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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL CHANGE
AND CHANGES IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
---- A CASE STUDY IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1973-1989)

By

YUNG-CHING LEE

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School-of Criminal Justice

1992

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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL CHANGE
AND CHANGES IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
---- A CASE STUDY IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1973-1989)

By

Yung-Ching Lee

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between social change
and police organizations. In the United States of America, many researchers in the
field of criminal justice claim that changes in social conditions constitute the major
reasons for police agencies expanding their forces and budgets. Can this assertion be
applied to other countries which have different social conditions from those of the
United States? Are there universal associations between social change and police
organizations?

This study uses six indicators to represent the concept of social change, and
two indicators to represent the concept of police organizations. Using data from 1973
to 1989 for the Republic of China and by way of regression analysis, the author
attempts to discover the relationship between social change and police organizations as
well as the most important indicator in explaining changes in police organizations.

The major findings of this study are as follows: 1) changes in social
movements have a negative association with changes in the size of police forces; 2)
the existence of Martial Law has a negative relationship to changes in the size of

police forces; 3) changes in the size of population, in the number of crimes, and in the

siz: of per capit
have no signifit‘
budgets: and 4'

the Republic of

 

 

Yung-ching Lee
size of per capita national income, and the existence of an opposition political party all
have no significant relationship to changes in the size of police forces and police
budgets; and 4) the number of social movements and the existence of Martial Law in

the Republic of China are the best predictors of changes in police organizations.

List of Tables
L'st of Figure

Chapter 1. l.‘

Chapter 2, L“

Cllapter 3. 5

 

 

 

TABLES OF CONTENTS

List of Tables
List of Figures

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
2. Problem
3. Purpose
4. Definitions of the Related Terms
5. Limitations of the Study
6. Organization of the Study

Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Theory of Social Change
2- System “Em OF REFERENCE
3. Social Change and Police Organizations
4. Summary

Chapter 3. SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLICE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA--l973-l989

1. Police System in the Republic of China

2. Factors Influencing Policing in the Republic of China
History
Political Factors
Military Power
Police Leaders
Law

3. Social Change and Police Organizations in the
Republic of China--l973-1989
The Change in Population
The Change in Crime
The Change in Individuals’ Income
The Change in Social Movements
The Change in Police Forces
The Change in Police Expenditures

iv

31
31
34
34
36

43
46

52
52
56
6O
63
66
7O

Chapter 4.

Chapter 5.

 

 

The Change in Police Organizational Structure
4. Summary

Chapter 4. METHODOLOGY
1. Definitions of the Variables
2. Research Hypotheses
3. Analysis and Statistics
4. Summary

Chapter 5. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
1. Correlation Analysis of the Variables

General Conditions in the Republic of China

Analysis of the Correlations

Correlation analysis of data set 1
The relationship between social change and the size of police
forces
The relationship between social change and police budgets

Correlation analysis of data set 2

76
79

81
81
83
85
91

92
92
92
93
93

93
95
96

The relationship between social change and changes in the size

of police forces

The relationship between social change and changes in police

budgets
2. Comparisons of the Variables
Data set 1
A. The relative importance of the independent variables in
determining the size of police forces
1. Non-lagged model for the size of police forces
2. Lagged model for the size of police forces
B. The relative importance of the independent variables in
determining the size of police budgets
1. Non-lagged model for the size of police budgets
2. Lagged model for the size of police budgets
Data set 2
A. The relative importance of the independent variables in
determining the variation in the size of police forces
1. Non-lagged model for changes in the size of police forces
2. Lagged model for changes in the size of police forces
B. The relative importance of the independent variables in
determining the variation in police budgets
1. Non-lagged model for the changes in police budgets
* 2. Lagged model for the changes in police budgets
3. Findings
4. Summary

97

99
101
101

101
101
106

108
108
109
111

111
111
115

116
116
118
119
129

Chapter 6. C

[at of Refere

Appendix

 

 

Chapter 6. CONCLUSIONS
‘ 1. Suggestions
2. Conclusions

List of References
1. English
2. Chinese

Appendix

vi

130
130
132

134
134
144

151

Table 3-2
Table 3-3
Table 3-3
Table 3-3-
Table 3-3-.
Table 3-3-1
Table 3-3-6
Table 3- 3-7
Table 3-3.};
Table 3-3-9
Table 3-3- It,
Table 3-3- 11
Table 3-3-12
Table 3-3-13
Table 3-3-14

Table S-]_] (
F

 

Lgr or TABLES

Table 3-2-1 NPA Directors’ Backgrounds and Other Information

Table 3-3-1 Taiwan’s Population

Table 3-3-2 Cities Whose Populations Exceed 100,000 in Taiwan

Table 3-3-3 Age-specific Distribution of Population in Taiwan

Table 3-3-4 Criminal Cases Reported to the Police in Taiwan

Table 3-3-5 Larceny in Taiwan

Table 3-3-6 Violent Crimes in Taiwan

Table 3-3-7 Per Capita National Income and Income Distribution in Taiwan
Table 3-3-8 Number of Households Owing Certain Appliances in Taiwan
Table 3-3-9 Demonstrations in Taiwan

Table 3-3-10 The Size of Police Forces in Taiwan

Table 3-3-11 Percentage of Police Engaged in Various Functions in Taiwan
Table 3-3-12 Police Expenditures in Taiwan

Table 3-3-13 The NPA and Other Police Agencies’ Budget

Table 3-3-14 Government’s Overall Budgets and Police Overall Budgets

Table 5-1-1 Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and the Size of Police
Forces

vii

41

54

55

56

57

58

61

62

66

68

68

71

72

75

94

Tabl

T3131:

Table

Table

Table 5

Table 5-

Table 5-3

Table 5-3-

Table 5-3-.

 

Table 5-1-2 Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and the Size of Police
Budgets 95

Table 5-1-3 Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and Changes in the Size of
Police Forces 97

Table 5-1-4 Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and Changes in Police
Budgets 99

Table 5-2-1 The Comparison of OLS and EGLS Estimations in the Size of Police
Forces 104

Table 5-3-1 The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis in the Size
of Police Forces 120

Table 5-3-2 The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis in the
Changes in Police Forces 122

Table 5-3-3 The Comparison Between Changes in the Size of Police Forces and Social
Movements 124

Table 5-3-4 The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis in the Size
of Police Budgets 125

Table 5-3-5 The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis in the
Changes in Police Budgets 126

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5-2-1 ACF of OLS Residuals in the Size of Police Forces 103
Figure 5-2-2 PACF of OLS Residuals in the Size of Police Forces 103
Figure 5-2-3 ACF of EGLS Estimation in the Size of Police Forces 105
Figure 5-2-4 PACF of EGLS Estimation in the Size of Police Forces 105

Figure 5-2—5 ACF of OLS Residuals in the Changes in the Size of Police Forces 113

Figure 5-2-6 PACF of OLS Residuals in the Changes in the Size of Police Forces 113

ix

1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

Since modern police1 were established in London in 1829, dramatic changes in
policing2 have occurred. Take the United States of America as an example. Changes
in policing can be seen not only in the number of police agencies and the number of
police officers but also in police expenditures and police functions. With respect to
police agencies, there were 4,003 police agencies at the suburban and county levels in
1971; this figure increased to 8,444 by 1988, according to Sourcebook of Criminal
flstjgg (1970 and 1989). With regard to the size of police forces, official data showed
that there were about 543,000 police employees in 1972; this number increased to
737,000 in 1985, a 36 percent increase over this period. As for police budgets, 5.1
billion dollars spent in 1972 increased to 22 billion dollars in 1985, a four-fold ..
increase. As for police functions, a major change involved the increase in specialized
units, such as the establishment of narcotics units, Special Weapon and Tactics

(SWAT) units, and family violence units. All these units are the products of the past

three decades. The subject of this study-Taiwan-has also experienced these kinds of

 

1Here, this author defines modern policing as "a system of law enforcement
involving a permanent agency employing full-time officers who engage in continuous
patrol of fixed beats to prevent crime," as given by Samuel Walker. See Walker, S.

(1977). A critical histogy of police reform. MA: Lexington Books, p. 3.

2For convenience, this study will use the terms"police, policing," and "police
organization" interchangeably, because all of them denote the same concept. Also,
this study will consider " police organization," "police institution," "police
department," and "police agency" as the same and use them interchangeably, although
Selznick offered a more precise definition to distinguish them. See P. Selznick’s
Leadership in administration (Selznick, 1957:4-5).

Chan

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2
changes. Taiwan’s police forces grew from 34,970 in 1973 to 80,519 in 1989, or an

increase of 2.29 times. Taiwan’s police budgets expanded about sixteen times in the
same period, from 1973’s 1,982,079,000 to 1989’s 31,723,831,000. Meanwhile,
students in criminal justice and police administrators also have different opinions about
police functions. For these thirty years, the debate over the true or proper police
function has continued, this indicates the function of police might covary with social
change’. Noting these fluctuations in policing, social scientists have various
explanations. Some sociologists believe that increases in population, changes in
population structure, increases in the crime rate, changes in social and economic
structures, and so on, have caused these alterations (Critchely, 1971; Fosdick, 1915;
Johnson, 1979; Manning, 1977; and Walker, 1977). Radical theorists argue that riots
in the early nineteenth century created fears among the public. In order to deal with
this threat, Americans created a paramilitary organization--the police. Because they
feared a standing army would endanger liberty, they believed this paramilitary force
would be the best alternative (Silver, 1967). Others contend that the police is a
product of attempts to control threats to social order from immigrants (Lane, 1975;
Richardson, 1970). For Marxist criminologists, law and criminal justice agencies,
police included, were the tools the capitalists used to maintain their ruling status
(Quinney, 1975). Another explanation for the creation of a uniformed police contends
that the police stand for just one of many urban govemment agencies created to offer

services to meet the changing demands on city government (Bercal, 1971; Monkkonen,

 

3For instance, I. Skolnick (1966) views the police function as maintaining law and
order in society, while P.K. Manning (1977) believes that the function of the police is
to maintain the status quo and to enforce social control.

