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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled
State Divestment, Reprivatization, and Peasants:

Dialectical Transformations within the Mexican Sugar
Sector

presented by
Donna Lynn Chollett

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

PhD Anthropology

 

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STATE DIVESTMENT, REPRIVATIZATION, AND PEASANT S:
DIALECTICAL TRANSFORMATIONS WITHIN THE MEXICAN SUGAR SECTOR

By

Donna Lynn Chollett

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology
1994

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ABSTRACT

. STATE DIVESTMENT, REPRIVATIZATION, AND PEASANTS:
DIALECTICAL TRANSFORMATIONS WITHIN THE MEXICAN SUGAR SECTOR

By

Donna Lynn Chollett

The last decade has seen a critical reassessment of the role of the state in economic
development, accompanied by substantial economic restructuring of Third World
economies. One of the most profound manifestations of this transformation is the process
of privatization. The sale of Mexico’s state-owned sugar mills to private capital marks
a historical turning point for the sugar sector and provides an opportunity to analyze the
impact of privatization on rural communities, as peasants adjust to the changing structure
of production and renegotiate their relationship with the Mexican state and the
reprivatized sugar mill. The research examines reprivatization through a political
economy approach, incorporating several levels of analysis: 1) international and national
policies affecting the sugar sector; 2) regional sugar mill policies; 3) collective
organization of the regional cane producers’ union; and 4) strategies of production and
resistance utilized by peasant households.

Anthropological research was conducted in two peasant villages in the sugar-
producing region of Colima, Mexico. Structured interviews with a sample of 100
peasant producers provided data on household economics, how reprivatization of the
sugar mill affects peasant production, changing agricultural practices and strategies, and
participation in the regional cane producers’ union. Sample data were supplemented by

interviews and data gathering in various agrarian ofﬁces, the sugar mill, and the

producers’ union. The sugar mill provided annual records (1986-1991) of costs of
production, proﬁts, and debts for all cane producers of the research villages, which were
utilized to compare the pre-privatization and post-privatization periods.

Reprivatization has made a signiﬁcant initial impact on the region of study.
Contrary to the expectations of privatization, productive efﬁciency has declined due to
lack of investment in the sugar mill. Cane producers face spiraling costs, increasing
debts, and are abandoning cane production in substantial numbers. Given structural
limitations placed on the union’s collective mobilization for a price increase, producers
who persevere in the production of cane select a variety of strategies of resistance as they

confront reprivatization of the sugar sector.

 

Copyright by
DONNA LYNN CHOLLE'IT
1994

 

DEDICATION

To my son, Todd, who endured a year of courageous struggle

while I was away in the ﬁeld.

 

 

‘1'

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend deep gratitude to the Saucedo family for their loving and caring
support as my host family during my ﬁrst ﬁeldwork season in 1984, and again in 1990-
91. This gratitude extends as well to the many people of Ocotillo, Chiapa, and
surrounding villages who not only collaborated with the researcher by providing data and
insights into the joys, sufferings, triumphs, and struggles of the "other", but also
extended to me their genuine and enduring friendship. Special thanks go to Teresa
Saucedo Vizcaino who dedicated many hours, through thick and thin, as my research
assistant. 1 wish to acknowledge those who served on my guidance committee: Scott
Whiteford, as committee chair, Helen Pollard, Bill Derman, and Jeff Riedinger. I am
indebted for their support and the time they dedicated to reading this dissertation. To
Leigh Binford I remain appreciative of the many hours of advice during my preparation
for the ﬁeld, and continued support while I was engaged in ﬁeldwork.

During the ﬁeldwork period, I was a visiting investigator with the Colegio de
Michoacan, Zamora, Michoacan. I thank the Colegio for their support and for making
their library and research facilities available to me. This material is based upon work
supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 49975. The government
has certain rights in this material. Any opinions, ﬁndings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily
reﬂect the view of the National Science Foundation. Financial support for the research
was also provided by the Fulbright Graduate Study Abroad Program, managed through

the Institute of International Education, and by the Inter-American Foundation.

vi

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...................................... ix
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................... xi
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1
Statement of the Research Problem ...................... 1
Background to the Research Problem ..................... 3

Research Objectives ............................... 4

II. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............ 11
Political Economy ............................... 12

Levels of Analysis ............................... 15

The Global Transformation of Production ................. 17

The Peripheral State and Peasants ...................... 21
Dialectical Relationships at the Regional Level .............. 25

Forms of Production Within the Peasant Community .......... 32
Production and Reproduction of the Peasant Household ......... 35

HI. METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES ..................... 38
Selection of the Research Site ........................ 38

The Sampling Frame .............................. 39

Research Procedures .............................. 40
Participant Observation ......................... 40

Structured Interviews .......................... 42

Oral Histories .............................. 45

Archival Data .............................. 46

Data Analysis .............................. 47

IV. THE RESEARCH SETTING ............................ 49
The State of Colima .............................. 49

The Region of Ingenio Queseria ....................... 54

The Research Communities .......................... 59

The Research Sample .......................... 65

vii

V. HISTORY OF THE SUGAR SECTOR ....................... 67

Historical Change Within the Sugar Sector ................. 68
The Colonial Period ........................... 69
Independence ............................... 76
Post-Revolutionary Changes ...................... 79
Statization of the Sugar Industry ................... 85

Historical Change Within the Research Region .............. 93
Colonial Colima ............................. 93
The Independence Period in Colima ................. 96
The Post-revolutionary Period in Colima .............. 101
The Period of State Control of the Queseria Mill ......... 108

VI. PRIVATIZATION ................................... 11 1

The Global Context of Privatization ..................... 112

Privatization in Mexico ............................ 117
NAFTA .................................. 120
State Policy on Privatization ...................... 123

Reprivatization of the Sugar Sector ..................... 128
FINA, S.N.C. .............................. 138
Azricar, S.A. ............................... 144
The Decreto Caﬁero ........................... 147

Social Contradictions of Reprivatization .................. 150

VII. COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION ........................ 155

Development of the Cane Producers’ Union ................ 156

Mobilization of the Cane Producers’ Union ................ 167

Peasant Evaluation of Collective Mobilization ............... 180

Privatization and the Restructuring of Relation ships ........... 195

Alternative Collective Strategies ....................... 204

VIII. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF REPRIVATIZATION .......... 212

Grupo Beta San Miguel ............................ 213

Policy and Reprivatization .......................... 215

Regional Transformations ........................... 220
Field .................................... 221
Factory .................................. ‘ 235

Outcome of Liquidation ............................ 244
Price .................................... 244
Costs .................................... 247
Debts ................................... 256

Peasant Evaluation of the Transformation of Production ......... 259

IX. THE LOCAL CONTEXT OF REPRIVATIZATION .............. 272

The Peasant Community ............................ 273

Household Production and Reproduction .................. 280
The Peasant Household ......................... 280
Forms of Production .......................... 281

Transformations in the Production System ................. 284
Changing Production Strategies .................... 284
Factors Inﬂuencing Production Strategies .............. 289

Individual Strategies of Resistance ...................... 311

viii

X. CONCLUSIONS .................................... 324

Political Economy ............................... 324

Neoliberalism and the Internationalization of Capital ........... 327

The Peripheral State, Peasants, and Capital ................ 333

Hegemony and Resistance ........................... 336

Collective Resistance .......................... 337

Individual Forms of Resistance .................... 338

Considerations for the Future ......................... 339

APPENDIX A. Equipment of Ingenio Quesen’a .................... 342

APPENDIX B. Interview Schedules ........................... 344

APPENDD( C. Mill Worker’s Account of Changes in the Sugar Mill ...... 353

APPENDIX D. Liquidation Documents ........................ 355
APPENDD( B. Table 54. Change in Hectares of Cane

by Individual Producer ......................... 359

LIST OF REFERENCES .................................. 360

ix

Table 1.
Table 2.
Table 3.
Table 4.
Table 5.
Table 6.
Table 7.
Table 8.
Table 9.

Table 10.

Table 11.
Table 12.
Table 13.
Table 14.
Table 15.
Table 16.
Table 17.
Table 18.
Table 19.
Table 20.
Table 21.
Table 22.
Table 23.
Table 24.
Table 25.
Table 26.
Table 27.
Table 28.

Table 29.
Table 30.
Table 31.
Table 32.
Table 33.
Table 34.
Table 35.
Table 36.
Table 37.
Table 38.
Table 39.

LIST OF TABLES

Sugar Imports and Exports, 1982-89 .................... 92
Crop Production in Colima, 1945-52 .................... 106
Ownership of Mexican Sugar Mills ..................... 131
Reasons for the Failed Strike ......................... 183
Origin of Decisions in UNPCA ....................... 187
Ability to Unite ................................. 188
Beneﬁts of UNPCA Membership ...................... 189
Ability of Organizations to Resolve Problems ............... 190
Problems of UNPCA ............................. 190
Changing Relation Between the Sugar Mill and UNPCA

Since Privatization ........................... 196
Changing Role of the State Since Privatization .............. 197
To Whom Caﬁeros Should Make Demands ................ 198
Who Is To Blame For Problems of Caﬁeros ................ 199
Support Given to Caheros .......................... 202
Evaluation of Progress ............................ 203
Origin of Cane Cutters ............................ 224
Problems of the Harvest ........................... 229
Field Yield ................................... 232
Opinion of the Modernization Program .................. 233
Factory Efﬁciency ............................... 237
Annual Price Increases for Sugar Cane ................... 245
Costs of Production Before and After Privatization ........... 249
Annual Increase in Costs of Production and Harvest ........... 250
Interest Rates on Machinery and Cultivation ............... 250
Interest Rates on Fertilizer .......................... 251
Costs of Production in the Zone of Ingenio Queserl’a .......... 252
Changing Costs of Production ........................ 254
Proportion of Caﬁeros Within the Production Zone

Owing Debts to the Mill ........................ 256
Proportion of Net Debt and Proﬁt Relative to Income Credit ..... 257
Initiation of the Crisis in the Cane Sector ................. 262
Blame For the Crisis in the Cane Sector .................. 263
Disadvantages of the Sale of the Sugar Mill ................ 265
Relationship of Peasants to the Sugar Mill ................. 267
Number of Cane Producers .......................... 268
Changes in Land Use and Production .................... 269
Quality of Life ................................. 274
Relative Economic position .......................... 274
Opportunity to Improve ............................ 276
Net Household Income, 1990-91 ...................... 277

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Table 40.
Table 41.
Table 42.
Table 43.
Table 44.
Table 45.
Table 46.
Table 47.
Table 48.

Table 49.
Table 50.
Table 51.
Table 52.
Table 53.
Table 54.

Index of Material Wealth ........................... 278
Changes in Production Strategies, 1986-1991 ............... 285
Cane Producers, Hectares and Tons of Cane, 1986-1991 ........ 288
Most Important Crop 289
Identiﬁcation of Agricultural Problems ................... 293

Mean Costs of Production per Hectare ................... 304
Average Net Earnings per Hectare ..................... 304
Costs as a Proportion of the Value of the Crop .............. 305
Percent Change in Costs as a Proportion of the

Value of the Crop, 1985-86 to 1990-91 ............... 306
Mean Debt per Producer, 1985-86 to 1990-91 .............. 307
Average Relative Contribution of Crops to Total Crop Income 309
Disadvantages of Cane Production, 1984 ................. 312
Disadvantages of Cane Production, 1990 ................. 312
Reasons for Continuing With Cane Production .............. 316
Change in Hectares of Cane by Individual Producer ........... 359

xi

 

Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.

Figure 7.

Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.

LIST OF FIGURES

Map of Mexico ................................ 50
Map of the State of Colima ......................... 50
Map of the Supply Zone of Ingenio Queseri’a .............. 56
Map of the Ejido lands ........................... 64
Sale of State-operated Enterprises in Mexico ............... 127
Sale of Mexican Sugar Mills ........................ 131
Costs of Cane Production as a Percentage

of the Value of Cane .......................... 255
Changes in Land Use ............................. 287
Peasant Evaluation of Agrarian Agencies ................. 303
Percent of Net Income Contributed by Crops .............. 310

xii

 

I. INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Research Problem

A signiﬁcant paradigmatic change is sweeping the globe, fostering a historical
dissonance between neoliberall ideology and praxis and the social reality emerging in
much of the Third World (Ibarra 1990). As criticism developed over the predominant
role played by Third World states in guiding economic development, a series of
ideological notions has passed from vogue: "state paternalism" , " government subsidies",
"protectionism", and the ”parastatal enterprise". In its place, the international and
national bourgeoisie have resurrected from classical economic theory another set of
antithetical constructs: ”the free market”, ”modemization", "economic efﬁciency", and
”deregulation”. This shift in theory and praxis was given major impetus by IMF and
World Bank policies aimed at restructuring Third World debt, requiring debtor nations
to open their economies to foreign investment, to reduce government subsidies, and to
sell state-operated enterprises (Redclift 1987).

One of the most profound manifestations of this transformation is the process of
privatization. Privatization in Mexico is a strategic response to convergent pressures of
international ﬁnancial institutions, on the one hand, and a reorientation of national
development policy, on the other, to confront the growing debt crisis during a period of
economic recession. As a keystone of structural reform, privatization has affected more

than 800 parastatal ﬁrms in Mexico, among them banks, mines, airlines,

 

"Neoliberal" is the term used in Latin America to refer to policies of deregulation, laissez faire
economics, and privatization. In the U.S. , "neoconservative" is applied to these policies characteristically
considered as 'Reaganomics'.

 

 

2
communications, and sugar mills. The recent and extensive state divestment and sale of
Mexican sugar mills to private capital provides a test case for analysis of the dialectical
process of transformation that accompanies privatization.

There are several reasons why the Mexican sugar sector is particularly suitable for
analysis. The sugar sector in Mexico, largely a private domain until the 19703, has
always been subject to a substantial degree of state intervention and control. Sugar, as
a world market commodity, has historical roots that extend back to the early colonial
period in Mexico. State policy ensured access to important resources, such as land,
labor, and capital to private sugar entrepreneurs, thus guaranteeing capital accumulation
among the rural elite. Consolidation and concentration of production by sugar haciendas
after independence created conditions which led Mexican peasants to play a major role
in the Mexican revolution. The subsequent agrarian reform returned land to peasants,
culminating in a major restructuring of the relations of production. The state has
intermittently intervened during periods of crisis to preserve the economic viability of the
sector and maintain political stability in rural areas; this process is clearly present in the
statization of the sugar sector in the 19703. As providers of raw material to a capitalist
industry, peasant cane producers were organized into govemment—controlled unions,
forming an organic relationship between peasants and state-owned sugar mills. This
relationship was maintained until 1988, when the decision was made to reprivatize the
industry. Reprivatization of the sugar industry portends a reconcentration of resources
by sugar industrialists, which may require a renewal of state measures of control.

The sale of all 49 state-owned sugar mills from 1988 to 1992--mostly to national and
transnational corporations--has weakened the state-peasant relationship, creating a
potential for political conﬂict. This change in ownership of Mexico’s oldest and largest
agroindustry, employing 128,000 cane producers, 97,386 harvesters, 69,146 mill
workers, employees, and transport personnel (Pare et al. 1987), marks a historical

 

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turning point for the sugar sector. It is within this sector that state divestment and the
redrawing of direct peasant-capital relations of production should prove signiﬁcant in the
ensuing transformative process. The consequences of this radical change for rural
communities as they adjust to the new structure of production have not, until now, been

systematically analyzed.

Background to the Research Problem

Reprivatization comes in the wake of 30 years of state encroachment into the sugar
industry, having been fostered by a crisis of proﬁtability which began in the late 19508.
A freeze on the domestic price of sugar from 1958 to 1970 and a drop in the price of
sugar on the world market in the 1960s led private mill owners to decapitalize their
operations. In order to prevent the loss of foreign exchange and to avert an economic
crisis in the countryside, the state intensiﬁed its intervention in the industry and
eventually assumed ownership of failing sugar mills. By 1975, 56 of Mexico’s 62 sugar
mills had been incorporated into the state sector (del Villar 1976; Purcell 1981).

Due to the inefﬁciency of state-operated mills and a substantial increase in the
domestic demand for sugar, by 1976 the sugar sector could no longer meet the needs for
internal consumption and Mexico was forced to become a net importer of processed
sugar. Although the state maintained a low domestic price for sugar, it did so at the cost
of tremendous subsidies to the sugar sector (del Villar 1976; Purcell 1981). State
investment in the modernization of its sugar mills during the 1980s was predicated on the
need to achieve self-sufﬁciency, restore Mexico’s position as a sugar exporter, and
prevent destabilization of the peasant sector. These subsidies were sustained until 1988
when, in response to the economic crisis, Mexico’s past president, Miguel de la Madrid,
made a decision to divest and decontrol the sugar industry.

Although the state retained the right to set domestic sugar prices and continues to

'.

i-l

4
ﬁnance credit to the sugar sector, reprivatization is accompanied by major changes in
credit delivery and the structure of production, with important consequences for
producers’ incomes and the relation of producers’ unions to the mill. During the period
of state control, the national-level cane producers’ union was often successful in resolving
local conﬂicts between producers and sugar mills to the beneﬁt of producers; however,
private investors are less amenable to negotiate producers’ demands when resolutions
negatively affect proﬁts. The withdrawal of the state from direct control and the increase
in capitalist penetration of the sugar industry signaled the urgency to investigate the
economic, social, and political ramiﬁcations and peasant responses to transformations
within the sugar sector. Not only is Mexico’s economic crisis requiring the withdrawal
of state subsidies to peasant production, but the state is simultaneously encountering
serious challenges to its political legitimacy. Situation of the research problem in this
context raises a signiﬁcant question: will the transfer of control of this major

agroindustrial complex undermine political stability of the rural sector?

Research Objectin

The objective of the research is to examine reprivatization of the sugar sector in
relation to: 1) global policies, both international and national, that are restructuring the
organization of production within the sugar sector; 2) regional sugar mill policies
affecting peasants’ access to production resources and the relationship between the
producers’ union and the sugar mill; 3) changes in production strategies and forms of
resistance within peasant communities; and 4) changes in production and reproduction
of peasant households. The research utilizes a political economy approach and
incorporates various levels of analysis, acknowledging the dynamic interrelationship of

peasants with local, regional, and global histories and processes.

Major policy changes such as the Brady Plan, aimed at structural reform, the North

 

 

5

American Free Trade Agreement between the US. and Mexico, and the creation of more
proﬁtable enterprises through privatization are linked into a neoliberal paradigm that
seeks modernization and economic efﬁciency. Implicit in these new directions is the
assumption of an intrinsic harmony between economic and social goals (Ibarra 1990).
Mexican public policy, as seen in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (1989-94), PECE
(Pacto para la Estabilidad y el Crecimiento Economico), and the Convenio de
Reestructuracion del Sector Azucarero, directly reﬂect the demands of the IMF and the
economic goals of Mexico’s neighbor to the North (Paré 1990). Investigation into the
extent to which these national policies inﬂuence the distribution of resources and foment
the concentration of wealth at the cost of greater social inequality constitutes one of the
objectives of the research.

A second objective is to identify, within the regional supply zone of the sugar mill,
Ingenio Queseria, changes in the distribution of resources such as credit, agricultural
inputs, equipment, and price beneﬁts, and how access to these resources inﬂuences
producers’ strategies. Ingenio Queseria forms a discreet entity through which production
is organized on a regional basis. It is at the regional level that new systems of
management are restructuring the organization of production and upon which new
relations of production are emerging. Is there greater or lesser equity in access to
resources since privatization? Does reprivatization encourage monocrop production of
sugar cane, or rather, crop diversiﬁcation? Are producers seeking alternatives to cane
production? The pre-privatization (1986-1988) and post-privatization (1989-1991) periods
are compared to illuminate regional-level changes.

A third objective of the research is to investigate the dialectical relationship which
involves ongoing negotiation and renegotiation between peasant unions, the state, and
private capital. Concern with the shifting balance of political power requires a regional

focus, since it is at the regional level that cane producers’ unions articulate peasant

 

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interests and demands and at which collective action is concentrated. The transition from
a diadic, peasant-state relationship to triadic interrelations among peasants, the state, and
capital have increased the complexity of the negotiation process. Of interest is how these
changes aid or abet the peasant struggle for fair prices, favorable work conditions, and
producer beneﬁts. Does this struggle lead to alternative collective strategies such as the
formation of independent unions? The efﬁcacy of emerging strategies are of utmost
importance for the assessment of regional-level initiatives in the face of important
transitions within the sugar sector.

The fourth objective consists of the analysis of economic constraints to agricultural
production, through a comparative study of the predominant crops in the region and how
factors such as prices, credit, access to resources, and markets shape decision making
among peasant producers. Cane producers operate within a production system of
economic, social, and political factors that have relevance to the variety of crop and/or
cattle complexes that form the basis of individual agricultural exploitation. As
privatization of the sugar mill affects access to resources, and in turn, production
strategies, the degree to which changing production strategies contribute to household
production and reproduction is investigated. Must peasant households increasingly rely
on the sale of their labor power since reprivatization? Or rather, has reprivatization
provided the basis for capital accumulation among peasant cane producers? The
worldwide scope of privatizations throughout the Third World makes these questions
particularly relevant to consideration of the destiny of peasant producers as they confront
the impact of these global transformations.

This dissertation is divided into ten chapters dealing with theoretical, methodological
and substantive issues of the research. Chapter 11, following this introduction, will take
up the theoretical and conceptual framework that is utilized for analysis. This chapter

explains the rationale for incorporating various levels of analysis. Beginning with a

7

global focus, a theory of the internationalization of capital helps to illuminate the
transformation of production that has accompanied reprivatization. The chapter takes up
discussion of the nature of the peripheral state which is relevant to the restructuring of
relations of production. Theoretical questions are raised as to the signiﬁcance of the
weakening relationship between peasants and the state as privatization has decreased the
state’s ability to subsidize peasant production. The chapter addresses differing theoretical
orientations to the issue of resistance and formulates a political economy approach which
remains sensitive to issues of structure and agency. It argues that conceptualization of
”peasant" , requires speciﬁcation of the forms of production to better understand the
diverse economic and political strategies of a differentiated peasantry. Finally, the
chapter will address the theoretical import of the peasant household, as a unit of
production and reproduction, for elucidating processes of capital accumulation and
mechanisms of surplus extraction.

Chapter III outlines the methodology and procedures used in conducting the
research. The rationale for selection of the research site is explained, as well as the
strategy for selecting a research sample for the interview process. Research procedures
including participant observation, structured interviews, oral histories, collection of
archival data, and data analysis are described.

Chapter IV introduces the reader to the research setting. The state of Colima forms
an entity that is tied to the central government through the political structure of PRI.
Selected political, economic, and geographical data situate this state within the broader
national scene. The research focused on the northeast portion of Colima, in the
production zone of Ingenio QueserIa. As a discreet economic entity, this zone and the
economic, social, and political features of the region and the sugar mill are described.
Within the research region, two communities were selected for anthropological ﬁeldwork.

The chapter elucidates salient geographic, demographic, economic, and occupational

 

 

 

8
features of these two villages and describes characteristics of the research sample
(n= 100) selected for intensive interviews.

Chapter V covers the historical background of the sugar industry, thus providing an
essential perspective for understanding historical transformations within the sugar sector.
This chapter argues that throughout its history, even during periods of private control,
the state has played a signiﬁcant role in the sugar sector. The chapter focuses on
dialectical relations of power through four broad periods: the colonial period, 2)
independence, 3) the post-revolutionary period, and 4) the period of state control. Sugar
cane was introduced early in the colonial period and sugar cane haciendas provided the
organizational structure for much of rural life in the post-colonial period. The Mexican
revolution erupted from an important sugar-producing region, which remained a center
of peasant resistance. The post-revolutionary period saw the creation of the political
system that continues to incorporate peasants into the organizational structure of the state.
The peasant-state relationship was particularly strengthened when the state assumed
ownership of Mexican sugar mills. The advent of the privatization of the sugar industry
makes this relationship increasingly tenuous. The chapter concludes with the historical
background for the research region, giving particular emphasis to oral histories, as well
as both published and unpublished historical documents on the production zone.

Chapter VI presents the global context of privatization. The chapter critiques the
neoliberal program which makes privatization a key component of economic
restructuring. It then addresses how the privatization process within Mexico articulates
with NAFTA and the role of national development policy. The chapter focuses on
rcprivatization of the sugar sector, indicating how the vertical and horizontal integration
of the industry have contributed to the concentration of economic wealth and power.
Policies of two important parastatal organizations, FINA and Azricar, S.A. , are

considered, along with modiﬁcations to the Decreto Caﬁero. The chapter concludes with

 

9
an analysis of the social contradictions wrought by state withdrawal and reprivatization.

Chapter VII turns to collective organization at the regional level. A brief
background on the National Peasant Confederation sets the stage for analysis of the
mobilization of the producers’ union during the 1990 harvest season. Implications for
the outcome, or lack thereof, of the producers’ strike are considered and compared with
strategies for mobilization taken by an alternative, independent producers’ organization.

The regional context of reprivatization is the subject of chapter VIII. Analysis is
directed toward Grupo Beta’s policies for restructuring the privatized mill and
reorganization of the production process. The policies are shown to be incongruent with
actual outcomes. Regional transformations that have resulted from privatization are
evident for both factory and ﬁeld, with signiﬁcant results for the economic outcome of
the harvest. The results of annual account balances for producers, in terms of price,
costs, and debts, are analyzed in detail. The chapter concludes with peasants’ own
evaluations of these changes.

Chapter IX focuses on the peasant community, providing the local context of
reprivatization. It commences with the subjective evaluation of sample members
concerning their changing economic status within the community and corroborative
results from data analysis. The complex nature of household economics, forms of
production, and land tenure characteristic of the sample and transformations in the
production system support the necessity of taking into account the differentiated nature
of the peasantry. The chapter considers the institutional factors that limit access to
resources through a comparative analysis of the various components of the production
system. Finally, it concludes with an analysis of the individual forms of peasant
resistance. Throughout chapters VII through IX, peasant discourse is incorporated to
elucidate the culturally constructed meanings and how they are acted upon, in congruence

with the theoretical orientation of an ideologically sensitive political economy.

 

10
The dissertation concludes with chapter X, which formulates conclusions based on

ﬁeld research results.

 

 

H. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Reprivatization of Mexico’s oldest and largest agroindustry, upon which tens of
thousands depend for employment, represents a historical apogee in the changing
relationship between the state, private capital, and peasants. As economic restructuring
demands withdrawal of state subsidies to peasants, it is undermining an important base
of support to a weakening political system. Yet, the new political strategy to promote
capitalist penetration of the sugar sector threatens to propel the sugar industry into
bankruptcy. This dissertation theoretically addresses reconﬁguration of the organic
relationship between peasants and the state and analyzes the substantive impact of this
process on the lives of sugar cane producers and their strategies to cope with
reprivatization.

Presentation of the theoretical and conceptual framework begins with the rationale
for a political economy approach and an argument for what I believe to be a viable
00“”me marxism in a postmodernist age. Once the tenets of this theoretical
framework are deﬁned, the chapter focuses on six related areas of theoretical concern.
1) Leveb of analysk: I contend that the dynamic interrelationship among the global,
“$01131. local, and household levels is of crucial analytic importance in a context that
integrates Wis and their communities into a capitalist agribusiness transformed by
intermﬁonal and national policies. 2) Global transformation of production: 1 will
critique neoliberal ideology and the internationalization of production that accompany the
Pﬁvatization process and indicate the contradictions between ofﬁcial policy and social

°°nditi0ns as they are expressed in the Mexican countryside. 3) The peripheral state

11

 

 

 

 

 

II. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Reprivatization of Mexico’ s oldest and largest agroindustry, upon which tens of
thousands depend for employment, represents a historical apogee in the changing
relationship between the state, private capital, and peasants. As economic restructuring
demands withdrawal of state subsidies to peasants, it is undermining an important base
of support to a weakening political system. Yet, the new political strategy to promote
capitalist penetration of the sugar sector threatens to propel the sugar industry into
bankruptcy. This dissertation theoretically addresses reconﬁguration of the organic
relationship between peasants and the state and analyzes the substantive impact of this
process on the lives of sugar cane producers and their strategies to cope with
reprivatization.

Presentation of the theoretical and conceptual framework begins with the rationale
for a political economy approach and an argument for what I believe to be a viable
Contemporary marxism in a postmodernist age. Once the tenets of this theoretical
frarnework are deﬁned, the chapter focuses on six related areas of theoretical concern.
1) Levels of analysk: I contend that the dynamic interrelationship among the global,
regional, local, and household levels is of crucial analytic importance in a context that
integrates peasants and their communities into a capitalist agribusiness transformed by
international and national policies. 2) Global transformation of production: I will
Critique neoliberal ideology and the internationalization of production that accompany the
Privatization process and indicate the contradictions between ofﬁcial policy and social

cOliditions as they are expressed in the Mexican countryside. 3) The peripheral state

11

13

Political economy has been appropriated from the works of Karl Marx and applied
in the disciplines of economics, political science, social science, and anthropology. The
diversity of its application suggests its heuristic value in addressing complex issues.
Political economists today largely reject the reductionism and economic determinism of
earlier Marxists, who modeled their theories after the structural-systemic approach of
Althusser and Balibar (1970). Corrections to the epistemological reiﬁcation inherent in
the works of these earlier Marxists were ﬁrst made by Gramsci (1971), Williams (1977),
and Cleaver (1979), who introduced more dialectically sensitive issues of hegemony,
ideology, and power.

Within the discipline of anthropology, postmodemists have turned to issues of
hegemony and ideology (Comaroff 1982; Iaclau and Mouffe 1985; Ortner 1984), and
of structure and agency (Adas 1986; Giddens 1979; Isaacman 1993; Scott 1985; Watts
1988). Most of these latter efforts, however, have done so in a post-Marxist fashion,
setting aside the structural features of Marxist theory, such as class relations within the
mode of production. Peasants, however, are situated in structures of power and
domination represented by the state and capitalist system, particularly within the
agribusiness of the sugar industry. All ideologically sensitive political economy
synthesizes concerns with human agency and the structural relations of production
inherent in the peripheral capitalist mode of production.

Yet, human agency is also present within changing political regimes of the state and
With the entry of new private owners of the sugar mills. The state utilizes ideology and
Creates alliances to assert its hegemony, while private capital puts into place policies to
ensure reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. I contend that through
dialectical interaction, peasants create spaces of power through the cultural production
0f ideas and their emergent strategies of resistance against these hegemonic forces.

Power emerges from peasant ideology, in material forms of discourse, and collective and

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13

Political economy has been appropriated from the works of Karl Marx and applied
in the disciplines of econonrics, political science, social science, and anthropology. The
diversity of its application suggests its heuristic value in addressing complex issues.
Political economists today largely reject the reductionism and economic determinism of
earlier Marxists, who modeled their theories after the structural-systemic approach of
Althusser and Balibar (1970). Corrections to the epistemological reiﬁcation inherent in
the works of these earlier Marxists were ﬁrst made by Gramsci (1971), Williams (1977),
and Cleaver (1979), who introduced more dialectically sensitive issues of hegemony,
ideology, and power.

Within the discipline of anthropology, postmodemists have turned to issues of

hegemony and ideology (Comaroff 1982; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Ortner 1984), and
of structure and agency (Adas 1986; Giddens 1979; Isaacman 1993; Scott 1985; Watts
1988). Most of these latter efforts, however, have done so in a post-Marxist fashion,
setting aside the structural features of Marxist theory, such as class relations within the
mode of production. Peasants, however, are situated in structures of power and
domination represented by the state and capitalist system, particularly within the
agribusiness of the sugar industry. All ideologically sensitive political economy
Symhesizes concerns with human agency and the structural relations of production
inherent in the peripheral capitalist mode of production.

Yet, human agency is also present within changing political regimes of the state and
with the entry of new private owners of the sugar mills. The state utilizes ideology and
Creates alliances to assert its hegemony, while private capital puts into place policies to
e“sure reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. I contend that through
dialectieal interaction, peasants create spaces of power through the cultural production
of ideas and their emergent strategies of resistance against these hegemonic forces.

POWCI' emerges from peasant ideology, in material forms of discourse, and collective and

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14
individual action. These, then, are vital elements in a contemporary political economy
for a postmodernist era.

The theoretical basis of this dissertation draws on Roseberry (1993, 1989, 1988),
who insists that political economy must recognize the dialectical interplay of concepts
generally framed in polar opposition: global-local; determination-freedom; structure-
agency. These oppositions, Roseberry warns, require that one avoid "making capitalism
too determinative. ..romanticizing the cultural frwdom of anthropological subjects. The
tension deﬁnes anthropological political economy, its preoccupations, projects, and
promise" (1988:174). My own application of a more efﬁcacious political economy will
equally privilege structure and agency.

A second theoretical issue in regard to a viable theoretical framework is the practical
relevance of the activities of human agents to processes of transformative change, such
as privatization of the sugar industry. In this dissertation, I argue that hegemonic forces
both have an impact on rural dwellers and are contested--ideologically and in practice-by
peasants. My position is that the culturally produced understandings, ideologies,

organized confrontations, and individual attempts to create spaces of power are of
theoretical import. They represent historically constituting contradictions inherent in
dialectical relations of production. In the vast arena between proletarianization and
revolution, the subjects of theoretical abstraction daily recognize and experience their role
in the larger processes of transformation.

Third, I take history as basic to political economy. Roseberry points out that a
Politieal economy approach attempts to understand "local communities as products of
Centuries of social, political, economic, and cultural processes. . . . " He explains, ". . .the
goal of historical investigation was not to subsume local histories within global processes
but to understand the formation of anthropological subjects. . .at the intersection of local

interactions and relationships and the larger processes of state and empire making"

 

 

15
(1988: 163). Chapter V will raise the issue of why sugar, as a commodity, is historically
central to the constitution of relation ships among the state, peasants, and private capital.
I argue that the state has been essential for ensuring the reproduction and transformation
of the sugar industry throughout its history. The sugar industry was created by a colonial
system, later decimated in the Mexican revolution through the resistance of peasant sugar
cane producers, and recreated again by the Mexican state. This dialectical tension among
a multitude of actors at multiple levels elucidates historical change in the sugar sector.
Understanding these transformative processes necessitates the conceptualization of

various, interrelated, levels of analysis.

Levels of Analysis

Reprivatization is closely associated with Mexico’s position in the world economy,
its relations with dominant capitalist economies, is expressed in class relations within
Mexico, and involves strategies of resistance to these processes of social change within
Production regions and peasant communities. A political economy approach facilitates
not only an understanding of relations between nations and the impact of capitalist
Penetration on local communities, but addresses class relations and, comprehensively
deﬁned, issues of political resistance and human agency as well.

It is the premise of this dissertation that the levels of analysis--global, regional,
local, and household--represent multiple, dialectieal interrelationships. For
cOl‘l’oboration, I draw on Mintz (1985), Roseberry (1989, 1988), Wolf (1982), and
Worslcy (1984). The use of ”dialectic” in this work must ﬁrst be deﬁned. Dialectic,
as deﬁned by Wessman (1981:4), is "a concept for dealing with the inherent
incompatibilities or contradictions within incompletely integrated social and economic
wholes”. Dialectics considers phenomena to be in a process of perpetual change; that

Process of change is the result of a struggle between contradictory forces (Rius

 

 

 

 

 

 

16
1976:145). Dialectical relations between opposed forces serve to 1) reproduce the
relations of production, or 2) result in transformation of the relations of production.

Mintz’s historical analysis of transformations associated with sugar production shows
how sugar formed the basis of the triangular trade and supported the colonial system,
enriching Europe as it impoverished plantation economies. Transformations were linked
to the emergence of new class relations and changes in the structure of power. This
dissertation likewise demonstrates inherent class contradictions between the Spanish

Crown and the conquistador class, and later, between the Mexican state and the new

bourgeoisie capitalists. Sugar cane-producing communities are intricately linked to the

world economy, mediated through a series of class relations. From Wolf’s perspective,

"...the common people were as much agents in the historical process as they were its
victims and silent witnesses" (1982:x). Furthermore, Worsley contends that the local
community and the state are not discrete spheres, but, rather, ”The manor and the village
were articulated to the lower levels of a State-wide political system, and it was the latter,
in turn, which guaranteed the social order of the village. It was a dialectical
relationship” (1984:85, emphasis added). Research on the sugar industry supports the
multifaceted, interdigitated relationship between peasant cane producers and the state, as
Well as their integration into the capitalist world system. Finally, Roseberry argues
t1'teoretically for the application of a unity of structure and agency to the understanding
of the structural context which stands in dialectical relationship to human action, thus
locating anthropological subjects ”at the intersection of local and global histories”
(1988: 179).

My approach is to treat the research communities in terms of the wider world of
Wl'tich they form an interacting part and at the same time eschew a reductionist attempt
‘0 explain local populations as a product of the expansion of the world capitalist system.
Examination of the reprivatized sugar industry is thus informed by a theoretical

 

17
framework that situates local-level processes within the broader structural framework in
which producers interact with, and form a part of, the state and capitalist systems. The
research incorporates four levels of analysis, acknowledging the interrelationship of
peasants with local, regional, and global histories and processes:
1) global - international and national policy changes affecting the transfer of

ownership of the sugar industry and restructuring of the organization of
production

2) regional - changes in sugar mill policies within the production zone which
affect peasant production and the relationship of the regional producers’ union
to the sugar mill

3) community - changes in peasants’ production strategies and forms of resistance

4) household - changes in household production and reproduction

Each of these levels is the subject of theoretical issues discussed in the remaining
sections of this chapter. In the following section, I discuss the internationalization of

production and its relationship to the sugar sector in Mexico.

The Global Transformation of Production

"Global transformation” , as used herein, refers to both international and national-
level changes in policy and praxis. Privatization in Mexico is but the most recent phase
of the internationalization of capital. N eoliberalism, which has guided economic
reS‘htructuring and the promotion of laissez-faire economic policy, is at the heart of the
Privatizations discussed in Chapter VI. I will draw on a theory of the internationalization
of capital formulated by Barkin (1987) and Teubal (1987) to indicate how global
t‘l‘ill'lsformations contribute to capital accumulation and affect the social organization of
Production within the Mexican sugar sector, yet critique those elements of the theory
which are today being discarded. The general orientation of this theory rests on the
1‘()tion that industrialization in the periphery is a result of the penetration of capital from
the center nations. The periphery, then, plays a role in the reproduction of capital in the

Center, in accord with changing conditions for capital accumulation (Blomstrom and

18

Hettne 1984). According to the theory, capitalist penetration into the agricultural sector
of Third World countries results in the vertical integration of food production systems
into the agroindustrial chain, as it transforms the relations of production in the
developing countries. This transformation involves not only food commodities, but the
sale of farm inputs, machinery, and capital goods for an increasingly modernizing Latin
American production system. Furthermore, this vertical integration was accompanied
by horizontal integration as agribusinesses attempted to diversify their activities through
processing, marketing, and distribution. Diversiﬁcation is in part due to nationalization
of foreign enterprises by governments which led many entrepreneurs to withdraw from
production per se and to concentrate their efforts in these latter activities (Burbach and
Flynn 1980; Teubal 1987).

I will illustrate, using concrete data, how the internationalization of capital in the
Mexican sugar sector is manifested in both vertical and horizontal integration of
production. Although some ﬁrms entered Mexico as early as the 19308 (Anderson
Clayton, Nestle, Quaker Oats, etc.), and the 1940s (Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola,
McCormick), in the 1960s, 93 new MNCs began operations, especially soft drink, feed,
beef, fruit, and vegetable ﬁrms. Nestle controls almost 100% of condensed and
powdered milk production in Mexico and is now a joint owner of several Mexican sugar
mills. By 1975, only 16 ﬁrms, including Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and General Foods,
controlled 86% of processed food production in Mexico. Of 130 ﬁrms with 300 plants
in the Mexican food industry, 80% are U.S. enterprises (Teubal 1987). Sugar-producing
rcgions have been subordinated to the needs of North American capital since the late 19th
century. Most sugar mills were industrialized after World War II, a number of which
Were subsequently nationalized. Consequently, multinational ﬁrms turned from
Production (vertical integration) to processing and marketing of sugar-based products

(horizontal integration) (Burbach and Flynn 1980).

 

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19
A form of "hidden transnationalization" characterized the period of state ownership,
when transnational interests withdrew from production of traditional products such as

sugar cane and concentrated their efforts on the supply of inputs and processing of the
ﬁnal product (Teubal 1987). Like other agroindustrial enterprises, the sugar industry
must rely on imported technologies. Appendix A lists equipment employed in the
production, harvesting, transport, and processing of sugar cane at Ingenio Queserl’a, the
sugar mill which is the subject of this investigation, to illustrate the dependency on
foreign capital technology.

With the reprivatization of the Mexican sugar industry, transnational corporations
are again becoming directly involved in the production end of the process. As detailed
in Chapter VI, companies such as PepsiCo and Coca-Cola have acquired a number of
Mexican sugar mills, controlling signiﬁcant proportions of sugar production in the
country, as well as the soft drink industry. The signiﬁcance of this internationalization
of production for peasant cane producers forms a central theme of this dissertation.

Whether sugar mills are purchased by national or transnational corporations, capital
is being reorganized according to an international model which involves increased vertical
integration of the productive process into the agroindustrial chain. This transformation
is manifested in imported technologies and mechanized equipment, adoption of labor
management systems which emphasize technical efﬁciency, and the withdrawal of direct
control of production by the state. Furthermore, these processes induce the breakdown
0f national boundaries, and deepen the international division of labor (Burbach and Flynn
1980).

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the theory of the
intﬁrnationalization of capital formulates the nature of structural relations between core
and periphery, but is subject to criticism on several fronts. The premise of this

dissertation contends that this theory is partial and must be seen as a corollary to

2O
complementary theories that explain the role of the state, political factors, class relations,
and peasant resistance to the process of capitalist penetration. It is imperative to take
into account the state and its intervention through an array of ofﬁcial policies.

The national economy not only assimilates global patterns that are transforming
production, but the state utilizes strategies to reshape the emerging productive structures,
and formulates policies in response to resultant social unrest. As Barkin points out,
"Agricultural development proceeds through a complex interaction of market pressures
and government policy” (1987:273). The principle of laissez-faire confronts political
realities that shape relations of production. For example, agribusinesses have
materialized in those areas where the labor force is concentrated. Numerous examples
indicate the presence of military intervention against unionized labor movements: the
1954 military coup in Guatemala to stamp out unrest among banana workers, a 1964
coup in the sugar-producing regions of Brazil as landowners sought to destroy peasant
organizations, and the Gulf and Western complicity in destroying the sugar workers’
union in the Dominican Republic in 1966 (Burbach and Flynn 1980).

In Mexico, the government in 1943 issued a decree requiring peasants to produce
SUgar cane for capitalist agribusiness complexes; this decree has met with repetitive
resistance on the part of producers who have preferred subsistence crops, diversiﬁcation,
or other alternative production strategies (Ronfeldt 1973). As will be seen in Chapter
1X, peasant cane producers in Mexico today are selecting alternative production strategies
as a form of resistance to privatization and capitalist penetration into sugar cane
PTOduction. A central research problem will be to determine how effectively private
Capital ensures reproduction of the cultivation of sugar cane under reprivatization and
Whether peasant producers cooperate through continued provision of the raw material,
or alternatively, choose to reject cane production and diversify their production

Strategies. 1 will now turn to the relationship between peasants and the state.

 

21
The Peripheral State and Peasants

The state is a political institution distinguished from civil society by its legitimate
control over the institutions of coercive power. Although the state becomes increasingly
alienated from society, it is still an organic part of that society. Marxist theory has
tended to treat the state as epiphenomenon to the economic base of the mode of
production and has been particularly weak with regard to the state in non-capitalist and
peripheral societies (Thomas 1984). The state, as it is treated herein, will be considered
a "peripheral state" in that it exhibits characteristics which are unique to a peripheral
capitalist economy.

Because the state is a primary actor in peripheral economies, enforced contraction
of the role of the state in the context of economic crisis and structural adjustment has
created major realignments among social classes. The nature of these relationships raises
important theoretical questions: Is ”modemization" of the economy compatible with an
undemocratic political system? Does the state enjoy autonomy vis-a-vis the capitalist and
laboring classes? As pcasants’ economic conditions decline with loss of distributive
power on the part of the state and its retraction from the sugar industry, will the state
have to resort to increasingly repressive measures of political control? Is the state
apparatus sufﬁcient to assert hegemony over the underprivileged classes, or can peasants
create spaces of power through which they challenge the system? I will turn ﬁrst to
conceptualization of the state.

Peripheral states are often distinguished by dependent capitalist development,
Coercive state policies, and distinct class alliances. Most explanations for the unique
development of peripheral social formations refer to a cluster of historically-derived

traits: colonial heritage, a weak bourgeoisie, insufﬁcient local capital and technology,

Weak markets, dependence on foreign capital, and the failure of import substitution
(Canak 1984; Thomas 1984).

 

22

According to Marxist interpretations, the state functions to reproduce the mode of
production of the dominant class and to contain class conﬂict; hence, the state becomes
an autonomous force (Canak 1984; Hamilton 1982). Researchers who emphasize the
authoritarian nature of the state explain that it is a ruling class response to popular
mobilization. They indicate that industrial growth could be achieved only through
exclusion and repression of peasants and the working class. According to this view, in
providing conditions for the preservation of capitalism, the state becomes the principal
agent in the exploitation of peasants, maintaining its dominance over them through
creation of ejidos, the CNC, PRI, and the production of hegemonic ideologies which
shape the relations of production (Warman 1980a).2 These analyses tend to
conceptualize a hegemonic, autonomous state bourgeoisie, opposed to national and
international capital, as well as to the lower classes (Canak 1984), or to depict class
coalitions among the economic and political elite and international capital (Hamilton
1982; O’Donnell 1973; Thomas 1984).

The characterization of corporate, bureaucratic-authoritarian states in Latin America
is currently being challenged (Foweraker and Craig 1990). While some scholars describe
the development of the authoritarian, corporate state in Mexico (Reyna and Weinert
1977; Thomas 1984), others explain that Mexico ”did not take the bureaucratic-
authoritarian turn” (Munck 1990:29). Nevertheless, Mexico represents a case within a
Class of peripheral states that has heretofore maintained remarkable stability by
distribution of material resources, manipulation of ideological mechanisms, and control
0f political organizations to create support for the system (O’Malley 1986; Salinas 1984,
1982, 1980). It was the building of a corporatist state structure which demobilized

\

2Ejidos are lands redistributed to peasants as part of the agrarian reform. The CN C (Confederacion
Nadional Campesina) is the ofﬁcial peasant organization and PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) is
iilc dominant political party in Mexico.

23
peasants and the working class and contributed to Mexico’s unique development. It is
widely understood that the alliance of the state with the peasant movement has been an
essential ingredient to Mexico’s political stability (Gordillo 1988).
Based on the premise that a dialectical relationship between the state, private capital,
and peasants is the key to understanding the political framework, I follow Evans (1982),
Hamilton (1984; 1982), Purcell (1981), and Thomas (1984), who stress that the state is
an arena for class conﬂict, a fact which places limits on the autonomy of the so-called
”authoritarian state”. The state must mediate its distributive powers between peasant and
capitalist interests, both of which continue to make demands on state resources in the
context of destatization of the economy. This process has involved a tenuous and shifting
alliance between the state and peasants over time; when challenged, the state has had to
bend to peasant interests. Purcell provides but one example of how peasant unrest moved
the state to confront private capital, in support of the peasant sector, despite Mexico’s
“alliance for proﬁts" between the state and private sector. In her analysis of the
government takeover of private sugar mills in the 1970s she concluded, ". . . political
stability in Mexico has been maintained because of a willingness and ability on the part
Of political leaders to give priority to political over economic considerations in times of
perceived crisis” (1981:211). Power struggles exist in Mexico between the state and a
Variety of power blocks--the economic and political elite, urban and rural elite, capital
and regional elite, and so forth. Thus, the state must be conceptualized so as to
recognize the struggles of peasants and workers. The social and economic disruptions
0f capitalist penetration are softened through policies such as state subsidies to basic
800ds, rural credit banks, or a myriad of rural development projects.
Furthermore, the nature of the state and class conﬂict is molded by speciﬁc,
hirtorical situations, as will be made clear in Chapter V. At different historical

junctures, the state has been forced to weaken or strengthen its alliance with any one

24

group. During the neoliberal period of the Porﬁrio Diaz dictatorship, the state supported
private capital at the expense of peasants. A major revolutionary force arose among the
peasantry, against the contradictions of capitalist development in the sugar-producing
region of Morelos, and culminated in the overthrow of the Diaz regime. It was out of
this revolution that the modern Mexican state evolved (Esteva 1983; Warman 1980b).
A state-peasant alliance materialized during the 19308 as the agrarian reform resulted in
the distribution of 27,750,000 hectares of former hacienda lands to peasants, eliminating
the hegemony of the former landowners (Chevalier 1967). Rural unrest thus prompted
a reorientation of state support to peasant production in order to counteract the
contradictions of capitalist production (Austin and Esteva 1987; de Janvry 1981; Esteva
1983; Gollas and Garcia 1976; Goodman et al. 1985). Historically, the policies of the
Echevern’a and L6pez Portillo regimes focused on rural development and the growth of
parastatal industries, directly threatening the state alliance with the rural bourgeoisie and
transnational capital. The state cannot exclude peasants, for it would lose its base of
support comprised of 30 million Mexican peasants (one-half of the population of Mexico)
(Esteva 1983; Goodman et al. 1985). Since the advent of the economic crisis in 1982,
and the loss of the state’s distributive capacity, however, the state-peasant alliance has
essentially been broken. Without material rewards, the state’s primary mechanism of
control is through peasant union organizations.

All ofﬁcial peasant unions in Mexico are incorporated into the political structure of
PRI. The government and PR1 in Mexico are synonymous. Cirdenas created the CN C
in 1938 to consolidate the state-peasant alliance by vertically incorporating the CNC into
the dominant political party. This move ensured the loyalty of peasants to the state and
Precluded autonomous movements outside of state control (Granados 1988; Hamilton
1984, 1882; Hodges and Gandy 1983; Landsberger 1973; Montes de Oca 1977; Rounds
1977). The capacity for peasants to mobilize and realize their demands is limited by the

25
fragmentation of peasant interests, the inefﬁcacy of the CNC as a medium to press
demands, and the increasing weakness of the state-peasant alliance in recent years (Hardy
1984). The increasing distance between the CN C leadership and the base membership
became especially pronounced in the 19703, creating a marked contradiction between the
organization, designed to administrate through the leadership structure, and the political
requirements of the state to contain peasant demands (Gordillo 1988; Granados 1988).
The national sugar cane producers’ union in Mexico, UNPCARM, as a political unit
within the CNC, is analyzed in Chapter VII.

In sum, privatization of the Mexican sugar sector marks one historical instance,
wherein the state has accorded greater amplitude to private capital and withdrawn
subsidies to peasant producers. This investigation recognizes, however, that the state has
always, even during periods of private control of the sugar industry, played a signiﬁcant
role and will continue to do so under conditions of privatization. A central research
problem, given the state’s loss of redistributive power, will be the mechanisms utilized
to intensify its political control of cane producers’ unions. A related issue of interest to
this research is the nature of collective response on the part of peasant organizations.
Will peasants continue to accept subjugation to state control, or will they opt for
afﬁliation with independent organizations? This question brings us to the dialectical

relations expressed at the regional level.

Dialectical Relationships at the Regional Level
Concern with the shifting balance of political power as peasants reconstitute their
relationship under state withdrawal and capitalist penetration of the sugar industry
requires a regional focus. It is at the regional level that peasants are organized into
unions for pressing their demands and defending their interests. Within the sugar sector,

the supply zone of the sugar mill forms the regional locus within which peasants of

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26
numerous communities are organized into the cane producers’ union. According to Fox
(1989), regional organizations serve as a communication system linking rural
communities and as a vehicle to articulate peasant interests and community level
initiatives, and thus have the potential to offset the consolidation of state or capitalist
power by concentrating collective action at the regional level. The cane producers’ union
is studied in detail in Chapter VII.

An abundant body of research has focused on the effects of state or capitalist
penetration on peasants (Barkin 1987; Corbett and Whiteford 1983; Esteva 1983;
Gordillo 1988; Grindle 1988; Mintz 1985; Rello 1986; Smith 1984; Taussig 1980;
Warman 1980a; Wolf 1982; Worsley 1984). Anthropologists have transcended the more
orthodox Marxist perspectives that deny peasants the capacity to resist state and/ or
capitalist encroachment, predict their inevitable disappearance in a unilinear process of
proletarianization, view peasants as passive victims of surplus extraction, or consider
them inserted into a transitory mode of production (see, for example, Bartra 1974; de
Janvry 1981; Teubal 1987; and Worsley 1984 for these more orthodox approaches).3

How then, may peasants best be conceptualized within the speciﬁc case of the sugar
sector? Peasant cane producers have alternately been perceived as a rural proletariat,
semiproletariat, or even as a petty bourgeoisie; cane producers are often viewed as mere
Wage laborers on their own land or as renters who rent their land to the capitalist

industry. I argue that they hold contradictory class locations within the peripheral

¥

1'Orthodox interpretations generally follow 1) Lenin (1974), who noted the socioeconomic differentiation
0f Peasants into capitalist entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and wage laborers, on the other, with particular
weight given to the process of proletarianization (see, for example, de Janvry 1981; Teubal 1987; Worsley
1984) or 2) the ”populist“ interpretations, grounded in the work of Chayanov (1966), who argued that
Peasants operate on a distinctive economic logic (see, for example, Esteva 1983; Warman 1980a). The
f(’l'rner view is clear in Worsley’s proclamation: “Their ﬁnal elimination will obviously take a very long
ﬁlm. But the trend is unmistakable“ (1984:166); "...today, the peasantry is ﬁnally being separated from
“10 means of production.... The scale of this migration is such, today, that it is changing, irreversibly.
The future is an urban future“ (1984:172-173). While de Janvry’s concept of ﬁmctional dualism situates
Peasants within the capitalist mode of production, they are seen as a source of cheap food and cheap labor;
this analysis does not take peasants’ strategies of resistance into consideration.

27

capitalist mode of production (this concept is contributed by Resnick and Wolff 1987),
in that they retain control of the means of production (land), yet produce for a capitalist
industry which owns the factory and machinery essential to capital accumulation and
reproduction of the system.‘ I will discuss this notion ﬁrst in terms of the economic
relations of production and secondly, deﬁne how they will be treated as active political
agents within a hegemonic capitalist system supported by the state apparatus.

WW. Peasant cane producers will be considered for
their complex relationships to subsistence and capitalist production, without reiﬁcation
of the mode of production concept; as stated by Worsley, "These two types, in reality,
are often interwoven in complex ways and there is much oscillation, over time, from one
pole toward the other" (1984:69). Within the research region, peasants engage in
multiplex forms of production, including production for use, production of commodities
for the capitalist market, and wage labor; they may at the same time work for wages and
employ wage laborers. Peasants may produce commodities part of the year, migrate to
the US. to work as wage laborers another part of the year, and return to their ﬁelds in
Mexico. Based on arguments of Alavi (1987), Roseberry (1978), Wasserstrom (1983),
and Wolf (1982), peasant production is theoretically incorporated within the dominant
mode of production. Alavi states: " . . .the contradiction between capital and the
exploited. . .peasantry is now internal to the capitalist mode of production of which the
Mt economy is now a part” (1987: 190). I take the mode of production to include
the forces of production (tools, technology, organization of production) and relations of
Preduction (social relations of appropriation among classes based on their relation to the
Mud and the means of production)--as well as the role of the sociopolitical and

ideological dimensions. Since mode of production is a theoretical tool which lacks

x

' ‘This argument, then, leaves behind older debates stimulated by Althusser and Balibar (1970) over the
mieulation of modes of production" (see, for example, Bartra 1974, O’Laughlin 1975).

28
historical speciﬁcity, I deﬁne the concrete social formation as the peripheral capitalist
social formation of Mexico.

In this dissertation, I follow Roseberry (1978) in my analysis of the mechanisms of
economic exploitation of peasants by the capitalist class. I will show in Chapter VIII that
peasants are exploited by the sugar mill through the extension of credit. Production
entails considerable capital investment to employ labor power and ensure reproduction,
for which the mill extends credit at usurious interest rates; the crop is thus under lien of
the mill and alienated from the producer as a product of the producers’ labor power,
therefore approximating industrial capital. Determination of the price paid for the
product, deductions for production expenses, interest charges, and net proﬁt or loss are
all manifested in the same liquidation process’ upon termination of the harvest. Hence,
peasants become exploited by capital; they are not simply a disguised proletariat, in that
they maintain control over the means of production. I contend that the change from state
to private ownership of the sugar mill has restructured the relations of production in
important ways.

Politigal' dimgsigns of prgﬂugtign. An alternative interpretation has emerged in
anthropology which holds that peasants, through the cultural production of knowledge
and diverse forms of resistance, challenge their exploitation by the state and the capitalist
systems. These challenges take the form of individual (Adas 1986; Comaroff and
Comaroff 1987; de Certeau 1984; Isaacman et al. 1980; Kanogo 1987; Scott 1990, 1985;
Stanford 1993; Taussig 1980; Throup 1987; Watts 1988) and collective (Bartra 1985;
Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Foweraker and Craig 1990; Gordillo 1988; Hardy 1984;
Rubio 1987; Warman 1980b) strategies of resistance used by peasants to defend their

interests and influence policy.

 

’Upon termination of the cane harvest, each producer receives a liquidation document which itemizes
the value of the cane, all costs and interest charges, and net earnings or debt owed.

 

 

29

Much attention is given in this work to the forms of resistance-both collective and
individualuutilized by peasants in the context of reprivatization of the sugar industry.
Earlier work on ”everyday forms of peasant resistance" offered an important contribution
to the conceptualization of peasants as active agents. However, as Roseberry (1989)
points out, the "moral economy” literature tended to romanticize peasant society and
dismiss the continuing forces for disorder and exploitation. Moreover, peasant
communities were treated as homogenous, traditional entities. These inadequacies are
rectiﬁed in this research through documentation of peasants’ historical insertion into the
structures of power and domination since the initiation of the sugar industry in the
colonial past and the contemporary tensions and contradictory orientations to changes in
the sugar sector.

Although this analysis remains critical of the moral economy dimensions of the
literature on peasant resistance, it will draw on those aspects that place strategies of
resistance at the center of analysis. As such, it is assumed that acts that may appear to
be merely risk avoidance constitute acts of political resistance: "...the aggregation of
thousands...of such ’petty’ acts of resistance have dramatic economic and political
effects" (Scott 1990:192). The intransigence of Columbian cane workers who burned
cane ﬁelds, stole crops, refused to work, and tore down fences, as described by Taussig
(1980), was a threat to the rural oligarchy. Researchers are today identifying such acts
as the strategies of resistance involved in class conﬂict. These issues are particularly
relevant with privatization of the sugar sector. My position is also supported by Stanford
(1993), who examined peasant acts of resistance, which bear striking resemblance to
those of cane producers in Colima: selling agricultural inputs or diverting them to other
crops, appropriating credit provided by the agribusiness, and production techniques that
were not in line with agribusiness policy. As in Stanford’s research, the production

strategies used by caﬂeros (cane producers) in Colima have reduced acreage and yields.

 

30
Will these strategies of resistance, concurrent with privatization of the ejido, encourage
the sugar mill to take over the lands of indebted caﬁeros? With the entrenchment of
neoliberalism and transnationalization of the economy, issues of how social actors assert
their demands for spaces of power within the system and the responses of actors who
hold hegemonic power become increasingly important.

Are these acts of resistance economic or political? intentional or non-intentional?
The new social movement literature increasingly understands social action in terms of the
complex interaction between structure and agency, taking into consideration the multi-
dimensional nature of economic, political, and cultural forces. Eurocentric theories have
tended to emphasize rational decision-making, strategy, and organizational response,
whereas postmodernist thinking emphasizes the semiotic dimensions involved in the
cultural constitution of collective identities (Escobar and Alvarez 1992). The position
taken by this researcher, however, coincides with that of Stam:

The stolid empiricism of mainstream Anglo-American social science led to a

prime concern with strategy. High-ﬂying poststructuralism on the Continent,

by contrast, lent itself to a concentration on identity. However, there is no

intrinsic reason for this academic division of labor to exist (1992:93).

I will follow Escobar, who elucidates the polyvalent nature of resistance:
". . .contemporary social movements in Latin America have a multiple character, as
economic, social, political, and cultural struggles. The boundaries and dependencies
among these domains are blurred, in some cases indistinguishable" (1992:82).

In accordance with the theoretical orientation presented herein, it is argued that
determination of the nature of resistance results in an artiﬁcial reiﬁcation. Acts of
resistance may be simultaneously economic and political, thus reductionism to these
simplistic categories (i.e. , base and superstructure) is herein rejected. As Scott has
argued, ”...material and symbolic resistance are part of the same set of mutually

sustaining practices” (1990:184). Moreover, the intent of resistance is subject to

v . ~'
sq“.

‘ ‘x

'3‘

31

interpretation. Again, Scott offers guidance on the issue of intent: "This
position. ..fundamentally misconstrues the very basis of the economic and political
struggle conducted daily by subordinate classes.... It is based on...Leninist and
bourgeois assumptions of what constitutes political action” (1985:292). I will assume,
after Isaacman, that for cane producers in Colima, intention is polyvalent: "Plundering
may have been a way of resisting surplus extraction, of feeding an undernourished
family, and of accumulating a small amount of capital" (1993:237); "...to ignore the
weapons of the weak is to ignore the peasants’ principal arsenal” (1993:238).

Dialectic relations are in part attributable to structural factors, yet responsive to
cultural and ideological, as well as economic, forces which make up the strategies
utilized by peasants as they negotiate their relationship with the state or with private
capital. A dialectical approach does not presuppose that the ideal is antithetical to the
material world, nor consider culture as epiphenomenal. This notion agrees with
Roseberry, who contends that ideas form a part of the material conditions of life; those
ideas are a product of history and in turn, serve as material forces as people act on their
ideas: ”...culture is constantly being shaped, produced, reproduced, and transformed by
activity..." (1989:43). I use a dialectic approach, following Mintz, to emphasize
process: ”Culture must be understood not simply as a product but also as production,
not simply as socially constituted but also as socially constituting” (Mintz 1985: 14).

The intent of this dissertation is to present peasant discourse and peasant action as
mutually shaping forces. I do not consider discourse as a substitute for resistance. The
culturally shared ideas and acts of resistance are mutually reinforcing. Borrowing from
Scott (1985), I argue that ideological dissent is manifested in strategies aimed at altering
the existing power relations. The import given to peasant discourse is supported by
Isaacman: ". ..their understanding of what they saw and understood is as important to

consider as the social structures that limited their choices and options” (1993:223).

32

Chapters VII through IX will incorporate much of the discourse collected during
ﬁeldwork, elucidating peasants’ cultural understandings of their position vis-a-vis the
state, the sugar mill, and the process of privatization and illustrate how these relate to
their strategies as active agents in constituting social change. The methodological
problem of interpretation poses an important challenge to analysis of peasant discourse.
However, as Isaacman (1993) points out, there is no authentic peasant voice, but taken
together, their testimonies provide a means to reconstruct diverse experiences of the
peasantry.

These diverse experiences call into question the application of "peasant" to such a
differentiated group of rural dwellers. The use of this term is justiﬁed by Roseberry:

I retain the word peasant as a matter-of-fact way of talking about rural

villagers, agriculturalists, tenants, and smallholders, making no claims and

drawing no inferences about their historical trajectories, moral and ethical

dilemmas, and political capacities and incapacities (Roseberry 1993:361).

Furthermore, according to Mintz:

Peasantries. . .where the worker engages in such labor. . .because he owns access

to land is dependent upon it, or because he has too little land of his

own. ...Those involved in such relationships may all be justiﬁably deﬁned as

peasants...there are many peasant societies where some peasants are more

’peasant-like’ than others (emphasis added) (Mintz 1974:93).

”Peasant”, as used in this dissertation, is but a gloss for a variety of rural producers
who are differentially inserted into the relations of production. This differentiation is
treated analytically by specifying the forms of production in the research communities,

to which I now turn.

Forms of Production Within the Peasant Community
One of the most exacting problems for peasant-focused research involves the
applieation of a theoretically appropriate concept of peasants; it is also an issue which

has generated considerable dissention among anthropologists. Most deﬁnitions of

33
peasants are similar to that of Shanin, who deﬁnes them as:

. . .small agricultural producers, who, with the help of simple equipment and the

labour of their families, produce mostly for their own consumption, direct or

indirect, and for the fulﬁllment of obligations to holders of political and
economic power (1987z3).

Shanin (1987) identiﬁes three difﬁculties with the validity of a unitary concept of
peasants: 1) peasants lack homogeneity as a group and represent diverse productive
strategies; 2) peasants must not be classiﬁed as a static type, but rather, considered as
a process; and 3) peasants form part of the larger society. Given these conceptual
difﬁculties, the use of "peasant" in this work lacks theoretical precision and is used only
in a generic sense. How, then, may we think about peasants without reducing them to
a homogenous entity? It will be argued below that conceptualization of peasants requires
the analytic speciﬁcation of forms of production within the dominant mode of production
of the social formation and accords attention to production as a dynamic process. The
forms of production introduced in analysis of this dissertation consider the different
positions, ideologies, and strategies of a differentiated peasantry.

Two important extremes characterize the treatment of peasants. On the one hand,
capitalist economic activity and the varied economic activities of peasants are all
incorporated into a single capitalist mode of production. Deere and de Janvry, for
example, hold that ”Under capitalism, peasants are a transitory and differentiating class
in a process of decomposition and absorption by the essential classes--proletariat and
bourgeoisie-of the mode of production" (1979:610). I hold that the peasantry is
differentially incorporated into the capitalist mode of production through a variety of
forms of production which contributes to a diverse array of relations of production
between peasants and capital. Among cane producers alone, we encounter producers
who own their own land, producers with agrarian reform land, those who work their

land, those who rent their cane ﬁelds to others, some who also work as renters or

 

34
sharecroppers, and others who are at the same time wage laborers. Some caﬁeros
combine cane production with raising cattle, crops for family consumption, crops for sale
on the market, or a combination of the above.

Development of an analytically rigorous framework for examining peasantries must
begin with the rejection of erroneous notions such as " peasant mode of production”
which treat ”the peasantry" as a homogenous entity. Building on the work of Gledhill
(1985), Rello (1976), and Friedmann (1980: 158), who suggested that ”’Peasant’ must be
replaced by a comprehensive and mutually exclusive set of rigorously deﬁned concepts
specifying forms of production" and the relation of the unit of production to the social
formation, this research analytically differentiates peasants within the research
community, according to access to land and forms of tenure, specifying the distinct
positions of ejidatarios, who hold usufruct rights; W, who may use their
land as collateral; renters and W, who gain access to land by payment of cash
or crops and have been denied access to credit and state assistance; and agricultural wage
Mrs, a fully proletariat class, within the peripheral capitalist economy. Each of the
forms of production is differentially affected by recent changes in the sugar sector. Cane
producers are almost always ejidatarios, who maintain direct relations with the mill;
sharecroppers and renters do not produce cane, but are affected by changing patterns of
land use, while wage laborers experience reorganization of harvest labor and diminishing
availability of labor opportunities. These dynamics are explored in Chapter IX.

This investigation also takes into account that peasants often ﬁll several of these
class positions simultaneously (e. g. , ejidatario, sharecropper, wage laborer) and
periodically shift among the different forms of production. Conceptualization of the form
of production and relations within the dominant mode of production thus must not be
reiﬁed as static ”types”, but rather, viewed as dynamic processes. These analytical tools

are then amenable for the study of the peasant household.

 

 

35
Production and Reproduction of the Peasant Household

Given several decades of research which portrayed the autarky of peasant
production, in 1979, Deere and de Janvry pointed out the absence of an adequate
conceptual framework for analysis of peasant households. The contribution of Deere and
de Janvry to this issue was particularly critical to a theoretical approach oriented toward
the understanding of how peasants are inserted into the larger economy.

This research applies key variables identiﬁed by Deere and de Janvry (1979) to
analysis of the peasant household. These variables are informed by three levels of
analysis: 1) the organization of the peasant household; 2) mechanisms of surplus
extraction involved in the relations of production; and 3) the changing class position of
peasants within the social formation.

The peasant household is both a unit of production and reproduction. It produces
commodities for use value and for the market in order to sustain the reproduction of the
household labor force and of the means of production. The organization of the peasant
household is accounted for in terms of four processes: 1) production -- ownership of the
means of production (i. g. , land); 2) circulation -- income from commodity sales and net
income; 3) wage labor; and 4) reproduction of the unit of consumption (Deere and de
Janvry 1979). Chapter IX will analyze these processes through identiﬁcation of:
production strategies (choice of crops, technologies), proportion of production dedicated
to use value or sale, degree of involvement in wage labor, expenditure of net income,
and accumulation of net income (Deere and de Janvry 1979).

The degree to which labor power is directed toward the production of use value,
market commodities, sold as wage labor, or the need for out-migration forms a broad
array of productive strategies within peasant communities. Whether the household must
rely on the sale of its labor power or remittances as it loses access to the means of

production or is capable of capital accumulation is largely determined by the mechanisms

36
of surplus extraction by non-producers (i.g. , via markets, credit institutions, the sugar
mill), manifested in the relations of production. As reprivatization of the sugar industry
proceeds, a key research problem is to determine to what degree privatization increases
producer costs, if credit becomes more unevenly distributed, and what economic
strategies or changes in cropping patterns peasants use to respond to these changes.
Once these are identiﬁed, it is the scale of reproduction that becomes the basis for ‘
analysis of household reproduction and transformation (Deere and de Janvry 1979).
Reproduction (renewal of the means of production and of labor power within the

production unit) and transformation (reorganization of the production process through

 

commoditization or proletarianization), then, become the basic concepts for analysis
(Friedmann 1980). It is through analysis of surplus extraction that the changing class
position of peasants becomes most clearly revealed. Finally, in addition to these
economic variables and in congruence with the general thesis of this research, it is
argued that the relations of production are conditioned by political and ideological
mechanisms, as well as economic processes.

This chapter conveyed the importance of addressing the research problem at four
levels of analysis. At the global level, both international and national policy changes
support the neoliberal ideology that is the basis for privatization. It was argued that
peripheral capitalism is characterized by strong state-led development which effects a
unique, yet dynamic, relationship between peasants and the state. The production zone
of the sugar mill forms a distinct region for the organization of production and the
political mobilization of cane producers. State withdrawal and capitalist penetration of
the sugar industry have restructured relations of production, which are taken to be
dialectic in nature. An argument was made for the cultural production of shared ideology
and strategic forms of resistance utilized by peasants in the context of privatization.

Within peasant communities, producers are differentiated into various forms of

-—— ‘#

 

37
production. This peasantry is taken as process. Finally, the chapter provided a
conceptual framework for analyzing changes within the peasant household. This
theoretical and conceptual framework lays the groundwork for the methodologies and

procedures for carrying out the investigation.

 

 

 

III. METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES

Selection of the Research Site

During a preinvestigation from July to August, 1989, the researcher interviewed and
collected data from ofﬁcials of Azr’rcar, S.A. in Mexico City, and investigated the
possibility of conducting ﬁeldwork in the production zone of Ingenio San Sebastian, near
Los Reyes, Michoacan. It was at this time that the privatization of Mexican sugar mills
was in its initial stage of implementation. This mill was recommended for study due to
its high productivity and strong union organization; its sale to Coca-Cola had only
recently been announced (Sierra 1989). Ofﬁcials at the San Sebastian mill were
interviewed and potential research communities were visited. As the ﬁeld season
approached, however, the mills in the region had not yet been privatized. It was thus
decided to return to the previously studied region of Ingenio Queseria, Colima, where
the mill had been transferred to Grupo Beta San Miguel on February 9, 1989.

This decision provided several advantages. The mill was about to enter its third
harvest as a privatized entity, allowing analysis of the initial impact of privatization from
onset to the present date. Signiﬁcant changes had occurred over the past several years,
including a decline in the number of hectares of cane in the zone, from 10,569 in 1985-
86 to 8,020 by 1990-91, with a corresponding loss of producers, from 1,479 to 1,373,
respectively. This fact raised an important question as to how these changes might be
related to the privatization process. The region provided a unique opportunity to analyze
major changes in the making, in an area where little previous research has been

conducted on the mill or its supply zone.

38

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In addition to its position as the primary agroindustrial complex of the region, the
area was selected in order to augment the current research project with data previously
collected during ﬁeldwork in 1984. This work, the basis of a masters thesis on political
efﬁcacy of agricultural production, allows the use of comparative data from ﬁve years
prior to privatization, with data collected during the 1990-91 sugar cane harvest. Not
only did this selection make an important contribution to longitudinal analysis, but it
allowed the researcher to work within an area where rapport had already been established
and communication maintained over the years since the previous ﬁeldwork.

Whereas the 1984 ﬁeldwork focused on the community of E1 Ocotillo (with a 1984
population of 584), the 1990 research was expanded to include the adjacent village of
Chiapa, the two communities having a total p0pulation of 1328. These two communities
may be considered representative of others in the production zone of Ingenio Queserfa,
although an important body of data was collected on the entire zone as well. Most
producers in these communities diversify their production strategies, including the raising
of cattle, sugar cane, maize, camote, jr’cama, and beans; few are monocrop cane
producers. In addition to ejidatarios (recipients of agrarian reform land), a signiﬁcant
number of renters, sharecroppers, and agricultural wage laborers reside in the
communities. The villages, then, provide ample opportunity to compare peasants who
differ in terms of land tenure, production strategies, and access to land, labor, and
capital. The research design utilizes an integrated set of qualitative and quantitative
methodological tools and procedures to examine the impact of reprivatization of the sugar

industry.

The Sampling Frame
The investigation began with a census of the two research villages using a short

interview form to solicit basic demographic information such as age, sex, educational

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40
level, and occupation of each household member. The 1990 p0pulation for Ocotillo was
511, distributed among 126 households; the population of Chiapa was determined to be
817, with 185 households. Based on a sampling frame of 163 household heads actively
engaged in agriculture, derived from the census data, a simple random sample of 100
household heads was selected for structured interviews (census data elicited and interview
questions are included in Appendix B). Each household head was assigned a number and

the sample was selected using a random number table.

Research Procedures

Participant observation, which is basic to anthropological ﬁeldwork, aided in the
development of interpersonal relations between the researcher and community members
and facilitated a more in-depth understanding of peasant responses to changes effected
by privatization. The researcher observed cultivation practices, aided in the cultivation
and harvesting of various crops, including maize, camote, jicama, and tried an
inexperienced hand at harvesting sugar cane and milking cows. Participation in these
activities also allowed the researcher to ask pertinent and related questions on the
activity, thus broadening knowledge of problems encountered by peasant producers. On
several occasions, impromptu and informal interviews were carried out with cutters
harvesting the cane in nearby ﬁelds. On one occasion, a ﬁeld inspector for the mill
allowed the researcher to accompany him on his daily rounds in the countryside, an
experience that contributed yet another perspective on ﬁeld problems.

A series of eight informal ”participant juntas" were organized to involve any
interested persons in the research communities to gather and discuss problems of
agricultural production, in general, and of cane production, in particular. These proved

invaluable, as the discussions were interactive among those who attended and largely

7.57.}

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41
guided by the participants themselves. Much insight came to light as the producers
responded to each other and revealed diverse points of view. Demonstrations by peasant
producers in the capital city were observed as well, thus clarifying some of the issues to
which producers have received no redress.

All monthly ejido meetings for both villages, where important agricultural issues are
regularly discussed, were attended and observed. These meetings also provide a basis
for observing the interaction of ejidatarios and government promoters. In addition, the
researcher attended all meetings of the cane producers’ union (Union Nacional de
Productores de Cafia de Azricar, UNPCA) in Queseria to observe leadership structure,
membership participation, decision-making processes, the role of outside power
structures, and the political strategies and forms of resistance to the changing
organization of production. This information allowed conclusions to be formulated on
how shifts in power affect the nature of participation in union activities.

The researcher participated in various community activities such as ﬁrst
communions, quinceaﬁos festivities, weddings, ﬁestas, village patron saint celebrations,
and a number of seasonal rituals, all of which rendered a more in-depth understanding
of village life.

Participant observation deepens rapport with community members, making possible
the development of a network of key informants with whom information may be obtained
on a frequent and informal basis. Key informants were especially sought among those
who were representative of different positions in terms of land tenure, economic status,
and leadership positions. A few of these include, among others, a woman who is a
member of the committee of the cane producers’ union, a past mayordomo of the
hacienda in Chiapa, a man with an inadequate amount of land to feed his family and who
participated in a land invasion several years ago, a 100 year old former hacienda

employee, and the leader of a peasant resistance movement who lives in a nearby

"h

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42
community. Several cane producers in other villages in the area were informally
interviewed to ensure that opinions and information offered were generalized throughout
the zone. Frequent interaction and the cultivation of a trust relationship between the
researcher and key informants permitted cross-veriﬁcation of data collected from other
sources and provided relevant information used to structure the interview schedules.
W

Once the census was collected and rapport developed with community members
through participant observation, a series of three structured interviews was conducted
with each of the sample members. A research assistant, who was a resident of Ocotillo
and had studied at the University of Colima, assisted with both the census and the
interview schedules. The ﬁrst interview elicited non-threatening information, with more
sensitive questions included in later interview schedules.

