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A DEFENCE
OF
WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

BY
KICHANG NAM

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ABSTRACT
A DEFENCE
OF
WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

By
Kichang Nam

Ayer argues that without assuming the criterion of verification Wittgenstein cannot prove that private language is impossible. Hintikka thinks that the aim of the private language argument is not to deny the existence of Cartesian private objects. Kripke asserts that what Wittgenstein really does in the private language argument is to show that private model of rule following, not private language, is impossible. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein has found the "most radical skepticism" in the history of philosophy, i.e., 'rule following skepticism.'

These are mistaken interpretations of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein does not use the criterion of verification to prove that private language is impossible. Wittgenstein would not say that there are private objects in the full-fledged Cartesian sense. Wittgenstein would not accept any kind of skepticism, including Kripke's rule following skepticism.

There must be some elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy that lead these philosophers to propose such incorrect interpretations. In my dissertation I attempt to identify such elements and remove the temptations that make



philosophers misunderstand Wittgenstein's private language argument. Removing such temptations will open up a road for a correct understanding of Wittgenstein.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In this introduction, I will explain Wittgenstein's definition of private language, along with the basic structure of the private language argument. A distinction between epistemological and semantical Cartesianism will be made. For Wittgenstein attacks epistemological Cartesianism, I think, by showing that epistemological Cartesianism implies semantical Cartesianism, which he believes to be an absurd theory. Also, I will try to present the different views about the aims of the private language argument. I will raise a question about whether or not Wittgenstein is right in believing that epistemological Cartesianism implies semantical Cartesianism. For if epistemological Cartesianism does not imply semantical Cartesianism, it is possible to accept epistemological Cartesianism, while rejecting semantical Cartesianism. Some philosophers, after arguing that epistemological Cartesianism can be separated from semantical Cartesianism, assert that Wittgenstein's private language argument can refute only semantical, not epistemological, Cartesianism.

1. PRIVATE LANGUAGE AS IT IS DEFINED BY WITTGENSTEIN

In *PI* §243¹ Wittgenstein asks whether people can imagine a language "the individual words (of which) are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." And in *PI* §256 and *PI* §269 Wittgenstein gives another type of characterization of private language. In *PI* §269 he says "sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called 'private language'." In *PI* §256 he raises a question about "the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand." From these characterizations together with other similar characterizations found in some other places in the *Philosophical Investigations*, we can form the following kind of picture of private language.

First of all, it is a language whose individual words refer to the speaker's sensations. And these sensations are private in the senses that only the speaker can have them (*PI* §253), or only the speaker can know that he has them (*PI*

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd edition., ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (New York: Macmillan, 1958). Hereafter this work will be cited in parentheses as *PI* followed by a number which refers to a paragraph in part I of *Philosophical Investigations*. For part II of *Philosophical Investigations*, page numbers will be given.

§246). Hence private language is a language whose words allegedly refer to this kind of private sensations. And also it is the language which no one other than the speaker can understand.

Note that when Wittgenstein says that no one other than the speaker can understand private language, he is not saying that it is possible for the speaker to understand it. All he says is that if there is anyone who can understand private language, then he must be the speaker, and no one else. Wittgenstein examines whether or not this possibility can be realized, that is, whether or not the language which only the speaker "appears to understand" (*PI* §256) is the language which he really can understand. The result of the examination is that it is not possible even for the speaker to understand private language. Since the speaker cannot understand private language, private language turns out to be the language which no one can understand. So it could not be called 'language' at all. Hearing it would be like hearing an emission of "an inarticulate sound" (*PI* §261). This is what Wittgenstein means by the impossibility of private language. The core of private language argument lies in Wittgenstein's attempt to establish this claim. Let me summarize what we have so far said in the form of an argument.

1. Suppose that private sensations are what only their owners can know that they have.

2. Suppose that private sensation-words refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations.

3. If a word refers to what can be known only to the person speaking, then no one other than the speaker can understand it.

4. That is, if there is anyone who would understand the word which refers to a speaker's immediate private sensation, then he must be the speaker himself and no one else.

5. But it is not possible for the speaker to understand that kind of word.

6. Hence no one can understand a word which refers to a speaker's immediate private sensation.

7. Uttering such a word is like making a noise.

8. Hence, there cannot be a word which refers to its speaker's private sensation.

I am not presenting here the private language argument.

The private language argument consists of proving the premises of the above argument, especially the third and fifth premises. At this stage, let's not worry about how to prove these individual premises. I will do it later.

Another point I want make now is this. Though Wittgenstein uses the term 'private language,' we will apply our discussion primarily to what we may call 'private sensation-words,' that is, those words which are said to refer to their speaker's private sensations. This would not hurt the purpose of private language argument. For it would be the case that if it is impossible for anyone to understand the meaning of a private sensation-word, then it must also be

impossible for anyone to understand private language, which is supposed to consist of such private words.

2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CARTESIANS AND SEMANTICAL CARTESIANS

In general, we may define a Cartesian as one who holds that a person's mental states, including sensations, can be known only to himself and to no one else. In what follows I will try to divide the Cartesians into various groups.²

First of all, I want to distinguish between what I call the 'epistemological Cartesians,' and what I call the 'semantical Cartesians.' By the epistemological Cartesians, I mean those who hold that the sensations are what only their owner can be directly acquainted with, and what only their owner can have. Corresponding to the epistemological Cartesians, there could be what I call the 'semantical Cartesians.' It is not as easy to describe the semantical Cartesians as it is to describe the epistemological Cartesians. But primarily I will mean by the 'semantical Cartesians,' those who hold that the meaning of a sensation-word is the sensation which it refers to. Publicly

² The classification made below is done simply for the purpose of making what I will argue later more clearly. It would be probably the case that no single philosopher may belong to one of those groups.

observable sensation-behaviors do not play any role in learning and understanding the meaning of a sensation word. Hence one learns the meaning of a sensation word purely by recognizing the connection held between the word and the private sensation, which is grasped by the method of private ostensive definition. Unless one experiences the sensation oneself, one can never be said to understand the sensation-word. We may put Locke in the group of this kind of Cartesians. In order for a certain sound to become a word with a meaning, Locke says:

it was further necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, ...³

So far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.⁴

Since it is Locke's contention that the ideas within one's own mind can be known only to that person, we can say that for Locke the meaning of the word 'pain,' i.e., the idea of pain, is private in the sense defined above.

³ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), Book 3, Ch.1, §2, p.402.

⁴ John Locke, Book 3, Ch.2, §7, p.408.

1) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGICALLY SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS AND EPISTEMOLOGICALLY NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

Now I further divide the epistemological Cartesians into two categories, i.e., the epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians and the epistemologically skeptical Cartesians.⁵ By the epistemologically skeptical Cartesians I mean those who assert that insofar as I can be acquainted with only my sensations, I cannot know that others have sensations. The epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians, however, would reject such solipsism, and assert that we can know that others have sensations. They hold that, though sensations are private, it is still possible for me to know that others have sensations. For I can have a good reason to believe that others have sensations by using, e.g., the argument from analogy.

2) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEMANTICALLY SKEPTICAL AND SEMANTICALLY NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

We also can divide the semantical Cartesians into two groups, the semantically skeptical Cartesians and the semantically non-skeptical Cartesians. The semantically skeptical Cartesians would assert that if pain is private and the meaning of the word 'pain' is the very private sensation, then only I can understand the meaning of 'pain,' and I cannot be sure that others use the word 'pain' in the

⁵ This is the distinction commonly used by many philosophers.

same way as I do. Thus, the semantically skeptical Cartesians deny the possibility of mutual understanding of 'pain.' They may be called 'meaning-solipsists.'⁶ The semantically non-skeptical Cartesians would assert, however, that, though the meaning of 'pain' is the very private sensation, it is still possible for me to understand the word 'pain' used by others. For, they might say, I can have a good reason to believe that others use the word 'pain' in the same way as I use it.

We can make four combinations out of the above four groups. 1) The epistemologically non-skeptical, and also semantically non-skeptical Cartesians; 2) the epistemologically non-skeptical, but semantically skeptical Cartesians; 3) the epistemologically skeptical but semantically non-skeptical Cartesians; 4) the epistemologically and also semantically skeptical Cartesians. Among these, only the first and the fourth are actually held by philosophers. Among these two, the fourth is the most consistent position. As we will see shortly, an important part of the private language argument is to show why the first type of non-skeptical position cannot but collapse into the fourth type of skeptical position.

⁶ This is close to what Ronald Suter calls 'conceptual solipsists.' Suter makes a distinction which is similar to my epistemological and semantical Cartesianism. See, Ronald Suter's *Interpreting Wittgenstein* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) pp.112-113.

3. THE POSSIBILITY OF BECOMING PHILOSOPHERS WHO ARE SEMANTICALLY NON-CARTESIANS, THOUGH EPISTEMOLOGICALLY CARTESIANS

Some might assert that all of those who hold epistemological Cartesianism have to accept semantical Cartesianism. But it is not that easy to say conclusively whether or not this is the case. In fact there are philosophers who would assert that the epistemological Cartesians do not necessarily need to become semantical Cartesians. That is, there might be philosophers who are epistemologically Cartesian but semantically non-Cartesian. By 'semantically non-Cartesian' I mean those who would say the following.⁷ In order to talk about private sensations meaningfully, we do not need to contend that one must be able to learn the meaning of a sensation-word privately, i.e., by grasping the connection between the word and the sensation. For we have to name private sensations by way of their connection with publicly observable things, for example, by way of pain-behaviors which are connected with pain. So we learn the meaning of a sensation-word by grasping the connection between private sensations and sensation-behaviors.⁸

⁷ Note that those who are semantically non-Cartesians are different from semantically non-skeptical Cartesians.

⁸ It may not be correct to call them 'non-Cartesians' because they still assert that we can name and talk about the Cartesian private sensations which really exist. Those who hold this kind of view might say that their view is the correct Cartesian semantical theory, and the semantical Cartesians' view described by us above is not a correct one.

Keeping the possibility of this kind of combination in mind, i.e., the combination of epistemological Cartesianism with semantical non-Cartesianism, let's examine what the purposes of private language argument would be.

4. THE AIMS OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Suppose that the private language argument is successful. If so, should we discard both epistemological and semantical Cartesianism? I believe that Wittgenstein would answer "Yes." But not all philosophers who are in favor of Wittgenstein's private language argument would agree with me. Some philosophers would say that the private language argument refutes only semantical Cartesianism, leaving epistemological Cartesianism intact.

For example, Hintikka asserts that the direct purpose of the private language argument is to discredit the belief that we can name a sensation purely by the method of private ostensive definition. In other words, Wittgenstein wants to show, according to Hintikka, that in order to name private sensations and to talk about them we need a public language framework. From this, Hintikka asserts, it does not follow

But how we name the view is not really important. Let's just call them philosophers who are semantically non-Cartesians.

that private sensations "in a perfectly straight forward Cartesian sense" do not exist. Thus Hintikka interprets Wittgenstein as really not giving up the existence of Cartesian private objects. Let's see what Hintikka actually says.

What follows from Wittgenstein's general philosophy of language is not that there are no private objects or that we cannot speak of such objects. All that follows is that we can use language to name them, to describe them, etc., only by means of a public framework. But from the public character of this framework it does not follow that the experiences themselves are not completely private. ...

Hence no reason emerges for thinking that we cannot, according to Wittgenstein, have private experiences *in a perfectly straightforward Cartesian sense*. The whole problem is how we are to talk about them. Sensations (pains, itches, hot flushes, twinges of pleasure, etc.) do not admit of private ostensive definitions. I cannot refer to them without enabling you to do likewise. But from the public nature of the framework needed to do so it does not follow that the experiences themselves are public; or that they do not play any role in public language-games.⁹

We can put what Hintikka asserts here as follows.

Wittgenstein leaves open the possibility that epistemological Cartesianism remains true. So, according to Hintikka, Wittgenstein may be epistemologically Cartesian, though semantically non-Cartesian.

Again, not all of those who accept the private language argument agree about what Wittgenstein can really achieve by

⁹ Merrill B. Hintikka and Jakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.267. Italics are mine.

it. Hence if we want to say that the purpose of private language argument is to discredit both epistemological and semantical Cartesianism, then we have to be able to show where people like Hintikka go wrong.

II. WITTGENSTEIN VS. NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

The Cartesians would vehemently oppose Wittgenstein's idea that a word which refers to the speaker's private sensation is nothing but a noise which cannot be understood by anyone including the speaker himself. For they would never doubt that those words, which refer to the speaker's private sensations, are understood by people or at least by their speaker. In what follows I will examine both the non-skeptical Cartesians's objections against Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein's reply to them.

1. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS FROM THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY AND SEMANTICALLY NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

Note, one of the premises of the private language argument is that if a sensation is something which only I can know, then no one else can know it. The epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians would assert that this premise is false.¹⁰

¹⁰ But the skeptical Cartesians wouldn't.

Let's see first how Locke could challenge it. Locke talks about the possibility that the meaning people could attach to the word 'pain,' i.e., the idea of pain, may differ from person to person. But he dismisses the possibility on the following curious grounds.

[It does not matter even if] the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time; v.g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes, were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice versa. For since this could never be known... neither the ideas hereby, nor the names, would be at all confounded, or any falsehood be in either ... I am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or convenience of life, and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.¹¹

If Locke's belief that "the sensible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike" is true, then we do not need to accept the premise that if only I know my sensations, no one else can know them. The problem lies in, however, Locke's way of justifying his belief. He asserts that his belief must be true because "the contrary supposition ... is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or

¹¹ John Locke, *Essay*, Book 2, Ch. 32, §15, p.389

convenience of life..." Most Cartesians would not accept Locke's method of justification, and so attempt to provide an alternative method.¹²

The alternative method of justification the epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians would propose is the argument from analogy. By using this method, they would show that the premise that if a sensation is something which only I can know, then no one else can know it is false. For I can have a good reason to believe that other people have sensations by some kind of analogical reasoning, and in a similar way others can also believe justifiably that I have sensations.

How would Wittgenstein reply to this kind of objection? Basically Wittgenstein would advise the epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians to think seriously about a claim like "Pain can be known only to me." For if it is true, then its consequence must be that I cannot know that others have pains. As Wittgenstein says, "[t]he essential thing about private experience is really not that each person

¹² At least one contemporary philosopher, however, agrees with Locke's method of justification. Carl Wellman asserts that, though it "cannot be established by logical analysis" nor "is it easy to see how it can be empirically established" that each of us has qualitatively similar sensation, we can assume it to be the case, "since our experiences of apparent communication can be explained in part by the assumption that different selves have similar sensations, these experiences constitute evidence to support this assumption." See, Carl Wellman, "Wittgenstein and Egocentric Predicament," *Mind*, (Apr., 1959) pp.223-233.

possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else" (*PI* §272). Wittgenstein seems to say that a consistent Cartesian should be skeptical about the existence of other minds. How would Wittgenstein support this important claim?

Before answering this question, let me first say something about the kind of strategy Wittgenstein seems to use. We can say that if Wittgenstein is successful in showing that a consistent Cartesian should be skeptical about other minds, then he is thereby proving the untenability of the epistemological Cartesians' position. For most Cartesians are likely to say that it is a serious defect of their theory if it is really the case that under their epistemological assumption there is no way of one's knowing that others have sensations. This kind of strategy which I think Wittgenstein takes is called by Malcolm Wittgenstein's 'external attack on the Cartesians.' Thus Malcolm says:

Wittgenstein employs another argument that is an external, not an internal, attack upon private language. What is attacked is the assumption that once I know from my own case what pain, tickling, or consciousness is, then I can transfer the ideas of these things to objects outside myself.¹³

¹³ Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*" in *Wittgenstein and Philosophical Investigations*, George Pitcher, ed., (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p.75; first published in *Philosophical Review*, (63), pp.530-559; Also in *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, John Canfield, ed., (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1986), vol.4.

What is established by the external attack is that the Cartesian philosophy falls into skepticism. All non-skeptical Cartesians' attempts to get out of this consequence will fail. Hence the Cartesians have to choose either skepticism or giving up their epistemological theory of sensations.

2. HOW TO SHOW THAT THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS ARE MAKING SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY CLAIMS: MALCOLM'S SUGGESTION

Wittgenstein sees something fundamentally wrong in the epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians' claim that even though sensations are private in the Cartesian sense, I can know that others have sensations. It is that they are making self-contradictory claims. Let's see how Malcolm attempts to show this point in his article "Knowledge of Other Minds."¹⁴

Malcolm asserts that those who conclude that others have sensations by using the argument from analogy have to ask themselves whether or not they understand the conclusion, which would be like this: "It is probable that human figure" (pointing at some person other than oneself) "

¹⁴ Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds," in G. Pitcher, ed., p.372; first published in *Journal of Philosophy*, 55 (1958), pp.969-978; Also in his *Knowledge and Certainty*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963). Also in J. Canfield ed., vol.8.

has thoughts and feelings." In order to understand this sentence, they have to understand the sentence "That human figure has thoughts and feelings" (I'll use the sentence "Others have sensations" from now on.) If they understand it, they have to have criteria for determining that others have sensations. Unless they have such criteria, they cannot say that they understand it. But once they have such criteria, then they already know how to establish that one knows that others have sensations. For they can just apply the criteria, and as a result they can know, without depending on such an argument from analogy, that others have sensations.

Those non-skeptical Cartesians, who are using the argument from analogy, are making contradictory claims if they say that they understand the sentence "Others have sensations," though they do not know that others have sensations. For when they say that they understand the sentence "Others have sensations," they are admitting that they have criteria for determining that others have sensations; when they say that they do not know that others have sensations, they are denying that they have criteria for determining that others have sensations. In short, they are asserting that they do and do not have the criteria for determining that others have sensations.

On the other hand if they insist, in order not to make contradictory claims, that they do not have any criteria for

determining that others have sensations, then they have to make a bizarre claim that they do not understand the sentence "Others have sensations." But if they do not understand it, then how could they even begin asking questions about other minds?

Malcolm attempts to draw Wittgenstein's views on sensations from this kind of criticism of the epistemologically non-skeptical Cartesians. Let me explain how he does it. Malcolm believes that we cannot deny that we understand the sentence "Others have sensations." If so, then we have to have criteria, Malcolm asserts, for determining whether or not others have sensations and they must be "open to view," i.e., publicly observable.¹⁵ If they are not publicly accessible, e.g., if the criterion is that we have to be able to feel others' sensations, then we could never say that we understand the sentence. For by deploying this kind of criterion, we can never determine whether or not others have sensations. Hence such things as feeling others' sensations is ruled out as a valid candidate for the criteria for determining whether or not others have sensations. Then what would be acceptable criteria? They must be the sensation-behavior of others. For they are publicly observable.¹⁶ From this we seem to be able to

¹⁵ Norman Malcolm, p.372.

