent L. Marando has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for __1fl-__Q-__ degree inmfil Science f/«Wfiw Major professor Date June 30, 1967 0469. m. 3. «>9 mg L. NOV 2 ? $99.5 '. , ‘ \ ABSTRACT THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF A HETROPOLITAN AREA by Vincent L. Marando This research examined the political integration of the Detroit metrOpolitan area by focusing upon the extent and pattern of formal c00perative agreements of fifty-eight municipalities. It was upon the types, numbers, and significance of cOOperative agreements among local governments that the research problem of this study was presented. The research problem was: Do local governments in metrOpolitan areas, by means of cooperative agreements, strive to maintain a balance between preferred life-styles and economic costs? Thus, was c00peration among local units of government an attempt to maintain this balance by helping forestall total political and social integration of a metrOpolitan area? The following two major hypotheses were derived from the central research problem and tested: (l) A positive relationship will exist between the socio-economic status of a municipality and the socio-economic status of the municipalities with which it c00perates when a c00perative agreement potentially affects the life-style of the partici- pating municipalities. (2) A positive relationship will exist between the per capita assessed valuation of a municipality and the per capita assessed valuation of municipalities with which it c00perates when a Vincent L. Marando c00perative agreement potentially threatens the economic tax base of the participating municipalities. The research was based upon two broad types of analysis: (I) cor- relation of municipal variables with cooperative agreements and (2) interviews with governmental officials in suburban municipalities. Forty-nine social, economic, and political municipal variables were cor- related with four classifications of cooperative agreements to determine if statistically significant relationships existed and to test the two major and related hypotheses. The four classifications of c00perative agreements were joint agreements, contractual agreements, agreements with social implications, and agreements with economic implications. The interviews were conducted with fifty governmental officials in three selected suburban municipalities. The three municipalities were selected according to factors found to be associated with joint agree- ments through correlation analysis. The interviews determined the offi- cials' attitudes concerning c00peration, municipal problems and goals, the basis of a metrOpolitan community, and their knowledge about metro- politan problems. The responses were used as a basis for testing hypotheses concerning the role of governmental officials in the formula- tion of c00perative agreements. The study demonstrated that social factors correlate significantly with c00perative agreements which affect life-style. Municipal wealth did not correlate significantly with cooperative agreements which might affect municipal tax bases. Economic factors were not the major reason why municipalities c00perate. Political and social factors were more Vincent L. Marando important. Council-manager cities participated in joint agreements to a more significant extent than did mayor-council cities, while governmental structure was not related to contractual agreements. Municipalities whose governmental officials were informed about metropolitan c00peration and communicated with officials from other local governments participated extensively in joint agreements. Government officials did not engage in regular communication with officials of dif- ferent municipalities concerning cOOperation. The city manager played an important role in the formulation of joint agreement primarily because of his extensive communications with administrators from other local governments. COOperation was only one method by which local governments met local problems. Municipalities c00perated primarily when it was to their benefit. Governmental officials saw few negative aspects asso- ciated with c00perative agreements. The metrOpolitan-wide benefits of cooperation were of a secondary nature compared to municipal benefits. COOperation did not transcend differences among municipalities, but was shaped by them. THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF A METROPOLITAN AREA by Vincent L. Marando A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1967 ACKNOWLEDGHENTS I am indebted to many individuals for the help they gave me in carrying out this study. I wish to thank Professor Charles Press, Chairman of the thesis committee, for guidance and advice. His ability to isolate and logically state the "problem" will always be appreciated. Committee members Harold S. Johnson and David Ziblatt were conscientious in their reading and insightful in their comments. The Institute for Community Devel0pment, Michigan State University, and its Director,Duane Gibson, provided support and resources to com- plete this study. Patricia Higgins turned much scribbled over sheaves of paper into neatly typed manuscript. The Citizens' Research Council of Michigan provided the data on intergovernmental c00peration in the Detroit area. I thank Robert Queller and William Carter for their perceptive insights into the Detroit metrOpolitan area. My sincere thanks go to the fifty governmental officials from Allen Park, Birmingham, and Ecorse who took time out of their busy schedules to talk about intergovernmental c00peration. Lastly, I would like to express my debt to my wife, Patricia, who gave encouragement and SUpport when it was needed most. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . O O O O O O O 0 LIST OF APPEND ' CES O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Chapter A FRAMEWORK TO STUDY POLITICAL INTEGRATION . . The Study of MetrOpolitan Political Integration Political Integration Defined . . . . . . . . . The Process of MetrOpolitan Area Integration . . Conditions Associated with Political Integration: Four Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . My Approach to Political Integration . . . . sum ry O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O POLITICAL INTEGRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Metropolis Is an Integrated Economic Community The New Metropolis: The Relation of Social to Economic Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Commitment of Citizens to Local Government for Pressures for Governmental Integration and Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integration Costs Vs. Independence Costs . Coalition Formation to Minimize Costs . . Summary . . I O I O O O O O O O I O O O 0 DATA COLLECTION AND HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . Legal Basis of MetrOpolitan C00peration In The Research Site . . . . . . . Data Collected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HypotheSes Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . Michigan 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O Page \O\I\i U'IN— 20 20 2| 25 33 37 #9 58 59 60 61 65 72 IV. V. VI. VII. THE PATTERN OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Types and Patterns of C00peration In the Detroit MetrOpoIitan Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nature of Municipal Services and C00perative Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Social and Economic Implications of Services Provided through C00peration . . . . . . . . . . . . COOperative Agreements, Socio-Economic Status and Economic Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Community Variables and C00perative Agreements . . . . The Relationship of Municipal Structure to C00perative Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS IN LOCAL COOPERATION . Purposes of COOperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Benefits of COOperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Governmental Officials'Participation In COOperative Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resident Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Barriers to Greater Intergovernmental COOperation Communications among Governmental Officials from Different Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . foiciais' Awareness of Sources of Information . . . Council of Governments . . . . . . . . . . . Community NewSpaper Reading Habits . . . . . . . The Lack of a Systematic Attempt to Gather Information Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE ROLE OF MUNICIPALITIES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION Q 0 O O O I O O O O I O O C O O 0 Municipal Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Provision of Municipal Services . . . . . . . . . A Comparison of Municipal Services . . . . . . . . . . MetrOpolitan Problems and Intergovernmental C00peration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . Summary of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page 76 77 78 8h 86 9| 96 122 l27 I30 131. 137 m2 “.5 m ‘53 162 I65 I68 I70 l7l I73 I73 I76 I80 I82 l89 I90 I90 I93 Page VIII. COOPERATION IN A METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . 20l Some Implications of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 20l The Effect of Spill-Over and Political Integration . . 203 Suggestions for Funher Research . . . . . . . . . . . 206 8' BL'OGRAPHY O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O 0 2% APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2'3 Table 3-I 3-2 3-3 u-z 4-3 h-h u-s u-e 11-7 LIST OF TABLES Incorporated Suburban Municipalities In the Detroit MetrOpoIitan Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Comparison of Selected Variables for the Three Municipalities of Allen Park, Birmingham, and Ecorse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Official Governmental Positions of Individuals Interviewed In the Three Municipalities of Allen Park, Birmingham, and Ecorse . . . . . . . . . . The Extent of Contractual and Joint COOperative Agreements In the Detroit MetrOpoIitan Area (Includes Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties) Formal Joint and Contractual Agreements for Municipalities In the Detroit Metropolitan Area . . COOperative Agreements with Social Implications and COOperative Agreements with Economic Implications to the Participating Municipalities . . . . . . . Pearson Product-Moment Correlation among Mean 5.5.5. and Per Capita A/V of 58 C00perating Municipalities for Agreements with Social and Economic Implications with S.E.S. and Municipal Health . . . Simple Correlations between Forty-Nine Community Variables and Four Classifications of C00perative Agreements for Fifty-Eight Municipalities . . . . Partial Correlations between Selected Community Variables and Four Classifications of C00perative Agreements for 58 Communities . . . . . . . . . Multiple Correlation and Regression Coefficients between Joint COOperative Agreements and Twenty- One Community Variables.. . . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 63-6“ 66 7O 79 8I-82 90 9h 98-100 ION-I05 IO9-IIO u-a 5-3 s-L. 5-5 Page Multiple Correlation and Regression Coefficients between Total Contractual Agreements and Twenty- Three Community Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . lll-ll2 Multiple Correlation and Regression Coefficients between Agreements with Social Implications and Fourteen Community Variables . . . . . . . . . . . Il3-Ilh Multiple Correlation and Regression Coefficients between Total Agreements with Economic Implications and Thirteen Community Variables . . . . . . . . . II5-II6 Municipal Governmental Structure Related to Joint COOperative Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I2h Municipal Governmental Structure Related to Contractual Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l26 Reasons for Participating In C00perative Agreements Given by Governmental Officials In Three Municipalities and by Governmental Position . . . . 135-136 Disadvantages of C00perative Agreements as Viewed . . by Governmental Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . I39 The Fairness of Costs of C00perative Agreements as Viewed by Governmental Officials . . . . . . . . . Ihl Elected Officials and Administrators'Participation In the Formulation of a C00perative Agreement . . . IA} Resident Contact of Governmental Officials Concerning COOperative Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Governmental Officiais' Responses as to Why More C00peration Does Not Exist between Their Municipalities and Other Governmental Units . . . . Ih8 Governmental Officials' Views Concerning the Present State of Intergovernmental C00peration In the Detroit Metropolitan Area . . . . . . . . . I52 . Total Frequency of Communications (Face to Face Meetings, Telephone Calls, and Mail Sent and Mail Received) between Governmental Officials of Three Municipalities and Other Local Units of Government l56 vii 5-9 6-2 6-3 Page Frequency of Contacts with Officials of Different Local Governmental Units as Given by the Officials of Three Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I60 Officials‘ Awareness of a Metropolitan-Hide Channel Of Information 0 0 O O O O O I O O I O O O C O O 0 l6“ Governmental Officials' Knowledge about Committee of one Hundred a a a a a a o a o a o a a a a a a a a a '67 HewSpaper Reading Habits of Governmental Officials In Three Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I69 Governmental Officials' Perception of the Ability of Their Municipality to Provide Services without the Help of Other Local Municipalities . . . . . . . . I77 Governmental Officials' Comparison of Services between Their Own Municipality and a Neighboring Municipality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18I Governmental Officials In Three Municipalities View MetrOpoIitan Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I85 viii LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix Page I. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2I3 II. QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTER-LOCAL COOPERATION . . . . . . . 229 ix ‘CHAPTER I A FRAMEWORK TO STUDY POLITICAL INTEGRATION This research project will investigate the process of integration of local governmental services within a metrOpoIitan area and examine social, economic, and political factors associated with this process. In the discussion that follows I isolate four theories accounting for political integration and present my own approach to examining this process. The Study of Metropolitan Political Integration In today's world of modern technology and increasing division of labor, a greater understanding of Integration of governmental units is needed because the demands upon governments appear to be exceeding the capabilities of existing units. Many point out that political integra- tion is one means by which a governmental power may be adjusted to make it better able to c0pe with its environment. Some observers argue that this process is occurring at all politi- cal levels: the local community, the metrOpolitan level, the nation- state, and the international level. Thus, metrOpoIitan areas provide a microcosm of the process of political integration since the metropolitan area presents a more simplified process than c00peration among nations. Language and cultural barriers are less frequently present to add com- plexity to the integration process. The metropolitan area, therefore, affords an excellent Opportunity to examine the conditions of political integration and to isolate important variables in the process. A simple view of political integration in metropolitan areas assumes that all forms of intergovernmental c00peration are useful methods for handling metropolitan problems. But, in fact, this may not be the case. Intergovernmental cooperation in some cases may not facili- tate, and may even aggravate the finding of acceptable solutions to metrOpolitan-wide problems. As John Bollens and Henry Schmandt argue, c00perative agreements among local governments may rather help maintain the status quo and render more difficult problem solutions at an area- wide level.