The structured interviews, using a combination of closed and open-ended questions,
were designed to gather data on four areas of concern:

1) To gather information on changing access to production resources, the role of
agrarian agencies in providing these resources, and how access might inﬂuence
production strategies, speciﬁc questions aimed at changes in producers’ access to credit
and agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, machinery) over the
past ﬁve years. Informants were asked to explain changes personally experienced in
access to the above, as well as to rank government agrarian agencies for their ability to
aid peasant producers. These data, along with information from institutional sources
(Ingenio Queseria, BANRURAL, SARH, CONASUPO, FERTIMEX, ASEMEX, etc.),
are used to examine the relative incentives and barriers that inﬂuence production
strategies.

2) To gather longitudinal data on changes in land use, informants were asked about

changes in cropping patterns, including the number of hectares devoted to each crop or

43

to cattle production and shifts in the type of crops grown or in grazing practices over the
most recent ﬁve year period. Supplementary to these data on actual changes in
production strategies, informants were interviewed on their rationale for production
decisions. Speciﬁcally, the general agricultural interview elicited information on: type
of land tenure, number of hectares, crop yield, number of cattle and amount of milk
and/or meat sold, price obtained, costs (inputs, labor), credit received, and proﬁt or loss
for 1990-91, 1989-90, and 1985-86 (the 1985-86 data are gathered only for landowners,
given the recall difﬁculty associated with landless peasants). The interview asks
producers to identify which crop is most proﬁtable, the most serious agricultural
problems for the producer, and any changes in production during the past ﬁve years.

3) Since household production and reproduction are basic to this analysis, questions
were constructed to derive information on access to land, agricultural and non-
agricultural family income, involvement in wage labor, reinvestment in agricultural
production, and to develop an index of material wealth. Additional information was
gathered during the census on house type (number of rooms, presence of water, sewer,
and electricity, and construction materials), household goods (appliances, cars, trucks,
tractors, etc.), and animals owned (both household and ﬁeld) by each household. Each
of these material possessions was assigned a monetary value, based on average prices
within the zone, to supplement measurement of the economic status of individual
households. An important aspect of the analysis is the contribution each productive
strategy makes to the total income and the proportion of income attributed to agriculture,
versus wages.

Household economics were analyzed by accounting for the balance between income
and household expenses (food, clothing, utilities, medical, educational, transportation,
etc.). Supplementary data were elicited on the contribution of other economic activities

(craft production, informal activities such as sale of home-prepared meals, and

44

remittances from migrant labor, and so forth) to total household income. The results of
this analysis are compared to producers’ evaluation of their own economic status,
accomplished by ranking one’s own position on a Likert scale. These data help to
determine the initial impact of privatization on economic status and standards of living,
and provide comparative data for future longitudinal studies to determine whether
privatization engenders increased economic disparity among peasant producers.
Comparisons are made between cafleros (cane producers) and non-caﬁeros, as well as by
other cropping strategies. These data, taken together, serve as a basis for the analysis
of changes in production and reproduction of peasant households within the two
communities.

4) Strategic collective action taken by peasants to confront the changes wrought by
privatization are, as explained in Chapter II, theoretically central; thus, a portion of the
interview is designed to gather data on the nature of informants’ participation in, and
evaluation of, the regional cane producers’ union. Since the objective of UNPCA is to
protect the rights of cane producers, a number of in-depth, open-ended interview
questions focused on the privatization of the sugar mill, including producers’ opinions
about the sale, advantages and disadvantages, changes wrought, and their evaluation of
state, versus private performance in the management of the mill. The ﬁnal portion of
this interview was conducted only with cane producers, since it deals primarily with
issues internal to the producers’ union. These questions focused on changes in the mode
of participation and political strategies utilized (voting, petitioning, demonstrations,
strikes, disafﬁliation from the union, etc.), the relationship between regional union
leaders and members, the relationship between the regional and national levels of the
union organization, and how its relationship with the state and the sugar mill has changed
since privatization. Several closed-ended questions form measurements as to how well

these agencies-the state, the sugar mill, and the UNPCA--aid cane producers.

45

Several interviews were also conducted with the regional union leader, who supplied
information on the internal organization of the union, the relationship of the union to the
state and the sugar mill, as well as its relationship to other unions. This information
deepened knowledge about political strategies, efforts of collective action, and viability
of the union as a channel to attain producers’ rights.

Key representatives of the sugar sector, including ofﬁcials of Azucar, S.A.,
FINASA, and Grupo Beta San Miguel in Mexico City were interviewed on several
occasions, as well as the mill manager, ﬁeld superintendent, accounting superintendent,
and other ofﬁcials of Ingenio Queserfa in the state of Colima. Information was elicited
on signiﬁcant changes in the organization of production affecting the sugar mill and its
supply zone. Because the researcher spent numerous days in the sugar mill to collect
liquidation data, this experience allowed invaluable observation of the dynamics of
privatization and changing conditions for mill workers.
gm! Histories

The change processes currently affecting the research communities are part of a
larger trajectory of historical processes within which these communities are embedded.
The research area was once part of an hacienda (located in the village of Chiapa),
involving a historically particular set of economic and political relationships. Older
residents of the community recalled the process of agrarian reform that affected the area
in the 1930’s, the constitution of the ejidos, as well as changes in production relations
as the zone shifted from private to state control, followed by the more recent changes
associated with reprivatization. The research design incorporates collection of oral
histories from knowledgeable informants to better understand these processes of social
change. The research problem is then situated in historical context through a synthesis

of oral histories and archival information.

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46
Arshixalllata

Historical data on the development of the region as an economic unit were collected
both from the national ofﬁce of Azricar, S.A. in Mexico City and Ingenio Queserr’a in
Colima. The former provided copies of Estadfsticas Azucareras which contain
comprehensive national-level statistics, some of which are broken down by state. The
latter allowed the researcher to copy all liquidation documents for the two research
communities for the period 1986-1991, as well as a 2% sample of the entire production
zone, for the same time period. In addition, a bottom-line itemization of proﬁt or debt
was taken from the entire zone for the ﬁve year period. Liquidation documents contain
the primary basis for evaluation of economic Changes since privatization, including: the
number of hectares and tons of cane for each producer, price paid for cane, a breakdown
of all costs of production (interest, inputs, labor, machinery, transport, advance
payments, producer beneﬁts such as IMSS, etc.), the net proﬁt or loss of each producer,
and debt owed to the mill. These data are supplemented by longitudinal information on
the production zone as a unit, supplied by various sugar mill ofﬁces. The Biblioteca
Azucar in Mexico City proved to be a rich source of statistical information, comparative
studies, data on global policies, and sugar industry history.

Archival data, obtained at the regional level from the sugar mill and agrarian
agencies concerned with the production and distribution of alternative crops, form the
basis for comparative analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of sugar cane production vis-a-vis
other crops. Time series data on provision of credit, seeds, fertilizers, machinery,
favorable prices, and marketing networks were compiled from information provided by
BANRURAL (the agrarian bank), SARH (Secretary of Agriculture and Hydraulic
Resources), and CON ASUPO (the state marketing network), together with production
records and data on credit, wages, costs, and prices available from the mill. This

information allowed analysis of both pre- and post-privatization systems.

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47
mamas

Statistical data analysis, using SPSS-PC, includes a combination of frequency
distributions, descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, and t-tests to aid in the analysis of
changes in agricultural costs and net earnings, and their impact on household budgets.
Frequency distributions (for nominal variables) and descriptive statistics (for ratio
variables) were adequate for tabulating peasants’ evaluations of many of the agricultural
problems and changes they deﬁned. Descriptive statistics were sufﬁcient in most
analyses to indicate changes in prices, costs, proﬁts, and debts since privatization of the
sugar mill. Where groups are compared, for example, caﬁeros versus non-caﬁeros,
cross-tabs provided a measure of ordinal variables; for ratio variables, the t-test was the
most appropriate measure.

Baseline data on the availability of credit and inputs to different segments of the
peasant population, production costs, and net proﬁts prior to reprivatization (1986-88)
are compared to the post-privatization period (1989-91). These data are stratiﬁed by type
of crop in order to determine changes in relative beneﬁts and cropping trends over the
ﬁve year period. Analysis aims to determine whether changing access to credit and
productive resources inﬂuences production strategies toward crop diversiﬁcation or
monocrop production of cane, the degree to which production costs have increased, and
whether private capital has achieved initial success in expanding the number of hectares
in sugar cane production.

The political dimensions of reprivatization are evaluated by a synthesis of
information acquired from peasant producers, both union and non-union members, union
leaders, and observation of union meetings. Conclusions are based both on subjective
evaluations made by informants and by empirical observation of meetings and of
strategies taken by peasant producers and union leaders. Analysis can then indicate shifts

in political strategies utilized in the pre—and post-privatization phases and whether state

48
intervention in producers’ unions has changed in terms of the nature of leadership, who
makes the majority of decisions, and whether there have been relative shifts in the degree
of cooptation or membership participation. A comprehensive picture of this situation is
then compared to the efforts of an independent, non-governmental producers’
organization which emerged in the research region in 1990.

Taken together, these methodologies and procedures yield an initial proﬁle of the
economic impact of reprivatization on cane producers, how they are differentially
affected, and how this process relates to political stability as peasants adjust to these
changes. This initial investigation does not presume to formulate a comprehensive
analysis of the impact of reprivatization--a project that could require perhaps ﬁve years
to complete. It intends to contribute baseline data from the pre-privatization context and
the initial responses during the ﬁrst three harvests following reprivatization, which will

generate a base upon which to conduct longitudinal studies in future years.

 

IV. THE RESEARCH SETTING

Field research on reprivatization of the Mexican sugar sector was conducted in the
state of Colima, Mexico, within the production zone of Ingenio Queseria. This chapter
provides a brief description to introduce the reader to: 1) the state of Colima, 2) the
region of the sugar mill, and 3) the two research communities where anthropological
ﬁeldwork was carried out. The description will touch on selected geographic, economic,
sociocultural, and political factors pertaining to the research setting. Also included in

this chapter is 4) a description of the characteristics of the research sample.

The State of Colima

Colima is the third smallest state in Mexico, bordered by the Paciﬁc Ocean on the
west, Jalisco to the north and northeast, and Michoacan on the southeast (see Figure 1
and Figure 2, on page 50). From the port of Manzanillo on the tropical coast, the land
rises to 3923 meters at the apex of an active volcano on the Colima-Jalisco border
(Oseguera 1978). Four mountain systems cover 75% of the state’s 5455 km.2 surface.
Three major rivers--the Marabusco, Coahuayana, and Armeria traverse the state from the
north to the coast. The hot subhumid climate consists of two seasons (dry and wet), with
an average rainfall accumulation of 1000 to 1300 mm. (Oseguera 1978; INEGI 1989).

The economy of Colima is largely agricultural. Little of the land is irrigated and
the principal crops consist of sugar cane, maize, beans, sorghum, rice, sesame, tomatoes,
melons, and tropical fruits. The tropical coast is an exporter of limes (Colima is

Mexico’s major lime producer), coconuts, mangoes, and bananas. Cattle raising was

49

 

50

 

     
 

 
 

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Figure 1. Map of Mexico (Oseguera 1979:44).

 

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Figure 2. Map of the State of Colima (Oseguera 1979:44).

 

51
historically important in the state, and remains so today. In addition to sugar production,
industry in Colima consists of a pelletizing plant, milk pasteurization, production of
lemon oil products, salt mines, and the state has the largest iron mine in Mexico
(Gobierno del Estado de Colima 1983; INEGI 1989; Oseguera 1979).

According to the 1990 census, there are 428,510 inhabitants in the state. On a state-
wide basis, 23.53% of the economically active population engages in agriculture;
however, this ﬁgure is 34.66% within the municipio of Cuauhtemoc in which Ingenio
Queseria is located, and 48.49% in the two research communities (INEGI 1990). There
are 147 ejidos in the state and 12,572 ejidatarios. Ejidos make up 289,291 hectares, or
52.94% of the cultivable surface; land classiﬁed as pequeﬁa propiedad,6 38.3% (INEGI
1991). Somewhat less than one-fourth of the land is irrigated, but private landowners--
who constitute a smaller proportion of producers--own a disproportionate amount of
irrigated land (30,831 hectares, versus 30,692 for ejidatarios) (Oseguera 1979).

Historically, Colima became a state with the signing of the Constitution of 1857.
Its status as a provincial state does not remove Colima from the centralized bureaucracy
of the Mexican government and the dominant political party. A ”state-party regime”,
wherein PR1 forms a unitary structure with the state apparatus, rules the country at
federal, state, and municipal levels (Gilly 1990:274). According to the statutes of PRI
(La Repriblica 1990), the ofﬁcial party is formed into a social organization integrated by
the agrarian, worker, and popular sectors and citizens comprising groups that support the
principles and actions identiﬁed with the Mexican Revolution. Organizations that are
grouped in these sectors, including ejidos, producers’ unions, workers’ syndicates, and
so forth, constitute the organizational force that forms the fundamental base of the party.

These organizations then have the obligation to promote the afﬁliation of their members

 

“No data are available on the number of pequeiios propietarios in the state, nor is this information
provided in census data.

in!

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52
with the PR1, elect delegates, send representatives to assemblies, propose candidates to
political posts, and vote. Each sector is represented by sectional, municipal, state, and
national delegates; this structure, then, links all political organizations in Colima,
including the CNPP (Confederacidn de la Pequeﬁa Propiedad) and UNPCA (U nion
Nacional de Productores de Car'ia de Azucar), to the highest levels of PR17.

PR1, the only ofﬁcial political party in Mexico, has never acted independently of the
state. Since its founding by Calles, each President has hand-picked his successor. No
eandidate has ever lost the national elections, although charges of election fraud are
common. The presence of the ofﬁcial party in Colima, as in other states, provides an
arena for local leaders to exert political inﬂuence and serves as a mechanism for the
mobilization of the populace during elections. The PR1 bureaucracy instills loyalty to
the party through ofﬁcial ideology and discipline through distribution of material
rewards. Through PR1, regional elites can climb the ladder of political power. It is not
uncommon for Mexican presidents to appoint state governors, as well as federal senators
and representatives, from among their personal friends.

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, native son of Colima, exempliﬁes this process. De
la Madrid moved to Mexico City as a young child, obtained a master’s degree at
Harvard, and when serving as Budget and Planning Minister, was appointed by
incumbent President Jose Lopez Portillo to succwd him in the presidency. He represents
one of the recent técnicos--U.S. educated technocrats who have risen to the presidency
since the regime of Bcheverria. De la Madrid opposed the populist policies of
Echeverrfa and L6pez Portillo, cut government spending, reduced state subsidies, and

fought corruption. The state’s role in the economy during his regime, however,

 

’More speciﬁcally, PR] is organized into: a national assembly, national political council, and national
executive committee (CEN); state assemblies, state political councils, and state directive committees;
municipal assemblies, municipal political councils, and municipal committees; and sectional assemblies and
sectional committees (La Repriblica 1990).

 

 

 

53
remained strong. Despite having inherited an economic crisis which forced austerity
measures, during his administration (1982-88), peasants in Colima were favored with
projects such as electriﬁcation of villages, installation of potable water and sewage
systems, cobbling of streets, health clinics, schools, irrigation works, telephone systems,
housing projects, and so forth. These projects, however, are at the cost of centralized
control through the government/PR1 bureaucracy (Riding 1984).

During the ﬁeld research, the presence of PR1 and the federal government were ‘
visible in Colima, through the National Solidarity Program“. Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
de la Madrid’s successor to the presidency, made several trips to Colima to promote the 1
ofﬁcial ideology of Solidaridad. The tri-color symbol of the Solidarity Program is
analogous with the PR1. Retraction of state subsidies to the rural sector is concealed in
musical lyrics and slogans about the united effort of the people and the government to
improve the standard of living. The joint effort of the federal, state, and municipal
governments is stressed in ofﬁcial pamphlets portraying the building of dams, irrigation
works, roads, clinics, schools, houses, potable water systems, and telephone systems.
This propaganda” underscored the loyalty of Colima’s governor, Elias Zamora
Verduzco, to the president, the "excellent relations" between the federal government and
labor unions, and the near absence of strikes in Colima.

At the same time, peasants and labor groups in Colima use PR1 to press their
demands, since working through unions that lack ofﬁcial PR1 recognition weakens
organized struggle against the state. PR1 suppresses mobilization through its refusal to
recognize independent organizations and utilizes the party to ensure a favorable electoral
vote. The CN C (Confederacién Nacional Campesina), the ofﬁcial peasant organization,

 

'I'he National Solidarity Program invested $340,000,000,000 pesos in Colima (approximately $113.3
million dollars).

’From a slick-paged magazine titled, “Colima: Un esfuerzo conjunto' , without publication information.

%_4—_¥

 

54
is incorporated into PR1 and controlled by national leaders appointed by the president.
Local ofﬁcials--from the Municipal President to the comisariados of the ejidos--are
required to be members of PR1. The state of Colima comprises numerous productive
sectors and political units responsive to the federal government; the concern of this
research, however, remains conﬁned to the northeast section of the state, within the

sugar—producing region of Ingenio Queserr’a. ‘

The Region of Ingenio Queseria

 

The supply zone of Ingenio Queserr’a constitutes a signiﬁcant entity for the focus of J
this research, since sugar mills are development poles of their regions. Ingenio Queserfa
is located 24 km. from the capital city of Colima, at 1200 meters above sea level. The
supply zone of the mill falls within the Provincia del Eje Neovolcanioo in the
northeastern section of the state. This zone encompasses cane ﬁelds in ﬁve of the ten
municipios of the state (Colima, Comala, Coquimatlan, Cuauhtémoc, and Villa de
Alvarez), as well as the municipio of Tonila in Jalisco (Quinto n.d.). Three broad
geophysical zones mark the area: the zona baja at 400-700 meters above sea level, the
zona media from 700-1100 meters, and the zona alta from 1100 to 1300 meters. The
zona baja is relatively ﬂat, with low slopes and fewer rocks in the soil. The zona media
consists of slopes and rocky soil. The most rocky soil is in the zona alta, incident with
the slopes of the volcano, high hills, and ravines. The region is volcanic, with soils of
volcanic and alluvial origin. The supply zone is divided into eight inspection zones, each
managed by a ﬁeld inspector (see map, Figure 3, pages 55-56). From Cuauhtémoc
north, the climate is more humid, beneﬁtting the cane. Queseria and San Marcos also
obtain higher yields because they are irrigated. The soils around Trapiche and Diezmo
are thinner, thus the cane is more quickly affected by low rainfall. The mean yield for

the zone was 59 tons per hectare in 1991; only 12% of the area is irrigated.

-—— —_______-d

 

 

55

 

56

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The factory has a capacity of 4250 tons of cane/24 hours”, industrialized 472,398
tons of cane (plus 7853 tons of seed cane), and produced 38,035 tons of sugar in 1990-
91, with a factory efﬁciency (tons of sugar/tons of cane) of 7.92%. The supply zone of
Ingenio Queserfa was 8020 hectares in 1990—91 (an additional 100 hectares were destined
for seed cane and 40 hectares were deferred for harvest the following year). In addition,
800 hectares are newly planted (cane cannot be harvested for 18 months after planting).
A potential for 11,000 hectares exists, but 2179 hectares are utilized for cattle; the new
mill owners will attempt to stimulate these producers to plant cane (source: Ingenio
Queserfa).

In 1990-91, the sugar mill was provisioned by 1373 caﬁeros, of which 1242 (90%)
are ejidatarios and the remainder, 131 (10%), are pequeﬂos propietarios (see Chapter VII
for discussion of the domination of the region by these private landowners). The 32
ejido communities and two private groups (Colima and Jalisco) that provision the mill
have an average of 50 caﬁeros; ten of these communities have three or fewer caﬁeros,
while the larger ejidos range up to 242 producers. Ejidatarios hold 5530 hectares of cane
(78%) and propietarios 1558 hectares (22%).“ These caﬁeros are divided politically;
796 are members of UNPCA, which is integrated into the CNC, or peasant sector. The
CNPP, an organization of wealthy, powerful, private landowners, is incorporated into

CNOP (Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Populares), or the popular sector.

 

loIn comparison with the other four sugar mills belonging to Grupo Beta, ingenios Constancia and
Ameea have capacities of 4000 tons/24 hours and Ponciano Arriaga and Alvaro Obregén have capacities
of 6000 tons.

”These data contrast with national-level data, where ejidatarios hold a relatively smaller proportion of
land. National data demonstrate the polarization within the sugar sector. In 1970, ejidatarios held 60.11%
of all cane land, securing 56.54% of the income from cane production. Pequer‘ios propietarios, with 37 %
of the surface, realized 40.77 % of the proﬁts. The average family of the latter earned an annual income
14 times as great as that of ejidatarios. In 1967, 50-60% of cane producers remained chronically indebted
to sugar mills, with the debt averaging 23.8 % of the value of production by 1973-74. Only 7.8 % of cane
producers are capable of capital accumulation; the majority earn substantially less than the national per
capita income (Jimenez 1987).

58

Both of these cane producers’ unions are components of PR1, the ofﬁcial government
party. Cultural deﬁnitions, economic differences, and distinct relationships of these two
groups to the means of production justify conceptualizing them as distinct groups for
purposes of analysis. Peasants of the research communities refer to the wealthy
landowners who have private land as ”propietarios" , rather than ”campesinos" . Unlike
the propietarios, ejidatarios-until 1992--have held usufruct rights, without the sanction
to sell their land as a private commodity. These differences are culturally constructed
in the hierarchical relationships that characterize the region.

Both pequeﬁos propietarios and ejidatarios contract with the mill, the only purchaser
of cane in the state. The mill then controls every aspect of production, from provision
of credit and inputs, to the production process, the harvest schedule, processing, and
distribution of the ﬁnal product. When producers receive their liquidation documents12
at the end of the harvest, all costs have already been deducted by the mill. Few of these
cane producers engage in the cane harvest. The harvest is done by 1080 wage laborers,
503 (47%) of whom are indigenous migrant workers from other states. Cane is
mechanically lifted onto trucks (there are 30 cargadoras in the zone), although this labor
is also accomplished manually and transported to the mill in 208 trucks owned by
UNPCA and caneros of the region (110 of these are owned by UNPCA) (source:
Ingenio Queserfa). Employment by the mill directly involves some 720 families and,
indirectly, another 2700 families. As the sole sugar mill in the state of Colima, it
remains a major factor for employment and the organization of labor.

The Queserfa mill has a long history; having been founded as an hacienda as early
as 1884, it subsequently changed hands among ﬁve different private owners before being

taken over by the state in 1972, later to be privatized again in 1989. Although data to

 

"As explained in Chapter VIII, these documents itemize the value of the cane, costs of production, and
net proﬁt or debt.

59
analyze these changing relationships were collected at the regional level, the research
focused on two communities within the supply zone, for the purpose of conducting

intensive interviews and collecting data for household analysis.

The Research Communities

The research communities straddle both sides of the river, Ias Grullas, Chiapa to
the west, and Ocotillo to the east. They are situated approximately 15 km. from the
capital city of Colima, on a road which branches off from the Camino Real, the highway
connecting Colima with Ciudad Guzman, Jalisco. The villages lie at the foot of an active
volcano, Volcan de Fuego, on the Colima-Jalisco border. As described earlier:

The smoking volcano, Volcan de Fuego, can be seen from the streets of

Ocotillo [and Chiapa], rising above the ejidal lands to the north of the village.

The landscape upon which Ocotillo [and Chiapa] are situated, is steeply

inclined from the south toward the skirts of the volcano. Residents are

accustomed to locate places from their own point of reference as ”arriba" (up,

higher) or "abajo" (down, lower) (Randall [Chollett] 1986:144-146).

The hues of the volcano shift with the time of day, the season, and one’s particular
perspective-peering out from behind the vegetation here, suddenly looming much larger
there. The land undulates, always slanting upwards from the village to within a few
kilometers of the volcano, where high ridges break the landscape, to suddenly soar up
the lava-crested sides of the smoking colossus. The streets of the villages are cobbled,
a public work completed in 1984. People’s everyday lives are largely hidden behind
brick or adobe walls that form a continuous facade of houses along the street. Outside,
a surface appearance of disorganized growth hides the fact of carefully tended fruit trees-
-mangos, limes, papaya, bananas--and a myriad of tropical plants and ﬂowers.

Across the street from the decaying hacienda,13 which speaks of another day,

another time, small groups of men sit on the curb, preparing their libation of Coca-Cola

 

I"I‘he history of this hacienda is discussed at length in Chapter V.

-——___ —_______-d

 

 

60

and El Presidente, and discuss the campo. Another group of men gathers daily at the
tortillerr’a to play dominoes. These kinds of public socializing are largely the activities
of men, while women remain more conﬁned to their homes. Much social interchange
takes place between the two villages, notwithstanding the unreplaced bridge that was
washed out when the river ﬂooded. The streets are frequently traversed on horseback,
although the number of trucks rumbling through the village streets is on the increase.
Horses or burros emerge onto the streets, almost hidden in their cargo of zacate or punta
dc caﬂa. Occasionally, a dozen or so cattle suddenly explode into the cobbled street, on
their way to fresher pasture on the other side of the village.

The surrounding ﬁelds are studded with large rocks, as if they themselves had been
planted. An occasional six-foot boulder appears as an immovable barrier to the
cultivation process. The campo is marked off and lined by long, low, winding rock
walls, each rock held into place by the pressure of surrounding rocks. A series of paths,
laden with volcanic dust, access the various parcelas. Principal agricultural activities
include cattle-raising, and cultivation of sugar cane, maize, camote, jicama, tomato, and
beans. Bananas, coffee, and other tropical plants are a minor component of production.

The population of Ocotillo has declined by 128 persons since earlier ﬁeldwork in
1984, most likely due to out-migration (as discussed below). The 1990 census counted
511 inhabitants in Ocotillo and 817 in Chiapa, a total of 1328. There were 311 occupied
houses (another 83 were unoccupied and 32 were under construction), giving a mean
household size of 4.27 in the two communities (the 1984 mean was 5.5). The total
number of children ranged from 0 to 14, with a mean of 5.24 children per family, among
families with children (the 1984 mean was 5.48). People tend to live in nuclear families
(83%), with 13% being extended families, and the remaining (4%) being skip generation
or having other relatives in the home. The mean educational level of household heads

has dropped, from 3.63 years of education in 1984, to 3.1 years in 1990. Out-migration

 

 

61

contributes to a lower educational level, since it is younger members of the community
who leave; however, it is also probable that declining economic conditions are forcing
some younger people to opt for wage or family labor, rather than remain in school.

Most village houses are privately owned: 272 (87.46%) own their own home, 20
rent, and 19 live in houses that are loaned to them. Older residents point out that houses
are no longer made of zacate or corrugated cardboard, as in the past. Today, 71% are
brick, and 15% are of adobe. Most (67%) have cement ﬂoors, 16% have ceramic tile,
11% have dirt ﬂoors, and 6% are a combination of cement and tile. The majority of
roofs (39%) are of corrugated asbestos; 24% are cement, 14% tile, 6% zinc, and 17%
are of various other materials. Most houses, 93.25 % , have running water, 91.64% have
electricity, and 65.59% have sewage systems.

Ownership of material goods was derived from census data: 54% of families own

a refrigerator, 27% own trucks, 12.1% own cars, and 5% own tractors. Larger animals

owned by families include:
draft animals 2.0% (mean: .05)
horses 50.0% (mean: 1.40)
cows 34.0% (mean=4.90)
bulls 14.0% (mean: .42)

Almost every home has numerous small animals, including chickens, turkeys,
ducks, pigs, goats, and burros.

Much of the material wealth is attributed to remittances from migration: Twenty-
six percent of household members had migrated to the U.S. in the past ﬁve years, with
an average of 2.46 migrations per person. These data most likely reﬂect under-reporting
(recall that there are 83 unoccupied houses). The percent who reported migrations (in
all years) to the U.S. in 1984 was 42.4%, with an average of 5.4 migrations among
household heads. In 1984, 47.4% of all adult offspring were residing in the U.S.; in
1990, 47.8%. The 1984 data were taken from the total census and the 1990 data from

62
the sample, which includes only families engaged in agriculture, thus the 1990 data most
likely under-represent the number who have migrated out. Among adult offspring who
Ind migrated to the U.S., the average number of migrations was 3.18.

The population is largely agricultural in occupation. Household division of labor
largely restricts women to the home-few women participate in agricultural production.
Their contributions to the household economy include household maintenance, child care,
and raising of small animals in the vicinity of the house. As pointed out in Chapter IX,
some women contribute ﬁnancially through various economic activities which augment
family income. Excluding ”housewives" , those employed in agriculture make up 40.27%
of all occupations (n=754); however, wage laborers, with few exceptions, are employed
in agriculture, augmenting this proportion to 60.41%. The percentage of people engaged
in agriculture has decreased from 71.91% in 1984. The following occupational structure,

of persons 18 years of age or older, was derived from the census:

under 18 years of age 574
housewife (or daughter) 312
campesino 178
jomalero (wage labor) 89
employee‘ 42
retired or ill 26
professional" 22
brick mason 17
merchant, store owner 15
domestic, gardener 14
student 14
soldier, police, guard 13
truck/bus/cab driver 12
mechanic 4
unemployed 4
construction, carpentry 3
musician I

-

“'Employee includes secretaries, technicians, clerks, waiters, and similar occupations.

I’"Professional" includes doctors, nurses, teachers, and similar occupations.

63

Among campesinos (ejidatarios, renters, sharecroppers), 49 % of the sample“5 are
ejidatarios, the remainder being landless. The ejido Felipe Chavez (see map, Figure 4,
on page 64) pertaining to Chiapa, is comprised of 528 hectares; each of the 31 ejidatarios
in the dotacién (original land grant) has, on the average, 10 hectares of rain-fed, and 2
hectares of irrigated land. The community has engaged in a land struggle since 1949 for
an ampliacién (extension) of 803 hectares. Despite a land invasion in 1979, only 153
hectares of this land have been turned over for collective use of 60 ejidatarios. A partial
grant was made in 1972, and another in 1985, but the landowners have placed a legal
wnparo against the expropriation of their lands. The limited land base provides an
average of 2 hectares to each of the members of the collective. The ampliacidn serves
as an element for differentiation among ejidatarios. Those of the dotacion have more
land and resources. Members of the collective, with tiny parcels, and an amparo placed
against part of the land grant, are often forced to migrate to the U.S. They tend to lack
interest in agriculture, for reasons made clear by one of its members: "I am not an
allthentic ejidatario. I have a little piece of land in the ampliacion, but I don’t know if
tOHIOrrow, they are going to take it away from me”. Two persons from Ocotillo have

Parcelas in the dotacidn and seven have parcels in the ampliacion.

Ej ido Vicente Pinto pertains to Ocotillo, its 800 hectares divided among 43
ej idatarios; each has 12 hectares of rainfed and one hectare of irrigated land. Ocotillo’s
pareClass are increasingly passing to outsiders--ll (25.58 %) now belong to non-residents--
a f act that is criticized by many ejidatarios. Several residents of the two villages have
parcelas in other ejidos of the area. Few pequeﬁos propietarios reside in the research

commul’lities, thus only six appear in the sample, four of whom are also ejidatarios.

\

I
:Henceforth, unless otherwise indicated, data are drawn from the sample (n= 100). Selection of this
Ip e W88 explained in Chapter III.

 

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65

W

From the census, 163 household heads engaged in agriculture were identiﬁed,
representing 52.41% of all households in the two communities. From this sampling
frame, a simple random sample of 100 persons was selected. The forms of production
and land tenure represented in the sample are complex. There are 49 ejidatarios and 6
propietarios; 4 of these are both ejidatarios and propietarios. Only 16 ejidatarios
cultivate their own land exclusively. In addition to their parcelas, 15 rent land, 10
sharecrop, 5 have access to lands other than their own parcelas, and 12 work as wage
laborers. Four other sample members, herein referred to as agricultoresnhave access
to ejidal or private land, but are not ejidatarios or propietarios (e. g. , a spouse or parent
with ejido land). Non—ejidatarios are persons whose primary occupation is based on
rental of land, sharecropping, or a combination of these production strategies; 38
members of the sample are so identiﬁed. Among the latter, 17 rent land (arrendatarios)
to cultivate, six are sharecroppers (medieros), and 30 also work as wage laborers
(iornaleros). Within the category of arrendatarios, systems of payment are further
broken down into those who pay rent in cash (22), those who pay in kind with crops
(10), those who are loaned the land (11), and sundry combinations of the above (14).
The remaining seven work only as wage laborers in the ﬁelds. Twenty-nine percent of
the sample, in addition, works in non-agricultural, secondary occupations. The basic

eategories of the sample include:

Pequeﬁos propietarios 2
Ejidatarios 45
Propietarios and ejidatarios 4
Agricultores 4
Arrendatarios 4
Combination

(arrendatarios, medieros, jomaleros) 34
Jornaleros 7

Among the six pequeﬁos propietarios of the sample, all are cattle raisers and only

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66

one grows a signiﬁcant amount of cane. The one with the largest amount of property
owns 46 hectares of private, and 24 hectares of ejido land, retaining only 1.5 hectares
of cane. The former mayordomo of the hacienda owns 4.5 hectares of private land, 12
hectares of the ejido, but rents land (mostly from relatives), allowing him to grow 80.5
hectares of cane. The other four average 17.25 hectares of private land; only two of
these have ejido parcels and none grow sugar cane. Three of these individuals are
extremely wealthy compared to village standards.

The proportion of caﬁeros in the sample was 33% in 1985-86, but had dropped to
27% by 1990-91 (two persons retain 1-2 hectares of cane which they use for cattle feed,
but do not deliver cane to the mill). On a village-wide basis, there were 45 caﬁeros in
1985-86, and only 35 in 1990-91. Abandonment of cane is discussed in detail in Chapter
IX.

The state, production region, and research communities described in this chapter
were historically constituted through dynamic processes of change. These entities today
represent the culmination of a historical trajectory through which they have experienced
colonialism, a war of independence, the Mexican revolution, and persistent intervention
of the political state in the development of the region. Before proceeding with analysis
of the privatization of the regional sugar mill, the history of the sector will be examined
in the following chapter to reveal how these dynamic processes have given shape to the

contemporary sugar SOCIOI' .

V. HISTORY OF THE SUGAR SECTOR

This research on reprivatization of the Mexican sugar sector takes as central: 1) a
historical perspective, and 2) the concept of power. A historical perspective is essential,
because, as Mintz afﬁrms, "Without history [anthropology’s] explanatory power is
seriously compromised... Human beings do create social structures, and do endow

events with meaning; but these structures and meanings have historical origins that shape,
limit, and help to explain such creativity" (1985zxxx). The concept of power is essential
because, "To omit the concept of power is to treat as indifferent the social, economic,
and political forces that beneﬁtted from the steady spread of demand for sugar"
(1985:166). The history of the sugar sector is a history of power relations. Sugar, a
cornerstone of the colonial system, displaced millions of people from their traditional
1ands and tied them into forms of coerced labor, to produce a luxury commodity for the
Proﬁt of the wealthy. Historically, sugar imbues relations of power between the mother
country and the colony, the hacienda and the pueblo, the sugar mill and cane worker, and
t‘Oday, between Pepsi and peasant. A constant in the transformation from colonialism to
industrial capitalism has been the relations of power between state, sugar industrialists,
and peasants.

This chapter is divided into two broad sections; the ﬁrst deals with historical change
of the sugar sector in Mexico, and the second provides historical background for the
l'eSearch region. The objective of this chapter is twofold: l) to locate peasant cane

PTOducers within the broader history which shapes their lives, and in which they, in turn,
give shape to, and 2) to disclose the essential role played by the state throughout the

67

68

history of the sugar industry. I will demonstrate in this chapter that the state has played
a recurrent role in providing the economic and political support for what has largely been
a private industrial domain. Can this historical foundation, then, be discarded in the
process of privatization and laissez-faire neoliberalism? To answer this question requires
looking beyond the hegemonic forces of state and private capital. The concentration of
land and resources for the beneﬁt of a rural elite, at the expense of rural dwellers,
generated a major revolution that restructured the entire society; thus, struggles for
power within the sugar sector provide important historical lessons to guide contemporary
change. In the second major division of the chapter, the historical encounter ﬁnds the
region of the present-day sugar mill, Ingenio Queseria, the research communities of
Chiapa and Ocotillo, and the former Chiapa hacienda embedded in the larger scope of
national history, where power struggles have been played out at national, regional, and

local levels.

Historical Change Within the Sugar Sector
The contemporary sugar sector in Mexico is the product of a historical trajectory
coVering over four and one-half centuries. This chapter elucidates the essential role of
the state in the historical development of the sugar industry through four broad periods:
1) the colonial period, 2) independence, 3) the post-revolutionary period, and 4) the
Peﬁod of state control. Sugar production during the colonial period experienced rapid
expansion, then stagnation, followed by rejuvenation of the industry with the Bourbon
reforms. The independence period saw marked modernization of the industry during the
POU‘iriato (the dictatorship of Porﬁrio Diaz, 1876-1911); however, peasants challenged
the dominance and power of Porfrrian haciendas through the Mexican revolution. The
pom-revolutionary period was marked by signiﬁcant vicissitudes in the development to

the sugar sector: the agrarian reform of the 1930s, economic depression from 1940 to

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69
1970, and the crisis that prompted statization of the sugar sector. The failure of the
state’s program to restructure the sugar industry and extract it from the crisis of the
19708 culminated in the reprivatization of sugar mills from 1988 to 1992.

A reading of this history brings into relief the constant dialectical relations of power
between state, private capital, and peasants, having signiﬁcant repercussions at multiple
levels, from their location within the world system to processes of change within the
peasant community. This history discloses the preponderant role, whether direct or
indirect, played by the state in regulating the sugar sector throughout 470 years of its
history.

The legnial Perim
Sugar was a key ingredient of colonial expansion. As a commodity, sugar fomented
the plundering of land, establishment of plantations, trade in human cargo, and coercion
0f labor for the purpose of accumulating wealth. Land, labor, and capital are central
ingredients which set the stage for a power struggle among private entrepreneurs,
mm, and the state. Despite the continual subjection of sugar production in the
COlony to the political economy of Spain, the Spanish Crown, throughout the colonial
Period, played no direct role in the development of the sugar industry. The role of the
State will be shown, however, to have been signiﬁcant. During the colonial period, key
factors related to class conﬂict and state hegemony of the sugar sector are underscored:
1) the state ensured private entrepreneurs access to land and labor (through encomienda
and repartimiento); 2) the state placed various restrictions on private entrepreneurs
(licenses, prohibitions, export restrictions); 3) the state put into place protective policies
toWard indigenous labor; 4) through the Bourbon reforms, the Spanish Crown facilitated
the entrenchment and expansion of sugar haciendas; as peasants lost their lands to
hECiendas, debt peonage became a mechanism to ensure a labor force for the production

of sugar; and 5) peasants developed forms of resistance to the concentration of land and

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70
control of labor on the part of sugar-producing haciendas. Each of these factors is
woven into the history of the colonial period.

Sugar cane was introduced to New Spain three years after the fall of Tenochtitlan,
the Aztec capital. After Hernando Cortes brought sugar cane to Mexico in 1523, the
sugar industry developed quite rapidly (GEPLACEA 1990; von Wobeser 1988). The
establishment of sugar mills became a signiﬁcant force in setting into motion a historical
class struggle for power that continues to characterize social relations of production
throughout the history of the sugar sector. Thus, control over labor and land established
the base for capital accumulation; this social deployment of labor for sugar production
involved the exercise of power. The Crown granted encomiendas (the tribute of
"Indians” and their free labor) to Spanish conquerors, forming the historical basis for the
development of sugar production and capital accumulation among encomenderos
(Landazuri and vazquez 1988). Encomienda was complimented by two other forms, the
marquesado (right to tribute of persons living and working on the land) and mercedes
(land granted as private property). The indigenous population contributed not only the
labor to construct sugar mills, cultivate cane and process it to sugar, but also tribute in
foodstuffs, wood, rocks, water, cotton, and services (Crespo et al. 1990). Although
encomienda did not grant rights to land, most encomenderos appropriated indigenous
lands and waters.

Initially, the Spanish crown encouraged sugar production by granting lands to those
who desired to install sugar mills. By 1600, 60 mills and trapiches (small-scale,
unmechanized sugar mills) existed in Veracruz, Puebla, Morelos, Michoacan, Jalisco,
Colima, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Nayarit, and Guerrero (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988). The
ﬁrst sugar was exported from Veracruz to Spain in 1539, earning huge proﬁts
(GEPLACEA 1990). The state was essential to capital accumulation at this early stage;

while the Spanish crown did not ﬁnance the genesis of the sugar industry in Mexico, it

 

71
provided the legal measures for appropriation of two essential resources--land and labor.

Nevertheless, a struggle between the Spanish state, represented by the king, and the
private interests of the conquerors, emerged (Meyer and Sherman 1979). Precedents
were established for a strong role played by the state, in relation to private entrepreneurs
and indigenous labor. The Crown, to curb the growing power of encomenderos and to
ensure the reproduction of the native labor force (including the food they produced and
the tribute they rendered), employed protectionist policies toward the indigenous
population for 300 years (Landazuri and vazquez 1988; von Wobeser 1988). The New
Laws of the Indies (1542-43) freed natives who had been enslaved and restricted labor
requirements that could be demanded of indigenous peoples. In 1549, labor obligations
to encomenderos were abolished and much of this labor force was replaced by African
slaves; in addition, ejidos (usufruct land rights) were granted to indigenous communities.
Scarcity of labor, exacerbated by a series of epidemics and demographic decline of the
indigenous population, forced the Crown to decree repanrimiemo, a rotating system of
compulsary labor, which was to be compensated with pay (Meyer and Sherman 1979;
von Wobeser 1988). Repartimiento was the Spanish Crown’s response both to protect
”Indians" and to create wage labor, given the lack of a proletariat. Repartimiento
persisted well into the 1700s, but was terminated earlier in the sugar sector. In 1599,
Viceroy Gaspar de Zt’riiega prohibited repartimiento of "Indians" for wage labor in sugar
mills. The Viceroy judged employment of indigenous people inside of mills a crime and
the guilty mill owner was imprisoned (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990).

Furthermore, the court ruled that no new mills were to be constructed, or cane lands
planted, without a license. These edicts weakened the colonial relation between
indigenous labor and Spaniards. Spain, at the time, was amply supplied with cane from
the Antilles; New Spain was to supply precious metals, thus the Crown eliminated

competition of mines with sugar mills for indigenous labor. This policy resulted in the

 

are a

if! 1377.

mm

 

72
closure of numerous small trapiches (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990). These regulations did
not terminate the abuse of laborers by the Spaniards. Although repartimiento was
abolished in 1632, with the emergence of the hacienda, access to labor was continued
through a system of debt peonage (Meyer and Sherman 1979).

As the demand for sugar expanded in Europe, the sugar industry became a
cornerstone in the triangular trade. Goods ﬂowed from Europe to Africa, to be
exchanged for slaves, who in turn, were exchanged for sugar «initially for the tables of
the elite in Europe, and later for the consumption of an urbanizing working class
(GEPLACEA 1990). Increasing sugar consumption toward the end of the 16th century
caused demand, and thus sugar prices, to rise (von Wobeser 1988). State control of

prices dates from 1573.'7 The increasing price of sugar from 1570-1600 encouraged
further expansion of sugar estates (Crespo et al. 1988).

The Crown prohibited the export of sugar from Mexico in 1631, thus restricting
sllgar haciendas to the national market. Aguardiente (sugar cane alcohol) remained
Prohibited until 1796, limiting the expansion of the industry; however, illegal production
Continued throughout the colonial period. Thus, sugar production ﬂourished within
l\dexico as a proﬁtable, autonomous development, despite restrictions by the Crown
(Landszuri and Viizquez 1988).

Many hacendados lacked sufﬁcient capital and had to rely on credit for construction,
expansion, and operation costs (von Wobeser 1988). The Spanish Crown did not provide
caDita] to the Mexican sugar industry; rather, the Church and entrepreneurs from Mexico
City ﬁlled the role of ﬁnancial institutions (Landazuri and Vazquez 1988). Ecclesiastical
oredit largely made possible the expansion of the sugar industry in the ﬁrst half of the

\

. ”A royal order set the ofﬁcial price of sugar at 5 pesos per arroba (about 11.5 kg.); sugar workers at
8 time earned from 4.5 pesos per year up to the highest paid position at 600 pesos per year (Landazuri
and Vazquez 1988).

73
17th century (von Wobeser 1988). This fact allowed the Church to accumulate vast
holdings through persistent indebtedness of hacendados (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988).

The precedence that sugar production took in Mexico is attributed to the hacienda
as a particular form of organization (J iménez 1986). The hacienda was a major unit of
production and served as a pole of regional development. Haciendas were distinguished
by irrigation works, buildings, machinery, and forms of labor-~renters, sharecroppers,
salaried labor, and debt peonage (Melville 1979). The hacienda was organized for
market production, yet productivity and market demand remained low and it depended
to a large extent on its own production and resources. It appropriated large expanses of
land, yet utilized them inefﬁciently, with little technological development (Wolf 1959).

The colonial sugar hacienda owed its success to the appropriation of indigenous

lalld, indigenous irrigation systems, and of the labor of indigenous peoples (Jimenez
1 986). Given their need for labor, haciendas perpetuated the survival of peasant
communities. Control over the indigenous population and ease of collecting tribute were
faCilitated by the relocation of dispersed peoples into congregated villages (von Wobeser
1988). As noted by Warman:

The growth of the great historical enterprises, from the modest slave

mill of the 16th century to the almost inﬁnite haciendas of the time

of the Porﬁriato, have found their success in their capacity to attract,

utilize and exploit the wage labor of the peasants, without absorbing

all of the costs of subsistence and reproduction of this group

(translated from Melville 1979:16).

Hacienda lands were let out to permanent workers for rent or sharecropping, thus
the production of maize contributed to their subsistence without cost to the hacienda.
I‘Iaciendas incorporated rainfed and pasture lands for grazing cattle and draft animals
“Sec! in agricultural labor and for growing food crops to feed the resident population
(Warman 1980b).

Peasants shaped this process as well; they sought to escape unending loss of their

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74

lands and demands for tribute and labor through wage labor on the hacienda, while the
hacendado had access to a labor reserve that maintained itself until needed. Wolf (1959)
explains that the hacienda was an instrument of the conquerors, while the pueblo was an
instrument of the conquered; peasant communities existed in hostile symbiosis with
haciendas. The indigenous population resisted encroachment on their communities and
the displacement of their own crops by sugar cane. Land invasions and destruction of
crops were frequent (von Wobeser 1988). Since the early colonial period then, peasants
have been active agents in resisting the imposition of tribute and encroachment on their

lands.

Despite its dynamism, by 1690, the sugar industry entered a severe crisis which was
not overcome until 1770 (von Wobeser 1988). The Bourbon reforms, initiated by the
Spanish state in the 18th century, rejuvenated the sugar sector.

W. The Bourbon reforms18 in the last half of the 18th century
mark a major watershed of the colonial period as Spain attempted to revitalize the
economies of its colonies, and maximize extraction of wealth from the colonies to ﬁnance
t1'le economy of Spain. These reforms, initiated by the Spanish state, revolutionized the
sugar industry, giving sugar haciendas a key role in the economy. The modernization
of the economy and political system coincided with the initial phase of a transition to
capitalism (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988).

The Bourbon reforms constituted a direct attack on corporate and private interests
in the New World. Ecclesiastical property was sold on royal order, thus depriving
“Inltitudes of agricultural producers and entrepreneurs of their source of credit. These

changes were accompanied by extensive expansion of haciendas, capital investment in

agriculture, and the increasing role of the hacienda. The Crown abolished restrictions

 

 

"The Bourbon dynasty, beginning with the rule of Philip V (1701-46) succeeded Charles 11, last of the
Hapsburgs.

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75
on the export of sugar from Mexico in 1796 and dropped the prohibition on production
of aguardiente in 1794. Production throughout the colonial period, however, remained
largely for internal consumption. The change did allow hacendados to place surplus on
the world market in years when supply exceeded demand. By the nineteenth century,
the sugar industry had become an important branch of the colonial economy (Landazuri
and Vézquez 1988; von Wobeser 1988).
Debt peonage allowed the hacienda to convert workers into a permanent labor force.
To attract and hold labor, haciendas sold goods on credit through the tienda de raya
(company store), thus assuring perpetual dependency through debt. Acasillados resided
permanently on the hacienda and were paid in cash and crops for their labor. Since cane
production also requires large amounts of seasonal labor, haciendas rented out a portion
01’ their lands, the rent being paid in cash, labor, or crops, to surrounding indigenous
communities. During the harvest, rental was charged only in labor, ensuring access to
Seasonal labor. Land rental allowed the haciendas to obtain resources, ensured survival
of indigenous villages whose lands had been alienated, and provided them a means to pay
taxes imposed by the Crown. The increasing separation of peasants from their land
created a growth in labor supply, depressed wages, and contributed to an abusive system
of labor control (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988).
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the sugar industry was invigorated by
e=°<>nomic growth, a more secure supply of labor to the sector, and increased sugar
consumption. The state, then, served as an important force in shaping the sugar
industry. Nevertheless, polarization towards the end of the Bourbon era became
pl‘Onounced between the export-oriented elite and those whose interests were within
I"lemme-the Church, hacendados, and merchants. By the end of the colonial period, the
8Dread of haciendas had diminished the capacity of peasants to sustain their basic food

needs. A middle class emerged whose interests opposed control by the Spanish crown.

76
The abdication of Carlos IV sealed the fate of the colonial relationship (Landazuri and
VAzquez 1988).
marine:

The independence period in the history of the sugar industry produced important
changes in the organization of labor and relations of production. This section explains
how the state developed a stronger alliance with capitalists, contributing to expansion and
consolidation of the sugar industry through: 1) protective tariffs; 2) the Reform Laws
which attacked corporate landholdings and sanctioned the expropriation and concentration
of land in the hands of sugar industrialists; and 3) the state’s toleration of despotism on
the part of hacendados. Subsequently, the policy of liberalism during the Porﬁriato

brought about major changes to the sugar industry: 1) penetration of foreign capitalists;
2) modernization of sugar mills; and 3) an export orientation linked to the world market.
It is against these hegemonic conditions that peasants took action in the Mexican
revolution.

Destabilization in the aftermath of the war of independence arrested the advances
Put into place by the Bourbon Reforms and was not surmounted until the Porﬁriato.
I’Capulations in hacienda regions had been displaced, irrigation systems destroyed, and
Sl1gar mills operated with the infrastructure inherited from the colonial period, with few
technological improvements (Crespo et al. 1988; Landazuri and Vazquez 1988). The
State, inﬂuenced by politically powerful hacendados, prohibited sugar imports to Mexico;
this protectionism was characteristic of the ﬁrst half of the century. Exports of sugar
fI‘om Mexico comprised less than 10% of national production until the 18703 (Iandazuri
a11d vazquez 1988).

The dominant class was comprised of hacendados, merchants, usurers, and public

officials, plus foreign capitalists who began to invest in the sugar sector after the middle

of the century. Numerous hacendados became regional caciques (political bosses),

77

wielding considerable power. Concentration of property, control of irrigation systems,
access to a cheap labor force, and their monopoly of the regional market enabled
hacendados to increase their wealth and maintain political hegemony. Although social
movements against the encroachment of haciendas were frequent in the 19th century,

peasant struggles remained localized and isolated (Iandazuri and Vézquez 1988).
During the Reforma”, the state continued to support the accumulation and
concentration of lands through the Ley Lerdo and the Ley de Desamortizacién of 1856,
which attacked corporate properties and restructured the relations of production. These

laws provided the basis for massive expropriation of land from the Church and

indigenous communities alike. Wealthy hacendados took advantage of these laws,

acquiring land (and irrigation systems) at half their value, and concomitantly, control of
the labor force from whom the land was alienated. The annexation of indigenous lands
by haciendas was accomplished through both legal and extra-legal means, fomenting
greater pressure on peasants--at a time when rural population was rapidly increasing--to
l‘esort to wage labor and rental of land in order to survive. The abrogation of colonial
Protectionism was supplanted by a constitution and set of laws which left peasant

Communities at the mercy of the haciendas (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988; Melville
1 9'79).

In exchange for land to produce their subsistence crops, the hacienda charged

Peasants quotas of maize and labor (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988). Sharecropping

\

"The Reforma (1855-1872) marks a period of liberalism in Mexico, led by Melchor Ocampo and
ellito Juarez. In 1855, Juarez abolished clerical and military privileges (Ley Judrez). The Ley Lerdo of
1 856 forced the Church to sell property not used for religious purposes. Large landowners, merchants,
and capitalists were able to acquire the bulk of these estates. Since the law barred all corporations from
holding land, communal lands of indigenous pueblos also lost their landholdings to speculators. These laws
Were incorporated into the 1857 constitution. In 1859, Juarez nationalized all ecclesiastical property
without compensation and suppressed monasteries so that their estates could be distributed to peasants--an
end that was not achieved. “Vacant lands“ were ordered to be sold in 1863, thus indigenous communities
“liable to establish title suffered further land losses. The Reform period ended with the death of Juarez
ﬁnd Porﬁrio Dfaz’ rise to power in 1876 (Keen and Wasserman 1980).

3.3

\W

I)

{ref

78
provided both labor and income to the hacendado, the earnings of which could be
reinvested in sugar cane production (Warman 1980b). Costs of labor, maintenance of
mills, and state taxes forced many hacendados to rely on loans, to rent out, or to sell
their land. The effort to diversify activities and provide their own inputs failed to rescue
many haciendas from constant debt and subsequent loss of property (Landazuri and
Vézquez 1988).

The history of the sugar industry up until the 20th century makes clear the state’s
role in guaranteeing the reproduction of the social and material conditions of production.
Despite lack of direct intervention in fomenting sugar production, the state guaranteed
reproduction of the sugar-producing haciendas by its toleration of despotism and its
support to hacendados, ensuring them access to land, infrastructure, and labor. Legal
sanction was given to expropriation of corporate property, which in turn, liberated a
Supply of labor for the developing capitalist industry.

W. With the advent of the Porﬁriato (1876-1910), foreign penetration
of the sugar sector and concentration of land reached a zenith (J iménez 1986; Landﬁzuri
and Vézquez 1988). The Porﬁriato was based on economic liberalism aimed at
industrialization, production for export, and support for foreign capital involvement in
the Mexican economy (Fabila 1941). lntemationalization of production brought direct
fOl‘eign investment in sugar mills and important growth to the sugar sector. Events in
the world market in the late 19th century, such as the Cuban war of independence and
oDening of the U.S. market, also contributed to the growth of sugar production in
I"lexico. The Porﬁrian state fortiﬁed the power of the dominant interests through control

01‘ resources (land, capital, water, and labor) and legislation, thus guaranteeing
reproduction of the social and material conditions of the sector and allowing hacendados
‘0 realize enormous proﬁts (Landazuri and Vézquez 1988).

Building of an extensive railway system, the steam engine, and the infusion of credit

79

and capital rejuvenated the sugar industry. These changes promoted the growth of an
internal market, while protective tariffs on sugar imports and preferential tariffs on
exports stimulated the export of Mexican sugar. Hacendados were given extensive rights
to land, waterways, forests, and contracts to construct railway lines (Landazuri and
vazquez 1988; Melville 1979). By the end of the Porﬁriato, Mexico contained the third
largest sugar production region in the world (Morelos), after Hawaii and Puerto Rico
(J iménez 1986). While it is argued that private investment is responsible for growth and
modernization during this period, state policies facilitated capital accumulation among
porﬁrian industrialists.

The Porﬁrian success also carried the seeds of its own destruction. From 1903—1906
the sugar industry suffered its ﬁrst major crisis of overproduction; moreover, the price
of sugar was on the decline (J iménez 1986). Furthermore, the appropriation of village
lands and exploitation of peasant communities generated continual, localized conﬂicts
between peasants and hacendados (Crespo et al. 1988). During this period, when
hacendados promoted expansion and modernization of capitalist mills, they
simultaneously fomented the development of an antagonistic peasantry which would join
forces with other social groups to overthrow the hacendados.
W

The post-revolutionary agrarian reform transformed the structure of production,
giving shape to the contemporary conﬁguration of the sugar sector. This section
illustrates crucial features of this transformation: 1) displacement of the landed
oligarchy; 2) disruption of the unity of factory and ﬁeld in sugar production; 3) the
state’s need to balance conﬂicting interests by a) subsidizing sugar barons, b) appeasing
urban workers with low sugar prices, and c) redistributing land to peasants; and 4)
increasing state hegemony over the sector through provision of credit, control of prices,

intervention in ofﬁcial institutions of the sector, setting policy which centralized control

 

80

of the sector, and subordination of peasants to external controls. Detailed attention is
given to the decrees of 1943 and 1944, for they established the conditions that continue
today to govern relations between peasants, private capital, and the state.

Peasants were active agents in challenging their exploitation by haciendas. In 1910,
1% of the population of Mexico owned 97% of the land and haciendas held 113 million
hectares (Esteva 1983). The state of Morelos had 37 haciendas and 24 sugar mills; this
was the heart of the Zapatista movement. In 1911, Emiliano Zapata issued his Plan de

Ayala, calling for a return of plundered communal lands, expropriation of latifundios,

 

and for autonomy and freedom for peasant villages. When Huerta fell in 1914,
hacendados in Morelos ﬂed and the zapatistas restored and put into operation four sugar
mills to process cane and to ﬁnance their army. Zapata’s objective was to change the
relations of production and redirect mill proﬁts to social ends (Warman 1980b).

In 1914, the Mexican state, under Villa and Zapata, came into the hands of the
rebels. Carranza’s forces, with the support of the U.S., attacked and burned peasant
villages and cane ﬁelds, destroyed the mills, and dismantled and robbed the machinery;
zapatistas took refuge in the hills. By 1920, Morelos’ sugar mills stood in ruins (Crespo
et al. 1988) and one-fourth of the population of the state had died (Warman 1980b).

After the revolution, in 1917, the Plan de Ayala was incorporated into Article 27
of the Mexican constitution. The Primer Ley de Ejidos in 1920, based on Article 27,
provided for the redistribution of hacienda lands (Crespo et al. 1990; Warman 1980b).
By 1923, grants of land had been given to 115 peasant villages and 200,000 hectares had
been distributed by 1929. Agrarian reform brought structural transformation by subduing
the power of the former rural oligarchy and redistributing land, water, and cane ﬁelds
to peasants who were an important ingredient in the stabilization of the new Mexican
state (Warman 1980b).

Sugar mills required centralized control of factory and ﬁeld, large extenses of land,

—4_4‘.I

 

 

81

and huge investments; peasants, recipients of land redistribution, lacked both resources
for and interest in cane production. The structural breakdown in the unity of ﬁeld and
factory maintained under the hacienda system is a signiﬁcant factor, since control of the
productive land base was now substantially separated from the sugar mill itself. For this
reason, Article 27 was revised to protect the infrastructure and irrigation works of sugar
haciendas; subsequently, 150 hectares of irrigated and 300 hectares of rainfed land
belonging to the agroindustrial complex of sugar mills were exempt from expropriation
(Crespo et al. 1990). This measure ensured the retention of agroindustrial units in the
hands of the rural elite (Jimenez 1986).

It was not until the presidency of IAzaro Cardenas that signiﬁcant distribution of
cane lands was accomplished--a total of 20 million hectares were redistributed during
cardenas’ term of ofﬁce. By 1940, 1.7 million ejidatarios owned 30 million hectares of
land, but haciendas still occupied 32 million hectares (Esteva 1983). In severing
ownership of land from ownership of mills, foreigners were driven from control of the
sector and a state-peasant alliance was forged. Cardenas took measures to channel credit
and technical support to cane producers through the Banco de Crédito Agricola and
Banco de Crédito Ejidal, giving the state control of credit to the sugar industry (Purcell
1981).

The state’s alliance with peasants took political, as well as economic forms.
Cardenas distributed more land than any other Mexican president, but he also engineered
the corporate structure of the government party which continues to serve as a mechanism
to control peasant and labor groups. Separate popular, labor, and peasant sectors were
incorporated into the hierarchical structure of PRM (Partido Revolucionario Mexicano,

becoming the PR1, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, in 1946) (W ilkie 1967). This
act ensured government control over workers’ and producers’ unions (Hamilton 1984,

1982; Hodges and Gandy 1983; Montes de Oca 1977; Rounds 1977). Cardenas

82
established the CNC in 1938, to unite competing peasant groups, bind the CNC to the
ofﬁcial government party, and prevent an alliance between peasants and proletariat which
might mobilize against the state (Landsberger 1973). The ofﬁcial cane producers’ union,
UNPCARM (Unién Nacional de Productores de Caiia de Azricar de la Republica
Mexicana), is within the corporate umbrella of the CNC, and thus, the ofﬁcial party.

Relations of production were restructured between the state and private capital as
well, as deﬁned by Crespo: "the mill-cane land relationship-and those of the industry
with the state, both redeﬁned in a pyramid of subordination in whose vertex is found the
State itself” (translated from Crespo et al. 1990:884). From the 19303 to the 19503, a
new group of capitalist entrepreneurs emerged who served as caciques on behalf of the
state by controlling peasants within the production zones of sugar mills. This period,
when ninety percent of the industry was privately owned, is characterized by Purcell
(1981) as a period of oligopoly capitalism. The inﬂuence of these industrialists allowed
them to distance themselves from the agrarian reform and obtain large amounts of
government credit (Jimenez 1986). The dependence of private industrialists on state
support is a signiﬁcant feature in the history of the sugar industry.

Among the major private capitalists were Benjamin Francis Johnston, William Oscar
Jenkins, Virginia Pamet, and Aarén saenz. In addition to the Los Mochis, Sinaloa mill
built in 1901, Johnston owned ingenios La Victoria and E1 Aguila. He consolidated his
power, becoming the largest sugar industrialist in Mexico. When World War II opened
the market to high world prices, he amassed a fortune. In 1938, cardenas distributed
83,442 hectares of his United Sugar Company lands to peasants in Los Mochis, forming
32 collective ejidos. The Johnston family retained ownership of the mill until 1960,

when it was purchased by Aardn saenz (Crespo et al. 1988).
Aaron saenz, "e1 rey del azﬁcar mexicano” (the Mexican sugar king) from 1930-70,

is responsible for much of the growth and capital accumulation of the sugar industry

[at

.84]

T" l
4‘...»

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'.

E?"

-117

.1? h- '

M
ALL.

83

(Crespo et al. 1988:116).20 In 1929—30, President Elias Calles used his political
inﬂuence to obtain credit from the Banco de Mexico to form the Compaﬁfa Azucarera
de El Mante, S.A., headed by Calles’ son, Aaron saenz, and Fernando Torreblanca.
This credit represented four times the value of the capital represented in the sugar mill
and a substantial subsidy by the federal government. The region had also beneﬁtted from
Calles’ promotion of large irrigation works for the mill, at a cost of $4,906,811 pesos
to the government. The mill thus remained protected from the 19308 crisis that affected
other large mills of the country. The unscrupulous use of public ofﬁce and perversion
of bank regulations were used to justify the expropriation of El Mante in 1939 and
formation of a peasant cooperative. In 1943, saenz took legal action (amparo) against
the expropriation; ultimately, he sold the mill to the cooperative, for which the
government paid $18,052,132 pesos (Crespo et al. 1988). The subsidation of these huge,
private sugar barons by the state and the expropriation of cane lands for redistribution
to peasants reveal the contradictory tensions in relations of production between the state,
private capital, and peasants.

The state also played an important role in the commercialization of sugar. Sugar
industrialists formed a cartel in 1931 to sell their products on the market, at a price ﬁxed
by the government. Private capitalists conceded control of the price of sugar to the state
in order to gain access to credit, yet provision of credit gave the state greater inﬂuence
in the cartel. Azricar, S.A. , created in 1931, represented the principal mills of the cartel.

When excess production continued, in spite of the cartel, saenz convinced President

 

2"Srienz was a former revolutionary hero under Obregén, federal deputy, Undersecretary of Foreign
Relations, signer of the manifesto that created the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario) in 1928,
presidential nominee (having lost to Ortiz Rubio), Secretary of Commerce, Industry, and Labor (with an
important role in regulation of the sugar industry), and Secretary of State. He built the El Mante,
Tamaulipas mill in 1928 with ﬁnancial support from Ellsworth Bunker, president of Mexico’ 8 most
important sugar mill (El Potrero) and partner in the largest sugar company in the U. S. Saenz also served
as director of UNPASA, the organization that controlled the sugar sector (Crespo et al.1988).

 

r1".
Le:

is

it“

’8'.

)3

84

Calles to ﬁnance their losses (through Banco de Mexico) by selling surplus sugar at a
loss on the world market. The state, then, played an important role in regulating
production and distribution of sugar of a largely private agroindustry. That role became
further entrenched when, in 1938, Azucar, S.A. was transformed into UNPASA (Uni6n
Nacional de Productores de Azucar), with government representatives from the Secretarfa
de Hacienda y Crédito Priblico and the Economfa Nacional, who held veto rights (Crespo
et al. 1990). UNPASA would now provide credit to its members, market the sugar
produced, warehouse the country’s sugar, export surpluses, and promote the organization
of industries for production and processing of sugar and its products (J iménez 1986).

Whereas the activities of sugar industrialists in the post-revolutionary period indicate
a degree of dynamism, the agrarian reform generated a number of factors that contributed
to decreasing production: small landholdings were held by a marginal peasantry with
scarce resources, coordination by the mill of the technical aspects of cultivation
decreased, and application of inputs, mechanization and technical development was
jeopardized. As a result, Mexico was forced to import sugar from 1943-46 (Crespo et
a1. 1988). However, much of the responsibility for the deﬁcit in cane production from
1933-50 can be traced to sugar industrialists who directed production away from national
demand to the production of alcohol and molasses for export (Flores 1987).

The period from 1940—1970 marks a new stage in the development of the sugar
industry. After Mexico was forced to import huge quantities of sugar in 1943, President
Avila Camacho issued two important remedial decrees. The ﬁrst decree (1943) gave
power to the Secretary of Agriculture to delineate supply zones around each sugar mill,
within which all ejidatarios and pequeﬂos propietarios (private landowners) were
obligated to cultivate sugar cane for the mill; thus, peasant cane producers were
subordinated to the monopoly control of sugar mills. The decree, aimed at meeting both

national and U.S. demands for sugar, remained in effect until 1975 (Crespo et al. 1990;

 

85
Jimenez 1986).

The second decree (1944), marking increased state involvement in the sugar
industry, established the method for ﬁxing the price of cane, the form of paying the
producer, and regulations for commercialization of byproducts. The price paid for one
ton of cane was equivalent to the wholesale price of reﬁned sugar per kg. , multiplied by
50% of the factory yield (kgs. of sugar produced per ton of cane) during the harvest.
An 80 kg. (8%) factory yield was guaranteed (Jimenez 1986). Thus, the proﬁt of the
harvest was equally divided between mills and producers. Producers were to receive
25 %21 of the value of by-products such as molasses and alcohol, were subject to
premiums or discounts, according to the quality of the cane, and were required to pay
transport costs to the mill. Credit was channeled to the mills through FINASA,
(Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A.) and then dispensed to caﬂeros (cane producers)
by the mills. The government continues to control the price of sugar as a low cost wage
good for urban labor; thus the caﬁero bears the cost of transferring surplus from the
country to the city. These decrees put into place a new management system to associate
carieros with industrialists in a subordinate relationship under a system of increasing state
hegemony of the sugar sector (Crespo et al. 1990).

S . . E l S I l

The period of state control of the sugar industry is counterposed in this dissertation
to the more recent period of privatization. In this section, detailed attention is given to
the state’s restructuring of the industry and to the ofﬁcial institutions charged with
control of the sector. These facets of increasing state control of the sugar sector set the
conditions which ultimately culminated in the privatization of sugar mills. Strategic

aspects discussed below include: 1) the impact of the international sugar market on

 

2‘Jiménez (1986) reports this amount as 50%.

 

 

86
development of the Mexican sugar sector; 2) state control of the price of sugar, which
led sugar industrialists to decapitalize their operations; 3) the increasing role of the state
in the institutions governing the sector and direct state ownership of mills, 4) substantial
state subsidies to the sector and economic destabilization; 5) signiﬁcant changes to the
Decreto Caﬁero, and 6) transformations in the relationship between the state, private
eapital, and peasants.

After 1944, private sector investments increased the productive capacity of sugar
mills and the sugar industry experienced accelerated growth through the 1960s. From
1953-59, Mexico expanded its exports to the world market; those exports were
increasingly destined to the U.S. from 1959-1970,22 after which the U.S. became
Mexico’s principal purchaser of sugar (del Villar 1976; J iménez 1986). After the 19608,
sugar became Mexico’s third most important export crop, comprising 15 % of the value
of agricultural exports (J iménez 1986).

From 1958-70, a state policy of ”desarrollo estabilizador" (stabilizing development)
aimed to stimulate economic growth through control of inﬂation. This would be
accomplished by freezing wages and the price of basic commodities (Purcell 1981). The
policy represented an attempt to keep the price of sugar to the consumer low without
raising the price paid to cane; the price ($1.35 pesos per kg., wholesale) was in effect
until 1970, at the cost of tremendous government subsidies, and contributed to a
destabilization of the industry which ultimately prompted direct state takeover of sugar
mills (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990). Despite favorable sugar prices on the world market,
export earnings did not offset the effect of the freeze placed on the domestic price of
sugar. The response of mill owners reveals their growing apprehension about the

expanding role of the state in the sugar sector (Purcell 1981). This policy culminated in

 

”U.S. cancellation of the Cuban sugar quota after 1960 was a primary cause of increased exports of
Mexican sugar.

 

87
loss of proﬁtability for sugar mills, decapitalization of the industry, and increasing debt
(Crespo et al. 1990; Purcell 1981).

From 1969 on, production declined as private owners decapitalized their mills.
Sixteen mills possessed modern equipment, 29 were semi-obsolete, and 19 completely
obsolete. Three sugar mills closed and some 40,000 hectares were taken out of cane
production (Jimenez 1986). Of the 65 mills in the country, 24 were economically
inviable and 45 % were near bankruptcy. Between 50-60% of caﬁeros were in debt in
1967 (Pare 1987) and in 1969, the capital deﬁcit of the industry amounted to $1.2 to 1.8
billion pesos (Crespo et al. 1990). This crisis of stagnation was to last until 1982.

In 1965, the state assumed ownership of two sugar mills and built three new mills.
The decade of the 1970s is noted for substantial state intervention in the economy and
the growth of parastatal industries; these events represent a signiﬁcant change in the role
of the state in the sugar industry (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990). As the state assumed
ownership of failing and obsolete sugar mills, its participation in production of sugar
increased from 14% in 1967, to 33.7% in 1974, and 72.1% in 1982 (Crespo et al.
1988). Eighteen sugar mills, accounting for 30% of national production, had been
incorporated into the public sector by 1969 (Purcell 1981). The government attempted
to rescue the sugar industry through extension of credit for new mill equipment, which
private mill owners tended to invest in more lucrative sectors of the economy.
Consequently, mills continued to become decapitalized from 1970-75, and mill owners
were unable to repay the enormous amounts of credit subsidized by the state. The price
0f sugar, frozen below the real cost of production, impeded capital accumulation within
the sector (Jimenez 1986). Internal demand for sugar grew from 1.5 million tons in
1967 to 3.25 million in 1982. Mexico suspended its exports in 1976, after 25 years as
a sugar exporter. Whereas in 1970 Mexico was the third largest producer in Latin

America, huge imports were required after 1980 (Crespo et al. 1988; Purcell 1981).

88

Rapidly rising domestic consumption of sugar threatened to eliminate an important
source of foreign exchange and the retreat of private mill owners from the sector implied
a breakdown in the system of control over the peasantry. Prior to statization of sugar
mills, sugar entrepreneurs were charged with controlling peasant producers on behalf of
the state; in turn, they were given control of the sugar market (Purcell 1981). Political
unrest among peasants prompted Echeverrfa (1970-1976) to institute social reforms,
especially via federal expenditures to the peasant sector (Goulet 1983). The preservation
of sugar mills was essential to prevent undermining the economic base of rural
communities, potential unemployment of thousands of peasants, and destabilization of the
peasantry. The state had sacriﬁced private interests in order to assume direct control in
the context of political constraints exerted by the popular classes (Purcell 1981).

The ﬁrst restructuring of the sugar industry took place between 1970—75. Echeverria
raised the price of sugar 48.3% in 1970 (to $2.15 pesos per kg.) for the ﬁrst time since
the 1958 price freeze. His objectives were: to end government subsidies, pay the
foreign debt, guarantee the economic viability of sugar mills, increase sugar production,
and increase income of cane producers (Jimenez 1987). The increased price would also
lure peasants back who had turned to more lucrative crops (Purcell 1981). Echeverria
created the CNIA (Comisidn Nacional de la Industria Azucarera) in 1970 as a federal
organization to coordinate and administer the sugar industry. It would incorporate three
branches, UNPASA, FINASA, and ONISA (Operadora Nacional de Ingenios, S.A.).
UNPASA was originally formed by private mill owners and supported by government
subsidies (del Villar 1976); its functions had expanded by the 1940s, giving it much
power as the only supplier of sugar to the domestic market and as a credit institution for
mill owners, who in turn served as creditors to cane producers (Purcell 1981). UNPASA
was now vertically integrated into the larger state organization. State control of sugar

Prices, its ﬁnancial support to UNPASA, and its growing participation in the

C0:
Mi

Mi:

sulfa

File

89

management of UNPASA reduced the organization’s capacity for self—sufﬁciency in
ﬁnancing, thus opening the way for sugar mills to pass to the hands of the state (del
Villar 1976). UNPASA became a mechanism for state control of the sugar industry in
1948 when the government assumed control of its executive council (Purcell 1981). The
director of Financiera Nacional replaced Aardn saenz in 1953 and representatives from
the Banco de Mexico and the Banco de Comercio Exterior further broadened the state’s
presence in the organization (Crespo et a1. 1990). In 1971, the state removed the credit
functions of UNPASA, leaving it responsible for distribution and commercialization of
sugar (Jimenez 1987).

Control of credit was now placed with FINASA. The government acquired
FINASA from the mill owners in 1966. FINASA began as a private bank, became a
national credit institution with government ﬁnancing, and would now be the channel to
ﬁnance the industry (del Villar 1976; Purcell 1981). FINASA was given exclusive
responsibility for providing credit to the sugar sector, and sugar mills were reduced to
a mere channel of credit to cane producers (Jimenez 1987). ONISA was to manage all
state—owned mills, signifying direct state control in the production of sugar (Crespo et
al. 1990; del Villar 1976).

Given this context, sugar industrialists continued to decapitalize their operations,
rather than repair the obsolescent mill equipment (Jimenez 1987). The potential closing
of sugar mills threatened to displace thousands of rural workers, and undermine the
economic base of rural communities, which employs over 12 % of the economically
active population. The state terminated its partnership with private mill owners to
Preserve political stability in the rural area and gradually assumed direct control of sugar
mills. Near the end of Echeverria’s presidency in 1975, 31 of the 65 mills were state-

Owned, accounting for 50% of national sugar production (Purcell 1981).

Five years of state restructuring failed to extract the sugar industry from its crisis;

55573

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.
b

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ugh! 9,.

LIL .\

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90
several factors contributed to this failure: state control of the price of sugar, increasing
costs of production, disincentive prompting caﬁeros to turn to other crops, and the fact
that the state had acquired the most mechanically inefﬁcient mills (del Villar 1976). The
government embarked on further restructuring (referred to as ”restructuring of the
restructuring") in 1975 to increase production to meet demands for internal consumption
and for export (Purcell 1981).

To meet these ends, the government published a new Decreto Caﬁero which
abrogated the 1943-44 decrees. The 1975 decree changed the formula for ﬁxing the
price of cane. The price ($75 pesos/ton, an increase of 50% from 1970) was now to be
determined by sucrose content rather than weight, the proportion of which was correlated
with guaranteed prices for other products such as rice, maize, beans, sorghum, and
soybeans. This measure removed the burden of capital accumulation from inefﬁcient
sugar mills and placed it on ﬁeld yield of the producers (J iménez 1987).

The new decree called for direct provision of credit through FINASA, rather than
being channeled through mill owners. This was to give producers more freedom in
decision-making vis-a-vis the mill; however, as the state assumed control of mills in the
19703, the new mill owner and ﬁnancier of credit came to coincide once again. An
additional provision created the Comisiones de Planeacién y Operacion de la Zafra,
which were to give cane producers a role in decision making (J iménez 1987). The latter
would link caﬁeros directly to the government through a tripartite representation of
caﬁeros, mill owners, and the state. As the majority of mills were managed by the state,
however, the caﬁeros were outvoted two to one (Purcell 1981). The CNIA (Comisién
Nacional de la Industria Azucarera) was created, and assumed control over all aspects
of the sugar sector, serving as both creditor and debtor of the industry (del Villar 1976).

