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THE 1905 ANTI-AMERICAN BOYCOTT: A SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL REASSESSMENT

BY

Guanhua Wang

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State university
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1994

ABSTRACT

THE 1905 ANTI-AMERICAN BOYCOTT:
A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REASSESSMENT

BY

Guanhua Wang

The 1905 anti-American boycott was a new type of popular
movement. This study argues that the movement was the result
of long-term, accumulative, and multi-facet developments in
urban political culture which directly led to urban political
activism in the form of urban nationalism.

Significant developments in early twentieth century China
included commercialization of mass communication, rise of
urban entertainment, and politicization of new urban social
groups. It was in these long-term accumulative developments
not in a few shocking effects of military defeats and other
national humiliations that this author try to find the roots
of Chinese urban nationalism.

In the early twentieth century, Chinese—exclusion acts by
the United States provided a perfect issue for Chinese
urbanites to express themselves politically. The exclusion
acts seemed to be unjust and at odds with both Western ideals
and Confucian humanism which banned all and only Chinese
immigrants. The fact that the Qing government was too weak to

obtain equal rights for its people provided an opportunity for

the urbanites to show their strength. To do so they decided to
boycott American goods. As a means, the boycott seemed to be
perfect because it was peaceful and by the people.

The boycott might have been.more effective and successful
if big merchants had not betrayed the movement half-way
through. The eventual failure of the boycott exposed the
difficulty of the sovereign status boycotters assigned to the
"public“ (gong) vis-a-vis the private and official spheres.
Merchants wanted to assert their rights as individuals to
trade freely with whoever they wished. The Qing government
stepped in to protect this claim as a sovereign government
would do. In the final analysis, although we can see from the
1905 boycott elements of an emerging public sphere in China,
there was a long way for the Chinese people to go in order to

build a mutual civic society.

© Copyright by
GUANHUA WANG
1995

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people who have helped me in a variety of
ways while I was writing this dissertation. Among them are
professors Norman Pollack, Michael Lewis, Donald Lammers, and
Warren I. Cohen. Professor Cohen has been very supportive to a
project which has no assurance of success.

My wife Li has been extremely patient and supportive. My
father has helped me in locating and xeroxing all the Shibao
items which are essential for the dissertation.

Many faculty and staff members in the History Department at
Michigan State University have provided me with excellent advice
and services. There are many others who have helped me all along.

Nobody, however, has helped me more than professor Stephen
C. Averill. His knowledge on modern Chinese history, on
scholarship of the field and related fields, and on Chinese
language is truly extraordinary. I felt quite embarrassed when he
corrected my pinying; More importantly, professor Averill is, as
Chairman Mao Zedong has said, a selfless man. I have encountered
no other professor, Chinese or American, who cares more about

his/her students than professor Averill.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1 Immigration Disputes Between the
United States and China

Chapter 2 The Making of Anti-Exclusion Public Opinion

Chapter 3 Might Vs. Right--The Ideology of
the Anti-American Boycott

Chapter 4 Economics of the Boycott and Merchants
as Political Activists

Chapter 5 The Politics of the Boycott:
The Limits of Peeple's Power

Conclusion

Appendix A Brief Biography of the Boycott
Intellectuals

Bibliography

Glossary

1

28

92

148

201

268

343
353

261
270

The 1905 Anti-Americhapan Boycott:

A Social and Cultural Reassessment

Introduction

In the early 19005 China saw its first urban popular
movements in the modern sense--patriotic, organized, and, by
and large, peaceful. In both geographic and social terms, the
1905 anti-American boycott was the largest of numerous such
movements between the Boxer Uprising of 1899-1900 and the May
Fourth Movement of 1919 (Liao 1986:57-59). Drawing on new
scholarship by China scholars (Rankin 1986; Rowe 1989, 1984;
Link 1981) and theories by Benedict Anderson (on nationalism)
and Jurgen Habermas (on the public sphere), among others, this
study will put the movement into much broader political,
social, and cultural perspectives than has been done by
previous studies, which have often treated the movement
strictly as a diplomatic or political event.

In other words, this is not just a study of a political
movement but also of a changing political culture in.which.new
social and political organizations acted upon new political
and cultural symbols, new language and media of mass
communication were adopted, and politics was conducted in a
totally open manner. From their respective angles, Anderson
and Habermas provide useful analytical tools to examine these
phenomena-~while one (Anderson) sees preconditions for the
emergence of urban nationalism, the other (Habermas) sees an

expanding public sphere (or spheres). Before elaborating on

1

2
these points, I shall first provide a brief account of the
movement and a summary of previous scholarship on the subject.

The direct cause of the popular agitation was apparently
America's barring of Chinese immigrants from entering the
United States. Based upon immigration treaties signed with the
reluctant Qing government and numerous exclusion acts passed
by the Congress, the United States not only excluded Chinese
laborers and sometimes even privileged Chinese from entering
America, but also treated them in an extremely humiliating
manner.

Disappointed with the Qing government's apparent
inability to protect their interests, some overseas Chinese in
the United States began to foment a boycott against American
goods in 1903. When the Sino-American negotiations on a new
immigration treaty became deadlocked in the late spring of
1905, Chinese merchants in the United States sent urgent
telegrams to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce for help.

In Shanghai, the merchants immediately adopted a boycott
plan in May and invited merchants of twenty-four cities to
join in their retaliation against the U.S. The Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce decided to give the United States two
months in which to drop its discriminatory practices and treat
Chinese people as equals (Shibao 11 May 1905; Zhang 1966:14) .
Thus, a nationwide anti-American boycott started with
unprecedented public enthusiasm and solidarity.

In the summer of 1905, tens of thousands of excited

3
urbanites held numerous meetings in major metropolises,
provincial capitals, and small towns throughout China.
Passionate public speeches were made. Large posters decorated
city streets, store windows, and telephone poles. Kites with
boycott slogans on them flew in the sky over boisterous
Guangzhou city. Pamphlets and handbills advocating boycott
against American goods were distributed everywhere. Actors in
Shanghai staged a patriotic play (A Ying 1962:669). Anti-
exclusion novels, folk songs, and poems were written by a
growing new type of urban intellectuals to mobilize the public
for the cause. The agitation became so emotional that it
claimed the first martyr of China's modern urban political
protest--a young man who poisoned himself in front of the
American Consulate in Shanghai.

In fifty-five hot days from 22 July to 3 September 1905,
there was at least one boycott pledge each day published in
Shanghai's Shibao alone. A rough calculation shows that about
13,000 individuals 'and stores published their boycott pledges.
They were from ten provinces and more than twenty cities. Only
when Chinese merchants and American business firms in China
suffered heavy financial losses and the U.S. government and
the Qing court intervened did the boycott movement began to

fade away .

Why did a seemingly minor diplomatic dispute between two

otherwise friendly countries touch off such a. large-scale

4

urban popular movement? Unlike other confrontations with
foreign powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the anti-exclusion boycott was not triggered by
immediate territorial threats from imperial powers. Neither
was it caused by foreign missionary intrusions. Rather, it was
inflamed largely by an issue with more symbolic than real
meaning' to most Chinese urbanites--—a racist insult to Chinese
national pride (Tsai 1986:97). Most Chinese immigrants were
from just two or three counties in China's southernmost
provinces and they constituted only a tiny fraction of the
Chinese population. Besides, Chinese exclusion was by no means
a new development in American immigration policy in the early
twentieth century. The first exclusion act was promulgated as
early as 1882-—more than twenty years before the boycott
eventually started. How do we explain the scope and.the timing
of this major urban uprising, then?

Scholars have provided various interpretations on the
origins and significance of ‘the boycott. Three major
interpretations stand out. The first stresses "national
awakening" (minzu juexing) under foreign.pressure (Field 1957;

Rhoads 1962; Zhang 1966; Tsai 1976; Mckee 1977) Zhang Cunwu

 

'Only a very limited number of Chinese needed to and
actually did go to the United States (see Chapter One). This
statement is of course not true for Chinese immigrants. For
them, American exclusion laws went far beyond an insult.
They threatened their very livelihood (McKee 1977:105).

"For many historians the 1905 boycott stood for
something new emerging from the aging civilization--
nationalism. Edward J. M. Rhoads praises the movement as

5

(of the Academia Sinica, Taiwan), who so far has written the
most comprehensive study of the movement, states: "The meaning
of national awakening' is to secure the independence and
integrity of national sovereignty, and.to maintain the dignity
and.equality of national position....American exclusion policy
went against these principles; therefore, American goods were
boycotted“ (Zhang 1966:243)

Historians of the ”national awakening“ school emphasize

the shocking psychological effect that political events,"'

 

“one of the first manifestations of Chinese nationalism as a
mass-based political movement." (Rhoads 1962:155).
Historians from Hongkong and Taiwan argue that '[In the
early twentieth century,] nationalism in China was repre-
sented unambiguously by strong and explicit articulation of
ideas for national reconstruction,” and that the 1905
boycott was a I'manifestation of the new sense of
nationalism”...'. (Liao 1986:57-59; Zhang 1966).

"National awakening“ is interpreted by Zhang Cunwu as
meaning that '...the public recognized their own strength
and increased their self confidence.“ More specifically,
national awakening meant that "[people] sought more actively
for the right of discussing national affairs internally and
for independence and equality among nations externally.“
(Zhang 1966:243). '

"The most important contribution that Zhang has made
is to relate the political events to specific structural and
institutional developments—~emergence of new schools, daily
press, modern printing houses, translations of Western
books, political novels, new social and political
organizations, and new ideas, notably Social Darwinism and
populismr-in China around 1900 (Zhang 1966:34-41). The major
shortcoming of Zhang's study is, however, that he fails to
analyze these changes and fails to show the inner
relationship between these new phenomena and collectively
how they gave rise to a new political culture as manifested
in the boycott movement.

'"The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Boxer
Uprising of 1899-1900 in particular (Zhang 1966:34-36; Tsai
1976:96).

6

humiliating incidents against Chinese nationals,‘ and the
introduction of Social Darwinism into China after the Sino-
Japanese War had in stimulating Chinese nationalism (Zhang
1966:34-36; Tsai 1976:96, 97). Clearly the focus of this
school is more on the sudden change of the popular mood than
on long-terntsocial, economic, and cultural changes documented.
by recent studies on late Qing China (Rankin 1986; Link 1981).

The second major interpretation emphasizes the
importance of gradual economic changes in late Qing China. Zhu
Shijia (a PRC-based historian with a Columbia Ph.D) contends
that the boycott movement was the result of a clash between
the Chinese national bourgeois class and the foreign
imperialistic capitalists (Zhu 1958:7). Likewise, Japanese
scholar Takaharu Kikuchi (1974:18-26) relates the boycott
movement to the rising Chinese national industries and the
increasing popularity of economic nationalism in China. This
view is supported.by the fact that modern Chinese chambers of
commerce were established in 1903-5, and that the boycott was
organized and led, among others, by Chinese merchants. The
idea of ”commercial warfare" (shangzhan) was an important
concept of the boycott discourse (see Chapter Three). The

trouble with this interpretation is, as I shall show in

 

'One of the most well-known cases occurred in 1903, two
years before the boycott movement broke out. The incident
involved Yung Tomrkim, a military attache of the Chinese
legation, who was badly beaten by two policemen in San
Francisco. Yung was handcuffed and tied by his queue to a
fence before being taken to the police station. Humiliated,
the attache committed suicide (Tsai 1976:97).

7
Chapter Four, that the long-term ideal of establishing a
national industry directly conflicted with specific interests
of Shanghai merchants who abandoned the boycott almost right
after it started (see Chapter Five). The movement, however,
continued despite the merchants' sabotage.

The third interpretation relates the boycott to specific
exclusion acts and to late Qing constitutional reforms.
Diplomatic historian.Delber L. Mckee, who has written the most
detailed English account of the Chinese exclusion acts and the
movement, ”questions the view that it [the boycott] began
because of the exclusion policy in general or solely because
Chinese national sentiment was aroused." (Mckee 1977:217).
Mckee argues that “the exclusion act of 1902, often regarded
as a minor revision of earlier legislation, actually
represented a new stage in the exclusion movement. . . This
stage, moving beyond the barring of laborers, struck a blow
against upper-class Chinese, particularly merchants and
students.“ Therefore, Mckee concludes, "the movement started
in America with the Chinese-American community in desperation
over a particular stage in the exclusion policy.“ (Mckee
1977:216-7). Stressing the foreign origin of the movement,
MCkee points out the important role played by Kang Youwei and
Liang Qichao, who were then active among overseas Chinese.
Mckee shows that Kang's people were the earliest organizers
and promoters of the boycott (Mackee 1977:110). Shih-shan

Henry Tsai's study supports this view (1983:129—36) .

8

Mckee's study thus shifts our attention from nationalism
in general to political reforms in late Qing China, a theme
carefully studied. by' many China scholars (Wright 1968;
Esherick 1976; Rankin 1986). To the extent that the boycott
can be examined as part of the reform movement, there is
strong evidence to support this view. For instance, Shibao,
which played a pivotal role in publicizing the boycott ideas
and in orchestrating the boycott activities, was founded and
run by Liang Qichao's followers and financed by the Chinese
Empire Reform Association (Baohuang hui, see Chapter Two).
Liang Qichao's idea of “new citizen“ (xinmin) in general and
his criticism of Chinese exclusion acts in particular
unquestionably inspired the boycotters.

The biggest problem with Mckee's interpretation is,
however, that he connected such a broad popular movement with
just a small group of reformist elites whose primary interest
was constitutional reform” The capability of Kang and.Liang to
control constitutional reformers in China is questionable in
the first place.' More importantly, a variety of social
groups--1iterary groups, study societies, newspaper reading
societies, speech societies, women's organizations, chambers
of commerce--all spontaneously joined the boycott.
Constitutional reformers constituted only a fraction of the

boycotters.

 

'Di Cuqing, the owner of Shibao, was very much his own
boss. His relationship with Liang Qichao deteriorated over
the years.

 

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9

This brief review of previous studies on the boycott
movement shows that none of them have fully explained the
following questions: how were the shocking humiliations China
experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries transformed into a mass psychology of crisis? How
was the mass psychology of crisis turned into nationalism, or
“national awakening“? How was the patriotism transformed into
well-organized collective economic action? And finally, why
did the rising urban Chinese nationalism focus upon the
Americans? In order fully to understand the origins and
significance of the boycott movement we have to examine broad

social and institutional changes in late Qing China.

Two Theoretical Models

In his highly inspiring study of nationalism, Imagined
Comunities, Benedict Anderson argues that the origins and
spread of nationalism should be understood in a broad context
of emerging "print capitalism.” (Anderson 1991:Chapter 3) . He
argues that nationalism was the result of the extended
imagination obtained by modern people thanks to the changing
and expanding means of modern communication. He stresses in
particular three related developments in this regard: the
secularization and standardization of national language; the
rise of a daily press; and the proliferation of a popular

entertainment form--modern fiction (Anderson 1991:Chapters 2

and 3).

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10

According to Anderson, a modern sense of nation gradually
has developed with the emergence of national languages which
have taken the place of universal languages (Latin in case of
Europe) on the one hand, and local dialects on the other as
dominant communicative forms (Anderson 1991:Chapter 3) . This
emergence of national languages is in turn the consequence of
print-as-commodity in the modern era. Print-capitalism, for
the first time in history, gave rise to a truly mass
readership, and made it possible for a large reading public to
have access simultaneously to the same events and ideas. The
novel and the newspaper were particular important in creating
a new sense of simultaneity (Anderson 1991:25). Anderson

points out :

Why this transformation' should be so important for the birth
of the imagined community of the nation can best be seen if we
consider the basic structure of two forms of imagining which
first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth century: the novel
and the newspaper. For these forms provided the technical
means for “re-presenting" the kind of imagined comunity that
is the nation (Anderson 1991:25; Emphasis in original).

While an actor in a novel might have had no idea what the
others were up to at a given moment, Anderson explains, all
the characters in the novel were "embedded in the minds of the

omniscient readers. " "Only they, like God, watch A telephoning

C, B shopping, and D playing pool all at once (Anderson

 

'"From the medieval conception of simultaneity-along-
time to an idea of homogeneous, empty time, in which
simultaneity is transverse, cross-time, marked not by
prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence,
and measured by clock and calendar" (Anderson 1991:24) .

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11
1991:26; Italics in original). With the help of novels and
other popular print materials, Anderson says:
An American will never meet, or even know the names of more
than a handful of his 240,000-odd [sic] fellow-Americans. he
has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has
complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous
activity (Anderson 1991:26) .
Anderson's thesis is quite suggestive given the broad nature
of his generalization. It was not just a coincidence that the
first urban nationalistic movement in China occurred during
the same period when language reform was advocated and ‘
practiced, daily newspapers flourished, and novels
proliferated (see Chapter Two). Only when we put the 1905
boycott into this broad context can we fully appreciate its
origins and significance.

Like Anderson, Jurgen Habermas also stresses the
political significance of new communicative means-—newspapers,
literary journals, coffee houses, and theaters--though he
relates the emerging mass communication not to nationalism but
to the public sphere (Habermas 1991, especially Chapters 12,
20). According to Habermas, in eighteenth century Europe there
emerged a bourgeois public sphere between the realm of state
authority and the private (or intimate) realm of family. It
consisted of private individuals who had come together to
debate among themselves and with state authorities about
political affairs. It was a reasoned, open, and relatively

unconstrained debate. The emergence of the public sphere was

of course preconditioned by the rise of a bourgeois class.

 

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However, the advent of the public sphere was also closely
related to the deve10pment of the newspaper industry, coffee
houses, and salons. The press in particular became a key
forum of critical political debate. Thus, the growth of the
public sphere should be understood in the context of the use
of certain forms of mass communication. With the formation of
the public sphere, personal ideas could be transformed into
public opinion. Later in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries with the rise of state power and commercialization
of mass communication the public sphere in Europe was
gradually destroyed. The historical period of the rise and
fall of the public sphere is nevertheless important to
understand modern Western democratic societies (Habermas 1992
Chapters 7 and 12; Thompson 1990:110-113).

Recently some China scholars, notably Frederic Wakeman,
Jr. and Philip C.C. Huang (1993), have criticized the use, or
misuse, of the concept of the “public sphere“ in analyzing
modern China. The thrust of their criticism.is that in China
the relationship between state and society was vastly
different from that of European countries. In Europe the
autonomous rights of people-—the bourgeoisie--vis-a-vis the
state developed much more fully and were institutionalized. As
a result, a civic society emerged. On the other hand, Chinese
gentryemerchant elites, while they did assume larger
responsibilities in extrabureaucratic activities in the late

Qing period, were far from.independent from.state authority.

13

In other words, China did see some development toward a civic
society in modern era, but the development remained in the
form of quantitative accumulation not qualitative
breakthrough. Therefore, the critics argue, the concept of
public sphere cannot be applied to the Chinese situation
without serious distortions of Chinese history (Wakeman 1993;
Huang 1993).

It is true that the appearance of some elements
characteristic of civic societies is very different from.the
emergence of a civic society itself. Similarly, to say that
capitalistic relationships exist in China is different from
claiming that China is a capitalist country. It is probably
true that in China the accumulative developments toward a
civic society were not comparable to the situation in European
countries. However, the concept of public sphere can still be
fruitfully used to analyze aspects of modern Chinese history
for a.number of reasons. For one thing, Chinese themselves had
used the concept public (gang), in ways quite similar to the
ambiguous ways that Westerners used the concept, in describing
things that were opposite to private (si) and.distinctive from
official matters. In modern China, patriotic Chinese began to
use the term to designate an intermediary realm between
private and government (Rowe 1990:316-18). During the 1905
boycott in particular, Chinese urbanites consciously adopted
the concept of "public“ to indicate that the movement was

launched and organized by the "people,” not by the state or

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14
the government. The boycotters also employed the concept to
mobilize Chinese urbanites because the boycott was for public
interests (gongyi).

The boycotters, however, used the term "public" in two
unique ways, which Habermas did not mention in his description
of the bourgeois public sphere. First of all, the boycotters
emphasized.the importance of collective action (jie tuanti) in
a public cause (gongyi shiye). Secondly, they assigned the
meaning “universal“ to the idea of public in such expressions
as ”universal principle" (gongli) and “universal law" (gongfa;
see Chapter Three). Clearly, Chinese were very creative in
manipulating and utilizing the concept for their specific
situation and particular needs.

This leads to my second reason for feeling that the
concept is applicable to modern Chinese history in general and
to my own study in particular. The concept of the public
sphere is an analytical tool for a changing relationship, not
just a precise description of a stable condition such as the
concept of civic society might suggest. This is why we might
fruitfully use the concept public sphere to analyze certain
aspects of modern Chinese history, but it would still be
misleading to speak of a civic society in China.

The relationship among private, public, and official in
the late Qing period, as was also the case in the Republic and
the post-1949 period, underwent gradual and subtle changes

which might or might not have specific institutional

 

 

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15
manifestation. Yet, this does not mean no significant changes
ever occurred. The concept of the public sphere will help us
to pay more attention to certain changes upon which other
analytical concepts do not focus.

The key to the rise and expansion of a public sphere,
according to Habermes (1992), was the changing and expanding
among ordinary citizens of a given society of communicative
actions which had political significance. As I shall show in
this study, communicative actions in the form.of the growing
public media and‘voluntary associations expanded.significantly
in late Qing China. If we focus on the political consequences
of these expanding communicative actions, instead of just on
who initiated and who had ultimate control of these actions,
it is possible to say that these changes were revolutionary
despite the fact that they were initiated from traditional
sources (Reynolds 1993).

Thus, I shall stress two unique features of the Chinese
public sphere to which Habermas's European model is not
applicable. One is the close relationship between the state
initiatives and the private efforts in giving rise to the
communicative actions. The second is that nationalism played
a particularly strong role in the rise of the Chinese public
sphere.

The reason that Habermas' theory can be used along with
Anderson's interpretation of nationalism is that for the

boycotters, public interests (gongyi) were national interests.

I1

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16
In early twentieth century China, an increasing popular sense
of public' emerged coincidentally with a growing sense of
nation (see Chapter Three). In other words, as the boycott
movement shows, nationalism took the form of populisniin.early
twentieth century China. Habermas' theory of the public sphere
is thus useful because it includes insightful discussions of
the rise of voluntary associations--literary societies,
chambers of commerce, and academies--not only as part of the
new communicative interactions but also as the institutional

basis of a new democratic politics (Habermas 1991:Chapter 5) .

Now let us turn to some specific structural and
institutional changes in late Qing China to illustrate how the

two theoretical models can be applied to this study.

.New secial and Political Organizations

William T. Rowe (1989, 1984) and Mary Backus Rankin
(1986) have carefully documented some of these changes in
Hankou and Zhejiang by examining merchant organizations and
their extrabureacratic initiatives in.sponsoring public works,
establishing new schools, organizing charities, militias, and
enterprises, and eventually participating in national

politics. Rankin in particular attributes merchants'

 

'Public opinion (yulun); Public interests, public
principle (gongli) , etc.

Ci

17
involvement in national politics to the sense of domestic and
foreign crisis (Rankin 1986:29, 30, 301). Indeed, the merchant
organizations did play organizing roles in the boycott.‘

However, other social groups also, more or less
spontaneously and independently, participated in and led the
boycott movement. Most notable were study societies, literary
associations, reading groups, women's organizations, speech
societies, and new schools. Most of these organizations were
newly founded for specific purposes by reformrminded
intellectuals, urban professionals, and.small merchants. The
organizers of these social groups had extensive ties with new
urban institutions such as newspapers, publishing houses,
schools, and hospitals. Some of these social groups had their
own publications, and all had regular meeting places.
Collectively these organizations constituted.an.important.part
of the growing public sphere in late Qing China. During the
1905 boycott they, along with merchant organizations, made the
immigration issue a public concern by organizing most of the
public meetings (see Chapter Five).

None of the organizers of these social groups, however,
could be called urban bourgeoisie. Few of them were even urban
elites. As such they did not fit in Habermas's definition of
the new stratum of "bourgeois" people in eighteenth century

Europe- - the merchants , bankers , entrepreneurs , and

 

'For a detailed discussion of merchant organizations
please see Chapter Four.

 

fl!

.h.~

18
manufacturers--which occupied a central position within the
"public“ and which was the ”real carrier of the public..."
(Habermas 1992:22-23). But their public role was undeniable,
as was amply demonstrated during the 1905 boycott movement.
When the merchant organizations abandoned.the public cause for
their own interests these organizations continued to provide
the leadership for the movement. After the movement was
finally suppressed by the Qing government, they began to
organize the urban public for new social and political causes

(see conclusion).

New' Political and Cultural Symbols

VOluntary associations mobilized the Chinese urban public
by using new as well as traditional political and cultural
symbols. “The exercise of power always requires symbolic
practices.“ (Hunt 1984:54). During the boycott movement, the
boycotters adopted and created numerous symbols for the
patriotic cause and for their new political beliefs. By so
doing, they rallied urbanites together and gave the boycott
movement a sense of legitimacy."

The boycotters used three types of symbolic practices:

 

'A.note has to be made on what I mean by "new" symbols.
Obviously, not all symbolic practices by the boycotters were
newly created. But during the boycott movement, even the
familiar images-~flowers and dragons, for example--common
sayings, and physical gestures had new meanings.

"As Lynn Hunt (1984:54) points out: "In a sense,
legitimacy is the general agreement on signs and symbols.“

V.

RE

6 1.
~‘w

19

visual, verbal, and symbolic action. From what we can see
today, the most popular images invoked by the boycotters were
flowers, the rising sun, and.an energetic youthu' Individually
and collectively these symbols represented a new China. The
contemporary novelist Li Boyuan started his famous A Short
.History of’ Civilization (Wenming .xiaoshi) with a vivid
description of a rising sun in the sea. “Looking at the
situation [in China] now, " Li wrote, “the sun is about to
rise,...with the new policies and new schools of these
years...“ (Li 1962:1).

The image of an energetic youth, on the other hand,
clearly epitomized a new people. On the cover of A
Comrehensive Book on the Sino—American Exclusion Treaty
(Zhongmei jingyue quanshu), published in 1905, was a young
soldier with a Western-style uniform blowing a trumpet (A Ying
l962:vii). In an anti-exclusion play, Adventures of
Haiqiaochun (Haiqiaochun chuanqi) , a mystic youth representing
the young spirit of China (shaonian Zhongguo hun) presumably
guided a boycott hero (see Chapter Five). The practice of
letting young school students make public speeches had.similar
symbolic meaning (Zhang 1966:114).

New words and phrases more than anything else served as
political symbols rather than just providing ideas. “Things

compete“ (wujing), "natural selection" (tianze), "struggle for

 

'All of these images appeared on covers of anti-
exclusion novels and pamphlets (A Ying 1962:iii-vii) .

20
survival” ( zhengcun) , "commercial warfare" ' (shangzhan) ,
”civilization“ (wenming) , "people's power” (renmin youquan) ,
and ”unite to form groups” (jie tuanti) became the catch words
of the day thanks to the new media-~daily press, literary

journals, publishing houses, and public speeches.

New Language, Rising Media of Mass Communication, and the
Politicization of Literary Forms

What is amazing is not the fact that these new ideas and
political symbols were adopted at all during the boycott
movement but the fact that they were so widely used in popular
as well as in elite literature--novels, popular songs, plays,
pamphlets, and newspaper essays (see Chapter Three). This can
be explained mainly by some conscious efforts by reform-minded
individuals and voluntary associations in late Qing China. As
I mentioned earlier, speech societies and newspaper reading
clubs were organized prior to and during the boycott movement
to mobilize the illiterate and the semi-literate. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a vernacular movement
was underway (De Francis 1950 Chapters 3 and 4; QMWZGG 1958) .
During the boycott movement most anti-exclusion literature was
written in vernacular instead of classical Chinese. What needs
to be pointed out is, however, that unlike the situation
during the May Fourth period of 1919, in 1905 the vernacular
movement had just started and the dominant boycott ideas were

written in a transitional language--semi-classical Chinese

1']

H
O

 

' a
v.

‘ A

‘y-

.
§‘.:

(D
(I,
I;)

21
(see Chapter Two). Still, it is clear that the language of
political discourse was changing.

The change in political language was accompanied by the
change in the media during the same period with the rise of
telegraph services, publishing houses, and above all, the
urban daily press. The growth of the new'media had fundamental
political consequences. Since most newspapers and journals
were privately run and since these newspapers and journals
published political news and.comments, the government began to
lose its monopoly on politics. While the urban public still
did not have the power of political decision making, they
began to enjoy the right of political discussion. During the
boycott movement, newspapers served as an open public forum
for political discussions. A critical public sphere was
clearly forming. It is the use of the embryonic mass media for
political purposes that made the political issues public
concerns. This process of the publicization of politics is
particularly evident when we note that in the nineteenth
century the influential political ideas were almost
exclusively written in forms such as memorials, private
correspondence, and books rather than newspaper essays (see
Chapter Two).

In the early twentieth century, private individuals
engaged in political discussions not only by writing newspaper
essays but alsoiby expressing their political ideas and ideals

through various literary forms--poems, folk songs, plays, and

I"

(D

'8

(I!
an

I

22
novels. The politicization of novels was, however, most
significant because fiction was the most popular literary form
of the late Qing (A Ying 1991). In 1902, just three years
before the boycott movement, many reform-minded individuals
began to advocate novel-writing for political purposes (A Ying
1991) . Naturally, American mistreatment of Chinese immigrants
and Chinese exclusion acts also became subject matters for
political novels. From 1902 to 1908, eight novels on these
subjects were published, which constituted an important part

of the boycott discourse (A Ying 1962) .

The Communicative Web of the Boycott and the Role of Novels

The role of the boycott novels in the nationalistic
movement was far more significant than simply promoting a
propaganda scheme. As I discussed earlier, according to
Anderson, the very structure (or plots) of novels in
eighteenth century Europe "provided the technical means for
're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the
nation“ (Anderson 1991: 25. Italics in original).

As we can see in the late Qing novels, the main
characters were simultaneously in much broader geographic
settings all over China and the world (see Chapter Two). More
importantly, as the boycott fiction shows, novels also
synthesized and connected all the information presented in a
highly complicated modern communicative web in a single text

which was simultaneously read by mass readers.

23

To illustrate this point let us first recreate the
communicative web of the boycott. The anti-exclusion message
was circulated in basically two ways: from oral to printed
message and vice—versa. In the first process, an individual
who might or might not have had personal experiences of
American mistreatment of Chinese would make a public speech in
front of an audience of from one hundred to one thousand
people. Of course, the message (or the sentiment contained in
the message) was delivered only to a very limited number of
people in a given area. The speech by itself had only local
impact. Thanks to the newspapers in which the speech was
published, the printed version of the oral message was read.by
larger audience in a given city. If the newspaper was also
subscribed to by people in other cities, the message was
shared by a still larger audience.

In the second process, a written version of anti-
exclusion material was published in book form. or in
newspapers. In order to let the urban illiterate share the
message, a speaker would transform the printed message into
spoken vernacular. We can logically imagine that the two
communicative processes became one when the spoken vernacular
was once again published in text forml In both processes,
however, the message reached the audience through a sequence
like this: mistreatment of Chinese in the United States
(action) --> initial message (spoken vernacular or text) -—>

publicized message (spoken vernacular or text). In reality,

24
all these could happen simultaneously, not necessarily in a
sequential order. But individuals could physically experience
only one thing at a time. Novels, on the other hand, provided
a device in which an individual could see the whole process
and a range of actors, speakers, and writers acting all at
once in a single text. Thus, a stronger sense of community

developed without the reader being consciously aware of it.

.New Politics

New communicative devices provided the mental and
psychological basis for public political actions. The
boycotters did not just create a new political discourse by
using new language and.new media, they also experimented.with
a new politics. The boycott was considered by contemporaries
to be a great experiment in the new politics: People do not
just talk empty words but take real actions; they do not rely
on officials but can exercise their own power (xingyong zili,
Shibao '23 May 1905). As an economic means for solving
economic, legal, and even political disputes, boycotts were
nothing new. But in earlier cases, issues and participants
involved had been much more limited (Remer 1933:13—15). The
1905 boycott, on the other hand, was taken up by Chinese of
virtually all the major cities throughout China and the issue
at stake was one of national concern.

Various social groups took the initiative in organizing

a variety of boycott activities, with the government acting as

25

a bystander. The decision—making process of this new politics
was in some respects quite egalitarian. In this regard, the
newspapers, notably Shibao and Shenbao, played a pivotal role.
They provided a forum in which concerned individuals and
voluntary organizations openly discussed boycott tactics and
goals. Public meetings played a similar role. At a typical
boycott meeting, anti-exclusion resolutions would be suggested
by speakers or organizers of the meeting. These resolutions
would then be discussed and finally decided by the
participants of the meeting with applause.

But the mass politics of the boycott was also coercive.
What was new about the boycott politics was the fact that the
coercive power of the boycotters clearly derived from public
reason rather than from status, written law, or social
customs. Since the boycott was felt by public opinion to be
good for the general public (gongyi) and for the nation,
violators of boycott resolutions were punished by the public
instead of by any state apparatus. Violators would have their
names published in newspapers and be forced to pay fines (see
Chapter Five). The power of legitimate use of violence was,
however, reserved to the Qing government.

So was the right of negotiating a new immigration treaty
with the United States. This right of dealing with a foreign
country and representing the nation was also reserved to the
state. The phrase “negotiate treaty by officials; boycott by

merchants'I (Yiyue zai guan; dizhi zai shang) was an attempt by

26
the boycotters to define the boundary between the state
authority and people's rights.

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter One
discusses the disputes between China and the United States on
the issue of Chinese immigrants to America. It tries to show
above all that the changing perception of the Qing
government's authority and. responsibilities over Chinese
nationals, including overseas Chinese. The growing popular
consciousness of political participation was not simply the
result of the imperial government's increasing weakness, but
also of a perception of expanding government responsibilities
which must be shared by the people. Chapter Two describes the
phenomenal change in the ways in which urban communication was
conducted: the wide use of telegraph services by merchant
organizations and newspapers, the rise of a commercial press,
the commercialization and. politicization of popular
entertainment-—novels of social criticism in particular--and
the emergence of :new language forms. This chapter also
describes a much-neglected group of petty intellectual
opinion-makers whose importance in political mobilization was
significant because they worked for the leading newspapers and
publishing houses and acted simultaneously as information
providers, entertainers, and social critics. The boycott
discourse which was largely created by these intellectuals is
analyzed in detail in Chapter Three. But the key role in

organizing the boycott activities was presumably played by an

27

entirely different group of people--the merchants. They were
the best organized and economically and socially most powerful
civil groups. As I point out in Chapter Four, the merchants'
economic interests were such that they could.not carry out the
boycott without seriously damaging their own interests. More
importantly, they had the most awkward and ambiguous
relationship with the state. While they initiated and led the
popular movement as the leaders of a growing civil society,
they quickly discovered that they could not control the urban
masses without state interference. Chapter Five goes on to
analyze how the movement started out as an expression of
popular solidarity and ended up with a deep schism among the
boycotters.

While this study stresses that the origins of the boycott
have to be found within.China, especially in the cities deeply
involved, it is neverthless crucial to understand the nature
of diplomatic and legal disputes over Chinese immigrants to
the United States which sparked the popular upheaval. Thus,

let us first examine the immigration controversy.

Chapter One

Immigration Disputes Between the United States and China

-"Freezing Conditions are on the Way" - Yi Jing

The immediate cause of the 1905 anti-American boycott was
American exclusion of Chinese immigrants to the United States.
In order to understand why this relatively isolated issue'
would lead to a nationwide popular protest, we have to
examine the social and political significance of Chinese
(emigration. as a 'whole in late Qing' China, for Chinese
immigrants to the United States represented no more than one-
tenth of the entire exodus of population from overpopulated
China in the second half of the nineteenth century (Hunt
1983:61).

Although "Peking's position toward Chinese in the United
States developed within the context of attitudes and policies
that applied to overseas Chinese generally" (Hunt 1983:96),
for purposes of this study I shall focus my account on
particular problems Chinese immigration to the United States
caused to both countries. Since many studies have been done

on why and how the United States. changed its policy from

 

'Studies have shown that during the late Qing the
United States had relatively good relations with China, and
that the immigration controversy was the only major conflict
between the two countries. See Hunt (1983).

28

29

welcome to exclusion of Chinese immigrantsf my primary focus
will be on the changing policies of 'the Qing government
toward overseas Chinese in general and Chinese-Americans in
particular, and on actions taken by Chinese-Americans to
protect their own interests. At least four distinctive
political and social groups were actively involved in the
shaping of Qing immigration policies: the Qing central
government (the Grand Council, Zongli Yamen, and later the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs); the diplomats representing China
in the United States; Qing local officials, especially those
in Guangdong; and Chinese-Americans and their allies in Hong
Kong and China proper.

While it is generally true that the Qing central
government was notoriously indifferent to and inept in
protecting overseas Chinese, its policy toward emigrants
changed gradually in the 1870s from callous indifference and
occasional hostility to paternal sympathy and protectiveness.
Making the imperial policy more complicated, the Chinese
foreign service officials stationed in the United States
varied in their diplomatic skills and perceptions of the
issue, and they did not always see eye-to-eye with the Qing
local officials on the imigration issue. Conflicting policy
suggestions were often made.

At the same time, because of the increasing difficulties

 

'See especially McClellan (1971); Tsai (1986); Coolidge
(1909), among others.

‘e

30

facing the growing number of overseas Chinese and various
social.problems and.instabilities incurred.in local emigration
communities, there was greater demand for and expectations of
Chinese government regulation and protection. The relation-
ship between overseas Chinese communities and the imperial
government was also changing as the former moved from.evading
governmental control to seeking its protection.

Unknowingly' and. inevitably, however, the increasing
appeal of overseas Chinese to and reliance on their home
country for help only deepened their awkward situation in the
increasingly' nationalistic world of the late nineteenth
century. Gradually the Chinese immigrants were losing the
advantages of their dual identity and their ambivalent
allegiance to either country. Eventually, when their
government proved to be unable to provide the protection they

needed, they appealed directly to their countrymen.

1. The Great Exodus

According to legend, the first Chinese to set foot on
the New World were three seamen, Ashing, Achun, and Accun,
crewmen on the ship Pallas. In one of her voyages from.Canton
to the United States in 1785, it is said that the captain of
the ship, John O' Donnell, decided to stay in Baltimore and
get married. This purely personal decision left the three

Chinese stranded in America. Later, a Philadelphia merchant

31
helped them to appeal to the United States Congress and it
was believed that they eventually returned home safely (Tsai
1986:1; Yang et al l989:3).

Nothing is unusual about this case except that accidental
circumstance temporarily inconvenienced some indiscreet
Chinese. Although the imperial court would not have been happy
about Chinese employment on a foreign ship, the law of the
Qing was not clear on this particular case. For decades
after its conquest of China, the Qing regime feared a
possible alliance between anti-Qing forces at home and
Chinese rebels abroad; consequently, it first forbade foreign
trade in the late seventeenth century, then in the early
eighteenth century prohibited the emigration of Chinese
people (Zhuang l989:75,79) . It was hard to prevent audacious
people from sneaking out, however. Consequently the Qing
government decided to punish those who eventually returned.
One statute, for instance, stipulated: “Those who find
excuses to sojourn abroad and then clandestinely return home,
if captured, shall be executed immediately. Those who
smuggle abroad cattle, horses, ammunition, or metal..., shall
be whipped one hundred times . Those who smuggle human beings
or weapons out of the country shall be hanged.“ (cited in
Tsai 1986:2). Presumably, the three seamen were not

considered deliberate and serious offenders of the law.

About half a century later, in 1848, two men and one

32

woman from China aboard the ship Eagle arrived in San
Francisco harbor. This time the two men rushed to gold mines
in California and the woman became a house servant of the
priest Charles Gillespie (Yang et a1. l989:3). They were,
according to American immigration records, the first Chinese
settlers in California, later the home of tens of thousands
of Chinese immigrants (Tsai 1986:2). Although we may safely
guess that the prospect of quick fortunes :must have played an
important role in their decision to come and sojourn in the
United States, the decision was still a bold one, for they
came to a strange country at the risk of severe punishment if
they ever chose to return to their homeland again. Legally,
until 1893 those who returned home from extended overseas
stays were still punishable, although the ban on emigration
‘was gradually abolished.after the 1850s in the Qing's treaties
with foreign countries, the United States included (HGCGSL
1-1:295-6) . However, more Chinese adventurers quickly
followed the lead of the first Chinese-Americans. By January
1850, the Chinese population in San Francisco alone had
increased to 787 men and two women. In the next few decades
tens of thousands of Chinese, most of them. young men, came to
the New World (Tsai 1986:2).

There is no question that most of them came to the
United States to seek economic opportunities instead of
political freedom (Coolidge 1909:17). NOnetheless, they were

no longer under Qing jurisdiction. This freedom also meant

33
that, at least until the late 18703 when a Chinese consulate
was established in the United States, they were not protected
as Chinese nationals in America. Before 1868, when the
Burlingame Treaty was signed between China and the United
States, Chinese immigrants in America were not even
officially considered Chinese nationals (wu 1983:219).

Many Chinese did not seem to consider the lack of
protection as an important factor in influencing their
decision to go abroad” By 1848 when the first Chinese settled
in California, tens of thousands of Chinese had already
emigrated.to:many other countries in Africa, Australia, South

America, and Asia, especially Southeast Asia (see Table 1).

Table 1.
Year Area Number of Emigrants % of the
(estimate) total
1801- Southeast 200,000 62.0%
1850 Asia
Cuba 17,000 5.3%
Peru 10,000 3.1%
Australia 10,000 3.1%
The United
States 18,000 5.6%
West Indies 15,000 4.6%
Others 50,000 16.0%
Total 320,000 100.0%

Source: Chen Zexian, "Nineteenth Century Chinese Contract
Laborers“ (Shijiu shiji de qiyue huagong) Lishi yanjiu, (Study
of History) No.1, 1963 (HGCGSL 4:169).

34

In the next quarter of a century Chinese emigrants increased
three times to a total of 1,280,000; among them.twelve percent

were to the United States (see Table 2).

Table 2
Year Area Number of Emigrants % of the
(estimate) total
1851- West Indies 30,000 2.3%
1875
Cuba 135,000 10.5%
Peru 110,000 8.5%
Panama 25,000 2.0%
U.S 160,000* 12.5%
Canada 30,000 2.3%
Australia 55,000 4.2%
New Zealand 5,000 0.4%
Hawaii 25,000 2.0%
The Philippines 45,000 3.5%
The Malay 350,000 27.0%
Peninsula
East Indies 250,000 19.5%
Others 60,000 4.7%
total . 1,280,000 100.0%

*During the same period more than half of them (92,373)
returned China.
Source: (HGCGSL 4:169).

Despite the much-publicized atrocities against Chinese

35
coolies in Latin America and Southeast Asia and American
exclusion of Chinese laborers in the last quarter of the
century, another 750,000 Chinese went abroad during the years
1876-1900, most of them to the Malay Peninsula and the East
Indies (HGCGSL 4:169).

Generally speaking, Chinese emigration overseas can be
divided into three historical periods: the seventh century,
the fifteenth century, and the nineteenth century (HGCGSL
4:3), with the nineteenth century emigration numerically the
largest. (Yang et a1. 1989:9). The term huaqiao ("Overseas
Chinese“) appeared in Chinese in 1899 as a result of the third
wave of Chinese emigration (Wu 1983:5). Historians and
social scientists generally agree that it was a combination of
internal and external causes that led to the great exodus.
Population pressure, natural calamities, and the civil strife
in the early and mid—nineteenth century were major internal
causes (Yang et al. 1989:11—17). Large scale demand for
laborers in America, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, and the
free immigration demanded by the Western powers during the
same jperiodq were the external causes (Peng in. HGCGSL
4:174-80).

Three types of emigrants can be identified according to
their method of going abroad and their emigration status: the
semi-slave laborers; the contract laborers; and free
immigrants (Wu 1983:21-22). The semi-slave laborers (called

coolies or piglets at the time) were mainly solicited or

36

kidnapped by foreigners and their Chinese agents and sent to
Latin America (mainly Cuba and Peru) and Southeast Asia
(Daniels 1990:240). Their travel costs and first months's
wages were paid by their agents, and they were not free until
they fulfilled their contracts in five to ten years. Many of
them died during the journey or before the end of their
contract terms. From 1845 to the late 18705, the heyday of
the notorious coolie-trade, about 500,000 coolies were shipped
out of China (wu 1983:42). In 1870, the Portuguese
authorities in Macao, the center of the coolie-trade, banned
the trade under pressure from China and the international
community. 'Voluntary laborers then.became the major source of
emigration. Although very often the travel costs of voluntary
laborers were also paid by travel companies and other
intermediaries, the consent of laborers was usually obtained
before hand. By and large, Chinese immigrants to the United
States were voluntary laborers and free immigrants (including
merchants and other types). In the 1850s American consular
officials in China explained to Washington the differences
between immigrants and coolies:

the “Chinese coolie trade“ [is]...a servitude in no respect
practically different from...the...African slave trade [and
the flow to] California, a Chinese emigration which has been
voluntary and.profitable to the contracting parties (cited in
Daniels 1990:240-1).

However, Chinese emigration to the united States was insepa-

rably part of this third wave resulting from both internal

pressure and external attraction. Yang et a1. (1989:19) have

37
studied Taishan county, Guangdong, the origin of sixty percent
of the Chinese immigrants to the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Table 3 shows the
percentage of Taishan immigrants throughout the world in the
mid-twentieth century, when immigration patterns had changed
much from.earlier (nineteenth century) times.

Taishan was located in the southwestern part of the Pearl
River delta area where hilly plateau constituted two-thirds of
the entire land area. As early as the Jiaqing period
(1522-1565) of the Ming Dynasty, the population/land ratio had
already become seriously unfavorable. Annual food production
could only feed the entire population of the county for four
months. Traditionally, therefore, the Taishan people "often
engaged in overseas trade” (Yang et a1. 1989:18). In the
18505, the Taishan area saw bloodshed between Hakkas and the
earlier settlers which forced

Table 3
Percentage of Taishan Immigrants to Various Countries

The United States 51% Canada 40.5% Cuba 23.5%
Peru 15.6% Brazil 37.9%

Total in the Americas 35.5%

The Malay Peninsula 10% The Philippines 4.4% Burma 1.9%

Total in Asia: 0.57%

Australia 4.36% New zealand 7.3% Nauru 6%
Total-in Pacific area 1.9%

Total in Africa 2.2%

Source: Taishan xianzhi (Taishan County Gazetteer) 1962 no.3

38

in Yang et al. 1989:19-20.

many to seek refuge abroad. At exactly the same time, the
news of the gold rush in California reached the area.
Consequently, tens of thousands people in Taishan and sur—
rounding counties sailed to the United States from.Hong Kong.
In 1876 there were about 80,000 immigrants in America from
Taishan alone (Yang et al. 1989:19).

The large-scale emigration necessarily eased the
population pressure internally and helped economic
development of the receiving countries. However, the social,
racial, and political problems caused by the emigration soon
reached such a scale in the second half of the nineteenth
century that the Qing government was forced to deal with the
issue for the first time in its history. It established new
offices, regulations and laws and. as a consequence its
authority began to be felt, even appreciated, by overseas

Chinese in general, and by Chinese-Americans in particular.

2. Evolution of A Protective Policy toward Overseas Chinese:
1860-1875

Despite the great exodus of Chinese nationals since the
nineteenth century, the Qing government did not develop a
vigorous
regulatory policy toward. emigration and failed to take

necessary measures to protect overseas Chinese until the

39
18705. The callous indifference toward the overseas Chinese
was typically reflected in a conversation.between the American
captain Samuel F. Dupont and the Qing high official Tan
Tingxiang in 1858 regarding China's establishment of a
consulate in the United State to take care of the affairs of

Chinese nationals:

Tan. It is not our custom to send officials beyond our own
borders.

LMpont. But your people on the farther shore of the Pacific
are very numerous, numbering several tens of thousands.

Tan. When the emperor rules over so many millions, what does
he care for the few waifs that have drifted away to a foreign
land?

Dupont. Those people are, many of them, rich, having gathered
gold in our mines. They might be worth looking after on that
account.

Ten. The emperor's wealth is beyond.computation; why should he

care for those of his subjects who have left their home, or
for the sands they have scraped together?

“Such was the sublime indifference at that time manifested by
China toward her emigrant offspring! " commented W.A.P. Martin,
who recorded the conversation (Martin 1897:60).

Partially because of the Qing government's indifference
and partially because of the illegality of their going abroad,
the overseas Chinese initially did not appeal to their own
government for help when they were seriously abused.in foreign
countries. In 1868, when some Chinese in Peru could no longer

bear the inhuman treatment as laborers in the country, they

40
sent a petition to the American Minister in Peru for help

(HGCGSL 1/3:965-6). It reads:

We humbly think that only when principles become universal can
business be conducted. No matter whether it involves Chinese
or foreigners, to manage a country is first of all to take
care of the people, regardless of whether they come from
nearby or far

way.

We were born and raised in China, a country of rites. Forced
by cold and hunger, we came to a foreign country, far away
from home. It was in 1851 when bandits were rampant and
business was bad. Right at the time, recruiters came looking
for' workers. We came aboard with a contract, without worrying
about [their] breaking it. TWenty years [sic] have passed.
There are tens of thousands Chinese here now. Since we first
arrived, we have done everything from herding cattle and
horses to tilling the land.and.digging wells, as we were told.
We worked from morning till night, no matter whether it was
winter or summer.... However, these vicious foreigners...who
have no conscience treated the contract like scrap papers and
took human life as grass.... The landlords were cruel and the
officials were unsympathetic. When we complained, we were
castigated. As a result [Chinese] often died under
mistreatment or committed suicide. It is not that we are not
grateful for our lives which were given.by the emperor and.our
father. Our lives are just unbearable.... We cannot tell
anybody of our misery and therefore beg for your
help....(HGCGSL 1/3:965-66).

There is no record that these Chinese laborers ever tried to
seek help from. their home country. .At any rate, they
apparently first appealed to Peruvian officials when they were
abused by their employers, as the petition indicates. When
this failed, they appealed to the next authority accessible.
Their own government was physically and, perhaps emotionally
as well, too far away. More importantly, the letter showed
that these Chinese laborers had a very general idea of

authority which should uphold principles regardless of

nationalities. It probably did not occur to them that the

41
American minister could not even find anybody to translate the
letter, let alone come to their aid. However, the American
minister did show concern and sympathy, although he could do
nothing other than forward the petition to the Zongli Yamen of
the Qing government along with an explanatory letter (HGCGSL
1/3:966).

The petition thus arrived in the hands of Qing officials
despite the fact that it was not the initial intention of the
petitioners (HGCGSL 1/3:966) . About five months after the
Chinese laborers sent out their petition, the Zongli Yamen
finally notified the American minister to China that it could
not do anything because China did.not have a treaty with Peru.
The Zongli Yamen, however, expressed its "deep appreciation"
for the concern and sympathy shown by the American diplomats
toward Chinese nationals and asked the American Minister to
Peru to 'find out what really happened and extend a helping
hand“ (HGCGSL 1/3:966).

Before the legal problems could be straightened out so
that the American minister could protect Chinese nationals on
China's behalf, another petition by Chinese laborers in Peru
was sent to the:minister (HGCGSL 1/3974-5). American diplomats
in China again notified China and suggested that China should
sign a treaty with Peru and send officials to take care of
Chinese nationals in that country; Otherwise China should give
American diplomats in Peru authorization to take charge of

affairs involving Chinese nationals. But this arrangement

42

could only be a temporary solution (HGCGSL l/3z3974-5).

Apparently, even if the Qing government was willing to
establish legations abroad, it was not prepared to (Yang
1989:325). Besides, the Peru incident was not enough of an
impetus to prompt such an important policy decision. Therefore
it took the easier solution: leave the matter to the American
minister in Lima so long as it was possible. The incident
did, however, put pressure on the Qing government to deal with
the problem, somehow. Instead of extending its authority
abroad, it decided to assert its rights more vigorously
within--to prevent more Chinese from going to such countries
as Peru. In July 1869, two months after notifying Americans of
its decision regarding Chinese nationals in Peru, the Zongli
Yamen.sent a note to Great Britain, France, Russia, the United
States, and Japan saying that China had decided to ban labor
recruiting by countries without treaties with China (HGCGSL
1/3:968-69). The irony was, however, that this decision would
force Peru to seek a treaty with China instead of ceasing to
recruit more Chinese laborers. As I shall show later, China's
treaty with Peru, among other things, forced China to take
more direct responsibility to protect Chinese nationals in
Peru and would eventually lead to the establishment of a
Chinese legation in the united States in 1878. This chain of

events was set off by another incident.

In 1872, three years after the ban on laborer

43

recruitment, an incident involving labor smuggling occurred
which forced the Qing government to take responsibility for
taking care of Chinese nationals outside of Chinese territory.
One day in October 1872, a Peruvian ship which departed from
Macao with about 200 Chinese nationals, some of whom were
children, was forced to anchor in a Japanese port with a
smashed mast. A Chinese passenger, Huang Muqing, who could not
bear the hardship on the ship and was not sure of his fate in
a foreign country, jumped into the water and swam.to a British
ship. He was probably not able to explain his action and
intention very well to the British sailors, and thus was sent
back to the Peruvian ship. He was then beaten up and had his
pigtail cut off in a effort to disguise his true nationality.
Further convinced of his doom.if he remained on the ship, he
escaped again. This time, the British offered to pay 100 tael
[sic] for Huang's freedom” The owner of the Peruvian ship:made
a mistake-—he refused to let Huang go. The Japanese police
were promptly notified, the ship was searched, and all 230
Chinese nationals were brought to shore. The owner of the
Peruvian ship was tried and convicted of illegal smuggling of
Chinese laborers (HGCGSL 1/3 976—999).

Japanese officials in Shanghai quickly informed the
intendant of Su-Song-Tai prefecture, Sheng Bingcheng. Sheng
dared not make decisions by himself, and therefore wrote the
Ministers of Beiyang and Nanyang suggesting that China could

not possibly ignore the incident and should send officials to

44
Japan to deal with the case because it was too expensive and
troublesome to take all the people involved back to China for
hearings (HGCGSL 1/3:976). Both ministers advised the Zongli
Yamen to appreciate Japan's good will and take immediate
actions so that the Qing would not be despised by foreign
countries for indifference to its own people. Both suggested
sending officials to Japan for the first time in Chinese
history to solve the problem (HGCGSL 1/3 976; 979-980; 981).
Less than two weeks after China was notified of the incident,
the Qing government unprecedentedly sent Chinese officials,
along with an American interpreter, to Japan. The mission
lasted about a.month.and all the Chinese nationals were safely
brought back to China. The Qing government thanked the
Japanese government for its hospitality and cooperation and
insisted on paying all the expenses incurred by Chinese

nationals in Japan (HGCGSL 1/3:986-87).

Presumably, both cases helped to shape a new sense of
nationality in Chinese official and folk minds. A new kind of
relationship between the Qing government and overseas Chinese
was bound to develop. While the two incidents forced the Qing
regime to take responsibilities it traditionally did not
acknowledge, they also confirmed the legitimacy of the Qing's
authority over its nationals, overseas Chinese included, at
least theoretically. More specifically, these incidents, among

other factors, directly contributed to the Qing's decision to

45
establish legations in foreign countries, including the United
States. With the establishment of consulates in foreign
countries in the mid-18705, the Qing gradually developed a
protective policy towards overseas Chinese.

As early as 1868 in the Burlingame Treaty with the United
States, China was granted the right to establish consulate in
the United States. In the same year China sent its first
official mission to visit Western countries, including the
united states. The mission provided the first opportunity for
Qing officials to have direct contact with Chinese-Americans.
A Qing official entered in his diary a conversation with a
Chinese huiguan' leader in the United States. According to the
huiguan leader, Chinese merchants had harmonious relations
with Americans, but Chinese gold.miners were treated unfairly
by militant Americans. In addition, Americans charged a poll
tax of $2 only on Chinese and if disputes occurred Chinese
could not act as witnesses in court. These practices were
obviously unfair, the huiguan leader said, and he hoped the
Qing government could interfere on behalf of Chinese-
Americans. The Qing official replied that the Qing government
could not do anything at the moment because there were no

government representatives in America yet (HGCGSL 4:560). This

 

'Huiguan literary means "the meeting hall.“ In the late
Qing, a huiguan was either a native-place organization or a
trade association. Most Chinese huiguan in the United States
in the period under discussion were native-place
organizations controlled by wealthy Chinese merchants (see
also Chapter Four).

46

was probably the first time that Chinese merchants in the
United States expressed their intention of seeking protection
from the Qing. But the Qing was slow to feel the compelling
necessity to send diplomats to the United States. One of the
reasons was probably that the United States at the time had
the most generous immigration policy and Americans treated
Chinese much better than Cubans and Peruvians did (HGCGSL
4:560-61).

