it i 3.5.... .2. . 55;...» 31.5. 3.. . 1.39}: :- i. v.3... a. z. - , 1...??? 253.... 3 2 2.1.9.3: .s. . #91:... at» ._ I! . ....,....i§..‘.i. c.‘ 1;? . 1.1 .)!41 ‘t. .rr) . {unifin . ) $30.3, . . . l,“ ah". «I. ”I” . .. 2‘: 25.4.2. .. .64 ... .23.? 3 hinge. . . x 2533;; : i'l :‘t .41 L .. an. .. 1......) v .25.. 0.. 3...... I. . :aannflts n3? 3.: I . 7!; lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll 2%”? 3 1293 01020 1550 This is to certify that the thesis entitled EX-POST RATE OF RETURN ON MAIZE RESEARCH AND EXTENSION IN NORTHERN CAMEROON presented by GEORGES DIMITHE has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for MS degree in Ag. Economics Major professor Date llllolm 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution LIBRARY Mlchigan State University PLACE ll RETURN BOXtonmavothbchockommmnoord. TO AVOID FINES Mam on or Mon duo duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE WWI ‘_—__, or EX-POST RATE OF RETURN ON MAIZE RESEARCH AND EXTENSION IN NORTHERN CAMEROON By Georges DIMITHE A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University ~ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Department of Agricultural Economies 1994 ABSTRACT EX-POST RATE OF RETURN ON MAIZE RESEARCH AND EXTENSION IN NORTHERN CAMEROON By Georges DIMIT HE Facing declining output per capita, the Cameroon government has invested heavily in agricultural research and extension. But, since 1985, support to agricultural research has declined, due to the financial crisis. Consequently, the Institute of Agronomic Research needs a basis for allocating this constrained budget among various programs to ensure that future investments by IRA make a significant contribution to national development goals'as well as for strengthening its bargaining power vis a vis policy makers. To address these issues, data on maize research and extension in North Cameroon were collected and analyzed for the period 1979-2000, with the general objectives to: (a) estimate the rate of return to investments in maize research and extension, (b) identify the critical factors which have contributed to the expansion of maize production, and (c) draw policy implications. The analysis yielded an 11.7 percent internal rate of renu'n and highlights key factors explaining maize expansion in the North. Copyrighted by Georges Dilithe With love and caring, for my wife, Félicité Lydie Nko’o Mebanda, my sons Franck, Cédric and Loic, and my daughter Elaida. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I take this opportunity to acknowledge my great intellectual debts to all those who have been my teachers, from my primary school days onwards. I owe a special debt of this kind to Dr. Richard Bernsten for serving as my major professor and research advisor. His guidance and support throughout my program has been extremely enjoyable and gratifying experience. Particular thanks are also due to my guidance committee members, Dr. Eric Crawford and Dr. Russell Freed. Their careful review and constructive evaluation of this thesis made it a much better document. I am thankful to fellow graduate students and faculty members in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, in arguments with whom a good deal of what I learned at MSU was strengthened. I am especially thankful to James A. Stems whose collaboration throughout this endeavor (from data collection in Cameroon to the analysis and write up) has been invaluable. My task during data collection was immensely facilitated by the collaboration of USAID/Yaoundé personnel, researchers and administrative staff at IRA Maroua, Garoua and Nkolbisson. I am grateful to them. I am especially greatful to Dr John Poku and Dr. Doyle Baker, for encouraging and supporting me throughout this endeavor. Their contribution to my training on the job has been extremely rewarding during my program. Finally, my appreciation goes to my family for the invaluable sacrifices to ensure my education and the suffering they are going through during my absence in Cameroon. To all these people, and many others I have not listed here, much thanks. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ............................................ viii LIST OF FIGURES ............................................. x ABBREVIATIONS ............................................. xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Problem Statement and Importance ................................ 1 1.2 Objectives ............................................... 3 1.3 Hypotheses ............................................... 3 1.4 Thesis Organization ......................................... 4 CHAPTER 2 PROBLEM SETTING 2.1 Structure and Performance of Cameroon Economy ...................... 5 2.2 Characteristics of the Agricultural Sector ............................ 6 2.2.1 Importance and Performance .............................. 6 2.2.2 Production System .................................... 7 2.2.3 Constraints ......................................... 8 2.2.4 Agricultural Policy .................................... 8 2.3 North Cameroon Farming Systems Overview ........................ 11 2.3.1 Introduction ....................................... 11 2.3.2 Climate .......................................... 14 2.3.3 Crop Production .................................... 17 2.3.4 Farming Systems .................................... 18 2.3.4.1 State-Supported Venture Systems .................... 18 2.3.4.2 Traditional Crop/livestock Sedentary Systems ' ............ 20 2.3.4.3 Traditional Pastoral Nomadic System ................. 20 2.4 Maize Research, Extension and Marketing Institutions ................... 21 2.4.1 Cameroon’ 3 Agricultural Research System .................... 21 2. 4. 2 Maize Research ..................................... 25 2.4.2.1 Introduction ................................. 25 2.4.2.2 NCRE Project ............................... 26 2.4.2.2.1 Project Overview ....................... 26 2.4.2.2.2 Maize Breeding ........................ 28 2.4.2.2.3 Maize Agronomy Research ................. 31 2.4.2.2.4 On-farm Maize Research .................. 32 2.4.2.3 SAFGRAD Projects ............................ 32 2.4.2.3.1 Introduction ........................... 32 2.4.2.3.2 SAFGRAD LP. #31 ..................... 33 2.4.2.3.3 SAFGRAD/FSR ........................ 35 2.4.3 Maize Extension .................................... 37 2.4.3.1 SODECOTON ............................... 38 2.4.3.1.1 Structure ............................ 37 2.4.3.1.2 Activities Overview ...................... 38 2.4.3.1.3 Maize Extension ........................ 42 2.4.3.2 Ministry of Agriculture .......................... 45 2.4.4 Seed Production .................................... 46 2.4.4.1 Seed Policy ................................. 46 2.4.4.2 North Cameroon Seed Multiplication Company (NCSM) ..... 47 2.4.4.3 Pioneer Agrogénétique Cameroon (PACSA) ............. 50 2.4.5 Maize Marketing .................................... 51 2.4.5.1 Office Céréalier .............................. 52 2.4.5.2 MAISCAM ................................. 52 CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK and LITERATURE REVIEW 3.1 Theoretical Framework ...................................... 55 3.1.1 Benefit/Cost Analysis ................................. 55 3.1.1.1 Benefit and Cost Concepts ........................ 55 3.1.1.2 Benefit and Cost Items Valuation .................... 57 3.1.1.3 Benefit/Cost Analysis ........................... 60 3.1.1.4 Limitations of Benefit/Cost Analysis ................. 68 3.1.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis ............................ 70 3.1.2 Institutional Analysis ................................. 71 3.2 Review of ROR Studies in Africa ................................ 72 3.2.1 Geographical Distribution of ROR Studies .................... 72 3.2.2 Nature of ROR Studies ................................ 72 3.2.3 Magnitude of ROR Values .............................. 73 ' 3.2.4 Key Determinants of the ROR Values ....................... 74 3.2.5 ROR Studies in Cameroon .............................. 76 3.2.6 Conclusion ........................................ 76 CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS and RESULTS 4.1 Research Activities ......................................... 78 4.1.1 Identification of Research Focus .......................... 78 4.1.2 Preliminary Data Collection ........ , .................... 78 . 4.1.3 Supplemental Data Collection ............................ 79 4.2 Time Frame ............................................. 79 4.3 Costs Determination ........................................ 80 4.3.1 Research Costs ..................................... 81 4.3.1.1 NCRE Costs (ATC‘Q‘) .......................... 81 4.3.1.2 SAFGRAD Projects’ Costs ....................... 86 4.3.2 Extension and Production Costs ........................... 89 4.2.3 Benefits Determination ................................ 96 4.5 Benefit/Cost Analysis ....................................... 99 4.5.1 Base Run Analysis ................................... 100 vii 4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis .................................. 104 4.6 Institutional Analysis ........................................ 112 4.6.1 Research and Extension ................................ 113 4.6.2 Inputs Availability and Delivery .......................... 116 4.6.2.1 Maize Seeds Production and Provision ................ 116 4.6.2.2 Open-Pollinated Versus Hybrid Maize Varieties .......... 117 4.6.2.3 Improved Maize Seeds Release ..................... 119 4.6.2.4 Fertilizer Supply System ......................... 119 4.6.3 Rural Financing ..................................... 122 4.6.4 Marketing Potential and Post-Harvest Opportunities .............. 123 4.6.5 lnfonnation System and Coordinations ...................... 123 CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Summary ............................................... 125 5.1.1 Institutional Setting .................................. 125 5.1.2 Maize Production .................................... 126 5.1. 3 Profitability and Success Factors .......................... 127 5.2 Policy Implications ......................................... 129 5.3 Limitations .............................................. 132 5.4 Future Research Needs ...................................... 134 APPENDICES . . ............................................ 135 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 145 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Area Cultivated (Ha) for the Major Crops in the North Province, Cameroon, 1984—1990. .................................... 17 Table 2.2: Maize Varieties Extended by SODECOTON, 1975-1991, North Province, Cameroon. ............................................ 42 Table 2.3: Area (Ha) Planted for Crops Extended by SODECOTON, North Province, Cameroon, 1979-1990. .................................... 44 Table 2.4: Area Planted (ha) for Seed Production by NCSM Project, 1979-1989, Cameroon. ............................................ 48 Table 2.5: Seed Production“) (mt) by NCSM Project, 1979-1989, Cameroon. ....... 49 Table 4.1: Estimated NCRE Maize Breeding Expenses (Nominal F.cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1981-90. ............................... 85 Table 4.2: Estimated NCRE Maize Agronomy Expenses (Nominal F .cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1981-90. ............................... 85 Table 4.3: SAFGRAD JP #31 Expenses (Nominal F.cfa) on Maize, North Province, Cameroon, 1979-1987. .................................... 88 Table 4.4: Estimated SAFGRAD/FSR Expenses (Nominal F.cfa) on Maize, North Province, Cameroon, 1986-1988. .............................. 89 Table 4.5(a): Estimated Maize Extension and Production Costs (Nominal F.cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1979-2000. .......................... 92 Table 4.5(b): Estimated Maize Extension and Production Costs (Nominal F.cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1979-2000 (Cont’ed). ................... 93 Table 4.5(c): Estimated Maize Extension and Production Costs (Nominal F .cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1979-2000 (Cont’ed). ................... 94 Table 4.6: Estimated Maize Revenues (Nominal F .cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1979-2000. ............................................ 97 Table 4.7: Estimated Net Revenues (Nominal F.cfa) for Maize Research, Extension and Production, North Province, Cameroon, 1979-2000. ............... 101 Table 4.8(a): IRR for Maize Research and Extension from Alternative Values for Key Variables, North Province, Cameroon ............................ 105 Table 4.8(b): IRR for Maize Research and Extension from Alternative Values for Key Variables, North Province, Cameroon (Continued). ................... 106 Table 4.8(c): IRR for Maize Research and Extension from Alternative Values for Key Variables, North Province, Cameroon (Continued) .................... 107 Table A.1: Macroeconomic Indicators for Cameroon, 1980 to 1989. ............. 135 Table A.2: Varieties DevelOped and Released by NCRE Project, Cameroon, 1981-90. . . 136 Table A.3: National NCRE Scientists Trained/in Training“ from 1982 to 1994, IRA- Cameroon. ............................................ 137 Table A.4: Summary of Published ROR to Agricultural Research Studies for Africa up to 1992. ............................................ 138 Table A.5: Total NCRE Expenses (Nominal $US), Cameroon, 1981-1990. ......... 139 Table A.6: NCRE Work Plans’ Budget Allocation (in Nominal value), Cameroon, 1987-1990. ............................................ 140 Table A.7: Maize Area (hectares) in the NCRE Lowland Breeding Unit’s Mandated Zone, Cameroon, 1984-1987 ................................. 140 Table A8: SAFGRAD JP #31 Total Expenditures (in Nominal $US), North Province, Cameroon, 1979-1988‘”. ................................... 