‘ Thus, the process of political integration of local communities will be viewed in this work primarily from an empirical standpoint to discover conditions under which local governments have cooperated. The question of the value of such integration to the reformer will be con- sidered as less relevant. This research will be largely concerned with what the costs and benefits for c00perating units have been in specific cases where integration occurred. Political Integggtlon Defined The concept of political integration has been defined with varying degrees of comprehensiveness by different writers. One school of writers on international cooperation stresses shared culture patterns as synony- mous with political integration. Ernst B. Haas, for example, views IJohn Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metrogolis (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, I965), p. 588. political integration in terms of shared attitudes. For him political integration is primarily a matter of consensus formation with respect to a specific task. Karl W. Deutsch examines political integration by look- ing at the comprehensive scope of interactions among governments, i.e., trade, mail flow, telephone calls, other forms of communication, pOpula-' tion movement patterns, and mutual-aid agreements. Morton Kaplan's approach to political integration views peOple as the carriers of politi- cal culture and the objects for analysis in examining political integra- tion.2 Local governments do not share norms in the same sense that nation- states with their differing languages, long histories, traditions, and national interests do. In fact, it will be argued In Chapter II that metropolitan areas are largely economic communities. Yet considerable evidence exists that an ecological process of sorting out persons by life-style and shared attitudes occurs within a metropolitan area. With respect to suburbia, such sorting out often conforms to legal boundaries. A number of observers have noted that individuals in suburban municipali- ties do often, in fact, accept the same basic norms and share common 2Ernst B. Haas, Consensus Formation In the Council of Euro e (Berkeley: University of California Press, I960); Karl W. Deutsch, et aI., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Or anlzation In Li ht of Historical Ex erience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l957); and Morton A. Kaplan, S stems and Process In International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., l957). The most significant theoretical work with respect to political integra- tion has been accomplished in the area of international relations. .That is, the political integration of nation-states. Although the political integration of nation-states and local governments is similar in many instances, there are significant differences. These differences will be discussed in chaper ii. interests.3 Scott Greer, especially, views the congruence of municipal boundaries with a local residential community as permitting the transla- tion of common interests into a polity. Thus, the difference of norms among citizens of different politi- cal units has some relevance to metrOpolitan c00peration as well as to international cOOperation. In the approach followed here political inte- gration is viewed as a legal process by which suburban municipalities pursue their goals by cOOperating with other municipalities. The com- munity goals are not results of the formal and legal structure of the suburban municipalities, but are merely expressed through the govern- mental structure. Rather, the community goals are primarily shaped by social, economic, and political demands of papulation, homogeneous in some respect, largely independent of the suburban governmental structure. The suburban governmental structure is brought into being and maintained to pursue goals of community residents. When the suburban municipality cannot fulfill this function, or can only do so at great costs, then political integration occurs as a means of obtaining community goals. Legal forms of c00peration offer municipalities a means of integrating In the pursuance of specific goals, while the municipalities remain legally separate entities. Thus, integration can occur on a functional basis and does not have to involve the total scOpe of the suburban munici- pality's governmental activities. It is in this context that the condi- tions associated with political integration will be viewed and examined. 3Robert Wood, Suburbia: Its Peogle and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, I959); also William M. Dobriner, Class In Suburbia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I963). Specifically, I will limit the definition of political integration for the purposes of this research to formal legal agreements. Thus, political integration, as I will use the term, is a form of cooperation which places members of two or more governmental units under one decision- making center as long as the agreement remains in force. The agreement may be made with respect to a specific function of government or to the total scape of local government. Just as important as the scOpe of the agreement is its permanance. C00perative agreements do not necessarily have to be perpetually binding upon the participating governmental units. Rather, they need only be followed until legal commitments, If any, are fulfilled and after that only as long as it is in the interest of the cOOperating parties to do so. However, some c00perative agreements are, in fact, long term contracts. An example of this type of binding commit- ment would be suburban participation in a metrOpolitan water authority. Others may last only for a few weeks or months as an agreement for spray- ing mosquito breeding places during a few weeks of a particularly pest- ridden summer. The Process of Metropolitan Area Integration This research, though focusing on cooperative agreements among local suburban municipalities, assumes it is valuable to view integra- tion from the standpoint of participating units. Thus, it is necessarily concerned with the extent of local control over the provision of services. l'IPhilip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.), The Inte ration of Politi- cal Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 196:), p. ID. This work offers the most comprehensive examination of political inte- gration. I have relied heavily upon their theoretical orientation to political integration. The policy choices of municipalities in providing services are, of course, limited. For example, the individual choices are made within the con- fines of a legal environment determined by decisions made at state and national levels. Nevertheless, suburban municipalities exercise signifi- cant control over their corporate futures. A municipality may plan to attract high socio-economic residents or it may welcome industry by pro- viding the land and facilities needed by industry. My insistance about the significance of local control is similar to that of Oliver Williams and his associates who affirm that local control does have real meaning for suburban municipalities in that, as corporate entities, they have powers to harness change in a manner never available to city neighbor- hoods.5 This power is crucial to an understanding of their willingness to undertake acts leading to intergovernmental c00peration. Each cOOperative agreement Is assumed to involve costs and benefits related to this power of independent action. These are not only economic but also social status costs and benefits. Each agreement, thus, reflects some combination or balance of economic and social costs. This differs not only with respect to different services, but is related also to characteristics of the participating municipalities and the problems they face. Thus, cOOperative agreements will be viewed in terms of both their legitimacy and effectiveness by officials and residents in the cooperating governments. By legitimacy of a cooperative agreement I mean the capacity of the agreement in the view of the local unit officials and 5Oliver P. Williams, Harold Herman, Charles 5. Liebman, and Thomas R. Dye, Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies: A Philadelphia fitory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, I965), p. 297. citizens to provide more social status benefits than costs, i.e., to engender and maintain the local social norms as reflected by the socio- economic composition of the community. By effectiveness of a cooperative agreement, I mean the capacity of the agreement to provide more economic benefits than costs, that is, to improve local service performance.6 gonditions Associated with Political Integration: Four Theoriep Past attempts at examining political integration have been based on at least four theoretical approaches. They are the economic approach posited by Vincent Ostrom, g£_gl,, and Harvey Brazer; the social vari- ables approach pursued by Oliver Williams, g£_gl.; the administrator- politician approach presented by Edward Weidner and Charles Adrian; and the shared communications and information approach presented by Karl W. 7 Deutsch and Richard Meier. 6Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., l959l, p. 76. This conceptualization of viewing the stability of local governments is based on Lipset's work. Chapter ii contains a full discussion of his model. 7Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warrai, “The Organi- zation of Government In Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Vol. LV (December, l96l), pp. 83l-8h2; Harvey Brazer, ”Some Fiscal Implications of Metropolitanism," MetrOpoli- tan Issues: Social Governmental. Fiscal, ed. Guthrie S. Birkhead (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Syracuse University, I962), pp. 6l-82; Oliver Williams, Harold Herman, Charles S. Liebman, and Thomas R. Dye, §uburban Difference; and Metrogolitan Policies: A Philadelphia Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, l965); Edward W. Weidner, Intergovernmental Relations asi§een by Public Officials (Minne- apolis: The University of Minnesota Press, I960); Charles R. Adrian, “State and Local Government Participation In the Design and Administra- tion of Intergovernmental Relations," The Annals, Vol. CCCLIX (May, l965L pp. 35-A3; Karl W. Deutsch, et al., "On Social Communication and the MetrOpolis," Daedalus (Winter, I96l), pp. 99-ll0; and Richard Meier,;A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (Cambridge: The MIT Press, l962). All four of these theories are narrowly focused and only partially related to each other. They also are not specifically concerned with the political integration of local communities. Each of the four theories have been partially substantiated by empirical research and all appear to explain, in part, the process of political integration. However, none of the theories are designed to cape with all the comprehensive conditions associated with political integration at the local level. My purpose in presenting the four political integration theories is not to try to disprove them. Rather, I attempt to deduce hypotheses from the four theories. By empirically testing the hypotheses, I hape to be able to evaluate the four theories and to relate them to one another. In addition, elements of the four theories of political inte- gration will be combined into my own theoretical approach to political integration. Hypotheses will also be deduced from my own theoretical approach. Thus, the hypotheses drawn from the four theories and my own theory will be subjected to empirical analysis to assess the importance of a number of factors in explaining political integration of a metro- politan area. The Economic Approach Reformers have traditionally examined c00perative agreements in metrOpolitan areas only in terms of economic costs. Some have stated that cOOperation should be employed in situations where the most effi- cient municipal service area overlaps local governmental boundaries, where substantial economies result from joint activity and where an inter-local arrangement produces better service.8 The key axiom to this approach is the economical use of resources. Better service, it is argued, should determine the degree of intergovernmental cOOperation. The difficulty of determining the most economical and efficient method for providing municipal services has been recognized by contempo- rary political scientists and economists, such as Vincent Ostrom and Harvey Brazer. They have recognized the political implications associ- ated with attempts at establishing economically equitable payments for services in metropolitan areas. They have proceeded to develop their approach around notions for determining the nature of public and private goods in metropolitan areas. Their prOposaIs center around the ability to exclude non-payers from the benefits of certain services where bene- fits or costs of a service cannot be readily determined. Such services, they argue, should be considered public. The economic approach has led to examining local functions in terms of scales of economy. Researchers argue that economy of service perfor- mance should be a determining factor when deciding which government should be allowed to provide a service at a local level. This approach is also concerned with the spill-over effects of functions from one com- munity to another. When the effects of a local government policy cannot be confined within a unit's boundaries, it is argued on economic grounds alone that the policy should be transferred to a government which can control the effects of the policy. 