The 1975 decree failed to achieve its objectives and Mexico lost its export capacity

91

in 1976; from 1976-85, Mexico was a net importer of sugar (GEPLACEA 1990).23
Only 13 mills underwent renovation and 33 of the 69 mills in 1981—82 obtained factory
yields below the guaranteed 8.3% (Jimenez 1987). The price freeze, coupled with an
inﬂation rate of 108%, prompted a second wave of state takeovers in 1977 (Crespo et
al. 1988). In 1982, of the 52 mills in the state sector (out of a total of 69), 71%
experienced losses (Crespo et al. 1990). As the state assumed increasing control over
sugar mills from 1971 to 1980, subsidies to the sector rose 700% (Jimenez 1987).
Subsidies were on the order of $4.4 billion pesos in 1971, rising to $22.1 billion in 1975
(del Villar 1976).

Mexico’s petroleum resources allowed L6pez Portillo (1976-1982) to continue the
populist policies of Echeverria. Peasant sectors were supported through extension of
credit to non-irrigated districts, provision of basic human needs such as health, education,
and welfare, and the program Sistema Alimentaria Mexicana which ensured government
subsidized prices for basic foods, with the objective of food self-sufﬁciency (Spalding
1985; Rello 1986). The need to balance attention to the masses and to not alienate elites,
however, is present in the Ley de Fomento Agropecuario (Agricultural and Livestock
Development Law) of 1979, which for the ﬁrst time made legitimate the association
between ejidatarios and private capital, creating the conditions for further exploitation of
ejidal lands by the rural bourgeoisie (Spalding 1985; Rello 1986). Nonetheless, state
subsidies to peasant production led industrialists and bankers to demand the elimination
of state price controls and many reacted by contributing to massive capital ﬂight. Lopez
Portillo’s nationalization of private banks prior to the end of his term represents a direct
State attack on the most powerful economic groups in the country. This action elucidates

the fact that the state is not a mere instrument of the dominant capitalist classes

 

 

23From 1980-83, imports of 2.5 million tons amounted to 23.4% of total production.

92
(Hamilton 1984, 1982).

Further restructuring of the sugar industry was realized under the administration of
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88). The complex, hierarchical relations shared among the
three directive agencies--CNIA, UNPASA, and FINASA were combined by a 1983
presidential decree into a single entity, Azricar, S.A. de C.V. (Crespo et al. 1990).
During this period, Mexico achieved self—sufﬁciency in sugar. The gains were
promising: the number of hectares of cane increased from 454,000 to 558,000, sucrose
content of cane rose from 11.3% to 12.2%, the amount of sugar produced per hectare
of cane increased from 5.9 to 6.4 tons, factory yield improved from 8.4% to 9.7%, and
lost time in factory dropped from 33.6% to 26.2%. At a time when demand for sugar
increased 2.4%, annual growth in the sugar sector was 4.4%. In 1987, the sugar sector
generated 14.7% ($79.5 million dollars U.S.) of all foreign exchange earned from
agroindustrial exports. Sugar exports in 1985 had been 3.1% of national production, but
by 1988 comprised 27.5% (Crespo et al. 1990). Mexico’s reentry into the world sugar
market was thus accomplished while the sector was under state control. After

privatization of the industry in 1988, Mexico became a net importer once again:

 

Table 1. Sugar Imports and Exports, 1982-89.

 

lea: Imam: Ewart: Heritage

1982 538,284 16,500 - 521,784
1983 833,220 14,685 — 818,535
1984 273,455 0 - 273,455
1985 0 66,194 + 66,194
1986 0 219,156 + 219,156
1987 0 518,455 + 518,455
1988 0 1,014,481 +1,014,481
1989 597,449 334,184 - 263,265

 

(source: GEPLACEA)

After Mexico’s reentry into the world market in 1985, the government embarked on

 

Tr,

7",,“

93
the Programa de Reconversidn de la Industria Azucarera Paraestatal (1986), to modernize
the industry, increase its competitiveness, attain ﬁnancial autonomy of the sector, and to
reduce state participation from 76% to 50% (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990). Crespo’s
evaluation of this situation just two years before the sector was privatized is relevant:

In this, the fundamental [issue] revolves around the capacity of the State to

maintain its directorship of the management of the sugar industry and its

capacity to support. . .especially the cane producers -- so they adopt actions
conducive to an intensiﬁcation of productivity...(translated from Crespo et al.

1988: 134)

State control of the sector, however, was to be short-lived. In 1988, in response to
the economic crisis, Miguel de la Madrid made a decision to divest and decontrol the
sugar industry. Privatization of the sugar sector constituted a crucial element in Salinas
de Gortari’s development policy. In 1990, he asked sugar producers to redouble their
efforts to convert the sector into one of the pillars of industrial transformation in the
country (Ilanbando Caﬁa 1990 (17):23). Privatization of the entire sugar sector was
complete by 1992. This subject will be taken up in the following chapter. The

remainder of this chapter presents the historical background of the research region.

Historical Change Within the Research Region

Colima held a peripheral status to the prime sugar-producing regions of Mexico.
Nonetheless, it experienced similar processes in the establishment of sugar cane
production, control of labor, and the dialectic relationship between the state, private
entrepreneurs, and peasants. The unfolding history of Ingenio Queserfa and the
communities of Chiapa and Ocotillo reveals how peasants of this region are inserted into
national and global histories and processes, and their role in creating those histories.
magnum

Ranching, rather than sugar cane, was the predominant economic activity in the

province of Colima in the colonial period, yet due to the early introduction of sugar cane,

94
the research community of Chiapa and the zone of the Queseria sugar mill shared with
other cane-producing zones the presence of mechanisms for the control of land, labor,
and capital: encomienda, repartimiento, the ubiquitous haciendas, and a landed elite who
exploited indigenous labor through their monopoly control of land.

The conquest of Colima by the Spaniards was accomplished in 1523. Cortes gave
the ﬁrst order for encomiendas in Colima in 1523, after which 19 were granted; by 1554,
numerous encomiendas were present in the province. A 1532 document indicates 48
encomenderos, 85 pueblos in encomienda (out of a total of 112 pueblos), and 4925
indigenous tribute payers in Colima (Sevilla del Rio 1986). When the Oidor (royal
judge), Lorenzo Lebron de Quiiiones, visited Colima in 1551-54, the encomienda of
Chiapa had already been granted to Jorge Carillo, who also held encomiendas in
Tecocitlan e1 viejo, Tecocitlan el nuevo, Motempacoyan, and Amatlan. The encomienda
of Chiapa later developed into a hacienda. This hacienda was expropriated during the
agrarian reform, forming the two ejidos that are the subject of this investigation, Felipe
Chavez (pertaining to the community of Chiapa) and Vicente Pinto (pertaining to the
community of Ocotillo) (Sevilla del Rio 1986).

Upon conquest, a large indigenous population existed in Colima to supply a labor
force (Saur 1990). Nonetheless, decimation of the population by conquest, excessive
labor demands of mines and plantations, disease, and hunger created a desperate need for
labor (Saur 1990; Sevilla del Rio 1986). Lebrén wrote in his report to the Spanish
crown:

...the natives. ..have begun to die like ﬂies, without being able to say of what,

or why. . .at the cost of the life of the natives, who when they ran out of their

miserable food, which they take from ﬂour ground from the maize, eat tree

roots and water, and this way they die... In many hamlets where these things

are seen, those that do not die...so the women do not get pregnant...and if

some do, they kill the fetuses before they are born, so they say, [because] they

do not want to see their children in captivity and servitude like themselves
(translated from Saur 1990:134).

 

95

The native population of the Villa de Colima had been reduced from 10,000 in the
early years of contact to 40-50 by 1551. Slow recuperation is indicated by the fact that
in the 18th century, many African slaves were brought to Colima by Bartolomé de
Cossio (Oseguera 1979). These facts suggest that labor scarcity may have been greater
in Colima than in the nation as a whole.

The ﬁrst agricultural activities introduced by the Spaniards were cacao and cattle-
raising. In the 15503, sugar cane was cultivated in the neighboring states of Jalisco and
Michoacan (Quinto 1990). Navarro (n.d.) reports cultivation of cane in Colima as early
as 1569, although there were few mills due to lack of demand and markets. In 1596,
Chiapa (known in ancient times as Tepetlatlan) was given as a merced to Hernando de
Alvarado by the Conde de Monterrey, viceroy of New Spain. This ranch bordered La
Capacha to the south; La Capacha (also known as Nuestra Seﬁora de San Juan) was given
as a merced to Alonso Carrillo de Guzman in 1584. Jesuits from Tepotzotlan bought the
lands from Carrillo de Guzman in 1617. The lands of Chiapa were bought by the Conde
de Regla don Pedro Romero de Terreros in 1778, then containing six cattle ranches.
These lands stretched from Villa de Colima to La Lecheria, the present day Queseria
(Sevilla del Rio 1986). The control of vast landed estates by a rural elite thus had deep
historical roots in Colima.

La Capacha was a ranch until 1661 when Alonso de Avila Alvarado founded a
trapiche for the manufacture of sugar and panocha (ungranulated sugar, usually shaped
into cones, and frequently used in the production of aguardiente). In 1722, Juan Ruiz
Quintero bought La Capacha, improved the trapiche, and planted most of the land in
sugar cane. He sold it to Nicolas de Salcedo in 1753, after which it passed in 1789 to
his son Jose Trinidad Salcedo, and to Modesto de Herrera in 1801 . La Capacha was thus
privately owned throughout the 18th century and in 1817 , Gonzalo de Evia y Argiielles
and his wife Maria de Estrada sold the land and trapiche to Antonio de Biana y Ocampo.

96
The haciendas of La Capacha and Chiapa were acquired by Miguel Alvarez Garcia in the
19th century (Sevilla del Rio 1986). Alvarez constructed the present hacienda of Chiapa
in 1886 (Oseguera 1979).

Hacienda Queseria (Albarrada), precursor to the present day sugar mill, was founded
by friars in 1776 (Quinto 1990). Navarro (n.d.) indicates that the estancia (ranch) of La
Queseria was founded by Dominican monks. The principal economic activity of
Queseria was cattle raising; cheeses from Queseria arrived at the royal table in Spain
("queseria" is the Spanish word for cheese dairy). A trapiche was installed in 1776 for
the production of piloncillo and alcohol (Navarro n.d.). Piloncillo was sold locally, but
cheese production continued to be the primary activity. The hacienda owned 1925
hectares; by 1846, the two major sugar mills in Colima were that of Queseria and
Ajuchitlan, which produced 226,800 kg. of sugar (Quinto 1990).

Cane expanded in the region of Colima in the 17th century, with trapiches operated
by Spaniards, as well as by indigenous inhabitants and mestizos. Around 1750, there
were 300 mills and trapiches in the state (Quinto 1990). Growth of the internal market
and a high domestic price for sugar in the 17th century also contributed to this
development (von Wobeser 1988). The production of Colima supplied Guadalajara and
Zacatecas (Landazuri and vazquez 1988). While the number of licenses grew in the 17th
century, this number diminished in the 18th century due to increasing control exerted
over the sugar industry by the Spanish Crown (Quinto 1990).

in lim

Once independence was achieved, Chiapa would continue to hold an important place
in the history of the state. Quinto (1990) indicates that in 1846, the population of Colima
was 61,827, 4.5% of which lived in haciendas. There were 20 haciendas in Colima at
this time. Much of Colima’s history would involve conﬂicts between Church and state

that were to profoundly affect both the Chiapa and Queseria haciendas after Mexico

97
achieved its independence from Spain.

Colima after the war of independence evokes the hegemonic conditions of the
Reforma and the Porﬁriato through the powerful Alvarez family which established the
hacienda in Chiapa, and efforts of Francisco Santa Cruz to expand and modernize the
sugar mill at Queseria. These represented diverse forms of production, yet both
rudimentary trapiche and modernized sugar mill required the implementation of a system
of debt peonage upon which capital accumulation of the period was based.

Colima’s ﬁrst governor, Gen. Manuel Alvarez (1800-1857), was assassinated in
1857, during the period of the Reforma. The assassination occurred as he attempted to
suppress rebels who were protesting the 1857 Constitution and demonstrating for the
protection of "religion and ﬁleros" (fueros are religious privileges). Alvarez was the
father of Miguel Alvarez (known as ”Capacha”; 1847-1910) who in 1886 built the
hacienda that still stands in Chiapa. The son of Miguel Alvarez, Miguel Alvarez Garcia
(1883-1933), became governor from 1919-23 and promoted sugar cane production at the
hacienda. He, in turn, was the father of Griselda Alvarez Ponce de Leon,“ the ﬁrst
woman governor (1979-85) in Mexico. This family is illustrative of the positions of
power and wealth held by sugar-producing hacendados.

The period of the Porﬁriato in Colima shares many features with other parts of
Mexico. In 1880, the pueblo of Queseria, had 1132 inhabitants, the second largest
concentration of people in the state (Quinto 1990). Its population grew along with the
expansion of cane and increasing need for labor by the sugar mill (Navarro n.d.).
Hacienda Queseria was sold in 1884 to C01. Francisco Santa Cruz and three Ochoa
brothers, Tiburcio, Ricardo, and Guillermo, who formed the company Santa Cruz y

Ochoa, Cia. (Quinto 1990). Santa Cruz, a Porﬁrian politico, also owned Hacienda La

 

“Griselda Alvarez lived at the Chiapa hacienda as a child and is personally known by many residents.

 

98
Magdalena, El Serrano, La Albarradita, J ayamita, and Cuyutlan. Cattle production
declined as the Santa Cruz family dedicated themselves to the more lucrative sugar
production (Navarro n.d.). It was Santa Cruz who installed the small ingenio (sugar
mill) in the hacienda (Caso 1987) to produce piloncillo for the local market. Ingenio
Queseria also produced alcohol at this time (Navarro n.d.).

Improved transportation was a key feature of the expansionary growth of sugar cane
production during the Porﬁriato. Santa Cruz, Governor of Colima in 1871-73 and 1880-
83, was personally selected for govemorship again by Porﬁrio Diaz in 1893, a term
which lasted until 1895 (Guzman 1988). Santa Cruz, as proprietor of Ingenio Queseria,
initiated the rail line between Manzanillo and Armeria in 1880. Construction of the
railroad that connected Manzanillo to Colima began in 1881, arriving in Colima by 1889
(Oseguera 1979). Once the rail system reached Alzada, sugar and alcohol were
transported to a warehouse and from there by rail (Navarro n.d.). The rail system
remained supplemented by roads for horse-drawn carts and mule teams driven by arrieros
(mule drivers) who transported sugar from Trapiche, Buenavista, Chiapa, Nogueras, San
Antonio, and Queseria to the interior of the country (Oseguera 1979).

The Porﬁriato also gave impulse to cane production when the price of sugar rose
from 10 pesos/quintal in 1868 to 19 pesos in 1875. This encouraged foreign penetration
of the sugar industry, in the provision of capital goods, which has a long history in
Colima. By 1870, Colima had imported machinery from Hamburg, Germany to distill
cane juice and steam engines and boilers from England. Three sugar mills were
producing sugar in 1886, Nogueras, with a steam motor, and Queseria and Agua Zarca,
powered by hydraulic wheel. Electricity was installed at Ingenio Queseria in 1895,
powered by a small generator run by a hydraulic turbine and an aqueduct provided water
to the sugar mill. Around 1910, the hacienda had installed steam-driven motors. The
boilers were fueled both by wood and bagazo (the foliage from the cane plant). The use

99
of wood contributed to deforestation of the area, although the blame for this process is
shared with the paper-processing plant at Atentique, Jalisco (Navarro n.d.).

Hacienda Queseria at this time maintained a tienda de raya, or company store,
which sold basic goods to its workers.” The mayordomo gave "vales" to purchase
items in the store; this amount was deducted from the weekly wages, paid at 35 centavos
per day (Navarro n.d.). The hacienda of Queseria offered land to peasants for
sharecropping of maize and beans, a common practice in the late 18003. At harvest, the
renter paid the hacendado 10 fanegas of maize seed for one fanega of land and 12
fanegas of maize for rental of a team of draft animals. The amount of land was usually
less than one hectare; seed and tools were provided in exchange for a portion of the crop.
The maize stubble after the harvest provided feed for the cattle of the hacendado. In
addition, the hacendado paid wage labor to cultivate maize, wheat, rice, and camote for
the hacienda (Quinto 1990). These labor practices are similar to attempts noted above
during the Porﬁriato to intensify the hacienda’s utilization of the labor force.

While the Porﬁrian sugar mill expanded and modernized, there were many small
trapiches at this time in the area of the research villages. These trapiches are indicative
of wide variation in the forms of sugar production. The old Ocotillo had a small
trapiche, powered by animals, to make panocha. In the years before agrarian reform,
most peasants worked as wage laborers for the hacienda in Chiapa. Unlike other sugar-
producing regions, Colima maintained a relatively diversiﬁed production system during

the Porﬁriato, for sugar cane was not a principal crop in Colima in the 18703 (Quinto

 

2‘Prices in 1920 were: sugar 8 centavos/kg, maize 3¢/kg., beans 10¢lkg., rice 10¢lkg., meat 12¢lkg.,
coffee 6¢loz, alcohol 30¢ll., petroleum 1C/l., huaraches 5¢/pair, sombreros 10¢, and blankets lZC/meter
(Navarro n.d.).

100
1990).“

Important changes occurred at the Chiapa hacienda after it was inherited by Miguel
Alvarez Garcia in 1910. Peasants report that the younger Alvarez employed many
workers, this being practically the only source of wage labor. Workers in the trapiche
and cane ﬁelds, at the sound of the church bell, lined up each morning except Sunday
to be assigned their work by the mayordomo. When Miguel Alvarez was owner, around
100 peasants were employed to work in the cane ﬁelds from 6:00 am. to 6:00 pm.
Wages were 50 centavos per day and increased to one peso in 1938. About 25-30 people
were employed to work at the trapiche in three six-hour shifts. The work was difﬁcult
and hazardous. Wood and cane foliage were burned to provide steam for the boiler.
The trapiche made alcohol, panocha or piloncillo--shaped into round bars or small cones-
-and cachasa, an inexpensive, black sugar product made from the foam of the boiled
sugar juice. Contemporary residents remember the vigorous activity of the pueblo in
these days, when the trapiche employed many people, generated money, and was busy
with the movement of workers.

The tienda de raya at Chiapa sold supplies such as corn, beans, chilies, rice, lard,
and clothing. On Saturdays tickets for purchasing these items were distributed, according
to the number of days worked, each value being represented by a different color. Meat
was available only on Saturdays when a cow was slaughtered. Workers were given
rations of corn and beans and were provided with houses constructed of pole and cane
leaves. Alvarez also rented out a portion of hacienda land to local peasants. Peasants
complain that the owner would let them graze cows on hacienda lands, but the calves

born to them were appropriated by the hacendado. Some peasants refer to the Alvarez

 

2“Production of piloncillo and sugar was 102 tons in the state (.15 % of national production), compared
to 39,100 tons for maize, 1770 for rice, 1500 for cotton, 900 for coffee, 534 for beans, and 395 for chile

(Quinto 1990).

101
family as ”caciques” and claim workers were ill-treated; others remember the younger
Miguel Alvarez as having treated them well. Regardless, the hacendado made loans to
peasants for expenses, medical care, and so forth, perpetuating a system of debt peonage.
-r v 1 ' n ri in lim

The revolutionary war brought federal troops to Colima to ﬁght the forces of Pancho
Villa. The rebels took refuge in a ranch known as El Frijol (today pertaining to Ocotillo)
and government soldiers burned the houses of the peasants. Peasants were tortured and
hung, for many who worked at the Chiapa hacienda were villistas. Peasants in the
hamlets at this time "planted with thousands of sacriﬁces, always alert, and risking [their
life]" (a peasant). A carpenter from the Chiapa hacienda was accused by government
troops of aiding the villistas; although they threatened to hang him, he managed to
escape. Thus, while the revolution in Colima remained distanced from its heartland in
Morelos, it called for personal sacriﬁce on the part of peasants in Colima as well.

As will be shown, agrarian reform brought profound structural change to the state
of Colima. Although peasants met repression at the hands of the landed oligarchy, their
resistance and struggle for land was supported by the state. The redistribution of land
to peasants spelled disaster for the agroindustry; thus, in the 19403, ofﬁcial policy
established zones for the production of sugar cane, and in response to world market
demand in the 19603, forced smaller mills and trapiches out of competition with the
larger sugar mills.

By the time the turmoil of the revolution was ending in the 19203, primary sugar-
producing haciendas in the state of Colima included Buenavista, Chiapa, El C6bano, E1
Trapiche, Nogueras, Queseria, and San Antonio (Oseguera 1979). After the death of
Francisco Santa Cruz in 1902, the family sold Hacienda Queseria to Ignacio and José
Gutierrez (Navarro n.d.). In 1926, Hacienda Queseria was owned by Bernardo,

Guillermo and Octavio Escobosa Canalizo. When the early phase of agrarian reform

102
began to affect hacienda lands, the Escobosas sold the hacienda to Francisco Prieto
Menocal and Teodoro Kunhard (Caso 1987; Quinto 1990).27 In 1933, Prieto Menocal
formed the Compaﬁia Agricola Jalisciense, S.C.P.A. (Quinto 1990). This company,
comprised of Manuel sanchez Aldana and Pablo Okuysen Deleze, with Prieto Menocal
as president, constituted the industrial association that managed the sugar mill (Navarro
n.d.).

Agrarian reform would bring about a major structural change to sugar production
in Colima, affecting the relation between ﬁeld and factory. Cane production was
removed from the hands of hacendados, the dominant economic class at the time, and
placed into the hands of ejidatarios. Colima is unique in the early redistribution of
hacienda lands between 1916-33 (15 ejidos were formed during these years and 38
between 1938-40) (Navarro n.d.).

A committee petitioned land in 1931 for the formation of ejido Queseria to beneﬁt
58 ejidatarios (Navarro n.d.). This case is unique in that the petition was supported by
the hacendado of Queseria, Prieto Menocal. Since peasants in other ejidos did not want
to cultivate cane, Prieto Menocal’s objective was to secure the land for Ejido Queseria
where workers, organized into a syndicate, signed an agreement with the owner to
continue cane production. A group of mill workers, formed into a workers’ syndicate
supported by Ejido Queseria, also petitioned lands. Hacienda owners opposed this
movement and formed a "guardia blanca" , which terrorized and murdered several
workers. They were granted 5395 hectares of land, however, in 1938 (Navarro n.d.;

Quinto n.d.).

 

27Navarro (n.d.) reports the sale of Hacienda Queseria to the Prieto Menocal family (Francisco, Jorge,
Celia, Pedro, Margarita), Hermosillo Prieto, and Teodoro Campos Kunhard in 1935.

.
0'
1v

CDT:

103

Before redistribution, the mill controlled 8000 hectares; Prieto Menocal submitted
a written petition requesting that 697 irrigated hectares be left unaffected to keep the mill
running. The hacienda was expropriated by presidential resolution on September 23,
1936, and 647 hectares of the Compariia Agricola J alisciense lands were distributed to
the ejido of Queseria. Ejido Queseria received an additional 300 hectares from the estate
of Salvador Ochoa (Quinto n.d.; 1990). When the agrarian reform took place, the
Queseria sugar mill had a maximum capacity of 200 tons of cane and 20,000 kg. of sugar
per day. The harvests of 1934, 1935, and 1936 showed substantial increases in
production from 8250 tons, 11,000 tons, to 19,000 tons, respectively (Quinto 1990).
After agrarian reform, Ingenio Queseria was left with the factory, and 35 irrigated
hectares (Quinto n.d.; 1990). By 1937, the mill was threatened with closure due to lack
of cane (Navarro n.d.).

Agrarian reform had a signiﬁcant impact on the research communities as well. The
community of Ocotillo did not exist until the lands of Hacienda Chiapa were redistributed
in 1935, forming it as a separate ejido. Rather, the region prior to agrarian reform was
made up of numerous small hamlets, comprised of pole and thatch houses. Around
1910, a cluster of six or seven houses was located somewhat to the south of present day
Ocotillo. The community of Chiapa had only some 15-20 residents living outside the
hacienda in 1930. Some people moved into Chiapa in the early 19303 seeldng work at
the hacienda, which provided much employment during the cane harvest.

At the end of the 19th century, Hacienda Chiapa, in the hands of the elder Miguel
Alvarez, was dedicated to cattle raising. He also owned the haciendas La Capacha and
El Chical. After his death in 1910, he left El Chical to his sons Manuel and Higinio
Alvarez, but their cattle-raising enterprise soon failed. To Carlos and Chabela Alvarez,
he left La Capacha, and the junior Miguel Alvarez inherited Hacienda Chiapa. Lacking

experience and the guidance of their father, the younger Alvarez generation eventually

104

lost their cattle and landholdings. Miguel Alvarez lost the hacienda a few years before
his death in 1933. After facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties, Alvarez went to his friend Luis
Brisuela28 and asked for a loan. Unable to repay the loan, Brisuela took over the
hacienda, bringing Doiia Carmen Ochoa (his purported mistress) to oversee the hacienda.

Peasants of Chiapa and Ocotillo organized to petition for ejidos in 1932. Most of
these leaders had been landless peasants who cultivated corn and beans. Eluterio Garcia,
leader of the group that had successfully petitioned an ejido for Cuauhtémoc, came to
Chiapa to encourage his friend Felipe Chavez to organize and petition lands for Chiapa.
One of the ejido founders reﬂected, ”He came and opened our eyes about the ejido, that
we should have a piece of land to work, and from it, sustain the family, because the rich
ones had us with their foot against our throats". Because of their fear of the landholders,
the leaders of Chiapa and Ocotillo held their meetings in the ravines. The leaders of this
movement were Felipe Chavez, Vicente Pinto Cortes, Natividad Aguilar, and Petronilo
Saucedo L6pez. The petition for ejidos was submitted October 10, 1932. In June, 1935,
government ofﬁcials came from Mexico City to meet with peasants regarding the pending
grant of the ejido. Those listed on the petition were marked by the landowner.

Carmen Ochoa was still owner of the haciendas in La Estancia and Chiapa when the
agrarian reform took place in 1935. The hacienda owner partitioned the lands among a
number of persons,29 an act that was later judged by authorities to be contrived for the
purpose of avoiding application of the agrarian reform. When the ﬁrst petitions were
made, Carmen Ochoa hired assassins to eliminate the petitioners. The government

provided peasants with 7mm carbines to defend themselves, allowing them to confront

 

z“Brisuela was one of the richest men in Colima and owned haciendas in La Estancia, El Zapote, plus
lands in seven other areas.

2’I‘he partitioning of lands was done on paper only, a practice referred to in Mexico as the use of
'prestanombres"

105
the rural landed elite. The assassins broke into the homes of the leaders, and bound and
carried Felipe Chavez, Vicente Pinto, and Jesr’rs Saucedo from their houses in the middle
of the night. They carried the three agrarian leaders north three kilometers to El Cedillo,
and shot them. On the way, they killed Cleto Bautista as well. By the time relatives
found the bodies, they had been dismembered by coyotes and were being eaten by
vultures.

Petronilo Saucedo, brother of J esr’rs was assassinated one year later while harvesting
corn; Jose Saucedo, ejido founder and brother of Petronilo, escaped being gunned down
along with his brother. Natividad Aguilar, the ﬁrst president of the ejido in Ocotillo,
was murdered in 1938 and Ramon Avalos, son of another ejido founder, Ignacio Avalos,
was murdered in 1941. A senor Lara, Anastasio Gutierrez, and Severo Gutierrez met
similar fates in Chiapa. Despite this repression of these petitioners, peasant resistance--
and their support by the Mexican state-brought about major structural changes to rural
villages.

On December 10, 1935, 528 hectares of land forming Ejido Felipe Chavez were
distributed to the community of Chiapa and on December 25, 1935, 800 hectares forming
Ejido Vicente Pinto were distributed to Ocotillo. Only 19 of the 37 petitioners in
Ocotillo remained to receive ejido lands. The remainder had ﬂed out of fear and those
that remained lived in constant terror. Fifty-two persons were on the list to receive
rights in Ejido Felipe Chavez in Chiapa. The interest of these new ejidatarios was in
planting corn, beans, rice, camote, and jicama--not sugar cane.

The 1943 government decree aimed at converting subsistence producers into
producers for the capitalist sugar mills. Although some caﬁeros claim that the 1943
decree did not result in pressure by the government to plant sugar cane, it was in 1944
that massive expansion of cane in Colima commenced. At the time of the decree,

Ingenio Queseria comprised 1166 hectares, including ﬁve ejidos. Queseria was ofﬁcially

 

1‘ un-vr V Y

 

__ —‘4I

 

MB

:1

106
registered as an ingenio (sugar mill) in 1945 (Navarro n.d.).
In the 19303-503, cane remained the most important agroindustrial crop in the
northeastern section of the state (Quinto 1990). Agricultural production in Colima

changed dramatically between 1945-1952:

 

Table 2. Crop Production in Colima, 1945-52.

 

Qua 1925—125 _ons_25_T 12
sugar cane 46,370 114,830
maize 40,868 46,713
limes 16,984 12,537
bananas 9,844 25,796
sesame seed 2,813 2,311
rice 2,178 5,385
coconut oil 798 800
beans 787 750
coffee 147 146
coconuts 221 111i

 

‘millions of coconuts
(source: Quinto 1990)

The year 1950 marked a period of destabilization in the sugar industry; liquidation
prices were low for producers and agricultural inputs difﬁcult to acquire. Mill owners
received economic ﬁnancing from the Compaﬁia Agricola J aliciense and modernization
of the Queseria mill began in 1952. Petroleum now replaced wood for ﬁring the boilers
(thus reducing deforestation) and electric motors replaced the steam motors. The mill
was sold again in 1953 to Lie. Carlos Septién Montes and Jose Seone Cabrera. Septién
Montes, a ﬁnancier, also owned the sugar mills of San Marcos, Jalisco and San Pedro,
Veracruz. According to Arturo Navarro, ”The previous owners were no longer
interested, they were weary of the many problems of agrarianism and labor union
movements” (Arturo Navarro, personal interview). Peasant and worker demands thus
forced the retreat of mill owners, and as will be shown below, the retreat of trapiche

operators from production. Production doubled the ﬁrst three years under Septién

 

107
Montes, from 5000 to 10,000 tons of sugar. In 1958, Ingenio Queseria was dismantled
and new machinery was installed (Caso 1987; Navarro n.d.). Under Septién Montes, the
mill reached a capacity of 4000 tons of cane per day, having achieved a major expansion
in both factory and ﬁeld.

Production was to become signiﬁcantly restructured in the area of the Chiapa
hacienda as well. Carmen Ochoa had abandoned the hacienda from 1936-41; it
eventually passed to the hands of Juan Ceballos. Ceballos used the hacienda as a cattle
ranch from 1941-58, during which time many peasants were without work. In 1944,
Ceballos brought the Cdrdenas family to oversee the hacienda and care for his cattle.
The Cardenas family put the trapiche back into operation around 195 8; the elder
Cardenas became administrator and his son served as mayordomo. The hacienda
employed ﬁfty workers during the harvest, ten to labor in the trapiche, and forty to cut
cane. The Cardenas’ continued the practice of sharecropping, giving peasants a cash
advance to work land, and receiving a return when they harvested their crops. As in
earlier days, peasants were in perpetual debt to the mayordomo.

Once the trapiche was put back into operation, the small amount of sugar cane
planted on ejido land was delivered to the hacienda at Chiapa, but ejidatarios soon
commenced delivering their cane to Ingenio Queseria. Manuel Barragan, comisariado
of Ocotillo, planted the ﬁrst cane in Ocotillo and rented parcelas of other ejidatarios to
grow sugar cane. He had received credit from the sugar mill and was the ﬁrst to sell
cane to Ingenio Queseria. Events in the world market soon provided impulse for other
ejidatarios to plant sugar cane.

The U.S. blockade of Cuba after 1960 was followed by tremendous loans to sugar
mills in the country, in order to increase production. Queseria was assigned a quota for
crude sugar (mascabado) until 1965-66, for export to the U.S. and Japan (Navarro n.d.).

Around 1960, Ingenio Queseria began to establish its hegemony over trapiches and sugar

108
mills in the state and across the border into Jalisco. It put pressure on the Chiapa
hacienda to refrain from purchasing cane and for the cane on the hacienda’s lands to be
delivered to Queseria. The 1943 decree was still in effect, obligating delivery of cane
to Ingenio Queseria.

Labor relations also undermined production at the hacienda in Chiapa. In 1961 ,
hacienda workers began to organize, demanding that their wages be doubled. Shortly
before the demise of the trapiche, a syndicate of 42 workers formed. A decision was
made by the administrator, ”We told ourselves if they win the ﬁght, if now, deﬁnitively,
there was going to be a syndicate, we were going to see ourselves go broke and we were
going to deliver the cane to Queseria. No longer are we going to involve ourselves in
this" (former mayordomo, personal interview). Afterward, the hacienda rented out its
lands to ejidatarios, who then delivered the cane to Queseria. Many peasants recall that
wage increases were a primary reason that the trapiche was shut down. The pressure to
deliver cane to Queseria was of less consequence than the labor problems, since the
majority of caiieros were already delivering their cane to the sugar mill.

The owners of Ingenio Queseria were joined in 1956 by Lie. Rafael Villa Corona,
giving new impulse to production (Caso 1987 ; Navarro n.d.). Villa Corona was also
linked to Ingenio Los Mochis, Sinaloa, initiated the Santa Rosalia, Tabasco mill, and
owned the short-lived mill of San Rafael at Coquimatlan, Colima (Crespo, et al. 1990).
Ingenio Queseria, the principal agroindustry of the state, was to remain in private hands
only 13 more years, before the state assumed control of the mill. The 1970s saw the
increasing encroachment of the state in the Mexican sugar sector.

rf ill

State penetration of the sugar industry in Colima conformed to similar processes of

statization at the national level. Private owners at Ingenio Queseria were unable to repay

the large loans made to sugar mills in the 1960-70s. State control of Ingenio Queseria

 

109
was initiated on October 31, 1969 when the mill was turned over to FINASA. Septién
Montes received indemnity from the government. Once nationalized, both ﬁeld and
factory expanded, and the mill offered more ﬁnancial assistance to producers, increasing
dramatically the number of caﬁeros in the zone. ONISA took over the mill in 1972,
followed by the series of changes that culminated in the management of all state-owned
sugar mills by Azricar, S.A. Under state control, Queseria achieved its record harvest
in 1985, with the production of 682,269 tons of cane, and 55,438 tons of sugar. As part
of the national program Reconversion Industrial, $2.4 billion pesos were to be invested
in the Queseria mill from 1987-90; this investment was never realized (Navarro n.d.).

After 20 years of state ownership, the pending sale of Ingenio Queseria to private
capital was made known. Lic. Lino Romero Velazco, leader of the CNPP and the
wealthiest eaﬁero of the zone, announced at the centennial celebration for Ingenio
Queseria the decision of caﬁeros to acquire the sugar mill: "We are ready to administer
the agroindustry". Lic. Zamora Verduzco replied that the parastatal was not for sale and
would continue in the hands of the state (Navarro n.d.). On February 9, 1989, the
government reprivatized Ingenio Queseria, selling it to Grupo Beta San Miguel, S.A. de
C.V. Four sugar mills were closed down in 1988 and 10 were privatized; by 1990, only
ﬁve mills remained to be sold. The operation of Ingenio Queseria by private capital is
the subject of Chapter VIII.

The history of the sugar sector makes clear the vicissitudes of a commodity subject
to contradictory economic and political forces. Capital accumulation has consistently
relied on appropriation of the means of production and coercion of labor, thus
establishing a dialectical relationship between capital and peasants. For the state, sugar
production provides a means of foreign exchange, an arena for creating alliances with
the capitalist class, and as a source of employment for rural cultivators, and therefore,

political stability. Yet the nature of class alliances or class conﬂict is historically

110
contingent. Thus, during the colonial period, the state ensured access to land, labor, and
capital and contributed indirectly to the rapid expansion of the sugar industry. The
hegemony of sugar industrialists reached its zenith after independence; but their
hegemony was contingent on state policies which attacked corporate property and
remained blind to despotic conditions which engulfed peasants on sugar haciendas. It
remained for peasants to contest the hegemony of the hacendados. After the revolution,
the state forged the political and economic basis for a renewed state-peasant alliance.
Both the agrarian reform and statization of the sugar industry represent crucial periods
when the state has responded to peasant unrest and placed political above economic ends.
The period of state control, however, required tremendous subsidies to the sector and
engendered the conditions which led to its recent reprivatization. The communities of
Chiapa and Ocotillo took part in these historical developments, ﬁrst, in their relationship
with the hacienda at Chiapa, and subsequently, as producers for Ingenio Queseria.
Today peasants of the region are responding to a new set of transformations brought
about by privatization of the sugar industry. The next chapter turns to the ideology,

policies, and contradictions associated with this important structural transformation.

VI. PRIVATIZATION

A signiﬁcant transformation in ideology and praxis has penetrated the globe in the
last decade, calling into question the traditional role of the state as the director of
economic development in much of the Third World. In Latin America, this shift
represents a dramatic reversal of policy, and has promulgated the massive privatization
of parastatal ﬁrms. Privatization may be understood as a neoliberal remedy to a long
period of state-directed development which drained the economies of many Third Word
countries (Ibarra 1990). Since the historic involvement of the state in the economy and
expansion of public enterprises in these nations has contributed to public borrowing and
the external debt, parastatals have been singled out by the IMF and World Bank for state
divestment (Glade 1986). The Inter-American Development Bank refers to the new
ideology as a ”silent revolution’ involving a ’fundamental and critical reassessment of
the role of the state” (quoted from Felix 1991:10). The following chapters will make
clw that this process is vehemently protested by those upon whose shoulders the burden
of privatization falls.

This chapter presents a critique of neoliberal ideology and praxis. In so doing, it
addresses the global level of analysis and applies the theory of internationalization of
capital and conceptualization of the peripheral state deﬁned in Chapter II. The chapter
commences with an argument for the historical tradition of state intervention in Latin
America. It will then identify the major international forces involved in restructuring the
role of the state and setting into motion the process of privatization. Next, the

privatization policy of the Mexican government is shown to be closely interlinked with

111

112
the objectives of international agencies and its close link to NAFTA (North American
Free Trade Agreement) is demonstrated. Reprivatization of the sugar sector is then
discussed in detail. The chapter concludes with an examination of the contradictions
created by privatization and its impact on the social sector that depends upon the sugar

industry.

The Global Context of Privatization

Most Third World countries have a long history of state-led development. State
involvement in the economy may derive from several factors--nationalism, import
substitution industrialization, the need for state control of strategic industries, or as a
result of rescue operations. State expansion from the 1930’s through the 1950’s was
stimulated ﬁrst by the depression, and later by the war years. Post-war economic
policies in Latin America were based on the ECLA’s (Economic Commission for Latin
America) promotion of import substitution, protectionism, and state involvement in the
economy. Through these interventionist tendencies, the state in many Latin American
countries came to control strategic industries considered essential to economic
development. This strategy facilitated the industrialization of Latin America (Blomstrom
and Hettne 1984; Glade 1986; Ibarra 1990); moreover, it was during the most intense
interventionist phase that Latin American countries experienced the greatest growth of
the GNP (Ibarra 1990). An exponential increase in international loans in the 1970’s
contributed to the growth of parastatals, ﬁnanced on the assumption that foreign loans
would extract these countries from underdevelopment. In the ensuing debt crisis of the
1980s, international banks concerned with recovering their loans put pressure on IMF,
failing to recognize their own role or that of the private sector in the accumulated debt
(Solo 1991).

Neoliberal ideology and praxis initially aimed not at privatization, but rather,

113

market—focused initiatives calculated to replace the distortionary effects of import
substitution, reduce the debt, and stabilize the economies of Third World countries. The
failure to achieve this goal, in fact, the worsening of conditions, led neoliberal ideologues
to target the state. Spurred by Reaganomics and the application of the Brady Plan to
countries willing to put into place free trade, private investment, and privatization, the
recipients of Washington—approved plans were then considered worthy of IMF, World
Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank loans. Both privatization and free trade
are postulated to attract the foreign investment that will ”jump-start" the economy (Felix
1991). IMF structural adjustment programs aimed at restructuring the foreign debt of
Third World economies gave major impetus to the recent shift toward privatization in
Latin America (Ibarra 1990).

The neoliberal rationale for privatization suggests numerous beneﬁts resulting from
disincorporation of parastatals: 1) ﬁnancial resources are gained from the sale of
enterprises; 2) state resources can then be diverted to social needs; 3) disincorporation
attracts capital investment; 4) privatization will stem capital ﬂight; 5) private investment
creates a competitive economy; 6) private investors will increase productive efﬁciency
and proﬁtability; and 7) taxes will be generated (Glade 1986). Data presented below and
in Chapter VH1 demonstrate that these beneﬁts have failed to materialize with
privatization of the Mexican sugar industry. The real beneﬁciaries of privatization are
international banks, ”And...these are the same people, or agents who brought about the
debt crisis in the ﬁrst place" (Solo 1991:12). The protection of debt-holding banks is
thus a primary force that propels privatization.

Parastatal enterprises are generally given an a priori deﬁnition as inefﬁcient.
Neoliberal ideology attributes them with excessive bureaucratization, subsidation of an
overemployed work force, corruption, and paternalism. An increase in the number and

complexity of state enterprises increases management costs, personnel budgets, and

 

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1 14

public sector borrowing, which may overwhelm the economy. Nonetheless, problems
of inefﬁciency may not be a result of state management per se, for many of these
industries exhibited weaknesses that prompted statization in the ﬁrst place. According
to Henrique: "There are no valid criteria to be applied a priori in the evaluation of state
activities nor indisputable principles about the goodness or evil of state intervention. . ..
It depends on the actual political, social, and economic conditions that create them and
on their actual implementation" (1986:98). Inefﬁciency of both private ﬁrms and state
enterprises may be attributed to government price controls, rather than bad management
of the ﬁrm (Boneo 1986). If prices are not increased, the privatized corporation, as
well, will require government subsidies. Mounting evidence suggests that private
enterprises are not inherently more efﬁcient than public enterprises, thus a simple change
in ownership will not effect the desired results (Cecen 1991).

Pressure for privatization generally coincides with periods of economic crisis,
increasing the difﬁculties of private capital to purchase and maintain parastatal ﬁrms.
Once acquired, parastatals are often undercapitalized, suffer from antiquated equipment,
sustain an overemployed work force, and are frequently in debt. These conditions leave
privatization a more propitious enterprise for foreign, than for domestic, entrepreneurs.
In turn, debt-for-equity swaps become a common practice for transferring state ﬁrms to
multinational corporations (Glade 1986). Marshall (1986) warns that to ensure continued
capital investment, privatization must be gradual and effected under normal economic
conditions. Very rapid privatization engenders speculation on the part of conglomerates
at the expense of long-term objectives for capital accumulation and technological
efﬁciency and creates a potential for economic vulnerability. According to Glade (1986),
the larger the number of privatizations within a short time frame, the greater the
probability that the process will result in oligopoly control of the privatized ﬁrms. The

rapidity of privatization of the Mexican sugar sector bears out this assertion.

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A number of contradictions beset the privatization process. Privatization always
involves the interaction of conﬂicting interest groups. Where enterprises are in the red,
investors demand compensation through undervalued sale prices, guarantees to increase
the price of their products, or the right to discard workers’ beneﬁts provided by the ﬁrm
(Ibarra 1990). An inevitable corollary of privatization is increased unemployment
(Marshall 1986). Where labor unrest and political instability prevail, governments
attempt to speed the privatization process by lowering already depressed prices for ﬁrms,
to compensate for the risk (Glade 1986). Government deregulation creates formidable
competition for recently privatized enterprises, on the one hand, and disequilibrium for
the social sector, on the other. One lesson of privatization experiences is that more
government regulation may be required after privatization (Marshall 1986).

Many ﬁrms have become collateral in debt-for-equity swaps which, in fact, protect
debt-holding commercial banks and call into question the notion of ”free trade” (Felix
1991; Solo 1991). As defaults threatened foreign creditors in the 1980’s, foreign banks
reduced their losses by trading off their debts for assets in public enterprises (Felix
1991). Privatization thus allows private banks and the export sector to increase their
proﬁts in the midst of a global recession and at the same time, has placed the tremendous
burden and cost on peasants and the laboring class (Stallings 1978).

Experiences of Latin American countries with privatization vary widely, yet data
provided by Cecen (1991), Collins and Lear (1991), Fontana (1986), Garcia de Aratiho
(1986), Henrique (1986), Marshall (1986), Martel ( 1978), Ortiz de Zavallos (1986), and
Stallings (1978) reveal several general trends. The state played a strong role in
development and parastatal ﬁrms represented key sectors of the economy, such as
petroleum, energy, mining, steel, banking, and sugar mills. Most accrued substantial
foreign debts, which led to IMF intervention, renegotiation of their debts, and mandates

for economic restructuring, including reduction of government subsidies, an end to

116

import restrictions, and sale of parastatal ﬁrms. There has been a tendency for ﬁrms to
be sold at greatly depressed prices. Many privatized ﬁrms failed, reverted to the
government, and after their rehabilitation with state subsidies, were resold again at
undervalued prices. In many cases, privatization has resulted in: a drop in production,
increased prices, loss of jobs, declining wages, curbing of union activities, government
or military intervention, and in some cases, political repression (arrests, torture,
assassinations). It was after restructuring led to political unrest and repression was
applied, in some cases, that IMF restructured the foreign debt and provided new loans
to these countries. Felix contends that in 1991, the economies of Latin American
countries were worse off than in 1983; ”The current stress on privatization relates to this
failure” (1991: l). Ibarra30 insists that the virtues of privatization have been
exaggerated; its beneﬁts are limited and the social and political costs are high:

The combination of orthodox policies of stabilization with trade opening. . .after

a decade of experimentation does not always seem to be sufﬁcient to bring

inﬂation to an end nor to clearly promote the structural change of foreign

commerce and Latin American production. And these same combinations of

policies have had markedly adverse effects in the distribution of income for

failure to understand the explicit aims for protecting distributive equality. . ..

[These] ideological processes of transfer...of the functions of the State to the

market, can erode the capacity of the government to orient development and

protect fundamental social rights (translated from Ibarra 1990:40).

The transfer of public enterprises to the private sector and their subjection to market
forces entails important cultural, social, and political transformations, many of which
contradict the stated objectives of privatization policy. It will be argued herein that

privatization is an economic policy which ignores cultural, social, and political

dimensions inherent in the process of economic restructuring. Parastatals in Latin

3"David Ibarra has served as economist with the National University in Mexico, consultant to CEPAL,
General Director of the National Bank of Mexico, president of the IMF and World Bank Committee for
Development, secretary of Hacienda y Crédito Priblico, lecturer at UNAM and the Instituto
Latinoamericano de Planifrcacion Econdmica y Social, as professor of the Faculty of Commerce and
Administration, and as head of Advanced Studies in Economics.

117
America have frequently been instruments for social and political ends, such as
maintaining employment, pursuing social welfare rather than proﬁt, and serving the
function of redistribution; as such, states have been traditionally reluctant to surrender
these ﬁrms to private forces without some degree of government regulation. In the latter
1970’s, state intervention received renewed impetus as a strategy to correct the social
disparities produced by the "free hand of the market". State involvement in the
economy, then, transcends purely economic objectives. For much of Latin America,
interventionism is embedded in the cultural ideology (Ibarra 1990). The constitutions of
these nations often give the state a dominant role in regulating and managing the
economy. In the case of Mexico, the "estado rector” is not only a legal, but a cultural
concept, involving a long tradition of government limitations on foreign companies,
regulation of labor contracts, protection of domestic production from foreign competition,
and the defense of nationalism (Morici 1991). The Mexican revolution, a reaction
against capitalist expansion, foreign domination, and inequality, served as an ideological
symbol of this nationalism. These notions are congruent with the theory of the peripheral
state presented in Chapter II. Mexico’s recent rejection of the culturally embedded
ideology for a policy of market opening and privatization of parastatal enterprises is the

subject of the following section.

Privatization in Mexico
The 1970s was a period characterized by signiﬁcant growth of parastatal enterprises
in Mexico, particularly after windfall oil revenues and foreign loans bolstered the state’s
capacity to subsidize key sectors of the economy. The economic crisis of 1982, coupled
with a $95 billion foreign debt, prompted the IMF and World Bank to call for radical
transforrnations--to open the country to foreign investment, cut government subsidies, and

divest the government of inefﬁcient state-owned enterprises (Carlsen 1991; Felix 1991;

 

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03-.

 

118
Glade 1986; Ibarra 1990). Mexico’s threat to default on its loans led the international
banking system to realize that others could follow suit, and thus contribute to the demise
of international ﬁnance.

The interrelationship of international and national forces--both deﬁned at the global
level of analysis in Chapter II--was a crucial element in the privatization process. The
international banking system imposed conditions for economic restructuring, based on the
underlying premise that debtor countries would again be able to service their loans (The
Economist 1991). Carlsen quotes Privatization lntemational’s evaluation of the Mexican
effort: ”a wide-ranging program propelled mainly by the country’s indebtedness"
(1991:16) and reveals the international inﬂuence in yet another quote, "The possibility
of renegotiating the debt was always contingent on the support of the two banking
institutions. And this support was always contingent on the IMF ’s vision of Mexico’s
internal economic policies. The IMF has been the ideological guide of the Mexican
economy" (1991:16).

The foregoing statements raise questions as to the autonomy of the Mexican state
vis-a-vis the international order. Even so, the capacity of the Mexican state to exert its
autonomy in the face of such international pressures would seem to stand on ﬁrm ground,
given its potential ability to default on its international loans. This bargaining chip was
diluted, however, in actual negotiations over Mexico’s foreign debt. Upon Salinas de
Gortari’s assumption of the presidency, the Mexican debt represented 60% of the GDP
and servicing of the debt absorbed 50% of its export earnings (Castaneda 1990).
Whereas the Mexican government requested a 50% discount on the debt, the actual
discount was only increased from 15% to 22%. Mexico’s foreign debt was reduced by
$14.5 billion, but interest payments were reduced only by $1.6 billion per year, and new
loans from 1990 to 1994 would amount to just $1.44 billion (Storrs 1991). The more
powerful role of the IMF, World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank in

119
the economic development of Mexico had a major impact on the outcome of these
negotiations.

The neoliberal model, espoused by these international institutions, has been adopted
by the national bourgeoisie and incorporated into Mexico’s current development policy.
Neoliberal ideology, based on the market as the mechanism to stimulate growth, demands
the withdrawal of state resources to inefﬁcient enterprises, promotes foreign investment,
and concomitantly--it is argued, increases technological and productive efﬁciency.
Mexico, as such, became a testing ground for the Brady Plan,31 a debt reduction
package offered in exchange for adoption of new economic policies that required a cut
in tariffs and sale of state-operated enterprises. Privatization was ﬁrst adopted by Miguel
de la Madrid and continued under the Salinas administration. Ofﬁcial policy accords
renewed emphasis to concepts such as " the free market", "modernization" , "productive
efﬁciency", ”deregulation", and so forth. At the same time, these ideological constructs
are antithetical to a set of notions which have passed from vogue in the last decade--
"state paternalism", ” government subsidies", "protectionism", and the "parastatal
enterprise" (Ibarra 1990). Market opening and privatization are political economic
corollaries of economic restructuring in Mexico. The relationship of NAFTA to
privatization demonstrates the complex interaction of power exerted by the international
banking system, the U.S. government, and the forging of a new development policy by
national elites in Mexico. NAFTA is discussed below to illustrate this interplay of

national and international forces.

3"The Brady Plan was signed in 1990 between Mexico and some 450 foreign banks, holding $53 billion
of Mexico’s loans. World Bank and the IMF each provided $10 million to Mexico as part of the debt-
reduction package. Inter-American Development Bank postponed its $2.6 billion loan for three years. The
plan makes provision to forgive a portion of the loan for countries that have undertaken the recommended
reforms. Creditor banks may: 1) decrease the principal 35%, 2) decrease the interest rate 40%, or 3)
provide new loans (The Economist 1991; Storrs 1991).

 

 

120

LIMA

Mexico’s president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, confronted with retraction of
international loans and the failure of his 1990 European trip to obtain new loans and
investments, promptly entered into negotiations for a free trade agreement with the U.S.
and Canada32 (Felix 1991). The ability of petroleum and foreign loans to ﬁnance
development had deteriorated, thus access to U.S. markets for Mexico’s manufactured
goods became essential”. Salinas primed his approach with privatizations, retraction
of government subsidies, Opening his country to foreign investment, and cracking down
on corrupt union leaders, businessmen, and drug dealers.“ By June 1990, Salinas and
Bush publicly stated that they were "convinced that free trade between Mexico and the
United States can be a powerful engine for economic development, creating new jobs and
opening new markets" (quoted from Kondracke 1991 :37). The agreement was signed by
Bush, Salinas, and Mulroney in December, 1992. The relation of NAFTA to foreign
debt, trade, and investment is revealed in George Bush’s "Initiative of the Americas",
to establish a free trade zone "...to create new capital ﬂows...with the aim of alleviating

the onerous weight of external debt..." (translated from Acosta 1990:6).

 

32Despite the appearance of Salinas’ initiative, the inﬂuence of U.S. policy is telling in his broad public
distribution of the volume Privatizacién, cl inevitable sendero del gigante decreciente, published by the
Centro de Estudios en Economia y Educacion, before assuming ofﬁce in 1988. This center is closely
connected with the ultraconservative Heritage Foundation, which enjoys strong inﬂuence in the U.S.

congress (Rodriguez 1989).

33Petroleum accounted for 78% of the value of Mexican exports in 1982, but by 1989 had dropped to
35 % . Over 60% of manufactured goods exported from Mexico are produced by multinational corporations
(Weintraub 1990).

3‘SECOFI, the Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial, established an ofﬁce in Washington, D.C.
"to change the view of Mexico as a low-wage, socially troubled, environmentally polluted country that
exports illegal aliens to the United States" and to lobby U.S. legislators to support NAFTA. It paid the
prestigious lobbying ﬁrm Burson-Marsteller $5.4 million dollars in 1990 and a sum of $5 million to
Shearman & Sterling to collect intelligence information on members of congress and to target them for
lobbying. TKC International was paid $388,376 by SECOFI in 1991 and during the fall of 1992, Guerra
& Associates was paid $81,000 to inﬂuence legislators and public ofﬁcials to support NAFTA (Lewis and
Ebrahim 1993:829).

 

 

 

 

121

Demands for state deregulation and the opening of the economy to market forces
make clear the intrinsic linkage between privatization and free trade, both of which are
conditions for debt restructuring in Mexico. The failure of the Uruguay Round of
GATT” brought policy makers to the conclusion that the world was dividing up into
trade blocks. The solution was a hemispheric trade block in which NAFTA is to play
a crucial role. NAFTA is an agenda for deregulation which, like privatization, is
supported by, and largely beneﬁts multinational corporations, allowing the concentration
of wealth and power. It will give multinational ﬁrms maximum frwdom to increase their
proﬁts without regulation (Dawkins and Muffett 1993);"6

Negotiation on issues such as loss of jobs, lowered wages”, unsafe working
conditions, and environmental destruction” were side-stepped by implementation of the

"fast-track". Negotiations were carried on clandestinely and the government withheld

 

”A key strategist in the GATT negotiations was James D. Robinson III, holding the chief executive
position of American Express. GATT would provide corporations such as American Express access to
foreign ﬁnancial markets. The agricultural terms of GATT were drawn up by Daniel Amstutz, former
vice-president of Cargill. Representatives to the GATT advisory committees include Nestle, Coca-Cola,
Pepmco (all buyers of privatized sugar mills in Mexico), Hershey, Ralston Purina, Kraft, and CPC
Intermtional (Dawkins and Muffett 1993).

3“NAFT A will affect environmental and food safety standards. National, state, and local safety
standards concerning issues such as pesticide and agrochemical use on food crops are set aside. Where
national level guidelines are more stringent, they may be deemed as barriers to free trade, nor may
countries prohibit the importation of products produced under environment-depleting or health-endangering
conditions. The advisory committees for NAFTA include thousands of businessmen, and only ﬁve
environmentalists (Dawkins and Muffett 1993).

3"In 1991, the U.S. minimum wage was $4.35, while that in Mexico was $.49 per hour (source:
SECOFI).

3“Seven environmental groups protesting NAFTA have now been bought off under the Clinton
administration. Groups which have now acknowledged their support for NAFTA include World Wildlife,
which received a $2.5 million donation ﬁ'om Eastman Kodak, whose chief executive is a founder of the
USA*NAFT A lobbying group, plus huge donations from Hewlett-Packard, Philip Morris, and Waste
Management; National Wildlife Federation, which received donations from Dow, Du Pont, Monsanto, 3M,
Shell, Duke Power, Pennzoil, and Waste Management; Audubon, which received donations from GE,
Procter & Gamble, and Waste Management; and The Nature Conservancy, which received $2 million from
Coca-Cola, plus donations from Canon, Tenneco, Cargill. Du Pont, Philip Morris, Procter & Gamble, and
Waste Management. Salinas has promised $30 million for a wildlife preserve on the condition that NAFTA
is ratiﬁed (Cockburn 1993).

122

documents from public perusal (Dawkins and Muffett 1993). South of the border, the
Mexican congress had no opportunity to debate NAFTA. Salinas focused his efforts on
courting the U.S. congress in support of the agreement. NAFTA went into effect
January 1, 1994; it represents a hemispheric reorganization of production, with Mexico
as a low-cost production center, affecting both factories and agriculture.

The agricultural sector is being reshaped by NAFTA. The agreement provides for
a phasing out of import tariffs on agricultural products, with which local producers are
unable to compete, thus fosters monocrop production of export crops on corporate farms,
and diminishes nutritional standards in rural Mexico. Opponents predict that NAFTA
will increase the use of agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides, and petroleum.
Moreover, free markets and internationalization of agriculture will, as in the past, create
scarcity by extracting resources from the country (Barkin 1990).

NAFTA also calls for important changes in the sugar sector. Sections 13 through
22 of Annex 703.2 of NAFTA deﬁne the conditions of trade in sugar. The current quota
for Mexican exports to the U.S. is 7,258 metric tons raw value. During years 1-6 of
NAFTA, Mexico may export to the U.S., duty free, up to 25,000 tons if it produces a
net surplus. In the seventh year of NAFTA, 150,000 tons may be exported, and from
years 8-15, it may export each year a 10% increase over the previous year. However,
if in the seventh year or thereafter it produces a net surplus for two consecutive years,
there will be no limit on its exports to the U.S. Although Mexico is not a sugar
exporter, it has requested a sugar quota of 1.5 million tons, the same amount of sugar
utilized by the soft drink industry in Mexico. It is believed that Mexico’s beverage
industry will switch to high fructose corn syrup for its soft drinks39 and export the sugar

produced in its sugar mills, thus acquiring export status overnight. Moreover, sugar

 

39When beverage industries in the U.S. switched to high fructose corn syrup, it immediately forced the
closure of sugar factories.

123

from Brazil, Cuba, and other countries will enter through the back door and be exported
from Mexico. As Mexican sugar ﬂoods the U.S. market, the price of sugar in the U.S.
will drop. NAFTA will thus harm sugar producers in both the U.S. and Mexico; as one
grower put it, "NAFTA will kill the goose that laid the golden egg" (member of the
Michigan Sugarbeet Growers Association, personal communication).

Working against sustainable development:

NAFTA will force large numbers of farmers in all three countries to switch to

different crops, leading to oversupply in some commodities, falling prices, and

disrupted markets for the traditional producers of alternative crops. . ..

Sugar...will be most negatively affected by NAFTA in the U.S.... NAFTA’S

real winners are multinational agribusinesses which beneﬁt from increased

access to low cost commodities (Lehman and Ritchie 1992: 1-2).

Having explored the international dynamics of economic restructuring, the chapter
will now turn to the dimensions of policy change within Mexico.
State Policy on Privatjgtion

Mexico in 1982 was faced with a choice-continued economic stagnation or
economic restructuring in conformity with external demands. Clearly, Mexico’s
economic crisis has forced the state to adopt a development posture in line with the
dictates of the IMF, World Bank, and the inﬂuence of the U.S. Salinas de Gortari
recognized the need to restore the conﬁdence of foreign investors in the Mexican
economyudebt restructuring was a means to that end. Further evidence of the inﬂuence
of the U.S. on Mexican policy is Salinas’ reversal from a policy of alignment with Latin
America to a retrenchment of relations oriented toward the U.S. (Castaiieda 1990). The
mutual dependency of the U.S. and Mexico on trade, combined with the greater
economic and political power of the U.S. , lessen the autonomy of the Mexican state.

The Mexican state under Salinas de Gortari has thus responded to sweeping

international pressures and, in turn, forged a new development policy within Mexico that

revolutionizes the nature of the Mexican state. Nationalism and import substitution

124

formed the foundation stones of state-led development in Mexico from the post-war years
until the 1980s. Under a system of state capitalism, the capitalist class became dependent
on protectionism and government subsidies. The 1973 Law to Promote Mexican
Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment limited foreign ownership in companies to
49 %; then in 1984, Mexico approved up to 100% foreign investment in most enterprises
within its borders (Morici 1991). Mexico has shifted from an interventionist, nationalist,
populist state to one oriented toward laissez-faire, intemationalism, and neoliberalism
(Cypher 1990).

Mexico’s National Development Plan of 1989-1994 makes privatization the key of
structural reform, creating a more democratic, strong, and efﬁcient state, although one
reduced in size. Privatization was claimed by the Salinas government to be the means
to a more efﬁcient economy and private investment as the "engine of growth". The
major objective of the plan is modernization of the state, the economy, and the country
(BANAMEX 1991):

Parastatal entities of the rural sector will be the motive of a profound

restructuring with the aim to promote and increase operating efﬁciency... .

Particular attention will be given to the case of agroindustries. . . such as

tobacco, coffee, and sugar. The means to translate increases in productivity

into improved standards of living for low-income producers will be

sought. . .patemalistic attitudes, which are anachronistic and inefﬁcient will be

abandoned... . Particular attention will be given to the mechanism of ﬁxing
guaranteed prices. In consultation with producers, industrialists and
consumers. . .margins of protection and promotion that should be accorded to

our peasants will be sought. The strategy implies participation of rural

producers in decision maldng. . .. (translated from Secretaria de Programacion

y Presupuesto 1989:71-74).

In sum, the development plan promises improved standards of living, guaranteed
prices, protection of peasants, and their participation in decision making. This plan,
however, is incongruent with emerging social reality (as demonstrated in Chapters VII-

IX). A similar contradiction exists in the Mexican Solidarity Program. Salinas’ address

to the 17th Congress of the National Peasant Confederation (1989) emphasized changing

125
the form of relationship between the state and peasants, to move from paternalism to
solidarity (Ganzalez 1989); solidarity now serves as the ideological metaphor created to
obfuscate the retraction of state subsidies to the peasant sector.

It is clear, then, that Mexico’s internal policies to reform and modernize the
economy expose the state’s lack of autonomy in the face of international pressure. At
the same time, lack of political reform in Mexico is indicative of the state’s ability to
largely retain the basic structure of its political system. Labor bosses within PRI are
critical of low wages and state control of unions, yet these factors are essential to attract
foreign investment (Reding xx). Both Echeverrfa and Lopez Portillo were able to contain
discontent through public subsidies to the labor and peasant sectors; de la Madrid and
Salinas de Gortari, faced with an economic crisis, were forced to abandon these public
expenditures. Culturally, the social pact between the state and the different social sectors
is viewed as a constitutional right; this social pact is fundamental to the stability of the
state (Gilly 1990). While neoliberalism offers concessions to certain segments of the
elite civil society, disenfranchisement of peasants and the labor class portend grave
political costs. In addition, growing tensions between the technocrats now running the
government and the hard-line party politicians have increased. The underlying principles
upon which PR1 was founded include nationalism, anti-imperialism, and statism; Salinas’
reformulation of these values has brought out criticism on the part of those concerned
with national sovereignty. A growing crisis of legitimacy within PRI has forced Salinas
de Gortari to resort to politically repressive measures to ensure his economic reforms
(Bailey and Gomez 1990). In the arena of political reform, then, Mexico has thus far
retained a degree of autonomy, through its preservation of the traditional PR1
bureaucracy. The incompatibility of economic modernization and a repressive political
regime thus poses a crisis to the state-party regime, should this political autonomy be

challenged by U.S. insistence on democratic reforms. These issues manifest themselves

126
in the contradictions of economic restructuring.

Strong evidence is emerging to suggest that the renewed internationalization of the
economy foments the concentration of economic power, capital ﬂight, formidable
competition of local producers with international markets, a decline in real wages, more
restricted labor legislation, an increase in unemployment, and a reduction of union power
(Barkin 1987 ; Glade 1986; Ibarra 1990; Teubal 1987). The question of whether
parastatal enterprises were, in fact, inefﬁcient has been challenged in some privatizations
and most have been accomplished with huge labor lay-offs, protests, and occasionally
involvement of federal troops and imprisonment of labor leaders (Carlsen 1991; Correa
et al. 1989; Malpica 1991; Pare 1990)."0 These actions would seem contradictory to
the notion of ”modernization" espoused by the promoters of structural change.
Moreover, 50% of parastatal enterprises in Mexico evolved from state takeovers of failed
private enterprises (Ibarra 1990). The private initiative has shown little initiative in
improving conditions for labor, provision of adequate wages, beneﬁts, safety standards,
enforcement of labor laws, or strengthening of labor unions. In its lack of protection for
labor, privatization thus serves as a protection for private capital (Malpica 1991).

Nonetheless, a vast array of privatizations has affected banks, the mining industry,
telecommunications, airlines, and sugar mills, among others. Between 1982 and 1991,
the government sold 822 state-operated enterprises, representing a decline from 1155 to
269 enterprises, respectively (BANAMEX 1991 :200).

 

”These factors are present in the privatization of Cananea, a Mexican copper mine. To facilitate its
privatization, Cananea was declared bankrupt and 2000 workers were ﬁred. Over 3000 federal troops were
called in to confront the resultant social unrest (Carlsen 1991). The declaration of bankruptcy not only
violated the labor laws, but was irrational on ﬁnancial grounds. From 1986-87 , Cananea increased its sales
525% and its exports from $3 billion pesos to $110 billion pesos; it was one of the most modern and
productive enterprises in this branch of the economy. Another mine, Mexicana de Cobre was rescued from
the huge debt incurred by its private owners. The government restored its proﬁtability and resold it to
Fomento Industrial del Norte, which had initially bankrupted it (Gasca 1989).

127

 

'30'40'50'60'70'76'82'83'84'85'86'87'88'89'90'91
Year
(Source: BANAMEX1991)

Figure 5. Sale of State-operated Enterprises in Mexico.

Disincorporation of parastatals has concentrated economic power in the hands of
international capital and a small domestic elite. The 37 entrepreneurs who together
represent 22% of the GDP in Mexico were the major buyers in four of the ﬁve largest
privatizations under the Salinas administration (Carlsen 1991). The owner of Cananea,
for example, controls 95% of Mexican copper production. Telmex, the Mexican
telephone company, is now jointly owned by Mexican ﬁnanciers and Southwestern Bell.
Mexicana de Aviacion, the nationalized Panamerican airline, was purchased by Pablo and
Israel Brener, who head Grupo Xafra,"l the consortium which owns some of the most
important sugar mills in the country (E1 Modelo, El Potrero, and San Miguelito, all in
Veracruz, constituting 17,000 hectares of cane land) (Carlsen 1991). The Brener

brothers, proprietors of the corporation Mexabre, also own 16% of the stock in

 

"Chase Manhattan Bank is but one of eleven members of this consortium (Ortega 1989).

128

Banamex, the hotel chain Real Turismo, Servicios de Telereservaciones, Turbomotores,
Datatronic, and share ownership in Aeropuertos y Terrenos (Barranco 1993). The
representative for the Committee of Mexican Businessmen in the NAFTA negotiations
was Juan Gallardo Thurlow, mining magnate and head of ﬁve sugar mills incorporated
into Grupo Sucrum (Rodriguez 1990). Among these ﬁve mills (Rosales, El Dorado,
Tala, Lézaro Cdrdenas, Independencia), Independencia is one of the most modernized
in the country; Gallardo is also associated with Embotelladoras del Norte (a soft drink
manufacturer).

Elimination of the 51% national ownership requirement has encouraged oligopoly
control of many ﬁrms by multinational corporations, yet many corporations were sold
to these transnationals substantially below their value. Despite explicit policy objectives
to avoid concentration of wealth through the sale of some ﬁrms to the social sector, only
ﬁve percent of companies have been turned over to workers’ or peasants’ organizations.
Workers have also been affected by the loss of 200,000 jobs which accompanied
disincorporation (Carlsen 1991). Privatizations in Mexico have largely taken place
without consulting workers and producers who are directly affected by this reorganization
of production. In the rural sector, these macro—level processes directly impinge on the

lives of peasant cane producers.

Reprivatization of the Sugar Sector
These transformations are manifested in the reprivatization of the Mexican sugar
industry. Mexican sugar mills were initially salvaged from a decapitalized private sector
in the 1970s and reprivatized from 1988-1992. Analysis of the contrasting conditions
between the sugar sector under state and private ownership does not presume that the
parastatal industry operated efﬁciently and without problems, as was made clear in
Chapter V (Statization of the Sugar Industry). Much criticism has been leveled at the

129

state’s management of the sector during this period. Del Villar ( 1976), Jimenez (1987),
Pare (1987), and Purcell (1981) concur that under state control, the sector was beset by
price controls, lack of investment to modernize mills, declines in factory and ﬁeld yields,
overemployment, incompetency, and corruption. Overall efﬁciency declined from 5.8
tons of sugar/hectare in 1974 to 5.4 in 1981, and in the following year, almost one-third
of the mills had factory yields below the 8.3% guarantee. Lost time in ﬁeld and factory
was 30.3% for state mills and 28% for private mills in 1984. Moreover, from 1970-83,
employment of professional ofﬁce workers increased 103% , and that of other workers
60%. Subsidies to the industry drained the government of $80 billion pesos per year
(Jimenez 1987).

Del Villar (1976) blames the state’s control of sugar prices for diminished efﬁciency
and the ﬁnancial crisis of the industry; the price, he argues, must be set in accord with
supply and demand. This contributed to the fact that production costs increased at a
higher rate than car‘iero incomes from 1970-75. After two major restructurings under
state control, Paré concluded that, "In spite of the statization of the sugar mills...in
general terms the recuperation of the sugar industry has been very slow up to the present
(1983)" (translated from Pare 19872285). Politically, the industry under state control was
highly centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian (del Villar 1976). In her analysis of
organized caﬁero movements, Pare details the ideological and political manipulation of
caﬁeros by the state, and the cooptation of caﬁero leaders within a vertically-controlled
state sector (Pare 1987).

Obviously, severe structural weaknesses afﬂicted the sugar industry during its public
enterprise phase. Nonetheless, that the sector was structurally weak, economically
inefﬁcient, and had to resort to sugar imports, prior to statization in the 19705, suggests
that efﬁciency is not an inherent characteristic of private enterprise. It was during the

earlier, private period that sugar industrialists depended on government ﬁnancing,

130
decapitalized the industry by investing in more lucrative sectors of the economy, and
failed to reinvest to improve the technological capacity of sugar mills. Increased state
ownership of the sector in the 19703 thus represents a rescue operation. Moreover, from
1984 to 1988, under state control, cane production increased 40%, having achieved a
record harvest in 1984 (Pare 1990). Mexico regained its position as a net exporter of
sugar from 1985-88 and became the fourth largest sugar producer in Latin America, with
exports of one million tons in 1988 (GEPLACEA 1990). This achievement was
facilitated by the Programa de Reconversion Industrial, considered the " green light" for
modernization of sugar mills during the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88).

In an ofﬁcial message on the "Zafra"2 of Efﬁciency" (1986-87), de la Madrid
asserted:

The production of sugar in Mexico has been in permanent ascension in the last

ﬁve years; we have clearly consolidated our self-sufﬁciency in the sugar that

we consume; we converted the deﬁcit into an exportable surplus; the car'ieros

have increased their productivity in yield per hectare; the workers, with

technical personnel and administrators, have also improved the conditions of

efﬁciency in the mills (translated from Manual Azucarera Mexicana 19889).

This achievement de la Madrid attributed to the "constant and decided support of the
Federal Government" . The president of the CNC claimed that record harvests, and the
export of surplus sugar would bring $100,000,000 (U .S.) in foreign exchange to the
country.

Despite the success of these recent achievements under state-directed development,
the decision to reprivatize the sugar sector was made by Miguel de la Madrid. An
infusion of private capital was to be sought to offset the expenditures of huge government
subsidies (Esteva 1983). In reality, the crisis in the sugar sector was worse in 1975 than
it was in 1982 when this decision was made (Pare 1990). Beginning with the term of

Salinas de Gortari, privatization of sugar mills commenced. The rapidity of this process

 

”Zafra is the cane harvest.

1' w

131
is marked within the sugar sector. In 1985, 52 of Mexico’s mills were state-operated.
By 1991, only ﬁve remained in the public sector, and all mills had been privatized by
1992:

 

 

 

 

 

 

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1990

Figure 6. Sale of Mexican Sugar Mills.

Noteworthy is the fact that few mills that came under the control of peasant groups:

 

Table 3. Ownership of Mexican Sugar Mills.

 

mmmrassrararsarranrm
so

State 52 50 50 49 36 26

Private 15 14 14 14 25 34 54 55
Union 2 3 3 3
Coop 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
(Cloaed) (3) (1) (1) (6)
Total 69 66 66 65 65 65 64 58

 

(source: Azucar, S.A.)
The government offered several incentives to private investors: the sale of sugar

mills in packets; sale at "castigated prices"; and favorable terms of sale. Private

132
investors were obligated to purchase a mixture of productive and non-productive mills,
which were sold in packets. However, Carlos Machado,43 head of the Camara N acional
de la Industria Azucarera asserted:

The sale of the 31 sugar mills did not respect [these conditions]; the sale of the

most productive mills to powerful, private groups, who had recently entered

the sugar industry, who enjoy the advantage of being vertically integrated, was

facilitated. They were to have purchased meat and bone, and this they did not

comply with (translated from Correa et al. 1989:14-15).

Three mills (San Cristobal, Veracruz; Independencia, Veracruz; Los Mochis,
Sinaloa) were slated to remain in the hands of the state, because of their economic
importance. Independencia was eventually sold, however, to Grupo Sucrum, San
Cristobal to Grupo Escorpién (associated with Pepsico), and Aga (a soft drink ﬁrm)
acquired Los Mochis. Only the worst mills were left for purchase by cane producers’
unions (Becerril 1993a; 1993g).

Initially, the peasant-owned cooperative mill, Emiliano Zapata, was removed from
the list of mills to be sold, due to pressure on the part of the workers’ union. The
workers wished to continue operating it, claiming, "We are not disposed to have our
principal source of employment acquired by the private initiative, surely by a soft drink
group called ’Escorpion’" (translated from Tumbando Calla 1990 (l9):27). Ingenio
Emiliano Zapata, with no debts, was strangely declared bankrupt and sold to Grupo
Xafra (owner of Coca-Cola) in 1992 (Becerril 1993a). This closing is of historical
signiﬁcance, because this mill was established in the heart of the zapatista region after
the revolution. Cardenas founded this mill in the 1930s as a peasant-run cooperative,
one of two in the entire country. Caﬁeros claim that E1 Mante, the second peasant

cooperative, was always proﬁtable and that the declaration of its bankruptcy in 1992 was
promoted by Tamaulipas Gov. Américo Villarreal who wished to acquire the mill. It

 

“Machado has owned ingenios Las Margaritas, El Refugio, Central Motzorongo, and Progreso since
before privatization of the sector.

133
was ultimately purchased by Aardn Séenz, the long-time sugar baron who wields
considerable power in the sugar industry (Becerril 1993b).

El Higo and Mahuixtlan (both in Veracruz) were purchased in 1988 by caﬁero
unions (pertaining to the CNC). A caﬁero journal praised the acquisition of these mills:
"An old dream of the CNC family throughout its history, was always to convert
ourselves into industrialists of our own product. Today, this vehement longing is a total
reality, with the acquisition of Ingenios El Higo and Mahuixtlan by our UNPCA-CNC"
(translated from Tumbando Cana 1989 (14):2). Under ownership of the CNC, both
factory and ﬁeld yields of the Mahuixtlan mill surpassed the averages for Veracruz, and
it achieved the highest number of tons of sugar per hectare in the state. It had a proﬁt
of $2,842,000,000 during a drought year. Cane production increased 30% , consumption
of petroleum decreased from 17 to 6.5 liters per ten, the mill covered its operating costs,
and in 1993 was able to pay ﬁve billion pesos on its debt to FINA. Proﬁts of
$1,732,000,000 were reported at El Higo in 1988, but frosts, ﬂoods, and torrential rains
in subsequent years caused severe losses (Becerril 1993g; Tumbando Cana 1990: 17). A
third mill, Melchor Ocampo, was purchased by the CNC in 1990 at a sale price of
$32,900,000,000 pesos and had better economic results than originally planned (Diario
de Colima 1990b). The reinvestment of capital in peasant-operated mills contributes to
their improved efﬁciency, whereas the bankruptcy of privatized mills (discussed below)
is in part explained by the transfer of their capital into soft drinks. High ofﬁcials within
the industry, however, viewed the sale of mills to peasant unions skeptically, claiming
that the unions wanted them "almost as a gift" and accused the unions of lack of
administrative ability and failure to pay back their loans (ofﬁcial, Azucar, S.A. , personal
interview).