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3
1981). Political scientists, many of them taking the perspective of political economy,

have created a large body of literature which explains police expansion as a function
of government growth‘. In this regard, there are three aspects to the explanations: the
policy model, in which the growth of government appears largely as a byproduct of
other activities; the voting model, in which the dynamics of growth are a characteristic
of popular preference; and the institutional model, in which growth is explained by the
structures, powers, and incentives of different institutions (Alt & Chrystal, 1983).
Many scholars have focused their attentions on policing, but most of these
studies used the United States of America and the United Kingdom as their samples.
This approach restricts the possibility of establishing a more comprehensive theory of
policing. This is the reason why this author has chosen Taiwan, his motherland, a
newly developing economic power, a one-party dominated country, and a nation
undergoing rapid change, as his research subject. Through this study, which might
amend existing theories on policing, a more comprehensive theory of policing will be

possible.

2. Problem
ngground of the Problem

The police is a product of society. Also, it is a subsystem of the criminal
justice system. The word "product" denotes that society causes its emergence. While

"subsystem" implies that policing is not only one of the components of the criminal

 

‘In this author’s view, the increases in police employees and police agencies can
be viewed as government growth, because the police, in effect, is a branch of
government.

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4

justice system but also is affected by other subsystems of the criminal justice system,
in a larger sense, the criminal justice system is also a subsystem of the social system.
Since the criminal justice system is a subsystem of the social system, it is inevitably
influenced by other social subsystems, irrespective of whether those subsystems are in
the private or public sectors. Many experts concur with this argument (e.g., Cole,
1989; Hudzik and Cordner, 1983; and Klofas, Stojkovic, and Kalinich, 1990), though
many other scholars do not. For example, McNeil (1978) and Perrow (1979) both
believe that organizations, whether in the private or public sectors, are able to control
their environments. In their research, Bailey (1985) and Richardson (1979) even
offered examples which showed that in some countries police are able to affect
politics. Under such circumstances, the association between social change, the
environment, and policing becomes obscure. The primary goal of this study is to
clarify this relationship by using Taiwan’s police organizations as examples.
The Immrtance of the Problem

Disagreements among scholars about the emergence and development of
policing continue. Some theorists in the domain of social science claim that the police
was only a tool for capitalists to use in maintaining their ruling status (Quinney, 1975)
and was the outcome of class struggle (Harring, 1981; Spitzer 1981), while other
scholars have different explanations about the origin of the police. Because of these
debates, the connection between social change and the police requires elucidation.
Through this study, this relationship will be clarified

Also, research conducted by the aforementioned scholars used the police in the

United States of America and the United Kingdom as their subjects. This approach

and

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5

may be insufficient to explain the police in other countries, because of the diversity
and differences in cultures, traditions, political systems, and so forth. Thus, in order
to amend the theories provided by these eminent scholars, it is important to use a
different country--the Republic of China--to revise the existing theories. This research
will serve to attain this goal.

Third, this project not only attempts to identify the association between social
change and the police but also singles out the importance of independent variables,
which may be used as a guide for later research. Furthermore, to identify the
significance of each independent variable will help, on the one hand, to establish a
model for forecasting the reasonable growth of the police; and on the other hand, it
will aid those countries whose conditions are similar to the Republic of China to
allocate their resources more efficiently.

The fourth and foremost aim of this study is to offer a systematic and complete
review of Taiwan’s policing. To date, reviews of this kind have been quite deficient.
Therefore, this study should be a useful guide to those students who are interested in

thisarea.

3. Purpose
There are two purposes for this study. A first aim is to discover the

relationship between social change and policing by way of Taiwan’s example. As
mentioned earlier, the association between social change and policing is quite vague,
and most studies in this area are conducted in the United States of America and the

United Kingdom, which might make them inappropriate to apply to other countries,

such a:

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6

such as those in Asia. Therefore, to use a different type of country as an example and
to explore the connection between social change and policing becomes necessary, as is
the need to identify the relationship between these two concepts.

Aside from identifying the association between these two concepts, another
purpose of this study is to determine,with the aid of computer programs, the most
decisive influences on policing within the realm of social change.

It should be mentioned that the purpose of this study is not to determine the
factors that cause expansion and changes in policing, but rather to identify the
relationship between social change and policing under a scheme provided by scholars
in this area. Therefore, this study does not expect to explain the factors which lead to

changes of in police organizations, but merely to identify them.

4. Definitions of the Related Terms

There are several core terms in this research. They are: social change, police
organization, crime, population, individuals’ incomes, social movements, police
budgets, the size of police forces, and the function of police organizations. For the
purpose of this research, many of them will be given operationalized definitions in
Chapter 4, and we only define the terms here which are not easily operationalized. In
other words, we merely define social change and police organizations in this section.

Social change in this research means the changes in Taiwan’s social conditions.
Change indicates variance and fluctuation. Take population as an example. It might
increase or decrease from one year to the next. No matter what the results are, we

believe it changes as long as there is a fluctuation. While social conditions in this

 

study me
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For the p
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Chapter 4.

7

study mean some social indicators which might have connections with Taiwan’s
policing, because there are many indicators of social change some of them are chosen.
For the purpose of this study, we choose the registered population to represent
demographic change in Taiwan; the criminal cases known to the police to stand for
crime change; the per capita national income, or the individual average income to
represent economic change; and the meetings and parades held in Taiwan (these are
defined as social movements), the appearance of a major opposition political party,
and the existence and removal of Martial Law to indicate political change. It should
be noted that because most of the social movements are relevant to Taiwan’s greatest
political opposition party-the Democratic Progress Party, also known as the DPP--
therefore it is adequate to use social movements to denote political change.

Police organizations in this study mean administrative agencies operated
according to the Police Act of the Republic of China. Under the Police Act, only the
National Police Administration (NPA), the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration
(TPPA), the Taipei Municipal Police Department (TMPD), the Kaohsiung Municipal
Police Department (KMPD), and all their subordinate agencies are police
organizations. Other administrative agencies in the Republic of China who have
police power, such as the Investigation Bureau of the Justice Department and the
Military Police of the National Defense Department, are not police organizations
because they are not administered and operated according to the Police Act.

Other related terms, such as population, crime, per capita national income,
social movements, major political opposition party, and Martial Law will be defined in

Chapter 4.

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5. Linitations of This Study

All research is more or less subject to some limitations. Unavoidably, there are
also some limitations to this study.

First of all, this study uses six indicators to represent the concept of social
change, which might be insufficient to reflect the notion of social change, and thereby
reduce the validity of this research.

Second, as a longitudinal study, this study uses seventeen years of data for
analysis, which might be too short and not allow some relationships between variables
to surface.

Third, this research tries merely to analyze the association between independent
and dependent variables and ignores the possible inter-relationships among variables,
which could restrict the general applicability of this study.

Fourth, a Beta coefficient was used in this study to determine the relative
importance of the independent variables, which might be not sufficient to specify the
relative importance of the independent variables, so the conclusions reached by this

study might be temporary.

6. Organization of This Study

There are six chapters in this research. In the first chapter, the purpose of this
study and the definitions of related terms were presented. Chapter 2 provides a review
of literature regarding social change, system theory, and the relationship between
social change and police organizations from the viewpoint of Western scholars.

Chapter 3 discusses how Taiwan’s society is changing and the fluctuations in Taiwan’s

policing.
methodolo
of the data

Taiwan’s t

 

9

policing. Also, the associations among them are offered. The study’s research
methodology is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis
of the data. And, finally, Chapter 6 gives some conclusions about the authority of

Taiwan’s police, as well as some suggestions for further research.

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10
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Theory of Social Change

Social change is a very complicated concept. The problem of explaining social
change was central to nineteenth century sociology. Even today, people are still
attempting to discover the causes of social change and its impacts on our society. For
the purpose of this study, this author first tries to demonstrate what the meaning of
social change; then this writer will give a short description of the various theories of
social change; third, this author will review system theory and its implications for this
study; fourth, this writer will discuss factors of social change and their relationship to
police organizations; and, finally, a conclusion is given.

A number of definitions of social change have been provided by dictionaries
and scholars. A typical meaning offered by G. and A. Theodorson in the Mo_de_rr_r
Dictionm of Sociology is "any modification in the social organizations of a society in
any of its social institutions or patterns of social roles" (Theodorson and Theodorson,
1969:34). A more simple definition was given by R. C. and W. D. Wallace; they said
social change is "change in social structure or organization" (Wallace and Wallace,
1985:601). Similar definitions can be found elsewhere. For instance, in a 1974
publication, Encyclow' of Sociology, Floyd Dotson defines social change as "any
significant alteration in the structure of society" (Dotson, 1974:267). Also, Thomas F.
Hoult considers social change as "any alteration in the state of a phenomenon" (Hoult,
1969:57). From the definitions listed above, we can see that there are at least two
aspects to social change. First of all, the concept of social change means alterations.

These alterations can be viewed in different ways. For example, in his Ph. D.

dissertatic
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1 1
dissertation, M. O. R. Rajehi pointed out that "people use word ’change’ to denote the

same meaning as development, progress, evolution, function, or progress" (Rajehi,
1981:56). In a strict sense, these terms are relevant to change, but they are not
identical, as Rajehi observed. Rajehi comments:

Progress denotes that future happenings will be better that whatever has

happened before. Evolution refers to a growth and development in

human capacity to use and direct its environment effectively. Function,

development, and progress, on the other hand, ’refers to the differences

within a structure-a chemical compound, a personality, a living

organism, a group, a set of customs--that appear over time and that are

initiated by factors already present within the structure’ (Rajehi, 1981:

56).

In this author’s view, Rajehi has given a precise observation. Therefore, this writer
will not add any comments. However, for the purpose of this study, this author will
use those words-evolution, function, developments, and progress--interchangeably,
because all these terms denote change to a certain degree, irrespective of the positive
or negative consequences of these changes.

A second requirement for social change is related to social structure, or social
system. As Wallace and Wallace and Dotson point out, social change involves change
in the social structure. It means that there must be some alterations in the social
structure, otherwise it cannot be called change. Then, what is social structure? N.
Abercrombie, S. Hill, and B. S. Turner explain social structure:

This is a concept often used in sociology but rarely discussed at any

length. It has been simply defined as ’any recurring pattern of social

behavior’(Abercromble, Hill, and Turner, 1988:228).

Since social structure is a recurring pattern of social behavior it should be observed

over a long time. If this cannot be done, then we are not able to discover any change.

 

 

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12

Furthermore, change in social structure can be observed in different ways. Fluctuation
of population is a typical example of change in social structure. Alteration in the
crime rate is another example. So is education. Because of the complexity of social
change and social structure, it is important to find some indicators that represent social
change adequately. These indicators will be discussed later.