It was not until the mid-18705 that the Qing government
finally decided to establish China's first legations in Great
Britain, the United States, and Japan (Zhuang 1989:148-49).
Historians have pointed out that general economic and
political considerations played important roles in the Qing's
policy change from.indifference to protection toward overseas
Chinese (Zhuang 1989zchapter Four; Yang et al. 1989:321-324)
As early as 1866, the governor of Guangdong suggested that
China should follow the example of the Western countries by
sending state officials to protect commercial interests abroad
(cited in Zhuang 1989:138). In the early 18705 the governor of
Fujian and the treasurer of Jiangsu more specifically argued
that the Qing should capitalize on overseas Chinese's
financial and technical strength by stationing officials in
foreign ports with Chinese immigrants (Zhuang 1989:129).
Politically, some Qing officials believed that legations in
foreign countries could serve not only to piotect Chinese

laborers but also to control them (Yang et al. 1989:324).

47

While these general considerations were evident, they
contributed to the gradual change of the Qing's policy toward
overseas Chinese only in a specific historical context. These
abstract considerations themselves were not sufficient to
cause policy changes. To link general economic and political
considerations directly to the decision of establishing
legations abroad is to overestimate the conscious planning by
the Qing government. At the highest level of decision-making,
only Li Hongzhang the Nanyang Minister showed any
understanding of overseas Chinese's potential role in China's
future (Zhuang 1989:129) . In addition to humanitarian concern,
Li also thought that overseas Chinese might play a positive
role in China's maritime security (Haifang, WJSL 2/17) . Thus,
Li needed occasions to convince the Qing government to send
diplomats to foreign countries.

In the early and mid-18705 several incidents occurred
which not only created a general atmosphere in which Li could
possibly make specific suggestions to establish Chinese
legations abroad but also occasions which directly led to the
founding of the first Chinese legations in foreign countries,
the United States included.

In 1874, Japan's invasion of Taiwan met with strong
resistance by the Taiwanese. The invasion failed miserably but
caught the Qing court by surprise. It triggered a great debate
by Qing high officials on China's oceanic defense (Qian

1990:49-60) . During the debate Li Hongzhang made proposals for

48

importing and manufacturing modern weaponry, opening mines,
and.establishing schools of foreign learning (Qian 1990:52-3).
Although his suggestions met with tough resistance from
diehard conservatives such as privy counsel (tong zheng shi)
Yu Lincheng and minister of Grand Court (da li si qing) Wang
Jiabi, Li won support from.Prince Gong, who was in charge of
the Zongli Yamen. On 26 April 1875, Prince Gong memorialed the
Empress Dowager Ci Xi with a oceanic defense plan which
included purchasing foreign battleships, opening mines, and
letting Li Hongzhang and Shen Baozheng take charge of Beiyang
and. Nanyang' maritime defence, respectively. The Empress
Dowager approved his plan (Qian 1990:56).

The role overseas Chinese might play was certainly not a
central issue in this debate, but the issue was clearly part
of the discussion. In.August 1875, when.Li Hongzhang suggested
sending resident diplomats in order to protect Chinese
laborers in Peru, he argued:

There are more than a hundred thousand Chinese in Peru who are
terribly abused by their employers... and Chinese in islands
of the West, East, and South oceans are no less than a
million. Last. spring, minister ‘Wang [Jiabi] and others
suggested.using overseas Chinese to help our maritime defense.
But how can we ask for their help in crisis if we do not care
about them in peaceful days? We should send officials to Peru,
Cuba, and other islands to rescue overseas Chinese from their
crisis now. Thus the overseas Chinese will know that the
imperial court cares about every Chinese, even those in the
isolated islands and deserted areas. Naturally they will be

loyal to [the Qing] and their loyalty is very important to our
grand strategy (WJSL 2/17).

If the debate on oceanic defense created a general atmosphere

Flt

a) b ~Ku ~59

g» A...

49

favorable to more active contacts with foreign countries in
general and to the establishment of legations abroad in
particular, the foundation of the first legations was still
less of a carefully laid-out plan than an expedient measure
for dealing with unexpected events. The priority and agenda
was largely decided by incidents and personnel available
rather than by the innate importance of overseas Chinese in
particular areas.

The Qing's first minister to a foreign country, Guo
Songtao, was sent to Great Britain in 1875 initially to
fulfill a mission of apology for the murder of British vice—
consul Augustus Margary in.Yunnan, China (WJSL 4/17). The Qing
did not send its first minister to the United States, Chen
Lanbin, until 1878 and his mission largely grew out of treaty
negotiations between China and Peru and a Chinese official
investigation of laborers' conditions in Peru and Cuba. Only
to a lesser extent was the legation established to deal with
problems and.growing concerns the Chinese-Americans had in the
United States (Tsai 1983:29-30).

In December 1875, the Zongli Yamen memorialed the throne:
Currently we have diplomatic issues to deal with the United
States and other countries. Prince Gong and others of the
Zongli Yamen suggest sending officials to these priority
countries first...[Since there are Chinese nationals in both
Cuba and Peru] who are badly abused, officials have to be sent
to protect them" Otherwise we cannot face these abused Chinese
and we will be despised by other countries.... According to
customs observed by countries, China has to establish
consulates in foreign countries involved in order to protect
Chinese laborers. In order to establish consulates, ministers

have to be dispatched to countries first. Both Cuba and Peru
are located near the United States. In recent years, Americans

50

have relayed petitions to us by abused Chinese laborers in
Peru. In addition, Americans' views on labor recruitment by
Peru are also fair. In recent years, Chinese students are
gone to Hartford to study Western learning; Hartford is in the
United States. Therefore, there are also issues to deal with
in America. We have to send officials to Peru, Spain (which
rules Cuba), and the United States. But it is not easy to
find qualified personnel for all three countries. We suggest
therefore sending officials to [the United States] who will
take charge of affairs concerning all three countries (WJSL

4/17-18).

On the same day, the throne accepted the memorial and handed
down the edict:

Chen Lanbin, a third grade expectant Director of one of the
Four Minor Courts, a Secretary of the Grand Council, a
concurrent Secretary of the Board of Punishment, and wearer of
the button of the second rank, and Yung Wing, a brevet third
grade Sub-prefect, shall be imperial commissioners to go to
the United States, Spain, and Peru as envoys. Yung Wing shall
be promoted to an Intendantship and shall receive the button
of the second rank (WJSL 9/19-20; Chinese translation by
Tsai, 1983:39).

On 22 June 1878, accompanied by an entourage of thirty-four,

Chen left Hong Kong for America (Tsai 1983:41).

Upon Chen's arrival in San Francisco, Chinese in the area
were already waiting to see the “dignified bearing of the Han
officials.” About one hundred Chinese representatives and
agents of the Six Companies‘ came to the ship. Among them a

dozen wore long gowns and the rest shorts; they all lined up,

 

'Six Companies was the registered name of the Chinese
regional/clan associations of mutual aid in the United
States. Among Chinese themselves they were called Huiguan.
The Six Companies were formed in 1862 (Li and Yang 1990:177—
83; Tsai 1983:31-38).

51

giving Chen a spectacular welcome (Zhuang 1989:169; Tsai
1983:41). Unlike China's legations to other countries, which
focused on other issues, the establishment of a Chinese
legation and later consulates in the United States signified
the change of the Qing's policy toward overseas Chinese from
utter indifference to;protectionl However, the change was less
a constituent part of a new foreign policy than a slow and
defensive response to the problems caused.by Chinese nationals
abroad. Despite the gradual change to the more favorable and
sympathetic views of overseas Chinese by Qing high officials,
especially those of open-minded and.pragmatic figures like Li
Hongzhang and Prince Gong, the fate of overseas Chinese and
their dubious potential for helping China weighed.very little
in overall Chinese domestic and foreign.policy considerations.

The change of China's policy toward overseas Chinese was
largely caused by the overall problems of the huge wave of
emigration since the mid-nineteenth century. The problems were
most acute not in the united States but in such countries as
Peru and Cuba, where Chinese nationals were terribly abused.
The Qing decided to send, officials to protect Chinese
nationals in these countries mainly out of concern about its
own image as a caring and responsible regime, not out of
economic and political considerations per 5e. A few Qing
officials such as Li Hongzhang did have some vague long-term
considerations for national security, as I have pointed out

earlier. However, the overseas Chinese were basically more a

52

problem than an asset for the Qing. Li would rather have Peru
return all the Chinese laborers in that country than send Qing
officials to protect them, if he had a choice. It is
important to note that the Qing's policy change toward
overseas Chinese was mainly made because the emigration posed
serious responsibility and legitimacy problems to the Qing
rather than as part of a positive and aggressive new policy of
strengthening and enriching the country. Even after the mid-
18705 when the Qing began to "modernize“ segments of the
Chinese military and industry, overseas Chinese were by no
means crucial to the Qing's survival. In other words, the Qing
would sacrifice the interests of overseas Chinese for other
policy considerations, as I shall show in the last section of
this chapter.

On the other hand, however, the establishment of Chinese
legations in foreign countries in the mid- and late 18705
marked a new era of the Qing's policy toward overseas Chinese,
Chinese in the United States in particular. Probably in no
other period in Chinese history had the relationship between
overseas Chinese and a Chinese government been closer than
that of overseas Chinese with the Qing regime (see details
below) .

This close relationship made possible a better
understanding of the overseas Chinese's real needs and a
policy more realistic in promoting and protecting these needs

by the Qing government. Since the late 18705 the Qing

53

government had begun to work hard to assert Chinese rights to
live and work in foreign countries instead of preventing them
from migration and having them come back whenever there was a
problem” Some Qing officials, the local officials of Guangdong
in particular, also realized that not only did many overseas
Chinese not want to come back to China permanently, but also
that their returnnwould.cause serious problems of unemployment
and overpopulation (HGCGSL 1/41376-1378).

Ironically, the change in the Qing's policy toward and
its perception of overseas Chinese occurred when the world
labor market had begun to change. Chinese laborers in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not appreciated
as much as they were in earlier years. This change was most
clear in the United States. The Qing's battle to protect
overseas Chinese was made much harder by many Chinese's
unwillingness or inability to settle down permanently in a
foreign country. The sojourning nature of Chinese immigrants
was again most clearly seen in the case of Chinese-Americans,
who quickly replaced Chinese in Peru and Cuba as the Qing's
major concern and the symbol of Chinese sufferings in foreign

countries.

3. "Freezing Conditions are on the Way"
It is hard to judge based on available materials to what
extent China's decision to dispatch its first envoys to the

United States in the late 18705 was because of discrimination

54

against Chinese nationals in that country. There is no
question, however, that the Chinese minister in America began
to deal with the discrimination against Chinese in the United
States as soon as he arrived in 1878 (Zhuang 1989:169). The
immigration issue became a serious problem between the two
countries in the late 18705.

As late as 1875, the U.S. minister at Beijing, Benjamin
P. Avery, assured the Zongli Yamen that:
The laws make no distinction between the people of China and
any other country, and no tax or charge is allowed to be
imposed or enforced upon any person emigrating from.a foreign
country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every
person emigrating form any other foreign country. Formerly it
was the custom in California to collect a special monthly tax
from Chinese for the privilege of extracting gold from the
mines...but that tax has been abolished.... The laws of the
United States aim to be impartial and just, to protect the
immigrant on his voyage and on his arrival and to insure that
he comes as a free man for lawful objects (Avery to Prince
Gong in Tsai 1983:30) .
The Zongli Yamen was pleased with American immigration policy,
at least pleased with its principle of impartiality. Prince
Gong wrote the U.S. Secretary of State praising America for
its "excellent.purpose and efficient methods“ for managing the
immigrants (Prince Gong to Seward, 29 June 1876, USPR China,
1876 in Tsai 1983:31).

Although discrimination against Chinese immigrants in the

United States can be dated back as early as 1850 with the

 

iAvery did not mention that since 1870 the Chinese had
been denied.natura1ization. Therefbre it is not exactly true
that "The laws make no distinction between the people of
China and any other country.” (Tsai 1983:30).

55

passage of the Foreign Miners' License Tax Law, prior to the
late 18705 the discrimination was confined to occasional
attacks and local legislation, almost all of which were later
declared unconstitutional by state or federal courts (Tsai
1983:43-44). In the late 18705 when California was in
depression, however, an anti-Chinese movement by workers,
especially Irish workers, began to take shape (Yang et al.
1989:176-77). The increasing violence against Chinese
immigrants in the United States caused.a temporary decline of
Chinese immigration to America in the last few years of the
18705 (see Table 4).

In 1876, Li Gui, a Chinese official from.Nanjing, on his
way to the United States to attend the Philadelphia
Exposition, recorded in his diary:

I went to see the Chinese passengers in the first class
cabin,.... All of them.were Cantonese. I asked them.how many
were going to America as manual laborers. They said no more
than 80. When asked why go to America, they replied that it
was easier to make a living there. I asked them.how come this
time not many people were going. They said that a telegram had
been sent to Hong Kong saying that Chinese in the United
States were hated by the Irish union and anything could
happen; that's why. I then asked them why they were going
anyway regardless of what they had heard. All of them said
that they were forced.by hunger to take chances.... I felt so
sorry for them (HGCGSL 4:561) .

The violence against Chinese in San Francisco prompted Chen

Lanbin to memorialize the throne requesting the establishment

 

'The figures by the Immigration Commission and Bureau
of Immigration in Table 3 indicate that more Chinese entered
the United States in 1876 than in 1875, contrary to what was
said in the diary. But if we look at the numbers for several
years in the late 18705, they were in accordance with Li's
account.

56
of a consulate in San Francisco in 1878, the same year he
arrived in the United States as China's first minister to the

country. He wrote:

Table 4 Chinese Arrivals in the United States, 1852-1884

Year Immigration Bureau of San Francisco
Commission Immigration Customs House*

1852 0 0 20,026
1853 42 42 4,207
1854 13,100 13,100 16,084
1855 3,526 3,526 3,329
1856 4,733 4,733 4,807
1857 5,944 2,580 5,924
1858 5,128 7,183 5,427
1859 3,457 3,215 3,175
1860 5,467 6,117 7,341
1861 7,518 6,094 8,430
1862 3,633 4,174 8,175
1863 7,214 5,280 6,432
1864 2,975 5,240 2,682
1865 2,942 3,702 3,095
1866 2,385 1,872 2,242
1867 3,863 3,519 4,290
1868 5,157 6,707 11,081
1869 12,874 12,874 14,990
1870 15,740 15,740 10,870
1871 7,135 7,135 5,540
1872 7,788 7,788 9,770
1873 20,292 20,291 17,075
1874 13,776 13,776 16,085
1875 16,437 16,437 18,021
1876 22,781 22,781 15,481
1877 10,594 10,594 9,468
1878 8,992 8,992 6,675
1879 9,604 9,604 6,969
1880 5,802 5,802 5,050
1881 11,890 11,890 18,561
1882 39,579 39,579 26,902
1883 8,031 8,031 ***
1884 279 4,009 ***

 

*Chinese passengers who landed in San Francisco included many
who were actually en route to Cuba, Jamaica, Peru, and other
Latin American countries via San Francisco. Source: Tsai

57

1983:19.‘
According to our estimate, there are about 140,000 Chinese

residing in various states in the United States. In the Golden
Mountain [San Francisco] area alone there are as many as
60,000. In recent years, however, the natives and foreigners
have not been able to get along. There are more than two
hundred cases [involving the Chinese] which are not yet
settled and about three hundred Chinese are being detained in
jail. [We] have to deal with disputes almost every day. ...A
consulate should be established in order to protect Chinese
nationals (HGCGSL 1/4:l330).

The throne accepted the suggestion and on 8 November 1878,
Chen nominated his relative Chen Shutang to be Chinese consul-
general in San Francisco (Tsai 1983:42).

The anti—Chinese violence also pronpted the American
government to take action. On 27 July 1880, an American
government delegation headed by James B. Angell, the president
of the University of Michigan and the new minister to China,
arrived in China to negotiate a new treaty which would
supplement the obsolete Burlingame Treaty of 1868.

The Zongli Yamen, however, felt that the Burlingame
Treaty had served the Chinese in America well and was very
reluctant to revise the Treaty substantially. It memorialed

the throne that:

The Treaty has played an important role in.protecting Chinese

 

'The decline in the number of Chinese who entered the
United States in the last three years of the 18705 can be
explained by riots against Chinese prior to and during these
years. Chinese population in America continued to decline
dramatically in the 18805 (see Table 4). However, the
violence did not stop those who were either desperate or
willing to take chances. The sharp increase in the number of
Chinese entering the United States in .

1881 and 1882 was probably because many heard news of the
Exclusion Act of 1882.

58

in the United States. Last year, the former minister [George
F.] Seward had discussed the revision of the Treaty
prohibiting four groups of people: the smuggled, the
criminals, prostitutes, and the sick from.entering the United
States. We have not come to an agreement yet. Now we have
heard that American legislators feel that to ban the four
types of the people is not enough and the President of the
United States has yielded to the popular pressure and sent
envoys to negotiate a new treaty. Although we do not known
their requests yet, we are afraid that they intend to revise
and abrogate the Burlingame Treaty (HGCGSL 1/4:1323-24).
The Zongli Yamen suggested that Bao Yun and Li Hongsao be
named to take charge of the new treaty negotiation (Ibid). By
agreeing to negotiate a new treaty, the Qing was bound to give
up certain rights provided by the Burlingame Treaty to Chinese
immigrants. But to refuse a treaty revision between the two
friendly countries was almost impossible, since the Qing
needed the good will of the United States on other issues more
important to the regime.

During a visit to China by ex-President Ulysses Grant in
June the previous year, Li Hongzhang allegedly had been told
by Grant that if he and his government could help China to
force Japan to withdraw from the Ryukyus, China would make a
concession on immigration (Tsai 1983:53). On two other foreign
relations issues in the late 18705, China needed support, or
at least a friendly gesture, from the United States as well.
One was China's dispute with Russia over Ili, Xinjiang, and
the other was the opium trade. On the latter issue, Prince
Gong argued: "The foreign drug was a big drain on Chinese

currencyg... China.has prohibited the sale but cannot stop it,

because huge interests are involved. The United States is a

59

country of fair play and a country widely respected. If she
stops the transportation and sale first, other countries will
follow the example" (WJSL 24, cited in Zhuang 1989:225).

While it is almost certain that these considerations had
some impact on the Qing's decision to be cooperative with the
United States on the immigration issue,'.it is probably more
accurate to say, however, that these issues made the Qing more
sympathetic to the internal problems caused. by Chinese
immigration to the United States rather than that the Qing
made a deal with a powerful country at the expense of Chinese
immigrants. A memorial to the throne by the Zongli Yamen
indicated that the Qing government did not intend to change
the spirit of the Burlingame Treaty but decided to make
necessary revisions to alleviate the instability in the United
States caused by unrestricted Chinese immigration and to
protect more effectively those Chinese who were already in
America. It says:
The relationship between Chinese laborers and the natives
[sic] of the united States was already like that of ice and
fire. The United States government tried very hard to mediate
the disputes. But this is not a long-term.solution. According
to the Burlingame Treaty, the two people can come and go at
their own will to the other country to travel, trade, and
reside permanently. But the treaty did not specify “Chinese
laborers" [could go, too]. Recently, Angell and others handed
in a summary of the treaty revision. It says that there are
more than.a.hundred.thousand Chinese laborers in various parts

of the United States now who indeed have caused problems to
America's stability. They'proposed.three ways to deal with the

 

'The Angell Treaty of 1880 which provided the legal
base for exclusion acts by the U.S. Congress in following
years had a supplemental article which prohibited opium
sales in either country. (WJSL 24/11; Zhuang 1989:225).

60

problem: regulation, restriction, and prohibition. Restriction
and prohibition are applicable only to laborers, not to any
others. we argue that prohibition is contrary to the existing
treaty [the Burlingame Treaty]; therefore China cannot agree.
But we can discuss the ways to restrict immigration in the
hope that it will only benefit not harm [the two peoples].
Angell says that the specific regulations have to be made by
the American Congress and they are here only to obtain word
from.China that it allows the United States to regulate at its
discretion.

We consider that the conditions of Chinese laborers in
the United States are different from.those of Chinese laborers
in. Cuba and. Peru. The ‘United States has provided some
protection towards Chinese laborers there according to the
Treaty. However, it is true that the Chinese laborers indeed
cause some inconvenience in that country because there are too
many of them. If we insist on not making any adjustment,
something serious will occur as the number of Chinese
increases every day, which will not only cause problems to
Chinese laborers already there but also to Chinese of other
classes. Thus the real.meaning of protecting Chinese nationals
will be lost. It seems to be better that we make new clauses
to restrict those Chinese who are going to work in the united
States. The new'clauses will supplement the existing Treaty in
order to benefit both countries (HGCGSL 1/4:1324-1326).

Of course, it is ridiculous to say that the Burlingame Treaty
did not specify the rights of Chinese laborers to go to the
united States at their own will, and therefore that
restriction was not contrary to the Treaty. The point is that
the Zongli Yamen persuaded itself to sign a brand new treaty
because it could not see other alternatives. But the Zongli
Yamen wanted to give in to America's demands as little as
possible. Finally, China was successful in giving the United
States only the right of limiting and suspending rather than
prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering America. (Tsai
1983:57-58). The United States, on the other hand, obtained
the right to restrict Chinese immigration to the United States

at its own discretion. The new treaty, which was signed on 17

61

November 1880, contained the following important articles:

Article I. Whenever in the opinion of the Government of the
United States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United
States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to
affect the interests of that country, or to endanger the good
order of the said country or of any locality within the
territory thereof, the Government of China agrees that the
Government of the United states may regulate, limit, or
suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely
prohibit it. The limitation or suspension shall be reasonable
and shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the United
States as laborers, other classes not being included in the
linitations. Legislation taken in regard to Chinese laborers
will be of such a character only as is necessary to enforce
the regulation, limitation or suspension of immigration, and
immigrants shall not be subject to personal mistreatment or
abuse.

Article II. Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United
States as teachers, students, merchants or from curiosity,
together with their body and household servants, and Chinese
laborers who are now in the United States shall be allowed to
go and come of their own free will and accord, and shall be
accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions

which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most
favored nation (WJSL 24/12-14; Tsai 1983:58-59).

Artice III provided that the United States would do its best
to protect the Chinese permanently or temporarily residing in
the territory of the United States (WJSL 24/13).

To the Qing, this treaty meant only mild and temporary
adjustment of immigration management. On the U.S. side,
however, this treaty provided the legal base for the united
States to exclude Chinese immigrants on much harsher terms.
As John F. Swift, a delegate of the Angell mission from
California, put it, the treaty had “untied the hands of
Congress and the matter of Chinese immigration is in the

control of our government.“ (Tsai 1983:59). While the treaty

62

was not to blame for all the much-hated exclusion acts later,
it certainly pointed the way for how the immigration issue was
to be solved when more violence against Chinese immigrants
occurredr-by'prohibiting more Chinese from.entering the United
States. Neither the United States nor the Qing wanted to be
bothered to solve the very complicated problem in a more
delicate and graceful manner.

No records, however, show that Chinese immigrants
responded strongly to the treaty which was to have such
significant consequences to them. After all, until the late
18805 Chinese immigrants in America hardly paid any attention
to any treaties between China and the United States because
treaties seemed never to affect their lives in dramatic and
direct ways. Even the law of the Qing was made to break and
thousands of Chinese were crossing the Pacific to America long
before the Burlingame Treaty. This is not to say that the
Chinese immigrants did not have a strong sense of law, but
only that they were more accustomed to follow or break laws
but not consciously to try to affect law-making. Less than a
decade after the Angell Treaty was signed, however, Chinese
immigrants in the United States began to take political

actions to protect their own interests for the first time.

In November 1880, less than two years after the Angell

Treaty was signed by both countries, American President

63

Chester A. Arthur signed the first Chinese Exclusion Act on 6
May 1882, which suspended the coming of Chinese laborers to
the United States for ten years. But the act did not apply to
Chinese laborers already in the United States on 17 November
1880, or to those who might come within ninety days after the
approval of the act (U3$., Statutes 1881-83, in Tsai 1983:67).
The act also provided the right to leave and come back to the
united States to those Chinese who were in the United States
before 17 Nevember 1880 (Ibid). Later, in December 1882, the
U.S. Attorney General B.H. Brewster, at the strong suggestion
of then-Chinese minister to the United States Zheng Zaoru,
ruled that 'A.Chinese laborer coming to this country merely to
pass through it cannot be considered.as within the prohibition
of the [exclusion] law...” However, this privilege was soon
abrogated by a 1884 act which forbade admission to the United
States of Chinese laborers from any foreign place (Tsai
1983:70).

The Exclusion Act of 1882, which signified the beginning
of the infamous Chinese exclusion history, was in fact a very
lenient law. The ninety-day grace period was apparently
noticed by shrewd Chinese immigrants. Since the voyage from
Hong Kong to San Francisco took about thirty to fifty days at
the time (Li and'Yang 1990:82), many Chinese apparently rushed
to America before its doors closed. In 1882, the number of
Chinese immigrating to the United States reached.a record high

of 39,579 according to the figure by ‘U.S.. Immigration

64

Commission (Tsai 1983:19). Furthermore, while the act caused
some inconvenience to exempt Chinese laborers, who had to
obtain legal certificates in order to leave and come back to
the United States, it did not shut the door entirely to those
Chinese who found ways to enter America illegally, largely
because it left it up to Chinese officials to issue the
reentrance certificates. There were numerous charges of
evasion of the law by the Chinese laborers, and Chinese
officials were accused of issuing large numbers of
certificates which stated that laborers were "traders,"
"students,“ and “teachers." (HGCGSL 1/4:l400).

What really prevented more Chinese from entering the
united States in the 18805 and made Qing diplomats angry at
American treatment of Chinese immigrants was probably the
numerous riots against Chinese and the federal government's
lack of power or will to protect them.‘ The most violent of
all were the Denver riot of October 1880; the Rock Springs
(Wyoming Territory) massacre on 2 September 1885; several
riots against Chinese in Washington Territory in October and
NOvember 1885; and.the Snake River massacre in June 1887. In
the Rock Springs massacre alone twenty—eight Chinese miners
were killed and fifteen were wounded. The property loss was

estimated at more than $147,000 (Tsai 1983:60-80) .

 

'In 1886 the Zhonghua huiguan of San Francisco sent
telegraphs to Hong Kong reporting Chinese losses of lives
and property in the United States and warning Chinese not to
go to the united States until the situation had changed
(HGCGSL 1/4:1345).

65

During and immediately after these riots Qing diplomats
vigorously demanded that the United States government provide
adequate protection to Chinese in America and compensate the
victims. Their arguments were irrefutable: China was
responsible for Americans' security in China and compensated
losses to Americans as stipulated in treaties with the United
States. It was only fair for the United States to do the same
(HGCGSL 1/4:1345-1349). Having regretted and condemned the
violence against innocent Chinese, the united States
government insisted. that it was the local governments'
responsibility to maintain order and that the U.S. government
was not legally liable for the Chinese losses. Secretary of
State Thomas Bayard neverthless responded favorably to the
Chinese minister's compensation request, saying the president
might recommend.to the Congress some measures of compensation.
The catch was it should not be “as under obligation of treaty
or principle of international law, but solely from.a sentiment
of generosity and.pity to an innocent and unfortunate body of
men.” (cited in Tsai 1983:76).

The Zongli Yamen might not entirely agree with the
interpretation. But when the United States government turned
$147,748.74 over to Zhang Yinhuan, the neW'Chinese minister to
the United States, the Zongli Yamen authorized Zhang to accept
the payment (HGCGSL 1/4:1357-58). Zhang was apparently
satisfied with the settlement. He memorialized the throne

stressing the significance of the indemnity: “Since China and

66

foreign countries began to trade, this is the first time that
a foreign country’ has paid. China such a large sum. of
indemnity." (HGCGSL 1/4:1358). He also reported.that: "America
is a country administered by the people. Every state has its
own laws, with some of which the American government cannot
interfere.” Thus, while still insisting on the American
government's responsibility to protect Chinese immigrants in
the United States, Zhang believed that the best way to avoid
further tragedy was for the Chinese government itself to
prohibit Chinese laborers from going to the United States
(HGCGSL 1/4:1374). In fact, the idea of self-prohibition had
first been proposed informally by Zhang's predecessors, Ouyang
Ming the Chinese consul-general in New York and Zheng Zaoru
the Chinese minister to the united States, who decided, after
numerous futile efforts to seek adequate protection for the
Chinese in the united States, that it would be much easier to
control prospective Chinese immigrants than to change the
American judicial and political system (Tsai 1983:83-84).

The suggestion of self-prohibition in 1886 and a new
treaty negotiation with the united States based upon the idea
in 1888, however, sparked the first major protest from the
Chinese community in the United States to the Qing's weak
foreign policy, and led to serious policy disputes between
Qing diplomats and Qing local officials in Guangdong, from

where most Chinese immigrants came.

67

As I have pointed out earlier, when the Qing established
its first legation and consulate in the United States in 1878,
the Chinese community had given a warm welcome to the Qing
officials. Since then the relationship between Qing diplomats
and the Chinese community in the United States had been very
close. A5 Shih-shan Henry Tsai puts it: “After the Ch'ing
[Qing] emperor had sent diplomatic agents to the United
States, the Six Companies and.the Chinese legation worked hand
in.glove to dominate the internal affairs of Chinatown." (Tsai
1983:37).

While the degree of the Qing's control over the Chinese
community in the United States cannot be exactly determined,
it is safe to say that the control had been fairly strong
compared with the Qing's control over Chinese communities in
other areas, countries in Southeast.Asia in.particular (Zhuang
1989:158,169-70). In Singapore, for example, the Qing could
only confirm locally selected merchants as consuls and was not
able to send. its own. diplomatic representatives due to
Singapore's colonial.position (Zhuang 1989:158). In the united
States, however, Qing officials not only acted as the sole
representatives of Chinese nationals there, but also directly
interfered with the selection of chairman and board members of
all the influential huiguan. The first Chinese minister to the
United States, Cheng Lanbin, changed the Chinese name of the
association of seven huiguan into 'Zonghuiguan" ("General'

huigan). Later Zheng Zaoru, the second minister, officially

68

entitled the association as 'Zhonghua zonghuiguan' (General
Association of the Middle Kingdom) .' The position of chairman
(zongdong) of the Zonghuiguan was held by leaders of branch
huiguan in turn, and the chairman had to be confirmed by the
Qing government (Zhuang 1989:174). In 1885, several huiguan in
San Francisco further decided that the selection of a new
chairman should.be reported to the minister, and the minister
would then inform the governor of the candidate's native
province in order to make sure of his good background (Zhuang
1983:174).

There is no question that the Qing tried to control the
overseas Chinese communities, and the Chinese community in the
United States in particular." However, the intimate
relationship ‘between Qing diplomatic agents and. Chinese
community leaders in the united States was also because the
latter needed help from.the Qing as well, not only in their
disputes with Americans but also in their control over the
Chinese populace in the united States. The Qing's recognition
provided them with prestige and legitimacy. Thus while in the
early years the leaders of huiguan were often prominent and

wealthy merchants, after the 18805 many Chairpersons of

 

'Its English name remained Six Companies.

"One way to control overseas Chinese communities was
to hold overseas Chinese' relatives in China as hostage. By
so doing, the Qing was able to restrain violence (tangdou)
in Chinatown and to prevent the majority of Chinese-
Americans from helping the revolutionaries (Zhuang 1983:176-
78).

69
huiguan were directly brought from China and held high-
prestige degrees from the Civil Service Examination. For
example, of the fourteen chairmen of the San—i huiguan from
1881 to 1972, thirteen were jinshi, nine juren, and one
gongsheng (Li and Yang l990:l79).'

Having said all of this, it is important to stress that
Chinese immigrants in the United States, Chinese merchants in
particular, had a very clear sense of their own interests
which they themselves had to promote and defend. As I shall
show shortly, they tried to do so by putting popular pressure
upon the Qing central government and thus shaping the Qing's
policy toward. emigration and. immigrants rather than by
directly challenging the Qing's authority. They found their
allies from Chinese merchants and elites of other social
groups in Hong Kong and Guangdong, and they also appealed
directly to local officials of Guangdong and Fujian, from
which provinces most immigrants came. In the late 18805, they
adamantly opposed the idea of self—prohibition and the treaty

draft based on the idea.

But the idea of self—prohibition was suggested by
virtually all the diplomats who had served and were serving as

ministers and consul-generals in the United States (Tsai

 

'Tsai (1983:35 note 38) provides slightly different
statistics. According to him: “Of the fourteen presidents of
the Six Companies from.1881 to 1927, three had the Chin-shih
[jinshi] degree and nine had the Chu-jen [juren] degree.”

70

1983:83-84). The idea eventually became an announced
government policy when the Zongli Yamen sent a note to
American minister Charles Denby in August 1886. It said:
According to the Treaty, Chinese laborers who were living in
the United States should be able to leave and return at their
own will.... However, recently serious cases of [Chinese]
being expelled and killed have occurred one after another. The
local officials [of the United States] have not tried to
prevent [the violence] in advance. Neither do they punish the
guilty'persons afterward.... Thus your country's protection is
only in.name not in reality.... Now China is to consider a law
of self-prohibition: those who have never been to the United
States will be strictly forbidden to go. Those who have
returned from.the United States to their native place will
also be prohibited from.going back, if they do not have family
members and properties in America. Chinese laborers who are
currently still in the United States and those who have treaty
rights to leave and go to the United States freely should be
protected in their treaty rights forever (HGCGSL 1/4:1370-71).
This self-prohibition policy led to the negotiation of a new
treaty concerning the immigration issue in 1887 and 1888. The
new treaty, which was signed on 12 March 1888 by Secretary of
State Bayard.and Zhang Yinhuan, the Chinese:minister (1885-89)
to the United States, prohibited the coming of Chinese
laborers to the United States for a period of twenty years.
But the prohibition did.not apply to the return of any Chinese
laborer who had a “lawful wife, child, or parent in the United
States, or property therein of the value of one thousand
dollars, or debt of like amount due himi“ (Tsai 1983:89).

The treaty signified that the Qing would rather control
its own people more tightly than to confront the United States
on.the thorny immigration issue (HGCGSL 1/4:1356). The treaty

thus gave a new twist to the triangular relationship among

the Chinese immigrants, the Qing, and the United States by

71

giving more prominence to international cooperation against
unlawful activities and to state power over individual rights
than to international confrontation over different national
interests. This subtle change was made more perceptible by
the Qing's demand from Great Britain for cooperation in
preventing Chinese laborers from entering the United States
through Hong Kong and other British territories (HGCGSL
1/4:1400-1401,1404). From the perspective of the Chinese
community in the United States and Chinese in Hong Kong and
Guangdong who had crucial commercial interests with Chinese
immigrants, this treaty and the policy of self—prohibition
meant the evasion by the Qing of the state's responsibility
for defending the legitimate rights and interests of its
people.

As soon as the Chinese merchants in the United States
heard news of the treaty they decided to bypass the
conventional channel through the Chinese minister, who had
negotiated the treaty himself, and to appeal to higher
authorities in.the Qing governmental hierarchy. They did.so by
first sending letters to merchants in Hong Kong informing them
of the details of the treaty (HGCGSL 1/4:1377). In July 1888,
several Hong Kong and Guangdong merchants who engaged in
grocery sales to Chinese communities in the United States
petitioned the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi,
Zhang Zhidong, asking him to exert his influence on the

imperial court not to ratify the treaty (HGCGSL 1/41376-1378) .

72

The petition argued that the livelihood of Chinese
merchants and laborers was intimately related and mmtually
dependent. Only when Chinese, most of whom were laborers,
could leave and enter the United States freely could the
groceryfibusiness flourish) because virtually every single item
Chinese laborers used in their every day life was imported
from China through Hong Kong, where Golden Mountain Grocery
stores were located. If new Chinese laborers could not enter
and old laborers were not allowed to reenter the United
States, according to the new treaty, in twenty years no
Chinese would.be left in America because each year there were
about 3,000 Chinese who died in America. Naturally, business
would perish as a result. Thus, although the treaty was
allegedly aimed only at laborers not merchants, Chinese
merchants would disappear without banning if Chinese laborers
were banned from.entering the United States. Furthermore, if
countries in Nanyang followed the example of the United
States, it would be disastrous not only to the grocery
business but also to the local people of Guangdong and.Fujian,
where emigration provided a way of living (HGCGSL 1/4:1377).
The petition therefore asked the Governor-General:
As we understand it there is a one-year period for the
imperial court to decide whether or not to ratify the treaty
even after it had been signed.by the court's envoy. Since the
treaty is not ratified yet, we earnestly appeal to you to
understand our situation and to persuade the Zongli Yamen not
to ratify the treaty. We thousands of merchants from
Guangdong, Hong Kong, and San Francisco and tens of thousands

of people [in the united States] would be extremely
grateful...(HGCGSL l/4:1378).

73
Personal ego and local perspective prompted Zhang Zhidong to
memorialize the throne directly instead of discussing the
issue with the Zongli Yamen. He wrote:

There are too many people in Guangdong who cause problems.
Those unemployed depend on going overseas to make a living. In
the United States, there are more than one hundred thousand
Chinese who rely on China for their daily necessities. The
same is true for the Chinese in the Nanyang islands. Thus, the
more places that Chinese can make their living, the more
Chinese goods can be sold. While the Chinese laborers make
their living by using their manual labor, Chinese merchants
make profits by transporting and selling goods to them. The
matter is that of cause and effect and the money comes from
and goes to no others than Chinese themselves. Therefore, to
ban Chinese laborers necessarily affects Chinese merchants.
Furthermore, if the United States takes the lead, the Nanyang
islands will follow suit. In March the British New Gold
Mountain [Xin jingshan, Australia] proposed to prohibit
Chinese from entering. Although the proposal was vetoed by the
British court, [the Australians] have increased taxes that
[Chinese nationals] have to pay. It intends to drive out
Chinese without even banning them. . . . Since the petition
involves Chinese merchants' livelihoods, I dare not hide it
from the throne's knowledge. It is up to the Holy Wisdom
[i.e.--the emperor] to order the Zongli Yemen to carefully
weigh the pros and cons of the matter and to do whatever
possible (HGCGSL 1/4:1378).

The emperor noted in vermilion: "I am aware of the matter."
(HGCGSL 1/4:1378) .

To a lesser extent, Li Hongzhang, the Beiyang minister,
shared Zhang Zhidong's concern. He sent a telegram to the
Zongli Yamen four days after Zhang's memorial complaining that
the new treaty was contrary to the 1880 treaty, which did not
"prohibit“ Chinese laborers from going to the United States
(HGCGSL 1/4:1379) . In the meantime in Guangdong, popular

discontent took the form of numerous posters (HGCGSL

1/4:1379) . Some laborers returned from America went so far as

74
to mob Zhang Yinhuan's home in Guangdong because as the
Chinese minister he had failed to represent the interests of
Chinese immigrants in the United States (Tsai 1983:90).

In addition to appealing to the local officials in
Guangdong, Chinese merchants in the united States and Hong
Kong also began to express their opinion to the general public
by publishing a pamphlet (probably in early 1888) entitled
Humble Opinions on Cbmmercial Matters (Shangwu shuyan), which
systematically criticized the idea of self-prohibition and.the
treaty based upon it (HGCGSL 1/4:1392-99). Later in the same
year the merchants sent the booklet, along with a long letter
called "More on Commercial Matters“ (Shangwu xuyan), to the
Zongli Yamen (HGCGSL 1/4:1386-99).

The merchants argued that the treaty was not only
devastating to the interests of Chinese merchants but also
detrimental to China's economy in general. Furthermore, the
new treaty was also an insult to the Chinese state (guoti),
for no other nationals were excluded.(HGCGSL 1/4:l394). On the
other hand, Chinese emigration to the United States and other
areas in the world would greatly ease the population pressure
in China (HGCGSL l/4:1397). If the Chinese government did not
reject the treaty entirely, the merchants warned, other
countries would follow the example of the united States, and
soon there would be no place in the world for the
overpopulated Chinese to go. The letter quoted the Yi Jing, a

Confucian classic, "Walking on newly formed frost" "Freezing

75
conditions are on the way" (Lushuang jianbing zhi; HGCGSL
1/ 4 : 13 91) .

Under pressure both from Qing local officials and
concerned merchants, the Zongli Yamen hesitated to memorialize
the throne in favor of ratifying the treaty, although the
treaty was obviously endorsed by the office. Instead the
Zongli Yamen promptly sent a telegram to Zhang Yinhua, the
minister, which read: "Secret. The new treaty prohibits
Chinese laborers from going to the United States for twenty
years which is incompatible with the 1880 treaty. . . .posters
are everywhere. The office cannot memorialize the throne to
ratify the treaty at the moment.“ (HGCGSL 1/4:1379) .

The significance of the decision did not escape Zeng
Jize, son of Zeng Guofan and Chinese minister to Great
Britain. When asked by Denby, the U.S. minister to China at
the time, why the treaty was not duly ratified, Zeng allegedly
said: “For the first time in the history of treaties, the
people had protested; and that protests had been sent by the
Cantonese against the ratification of the treaty." (WJSL
76:23; 77:3; Tsai 1983:90).

As far as the United States was concerned, however,
whether or not the Qing ratified the treaty did not matter,
for the 1880 treaty had already authorized the United States
government to regulate Chinese immigration to the United
States as American interests required. On 18 September 1888,

the Scott Act passed Congress, stipulating that Chinese

76

laborers who left the United States should not be permitted to
return except for those who had property and direct relatives
in the United States, and that all certificates of identity
issued to Chinese laborers who were visiting China were void.
At least six hundred Chinese laborers with such certificates
were denied entry at American ports (HGCGSL 1/4:1382-83; Tsai
1983 :91) .

The Scott Act showed clearly that with or without a
treaty, the United States would exclude Chinese laborers
anyway. Chinese merchants in Hong Kong and in the United
States decided to push the Qing government a little further in
defending their rights. After the Scott bill became law and
many Chinese were denied entry to the United States, merchants
in Hong Kong and Guangdong sent a telegram to Li Hongzhang,
who forwarded it to the Zongli Yamen. The telegram thanked the
imperial court for not ratifying the treaty and condemned the
Scott Act, which had been made regardless of the existing
treaty between China and the United States. The merchants
warned that if China let the United States exclude Chinese
without doing anything, the Cantonese would have no way of
making a living. ”We request the imperial court to be
determined not to sign the treaty and not to allow the United
States to enforce its own act,” the telegram concluded, and
”the tens of thousands of people in Guangdong and Fuj ian will
be extremely grateful.” (HGCGSL 1/4:1382-83) .

The Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi Zhang

77

Zhidong strongly supported the merchants. He suggested that
the Zongli Yamen should. consider recalling the Chinese
minister to the United States, dismissing Americans employed
by the Qing government, and forbidding American missionaries
from traveling in China's interior (HGCGSL 1/4:1383-85). In
the meantime, he directly contacted the Chinese minister in
the United States, Zhang Yinhuan, denouncing the idea of self—
prohibitiOn as ”extremely absurd" and suggesting some sort of
”boycott” to ”retaliate.” (HGCGSL 1/4:1385-86).

Zhang Yinhuan, on the other hand, looked at the matter
from an entirely different perspective. He sent a long
memorial to the throne in early 1889 defending the self-
prohibition policy. In the memorial he argued that the self-
prohibition policy was designed to save Chinese laborers from
further unemployment and violence against them.in the United
States, and.that the policy only harmed the interests of those
who made huge profits by smuggling Chinese laborers overseas.
According to Zhang, Hong Kong contract (baolan) Companies
made a profit of $120 for every Chinese sent to the united
States. Every year more than $500,000 was made. The huge
profits were then divided by the baolan merchants in Hong Kong
and the Chinese secret societies in the united States. But
these baolan merchants did not care in the least about the
future lives and work of the laborers in the United States. In
recent years, Zhang asserted, there were only two types of

people who went to the united States: the most stupid and the

78

most sly. They heard more money could be made in foreign
countries, and they therefore managed to gather enough money
and give it to the baolan merchants, who provided them
documents and told them what to say at American ports. The
situation was made worse by officials in Guangdong such as the
interpreter of the Governor—General, who instigated popular
discontent to make profit himself. Zhang argued that it was
absurd to say that China was overpopulated and that the
unemployed, if they did not go abroad, would cause trouble in
their native places. Even if this was true, which it was not,
he argued, ”we probably couldn't say it is reasonable to send
the vagrants and rascals to other countries” (HGCGSL 1/4:1399-
1403).

What Zhang Yihuan said was not totally groundless. But he
made the complicated immigration problem and the popular
discontent a matter of a few people's conspiracy. Among all
the Chinese ministers to the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Zhang was the most
irresponsible and extravagant (Tsai 1983:82). He wanted to
have the thorny problem solved the easy way-~to maintain the
status quo and to let the immigration issue gradually
disappear as new immigrants ceased coming to the United
States. Although the self-prohibition was not originally his
idea and virtually all Chinese diplomats supported it as a
realistic policy, Zhang's handling of the immigration issue

from 1885 to 1889 greatly alienated the Chinese community in

79
the United States.

Unfortunately, however, the more competent Chinese
diplomats never accomplished much more than Zhang did, and the
rejection of the treaty negotiated by Zhang probably made
China's position on the immigration issue even worse, because
without a treaty the United States simply did whatever it
pleased unilaterally and left the Qing government in a very
awkward position. After the Scott Act was implemented, Zhang
Yinhua sent the Zongli Yamen a terse telegram: ”The United
States repealed the new treaty and refused further
discussion.... Chinese [laborers'] entry and transition
through the United States are both denied now. " (HGCGSL
1/ 4 : 1426) .

While the Zongli Yamen was protesting the Scott Act of
1888, another exclusion act, the Geary Act, passed the U.S.
Congress and was signed into law by the president in 1892. The
Geary Act replaced the first Chinese restriction act of 1882,
which was about to expire. The new exclusion act stipulated
that the suspension of immigration by Chinese laborers be
extended for another ten years and, more importantly, it
required that all Chinese in the United States apply for a
certificate of residence within one year. Those Chinese found
without certificates were to be deported (Tsai 1983:96; McKee
l977:48-49;55-56) .

The Geary Act more than any other exclusion act triggered

furious protests from the Chinese community in the United

80
States. The reason was simply that the act forced the Chinese
immigrants fundamentally to change their migrant way of life:
they had either to stay or leave the united States forever,
because residence registration would indicate their status.
Once Chinese laborers without more than $1,000 of property
left the United States, they would not be able to come back
again. Y.K. Chu, who interviewed many Chinese who were
immigrants at the time, describes the awkward situation
Chinese laborers were in after the Geary Act:
If a Chinese laborer wanted to return to China to visit his
relatives there, he had to apply for the return-to-America
certificate. The U.S. government would check his registration
card. If the applicant was in laborer status, his application
would be denied immediately and he would never obtain the
return certificate. Under such circumstance, he could of
course leave the united States no matter what. But once he
left he could not come back again. If he did not leave, he was
as if trapped here without much human joy for the rest of his
life (Chu 1975:39).
Table 5 shows that most Chinese immigrants in the United
States lived a migrant life instead of a life of permanent
residency before 1892.

The only solutions to the dilemma faced by the Chinese
laborers were to have the Geary Act repealed, or to break the
law. Disappointed with the Qing government, the Chinese
immigrants in the United States defied the advice of the new
minister Cui Guoyin (1889-93), who asked them.to comply with
the registration order. An emergency meeting was held by the

Zhonghua zong huiguan in San Francisco to discuss actions to

be taken (Chu 1975:40) . At the meeting, Chen Taichao,

81
Table 5. Chinese Arriving in, and Departing from, the United

States 1882-1892

Year Chinese Arrived Chinese departed
1882 39,579 10,366
1883 10,182 12,159
1884 3,473 14,145
1885 5,352 19,655
1886 4,849 17,591
1887 3,764 12,155
1888 2,777 12,839
1889 2,063 10,226
1890 1,870 8,056
1891 3,007 8,924
1892 3,190 6,696

Adapted from.Tsai 1983:98.

the chairman of Sanyi huiguan, made a passionate speech
advocating a boycott against the registration order. He also
made. the suggestion to hire lawyers to challenge the
constitutionality of the registration requirement (Chu
1975:40). Both of his ideas were accepted by the meeting and
$200,000 was quickly collected.to pay the legal expenses (Chu
1975:40)L

The boycott decision was faithfully followed.by majority
of Chinese in. the United. States. When. the registration
deadline had passed, only about 10,000, or less than ten
percent of the entire Chinese population in the united States,
obeyed the law and registered (Chu 1975:41) . However, the
merchant leadership and the advisability of the boycott was
seriously shaken by the federal court ruling that the

registration order was constitutional (Chu 1975:41). Posters

82
appeared everywhere in Chinatown which blamed Chen for the
ill-conceived idea of a boycott. Someone even put up $300
rewards for Chen's assassination (Chu 1975:41).

The total failure of the boycott against the registration
and against the advice of the Chinese minister forced the
Chinese in the United States once again to turn toward the
Qing government for any help they could possibly get. The Qing
government, on the other hand, decided that even an imperfect
treaty was better than no treaty at all because the Qing did
not and could not leave the matter entirely to the United
States. As the Zongli Yamen's note to the American minister
pointed out, ”Although the Chinese laborers are in foreign
countries, they are nonetheless Chinese descendants (chizi).
China cannot leave them unattended.” (HGCGSL 1/4:1425) .

The problem for the Qing government was, however, how to
get the best protection possible. A realistic View was
expressed by Cui Guoying, who succeeded Zhang Yinhua as the
Chinese minister to the United States. He composed a memorial
summarizing his three-year experience in the United States

with much insight:

The treaties between the Western countries and the Asian
countries have always been unequal. The situation is the
result of long development. It is not something which happened
in one day or two. Although it is hard to change the entire
situation, we have to be careful in planning every step in
advance (HGCGSL 1/4:1426-28) .

He suggested that China should take full advantage of the most

83
favored nation status to demand Chinese nationals' rights of
naturalization in the United States and a clause in the new
treaty which would stipulate mutual exchange of fugitives
(HGCGSL 1/4:1427).

Cui's suggestion indicated that some Qing officials,
especially those with extensive diplomatic experience, had
begun to realize the limits of diplomacy on the issue of
immigration and to see that the final solution of the problem
lay in American domestic politics, in which Chinese immigrants
had to participate as American citizens. Cui also believed
that the Qing should have more control over Chinese nationals
abroad who were supposedly under Qing protection (HGCGSL
1/4:1427).

Although there is no evidence showing that the imperial
court was very interested in the naturalization idea, Cui's
other suggestions were apparently accepted by the Qing court.
In a new treaty negotiation which was based on the abortive
treaty of 1888 and was conducted by the new Chinese minister
Yan Ru (1893-1896), the Qing court insisted that 1) the
suspension of Chinese laborers to the United States should
continue for ten years instead of twenty years; 2) Chinese
travelling via America to other countries should be allowed to
enter the United States; 3) the two countries should exchange
fugitives; 4) American citizens in China should register if
the United States insisted on registration of Chinese laborers

in its territory (HGCGSL 1/4:1429—1431). Yan Ru memorialized

84

the throne in early 1894 that:

The clause on fugitive exchange is especially important
because once Chinese nationals have arrived in the United
States they often invoke American law and enjoy the right of
self governing. If they have broken Chinese law or they are
wanted criminals, the Chinese consuls can do nothing to them,
although the consuls know their whereabouts. In the past
treaties there was no such clause....Now that Yang Ru and the
United States are negotiating a treaty with a clause on
fugitive exchange, Chinese nationals will have something to be
afraid of. Thus Chinese law can be applied overseas and not
only protection but also restraint can be accomplished (HGCGSL
1/4:1430) .

On 17 March 1894 a treaty was signed and nine months later
exchanged.between China and the United States which stipulated
that 1) ”The Chinese laborers shall be absolutely prohibited
from.coming to the United States for a period of ten years;”
2) Article one did not apply to Chinese laborers who had
parents, wife, children, or one thousand dollars' property or
credit in the united States; 3) The prohibition did not apply
to Chinese other than Chinese laborers and to those who were
on their way to other countries via the United States; 4) the
Chinese in the united States were given the privileges of
citizens of a most favored nation, ”excepting the right to
become naturalized citizens,” and the united States had the
right of necessary regulation, to which the Chinese had
pledged not to object; 5) Chinese laborers residing in the
united States should register. The Chinese government could

set up a similar requirement for Americans residing in China;

6) The treaty was to be renewed automatically for another ten

85
years if neither country notified the other in six months in
advance (HGCGSL 1/4zl431—1432; Tsai 1983:100). The fugitive
exchange was stipulated in a separate treaty (HGCGSL
1/4:l436-37).

The Zongli Yamen memorialized the throne for the treaty's
ratification, saying: ”Frommnow on the Chinese residing in the
United States will be immune from mistreatment." (HGCGSL
1/4:1437-38). However, the treaty was in fact a major defeat
for Chinese merchants and laborers in the United States
because, as I have pointed out earlier, the flourishing of the
Chinese community in the United States relied heavily on the
free migration of Chinese laborers. After the 1894 treaty and
the registration of Chinese laborers in the United States, it
was nearly impossible for most Chinese to migrate between the
two countries legally. As a result, after the mid-18905 many
Chinese began to adopt new means to evade the new regulations
in order to enter or reenter the United States (Chu 1975:40-
46).

One way to avoid future problems was to claim the native—
born status which would entitle anyone to citizenship. If
Chinese-Americans had little ambition or interest in
participating in American politics and therefore had little
interest in naturalization for that purpose, they wanted the
citizenship for very practical reasons: to.migrate between the
two countries and to bring their relatives—-presumably their

own children--to the United States (Chu 1975:43). In order to

86
bring more people to the United States, many claimed.more than
ten sons.’

Another way was to claim.business shareholder (more than
$1,000) status. A Chinese laborer or farmer who wanted to
visit his family in China temporarily would go to San
Francisco or other big cities to find a willing Chinese
merchant or a merchant relative. He needed to pay a small fee
for being accepted as a ”business partner.” The money was of
course well spent because not only could the laborer come back
to the States himself, but he could also ”get married" in
China and later bring children to the "gold mountain country“
(jinsha g'uo; Chu 1975:45). According to some old Chinese
immigrants' recollection, there was a business firm called
Xinguanghe which had more than one hundred ”partners”
investing and withdrawing their shares over about ten years.
The real shareholders, it was believed, were only three (Chu
1975:45). As time went on, many merchants made false
partnership a sideline business (Chu 1975:45).

For those people who could not find a helpful merchant to
accept them as ”shareholders,” they might ask a buddy or a
relative to acknowledge a $1,000 debt, which would give them
the right to come back to the United States again (Chu
1975:45—46). Many others simply entered and stayed in the

United States while ”on their way to other countries" such as

 

'Most Chinese did not want to bring their daughters to
the united States. Therefore they reported their daughters
as sons (Chu 1975:44).

87
Cuba and Mexico. In 1905 for example, 320 Chinese laborers on
their way to Mexico ”disappeared” in the United States (Yang
et a1. 1989:443).

It should be pointed out, however, that the scale of
illegal immigration must have been very limited, because the
statistics of Chinese in America since the late nineteenth
century showed declines instead of increases. In 1890, there
were 107,488 Chinese immigrants in the United States; in 1900,
89,863; and in 1910, the number was only 71,531 (Yang et al.
1989:441).

At any rate, the 1894 treaty did not solve the
immigration issue between.China and the United States once and
for all as the Qing government hoped. It led to continued law
evasions on the part of Chinese immigrants and it failed to
check the increasing hostility toward Chinese of all classes
by U.S. legislative and law enforcement agencies (McKee
1977:29, ,passiml in. chapt 2). The 1894 treaty’ in fact
gradually introduced the immigration issue between the two
countries into a new phase, in which the United States
legislative and other governmental agencies, the Bureau of
Immigration (established in 1892) in particular, "worked
consciously and actively for total exclusion” of Chinese
within as well as outside of America (McKee 1977:29). In this
new phase the Chinese community in the united States and its
territories began to struggle not so much to bring new

immigrants to the United States as not to be totally driven

h

88
out of the country, a country which Chinese-Americans had

finally decided to choose as their permanent home (HGCGSL

1/4 :1444-59) .

A series of new developments in the exclusion policy in
the late 18905 and early 19005 made the mistreatment of
Chinese beyond the immediate concern of Chinese immigrants
themselves and forced the Chinese-Americans to appeal to the

general public in China not just to the Qing court. In 1898

When the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands, the
exclusion policy was extended to Hawaii; one year later Major
General Elwell S. Otis introduced the exclusion policy into
the Philippines (McKee 1977:35; Tsai 1983:101). In 1902 an
eke lusion act further confirmed that the exclusion law was
applicable to these new areas possessed by America or under
the U.S. control, and Chinese residents there could not enter
the American mainland (McKee 1977:64) . The extension of the
e3(€2.1usio'n to these new territories, especially to Hawaii, was
Sj~97nificant not only because the fear of exclusion of Chinese

from places other than America proper was confirmed, but also

b I 0 O l I
ecanise Chinese commercral and other economic interests in

Iia‘vaii and Philippines were much greater than in the U.S.

Chinese immigration to Hawaii began in 18505 and, unlike

lihese in America proper, many Chinese contract laborers and
n1
archants brought their families with them and stayed in

1'3: '
awaii as permanent residents there (Yang et al. 1989:361) .

era.

