


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CULTURAL DETERMINACY IN NEGOTIATION

By

Laura Elizabeth Drake

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

CULTURAL DETERMINACY IN NEGOTIATION

By

Laura Elizabeth Drake

This project addresses the divergent views of negotiator behavior presented in the negotiation and cross-cultural literatures. The dominant "Cultural Determinism" model is assessed in terms of its major assumptions. This model is contrasted with that of negotiators as reflexive individuals who reciprocate bargaining moves. It is argued that negotiation variables such as reciprocity, shown to influence same-culture negotiation behavior, may influence cross-cultural negotiator behavior as well. Thus, the influences exerted by "culture" are mediated by the practical requirements of negotiating.

To test the assumptions made by Cultural Determinacy, a negotiation styles coding scheme is applied to American-Taiwanese negotiation interaction. Concurrently, reciprocity in American-Taiwanese negotiation styles is tracked via sequential analysis procedures. Results suggest that culture does exert some effects on negotiator behavior in cross-cultural contexts. However, reciprocity also appears operative, so that strict assignment of negotiation styles based upon cultural membership is unwarranted.

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INTRODUCTION

- A: Oh, you would want to go lower than that?
T: Yeah, 'cause you know for a better bargain I would go down lower than \$350.
A: Right, but on my end I would go higher than \$550.
T: Of course ((laughs)).
A: Its a great game that we play in this capitalistic society here. Everyone's trying to maximize the benefits.
T: Umm Hum I know what you mean but in this, I mean for this kind of test I want to stand up to you and do it this way.

In the transcribed exchange above, two negotiators bargain for the price of goods. Negotiator expectations regarding the bargaining process appear unique rather than shared. Specifically, Negotiator A expects both parties to "maximize" individual outcomes. Negotiator T expects to "stand up to" the opponent. Given these conflicting expectations, what negotiation processes and outcomes will evolve? Our ability to accurately answer this question may be complicated by the knowledge that these negotiators not only represent divergent interests (buyer v. seller), but also divergent cultures. Negotiator A is American. Negotiator T is Taiwanese.

Cross cultural negotiation processes and outcomes have become a source of scholarly interest as well as a practical interest for corporations with worldwide holdings and operations. U.S. and other companies with foreign interests are concerned with how to efficiently and effectively approach

expansions, mergers and acquisitions, and licensing or distribution agreements across cultures (Hendon & Hendon, 1990; Harris & Moran, 1991). For example, the breakup of the former Soviet Union is expected to provide new business opportunities and expanding business contact between East and West (The Economist, 1993). Approaching these opportunities will require extensive negotiations between representatives of respective companies and cultures.

How professionals approach these cross-cultural negotiations is considered vital to a company's business success. Until recently, international business persons have relied upon conventional beliefs regarding "typical" cultural differences to guide their behavior in cross-cultural negotiation interaction. For example, Americans are stereotyped as independent, competitive, stubborn, or aggressive in negotiations (Graham & Sano, 1989). Alternatively, Asian negotiators are assumed shy, soft-spoken, more polite and cooperative than Americans (Harris & Moran, 1991). Therefore, Americans are advised to "tone down" their behavior when negotiating in China, Korea, or Japan. However, as the international marketplace grows and telecommunications systems bring cultures closer together, conventional stereotypes like these may no longer suffice in our efforts to predict and understand cultural differences.

Researchers have begun to investigate the influence of culture on negotiation and conflict behaviors. However, these studies are largely accounts of the differences between American v. other approaches to negotiating (Campbell, Graham, & Meissner, 1988; Graham, 1984; Adler, Graham, & Gehrke, 1987; Fant, 1989; Pye, 1982; Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Wollson & Norden, 1984; Nomura & Barnlund, 1983; Farver & Howes, 1988; Solomon, 1987; Unterman, 1984). As such, these studies constitute intra- rather than inter-cultural negotiation research. Very few researchers approach cross-cultural negotiation by documenting the effects of culture in face-to-face negotiation interaction (Cai, 1993; Adler & Graham, 1989; Gudykunst, et al., 1986).

The intra-cultural approach has produced a number of assertions regarding differences in conflict and negotiation "styles" across cultures (Chua & Gudykunst, 1987; Trubisky, et al., 1991; Kagan, et al., 1982; Lee & Rogan, 1991; Harris & Moran, 1991; Leung, 1988; Ting-Toomey, 1988; Johnstone, 1989). This literature implies that culturally-associated differences in negotiating behaviors (conflict behaviors, persuading behaviors) constitute stable individual difference variables which affect the behavior of cultural members in predictable ways. That is, "culture" is believed to exert significant pressures upon negotiators, such that negotiating behaviors do not vary from intra-cultural (same culture) to inter-cultural

(crossed-culture) negotiation interaction. Thus, culture determines negotiator behavior.

This Cultural Determinism model suffers from two weaknesses. First, the Cultural Determinism assumption has received few empirical tests (Cai, 1993; Lytle, 1993). Thus, the effects of culture in cross-cultural negotiation are less than certain. Second, literature based upon this model fails to incorporate theories from negotiation research to predict and explain cross-cultural negotiation processes and outcomes. Specifically, the negotiation literature suggests that several individual and contextual variables affect negotiator behavior. Some of these are: alternatives to negotiating (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), pressures from constituents (Turner, 1992; Roloff & Campion, 1987), frame of reference (Putnam & Holmer, 1992), planning ability (Roloff & Jordan, 1992), argumentativeness (Keough, 1992; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989), face concerns (Wilson, 1992), negotiator biases (Neale & Bazerman, 1985) and reciprocity (Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Putnam & Jones, 1982). These negotiation variables may subordinate, over-ride, or interact with the effects of culture.

However, the negotiation literature itself is also insufficient for explaining inter-cultural negotiation interaction. Although negotiation researchers have placed greater emphasis on empirical methods, the generalizability of these research findings across cultures is largely unknown.

Samples in these studies overwhelmingly represent Western cultures. Consequently, the degree to which cross cultural communication in negotiation is affected by the individual and contextual variables listed above is also less than perfectly understood.

This thesis begins to address these shortcomings by developing and testing a preliminary cross-cultural coding scheme for tracking interaction between Western and Eastern negotiators. The purpose of this approach is to provide a theoretical basis for differences in negotiation behavior across intra- and inter-cultural negotiation settings. Based upon descriptions of cultural differences accompanying the Individualism-Collectivism dimension (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, et al., 1988), face-to-face interaction between American (Individualistic) and Taiwanese (Collectivistic) negotiators is examined for predicted differences in negotiating style. At the same time, coded interaction is examined for evidence of negotiator reciprocity, a variable shown to be relevant across negotiation contexts (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Putnam & Jones, 1982; Donohue, 1991).

This approach allows a critical appraisal of the Cultural Determinism model, as well as a preliminary step toward understanding the mutual influences of both "culture" and other negotiation variables like reciprocity in inter-cultural negotiation. The results of this study hold implications for

future intra-and inter-cultural negotiation research, aimed at uniting the divergent culture and negotiation literatures.

The first section of this thesis reviews the current cross-cultural literature and its assumptions. In the second section, the negotiation literature, and specifically, reciprocity theory, is reviewed. Finally, a category scheme for coding negotiation interaction is proposed and tested.

CULTURE

"Culture" is composed of assumptions and beliefs common to a large group of people with a shared history. Samovar, Porter, and Jain (1981) define culture as the culmination of "knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, timing, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a large group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving." (p. 25). Though definitions of culture abound, all seem to converge on the notion that culture reflects group-wide patterns of human thought and interaction. Thus, individual beliefs, values, and behaviors are echoes of the habits and practices of the culture group from which an individual hails. The cultural literature argues that behaviors differ from culture to culture because cultural groups hold divergent values. These value orientations in turn determine societal-level, and individual-level negotiating behaviors. In addition, cultural values are

thought to determine persuading behaviors and conflict behaviors (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Harris and Moran, 1991; Johnstone, 1989, Pye, 1982; Samovar, Porter, & Jain, 1981; Walker, 1990; Lee & Rogan, 1991; Lee, 1990).

Individualism V. Collectivism

Broadly speaking, cultures are thought to differ along a dimension labeled Individualism v. Collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Hall, 1976; Triandis, et al., 1988; Hui, 1988). These two anchoring points form a continuum along which cultures prioritize either individual (individualism) or group (collectivism) values. Members of individualistic and collectivistic cultures define themselves differently in relationship to society (Wheeler, et al., 1989; Triandis, et al., 1990). Additionally, each holds different attitudes toward concepts like "time," "family," etc. (Trompenaars, 1993).

As the name implies, individualistic societies socialize persons to value the interests and needs of the individual over the interests and needs of the group, community, society, or nation. Thus, distinctions between "ingroups" and "outgroups" are relatively unimportant in individualistic cultures. Individualists value personal autonomy, competition, and self-sufficiency (Leung, 1987; Harris & Moran, 1991). In contrast, Collectivistic cultures socialize persons to value the good of the community, group, or nation over the interests and needs of

the individual. Collectivists define themselves in terms of their membership within groups. These "ingroups" are sharply distinguished from "outgroups" of which the individual is not a part (Triandis, et al., 1988). The interests of ingroups overrule the interests of both outgroups and individuals. Thus, maintaining the integrity of ingroups is important, while behavior toward outgroups is less crucial (Gudykunst, et al., 1992). Such group maintenance requires cooperation and avoidance of embarrassment or overt conflict. Thus, harmony, solidarity, and conformity are the hallmarks of collectivistic cultures (Wollson & Norden, 1984; Ting-Toomey, 1988).

The individualism versus collectivism dimension has been chosen for focus in this study because concepts and negotiator characteristics related to this dimension, such as negotiation and conflict "styles," are relevant and important to the intercultural negotiation setting. Variables that are conceptually related to the Individualism-Collectivism dimension, such as ingroup and outgroup distinctions may influence negotiation processes and outcomes. Previous researchers have successfully operationalized Individualism and Collectivism in empirical demonstrations of differences across cultures. Thus, the dimension can be used to construct arguments regarding how culture should affect negotiators and negotiation processes (Lytle, 1993).