In the history of sociology, two approaches have dominated the concept of
social change. They are: evolutionary theory and revolutionary theory. Evolutionary
theory, as one would expect from its title, was heavily influenced by Darwin’s theory
of biological evolution. H. Spencer (1892) and E. Durkheim (1951), were the early
advocates of this theory. On the other hand, theories of revolutionary social change,
particularly deriving from K. Marx (1962), stressed the importance of class conflict,
political struggle, and imperialism as the principal mechanisms of fundamental

structural changes.

Smncer on Social Change

Basically, Spencer views the social system, or social structure, as an organism.

Any evolution can alter the structure and function of society; moreover, the growth of
its size also can lead to the differentiation of society. Increases in population or the
combination of social groups can bring about the development of society, and the
larger a society is, the more complex its social structures are (Coser, 1977). At the
same time, Spencer believes that the evolution of society does not proceed step by
Step; rather, it is heavily influenced by social and natural environments. According to
Coser, Spencer felt that:

Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent

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and re-divergent...While spreading over the earth mankind has found

environments of various characters, and in each case the social life

fallen into, partly determined by social life previously led, has been

partly determined by the influences of the new environment; so that the

multiplying groups have tended ever to acquire differences, now major

and now minor: there have arisen genera and species of societies

(Coser, 1977:96-97).

In short, Spencer correctly observed the relationship between society and the
environment as determining the structure of society, much as the environments of
biological organisms often influence their physical structures. Also, Spencer believed
that those people and social structures which best fit their environment would be the
ones to survive. As a matter of fact, Spencer coined the phrase "survival of the
fittest," which is often associated with C. Darwin. Therefore, Spencer’s ideas are
sometimes called social Darwinism.

Durkheim on Social Change

Compared to Spencer, E. Durkheim talked less explicitly about social change.
Durkheim’s concept of social change is mainly found in his famous work fl_h_g
Division of Labor in Socieg, which was originally published in 1893.

Generally, Durkheim sees social change revolving around an analysis of the
causes and consequences of increases in the division of labor. He writes:

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density

of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course

of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser

and generally more voluminous (Durkheim, 1947:302).
In this short paragraph, volume refers to population size and concentration, while

density pertains to the increased interaction arising out of escalated volume.

Durkheim believes that division of labor arises out of increases in the concentration of

 

populations \ll
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populations whose members increasingly come into contact with one another. Along
with this, the concept of mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1947) also
plays a significant role for Durkheim when dealing with the problems of social
structure. In Durkheim’s mind, mechanical solidarity is based on a strong collective
conscience regulating the thoughts and actions of individuals located within structural
units. It is a kind of primitive society. By contrast, organically structured societies
are typified by large populations distributed in specialized roles in many diverse
structural units. In comparison with mechanical societies, it is evident that organic
societies reveal high degrees of interdependence among individuals and corporate
units, with exchange, legal contracts, and norms regulating these interactions. More
specifically, there are clear distinctions between mechanical and organic solidarity.
These disparities are: structural differentiation, value generalization, and normative
specification. The changing of these kinds of characters, for Durkheim, did not
represent disorganization of the society; rather, it stands for a new form of social
integration. In other words, it means an old society is changing to a new society.

Durkheim’s concepts in mechanical and organic solidarity provide a useful tool
for us to observe social change, although it is too simple to apply in the real world of
today, because today’s society is more complicated than he could imagine. He,
nonetheless, points out that the heterogeneity of the society and particularly of the
individual are critical when the problems of social change arise.
Parsons on Social Change

Basically, to argue that functionism, or the sociology of Parsons, is

fundamentally a theory of change, is to challenge a very common opinion among

oft

Ho

Ac

15

sociologists, according to Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1973). In fact, Parsonian
sociology has been accused both of confusing the idea of social equilibrium with that
of cybernetic regulation and of neglecting the phenomenon of social change.
However, it does not mean that Parsons did not pay any attention to social change.
According to Lewis A. Coser:

Parsons returned to a Spencerian evolutionary scheme in an attempt to

counter critics who accused him of being unable to offer an explanation

of social change (Coser, 1977:571).
In his article "Some Considerations on Social Change" (Parsons, 1970:95-123),
Parsons, reverting to views worked out in his early writings, treats a phenomenon that
he deems vitally important to industrial growth, namely, differentiation of the range of
activities once carried on within the household, which gradually come to be
distinguished from economic and professional activities proper, the latter being carried
on outside the home in a workplace at some distance away. From his outside
occupation, the individual earns the income necessary to purchase what he needs on

the consumer goods market (Parsons, 1970). The concept of differentiation plays a

significant role in Parson’s theories. For example, in his Societies published in 1966,

 

Parsons developed "a paradigm of evolutionary change." The first component of the
paradigm is the process of differentiation. Parsons assumed that any society is
composed of a series of subsystems that differ in both their structure and their
functional significance for the larger society. As society evolves, new subsystems are
differentiated. Moreover, they also must be more specialized and adaptive than earlier
subsystems. This led him to the essential aspect of his evolutionary paradigm, the

idea of adaptive upgrading. Parsons described this process:

a

'2

Own:

1
evolves
Parsons

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underg.
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16

If differentiation is to yield a balanced, more evolved system, each
newly differentiated substructure...must have increased adaptive capacity
for performing its primary function, as compared to the performance of
that function in the previous, more diffuse structure ..... We may call this

process the adaptive upgrading aspect of the evolutionary change cycle

(Parsons, 1966:22).

This is a highly positive model of social change. It assumes that as society
evolves it grows generally better able to cope with its problems. Because of this,
Parsons is often thought of as a conservative sociologist.

Furthermore, Parsons argued that the process of differentiation leads to a new
set of problems of integration for society. As subsystems proliferate and grow more
specialized, the society is confronted with new problems in coordinating the operations
of these units.

Third, Parsons believes that the value system of society as a whole must
undergo changes as social structures and functions grow increasing differentiated.
Nevertheless, because the new system is more versatile, it is harder for the value
system to encompass it. Thus, a more differentiated society requires a value system
that is "couched at a higher level of generality in order to legitimize the wider variety
of goals and functions of its subunits," according to Parsons (Parsons, 1966:23).
However, this process of the generalization of values often does not proceed smoothly
when it meets resistance from groups committed to their own narrow value systems.

In brief, from the perspective of Parsons’ action theory, evolution involves: a)
increasing differentiation of the personality, social, cultural, and organismic systems
from one another; b) increasing differentiation within each of these four action

subsystems; c) escalating problems of integration and the emergence of new

 

integrativ
subsyster
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17
integrative structures; and d) the upgrading of the survival capacity of each action
subsystem, as well as of the overall action system, to its environment (Turner, 1991).
Marx on Social Change

As was perhaps evident in the discussion of evolution theory, social change
was viewed as a highly orderly process. This is not so in conflict theory, or in a
larger sense, in the theory of revolution, which was first developed by Karl Marx.

In Marx’s view, society comprised a moving balance of antithetical forces that
generate social change by their tension and struggle. This thinking, according to
Coser, was different from most of the doctrines of Marx’ time, but in tune with much
of nineteenth century thought (Coser, 1977). For Marx, struggle not peaceful growth
was the impetus of social progress, strife was the father of all things, and social
conflict was at the heart of the historical process. In order to develop his theory,
Marx adopts a quite different view from Hegel, who believes that the evolution of
mankind resulted mainly from the evolution of ideas or of the human spirit. Marx
takes the evolution in man’s material condition as his point of departure. He states:

Legal relations as well as the form of the state are to be grasped neither

from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the

human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of

life, the sum total of which Hegel...combines under the name of ’civil

society’.... The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in the political

economy (Marx & Engles, 1962:362).

In addition his material determinism, the relationship of production is also
Significant when Marx discusses social change. He believes that each particular class

antagonism, which is rooted in particular productive conditions, must be analyzed in

its own right. Furthermore, as societies emerge from originally undifferentiated

 

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hordes, Marx believes, the division of labor leads to the emergence of stratification, of
classes of men distinguished by their differential access to the means of production
and their differential power. Also, because resources are limited, these resources will
be owned exclusively by those who have attained dominance by way of their
expropriation of the means of production, irrespective of the economic surplus that has
been accumulated. However, in his mind, this dominance never remains unchallenged.
This is why he asserts that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of
class struggle" (Marx & Engles, 1962:34).

Undoubtedly, Marx’s foremost concerns were change and conflict; by contrast,
Parsons’ dreary, or functionalism, has devoted much more of its theoretical energies to
explaining social order, in other words, how to make society stick together. Even
though these differences exist, it does not mean that there is no intersection between
these two theories. Actually, there are some similar points between them. For
example, Seymour M. Lipset explains:

Surprising as it may seem to those who would emphasize the theoretical

differences among schools of sociology, functionalist analysis shares

with Marxist thought Hegel’s insight that all social systems inherently

contain contradictions, the resolution of which press for social change

(Lipset, 1975:177).

The only, or primary, disparity between them is their assumptions about human nature.
In Dick Atkinson’s opinion:

Marx felt it[the human nature] was basically cooperative, rational, self-

controlling. Parsons, following Hobbes and Durkheim, felt it was in

competition with itself and implied conflict in social relationships

generally (Atkinson, 1971:109).

In short, both evolution and revolution theory suffer from deficiencies. For

 

 

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19
evolution theory, we take Parson as an example. He poinwd out the major

characteristics of society in different phases but failed to explain why social change
occurred and how it changed. Revolution theory represented by Marx, held that
conflict would bring social change; in fact, this assumption was wrong. Furthermore,
Marx incorrectly predicted the formation of the modern proletariat into a revolutionary
class during the present capitalistic epoch, which would overthrow the capitalist
economic system and then form a communist society.

While revolutionary and evolutionary theories of social change each display
inadequacies, both theories have some implications for this research.

In general, the concept of social change can be seen as environments and
inputs for this study. Both environments and inputs are vital to all organizations,
either in the public or the private sectors, because organizations have to confront them
actively or passively. Also, they all have impacts, direct or indirect, on organizations.
Meanwhile, the degree of these impacts might be varied. It largely depends on the
nature of organizations. In other words, the effects of environments and inputs on
organizations vary from one organization to another. Hence, we must understand the
nature of police organizations if we are to explore the association between social
change and police organizations.

In particular, the aspect of evolutionary. dreary with most relevance to this
Study is the notion of differentiation. Police organizations will be differentiated and
Changed, when accompanied by increases in population and crime, the fluctuation of
political conditions, as well as variations in the economy. Revolutionary theory also

implies the significance of conflict. If police agencies fail to perceive and respond to

social
police

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2. Sys

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20

social change--environments and inputs—this will not only lead to conflict between
police agencies and their environments, but also will cause conflict inside police

organizations.