141 Table A.9: SAFGRAD/FSR Expenses (Nominal F.cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1986-1988. ............................................ 142 Table A. 10: SODECOTON Personel Costs (in Nominal F.cfa), Cameroon, 1979- 1990. ............................................... 143 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: North Province Administrative Divisions ....................... 13 Figure 2.2: Average Rainfall and Temperature Distribution in Cameroon .......... 16 Figure 2.3: Organizational Structure of IRA ............................ 23 Figure 2.4: Area (ha) Planted for Major Food Crops in the SODECOTON Zone, North Province. ......................................... 44 Figure 3.1: Graphical Representation of Individual’s Welfare .................. 62 Figure 3.2: Welfare Effect of a Single Price Change ........................ 63 Figure 3.3: Welfare Effect of a Single Price Change under Simplified Assumptions. . . . 64 Figure A.1: SODECOTON Geographical Coverage ........................ 144 xi AMP AVA BCR BIRD CAP CBR CCCE CFDT CGIAR CIF CIMMYT CRSP CV DIRAGRI EEC EEVT EV EVT FAC FAO Fcfa FEP FOB FONADER FROR FSAR FSR GDP GVP ICRISAT IDRC IFAD IFCC IITA IRA IRAT IRCA IRCT IRHO IRR IRRI ISNAR ABBREVIATIONS Agricultural Management and Planning Project Association Villageoise Autogére’e Benefit Cost Ratio Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement Cameroon Agricultural Policy Completely Randomized Block Design Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique Compagnie Francaise de Developpement du Textile Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Cost, Insurance, and Freight International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center Collaborative Research Support Project Compensating Variation Direction de I'Agriculture European Economic Community Elite Experimental Variety Trial Equivalent Variation Experimental Variety Trial Fonds d 'Aide et de Cooperation Food and Agricultural Organization Franc de la Communauté Financiere Afi'icaine Foreign Exchange Premium Free on Board Fonds National de Développernent Rural Financial Rate of Return Fond Special d 'Action Rurale Farming Systems Research Gross Domestic Product Groupement Villageois Pré-Coopérative International Center for Research in Serni-Arid Tropics International Development Research Center International Fund for Agricultural Development Institut Francais de Café et Cacao International Institute of Tropical Agriculture Institut de Recherches Agronomiques » Institut de Recherche: Agronomiques Tropicales et des Cultures Vivriéres Institut de Recherche sur le Coton en Afrique Institut de Researche de Coton et des Testiles Exotiques Institut de Recherche pour les Huiles et les Oléagineux Interml Rate of Return . International Rice Research Institute International Service for National Agricultural Research xii MAISCAM MIDENO MIDEVIV MINAGRI MSc N CRE NCSM NEB NETP N GO NPV NVT OAU OECD OER ONAREF ONAREST ORSTOM PASCA PCN PhD R&D RCB ROR ‘ RUVT SAFGRAD SCF SEB SER SEMRY SOCOOPED SODEBLE SODECAO Mai'serie du Cameroun Mission de Développement de la Province du Nord-Ouest Mission de De’veloppement des Semenses et des Cultures Vi vri éres Ministére de l'Agriculture Master of Sciences National Cereals Research and Extension Project North Cameroon Seed Multiplication Project Projet Nora-Est Bénoué National Extension and Training Program Non-Governmental Organization Net Present Value National Variety Trial Organization of African Unity Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Official Exchange Rate Ofiice National de Regeneration des Fore‘ts Ofi‘ice National de Recherches Scientifiques et Techniques Ofi‘ice de la Recherche Scientific et Technique d '0utre-mer Pioneer Agrogénétique Cameroon Projet Centre-Nord Doctor of Philosophy Research and Development Randomized Complete Block Design Rate of Return Regional Unified Variety Trial Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and Development Project Standard Conversion Factor Project Sud-Est Bénoué Shadow Exchange Rate Société d ’Expansion et de Modernization de la Riziculture a Yagoua Société Cooperative de Développement Société de Développement du Blé Société de Développement du Cacao SODECOTON Société de Développement du Coton STRC TLU UCCAO ULER UN UNIDO US USAID Scientific, Technical and Research Commission Testing and Liaison Unit Union Centrale des Cooperatives Agricoles de l'Ouest Unite Locale d 'Encadrement Rapproché United Nations . United Nations Industrial Development Organization United States of America United State Agency for Intemational Development xiii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Problgm Statement and Importance In most African countries, agriculture is the main contributor to GDP, foreign exchange, and employment. Facing declining output per capita, these governments have invested heavily in agricultural research in order to increase productivity and thereby meet the expanding demand for food. Unfortunately, research investments are expensive. Since these countries have limited financial capacities to support their national research systems, they have relied on donors to support agricultural research. Despite substantial investment in research, African agriculture appears to be stagnating. A "Green Revolution" is yet to take place, as happened in Asia. As a result, donors are increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of these investments. In addition, recent political events in Eastern EurOpe and associated requests for foreign aid to promote a free market system have placed increased pressure on African countries to provide evidence of a significant investment inipact to convince donors to continue to support agricultural research. Since 1985, support to agricultural research in Cameroon has declined, as a result of the financial crisis. For example, because of the government priority setting policy, the Institute of Agronomic Research (IRA) budget was reduced by 54 percent from 1985-86 to 1988-89 (IRA, 1989). Moreover, since 1989-90, the government has failed to allocate an effective budget to IRA. Therefore, to strengthen its bargaining power vis a vis policy makers, IRA administration needs documented evidence that research gives high returns. This need is reflected by increased IRA administration’s interest in impact studies and the 2 recent creation of an economic unit within IRA’s directorate with a mandate to conduct assessment studies. In response to the funding crisis, IRA has designed, in agreement with the government, a five year Action Plan which called for the government to provide a stable funding at around 4.5 billions F.cfa. But, because of the high cost of maintaining capital investments‘ launched before the economic crisis, only 12.4 percent of this budget will be allocated to research activities. Allocating such a constrained budget among the various research programs will require prioritization, taking into account the relative importance of each program, to ensure that future public investments in IRA make a significant contribution to national development goals. In order to do this, IRA administration needs concrete evidence of the impact of past research investments, as a basis for future budget allocations. This study analyzes the returns to maize research and extension in the Bénoué plateau in the North Province. The topic was selected in response to the interest of primary users of the study’s results (IRA, USAID and NCRE). Initial interviews with administrators, researchers and extension agents revealed considerable interest in better understanding factors contributing to the tremendous expansion of maize in this area. In addition to estimating the returns on the investments made, the study will also identify the critical factors that have contributed to research impact, and generate policy implications to guide the on-going resource allocation debate. 1 'From 1976-77 to 1985-86 IRA’s budget underwent a rapid expansion. Recurrent costs (including personnel, operations and research) increased by 281 %. During the same 10 years, IRA‘s investment budget increased by 277 %'. (IRA, 1989 p:41). 1.2 Qbiegm The general objectives of this study are to: (a) estimate the rate of returns to investments in maize research and extension in the Northern Province of Cameroon, (b) identify the critical factors which have contributed to the expansion of maize production, and (c) draw policy implications. These general objectives are addressed through five specific objectives: 1) Identify and describe institutions that have contributed to the development and expansion of maize production in Northern Cameroon. 2) Estimate the costs incurred and benefits generated by these institutions in performing their respective activities. . 3) Estimate the rate of return (ROR) to the maize research/extension investment and the sensitivity of this ROR to reasonable changes of critical parameter values. 4) Determine the key factors that have enabled these institutions to make an effective contribution. 5) Highlight policy implications of the thesis results. 1-3 mm The following is hypothesized and used to guide the study: 1) Maize research and extension in the North Province of Cameroon have had a positive economic return - that is, the net present value is greater than zero. 2) Key factors which have contributed to this positive impact include the favorable agroclimatic environment in the target maize-producing area, strong linkages between support institutions, and recent decline in cotton prices. 3) The IRR is highly sensitive to yield and the adoption rate of maize. 1.4 Thesis 0120M ' L1 This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the problem addressed and its importance, defines the objectives of the study and the hypothesis formulated to guide the research. Chapter II describes economic, agronomic and institutional settings of the study. Chapter 111 reviews the economic theories that guides ROR analysis and the ROR literature. This review provided the basis for formulating the hypothesis tested, selecting the appropriate analytical model, and identifying data required to estimate the ROR. Chapter IV describes how the benefits and costs values are estimated and presents the analytical results, including an analysis of the institutional circumstances which have contributed to the impact level achieved. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings, draws policy implications and proposes future research. CHAPTER 2 PROBLEM SETTING 2.1 Structure and Performance at Cameroon Economy Cameroon is one of the most diverse African countries, with respect to its climate, topography, hydrology, vegetation, animal and soil types. Its extends over 475,000 kmz, with a population of 11.2 millions inhabitants, 61 percent of whom live in rural areas (World Bank, 1990). With a population growth rate (1989) of 3.1 percent (World Bank, 1989.; 1989,), agricultural productivity is of critical importance to continued economic growth. With a GDP of US $920 per capita (1988), Cameroon is classified as a middle income country. Even though Cameroon economy is very diverse, agriculture remains its backbone, accounting for 24.8 percent of GDP (World Bank, 1990). Since independence, Cameroon economy has gone through three distinct growth phases. During the first phase (1960-1978) following independence, the economy grew rather slowly, but the pace picked up in the 19703. The second phase (1978-1981) was marked by a rapid growth, as a result of the discovery and exploitation of oil in 1978. From 1978 to 1979, the relative contribution of oil rose abruptly from about 1 to 20 percent of GDP, reducing agriculture’s contribution from 72 to 50 percent of GDP. The third phase started in 1982, when the pace of economic growth began to slow down (Table A.1). Since 1985, Cameroon has experienced a severe recession as a result of both external and internal factors, including the persistent fall in export cr0p prices, the sliding value of US dollar against the country’s currency, declining oil production, and poor management of the economy. From 1987 to 1990, foreign exchange earnings fell by 45 6 percent, the real GDP decreased by 25 to 30 percent, and government fiscal deficit grew rapidly (World Bank, 1990). To address these problems, in 1990 the government, in conjunction with the World Bank agreed to implement a structural adjustment program designed for: (a) stabilizing public finances over the medium term (4 years) through improved management of government resources, control over government salaries, improved civil service management and productivity, and increased non-oil tax revenues; (b) restructuring and rehabilitating the public enterprise and banking sectors; (c) stabilizing agricultural financial and marketing structures 02am. 2.03); (d) deregulating internal commerce and rationalizing external trade regulations; (e) increasing incentive for petroleum exploration and production; (f) reorienting health and education sectors policies to improve the quality of services; and (g) introducing action programs to reduce the social cost of adjustments (World Bank, 1990; p. I). But, an ongoing political crisis seriously je0pardized the successful implementation of the structural adjustment program. Today, Cameroon faces an uncertain economic and political future. With the projected decline in oil reserve and revenues, agriculture is expected to regain its primary role in providing the necessary impetus to the overall economy. The chances for Cameroon to successfully overcome the financial crisis lies not only on a successful implementation of the structural adjustment plan and necessarycomplementary policies, including appropriate agricultural policies, but also on the government’s ability to reestablish a more serene political enviromnent. 