Culture and Negotiation

Two approaches to the study of cultural differences in negotiation are apparent in the literature. The first is descriptive or comparative. Negotiators from a variety of cultures are compared with negotiators from the United States for verbal and nonverbal communication differences. In a representative study, Graham (1984) videotaped negotiators from the United States, Japan, and Brazil. Examination of the verbal and nonverbal behaviors exhibited by three negotiating dyads from each country revealed that Brazilian negotiators made fewer promises and more commands than American or Japanese negotiators. Americans used "aggressive" persuading tactics earlier in negotiations than Japanese. Brazilians used the word "no" more frequently than either Japanese or American negotiators. Japanese negotiations were characterized by more silent periods than either American or Brazilian negotiations. Brazilian negotiators interrupted twice as frequently as American or Japanese negotiators. Finally, Brazilian negotiators touched relatively frequently, while American and Japanese negotiators touched only during introductory and closing handshakes.

Adler, et al. (1987) compared business negotiations in the United States, Canada, and Mexico for differences in "representational" versus "instrumental" bargaining strategies. Representational bargaining was defined as non-task-oriented

talk focussed upon information exchange. Instrumental bargaining was defined as highly persuasive talk focussed upon obtaining concessions and agreements. Using a much larger sample than Graham (1984), these authors approached bargaining differences theoretically, linking cooperative social orientations with representational bargaining and individualistic orientations with instrumental bargaining. In this study, French Canadians were described as having a more "social" orientation (collectivistic), while English Canadians and Americans had an achievement orientation (individualistic). Mexican negotiators were described as similar to French Canadians in orientation, and therefore more socially oriented than Americans. Though the authors did not categorize these samples along the individualism-collectivism dimension, their descriptions of "social" versus "achievement" orientation closely parallels the discussion of individualism versus collectivism presented above. That is, French Canadians and Mexicans were assumed to value personal and family relationships (ingroup memberships) more highly than Americans. Contrary to expectations in this study, French Canadian negotiators tended to use instrumental, rather than representational bargaining strategies more frequently than Americans or English Canadians.

Campbell, et al. (1988) compared problem solving approaches of French, German, English, and American

negotiators. The authors defined a "Problem Solving Approach" (PSA) as generally integrative and cooperative talk, focussed upon information exchange. The dependent variables in this study were profits, satisfaction, and interpersonal attraction. Within each cultural group, the researchers tested a number of hypotheses regarding the effect of PSA on the roles of buyer and seller. Results revealed that buyer and seller roles were differentially affected by PSA across the four cultural groups.

✓ The second approach to studying cross-cultural negotiating behavior draws a causal relationship between negotiator's culturally practiced value orientations and particular "styles" of negotiating, arguing, persuading, and managing conflict (Glenn, et al., 1977; Walker, 1990; Johnstone, 1989; Ting-Toomey, 1988; Lee and Rogan, 1991; Chua & Gudykunst, 1987).

✓ For instance, in an analysis of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea negotiations, Walker (1990) described differing cultural orientations toward argument. Cultural values and consequent reasoning processes produced First World, Second World, or Third World arguments in negotiations among United Nations representatives. First World arguments, associated with Western countries, stressed objectivity and details. Second World argumentation style emphasized abstract or general principles and was associated with Eastern Bloc countries. Finally, Third World argument, based upon moral appeals and emotion, was associated with undeveloped countries.

Walker's purpose in identifying these three argumentation styles was to "foster a better understanding of cultures and cultural dimensions of communication in international negotiations" (p. 114).

In a similar vein, Johnstone (1989) argues that cultural values determine which persuasive tactics we most often use in conflict situations. According to Johnstone, persons have access to multiple persuasive tactics. However, culture forces a particular "style," or group of persuading behaviors to become routinized in our approach to persuasive situations. Thus, Individualistic (Western) cultures emphasize rational argument-making, a "Quasilogical" style of persuasion, while collectivistic (Eastern) cultures emphasize "Presentational" or "Analogical" persuasive styles. Presentational persuasion uses visual metaphors to bring the truth of a persuasive argument forward in the listener's consciousness. Analogical persuasion reminds the listener to heed age-old moral lessons.

In a third study, Ting-Toomey (1988) contends that cultural attitudes toward "Face" (priorities regarding self and other) determine our conflict styles. In particular, Ting-Toomey credits Collectivistic cultures with high concern for "other face," interest in protecting the opponent's self-image and autonomy. Thus, to "save face," an Asian negotiator is more likely than his/her American counterpart to placate an opponent by conceding on hotly contested issues. In contrast,

Individualistic cultures value autonomy and therefore have greater concern for "self face," interest in protecting self image and freedom from imposition. Thus, American negotiators are more likely than Asian negotiators to aggressively pursue negotiation goals and sacrifice the opponent's face in order to obtain desired goals.

Finally, Harris and Moran (1991) propose that differences in Western and Eastern reasoning processes lead to differences in negotiating styles. The authors argue that because collectivistic cultures value conformity over individualism and intuition over empiricism, Eastern negotiators use "Normative" and "Intuitive" bargaining strategies more frequently than Westerners. On the other hand, since Individualistic cultures emphasize competition over solidarity, and deductive logic over moral appeals, Westerners use "Analytic" and "Factual" negotiating styles more frequently than Easterners.

This study is of particular interest to the current research project. In particular, Harris & Moran (1991) offer a "Negotiation Styles Self-Assessment Exercise" designed to help negotiators determine their Normative, Intuitive, Analytic, or Factual bargaining tendencies. This exercise is valuable as a basis for a Negotiation Styles coding scheme to test the assumption of negotiation style differences in face-to-face interaction between American (Individualistic) and Taiwanese (Collectivist) negotiators.

Cultural Determinacy

The thread connecting assertions about cultural "styles" of negotiating, persuading, arguing, and handling conflict is the Cultural Determinacy assumption. The representative studies cited above assume that cultural priorities or values determine individuals' communicative practices across negotiation, conflict, and persuasive contexts. For example, Samovar, Porter, and Jain (1981) epitomize this Cultural Determinacy approach:

"..the influences culture has had on us have become buried in the primitive portions of our brains beneath the neocortex, where they largely are below our levels of awareness...our culture to a great extent programs us to do what we do and be what we are" (p.25, emphasis added)

In this model, cultural members are presumably unaware of, and unable to control cultural influences upon behavior. Differences in Western and Eastern epistemological beliefs lead to divergent reasoning processes and values, which in turn determine the distinctive forms of American, v. European, Middle Eastern, and Asian communication.

✓ The implication behind this assumption is that negotiation, persuasion, or conflict behaviors caused by culture are relatively stable individual characteristics, similar to personality. These characteristics remain stable across contexts. Thus, negotiators in intra- or inter-cultural negotiation settings will resort to predictable negotiating modes. Predicting an opponent's bargaining tactics requires

merely determining the negotiating procedures practiced in his/her culture.

This line of thinking has produced a spate of negotiation manuals for overseas business travelers (Pye, 1982; Unterman, 1984; Harris & Moran, 1991), as well as general handbooks describing the rules and norms of negotiating in other cultures (Solomon, 1987). These books and pamphlets invite visiting American business persons to adopt, or at least adapt to these foreign rules and norms for two reasons. First, adaptation is expected to increase business success (Beliaev, et al., 1983; Van Zandt, 1970; Hall & Hall, 1987; Deutsch, 1984; Graham & Sano, 1984). For example, Harris and Moran (1991) imply that expeditiousness is one reason to adopt a host culture's negotiating customs. Adapting is assumed to increase trust and liking, therefore expediting a final agreement.

In a representative volume, Pye (1982) warns that Chinese negotiators are attentive for signs of commitment to general principles. The Chinese assume that once an opponent commits verbally to a general tenet such as "cooperation," s/he can later be shamed into adhering to that principle in the manner deemed appropriate by the Chinese. Thus, the author advises Americans to approach early negotiation sessions with caution, being careful not to present a firm stance on issues until s/he has gained an understanding of Chinese intentions.

Second, negotiators traveling overseas are advised to adapt so that potential conflicts may be avoided. For

instance, Johnstone (1989) recounts the experiences of American government representatives working to place Arab students (mostly male) in American universities. As space in these universities was limited, extensive negotiations were conducted via telephone, between the students and government representatives, who were female. The Arab students continued to demand placement, even after government aides insisted that all openings were full. Feeling abused, rather than appreciated for their efforts, the American aides concluded that their difficulties in communicating with the Arab students were attributable to Arab dislike for women. Johnstone argues that on the contrary, difficulties like these are primarily due to differences in Western and Middle Eastern persuasive bargaining styles. Increasing awareness of these differences prior to interacting will reduce the likelihood of conflict. Furthermore, adopting the host culture's methods will be more productive in terms of achieving persuasive goals, than insisting that one's own persuasive style prevail in cross-cultural interaction.

Adaptation

This "Do as the Romans" approach is based upon a static or deterministic view of culture that seems over-simple. Specifically, two general arguments may be leveled against this approach. First, it is naive to assume that members of a host culture will fail to recognize (and act upon) ingroup v. outgroup differences when an outsider adopts local negotiating

customs. Although adopting a host culture's behaviors is assumed to increase perceptions of similarity and therefore increase acceptance of the "newcomer," we know that ingroups and outgroups are perceived and treated differently in some cultures. Therefore, visiting business executives may not be viewed as, nor afforded the privilege of cultural natives, simply because they behave as cultural natives. In fact, it may be deemed inappropriate for an outsider to behave in ways which are perfectly acceptable for insiders (Gudykunst, 1983).

Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that "adaptation," or modeling a host-culture's negotiating customs can be disadvantageous under some circumstances. Francis (1991) tested the effects of three degrees of adaptive behavior in intercultural negotiations between American, Japanese, and Korean buyers and sellers. ✓ Hypotheses regarding the effect of adaptation on interpersonal attractiveness were tested. Results suggested that moderate adaptation by Japanese business representatives increased American's ratings of Japanese attractiveness, while substantial adaptation reduced attractiveness ratings. Based upon the tenets of Social Identity Theory, the author postulates that substantial levels of adaptation may threaten an individual's desire for distinctiveness, via association with his/her ingroup. When distinctiveness is threatened, adaptation becomes counter-productive in that perceptions of trust decrease.

✓ A second argument against adopting a host culture's business practices is that communication signals may become confused. Specifically, moderate adaptation may be undertaken not only by visiting negotiators, but by representatives of a host culture as well. Hosts who adapt their behavior to make a visitor more comfortable may be confused by the visitor's insistence upon behaving as a domestic. Adler and Graham (1989) directly tested the degree to which negotiators change their behaviors from intra- to inter-cultural negotiation situations. Japanese, American, and Canadian negotiating behaviors were compared in same-culture and crossed-culture dyads. The researchers found that Americans were more satisfied with the negotiation process when negotiating in cross-cultural than in same-culture dyads. Japanese negotiators achieved lower profits and higher interpersonal attraction in inter-, than in intra-cultural negotiation. French-speaking Canadians were more cooperative in cross-cultural than intra-cultural negotiations. Finally, English speaking Canadians achieved lower joint profits and spent more time negotiating in cross-cultural than in intra-cultural negotiations.