2. System Theory

In terms of system theory, two person’s ideas are significant to this research: L.
Von Bertalanffy and T. Parsons. Von Bertalanffy is generally considered the creator
of general system theory. The primary concepts of Von Bertalanffy’s system theory
are listed as follows (Von Bertalanffy, 1980).

l. A system is a combination of two more interrelated elements. Also, a
system is composed of several smaller systems; a single element cannot be a system.

2. Systems take many forms, such as natural systems versus artificial systems,
open systems versus closed systems, and so forth. For this study, the notion of the
open system and the closed system is crucial. Because this distinction is a relative
comparison, particularly in human society, are unable to say this system is a closed
system and that system is an open system unless we make a comparison.

3. For the purpose of proceeding the activities to attain the goal, inputs are
required for all systems; in addition, all systems will produce some kind of outputs
which are needed by other systems. At the same time, inputs from outside systems
would be transformed to several different types of outputs and given to other systems.

4. Entropy is used to measure the degree of uncertainty of the system. In a
closed system, because of increasing entropy, it will die eventually. On the contrary,

in an open system the exchange of information, energy, material, and so on, between

21
different systems, will prevent entropy from increasing. This not only implies that a

primary goal of a system is to survive, but also indicates the importance of the
environment.

5. Environment is vital to any given system and has a great influence on a
system, while a system has little, if any, impact on the environment.

In addition to Von Bertalanffy’s system theory, the idea of Parson’s social
system is also helpful in explaining the goal of this research.

In his eminent work The Structure of Social Action Parsons offered a general

 

theory of social systems as problem-solving entities, which seek to integrate
sociological theory with developments in biology, psychology, economics, and political
theory. Parsons believed that every social system has four subsystems corresponding
to functional imperatives, that is, adaptation (A), goal-attainment (G), integration (1),
and pattern-maintenance or latency (L). This AGIL model, in Parson’s mind, not only
can be employed to analyze the interaction between two persons, but also can be used
to explain the interaction between two societies. Moreover, these four subsystems can
be conceptualized at various levels so that the basic AGIL pattern also corresponds to
the economy, polity, societal community, and institution of socialization as well. In
adapting to their internal and external environments, social systems have to solve these
four problems in order to continue to exist and they evolve through greater
differentiation of their structures and by achieving higher levels of integration among
their parts (Parsons, 1951). His AGIL model on one hand suggests that the goal of a
system is to survive. On the other hand, he also pointed out the significance of the

environment. Although Parsons’ theory was seriously criticized, yet the implications

22
derived from his AGIL pattern are sufficient to help in explaining why social change

is important to policing, and how police systems cope with it.

In brief, the influence of system theory on this study is great. Because this
author assumes that policing is a subsystem of the criminal justice system and the
criminal justice system is a subsystem of the social system, any variance in the social
system, for example, the growth of population, the redistribution of income, a change
in the crime rate, and so on, could be regarded as not only environment but also inputs
and would cause a fluctuation in the criminal justice system. In the same vein, the
alteration of the criminal justice system would unavoidably lead to changes in the
police system. Moreover, the degree of variance in the police system depends on how
closed (or open) of the police system is. Specifically, if the police system is a highly
open system, then any alteration in the criminal justice system has a great impact on
it. On the contrary, if it is relatively closed, then the influence from outside the
criminal justice system would be small. Another important implication derived from
system theory is the concept of environment. According to system theory, any given
system has little, if any, effect on environment; nevertheless, the system itself is
heavily influenced by the environment. The criminal justice system is the
environment of the police system, and the social system is the environment of the
criminal justice system. Consequently, variance in the social system not only forces
the criminal justice system to adjust itself, but also leads the police system, the
gatekeeper of the criminal justice system, to change in order to survive, according to

Parsons.

3.50ci

The w:
it is a1:
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Police

23

3. Social Change and Police Organizations

The police is not a product of nature, instead, it is a product of artificiality.
The word "artificiality" indicates that the police is not only influenced by history, but
it is also affected by politics, culture, and society. In other words, it is affected by
environments. In order to find out how the police evolved, we have to look backward
first.
Police and Histog

With respect to police history, Peter K. Manning pointed out that:

An historical overview is' critical because policing is shrouded in

tradition, and is, in fact, a very traditional occupation, essentially

unchanged in form since the early nineteenth century (Manning,

1977:38).
The first appearance of modern policing is in London, 1829. Here, this writer defines
modern policing as "a system of law enforcement involving a permanent agency
employing full-time officers who engage in continuous patrol of fixed beats to prevent
crime," following the definition offered by Samuel Walker (Walker, 19773). The

function of the police can be traced prior to that time. Walker, for instance, says that:

The need for more effective law enforcement and protection of public
safety in London was evident even by the late 17008 (Walker, 1980:60).

T.A. Critchely also notes this. He points out that the collapse from 1689 onwards of
the old English police system was because of its:

sheer inability, in its debilitated and corrupt state, to cope with a social
and economic upheaval which, in the course of the 18th century,
doubled England’s population from six to twelve million, transformed
the metropolis from two overgrown cities into a massive conurbation
and turned vast rural areas into agglomerations of slums, mines, and
factories which lacked the elementary conditions of civilized living
(Critehely, 1971:36).

24

Along with the increase in population in London, occupational changes as well as the
economic situation were also significant in determining the emergence of modern
police, as stated by Manning (Manning, 1977). Therefore, the police is not only a
creation of history but also a product of social change.
Police and Politics

Policing is also heavily influenced by politics. The reason for this impact is
obvious, because the police is a subsystem of the political system. Since it is under
the domain of politics, it is inevitably influenced by political power. Numerous
articles can be used to support this argument. M. H. Haller, for example, says that
police work is shaped by political forces. He reviews the history of the Chicago
police from 1905 to 1935 and notes that police officials and reformers in Chicago at
that time discovered they shared a common desire to control crimes against property.
Consequently, a number of technical and administrative changes were made that were
intended to improve their crime fighting capacities. Because of influence of political
power, the police’s mission changed from providing community services to combating
crime (Haller, 1971). David H. Bailey has a similar viewpoint. After he observed the
police systems of several countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
India, and the United States, he concluded that:

Police have not generally been independent political actors. They rarely

act on their own politics, but usually as instruments of others (Bailey,

1971:91-112).
He also lists the Prussian police in nineteenth century, as well as the police in India, to
support his arguments (Bailey, 1971). Even using the Marxist perspective to explain

the development of the police, this assertion is also true. Take S.L. Harring and L.M.

McMullin'S
1811 to 1
just ate ml
betwccn the
conclude by
dtvclopnel
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25
McMullin’s work as an example. They studied the police in Buffalo, New York, from

1872 to 1900. In this paper, they explain why the Buffalo police system expanded
just after the Civil War, the changes it underwent during these decades, and the link
between these changes and the social backgrounds of key city officials. They
conclude by calling for additional query into the role of power elites in the
development of the police and of the function the police perform in a capitalist
industrial society (Harring & McMullin, 1975). Evidence provided above demonstrate
why Bailey is convinced that:

The creation of police forces is to be understood in political terms;
police forces are the creatures of politics (Bailey, 1971:100).

Polige and Crime

Third, the crime rate also has a close association with changes in police
organizations. In this context, the fluctuations in the crime rate not only influence the
operation of the police, but also have an effect on the size of police forces. As for the
former, it can be seen in the changing of police operation style. For example,
according to George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, the evolving strategy of policing
includes three stages: the political era, the reform era, and the community era (Kelling
& Moore, 1988). Many factors affect the strategy of policing, however, increase in
the crime rate is without doubt one of the factors. In their work Community Policing:
A €0an Persfltive, Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux have a
similar viewpoint (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). This illustrates that crime is
still the major concern of police organizations no matter what kind of strategies they

adopt. On the other hand, the crime rate affects the size of the police force, too.

 

Gary S.
rate mo
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26
Gary S. Becker’s argument is an example. He contends that an increase in the crime

rate motivates the community as a whole to procure more policing services which, in
turn, indicates that more policemen are needed (Becker, 1968). There is a controversy
here. As the crime rate increases, people are apt to demand more police officers.
However, several empirical studies demonstrate that there is little association between
the size of a police force and the crime rate. Theoretically, if each citizen was
protected by one policeman, a decrease in the crime rate would be expected. Since
this is unattainable in reality, most of the studies in this regard take the present
number of police officers as their point of departure. In other words, researchers use
the number of policeman at the present as a basis to further their research. In their
197 8 study, James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland report that police resources and
police activity independently affect the robbery rate after controlling for various
socioeconomic factors (Wilson & Boland, 1978). Consequently, whether there is a
relationship between the number of policemen and the rate of crime requires more
investigations. Whatever the effect of the soaring crime rate, or other factors, that
police forces are becoming larger is an undisputed fact.
Police gd Population

Fourth, the connection between the size of the population and the number of
police officers is also worthy of note. At first glance, it seems logical that when the
population increases, it is inevitable that the crime rate will increase, too. And, as
demonstrated above, growth in the crime rate will lead to an increase in police
officers. Whether the number of crimes is a constant, which means there is a

limitation to its number, or a variable, which implies it is subject to change, is a

 

controversia
Stable inert:
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27
controversial issue. Irrespective this issue, studies in this regard show that there is a
stable increase in crimes if the population increases. Take murder in London as an
example. It increased from 0.6 to 1.8 per 100,000 population, from 1955 to 1974
(Chaiken & Chaiken, 1983). As a matter of fact, the problem of population size is not
so simple. One must take into account the structure of population and the composition
of ethnic groups. The relationship between crime and the factors of age and race is
also critical. Marvin Wolfgang and Bernard Cohen have spoken of the need to
determine the extent of overlap between two poorly conceived terms-namely, race and
crime. They note that :

An examination of many studies in many cities throughout the country

over time spans and by specific offenses, by age, sex, and race, shows

consistently that black adult crime and juvenile delinquency rates,

measured by arrests, are higher than white rates (Wolfgang & Cohen,

1970:31).

Wesley Skogan has a similar observation. He notes that:

victimization surveys and victims’ descriptions to police of those who

”got away" paint a similar picture. At the neighborhood level the

volume of crime is strongly correlated with the size of the black

population (Skogan, 1979:384).