¹⁶ Strictly speaking, it is wrong to say that what is publicly observable must be only the sensation-behaviors of others. For their neurophysiological features are also

derive Wittgenstein's view that sensation behaviors are conceptually, i.e., criteriologically, not just contingently, connected with the meaning of sensation-words.

Let me now raise some questions about Malcolm's criticisms of the non-skeptical Cartesians. Malcolm does not argue for his claim that to understand the sentence "Others have sensations" we must have some criteria for determining whether or not someone has sensations. But should we know, in order to understand the meaning of a sentence, the criteria for determining whether or not it is true? Let's take as an example the sentence "This movie is good." Should we have criteria for determining whether or not a movie is good in order to understand the sentence "This movie is good"? Wouldn't it be possible for someone to assert that he does understand "This movie is good" even though he does not know the criteria for determining whether or not a movie is good? After all, we could say that there are no such criteria.

What I want to say would be explained better by using the following kind of distinction, i.e., the distinction

publicly observable. Observing people's neurophysiological features would be proposed as criteria for determining whether or not others are in pain by the identity theorists. However I do not think that Wittgenstein would accept it as a valid criterion for determining whether or not others are in pain. One reason can be given here: Wittgenstein would point out that we do not learn how to use the word 'pain' by grasping the connection between a person's neurophysiological features and pain.

between what we might call 'epistemological criteria' and 'semantical criteria.' Roger Buck points out the ambivalence about the notion of criteria as it is used by Malcolm.

The use of the term 'criteria' to stand for 'that by means of which (or through the noticing of which) we verify our statements' would not by itself be objectionable. But the notion of 'criteria' has other liaisons. It is intimately tied to the idea of meaning, in such a fashion that the meaning of a sentence is given by giving the criteria for its use.¹⁷

Note that Malcolm is implicitly assuming that the semantical criteria are the same as the epistemological ones. But Malcolm needs to argue for rather than just assume it. For, as Buck points out, "[a]ctually there is no such total divorce as this would suggest, nor is there so direct and intimate a connection as Malcolm supposes."¹⁸

(There is) the ambivalence as to whether ascertaining someone's criteria for the use of 'y' is a logical investigation directed to finding out what he means by 'y' or an epistemological inquiry aimed at finding out what he would count as conclusive verification of some statement in which 'y' is used by him. For all we know so far it might be possible to 'judge' whether (someone) has that knowledge' (i.e., of the use of an expression) without investigating what would 'settle' whether in a given use of that expression to state something the expression rightly applies to what in that use it is applied to.¹⁹

¹⁷ Roger Buck, "Non-Other Minds," in Canfield, ed., vol.9, p.196; first published in *Analytical Philosophy*, R.J. Butler, ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966).

¹⁸ Roger Buck, p.199

¹⁹ Roger Buck, pp.198-199

What I was getting at was that we may be able to understand "This movie is good" if we know the criteria for its use, i.e., the semantical criteria, even though we do not know the criteria for verifying whether or not a certain movie is good, i.e., the epistemological criteria. If this is possible, then so is it for the non-skeptical Cartesians to assert that they understand the sentence "Others have sensations," even though they do not know that others have sensations. For they could say that they have the criteria required for understanding the sentence "Others have sensations," though they do not have the criteria for knowing that others have sensations.

Hence Malcolm has to argue for the claim that we have to know the criteria for determining whether or not a sentence is true to understand what it means. To establish it, then, Malcolm has to accept, it seems, the problematic verificationistic criterion of meaning. As Buck says "To run together one use of 'criterion' which is oriented towards verification with another whose orientation is towards meaning is to make the notion of 'criteria' carry essentially the burden of a verificationist theory of meaning."²⁰ William Lycan expresses the same view. He asserts that Malcolm "deploys [the] principle" that "[f]or any expression 'Q': if we have no criterion for establishing

²⁰ Roger Buck, p.197

the truth of 'Q', then 'Q' is unintelligible and meaningless" against Mill's argument from analogy.²¹

It is unfortunate that Malcolm formulates his argument in the verificationistic framework. But Malcolm is correct in pointing out that the Cartesian epistemological claims have absurd semantical counterparts, and once the Cartesians realize it, then they should discover that they are making inconsistent claims. Wittgenstein would agree with Malcolm about this. In what follows, I will try to establish exactly this point, i.e., that the Cartesians' epistemological claims have absurd semantical counterparts, in a different and hopefully non-problematic way.

3. HOW TO SHOW THAT THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY NON-SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS ARE MAKING SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY CLAIMS: MY SUGGESTION

The so-called epistemological problem of other minds is said to be raised because of the privacy of, e.g., pain. So the question, "If pain is known only to me, then how can I not know that others feel pain?" But note that the privacy of

²¹ William Lycan, in "Noninductive Evidence: Recent Work on Wittgenstein's Criteria," in J. Canfield ed., vol. 7, p.120; first published in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, (8), pp.109-125. Saul Kripke would also agree with Buck and Lycan in that Malcolm is using a verificationistic criterion of meaning in his article "Knowledge of Other Minds." See, Saul Kripke, in *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p.120 n.



pain should as well raise what may be called a "semantical problem of other minds", e.g., "If the meaning of the word 'pain' is the private sensation, pain, which only its speaker can directly be acquainted with, then he cannot know that others mean the same thing as he means by the word 'pain.'"²² Consider the following claim of Wittgenstein's.

If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense), why not in that case about the meaning of these words as well?²³

Others may mean by 'pain' what I mean by 'pleasure,' and there is no way of disproving this bizarre claim insofar as the Cartesians assert that the meaning of the word 'pain' is the private sensation pain. To say that one cannot know that others mean the same thing that he means by the word 'pain' is to say that 'pain' is not understood by one

²² This latter problem could be called an 'epistemological problem' too. But if so, then it is the problem of knowability about the meaning of a word 'pain', whereas the former one is the problem of knowability of pain. Also it may not be entirely correct to say that the privacy of pain raises both epistemological and semantical problem of other minds. Strictly speaking, we should say that the privacy of pain plus the claim that the meaning of 'pain' is that private sensation raise the semantical problem of other minds. Since the Cartesians would hold both, they should raise the semantical problem of other minds. We can also say that the epistemological problem of external world has as its counterpart the semantical problem of external world.

²³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, Translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) §456. Hereafter this work will be cited in parentheses as *OC* followed by a number which refers to a paragraph in *OC*. Here Wittgenstein is saying that if we can raise the epistemological problem of the external world, so can we the semantical problem of the external world.

another. Of course this is an absurd consequence which, I believe, most Cartesians would not accept.

So if philosophers want to raise the so-called problem of other minds, then they have to raise it on both epistemological and semantical level. Now if a Cartesian believes that it is absurd to raise such semantical doubt, then he must also say that it is no less absurd to raise such epistemological doubt.²⁴

If the Cartesians have such a deep conviction that people mutually understand the word 'pain,' then it means that they have the way of answering positively the semantical question "Given the privacy of pain, how can one know that others mean the same thing as one means by 'pain'?" The only possible positive answer they can give, insofar as they assert that the meaning of the word 'pain' is the private sensation pain which it refers to, would be that one can experience the pain that others feel. If this is the reason why they do not raise the semantical problem, then they are making contradictory claims. For they deny that one can experience the pain that others feel when they raise the epistemological problem of other minds. Note that we can use the claim that one can experience the pain others

²⁴ It seems to me that many philosophers think that, though it looks absolutely preposterous to doubt that one can understand what others mean by 'pain', it looks less so - even looks intelligent - to doubt that one knows that others feel pain.

feel as a positive answer to the epistemological problem of other minds.²⁵

I believe that all Cartesians, if they are reasonable in the sense that they do not want to say that such sensation-words as 'pain' are not mutually understood by people, have to give up their theory of meaning of sensation-words, which would in turn lead them to give up their epistemological theory of sensations. But the Cartesians would not accept the above type of criticisms. Let's see some ways in which the Cartesians can respond to Malcolm's and also my type of criticisms.

4. CAN I KNOW THAT OTHERS HAVE PAINS WITHOUT USING ANY CRITERIA?

To the criticisms made above, the Cartesians might respond as follows. There are ways of understanding the sentence "Others have sensations" or knowing that others have sensations without employing any criteria. The Cartesians could assert that since I know what pain is like in my own

²⁵ These two problems are the same problem in that they require the same answer. Wittgenstein says that "Questions differ if their answers are different. To understand a question means to know what kind of proposition the answer will be." See F. Weissman, *Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle*, trans. B.F.M. McGuinness and J. Schulte, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), p.227.

case, what I need to do is just to assume that others have the same as I. As Malcolm says:

There is a familiar inclination to make the following reply: "Although I have no criterion of verification still I understand, for example, the sentence 'He has a pain.' For I understand the meaning of 'I have a pain,' and 'He has a pain' means that he has the same thing as I have when I have pain."²⁶

Wittgenstein says:

But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had. (PI §350)

This method, however, cannot succeed. Wittgenstein counters as follows:

It is as if I were to say: "You surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock."- the explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same time", but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.

In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain and I am in pain. (PI §350)

Here Wittgenstein is showing that the attempt to escape out of the skeptical hole by using the phrase "the same as" is a mere sidestep from tackling the real problem. Buck makes it clear:

²⁶ Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds", p.373.

Thus if one says 'Thomas Jones is a Unitarian and Goldwin Smith is the same' what one says about Smith is clear enough supposing Smith and Jones are both persons and one knows what the criteria are for calling a person a Unitarian. But let Jones remain a person, and Goldwin Smith be a building, and then what is said by the use of 'same' here becomes quite unclear. One's understanding of 'Goldwin Smith [the building] is a Unitarian' is not improved by noting that to say this of Goldwin Smith is to say the same thing of it as was said of Jones. The form of words 'x has F and y has the same' commits the speaker to the assumption that x and y are of a sufficiently similar type for F to apply unambiguously to both.

²⁷

We have to know, according to Buck, what 'I' and 'some other man' are, and also the criteria for saying some other man is in pain, before we say that others have the same pain as I. But if we know all of these, then we would not need such an indirect method as the argument from analogy. For we would already have the answer. As Buck says, " 'the same' is a concept whose intelligible employment is parasitical on the existence of criteria for other concepts."²⁸

There is another method that the Cartesians could suggest. It may be the case that I can know others' sensations without using any criteria if I am able to imagine others's sensations, just as I sometimes can imagine, e.g., my past sensations. Wittgenstein considers this kind of method. He asks:

²⁷ Roger Buck, "Non-Other Minds", pp. 189-190.

²⁸ Roger Buck, p.189.

Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself, and now I transfer the idea to objects outside myself? (PI §283)

His answer is "No."

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. (PI §302)

But why is it difficult to imagine someone else's pain on the model of my own? Kripke raises a question as follows.

If I see some ducks for the first time in Central Park, and learn my 'concept' of ducks from these 'paradigms,' it may be plausible to suppose that these very ducks could not have been born in the fifteenth century. ... It by no means follows, whether these essentialist claims are correct or not, that I cannot form the concept of ducks living at a different time...from the paradigms I used to learn the 'concept of duck'.²⁹

Kripke is missing the point here. Wittgenstein would not deny that we can imagine a duck in some other places on the model of a duck we are now seeing. What he is saying is that there must be criteria for using "I imagine A on the model of B." In the case of imagining ducks we surely have such criteria, whereas in the case of imagining others's sensations on the Cartesian model we don't. Buck would say, I think, that "'imagining' is a concept whose intelligible employment is parasitical on the existence of criteria for other concepts."

²⁹ Kripke, *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, p.116.

The problem the Cartesians face results from their rejection of the normally used criteria for saying that others have the same pain as I. Since they rule out using such criteria, we do not know how we could understand them when they assert that others have the same pain as I. In this respect, they are like a character of Lewis Carroll's "The Two Clocks". This character has two clocks; one is a clock which loses a minute a day, the other is a stopped clock, which always points to 8 o'clock. He says that he can tell when 8 o'clock comes by using the stopped clock. For example, he may say that he can see when 8 o'clock comes by seeing his stopped clock when it is exactly 8 o'clock. He may assert that he is not using the stopped clock just for a fun. He may assert that he cannot but use it. For it tells the time correctly twice a day, while the other clock only once in two years. At any rate, he is like the Cartesians in that he rejects using normal criteria for telling the time. Since he rejects using normal criteria, we cannot know how we understand him when he says that he can know when 8 o'clock comes by using the stopped clock.

Lewis Carroll, like Wittgenstein, is showing here just how empty this explanation by means of identity is. It really explains nothing. The objector is quite right to feel dissatisfied with the explanation given to him. For we still do not understand when Carroll's clock is right or when another person can have the same kind of

experience we have, given the Cartesian assumptions.³⁰

³⁰ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, p.117. The story is in Lewis Carroll, "The Two Clocks", in *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll* (New York: Random House) pp.1230-1231.

III. WITTGENSTEIN VS. SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY AND SEMANTICALLY SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

In chapter II we have seen how Wittgenstein could show that the attempts of the non-skeptical Cartesians to get out of the skeptical consequence would fail. Let's assume that Wittgenstein is right in holding that there is no way out of such skeptical consequences. But this may not make the Cartesians give up their belief that our sensations are private in their sense. For they may convert to another type of Cartesianism, the epistemologically and semantically skeptical Cartesians. These Cartesians would accept both epistemological and semantical claims like "It is impossible for me to know others' sensations, if sensations are private." and "It is impossible for me to understand the sensation-words used by others, if the sensation words refer to private sensations." They are in a sense very close to Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein himself accepts the above two kinds of claims. But they are also different from Wittgenstein in one important respect. Wittgenstein would say that if sensation words refer to private sensations, then even their speaker cannot understand them, while the

skeptical Cartesians would say that their speaker, though not anyone else, can understand them.

These Cartesians would accuse the non-skeptical Cartesians of using a wrong method, just as Wittgenstein does. They assert that the Cartesians have to give up the hope of justifying the claim that I know that others feel pain. So they would not accept such methods as the argument from analogy. They hold fast to their original claims like the one that pain is only known to its owner. This position looks certainly more consistent than that of the non-skeptical Cartesians. But it has its own problem that it is a skeptical position, sometimes called the 'egocentric predicament.' Carl Wellman writes:

If all factual knowledge is grounded in experience, how can one know any reality which is independent of experience? If experience is private, how can one person know anything about the experience of another person? If words derive their meaning from private experience, how can one person explain to another what he means? The picture (i.e., the Cartesian epistemological picture) seems to imply that I can know only my own experience and that I can understand only my own words. This is the egocentric predicament.³¹

³¹ Carl Wellman, "Wittgenstein and Egocentric Predicament," p.223.

2. PRIVATE LANGUAGE AS IT IS DEFINED BY WITTGENSTEIN IS THE LANGUAGE OF EPISTEMOLOGICALLY AND SEMANTICALLY SKEPTICAL CARTESIANS

What I wanted to say in the previous section was this.

Suppose that there is no way out of the so-called egocentric predicament. If so, would Wittgenstein's external attack on private language succeed in persuading the Cartesians to give up their theories of sensations? The answer is "No." For it could not persuade the epistemologically and semantically skeptical Cartesians. Note that these philosophers would say that the egocentric predicament is something that we have to accept as a fact. These die-hard Cartesians might endorse the view that people in fact do not understand one another when they use the word 'pain.' For only the speaker of 'pain' can understand it. It is just an illusion, they might say, that people do.³²

Now we can understand why Wittgenstein defines private language as the language which it is logically impossible for others except its speaker to understand. For it is the conception of language that the most consistent Cartesians, i.e., the epistemologically and semantically skeptical Cartesians would accept. Wittgenstein intends to demolish this conception of language by showing that even the speaker of a private language cannot understand it. If even the

³² It seems to me that there is no philosopher who holds this position. But it is a possibility.

speaker of a private language cannot understand it, then no one can understand it. The language which no one can understand cannot be language. This is what Malcolm calls 'Wittgenstein's internal attack upon private language.'

"The argument that I have been outlining has the form of reductio ad absurdum: postulate a private language; then deduce that it is not a language."³³ What Malcolm says will help one to understand what I am getting at.

It [that is, the claim that "I know from introspection what acts of thinking and perceiving are..."] is the most natural assumption for a philosopher to make and indeed seems at first be the only possibility. Yet Wittgenstein has made us see that it leads first to solipsism and then to nonsense."³⁴

3. THE CORE OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT: THE INTERNAL ATTACK

Now we are entering probably the most controversial part of the private language argument. It begins with a simple question of whether or not someone, who asserts that he is using a private sensation-word, is able to identify the private sensation which is supposed to be its meaning. The

³³ Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", p.75.

³⁴ Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of other-minds", pp. 378-379.

answer to this question is "No" according to Wittgenstein. Let me explain why Wittgenstein believes that the speaker of a private sensation-word cannot identify the private sensation which is supposed to be its meaning. First, consider the following well-known section of *Philosophical Investigations*.

Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.- I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.- But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.- How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and as it were, point to it inwardly.- But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.- Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation.- But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. (PI §258)

How could the diarist identify the sensation correctly whenever it occurs? In order to identify the sensation, he must have certain criteria for identifying it. But what would be the criteria which the diarist could use? There seems to be only one criterion which is available for him. It would be like this. He determines to use the sensation he is now having and baptizing with the sign 'S' as a kind of model-image. He then will compare the sensation he will

be having some time in the future with the model-image he will then bring up out of his memory. If the sensation he has in the future is the same as the model-image, then he calls it 'S.' If not, he doesn't.

This criterion at first sight appears to be harmless. But it has a serious problem, which Wittgenstein reveals in this way. The diarist may not remember the model-image correctly. Certainly memory is not infallible. Hence his judgments that the sensation he is now having is or is not the same as the model-image will at least sometimes be wrong. But the diarist cannot know that he makes a mistake when he actually is wrong.

Well, why not? Isn't it possible to imagine that the diarist gives up his judgment and confesses that he was wrong? Yes, it is possible to imagine such a thing. But the problem is that there is no way of checking that what he is saying is right or wrong. Someone's simply saying that he made a mistake does not confirm that he really made a mistake. He may have been wrong in judging that he made a mistake. Hence he has to be able to present some criteria by which he judges that he made a mistake, just as he needs criteria by which to judge that he did not make any mistake. That is, he has to have criteria for determining the correctness of his memory-judgments. However the diarist could not offer such criteria. "In the present case, [he has] no criterion of correctness" of determining whether or

not he remembers the model-image correctly. Without the criteria for judging the correctness of his memory-judgments, the above 'criterion' for identifying the sensation is not a criterion at all.

Why must it be the case that the diarist has no criterion of correctness for determining whether or not his memory judgments are true? It is because there is nothing other than his memory that he can depend on. In order to check the veracity of one memory that looks suspicious, he should appeal to another memory. Now he has to give a reason why he believes the truth of this particular memory-judgment. For it is possible that he makes a mistake about that judgment. The reason he can give must appeal to another memory. This kind of process will go on and on infinitely, insofar as he is not able to check his memory-judgments by something other than his memory-judgments. But he cannot use something other than his own memory judgments. Hence he will never be able to confirm his own judgments.