89

In the mid-18805, there were 25,000 Chinese in the Hawaiian

Islands, constituting one-fourth of the entire population
there; there were 219 Chinese stores, about one—third of the

total stores in Hawaii (Li and Yang 1990:144-46). It was

therefore not just coincidence that the idea of boycotting
American goods was first advocated by Chinese immigrants in
Hawaii (see Chapter TWO) .

The new Chinese minister, Wu Tingfang (1897-1902), the

most competent minister of all,' protested the extension most

Vigorously for an additional reason: only Chinese were

excluded in Hawaii, despite the fact that there were Japanese,
Koreans, and other Asians in the Hawaiian Islands (Yang et al.
1 9 8 9:362) .

Chinese pride was also seriously hurt by new regulations
and practices against not only Chinese laborers but also
CIii-Siamese merchants, students, and even Qing officials.
Merchants were frequently denied entry because of insufficient
information on their certificates (McKee 1977:35) . A former
iInll'ligration official was allegedly instructed that if any
c1"111-11e5e merchants arrived at New Orleans and he had no time to
eXamine them, the merchants were to be deported without
eahta-Jil'tination (McKee 1977:75) . Students were denied entry on

\

sch 'According to _Tsai (1983:100), Wu, a British-trained

th Olar and a prominent international lawyer, "was one of
e ablest proponents of the Chinese view and an influential

tic of America's exclusion policy. " . . . "Wu did more than

A1143? other single individual to present China's case to the
$2:-

e

ican public . ”

90

grounds of insufficient knowledge of English, poorly defined

purpose of study, insufficient documents, and even eye

infections (McKee 1977:42,69—70,96; HGCGSL 1/4:1452). The most
well known case of mistreatment of Chinese officials was that
of Tom Kim Yung, a military attache of the Chinese legation,

thrown into prison by the police in San

in 1903 (A Ying

who was beaten,

Francisco, and then committed suicide

1962:102; McKee 1977:81).

Those Chinese who eventually managed to get into the

Uni ted States experienced various humiliating treatment by

American immigration officials. They were put into shabby

detention sheds for weeks while waiting for proper

authorization or documents." Worse still was to be examined

With the Bertillon system of identification, which was

introduced in 1903 with funds authorized by the U.S. Congress
( (HGCGSL l/4:1453; McKee 1977:67-68). The system was allegedly

- a scientific method of identifying criminals by the accurate

measurement and inspection of the'naked body" (McKee 1977:74) .
If these practices hurt personal and national pride, they

also seriously threatened the very livelihood of Chinese-
Arnericans. In 1903, Chinese merchants in the United States
Sent a petition to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
( Wei wu bu, founded in 1902) condemning the exclusion acts and

athkisng for a better treaty with the United States when the

\

be 'For detailed discussion of the "shed” and Chinese
SDonse to it see Chapter Three.

 

91

1894 treaty expired in 1904 or for the abolition of the

exclusion treaty in its entirety (HGCGSL 1/4:1444-1459).'

While it is hard to say that the petition played a decisive
role in influencing the Qing's decision to have a new treaty
with the United States, the fact was that Liang Cheng, who
succeeded Wu Tingfang as Chinese minister (1903-07) , informed

the U.S. Department of State in December 1903 that China

intended to terminate the 1894 treaty and negotiate a new
irnrnigration treaty with the United States. In the meantime,

Chinese-Americans realized that the Qing government was too
weak to help the cause of Chinese immigrants substantially,

EVen if the Qing government was willing to do so, and in early
19 0 5 when the new treaty negotiation between China and the
United States came to a stalemate and was to be continued in
China, they appealed to merchants and the general public in
China for help. Their Chinese compatriots, much to the
s‘~13l:"1>rise of the United States and other foreign powers,

responded with a nationwide boycott against American goods in

1905.

\

.l‘hreet'rhe details of the petition are discussed in Chapter

 

Chapter Two
The Making of Anti-Exclusion Public Opinion

The news of American discrimination against Chinese
immigrants, travelers, and students in the United States had
begun to appear in Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, Guangzhou
(Canton), Shanghai, and other large Chinese cities in the late
nineteenth century.’ When the Chinese-Americans directly
appealed to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce for help in early
May 1905, the Chinese urbanites' response was almost instant
and surprisingly strong." A strategy of national boycott
against American goods was quickly decided on 10 May 1905'"
and the boycotters set loose a deluge of anti-exclusion
pro tests in a variety of publications and public speeches.
The boycott movement against American mistreatment of
C1”-lj—Jmese immigrants was not just another example of the mass
é1r1t:i-—foreign agitation which had been so common since the
Se<-=c>nd half of the nineteenth century in China. It impressed

‘

V 'In such newspapers as Shenbao, Shibao, Hangzhou
ernacular, China Daily (Huazi ribao) .

( "Apparently surprising to American policy-makers
Cohen 1990:57).

Q t "'On 10 May 1905, the recently founded Shanghai Chamber
a ?onmerce held a meeting in which a national boycott
tgalnst American goods was decided. The meeting also decided
t cat the boycott was to began in two months (later changed
S t 2 0 July 1905) if the inmigration policy of the United
ates did not change (Shibao, 11 May 1905) .

92

93

historians by its scope and the sophisticated manner in which

Chinese urbanites confronted a great foreign power.‘ As Akira
Iriye points out, the boycotters were not blind xenophobes.
Neither were they revolutionary conspirators. They were common
Urbanites--the gentry, merchants, journalists, students, and
other urban dwellers--who employed “civilized words and acts"
in order to unite and regain national rights (Iriye 1967:223-
224 ) . In its wide range of participants and sympathizers, the
boycott was truly a movement of the public.

To understand why a relatively isolated diplomatic issue
had sparked such a large popular upheaval and why the movement
was so rational and peaceful, it is crucial to understand the
SOCial and institutional changes in late nineteenth and early
twéntieth century China which transformed the nature of late
Qing politics. The question is what changes are really

necessary and relevant to put the boycott into a broader
perspective.

Akira Iriye has insightfully related the boy'cott to an
er"‘eztging public opinion in late Qing China which was rational
and progressive (Iriye 1967) . Like many other diplomatic
1aqisdzorians, however, his main concern is quite narrow. In his

Q 0 I I I O 0
age, he focuses on public opinion's impact upon Qing foreign

\

 

be 'Historians are also impressed by the rational and

bb?ceful manner of the popular movement. As Akira Iriye
ihlnts out: “What distinguished the years after the Boxer
‘ Qident was the public's self—consciously disciplined and

l g a~\Ii1ized' way of confronting the foreign powers. " (Iriye
s7:223).

94
policy, and he therefore has little to say about the making
and the nature of public opinion in general and the boycott
ideology in particular. I shall broaden his study by examining
the way in which the new political discourse was formed and
its nature. These questions are important because the
boycotters not only contributed to the emerging public opinion
but: also were guided by it. More importantly, what was new in
the political realm at the turn of the century was first of

all the fresh way politics was discussed.

In the nineteenth century, influential political ideas
were often written in forms such as memorials, private letters
and books rather than newspaper essays. In other words, in
nineteenth century China, modern media, most notably daily
neWSpapers, did not provide means for serious political
dJisczourse and politics was not something to be discussed in

public and by the public. Lin Zexu, one of the first Chinese
Who recognized Western military superiority, disclosed his
ideas in memorials and private letters. Wei Yuan published his
Sea- defense ideas and elaborated his idea of "using barbarians
to control barbarians“ in the famous book, Haiguo tuzhi
( Treatise on maritime kingdoms) of 1842. For all its
E.QD'Lzllarity later, Haiguo tuzhi was initially more an
intellectual exercise of the author than a policy suggestion
Q): an essay for public consumption. It circulated only among
we :1 , . . . . .
Yuan 5 friends and scholar—offiCials like himself.

A .
l tIfxough it was commented on and criticized by other scholar-

95

Officials such as Feng Guifen, Guo Songtao, and Liang Qichao,
it was not until 1858, sixteen years after its original
Printing and one year after Wei's death, that Haiguo tuzhi was

recommended to high ranking officials (Wang 1963:145-6) .
Feng Guifen (1809-1874), also a scholar-official, was
Probably the first man to apply to China's modern problems the
term ziqiang (self-strengthening) . His ideas also anticipated
the famous phrase zhongxue wei' ti xixue weiyong (Chinese
learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning
for practical application), a slogan to be made famous a
generation later by Zhang Zhidong in the 1890s. His famous
Ji aobinlu kangyi (Protests from the study of Jiaobin), four
es Says dealing with governmental, financial, educational, and
other aspects of China's moderniza tion, was not intended for
publication. Feng showed the essays to Zeng Guofan, who
suggested publication. The author declined, although he
aZL:Lowed his friends to read them or make copies (Teng and

Fairbank 1966:50).

Clearly in nineteenth century China political discourse
was formed by a very small group of elites in rather a
different manner than that of the early twentieth century.
All the above-mentioned scholar-officials were jinshi degree
ho J~c3ers and well versed in literary classics. Their readers
were definitely very limited, not just because their books

we): . .
e not published but also because they were excluSively

V473“

itten in classical Chinese. Although people of other social

96

Classes were also politically vocal occasionally in various

forms--poetry, posters, petitions, prose--there was little
linguistic and content relationship among these relatively
independent political discourses.’ Thus antiforeign religion
movements tended to be locally-important. Other than general
hostility toward foreigners there was no consensus on issues
facing Chinese and China as a whole and on the strategies and
tactics to deal with them.

The significant developments since the late nineteenth
Century involved not just the many new concepts introduced
into China at this time, but also changes in a number of
r e lated areas: the use of telegraph services for news reports
and other communications; the rise of a commercial daily press
which provided forums for political discussions; the
colilimercialization and politicization of urban entertainment;
the emergence of a new linquistic style which had enormous
intellectual and political significance; and, finally, the
QZlfi‘cnnrth of a new type of intellectuals--professional writers,
edLlcators, and social critics. Together these structural
Q1"lariges helped to shape the boycott movement and its ideology.
S3117mm virtually all the structural and institutional changes
in mass communication, which I shall describe shortly,

Q>Qcurred outside of direct state control or with tacit state

eCognition, they were part of expanding public sphere. As a

 

1 *For a collection of anti-foreign literature in the
a"Tue nineteenth century see Wang Minglun (1984) .

97

result, as the 1905 boycott movement demonstrated, politics in

China began to become mediated public event.‘

1. rdedia
One of the factors that made it possible for the 1905

boycott to be a nationwide movement was a shared national

language. By a shared national language, I mean two things.

First of all, the development of modern technology in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided for the

first time in Chinese history the means of modern

cornmunication. The telegraph and modern newspapers greatly

sIDeeded up the process of information exchange so that the

Same political issues could be simultaneously addressed

nationwide. Secondly, a shared national language also meant
that: linguistically the protest rhetoric was to a great degree
trans-regional and cut across various social classes in its
vocabularies, syntactic patterns, and idiomatic expressions.
This new national language was not in the strict classic

fOrm (wenyan) which conveniently expressed both Confucian
Q0S-I'aopolitan and provincial ideologies. It was also different

from vernacular forms which were closer to spoken languages

\
'Expounding on Habermas, John B. Thompson has pointed

22‘:- : ' . . .the development of mass communication has
1 iconstituted the boundaries between public and private
b): fe. . . . Power was rendered more visible and decision-making
Qvgcesses became more public, . . . [Publicized political
l S Qnts become] mediated public events. . . " (Thompson

S 0:241. Italics in original).

 

98
but lacked the sophistication and profoundness of wenyan. It
Was a language adopted by wide spectrum of the traditional
elites - imperial degree holders - and new school students. I
will. have much more to say about this emerging national
language later. Let us first look at the means of verbal

comrnunication of the boycott discourses.

When the treaty negotiation between the United States and
China on the Chinese immigration issue was transferred to
Beijing in early 1905, due to the alleged refusal of Liang
Cheng (then China's minister to the United States) to
endorse the treaty, Chinese in America had a great sense of
crisis. Around 10 a.m. (about 11—p.m. Shanghai time) on 4 May
19 05, a special telegram from Washington reached Shanghai
which read: "Liang Cheng, the minister to the United States,
has been negotiating a Chinese immigration treaty with the
Uni ted States for months. The government of the United States
a.‘:"7l-$>.‘.i.sts on [exclusion] and refuses to compromise.“ The next
I"11(33E‘Iriing the ominous news was in Shanghai Shibao (JDSZL
3‘ 9 S 6 :13) .
In desperation and fear of betrayal, overseas Chinese
Sent telegrams to various departments of the Qing regime and
to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. According to one source,
a t least twenty—one telegrams from the overseas Chinese in the
hited States were received by the Ministry of Foreign

A
E fairs (Wai Wu Bu) and other departments and high ranking

99

officials of the Qing government between 9 May and 13 May 1905
(Chang 1973:116). Another source confirmed this flood of
telegrams, saying: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been
receiving telegrams almost every day from provinces and
overseas Chinese since early this month [May]. On the single
day of 13 May alone it received four wires from Chinese in
America.” (JDSZL 1956:13) . Likewise, after the meeting of 10
May 1905 which discussed possible actions against American
exclusion laws, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce publicized
their decisions nationwide by sending telegrams to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and twenty-one cities throughout

China (Zhang 1966:45).'

The 1905 anti-American boycott is the first political
extent in modern China which used the telegraph extensively in
mobilizing and organizing a popular movement. As early as the
18 803 Li Hongzhang developed a national telegraph system by
linking the international cables, which had previously
tehninated at Shanghai, first to Tianjin and then to Beijing;
branch wires were then extended to many large inland cities.
Since then memorials had flashed by telegraph from the

p:‘c-l‘nlnces to the Grand Council (Spence 1990:219). Among the

e
arliest users of the telegraph were newspapermen. In 1882

\

( 1‘1 ’The twenty-one cities were Hankou, Yichang, Shashi

( hubei); Zhenjiang, Nanjing, Suzhou, (Jiangsu); Tianjin

( §bei); Chongqing (Sichuan); Yantai (Shandong); Jiujiang

( langxi) ; Wuhu, Anqing, Chizhou (Anhui); Guangzhou, Shantou
Qhuangdong); Fuzhou, Xiamen (Fujian); Wuzhou (Guangxi);
l S Eggsha (Hunan); Hangzhou (Zhej iang); and Hong Kong (Zhang

100

Shenbao made use of the new Tianj in-Shanghai telegraph line to
publish the first telegraphic dispatch in Chinese journalism
(Lee and Nathan 1987:363) . Guangdong, another center of the
boycott, also saw the rapid development of telegraphy in
18803 . In 1884 lines were strung between Guangzhou and
Shanghai and between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Later, the
SYstem was extended to all parts of the province. By the end
035 1908 there were 1,200 miles of telegraph lines in
Guangdong. A telegraph school in Guangzhou was established in
1887 to train operators for the system (Rhoads 1975:20) . As
of 1895, Shanghai had telegraph connections with Nagasaki,
Vladivostok (Haisen wei), Singapore, London, and San
1"fin-"Eutucisco. Domestically, Shanghai could reach Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanhaiguan, Baoding, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Nanning,
Nanj ing, Hankou, and Hong Kong (Zhang 1990:930-931) . By 1910
there were 560 telegraph offices in China, and about 28,000

mi lee of overhead line. (Elvin and Skinner 1974:10) .
Before the twentieth century, by comparison, the

1:
e legraph did not play a noteworthy role in connecting Chinese

in . .
any popular upriSing. For the 1905 boycott movement,

hcwever, the telegram became an organizational necessity. In
thé telegram to the twenty-one cities, the Shanghai Chamber
Q t Commerce suggested allowing a two—month grace period for
thé United States to change its course. Accordingly, chambers

6E commerce of all the twenty-one cities would wait for

f A
urther notice of the next step from Shanghai. This carefully

 

101
designed tactic required timely exchange of information. Only
the telegraph could circulate the information promptly.

The telegraph is politically significant when we consider

the fact that in many later political movements-—the May
Fourth movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth movement of 1925,
the 1931 movement against Japanese aggression of China, and
SO forth--telegrams were sent, usually from large cities such
as Shanghai, to cities nationwide. It is hard to imagine that
any national political agitation could have been quickly
orchestrated without the telegraph.

The telegraph was also linguistically significant, which
in turn tremendously enhanced its political role. Telegrams
were normally written in short set phrases for brevity and
lower cost. The set phrases of the telegraphic language
a'ES‘thed many expressions which were quickly and widely used by
neWSpapers. In fact, it was telegraphic phrases, with their
conciseness, rhythm and profound meanings, that standardized
“any popular expressions of the boycott. The Shanghai Chamber
Os Commerce's telegram of 10 May 1905 to the Ministry of
IP01Teign Affairs may serve as an example. It read: ”American
16""8 and regulations maltreat Chinese, extending from workers
he. merchants. ...This is a serious matter influencing the
national polity and people's life (guoti minsheng) . [We] plead

[with you] to refuse. to sign the treaty so as to assert
116‘ t ional rights (guoquan) and protect commercial

i .
IIterests. . . ." (Zhang 1966:44) . In this particular telegram,

102

Such: fairly new concepts as guoti minsheng and guoquan were

adopted.
More importantly, such expressions as meilie (American
Exclusion Act), you gong ji shang (extending from workers to
merchants) and xiangjie buyong meihuo (mutually exhort not to
use American goods) became standard expressions of the
Incrureernent. Later disputes on the specific methods of boycott
Ciidfl riot question any of these expressions; rather, all parties
tried to justify their approaches by citing principles
errf-IDcpdied in the telegraphic language.‘ The four-word phrase
buyong meihuo (do not use American goods) was repeatedly
articulated in various public speeches. And in a newspaper
a"1:11—31Ouncement of 1 September 1905, the Speech Society of Public
Loyalty (Gongzhong yanshuo hui) accused the merchants who sold
A:liwmeitzlican goods of violating “nonuse-ism' (buyong zhuyi, JDSZL

l 9 5 6 : 70) .
The wording of the telegram was the result of serious
di sCrussions of merchants'and official observers at the 10 May
[ItI‘EE‘EEt:ing. Originally someone proposed.the idea of "prohibition"
(2.15. 'using American goods (jinyong meihuo) during the meeting.
Yang Shiqi, a Qing official of the Commerce Department who
was sitting in on the meeting as an official observer,
questioned the word prohibition, asking prohibition "by
‘fiilnt<3wn?" Since nobody could come up with an answer, the meeting

“*-.__

(:11 'For details of the boycott politics, please see
apter Five .

103

was stuck with the issue for more than a hour until another
government official, Shi Ziying, suggested changing
”prohibition“ (jinyong) into "mutually exhort not to use”

(xiangjie buyong, He Zuo 1956:57—58) .
The linguistic forms of telegrams also clearly revealed
the power relationship between the sender and the receiver.
On 10 May 1905, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce sent out two
Other telegrams. One was to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Commerce Department (Shang Bu) and the other to the
Nari-Yang and Beiyang Ministers. In these telegrams, the
proper authorities were addressed with all due respect. It
Should also be pointed out that the telegraph was
nationalized in 1904 (Liu 1985:116) . Therefore, from the very
13eg’fi.rining, the anti-American rhetoric was not totally out of

the Qing government's control.’

Compared with the telegraph, newspapers played an even
care pivotal role in publicizing the issue and in difquing

e - . . .
ht1_ excluSion ideas, Since the content of telegrams was

\

'Even after its nationalization in 1904, telegraph
behice did not immediately fall under total state control
axle ause the service was still open to the general public,
1 S Q certainly open to various voluntary associations in
( D 5 . The first newspaper and publishing law in China
6922'. g baozhang lu) was not promulgated until 1907.
Qi One the other hand, however, some sort of censorship
‘ :16- occur where state power was particularly strong. For
311% tance, in June 1905 when Zhili Governor General Yuan
elkai was not happy about Tianjin Dagong bao's favorable
bonds on the boycott, he ordered the local telegraph
lces not to serve the paper and the local post offices
to deliver the paper.

Q
not

 

104

known to the public only through newspapers. Newspapers also

had the advantage of being able to run long essays.
Newspaper essays often helped standardize the linguistic
patterns and the patterns of anti-American rhetoric.‘ As
early as 1873 Shanghai Shenbao published an editorial
addressing the issue of "piglet trade“-—the coolie traffic (A
Ying 1962:575-577). One of the most influential essays
condemning the exclusion laws was published in Shanghai Shibao

*

( The Eastern Times) in 1903 (A Ying 1962:588-597) .* In the

essay, the author of the paper for the first time stated the
legitimacy and necessity of the boycott. The essay started
wi th a discussion of American exclusion acts (lie) since
18 94 which, according to the author, were getting harsher
every year, to the extent that only animals could bear them
wi thout rebellion. No other nationals were treated in this
humiliating way. The essay continued,

‘ W .
Do estern proverb says 'better die than not to be free' and

B 31:19 Zhongshu says 'better die than to be greatly humiliated.’
Q Q 1'19 excluded is the worst case of not being free. Nothing
5. “€41 be more humiliating than being bodily measured by
‘57.; lgration officers at the entry ports of America. In this
world of competition, universal principles have no ruling,
aurds are impotent. [The only solution, according to the

then] is to unite into a big group and to boycott American

 

bl 'For a detailed analysis of the boycott discourse
ease see Chapter Three.

be. **The essay was originally published in Kit: Zhongguo

lac (New China daily) of Honolulu--a city in Hawaii, and

Dr er rerun in Shibao of Shanghai, one of the most
QQressive newspapers in China in that decade.

 

105

goods since the Chinese government is weak. The boycott will
Work because the exclusionists belong to the Labor Party. If
We boycott American goods it would eventually hurt those who
produce them-the Labor Party. Thus, American would be forced
to abolish the Exclusion Act. Furthermore, boycotting American
goods could also help our national industry. The boycott is
also the best and safest approach to the issue, for it is
within people's right to choose what goods to buy. The Chinese
government would not interfere and Americans would have no
excuse to exercise their power (qiangquan) (A Ying

1962 :588-95) .

The importance of the essay lies in the fact that it made
Several crucial points in plain and persuasive language.
Later on, many propagandist writings and speeches were more
or less elaborations of these points. The essay pointed out
that American racism against Chinese was against both
western principles of liberty and Chinese morality. It
a*d-\I‘c><:ated a boycott by Chinese people in spite of the
Q"°\fe:r:nment, since it was people's right to choose what to
buy . The essay also attributed the discrimination to the
Art"enrican Labor Party (Gongdang, A Ying 1962:592) . These themes
were echoed time and again in numerous ways.‘'
Equally if not more important was the more routine role
played by the newspapers - reporting the progress of the
movement. During the boycott movement of 1905-1906, Shenbao
and Xinwen bao were the two most widely circulated
hQWSpapers, yet their major role was basically confined to
reporting events instead of shaping the boycott discourse by

\
'See Chapter Three.

 

106

Publishing agitational essays. In addition to reporting what
Was happening, the newspapers also published anti-American
advertisements, which were often announcements of boycott
meetings; open letters to individuals and the public by such
prominent figures as Zeng Shaoqing and Lin Shu; public
speeches, and so on. Zeng Shaoqing constantly exchanged
letters with anti-American activists of other cities in
Sherzbao and his famous ”Farewell letter to the world" (Gaobie
tianxi'a shu) was published in Shibao and other newspapers
(Zhang 1966:158). It is hard to imagine that Zeng Shaoqing
col-1 1d have been the spiritual leader of the movement without

newSpapers.

Newspapers of different cities often quoted each other.
Shibao, for example, had a special section publishing boycott
an: ticles from other newspapers. Newspapers had the advantage
of both speed and large circulations. As early as the late
nineteenth century, residents of Suzhou could read Shanghai
Shelfibao the next afternoon (Bao 1971:105-6) . According to one
as timate, in the early twentieth century there were about

3
0 0 - 000 people in Shanghai who read newspapers (Zhang

19 90 :931) . It has to be pointed out that even in the early
t"Vehitieth century the regular readers of the newspaper con—
S:Ls‘ted of only a tiny fraction of Chinese urban dwellers. In
19 06 when Bao Tianxiao took the job as a major writer for

s -
hlbao, many of his relatives in Suzhou had objections (Bao

l ,
9'73-:322) . His father-in-law, among others, warned him that

 

107

the writers for the newspaper were a notorious breed, for they

did nothing but expose other people's privacy (Bao 1971:322) .
However, it is beyond any doubt that in the early twentieth
century newspapers were the most important medium shaping
Chinese language in general and boycott rhetoric in
particular. Newspapers' influence certainly went beyond their
readers. Many more people were exposed to newspapers through
attending public speeches, which were often oral versions of

written essays in newspapers (XWZL 1990\50:103-122) .

What, then, were the political positions and status of

3- earising newspapers during the boycott movement? There have
been many studies on the rise of the modern press in China
( Lee and Nathan 1985:360-395; Link 1981) . There is no need to

repeat all their findings here. Suffice it to point out that
in the nineteenth century Chinese newspapers' function was
15):: interily commercial, and in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries the Chinese press began to politicize in
1 ts content and language. The turning points were the defeat
(33 the Chinese navy by Japan in 1895 and the 1898 reforms.
Af he: the abortive reform attempt in 1898, however, the Qing
QQ\’e:rnment began to see newspapers as a dangerous threat in
publicizing subversive ideas. The Subao case of 1903 was the
hast example to show the limitations of the imperial court's
tolerance of the criticism of the press, and its capability

t— I O I ‘ I
Q inflict punishment upon subverSive newspapers (Link

 

108
1981:102-104) .

Subao, the most famous of all the revolutionary
newspapers, was founded in 1896 in the Shanghai International
Settlement, where it received Japanese financial aid and was
officially registered with the Japanese consulate as a foreign

property under the name of the Japanese wife of its first
manager, Hu Chang. The paper was initially a humble
establishment, but it became famous overnight in 1903 when six
of its editors and contributors were arrested for publishing
inflammatory essays against the Manchu rulers in China.
Al though the arrest and trial was a time-consuming process,
the accused were eventually put into prison and the paper shut
dowm. Several other revolutionary newspapers took over the
cause of Subao, but none lasted (Ge 1964:153,171—76) .

The crackdown on Subao, however, only suppressed the
revolutionary press. Newspapers of various other types were
St ill emerging and newspapermen gradually adjusted their press
to political reality. When the 1905 boycott began most
JrieVVSpapers appeared to be more information centers than
Schrces of political agitation. The more successful
neWSpapers were progressive but very moderate, some even
col'Ilservative in their political positions. Shenbao was not
radical most of the time. During the 1905 boycott, it confined
i ts role primarily to reporting instead of publishing
$91 tational essays. Zhongwai ribao took a conciliatory

DQ .
sition throughout the movement and became the voice of big

109
merchants who tried to end the boycott quickly and peacefully
(Fang 1982:345-346) . Shibao was the most progressive of the
decade and the most active and nationally influential
newspaper during the movement. Therefore a more detailed

account of its political background is necessary.

Founded by Di Chuqing in 1904 in Shanghai, Shibao had
used several stylistic innovations to become a modern
newspaper with a progressive flavor (Ge 1964:141-145) . The

paper was definitely not as polemical as the subversive Subao,
yet it promised political comments which “will deal with
important topics concerning the entire nation" (Ge 1964:149) .
I t; advocated reform instead of revolution. Its moderate stance
re flected the changing political view of Liang Qichao, for it
was he who funded the paper and wrote the introductory essay

for the first issue. In the introductory essay he wrote:

M13? should we publish Shibao? The classics say that "a
gentleman can maintain the Mean [zhong] at any time“
‘ - - Therefore, nothing is more important than time (shi) in
order to rule the country and lead people. To be aware of the
trend of the times [and to make the right choice at the right
I:3"<>Iuent] is not just a Chinese axiom. In the West, Darwin
invented the universal law of “things compete with each other
$36- the superior will win and the inferior will lose“ (wujin

lanze yousheng luebai) . Later on Spencer changed the
\

R - *The quotation I'junzi er shi zhong" is from Book of
Qites-thepoctrine of the'Mean. .Zhong means not to go
Thtremes in emotion and in action. (For the full text of
thee Doctrine of the Mean in English see Wing-tsit Chan,
p arms. and compiler, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,

qiiimceton: Princeton University Press, 1963. pp.97-114. The
Qtation is on p.99) .

110

principle into survival of the fittest. Those who are not
fit, even if they are superior will turn into inferior, and
those who fit, on the other hand, will change from inferior
to superior. The truth of winning and losing lies right
here.... In today's China, neither those who hold high
offices nor those who live in remote mountain valleys know
the world's grand trend, believing that they can cling to
thousand-year-old learning to deal with today's changes. But
the inadequateness of their old learnings shows, and they
cannot just get by for very long.

Thus, the wise and the ignorant from all corners of the
country debate passionately about the way in which the West
came out of turmoil and what they did to became strong. They
are running around, proselytizing and crying that we should
be like the West! While nobody would deny that the West is
in good order and strong, it is not clear that what they do
really suits our times. Confucius said: “Excess is as bad as

deficiency“. If we cannot catch up with the times, we will

degenerate day by day and the country will not be saved. If
we go too far ahead of the times, yelling wildly without
accomplishing anything, we will have other thorny problems
arise and the country will not be saved either....It is a
critical moment now! We, who share the same concerns, are
afraid of this and therefore found this newspaper, naming it
Shibao (The Times). As for our national essence, while paying
due respect, we will put aside whatever is obsolete. As for
the Western culture, while useful, we will put off whatever
is not suitable for today's China. We will do our best to
discuss major issues pertinent to our country and to the
world impartially and fairly from both positive and negative
PerSpectives. Thus we will provide national salvation
Strategies for government advice, and for people to

di scuss . . . .
Thus, our comments will be those which are suitable and

applicable. If not applicable to today's‘China even holy
Octrine and fancy rhetoric are impotent and instead cause
prOJoIems. Therefore we will encourage each other and
a”:E‘tilculate only what is applicable (Ge 1964:149-150) .
This restrained editorial policy deserves special attention
because of the important role the paper played in the
111°\rement. It is progressive but not agitating. It is
DI”Gan-minded yet critical of Western social and political

:heories and reality. It stressed the utility of Western

earning. On the other hand, it did not dismiss the Chinese

111

cultural essence (guocui); far from it. Liang Qichao was
never a wholesale Westernizer (Chang 1971) , and the owner of
the paper, Di Chuqing, was even more fond of the Chinese
national essence. He was a collector of Chinese paintings and
calligraphy who in 1900 had participated in Tang Caichang's
abortive uprising in Hubei against the Manchu rulers and later
fled to Japan. Disappointed with conspiratorial revolution,
he returned to China in 1904 to be a constitutional reformer
instead of a revolutionary (Ge 1964:141) . As the introductory
editorial claimed, the purpose of his paper was to advise the
government. The successfulness of the Shibao lay in the fact
that it skillfully struck a balance between politics,

cortunercial publishing, and modern journalism.
There were, of course, more radical newspapers published
during the boycott movement (Fang 1982:330-353) . But none of
them went so far as to openly and explicitly question the Qing
government's legitimacy in representing China internationally.
Besides, none of the radical newspapers founded during the
IT‘c>"ement had more than local influence or lasted long (Fang

1 9 82 :330-353) .'
\

1:1 'Because of the crackdown of radical/revolutionary
lEWSpapers in early 19005, notably the Subao incident of
IL 9 03, revolutionaries did not have newspapers in Shanghai in
H005. The most vocal radical newspapers were published in
Gang Kong. They were Zhongguo ribao, Shijie gongyi bao,
11:19 ngdong ribao, and Yousowei bao. During the boycott
thvement, at least two newspapers were founded to propagate
8 he cause. They were Baogong bao (Shanghai, by Man-Mirror
13%qu Society) and Meijing huagong juyue bao (Guangzhou).
e3 wever, neither paper lasted long. Baogong bao, for
a~3li‘nple, existed for only one month (Fang 1991:338-39) .

112

With the rise of the modern press, more traditional media

of political discourse did not cease to be important in
mobilizing the boycott. One obvious example is books
published prior to and during the boycott period. In 1904,
Liang Qichao's Notes on the Exclusion Law Against Chinese
Laborers (Ji huagong jingyue) was published in book form (A
ying 1962:487-521) . Also available now were The Mistreatment
01' Honolulu Chinese (Tanxiangsha huaren shounue ji) , and The
Mistreatment of Brethren (tongbao shouneu ji; A Ying 1962:553-
5 59; 522-552) . It is significant that these books were
irnportant and influential during the movement largely because
they were one way or another related to the newspapers.
Li ang's Notes on the Exclusion Law Against Chinese Laborers
was serialized first in the famous Journal of the New People
( Xingmin congbao) in 1904. The Mistreatment of Honolulu
Ch inese was published by Hangzhou Vernacular (Hangzhou baihua
bao) in 1903. And The Mistreatment of Brethren was given free“
of charge to the buyers and subscribers of newspapers (A Ying
1962:25-26). The close relationship between newspapers and
1300]: publishers during the period lay also in the fact that in
ealiltly twentieth century China, newspaper offices and
publishing institutions often shared the same buildings and
were run by the same kind of people - intellectual merchants.

Ia~-‘l:':xy people worked for both newspapers and book publishers

 

113
simultaneously (Bao 1971:245,250).
According to one study, in the early twentieth century
there were at least forty-four publishing houses in Shanghai

alone, only some of which, such as Shanghai Commercial Press

( Shangwu yinshu guan) , published both books and periodicals
( Zhang 1990:1029) . The increasing connections between
newspapers and book publishing in the early twentieth

century was obvious, though. Books were often advertised in
the newspapers, and newspapers also ran review articles on the
important books either to help their sales or spread their
ideas. The famous Subao case showed clearly that newspapers
played a very important role in publicizing a book, at least
from the Qing government's point of view (Ge 1964:153) . We
are very familiar with the story of how the Qing government
persecuted the publisher of Subao, which ran articles
introducing the subversive book, The Revolutionary Army, but
We do not know anything about what happened to Tatong shuju,
the publishing office of the famous book. One possible
e3'c2_E>.‘l.anation is that small book publishing offices were often
established on a temporary basis.
By comparison, newspapers were politically more important
than books. In the early twentieth century, the most
inbortant political debates were carried in periodicals. One
Q E the most obvious examples is the debate between
b$Volutionaries and reformers in Minbao and Xinmin congbao

( zluang and Wang 1963 2/1:4—10). Before Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-

114

san) founded Minbao in 1905, revolutionary ideas were barely
heard by the general public. Another indicator of how
newspapers replaced books as forums of political debate is
that the majority of influential political comments (shilun)
were published in newspapers and periodicals (Zhang and Wang
1962). The four-volume anthology (of commentary on current
affairs covering the ten-year period before the 1911
Revolution is revealing. For the five years from 1901 to 1905,
only seven books, about 200 pages out of 1,600 pages of the
total anthology, were politically significant, and among the
seven two were collections of periodical articles (Zhang and

Wang 1962) .
More detailed studies are needed to find out if the rise
0 f press media in early twentieth century China increased
the superficiality of political discussion. The fact is,
however, that newspaper essays were produced with much more
Speed, regularity, and popularity than books, and newspapers
more than books increasingly set the standard for the
linguistic patterns of political discourse. As far as the
a”fltlfi—American movement is concerned, although it is hard to
asSert that books echoed newspapers, there is little doubt
that books did not constitute a separate discourse whose
QC>1'1tent or language was distinct from that of newspapers. It
is significant intellectually that the anti-American movement

b:'=‘c>duced few high quality or thoughtful pamphlets and books.‘
\ .

'See Chapter Three.

115
Among those who had written books on American discrimination
issues, only Liang Qichao was well known. Even Liang's book

was by no means intellectually significant.

Aside from more formal publications, posters and
riandbills also appeared during the movement (A Ying 1962).
In Guangzhou, people even made kites with anti-American
ggfilogans on them (JDSZL l956/1zl—2). However, unlike earlier

gauz1ti-foreign religious movements (Wang 1984), anonymous
posters did not comprise an important part of the written
discourse of the anti-American boycott. Some of the posters
got: attention beyond their locale only through major
newspapers. Shenbao, for example, published handbills from
Songjiang county. (Shenbao 23 June 1905). ’

MOre important in popularizing anti—American ideas were
public speeches. Unfortunately there are few written records
1e 15 t of public speeches. However, several observations can be
made based on various sources.' As I pointed out earlier,
neWSpapers regularly published the news of public gatherings.
In these meetings, it was almost routine practice that public
Sipeeches were given. According to one source, after 20 July
1 9 05, when the movement reached its apex, there were meetings
he 1d almost every day (JDSZL l956/1:29) . In Shanghai a public
as331§>€i~ech society — Speech Society of Public Loyalty (Gongzhong
\

'The most important sources are newspapers and A Ying's

QILlection of anti-American literatures (A Yang 1962) .

116

yanshu hui) - was organized with Ge Zhong, a small merchant
with an intellectual background, as its leader. Speakers
‘ranged from the merchant leaders of the movement to a
thirteen-year-old student. On 20 July 1905, for example, the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce held a meeting to discuss the
specific ways of boycotting American goods. Participants in
the meeting included Shanghai merchants of various provincial
origins and journalists. At the meeting speakers included
almost all the most important figures of the boycott movement,
such as Zeng Shaoqing, Ge Zhong, Ye Haowo, and Wang Kangnian
(JDSZL 1956.1:29-30). WOmen had meetings of their own. On 17
July 1905, Shi Lanying chaired a meeting with a hundred
participants. Shi and.a female student, among others, spoke at
the meeting. In Suzhou, women's meetings were organized by the
Unbound Feet Society (Pangzu hui; JDSZL 1956/1:3l, 35). In
Guangzhou, the Humanitarian Voice Society (Rensheng yanshe)
organized. numerous meetings after the beginning of the
movement in May 1905. Originally it was planned to hold
meetings once a week, but later it was changed to one meeting
every other day, with seven to eight speakers and about seven
to eight hundred in the audience each time (JDSZL 1958:14).

Public meetings were not only held in large cities like
Shanghai and.Guangzhou, but were also reported.in counties and
small towns such as Jianping (in Rehe), Taicang and Changshu
(in Jiangsu), and Jiaxing (in Zhejiang).

In several ways oral and written discourse were

117

different. Since speakers varied in their social status and
speeches were strongly localistic in their dialects and
verbal expressions, there might be substantial variations in
these speeches either in their content or their linguistic
patterns. For instance, speeches often related anti—American
themes to specific concerns of the speakers and the audience.
Thus, for example, women's speeches stressed women's changing
status in China and their role in national salvation (JDSZL
l956/1:31). Speeches often debated specific boycott tactics.
Because speeches could create a special sense of intimacy
between speakers and listeners, they tended to be more senti-
mental and emotional. There was one report to the effect that
someone smashed.his American—made watch in a public gathering
(Shenbao, 23 July 1905). It was almost a routine practice to
sign names to petitions or pledges at the end of public
meetings. Since public speeches could easily get out of
control, the Qing government banned public meetings and
speeches first when it felt the necessity to end the boycott
(HGCGSL 1/4:1643-44).

Even given the fact that speeches tended to be variable
in their content and linguistic expressions, however,
available evidence strongly suggests that public speeches
did not differ substantially from written publications in
terms of content. And there were definite overlappings
between written and oral materials in vocabulary use and

idiomatic expressions. It is very significant that oral and

118

written discourses echoed each other, with written discourse
generally formalizing the expressions. In other words, public
speeches primarily played an intermediary role in translating
written discourse into intimate and easily understandable
form. Here again newspapers played a crucial role in
bridging the gap between oral and written discourse. Public

speeches often drew substantially from newspapers. On the
other hand, speeches were polished and edited (often just
adding some new vocabulary) only to be published in
newspapers again, as described vividly in Li Baojia's satiric
novel, A Short History of Civilization (Li 1962) . For
instance, news of women's meetings and speeches was published
in The World of Women (Nuzi shijie) . And there were even cases
in which public ”speeches“ were not made in oral form at all,
but simply presented in written form in the newspaper, because

of the speaker's dialect barrier (Shenbao, 23 May 1905) .

2. Language

I have discussed the role various media played during the
boycott movement. It is clear that various media did not
advocate the anti-American cause independently; rather, they
fed on each other, with newspapers playing the central role of
connecting and publicizing various writing and speaking
forms. The linguistic forms - literary classical (wenyan) or

vernacular (baihua) - used in boycott propaganda were also

119

important because language carried with it certain persuasive
powers for specific social groups due to its specific format
in addition to the message it delivered. Yan Fu's elegant
literary classic-style translation of Western books had
enormous appeal to Tongcheng school scholars such as wu Rurun
(Wang 1957:36-37) . On the other hand, vernacular writings in
the early twentieth century were clearly aimed at the social
classes who had limited education (Johnson in Johnson et al.
eds. 1987:34-72) .

The important works during the anti-American boycott were
written neither in purely classical nor in vernacular style.
They were written in a language which combined the classical,
vernacular, and imported vocabulary. Again taking the 1903
Xinzhongguo bao essay as an example, the potency of the
arguments made in the essay lay primarily in the way they were
presented linguistically, since the writer himself did not
have any authority otherwise. The essay was written in a new
linguistic style popularized by 'Liang Qichao in Japan which
was characterized by liberal use of new vocabulary and
sentence structures, and by clear and straightforward
presentation of political points of view (Nathan 1986:140-41) .
There were few archaic allusions, but when it seemed to be
neccessary, the author did not hesitate to blend Confucian
wisdom with Western axioms (A Ying 1962:588) . The two were not
only not contradictory, but also complemented each other

naturally. The article distinguished itself from classical

120

eight-legged essays by its extensive use of such neologisms as
zhuquan (sovereignty), shangzhan (commercial warfare), hequn
(grouping), gongli (univeral principle), jingzheng
(competition), dizhi (boycott), and also by its use of tables
of trade figures between China and the United States to

illustrate its point (A Ying 1962:588-596).
At almost the same time when Chinese newspapers began to
politicize in the last years of the nineteenth century, a
fresh political writing style was beginning to take shape.
There is little question that Liang Qichao played a very
important role in the first change of modern Chinese political
writing. His “new style prose", as Andrew J. Nathan points
out, “was a response to the needs of propaganda journalism.for
a style that could.reach a larger audience“ (Nathan 1986:140).
The change in prose style began to be apparent in Liang's
writings in Japan, where he founded Journal of the.New People
(Xinmin congbao) in 1898. Classical references, which were
common in his essays before the 1898 reforms, were reduced and
blended with foreign terms and allusions. He was one of the
first Chinese writers to make extensive use of Japanese terms.
Liang also began to free himself from classical grammar. His
sentences became longer and more complex (Nathan 1986:140-41) .
The influence of his style was acknowledged by many,
especially those who had little vested interest in classical
learning. It is obvious that the 1903 essay in Shibao exibited

all the characteristics of Liang's political writing.

121

The importance of Liang's writing lay in the very fact he
created a new linquistic style. At the turn of the century,
there existed. several kinds of linguistic discourses:
literary classical, semi-classical, and plain vernacular
(baihua, based largely on Beijing spoken vernacular). It is
not that others had to learn from Liang Qichao to add
neologisms into their writings. Rather, by adopting the new
semi-classical prose style, Liang Qichao gave the new writing
a prestigious status and legitimized its use in political
discussions, since as a provincial graduate degree holder
(juren) he might have easily used literary classical in his
political 'writing. The fact that. he chose to ‘write in
semi-classical fomm gave the new “linguistic form an
authoritative and erudite tone which was only associated with
literary classical style before. The subtle psychological
impact on its readers is comparable to that of the mayor who
was capable of speaking official French but chose to address
the local audience in their own dialect (Bourdieu 1991:68).
Spoken by a person who was well respected because of his
official status, the language carried an authoritative weight

it did not otherwise have.

It should be pointed out that even the new style writing
was familiar to only a limited number of city dwellers in
early twentieth century China (Johnson in Johnson et al. eds,

1987:34-72) . The newspaper essay style (baozhang wenti), as

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122

the new writing was called, necessarily distanced itself from
people's daily and personal (idiosyncratic) experience since
it was still different from colloquial speech” As a medium it
was useful to express abstract ideas and ideals with
profoundness and subtlety. But it lacked the effect of
intimacy of the spoken language. Practically, it was much
easier for the majority to understand if the newspaper was in
baihua vernacular. Actually, in early twentieth century China
there were almost no newspaper publications, with the notable
exception of Gnocui (National Essence, founded in 1904), that
used pure wenyan. Most newspapers used a linguistic style
closer to colloquial in their commercial and local news
reporting.

NOt surprisingly, the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries saw the first baihua movement in modern China,
though it had only limited success (Zeng in Gong ed.

l988:958—61).' Language reform. was advocated by many

 

'The degree of relative popularity of baihua versus
wenyan can be estimated by the publication and circulation
of religious materials compiled and published by Western
missionaries, who were particularly interested in mass
evangelizing. At first they tried romanization in local
dialects. In the fifteen-year period between 1851 and 1866,
for example, some thirty-seven missionaries, more than
one-tenth of all the Protestant missionaries who had worked
in China, published Chinese materials in some form of
phonetic script (De Francis 1950:22). Yet the romanized
works formed only a small portion of the total volume of
materials produced by the missionaries. And it should be
noted that in this period not a single romanized item was
published in the Mandarin dialect which was spoken by
seventy percent of the population of China (De Francis
1950:23). To reach a larger audience, the missionaries felt
that their chances were greater of persuading the Chinese to

 

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Q: :1

T.

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s.

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123

reform—minded Chinese intellectuals, who believed that low
literacy was responsible for the backwardness of China and
that low literacy was in turn accounted for by the difficulty
of Chinese ideographic characters (Zhao and Zeng in Gong
1988:998-1031). In the first few years of the twentieth
century, several baihua newspapers were founded (Fang 1982).
The most well known were Hangzhou baihua bao (1901-1904),
Suzhou baihua bao (1901), Xin baihua (1903, in Japan), Anhui
suhua bao (1904), Baihua (1904, in Japan), Yangzijiang.baihua
bao (1904), Zhongguo baihua bao (1904), and Zhili baihua bao
(1905; Ding 1982).

The purpose of baihua newspapers was of course the
presumed accessibility to larger audiences. Yangzijiang
.baihua.bao, for' instance, was originally founded in Shanghai
in June 1904. After four issues, the editor decided that
'people's knowledge was elementary and they could not fully
understand wenyan, " and he therefore changed the paper to

baihua (Ding 1982:210). Few statistics exist on the sales of

 

accept the milder reform of writing the Mandarin colloquial
in the transitional ideographic script. They were therefore
more interested in

replacing the classical by the vernacular style than they
were in abandoning the ideographs for an alphabetic form of
writing. According to John De Francis, in the three years
from 1900 to 1902 the total output of Bibles or Bible
portions in all forms amounted to 4.1 million volumes. But
only 47,000 of these, or about one percent, were in
romanized form. Of the overwhelming majority of volumes
published in Chinese characters, 1.3 million were in
classical or semi-classical style and 2.8 million volumes
in character colloquial; of the latter only 67,600 were in
non-Mandarin dialects (De Francis 1950:24).

124

baihua newspapers. Fortunately we have some rough ideas on the
sale of Zhili baihua bao, which was one of the few baihua
newspapers active during the anti-American boycott (Fang
1982:330—353) . Zhili baihua bao had distribution offices in
Beijing, Shanghai, Anhui, Tianjing, Nanjing, Fengtian, and
Tokyo. 3,000 copies of the first two issues were quickly sold
out, and 2,000 more were therefore printed (Ding 1982:286).
While we do not know how many were actually sold, the fact
that few of the baihua newspapers published in the early
twentieth century can be located nowadays seems to indicate
their limited circulation. Their sales were nowhere near those
of Shenbao' and their importance was local rather than na-
tional. At any rate, few of the baihua newspapers survived
more than two or three years. Zhili baihuabao existed less
than a year. Hangzhou baiha bao probably lasted the longest -
from June 1901 to January 1904, less than three years (Ding

1982:63-87) .
There are several reasons for the short life of various
baihua newspapers. Most importantly, these papers were
usually founded by people of little political, financial, and
intellectual substance. Anhui suhua bao, for example, was
founded by Chen Duxiu when he was only twenty-four. And the
manager of Hangzhou baihua bao was a school teacher (Ding

1982:163, 63) . Suzhou baihua bao was founded by Bao Tianxiao,

 

'As early as 1390, Shenbao had a daily circulation of
20,000 (Zhang 1990 931).

 

'l I

125
a shengyuan and school teacher (Bao 1971:168) . Since modern
printing machines were not available in Suzhou, the paper used
woodblock printing instead. The paper could not continue
simply because, according to Bao, after less than three years
of publication there was no place to store those woodblocks
(Bao 1971:170).
' Clearly, baihua newspapers did not have the substance and
prestige to survive the transitional period. In the early
twentieth century, newspapers depended on and found their
readers primarily among people who could both understand and
afford such newspapers as Shenbao and Shibao. The
transitional nature of the period in so far as language was
concerned was made more apparent with the publication of
Guocui bao in Shanghai in 1905. The monthly journal was
entirely in wenyan and aimed at preserving Chinese culture.
Among its contributors were Deng Shi, Liu Shipei, Zhang
Taiyan, Wang Guowei, and other so-called masters of national
learning (Zhang and Wang 1963 2/1:16-l8) . Wenyan was still
associated with power, money and prestige. On the other hand,
baihua, while easier to understand, carried little persuasive

and authoritative weight with it.

Apparently the most influential, though by no means
exclusive, mode of address during the boycott was neither
baihua nor wenyan. The semi-classical language seemed to

provide a unique medium which could combine the traditional

126
morality with.imported ideas and connected the upper and lower
classes. The semi-classical language also had.both some of the
symbolic prestige of wenyan and some of the popularity of
baihua.

The real significance of this new language was probably
its publicness. It was a language of publicity. The choice of
terms and sentence structure was not for their accuracy or
aesthetic value but for simplicity and.clarityu' In terms of
conveying messages and introducing ideas, the new language
overwhelmed classical Chinese by its quantity not its

quality." It was a public language which was out of state

 

'For comparison purposes, we may recall the way Yan Fu
did his translation, which was not for publicity. Yan Fu
emphasized xing (accuracy) and ya (elegance) in translation.
He would ”ponder for a month over one term.” He also refused
to adopt neologisms from Japan and often coined new
expressions based upon classical Chinese (Reynolds
1993:124).

"One of the most important reasons for the new
language to develop so fast at the turn of the century is
because of the large quantity of translations (Zhang ed.,
1990:907-24). The language style, once adopted by many,
began to develop beyond anybody's control. Liang Qichao,
whose writing was the example for many, deplored later the
bad influence sloppy translation had had upon writing style:
“During the period 1902-1903 translation work especially
flourished, and there were more than several dozen
periodicals with fixed publication schedules. For each new
book that appeared in Japan, there were often several
translations [into Chinese]. New ideas swept in like
wildfire, but they were all introduced in the so—called
'Liang Qichao style'--disorganized, unselected, incomplete,
ignorant of conflicting interpretations, concerned solely
with quantity. Still, Chinese society welcomed these, the
way that people in a disaster area gulp down grass roots and
tree bark, frozen birds and dead rats, ravenously and
indiscriminately without asking whether these things are
digestible much less whether they might make you sick. In
point of fact, no safe substitutes were available.“ (Quoted

127
control and elite monopoly mainly because this newly—developed
mode of address was anchored on the modern commercial press.
Since newspapers and new-style writing had played crucial
roles in constructing anti-American discourse, the
intellectual leaders of the movement should be found.primarily

among those who were associated with the modern press.’

3. Intellectual Leadership

The intellectual leadership of the movement were
basically' petty' intellectuals (including intellectual
merchants). It is striking that the politically and
intellectually most eminent figures of the period, such.as Yan
Fu and Zhang Taiyan, were conspicuously silent on the issue."
After all, Yan Fu was one of the best scholars of Western
learning at the time, and he was in Shanghai in 1905 to help
in the establishment of the Fudan Public School (Fudan
gongxue, later Fudan University). There are several possible
reasons for Yan Fu's silence. He was never as politically

active as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Zhongshan. His

 

in Reynolds 1993:124).

'For detailed analysis of both linguistic style and
content of the boycott discourse, please see Chapter Three.

"On 6 July 1905, Yan Fu, among others, was invited by
Shanghai's leading merchants to make a speech at an anti-
exclusion gathering (Zhang 1966:150). This is the only
occasion, however, on which his name was associated with the
boycott movement.

128

famous translations of Western learning were all in elegant
wenyan full of classical allusions and never intended for the
public. According to Wang Shi, after 1898 he became even more
conservative politically. In 1904, he allegedly told Sun
Zhongshan, while visiting London, that the character of the
Chinese populace was so evil and the Chinese masses were so
ignorant even reform could not be very useful. Only through
education could the situation be changed gradually (Wang
1957:64). It is understandable that he was not interested in
popular movements sudh as the anti-American boycott. Zhang
Taiyan, like Sun Zhongshan, was a revolutionary vigorously
advocating the overthrow of the Manchu regime. It is
significant that none of the well—known revolutionaries were
active in.the anti-American movement. This fact indicated that
the movement was not in.tune with the revolutionary agenda and
was politically moderate enough to be tolerated by the Qing
government.’

Eminent scholar-officials were also silent on American
discrimination against Chinese. Huang Zunxian.was probably the
only ranking government official with substantial knowledge of
the West and Japan who wrote anything on the discrimination
issue (Tsai 1983:65,70). However, his contribution to boycott
discourse was confined to a few poems which were more for

self-expression and for a small group of intellectual elites

 

'For a detailed discussion of the politics of the
boycott, please see Chapter Five.

129
than for public consumption. Besides, he died in 1905 (Zheng
1959).

Liang Qichao did much more than Huang in contributing to
the discourse. He published Xindalu youji (The travel notes
of the new continent) in 1904. The travel notes pondered many
aspects of American social and.political systems. In the same
year he published in book form.thes on the American Treaty
EXcluding Chinese Laborers (Meiguo huagong jinyue ji) which
was originally part of the Ybuji (A Ying 1962:487—521). His
influence was also felt through Shibao, to which he made
editorial contributions from.time to time. However, it is very
important to note that in 1905 Liang Qichao was much less a
demon for the Manchu rulers in.China than he had.been earlier.
While less sanguine on American political system in 1905, he
was taking a more conciliatory attitude toward the Manchu
regime in China. He wanted reform from above rather than
revolution (Chang 1971). It is more accurate to say that his
voice was heard at all because of his changed political
position than that he set the tone for the boycott discourse
(Fang 1991:275).

It should be pointed out that historians (McKee 1977,
Chang 1971, Bergere 1989, Pusey 1983) tend to focus on such
intellectural and political giants as Yan Fu and Liang Qichao
when talking about intellectual revolution in late imperial
China, and the boycott mpvement in particular. While these

people's influence is undeniable, their role' during the

130

boycott movement in particular was definitely marginal. In a
new study on the Xinzheng (1901-1911) intellectual and
institutional revolution, Douglas R. Reynolds rejects "the
Great Man theory of history, whereby one or two Promethean
intellectuals or leaders are presumed somehow to have changed
an entire age.‘ I share his view that: "What changed China
were numerous people.“ (Reynolds 1993:39). Just as "concrete
[reform] programs [were] pushed energetically and
simultaneously at multiple levels on multiple fronts by local,
regional, and national elites" (Reynolds 1993:40) , the boycott
movement was championed and led by multiple levels of
intellectuals.'

Among the advocates of the boycott were national elites
such as Zhang Jian and Ma Xiangbo; regional elites such as the
merchant-intellectuals Zeng Shaoqing and Gong Ziying; and
lower-level intellectual-professionals such as Wu Woyao, Ge
Zhong, and numerous others--novelists, playwrights, actors,
translators, newspapermen, book dealers, teachers, and
students (see Appendix). It was this last group of lower-level
intellectuals, however, who were the largest in number and
politically most significant during the boycott. When the
merchant and gentry elites began to back up from their earlier
boycott position, the lower-level intellectuals, along with
other social groups, who carried the movement forward.

Socially and politically this was definitely a new group

 

'About merchant leadership see Chapter Four.

131

emerging fram big cities in late Qing China. In early-19003
Shanghai, according to one estimate, there were at least 3,000
of the new intellectuals who were from.provinces throughout
China (Zhang ed.,l990:1026). The emergence of this new social
group was mainly because of the expansion of public media,
daily press and publishing houses in particular. Another
source of the new’ intellectuals were newly established
Western-style schools.