In terms of age, the situation is no better. Criminologists have been paying
much attention to juvenile delinquencies for a long time. On the other hand, crimes
committed by teenagers are serious. Official statistics from 1988 show that roughly
42 percent of all persons arrested for the most serious index violent and property
crimes in 1985 were under 20 years old, and almost four-fifths were nule (Report to
the Nation on Crime and Justice, 1988).

The evidence given above illustrates that demographic factors are more

28
complicated than we may at first imagine. And, the connection between the size of
the population and the size of the police force is relatively stable. When one changes
the other changes in a similar way.
Pong gig gongmy

F‘mally, the association between the economic factor and the police requires
exploration.

The economic factor, essentially, has indirect and direct effects on policing. Its
indirect effect on policing can be observed through its direct influence on crime. In
other words, the economic factor is likely to affect the crime rate implicitly or
explicitly, and the crime rate influences the operation of policing, as mentioned earlier.
Hence, economics also has an effect on policing. With respect to the influence of the
economic factor on the crime rate, perhaps the rate of unemployment or poverty are
better indicators.

By reviewing modern research on the relation between the labor market and
crime, Richard B. Freeman found that there was an expected significant positive
association between these two variables in some analyses, but not in others (Freeman,
1983). As a crime researcher, he conservatively concludes that:

While it seems safe to say that there is some difficulty in measuring the

relationship between crime and unemployment, the various job

experiments with individual crimes offer little optimism about the effect

of job creation on the behavior of persons already embarked on a career

of crime (Freeman, 1983:106).

Nevertheless, he also states that:
It may be that the key to the unemployment/crime relationship is to be

found in the behavior of young persons who have yet to embark on
such a career (Freeman, 1983:106).

29

In brief, the connection between the crime rate and unemployment is still
significant in the view of criminologists if they conduct crime research in this context.
In order to avoid serious attacks, however, they must be as conservative as possible
when they give their conclusions. However, this situation is not a barrier to this study.

Owing to the association between unemployment, or in a larger sense—the
economic factor, and the rate of crime, the structure or the style of policing is
unavoidably influenced by the economic factor. In his paper, for instance, Charles H.
Levine points out that many police departments underwent substantial changes in the
way they organized, managed, and deployed their resources in coping with fiscal stress
(Levine, 1985). In order to deal with economic depression, about one-quarter of the
police departments laid-off employees, decreased overtime use, and even slowed
promotion rates, according to Levine (Levine, 1985). Therefore, the effect of the
economic factor on policing cannot be underestimated or ignored, particularly in a
highly decentralized country like the United States.

In conclusion, factors which might have an effect on policing, no matter
whether it is a direct or an indirect effect, are likely to interact with one another. For
example, the interaction between the political factor and the economic factor is
difficult to distinguish. Even using the most advanced statistical skills, some variances
are beyond statistical control. It is because of this kind of interaction that the history
of policing has been shaped. Also, the cultural factor is crucial in researching the
history of the police. In this regard, John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood pointed
out that:

It is important to recognize that no organization can be isolated from its

30

cultural environment. That is, organizations as social organisms must

operate within the framework of the larger cultural system. As a

consequence, the alternatives in any given situation are greatly limited

by their congruity with the values of the total culture (Pfiffner &

Sherwood, 1960:252).
Empirically, several researchers also have like opinions. In Walter L. Ames’ 1974
study (Ames, 1981) and L. Craig Parker, Jr.’s 1981 research (Parker, 1984), both
admit that traditional values, or the cultural factor, is not only significant in people’s
daily lives but also critical in determining the style of policing. More recent research
conducted by Randolph D. Hicks also specifies that one of the important factors which
has positive influence upon Japanese policing is the culture of the Japanese people
(Hicks, 1985). Therefore, the cultural factor must be included in the study of the

history of policing.

4. Summary

In this chapter, this writer reviewed theories of social change, system theory,
and the connections between social change and policing. As stated earlier,
evolutionary theory suggests that differentiation cannot be ignored; revolutionary
theory cites the significance of conflict; and system theory notes the importance of
environments. On the other hand, as can be seen from the differing findings of many
researchers, the association between social change and policing is not easy to clarify.
All these hint that a more careful study of social change and policing is required,
especially as regards a different country. The next chapter will demonstrate the

relationship between social change and policing in the Republic of China.

31

CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLICE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA-4973 TO 1989

l. The Police System in the Republic of China

The police system is a reflection of the political system, therefore, the police
system in the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, mirrors the political system
of the Republic of China. The Constitution of the Republic of China, passed on
December 25, 1946, published on January 1, 1947, and implemented on December 25,
1947, is the basis of the political system of the Republic of China. Under this
constitution, five branches constitute the government. They are: the Executive Yuan,
the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examinations Yuan, and the Control
Yuan. Each Yuan has different functions, and each Yuan cooperates with the others,
instead of balancing or checking their powers. In this regard, the Constitution
demonstrates the influence of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the founding father of the Republic of
China.

Of these five Yuans, the Executive Yuan is the most powerful branch of the
government. To some extent, the head of the Executive Yuan, just as the President of
the United States of America and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, enjoys a
great deal of power in deciding and implementing national policies, although some
scholars debate this. The head of the Executive Yuan, the premier (shyng-jeng-yuan-
jaang), is nominated by the President of the Republic of China and is approved by the
Legislative Yuan, according to the Constitution of the Republic of China. Therefore,
the head of the Executive Yuan is not only responsible to the President but also is

overseen by the Legislative Yuan. Under the premier are eight ministries ( Interior,

32

Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Finance, Education, Justice, Economic Affairs, and
Transportation and Communications), and two commissions (Mongolian and Tibetan
Affairs, and Overseas Chinese Affairs). In addition, several administrative agencies,
such as the National Environmental Administration, the Commission for Research and
Development, and so forth, are under the control and direction of the Executive Yuan.
However, the positions of these administrative agencies, including the National Police
Administration (NPA), the subject of this research, are not as high as the eight
ministries and two commissions.

The National Police Administration along with the Central Police College
(CPC) are the two highest police agencies. Both are under the control of the Interior
Ministry of the Republic of China, but they have different functions to perform. The
NPA, according to the Police Act (PA), is not only responsible for implementing,
directing, and monitoring national police policies, it is also responsible for overseeing
and appointing the middle-level and above police officials throughout the country. On
the other hand, the CPC is responsible for handling police education and training
above the level of police lieutenant. Every police sergeant is required to attend the
Central Police College to receive at least four months of training before being
promoted to the level of police lieutenant. The Republic of China is in effect a highly
centralized country, although its constitution claims that the power and authority is
balanced between local and central governments (Lee, Y.C. 1987; Chiou, PL. 1988;
Pao, CC. 1990).

Under the NPA, there are several police departments which perform various

functions. These can be classified into two categories: administration-based police

33
departments and specialized police departments. As for the former, their jurisdiction is
administrative, and they are responsible for all police-related events that happen in
each jurisdiction. In this category, there are three major police departments: a) the
Taiwan Provincial Police Administration (TPPA)-- 21 county (city) police departments
are under its direction; b) the Taipei Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD)-- 14
police precincts are under its control; and c) the Kaohsiung Metropolitan Police
Department (KMPD)- eight police precincts are under its control. As to the
specialized police departments, their jurisdiction covers criminal and civil affairs. In
this category, there are sixteen agencies are under the direction and command of the
NPA, including the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), the Highway Police Bureau
(HPB), the Airport Police Bureau (APB), the Entry and Exit Service Bureau (EESB),
the Airborne Squadron (AS), the Taiwan Police Academy (TPA), seven Police
Preserve Corps (from First to Seventh), the Police Armory (PA), and the Police
Communication Network (PCN). These police agencies have, basically, two superiors.
Take the TPPA as an example. On the one hand, it is under the control of the NPA;
on the other hand, it is also subordinate to the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG),
so they have to obey orders from both the TPG and the NPA. In the same way, the
TMPD and the KMPD must follow directions from the NPA, the Taipei Metmpolitan
Government (TMG), and the Kaohsiung Metropolitan Govemment (KMG). This
structure makes the police systems in the Republic of China quite unique, and many
authors believe that this dual command system is harmful to a unified command of
policing (Tu, L. 1982; Chen, M.C. 1982; Research Unit of the CPC, 1986; Chiou, PL

1988).

34
2. Factors Influencing Policing in the Republic of China

There are, primarily, five factors that influence Taiwan’s policing. Among
these factors, some are related to Chinese history and tradition, and others are relevant
to the ROC’s political environment and law. Of course, the factor of leadership is
also crucial in determining Taiwan’s policing. We begin with an examination of the
historical factor.

1. History

China has five thousand years of history. Throughout Chinese history, some
dynasties adopted a decentralized system, which meant that local governments,
especially local military powers, enjoyed a great deal of power and authority to decide
their own affairs in their own jurisdictions. Others, however, employed a centralized
system, which meant that the power and authority of local governments were highly
restricted, and the central government had the power to dominate and control local
governments. Chinese historians described these two systems in great detail (Chien,
M. 1981; Ku, C. 1989).

Chinese history reveals that, because the central government was not able to
control the local governments, several dynasties were overthrown by local
govermnents whose strength was allowed to grow unchecked. A centralized tradition
took shape gradually, because the central government was afraid of strong local
governments. Even after the Republic of China was established in 1912, it still
suffered from the vagaries of local military powers until it was reunited in 1927
(Chang, P.Y. 1988). Today, the centralized system is still maintained in the Republic

of China, although the constitution of the Republic of China claims that the power and

35
authority between the central govemment and the local governments are balanced.

Also, this tradition is highly criticized (Chang, CH. 1989; Lai, K.N. 1990; Hsiao, CC.
1991). Apparently, the foremost reason for rulers employing a centralized system was
their belief that a centralized system would stabilize their regimes, because military
and police powers, two of the most effective elements required to maintain a regime,
are under their control under a centralized system. Several examples illustrate that this
centralized tradition is still alive in the ROC.

First, the establishment of the NPA reflects this thinking. The NPA was
established in 1972. The reason for building the NPA was because the Division of
Police Affairs (DPA), the forerunner of the NPA inside the Interior Ministry, did not
have enough authority and personnel to deal with national police policies. Meanwhile,
the DPA did not have direct authority to monitor the TPPA and the T'MPD (the
KMPD was under the TPPA’s control at that time). In order to establish a strong,
unity-of-command police department able to control all police departments in Taiwan,
the NPA was built (Chiou, HQ 1982; Chen, LC. 1985).