"But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?" - No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)

Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment. (*PI* §265)

For the diarist, Wittgenstein says, "whatever is going to seem right to [him] is right," and so "we can't talk about right."

Some philosophers like Ayer think that Wittgenstein is unfairly rejecting our memory as a legitimate source of our knowledge. But this is a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein is not a memory-skeptic at all. What he is saying is that only in a certain case, like the situation in which the diarist is, can we not trust our memory. Let's examine Ayer's criticisms of Wittgenstein, and how Wittgenstein would respond to them. Ayer says:

Let the object to which I am attempting to refer be as public as you please, let the word which I use for this purpose belong to some common language, my assurance that I am using the word correctly, that I am using it to refer to the "right" object, must in the end rest on the testimony of my senses. It is through hearing what other people say, or through seeing what they write, or observing their movements, that I am enabled to conclude that their use of the word agrees with mine. But if without further ado I can recognize such noises or shapes or movements why can I not also recognize a private sensation?³⁵

What Ayer tries to say is not entirely clear to me. But it seems to me what he wants to assert is this. When we identify anything, public or private, we depend ultimately on our memory and sensations. Note that the diarist also

³⁵ A. J. Ayer, "Can There be a Private Language?" in Canfield ed. vol.9, p.6; first published in *Aristotelian Society of Proceedings*, Supplementary volume 28, pp.63-76; Also in Pitcher ed.; Also in *The Private Language Argument*, O.R. Jones, ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971).

should depend on his memory and sensations to identify the sensation at issue. Hence the situation the diarist faces when he identifies his private sensation is not different from the one we face when we identify public objects. Now Wittgenstein asserts that the diarist cannot identify the private sensation because he can use only his memory and sensations to identify it, and as a result he cannot give any meaning to the private sign. But if that is the case, then, Ayer asserts, neither can public objects be identified, and neither can public objects-words be endowed with meanings. This shows that Wittgenstein is wrong in believing that the diarist cannot rely on his own memory to check whether or not he is applying the sign 'S' correctly.

Thus Ayer says:

Wittgenstein is wrong in taking the corroboration of one memory by another, or that of a memory by an item of sense experience, as an inferior substitute for some other method of verification. There is no other method. Whatever I have to identify, whether it be an object, an even, an image, or a sign, I have only my memory and my current sensation to rely on. There is a difference only in the degree to which the memories and sensations are cross-checked.³⁶

Is this a good criticisms of Wittgenstein? I think not. Let me explain. Surely it appears to be the case that our sensations and memory play essential roles in learning a language. If we do not have any sensations, or if we cannot

³⁶ A.J. Ayer, *Wittgenstein* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985) p.76.

remember anything, then we could not learn any kind of language. But from this, it does not follow that there are no differences between the ways we use sensations and memory to check whether or not we identify public objects correctly and the ways the diarist uses them to check whether or not he identify the private sensation correctly. In fact, there are many differences between them, which we cannot simply dismiss as insignificant as the difference "only in the degree to which the memories and sensations are cross-checked."

For example, the diarist cannot rely on other peoples' testimony, whereas I can. It is true, as Ayer might say, that I have to receive others' testimony through my senses. But this does not make others' testimony in any way less valuable. Compare this real testimony with an imaginary testimony. Suppose that the diarist imagines someone's giving testimony to him. He may even speak out this imaginary testimony to himself. Then, he is receiving this imaginary testimony through his sense, i.e., auditory sense, just as I receive real testimony through my auditory sense. Should we say, then, that the real testimony I have is the same as the imaginary one he has, because both are ultimately received by our senses? The answer is obviously "No". Suppose further that next day both he and I want to confirm the testimonies we have had. First, both he and I can appeal to the testimonies of our memories. So far

there is no difference. But I can go out and check my memory claim, whereas he can't. Admittedly I also receive this confirming testimony through my auditory sense. Again, now should we say, because of this, that the real testimony I have is no more and no less valuable than the imaginary one the diarist has? Surely not. Imaginary testimony is not testimony at all, as an imaginary present is not a present at all.

Thus, the ways we use memory and sensations are different from the ways the diarist has to use his memory and sensations, although in both cases everything must be received finally through his and our senses. This difference originates from the conditions that the diarist has to impose on himself when he attempts to use the sign 'S'. Recall that it is assumed that no one other than the diarist himself logically can check whether or not the diarist is using the sign 'S' correctly. Hence if he says that he is right about his judgments about S, then we cannot dispute it. If he says that he just made a mistake, then we also cannot dispute it. If he says that he is not sure about whether or not he is right, then we cannot dispute it. If he says that he can never go wrong, then we cannot dispute it. He may even say that he has been joking all the time. To this we cannot raise any question at all. This is no small defect. Even Ayer agrees about this point.

There are passages in the *Philosophical Investigations* in which Wittgenstein appears to

mean by a private language one that it is logically impossible for anyone but the speaker to understand. If this were all that he meant, I doubt if anyone would dispute his claim that there can be no such language. Certainly I should not wish to do so.^{37 38}

There is one more thing we have to consider before we finish our examination of the core of private language argument. Let me explain. It is true that by definition no one other than the diarist himself can check his use of the sign 'S'. But it does not exclude the possibility that the diarist can use something publicly observable to check his use of the sign 'S'. Why can't he use this kind of method? Because if he did, he would be doing the same thing as we do. Let me explain.

³⁷ A.J. Ayer, *Wittgenstein*, pp.74-75.

³⁸ If we do not pay attention to the logical sense of 'can' here, it is easy to make the following kind of charge. Wittgenstein is wrong in believing that the diarist cannot give any meaning to the sign 'S' because no one other than himself can check his use of it. Those who make this kind of charge would use an example of Crusoe, living alone since birth, and point out that Crusoe is likely to end up with a language however primitive it might be. The possibility of Crusoe's language shows, they would assert, that the assumption that if no one other than the speaker can understand it, then he himself cannot understand it is false. It should be now clear that private language is not to be compared with Crusoe's language. For it is logically impossible for the third party to understand private language, whereas it is certainly logically possible for the third party to understand Crusoe's language. Shortly I will talk about Crusoe's language in more detail. There I will show that the possibility or impossibility of Crusoe's language does not exercise any influence on how we solve the problem of private language. Moreover, I will show there that Wittgenstein would welcome the claim that Crusoe's language is possible.

It is possible to imagine that the diarist's sensation is correlated to certain observable phenomena. For example, it may be the case that whenever he thinks he has the sensation which he wants to name by the sign 'S', he finds that the temperature of the place he is in is 5 degree below 0, i.e., the freezing point. Suppose that he now thinks that he has the very sensation and says that he has it now. But after a second thought he is not sure that he is now having the sensation. So he checks a thermometer and finds that it does not point to the freezing point. This shows that he is wrong in thinking that he has the sensation. In this way, the diarist alone, without any other's help, could check his own usage of the sign 'S'.

Now what is wrong in this method? What is wrong is that the reading of a thermometer plays an essential role in identifying the sensation. Strangely enough, the sensation itself does not play any role. Not only does it not play any role, but also it would not really matter whether or not it really existed, insofar as he identifies it by reading a thermometer.³⁹

The upshot of this discussion is that the diarist cannot rely on some observable phenomena which are

³⁹ If he wants to use his sensation at all, then he has to say that he is right about his sensation, and the correlation is not obtained for this case. This would make his sensation important. But once he gives up the correlation, he falls into the dark situation he was in before.

correlated to his private sensation in order to check the veracity of his judgment about the very private sensation, without making the private sensation useless.⁴⁰ Read the following comment made by Wittgenstein about this kind of method.

Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign "S" in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all.) (PI §270)⁴¹

It should be now clear why the diarist cannot rely on his memory. It is because there is nothing public or external that the diarist can depend on. John Cook describes the diarist as a disembodied being.

⁴⁰ Saying that private sensations are useless may lead some to think that Wittgenstein is some kind of instrumentalist. But I do not think that it is a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein. I will try to provide what I think to be the correct meaning of 'useless' as it is used by Wittgenstein later.

⁴¹ Many philosophers confuse what Wittgenstein is saying here with the verification principle. But this is wrong. Wittgenstein is not using the verification principle here at all. If he uses it, then the private language argument could have been much simpler than the one we know now. That Wittgenstein's account of pain is not dependent on verificationism will become clearer when we examine his positive account of pain.

For if we take seriously the supposition that this is a disembodied being whose 'words' or 'signs' play no role in any language-games, and then ask ourselves how this notion of association is supposed to account for whatever he is supposed to do with their signs, we really find ourselves in difficulties. ... That is, given the supposition that this is a disembodied being who neither does nor seems to participate in any form of life, there could per hypothesis be nothing whatsoever that differs between a supposed case in which he remembers and a supposed case in which he is mistaken.⁴²

We have so far described the very thing the diarist wants to name with the sign 'S' as sensation. But note that describing the diarist's private sensation as sensation is similar to attempting to describe it by way of publicly observable things. For 'sensation' is a word of public language which is understood by almost everyone. Hence it is wrong for the diarist to describe what he has as 'sensation'. For if he does, his supposedly private sensation is not private anymore.

What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of justification which everybody understands. - And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something - and that is all that can be said. "Has" and "something" also belong to our common language. - So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. - But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in

⁴² John Cook, "Solipsism and Language", in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language*, ed. Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz, (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1972), pp.65-66.

a particular language-game, which should now be described. (PI §261)⁴³

4. THE IRRELEVANCE OF CRUSOE'S LANGUAGE TO THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Some Cartesians think that by showing that someone ('Crusoe') who is isolated from other human beings from the birth can develop his own language, they can refute Wittgenstein's argument against private language. I will try to show in this section that the possibility of Crusoe's language cannot exercise any influence on the possibility of private language.

In order to see the difference between private language and Crusoe's language, it is important not to forget that the core of private language argument is designed to demolish the epistemologically and semantically skeptical Cartesians' point of view. It means that the diarist must

⁴³ It would be helpful if we compared the diarist's report about his supposedly private sensation with our report about dreams. We report our dreams in public language. Suppose that there is a person who wants to assert that his dream, even though he can report it in public language, is still something only he can know or only he can have. If he says that this is the essence of dream, then let him say so. Insofar as he cannot say anything about it, it does not play any role in our dream-language game. It would not matter even though there were no such a thing after all. The diarist is similar to this person. Either he is silent about his private sensation or he says something about it. If he says something about it, then it is not any more something that only he can know. For he has to use public language to describe it. If he is silent about it, then he may keep it private. But then it is useless.

be understood as an epistemologically and semantically skeptical Cartesian. This in turn means that the diarist cannot use any of his publicly observable behaviors or environments to check whether or not he is using the sign 'S' correctly. He also will not admit that other people can know how he is using the sign 'S'. As a third party, there is nothing we can gain from the diarist's public behaviors or surrounding environment which we can use to guess how he is using the sign 'S'. We can use this point to show the differences between Crusoe's language and private language.

It is not difficult to figure out a reason why private language has nothing to do with Crusoe's language. The sensation which the sign 'S' is supposed to name is what can only be had by the diarist. Can we say that the objects which Crusoe is experiencing can be observed only by him? No. It is certainly possible for others to observe the poor man's environment which he may be talking about.⁴⁴ So here is the difference: in the case of the diarist it is logically impossible for others to observe the sensation he is talking about.⁴⁵, whereas in the case of Crusoe it is

⁴⁴ Would the person who discovers Crusoe dare to say that he cannot observe anything Crusoe appears to observe? He is likely to be judged to be confused if he says such a thing.

⁴⁵ Even though someone other than the diarist reports that he cannot experience the sensation the diarist is supposed to be experiencing, he is not likely to be regarded as confused.

logically possible for others to observe his environment.

J.J. Thomson makes it clear.

Now what is remarkable is that some philosophers who have understood the thesis in this way nevertheless take it to be relevant to discuss the question whether or not a man who grew up alone on a deserted island could have invented a language for his own use. But why should a man's growing alone make the language he invents (if he can invent a language) of necessity unintelligible to anthropologists who discover him? And if what is in question is the possibility of a language which is of necessity unintelligible to anyone else but its speaker, then having shown that a man who grew up alone couldn't have such a language you would still have to do the job of showing that a man who grew up in company couldn't have such a language."⁴⁶

The Cartesians might respond as follows. We have to compare the diarist's sign 'S' with Crusoe's sensation words, not with his physical objects-words. If so, then the person who discovered Crusoe - let's say he is an anthropologist- may report that he cannot experience Crusoe's sensations.⁴⁷ If we compare the diarist's sign 'S' with Crusoe's sensation-words, then there does not seem to be any difference between them. For in both cases, it makes a sense under the Cartesian assumption of privacy that we cannot have the sensations which both Crusoe and the diarist are supposed to have. Hence we cannot simply say that

⁴⁶ Thompson, J.J. "Private Languages," in Canfield, ed. vol.9 p.196; first published in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, (1), 20-31; Also in O.R. Jones, ed.

⁴⁷ In this case we would not say that the anthropologist who reports that he cannot have Crusoe's sensations is confused.

Crusoe's language is different from the diarist's language because Crusoe's language is about what many can observe while the diarist's language is about what only he can have. For, assuming Cartesian privacy, there seems to be nothing wrong in saying that Crusoe's sensation-language is also about what can only be known to him. So the analogy between the two languages seems to be revived.

But once the Cartesians reestablish the analogy between private language and Crusoe's language, then they have to realize the following. It is assumed that we, as the third party, cannot understand the private, i.e., the diarist's language. In order to keep the analogy alive, then, they have to say that they cannot understand Crusoe's sensation language. But note that the Cartesians want to say that they can understand Crusoe's sensation language. Can't the Cartesians assert, reversely, that since we can understand Crusoe's sensation-language, we must also be able to understand private language? No. Let me explain.

Assume that the anthropologist asserts that he has discovered that Crusoe has a sensation language, or Crusoe has sensations. Further assume that the Cartesians accept it. What is wrong here? It is this. Wittgenstein would immediately ask the Cartesians how they can be sure that what the anthropologist asserts to be Crusoe's sensation-words are really sensation-words. If they say that they are sure because the anthropologist has some observable evidence

to determine which are Crusoe's sensation-words, then the analogy between Crusoe's language and the private language breaks down. For in the diarist's private language, we rule out the possibility of using any publicly observable evidence to determine that the diarist's sign 'S' is a sensation-word. In order to keep the comparison intact, the Cartesians, who are using the anthropologist's report, have to say that the anthropologist does not use any public evidence to tell which are Crusoe's sensation-words. But if the anthropologist does not use any public evidence, how can he know which are Crusoe's sensation-words? Can the Cartesians believe that the anthropologist somehow is capable of feeling Crusoe's sensations? No. They cannot believe it. If they do, they are rejecting their own notion of privacy. For it means that I can have another's sensations in the Cartesian sense. Hence the correct comment which the consistent Cartesians have to make about the anthropologist's report should be that the anthropologist cannot use any publicly observable behaviors as the evidences for determining which are Crusoe's sensation-words. In short, they have to say that they cannot know whether Crusoe is using sensation-language or whether he has sensations.

The Cartesians cannot use the discovery to support the claim that private language is possible. If they use it, then they are refuting themselves. For what they must

assert is that I cannot be sure that others are using the sensation-words in the same way as I do, or that others have the sensations which are the same as mine. So they should be no less skeptical of Crusoe's use of sensation-words than of other normal people's use of them.

If the Cartesians insist that the anthropologist's report is a valuable discovery, then they have to admit that the publicly observable behavior of Crusoe is the evidence for determining whether or not Crusoe is using a sensation-word, or whether or not Crusoe feels sensations. If so, then they also have to admit that behavior is the criterion for determining that Crusoe has sensations. However they cannot do it. For it will go against their own beliefs about the privacy of sensations.

To conclude: Wittgenstein would gladly welcome the report that an anthropologist discovered Crusoe, and understood his sensation-language. For it helps establish that the Cartesians are wrong, and he is right.

Wittgenstein's own words seem to support the claim that Wittgenstein himself believes that Crusoe's language is possible.

In MS 165 Wittgenstein imagines a solitary cave-man who uses a picture-language on the walls of his cave. Such a language, he says, would be readily intelligible. Later he imagines a solitary cave-man who speaks only to himself, gives himself orders, etc. Provided he uses simple signs which we could interpret, we could come to understand him. A few pages further on Wittgenstein concludes that to describe a language which someone speaks only to himself is to

describe a regularity of his behavior, and not something which can happen only once. (cf, MS 129, p.89)⁴⁸

It is wrong, I think, to give a once-and-for-all type answer to the question whether or not Crusoe can invent a language. But one thing for sure is that Crusoe's language has absolutely nothing to do with private language in the sense in which that term is used by Wittgenstein.

⁴⁸ G. Baker, and P.M.S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules and Languages*, (Oxford:Blackwell, 1984), p.21.

IV. WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF PAIN - PRELIMINARY REMARK

We may term what we have so far discussed 'Wittgenstein's negative account of pain' in that it is basically a criticism of Cartesian theory of sensations. Let me now present what we may call 'Wittgenstein's positive account of pain', which consists of several theses. During the process of examining Wittgenstein's positive account of pain, we will encounter Wittgenstein's views on the nature of criteria and of knowledge.

1. SIX THESES OF WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF PAIN

The first thesis of Wittgenstein's positive account of pain is the claim that pain-behavior including facial expressions are the criteria for determining whether or not someone is in pain. Some could object to this thesis by pointing out that the criteriological view has at least one serious defect: it cannot explain what appears to be an undeniable fact that pain could exist without any pain-behavior, or vice versa. This objection comes from confusing Wittgenstein's notion of criteriological connection with logical entailment. If we adequately understand what

Wittgenstein means by 'criteria', we will realize that we cannot raise this kind of objection against Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein asserts that I do not use any criteria at all for determining whether or not I am in pain. This is the second thesis of Wittgenstein's positive account of pain. Another thesis related to it is the claim that it makes no sense to say that I make a mistake in determining whether or not I am in pain.

Some philosophers point out that the second and third theses are not compatible with what the first thesis implies. For example, the second thesis - that I do not use any criteria for determining whether or not I am in pain - is not compatible with the claim that behaviors are criteria for determining whether or not someone is in pain. Also the third thesis - that it makes no sense to say that I do not make any mistake about my own pain - is said to be incompatible with the claim that behavioral criteria sometimes lead us to make mistakes. These philosophers are misunderstanding Wittgenstein. If they understand adequately Wittgenstein's views on the nature of criteria and knowledge, they would realize that there are no such inconsistencies.

Some philosophers suggest that we use Wittgenstein's claim that uttering "I am in pain" is a new pain-behavior in order to explain some of Wittgenstein's theses such as "I do not use any criteria for determining whether or not I am in

pain," or "I cannot make any mistake in determining whether or not I am in pain." The claim that uttering "I am in pain" is a new pain-behavior is the fourth thesis.