2.2 WM 2.2.] Importance and Performance The agricultural sector in Cameroon has always been the key sector for the economy. In 1990, it employed 75 percent of the working population, accounted for 47 percent of export earnings, and contributed 24.8 percent of the value of the country’s total production (World Bank, 1990). .7 Since independence, Cameroon’s agriculture sector growth rate has fluctuated considerably. Averaging 5 .2 percent in the 19605 (compared to 1.4 percent growth rate for the overall economy), the growth rate fell to 3.4 percent during the period 1970 to 1975. Between 1975 and 1982, annual growth rate rose to 7 percent, the highest level ever reached, due to expansion of export crop production. After 1983, unfavorable weather conditions, coupled with the decline in world market of export crop2 prices drastically reduced the rate of growth (1.9 percent from 1982 to 1988 while the economy was growing at 5.6 percent). During 1986-1988, the economy experienced a timid come back. (World Bank, 1990). 2.2.2 Production System The agricultural sector is made up of three distinct subsectors: a traditional sector, a parastatal sector, and a private sector. The traditional subsector is dominated by small rural holders, who produce over 90 percent of the total agricultural output, and account for 75 percent of the total employment. Although the traditional sector is the dominant contributor to the total production and employment, it has received limited and inadequate investment support from the government. The parastatal sector includes commercial agro-industrial ventures which the government considered to be the engine of agricultural growth. Generally speaking, they have failed to meet government’s expectations, despite heavy financial support through public investment. Finally, the private sector is still quit weak and has yet to make a significant contribution to the economy. These are mostly government bureaucrats and retirees’ businesses. 2 The major export crops in Cameroon are cocoa (14 percent of the total export earnings), coffee (12 percent), timber (5 percent), and cotton (2 percent). In general, while the performance of export crops have been mixed over the past 30 years, it is claimed that, at least until recently, food crop subsector appears to have kept the pace with population growth, and high mortality rates have seriously affected the livestock subsector. 2.2.3 Constraints Due to its agroclimatic diversity, Cameroon has the potential to be self-sufficient in crop and animal productions, and to produce exportable surpluses. Although until recently the country has been self-sufficient in many food crops, agricultural performance has been modest, relative to the natural and human resources available (World Bank, 1990). The bulk of the country’s production comes from a shrinking rural population, and in recent years, productivity has failed to keep pace with 3.2 percent population growth rate. The difficulties experienced by the agricultural sector are due to both internal and external factors; The most important external factors have been declining commodity prices for exports crops. Key internal factors include government policies which have failed to provide adequate and appropriate support to the agricultural sector. These have resulted in an aging farming population, inadequate rural infrastructures, erratic input supply, and inadequate institutional support (e. g. research, credit and extension) to farmers. The poor quality of the infrastructural network contributes to high distribution costs, limited regional coverage, and high post-harvest losses. 2.2.4 Agricultural Policy Cameroon government has sought to promote agriculture through policies designed to support agriculture research and extension, provide farmers subsidized inputs, and create a stable price environment particularly for export crops. Historically, the government began to strengthen agricultural extension during the colonial period after World War II. The goal was to promote a rapid diffusion of export crops (e.g. cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber tree, and cotton) through technical support to crop-specific research stations (IFCC, IRHO). To achieve these goals, a training center for extension agents was first created at Ebolowa in the 9 South Province. Later, a second center was created at Yaounde to provide more practical training. Initially, the government extension approach focussed on identifying progressive farmers to serve as pilot farmers for demonstrations. Field visits were organized for neighboring farmers who were expected to strictly follow the instructions provided. The colonial government required that most of the farms be located along the road or behind farmers’ houses in order to ensure permanent and easy policing, as well as tax collection. Failure to conform to the instructions was severely sanctioned. In the 19403, after the practice of forced labor was abolished, the extension service was reorganized, and training centers strengthened. Also, the extension approach shifted to a strategy centered on State- owned structures called Modernization Sectors. This marked the beginning of a new era in development philosophy that prevailed until the financial crisis in the 19803, which forced the government to publicly acknowledge the failure of this approach. After independence, the government continued to provide extension services through State-owned agencies and the Ministry of Agriculture’s traditional extension service, but their nature changed over time. Initially, the extension philosophy was based on the diffusion and community development models that were promoted in most Third World countries. Thus, the first Five Year Development Plan relied heavily on the Modernization Sectors, alongside the traditional extension service. In 1968, a new law allowed the government to create crop- specific parastatals, which were introduced in the second Five Year Development Plan along with the Modernization Sectors. Subsequently, Modernization Sectors were abolished and 14 parastatals were created, including SODECOTON in the North Province. These parastatals were expected to be the starting point for rapid diffusion of technology. 10 Since the creation of parastatals, the government has given priority to providing financial support to them, while neglecting the traditional extension service. During this period, agricultural policy focused mainly on export crops as a source of foreign exchange. It was not until the early 19705 that the government began to pay attention to food crops. By 1980, it became evident that the diffusion and community deveIOpment models had failed to generate a Green Revolution through a rapid increase in agricultural output. In the 19808, the agricultural extension emphasis shifted towards supporting integrated rural development projects, as reflected in the fourth and fifth development plans. As a result, the traditional agricultural extension service was reformed in 1987, with the creation of ULER (Unite locale d ’Encadrement Rapproche') as a way to improve efficiency through better use of extension staff. This was aimed at insuring that graduates from the various professional schools of agriculture were effectively posted in the rural areas so they could provide better technical support to the farmers. Recent IBRD (1989) and World Bank (1990) diagnoses of the extension services indicated that, except in the North-West Province where only MIDENO (Mission de Developpement de la Province du Nord-Ouest) provides extension services, these policies have led to a proliferation of inefficient institutions. Overall, these institutions have proven to be costly, inadequately managed, and operate in a confusing policy environment with overlapping responsibilities and obscure objectives. In addition, their staff are inadequately trained, poorly motivated, lack logistic support, and operate under ineffective rural communication system. In an attempt to address the above issues, the National Agricultural Extension and Raining Project (NAETP) was initiated in 1988, with the objective to improve the efficiency of Cameroon’s agricultural extension services and harmonize them into a single and less ll costly system. The NAETP started as an 18 months pilot project in the North-West and selected areas in the South, East and Extreme-North provinces. Subsequently, it was extended for five years in 26 Departments in the Adamaoua, South-West, Littoral and West provinces. Since the North Province is not included during this first phase, extension activities were left to SODECOTON. In 1990-91, within the context of structural adjustments, Cameroon government designed a new agricultural policy that focused on five major goals: (1) modernization of the production system, (2) ensuring food security, (3) encouraging and diversifying exports of agricultural products, (4) encouraging domestic processing of agricultural products, and (5) re—equilibrating the majors production channels. The government has placed considerable emphasis (a) restructuring, privatizing or dissolving state-owned agencies previously considered to be the engine of agricultural development and growth, (b) reorganizing the seed production and distribution systems, (c) reforming the fertilizer subsector (with the help of USAID) through a progressive reduction of government subsidies to ultimately achieve total privatization, (d) strengthening the agricultural research system, (e) improving the macroeconomic environment to enhance private investment, increased availability of agricultural inputs and credit, as well as reforming the current law on cooperatives and land tenure, and (0 further liberalizing the domestic market and promoting regional and international markets (World Bank, 1990). 2.3 WM 2.3.] Intmdudion The North Province became a separate Province in 1984, when the former "big North” Province was subdivided into three Provinces: the Extreme-north, North, and 12 Adamaoua. The North Province extends over 67,798 km2 and is subdivided into four Divisions: Bénoué, Faro, Mayo-Louti, and Mayo-Rey (Figure 2.1). Recent p0pulation data estimate the Province has 599,000 inhabitants unevenly distributed across the Province. The Province area and population represent 14 and 5 percent of the national statistics, respectively. 13 Sunder “N mic {OUTI /- a BENOUE / 'Ha Pol. - - ( \/ Icrlftlilt- a MAYO HEY Figure 2,1: North Province Administrative Divisions 14 The North Province benefits from relatively favorable climatical conditions, which have made both crops and livestock the Province’s primary activities. Unfortunately, its isolation from the major consumption and supply centers has hindered agricultural development of this sector. However, agricultural development in the Province has been enhanced by an integrated rural development approach promoted by the government through various projects and institutions, some of which cover the entire country. Those with a national mandate include " Oflice Céréalier” , Fond National de Développement Rural (FONADER’), the North Cameroon Seed Multiplication Project (NCSM), SOCOOPED, and the Institute of Agronomic Research (IRA). Major projects with a regional coverage include Société de Développement du Coton (SODECOTON) and Projet Nord Est-Bénoué (N EB). 2.3.2 Climate The Northern Provinces (Adamaoua, North, and Extreme-North) experience a tropical climate, with a monomodal rainfall distribution which increases from north to south. Based on annual distribution of the rains and predominant vegetation types, the North Province has been divided into three major agro-ecological zones: (1) the Sahelian savannah zone in the north-east region with an annual rainfall ranging from 600 to 800 mm, (2) the Sudan savannah zone in the west region with 800 to 1000 mm of rainfall, and (3) the Guinea savannah zone in the south region with 1000 to 1200 mm of rainfall (figure 2.2). Unlike the southern regions of Cameroon which have two rainy seasons alternating with two dry seasons, the North Province has only one rainy season (April-May through October-November). The highest rains generally occur in August. The cropping period and calendar across the Province are determined by rainfall patterns, which vary from four to six 3 FONADER has been restructured and transformed into a bank called Credit Agricole. 15 months. This makes planting time the busiest period for farmers, since they must plant their principal crops during a very short time period (mid-May to mid-June). In the north and west regions, the rainy season is shorter (mid-May and mid-June), compared to the south and east regions (April- mid-June). The average monthly temperature varies from 26.5 °C in November-December to 45 °C in March-April. \_/ 150 [hum (.C) \ ,I a o lsohyét (on) M: Average Rainfall and Temperature Distribution in Cameroon 17 2.3.3 Crop Production The main traditional food cr0ps in the North Province are cereals (sorghum and millet) and legumes (Groundnut and cowpea) as shown in Table 2.1. In most years, Sorghum has accounted for the largest proportion of cultivated area, followed by cotton, groundnut, and maize. However, recently, maize area has been expanding rapidly (figure 2.3), especially in the south-east Bénoué region which is referred to as the Province’s maize belt. In this area, maize is not only grown as a sole crop, but also intercropped, and in rotation with cotton and/or legume crops. Table 2.1: Area Cultivated (Ha) for the Major Crops in the North Province, Cameroon, 1984-1990. Year Cotton Sorghum Peanut Maize Beans Cowpea Cassava Rice lMillet 1984 35,974 60,956 27,237 10,700 3,980 2,094 761 1,448 1985 61,536 85,043 29,873 24,044 5,372 973 1,052 654 1986 51,534 101,037 36,371 15,849 5,786 1,780 1,294 642 1987 31,464 67,473 20,676 12,554 2,430 366 1,006 12 1988 38,497 102,668 18,909 17,585 5,811 1,178 124 428 1989 34,115 75,978 20,696 23,553 3,981 1,307 1,924 384 Source: Adapted from the 1984-1989 National Agricultural Survey. Cereals account for 53% of households’ caloric intake (IRA, 1986; N gambeky, 1990). These crops are generally consumed as flour, porridge, grits, and as local beverage; and the stalks are used for fuel, fences and fodder. Maize is also consumed green during the hunger period to fill the food deficit. Cotton has been the dominant cash crop, followed by groundnut which also serves as food crop. However, in the last decade, maize has become an 18 increasingly important food crop and a new source of family income, particularly in the west and south-east Bénoué regions. The relative importance of these crops vary across the Province. Dry season sorghum (muskwari) and cowpea are mostly grown in the west and north-east regions. Maize is mostly grown in the south-east region while groundnut and cowpea are popular throughout the Province (IRA, 1986; Ngambeky, 1990). 