Second, the authority to appoint and transfer middle- and high-level police
officials also mirrors this tradition. Pursuant to the Police Personnel Management Act
(PPMA), the power to appoint of middle- and high-level police officials resides with
the NPA based on final approval by the Interior Ministry. In practice, the Interior
Ministry approves the appointment of any official the NPA proposes. In addition,
transfer of middle— and high-level police officials is under the control of the NPA.
The NPA has the authority to transfer a police commissioner from one city to another

city without the consent of either of the city’s mayors. Recently, several mayors who

WC]

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(fire

C811 t
OVCT
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36
were not pleased with this kind of transfer, because they considered their authority had

been invaded and deprived, rose up in protest, so conflicts between local governments
and the central government have emerged (Lee, Y.C. 1987).

Third, a cenu'alized tradition also appeared in many police-related acts. For
instance, Article 3 Section 1 of the Police Act stipulates that the affairs regarding the
police personnel system and its rrranagement, police education, police uniforms, police
operations, and so forth are under the authority of central government; Articles 4 and 5
of the same act say that the Interior Ministry and the NPA are responsible for handling
police affairs nationwide. Similarly, the Police Operation Act (POA) provides
direction to all police departments around the country on how to perform police duties
as well as the prOper style for police operations. Acts like these indicate that the
central government of the Republic of China,'through the NPA, has strong control
over local police forces. As a matter of fact, even if police acts did not have such
regulations, local police forces would still be under the central government’s control
because, in the first place, the NPA has the authority to appoint and transfer middle-
and high-level officials, and, in the second place,.it is able to control the local police
budgets by way of appropriation, which causes local police forces and local
governments to willingly follow the direction of the central government. A centralized
tradition, as shown above, is an important factor in determining ’the nature of police
organizations in the Republic of China, both in the short run and the long run.

2. Political Factors

For any country in the world, either in the East or the West, politics effects

policing. There are no exceptions. In Taiwan, politics also affects police policies

of

con
the

dorr

had :
espcc
Comr
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TailNan

 

37 .
(Kao, CS. 1985). The influence of politics on policing can be seen from several
aspects.

The first political factor affecting Taiwan’sipolicing is the continued dominance
of one political party. Since Chiang Kai-Shek moved his Nationalist Party (also
known as Kuomintung, or KMT) to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT has been the
controlling regime in Taiwan. Even today, the KMT still controls over 70 percent of
the seats in the Legislative Yuan and many local legislatures, although the KMT’s
dominant status is under challenge little by little.

Chiang Kai-Shek and his successor--Chiang Ching-Kuo, his oldest son--, both
had a strong desire to bring the KMT regime back to mainland China. This was
especially true for Chiang Kai-Shek, because he lost mainland China to the Chinese
Communist Party and Mac Tse-Tung in 1949. 80, during Old Chiang’s time, a
primary goal for the KMT was to recover mainland China. This dream had not come
true when Chiang Kai-Shek died in 1975. As his successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo also
had the responsibility to make his father’s dream come true. However, many factors
combined to make him think about the KMT’s situation in a more realistic way: his
poor health; the appeal of democracy and power re-distribution among people in
Taiwan; the unbalanced military power between the KMT and the Chinese
Communist Party; and, the establishment of a diplomatic relationship between the
United States and the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Republic of China (PRC).
He realized, in his later years, that his father’s dream would not come true in the short
run; but, as a leader of the KMT, he also had the responsibility to maintain the KMT’s

position of power in Taiwan. Therefore, the stated goal of the KMT changed from

recov:
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1987.
Ph.D.
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1990; L
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KMT no

example
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DPP is,

38
recovering mainland China during Chiang Kai-Shek’s time to making the KMT’s
regime stable under the rule of Chiang Ching-Kuo. Two years before his death in
1987, Chiang Ching-Kuo announced that Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese with a
Ph.D. degree from Cornell University, as the vice president, and became President of
the Republic of China in February 1988. This announcement was another indication
that stabilizing the KMT’s regime remains its most important goal. A president with a
native background is helpful to the KMT’s rule because it increases the legitimacy of
the KMT. For the KMT leaders and Lee Teng-Hui, there are two threats which might
endanger the survival of the KMT. They are: the Democratic Progress Party (DPP),
an internal threat; and the Chinese Communist Party, an external threat (Pemg, K.W.
1990; Lin, CY. 1989). The DPP, a political party considered by the Conservatives to
be violent (Hsieh, S.Y. 1990) or part of what they believe to be a "destructive
opposition" (Chu, K.C. 1991; Chen, C]. 1987), was established in the mid-1980s after
the KMT removed its restriction on forming new political parties. The DPP’s political
activities began, however, in mid-1970s (Lin, CY. 1989; Chang, CT. 1989; Pemg,
HE. 1989 and 1990; Pemg, K.W. 1991). As a result of the DPP’s emergence, the
KMT no longer dominated elections in Taiwan. The people’s support for the KMT
decreased gradually, while the support of the DPP increased. In the past decade, for
example, although the KMT still holds over 70 percent of the seats in the legislatures
at all levels. The DPP has also made remarkable progress in local and central
legislatures. Official statistics show that the DPP has steadily enjoyed about 30
percent support among voters over the past ten years. KMT leaders realize that the

DPP is, on the one hand, a helpful force in making Taiwan more democratic, but, on

fun
19E
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39
the other hand, they are not pleased with the emergence of a strong opposition party,

because this forces them to share resources and power with the DPP. A more
fundamental question is the DPP’s major appeal-Taiwan independence (Huang, T.F.
1989. and 1991). This makes the KMT worry about Taiwan’s future and a possible
invasion by the Chinese Communist Party. It is interesting to note that though the
KMT and the Chinese Communist Party have different ideologies, implement different
systems in each territory, and compete with each other, they both have a common
goal, that is, both claim that there is only one China, and both assert that they are the
orthodox, legitimate, and only China. Furthermore, both believe that Taiwan is a part
of China, and both will not tolerate Taiwan’s independence. When the KMT speaks
of "China" it means the Republic of China (ROC), whereas the Chinese Communist
Party means the People’s Republic of China (PRC). in this contest, obviously, the
PRC has won because it was recognized by most countries, has diplomatic relations
with those countries, and is more well-known than the ROC. On the other hand, the
PRC has lost because of the prosperous economy of the ROC. Irrespective of the
arguments between the ROC and the PRC, both have reasons for not allowing Taiwan
to become an independent country. In fact, many scholars consider Taiwan’s
independence unrealistic and unfeasible. The Chinese Communist Party now has Tibet
and Inner Mongolia under its control and would fight to keep Taiwan a part of what it
claims as its territory should Taiwan claim independence. On the other hand, the
KMT leaders worry that Taiwan’s independence would cause the CCP to invade,
which might jeopardize the people’s welfare. But more important, an independent

Taiwan would mean that the KMT would lose the legitimacy of its claim to recover

demor

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40
mainland China. For its part, the DPP has held numerous political and social

demonstrations and protests since its appearance. The NPA’s data demonstrates that
thousands of anti-KMT demonstrations were held in Taiwan every year since 1987, the
year the KMT removed Martial Law. Most of these demonstrations had a direct or
indirect association with the DPP (Wu, 8.8. 1987). The KMT leaders consider that
too many demonstrations will not only lead to the instability of Taiwan’s society and
endanger its survival, but will also decrease the attractiveness of Taiwan’s investment
environment. In other words, the KMT leaders are afraid demonstrations held by the
DPP will scare off both current and future foreign capitalists from investing in Taiwan.
This would be harmful to Taiwan’s economic development, and the economy is both a
testament to the world that the KMT has done an excellent job on this small island
and a powerful propaganda tool to convince people in mainland China to overthrow
the regime of the Chinese Communist Party. Under these circumstances, the police in
Taiwan plays a vital role for the KMT in maintaining Taiwan’s stability by
suppressing the Taiwan independence movement. The KMT was, is, and will be in a
difficult situation as long as the status quo remains. For the purpose of this research,
there are three factors which continue to affect Taiwan’s policing in addition to history
and politics: military power, police leaders, and the law.

3. Military Power

In modern Chinese history, military power has always played an important and
decisive role in deciding the future of the country. It not only dominates political
developments in the Republic of China (Chang, CT. 1989), but also has a great deal

of impact on the policing of this country, especially during the past four decades.

Two examples help to illustrate how military force affects Taiwan’s policing. First,

most of the directors of the NPA have had military backgrounds. Heng-Day Juang,

the current director, is an exception. He is a graduate of the Central Police College--a

prerequisite for middle- and high-level police officials. He became the director of the

NPA in 1990. Scholars were against with this policy and urged a replacement was

required (Lin, ST 1980). Table 3-2-1 shows the backgrounds of the NPA directors

since its establishment in 1971.

NPA Directors’ Backgrounds and Other Information

Table 3-2-1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Name Term Party Job Before Job After
NPA NPA
Chiou, July 1972 ’ KMT Deputy Deputy
Jyu- to Commander, Commissioner,
Tsuen Dec. 1976 TPPH NSB
Koong, Dec. 197 6 KMT Commander, Representative
Ling- to Marine Corps of ROC in
Chemg May 1980 Malaysia
Ho, June 1980 KMT Deputy Deputy
En- to Commander, Commissioner,
Ting July 1985 TPPI-I NSB
Lo, July 1985 KMT Deputy Strategic
Chang to Commander, Counselor,
Aug. 1990 TPPH the Office of
the President
Juang, Aug. 1990 KMT Commissioner,
Heng- CIB
Day

 

As shown in this table, all the NPA’s directors before Juang had military backgrounds,

and most of them returned to the army after their terms in the NPA expired.

the lit
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inside I
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InVesn'

 

42

Therefore, many people including members of the DPP, high-level police officers, and
the liberals inside the KMT were pleased that Juang became the director of the NPA
and saw his appointment as a significant event. Although the DPP claims that this is a
great step for this country towards becoming more democratic, it is most enthusiastic
over the prospect that the military no longer has direct control over the police, because
it means that they will have more latitude in furthering their anti-government activities
without military threats. It also means that the KMT leaders will take a more lenient
attitude toward political opponents. On the other hand, for the liberals inside the
KMT, this replacement is helpful because it gives this country a better international
image. Therefore, everyone welcomed this replacement, including the DPP, liberals
inside the KMT, and police officials. Only the military leaders, fearing that their
impact on policing had been reduced, if not completely eliminated, opposed it. Even
though the military’s influence on policing decreased, it did not relinquish all
influence. The reason is that the position of the NPA director is not so high as to
ignore direction from higher levels. Above the NPA, the National Security Bureau
(NSB) has legal authority to command all organizations whose activities are relevant
to national security, and, of course, the NPA is one of these agencies. The NSB was
established during Old Chiang’s time. Its main goal was to coordinate, direct, and
monitor the operations of all intelligence administrations. In Taiwan, there are several
intelligence agencies: a) the NPA, which is under the Ministry of the Interior, b) the
Investigation Bureau (IB), which is under the Ministry of Justice; c) the Taiwan Peace
Preservation Headquarters (TPPH), the Military Police Headquarters (MPH), and the

Military Information Bureau (MIB), which are all under the Ministry of National

Defens
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were. 1
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43
Defense. Each agency performs a different function, but all of them are under the

NSB’s direction in addition to their own superiors. Directors of the NSB are, and
were, transferred from the army. Therefore, the army still has an impact on the
operation of the NPA, even today (Tu, L. 1982; Chen, M.C. 1982; Central Police
College, 1986), because of the supreme position of the NSB. These examples
illustrate that it is unrealistic to overlook the influence of the army when studying
policing in Taiwan.