Out of 44 state-owned sugar mills that were sold, four of the seven mills destined

for producer control have subsequently reverted to the private domain. Not all mills

134

were privatized, but rather, several were closed down, contributing to unemployment in
their regions. Three mills were closed in 1985-86 (Libertad, Veracruz; Nueva Zelandia,
Tabasco; Santiago, Jalisco), two mills were closed between 1988-91 (Estipac, Jalisco;
Oacalco, Morelos), and six mills were closed in 1991-92. The closure of Ingenio
Oacalco prompted caﬁeros of the area to demand that President Salinas de Gortari
intervene; 800 caﬁeros seized the ofﬁces of Azricar, S.A. and demanded the mill be
turned over to them. One year later, failing to achieve this goal, the zone was noted for
its high unemployment and out-migration to the U.S. (Correa et al. 1989).

Soft drink corporations, purchasers of half of Mexico’s sugar, predominate in
ownership of Mexican sugar mills; 10 of the 44 mills sold include ﬁve to Pepsico, two
to Aga, and three to the Asociacién de Embotelladores Refresqueros Mexicanos (FINA
ofﬁcial, personal interview). Azucar, S.A. recognizes that the savings in utilization of
sugar produced in the owner’s mill is an attractive incentive to purchase sugar mills,
especially for soft drink companies. Not only is the sector now controlled by private
interests, but those interests are largely multinational.

The ﬁrst sugar mill to be privatized was Atencingo, which along with Plan de San
Luis, was purchased by Grupo Escorpion. Enrique Molina, president of Escorpion and
owner of Atencingo, is associated with Pepsi-Cola, Mirinda, Paﬁaﬁel, Squirt, Manzanita,
Sol, Titan, Sangria, Tim, and Seven Up; the mill was purchased to supply sugar for
these soft drinks. This mill suffered losses of $28,000,000,000 in 1988-89. It was
purchased for $47 ,500,000,000 and ﬁnanced over a ten-year period (Correa et al. 1989).
In 1990, FINASA cancelled the bid of Escorpio-Pepsico for the purchase of Ingenio "La
Abeja" , since it had already acquired ﬁve mills since disincorporation. The sale would
have allowed Escorpion to monopolize the sector, which is purportedly not allowed under
the provisions of disincorporation. It was reportedly sold to industrialist Francisco
Garcia Gonzalez for $9,000,000,000, yet, in May 1992 the Abeja mill had become the

135
property of Grupo Escorpion (Diario El Independiente 1990b).

Pepsico“ now owns 12 mills and controls 20% of the country’s sugar production
(Malpica 1991). Pepsico bought out Empresas Gamesa (headed by Alberto Santos de
Hoyos 45, although its sugar mills were slated to be turned over to the CNPP, which
had made initial payments of 15% on the purchase price. Caﬁeros of these regions were
forced to associate with Grupo Gamesa. Pepsico admits that the key factor in its decision
to purchase Gamesa was the U.S . -Mexican market integration. Escorpion is Mexico’s
largest Pepsi bottler, and together with Gamesa and Sabritas (yet another Pepsico
industry with 70% of the salty snack market) monopolizes the junk food market in
Mexico. Coca-Cola controls two-thirds of the soft drink market in Mexico, and Grupo
Industrial Bimbo accounts for one—third of the snack market; it leads the country with
90% of the sweet snack market and 15 % of salty snacks (Bouleau 1990, Correa et al.
1989, Malpica 1991). Coca-Cola and Bimbo are co-partners in Grupo Beta San Miguel,
owner of ﬁve sugar mills, one of which was the subject of this research. Grupo AGA,
manufacturer of the soft drink Sidral, bought Ingenio Puga; Embotelladores Mexicanos
(a Coca-Cola manufacturer) bought Concepcion; Grupo Querétero, representing the
Obregon Ruiz bottling company, purchased Tres Valles, Lopez Mateos and La Gloria;
and Rafael Ros acquired Ia Concepcién (Correa et a1. 1989).

 

“Pepsico’s annual sales are $15,419,000,000 (U.S.) and it realizes proﬁts of $901,000,000 (Ortega
1990). As a multinational corporation, it has bought out Frito Lay, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and Kentucky
Fried Chicken. A Mexican group which produces chicken for Tyson Foods has initiated a project in ejidos
of the La Laguna region (on the Coahuila-Durango border) to establish chicken farms to produce chickens
for Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets in Latin America (Poole 1991). Pepsico plans to expand the number
of Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in Mexico from 53 to 200 (Bouleau 1990).

”Empresas Gamesa is a consortium comprised of numerous enterprises: Promotora Agropecuaria
Gamesa, Productos Gerber, Ingenios Gamesa, and Grupo Gamesa. Grupo Gamesa includes Nabisco
Famosa, Harinera Santos, Dulces Lady Baltimore, Mareas Alimenticias Intemacionales, Galletera Palms,
Gamesa Comercial, Desarrollo Industrial Gamesa, Almacenadora Gamesa, Desarrollo Inmobiliario Gamesa,
Pastas Tepeyac, Inmobiliario Jalisciense, Corporativo Gamesa, and Acrosantos. Pepsico, Inc. purchased
72% of Empresas Gamesa in 1990 at a cost of $320 million dollars (Ortega 1990). Empresas Gamesa
recently embarked on a pilot project with ejidatarios of Nuevo Leon to turn 10,000 acres of ejido land into
wheat farming to supply wheat for Gamesa’s cookies (Poole 1991).

136

These sales suggest the subordination of cane production to the interests of capital
accumulation on the part of soft drink manufacturers, at the cost of supplying sugar for
national demand (Correa et a1. 1989). Despite the sugar sector’s loss of export capacity
from 1976 to 1985 (Azr’rcar, S.A. 1975-1990; GEPLACEA 1990), it remained vertically
integrated through the process of transnationalization of the sugar industry.
Reprivatization of the industry has increased this vertical integration, through direct
ownership of the means of production, and horizontal integration, through the extension
of private capital into the processing industry, which depends on sugar as its raw
material. The soft drink and processed foods industries are constituencies of the Ministry
of Industry and Commerce, which supported the 1958-1970 price freeze on sugar.
Credit is channeled to these industries through the Banco Comercial y Fomento (Purcell
1981). The facile import of cheap sugar at world market prices beneﬁts soft drink
corporations, while it creates stiff competition for the social sector dependent on the sale
of Mexican sugar. Through its importation of sugar and sale of sugar at subsidized
prices, the government subsidizes the soft drink and processed foods industries (Correa
et a1. 1989).

At the processing end of the agroindustrial chain, 55 percent of national sugar
production is destined for industrial use, primarily to the foreign sector. Of this amount,
55 percent is used in the manufacture of soft drinks, 14 percent for confections, 12
percent for breads, and the remainder for miscellaneous products such as wines and
liquors (Banco de Datos de Estudios Rurales 1984). Since 1966, the industrialization of
sugar has escalated in importance; sugar production has grown 51% , while the soft drink
industry has grown 243% (Jimenez 1987). Within Mexico 1,200,000,000 cases of soft
drinks (48% colas) are sold annually. The price of soft drinks increased 40% in 1989
(Correa et a1. 1989). The amount of sugar destined to industrial use relative to domestic

consumption over the past three decades shows a dramatic increase:

 

 

137

m Ladusuialllse Demands:
1963 29.20% 70.80%
1973 41.00% 59.00%
1983 55.12% 44.88%

(Jimenez 1987:18)

The inﬂux of soft drinks and processed foods has had an immense impact on the
Mexican diet. Per capita consumption of sugar is 45 kg. per year (1990) (Hernandez
1992); sugar makes up 60% of the recommended calorie intake of the working class and
Mexico is now the largest per capita sugar consumer in the world (Mora et al. 1990).

The proﬁts that capitalists accumulate from the production of these products directly
depends on cane producers who supply the raw material for production. Industrialists
and peasants are bound together in formal, contractual relationships formulated in
privatization policy, national development policies, and more speciﬁcally, the policy that
deﬁnes the relationship between caﬁeros and sugar mills. In accordance with the
Covenio de Reestructuracion del Sector Azucarera, signed by representatives of the
CNC, UNPCARM, CNPP, STIASRM, the private initiative, SARH, the Camara
Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera, and several other federal
dependencies, sugar mills were required to invest, modernize, and diversify their
operations and promote alternative employment for mill workers. For its part, the
federal government was obliged to modify the Decreto Caﬁero, ﬁxing the method of
payment so as to stimulate efﬁciency. Finally, the importation of sugar was to be
liberalized, with a favorable tariff to avoid problems of speculation and supply. The
provisions include:

1) to restructure Azricar, S.A.

2) to modify the Decreto Caﬁero, establish new criteria for setting prices through

a two-year pilot program, and make sucrose content the basis for payment of
cane beginning in 1992
3) to eliminate sugar imports, set adequate tariffs, and eliminate differential prices
4) to eliminate the guaranteed factory yield within three years

5) to equally support research, projects, and works for the rehabilitation or
construction of infrastructure and improve productivity of cane ﬁelds

138

6) to equally share costs for research, technical assistance, and experimentation

on cane varieties

7) to increase factory efﬁciency and decrease sucrose loss (to 2.5 in 1989-90; to

2.4 in 1990-91; to 2.3 in 1991-92)

8) to make privatization responsible for payment, investment, indemnization, and

diversiﬁcation

9) to promote alternative employment

(Diario de Colima 1989b).

The remainder of this chapter will address how well these aims have been met.
First, capitalists within the sugar industry have continued to rely on credit from FINA--a
state-managed ﬁnancial institution. Nonetheless, they have failed to pay off their debts
and fulﬁll their obligations to cane producers and factory workers. Second, since
privatization, mills have provided little sugar to Azucar, S.A. the state agency that
distributed sugar for public consumption until 1992. Lack of sugar has created major
market distortions which seriously affect both sugar mills and cane producers. Third,
important modiﬁcations have been made to the Decreto Caﬁero, an ofﬁcial document
which speciﬁes the basis for setting the price of cane and deﬁnes relationships between
sugar mills and caiieros. These are each taken up in turn.

W

Financiera Industrial Azucarera, S.A. , the private institution founded in 1943, was
converted into Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A. (FINASA) in 1953. In 1985,
FINASA was transformed into a national credit society (FINA, S.N.C.) and became an
institution of the Banco de Desarrollo. Its social capital is $2 billion pesos, with 99.4%
of this capital owned by the federal government (Manual Azucarera Mexicana 1988).
As a state institution, FINA continues to operate with proﬁts, according to ofﬁcials“.

The state, through FINA, continues to ﬁnance all credit to the sugar sector. As

explained by a FINA ofﬁcial, its role is to channel resources, whether public or private,

 

“Personal interview with Lic. Gerraldo Tovar, Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.N.C., April 18,
1991.

139

to "credit subjects" who count with sufﬁcient guarantees. He explained, "The act of
reprivatization does not change the license of the institution; instead of an enterprise of
the public sector, we channel resources to the private initiative". This role assures the
subsidation of private sugar mills by the Mexican state, although this ofﬁcial denies that
it constitutes a subsidy. The continuing role of FINA was explained by the ofﬁcial:
"Without the raw material, the mill does not function. The inﬂuence zone depends on
the sugar mill--it is an important sector. It is essential to support this sector". FINA
gives credit to the sugar mills, which in turn, distribute credit to car‘ieros. Although
FINA makes recommendations on who should receive credit, ultimately, it is the sugar
mill that decides who may receive credit for cane production. Upon liquidation, the
sugar mill discounts the amount owed to FINA from the producers’ accounts.

FINA was responsible for the sale of sugar mills to private investors. The sale of
these mills was difﬁcult, according to FINA since "This was the ﬁrst experience in our
country with selling this type of enterprise". In 1989, a seven-year term of payment at
32% interest was offered, with a down payment of 10% of the value of the mill. But
by 1990, only the worst mills remained, thus easier terms were given and mills were
allowed to cover loan payments with the value of the sugar produced. The terms were
eased to 10 years, with a 20% down payment and lower interest rates. FINA claims that
the government has not gained enough from mill sales to reduce the national debt. The
total sale price of all privatized mills was $1,234,604,000,000 pesos (Becerril 1993a).

The continued government control of the price of sugar is an important factor in
reducing the proﬁts of sugar mills. The subdirector of Azr’rcar, S.A. , however, admitted
that lack of cash ﬂow among mill owners is partially explained by the fact that they are
utilizing their own product for processing, rather than selling it on the market (personal
interview). The soft drink ﬁrms purchase sugar produced in their mills at depressed
prices. PECE (Pacto para la Estabilidad, la Competitividad y el Empleo) set the price

 

 

140
of sugar at $1,447.37 pesos per kg. (1993); the ﬁrms acquire it at $217.00 for use in soft
drinks such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. This transfer of capital to private interests
creates losses for the sugar mills (Becerril 1993b).

Most private investors were unable to make payments on their loans and attempted
to modify the terms of the sales. By August 1992, debts for acquisition of sugar mills
were being restructured. The balance owed among all private mills was
$728,387,000,000 pesos. Their claimed ﬁnancial difﬁculties and lack of capital have
become a rationale for minimal investments in the newly acquired mills. Thus
diversiﬁcation has been practically nonexistent. Fifteen sugar mills were threatened with
closure (Garcia 1992).

By May of 1993, the 14 private corporate groups, largely soft drink magnates, had
repaid less than half of their sale contract obligations, owing 4.5 billion pesos. Neither
had they covered their ﬁnancial obligations to Social Security (IMSS), the National Water
Commission, and the Sindicato Azucarero. Grupo Sucrum, headed by Juan Gallardo
Thurlow, a representative in the NAFTA negotiations, failed to pay $5,500,000,000
pesos owed to IMSS to cover medical services for workers and caﬁeros at Ingenio
Independencia. These quotas had already been discounted from the pay of workers and
producers, yet they were left without medical services. Two years after its purchase,
without having made any monthly payments subsequent to the down payment, Thurlow
declared the mill bankrupt. According to a representative of the cane producers’ union,
this tactic allows industrialists to evade payment on their debts to the government and
later repurchase mills under "prestanombres" (false names). Ingenio Independencia
already had modern equipment when it was sold to Thurlow, including three new
generators valued at $12,800,000,000; yet, the purchase price of the mill was only
$12,819,000,000. Thurlow purchased, apart from Ingenio Independencia, one mill in
1988, plus three other mills in 1990. On one of the latter mills, he has never made a

 

 

141
payment (Becerril 1993a; 1993d).

The largest sugar mill, Ingenio San Cristobal, was sold to Grupo Escorpion
(afﬁliated with Pepsico) in 1988 for $50,359,800,000 pesos, but by the end of 1990,
Escorpion still owed $34,640,020,000. Escorpion had sold broken down equipment from
the mill for $69,000,000,000, which would more than cover the debt, yet failed to meet
even its annual payments. In 1992 the government restructured its loan. Neither has it
liquidated its loan on two other mills it purchased (Becerril 1993a).

Grupo Xafra (linked to Coca-Cola) deposited one-half the purchase price of its three
mills (Modelo, Potrero, and San Miguelito, three of the best mills in the country) in 1988
and has not made one further payment (Becerril 1993a). In 1990, a producer and
workers’ strike broke out at Ingenio Potrero; workers accused the owners of intending
to operate the mill for ﬁve years and resell it, in ruins, to the government. The
management threatened to liquidate the workers and end the harvest, leaving producers
and cutters without jobs (Torres 1991a; 1991b). On May 23, 1991, Grupo Xafra placed
an advertisement in El Financiera for the sale of Ingenio Modelo at a price of $19 billion
pesos, to "physical or moral persons of Mexican or foreign nationality" (El Financiera
1989:15A).

Among other privatized mills, Redo y Socios, purchaser of seven sugar mills from
1988-90, had paid absolutely nothing by 1992. Piasa and Aga, both soft drink afﬁliates,
received four mills "almost as a gift". The owner of Piasa and president of the Cémara
Nacional de la Industria Azucarera warned leaders of producers’ and workers’ unions in
1993 that if his demands were not met, he would close down Ingenio La Gloria. The

latter was rated in third place for production in 1992-93 (Becerril 1993a; 1993f; 1993g).

 

 

142

As of August 1992, two sugar mills were bankrupt and 12 were in virtual bankruptcy."7
Of the six privatized mills, two shut down operations as sugar mills, and the remaining
four operate at 50% capacity, with no worker unions or legal work contracts. At least
one of these bankruptcies involved serious violations of human rights (Becerril 1993c).

Alberto Santos (owner of ingenios Alianza Popular, Bella Vista, Pedernales, and
Puruaran) received ﬁnancial support from FINA to modernize its mills, increase
productivity, and preserve the zones as a source of work. On May 25, 1992, he closed
Ingenio Puruaran, Michoacan--a source of employment for 30,000 people-and began
dismantling the factory. Factory workers, cafreros, and local inhabitants, determined to
keep the mill, which dates to 1715, open, took it over on December 7, 1992. Denied
credit, they repaired the mill and processed the cane. From the sale of sugar, they
covered salaries, advance payments, liquidations, and credit for fertilizer and
insecticides. At the end of the harvest, they had $700,000 (new pesos) worth of sugar
in the warehouse. As they were putting the mill back in operation, Alberto Santos hired
gunmen, who ﬁred on three workers on October 10, 1992. The gunmen were detained
by police, but released one hour later and their high—power weapons returned.
Subsequently, on May 3, 1993, state and federal police invaded Puruaran and the sugar
mill and entered the houses of ﬁve caﬁeros and workers. One of these was retired, had
heart problems and diabetes, and had recently been released from the hospital. These
victims were sequestered, and their whereabouts unknown (La Jomada 1993).

Under threat of strike in the 62 sugar mills of the country in March, 1993, a
Convenio de Concertacion de la Industria Azucarera was drawn up by private capital, the

state, and workers. The government intervened in these negotiations, giving magnates

 

"These include Navolato, Rosales (Sinaloa); Purisima, (Jalisco); Puruaran (Michoacan); Santo
Domingo, Juchitan (Oaxaca); Hermenegildo Galeana (Tabasco); San Pedro, San Francisco Naranjal, El
Higo, Mahuixtlrin, Panuco (Veracruz); El Mante (T amaulipas); Emiliano Zapata (Morelos) (Garcia 1992).

 

 

143
such as Thurlow (associated with Grupo de Embotelladores Unidas), Brener (associated
with Coca Cola), and Molina Sobrino (associated with Pepsico) access to new federal
credit and agreeing to regulate the massive imports of sugar (Becerril 1993c).

Privatization has clearly not increased operating efﬁciency of sugar mills. Ofﬁcials
at Azricar, S.A. and FINA in Mexico City report minimal investment in the now
antiquated sugar mills to improve productive efﬁciency. Despite having purchased mills
at depressed prices (on the average, 50-60% of their value), capital investment is only
25% of the expected rate. An ofﬁcial at Azr’rcar, S.A. related to the researcher, "It is
very little money, practically nothing that the private initiative has invested to date".
FINA proposed investments of $300,000,000,000 at the national level, yet only a fourth
of this amount had been extended in credit for maintenance and upgrading of mills at the
end of the ﬁeld research. Of 64 mills in the country, only 21 were operating at a proﬁt
in 1991; 16 had net losses, and the remainder were breaking even (FINA ofﬁcial,
personal interview).

A recent study by STPS (Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social) provides
evidence that the principal cause of the crisis in the sugar sector lies in the inability of
the new industrialists to manage their newly-acquired sugar mills and their failure to
modernize them. This study contradicts the notion held by sugar industrialists that the
primary cause is government control of sugar prices and excessive imports of foreign
sugar. The soft drink magnates--primary purchasers of sugar mills, lacked experience
and knowledge for administration of the enterprises, yet devalue the experience of the

workers." The entry of these corporations represents an important change from the

 

“By way of illustration, the declaration of bankruptcy of Ingenio Independencia by Grupo Surco after
two years of privatization followed a major increase in energy use. In 1989-90 (under state control),
3,000,000 liters of fuel were used to operate the mill; this amount increased to 50,500,000 liters in 1990-
91. Previously the mill had processed 250 tons of cane per hour, but in 1992-93 factory efﬁciency
declined to 190 tons per hour. Workers claimed that the mill would function for 10 minutes and then be
stopped for one hour. Six months after Grupo Xafra acquired the peasant-owned Emiliano Zapata mill,

 

 

144
industry’s management by the traditional sugar industrialists. The latter own mills as a
family tradition, have decades of experience, and are more dedicated to sugar production.
The former have entered this sector largely for speculative purposes, and lack the
knowledge and experience of the traditional sugar families (Peter Singlemann, personal
communication).
Mitch.

Azricar, S.A.,“9 the major parastatal of the sugar sector, was being phased out in
1991. Its 6000 employees of 1989 had been reduced to 900 by 1991, and the institution
was predicted to be gone by 1993. Prior to privatization, Azr’rcar, S.A., whose aim was
to ensure public supply, was the sole distributer of sugar. In 1988, Azr’rcar, S.A.
distributed 100% of the sugar produced. The private owners utilize 70% of the sugar
produced in the country, leaving only ﬁve mills (Puruaran, Pedemales, Alianza Popular,
Bella Vista, and Emiliano Zapata)"0 that continued to provision Azricar, S.A. with sugar
for public consumption in 1990; in that year it received only 13 % of the national
production.

Government policy supports differential prices when it purchases sugar, in an
attempt to ensure its own supply of sugar, which it then commercializes. According to
the subdirector of Azucar, S.A., this institution pays a higher price to transnational soft

drink and bottling corporations than to nationals for the sugar purchased from them. The

 

erroneous technical decisions created constant production delays. The mill experienced 761 hours in lost
time, a historical record. Huge amounts of molasses were being discarded into the local rivers, causing
local inhabitants to protest the contamination of their water. Workers blockaded the mill and labor conﬂicts
emerged, requiring months of negotiation to resolve indemnization of workers who had been laid off their
jobs (Becerril 1993b; 1993c).

”Personal interview with Lic. Rudi Omar Albertos Cimara, Subdirector de Planeacion y Desarrollo,
Azdcar, S.A., April 18, 1991.

”The ﬁrst fouroftheseingeniosatthetimeofthe researchwerein theprocess ofbeing soldtothe
CNPP and the latter was a cooperative operated by the CNC, thus all were under state control. All of
these mills later reverted to private ownership.

145

policy is to "give the most freedom to the sugar mill to participate in the market, without
regulation" (personal interview). The soft drink industry utilizes 36% of sugar destined
for industrial use, the remaining going to sweets, breads, chocolates, preserves,
pharmaceuticals, wines, and liquor (Garcia 1992). Despite government price controls
on sugar, SECOFI authorized a price increase for soft drinks in 1989; an increase in the
price of jellos, cookies, ice cream, candy, and chocolate was proposed as well. These
price increases assured proﬁts for the processing industry and sugar mills involved in
their operations, in light of a 53% increase in the price of sugar ($740 to $1130/kg.,
standard) (Diario de Colima 1989c).

The loss of government control over distribution has created conditions for alternate
periods of scarcity and speculation, followed by market ﬂooding. When shortages of
sugar occurred in 1989, Azricar, S.A. blamed privatization and the subsequent drop in
production in the sugar industry. Market speculation and withholding sugar from the
market are frequently believed to be the culprit for Mexico’s inability to export,
neglecting the large proportion of domestic sugar being utilized by private mill owners
for processing their own products. The shortages forced soft drink industries to import
sugar. Thus, in 1989, Mexico once again became a net importer of sugar, importing
300,000 tons at a cost of $665,000,000,000 pesos (Correa et al. 1989: 12). The gravity
of this situation increased with the importation of 800,000 tons of sugar in 1990. The
cost of these imports, $640,000,000,000 was equivalent to the value of seven privatized
sugar mills (Tumbando Caﬂa 1990 (l9):22).

Scarcity of sugar supplies in 1991 fostered massive imports by Azr’rcar, S.A. ,

leaving markets ﬂooded. During 1990-91, Mexico imported 2.4 million tons of sugar"1

 

"This sugar was imported from Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Korea, and the Philippines (Diario de Colima 1991b; Zdr'iiga
1992).

146

at cheaper prices than Mexican sugar,’2 in addition to the national production of 3.6
million tons. National consumption was 4 million tons, leaving a surplus of 2 million
tons. CNPP leader, Jesus Gonzalez Gortazar called the action "criminal", since sugar
mills were unable to sell their own stockpiles (Diario de Colima 1991b; Ztiﬁiga 1992).
According to Sergio Villa Godoy, president of the Citmara Nacional de la Industria
Azucarera y Alcoholera and general director of Grupo Sucrum, the opening of the border
was an error that in 1991 cost $600 billion pesos: "There is no sugar mill that produces
sugar at the dumping prices that are at play in the international market" (translated from
Ztiiiiga 1992:6A). Imports remained high in 1991-92; sugar imports of 2.6 million tons
represented 70% of the national harvest (Becerril 1993d). One observer said of these
imports, "If we were owners of the Sahara Desert, now we would be importing sand"
(translated from Vazquez 1990: 14). The government agrwd to regulate sugar imports
only after massive imports had caused severe disruptions to the national sugar market.

The future of the sugar market is also tied to NAFTA. A CNC leader asserted that,
"The decisions of the Secretary of Commerce with respect to sugar, are tied to the
context of the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement" (translated from Garcia
1992:21). Given recovery of export capacity, the sugar sector would be a major
beneﬁciary of NAFTA; many, however, fear that the current crisis represents a lost
opportunity, under the pending implementation of the free trade agreement. Under
NAFTA, Mexico would increase its exports to the U.S. market from 80,000 tons to 2
million tons; to do so, Mexican cane producers would have to double their production.
Cane producers, however, currently suffer the impact of mechanical inefﬁciency and

bankruptcy of sugar mills, severe market distortions, and signiﬁcant changes to the

 

”At the beginning of 1991, the authorized price of sugar was $1350 pesos per kg., but sugar mills,
with 30% of the production in their warehouses, were forced to sell the product at $1200 (Hernandez
1991a). The 1992 world market price of sugar was between $1600-$1800 pesos. Imported sugar now
undersells domestic Mexican sugar, which was $1908 in August, 1992 (Ztiﬁiga 1992).

147
contract that binds them to sugar mills.
new

The Decreto Caﬁero is a formal, national-level contract between cane producers and
sugar mills whose key function is to regulate the price of sugar cane. A new plan for
restructuring the sugar sector (Convenio de Reestructuracion del Sector Caﬁero) proposed
modiﬁcations to the Decreto Caﬁero, reformulating the method of ﬁxing the price of cane
for the 1992-93 harvest. Sucrose content was to be utilized as an indicator of extractable
sugar for establishing the basis of payment. The guaranteed factory yield of 8.3% was
to be gradually eliminated. The document committed the industrial sector to increase
sugar production of mills at an annual rate of 3.7% after the 1990-91 harvest, increase
factory efﬁciency, and diminish losses of sucrose from 2.64% to 2.3% by 1991-92
(Convenio de Reestructuracion del Sector Can'ero).

Decisions concerning the price of cane are jointly made by four state agencies:
Secretaria de Hacienda, SPP (Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto), SECOFI
(Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial), and SARH, plus the Camara de la
Industria Azucarera, composed of representatives of the private initiative. In 1989-90,
the price of cane was increased 13.85%, while inﬂation was on the order of 20% ,
fertilizers rose 38% , and diesel fuel 25 %. The tremendous cost of government subsidies
to maintain a low price on domestic sugar demonstrates signiﬁcant power exerted by
urban workers and the food processing industry. Given this price, caﬁeros received on
the average an amount equivalent to the minimum wage (Pare 1990). Moreover, the
private initiative made an unsuccessful attempt during the 1990-91 harvest to eliminate
producer beneﬁts such as health insurance, advance payments, and sacks of sugar given
to producers; the effort was thwarted by a threatened producers’ strike and subsequent
renegotiation. The CNPP rejected the Decreto Caﬁero, arguing that it favored the

capitalists and failed to take into account the point of view of caﬁeros; it claimed that

 

 

148
neither CN C nor CNPP were called upon to participate in its formulation.

A new Decreto Caﬁero (Diario Oﬁcial 1991) formulated May 30, 1991 makes the
monthly wholesale price of sugar the determinant for ﬁxing the price paid for cane; this
price will be calculated as a function of the sliding price of the U.S. dollar. Caﬁeros can
thus expect to receive varying prices for their cane, depending upon the month it is
harvested and delivered to the sugar mill. Since the price,’3 as a subsidy to urban
workers, remains extremely low, it will continue to have repercussions on the income
of cane producers. Each zone may opt to determine payment of cane delivered to the
mill, either on the average amount of sugar recuperated from a ton of cane in the zone,
or on an individual basis, through analysis of samples. Factory yield, then, continues
to play an important role in the income of cane producers. Elimination of the 8.3%
guaranteed factory yield will leave caﬁeros at the mercy of mechanically inefﬁcient sugar
mills. In 1992, it was announced that caﬁeros with less than 10 hectares would lose their
social security (Corro and Correa 1992). Both social security, acquired in 1963, and
medical beneﬁts, received in 1956, represent major achievements attained through years
of struggle on the part of caﬁeros.

Analysis of modiﬁcations to the Decreto Caﬁero indicate important changes in terms
of price and producers’ beneﬁts. From 1943 to 1975, the price had been based on the
amount of sugar extracted from cane in the mill, or factory yield. The 1943 Decree
ofﬁcially established mandatory supply zones for sugar mills, reﬂecting the diminished
production and increasing consumption of sugar in the country at the time. In 1975,
during the presidency of Luis Echeverria, the Decreto was modiﬁed, basing the price on
the amount of sucrose in cane, or ﬁeld yield and in relation to the guaranteed prices of

rice, soy, beans, sorghum, and maize. This method makes caﬁeros independent of

 

”As of August, 1992, the price per kg. of reﬁned sugar to the consumer was $1908 pesos; standard
sugar, $1718; popular white sugar, $1789; and mascabado $1561 (Garcia: 1992).

149
efﬁciency, or lack thereof, in the factory; at the same time, it motivates the car'iero to
improve the yield of the cane. During this period, recapitalization of the sugar industry
was largely at the cost of state subsidies. In 1980, under Lopez Portillo, the Decreto was
again changed, making factory yield, once again, the basis for determination of price.
The burden of recapitalization of the industry is thus placed on the shoulders of
producers--a serious blow, given the generally poor conditions of antiquated sugar mill
machinery. This decree did, however, set a minimum guarantee of 8.3% factory yield
(83 kg. sugar per ton), below which the caﬁero was guaranteed full price for the cane.

A second important modiﬁcation to the 1980 Decreto is that cafieros no longer
receive beneﬁts from the byproducts--molasses, alcohol, bagazo, and so forth. Sugar
mills often burn the bagazo to operate the factory, sell it for animal feed or to make
compressed wood and a variety of other products. Previously, as established in the 1943
Decree, the caﬁero received 50% of the proﬁts from these products. Now, the caﬁero
is discounted for bagazo left in the cane, receiving lower proﬁts, despite the lucrative
beneﬁt to the sugar mill (Pare 1987).

Caﬁeros are paid for their cane at liquidation in August. When they receive their
liquidation, all costs of production, advance payments, interest, and other charges are
already deducted. Caﬁeros pay interest charges on machinery, fertilizer, works such as
"derocking" the soil, and on loans. An important component of the cost of production
is the interest charged by FINA. The rate for plantas, or ﬁnancing of new cane is
100%; the capital is distributed at rates of 60% , 25 % , and 15 % over a three-year period.
These charges generally leave the producer with no net income. Given the high rate of
indebtedness among cafreros, the government decided in 1990 to restructure debts for the
1989-90 harvest at normal rates of interest. The mechanisms for doing so had not yet

been worked out, but if a caﬁero defaults on the loan, FINA can now seize his/her

property.

 

150
The price of sugar cane ultimately depends on the market price of sugar, which
continues to be controlled by the government. Sugar industrialists, as well as cafieros,
blame the government for these price controls, since they contribute to the current crisis

in the sector.

Social Contradictions of Reprivatization

The fate of the sugar sector is of ultimate importance to the country, since it is an
important source of employment in Mexico. In 1990, it provided income to 131,533
cane producers, 76,854 cane cutters, 50,000 mill employees; some 400,000 people
depend directly on the sugar industry and indirectly it supports between ﬁve and six
million, or one out of every 15 Mexicans (Becerril 1993c; Correa et al. 1989, Garcia
1992; Azricar S.A. 1990).

In 1990, the Manual Azucarero Mexicana noted the severe economic crisis of the
nation and projected that privatization and modernization of the sugar sector would create
increased efﬁciency and productivity. This optimism is less conspicuous in the 1991
volume which notes the sharp readjustment and obstacles faced by the now almost totally
privatized sector in the context of the globalization of the world economy. This volume
states that if the sugar industry is weakened or disintegrates, this would break the
equilibrium, with grave economic and social repercussions (Manual Azucarera Mexicana
1990; 1991). The sugar sector was said to be "in the worst crisis of its history" by the
end of the 1980s (Correa et al. 1989: 12) and by 1992, the sugar industry was described
as "wounded to the death" (Garcia 1992: 18).

A total of 100,000 hectares of cane have been abandoned in Mexico. As a result,
sugar production declined 13.4% between 1986-1991, and dropped another 6.4% in
1992. This represents a loss from 3,743,557 tons of sugar in 1987 to 3,172,503 tons in
1990 (Malpica 1991; Marcos 1992). From 1989 to 1990, the surface cultivated in cane

151
diminished 11%, processed cane dropped 16%, factory yield worsened from 9.7% to
9.1%, and tons of cane per hectare dropped 11% (Malpica 1991).

In terms of supply and demand of sugar, the indiscriminant opening of the border
to sugar imports is blamed. Imported sugar carries a lower price than domestic sugar,
provoking decapitalization of the industry. As a result of the failure to modernize the
sector and resolve problems of productivity and efﬁciency, " The change in ownership
has provoked uncertainty, lack of control, and disinterest in trying to make the sugar
mills work at 100% capacity. There has been no modernization; instead negligence
exists, in disaccord with the program of the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari"
(translated from Serrano 1990: 15). The degree of bankruptcy in the sugar sector is
strikingly perilous under conditions of privatization.

Sugar mills had been notorious for their over-employment under state administration.
In accordance with objectives to " rationalize production" , privatization of sugar mills has
been accompanied by massive worker lay-offs. As early as 1990, 4430 mill workers,
10% of the total, had been laid off their jobs (Pare 1990). In 1992, 8,000 mill workers
lost their jobs (Becerril 1993i). As the poor administration of privatized mills caused the
majority of mills to operate with deﬁcits, 20,000 of the 50,000 mill workers of the
country were threatened with loss of employment (Excelsior 1992). Unlike the rescue
operations carried out by the state before privatization, a FINA ofﬁcial stated, "[FIN A]
will not resort to the rescue of sugar mills that do not demonstrate viability, under the
pretext of maintaining them as a source of employment, now that they are the
responsibility of those who manage them" (translated from Corro and Correa 1992:30).
Cane leaders complained that the industry was worse than when managed by the state and
accused the new owners of acting with a "negative mentality" (Corro and Correa 1992).
As explained by Luisa Pare (1990:23), "The majority of sugar mills were turned over

to the private initiative, without taking into account the social sector".

152

Since the declared bankruptcy of Ingenio Independencia, the labor contracts and
unions are no longer recognized. Workers have lost beneﬁts, including social security,
which were the result of years of class struggle. The private initiative has made a
concerted effort to curtail workers’ beneﬁts, although the unions have thus far managed
to retain retirement, housing, medical service, training, and scholarships, as deﬁned in
the labor contract. These triumphs are minimized by the failure of the industrialists to
comply with the contracts (Becerril 19930. Upon termination of the 1993 harvest,
car‘ieros had still not received their advance payments, nor credit for ﬁeld costs of the
coming season. This situation threatens further declines in production (Becerril 1993g).
Hence, while extolling modernization, private capitalists have attempted to restore the
relations of production prevalent during the Porﬁriato.

As new private mill managers have taken over the sugar mills, the need to redeﬁne
the relationship between caﬁeros and the state, and between caﬁeros and the sugar mill
surfaces. Private mill owners have unwillingly inherited a caﬁero sector in which notions
of a paternalistic relationship between themselves and the sugar mill persist.“ Peasant
cane producers hold a strong sentiment of "belonging" to the government and inability
to adjust to the new private-caﬁero relationship.

Furthermore, the private initiative uses union conﬂict to weaken the power of
producers’ unions. In 1991, for example, the sugar industrialists supported a dissident
group of cane producers in order to keep the CNPP divided (Hernandez 1991b). The

private initiative has been unwilling to effect modernized standards in the contraction of

 

“An illustration of this problem was presented at Ingenios San Sebastian and Santa Clara, Michoacan
which were sold in October of 1990. In November, 1990, an interim manager, serving until the arrival
of the new manager, was interviewed by the researcher. During the interview, the phone rang and the
manager began to complain to the caller about problems in their relation with car‘ieros: ”The situation that
they have, now that the mill is of the private industry, it no longer belongs to the federal government, the
caﬁeros feel like part of the federal government and I think that much time will pass before they
assimilate'.

153
labor, paying low wages, tolerating child labor, and implementing demands that require
workers to surpass the legal limits in labor hours. Malpica evaluates this situation:

. . .an inapplicable labor legislation and the nonexistence, blocking, and

nulliﬁcation of whatever organization that responds to the economic, judicial,

labor or social rights of these workers. That is, the lack of protection that
deprives workers redounds in a form of economic protection for agroindustrial

capital (translated from Malpica 1991:71).

Privatization has failed to extract the Mexican sugar sector from its crisis; rather,
the crisis has intensiﬁed. Villa Godoy, President of the Camara Nacional de la Industria
Azucarera, described the sector "with broken arms, ankles out of joint, bruises on the
face and bleeding from the nose" (translated from El Financiera 1992). Mexican sugar
mills remain unmodemized, in debt, beset by conﬂicts between unions and mill owners,
and threatened by cheap sugar imports, in short, in the worst crisis of the secor’s history.

This chapter has shown that privatization rests in neoliberal ideology that asserts the
stated objectives of state deregulation, increased investment, greater economic
productivity, technological efﬁciency, and modernization. Structural adjustment
programs, however, are designed to protect the interests of debt-holding international
banks and beneﬁt multinational ﬁrms which have entered the Mexican economy for the
purpose of quick proﬁts. The internationalization of capital not only threatens national
sovereignty, but has created a set of contradictions that imperil the social sector. The
state’s traditional role in the economy in ensuring social and political ends was thus
curtailed in support of these vested interests.

Economic restructuring and privatization were shown to involve a complex
interaction between international policies (IMF, NAFTA, etc.) and national development
policy (National Development Plan, Covenio de Reestructuracion del Sector Azucarera,
etc.). Within the sugar sector, the contradictions of neoliberalism are most clear. The

rapid privatization of sugar mills led to concentration of economic power, at the expense

of the social sector. Rather than deregulation, the state continues to ﬁnance the

154
privatized sugar sector through FINA, S.A. and through various subsidies and price
controls. In the experience of Azr’rcar, S.A. , market opening and deregulation have
created severe market distortions. Rather than modernization and increased productive
efﬁciency, lack of investment on the part of private capital has resulted in bankruptcies
and productive inefﬁciency. Moreover, the social and political costs to peasant cane
producers--who were to enjoy increased standards of living and a participatory role in
the process--include loss of employment, fewer beneﬁts, perjorative modiﬁcations to the
Decreto Caﬁero, greater external control over union organizations, and political
repression of their protests against privatization. The next chapter analyzes the collective
mobilization of the regional cane producers’ union in its confrontation against the
conditions described in this chapter that have resulted from state divestment and

reprivatization of the sugar sector.

VII. COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION

The theoretical orientation of this dissertation emphasizes the organic relationship
between peasants and the state, and the subsequent reconﬁguration of that relationship
with privatization. The Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC) is an important arena
which expresses the state-peasant relationship. Theoretically, the CN C serves as a
intermediary between peasants and the state; the CNC is a state instrument that penetrates
peasant society and, at the same time, a class instrument that penetrates the state
apparatus (Hardy 1984: 16). Furthermore, the double control of UNPCARM (Union
Nacional de Productores de Car‘ia de Azricar de la Repriblica Mexicana), which is
vertically situated within the hierarchical CN C, and state-operated sugar mills
incorporated peasants into a structure of domination which conjointly linked their political
organization to the agroindustrial complex.

In this chapter, I will discuss the historical development of the cane producers’
union through which the state-peasant alliance was forged. Within UNPCARM, despite
its hierarchical structure of control, cane producers have engaged in historical struggles
to defend their interests. It is the purpose of this chapter to illuminate the dialectical
nature of these struggles as the context shifts from state to private domains.

The chapter then turns to a particular event-~the mobilization of the regional union
following the privatization of Ingenio Queseria. This event demonstrates how cane
producers, through collective organization, utilized their limited spaces of power to press
their demands against the state and the privatized sugar mill. The event illustrates the

interwoven connections between state and private structures of power and cane

155

156
producers’ unions, and between the national UNPCARM and its regional-level
organizations (U NPCA). This event is contrasted with an occurrence of collective
mobilization when the mill was under state control.

Analysis of this event also incoporates peasant discourse, which evokes the cultural
production of ideas as peasants evaluate the outcome of their collective mobilization.
Peasant discourse becomes an instrument for contesting the hegemony of state and
capitalist ideology and praxis. The chapter then turns to an analysis of the restructuring
of state-peasant-capitalist relationships under conditions of privatization and concludes
with a description of the emergence of an independent peasant organization that

challenged the state from outside of the dominant structures of power.

Development of the Cane Producers’ Union

At the time that agrarian reform was dramatically reshaping the sugar sector, the
most historically signiﬁcant peasant organization in Mexico, the CNC, emerged. The
institutional incorporation of this organization into the ofﬁcial political system of the state
transforms the history of the CNC into a history of the relationship between peasants and
the Mexican state (Hardy 1984).

The ﬁrst peasant organizations in Mexico emerged in 1922 with the formation of the
Ligas de Comunidades Agrarias in Michoacan (Crespo et a1. 1990). The 1930s marked
the beginning of labor organization in the region of Queseria, Colima. As sugar cane
production expanded, labor discontent increased at Ingenio Queseria, and by 1934—35,
agrarian syndicates were a feature of rural production in Colima. Peasants of Colima
were organized into the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias "Torres N tir‘iez" in 1936
(Oseguera 1979).’4

 

“This name is taken from two agrarian leaders, Ignacio Torres and Pedro Nuiiez, who were
assassinated by Cristeros during the Cristero Revolt (Oseguera 1979).

157

The appearance of various peasant organizations in the 1920s and 1930s, and the
growing strength of the CTM (Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos) led Cardenas
to establish the Confederacion Nacional de Campesinos in 1938, to unite competing
peasant groups, bind the CNC to the ofﬁcial government party, and prevent an alliance
between peasants and proletariat which might mobilize against the state. In 1938, the
ofﬁcial party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, was transformed into the Partido
Revolucionario Mexicano, divided into four autonomous, separate sectors--peasant, labor,
popular, and military (Hardy 1984; Landsberger 1973).

The constitutional assembly of the CNC took place on August 28, 1938, attended
by 300 delegates of the Ligas de Comunidades Agrarias and some three million peasants.
At the time of its formation, the CNC incorporated Ligas of ejidatarios representing all
states in the nation, unions, cooperatives, and pequeﬂos propietarios (private
landowners). The CN C is organized at four hierarchical levels: 1) village ejidal
committees,” 2) regional committees, 3) state level Ligas de Comunidades Agrarias,
and 4) the National Executive Committee (Hardy 1984). The ﬁrst General Secretary of
the CNC was Graciano Sénchez (Warman 1980a). Throughout its history, the
democratic election of CNC leaders has been questioned and lack of grass roots
participation is widely acknowledged (Restrepo and Eckstein 1975). A small circle of
elite leaders tend to be reelected, who often lack support of the base membership, which
has become increasingly marginalized. The leadership of the National Executive
Committee has always been ﬁlled by non-peasants; this position is occupied by leaders
selected by the state itself (Granados 1988).

Since the 1930s, the state has channelled peasant mobilization through their union

 

”At the village level, the ejido remains the basic unit of peasant organization; the granting of ejidos
is a product of class struggle and continues to serve, via its incorporation into the CN C, as an apparatus
for state domination of the rural sector. The ejido guaranteed the intervention and vigilance of the rural
areaonthepartofthestate.

158

organizations and utilized the CNC as a mechanism to control and dominate the Mexican
peasantry. The potential power of organized labor was severely weakened when the state
restricted action of the CTM (Confederacién de Trabajadores Mexicanos) to the industrial
sector and that of the CNC to the agricultural sector. Within the sugar sector, the
separation of ﬁeld and factory that ensued from agrarian reform had already divided
organized labor into caﬂeros (cane producers) and factory workers. The cane producers’
union remained in the CTM until 1948, when it entered the CNC. In 1936, STIAASRM
(Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Azucarera Alcoholera y Similares de la
Republica Mexicana) formed as an organization of sugar mill workers (Crespo et al.
1990). STIAASRM #82 remains the primary labor organization for mill workers at
Queseria and links them to the union at the national level. Important here is the division
maintained between factory workers and cane producers that precludes major challenges
to regime stability through united efforts of these two sizable groups. In addition, the
CNPP (Confederacion Nacional de la Pequeiia Propiedad), which incorporates sugar
producers who own private property, was integrated into CN OP (Confederacion Nacional
de Organizaciones Populares) in 1943, effecting a further division among caiieros, based
on different types of land tenure (Hardy 1984).

Caﬁeros afﬁliated with the CNC began to organize in 1941, demanding an increase
in the price of cane. This effort had repercussions throughout the country, leading to the
ﬁrst Congreso Nacional de Cultivadores de Caﬁa and subsequently, the ﬁrst car‘iero
organization, UNPCARM. Henceforth, the history of the cane producers’ organization
has been a history of conﬂicts over the price of cane and over the relationship of caﬁeros
to mill owners (Crespo et al. 1990).

Unionized efforts on the part of caﬁeros have achieved signiﬁcant goals. When the
government lowered the price of cane in 1952, caﬁeros pressured for a price increase

(Crespo et al. 1990). Caﬁeros received medical services by presidential decree in 1945

159

(Flores 1987). In Colima, upon formation of the Sindicato Nacional Azucarero,
members demanded that Ingenio Queseria provide medical services for workers and their
families. It later successfully fought for the establishment of a medical clinic. In 1944,
President Avila Camacho legislated improved beneﬁts to cane producers: a larger
proportion of the excess above the 8 % factory guarantee, 50% participation in the sale
of byproducts (molasses and alcohol), and 1.5 centavos per kg. of sugar produced. The
latter was the ﬁrst direct state subsidy to cane producers (Crespo et al. 1990). This
decree, however, established increased hegemony of the state in the sector, giving the
state control over the price of sugar. Caﬁero opposition to the 1944 decree failed to
obtain changes in its provisions (Flores 1987).

The late 1950s were marked by labor strikes as peasants accused union leaders of
selling out to the government. During this period, President Lopez Mateos broke strikes,
imprisoned leaders, and asserted state control over producers’ unions (Purcell 1981).
After an unsuccessful attempt by the CNC to unify producers’ organizations in 1959,
UNPCA in 1961 broke away from the Confederation. New car‘iero organizations formed
in the 1960s, opposing the CNC (Flores 1987). In 1960, subsequent to the 1958 price
freeze, union demands were radicalized with the call for a 50% increase in the price of
cane. Industrialists opposing state control of the price of sugar supported their demands,
demonstrating the complexity of state-private-peasant relations. Consequently, some
45,000 workers and 85,000 caiieros went on strike in 78 mills of the country (Crespo et
al. 1990). The CCI (Central Campesina Independiente, formed in 1963) protested that
the proﬁts of cane byproducts beneﬁtted only the sugar mills, and made demands
concerning the price of cane, transport, and credit. Social security was extended to cane
producers in 1963, presumably to attract workers and producers to cane production
(Flores 1987).

Despite these gains, the CNC in 1966 blamed the agrarian reform for the continued

160

dependency of caﬁeros on sugar mills, monopoly control by the mills, and forced
production within designated zones--similar to conditions in the Porﬁriato. Moreover,
dissention within the union organization signiﬁed a weakening of bargaining power for
caiieros (Crespo et al. 1990). During the period 1941-63, these conﬂicts kept caﬁeros
of the nation divided into three main groups: UNPCA, the Associacion Nacional de
Productores de Car‘ia de Azﬁcar, and the Federacién Nacional Cafiera. Lack of
uniﬁcation among caﬁero organizations posed a major threat to the CNC, which in
appearance represented car‘iero interests, but in reality defended state policy.
Fractionalization and mobilization within producers’ unions had transcended the limits
of control exerted by the CNC, representing a crisis of legitimacy for the organization.
Much of the conflict revolved around hegemony within the leadership of the CN C. In
addition to conﬂicts in the social relations of production between sugar mills and caﬁeros,
were conﬂicts between the CN C and its constituent unions, and between the central
government and regional power groups (Flores 1987).

One of these regional power groups was located in the state of Veracruz. A leader
of the Federacidn Veracruzana de Productores de Caﬁa (FVPC), Roque Spinozo Foglia,
who had broken with the CN C in 1969, succeeded in obtaining important social beneﬁts
for caiieros.’6 He denounced abuses by both mills and CNC leaders, fraud within the
CNC, and repression and assassination of peasants; in turn, the CNC leader blamed
Spinozo for promoting anarchy and peasant unrest. When dissention caused many to
leave the CNC in 1972, mill owners refused to negotiate contracts with non-CNC
members. The state supported the CN C against the FVPC. Work stoppages (the strike
known as the ”huelga de machetes caidos" , or "strike of fallen machetes") at Ingenio San

Cristébal, Veracruz culminated in the intervention of the army. Pending violence in a

 

“Spinozo fought for transport costs to be paid by the mill, an increase in guaranteed factory yields,
scholarships for children of caﬁeros, and higher prices for cane.

161
number of mills prompted the arrest of Spinozo, who, after his release, led the
occupation of Ingenio San Cristobal by cafieros (Crespo et al. 1990; Igarttia 1987).

As these events unfolded, the connection between national hegemony of the sugar
sector and sugar mill zones was illustrated in the region of Ingenio Queseria. In the
context of discontent over the 1975 Decreto Cafiero, then Secretary of Hacienda, José
Lopez Portillo, came to Queseria on October 27 , 1975 to discuss the new decree and the
price of cane with producers of the zone. In Lopez Portillo’s words:

The payment of cane is made through a new system apart or different from the

efﬁciency achieved by the industry. . .when they produce well, the result of the

caﬁeros’ efforts will be compensated, rather than when the industry is
inefﬁcient, the caﬁero effort, even when there has been great productivity, is

affected by the bad results of the sugar mill...(translated from Pare 1987:236).

Lopez Portillo then revealed the political intent of this policy:

. . .the roads of the Revolution are always open; the very situation requires a

new means and this new means can be had by an administration that is

[conscientious] and at the same time responsible, that is attentive to the

preoccupations and the justice of the workers; because this is what the

government is for, to resolve the problems of the citizens...who work and

produce...(translated from Paré 1987:191).

The appeal to the ideology of revolution, in a context of increasing discontent among
cane producers is explicit. The weakening of the state-peasant alliance since the 1970s
has made control of peasant mobilization and maintenance of political stability more
difﬁcult. UNPCARM and the Federacion Nacional Caﬁera were united by the CN C in
1973 into the Coalicion Nacional de Organismos Caﬁeros. This uniﬁcation was to
facilitate confrontation with the Alianza Nacional de Productores de Caﬁa, which
threatened to become an independent union; caﬁeros in Colima had joined the Alianza.
The formation of the Alianza marks a crisis of legitimacy for the CN C, after which the
state restructured peasant unions, absorbing the CNC, UGOCM (Union General de
Obreros y Campesinos de México, CCI, and CAM (Consejo Agrarista Mexicano) into

the Pacto de Ocampo, allowing direct control from above. This vertical control

162

facilitates cooptation of union leaders and obstructs development of a class consciousness
among caﬁeros. The sector was in the process of statization at this time, requiring a
single organization controlled by the state to regulate the relations of production and
promote capital accumulation of the sugar sector (Pare 1987). Subsequently, in 1977,
a uniﬁcation congress was held at Puebla to unite caﬁero organizations, facilitate
government control of the peasant struggle, and to maintain caﬁeros in a subordinate
position to sugar mills, many of which were now state—owned. This effort strengthened
the link between caﬁeros and state, but struggle for hegemony of the CNC continued
(Hardy 1984).

Thus, by 1977, a new kind of organization was emerging within the CNC, based
strictly on productive activity. These organizations-we producers, tobacco growers,
and so forth, were constituted into regional and state-level organizations that had
representation in the national CNC. The Union Nacional de Cafreros held its
constitutional assembly in 1977, attended by 1344 delegates from 66 cane-producing
zones of the nation. Each production zone is represented by a regional union, which in
turn, is integrated into the national-level organization. The union formulated two major
objectives:

1) To fortify an alliance with the government to increase production and accelerate
the social and economic progress of Mexico.57

2) To elesyate the social and economic conditions of cane producers (Hardy
1984).

UNPCA in Colima organized June 8, 1977. Each ejido has three representatives,

forming a 33 member executive committee. This regional union has been an integral part

 

”This included: promotion of the cultivation of sugar cane, acquisition of machinery, and legal
formulation of contracts for the purchase and sale of sugar cane between caiieros and sugar mills.

”This would be achieved through: life insurance, increasing productivity, credit, and improved salaries
for cane cutters.

163

of the national cane producers’ historical struggle for just prices, caﬁeros rights, and
improved beneﬁts. Among its achievements are: receipt of three 50 kg. sacks of sugar
given to caﬁeros, biannual advance payments, life insurance, improved medical beneﬁts,
and social security. As participants in this struggle, caﬁeros in the zone of Queseria
discern the connectedness between the state, private capital, and their own union
organization, all of which imbues the relationship with a historical continuity, from the
foundation of their organization to the recent privatization of the sugar mill. One caﬁero
offered his perspective on this relationship:

With the change in owner [of the sugar mill], UNPCA has had more capacity.

The government has capacity if it wants, but the government sets the price for

the rich. From here, the unions were born, to support the screwed one, the

peasant. If we aren’t afﬁliated with the union, we aren’t going to have any

support from the government. The government was the one that supported the
hacendados. In Mexico we began to open our eyes that we screwed ones could
have the same support as the rich. Someone went to the CNC in Mexico and

said, "We’re going to start a union to deal with the sugar mill".

The formation of the cane producers’ union was a signiﬁcant force in the historical
development of the sugar industry. Mobilization of peasants within this organization
brings into relief the antagonistic relations and dialectical nature of the process of cane
production that characterizes this sector. Although UNPCARM serves as a channel for
peasant struggle, it epitomizes state mechanisms of economic and political control which
assure allegiance to UNPCA-CNC. Organizations which do not conform to ofﬁcial state
regulations may not be created. Thus, independent organizations have no rights to
beneﬁts (social security, etc.) enjoyed by ofﬁcially-recognized organizations (Tumbando
Cafla 1990: 19). Moreover, only organizations recognized by the CNC and CNPP may
take part in the Comités de Produccion Caﬁera (Tumbando Cafla 1990:18). The social
function of caﬁeros was to satisfy national demand for sugar, generate exports to earn

the foreign exchange that would ﬁnance industrialization, to supply a cheap raw material,

and to produce low cost food in order to maintain low wages for the work force (Flores

 

 

164
1987).

Hegemonic control takes place in the ideological, as well as political and economic
arenas. In response to dissention and the emergence of independent producers’ unions
which have challenged the legitimacy of ofﬁcial organizations in the last few years, the
UNPCARM journal reiterates state ideology by emphasizing the loyalty of caﬁeros to
PR1, the state-peasant alliance, and the honesty of its leaders. It discredits any political
opposition, accusing it of ”disrupting the stability” and attacks its critics, characterizing
them as "pseudoleaders", ”pernicious”, "subversive", and "against the progress of
Mexico" (Wanda Caﬂa 1990 (20):2; (l9):2; (l7):28). When its legitimacy was
challenged in 1990, UNPCARM asserted, "Precisely now, the cement of the
Organization is more ﬁrm than ever; following the politics of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional...the UNPCA-CNC constitutes the most powerful caﬁero syndicate of the
Country" (translated from Tumbando Caﬂa 1990 (l7):2). During a ”National Solidarity
Week” in 1990, the journal printed the speech of Isidro Pulido Reyes, national leader of
UNPCARM:

The caﬁeros will always respond to the politics of the Chief of the Nation. We

eafieros. . .never have said no to the instructions that we receive from Lie.

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, a man preoccupied with the national country. . .. We

maintain triumphant the ideological challenge of our revolution, that continues

being the sustenance of a social aspiration, in which we place conﬁdence

(translated from Tumbando Calla 1990 (l9):13).

A common theme in the Mexican political process is the cooptation of dissident
leaders and groups into the CNC. In 1980, Roque Spinozo rejoined the CNC, becoming
leader of UPCARM (Crespo et al. 1990; Igarti’ra 1987). In exchange for CNC

recognition, the FVPC received a number of concessions (Flores 1987).” Statization

of the sugar industry thus coincided with increasing state intervention in producer

 

”These included a 10% increase in price, a cut in discounts for poor quality cane, payment for cane
byproducts (bagazo), payment for unharvested cane, and construction of houses for car'ieros and cane
cutters (Flores 1987).

 

 

 

165
organizations. Car‘iero unions are clearly controlled through economic concessions,
cooptation, and at times, repression. Clear evidence of the latter is the 1984
assassination of Spinozo; his assassins were never apprehended. The loss of bargaining
power that followed the assassination of Spinozo was recounted by a car‘iero from
Queseria:

The struggle that took place from ’72 to ’77, I was involved all that time. I

was there in Veracruz, in Sinaloa, in Tamaulipas, in Michoacan, and I went

there with the leaders. There, they held the congresses and with my presence,

they said the state of Colima is participating with them. Well man, if they won

the conquests from ’75 until ’84, more or less, we had a proﬁt. But when they

buried our national leader, the conquests ended.

The assassination of Spinozo occurred three years prior to privatization of the sugar
industry, and marks a watershed in the state-peasant relationship. Since privatization
began in 1988, strikes have emerged over compliance with the Decreto Caﬁero and
worker contracts: "In the last three years, [the caﬁeros] have been obligated to stage
strikes, as the only form to obligate the new owners to comply with their contractual
obligations” (translated from Becerril 1993a:10).

Eight sugar mills staged a 15 day strike prior to the 1988—89 harvest, achieving a
55% increase in the price of cane. In 1989, demands centered on noncompliance with
the Decreto Caﬁero, as well as the price. In the region of Queseria, cafieros threatened
a strike when the new private owners of the mill attempted to terminate advance
payments which are guaranteed in the contract. Once threatened, the private owners
refrained from removal of this beneﬁt. Furthermore, the union leader from Queseria
participated in a commission that communicated with President Salinas de Gortari on
compliance with the decree, which guarantees that the price of cane will be adjusted
according to the rate of inﬂation. Salinas promised the cafieros that this noncompliance

would last only one year, assuring them that, ”You are not going to loose the rights of

the Decreto”. Subsequently, four mills declared a strike and caiieros demanded that they

 

166
receive a 20% increase in the price of cane to adjust for inﬂation during the previous
year. They obtained only 13.88% (Diario de Colima 1989a).

Union loyalty is also a problem in Colima. An emergency meeting of UNPCA was
held at Queseria on September 26, 1990 to resolve a split in the union. A group known
as 'Gracianistas" ,°° wealthy caﬁeros who own their own trucks and equipment, desired
to leave UNPCA because they did not wish to pay costs for this equipment charged to
all union members. A list of some 50 dissenters was sent by Rodolfo Aguierre Suarez,
regional UNPCA leader, to the national headquarters. The national UNPCARM
discouraged the split. At the October 3 meeting of the regional union, the leader read
the statutes of UNPCARM to impress upon the dissidents their obligations to the union.
The control exerted over unions in the sugar sector goes beyond ensuring loyal afﬁliation
to ofﬁcial unions, a fact clearly expressed in July, 1991, when sugar mill workers of
Ingenio Queseria were publicly advised to attend a special meeting held by PRI, to hear
the three party candidates speak, warning that those who were not present would be ﬁned
(GarciaLemus 1991).

Union members are cognizant of the structural relationship between the state and
peasants. Despite the state-peasant alliance through which their organizations are
incorporated into PRI, as one cai'rero explained:

The government has very powerful control over the peasants; the pequer‘ios

propietarios have their leader, the ejidatarios have their leader, and they are in

charge of [the caﬁeros] here. They control them so they don’t leave the corral.

The leader only calls, and the bunch of assholes gathers, and from there, they
are going to follow them.

 

”In 1983, a dissident group at Queseria, led by Jesus Facio, broke off from UNPCA during a national
meeting held in Puebla, forming an independent organintion. This group joined with other CN C dissidents
at the national level, who were purportedly supported by the CNPP. This group claimed that their
candidate for leader had not been allowed to enter the Puebla meeting and was sequestered by the CNC.
The group formed the Union Graciano Sinchez, and disrupted the Puebla meeting. It is reported by
caﬁeros that today the group is without power, being neither part of the CNC nor the CNPP. In the
Queseria region, Facio remains a critic of UNPCA.

167

Union leaders, referred to in Mexico as ”charros" (horsemen who ride in the rodeos)
for their control over peasant organizations, are frequently accused of corruption and
functioning as regional caciques. Despite ideological and political economic mechanisms
of control, the Mexican state is today facing a crisis of legitimacy. Peasants have largely
lost faith in the government and its mission to the peasant sector:

The mechanisms of survival of the CN C are precarious against state policies

that do not resolve the rural problematic and are facing the growing divorce of

the organization with the peasantry, a divorce that in some way explains the

emergence of incipient independent organizations, still weak, but regionally

present (Hardy 1984:12).

This brief overview of the development of caﬁero organizations points to strategies
that cane producers take, as active human agents, in the historical struggles for their

rights and interests, against the structures of domination that prevail in the sugar sector.

However, the nature of that struggle has changed with the reprivatization of sugar mills.

Mobilization of the Cane Producers’ Union

Caﬁeros in the zone of Ingenio Queseria have acted collectively in resisting the
entrenchment of private capital in a formerly state-operated domain. They accomplish
this primarily through two organizations, the Union Nacional de Productores de Cana-
CNC (referred to below as "UNPCA"), representing ejidatarios and the Confederacion
Nacional de la Pequeiia Propiedad (CNPP), representing pequeﬁos propietarios, or
private landowners. There were 1185 ejidatarios producing cane for Ingenio Queseria
in 1989-90 and 273 propietarios, totaling 145 8 producers. Of these, 796 members are
integrated into UNPCA."l

 

“At the national level, the CNPP is integrated by 39,460 producers, while UNPCA has 92,533
members, totaling 131,533 cane producers. These data are calculated, based on ofﬁcial reports that 70%
of caﬁeros are integrated into the CNC and 30% into the CNPP, using the 1989-90 total. Published
information on the number of producers varies widely since competition between the unions leads them to
distort such information. The publications of the UNPCA-CNC, for example, claim an unrealistic
membership of 105,000 producers (Tumbando Carla 1990:20). Correa et al. (1989) report 50,000

 

 

168

Important differences distinguish the two producers’ unions.62 The former is made
up of relatively poor peasants, while the latter is comprised of wealthy farmers, who
have accumulated large amounts of private land and/or rent many hectares of land from
ejidatarios. Each is incorporated into a different sector within PRI, one belonging to the
"peasant class" of the CNC, and the other to the "popular class" of the CNOP. This
structural factor, along with ideological and political disagreements between the two
organizations, precludes uniﬁcation. Conﬂicts between UNPCA and the CNPP over
proposed demands and political strategies are frequent. Ambivalence toward these
wealthy caiieros and the power they wield is clearly expressed by car‘ieros of the zone:

When a pequer‘io propietario goes to these big dogs (mill ofﬁcials) and says to

the secretary, "I want to speak with the manager”, they let him in and they

greet him. The propietario arrives prepared; he puts ten million pesos on the

desk and he explains his problems and they ﬁx them. And the screwed one
goes to talk with this same big dog in order to let him pass and tell his
problems and they say, ”Yes, we are going to do this” and they never do
anything. To us they say yes, but they don’t say when, well its never. With

the pequefios propietarios the money is falling to them, but with one [like us]

no.

In 1990-91, the powerful CNPP leader launched a media campaign against the sugar
mill, publicly criticizing it in the press, on television, and at public meetings. He
demanded that caﬁeros receive 75 % of the proﬁts from the sale of sugar, rather than
divide them equally with the industrialists. The leader rationalized this demand on the
basis that caﬁeros of the zone own the land, trucks, tractors, and all the ﬁeld

infrastructure, amounting to 70% of the value required to produce sugar. He threatened

 

members for the CNPP, 55,000 for the UNPCARM, while another 13,000 belong to independent unions.
Crespo et al. (1990) gives 1985 data of 123,771 producers, 86,392 UNPCARM members, and 37,379
CNPP afﬁliates. Hardy (1984) states there were 114,000 producers, of which 65,000 belonged to
UNPCARM. Informed sources report that 61.5% of national production of sugar is attributable to the
CNC, while 38.5% is produced by members of the CNPP.

“The pequei'ros propietarios dominate the region economically and politically. The leader of their
union, the CNPP, refused to be interviewed, thus comparative analysis of the two union organizations is
absent. Most pequeﬁos propietarios are urban dwellers; the few who resided in the research communities
were also ejidatarios, thus data in this dissertation do not reﬂect important differences between these two

groups.

"’7

 

169

in June, 1991 that if the sugar mill failed to process all the cane in the region, his union
would take legal measures against Ingenio Queseria because "this arbitrariness in the
lateness of processing on the part of the industrialists provoked urgency that is causing
huge losses to cafieros" (translated from Ochoa 1991b:l). This situation is an anomaly
in that the relationship between sugar mills and producers’ unions is generally more
favorable to the CNPP than to UNPCA. The sharp division between these two major
groups precluded their uniﬁcation in the 1990 mobilization for a just price for sugar
cane.

The key objective of the 1990 cane producers’ strike was to obtain an increase in
the price paid for sugar cane, yet unions across the nation were concerned as well with
a series of issues: the high cost of agricultural inputs, high interest rates, taxes paid to
IMSS“, and mounting debts. Five additional demands were speciﬁed: 1) advance
payments on December 15 and March 15; 2) preliquidation for delivered cane in the
amount of 90% of its value; 3) incentives for improved production over a ﬁve-year
period; 4) sale to caﬂeros of three 50 kg. sacks of sugar at wholesale prices; and 5) road
repairs to be covered by the industrialists (Tumbando Caﬂa 1990:19).

From 1988-1990, the price paid for sugar cane had been inferior to the rate of
inﬂation-~in contradiction to the Decreto Cafiero, leaving car'ieros with a price deﬁciency
of 18.88%, equivalent to $10 billion pesos. By 1990, rising production costs required
that producers receive at least a 50% increase in price merely to remain solvent. On
November 6, 1990, the government offered a price increase of 26.9% for the 1990-91
harvest. At a special national meeting on November 7, 1990, the director of Azucar,

S.A. , Carlos Torres Manzo, "obviously nervous, tried to explain to caﬁeros the motives

 

“IMSS, the Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social, receives $721 pesos for every ton of cane
delivered by caﬁeros. Car‘ieros complain, however, that the medical services they receive are poor
(Tumbando Caﬂa 1990 (l8):28).

170
of the proposed price...an increase in the price of sugar was eminent and the
repercussions in other products as well as the wage demand of mill workers were
considered. The sugar industry is passing through a critical moment" (translated from
Sepulveda 1990:1-2). He noted the necessity of huge sugar imports and that the CNPP
had already accepted the proposed price (a statement that was not borne out in truth).

UNPCARM rejected the proposed 26.9% increase, demanded a 100% increase in
price, and threatened a national strike if their demands were not met. After consultations
between the national and regional union leaders, 47 of the 64 mills agrwd to carry out
the national caﬁero strike (Sepulveda 1990). All regular and special meetings of UNPCA
in the region of Queseria were attended to observe the process of negotiation. Of
particular interest are the dialectical relations between caﬁeros, government ofﬁcials, and
private mill owners and critical linkages between producers operating within their
regional unions and the national cane producers’ union. The evolution of events revealed
important shifts in objectives and determination as negotiations unfolded and the eventual
failure of peasants to maintain their unity vis-a-vis national and regional leaders.

Mae. As early as October 3, 1990, caiieros at a general UNPCA meeting in
Queseria began to discuss the price to be paid for cane in the upcoming harvest. The
union leader, Aguierre Suarez, reported a debt of one billion pesos owed to car‘ieros by
the industrialists for failure to comply with the Decreto Caﬁero in the previous two years.
This debt, discussed at the regional meeting, was to become an element in national level
negotiations over the price of cane.

Eleven days later, on October 14, a special meeting was convened to address the
issue of price. The price of cane is supposed to be set by SECOFI by October 1.
Because the price had not yet been set, the union leader stated, ”The situation is
threatening the union" . He announced that proposed changes to the Decreto Caﬁero

would eliminate social security, advance payments, and sacks of sugar. Aguierre, along

171

with leaders of the other unions, were to meet with Hank Gonzalez (director of SARH,
Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos) in Mexico City on October 18 to
negotiate the price. Aguierre announced to the group, " If they give us a good price, we
will cut the cane; if not, we don’t cut. This mill is not going to grind one piece of cane
until they give a good price. We are committed to not harvest any cane”. The doors to
the sugar mill would be blocked to prevent the entry of cane. All cafieros present
approved of this decision.

Verbal participation was encouraged by the union leader. One member argued,
" [The private mill owners] want to make another law at their convenience and they don’t
comply with what they are supposed to pay as the guaranteed price”. Another
demanded, " We will not accept one modiﬁcation to the Decreto. They should not take
away what we have gained. They don’t produce the sugar, it is us. We should make
the rules because we deliver the raw material so that they can work and have their fruits.
We will close the door and we will not deliver any of the cane” . One car'iero remarked,
”We won’t move a ﬁnger. The more we unite, the more we will better ourselves”.
Another added, ”We will defend the price that corresponds to us, not more, or less”.
The leader responded, ”If we don’t defend ourselves, no one will defend us. We must
be conscious [of this] if we want to continue living from the cane”. Opinions were
sought, commitment was high, and the group united in their demands against an unjust
price and potential loss of beneﬁts. Members were asked to accompany the leader to
Mexico City (an 11 hour trip by bus). A caﬁero replied, ”If you want me to go, I will
go. I will yell at them, I am not afraid". At this meeting, group unity and commitment
to achieve a 100% increase in price prevailed.

The union leader made six trips to Mexico City during the fall. The meetings were
held in the ofﬁces of SARH, in the presence of ofﬁcials from SARH, Azucar, S.A.,

SRA, the Hacienda, and SECOFI. Aguierre conﬁded in a personal interview:

 

 

172

Because the sugar mill now belongs to other owners, the government is not

interested in paying us much. The Pact [PECE] is managed for the

convenience of the people who do not produce; they do not manage the
fertilizer, the herbicides. Last year fertilizer cost $325,000 per ton, now it is

at $500,000. The industry does not manage the Pact. We who produce, they

do not pay.

Another special assembly was called on November 11, 1990. The UNPCA leaders
had now attended a third in a series of emergency meetings of the national UNPCARM.
They had been offered a 26.9% increase in the price of cane; moreover, car’ieros would
now pay 100% of their insurance,“ advance payments would continue at high interest
rates, and the sacks of sugar given to caﬁeros would be reduced according to the number
of tons of cane delivered“. Unable to achieve anything, the union leaders had returned
to the bases to decide how to proceed. Aguierre reported the results of the national
meeting to the membership at Queseria, explaining that the costs had increased from
$58,700 pesos per ton to $62,800, making the offered price unacceptable. He asked:

With the strong organization that we have, what shall we do? Let us do what

is necessary because we are the only producers in the country who can defend

ourselves. Let’s put ourselves in agreement, so what is decided is not what I

say, but how we all decide. The members often complain about the leaders,

but what is important is that we are united.

Anger was expressed among caﬁeros over lack of government support and
pronounced ambivalence toward the private initiative was apparent. One dissident voice
retorted, ”This is the regime of the great demagoguery”. A voice from the audience
asserted, ”It is we who are the producers of cane and we are dying of hunger in the
country”. The union leader incited members, ”Let’s join the ﬁght". He was answered

by, ”It’s time”. All cafreros had signed the demand for a 100% increase in price and

retention of beneﬁts; if it were not met, the strike would begin. Lists were passed out

 

“Insmance costs had previously been shared equally among the government, the mill, and the cai'rero.

“Previously, all caﬁeros received three 50 kg. sacks of sugar. Under the proposal, they would receive
only one for each 100 tons of cane delivered, with a maximum of three sacks.

173
for the ejido comisariados to obtain signatures supporting the resolution.

During this period, the UNPCA leader gave the appearance of supporting the base
membership. He had gone to the General Secretary of SARH and requested, ”Come to
the country and see how it suffers. At times we don’t even eat, and here you are seeing
the dinner hour". In a personal interview he reﬂected, ”They do not know the poor, they
only know how to administrate" . He regarded the attempt to modify the Decreto:

It is like a man who has a woman and he cannot maintain her and now he

wants to get another. They can obligate us to cut the cane and deliver it this

year, but if they don’t clear up things, we are going to knock down the cane

and we will see who pays the debts that we have with the mill, because they

cannot obligate us to continue with the cane. We already lost one revolution

and we car‘ieros are not going to lose more. We will not give ourselves up in

defeat--we will start another.

It was during this period that the leader appeared most sincere in his efforts to
defend the caﬁeros and in his openness to being interviewed. Apparent at the November
11 assembly was the regional leader’s incitement of members and increased dedication
to the struggle.

Isidro Pulido Reyes, General Secretary of UNPCARM, sent a letter to Maximiliano
Silerio Esparza, General Secretary of the CNC, on November 12, informing him that the
26.9% increase would result in economic loss for caﬁeros and that car‘ieros representing
eleven states were prepared to strike. Caﬁeros across the nation continued to reject the
proposed 26.9% increase and modiﬁcations to the Decreto Caﬁero (La Voz de Michoacan
1990b). The threat of strike spread to Colima. At midnight on November 15, 1990, the
mill workers at Queseria planned to go on strike, in demand for higher wages. On
November 15, 24 sugar mills in the country staged a work stoppage ("paro"), refusing
to cut and deliver their cane. Processing of cane had fallen behind at the national level,
with only 867,000 tons in comparison to 1,237,000 tons by the same date in the previous
year, because of the work stoppage. The strike threatened to paralyze all 64 mills of the

country, if demands for a just price were not met (La Voz de Michoacdn 1990c).

 

 

174

1211359319. Two days later, on November 17, Hank Gonzalez of SARH announced
that the problem was "totally resolved” and that there would be no national strike. This
public deception was revealed by continued strikes at regional sugar mills (La Voz de
Michoacdn l990dz4-C). Only ﬁve mills in the country had begun the harvest by
November 23. UNPCA unions throughout the country sent delegates to another national
meeting on November 26. These delegates, representing 100,000 cane producers,
rejected the price increase and voted to continue the strike unless they received another
18.8%, in compensation for money owed them from the two previous harvests. Union
leaders from 56 of the 64 mills voted to continue the strike. But on November 27 , the
national UNPCARM leaders agreed to commence the harvest, having been offered an
increase of 14.5% in credits and other collateral beneﬁts from the sugar industrialists,
in addition to the 26.9% price hike. The vote was 82 in favor of the agreement, 28
against, with one abstaining vote. Twenty percent of those in disagreement decided to
break with UNPCARM and join the CNPP (Diario de Colima, l990e).

This agreement, signed by Azucar, S.A., the Camara Nacional de la Industria
Azucarera y Alcoholera, the CNPP, UNPCARM, and Financiera Nacional Azucarera,
made the following provisions:

1) the price of cane, with a 26.9% increase, will be directly related to the

wholesale price index of Mexico City

2) SARH will channel $100,000,000,000, in earnings from the sale of sugar mills,

to projects for irrigation infrastructure; caﬁeros would provide an equal
amount“

3) $10,000,000,000 was to be provided by sugar mills for programs deﬁned by

FICAMEX‘”; sugar mill industrialists would provide an additional
$10,000,000,000

4) the maximum allowable loss of sucrose in the factory will be reduced from
2.64% to 2.5%

 

“Since the zone of Queseria has little irrigated land (960 hectares), this beneﬁt would not materialize
in Colima.