2.3.4 Farming Systems In general, North Province farming systems can be grouped into three major categories: the state-supported agro-industrial system, the traditional crop/livestock sedentary system, and the traditional pastoral nomadic system. Cropping period and calendar, as well as land clearing method, are identical in both the state-supported agro-industrial system and the traditional crop/livestock sedentary system. The most common land clearing method is slash and burn, especially for maize, cotton and sorghum. These systems have been extensively described by the IRA-SAFGRAD Farming Systems Research team (IRA, 1986; N gambeky, 1990). 2. 3. 4. 1 W This term refers to the low and high input cropping systems, both of which are being extended by SODECOTON. They are essentially cotton based rotation systems, which vary in terms of management level depending on the cr0p‘. SODECOTON provides the inputs used in these systems and technical back-stopping to participant farmers.- The distinctive 4 The main cotton based rotations are cotton-sorghum-sorghum, cotton-sorghum-cotton-maize, and cotton-sorghum-cotton-groundnut, cotton-maize or cotton-groundnut. 19 features of these systems, compared to the traditional systems, include the use of animal traction for land preparation5, row planting, and the used of seed treatment, chemical weeding, and herbicides. However, some farmers following the low systems also have adopted these recommended practices, especially fertilizer, but at lower application rate. Sorghum is planted under both management systems. The farmers following high input sorghum system generally plant improved sorghum varieties, either in pure stands or in association with maize, after cotton. In contrast, farmers following the low input system mostly plant local varieties in pure stands, after either cotton, a cereal or legume. Unlike with sorghum, SODECOTON promotes maize in a high input package, mostly in pure stands but also in association with sorghum. Generally, farmers plant cowpea and other supplementary cr0ps like millet and vegetables between early May and mid-May, sorghum and groundnut between mid-May and early June, cotton between early June and mid-June, maize in early May to mid-May, and rice in mid-June. Animal husbandry and agro-forestry are important components of both the state- supported system, as well as of the traditional crop/livestock sedentary system. Animals are used for land preparation (animal traction), transportation, milk and sold to meet emergency cash needs. The most common animal found are cattle, oxen, goats and a small number of sheep, which are fed crop residues, grain husks, tree leaves and hay. Government’s effort to encourage tree planting through SODECOTON, ONAREF and NEB, and CARE have increased farmers’ awareness and recognition of the economic importance of trees, including fruit (mango and lime) and non-fruit trees (Ngambeky, 1990). 5 Land preparation with animal traction is used mostly for cotton, maize and groundnut, but less so for sorghum, com and. muskwari (dry season sorghum). 20 2. 3. 4. 2 Traditional Crop/livestock Sedenta_ry Systems In this category, farmers grow sorghum/groundnut as the main crops while raising animals on permanent locations. These farmers adopt very few of the practices recommended by SODECOTON. About 85% of the rural farming population practice the traditional crop/livestock sedentary systems. Traditional farmers generally grow food crops in rotation with cotton, in pure stands or in association. At the Province level, 85 percent of the farmers grow pure groundnut“, 75 percent pure maize, and 75 percent pure sorghum, and 45 percent pure cowpea. The most common associations are sorghum/cowpea, sorghum/groundnut, and sorghum/groundnut/maize, but farmers also grow maize/millet, groundnut/cowpea, maize/cowpea, and maize/groundnut in intercrops. The main non-cotton-based rotations are simple rotations of sorghum-groundnut, maize-sorghum, maize-groundnut, and cowpea-maize, or sorghum/groundnut followed by maize/sorghum, maize/groundnut or cowpea/maize. 2.3.4.3 Wm This system involves 15 percent of the rural farming population, mostly from the ethnic group Foulbé, who graze cattle (transhumance) over a wide-ranging area, with no interaction with crop production. During the dry season, these farmers move further south in the valleys in search of grazing land and water. 6 SAFGRAD (1986) reports that 96 percent of the farmers in the NEB, 83 percent in the SEB, and 84 in the WEB grow groundnut in pure stand. 21 2.4 Mag Research, Extensg' n and Marketing Insg' utions 2. 4. I Cameroon ’s Agricultural Research System The foundations of scientific research in Cameroon was laid during the colonial period. As in most developing countries, agricultural research is organized and implemented by governmental agencies. Since independence, both the disciplinary as well as qualitative aspects of research have changed profoundly. Similar to the country’s general economy, Cameroon’s research system evolution during the post-colonial period can be classified into three distinct periods: 1) The 19603 were characterized by increased government recognition of the importance of research. Key policy initiatives included the creation of a coordination council7 and executive bodies' which were dominated by French private interest groups. These structures were solely responsible for promoting and implementing scientific research activities. 2) The 19703 were characterized by increased nationalization of research structures, a rapid expansion of research executive bodies, as well as an expansion in the number of research disciplines and the scope of activities. 3) From the early 19803 to date, government support to agricultural research dramatically declined due to the economic crisis. Post-colonial agricultural research, which dates to 1963, followed the general pattern describes above, both in terms of budgetary as well as disciplinary evolvements. Originally, 7 A National Council jbr Technical and Scientific Research, Studies and Surveys was created in October 20, 1962. It was chaired by the Vice-President of the then Federal Republic of Cameroon, assisted by five specialized committees. 8 The executive bodies include ONAREST (May 24, 1965), Federal University of Cameroon (July 26, 1962) and associated higher schools, French institutes and Office (IRHO, IFCC, IRCA, IFAC, IRTC, CT FT . ORSTOM). and other technical services located within various ministries. 22 research was performed by French institutes, which focused - on export crops namely cotton (IRTC), cocoa and coffee (IFCC), oil palm (IRHO), fruits (IFAC), and wood (CTFT). Alerted in the early 19603 by potential food shortages in the western and extreme- northern parts of the country, the government urged the research system to expand its mandate to include food cr0ps; As a result, two research stations were created in Dschang and Guétale in 1965. In 1974, in accordance with a nationalization campaign undertaken in the early 19703, Cameroon government tool: full control over agricultural research by nationalizing the French ICVT to create the Institute of Agricultural Research (IRA). Initially, IRA’s primary mandate was to carry out crop research in order to improve their productivity. Subsequently, this mandate was extended to include: a) Increased responsibility for multiplication and certification of improved seeds and vegetative planting materials, as well as ensuring that an adequate supply of these materials were available to farmers; b) Ensure wide diffusion of research results by reinforcing the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and relevant government agencies to extend research results; and c) Support planning and policy making by various governmental development agencies. Since its creation, IRA has undergone majors changes, both in terms of the Institute’s structure as well as the scope of research conducted. 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M”: u o w. 035. 108 Rugs 1-4; Research Expemej The IRR was recalculated using as much as a 25 percent increase in NCRE, SAFGRAD JP #31, and SAFGRAD/FSR expenses attributed to maize research in the North Province (Table 4.8). These adjustments were run separately (runs 1-3) and simultaneously (run 4). The results obtained show an IRR not less than 11.6 percent, which indicates that as much as a 25 percent error in the estimation of research costs has almost no impact on the ROR. Consequently, the estimated IRR value is close to its true value, if these cost items accounted for the only estimation error in the computation process. R -7' DE N Ex e Three scenarios are considered in an attempt to account for possible underestimation of extension/production expenses. In one case (run 5), both estimated extension and production expenses were adjusted upward by up to 25 percent, and this yielded an IR of 11.56 percent. In the second case (run 6), it was assumed that the only estimation error is the costs of seeds. This scenario was run to test the impact of the assertion made by many key informants that maize seed price was subsidized by the government at about 60 percent. Adjusting the seed price upward to account for the subsidy reduced the IRR to 10.9 percent. In a third scenario (run 7), both the estimated seed costs and SODECOTON’s extension/adoption expenses were increased by 150 (i.e. 60 percent subsidy) and 25 percent, respectively, which yielded a 11.0 percent IRR. Thus, if one considers only potential errors in estimating these extension/production expenses, an upward adjustment of up to 25 percent still gives an IRR of no less than these 11.0 percent. 109 Runs 8-11: Research, Extension and Production Costo After having adjusted research and extension/production expenses separately, these three cost items were then increased simultaneously by 5-10 (runs 8-9) and 15-25 .(runs 10-11) percents. The results indicate an IR in the range 10.72-9.79 and 8.88-7.03 percents, respectively. These results show that a 10 percent estimation error on total research, extension and production costs would have a significant negative impact on the IRR. Realistically, given that these costs estimates are based on actual data, estimation errors of this magnitude are highly unlikely. Run 12: Maize Area over the Eistorio Eerioo The base run IRR was computed using SODECOTON data which do not include the entire Province’s maize production area, since key informants and available statistics indicated the maize area outside the SODECOTON zone is relatively insignificant. However, this assumption was relaxed upward by 25 percent, ceteris paribus. The run generated an IR of 13.5 percent, representing a 1.8 percentage points increase over the base run IRR. - 2' ' i In the base run, gross revenues from maize production in the North Province was computed using estimates of the high input system’s yield and assuming that the yield in the low input system is two-thirds the yield in the high input system. In runs 13-14, when these yield estimates were increased to up to 10 percent, the IRR increased by as much as 1.7 percentage points over the base run value. To further test the effect of yield on the IRR, in runs 15-17, maize yield was adjusted upward to as much as 50 percent, which gave an IRR of 21.5 percent. Even when yields are increased by 50 percent simultaneously with 20—40 110 percent higher input costs (run 18-20), the IR is still greater than the base run. Finally, when maize yields are increased by 100 percent and input costs by 20-40 percent, the IRR exceeds 20 percent. Runs 23-25: Maiz Ar Pr vi u l r t Sor hum A major assumption in the base run analysis is that maize did not replace sorghum, but rather all maize was planted on newly opened land. However, common sense and SODECOTON report suggest the contrary; Run 23, in which it was assumed that only 9 percent of the maize area replaced sorghum, generated a ROR of 10.0 percent. Increasing this percentage to 28 percent further reduces the ROR to -4.3 percent, which shows that the assumption about the proportion of sorghum area replaced by maize is extremely critical. Overall, these results raise some concerns about the profitability of this investment. R 22°Ext in dMizer v eFrec tPerid Given the reduction in government budget allocated to develOpment agencies due to the economic crisis Cameroon is facing, it is realistic to expect a substantial reduction in the level of support SODECOTON is able to provide to farmers in the future. The base run analysis assumed a constant level of investment to the year 2000 equal to the magnitude of the 1990 investment. While there is no way to predict what this level could be, runs 26-27 attempt to take into account a more than likely reduction of extension effort by reducing SODECOTON’s expenditures on benefits and salaries for its personnel by 50 to 100 percent. Interestingly, the results indicate that a substantial decline in SODECO’I‘ON’s support with no reduction in maize area planted reduces the base run rate of return by no more that 0.3 percentage points. This implies that regardless of what would happen from the year 1991 to 111 2000 in terms of public support to maize extension, the base run rate of return will remain unchanged, ceteris paribus. Yet, to assume that reduced maize extension expenditures would have no effect on maize area is somewhat unrealistic. Thus, to take into account the link between maize extension effort and maize area, both variables were adjusted simultaneously in runs 28-29, by reducing maize extension costs by 50 percent and maize area by 25 to 75 percent. Unexpectedly, the results obtained show that the IRR ranges between 11.6 to 11.8 percent, which is not significantly different from the base run result. Summary The sensitivity analysis revealed that the most important determinant of the ROR obtained were the assumption about the maize area previously cr0pped to sorghum. These results also showed the significant impact of maize yield on investment profitability, supporting the hypothesis that the IRR would have been even more attractive had the varieties extended been hybrids, ceteris paribus. In contrast, adjusting historic research and extension/adoption expenses upward by as much as 10 percent did not prove to have a major impact on the rate of return. But beyond this range, the IRR is reduced by at least 20 percent, if all cost estimates are adjusted simultaneously. Finally, the sensitivity analysis showed that, regardless of what would happen from the year 1991 to 2000, in terms of the level of maize extension support and maize area, the base nm rate of return remains unchanged, ceteris paribus. This is explained by the fact that these costs are small (relative to the one of the early periods) and the distant time periods during which they are incurred lead to corresponding present values with only marginal [12 effects on the IRR. The major drawback in this sensitivity analysis is that fact that in most cases, adjustment are considered separately. 