At least as far as the boycott movement is concerned, it
can be shown that the expanding public sphere in China was
partly because of this growing group of petty intellectuals
who were politically active, rather than because of a small
group of social elites who were famous community leaders. The
interesting thing about the intellectual leadership of the
boycott ideology is that one can hardly associate it with any
particular name or names. MOst authors (and speakers) were not
identifiable because they used pen names. That these nameless
lower-level intellectuals could have tremendous popular appeal
is because of the ideas they represented. In the boycott
movement it ‘was the ideas and ideals, not one or two
charismatic personalities, that moved the urbanites. That is
probably why virtually all the pen names, such as Aihua
(deploring China), or Zhichun (group of lofty aspirations),
indicated certain.meaningful themes. The practice reflected a
particular view of authorship and text. What mattered was the

words being said, not who said them. Language was to express

132

universal truth, whereas the writer served. only as an
intermediary, not the creator of the text. During the
anti-American boycott, pen names served as part of the texts
expressing feelings and ideas, since the writers did not
matter anyway. The notion of author as intermediary fits the
fact that many writings and speeches during the movement were
just repeating and echoing each other, as I have pointed out
earlier. The whole anti-American discourse was created as the
lowest common denominator of the Chinese urban multitude, and
many people were simply repeating what everybody else could
not possibly refute or even question, at least in public.
There seemed no need for an intellectual leader in this
movement. When a thirteen-year-old student made an anti-
American speech, nobody would assume that he was expressing
his own ideas. Rather, he was making public in verbal form
thoughts that were presumably shared by everybody in the
audience. He did not have to have any important social status
to make what he said.persuasive; he did not even have to have
a name.

The case of this thirteen-year-old boy could be
interpreted as an individual playing a public role. His action
definitely had public meanings and consequences because the
action took place in what Habermas has called the public
sphere. But what he was participating in was definitely not
the kind of rational debate which Habermas associates with an

open and unrestrained public sphere. It is more accurate to

133
say that the boy was acting' in a public sphere which was
dominated.by certain favored ideas and ideals." As far as the
exact role the young boy, and presumably many other young
female as well as male students, played, various
interpretations of (political) culture are definitely more
useful than the idea of a public sphere (Geertz 1973; Hunt
1984; Esherick and. ‘Wasserstrom. 1992). The cultural
interpretations stress the rhetorical and playful aspects of
communicative action, and the notion of public festivals, all
of which Habermas neglects (Garnham 1993:360; see Chapter
Five). The use of young speaker(s) was as much symbolic as the
adoption of rhymed words was playful in boycott meetings (for
detailed analysis and specific examples see Chapters Four and

Five).

This is not to say, however, that the boycott movement
did not have an intellectual leadership. The authors and the
speakers of the boycott discourse were definitely minorities
among the large mass of less articulate participants.

Therefore a collective biographical analysis of the

 

'For the symbolic meaning of young men, please see
Introduction.

"In this regard, Antonio Gramsci's view on civil
society is historically'more accurate. For Gramsci, the
public sphere was not a neutral ground for the emergence of
rational political discourse in the ideal and abstract
sense. It was an arena of contested meanings where a
hegenomic relationship among contending ideas and ideals was
kept and continuously redefined (Gramsci, in Alexander and
Seidman eds., 1990:47-54; Eley 1993:325-26).

134

intellectuals who played pivotal roles in shaping the boycott
discourse is illuminating. I have selected ten petty
intellectuals for this analysis (see Appendix). I have
selected them mainly because they were associated with the
boycott movement in two ways: they created boycott literature
and they led and participated in the boycott movement. The
question is do they share some common characteristics other
than their lower social and intellectual status? In other
words, do they fit in a certain category?

Historians have categorized late Qing intellectuals in
various *ways according' to their’ particular' emphasis and
purposes of study. For example, Paul A" Cohen (1974:Chapter 9)
has divided late Qing reformer-intellectuals into two groups:
those of the littoral and those of the hinterland. According
to Cohen, the culture of the littoral area was more
commercially than agriculturally rooted and was more modern
than traditional. As a result, the littoral intellectuals were
characteristically more open and therefore pioneers in
introducing neW'ideas to China (Cohen 1974:241-43). While this
might be true, the geographical division of intellectuals has
its limits. For instance, most intellectuals that I analyze in
this study fit into the category of what Cohen calls littoral
reformers because the boycott mpvement was most visible in
Chinese coastal cities. However, many of them were also
migrants from various provinces throughout China (see below).

The relationship ‘between their social values and their

.1 F. an ‘n« he s.

135
geographical status is hard to decide.

In addition, Cohen mostly analyzes high—level
intellectuals such as Yung Wing, Wu Tingfang (wu T'ing-fang),
Zheng Guanying (Cheng Kuan-ying) , Ma Jianzhong (Ma Chien-
chung), and Ma Xiangbo (Ma Hsiang-po) . The people I have
examined, on the other hand, were mostly disseminators not
innovators of ideas--professional writers, newspapermen,
novelists, translators, and even actors. Since theirs were
relatively new professions in major cities, they had neither
a. secure social. position. nor’ any invested. interests to
protect. Most of them had what Marie-Claire Bergere (1989:41-
42) has called relatively “marginal social positionf--they
were employed on temporary contracts. This type of

intelligentsia, as Bergere points out:

found it more difficult than the other groups that had.emerged
in the treaty ports to establish its position in between the
two worlds between which it mediated. It had turned its back
on traditional society, which did not recognize it anyway, or
hardly; but could.not yet find its place in the newly emerging
order. It was thus a non-integrated intelligantsia, receptive
to all kinds of counter-ideologies and open to the influence
of any movement advocating reform or revolution (Bergere
1989:42).

Virtually all ten intellectuals in my analysis somewhat fit
these descriptions. They were in marginal positions because
many of them.were at once intellectuals, educators, cultural
merchants (book dealers for example), and entertainers (such'

as novelists; see my analysis in the following pages). But

136

Bergere basically treats the urban intelligantsia as a whole
and fails to point out that it was the lower-level
intellectuals in particular that were in marginal positions.

Hao Chang (1980) divides late Qing intellectuals into two
different groups: the gentry-literati and the modern
intelligentsia. Like Bergere, Chang refers to the new
intelligentsia as "free-floating intellectuals" (Chang
1980:337). According to Chang, the new intelligentsia "tended
to congregate in the urban centres and.had little relationship
with the local areas from which many of them or their families
had originally come....[t]he modern intelligentsia's
political-organizational activities took place largely outside
the contexts of bureaucracy or local society. In the cities
their activities centred. around schools, newspapers and
voluntary associations, and so set the pattern for later
generations“ (Chang 1980:337). The ten intellectuals that I
select for this study fit these general descriptions in all
but one respect. While Chang stresses the new intelligentsia's
dual identity as troublesome and causing emptional agony, I
emphasize that the dual identity was not a problem yet in the
early 1900s. As my analysis of the boycott discourse shows in
the next chapter, the boycott intellectuals did not perceive
traditional Chinese ideas as fundamentally at odds with
imported concepts, though contradictions and confusion caused
by new concepts did exist in their writings.

My analysis of the boycott intellectuals is different

137
from. previous studies and. categorizations of neW' urban
intellectuals in one important way. I stress that these
intellectuals subscribed to and advocated new values more out
of necessity than choice, although the two was not always
distinguishable. For many lower-level intellectuals in the
early 19003, I argue, to propagate new ideas by writing
political novels, translating Western (including Japanese)
books, and publishing newspaper essays, was as much a way of
making a living as a conscious political action. The fact that
professional writers began.to be paid.during this period (Link
1980:51-51;152-55) is more important a factor than the
political ideals which motivated people to write. This is
particularly true for many boycott intellectuals who were
closely' associated. with. major newspapers and. publishing
houses, which were above all commercial enterprises. The fact
that the most important boycott novel The Bitter Society (ref.
Chapters Three and Five), was sold to the general public and
given only to people who subscribed to Shenbao should be
understood in the context of the commercialization of the
publishing and urban entertainment business. This is by no
means to say that boycott journalists, essayists and.novelists
were not sincere. They were. My point is that we should not
examine them from a single political perspective. Rather, we
should understand them as writers and entertainers as well as
political activists. The periodic fusion of their professional

life, which depended upon growing cultural consumers in the

138
cities, with political movements is important for us to
understand why a political cause would take such a public and
popular form.

The boycott movement was blessed.by a unique intellectual
leadership which could not be adequately understood by simple
geographical, social, and political categories. Given the low
social and intellectual status of the boycott intellectuals,
their political significance could be better explained as a
result of commercialization of urban culture and
entertainment. In early twentieth century China, urban culture
and.entertainment in turn developed.around.public media. It is
probably not just a coincidence that almost all the ten
intellectuals included in this analysis were associated with
some sort of public media. A collective biography of the
intellectual leadership of the boycott show some patterns in
their education, careers, social ties, and values to which

they subscribed.

Education
By the traditional standard of Chinese education, all

ten were ”lower quasi-intellectuals~"*.Among the ten, only two

 

*Antonio Gramsci used this term to designate teachers,
and journalists, actors who played a pivotal role in
carrying sophisticated intellectual ideas to the masses
(Alexander in Alexander and Seidman ed. 1990:7; Boggs
l984:l75-76,220-21). I borrow the term. because the lower
intellectuals--lower degree or non-degree intellectuals--in
the late Qing period played a similar role.

139
had the juren degree; the rest either had xiucai degrees or no
degree at all. This can be partially explained by the fact
that only one of them, the novelist Zeng Pu, was from a
wealthy landlord family. The rest of them were either from
families of petty officials or small merchants.

While they were not qualified or did not want to be offi-
cials in the late Qing period, they were all well versed in
classical Chinese. The novelist Bao Tianxiao's case is
instructive in this regard. Born into a small merchant family
in Suzhou and physically fragile in his childhood, Bao did not
get his xiucai degree (the only degree he ever had) until
1894, when he was nineteen years old (Bao 1971:134). His
literary talent was, however, first appreciated by the
examiner and later by his readers. On his scroll the examiner
commented, "your writing has an easy-going air" (wen you yiqi,
Bao 1971:137) . Also illuminating was Wu Woyao's case. Despite
having had little formal schooling and no degree, Wu became
one of the greatest novelists of the time (Chen 1982) .

Among the ten only one, Zeng Pu, had some formal
training in any foreign language. Lack of foreign language
training, however, did not prevent some of them from
translating foreign books. Lin Shu became one of the
greatest translators of the time with the help of those who
knew foreign languages. Again, Bao Tianxiao's case provides
us the most useful information. He recalled how he constantly

consulted dictionaries while translating a Japanese book

140

into Chinese and how economically rewarding it was to do so.
Occasionally, he recollected, he could get along for months
with the royalties from one translation (Bao 1971:250).

The education of these lower quasi-intellectuals showed
that while they could not make a decent living by entering
officialdom, they were quite able to make a career of selling
their writings and translations if there was a market for
their cultural products. Also important to note is the fact
that writing in classical or semi-classical Chinese and
translating foreign books would very likely be part of many
lower level-intellectuals' normal lives, if they had to sell

their writings for a living.

Career
Being quite literate yet without higher degrees, all of
these lower quasi-intellectuals had.many jobs before becoming
newspapermen, educators, or professional writers. For
instance, Peng Yizhong, who failed the civil service
examination seven times, worked as a low-ranking official
clerk, sold flour and fruits, and finally became a
newspaperman (XWZL 46:92-93). wu Woyao left his home town in
Guangdong to make a living on his own at seventeen when his
father died. He supported. his mother while serving as
secretary to a county official. In his twenties he went to
Shanghai and earned his living by working as a clerk in an

arsenal, and by making occasional contributions to daily

141
newspapers. Between 1902 and 1905 he became the editor of the
American-owned journal Chubao (also called Hankou ribao) in
Hankou. In 1906, Wu established a literary journal YUe yue
xiaoshuo (Monthly Fiction) in Shanghai. He died in 1910 as a
established novelist. and school principal in the treaty port
city (Chen 1982). Bao Tianxiao was a private tutor, editor
of his own vernacular Suzhou baihua bao, and a school teacher
before he finally became one the most popular novelists of the
Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies school (yuanyang hudie pai) in
Shanghai (Link 1981; Bao 1971).

Their' career trajectories testify that the
commercialization of popular culture and the rise of the
daily press attracted many otherwise unemployed or poorly
employed lower-level intellectuals to more glittering
opportunities in large cities in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The careers of these intellectuals are
especially illuminating when compared with.that of the equally
talented writer and story teller Pu Songling (1640-1715) of
the early Qing. Pu failed the civil service examination many
times and did not get his gongsheng degree until he was
seventy-one. Uhlike unsuccessful intellectuals in late Qing,
however, he was a private tutor almost all his life, despite
his remarkable talent as a novelist (Ci hai 1979:606).

Of course not all the writers and speakers of the boycott

movement were intellectuals. Some of them were merchants,

among whom the most famous were Zeng Shaoqing and Ge Zhong.

142
However, the role of the leaders of merchant backgrouds was
more one of organizing the movement than of providing and

spreading its ideas.

Social ties

The versatile life experiences of the petty intellectuals
led to broad social ties both in spatial and social terms.
Almost all of them had been to many cities throughout China,
some even abroad. In this respect Wu Woyao's case was typical.
He had been to many cities in at least six provinces, from
Guangdong in the south to Shandong in the north (Chen
1982:6-8). His mobile life is reflected in the spatial
setting of his novels. Abnormal Social Phenomena Witnessed
in the Past Twenty Years (Ershi nian mudu zhi
guaixianzhuang) , his most celebrated novel, while centered
around Shanghai and Nanjing, two metropolitan cities, told
stories set in Feshang, Guangzhou (Guangdong), Suzhou,
Yangzhou (Jiangsu) , Hangzhou (Zhej iang) , Hankou, Wuchang
(Hubei), Hong Kong, Tianjing, Laomidian (Hebei), Beijing,
Yichang, Jiujiang (Jiangxi), Wenhe county, and Mengying county
(Shandong) (Wu 1959). The broad spatial experiences would
certainly help to shape a more open—minded and more balanced
world view, as I shall show shortly.

The broad social connections of these intellectuals are
equally striking. Again taking Wu Woyao as an example, his

broad social connections can be inferred from his intimate

143
description of various social groups. In Abnormal Social

Phenomena Witnessed in the Past Twenty Years, Wu described

in vivid language social groups ranging from
scholar-officials and merchants to students, prostitutes,
intellectuals, soldiers, petty urbanites, actors,

philanthropists, and so on (Wu 1959) . However, like many other
lower-level intellectuals, the closest social ties Wu had
were with other culture agents - teachers, entertainers, and
newspapermen. According to Chen Shin-Hwei (1982:15) , Wu's best
friends were two writers, Zhou Guishen and Li Huaishuang, and

three stage actors. For a novelist trained in Chinese
classics and educated with traditional social values, wu's
friendship with Zhou Guishen was very suggestive. According
to Ma Bing (1955:40), Zhou knew both French and English and
was the first to introduce foreign literature into China.
Influenced by Social Darwinism, he asserted that Chinese
literature had to develop in competition (jingzheng) with
foreign literatures (Ma 1955:40).

Bao Tianxiao's social life in the early twentieth century
was perhaps afilittle narrower. His friends were mainly, but
by no means exclusively, from the literary world, who would
meet to share one another's company in teahouses, banquet
halls, wineshops, and theaters (Link 1981:164). However, it
was major publishing organs that brought them together (Link
1981:164) . Although Bao did not come to Shibao until 1906

when the boycott movement came to its end, his account of the

144

social life surrounding the publishing organ is relevant.
According to Bao, at Shibao's guest house (xilou) he
befriended. people ranging from. educators (some of them
founders of new-type schools in Shanghai) and merchants to
returned students, and, of course, writers. In terms of
educational background, his friends included both juren
degree holders and those trained abroad. (Bao 1971:328-33).

If we consider social ties in broader terms including
intellectual and psychological relationships and thus
including relationships with their readers, the lower-level
intellectuals' social connections were certainly among the
widest in urban China. According to Perry Link's estimate,
the readers of the most popular novels in the 1910s and 1920s
were between four hundred thousand to a million people in
Shanghai when that city's population was estimated to have
grown from around 1.4 million to around 3.2 million (Link
1981:16). We do not have much information on the first decade
of the century, but the literary scholar A.Ying believed that
the first decade of the twentieth century was the most
flourishing period in the novel-publishing business. According
to him, there were at least 1,000 novels published in book
form. during the period.(A.Ying 1991:1-2). Little information
is available on the readership of the anti—exclusion novels.
According to A Ying (1962:14), the novel The Bitter Society
was one of the most popular novels in this genre, with a

first printing which sold 3,000 copies. The actual number of

145
readers could easily have been five to ten times more because
one copy was often circulated among several readers (Link
1981:16). At any rate, the readers of the popular fiction by
lower-level intellectuals included school students, clerks,
shopkeepers, wealthy merchants, and even respected

intellectuals (Link 1981:189-91).

values

To ‘understand. the 'values to ‘which lower-level
intellectuals subscribed we have to understand the dual roles
they played both as observers of the social and political
events and as individuals living in the period. As observers
their writings often expressed values presumably shared by
their readers.'IHowever, as individuals they did leave their
own value imprint on their works. Although individuals might
subscribe to different values, some generalizations can be
made about the ten chosen for this analysis. First of all,
most of them were middle-aged. The youngest of them, Bao
Tianxiao (born in 1875), was thirty years old when the
anti-American boycott started, but he became influential in
the literary realm only after the movement was long over. The
symbolic leader of the movement, Zeng Shaoqing, was,

suggestively, the oldest of all, in his sixties. The most

 

*For instance, the works by Li Baojia and wu Woyao, the
two outstanding writers and novelists of the time, were
often criticized as catering to the taste of petty urbanites
(A Ying 1991:134; Wang in wu 1959:1).

146
vocal of all during the movement was Wu Woyao, who was thirty-
nine in 1905. Lin Shu, the famous translator and also a vocal
protester of American discrimination was in his early fifties.
Linguistically, intellectually, and morally they had intimate
relationships with traditional China.

On the other hand, most of them were young enough to
learn something new or put their traditional training into
new use. After all, they were all involved in the new
business--the daily press and new schools--at the time. If
they were not the most enthusiastic advocators of foreign
ideas, they were open enough to accept them selectively.
Besides, if introducing new ideas made good business, as Bao
Tianxiao's case showed, why not? As I have pointed out
earlier, we should understand them as professional writers and
entertainers as well as social critics. They formed a
distinguishable group not so much because of their political
views as because of their common role in the embryonic mass
communication and print entertainment business. They turned to
political activism, as they did in the 1905 boycott movement,
incidentally, that is, not by calculated plan but by dutifully
carrying out their responsibility as social critics. That is

why they could be critical without being ideologically rigid.

As I have pointed out in this chapter, the anti-American
discourse was urban and public, thanks to the rise of the

modern press. Newspapers and periodicals provided an axis

147
around which the boycott discourse was centered, and from
which the discourse radiated to the public. Spatially, the
newspapers took advantage of the telegraph, which connected
distant places in a very short time. Newspapers also reported
national as well as local events, and quoted newspapers of
different locales. Socially, newspapers addressed a variety of
different audiences by using various forms of linguistic
presentations but delivering striking messages in all of them.
Even illiterates could be familiar with the newspaper jargon
during the movement since public speeches often echoed
newspapers. Thus newspapers provided linguistic patterns -
vocabularies and expressions - shared by an unparalleled
multitude. While opposing views and different opinions were
inevitable, the uniformity in linguistic presentation and
shared images of America, however, were much more fundamen-
tal. In the next chapter I will analyze in detail the
anti-American discourse itself and the patterns of perceptions

of American discrimination.

Chapter Three

Might Vs. Right--The Ideology of the Anti-American Boycott

In Chapter Two I have given an account of the nature of
the media in early twentieth century China, Shanghai in
particular, and a collective biography of the intellectual
leadership of the boycott. I have argued that due to the
emerging mass media in early twentieth century China the
boycott ideas spread rapidly and widely among Chinese
urbanites. This chapter will provide a detailed analysis of
the boycott discourse. This analysis is essential to
understanding the nature of the boycott ideology, which in
turn is crucial to understanding the movement itself.‘

The boycott ideology should.be understood in the context

of the general intellectual trends of the time. In early

 

*I here follow Clifford Geertz (1973:216-7) in defining
ideology as a cultural systemn Ideology, according to
Geertz (1973:216), is a program. It, along with other
cultural patterns, provides “a template or blueprint for the
organization of social and psychological processes, much as
genetic systems provide such a template for the
organization of organic processes..." Geertz (1973:217),
also provides a persuasive explanation of why ideology as a
cultural system should.be studied in order to understand
human behavior. As he points out (1973:217)”...human
behavior is inherently extremely plastic. NOt strictly but
only very broadly controlled by genetic programs or models -
intrinsic sources of information - such behavior must, if
1t is to have any effective form.at all, be controlled to a
Significant extent by extrinsic ones [that is, by
Ideologyl."

148

149

twentieth century China such new concepts as nationalism
(minzu zhuyi), populism (minquan), and evolution (jinghua),
among many others, began to be popular among ordinary Chinese
urbanites, although the traditional Confucian ideas were far
from.thoroughly discredited (Wu et al. 1990). Nationalism in
early twentieth century China was clearly different from
earlier Confucian gentry-scholar anti-foreignism.expressed in
such.phrases as "Chinese-foreign.distinction" (huayi zhi bian)
and from spontaneous peasant xenophobia. It was a reform-
oriented response to imperialism.and associated with the ideas
of evolution and populism (Wu et al. 1990:8) . The advocates of
the new nationalism.believed that imperialism.was a result of
historical evolution and China was weak in the competition
among nations mainly because its polity was too authoritarian.
Thus, China could survive the imperialist era only' by
establishing a new polity-~a constitutional monarchy for the
reformers; a republic for the revolutionaries (Zhang and wang
eds., 1962 vol. 1 part 1:11).*

The new ideas became popular not just because of several
intellectual giants' efforts, no matter how influencial their
writings were, but also because of a variety of developments

which occurred around the turn of the century in China and in

 

'This is of course just a very brief summary of the
general trend of intellectual development at the time. The
new type of Chinese intellectuals vigorously debated what
nationalism, populism, and evolution meant (Pusey
1983:Chapter 6). For more detailed analysis on these new
ideas as manifested in the boycott ideology, see below.

150
Chinese communities abroad. I have described some of these
developments in the introduction. Here I shall confine my
discussion to those that directly contributed to the new
intellectual trend.

Although the new ideas developed largely independent of
the Qing official sphere, their flourishing definitly
benefited from, if it was not a direct result of, the New
Policies (Xinzheng) promulgated by the Qing court after the
Boxer debacle in 1901.'.After China's humiliating defeat in
the Boxer War (1900), even the conservative Qing court began
to advocate and initiate changes. The New Policies were a
series of reform measures in education, finance, commerce,
military, and administration. A new study on Xinzheng

concludes that the reforms were so sweeping and fundamental

 

'Xinzheng'was launched by a refonm edict of the Empress
Dowager, issued on 29 January 1901. Included in this edict
are the following statements:

We therefore call upon the members of the Grand Council,
the Grand Secretaries, the Six Boards and Nine
Ministries, our Ministers abroad, and the Governors
General and Governores of provinces to reflect carefully
on our present sad state of affairs, and to scrutinize
Chinese and Western governmental systems with regard to
all dynastic regulations, national administration,
official affairs, matters related to people's livelihood,
modern schools, systems of examination, military
organization, and financial administration. Duly weigh
what should be kept and what abolished, what new methods
should be adopted and what old ones retained. By every
available means of knowledge and observation, seek out
how to renew our national strength, how to produce men of
real talent, how to expand state revenues, and how to
revitalize the military. For our reference, report
detailed proposals within two months (cited in Reynolds
1993:13).

151
that they initiated a “quiet revolution" in China (Reynolds
1993:12-13). The reform policies from above, combined with
long-existing local, non-official initiatives in the public
sphere described by Rankin (1986), led to new institutions and
social organizations (see Introduction) which in turn became
the center of new ideas.

New schools in major cities were definitely a center of
new ideas, but in terms of new intellectual trends more
significant was the fact that many students began to study in
Japan and they became the carriers of the new ideas. In 1905
there were about 8,000 Chinese students in Japan, where they
published their own newspapers and magazines advocating new
concepts (Reynolds 1993:48, Chapter 4). Many of their
publications were circulated.in treaty port cities and even in
the interior of China (Zhang and Wang eds. 1962, vol. 1, part

1:introduction).'

 

'The Japanese factor contributing to new ideas and
concepts in China can partially be seen in China's borrowing
of Japanese vocabulary. The following are some of the
examples:

Japanese Chinese
aikoku (love of country) aiguo
chiho jichi (local self-government) difang zizhi
chousho (abstract) chouxiang
domei (alliance) tongmeng
honyaku (translation) fanyi
horitsu (law) falu
hoshin (course, policy) fangzheng
ishin (reform, transformation) weixing
jitsugyo (industry, business) shiye
jiyu (freedom) ziyou
kagaku (science) kexue

kannen (concept) guannian

152

Although the study abroad (youxue) was initially
encouraged by the Qing government, Chinese students in Japan
became increasingly radical, more radical than the Qing
government would.allowy partially because of the revolutionary
activities of Sun Zhongshan there. In 1905, Chinese reformers
and revolutionaries in Japan began to debate whether or not
China should have a revolution. The reform—versus-revolution
debates were also carried out among Chinese students and

overseas Chinese in Europe and America.

 

keizai (economy) jingji
kokka (country) guojia
kokutai (state system) guoti
kyoiku (education) jiaoyu
ronsetsu (commentary) lunshuo
ryugaku (study abroad) youxue
seifu (government) zhengfh
shakai (society) shehui
shakai shugi (socialism) shehui zhuyi
shinka (evolution) jinhua
shiso (thought) sixiang
shogyo (commerce, trade) shangye
zaisei (financial administration) caizheng

‘ Sources: Liu et al. eds. 1984; Reynolds (1993:279-308).

Note: Caution has to be used in using linguistic examples to
show the Japanese influence. First of all, it is hard to
determine exactly when Chinese borrowed these words from
Japan. Secondly, all the borrowed characters were
originally Chinese, therefore the influence was not always
one way and therefore not always decisive. However, the fact
is still that these expressions were new for the Chinese in
the late Qing both in their linguistic forms and in their
meanings. In term.of linguistic forms, all these concepts
were compound words (two or more Chinese characters used
together), whereas traditionally key concepts were more
often expressed in single characters such as si (think, new
expression--sixiang). shang (commerce, new expression—-
shangye), and bian (evolution, new expression-~bianhua, or
jinhua). About the changing meaning of some of concepts, see
my discussion of the boycott discourse below.

153

While the central issue of the debate was on whether the
Manchu regime should be reformed or overthrown, reformers and
revolutionaries explored a variety of "isms"--socialism,
anarchism, state socialism, constitutionalism, and even
Marxism (Zhang and Wang eds. 1963, vol.2, part 1:5) . In China,
the rising urban entertainment forms (plays and novels in
particular), a large quantity of translations, newspapers, and

new schools collectively popularized these new ideas.

It was in this fresh intellectual atmosphere that the
boycott discourse emerged. As I pointed out in Chapter Two,
boycott ideology was expressed in various media and linguistic
forms-~newspaper articles, pamphlets, novels, popular songs,
operas, etc.--with various emphases and degrees of
intellectual sophistication. Nevertheless, several themes (or
motifs) repeated themselves in remarkable patterns of
similarity which suggest shared concerns and a high degree of
consensus among urban Chinese on how the controversies between
China and the United States concerning immigration issues
should be interpreted and acted upon. Agitational materials
for popular consumption showed no substantial deviations from
those aimed at more sophisticated readers. Or, to put it
another way, there was not an independent body of ideas which
belonged to a given social class.

This is not to say that there were no controversies among

boycotters concerning goals of the movement (see Chapter

154

Five). Nor is this to say that there were no confusions and
contradictions in their speeches and writings. On the
contrary, as I shall show presently, there was a fundamental
dilemma sensed by the boycott activists in the changing world,
namely the irreconcilable confrontation between physical
power (qiangquan) and universal principles (gongli) or, to
put it more simply, the confrontation between Might and Right.
The United States and its immigration policy, as perceived by
boycotters, seemed to epitomize the problem. "How come the
most civilized nation does the most brutal things to our
Chinese?, " as one boycott activist demanded in a public speech
(A Ying 1962:614) . Boycott discourse also showed ambiguous
feelings and attitudes toward many key ideas and ideals such
as civilization (wenming), evolution (jinhua), democracy
(minzu), and nation (guojia) .

But the boycotters seemed not to be concerned with
theoretical sophistication or even consistency. No serious
attempt was made by anybody during the movement to be
theoretically creative or even consistent, for they seemed to
be content with the higher truth--the justice of their cause.
The boycott rhetoric was first and foremost to serve that
cause.

Despite the highly uniform and ritualistic nature of the
boycott language, it is still possible to trace different

social and economic interests underneath layers of boycott

155

rhetoric.'IBut clearly more useful than class analysis is to
treat boycott discourse as a cultural phenomenon or a symbol"
system in its entirety. “Talk," Edelman (1985:114) points
out, "involves a competitive exchange of symbols, referential
and evocative, through which values are shared and
assigned...." He continues, "In subtle and obvious ways
cultures shape vocabulary and meaning, and men respond to
verbal cues. People who share the same role learn to respond
in common fashion to particular signs [symbols].' (1985:15).

For his study of language use in American politics,
however, Edelman (1985:115) stresses the unique value system

and the response of unique group interest. My purpose is a

 

*For a lucid discussion of the Marxist view of language
see Hunt (1984:21-4). While it is impossible to identify
certain concepts which were championed exclusively by one
social class, merchant interests did interpret some boycott
rhetoric differently and put more emphasis on certain
concepts. For instance, toward the end of the boycott
movement, Shanghai wholesale merchants tended to stress the
right to trade, as opposed to not to trade, with Americans
(see Chapter Five). There is no question that economic
interests played a much more important role in deciding the
ways different social classes acted during the boycott (see
Chapter Four).

**Ithiel de Sola Pool thus defines the meanings of
Symbols: "A social scientist may define the meaning of a
Symbol to a given person as the sum of the contexts in
Which that person will use that symbol. The usages need not
be consistent or 'proper', but insofar as the usages occur
lnlpredictable contexts the symbol has meaning for the man
who uses it and that meaning is an important fact to the
Social scientist." Pool, "Symbols, Meanings, and Social
Science,“ in Lyman Bryson and others (eds.), symbols and
Values: An Initial Study New York, 1954, chapter 23, cited
in Edelman (1985:115).

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156
little different. I try to show how a predominantly
merchant-intellectual world view was expressed verbally in
such a way that it was shared by other social groups in urban
China during the boycott movement. Boycotters constantly
sought social solidarity by invoking traditional cultural
symbols as well as fashionable new concepts. This fact
explains why the Chinese urbanites, while accepting Western
ideas, also had an ambivalent feeling toward such new concepts
as evolution, civilization, and democracy. This tendency
toward the idiomatic use of set phrases was not merely a
conscious exercise of symbol manipulation. In many cases,
especially in anti-American novels, it also functioned as “a
symbolic outlet“ (Geertz 1973:207) . By looking at the boycott
rhetoric as both instrumental and expressive, I argue that the

boycott language served a cause without suggesting conspiracy.

All of my analysis of the boycott discourse is based on
written materials or spoken items recorded in written form.
Naturally, I can claim neither completeness nor definitiveness
for my analysis, since not all the thoughts were articulated
and recorded, and I cannot say that every piece of evidence
necessarily reflects the real thought of the boycotters.
Occasionally and privately the sophisticated urban people of

the time expressed their doubts and cynicism about the

157

*

propaganda rhetoric (Bao 1907:36). In a very important way

the publicized.materials failed to reveal the real motives of

 

’The degree of effectiveness of the boycott propaganda
is, like other cases of the sort, hard to decide. In
general, there is no question that Chinese urbanites were
very
responsive to the agitation, given the fact many actively
participated the boycott. On the other hand, there is also
little doubt that not all sophisticated urbanites took every
propaganda gimmick seriously. The most often-heard complaint
was leveled against public meetings where passionate
speeches were often made. The major complaints were two.
First of all, many in the audience could not hear what the
speaker said in a meeting of several hundred.people,
partially because of the lack of such modern devices as
loudspeakers, and partially because of the crowd noise.
Secondly, people who could read often found that many
speeches were nothing new, but rather the simple repetition
of newspaper reports.

As a result, some urbanites did not take the boycott
rhetoric seriously. They came to meetings mainly to “join
the crowd" (kan renao). The realism.and cynicism.toWards the
popular movement were, however, only expressed in novels and
plays, not in open discussions. Here is an except from.Bao
Tianxiao's novel The Blue Blood CUrtain which described one
of the boycott meetings at Zhangyuan park, Shanghai:

...such a big place is full of people without a single
vacant inch. Tens of thousands of indistinguishable heads
jostling around.... [The scene is] very much like
[people] watching a new drama performance or listening to
storytelling. All come to join in the crowd (cou renao).

The crowd applaud at the end of every sentence the
speaker makes. Presently, the crowd begins to applaud
half-way through the speaker's sentence. Thus, the second
half is overwelmed by the applause. People sitting in the
back rows join in the applause without even hearing the
speaker clearly. There are also people talking to each
other while cheering the speaker along with others. It is
as if to applaud is an obligation once you are at a
meeting.

You, as a reader, might well be aware of the fact
that at all the meetings with a huge crowd, hand clapping
has a hypnotic effect. In the silence, if one person
gives a hint by striking three figers on his palm, people
all around him would respond instantly with thundering
applause.... If you do not believe me just go to the
meeting to try this out for yourself (Bao 1907:23—25).

158

many who actively participated in the movement. For example,
the rhetoric did.not show the role parochialism.(affection for
native-place association) played. In public rhetoric we see a
lot of appeals to nationalism.but very little to native-place
feelings. Clearly this is misleading, and the rhetoric
expressed more hope than the reality. This type of problem can
be solved partially by analysis of the organizations and
politics of the movement (see Chapters Four and Five).

However, the available materials are considerable and
some generalizations are possible. Moreover, a great degree
of spontaneity and genuine expression of feelings can be
assumed, for the boycotters did show remarkable solidarity,
and at one time American diplomats in Shanghai were compelled
to report that “AmIericanl trade has gone from bad to worse;
boycott nearly attained full measure; agitation pervaded all
places;...' (Consular Dispatch, Shanghai, 11 August 1905).
This solidarity was achieved mainly by an extensive
anti-exclusion acts campaign. For this reason, I shall begin
my discussion of the boycott ideology by examining the
boycotters' critique of the exclusion acts. Then I shall
analyze their diagnosis of the problems facing China and.their

Prescription for solution.

1. Perceived Injustice of the American Exclusion Acts against

Chinese Immigrants

159

What made many Chinese angry about America's treatment of
Chinese immigrants was first of all the inconsistency of
American immigration law and the changing attitudes from warm
welcome in the early years to severe restrictions later on.
In almost all the anti-exclusion writings, Americans were
characterized as selfish and ungrateful. When they needed
Chinese laborers in earlier years for mining and railroad
construction, Americans had welcomed Chinese; once they did
not need Chinese laborers anymore they had expelled them
relentlessly. As early as 1886 Zhang Yinhuan, the Chinese

minister to the United States, complained that:

Under the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 Chinese enjoyed the
benefit of being allowed to come or go at will in America. At
that time America was intent on opening up the Western
frontier and spared no pains to attract Chinese. In an
instant railways were built in all directions. In the
mountains, inexhaustible mines of coal, iron, and metals mines
were developed. The barren area around San Francisco is now
a metropolis. Wonderful structures reach the clouds; merchants
and travelers fill [the city] to the brim. How could all this
have been accomplished without the efforts of Chinese? And yet
after a few years [the Americans] plotted to restrict
immigration, and in a few more years they were plotting to
expel the Chinese. (Arkush and Lee 1989:73).

After the boycott movement broke out in 1905, this theme was
widely invoked in various forms. In a letter of 1905 to Zeng
Shaoqing of the Shanghai Chambers of Commerce, a
representative of the Guangxi gentry and merchants stated the
theme bluntly and passionately: ”America's [prosperity] today

was achieved by employing Chinese laborers. American iron was

160
made of Chinese blood!" (A Ying 1962:668) . A popular song
presumably composed for illiterate and lower class consumption

began with these lines:

Poor Chinese laborers/ Poor Chinese laborers/ In the heaven
and the earth nowhere was their misery heard/ When virgin land
was opened in former years, [they were] recruited as coolies/
Now that the forest road has been opened up [they are] thrown
away as worn shoes/ Just as [people] put away bows when there
is no bird to shoot, exclusion laws against Chinese laborers
are extended to gentry and merchants (A Ying 1962:5).

A novel written during the movement illustrated the same motif
in a conversation between a Chinese-American and a merchant

on his way to America:

[The merchant:] Years before when I was little, I went to
San Francisco with my uncle. Once we arrived, the local
officials and gentry all rushed out to meet us when they
heard Chinese were coming. . . [they said] 'we like Chinese to
come here to do things very much. . . ' . Their warm welcome was
no less than that extended to their own folks. I wonder why
all of that has changed today.

[The Chinese-American:] What you just told us is an old
story. At that time, the Golden Mountain was an uncultivated
land dependent on Chinese to plant, build roads, open mines,
etc. Of course we were well treated. Now the place is getting
more bustling every day, with more and more people. Therefore,
they begin to hate Chinese for competing with them for
business. . . (The Bitter Society, in A Ying 1962:80) .

This motif of the ungrateful Americans was succinctly and
powerfully presented time and again with a familiar Chinese

proverb in couplet format: "The good bow is put away when

a

*Saanrancisco.

161
there are no more birds to shoot in the high sky; the hunting
dog is boiled [to be eaten] when the sly rabbit is dead." (A
Ying 1960:5;535). The phrase dates back at least as early as
Sima Qian's Historical Records (Shi ji, ca. 145 or 135
B.C.-?). The popularity and strength of this proverb lies in
the fact that it has fluid meanings. On the one hand, it is
certainly unjust, as the proverb implies, to be so
conspicuously ungrateful to one's benefactor. On the other
hand, however, the tragic outcome is almost inevitable in the
real ‘world due to the nature of things. Depending on
circumstances and the purposes of the user, the proverb can
serve either as a condemnation or a cynical statement of
truth. While the proverb was used by the boycott activists
primarily as a moral condemnation of American injustice to
Chinese immigrants, the fluid meanings of the saying
persisted. The phrase's expressive function did not entirely
disappear. This function would subtly ease the pain of

psychological adjustment when the boycott appeared to fail.

The perceived injustice of the American exclusion acts
was enormously amplified.by numerous accounts of the hardships
Chinese immigrants had.experienced on their voyage to America
and their sojourning life in the United States. The
anti-exclusion literature provided an image of innocent and

hard-working Chinese pioneers in wild America which

162
contrasted sharply with the image of selfish and ungrateful
Americans.

The horrendous experience of Chinese-Americans started
with departure from.their homeland. Since many Chinese were
hoaxed, sometimes even kidnapped, to America' there were
numerous graphic accounts of the horrendous coolie traffic.
There were at least three novels published during 1905-8 which
contained vivid accounts of the coolie traffic, as well as
numerous brief newspaper reports. Ashes After catastrophes
(Que yu hui) was about a.youth who was kidnapped to America (A
Ying 1960:310-417). The Golden Wbrld (HUangjin shijie) had
provided a detailed account of a voyage to Cuba (A Ying
1960:113-229). The Bitter Society (Ku shehui, A Ying
1960:15-112), which was published during the anti-American
boycott by the Commercial Press, had the best account of a
Chinese coolie's journey to Peru which was comparable to, if
not worse than, the Atlantic voyage of African slaves
described.in Roots (Haley 1977: chapters 37-39). When the ship

had arrived at a Peruvian port, the author wrote:

...the foreigner called up sailors to take off the coolies'
shackles. The coolies felt the freedom. of their feet
immediately, only to find that they could not stand up. The
foreigner lost his patience and brandished the whip on their
head, Bearing the pain, the coolies managed to get up at last
but could not move.... The sailors came forward and dragged
the coolies one by one to the ladder. Some fell on the board

 

*A term used at the time to indicate Cuba and Peru, as
well as the United States.

163

and werekicked. Some had broken heads, bleeding, but were

not allowed to rest.... There were a group of coolies
dragging behind, one fell on the top of another, tangling
together.... The sailors wondered.what had happened, and. they

sniffed a stinky smell which made them sick. They called the
foreigner. Putting some liquid medicine on his nostrils, the
foreigner came over. He ordered the sailors to pull away the
people on the top. What they saw was so horrible that even
men with iron and stone hearts could not hold back their
tears. Underneath were seventy or eighty people lying dead,
with blood all over their faces, flesh and clothes stuck
together. (A Ying 1962:66).

Whether or not the voyage to the United States was as bad as
that to Peru does not really matter, for most Chinese at the
time did not have separate images of overseas Chinese who
lived in different countries, and "America" was a term used
to designate the United States as well as countries in South
America.

For those Chinese immigrants who survived the voyage, the
sojourners' lives in an alien country were portrayed as
equally horrible. As Chinese consul-general at San Francisco
from 1882 to 1885, Huang Zunxian (1848-1909) was an
open-minded reformist official and a passionate poet. In one
of his poems he described the hardship experienced by Chinese
immigrants:

When the Chinese first crossed the ocean, / they were the same
as pioneers./ They lived in straw hovels, cramped as snail
shells;/ For protection gradually [they] built bamboo

fences./ Dressed in tatters, they cleared mountain
forests;...(Arkush and Lee 1989:62).

Interestingly, the pioneer image of the Chinese immigrants was

164
also put neatly into a familiar phrase of eight characters
when the boycott movement started: bilu lanlu, yiqi shanlin
(riding on a firewood cart in ragged clothes; on the way to
clear the forest (The Bitter Society chapter Twenty-three; A
Ying 1960:5). The phrase is from the Confucian classic Zuo

Commentary (Zuo zhuan) of about two thousand years ago.

Many more propagandistic materials were, however, aimed
at the severity of the exclusion acts and the rough and
arbitrary way in which they were implemented. Naturally the
source materials on American mistreatment of Chinese were
provided by overseas Chinese or by those who had.been to the
United States. In September 1903, Chinese-Americans sent a
long petition to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Department of Commerce and several high officials of the Qing
government. In the petition, they systematically articulated
their complaints toward the American exclusion acts and the
inhuman way Americans handled legal as well as illegal
Chinese immigrants. This petition was made public through
newspapers in Shanghai and also published in Liang Qichao's
Notes on the Chinese Exclusion Act (A Ying 1962:487-521).
Since the petition was one of the major sources of the vast
number of propagandistic materials produced during the
movement, let's first summarize the major complaints listed in

it:

165

1. The bar against Chinese immigrants had.been constantly
extended from laborers to immune classes such as students,
merchants, and government officials. The problem, as perceived
by Chinese merchants in the United States, partially arose
from. the rigid. yet vague definition of merchants by
Americans. For example, such people as owners of restaurants,
tobacco factories and laundries, etc. were not considered
merchants. The exclusion acts were also extended from the
United.States proper to its territories such as Hawaii and the
Philippines.

2. Harsh implementation of the exclusion acts.
Originally, those who had documents bearing the seal of an
American.consulate were admitteduwithout questioning. In later
years, however, more and more restrictive methods were adopted
to prevent Chinese from entering the United States. “Sheds“
were thrown up in various entry ports. Arriving Chinese,
regardless of the type of documents they carried with them,
were detained in the sheds as long as several weeks or even
months before a hearing was granted. If even the slightest
contradiction was found in one's testimony, one was
immediately sent back, even if one had documents bearing the
seal of an American consulate in China.

3. Humiliating treatment of Chinese immigrants. According
to the earlier treaties, Chinese residents in the United
States might depart and reenter America freely with proper

documentation issued by customs officers. In later years, the

166
process became more and more complicated and time-consuming.
Even if proper documents were obtained, reentry was a painful
experience for Chinese, since they were invariably detained
first in the shed. Furthermore, American officials constantly
harassed. Chinese residents by checking on their legal papers.

4. Chinese en route to other countries via the United
States were often refused entry.

5. Immune classes were often refused entry on improper
grounds, such as quarantine (A Ying 1960:509-520).

When the boycott movement started in 1905, these
complaints were elaborated in detail and dramatized in
various boycott materials. A large quantity of agitational
materials were devoted to American mistreatment of Chinese
immigrants or Chinese of other status. One of the most
condemned practices of American immigration personnel was the
detention of Chinese in the shed. The practice attracted so
much criticism that the shed became a symbol of humiliation
and mistreatment of Chinese by Americansc' .A Story’ of
Ill-Treatment Inflicted upon Chinese Brethren (Tbngbao
shounue ji), a popular pamphlet published in 1905, described
what the shed was like:

The sheds are set up along the coast of San Francisco (other
entry ports are building them now) with thick wood as a fence

topped with thin planks. They are built exclusively for the
arriving Chinese. The shed is dark, filthy, and smelly.

 

*Interestingly, the shed later also becomes one of the
most envoked images of maltreatment of Chinese intellectuals
and officials in the literature of the Cultural Revolution.

167

Along the four sides of the interior, several planks are set
up as beds and tables. The [living] conditions in the shed are
even worse than in a prison. When thirsty, one can only
drink cold water; when hungry one can only eat black. bread or
hard rice which is never enough. One can not do laundry when
clothes are dirty; no relatives and friends are allowed to
visit. Everyday there are guards watching and no detainee is
allowed to step outside. There are also a bunch of hooligans
who are neither officials nor commoners. They burn some kind
of medicine to fumigate the [detainees'] faces and heads for
contagious disease. These people steal money whenever they
have a chance. When [you] are in the shed, the situation is
hopeless. Almost every Chinese who cames to the United States
has had the experience (A Ying 1962:544).

The novel Tears of Overseas Chinese (Qiaoming lei) also

provided detailed description of life in the shed:

[We] come to a courtyard surrounded by rows of small sheds
which are so low that one can.hardly stand.up straight, and so
narrow that one can barely sit down. The shed is built with
wood and dirt.... The shape of the shed, as I see it, is
like a soldier's lookout post with a hole to see outside.

There is a small chunk of wood behind to sit on and
there is another piece of plank to rest elbows on....There are
also people with their wives, about ten of them, who feel
particularly humiliated. Once entering the shed, [they] begin
to cry miserably. (A Ying 1962:429)

To associate the shed.with the image of a physically weak and
morally sensitive woman.was apparently assumed.to have special
effect. In The Golden world a young women presumably told.her
own experience in the shed in a public speech. According to
her “The most embarrassing thing [in the shed] is for a girl
to mingle together with men, for there is no separate place
to change and to sleep. The situation is even worse than on

the ship. There is no door or piece of cloth to hide behind."

168
(A Ying 1962:181) .

The most shocking account, however, was provided in a
stage play entitled The Adventures of Haiqiao Chun (Haiqiao
chun chuanqi). Act three of the play, "Imprisonment of
Overseas Chinese“, is presumably situated in a shed. According
to the play, a young wife was joining her husband in the
United States with legal documents. However, when questioned
she was too shy and too nervous to speak clearly. The
inquisitor therefore put her into a shed despite her legal
documents. After a long wait the wife could not bear the
humiliating situation any longer, and was also so anxious to
see her husband that she could not sleep. Eventually, she
went insane and just took every man as her husband (A Ying
1962 :448) .

By putting Chinese into the shed, Americans treated
Chinese as either criminal suspects or non-humans. That is
probably why the practice was so much hated. Since the sheds
were built for Chinese of all social classes, not just for
Chinese laborers, they served to strengthen the racial

awareness of the Chinese.

Indeed, this racial sensibility was effectively
capitalized on by the boycott activists. Time and again, the
boycott writings and speeches emphasized that all Chinese and
only Chinese were discriminated against as far as American

immigration law was concerned. In a series of public speeches,

169

which were later published in Shibao, a speaker angrily asked:

Gentlemen, think about it! The Irish, whom we call "devils of
cizi" (cizi gui), came to the United States and took over the
American handicraft industy. Yet Americans do not ban them.
The Italians and Portugese, who are penniless, entered the
United States and seized the top positions in the American
handicraft industry. Yet Americans do not ban them. These
people are all whites, though. However, the Japanese and
Koreans are of the same yellow race [as Chinese], and their
salaries are even lower than those of us Chinese. Still,
Americans do not ban them. Even African black people and the
brown people from India and Australia all enter and depart
America freely and they are not banned. This is clear
evidence that Americans do not bully anyone but Chinese,

Americans do not maltreat anyone but Chinese (A Ying
1962:614) .

Although this was not exactly true, for American
discrimination was also targeted against other peoples

(Daniels 1990:Part 2, esp.Chapter Ten), the fact that the
racial discrimination against Chinese immigrants was most
outragous and notorious during this period was keenly felt by
the boycotters.

This anger toward racist American immigration policy was
shared by those Chinese who were well aware of the
shortcomings of overseas Chinese and of problems with Chinese
culture. Liang Qichao had visited Chinatown in the United
States and acknowledged that the Chinese were dirty,
disorganized and backward people, as some Americans
complained. Liang came to believe more strongly after
travelling in North America that Chinese were backward in

several ways. He concluded that Chinese character was that of

170

clansmen rather than citizens; Chinese had a village mentality
and not a national mentality; Chinese could accept only
despotism and could not enjoy freedom; Chinese lacked lofty
objectives (Arkush and Lee 1989:92—93). Yet Liang Qichao did
not think the American exclusion acts against Chinese were
justified since, he argued (showing his own racial bias in the
process), "Although Chinese are stubbornly backward, aren't
they better than the black race?. . . If [America] expels nine
million blacks according to such exclusion acts as those
against Chinese, then I would not have anything to complain
about.“ (A Ying 1962:508; see also Pusey 1983:96-100; 117-18) .

An article published in the Guangdong Daily (Guangdong
ribao) made the American exclusion acts appear to be even
more absurd, though from a different line of argument. It

reasoned that:

Let us assume that Chinese are indeed inferior. It is
reasonable for Americans to expel Chinese from the United
States in order to keep Americans from being infected by the
malicious habits of Chinese. But why do Americans come to
China then? If they are afraid of getting infected by Chinese
even in their own country, why aren't they afraid of being
contaminated in China while living among Chinese? Do not these
Americans who come to China belong to the superior race? (A
Ying 1962:608).

In many boycott speeches and writings it was stressed
time and again that Chinese were discriminated against as a
whole and as a race. The most publicized cases during the

anti-American boycott were the mistreatment of Chinese

171
merchants, students, and officials, instead of laborers, who
were presumably the only class targeted by the exclusion acts.
Fujian Daily News (Fujian riri xingwen) thus pointed out: ”The
American exclusion acts do not just exclude laborers.
Merchants, teachers, students, and travelers are all included
in the exclusion acts. Only officials are immune from the
acts. Yet when officials come to the United States, they are
questioned and roughly handled worse than criminals. Thus
officials are in fact also banned. In name they exclude
laborers only, in reality they exclude all the 400 million
Chinese." (A Ying 1962:605) . This view of the exclusion acts

was widely publicized during the boycott movement.

As I have shown above, the boycott writings portrayed
the American exclusion acts as inhuman and unjustified. What
seemed to anger Chinese the most was not so much the exclusion
itself as the inconsistency of American immigration policy.
It was simply wrong for the boycotters that the United States
opened and closed its doors at will solely according to its
own interests. And it was not only wrong but also absurd that
the United States excluded the Chinese alone. However, the
American exclusion acts were not just something to be
condemned, but also something that forced interpretations.
Much boycott literature offered to explain why Chinese were
treated so badly in foreign countries, particularly in the

United States.

172
2.Interpretative Frameworks of the Boycott

The boycotters perceived and described the problems
facing China, as epitomized and exacerbated by the American
exclusion acts, in profound terms. The exclusion acts were
not simply interpreted as accidents or misunderstandings. The
boycotters interpreted.the confrontation between.Americans and
Chinese in alarming language. As many anti-American
publications showed, the ideas of Social Darwinism.had.begun
to provide a fresh interpretative scheme and vocabulary for
urban Chinese. Within this scheme the contemporary world was
characterized as a Hobbesian battleground with the strong
preying on the weak. It was argued, therefore, that Chinese
were unfairly treated because China was weak and weak races
would became extinct in ruthless survival competitions.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries few
ideas were more influential in popular thinking of Chinese
urbanites than.Social Darwinism.(Zhang 1990:1034). Even.before
Yan Fu's famous translation of Thomas Henry Huxley's Eyelution
and Ethics and Other Essays in the 18905, the concept of
evolution was introduced to Chinese urban audiences through
newspapers and booklets. On 21 August 1873, Shenbao reported
English naturalist Charles Darwin's theory of evolution,
though the description was very sketchy and enigmatic. The
report was written entirely in wenyan with such elusive terms
as “xingqing‘ (temperament) and lxueq”" (sap) used to describe

the essence of man. Between then and the late 18905 when Yan

173
Pu published his translation of Huxley, there were several
books and translations that mentioned Darwin's theory of
evolution (Zhang 1990:1034-35). In 1894, Yan Fu translated
part of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays and
entitled the translation On EVolution (Tianyan Inn).

The popularity of Yan Fu's translation was initially
limited to a few intellectuals well versed in classical
Chinese, for Yan's translation was in wenyan and full of
archaic allusions. According to Wang Shi, an expert on Yan Fu,
the draft of the translation was initially circulated as early
as 1894, four years before its official publication in 1898
(Wang 1957:33). Yan's translation had enormous appeal first to
well-educated scholars such as wu Rulun, the master of the
famous Tongcheng school, which advocated the writing style of
the ancient Chinese classics (Wang 1357:33-34). Among the
first to read the manuscript and to advocate the theory of
evolution was Liang Qichao. Later Kang Youwei got access to
On Evolution through Liang and was apparently very impressed”
Kang praised Yan Fu as the I'first scholar of the Western
learning in China." (Wang 1957:36-37).

Despite the abstruseness of the translation, the message
delivered was irresistible for many Chinese after the
Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). The book later became popular
among young students. Lu Xun recalled that he bought a copy
of a lithographic print of On Evolution in Nanjing, and that

whenever he had a chance, he would "eat pancakes, peanuts,

174
peppers, and read ENolution.“ (Wang 1957:37). Bao Tianxiao
also reminisced that ”As soon as Evolution came out, the new
knowledge spread among intellectuals of the new learning.
Almost everyone had a copy.“ (Bao 1971:219).

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
even some grade school and. high school students were familiar
with the phrase “wujing tianze; shizhe shengCun“ (species
which compete with each other are selected by nature; and the
fittest will survive). The popularity of the idea was of
course explained by the precarious situation China was in at
that time. However, it should also be noted that
linguistically the key' idea. of evolution. was ‘very’ well
phrased by Yan Fu. The phrase had the advantage of economy and
profoundness of classical Chinese, yet it was not at all as
elusive as many wenyan phrases. The eight characters were
neatly packed into a couplet (duizi), a form of proverb or
paralleled aphorism.commonly used by Chinese in both popular
and elite literature. As is often the case, while few people
read Yan Fu's book, many knew the phrase by heart. Thus the
ironic situation became almost inevitable: while Chinese
characters indicating ideas of evolution became popular in
names of people and institutions (schools for example), Yan
Fu had a hard time finding publishers for his translations
(Bao 1971:219).

Still, the fact of the matter is that the ideas of

evolution had become a convenient interpretative framework

175

right before the anti-American.boycott. As early as the 18805
the Confucian scholar- official Huang Zunxian had lamented
that “Today is not yet the age of Great Unity (datong); we
only compete in cleverness and power" (Arkush and Lee
1989:64). Twenty years later, Huang explicitly acknowledged
that: “We live in a period when competition and natural
selection is severe and ruthless“ (Zhang and Wang 1962,
v.1,1:334).

As the century turned, Chinese intellectuals began to use
the concept of evolution more consciously, widely, and even
indiscriminately (Zhang andfiWang 1962 val and v.2). The advent
of the new century provided an occasion for reformers and
revolutionaries alike to remind Chinese people of the kind of
world they lived in. "Step from.the stairs of the nineteenth
century onto the stage of the twentieth century, which is the
era of most drastic competition,“ one author wrote poetically
in 1903 (Zhang and Wang 1962, V'l, pt. 2:538). Not only was
the twentieth century an era of Darwinian competition, but
China was also the center of the struggle, some warned their
compatriots. In an article entitled “The Reconstruction of
China,“ the author began his political sermon emotionally:
WAlas! Today's China is the burning focus of the world powers'
competition." A student publication echoed: "In danger is
China! She is the center of power struggle of the countries.
Alas! how many people know that, due to China's situation in

the struggle, our country is at the center of the center?"

176
Another article, "On the Future of China and Her Nationals'
Responsibility,“ could not agree more: "What is the date,
today? It is when our China is at the center of world
competition" (Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1, pt. 1:416,434,460).

Despite the other differences between reformers and
revolutionaries, the theory of evolution was embraced by both
political groups in early twentieth century China. As the
leading constitutional reformer of the day, Liang Qichao,
asserted: “Reform is the unavoidable universal principle in
the sphere of evolution. Whatever is suited to its
environment will survive; whatever is unsuited to its
environment will perish" (Zhang and Wang 1962 val, pt. 1:243).
The most radical and.Widely known revolutionary of the time,
Zou Rong, on the other hand, argued passionately that:
“Revolution is the universal principle of evolution.
Revolution is the universal principle of the world" (Zhang
and Wang 1962 v.1, 2:651).