8John Burns, Commissioner, Office for Local Government, State of New York, Local Government C00peration: A Epide for Municipal Official; (Albany, New York, April, I963). l0 Modern researchers, such as Ostrom and Brazer, have brought to light many important economic factors which were overlooked by the politi- cal reformers who used economy and efficiency as their sole criteria to measure local governments and their service performances. However, the political economist still knows too little about either the private or the public sector to permit him to do more than attempt to point up defi- ciencies relative to some commonly accepted criteria and further, to indicate the kinds of actions that may minimize such deficiencies.9 According to the economic approach, the most important factor influencing local governments to c00perate is the desire of local offi- cials and citizens to lower service costs. The following hypothesis is presented for empirical analysis: The desire offigovernmental official; to lower costs by providing services through cooperative ggreements will represent the major reason why municipalities coogerate. The §ocial Variables Approach Oliver Williams and his associates have examined political integra- tion most thoroughly in terms of social variables. They posit that the decision to enlarge service areas involves two distinct yet related judg- ments. First is the question of whether to "go It alone"; second, what municipal partners to select. The process of choosing a partner often settles the question of whether to c00perate at all, for the availability of a "suitable" partner can be crucial. The selection of partners, they posit, is determined by preference, which is based mainly on social status factors. They do not overlook physical and fiscal factors, but place them in a secondary position behind social status factors. 9Harvey Brazer, pp, gj£., p. 3h5. ll They hypothesize that for functions affecting life-style [schools or planning for example] suburbs will seek to cooperate with other com- munities of similar social status as Opposed to those of different sta- tus. Schools, especially, relate directly to the life-style of a com- munity. The education of children is an extension of parental care. No other local activity has as direct an effect on the lives of parents and their offspring. Where life-style is not affected [sewage disposal, police radio agreements] social differences will be unrelated to pattprns of cooperation. Especially where large capital investments are involved economic differences may be of prime importance. They also posit that high social ranking communities will exhibit relatively greater concern for the number and quality of municipal serv- lces provided. Therefore, high social ranking municipalities' partici- pation in cooperation agreements will exceed the number of cooperative agreements of low ranking municipalities. This is based on the assump- tion that c00perative agreements will raise the number and quality of the services involved. Their approach suggests the prime importance of similarities and degree of social rank as a precondition for some kinds of c00peration and the secondary importance of equality of tax resources of cooperating suburban municipalities. Among suburban municipalities, even if equity of tax resources is a necessary condition for c00peration, it is not a sufficient one.I loOliver Williams, pp, pl£., chapter ix, pp. 239-267. The basic social approach used here owes quite heavily to chapter ix. l2 The social variables approach suggests that social factors will be of prime importance for some kinds of cooperation. A qualitative dis- tinction, to be fully discussed in chapter iv, exists between joint and contractual agreements. Joint agreements generally seem to involve fewer municipalities and more socially sensitive services than do contractual agreements. Contractual agreements involve large numbers of municipali- ties and services which are costly and technical in nature. The follow- ing social hypotheses are presented to test this distinction. Social variables hypotheses: The number of joint agLeements a municipality participates in is pppitively related to the amount of its tax valuation in residential property. The number of joint agreements a municipality participates in is pppitively related to its socio-economic status. The number of contractual agreements a munipipalitypparticippppp in is not significantly rgjpted to its socio-economic status. The Administrator-Politician Approach Edward Weidner outlines an administrator-politician approach in his research on federalism which seems to me to have relevance for metro- politan c00peratlon. He argues that intergovernmental relations cannot be looked upon as if whole governments deal directly with other whole governments. It is seldom, if ever, that all branches of a government act in unison on anything. As intergovernmental relations have deveIOped in practice in recent years, they have come to be primarily the relations 13 between officials in different functional areas seeking their "opposite numbers" in other governments.11 The underlying assumption of this approach is that all officials are subject to competing claims upon their loyalties. This theory states that there is a great variation in the goals or objectives that are being pursued by different classes and groups of public officials. Functional administrators tend to associate their interests mainly with their func- tional specialty. There is a considerable inducement to conform to the standards of phil050phy of a particular profession. Functional special- ists of different governmental units share the same values and goals because they often receive the same type of training where they learn the same values, standards, and general professional goals. We would then expect that c00peration among local governments would generally be facilitated by functional experts whose main concern is with maintaining professional standards and achievement of professional goals. Thus, loyalty to the function tends to compete with and to win out over loyalty to the particular unit of government among functional officials. Charles Adrian has added to Weidner's thesis by arguing that loyalty to the func- tion increases with administrative professionalism; that is, the more professional an administrator the more he will be oriented to his func- tional specialty and the less he will be committed to the unit of govern- l2 ment. The most professional administrators we would,thus expect to find in city-manager cities. IIEdward Weidner, pp, pl£., p. I. lzCharIes Adrian, _p, ci lh On the other hand, elected politicians are more unit oriented. Elected officials are responsible to the unit of government and not to a specific profession and its standards. Elected politicians generally have less systematic contacts with officials from other units of govern- ment through which they can develop similar attitudes toward common prob- lems. They are more likely to look at proposed cooperative agreements on a strict cost basis--carefully weighing both social and economic costs. Thus, the type of position and the field of governmental activity concerned, along with the extent of specialization or professionaliza- tion, according to Weidner,will result in differences in attitudes toward intergovernmental copperation.l3 According to the administrator-politician approach, municipal c00peration will reflect a municipality's degree of administrative pro- fessionalism. Also, administrators will participate in c00peration to a greater extent than politicians. In this study, municipal administrative professionalism will be equated with the council-manager form of govern- mental structure. The manager is a professional administrator who is responsible for the total administration of municipal government. Govern- ment Officials' participation in cooperative agreements will be hypothe- sized according to administrator-politician typology. The following hypotheses are presented for testing. Administrator-politician hypotheses: '3ibid., p. l20. l5 Council-manager municipglities participate to a greater extent in joint cOOperative agreements than municipalities with mayor-council typpp, pf_g9vernmental structures. The type of municipal governmental structure ip:not related to contractual agreements. Administrators view intergovernmental cooperation more favorably pp,a means of providing municipal services than do elected officials. Administrators participate in the formation of copperative_gg;ppf ments to a greater extent than do elected official;. Officials of copncIl-manager municipalities view c00peratlon more favorably than do officials of mayor-council municipalities. Participation in capperatlve agreements isgpo§itively related to the amount of professional organizational activity among governmental officials of different local units of government. The Cpmmunication and Information Approach Karl Deutsch has been the leading proponent of the shared communi- cation and information approach to the study of political integration. The communication capacity of a unit, as he has pointed out, is a major determining element in the unification process.‘h The effectiveness of the communication network among governmental units affects the degree to which they will tend to coalesce in their views. If governmental offi- cials participate regularly in communications with other governments, and l“Karl W. Deutsch, etr al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. p_i_t_. l6 also with officials in these governments through professional organiza- 15 This approach stresses tions, they tend to develop shared outlooks. that because of shared outlooks, based upon communication, legal integra- tion will be facilitated. If little communication exists among governmental units the possi- ble rewards of intergovernmental c00peration cannot be determined by each. Communication is thus, according to this theory, the first step to cooperation. The frequency and types of communications among units must be estimated. Thus, before a metropolitan community can be formed a significant amount of communications and transactions between the separate units must exist. The communication and information approach posits that the number of cooperative agreements a municipality participates in will be related to the amount of contact among officials from various governments. For cooperation will be more difficult if officials have little contact with one another and if they have little information concerning c00peration and mutual problems. The following hypotheses are presented for testing. Communication and information hypotheses: The ioint agreements a municipality participates in is positively related to the amognt of communications with officigls of other local units of governmentI measured by means of face to face contacty tele- pppne calls and gpil flow among municipal officialp. The joint agreements a municipality participates in i; related to the degree its official; are aware of availgple sources of information concerning the metropolitan area. ‘sPaul Friesema, iouxland Studies No. A: A Stud of Inter overn- mental Relations (Iowa City: The University of Iowa, lg6§). l7 The_jplnt Egreements a municipality participates in is related to the amount of information concerning c00peration in the metropolitan area that its officials possess. The joint coogerative agreements a municipality participates in is related to the extent that its municipal officials read neighboring municipal newSpapers. gy_5pproach to Political Integration The past studies dealing with metropolitan governmental reorgani- zation often have not examined political communities, that is, the under- lying social and economic patterns on which local governments rest. The functions of local governments in preserving life-styles have until recently been generally overlooked by political scientists examining metrOpolitan governmental reorganization. Those who investigated the problem of metropolitan political integration often did not deal with the question of whether metrOpoIitan-area governments or other coopera- tive arrangements could fulfill the social functions being performed at the local level.'6 Most emphasis has been on economic and tax base advantages. More recently, some studies have almost completely deempha- sized economic elements and made social conditions all important. My '6The approach I am suggesting has not been fully explored In dis- cussions of metrOpolitan problems undertaken by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. They stress the theme of governmental reorganization and why solutions to metropolitan problems have not been put into effect. They give little attention to the sociological, politi- cal and economic basis of intergovernmental cooperation and conflict, Roscoe Martin, In Metropolis in Transition, prepared for the Housing and Home Finance Agency under the Urban Studies and Housing Research Program gives a detailed list of various governmental approaches to meeting metro- politan problems, but he does not examine the community basis of local governments. l8 approach will be to examine both social and the economic elements from the standpoint of the unit of government. For example, what are the functional conditions in the process of political integration at the local level for both elements? My approach posits that the process of political integration, as indicated by intergovernmental legal agreements, is shaped by social and economic cost factors. Governments at the local level may cooperate or resist cooperation depending on the balance between social and economic costs their leaders discern. The theoretical framework and hypotheses presented and tested are all related to the central research problem: Do local governments in metropolitan areas, by means of cooperative agreements, strive to maintain a balance between preferred life-styles and economic costs? Thus, is copperation among local units of govern- ment an attempt to maintain this balance by helping forestall total political and social integration of a metrOpolitan area? The following two hypotheses are derived from the central research problem: A_positive relationship will exist between the socio-economic sta- ppp_pf a municipality and the socio-economic status of the municipalities with which it cOOperates when a capperative agreementppotentially affects the life-style of the participating municipalities. A_pppitive relationship will exist between the per capita assessed yplpption of a municipgllty and theyperypppita assesppd valuation of municipalities with which it cooperates when a cooperative agreement pptentially threatens the economic tax bape of the:participating munici- palities. l9 ummar This chapter has focused on the process of political integration- of municipalities within a metrOpolitan region; based on the assumption that local governments in metrOpolitan areas, by means of capperative agreements, strive to maintain preferred life-styles and local tax base advantages. The process of political integration at the metropolitan level was presented. The conditions associated with political integra- tion as approached by four theoretical approaches was discussed, hypothe- ses were presented, and a combination emphasizing elements of the four approaches were integrated into my approach to be further developed and used in this research. CHAPTER II POLITICAL INTEGRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This chapter will be devoted to expanding the central theme out- lined in Chapter I. I will further deveIOp a theoretical framework rela- tive to other theories of political integration by drawing upon the literature. The following outline will be followed in reviewing litera- ture to explain and clarify the theoretical rationale of the research problem: (a) Introduction; (b) The MetrOpolls: An Economic Community; (c) The New Metropolis: The Relation of Social to Economic Factors; (d) The Commitment of Citizens to Local Government; (e) Pressures for Governmental Independence and for Integration; (f) Integration Costs 1;, Independence Costs; (9) Coalition Formation to Minimize Costs; (h) Sum- mary. Introduction Local governments perform functions their residents demand. When the local governments cannot provide what their residents demand, cOOpera- tive agreements may be considered. Yet, municipalities incur certain costs, in addition to benefits, by c00perating with other local govern- ments. Thus, integration can be assessed by examining the costs and bene- fits local governments obtain by copperating. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter describes some social, economic, and political 20 2I forces in Operation in a metropolitan area; sets forth the roles of local governments and the metropolitan area and deveIOps a cost-benefit approach to examine political integration. The Metropolis Is an Integrated Economic Community A metrOpolls comes into being as an economic community. It is an interrelated whole of industry and commerce with cooperative arrangements for transportation and the distribution of products and services. The pOpulation of metropolis is a concentration of producers and consumers of goods and services. An individual's total scape of day-to-day eco- nomic needs can be met within the metropolitan area and still the metro- politan area also exports goods and services. The economic ties of metrOpolitan areas appear to be much more comprehensive than either the social or political interrelations. The interrelatedness of a metrOpoli- tan area, in fact, rests wholly on economic, not social and political factors. Neighboring communities within a metropolitan area may differ with respect to the social composition of their residents. The communi- ties may be socially homogeneous and yet they are dependent upon one another to produce and consume the goods and services to sustain life. This suggests that the political integration of metropolitan areas would proceed differently if individuals were socially interdependent as well as economically interdependent. Contrary to the above stated view, some writers claim that metro- politan areas are also political and social communities with strong ties of mutual interest and concern.l John Bollens and Henry Schmandt suggest lJohn C. Bollens and Henry L. Schmandt, The Metro olis: Its Peo le Politics' and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row, I965), p. #5. 22 that these ties are coterminous with--in fact, they help to fix-~the territorial boundaries of the social collectivity of community.2 But evidence to support this contention that whole metropolitan areas are social and political as well as economic communities is inconclusive. The assumption that metropolitan areas are social and political communi- ties is in part contradicted by the multiplicity of local governments within metropolitan areas. If metropolitan areas were social and politi- cal communities we might expect to find a different pattern of local governments and interactions between them that would be less antagonistic. MetrOpolltan areas are differentiated from rural communities by the pattern of their economic organization. MetrOpolitan areas are charac- terized by a highly elaborate division of labor and specialization of occupational effort. This division of labor has not remained constant but has been increasing in modern society as functions become more nar- rowly defined and work becomes more specialized. The individual in a metropolitan area produces a smaller portion of the things he consumes and his productive enterprise becomes separated almost completely from his consumption of goods and services. This process of division of labor is closely related to urbanization and has even been used as a definition of urbanization. The economic interdependence of individuals and groups in a metropolis has profound effects upon the social and political aspects of metrOpolitan residents' lives. Increased speciali- zation of occupational effort does not permit the metrOpolitan resident to produce what he consumes. He must rely upon other individuals in the metrOpolitan area for goods and services that his specialization does not 2ibid.. pp. us-us. 23 permit him to provide for himself. Thus, the basis Of a metrOpolitan community is not shared values and objectives as is more the case in smaller communities. A symbiotic relationship, Of specialization and mutual interdependence characterizes the metrOpolitan area which is internally differentiated and integrated. This is a relationship in which the parts of the whole are differentiated and specializing in the performance Of some functions, while at the same time the components are interdependent with respect to fulfilling their needs and wants. This symbiotic relationship encourages diversity Of values in metrOpolitan areas with respect to both individuals and local municipalities as reflected by their governmental policies. Emile Durkheim wrote that societies with little division of labor are characterized by a type of solidarity based On a single set of values and behavior patterns. He also argued that with an increase in the divi- sion Of labor comes a splitting up of social tasks and a corresponding interdependence of the parts in a complex society. People are held tOgether by their mutual interdependence because they perform differen- 3 tiated tasks within a complex whole. This type of relationship is at one time both integrative and disintegrative. The forces acting upon individuals in complex societies are in Opposite directions and are held in balance by their position respective to the whole system. Durkheim's conceptualizations of complex social interaction as found in metrOpolitan areas suggest that the inhabitants need not agree on the basic values or goals of the metrOpolitan area in order to make 3Roland Warren, The Community In America (New York: Rand McNally, l963)’ PO 550 2h it function. When the metrOpolitan area cannot function mechanically fulfilling its economic and social needs, attempts at greater unified effort can be pursued through governmental action. For example, in all metrOpolitan areas, state, county, and local highway departments have been increasing their coordination over the highway networks to meet the needs that metropolitan residents demand. Oliver Williams and his associates view the economic character of metrOpolitan areas as a problem of coordination between local communities caused by their area specialization. Economic specialization with its interdependence of individuals and communities introduces problems of coordination. Specialized communities can exist only by being accessible to a common economic system, the economic enterprise of the metropolitan area.“ Spatial specialization can only exist in a metrOpolitan economy, when the basic services for each subarea and means through which they 5 Coordination to maintain may be accessible to one another are provided. metropolitan subarea specialization rests with government, because it controls the major services,such as the highway system, the water system and the sewage disposal system, upon which subarea specialization con- sists. The major focus of area differentiation and problems of coordina- tion within metrOpolitan areas is in its political structures. Through the apparatus of local government, areas within the metropolitan area have preserved and fostered particular types of social interaction in terms of social composition of residents and resulting patterns of l'Dliver Williams, et al., pp,‘pl_., p. 298. 5ibid., p. 299. 25 life-styles. This function of governmental structures has been con- sidered by some political scientists as a lag in responding to modern society.6 But this may be no lag at all, but only a legitimate govern- mental expression of maintaining some of the social differentiation and specialization aspects of metrOpolitan areas. The New Metrppplis: The Relation of Social to Economic Factors Advancements in technology have allowed man a greater flexibility in his control over Space. Man can now get from place to place faster and with greater ease, and this widens his choice of residence within a metrOpolitan area. In effect, he is given a “super market" full of dif- ferent communities from which to select his place of residence. But his selection is limited not only by economic circumstances but also by his social preferences. Thus, communities can be assessed in terms of social and economic factors. ppcial Factonp Individuals in local municipalities generally strive for communi- ties which are socially homogeneous. Social homogeneity is reflected in most residential communities in the norms shared by peOple desiring a 7 certain life-style. This life-style generally centers around the heme, 6Victor Jones, "The Organization of a MetrOpolItan Region," ppir veggjtypof Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. CV (l958), p. 539. 7This point has been presented by various writers. Empirical studies supporting differences in life-style between suburbs and core city have been completed by Wendell Bell, "Social Choice, Life Styles and Suburban Residence," and Sylvia Fleis Fava, "Contrasts in Neighbor- Ing: New York City and Suburban Community," both articles are in William Dobriner (ed.), The Suburban Community (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, l958), and William M. Dobriner, Clas In Suburbia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I963). 26 school, and recreation activities.8 Through these, suburban residents 9 reenforce one another through the similarity of their norms. Thus, suburbs are more than a distant fringe of the city. They center around a social separateness and consciousness of independence, particularly with respect to the core city. Yet, the social activity of suburbs is limited because of the separation of residence and employment which leaves to the central city many important urban functions. The analysis of political integration presented in this work takes into account the social homogeneity and community identification of sub- urban residents. Suburban social homogeneity and identification shapes the process of political integration within the area. Intergovernmental cOOperation may be relied upon as a means of integration because it does not disturb the social homogeneity and community identification of resi- dents. The literature on metrOpolitan integration abounds with failure of annexations and consolidations, because these methods threaten sub- urban social homogeneity and identification. Scott Greer, a political sociologist, has viewed suburban munici- palities as governmental game preserves whose citizens are relatively O O O l O ' O immune to municipal law. 0 Incorporation protects suburban citizens 8Wendell Bell, "SOcial Choice, Life Styles and Suburban Residence," The §uburban Community, ed. William Dobriner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, l958), pp. 225-2h7. 9For a comprehensive discussion of suburb see William M. Dobriner (ed.), Jhe §uburban Community (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, I958); and C. E. Elias, Jr., James Gillies and Svend Riemer (eds.), MetrOpolis: Values In Conflict (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., l96h). loScott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., I962), p. 53. 27 from annexations and governmental control by a larger unit. The local governmental structure is a means by which its residents express or preserve a desired social or economic purposes; which does not neces- sarily have to remain constant. These municipalities are not randomly formed, but are roughly coterminous with social communities. Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell, two urban sociologists, have developed a typology by which suburban pOpulations in metrOpolitan areas are described and ranked.H They use the social indicators of social rank (economic and occupational status), segregation (the proportion of segregated ethnic populations in a community), and urbanization (children- centered families). The communities they examined in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas were significantly homogeneous when ranked on their three social indicators. The most significant difference between suburbs and central city is made in terms of life-style. Shevky-Bell rely on their urbanism indicators to illustrate this. Life-style ranges from child-centered families to single people living in apartments. The family-oriented population continues to seek and find its sites in the suburban fringes of the city. Because child-centered families are based on the need for Space and space is most readily available outside the central city, we would expect the policies of local governments to reflect this condition. Political integration or governmental reorganization or both, must be examined in light of the life-style basis of the communities involved. I‘Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell, Social Area Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, l955). 28 William Dobriner goes further than using just life-style as a means of differentiating between suburbs and central city by stating that class variables critically define suburbs.‘2 He defines a social stratum as a collection of interrelated status positions, characterized by similar honorific evaluations, wealth, power, and life-style. The residential suburbs are relatively homogeneous in these terms. The residential sub- urb derives its primary structure from the base institution, the family, and its unique set of associated functions. Although suburbs are becom- ing more heterogeneous they are still relatively homogeneous enclaves, with given suburbs as historical or empirical units, continuing to resist the heterogeneity brought about by urbanization. He also indi- cates that the higher the social class of a suburb the greater the homo- genelty. This resistance may be most successfully accomplished through policies initiated by local government. The scope of a metrOpolitan- wide government would be too comprehensive to allow separate social entities to pursue their own policies. MetrOpolItan-wide land use policies and tax rates would limit subareas from relying upon govern- ment to pursue segregation and low tax limited service objectives. Proceeding from the premise that local communities are roughly coterminous with one or more of the social communities described above (by means of the Shevky-Bell typology), it would follow that common interests are translated into a polity by means of expressed policies reached through local governments. The common field of activity is con- tained within a formal local political structure having power to control leilliam M. Dobriner, Class In Suburbia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I963). 