4.6 Institutiogg! Analysis" The previous sections of this chapter present the quantitative part of this ROR study. In general, ROR studies show that there exists considerable variability across locations within a country and between countries with respect to the magnitude of the ROR for the same technology. A major reason for this variability is the difference in the physical and institutional contexts within which the technology is developed and used. These institutional and physical factors establish constraints and opportunities for economic agents, through their effects on the incentive structure, which in turn generate outcomes or payoffs. Consequently, within the same physical environment, alternative institutional arrangements generate differing patterns of interactions and thus differing payoffs. It is only when the quantitative analysis is integrated with an analysis of the institutional setting that one begins to understand factors underlying the performance of a new technology. While this section incorporates the institutional dimension, it does not anempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the institutional setting of maize research and extension in the North Province. Rather, it is based on the author’s personal experiences, interviews with key informants, and a review of appropriate literature. The analysis proposes key factors that have contributed to the estimated ROR to research and extension, in addition to the characteristics of the physical environment and the technology discussed earlier. It also highlights potential constraints to future expansion of maize production in the North Province. I I 3 4. 6. I Research and Extension Maize expansion in the North Province is partially due to both the unique and long standing complementary organization of research, extension, and seed supply, and the strength of these institutions. In most parts of Cameroon, a large number of institutions, mostly governmental, support the agricultural sector. Their mandates are broad and, in many cases, overlap. For example, in the Center Province, extension activities were undertaken by SODECAO, NETP, MINAGRI, SOCOOPED, MIDEVIV, NGOs, and to some extent by the TLU. Coordination and c00peration between these institutions has been a major issue of concern in the policy debate, and has often been cited as one of the reasons why the implementation of development policies has fallen short of government’s expectation. In contrast, agricultural institutions in the North Province are much better organized. While IRA is responsible for all agricultural research, as is the case in the rest of the country, agricultural extension is dominated by SODECOTON with the support from NCSM for seeds provision prior to its privatization. Although numerous other institutions are also present in the Province, their activities are either marginal (e.g., SODEBLE, MINAGRI and Project Céréalier) or very specific (e. g., SEMRY for irrigated rice and MAISCAM for maize processing). This set up is unique in the country in the sense that fewer different institutions are involved in agricultural research and extension, which facilitates better coordination. For example, SODECOTON deals with both food crops and cash crops, provides inputs to and buy production surpluses from farmers. In addition, SODECOTON follows a modified Training and Visit extension system, which not only seeks to increase production but also to promote commercialization, farmer organization, and education. Specific efforts to support these goals include programs to diffuse improved varieties and production techniques (e. g., mechanization), supply necessary inputs, empower farmers through self-managed 114 cooperatives, market production surpluses, expand the development of infrastructure (e. g., roads), and promote farmers’ literacy. Thus, the success of the maize research and extension in the North Province is partially due to SODECOTON’s broad mandate. Furthermore, the significant impact of IRA and SODECOTON on maize production in the North is partly due to the unique approach to research and extension that they have ad0pted. In contrast to the classic situation, where research and extension have generated numerous scientific reports and findings with little applicability to small farmers’ conditions, these institutions rely on joint annual planning meetings, on-farm testing, field demonstration, joint monitoring and evaluation, and prototype extension bulletins to ensure that the new technology generated is appropriate to farmers’ needs and is extended to them. These joint planning meetings have reinforced the holistic and interdisciplinary characteristics of the farming system methodology, and contributed to building and strengthening proactive and mutually beneficial relationships between research, extension and farmers. This collaboration has resulted in significant management innovations that have (a) improved the identification of farmers’ problems, (b) improved research implementation which has produced higher quality research results, (c) provided greater incentives to researchers and extension staff, ((1) improved the coordination and use of scarce resources, and (e) generated a greater flow of information that is useful to farmers. As a result, farmers benefit from greater access to high-yielding varieties and cultural practices adapted to their circumstances, and lower transaction costs, all of which translate into more farm income. In addition, fa'rmers’ active participation in the identification of research issues and the evaluation of results has increased their interest in new technologies. Finally, a major incentive to researchers is provided by the guarantee that if they develop appropriate 115 technologies, an effective extension system is in place which has proven its ability to widely diffuse new technologies. Unfortunately, the close proactive link between research and SODECOTON has been informal, in the sense that there exits no formal institutional arrangements to insure continued cooperation between researchers and extension agents. This deficiency raises some doubts about the sustainability” of the system. Also related to the sustainability issue is the high level of donor funding that has been required to support the joint research program (NCRE and SAFGRADs) and the extension system. It is doubtful that the government will be able to maintain a reasonable level of investment after the mid-1994 when the NCRE Project is to be terminated. Already, the current economic crisis has drastically reduced the government capacity to provide recurrent costs for research, credit, input supply, marketing, and processing. Unless the economic crisis is resolved, further reductions are likely in the future. In an effort to adjust their budgets to the country’s reduced finances starting from 1990, SODECOTON and IRA signed performance contracts with the government. To comply with its contract, SODECOTON attempted to reduce its expenses for social programs and narrow its focus to a limited number of operations by, for example, decreasing subsidies (e.g., cotton since 1989) and reducing or stopping its purchase of food crops such as maize. While these reforms will reduce operating costs, SODECOTON (1979-80, p.2; 1985-86, p.3) fears that if it no longer buys food crops (which. are rotated with cotton), farmers will I dramatically reduce their cotton area. On the other hand, an expansion of the food crop area could also threaten cotton production which is SODECOTON’s primary focus. For example, in 1979 when world price of cotton dropped and SODECOTON’s groundnut oil (Diamaor) faced increased competition 3’ The concept sustainability is used here to mean sustained institutional performance. 116 with less expensive imported oil, SODECOTON reduced its guaranteed price for cotton. This prompted many farmers to look for better alternatives, such as maize for which a market was guaranteed by MAISCAM. In addition, after SODECOTON signed its performance contract, it started charging IRA for implementing research trials. Because IRA also faced a financial crisis, it immediately decreased the number of on-farm trials it contracted out to SODECOTON. These policy changes are indicative of the new environment under which both research and extension have to be conducted in the future. Clearly, SODECOTON can no longer afford to ignore the high costs of its activities, given its need to improve its financial performance. 4. 6.2 Inputs Availability and Delivety As indicated by the sensitivity analysis, returns to research and extension are highly sensitive to maize yield. Among various determinants of yield, two are critical; the maize type and cultural practices”. While Cameroon has benefited from the existence of a reliable source of open-pollinated maize seeds, little effort has been directed at developing hybrids with greater yield potential. 4. 6. 2. 1 W A major determinant of maize expansion in the North Province has been the existence of a reliable support system for producing and distributing quality seed. Anecdotal evidence supported by SODECOTON reports (SODECOTON, 1985-86 p.61) suggest farmers are ‘° As discussed previously, collaborative applied research carried out by IRA and SODECOTON has successfully identified cultural practices that have been widely adapted by maize farmers. 11 7 reluctant to keep seeds from the previous production (SODECOTON, 1985-86 p.61); Therefore, they either purchased seeds on local markets or through SODECOTON. Historically, SODECOTON’s main source of seeds has been the NCSM although IRA has provided limited amounts of seeds. But, due to poor financial performance, NCSM was privatized in 1991 and (symbolically) bought by Pioneer. While Pioneer’s involvement in seed production initially raised hopes for a brighter future for maize production in the country as a whole and in the North Province in particular, these hopes were shattered when Pioneer pulled out in July 1993. This set back constitutes a serious handicap to the expansion of maize in the North Province. 4622 WWW With regard to the inherent yield potential, research results indicate that the yield for most improved varieties extended in the North Province are quite encouraging. In the North, under farmers’ conditions, the available improved varieties yield two to three times as much as traditional varieties. To date, maize breeding and extension in North Cameroon in particular, and in the country in general, has been focused exclusively on identifying and developing open- pollinated varieties, despite evidence of some yield advantage obtained by the lowland breeding unit. For example, available research results indicate that hybrids outyielded Open- pollinated varieties by 50 to 100 percent, under good management and adequate rainfall (1990 NCRE lowland breeding unit results). But, as Cameroon’s economy restructures to overcome the current financial crisis, the traditional debate of hybrid/open pollinated maize types takes greater significance. The study’s sensitivity analysis showed that a 50 percent increase in . maize yield increases the base run returns to research and extension by 3.08 to 4.86 percent, 118 assuming a 20 to 30 percent increase in adoption costs. Similarly, the IRR increases by 10.8 to 13.8 percentage points under a 100 percent increase in yield and a 20 to 30 percent increase in adoption costs. Key informants reported that IRA’s focus on open-pollinated varieties has often been justified by the claims that (a) farmers cannot profitably adopt hybrids under risky and low input conditions“, (b) small farmers will not be willing or cannot afford to replace their seeds each season, as required with hybrids, and (c) that success in hybrid maize production requires the existence of a well—established hybrid seeds industry which does not exist in Cameroon. Recent evidence from other developing countries suggests that these claims (a and b) are not based on facts. Byerlee M (1993) report that hybrids have been successfully adopted and were profitable under low input conditions in India and El Salvador, as well as Eastern and Southern Africa (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia, and South Africa ‘2. Although these results were obtained from studies that compared hybrids to an unimproved local open-pollinated variety, and where a well-established hybrid seed “ It is often argued that hybrid’s higher production potential can only be achieved under favorable climatic conditions when a complementary package of inputs such as fertilizer are applied. ‘2 Byerlee out! (1993) reports that: a) In Swaziland, hybrid maize varieties are extensively adopted by small-scale farmers. Around the late 19808, hybrid seeds were planted on about 80 to 90 percent of the maize area. b) In Kenya, there has been a rapid and widespread adoption of hybrid varieties and a complementary package of improved practices even though this seem to have occurred mainly in the commercial maize producing areas. Maize area with hybrids row from 35 percent in 1970-74 to 64 percent in 1986-88, much of which occurred in areas dominated by very small farmers. This expansion in hybrid maize production has been accompanied by a very low fertilizer use on hybrid. c) In Malawi, an analysis of the zerofenilizcr plot of data from 212 on-farm demonstrations (hybrid versus local maize with and without fertilizer) conducted over the past three years (1990-92) in the Lilingwe area shows that hybrids outyielded local varieties by 56 percent (380 kg) over all three years including 1992, one of the driest year in Malawi’s history. Simple economic budgets indicated a marginal return to farmers above 100 percent even under no subsidy alternative. (1) In Zimbabwe, the performance of hybrid varieties under the low input conditions has been similar to the results at obtained in Malawi. 