The authors posit Acculturation theory and Reciprocity as explanations for negotiators' tendency to "adapt" or change their behaviors from intra-to inter-cultural negotiating.

✓ Acculturation refers to purposeful efforts to accept and understand a foreigner's "different" behaviors. ✓ Reciprocity

refers to the tendency for negotiators to consciously or unconsciously imitate one another's behaviors.

While Acculturation Theory is a cultural construct, Reciprocity has received attention in other disciplines. It is particularly important in the negotiation literature and is related to a number of other communication and negotiation constructs discussed below. While many of these constructs may be relevant in a cross-cultural negotiation context, reciprocity is the variable of interest in this project, because it is the most universal. Specifically, reciprocity has been found to operate across a number of human activities and across cultures as well. Therefore, reciprocity can be used to construct arguments regarding expected failings of the Cultural Determinism model to account for cross-cultural negotiation interaction.

NEGOTIATION

While cultural experience undoubtedly influences negotiator behavior, the negotiation literature indicates that a variety of individual and contextual variables other than culture may influence negotiation processes and outcomes. Several of these variables may be relevant in inter- as well as intra-cultural negotiation settings and may interact with culture in significant ways. Alternatively, some influences may over-ride cultural mandates (Cai, 1993). However, the pervasiveness of these negotiation variables across cultures has not been established. Therefore, it is important to

examine the ways in which these variables may influence cross-cultural negotiation.

Bargaining and Negotiation

Negotiation is defined as a bargaining process wherein two or more parties attempt to agree "what each shall give and take or perform and receive in a transaction between them" (Putnam & Wilson, 1989, p.121). Unions negotiate contracts. Attorneys negotiate damage settlements. Parents negotiate rules for children's behavior, and romantic partners negotiate the terms of a relationship.

The negotiation process creates interdependence among negotiators (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Greenhalgh, 1987). That is, a negotiator's success in reaching his/her goals is dependent upon procuring cooperation from the opponent. Peace negotiations create such interdependence between two world powers. Warring countries enter peace negotiations hoping to obtain benefits possible only through peace (Pilar, 1983). Trade is one such benefit. However, continued trade depends upon negotiating and maintaining a cooperative relationship between powers. Non-cooperation by either side confounds the achievement of this goal, simultaneously negating benefits for both sides.

Approaches to Negotiation Research

Negotiation research is primarily divided into two related camps. In the first instance, negotiation processes (emergent negotiation phenomena) are predicted from individual negotiator

variables. Individual negotiator variables are characteristics of the negotiators themselves, such as planning ability (Rolloff & Jordan, 1992), biases (Neale & Bazerman, 1985), frame of reference (Putnam & Holmer, 1992), argumentativeness (Keough, 1992), face concerns (Wilson, 1992), confidence (Neale & Bazerman, 1985), goals (Donohue, 1990), and flexibility regarding target and resistance points (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

In the second approach, contextual or process variables are used to predict negotiated outcomes. Contextual variables are situational features which characterize a particular negotiation session or scenario. These include pressures from constituents (Rolloff & Campion, 1987), alternatives to negotiating (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), information-seeking (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), cooperative v. competitive stances (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), hardline and softline bargaining strategies (Allen, Donohue, and Stewart, 1990), number and complexity of issues (Morgan, 1990), argumentation (Rolloff, Tutzauer and Dailey, 1989; Putnam & Wilson, 1989) intensity of the negotiation situation (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1992), and reciprocal bargaining moves (Putnam & Jones, 1982).

Reciprocity in Negotiation

Reciprocity is a process variable found in most negotiation settings, from divorce mediation (Donohue, 1991) to Labor-Management disputes (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Reciprocity is most prominently featured in gaming research, wherein

researchers study the degree to which negotiators honor or abuse their interdependent relationship (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Specifically, subjects in these studies are required to make decisions which affect self and partner rewards. For instance, in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, parties A and B choose from two (or more) options over multiple trials. Each player's goal is to maximize his/her own benefits. Possible options usually represent a "cooperative" or "non-cooperative" move. Parties choose their moves sequentially, or simultaneously. The reward structure of these moves is such that parties may be motivated toward non-cooperation in order to obtain high immediate payoffs, but will achieve greater rewards overall if they behave cooperatively. The results from two decades of gaming research indicate that cooperative moves tend to be met with cooperative counter-moves, while non-cooperation tends to breed further non-cooperation. Thus, reciprocity is the norm in these bargaining exercises (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).

Similarly, Donohue and colleagues (1991; Donohue, Lyles, & Rogan, 1989; Donohue, Drake, & Roberto, 1993) find that reciprocity operates in divorce mediation contexts. When divorcing spouses negotiate the terms of their separation, they must reach equitable agreements regarding the division of marital property and child support/visitation issues. Typically, couples reciprocate relationally-based, fact-based, or value-based arguments. For example, accusations by a

husband or wife tend to elicit defensive responses and counter-accusations from the spouse. Soon the two are engaged in an escalating attack-defend cycle wherein one party accuses, and the other must defend his/her character (Donohue, 1991).

The same effect has been documented in simulated labor-management negotiations (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Specifically, subjects playing a managerial role in a simulated grievance case tended to adopt defensive bargaining tactics. Subjects playing a labor role rely most frequently upon offensive attacks. Reciprocal interaction distinguished deadlocked (non-agreement) negotiations from settlement negotiations. The impasse negotiators locked themselves into attack-attack, or defend-defend cycles of reciprocity, whereas the agreement negotiators complemented, rather than reciprocated negotiation tactics.

Pruitt and Rubin (1986) discuss the role of reciprocity in the escalation of social conflicts. According to the authors, "conflict spirals" occur when "each party reacts contentiously to the other party's recent contentious action." (p. 68). This creates a vicious circle of negative reciprocation which transforms issues from small to large or from specific to general. In addition, this process transforms goals from obtaining measurable benefits to "hurting" or punishing the other side. Thus, reciprocity plays a large part in the enactment of social conflicts, as well as private contract negotiations.

Other studies indicate that a "norm of reciprocity" exists in a variety of social behaviors. For example, Sillars (1980) found that college roommates tend to reciprocate avoidance strategies in conflict. Gottman (1979) finds that unhappily married couples are those who tend to reciprocate, rather than compliment negative affect during interaction. Finally, Cai (1993) found that buyers and sellers in inter-cultural business negotiations tend to reciprocate self-and other-oriented face-work messages.

In summary, reciprocity seems to operate in two general directions. First, negative reciprocity occurs when distributive or competitive behaviors by one negotiator elicit like behaviors from the opponent, and so on. Second, positive reciprocity occurs when integrative or cooperative behaviors from one negotiator elicit cooperative or integrative responses from the opponent. In either case, reciprocity appears to operate in a variety of negotiation contexts, and appears to have predictable, measurable effects in these contexts.

Reciprocity and Culture

By anthropological accounts, the norm of reciprocity is a universal human phenomenon. That is, reciprocity operates across all cultures (Cialdini, 1985). In fact, the anthropological literature argues that reciprocity is responsible for the survival of the human species because our capacity for reciprocation acts as an adaptive mechanism. For instance, Speech Accommodation Theory (Giles, et al., 1987),

Acculturation (Johnson, 1990), Communication Accommodation Theory (Gallois, et al., 1988), and "Code-switching," (Tubbs & Moss, 1991) all describe the tendency for conversational partners to reciprocate conversational styles and speech patterns as either an incidental result of interpersonal contact or a result of purposeful attempts to increase self-acceptance, trust, and liking.

Because reciprocity is present across cultures and human activities, we would expect reciprocity to operate in inter-, as well as intra-cultural negotiation interaction. This dimension of negotiation behavior was selected for focus in this study because the substance of the construct is important in negotiation settings and relevant to cross-cultural interaction. Reciprocity has been shown to influence negotiator behaviors and outcomes (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Allen, Donohue, & Stewart, 1990; Donohue, Drake, & Roberto, 1993; Putnam & Jones, 1982; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988).

Researchers have successfully operationalized reciprocity in negotiation interaction. Therefore, the reciprocity construct can be used to accomplish two goals in the present study: First, reciprocity can be used as a basis for predicting systematic departures from the cultural determinism model. Second, this variable spans both the negotiation and cultural domains and thus can be used as a starting point for investigating the combined effects of both culture and

negotiation variables in cross-cultural negotiation settings. Thus, we may gain a more complex understanding of culture's effects on negotiators and on negotiation processes.

CULTURE AND RECIPROCITY IN NEGOTIATION

Studying the dual influence of culture and other negotiation variables on negotiator behavior in inter-cultural contexts requires that several research conditions be met. First, a method for distinguishing cultures from one another must be explicated. Second, a cultural variable believed to differ across cultures must be defined as the focus of study. Third, a method for tracking that cultural variable within cross-cultural interaction must be designated. Finally, a means of tracking the influence of reciprocity must be explored. These tasks are the focus of the following sections.

Distinguishing Cultures

Here the task of distinguishing "cultures" from one another is accomplished via the Individualism-Collectivism dimension. Specifically, Americans might be used as a sample representing Individualistic culture. Americans value autonomy and individuality, competition and self-sufficiency (Harris & Moran, 1991). While some members of American culture may value family relationships and other group ties more highly than others, group membership in American society is generally less valued than individual efforts and accomplishments. For example, the most competitive members of our society, sports

figures, are the most revered, highly paid and frequently awarded.

On the other hand, a collectivistic culture might be represented by a sample of Chinese or Taiwanese subjects. The Chinese value harmony, cooperation, and conformity, the greater good over individual good. While some members of Chinese culture may value autonomy and competition more highly than others, individuality is generally less valued than conformity in China (Pye, 1992). For example, the Chinese often rely upon a third party to intercede in family conflicts, so that face and harmony may be protected (Cai, 1993). Thus, American and Taiwanese subjects might represent both ends of the Individualism-Collectivism continuum and therefore present the greatest potential contrast in negotiator behaviors.