”FICAMEX is a fund created by the CN C, CNPP, and the federal government, primarily to dispense
provisions to cane cutters.

175

5) debts and delinquent interests will be renegotiated"8

6) advance payments for December 15 and March 15 will be retained

7) eaﬁeros will continue to receive sacks of sugar

(La Jomada 1990: 19)

The agreement resulted from dialogue between government authorities, sugar mill
ofﬁcials, and cane producers. The political and ideological mechanisms of control over
UNPCA, however, were blatant at this national convention. The head of the CNC,
Maximiliano Silerio Esparza, commended caﬁeros, who had demonstrated
"understanding, patriotism, and nationalism in the past two harvests by receiving price
increases smaller than the inﬂationary index to support the struggle against inﬂation".
In referring to the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democratica, an independent opposition
party) which was accused of offering a house, a car, and $120,000 per ton to each
car'rero to induce them to join their ranks, he begged car'ieros "to not enter the terrain of
deceit, demagoguery, and lies"; to this, the general secretary of PR] explained, "The
deﬁnition of PR] is at the side of the peasants" (translated from Sepulveda 1990:2). On
the other side of the ideological divide, caﬁeros in Colima accused their leader, Silerio
Esparza, of being "bought". In the words of a caﬁero from the zone of Queseria, "We
do not have support from any side".

Unable to economically sustain the strike, by November 28, seven mills had begun
harvest."9 The loss of 36,000,000 tons of cane, and thus 3.5 million tons of sugar, was
imminent (Pérez 1990). By December 6, 11 mills were harvesting; the rest were soon
to follow. The next meeting of the regional caﬁeros’ union at Queseria occurred on

December 6. UNPCA leaders, explained Aguierre, had gained nothing from the ﬁrst

national meeting, were offered an 8-9% increase at the second, and at the third, the

 

“At Ingenio Queseria, renegotiation of debts would be accomplished on terms of three, six, or ten
years, according to the debt, at normal interest rates of 32% per year.

6”These included ingenios Emiliano Zapata, Concepcion, La Gloria, Casasano la Abeja, Adolfo Lopez
Mateos, Fabrica Vive, and Aaron Sienz Garza.

176

26.9% increase had been accepted. Aguierre announced to those assembled, "The price
of the cane has now reached its peak, it is what corresponds to us" (emphasis added).
This statement represents a radical reversal of his previous position. Noting that "We
as leaders are thinking about how to defend the car‘iero", Aguierre proposed a plan to
request: 1) that the sugar mill pay 50% of the cost to maintain roads; 2) that the sugar
mill pay 50% of the cost of cane cutters; and 3) that advance payments be made available
to all, including those with debts. In addition, he presented a plan for UNPCA to
contract and manage their own harvesters in order to cut expenses:

The sugar mill contracts all the people, but now it is going to understand the

union. We want to contract capable people, and at a single salary, and the

union wants to contract them. It is a loss of money if we allow them to
continue managing it the same way. . .it is the worst error that we can commit.

If we win this year, we are going to win forever.

The leader had not completely retreated from his former resolve, for he afﬁrmed,
"If we resolve these problems with the sugar mill, there will be a harvest; if not, there
is no harvest. Nothing is going to be processed if they do not respond to us".

There was obviously less resolution to stop the harvest in this meeting, as most of
the discussion revolved around strategies to manage the harvest-~as if it were indeed
going to take place. Price had shifted from the central issue; the contracting of cutters
was now central. Moreover, the focus of discontent had shifted from the government
and the national level, to the sugar mill at the regional level. The 26.9% price increase
had been accepted, but with determination to press further demands.

W. Negotiations took place between the mill manager and the union
leader; inconformity over advance payments held up the initiation of the harvest, planned
for December 6. The union leader demanded that advance payments be made regardless
of debts owed by cafieros and informed the manager that the day these demands are
resolved, they would begin the harvest. On December 10, an agreement was reached

and the harvest commenced.

177

The UNPCA meeting on December 13 began with the UNPCA leader’s afﬁrmation:

The government saw that we had the support of the bases and offered us

26.9%, what corresponded to us. The government did not want to give us the

18% for the inﬂation of the last two years. We fought for the 18.8%, until

they shut our mouths. Now the sugar mills are not of the government, now

they passed to the private initiative and they tell us what they are going to pay.

The union leader’s statement implies that privatization of the mill has changed the
rules of the game. The leader then emphasized the gains they had made. The
government would provide scholarships70 and supplies for the cutters. It was with the
mill manager that other gains were negotiated. In reality, these gains were minimal;
payment for 50% of road costs is a minor fraction of the costs of production71 and the
advance payments were already guaranteed in the Decreto Caﬁero. Moreover, the cost
to cover cutters was denied and cafieros with yields less than 40 tons per hectare would
receive a reduced prepayment. Aguierre discussed the organization of the harvest
season, expressing an expectation for better results than the previous year: "This year
they made repairs to the sugar mill and it is probable that we will have more [proﬁt]" .

The leader presented a plan to cut costs by having the union contract 800 cutters
itself, rather than contract them through the mill, saving $2000 pesos per ton (caﬁeros
paid the mill $12,800 per ton for cutters in 1989-90; now the cost would be $10,000).
The management of the crews would be accomplished as a group, not by individuals.
Although the order to burn would continue to emanate from the mill, the union would
organize the number of cutters and where they are placed. The plan was to bring 200

cutters from San Luis Potosr’ and 250 from Guerrero.

Another member suggested, "A document should be sent to the sugar mill saying

 

”Previously, scholarships for sons and daughters of ejidatarios were available, but dissolved with the
disappearance of FIOSCER in 1985. Now each car'rero has the right to solicit one scholarship, in the
amount of $90,000 pesos per month.

"According to the union leader, the average cost per car‘iero to repair roads is $112,500 pesos
(approximately $37.50 U.S.), yet much ado was made of this gain in the UNPCA meeting.

 

178
that the owner of the parcela has authority on his land and that explains some points that
we don’t like". Problems with the ﬁeld inspectors, employed by the mill, were implied:

Each inspector wants to do bad things and this is not going to happen; they

want to manage the producer. There is going to be a program in which we are

going to know who is going to cut, and how many parcelas, and if they have

a problem they should come to the union, because the inspectors do things that

are not correct.

One member complained, "they should give the owner of the parcela authority
because the guardacortes (workers who oversee cutters) are sons of a bitches". The
leader closed the meeting by replying, "It gives me great pleasure that we are defending
ourselves. Now all the car'ieros are going to spend equally, all of this is going to end".
The predominant theme of this meeting was one of conformity and acceptance of the
minimal beneﬁts.

UNPCA did not convene another meeting until May 9, 1991, despite serious
problems that continued throughout the harvest. The meeting was preceded by much
informal discussion among caﬁeros who had arrived early. The primary concern among
them was the huge amount of cane not being processed. They repeatedly claimed that
the mill owners were not going to continue to operate with losses and expressed their fear

that the mill would be abandoned. An exchange among several car‘ieros was recorded:

If the mill stops and all of the parcelas are left with cane, what are we going
to do?

The San Marcos mill no longer works.

The government has to make the effort...

But they [the owners] are private. . .If they don’t pay?

This conversation was interrupted by the union leader announcing that work had
been done on the boilers, but they still were not functioning. For the past three weeks,
only 12,000 tons per week had been delivered for processing (the capacity is 4200 tons
per 24 hours), "because the mill is no good. Unfortunately, in this harvest, the mill is

179
failing". Aguierre had talked with the mill manager, stressing that the delays were the
fault of the mill, not of the caﬁeros, thus those whose cane is not processed should be
compensated. All agrwd that he should present a petition to the manager.

To dispel disquietude over the harvest, the leader then announced, "We are thinking
in the good, not in the problems that we cannot resolve, the problems of the harvest.
The sugar mill no longer wants to support us with money; we are thinking of a beneﬁt
that each caiiero could have, we are thinking about social security". He then presented
a plan for an increase of $2 million pesos (from the current $6 million) in social security
beneﬁts for all who deliver a minimum of three tons of cane. He then afﬁrmed the
solidarity of the group by asserting, "Whoever has any problem, they can speak with
conﬁdence; we are friends, we belong to the caﬁero family. There is no reluctance to
speak of the things that are left".

A caﬁero asked about payment for their cane. The union leader responded:

The national union in Mexico now is ﬁghting so that the sugar mill pays us,

but I see it as difﬁcult. These people, the new owners, are very hard in

making agreements between them and ourselves. We have always taken the

best advantage that we can and that we were able to make. In this harvest we
have not been able to because the mill is failing a lot. As you know, the ﬁrst
harvest they did not want to give us advance payments for December and

March, and now we have received them by the force of stopping the harvest.

I am sorry that our cane is left [in the ﬁelds], but I assure you that in this year

they are going to have to pay for all the wasted cane. It is not the fault of the

caﬁeros that the mill has not worked well--the mill is no good. We supply
what corresponds to us; not them.

Following months of experiencing mechanical breakdowns and culminating in the
inability to process all cane in the zone, the producers’ union negotiated a series of
conditions to be applied to the harvest. On June 8, 1991, the agreement worked out
between union leaders in Colima and Ingenio Queseria was announced:

1) each cutter was to receive a gratiﬁcation of $100,000, with the objective of

increasing the harvest
2) the harvest would terminate on June 29, or last until the rains begin

180
3) Ingeznio Queseria would pay a factory yield of .9241 over the guarantee of
4) Isngenio Queseria was obligated to pay for uncut cane
(Diario de Colima 1991a)

The December agreement did not terminate conﬂicts between cafieros and mill
owners in other regions. These events were followed by seizure of the ofﬁces of Ingenio
Emiliano Zapata by workers, and demonstrations in front of SARH. Following the
protest to SARH, which began on December 10, negotiations resulted in agreement for
sugar mills to return to caﬁeros $800,000,000 pesos in illegally retained quotas.
Moreover, caﬁeros in other regions continued to demand that they receive both a 100%
increase in price and 50% of the proﬁt from byproducts or that the product, i.e., sugar,
be delivered to them for direct commercialization by caﬁeros themselves. Because of the

poor management of commercialization, caﬁeros asked for representation in Azricar, S.A.

(Diario El Independiente l990a).

Peasant Evaluation of Collective Mobilization

This section is concerned with discerning how collective organization manifests itself
in the complex network of relations between car‘ieros, union leaders, mill ofﬁcials, and
the state. Analysis focuses on how caiieros explained the failure of the union to achieve
its objective of a 100% increase in the price of cane, utilizing interview responses and
peasant discourse to demonstrate the cultural construction of meaning concerning the
efﬁcacy of collective strategies utilized by caﬁeros.

Prior to the UNPCA strike, the union leader had openly expressed in interviews his

militancy in defending the rights of caiieros and ﬁghting for a just price. He even eluded

 

12The base for determining liquidation in the previous year was .8592; applied to the 1989-90 price of
sugar, the 26.9% increase would have yielded a price of $60,831.36 pesos per ton. Having given a base
for determining liquidation of .9241 in 1990-91, car‘ieros of this zone, with a 26.9% increase in price,
received $65,426.28.

181

to the need to start another revolution. Following the 1990 strike, this leader, in
personal interviews, was defensive of the sugar mill. Unlike before the strike, he was
evasive on political issues, blaming declining earnings on lack of rainfall (this factor had
been discounted by mill personnel). He claimed that the mill was now more efﬁcient,
that conﬁdence had improved, and denied the slow progress of the harvest-~at the height
of mechanical breakdowns. He consistently contradicted himself in interviews and his
attitude had shifted from one of disconformity to conformity.

When questioned about the complaints of caﬁeros concerning breakdowns in the
mill, delays in the harvest, and rotting cane, the leader said their comments were based
on "pure hearsay". The phone rang, interrupting the interview; Aguierre answered it,
saying, "I have burned cane, it is going to waste". During the interview the leader
remarked that it was good that this researcher was getting information from the ﬁeld
superintendent and himself, because the car‘ieros would not give correct information. His
comments were not indicative of a leader placing conﬁdence and support in the
membership. The need to cover up the poor performance of the harvest was apparent.
He argued that Grupo Beta was giving good attention to the mill, investing more in it
than the government had. Aguierre did admit that the mill was only processing 2000
tons of cane per day, when its capacity is 3000 tons (the correct ﬁgure is 4250), but the
mechanical failures were being corrected. Next he admitted that Grupo Beta, having
bought a package of good and bad mills, was only maintaining Ingenio Queseria. The
owners have no interest in replacing the equipment, because the mill is unproﬁtable, he
claimed.

Interviews were carried out with caﬁeros in the research communities to elicit their

assessment of the results of the strike. The 1990 strike was supported by 63.3% (n=30)
- of the caﬁeros interviewed. The remainder were unaware of the strike, unconcerned, or

believed it was an issue to be dealt with by the leaders. Generally, those who failed to

182

attend meetings and lacked concern were members of the collective group in Chiapa,
which cultivates 34 hectares of cane. Each person in the collective has only one or two
hectares (some have less and others have none), thus a common response is, "We don’t
have cane, we only have it for the insurance. The meetings would be a waste of time",
or "With one hectare we are in agreement that the comisariado of the ejido attends".
Many cafieros argue that going to union meetings would be a waste of time or that they
cannot afford the cost of transportation to Queseria. One person did observe, "There you
go, we have been thinking, what did they do in the meeting? If we all took
responsibility, there would be more support for the leader". The high percentage of
those who rent out their cane also contributes to apathy about cane production and is a
disincentive to participation in the producers’ union. This is particularly true in Ocotillo,
where one pequeiio propietario rents nine parcelas. The UNPCA representative from
Ocotillo, dismayed at the lack of attendance of union meetings during the turn of events
in the fall of 1990, lamented that many caﬁeros in Ocotillo do not work their own cane
ﬁelds. As one caﬁero reﬂected, "Antonio has all the cane-why ﬁght for the price?"

How did caﬁeros themselves explain the failure of the strike and acceptance by their
leaders of a price insufﬁcient to guarantee solvency? Peasants were interviewed to assess
how well the leader’s position reﬂected that of the base membership and to discern their
varied reactions. Thirty caﬁeros answered questions about why the 1990 caﬁeros’ strike
had failed to achieve its objective of a 100% price increase. Almost one-third claimed
not to know the reason; 10% said the union leader had been bribed, and another 10%

attributed the acceptance to the small price increase obtained:

183

 

Table 4. Reasons for the Failed Strike (n=30).

 

Don't know 30.0%
Combination of responses 13.2%
Union leader was bribed 10.0%
Received a small price increase 10.0%
Union leaders accepted the price 6.7%
Majority agreed with the leader 6.7%
Other benefits were negotiated 6.7%
CNPP accepted the price 6.7%
Other mills had begun the harvest 3.3%
Sugar mill refused the price 3.3%
Had to begin harvest 3.3%

 

When pressed to further explain the acceptance of the 26.9 % price increase, the
control of decisions by the government, mill, and union leaders--both regional and
national--was evident in peasants’ responses. The majority of car‘ieros explained that
their leaders were bribed into accepting the price and failed to support the base
membership. Yet another factor is that mobilization is begun too late in the season,
allowing too little time to bargain. Once it is time for the harvest to commence,
economic pressures bend the will to pursue the struggle. Finally, unwillingness to voice
their inconforrrrity impedes the process; as one person said, "We all support whatever the
leader supports".

One of the more politically adverse car'ieros claimed that the leader does not defend
car‘ieros; rather, he supports the mill for fear of losing his position. Bribery is widely
recognized among cane producers. The following quotes taken from peasant discourse
after the strike reveal this common thread:

The CNC73 would have to put pressure so that the sugar mill does not take an

arm and a leg. But it is tranquil, it does not do it. Between the union and the
mill, they have an agreement; they polish the apple (give a small price

 

”Technically, caﬁeros are referring to UNPCA, but since it is a branch of the CN C, this is the term
of reference in local discourse.

184

increase). But the propietarios pay their bribes, and it is going to be the same
story. When the union was pressuring, Rodolfo accepted the bribe and it was
fucked. And we humble ones, what? It is pure dirty work that the government
has with the sugar mill, the CNC, everything.

All the leaders sell themselves to the best offer, the one who offers most.
Thus, never are we going to improve, because no one defends the cafieros, and
the people here do not make the decision to defend themselves. . .Salinas
trampled on the Decreto because taking the basic products as a base, we would
have $85,000 pesos per ton. Well, we are left with them owing us $18,000
pesos. In this situation there was inconformity at the national level.
Unfortunately, our leaders did not know how to comport themselves at the top
level for the necessities of the cane producer. Why? Because our national
leader, in ﬁghting for change-well they only made the agreement in the
government meeting-when they let the general secretaries of the unions know,
it was because he had already signed.

Nothing is resolved here in Queseria. Prices can’t be set here. If the regional
leader does not agree with the national leaders, unfortunately, if the regional
leader doesn’t get [what he wants], he can no longer do anything. This is what
happens--the leader is bought. He has certain conveniences. It is not he who
defends the caﬁero. If the sugar mill says "I’ll give you a certain number of
centavos", it dies. The regional leader has to go to the national leader to reach
an agreement. It is possible that there, he also is bought.

The caﬁero leader can defend the car‘ieros, but there is no longer much
conﬁdence in them because they are bought. The peasant is the one who
suffers everything, and do you know why? Because the leaders do not defend
us. Unfortunately, the leaders are traitors to the car'reros. If the sugar mill and
the leaders do not act in favor of the caﬁero like the obligation that they have,
there is a failure at the level of the cafrero. Everything depends on the leader.
The strike did not succeed because the leader was bought. The thing is
screwed.

They give money to the leader to shut his mouth, everything is arranged with
the sign of pesos.

It is what always happens. The government and the PRI--it is the same thing--
the politics is hard. The people cry, "We are going to do this". The owners
offer a bribe to the leaders; they say, "Here, I’ll give you 100 million--you
have to fuck the rest of them".

In the 1990 strike, I was ready if there was no harvest, that we suffer, that we
tighten our belts. If the mill didn’t grind, it was going to be a greater injury.
The national leader lacked decision--he loosened up. He had the support of all
the unions of the country, but he did not defend us. For this, we never achieve
anything. We need a change of leaders who are more decisive and with more
valor, because Roque knew how to organize. He, yes, defended the rights of
all caﬁeros. They did not shut his mouth with money, nor did they chain his
hands with the fear of threats. Those who want to help the most exploited,
they kill.

185

Yes, but I knew they weren’t going to carry out the strike because there are no
longer good leaders. They already killed the one who defended us, Roque
Spinozo Foglia.

A sense of betrayal is evident in the proliﬁc commentary on the outcome of the
car'reros’ struggle. The frequent referrals to Roque Spinozo demonstrate the deep
impression left by the assassination of one of the few national leaders who defended the
car'ieros. Not only do cafreros feel betrayed by national leaders, but also by their own
regional leader.

When one goes to the CNC, they attend you with much friendliness. They
listen and they tell us, "Don’t despair" when we explain the problem. We
leave enchanted, but they never resolve the problems. Instead, a ﬁlthy rich
person goes, shows them money, and for him, they resolve the problem easily.

You remember what I told Rodolfo in the union meeting, "I think that the
organization has shown itself to be too peaceful. I consider the Ser‘ior President
of the last regime and the one we are in, they have been anti-agrarian, anti-
proletarian presidents because, unfortunately, they do not give the products of
the country value". Well you saw what the reaction of our leader was. He
said, "Nacho is a know-it—all"...for what I told him, he was offended. I told
him, "Our leader Roque Spinozo is gone, and you should have followed the
same ideological platform that he left us. But now you have gone to the other
side".

The foregoing commentaries contradict the claim of UNPCA that the dynamics of
the organization is based in the support and participation of the base membership, from
the bottom up, rather than from the top down. Sugar mills capitalize on the top-down
control exerted over ofﬁcial peasant organizations. When asked to explain the sudden
conformity in the fall of 1990, the ﬁeld superintendent at the mill summed it up in one
word, "discipline". The discourse of a caﬁero who had been an activist in the region
illuminates how this discipline poses difﬁculty for those with leadership ability to realize
their potential:

I am different because I spent much time in the brawl and I went with the

leaders and they awoke my consciousness. I wanted to ﬁght against the

corruption and it is difﬁcult here. I wanted to do something to succeed and I

could not because if I had followed the road that is marked to rise to a

position, that of polishing the apple, serving to carry out orders, lick the shoes
and not divulge what you don’t agree with, I would have had position and

5‘

186

money-mot like now that I walk barefoot. I did not do it because it is
degrading, because it is against my principles.

The leader of CEDPA, an independent peasant organization (discussed below),
described the failure of the strike and acceptance of the price by employing the metaphor
of the volcano (the Volcan de Fuego, which dominates the region, erupted on April 16,
1990):

The system is a perfect dictatorship. It is like the magnum of the volcano.
The ﬁre in the volcano rises to the surface. There are tremors and it
accommodates and reaccommodates the surface of the land, until everything is
calm and it returns to normal, and everything is as if it never had happened.

The government has a corporate system, a well-organized system of control.
The leaders carry their people and they incite them, that they do not have to
cease until they are given a just price, and they tell them to ﬁght so the
situation changes. In these meetings they incite them to spark their anger.
Also, the maximum leaders permit the members to take their protests as far as
they want, because it is convenient for them if they protest and discharge all
their anger. But the readjustment arrives. Now they consult with the
maximum leader and later the small leaders go with their members. Then they
tell them that they have gained the maximum that they should earn, that they
do not deserve more, until they calm down. The small leaders tell them, "Up
to here, I permit you to arrive". They do everything so that from the simple
view, it appears that there is democracy, that yes, the leaders can protest and
the leaders, yes, do something to help them. Thousands of leaders in Mexico
do this as a means of control. To the small leaders, they give to these so they
beneﬁt from the system, they are sold, and they cannot leave the game.

The car'rero has an alternative, he can go with or against the leader. But the

cafreros are afraid to break the shell of the scheme. There are people who

don’t know of what, but they are afraid of something unknown. They say, "To

go against the leader, I have no companions and if I venture there, who is

going to accompany me? Do I go alone?"

The leadership structure has a profound effect on participation in unions. The
nature of participation in UNPCA was discerned both through observation and structured
interviews with car‘ieros. Despite the fact that the majority (60% , n=30) of interviewed
union members believe that the leaders are selected by the base membership (rather than

by the government or sugar mill), only 20% believe decisions originate primarily from

members:

187

 

Table 5. Origin of Decisions in UNPCA (n=30).

 

UNPCA leaders 33.3%
Members 20.0%
Government 16.7%
Sugar mill 10.0%
Don't know 10.0%
UNPCA leaders and members 6.7%
Sugar mill and UNPCA leaders 3.3%

 

This perception inﬂuences attendance at UNPCA meetings. Only two of 30 caﬁeros
interviewed attend all UNPCA meetings. Sixty percent never attend, 30% seldom attend,
and 3 % attend frequently. Low participation in the producers’ union diminishes
inﬂuence that caﬁeros are able to exert. Asked how much inﬂuence they have in issues
related to cane production, 23.3% (n=30) responded "much", 36.7% "some", 13.3%
"little", and 26.7% "none". In general, then, peasants lack active participation and
control over their organizations. Participation means "to listen, only to keep silent so
there is order" . Through observation, it may be concluded that those who do attend
meetings are more likely to complain about the results once they leave, than to actively
take part in the discussions. Membership in UNPCA largely entails followership, rather
than leadership. leadership is highly centralized and the appearance of representation
and active participation by the base is largely illusory. Peasants act on their perceptions
of the leadership structure and decision-making processes, which in turn, determine
efﬁcacy in problem resolution. Nevertheless, the degree to which caﬁeros, verses
peasants in general, are claimed to be able to unite for common purposes differs

signiﬁcantly:

188

 

Table 6. Ability to Unite.

 

Qgﬁgrgﬁ (n=}!!! All Peasants (n=ﬂ]

Very united 20 . 0% 7 . 2%
Somewhat united 43 . 3% 32 . 0%
Little united 20. 0% 14 . 4%
Not united 16.7% 46.4%

 

Paradoxically, the issue of organizational efﬁcacy remains quite distinct from the
predominant ideology of organization held by most peasants. This ideology, a vestige
of years of state tutelage, proclaims the positive power of organization. In reality,
peasants are extremely individualistic, unwilling to unite and cooperate, hold the political
efﬁcacy of their organizations suspect, while championing the force of organizational
capacity.

Sixty percent of cane producers interviewed afﬁrmed that caﬁeros are able to
organize to defend their interests. Among the primary reasons stated were that the union
has national support and that with collective force of the union, they have the capacity
to strike. Respondents mentioned other factors that contribute to the ability to organize;
for example, UNPCA protects caiieros, defends them against the mill, and it is a
mechanism to deal with government ofﬁcials. This idea was expressed by one car‘iero,
"It is to promote-credit, trucks, lifters, better prices. It is a union to pressure. We are
many and they pay attention to us. One alone, they don’t pay him any attention". This
ideology of organization is prevalent in peasant discourse. Numerous peasants stated,
"The organization is the principal base for [resolving] problems" , "United, we have
power" , or "The organization is strong".

Underneath this ideology lies a deep skepticism that stands out in the contradictory
statements made:

If we are not in an organization, we are not going to receive any help from the

189
federal, state, or municipal government. For the government to help we need
to be within an organization. Here, we don’t understand that we have to
cooperate. We are disorganized.

It is difﬁcult if there is no union. In the caiiero union they can organize well.
They do not reach agreement. Everyone does things in his own favor.

The union gives us power. If every peasant would take part in the strike. . .at

the peasant level we would unite to do this. For everyone, they would need

to comprehend ﬁrst; it is necessary to focus. The law of life is not to go

hungry. Everyone organized, I believe we would resolve something. There

has been no mobilization. I do not know where we are headed--it is very hard.

Me, every now and then they scold me-—they judge me crazy. The whole

world rejects us.

Inability of car‘ieros to organize is attributed to the car'ieros’ incapacity to reach
agreements, UNPCA’s more favorable treatment of wealthy caiieros, the failure of its
leaders to defend caﬁeros, its weakness vis-a-vis the sugar mill and the government,
corruption, and apathy on the part of caﬁeros.

Given these obstacles, 40% (n =30) of the caﬁeros saw no beneﬁts of belonging to
UNPCA. Asked the beneﬁts of membership, one person replied, " None, well, what?

What beneﬁt?" The beneﬁts of UNPCA membership that were identiﬁed included:

 

Table 7. Beneﬁts of UNPCA Membership.

 

Resolves problems 6.7%
Provides insurance 6.7%
Defends caﬁeros 6.7%
Helps when cane is accidentally burned 6.7%
Provides cane cutters 3.3%
Provides equipment for the harvest 3.3%
Assures all cane is paid for 3.3%
Don't know 3.3%
Other" 19.8%

 

Even though skepticism is prevalent, caiieros hold slightly stronger convictions than

 

"Credit, loans, houses, scholarships, resolves problems, allows participation, allows exchange with
national level, and combinations of other responses.

non-caﬁeros that organizations help to resolve problems:

190

 

Table 8. Ability of Organizations to Resolve Problems.

 

frer n= 1
Resolve many problems 38.7%
Resolve some problems 45.2%
Resolve few problems 16.1%
Resolve no problems -

30.3%
36.4%
19.7%
13.6%

Non-Canergs (n=66)

 

Caﬁeros were asked to identify the major problems of the union.

Among the

problems UNPCA confronts, the price of cane holds top priority, followed by the failure

of UNPCA to defend the rights of its members.

identiﬁed each of the following problems is given:

The percentage of cafieros who

 

Table 9. Problems of UNPCA (n=49 responses).

 

Don't know

Price of cane

Does not defend caﬁeros

Debts

Disrepair of mill

High costs of production

Poor leadership

Disorganization, inability to mobilize
Lack consciousness

Lack government and mill support

Mill Does Not Comply With the Decreto
Accidental Burnings

Lack Access to Equipment

Low Yields

Cheat in Lab

None

26.53%
18.37%
10.20%

8.16%
8.16%
4.08%
4.08%
4.08%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%
2.04%

 

In their collective struggles, car'reros of the zone have utilized a variety of strategies

to redress their problems and defend their rights. These include strikes, demonstrations,

blocking the entry to the mill, signing petitions, splitting away from the union, and

191

sending commissions to Mexico. As seen above, in 1990, eaﬁeros gained a small
increase through joining forces in a national-level strike, as well as obstructed the attempt
by the private mill owners to remove beneﬁts such as advance payments. The previous
year they had also sought a price increase; whereas some caﬁeros claim to have achieved
nothing, they did receive a 13.8% increase in price in 1989. The events of that year left
little impression on caﬁeros in the zone of Queseria, who only vaguely mention signing
a petition. In 1988-89, the year that Ingenio Queseria was privatized, a strike broke out
in Colima and the entry to the mill was blocked, in demand of a higher price. The mill
had not wanted to increase the price and was concerned with the delivery of cane with
less "garbage" (dirt, rocks, etc.). New demands were placed on the ﬁeld inspectors to
see that the cane was delivered "clean". As in 1990, the mill had suffered mechanical
problems in the factory, leaving cane rotting in the ﬁelds. Caﬁeros blocked the doors
in demand that all cane be delivered. Again, caﬁeros merely explain, "they didn’t
achieve anything."

The most eventful mobilization remains the caﬁero strike of 1984 (see Randall
[Chollett] 1986 for a detailed description). Although it occurred during the period of
state control, it will be discussed in some detail in that it illustrates important differences
in motivation, active participation, and efﬁcacy of outcome to the 1990 strike against the
privatized mill. The mobilization of 1984 also stands in stark contrast to the peasants’
more vague recollection of the events of other years; this event is indelibly inscribed in
the memories of car'reros of Colima. The strike was not an effort to gain a just price, but
rather, a political action taken to free the imprisoned UNPCA leader from jail.

The imprisonment of Crecencio N rir‘iez Silva involved a complex set of processes
and relations that transcended the area of inﬂuence of the regional union. In 1979, when
cane cutters of Colima tried to form a syndicate in conjunction with demands for medical

beneﬁts and increased wages, they met the opposition of wealthy landowners of the area.

192
Crecencio Nr’rr‘rez not only helped the cutters to organize, but fought for equal treatment
of ejidatarios and pequef'ros propietarios by the sugar mill. In this process, he created
enemies.

Members of the Graciano Sénchez group, who had Split from UNPCA in 1983, now
moved against Nr’rﬁez, audited the union’s books, and charged him with embezzling $10
million pesos from the union. He was arrested and jailed on November 11, 1984, at the
beginning of the cane harvest. Nunez, however, enjoyed the loyal support of union
members; car‘ieros of the zone of Queseria immediately mobilized, demanding his release
from jail.

On November 14, 500 caﬁeros had signed a statement of faith in the leader, which
was then presented to the governor. Demonstrations were held at the sugar mill in
Queseria, with some 500 cafreros participating. Carieros of Colima contacted the national
union leader, who in turn, contacted the governor of Colima. The national leader
informed the governor that if N rir‘iez were not released, a national strike would be held
in support of the car‘ieros of Colima; unions across the nation were willing to mobilize
on behalf of the Colima producers. On November 16, the union at Queseria formally
declared a strike, refusing to deliver their cane to the mill until N riﬁez was released. A
telegram was published in a national newspaper to President Miguel de la Madrid,
begging his intervention. The telegram was co-signed by Roque Spinozo Foglia, a
national-level leader within UNPCA. The event is indicative of the interpenetration of
events at national and regional levels within which peasant producers take action.

During the mobilization, the head of the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias of the CNC
charged union members with rebellion and inciting the strike. They, in turn, attacked
him, as a major ofﬁcial of the CNC, with failure to support eaﬁeros who were afﬁliated
with the CNC. This ofﬁcial publicly denied taking actions that threatened "our rural
family" (Randall [Chollett] 1986:114). The issue became highly politicized and reached

193
national level proportions. The hand of the government was forced, and the leader was
released on November 16. Caﬁeros of the zone had put up titles valued at $30 million
pesos in lieu of bail.
These events were vividly described by car'reros of the research communities who
actively participated in them. A woman from Ocotillo who took part in the
demonstrations related:

We went to sleep in the government palace. Some were standing, others asleep
in the night. We held guard, there was everyone, women and men. We
weren’t leaving until Chencho was taken out of jail. It was very beautiful
demanding that they get him out because it was unjust that they cast him in jail
out of envy. Well, they were saying that he had robbed money and when they
did an audit, they found nothing that he had robbed.

A car'iero of Ocotillo was the ﬁrst to block the entrance of the mill with his own
truck to prevent the entry of cane trucks to the mill. Others soon joined him. Another
car'iero from Ocotillo parked his car in front of the gateway to the mill for two days,
preventing mill ofﬁcials from leaving in their own cars. Another participant in the strike
described the events:

There was this Chencho. They threw him in jail. We held a strike. I went,
they blocked the doors [of the mill] with trucks. I did not allow anyone to
pass. They had a ﬁre to roast meat. A policeman came and asked, "Who is
the leader? He must come and open it. " But nobody went. The governor was
forced to release him. They opened the doors because they were blocked with
cargadoras. Now [with the change of leaders] everything is done over there
[in Mexico City].

Another Ocotillo activist in the strike recounted:

When Chencho was in the jail we went to demand that they let him out and
everyone supported equally, men and women. Some were in the government
palace, others at the jail, and others at the sugar mill. At the sugar mill we did
not allow any truck to enter and the police came and demanded that we leave.
There were some very valiant women and they were together by the door
roasting meat for everyone in the night. The police arrived and asked them,
"What are you doing here?", yelling at them. One of them, also yelling,
"Well, roasting meat. If you want, come, and if you come to bother us, don’t
be fucking with us" and the police left.

The comisariado ejidal from Chiapa at the time of the strike elaborated further:

194

When they detained the secretary of the cane union, Crecencio Nrir‘iez, for false

reasons--because they never proved he had robbed like they had blamed him--

we all united and went to the governor and she told us that here there was

nothing to arrange. We went again to the governor because now we had gone

from one place to another. We had already talked with the national leader in

Mexico and he called the governor, [saying] that if they did not release him

from the jail, there was going to be a national strike. And right away it was

resolved, with the support of the national union. The strike had already begun

in Colima. They were saying that by mandate of the governor, we were to

leave the gates [of the mill], that they brought Chencho to Queseria and

everyone shouted happily.

The man who had arrived ﬁrst to block the entry mused, "Everything was very
beautiful because we made them listen to us and release Chencho from jail". Nt’rr‘iez is
singular among cane leaders, for only his name is mentioned frequently in conversations
about the union. In identifying the UNPCA leader who has contributed most, 68.4%
(n= 19) named Nr’rﬁez; 10.5% named the current leader, Rodolfo Aguierre Suarez, only
one other person was named once, and the remainder responded that the leaders are all
the same or that they did not know. A 1984 statement of a caﬁero from the region
reﬂects the general consensus of the period: "Whatever problem, we go to Crecencio.
He resolves it". A plaque hangs on the wall of the UNPCA headquarters which reads,
"The Caﬁeros of the CNC Suppliers of Ingenio ’Queserr’a’ to Companion Cresencio
Nunez Silva in recognition of your unconditional just and loyal struggle in defense of the
integrity of our organization 1981-1986".

Nine days after the incident in Colima, on November 25, 1984, in the state of
Veracruz, Roque Foglia Spinozo, the national cane leader who had supported caﬁeros in
Colima, was assassinated; the assassins were never brought to light. A newspaper
editorial referring to this event bears recounting, as it illustrates the intimate association
between the Colima strike and the murder of the national cane leader:

The assassination could have its [roots] in the deep division that has reigned in

this union recently and which, as we have seen in Colima, affects members of

the Federacion de la Pequer‘ra Pr0piedad, as well as those of the CNC. If in

Colima, fortunately, these phenomena have not yet reached this level [of
violence], it is because in certain circumstances it has been the governmental

195
power that calls for the prudence of the struggling groups and in others, the
movement of the organizations in search of a peaceful settlement through

democratic processes (translated from Diario de Colima, November 27 ,
l984:2, quoted from Randall [Chollett] 1986:417).

This event continues to symbolize the peasant struggle and its inherent danger today
under conditions of privatization. During the 1990 cane producers’ strike over the price
of cane, a cai'rero explained, "We are defending a just price and we know the danger,

since he who defends himself, they kill him like they did with Roque".

Privatization and the Restructuring of Relationships

Caﬁeros are linked in a web of relationships with the state, sugar mill, and
producers’ union, which poses a formidable obstacle in the context of privatization.
Weakening of the organic relationship maintained between peasants and the state
coincides with a deepening of capitalist penetration in the sugar industry. Neoliberal
ideology has manifested itself in the dynamics of state-capitalist—peasant triadic
relationships. Peasants have become active agents in rejecting these changes; their
response toward both state and mill, and in turn, their own union organization, has been
highly critical:

The caﬁero has three rivals. The ﬁrst is the sugar mill. The second is the

government, because no one tries to help him; it tries to see how much it can

take. The third is the union of the caﬁeros. These give him the coup-de-grace

(ex-cafrero).

Changing relations of production have called into question the channels through
which cafreros should direct their protests and demands, since the union remains under
the auspices of government control, yet the process of production is subsumed to the
private mill owners. The confrontation is more complex; caiieros cannot confront the
industrialists to negotiate the price because the price-the ultimate concern of all car‘ieros--

is ofﬁcially set by the government. Yet, many remain confused about who controls the

price of cane: "The price is set by the true chief of the nation charged with these things.

196
Now that it is private, who knows?" Numerous complaints about the low price of sugar
cane attributed this injustice to the mill itself, rather than the government. Ambivalence
is clear in much of the discourse:

We can’t go to the union because they don’t pay attention to us. With the

government, we can, but they don’t resolve problems. SARH sets prices and

does not want to increase the price. The sugar mill wants to take an arm and

a leg from the peasant. There, one gets nothing. One can do nothing; the only

thing is to be in agreement with them.

The preceding statement brings into relief the mixture of ambiguity and
ambivalence, as the diadic relationship between peasants and the state is reconﬁgured into
a complex, triadic peasant-state-eapital relationship. Peasants were interviewed to elicit
their views on the changing relations between the sugar mill and UNPCA. Many
(22.7 %) stated that there was no change, noting that the relations between the producers’
union and the mill had never been positive and that the union had always been ruled by

wealth, power, and corrupt leaders:

 

Table 10. Changing Relation Between the Sugar Mill and UNPCA
Since Privatization (n=22 responses)

 

No change 22.7%
Sugar mill gives less support, exploits caﬁeros 22.7%
UNPCA has less capacity 18.2%
Caneros want to quit production, ending relation 13.6%
Sugar mill does not respect decreto, obligations 9.1%
Sugar mill imposes strict requirements 9.1%
More equal treatment of UNPCA and CNPP 4.5%

 

Among those who recounted changes in the relationship, an equal number (22.7%)
pointed out that the sugar mill is less willing to aid, assist, and support car‘reros than the
government, as owner, had been. The two form opposed entities, one exploited by the
other. They noted that the mill is less willing to negotiate the price of cane and shows

lack of respect for the union. Responses elicited convey a loss of capacity on the part

197
of the union to strike and press demands: "Now they want to pay as they like. There
is less opportunity to negotiate the price. They are very strong, powerful corporations,
but they don’t want to pay for the sugar". Peasants were interviewed to evoke their
changing perceptions of the role of the state in UNPCA with privatization of the sugar
sector. The majority, 40% (n=20 responses) indicated that the government continues
to control UNPCA. A caﬁero explained, "Yes, it continues to intervene, because the
CNC and the government is the same. The CNC depends on the government". Despite

this, tabulation of these replies suggests withdrawal of state support to cane-producing

peasants:

 

Table 11. Changing Role of the State Since Privatization

 

(n =20 responses).
State continues to control UNPCA 40%
State gives less support to caﬁeros 20%
State intervenes less 15%
State is allied with the private investors 10%
State gives more support than private investors 10%
State is interested only in sugar 5%

 

The varied reactions demonstrate a great deal of ambivalence; while one caﬁero
acknowledged, "The government is always going to insert itself in whatever situation" ,
another asserted, "Yes, it has changed because the state now sets aside the problems and
pays us no attention. It has now washed its hands". Yet another clariﬁed, "It is pure
dirty work of the government, united with the sugar mill, the CNC, everything".

The declining economic position of cane producers in the region of Queseria
engendered bitterness toward the government, the sugar mill, and the union. An astute
car'rero described the dialectical relationship between UNPCA, the private investors, and

the government thus:

They are selling industries, they are going to the hands of the private initiative.

198

It does not serve them to give good prices. We all thought that the government
was putting money in its pocket, but it was helping the ear‘iero. Since three
years ago, we have no proﬁt, we feel like we have gone backwards. When it
belonged to the government, they built houses for the caﬁeros, FIOSCER built
the casa ejidal. Only when the owner changed, all this ended. These [owners]
want nothing more than to take out money and the peasants are of no concern
to them. We complain by means of the CNC and they deal with them to see
what can be done. But the government and the private initiative have
agreements; the government defends the private initiative. The only thing that
can help us is the government, but it has commitments. The private initiative
says to the government, "I am going to buy [the mill], but help me"--by not
accepting demands from the peasant, so they receive a proﬁt. The private
initiative says to the national leader, "This price is not convenient for us" and
nothing more can be done.

A former car‘iero who had wholeheartedly supported UNPCA in 1984, has since
abandoned cane production, as well as his loyalty to the union:

Now the CN C no longer serves for anything because it does not defend us like

it should. Now the mill and the government manage and do with one what

they want. The government. . .has power and money but it pays no attention to

us. The mill, if it didn’t have so much interest in robbing like it does now,

would help us, but now they want only it to proﬁt.

Given the changing relations of production, peasants were asked to whom they
should turn for redress. More peasants (47 .4 %) say that it is to UNPCA that cafreros

should address their demands:

 

Table 12. To Whom Car'ieros Should Make Demands (n=97).

 

UNPCA 47.4%
Government 25.8%
Sugar mill 18.6%
No one 3.1%
Don't know 2.1%
Government and mill 1.0%
UNPCA and mill 1.0%
All three 1.0%

 

The strong proclivity to work through the union is revealed in their responses:

Because it is the womb of the caﬁeros. There the caﬁero should have recourse
to demand that [the union] respond as it should.

199

The car'iero union should shelter and protect the caﬁero because the union was
made with this idea.

Recourse for unorganized, landless workers is even more limited:

The caﬁeros, to the union; there each expounds his problems. We workers,

what? What importance do they give us? With whom? The only thing is with

‘th:teinspectors, but they are bought, with a bottle. We have neither voice, nor

Peasants were asked to speciﬁcally identify who was to blame for the current crisis
in the cane sector. One person generalized, "Everyone is at fault--some for being fools,
others for being clever. The government is on the side of money (the owners). The
sugar mill wants proﬁts. The car‘iero left the maize to plant cane". There are, however,
important differences in the degree of blame placed on these different agents. Peasants
in the sample indicated with whom they place fault for the problems cane producers face.

The sugar mill stands far above others identiﬁed as recipients of this blame, followed by

the government, then UNPCA:

 

Table 13. Who Is To Blame For Problems of Caﬁeros (n=97).

 

Sugar mill 46.4%
Government 28.9%
UNPCA 13.4%
Caﬁeros 3.1%
Government and UNPCA 2.1%
Government and sugar mill 1.0%
UNPCA and sugar mill 1.0%
Don't know 1.0%

 

Thus, while primary blame for problems is placed on the mill, it is through the
state-controlled union that grievances must be redressed, deﬂecting confrontation between
capitalists and peasant producers on to the government.

Among those who placed primary blame on the sugar mill for their problems
(46.4%; Table 13, page 199), it was stated that, "This year, yes, I blame the sugar mill.

200
The mill and the union are two things in conﬂict. The cafrero is doing the labor. They
don’t give us pay. We give the raw material, but the sugar mill, no". A series of
evaluations elicited during interviews reveals the depreciation of the private, relative to
the state-owned mill in the cultural understandings of peasants:
The government should not have sold the sugar mill to other people since it
gave more help to many people. It made more work in the sugar mill, and
now all this has fallen down. The private mill only wants the money.
When these new owners entered, we were left with debts and it is the same
cane. We don’t even know if this owner grabs more, because the owner
changed, and we were left in debt.
It is really bad. Everyone complains about this sale. We are no longer left
with anything. We are left with debts. The only thing, those who bought it
are screwing us. The increase [in price] was little and what can one do?
It was bad for all the caﬁeros. It was better when it belonged to the
government. It is not good that it has been sold. The change in owner of the
sugar mill was the breaking of the car‘ieros, because I have heard that these
[owners] try to take advantage in everything. They come with new ideas of
doing business and wherever they are seen, they exploit the car'iero and the
harvester.
Now we are chained and we have to go as far as the contract obligates us.
They don’t want to negotiate with one. They do everything for their own
beneﬁt. Thus, the way they are working, they only leave the car‘iero dancing
in the string of mules. They do their dirty work and ultimately, they leave one
broke.
These [owners] are very much against the car‘ieros. They are the owners and

they have no commitment with the caﬁero. The government had another way
of treating us.

Next to the mill, peasants placed blame on the government for the current crisis in
the cane sector (28.9% ; , Table 13, page 199). Caﬁeros bitterly denounce the withdrawal
of the state since its divestment of parastatal enterprises. The retraction of state subsidies
and support has broken the former alliance and fomented sharp criticism of the
government. As one car'iero complained, "The government goes against the one that
works, they hit us with sticks, like mules, and they say ’keep going, bunch of assholes’".

Car'ieros criticize the fact that the government continues to keep the price of cane

201

low, yet the sense of betrayal in having sold the mill is profound; repeatedly, they
blamed the government because it sold the mill. A cafiero of Chiapa contended, "When
it was seen that the sugar mill was being sold, those of the CNC went, and the governor
deceived us because he told us that the mill was not up for sale and that it was not going
to be sold. Now we have lost conﬁdence in the government" . The generalized negative
attitude toward the government has dramatically affected allegiance to PRI. During
research in 1984, 91% of the sample (n=33) identiﬁed PRI as the political party that
contributes most to peasant well-being; 64% were card—carrying members. By 1990,
only 49.5% (n= 100) so identiﬁed PRI and 46.4% claimed that no political party helps.

Relatively less blame is placed on UNPCA (13.4%; Table 13, page 199) for
problems confronted by car‘ieros than on the sugar mill or the government. One of the
more loyal car'ieros acknowledged the continuing importance of UNPCA’s role in the
privatization process:

We have the support of the CNC. If it were not for the CNC, they would do

with us what they wanted. It is a strong industry; they are very rotten in this

country. How are we going to deal with them if it is not for the CNC? They

pay attention to us, we of the CN C. The former owners (the government), up

to a certain point, attended more to those of the union because the government

wanted to. The whole world was robbing the government and now it has

changed. With these who make cookies, there no longer is corruption like
before. Those of the CNC have more now, but before they supported the
pequeﬁos propietarios more. Now, with these new owners, it is more equal.

They want those of the CNPP to form the same line as those of the CNC.

They [pequer'ios propietarios] were attended and no longer, they are now equal.

They give more attention now that the government does not intervene. From

the congresses at the national level we caﬁeros have support.

Despite this evaluation, a general theme in the commentaries regarding UNPCA is
that it has less power since privatization. Much of this is related to state withdrawal:
"The union has changed because the government made it change. If there is no
intervention from the government, there is nothing, there is no credit. It intervenes

less . One cai'rero explained, "It no longer has the same power". Some believe that

UNPCA "...is bought by the sugar mill and the government", while others discredit the

202
help provided by the union: "Because ﬁrst they say yes, but they don’t extract one from
the pressures. They don’t pull the mule from the corn patch. A rich one goes and yes,
they resolve [his problem], and for one [like me], nothing".

Even in light of the low evaluations and negative attitudes towards the cane
producers’ union, compared with the support caﬁeros claim to receive from the
government and the mill, the union provides relatively more support to producers. The
following table reports car‘ieros’ responses about the degree to which each of these

institutions help caﬁeros:

 

Table 14. Support Given to Caﬁeros (n=30).

 

v mm 11 Sugar Mill EMA

Much 23.3% 6.7% 23.3%
Some 20.0% 20.0% 33.3%
Little 10.0% 16.7% 13.3%
None 46.7% 56.7% 30.0%

 

Juxtaposition of these responses with the predominant conclusion among car‘ieros that
their leaders are "bought" and do not defend them, suggests that their struggle for just
treatment by government and mill ofﬁcials will continue to be aborted. It is instructive
to compare how peasants evaluate UNPCA, the organization most closely associated with

cane production, to the ejido, the organizational unit for all agrarian reform recipients:

 

203

 

Table 15 . Evaluation of Progress.

 

WA F W Peasantalnsﬂl
Rapidly 6.7% 3.1% -
Slowly 26.7% 59.8% 19.6%
Remains the same 13.3% 16.5% 18.6%
Getting worse 50.0% 18.6% 58.8%
Combination - 2.1% 3.1%
Don’t know 3.3% - -

 

Compared to how sample members rated the progress of the ejido, UNPCA is rated
substantially lower. The majority (59.8%) state that the ejido is slowly progressing,
against only 26.7% for UNPCA. Substantially fewer (18.6%) believe that the ejido is
getting worse, as compared to UNPCA (50%). The changing relations of production
with privatization contribute to this differential evaluation. When asked to evaluate how
peasants in general (including unorganized, landless peasants) were progressing, the
majority, 58. 8 % , claimed their conditions are worsening; however, unless they are
incorporated into UNPCA, the ejido, or the cattle producers’ union, peasants of the
region are completely without representation.

This chapter has thus far dealt with collective organization and the relationship of
peasants to ofﬁcial structures of power. A question raised in the introduction, however,
is whether car'ieros would adopt alternative collective strategies in the context of a crisis
in state legitimacy and privatization of the sugar sector. The prediction that caiieros
would desert ofﬁcial organizations and join forces with independent, non-government
unions is largely not borne out to date in the state of Colima. Nevertheless, an
independent producers’ union--which incorporated some cafreros--did emerge in 1990.

The dynamics of its generation are analyzed in the next section.

 

204
Alternative Collective Strategies

Despair with the ofﬁcial union encourages few car'ieros in Colima to consider
alternative organizations. Lack of ofﬁcial recognition disempowers independent
organizations, a fact not lost on cane producers:

In reality, one can do nothing if we separate from the CNC and form another

organization. It is worse because if the CNC doesn’t pay attention to us, in the

CNPP, it is less so. Like what happened with the Graciano Sénchez group,

they left and they don’t belong in one place or another. They are not going to

be accommodated anywhere. They are without power and without vote. There

is no consciousness for us because the government has us by the reins and does

not allow us to move.

When 29 cafieros were asked how they can best achieve their collective goals,
82.8% declared that goals can best be achieved by strengthening the UNPCA
organization; only two would consider joining independent organizations, two claimed
there is no way to achieve goals, and one argued that the only alternative is to quit cane
production and put the sugar mill out of business. Alternative organizations do exert
power in other regions of Mexico. For example, UNORCA (Union Nacional de
Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autonomas) forms a network of some 60
autonomous peasant organizations, which opposes privatization of parastatals and of
ejidos. The UCD (U nidad Caﬁera Democratica), incorporating 12,000 car'ieros from 25
sugar mills, formally organized in 1990, in objection to the corruption of ofﬁcial unions.
It was active in challenging the changing conditions of production resulting from
privatization until its leader was imprisoned in 1991.

In 1990, an alternative, independent peasant movement was taking place in Colima.
The Comité Estatal Para la Defensa de los Productores Agropecuarios (CEDPA),
incorporates producers of all sectors, including car‘ieros; independent of party afﬁliation,
its objective is to attain just prices for agricultural products. Unlike other peasant

organizations, CEDPA encourages the membership of non-ejidatarios; many of its

members are landless peasants. As an alternative to the peasant struggle, peasants

205
participate as active members, rather than as spectators. The organization uses peasant
struggle, confronts the government, and proposes alternatives.

The strategies of this organization were diverse: members held marches,
demonstrations, and tianguis (open markets) to sell their crops at prices set by the
peasants themselves. On November 10, 1990, 1000 CEDPA members held a
demonstration in the center of Colima, throwing their crops (bananas, limes, coconuts,
cane, etc.) in the streets to protest their low value. Government ofﬁcials (Secretaria de
Gobierno, Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano, SARH), on learning of the planned
demonstration, called CEDPA leaders to a meeting; government ofﬁcials tried to
persuade the protesters not to march, but their admonishment went unheeded. In addition
to their demands for better prices, the marchers demanded that the governor ask Salinas
de Gortari to end the excessive import of basic crops which compete with the products
of peasants. Among the demonstrators, cafreros protested that cane costs $70,000 per
ton to produce, yet they receive only $46,000; they demanded a just price of $92,000.
Peasants then confronted ofﬁcials at the government palace:

The Mexican countryside is found in frank decapitalization as a consequence

of the fact that the federal government has implemented an erroneous

agricultural policy, permitting the import of basic grains. . .harming the workers

of the national countryside; besides we are being drowned with low prices,

expensive inputs and usurious bank interest rates. All of this is provoking the

gradual abandonment of the country (translated from Diario de Colima
l990c:1).

An editorial in response to the demonstration reported:

The Mexican countryside is experiencing an era of maltreatment on the part of

those who rule in agricultural politics, without being able to see that the know-

it—all Carlos Hank Gonzalez can pull the mule from the ravine. . .. Because of
this, everywhere in the country, complaints are being raised, each day more
angry and violent, and for this, opposition parties are strengthening and the
government is losing more and more the sympathy of the men of the
countryside (translated from Cortes 1990:2).

Ofﬁcials condemned the demonstration, and in response, announced a march on

November 15 that would be peaceful, and not political. Manipulation of peasant

206

organizations by PRI was evident in the events of the day. The march was sponsored
by the CNC, UNPCA, the CNPP, and other ofﬁcially-recognized peasant organizations;
it was orderly, tranquil, silent, and solemn. Banners carried by the 800 participants
demanded "The Transfer of Parastatal Enterprises to Producers of the Country with
Adequate Credit" , "There Will Be No Cane Harvest Without J ust Prices" , " Restructuring
of Credit to the Country and Low Interests", and "The Diesel Gasoline Went Up and
This is Solidarity?".

A plea containing ﬁve points was read and turned over, to be delivered to Salinas
de Gortari: l) restructuring of credit and reduction of interest rates; 2) application of
strong tariffs to crop imports; 3) just taxes to producers; 4) transfer of parastatals to
peasants, with credit; and 5) control of prices (Ruiz 1990:7). The governor spoke to the
crowd from his balcony:

This is an unusual march, but it is a march of unity. . .of the authentic producers

of the country who feel the anguish and the desperation.... For generations

and generations we have been linked to the land; the free trade is another

activity, ours is the countryside and we continue united in the country

(translated from Ruiz 1990:7).

The speech lasted less than ﬁve minutes and the governor promised to take the
petition to Salinas de Gortari. As he returned to his ofﬁce, shouts rose up from the
crowd "That is a lie, there will be no solutions". The next day, the price of fertilizer
rose 40%.

Upon arrival of the march at the government palace, Arnoldo Vizcaino’s entry to
the govemor’s ofﬁce had been blocked. He accused the event of turning into a political
party act, arguing, "If they invited us to participate, they should permit us to speak with

the governor, because we also are leaders of an organization of producers". Some PRI

207

members were also offended. They complained that their banners were censored,”
taken away from them, and they were "gagged" so as not to reveal their inconformity.
Popular protest was absent and only the leaders of ofﬁcial organizations were invited to
a private dinner with state ofﬁcials. A letter to the editor complained: "What was
supposed to be an open dialogue between people and government, resulted in a
monologue from the principal balcony" (translated from Ruelas 1990:3). A local
newspaper reported:

The desperation of the agricultural producers of Colima has moved them to
take means that they have never before realized, principally for being
institutionalized... The reality of the Colima countryside, in truth, is
disastrous, at a level that they have opted to abandon the crops that in previous
years were the principal source of income for thousands of families... The
agricultural producers of Colima have been promised much and little has been
done-from president Salinas de Gortari to the secretary of Agriculture Hank
Gonzalez (translated from Diario de Colima l990dz2).

In response to CEDPA demands, the General Secretary of SARH, Hank Gonzalez
came to Colima to hold discussions with peasants. This event occurred only one month
after CEDPA began its demonstrations. There was fear on the part of state ofﬁcials that
the visit of Hank Gonzalez would be used to spotlight the complaints of CEDPA. Two
meetings behind closed doors and with leaders of ofﬁcial organizations, were planned;
CEDPA was not to participate. The governor sent a message to Vizcaino: "Tell
Arnoldo that I reafﬁrm my friendship, but that he abstains from foolishness on Friday".
At midnight, the police arrived at the home of Vizcar’no, informing him that the governor

was calling him by phone. He was escorted in patrol car to the government ofﬁce in

Cuauhtémoc. He was told he would be allowed to join the meeting with Hank Gonzalez,

7’According to a local ejidatario, censored banners included: "Citizen, unite with this civic opposition,
against the disguised and cynical dictatorship", "We reclaim the postulates of the Mexican Revolution,
Enough simulations of corrupt politics", "Peasants disunited, we are being oppressed, we are manifesting
that we will struggle, secure that we will conquer", "The people suffer inequality, poverty, and
malnutrition, the functionaries enjoy $$$, they say modernizing the nation", "Comisariados, ’leaders’,
senators or representatives, now that you have abandoned your electorate, you are very happy charging
$33, but the people already see you as traitors" (Ruelas 1990:3).

 

208
but only leaders of the organizations would be allowed in. The CEDPA leader replied
to the governor, "Excuse me, governor, but my companions and I are looking for a
response to our problems and I do not have more rights than them; they also, have a
right to present themselves and be heard".

The day of the visit, Vizcaino arrived with his group and was introduced to Hank
Gonzalez. When his turn came to present the demands of CEDPA, he told the SARH
ofﬁcial:

I am a member of a state group that isn’t even legally recognized, called

CEDPA, and it formed to respond in some way to the desperation that all the

agricultural producers have because we are producers and we are hard hit by

heavy problems.

After explaining the problems, Hank Gonzalez replied, " All the problems that you
have presented are grave and we are going to give you a solution". The SARH chief
rose to leave; Vizcaino countered, "One moment, friend. You came here to give a
solution to our problems and you did not give me a concrete solution. I cannot allow
you to leave until you give something to my people. For this, we came and we are not
leaving until you hear them". The reply: "I am sorry, my time has run out". Vizcafno
retorted, "No ser'ror, my companions also have a right to hear what you are going to
say". Hank Gonzalez responded: "I am sorry, I promise you that I am going to return
soon, with more time. Today, 1 deﬁnitively cannot, the time here has run out".
Vizcaino had the ﬁnal word: "If you are sincere, I thank you, but I speak for the
desperation felt by all the producers of the region".

Crucial differences distinguish the objectives, strategies, and modes of participation
of CEDPA from ofﬁcial institutions. In contrast to Salinas de Gortari’s Programa de
Modernizacion, which would place the rural area in the hands of the private initiative,

CEDPA would place control in the hands of the peasants. In contrast to the control

exerted over its members by UNPCA, CEDPA creates "spaces of power", and aims to

 

209
develop peasant consciousness. In contrast to the vertical leadership of UNPCA,
according to the CEDPA leader, "we were born from the anger of the people. We have
opened doors that we could not open" (Arnoldo Vizcafno). This leader acts not for his
fellow members, but with them.

The gravity of the crisis and destabilization in the rural areas of Colima prompted
the following assessment of the emergence of CEDPA:

With this circumstance, it is not strange that the Comité Estatal Pro-defensa de

Productos Agropecuarios has formed, with the clear and speciﬁc objective, the

search for just prices for their products and the modernization of

infrastructure... We do not share the point of view manifested by the
government of the state, when it reprimanded the members of CEDPA,
accusing them of terrible and dramatic acts. The throwing of products in the
principal street and in front of the facade of the Government Palace is not
being dramatic. It was a symbolic act where they manifested the anger of these
peOple, removed from the privileges and beneﬁts of the supposed modern

economy (translated from Preciado 1990:5).

CEDPA published its position against the government in January, 1991:

Under the slogan of modernization of the country the government has

permitted, promoted, and accepted the importation of agricultural

products...without considering the internal production... In these difﬁcult
circumstances and in this gloomy agricultural panorama where the ofﬁcial
peasant organizations do little or nothing to defend their "representatives", that

at the beginning of last November, an incipient, alternative group, a true

peasant struggle emerged, the Comité Estatal para la Defensa de los

Productores Agropecuarios (translated from Ecos de la Costa 1991).

According to Vizcaino, the accomplishments of CEDPA are: 1) it inaugurated a
different style of struggle; 2) it disclosed the erratic policy of the government toward the
country; 3) it achieved bringing Hank Gonzalez to Colima; and 4) they obligated
traditional agricultural organizations to act. On the negative side is the adverse stance
of traditional organizations to recognize their struggle, and the ofﬁcial obstacles placed
against their activities. Despite widespread media coverage received by CEDPA in the
fall of 1990, few peasants in the research villages were knowledgeable about the
organization; 90% (n=97) reported they did not know of CEDPA.

CEDPA represents an alternative response to the modernizing, privatizing forces of

210

government policy. Unlike UNPCA, it provides for grassroots participation and has not
been coopted by government control. Such independent organizations, however, lacking
ofﬁcial recognition, face severe restrictions on their activities. Few caﬁeros of Colima
would consider these as a viable alternative. Whereas the ideological underpinnings of
the ofﬁcial organization remain ﬁrmly in place, cane producers in the zone of Ingenio
Queseria are reacting with increasing skepticism toward the efﬁcacy of mobilization
within UNPCA, their struggle against political control by the neoliberal state, and
economic exploitation by the newly-privatized sugar mill.

This chapter has shown that the constitution of the CN C created an organic
relationship between peasants and the Mexican state that simultaneously gave peasants
an organization for collective action and the state a mechanism for economic, political,
and ideological control of the peasantry. This relationship was doubly reinforced for
cane producers whose union was subsumed within the government-controlled CN C and
simultaneously linked to state-owned sugar mills. The nature of this relationship was
shown to be dialectic. Despite its subordination to the state, militancy of the union
resulted in important achievements: price increases, medical beneﬁts, social security,
payment for byproducts, and so forth.

A particular event, the caﬁero strike of 1990 was documented to demonstrate the
limited efﬁcacy of the union vis-a-vis the privatized mill. The process occurred through
three phases: 1) initial unity of union members and commitment to achieve a 100%
increase in the price of cane; 2) a shift in focus from the national state to the regional
sugar mill, and from the price of cane to demands for alternative concessions; 3)
conformity and acceptance of minimal beneﬁts. In analyzing peasants’ understandings
of this outcome, an ideology of organization, the result of state tutelage, was present, yet
in terms of concrete efﬁcacy, the majority of cane producers are apathetic, demonstrate

minimal participation, lack faith in their leaders, express their wrath toward the new mill

 

211

owners, and feel betrayed by the government for selling the mill. In contrast to the
union’s mobilization of 1984, its inﬂuence today is perceived to have deteriorated.

The chapter argues for a transformation in the relations of production since
privatization of the sugar mill. The diadic relation between peasants and a paternalistic
state has evolved into a more complex, triadic state-peasant-mill relationship, which
separates the peasant struggle from the source of exploitation. The new structure of
production has engendered ambivalence toward the sugar mill, the state, and the
producers’ union. This ambivalence is related to major transitions in the economic
viability of sugar cane production that have affected the supply zone of Ingenio Queseria
since its sale to private capital. It is to these changing conditions that the next chapter

turns.

VIII. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF REPRIVATIZATION

This chapter will analyze the economic contradictions associated with reprivatization
of Ingenio Queseria. As discussed in Chapter VI, neoliberal policy asserts that
privatization of parastatals will foment investment, create more efﬁcient ﬁrms, increase
productivity, and thus, invigorate the economy. In the regional production zone of
Queseria, Grupo Beta San Miguel promulgated a new series of policies to achieve these
ends. This chapter analyzes: l) the implementation of these policies, 2) their impact on
both ﬁeld, and 3) factory. How these regional transformations affect peasant cane
producers is then investigated through analysis of liquidation documents, which reveal
4) prices paid to producers, 5) their costs of production, and 5) net gain or loss. The
chapter concludes with 6) peasants’ evaluation of the transformation of production and
the changing relations of production that characterize the region. The chapter, then,
examines the relations of production between the privatized mill and peasant cane
producers, inherent in a political economy approach. The initial phase of state
withdrawal and reprivatization of the sugar industry has fostered conditions which
contradict the explicit objectives of privatization and are dissonant with the social and
economic well-being of peasant cane producers. In keeping with the theme of an
ideologically sensitive political economy, much peasant discourse is presented to evoke
the ideological underpinnings that materialized in the collective mobilization of car‘ieros
in 1990 (as seen in the previous chapter), and that became manifest in numerous,

individual strategies of resistance, to be discussed in the following chapter.

212

213
Grupo Beta San Miguel

On April 26, 1987, at the centennial celebration for Ingenio Queseria, the Programa
de Reconversion Industrial, part of the National Development Plan to increase quality,
productivity, and competitiveness in the sugar sector was announced. This program
would invest $2,400,000,000 pesos to expand and modernize Ingenio Queseria. The
governor of Colima, Elias Zamora Verduzco, announced that "Ingenio Queseria will not
be sold. It is the pr0perty of the nation and as such will continue, in hands of the ofﬁcial
sector, seeking to balance the social forces of labor and production" . MeGregor Beltran,
general director of Azricar, S .A. announced an agreement made with President Miguel
de la Madrid to make this the "zafra76 of efﬁciency" , predicting a surplus of 500,000
tons of sugar, along with the export of 40,000 liters of eane alcohol, which would bring
Mexico $100,000,000 dollars (U .S.) in foreign exchange. At the national level, the
government was to spend $186,000,000,000 over a ﬁve-year period in the Programa de
Reconversion (Quiles 1987).

The optimism of the centennial celebration had faded by December, when it was
recognized that the Programa de Reconversion had carried out none of its planned
objectives for Ingenio Queseria. The decision to sell the mill was announced November
16, 1988. Ingenio Queseria was sold February 9, 1989, after 19 years of state
ownership, to Grupo Beta San Miguel, a consortium of Coca-Cola, Nestle, Industrial Pan
Bimbo (a Mexican bread manufacturer), and Mundet (a soft drink company which
produces the popular Sidral beverage). The purchase demonstrates the vertical
integration of sugar cane production into the agroindustrial chain, and the horizontal
expansion into several branches of the food processing industry. Eneko Belausteguigoiti

heads the consortium. Ing. Alfonso Gunter Gonzalez, general director of Grupo Beta in

 

"The zafra is the cane harvest.

T

 

214

Mexico City, informed that the group originally wanted to purchase mills in Veracruz,
but the cost of these mills was too high. It was publicly announced on November 24,
1988 that Grupo Beta had advanced $5 billion pesos for the purchase (Verduzco 1988).
It is rumored that the sale price of Ingenio Queseria was on the order of $10 billion
pesos (approximately $3 million U.S.). Grupo Beta is also associated with Ingenio
Constancia, Veracruz (which has always been private), and purchased ingenios San
Francisco Ameca, Jalisco; Ponciano Arriaga, San Luis Potosi; and Alvaro Obregon,
Quintana Roo as part of the sale packet.

Of ﬁve sugar mills owned by Grupo Beta, Ingenio Queseria is the least productive.
Preferential investment in different mills has most likely affected Queseria. Although it
operated with proﬁts until 1983, since 1984, the mill has operated in the red and was
already in process of decapitalization when purchased by Grupo Beta. From 1984-87,
Queseria had small losses, operating with proﬁts from interest, rather than capital. From
1987 to 1990 it operated, according to the mill manager, with "scandalous red numbers”.
But this, he claimed, is not a problem without solution. Asked if the situation will
improve, he replied, "If it doesn’t die, it will improve". Ingenio Alvaro Obregon, the
largest sugar producer of the group, suffered losses as well, but in 1989-90, proﬁts from
Ponciano Arriaga and Ameca covered the losses of Alvaro Obregon and Queseria (FINA
ofﬁcial, personal interview). In contrast to the mean of 75 tons of cane per hectare at
Ameca, Queseria yields only 59 tons. Grupo Beta has made no important investment in
Ingenio Queseria since privatization, but is investing $1.2 billion pesos in Ingenio Alvaro
Obregon so it can produce reﬁned white sugar. By 1990-91, this mill, built in 1978, was
no longer in the red, since it was "already at the point of take-off". The differential
position of Ingenio Queseria vis-a-vis the other mills in the group indicates that Queseria
may be the subject of benign neglect, as the mill owners direct their efforts to the more

proﬁtable mills in the sale package. The ﬁve mills comprise a total area of 60,000

215

hectares, although ideally, Grupo Beta would like to expand this to 75,000 hectares.

The private investors have come to the sugar mill with a particular set of
perspectives. This received wisdom brings the industrialists into direct confrontation
with producers and workers, upon whom the industry depends. Ing. Gunter claimed that
international interests will bring improvement to the mills because of their superior
technology. He agreed that foreign investors take money out of the country, but believes
that overall earnings within the country will be higher; apparent was his afﬁnity to
"trickle-down economics". The ﬁeld chief at Ingenio Queseria described the mill under
state control as "another series of vices". An important criticism of state-run mills was
the overemployment they sustained. The privatized mill has released many workers in
the top«heavy bureaucracy. Before privatization, Ingenio Queseria had over 100
administrative personnel, but this number had been reduced to 44 by September, 1990.
During the 1990-91 investigation, the mill was installing a computer system and expected
to lay off 127 workers, 15 of whom were ofﬁce personnel. Many of the former
personnel have been replaced. Without exception, mill ofﬁcials believe that privatization

is an improvement over conditions under the state-led sector.

Policy and Reprivatization

As privatization recreates a new set of relations of production, it superimposes major
policy changes which affect the sugar sector. Ing. Alfonso Gunter related in a 1990
interview that the law should be changed to eliminate the ejido: "The ejido is now
absolutely antiquated". It would then be possible to work more hectares as a single unit,
he explained. Mechanization would be more efﬁcient on 100 hectares, than on 10, thus
plans are to make loans to caﬁeros who work large tracts of land, for the purchase of
trucks, tractors, and cargadoras (mechanical cane lifters). In recognition of the land

sales this change would induce, he showed little concern for where a large segment of

216

ex-ejidatarios would seek other means of employment. The recent decision to modify
the Mexican constitution and privatize ejido lands may prove to be a signiﬁcant factor
in insuring the general director’s objective "to grab the entire ejido, as a single entity,
to produce pure sugar cane". The ﬁeld chief of Ingenio Queseria pointed out that when
caﬁeros have debts, ejido lands are protected, but the mill can seize land of indebted
private landowners. Several non-caﬁeros reported to the researcher that the mill had
offered to rent their land to plant sugar cane. A villager who utilizes his parcela to raise
cattle related, "The Ingenio of Queseria offered to rent my land. Ultimately, they are
going to want to have the lands [for themselves]. They no longer want for there to be
ejidos. Now, they are exploiting us".

Contentious relations are present between the mill and the private landowners as
well. The general director of Grupo Beta blames these private landowners for low
yields, arguing that even though they may deliver 40,000 tons of cane, the sucrose
content is extremely low. Because they control large amounts of cane land from which
they reap huge proﬁts, they are little interested in increasing yields. This group has been
highly critical of the privatized mill, utilizing the media to voice the objections of this
powerful group. The director evaluated this situation, "It is a game of pressures-~we will
see who pressures most".

More speciﬁc policies of the privatized mill were related by the general manager of
Ingenio Queseria, Ing. Roberto Arreola Manzano, who was transferred from Ingenio
Ameca at the time the mill was purchased. He contends that under state control, the
government subsidized laziness, negligence, and apathy; confusing "labor politics" with
"political politics" , the two collided. Industrial groups, on the other hand, know how
to manage a sugar mill. He believes that when investing in mills, the owners took on
a great risk.

Ing. Arreola’s objectives, as mill manager, are to increase productivity through

217
efﬁciency in the industrial process and to show the cafrero that it costs the same to
produce 60 tons of cane as 100 tons. He stressed completing all the labor tasks. The
key is to raise the consciousness of the where He believes the largest obstacle is
"ignorance" and Grupo Beta has experts "to remove the ignorance", revealing that the
ideology of modernization theory has been put into place with the reprivatization of the
sugar mill.

The master plan of Grupo Beta is to be carried out in several phases. The
consortium is investigating technologies in the U.S., Cuba, Brazil, Europe, and Africa
to determine which might be most efﬁcient to put into place in Mexico. The ﬁrst phase
involves investment of $10-$15 million pesos (about $3000-5000 U.S. dollars) per sugar
mill over a three-year period. Although this is a minimal expenditure, the beneﬁts of
"putting the ﬁeld in order" will be high. The second phase will require greater
investment, but the beneﬁts will be less than in phase one. Consolidation is the objective
of the third phase. Speciﬁc objectives of the ﬁve-year master plan are to increase
productivity of ﬁeld and factory through: 1) expansion of the production zone from 8020
to 15,000 hectares; 2) introduction of new cane varieties; 3) stricter requirements in the
production process; and 4) by limiting credit to producers with the potential to increase
yields.

Over an eight-year period, expansion would increase the tons of cane harvested from
400,000 to 850,000. Varieties of cane that are more resistant" and higher in sucrose
content were adopted to increase ﬁeld yields from 40 tons per hectare in 1988-89, to 50
in 1989-90, projecting 65 tons by 199091. The predominant older variety (MEX-54-8l)
still covers 67% of the surface of the zone; all producers in the research communities

plant this variety. New varieties, while higher yielding, require more frequent replanting

 

T’MEX-69-290, for example, is higher yielding, resistant to drought and high temperatures; MEX-57-
473 requires good soils and is being introduced in irrigated lands.

218

(an investment that generally requires three years to pay off), thus passing the cost of
increased productivity on to the producer. The cost to plant new cane, or plantilla, not
including harvest and transport costs, is $2,794,000 pesos per hectare (1990-91),
compared with $900,000 for socas and resocas (soca refers to the ﬁrst cultivation and
resoca to subsequent cultivations after planting).78 The cost of the harvest is $4500 per
ton for cutters, plus $26,000 for other harvest expenses. One of the caﬁeros explained
the demand for new varieties from the peasant point of view: "One hectare of cane, to
plant it costs $3,500,000, and one is left in debt for ﬁve or six years, without beneﬁt.
After that it is time to plant new cane again, thus we are tied up".

In terms of labor tasks, the cultivation of ﬁelds after harvest--often neglected by
cafieros of the zone--is being stressed. This neglect is a common problem which
exacerbates strangling of roots and compaction of the soil. The ﬁeld chief of Ingenio
Queseria attributed unusually low yields from 1988-90 to failure to cultivate, blaming
caﬁeros for being irresponsible and for "lack of culture". Seasonal factors play some
role in cane yields, yet low rainfall is not considered by the ﬁeld superintendent as a
signiﬁcant factor.” A common impediment to cultivation is the presence of large rocks
and boulders in the ﬁelds. Formerly, caﬁeros paid enormous sums to have these
removed;"0 the mill will attempt to cut costs by eliminating this process (these charges

were still being made on 1990-91 liquidation documents).

 

1"Plantilla is grown 16-18 months before it is ﬁrst harvested, thus renders no proﬁts during this period.
Once cut, socas and resocas are cut annually. The life-span of the cane depends on soil characteristics,
plagues, care in cultivation and fertilization, irrigation, and variety. Whereas new varieties must be
replanted after ﬁve or six years, traditional varieties are grown up to 20 years before replanting.

”Rainfall was extremely sparse in 1989-90, yet yields surpassed the previous year when rainfall was
more plentiful. While cane generally requires 1400 mm. of annual rainfall for good yields, rainfall
beginning in 1988-89 and for three consecutive years was 1515.8mm, 880.2mm, and 1266mm, yet cane
yields were 40.7, 50.2, and 59.2, respectively. These increases are attributed to greater attention to
cultivation.

”Ofﬁcially, the cost is $600,000 per hectare, but interest rates often exceed 300% of this amount.

219

Changes in cultivation practices suggest an increased use of agrochemicals. The
mill is now recommending a decrease in labor to wwd (from three or four times per year
to one) and one to two applications of herbicide. Caﬁeros have reported that they are
now using herbicides to reduce wage labor in weeding the cane, adding that the use of
chemicals has, in fact, increased their costs. In addition, mill plans include increased use
of fertilizers. Common usage currently includes 500 kg. per hectare of Triple, an equal
mixture of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, but varies depending on soil conditions.
The cost is $46,000 pesos per hectare if applied by hand, $140,000, if by tractor.

Other labor demands focus on the harvest. Problems arise over delivery of cane
with rocks, dirt, and extra foliage. Previously, cutters cut the cane off at the base, piling
it into tercios of 33 kg. The new owners now demand that harvesters remove all foliage
from the cane, both above and below the section with the highest sucrose content. The
ﬁeld superintendent exclaimed, "The ingenio accepts cane, not garbage". This new form
of cutting doubles the time required to cut the cane, yet real wages (paid on a piece-rate
basis) have declined. The goal of these efforts was to achieve in ﬁve years: 800,000
tons of cane, 70 tons of cane per hectare, 80,000 tons of sugar, and seven tons of sugar
per hectare.