29 some of the basic goods and services of the residents. Thus, streets, schools (and to a degree, commercial and residential development) are not only sources of interdependence--their control is so structured as l3 to allow effective action by the interdependent population. gconomic Factors Social factors are not the only determining items to be considered when examining local policy and political integration at the local level. The social rank and homogeneity of communities have at times been sacri- ficed to meet the increasing costs of the services demanded from local governments. When the costs of government cannot be met, the procure- ment of industry may provide the needed tax resources. But often with the arrival of industry come workers of different social status and values. These workers may disrupt the social homogeneity and shared norms of the community. Different means of increasing local tax resources, other than attracting industry, are available to local communities. They may annex to a larger municipality, consolidate to form a larger governmental unit, join a special district and/or cOOperate with existing governments. However, the objective often remains one of increasing tax resources without sacrificing community norms. Annexation and metrOpolitan reor- ganization in general often do not allow this and for this reason are usually unsuccessful. Some writers have viewed the major forces behind incorporation and resistance to annexation as not social but economic, that is, the 'BScott Greer, "The Social Structure and Political Process of Suburbia," American Political §cience Review (August, I960), p. 5l9. 30 incorporation around an industry for a favorable tax position.lu Obvi- ously, both social and economic factors play a part in determining local policy and intergovernmental cOOperation, but perhaps at some point in the urbanization process a balance is struck or the emphasis shifts from economic to social or the reverse. A Balancipgyof Social andpgppnomic Factors The goals of suburban governments and the relation between social and economic factors have been viewed in different terms by various writers. Some view the choice of community in terms of status and access to work. For others, tradition mutes the current objectives of local government. Presented below are some attempts by specialists to balance social and economic factors. Walter Firey has pointed out, with respect to Boston, that while economic factors may play an important part many times an area of land may be a symbol of certain cultural value and locational activities may IS be based on sentimental rather than economic reasons. He does not deny the importance of ecological factors and the underlying economic struc- ture of an urban area. However, his argument is that neither ecology or economics can fully explain land use patterns within a city. His examples of Beacon Hill, Boston Common and The North End, an Italian Ghetto, defy ecological and economic theory. Why these areas are where they are can ‘hJohn Hooyer, "The Transition from Township to City Government In Three Michigan Townships" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Michigan State Uni- versity, I96“). 'SWaIter Firey, "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables," American Sociological Review, Vol. X (April, I9h5), pp. 2l3-22l. 3l best be answered by the residents' preferences and attitudes. Firey, thus, characterizes the balance for community in ecological and atti- tudinal terms. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan see tradition and commitment to old patterns of living as affecting social and economic conditions in communities. Speaking about the Italian communities in New York City, they say: ”Because the desire for the new and the fashionable is so restrained among Italians by attachment to the old neighbor- hoods, even old neighborhoods that are quite unfashionable (because they are adjacent to docks, railroad yards, and factories) remain fully occupied, resisting the social con- sequences if not the outer appearance of blight... Thus, Italians occupy inlying areas that have been by-passed in the push to deveIOp distant suburbs; in the shadows of the I6 skyscrapers they enjoy quiet and convenient neighborhoods." This commitment to the group may not only shape the influence of urbani- zation, but may also provide an effective buffer to its influences. Glazer and Moynihan see the social and economic balance between local government as being affected by tradition and group norms. Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon in their book, Anatomy of a Metropolis, balance Spacious living versus easy access. They discuss the balance of local government in terms of the location of jobs to the location of residences. They see evidence of a basic "balancing" pro- cess in operation. On the one hand, the incentive to live near jobs and other urban attractions tends to concentrate pOpulation and build up densities. Opposing this is a complex of resistances to concentration and high density based largely, though not wholly, upon the desire for '6Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Be ond the Meltin £p£_(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, l963l. p. l88. 32 Spacious living.l7 Thus, the balance is one of economy, in terms of access to work versus status characterized by a desire for spacious liv- ing. The apparatus of local government can, to a great extent, influence this "balancing" process by zoning and land use policies. Local policies can affect the social and economic balance to a degree. Through policy deveIOped at the local level an area can become either a residential preserve or an industrial site. By means of land use and tax policies the social status and norms of a community can be protected. Industry can be encouraged by government offering to deveIOp the services and facilities it needs. Policies at the local level also have an influence upon, and in return are influenced by, location of jobs, available land and land use. Amos Hawley and Basil Zimmer do not see a balance between social and economic factors as shaping communities in metropolitan areas, but rather they view the metrOpolitan community as developing in phases. They hypothesize that, ”the last phase in the maturation of the metro- politan community is the integration of the whole in a social and an administrative, as well as an economic, unity.“8 Even the most highly deveIOped metrOpolitan communities are not socially and administratively integrated. Hawley and Zimmer argue that the process of metrOpolitan development to one of complete social and administrative integration is an inevitable process inconvenienced by local governmental authority. ‘7Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon, Anatom of a Metro olis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., I959), pp. l-338. 18 Amos H. Hawley and Basil G. Zimmer, "Resistance to Unification In a MetrOpolItan Community,” Community Political §ystems, ed. Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, l96l), p. lh8. 33 Their conclusion is Open to question, especially in light of the fact that local governments may function to stOp the process and not only inconvenience it. The notion of examining local communities in terms of social and economic factors has been alluded to by many writers in varying ways. Different components of the relationship of economic to social factors, in terms of kinds and amounts have been cited in the above paragraphs. In an examination of political integration of local governments we must take into account the interaction of social and political factors with economic factors as expressed in this section. The Commitment of Citizens to Local government Thus far we have considered costs and benefits to local units in the same way one might examine international agreements. But there is an important difference. Some students of metropolitan areas have com- pared inter-local governmental relations to international relations l9 between nation-states. The political integration of nation-states has been observed by writers and political scientists since the advent of nations. Why nations come into being and in some instances join supra- national organizations has been examined much more thoroughly than the political integration of local governments. The similarities are inter- esting and may be worth noting, particularly with reference to construct- ing a theory of local intergovernmental relations. This is because theory ‘9Victor Jones, "The Organization of a Metropolitan Region," p21: versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. CV (1958), pp. 538-539; and Matthew Holden, Jr., "The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem In Diplomacy," The Journal of Politigp, Vol. XXVI (August, l96h), pp. 627- 6h5. Jones and Holden have compared international relations to inter- governmental relations between local governments. 3h formation in the area of international relations is better deveIOped over that at the local level. Matthew Holden contends that metropolitics and international politics are anaIOgous because each occurs not within politi- cal communities but within diplomatic systems. He sees diplomatic sys- tems as having three major characteristics; they constitute ecological communities but, on the whole, are not political communities. The pri- mary actors are governmental and the communication structure is dominated by a mythology.20 The actions of local governments In many ways are analogous to those of nation-states. They compete with one another for scarce resources (taxes, industry); they bargain for needed supplies and facilities (water, sewers); they seek to expand their sphere of control (through annexation and consolidation); and they form coalitions for defensive purposes (such as suburban leagues of municipalities).ZI At several points, however, the analogy of nation-states to local governments does not hold true. Local governments do not have the same hold or influence on their residents that nation-states have on their citizens. The nation, particularly when it is involved In international relations, has great control over its citizens. The nation-state is at present the most significant level of government in terms Of the impact of its decisions. The physical safety of individuals and the economy are recognized in national terms. When nations cannot adequately provide for the safety or economic well-being of its citizens, other international arrangements are initiated. The scope of problems handled at the local onolden, pp. p_i_t_., p. 6H7. 2‘John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metro olls: Its Peopley Politics; and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row, l9 5), p. 6i. 35 level does not approach the importance of what is delegated to the nation. The difference in the scape of problems between the nation and local government are different not only in degree, but kind. Matthew Holden, in his comparison of international relations with local governmental relations, does not distinguish the characteristics of the two levels.22 Local governments are created by and owe their existence to states. If a problem becomes too pressing upon local governments their residents can by-pass it and appeal to the states for aid. They even have the alternative of going to the Federal government for assistance. Individuals are not only residents of a local govern- ment but citizens of a state and nation. If a conflict arises between these two roles, the latter would most likely take precedence. This may not have always been true but today local government only partially con- trols the destiny of its residents. When contrasting local governments in metrOpolitan areas to rural communities rather than nation-states, we also find dissimilarities. Although an individual can choose the type of community he wants to live in, his commitment to the community is not necessarily great. This Is because local communities in metropolitan areas are not primarily com- munities where individuals interact solely within primary groups and are disciplined only by community norms. Morris Janowitz calls the local municipality a "community of limited liability.”23 That is, if a local policy or situation in the community is distasteful or injurious to an 22Holden, pp, pl;.. PP. 627-6h5. 23Morris Janowitz, The Community Press In an Urban Setting (Glencoe: The Free Press, I952). 36 individual he can minimize his losses by moving out of the community. Because the community is not a primary one it has little hold on him. Although the commitment of individuals to the local community is always less than it would be if the community were based on primary inter- actions, there are wide variations of commitment between types of indi- viduals. Local merchants, real estate people, and other individuals who have both a social and economic interest in the community have more at stake than do residents. There is also a variation in commitment to community residents. The couple without children who rent an apartment have less at stake in the community than home-owning residents with children. Thus, an increase in the tax_rate of a local municipality or inade- quate services will not affect all residents in the same manner. Those residents with the least commitment to the community may find that the best solution is to move to a different area. Scott Greer points out that even the most deeply involved can withdraw from the local community and satisfy all needs elsewhere--and the withdrawal need not be physical. The withdrawal can be in terms of community participation and activity. The process of political interaction will reflect the commitment of the residents to both the local community and the metropolitan areas. The degree of commitment to a governmental unit will have an effect on the possibility and form of political integration. The process of politi- cal integration between nation-states is different than is political 2“Scott Greer, "Individual Participation In Mass Society," ‘Approaches to the Study,of Politics, ed. Roland Young (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, l958); and reprinted in Democracy In Urban America, eds. Oliver Williams and Charles Press (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, l96l), pp. 8I-96. 37 Integration between local government in no small part because of the commitment of the inhabitants to the various governmental units. Pressures for gpvernmental Integration and for Independence Within metropolitan areas forces are pulling and pushing at the same time, hindering or facilitating political integration. Local governments in a metropolitan area are involved in a symbiotic relation- ship. They are acted upon by forces which compel them to centralize, while at the same time forces are focusing upon them to Specialize. These two seemingly conflicting processes work together in metrOpolitan areas. Within the metrOpolitan areas there is pull upon local govern- ments to cOOperate to solve mutual problems while a pull exists between local municipalities differentiating them with respect to social status, ethnicity and life-style.25 Pressures for governmental Integration The Impetus for governmental centralization in metrOpolitan areas centers around the fact that many of the problems facing local govern- ments are beyond their power to solve. Many metropolitan problems brought on by urbanization do not coincide with governmental boundaries. Air and water pollution fall into this category. The only way this type of metropolitan-wide problem can be solved is by action taken by govern- (ments with legal jurisdiction over the total of the affected areas. 