Defining a Cultural Variable

Lytle (1993) argues that culture influences negotiator behavior by affecting negotiators' priorities, goals, and strategies. "Culture influences the individual negotiators' interests, through its effect on priorities and types of goals, and [negotiators'] strategies, through its affect on negotiator plans and tactics." (p. 24). Culture also influences the negotiation process, in that negotiators' goals and tactics combine to affect negotiated outcomes.

The current project locates culture's effects within negotiator strategies. Specifically, supposed differences in individualistic v. collectivistic negotiating "styles" (Harris & Moran, 1991) are the focus of this project. For example,

collectivistic negotiators are said to value interpersonal relationships more than individual goals. Thus, Taiwanese negotiators are expected to pursue face-maintenance and relationship building tactics in negotiating. According to the Cultural Determinism model, Taiwanese negotiators will emphasize these goals across intra- and inter-cultural negotiation contexts. Therefore, these collectivistic negotiators might be expected to use what Harris and Moran (1991) label a "Normative" negotiating style.

The NORMATIVE negotiator concentrates on creating a harmonious relationship between bargainers. Normative negotiating requires attention to self and other emotions and values. A normative negotiator strives to have the final agreement or contract reflect the desires and values of the negotiating parties. Harris and Moran (1991) explain that normative negotiators assume that negotiating is bargaining. Normative negotiating behaviors are "judging, assessing, and evaluating the facts according to a set of personal values, approving and disapproving, agreeing and disagreeing, using loaded words, offering bargains, proposing rewards, incentives, appealing to feelings and emotions to reach a "fair" deal, demanding, requiring, threatening, involving power, using status, authority ..." (p. 73). Additionally, self-evaluative statements like "I focus on what is going on between people when bargaining" indicate a normative style.

Next, representatives of collectivistic cultures, and Chinese negotiators in particular, are assumed to focus upon general principles and ideals rather than specific details. That is, negotiators from Taiwan are likely assume that details can be worked out in the future, whereas the general tone of negotiators' working relationship should be established in the present (Pye, 1982). Intuitive feelings about the trustworthiness of the opponent are important. If two negotiators can agree on generalities, the Chinese assume that specific details will essentially "take care of themselves." According to the Cultural Determinism model, Taiwanese negotiators will emphasize these generalities and intuitive impressions of opponents across intra-and inter-cultural negotiation contexts. Therefore, collectivistic negotiators might be expected to use what Harris and Moran (1991) label an "Intuitive" negotiating style.

An INTUITIVE style is based upon the fundamental assumption that imagination solves problems. Intuitive negotiators look to the future, offer "creative" solutions, and draw attention to prospective opportunities being created in present agreements. According to Harris and Moran (1991) "Intuitive" negotiating requires "making warm and enthusiastic statements, focusing on the entire situation or problem, pinpointing essentials, making projections into the future, being imaginative and creative in analyzing the situation, switching from one subject to another, going beyond the

facts..." (p. 73). Additionally, statements like "I follow my inspirations of the moment" indicate an intuitive style.

In comparison, Individualistic negotiators are assumed to value autonomy and competition. Obtaining negotiation goals is more important than preserving relationships. Harris and Moran (1991) claim that individualistic negotiators view negotiation as a competitive process. The authors believe that Western negotiators "compete" by trying to present the most logical persuasive arguments in negotiating. Furthermore, the Cultural Determinism model predicts that individualistic representatives will emphasize this form of competition across intra- and inter-cultural negotiation contexts. Therefore, individualistic negotiators like Americans, will use what Harris and Moran (1991) label an "Analytic" negotiating style.

An ANALYTIC negotiator assumes that logical analysis leads to universally true conclusions. According to Harris and Moran (1991), forming reasons, drawing conclusions, identifying cause and effect, and weighing the pros and cons are analytic negotiating behaviors. "Analytic" negotiating involves "arguing in favor of, or against one's own or others' position, directing, breaking down, dividing, analyzing each situation for cause and effect, identifying relationships of the parts, putting things into logical order, using linear reckoning." (Harris & Moran, 1991, p. 74).

At the same time, individualistic cultural representatives are thought to be detail- rather than person-oriented (Harris &

Moran, 1991). That is, Americans tend to admire a negotiator who is clearly in command of the relevant facts in a negotiation case. S/he is said to have "done his/her homework" and is perceived as competent and efficient. The Cultural Determinism model assumes that individualists will value this factual orientation across both intra- and inter-cultural negotiation contexts. Therefore, Americans might be expected to use what Harris and Moran label a "Factual" style.

✓ A FACTUAL style is based in the root assumption that "the facts speak for themselves." A factual negotiator points out facts and details in a neutral way, keeps track of what has been said, and clarifies the issues. Harris and Moran (1991) describe factual behaviors as "...reminding people of their statements, knowing most of the details of the discussed issue, and sharing them with others, clarifying, relating facts to experience, being low-key in their reactions, looking for proof, documenting their statements." (p. 73). Additionally, self-evaluative statements like "I want to know the details when discussing an issue" indicate a factual style.

Tracking Negotiation Styles: An Interactive Coding Scheme

Harris and Moran (1991) approach differences in negotiator tactics and strategies on the basis of Cultural Determinacy. This model assumes that the four Negotiating Styles-- Factual, Normative, Analytic, and Intuitive-- differentiate Western from Eastern negotiators. Specifically, the model predicts that

- H1: As compared to Individualistic (American) negotiators, Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators will use the Normative negotiating style more frequently during inter-cultural negotiations.
- H2: As compared to Individualistic negotiators, Collectivistic negotiators will use the Intuitive negotiating style more frequently during inter-cultural negotiations.
- H3: As compared with Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators, Individualistic (American) negotiators will use the Analytic negotiating style more frequently during inter-cultural negotiations.
- H4: As compared with Collectivistic negotiators, Individualistic negotiators will use the Factual negotiating style more frequently during inter-cultural negotiations.

Testing these hypotheses requires locating and tracking the four negotiating styles within negotiator talk. Specifically, in face-to-face interaction between American and Taiwanese buyers and sellers, Factual, Intuitive, Normative, and Analytic bargaining styles will be defined as negotiator utterances which bear certain characteristics. Based upon the category descriptions offered by Harris and Moran (1991), Factual utterances are defined as those which indicate a "what is" or "what was" orientation. That is, discussing what has been tried in the past, what has worked/not worked, drawing conclusions regarding the present issue based upon past

occurrences and events will be coded as factual utterances. Additionally, asking for or providing details, repeating or clarifying details, keeping track of what has been said, and documenting details are coded as factual negotiating behaviors. Based upon examples from the transcripts, a factual negotiating style might be exhibited in the utterance, "can you give me that in writing?" or "earlier you said ..."

Analytic utterances are defined as those which rely upon logic and reasons to make a point. Specifically, giving reasons, arguing the advantages and disadvantages of a plan of action, directing the discussion agenda, and identifying cause and effect relationships will be coded as analytic negotiating behaviors. For example, an analytic negotiating style might be exhibited in the utterance, "let me explain it to you..." Alternatively, an analytic negotiator might build a logical argument like, "Most medium sized shops are selling this item for \$100. Your shop is medium sized. Therefore, you could sell this item for \$100."

Intuitive utterances are defined as those which exhibit a future or creative orientation by initiating offers or discussing the implications a present agreement might hold for the future. For example, an intuitive bargainer might propose, "Let's settle on this amount for televisions right now. Then, in 6 months, if both of us are doing well, maybe we can raise it a little." Additionally, making enthusiastic statements, suddenly introducing a new topic, focusing on the whole

situation, and jumping to conclusions will be coded as intuitive negotiating behaviors. For instance, an intuitive negotiator might say, "I wonder if we could set up some kind of a deal where I can get a discount." Or, "That's a great idea!"

Normative utterances are defined as those which attempt to establish a sound relationship or identify another's needs and values. Thus, showing interest in the opponent's conversation, offering to compromise or bargain, offering rewards or incentives, making demands, requirements, threats, and power or authority appeals will be coded as normative negotiating behaviors. For example, a normative negotiator might say, "Since you've been such a good customer, I could probably give you interest-free credit." Or, "How do you feel about that idea?"

Using Harris and Moran's (1991) Negotiation Skills Self-Assessment Exercise as a coding instrument accomplishes two goals in the present study. First, because this measurement instrument is designed from the cultural determinism model, it is well-suited for testing the fundamental assumptions of cultural determinacy. Specifically, if cultural determinacy holds, then face-to-face interaction between members of different cultures should produce distinct differences in these four negotiating styles. On the other hand, if cultural determinism holds only in intra- and not in inter-cultural negotiation interaction, then the differences predicted by Harris and Moran (1991) should not materialize in face-to-face interaction.

Second, this instrument allows us to compare negotiators' perceptions of West v. East negotiating differences with actual West-East negotiation interaction. Using the same instrument to both code negotiator behaviors and obtain self-evaluations will provide a picture of negotiators' implicit theories regarding negotiation behavior. These implicit theories may persist, whether or not predicted differences in the four negotiation styles emerge in face-to-face interaction. For example, given the prevalence of assumptions regarding differences in Western and Eastern negotiator behavior, bargainers may continue to perceive differences, even in the face of contradictory evidence. The same cultural stereotypes which dominate the cross-cultural literature may guide a negotiator's assessments of self and opponent negotiating styles. Therefore, if American and Taiwanese negotiators rate themselves as more Factual, Analytic, Intuitive, or Normative than their counterparts, then it might be argued that these four dimensions do indeed differentiate negotiator perceptions, if not behaviors, across cultures. It might further be argued that these perceptions form the bases for the Cultural Determinacy assumption. Therefore, comparing subjects' self- and other-assessments to coded negotiation interaction may provide insight into the following research questions:

RQ1: As compared with Individualistic (American) negotiators, do Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators rate themselves as relatively more Normative in negotiating across cultures?

RQ2: As compared with Individualistic negotiators, do Collectivistic negotiators rate themselves as relatively more Intuitive in negotiating across cultures?

RQ3: As compared with Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators, do Individualistic (American) negotiators rate themselves as relatively more Analytic in negotiating across cultures?

RQ4: As compared with Collectivistic negotiators, do Individualistic negotiators rate themselves as relatively more Factual in negotiating across cultures?

Several weaknesses may be present within the negotiation styles coding scheme and self-assessment exercise. First, the four categories explicated by Harris and Moran (1991) may be less than comprehensive or exhaustive. Therefore, some cross-cultural negotiation behaviors may represent neither Factual, Intuitive, Normative, nor Analytic bargaining. As a result, these potentially important behaviors receive little attention or discussion.