119 industry existed, the results question the conventional wisdom that has guided maize development in Cameroon. Thus, there is a need for Cameroon researchers to reevaluate the potential benefits of expanding research to hybrid maize. 4. 6.2.3 Improvod Mag e goods Rolooog Seed releasepolicies play an important role in insuring that new varieties are available to farmers. Currently, the procedures for seed production and release are determined informally by breeders with the assistance of agronomists and parastatals. As a result, there exists no informed criteria for releasing new varieties. Thus, there is a need to develOp a uniform policy that defines the characteristics (yield advantage threshold, stability, color, endosperm type. etc...) to ensure the timely release of high quality seeds. An attempt to address this issue has already been made with the extension of IRA’s mandate to "ensuring an adequate supply of seed and other planting materials through seed multiplication and certification, and provision of foundation seeds to developmental agencies and private sector organization" (IRA, 1989). While IRA now has a mandate for seed production, it is important to ask the question how effective will the research system be in producing and supplying quality seeds, at reasonable costs and in a timely manner? 4.6-2.4 Wit!!! Because maize is highly responsive to fertilizer, greater use of fertilizer in maize production could potentially increased yields. Yet, on the average, between 1979 and 1990, farmers applied chemical fertilizer on only 31.5 percent of maize area in the North Province (ranging between 15 and 44 percent), the bulk of which was imported. 120 Prior to 1987, fertilizer importation was coordinated by government through administrative processes that imposed legal constraints on private transactions (i.e., import authorization and license, special clearance to use ships other than Cameroon Shipping lines Company (the national shipping company), and custom inspections. On the other hand, the private sector agents related directly to government agencies and they only indirectly related to one another. Fertilizer was imported through a joint operation between the MINAGRI and FONADER. An interministerial tender board had authority to accept bids from fertilizer importers and award contracts, with funds provided by FONADER and the Ministry of Finance. Imported fertilizers was then allocated to provincial cooperatives or Delegations of Agriculture on the basis of their needs as determined by MINAGRI - SODECO’I‘ON was the largest consumer of the imported fertilizer. A uniform pricing policy has been applied, regardless of the type of fertilizer and the location. This has corresponded to a government price support to farmers amounting to about 65 percent on the average (Oakerson and Truong, 1990). The public monopoly on the importation and distribution of subsidized fertilizer created opportunities for rent-seeking behavior and corruption through selective use of discriminatory power entrusted to bureaucrats. This behavior has translated into the offering of large number of small contracts with high freight costs, and failed to generate sufficient information to ensure timely distribution, at low costs. As a result of the institutional setting and the fertilizer subsector’s poor performance, an unspecified but seemingly important amount of fertilizer is smuggled from Nigeria”. ‘3 Up to the late 19703 maize import was marginal, but since 1980, the amount imported has become significant because of: the uncertainty associated with seasonal price fluctuations, security inventory keeping as a strategy to guarantee the supply to potential buyers, the credit structure which makes it easier to get 121 Triggered by the financial crisis prevailing in the country, in 1988 the government initiated a fertilizer subsector reform program with the support from USAID. This program was aimed at liberalizing and privatizing fertilizer procurement, introducing free market pricing, and reducing fertilizer subsidy to zero by 1991 (Oakerson and Truong, 1990). If successful, these reforms will solve many of the problems plaguing the subsector. Yet, the effectiveness of this major'restructuring effort will depend on the sustained commitment of government bureaucrats to liberalization, the entrepreneurial and innovative initiatives of private economic agents, the market structures, their competitiveness and profitability, as well as the introduction of new institutional arrangements relating to issues such as property rights and dispute settlement. An equally important constraint to increasing the performance of the subsector is related to the intrinsic nature of the fertilizers themselves: chemical fertilizers are bulky products that can be damaged by exposure to water, import and distribution require large amounts of dry storage space, and the chemical compounds in fertilizer decompose and can be depleted over a period of two years under poor storage conditions. Consequently, the actual nutrient content of the fertilizer may not be consistent with its labelling, given delays in transportation, distribution and the seasonality of its use. Until recently, SODECOTON carried out all the necessary functions. Yet, SODECOTON only sells fertilizer to cotton farmers and if mandated again to distribute fertilizer, SODECOTON alone could not possibly satisfy the fertilizer demand of an expanding maize subsector. a loan for maize importation than for buying local maize (Conte et al, 1993). 122 4. 6.3 Rural Financing Another major contributor to the success of maize production and extension in the North Province has been the input credit program sets up by SODECOTON. To some extent, this program contributed to relaxing the capital constraint that farmers faced. Although maize production in the North Province is not capital intensive, farmers need access to working capital, at least to purchase fertilizer. However, as this subsector expends, the demand for capital will grow beyond SODECOTON capability to provide it. Yet, although the country’s rural financial sector has expanded rapidly in recent years, its performance has not been encouraging. In the North Province, a parastatal organization with a national mandate, FONADER, was established principally to distribute credit for rural development. Unfortunately, its organizational phiIOSOphy failed to consider the socioeconomic characteristics of the environment in which it operated. For example, farmers were required to provide collateral and go through a lengthy administrative process (negotiation time) in order to be eligible for a loan. In addition, high transaction costs (costs of maintaining and collecting loans), low loan recovery problems, and the scale bias of the loan program against small farmers made it impossible for FONADER to be successful. While the informal sector has limited access to capital,it is more flexible, scale neutral, and sensitive to farmers’ circumstances. The challenge for decision makers is to redesign existing credit institutions so they can better support sustained growth and development for the maize subsector in particular and agriculture in general. 123 4. 6. 4 Marketing Potential and Post-Harvest Opportunities Although the area under intensive commercial maize production in the North Province is significant, much of the area is under low input subsistence farming. However, in the last decade, subsistence farming has been gradually transformed into a higher value commercial production system as more and more farmers look at maize as a major source of income. This attitude has been driven by not only the inherent characteristics of the technology itself (relative to cotton), the existence of strong research and extension support institutions, and occasional drops in cotton prices, but also by a stable and attractive guaranteed market provided by MAISCAM. Because MAISCAM is still operating below capacity, there is still some additional marketing potential to be exploited. However, if maize production in the region expands greatly, MAISCAM alone will not be able to absorb the Province’s total production. Thus, in the long-run, an efficient market structure will have to be developed and alternative uses for maize (including the feed industry) will have to be promoted to sustain the growth of the maize subsector over time. In addition, although this study did not include an extensive market analysis, discussions with various key informants indicated that seasonal market price variability is a major constraint to the expansion of maize production in the North Province. For example, these informants cited maize price variability as a major factor for increased importation of maize. A better understanding of the marketing aspect of the maize subsector may therefore be necessary to identify the problem and suggest possible solutions. 4. 6.5 Information System and Coordinations A major constraint to the expansion of maize production in the North Province is the lack of timely and accurate production and market information, which is needed by both the 124 public sector as well as the private sector. The collection of basic information on agriculture is intrusted to DEP (farm level data on crop planting, production, marketing, prices and input use) and the Direction of Statistics and National Accounts in the Ministry of Plan and Regional Development (for wholesale and food retail prices, population statistics, and imports and exports). Both institutions have historically had problems collecting and disseminating data or information on a timely basis. With the economic crisis, their performance has worsened. In 1989, the AMP and CAP projects, sponsored by USAID, were established in an attempt to improve data collection and information provision. However, these data are still not available at the intermediate farm and village market levels, except for the West Province. The need for appropriate and timely data has become increasingly critical as the country attempts to restructure its economy to support the private sector, and to detect and adjust to emergencies. Moreover, access to these data is extremely important for the expansion of maize research in the North Province. CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Summaa 5.1.1 Institutional Setting The agricultural sector has always been the main contributor to GDP, foreign exchange, and employment in Cameroon’s economy. In 1990, it employed 75 percent of the working population, accounted for 47 percent of export earnings, and contributed 24.8 percent of the value of the country’s total production (World Bank, 1990). Facing declining output per capita, the Cameroon government invested heavily in agricultural research in order to increase productivity and thereby meet the expanding demand for food, based on p0pulation growth. Agricultural research in northern Cameroon began in the colonial period (1948) with the establishment of a research station at Guetale, which focused on export crops - mainly cotton. Cotton production rapidly became a way of life for two generations of farmers (Stems, 1993), as the cotton-based agricultural system, driven by a massive government intervention, literally transformed the agricultural sector in the Province. In the mid to late-1970s, IRA initiated research on food crops, but it was not until 1984 that farming systems research became a full-fledged program. Over the last two decades, the food crop research budget and related activities increased in importance as a result of donors’ support to NCRE and two SAFGRAD projects (J.P. # 31 and FSR). In contrast to the institutional setting of agricultural extension in the southern part of the country, extension activities in the north are dominated by SODECOTON, a parastatal organization created in 1974 to take over from the French cotton company, CFDT. Co- founded by the Cameroon government and France, supervised by the Ministry of Commerce, and collaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension service, SODECOTON covers 125 126 both the Extreme-North and North provinces. SODECOTON’s extension service, which follows a modified Training and Visit extension system approach, became involved in food crop extension in 1974-75 with rainfed rice, and, then maize a year later. The objective of these food crop extension activities was to encourage farmers to replace sorghum progressively with more productive crops, so farmers could devote more of their time and larger portions of their land to cotton production (SODECOTON, 1976-77; p.20). 