The selective distribution of credit-—only to those who are capable of advancing--
allows the sugar mill to control who may continue to produce cane and who may not,
engendering increased socioeconomic differentiation. Some producers, for example, have
been denied credit because of low yields. It is they who are least in a ﬁnancial position
to make new investments, while the better-off, more productive farmers continue to
receive ﬁnancial support. Some caﬁeros reported that the mill refused to accept their
low-yielding cane, but they "rented" the cane to ﬁeld inspectors from the mill who
assured them they could get the cane into the mill for processing. This practice nulliﬁes

the objective to increase productivity. When the restructuring of car‘ieros’ debts occurs,

220

those with low yields will get no credit; according to Ing. Gunter, "The caiiero is the
most important--without the caﬁero, there is no sugar mill, but a bad cai'rero has no
reason to receive credit". Since credit is essential to cane production, the producer is
forced to turn to other crops, thus losing access to health insurance provided by the mill
and union membership (there is no union organization for production of other crops
grown in the region). In stark contradiction to the concept of privatization, all credit
continues to be provided to the sugar sector by FINA. Ing. Gunter states that if FINA
disappears, "There will be chaos, resulting in anarchy". His statement suggests the
intent of the private initiative to continue to depend on state ﬁnancing.

The aim of Grupo Beta was to increase production within a three-year period to
stimulate peasants to produce more cane. In fact, most caﬁeros foresaw the results of
the 1990-91 harvest as key in their decision "to continue cane production or to quit".
There is evidence that yields are increasing. The zone evolved from a mean of 62 tons
per hectare in 1985-86, to an all-time low of 41 in 1988-89, rising again to 59 tons per
hectare in the 1990-91 harvest, although falling short of the goal of 65 tons.

Overall, modernization and development are viewed by private capital in narrow
technological terms without taking into account the social sector. The private capitalists
remain evasive when discussing sociopolitical issues and ethnocentric toward the

producers and workers upon whom they ultimately depend to realize their proﬁts.

Regional Transformations
Reprivatization of Mexican sugar mills, according to neoliberal ideology, promises
to stimulate modernization of ﬁeld and factory with private investment, increase
productive efﬁciency, and augment production. The research focused on regional
transformations to evaluate how well these objectives were being met within the region

of Ingenio Queseria. A combination of data derived from interviews with caiieros in the

221

research sample, interviews with mill personnel, and liquidation documents81 collected
from the sugar mill provided the content for analysis. The liquidation documents of all
car'reros from the research communities, plus a 2% sample of the entire production zone,
covering the period 1985-86 to 1990-91, were utilized. In addition, bottom-line results
of proﬁt and loss were taken for the entire zone. These data were analyzed for
signiﬁcant changes over the ﬁve-year period in ﬁeld production, factory production, and
results of liquidation, including relative changes in the price of cane and costs of
production, and debt structure. Comparisons are made between the pre-privatization
(1985-86 to 1987-88) and post-privatization (1988-89 to 1990-91) periods.
Field

The domain of the ﬁeld draws attention to several important issues discussed below.
One of the most striking issues is the continued exploitation of cane cutters and the
growing antagonism between local and migrant cutters. Interpersonal relationships
between car‘ieros and mill personnel are also problematical. Caﬁeros and mill personnel
will be shown to adhere to opposing perceptions about modernization and efﬁciency in
ﬁeld production. Finally, the issue of environmental degradation will be taken up.

The seven month harvest season constitutes the most vital element of cane
production and is a period of intense activity in the cane sector. The 1990-91 harvest
ofﬁcially commenced in Colima on December 10 and ended on July 3, 18 days after the
rainy season began. Caﬁeros of the zone do not engage in the harvest, but employ wage
laborers to cut the cane. Harvest costs are divided between distributive costs

(administrative costs and payment to cutters) and direct costs (an "enganche" ,82 or

 

"Each producer receives a liquidation document at the end of the harvest which itemizes tons of cane,
value of the cane, costs of production, and net proﬁt or debt.

.”The enganche was reported by cutters from Guerrero to be $100,000 pesos. Several "cabos" arrive
in their villages to contract them as a team, accompany them to Colima, and manage them throughout the
harvest season.

222

payment to entice cutters from other states, costs of transportation from their home state
and to the ﬁelds, wages for guardacortes who oversee the cutters, and for making the
breaks between ﬁelds which will prevent the spread of ﬁres from one ﬁeld to the next).

Privatization of the sugar mill has not modernized working conditions for cane
cutters. Cane cutting is recognized as the most difﬁcult, back-breaking labor in rural
Mexico (Pare et al. 1987) and the cutters become covered from head to foot with the
sticky residue from the burned cane. Random cutters from Guerrero and San Luis Potosi
were interviewed while working in the cane ﬁelds during the 1990-91 harvest season.
They reported that some children begin to cut cane as early as ﬁve years of age; children
from eight to twelve years-extremely small for their ages--were observed harvesting
cane. Some of the difﬁculties mentioned were that the cane has spines which cut their
hands, the sun beats down on them, many suffer severe headaches and fever, they
breathe in ash from the burned cane and the ash gets in their eyes, and many become ill
from working so hard and being malnourished. Rheumatism, arthritis, and bladder
infections are common. One cutter observed, "One is left with pure spines, because for
money, one is left with nothing". The following commentary of a local cane harvester
underscores the hardships endured by these workers:

To be able to earn a little more one has to work more. Me, for example, when

I am cutting cane, I hardly eat. I put a taco with beans in my pockets so that

in short moments I can eat a little. When I can’t stand the hunger, in the shade

of a tree, I make a ﬁre, I heat what I bring for sustenance and I eat. After

eating, I put myself to work cutting cane, working hard, not like the others

who talk and rest. I get out a little more in the cane harvest, but I kill myself

much more than the others. They no longer like to work in the cane because

it is hard; they say, "No, I’m not going to get ﬁlthy with the soot". Now no

more than ﬁve from here in Chiapa go to cut because now the new owners

have become very strict. They want one to cut cane by cane and one spends

more time in cutting it and one does not earn sufﬁciently.

The ﬁeld process is beset by labor conﬂicts among a complex set of actors, as well

as new labor demands made by the privatized mill. The payment of cane cutters by

private capital involves double exploitation. Unlike before privatization, when cutters

223

cut a bundle of cane stalks at a time, making one slash of the machete, now they are told
to cut one stalk at a time, making a second slash to remove the tops of the cane. Before
imposition of new cutting methods, cutters could average 200 tercios per day; since the
new requirements were put into place, they often cut only 100 tercios;83 the average
cutter, applying the rate of $150 pesos per tercio, would thus experience a drop in
income from $30,000 to $15,000 pesos per day. Records at Ingenio Queseria indicate
a drop in the average number of tons cut per day from 3.5 in 1986—87 to 3.4 tons in
1988, declining to 3.0 tons in 1989-90. The new labor requirements were an important
topic of discussion among peasants in the zone of Queseria:

Now those that bought [the mill], the private ones, put more requirements so

that the cane goes free of roots and here the caﬁero loses; and if one does not

do it that way, the sugar mill loses. They have become very strict. Before one

grabbed all with the hand. Now it is cut one by one. Many are quitting the

cane; they are abandoning the work. I worked in the weeding, fertilizing,
seeding, cultivating, before. This work has now gone down.

They are very strict. The people no longer want to cut. Before they cut a

large tercio. Now they have to cut the root and take off the tassel. The root

has no juice, if it carries the root, it weighs a lot, but it is not convenient for

the sugar mill. They discount the cafiero. Before no, before it was no

problem. Now that the owners changed they became very clever. They don’t

want to lose. Those of the mill don’t want to earn little, to work just to be
working. Instead, they want to pay less. It is jeopardizing us.

Caﬁeros, according to the cane cutters, have also resisted this new method of
cutting, since in removing the excess foliage, it reduces the weight of the cane. Since
they are paid by the ton, they instruct the cutters to cut the cane one notch above where
the mill inspectors tell them to cut it. How do cutters react to this contradiction between

caﬁeros and the mill? They replied, "The sugar mill authorizes everything; it is the

sugar mill that pays us". From the perspective of private capital, a mill supervisor

 

”The amount of cane each individual can cut per day varies widely, depending on age, experience,
physical stamina, and general health. Under the old cutting methods, harvesters reported cutting up to 300
tercios per day (one cutter claimed to have cut 600 tercios) if they work "very, very hard"; most reported
200-300 tercios per day. Children are more likely to cut around 50 tercios. Since cutting requirements
have changed, they realize only one-half of the former amount.

224
explained how the new cutting methods beneﬁt the mill by cutting processing costs, with
little concern for the decreased earnings of these wage laborers.

There has been a shift in the use of labor for the cane harvest. In 1985, 1000 local
cutters were employed (the local population is mestizo) and only 50 indigenous workers
from other states. The large landowners ﬁrst began bringing in these "foreign" workers.
In 1989-90, when the zone fell short of the required 600 cutters by 400, a local cafrero
leader explained, "We have not been able to get [them]. . .because they have been asking
for too much salary for which we have continued searching to ﬁnd people that...have a
desire to work and that are not so problematical" (translated from Diario de Colima
l990a: 1,6). Today, former cutters from the research communities complain that they can
no longer obtain work, because of all the "indians" brought from Guerrero. While
overall, local cutters have generally outnumbered non-locals, data provided by Ingenio
Queseria indicate the highest proportion of non-local cutters hired in 1989:

 

Table 16. Origin of Cane Cutters.

 

Year 14:31 ngent Ml Non-meg] Percent Non-Iml Total

1986 590 53.4% 515 46.6% 1105
1987 580 52.7% 520 47.3% 1100
1988 550 55.0% 450 45.0% 1000
1989 510 39.2% 800 61.5% 1300
1990 577 53.4% 503 46.6% 1080

 

The local ideology holds that "indians" (also referred to as "chutaros" or "cochos")
are harder workers than the local mestizos. Locals refer to them as "illiterate",
"ignorant", "less civilized", and as having "less ambition". The union leader says the
"foreigners" are good workers, because they work all day, adding, "The people from
Guerrero turn out to be cheaper than the people from here". He referred to the locals

as "lazy"; they do not want to work--they only work from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 pm. The

225
logic of contracting outside workers is clearly understood and embedded in the ideology
of local wage laborers:

Three or four years ago, we demanded a better salary; for this, they bring
people from Guerrero. If they pay us $20 pesos, they earn $15—-this is the
reason that they bring people from over there, to pay less, they pay them
miserably. It is bad because we have no work. When I worked, it was for the
government, and now they are private. The government paid a price to the
worker. These pay very serious.
Yes, they work harder, but they do it for little salary. They are easily
convinced because what they are paid, they accept. Whatever they are given,
they are content. They out faster, they hardly go to drink water, they don’t
rest. They earn very little for their nourishment. This is their North. They
don’t defend themselves. They are paid a misery. For this, they bring them
from another state.

In 1990, Ingenio Queseria imported 300 cutters from San Luis Potosi at wages that
substantially undercut local wages. Although the ofﬁcial rate to be paid to cutters in
1990 was set at $150 pesos per tercio (33 kg., or approximately $4500 per ton“), local
cutters were receiving $140 pesos per tercio, cutters from Guerrero were earning $130
pesos, and the San Luis Potosr’ cutters in one ﬁeld were found to be receiving only $95
pesos. Assuming an average of 105 tercios per day, cutters would earn $14,700 ($4.90
U.S.), $13,650 ($4.55 U.S.), and $9975 ($3.33 U.S.) pesos per day, respectively,
whereas the rate of $150 would yield an income of $15,750, or $5.25 U.S. The workers
from Guerrero came, having been promised $150 per tercio, yet they observed
discrepancies throughout the zone in the amount cutters were paid. Remarkable among
these cutters is their acceptance of low wages, differential payments, being cheated by
the guardacortes, and substandard working and living conditions.

Many of the indigenous workers come from regions of extreme poverty and

unemployment, and often do not speak Spanish. One cutter said wages in Guerrero were

$10,000 per day, adding, "We come out of necessity, not for the pleasure". Since these

 

“Wages of cutters in Colima were $4000 pesos per ton in 1989-90, $3500 in 1988-89, and $1500 in
1987-88 (UNPCA leader, personal communication).

226
cutters come on a seasonal basis, generally for six months, from diverse parts of the
country, they remain unorganized and powerless to demand better pay and working
conditions. Unlike local cutters who often leave the cane harvest to work on other crops,
those who are imported must depend on the cane harvest. Peasants of the region, who
exhibit a high degree of out-migration to the U.S. , repeatedly claimed of the cane cutters
who migrate from Guerrero, "Here is their North".

Migrant cutters are housed along with their families in barracks-type housing, having
to draw water from the river as the piped water rarely works. Plumbing and sewage
systems are generally inoperable, yet locals criticize these people for leaving their
excrement in the ﬁelds. Up to 800 cutters inhabit four barracks in Queseria,
Cuauhtémoc, Trapiche, and El cobano, where malnutrition and illnesses reach alarming
levels. Cane cutters in Mexico have never been recipients of social security. Workers
living at El Cobano reported having no furniture, sleeping on petates (woven mats) and
eating primarily beans and tortillas. They receive supplies,” but must work every day
of the week to receive them. Earning on the average less than $5.00 U.S. per day, they
are looked down upon as less than human beings. Nonetheless, the union leader spoke
of the improvement in the lives of the indigenous cutters: "Whichever one has their
sewing machine, their radio. . .. When they come here they arrive in no more than their
little rebozo. They have improved two hundred percent".

Attitudes toward nonlocal cutters are complex. Local wage laborers, while
recognizing the exploitation of cutters imported from other states, largely resent the
competition for scarce jobs, as expressed in the following statement:

For the people here, the sugar mill no longer gives work. Now they give

preference to the indians that they bring from outside. I was going to the
parcelas and the guardacorte hired me. Now, they no longer want to give

 

”These consist of 1 kg. sugar, 2 kg. maize, 1 bottle of oil, pasta, 1 kg. salt, 1 kg. crackers, 1 can of
chilies, 1 kg. rice, and sardines (as one cai'rera explained, "-right down to the toilet paper").

227

work, only to the "coches" of Guerrero. The guardacortes always fuck them

when the hour arrives to pay the cutters. Now they no longer give work

because those from here defend themselves and they don’t make fools of us

with the accounts. The foreigners--those poor things, they bring them because

they don’t know how to defend themselves, well they don’t know how to keep

records.

Competition with migrant cutters, but also low pay and aversion to such hard, ﬁlthy
work were reasons that locals no longer cut cane:

Those from here became very smart and for that, they don’t employ them.

They no longer want to work for free. To the indians, they pay them whatever

miserable amount and the poor things hardly defend themselves.

The cutting of cane is very hard. I got sick from the ashes and the heat. I did
not like it. I am not going to work even to eat.

Before they worked only with people from here. Since ten years ago, they

don’t want to give facilities. If they gave to us like they do to them, those

from here would work. I don’t even earn enough to eat. With the ash, it ruins

the clothes a lot. You have to embrace the cane. The woman, poor thing, has

to wash the clothes.

Poor working conditions are exacerbated by endemic efforts to defraud cutters of
their pay. Guardacortes, or "cabos" , often rob the cutters by reporting fewer tercios than
actually cut. The UNPCA leader denied this, saying it was a "lie". Cutters, however,
informed the researcher that guardacortes, who are paid $4500 pesos per ton of harvested
cane, could make up to $150,000 pesos extra per week by reporting 6-8 fewer tercios
than actually cut by each harvester on a daily basis. Many cutters made similar
comments about these supervisors: "The one that takes advantage is the one that works
less and the one that gains most". As a local cane cutter remarked, "All the time we
were the ones that were the most exploited, the hardest worked, badly paid, and
swindled" . Exploitation of cane harvesters by ﬁeld personnel is a frequent topic of
conversation:

They rob a lot of the tercios from the poor cutters, from the sweat of their

work, which is very hard. The cabos discount the cuttings in order to pay

those who don’t work. They discount tercios and they have two salaries--that
of the sugar mill and that of the cutters.

228

The complicity of car‘ieros in this process was also described by various peasants,
one of whom explained, "[The guardacortes] discount the cutters because they are on the
side of the landowner. The same landowner tells [the guardacorte], ’fuck them’". Thus
while caﬁeros are exploited by the sugar mill, they, in turn, exploit the cane cutters.
Asked about changing this system and cutting costs by having the car‘ieros themselves
supervise cutters in their own ﬁelds, a ﬁeld supervisor explained that it would "disrupt
the caﬁero equilibrium" . He elaborated that cafreros want to work as little as possible,
yet earn high proﬁts and that "the caﬁero himself has approved of these vices". There
is "lack of consciousness on the part of the producer". In part, car‘ieros do tend to
neglect their ﬁelds, since most of the work is done by wage labor.

Problems with mechanical efﬁciency of the sugar mill (discussed below) also posed
a severe threat to cane cutters brought from other states. The harvest, marked by
repeated breakdowns in the mill, cut the work days and consequently, the earnings of
cutters. In February and March of 1991, some cutters reported only working three days
per week. A cafrero described the effect of disruptions to the harvest on the work crews
from Guerrero hired by a wealthy, private landowner:

Now because there is hardly any cutting, the poor ones no longer know what

to do. Besides, they cut the cane and it stays in the ﬁeld ﬁve or eight days.

At the hour of weighing it, what happens? Nothing--it is very dry and since

they pay them by the ton, the guardacorte crosses himself. It’s really desperate

and he tells the owner to pay him what is just or return him to his own land.

[The landowner] says, "Get out of here. No one is keeping you here" . He

tells him, "Better to kill you than give you the money". [The guardacorte]

answered, "Well, if you want, kill me, but I have sons to maintain". The poor

things are burdened with sadness, it is really hard for them.

Much evidence has been presented for deteriorating relations between cane cutters
and the sugar mill, yet relations between cai'ieros and mill personnel are equally adverse.
On one occasion, the ﬁeld supervisor visited a caﬁera in Ocotillo to discuss her lack of

attention to the cane. He insisted, "Things have to be done on schedule, not yesterday,

or tomorrow". The cai‘iera complained that a wealthy landowner had shot the chain from

229

the irrigation gate with his pistol, illegally appropriating all of the irrigation water. She
had gone from ofﬁce to ofﬁce, but failed to obtain assistance. The inspector later related
to the researcher that this car'iera was merely using the event "to justify the problem".
His job is to ensure that caﬁeros comply with the labor tasks "so that the mill has cane".

On another occasion, a caﬁero entered the accounting ofﬁce of the sugar mill,
complaining of the debt he owed. The chief of accounting became angry and ordered
him to read the liquidation document. He argued there was nothing he could do, that the
car'iero should get someone to read the document for him. Voices were raised. Finally,
the accounting chief ordered the man to bring in someone who can read, accusing the
man of being illiterate. A caﬁera approached the same ofﬁcial to enquire why her
earnings from the ﬁve hectares of cane were so low, when she had invested so much
money and hard work to cultivate it. It had been accidently burned and left several days
before cutting and harvest. His reply: "Look seﬁora, it is that you do not understand.
The cane was accidentally burned and this is not the same. What you don’t understand
is the sugar cane". These accidental burnings of cane ﬁelds are frequent, with serious
repercussions on producers’ incomes. They are, however, but one of many difﬁculties
that affect the sugar cane harvest.

Given the critical and recurrent problems that beset the 1991 harvest, the sample

members’ identiﬁcation of these problems was elicited:

 

Table 17. Problems of the Harvest (n=96).

 

Unprocessed cane 46.9%
Accidental burnings 16.7%
Corruption, bribes 11.5%
No problems 9.4%
Other 8.2%

Do not know 7.3%

 

 

230

The most frequent comments concerned the slowness of the harvest and the massive
amount of cane being left in the ﬁelds (this issue is discussed below). The next frequent
problem addressed the issue of accidentally burned cane and resultant discounts made by
the mill. A number of peasants even complained that the mill intentionally sends people
to burn the cane early, so that they may pay a discounted price for the cane. Corruption
includes crediting fewer tercios than cut, under-weighing the cane, bribes, and so forth.
A wide variety of other problems related to the harvest were mentioned: poor
organization of burning schedules and delivery of the cane; low price for the cane and
low wages paid to cutters; bribery and corruption on the part of guardacortes, ﬁeld
inspectors, and truck drivers; favoritism toward private landowners in delivery of cane;
loss of work due to mechanization; stricter regulations regarding the cutting process and
quality of the cane; and concentration of land. Some car‘ieros asserted that this was the
worst harvest ever, an opinion that reﬂects the general consensus among cafreros of the
zone.

Compounded with these contentious issues in the ﬁeld are the contradictory results
of the sugar mill’s efforts to expand cane production in the zone. Although the projected
expansion of cane to 15 ,000 hectares would have a decidedly negative effect on crop
diversiﬁcation, present trends do not indicate the feasibility of achieving this goal. The
mill has taken several measures to combat loss of area. A new zone was opened up at
Asmoles in 1989, at a great distance (approximately 42 km.) from the mill. A ﬁeld
inspector encouraged ejidatarios to convert their land to sugar cane near Los Asmoles,
promising that "it will bring you much money". Ten ejidatarios planted 65 hectares of
cane, but none of the cane for which ejidatarios sacriﬁced their lands over a two year
period, were ever processed. The soils were unsuitable (with excess chlorine and
calcium carbonate) and yielded an average of only 38 tons per hectare. A cattle raiser

from Ocotillo accepted the offer, his cane was ﬁrst cut in 1990-91, but he had no

231
earnings. He planned to go to BANRURAL for a loan to replant his land in pasture.
The ﬁeld chief of Ingenio Queseria said of the experiment "it gave us a blow to the
head" .

A second region has been given impetus, San José del Carmen, Jalisco, which is
experiencing excellent results with the new variety MEX57-l456. Its producers are
given much support by the mill and the new varieties are obtaining high yields, some up
to 200 tons per hectare. This cane, however, is subject to a fungus referred to as
"carbon" . Finally, Grupo Beta intends to encourage many who have quit to return to
cane production. The general director of Grupo Beta claimed that the ideal is to expand
within the present zone, rather than to extend it. When a ﬁeld inspector urged an
ejidatario of Chiapa who raises cattle to convert to cane, promising to assist him by
helping him get credit to purchase a cargadora and truck, the ejidatario replied, "How
am I going to involve myself in this business, hearing the lamentations of the car'ieros?
They are suffering the black pain of the caﬁeros who work without proﬁt" . The ﬁeld
inspector for Ocotillo even offered to rent parcelas of certain cattle raisers in order to
plant sugar cane. The belief that proﬁts will encourage a return to cane production may
be wishful, since production costs at Queseria are much higher than in other zones--a
decided disincentive to producers.

In 1988-89, the year that Ingenio Queseria was privatized, the new owners predicted
the mill would process 530,000 tons of cane and 42,000 to 46,000 tons of sugar; the net
result, however, was only 367,532 tons of cane and 31,012 tons of sugar. Similarly, a
total of 500,000 tons of cane and 40,000 tons of sugar were expected in the 1990—91
harvest, but results were 470,000 tons and 38,362 tons, respectively. The record year
(since 1975) remains 1984 when, under state control, Ingenio Queseria attained a ﬁeld
yield of 75.27 tons per hectare, processing 729,156 tons of cane and 57,000 tons of

sugar (Ingenio Queseria). Inability to meet predicted objectives can not be attributed to

232

declining yields, since average yields have increased for the past two harvests:

 

Table 18. Field Yield (tons per hectare).

 

’85-86 61.94
’86-87 63.55
'87-88 50.23
'88-89 40.70
'89-90 50.20
'90-91 59.15

 

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

Whereas important efforts were made to regain yields per hectare, the three years
before privatization averaged 58.7 tons, while the three harvests after privatization
yielded an average of 50.0 tons. Even at the currently reduced number of 8020 hectares,
an additional 8.7 tons per hectare would have surpassed the goal by 39,774 tons, adding
69,774 tons of cane to the 1990-91 results. By calculating the number of hectares times
the average yield in the zone for each year, the number of tons of cane actually
processed fall short of the expected amount by: 3180 tons in 1986, 129 tons in 1987,
22,333 tons in 1988 (a total of 25,642 before privatization); 28,145 tons in 1989, 21,835
tons in 1990, and 40,990 tons in 1991 (a total of 90,970 after privatization). From the
1985-86 to the 1987-88 harvests, the average number of tons processed was 570,691;
after privatization (1988-89 to 1990-91), the average was 415,578. These ﬁgures
demonstrate that beyond the dramatic drop in number of hectares dedicated to cane
production since privatization, that substantially large areas of cane are not being
processed by the mill. This inability to process all cane in the supply zone serves as a
measure of inefﬁciency in the utilization of productive lands in the region.

The concern with productive efﬁciency in the ﬁeld begs the question of
modernization which is central to privatization policy. Blaming of the victim was evident

in a state newspaper, in which SARH called for caﬁeros in Colima to modernize or retire

233

from cane production. Failing to recognize the failure of private capital to extract the
industry from crisis, this government bureaucracy blamed traditional technology and the
$6 billion peso debt on inefﬁcient production. The subdirector of SARH indicated that:
"Producers have to understand that one thing is the price and another is industrial
management, because if the price falls, they fail to invest and care for their
crops. . .market opening is a pressure that obliges us to improve". He then gave Asmoles
as an example of the success of adequate technology! (V idaurrazaga 1991a: 1,7).

Modernization from the perspective of policy makers takes on a different cast at the
grassroots level. The peasants in the sample were asked their opinion of the national
Modernization Program; an overwhelming 47 .4% (n=97) did not know about the
modernization program. As one person queried, "It hasn’t happened, right? I didn’t
know that this happened". Another replied, "I don’t understand it because no
modernization has arrived. It is the same". The next largest group, 38.1 % said

modernization had not occurred here:

 

Table 19. Opinion of the Modernization Program (n=97).

 

Don't know 47.4%
No modernization has occurred here 38.1%
Modernization has been helpful here 11.3%
Combination 2 . 1%
Some modernization has occurred here 1.0%

 

In discussing modernization, peasants pointed out that the increasing use of
machinery destroys the soil and has diminished the availability of work. They
acknowledge that the high cost of mechanization, and the absence of government help
with such costs, puts it beyond the reach of most peasants. Their production is held back
by lack of credit. Peasants frequently stated that mechanization is not possible in the

zone because of the huge rocks in the soil and also because "I am accustomed to plant

234

in one form. The lands are very uneven, we cannot mechanize". Frequently, lack of
government support is blamed: "The government does not think about helping us. If it
does not help, it is our government, what can we do?" Others complained that
modernization only helped ejidatarios or the leaders, or the bank. The more positive
responses tended to focus on improvements such as derocking the soil, the new canals,
and the dam that was under construction in 1991. Some felt that mechanization allowed
work to progress more rapidly and created more jobs.

Aside from the social relations of production and issues of productive efﬁciency,
environmental concerns affect the supply zone of the sugar mill. Smoke, ranging from
black to yellow to white, depending on the processing phase, billows from the several
smokestacks of the mill, spreading across the sky for miles, literally competing with the
volcano in the amount of smoke exuded. Yet another area in which mill owners have
been reluctant to invest is in the installation of anti-pollution equipment. The town of
Queseria is covered with ash and dirt (the mill sits on the town plaza) and the area of the
mill itself is polluted by chemical wastes. Pollution laws continue to be conveniently
overlooked with privatization. Twelve ingenios in the country were to have been closed
in 1990 to install anti-pollution equipment, but the closings were lifted for "economic
motives" (La Voz de Michoacan 1990az4-C).

In addition to voluminous contamination by the sugar mill itself, the annual burning
of cane ﬁelds contributes more pollution to the air. As a ﬁeld burns, birds ﬂy up to
escape the blaze and small animals scurry from the ﬁelds. The burnings threaten the
vulture population which nests in the cane ﬁelds and serves as an important source of
garbage control, where such sanitary facilities are absent. The entire sky is blackened
and the ash ﬂoats down in large ﬂakes for miles, ﬁltering into the open windows of
houses. Added to the ash that accumulates in the streets, are pieces of decaying cane that

have fallen off the cane trucks as they carry their loads to the mill.

235

Older residents frequently express their disparagement over the effect of sugar cane
expansion on the local environment over the past 30 to 40 years. A peasant from
Ocotillo related that 27 years ago, when he rented land in Las Higueras, there were many
trees, mangoes, and other plants. In the rental contract, he agreed not to cut one tree.
He lamented that within 10 years of planting the land in sugar cane all the trees were
gone. Repeated burnings have destroyed trees, vegetation, dried out the soil, and
increased soil runoff. Local residents perceptibly denounced these changes:

As the situation is, as I see it, it is going to disappear. This zone is good for

the cane, but we have a tiny part. The trees, the vegetation--everything is

disappearing. Everything [was] green, green, and now there isn’t anything

because the cane is making it disappear. Now [the cane] is giving very little
result, even to the big growers. For many the sugar mill is life; for others it

is death. No longer are there trees, water, nothing. Some have to die so that

others can live.

Me, what I see bad about the cane, is that it is getting rid of the trees and the

water, they are disappearing from here. Where are the springs that still ran in

those times? There is no longer anything. The birds are no longer seen.

Before, one went to get guayabas, limes, and many wild fruits, and now, no.

I went to hunt guilotas, armadillos, and now, they are no longer seen. It burns

everything and what interest is the cane, if now everyone complains that they

are left with no money?

The cane, on burning, gets rid of almost everything-the woods, the animals,

and it is leaving the soils very arid. Ultimately, if it continues like this, we are

going to have a desert instead of the woods that we had.

In addition, caﬁeros have noted that the soil has become diseased by planting the
same cane year after year. Local peasants explain that once cane has been planted in a
ﬁeld, if the land is converted to other crops such as maize, the worms (aslome) that
infested the cane remain and destroy the new crop. The cane roots are difﬁcult to
remove, and send up new shoots among the newly planted crops. Equally adverse
conditions are affecting productivity of the factory.

Em
Like the ﬁeld, the factory is deﬁned by both social relations and level of productive

efﬁciency. Massive layoffs and a new management system contributed to poor relations

236
among mill personnel. Moreover, failure to invest in the factory had decreased
productive efﬁciency, causing critical delays in the harvest and processing of cane in
1990-91. Regardless, the mill realizes huge proﬁts in the sale of reﬁned sugar, largely
to the food processing industry.

During the harvest season, the researcher spent numerous days collecting data in the
sugar mill, particularly in the ﬁeld and accounting ofﬁces. Following massive layoffs
of personnel, ofﬁce workers were observed to be under tremendous pressure. Those
employees who remain must take on the work load of their former colleagues and are
constantly buried in stacks of paperwork. On February 7, 1991, the outside entry door
to the accounting ofﬁce was locked to prevent employees from stepping outside of the
ofﬁce. Part of the workers had been removed to another ofﬁce and those who remained
had no way to communicate with the chief ofﬁcial, since they were forbidden to leave
the room. Thirty-six employees of this ofﬁce had already lost their jobs and another
layoff was expected, yet workers did not know which ones would be selected. Entry was
gained only by passing through the factory which is noisy, ﬁlthy, and dangerous.
Workers on that day gathered to complain of their inhuman treatment and signed a
petition of protest. One worker described the mill manager as "despotic-~he’s another
Hadam Hussein".

Compounding these difﬁcult social relationships were tensions caused by technical
problems. Data emerging from the region of Ingenio Queseria indicate that the
reprivatized sugar mill is not realizing the increased efﬁciency expected with private
investment. Measurements of factory efﬁciency support the reports cited above on the
failure of private owners to invest in the mill. Lost time in the factory has increased
signiﬁcantly since privatization. From 1989 to 1990, the percent of lost time almost
doubled, reaching an all time high in 1990—91, when the mill suffered repeated delays

due to mechanical breakdowns:

 

big
(dll

237

 

Table 20. Factory Efﬁciency.

 

IAEELEEDQJELIEM:Q£! 138392111389:
'85-86 15.16% 7.88
'86-87 17.70% 8.56
'87-88 13.29% 7.87
'88-89 13.04% 8.44
'89-90 25.06% 8.12
'90-91 38.34% 7.92

 

 

(source: WV.)

The mill was closed a sum total of two months during the seven-month harvest
season due to these successive breakdowns. Some 45,000 tons of cane were left
unharvested in the ﬁelds, almost 10% of the amount processed“ (this ﬁgure is
multiplied to 1,500,000 tons at the national level, illustrating the generalized nature of
mechanically inefﬁcient mills in the country). In February, the union leader reported that
the milling equipment was working at half capacity; moreover, two of the four
evaporators were not functioning.

Factory yield, the amount of sugar produced per ton of cane, has not altered
signiﬁcantly since privatization, although private investors were committed to increase
factory efﬁciency (a record was set in 1975 , with a factory yield of 9.11). The mill
ideally should be able to extract 100 kg. of sugar from each ton of cane, giving a yield
of 10. While the overall differences compared to the state-operated mill are minimal,
factory yield at Ingenio Queseria declined each year since privatization (see Table 20).
The drop from 8.44 in 1988-89 to 7.92 in 1990-91 is signiﬁcant when applied to the

entire production zone; the difference between these two yields, .52, would result in the

 

”Since this cane represents 742.65 hectares that were unharvested, it can be assumed that some of the
higher-yielding ﬁelds were left unattended. The average yield of these ﬁelds would have been 65.93 tons
(dividing the number of tons by the number of hectares), compared to the average of 59 tons in the zone.

238
production of 2444 more tons of sugar. The mill owners support revisions to the
Decreto Caﬁero which make factory yield, rather than ﬁeld yield, the basis for
determination of the price of cane. This modiﬁcation places the economic burden of
inefﬁcient mills on the shoulders of the caﬁero. Although inefﬁcient sugar mills have
detrimental effects on the price of cane, the ﬁeld chief insisted that factory yield should
be used since "It is a business, it is necessary to have a proﬁt for the sugar mill".

Another indicator of declining factory efﬁciency is the allowable loss of sucrose
during processing of sugar. The 1980 Decreto Caﬁero guarantees that pre 1989-90 losses
in sucrose do not exceed 2.64%; according to the 1989 agreement, the private initiative
is committed to reducing this loss to a maximum of 2.5% in 1989-90 and 2.4% in 1990-
91. Only once in the ﬁve-year period has this loss not exceeded the speciﬁed limit:

1989-90 3.09%

1988-89 2.84%

1987-88 2.95%

1986-87 2.64%

1985-86 3.04%

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

While overall differences are small between the mill under state and private
ownership, the private initiative not only has not reduced this loss according to its
commitment, but losses increased from 1989 to 1990, reaching the highest point in ﬁve
years (1990—91 data were not available upon termination of the ﬁeld research). Yet
another measurement of factory efﬁciency is the number of tons of cane processed per
day for the period of the harvest. These were: 2558 tons in 1989-90, 2940 tons in
1988—89 (a mean of 2749 since privatization; the 1990—91 data were not available), 3373
in 1987-88, 3683 in 1986-87, and 3280 in 1985-86 (a mean of 3445 before privatization).
Mill capacity is 4250 tons per day.

Sugar mills are capable of producing some 125 different products from the

byproducts of sugar cane. A strategy utilized by Grupo Beta to lower its petroleum costs

239

is to run the factory on "pure bagazo". While the burning of this cane byproduct
represents a savings to private capital, it is a loss to car‘ieros who are no longer
compensated for proﬁts realized from cane byproducts. Moreover, the price of cane is
discounted for excess bagazo. Having lost access to these byproducts, caﬁeros of the
zone report that they go to the mill to purchase bagazo to feed to their own cattle. This
product was sold for animal feed at a price of $40,000 pesos per ton in 1989-90. Nor
did utilization of bagazo contribute to more efﬁcient use of petroleum, since the number
of liters of petroleum per ton of cane processed increased substantially: 21.27 in 1985-
86, 16.06 in 1986-87, 16.37 in 1987-88, 20.67 in 1988-89, and 30.17 in 1989-90
(Ingenio Queseria). Ingenio Queseria also utilizes the syrup, a byproduct of sugar
production, which is sold at $150 pesos/kg., mostly for use in cattle feed, but also for
alcoholic products such as rum. Three tanks with capacities of three, ﬁve, and eight
million liters store the liquid. Extraction is 45 kg. of molasses per ton of sugar (using
38,000 tons of sugar as a measure, this represents a proﬁt of $256,500,000 pesos). The
contradiction in mechanical deterioration of the mill and proﬁts extracted from
byproducts is not lost on caﬁeros: "In the question of the factory it is the incompetency
of them. They don’t even get out the sugar, since they bring it to the syrup stage, and
in whatever manner they earn, because they process the syrup and from there, they don’t
give anything [to the ca‘r'ieros]".

To explain the factory inefﬁciency evident in these data, both investment and
management must be considered as relevant factors. It was expected that Grupo Beta
would invest the $5 billion pesos proposed by the Reconversion Industrial to install new
boilers for the mill, but this objective had still not been accomplished in 1991. During
the 1990—91 harvest, only three of the mill’s seven boilers were working, and two had

been repaired. No investments had been made in the factory until 1990, when

240

improvements costing $680 million pesos were made.87 Irregularities in the steam
boilers and evaporators constituted the two gravest factory problems of the harvest
season, yet they were not replaced. This neglect contradicts the purchase agreement
which commits private investors to increase operating efﬁciency. Lack of investment
also conﬁnes the viability of sugar production to short-term gain. The reluctance to
invest in the sugar mill does not negate the fact that the new owners of Ingenio Queseria
inherited an antiquated, mechanically inefﬁcient mill. Although its managers under state
control were notorious for factory inefﬁciency, little improvement has been made since
privatization. Appendix C contains the translated text of one of the mill workers, who
traced mechanical problems inherited from the past.

The lack of technical expertise and inability to manage the mill provoked a rather
serious incident during the 1990-91 harvest. The mill manager insisted that a mill
worker open the door to the malfunctioning boiler (generally, the malfunction is because
the tubes that enter the boilers rupture). When the worker refused, the manager
demanded that the door be opened. The worker responded, "I will open it, but you are
going to be responsible". When the door was opened, the boiler exploded. Mill ofﬁcials
contend that $3,100,000,000 (about $1,000,000 U.S.) was planned to repair the boilers
and for general maintenance of Ingenio Queseria in 1991-92. Current efforts are to
"stabilize the mill".

By May, 1991, the situation at Ingenio Queseria was critical. A local newspaper,
in an article titled "Threat of Closing Ingenio Queseria for Being Unproﬁtable",
announced the probability of closing the mill altogether, provoking unemployment
(translated from Ochoa 1991a: l). The general director of Grupo Beta announced that

excessive imports, lack of commercialization, and the high cost of modern technology

 

"These included new pipes to bring water in to the mill, 7 barometric condensers, 5 compressors, 2
pumps for the syrup, installation of a vapor compressor for the boilers, and repair of one boiler.

241

have resulted in an absence of proﬁtability. The cost of foreign technology to upgrade
the mill would be in the neighborhood of $10-15 million (U .S.), according to another
article titled, "The Ingenio of Queseria Could Quit Functioning; It Has Not Been
Proﬁtable". Lie. Gunter explained that the mill may close its doors "...because no one
is willing to spend their money so it can function" (translated from Ruiz 1991:l).

These serious problems in the factory had severe repercussions for the cane harvest.
On February 2, 1991, some 100 trucks were observed at the mill, waiting to unload
cane. Large mounds of cane in the patio were two weeks old and cut cane in the ﬁelds
had been waiting delivery for six days. This situation persisted throughout the harvest.
By February 13, Queseria was behind 70,000 tons (130,000 tons had been processed);
the CNPP leader accused mill owners with failure to correct irregularities in the obsolete
machinery (V idaurrazaga 1991b). When one of the boilers broke down in March, 1991,
rumors spread among caﬁeros that mill ofﬁcials had claimed, "If cane is left in the ﬁelds,
it is the problem of the producers", since they already had produced sufﬁcient sugar to
meet their own needs. On April 24, the CNPP leader appeared on local television,
reporting a backlog of 226,000 tons of uncut cane; that same day, a national television
program urged caﬁeros of the nation not to abandon cane production, assuring them that
sugar mills would satisfy their processing needs. By May 9, 176 hectares remained
uncut and the mill was shut down for eight days. A total of 120,000 tons of cane
remained unprocessed on May 22 and the harvest was extended into June. Although the
union put pressure on the mill to compensate producers for this loss, leaving the cane for
the subsequent harvest will decrease yields some 20% , reduce the juice in the cane, cause
undesired root growth, and leave the cane subject to ﬁeld rats.

On June 14, one day before the rains began, Ingenio La Purr’sima, Jalisco placed an
advertisement in the Colima newspaper (Diario El Independiente 1991a) offering to

purchase cane at $70,800 per ton (the price being paid at Ingenio Queseria was $65,426).

242
The ﬁeld chief reported the 1990-91 harvest to be the worst for Queseria in 15 years,
noting "an inﬁnity of problems", along with the very grave debt owed by the mill. The
issue of factory inefﬁciency permeated discussions among cane producers in the zone:

There is less production. At any rate, not all is processed because the mill is
really screwed and it spends much time shut down. Those at the mill do not
make repairs and for this, right away it is stopped, while the cane is drying in
the ﬁelds. Then when it enters the scales if is very low in weight. The
ingenio is going bankrupt. We are no longer going to want to continue giving
the product as a gift.

They go very slow because the mill is spending much time shut down by
mechanical failures, because they no longer invest money in the mill. This is
the worst harvest ever. The others were bad, but this is the worst. Much cane
is left thrown out and the fools that have cane are going to lose.

The mill is failing; all that we arranged in the CNC is failing because the mill
is not working well.

Efﬁciency of ﬁeld and factory are interrelated. Crespo (1988) deﬁnes the overall
efﬁciency of both factory and ﬁeld as the number of tons of sugar produced per hectare
within the production zone. Using this criteria, overall efﬁciency was superior before
privatization:

1990-91
1989-90
1988-89
1987-88
1986-87
1985-86
1983-84 5.88, record year

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

#99999
00 \oe-oq
otoumm

The mean in the pre-privatization phase is 4.76, while that in the post-privatization
phase is 4.10; there is improvement, however in each of the years since privatization.

Commercialization of sugar has also become a concern of the factory, rather than
of Azricar, S.A., since privatization. Sugar output by the mill (see Table 35, page 269)
averaged 46,419 tons annually in the three years prior to privatization, and 34,206 tons
in the three years after privatization. Based on records in Ingenio Queseria, sugar sales

during a two month period, July and August 1991, include the following:

243

Ceili n misses lies.

Embotelladora de Colima, S.A. 28 1,047,000
Articulos Mundet P/Embotelladora, S.A. 21 743,300
Embotelladora de Apatzingan, S.A. 9 194,000
Embotelladora de Zamora, S.A. 4 110,000
Embotelladora de IAzaro cardenas, S.A. 1 36,000
Bimbo de Toluca, S.A. 11 390,000
Bimbo del Paciﬁco, S.A. 5 120,000
Tia Rosa Suandy, S.A. de C.V. 7 252,000
Continental de Alimentos, S.A. 10 350,000
Alimentos Findus, S.A. 4 109,000
Frexport, S.A. de C.V. 23 480,175
Siasport, S.A. 7 126,000
Comercial Terrones e Hijos 3 30,000

Segunda Dotacion dc Azricar
a Obreros Empleados Sindicales 1 55,975
Segunda Dotacion Azucarera Obreros J ubilados 2 15,600

Victor Ramon Ifrr’guez Barajas 11 195,000
Oscar Rafael Castaneda Palomino 8 92,000
Yolanda Carrillo Vergara 5 70,000
Ing. Gerardo Flores sanchez 1 20,000
Sr. J. Jesr’rs Rivera Bravo 2 20,000
Manuel Valdez Godinez 1 15,000
F vi '11 M n z _1_ 12,000
Total 163 4,483,050

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

Five different soft drink bottlers were supplied with sugar by Ingenio Queseria
(Coca-Cola and Mundet are partners in Grupo Beta). A total of 47.52% of sugar sales
in these two months was for soft drinks, 17.00% for breads and sweet snacks (Pan
Bimbo is also a partner), and 10.24% went for production of animal feeds. The nature
of three of the companies is unknown; discounting these (accounting for 14.19%),
74.76% of the sugar went to the processing industry. Individuals purchased only 9.46% ,
presumably for retail, although this is not known for fact. The price of sugar was
$1365.49/kg. in July and $1371.28/kg. in August, thus total sales for these two months
were $6,152,088,060. Production in this mill is primarily destined to proﬁt-making
industries, rather than public consumption. This chapter will now turn to the economic
effect of cane production on peasants of the zone, taking into consideration these

changing dynanrics from the pre and post-privatization phases.

244
Outcome of Liquidation

The economic results of cane production are a function of the price of cane, the
costs of production, and a series of other charges made by the sugar mill. All caﬁeros
rely on credit and are subject to interest payments. Cane producers receive two advance
payments on December 15 and March 15 to cover their production costs, which are then
deducted at the time of liquidation, generally in August. The liquidation documents they
receive are complex and will be analyzed below (see Appendix D for copies of typical
liquidation documents). Price is central to analysis of the relations of production between
capital and cane producers, yet deductions for costs of production also link caﬁeros into
a system of exploitation by the sugar mill. Total dependence on credit to cover these
costs determines that credit sets into motion the capital, and thus, labor power required
to realize the production process. The contradictions of controlled prices and increasing
costs are then analyzed in terms of the degree of debt generated among caﬁeros.
Price

The low price paid for the raw material remained a primary concern of caﬁeros in
1991. Despite the National Development Plan’s proclaimed intent to improve conditions
for low-income producers, the majority of cane producers are caught in a cost-price
squeeze. The price, contrary to free market principles, continues to be controlled by the
state. In accord with the Solidarity Pact, the price of basic products, including sugar,
is adjusted to control for inﬂation. Determination of the price of sugar cane is made in
September, 12:31:: the harvest begins, thus caiieros are not compensated for inﬂation
which accrues between September and liquidation the following August.

In September, 1990, Grupo Beta was working with SARH and the Secretaria de
Comercio to obtain a higher price for cane and for sugar. It is in the interests of Grupo
Beta to assure a better price to car‘ieros, according to mill ofﬁcials. Ing. Gunter quipped,

"Rich car'rero, mill without problems; poor car‘iero, mill with problems". Ing. Gunter

245
criticizes the government’s control of the price, explaining that the government views the
private investors as taking advantage. The ﬁeld superintendent for Ingenio Queseria
judged a 40% increase in price to be in order for the 1990-91 harvest; the proposed
26.9% increase, he claimed, would be hard on car‘ieros. These statements would seem
to contradict the generally held belief that the private initiative inﬂuences the government
to keep the price of cane low.

To calculate the price paid for cane, the price per kg. of standard sugar at the
national level is multiplied by the percentage of the average sugar yield within each
supply zone (i.e. , at the regional level), the product of which is multiplied by the tons
delivered to the mill by each individual cane producer. The prices in the zone of

Queseria have been:

 

Table 21. Annual Price Increases for Sugar Cane (per ton).

 

_ca_Y 1‘ mi 11mm IareLcﬂnﬂation
1990-91 $ 65,426.28 36.48% 23.87%“
1989-90 $ 47,938.83 10.73% 38.95%
1988-89 5 43,292.98 61.93% 20.20%
1987-88 5 26,735.75 130.49% 119.56%
1986-87 5 11,599.73 112.28% 132.48%
1985-86 5 5,464.343 - 87.57%

 

At the national level, a 140% increase was obtained for 1987-88, 55% in 1988-89,
and 13.88% in 1989-90 (Twnbando Caﬂa 1990 (20):19; 1988 (l3):2; 1988 (13):4). As
seen in Chapter VII, producers demanded a 100% increase in the price of cane for the
1990-91 season. They received an increase of 26.9% over the previous year, insufﬁcient

to cover rising costs of production. The ofﬁcially approved increase would have

 

”Inﬂation rates are based on the consumer price index for the city of Colima, provided by Banco de
México, Indicadores Economicos, May 1991. The 1990-91 rate of inﬂation is based on incomplete data,
ending April, 1991, thus the April 1991 rate was compared to the April 1990 rate.

246

represented a price of $60,834.375 per ton. The price actually paid in the zone of
Queseria, however, was $65,426.28, based on a net yield of 9.24 determined for the
zone. The differential effect of a 26.9% increase, versus the price actually paid, was
calculated for 24 caﬁeros in the two research villages. The results show a net difference
of $1,977,366 pesos; the average proﬁt for caﬁeros in the research communities would
have declined from $9,548,842 to $8,413,930 pesos had the 26.9% increase been
utilized. This price increase explains the greater proﬁts and consequential decrease in
number of producers with debts relative to the previous year when costs, on average,
exceeded the price of cane.

The price of sugar cane is mediated by deductions for accidentally burned cane, cane
delivered late, and extraneous material delivered with the cane; these discounts cut into
potential proﬁts. Accidental burnings, prior to order by the mill, are common. Even
without accidents, if cane transportation cannot be arranged and cane is delivered late,
it is discounted. When cane is burned without order from the mill, it is discounted 10%
if delivered after 48 hours, and 20% if delivered after 72 hours, in accordance with
Article 9 of the Decreto Caﬁero. After another period of 24 hours the cane is not
accepted for processing (although it is often accepted in practice). In 1990—91, 44,855
tons of cane were accidentally burned; 4,449 tons were discounted (ﬁeld superintendent,
personal interview). Ejidatarios, unlike private landowners, do not own their own
transport equipment. Drivers of the cane trucks have reported that accidentally burned
cane of ejidatarios is often cut and delivered late and then discounted, whereas that of
private landowners is always harvested and entered into the mill on time, without
discounts.

Cane is also discounted for "garbage"--dirt, rocks, extra foliage, etc., as speciﬁed
in Article 11 of the Decreto Caﬁero. Although evaluation is supposed to be based on a

physical sample of the cane, the amount of garbage is subjectively evaluated when the

247
truck arrives at the scales to be weighed. Upon this visual estimation by experienced
mill personnel, the percentage of foreign material per ton is discounted, in accordance
with the price per ton. UNPCARM argued in 1988 that these discounts to the value of
the cane should not be applied in any mill, for they render negative economic results to
the producer. The small difference between gross and net weight of the cane in
calculating the price paid can mean the difference between a small proﬁt and debt.

In 1991, due to negotiations between caﬁeros and mill personnel, caﬁeros were
credited for cane that was not harvested or delivered due to mechanical inefﬁciency of
the mill. Whereas cafreros were paid for cane left in the ﬁelds, they were still charged
all production costs incurred during the year. These costs will now be analyzed.

9.0515

Because the price of sugar is kept low by government subsidies and costs of
production have soared, an increasing proportion of producers are indebted to the mill.
Since 1987-88, the rate of increase in costs of production has outpaced increases in the
price paid for cane. In 1988-89, cane producers received a 55% increase in price at the
national level; costs of production rose 87%. In 1989-90, a price increase of 13% was
granted; costs again rose some 55%. Actual costs of production in the research region
were $49,507 pesos per ton, surpassing the price of $47,938.85 per ton. Fertilizer alone
rose from $281,000 pesos per ton in 1987 to $402,000 pesos in 1989 (a 43% increase),
then to $594,000 in 1990 (a 48% increase), according to FERTIMEX. By 1990-91,
average production costs were reported to be $70,000, although the cost of seeding new
cane was substantially higher, $85,000 pesos.

According to rates charged by Ingenio Queseria, the cost of cane cultivation per
hectare for new cane (plantas) was $2,905,325 in 1991; this cost represents a 31.43%
increase over the previous year. The cafiero is charged 60% of the capital the ﬁrst year,

25% the second year, and 15% the third year; interest is charged at 100% of the capital

248
in each of these three successive years. Cultivation costs for plantas include preparation
of soil, planting, cultivation, opening paths between ﬁelds, and the cost of inputs.”
These costs do not include an additional $234,500 for irrigated cane, nor the cost of the
harvest. The cost for established cane (socas and resocas) is $1,159,175 pesos per
hectare, a 40.83% increase over the 1990 cost.

Data derived from liquidation documents of all caﬁeros in the two research villages
(n=59),"0 are based on percentages of the total costs of production, minus advance
payments and loans. The sugar mill calculates the cost of machinery and labor for
cultivation and the cost of fertilizer on a per hectare basis. Other charges in the
liquidation document are calculated by the ton: cutting, loading, transport, UNPCA
payments for harvest, medical and social security beneﬁts. Yet other costs are calculated
on the number of jomales, or daily wages for labor; these include the guardacorte and
other hired labor. These various means of calculation obfuscate analysis of trends.
Thus, unless otherwise noted, costs are given per ton. The following table provides data
on each cost, as a proportion of the total costs of production, and compares these costs

before and after privatization of the mill:

 

”Cane ﬁelds are fertilized twice with one application of 500 kg. of the formula 2010-10 and one 300
kg. application of Urea per hectare; herbicides of 2 kg. Karmex or Ditox-800, 2 liters of Esteron-47, and
one liter of Surfacante are applied. After the harvest, ﬁelds are again fertilized with 700 kg. of 20-10-10,
as well as another dose of herbicides of either a) 2 kg. Karmex or Ditox-800, b) 3 kg. Gesapax-SO and 2.5
liters Esteron-47, or c) 5 liters Gesapax H-375. Insecticides are utilized as well to combat soil plague,
either manually, or sprayed by plane.

g"Several caﬁeros receive liquidations documents for multiple parcels, for example, one private
landowner rents or owns 13 parcels, and one ejidatario also rents two other parcels. Each liquidation
document is analyzed as a separate case.

249

 

Table 22. Costs of Production Before and After Privatization.

 

Before After

Privgt'gatign Privgtgat' ion
Transport of cane 27.3% 16.1%
Machinery and labor 21.7% 27.3%
Fertilizer 12.7% 14.3%
Field labor 8.4% 10.3%
Cutting 6.5% 6.5%
Loading cane 6.2% 3.8%
Deductions (loans, taxes) 5.7% 12.3%
Derocking soil 4.5% 2.9%
Cutter costs 3.8% 4.4%
Benefits 2.6% 1.7%
UNPCA .7% 1.0%

 

Before privatization of Ingenio Queseria (1986-88), the largest single cost of
production was transport of cane to the mill. Since privatization (1989-91), the major
portion of costs is absorbed by machinery and labor for cultivation (avfo). After
transport, machinery and cultivation formed the largest proportion of costs in the pre-
privatization phase, followed by fertilizer, also the third largest expense since
privatization. Interest is for short-term credit, while the deductions include both capital
and interest on outstanding loans. Beneﬁts received by caﬁeros are discounted at the
time of liquidation. FIOSCER, founded in 1971, provided many beneﬁts (potable water,
electricity, roads, schools, housing, community projects, etc.) until it was eliminated in
1988; deductions for F IOSCER continued to appear on liquidation documents in 1990-91.
FIMAIA was established to aid caﬁeros in acquiring machinery and trucks to transport
cane. Caﬁeros also pay premiums (at reduced rates) on medical beneﬁts, IMSS (social
security), life insurance, and bags of sugar. From 1986 to 1990, overall costs of

production and harvest increased at the rates indicated:

250

 

Table 23. Annual Increase in Costs of Production and Harvest.

 

Sagas _a_tas_Pl II
'86-87 64.08% 51.80%
'87-88 94.39% 112.95%
’88-89 90.08% 84.66%
'89-90 66.54% 39.54%

'90-91 - -

 

 

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)
These costs of production include substantial interest rates, since all cane producers

rely on credit. Interest, as a proportion of total costs, averaged (n=59):

1986 10.3%
1987 14.8%
1988 18.2%
1989 12.4%
1990 19.9%
1991 15.9%

Combining data for the two periods results in an average interest rate of 14.43%
before, and 16.07% after privatization. The proportional increase in costs for machinery
and cultivation is relevant to the mill’s attempt to promote new cane varieties. Credit
for new cane is repaid at higher interest rates than for cane after the ﬁrst cutting. From

1986 to 1991, these rates diverge dramatically:

 

Table 24. Interest Rates on Machinery and Cultivation.

 

Sagas mam
'85-86 25.6% 60.5%
'86-87 54.4% 91.8%
'87-88 60.3% 126.6%
'88-89 27.8% 115.6%
'89-90 38.8% 89.1%
'90-91 29.0% 67.3%

 

Similarly, interest rates on fertilizer are less favorable for newly planted cane:

251

 

Table 25. Interest Rates on Fertilizer.

 

Sims Man
’85-86 31.7% 57.9%
'86-87 48.7% 95.3%
'87-88 59.4% 95.7%
'88-89 18.6% 55.3%
'89-90 42.8% 113.0%
'90-91 24.2% 54.9%

 

The highest rates of interest charged on costs of production are for derocking the
soil. These averaged: 206.6% in 1986, 233.1% in 1988, 209.2% in 1990, and 253.3%
in 1991. The lowest single rate identiﬁed was 50.2% in 1990, whereas interest rates
have reached as high as 536.7% in 1991. No charges were made in 1987 and 1989.

Interest rates charged to car'ieros are not to exceed the rates of CETES (treasury
certiﬁcates which have determined interest rates since 1990) speciﬁed by the government.
In 1986, when interest rates were determined by the Average Percentage Cost (CPP), the
maximum allowable rate was between 31.5 and 32.5% until April, after which it
increased to 76.26% for planting, fertilizer, and infrastructure (refaccionario) and

81.03% for machinery and labor (avto). Maximum allowable rates for all years were:

mm WM bin or
1987 83.43% 88.65%
1988 42.65% 44.65%
1989 41.55% 43.05%
1990 29.96% 31.96%

In most years, then, the rates charged appear to exceed the allowable amount. An
ofﬁcial of FINA was asked why certain interest rates exceed these amounts. He replied,
"This can’t be. This is a very delicate matter if the sugar mill charges a rate higher than
Financiera is paying". The mill is obligated to charge the same rate to caﬁeros that it
pays to the credit institution. Average costs per ton, based on liquidation documents

from all caﬁeros (n=59 cases) in the research communities are presented:

252

 

Table 26. Costs of Production in the Zone of Ingenio Queseria.

 

Avio
Fertilizer
Cutting
Loading
Transport
Guardacorte
Harvest
Derocking
Payments
Benefits
Union

1985-86
Cost/Ton % Total
5 1,026 22.3%
s 430 9.3%
s 340 7.4%
s 279 6.1%
$ 1,287 28.0%
s 401 8.7%
s 138 3.0%
s 377 7.3%
s 274 6.0%
s 26 .6%
s 27 .6%

1986-87
Qgngon % T9@
5 1,607 19.4%
s 999 12.1%
s 517 6.2%
s 533 6.4%
3 2,289 27.7%
s 707 8.6%
s 359 4.3%
s 333 4.0%
s 544 6.6%
s 332 4.1%
s 57 .7%

1987-88
Cost/Ton % Total
5 4,467 22.3%
$ 3,372 16.8%
$ 1,157 5.8%
$ 1,219 6.1%
$ 5,285 26.4%
$ 1,608 8.0%
$ 825 4.1%
$ 454 2.3%
$ 917 4.6%
s 603 3.0%
s 134 .7%

 

 

253

 

Table 26 (cont’d).

 

1988-89 1989-90 1990-91
Cost/Tm Zo Tgtal Cost/Ton Zn Tgtgl QgngQn Zn Tm]
Avio $ 14,287 29.6% $ 15,943 29.3% 5 15,691 23.1%
Fertilizer S 11,284 23.4% 5 4,783 8.8% 5 7,264 10.7%
Cutting 5 2,390 5.0% $ 4,157 7.7% $ 4,667 6.9%
Loading $ 1,882 3.9% $ 2,040 3.8% $ 2,556 3.8%
Transport $ 7,986 16.5% $ 8,648 15.9% $ 10,779 15.9%
Guardacorte $ 5,641 11.7% $ 5,451 9.8% $ 6,447 9.5%
Harvest $ 1,910 4.0% $ 3,484 6.4% $ 1,822 2.7%
Derocking - - 5 2,375 4.4% 5 2.954 4.4%
Payments $ 1,701 3.5% $ 6.497 11.5% $ 14,511 21.4%
Benefits $ 1,022 2.1% $ 846 1.6% S 875 1.3%
Union $ 216 .5% $ 240 .4% S 327 .5%

 

The combination of data from the pre and post-privatization periods indicate
increases in the percentage of costs paid by car'ieros for machinery and cultivation,
fertilizer, cutting, harvest labor, UNPCA costs for harvest, payments, and interest on
current loans, entailing some of the greatest costs of production. Decreased costs are
found for loading cane, transport, derocking, beneﬁts, and union dues; of these, only
transport represents a substantial portion of the production costs. These changes have
thus proved disfavorable to cane producers.

The total value of cane produced in the region in 1990-91 was $34,512,071,834
pesos, while costs of production (including advance payments) amounted to
$31,495,770,233, or 91.26% of the value of the cane. A total of $3,331,438,358 was
paid to car‘ieros in net proﬁts, while a debt of $5,317 ,940,890 remained owed by caﬁeros
of the zone. Of 1323 caﬁeros tabulated,91 764, or 58% received net proﬁts and 559,

or 42 % , owed debts at the end of the year (Ingenio Queseria). The increasing extraction

 

"117 car‘reros remain unaccounted for because results do not indicate the nature of consolidation of
accounts; this occurs when charges or credits are applied to another account.

254
of surplus value from peasant producers is clear in analysis of liquidation documents.
Total costs, as a percentage of value of cane delivered to the mill have now made
production of this basic product untenable, having risen from 74.6% in 1985-86 to

94.9% in 1990-91, with an all time high of 108.5% in 1989-90:

 

Table 27. Changing Costs of Production (per ton, n=59).

 

Costs of Costs as a Percentage
Productig f th V l f 92

'85-86 8 4,075.30 74.6%

'86-87 5 7,910.82 68.2%

'87-88 $ 18,799.35 70.2%

'88-89 $ 46,469.06 108.5%

'89-90 5 49,507.17 103.3%

'90-91 5 61,102.05 94.9%

 

Only since privatization have costs of production, on the average, superseded the
value of cane. Costs absorbed 71 % of the value of cane, overall, during the three years
prior to privatization, whereas in the three years following privatization they absorbed

102%, creating a net debt.

 

”These data are calculated using the actual value of industrialized cane given in the liquidation
document.

255

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

IProﬁls ICosts +Percantwllh09bts

Figure 7. Costs of Cane Production as a Percentage of the Value of Cane.

The liquidation document received by car'reros is extremely complex and difﬁcult to
interpret (refer to Appendix D). The average educational level of caﬁeros (n =33) is 3.18
years, and many are illiterate (12.1% have no formal education). Moreover, beginning
in 1990-91, a new category, "consolidation of accounts", was added to the document,
obfuscating analysis. When added to the income credit section, this item represents
earnings from a different document, applied to the document in question. When added
to the costs, it represents earnings from the current document applied to another account.
Thus, the balance (proﬁt or loss) often shows a sum of "0". This strategy prevents large
car'ieros who work numerous parcels from collecting on some parcels, while they owe
debts on others. This researcher found only one caﬁero who had attempted to analyze
his liquidation documents--the former mayordomo of Hacienda Chiapa. The remainder

rarely save these documents. Even an astute car'rera who serves on the union board and

256

is knowledgeable and articulate about cane matters had not understood her liquidation
documents, keeping them tucked away in odd sewing machine drawers, bureaus, etc.
She remarked, "In the liquidation there are so many numbers that we don’t understand
and here they make their discounts to us". Without an understanding of these
documents, car‘ieros are unable to question and challenge the charges made to them.
Lass

Given spiraling costs of production, the number of producers indebted to the mill
at the end of the harvest is increasing. Five years ago, 19% of producers (n=1532)
owed debts at the end of the harvest; by 1990, the proportion had increased to 53%
(n= 1458):

 

Table 28. Proportion of Caﬁeros Within the
Production Zone Owing Debts to the Mill.

 

’85-86 31% '
’86-87 19% '
'87-88 26% ‘
’88-89 44% '
’89-90 53% '
'90-91 50% ”

 

i‘based on 100% of the production zone
l’based on a 2% sample of the production zone
(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)
The upward spiral in debts was particularly marked in 1988-89 (the year the mill
was privatized), more than doubling the number from the previous year. As the
proportion of caﬁeros owing debts to the mill increases, the amount owed as a percentage

of income credit (value of cane, seed cane, and other credits for delivery of the raw

material), shows signiﬁcant increases since privatization:

 

257

 

Table 29. Proportion of Net Debt and Proﬁt
Relative to Income Credit (n=59).

 

Debt 93 Profit“ Mgn mm
'85-86 14.3% 12.2% $ 193,715
'86-87 1.8% 15.3% s 395,409
'87-88 25.5% 13.3% $ 690,654
'88-89 39.7% 14.5% 5 3,572,774
'89-90 29.4% 9.6% $ 6,495,860
'90-91 35.8% 27.5% $15,785,422

 

A comparison of the debt relative to income credit reveals an average of 13.87%
before privatization and 34.97% after privatization; likewise, the relative proportion of
proﬁt to income credit was 13.6% and 17.2%, respectively. Thus, the substantial
weight of debt by far surpasses the capacity of many cane producers for capital
accumulation.

The total debt increased from $1,700,000,000 in 1989 to $4,600,000,000 in 1990
(at the national level, the debt reached $700,000,000,000). By the end of the 1990-91
harvest, the car‘iero debt for the entire zone of Queseria was $6,000,000,000 pesos.
Individual caﬁeros saw themselves bound to a system of debt obligations that required
them to continue cane production; as expressed by one caﬁero, "[The owners] leave the
caﬁero to one side. They aren’t concerned about anything, if one has no debt. If one
has a debt, they are interested that you pay". The debts of car'ieros were to be
restructured over a period of three to six years, requiring some car'ieros to forgo
liquidation in order to pay off their loans. Approximately 70 % of the producers at
Ingenio Queseria were to have their loans restructured. One of the more bitter car'reros

appraised the rising debt in the region: "In the sugar mill they are fucking and fucking.

 

”These data are calculated by dividing total charges by total income credit for each producer.

S"These data are calculated by dividing net payment received by total income credit.

258

Who is going to want to continue if instead of earnings one has a mountain of debt?”
A comisariado ejidal reﬂected, "Now they are abandoning the cane because if you owe
twenty-ﬁve million, for the next year it is going to double; what kind of joke is this?"

Rising debts raise the question of whether economic insolvency is, in fact, attributed
to inefﬁcient production practices on the part of caﬁeros. A frequent criticism is leveled
at these producers for failing to invest in planting new cane, which results in low yields.
Data provided by Ingenio Queseria suggest that variety and age of cane are minimally
related to outcome of liquidation. Cane classiﬁed as "plantas" (new cane planted in
1988, n=7) had an average yield of 68.57 tons per hectare, "socas" (planted in 1987,
n=7) yielded an average of 54.29 tons, "resocas" (planted in 1986, n=2) yielded 21.21
tons, resocas (planted in 1985, n=5) yielded 50.00 tons, resocas (planted in 1984, n=2)
yielded 42.5 tons, and resocas (planted in 1983 or previously, n=21) yielded 60.24 tons.
These data are based on all cane parcels in the research villages, all of which are rainfed.
All except two cases were variety Mex 54-81, although the two MEX 69-290 cases alone
averaged 80 tons, higher than the mean of 68.57 reported for that group. Thus, the
highest yields do accrue to new cane, yet the second highest yields are for the oldest
group. The bankruptcy which forces cafreros out of cane production does not necessarily
derive from inefﬁcient production methods utilized by producers. As one car‘iero who
planted cane for the ﬁrst time in 1984 explained:

Since I planted cane in the parcela, there have been six cuttings and nothing,

not one cent divided in half has been left for me. At ﬁrst I was thinking, and

the guardacortes asked me why I didn’t have anything left. I paid the debt and

I waited, and nothing. This last year I said, "I am going to work the cane and

take care of it, well for this, I have had no proﬁt". I cared for it, I put all the

fertilizer, I cultivated, I did all the labor. The tons increased. There was

more than before, but my debt doubled. Finally I was left with a debt, or

really I don’t know how the sugar mill does it, so that at any rate, one is left

with no more than pure debt.

An ex—car'iero, when asked why so many caﬁeros have debts, replied:

This is what I would like to know. The one who has most wants more and he

259
doesn’t care, being full, that the rest die. Well for this ambition of theirs we
can perish, much of humanity, and so here, the one who is well does not
know of the one who has hunger. Ultimately, the mill itself can take away
our lands for the debts. Lazaro Cardenas came to give lands, but it seems that

another arrives that wants to repossess them. In the end, not paying it, ﬁnally
they come and conﬁscate my house, and ultimately, I am left in the street.

Peasant Evaluation of the Transformation of Production

Given these conditions, cane producers have clearly and unequivocally rejected the
change in ownership of the sugar mill. The chapter concludes with an analysis of
peasant ideology with respect to the impact of state divestment and reprivatization of the
sugar industry. Ethnographic analysis demonstrates that this ideology represents widely
shared cultural meanings, constructed to contest the weakening of the distributive power
of the peripheral state and the increasing exploitation by the capitalist industry, as
relations of production are vertically inserted into an increasingly internationalized system
of production.

The peasant struggle against the private owners of the mill is peculiarly colored by
the fact that 75% (n=97) of peasants interviewed did not know who Grupo Beta was.
When asked who purchased the sugar mill, another 18% gave vague responses such as,
"they are not from here", "foreigners", "industrialists", "the rich", "powerful",
"caciques", "three people from Monterrey", "a cookie industry", or that they use
"prestanombres" (false names to conceal their identity). Five percent of the sample
identiﬁed the owners in more speciﬁc terms: "sons of de la Madrid", "Lino" (the largest
cane producer in the zone and leader of the CNPP), "Banco Comercio", "La Marina"
(a large department store in Colima), "Coke, Pepsi, Sidral, and AGA". No one could
correctly identify members of the consortium that make up Grupo Beta. One peasant
doubted that a transfer in ownership had taken place: "It has masked our eyes. It could

be this fake name but I don’t think so. It could be the same government and it is using

A

260
a borrowed name in order to change the rules. I am in doubt that they sold it" . These
misconceptions do not conceal a profound animosity on the part of car'ieros toward Grupo
Beta. Peasant ideology materializes in a discourse that makes explicit the threat of
exploitation by the new private owners:
It does not pay much for the cane. This is the principal thing. It is private.

It should return to the hands of the government. Now the owners are private;
it is not like before.

The private group, they are those who have some control outside of the ejido.
We have this huge debt. They don’t let us earn. When it belonged to the
government it was better; now, we are going to the grave.

[The new owners] aren’t from here and they are going to take the money and
grab the money and leave the people here more screwed.

It is not good that it has changed ownership. Now only one is going to earn,
the most cleaver [the sugar mill].

These [owners] are rich, and of what importance are the poor caiieros to
them? They have their ideas of how to grab money.

Even the pequeﬁos propietarios with much equipment are rejecting it. The
government always worked better. No one complained. The people had
friends with them. It is hard now in the sugar mill. These have been here
two harvests. When they bought [the mill] they said it was going to be better,
but it is worse.

The proﬁts of the sugar mill fall to other hands and not to the state. It is not
good because I notice that in these times, the cane is cleaned out of the ﬁelds.

Since the change, nothing more than problems. They are private, these ones.
For the caiieros it is bad because very little cane is cut.

They began to want no more than to make bucks for themselves. Since three

years ago, the worse, for the sale of sugar mills by the government itself.

The private owners are also loosing.

A common thread in these commentaries is that the mill is now private, not public,
and the private capitalists have very different objectives than did the State. Yet, it is
important to recognize the diversity of opinion among caﬁeros. While most hold negative

attitudes toward the private owners, some are highly critical of the sugar mill when it

was under government control. One of the largest private landowners, who controlled

261
hundreds of hectares of cane until he abandoned production in 1989, expounded:

Everything was good until the government of Diaz Ordaz. Before, it paid,
when it was private, the sugar mill was very good. When it was private, they
brought in very good people, people that knew the work, that knew what they
were doing. In the government of Echeverria, the government grabbed the
sugar mill and from then on, I saw that our country of the regime of
Echeverria, since then, we have sunk to the bottom. We have gone into
bankruptcy. The losses I began to have when the mill passed to the hands of
the government. Then the mill changed a lot, because the government did not
learn how to manage it. All the people placed in enterprises of the
government, only enter to rob; not to work, but to enrich themselves from it,
and the ﬁrm went down. In my manner of thinking, the government should
not have even one enterprise.

When it passed to the hands of the government, there was pure favoritism.

They brought in the compadre, the relative, the friend, only in order to make

themselves rich, but not because they knew the cane. All those that they

placed there, pure scoundrels, pure bandits. It began to hire people that
dedicated themselves to nothing but robbery. Then, they ordered us to burn

the cane, in order to rob us; they robbed us in the scales, they robbed us in

the yield. They dedicated themselves to pure robbery, to become

multimillionaires, all of them. Thus, the sugar mill could not sustain itself.

Me, on seeing how much they robbed me and how much I suffered, I retired

as a car‘iero. I abandoned it two years ago [1989]. These who bought the

[mill] have been here two years. Who knows how they are. Me, no longer,

I don’t know anything. I have quit.

The fact that the mill was transferred to persons unknown to the peasants of the
region is compounded by the fact that the sale took place without consulting cane
producers--the suppliers of raw material to the mill. The sale thus left car'ieros with a
sense of powerlessness: "I don’t know the motive, only suddenly, it changed owners.
They were decisions of the government itself. The peasants couldn’t say anything"; "It
wasn’t even known when the other people entered, they didn’t publish anything; they did
it very secretively".

When asked their opinion on the sale of Ingenio Queseria, 96% of the sample
(n= 100) replied that the sale was bad. Only one person stated that the sale was good,
one claimed it was a mixture of good and bad, and the other two said that the mill was
the same since the sale. Most peasants, 63 % , would prefer that the mill were still owned

by the state; 24% prefer that it were owned by UNPCA, and 9 % said that it should

 

262
continue to be operated by the present owners. The following quote expresses the desire
for the mill to be operated by the cafreros themselves: "All of the ejidos united should
buy the sugar mill, working together. If we were owners, with the energy of all of us,
as producers of prime quality material, the taxes would lower".

Asked to explain why Ingenio Queseria was sold, the majority, 62%, replied that
the sale was a result of government action. Contributing factors that they identiﬁed
included: the government was losing or going bankrupt, there was bad administration
and corruption under government control, labor demands and strikes forced it to sell, the
government had overemployed and oversubsidized the industry, it did not maintain the
mill well, and sold it to rid itself of problems, to improve the mill, to promote sugar
exports, or to pay the national debt. Most spoke disparagingly as they attempted to
explicate why the mill was privatized. Peasants demonstrated acute awareness of the
place of its privatization in the global context:

Two years ago the government tried to sell all the companies. Perhaps it is

better for the government, but the government got rid of all this responsibility.

All the sales of businesses are not enough to pay the debts. The money

belongs to the nation, all those of the nation lose.

They wanted bucks when they sold it to pay the debt to the United States.

Echeverri’a and Lopez Portillo asked the United States for credit--the nation

was sold. When are they going to pay the debt?

According to most informants, the sale of the mill closely correlates with the crisis

in the cane sector:

 

Table 30. Initiation of the Crisis in the Cane Sector (n=95).

 

Began when the mill was sold 70.5%
Predates sale of the mill 23.2%
Predates sale, but is worse since 3.2%
Do not know 3.2%

 

Many, however, claim the crisis predates the sale, although a few who believe it

263
began before the sale state that it has worsened since privatization of the mill:

Since the moment that the private ones grabbed the sugar mill, one hears the
lament of the cai'ieros.

The car‘ieros were ruined with this change.

There were various things that affected it: ﬁrst, the car'ieros asked for money
to do the labor and they didn’t do it. It has sharpened since the sale, because
these owners are more demanding and they do not help the caﬁero like the
government did.

Since the sale of the sugar mill, they bring new ideas about using more
mechanical lifters and they push to the side the cane harvesters and bring indian
cutters that are more assholes and they fuck them more. They discount the
money that the cutters are owed, those who kill themselves most working-mot
those who are sitting and writing with typewriters and being assholes.

[The crisis began] two years ago. Before, many people were maintained by the
cane. Whatever person received his millions. And now, nothing. [With] the
crisis, simply, there is no work.

It is now three harvests that the cafieros only go around crying because they are
left with no money.

[The crisis began] ﬁve years ago, because the managers began to rob. The
government has interest in helping us, but it puts in people that rob one and
only see their own proﬁts and they don’t care if the caﬁero is fucked.

The researcher enquired who they thought was to blame for the crisis in the cane

sector, deriving the following results:

 

Table 31. Blame For the Crisis in the Cane Sector (n=97).

 

Private owners 27%
Low cane price and high production costs 25%
Government 22%
Labor issues (loss of work, new labor demands) 11%
Other 15%

 

Those who blamed the new owners for the crisis criticized the lack of administrative
ability, corruption, personnel layoffs (especially knowledgeable and skilled workers),

exploitation of caﬁeros, imposition of more costly ﬁeld techniques, discounts to cane, the

264
low price of cane, lack of aid to caﬁeros, and the capitalists’ primary objective of making
proﬁts at their expense. Those who said the government was responsible mentioned bad
administration, corruption, overemployment, oversubsidation, setting low prices,
discounting cane, and caﬁero debts.