Second, the categories themselves are gross, rather than refined. Specifically, some categories encompass a variety of negotiator behaviors which may or may not be conceptually related. For example, the "Factual" approach is an aggregate of "looking for proof" and giving "low-key" reactions. While low-key negotiators may behave more rationally in negotiations, a low-key approach does not necessarily indicate a desire to know the details of a case. Thus it may be argued that these characteristics should comprise two distinct categories: A

focus on facts and details would constitute one category, while mild reactions and "neutrality" would constitute another.

Similarly, the "Intuitive" category includes the behaviors, "switching from one subject to another" and "making future projections." Perhaps these behaviors should constitute two categories labeled Future Focus and Multiple Goal Orientation. For instance, switching subjects may indicate a creative or inspirationally-driven approach to negotiating. However, addressing a series of topics might also indicate that the negotiator has several high-priority goals to address within that session.

Finally, some of the items included in Harris & Moran's (1991) original self-evaluation exercise are ambiguous. The practical results of this ambiguity are two. First, respondents may find it difficult to rate self and other negotiating behavior according to ambiguous items. They may mis-perceive the relevance of questions which are unclear. Therefore, greater measurement error is introduced to the measurement process as subjects respond incorrectly to items measuring a Factual, Intuitive, Normative, or Analytic negotiating style. For example, Taiwanese subjects may have difficulty responding to a seemingly Western-biased statement such as, "I am perceived as a down to earth person."

Second, ambiguous items make it difficult for the researcher to apply the coding scheme to actual negotiator behavior. For example, "My proposals command the attention of others" refers to not to the negotiator's behavior, but

potentially to the behavior of his/her opponent. These items cannot be used in the construction of a coding scheme which amasses individual negotiator characteristics. Therefore, ambiguous items were removed from both the coding scheme and the questionnaire in this study.

Despite these weaknesses, a negotiation styles category scheme is uniquely suited to addressing the assumptions of Cultural Determinacy. Specifically, the assumption that negotiators follow the same behavioral guidelines with international, as with domestic opponents may be directly tested.

Tracking Reciprocity: Sequential Analysis

Several hypotheses based upon the Cultural Determinism model have been proposed. However, reciprocity, a salient negotiation variable, is also presumed to operate in intercultural negotiation interaction for two reasons. First, reciprocity is a universal property of human communication. Therefore, it may be argued that reciprocity operates in inter- as well as intra-cultural negotiation settings. For example, one negotiator's "Normative" focus on a topic would elicit a normative response from the opponent.

Second, Individualistic and Collectivistic cultures differ in their prioritization and treatment of ingroups and outgroups (Boski, 1988; Lytle, 1993). Specifically, collectivists consider ingroup interaction more important than outgroup interaction, whereas individualists make relatively less distinction between these two. For collectivists, maintaining

harmony may be less important in outgroups than in ingroups. Given that negotiators from other cultural groups may be perceived as members of an "outgroup," then members of collectivistic cultures may emphasize relationship-orientation (Normative negotiating) and intuition (Intuitive negotiating) less in inter-, than in intra-cultural negotiations. In the absence of a relatively exclusive emphasis on culturally-associated negotiating styles, reciprocity may influence collectivist's negotiating behaviors more than cultural determinism in cross-cultural bargaining situations. Therefore, in inter-cultural negotiation contexts, Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators may use Normative and Intuitive negotiating styles no more frequently than Individualistic (American) negotiators.

Individualistic cultures do not differentiate as strongly between ingroup and outgroup members as collectivistic cultures. Therefore, American emphases on Factual and Analytic negotiating styles should not change from intra- to inter-cultural negotiation contexts. However, when negotiators and others encounter members of other cultural groups, differences between the two interactants tend to be accentuated (Tajfel, 1982; Brewer, 1979; Dodd, 1991). Therefore, Americans sensitive to the differences between themselves and their Taiwanese counterparts might also adapt their behaviors by reciprocating bargaining moves (Kim & Rubin, 1988). Thus, in inter-cultural negotiations, Individualistic (American) negotiators may use the Factual and Analytic styles with no

greater frequency than their Collectivistic (Taiwanese) partners.

It is a matter of empirical interest whether Cultural Determinacy provides an adequate basis for predicting negotiation behavior. Of equal importance is the degree to which reciprocity in negotiation overrides, is over-ridden, or interacts with "culture." The image of negotiators as adaptive, reciprocal partners clashes with that of negotiators as static, culture-bound individuals ruled by culturally-prescribed negotiating behaviors. For example, consider the following transcribed excerpt from an American/Taiwanese negotiation:

American: Okay, I'll tell you what, make it \$145.

Taiwanese: Oh, come on! It's only twenty dollars.

American: My people would be mad at me if I go with the bottom.

Taiwanese: \$145?

American: Yeah. \$ 145 is the best deal

Taiwanese: Unless you buy me dinner

American: Buy you dinner? Okay.

Taiwanese: Okay \$ 145 plus dinner.

American: Okay, we got a deal.

Taiwanese: I think that's it, right?

American: Nice doin' business with you.

In this example, the Taiwanese negotiator resorts to what Harris and Moran (1991) might consider an "American" compromise. Specifically, the Taiwanese buyer agrees to give

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the American seller the desired price in return for an off-the-record, informal incentive, independent of the negotiation task. Additionally, the American seller resorts to what Pye (1982) has described as a "Chinese" authority appeal. Specifically, the American claims that s/he lacks the authority to lower the price without incurring the wrath of higher-ups. Pye claims that this is a common form of Chinese indirectness, designed to save face rather than inducing conflict by saying "no."

It seems that these negotiators do not behave within the boundaries prescribed by the Cultural Determinacy model. Instead, in this negotiation segment, behaviors presumed unique to cultures have "crossed" cultures. Thus, the Cultural Determinacy Model fails to account for the interaction here. A more accurate account might be provided by a reflexive or reciprocal model of negotiating behavior.

If reciprocity is a significant force in cross-cultural negotiation, then we might expect each bargainer to adopt negotiating behaviors that appear acceptable and desirable to the opponent. Thus, in inter-cultural negotiation contexts, Individualistic (American) and Collectivistic (Taiwanese) negotiators may reciprocate negotiation strategies or "styles," such that

H5: A Factual initiative by one negotiator will elicit a similar response from his/her counterpart.

H6: An Intuitive initiative by one negotiator will elicit a similar response from his/her counterpart.

H7: A Normative initiative by one negotiator will elicit a similar response from his/her counterpart.

H8: An Analytic initiative by one negotiator will elicit a similar response from his/her counterpart.

Sequential Analysis procedures are commonly used to track complementary or divergent behaviors in interaction.

Sequential analysis refers to the "marking" of criterion behaviors, as well as partners' responses to those behaviors. Responses may be immediate or delayed. Thus, the response of interest may occur adjacent to the marker, or 2-3 behaviors later.

Lag Sequential Analysis (Putnam, 1989; Putnam & Jones, 1982) tests for the frequency of contiguous, one-removed, twice-removed, etc. behavioral responses across coding categories. Specifically, the frequency with which a "marked" criterion behavior is followed by the same behavior is calculated, and the statistical significance of this frequency is noted. For instance, the number of "Intuitive" initiatives followed by Intuitive responses is compared with the number of consecutive Intuitive moves which might be expected by chance, given the total number of "Intuitive" codes within the data. Comparing observed percentages to expected (chance) percentages produces a Z score for proportional differences (similar to the Z score for mean differences, but modified for use with frequency data (Smith, 1988)).

This procedure is particularly relevant to the current research effort. Because Lag Sequential analysis provides a

frequency count of the similar and dissimilar behavioral moves within coded interaction, this procedure can provide at least a numerical representation of similar and dissimilar negotiation moves exhibited by American and Taiwanese bargainers.

Therefore, a preliminary understanding of the degree to which reciprocity operates in cross-cultural negotiation contexts may be gained.

METHODS

Participants

94 students from a large midwestern university were recruited for an "international relations" study. The researchers obtained a convenience sample of 26 male and 21 female Taiwanese subjects through the Taiwanese Students Association. Taiwanese respondents averaged 26.5 years in age (SD 8.96). These subjects reported that they averaged 8 hours daily in contact with other persons from Taiwan (SD 18.3) and 2-3 hours daily with persons from the United States (SD 3.08). Average stay in the United states varied from 18 months to two years.

47 American subjects were recruited from undergraduate communication classes. Subjects received class credit for participation. American subjects were randomly assigned appointment times opposite a Taiwanese subject of the same gender. Mean age for American participants was 22.29 (SD 4.75). American subjects reported spending an average of 8 hours per week with persons from other cultures (SD 17.6).

Instructions

Subjects arriving at the lab were assigned a role as a buyer or seller in a business transaction. Subjects received the following instructions and price ranges:

YOU ARE A SALES REPRESENTATIVE [purchasing agent] FOR A WHOLESALE [retail] APPLIANCE DISTRIBUTOR [franchise]. YOUR COMPANY SELLS IMPORTED AND DOMESTIC BRANDS OF TELEVISIONS, VIDEO CAMERAS, RADIOS, AND 35 MILLIMETER CAMERAS. YOUR COMPANY EXPECTS YOU TO MAKE A PROFIT [save as much money as possible] SELLING [buying] THESE APPLIANCES. HOWEVER, AS HEAD SALES REPRESENTATIVE [purchasing agent], YOU ARE FREE TO REACH WHATEVER AGREEMENT YOU FEEL IS BEST WITH EACH OF YOUR BUYERS [suppliers]. LISTED BELOW IS A PRICE RANGE FOR EACH ITEM. THE NUMBER OF TELEVISIONS, ETC. YOU SELL [buy] IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE PRICE THE PURCHASER [you] WILL PAY. YOUR CUSTOMER [supplier] WILL CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS WITH YOU PERIODICALLY OVER THE COMING MONTHS. YOUR GOAL IS TO NEGOTIATE THE BEST POSSIBLE DEAL, GIVEN THE NEEDS OF YOUR COMPANY AND YOUR CUSTOMER [supplier]. PLAY OUT YOUR ROLE AS REALISTICALLY AS POSSIBLE.

20" Color Televisions	\$550	\$350
AM/FM radio & cassette recorder	\$125	\$ 75
Video Cameras	\$1,000	\$800
35 mm Cameras	\$200	\$125

This exercise is adapted from a negotiation simulation used extensively in studies of negotiation behavior (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Campbell, et al., 1988; Adler, et al., 1987). The original exercise provides buyers and sellers with differential payoff schedules for 3 sale items. This exercise has been used in the past because it provides "the essential elements of actual commercial negotiations observed in preliminary field research" (Adler, et al., 1987, p. 419). Specifically, the payoff options allow opportunities for integrative agreements, logrolling, concession making, or "splitting the difference," depending upon the bargaining processes negotiators choose.