The vocabulary of evolution was also used.by many Chinese
intellectuals as a useful interpretive tool for virtually all
phenomena. The nation state, for instance, was interpreted as
the result of evolution. As an essay titled "On Nationalismfl
explained: "...the origin of states is the result of
competition among nations. However, I would like to turn the
axiom the other way around: every [people] that wants to
preserve itself in the competitive world has to establish a

nation state. ...The [results of] evolution of group

177

organization are called states (guojia)" (Zhang and.‘Wang 1962
v.1, pt. 2:486). Similarly, various political systems were
also explained in terms of evolution. The author of "On the
Evolution of the Polity” started his article with a typical
philosophical generalization: “[In a world of] natural
selection and competition the fittest survive. This is true
for all things, especially true for polities." Another author
expressed a similar view in converse terms: "Whether or not
the world evolves depends on the gain and loss of polities"
(Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1, pt. 2:546,530).

As the term evolution became more familiar to more and
more Chinese, the analysis became more sophisticated. In due
course, evolution began to be applied to many specific
spheres. Thus not only people and matters evolved; nations,
polities, education, economies, and diplomacy also evolved.
Even marriage patterns could be interpreted in term of
evolution, and the theory of evolution was conveniently used
to justify free. marriage (Zhang and Wang 1962 v.1, pt.
2:853-59).

For many Chinese at the time, to talk about evolution was
to spread and advocate the idea of competition and struggle.
Thus soldiers were presumably engaging in military combat,
while merchants spoke in terms of commercial warfare,
students of learning competition, and so on. Competition was
stressed because it was through competition that the fit

emerged. This stress on competition eventually gave rise to

178

new moral values. For some selfishness was no longer
perceived as morally bad; instead it was encouraged as the
driving force to excel (Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1, pt.
2:494-95). Along the same line, natural selection was not
explained as inevitable fate beyond human control. Rather it
was man, not nature or heaven (tian) that selected, some
argued (Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1, pt. 2:714-15; 866-67).

It is important to note, however, that for many Chinese
intellectuals of the time, the theory of evolution was not
incompatible with ancient Chinese teachings, and for some of
them not even totally new. One author, for example, found Mo
Tzu's (ca. 468-376 B.C.) idea of stressing human effort very
similar to the ideas of evolution (Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1,
pt. 2: 866-67). Another argued that Mencius (371-289? B.C.)
and Yang Zhu (440-360? B.C.) both praised selfishness as the
theory of evolution encouraged (Zhang and Wang 1962, v.1, pt.

2:495).

In the early twentieth century the concept of evolution
was so popular that it was used as verb (jinhua) and adjective
(tianyan) , as well as noun. Jinhua also became the synonym of
progress or development (fazhan) in Chinese. For example,
fazhan shi (history of development) was also written as
jinhua shi (history of evolution). Although the term jinhua
was probably imported from Japan (shinka), tianyan, a more

widely used synonym, was of Chinese origin. The wide

179

acceptance of the usage can probably be explained by the fact
that tianyan was not entirely a foreign concept and somehow
sounded familiar. Many Chinese aphorisms had tian (heaven) as
their key concept and revealed the profound meanings of
mythical heaven. In Chinese classics and popular literature
one can easily come across such.phrases as: "those who submit
to heaven will prosper; those who challenge heaven will
perish“ (shuntian zhe Chang; nitian zhe wang); "tian is
principle" (tian ji 1i yie); "the net of Heaven has large
meshes, but it lets nothing through“ (tianwang huihui shu er
bulou); “The ruler's heaven.is people; and the people's heaven
is food" (wangzhe.yimin weitian;.minyi shi weitian). In fact,
tianwwas such a familiar concept that one diligent thinker was
afraid that tianyan might not contain any fresh meaning at
all. Thus he suggested in 1903 that tianyan should be
understood as renyan (evolution by man), for Social Darwinism
stressed human effort (Zhang and Wang 1962 v.1
pt.2:714-719).'

This does not mean, however, that the theory of evolution
was the only scheme through which the world was understood by
Chinese 'urbanites. Socialism, anarchism” and. rudimentary

Marxism were introduced into China in the early twentieth

 

*Although this author suggested that the ancient
Chinese concept of tian was more pessimistic, his position
was actually untenable since Confucianism was such an
inclusive body of ideas that one could easily find
absolutely opposite views of heaven in Confucian phrases
such as ”man will triumph over heaven" (rending shengtian).

180

century as well. Even communism entered popular literature.
Lin Xie, a popular writer before and during the anti—American
boycott movement, for example, ridiculed the abusive use of
the term communism by so- called reformers (weixin dang)
(Zhang and Wang 1962 v.1, pt. 2:905). However, there is
little question that the vocabulary of evolution was adopted
by people of wide political spectrum and various degrees of
literary competence. And few found the new idea totally
contrary to ideas they had believed in.

Not surprisingly, the theory of evolution was also used
to explain the American exclusion acts and to justify the
boycott. As Chen Yikai put it bluntly in his influential
editorial for the New China Daily in 1903: “Today's world is
a world of power, a world of competition, and a world of
prevalence of the superior and the subordination of the
inferior. . . . Appeal to reason alone is by no means enough to
persuade people. . . . [We] cannot reason with Americans
nowadays. . .What is the way to abolish the treaty, then? It is
a boycott“ (A Ying 1962:589-91,611) . Like Chen, many boycott
activists perceived the confrontation with the United States
from a much broader perspective than simply as an isolated
dispute over immigration rights. The importance of its victory
therefore was no less than Japan's triumph in the war of
1904-5 against Russia. In a letter to Zeng Shaoqing, Wu Woyao,
the noted novelist, wrote: “The Chinese boycott against the

Arnerican treaty today is also a war without its military

181
form. If the battle is won, the prestige [of the Chinese] will
not be lower than that of Japan" (A Ying 1962:667). Lin
Quanhong, a female activist, exhorted her fellow sisters in

a open letter which echoed Chen's editorial almost word for

word:

Alas! Today's world is the world of racial competition. [In
the struggle] the superior will triumph and the inferior will
be defeated. This is decided by universal principle and there
is no way to avoid it. . . .Thus today's boycott against
American goods is our last resort. If, by fortune, we
succeed, the prestige of our people will be known to the
peoples of five continents and our people will be welcome by
most of them. . . .Otherwise, [I] cannot think how dangerous our
fellow people's future will be" (A Ying 1962:648) .

This millennial concern was also expressed in various
literary pieces for the less educated. In the opera The

Adventure of Haiqiao chun, a young man (xiaosheng') stated:

The competition. of things and. natural selection. is the
universal principle of heavenly evolution. Haven't you
gentlemen all heard? [We] cannot survive without
competition. And [we] cannot compete without organizing into
a group. ...The hair-thin chances of survival [for Chinese]
hang on today's boycott against the American treaty" (A Ying
1962:467).

In another popular drama written in Cantonese dialect, an

actor presumably sang in a measured tempo (zhongban):

My fellow countrymen, do you know that things compete and
heaven evolves?/ Do you know the superior wins and the

 

*‘Sheng' is the male protagonist of traditional Chinese
drama. .Xiaosheng is usually a physically strong and
courageous youth.

182
inferior loses in the struggle for survival?/...[I] hope our
fellow countrymen will unite and boycott without delay" (A
Ying 1962:683-4).

Anti-American. novels were interspersed. with similar
expressions of Social Darwinism" The Bitter Society couched
the confrontation.between the‘United States and.China in terms
of racial competition. One protagonist cynically told his
friend who assumed that America was a free country: “In
today's world, there is no freedom for the yellow race; there
is only freedom for the white race" (A Ying 1962:78). A
speaker in the novel The Bizarre Tale of the Boycott (Juyue
qitang) told his audience that to boycott American goods was
to engage in a struggle of life and death (A Ying
1962:230-1). The wretched Student was a novel written by a
returned student who was apparently not a stranger to Social
Darwinism at all. The allegorical adventure of the student
started with.a.metaphoric scene of an ant fight. In the course
of the battle, a motley group of yellow ants was savagely
defeated by a well-organized army of white ants. The author
concluded, through the introspection of his hero, that even
the struggle between ants demonstrated the same principle of
evolution: “the inferior is doomed to perish while the
superior will certainly survive. There is no exception to
this rule“ (A Ying 1962:273-74).

To a great extent, the boycott movement was inspired by
a more general concern for national and racial survival and

stimulated by a widely shared sense of crisis. The theory and

183
vocabulary of evolution helped Chinese urbanites to put the
Sino-American dispute concerning the immigration issue in to
a broad perspective. The notion of struggle and evolution was
so influential that the boycott movement was also called the
“treaty struggle“ (zhengyue), a neologism with a Social
Darwinian connotation.

By comparison, the specific social and economic causes of
Chinese emigration and of American discrimination against
Chinese immigrants were not thoroughly discussed and widely
publicized at all. In their letter to the Qing government,
Chinese merchants in America cited the millions of dollars
Chinese immigrants sent back to China every year as one
reason why the Chinese government should provide protection
for Chinese-Americans (A Ying 1962:513) . However, this theme
was not picked up by newspapers or other media. Economic
concern was expressed in rather general terms and as a

benevolent side effect of the boycott.

Influential as it was, Social Darwinism was by no means
the only mental scheme through which American discrimination
was perceived and understood by boycott activists. Social
Darwinism is after all a theory of the strong, since the
doctrine implies that might is right. It is interesting to
note that the weak--Chinese in this case--adopted the theory
at all. Actually, the writings and speeches of the boycotters

did show tremendous confusion, ambivalence, and inconsistency

184

in their endorsement of ideas of competition and evolution.
Confusion and contradiction were evident in the wide and
anomalous use of the two related yet antithetical noun
phrases: qiangquan (power) and gongli (sometimes gonglie,
meaning principle). The confusion derived from the fact that
the boycotters vacillated.between the meanings of the concept
gongli. It could at once mean cosmic law, which was beyond
human control and therefore neutral and objective, and moral
principle, which meant just and righteous. The following are
some examples from.various boycott publications:

1) In today's world, races compete, and the superior prevails
over the inferior. Gongli is evident and inexorable (A Ying
1960:648).

2) In today's world, there is no gongli; there is only
qiangquan (A Ying 1960:684).

3) In the relations between two countries the important thing
is qiangquan not gongli.... To speak of gongli only...is
useless (A Ying 1962:589).

4) Gongli has no force....(A Ying 1962:589).

5) [American politicians]...do not care about gongli (A Ying
1962:291).

6) How can the united States resort to qiangquan disregarding
the treaty with China? (A Ying 1962:79).

Clearly, in 1) gongli means cosmic law which is neutral and
beyond human control. Accordingly, gongli in this sense is
perfectly congruous with qiangquan. Statement one therefore
suggests that power politics is beyond right and wrong, the
logical conclusion of Social Darwinism. In the other cases,
however, gongli implies moral principle. In this sense, gongli

and qfiangquan are antithetical and mutually exclusive. In

185
these statements, qiangquan is inherently evil. Obviously,
despite the tremendous appeal of Social Darwinism and the
immense popularity of its vocabulary, many boycotters refused
to endorse power politics.

Apparently some boycott activists realized that there
were contradictions and confusions involved in the use of
gongli and qiangquan, and attempts were made to provide a
more convincing interpretation of the two concepts. An
article in a Canton newspaper thus made a distinction: "When
powerful countries negotiate among themselves they evoke
gongli; when powerful countries deal with weak countries they
resort to power (qiangquan) " (A Ying 1960:610) . An author who
apparently had some knowledge of international law put the
idea in a more sophisticated and persuasive way: "When the
powerful tyrannize over the weak gongfa '(universal law) is
more than adequate; when the weak deals with the powerful
gongfa is inadequate" (A Ying 1960:641) .

Evidence above shows that boycotters in general were more
disgusted than thrilled by power politics among nations (cf.
my discussion of the perceived injustice of the exclusion acts
at the beginning of this chapter). Although Social Darwinism
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided

urban Chinese with a fresh way of perceiving the world,

 

*Gongfa is a legal term in modern Chinese. But in the
boycott discourse gongfa and gongli had the same
connotation.

186
boycotters by and large did not simply embrace the idea of
evolution enthusiastically. They had doubts and reservations
about the seemingly inevitable truth and reality of
competition and evolution.

While Darwinian vocabularies were adopted largely to
build up the psychological power of fear, the traditional
concept of universal humanity (minbao wuyu, roughly, forming
one body with the universe) was used to appeal for
conscience. Once again set phrases were skillfully used.
“Minbao wuyu" was a concept first formulated by the Song
philosopher Zhang Zhai (1020-1077). The gist of Zhang's idea
is that one should extend one's love and care to all mankind
and things in the universe, for nothing on earth is not made
up of ying and yang, the two basic substances of the universe
(Cihai 1979:1085, 1805; Chan 1963:498-9). Clearly, Zhang's
idea of universal humanity had persisted in the popular mind
and given boycotters moral strength in the early twentieth
century despite the new ideas pouring into China. Like much
other popular wisdom, the notion of minbao wuyu was also
poetically expressed in a proverbial phrase luyuan zhifang
(literally: rounded head and square foot). The phrase was
evidently taken from Huangdi neijing, the famous Chinese
medical book written around the second century B.C. Chapter
Seven of the book read:

Heaven is round; the earth is square. Man's head is round;
his feet are square so as to correspond to the [shape of

heaven and earth]. Heaven has sun and moon; man has a pair of
eyes. The earth has the nine districts; man has the nine

187

orifices. Heaven has wind and rain; man has joy and anger.
Heaven has the four seasons; man has the four limbs. Heaven
has the five notes; man has the five viscera. Heaven has the
six (yang) pitch—pipes; man has the six bowels. Heaven has
winter and summer; man has cold and heat....These are the
mutual correspondences between man and heaven and earth
(Unschuld tran. 1988:51-52).
This Chinese medical theory was also a general world View
which assumed the intimate relationship between the structure
and functions of the human organism and the universe. The
boycotters used the term to imply that since all people
looked.alike and. belonged to the same category, they ought to
love each other as equals. The moral power of the phrase was
such that even a person as radical as Zou Rong found it
useful. His popular pamphlet The Revolutionary Army (1904),
for instance, passionately expressed the idea of.minbao wuyu
despite its overwhelming cliches of Social Darwinism. He
condemned in strong words the astonishing callousness of the
Qing government toward the fate of the overseas Chinese:
Our brothers and sisters are suffering .from mistreatment
worse than that exercised toward beasts. The Manchu
government, however, turns blind eyes and deaf ears to the
fact. People have the same rounded head and square feet. Yet
same are so respected and noble while others are so despised
and mistreated. Alas! Alas!“ (Zhang and Wang 1962:658-9,
emphasis mine).

One of the motifs which runs through a variety of boycott
literature is the idea of universal humanity regardless of
races and social classes. In the novel The Golden world one

protagonist expressed the idea metaphorically. Referring to

some people's indifference toward the sufferings of Chinese

188
immigrants, he asked: "Even the fox mourns the death of the
hare.‘ How can [we people] with all our rounded heads and
square feet have no conscience?" (A Ying 1960:143). A Canton
newspaper article Ihad. the following to say about the
exclusion acts: "Heads have the same roundness and feet are
similarly square; are we Chinese not human?" (A Ying
1960:610). The idea of universal humanity was also theatri-
cally expressed in the opera The Adventure of Haiqiao chun. A
Chinese student who wound up in the shed on his way to the
United States stated on the stage:
my sorrow persists with tears on.my face/ Ask heaven where is
gongli ?/ I was stuck in the alien land that is a great shame
to my home country/ Who does not have a rounded head and
square feet, how come [we] are treated like oxen and horses?
(A Ying 1962:446).
This concern for universal humanity was such a powerful moral
force that it eventually divided the boycotters themselves.
When. it was said that the merchant leadership of the movement
was going to take a more conciliatory position and ask only
for the right for the immune classes (mainly merchants and
students) to enter the united States, some radicals found the
stand contradictory to the moral ethos of the movement. One
popular pamphlet questioned: "The four classes of gentry,
peasants, artisans and.merchants are all Chinese. Why should

laborers alone suffer; are they inferior to the other three

 

*Also a Chinese set phrase: tusi hubei.

189
classes?“ (A Ying 1962:552) Out of the same concern, the
novelist Wu Woyao petitioned in a letter to Zeng Shaoqing the
leader of the boycott in Shanghai, "If the boycott is just
for a few people's rights, it is not morally right, and our
consciousness will never be at peace. Personally' II do not
think it is right.“ (Zhu 1958:149). The Renjing (Man—Mirror)
Study Society, a literary organization in Shanghai, was more
direct on the issue: "The four classes of gentry, peasants,
artisans and. merchants are equal. We cannot treat them.
differently. Their equality is eternal and universal (italics'
mine. Zhu 1958:149). A.woman speaker, featured in The Gblden

world, drove the point home:

Sisters! Aren't we the mother of Chinese nationals? ...In the
eyes of a mother, there are only children, there are no
classes....Today we talk of boycott because foreigners have

abused our overseas nationals. Of the overseas Chinese,
workers are the largest in number and they also suffer the
most. If workers can get out of the bitter sea to the happy
landwzmerchants and.etudents will automatically have the same
[opportunity]. If we just revise the treaty in order to
benefit the merchants and students only, workers will not
have the same right. Sisters! aren't they our children as
well? (A Ying 1960:176).

These boycott activists refused to be "realistic" in politics
and refused to compromise their moral standard.

It is evident that the movement was inspired by various
social ideas. And it is important to point out that few
boycotters thought that Social Darwinism.was fundamentally at
odds with. Confucian.notions of universal benevolence (fanai).
The boycotters selectively used both ideas to mobilize the

urban masses. We may also argue that urban Chinese in the

190
early twentieth century did not embrace Social Darwinism
wholeheartedly because the traditional ideas tempered the raw

force of evolution and competition.

3. Populism vs. Democracy

Description of the mistreatment of overseas Chinese and
diagnosis of the problems facing China led to a prescription
for their solution. The boycotters found the solution in
organizing individual Chinese into groups and appealing to
their sense of civic responsibility. The boycott discourse
as a whole took a populist stance. The practical and
reconciliated attitude toward ruthless competition and
universal love was also shown in boycotters' discussion of
such broad issues as democracy and civic responsibility. The
American exclusion acts and the rise of the boycott movement
provided urban Chinese an occasion to reflect upon issues of
political organization and philosophy. In this respect, once
again, the boycott rhetoric showed remarkable consensus and
adopted a moderate and progressive view. While they were
critical toward American democracy, they vigorously advocated
popular rights as opposed to governmental authority.

For the boycott activists, the peculiar American
political system was much to blame for the absurd and inhuman

law of exclusion. A repeatedly-stated theme in various

191

boycott publications was that the American Labor Party had
initiated the idea of exclusion and the United States
government had been overwhelmed by popular pressure. This
theme was first put forward by Chinese merchants in North
America. In their petition to the Qing government in 1903,
they pointed out the vulnerability of the American government
to popular frenzy. The petition maintained that the idea of
exclusion was first advocated by a rascal in California who
latter attracted many Labor Party followers. It went on to
explain how the popular demand for exclusion became a
government policy:
The United States is a country ruled by people. From the
president down to the officials of provinces, all of them
have to be obedient to public opinion in order to be elected.
Thus the Labor Party becomes more and more powerful. As a
result the exclusion laW' becomes more severe (A Ying
1960:510).
'I'wo years later when the boycott movement started, this thesis
of democratic vulnerability was echoed by boycotters of
different political persuasions and various degrees of
intellectual sophistication. Both the more radical newspaper
Shibao and the conservative paper Zhongwai ribao, for
example, editorialized that the American government had
simply submitted to the Labor Party's pressure (A Ying
1960:599-601).

An author with the pen name of “China's coldrblooded.man“

(Zhongguo liangxue ren) represented the better informed and

more sophisticated boycotters. He wrote:

192

It was the American Labor Party that envied Chinese immigrants
and initially championed exclusion. The American government at
first rejected this demand. Later it found the Labor Party
had more and more followers and became increasingly powerful.
Under the democratic system none of the officials, from the
president at the top down to ministers of various
departments, can hold on to their power if they are disliked
by the people. Besides, American politicians were divided into
two parties competing with each other. Thus the Labor Party
with its large number of people enjoy decisive power.
Eventually, the American government adopted the Labor Party's
suggestion and signed the treaty with our government (A Ying
1960 :231) .

Writings for popular consumption conveyed a similar message in
plain language. A storytelling and ballad sing-song piece in
Suzhou dialect explained American politics in a simple and
sarcastic manner: “America has been called a great civilized
country. Only because the Labor Party has the say, does the
government enact the labor treaty, lest our Chinese snatch
their rice bowl.“ (A Ying 1960:483—4) . Vulgar language and
rhymed words were used by another composer of a ballad:
When American laborers get power, Chinese workers will
suffer. . ./ [If] the Labor Party says yes, Americans will hush/
[If] the Labor Party says no, its countrymen will echo/. . .The
Labor Party is wooed as sluts are courted/ Why is it so? It
is the way a democratic country works and civilized law
dictates (A Ying 1960:5-6).

This criticism of the American political system, however, only
reflected a less sanguine view of democracy rather than the
rejection of it out of hand. On the contrary, while
criticizing the American political system, boycotters

vigorously advocated people's rights vis-a-vis government

authority in China. It should also be noted that by

193

championing peOple's rights and power, the boycotters did not
go much beyond the Confucian notion of the people as the basis
of the state (minben) . In fact, the political concepts
frequently invoked during the movement were not democracy,
which acquired some negative connotation as I have shown
above, but group solidarity (tuanti or qun) of the common
people. As a popular play had it: " [One] cannot survive
without competition; [one] cannot compete without organizing
a group. Let's unite together to compete“ (A Ying 1962:467) .

Whatever the similarities and differences between
democracy and populism, theoretical consistency seemed not to
be a major concern of the boycotters. What they did with
great vigor was simply to redefine the people-government
relationship so that the common people could take more
responsibility for public affairs. A long essay in Shibao
maintained that China's weakness derived from the political
apathy of its people: "If all the people of a country abandon
their responsibility and leave everything to their government,
then blame the government for not being able to compete with
others, the country must be weak. " The essay went on to argue
that a country is just like a family and people should help
their government just like children ought to help their father
(A Ying 1962:616-7) .

Although this line of argument has strong connotations of
Confucian ideals of the body politic, a fresh notion emerged

in the same article which did not stress the cooperative

194

relationship between people and government. Instead the new
concept advocated separate responsibilities of the two, for
the government was not likely to be able to do much for its
people anyway; As the article put it bluntly: "Americans will
continue to exclude Chinese according to their own law with
or without a treaty with the Chinese government.” Therefore,
the article urged, Chinese people should do their share
regardless of the policy of the government (A Ying
1960:614-5). The article went on to define the separate
responsibilities between government and people. It pointed
out that while the Chinese government could not boycott
American goods due to the commercial treaty between the two
countries, the Chinese could because: “the government does
not have the right to fbrce its people to buy and cannot
guarantee sales“ (A Ying 1960:620). A speaker in A Bizarre
Tale of the.Boycott told.his audience: “We ought to know that
it is merchants' right to order or not to order certain
merchandise rather than government's business....It is up to
individual people to buy or not to buyg..' (A.Ying 1962:234).

Similarly, an essay in the Guangzhou Daily exhorted
Chinese people to abandon the illusion that they could rely
upon their government to abolish the exclusion acts. It
argued that putting pressure on the Qing government was of
only secondary importance; since what the people could.do was
only to send telegrams asking the government not to sign a new

treaty. It was then up to the government to decide whether or

195
not to have the treaty. The people had no way to prevent a
treaty, if the government chose to have one. The most
important thing for the people to do, according to the essay,
was therefore not to buy American goods and not to serve
Americans, for these sorts of things “are what we as merchants

and common people ought to do and have the natural right to

do. By doing so we are not interfering with affairs of
either the American or Chinese governments" (A Ying
1962:608-9) .

It is important to note that the essay did not advocate
popular pressure on governmental decisions; rather it
championed direct action by people in given areas. The
boycott was thus explained as entirely people's initiative,
having nothing to do with the government. It is of course
superficial to assume that the advocates of people's rights
were inspired solely by abstract beliefs in people's rights
and power. There was a very practical concern by boycotters
that the boycott movement might leadto American pressure on
the Qing government and the Qing government in turn would be
forced to suppress the boycott on behalf of Americans.' The
author of The Bitter Society spoke to this concern through
his hero in the boycott movement (A Ying 1962:110). An

article in Diplomacy (Waijiao bao) provided the clearest and

 

*On the delicate relationship between the
merchant-intellectual leadership of the movement and the
Qing government in 1904-5 see Chapter Five.

196

most sophisticated View on the interdependency of people's
rights and government authority:
Which country's goods to order is decided by merchants.
Foreigners cannot coerce and. our government should. not
interfere. However, ...since the boycott is triggered by the
Exclusion Act, it is a matter of international concern, thus
government help is essential. We do not expect the government
to make public speeches [on our behalf]; we just ask the
government to leave us alone. NOt to suppress [the boycott] is
to help (Zhang and Wang 1963 v.2, pt.l:4).
If people's strength did not derive from the government, it
had to come from their sense of solidarity and identity. The

"boycott nationalism“ was the product of this practical
necessity. I use the term.boycott nationalism to stress its
artificial creation and to distinguish it from many other
theories of nationalism.developed by various political forces
for their respective purposes in early twentieth century
China. For example, the national essence school (guocui pai)
advocated national learning as the essence of a nation (Zhang
and.Wang 1963 vu2,pt.1:43,52). Revolutionary nationalism.was
anti—Manchu and had strong racist connotations.

By comparison, the boycott nationalism had populist
overtones. An essay in Shibao related people's rights and
responsibilities to a new concept of nation. It read:

In this treaty struggle, we do not rely solely on official
power, rather we are able to use our own strength. Our people
have been relying on government for hundreds and thousands of
years. Everything from.domestic to foreign policies has been
controlled in the hands of government. If the policies are
good, people benefit from.them; if they are bad, people suffer
from them, never questioning. Today, [people] begin to have

the notion of nation, and to realize that the nation and we
have intimate relations.... Thus people begin to speak up

197

when something is wrong with important domestic or foreign
policy decisions (A Ying 1960:601-2).

The vernacular pamphlet A Story of Ill—Treatment Inflicted
upon Chinese Brethren expressed a similar idea in simpler
and.plainer language: "The common folk (baixing) of a country
should.fulfill their share of responsibility to the country"
(A Ying 1962:524). This was not an idle appeal. Many of the
boycott publications attributed the weakness of China to the
Chinese people's lack of nationalistic consciousness (A Ying
1962:589,600,605,648).

The boycott nationalism also had a humanistic aspect
which thought of the nation as an extended family. A Bizarre
Tale of the Boycott tried to explain the concept of nation
through a simple analogy:

People are given.birth.by parents. Men by the same parents are
brothers and together they make a family. Several families
make up a clan and men of the same clan are all brothers.
Expanding from.clan to village, village to district, district
to prefec ture, prefecture to province, province to country,
all countrymen are brothers....Gentlemen, gentlemen! All the
people of one country are brothers of the same father and
identical mother...(A Ying 1962:245).

The family analogy was a popular one. A vernacular pamphlet
writer asked his compatriots to "love [your] motherland just
as [you] love [your] wives“ (A Ying 1962:657). As in the case
of some other important ideas propagated in the boycott

literature, the concept of nation was also understood through

traditional ideas.

To sum up, the boycott ideology was a combination of

198

ideas old and new. This was clearly shown in the extensive
use of both newly-borrowed concepts from the West (many of
them.arriving via Japan) and traditional Chinese proverbs and
aphorisms. This mixture of the new with the old does not
change the fact that the boycott discourse showed remarkable
uniformity. This was made possible largely because key
concepts and images were expressed repeatedly in idiomatic
Chinese through various media. The acceptance of the new con-
cepts was evidently facilitated by putting them into familiar
linguistic forms and.hy the belief that the new concepts were
entirely compatible with or only extensions of traditional
wisdom”

Chinese culture was clearly in transition under the
impact of Western ideas, Social Darwinism.in particular, at
the turn of the century. The complexity of the boycott
ideology lay in the fact that the urban populace in early
twentieth century China did not simply embrace one (might)
and discard the other (right, as Chinese traditionally
understood it) or simply accept one as the other. Rather the
boycotters took a stand I call tempered. progressivismi That
is, they accepted the notions and adopted the vocabulary of
Social Darwanism. without discarding ideas of Confucian
humanism (fanai, literally: universal love). To a great
extent, the boycotters used Social Darwinism as a means to
mobilize the urban masses in order to achieve the end of

Confucian humanism-~abolition of the exclusion acts.

199

Similarly, the boycott discourse also showed an
ambivalent and contradictory view toward democracy. In this
respect mild progressivism took the form of cautious
populism. On the one hand, boycotters held the American
variety of democracy—-government's submission. to popular
demands--responsible for the exclusion treaty. On the other
hand, boycotters advocated people's rights vis-a-vis
government authority when organizing a boycott.

Theoretical eclecticismeas also clear in the boycotters'
concept of nationalism. The boycott nationalism included
racial awareness, a sense of group solidarity, and people's
rights and responsibility. Although boycott activists tried
very hard to appeal to a Chinese sense of nation, their
Chineseness was clearly more culturally and racially-oriented
than territorially- and sovereignty-oriented. There was a
practical reason for this tendency, for the nationalism of
Chinese Americans could not be anything but cultural and
racial identity. The point is, nevertheless, that the tradi-
tional sense of cultural and racial identity only facilitated
the rise of modern nationalism, if the distinction is

possible at all.

The uniformity of the boycott discourse did not mean ab-
sence of confusion and contradiction, for traditional ideas
did contradict the new. The most obvious conflict was that

between might (qiangquan) and right (gongli) . More

200
importantly, the boycotters seemed.unified only by the:means--
boycott--and.reached no consensus concerning the ultimate goal
of the boycott. This partially explains why the movement was
initially successful but ultimately failed. Initially,
ideological ambiguity did not undermine boycotters' sense of
the justice of their cause. As the boycott continued and
merchants' interests suffered, however, the uniformity began
to collapse. The next chapter will analyze how the boycott

affected the interests of merchants.

Chapter Four
Economics of the Boycott

and Merchants as Political Activists

As I have shown, although the 1905 anti-exclusion boycott
was triggered by American mistreatment of Chinese in the
united States and advocated first and foremost by overseas
Chinese, the boycott itself was propagated and organized by
Chinese urbanites in China.proper. Understanding the boycott's
domestic origin is crucial to understanding the movement not
only because there were purely domestic causes why the boycott
movement occurred in early twentieth century China, but also
because its development and outcome were decided by domestic
social, economic, andgpolitical factors independent of foreign
influences, including those of overseas Chinese.

In this chapter, I shall analyze the domestic setting of
the boycott movement with special emphasis on its economic
aspects. I shall first of all put economic boycott as a
retaliatory strategy into historical and structural
perspective. I argue that the boycott was adopted not because
it was the most effective tool to change American immigration
policy, but because it was the least dangerous yet most
symbolic way to confront a great foreign power for both the
Qing government and for urban Chinese at the time. Though it
was publicly stated at the time and has since been argued by

some historians that the boycott would.help domestic industry

201

202

and sellers of native products (Zhu 1958:7), in fact the
boycott was primarily an economic means to achieve a specific
political purpose. The alleged long-term.economic benefit to
the Chinese national economy was only a dubious economic
justification for a clearly political cause. The boycott
should therefore be understood in political as well as in
economic terms.

Not only was the boycott as a retaliatory strategy
adopted according to China's domestic political and economic
situation, but also the prime location of the boycott was
chosen because of new developments which.had occurred.in China
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Initially, some
overseas Chinese wanted to initiate the boycott movement in
Hong Kong or Guangzhou, Guangdong province, but the idea was
quickly dropped in favor of Shanghai as the headquarters of
the boycott movement because of the latter's commercial
importance and its significance as the largest city in China
since the late nineteenth century (Zhang 1966:33). Thus the
movement cannot be fully understood without understanding some
characteristics of the city at the turn of the century. While
it was a city in which many modern patriotic movements
originated (Liao 1986), it was primarily an economic and
commercial (and to some extent a cultural), not a political,

center. It was the merchants and petty intellectuals' instead

 

*For a discussion of intellectuals active in the
boycott movement please see Chapter Two.

203
of gentry' and. radical students 'who dictated. the city's
moderate and progressive political tone, at least at the turn
of the century, and who played the most important role during
the movement.

The Shanghai merchants were among the first to organize
into modern chambers of commerce in the early twentieth
century. While the rise of the merchant class indicated a
relatively independent economic and.political force in modern
China, the merchant organizations were under the strong
political supervision, if not the absolute control, of the
Qing government. Furthermore, the merchants were organized
along native-place as well as trade lines, which complicated
their collective behaviors. All of the above factors
significantly shaped the course of the boycott movement in

1905.

l. The Boycott in Perspective

In their 1903 petition' to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and several high ranking
officials of the Qing government, Chinese-Americans asked the
Qing government to take retaliatory measures against American
mistreatment of Chinese in the united States. The petition
specifically suggested that the Qing government raise import

duties against American goods (A Ying 1962:511-12). It was

 

'For details of the petition please see Chapter 3. The
full text of the petition is in A Ying 1962:509-20.

204
argued that if the tariff was raised the United States would
certainly give ground on the immigration issue since,
according to the petitioners, America's dominance of the world
industry and commerce depended entirely on its ability to
expand to China (A Ying 1962:511).

This assertion was of course a gross exaggeration, for
trade with China had little importance to the U.S. economy
(Chao 1986:103-04). But the Qing did not respond favorably to
the idea probably for the simple reason that China did not
recover its tariff autonomy until 1928. More importantly, the
immigration issue was definitely not important enough for the
Qing to take such a dramatic action against the United States
(see Chapter One). However, some Qing officials did suggest
other retaliatory measures. The Governor-General of Guangdong
and Guangxi Zhang Zhidong suggested as early as 1888 that
China should recall Chinese ministers to the United States,
dismiss.American.employees in various governmental services in
China, and forbid American missionaries to go to. China's
interior (HGCGSL 1/4:1385). In 1902, Wu Tingfang asked the
Qing government to warn the United States that if the latter
continued to mistreat Chinese nationals in America, Chinese
merchants might retaliate with a boycott (WJSL 152/19). Liang
Cheng, the Chinese minister to the United States at the time,
wrote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 1905 suggesting
that if the United States continued to make and implement

exclusion acts against Chinese nationals, China should

205
retaliate in kind: letting Chinese customs personnel know
about American exclusion acts and implementing them against
Americans in China (cited in Zhang 1966:29).

Liang's suggestion was legally valid based on reciprocal
articles in the treaties between the two countries. The
problem was, however, much more complicated, not only because
Americans came to China for entirely different reasons from
those motivating Chinese immigrants to the united States, but
also because the number of Americans in China.was much fewer--
only about two percent as many as the Chinese in America.’
Besides, China was not powerful enough to confront the United
States on equal terms, as many Chinese at the time realized."
At any rate, no record shows that the Qing court ever
seriously considered Liang's suggestion.

The idea of boycott was first explicitly and
systematically advocated in 1903 by Cheng Yikai, the chief
writer of the.New China Daily (Xinzhongguo bao) of Honolulu,
Hawaii (A Ying 1962:588-597). In an article in the newspaper,
he argued that a boycott against American goods was the only
effective way to confront exclusion acts because China had
become the center of the commercial warfare (shangzhan) of the

day and a boycott would hurt American commerce, industry, and

 

'In 1900 there were 1,908 American residents of all
types in China (McKee 1977:16), compared with about 10,0000
Chinese in the United States.

"For a detailed discussion of the boycott ideology
please see Chapter Three.

206

eventually the American laborers who had initiated the idea of
the exclusion (A Ying 1962:591-92). He also argued that by
boycotting American goods China could develop its own industry
(A Ying 1962:593). Chen's formula for the boycott included
three related aspects: 1) merchants would not buy and sell
American goods; 2) port laborers would not handle American
goods; 3) consumers would not purchase American goods (A Ying
1962:591).

Obviously Chen exaggerated the significance of a boycott
either to America or to the Chinese economy (for details see
below). But he was right in suggesting that short of violence
a boycott was the only'method available for Chinese people, as
opposed to the Qing government, directly to hurt American
interests and express their anger toward the exclusion acts.
Chen argued that to correct wrongs Chinese people could not
rely solely on one competent official (such as Wu Tingfang),
or rely on the weak Qing government. Chinese people had to
make their own contribution to the cause and to make their
power felt. The best and only way was a boycott, for it was
people's right to decide what to buy (A Ying 1962:594-95).
Chen's article was serialized in Shibao two years later when
a new'immigration treaty was to be negotiated.in China (Shibao
15-17 May 1905).

As it turned out, out of many alternative ways of
confronting the exclusion acts only the boycott against

American goods eventually became reality. Why did urban

207

Chinese respond enthusiastically with a boycott? To what
extent was the boycott effective? Whose interests other than
those of the Americans would be affected by the boycott? Why
couldn't the boycott as a retaliatory strategy continue later
on? No studies of the movement have provided adequate
explanations for these questions. Historians (Zhu 1958:7; Yang
et al.:376) have argued, among other things, that because a
boycott would benefit the rising Chinese national capitalists
(minzu zichanjieji) , therefore Chinese merchants supported the
idea. This is true only in a very general and limited sense,
because the boycott was targeted only at one country's goods,
not. foreign goods in general, and because American goods
consisted of only a very small fraction of the foreign goods
imported to China (for detailssee below). Furthermore this
assertion tells us very little about what kind of merchants
(and industrialists) supported the boycott.

The exact role economic nationalism played cannot be
fully'understood.or convincingly explained without an analysis
of the nature of trade between China and the united States in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Four
aspects of the trade relationship between the two countries
are relevant to this study. They are: the types and value of
American goods sold in China; the geographic distribution of
American goods in China; the merchants who sold American goods
and their methods of selling foreign goods in general and

American goods in particular; and the type of consumers who

208

relied on American goods and the extent of their reliance.

A. Types and Volume of American Goods Sold in China

Historically and economically American trade with China
was insignificant to both countries (Chao 1986:104-105; Schran
1986:237-258). In the second half of the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries the average share of‘U.S. exports in
the U.S. gross national product was about seven percent and
the share of trade with China was about one percent of the
total American exports (Schran 1986:239). While two items--
cotton and tobacco products--accounted for large shares of
total exports from American cotton and tobacco industries,
they comprised a relatively small share of the total
production of both industries (Chao 1986:104-127; Cochran
1986:153-203).

Foreign trade probably contituted an even smaller share

of the Chinese economy (Feuerwerker 1969:2). While imports
from the United States increased from.$3,844,200 in 1895 to

$53,384,000 in 1905,' American imports constituted less than
ten percent of total foreign imports to China (Hsiao 1974:22—
14; Li 1985:698; Yan 1955:64). The United States trailed.Great

Britain and Japan in exports to China (Yan 1955:64)." The

 

'The figure is calculated based on the statistics by
Chao (1986:105). Chen Yikai (A Ying 1962:592-593) provided
comparable figures based on Chinese currency, the tael.
According to him, American exports to China were 3,603,840
taels in 1895 and 24,722,906 in 1903.

"According to Yan's statistics the relative shares of
imports in 1901-1903 were: Hong Kong 41.6%; Great Britain

209
total American interests in China were also relatively small
compared with those of Great Britain, Japan, and even Germany,

according to a contemporary survey (see Table 1)

Table 1 Foreign Business Firms in China
Country Number of Business Finms Personnel
Japan 560 5,280
U.K. 520 5,612
Germany 159 1,659
U.S. 114 2,542
France 71 1,203

Source: Dalu (The Continent) April 1905, in Li (1985:712).
Imports from the United States were, however, conspicuous
in China for two reasons. One was that American imports were
mostly consumer goods; the second was that American imports
were relatively concentrated in populous cities. The most
important American exports to China in the early twentieth
century were: cotton textiles, flour, petroleum products,
tobacco products, and other consumer products of daily use
such as soap, candles, cosmetics, hardware (wujin, the five

metals), stationery, and so on (see Table 2). China also

 

15.9%; Japan and Taiwan 12.5%; the United States 8.5% (Yan
1955:64).

210
started to import machines from the United States, but the
amount was definitely negligible from.the point of view of the

boycotters.'

Table 2 Composition of U.S. Exports to China (% of total

exports)
Year Cotton Iron and Steel Machinery Oils, Mineral
Tobacco Products Products Refined
1901 42.5 5.1 2.6 22.7 5.1
1905 51.6 1.9 0.5 15.9 3.6

Source: Shu-lun Pan, Trade of the united States with China,
pp. 42, 59-60, 110-111, in Schran 1986:252.

Between the 18305 and 1910, the most important American
goods sold in China were cotton textiles. In 1900, $8,783
worth of cotton cloth was sold in China, comprising 57.6% of
total American imports in China. In 1905 the sale of American
cotton cloth in China increased.more than three times that of
the year 1900 to a record high of $27,760, which comprised
fifty-two percent of total American imports to China. Five
years later in 1910 the figure dropped to $5,763 (Chao
1986:105). The rise and fall of American cotton textiles

occurred. not because of political reasons, the boycott

 

'From.21 July to 3 September 1905, about 13,000
business firms, stores, and individuals declared in Shibao,
among other newspapers, that they decided not to sell, buy,
and use American goods (Shibao, July-September 1905). I find
that only a few mentioned machinery. According to Yan
Zhongping's statistics, machinery comprised only 0.7% of
total foreign imports into China in 1903 (Yan 1955:72).

211

included,‘ but because of economic reasons, such as
compatibility of American cotton products to the needs of
Chinese consumers and competition from products of other
countries." In the early twentieth century, the thick American
cotton cloth was well-regarded by ordinary Chinese consumers
because of its sturdiness and warmth, compared to the finer
and thinner British types (Chao 1986:110-111). In 1905 at
least eleven brands of coarse cloth, four brands of fine
cloth, ten brands of twill (or drill, xiewen bu), and thirty-
one brands of various types of sheets were sold in China by
the united States (Shibao 21 July 1905).

Around the turn of the century, American cotton fabric
comprised eighty percent to ninety percent of total Chinese
imports of coarse cloth (Chao 1986:111). Both for its
quantity and quality, American cotton cloth could not easily
be replaced by native-made cloth, either, for traditionally
China had been a cotton-importing country and its textile

industry did not start until the late 18903. In the early

 

'The boycotters, however, did realize that cotton cloth
was among the largest items imported from.the United States
and they listed at least several dozen different brands of
American cotton cloth as items being banned. I shall discuss
in Chapter Five specific reasons why the boycott did not
achieve its goal as the boycotters expected.

"Ironically, 1905 was a particularly good year for
American cotton textiles despite the boycott movement, and
the drop in sales in the second half of the 19105 had little
to do with the boycott movement either. In Kang Chao's
discussion of the rise and fall of American cotton textile
sales in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he
did not find it necessary to mention the boycott movement at
all (Chao 1986:103-127).

212
twentieth century the Chinese textile industry developed
slowly, largely"because of traditional political and economic
obstacles, not because of foreign competition (Li 1985:695-
96).

The second largest import from the United States was
petroleum.products.' From an economic point of view American
petroleum imports to China not only did not become an obstacle
to the native petroleum.industry but were in fact a necessity
for modern Chinese industry as a whole, due to the slow
development of China's own oil fields (Cheng 1986:205-233).
The largest proportion of petroleum imports from the united
States, however, was kerosene, which was used primarily and
widely as a conswmer good in both households and stores, and
was thus a convenient target of the boycott (Cheng 1986:206-
207). In 1905, for instance, China imported 153,470,000
gallons of kerosene from.various countries, of which 50-60%
were from the United States, while only importing 47,000
gallons of gasoline (SHDWMY:194). Increasing kerosene imports
from various countries, from the United States in particular,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was due
to its lower price relative to that of vegetable oils. In

1879, for example, the same quantity of kerosene was about 50%

 

'Chu-Yuan Cheng (1986:205-233) asserts that "petroleum
products dominated American exports to China from 1876 to
the 19205.“ This statement is probably due to a different
way of calculating available data. From the large quantity
of boycott literature, it is clear that cotton textiles were
considered the most important American imports.

213
cheaper than tea oil in Hankou. In 1884, the retail price of
kerosene in Ningbo was only about 40% that of bean oil (Cheng
1986:207) .

Tobacco products were probably the fastest growing
American imports in China. If other American businessmen in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found that
the market for industrial goods in China was impenetrable or
they were not aggressive enough to open the market, the same
was definitely not true for American businessmen in the
tobacco industry (Cochran 1986:151) . For American businessmen
of the tobacco industry, the China market became a reality in
the early twentieth century. The British-American Tobacco
Company (BAT), a joint venture established in 1902, sold 1.25
billion cigarettes in China in 1902, and 9.75 billion in 1912
(Cochran 1986:152-153).

While it is hard to estimate how many Chinese began to
smoke cigarettes as a habit, it is safe to say that cigarette
smoking began to become popular among urbanites. Virtually all
the boycott pledges run in the newspapers in 1905 mentioned
American cigarettes and identified several brands. The Pinhead
brand (pinhai bai) in particular seemed to be the most
popular (Shibao 21 July 1905) . On the other hand, however, it
should also be pointed out that cigarette smoking was a
relatively new phenomenon in China and that only a fraction of
consumers were directly affected by the boycott. Opium and

pipe smoking were still popular in large cities such as

214

Shanghai and Suzhou, as reflected in contemporary novels (Wu
1959:684). And it was relatively easier for Chinese
industrialists to manufacture cigarettes to substitute for the
imports because little capital was needed. to start the
business (Cochran 1986:196). All of the above factors, among
others,‘ made the boycott against American cigarettes the
most successful.

American flour was another consumer good which was
conspicuously visible in China.in the early twentieth century.
During the boycott movement a popular song was composed
entitled 'A Song Advocating not using American-Flour-Made
Mooncakes," which went:

It is about time for the Mid-autumn Festival to celebrate the
bright moon/ Tens of thousands of families have prepared
delicious mooncakes/ But if they are made of American flour
they are not clean/ [Because] American flour is [made of]
Chinese blood/... (A Ying 1962:9).

There were also many boycott pledges which specified.American
flour. Compared with other items mentioned above, however,
flour was much less significant in overall American exports to
China. Flour comprised only 0.7 percent of total Chinese
imports from America in 1894; and 1.8 percent in 1913

(SHDWMY:195). No specific brands of American flour were

mentioned in these boycott pledges.

 

.The marketing mechanism.and relative financial and
political strength of cigarette merchants also played a
role. For details of these two factors see below.

215

B. Geographical Distribution of American Goods in China

While there were political and cultural reasons (see
Chapters Two and Three) for Shanghai to lead the movement, the
economic reason was also obvious. Not only had Shanghai
developed into a commercial and financial center of China
since the second half of the nineteenth century, but Shanghai
had also become the center of American imports in particular.
As I mentioned earlier, American merchants (with a few
exceptions) were not particularly energetic in opening up the
China market, especially interior markets. American merchants
stayed in the big cities, especially in Shanghai. The biggest
American companies and firms in China such as China, Japan &
Co. (Fengyu, cotton textiles), Fearon Daniel & Co. (Xielong,
cotton textiles), American Trading Co. (Maosheng, soap, cotton
textiles, and others), Standard Oil (Meifu, petrolum
products), and BAT (tobacco) all had their headquarters in
Shanghai (SHDWMY:102; Shibao 21 July 1905; May and Fairbank
1986 passim) .

It should be pointed out, however, that the fact that
American merchants conducted their business mostly in Shanghai
was common rather than exceptional for all foreign businessmen
in China, due to the increasing importance of Shanghai as a
commercial, financial, and industrial center since the late
nineteenth century. This is to say that the bulk of the

international trade was conducted in Shanghai, not that

216

Shanghai consumed most of the imports of all kinds. The bulk
of foreign imports entered China first in Shanghai (see Table
3), and some of them were then transshipped to other ports.

In 1894, for example, 93,256,000 taels (57.53 percent of
the total imports to China) entered Shanghai port. Of this
amount, goods worth 62,614 taels (or 67.59 percent) were
transshipped to other ports throughout China (SHDWMY:30). The
import of cotton textiles was also illustrative. Out of
13,790,000 bolts of cloth. imported. into China in 1894,
13,000,000 bolts entered Shanghai first. Only about twenty
percent of this 13,000,000 were actually sold in Shanghai.
Therest were transshipped to other areas (Yan ed., 1955:
47).

Table 3 Proportion of Total Chinese Imports

in Five ports 1871-1903

Year Guangzhou Shanghai Hankou Tianjin Dalian Others
1871-1873 ' 12.7 64.1 2.7 1.8 - 18.7
1881-1883 11.8 57.1 4.2 3.1 - 23.8
1891-1893 11.6 49.9 2.3 3.1 - 33.1
1901-1903 10.4 53.1 1.8 3.6 4.9 31.1

Source: Yan ed. 1955:69.

American imports clearly followed the same pattern. The

best example is probably American cotton textiles imported to

217

China. In the 18705 when the basic trade pattern was
established, most American cotton fabrics landed first in
Shanghai and then were shipped to other ports throughout
China. Only 9.4 percent of the total cotton fabrics from the
United States were sold in Shanghai, whereas 38.8 percent and
33.5 percent were transhipped to Tianjin and. Xinzhuang
(Hebei), respectively, where the cold weather apparently
helped.sales of the thick American cloth (Chao 1986:111-112).'
Altogether American cotton textiles were sold in at least
nineteen cities in North, Central, East, and South China as
early as the 18703 (Chao 1986:111-112). Zhenjiang, a small
city along the Yangzi river in Jiangsu province, for example,
imported foreign cloth from Shanghai in 1886 and the quantity
increased steadily over the years (Zhenjiang Gazetteer juan
22,31) .

Shanghai played similar roles in the import and sale of
American cigarettes. BAT had its branch headquarters in
Shanghai. In addition, BAT had its first and largest cigarette
factories in Shanghai, too. But again Shanghai was important
geographically for American cigarettes, not so much for its
consumption as for its central role as a distribution center.
As Sherman Cochran has convincingly shown, American
entrepreneurs in the tobacco business were exceptionally
aggressive in their selling efforts in China. They advertised

and sold American cigarettes not only in large cities but also

 

'The figure is for the year 1876.

218
in small towns and even in rural, mountain, and desert areas
(Cochran 1986:151-203).

The distribution of American cigarettes was conducted
through a metropolitan-—city—-market town hierarchy. While
Shanghai was the most important distribution center of
American.cigarettes, many other cities throughout China.becamo
the division centers of BAT products (Cochran 1986:160-161).
It should.be noted, however, that American cigarettes were yet
to reach some important cities in China's interior. One
notable example was Chongqing, Sichuan in the southwest of
China, where people still thought cigarettes were poisonous
(Ding in SHWSZL 56:introduction 21). It should also be noted
that cigarette consumption was something new in big coastal
cities in early twentieth century China. Important market
towns very close to Shanghai (less than fifty miles away) such
as Songjiang and.Changshu did.not record.any cigarette imports
until the Republican.period (songjiang Gazetteer 233; Changsha
City Gazetteer 458-459).

Standard Oil opened its first office in Shanghai in 1885.
Eight years later in 1894 Standard Oil hired the Shanghai
merchant Ye Chengzhou to sell its oil (Miao in SHWSZL 56:45).
In only a few years Ye opened stores selling kerosene in
Zhenjiangy Nanjing,‘Wuhu (Jiangsu), Jiujiang (Jiangxi), Hankou
(Hubei), Yingkou (Liaoning), Tianjin, and Yantai (Shandong).
.Standard Oil opened another office in Hong Kong in 1894, and

by 1908 it had established branches at Fuzhou, Amoy, Swatow,

219
and Guangzhou (Cheng 1986:216). Relatively smaller cities
imported American kerosene from larger cities. Zhenjiang,
Jiangsu province, for example, recorded imports of American
kerosene from Shanghai as early as 1886. In 1891, Zhenjiang
imported 1,509,000 gallons of American kerosene (and 908,000
gallons of Russian kerosene). In 1899 the figure jumped to
2,561,000 gallons (Zhenjiang Gazetteer 22,31) . In the early
twentieth century, kerosene was probably the only American

import which entered China's rural areas (Cheng 1986:214-219) .

Available data provide us with a general picture of the
geographic distribution of American imports. The bulk of the
American imports apparently landed in Shanghai first, and many
of the imported goods were also first accepted and consumed in
Shanghai. The sale of American cotton textiles in China had
probably the longest history of all the most important imports
from the United States. By the early twentieth century,
foreign cloth in ‘general and American cotton fabrics in
particular had long been accepted and favored by Chinese
throughout China. As a result, in 1905 the Shanghai area was
no longer the consuming center of American cloth but a
distribution center. The bulk of American cloth was sold in
Tianj ing and Xinzhuang in northern China.

American cigarettes and kerosene were probably sold even
more broadly than American textiles, despite the fact that

they were relatively new imports to China in the late

220
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, Shanghai
was most important and crucial not so much for the consumption
as for the distribution of American products.

The wide geographic distribution of American imports thus
made the boycott necessarily a nationwide movement. On the
other hand, the boycott might have been much more effective if
American goods never left Shanghai at all, given Shanghai's
importance as an entry port and a distribution center for the
bulk of American goods. I will return to this issue later. For
now let's examine the ways American goods were actually
ordered and sold in China and the various merchant firms which
handled American goods, for these factors had significant

implications for the boycott movement.

C. Ways American Goods Were Handled and by Whom

China's trade with Western countries had been dominated
by the westerners through yanghang (foreign firms) in China.
China's trade with the 'United States was similarly controlled
by American firms (meihang) . In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the common practice was that American
firms in China, mostly in Shanghai, ordered goods from the
United States. Chinese merchants rarely had direct contact
with American manufacturers, but American firms relied heavily
on their Chinese agents to sell goods in China. These Chinese
agents, who were called by different names but commonly

addressed by Chinese as compradors (maiban),' behaved as

221

middlemen in helping to sell American goods to Chinese retail
merchants, who then sold American merchandise to consumers.

In the early twentieth century, however, some Chinese
merchants began to engage exclusively in one type of
merchandise and acted as wholesale merchants (pifa shang) who
directly ordered American goods from the united States and
then sold the goods to retail merchants. The variable
importance, financial and.political strength, and.interests at
stake largely decided the different attitudes and behaviors
during the boycott movement and shaped the course of the
event. For the purposes of this study, I shall focus on
various Chinese merchants who were directly involved in
handling and selling American goods.
Compradors

In selling American goods, American companies and finms,
just like other foreign companies in China at the time, relied
heavily on Chinese representatives--compradors--though with
different titles and job assignments (see Table 4).
BAT, for example hired several Chinese, notably wu Tingsheng
and Li Wenzhong among others (SHWSZL 56:145-155; Cochran
1986:170-172). Officially, they ‘were called. interpreters
rather than compradors. But functionally, they worked for the
company just like other compradors at the time, serving as
middlemen between foreign companies and Chinese merchants. wu

Tingsheng and Li Wenzhong as compradors were formal employees

222
Table 4 Compradors who worked for American Firms (Meihang) or
Sold American Goods in the Late Nineteenth and

Early Twentieth Centuries

Name Birth Place Trade Source

(or Company)
Ding Zhongmao Zhejiang BAT (Wang 1983:335)
Zheng Bozhao Guangdong BAT (SHWSZL 56:156)
wu Tingsheng Zhejiang BAT (SHWSZL 56:155)
Ye Chengzong Zhejiang Standard oil (SHWSZL 56:155)
Chen Guanyi Guangdong Standard oil (Zou 1989:121)
Yuan Hengzhi ? International

Banking Co.

foreign cloth (Wu SHWSZL 56/74)
Xu Chunrong Zhejiang Deutsche
Asiatische Bank

foreign cloth (Wu SHWSZL 56/76)

of BAT. Salary was an.important part of their income. At least
during the period under discussion they were not independent
merchants.

An important quality for a comprador, in the case of

American cigarette sales, was wide connections with other

223

Chinese merchants rather than just a knowledge of some foreign
languages. Other social connections with officials, gentry,
militarists, businessmen, and.even.peasants were also helpful,
as Wu's case indicated, for troubleshooting was one of the
main functions of compradors (Cochran 1986:170). Their other
important job was to recruit and organize Chinese distributing
merchants in Shanghai and attract regional sales
representatives in other areas of China. Wu, for example, co-
founded the Shanghai Tobacco Trade Guild in 1898, which
initially had ten members' (Cochran 1986:171) . While Wu was in
charge of sales in the Lower Yangzi River Valley area, Li was
a leading BAT comprador in NOrth China. In 1905, Li attracted
merchants in nineteen new locations to become BAT dealers
(Cochran 1986:171).

In the early years of BAT's expansion into the China
market, compradors apparently played an important role and
compradors defended BAT's interest most vigorously because of
the close relationship among theme As I shall discuss later,
Wu Tingsheng tried to help the sale of American cigarettes
during the boycott movement in 1905. But even in 1905,
compradors were definitely not as important as they were in
the nineteenth century in foreigners' trade with Chinese.

Compradors, if they were not actually merchants themselves,

 

'According to another source (SHWSZL 56:156-157),
Jinlong, an American firm.in charge of cigarette sales, had
six contract Chinese firms in Shanghai. They were Yongtai,
Fuhe, Qiankunhe, Ye Dexin, Yongshengchang, and Shunxinyuan.