While the current ideology focuses on the deteriorating economic position of caﬁeros
with privatization, it draws on historical understandings. For example, one cane leader
likened the current situation to the system of debt peonage and the tienda dc raya of the
former haciendas. A synthesis of other commentaries evokes an ideology that is
generalized among cafieros in the zone of Ingenio Queseria:

The private group is allied with the government. These associates are going

to work in other ways; they are caciques. The car‘ieros are going down, they

are going to throw out the peasants. . .. The government and the private owners

have agreements-~the government defends the private initiative. There is an

anomaly; the new owners are against the peasant. They don’t want to give
good prices. They don’t let us proﬁt. What advantage to we have? The sugar

mill wants to take out the eyes of the peasant... The caﬁero is the servant of

the sugar mill; he is worse than the peon, for him, after eight days, they pay

him.... I don’t know what the government wants to do. What plan does it

have? Now it is pure loss in the cane. Never are we going to get out of debt.

If we continue, we cut our own throats. But if we quit, also. Where are we

going?. .. All the people that manage the industries are foreigners. All the

money that they make leaves for outside, and the people here are going to be
screwed. Now one hears talk of privatizing the ejido, no longer are there
going to be lands for peasants. For this, we are going to return to the times

of the Porﬁriato.... The government is going to want to sell even the pe0ple

with the territory, like Santa Ana did.

Given the pervasive nature of negative evaluations of the mill since privatization,
it is not surprising that, when asked to identify any advantages associated with
reprivatization, 92 % answered that there were no advantages. The other eight percent
mentioned factors such as: it would contribute to sugar exports and market growth; new,
more professional personnel had been hired; corruption had ended; the stricter
requirements were better; it created more jobs; cane was paid better; insurance was given
by the mill; the harvest was proceeding well; and cutters received more fringe beneﬁts.

Responses concerning the disadvantages of the sale were copious:

265

 

Table 32. Disadvantages of the Sale of the Sugar Mill
(percent that gave each response, n =96 respondents).

 

Caneros earn less, bankruptcy, and debts 98.9%
Many are quitting cane production 74.0%
Strict regulations for cutting, cane quality,

discounts to cane 47.9%
Low price for cane, high costs 37.5%
New owners do not help with loans, costs, inputs 33.3%
Mill unrepaired, cane not processed 28.1%
Cutters earn less, receive fewer benefits 22.9%
Less work in cane, factory layoffs 18.8%
New owners only want profits 14.6%
Loss of caﬁero benefits, sugar 13.5%
Increased interest rates 5.2%
Increased price of sugar 5.2%
New owners are bad, rob caﬁeros 4.2%
Environmental damage 2.1%
Bribes and corruption 1.0%
Private capitalists do not understand caﬁero problems 1.0%
More political problems 1.0%
Cane is now being rented out 1.0%
No disadvantages 1.0%

 

The data demonstrate that the predominant issues are loss of proﬁts and debt, due
to rising costs and a low price for the product, abandonment of cane, new demands
placed on producers and laborers by the private management, and failure of the
management to invest in the factory or ﬁnancially support producers in the process of
production. It is through the rich discourse that emerged in interviews that the
profundity of these problems is brought to light:

Now, there is less production. The parcelas are bald. Before, the car'iero

worked the cane because he knew he was going to be left with earnings. Now,

it is better to rent because one knows beforehand that there is going to be no

money left; on the contrary, debts. They give the order to burn, and [the cane]

remains 10 days. The mill works slow. The caﬁero is not to blame when the

mill has irregularities. The ﬁelds are paralyzed. All the peasants are screwed

with the discounts. In place of proﬁt, one is screwed.

No longer is the government going to subsidize and we are going to be left
without money. The price is very low; everything rises, the cane cutter, the

266

fertilizer, and the cane, the same price. The caﬁero is left with pure debt.
Now it is pure loss in the cane because the sugar mill and those of the CNC
only try to rob the most they can. He who continues with the cane is never
going to get out of debt. Before, it even provided enough to sustain one, and
now, we are like the barzon.” [The government] had more interest in one
earning, even if it was little. These [new owners] are going to want to beneﬁt
themselves for their own enjoyment.

We have the idea of abandoning the cane that corresponds to the ampliacion
and putting cattle there. If they cut, they are going to have a great loss. The
government treats us like the song "El Barzon" . We work hard for the
government and the government makes us long bills with so many increases in
the fertilizer. And when we settle accounts, we end up owing it, but like the
"barzon", it says to us, don’t worry--here is the land; keep working.

Now the peasants are left with pure debt. If the sugar mill gives them ten
pesos, it takes away twenty. Because these owners come to do business and
extract the most possible. They don’t care if the car'ieros don’t earn. Some
owe 70 million; now they are sold to the sugar mill.

Before the caﬁeros had two or three million or more left over. Now, they are
left with two or three million in debts. The one that is earning is the sugar
mill. Those of the mill rob, fuck the cafrero. They are going to discount [the
cane], and why? Because more is left for them. It is pure tricks on their part.

It is not the same. Before, they gave a little bit of proﬁt to whatever parcela
owner. Now, they have debts of three or four million. From this has come
the bankruptcy of the car‘ieros. Many people maintained them selves and now
it is exploitation. If the mill does not grind what it was grinding, if it doesn’t
achieve the rhythm of before, how many are going to abandon the cane for the
same reason? With ninety million in debt, with what are they going to pay?
With looks? This is what I don’t understand. I worked the cane, I planted,
cut, and never has this happened until this change. Could this be a gain?

The discounts don’t end. And what discount? All that garbage they sell. Now

the cane ﬁelds are losing faith, they can bear no more. If before a little bit

was left over, now three or four times the debt. When the harvest ends,
everyone leaves crying, like when the udder is taken away from the calf.

The critical issue in a political economy approach to privatization of the sugar sector

concerns the transformation in relations of production between state, peasants, and

 

”This comment refers to a popular campesino song "El Barzon". Numerous peasants mentioned this
song during interviews, when speaking of their own situation. The song makes a political statement,
metaphorically telling of a team of draft horses; the yoke broke, but they just kept on walking. The
peasantreturnshometotellhiswifehehasnormize, becausethepatrontookittopaywhatheowedto
the hacienda. The patron told him to keep working the soil, but his wife urges him to get on the list to
receive an ejidal parcel, rather than live in poverty and keep on working for nothing (thus breaking away
from his own yoke).

267
capital. An important part of the interview process involved eliciting peasants’ ideas
about their relationship to the sugar mill, especially how that relationship had changed
since the mill was transferred from state to private ownership. They provided a broad
range of different responses (n=49), the most frequent being that the private owners do

not want to help cafreros:

 

Table 33. Relationship of Peasants to the Sugar Mill
(percent that gave each response, n=97 respondents).

 

Private owners do not want to help, fewer benefits 41.1%
Caﬁeros have, or want to quit production 37.1%
Private owners exploit caﬁeros and cutters more 29.9%
Private owners want only to profit, pay a low price 26.8%
Caneros are against the mill and the manager 19.6%
Cutters resent loss of employment 13.4%
Peasants Oppose the new requirements 11.3%
Loss of ability to negotiate, owners less approachable 10.3%
Mill only supports the rich, is against caﬁeros 10.3%
Lack of understanding between peasants and the mill 5.2%
The mill is corrupt (robs, cheats, bribes) 4.1%
Caﬁeros are chained to their contracts,

mill does not respect Decreto Canero 4.1%
Less technical assistance 3.1%
Private investors understand, help peasants more 3.1%
Mill controls, has much power 2.1%
More political problems between mill and caﬁeros 2.1%
Private owners are more professional, ended paternalism 2.1%

 

During these discussions, caﬁeros expressed their lack of conﬁdence toward the
intentions of the sugar mill:

These things fall on the government which knows this problem of the sugar
mill and of the caﬁero. Salinas de Gortari, he sold it to these associates. We
need a change of government that knows the caﬁero problems and that has a
good administration.

The caﬁeros are in disconformity with the sugar mill. Not one is content with
the mill because they do not have earnings, or if not, they have debts. These
fucking bastards don’t help anything. What have they helped? It is terrible,
this thing of the cane, it is not good for anything. They are bigger robbers
than anyone. They came to fuck the caﬁero.

268

I don’t understand these owners. I don’t know, but on seeing that they now
want no more than to proﬁt, one does not see true interest. I don’t know what
interest the sugar mill has in strangling the caﬁeros, but as it seems, this is
what they want.

Everything depends on the sugar mill; it will not improve until they pay well
for the cane. They are the ones that have the word on improving the situation.
Those of the mill hold the reins. But it is no longer going to correct itself
because those of the mill are the ones that are going to continue to proﬁt.
Those that already cut and burned [their cane] are crying because they know
that they were left with a huge debt. It is better to abandon the cane; this is

the best of solutions. They say how much they pay and how much they give,
but if we quit, the problem ends.

While political economy tends to discount peasant ideology-expressed in discourse,
research which incorporates the notion of human agency provides evidence of the manner
in which this ideology is materially transformed into action. At the regional level,
peasant response involves collective action to place demands on the mill for a just price
and preservation of previously gained beneﬁts, and individual strategies of resistance,
including abandonment of sugar cane production. The power of the above ideas is both
generalized and materially manifested in a retraction of cane production within the

region. A signiﬁcant proportion of caiieros in the region have withdrawn from cane

production:

 

Table 34. Number of Cane Producers.

 

matures: Renew hn
'85-86 1,479 +10.04%
'86-87 1,532 + 3.58%
'87—88 1,443 - 5.81%
'88-89 1,508 + 4.50%
'89-90 1,458 - 3.32%
'90-91 1,373 - 5.83%

 

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)
The average change over the pre-privatization period was an overall increase of

7.81% in the number of producers. In the three years after privatization, there was an

269

average decline of 4.63%. A drop of 10% in the number of producers from the high
point in 1986-87 has had a signiﬁcant impact on sugar production in the region. The
number of hectares dedicated to cane production declined from 10,618 in 1986 to 8020
in 1990-91; 1425 hectares were diverted to other uses in 1990 alone. Abandonment of
cane is responsible for a reduction in cane delivered to the mill--from 616,689 tons in
1985-86 to 470,000 tons in 1990-91. Queseria experienced its record harvest in 1984,
with 729,156 tons of cane. The amount of sugar produced dropped from 48,642 tons in
1985-86 to 38,035 tons in 1990-91.

 

Table 35. Changes in Land Use and Production.

 

Hectares Tons Cane Tons Sugar

_9_99M xi mam _¢_90M xi Queseda _¢_c&M xi Queseria
'85-86 579,894 10,618 40,366,927 616,689 3,691,102 48,642
'86-87 596,636 10,255 41,372,482 629,870 3,743,557 53,952
'87-88 561,383 9,828 37,244,119 465,515 3,590,079 36,663
'88-89 434,094 9,579 28,454,370 367,532 2,769,306 31,012
'89-90 511,653 8,154 34,893,127 409,202 3,173,679 33,244
'90-91 - 8,020 38,000,000 470,000 3,772,000 38,362

 

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V., Manual Azucarera, Estadisticas Azucareras,
1985-1991; Diario El Independiente 1991b)

The reduction in producers, hectares of cane, and sugar produced contributes to an
incipient transformation in the nature of productive activity in the zone of Ingenio
Queseria. A caﬁera in the research village described the general wane of economic
activity:

Now many have let cows into the cane or the caiieros sell the cane for pasture.
Before, in these times, many people form Guerrero were seen. They took and
brought truckloads of them and the trucks didn’t stop to sleep, carrying cane
and passing collectors up there above Ocotillo. In the sugar mill were seen the
long lines, waiting for the cutters to be paid. Now everything seems lonely,
no longer is there movement of people and money. Now, here, no one works
in the harvest, since they no longer pay and there are many without work. No
longer do you see so many indians working. Everything has been falling
down, since the sale of the sugar mill. One sees less movement of money, of

270
work, of workers, of cane lifters, of trucks, of cutters, of everything. If it
continues like this, the sugar mill is going to end, and things here are going to
be more difﬁcult.
Peasants provide unending commentary on the abandonment of cane in the region:

No longer is the cane seen. The biggest caﬁeros have quit. What of the little
ones? Worse.

Now one sees less cane, now there are cows and before, there were pure cane
ﬁelds.

Before, they abandoned the maize to plant cane. Now many are abandoning
the cane.

This chapter has presented the policy of the privatized sugar mill, which aims to
reproduce and transform the relations of production through expansion of cane lands,
concentration of land, new varieties to increase yields, stricter labor requirements, and
redirection of credit to more productive producers. Contradictions were shown to be
apparent, however, in the lack of investment in the infrastructure of the mill, inability
to process all cane in the zone, and declining efﬁciency in the factory. Field relations
under privatization result in a double exploitation of migrant cutters, who work at wages
that undercut local wages, and thus contribute to underemployment among local wage
laborers. The pre- and post-privatization phases were compared to demonstrate an
overall decline in tons of cane harvested and tons of sugar produced. While the sugar
mill beneﬁts from the sale of sugar and its byproducts, and imposes discounts that reduce
proﬁtability for caﬁeros, the state’s continued control on the price of cane and
inﬂationary production costs have contributed to increasing debt among caﬁeros of the
zone.

Contesting ideologies are present in the devaluation of peasant knowledge by mill
personnel and the acute wrath toward the privatized mill, which is generalized among
caﬁeros of the zone. Under the neoliberal program, the mill has utilized means to

increase its appropriation of surplus value from peasant producers; given this context,

271
peasant evaluation of the privatization of Ingenio Queseria is predominantly negative.
They view the privatized mill as more exploitative than when it was under state control,
linking the crisis of the sugar sector to the sale of the mill. Given the limited gains of
collective mobilization, many have chosen a strategy which is within their power--the
abandonment of sugar cane.

The dynamics of socioeconomic change in the region of Ingenio Queseria are
conditioned by internationalization of the agroindustry, substantive restructuring of the
relations of production, state control of prices and credit, soaring costs of production,
increasing debt, and the failure of private capital to rejuvenate the sugar industry.
However, rooted in these transformative processes are dialectical forces which challenge
the emerging structure through collective mobilization (Chapter VII) and individual

strategies of resistance, the subject of the next chapter.

IX. THE LOCAL CONTEXT OF REPRIVATIZATION

This chapter turns its attention to the local dimensions of the transformative
processes discussed in Chapter VIII. Theoretical concerns with the forms of production
and the production and reproduction of the peasant household, as well as issues of
resistance discussed in Chapter II are brought to bear on analysis of the local context.
The chapter commences with the peasant community, presenting results of analysis on
the sample members’ assessment of their changing economic status, and analyzes
household economic data to make distinctions among different sectors of the peasant
population, particularly as they relate to caﬁeros, versus non-caﬁeros.

A concern of this chapter is the degree to which peasant households are able to
reproduce themselves and/0r accumulate wealth. Simple reproduction implies that the
household merely provides for its own subsistence needs. Access to the means of
production and changes in access to resources, production for use or sale, involvement
in wage labor, and ability to accumulate net income are analyzed to arrive at conclusions
about reproduction of the household unit. After a brief discussion of household
economics and the forms of production present in the research communities, the chapter
turns to transformations in the production system. An important issue is the degree to
which the crisis in the sugar sector is contributing to changing production strategies;
thus, this section will evaluate factors inﬂuencing production strategies, and provide a
comparative analysis of the major crops in the production system and their contribution
to production and reproduction of the peasant household. Finally, the chapter introduces

the ideological matrix associated with cane production and identiﬁes individual strategies

272

 

273
of resistance utilized by cane producers in the context of state withdrawal and

reprivatization of the sugar industry.

The Peasant Community

The two research communities, Chiapa and Ocotillo (see Chapter IV), are highly
differentiated according to land tenure and economic wealth. This section concerns itself
with the question of whether distinctions can be made on the basis of cane production as
an economic strategy. Based on the argument for an ideologically sensitive political
economy, analysis requires attention to socio—political and ideological underpinnings, as
well as material conditions that are transforming the ability of caﬁeros to produce and
reproduce their means of livelihood. The sampled informants’ own evaluations and their
commentaries are ﬁrst presented, followed by household economic data, in order to
assess the degree to which cafieros in the community may be differentially affected by
transformations in the sugar sector. Questions asked of informants concerned their
quality of life, relative economic position, and ability to improve that position.

Almost all peasants recognize marked economic differences among villagers. A
total of 71.1% (n=97) stated that there is ”much difference” in economic status within
the village, 19.6% said there was "some difference", and 9.3% said ”all are equal". The
same question in 1984 resulted in responses of 60.6%, 15.2%, and 24.2% (n=33),
respectively. Community consensus holds that differentiation is greater today than ﬁve
years ago. Members of the sample rated their quality of life on a scale of 1-5; the
majority rated their life ”average”. What is striking are the differences in the way

peasants evaluate their quality of life over a period of years:

274

 

Table 36. Quality of Life.

 

1.21.

N 0n-caﬂeros Caﬁeros

(n=66) (n=31)
Very good - -
Good 6.1% 12.9%
Average 72.7% 80.6%
Bad 18.2% 6.5%
Very bad 3.0% —

1&4
Non—caﬁeros
(n=20)

25.0%
15.0%
35.0%
15.0%
10.0%

Caﬁeros
(n=13)
46.2%
23.1%
23.1%
7.7%

 

In 1984, almost half of the caﬁeros claimed their life to be "very good", and almost

one-fourth, ”average". More recently, none ranked their life as ”very good”, and over

80% regarded it as "average”. There was a decided drop in the number of non—caﬁeros

who ranked their life ”very good" or ”good”. Caﬁeros gave higher ratings than non—

caﬁeros in 1984, but by 1990 the differences between these two groups were no longer

as pronounced. When asked to rank their relative economic position vis-a-vis others in

the village, more caﬁeros categorized themselves "better” in 1984; in 1991, more non-

caﬁeros classiﬁed themselves as "better”. While in 1984, no caﬁeros classiﬁed

themselves as "worse", in 1991, 38.5% of them did so:

 

Table 37. Relative Economic position.

 

1291
N 0n-caﬁero Caﬁero
(n=69) (n=31)
Better 43.5% 41.9%
Same 15.9% 22.6%
Worse 40.6% 38.5%

1285
Non-caﬁero
(n=20)

25.0%
55.0%
20.0

Caﬁero
(n=13)
30. 8%
69 . 2%

 

Again, differences between caﬁeros and non-caﬁeros had evened out over time.

Much of the blame for the declining economic position of peasants is placed on the

government:

 

 

 

 

275

The government does not help very well and the crisis is very strong, it is very
hard. One gets out only enough to eat. The government promises one thing
and it does not comply. Instead of walking, we are crawling.

The government does not support us. The maize that we plant, never do they
pay well for it. At ﬁrst they say, when we are going to plant, that it is going
to be at a price. Afterwards, they pay for it almost as if we gave it for free.

It is not a question of the peasant, it is all the government; the government
should give value to the products and not charge so much interest.

The peasant can’t do anything because the government, instead of helping him,
puts the noose around his neck so that he does not advance.

It is really a thing of the government. The peasant, they should give him more
support because we give what is most important--life, food, and it is he that
they screw most, the peasant.

 

I am going to speak clearly. The government does not help us. We are in
debt. There is no work. There is no labor. Not even for the milpa (corn
ﬁeld), there is no insurance. The fertilizer, high, expensive-more than
$300,000 a ton. We lost the camotes. One has no hope. It is hard. Instead
of helping us, the government is fucking us.

These comments reveal the despair concerning state retraction and lack of support
for the peasant sector. The government’s inattention to peasants evokes a deep sense of
injustice, since they provide the subsistence for the entire nation, yet are the most
exploited:

The only problem is that the none of the products have value and it is a beneﬁt
for the whole country. One wants to produce for the country, for his family,
but it isn’t worth anything-one is bankrupt. You have already seen the cane
ﬁelds. In not one product is any money left over. The maize is worthless; the
camote, also. One has debts, obligations.

All of us caﬁeros are thinking that it is not possible that we have the lands in
order to produce debts that drown us. We have the lands to produce food for
the whole republic, not just for ourselves. We are important because we are
the ones that feed those who do not make the land produce. For the same
[reason], we ought to leave something for the sustenance of our family.

The work of the peasant has no value. He cannot cover his costs. One soft
drink is worth more than two kilos of maize, and it is better to give maize to
your family than sugar water.

Many leave to work in the United States. The country here, it no longer gives
even enough to eat.

276

The salary gives only enough to half-way eat. For everyone in or outside of

the ejido, it is the same problem. We have no centavos. We plant with the

illusion of hope. We spend a million, and we have another debt--it is very

difﬁcult for us.

The maize has no value and it is the only thing that provides. Thus, no one

wants to plant only to go in debt. We all think of the crisis. We know that the

crisis will not end while the government is the PR1.

All the peasants here dedicate themselves to planting maize, and this does not

pay them. The fertilizers, herbicides, really expensive, and the maize, cheap.

[We are] only getting enough to half-way eat.

The production of the country has had no result. Now no one is going to plant

this year. Not because the land does not produce; but for the bad balance of

costs and expenses.

A major shift has occurred in the way peasants see their opportunity to improve.
The majority (72.7 %) in 1984 stated that their capacity to improve was "average"; the
proportion who replied to this question in 1991 was reduced to 43.3%. In 1984, the
difference in the way cafieros and non-caﬁeros answered this question was statistically
signiﬁcant; but in 1991, the group means are almost identical (1=very good, 5=very

bad):

 

Table 38. Opportunity to Improve.

 

1221 1204

N on-Caﬁeros Caﬁeros N 0n—Caﬁeros Caﬁeros

(n=66) (n=31) (n=20) (n=13)
Good 6.1% - 10.0% 30.8%
Average 36.4% 54.8% 75.0% 69.2%
Bad 30.3% 29.0% 15.0%
Very bad 27.3% 16.1% - -
lean 3.79 3.61 3.05 2.69

(t22.01, p=.05)

 

All caﬁeros in the research sample have access to ejido land. The ejido serves as
an institutional unit which differentiates landed and landless peasants-explicitly stated by

one peasant: ”There are two classes of people: ejidatario and neighbor”. The latter are

277

 

those without ejidal parcels, and generally, worse off economically. As changing
material conditions affect all peasants, whether landed or landless, peasant discourse
continues to reveal the more advantageous position of ejidatarios:
For us, there are no programs, nothing. The ejido advances a little more
because for them, the government supports them more with fertilizers,

herbicides, and loans from the bank. For the landless peasants, no help.

Only they [the ejidatarios] improve. They organize. They are left with
money. They are the ones that beneﬁt.

For the ejidatarios, yes, [the ejido] serves them because for them, they are
given attention. Since they have a parcela, they give them cattle credit, and the
government supports them.

 

Ideologically, economic differences among community members are seen to be
great, but is there empirical evidence that these notions are manifested materially? Net
annual income (total household income - expenses) for the sample results in a bi-modal

distribution for the villages, providing evidence for marked economic inequality:

 

Table 39. Net Household Income, 1990-91 (n= 100)
(overall mean = +$722,052 pesos).

 

over -$10,000,000 7%
-$5,000,000 to -$9,999,999 38%

$0 to +5999 18%
+51,000,000 to +59,999,999 28%
over +$10,000,000 9%

 

Differentiation among ejidatarios and landless peasants has always marked peasant
communities. The primary interest of this investigation is the economic differences
between caﬁeros and non-caﬁeros. Signiﬁcant differences occur between caﬁeros and

non-caﬁeros in their ability to accumulate material wealth. Using an index developed as

 

278
a measure of material wealth”, the mean per household (n= 100) was $73,865,516
pesos. A breakdown into categories illustrates the degree of differentiation on the basis
of material wealth:

 

Table 40. Index of Material Wealth (n = 100).

 

Parent Nn— ﬁr Carlene
Below $50,000,000 50% 58.2% 33.3%
$ 50- 99,000,000 26% 23.9% 30.3%
$100-l49,000,000 15% 13.4% 18.2%
$150-199,000,000 4% 3.0% 6.1%
$200-249,000,000 1% 1.5% -
$250-299,000,000 1% - 3.0%
$350-399,000,000 1% - 3.0%
Above $400,000,000 2% - 6.1%

 

A t-test gives a statistically signiﬁcant difference for the two group means--
$56,717,875 for non-caﬁeros and $108,682,455 for cafleros (t=-2.51, p=.016). This
difference, it will be argued, although it continues to serve as an element of stratiﬁcation,
is more indicative of the past relative advantage of car'leros, since most of this material
wealth was accumulated before the onset of the crisis in the cane sector. Fewer houses,
a major component of the index, were built in the last ﬁve years than previously. Out
of nine houses in the sample built in the past 10 years, only three were constructed
within the past 3-5 years, and the remaining between 5-10 years ago. Houses (or
additional rooms) in the villages are frequently constructed with remittances from the
U.S.

Increasing debt has forced many to migrate to the U.S. Nearly half of the adult

 

”This index is not meant as an exact measurement of material wealth, but approximates the value of
goods for comparative purposes. It is based on the value of the house, major household possessions,
vehicles, animals, and so forth. Estimates of the average values in 1991 were obtained from SEDUE, local
furniture stores, and knowledgeable informants. The same amount was applied to each item owned, and
the values cumulated for each household.

279

offspring migrate to the U.S. Remittances constitute an important source of revenue for
the purchase of material goods. An informant clariﬁed this point, ”No one has money
to do things in their own interest and the village does not advance, nor the people.
Some, yes, they rise up because they work on the other side [the U.S.]. They go north
and get enough to live better". Eighteen percent of sample members reported on how
they spent remittances, which averaged $2,943,889 pesos, and ranged from $100,000-
$24,000,000 pesos. Remittances were channeled to the following sources:

Food/ household expenses 83. 3 %
Build house/room 55.6%
Household furnishings 33.3%
Clothes 22.2 %
Fiesta 5 . 6%
Care of grandchildren 5.6%
Pay debts 5 . 6%

It became clear in collecting these data that families which had previously spent
remittances on improving their homes and the purchase of refrigerators, stoves,
televisions, and so forth, were utilizing these funds to a greater extent for reproduction
of the household (largely food) in 1991. Remittances accounted for 23.11% of the total
income among 17 informants. Contrary to expectation, there is little difference between
caﬁeros (25.23%, n=9) and non-caﬁeros (24.08%, n=8) on the contribution of
remittances to income. Poorer cafieros have a greater migration rate; 70% of those who
had migrated to the U.S. experienced cane debts in 1991, as opposed to 30% of those
who had received proﬁts from cane. Overall, remittances tend to be small and
infrequent. An informant who received only $100 from his son in one year, and nothing
from his three daughters who are in the U.S., retorted, ”It is like the burro played the

ﬂute” .

280
Household Production and Reproduction
Wench

The household, for analytic purposes, is deﬁned as all those who are cohabiting in
the residence, including persons who lack consanguineal or afﬁnal relationship to the
household head. Interviews, for the purpose of data gathering, were conducted with the
person identiﬁed as the household head by the census. Exceptions are data gathered on
household budgets, in which case, the most knowledgeable person--usually the woman-
was interviewed. Since few women are directly involved in agriculture, most informants
were males, although occasionally, female gender and household head coincided (most
census date-collected before selection of the sample-was gathered from women).

On the average, household heads in the sample contributed 77.4 % of all household
income (n =90) in 1990-91. In those households where the head had a net deﬁcit
(n =10), their losses were equivalent to 81.9 % of the total household income. The
household head worked at a secondary, non-agricultural occupation in 24 cases,”
contributing an average of 76.9% of the total income (based on data for 17 cases). Wage
labor comprised 77.26% of total household earnings in over half of the households
(n=51). Of the latter, 79.3%, on the average, is from wage work in agriculture. Thus,
the household head is a major contributor to family income. Their earnings, however,
are highly dependent on supplementing agricultural activities with waged, non-
agricultural labor.

Among households of the sample, 38% of families depend on the labor of sons and
daughters. Their contribution makes up 31.1% of family income. Spouses contributed
to net income in 10 households, the mean being 38% of total income. Thirty-ﬁve

households supplement their family incomes by providing various services. These are

 

”Non-agricultural jobs included: brick mason, construction, salt mines, fence building, government
ofﬁce, watchman, chauffeur, vendor, and weaving chairs.

281

primarily the contribution of women, who add 15.6% to family income, on the average,
providing services such as: selling snacks, soft drinks, food, or meals (21.5%); making
crafts such as doilies, embroidered napkins or pillow cases (15.4%); sewing, washing,
or ironing (9.2%); operating a small store in the home (6.2 %); selling clothing or shoes
(4.6%); beautician (3.1%); and other activities (midwife, selling small animals,
delivering mail, babysitting, holding rafﬂes, selling beer at the plaza de torros (one case
each). These data demonstrate the substantial supplementary income, apart from the
primary provider’s agricultural earnings, that contribute to the economic viability of these
rural families. The multiplex division of labor within the household thus complements
the forms of production, which contribute to the economic base of peasant households.
mm

Peasant households in the research communities are complexly organized into a
variety of forms of production, based on differential access to land and multiplex
production strategies, aimed at reproduction of the household unit, as well as production
for proﬁt. This complexity is reﬂected in the makeup of the sample, discussed in
Chapter IV. A few producers hold privately-owned land, thus are relatively free of
external controls, yet subject to foreclosure if they are unable to cover their debts.
Ejidatarios, who have usufruct rights, to date have had protection from the risk of
conﬁseation of their property, but remain subject to powerful controls by the state, the
sugar mill, BANRURAL, CONASUPO, SARH, SRA, and so forth. Some choose to
rent out their land, rather than work it themselves. Rental of ejido parcels is frequent
in Ocotillo, where nine ejidatarios rent 49.3 hectares of cane land to three persons: two
private landowners from outside the village and one local ejidatario. Seven of these
renters are women, one of the men suffers rheumatism, and the other is an alcoholic.
The dominance of wealthy and powerful private landowners in the region, who live

outside of the villages, is present in this community where one person rents seven of the

282
parcelas.98

Arrendatarios (land renters) enjoy the advantage of disposing of products and proﬁts
as they see ﬁt, but must pay the cost of high land rents. Medieros (sharecroppers) can
evade this monetary fund of rent, but must sacriﬁce through payment in kind (generally
one-half of the harvest). Many of these forms for organizing the peasant household
incorporate a multiplicity of strategies, as well as wage labor. To speak of "peasant” as
a unitary entity is, thus, erroneous.

The various forms of production that can be identiﬁed within the research
communities are neither "types", nor are they static entities. They are systems in a
dynamic process of change. Several general trends may be delineated, however. The
predominance of cane (n =29 caﬁeros) and cattle production (11 =37 ganaderos) is almost
an exclusive domain of ejidatarios, propietarios (private landowners), or agricultores
(those with access to land, i. g., through a spouse or relative). Only one arrendatario
engages in cattle and cane production. Most ejidatarios (62 %) combine cultivating their
own parcelas with renting, sharecropping, and wage labor. Whereas 22 % of ejidatarios
(n =50) are forced to supplement their income with wage labor, this proportion increases
to 95 % of all arrendatarios and medieros (n =40).

Production systems within the region are complex, yet reﬂective of this
differentiation. Each different production strategy utilized by peasants involves a unique
mix of crops and/or pasture. For 1990-91, a total of 32 different productive strategies,
utilized by 92 producers, can be identiﬁed for the two research communities, whereas
in 1985-86, 19 different strategies can be identiﬁed, among 52 producers. These shifts

in the number and type of strategies indicate an increasing diversiﬁcation of the

 

”The data cited above are for 1990-91 only. In other years, between 12-14 parcelas (averaging 91.5
hectares) have been rented out, generally to the same four private landowners, although three rented only
one cane ﬁeld each, while the other rented the remainder.

283
production system over the ﬁve-year period. The mean number of different crops and/or
cattle produced by sample members was:

1985-86 2.196

1989-90 2.745

1990-91 2.922

Sugar cane is a component in 38% of the of the 32 strategies in 1990-91, yet never
occurs alone. It is most often associated with cattle and/or maize production. Cattle is
a component in 63% of the strategies, yet only 3% of the producers dedicate themselves
solely to cattle raising; it is frequently associated with cane or maize. Maize, a
component in 72 % of the strategies, is the only crop that occurs alone to a signiﬁcant
degree. One—fourth of the producers cultivate only maize, yet it is highly associated with
cattle production when it is not grown as a monocrop. Both of these phenomena-—
monocropping of maize and combining maize with cattle raising-have increased over the
past ﬁve years. None of the other crops (camote, jicama, beans, tomatoes) form
exclusive components of the production system, occurring in a myriad of combinations,
involving anywhere up to ﬁve crops within any one strategy.

The single most prevalent production strategy in 1985-86 was a combination of maize
and cane (15.39% of producers), followed by cattle-raising and maize (9.62 %), then cane
and pasture (5.77%). Cane was a single crop strategy for 7.69% of producers in that
year; cattle raising also occurred alone in 7.69% of cases and maize in 5.8%--all other
crops were grown in combination. By 1990-91, cane was always associated with other
crops; maize (25% of producers), pasture (3.26%), and jicama (1.09%) were the only
strategies practiced alone. Monocrop production of maize was the most numerous among
the production strategies, followed by a combination of pasture and maize (9.78 %) and
cane/pasture/maize (9.78%). These changes in production strategies from 1985-85 to

1990-91 are indicative of important transformations in the system of production.

284
Transformations in the Production System

Analysis of the local production system takes into consideration the different forms
of peasant production, changing land tenure and use, economic constraints and
opportunities that affect cropping strategies, sociopolitical factors of peasant organization,
policies of agrarian institutions, the nature of agroindustrial development, and the
dynamic interaction of all of these forces. These provide the context within which
peasants make decisions in regard to resource allocation and select cropping strategies
to deal with economic uncertainty. Decisions at the household level, as producers adapt
to increasing risk, are transforming the production system. This section provides detailed
analysis of changes in production strategies, changes in land use, and the factors that
inﬂuence these changes. Comparative analysis of the costs of production, net outcome,
and contribution of the different crops to household income situates cane production
within the larger system of production.

h ' r ' n i

Important shifts in land use have occurred since 1985-86. As sugar cane has been
taken out of production, the majority of this land has been diverted to maize and pasture
(see Table 41 on pages 285—286). The amount of land, number of producers, and
proportion of land dedicated to cane has decreased since 1985. While the proportion of
land dedicated to cattle raising increased between 1985-86 and 1989-90, the proportion
of ganaderos did not change substantially; this trend is attributable more to extension of
grazing lands, than to the entry of new ganaderos. Maize shows the most marked
increase in proportion of land and producers from the mid 19803 to the l990s. This
change is related primarily to a greater number of producers cultivating maize. There
is a trend for fewer peasants to select camote, but those producers dedicate a greater
proportion of their land to the crop.

Taking just ejidatarios, propietarios, and agricultores (1985 data were not gathered

 

Table 41. Changes in Production Strategies, 1986-1991.

 

Total hectares

Cane

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

Pasture

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

Maize

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

Caeote

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

Jicana

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

1222-.ﬂ

(1014.98 has.)

(n=28)
168.68
6.02
16.62%
30.7%
30.5%

(n=50)
467.50
9.35
46.06%
53.6%
54.4%

(n=79)
272.70
3.45
26.87%
56.6%
85.9%

(n=21)
62.50
2.98
6.16%
26.9%
22.8%

(n=12)
8.40
.70
.83%
20.6%
13.0%

M

(997.74 has.)

(n=32)
213.84
6.68
21.43%
36.3%
35.6%

(n=42)
372.00
8.86
37.28%
50.4%
46.7%

(n=80)
321.90
4.02
32.26%
60.6%
88.9%

(n-26)
71.50
2.75
7.17%
23.5%
28.9%

(n=8)
4.00
.50
.40%
12.1%
8.9%

120%

(636.52 has.)

(n=33)
228.02
6.91
35.82%
53.5%
64.7%

(n=29)
267.50
9.22
42.03%
57.2%
56.9%

(n=29)
104.50
3.60
16.42%
44.7%
29.4%

(n=15)
30.00
2.00
4.71%
14.7%
29.4%

(n=2)
2.50
1.25

.39%

19.2%

3.9%

286

 

Table 41 (cont’d).”

 

Tomato

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

Beans

Has.

Mean Has.

% Total Crop Land
Mean % per Producer
% of Producers

(n=14)
22.10

2.18%
19.4%
15.2%

(n=11)
13.10

1.29%

12.0%

122m

(n=6)

13.50
2.25
1.35%

25.7%
6.7%

(n=2)
1.00
.50
.10%
4.4%
2.2%

(n=2)
2.50
1.25

.39%

46.4%

3.9%

(n=2)

.75
O 24%

 

on other peasants), the net changes in hectares from 1985-86 to 1990-91 were:

cane - 59.34 has.
jl’cama + 1.50 has.
beans + 8.00 has.
camote + 15.50 has.
tomato +15.50 has.
maize +7280 has.
pasture + 157.00 has.

Slight increases in the production of more minor crops, such as jicama, tomato, and

beans are noted. Reconversion of 59.34 hectares of former cane land to new productive

uses is documented:

pasture 30.60 has.
camote 11.05 has.
maize 9.10 has.
non-cultivated 6.59 has.
tomato 1.00 has.
DEBS LL12 has.
total 59.34

 

9”The 1985-86 data include only landholding peasants because renters and sharecroppers had difﬁculty
recalling these data. Data for this year, with the exception of sugar cane, do not reﬂect the total sample,

thus percentages, rather than actual numbers are more relevant for interpretation.

287

The following charts place these shifts in production strategies into perspective:

   

1905*

Figure 8. Changes in land Use.

Shifting cropping strategies are clearly inﬂuenced by low market prices, soaring
costs of production, tightening access to credit, and generalized insolvency among
peasant producers. The immediate concern of peasants is with household security. One
peasant explained:

The harvest has no value. The country does not provide, but we have to work,

we plant out of obligation. A person that is malnourished has no desire to

work; then, how are we going to work? The maize ends up cheaper buying it

than planting it. The government raises the fertilizer and the herbicides on us

and the costs of food increase. This is the most grave problem that we have

in life. I blame the government; it should maintain the price for the crops.

Lack of proﬁtability has forced peasants who formerly sold their crops on the
market into subsistence production for family needs. As land is withdrawn from cane
production, there is a trend toward increased production of cattle on the part of those
with access to credit, and a withdrawal into subsistence production of maize on the part

of peasants with limited resources. A peasant in the latter position told the researcher,

"It is difﬁcult because there is no longer any result. I have tried everything. I am no

288
longer going to plant, only [enough] to eat".

The dynamics of shifts in production strategies indicate the role of sugar cane in the
diversiﬁcation of the production system. The two research communities had 35 cal‘ieros
in 1991, working a total of 222 hectares of cane land, and provided 12,323 tons of cane
to Ingenio Queseria. A substantial decline in cafieros and area dedicated to cane is noted

over a ﬁve year period:

 

Table 42. Cane Producers, Hectares and Tons of Cane, 1986-1991.100

 

Brenner: Mae lasagna:
1986 36 296.7 14,950
1987 25 209.0 12,455
1988 30 202.1 9,348
1989 19 128.1 4,001
1990 22 165.9 7,030
1991 30 196.2 12,323

 

(source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

Abandonment of cane is a driving force in the diversiﬁcation of the production
system. An important dimension of this process is the nature of abandonment. Seven
caﬁeros of the two villages have completely abandoned cane since 1985. The decrease
in actual number of producers is less signiﬁcant than the decline in number of hectares--
79.84 hectares--from 358.45 in 1985-86 to 278.61 in 1990-91. The mean hectares per
caﬁero dropped an average of 1.66 hectares per producer, from 10.95 in 1985-86 to 9.29
in 1990-91 (Appendix E lists the number of hectares for each caﬁero over a six year

period). The strategy to reduce the number of hectares of cane is addressed in the

 

“”I'wo of these "producers” are collective groups comprised of 60 members who jointly work these
units of cane land. Each ejido also has a parcela escolar, counted as one producer, for the beneﬁt of the
village schools. The number of producers reported does not reﬂect the total number of producers in the
two villages because in some years, cane is not delivered, and occasionally, the data are missing. The
number of hectares reported here includes ejido land only, because cane from private property is tabulated
separately by the sugar mill. Tons of cane are from ejido land only.

289

section on strategies of resistance.
Eagtgrs Inﬂuencing Prﬂuctign Strategies

Having documented shifts in production strategies, analysis will now turn to the
contributive factors, including producers’ own ideological understandings and rationale
for these changes, peasant identiﬁcation of key agricultural problems, and discussion of
ofﬁcial agencies through which peasants must gain access to productive resources.
Peasants of the sample were asked to identify their most important crop; their replies

differed markedly from 1984:

 

Table 43. Most Important Crop.

 

1221 1234

(n-99) (n=15)
None 32.61% 0%
Only grow maize 19.57% n.a.
Cattle 17.39% n.a.
Jicama 16.30% 6.7%
Camote 8.70% 33.3%
Maize 3.26% 20.0%
Tomatoes 2.17% 0%
Cane 1.01% 46.7%

 

The most striking difference is that in 1984, almost half of the respondents identiﬁed
sugar cane as the most important crop; by 1991, almost one-third claimed there is no
crop that is proﬁtable and only one of the 100 sample members named cane as their most
important crop. Political and economic factors that generated transformations within the
sugar sector have led peasants to reformulate the ideological underpinnings of sugar cane
production. During the 1984 ﬁeld season, peasants expounded on the beneﬁts of cane
production--the sugar mill provides credit, advance payments, loans, fertilizer,
machinery, and they reaped large proﬁts. Since state retraction from the sector and

privatization of the mill, literally all commentary about sugar cane is perversely negative.

 

 

290

As peasants discussed changes in production in the past ﬁve years, the most
signiﬁcant changes were couched in terms of increased costs, decreased proﬁts, and
rising debts. Changes in access to productive resources are having two major effects.
One, peasants are utilizing fewer inputs (fertilizer, herbicides, etc.) to cut costs; this in
turn, reduces yields. Second, they are cutting back on the number of hectares because
of lack of resources to cultivate. Peasants projected cutting back 12.42% on hectares
dedicated to cane, 22.67% on pasture, and 7.0% on maize for 1991. To reduce the
product that is the staple of the Mexican diet suggests severe problems in regard to
household reproduction.

As peasants cutback on the amount of maize they cultivate, a greater proportion of
that maize is going for household consumption, rather than being commoditized in the
market. On average, approximately 10% more of the maize produced is retained for
household consumption:

'nfm'k frfmi nm'n

1990-91 28.2% (n=61)
1989-90 32.1% (n=76)
1985-86 20.8% (n=20)

A reduction in work was frequently mentioned as an important change that had
occurred in recent years. For some, especially landowners, this was an advantage, since
herbicides and mechanization had lightened their work load. But for others, renters,
sharecroppers, and wage laborers had experienced cuts in needed work due to
mechanization and the expansion of pasture lands, which require fewer hired hands. A
number of peasants explained that, in response to high costs, they have been forced to
cut back on production or to hire fewer wage laborers; this is a strategy used by many
to cut costs. Some jomaleros (wage laborers) claim that they would work longer hours,
but the landowners won’t pay them for all day. Consequently, a few producers attempt

to cultivate alone, or they employ their children in the ﬁelds, to cut the cost of wage

 

291
labor.

Fifty-seven percent of the sample (n = 100) engage in wage labor; among these, 38 %
claim that their need to engage in wage labor has increased in the past ﬁve years, for
46% it has remained the same, and for 16%, it has decreased. By far, maize production
allows for the greatest employment of wage labor, employing 78.26% of the 46 wage
laborers for whom these data are available. Employment in maize is followed by camote
(23.91%), cane (17.39%), cattle-raising (13.04%), tomatoes (10.87%), and jicama
(8.70%). Wage laborers have less work since privatization of the mill, since the cane
harvest is now providing fewer opportunities for local cutters, in favor of migrant cutters
from other states. A number of peasants are being forced into non-agricultural labor
(working in the salt mines along the coast has provided one alternative to migration to
the U.S.).

Changes in land use not only affect the amount of wage labor jobs available, but
also land available for landless peasants to cultivate. One person explained, ”They are
planting pasture in much of the land and now there is no longer work. This diminishes
the production of maize and camote”. landless peasants claim that the expansion of cane
in earlier years has made it more difﬁcult to rent land to grow maize. Now that cane is
being taken out of production and ﬁelds are converted to grazing cattle, it is equally
difﬁcult to gain access to land. In the words of one peasant, "Before, there was work
for all the peasants, during the rains and the dry season-everyone worked in the country,
even the women. The cane arrived and this work disappeared” .

Wage labor is crucial to most peasant families--they can no longer rely on
agriculture alone for reproduction of the household. Taking into consideration only those
households (n=73) which experienced net earnings in 1990-91, only 41.2% of those
earnings were agriculturally derived. In the 27 cases where the head incurred net losses,

these were equivalent to 14.7% of the debt. The need to engage in wage labor is greater

292
for non-caiieros; 76% of non-caﬁeros (n=67) work for wages, and only 30% (n=33) of
car‘leros. This difference, however, is attributed to the fact of landownership, not
production of cane. There is little difference in the proportion of total income that is
contributed by wage labor--74.55% by non-caﬁeros and 77.81% by caﬁeros. Among
car'ieros, all those who work for wages, with one exception were among the caﬁeros who
experienced debts or zero net earnings from cane in 1991.

The internal dynamics of household production and reproduction thus have been
reorganized through changes in land use, crops produced, in dedication to use value or
commodity production, in utilization of productive resources, and shifts in employment
of and involvement in wage labor. These, in turn, are inﬂuenced by external factors that
affect the agricultural sector. A portion of the interview was directed toward
identiﬁcation of impediments to agricultural production. The primary problem,
mentioned by 70% of the sample members, was low prices for agricultural products and
high costs for agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, implements,
transport, land rent, and wage labor. Peasants point out decreased earnings which
contribute to declining standards of living. Eight percent mentioned that they are now
only subsisting and others claimed that they now eat less than before: ”Now we eat less,
instead of three meals, two".

Responses elicited in 1990 differ markedly from 1984, when 24.2% of a sample of

33 said that no problems existed for agricultural production:

293

 

Table 44. Identiﬁcation of Agricultural Problems (percent that mentioned).

 

123221 (n=1ﬂ) 1 n=
Price/costs 70% Credit 27.3%
Barely subsist 8% No problems 24.2%
Credit 6% Lack irrigation 18.2%
Lack land 5% Marketing 15.2%
Low productivity 5% Low productivity 15.2%
Other 6% Lack land 12.1%
Cane-related 9.1%
Lack government aid 6.1%
Lack technology 6.1%
Low wages 3.0%
Other 6.0%

 

The economic crisis has clearly refocused the concerns of peasant producers.
Important constraints are lack of land and irrigation. landless peasants often said that
the only land they could rent or sharecrop was for maize production. Maize production
has largely been affected by lack of market proﬁtability. Thus, many peasants who
formerly sold maize on the market now plant only enough maize to ensure auto—
consumption. Beans, like corn, form a basic ingredient to the diet, but obtain a higher
market price than maize. Many informants complain that with the economic crisis, they
are forced to eat "pure beans”. Neither camote nor jicama have guaranteed prices, are
often affected by plagues, and markets for camote and jicama are extremely unstable--
often ﬂooded, thus production of these crops involves greater risk. Tomatoes are quite
proﬁtable, yet highly susceptible to plague, threatening the loss of substantial investment.
Camote, jicama, tomato, and beans are neither subject to ofﬁcial credit, subsidized and
controlled prices, nor ofﬁcial markets. Unlike crops, cattle raising offers the advantage
of selling when the market price is high. Cattle production requires substantial
infrastructural investments, thus access to credit is essential. Although this sector was

the most lucrative ﬁve years ago, ganaderos are now often forced to sell all of their cattle

294
to pay their loans to BANRURAL. Cattle raising, however, remains a strong indicator
of socioeconomic differentiation.

Investigation into access to production resources, as mediated through ofﬁcial
institutions,101 further clariﬁes the strategies chosen by peasant producers. The major
components of the production systemucane, cattle, and maize-all link peasants into a
network of state-operated agrarian agencies, and therefore, into power relationships that
transcend the local village. The role of each of these agencies--BANRURAL,
ASEMEX, FERTIMEX, PRONASE, FIMAIA, SARH, CONASUPO, SRA, the Liga de
Comunidades Agrarias, and Ingenio Queseria--in controlling access to credit, inputs,
markets, land, and political power is brieﬂy outlined, then evaluated by members of the
sample.

Q3313. One-half of the sample members (n= 100) have never had access to bank
credit, since BANRURAL gives loans only to ejidatarios (who make up 49% of the
sample). Among those who have received credit, 51% report that access to credit is
worse than ﬁve years ago. Criticism is leveled at high interest rates, late delivery of
credit, failure to compensate peasants for crop losses (peasants were required to purchase
crop insurance until 1990), and bank debts.

Cattle and maize are the only two strategies supported by BANRURAL in the
research region (credit for camote was cancelled in 1984, when many were left with
unpaid debts). Cattle raising receives broad governmental support, relative to other
productive activities. While bank policy promotes cattle-raising, all but one of the
ganaderos in Chiapa were deeply in debt and unable to repay their loans to BANRURAL
in 1991.

While substantial loans are available for cattle raising, BANRURAL in 1990 denied

 

‘°' Many of these institutions were restructured since the ﬁeldwork, further diminishing peasants’ access
to productive resources. The discussion herein pertains to the ethnographic present.

295

maize producers in one of the research communities credit, due to outstanding loans.
These cutbacks in credit and policy changes instituted by BANRURAL have led to a
decline in production in the research communities. In 1990, 65 individuals from Ocotillo
and Chiapa owed BANRURAL a total of $137,294,400 pesos for maize and cattle credit;
the mean is $2,112,221.54 per person. This amount includes interest, which accounts
for 67.73% of the capital (source: BANRURAL). While these debts are going unpaid,
they are accruing high interest rates.

BANRURAL is cutting back on the number who will be subject to credit and
preference is given to those producers with "productive potential”. Each producer is
extended 60% of the costs for maize production. For one hectare of maize, the costs,
including credit, are $2,200,000. The bank projects a proﬁt of $3,240,000 from the
sale; theoretically, after deducting costs and repayment of the loan, the producer is left
with a net proﬁt of $1,040,000. However, to achieve these results requires a yield of
4.5 tons per hectare-approximately 2 tons above the average yield in the area. The bank
presumes ideal conditions. Assuming 2.5 tons per hectare, the sale price would be
$1,800,000, leaving a net loss of $400,000 after deducting $2,772,425 in costs. Nor do
the bank’s policies take into account the maize that will be utilized for family
consumption, rather than sale. The BANRURAL ofﬁcial blamed peasants for inefﬁcient
production, failure to invest labor, and increasing costs by hiring wage labor. Credit is
but one of the productive resources which has become increasingly scarce in recent
years.

The discourse on BANRURAL illuminates common frustrations of peasant producers
with the only credit institution available to them, outside of the sugar mill:

A friend lost more than $4,000,000 in credit for cattle. They are going to the

tomb with the cattle credit. Many spend the money and they can’t pay the

debt. In the ejido parcela, everything is disappearing and the debt is left.

One wants to make a big planting of maize, but one is preoccupied if he does

296

it with credit. You are left really obligated with the money, because the
harvests are not sure. Better that I don’t have anything to work with; with
credit, I am never going to work. One is left indebted. Two years ago they
offered credit and one was committed to the bank. But they didn’t loan until
I put up the mortgage of my little house in Colima. The bank does not pardon.
The interest accumulates month by month. If you don’t have anything to pay
the bank, it takes away what you put up as guarantee. I got rid of the
commitment and I did not return to deal with them.

Only twice was I helped by the insurance and I didn’t like it because of the
high interest. I paid and I did not return. Now, they send a notice that I owe
$400,000. I did not leave owing anything and I am not going to pay them
anything. All this money goes into the pocket of the entrepreneurs. They
begin to spend it on themselves, and the bills come saying I am short, and they
say, ”Now I will make these asshole ranchers cooperate” , and they send
someone to say that one owes. They are a bunch of scoundrels. One leaves
ashamed, but it is he who maintains this whole bunch of lazy asses". When
they give cattle credit to an ejidatario, in the simple view, he seems to have
progressed, because he sees some calves. But the reality is another. One
realizes that they are in debt down to the shoes, and what the cattle with the
calves produced is not enough, nor what he spent to feed them; one loses
everything. And this is progress?

Common to these discussions on BANRURAL is a sense of being exploited and of
the resources of peasants being drained for the beneﬁt of others. The problems
associated with BANRURAL are closely tied to the government crop insurance
institution, ASEMEX (formerly, the notorious ANAGSA). AN AGSA was publicly noted
for corruption and scandal in handling crop insurance for peasants; it was dissolved in
1990. The new ASEMEX had recently formed at the time of the ﬁeld research.

Crop insurance was mandatory to receive credit under AN AGSA; ASEMEX plans
to cut back on the number of persons insured and will only insure crops that have already
become established, since new crops are at greatest risk of loss. It will only insure crops
at 70% , and cattle at 95 %; however, it will no longer cover cattle that are stolen, or that
jump the fence and are killed. ASEMEX deﬁnes three categories of potential clients:
high risk insurees (Ocotillo and Chiapa fall into this category) who will pay a higher rate
for insurance, medium risk (those with maize yields of 3 tons per hectare or greater), and

low risk (those with access to irrigation). Insurance costs $120,000 per hectare. If a

297

peasant reports crop damages of over 55 % within four years, ASEMEX is no longer
going to pay beyond this amount. When this information was conveyed at a community
meeting, a peasant spoke up, "I don’t see where is the solution". Another explained to
the researcher:

Until now, they have had us with our feet up and our feet down. We lost.

There is much corruption. They come to one who has losses and say that it is

good. They report good crops as "bad" for bribes. Others have beautiful

crops. They go to a barbecue, they give them a bottle, and they report losses.

I_np_u_ts. The largest complaint among producers is the rising cost of fertilizer.
Almost one-third (30.1% , n=93) state that access to fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides
is more difﬁcult than ﬁve years ago. FERTIMEX is the Mexican company that produces
fertilizer. Data were provided by FERTIMEX on the costs of fertilizer over time:

f r r n (in U.S. dollars)

1990 $167.23 1 53.53%

1989 $108.92 ‘1 4.58%

1987 $104.15 1‘ 50.31%

1986 $ 69.29 1 12.76%

1985 $ 61.45 -

The two major problems with fertilizer, according to informants, are the rising
prices and untimely delivery:

In no moment does it help, the price went up to the sky.

[The credit] is delayed a lot; it is needed within 21 days, and it arrives late; they
don’t give all that is nwded for the labor.

Previously, fertilizer was distributed through BANRURAL. Late delivery of credit
often kept them from fertilizing their ﬁelds on time. Peasants are now given receipts to
purchase it at warehouses. Fertilizer is also obtained by caﬁeros through the sugar mill.
One caﬁero suspected irregularities: "The Triple is more expensive, but they don’t give
it--pure sulfate in the sugar mill. They are sacks of 50 kg., but they have 45-47 kg.
From each one, they take a little bit, but to them, it is a lot".

The Mexican seed company, PRONASE, provides another important input to the

298
production process. Many who have experimented with improved seeds have done so
with poor results. Not only is the cost beyond the means of many producers, but the
quality of these seeds was in question:

Last year, I bought two bags of maize; they were nibbled. [Purchased seed]
is hardly used, each one saves a part of the seed [from the harvest].

They only exploit one. The [purchased] seed costs three times as much, only
to be painted.

They give a cat for a hare. It was painted maize; they take advantage of one.

Several peasants criticized the newer varieties, reporting that they were worse, did
not yield as well, and that they had returned to the traditional criollo variety. The use
of traditional varieties, set aside from each harvest is common; 45.6% (n=90) do not
buy maize seed (this ﬁgure may represent under-reporting). Others combine traditional
maize with purchased varieties. Among the 49 who do purchase seed, 22% said access
to seed is worse than ﬁve years ago. Many complained of the increased cost of seed.

Meghanigatign. Production is still largely unmechanized in the region. Only 44.1%
(n=93) of peasants use any type of mechanized equipment, including trucks for
transportation. For 85 cases, 20% cultivate using only a barretdn (digging stick); 74.1%
use draft animals and a hand-held plow, and 1.1% use a combination of these. Among
those who use mechanized equipment (generally tractors and trucks), 22.0% reported that
their access to this equipment has worsened over the last ﬁve years. The rising cost of
renting tractors and for transporting their crops was a common complaint.

Few producers in the research communities have beneﬁtted from FIMAIA. One
caﬁero obtained a truck to deliver sugar cane-with the understanding that it would
beneﬁt cafieros of the ejido. Many cal'leros complain, however, that this individual
charges high quotas to deliver cane, and that he uses the truck for his personal gain.
Timely delivery of cane is crucial, since the mill will only accept cane within 72 hours

of cutting. The poor distribution of transport vehicles for sugar cane has plagued the

299
region for many years.

W. The Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos
(SARH) is highly centralized and powerful in matters pertaining to the agrarian sector.
It oversees irrigation and technical aspects of production, making major decisions about
projects, prices, and distribution of resources. It is respected among peasants for
provision of irrigation water: SARH supplied half the funding for the dam that was
under construction in 1991 and has assisted in the building of irrigation canals for the
ejidos. Various peasants also recognized improvements instigated by SARH, such as
derocking the soil, and planting of improved grazing pastures.

Forty hectares of Ejido Vicente Pinto are irrigated (each half receives irrigation in
alternate years) and 60 hectares of Ejido Felipe Chavez.102 Each ejidatario has only
one (Ocotillo) or two (Chiapa) hectares of irrigated land; arrendatarios and medieros are
more likely to rent rainfed lands for their crops. Irrigation water derives from the river,
Las Grullas, whose ﬂow is controlled by a small dam to the north of the villages. This
darn dates from 1921 and is in disrepair.103 The irrigation canals which channel water
to the ﬁelds were cemented shortly after the 1985 ﬁeld research. The dam under
construction in 1991 will irrigate only the southern portions of the two ejidos, thus water
remains a scarce resource. The comisariados of each ejido are charged with regulating
the distribution of irrigation waters, although peasants frequently complain that they do
not receive their allotment, because other ejidatarios have paid bribes to receive more
than their share.

Marketing. CONASUPO, the state-subsidized marketing institution, plays a double

role in the research communities. First, it maintains a chain of peasant-operated, rural

 

mAnother 90 hectares receive irrigation, but are not classiﬁed as irrigated by SARH.

“”Ejido Vicente Pinto petitioned SARH in 1978 for rehabilitation of this dam. The project was
approved, but never implemented.

300
outlet stores that sell basic products at guaranteed prices; these are being phased out with
privatization. Today, most peasants claim that prices in the rural stores are higher than
in the city markets. On the rural stores, one informant remarked, "They sell just as
expensive, they only say it is CONASUPO".

Secondly, it purchases maize and beans from peasants, then warehouses and markets
these products. Although CONASUPO offers a somewhat better price for maize
($680,000 in 1990), it makes demands and applies discounts—-policies which encourage
peasants to sell to intermediaries (acaparadores/coyotes). Intermediaries were paying
$600,000 per ton in 1990. CONASUPO does not accept maize on the cob (olote); the
acaparadores purchase it on the cob. CONASUPO discounts maize for a variety of
conditions. Many complained that CONASUPO buys maize at $600,000, then sells it
for $800,000. One person complained, "Now, it is not CONASUPO, it is ROBASUPO".
Very few peasants sell their crop to CONASUPO, for reasons proliﬁcally discussed
during interviews:

For the maize, they discount the cob, the truck is in a line all day. They test

the moisture and spoilage with tubes; they weigh 1/4 kilo and they count grain

by grain. For moisture, they discount 5-10% per ton. CONASUPO does not

buy the cob. Now some plant no more than for family use.

There are coyotes; they loan money for the harvest--CONASUPO, no.

For CON ASUPO, it lacks much adaptation to the peasants. They have many

weaknesses. It has not been able to get rid of the coyotaje because they give

more facilities. A while back I went to CONASUPO and they wanted to
discount me a lot. Thus I went with a coyote. Here, CONASUPO does not
respond to our needs.

W. The Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria (SRA) concerns itself only
with ejidatarios. Peasants without land remain estranged from the agency: "I don’t
know about [the SRA], it helps the ejidatarios”; ”I don’t have any beneﬁt--it is for pure
ejidatarios". It is perceived in ambivalent terms by landed peasants: on the one hand,

they received their land and are administered through the SRA; on the other hand, the

301
SRA represents a bureaucracy that exerts control from beyond the village and it has
failed to turn over lands to the ampliacion already granted by presidential decree.
Members of the collective frequently complained of this irregularity:

It is treating us in the ampliacion with pure deceit. We have no lawoyer, but

a rich one arrives with his money, and they make an amparo.l It is

tramming the law of the Agrarian Reform. They don’t deliver anything to us,

it is only on the side of the rich.

We see and we feel that the person that is there supports the pequel‘l'a propiedad

more than the ejido. They lie. The money [bribes] enters on the side of the

pequei'la propiedad.

Twenty-ﬁve years ago, I was involved in politics. All this I realized--lies,

treason, pure deceit. The Agrarian Reform is to support the country; however,

it is to the contrary.

Members of the ampliacién held a very tenuous relationship to their land resources.
Despite a presidential decree granting them land, wealthy landowners have paid bribes
and taken legal action to prevent redistribution of their lands to the collective group. A
much more sinister threat to the land base was under way at the close of the ﬁeld season,
however, as plans were being made in the national capital to privatize the ejido (the

constitutional amendment to Article took effect on January 6, 1992). Once government

regulation of agrarian reform land terminates, land may become an even scarcer

resource.
W. The Liga de Comunidades Agrarias comprises the state-level

political organization of the CNC. Few informants were closely involved in, or
knowledgeable about the Liga. The institution evokes strong feelings of nationalism,
however, exempliﬁed in the discourse of the peasant who commented, "[The Liga] is the
mother of all the ejidos. When we have a problem, we go to Mama Liga". More

skeptical informants offered a different series of comments:

 

lo‘Amparo is a legal action, frequently used by wealthy landowners to block expropriation of their land
for the beneﬁt of ejidos.

302

In eight years, it has given nothing, since we received the land in the
ampliacion.

It is pure politics, it does not execute the law.

Political power is also a resource, yet one that offers limited access within the
ofﬁcial institutions, such as the Liga. The leader of the Liga was highly criticized for
his lack of support to cal'leros in 1984, as they struggled for the freedom of the jailed
union leader, Crecencio Nuﬁez (see Chapter VII).

W. The linkages between caﬁeros and the sugar mill have been
closely examined; these include: total control of the mill over credit, inputs, mechanized
equipment, harvest labor, technical assistance, the production and harvest schedule, and
sale of the product. The mill is increasingly denying credit and enforcing new
production demands, which place the burden of increasing productive efﬁciency on the
producer. In turn, the mill has not modernized or improved the factory which ultimately
determines the caﬁeros’ economic outcome.

Given the dependency of peasants on an array of agrarian agencies for dealing with
land disputes, irrigation and technical extension, credit, marketing, and agricultural
inputs, informants (n = 100) were asked to rate these agencies for how well they help
peasants (5=very good, 4=good, 3=average, 2=bad, l=very bad). These evaluations
are graphed below; what is signiﬁcant is that the institution with the very lowest rating

is the sugar mill:

303

 

 

 

 

Figure 9. Peasant Evaluation of Agrarian Agencies.

The economic crisis has generated considerably more negative attitudes toward rural
agencies, which are particularly sharpened against the privatized sugar mill. The depth
and breadth of the crisis will now be shown through comparative analysis of costs of
production, proﬁts from sale, and debts incurred. The most relevant factors which
diminish proﬁts, and thus capital accumulation, are low prices and high costs of
production. Of the seven major components of the production systems in the villages,
the cost of cane was in third place in 1985-86, rose to the most expensive crop in 1989-

90, and was surpassed only by jicama and tomatoes in 1990—91:

304

 

Table 45. Mean Costs of Production per Hectare (in pesos).

 

Cane
Cattle
Maize
Ca-ote
Jica-a
Tomato
Beans

l221t2l

$2,177,973
$1,532,593
792,487
$1,592,929
$3,406,033
$2,816,000
5 801,000

$

(n=25)
(n=37)
(n=62)
(n=14)
(n=10)
(n= 5)
(n= 5)

1.23M

$1,515,287
577,714
$48,845
$1,292,005
$ 800,000
$1,504,762
5 350,000

$
$

(n=27)
(n=28)
(n=78)
(n=26)
(n= 7)
(n= 5)
(n= 2)

128%

$181,613 (n=30)
$ 66,380 (n= 7)
$115,719 (n=21)
$337,180 (n=10)
$500,000 (n= 1)
$ 50,000 (n='7)

 

How well each of these components contributes to net earnings, and thus production

and reproduction of the household is assessed by subtracting costs from the price received

for the harvest. Given the rate of inﬂation in Mexico during the years of concern, data

are adjusted to the U.S. dollar to facilitate comparison:

 

Table 46. Average Net Earnings per Hectare (U .S. dollars).‘°5

 

Cane
Cattle
Maise
Camote
Jica-a
Tbllto
Beans

12%21

S 117.
$ 334.
$ 4.
$
$ 47.
-$722.
-$101.

32
14
73

.20

40
67
25

M

-$ 83.
S 412.
-$ 3.
S 580.
$ 921.
$1082.
S 17.

39
22
43
71
33
82
39

M

$169.78
$616.20
$258.58
$ 1.97
$15,000
-$250.00

 

Sugar cane evolved from the fourth most proﬁtable crop in 1986 to the least

proﬁtable, with net losses of $83.39 in 1990, taking second place in 1991, yet still below

the net earnings of 1986. Cattle has provided a relatively high net income in most years,

 

“”The net earnings are given in U.S. dollars. The rate of exchange varies daily and increases
throughout the year. For ease of calculation, an approximate exchange rate of $200 to the dollar is used
for 1985-86, $2300 pesos to the dollar in 1989-90, and $3000 pesos to the dollar for 1990-91.

 

 

305
yet earnings declined over the ﬁve year period. Earnings for maize, camote, and jicama
are minimal, whereas tomato and beans are subject to net losses in 1991. Tomatoes,
grown only by few producers, suffered heavy losses due to plague conditions. Clearly,
as cane production becomes less economically viable, alternative production strategies
aimed at commoditization are limited.

Costs relative to the value of the product (costs/ gross proﬁt) provide a comparative
measure for discerning changes through time, without correcting for inﬂation. These
costs have always been uncommonly high for sugar cane. In comparison with other
crops, although sugar cane surpassed all other crops in 1985-86 and 1989-90, this was

no longer true in 1990—91:

 

Table 47 . Costs as 3 Proportion of the Value of the Crop.‘°°

 

1222-21. 1222-21 1285:85

Cane 94.5% 124.8% 83.3%
Cattle 69.5% 42.3% 45.1%
Maise 72.4% 82.2% 73.9%
Camote 183.4% 114.6% 64.2%
Jicana 101.2% 21.1% -

Toeatoes 494.4% 39.4% 14.3%
Beans 69.5% 104.2% -

 

Although a decrease in the costs of production as a proportion of the value of the
product occurs for sugar cane, maize, and beans between 1989-90 and 1990-91, in every
production strategy except maize, the ability to accumulate through commoditization has
drastically dropped since 1985-86. Below, the four major components of the productive
strategies present in the research communities--cane, cattle, maize, and camote-are

compared by percentage changes in these data and in the proportion of producers whose

 

'°‘In the case of cattle raising, this value is represented by proﬁts from the sale of meat and milk. The
value of maize retained for household consumption is included with proceeds from sale.

306
costs were equal to or exceeded the value of the product:

 

Table 48. Percent Change in Costs as 8 Proportion of the Value
of the Crop, 1985-86 to 1990-91.

 

LEM/lam ‘7 Pr (1 Wih 2 V l e
Cane + 11.2% t 46.7%
Cattle + 24.4% 1 5.2%
Maize - 1.5% 1* 10.7%
Canote +119.2% t 10.8%

 

Despite some overall improvement in cane earnings for 1990-91, 60% of caﬁeros
experienced costs greater than the value of their crop; only the three tomato producers--
all of whom suffered losses, exceed this ﬁgure. In 1989-90, 86.2% of caﬁeros had costs
greater than the value of their crop; with the exception of tomatoes in 1990-91, no other
crop, in any of the three years compared, has left more than 50% of its producers with
costs that exceed the value of the crop. The proportion of producers with costs greater
than the value of the crop is the lowest (13.3 %) among cane producers in 1985-86,
indicating dramatic changes in the viability of sugar cane as a production strategy from
1985-86 to 1990-91. The relative changes, compared to other crops, suggest that sugar
cane is differentially affected, vis-a-vis other crops, in the context of the larger economic
crisis. It may be concluded that the economic crisis alone is not responsible for adverse
conditions affecting cane producers.

Debt and bankruptcy are an increasing reality for rural producers. The mean debt
of those peasants who incurred negative results, reveals that cattle production has been
the primary contributor to bankruptcy. Cane took second place by 1989-90, and the
relative debt for maize has experienced gradual increase. Data are given in U.S. dollars

to correct for inﬂation:

307

 

Table 49. Mean Debt per Producer, 1985-86 to 1990—913‘"

 

122m 12am 128286
Cane $266.57 $1446.10 $545.38
(n=15) (n=25) (n-19)
Cattle $5277.09 $2097.93 $18,501.95
(n=13) (n=5) (n=3)
Maize $1037.91 $930.69 $803.32
(n=22) (n=15) (n=11)
Camote $49.25 $65.80 $756.65
(M3) (M6) (M6)

 

Debts owed for cane, as a percentage of total agricultural debts, averaged 76.9 %
in 1985-86, 80.5% in 1989-90, and 65.8% in 1990-91, for those car‘ieros who owed
debts. When the total debt of all producers is calculated, caﬁeros show a signiﬁcantly
higher debt. The mean for non—caﬁeros (n=67) is $1,439,652, and for caﬁeros (n=33),
$5,230,701 (t=-2.32, p=.023). Outstanding debts, not ﬁgured into net income and
expenses, clearly place car‘ieros in a disadvantaged position. N inety-one percent of
car'leros hold outstanding debts; of these, 72.72% had debts for cane in 1991, ranging
from $1,000,000 to $45,000,000 pesos. The government abrogated the obligation to
cultivate cane within supply zones in 1975. Until then, the reproduction of the system
had been guaranteed by law. Since then, the subjection of peasants to cane production
takes other forms. Debt now keeps some caﬁeros tied to the mill who would otherwise
prefer to quit. Debt is less a factor for landless peasants who have no access to credit
either from the sugar mill or BANRURAL. Participant observation in both 1984-85 and
1990-91 allows the conclusion that a greater number of all peasants are relying on loans

from friends, neighbors and relatives than before.

 

“"Data are for those producers who incurred debts. U.S. dollars are calculated using an approximate
exchange rate of $200 pesos to the dollar for 1985-86, $2300 for 1989-90, $3000 for 1990-91.

308

Within the larger economic crisis that affects the entire production system, the
relatively more disadvantageous position of sugar cane is often compared to previous
years. To take one example, a car'iero who decided to abandon cane production in 1988
because he no longer earned a proﬁt, compares that year with better times in the past:

I was a caflero from 1960 until 1988. Since three years ago when I quit, I

already had pure debt. The last harvest that I delivered, I didn’t even approach

them to see if I had a proﬁt or debt. I believe that I did not have a debt or
they would already have visited me to demand that I pay the bill. At ﬁrst, the
government did help the caﬁeros and we were relieved. I remember that in

1970, when I went to deliver the cane, like in August, they did my liquidation

and they gave me $23,000 pesos. At ﬁrst I was scared. I thought that they

had made an error. In my house I guarded the money for a week and they did

not come from the mill to reclaim it. Then I began to take it to pay what I

owed in one place and another and I spent $3000. And with what was left

over, $20,000, I built the house, everything, from walls, roof, ﬂoor.... Now

not even the big car‘ieros earn, it doesn’t give them proﬁts, only pure debts.

Cane production gradually evolved in the zone into a culturally embedded productive
strategy, ultimately, bringing many caﬁeros to bankruptcy. The contradiction between
this ideologized past and the present reality are striking in the words on one young
caﬁero: ”I remember when I was a boy and they said ’God and Cane’; that’s what they
said. I was a boy and I thought, ’What does this mean?’ Well, in that time, yes, they
proﬁted. And now, everyone is left with pure debt. "

Cane is contributing a smaller proportion of income to families. Whereas it
comprised 63.48% of cafl'eros’ agricultural incomes in 1985-86, in 1989-90, cane reduced
net earnings by 51.28%, and made up 62.1% of net crop losses (compared with 18% of
losses in 1985-86). In 1990—91, 32.25% of car‘ieros’ net crop income derived from cane
earnings, and for those with net losses, 24.73% were due to sugar cane. Cattle-raising,
on the other hand, has increased in relative contribution, from 84.08% in 1985-86 to
104.81% in 1990-91. Maize contributes 15.06% more, whereas earnings from camote,

relative to other crops, have dramatically decreased:

309

 

Table 50. Average Relative Contribution of Crops to Total Crop Income.108

 

1222-21 128221! 12828.6
Cane
Net Profit 32.25% (n=15) -51.28% (n=18) 63.48% (n=27)
Net Loss 24.73% (n= 9) 62.10% (n-10) 18.02% (n= 5)
Cattle
Net Profit 104.81% (n=27) 129.29% (n=26) 84.08% (n= 7)
Net Loss -73.83% (n= 6) 63.65% (n= 4) 15.30% (n= 1)
Maize
Net Profit 52.08% (n=38) 31.27% (n=51) 37.02% (n=15)
Net Loss 113.56% (n=20) 53.36% (n=20) 122.10% (n= 2)
Camote
Net Profit 17.07% (n-ll) 72.19% (n=21) 72.01% (n= 8)
Net Loss 220.54% (n =5) 89.58% (n= 5) 150.40% (n= 1)
Jicama
Net Profit 71.62% (n= 6) 51.09% (n= 7) -
Net Loss- -182.80% (n= 3) - -
Tomato
Net Profit 82.30% (n= 5) 75.10% (n= 5) 98.40% (n= 1)
Net Loss 99.60% (n= 3) - -
Beans
Net Profit -62.85% (as 2) 22.40% (n= 2) -3.60% (n= 1)
Net Loss 46.13% (n= 3) - -

 

 

lo"Rows that indicate 'net proﬁt“ refer only to those cases who had a net proﬁt for all of their crops
combined. Rows that indicate "net loss” refer only to those cases who had a net loss for all of their crops
combined. Due to multicropping, these ﬁgures may contain combinations of proﬁt and/or loss for any one
crop. If the producer had a '0' balance, he/she is not considered.

A word of explanation is in order for the positive and negative results on any one crop. For
producers with a podtive net balance, if the crop earnings are positive, they indicate that crop’s
contribution to the net income. If the earnings are negative, they indicate the proportion to which losses
reduced net income. A few cases result in a contribution of over 100%. This can occur, for example, if
the proﬁts for cattle are offset by losses from sugar cane, thus reducing the total net income to less than
thepnﬁhsnmdeforauﬂe

For producers with a negative net balance, if the crop also had losses, then the contribution of that
debt to the total debt is given as a positive ﬁgure. For crops with a positive balance, but a negative total
net income, a negative ﬁgure indicates the proportion that crop contributed to reducing the total debt. If
the crop’s contribution is a fraction of 100% , then the total debt was greater than the proﬁt for that crop;
if it is greater than 100%, then the total debt is smaller than the proﬁt for the crop. Both the complexity
of the cropping system and the high degree of insolvency among peasants make the analysis more
cowwﬂumd.

3 10
The contribution of cane to family income (for those who had positive net incomes)

is more clearly appeciated graphically:

120.0

 

 

1ND

 

 

80.0

 

 

 

 

 

60.0

40.0

 

 

20.0

 

 

 

0.0

 

 

 

ICane ICattle lMaize

Figure 10. Percent of Net Income Contributed by Crops.

The proportion of producers with positive and negative household balances (income-

expenses) were calculated; the data reveal the following distribution:

macros Cancros
Negative balance 46.3 % 42.4 %
0 balance 19.4% 15.2%
Positive balance 34.4% 42.4%

Given the landed position of cafieros (49% of the sample are landless; 27 % of the
sample in 1991 were car‘ieros, all of whom own land), a greater difference in results
would be expected than is found in the household balance. Moreover, among caﬁeros

alone, 54.55 % had a net household deﬁcit (83.33% of these had either negative or no

 

 

 

311
earnings from their cane), thus 45.45% had a net balance (yet 60% of these also had no
earnings or debts from cane). Cane proﬁts sustained caﬁero families until 1986. Since
then, there has been a decrease of 18.18% in the number of caiieros in the research
communities. Abandonment of cane production not only threatens the reproduction of
this crop in the supply zone, but it fails to reproduce conditions for access to credit,
agricultural inputs, insurance and social security beneﬁts, and involvement in producer
organizations. These data do not indicate the presence of conditions for cane production
as a viable household economic strategy within the context of state divestment and
reprivatization of the sugar sector. This chapter will now turn to individual actions taken
by peasants, as active human agents, in the dialectical, transformative process of

redeﬁning their relationship with the sugar mill.