' 4. Police Leaders

Police leaders are also important in determining changes and developments in

Taiwan’s policing. As mentioned earlier, before Juang, all of the NPA directors were
from the army. All wished to have good performance records during their terms in the
NPA in order to earn a higher position in the future, so all of them spent much of
their time and energy to improve or, more precisely change, the operation of the NPA
and policing, based on their own ideas and without considering police traditions as
well as possible resistance from police officers. Consequently, the police in Taiwan
always has a military flavor. For example, shortly after taking the director’s position
at the NPA, Ling-Chemg Koong decided to implement an innovative program. He
named it the "Policing Modernization Movement." This was a program with multiple
goals; the ultimate goal was to improve the police’s efficiency and effectiveness.
Therefore, he demanded that the Executive Yuan support his plan to increase police
officers’ salaries; to establish several new units which, he believed, would improve the
police’s performance; and to make the police mobilized. During his 42-month tenure,

the average salary of police officers increased significantly; this made him popular at

that 1
hour:
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It was
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police
station
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and bet
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44
that time (Lee, Y.C. 1983). Additionally, three-level-command-centers Operating 24

hours, like command centers inside police agencies in the United States, were also
established during his term. Furthermore, almost every police officer was given a
motorcycle, and most of the police precincts had at least one patrol car, which made
the police forces highly mobile. Innovations like these were greatly appreciated and
welcomed by police officials at that time. Nevertheless, one subprogram of this
movement caused resistance from both police officers and civilians (Chen, LC. 1980).
It was Koong’s belief that Taiwan’s policing would become like the United States, in
the long run, so there was a need to expand the size of police precincts and close
police stations, which were basic to Taiwan’s policing. Instead of going to police
stations to report something, citizens were to report to police precincts by telephone.
People in Taiwan did not like this idea, because the telephone system is not pervasive
and because of other psychological factors (Lee, Y.C. 1983; Chen, LC. 1980). Also,
police officers did not appreciate being deprived of their jurisdictions. Resistance
from both the public and police officials forced Koong to leave the NPA on June 1,
1980, making him the NPA director with the shortest term since its founding. Koong
was transferred to Malaysia where he served as the ROC’s foreign affairs
representative, a poor transfer for a person with a military background. En-Ting Ho, a
Deputy Commander of the TPPH at that time, took Koong’s place in early June 1980.
He realized that the program of canceling police stations was not popular, so he
terminated it shortly after taking over the directorship of the NPA. Also, he decided
to do nothing specific; this "rest policy" lasted throughout his term. His do-nothing

approach eventually landed him the Deputy Directorship of the NSB when he left the

10.
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45
NPA on July 2, 1985. Compared with Koong, it is obvious that Ho not only had a

longer term at the NPA, but also received a better promotion when he left. After Ho’s
departure, Chang Lo took Ho’s place in July 1985. Lo basically was a leader not only
with ideals but also with ambition. Lo believed, in the first place, that "training is the
best welfare for police officials." Second, he believed that crime could be terminated
or diminished. Third, in order to attain the goal of diminishing crime, he held that
police organizations had to be adjusted and special police squads, like SWAT teams,
should be emphasized. His beliefs were accompanied by a soaring crime rate, the
removal of Martial Law, and an increase in anti-government demonstrations. The
DPP initiated most of these demonstrations, some in conjunction with other social
movements, such as the "Environmental Protection" movement, the "Old-Soldier"
movement, and so on. These activities, to a certain degree, led L0 to implement an
innovative program—Five-Year Policing Construction Project. It is impossible to
determine whether his beliefs or the changing social conditions caused him to propose
such a five-year program. However, based on the timing of his announcement of the
program, it is apparent that his beliefs were more crucial in causing him to make such
a decision. Martial Law was lifted in July 1987. Anti-govemment demonstrations and
other social movements increased after Martial Law was removed. Therefore, it was
Lo’s personal beliefs that led him to implement this innovative program. In fact, it is
a Chinese tradition for the policies and regulations of an organization to shift with the
change of the person in charge (Chen, P.C. 1984; Lee, H. S. 1985; Chen, CL 1987).
For the purpose of this study, there is no need to provide details about Lo’s projects,

but one key point should be mentioned. Compared with Koong, Lo stressed the

jxflic
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46
police’s capacity to fight crime and added more police stations and police precincts as

well. Koong was convinced that police stations were unnecessary. By contrast, Lo
had no such idea. So, Lo had a longer tenure than Koong. The examples offered
above illustrate that police leaders, especially the director of the NPA, are a vital
factor in determining changes in Taiwan’s policing. To some extent, Taiwan’s
policing is governed by individuals, not by laws. However; it does not mean laws are
not crucial in this country; it merely means that the human factor is more important
than the legal factor.

5. Law

A fifth factor influencing police changes in Taiwan is the law. According to
the Central Regulation Standard Act (CRSA), the establishment of administrative
agencies and the functions of administrative agencies must follow the CRSA’s
regulations. That means the establishment of any administrative agency and its
function must be approved by the Legislative Yuan. This regulation, however, is not
enforced strictly. In other words, some administrative agencies were built pursuant to
the CRSA, some were not. For example, there are more than 100 police agencies,
local and central included, in this country. But only three of them were established
according to the CRSA; the remainder did not follow it. These three agencies are: the
NPA, the Central Police College, and the Taiwan Police Academy. Many scholars,
particularly in the field of police administration, who believe that time, money, and
other resources are the costs of an accountable democracy, criticized the fact that law
enforcement agencies did not obey the law (Chiou, H.C. 1988; Ku, T.C. 1985). By

contrast, the authorities argued that time would be wasted and the police would not be

47
able to meet emergencies if the establishment of all police agencies followed that rule

(Lee, Y.C. 1987; Chiou, PL. 1988). This is another indication of the fact that this
country is fundamentally governed by individuals, not by laws or a system. The
director of the NPA, or the KMT authorities, amend existing laws or make new laws
to create an environment that favors their policies as long as they believe this is
necessary to maintain social order.

The NPA has basically two reasons for amending the laws under its authority.
The first reason is the reactions of police officers. For instance, a law named the
Police Arms and Other Equipment Usage Act (PAOEUA) regulated not only how
police officers could use guns while on duty, but also stipulated the liability of officers
and the govemment after a shooting occurred. This act was passed and irnplemented
on September 25, 1933. It was first amended on November 22, 1968, and was re-
amended on January 18, 1985. Before its second amendment, many police officers
felt that the guidelines governing the use of firearms in that act were so strict that they
had few instances in which they could use guns. For the purpose of protecting police
officers and maintaining social order, wider discretion was given to officers in the
act’s second amendment. The director of the NPA also had great influence in
amending laws relevant to police organizations. In this regard, there are two
examples. After Lo took the director’s position at the NPA, he implemented many
innovative programs, as mentioned earlier. One of his beliefs was that police
education, and specifically police academies must be administered by the central
government, i.e., they must be under the control of the NPA. In order to meet his

demands, the Police Act, a law regulating the operation, structure, and authority of the

polio:
inau g
the cr
organ
Struct
impor
attain
Secon
the Pt
amenc
many
Thus,
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directc

 

 

48
police in the Republic of China, was amended on July 2, 1986, one year after his

inauguration. In this amendment, the police academies, which were originally under
the control of the provincial or metropolitan governments, were placed on the
organizational chart of the NPA. A second example is the amendment of the NPA’s
Structural Act (NPASA). Lo also believed that a powerful and strong NPA was
important in implementing his innovative projects and fighting crime. In order to
attain this goal, he moved several police departments and squads, including the First,
Second, and Third Peace Preservation Corps, the Police Communication Network, and
the Police Amrory from the Taiwan Provincial Government to the NPA. This
amendment expanded the power and authority of the central police to the extreme and
many scholars did not agree with it (Lee, Y.C. 1987; Liu, S.L. and Chen, LC. 1990).
Thus, police power between central and local governments became unbalanced.
Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of these changes, they illustrate how the
director of the NPA was a crucial factor in deciding on the content of the law.

Over the past ten years, as a result of the DPP’s appeals, the removal of
Martial Law, and the thaw in the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China,
the KMT authorities have also made some new laws and amended some old laws,
which have all significantly affected Taiwan’s policing. For instance, some articles of
the Criminal Procedural Act were revised in 1982, and those amendments were passed
on August 4, 1982, and put into practice on August 6, 1982. The KMT authorities
also made some amendments in favor of Taiwan’s residents, such. as providing rights
to counsel; on the other hand, for police convenience and in cases of emergency, the

KMT authorities also gave police more power to further their investigations, allowing

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49

them to make arrests without warrants, for example. Many scholars worried that this
new, contradictory amendment might be harmful to human rights and they urged its
retraction (Lee, HS. 1982; Tsai, T.M. 1984). However, their voices were ignored.