There are two other perplexing claims Wittgenstein makes about pain. One is the claim that it does not make any sense to say that I know that I am in pain. This is the fifth thesis, which has caused hot debates among philosophers. The other claim - the sixth thesis - is that two or more than two persons can have the same pain.

The following are the six theses which consist of Wittgenstein's positive account of pain.⁴⁹

THE THESES OF WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF PAIN

- 1) Pain-behavior is criteriologically evidence for determining whether or not someone is in pain.
- 2) I do not use any criterion for determining whether or not I am in pain.
- 3) I cannot make any mistake at all in determining whether or not I am in pain, or it makes no sense for me to be mistaken about my pain.
- 4) Uttering "I am in pain." is like groaning or moaning.
- 5) It does not make any sense to say that I know that I am in pain.
- 6) More than two people can have the same pain.

⁴⁹ I do not mean that these six theses exhaust all the theses which could be classified under the title of "Wittgenstein's positive account of pain." I select what seems to me essential.

2. WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF CRITERIA

Let me present various aspects of Wittgenstein's account of criteria to see what bearings they have on our problem of explaining Wittgenstein's account of pain.

1) CRITERIA AS HAVING A SEMANTICAL ASPECT

For Wittgenstein, the notion of criteria has what I call a 'semantical aspect.' By the claim that 'criteria' has a semantical aspect, I mean that we cannot learn how to use a word like 'pain' without learning to catch the connection between pain-behavior and pain. Anyone who does not catch the connection between pain-behavior and pain would not know how to use the word 'pain' correctly. So Wittgenstein says:

When we learnt the use of the phrase "so-and-so has toothache" we were pointed out certain kinds of behavior of those who were said to have toothache.⁵⁰

Anthony Kenny correctly points out this point.

X is not a criterion for Y if someone could learn the meaning of 'Y' without having grasped the connection between X and Y.⁵¹

Wittgenstein sometimes describes this semantical characteristic of criteria by using the terms like

⁵⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, 2nd edition, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p.24, Hereafter this work will be cited in parentheses as *BB* followed by page numbers.

⁵¹ Anthony Kenny, "Criterion," in P. Edward, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (New York: MacMillan and Free Press, 1967), vol.II, p.259.

'grammatical truths' or 'grammatical rules.' See P.M.S. Hacker's following claim.

Hence the proposition that p is a criterion for q is a grammatical truth or grammatical proposition which explains a rule for the use of words.⁵²

2) CRITERIA AS HAVING AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT: CRITERIA AS NONINDUCTIVE EVIDENCE

Wittgenstein obviously believes that a criterion is evidence that helps us determine whether or not that for which it is a criterion is true. But it is a special kind of evidence, sometimes called 'noninductive evidence'.

What is meant by 'noninductive evidence'? It means that a criterion is direct evidence for the truth of a judgment for which it is a criterion. Shoemaker writes:

For present purposes, we may characterize the criteria for the truth of a judgment as those states of affairs that are (whose existence would be) direct and noninductive evidence in favor of the truth of the judgment.⁵³

But this is hardly helping clarify the notion of noninductive evidence. Shoemaker gives a further explanation.

If so and so's being the case is a criterion for the truth of a judgment of identity, the assertion that it is the evidence in favor of the truth of the judgment is necessarily (logically)

⁵² P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p.310.

⁵³ Sidney Shoemaker, *Self Knowledge and Self Identity*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963) p.3.

rather than contingently (empirically) true.⁵⁴

What Shoemaker is saying is that it is necessarily - not contingently - the case that a criterion is the evidence for judging that what it is a criterion of is true. For example if groaning is a criterion for someone's being in pain, then it is necessarily the case that his groaning is an evidence for judging that he is in pain. But what does it mean? It means that if someone raises a question why someone's groaning is evidence for judging that he is in pain, then we "will be at a loss to answer the question, and find that here we strike rock bottom..." (BB p.25) In this context, we can understand the following comment from G.H. von Wright's about criteria.

The evidence which we produce for the truth of a proposition which we claim to know consists of propositions which we accept as true. If the question is raised, how we know these latter propositions, further grounds may be offered to show how we know them and further evidence given for the truth of the propositions thus claimed to be known. But the chain of grounds (evidence) has an end, a point beyond which no further grounds can be given. This is a thing which Wittgenstein often stressed.⁵⁵

Don't misunderstand Shoemaker's claim that if A is a criterion of B, then it is necessarily the case that A is an evidence for B's being true as meaning that A entails B. For example, Shoemaker would not say that if groaning is a

⁵⁴ Sidney Shoemaker, p.34.

⁵⁵ G.H.von Wright, "Wittgenstein on Certainty", in Canfield ed., vol.8, p.170; originally in his *Wittgenstein*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

criterion for someone's being in pain, then someone's groaning entails that he is in pain. All he is saying is that it is a necessary truth that groaning is an evidence for pain.

3) CRITERIA AND SYMPTOMS

Wittgenstein contrasts criteria with symptoms. Since criteria are said to have two aspects, we can contrast them with symptoms in two ways. First, symptoms would be things which are not needed to understand a certain word, though they are related to it. Second, a criterion is noninductive evidence, whereas a symptom is inductive evidence. For example, Hacker says:

This is the point of contrasting symptoms with criteria. We then discover the symptoms of X in experience, and such discoveries presuppose an understanding of 'X' and the possibility of its non-inductive identification.⁵⁶

3. WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Wittgenstein asserts that there are many propositions about which it makes no sense to raise any doubt. Such propositions as "Here is my hand," "The earth existed before I was born," belong to the class of the propositions about

⁵⁶ Hacker, P.M.S. *Insight and Illusion*, p.310.

which it makes no sense to doubt.⁵⁷ These propositions "stand fast," as Wittgenstein says, because they have a peculiar logical role in our system of knowledge. He writes:

When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. (OC §136)

But what kind of peculiar logical role do those empirical and indubitable propositions have in "the system of our empirical propositions"? The following remark of Wittgenstein helps answer this question.

That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. (OC §308)⁵⁸

For those people who still continue to try to doubt these propositions by employing various arguments, Wittgenstein prepares the following kinds of replies.

If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word "hand" has

⁵⁷ Incidentally these are the propositions that G.E. Moore asserts that he can know for certain. Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is said to be written to respond to G.E. Moore. See his "A Defence of Common Sense", "Proof of an External World," in *Philosophical Papers*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959).

⁵⁸ Compare this to the peculiar characteristics of criteriological or noninductive evidence. To say that if A is a criteriological or noninductive evidence for B's being true is to say that if we want to make judgments, we cannot deny that A is a criterion for B.

any meaning? So that is something I seem to know after all. (OC §369)

The same claim is made in another place.

If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense), why not in that case about the meaning of these words as well? (OC §456)

In general, Wittgenstein asserts:

If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. (OC §114)⁵⁹

There is one important thing I should mention.

Wittgenstein asserts that it makes no sense to say that we know that these propositions are true. For it makes no sense to say that we know what is beyond doubt, according to Wittgenstein. Hence Moore had better not say that he knows that here is my hand, Wittgenstein says

Instead of "I know...", couldn't Moore have said: "It stands fast for me that ..."? And further: "It stands fast for me and many others..." (OC §116)

In the previous two sections I have tried to sketch Wittgenstein's views on the nature of criteria and knowledge. Keeping them in mind, let's examine Wittgenstein's positive theses one by one.

⁵⁹ Compare this with what we will say about criteria after a short while. We will say that if someone denies that pain-behaviors are criteria for pain, then we have to question that he really understand what is meant by 'pain.'

V. CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF PAIN

1. AN EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CLAIM THAT PAIN-BEHAVIOR IS A CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THAT SOMEONE IS IN PAIN

It is Wittgenstein's belief that pain-behaviors are the criteria for pain. Now this could mean at least two things. First, it could mean that we cannot learn the meaning of the word 'pain' without grasping the connection between pain and pain-behavior. Second, it could mean that pain-behavior is noninductive evidence by which we can determine whether or not someone is in pain. Let's examine these two claims.

1) WE CAN'T UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF A WORD 'PAIN' WITHOUT GRASPING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PAIN AND PAIN-BEHAVIOR

Could we make counterexamples to this claim? In order to offer a counterexample, someone must explain how we can understand the meaning of a word 'pain' without considering anything about publicly observable things. Strawson attempts to offer this kind of counterexample. He says:

Wittgenstein gives himself considerable trouble over the question of how a man would introduce a name for a sensation into this private language. But we need imagine no special ceremony. He can get into the habit of making a certain mark in a

different place everytime it occurred.⁶⁰

It should be easy to guess how Wittgenstein would respond to this type of criticism. Wittgenstein's diarist section can be used to abolish exactly this kind of reply.

Wittgenstein considers the possibilities that someone might invent a name for a sensation. This person may be such a genius that he understands the meaning of 'pain' without any other's help, as he might discover how to prove Pythagoras' theorem all alone. If this is possible, then the claim that without grasping the connection between pain and pain-behavior no one can learn the meaning of 'pain' is not true. How would Wittgenstein reply to this?

"What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach the child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'." Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word.- So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?- But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?- How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose? -When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain'; it shows the post where the new word is stationed. (PI §257)

Even though it may be possible to think that someone

⁶⁰ Peter Strawson, "A critical notice of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", in O.R. Jones ed. p.44; first published in *Mind*, (63), pp.77-100; Also in Pitcher ed.; in Canfield ed., vol.4.



could invent a name for the sensation, e.g., pain, it does not mean that he can understand the meaning of pain somehow without knowing the connection between pain and pain-behavior. For in order for him to make himself understood, he has to explain the meaning of 'pain' to us, and when he explains it, he has to connect pain to pain-behavior. That is, he has to point out the conceptual connection between pain and pain-behavior to explain the meaning of 'pain.' This is the only way he can show to us that he understands 'pain.' Can he offer something which we cannot offer as an explanation of the meaning of 'pain' because he learned it all alone? No. Hence there is no difference between him and us about the meaning of 'pain.'

The Cartesians might respond as follows. What really matters in understanding what 'pain' means is not whether or not he can explain it to others but whether or not he can feel pain all by himself. Somehow he has to feel pain. Otherwise he can never understand what 'pain' means. On the contrary, if he has ever felt pain, then he is understanding what 'pain' means even though he cannot explain it to others. The Cartesians might continue this line of objection by saying that it is possible to imagine that someone, who has never felt pain in his life, is using the word 'pain' in the same way that we use it. We cannot say, they would assert, that this person knows the meaning of 'pain'. How would Wittgenstein respond to this type of



objection?

The person, who, though he never felt pain, uses 'pain' in the same way as we do, is not unlike the person

whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant - so that he constantly called different things by that name - but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain.' - in short he uses it as we all do. (PI §271)

Does Wittgenstein say that this latter person does not understand the meaning of the word 'pain'? No.

Wittgenstein says that the thing this latter person fails to retain in his memory is "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves it" (PI §271). We can apply this kind of answer to the former person's case. That is, the pain he is supposed to have never felt is "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves it." In other words, it does not matter whether or not he has ever felt pain if he really uses the word 'pain' in the same way we use it.

2) PAIN-BEHAVIOR IS NONINDUCTIVE EVIDENCE BY WHICH WE CAN DETERMINE THAT SOMEONE IS IN PAIN

According to this view, it is necessarily the case that observing pain-behavior is evidence by which we can, in principle, tell that someone is in pain. A common question raised to it is how Wittgenstein can explain that we sometimes make mistakes in judging that someone is in pain on the grounds that he displays pain-behavior. For example, it may be the case that someone may just pretend to be in

pain.

To this type of objection Wittgenstein first would point out that we do not need to worry about the possibility of pretension at least for babies and animals. So he asserts:

Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence?- And on what experience is our assumption based?
(Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.) (PI §249)

Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him to howl on particular occasions as if he were in pain, even when he is not. But the surroundings which are necessary for this behavior to be real simulation are missing.
(PI §250)

A child has much to learn before it can pretend.
(A dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere.) (PI II, p.229)

However, that babies do not pretend to be in pain does not guarantee that we can be always correct about babies' pains. Also, adults can pretend to be in pain, and so they could certainly deceive us. So it is the case that we go wrong at least sometimes in judging that someone is in pain by observing his pain-behavior. Wittgenstein has yet to answer the above kind of question.

Wittgenstein would say that though we sometimes fail to determine correctly whether or not someone is in pain by observing his pain-behavior, it does not make false the claim that there is a criteriological connection between

pain and pain-behavior. Thus Hacker writes:

In this sense, the claim that the satisfaction of the criterion for p confers certainty, proves or is decisive for the truth of p is compatible with the claim that the criteria are defeasible.⁶¹

We can put the above objection in the following type of philosophical jargon. If a criterion is noninductive evidence, that is, if criteriological evidence is neither inductive nor deductive one, then how can we be sure of the truth of what it is a criterion of? Since it is not a deductive evidence, that is, since it does not entail what it is a criterion of, it cannot give us a deductively certain ground on which we can determine the truth of what is a criterion. Also, since it is not an inductive evidence, it does not seem to give any probabilistically - low or high -certain ground on which we can determine the truth of what it is a criterion of. Either way, a criterion seems to fail to insure the truth of what it is a criterion of.

This is a misunderstanding. When Wittgenstein says that criteriological evidence of pain is neither deductive nor inductive, he is not saying that we can always doubt the truth of what it is evidence for. For he makes it clear that when criteriological evidence is present, it is sometimes, in a certain context, beyond doubt and so certain, that what it is a criterion of is the case. If

⁶¹ P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p.317.

someone still raises a doubt, then we have to wonder what he means by the word 'pain.' That is, he is displaying that he does not understand the meaning of the word 'pain.' We had better quote Hacker again.

Doubt in such circumstances would betoken a failure of understanding, lack of mastery of the concept of pain, not admirable caution.⁶²

Fodor and Chihara attempt to come up with a case in which we confirm the truth of a statement neither by depending on criteria nor by symptoms.⁶³ If there is such a case, then it surely opens the possibility that we identify someone's pain not by criteria nor by symptoms, but by something else. Let me examine their argument.

Their counterexample to the above claim is this. C.T.R. Wilson, who is the inventor of the Wilson cloud-chamber, determined that charged particles move through his chamber by observing "the formation of tiny, thin bands of fog on the glass surface of the instrument". Chihara and Fodor assert that observing these streaks of fog is neither a criterion nor a symptom for the motion of particles. It is not a criterion, because "Wilson did not learn what 'path of a charged particle' means by having the cloud-chamber explained to him: he discovered the method". It is not a

⁶² P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p.316.

⁶³ C.S. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language, A Critique of Wittgenstein", in Canfield. ed., vol.7, pp.71-85; first published in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1965), pp.281-295; Also in G. Pitcher ed.



symptom either, because there is no "observed correlations between streaks and some criterion of motion of charged particles."⁶⁴ What Wilson does is rather to formulate a hypothesis that explains as well as possible why such streaks of fog appear. They suggest, then, that we explore the possibility of explaining the concept of 'pain' in the way scientists explain such theoretical concepts as 'electrons.' They say that "we may instead form complex conceptual connections which interrelate a wide variety of mental states."⁶⁵ Pain is one of such mental states which are assumed to exist. By using the existence of such things as pain, we can explain people's behaviors. The better we explain people's behaviors by using them, the greater the "evidence for the existence of the mental processes we postulate," they assert.⁶⁶ The conclusion they draw is that "it is, at least, conceivable that a non-Wittgensteinian account ought to be given of the way children learn the mental predicates,"⁶⁷ and so it is also conceivable that there is no conceptual connection between pain and pain-behavior.

What is wrong in their argument? I think they do not notice the difference between the past situation in which

⁶⁴ C. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, p.81.

⁶⁵ C. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, p.82.

⁶⁶ C. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, p.83.

⁶⁷ C. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, p.83.



Wilson proposed his discovery for the first time and the current situation in which his discovery is now accepted. When Wilson proposed his method, scientists would not have immediately accepted it as established. To confirm it, other scientists would also have tried the method themselves. Imagine what we would do now with Wilson's method if it turned out that it was actually a fabrication. No one would say that the streaks on the surface of the glass, though he now obtains the same result as that of Wilson's, indicate the motion of particles. But as a matter of fact it did not happen. Other scientists were also able to obtain the result that Wilson proclaimed he obtained. Wilson's method was confirmed and accepted as a correct method to detect particles. It is true that Wilson did not learn the meaning of 'particle' by grasping the connection between the streaks and motion of particles. He invented the meaning, as Chihara and Fodor say. Compare Wilson with the genius who invented the meaning of 'pain.' In the genius example, we have seen that the possibility that a genius could invent and learn all alone the meaning of 'pain' does not falsify the claim that there is a conceptual connection between pain and pain-behavior. Similarly, the fact that Wilson learned the meaning of 'particle' all alone does not falsify that there is a conceptual connection between the streaks and the motion of particles. These days grasping the connection between the streaks and the motion



of particles, I believe, would be surely one of the ways of understanding the meaning of 'particles.' Hence observing the streaks on the surface of glass, I think, will be regarded as a criterion for the motion of particles at least by scientists. It is true that at the time that Wilson proposed his method, it was not regarded as a criterion. But that does not make it impossible that it later becomes a criterion, as it really happened.

2. AN EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CLAIM THAT IT DOES NOT MAKE ANY SENSE TO SAY THAT I KNOW THAT I AM IN PAIN

We have seen before that Wittgenstein holds in his book *On Certainty* that it makes no sense to say that we know what is beyond doubt. We can find a similar claim in *Philosophical Investigations*, where he gives a kind of way of testing whether or not one is using correctly the phrase "I know such and such."

"I know..." may mean "I do not doubt..." but does not mean that the words "I doubt ..." are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded. (*PI* II, xi, p.221)

For example, consider the sentence "There is a mountain on the backside of Moon." I know that it is true. But it is still possible to doubt, i.e., it is not logically excluded to doubt its truth. Compare it with the sentence "I am in pain." Wittgenstein asserts that "I can't be in error" in

judging that I am in pain, or that "it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain," or that "[t]hat expression of doubt has no place in the language game" of pain (*PI* §288).

I turn to stone and my pain goes on. - Suppose I were in error and it was no longer pain? - But I can't be in error here; it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain! - That means: if anyone said "I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something else", we should think something like, he does not know what the English word "pain" means; and we should explain it to him. (*PI* §288)

It is impossible, i.e., it is logically excluded to doubt that I am in pain when I am in pain. Hence it makes no sense to say that I know that I am in pain.

"I know what I want, wish, believe, feel," (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers' nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment *a priori*. (*PI* IIxi, p.221)

If we use it, i.e., if we say that I know that I am in pain, it can mean nothing other than saying simply that I am in pain.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know that I am in pain. What it is supposed to mean except that I am in pain? (*PI* §246)

Many philosophers would deny that it is nonsensical to say that I know that I am in pain. "Isn't that so much better?", some philosophers might ask, "if doubt is not merely psychologically but logically impossible, then the corresponding knowledge must be so much the more secure."⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Anthony Kenny, "Verification Principle and the private language argument", in Canfield ed., p.217; first published in O.R. Jones ed.