25Jean Gottmann, MegaIOpolis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, l96l). Dr. Gottmann discusses the symbiosis of urban and rural in metrOpolitan areas of the eastern seaboard. His central concern is the interdependence urban and rural land use. 38 A related force for centralization of local government centers around the fact that individuals living in one municipality may be affected adversely by the policies of a different municipality. They may not be able to protect themselves from the municipality of which they are not residents. John Dewey argues that a public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.26 He goes on to state that since those who ,are indirectly affected are not direct participants in the transactions in question it is necessary that certain persons [governments] be set apart to represent them, and see to it that their interests are con- served and protected.27 Many of the policies of local governments in metropolitan areas are of this nature. The proximity of local governments within metro- politan areas creates a situation where the effects of policies often cannot be limited to governmental jurisdictions. If the consequences of municipal government affect the total metrOpolitan area then the public for that municipality should, in Dewey's terms, be the metrOpolitan area. The Ineffective control of policy consequences Is a significant force encouraging metropolitan-wide government. The key to Dewey's theory about politics, with respect to politi- cal integration, centers around the unfavorable affects of governmental policies on neighboring municipalities. However, if a local government's 26 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problem (New York: Henry Holt and Company, l927), pp. l6-l7. 27ibid., p. l7. 39 policies favorably affect another municipality this may act to keep them apart. The affected municipality may benefit without cost and would want to maintain the situation. The advantage gained by suburbs, at the expense of the central city, with respect to services provided by the central city for the total area reflect this type of situation, e.g., city museums, art galleries, zoos, and other recreational facilities. A lack of local tax resources also acts as a force for the inte- gration of local governments. Thus, cost of capital investments, such as sewers, water lines, new school buildings (particularly at the high school level) may be beyond the financial ability of a single munici- pality. The municipalities may not be able to provide the needed invest- ments except by placing a high tax burden upon their residents through increased taxation. Adjacent communities facing similar problems may find it to their mutual benefit to combine their tax resources. A deveIOping ideology by executives and white-collar workers of large nationally centered organizations seems also to have fostered local governmental integration. Some writers have stated that the execu- tive and white-collar workers commitment is to the organization first and to the community only secondarily. These individuals of the large corporations are concerned primarily with national influences upon their organization, because this is where decisions are made that will effect the corporations and their careers.28 Corporations and their tOp execu- tives respond to the metrOpolitan areas as a single community and not as 28Norton Long, "The Corporation In Modern Society," Democracy In Urban America, eds. Oliver Williams and Charles Press (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, l96l).pp. 53-6l. in #0 a mosiac of local governments competing for the resources of the area. Executives are concerned with the services local governments can provide their corporations. The provision of these services must come first, because the costs of providing the services do not vary too significantly 29 between local governments in metrOpolitan areas. Edward w. Weidner in his study, Intergovernmental Relations as §een by Public Officials, as described in Chapter I of this thesis, states that cOOperation among units of government is more likely to occur among the functional administrative representatives of the govern- 30 ments than it is among the elected officials. Functional administra- tors of local units of government may exert pressure for coOperation in a metrOpolitan area because they are more concerned with their adminis- trative duties than with the unit of government. Inter-local cOOpera- tion may be one way for administrators to carry out more successfully the values, standards, and goals of their profession. Thus, the func- tional officials exert an influence for governmental integration in 3i metropolitan areas. 29See Robert 0. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," Communit Political S stems, ed. Norris Janowitz (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, l96ll, for description of large corporation activity in a local community. 30 Edward w. Weidner, inter overnmental Relations as Seen b Public Officials, Research Monograph No. 9 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, l960). 3‘5qu Charles R, Adrian, "State and Local Government Participation in the Design and Administration of Intergovernmental Problems."‘lhg Annals, Vol. CCCLIX (Hay, l965), p. 36. Adrian expands upon Weidner's theme by focusing upon the degree of professionalization among adminis- trators from various units of government. hi Pressures for_§overnmentai Independence 0n the other hand, there are forces of local government in metro- politan areas acting to keep them decentralized. Some have already been noted by Greer, Dobriner, Shevky, and Bell. These forces are mainly identified by social variables and are reflected in community norms. in effect, what local communities pursue in terms of municipal goals may be significantly different from the goals of the metrOpolitan area. The purposes of local government may be different and antithetical to the purposes of metrOpolitan government. In terms of status and prestige, individuals may identify with the local government, not with the total metrOpolitan area. Local governments in metrOpolitan areas may serve as catalysts to promote a sense of separate identity, community conscious- ness and economic benefits for their inhabitants. Thus, the structure of governments in metrOpolitan areas represents not just the accident of rural jurisdiction caught up in urbanization, but a purposeful dissection of the area into small pieces, each capped with legal authority, and pursuing goals of its own.32 Resistance to changing local governmental structure and powers is generally successful because of the general belief in this county in Jacksonian ideology. Scott Greer has described the Jacksonian ideology with respect to local governments as the free enterprise of founding governments, especially small governments on a laissez-faire basis. Government closest to the peOple, operated by peers and not by profes- sionals, is considered best. once the small governments are formed they 32Robert Hood, Metropolis Against Itself (New York: Committee for Economic Devel0pment, l959). p. 12. #2 they must fend for themselves in providing for their residents. The supporters of Jacksonian democracy believe that through the mechanism of competition on a local basis the desires of the people are best met. Also, the historical attachment to small governments has given them a legitimacy beyond their ability to meet the demands of their residents. Any governmental entity, once in being, is difficult to disband.33 The legal foundations of incorporation and home-rule laws reflect this Jack- sonian ideology. The ease of incorporation allows for a multiplicity of municipalities, whereas on the other hand, annexations are generally more difficult to enact.3h Robert Hbod constructs a strong case for those who believe that small governments are best for securing the American aims of equality and liberty.35 Through small local governments, mainly suburban govern- ments, individuals with similar social backgrounds strive to maintain common social norms. Hood bases his argument net only on the Jacksonian belief that small government is best because it is closest to the people but best for creating a social community. Hood states that suburbs form communities whose residents share such similar backgrounds as to approach fraternity proportions. These communities are comprised of individuals 36 subjected to conformity by group pressures and norms. 33Scott Greer, Governing the Metrogolis, 22, cit., p. 5“. 3“There are several western states, Oklahoma, Texas, California, which are exceptions and have laws which facilitate annexation. 35Robert Hood, §uburbia= _l$s Peogie and Their Politic; (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, l959 . ' 361212, See this volume for a discussion of the relatiohship between democracy and suburbanization. re. In- rel M an: Ci: (PE PA. bJ‘l uEr A3 Suburban residents striving for social status are not the only metrOpolitan residents exerting pressure for governmental decentraliza- tion. Negroes and other minority groups in big cities want to maintain smaller units of government also. They want to do so in order not to sacrifice political power. It is easier for a minority to exert politi- cal power ln a city ward than it is in the metropolitan area as a whole. in many large northern cities the Negroes are approaching positions of real political power. They are able to elect city officials in cities where elections are held on a ward basis. City mayors also extend them real concessions beyond the actual influence they may have at the polls. If the metropolitan structure of government were changed this growing position of power and local governmental access would also be changed. The political power of minority groups would be diluted by the large num- bers of white suburban residents.37 Scott Greer adds to the case for decentralized government in his examination of the St. Louis metropolitan area which indicated that the fragmented nature of the metropolitan area did fulfill the service needs and demands of its residents to a satisfactory degree. He found no indi- cation that any functional breakdown was imminent in local governments. Mor were the residents of the area very concerned with what their govern- ments were costing them. Instead residents in the St. Louis metropolitan —Vfi 37See Morton Grodzlns, The Mgtrogolitan Area as a Racial Problem (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburg Press, l958). Grodzins sees conflict between local governments growing more acute as race and class become increasingly coterminous with local governmental boundaries. hh area were more interested in facility of movement within the metropoli- tan area, and the upkeep and livability of their own immediate neighbor- hood.38 Thomas Dye has pointed out summarily that real and persistent con- flicts of interest are associated with areal specialization which divide suprpulations in metropolitan areas. He states that a decentralized political structure is functional to the metropolitan system and that some Functions performed at the local level may not be performed at the metrOpolitan level. He illustrated that a decentralized political struc- ture was functional to the metropolitan system in the following ways: (i) It provides a source of social identification for individuals and groups enabling them to relate themselves to the metropolitan system; (2) By reducing the scale of social experience, it curbs feelings of apathy, isolation, and anomie among individuals and aggregates; (3) It provides an institutional device whereby subpopulations may protect themselves from those whose standards and way of life they do not share; (h) It provides additional institutional settings for the release of individual and group frustration and grievance through public catharsis; (5) It offers an Opportunity for a large number of elites to exercise power; (6) it expands available opportunities for individual participa- tion as a means of contributing to both individuals and public policy; (7) By providing additional points of access, pressure, and control it gives additional insurance that political demands will be heard; (8) It 38Scott Greer, "Dilemmas of Action Research of the MetrOpoiitan Problem," Community Political Systems, ed. Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, l96l), pp. l97-l98. llS permits minorities to avail themselves of government position and power 39 and exert greater influence over policy. Integration Costs Vs. Indegendence Costs Political integration can be analyzed in terms of social and economic costs. Governments at the local level may integrate or resist integration depending on the balance between social and economic costs. For example, increases in tax rates (an economic cost) and decreases in social status (social costs) of a community will be the bases of resis- tance to political integration. Whereas, when local governments obtain decreases in tax rates and increases in social status by cOOperating with other local governments political integration will be facilitated. I propose that a socio-economic costs and benefits typology can be used in examining local political integration. Each cooperative agreement between local governments can be typed by use of the following four-fold classification: l. Economic Costs 2. Economic Benefits 3. Social Costs k. Social Benefits Political integration does have a price, one which must be met by government and is in part, set by those who are governed. As indicated in Chapter I, Karl Deutsch maintains that it is the capabilities and per- formances of governments that provide the key to integration and cohesion in societies. Governments have the means to establish and maintain 39Thomas R. Dye, "Metropolitan Integration by Bargaining among Subareas," American gehavioral §cientist (May, l962). p. ll. Q6 certain standards of well-being for their pOpulations which are basic conditions for intergration.ho However, many local governments are limited financially and geographically. They often are not able or will not provide the services that their residents need or want. Political integration is one means by which local governments can more adequately provide services for their residents. But, political integration has costs. That is, what price is to be paid by a local government for receiving a desired good or service? If the governmental arrangements in a metrOpolitan area were changed, wealthier municipalities may be expected to help finance serv- ices in neighboring municipalities. in order for metrOpolitan areas to politically integrate they must not only perceive a common purpose but there must be a general acceptance of some redistribution of the local tax revenue. in metropolitan areas a common goal or problem may be per- ceived by local communities, but a redistribution of the taxes of the local municipalities is less often achieved. Differences in service needs, desire, and ability to pay between local governments often hamper sharing costs and reallocating local tax revenue. Suburban municipalities have been profitable to their residents in both economic and social terms. The suburbs reward their residents because they are not troubled with high welfare and police costs. They can put a larger prOportion of their municipal budget into education. “OKari H. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," The Inte ration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Phil. and N.Y.: J. B. Lippincott Company, l96h), p. l43. Karl H. Deutsch: Essay, on "The Price of Integration" is the only work directed specifi- cally at the subject. He not only offers many ideas that are thought- provoking, but he also gives some clues as what methods could be employed to determine integration ”costs.“ “7 This economic gain is reenforced by social factors. If the suburban municipality is relatively homogeneous then the educational system can be geared to one main objective. Such an objective might be getting the high school graduates into good colleges. Thus, the economic and social advantages of suburban municipalities may reenforce one another and act in a way to prevent political integration or shape it-into a specific pattern. "If the suburban municipality is still a tremendous bargain from this simple economic viewpoint, then it may be in the economic interest of the suburbanites to turn down the small bargain of a common transport authority or of a metrOpolitan district or county in order not to endan- ger the big bargain of separate suburban government."ul Deutsch rests his argument mainly on economic factors. The costs of integration to local municipalities do reflect a mixture of economic and social factors. However, the sotlai advantages gained by having separate'municipallties may be more important in preventing political integration at the local level then are the economic factors.“2 Pressures on local governments to cq0perate may come from outside the metrOpolitan region. Revenue for local services may come from the state and the federal government. Specific conditions may be attached to the revenue which may have significant consequences on the metropoli- tan area. An example of this would be federal aid for urban renewal and “libid., p. lh3. hzThe basis for the argument for this section comes from Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," The Integration of Political £25- munities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Phil. and N.Y.: J. B. Lippincott Company, l96h), pp. lh3-l78. 1.3 the accompanying conditions concerning social integration, housing, and family relocation. However, federal aid has been a stimulus for creating many single-purpose agencies now in existence. This has been because the federal government has in the pastnot required great amounts of coordination and c00perati0n among local governments in order to receive funds. "If the federal government can tie its programs tagether, a more comprehensive approach to metropolitan areas might be reflected in local "“3 reorganization of thought and action. The sources and conditions connected with revenue for a service or good has significant influence on the form of political integration within metropolitan areas.uh The types of services municipalities cooperate with each other on also affect the economic costs associated with political integration. Some services are divisible with respect to allocation of costs and to benefits. An example of this type would be the purchasing of water by a local municipality from the core city. They pay on the basis of how many gallons they purchase, whereas other services are indivisible. Allocating costs and benefits to air pollution abatement would fall into this category. Classification of services by means of a divisible- indivisible typology offers a frame of reference by which metrOpolitan integration can be examined. lndivisible types of services give rise to the problem of collect- ing payment from persons or governmental units which can benefit without paying directly for the service or good. How is someone made to pay for “3Hilliams, et al., 22, gl£., p. 3l0. M‘Ibid., p. 30h. See for a discussion of the consequences of gov- ernmental reorganization on the redistribution of resources and social inequities in metrOpolitan areas. #9 a service or good when he can get it without paying? In situations where the assessments of costs to benefits can be determined, the process of political integration will be facilitated. Under circumstances where the goods or services cannot be divided with respect to costs and bene- fits, political integration will be hindered. The nature of the service in addition to the source of revenue has significant influence on the political integration of local municipalities in metropolitan areas. Coalition Formation to Minimize Costs The social-and-economic costs approach may be used as a basis for analyzing coalition formation. Attention in this study is centered on cooperative efforts between local governments and the conditions under which local government cOOperate with one another to provide goods and services for their residents. MetrOpolitan areas are confronted with real and imagined problems for which existing political and municipal arrangements are inadequate. Individuals make different demands upon local governments and the metro- politan area as a whole. The demands are also made in varying amounts and through different means. Due to the decentralized loci of decision- making in metrOpolitan areas, any effort to aggregate metropolitan indi- viduals' demands upon local government seem to rest upon coalition forma- tion. Each local government has jurisdiction over a specific area and does not have to compromise its authority with other local governmental units. In effect, the governments in a metrOpolitan area compose a parlimentary-type form of government that must Operate without a suitable legislative mechanism which would aggregate their interests and allocate costs and benefits. Political parties in metrOpolitan areas are 50 “5 They ineffective in coordinating the demands of local municipalities. have historically been concerned with winning offices. The coordination 'of governments which comprise different local constituencies would be too uncertain an activity for office seeking oriented parties. Thus, cooperative efforts between local municipalities appear to be the fruit- ful focal point for examining political integration. It is Upon the types, numbers, and significance of cOOperative agreements between local governments that coalition formation is examined. If local governments must form coalitions of one type or another to satisfy their demands, then coalition construction must be viewed in terms of some estimate of costs and benefits. The costs and benefits must be viewed not only for the local government, but for the coalition and the metropolitan area as a whole. The classification as outlined ls used as a frame of reference for costs and benefits: (l) economic costs; (2) economic benefits; (3) social costs; (h) social benefits. Thomas R. Dye has argued that a decentralized political structure has been functional to the metropolitan system from several points of view. He also believes that bargaining among leadership groups might be a most appropriate, if not the only feasible, technique for achieving policy integration within the metropolitan area.‘+6 Bargaining is made possible because conflict, while a basic form of interaction among hsMorris Janowitz, "Converging Perspectives In Community Political Analysis,” 92, cit., PP. l3-l7. The central theme of this paragraph comes from Janowitz's Interpretation of channelling metrOpolitan demands. l*6Thomas R. Dye, "MetrOpolitan Integration by Bargaining among Subareas,"gp_. g_i__t_., p. ll. Sl metropolitan communities, is not necessarily of the non-zero-sum type. Competitive bargaining can result in the formation of rewarding coali- tions among local governments.“7 Vincent Ostrom and his associates have emphasized inter-local negotiating to provide services as an alternative to appealing to higher levels of government. Appeal to central authorities runs the risk of placing greater control over local metrOpolitan affairs in agencies,such as the state legislature. Hhile at the same time reducing the capability of local governments for dealing with their own problems. A substantial investment in informal negotiating and decision-making arrangements can be justified from the perspective of the local authorities is such arrangements can prevent the loss of local autonomy to higher levels of government. They have stated that to minimize the costs of conflict to their power positions, administrators of local government agencies in metro- politan areas have tended to devel0p an extensive system of communication about each others' experiences and to negotiate standards of performance “9 Thus, they give us a applicable to various types of public services. clue to the reasons and methods for negotiation and coalition formation among local governments. Dye and Dstrom give little indication of what would be the basis for a rewarding coalition of municipal governments or the costs and “7pm., p. n. h8Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert warren, "The Organization of Governments In Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. h (December, i96l), p. 5&2. l"9Ibid., p. 8h2. 52 benefits to the participating and nonparticipating communities. The nature of the pay off to participating communities in economic, social, and related terms is an area open for inquiry with respect to metropoli- tan integration. In attempting to lay a theoretical foundation for cOOperation between local municipalities within a metropolitan area, I hope to shed some light on the components necessary for achieving munici- pal coOperation. This may also serve to view coalitions as a phase of L metropolitan integration upon which governmental structural changes can be evaluated. 1EEIi Coalition formation and cooperation between local governments are used interchangeably. Thus, if municipalities cOOperate they form a coalition with the purpose of achieving some goal, which is to some extent shared by all participating members. Either all or some members of the coalition come together to make a decision that will inflict costs and distribute benefits to the participating members. The coopera- tive agreements may have some effects beyond the coalition members.- The coalition need only to be able to raise revenue and apply it toward some specified and. It may consist of two municipalities or the municipali- ties composing the whole metropolitan area. Generally, most cOOperative agreements are non-zero-sum coalitions, a type of cooperative agreement where all may benefit and all lose. COOperative agreements are voluntary actions on the part of the partici- pating municipality. Mead and not legal (jurisdiction) determines if a municipality cOOperates with others to obtain a goal. Because the par- ticipation of municipalities is voluntary, a zero-sum cOOperative activ- ity occurs unfrequentiy. This is when one of the coOperating members 53 may directly benefit by another cooperating member's loss. In fact, the zero-sum classification may be used to indicate a specific type of cooperation. That is, a cOOperative act that must be viewed in light of other cOOperative acts and not singularly. In any particular coalition or cOOperative act one cooperating member may lose but he may do this to gain a better bargaining position for the next cOOperative act, and he may, as may both parties or all parties, gain on the whole from the series of cooperative acts. In a non-zerp-sum cOOperative activity, the gains and losses of the participating members may be either equal or unequal. That is, some members may gain more or lose less from cooperating then others in terms of both costs and benefits. One municipality may just need to obtain the goal to a greater extent than another municipality. The nature of costs, benefits in relation to municipal needs, shape the type of coali- tion formed. The pay off for each participating municipality is viwed as the result of benefits and losses. The pay offs are stated in economic, social, and political terms. The economic pay offs are related to tax rates and other revenue costs. Simply stated, how much will it cost a municipality to cooperate? The social pay offs will be related in social status, ethnic and life-style changes. Will an intermunidipai agreement lower the social status composition of a participating community? The political pay offs are enumerated by community representation factors. What type of representation will a participating community have in influ- encing an ldtermunicipai decision? 54 Problems associated with metropolitan areas are rarely of the nature where they affect all municipalities with relatively the same impact. Some municipalities are confronted with problems more acutely than are other municipalities within the metrOpolitan area. These com- munities would gain most by solving these problems. This brings rise to the questions of when are urban problems truely metropolitan; and would finding a solution to a metrOpolitan problem be in the interest of the L local community? If a metropolitan area has problems with water pollu- tion but a particular community does not, but the community does contrib- ute to the problem, why would this community cooperate? i The nature of the goal to be achieved not only shapes the type of coalition to be formed and the participating members, but also deter- mines if a coalition can be constructed. To illustrate this point munici- palities may obtain benefits without coOperating with other municipali- ties. Thus, a municipality may receive benefits from a coalition of other municipalities without being a member of the cooperative arrange- ment. This type of situation depends upon the nature of the cOOperative venture. Local communities cannot be barred from the benefits of munici- pal c00peration with respect to air pollution, but they can be excluded from the benefits of cooperation in the area of sewer installation. In the example of air pollution, both the costs and benefits are beyond a single municipality, that is, it cannot be secured through the purely private behaviOr of one municipality. As for sewer installation,the costs and benefits are both limited to participanting members. Vincent Ostrom and his associates refer to this concept as the "exclusion principle," the practicability of denying benefits to nearby SS 50 communities. In contrast with Dewey's formulation of the nature of public goods, the exclusion principle focuses attention on the practica- 5‘ They make the distinction between private bility of denying benefits. and public goods on the basis of a good or services packageability. A good or service that cannot be sold only to those individuals who are willing to pay is often classified a public good or service. This type of good or service makes the assessment of costs extremely difficult. This same distinction of packageability or exclusion with respect to goods and services is a key concept in coalition formation of local municipalities in metropolitan areas. To the extent that they [municipalities] take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cOOperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable 52 The ability of a municlpil‘tY to patterns of interacting behavior. provide goods and services is not only related to costs and benefits involved, but also to the nature of the goods and services with respect to excluding nonpayers to the benefits and maintain preferred community status and tax positions. C00perative agreements between local governments are not only the result of socio-economic costs and benefits and the nature of the prob- lems and goals involved but also reflect the attitudes,.vaiues and per- ceptions of politicians and administrators. The primary actors involved Solbid., p. 833. 