5.1.2 Maize Production The main traditional food crops in the North Province are cereals (sorghum and millet) and legumes (groundnut and cowpea). The relative importance of these crops varies across the Province, with maize being grown mostly in the south-east region. Although maize was introduced in coastal Cameroon some 400 years ago by the Portuguese (Ayuk-Takem, 1991), is cultivated extensively in all ten provinces, and is an important part of the population’s diet, key informants argue that it was not until the early 19703 that maize production was introduced in the North Province. But, over the last decades, the maize area in the northern part of Cameroon has expanded tremendously. During the period 1976 to 1990, seven new maize varieties were extended in the North Province, two of which were introductions from Nigeria. These varieties have performed quite well, with the yield under the high input production system in farmers’ fields averaging 2.3 metric tons per hectare, ranging from 2.0 to 3.0 mt/ha. In the North Province, maize is extended under low input and high input production systems. These two systems differ not only in terms of the input use, but also in terms of the level of SODECOT ON monitoring. Farmers participating in the high input production system are supervised by SODECOTON field agents, and must grow crops using mechanical land 127 preparation (oxen and tractor), seed treatment, herbicide and fertilizer, and a specific plant density (0.80 x 0.25 m, one plant per hill). Farmers participating in the intensive system have little choice but to follow SODECOTON’s guidelines. In contrast, most non- SODECOTON farmers grow crops with minimal input (low input production system). SODECOTON food crops efforts have been supported by the existence of a public seed company (NCSM) from 1975 to 1990 and, since 1984, MAISCAM has provided a major private market outlet. 5.1.3 Profitability and Success Factors The base run analysis of estimated benefits and costs yielded an 11.7 percent internal rate of return, which is close to the bank interest rate, considered as the defending alternative. Over the historic period (1979-1990), research expenses accounted for 82 percent of total research and extension costs, the bulk of which was made up of salaries and benefits. In contrast, research and extension represents respectively only about three and less than one percent of total costs including production costs. Over this same period, about 66 percent of total production costs were incurred in the low input production system, the main cost component being weeding cost. The interpretation of this result has to be made within the context of two key assumptions upon which the IRR is based: first, that virtually all of the maize area in the Province is planted to improved varieties from research and extension and, second, that all area planted to maize is grown on newly opened fields. This last assumption turned out to be very critical in the sensitivity analysis for the value of the IRR obtained. When the maize area previously under sorghum is assumed to be 28 percent, the IRR becomes negative. This result raises some legitimate concerns about the profitability of maize research and extension in the North Province. In addition, the sensitivity analysis on the base 128 run data set indicated that (a) upward adjustments of research, extension and adoption expenses within a reasonable range (i.e., as much as 10 percent) have limited impact on the IRR value, while (b) both maize area and maize yield adjustments significantly impact the IRR value. The importance of the latter variable to the profitability of maize research and extension in the North Province, suggests the need to develop and promote hybrids as part of the strategy to increase productivity. The study indicates that the following key factors have contributed to the expansion of maize in the North Province: a) Relatively favorable climatic conditions for maize production, coupled with the need for more productive technologies to reduce food insecurity, especially during annual hunger periods. b) The simplicity of maize production management relative to management requirements for other cr0ps (such as cotton) and the compatibility of maize with the existing farming systems and consumption pattern. c) The early maturity of maize, relative to other traditional cereals, which enabled farmers to harvest the crop during the hunger period and earn an early income. (1) A unique institutional set-up under SODECOTON, whose mandate extends over a wide range of complementary activities including food and cash crop extension, providing inputs to and buying production surpluses from farmers, contributing to the development of infrastructure, and promoting farmers’ literacy. e) The existence of apprOpriate research results that were generated through scientific exchanges and collaborative linkages (genes, technical knowhow, institutional build- up, and training) within national programs and between IRA and IARS. 129 t) The high quality of human capital both in research and extension, which developed effective research and extension methodologies and recommendations consistent with farmers’ problems“. For example, SODECOTON has a corps of 1,000 relatively well-trained and closely supervised monitors (agents) for about 170,000 farmers (IBRD, 1989; World Bank, 1990). g) Strong institutional linkages between research and extension, which took advantage of the institutions’ complementarities and were effective in identifying and taking into account farmers’ constraints and setting research agenda. Furthermore, these linkages provided incentives for both project researchers and extension agents. h) The emergence in the mid-19803 of a major input supply source (SODECOTON) and a major market outlet (MAISCAM) for farmers’ maize production surpluses, almost concurrently with the introduction of maize, that guaranteed access to inputs through the extension service and access to a private sector market for maize. i) The decline in the cotton price, which gave maize a market price advantage over COIIOII. 5.2 W The study revealed a positive impact of investment on maize research and extension in the North Province. Field visits and SODECOTON reports indicate a rapid expansion of maize in this Province. But, for maize production in North Cameroon to further expand and be sustainable, there is a need to find ways to develop the marketing and processing side now that the production potential has been developed. ‘ “Although the quality of human capital both tn IRA and SODECOTON was not explicitly discussed "1 the malts section, it was often cited by key informants as a major contributor to the expansion of maize rescarch and extension in the North Province. 130 This study has clearly indicated that research, extension and marketing are complementary. For example, research will have limited impact unless the results obtained are adapted to the target environment and are extended to farmers, and farmers cannot increase their production unless there market opportunities for the surpluses. As a result, none of these functions can, by itself, be effective in achieving its objective; A minimal level of investment in research, extension, and marketing is therefore necessary to achieve an acceptable return on the investments made in the agricultural sector. On the research side, in order to adjust to the new environment, IRA needs to expand its program of economic analysis, which has been limited to simple partial budgeting. For example, high priority must be given to conducting studies on the economics of production, returns to research, and resource allocation, as well as subsector analysis, if IRA is to play a more effective role in the national policy'deliberation. This will require both the systematic collection of research results and related data and the presentation of these data in an appropriate format. The demonstrated importance of maize yield on the IRR, as well as evidence from various other countries, suggest the need to reevaluate the role of hybrid corn in Cameroon maize future. The conventional wisdom that hybrids must be promoted as part of a rigid package and as a separate and distinct crop with special requirements needs to be reevaluated with the objective of coming up with the best strategy for the farmers. While the agronomic risk seems to be small, the timeliness in the availability of cash, quality seeds and fertilizer, and the timely anticipation of institutional problems related to seed production will be critical for successful adoption of hybrid varieties in Cameroon. The end of direct government involvement in seed production and the emergence of a private sector requires that issues such as Ilite] lectual property rights on germplasm (public good by nature) and the associated ethical 131 problems, as well as potential monopoly profit be regulated to insure that farmers are not exploited. Historically, the role of the public sector in research and development and in extension has been essential and will remain important in the future. Success stories in hybrid development and adoption in developing countries have depended on strong public sector research and extension. Byerlee M (1993) notes that in Africa, research and extension on hybrid maize has been stagnating. Most of the varieties are about 40 years old, while in countries like Brazil the turnover rate is about 3 to 4 years. Therefore, active support of public sector research and extension is needed, in addition to incentive provision, training, seed release policy, and for developing and organizing markets. It is interesting to note that, in most of the deve10ping countries that have promoted the adoption of hybrids, all maize breeders are from the public sector, and the seed industry has often been monopolized by multinationals who did not develop the market, but took advantage of an existing market (Byerlee _e_t_ol_, 1993). A key factor contributing to higher maize yield is fertilizer application. Given the performance of previous public agencies on the importation and distribution of fertilizer, as well as the amount of fertilizer that would be needed to support a major increase in maize production, greater private sector involvement and a reduction of public investment are imperative. This calls for a rationalization of the public investment portfolio to create an attractive environment for the private sector. Already, the reform of fertilizer subsector is underway in an effort to liberalize the economy and expand the private sector. The success of this reform depends on sound microeconomic incentives and reduced administrative control. For example, potential incentives could include policies that would make it possible for entrepreneurs to take advantage of the significant economies of scale in shipping. This would ultimately contribute to reducing fertilizer costs to farmers. Fortunately for the 132 country, the main port of entrance (Douala) has an excess capacity that could accommodate larger amounts of imports (Oakerson and Truong, 1990), but the reliability of suppliers and transporters, and the availability of dry storage facilities remain a major concern. Finally, a major constraint to maize expansion in the North Province is the inadequacy of the region’s financial support systems. This has been the missingpiece in the agricultural development institutional setting’s puzzle which SODECOTON was able to partially fill. Yet, SODECOTON’s ability to provide financial support to farmers is far too limited to meet public expectations that maize expansion should be a vehicle for poverty alleviation. Thus, there is a need to create new financial support systems which better fit farmers’ conditions and development expectations. For example, consideration should be given to developing or strengthening financial intermediaries, as informal financial lenders provide some financial services more efficiently than the formal credit service. In any event, the government needs to realize that the performance of a financial market depends on the economic vitality of the clients it serves. If these clients are poor or financially unstable, their ability to use the financial market is diminished and they will be less willing to borrow and less able to repay the loans. A major implication of this is that maize expansion should be viewed in the more global context of rural poverty alleviation and economic development. This perspective is needed in order to develop rural micro enterprises and production and consumption linkages necessary for an expansion beyond the subsistence level. 5 .3 M915: The quality of this research is constrained by numerous factors, the most important of which is the availability and quality of data. In Cameroon, inadequate attention has been given to data requirements for this type of analysis. As a result, this constraint required 133 numerous assumptions, some of which are almost arbitrary, and which turned out to be the basis for most of the difficulties encountered including: a. inability to compute economic values for the benefits and costs items identified, whenever necessary; inability to estimate research and extension extemalities generated by maize production. For example, this is the case for maize research and extension’s contribution to household food security and institution building; Maize yield by production system and proportion of maize area previously cropped to sorghum; Inability to account for changes in production that would have occurred without the project; inability to be more specific in predicting future policy, institutional and financial environments under which crop research, extension and adoption will be performed; inability to estimate more realistic supply and demand parameters which made it impossible to do distributional analysis; minimal treatment of risk and uncertainty. This was done using conservative values, best estimates available, and sensitivity analysis. Unfortunately, sensitivity analysis does not constitute a comprehensive analysis of risk. A combination of sources of uncertainty would have been more realistic, but yet difficult to interpret. However, sensitivity analysis is simple and requires less data than more sOphisticated methods of risk analysis. Though attempts made to minimize these weaknesses, were not entirely successful, the assumptions that are made are reasonable and, as shown by the sensitivity analysis many of these weaknesses are likely to have little significant impact on the IRR estimate. 