That is, why doesn't Wittgenstein simply say that since I cannot be in error about my pain, or it is logically excluded to doubt that I am in pain, I know that I am in pain? Isn't Wittgenstein wrong in asserting that it makes no sense to say that I know that I am in pain? Richard Rorty says:

it is not clear whether we should accept the (above Wittgenstein's) analysis and get rid of the (potentially) embarrassing fact that we possess incorrigible knowledge, or whether we should reject the analysis because it does not cover a certain sort of knowledge, while trying to overcome our embarrassment by other tactics.⁶⁹

I will not try to defend Wittgenstein's views on knowledge against the above kind of objection. What I will do in the following is to discuss an objection of a different kind. Wittgenstein and the Cartesians appear to agree on the substantial point that I cannot be wrong in judging whether or not I am in pain. The Cartesians might use this similarity to criticize Wittgenstein. For example, they could assert that the reason why I cannot doubt about my own pain is that pain is private in their sense. How would Wittgenstein deal with the claim that I cannot doubt about my pain because it is something only I can have?

It is important to note that when Wittgenstein says

⁶⁹ Richard Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Incommunicability, in Canfield ed. vol.9, p.163; first published in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, (7), pp.192-205.

that I cannot be wrong about my pain, the pain here is not the Cartesian private sensation. He is talking about pain as it is ordinarily understood. If we understood pain here as Cartesian private pain, then, Wittgenstein would assert, I can make a doubt about whether or not I identify my pain correctly. This is the point, of course, Wittgenstein makes in the private language argument. Wittgenstein says:

That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I might *legitimately* begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with the expression of a sentence, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists. (PI §288)

Wittgenstein, however, suggests one legitimate or sensible use of saying "I know that I am in pain." He says that we can understand such sentences as "I know that I am in pain" as a grammatical proposition, which teaches us how to use the sentence "I am in pain." That is, we can use it to teach people that it makes no sense to say that I cannot doubt that I am in pain, once I am in pain. Note that he says something similar about propositions like "I know that here are my hands." He says that we can use them to remind people of the fact that in normal language game we can never doubt the proposition that here are my hands. It is Wittgenstein's view that in general "I know p," where p is filled with a proposition whose truth we cannot doubt, can



be understood as a grammatical proposition which states a grammatical rule. Only in this way such claims as "I know that I am in pain," "I know that here are my hands" can be legitimately used, Wittgenstein asserts.

We have said that it is Wittgenstein's view that it makes no sense to say that I know that I am in pain. Now, what about the proposition that you have pain? Would Wittgenstein say that it makes a sense to say that I know that you are in pain? The answer is "Yes and No." Let me explain. Imagine a case in which a person is wounded in an accident. He is bleeding and showing every imaginable pain-behavior. Would Wittgenstein say in this case that it is possible to doubt that this person is in pain? Would Wittgenstein say that in this case I can make a mistake about his pain? I think not. He would certainly say that it is beyond doubt that this person is in pain. Recall that it is Wittgenstein's view that if criteriological evidence is present, it is sometimes, in a certain context, beyond doubt that what it is the evidence of is true. Hence, Wittgenstein would allow us to say, I think, that it makes no sense to say that I know that he is in pain. Of course, I am not denying that Wittgenstein would also let us use such a sentence as "I know that he is in pain" in some other occasions. What I want to say here is that there are situations - probably many - in which we can be certain that others have pains. Thus, Wittgenstein can say, it seems to

me, first that it does not make any sense to say both that I know that I am in pain and that I know that he is in pain; second that I do not make any mistake either about my pain or his pain.⁷⁰

In the passing, I want to mention some differences between the proposition that I am in pain and the propositions like "Here are my hands." Wittgenstein would say that it is logically excluded for me to doubt that I am in pain. But it does not seem to be sure that Wittgenstein would also say that it is logically excluded for me to doubt that here are my hands. Maybe he can say that it is logically excluded for me to doubt such propositions as "Here are my hands" in the sense that if we doubt it, we have to give up the entire system of knowledge. But if this is the sense of 'logically excluded from doubt,' then we have another problem. Would Wittgenstein say that it is logically excluded for me to doubt about my pain, because if I doubt it, then I have to give up the entire system of knowledge? The answer seems to be "No." Wittgenstein would

⁷⁰ That Wittgenstein would say that it is nonsensical to say that I know that he is in pain because it is beyond doubt that he is in pain shows that it is not Wittgenstein's concern to answer the skeptical question of other minds by saying that I can know that he is in pain. If he wants to answer positively to it, he is likely to assert that I know that he is in pain because it is beyond doubt that he is in pain. Wittgenstein would never admit that there is such a problem of other minds. Hence he would not provide any solution for the problem. What he does is to show that the problem of other minds is not a real problem. We will talk more about Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem in the last chapter of this dissertation.

not say, I think, that it is logically excluded to doubt that here is my hand. For he would say that, though in normal situations it is beyond doubt that here are my hands, in some situations I can doubt that what I believe to be my hand is really my hand. Would there be such situations in which I can doubt that what I think to be pain is really pain? I think not. In whatever situations if I think that I have pain, then I have pain. But in the case of my hand, I may be wrong in some situations in judging that what I am seeing now is my hand, though I sincerely believe it. Another difference I can think of is this. It seems that it is awkward to say that I stand fast to the claim that I am in pain, though it is less so to say that I stand fast to the claim that here are my hands.

3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE THESIS THAT UTTERING "I AM IN PAIN" IS A NEW PAIN-BEHAVIOR

Wittgenstein says that uttering "I am in pain" is like groaning or moaning. The difference between them is that we learn to utter "I am in pain," whereas we do not learn how to groan or moan. See the following paragraph where Wittgenstein asks how people can learn the meaning of 'pain'? One possibility, Wittgenstein asserts, is this.

Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has

hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

(*PI* §244)

Some philosophers think that we can use this kind of claim of Wittgenstein's to explain some of his difficult claims. For example, some philosophers become perplexed why Wittgenstein says that it does not make any sense to say that I know that I am in pain. The answer they come up with is that saying "I know that I am in pain" is senseless in the same way as saying "I know when to cry, limb." is.⁷¹

I do not think that this is a correct way of explaining some of Wittgenstein's theses on pain. First, it will lead us to ignore many important points about Wittgenstein. For example, if we think that Wittgenstein asserts that it is nonsensical to say that I know that I am in pain because uttering "I am in pain" is like groaning, we would miss the real reason which we have seen before. Second, it can lead people to think - wrongly - that Wittgenstein asserts that "I am in pain" is not a sentence. If someone understands Wittgenstein here as asserting that "I am in pain" is not a sentence, then he is wrong. It is wrong, because when we

⁷¹ Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds", p.383. Also, Anthony Kenny, "Verification Principle and the Private Language Argument", in J. Canfield, ed., vol.9, p.217; first published in O.R.Jones ed.

say "I am in pain," we seem to say certainly something which is true or false, whereas when we groan, we are not making any statement which could be said to be true or false.

Wittgenstein himself does not seem to wish to deny that the sentence "I am in pain" is also a descriptive sentence. In part II of *Philosophical Investigations* he says that "I am in pain" is a descriptive sentence.

"I am in pain" which replaces crying is not merely another cry, it can be used to describe a sensation, a cry cannot. (PI II, IX, p.189)

I do not think that Wittgenstein intends to deny that "I am in pain" is a descriptive sentence when he says that uttering it is a new pain-behavior. There are occasions in which uttering it is really like a pain-behavior. But there are also occasions in which uttering it is a making a statement about pain.

4. AN EXAMINATION OF THE THESES THAT I DO NOT IDENTIFY MY SENSATION BY CRITERIA, AND THAT I DO NOT MAKE ANY MISTAKE ABOUT MY PAIN

Wittgenstein asserts that I do not use any criteria for determining whether or not I am in pain.

What I do is not, of course, identify my sensation by criteria: but to repeat an expression. But this is not the end of the language-game: it is the beginning. (PI §290)

This thesis, together with another that I do not make any mistake about my pain, has given rise to much controversy.

In this section, I will examine some objections that can be raised against these two theses, and try to answer them without using a wrong method, i.e., the method of identifying uttering "I am in pain" with pain-behavior.

1) THE DIARIST SECTION REVISITED

John Canfield asserts that some may find inconsistencies between these two theses and what Wittgenstein says when he criticizes the diarist. One inconsistency that they can find, according to Canfield, is this. Recall that the reason why the diarist fails to identify the sensation he is supposed to name with the sign 'S' is that the diarist cannot come up with any criteria. But why wouldn't it be possible for the diarist to identify the sensation without using any criteria, if, after all, I do not use any criteria for identifying my pain?⁷²

The other alleged inconsistency is this. Recall again that Wittgenstein rejects the diarist's claim that he can identify the sensation, because for the diarist "whatever is going to seem right to [him] is right." Now compare this with the thesis that, on the assumption that I am sincere and have no intention of lying, whenever I say I am in pain, I am in pain. Hence we can say that "for Wittgenstein, our

⁷² John Canfield, "Private Language" in *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, R. Arrington and H. Glock, ed., (London: Routledge, 1991), p.123.

public talk of pain is such that for the speaker "Whatever is going to seem right is right." Now am I not "in a position similar to the [diarist] for whom 'whatever is going to seem right is right'?"⁷³

Are there really inconsistencies of these kinds in Wittgenstein's account of pain? Canfield answers "No." I would agree with Canfield. But I disagree with some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein that Canfield makes to support his answer. Let's see how Canfield tries to show that Wittgenstein is not making the first kind of inconsistent claims.

According to Canfield, the first kind of inconsistency arises from the following kind of consideration. Suppose that Wittgenstein argues in the diarist section this way. First Wittgenstein assumes the verificationistic principle that "one ought in general to have such a criterion" of identifying a sensation to give the meaning to a sensation-word. Then, Wittgenstein examines whether or not the diarist can have the criterion of identity. Wittgenstein finds out that the diarist cannot have one. Therefore, Wittgenstein concludes that the diarist cannot give any meaning to the sign 'S.' But Wittgenstein says that it is all right for me not to have such a criterion. If the above principle, assumed in the diarist section, is used, then Wittgenstein has to say that I also cannot give the meaning

⁷³ John Canfield, p.124

to the word 'pain.' But in fact, he does not say it. Hence he is making inconsistent claims.

Now what is wrong in this kind of argument that some could use to show the first kind of inconsistency? Canfield's answer is that Wittgenstein does not use the above kind of verificationistic principle in the diarist section. So Wittgenstein can say, without any inconsistency, that I do not use any criteria for determining whether or not I have pain.⁷⁴

Canfield points out that the verificationistic principle is not employed in the core of private language argument. I agree with him. We have already seen that Wittgenstein does not use such a general principle at all to show that the diarist cannot identify his private sensation. What he does is to show that the conditions the private diarist has to impose on himself puts him first in a situation in which he cannot rely on his memory, and so finally in a position in which he cannot say anything about his supposedly private sensation. Those conditions are not arbitrarily imposed by Wittgenstein in the disguise of the name of criterion from the outside. As Canfield says:

Note that it is one who assumes 'the abrogation of the normal language-game with the expression of a sensation' - that is, one who is in the grip of the picture of private language - who needs a criterion of identity. And again, the demand is

⁷⁴ John Canfield, p.123.

not imposed from without, dogmatically.⁷⁵

Canfield concludes: The conditions that the diarist has to impose on himself make us judge that he does not have any criteria. Whereas since I do not need to impose such conditions on myself, it is all right for me to say that I do not use any criteria. This is why Wittgenstein says that "if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh" (*PI* §288). Let me quote the full section.

That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if we cut out human behaviour, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists. (*PI* §288)⁷⁶

Now I want to correct one misunderstanding that Canfield has about Wittgenstein. It is correct to say that Wittgenstein does not use such a general principle in the diarist section. But, though we assume that it is used in the diarist section, the inconsistency at issue does not seem to follow. For when Wittgenstein asserts that I do not use any criteria for determining whether or not I am in pain, he is not saying that there are no criteria at all.

⁷⁵ John Canfield, p.133.

⁷⁶ Quoted by John Canfield in his "Private Language Argument", p.133.

What he is saying is that even though there are such criteria, I do not use them. Ronald Suter makes this point clear.

[W]hile there are criteria for first-person, present-tense psychological statements, but the speaker does not (normally) employ such criteria in making these statements, but we do employ these criteria when making the second or third-person psychological statements.⁷⁷

I do not use any criteria not because I do not have any, but because I do not need to use them. I have to learn how to use the sentence "I have pain." When I learn it, I have to know the relevant criteria. But once I learn the criteria, I do not need to apply them. The diarist, on the other hand, cannot use any criteria because he can't have any. Canfield seems to think that it is Wittgenstein's view that I can use "I am in pain" without having any criteria.

Note, though I do not use any criteria, still others can check whether or not I am telling a lie etc. If there are no criteria for governing my use of the sentence "I am in pain," then other people cannot detect that I am telling a lie. Since other people can detect it, it means that there are such criteria. But in the diarist case, other people cannot tell whether or not he is telling a lie. For there are no criteria for governing his use of sign 'S.' This is the important difference that needs to be emphasized. I will use it to dismiss the second alleged

⁷⁷ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, p.151.

inconsistency.

The second type of inconsistency was this.

Wittgenstein seems to assert that for my pain it is all right to say that whatever seems to be right to me is right, whereas for the diarist's private sensation it is not permissible to say that whatever seems to be right to him is right. Putting it another way, why can't Wittgenstein allow the diarist to be the incorrigible judge about his supposedly private sensation, if he allows me to be the sole incorrigible judge about my pain?

The answer is basically the same as the first one. It is because of the condition the private diarist faces and the one we face are different. Note that it is possible for someone else to make a mistake about my pain. For instance, he may judge that I am not in pain even though I am in pain; or he may judge that I am in pain even though I am not in pain. It is also possible for someone else to recognize that I am telling a lie when I say that I am in pain. Wittgenstein would not deny these possibilities when he says that I do not make any mistake about my own pain. But, as has been said before, for the diarist's judgments about his private sensation, there could be no such exchanges between him and anyone else. For instance, we can never detect that the diarist is telling a lie when he intends to tell a lie about his private sensation: We cannot imagine the case in which we may judge that he does not have his private

sensation, though he says that he does have: We cannot imagine the case in which we may judge that he does have his private sensation, though he says that he does not have. We cannot do these things, because we have to accept whatever the diarist says. If it has to be the case that we have to accept whatever the diarist says, this means - ironically - that we cannot but be suspicious about his judgments about his private sensation.

It might be said that if we assume that the speaker of the sentence "I am in pain" is sincere, then we have to accept whatever he says, and so there is no difference between public speaker of 'pain' and the private speaker. But those who come up with this kind of claim have yet to understand what has been said above. What we have said is that there is no distinction between sincerity and insincerity on the part of the diarist, whereas there is such a distinction on the part of the public speaker of 'pain.' Even though the diarist intends to tell a lie when he says that he has his private sensation, we cannot but accept his claim that he has his private sensation.

2) ANOTHER KIND OF ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY

J.M. Shorter in his article "Other Minds" attempts to show that a paradox that I both can and cannot make any mistake about my pain follows from Wittgenstein's thesis of the incorrigibility of first-person pain statement and his other

claim that someone else can be in error in determining whether or not I am in pain. If Shorter is right, then of course we should reject Wittgenstein's positive account of pain. Let's see Shorter's argument about this problem.

Or "(1) "I have pain," said by me about myself, is the contradictory of (2) "I have not a pain," said by me about myself. Therefore, since (3) "He has a pain," said about me by someone else, is also the contradictory of (2), (1) and (3) must both be the same statement. Consequently, if (3) is logically connected with certain behavioral statements, (1) must also have these connections. This makes it difficult to see how (1) can be incorrigible. If I can be mistaken about my own behavior, as is the case, and if there is a logical connection between my pain and my behavior, then, it would seem, I can be mistaken about my pain." ⁷⁸

This argument has at least one false premise which is not stated explicitly. Let me reformulate the above argument.

- 1) "I have not a pain" said by me about myself is the contradictory of "He has a pain" said about me by someone else.
- 2) Hence "I have a pain" said by me about myself and "He has a pain" said about me by someone else are the same statement.
- 3) "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is logically connected with certain statements about my behavior.
- 4) "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is about my behavior.
- 5) Hence, "I have a pain" said by me about myself is logically connected with certain statements about my behavior. (by 2,3)

⁷⁸ J.M. Shorter, "Other Minds", in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Paul Edwards, ed., (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967), vol.6, p.8.

6) Hence, "I have a pain" said by me about myself is about my behavior. (by 2,4,5)

7) I can make a mistake about my behavior.

8) Hence I can make a mistake about my pain. (by 6,7)

Shorter does not state the fourth premise - "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is about my behavior - explicitly. But I think he has to use it as one of the premises of his argument. For without it, the conclusion does not follow. But, as stated explicitly, it is false. Hence we cannot guarantee the truth of the conclusion. But why is it false? The reason is simple. It is because "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is about my pain not about my behavior. The third premise that "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is logically connected with certain behavioral statements, which Wittgenstein would accept, should not be equated with the fourth premise that "He has a pain" said about me by someone else is about my behavior, which Wittgenstein would reject. It is not about my behavior but about my pain, even though it is logically connected with certain statements about my behavior.

There is another point that Shorter fails to notice. It is that there are two senses of 'corrigible' that can be assigned to the statements like "I am in pain," or "He is in pain." This is made clear by Suter who explains that the statement "He is in pain" said about me by someone else could mean two things in the following way.

First it is a way of saying that third-person present-tense pain statements are not beyond correction; so someone might discover that ["He is in pain"] is false when made by one speaker about another person. Second, the statement that ["He is in pain" said about me by someone else] is corrigible might mean that even the speaker can be mistaken when he or she judges that "He has a pain", assuming that the speaker does not use the pronoun "he" in the fashion of de Gaulle to talk about himself.⁷⁹

If we apply these two senses of corrigibility to the statement "I am in pain" made by me about myself, then we can get the following result. To say that it is incorrigible is not to say that whenever I say that I am in pain the statement "I am in pain" is always true. I could deliberately tell a lie. In this case, the statement "I am in pain" made by me about myself is false. To my statement, then, someone else can contradict me by saying about me "He is not in pain." (He may have sufficient evidence to believe that I am telling a lie.) In this sense, the statement "I am in pain" said by me about myself is corrigible. But if I do not intend to tell a lie, then the statement "I am in pain" cannot be false. In this sense, the statement "I have a pain" made by me about myself is incorrigible. Shorter fails to distinguish between these

⁷⁹ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, p.150.

two senses of 'incorrigibility.'⁸⁰

We have said that Wittgenstein would assert that "He has pain" said about me by someone else is about my pain, not about my behavior. This is probably the most distinct feature of Wittgenstein's account of pain that distinguishes him from logical behaviorists. Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes between pain and pain-behavior. Wittgenstein says:

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? (*PI* §304)

But Wittgenstein now gets another kind of criticism. It is that if he distinguishes pain from pain-behavior, then he must believe that there are pains in the Cartesian sense. We will see what is wrong in this kind of charge in the next chapter.