224

were increasingly overshadowed in the early twentieth century
by Chinese merchants who controlled sales networks (see
below). Standard Oil thus had a different approach when it
began to expand to China in the late nineteenth century by
hiring Ye Chengzhong and later Chen Guanyi (Guangdong) as its
sales representative (Zou 1989:121). Similarly, American
cotton textile sales in China relied more on Chinese merchants
than compradors.

Wholesalers

While the compradors were indispensable because of their
language ability, which enabled them to act as intermediaries
between foreigners and Chinese merchants, they were not as
essential in the sales mechanism.as distributing merchants.
The same was true with the sales of American goods in China in
the early twentieth century; While many studies have been.done
on BAT's activities in China, we have only scattered
information about BAT's distributing agents, especially their
relationship with smaller retail merchants in the early
twentieth century, probably' because an extensive retail
network throughout China was yet to be established. Still,
some tentative generalizations can be made based.on available
information.

First of all, the actual sales techniques were designed
by Chinese merchants, not by foreigners or compradors, whose
role 'was confined. more or less to advertising (Cochran

1986:172-173; Cheng in SHWSZL 56:157). MOre importantly it was

225

BAT's distributing agents (or wholesalers)’ who innovated ways
to recruit retailers and maintained.special relationships with
the retailers. Zheng Bozhao, a cigarette merchant who became
BAT's distributing agent, serves as a good example to
illustrate the key role played by wholesale merchants in the
mechanism of American cigarette sales in China (Cheng in
SHWSZL 56:156-177).

Zheng was a clerk (who later became manager in probably
1904 or 1905) of Yongtaizhan, a wholesale warehouse
established about thirty years before it was affiliated with
BAT (Cheng in SHWSZL 56:155-156; Cochran 1986:173). It became
a franchised firm selling American cigarettes when BAT was
established in 1902. At first Yongtaizhan was franchised to
sell one brand, Pirate. Later a different brand, Ruby Queen,
was added to Yongtaizhan's sales list as a reward for the
firm's successful sales record (SHWSZL 56:157).

Yongtai, like other franchised stores--there were six of
them in the early twentieth century in Shanghai--had to sell
a certain amount of cigarettes in order to renew its contract
with BAT (SHWSZL 56:157). The more it sold, the more
commission it got, and the larger amount of cigarettes it
would get from BAT to sell.

Thus the relative success of a distributing agent

depended.on.a dependable retail network. In this respect Zheng

 

'I use the term.wholesaler in accordance with my
discussion of merchants who sold other American goods,
especially American cloth.

226

was one of the most successful agents of BAT. He used
Yongtai's old retailers in the Shanghai suburbs and diligently
recruited new retail merchants in other areas to sell BAT
cigarettes (Cheng in SHWSZL 56:157-158). Apparently, Zheng
chose his own regional retailers basically on his own terms.
He stressed business experience and long-termlrelationships of
trust instead of financial strength. Thus small merchants with
little means, if they worked hard and had selling ability,
were given cigarettes on consignment. Once the relationship
was established Zheng would not replace a retailer for small
problems. Zheng's retailers, on the other hand, would work
hard and carefully for him (SHWSZL 56:160-161) ." The loyalty
of the retailers therefore could be expected, even during
unexpected events such as the 1905 boycott movement."

BAT had several other Chinese distributing firms in
Shanghai in the early twentieth century. They were Fuhe,
Qiankunhe, Yedeqing, Yongshengchang, and Shunxinyuan. These
distributing firms had their own ‘retail network (Cheng in

SHWSZL 56:157). BAT also had its regional distributing agents

 

'It should be noted that the discussion on Zheng is
largely based on the information provided by Zheng's long-
time secretary Cheng Renjie, who did not work for him.unti1
1921. While there is little information on Zheng in his
early years as BAT's distributing agent, Cheng's account can
give us some idea of the way Zheng gradually established his
retail network, for which he was highly regarded by the BAT.

"It is said that during the boycott movement of 1905,
Zheng changed the name of Ruby Queen to make it sound like a
British brand and he was successful in selling the brand
even during the movement (SHWSZL 56:157).

227

in other cities such as Tianjin, Baoding, Taiyuan, Fuzhou, and
Ningbo. (Cochran 1986:171—172; Wang 1983:335). Apparently not
all of these distributing firms were conducting cigarette
sales alone, especially in the early years of BAT. Many of
them continued to sell a variety of other goods besides
cigarettes (Cochran 1986:172). It is hard to estimate to what
extent these distributing firms relied on cigarette sales, of
American cigarettes in particular, for their business. Given
the fact that cigarette smoking was a relatively new
phenomenon and a wide variety of methods of tobacco
consumption (smoking, inhaling, or chewing) were still
popular, there is no reason to believe that many merchants
depended entirely on American cigarette sales for their
livelihood. Thus yielding to popular pressure during the
boycott movement, at least temporarily, was the rule rather
than exception, as some contemporaries testified (Wang
1983:335).

The situation of cotton textile imports and sales in
China was somewhat different. The textile imports had a much
longer history, and textile merchants had organized their
sales network much earlier, in the mid-nineteenth century. A
group of wholesalers (pifa shang) began to appear during the
same period. The wholesalers in the textile business played
the key role in selling foreign cotton fabrics, American
fabrics in. particular. Unlike cigarette merchants, some

Chinese merchants of foreign cloth (yangbu shang) began to

228

order their goods directly frommmanufacturers abroad.under the
so-called indent system.(dinghuo zhidu) in 1879 (SHDWMY 112).
Under the indent system, foreign firms in China acted like
compradors themselves. They ordered the goods (the quality and
quantity of which were decided.by Chinese merchants) for their
clients and earned commissions. It was the Chinese wholesale
merchants who owned the goods ordered and.who took the risk of
the changing market situation (SHDWMY 112-113).

The numerous wholesale firms in Shanghai developed
because of the rise of many retail stores selling foreign
goods, from.which the wholesale firms themselves developed in
the late nineteenth century. The wholesale business became
profitable also)becausezmany'merchants of other areas (kebang)
came to Shanghai to purchase large quantities of foreign
goods (BHSYS 22). Tianjin's foreign cloth merchants, for
example, established shengzhuang’ in Shanghai and purchased
large quantities of foreign cloth from Shanghai wholesale
firms for good.prices (Linyuanwenzi 103). A.Chongqing merchant
talked about the ways in which the foreign cotton wholesale
trade was conducted in Shanghai. According to him, Shanghai
wholesale merchants ordered cotton textiles from yanghang
(foreign firm) merchants-~only two of which did not take
orders from Chinese merchants. After a deal was made, the
price would be decided according to the current rate of the

British.pound sterling and Chinese silver. When the goods were

 

'Residence stores in Shanghai (Sheng).

229

delivered, Shanghai merchants would pay with local bank
(qianzhuang) promissory notes. A Sichuan merchant, on the
other hand, had to order foreign textiles through a local
merchant or a broker. The purchase contract was signed by the
local merchant, who earned 0.5 percent commission but had to
pay for the shipping fee. The Sichuan merchant could go to the
contract foreign firm to examine the contract in order to make
sure no fraud was involved. If the ordered goods were not
received in four weeks, the Sichuan merchant could cancel the
order. On the other hand, if in two (sometimes four) weeks,
the buyer was not able to pay, the foreign firm would keep the
five percent deposit (Yao ed. 3:1549) . The wholesale
merchants were financially powerful. They also knew the market
and, to some extent, controlled the market by determining what
to order and the price. The attitude of the wholesale
merchants, especially those of American cotton textiles,
towards the boycott movement played a very important role in
the course of the event. As I shall discuss in Chapter Five,
they opposed the movement most vigorously and tried various
ways to sabotage the movement.

Retailers

In the sales network, retail merchants were most
numerous. In the early twentieth century, international trade
developed on such a large scale in Shanghai and other port
cities in China that special stores were established to sell

particular goods, foreign goods included. In Shanghai, for

230
instance, retail stores were divided into several different
types, each of which were famous for their particular goods.
Generally' speaking there 'were Beijing goods stores
(jinghuodian), Guangdong goods stores (guanghuodian), Beijing
and. Guangdong grocery stores (jingguang' zahuodian), and
foreign and Guangdong goods stores (yangguang zahuodian).'

Beijing goods stores mostly sold native handicraft goods
but also sold a few small foreign items, such as towels,
socks, foreign candles (yangzhu), kerosene (yangyou), foreign
needles (yangzhen) and cloth. These stores were normally very
small family stores with only one or two apprentices (BHSYS
14-15). With limited financial sources, these stores usually
had few goods in stock. A typical Beijing goods store had a
business of less than 200 taels a month (BHSYS 15). But stores
of this type were numerous and their customers were ordinary
city dwellers.

All the other three types of retail stores were usually
larger and sold goods from Guangdong and from foreign
countries. These were also family stores but with share
capital from.others. Their business was about several thousand
taels a month, on average and.they had more variety of goods
than family stores selling Beijing goods (BHSYS 17). The
bigger a store was the more foreign goods it would carry; Many

large retail stores were concentrated in foreign concessions

 

.The development of the retail stores can be summarized
as: jinhuodian (1840)--guanghuodian (1850)--jinguang
zahuodian (1860)-eyangguang zahuopu (1870; BHSYS 13-14).

231
on.Nanjing Road, Henan Road, and Qipan Street. On.Nanjing Road
alone there were about twenty large retail stores selling
foreign goods, among other things (BHSYS 22).

Retail merchants were not only most numerous but also
dealt with customers most directly. Thus their support of the
movement was most solicited. Compared with the wholesalers,
retail merchants were small merchants with little means who
usually sold a variety of goods. For these two reasons they
yielded.more easily to the boycott pressure, as I shall show

in the next chapter.

2. Political Consciousness of the Merchant Class

Considering the fact that Chinese merchants did play a
leading role, at least initially, in the 1905 boycott, an
analysis of the political consciousness of the merchant class
is necessary. Merchant was not just an economic category.
Chinese merchants played. much more than just economic
functions in late Qing China, as Rankin (1986) and.Rowe (1984,
1989) have convincingly argued. According to Rankin, the late
Qing local elite activism by gentry-merchants in Zhejiang
included supervising welfare projects, financing local
education, organizing militia, water control, road
construction, as well as business activities (Rankin
1986:Chapters 3-5). Likewise, Rowe's well researched studies
on Hankou show that the merchants and their organizations not

only played leading economic functions in the city but also

232

became community leaders on social and political affairs (Rowe
1984 and 1989). Exactly because of these extrabureaucratic
managerial activities by non-official elites, Rankin and Rowe
argue that the role played by Chinese merchants in the
intermediary area between official and private realms in late
imperial China was very similar to that played by the
bourgeoisie in the public sphere in eighteenth and nineteenth
century Europe (Rankin 1986:15-21, passim; Rowe 1989:183-86).

Nbbody can dispute the fact that elites--many of whom
were merchants or engaged in commercial activities--began to
play an expanding role in local, sometimes national, affairs
in the post-Taiping era as the dynasty declined. The question,
however, is whether this expanding role by non-official elites
represented just quantitative and. cyclical change or a
qualitative breakthrough in late Qing politics. In other
words, did the elite managerial activism lead to expanding
‘political demands from.which a new power relationship would
eventually emerge? These questions are important because.
Habermas argues explicitly' that the structural and
institutional transformation in eighteenth-century Europe led
to important political changes—~more open and democratic

political systems (Habermas 1992:Chapters 7 and 11) .'

 

'As Geoff Eley points out, “In other words, the public
sphere derives only partly from the conscious demands of
reformers and their articulation into government. ...[Tlhe
latter were as much an effect of its emergence as a cause.
Socially, the public sphere was the manifest consequence of
a much deeper and long-term.process of societal
transformation....The category of the public was the

233

For this reason and because of the scope of this study,
I would like to address the current debate' on the Chinese
public sphere by analyzing the political consciousness of the
merchants in late Qing' China. This issue is also 'very
important to an understanding of the behavior of merchants
during the movement since apparently economic interests did
not directly and exclusively decide the merchants' political
behavior.

For Rankin, there is no question that the expanding
managerial functions played by the elites, merchants included,
led to their rising political consciousness. She argues that
elites' initiatives went beyond local concerns to lead to
interest in national affairs and.politics due to domestic and

foreign pressures (Rankin 1986:29,301)." To quote her:

 

unintended consequence of long-run socioeconomic change
eventually precipitated by the aspirations of a successful
and self-conscious bourgeoisie..." (Eley 1992:290—1).

'See articles in.Modern China, Vol. 19 No. 2. [April
1993] and in Calhoun ed., 1993).

"Rankin's view of the society/state power relationship
in late nineteenth century is quite sophisticated and well
versed. As she puts it (1986:28): "When state and local
interests clashed, the disputes remained specific and
isolated. The elites still derived.privileges from.their
association with the state, and conflicts with officials
were likely to create a desire for improved contacts within
the government rather than foster collective demands for
separate political power.” She adds on quickly that this
situation had decisively changed since the promulgation of
the New Policies of 1902: “This situation had already
changed substantially during the late 1890's, and the Qing
New Policies, which mandated sweeping administrative reforms
after 1902, completed the disequilibration“ (Rankin
1986:28).

234

A characteristic of the last Qing decade was the simultaneous
outward extension of local and provincial elite activists to
the national level. This nationalistically inspired and soon
highly politicized process overshadowed the local defense of
elite interests against the state, and ultimately it pulled
the most dynamic organizations of the public sphere into
revolutionary politics (Rankin 1986:29).

Rowe's study ends at an earlier point (1895) and is confined
more strictly to urban merchants. Yet he, though to a lesser
extent, shares Rankin's sanguine evaluation of the merchant
elites' political consciousness. He sees rising nationalistic
sentiment and detects on the part of the Hankow merchants and
urbanites “a growing hostility to foreigners that was less
related to innate criminality, or to cultural chauvinism, than
it was to a protonationalist resentment of foreign arrogance
toward Chinese“ (Rowe 1989:273).

.At least three recent studies on late Qing merchants and
merchant organizations by PRC scholars (Yu 1993; Xu and Qian
1992; Zhu 1991) support the ‘view that merchants, more
specifically the newly-founded chambers of commerce,
represented a new political as well as a social and economic
force. Zhu Ying (1991) argues that:

...after the new type of merchant groups emerged, the
industrialists and merchants were much better organized and

their class consciousness increased. They became an
independent [social] class. ...The bourgeoisie began to lead
large scale anti-imperialist patriotic movements (Zhu
1991:13).

More specifically, he argues that the political consciousness

of the merchant class manifested itself in three aspects:

235

nationalism, a sense of social and historical responsibility,
and the idea. of grouping (jie tuanti; Zhu 1991:43—52).
Similarly, Yu Heping (1993:Chapter Five) points out that
although merchants formerly had not participated politically
at all except for publishing some reform suggestions in the
late nineteenth century, they began to take political actions
in an organized fashion after chambers of commerce were
established in the early twentieth century. Xu Dingxing and
Qian Xiaomdng (1992) point out in their study of the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce that Shanghai merchants and.industrialists
were among the first to introduce Western ideas into China.
Such.influential businessmen as Zheng Guanying, Zhang Jian, Xu
Run, Zhu Dachun, and Zhu Yunzuo were vocal advocates of
Western learning (Xu and Qian 1992:24-27). In the early
twentieth century, Shanghai merchants began to adopt a Social
Darwinian world view and publish ideas about commercial
warfare (shangzhan) in such merchant periodicals as Jiangnan
shangwubao, Shangwubao, and.Xuanbao (Xu and Qian 1992:29,33).
The political consciousness.of the "new social class,” a term
used by Xu and Qian (1992:35), was also transformed into
political action in the 1905 boycott, rights recovery
movement, self-government demands, constitutional reforms, the
1911 Revolution, and later in the May Fourth MOvement (Xu and
Qian 1992: Chapters 3-5).

However, this sanguine assessment of the merchants'

political consciousness is challenged by some China scholars.

236

Wakeman (1993) believes that Rankin and Rowe have exaggerated
the independence of merchants' activities and their
organizations from.governmental interference and bureaucratic
domination. In fact, Xu Dingxing himself in an earlier study
on Shanghai gentry-merchants stresses the dependent position
of Shanghai big businessmen upon the Qing state by pointing
out the fact that 1) many big businessmen such as Yan Xinhou,
Sun Duoseng, and Xu Run were former officials themselves; and
2) many successful businessmen sought official privileges and
protection by purchasing honorific official positions. The
most famous examples are Ye Chengzhong, Zhu Baosan, Zhu
Dachun, Xu Chunrong, Shao Qingtao, and Zeng Shaoqing (who
later became the leader of the boycott) (Xu 1988:53-55). As
far as Western ideas were concerned, he admits that “what
could be absorbed by the people of industrial and commercial
realms was very limited“ (Xu 1988:56).

The most disparaging view of the Chinese bourgeoisie's
political consciousness is offered by Zhang Yegong and Xu
Siyan (1992). They argue that until the late 19205 the Chinese
bourgeoisie (as represented by chambers of commerce) were
politically passive, observing the motto ”being merchants,
talking commerce“ (zaishang' ,yanshangy Zhang and. Xu
l992:110,1l4). They point out that although the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce was involved in constitutional reforms,
the railroad recovery movement, and the 1911 Revolution, this

foremost merchant organization played only marginal roles in

237

all these events. Far from playing the role of community
leaders the Shanghai merchants participated.in these political
movements only for their narrow interests and for a quicker
return to stability and normalcy (Zhang and Xu 1992:111-114).

Chinese merchants, Zhang and Xu argue, were politically
myopic. Although they began to develop some political
consciousness in the early twentieth century, their nascent
political consciousness was never transformed into a modern
sense of political participation. To protect their short term
economic interests they could easily give up political
principles and.rights (Zhang and.Xu 1992:113). The reasons for
the merchant class's political impotence were, according to
Zhang and Xu, the traditional educational background of
merchant. leaders,‘ organizational. ‘weakness,"' state
suppression, and lack of leadership capability and confidence
on the part of business leaders (Zhang and Xu 1992:126-27,
129-30).

While these criticisms sound too harsh and the authors
seem.to demand.something historically impossible from Chinese

bourgeoisie, these studies persuasively explain why Chinese

 

*The educational background of merchant leaders changed
in the 19205. By that time, many bourgeois Chinese had more
systematic Western educations (Zhang and Xu 1992:130).

"All the sub-committees of the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, for instance, were established for economic
purposes. Such modern institutions as schools, libraries,
arbitration offices for commercial affairs, and commercial
investigation bureaus were established for general education
and for improving commercial activities (Zhang and Xu
1992:126).

238
merchants and capitalists played at most only secondary role
to Chinese intellectuals and students in modern politics.
Modern Chinese political history might have been very
different if the Chinese bourgeoisie had played more a
significant and active role.' In 1905, Chinese merchants, I
would argue, had a chance to play first fiddle. The fact that
the merchants abandoned their leadership responsibility half-
way through the boycott significantly tarnished their image.
The painful and unsuccessful experience during the boycott
significantly affected the merchant class's future political

performance.

All the above assessments of Chinese merchants' political
consciousness have the advantage of looking at the issue from
a long and broad perspective with different comparative
emphases. Rankin, Rowe, and Xu and Qian stress changes in and
the modernizing aspects of Chinese merchant elites in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as compared with
traditional elites and traditional.merchants. wakeman stresses
the differences that still existed between Chinese merchants
and the Western bourgeoisie despite the changes in China. He
bases his central argument upon the intimate relationship

between social elites and the state. Zhang and Xu examine the

 

'Reflecting upon the 1989 pro—democracy movement in
China, some scholars argue that "the constituent elements of
a nascent civil society are relatively limited in number,
largely urban based, mainly centered in the intellectual-
student community“ (cited in Chamberlain 1993:202).

239
Chinese bourgeoisie in general, including merchants. They try
to find why Chinese capitalists' political.performance did.not
match their economic strength and social influences. They
argue that compared with other social groups, intellectuals
and students in particular, the Chinese bourgeoisie's
political apathy was obvious and deplorable.

My purpose is more specific. I try to show the factors
that contributed to or hindered.merchants' leadership role in
one of the first and most important political protests in
early twentieth century China. This sort of specific case
study can test the usefulness of higher-level generalizations
such as those I have summarized above. My focus will be on the
merchant leadership of the boycott movement, but I shall use
a different approach from the one I used to analyze the
intellectual leadership of the boycott because merchants
participated in politics as well as other social activities
much more as groups than did intellectuals (Bergere 1989:140—
86; Yu 1993 1; Zhang and Xu 1992 107-109; Zhu 1991:8-9). As
Marie-Claire Bergere points out, for the Chinese bourgeoisie
family relations and regional links played a fundamental role
in their personal careers (Bergere 1989:140-41). Politically
merchant organizations, which were formed along both regional
and trade lines, played crucial roles. I shall first make some
general observations about merchant leaders at the time, and
then examine more closely some important merchants'

organizations to illustrate my point.

240

First of all, merchants were politically pragmatic. More
specifically, they were not interested in or good at political
articulation and theorization. Despite the claim that
merchants were among the first to introduce Western ideas into
China (Xu and Qian 1992), there were very few publications
specifically for merchant consumption and the few such
periodicals that were published in the late Qing had little to
say about political affairs (Zhang and Wang eds., 1962-63) . As
one contemporary merchant deplored: "Merchants do not pay
attention to current affairs, do not read newspapers, and
therefore are not enlightened“ (in Zhang and Wang eds., 1962,
vol.1, part 2:891). Out of about one thousand newspapers,
literary journals, and periodicals published in late Qing only
three were published by merchants and for merchants. They were
Gongshang xuebao (f.l898, Shanghai, weekly), Jiangnan shangwu
bao (f.l900, Shanghai), Shangwu bao (f.l903, Beijing, three
issues monthly). I have not found a single article published
by merchant periodicals on American mistreatment of Chinese
immigrants or on the boycott. The latest and presumably most
influential of the three, Shangwu bao, clearly had official
ties (JDQK vol.2:1151) . Virtually all the articles in seventy
issues of the magazine published from December 1903 to January
1906 were strictly devoted to specific commercial affairs. Not
a single article was on or related to constitutional reforms
(JDQK vol.2:1151-1153) . Also revealing is the fact that of the

several hundreds of important political commentaries published

241
in the first decade of the twentieth century none was from a
merchant periodical and only one was by a merchant study
society (Zhang and Wang eds., 1962-63).

Political pragmatism. is, however, not the same as
political apathy. Merchants were in fact very active
politically in the early twentieth century on policy issues
very closely related to commercial affairs. Concerned
merchants considered promoting business in general to be a
measure of national salvation (the idea of commercial
warfare). In 1904, gentry-merchants Sun Duoxing, Sun Duoseng,
and Xu Run"r established the Shanghai Society of Commercial
Learning (Shanghai shangxue hui) in order to ”enlighten the
merchants and. expand trade" (Shibao, 25 August, 1904).
Merchant scholars were also influential in the Shanghai Study
Society (Huxue hui) founded the same year in Shanghai. The
Shanghai Study Society was a scholarly society headed by Ma
Xiangbo, an educator with substantial business and official

ties." .The Society' aimed. at “opening [people's] minds,

 

'More about them later.

"Ma had a mixed Confucian-Western education. He served
as secretary for the Chinese Minister to Japan. After he
retired from.public service in the late nineteenth century
he had been active in education. He founded the Zhengdan
gongxue in 1902. His educational efforts were greatly helped
by the Governor General of Liangjiang (in charge of the
provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi). Because of his
exceptional talent in making public speeches he was praised
as the ”first speaker of China." When the boycott movement
started in 1905, he was the chairman of the Shanghai Study
Society (Huxuehui), a scholarly study group (reminiscence by
Li Qingya, Ma Yuzhang, Han Jingqi, and Lu Zhangpu in
materials of Shanghai Local History (Shanghai wenshi ziliao

242

encouraging dialogue of learning, and promoting the public
welfare of the intellectual sphere." (JDSHDSJ:583). During the
boycott .movement both study societies organized. boycott
meetings.’ Merchant political pragmatism was also reflected
in their case-by-case approach and readiness to back off or to
make compromises if their goals seemed.unachievable (Zhang and
Xu 1992)."

My second general observation is that merchants' official
connections did not always make them politically inactive. It
is certainly true that merchants, wealthy ones and community
leaders in particular, had closer relationships with the
official establishment. This is much more obvious when they
are compared with intellectuals who were increasingly
alienating themselves from the state. In the late Qing, the
top stratum.of the merchant class and.politically influential
merchants'" were a hybrid called gentry-merchants""
(shenshang) . They were formed in two ways. One was urban
gentry (traditional scholars and retired officials) turned

into merchants. Such top leaders of the Shanghai Chamber of

Commerce as Yan.xinhou and.Sun Duoseng were good examples. The

 

No.4, 1986:128-145).

'Unfortunately there are very few materials available
for a more detailed account of the two study societies.

"See my discussion of the Zhong Shengyou case below.

"Most wholesale merchants that I discussed earlier in
this chapter belonged to this group.

""Bergere uses the phrase "scholars and merchants".

243

former engaged in foreign affairs (yangwu) under Li Hongzhang
before he became a banker, investor, and first general manager
(zongli) of Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. Sun was from a
scholar-official family. His grandfather was a jinshi and
ranking Qing official. He himself was not very successful in
the civil service examinations. After the New Policies were
promulgated he and his brother Sun Duoxing invested in flour
factories. Thanks to family ties, they obtained tax-exempt
privileges from the Ministry of Commerce and their business
developed very fast. The Sun brothers became very influential
in the business world (Xu 1988:54).

The majority of the gentry-merchants were, however,
merchants who assumed gentry (shen) status by purchasing
official titles. The big wholesale merchants such as Ye
Chengzhong, Zhu Baosan (kerosene and hardware), Zhu Dachun,
Zhou Shengqing (iron and steel), Xu Chunrong, Shao Qingtao
(foreign textile) and Zeng Shaoqing (rice and sea products)
all held.official titles. unlike gentry-turned-merchants, this
group of people's official connections were more symbolic than
real.

More importantly, when the state itself was undertaking
a reform policy as the Qing government was after 1901, and
when the state itself had grievances against foreign powers,
as was the case when Americans mistreated Chinese immigrants,
merchants did not have to be rebellious in order to be

politically active. The Sun brothers founded the Society of

244
Commercial Learning when the Qing government itself began to
encourage commerce and industry (shiye). In the case of the
anti-American boycott, officials from both the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce were supportive,
as I shall show in detail in the next chapter. Until the late
19105 the official-merchant relationship was probably more
cooperative than antagonistic because the Qing government
itself was the initiator of numerous modernizing programs. A
recent study of the New Policies period goes so far as to

argue

The real revolution of modern China, which dismantled China's
2,100-year imperial form of government and its philosophical
underpinnings, was not the political Revolution of 1911
centered on the activities of Sun Yat-sen. . .and his
associates. Rather, it was an intellectual and institutional
revolution centered on the Xinzheng or New Systems Reforms of
the late-Qing government, 1901-1910. The heroes of that
revolution were not the self-proclaimed revolutionaries around
Sun but, ironically, their targeted enemies--the Manchu
government they were trying to overthrow and its conservative
Chinese and Manchu official and gentry supporters. . . . [T]he
Xinzheng Revolution and its achievements have since 1911
served. . .as the real bedrock upon which postimperial China has
defined its course intellectually and institutionally, even up
to today (Reynolds 1993:1).

Thus close official connection should not necessarily
disqualify the merchants' leadership position in society. As
another scholar points out: "Historically conceived, civil
society is as much a creature of the state as it is of
society' (Chamberlain 1993:204).

The third point I would like to make is that politically
regional links played significant roles in a national movement

such as the 1905 anti-American boycott because merchants were

245
organized along regional as well as trade lines. Since it is
crucial to understand the ways merchants organize themselves
in order to understand their behavior in the boycott, I shall
provide a more detailed analysis of some merchant
organizations in general and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce

in particular.

3. Merchant Organizations in the Early Twentieth Century

During the period.under discussion, Chinese merchants in
large cities were generally organized along two often-
overlapping lines: native-place associations and trade
associations. Since Shanghai merchant organizations played a
pivotal role in the boycott movement, let us focus on the way
Shanghai merchants were organized.

Huiguan.

The first anti-exclusion meetings in 1905 were mainly
organized by huiguan (Su JDSZL 1954/1:l3-25). It seems that
native-place associations were, at least politically, more
conspicuous than trade associations. In Shanghai as in many
other Chinese commercial centers merchants came from.various

places and were traditionally and naturally gathered along

 

'Generally speaking huiguan were native place
associations dominated by wealthy and prestigeous merchants,
with people of various occupations and social status as
members. Gongsuo, on the other hand, designated merchant
organizations of the same trade. This study uses the above
definitions. However, careful readers will find that the two
terms were sometimes interchangeable. For example, the
Guangzhao gongsuo was a native place association instead of
just a trade organization.

246

native-place lines (Rowe 1984 Chapter 7). Many huiguan had
been established in Shanghai since the mid-seventeenth century
(SHBKZL:507-513) . Huiguan were also among the longest—lasting
social institutions in commercial cities. According to the
Shanghai Guide of 1926 there were still sixty huiguan active
in the most modern city of China in the 19205 (cited in Xu
1990 : 91) .

According to the constitutions of the various huiguan in
Shanghai, these predominately native-place organization
performed above all sentimental functions. The phrase "to
promote native-place sentiment" (yilian xiangyi) appeared in
many constitutions of huiguan (SHBKZL passim) . Huiguan were
established to promote this native-place sentiment largely for
two specific practical reasons. One was simply to provide a
place where people from the same locale could pray to their
commonly-worshipped gods. Many Chinese merchants believed in
and relied on blessings from their gods. Secondly, huiguan and
the estates they possessed also provided places where deceased
compatriots could be buried, if the family of the deceased
could not afford to have their bodies shipped home (SHBKZL
397). Of course, huiguan were also funded for more worldly
reasons; such as to help native-place compatriots in their
disputes with others in cities where people from all over
China gathered (SHBKZL 397).

One of the most celebrated cases which had shown

huiguans' social and political strength was that of the

247

confrontation between the authority of the French Concession
in Shanghai and the Siming Gongsuo (the Ningbo Guild of
Shanghai) over the latter's grave land. In 1874 and in 1898
the Ningbo Guild had twice successfully resisted the French
municipal authority's attempts to construct roads which would
disturb the graves of their fellow-townsmen (Remer 1933:13-
14).

However, there were obstacles hindering the native-place
organizations from.playing a significant role in a nationwide
popular movement such as the 1905 boycott. As an insightful
reader of the Shibao pointed out, the Ningbo Guild's struggle
was just for the land of one gongsuo. On the other hand, the
boycott required the unified action of much broader social
groups (Shibao 20 June 1905).

That the native-place organizations did not play decisive
roles in the 1905 movement was also because their functions
were not historically political. As time went on many huiguan
failed. to maintain their original attractions to their
members. Quite a few huiguan were neglected by their members
after the death of their original founders. Huiguan properties
were often not cared for; documents were lost and many
properties themselves began to become objects of dubious
ownership claims (SHBKZL). While a few huiguan, most notably
the Guangzhao Gongsuo, gradually took on.new functions such as
establishing schools and hospitals as Shanghai became an

increasingly complicated modern city, many others were

248

satisfied with their traditional functions of god-worshipping
and welfare activities. The privilege of performing these
functions was increasingly an unattractive duty rather than an
opportunity to advance one's power. As a result, this type of
organization declined as other social groups began to play
more prominent roles socially and politically.

Trade Gongsuo

The trade organizations known as gongsuo had a history as
long as the huiguan. As Shanghai became a large commercial
trade center in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, gongsuo began to take the place of huiguan as more
important merchant organizations, especially in the realm of
commercial activities. An indication of the increasing
importance of gongsuo was the large number of such
institutions established during the period. From 1843 to 1911,
there were at least forty-three trade gongsuo established in
Shanghai, whereas only half that number of huiguan were
founded during the same period (SHBKZL 507-513; SHYJZL 2/144-
153). It was these trade guilds which regulated aspects of
Shanghai merchants' commercial activities such as prices,
market division, and new members. These trade organizations,
along with native-place organizations, also provided the basis
for local municipal administration in the late Qing (SHYJZL
2/154) . During the boycott movement numerous public pledges of
boycott against American goods were made by trade guilds

instead of by individual stores (Shibao and Shenbo 1905,

 

WE

Q;

 

249
especially July and August issues).

It is important to point out, however, that the
difference between native-place organizations and trade guilds
was never absolute in Shanghai as well as in many other cities
at the time (Rowe 1984 Chapters 7,8) . While merchants in the
same trade might not necessarily come from the same district
or province, merchants from the same provincial locale were
indeed often in the same business (SHYJZL 2/144) . This can be
seen from the fact that numerous names of gongsuo in Shanghai
were preceded with locale designations, such as Shandong &
Henan Silk Gongsuo, Ningbo Carpenter's Gongsuo, and Suzhong
Jade Products Gongsuo.

Generally speaking, in Shanghai foreign trade was largely
dominated by merchants from the three provinces of Zhejiang
(especially Ningbo) , Guangdong, and Fuj ian. Foreign trade was
further divided by trade with the Western countries, with
Japan, and with South Sea (Nanyang) areas (Singapore, Malaya,
and the Philippines). The trade with Western countries and
with Japan was mainly conducted by merchants from Zhej iang and
Guangdong, whereas the Nanyang trade was predominately handled
by merchants from Fujian (SHDYMY l/chapters 3,4) . Therefore it
is probably true that the boycott affected the merchants from
Zhejiang province the most, especially the large wholesale
merchants.

Thus the merchants' interests were complicated by both

common native—place sentiment and common trade interests.

250
These parochial interests were reflected in the Shanghai
merchant organization par excellence--the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, which was established in 1904 in an attempt, among
other things, to reconcile the contradictory interests among
merchants. Since the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce played a
crucial role in orchestrating the 1905 boycott movement, I
shall discuss the organization in detail, with emphasis on its
power over the merchant community in Shanghai, its leadership,
and its relationship with the Qing government. For purpose of
comparison and because of the available source materials,
however, I shall also discuss aspects of another important
merchant organization at the time--the Tianjin Chamber of

Commerce (Tianjinshi Zongshanghui) .

4. The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce

The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was established as a
result of increasing commercial activities and the Qing
government's reform policies in the early twentieth century.
In 1902, the Shanghai Council of Commerce (Shanghai shangye
huiyi gongsuo) was established to provide counsel for the Qing
government in its commercial treaty negotiations with foreign
countries. After the Ministry of Commerce (Shangbu) was
established in 1903, the Shanghai Council of Commerce was
reorganized as the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai
zongshanghui) according to the Concise Chart of Chambers of

Commerce published by the Ministry.

251

The stated purpose of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
was to “bring together the people in the same trade; promote
knowledge; investigate commercial affairs for the Ministry of
Commerce's advice; maintain public interests and correct
[unsatisfactory] guild regulations; provide good offices in
disputes and present complaints for the victimized..." (TJSH
archives 1/5; Xu SHYJLC 1988/1:242). The Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce would be led by a general manager (zongli), an
assistant manager (xieli), and sixteen (plus two alternate)
board members (yidong) . The managers would be elected
annually by the members of the board and then confirmed and
appointed by the Ministry of Commerce (TJSH archives 1/5-6).
The managers' qualifications included: 1) good character and
reputation; 2) having a solid business in Shanghai; 3) being
familiar with official documents and having rational thinking
ability; 4) being a member of the chamber; 5) aged around
forty.

The number of members was not decided in 1904 when the
Chamber was first founded because it was uncertain how many
merchants would join the organization. However, the maximum
number could not exceed fifty according to the regulations of
the Ministry of Commerce. It is important to note that the
membership was actually given not to individuals but to
merchant bang (merchant groups based on common native-place
relationship) and hang (trade associations). According to the

charter of the chamber, a bang or hang which made

252

contributions to the chamber of 300 taels annually could elect
one representative (member) to the chamber; for a contribution
of 600 taels, they could elect two members; for 900 or more
taels, three members. The qualifications of a member were: 1)
good character; 2) doing business in the trade; 3) rational
thinking; 4) having personally made financial contributions to
the chamber; 5) aged about thirty years old. Individual
merchants who made financial contributions of more than 300
taels a year could be special members of the chamber (TJSH
archives 1/5-20).

The charter of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce also
stipulated that the elected managers and members should not
decline the positions and those who failed to pay membership
fees or failed repeatedly to show up at chamber meetings could
not vote. The charter further provided that the elected
managers and board members had to attend chamber meetings on
time. Absences due to sickness should.be communicated to the
chamber in advance, and three absences without good reason
would be punished (the penalty would be decided by members
according to circumstances). The chamber was supposed to be an
independent merchant organization, yet with a close and
subordinate relationship with the Qing government, the
Ministry of Commerce in particular. According to the charter
(clause 72), the decisions by the chamber on important
commercial matters should not be implemented without the

consent of the Ministry (TJSH archives 1/5-20).

 

m'

m.

(‘1'

(I)

A

 

253

Soon after the founding of the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, several other chambers of commerce were established
in Beijing (April 1904), Tianjin (6 December 1904), Xiamen
(July 1905), Guangzhou (22 September 1905), Suzhou (November
1905), and Hunan (24 December 1905). Many more were
established. after 1906 (TJSH archives 1/301-303). These
chambers of commerce largely followed. the :model of the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in their structures, at least
according to their respective charters (TJSH archives 1/4).

The power of these chambers of commerce lay in their
prestige as community leaders rather than on their solid legal
bases. The charter of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was
very vague about its jurisdiction. The chamber confined its
responsibility largely to commercial affairs, and it could
only discipline its disobedient members by stripping them.of
membership and imposing fines (TJSH archives 1/5-20) . The
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce's action in one case involving
two Shanghai merchants may illustrate what the chamber tried
to do in asserting its authorities and also its power limits.

The case involved a merchant named Yang Yunzhi, who had
a juren degree and the title of Daotai (houbu dao). Yang was
charged by his business partner Zhou Liuj i with monetary
fraud. Legal action was taken by Zhou, the Municipal Council
of the Concession (gonghu ju) interfered, and 'Yang 'was
subsequently arrested by the Concession foreign police. The

newly-founded Shanghai Chamber of Commerce believed that the

254

case should be solved between Chinese merchants with the
Chamber as go-between. The Chamber distributed a meeting
notice to Shanghai merchants regarding the case and about two
hundred people attended a meeting on 24 May 1905. Speakers
stated that disputes among Chinese merchants should not be
brought to Concession authority and.no lawyers should.be hired
in monetary or debt disputes. Zhong Jinzheng, a board member
of the Chamber, spoke for the Chamber. He insisted that while
the Chamber could not interfere with legal disputes, the
Concession police should not arrest decent Chinese merchants
for trivial monetary disputes (Shibao 29 May 1905).

Although there is no record to show how the matter was
eventually solved, two points could. be made about the
Chamber's authority over Shanghai merchants based on
circumstantial evidence. First of all, the Chamber had no way
to stop a merchant from taking formal legal action against his
fellow Chinese merchants if he decided the action would serve
his best interests. Secondly, the Chamber could not legally
stop the Concession police from.arresting Chinese merchants,
although the Concession authority had previously promised
cooperation with the Chamber regarding disputes among Chinese
merchants (Xu SHYJLC 1/243).

Despite the slight legal basis for its authority over
merchants, however, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce began to
play the role of community leader in several matters of public

concern after its founding in 1904. In July 1904, for example,

255

the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce successfully thwarted a tax
scheme by the Road Construction Bureau of the Southern City
(Nanshi malu gongcheng ju). In August, the Chamber sent a
telegram to the Minister of Nanyang Commerce demanding that
Chinese merchants have rights equal to those of the foreign
merchants (SHDSJ 583,584). In December 1904 and January 1905
the Chamber played the role of intermediary between the Qing
authorities and Shanghai urbanites in a complicated murder
case in which a Russian sailor killed a Chinese bystander,
Zhou Shengyou (SHDSJ 587,590,591). Since the so-called “Zhou
Shengyou case“ was highly-publicized at the time and occurred
right before the boycott movement, a little more should be
said about the case and about the role the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce played.

About four p.m.on 15 December 1904, two Russian sailors,
whose battleship was seeking refugee in Shanghai during the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), had a dispute with a ricksaw
puller. One of the Russian sailors got angry and picked up an
ax. He missed the puller, but hit a bystander named Zhou
Shengyou right in his face, and Zhou died from the wound
(SHDSJ 586). Since the Russian ship was seeking legal
protection from Japanese attack by placing itself under
Chinese sovereignty, the Shanghai Daotai demanded that the
murderer be turned over to Chinese authorities despite
extraterritoriality; The Russian consulate in Shanghai

refused. While the Chinese authorities were ready to back off

256

from their extradition demand, the Shanghai urbanites' angry
voices were hard to quiet, in part because the victim was a
native of Ningbo, whose felloW’ compatriots claimed the
strongest commercial and financial power in Shanghai. A
meeting of Shanghai merchant representatives was held at the
residence of the General Manager of the Chamber. Shanghai
Daotai Yuan Shuxun also attended. At the meeting some
suggested a merchant strike (bashi). The Daotai opposed the
idea and stated.the official position of non-recognition, that
is to say, refusing to acknowledge the Russian court's verdict
and sentence (SHDSJ 590).

Apparently Shanghai merchants believed they had at least
some degree of political independence from the government, for
they held another meeting at the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
on 14 January 1905. At the meeting, Zeng Shaoqing, who later
became the leader of the boycott movement, pointed out that
people could not trust officials to protect their interests,
for they only “care about their own lives and well—being."
Therefore he suggested that merchants organize themselves and
find their own solution. Another merchant suggested cutting
off all economic relations with the Russians. The meeting
finally decided not to use Russian banks' currency from that
day on (SHDSJ 590).

However, when thousands of shopkeepers and people from
all walks of life gathered.in front of the Siming Gongsuo, the

Ningbo native organization hall, the leading merchants of the

257
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce began to worry about riots. They,
along with the Shanghai Daotai Yuan Shuxun, rushed to the
trouble spot and persuaded the passionate crowd to cool off.
The next day, the Qing appointed Sheng Xuanhuai, a very
influential official-merchant who had first suggested the
establishment of chambers of commerce throughout China, to
handle the case, along with the discredited Daotai (Xia
1988:345-352). Sheng successfully' persuaded. the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce to accept the final settlement between the
Russian and the Chinese government: to compensate the family
of the victim.and sentence the sailor to an eight-year jail

term and hard labor in Russia (SHDSJ 591; Xia 1988:351-353) .

Compared to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, the Tianjin
Chamber of Commerce apparently had even greater control over
its members. In its charter, the Tianjin Chamber stipulated,
among other things, that merchants could only wear plain but
clean dress on ordinary days; that silk and other fancy dress
should be reserved for special occasions; that on normal days
merchants could have only one dish for each meal; that
merchants were forbidden to visit brothels and other notorious
places; and that merchants were forbidden to smoke opium as a
habit. (TJSH archives 1/38-39) . The punishment for the
violators was also more specific and severe. Those who were
caught in a notorious place the first time had to declare in

the newspaper that they would not do it again. If caught a

258
second time, they had to pay a fine, and for a subsequent
offense the guilty person would be expelled from the Chamber.
Opium addicts were given a few months to quit, but if they did
not their membership would be stripped immediately (TJSH

archives 1/39).

The power chambers of commerce had over their members was
ultimately decided by the number of merchants (or merchant
groups) who found it was advantageous to become members at
all. Studies have shown that merchants, especially those in
relatively small cities, were initially reluctant to establish
or join chambers of commerce. They thought it was just another
government trick to get more taxes. But very soon the
advantages of the chambers began to be obvious to Chinese
merchants at large. From 1902 to 1904 only five chambers of
commerce were established with a total membership of 3,593
throughout China, whereas in the single year of 1905 ten more
were founded with a total membership of 14,703 (Zhu 1991:55) .

Unfortunately we do not have detailed information on the
membership of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. But from the
fact that the most wealthy and powerful merchants in Shanghai
became members or managers and board members (more later), it
can be assumed that the Chamber of Commerce was by no means an
organization of a few. The archives of the Tianjin Chamber of
Commerce provide more detailed information on its membership.

By 1905, thirty-two trade groups (hang) representing 581 firms

259

(shanghao) had already joined the Chamber (TJSH archives
1/276). The most important merchants' groups in Tianjin--
Chinese banks, salt and grain bang, and cloth merchants--were
all conspicuous members. All these firms were issued
membership certificates and plaques for their doors. Among the
581 firms, fifty-nine went out of business and returned their
certificates in.1905. However, the next year saw 191 new firms
become members (TJSH archives 1/62). Among the members were
twenty-six yanghang, thirty-five foreign cloth, and twenty-
seven foreign medicine firms which might have been directly
involved in the sale of American goods (TJSH archives 1/63-
78). The sixteen oil firms might also have been involved in
the sale of American kerosene, as well as vegetable oils. The
only conspicuous absence from the membership list who might
have been directly involved in the sales of American products
were cigarette merchants. It is clear that the attitude of the
chambers of commerce was an important factor in the boycott
movement at least in such a commercially-important port city
as Tianjin.

In Suzhou, which was not commercially as important as
Tianjin. in the early’ twentieth century, the Chamber of
Commerce was established later and had fewer members when the
boycott movement broke out. A 1906 report by the Suzhou
Chamber of Commerce stated: "Since the founding of the
Chamber, it has been.a year. So far there are about forty bang

which have already joined in the Chamber. However, there are

260
still quite a few which have not joined in. As the news
spreads out they should gradually come along." (Suzhou Chamber
Archives 67/24, in Zhu 1991:322). Presumably, the Suzhou
Chamber had less control over Suzhou merchants.

Now let's look at the members of the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, which was the exemplar of chambers of commerce in
China. The Shanghai Chamber had five general board members
(zongdong) who presumably had the ultimate authority over the
Chamber.- Of the five zongdong (in 1902), two were from
Zhej iang province and both of them represented the Siming
gongsuo as well as their trades. Two were from.Guangdong, and
one of them.represented the Guangzhao gongsuo. One was from
Qingjiang, Jiangxi province. Of the five general board
members, only one (Zhu Baosan from.Zhejiang) represented the
hardware and foreign goods trade, which had substantial
interests in imports of various kinds. Zhu Baosan himself,
while representing the yanghuo hang (foreign goods trade),
invested in a variety of other businesses such as insurance,
flour, silk, airplanes, and banking. He also worked as a
comprador for a British firm (Wang ed. 1957 2/965-966).
Obviously none of the general board members profited primarily
from the sale of American goods. On the other hand, all these
powerful merchants engaged in a variety of commercial and
industrial activities and could be affected one way or the
other by the sale of foreign goods in general and American

goods in particular. For instance, four of the five general

261
board members were involved in the banking business (Xu
1991 :46) .

The daily work of the Chamber was run by an executive
branch, which was made up of a general manager, two assistant
managers, and thirteen board members (yiyuan) . In 1902, the
general manager (Yan Xinhou) and one assistant manager (Zhou
Jinzheng) were both from Zhejiang. The other assistant manager
was from Jiangsu. Of the thirteen board members, six came from
Zhej iang, two from Guangdong, one from Jiangxi, and four were
of unknown origins (Xu 1991:46-47). Among the managers and
board members, only one (Su Baoseng) profited primarily from
the sales of foreign goods.

In 1902, the Shanghai Chamber had fifty-nine recorded
members besides managers and board members. Four of them
represented foreign goods firms which mainly sold foreign
textiles, kerosene, and hardware. Of the four at least two
were from Zhenjiang, one was from elsewhere in Jiangsu, and
one was of unknown origins. As was the case in the Tianjin
Chamber, nobody represented the cigarette business (Xu
1991:47-50) .

Zeng Shaoqing, who later distinguished himself during the
1905 boycott movement, was then an ordinary member of the
Shanghai Chamber. He represented the Fujian bang (Jianchao
bang) and the Nanhuo business--sea food, rice, and other
native products from southern China and Southeast Asia (SHDWMY

1/165-166; Xu 1991:50; Wang ed.l957:956) . The Nanhuo trade was

262

a conspicuous yet not particularly important business in
Shanghai engaged in primarily by merchants from Fujian and
Guangdong. In 1894 Shanghai merchants had 126,225,000 taels
(81.4% of the total) of trade with.Western countries (Xiyang),
14,998,000 taels (9.7 percent of the total) with Japan, and
only 13,861,000 taels (8.9 percent of the total) with.Nanyang
(SHDWMY 1/190).

Unlike Xiyang merchants who traded with foreigners,
Nanyang merchants' business partners were mostly overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia. They sold Chinese local products
tea, textile products, etc.--to overseas Chinese and brought
various sea products and rice back to Shanghai. Economically,
organizationally, and even culturally.Nanyang merchants were
significantly different from.Xiyang merchants (SHDWMY 1/203).
The former's business had little to do with foreigners and
they were therefore more independent and presumably
nationalistic. The latter, on the other hand, relied heavily
on foreigners and were associated with things foreign. While
more systematic study has to be done in order to decide
whether merchants who sold Chinese products were more
nationalistic politically than. merchants who dealt with
foreigners, suffice it to say that these two groups of
merchants often at least had different family and educational
backgrounds. As wu Tingsheng's case indicates, Xiyang
merchants usually had some sort of foreign education in their

youth and later worked in foreign firms. On the other hand,

263
merchants who had business only among Chinese and sold
primarily Chinese native products often did not have much
contact at all with foreigners and things foreign. Zeng
Shaoqing was no exception to this rule. Since he was probably
the most important figure during the boycott movement, let us
take him as an example.

Zeng was originally from Tongan, Fujian province. “When
he was young he read widely [in Chinese] and dabbled with
painting“ (Wang ed.,1957 2/956). Zeng's family engaged in
overseas trade for generations, but it was not until Zeng
Shaoqing's time that the Zeng family became commercially
prominent in Shanghai (Wang ed.,1957 2/956). Zeng's success
was associated with the famous.Nanyang trade firm.Malcampo &
Co. (Fuyunan), which was established in 18605 in Shanghai by
Su Ziming, who was also a Fujianese. Su's interests and
ambition were apparently not limited to pure commercial
activities when he established the Jianding Huiguan (SHBKZL
275). Zeng became Su's business partner after Malcampo & Co.
was established. The firm mainly imported various sea products
to Shanghai from overseas Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia.
The firm also exported grain, silk, and other Chinese local
products to Nanyang Chinese (SHDWMY 1/165). After the Boxer
Uprising in 1900, Zeng imported rice to China from Southeast
Asia. He made a name for himself by selling the relief rice at
a low price, and he also showed his sound business sense by

making a lot of money (Wang ed. 1957 2/956). In 1905, Zeng

264
became the manager of Malcampo 8: Co. when Su died and
Malcampo & Co changed its name to Defahang (SHDWMY 1/166,416) .

Although he was in his late fifties, Zeng's position in
Shanghai business circles rose steadily. Not satisfied with
trade only, Zeng invested in the insurance business in
Shanghai, paper industry in Zhenj iang, Jiangsu, and porcelain
manufacture in Jingdezhen, Jiangxi from 1905 to 1907 (Wang ed.
1957 2/1094) . In 1905, he became board member of the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce representing the Nanhuohang and the Fuj ian
gang (bang). In December of 1905, he was elected the general
manager of the Chamber.

However, Zeng's rise as a prominent figure in the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was not because of his
accumulated wealth. Nanyang trade was not a significant
business in Shanghai, as I have pointed out earlier. Zeng's
new investments in industries were not outstanding either,
compared with other merchants/industrialists at the time. Yan
Xinhou, the general manager of the Chamber from 1902-1905, had
investments four times larger than Zeng's (Wang ed., 1957
2/1092-1094). Of the thirteen big investors in national
industries, Zeng ranked eleventh (Wang ed., 1957 2/1091-

1095).*

Apparently, Zheng Shaoqing's prominence among merchants

1'This is by no means a complete list of investors in
national industries during the period. For instance, Zhang
Jian, who allegedly invested twenty times more than Zheng
Shaoqing (Zhang 1984:468), is not on the list.

265

in Shanghai was largely because, like his former business
partner Su Ziming, Zheng's interests went far beyond business
circles. He was a leader of the Fujian merchants, and also
simultaneously a secretary of the Jiangsu Society (Jiangsu
xuehui) in charge of financial matters (SHDSJ 608). His
interest in social and political affairs was shown first, but
by no means only, in the Zhou Shengyou case, when he advocated
self-reliance in solving the case. However, like most other
wealthy merchants at the time, Zeng was by no means radical or
in any way rebellious against the Qing regime. Quite the
contrary, he associated with the regime, just as many other
merchants did, by purchasing the title Daotai.

Several other leading merchants of the Shanghai Chamber
also deserve special attention, not because they were
particularly active during the boycott, but because they
engaged in the import business, American goods in particular,
and they had every reason to abort the boycott as soon as
possible. They were Shao Qintao, Xu Chunrong, Su Baosheng (in
the foreign cloth trade), Ding Qinzhai, Xu Wenwong (in the
kerosene business), Zhu Baosan (foreign goods), and Zhu Dachun
(machinery) .

Among them the most wealthy and powerful in the Chamber
were probably Zhu Baosan and Zhu Dachun. Zhu Baosan was a
zongdong and a board member of the Chamber in 1902. He became
assistant manager in 1905 and also served as a board member in

1filter years. Zhu Dachun was a member of the Chamber in 1902

266

and became a board member after 1906, possibly earlier (Ding
1983:502). While the two were definitely involved in the trade
with the United States, they became wealthy and powerful
largely because of their other business. Both of them.had been
compradors working for British firms and had invested in a
variety of trades and industries (Wang ed., 1957:958-960,965-
966). Therefore, their business could not be fatally affected
by a boycott against American goods alone.

On.the other hand, a.boycott movement could.be disastrous
to the other merchants, especially to merchants in the foreign
cloth business. While these merchants were not the most
powerful in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce (Shao and Ding
were both ordinary members of the Chamber in 1902; Su was not
on the 1902 membership list of the Chamber), their influence
and voice in the Chamber were by no means negligible. Their
position in the Chamber was definitely rising. In 1906 at
least three of them.became board.members of the Chamber (Ding
1983 :502) . More importantly, these merchants had extensive and
intimate relations among themselves and with other powerful
merchants in Shanghai. For example, Xu Chunrong, who
represented the foreign cloth trade in the Chamber, was a
business partner of Shao Qintao and a close friend of Yuan
Hengzhi, a comprador of the American International Banking
Corporation as well as a foreign cloth importer. Shao Qintao
and Yuan Hengzhi were sworn brothers (Wu in SHWSZL

56/74,88,103,106). A leading foreign cloth merchant, Xu

267

Chunrong, also invested substantially in banking, in which he
had Xi Ligong, a very wealthy merchant/industrialist, as his
partner. The business partners were also in-laws (Wu in SHWSZL
56/101). The connection with the Xi family was important
because the Xi family was not only very successful in business
but also had official connections. Xi Ligong's father was a
sworn brother of the then-Shanghai-daotai Yuan Shuxun (Wu in
SHWSZL 56/98) . Business connections were further strengthened
by native-place relationships, for virtually all of these
merchants mentioned above were from Zhejiang (with the
exception of Xi Ligong who was from Suzhou, which like
Zhejiang was also a Wu dialect area), a province with
negligible emigrants.

Economically, these merchants and merchants represented
by them had every reason to oppose the boycott movement,
although they might go along with the movement initially under
popular pressure. On the other hand, it is almost impossible
to identify any merchant in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
who would gain substantially and directly from the boycott.
Economically, therefore, a boycott made very little sense to
Shanghai merchants. The boycott leadership of the Shanghai
merchants can only be understood and explained from a social
and political point of view. Shanghai merchants would only
gain social and political prestige from the boycott, not

economic power .

Chapter Five

The Politics of the Boycott: The Limits of People's Power

As I have pointed out in Chapter Four, a boycott
against American goods was to achieve political purposes
by using economic means. While the boycott was economically
detrimental to merchant interests in Shanghai and other
large cities, it was blessed by "public opinion“ (Iriye
1967:216-238) led by intellectuals who controlled the media
(see Chapter Two). This is not to say that all merchants
were opposed to the movement. In fact most merchants were
supportive of the movement, not only because it was a just
cause but also because the boycott allegedly would help the
merchant interests in general in their shangzhan (commercial
warfare) against foreign business interests (see Chapter
Three).

The rising merchant class exemplified by the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce adopted, and eventually led, the boycott
despite the potential economic hardships because of the
rising political consciousness of merchants in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Zhu 1991:43-52)
and because of the practical fact that merchants provided
organizations and controlled the trade mechanisms. Their

attitudes became the focus of the public and they were

268

269
pushed to take action. As I shall show in this chapter, the
leading merchants in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
pledged their support of the boycott largely as a short-term
retaliatory measure for its symbolic effect rather than as a
serious long-term.political and economic plan.