134 5 .4 We Research Neefi Despite the limitations imposed by data availability, reasonable ROR studies can still be done. The methodology that would have to be used may be different from one study to another as specific assumptions are made to accommodate the data available. The importance of an ROR studies for any research institute in general and for IRA in particular stems from the fact that it provides a quantified and documented basis for allocating the constrained research budget. In addition, the inclusion of an institutional analysis highlights the strengths and weaknesses (constraints) in the research and development process. Success stories would be powerful leverages upon which the administration can rely in stressing the importance of research for the national economy and in the negotiation for public support to research. Yet, as much as ROR studies need to be encouraged, additional effort is required to improve data collection and record keeping in a cost efficient way. The basic data needed for ROR includes yields, area in production, adoption rate, input consumption, input and output prices with information on taxes or subsidy level, salaries and benefits for research staff as well as their time allocation to various crops they work on. InstitutiOnal analysis should extend to input and output market studies and to the exploration of forward and backward linkages and coordination processes between various interrelated stages of a particular subsector. Such studies will not only increase the effectiveness of research but also will constitute a major contribution to the national policy deliberation process. APPENDICES 135 .mEoesooc ZOHOUmn—Om Q .5): .xcmm 283 JED 853:8:— 2Eoc8m was? 333 2.2m Hammad 5.26832 £258 28 52:0 286E 28.. new 25.. 6.0256 8: 83 $5 mouaoEE sac: ._ Ea< Ewen $8.» 35 e ._ 80800 530 $8.» no.0 e .véaszmm 2 .om 2.2. «505 83> e cod; 8.00— 98.0: a: 38.x ovdd zoodmm- .mmé sch.— ‘84» 38.0. 50006 32 owSoN 22m: 006N— 09mm. 0m.w omdm 8.0mm- we; V04 00.0 O0.w- w0b.m wwz OmeM Ode— 00.02 8.0: mm 00.0m 8.2.17 me; 2..— ON;— ow.~- mo.»‘ 53 0003” 00.0: 8.5m— Sung 0w.w om.m~ 8.50- 3..— cod CYN— 0N6 001v 0w3 Omdvv ovfim cod: 00.5— 07m SuNN 00.5mm 8.— end 00.: 9:. mmafi 33 8.59. O0éa 00.09 00.:— 8.5 a: 00.3? am.— On;— 00.5 mm; ema— o~ .Em ovdh omdofi 840 05.0 an 8.3%. Na.— Nb; 052 090 w—0.N mg— o0.mmm 3.2. a: a: a: a: omémm- 0—.~ 0v; 2.2 2.0 m:.N awa— OWEN 00.; a: a: a: a: 00.531 ow; mm; cad end— 02..— 5o— OMA a 090m 2. a: a: a: ONdmN. 3V; ow.— 2.6 00.9 9;.— 82 n n ambzmom @2328 03.235 mac. 5: 6.00.5 5on 89 :5 Ceca 880 89 5: v.3:— 8:8 8o. :8 rvoa =o 3:5 *0?“ 0228 Son 382.6 5: am: 5553: 38.50 B 8: ....=u €85 B 8: So". ataxm .859: 02.5 35.650 m sees» .50 :3. .5 £058er 325.30 898%:— 359582an .owO— on OwG~ .COOHQENU 20% 30322: Oman—OGOQQOuomE ”N V wwuuh 136 Table A.2: Varieties Developed and Released by NCRE Project, Cameroon, 1981-90. Variety Year Ecology Description (Cycle, Released COIOF, Type"’) Lowland Maize CMS 8501 1985 North, South East Medium, White, OP CMS 85-3 1985 Center & North Medium, White, OP CMS 8602 1986 North Early, Yellow, OP CMS 8704 1987 Center & North Medium, Yellow, OP DMR-ESR—Y 1988 Center Early, Yellow, OP CMS 8710 North Late, White, OP Ndock 8701 Center Late, White, OP Highland Maize Shaba 1986 Adamaoua Late, White, OP Kasai 1985 West & North West Short, White, OP Coca SR md West & North West Late, White, OP Bacoa SR md West & North West Early, Yellow, OP Rig IR 71 67 1986 Ndop Plain Irrigated Cica 8 1984 Mbo Plain Irrigated BKN 3033 1987 Agrilagdo Irrigated ITA 222 md Agrilagdo Irrigated mm 835 1985 Extreme North Early, White C854 1988 Extreme North Early, White C895 1988 North Medium, White CS6] 1988 North Medium, White 834 1986 North Medium, White “’"OP" stands for ”Open pollinated“. ”md" stands for missing data. Some: Adapted from NCRE Annual Reports, 1992-90. 137 Table A3: National NCRE Scientists Trained/in Training") from 1982 to 1994, IRA-Cameroon. Degree Disciplines MSG PhD Trained On Training Trained In Training Agronomy 0 4 0 1 Soil Science ‘ l 0 1 0 Rice Agronomy 1 l 0 0 Rice Breeding 1 0 O O Maize Breeding 3 0 1 1 Maize Pathology 1 0 0 0 Cereal Pathology 0 0 1 0 Extension Agronomy 2 1 2 l Education/Extension 0 0 0 1 Agricultural Economics 1 2 1 l Sorghum/Millet Breeding 3 1 0 1 Grain Storage Entomology l 0 0 0 “" Only the highest diploma acquired is included. Source: Adapted from various NCRE Documents. 138 Table A.4: Summary of Published ROR to Agricultural Research Studies for Africa up to 1992. Author(s) Year Country Crop Period Rate of studied Return (96) Abidogun 1982 Nigeria Cocoa - 42 Evenson 1987 Africa Maize & Staple CrOps 1962-1980 30-40 Norgaard 1988 Africa Cassava 1977-2003 149: 1"” Schwartz M 1989 Senegal CowPea 1981-2015 63 Karanja 1990 Kenya Maize 1955-1988 40450 Mazzucato 1991 Kenya Maize ' 58-60 Mazzucato & Ly 1992 Niger CowPea & 1975-1991 <0 Millet/Sorghum 1975-2006 2-21 Boughton & Henry de 1992 Mali Maize 1969-1991 135 Frahan 1962-1991 54 Schwartz, Sterns & Oehmke 1992 Senegal Cowpeas 1981-1986 31-92 Sterns & Bernsten 1992 Cameroon Cowpea 1979-1992 3 1979-1998 15 Sorghum 1979-1998 1 Harward et_al 1993 Zambia Maize 1978-1991 <0 1978-1991 90-103 1978-2001 96-106 Laker-Ojok I993 Uganda Sunflower 1985—1996 31 1985-2006 38 Maize 1985-1996 , <0 1985-2006 33 Soybean 1985-1996 <0 1985-2006 6 Makau Kenya Wheat 1928-1982 30-40 Mcmillan M Zimbabwe Maize Ahmed & Sanders Sudan Sorghum 1983-2005 22-39 ‘" Benefit/Cost ratio of the casaava mealybug control at IITA. Source: Adapted from Crawford (1993), Oehmke gt_a_11 (1992), and Salinger and Stryker (1991). Til-It‘.‘ ~I.§u\.~ .V I\\ I\\\\\N\ .:o_.8.u_:_Ee< mduz "roamed 2....80 finds 000. can 98. «mm N.0.:._ v3.6: 3.8.8. 88...: 88.2.. 8...: ........ H H... a .5 .m 25.3. o o o o o o o c c 380 3.32.33 8. .3. 88.8. 8488 88.88 5.8. 8.8: 88.8. 3.8.x. :88: 8a.... 3.8 8.22.. .358 mom. . m mend. 30.8 31% Sad. 22... NR... .2... 0. nd 08... £833. 8.8-5.6 o o o o 8 n8 .8.“ :5. :3 2.2 823......» e... .85.»...8 .83 8. n. o 88... 8 o 2...... a c 8.. .28 8.5.... 8.38-... 88.8 88.8 o...” 8...: 8...... :8... 2.2.. 8...: 88.8 8: .2... 82...... 8.23.... 43.8.. 83.8 838 8.88 3.2. 8.8. «8.8. «2.8. 88.8 ”8.... 8...... .m. 5.88.. .8... .4 83... 28.8. 88.2 .88 83a :18 8.8 28.8 .8... an; 3:83 5.83.. «8.8. 83.; 8.8 :28 8...: .8.“ 8...... 28.2 o 83 .23 .380 8. .88 8...... 88.8 “2.8 8.8.. «8.8 8...? 28.8 8. .. can 35:32:: 29...; w. .88.... .8. .m 83.. 8...... v8.8 .88 «8.8 88.2. ”2.8 8n... 258.6 838 .88. .88. 8...... 88.8 38.8 88.8 .m. .8 «8.: o . .2...“ .85 . 8...... 82.... :3 «no... on... 83.” o .35 .958... 8.38 83.. 88.8. 8...: 8...... 8...: .8. .n 8...; “8.: o 2.8 as... .83 8.888 88.33 8888.. 8.3.8.. 84.8.... 8...: 88.88 8.88 83.8 833 38.8% .N .818. 8...... 8...... 48.9. 88.8 83..” «8.3. 2...... oz..." 8a..” .23; 1.3.352... «8.8 88.2. :3... 3.8 88.8 35.8 on}... n85. .88 88.... .93; 3.58-... can: 3...... 08.8. :3... 8...: 88.8 8...: 38.3 2.3... 88.8 8......2....2.m...25: .58.. 83...... .888: 88.8... 8.68.. 83; . .888 83% 88.8.. 88.8. 8a."... 3.2.39... a. 3.3.2.. “8.3 82.8 ~88 248m 88...: “8.2 88.2. 32... 8...: 88.8. .. 3.8 .8. a. .88 «8.8 8...: 8.8. n. ..: 82.. 83 «8.: 8:88.825... .228 3....“ 8....“ o $3.9 33.8 3.8 .3...” 5.... 28.8 8...“ <.:. 3 8.2.2.... .5838 o o o o o o 8...... :92 «8.2 a «E. 8 .55.. 5.... 228 o o o o o o 2...: o 88.8 o E... 8 8.2.2.... o.o...o> 8....8 8... . 8 v8.2 .8 .3. :3 «8.. ”8.2 .55....5 8....0 o. 1...: 88.8 88.2 8.38 88.: 8.8 82.: 88.8 '2...” .3... 3:83 8....0 8.... 88. 8... 88. e8. 82 .8. m8. 88. .8. 8.2m... Sou H 32-32 6888.6 .83 1.5882 . .35.... 9.02 3.; 83.3 140 Table A.6: NCRE Work Plans' Budget AllocatiOn (in Nominal value), Cameroon, 1987-1990. Year Breeding Agronomy NCRE Official Ratio Ratio Unit Unit Project Exchange Breeding Agronomy (F .cfa) (F .cfa) ($US) Rate Unit (%)a Unit (%)" (F .cfa/SUS) 1987 7,650,000 8,870,000 2,078,157 300.5 0.0123 0.0142 1988 7,400,000 6,900,000 2,442,582 297.8 0.0102 0.0095 1989 9,500,000 11,300,000 2,434,819 319.0 0.0122 0.0145 1990 14,000,000 7,300,000 4,490,334 272.3 0.0114 0.0060 Average 0.0115 0.0111 " Computed as: breeding research unit cost/(NCRE cost * official exchange rate). " Computed as: agronomy research unit cost/(NCRE cost * official exchange rate). Source: NCRE Work Plans 1987-1990 and Table A.7: Maize Area (hectares) in the NCRE Lowland Breeding Unit's Mandated Zone, Cameroon, 1984-1987. Year South Province 1984 8,204 1985 8,480 1986 6,873 1987 6,760 1988 6,535 1989 5,803 Average Cemer Province 12,391 13,037 21,275 20,013 15,731 11,951 Adamaoua Province 25,174 18,988 15 .815 19,608 20,310 22,326 North Province 10,700 24,044 15,849 12,554 17,585 23.553 Ratio (%)' 0.1895 0.3725 0.2650 0.2130 0.2923 0.3701 0.2837 . ‘ Conputed as: North Province area divided by the aunt of the area in all three provinces. Source: National Agricultural Cenaua. 141 Table A.82 SAFGRAD JP #31 Total Expenditures (in Nominal SUS), North Province, Cameroon. 1979-1988‘”. COST ITEM 1979 to 4/4/l984 to 7/l/l986 to 7/l/l988 to 1983‘“ 6/30/1986“’ SID/1988‘“ 8/15/1988“ 27,433 Travel and Per Diem Shipping and Storage 6,444 Housing 61,308 Other Direct Costs 2,770 Equipment, Supplies and Materials 69,518 Subtotal Non-Salary Expenses 121,881 229,280 Salaries and Benefits 170,593 222,835 4,099 Office Supplies 3,771 Research Equipment 8,460 Research Supplies 9,137 Vehicle Maintenance/Repairs 3,987 Fuel 14,073 Vehicle Insurance 1,444 Temporary Labor 27,686 Temporary Driver/Secretary 6,873 Training by TLU 1,918 mAny blank in the table simply mearu the data was not provided under that particular form by the source. “'"Other Direct Costs“ includes health insurance, passport, visas, professional journals, communications, vaccines, bank charges. M"l-unipment, Supplies and Materials' includes office supplies, equipment repairs, laboratory equipments, field trials, supplies, labor, secretary, translation, training workfiops. “’Paid for by SAFGRAD JP '31. "’Paid for by NCRE Project. Source: SAFGRAD LP. I3! (1984) for 1979 to 1983, and phone interview with Jerry Johnson for 1984-1988. 142 Table A.9: SAFGRAD/FSR Expenses (Nominal F.cfa), North Province, Cameroon, 1986-1988. COST ITEMS 1986 1987 1988 Office Maintenance 0 0 31,471 Typing Table 0 422,910 0 Photocopy Machine 0 1,875,193 0 Office supplies 1,426,565 0 0 Office Stationaries 2,813,462 877,817 294,682 Calculator 10,000 6,000 0 Vehicle 8,614,000 6,320,276 0 Motocycle 0 3 , 160,000 0 1. Total Eguipment and Supplies 12,864,027 12,662,196 326,153 Rent and Furniture 8,536,483 4,800,000 9,094,589 Local Transport 1,422,750 3,268,918 1,602,300 2. Total Salaries and Benefits Expatriates 9,959,233 8,068,918 10,696,889 Local Personel Salaries 4,511,724 19,207,876 17,585,344 Overtime 0 10,000 0 Per Diem 702,700 896,910 229,000 Transport 832,785 1,605,275 245,920 Medical Care 0 4,000 0 3. Total Salaries and Benefits Nationals 6,047,209 21,724,061 18,060,264 Experimental Materials 1,215,995 202,965 0 Laboratory Chemicals 191,232 160,600 114,167 Sample Analysis 11,400 0 0 Meetings & Field Days 117,240 49,904 0 Vehicle Maintenance 2,167,697 1,607,125 762,201 Fuel 704,045 1,143,620 1,674,235 Sign Printing 0 62,200 0 4. Total Direct Research Elm 4,407,609 3,226,414 2,550,603 Insurance, Licence 733,322 3,716,822 992,475 Water, Gaz, & Electricity 108,787 190,345 0 Mail, Cables, Telex 439,569 742,939 521,191 Bank Charges 18,743 60,499 50,657 Documentation 5 1,558 72,705 0 Miscellaneous 154,258 399,740 413,640 5. W 1,506,237 5,183,050 1,977,963 E E _— Spurgg: IRA Maroua Table A.10: SODECOTON Personel Costs (in Nominal F .cfa), Cameroon, 1979-1990. 143 Year Senior Staff Others 1979 133,691,888 212,351,618 1980 274,664,066 265,318,256 1981 351,161,203 342,440,879 1982 392,209,511 416,619,197 1983 137,892,322 563,019,678 1984 249,427,626 562,475,392 1985 255,245,710 885,918,576 1986 210,392,283 657,819,779 1987 139,089,000 646,606,000 1988 112,271,120 557,322,988 1989 - 103,504,697 532,705,465 1990 98,316,000 494,999,000 ' Source: SODECOTON '5... 144 M: SODECOTON Geographical Coverage BIBLIOGRAPHY 145 BIBLIOGRAPHY MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (MINAGRI) Division des Enquétes Agroéconomiques et de la Planification Agricole (DEAPA). 1991. I984 - 1989 National Agricultural Surveys: National and Provincial Results (Provisional). Unpublished document. Division des Etudes/MINAGRI, 1988. 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O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1984,. Bilan de Réalisation du Projet SAFGRAD au Cameroun 1979 - 1983. IRA/SAFGRAD, Maroua. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1983,. Rapport Intérimaire d’Activité, Campagne I983. SAFGRAD J .P. 31, IRA-Maroua, Cameroon. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1983,. Rapport Pre’liminaire sur les Principaux Résultats Acquis et sur les Nouveaux Themes Prepares. SAFGRAD J .P. 31, IRA- Maroua, Cameroon. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1981. Rapport Préliminaire des Résultats de l ’Essai Varietal Avancé de Sorgho Realise par le Projet Pilote A gro-Pastoral de Mindif- Moulvoudaye - Canrpagne 1981. IRA/SAFGRAD, Maroua. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1983,. Rapport Analytique de Deux Essais Variétaux Avancés de Niébé Realises par le Projet AGRILA G00 (1 Karewa. IRA/SAFGRAD, Maroua. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1984,. Programme de Recherches Propose pour la Campagne 1984. IRA/SAFGRAD, Maroua. Gwathmey, C. O. and M. T. Fobasso. 1982. 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