⁸⁰ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, pp.150-151. Another way of explaining is this. It is possible to contradict the sentence "All bachelors are unmarried adult males" by simply negating it. But this possibility does not affect that the sentence "All bachelors are unmarried adult males" is logically true. Similarly, the possibility of someone else's contradicting my claim that I am in pain does not affect that my claim is incorrigible.

5. MORE THAN TWO PERSONS CAN HAVE THE SAME PAIN

How does Wittgenstein show that more than two persons can have the same pain? Wittgenstein would say that there have to be criteria governing the use of the sentence "He and I have the same pain." For without them, no one can use it legitimately.⁸¹ But what makes Wittgenstein so confident in believing that there are such criteria? It is, I believe, because it is an indubitable fact that in real life we talk about our having the same pain. So Wittgenstein says:

In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (PI §253)

What would be the criteria for determining whether or not two persons have the same pain? One of them would be this. If two persons give the same descriptions about their pains, then they have the same pain. See Malcolm's claim about this topic.

If the description of my backache is the same as the description of yours, then you and I have the same backache. This is how the expression "same backache" is used. If your backache answers to a different description then it is different. There is no other sense of "same" and "different" in regard to sensations.⁸²

How would the Cartesians counter this? They could

⁸¹ We have seen before how confused it is for some Cartesians to propose to use such a sentence without having any criteria.

⁸² Norman Malcolm, "The Privacy of Experience", in Canfield, ed., vol.8, p.42; first published in his *Thought and Knowledge*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

counter in two ways. First, they would assert that it is possible that others could give the same descriptions of pain as mine even though they do not feel any pain. Second, even though others have pains, their pains can be the same as mine only in the sense that theirs and mine are qualitatively similar. That is, we can never have numerically the same pain.

Let's examine the second way first. I will show that it does not deserve any serious examination. What can the Cartesians get by holding that each of us has numerically different pain? It must be that they believe it is philosophically significant to say such a thing, although it may not have any significance in ordinary language. In my opinion the only philosophical significance it has is that it is essential to the formulation of the skeptical problem of other minds. But I will show that the possibility of numerical difference does not help formulate a skeptical problem of other minds.

First, when the Cartesians say that each of us has numerically different pain, they may allow that you and I could have qualitatively the same pain. If so, then such skeptical problem of other minds does not arise. You and I could have qualitatively the same cars though they are numerically different. From this, any interesting skeptical question about your car does not arise.


So it may have to be said that you and I must have

qualitatively different as well as numerically different pains. But still it seems that you and I have the pain, though different qualitatively and numerically. Insofar as we have pain, then the skeptical question cannot arise. You and I may have cars which are both numerically and qualitatively different. But from this we cannot ask whether or not you have any car at all, or your car may be just an illusory one.

Hence what the Cartesians have to say to formulate the skeptical problem of other minds is that you may not have any pain whatsoever, even though your descriptions of your pain are exactly the same as mine. Note that we are not here using the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity at all. We have already seen how Wittgenstein deals with this kind of claim.

VI. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT BY PHILOSOPHERS WHO ARE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY CARTESIANS BUT SEMANTICALLY NON-CARTESIANS

We have brought up before the possibility that some philosophers could partially accept Wittgenstein's private language argument. They would agree with Wittgenstein's claim that only by grasping the connection between pain and pain-behavior do we learn how to use the word 'pain.' But from this, they assert, it does not follow that we have to conclude that there is no such thing as private sensation pain in the full-fledged Cartesian sense. What must be established, they might say, is only something like the claim that "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria"(PI §580). If these Cartesians are correct, then private sensations, which are identified by outward criteria, still exist. We can say that these philosophers are epistemologically Cartesians but semantically non-Cartesians. Let me introduce briefly Hintikka's interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument, which claims that Wittgenstein holds this version of Cartesianism.



1. HINTIKKA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Hintikka says that Wittgenstein rejects the view that we need a special language to talk about such things as sense data, phenomena, or what is immediately given. According to Hintikka, Wittgenstein holds that we can talk about sense data or phenomena using our ordinary public language, not a special language. Hintikka asserts that when Wittgenstein rejects such a special language, he does not reject the existence of such sense data or phenomena themselves. This is why Wittgenstein continues to use the term 'phenomenology,' according to Hintikka, after he rejects the possibility of phenomenological or private language.

Hintikka asserts:

his aim still was to understand 'phenomena', i.e., what is immediately given to us in our experience. This aim survived the change of his basic language. It is Wittgenstein's rejection of phenomenological language as an independent basis language, combined with his continued interest in phenomenological problems (problems concerning "the given" or immediate experience) that lends its characteristic flavor to his later use of the terms "phenomenology" and "phenomenological." Since there is no pure phenomenological language, there cannot be any systematic science of phenomenology of the kind that, e.g., Husserl attempted to build, but there are phenomenological problems.⁸³

Hintikka quotes Wittgenstein's following remarks as the evidences for his claim.

⁸³ M. Hintikka, and J. Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p.151.

There is no phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems.⁸⁴

[T]he world we live in is the world of sense-data; but the world we talk about is the world of physical objects.⁸⁵

So "the real purpose of Wittgenstein's private language argument," according to Hintikka, is "to show how people manage" to talk about the private sensations with the public language,⁸⁶ not to show that there are no such things as private sensations in the Cartesian sense.

2. AN EXAMINATION OF SOME OF WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITINGS THAT APPEAR TO CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE SENSATIONS

Hintikka's interpretation does not come out of nowhere. There are indeed places where Wittgenstein seems to admit the existence of private sensations in the Cartesian sense. Consider the following paragraph in *Philosophical Investigations*.

"But you will surely admit that there is a

⁸⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Color*, I sec.53, and III, sec. 248. quoted in *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p.151.

⁸⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Lectures in Cambridge*, 1930-1932, p.82, quoted in *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p.141.

⁸⁶ M.Hintikka and J.Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein*, p.247.

difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? - "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing." - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! (PI §304)

Wittgenstein says that the sensation pain itself is not a something but not a nothing either. And he seems to say in the ensuing sentences that he is not making a definite conclusion about the existence of pain itself.

The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. (PI §304)

Wittgenstein says that he has only rejected the grammar. Here Wittgenstein asserts, it seems, that there are private sensations. At least he seems to leave the problem about the status of private sensations open. Moreover this kind of evidence does not seem to be isolated. Consider the following section in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot? (PI §297)

What Wittgenstein may want to say is this: Though in the pain language-game pain itself does not play any role, it does not make pain nonexistent, as, though in a picture of a water boiling in a pot the water itself is not pictured, it does not make water nonexistent. Wittgenstein seems to assert that in the pain language-game, though the

picture of pain does not play any role, the image of pain may as in the picture of a water boiling in a pot, though the picture of water is not pictured, the image of water may be imagined. Consider the following section.

It is - we should like to say - not merely the picture of the behaviour that plays a part in the language-game with the words "he is in pain", but also the picture of pain. Or, not merely the paradigm of the behaviour, but also that of the pain. - It is a misunderstanding to say "The picture of pain enters into the language-game with the word 'pain'." The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture. - The image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture. (PI §300)

Wittgenstein says "[t]he image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture." This seems to be similar to his claim that "Pain is not a something but not a nothing either."

The upshot of all of these is that we seem to have evidence for saying that Wittgenstein does not deny that private sensations in the Cartesian sense exist.

3. WITTGENSTEIN'S REAL POSITION ABOUT THE STATUS OF PRIVATE SENSATIONS

Let me say again that Hintikka's interpretation of Wittgenstein raises the possibility that those who are epistemologically Cartesian do not need to become semantically Cartesian. That is, he raises a possibility



that those who are epistemologically Cartesians may become semantically non-Cartesians. If this is the case, then, as has been said before, Wittgenstein's private language argument cannot refute epistemological Cartesianism, though it can refute semantical Cartesianism. Hence Wittgenstein needs to show that private sensations do not exist. Only after this is shown, can Wittgenstein's private language argument succeed in defeating epistemological Cartesianism. In this section, I will try to show how Wittgenstein would establish that there are no private sensations in the Cartesian sense.

There is an incorrect way of showing how Wittgenstein would deny that there are private sensations. So let me first clear it away. I will show, then, a correct way of establishing why Wittgenstein would never say that private sensations exist.

Note that an epistemological Cartesian, who holds non-Cartesianism semantically, asserts that we cannot name and talk about private sensations - which really exist - without depending on public language framework. Wittgenstein's attack against the epistemological Cartesians and semantical non-Cartesians would be directed towards this claim, i.e., the claim that, though sensations are private, we cannot talk about them otherwise than by way of public language framework. Wittgenstein would assert that it is tantamount to saying that private sensations do not play any role in

our language game. If they do not play any role in our language game, then they are useless. Hence they do not exist. Let me formulate this argument.

- 1) If there is anything which does not play any role in our language game, then it is useless.
- 2) What the epistemologically Cartesians but semantically non-Cartesians is holding is tantamount to saying that private sensations do not play any role in our language game.
- 3) Hence private sensations are useless.
- 4) If anything is useless in the sense that it does not play any role in our language-game, then it does not exist.
- 5) Hence private sensations do not exist.

Some could attack this kind of argument in the following way. They would say that the second and fourth premises are false. They would reject the second premise because they believe that private sensations do play a role in our language-game. They would reject the fourth premise on the following grounds. Though private sensations do not play any role in our language and so are useless, it is absurd to claim that they do not exist because they are useless.

Among these two objections, Wittgenstein would reject the first one, but would accept the second one. That is, he would say, unlike the above objectors, that it is the case that private sensations do not play any role in our language game. But he, like the above objectors, would say that it is absurd to assert that since private sensations are

useless, they cannot exist. Let's see first how Wittgenstein shows that private sensations do not play any role in our language game. Wittgenstein says:

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --- Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.--Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. -- But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language?-- If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.-- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI §293)

That is, insofar as the Cartesians assert that sensations are what can only be known to and had by their owners, they "have no place in [our] language-game at all." For the word 'sensations,' as it is used in our language, is not used to refer to such private things. Such private sensations, which do not play any role in our language-game, are like a "wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it" or in short are useless.

[A] wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. (PI §271)

Now some philosophers would not agree with Wittgenstein's claim that private sensations do not play any role in our language-game. They would say that there is one

important role that such private sensations or phenomena play in our language-game. It is that they play the role of the foundations of our knowledge. Isn't it the case that all of our knowledge is founded on our immediate experience? Wittgenstein would answer "No." Wittgenstein does not say that the foundation of our knowledge is our immediate experience. The foundation of our knowledge, if we have to use the term 'foundation,' consists of such propositions as "Here are my hands" etc., which are not about our immediate experience.⁸⁷

Now let's examine why Wittgenstein would reject the fourth premise. Intuitively it seems that it is one thing to say that private sensations are useless and another to say that private sensations do not exist. Wittgenstein would not go against such intuition. That is, he would not say that since private sensations are useless, they do not exist. Claiming that private sensations do not exist because they are useless is no less absurd than saying that the wheel does not exist because it is useless. Hence, if the reason Wittgenstein can give for the denial of the existence of private sensations is only that they do not play any role in our language-game, then we had better

⁸⁷ Though we concede that our immediate experiences are foundations of our knowledge, it doesn't necessarily mean that we have to assume the existence of such things as sense data. For example, Chisholm's adverbial theory does not assume the existence of sense data distinguished from public objects.

reject the very reason, and leave the problem of whether or not private sensations exist open.

We can find Wittgenstein's real reason for denying the existence of private sensations, I think, in the core of private language argument. There we have said that when the diarist tries to talk about his private sensation, he is finally falling into the position in which he cannot but utter "inarticulate sound." We may better say that private sensations are useless in this sense, i.e., in the sense that the diarist cannot but utter inarticulate noises when he tries to talk about his supposedly private sensation. It would not be possible for us even to say that the diarist's private sensation does not exist. For there are criteria for using 'exist,' and 'not-exist.' We cannot apply them to the diarist's private sensation. (Wittgenstein never says, it seems to me, that private sensations in the Cartesian sense do not exist.) John Cook asserts that Wittgenstein in the private language argument tries to explain something he believes that he cannot really do.

How, then, are we to tell a suitable 'private language' story? - The answer is: Don't even try! But does Wittgenstein not try? In a sense he does, and it is important to recognize just what sort of attempt he makes.⁸⁸

To summarize: To the question whether or not it is possible to say that private sensations in the Cartesian sense exist, though they have to be named and talked about

⁸⁸ John Cook, "Solipsism and Language", p.40.

by way of the public language framework, Wittgenstein would answer as follows. The question of the existence cannot be applied to private sensations. For private sensations are things for which we cannot say that they exist or do not exist. This is, I think, a claim which is stronger than saying that private sensations do not exist.

But, then, why does Wittgenstein say things like "[pain] is not a something, but a nothing either" (PI §304) or "the image of pain enters into the language-game, though the picture of pain doesn't"? (PI §300) I do not think Wittgenstein is here talking about private sensations in the Cartesian sense. He is talking about sensations that we talk about in real life. So when he says that "pain is not a something but a nothing either", he is not saying that Cartesian private pain is not a something but a nothing either. Suter clarifies:

What he means is that it is not a something like a cow or a car, but it is not a nothing either, since it makes a difference if you have it. Sometimes the difference between having and not having a pain is slight, sometimes it is enormous: a pain can be inconvenient or horrible, even frightful. When people have a pain, however, this is not to possess or own something; in this respect, as well as others, it differs from having a vehicle or a ballpoint. When it is asserted that "Mary feels joy or pain," we avoid needless trouble, then, if we do not take this to imply that there are two things - Mary and the thing she feels, namely joy or pain. Such an assertion should be contrasted with, say, "John feels the table," which does not imply that there are two things - John and the table he feels.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, p.131.

I might add here the following remark of Wittgenstein.

That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (*PI* §293)

In other words, we should not take the word 'pain' as the name of an object, pain, in the way we take the word 'table' to be the name of the object, table. This is, I think, what Wittgenstein means by the claim that the objects drop out of consideration as irrelevant. But to say that pain is not like a table does not mean that pain is nothing.

What about another claim that the image of pain enters into the language game, though the picture of pain doesn't? Doesn't Wittgenstein want to say here that the Cartesian sense of private pain enters into our language-game as the image of pain, though not as the picture of pain? I do not think so. Immediately after Wittgenstein talks about the image of pain, he makes this important statement.

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I *do* feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body. (Which would also be possible.) (*PI* §302)

Here Wittgenstein is explaining what is a correct and incorrect use of the image of pain. For example, we cannot use the 'image of pain' to refer to another's pain understood in the Cartesian sense. For, in this case, we do

not have any criteria for using the phrase.⁹⁰ On the other hand, it is a correct use if we use the 'image of pain' to refer to another's pain understood in ordinary sense. For example, we can imagine another's pain in his arm.⁹¹ For in these cases, we have criteria for using the phrase. The following passage brings this out:

It is conceivable that I feel pain in a tooth in another man's mouth; and the man who says that he cannot feel the other's toothache is not denying this. The grammatical difficulty which we are in we shall only see clearly if we get familiar with the idea of feeling pain in another person's body. For, otherwise, in puzzling about this problem, we shall be liable to confuse our metaphysical proposition "I can't feel his pain" with the experiential proposition, "We can't have (haven't as a rule) pains in another person's tooth". (BB p.49)

Hence we must understand Wittgenstein as saying that the image of pain, used correctly, enters into our language-game, not that Cartesian image of pain does. So Wittgenstein is not saying anything about the Cartesian sense of private pain when he talks about the image of pain's entering into our language-game. On the contrary, he is talking about pain as it is used in real life.

But why does Wittgenstein say that the picture of pain

⁹⁰ Again, we have seen before how confused it is to say that I can imagine another's pain on the model on my own without having any criteria for determining whether or not someone is in pain.

⁹¹ It is Wittgenstein's belief that I can have another's pain in his arm or tooth, although I cannot have another's pain understood in Cartesian sense of private pain.

does not enter into our language-game, although the image of pain does? Isn't it the case that we cannot have the image of pain unless we have the picture of pain? Can we know what the image of water is even though we do not know what the picture of water is? This may appear to be a perplexing problem. However the solution has already been given before. Wittgenstein describes the relation between a name and the thing it names just like the relation between a picture of something and that something. Hence to say that 'table' is the picture of table is to say that 'table' is the name of the thing, table. But in the case of 'pain' we cannot say that 'pain' is the name of pain in the sense that 'table' is the name of a table. Hence we cannot say that 'pain' is the picture of pain either. This may be what Wittgenstein means when he says that the picture of pain does not enter into our language-game.

4. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE COMPONENT OF THE MEANING OF A SENSATION-WORD

Many Cartesians, I think, try to make a distinction between public and private meaning of a sensation-word. According to Crispin Wright, it is not surprising because it is a "pre-philosophical conception."

We tend to view the understanding each of us has of a word like 'pain' as possessing both a public and a subjective component. The public component

is conceived as graspable by one incapable of feeling pain: it is constituted by our shared concept of what pain-behavior is and of the consequences, personal and social, of someone's being in pain. The subjective component, in contrast, is fixed by the character of painful experience; only one who can suffer pain can imbue his understanding of the word with such a component, and the component is, in the nature of the case, idiosyncratic.⁹²

Wittgenstein also considers this possibility.

Or is it like this: the word 'red' means something known to everyone; and in addition, for each person, it means something known only to him? (Or perhaps rather: it refers to something known only to him.) (PI §273)

The Cartesians can use this kind of distinction effectively, it seems, to respond to Wittgenstein's charges against them. For example, to Wittgenstein's charge that they are making our sensation-words incommunicable, they would point out that those words also have publicly shared meanings which can be used for a mutual communication. They would also say that it is an overreaction on Wittgenstein's part to ignore the subjective felt quality of pain.

Wittgenstein would not accept this kind of view. For once we allow the subjective component, we cannot get out of skepticism. Crispin Wright makes this point clear:

Now, the niche here granted to a public component may be held to obviate any implication that the language of sensation, and of the passions generally, is already, for each of us, a private

⁹² Crispin Wright, "Does *Philosophical Investigations* I.258-60 Suggest a Cogent Argument against Private Language?" in P. Pettit and J. McDowell, eds., *Subject, Thought and Context*, (New York: Oxford Press, 1986), pp.211-212.

language. But if the felt quality of my experience has some part to play in determining the content of the relevant parts of my vocabulary, and if it is accepted that this quality can be known only by myself, it must follow, it seems, that we cannot have reason to think that we *fully* understand each other's talk of sensations, and so on....The pre-philosophical conception, even if it escapes the outcome that the language of sensations is already, for each of us, private, must at least, it appears, be committed to the possibility of a private language. Accordingly, a demonstration of its impossibility will be a demonstration that this conception cannot contain the germ of a satisfactory philosophical understanding of the language of mind.⁹³

That is, insofar as the Cartesians admit the subjective component of the meaning of a sensation-word, they have to conclude mutual understanding of a sensation-word is impossible, however well the so-called public component is communicated.