This was evidenced by the fact that the actual leader
of the boycott movement was a lesser merchant, Zeng
Shaoqing, who was patriotic but not the most powerful in the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. He represented only a not-
very—important group of merchants in Shanghai (see Chapter
Four). While the boycott was certainly not in the best
interests of the merchant class, however, even those who
profited from.the sale of American goods the most initially
worked to change American policy toward Chinese, in hopes
that the anti-American sentiments which were hurting
business would end soon. Only when the movement actually
started and seemed to become an open-ended commitment did
the concerned.merchants begin to sabotage the boycott and
undermine the united front. It was in fact the merchants
themselves, represented by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce,
not the Qing government, who took the first step to see the
end of the movement.

The 1905 boycott movement against American mistreatment
of Chinese immigrants started with popular enthusiasm.and
solidarity blessed by official acquiescence. However, the

people's solidarity began to collapse when the Chinese

270
merchant interests were seriously damaged and when the
boycotters had difficulties defining a clear and practical
goal of the boycott. This chapter will show that the boycott
failed because of its widening goals and narrowing means. As
the popular movement unfolded, its goal became an open
commitment to total justice instead of specific political
demands. On the other hand, the boycott degenerated from a
collective action to individual consumer choices when large
merchants decided to uphold their rights not to boycott. The
concept of people's rights led to a dilemma when the people
could.not agree among themselves. But the failure of the
movement testified to more than just the failure of the
concept, it also demonstrated the degree to which the social

elites--gentry-merchants--relied upon the state.

1. Defining the Scope of the Boycott

When boycott as a strategy against the exclusion acts
was adopted by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on 10 May
1905, the scope of the boycott was not clearly defined.
Initially, the boycott was understood as a much more
extensive retaliatory measure against Americans and American
institutions--schools, newspapers, and churches--as well as
American goods. It was only gradually that the boycott
against American goods became the only focus and the
rallying point of the movement. The way in which this

consensus was achieved--by open and rational discussions

271
through newspapers and public meetings--somewhat resembled
the way in which political issues were supposedly handled in
the liberal public sphere in Europe.

On 13 May, three days after the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce decided on the boycott, the Speech Society of
Public Loyalty held its own meeting. The meeting decided
that Chinese should not only boycott American goods but also
American schools (Shenbao 16 May 1905). Four days later,
Zhang Zhujun, one of the women activists in Shanghai,
suggested a more radical boycott strategy in an open letter
to the Guangzhao gongsuo, one of the most active native-
place organizations during the movement (see Chapter Four).
She suggested that porters not carry American goods; Chinese
employees working for American hospitals, churches,
consulate, and businesses quit their jobs; and students in
American schools quit their schools (Dalu bao No.4, 17 May
1905).

Despite the fact that some people did resign from.their
American employers' posts as newspapermen, teachers, and
business clerks, they spontaneously and freely took these
actions as individuals. The most publicized case in point
was wu WOyao, the famous novelist, who resigned as a writer
for Chubao, an American-owned newspaper in Hankou. These
people were cheered for their patriotic deeds (Shibao 19
June 1905). But theirs were not planned and organized

boycotts. Only school students took collective actions.

272
Some young students in Shanghai were apparently excited by
the popular sentiments. On 21 May students of the Qingxin
shuyuan, an American missionary school in Shanghai, walked
out of their campus to protest American exclusion acts
(Shibao 24 May 1905). But the boycott against the American
schools did not last and few students of other American
schools, the most prominent of which was St. John's
University, followed suit.‘

“Public opinion," as expressed in major newspapers such
as Shenbao, Shibao, and Dagong bao, considered boycotting
schools too radical. Suzhou gentry and.merchants, for
instance, publicized their concern to Shenbao, one of the
most circulated newspapers in Shanghai. They agreed only to
boycott American goods, but not to boycott American schools,
hospitals, and churches, which they considered to be
beneficial to the Chinese and to have nothing to do with the
immigration law (Shenbao 19 June 1905). An article, which

was originally published in Yangcheng ribao and later

 

'One historian argues that the students' action was
significant and that they played the most active role in the
boycott movement (Li, 1993:8-9). Evidence, however, does not
support his argument. Not many students quit schools and
those who did walk out returned to their schools very soon
(see my discussion below). School students were indeed very
active in large cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, and
Beijing. But they followed the leadership of the merchants
and intellectuals instead of acting as an independent
political force in this popular movement. The consular
despatches by American diplomats in China used the term
”students” in a broad and misleading way referring to both
the petty intellectuals and school students. In fact, only
the former played the role of intellectual and
organizational leaders for the boycott.

273
reprinted in Shanghai's Shibao, shared this view. It
contended that going to American schools was a matter of
scholarship. It should not be banned even between enemy
countries (in Shibao 23 June 1905).

Tianjin merchants also contributed to the discussion
through newspapers. They were even more cautious in their
decision to go along with the boycott against American goods
but not to dissolve schools and hospitals associated with
Americans. They argued that hostile actions against
Americans in China would violate international law and
therefore exhorted people "not to take reckless actions"
(Shenbao 25 June 1905).

Not only did the merchant organizations advocate
boycotting American goods only, but the intellectual leaders
of the movement also shared their concern and wanted to have
the movement under strict guidance. From.the conservative
and elitist journal Diplomacy (waijiao bao, No.117, 5 August
1905) in Shanghai to the popular Anhui vernacular (Anhui
suhua bao, No.21-22, 13 September 1905:1-15), a wide range
of journals and newspapers published articles advocating
actions. Behind these cautious warnings was the fear that
the mass movement might develop into another Boxer Uprising
(Anhui suhua bao, No. 21-22, 13 September 1905:12-13). This
fear of turmoil and its devastating blow to business was
felt most keenly by merchants in Tianjin, where the Boxer

Uprising in 1900 had caused tremendous damage. The "Boxer

274
turmoil“ (quanluan), as it was called by many contemporary
newspapers, had hit the business section in Tianjin the
most. A large quantity of silver was taken away by the
allied forces and most stores were looted. As a result of
the event, inflation went up 200 percent and merchants were
desperately short of cash to conduct trade and other
business (Hayashibara 1987:107). Therefore the Tianjin
merchants, while agreeing to boycott American goods,
repeatedly warned against "reckless actions“ (Tagong bao, 13
June , 19 June 1905).

From 18 May to 21 May 1905, the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, Shanghai Study Society, Society of Commercial
Learning, and Speech Society of Public Loyalty jointly and
respectively held public meetings in Shanghai. These
meetings again resolved to boycott American goods (Shenbao
and Shibao, 20 May to 23 May 1905). The only other action
suggested at these meetings was to engage in anti-exclusion
propaganda by comrades from xuejie (the realm.of learning).'
They would be in charge of holding speech meetings and
printing anti-exclusion materials (Shibao 22 May 1905).
Thanks to the intellectuals and students, a large quantity

of anti-exclusion materials were produced (see Chapters Two

 

'The term xuejie (the realm of learning) was widely
used in conjunction with and as opposed to “shangjie” (the
realm of commerce) during the boycott movement. The
denotation of the term xuejie was, like the phrase shangjie,
quite broad and vague. It referred to scholars, petty
intellectuals, and students who were associated with
newspapers, publishing houses, bookstores, and schools.

275

and Three).

Among the discussions of the scope of the boycott, the
most persuasive and comprehensive analysis was probably
provided by an article initially published in Shuntian
shibao, a newspaper in Manchuria, and later in Shanghai's

Shibao. It stated:

Three boycott resolutions were proposed in public
meetings organized by Shanghai merchants. They were 1) in
both public and.private services, no Americans should be
hired; 2) Chinese under American employment should resign
from.their posts immediately; 3) Chinese should not ship and
sell American goods....

The first would not affect American interests very much
but would have implications in political and educational
areas. The second option would have to sacrifice the
livelihood of numerous Chinese before it would work.... The
third.method is the best and easiest to implement. That is
to use peaceful means without much fanfare yet powerful
enough to paralyze American commerce. Although the boycott
is something new in China, it is often practiced in Europe
and America over economic disputes (in Shibao 20 June 1905).

Through these open public discussions mainly in the
press and.public meetings, the movement was gradually
narrowed to boycott American goods only. Although no
individuals or organizations had the legitimacy and the
authority to issue orders, a consensus was apparently

reached on the issue.‘

If they were determined to have a peaceful and limited

 

'Later when the boycott actually started in late July,
1905, some people and organizations went beyond this
restraint, but their actions were never legitimized through
open public discussions in the press. The Qing government's
crackdown on the popular movement started because of these
actions.

276
boycott, Chinese urbanites were equally determined to have
the boycott start according to a schedule set up by the
public. Once the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce promised to
inaugurate the boycott in two months if the United States
did not change its immigration policy, it was impossible for
the Chamber to back off from its position without losing its
credibility.

Even when the two—month ultimatum.was challenged by the
newly arrived American Consul General James L. Rodgers, the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was obliged to stand by it. On
21 May Rodgers invited leading merchants in Shanghai to the
American Consulate to try to persuade them to call off, or
at least postpone, the boycott (Shenbao 23 May 1905).
Rodgers argued that the current talk of boycott was the
result of misunderstanding and that the two-month ultimatum
was not reasonable because the United States Congress would
not convene and discuss the matter until six months later.
Rodgers also warned that a boycott might damage the friendly
relationship between the two countries (Shibao 22 May 1905;
Shenbao 23 May 1905).

Zeng Shaoqing, who had been at the center of boycott
agitation and therefore become focus of public attention,
replied that the mistreatment of Chinese immigrants was well
known to everybody and the two-month deadline could not be
changed just because of American Congressional procedures.

To the sixty-year old merchant, the idea that tens of

277

thousands of Chinese immigrants' livelihood would be
disastrously affected just because of some meeting schedule
was absurd. Zeng conceived the issue at stake to be on a
higher plane. He argued: ”All of us would of course like to
hear amendments to the immigration treaty. But even the
current treaty does not explicitly include a mistreatment
clause" (Shenbao 23 May 1905). Zeng believed that the real
issue went much beyond legal process to involve politics:
that the United States government had submitted to the Labor
Party's pressure (Shibao 22 May 1905; Shenbao 23 May 1905).

Su Baoseng, a foreign cloth merchant (ref. Chapter
Four), agreed with Zeng Shaoqing that the status quo could
not go on for another six months. But Su was worried about
his business more than the welfare of the Chinese
immigrants. As a wholesale merchant dealing large quantities
of American textiles, he could not afford to take such a
noble stand as Zeng did. He pleaded to the Consul General
that a solution had to be found soon, for even if the
boycott did not really start the public sentiment would
certainly affect the sale of American goods. He added that
some of his orders for American linen were placed six months
in advance for delivery at the end of the year. Therefore a
large amount of money was at stake (Shibao 22 May 1905;
Shenbao 23 May 1905).

Although the meeting eventually ended with talk of

traditional friendship between the two countries, nothing

278
substantial was achieved as far as the immigration issue was
concerned. The Shanghai merchants were as obligated as they
were before in carrying out the boycott promise on schedule,
whereas the Consul General did not even report the meeting
to the State Department, let alone suggest any policy
changes. After all, the Shanghai merchants might well back
off from the boycott when the day came, given the interests
they had at stake. One good sign to this effect occurred
when the Shanghai merchants held a party for the American
businessmen and officials in Shanghai several days later on
28 May. The atmosphere of the party was so amiable that the
American Consul General got the impression that the boycott
would not be in effect in two months' time (Shenbao 20 July
1905). In fact, even if the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce had
really wanted to call off the boycott it could not have done
so.

The Shanghai merchants were simply under tremendous
public pressure to launch the boycott on time. The meetings
with Americans were closely watched by the public, as they
were publicized by such major newspapers as Shibao and
Shenbao. Shibao not only published the conversation between
Mr. Rodgers and the merchants, but it also commented on the
Consul General's remark that the boycott would harm
friendship between the two countries and the Chinese people
should.wait for Congress's decision in six months. It

stated:

279

We Chinese have suffered from the exclusion treaty for more
than twenty years. We cannot bear [the exclusion] any more;
therefore we begin to speak of boycott. For our Chinese we
have already waited for too long. How can the American
Consul say it is not the proper time to act because the
Congress is not going to meet for six months? Besides we
can put pressure [on American policy makers] only before the
issue has been discussed and the treaty is signed.... As for
the argument that a boycott would damage the friendship
between the two countries, it is absurd. How come it is not
considered to harm the friendship when Americans exclude
Chinese for several decades and it is when we begin to talk
about boycott? (Shibao 22 May 1905).

On the same day that the Shibao eloquently refuted the
Consul General's remarks regarding the boycott, it also
acknowledged the complicated problems a boycott might
involve. The newspaper sought solutions from.the general
public by putting out an advertisement soliciting ideas on
the specific methods of the scheduled boycott. It said:
Today the [abolition of] the exclusion treaty is the most
important and urgent issue of all. We comrades have
resolved that not to use American goods is the best tactic.
But there are extremely complicated.problems involved. If
any insightful gentlemen have good ideas on how to implement
the boycott please write us. We shall publish your ideas to
the public. Many thanks (Shibao 22 May 1905).

There were indeed many problems involved in carrying out the
boycott. One of the most obvious problems was that most
consumers could not possibly distinguish American goods from
those of other foreign countries. Therefore, the most
effective way to carry out the boycott was to persuade
merchants not to order and sell American goods.

Some concerned urbanites in smaller cities realized

this early on. Hangzhou intellectuals, for example,

280
published a letter to Zeng Shaoqing in late May which
suggested that the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce simply
command Hangzhou native merchants in Shanghai who had been
in the business to stop dealing with American goods. By so
doing, the letter argued, the boycott could be carried out
most efficiently, because people in Hangzhou and in the
entire country would certainly support the patriotic action
(Shibao 24 May 1905). This, of course, was not possible, for
the Chamber did not have the authority to issue such a
command (see Chapter Four).

For the small retail merchants who carried some
American goods but did not rely upon selling American goods
for their survival, stopping the sale of American goods was
not a serious problems They would sacrifice some interests
for a popular and a good cause. Some of them just waited for
the boycott notice from.the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, as
the Shanghai bookstore association pledged to do (Shibao 24
June 1905). Some merchants in interior China even acted .
without waiting for the notice from Shanghai and for the
scheduled date. The Hunan Commerce Bureau, for example,
decided to purchase German rice processing machines instead
of American ones despite the fact that the latter were of
better quality (Shibao June 24, 1905).

However, there were definitely some merchants who
wanted to continue to sell American goods, at least those

goods in stock, given the fact that they had little extra

281
capital in hand (see Chapter Four). Another problem involved
with the boycott therefore was how to deal with these
merchants. Some suggested mutual watching and punishment
measures (Shibao 26 May 1905). As I shall show later, these
measures were eventually carried out only on very limited
scales due to the fact that large numbers of small retail
merchants' livelihoods were at stake. More importantly, few
chambers of commerce had the authority to discipline their
members. Their charters did not give them that authority
(see Chapter Four).'

A.more serious problem with the boycott lay in the fact
that the attitudes of the retail merchants toward the
boycott movement, one way or the other, were not as
important as those of wholesale merchants who dealt with
large quantities of American goods. These merchants, whose
behavior I shall discuss shortly, were not willing to stop
ordering and distributing American goods, not only because
larger interests were at stake but also because these
activities were less visible than selling them.in retail
stores. Wealthy Shanghai wholesale merchants could and would
continue to order American goods and even distribute them to
wholesale merchants from other areas, at least before the
two month deadline. It is obvious that the more they ordered

and distributed American goods before the boycott formally

 

'One of the major chambers of commerce, the Tianjin
Chamber of Commerce, did have the power, but it called off
the boycott even before it started (see below).

282

started the more difficult it would be for the boycott
movement to be implemented later. The American goods in the
possession of Chinese merchants would inevitably serve to
divide Chinese urban communities against each other.

Unfortunately, only a few concerned individuals pointed
out this potential problem at the time. In the crucial
period before the scheduled boycott, the most powerful and
active social groups such as the Man-Mirror Study Society
(Renjing xueshe), Speech Society of Public Loyalty, and the
Book-Reading Society of Yangzhou (Yangzhou yueshu she) in
Shanghai and other cities focused their attention almost
exclusively on mobilizing and educating the general public--
the consumers—~instead of on the real source of the problem-
-the wholesale merchants. They seemed to be too busy
organizing public meetings and distributing flyers to devise
a workable and effective boycott strategy. These social
groups, 1ed.mainly by intellectuals, did not have the
required knowledge and specialization to design such a
strategy. But the real reason for the lack of action in
persuading the wholesale merchants not to order American
goods before the deadline was probably a matter of
credibility and legitimacy: no individual or organization
could openly advocate not dealing with Americans without a
grace period, let alone enforce the idea. The only thing the
activists could do before the boycott officially began was

to let the general public recognize and persuade them not to

283
buy American goods once the deadline arrived.

Thus, beginning in late May the boycotters in Shanghai,
mainly those from schools and various study groups, had
started a campaign to educate people about American
products. The Shanghai Study Society, for example, collected
donations to print flyers describing trademarks on American
products (Shibao 26 May 1905). Gong Ziying, the general
manager of the Society, donated 10,000 flyers (Shibao 29 May
1905). In Guangzhou, the same campaign was organized by
charity halls (shantang) which were sponsored and controlled
by merchants. This is because in Guangzhou intellectuals did
not have the same strength as they did in Shanghai, and also
because, as I have shown in Chapter Pour, the Guangdong
merchants did not have substantial investments in trade with
the United States.

By late May and early June, however, concrete boycott
methods did begin to take shape, thanks not to the merchant
organizations but to some literary groups and concerned and
insightful individuals who published their suggestions in
newspapers, Shibao in particular. One letter to Shibao by a
member of the "common folk" had a set of very insightful
suggestions:

1. Investigate the amount of imported.American goods and
their shapes, color, etc. Set up an exhibition to display
samples of American imports;

2. Have the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce take the

responsibility of finding out which business firms deal with
American goods and let them.pledge not to order American

284
goods befOre [the deadline]. For those American goods which
have already been ordered, a list should be made and turned

over to the Chamber of Commerce in order to prevent
fraud....

3. Set up strict punishment measures for those who secretly
order American goods. If found, Chinese banks (qianzhuang)
will not do business with them and the names of the
merchants and their firms will be published in newspapers
for their damage to the solidarity (Shibao 28 May 1905.

Emphasis mine.)

In a letter to Zeng Shaoqing of the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce, several individuals were deeply upset by the fact
that the Chamber failed to take effective preparation
measures before the scheduled date of the boycott. They
urged Zeng to contact various merchants of the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce to take immediate action and stop
ordering American goods first. They argued that ”[We] have
to stop ordering American goods [now] in order to carry out
the boycott effectively." (Shenbao 20 June 1905. Emphasis
mine). Another concerned individual also suggested the need
for more concrete and coherent boycott strategies than mass
meetings and aimless speeches. He complained that although
numerous meetings were held by merchants and intellectuals
none of these gatherings went much beyond talking randomly
about not using American goods (Shibao 29 May 1905).

By late June, many boycott activists and sympathizers
began to be very suspicious and critical of the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce for its inaction. About one month before
the scheduled boycott day, the Man-Mirror Study Society

demanded that Chinese merchants stop ordering American goods

285
immediately (Shibao 22 June 1905). Letters were pouring in
to Zeng Shaoqing (Shenbao 24 June 1905; Zhang 1966:76). Most
of these letters questioned Zeng why no action had been
taken by the Chamber and warned Zeng not to be fooled by
American sweet words promising reform in the future (Xinwen
bao 19 June 1905, cited in Zhang 1966:76). One letter even
went so far as to suggest that Zeng might have accepted
bribes from.Americans. Zeng was obliged to publish his
defense in Shanghai newspapers and pledge to carry out the
boycott measure to the end if no satisfactory reforms were
taken by 20 July 1905 (18 June 1905 lunar calendar), the

deadline (Shenbao 21 June 1905).

But what exactly would constitute satisfactory reforms?
This was another thorny issue for which the boycotters
needed to come up with an answer. Again, it was some
concerned individuals who began to discuss the exact goals
of the boycott in newspapers. The same person who criticized
aimless speeches suggested that the leadership of the
boycott first of all find out precisely to what extent the
immigration treaty must be amended. Boycott organizers, he
further suggested, also needed to think about what should be
done if Americans only partially amended the treaty; what if
the treaty had been changed but the reality of the exclusion
and the mistreatment were still the same? (Shibao 29 May

1905).

286

These suggestions touched on the most complicated
issues of the boycott. Yet, since the first meeting of the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on 10 May 1905, the boycott
activists had largely ignored the exclusion treaty itself.
While there was much public discussion of the methods of
carrying out the boycott, there were no public meetings
devoted to the discussion of specifics of a satisfactory
treaty regulating Chinese entering the United States.
Apparently such a complicated matter as an immigration
treaty could not possibly be discussed, let alone decided,
by the general public, as the boycott tactics could. The
real problem.was, however, that both the merchants and the
intellectuals were too reluctant seriously to consider the
future treaty between the two countries.

On the treaty issue, they relied almost entirely on the
Qing government, which they did not trust in the first
place. The typical attitude in this regard was expressed by
the phrase “discussion of the treaty by the government;
boycott by the merchants' (yiyue zaiguan; dizhi zaishang,
Xinwen bao 3 June 1905, cited in Zhang 1966:80). The phrase
expressed a tacit understanding between the boycotters and
the government that neither party would interfere with the
other's legitimate sphere. What the boycott activists wanted
from the Qing government was only that it would not sign a
treaty with the United States behind the back of the public

(Shibao 24 May; 29 May 1905). In a letter to the Ministry of

287
Foreign Affairs, Zeng Shaoqing went so far as to demand
that: “...this time the treaty draft has to be sent to
Shanghai merchants to see before the Ministry can sign it.“
(Zhu ed. 1958:146-7). But the boycotters did not know and
could not agree upon what kind of treaty--if any treaty at
all--they wanted the Qing government to have with the United
States.

Most Qing high officials were actually sympathetic to
the boycott cause (Zhang 1966:62-72; Shenbao 14 June).
though no one knew where this movement would lead. Under
popular pressure of unprecedentedly wide scope and
solidarity, the Qing government had no plan to sign a secret
treaty with the United States, whose treatment of Chinese,
including Chinese mandarins, was humiliating to the Qing
government as well (see Chapter One). On the other hand, it
was very unlikely the Qing could and would negotiate a
treaty with the United States which could satisfy all the
boycott groups, given the fact that these groups were
divided among themselves on the issue.

On 4 June 1905, Shenbao published a treaty draft by
Liang Cheng, the Chinese Minister to the united States. This
was probably the first time in Chinese diplomatic history

that a treat draft with foreign countries was ever published

 

'According to Shenbao (14 June 1905), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs declined the request by William W. Rockhill
that the boycott movement be stopped by the Qing government.

288
in a privately-run newpaper. The draft included several
important revisions of the previous treaty. It provided, for
instance, a narrow and clear definition of the laboring
class and made it clear that non—laborers should not be
excluded. On the other hand, it acknowledged the U.S. right
to exclude Chinese laborers who fell into the definition
(Article 1). It also allowed Chinese laborers en route to
other countries to travel via the United States. While it
required the Chinese laborers traveling via America to obey
the law of the United States, it prohibited violation of the
laborers' rights (Article 2). Article 2 also protected the
rights of laborers already in the United States who wished
to go back to China and then return to the U.S. The draft
treaty further differentiated the United States proper from
its territories, such as Hawaii and the Philippines, where
Chinese laborers should be allowed to enter, as other Asian
immigrants were (Article 4). Article 6 of the draft treaty
stipulated that while waiting for admission to the United
States, Chinese nationals should not be detained. If
questioning was necessary by American administrative
officials, the concerned Chinese nationals should be allowed
to hire their representatives. Chinese nationals were also
given the right of appeal and protection against arrest
without warrant (Shenbao 4 June 1905; U.S. Department of
Commerce and Labor, NA, RG85, 52320/27, cited in Mckee

1977:95-6). On 12 June 1905 the treaty draft was also

289

published in Tianjin Tagong bao (Tagong bao June 12, 1905).

Considering the fact that this treaty draft was first
submitted to the U.S. government in August 1904, the date of
its publication in Shanghai and Tianjin in June 1905, when
the boycott was building up momentum, was significant. It
demonstrated the impact of the movement upon the Qing
government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular.
As early as 31 May 1905, Guangdong gentry and merchant had
sent telegrams to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting
the publication of the American treaty draft (Shenbao 27 May
1905). Four days later, Suzhou boycott activists similarly
requested the text of the American treaty draft (Shenbao 27
May 1905). It is understandable, considering that
negotiation was underway, that the Qing government could
only publish the Chinese treaty draft. Still, the
publication itself was significant. However, it is also
significant that the publication of the treaty draft failed
to provide a focus for the boycott." Little if any
attention was paid to the draft treaty, and Shenbao itself

did not make any comments on the draft."'

 

"This treaty draft was considered very reasonable by
John Hay the Secretary of State and William.W. Rockhill, the
new American Minister to China. But the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Labor provided a counterdraft which was vastly
different from the Chinese position (Mckee 1977:95-99). The
negotiation in Washington did not lead to any solution of
the problem.

'"The only brief discussion of Liang's treaty draft was
an article published in Yangcheng ribao (Guangzhou Daily).
The article considered that the treaty draft needed only

290

The question of what the exact goals of the boycott
were slowly caught the attention of increasing numbers of
people just before the boycott was scheduled to start in
July. But the public discussion of the issue was diffused
and almost entirely ignored the position of the Qing
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An article published in Lindong
ribao argued that the interests of merchants and laborers
were intimately related and the mistreatment of merchants
and other Chinese originated with the laborer exclusion
treaty. Therefore the article insisted that the movement was
not just to amend some of the clauses of the exclusion
treaty, but was to abolish it in its entirety (in Shibao 18
June 1905). In an open letter to Zeng Shaoqing, a group of
intellectuals in Shanghai argued that if the treaty was only
to be amended and not abolished the exclusion acts would
certainly not be abrogated either (Shenbao 20 June 1905).
The famous novelist Wu Woyao and the literary society, the
Man-Mirror Study Society, in Shanghai also expressed similar
ideas (see Chapter Three; Zhu ed., 1958:151, 149; Zhang
1966:58-62).

What these suggestions amounted to was that no

 

minor changes to serve as the basis for the new treaty.
However, no follow-up discussion was conducted to catch wide
public

attention (Shibao 24 June l905:2; 27 June 1905).

On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did
not plan to use the boycott movement directly in
strengthening its negotiation position with the United
States. No record shows that there was any direct contact
between the boycotters and the officials of the Ministry.

291
immigration treaty was in fact needed at all. Therefore the
goal of the boycott seemed to be rather simple, i.e. to
pressure the Qing government not to sign any treaty which
was bound to be discriminatory and exclusive. This view was
strengthened by an alleged talk given by Wu Tingfan, a
Guangdong native who was a former Chinese Minister to the
United States and a ranking official (silang) in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When asked about the
possibility that Chinese in America might be totally
subjected to harsh American laws if the immigration treaty
between the two countries was not renewed, wu allegedly
replied that the current treaty was the worst possible. In
fact, if there was no treaty at all between the two
countries the situation might be better, for the Americans
could not invoke treaty rights to exclude Chinese (Shenbao
21 June 1905; Shibao 22 June 1905).

Some boycott activists also suggested the abolition of
the treaty, but from.a very different point of view. Instead
of asking the Americans to open the door for all Chinese
without discrimination, as the Man-Mirror Study Society did,
some believed the solution lay in having all the Chinese in
the United States come back to China. Therefore for them no
immigration treaty was necessary either. For example, Zhang
Zhujun, the woman activist in Shanghai, denounced those who
preferred to stay in America as having a slave mentality

(Talu bao 17 May 1905). Her view was shared widely by such

292
famous people as Lin Shu, and was also reflected in the
popular novel The Bitter Society (Chapter Forty-eight in A

Ying 1962).'

It is ironic that while the scope of the boycott
narrowed to include only boycotting American goods, as I
have shown earlier, the goals of the boycott broadened as
the movement went on and the urban masses were more and more
mobilized. The idea of abolishing the immigration treaty
became so widespread that some changes which occurred in
June and July in American treatment of Chinese entering the
United States were almost entirely ignored. On 14 June
President Theodore Roosevelt ordered Victor H. Metcalf, the
"annoyingly inflexible“ chief of the Bureau of Immigration,
to issue “rigid instructions“ to be courteous to Chinese
entering the United States (Mckee 1977:127). In late June
the Bureau began to moderate the regulations significantly
(Mckee 1977:129).

The bottom line was still, however, that only

 

'It is interesting to note that in one of their letters
to the Qing government suggesting a solution to the
immigration disputes, some Fujian gentry-merchants asked the
Qing government to take strict measures to prevent bogus
merchants from obtaining merchant identification and punish
those who tried to go to the United States under false
identification (Shenbao 16 July 1905). But this suggestion
was definitely not in accordance with the general sentiment
of most boycotters, who advocated loosening the harsh
immigration regulations by the United States. For most of
the boycotters the source of the evil obviously lay in
America's inhuman and discriminatory law.

293

privileged classes were to be admitted. Even the most
conservative boycotters in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
did not find the changes significant enough to warrant
cancellation of the scheduled boycottu* For most of the
boycott activists, the changes in American immigration
policy toward Chinese came too little, too late. If
anything, the changes probably only encouraged the
boycotters to carry out their mission more adamantly.

Several schools in Shanghai began to use stationery
made in other countries as early’as late May." In early
June the Guangzhou Chamber of Commerce found that the main
American product sold in the Guangdong area was flour and
the major users of the flour were the pancake stores. The
Guangzhou Chamber of Commerce therefore requested these
stores not to use American flour any longer (Shenbao 10 June
1905). These sporadic, individual, yet totally spontaneous
actions quickly became a widespread, organized, in some
cases coerced, mass boycott when the day for the showdown

finally arrived.

2. Boycott!

 

'Such merchants as Su Baosheng and Shao Qingtao, for
example, pledged boycott of American goods at the 19 July
meeting despite the fact that they were extremely reluctant
to do so (Shenbao 20 July 1905).

"On 27 May 1905 more than one hundred students
representing twenty-seven schools in Shanghai held a meeting
and decided not to buy American stationery for school use
(Zhu 1958:156).

294

At 4:30 p.m. 19 July 1905 (June 17 lunar calendar), one
day before the scheduled boycott, Shanghai intellectuals,
students, merchants, and representatives from other cities,
totalling about 1400 people, gathered together at the then
nushu (wuben Women's School). Sixty-eight-year-old Dr. Ma
Xiangbo, president of the newly founded Fudan Public College
(Fudan gongxue, later Fudan University), made an
inflammatory speech. On the one hand he challenged his
audience to show Americans that Chinese could unite together
in carrying out the boycott to the end; on the other he told
them.“a boycott was the easiest thing to do for it took
[individual] voluntary actions with which American nor
Chinese government could interfere“ (Shenbao 20 July 1905.
My emphasis).

Many people in various other towns and cities, as well
as in Shanghai, must have been anxiously waiting for the day
and the moment. Nobody seemed to pay much attention at all
to the letter from.the American Consul General Rodgers to
Shanghai governor Yuan Shuxun, published on the same page in
Shenbao, next to the report on the boycott meeting. The
letter said Rodgers had already notified the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce days earlier that the American president
Roosevelt had issued an executive order to give Chinese

officials, merchants, tourists and students courteous

295
treatmentu' Rodgers also predicted.optimistically that a
satisfactory treaty for merchants of both countries would
eventually be reached (Shenbao 20 July 1905).

A serious and straightforward talk between Mr. Rodgers
and Zeng Shaoqing on the next day, 20 July 1905, clearly
showed the gap between American reforms and Chinese demands
and showed why a mass boycott could not be headed off by
minor changes in American immigration policy and by sheer
diplomacy. The conversation, as published in Shibao, went:

Rodgers: Our [Congress] will not meet until November, why do
you insist on what we cannot do now?

Zeng: Things change constantly. [We] cannot treat all
matters the same way. For example, our last meeting was on
Sunday, 21 May [1905], which was not an office day for me.
The reason that I came over anyway was because it involved
such an important matter that I had to come. If your islands
are under attack, do you wait for the meeting to make a
decision or do you just send out warships?

Rodgers: That is a war situation, whereas we are talking
about a peaceful treaty, which is different.

Zeng: The [immigration] treaty is not an ordinary matter.
[The Congress] should have discussed the matter last year
when the treaty was to expire. If [the Congress had done so
then] there would be no controversies today....

Rodgers: Our country has already begun to reform.[its
immigration policy] and our Minister [William W. Rockhill]
also wants to settle the issue as soon as possible.

Zeng: This is very good. Why don't you then write me a
pledge [of reform] in order for me to show to the public.

Rodgers: I cannot write such a pledge. But can't you just

 

'The news of the president's order to treat non-laborer
Chinese courteously was published in Shibao (29 June 1905).
But neither comment nor discussion was made by either the
newspaper or by concerned individuals. The news was probably
not significant enough to catch public attention.

296

trust me?

Zeng: I certainly trust you with all my heart, but I am
afraid that the public does not trust me! (Shibao 22 July

1905).'

At this point the Shanghai merchants, represented by the
Chamber of Commerce, could no longer back off and had to
take the responsibility to lead the boycott.

On 20 July 1905, the same day after Mr. Rodgers failed
to persuade Zeng Shaoqing to call off the boycott, the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce held a public meeting. Unlike
all the previous gatherings, the reluctant big merchants of
Shanghai had.to make a commitment now. The meeting was to
decide specific measures to carry out the boycott. Under the
tremendous public pressure Su Baosheng, along with several
other merchants dealing with American products, pledged not
to order.American goods anymore after 20 July 1905. They
were cheered by the audience who pledged not to use American
goods after the same day (Shenbao 20 July 1905).

The success of the meeting was, however, more apparent
than real. In the excitement of the moment few realized, let
alone pointed out, the obvious distinction between "not to
order" (buding) and "not to use" (buyong). The problem.was
that the wholesale merchants did not pledge not to sell

American goods that were already ordered. But the

 

'The conversation was published originally in Chinese,
which I have translated. The dates used in the dialogue were
initially in the lunar calendar. I have converted all the
dates into the solar calendar.

297
conflicting interests and views would end up dividing
participants into two parts. One group of people represented
by wholesale merchants' interests proposed to stop ordering
American goods only-—the "non-order faction“ (buding pai). A
banker and board member of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
named Xia suggested that merchants stop ordering American
goods that day but consumers continue for another four
months to buy American products which had already been
ordered. Although this proposal was opposed by many at the
meeting, the non-order faction prevailed at the time largely
because the conservative social elites, not just large
merchants, in Shanghai supported the position. Wang Kangnian
(Ganqing), the owner of the conservative newspaper Zhongwai
ribao, proposed that an investigation be conducted to
identify ordered goods so as not to put concerned merchants
into a difficult situation. He insisted that this was the
only way to achieve non-use of American goods, for the
boycott needed support from the merchants (Shibao 21 July
1905).

Another group represented by people from the Man-Mirror
Study Society and the Speech Society of Public Loyalty
insisted that non-order (buding) and non-use (buyong) had to
be implemented simultaneously in order to be effective-~they
were the non-use faction (buyong pai). Their argument was
that the continuous sale of some American goods would cause

confusion and dampen the morale of the public (Shibao 21

298
July 1905). While both factions claimed support from
individuals of various social classes and groups, the
leaders of the two factions clearly belonged to two
different social groups: big merchants and petty
intellectuals. The former was represented by the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce with support from such social elites as
Zhang Jian and Ma Xiangbo; the latter was headed by the Man-
Mirror Study Society and the Speech Society of Public
Loyalty.

The meeting, however, reached a consensus to stop
ordering American goods immediately, despite the opposition
from.such merchants as Han Runsheng and wu Tingsheng,
wholesalers of American cigarettes. At the end of the
meeting eleven merchants representing iron products,
machinery, foreign cloth, kerosene, flour, and timber
businesses signed their pledge not to order American goods

anymore (Shibao 21 July 1905).

The merchants' lukewarm attitude toward the boycott was
in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm.of intellectuals,
students, small clerks, some of the retail merchants, and
women's groups in various towns and cities throughout

China.‘ Such a widespread popular movement testified to the

 

'After the 19 July meeting which officially kicked off
the boycott, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce sent telegrams
to that effect to thirty-five cities throughout China (Yang
et al. 1989:382).

299
success of the propaganda on the one hand, and to the great
degree of consensus on the other. But the increasingly large
number of the participants in the boycott in various locales
inevitably made the boycott against American goods too
narrow a popular focus. Numerous individuals and stores in
many cities did find expression of their loyalty to the
cause in pledging not to sell and buy American goods. For
most boycotters, however, not to sell and buy American goods
was either not relevant or just not enough to show their
patriotism.and their sympathy for their fellow countrymen.
They naturally took it as their duty to persuade and coerce
others to do the same whenever it seemed necessary. Very
soon a spontaneous popular movement began to demand
involuntary actions from.everyone. In July and August the
movement reached its climax.‘ During this period various
social groups--mainly the new type of organizations such as
study societies and women's organizations--in different
locales began to take boycott initiatives over from Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce. These social groups not only
intensified the boycott propaganda but also tried to enforce

boycott measures.

A Political.Movement Turned Theatrical

 

'This was true in Shanghai. In other cities such as
Suzhou, Yangzhou, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou, the heyday of the
boycott was in August and September. In Guangzhou the
movement lasted the longest-~to the end of the year (Zhang,
1966:Chapters Three and Four).

300

Once the non—elite social groups took over the
initiative, the popular movement changed dramatically from
rational discussion and organized petition to mass
demonstration. Several new developments after late July
signified the change of the boycott style from.petitionary
to theatrical: the appearance of a large quantity of popular
literary and theatrical works, the use of posters and
handbills as mass mobilization means, and.public meetings
which were held by and featured non-elite speakers. For
these phenomena Habermas's concept of the public sphere
seems a bit too unimaginative and narrow. However, scholars
specialized in cultural history and collective action have
fruitfully compared political protests with theatrical acts
in order to show that collective action, often violent' and
seemingly irrational, can in fact be rational, meaningful,
and symbolic for the participants. The "crowd" were
conscious actors themselves (Esherick and Wasserstrom.l992;
Wasserstrom.l992; Hunt 1984; Desan 1989).

For me to look at the boycott as a drama and some sort
of a festival is not only relevant, because it was
tremendously dramatized by artists and writers of the time
and.perceived as such by some contemporaries, but also
revealing of how people's sense of real and surreal affected

their sense of public responsibilities and private rights.

 

'While the boycott never turned violent (see below), it
did.become dramatic.

301

A. Adopting Artistic and Literary Forms

In late July or early August, actor Wang Xiaonong (ref.
Chapter Two) was having a show at Shanghai's Chunxing Tea
Park. When he realized that boycott was at a critical stage
he decided to energize the movement by performing a
patriotic play. The play was entitled The Arduous Journey
(Ku luxing), and started with Poland's historical experience
under foreign invasions. The fate of Poland would, Wang
believed, demonstrate the “disastrous consequences" of a
people without patriotism. The case of Poland would also
show the "miserable conditions of a people that lost its
sovereignty.“ The middle of the play was "about the barbaric
polity of the African red [sic] race in order to prove,’I
Wang argued, “that our people are not an inferior race and
are qualified to win [a racial competitionl." Toward the end
of the show "the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi)' will issue an
'edict encouraging the Chinese people to carry out the
boycott to the end." The drama was scheduled to play on two

nights on 11 and 12 August, 1905."

 

'Legendary Chinese ancestor sage.

"Wang Xiaonong and Xiong Wentong to Zeng Shaoqing in A
Ying 1962:669. The letter did not have date on it. But from
its content it is clear that the letter was written in late
July and early August. No play script has been found and it
not clear if the play was ever shown in public. However, at
least one complete boycott play script, The Adventure of
Haiqiaochun, is available (see Chapter Three) and there is
little doubt that some sort of boycott dramas were acted out
in Shanghai and Guangzhou.

302

At about the same time, a quite experienced writer was
just finishing up a story which was about a group of
unfortunate students (dushu ren) who were driven by poverty
from their hometown and villages to look for fortunes in big
cities such as Shanghai, Suzhou, and Guangzhou. Like other
novelists at the time who played the role of muckraking
journalists as well, this author also followed such exiting
events as the boycott very closely. The novelist decided to
let the protagonists of his story go to America to
experience the misery of exclusion and then come back to
join the boycott. The story was named The Bitter Society
(ref. Chapter Three). Although the talented storyteller was
not important enough to have his name recorded in literary
or political history, the appearance of the novel on
Shanghai's book market must have been some sort of a
publishing event. It was praised at the time as a “moving"
work that “could last" (A Ying 1962:15). Printing offices
decided to sponsor its publishing (Zhang 1966:100-101).
Shenbao continued to run an advertisement for the book for
more than a week starting from 30 July.

For the majority of the urbanites, however, novels, no
matter how well written, were definitely beyond their
immediate reach. There is little doubt that the boycotter
activists began to create numerous ballads. The following
satirical song might have been the "most influential"

boycott device of all (Cochran 1986:192). Composed in the

303
form.of Cantonese love songs it playfully exhorted people
not to buy American cigarettes:

You are really down and out,
American cigarettes.

Look at you down and out,

I think back to the way you used to be.

In those days when you were flying high.
Who would have rejected you?
Everyone loved you, saying you make people happy
Because your taste overwhelms people
And is even better than opium.
Smelling it makes people's mouths water.
We've had a relationship

In which up to now there has been no problem.

I thought our love affair would remain
Unchanged until earth and sky collapsed.
Who would have expected that the Way of Heaven would not be
as always.
That human things might change.
Then this movement against the treaty got underway
And spread everywhere
Because America mistreated our Overseas Chinese,
Degrading us like lowly oxen and workhorses.
Therefore everyone has united to boycott America,
And that means opposing Americans.
What is the most ideal way?
People say it is best not to sell American goods,
And to this end we must all united into a collective body.

Ah cigarette,

You have the word American in your trademark for everyone to
see

So I must give you up along with my bicycle.

Our love affairs

Today must end.

Ai,
Cigarette please don't blame me.
Perhaps a time might come when we meet again,

But it must be after Americans abrogate the treaty. .
Then as before I shall be with you again (A Ying 1962:14).

The following song, also in Canton dialect, was composed by

members of the Feshan Self-strengthening Society just before

 

'I use an English translation of the song (Cochran
1986:192-93) with some changes.

304

the.Mid-autumn Festival”. The song urged people not to use
American flour to make mooncakes:
It is about the time of the Mid—autumn Festival.
Tens of thousands of families,
have their mooncakes ready,

To celebrate the bright moon.
But if you use American flour,
the cake must not be clean "
[because] flour from the Flower Flag [country] is [made]
with Chinese blood.
So, please make a change
to use rice flour to make mooncakes,
It is easier and faster to make;
and it is cheaper and tastier.
Let us unite together
with our body and soul;

let us make a resolution to eat our own products,
thus, the moon and the sun will be bright again...(A Ying

1962:9).

In Shanghai storytelling and ballad singing in Suzhou
dialect (suzhou pingtan) was one of the most favored
entertainment forms. An active boycotter and a member of the
Man-Mirror Study Society, Xingqing, wrote a ballad in this
style which was actually based on a boycott meeting held by
Shanghai women (A Ying 1962:483-86).

In fact, many artistic and literary works of the
boycott were based on real people and their stories. This
fact had two potentials. On the one hand, because they were
based on real events they might have been taken seriously

and had tremendous emotional power despite the fact that

 

'Fifteenth day of the eighth lunar month.

"'Flower Flag“ refers to the United States.

305
they were artistically crude and unsophisticated. On the
other hand, the political movement was dramatized and as a
result many people might have taken the movement as a show
which had some distance from reality and soon would be over.
Both potentials were superbly illustrated by some children's
songs which were based on real stories.

One of these children's songs told a story about a
thirteen-year-old school boy, Li, who set an example for
kids in the boycott. According to the story, Li heard anti-
exclusion speeches at school and was immensely moved. When
he came back home, he found that there were many things in
his home—-perfume, carpets, and lamps-—which were made in
America. Ashamed and angered, he asked his parents to throw
all these things away. His parents paid no attention to him
since they thought he was just a kid and could not be
serious. Outraged, Li smashed the American-made phonograph
his parents had.bought him. Once he was calmed down,
however, he began to be afraid of being scolded by his
parents. So he began to cry and refused to eat until his
parents found out what happened and forgave him” Moved by
Li's patriotism, the parents decided to throw away
everything in the house which was made in America (Ding
1958:21).

Another children's song was written by Chu E, a nine-
year-old-girl of Jiaxing, Zhejiang province. The song told

the story of her own:

306

Listen, listen, listen
Keep quiet and listen to me sing.

My father speaks every day of banning American goods;
My mother talks every night of hating American goods;
Everybody says to discard American goods.

I hate American goods, too, all the times

So, I smash Linwen Perfume [in our house].

My mom is outraged,

but my dad gives me praises.

Everybody applauds,

Saying I am.a wonderful child,

'cause too harsh are America's exclusion acts...(Xu et al.
eds.,1991:376-77).

In both cases, children took all the fanfare and
rhetoric of the boycott more seriously than their adult
parents, who consciously or unconsciously kept a distinction
between a public event, which was half-real and half-
theatrical for them, and private matters. The distinction of
the adult world between public and private and surreal and
real did not exist in children's minds. What was significant
was that it was the children's view which triumphed because
the subtle distinction of the adult world could only be
silently kept in private and not be made openly in public.

B. Putting up Posters and Distributing Handbills

Another dramatic change in the method of propagating
boycott ideas and mobilizing the urban masses after July was

the use of posters. Formerly newspapers had played the key

role as a public forum for the boycott movement. As posters

 

'Apparently Linwen Perfume was American-made, but I
cannot find its American brand name.

307

and handbills overshadowed newspapers, emotions began to
overwhelm reason. Posters were often in big characters, in
vernacular or dialects, straightforward in their content,
and anonymous (Consulate Dispatches, Shanghai, 17 August
1905). On 18 July vernacular posters appeared throughout
Shanghai reminding people of the fact that the deadline was
approaching and demanding that stores "must carry out [the
boycott] measures“ (Shenbao 19 July 1905). Later on, posters
decorated walls, telephone poles, and store doors in
Shanghai (Yang et al. 1989:382). One of the most common
posters in Shanghai was printed in large bold type on paper
eighteen inches by ten inches, and read, "In order
positively to retaliate against the American treaty, you
cannot buy or sell American Goods. If you buy or sell
American Goods you are lower than a pig or a dog.“
(Consulate Dispatches, Shanghai, 17 August 1905).'

In July in Guangzhou, posters in various colors
appeared everywhere. On most of these posters were slogans

such as:

The American treaty harshly excluding Chinese mocks
universal principle (gongli); All the nationals of our
country publicly pledge not to use American goods.

The boycott will continue as long as the harsh treaty is not
abolished!

This store does not sell American products.

 

'The translation was by Mr. Arnold of the American
Consulate in Shanghai.

308

Boycott American goods!

Posters were not like newspapers, which were available
only in major cities. Boycotters in small towns printed
their own posters and distributed handbills catering to the
local folks. A handbill distributed in the Songjiang county
area was typical. It used very simple words to tell people
not to buy American goods and how to tell American goods
from others:

Brothers, brothers! Now there is a most important thing [we]
have to tell you. That is the Americans do not allow our
Chinese to go to America and drive out our Chinese from
their country. This is an important matter... therefore we
exhort you not to do business with the Americans. Since many
of you might not know what are American goods, we print out

marks which American goods have. If foreign products have
the following signs on them, do not buy:

United-States; United States of
America;

United States of North America; U.S.A.
(Shenbao 23 June 1905)

Clearly these posters and handbills were aimed more at
the public at large than at merchants who were specialized in
dealing with American goods. Even with the help of these
posters and handbills, however, it was still hard for the
consumers and the general public to distinguish various
American goods, given the fact that brand names could be
easily changed if the merchants really wanted to sell the
goods in stock. Full cooperation from the merchants was thus

considered crucial in making the boycott most effective. In

309
this respect, public meetings played a much more important

role in committing merchants for the cause.

C. Public Meetings

After late July public meetings had continued to serve
the purpose of educating and agitating the public but with
distinctive new developments. New the public meetings were
more regularly held and more widespread. In Guangzhou, for
example, public meetings were held three times a week (Ding
1958:15-17). Many meetings were no longer devoted to
propaganda (posters and handbills replaced speeches in
disseminating anti-exclusion ideas). They served a :more
practical purpose: to solicit pledges of not buying and
selling American goods. These meetings often ended with
resolutions and.pledges signed by individuals and stores.

Occasionally resolutions passed by public meetings were
accompanied with specific punishment measures for those who
broke their pledges and who violated ‘the principle of not
using American.goods. The Tianjin Chamber of Commerce as early
as late June had.decided that a fifty-thousand yuan fine would
be imposed.upon those merchants who continued to buy American
flour, kerosene, and machinery. (Shibao 25 June 1905). But
most of the public resolutions did not carry with them
coercive measures, largely because most of the chambers of
commerce did not have the authority to do so in the past (see

Chapter Four). This was particularly true in Shanghai, where

310

the chamber had little coercive power other than to persuade
bankers not to deal with boycott breakers and.to publish.names
of the individuals and stores that dared to break their
pledges. In Guangzhou the public pledge took a more
traditional form, in which participants swore not to use
American goods “in front of gods and ghosts“ (Ding 1958:18).

What was significant with these meetings was the
percentage of concerned merchants and stores that attended the
meetings and signed their pledges, apparently under popular
pressure. In Guangzhou, for example, at one of the first
meetings representatives of all fiftyeseven stores and firms
which had carried American products attended. Of all these
stores and firms, only one did not sign the public pledge on
the spot. The reason for this conspicuous deviation, the
organizer of the meeting explained, was not because there were
any objections to the boycott from the store. It was because
the representative of the store who was present at the meeting
did not have full authority from the store owner (Shibao, 25

July 1905).

D. Organizations in the Boycott
Most of the boycott meetings were called for by various
social organizations which were formed before the boycott

movement for a variety of purposes.‘ In fact, it is

 

'Among them were merchant organizations, study
societies (see below), reform organizations--anti-foot-
binding and anti-opium.smoking societies, and revolutionary

311

unthinkable that any boycott activities would have been
possible without these voluntary organizations. As I have
mentioned earlier, especially in the introduction, various
social organizations boomed in the late Qing. The best-formed
organizations were probably the merchant organizations and
native—place organizations, as I have discussed in Chapter
Four. But even these organizations had only vertical
relationships in a given locale. Chambers of commerce and
native-place associations of different locales did not have
close administrative relationships.‘r

Also influential, if not powerful, were intellectual
organizations." The best known of this type of organizations
were the Shanghai Study Society, Commerce Study Society, Man-
Mirror' Study' Society; and. the Speech. Society' of Public
Loyalty. Some less important study organizations were

newspaper reading societies, of which the most active was the

 

groups. All except revolutionary groups were active during
the boycott (Zhang 1982; Xu et la. eds.,199l).

'In this regard, the relationship between the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce and the Tianjin Chamber of Commerce was
probably typical. The merchants from the two chambers had
very strict business relationships only. Many disputes
resulted from their mutual distrust and poor business
behavior (TJSH Archives, 1987, vol.1:81,568).

"Student organizations were negligible during this
movement, though many public meetings were held in schools.
It was only toward the end of the movement that a national
student association became active in Shanghai—-the Huanqiu
Zhongguo tongxue hui (Globe Chinese Student Association,
Shenbao 10 September 1905).

312
Book-Reading Society of Yangzhou."'
While the members of these study groups sometimes
participated in each other's meetings," the study groups
basically acted as independent units and took distinctive
positions on the goals and methods of the boycott. The
Shanghai Study Society and the Commerce Study Society were
made up of people who were at once gentry, merchants, and
intellectuals and who had closer official and commercial
ties."" Ma Xiangbo, the head of the Shanghai Study Society,
was a former diplomat for the Qing government and had a close
relationship with Zhou Fu, the Governor General of Liangjiang
(see Chapter Four). Sun Duoxing, who founded the Commerce
Study Society, was a large merchant himself. The Sun family
had important official ties in Shanghai (SHJDS:581; Xu

1988:53-55). Consequently, they were more conservative and

more sympathetic to the position of the Shanghai Chamber of

 

'The appearance of these study societies and other
reform social groups was part of a larger trend that goes
back to the late nineteenth century. After the promulgation
of the New Policies in 1901, various study societies
flourished. The booming of the newspaper-reading societies
serves as good an
example. From 1902 to 1911, there were at least 220 such
societies organized. Among them.ten were for women (Li
1990:103-105).

nGe Zhong of the Speech Society of Public Loyalty and
Wu Woyao of the Man-Mirror Study Society, for example, had
spoken at numerous meetings organized by a variety of
intellectual and.merchant organizations.
'"The two societies apparently had a close'
relationship, for Ma Xiangbo was a prominent member of both
(SHDSJ:582).

313

Commerce in terms of the goal and methods of the boycott.

The Man-Mirror Study Society and the Speech Society of
Public Loyalty, on the other hand, were composed of petty
intellectuals such as Wu Woyao and Ge Zhong, who insisted on
abolition of the discriminatory treaty in its entirety and who
were more concerned with the interests of the "public" than
those of a few merchants. The Man—Mirror Study Society was
definitely'a.progressive and reform.organization. Its charter,
which was published on 21 October 1904 in Jingzhong ribao, a
radical newspaper, stated that the purpose of the society was
"to gather people of common aspirations in order to achieve
the results of group study and to cultivate useful people."
The Society had five branches supervising distinct activities:
1) "Book reading, to cultivate character and exchange
knowledge;' 2) 'Lecturing, to learn from.others who provide a
useful mirror [to ourselves];" 3) "Miscellaneous studying
(keyi), to take additional lessons in science and to study
liberal arts (wenyi);'I 4) "Physical exercise, to train bodies
of the soldiers and the people;" 5) "Language reform, to
reform language and conform written language to speech"
(SHDSJ:584). Such boycott activists as Wu Woyao and Feng
Xiawei' were its members.

Less influential but equally active were learning groups

and other social groups, such as various women's groups. The

 

'I shall provide some details about Feng later in this
chapter.

314
latter were particularly conspicuous. Chinese women began to
organize themselves along several lines in the late nineteenth
century. The first. women's organizations ‘were anti-foot-
binding societies throughout China. In the early twentieth
century women also began to organize along professional and
educational lines (Liu 1989; Xu et al. eds., 1991). While the
influence of women's organizations in terms of shaping the
directions of the movement was definitely insignificant, they
nevertheless kept their identity by organizing their own
meetings in Shanghai, Nanxiang, Jiading, Suzhou, wuxi,
Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and.many other cities. In these meetings
they’made boycott resolutions of their own (Zhang 1966:128-29;

Shibao and Shenbao, July, 1905; Liu 1989:256-59).'

 

'Here is a list of some of the boycott meetings
organized by women

Time (1905) Location Organizers
9 Jul. Guangxi Road, Shanghai Shi Lanying, Zhang
Junhan
16 Jul. Lanling School for Girls, Jiang Zhengru,
Jiang
Suzhou Fengwu
20 Jul. Shanghai Zhang Zhujun
Suzhou ?
21 Jul. Nanxiang School for Wang Qiling
Girls, Nanxiang
wuxi Elementary, Wuxi Women teachers
26 Jul. School for Girls, Jiading ?
27 Jul. Normal School for Women, ?
Shanghai
Guangzhou Guangzhou women
Nanxun Hospital, Zhejiang ?
5 Aug. Jingzhi School for Girls, ?
Wuxi _
28 Aug. Natural Feet Society, Zhong Peiying

Shanghai

315

Because of the decentralized nature of these social
organizations, boycott activities were not coordinated and
controlled as some had hoped. While many local organizations
looked to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce for specific
instructions, most local groups simply' passed. their' own
resolutions, especially after the Chamber seemed to care more

about a few big merchants' interests than about the cause.

3. The Breakdown of Boycott Solidarity

As I pointed out earlier, the Shanghai wholesale
merchants' pledge not to order American goods was made under
popular pressure. As the movement began to harm. their
interests, they did two things to protect their interests. One
was simply to break their pledge and continue to order
American goods. The other was to sell their American goods in
stock. No specific measures were issued by the Shanghai

Chamber of Commerce regarding how to carry the resolution out

 

1 Sept. Su Zhou ?

Source: Liu 1989:256-59; Zhang 1966:128-33.
Some meetings did not allow men to participate. The reason

was largely because at that time men and women were still
separated in schools and social gatherings (Li 1990:105-
106).

316

and what should be done if some merchants broke their
promises. Rather, as far as Shanghai big merchants were
concerned, the most urgent task seemed not to be to apply
effective pressure on American policy-makers, but to protect
their own interests. Their concerns were understandable,
because during the initial period of the boycott what Chinese
boycotted were not exactly American goods, but American-
produced goods possessed by Chinese merchants. Thus the
pressure was first and foremost on Chinese merchants.