This exercise was adapted for the current project for two reasons. First, the adapted version provides a minimum goal structure for both negotiators. Specifically, although the instructions ask negotiators to meet the general goals expected by the home company and the customer/merchant, neither goal is stressed or preferred. Thus, negotiators are free to pursue relationship-oriented (Normative/Intuitive) bargaining styles or competitive (Factual/Analytic) bargaining styles.

Second, the adapted version provides no prescription for how goals should be pursued. Neither the instructions nor the task itself indicate that an integrative or distributive, cooperative or competitive "solution" is preferred. Therefore, negotiators may create a solution to the bargaining exercise as they interact. For example, some negotiators in this study spoke at length about each item, then agreed upon a total price for all four (logrolling). Others approached the task item by item, confirming a price for each item before moving on to the next. Taken together, these characteristics of the bargaining task allowed both cultural determinism and/or reciprocity to influence negotiator behavior.

When subjects affirmed that instructions were clear, one Taiwanese buyer or seller and his/her American counterpart were escorted to an observation room containing a table, two chairs, and a tape recorder. A confederate videotaped the interaction from behind a two-way mirror. Participants were introduced to each other by pseudonyms fitting with their nationality (For sellers, Mr./Ms. Woo or Smith. For buyers, Jhong and Jones).

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No discussion format was prescribed. Subjects were instructed to continue negotiating until they felt a suitable agreement had been reached.

All dyads were interrupted at the end of 15 minutes. Some negotiators settled in less than 15 minutes. Upon completion, negotiators were escorted to a neutral area where each completed a questionnaire assessing their own negotiating behavior and that of their partner. 64 items adapted from Harris and Moran's (1991) original 80-item "Negotiating Skills Self-Assessment Exercise" made up the questionnaire. Factual, Intuitive, Normative, and Analytic bargaining behaviors were each measured with 16 items describing how subjects typically feel during, operate in, or approach negotiations. Subjects responded to items using a 5 point likert scale to indicate how often each statement described their bargaining behavior (1 = never, 5 = always). Additionally, subjects responded to 6 open-ended descriptions of self and partner, as well as 9 demographic questions. Taiwanese subjects completed additional items assessing English-speaking ability and time spent in the United States (This questionnaire reproduced in Appendix A).

Transcript Features

26 negotiation video tapes were transcribed following Jefferson's (1978) rules for transcription. These transcripts featured 10 female dyads, 6 of which contained American wholesalers. 16 male dyads were featured. Half contained American buyers. A total of 3685 utterances were transcribed

and subsequently coded. Average transcript length was 141 utterances.

Coding Procedures

Harris and Moran's (1991) Negotiation Skills Self Assessment Exercise and description of negotiating styles formed the basis for the Cultural Determinacy coding scheme. 4 coders received 5 hours instruction in identifying and coding units of talk according to one of the four negotiation styles. The unit of analysis in this study was the "thought unit," (Gottman, 1979) an independent clause within an uninterrupted talking turn. Coders were instructed to examine the thought units in a given talking turn and code each for the negotiation style exhibited.

To provide a picture of movement or patterns in style use, coders were then instructed to collapse contiguous thought units containing the same negotiation style into a single "style code." Thus, different negotiating styles used in the same utterance might indicate the variety of style use by each cultural group, even though some styles might be used more frequently than others. For example, within the same talking turn, a wholesaler might bargain normatively by acknowledging the retailer's need for a profit margin. Within the same talking turn, the wholesaler might factually explain wholesaling procedures. Finally, the wholesaler might end his/her utterance normatively by expressing a desire to reach a compromise that would make both negotiators happy. Thus, this speaker's talking turn would receive the codes 3,1,3.

The result was a speaker by speaker analysis of the negotiation styles exhibited by cultural members within each transcript, across talking turns. This procedure produced 1829 factual, 259 intuitive, 1169 normative, and 352 analytic coded units. Unitizing reliability according to Guetzkow's U (Folger, et al., 1984) reached .025. U is an estimate of discrepancy rather than agreement. Therefore, this estimate translates to an agreement rating of 98 %.

An additional category was added to the coding system. Specifically, utterances which contained no full though unit and thus could not be coded according to one of the four negotiation styles received a 5 or "other" code. A total of 78 utterances received the code "other" across the 26 transcripts.

Based upon a sub-sample of 391 coded units (11 % of total sample), Global interpretive reliability using Cohen's Kappa (Folger, et al., 1984) reached .83. Category-by-category reliabilities are reported in Table 1. To protect against coder drift and deterioration, coders were told that the researcher would monitor coding accuracy by comparing 50 utterances at random from each coded transcript with the researcher's results. Transcripts which fell below 85% agreement with the researcher would be returned to the coders for re-coding. Throughout the coding process, one transcript was returned to a coder.

Table 1. Interpretive Reliabilities

<u>Category:</u>	<u>Kappa:</u>
Factual	.81
Normative	.87
Intuitive	.86
Analytic	.73
"Other"	.93

RESULTS

Exit Interviews

The first four dyads were interviewed regarding their impressions of the experiment and suggestions for improving the experimental instructions. Americans guessed that the experiment examined who was more "aggressive," or "persuasive." One respondent said she had never interacted with people from other cultures, so that the experimental interaction was an entirely new experience for her. Another said he enjoyed being "thrown in" to the experimental situation without detailed constrictions on behavior. He enjoyed the feeling of "improvising." Finally, one American interviewee found questionnaire items dealing with inductive v. deductive reasoning difficult to answer. He felt these questions were irrelevant to the negotiation task.

Interviews with Taiwanese respondents revealed that some had difficulty with the vocabulary in the questionnaire (although two questionnaire items assessed spoken English, none assessed writing/reading ability). On average, Taiwanese participants rated their speaking ability as "fair to good" ($X = 2.98$, $SD 1.04$) on a scale from 0 (no ability) to 4 (excellent).

One Taiwanese subject explained that during the negotiation exercise, his goal was to create a good deal for himself and the American opponent by selling a larger quantity for a lower price. He focussed on trying to point out what the American stood to gain from such a deal, without revealing what he himself would gain. Overall, interview responses convinced the researcher that the real purpose of the experiment had not been revealed.

Differences in Negotiating Styles

To assess differences in negotiating styles across cultures, frequency counts of the Factual, Intuitive, Normative, and Analytic styles exhibited across the transcripts by both American and Taiwanese negotiators were compared using Multiple-Sample Chi Square analyses (Smith, 1988). These frequencies are reproduced in Table 2. The overall analysis revealed significant differences in American versus Taiwanese negotiation styles ($X^2 = 30$ $p < .005$ (3 df) = 12.83). That is, observed differences in frequency were greater than those expected by chance. This finding indicated that some negotiating styles may be used more frequently by one culture than another.

Subsequent pairwise comparisons revealed that the differences appeared in the Normative and Analytic categories ($X^2 = 15.54$ $p < .005$ (1 df) = 7.87). No statistically significant differences appeared in the Intuitive or Factual categories. The implication here is that in terms of frequency, Taiwanese negotiators more often use a Normative negotiating style than

Americans. Alternatively, Americans more often used an Analytic style. However, Americans and Taiwanese appear to use the Intuitive and Factual styles equally often. Thus, two of the predictions made by the Cultural Determinacy model received support (H1 & H3).

Table 2. Frequency of Style Use

	Factual	Intuitive	Normative	Analytic
American	953	143	530	213*
Taiwanese	875	116	637*	139

*Significant, $p < .005$

Reciprocity in Interaction

Next, investigation of possible reciprocal interaction was undertaken. The coded transcript data were subjected to Lag Sequential Analysis procedures. Observed frequencies of contiguous, once-removed, twice-removed, etc negotiation behaviors were compared with estimated chance frequencies. For example, 346 instances of sequential Analytic negotiating behaviors were observed. Of those, 11.8 % followed directly after an analytical utterance. 9.5 % might be expected to follow sequentially by chance alone, given the total number of analytic utterances across the transcripts. Thus the Z score for these proportional differences is 1.49, and not significantly significant (see Table 3). Statistical significance is reached at Z scores above 1.64 ($p < .05$) or 2.58 ($p < .01$).

Lag Sequential Analysis tracks contiguous responses (Lag 1) or delayed responses (Lags 2, 3, and 4). For example, at lag 1, the program counts the frequency with which a Factual initiative by one negotiator is immediately followed with a Factual response from the opponent. At Lag 2, the program computes the frequency with which an Intuitive utterance from one negotiator is followed with an Intuitive response two utterances later, and so on. Lag 4 denotes that the response occurred 4 utterances after the initiative was issued.

Table 3. Sequential Analysis Z Scores

	Factual	Intuitive	Normative	Analytic
Lag 1	5.82**	.25	2.87**	1.49
Lag 2	4.47**	2.03*	4.49**	3.89**
Lag 3	2.88**	.08	2.45*	1.22
Lag 4	2.03*	-1.90	2.77*	3.09**

*Significant, $p < .05$ **Significant, $p < .01$

Most notable among the Lag Sequential results is a significant ($p < .01$) response sequence for Factual utterances. That is, at Lag 1, American or Taiwanese Factual utterances tended to elicit a factual response significantly often. At Lags 2, 3, and 4, the pattern continued. Thus, "strings" of up to 5 factual utterances occurred significantly often throughout the transcripts. Thus, American and Taiwanese negotiators appear to reciprocate Factual negotiating behaviors, spending equal time asking for and offering details regarding products

and prices. This finding supports Hypothesis 5. Negotiators tended to reciprocate Factual negotiating styles in inter-cultural negotiation interaction.

The same pattern appeared in Normative negotiating styles. That is, a Normative initiative, in which a negotiator might ask about the opponent's preferences and needs, was followed by a normative response significantly often ($p < .01$). The pattern continued at lags 2, 3, and 4. Thus, strings of up to 5 Normative utterances occurred significantly often throughout the transcripts. These findings support Hypothesis 7. Negotiators tended to reciprocate normative negotiating styles in inter-cultural negotiation interaction.