⁹³Crispin Wright, p. 212.

VII. KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

Recently Kripke proposed an intriguing interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. In this chapter, I will examine Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein keeping in mind what implications it has for Wittgenstein's account of pain.⁹⁴ Let me first explain Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein.

1. WITTGENSTEIN'S SKEPTICAL PARADOX

Kripke asserts that Wittgenstein finds a serious problem in the notion of rule-following in our language. The problem is that we cannot justifiably believe that we are following a rule when we use our language. Kripke thinks that this claim implies that our language is not language. For language requires, Kripke thinks, that we be able to justify that we follow rules in our language. Kripke calls this problem 'skeptical paradox' of Wittgenstein: It may well be

⁹⁴ In fairness to Kripke, he is not claiming that his interpretation is a correct one. Rather he says that his book is written "to present the argument as it struck me, as it presented a problem for me." Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, viii.

called 'Wittgenstein's rule-following-skepticism,'⁹⁵ which Kripke thinks to be a radical and original form of skepticism. Kripke says:

Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced.⁹⁶

What implications does this claim have for Wittgenstein's account of pain? Recollect the diarist above. It was said there that the diarist cannot justify that he is applying the sign 'S' correctly. In other words, the diarist cannot justify that he is following a rule when he uses the sign 'S.' Kripke would say that this is not surprising. For we cannot justify that we are following a rule when we use any word either. Hence the same problem arises with words like 'desk' which are supposed to refer to a public objects.

⁹⁵ We can call it 'meaning-skepticism' too. But I prefer 'rule-following skepticism.' For 'meaning skepticism' could refer to the semantically skeptical Cartesianism, which is certainly skeptical about meaning in that it denies mutual understanding. But the semantically skeptical Cartesians would say that rule-following is possible in the speaker's own private language. Kripke's rule-following skepticism would deny this possibility too.

⁹⁶ Saul Kripke, p.60.

2. HOW KRIPKE SUPPORTS HIS CLAIM THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS FOLLOWING A RULE

Let me briefly present Kripke's ingenious argument for his claim that there is no such thing as following a rule. Kripke presents his arguments with the mathematical sign '+.' Suppose that I am now computating a mathematical problem, e.g., " $68+57=?$ ". When I give an answer '125' to this problem, I think that I am following a rule which I am supposed to follow when I use the sign '+.' But suppose that someone challenges me by saying that I have to answer '5' rather than '125.'

Most of us would find no problem in the claim that I can justify my rule-following here because my present use of sign '+' accords with my past use of that sign. But Kripke thinks that this is not a good way of justifying that I follow a rule. For it is possible, Kripke asserts, that my present use of that sign may not accord with my past use of that sign. How? In the past I might mean quaddition by '+,' not addition. Quaddition means the same thing as addition if the sum of a calculation is less than 57, but otherwise means just '5.' Hence since the sum of " $68+57$ " is more than 57, I should have given as an answer '5' rather than '125' to the problem " $68+57=?$ ". Hence the past usages cannot justify that I mean addition by '+' rather than other things, say, quaddition.

Could there be any other way of justifying my rule-

following when I use the '+' sign? Kripke thinks that to justify a rule-following, we have to find out the fact or truth-conditions that constitute my rule-following. Kripke thinks, however, that there is no such fact.⁹⁷ Then, how does Kripke show that there is no such fact?

Kripke considers three possible candidates for such a fact; actual application of a sign, mental states accompanying a sign, and dispositions to apply a sign.⁹⁸ These candidates, according to Kripke, exhaust the possibilities of all facts, and all fail. Which means that there is no such fact. Hence I cannot justify that I mean addition by '+' rather than other thing, say, quaddition. McGinn summarizes Kripke's reasons for rejecting each of these candidates as follows.

Actual applications underdetermine meaning since alternative meanings (e.g., quaddition) are consistent with the applications that have so far been made out of the sign; states of consciousness are (a) not always forthcoming and (b) can always be variously interpreted and applied; and dispositions are inadequate to determine meaning because (a) they are finite whereas the meaning of '=' has an infinitary character and (b) people can be disposed to make mistakes, so that there can be a systematic divergence between what one means and the answers one is disposed to give. Kripke's contention is that these candidates exhaust the field, and so there is nothing for meaning to consist in.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Collin McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.62.

⁹⁸ Collin McGinn, p.140.

⁹⁹ Collin McGinn, p.141

3. WITTGENSTEIN'S SKEPTICAL SOLUTION

Let me now introduce what Kripke thinks is Wittgenstein's solution to the skeptical paradox. If Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox is not solved, then we have to say that our language is not a language. Wittgenstein does not like this consequence. Hence Wittgenstein tries to offer a solution. What is that solution? Kripke says:

The solution turns on the idea that each person who claims to be following a rule can be checked by others. Others in the community can check whether the putative rule follower is or is not giving particular responses that they endorse, that agree with their own.¹⁰⁰

That is, a use of a word must be checked by a community. That is, if a rule is followed only by one single person, then we cannot say that he is following a rule. On the contrary if a rule is followed by many people and there is a way of confirming whether a certain person is following a rule correctly in accordance with others' usage of the word, then we can say that, in that sense or to that extent, rule-following is possible.

This is the solution, which Kripke thinks Wittgenstein is not satisfied with. Wittgenstein does not like it for much the same reason Hume did not like his solutions for the problem of induction. So Kripke compares Wittgenstein's solution to Hume's solution to the problem of induction,

¹⁰⁰ Saul Kripke, p.101.

when he says "A certain problem, or in Humean terminology, a sceptical paradox is presented concerning the notion of rule. Following this, what Hume would have called a "sceptical solution" to the problem is presented."¹⁰¹

Why would Hume have called his solution 'skeptical'? Hume thinks that we can never completely justify the causal connection between certain events A and B. This is Hume's skepticism about induction. In order to solve this skeptical problem Hume proposes to think that "not an a priori argument but custom is the source of our inductive inferences."¹⁰² However, since this solution is made by giving up establishing a priori and necessary and sufficient sources of inductive inferences, it cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution to skepticism. In fact, Hume still concedes that his skepticism is unanswerable. Hence Hume's solution cannot be called a "straight solution" because it does not show that skepticism is wrong.¹⁰³

In the same fashion, according to Kripke, Wittgenstein proposes to reconsider the claim that "facts or truth conditions are of the essence of meaningful assertion." For insofar as we insist on that claim, "it will follow from the sceptical conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means

¹⁰¹ Saul Kripke, pp.3-4.

¹⁰² Saul Kripke, p.66.

¹⁰³ Saul Kripke, p.66.

anything are meaningless."¹⁰⁴ So we have to give up the hope of providing the kind of justification which satisfies the truth condition for following a rule. In other words, we have to give up the generally accepted assumption of the theory of meaning, i.e., the assumption that the meaning of a sign is exhausted by stating its truth conditions, i.e., by stating the facts which make it true. For the effort to try to find a complete justification for using a sign is essentially related to this assumption. If the meaning of a sign is not given by stating the facts which make it true, then what would we be doing with a sign? What we are doing is asserting some things. The meaning of a sign is warranted by the fact that "there [are] roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives."¹⁰⁵ That is, what we should do is to give another kind of justification for following a rule. This justification satisfies what Kripke calls the 'assertibility conditions' or 'justification conditions,'¹⁰⁶ for following a rule. Kripke writes:

Wittgenstein replaces the question, "What must be the case for this sentence to be true?" by two others: first, "Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately asserted (or denied)?"; second, given an answer to the first

¹⁰⁴ Saul Kripke, p.77.

¹⁰⁵ Saul Kripke, p.78.

¹⁰⁶ Saul Kripke, p.74..

question, "What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying) the form of words under these conditions?"¹⁰⁷

It is important to see that the second question has to be asked. So Kripke says:

Now, Wittgenstein's general picture of language, as sketched above, requires for an account of a type of utterance not merely that we say under what conditions an utterance of that type can be made, but also what role and utility in our lives can be ascribed to the practice of making this type of utterance under such conditions.¹⁰⁸

Kripke asserts that Wittgenstein would not be satisfied with this solution and still concede that his paradox is unanswerable. For the assertibility condition does not describe the conditions which make a sentence true. This is why Kripke calls the solution a 'skeptical' not a 'straight' solution. Kripke says:

Wittgenstein's sceptical solution concedes to the sceptic that no 'truth conditions' or 'corresponding facts' in the world exist that make a statement like "Jones, like many of us, means addition by '+'" true.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Saul Kripke, p.73.

¹⁰⁸ Saul Kripke, p.92.

¹⁰⁹ Saul Kripke, p.86.

4. AN APPLICATION OF KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT TO THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Now what bearing do these solutions have on the celebrated section about the diarist? Kripke thinks that 'pain' can be thought as a counterexample to the skeptical solution. For it appears that we do not need any other's help to check whether or not I am following a rule for the word 'pain' correctly. It not only is unhelpful but also may be harmful to do so. For it seems that I am the sole, incorrigible judge about how to follow the rule for the word 'pain'. Thus, if I can follow the rule for the word 'pain' independently of other members of the community, then the above solution should be given up. To dismiss this type of counterexample, Wittgenstein shows in the diarist section that since the sign 'S' is never checked by others, it cannot be given any meaning.

Again, what Wittgenstein is doing in the private language argument is to show that private language is impossible, because it lacks one essential element which makes ordinary public language possible. That is, Wittgenstein intends his private language argument to support his skeptical solution for the skeptical paradox. So Kripke says, "It is his solution... that contains the argument against 'private language'; for allegedly, the



solution will not admit such a language."¹¹⁰ But isn't it the case that Wittgenstein never talks about rule-following in the diarist section? No. Kripke says that what Wittgenstein is indeed denying in the private language argument is not that a word which is supposed to refer to private sensation can be understood by anyone, rather that the private model of rule following is unacceptable. Kripke says:

What is really denied is what might be called the 'private model' of rule-following, that the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analyzed simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider community.¹¹¹

5. MY CRITICISMS OF KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION

In the following I will try to establish three things: One is that Kripke is mistaken in not considering Wittgenstein's criticisms of the Cartesian private objects. He also needs to clarify his notion of private rule following. Finally, Wittgenstein would never accept Kripke's rule following skepticism.

¹¹⁰ Saul Kripke, p.60.

¹¹¹ Saul Kripke, p.109.

1) KRIPKE DOES NOT CONSIDER CARTESIAN PRIVATE OBJECTS

The problem for Kripke is to justify that we mean something by a word. For example, how I can justify that I mean plus rather than quus by the plus sign. In order to justify that I mean something by a word, I have to find out, Kripke asserts, some fact. Kripke asserts that when we examine (the candidates for the) facts that would justify my meaning something by a word, we have to examine all kinds of (the candidates for the) facts that we can associate with my meaning or intending something by a certain sign. Justifying my meaning something by a word is so important a matter, Kripke seems to think, that we have to examine whatever is available for us to achieve it. Kripke writes:

Another important rule of the game is that there are no limitations, in particular, no *behaviorist* limitations, on the facts that may be cited to answer the sceptic. The evidence is not to be confined to that available to an external observer, who can observe my overt behavior but not my internal mental state. It would be interesting if nothing in my external behavior could show whether I meant plus or quus, but something about my inner state could. But the problem here is more radical. Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has often been viewed as behavioristic, but to the extent that Wittgenstein may (or may not) be hostile to the 'inner', no such hostility is to be assumed as a premise; it is to be argued as a conclusion. So whatever 'looking into my mind' may be, the sceptic asserts that even if God were to do it, he still could not determine that I meant addition by 'plus'.¹¹²

As we all now know, after examining all kinds of candidates, Kripke proclaims that all fail to justify that I mean

¹¹² Saul Kripke, p.14.

something by a sign.

But does Kripke examine all the candidates? I don't think so. There is one important candidate for a fact that he does not consider. Recall that philosophers like Locke assert that the meaning of a word is the idea in our mind that only its owner can know. Kripke does not examine the possibility that the meaning of a word is some idea in our mind. Kripke might say that he examines it when he talks about meaning as a mental, introspectible, or inner state. For example, he says:

Why not argue that "meaning addition by 'plus'" denotes an irreducible experience, with its own special *quale*, known directly to each of us by introspection? (Headaches, trickles, nausea are examples of inner states with such *qualia*.)¹¹³

Is 'irreducible experience' here the same as the Cartesian private experience? I think not. First of all, Kripke does not say explicitly, e.g., that it is something that only I can have and another person can't. He does say that it is something that we directly know by introspection. But this is different from saying that only I can have my experience.

What Kripke does when he talks about meaning as an irreducible experience is to examine whether or not meaning is like such mental states as "[d]epression, excitement, pain." It is right that Wittgenstein does examine and reject the claim that meaning is a mental state like headache, or pain. But Wittgenstein also examines the claim that meaning

¹¹³ Saul Kripke, p.41.

is something private which only I can know. There seems to be nothing wrong, I think, in proposing this Cartesian private idea as a candidate for a fact that might justify my meaning something by a word. Kripke might say that since having such an idea in the mind is a mental state, he would be in fact examining it when he examines whether or not meaning is like pain or headache. This would be acceptable, if Kripke qualifies 'pain,' 'headache,' 'emotion' etc. with 'private' in the Cartesian sense. But Kripke never does it. He just thinks of these things in their ordinary senses.

It is bizarre that Kripke does not talk about Cartesian private objects at all. It is more so, considering that since Descartes' time, mental states have been considered by many philosophers to be private in the Cartesian sense. Kripke says that if Wittgenstein is hostile to 'inner,' then it must be argued as a conclusion, not assumed as a premise.¹¹⁴ But Wittgenstein is not hostile to 'inner' used in ordinary way. He is hostile to 'inner' understood in the Cartesian private sense. He tries to show why he rejects such Cartesian private inner states, e.g., in the private language argument. Kripke does not seem to be interested in this kind of problem at all.

I am not saying that if Kripke examined the Cartesian idea in the mind as a candidate for a fact, he would find that Wittgenstein proposes it as a fact. Not at all.

¹¹⁴ See above quotation 112.

Wittgenstein would not say that such an idea is a fact that could justify my meaning something by a word. What I want to say is that Kripke's not considering it as a possible candidate for a fact leads Kripke to misinterpret the private language argument, which is an essential part of Wittgenstein's attempt to criticize the claim that the meaning of a word is the private idea in the mind.

According to Kripke, Wittgenstein designs the private language argument for the following purpose. Wittgenstein first establishes that only the community-dependent model of rule following is possible. Then, he notices that the rule following of private language cannot be that of the community dependent model of rule following. Hence he has to show that the rule the private linguist is following must be impossible. And the reason why it is impossible must be that its rules are not community- dependent ones.

But the matter of fact is that the reason why the diarist cannot follow any rules for the sign 'S' is not simply because its rules are not community dependent. Recall our discussion of the core of private language argument. There we have interpreted Wittgenstein as arguing as follows: The diarist's rule following cannot be checked by other people. But it does not rule out that the diarist himself may check his rule following without depending on other people. For example he can use the public objects he is observing to check his rule following, even though he

lives all alone. In fact, this is the way Crusoe would follow rules, if he follows rules at all. What Wittgenstein is saying is that the diarist cannot use the public objects to check his rule following. For by doing it, he makes his supposedly private sensations useless. As a result, there is no way the diarist can check his rule following.

Note that insofar as the private language argument is concerned, we can never find evidence that Wittgenstein would deny that Crusoe can follow rules. Hence, if we consider only the private language argument, then Wittgenstein does not rule out the possibility that there is a community-independent model of rule following like that of Crusoe's. So, in order to support the claim that only the community rule following is possible, it has to be shown not only that private language is impossible but also that Crusoe's language is impossible. But Kripke does not argue for the impossibility of Crusoe's language.¹¹⁵

Does Wittgenstein hold that only the community model of

¹¹⁵ We will see in the next section that Kripke thinks that Crusoe may follow rules. Kripke's view on Crusoe's language causes a serious trouble for him, as we will see later. I think he has to say that Crusoe's language is impossible. It will make his interpretation consistent, though still wrong. Maybe it is because of the concern of this kind of consistency that Malcolm, who, like Kripke, believes that Wittgenstein asserts that only the community model of rule following is possible, works hard to show that Wittgenstein also believes that Crusoe cannot follow rules. I think Malcolm is right about this, though he is wrong in believing that it is Wittgenstein's view that only the community dependent model of rule following is possible. See his *Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden*, (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986) See ch.9.

rule following is possible? I think not. As I have said before, Wittgenstein never says that a person like Crusoe cannot invent a language. If it is possible for Crusoe to invent a language, then it must mean that there is a community-independent model of rule following. McGinn says as follows:

Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is putting forward his positive view and opposing it to the view he rejects. The most glaring feature of these sections in the present connexion is that the words 'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are never qualified with 'social' or 'community' - and 'social custom/practice' is not *pleonastic*. Surely Wittgenstein would have inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant to maintain a social conception of rule-following, especially in view of the fact that the introduction of the community is taken to be a surprising result of signal importance - as sharply conflicting with what we antecedently expect.¹¹⁶

If what McGinn says is correct, then it is wrong to claim that Wittgenstein holds that only the community-dependent model of rule following is possible. I tend to agree with McGinn on this point. Wittgenstein says:

Is what we call 'obeying a rule' something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? ...

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.- To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be

¹¹⁶ Collin McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, p.78.

master of a technique. (PI §199)

But can we say that the diarist is following a rule only once in his life when he tries to use the sign 'S'? Yes! It is so, because he cannot know that each time he tries to identify the sensation S and name it with 'S,' he is doing the same thing he does before. For him, each occasion of using the sign 'S' is an unique event, which would exist only once in his life.

Kripke misses this point, probably because he does not consider seriously the notion of Cartesian privacy, which is different from the notion of community-independency.

2) A REFLECTION ABOUT KRIPKE'S DESCRIPTION OF PRIVATE MODEL OF RULE-FOLLOWING: PRIVATE MODEL OF RULE-FOLLOWING, THE DIARIST'S RULE-FOLLOWING AND CRUSOE'S RULE-FOLLOWING

Kripke defines 'private model of rule following' in the following ways. A person is following the private model of rule following, if he is "considered in isolation" or, more specifically speaking, if his following a rule "is to be analyzed simply in terms of facts about the rule follower and the rule follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider community."¹¹⁷ Kripke asserts that showing the falsity of the private model of rule following is a "more basic" matter for Wittgenstein than showing the

¹¹⁷ Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, p.109.

impossibility of private language.¹¹⁸ Hence Kripke treats the private language argument as if it has only a secondary importance. In this section I will attempt to show that it is the other way around by examining the notion of private model of rule following as it is described by Kripke. That is, I will show that the notion of private language is more important for Wittgenstein than the notion of a private model of rule following. For the notion of a private model of rule following, it will turn out, gets its philosophical significance only if it is connected to the Cartesian private objects which are supposed to be the meanings of the words of private language. To do this job, I begin by examining how Kripke would talk about the relationship between Crusoe type of rule following and private model of rule following.