The difference between the Chinese-owned and the
American-owned goods was stressed by merchants themselves but
also recognizedey the Shanghai Study Society and.the Shanghai
Commerce Study Society, the two elitist scholarly societies in
Shanghai. That is why during the heyday of the boycott in late
July and early August the Shanghai merchants not only did.not
take the lead in boycotting American goods, but also speeded
up the sale of these goods. They were busy finding ways to
"dredge" (shutong), as it was then called, American goods in
stock and those ordered on the way from American ports to
Shanghai.'

Even the boycott newspapers in Shanghai such as Shibao
and. Shenbao showed their understanding of the idea of

"dredging out." After all, one of the purposes of the movement

 

'According to the American Consulate's report, there
were in Shanghai warehouses approximately 160,000 bales of
American piece goods, valued at 12,000,000 Haiguan taels, or
nearly $8,000,000 gold (Consulate Dispatches, Shanghai, 16
September 1905).

317
was to protect and enhance Chinese merchants' strength and
interests, not to hurt them. The movement was propagated as
part of the commercial warfare (shangzhan, see Chapter Three).
Besides, the effectiveness of the boycott and solidarity of
the boycotters definitely needed, if they did not depend upon,
the merchants' hearty support and full cooperation.

Shortly after Shanghai merchants pledged not to order
more American goods, Shanghai Shibao published a comment on
current issues which praised the merchants who had made the
"greatest sacrifice" for the public cause. The article further
urged.the public to show their understanding of the merchants'
difficulty (tiliang Shengqing). It was crucial, the author
argued, for' the jpublic to find. ways of "relieving the
[financial] burden of the gentlemen who pledged not to order."
Otherwise, the author warned that the movement could not last
(Shibao 23 July 1905). In a letter to the concerned merchants
the Commerce Study Society stated that "...the boycott was
against Americans, not our fellow countrymen..;." (Shibao 24
July 1905).

Not all people, especially those in other cities and
towns, shared the same concern Shanghai big merchants had. In
many places the boycotters began to put away American goods
right after the movement started on 20 July 1905. Some store
owners even destroyed American goods in public to show their
support for the cause. This discrepancy would certainly be

detrimental to the solidarity of the boycotters, especially

318

when the situation seemed not to change in the short run.
Consider: normally the transportation of goods from.the United
States to Shanghai took. about six: months. In the best
situation possible (when the ordered goods were shipped right
way, for example) at least some American goods would continue
to be sold.half a year after the boycott went into effect. The
temptation was, of course, to make false claims about the date
of the order, if some merchants wanted to continue the
business. A more serious threat to the boycott movement was
the possibility that some merchants would continue to order
secretly despite their pledges (A Ying, 1962:477-482).

This was obviously a thorny problem confronting the
boycotters. The solution proposed by the Commerce Study
Society was to convince the merchants that it was financially
unsound to order any more American goods. But the shrewd and
experienced businessmen would decide this by themselves (A
Ying 1962:479). Even if there were no new orders, the problem
caused by previous orders was enormous, for some Shanghai
merchants put in extra orders when the deadline of the boycott
was approaching. Some new orders were put in as late as
October (Shenbao 12 August 1905). As American goods continued
to arrive in Shanghai ports, no wonder some boycotters could
not help asking: "When will be the end?"

A protracted boycott would have numerous implications:

 

'Meaning the date when a total boycott could be
implemented.

319

the merchants would be exhausted, consumers could not tolerate
long—term inconvenience, the government might suppress the
boycott to preserve social order, and the United States and
other powers might intervene to stop the movement. The boycott
had to have some short-term effect upon Americans. To achieve
this, some boycotters believed that two things had to be done.
One was to press the merchants to cancel some, if not all,
their orders. The other was to mobilize porters not to unload
American goods.

Zeng Shaoqing justified the idea of cancelling the order
contracts at a large meeting on 6 August. He argued that
according to the common practice of merchandise orders, orders
could be cancelled if such accidental events as workers'
strikes occurred. Since China's current boycott was an
accidental event, he reasoned, the orders could be cancelled
(Xinwen bao, 7 August 1905, cited in Zhang 1966:150-1) . In the
meantime, boycott activists in Shanghai began to mobilize
porters not to handle American goods.

These two proposals, if carried out, would have had much
greater and more immediate impact on American business
interests. The cancellation of the orders would affect
American business interests immediately, and stoppage of
loading and unloading American goods in Shanghai ports would
prevent a large quantity of American goods--valued at $ 8
million gold--from being transported to other areas of China

(Consulate Dispatches, Shanghai, 11 August, 16 September

320
1905) .

But these two measures could not be fully and effectively
carried out without causing international legal disputes
(qianshe guoji) , which the boycott leadership and majority of
boycotters, at least in theory, were extremely reluctant to
cause. When Shanghai merchants mentioned cancellation of their
orders, American merchants were deeply upset and reacted
strongly. They accused Chinese merchants of violating their
agreements and subjected them to lawsuits for damages.
Furthermore, the American Consulate reported, "the recognition
of such a policy by the boycotters has encouraged those who
have contracts with native merchants to repudiate not only
their contracts but also their debts, and therefore ruin
confronts them [namely the Shanghai merchantsl' (Consulate
Dispatches, Shanghai, 11 August 1905). It was equally
difficult to mobilize porters not to handle these goods,
because many of American goods were carried on foreign ships

(Consulate Dispatches, Shanghai, 11 August 1905).

Thus conflict between big Shanghai merchants on the one
hand and the radical boycotters on the other could not be
solved, and it became so tense in early August that two
dramatic events occurred. One was death threats to Zeng
Shaoqing, the symbolic leader of the movement. The other was
news of the death of Feng Xiawei, who committed suicide to

encourage his fellow countrymen to carry out the cause to the

321

end.

In early August Zeng began to receive anonymous letters
threatening to kill him if he continued to work for the
boycott. On 9 August two strangers came to Zeng's residence to
try to persuade him to leave Shanghai (Shibao 10 August 1905).
In the meantime American Minister Willam W. Rockhill also
asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discipline Zeng
(Zhang 1966:159). Although there was no evidence indicating
who was behind the death threats, they were widely speculated
to be supported by powerful Shanghai merchant interests.’

The sixty-year old Zeng Shaoqing responded with an open
letter which expressed his determination to be a martyr for

the cause:

Since the day [10 May 1905] I signed my name on the
telegram.[to the government] I had already made up my mind to
die for the matter of public good (gongyi shi). Why should I
avoid.it now! Besides if I am.afraid of death myself the world
would despise all [us Chinese], saying the nature of Chinese
is afraid of death...I would.be the guilty man.... Please tell
our countrymen that to die at the hands of Americans, the
hands of those who dealt.with American goods, is the right way
to die. To die this way is the same as to be alive and I will
have no regrets.... I only hope that after I die tens of
thousands of Zeng Shaoqings will rise up and continue [my
cause] to restore our national power and personal dignity. If
one day our country will stand together as equals with other
powers the day that I die will be the day that I am reborn.

After I die please do not go after my assassins. Stick to
non-use as the boycott principle. Make sure not to rise up to
give other countries the excuse of calling us uncivilized. [If
that happens] I cannot close my eyes in my death (Shibao 10

 

'Zeng's "Farewell Letter to the World" indicated that
he suspected those who engaged in selling American goods
were behind the conspiracy (Shibao 10 August 1905). The
popular play The Adventure of Haiqiaochun also suggests the
same thing (A Ying 1962:479).

322

August 1905; Shenbao 11 August 1905).

The farewell letter received more than a hundred responses
expressing the public's indignation, sympathy and support
Zeng's supporters compared him with Yao, Shen,’ Zhuge Liang,n
Giuseppe Mazzini, and Abraham Lincoln. One letter promised
that if Zeng was murdered, millions of Zeng Shaoqings would
rise to carry the movement to the end (Xinwen bao 13 August
1905, in Zhang 1966:159-162).

Reflecting the tensions that existed in Shanghai at the
time, is the fact that Zeng Shaoqing was not considered a
boycott hero at all by some more radical boycotters. He was
held responsible for the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce's total
inaction after some Shanghai merchants broke their pledges and
put in new orders to buy American goods (Shenbao 12 August
1905). At the same time that Zeng's life was threatened.by big
merchant interests Zeng was given three days to answer the
question: Why had he, as the initiator of the boycott, not
taken punitive measures to stop these activities (Shenbao 12
August 1905)? In sharp contrast to his reply to the death
threat, Zeng's response to this question mmst have sounded
very disappointing to the enthusiastic boycotters. He said

that although. the merchants of the Shanghai Chamber of

 

'Yao and Shen were legendary emperors in ancient China.

"Zhuge Liang (182-234) was a famous strategist in the
Three Kingdoms period.

323

Commerce had.made the pledges, he had no power whatsoever to
force them to keep their promises (Shenbao 12 August 1905).
Apparently the boycott activists mistakenly thought he had
great power over the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. He was
actually just a board member of the Chamber, and the only
board member who championed the cause openly and
enthusiastically.

The fact that Zeng Shaoqing was caught in a cross-fire
indicated the deep schism that existed among the "people," a
termmthe boycotters used to refer to merchants and the general
public as opposed to the government. It also shows the dilemma
that the boycott movement was facing: if the government had.no
rights to force people to buy American goods, neither could
the boycotters force merchants not to sell American goods.

But even if the boycotters could no longer count on the
big merchants, the popular movement might still be successful
insofar as the general public stuck to the cause. After all,
the merchants would order goods only because people would.buy
them. It is probably not totally inaccurate to say that Feng
Xiawei sacrificed his life in the hope that his countrymen
would also give up a.little to save the cause. It did not
matter what Feng's real motive was. The boycotters certainly
interpreted his suicide this way in their numerous eulogies

dedicated to the martyr.'

 

'Feng died on 16 July 1905, several days before the
scheduled boycott (A Ying 1962:457; Zhang 1966:165), but his
death was not reported in newspapers until 21 August 1905

324

From the scant evidence, we know that Feng Xiawei was a
Philippine-Chinese originally from Nanhai, Guangdong province,
the place of origin of many overseas Chinese. (Zhang
1966:61,165; A Ying 1962:457).' He went abroad when he was
seventeen years old and.had been to South.America and European
countries. Feng returned to China shortly before the boycott
started (A Ying 1962:457). He must have been fairly literate
and stayed in Shanghai for a while, for he was accepted as a
member of Shanghai's literary society--the Man-Mirror Study
Society (Shibao 21 August 1905; Zhang 1966:61; A Ying

1962:457).

 

(Shibao). On 20 August 1905, the Man-Mirror Society held a
memorial meeting to honor Feng. But Shibao's report on the
meeting was very brief (Shibao 21 August 1905:3).
Contemporaries could only speculate on his motive (A Ying
1962:458). We cannot even be certain that Feng Xiawei's
death was a suicide and an attempt to protest against
American maltreatment of Chinese immigrants. (One reason
that newspapers did not report extensively on the event, as
they reported on the death threat to the boycott leader Zeng
Shaoqing, was probably that they did not want the popular
movement to turn violent). At any rate, Feng's death was
later exploited by some boycotters to encourage and inspire'
the general public. Memorial meetings were held in Guangdong
and numerous eulogies were read and published (A.Ying
1962:696, 699). One scene of the play Adventure of
Haiqiaochun was devoted to glorifying Feng's presumed
heroism (A Ying 1962:457—461).

'The bulk of this information on Feng is from.eulogies
and the play Adventure of.Haiqiaochun. As the playwright
admitted, the description of Feng's inner thought was
fictitious. But the play's description of Feng's personal
experiences abroad and his membership in the Man-Mirror
Society was probably reliable, for it was in accordance with
the eulogies and a few newspaper reports. The play's
description of some other events of the boycott movement was
also based on real happenings, in accordance with the
reports of such fairly reliable newspapers as Shenbao and
Shibao.

325

Whatever Feng's real intention was, he did not disclose
it to anybody before he committed suicide on 16 July 1905. He
did not even distinguish himself in the boycott meetings held
by the literary society. His name did not appear in any major
newspapers, which had meticulously listed thousands of names
of the speakers in public gatherings and individuals who
pledged not to buy American goods. There is no good reason,
therefore, to speculate that Feng intended to attract public
attention by taking dramatic action. Nevertheless the
development of the popular movement made it almost certain
that his death would.become a public affair. At the 20 August
memorial meeting, the keynote speaker proclaimed that
"gentleman Feng had sacrificed his life to protest the
exclusion treaty, to wake up his fellow countrymen, [and to
encourage them] not to use American goods to the very end"
(Shibao 21 August 1905).

The play Adventures of Haiqiaochun portrayed Feng as a
traditional chivalrous hero who nevertheless had a modern
flavor, wearing a western style-suit. He was guided by the
spirit of 'young China (shaonian Zhongguo hun) to the American
Consulate in Shanghai, where he swallowed poison. He
sacrificed his life, the playwright commented, "in order to
let the Americans know that the hearts of our countrymen.never
die and China can therefore be saved" (A Ying 1962:458).

A eulogy dedicated to Feng Xiawei was similarly more a

celebration of life (of a new China) than a memorial of the

326
dead. It praised Feng as greater than ancient Chinese loyal
ministers and chivalrous men (zhongchen yishi), for they had
died only for one man or one family. Therefore, the death of
the ancient heroes, the author argued, was for private loyalty
and had no great social consequences. Feng Xiawei, on the
other hand, "had died for the society" (A Ying 1962:697).

we can never know to what extent the death of Feng Xiawei
inspired the boycotters to continue the movement. But it is
evident that the boycotters made Feng a symbol. "The exclusion
treaty exists for one more day," the eulogy claimed, "Feng's
ghost would not rest for more day." (A Ying 1962:697). It is
also evident that the death threats against Zeng Shaoqing did
not soften many boycotters' determination. The boycott
continued to take a toll on the Chinese merchants as well as
on Americans. The boycott was particularly effective in
central and southern China.'

The wholesale merchants of Shanghai, on the other hand,
persisted in their struggle to survive the "accident," which
they believed would be over soon either naturally or by
government intervention. After August, they began to divert

their larger share of the market northward to Tianjin and

 

'The short-term effectiveness of the boycott is not
deniable, though the exact statistics are impossible to
obtain. According to Li Shiyue (1985:706), American imports
to China were 76,926,833 Haiguan taels, which dropped to
44,436,209 Haiguan taels, the next year. The short—term
effectiveness of the boycott is also testified by American
Consulate Dispatches (11, 12 August 1905). See also Zhang
(1966:152-3) and Cochran (1986:151-203).

327
Northeast China, where Yuan Shikai, the Minister of Beiyang
and the Governor general of Zhili, successfully put the
boycott under control (Yang et al. 1989:394). When the boycott
activists in the Yangzi delta area planned to send delegates
to northern China, however, the Shanghai merchants panicked.
They began.to be afraid that the boycott was not going to have
a. natural. death. soon. enough. without state intervention.
Turning back on their boycott comrades, they finally adopted

the last resort: appealing to the Qing government for help.

4. The Qing Government's Suppression of the Boycott

Generally speaking, the Qing government was initially
sympathetic to the popular movement and tacitly agreed with
the boycott. Even the Empress Dowager expressed her sympathy
to the overseas Chinese. Of all the ranking officials in the
central and local governments, Yuan Shikai, the Minister of
Beiyang, was the only one who openly and decisively opposed
the boycott.

The two ministries which were most directly responsible
for dealing ‘with the immigration issue and 'with local
merchants' organizations were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Commerce. Two ranking officials in the

former ministry, Wu Tingfang and Liang Chengy"were known for

 

'On July 7, 1905, Liang Cheng advised the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that: "All American officials except those
from.the Commerce Department take the treaty as the most
urgent matter. If we do not budge on the issue, and also the
boycott by the merchants implicates the market, they will

328
their opposition to the harsh immigration laws. Liang's treaty
draft reflected some of the most essential demands by Chinese,
mainly Chinese merchants, in the United States (see Chapter
One).

The Ministry of Commerce also supported the cause. The
Ministry favorably responded to the boycotters' concerns as
early as December 1904 (Shibao 7 May 1905). Its ranking
officials were present at the first (10 May 1905) Shanghai
meeting which decided on the boycott (see Chapter Two). The
top adviser of the Ministry, Zhang Jian, showed.his support by
giving’ speeches in. boycott meetings, although as a 'big
merchant in the Yangzi delta area his position on strict
boycott measures was rather conservative.’

Locally, ranking local officials sent memorials showing
their support of the public sentiment." The most powerful
support from.the local officials were from Cen Chunxuan, the

Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi. Cen not only

 

certainly give in gradually." (Gong Yne, Qing Archives.
Taipei. Liang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 7,
1905, cited in Zhang 1966:65).

'He was one of the most influential supporters of the
idea of "dredging out“ (shutong) American goods in stock
(Xinwenbao 7 August 1905, cited in Zhang 1966:150).

"In this respect, the memorial of 18 June 1905 by the
Shanxi Censor (yushi) Zhang Xuehua was representative. He
listed three reasons that the government should not suppress
the popular movement: 1) the public sentiment could not be
spurned; 2) the previous treaty insulted national dignity
and threatened the livelihood of the people; 3) the boycott
by itself should not lead to [international] controversy
(cited in Zhang 1966:64).

329

controlled the area where the majority of immigrants were
from, but also enjoyed enormous trust from the Empress Dowager
(Liu 1985:121—2). The boycott was also blessed by tacit
support from Zhou Fu, Governor General of Liangj iang. Zhou had
probably the greatest power of all the local officials in
shaping the course of the boycott because he ruled the Yangzi
delta area where the merchants controlled the trade with the
United States and where the intellectuals were most active.

It is significant to note that for the several months in
which the boycott meetings were held in many cities and towns,
the Qing government tolerated the boycotters' claim that the
people had autonomous rights to act upon this very important
diplomatic issue. However, the official, position on the
immigration issue was never as radical as that of the
mainstream boycotters, who increasingly favored the abolition
of the entire exclusive treaty. Even the most sympathetic Qing
official, Liang Cheng, accepted America's right to exclude
Chinese laborers (see Liang's treaty draft, Shenbao 4 June
1905) . Given the fact that the boycotters tried to achieve the
unachievable, the Qing government was bound to intervene
sometime.

Several factors would affect, however, when the Qing
court and the local officials had to intervene. One of the
factors was pressure from the United States. Another related
to the first was when the movement went out of control and

turned violent. The third was the degree that Chinese

330
merchants' interests and the market in general would be
affected. It is hard to say which of these factors was most
important, and all of them were related. Any one of them might
have forced the Qing government to take action.

Yet the fact remains that the Qing central government and
the local ranking officials, with the notable exception of
Yuan Shikai, were extremely slow in responding to the repeated
urgings from.American diplomats in China and from the United
States government to stop the boycott. The slowness of the
Qing's response was partially' because the movement was
considered legitimate' and partially because it was by-and-
large surprisingly peaceful. It was only when the Shanghai
merchants began to experience serious financial problems and
appealed for help from officialdom that the Qing government
and the local officials stepped in to restore order.

As I have pointed out earlier, it was not just the large
merchants who felt the movement went too far shortly after the
movement got started. Some famous Shanghai and national
scholars and social elites" were very sympathetic to the

merchant interests. In Shanghai, and to a lesser extent in

 

'Liang Cheng wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on May 13, 1905 that: "...The boycott is the people's
movement, it shouldn't involve our government. In the light
of a united public opinion, our government should not
attempt to intervene or dissolve the movement." (Qing
Archive, Labor Treaty, cited in Zhang 1966:65).

"People like Ma Xiangbo, Yan Fu, Wang Kangnian, and
Zhang Jian who were at once scholars, businessmen, and
educators, and who had broad commercial and official ties.

331

other cities as well, these social elites and big merchants
were collectively called.shengshang (gentry-merchants), who at
once claimed the leadership of a growing civic society in late
Qing China and intimate official ties (Xu 1988:53-58). On the
other hand, the Qing officials relied upon them.for social and
financial support and responded to their needs and requests
more than to those of any other social group (Liu 1984). It is
therefore more accurate to say that the suppression was not
single-handedly carried out by the Qing regime. It was a
cooperative action by both the Qing government and by the
upper class of the "people"--the merchant-gentry class.

The exact relationship between the merchant-gentry and
the Qing government, however, varied significantly in
different geographic areas. In Tianjin, where the merchants
were less powerful and autonomous than those in Shanghai, and
where the Governor of Zhili Yuan Shikai was hostile to the
popular movement, the boycott never went beyond a feW'meetings
and empty pledges (Hayashibara 1985:117).

As early as 20 June 1905, one month before the scheduled
boycott, public meetings and. anti-exclusion. posters had
already deeply disturbed Yuan Shikai. He summoned board
members of the Tianjin Chamber of Commerce to his office and
reprimanded them for damaging China's friendly relationship
with the united States by organizing and participating in the
movement. Yuan told the merchants that China needed the United

States for its good offices in preserving China's territorial

332
integrity. The Tianjin Chamber of Commerce relied too much
upon Yuan's power to preserve the needed stability to disobey
him. The Chamber immediately distributed handbills to the
Tianjin public which said:
After the Boxer Turmoil Tianjin commerce suffered a great
deal. Thanks to the Governor's great efforts to preserve
peace, [the market] has been getting better lately. We were
hoping for steady growth.when the telegram came from.the South
regarding America's exclusion of the Chinese laborers.
Turbulence followed and the market seemed to slow down. If
[people] do not buy American goods those who already did
cannot sell. Then the ordered goods cannot be returned,
either. Problems like these will inconvenience the Tianjin
market. ‘We think. that after our Tianjin.:merchants have
suffered huge losses we cannot afford such disturbances any
more. Thus we have decided to issue this handbill advising
various guilds that all the transactions in Tianjin shall be
conducted as usual and not to be perturbed by rumors in order
to maintain the peace of the market (Zhang 1966:68).
Yuan's effort to ban the leading Tianjin newspaper (Lagong
bao) from.publishing boycott news was less successful. Ying
Lianzhi, the publisher of the paper, simply refused to obey
Yuan's order. Since the paper was in the French Concession,
the only thing Yuan could do was to order the post office in
Tianjin not to mail the paper and the public not to buy the
paper.

Overall, however, the suppression in Yuan's area was
successful, partially because in.Tianjin the intellectuals did
not have the same power that their Shanghai counterparts had.
There were no such literary organizations in Tianjin as the
Man-Mirror Study Society and the Speech Society of Public

Loyalty to carry the boycott forward after the merchants

abandoned the cause.

333

On 21 and 27 June Yuan twice tried to persuade the Qing
central government to issue orders to ban the boycott
elsewhere in China. Yuan argued from.a real political point of
view, saying that China needed the friendship of the United
States to preserve China's territorial integrity (Zhang
1966:67-68). The argument was of course strong, but it was
certainly not strong and persuasive enough an argument for the
Qing government to ban the boycott throughout China, as Yuan
had in Tianjin. The boycotters simply did.not see why American
friendship, which nobody seemed to doubt, could not also be
reflected in a more fair and human immigration policy.

In the meantime, William W. Rockhill added pressure on
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing to call off the
boycott (Mokee 1977:117-118). Rockhill stressed.the bad.timing
of the boycott, since negotiations were being conducted
between the two governments.‘' He also pointed out the danger
of riots against foreigners at large. The American Minister to
China.mentioned.a handbill distributed.in Fuzhou which falsely
accused Americans of killing two thousand Chinese in the
United States (Mckee 1977:117-118; Zhang 1966:70). The Qing
government could.and.would.decisively act against this type of
agitation without openly defying the public sentiments

(yuqing) .

On 29 June.the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a

 

'Apparently the Minister missed the whole point of the
boycott, for the boycotters acted exactly because they could
not trust their government.

334
telegraph to Ministers of Nanyang and Beiyang, Governor
Generals of Sichuan, Lianghu, and Liangguang, and the
Governors of Anhui, Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong, J iangxi,

Zhejiang, and Fujian which said:

Because the American exclusion treaty is being considered for
renewal, merchants in various ports suggested not to buy
American goods as a means of boycott. They also telegraphed
this Ministry suggesting that the treaty not to be signed.
Actually, Minister Liang's draft treaty has been sent to the
U.S. Department of State and is currently under consideration.
No decision has been made. Mr. Rockhill came to Beijing to
talk about the matter in a very peaceful manner. He not only
has not forced us to sign the treaty but has also agreed to
telegraph his government to amend the exclusion treaty. Those
merchants who were deeply worried about a harsh decision [on
the matter] therefore grouped together to propagate a boycott
in newspapers and handbills. While their actions were indeed
inaugurated by public indignation, [the government] is afraid
that rascals might take the opportunity to instigate the
fools, causing other complications. You must persuade [them]
with power (shili quandao) and inform the merchants of the
current treaty discussion in order to dispose of the doubts
(cited in Zhang 1966:72).

The term "persuade with power" (shili quandao) was a rather
vague one. It certainly did not mean, at least to Zhou Fu and
Cen.Chunxuan, the most powerful local officials in central and
South China, to ban the boycott movement in their territories
in the manner Yuan had used his power in Northern China. The
vagueness was probably deliberate. The Qing central government
acted very cautiously and reluctantly, not just because the
exclusion treaty was indeed humiliating to China, but also
because of the overwhelming pressure by the urban public.

Major newspapers in Tianjin, Shanghai and Hong Kong

335
continuously publicized virtually every move by the Qing court
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Shenbao 3 June, 14 June,
18 July 1905; Shibao 14, 11 July August 1905).

By being vague the Qing government virtually allowed the
local authorities to act at their own discretion. Personally,
the two Governor Generals in central and Southern China had
very different views of the boycott from.that of Yuan Shikai.’
They certainly acted very differently from Yuan toward the
boycott movement in areas under their control.

After receiving the telegram.of 29 June from.the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Fu did.not take any action other than

simply letting news of the telegram become known to Shanghai

 

'Studies also show that Zhou Fu, and Cen Chunxuan in
particular, were political rivals of Yuan Shikai, who was
the most ambitious and powerful Han Chinese at the time. The
power struggle between Han Chinese was extremely important
in
understanding the last few years of the Qing regime, for the
Qing government relied heavily on Han Chinese in various
social, economic, and.political reforms. As a Qing official
of the time, who later became a historian, pointed out:
"After 1900...for about ten years the government had been
but a stage for the Han ministers to engage in their power
struggles." (Liu 1985:175).

While Yuan had the greatest power and influence of the
Han Chinese in the Qing central government after Li
Hongzhang died in 1901, Zhou and Cen controlled the
wealthiest areas of China. In 1904-5 Zhou Fu and Cen
Chunxuan were among several other local ranking officials
who suggested constitutional reforms (lixian), not totally
without power struggle considerations (Zhang ed. 1990:684;
Liu 1985:121, 139, 148). It is hard to say to what extent
pure power struggle consideration played a role in Zhou and
Cen's apparent indifference in suppressing the movement. But
it is clear that the two powerful local officials felt much
more pressure from.the public in Central and South China
where the merchants and intellectual organizations were more
numerous and powerful and the sense of alienation from the
Qing regime was stronger.

336

boycott leaders (Zhang' 1966:73). The Shanghai Iboycotters
simply responded by promising a peaceful and civilized popular
protest. Zeng Shaoqing of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
wrote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that: "I think that not
to use American goods is the natural right of everybody
(renren ziyou zhiquan). It will not complicate international
relations whatsoever" (Zhu 1958:147). The famous scholar-
businessman Zhang Jia told Yuan Shikai that the boycott
movement was a "civilized competition..." (Zhang 1933 vol.3:9
cited in Zhang 1966:74).

These arguments by the boycotters were apparently
convincing to Zhou Fu. Even after Americans threatened.to hold
the Chinese government "directly responsible for failure to
insure the rights required by Article 15, of the treaty of
1858," Mr. Rodgers, the Consul General in Shanghai, reported,
"The Viceroy of this district, Chou Fu [Zhou Fu], whose
official residence is at Nanking, has remained non-committal
on the subject despite all efforts to make him declare
himself" (Consular Dispatches, Shanghai 12 August 1905). The
Vice Consul in charge at Nanjing was finally successful in
persuading Zhou Fu to suppress "the inflammatory literature
which is being printed in Shanghai," but the Vice Consul was
not able to convince Zhou that he should suppress the boycott
movement per se. "Upon the main question of the boycott," the
Vice Consul reported, "his action has not to this date been

satisfactory..." (Consular Dispatches, Shanghai 12 August

 

 

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337
1905).

Zhou Fu excused his non—action by claiming ignorance of
the matter, but American diplomats in China were convinced
that he had a "thorough knowledge of the boycott movement...".
That he failed to act, Mr. Rodgers reported to the Assistant
Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis, was because of "his
disinclination to suppress it. His attempts to evade the
question have been notorious, and his failure to act has been
largely the cause of the development of the agitation of the
present" (Consular Dispatches, Shanghai 15 August 1905).

While Mr. Rodgers greatly exaggerated Zhou's role in
causing the agitation, it is certain that Zhou's suppression,
which came slowly and.indecisively, was not the only cause for
the movement to subside in Shanghai after early August. The
Shanghai merchants began to turn against the boycott even
earlier. As early as 11 August 1905, Mr. Rodgers reported to
the State Department that: "CHINESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SHANGHAI VERY ANXIOUS TO STOP BOYCOT‘I‘... . For the last ten
days the members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce have been
ready to end the matter..." (Consular Dispatches, Shanghai
August 11, 1905 [upper case originall).

An important reason for Zhou Fu not to be able to act
quickly even after the Shanghai merchants turned against the
movement was that the boycotters were extremely careful to
keep the:movement.peaceful. Despite occasional "incidents" and

a few "inflammatory" posters, the Shanghai Consular Despatches

338

admitted: "...no trouble or violence has been reported" (11
August); "...still no trouble or disturbance,..." (12 August);
"...no report of violence from any quarter..." (21 August);
"Boycott still continues. No disturbances" (26 August)

(Consular Dispatches, Shanghai 11, 12, 21, 26, August 1905).'

To paralyze the popular movement peacefully and with
legitimacy"was critical for the Qing government to survive the
upheaval without losing much of its credibility. It is in this
regard that the Shanghai merchants played an essential role.
They provided two excuses for the Qing government to render
the movement impotent. One was that the ordered.American goods
were now the property of Chinese merchants, therefore they
were no longer American goods. The other was that while the
state had no right to force its people to buy goods from a
given country, no people could force anyone not to buy certain
goods, either.

In late August when boycotters planned to carry out the
boycott to the North (e.g.--in Tafeng, Chengji, Hongtai, and
Yuansheng), about ten foreign goods firms in Shanghai sent
telegrams to Yuan Shikai, the Ministry of Foreign.Affairs, and
the Ministry of Commerce (Labor Treaty, cited in Zhang

1966:153—54). The Ministry of Commerce asked leading gentry-

 

'This peaceful manner of the movement was kept
throughout the heyday of the boycott to early September,
when Consul General Rodgers reported to the Secretary of
State that: "Public opinion is that boycott practically is
abandoned here,..." on 7 September 1905 (Consular Dispatches
September 7, 1905).

339
merchants Zhang' Jian, Tang' Shouqian, Wang' Kangnian, Sun
Lixuan, and Zhou Shenqing to consider a solution. The solution

was to have the Ministry of Commerce announce that:

The goods that Chinese merchants have ordered from fOreign
firms were not refundable and therefore are the same as the
Chinese merchants' own goods. It is said that in Shanghai the
goods ordered without being sold are worth sixty to seventy
millions. If all these goods are not purchased, the Chinese
merchants must be hurt first before the Laborer Treaty is
reformed. Thus [the Ministry] now orders the Chamber of
Commerce, Commerce Study Society, and the schools to meet and
recognize all the goods already ordered by Chinese
merchants...[as Chinese property]. Stamps'.are to be put on
them to be sold as usual. At the same time, telegrams are to
be sent to other ports to do the same (Shibao 7 September
1905, cited in Zhang 1966:154).

When the determined boycotters championed the people's right
not to buy American goods regardless of their ownership, the
Qing officials responded with.the argument that nobody had the
right to forbid the sale and use of American goods.

It is particularly important to note that the concept of

trade freedom (maoyi ziyou) was first used by the Qing

 

'Apparently to put stamps (yinghua) on left-over (or
closeout) merchandise for final and quick liquidation was a
common practice at the time. When such revolutionaries books
as The Revolutionary Army and.The Awakening Bell (Jingshi
zhong) were banned by the Qing government, the Shanghai
Book-trade Association (Shuye gongsuo) decided to have the
printed copies stamped as obscene books for liquidation
(Feng 1985:1038).

But the practice during the movement clearly posed a
serious problem to the effectiveness of boycott. Some
merchants put stamps on the shelves on which American goods
were usually sold instead on the goods themselves. Thus
newly ordered American goods could also be sold as those
which were in stock before the movement started (A Ying

1962:261).

340

government officials to fend off American pressure to stop the
boycott movement. In mid—August, Cen Chunxuan responded to the
suppression request by the American Consul General in
Guangzhou by saying that: "Trade by merchants and purchase by
the people are everyone's free right." "On the other hand,"
the Governor General reluctantly added, "as long as it should
be free, merchants and other people could not force others not
to buy a certain country's goods and not to trade with people
of a certain country" (China Daily 17 August 1905) .

The Hong Kong newspaper China Daily, which was
sympathetic to the boycott, supported the idea. It cheered the
argument as "being absolutely in accordance to the universal
principle" (gongli, my italics, China Daily 17 August 1905 ).
The paper further explained that "What is not allowed by the
universal principle is what ought to be interfered with by
legal authority (faquan, China Daily 17 August 1905) .

But the argument was clearly a double—edged sword. Later,
when the movement began to hurt the merchants' interests and
to be out of control, the same argument was invoked to
suppress the boycott. In late August, Cen Chunxuan again
asserted to the American Consul General in Guangzhou that:
"Whether the merchants would buy American goods or not has to
be decided by their own free will." But this time he agreed
to stop the boycott meetings and speeches in order to "let
merchants and other people trade freely as usual" (China

Daily, 31 August 1905). On 31 August 1905, the Qing Court

 

 

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341

issued an edict which read:

China and the United States have been friendly and never had
conflicts. The U.S. government has agreed that all the former
exclusion treaties are to be amended through peaceful
meetings. [You] should quietly wait for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to discuss the changes and should not forbid
the use of American goods. The boycott not only has negative
effects on the friendly relationship but also hurts Chinese
people's business. ... The governors of the relevant provinces
should advise the merchants and order them to engage in trade
as usual in order to preserve stability (Guangxuchao
donghualu, cited in Zhang, 1966:203. My emphasis).

While the edict did not end all the boycott activities right
away (Zhang 1966:206-7), it did outlaw the obstruction of
selling and buying American goods. Despite sporadic boycott
activities in various cities throughout the rest of 1905, the

movement definitely began to fade away.

In October 1907, when the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce
welcomed American Secretary of War William H. Taft with a
splendid banquet, the unpleasant event which had occurred two
years earlier seemed never to have happened. With much
bitterness toward the Shanghai merchants' quick turnabout, Wu
Woyao wrote an essay, entitled "The Ghost Cry in the Man-
Mirror Study Society" dedicated to the memory of Feng Xiawei,

the lone martyr of the movement:

...Years earlier when. Americans mistreated our overseas
Chinese, Shanghai gentry-merchants initiated the boycott. Some
people of the foreign countries said that a boycott was a
matter of persistence; something Chinese would not be able to

342

do. Americans need not have worried. Feng Xiawei, a member of
the Man-Mirror Study Society and a martyr from.Nanhai, was so
shamed by this that he committed suicide. He left a letter to
his comrades saying: "Those alive should stick to the end lest
foreigners laugh at us." As a result, everybody began to talk
about the boycott. But very soon the boycott faded away and
the Exclusion Treaty was not changed. [Now] Two years later,
when Taft comes [to China], those who come out to welcome him
are none other than Shanghai's gentry—merchants. As the saying
has it: "Correct wrongs when [you] know them," Shanghai
gentry-merchants have done exactly this.

That the strong subdue the weak and the weak are subdued
by the strong...is. a 'universal rule (tongyi). That the
powerless people from a sick and.weak country were to boycott
a powerful democratic country was no different from.a hungry
person refusing to eat by the side of a cook. This is called
not to know one's moral strength and.physical power! NOW that
Taft comes, [the Shanghai gentry-merchants] suddenly change
[from.the boycott] to welcome. People who can tell the current
(shishiwu zhe) often do this.

Now that Taft has arrived, [Shanghai gentry—merchants]
hold a banquet at Yuyan in his honor.... When night falls the
sound of crying comes from.the door of the Man-Mirror Study
Society. The sound is sad yet harsh; sorrowful yet.passionate.
Those who hear the cry ask: "This is the sound of a ghost.
Where does it come from?" ....The ghost answers: "I am.Feng
Xiawei" (A Ying, 1962:418-9).

Conclusion

Insofar as the goal of the boycott was to reverse
.American immigration. policy toward Chinese nationals it
certainly failed. In retrospect, the popular movement could
not possibly have accomplished its goal because the means were
too limited to achieve the end. By the late nineteenth
century, as the need for foreign labor declined, some sort of
restriction by the United States on the influx of immigrants
was inevitable. The 1882 Chinese-exclusion.Act happened to end
an era of free immigration in. U.S. history. .America's
sovereign.right of controlling its borders might not have been
challenged if it had not taken such a brazenly anti-Chinese
form.

The source of confrontation also derived from.the rapid
modernizing process of the American state apparatus. With the
establishment of new specialized immigration services in the
early twentieth century, American immigration policy began to
be scientifically implemented by using, among other things,
the Bertillon system.of identification (see Chapter One). The
inhuman and arbitrary nature of the exclusion acts were thus
made extremely evident to the point of absurdity. Probably
never before in Chinese history had people been so rigidly and
precisely' categorized-~as laborers, merchants, travelers,
students, and officials. Only certain classes of people were

eligible for specified rights. Discrimination thus had never

343

344
appeared to be more obvious and senseless, especially in a
period in China when the idea of equal rights among people of

different social status and gender was gaining popularity.

Still, the boycott movement might not have occurred at
all if the issue involved had just been about the immigration
rights of a tiny fraction of the Chinese population.
Immigrants themselves might try to aohieve their rights as
individuals through legal and illegal means, as many did. The
immigration dispute could also have been solved through
governmental negotiations, as the Qing court tried to do and
the Japanese government successfully did in 1908.‘

The Chinese urban public took the matter up because they
perceived the issue involved in more profound terms. For them
the racial discrimination against Chinese immigrants signified.
a fundamental crisis the .nation faced, This crisis had
manifested itself earlier in various forms of military defeat
and loss of political and economic rights. This crisis also
inspired numerous violent responses from peasants, reformist
gentry-literati, and conspiratorial revolutionaries against
foreigners and the Manchu regime. None of the earlier
responses were, however, sufficient to meet the crisis.

The boycott movement of 1905 developed from.a distinctive

 

'In the "Gentlemen's Agreement" (1908) with the United
States the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports
to Japanese laborers to the united States (Ichioka 1988:71-
72).

345

social and cultural milieu in the growing cities. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, increasing
commercial and industrial activities in coastal cities gave
rise to a hybrid urban elite class——gentry-merchants whoes
political consciousness and power increased when they began to
form voluntary associations. On the other hand, the rise of
the daily press and commercialization of urban entertainment
during the same period begot new urban intelletual-
professionals who, while low in social status, played a
pivotal role in a increasingly commercialized and politicized
urban culture. The two social classes began to formulate a
rational and reformist political discourse through the daily
press, publishing houses, literary journals, and newestyle
schools. Their political potency was magnified by surrounding
urban voluntary associations organized.by women, students, and
other urban social groups. The Chinese urbanites began to make
local and national political issues into public concerns by
openly and freely discussing them in newspapers and public
meetings. The 1905 boycott should be interpretated as one of
the menifestations of urban response to the national crisis.

Unlike the rural masses, reformist gentry, and dedicated
revolutionaries, boycotters' political potency did not come
from.supernatural beliefs, Confucian morality, or organized
violence. Rather, the boycotters appealed to public reason and
conscience for’ public welfare. They celebrated rational

consensus and interests of the public. Public interests

346

(gongli) were considered different from, and above, private
(individual) interests (sili). Public interests were also
considered different from government interests. That is why
the boycotters consiously differentiated. people's rights
(minquan) from state authority (zhengfu [you] q1.1an).‘r The
famous phrase "boycott by merchants; negotiation of [the
treaty] by' government" (dizhi zhaishangv .yiyue zhaiguan)
succintly expressed this new political conscious.

Few people at the time openly contested this View. For
the boycotters not to buy and sell American goods was not just
a.means to force changes on the exclusion acts but also a test
of public solidarity and strength. It was in the growing
public conscience that many boycotters found the hope of China
and the real meaning of the movement.

The concept of the public interest and public good
(gongyi) was so important and so powerful for some boycotters
that the actual result and tangible achievement of the boycott
for the Chinese immigrants, on whose behalf the movement was
launched, did.not even.matter. While the boycott was the least
effective method in forcing the Americans to abolish the
exclusion treaty, some members of Chinese Educational Society
(Zhongguo jiaoyuhui) argued, it was the most effective way of

arousing patriotic sentiments (Shibao, 10 September 1905).

 

*The term government authority (zhengfu quan) was not
an idiomatic phrase in Chinese at the time. Instead more
often the idea was express in "the government has (or has
not) the authority" (zhengfu youquan, or zhengfu wuquan).

347

This idea was probably shared by many urbanites who insisted
on not using American goods and on the total abolition of the
exclusion treaty (Shibao, 10, 11, and 14, September 1905)."

Evidently the real meaning of the boycott movement for
the Chinese urbanites went far beyond the immigration issue
itself to become an expression of their concern for more
fundamental issues China faced. From this point of View the
boycott movement was simply one link in a chain of political
protests in early twentieth century China which expressed
urban popular sentiment for political reforms. Thus, the
movement was not a total failure at all, for it helped give
rise to a growing number of political activists in Shanghai.
The organizations and the activists of the boycott movement
almost immediately found a new focus of political agitation
after the movement was suppressed.

On 8 December 1905, woman Lihuang, the wife of a Sichuan

 

"After much bewilderment about the true purpose of the
boycott, American diplomats in China finally recognized the
deeper meaning of the popular movement. In a lengthy report
to the Assistant Secretary of State, Consul-General Rodgers
said: "that the boycott is but the medium of arousing a
popular sentiment and that at the proper time it will be
allowed to drop behind, while the cause of reform in China
goes to the fore; that anti-dynastic sentiment will develop
rapidly and that political troubles of magnitude are coming;
that the anti-foreign movement which has, as always, much
strength will be joined to other issues and that China like
Japan will soon demonstrate to the world its solidarity and
likewise accomplish marvels. There is plenty of evidence to
justify such conclusions. There is openly expressed contempt
for the Central Government"(Consular Dispatches, Shanghai,
14 August 1905).

348

native official, arrived in Shanghai on her way home,"” along
with fifteen female servants. The police of the International
Concession had woman Lihuang arrested on charge of human
smuggling because of the seemingly excessive number of female
servants she had with her. The two Chinese legal officials
serving in the Mixed Court, Guan Junzhi and Jin Shaocheng,
insisted on woman Lihuang's immediate release for lack of
evidence. The British police seized the suspect by force
despite protests from Guan and Jin (SHDSJ:608).

The next day, Shanghai merchants gathered together in
various native-place gongsuo to protest the British arrogance.
Again telegrams were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Commerce demanding official protests and
intervention (SHDSJ:608). On the evening of 10 December 1905,
a public meeting was held in Xiyuan, where anti—exclusion
meetings had been held before. According to a report to the
police chief of the International Settlement, the entire
meeting was controlled by the boycott activists (SMPA:28). In
the afternoon of the following day another meeting of about
one thousand people was held. Five out of seven speakers at
the meeting were former boycott activists (SMPA:30). Several
other public meetings were held in the following days by the
same group of people (SMPA:30, 31-32,33,35,36-38,39-40). Anti-

British posters were printed by the Lajing printing house,

 

‘Sources did not indicate where she started her
journey.

349
which had been sympathetic to the anti-American boycott
(SMPA:40).

Conspicuously absent from these public gatherings were
board members of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. Even Zeng
Shaoqing, the famous Fujian. native Iboard.:member' of the
Chamber, did not participate in or organize any meetings.
Zeng's apparent indifference to the dispute was criticized by
Ge Zhong, the head of the Speech Society of Public Loyalty
(SMPA:36). It may or may not have been a coincidence that Zeng
Shaoqing had just been elected and confirmed by the Ministry
of Commerce as the new Chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce in December 1905. At any rate, the Shanghai Chamber
of Commerce was definitely not in a mood to start yet another
popular movement it had no power to control.' If the Chamber
had tried to lead the new wave of political protest, would it
have had the same credibility as it had six months earlier?
Since the chambers of commerce were then the most organized
and powerful urban social groups, what does the boycott
movement and subsequent political development tell us about

the growing public sphere in China?

The rise and the fall of the boycott movement sheds much
light on several characteristics of the Chinese public sphere

and its transformation in the early 19005. First of all, it

 

'No a single meeting was organized by the Chamber on
the woman Lihuang case (SMPA:28-42).

350

was indeed the elite merchants, more often referred to as
gentry-merchants, not the bourgeoisie (as was the case in
Europe), who acted and were perceived as the leaders of the
growing public sphere. Their increasing discontent with the
weakness of the Qing government and their growing influence
and prestige among Chinese urbanites clearly showed in their
championing and leading of the boycott. The merchants'
initiative on an important political issue--a foreign
relations issue--was even tacitly supported by Qing officials.
But what was really new about the merchant leadership as
reflected in the boycott movement were two things: a) never
before had the merchants and the urban public. so clearly
defined what was within their rights to do; b) the merchants'
leadership gained unprecedented support from.the media, which
introduced and publicized Western concepts of the civil
society. The moth-publicized concept of commercial warfare
(shangzhan) in particular put the merchants and their
organizations on the central stage.

Secondly, the merchant elites were very vulnerable to
state authority, not only because they confined their power to
exhortation, but also because of their declaration that the
movement was to strengthen instead of contending for

government power. This is particularly true for the elite

 

'An often-used term at the time, "merchant/people"
(shangmin), indicated a growing tendency to identify
merchants with the general public as opposed to officialdom.

351
merchant organizations such as the Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce.

Thirdly and more importantly, as was shown in the popular
movement, the presumed leaders of the growing civil society in
China were not only weak vis—a—vis the state power but also
vulnerable to popular upheaval. The merchant organizations had
little control over urban communities.‘ Numerous other social
organizations, especially study societies and student
organizations, began to take over political initiatives toward
the end of the movement and thereafter. David Strand
(1989:279-283) suggests in his study of Beijing in the 19205
that society itself was divided and society itself may have
generated even greater obstacles to civil society than those
presented by the state (Rankin 1993:175). This study suggests
that the merchant organization par exellence--the Shanghai
Chamber of Commerce--probably began to lose its leadership
status in the Shanghai community as early as immediately after
the 1905 boycott.

In late imperial China, the development most similar to
a public sphere as described by Habermas was the emergence of
"new literary genres such as the novel and journals of popular
taste..., as well as the 'commoditization of news and

information' represented by the new commercial press" (Rowe

 

'This was more in Shanghai than in Tianjin and
Guangzhou. Even in Tianjin, where the Chamber of Commerce
had enormous power over its members, it relied heavily upon
Yuan Shikai to maintain local order (see Chapter 5).

352
1993:145). This study has shown (Chapters Two and Three) that
the boycott discourse was created above all by professional
and popular writers of the commercial press not by the
presumed leaders of the public sphere-—the merchants. The
impact of these popular writers upon urban popular minds has
been enomous and persistent (Link 1982) far beyond the boycott
movement itself. Even when the crackdown on the boycott was

imminent a reader wrote to Shibao expressing optimism:

Our government and high officials have power to suppress
tangible forms of [popular] movement such as public speeches
but cannot supress formless popular minds, hearts, and blood
which will stick to the end. This is our people's heavenly
duty (tianzhi) and obligation (Shibao, 14 September 1905) .

Ironically, China experts have focused on merchants and almost
totally neglected intellectuals when they study the public
sphere in China. It seems to me that in order to understand
the nature of the Chinese public sphere and its
transformation, we should pay as much attention to the
changing relationship among social groups within the civil
society as to the relationship between civil groups and the

state.

Appendix

A Brief Biography of the Boycott Intellectuals

Wu Woyao (1866-1910) was a newspaper editor and an
eminent novelist. During the movement he made numerous public
speeches condemning American mistreatment of Chinese. He also
wrote letters to Zeng Shaoqing expressing his opinions on the
issue. wu was from a family of lower ranking officials. But
his father died during wu's childhood and left little money
to the surviving family. Wu supported his mother while
serving as secretary to a county official. In his twenties he
went to Shanghai and earned his living by working as a clerk
in an arsenal, and by making occasional contributions to
daily newspapers. Between 1902 and 1905 he became the editor
of the American-owned journal Chu bao (also called Hankou
ribao) in Hankou. He resigned the post in 1905 in protest
against the American exclusion of Chinese laborers in the
United States. In 1906, Wu and his friend Zhou Guisheng
established in Shanghai Yue yue xiaoshuo (Monthly Fiction)
and. worked for .Xiuxiang .xiaoshuo (Fiction Illustrated),
printed between 1903 and 1906. His writing career made it
natural for him to become an educator when he served as the
principal of a primary school for children of Cantonese
families in Shanghai from. 1907-10. Despite many things he did
during his life time, Wu was best known as an entertainer—-
novelist--and most famous for his exposure novel Ershi nian
muduzhi guai xianzhuang (Abnormal Social Phenomena Witnessed

353

354
in the Past Twenty Years) published between 1903 and 1910

(Chen 1982).

Li Boyuan (1867-1907), also a novelist, did not
distinguish himself in the boycott movement, but he edited
Fiction Illustrated, which published the anti-exclusion novel
Wretched Students in 1905. His Wenming xiao shi (A Short
History of Modern Times), one of his best novels, had a
chapter on a traveler's experience in the United States in
1905. Li was born in Jiangsu. When he was three, his father
died; he was raised by an uncle, a magistrate in Jinan in
Shandong province; later he worked as a clerk for his older
brother, a circuit intendant (daotai) in charge of the
transit tax (likin) bureau in Chuzhou, Anhui. He left work to
study for the official examinations but failed several times.
He enjoyed art and poetry from childhood; by the time he was
recommended to an official post in 1901, he was more
interested in his career in journalism and fiction. In
Shanghai he published his first newspaper, Zhinan bao (The
Guide) in 1896. Later on he established several other papers,
including the first Chinese tabloid, Youxi bao (Amusement
News). Li made his name with the publication of a satire, The
Bureaucrats: A Revelation (Guanchang xianxing ji; see Holoch

1979) .

Zeng Pu (1872-1935) , novelist and translator, edited Nuzi

355
Shijia, which published several anti-exclusion articles and
speeches in 1905. Zeng was from Changshu, Jiangsu. Born into
a wealthy landowner's family, Zeng obtained his juren degree
in 1891. In 1895 he began to study French at the Tongwen Guan
(Language Institute) in Beijing as a means of entering
government service. While he failed to get a position in the

government, he became interested in French literature.’

Wang Xiaonong (1858-1918) was born into a Manchu family
and was once a county magistrate. He was impeached while in
office and decided to become a play writer and actor. He
founded Ershi shiji da wutai (The Great Stage of the
twentieth Century) magazine in 1904, which was banned after
two issues. In August 1905, he organized.a theatrical show KU
luxing (The Arduous Journey) telling the chilling story of
the Polish people's suffering under foreign rule. The show
was staged in the heyday of the boycott movement in Shanghai
and aimed at arousing patriotism among Chinese urbanites (A

Ying 1962:669).

Ying Lianzhi (1867-1926) was born into a poor Manchu
family, but he was self-educated and well versed in classical

Chinese. Tired of the corruption in the Qing bureaucracy, he

 

*Milena Dolezelova-Velingerova, ed. (1980:205-209) The
Chinese.Novel at the TUrn of the Century provides
biographical information on Wu, Li, and Zeng.

356
took a vow not to have an official career. Having written
articles supporting Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in 1898, he
fled to Shanghai after the failure of the Hundred Days Reform,
In 1902 he returned to Tianjin and founded the famous Ta gong
bao. In 1905, the paper published numerous news reports on

the anti-American boycott (XWZL 46:78-80).

Bao Tianxiao joined the editorship of Shibao, one of the
most articulate newspapers during the boycott movement, in
the spring of 1906 when the movement came to its end.
However, his involvement with the boycott was evident in his
novel Bixue.hun (The Soul of the Blue Blood) which described,
among other things, the patriotic activities of Shanghai
prostitutes during the boycott movement (Bao 1906). More
importantly, his life and career trajectory paralleled many
other lower quasi-intellectuals active in the entertaining
and educational business, as well-recorded in his
autobiography (Bao 1971). Bao was born in 1875 into a small
and.declining merchant family in Suzhou. Physically fragile in
his childhood, he chose (or rather his family chose for him)
one of the two career possibilities of his family background
when he reached his teens--to study the classics and
eight-legged-essay composition in order to pass the civil
service examinations-~rather than to enter the competitive
business world of his father. In his late teens (1894) he

became a xiucai. For a while it appeared.he was doomed to life

357
as a poor teacher in a still-prosperous but lusterless city.
When the air of reform breezed into this worry-free and
old-fashioned city in the early twentieth century, Bao tried
to run magazines and a vernacular newspaper--Suzhou baihua
bao--without much success. Later he tried his fortune as a
school master in Shandong, and eventually settled down in
Shanghai in 1906 as a professional writer. As a petty
intellectual, he was neither profound nor scholarly, but had
an easy-going writing style attractive to petty urbanites.
Politically, he was too mature to be a revolutionary in the
early twentieth centuryu As Perry Link (1981:181) points out,
in education and temperament he belonged to the "old school"
writers. Later he would demonstrate a "growing remoteness from
the Westernized elite of May Fourth," but a "corresponding
closeness to the less articulate but 'still Chinese' majority
of the urban.populace" (Link 1981:181). In the early twentieth
century, however, Bao was part of what I call the "incidental
cultural avant-garde" (as were many people like him) who

dabbled with the translation business (Bao 1971:250).

Peng Yizhong (1864-1921) founded Jinghua ribao in 1904,
which published anti-exclusion materials in 1905. Like Bao,
Peng was also from.Suzhou, but he was from.an official family.
He had taken.the civil service examination seven times without
success. He worked as a low-ranking official and sold flour

and fruits. In 1902 he sold family belongings for the money

358

to publish a newspaper (XWZL 46:92-93).

Lin Shu (1852-1924) was famous for his copious
translations of Western novels into Chinese classical style.
His contribution to the boycott started as early as the
summer of 1901 when he translated Harriet Beecher Stowe's
uncle Tom's cabin with the help of ‘Wei I, a young man who was
working at the time for the Translation Bureau of the Board of
Education. The novel was adapted into a stage show in Tokyo
in 1903 by Chinese students there. Lin Shu constantly
compared Chinese laborers' fates in the United States with
that of slaves written about by Ms. Stowe. On 23 June 1905
when the boycott movement started he published a letter in
Shenbao to Shanghai Chamber of Commerce complaining that:
"Since the death of Lincoln, Americans go so far as to treat
Chinese as black slaves. What you are doing is to rescue our
brethren from the bitter sea." Lin was born in 1852 in the
'village of Nan-tai, Min County, not far from the city of
Foochow in the coastal province of Fujian. Coincidentally,
the neighboring county of Houguan became the birthplace in
the following year of Yan Fu, the man who in later years was
to be paired.with Lin as the two great translators of Western
thought and literature into Chinese. NOne of Lin's direct
ancestors had managed to gain an official position or pass
the examinations. Lin's father had various occupations and

Lin's childhood was troubled with family misfortunes. In

359
1862, the same year that the family fortunes began to
improve, Lin began his first formal schooling with a local
tutor at the age of ten. In 1882, he earned the title of
juren, and later tried seven times with no success to pass the
metropolitan examination. His name was destined to be
associated with the literary translation history of China.
In 1897, Lin earned his fame nationwide with the translation
of La Dame aux Camelias by Alexandre Dumas earned. He
started a career of professional translation in 1901 with the
translation of Uhcle Tom's cabin. In the meantime, however,
Lin also taught school in Beijing and many other places

(Compton 1971).

Zhang Zhujun and Wu Huaijiu were educators. Zhang made
and organized several speeches during the anti-American
boycott. However, we know very little about her except that
she was from Guangdong and was the teacher and the head of
several women's. schools in Shanghai during the movement. Wu
Huaijiu was the head of the Wuben Female School (Wuben nushu)
when the boycott broke out in Shanghai. Many anti-American
meetings were held in the school, one of the few Chinese
women's schools in Shanghai at the time. About Wu little
biographical information is available, except that he was a
Shanghai native and one of the first in Shanghai to establish
modern schools for women. Wuben Female School was founded by

Chinese, located outside of the International Settlement, and

360
was very popular. According to Bao Tianxiao's reminiscences,
in order to send their children to this school, many families
moved to Ximen, where the school was located. Wu Huaijiu was
a friend of Ding Chuqing and a frequent visitor of xilou

(resting house), a sort of intellectual saloon in the building

of Shibao (Bao 1971:331).

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