Analytic negotiating styles were also followed by Analytic responses, but only at lags 2 and 4. Thus, no significant strings of Analytic negotiating occurred. These data are difficult to interpret. However, taken together with the frequency results, this finding may indicate Americans' insistence on an Analytic approach. For instance, if Americans offered an Analytic bargaining move and were met with a Normative move from the Taiwanese, Americans might reiterate an Analytic style, setting up a pattern of Analytic negotiating at lags 2 and 4. Specifically, an American buyer might offer the reasons behind his/her offer of a particular price for the goods being discussed. The Taiwanese seller might respond with a normative acknowledgement of the buyers desires, but insist that the seller too must achieve certain price goals. The American buyer might then respond with an explanation of the

meaning or logic behind his/her initial proposal, hoping to persuade the seller to lower prices. Thus, Hypothesis 8 is not supported. Negotiators did not appear to reciprocate Analytic negotiating styles.

No significant "strings" were noted in terms of Intuitive bargaining exchanges. This indicates that Intuitive bargaining styles did not elicit Intuitive responses. Thus, Hypothesis 6 received no support. Instead, the lag data seem to suggest that intuitive negotiating appeared in isolated instances.

Personal Assessments of Self and Other

Do American and Taiwanese bargainers assess their negotiating styles differently in Factual, Normative, Analytic and Intuitive terms? Procedures were undertaken to first assess negotiators' self-perceptions, then perceptions of partner. First, questionnaire data were subjected to Confirmatory Factor Analysis procedures (Hamilton & Hunter, 1988). 16 questionnaire items representing each negotiating style (Total N = 64) were probed for internal consistency, then parallelism. The final solution contained 7 items for the Factual scale ($\alpha = .72$, average inter-item correlation .27), 5 items for the Intuitive scale ($\alpha = .72$, average inter-item correlation .34), 7 items for the Normative scale ($\alpha = .74$, average inter-item correlation .3), and 7 items for the Analytic scale ($\alpha = .80$, average inter-item correlation .37). Each of the items in the final scales were presumed to tap characteristics of Factual, Intuitive, Normative, or Analytic negotiating.

American and Taiwanese scores on these 4 "scales" were then compared. Mean scale scores (reported in Table 4) were compared via T-tests for statistically significant differences. An interesting result was that Americans rated themselves slightly higher than Taiwanese across all four categories, though only one of these differences reached minimal statistical significance. Specifically, American negotiators rated themselves more normative than did Taiwanese negotiators ($t = 2.00$ $p < .05$ (2-tailed) ($df = 1.66$)). However, this difference is not in the direction predicted by the Cultural Determinacy model. Thus, RQ1 is refuted. Taiwanese did not rate themselves as more often normative in cross-cultural negotiations.

Additionally, no significant differences between American and Taiwanese self-ratings of Factual, Intuitive, or Analytic negotiating occurred. Therefore, Research Questions 2, 3, and 4 can also be refuted. Americans and Taiwanese did not rate themselves as more often Factual, Intuitive, or Analytic than their partners in cross-cultural negotiation.

In the second phase of analysis, participant responses to 2 open-ended questions were compared:

"How would you describe yourself as a negotiator?"

"If you had to describe the person you were negotiating with, what words would you use?"

Words or phrases offered in response to these questions were each transferred from the questionnaires to a single note card.

Table 4. Self-Evaluation Means

	American	Taiwanese
Factual	25.30 (2.72)*	25.26 (3.65)
Intuitive	17.70 (2.62)	16.45 (3.44)
Normative	26.23 (3.54)	24.61 (4.17)
Analytic	26.02 (3.41)	24.64 (4.54)

*Standard Deviations in Parentheses

4 teams of three judges, blind to the purpose of the task, examined one group of cards (Taiwanese-self, Taiwanese-partner, American-self, or American-partner). Judges were instructed to discuss the content of each card, then sort cards into like groups on the basis of consensual agreement. After completing the initial sorting, judges were encouraged to read the cards in each pile and make adjustments as necessary (Berger & Bell, 1988). The number of cards in each pile were converted to percentages or ratios in comparison to the total number of descriptions in each group. The results of this procedure are reported in Table 5.

Taiwanese respondents most often considered their American counterparts "Easy-going" and themselves as "Lacking experience." In comparison, Americans most often considered Taiwanese opponents "Friendly" and themselves "Willing to compromise." Three other results are particularly relevant to the predictions made by the Cultural Determinacy model. First, 16% of Taiwanese self-descriptions focussed on "Harmony."

Table 5. Descriptions of Self and Other

AMERICAN			
<u>Self</u>		<u>Partner</u>	
Willing to Compromise	15%	Friendly	23%
Fair	10%	Willing to Compromise	15%
Empathic	10%	Calm/Quiet/shy	12%
Pushover	6%	Stubborn/persistent	8%
Friendly/nice	5%	Business minded	8%
Stubborn/tough	5%	Sincere/honest	2%
Total		Total	
	117		99
TAIWANESE			
<u>Self</u>		<u>Partner</u>	
Inexperienced		Easy-going	22%
(lacking skill)	22%	Nice	20%
Like Harmony	16%	Honest	11%
Fair	11%	Competitive	10%
Reasonable	10%	Business sense	9%
Logical	7%	Organized	6%
Total		Total	
	97		81

This description is consistent with a presumed tendency for Eastern negotiators to have greater desire for peaceful inter-negotiator relationships. The Taiwanese respondents in this study feel that this element of cultural determinism applies to them as negotiators. This finding supports, at least indirectly, this presumed desire for peaceful relationships, even in inter-cultural negotiations. Thus, RQ 1 is supported via open-ended self-description, though not supported through the questionnaire self-assessment data.

Second, 15% of American self-descriptions focussed upon "Willingness to Compromise." Cultural determinism ascribes this characteristic to Eastern negotiators and "Normative" bargaining.

Here, the Western negotiators felt this element of normative negotiating behavior applied to them as individuals. Thus, this finding contradicts the predictions made by the Cultural Determinacy model. RQ 1 is denied in open-ended responses as well as in the questionnaire self-assessment data.

Third, Taiwanese negotiators described themselves as "Logical" (7%). According to the Cultural Determinacy model, this characteristic is a Western, or Analytic negotiating approach. However, in this study, Eastern negotiators felt this characteristic applied to them as individuals, while Western negotiators made no reference to approaching negotiations "logically." These two findings contradict the predictions made by the Cultural Determinacy model, indirectly refuting RQ 3.

DISCUSSION

This exploratory study explicates the assumptions underlying the Cultural Determinacy model of cross-cultural negotiation behavior and examines negotiation interaction for patterns which support or challenge these assumptions. ✓ In addition, this thesis explains that reciprocity is an influence in studies of intra-cultural negotiator behavior that may apply in intercultural negotiating contexts as well. Therefore, the study also examined the interactive data for indications that reciprocity in bargaining style might occur during intercultural negotiation. As a result of this study, revising the simplistic Cultural Determinacy model to include reciprocity might be either recommended or discouraged.

Overall, these data do not provide support for the strict assignment of negotiating behaviors based upon cultural membership. Instead, tentative support for Normative and Analytical differences is found. In addition, reciprocal behavior seems present here. Taken together, these results offer several fascinating implications for future cross-cultural research.

Different Negotiating Styles?

Analysis of the frequency data reveal that statistically significant differences in cultural negotiating behavior do exist. These differences seem to be located in "Normative" and "Analytic" categories. However, one weakness present in this study is failure to provide unequivocal support for Normative differences. For instance, differences in the Normative category may be an artifact of the coding scheme.

Specifically, one of the "Normative" negotiating behaviors delineated by the Harris and Moran (1991) coding scheme is "showing interest in the other party." This means that backchannel utterances like, "uh huh" and "yes," are considered normative behaviors. Thus, in this project, backchannel utterances which seemed to indicate attention and encourage the speaker to say more were coded as normative.

The impression gained from these transcripts is that Taiwanese participants were indeed more likely to engage in this backchanneling behavior. While such backchannels may indicate interest in the opponent, a plausible alternative explanation is

that backchannels indicate Taiwanese efforts at either planning a responsive utterance, or processing English messages from American opponents. For example, Taiwanese bargainers may backchannel to acknowledge that they have heard the speaker. But the backchannel "uh huh" may here be serving as a minimally responsive substitute for a full-blown response, while the Taiwanese negotiator engages cognitive energies in planning the next utterance (Berger, 1992; Butterworth & Goldman-Eisler, 1979; Siegman, 1987) and translating that utterance from Chinese to English.

On the other hand, the "Analytic" dimension may indeed be a legitimate means of distinguishing negotiator behavior from East to West. Here, clear differences were established, and analytic bargaining seemed to characterize American negotiators, just as predicted by the cultural Determinacy model. Given the findings regarding analytic negotiating differences, we can conclude that analysis and formal-logic models operate more frequently in Western (American) than in Eastern (Taiwanese) approaches to negotiating. Therefore, future research might focus upon more thoroughly explicating and investigating this "analytic" dimension.

The absence of cultural differences in Factual negotiating may be an artifact of the negotiation task. Specifically, negotiating the price of goods and services, quantities and dates, would seem to require a factual focus from both negotiators. So that "Factual" negotiating is a practical

requirement of the negotiation task. Indeed, according to the frequency tables, both American and Taiwanese negotiators in this study devoted the bulk of discussion time to Factual interaction. Comparatively little time was spent in Intuitive, Normative, or Analytic bargaining. Two conclusions may be drawn from this finding. The first is that opportunities for differences in Factual negotiating did not arise in this study.

The second and more far-reaching conclusion is that a "Factual" dimension to intercultural negotiation behavior is not a valid means for differentiating Western from Eastern negotiators. That is, if the factual dimension fails to distinguish bargainers in certain contexts, like negotiating prices and products, then its utility is negligible.

Lack of statistically significant differences in the Intuitive category may most easily be explained by the weaknesses inherent in the Negotiating Styles coding scheme explained above. In particular, the Intuitive category contained both ambiguous and discrepant items. Therefore, the Intuitive category may have presented a particular challenge to coders attempting to categorize "intuitive" behaviors. Additionally, self-assessment items supposedly measuring intuitive tendencies may have been difficult for negotiators to interpret and respond to with accuracy. However, coder accuracy in the intuitive category reached .86 and the reliability measure for the intuitive self-assessment scale .72. Therefore, it may be argued that Intuitive

negotiating styles are not particularly useful in distinguishing negotiators.

Reciprocating Negotiation Styles

The Lag Sequential data appear to provide limited support for the presence of reciprocity in inter-cultural negotiation interaction. Specifically, both Factual and Normative initiatives by one negotiator tended to elicit a Factual or Normative response from the opponent, setting off relatively stable periods (4-5 utterances) of Factual or Normative bargaining.