Most would think that Kripke would consider someone, who has been living alone since birth, as being isolated from other people. Hence many would think that Kripke would say that Crusoe is committed to the private model of rule following and so cannot follow any rules. But it is not what Kripke says. He writes:

Does this mean that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an island, cannot be said to follow any rules, no matter what he does? I do not see that this follows. What does follow is that if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him. The falsity of the private

¹¹⁸ Saul Kripke, p.110.

model need not mean that a *physically isolated* individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual, *considered in isolation* (whether or not he is physically isolated), cannot be said to do so.¹¹⁹

In a word, Kripke does not say that the falsity of a private model of rule following implies the falsity of Crusoe's kind of rule following. It means that Crusoe does not need to be considered in isolation, though he is physically isolated. Hence by 'a person considered in isolation' Kripke must not mean such thing as 'a person who lives alone since his birth.' If he does not mean by 'a person considered in isolation' a physically isolated person, then what would he mean by it? Let's see if we can find the answer to this question in Kripke's treatment of the diarist. Kripke correctly alludes to private language as it is defined by Wittgenstein, i.e., the "language that is logically impossible for anyone else to understand".¹²⁰ Since he must obviously believe that the person using private language or the diarist is committed to the private model of rule following, Kripke may mean by 'a person considered in isolation' the person like the diarist. But what is so peculiar about the diarist that makes Kripke consider him as the person in isolation? Whatever it is, it must be

¹¹⁹ Saul Kripke, p.110. Here Crusoe is not the Crusoe who is a hero of a novel. Crusoe is the Crusoe described by philosophers like Ayer, i.e., the person who lives alone since birth in a complete isolation from other people.

¹²⁰ Saul Kripke, p.109.

something that Crusoe lacks. Otherwise, Kripke cannot say that the diarist can be considered in isolation, whereas Crusoe cannot. That is, we want to know why Kripke thinks that we cannot take the diarist into our community and apply our criteria for rule following to him, whereas we can to Crusoe. One thing that would distinguish the diarist from Crusoe is certainly this: The sign 'S' the diarist is using is supposed to refer to what can only be known to him, whereas the words Crusoe uses, if he uses them at all, do not need to be the words which refer to only what he can know. Now we can give a meaning to the phrase 'a person considered in isolation.' It is that if a person claims that he is using a word which refers to what only he can know, then he is the person who must be considered in isolation.

Now I claim that the person considered in isolation or the person who is using the private model of rule following must be one and the same person as the person who is using the word which is supposed to refer to what only he can know. If anyone insists that he uses the sign 'S' to refer to something that only he can know, he should be considered in isolation from others and as following the rules for it all alone. On the other hand, if anyone says that he is following a private model of rule following for a word, then he must mean that it is the word that refers to what only he can know.

Would Kripke agree with me? I think he has to.¹²¹ But if he does not accept it, then he has to show us other kinds of private model of rule following, which are, however, different from the diarist kind of private model of rule following. I will show in the following that it is something Kripke cannot do.

The kind of private model of rule following we are looking for, whatever it would be like, must have the following characteristics. First, it must be similar to the diarist's case in that it must be a kind of private model of rule following. But it must be different from the diarist's kind of private model of rule following in order to be distinguished from the latter. What kind of private model of rule following would it be like? I cannot think of another case other than this: A person is following a private model of rule which is, however, different from the diarist's kind of private model of rule only if he can attach a private rule for a word which refers to what can be known to other people as well as him. But can Kripke say that there is such kind of private model of rule following? The problem is not whether or not Kripke can call it 'private.' He can certainly call it that. The real problem

¹²¹ Maybe he could not agree with me. For it means a shift of our attention from the private model of rule following to the Cartesian notion of privacy. This would not be good for Kripke, because he would say that the real issue of the private language argument is the nature of rule following, rather than the Cartesian privacy.

is whether he can say that this kind of rule following is impossible. Note that it is Kripke's intention that all kinds of private rule following are impossible. Hence if he wants to call it private, he must also say that it is impossible. However it seems to me that the above kind of rule following cannot be impossible.

Kripke has a dilemma. Kripke should say either that the above kind of rule following is private but possible or that it is not private and so is possible. If he chooses the former, then he goes against his own claim that all kinds of private model of rule following is impossible. If he chooses the latter, then he is saying that there is no other kind of private model of rule following other than the diarist's kind of rule following.¹²² I think Kripke has to choose the latter for the following reason. First, it appears to be a contradiction to say that a person has a word which refers to something everyone can know but that the rules for the word are private. For if a word is about something that everyone can know, then it seems, the rules for using it must also be knowable to everyone.

But couldn't Kripke opt for the former and say that the above kind of model of rule following is private and so impossible? After all, my reason why Kripke has to choose

¹²²Once Crusoe kind of rule following is excluded from the set of private model of rule followings, then it would be extremely difficult for a philosopher like Kripke to come up with an example of a kind of private rule following different from the diarist's kind of rule following.

the latter does not show conclusively, it seems, that the above kind of model of rule following is still private and so impossible. Hence, let's assume that there is such a kind of rule following. Now the question I want to ask here is this: "Are there any philosophically important ideas we can learn from such a private model of rule following?" None.¹²³ That is why I want to assert that we can find interesting philosophical points in the notion of a private model of rule following only if it is connected to the Cartesian private objects which are supposed to be the meanings of the words of private language.

Kripke asserts that "the incorrectness of the private model is more basic, since it applies to all rules."¹²⁴ That is, the incorrectness of the private model is more basic than the impossibility of private language. But if what I have said above is correct, then it would not make any sense to say that the former is more basic than the latter. For they are in fact one and the same thing. If we have to use

¹²³ Again, if Kripke allows that Crusoe's rule following is private, then we can draw some philosophically interesting points by examining that kind of private model of rule following. For example, if Crusoe's rule following is possible, then the claim that only the community dependent model of rule following is possible must be rejected. Hence those who hold that only the community rule following is possible must argue that Crusoe cannot follow any rule. This is what Malcolm does explicitly in his book *Nothing is Hidden*. That is, Malcolm thinks that Crusoe's rule following must be private. But Kripke himself denies that Crusoe's rule following is private, thereby causing a problem for himself.

¹²⁴ Saul Kripke, p.110.

the term 'basic,' then it seems that we may as well say that the impossibility of private language is more basic than the incorrectness of the private model of rule following. It is so in the sense that without talking about private language whose words are supposed to refer to the Cartesian private objects, we cannot draw any philosophically interesting points from the private model of rule following.

To conclude: Kripke has to take the Cartesian privacy, as it is described by Wittgenstein, into a consideration. But he does not do it.

3) WITTGENSTEIN WOULD NOT ACCEPT KRIPKE'S RULE FOLLOWING SKEPTICISM

In this section, I will try to sort out what is right and wrong among Kripke's various interpretations of Wittgenstein. It will make us see clearly why we cannot say that Wittgenstein holds Kripke type of rule following skepticism. Let's think about how Kripke would raise his skeptical doubt for the word 'pain.' First read the following:

I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by 'table' in the past I meant *tablair*, where a 'tablair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there?¹²⁵

¹²⁵ Saul Kripke, p.19.

Suppose that I am in France. I see a French man groaning and moaning. So I say that he is in pain. Now imagine that a skeptic challenges my use of the word 'pain' here. He might say that perhaps I meant paippy in the past by 'pain.' 'Paippy' means the following: When I see a person groaning and moaning in my country, I say that he is in pain. But if I see a person groaning and moaning in France, then I say that he is happy. The skeptic would say now that I cannot find the necessary and sufficient conditions that could justify conclusively that I meant pain, not paippy, in the past by 'pain.' So perhaps I should have said "He is happy," not "He is in pain," the skeptic would conclude. Now would Wittgenstein agree with Kripke about the claim that we cannot answer the skeptic? Would Wittgenstein say that I cannot justify that I mean pain, not paippy, by 'pain'? Let's examine this.

First, both Wittgenstein and Kripke would agree in that no internal facts, or nothing that is going on in our mind, can justify that I mean pain by 'pain.'¹²⁶ But what about external facts like publicly observable things? Wittgenstein would say that there are some among external facts that could justify that I mean pain by 'pain.' For example, Wittgenstein would say that we can justify that someone means pain by 'pain' by examining how he uses the

¹²⁶ However there is a difference too. Kripke does not consider the Cartesian private mental idea as a candidate for a fact, whereas Wittgenstein would.

word. If he uses it in most occasions in which he sees a person groaning or moaning, which are some of our criteriological evidence for being in pain, then we are justified in saying that he means pain by 'pain.' Also, there are many things we do when we use the word 'pain.' They constitute what Wittgenstein calls 'custom.' If he has displayed that he is practicing such a custom, then we are justified in believing that he understands the word 'pain.' It is because of these that I can justify that in the above kind of example I mean pain by 'pain,' Wittgenstein would answer to the skeptic, even though it is possible - i.e., a priori or logically - that I may have meant paippy by 'pain' in the past. But couldn't I imagine following a rule for 'paippy,' for example, by imagining a custom related to paippy? Yes. However, imagining such a custom is not enough. Wittgenstein says:

And if it is now said: "Isn't it enough for there to be an imaginary application?" the answer is: No. (Possibility of private language.) (*RFM* VI, §32)¹²⁷

If the skeptic insists that he could say that the French man is happy in the above kind of occasion, even though he cannot abandon the custom related to the usage of the word 'pain' - for example, he may still feel a pity for him, or

¹²⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, ed. by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press, 1956). Hereafter, *RFM* followed by part and section numbers.

try to help him - then what he is doing is just uttering the sentence "He is happy." He would indeed be like a person who believes that he can follow a rule only once.

Wittgenstein says:

The application of the concept 'following a rule' presupposes a custom. Hence it would be nonsense to say: just once in the history of the world someone followed a rule (or a signpost; played a game, uttered a sentence, or understood once; and so on.) (*RFM* VI §21)

It is important to notice that Kripke and Wittgenstein agree on one thing, at the same time they disagree with each other. Wittgenstein and Kripke would agree with one another that such external facts are not necessary and sufficient conditions that could justify conclusively that I mean pain by 'pain.' But they would disagree with one another about the following point. Kripke would say that from the claim that such facts are not necessary and sufficient conditions, it follows that there are no facts that could justify conclusively that I mean pain by 'pain.' Wittgenstein, however, would not say that such a conclusion follows.

Suter says:

[I]t is a mistake to suppose that, because [Wittgenstein] mentions no fact, or nontrivial truth conditions, that could prove whether a person meant 'quus,' 'plus,' 'cross,' 'many,' 'blue,' or something else by the plus sign, he must somehow accept [Kripke's] doubts and concede to him that there is no fact that I meant 'plus.' That would be like saying there is no fact that someone has a headache if we cannot, as seems to be the case, give nontrivial truth conditions for

someone's having a headache.¹²⁸

There are two propositions, that appear to be hard to reject. One is that it makes no sense to doubt that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules when we use our language. The other is that to justify that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules when we use our language, we have to have the necessary and sufficient conditions that could justify my meaning or rule following. Note that Wittgenstein believes the first proposition, whereas Kripke believes the second one. Their different choices combined with their common belief that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions that could conclusively justify my meaning something by a word produces different conclusions. The difference and sameness between them can be seen in the following way.

Wittgenstein

It makes no sense to doubt that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules when we use our language.

There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that could justify conclusively that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules when we use our language.

Hence we do not need to look for such necessary and sufficient conditions for justifying that we mean something by a word or we follow rules when we use our language, or we can justify that we mean something by a word or we can follow rules without having such necessary and sufficient conditions.

¹²⁸ Ronald Suter, *Interpreting Wittgenstein*, p.213.

Kripke

We have to have the necessary and sufficient conditions to justify conclusively that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules when we use our language.

There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that could justify conclusively that we mean something by a word, or that we follow rules.

Hence it makes sense to doubt that we mean something by a word or that we follow rules when we use our language.

I do not know whether or not there could be any philosophical knock-down arguments for showing which, of the two arguments, is right. But one thing for sure is that Wittgenstein would not opt for the second proposition that Kripke opts for. It is his firm belief, I think, that it makes no sense to doubt that we are following rules in our language. For example, Wittgenstein says:

Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game. It characterizes what we call description. (*RFM* VI, 28)

Also it is evident that Wittgenstein believes that we do not need necessary and sufficient conditions to justify our rule following. He says:

How can he *know* how he is to continue a pattern by himself - whatever instruction you give him? - Well, how do I know? -- If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And I shall act, without reasons. (*PI*, §211)

See other similar remarks.

"How am I able to obey a rule?" - If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my space is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."
(*PI*, §217)

We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reason has an end. (*BB* p.143)

VIII. Conclusion

Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein has this merit. It reminds us of Wittgenstein's firm belief in our ordinary language. It is of utmost important for Wittgenstein to consider how people succeed in learning various words and using them in our language. Stanley Cavell says:

What motivates Wittgenstein to philosophize, what surprises him, is the plain fact that certain creatures have speech at all, that they can say things at all.¹²⁹

Kripke, however, raises a doubt about the very claim - which Wittgenstein strongly believes - that we succeed in communicating with one another by our language.¹³⁰ However, it is not Kripke alone who raises a doubt against our language. Wittgenstein would say that there are many such philosophers. The difference between Kripke and the other philosophers is this: Kripke directly challenges the legitimacy of our language and knows what he is up to, whereas many philosophers do not know that what they are doing is in fact tantamount to challenging the legitimacy of

¹²⁹ Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) p.15.

¹³⁰ Strictly speaking, Kripke would say that it is not he but Wittgenstein himself, or Wittgenstein as he understands him, who raises such a doubt.

our language. We have already seen how Wittgenstein shows that Cartesians are inadvertently making our language impossible. Thus one thing we have to keep in mind is that if there is such a thing as philosophical foundation for Wittgenstein - if he allows to use such a term as 'foundation' - then it is our language.

But what I want to argue for in this final chapter of my dissertation is not Wittgenstein's belief in our language. I want to talk about whether we can say that there is anything that we learn from our discussion on Wittgenstein's private language argument. The following remark of an ancient Chinese buddhist monk, named Ch'ing-Yuan, may be helpful for our discussion.

Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and waters as waters. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and waters are not waters. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and waters once again as waters.¹³¹

I think that we, like this monk, may just come back to our position - I mean the position we were in before we study philosophy - as a result of studying Wittgenstein. But it is not entirely correct to say that the position we end up with is the same as the position we were in before. There must be some differences. Then, in what sense we come back to our original position, and in what sense we are

¹³¹ Allan Watts *The Way of Zen*, (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), p.126.

different than before? I will use Wittgenstein's succinct remarks on the difference between common-sense man and common-sense philosopher to answer them. He writes:

Now the answer of the common-sense philosopher - and that, *n.b.*, is not the common-sense man, who is as far from realism as from idealism - the answer of the common-sense philosopher is that surely there is no difficulty in the idea of supposing, thinking, imagining that someone else has what I have. But the trouble with the realist is always that he does not solve but skip the difficulties which his adversaries see, though they too don't succeed in solving them. (BB p.48)

Wittgenstein is here talking about how the common-sense philosopher and the common-sense man would answer the skeptical question "Can't I feel another person's pain?" Wittgenstein says that they would answer it differently. Then, what is the difference between the common-sense man and the common-sense philosopher about the problem "I can't feel his pain"? The common-sense philosopher, Wittgenstein explains, confuses the "metaphysical proposition 'I can't feel his pain' with the experiential proposition, 'We can't have (haven't as a rule) pains in another person's tooth' " (BB p.49) The common-sense philosopher thinks that it is possible that I can have pain in another person's tooth.¹³² And he thinks that this is the answer to the metaphysical question "Can't I have his pain?". But it cannot be the answer to such a metaphysical question, Wittgenstein

¹³² Note that Wittgenstein agrees with the common-sense philosopher about this point, i.e., that I can have pain in another person's mouth.

asserts. It is the answer to the empirical question "Can't I have pain in another person's tooth?". The metaphysical question "Can't I have his pain?" is not answered in this way, Wittgenstein says, for the following reason. When a metaphysician asks "Can't I have his pain?", he is talking about pain understood as the Cartesian private pain. But when we ask an empirical question "Can't I have pain in his mouth?", pain must be understood in a non-Cartesian sense, i.e., in the sense we ordinarily use it. That I can have pain in another person's body cannot be used as an answer to the metaphysical question about pains. For both the empirical and metaphysical questions deploy the different senses of 'pain'.

Is Wittgenstein saying here that we cannot answer the metaphysical question and must be skeptical about other minds? No. What he wants to say is that there is no such metaphysical question at all. For it makes no sense to ask whether or not I can feel another's pain understood in the Cartesian sense. Wittgenstein asserts:

Another such trouble, closely akin, is expressed in the sentence: "I can only know that I have personal experiences, not that anyone else has". - Shall we then call it an unnecessary hypothesis that anyone else has personal experiences? - But is it an hypothesis at all? For how can I even make the hypothesis if it transcends all possible experience? How could such a hypothesis be backed by meaning? (Is it not like paper money, not

backed by gold?) (BB p.48)¹³³

Wittgenstein might say that he is like the common-sense person in the following respect. Both would not say that there are such problems as the problem of other minds. I think Wittgenstein is right in this point. Most people would have never thought that there are such problems as the problem of other minds or the problem of the external world before they read philosophy. In this sense, by learning Wittgenstein we come back to our original position. For we do not learn from Wittgenstein the answers to such problems as the problem of other minds. What we learn from him is that there are no such problems, and nothing to answer. And this is indeed the position we were in before studying philosophy. But there is one difference. We can now defend ourselves against those who challenge us by raising such metaphysical and skeptical problems as that of other minds. In this sense, we are different than before.

¹³³ Kripke would disagree with me. He asserts that Wittgenstein concedes to skepticism of other minds. According to Kripke, "As in the case of the main text, Wittgenstein has presented us with a sceptical problem - it seems impossible to imagine the mental life of others on the model of our own." But Wittgenstein, Kripke asserts, offers a skeptical solution to the skepticism of other minds. Wittgenstein proposes, according to Kripke, to "abandon the attempt to ask what a 'self' is, and the like; and let us look, instead at the actual role ascriptions of mental states to others play in our lives. Thus we may obtain a 'sceptical solution' to our new sceptical paradox." Kripke's interpretation here is again wrong which is the result of his not paying attention to some of Wittgenstein's remarks on the problem of other minds like this one we quote.

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