Individual Strategies of Resistance

Within the context of a larger agrarian crisis, the severity of the crisis in the sugar
sector is acted upon by cane producers in the research communities. After examining
the ideological matrix of sugar cane production, analysis will proceed to address how this
ideology becomes materially manifested in strategic actions taken on the part of peasants
to defend their economic interests.

Thirty cane producers discussed the advantages and disadvantages of sugar cane
production during interviews. They identiﬁed 53 different disadvantages, and only 23
advantages; 43.3% said there were no advantages, and only one person said there were
no disadvantages. This stands in stark contrast to 1984, when 15 informants identiﬁed
50 advantages, and only 14 disadvantages to producing sugar cane. Credit, equipment,
and cutters provided by the mill were the most important advantages given in 1984
(24%), followed by social security and medical beneﬁts (22 %), and high earnings (14 %).
The key disadvantages in 1984 concerned:

 

 

 

 

312

 

Table 51. Disadvantages of Cane Production, 1984 (n=15).

 

Delivery problems 43%
Accidental burnings 21%
Charges made by the mill 21%
Debts 7%
Low price 7%

 

In 1990, aside from the 43% who claimed no advantages, medical insurance was
seen as the primary advantage (40%). Assistance, including credit, advance payments,
and inputs were second in importance (23 %). Disadvantages were discussed more

profusely:

 

Table 52. Disadvantages of Cane Production, 1990 (n =30).

 

No profit, low price 90.00%
Mill in disrepair 20.00%
Accidently burned cane 16.67%
Discounts 13.33%
Lack of control over production 13.33%
High interest rates 6.67%
Loss of benefits 6.67%
New cutting requirements 3.33%
No disadvantages 3.33%

 

Lack of proﬁtability heads the list of disadvantages. Lengthy interviews with
cafieros of the zone yield in-depth insight into how these producers view the increasingly
disadvantageous production of sugar cane. A caﬁero of 20 years asserted that even with
high yields, he earned no proﬁt, claiming, "Never have I had a thing hit so hard as now.
But we have a commitment to the country because we have to produce the sugar that is
consumed in Mexico". Lack of proﬁtability has affected not only ejidatarios, but many
of the wealthy and powerful private landowners are reported to owe tens of millions of

pesos to the sugar mill. A caﬁero from the village described one case:

 

313

Before, there was a great cane grower--besides he is a pequeﬁo propietario.

All the members of the family possess much, much land. They have many

trucks, cargadoras, tractors, and their own crew of cane cutters--there were still

approximately 70-80 three years ago. Now they quit being cane growers and
now they are going to plant their lands in pastures because, according to him,

no longer is the cane proﬁtable.

The exploitative nature of cane production is ideologically located in the cultural
construction of meaning. The comisariado referred to sugar production as "sembrando
la chingada".‘°° Moreover, being a cane producer is an anxiety-producing
phenomenon. Caﬁeros worry about whether their cane will be accidentally burned, and
if so, whether it will be cut on time, delivered to the mill, and be discounted. A car‘iera
contrasted the everyday anxiety associated with cane production with a particular year
when she rented out her cane:

If it gets out on time, if the cane is delivered...to sell the cane, we rented the

cane...a-a-h, I slept well. Whether it would burn or whether it would not

burn, to me, it didn’t matter. Other years I heard the blazing, that the cane

was burning, and man! Two times we saved it, two times we escaped, it was

already burning. One part burned, some 50 square meters, and we escaped.

And the other time in the Milpillera, and we managed to escape, two times we

saved the cane. We have the responsibility, and until May the ﬁeld [can] burn

by itself. Imagine with no more than a little match. Man!

State retraction of subsidies from the sugar sector, together with privatization of the
sugar industry, is increasingly marginalizing the majority of producers of its raw
material. Peasants in the research region are challenging their increasing exploitation
through the cultural production of knowledge and through diverse forms of resistance.
Chapter VI documented and analyzed collective strategies of resistance to the
transformations in the sugar sector; peasant collective organization was seen to be

weakened vis-a-vis the structures of state and capitalist domination. Nonetheless, peasant

 

m"The 'chingada" is a metaphor that is embedded in the history of Mexico. Mexicans often refer to
themselves as 'hijos de la chingada'-the mestizo product of the Spanish conquerors and the indigenous
population. More speciﬁcally, Cortes was aided in the conquest by his indigenous mistress, Malinche, who
served as his interpreter. The union is metaphorically seen as the rape of the Mexican people by the
Spaniards.

 

 

314

producers, as active agents, utilize a variety of individual strategies of resistance, to
challenge the structures of power and domination. The remainder of this chapter argues
that the aggregation of these acts has a signiﬁcant political and economic impact.
Moreover, their intent is polyvalent; ethnographic ﬁeldwork and participant observation
lend support to the political intent of resistance, yet their weapons simultaneously
disclose resistance to surplus extraction, a means to feed a hungry family, and attempts
at capital accumulation. These strategies include: 1) abandonment of cane production;
2) reduction of hectares; 3) changes in land use; 4) use of cane for cattle; 5) rental of
cane ﬁelds; 6) appropriation of agricultural inputs provided by the mill; and 7) bribes.
It will be argued that lack of proﬁtability in the sugar sector encourages strategies that
fail to augment productivity. Such strategies of resistance spill over into other parts of
the production system, dramatically changing the way land is being used.

MW. Well over half of the cai'leros (53.6%) claimed that it would
be better to terminate cane production in the zone. The rationale for terminating or

continuing cane production was elaborated on by 97 of the informants:

gentinee:

Provides work 31.96 %
Importance of sugar 16.49%
Cane pays more 4.12%
Medical insurance 2.06%
Until collective members retire 2.06 %
Cane is beneﬁcial to environment 2.06%
Use cane for cattle feed 1.03%
Terminate:

No proﬁt, debts 47.42%
Nwd to diversify production 5.15%
Cane is damaging to the environment 4.12%
Poor condition of the mill 2.06%

Differential insertion into the forms of production and land tenure inﬂuence these
choices. Wage laborers stand to lose a source of work if cane were to be abandoned in

the zone. Sharecroppers and renters would experience mixed results--loss of wage labor,

315
but improved access to lands no longer tied up in monocrop cane production. The
largest portion of car'ieros would choose to terminate cane production. Lack of ﬁnancial
viability is the primary reason for abandoning cane in the region:

The cane has now changed a lot because before it paid--little, but it paid. If
they don’t give any beneﬁts like before, why continue with the cane?

This business has to end. Those of the sugar mill are going to lose much
money and we are going to bear the hunger, because if it ends, a lot of work
in the country will end too, and there is going to be much scarcity. It is a
difﬁcult situation because if the cane is abandoned because it gives no proﬁt
and leaves pure debts, we don’t produce sugar, and this hurts the nation. But
no way are we going to continue putting ourselves in debt. If we continue, we
cut our own throats, but if we quit, also. What do we do?

[If we quit] then one dedicates himself to cattle and the country is reforested,
because now it is already destroying the trees and animals. We should pull up
the cane and quit this bad business, business for others. The car‘iero is a fool
if he continues.

The cane has to disappear. This product is going to fuck us.

The last year. . .they charged me a bill that I did not owe. I got desperate and
I said " go fuck yourselves” and I quit.

It is better to hold a strike and not sell anything to the sugar mill. When things
get more difﬁcult, the only thing that we can do is wield the machete and get
rid of the cane. This would give a severe blow to the sugar mill.

We can hold a strike and we are left with nothing until the mill decides to give
a better price. If we do not deliver the cane, and we leave millions of debt
with the mill, the sugar mill receives a severe blow.

If it is not agreeable with us, we can abandon the cane, we will make the sugar
mill disappear.

The signiﬁcance of these last three statements should not be overlooked. They
provide corroborative evidence that abandonment of cane is not mere withdrawal on the
part of ”passive victims" of privatization; rather, abandonment is a strategic action taken
on the part of peasant cane producers against the sugar mill. Nor is their offstage
discourse empty posturing, for it materializes in acts that are often not recognized as
political. It will be recalled that 2598 hectares of land were taken out of production
between 1986 and 1991, a decline of 24.5% of the zone. Should abandonment become

 

316

more widespread, this trend could potentially undermine the future of the sugar industry.

While the larger economic crisis has indeed limited the viability of alternative
production strategies in the region, peasants may not continue blindly for lack of
alternatives, but they may choose to do so for speciﬁc purposes. Several of these reasons
will be examined.

MW. The high proportion of caﬁeros who maintain
that it would be better to terminate production raises the interesting question as to why

they continue. Medical beneﬁts turn out to be the primary reason that caﬁeros persist:

 

Table 53. Reasons for Continuing With Cane Production (n=28).

 

Medical insurance 39.29%
Member of collective 21.43%
Already quit or plans to 21.43%
Unable to quit because of cane debt 10.71%
Lack other production alternatives 7.14%
Keep cane for cattle feed 7.14%
Keep cane for earnings 3.57%
Keep cane for benefits 3.57%

 

Medical insurance looms large in the consideration of whether to continue
production or not. Asked speciﬁcally what they would do if medical insurance were
withdrawn, 75 % of caﬁeros said they would terminate production. Members of the
ampliacion will collect social security from the mill when many of them retire in several
years; the collective unit is holding out only for this purpose. Members of the collective
voted not to abandon the cane and those who disagree have no choice but to remain.
One member explained, "The cane has insurance-this is all the advantage”. To retain
medical insurance, the strategy has been to cut back, maintaining only enough hectares
for them to retain rights to the insurance. If, as mill ofﬁcials argue, larger plots of land

are more economically efﬁcient, this situation promotes a strategy that reduces productive

 

 

 

317
efﬁciency.

Given that medical insurance is a primary motive to continue, is this advantage not
offset by the huge debts many car'ieros hold? Few caﬁeros have considered this question,
although one person raised the issue: "They do not abandon it for the social security,
but for this, it costs them more having the insurance from the mill". Medical insurance
outside of the mill costs $510,000 per family, per year. Caﬁeros have $801.54 per ton
of cane deducted from their liquidation for medical insurance (thus they do pay for it).
The break even point is 636 tons of cane; if the cal‘rero delivers less, then insurance is
cheaper through the mill. In 1991, 30 cafleros in Ocotillo and Chiapa delivered under
636 tons of cane; only 6 delivered over 636 tons. The criteria for this decision thus
becomes largely a matter of the debt one must bear, in order to maintain insurance. If
advance payments were dropped (as the mill has attempted to do), 63 % would quit.
Only 11% would quit if the mill no longer gave them bags of sugar--they recognize that
they are discounted the price of the sugar at liquidation anyway.

WW. Despite their many criticisms of the sugar mill and cane
production, many peasants rationalize the need to maintain the industry for the economic
viability of the zone. The mill and associated cane ﬁelds are a tremendous source of
employment in a job-scarce environment. They believe that if the mill stops functioning,
poverty in the region will increase. Many also fear what would happen both to the
supply and the price of sugar, should the mill go out of business. The price of sugar is
kept low by the government, but as one car'lero explained, " It would be better to pay
more for a kg. of sugar in order to continue maintaining a means of work for many
people that have no other alternative employment" . Strong differences of opinion exist;
many, especially non-ejidatarios, believe that diversiﬁcation of the crop system would
supply more jobs, more land to rent, and decrease land rent.

W. What would car‘ieros do with their land if they quit cane

 

318
production? This chapter has documented important changes in land use as cane land has
been taken out of production; much of it was converted to grazing or maize. The
following statistics report the proportion of cafleros (n = 30) that would convert their land
to various uses if they were to quit; many of the responses were combinations of

different crops:

Maize 73.33 %
Pasture 53.33 %
Camote 30.00%
Beans 23.33 %
Tomato 16.67%
chama 10.00%
Punta“° 6.67%
Potatoes 3.33 %
Papaya 3.33 %

One caﬁero, with six hectares of cane, converted ﬁve hectares to pasture, maize, and
beans, in 1988. He was no longer making a proﬁt with the cane, yet retained one
hectare for his cattle. Now that he is no longer a caﬁero, he explains, "I am searching
for the way to improve with other crops than cane”. Yet another response was,
"Whatever crop, only that it is not cane".

WM. As cattle raising expands at the expense of sugar cane, some
producers have sold their cane for cattle feed, or alternatively, rented the land for cattle
grazing. One car‘iero with a 1990 debt of a million pesos, cut his cane, sold it for cattle
feed, paid off his debt, and was left with earnings of $800,000. One of the few wealthy
cattle raisers in Ocotillo, who retains between 25-40 calves at a time, prepares balanced
feed for his cattle using sugar cane. In association with an ejidatario from the ampliacion
who provides the cane and grinds it, they are quite successful in this economic venture.
Others sell the punta de cal‘ia left in the ﬁelds after harvest. The going rate in 1991 was

$80,000-100,000 per hectare. Further evidence for extensive use of cane for cattle feed

 

"°"Punta" is the tassel of cane used for cattle feed.

 

319
was found in the municipal seat. A man in Cuauhtémoc had purchased a molino
(grinding machine) for $1,800,000, now rents 1 hectare of cane, paying $1,000,000 per
hectare, and grinds the cane for his own cattle. One of the caﬁeros of the village planted
one hectare of new cane, speciﬁcally to feed to his cattle. They explain: ”In other
years, many had parcels of cane. It no longer pays them. They prefer to cut it, grind
it, and give it to the cows instead of delivering it to the sugar mill”.

A caﬁero from Ocotillo relayed the following account to the researcher:

When I went to a pueblo, I saw the cane of Nacho, beautiful, the cane, tall,

and thick, and there were cattle in the cane. I went to him and I said that the

cows had gotten into the cane and he answered me, ”No, it’s that I already quit

being a caflero and better to give it to the cows”.

A powerful, wealthy caﬁero of the region, who had raised cane for many years,
converted his cane to cattle-grazing. The conversion of cane to grazing and animal feed
can be seen as a form of resistance, which denies the sugar mill the opportunity to
extract surplus value from the caﬁero.

W. Given the current situation, 31% of caﬁeros alleged that it
was better to rent their cane land out, than to work it themselves. Privatization has
encouraged this strategy. Renting the cane out frees car‘ieros of worries and problems:
"I rent the cane because if I manage it, it does not pay me. For this I sell it, well I got
rid of the problems". They refer to the money they receive in rent as ”clean money" and
the burdens of cane production are passed on to others. Increased economic insolvency
also encourages the sale of ejidal parcels for short-term beneﬁts, a practice which spells
long-term economic disaster.

Land is often rented to wealthier producers, who live outside of the community.
This practice is increasing the concentration of lands in the hands of a few individuals.

Ironically, mill ofﬁcials complain that it is the wealthy renters of large tracts of land who

are least concerned with increasing yields, since they already reap huge proﬁts from their

 

320
concentrated control of the land base. The lack of concern for productive efﬁciency is
expressed by the comisariado who discussed the rental of cane lands with the researcher:

Some car‘ieros have more cane and they rent many parcelas. They ask the

sugar mill for many loans and they use all the money in the ﬁelds that they

want, and of course, they give preference to their own. They don’t attend the
cane well, the production drops, and they don’t beneﬁt it. They only leave the
cane in debt, the little parcel of the screwed ejidatario and they tell him, "Look

at me, I was left with debt; I no longer want the land", and they leave the poor

one full of debts. Some cruel ones that rent the cane land of others don’t have

any interest in the region. They spend less on labor, don’t make the

guardarrayas well, they burn more parcelas, and they burn the trees too, as if

they had no interest in the land. They only have interest in seeing how much
money they can squeeze from the parcela for their own beneﬁt.

Apathy is particularly high in one of the research communities, where one individual
has rented up the parcelas of 10 cai'leros. One of the car'leros from the collective (whose
members show little interest in the cane) remarked, ”Antonio has all the cane-why ﬁght
for the price?" These factors contribute to lack of interest in the producers’ union as
well. Noting the lack of attendance at a union meeting, the union representative from
Ocotillo retorted, "What a joke it is--there are ﬁve of us who do not rent out the cane"
(l2 caﬁeros of the 23 in Ocotillo did not rent their cane in 1991); for this, few attend the
meetings. Without active interest and participation in the union, the power of collective
action is diminished.

AW. Some strategies of resistance contribute to
lowered yields. Because the cost of fertilizer has increased over 100 % from the year
before privatization to the 1991 harvest, a high proportion of producers have chosen to
sell the fertilizer they receive from the mill, rather than apply it to the cane (it is often
sold to non-caﬁeros who have no other access to this resource). Mill ofﬁcials attribute
this practice to laziness and irresponsibility on the part of peasants. This strategy is anti-
productive in terms of increasing cane yields, yet is rational to the person threatened

with, or already facing, bankruptcy. The mean yield for the research communities was

58.4 tons per hectare in the three years prior to privatization and 50.02 tons since,

321
resulting in a 14.6% drop in mean yields. Appropriation of fertilizer for personal use
thus denies the sugar mill potential proﬁts in the production of sugar.

Some caﬁeros merely fertilize around the outside edges of their ﬁelds, since ﬁeld
inspectors never enter the cane to see that the remainder remains untreated. Others apply
the fertilizer to their maize; maize is basic to the Mexican diet, whereas, as one peasant
explained, ”We don’t eat pure sugar”. In fact, maize growers who would otherwise be
forced to cutback on fertilizers, given the high cost, report acquiring this input from the
car'leros. These strategies are a means of taking back the surplus value extracted from
caﬁeros by the mill.

m Given the increasing demands for high yielding cane, mill policy is
encouraging the ”mordida" in order to pass through cane that otherwise would not be
accepted into the mill. A car'iera in one of the villages was told that the sucrose content
of her cane was not acceptable. The ﬁeld inspector paid her $800,000 pesos for six
hectares of cane, and passed it off at the mill as good cane. In turn, caﬁeros themselves
bribe the guardacortes to report fewer tercios, or bundles, of cane than actually out, thus
lowering wages paid to the cutters. Another tactic is for cal‘ieros to report more cutters
in the ﬁeld than there really are, thus receiving more money to pay their wages. As cane
earnings decline, bribery offers a small degree of recuperation.

These forms of peasant resistance make clear that contrary to the professed goals
of agrarian policy, soaring costs of production, technological inefﬁciency, controlled
prices, and increasing debts not only contribute to declining incomes and economic
insolvency, but encourage strategies that reduce productive efﬁciency. Peasant producers
are keenly aware of their role in providing the raw material that earns proﬁts for
multinational corporations and the national elite, while they receive diminishing returns
for their labor. As peasants renegotiate their relationship to the state and private capital,

they demonstrate that they are not merely victims of state shrinking and capitalist

 

322
penetration, but rather, active agents utilizing collective organization to press demands,
and when that fails, resorting to individual strategies of resistance.

This chapter shifted from the regional focus of Chapter VIII to the dynamic
processes of change within the two research communities. It is at the local level that
dimensions of household economics, the complexity of forms of production, and
changing productive strategies are best appreciated. Not only were community members
shown to view a decline in their economic status relative to six years earlier, but
culturally-deﬁned distinctions and economic differences between car‘ieros and non-caﬁeros
based on empirical data were less pronounced by 1990.

Peasants in the research communities are differentiated according to distinct forms
of land tenure and engage in multiplex forms of production. Important transformations
in the production system reveal deteriorating conditions for sugar cane, within the
broader economic crisis that is affecting all sectors of the rural economy. It was argued
that abandonment of cane was contributing to a diversiﬁcation of the cropping system;
former sugar cane lands are being converted largely to cattle and maize. However, low
prices, high costs, retraction of credit, unstable markets, and scarce land contribute to
declining production, cutbacks on labor and inputs, and redirection of production for
household consumption.

Real net earnings for cane have decreased since privatization of the sugar mill, as
they have for most crops. A comparison of costs relative to prices shows that most crops
have lower margins of proﬁt than in 1986, yet cane producers are affected relatively
more by a signiﬁcant increase in the number of producers whose costs are equal to or
greater than the value of the product. Cane production places a larger proportion of its
producers in debt than do other crops. Cane made up 63 % of net income in 1986, and
only 32 % in 1991, demonstrating its 1053 as a strategy for household reproduction and

capital accumulation.

 

323

Sugar cane has been culturally redeﬁned from a desirable, lucrative production
strategy to one that is the object of much contempt. As a result, peasants have chosen
to abandon or cut back on cane production, seeking diverse ways to reappropriate the
surplus value extracted from them by the mill. It was argued that the forms of resistance
they utilize deprive the mill of its raw material and contribute to concentration of land,
productive inefﬁciency, declining yields, and apathy toward the union organization. The
strategies described in this chapter may serve self-interest but at the same time they rob
the mill of potential proﬁts. These practices are generalized in the supply zone,
constituting campaigns of attrition which Scott argues: "When such acts are rare and
isolated, they are of little interest; but when they become a consistent pattern. . .we are

dealing with resistance” (1985:296).

X. CONCLUSIONS

Political Economy

The theoretical framework of political economy was utilized in this dissertation to
analyze state divestment and reprivatization of the Mexican sugar industry. Political
economy, along with other structural systemic paradigms, became the subject of critique
in a post-modemist, post-structuralist, and post-Marxist scholarly milieu. Recent
epistemological challenges to conventional theoretical frameworks propose important new
directions. The new social movements literature, for example, is more complexly
conﬁgured, focusing on ”explanations of political, social, cultural, spatial, and temporal
dimensions that are not reducible to structural determinations, economic or otherwise"
(Calderon et al. 1992:30). I have chosen in this work not to dismiss structural
determinations, but rather to appropriate the assertion that "structure and agency interact
in manifold ways and in which actors produce meanings, negotiate, and make decisions"
(Escobar and Alvarez l992:4) to a political economy perspective. Recognizing that
peasants are engaged in a cultural and political struggle for access to mechanisms of
power (Escobar and Alvarez 1992), I espouse a political economy approach that remains
sensitive to ideology and the cultural construction of meaning, without discarding the
structures of power that impinge daily on the lives of peasants. Political economy is thus
reconceptualized to take into account hegemony and ideology, structure and agency, and
yet retain the basic Marxist concept of mode of production. I argue that this
reconceptualized political economy is the most efﬁcacious approach for understanding the

transformations within the sugar sector.

324

 

 

 

325

The historical grounding of a political economy approach is crucial for
understanding the transformations within the sugar sector and the insertion of peasants
into the structures of power and domination. Throughout the colonial period, the Spanish
Crown ensured the reproduction of the luxury product by granting entrepreneurs access
to land, labor, and capital, setting into motion relations of hegemony, power, and
unequal distribution of wealth. Hegemony has not gone uncontested, but has been
confronted through a series of class conﬂicts that have reordered the relations of
production. In this process peasants were both victims and agents in constituting their
own histories. Peasants’ confrontation of the landed oligarchy in the Mexican revolution
was a dialectical process which transformed the relations of production. Out of this
revolution, the modern Mexican state emerged. It is this state which forged an organic
state-peasant relationship through redistribution of land and creation of the hegemonic
political system that continues to incorporate peasants into the structures of power.

Whereas orthodox approaches deemphasized the role of the state, I have shown that
in the sugar sector, peasants were brought into direct relations of production with the
state through state ownership of sugar mills; thus, the state must be of central theoretical
concern. This relationship transcended economic relations since the state utilizes
ideology and a centralized political party system to control peasant unions. Political
economy assumes that relations of production are dialectic, encompassing contradictory
forces which lead to structural transformation. Contradictions were inherent in the
statization of sugar mills aimed at preserving the source of peasant livelihood and the
simultaneous exploitation of peasant cane producers by the state. Inability to sustain the
reproduction of the parastatal industry with the advent of the economic crisis led to the
reprivatization of sugar mills. Thus, the sugar sector experienced a major transformation
in the relations of production with the assumption of ownership by private capital.

I argue that privatization remains problematical in the experience of peripheral

 

326
capitalist economies. Peripheral states such as Mexico are characterized by a unique set
of features which contribute to culturally embedded traditions of state involvement in the
economy. My analysis of reprivatization of the sugar industry demonstrates an
abrogation of the organic relationship between peasants and state which is vehemently
contested by peasant cane producers subject to the internationalization of capital and
reorganization of the relations of production.

Privatization of sugar mills created a peculiar class arrangement. Dialectical
materialism traditionally counterposes two classes in conﬂict over the means of
production; however, a reformulated political economy must account for the
transformation from diadic to triadic relations as the state, through continued control of
the price, interposes itself between private capital and peasant cane producers. In the
case of sugar cane producers, the object of their struggle (the price) no longer coincides
with the source of their exploitation (the sugar mill). The transformation from a diadic
state-peasant relationship where, under state control, car‘ieros simultaneously confronted
mill owner and controller of the price, allowed for a more efﬁcacious bargaining power.
Reprivatization has caused car'leros to divide their efforts between a struggle over price
with the state, and a struggle with the mill over beneﬁts and just working conditions.
Moreover, in recreating its alliance with private capital, the state controls the peasant
struggle through the PRI, the CNC, and UNPCA. This division of efforts thus weakens
the challenge to hegemony in the sugar sector.

Peasants stand poised between the state and private capital in various, contradictory
class locations. Peasant cane producers have not been separated from the means of
production; yet, exploitation occurs through the extension of credit at usurious rates.
Credit is deducted in the same liquidation process that determines payment for their raw
material, thus surplus value is skimmed off by the sugar mill in proﬁt. Although this

process was similar under state control, the political and ideological conditions of these

 

 

327
relations of production differ. The state was interested in producing surplus sugar to
earn foreign exchange-a critical necessity for peripheral capitalist social formations.
Nevertheless, during periods of social unrest, the state perpetuated its hegemony through
distribution of material rewards; it was the state that, through agrarian reform, returned
to peasants their means of production. Private capital, to the contrary, demonstrates a
primary interest in proﬁt, with even less concern for the welfare of those who provide
the mill with its raw material and those who labor in the sugar cane harvest.
Reprivatization of the sugar industry marks an important historical juncture that raises
questions about the abrogation of the state-peasant alliance and Mexico’s accommodation

to the neoliberal paradigm.

N eoliberalism and the Internationalization of Capital

N eoliberalism forms the ideological foundation for structural adjustment policies
which, international and Mexican policy makers assert, will bring positive economic
beneﬁts. I will critique several of the objectives of these policies.

1) Ineream inveetment. Neoliberal ideologists claim that the opening of the
Mexican economy to foreign investment will invigorate the economy. A particular
feature of peripheral capitalist economies is the weak state of national capital, requiring
heavy state involvement in the economy. Much of Mexico’s state-led development,
particularly during the period of statization of the sugar sector, rested on petroleum to
fuel development (a process referred to in Mexico as "sowin g petroleum”) . The world-
wide drop in oil prices was a catalyst to Mexico’s economic crisis and perilous foreign
debt. Was the objective of debt restructuring to salvage the Mexican economy?

This dissertation argues otherwise; debt-for—equity swaps served to protect debt-
holding foreign banks and transfer capital assets, in the form of privatized ﬁrms, to

international interests. Furthermore, within the sugar sector, it is the consortiums of

328
national and international capital who have purchased sugar mills. Producers’ groups
that owned sugar mills, while shown to have experienced at least, if not better, economic
results as private capital, not only have been denied a role in purchasing mills, but
cooperative mills held by the CNC were questionably declared bankrupt and passed to
the hands of private capital. The denial of participation by these groups in the
privatization process contradicts professed national policy objectives.

National policy no longer protects Mexican sovereignty through regulation of foreign
shares in Mexican ﬁrms. Consortiums, as purchasers of Mexican sugar mills, hold
franchises to international ﬁrms such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and so forth. Whether
franchises are held by national or international interests, these corporations are vertically
integrated into the international chain of production and support international interests
through their horizontal integration into the food processing industry; Ingenio Queseria
alone provides sugar as a raw material for Coca-Cola, Nestle, and a range of Mexican
sweet snack and soft drink products. Private investment, however, has not rejuvenated
the Mexican sugar industry, nor extracted it from its economic crisis. As a result,
internationalization of production subsumes peasant cane producers to the interests of
capital accumulation.

2) MW. Throughout Mexico, sugar mills remain antiquated, with little
capital investment. By 1992, four years after initiating their sale to private capital, 12
mills faced bankruptcy and 40 required restructuring of their loans (Garcia 1992).
Backlogs in the harvest, due to mechanical breakdowns are common, leaving unharvested
or undelivered cane in the ﬁelds. At Ingenio Queseria, in contradiction to the Decreto
Caﬁero, the mill in 1992 refused to compensate car‘leros for undelivered cane.

In the few years since privatization began, cane yields at Ingenio Queseria have,
indeed, shown small increases. These advances, however, are at the expense of caﬁeros

and cane cutters, rather than the sugar mill. The introduction of higher yielding varieties

 

 

329

of cane locks producers into more frequent debt, due to the shorter life of the new
varieties. Moreover, demands on harvesters are aimed to increase the proportion of
extractable sucrose for the sugar mill, while requiring more demanding labor tasks for
cutters. While this may contribute to a more ”modernized” production process, it has
not accorded a complimentary increase in wages to the most underprivileged segment
within the cane sector. "Modernization" of the sugar industry coincides with lack of
enforcement of child labor laws, payment of wages insufﬁcient to guarantee nutritional
standards, failure to comply with historically gained producers’ beneﬁts, arbitrary control
of producers’ unions, suppression of independent organizations, and non-compliance with
environmental regulations; the persistence of a non—democratic political system stands in
contradiction to the principles of modernization.

3) W. Paradoxically, although one objective of
privatization is to free up state resources for reduction of its national debt and investment
in national development, the Mexican state, through FINA, continues to subsidize the
sugar industry. These subsidies no longer support the public sector, but rather, private
capital, both national and international. Restructuring of the loans for the purchase of
sugar mills constitutes yet another arena for state subsidation to the sector. At the same
time, traditional subsidies to the peasant sector, such as guaranteed prices through
CONASUPO, extension of credit through BANRURAL, and supports, such as SAM
(Sistema Alimentaria Mexicana), to the production of basic food crops, have been
withdrawn, leaving peasants with fewer alternative options. Modiﬁcations to Article 27
of the constitution (discussed below) signify the penultimate act of state retraction from
its traditional obligations to peasants.

4) WW. Throughout history, state intervention in the
sugar sector has been an essential ingredient to capital accumulation. Mexico’s

protective tariffs have ensured proﬁtability of sugar in an unstable and ﬂuctuating world

330

sugar market. While the sector periodically faces periods of instability, various
institutions, such as UNPASA, and more recently, Azucar, S.A., acted to control
marketing and distribution. With the receding of protective tariffs, cheap sugar imports
have ﬂooded the Mexican market, jeopardizing the sale of domestic sugar and
contributing to bankruptcy of sugar mills. The absence of Azr’rcar, S.A. as a regulating
device has encouraged speculation, withholding, and alternating periods of surplus and
shortage. In the markets for both sugar and other agricultural products, peasants have
been forced to compete at a disadvantaged position with international capital.

Free market principles have not accrued, given the concentration of economic power
and oligopoly control over the production process. Domestic supply of sugar is
threatened by the increasing use of sugar and its byproducts for the processed foods
industry. Thus, mill owners may now utilize these products without placing them on the
market, freeing them from government price controls and taxes imposed through market
sale (Singelmann and Otero 1994). This is a contributive factor to Mexico’s loss of
export capacity since reprivatization.

Contrary to the notion of the free hand of the market, the state continues to control
the price of sugar. Keeping the price of this commodity low through state subsidies has
three important ramiﬁcations. One, it indicates the government’s tactic to keep wages
low through maintenance of a low-cost wage good for urban labor. Two, it prejudices
peasant cane producers who simultaneously struggle with the inﬂationary cost of
production, thus signifying a state that is today less responsive to peasant demands.
Whereas price controls have a long history, in the past they were softened through other
kinds of subsidies to the peasant sector. Third, it represents the ambivalent position of
the government and private capital in their relative positions over the price of sugar. On
the one hand, private capital has an interest in maintaining low sugar prices to the

processed foods industry, and supports government price controls. On the other hand,

331
the industry relies on sugar cane producers and must market a portion of its product, thus
higher prices are in order to ensure the source of raw material to the industry and to
realize proﬁts. The state thus serves as an arena in which class conﬂict is played out by
contending actors-«urban labor, peasants, and private capital.

5) WW Economic restructuring and
privatization have not resulted in economic efﬁciency, nor have they increased
productivity for either ﬁeld or factory. Liquidation documents form the basis for
statistical analysis of transformative changes since privatization of the sugar industry.
As shown previously, changes in the costs of production, interest rates, and net proﬁt or
loss from the pre-privatization (1986-88) to the post-privatization (1989-91) phases
indicate increasing economic insolvency for peasant cane producers. Central to the
conclusions drawn are changes in the cost per ton, shifts in these costs as a percentage
of the total value of the cane delivered to the mill, and the increase in the percent of
producers with debts from 1986-1991. While all sectors of the agrarian economy are
affected, among the major productive strategies present in the research communities,
sugar cane places its producers in a relatively disadvantageous position, given the more
rapid increase in the number of producers owing debts. As a result, area in cane
production has declined, production has decreased, and less sugar is being produced than
before privatization.

As the crisis in the sugar sector poses ever-increasing economic risk, it is
superimposed on yet a broader crisis in the countryside, placing constraints on alternative
productive strategies. The repercussions of economic inefﬁciency for peasant households
were demonstrated in Chapter IX. There has been little change in ownership of the
means of production to date; this situation may change as a result of the privatization of
ejido lands. As caﬁeros retract from cane production, signiﬁcant shifts in circulation

have occurred. Whereas some continue to commoditize products—-sugar cane, cattle

332

products, maize, and camote-on the market, rising debt diminishes the capacity for
capital accumulation. Others have chosen to confront the crisis through production for
use. Tightness of credit, inputs, and unstable markets have thus contributed to declining
productivity both within and outside of the sugar sector. While a few producers have
sustained their capacity for capital accumulation, the larger proportion are able to attain
reproduction of the household only through combining wage labor, out-migration to the
U.S., and increased production for use value with their former production strategies.
Reproduction of the peasant household has thus been transformed through alternate
means. It was argued that strategies of cane producers--abandonment of cane, reduction
in hectares, rental, shifting to alternate crops, appropriation of agricultural inputs for
personal use, and bribery are counter-productive. These strategies have effectively
checked the sugar mill’s objective of expanding monocrop production of cane in the
region; paradoxically, the result has been a slight diversiﬁcation of the cropping system.
Abandonment of cane, lack of productivity, and inefﬁciency challenge the mill’s efforts
to reproduce the relations of production at Ingenio Queseria.

A central theme of this dissertation is that, when applied to agrarian policy, this
paradigmatic change is fostering a historical dissonance between dominant neoliberal
ideology and praxis and emerging social reality in the countryside. Free market
principles intended to foment capital accumulation and productive efﬁciency increase
social disparities, allow beneﬁts to accrue to the wealthy, and limit democratic
participation (Ibarra 1990). Peasants are today responding to the increasing
internationalization and vertical integration of production wrought by privatization. The
consequences of economic restructuring and privatization foment social and political
conditions that may require an increasing resort to repressive measures, as peasants and
workers develop new strategies of resistance. Stallings makes clear that repression, loss

of labor and union organization rights, and declining standards of living are " . . .not mere

 

 

 

333

coincidence. It is an inteng part of stabilization as workers refuse to passively accept
the burden of maintaining the banks’ proﬁts” (1978: 18). Marcos draws the connection
between the crisis in the sugar sector and neoliberal policy and praxis: "The crisis of
the sugar industry can convert itself into the symbol of the failure of the reprivatizing
policies and the costs that are being derived from the government obsession to take the
application of its neoliberal project to its ultimate consequences" (translated from Marcos
1992: 10).

The Peripheral State, Peasants, and Capital

Relations between the state, peasants, and capital in this peripheral social formation
are imbued with power, yet always conditioned by historical context. At different
historical junctures, the state forged an alliance with private capital, at the expense of
popular groups; at others, alliances were reconﬁgured, in response to peasant unrest.
Political stability in Mexico is attributed not only to the state’s c00ptation of peasants
through their union organization, but also its willingness to beneﬁt peasants through state
subsidies, guarantee prices, provide access to credit, and offer various social welfare
programs. The state frequently responded to the demands of peasant cane producers,
granting them numerous economic and social beneﬁts. Policy directives associated with
economic restructuring, however, explicitly disavow this paternalistic role. As the state
has withdrawn these subsidies, many peasants have lost faith in the CNC and loyalty to
PRI. Despite the generalized disenchantment expressed toward the government through
peasant discourse, a degree of allegiance was retained among many ejidatarios, as
recipients of the historically signiﬁcant agrarian reform. Superimposed on this situation
is the government’s renouncement of the Mexican revolution through modiﬁcations to
Article 27 of the constitution. This modiﬁcation took place on January 6, 1992, giving

peasants the right to sell ejido land, including sale to foreign investors. As the social

 

 

334

glue which held the society together dissolves, and alternative means for production and
reproduction fail to emerge, we may expect peasants to select more radical means to
ensure their survival. With the public eye on the NAFTA agreement, peasants may again
force the state to respond to their demands. In 1994, for example, initial repression of
the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional) uprising in Chiapas brought
criticism from human rights organizations, forcing the government to negotiate with the
rebels. State autonomy vis-a-vis the peasant sector is tenuous.

Neither has the state maintained its autonomy in relation to national and international
capital. The attention of this dissertation to state divestment is incomplete without equal
consideration of its continuing role in controlling the price of sugar, provision of credit,
and restructuring the loans of the purchasers of sugar mills. To these factors must be
added the extremely favorable terms of sale, and the state’s continued control of political
opposition to transformations in the sugar sector. The private initiative is highly
dependent, as it has been historically, on the Mexican state and ofﬁcial policies which
ensure its ability to accumulate capital. Continued state involvement is indicative of its
responsiveness to the demands of private capital.

Reprivatization of the Mexican sugar sector was shown to be a complex result of
international and national initiatives. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, as a political actor,
wholeheartedly supported the neoliberal program. It is doubtful, however, that he could
have chosen another path, given the international forces of the IMF and World Bank and
the internal economic crisis. Salinas’ bid for continued U.S. support, restructuring of
the Mexican debt, and access to U.S. markets rested on his compliance with mandates
for market opening, state divestment, and privatization. The Mexican state’s potential
autonomy vis-a-vis the international ﬁnancial system was weakened through its
accommodation to the neoliberal paradigm. The focus of this paradigm is largely

economic, for both the U.S. and Mexico have conveniently overlooked the social and

 

 

 

335
political manifestations of economic restructuring.

What, then, can be concluded about the role of the Mexican state in the process of
privatization? The state, contrary to neoliberal ideology has remained a present and
continuing force with the sale of Mexican sugar mills to private capital. Moreover, the
continuing crisis in the sugar sector cannot be attributed solely to the penetration of
private capital, whether international or national. The state’s continued control of the
price of sugar (and concomitantly, sugar cane) is an important factor in the economic
insolvency of sugar mills and of cane producers. The control of price, however, is no
longer counter-balanced by complementary subsidies to the peasant sector. I thus
conclude that the simultaneous coincidence of privatization and withdrawal of state
subsidies is of great signiﬁcance.

To consider the counterfactual, had sugar mills not been privatized, would caﬁeros
not have experienced the negative results that have occurred with privatization? As
Chapter V makes clear, the industry is subject to ﬂuctuations in the world market and
has been affected by alternate periods of prosperity and depression throughout its history.
To take the period of state control, the industry suffered its worst depression from 1970-
75; by the early 1980s, it experienced record production. The state-operated parastatal
was highly criticized for its inefﬁciency, overemployment, lack of productivity,
exploitation of producers and workers, and political corruption. Nevertheless, statization
of the sugar sector was a rescue operation, prompted by economic crisis while the sector
was in the hands of private capital. Furthermore, it was upon the recent privatization of
the sector that Mexico once again lost its export capacity for sugar. The fortune of the
sugar sector, as suggested in Chapter V1, is not merely a matter of state versus private
control. The sugar industry, whether state or private, has always been subject to
government subsidies and regulation; this intervention is essential to correct the failures

of the ”free hand of the market". Nonetheless, the state’s control of the price of sugar

 

 

336
subjects the industry to economic peril. Finally, it cannot be assumed that the economic
crisis would have allowed the state to continue to subsidize this vast industry. What has

not occurred, however, are improvements promised by the neoliberal program.

Hegemony and Resistance

The history of the sugar industry is a history of the dialectical relationship between
peasants and mill owners, wherein class struggles have culminated in transformation of
the relations of production. These transformations are understood through a political
economy approach which remains sensitive to the issues of structure and agency and
attuned to the ideology of peasant discourse. Peasant cane producers have confronted
hegemony is various forms. The state, represented by the Spanish crown in the colonial
period, used its power to release land and labor for the colonial sugar industry. During
the economic liberalism of the Porﬁriato, peasants were subject to the expansionary
processes of the large, landed estates. As was shown, the growth of haciendas was
supported by state policies. This particular appropriation of their resources and labor led
peasants to provide a major force for resistance during the Mexican revolution. Peasant
rebellion against the hegemony of sugar cane haciendas was a class conﬂict between
sugar cane workers and the landed oligarchy that culminated in the Mexican revolution
and restructured the relations of production. The means of production--the land--was
separated from the factory and transferred to the hands of peasants, vastly diminishing
the power of the rural oligarchy. The collective power of peasants was also subsumed
to the political bureaucracy of the Mexican state.

In the aftermath of the revolution, reluctance to produce sugar cane for private sugar
industrialists was counteracted by a state decree, requiring production of cane within

speciﬁed supply zones. Many peasants of Colima have accommodated themselves to this

 

 

337

structure of power, some even deriving lucrative beneﬁts. Whether through
accommodation, pressing demands, or resistance, peasant cane producers are present as
active human agents. As the state gradually assumed control of the sector, forcing the
retraction of private capital, caﬁeros utilized their union organization to gain important
rights--improved prices, medical beneﬁts, social security, and a share in the proﬁt of
cane byproducts. Thus, the union is an arena in which state hegemony is both
constituted and challenged. The last two decades, however, have seen a weakening of
their union organization. The greater weakness of UNPCA relative to previous ﬁeldwork
(1984-85) when the mill was under state control was analyzed through the collective
organization of 1990.
ColleztixeBesistance

The cane producers’ union continues, under conditions of privatization, to be subject
to the tutelage of the Mexican state and the PRI. Vertically integrated into a bureaucratic
structure founded on patronage, rather than democratic participation, the instrument for
challenging the changing relations of production stands in contradiction to the
modernizing principles of neoliberal ideology. Nonetheless, in 1990 members of this
organization, as active human agents, challenged their waning economic position under
conditions of privatization. The unity of the majority of cane producers in the country
was a potentially powerful force in the conﬂict between peasants and capital. While their
gains were minimal, they caused the state to increase the price of cane 26.9% , prevented
private capital from rescinding hard-won beneﬁts such as advance payments and medical
insurance, and forced the mill to compensate them for unprocessed cane.

The shared construction of meaning among peasants of the zone encouraged them
to challenge the mill by withholding the raw material upon which it depends for proﬁts.
Collective efforts are weakened, however, by differentiation within the peasantry.

Present are contradictory orientations, based on diverse forms of production and land

338

use. Peasant discourse was used to reconstruct the diverse experiences and orientations
within and outside of the cane-producing group. In the interstices of rural production,
some chose to abandon cane and others to struggle for improved beneﬁts. Although the
collective ampliacién had been granted additional lands by presidential decree, the
Agrarian Reform ofﬁce failed to confront the large, wealthy landowners and comply with
the decree. Members of the ampliacién, with only one or two hectares, lack interest in
cane production or in attending union meetings. Likewise, those who rent out their land
as a strategy to deal with ﬁnancial loss were uninvolved and uninformed about union
activities. Sharecroppers and renters, in general, believed the demise of the mill would
increase the availability of land to work, while landless rural laborers saw the continued
operation of the mill as insurance of a future job market. In addition, antagonistic
relations between the large, wealthy landowners of the region, integrated into the CNPP,
and the ejidatarios integrated into UNPCA, precludes a united struggle of all caﬁeros of
the region. The lack of a uniﬁed peasantry weakens collective action in the region.
Wham;

Organizational weaknesses inherent in the cane sector lead caﬁeros, who are
economically differentiated, to engage in diverse, individual strategies of resistance.
These strategies, while inefﬁcient in terms of productivity, are the weapons used by
peasants of the zone to create spaces of power and contest the hegemony of state control
of their union and increasing exploitation by the sugar mill. It may be asked, are these,
indeed, acts of resistance, and what is their intent? I contend that discourse and political
action are mutually shaping and socially constituting. Extensive analysis of the
voluminous discourse recorded during ﬁeldwork, plus intensive participant observation
lead to a conclusion in the afﬁrmative. In comparing the 1984-85 ﬁeld season (when the
mill was operated by the state) and the 1990-91 ﬁeld season (which included the third

harvest since privatization), what was striking was the dramatic change in orientation

 

 

 

339
toward cane production, the sugar mill, and the government. The lack of positive
evaluation in this dissertation (although a few examples are presented) reﬂects the reality
encountered during ﬁeld research. Peasants’ own explanations for their strategies
demonstrate the polyvalent nature of their resistance, which may be simultaneously
economic and political, concurrently risk-reducing and confrontational.

This dissertation raises signiﬁcant questions about the efﬁcacy of both collective and
individual strategies of resistance against the structures of hegemonic power. If ”at the
end of the day" state and/or capitalist hegemony holds sway over the less powerful, are
their efforts at resistance rendered theoretically meaningless? I have argued that the
culturally shared meanings among peasants of Colima have materialized in a vociferous
rejection of the transformations that accompany reprivatization of the sugar mill. Both
through their discourse and their actions peasants have appropriated spaces of power to
contest these changes. Their voice and their polyvalent strategies of resistance are both

meaningful and relevant. This does not mean that they always win.

Considerations for the Future

This dissertation documented deterioration of economic conditions for peasants since
the sale of the sugar mill, ideological disavowment of the government and party loyalty,
collective organization, and individual strategies to contest the transformation of
production in the sugar sector. It remains to be seen whether these efforts will culminate
in a major challenge to the hegemony of the privatized sugar mill. Within Mexico lies
the potential for increasingly coercive and repressive measures as economic restructuring
has undermined the state’s redistributive capacity. As declining support reaches a critical
level, we may expect to see peasant producers utilize new strategies to challenge the
legitimacy of the state. Peasants in Colima are politically conservative, relative to other

parts of the country. Should conditions worsen, however, they may choose to adopt the

340
strategies of the EZLN which seized several towns in Chiapas and declared war on the
Mexican government on January 1, 1994. On February 7, caﬁeros and workers of
Ingenio Puruaran, Michoacan, mentioned in Chapter VI, decided to join forces with the
EZLN in order to press their demands for the reopening of the bankrupt sugar mill. The
Mexican state has responded through increasing political surveillance and control of the
area (Robles 1994).

Compounded with a worsening of their economic status is the recent modiﬁcation
to Article 27 which would allow ejidos to privatize their lands. Ejidos today comprise
50% of agricultural land in Mexico; it would require a 66% majority for any ejido to
decide to privatize its land. Initial steps in this direction were realized with the passage
of the Ley de Fomento Agropecuario in the sexenio of L0pez Portillo, allowing the
association of ejidos and private interests. These measures are likened to the Ley Lerdo
and the Ley de Desamortizacidn of 1856 which divested peasant communities of their
lands and allowed the concentration of land by haciendas. Some scholars believe that
privatization of the ejido emanating from the modiﬁcation to Article 27 will result in a
renewed concentration of land. The privatization of sugar mills, compounded with the
potential privatization of ejidal lands, poses a perilous situation for debt-ridden caﬁeros,
who are currently bound to the mill in a form of neo-debt peonage. Economic crisis
encourages the willingness of ejidatarios to commoditize land for short-term gain. A
possible strategy of Grupo Beta may be to withhold investment in the mill until it can
conﬁscate the land of indebted caﬁeros. Once the unity of ﬁeld and factory is
accomplished, the mill could then invest in the mill to increase its productivity, with the
added advantage of a cheap source of labor in the former cane producers. Thus, we may
once again see the concentration of lands in agroindustrial regions. Should this prove
to be a strategy of the mill, it begs the question of why they would surrender the current

practice of subcontracting; when peasants hold the land base, it is they who bear the risks

 

341
of production. Another possible strategy may be to preferentially invest in the more
lucrative mills in the sales packet, and subject the other mills to benign neglect. This
could, potentially, result in fewer, more productive sugar mills in the country. These
are issues that should be the subject of longitudinal analysis.

This research yields an initial proﬁle of the impact of privatization of the sugar
industry on peasants, how they may be differentially affected, and the strategic actions
they have utilized to assert themselves against the hegemonic forces of the state and
private capital. The results of this research are not presumed to present a comprehensive
analysis of the ramiﬁcations of privatization-~a project that would require a much longer
time-frame to complete. It intends to contribute base-line data from the pre-privatization
context and the initial harvests following privatization, upon which longitudinal analysis
can build in future years. This research leaves unanswered whether the sector may
recover after the difﬁcult years of conversion, or whether private capital will be unable
to wrest the sector from its current crisis. Future research should be directed toward
these developments, what role the privatization of ejidos will play, and the rapidly
changing political context within Mexico.

For the present, half a decade after initiating the privatization of Mexican sugar
mills, the sugar sector is in the throes of the worst crisis in its history. While neoliberal
ideology proclaims the beneﬁts of structural adjustment, free trade, and privatization, an
increasingly marginalized peasantry has taken an active role in rejecting the changing
relations of production. These unfolding processes, as they have been analyzed herein,
reverberate in the dissenting voices of producers of the cane:

If they don’t clear up things, we are going to knock down the cane and we will

see who pays the debts that we have with the mill, because they cannot obligate

us to continue with the cane. We already lost one revolution and we car‘ieros

are not going to lose more. We will not give ourselves up in defeat--we will
start another.

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

Equipment of Ingenio Queseria

27 Ford 4500 tractors
3 MF-SO tractors
3 J & L L-8000 cane lifters
15 J & L cane lifters
12 Thompson ME—321 cane lifters
1 Continental 50 ton scale
1 Revuelta 50 ton scale
3 Miron cranes
2 Fulton cutters,
one with a 600 hp. Elliot 2DYR turbine and a Luﬂdn M reducer
one with a 700 hp Elliot 2CYR turbine and a Lufkin 10 NT 1070
reducer
1 Unigrator cutter, with a 490 hp. Terry GA turbine and a Luﬂcin
NM147B reducer
1 Gruendler ﬁber remover with a 700 hp. Terry GA vapor turbine and
a W.H. SU reducer
4 Fulton-Fhasa grinding mills
2 Fletcher grinding mills
one with a 1040 hp. Elliot turbine, Farrel DR-5 8/ 3 reducer, and
Luﬂdn gears
one with a 1000 hp. Elliot 2 DYR turbine and a Lufkin reducer
four with 865 hp. Murray UV-2 turbines and Farrel DR—33 reducers
6 Edwards pressure batteries
1 Separation system with 65 hp. Gutierrez motors
l Cush-Cush juice strainer with 10 hp. motors and Falk reducer
2 DSM DE 6 strainers
l 20 ton Elsa crane
7 Babcock & Wilcox boilers
one with 200 hp. Evisa fan and 1 600 hp. Elliot
one 2CYR steam turbine
one with Elliot 2BTRT steam turbine and l 2CYRT steam turbine
2 American Marsh HHT pumps
1 160 hp. Elliot 2DYR turbine
l 153 hp. Elliot 2DYR turbine
3 Fairbanks Morse pumps
1 200 hp. Worthington turbine
1 375 hp. Dean Hill turbine
3 turbogenerators
one with Terry turbine, Luﬂdn reducer, and General Electric
generator
one with Elliot turbine, Farrel reducer, and General Electric
generator
one with Shin’Nippon Machinery Co. turbine, Osaka Chain &
Machinery reducer, and Shinko Electric generator

342

A,— unrmu. __
I II
I It:

 

343

1 Mantro-Mess automatic duplex scale

1 Acme No. 2 Sulfate equipment

1 Fisher alkalization equipment

6 juice heaters with Rapi-Dorr clariﬁers

5 Elliot ejectors

4 50 hp. Nash CL405 vacuum pumps

1 60 hp. Sihi LPHA vacuum pump

1 Marley cooling tower

4 200 hp. Fairbanks Morse pumps

2 250 hp. Fairbanks Morse pumps

3 115 hp. American Marsh HLM-12 condensors

3 Cristachum Myesa crystalizers

7 "U” crystalizers

9 Robert (2 automatic and 7 continuous) centrifuges
3 Buckau Wolf automatic centrifuges

l 40 hp. Link Belt dryer

1 Mantro-Parsons automatic duplex scale

1 Oken scale

4 Fischbein machines (1 automatic) to sew sugar sacks

-plus a variety of factory equipment for which brand names are not
provided

(Manual Azucarera Mexicana 1991)

 

 

 

APPENDIX B

Interview Schedqu

CENSUS:

Demographic:

Data collected on each household
member:

N arne

Relation to head of household

Sex

Date of birth

Place of birth

Marital status

Principal occupation

Secondary occupation

Years of education

Adult oﬁ‘spring, in addition to above:

Current residence
Date left

House:
Ownership:

owned

rented

loaned
Number of rooms
Number of ﬂoors
Utilities:

electricity

sewage system

piped water
Construction material:

ﬂoor

roof

walls

344

Material property:
Ownership of
refrigerator

sewing machine a
television '
radio

stereo

tape recorder
motorcycle

car '. _'.
truck

other property (type)
other houses or real property

animals

 

Services or sales provided in the home

Migration:

Household members who migrated to the
U.S. in the past 5 years

Year(s) of migration

Duration of migration

Amount of remittances

Expenditure of remittances

345

W1
Agricultural data:

1.

PPSP‘S‘PPE"

Type of producer:
propietario
ejidatario
agricultor
arrendatario
mediero
jomalero

Do you have ejido land?
Name of ejido?
Do you have privately owned land?
Location?
How many hectares do you work yourself?
How many hectares of your land are rented to another person?
How many hectares are sharecropped?
How many hectares are...

irrigated

rainfed

pasture

For each crop cultivated in 1990-91; 1989-90; 1985-86:

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

Was crop on your own land, or did you rent land or sharecrop?
Rent paid or amount of crop turned over to the landowner?
Number of hectares?
Tons harvested?
Yield?
Tons sold; if maize, tons kept for family consumption?
Price received?
Costs of production...
labor
seed
fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides
machinery
Amount of credit received?
Earnings?
Debts?

For cattle raised 1990-91; 1989-90; 1985-86:

21.
22.
23.
24.
25 .
26.

Were the cattle on your own land, or did you rent land?
Rent paid?

Number of hectares of pasture?

Number of cattle?

Amount of milk sold and price received?

Amount of cattle/ meat sold and price received?

 

346

27. Costs of production?

labor

feed

medical

maintenance of pasture
28. Amount of credit received?
29. Earnings?
30. Debts?

Wage labor:

31. Have you worked as a wage laborer in the past 12 months?
32. For whom?

33. On ejido or private land?

34. What crops did you work?

35. How long did you work?

36. What was the rate of pay?

37. Number of household members who work for wages?

Opinions on agricultural production:
1. What crop (or cattle) brings you the most proﬁt?

 

3"

What are the most grave problems you have in agricultural production?

9’

In what way has your production changed in the last ﬁve years?

5‘

Relative to your economic position in agricultural production ﬁve years ago, what
is your present position? Why?

1) much better
2) better
3) the same

4) worse
5) much worse

Please explain why you prefer the crops (or cattle) that you produce.
Which crops would you prefer to produce, and why don’t you cultivate them?
How has your access to credit changed in the last ﬁve years?

How has your access to seed changed in the last ﬁve years?

99°89?”

How has your access to fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides changed in the last ﬁve
years?

10. How has your access to mechanized equipment and transport changed in the last ﬁve
years?

11. What proportion of your earnings have you invested to improve production in the
last ﬁve years?

12. Has your need to work for wages increased in the last ﬁve years?

347

INfIfﬂVIEW £2:

Socioeconomic data:

1.

Five years ago, we asked people’s opinion about life in this village. I am interested
in your opinion today. Do you believe this village is... Why?

1) progressing rapidly

2) progressing slowly

3) remains the same

4) is getting worse

Among the people of the village, do you think...
1) some live much better

2) there is some difference, but not very great
3) all are equal

In what way has this situation changed in the last ﬁve years?

Do you think your economic position is...

1) better

2) the same

3) worse. . .than the majority of people in this village?

What kind of life does your income allow?
1) very good

2) good

3) average

4) bad

5) very bad

. Do you think that peasants are... Why?

1) progressing rapidly
2) progressing slowly
3) remain the same
4) are getting worse

What is your opportunity to improve your economic situation? Why?
1) very good

2) good

3) average

4) bad

5) very bad

What can a peasant do to improve his/her economic position?

In agrarian issues, for example, prices, interest rates, agrarian programs, do you
have the opportunity to inﬂuence decision making...

1) always

2) frequently

3) half the time

4) infrequently

5) never

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

348

Do you believe that peasants here are... Why?
1) very united

2) more or less united

3) little united

4) not united

Do you believe the ejido is... Why?
1) progressing rapidly

2) progressing slowly

3) remains the same

4) is getting worse

Some people believe that peasant organization is necessary to resolve agricultural
problems, while others believe it is not worthwhile. Do you think that organization
serves to... Why?

I) resolve many problems

2) resolve some problems

3) resolve few problems

4) it is worthless

How well do each of the following organizations and institutions contribute to the

well-being of peasants?

SRA Liga
SARH UNPCA
BANRURAL Ingenio Queseria
ASEMEX FIMAIA
CONASUPO IMSS
FERTIMEX PRI
PRON ASE CEDPA
1) very good

2) good

3) average

4) bad

5) very bad

Which political party helps peasants most?
What is your opinion of the Solidarity Pact?

What is your opinion on the Modernization Program?

Privatization of the sugar mill:

16.

17.
18.

Because the focus of the study is on the reprivatization of the sugar industry, what
have been your thoughts on the sale of Ingenio Queseria to a private group?

Why was the sugar mill sold?
Who is Grupo Beta?

 

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

26.

27.
28.

29.

30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

349
Do you believe that the sale is beneﬁtting the peasants here? How, or why not?
What are the disadvantages of this change?
How has the production of cane changed since the sale?
How has the relationship of peasants to the sugar mill changed?
Is the sugar mill helping peasants more than before the sale, or less? Explain why.

Who has given more attention to the demands of the peasants, the new owners, or
the previous owners? Why?

Who is able to help the peasants more, the new owners, or the previous owners?
Why?

Do you think it would be better if the sugar mill... Why?
1) was still controlled by the state

2) had been purchased by the CNC

3) it is okay in the hands of the new owners

When, and why did the crisis in the cane sector begin?

Which contributes most to cane problems?
1) the government

2) the sugar mill

3) the cane producers’ union

4) the caﬁero

To whom should peasants protest, to the government, the sugar mill, or the caflero
union?

In your opinion, which would be better... Why?
1) to intensify cane production in the area
2) to quit cane production
Which is more proﬁtable, to rent out the cane, or to work it yourself?
What is your opinion on the Decreto Caﬁero?
Do caﬁeros have a right to beneﬁt from the byproducts of the cane?
What is your opinion on the organization of the cane harvest?
What is your opinion of...
the ﬁeld inspectors
the guardacortes
the local cutters
the migrant cutters

What alternatives are there for improving the organization of the cane harvest?

 

350

Caﬂeros only:

37.

38.

39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.

How often do you attend the meetings of the caﬁero union?
1) always

2) most of the time

3) once in a while

4) never

Within the caﬁero union, how is the leader selected, by those above, or by the base
membership?

Where do decisions concerning cafiero matters originate-do they come most
frequently from...

1) state ofﬁcials

2) the sugar mill

3) the union leaders

4) the members

Do you actively participate, or do you follow the leaders?

What facilitates your participation? What impedes it?

What are the beneﬁts of being a member of the cafiero union?

What are the greatest problems for the cai'lero union?

. How are disagreements between members and national leaders resolved?

How are disagreements between members and regional leaders resolved?

Who have been the union leaders that helped caﬁeros the most? What did they do
to help?

Did you support the cafiero strike of 1990?

Why didn’t the cane strike reach its goal?

Why did the car‘ieros accept the 26.9% increase in price?

Can the caﬁeros organize to protect their rights? Why or why not?
How can the cafleros best achieve their goals...

1) consolidate their own organization

2) unite with another state organization

3) unite with an independent union

How has the involvement of the state toward the caﬁero union changed since the sale
of the sugar mill?

In what way has the relation of the caﬁero union with the sugar mill changed since
the sale of the mill?

 

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

61.

62.

351

Do you believe that the caﬁeros are...
1) very united

2) more or less united

3) little united

4) not united

Do you think that the caflero union is...
1) progressing rapidly

2) progressing slowly

3) remains the same

4) is getting worse

How much power do the cafieros have to inﬂuence cane matters?
1) much
2) some
3) little
4) none

How much conﬁdence do you have in the capacity of the state to beneﬁt the
caﬁeros?

1) much

2) some

3) little

4) none

How much conﬁdence do you have in the capacity of the sugar mill to beneﬁt the
caﬁeros?

1) much

2) some

3) little

4) none

How much conﬁdence do you have in the capacity of the cal'iero union to beneﬁt the
caﬁeros?

1) much

2) some

3) little

4) none

What are the advantages of producing sugar cane? What are the disadvantages?

Which contributes most to low cane yields?
1) lack of rain

2) lack of fertilizer

3) lack of cultivation

4) old cane

5) renting out the cane

Are you satisﬁed with the earnings you receive with the cane? If not, why do you
continue to produce it?

 

352

63. What would you do if...
they took away car'iero insurance?
they took away advance payments and loans?
they took away the bags of sugar?

64. If the cane disappears, what would you do with your land?

65 . What are the alternatives caﬁeros can use to improve?

W
Household Budget (annual):

Rent

Food

Clothing

Electricity and water

Medical costs

Education

Transportation

Entertainment

Other (specify)

[Total]

Income of the head of household
Income of other members of household
Income from services, sales provided by the household
Total household income/debt

 

APPENDIX C

Mill Worker’s Account of Changes in the Sugar Mill

The sugar industry of the country has totally collapsed for lack of maintenance
of the sugar mills.

The bad functioning of the mill is because of poor organization and the little
interest in the mill. The administrators only want their own beneﬁt, their
assured earnings. Like Jose H . Instead of paying the employees, he
went hunting in India. If the administration goes bad, we all go bad.

Afterwards, in other harvests, came pure engineers charging the dough with
their titles they had studied for, but they did not know how to manage this mill.
We workers had not studied, we didn’t know books. We knew what time and
experience had taught us. Now they put in many monkeys and for that it
doesn’t function well and it is stopped many hours without working. But they
ought to manage it with a good administration.

In the epoch of the owners Lic. Carlos Septién and the manager, it was his
brother, Jorge Septién, those owners raised up the sugar mill. Yes, they
administered it well in the factory and the ﬁeld. It was in this epoch that the
sugar mill ﬂourished. They put interest in it. If a piece of equipment was
screwed, we asked for it, and they brought it and we put it in. That was when
it was good for all of us. I believe that everyone earned. The administrators
and owners gave us many things: clothing, rations, shoes, at Christmas they
had workers’ parties. But we knew the mill well, in the running and ﬁring of
the motor, we knew where there was a problem, if in some place there was a
tube that with time had thinned from use and had to be changed. We asked the
administrator and he gave it to us.

When the government saw that the Septiéns had made a good business, they did
everything possible to get the sugar mill. They began to squeeze and squeeze
them with high taxes, until they won. But the government began to ﬁll the
sugar mill with bureaucrats, appointed wherever, in the factory, in the
administration, in the ﬁeld ofﬁces. The inspectors they placed so they could
rob. Whatever else, they wanted to rob. To have the earnings apart from their
salary. They progressed rapidly, their good house, their truck, and the mill
completely abandoned.

In the epoch of J osé Lopez Portillo, whatever small person was left with
earnings. Even more those that had large expanses of cane. But in that
sexenio, the government paid a good price for the cane, a just price. Now in
the last years that it belonged to the government, three or four years ago, they
sold it because it was at the point of bankruptcy. They no longer wanted to
invest in the factory. They didn’t rehabilitate the ﬁelds. Then we began to hear
that the mill was going to be sold. We didn’t know, but what we noted was
that now they no longer invested in the mill. When the government managed
it, they never modernized it. It had pure antiquated machinery. The mill was

353

 

354

mill was sold as a mountain of junk, the government let if decay a lot. Those
that worked there, the technicians, made miracles so the mill would keep
functioning. We searched for old parts, thrown out screws, or tubes that
already had been removed because they no longer worked. We soldered old
tubes because they no longer gave us the opportunity to request things, well
they shut us up saying there was no money. Well clearly, they were taking
advantage. We were desperate looking for parts in one place and another.
Also, the caﬁeros began to operate in the red. The government held control
[but the mill] lost time without working.

Thus when these owners received it, they received the pure junk of the mill.
The government and its administrators let the mill decay and by wanting to
make money, and ultimately, to take the greatest part. The mill is very
screwed and it spends more time stopped than it works. Cane is left wasting
in the patio. Now in the night shifts, almost daily, you see the workers asleep
because the mill has broken down. It loses much time and money. In the
country it is even harder, the peasant is the one who is losing wherever he is
seen. Always it is the most screwed who loses and the one who suffers most.

These owners have little time here, but they do not have a good administration
because they are operating in the red. It is heard that they want to get rid of
the manager because he runs a bad operation and the owners do not like him.
They say that they don’t have enough to pay what they owe us and the
government. They have a term of eight years to pay the government. But it
does not stop being a good business. That is their hope in continuing, that it
will compose itself. They are people who have a lot of money, but anyhow,
they don’t invest good money in what is bad. They come to proﬁt, to do
business. The sugar mill is to blame for the problems of the caﬁeros, for the
bad organization that it has. The government increases everything that it sells,
and leaves the salaries stagnant. On that side, the government and the sugar
mill decontrol the worker.

They have much experimental cane. The mill has already begun to rehabilitate
the country. A man from San José del Carmen came to talk with the ﬁeld
chief so he could explain what were the beneﬁts of producing cane. Up there,
they get very beautiful cane, very thick, because there is much water and the
soils are good; they aren’t so overworked. The soils of that area are soils that
are not so worn out, that have been planted only in pure maize. They don’t
need plowing, nor fertilizer. In contrast, those here in the municipio of
Cuauhtémoc, the soils are very worn out and plagued because this is the bad
thing about the cane. The land has much plague, like the aslome. It no longer
has a good yield. Here the lands cannot be planted if it is not for pure
fertilizer.

For this, the caﬁeros have no proﬁt either and they become desperate. They
had a strike to increase the price 100% and they were going to have a work
stoppage. Also, we factory workers, but they only gave us pablum with the
ﬁnger. Because those in Mexico arrange it, without taking us into account.
And one, what does he do? Only conform with what they give us in increase.
One has no strength, nor power; they manage you easily.

 

APPENDIX D

Liquidation Documents

 

l 2618"!" ‘6...) tuseuro Mum. 5.41. or c.v. ‘ 1171
%IWWWWMM
"pounce: 1114009

88"... =:::ssemsmmmemmummmeemmnmsun

s Pgliiiﬂio 56"”

: OIAI lﬁZE; ‘ l

Wh 1-5-L
o . 0 azucaa ease sun 0 .
i gueugs no this: MR 3 “72335.80”

 

 

 

 

  
  

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  

 

I casorros .. recesses n urrnt "runes r o r s L
wanna call INDUCTIULIIAIM 14.265.153.00“ 14:26:30.0“!
10026501556335! 16026501530005!
sum cams .. ssouccrous .. 7 7
n It
, 4:192:22 vs laser 1:} 9:9: : harness gallant: a:
‘ B . . .. w . in).
L f L _ N
R ' J”.
31156 easier "so sells Si‘iﬂiiigtiljg
sures snaggih lg .4}, .
‘ AC1 I S ‘3 IOCINKI' e .
: r r c s s a 00 _ u: .
f ﬁgurine anions: I i , H 12255217533 '
§_ unclear no PISLINIDACIONIS seguug. 913.
A a 58; 14: SI;

 

 

 

 

TOTAL (£05088 14,007,014» 2,068,893.00 1610700324.”

nun-o RISILTADO or esu LIOUXMCKOI: "I’mi‘ﬂgﬂ "'““”‘°af£

 

 

_ . 7.. .—.—.-

 

 

e.

    
    
 

     

 

 

3333:3239? medals}: e s as men 05 toxin 0
um: Antares“. s to 003 car ar urns coarseness.-
i . 3'0 I ‘0 ~ - A .. U... ‘
ssssreceeoe‘.. ’ restirs'o

 

 

‘ no £5”;ng 051160 a was new arc-Argent: A u 095% _rnsrsrrnrs v souuurr 9st
uses: are: era . s. 1.. LA currosoo . .-
I

‘1" Ella. 9010:2131
' OICIVIOAS DE CONTRATOS CUE

 
 
 

 

  
 
    
   

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7581160

Wit?

. . ' . '. .
.it..- ...' «2%,:- m: 43‘4“ x u

AIQSYECIDOR

»-—— lot-sass

 

 

355

 

356

 

 

.THV’M$AI-- . H“
' . ‘
£6/K41/3S " ' !N6£l10 ourssnl . s... or r.v.
LICUIDACXJN FINAL 3: rAAAs AroxerAs :9 LA IAI'A 1919/1900
pnc.urroA: 111803!
[J :0: 15 raarlcuLAAer (OLIHA
suvsurx rel 31-‘9 MA?
rows Acnsarrl A): 1. 33.7 b
téan 3E C”iT.l %0/Agﬁl90 .
neuorn sArt L.0u 0A: on soar: CAtA uerl 1.39?
rnrcro POI x5. or AIUCAA IASE srAuolnol 5'7. 4 10
PRtCIO ran ronttAoA or CAQA: 147.930.u30
= carnrro: .. ruslrsos -- (ArrrAL rutrntsrr
VALoa :AiA ruousrrlAerAoA sr.9:e.300.gosa
51.054.300.00cn
nanos CAIGOS .. orourzrours --
VI 5 CA ’7/ n A 5 .
an? :gcAi v18 REESEAg 153805189. 1:; i: I
:2 Avro nxrgnros PLANTAS 3.04 .4 3. .g 2. .
sx iERT DIIKRID rLAurAs 23 . _. . .
0 I T E ‘I I ..e
i z 3 R E 0 5';°;' ’1' g
A e
raos cAgvos or COSECNA 424951343.35
nrearsr r arzAaos 9)223.zzo.00
Asros nrsfnrayratrr 3.3 .2 .
UO'AS At a“- s. I e
ESPIEDI pesAsé 1.4 .r . 3.473.747.00
GRUPACIOIES cAsrlAs NACIONAL'S i°5'§el'88
SUI-TOTAL :AAaor: 40.645.229.00 19.175.214.00
assurero zArAAl
IALDO nerAsos 0: zAtnAs ANTEIZORES 111.744.770. o
ANTICIPOS v10 rnsirauroAcrones s. 22.11,.gg
I r o s c a A -. ’ . .
A z u c A R st. 4.

TOTAL CAIGOSI

""-"'> RESULTADO PE ESTA LIQUIDACION:

RECISX DEL 2N§EN18 “GUESEIII'o S. A. LA CAHIIcA:
' "":':: 0 0 I SALDO 0U! IISULTO A H! A O
==III IE CORRISPONDE Diiigii DE NAI‘I D
ZAFRAS ANTE:IORESI A L0 QUE D Y H a EIA COM can

pa; :2? :AGAIE a; OBLIGO A

{Ittzlﬁ SESAXA I 3. A
24. 13187 EN EL 00

me mm. [mm mlmt '3 [N LA

DERIVADA DE CONYIATOS

V0. 0 .EH'O DE CI'OII

 

 

46.030.150.00 - 19.375.233,90_.

I1 2.049.092.1110
A t A I G C

AUTO'II
7’0

guilltlk

-~v
1.
97

.JJ

' T O'Y'I—L“‘!
newsman .
SJIOSOI3U°.°°CI"

 

ii: 112311.711"—
23111911!

 

  
    
 
  
  
  
  
     
  

 
 

357

Data Recorded from Liquidation Documents

[JCNJHDAHCHDFIIUDLAL.EH3(1A§LASAAPCHKTAJIASiEmJIJ\iLAFWhA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PRODUCTOR
EJIDO
SUPERPICIE HAS.
TONS ACREDITADAS
PECHA DE CORTE
RENDIM. BASE LIQUIDACION SOBRE CARA NETA
PRECIO POR KG. DE AZUCAR BASE STANDARD
PRECIO POR TONELADA DE CARA

CREDITOS INGRESOS

CAPITAL INTERESES

VALOR CARA IRDUSTRIALIZADA
VALOR CARA SEMILLA
APLICACICN CARA CASTICADA
CARA BUENA CALIDAD

TOTAL

 

CANA NO INDUSTRIALIZADA
CONSOLIDACION DE CUENTAS

 

ﬂﬁﬂO§ CABGOSZQEDUCCIOEES

AVIO PLANTAS

 

FERT. PLANTAS

 

AVIO SOCAS/RESOCAS

 

FERT. SOCAS/RESOCAS

 

AVIO DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

15% AVIO DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

25% AVIO DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

PERT. DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

15% PERT. DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

25% FERT. DIFERIDO PLANTAS

 

CORTE

 

ALZA

ACARREO

OTROS GASTOS DE COSECHA
INTERESES DE REZAGOS

 

GASTOS DISTRIBUIBLES

 

FICARA
DESPIEDRE PESADAs

 

OBRAS

 

DISTRIB. FERT.

 

CUOTAS AL IMSS

 

CUOTAS AL IMSS '86

 

C‘UOTAS AL IMSS '87

 

JAGRUPACIONES CAﬁERAS NACIONALES

 

SUB-TOTAL CARGOS
RESULTADO ZAFRA

 

358

SALDO DE REZAGOS

 

RECUPERACION DE REZAGOS

 

ANTICIPOS Y/O PRELIQUIDACIONES

 

PRESTAMOS A CTA. DE LIQUIDACION

 

FIOSCER

 

FIMAIA

 

SEGURO DE LA VIDA

 

IMPUESTOS

 

RETENCION TERCEROS

 

ADEUDO INGENIO

 

RETENCION CTA. FLETEROS

 

RET. U.L.P.C.

 

AZUCAR

 

INCENTIVO A LA PRODUCCION

 

CONSOLIDACION DE CUENTAS

 

RESULTADO DE ESTA LIQUIDACION

A CARGO AFAVOR

 

 

DEUDA

 

"

 

APPENDIX E

 

Table 54. Change in Hectares of Cane by Individual Producer.“'

 

 

 

 

1990-91 1989-90 1988-89 1987-88 1986-87 195-es

1 63.50 78.00 80.84 59.30 90.30 48.70
2 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 .00 .00
3 .00 .00 .00 2.00 2.00 5.00
4 6.50 3.01 .00 .00 .00 .00
5 7.00 9.10 .00 9.10 9.10 9.10
6 5.20 6.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
7 1.50 7.51 10.00 12.00 16.00 16.00
8 .00 .00 .00 .00 6.60 6.60
9 .00 .00 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80
10 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
11 7.80 7.80 7.30 7.80 6.80 7.80
12 26.10 30.00 24.00 30.00 30.00 31.00
13 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
14 .00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
15 12.50 13.01 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00
16 .00 8.00 8.00 .00 8.00 8.00
17 16.55 28.45 28.55 28.55 28.55 22.90
18 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 .00 .00
19 14.00 16.00 16.00 .00 16.00 16.00
20 8.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 .00 12.00
21 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 .00 8.00
22 7.50 5.00 9.00 9.80 9.80 3.80
23 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 .00 .00
24 .00 5.06 5.05 .00 .00 6.05
25 16.30 .01 5.00 .00 .00 14.00
26 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60
27 3.00 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60
28 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
29 .00 .00 12.00 .00 16.00 16.00
30 11.30 .00 .00 2.00 10.00 10.00
31 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80
32 10.01 10.00 10.00 .00 12.00 12.00
33 4.00 5.00 5.00 .00 5.00 5.00
34 5.30 5.30 5.30 5.30 .00 .00
35 1.15 1.15 1.15 .00 .00 .00
36 .00 5.00 5.00 .00 5.00 5.00
37 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
._;§ 8.00 10.00 10.00 .00 10.00 10.00
Baa. 278.61 330.41 345.99 269.65 358.45 350.25
lean 9.29 10.01 10.48 10.37 12 .8 10.95
(11230) (n=33) (n=33) (n=26) (n=28) (n=32)

 

(Source: Ingenio Queseria, S.A. de C.V.)

‘

"‘These data are based on liquidation documents provided by Ingenio Queseria. They include the two
collectives and two parcelas escolares. Household analysis considers members of the collective
individually, and data on the parcelas escolares are not taken into consideration. The data presented in this
table include all caiieros of the villages, thus different ﬁgures are attained than for the sample alone.

359

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