5'gbld., p. 833. I52Ibid., p. Bhl. 56 in governmental integration are governmental. People are the carriers of political culture. Thus, whatever the forces for or against political integration may be, action must take place in the governmental sphere by governmental actors. Political behavior with respect to governmental integration is fundamentally a process of decision. It is a resultant of a complex of human choices. Hence, local governmental integration must be understood, in part, in terms of those individuals who had and have a hand in any cOOperative agreements. Philip E. Jacob comments that much political research tends to approach political institutions and structures as established social artifacts rather than as the direct outcomes of human 53 actions and reactions. Attitudes, values and perceptions are influ- ential in the choices made by decision-makersbecause cooperative agree- ments are the result of political decisions made by those who have the authority to commit their communities to the agreements. Thus, it is legitimate to examine, independently of the community's values, what it is that activates politicians and administrators in local municipalities. COOperating agreements among local governments are made by poli- ticians and administrators on the basis of perceived costs and benefits. They act in a fiduciary capacity for the local government. Their own attitudes enter into the decision of whether to establish a contract or 53Philip E. Jacob, "The Influence of Values In Political Integra- tion," The inte ration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, l96h), pp. 209-2h6. S“glam” p. 210. 5“ ‘EE?““"‘“‘ .l' \ 57 not, but more significantly the decision will reflect their perception of constituency attitudes. Harren E. Miller and Donald Stokes found with reference to con- gressmen that for certain issues a representative's perception of his constituency's attitudes were highly correlated with his voting record.55 Coalition formation will not only reflect the actual costs and benefits to be received by a cOOperative agreement, but also the perceptions of local residents' needs and wants by politicians and administrators. However, politicians and administrators perceptions of community atti- tudes may vary with respect to different c00perative agreements. For example, a community's needs for Sewers and water may be well known to the public officials, thus, giving them a clearer indication of constit- uency attitudes. On the other hand, they may have little information concerning community attitudes toward refuge collection. Their actions in both cases will be shaped by the demands made upon them and the insuing effects on their perceptions concerning community needs and demands. Any local attempt to solve metrOpolitan problems, short of govern- mental reorganization, will involve coalitions of local governments. The coalition formations will be influenced by many factors. The nature of the metropolitan problem or goal to be pursued will specify the coalition members or determine if a coalition of local governments can be formed at all. The social and economic characteristics of the municipalities will also set limits as to the selection of coalition members. The 55Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence In Congress,” American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII (March, l963), PP. “5-570 58 nature of participation costs and pay offs will define the cohesion and continuation of the coalition. The local governmental officials will play the key role. It is their perception of community goals, needs,and problems which provide the basis for decisions to commit their munici- palities to any coalitions of local governments. ummar This chapter presented a discussion of the literature on the pro- 1 cess of political integration not only with the purpose of examining relevant works, but also attempting to construct a theoretical basis on B which to conduct research. This theoretical basis centered around the socio-economic costs and benefits of cOOperative agreements among munici- pal governments and indicates that: Local governments in metropolitan areas, by means of cooperative agreements, strive to maintain a balance between preferred life-styles and economic costs. Thus, cobperation among local units of government is an attempt to maintain this balance by helping forestall total political and social integration of a metro- politan area. CHAPTER III DATA COLLECTION AND HYPOTHESES The purpose of this chapter is to give a description of the methods used in this study to test the hypotheses deveIOped from the theoretical framework presented in Chapters I and II. My theory contends that local governments rely upon cOOperation to maintain the municipal social and economic status quo. Four theoretical approaches to integration pre- sented in Chapter I will be tested and related to my theory. These four theoretical approaches to be tested are: the economic theory (Brazer and Ostrom); the social variables theory (Williams, g;_gl.); the administrator- politiclan theory (Weidner and Adrian); and the communications theory (Deutsch and Meier). The reievpnce of the theoretical approaches will be tested in terms of aggregate cooperative agreements data for the Detroit metrOpolitan area and interviews with fifty governmental offi- cials in three suburban municipalities within the Detroit metrOpolitan area. The legal basis of cooperation is explained, the researth site is described, and the rationale for selecting three suburban municipalities for an in-depth analysis is given. A classification of cooperative agree- ments and the municipal background material used in this research are presented and Operational hypotheses are presented. 59 60 Legal Basis of Metropolitan Coogeration In Michigan The state of Michigan does not unduly restrict intergovernmental COOperation. The l963 Constitution of the state of Michigan granted broad powers to local units for intergovernmental cOOperation and permits a wide variety of intergovernmental arrangements. These arrangements are subject only to the limitations imposed by the requirement that units L cannot do jointly that which they cannot do individually and such other limitations as may be provided by law..Although no new legislation has : been enacted to implement this provision of the Constitution, Act No. 35 of l95l authorizes intergovernmental contracts among local units of government and there are a number of specific statutes authorizing cOOperation in various areas.I The provision of the Constitution of l963 on intergovernmental cOOperation states that the legislature shall by general law autHOrize two or more counties, townships, cities, villages, or districts or any combination thereof to:2 l. Contract with one another or with the state for the joint admin- istration of their respective functions or powers; A 2. Share the costs and responsibilities of functions and services with one another or with the state; ‘ 3. Transfer functions or responsibilities to one another with the consent of each unit involved. ‘Citizens' Research Council of Michigan, Staff Pagers on Govern- :nental Organization for Metrogolitan Southeast Michigan, Report No. CCXVIII (January, l965), pp. l6h-l65. 2Michigan, Constitution (l963), Art. 7, sec. 2. 6i h. COOperate with one another and with the state government; and S. Lend their credit to one another in connection with any authorized publicly owned undertakings. The Research Site The Detroit metropolitan area was selected as the site for analysis in this study. It was selected for scholarly as well as practical rea- sons. The Detroit metropolitan area with fifty-eight incorporated municipalities provides examples of a large number and a wide variety of cOOperative agreements among the suburban municipalities. The Detroit area also provides examples of cOOperative agreements among differing units--suburban municipalities, counties, metropolitan authorities and/or the city of Detroit. Secondly, a great deal of data has already been collected about this area by public agencies like the Bureau of the Census, the state of Michigan, and the municipalities; as well as by private research agencies like the MetrOpolitan Fund, the Citizens' Research Council, Detroit MetrOpolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, and the United Community Services of Metropolitan Detroit. Finally, the Detroit metropolitan area is also within reasonable travelling distance from Michigan State University. The University also has an Open trunk telephone line to the Detroit area. This greatly reduced the costs of setting up appointments for interviews and gathering information. The Detroit metropolitan area as defined by the Bureau of the Census was the area used in this study. The Bureau of the Census defines the Standard MetrOpolitan Statistical Area of Detroit as including the three counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. The l96O pOpulation of the Detroit metropolitan area was 3,762,360. The population increased to 62 h,Ohl,OOO by l965 as estimated by the Detroit MetrOpolitan Area Regional Planning Commission. As is the case in most northeastern metropolitan areas, the core city of Detroit has been decreasing in pOpulation while the remaining area has been increasing in pOpulation. All cooperative agreements participated in by the fifty-eight municipalities as of Fall, l96h, will be used as a basis for analysis in this study. These municipalities are listed in Table 3-l. They fall 1 into three general time categories with respect to municipal incorpora- tion dates. Four municipalities were incorporated prior to the twentieth century. Twenty-two were incorporated between l920 and l939. Thirty- 1 two municipalities were incorporated since l9hO. Most of the municipali- ties were incorporated as villages prior to their incorporation as municipalities. The dates for village incorporation, where it occurred, are also presented in Table 3-l along with municipal incorporation dates. Three suburban municipalities were selected for an in-depth analy- sis of cooperation: Allen Park, Birmingham, and Ecorse. These were chosen, primarily, on the basis of their joint cOOperative agreement activity. Allen Park and Ecorse did not rely extensively on joint coop- erative agreements to provide services. Ecorse, a low socio-economic community was the least cOOperative urban municipality having partici- pated in only three joint agreements. Allen Park participated in only four joint agreements and was selected primarily because it was a high socio-economic status community. Birmingham was a high socio-economic status municipality that participated in thirteen joint cOOperative agree- ments. 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III .R. n N. n as .N III iii R3 .N an m: xcmm cu..< .muOP zocx meo.nocm. co.umcm.oxm mEo.nOLm muocmc.u co.uu0u0cm ucoscco>oa co.umucoemcmcp u.coo oz uoz use .mo> .m.um¢ ou..oe mo pea ecu co.umo..o:o mcozum .cuuax .m.u0m mxmamoza z mm.h.4<¢.u.zsz wwxxh z. m4<.u.uuo .(hzutz¢u>om Mic m4m - . o g 8 E '5 u t authorities, L I— — e am new 8 and specual < u districts. I. GENERAL GOVERNMENT l. Finance 2. Personnel (other than policemen and firemen) 3. Elections ll. Other General Government Func- tions (please specify) 229 230 Col. 3. Col. C. Col. A. Methods of Names of Service or Inter-local Units Functional Area ._£222££2£12£L_ Please report names of school dis- tricts, coun- 0222252£i2?____ B-I 3-2 3-3 C n Col. D. Describe Function or Service Pro- vided Through _.£2222523122_ u E'é ties, cities. EE Eg 3E 1.2.1.1233; 5 C 3 E g 0 “I5 o authorities 6:3 .33 |'_§land special, < O districts. POLICE I. All Police Services Personnel Communications Patrol Service Criminal Inves- tigation Traffic Juvenile Activities 8. Jail . Animal Control IO. Other Coopera- tive Police Services (please specify) FIRE egg CIVIL DEFENSE I. All Fire Services 23I Col. D. Describe Col. 3. Col. C. Function or Col. A. Methods of Names of Service Pro- Service or Inter-local ' vided Through Functional Area COOEerI ‘ COOperation ‘ B-l Please report Contract names of a school dis- tricts, coun- ties, cities, 0 O o u ' v o > o :Illages, E a 3: fills Epi’ L 0 o u u orItIes, mm mm and speCIal districts. N e O J? w 0 Personnel Communications Firefighting Fire Prevention Buildings and Equipment . Civil Defense Other COOpera- tive Fire or Civil Defense Services (please specify) IV. PUBLIC WORKS 552 UTILITIES I 2. . Engineering and Inspection Streets and Highways 3. Sanitation u. Sewerage - Sanitary and Storm Functional Area S Col. A. ervice or 232 Col. 8. Col. C. Methods of Names of Inter-local Units COOperation COOperating B-l B-2 8-3 Please report Contract names of a b school dis- : tricts, coun- _ o . . . o o u o u ‘E 2.5 :;Tség:;tles. 2.3 3.2 .52 z; 2 township; 6)) Z 8 E g 8 “E u authorities I- III 0 o I- - o ' am am < 8 and special districts. Col. D. Describe Function or Service Pro- vided Through Cooperation Water Supply Water Distribu- tion System Public Lighting Public Transpor- tation Public Building Maintenance Central Garage Other Public Wbrks or Utility Services (please specify) PARKS, RECREATION fl FORESTRY I. 2 Parks Playgrounds Grounds Mainte- nance Swimming Pools Tree Trimming 233 Col. B. Col. C. Col. A. Methods of Names of Service or Inter-local Units Functional Area Cooperation COOperating B-l B-2 B-3 Please report names of school dis- tricts, coun- c . . . — o ties, Cities, A.) e— . O O o o u c 2 u Villages, O o > o c u L m . - - ---— -- E o L townships, > > u > 0 ”lb 0 . . o L o L 'fi O c authorities, L O o o L — o . em «in o and speCIaI < u districts. Col. 0. Describe Function or Service Pro- vided Through .__£2222I2£l£!L. 6. Control of Tree Diseases 7. Cemetery 8. Other Park, Recreation and Forestry Pro- grams (please specify) VI. PUBLIC HEALTH. HOSPITALS 55p WELFARE l. Public Health a. All Public Health Services b. Public Health Services, Part 2. Hospitals a. Public Hospitals b. Hospitals, Part 234 Col. D. Describe Col. 8. Col. C. Function or Col. A. Methods of Names of Service Pro- Service or Inter-local ' vided Through Functional Area COOperi Cooperation 7 B-l Please report Conzract names Of a b school dis- : tricts, coun- -—.g ties, cities, 0 u o u u E 2. villages, 'UU>UC LID . ---- ---— -- o L townships, > > u > O u— u . . o L o L .5 c authorities, L000 —0 . C-U‘I min 3 and speCIaI districts. 3. Welfare A. Other Welfare Programs (please specify) VII. LIBRARIES I. All Library Services 2. Library Services, Part 3. Other Library Services (please specify) VIII. PLANNING, URBAN RENEWAL App HOUSING I. Planning 2 Urban Redevelop- ment 3. Housing A. Other Planning, Urban Renewal and Housing Services 9 IX. OTHER FUNCTIONS III.--‘ i .l . lvl illbi i) "lllllilllllillllllllli“