However, the lag results in this study must be interpreted with caution. That is, utterances are disproportionately distributed across the four categories. Thus, patterns of reciprocal interaction noted by the analysis may in part be artifacts of this distribution. For example, because the Factual category is so heavily represented in these data while the Intuitive and Analytic categories are least represented, it might be argued that "Factual" utterances occurred so often throughout the data that Intuitive and Analytic utterances could not "string" together. Therefore, the lag data are not definitive. However, they do point to the relative merit in revising our understanding of cross-cultural negotiation interaction to include reciprocity.

Similar Personal Assessments

In the rationale section it was argued that negotiators' implicit theories regarding cultural differences might lead them to perceive their bargaining behaviors as divergent regardless of any codifiable behavioral differences. On the contrary, results show that American and Taiwanese negotiators perceive themselves as equally Factual, Intuitive, and Analytic. Furthermore, Americans perceive themselves as slightly more Normative than Taiwanese, contradicting the assumption that Eastern negotiators are more Normative than Westerners. Thus, we can conclude that in terms of self-perceptions, Western and Eastern bargainers do not differ along these four dimensions of Cultural Determinacy. However, negotiators may perceive differences along other dimensions not explicitly measured in this study.

To allow for this possibility and perhaps gain additional insight into perceived differences, open-ended descriptions of self and partner were appraised. Again however, similarities in these descriptions are striking in the following examples. First, Taiwanese describe their partners as Easy-going and Nice (22%), while Americans describe their partners as Friendly and Willing to compromise (23%, 15%). Taiwanese describe Americans as competitive (10%), while Americans describe Taiwanese as stubborn or persistent (8%). Both describe their partners as having good business sense (9%, 8%) and honesty (11%, 2%). These descriptions are connotatively similar.

Second, Taiwanese negotiators described themselves as enjoying harmony (16%). Enjoying harmony is a normative trait, in line with the assumptions of Cultural Determinacy. However, Americans just as often described themselves as empathic to the opponent's feelings (10%). Empathy too describes Normative negotiating. These descriptions would seem to indicate that negotiators do not perceive differences in Normative traits.

Finally, both groups were similar in most often describing the opponent as "Friendly" or "Easy-going." This finding is both consistent and inconsistent with the behavioral data. Specifically, more Normative behaviors from Taiwanese negotiators may account for American perceptions of Taiwanese opponents as friendly. However, Taiwanese perceptions of Americans as easy-going are not accounted for in the frequency tables. Both less frequent normative behaviors and more frequent analytic behaviors from Americans fail to match the finding that 20% of Taiwanese descriptors for Americans were related to this easy-going characteristic.

While "friendly" and "easy-going" are not precisely synonymous terms, it can be reasoned that they are more similar in terms of describing a normative than a factual or analytic negotiator. Perhaps "easy-going" describes the American tendency to negotiate intuitively, even though differences in Intuitive style use did not reach statistical significance. This lack of cross-culturally synonymous terms is one of the many practical difficulties facing cross-cultural researchers. In general, similarity rather than difference seemed to be the

rule in this study. Therefore, we can conclude that negotiators' open-ended responses fail to support the assumptions of the Cultural Determinacy model. Negotiators did not differ in their estimations of self and other.

Conclusions

The coding scheme used in this study was developed from a cultural determinism approach to inter-cultural communication. So that, while it is possible that culturally-associated differences in negotiating styles do exist, not all coding categories derived from the 4 Harris and Moran (1991) negotiating styles may be sensitive to those differences. For example, although Analytic negotiating seemed to describe American negotiators particularly well, other categories of difference did not receive unequivocal support. Therefore, finding a dimension which accurately describes Eastern negotiators remains a challenge for future research.

The potential presence of reciprocity in cross-cultural negotiation also received some support in this study. Therefore, these results imply a need to focus future inter-cultural negotiation research on tracking other negotiation variables in face-to-face interaction. For example, tracking the influence of negotiator biases may be a useful means of further explicating the Collectivism-Individualism dimension in cross-cultural negotiation. Overall, the lesson learned from the current research effort is that current assumptions regarding the differences between Western and Eastern negotiating behavior are simplistic and in need of refinement.

Specifically, this study provides support for re-conceptualizing negotiators as reflexive individuals rather than inflexible products of culture. For example, reciprocity seems to address some of the shortcomings of the Cultural Determinacy model.

Falsifying, or even identifying the sources of systematic variation in negotiator behavior across cultures is no small task. However, these data point to the relative lack of merit in the Cultural Determinacy approach alone for both detecting and understanding negotiator differences. The conclusions reached here are helpful in focusing future negotiation research away from the compound, ephemeral variable "culture" as a determinant of negotiation and conflict behavior. Instead, this study makes clear the need for future investigation concerning both the components of culture and the influence of adaptive human responses like reciprocity across negotiation settings.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Please respond to this list of questions based upon your typical behavior. It will be most helpful if you answer each question honestly, not according to what you think will be helpful to the study or according to what you wish were true. Your responses will help us most if you are as honest as possible. Please answer every question. This task will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.

For each statement, write clearly the number corresponding to your choice of the five possible responses below:

1. Never, or very rarely - If you have never, or very rarely, found yourself doing what is described in the statement.
2. Occasionally, but infrequently - If you have occasionally but infrequently found yourself doing what is described in the statement.
3. Fairly frequently - If you have fairly frequently found yourself doing what is described in the statement.
4. Very frequently - If you have very frequently found yourself doing what is described in the statement.
5. Always - If you always find yourself doing what is described in the statement.

-
- 1) I focus on the entire situation or problem.
 - 2) I evaluate the facts according to a set of personal values.
 - 3) I bargain unemotionally.
 - 4) I think that the facts are most important in most situations.
 - 5) I enjoy working on new problems.

- 6) I focus on what is going on between myself and another when bargaining.
- 7) I tend to analyze the elements of a problem carefully.
- 8) I am neutral when arguing.
- 19) I am sensitive to another's needs and feelings.
- 10) I am good at keeping track of what has been said in a discussion.
- 11) I look for common ground and compromise.
- 12) I use logic to solve problems.
- 13) I want to know the details when discussing an issue.
- 14) I follow my inspirations of the moment.
- 15) I take a strong stand on matters of principle.
- 16) I am good at looking at one issue at a time.
- 17) I clarify information for others.
- 18) I get my facts wrong.
- 19) I try to please people.
- 20) I am very systematic when making a point.
- 21) I am good at specifying the essential points of the matter.
- 22) I enjoy harmony.
- 23) I weigh the pros and cons.
- 24) I am patient.
- 25) I consider the future when discussing an issue.
- 26) I let my likes and dislikes influence my decisions.
- 27) I look for cause and effect.
- 28) I focus on what needs immediate attention.

- 29) When others become uncertain or discouraged, my enthusiasm carries them along.
- 30) I am sensitive to approval and disapproval.
- 31) I make logical statements.
- 32) I rely on well-tested ways to solve problems.
- 33) I switch from one idea to another.
- 34) My ideas are very well thought out.
- 35) My arguments are precise.
- 36) I help others to see the exciting possibilities in a situation.
- 37) I appeal to emotions and feelings to reach a "fair" deal.
- 38) I present well-articulated arguments for the proposals I favor.
- 39) I do not trust inspiration.
- 40) I speak in a way which conveys a sense of excitement to others.
- 41) I let others know what I am willing to give in return for what I get.
- 42) I put together very well-reasoned arguments.
- 43) I am practical.
- 44) I am imaginative and creative in analyzing a situation.
- 45) My enthusiasm is contagious.
- 46) I build upon others' ideas.
- 47) I like to use the inductive method (from facts to theories).
- 48) I let emotions guide my decisions.

- 49) When I disagree with someone, I skillfully point out the flaws in the other's arguments.
- 50) I am calm in my reactions.
- 51) In trying to persuade others, I appeal to their need for excitement and novelty.
- 52) I try to make other people feel that they have something of value to contribute.
- 53) I am realistic when facing difficulties.
- 54) I point out the positive potential in discouraging or difficult situations.
- 55) I show tolerance and understanding of others' feelings.
- 56) I use arguments relevant to the problem at hand.
- 57) I think there is more to an issue than facts.
- 58) I carefully organize and plan.
- 59) I am skillful at bringing up pertinent facts.
- 60) When disputes arise, I search for the areas of agreement.
- 61) I am consistent in my reactions.
- 62) I quickly notice what needs attention.
- 63) I appeal for harmony and cooperation.
- 64) I am composed when negotiating.

Please answer the following questions in as much detail as you feel will be helpful. If you need more room you may write on the back of the paper.

1. If you had to describe the person you were negotiating with, what words would you use?
2. How would you describe yourself as a negotiator?

3. Do you feel any of the above statements describe you particularly well? If so, which ones?
4. Are there any questions that you thought were ambiguous? Which ones?
5. What do you think the purpose of the questionnaire was?
6. Did you have any difficulties completing this questionnaire?
If so, why?
7. At which level are you currently studying?
☐ Freshman ☐ Sophomore ☐ Junior ☐ Senior
☐ Master's ☐ Doctorate ☐ Post-Doctorate
8. What year were you born? _____
9. What is your citizenship? ☐ United States ☐ Taiwan
☐ Other (please specify)
10. What is your ethnic background? ☐ Asian ☐ Black
☐ Hispanic ☐ Caucasian
☐ American Indian
☐ Other (please specify)
11. On average, how many hours do you spend with people from other cultures:
per week _____ per month _____ per year _____

Thank you for participating in our study. We sincerely appreciate your time!!

Additional Questions for Taiwanese participants:

10. What is your background? ___Taiwanese ___Chinese
 ___Hakke ___Other (please specify)
11. How long have you been in the United States?
 ___1 to 3 months ___4 to 6 months ___6 to 12 months
 ___1 to 2 years ___3 to 4 years ___5 or more
12. Rate your spoken English ability when you first arrived in
 the United States.
 ___No ability ___Poor ___Fair ___Good
 ___Excellent
13. Rate your spoken English ability now.
 ___No ability ___Poor ___Fair ___Good
 ___Excellent
14. Outside of class, do you spend a greater proportion of
 your time interacting with people from the United States
 or with people from Taiwan?
 ___Taiwan ___United States
15. On the average, how many hours per day do you spend with
 people from the United States? ___
 With people from Taiwan? ___

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