A second example of the KMT amending laws resulted from an increase in the
number of guns imported from mainland China, the Philippines, and other places.
Most of these guns fell into the hands of outlaws (in Chinese Liu-Mong, a member or
leader of a gang, a person without a job and who, by means of blackmail, extortion, or
other illegal activities, such as prostitution and gambling, makes his living.) As a
result, two strict laws were passed in 1983 and 1985. The 1983 Guns, Swords, and
Other Arms Control Act (GSOACA) outlawed the use of guns, bullets, and swords and
prohibited anyone from manufacturing, selling, transporting, or owning them without
the government’s permission. If a person, for instance, owned a handgun for the
purpose of committing a crime, a maximum penalty was seven years in prison; for
those producers or dealers, a minimum penalty was ten years in prison and the
maximum is death. The Statute for the Suppression of Jagrants (SSJ) was legislated
on July 14, 1985, and implemented on December 1 of the same year. The purpose of
this act was to legitimate the I-Ching Project, whose goal was to get rid of gangs. On
the other hand, this act also served as a legal base for police agencies to continue their
efforts to apprehend gangs and rascals. The contents and procedures in this act,
compared with the Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedural Act, were easier on the
police and more convenient for them to follow so it became a powerful tool to use
against gangs and rascals. However, liberal scholars opposed this act (Lin, S.T. 1985;

Hong, W.L. 1988). While the effects of these acts were not particularly positive (in

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50
fact, the number of crimes did not decrease), it can still be said that they influenced

police operations to a certain degree.

On July 1, 1987, Martial Law was lifted. Under Martial Law, strikes, protests,
and demonstrations were severely restricted, if not prohibited. The removal of Martial
Law, which had dominated Taiwan’s social conditions for 40 years caused the KMT
authorities to worry that a certain degree of social unrest would result. So, they
decided to make some laws to replace Martial Law and regulate the forthcoming
protests and demonstrations. As a consequence, several acts were passed after the
removal of Martial Law. Of these, two were most important for Taiwan’s policing.
One was the National Security Act (NSA) of 1986, and the other was the Meeting and
Parade Act of 1988. The goal of the National Security Act was to preserve the
security of Taiwan. In order to attain this goal, this act prohibited claims against the
Constitution of the Republic of China, and made it illegal to be a Communist or to
advocate that Taiwan be a separate country. In other words, the Taiwan Independent
Movement was, and still is, strictly banned under this act. The National Security Act
also declared the Entry and Exit Service Bureau the NPA was the agency who had
authority to control the immigration and emigration of the people in Taiwan, which
meant that it was necessary to get a permit from the EESB in order for people to go
abroad and return. Article 4 of the National Security Act gave police agencies
authority to inspect the people. Specifically, the act denoted fishermen, boatcrews,
and other people who went abroad and returned frequently to make their livings, and
passengers who went abroad and returned. Materials as well as transportation

equipments fell under the police’s inspection jurisdiction. It should be noted that this

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51
regulation expanded the size of police forces to a great degree. Before this regulation

had been implemented, the inspection of fishermen and fishing boats was under the
authority of the Taiwan Peace Preservation Headquarters (T'PPH), a military
organization. Because of the National Security Act, the TPPH had to transfer its
authority to police agencies. The TPPH had required a great deal of manpower to
perform this duty, so the NPA also needed much manpower to take it over.
Consequently, many police officers were recruited to do this job, therefore, the NPA
became larger and larger (Kao, CS. 1985 and 1988; Wu, S.Y. 1989; Liu, S.L. and
Chen, LC. 1990). Other articles of this act, from Article 5 to Article 10, had no
impacts on this study, so no discussion is required.

The effects of the Meeting and Parade Act (MAPA) on Taiwan’s policing were
also significant. The main aim of this act was to maintain social order while meetings
and parades were held. It not only gives wide discretion to police agencies in
approving the applications for permits from citizens but also delegates full
responsibility to police agencies to maintain order during meetings and parades. In
addition, it requires that applicants follow the orders of police agencies or suffer the
consequences. This act caused the size of police forces, and police expenditures, in
Taiwan to mushroom (Chen, M.C. 1990; Liu, S.L. and Chen, LC. 1990; Lin, ML.
1991). According to the NPA’s data, police forces were increased from 58,731 in
1987 to 78,500 in 1988, a 34 percent increase. During the same period, police
expenditures increased by a quarter, from NT$ 25,938,803 in 1988 to NT$ 32,571,099
in 1989. These figures indicate the influence of laws on policing as well as the

determination of the KMT authorities to maintain Taiwan’s social order.

52
In addition to the five factors already identified which influence Taiwan’s

policing, there are also some factors which should not be ignored, such as the DPP’s
attitude toward the KMT and Taiwan Independence. If the DPP would discard its
Taiwan Independence appeal, play the game within the current political structure, and
win the regime through legitimate ways; or if the KMT would view the Taiwan
Independence Movement in a usual way, treat the DPP as a real opponent, and play
the game according to the rules, then policing in Taiwan might develop in a more
normal way. Unfortunately, due to the nature of these factors and the difficulties in
quantifying them, it is hard to determine their relationships to policing except through
an examination of the literature and the observations of scholars based upon their

research into the question of how social change might affect policing.

3. SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLICE ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA-49734989

In this section, we will, in the first place, explore changes in Taiwan over the
past 17 years. We will focus on population, crime, individuals’ incomes and social
movements. Next, we will examine the changes in Taiwan’s policing, especially in
relation to the size of its forces, expenditures, and organizational structure. Also, the
association between social change and policing will be examined.

Social an in the Re ublic of China Since 1973
1. The Change in Population
Taiwan implemented its demographic policy over the past 20 years which was

just as successful as its land reform policy, principally because the birth rate was

53
controlled. Table 3-3-1 shows Taiwan’s population growth from 1973 to 1989. From

this table, we see that the increase in the population each year never exceeded 2.0
percent other than in 1976, when it grew by 2.22 percent. The case of 1976 was
unique. In the Chinese calendar, 1976 was the year of the dragon, and children born
in this year were marked as children of the dragon. Many parents chose this year to
give birth to their children because of the Chinese tradition which holds that children
born in the year of the dragon will have a better future (21st Century Foundation,
1990). As a matter of fact, beginning in 1981 this figure decreased gradually until
1988, then it once again decreased in 1989. Also, 1988 was the year of the dragon,
but the birth rate in 1988 was much lower than in 1976. Scholars attributed this to the
population control programs of the government as well as to the fact that the people
were better educated and less superstitious (21st Century Foundation, 1990). From
1973 to 1980, the average annual increase in the rate of Taiwan’s population was
about 1.94 percent; and from 1981 to 1989 it was 1.36 percent, a 0.58 percent
decrease. In spite of the fact that the population growth rate was decreasing, Taiwan’s

registered population increased from 15,564,830 in 1973 to 20,107,440 in 1989.

 

54
Table 3-3-1

Taiwan’s Population

 

 

Year Registered Comparison with
Population Previous Year

1973 15,564,830

1974 15,852,224 +1.0185(=1.85%)
1975 16,149,702 +1.0188(=1.88%)
1976 16,508,190 +1.0222(=2.22%)
1977 16,813,127 +1.0185(=1.85%)
1978 17,135,714 +1.0192(=1.92%)
1979 17,479,314 +1.0201(=2.01%)
1980 17,805,067 +1 .0186(=1.86%)
1981 18,135,508 +1.0186(=1.86%)
1982 18,457,923 +1.0178(=1.78%)
1983 18,732,938 +1.0149(=1.49%)
1984 19,012,512 +1.0149(=l.49%)
1985 19,258,053 +1 .0129(=1.29%)
1986 19,454,610 +1 .0102(=1.02%)
1987 19,672,612 +1.0112(=l.12%)
1988 19,903,812 +1.0117(=1.17%)
1989 20,107,440 +1.0102(=1.02%)

 

Source: Social Indicators in Taiwg Area of the Republic of China 1989, p.28.

Another feature of the population is the phenomenon of urbanization (Wang,

W.L. 1981; Tsai, W.H. 1982). According to official statistics, in 1973 there were 16

cities whose populations were over one hundred thousand. By 1982, this number was

23, and at the end of 1988, it rose to 29. At the same time, in 1973, only 41.4 percent

of Taiwan’s population lived in cities with population over 100,000. In 1989, this

number rose to 66.4 percent, a 25 percent increase. In other words, two out of three

55
residents of Taiwan now live in cities whose populations exceed 100,000. Table 3-3-2

demonstrates this trend.

Table 3-3-2
Cities Whose Populations Exceed 100,000 in Taiwan

 

 

Year Number of % of Total Population
Cities Living in Cities
1973 16 41.4%
1974 18 42.8%
1975 19 43.9%
1976 20 44.4%
1977 ' 20 44.8%
1978 20 45.4%
1979 21 46.8%
1980 21 47.2%
1981 22 48.0%
1982 23 49.2%
1983 23 49.5%
1984 24 49.9%
1985 25 - 50.7%
1986 27 52.3%
1987 28 53.4%
1988 29 59.3%
1989 29 66.4%

 

Eource: Statistical Yearbook of go Republic of China 1989, pp.12-15.

Taiwan’s population is also aging. From Table 3—3-3, we see that the
Percentage of the population under 14 years old decreased gradually, while the
Percentage of the population 15 years and older grew. For example, in 1973, 37.06

Inn-cent of the population was under 14, and 62.94 percent was above 15. By 1989,

56

the percentages had decreased to 27.49 for those under 14, and increased to 72.51 for

those over 15.

Table 3-3-3
Age-specific Distribution of Population In Taiwan

 

 

unit: %
65 Years
Year 0 Year 1-14 Years 15-64 Years and Over
1973 2.10 34.96 59.71 3.23
1974 2.06 34.10 60.47 3.37
1975 2.08 33.24 61.18 3.49
1976 2.32 32.35 61.70 3.63
1977 2.13 31.80 62.24 3.82
1978 2.18 31.07 62.76 3.98
1979 2.17 30.52 63.17 4.14
1980 2.10 29.99 63.63 4.28
1981 3.27 28.33 63.99 4.41
1982 1.97 29.25 64.24 4.54
1983 1.89 28.90 64.54 4.67
1984 1.77 28.40 64.98 4.85
1985 1.63 27.95 65.37 5.05
1986 1.50 27.49 65.73 5.28
1987 1.46 26.91 66.09 5.54
1988 1.57 26.37 66.32 5.74
1989 1.47 26.02 66.56 5.95

 

Entree: Social Indicators in Taiwan A_rea of the Republic of China 1989, p.31.

2. The Change in Crime

Taiwan’s industrialization, urbanization, and the increase in individuals’

incomes was accompanied by an increase in crimes, such as gun smuggling. In this

57
section, we look at the overall crime situation in Taiwan from 1973 to 1989, with
special emphasis on larceny, a major crime in Taiwan, and violent crimes.

Table 3-3-4
Criminal Cases Reported to the Police in Taiwan

 

 

Year Number of Cases Comparison with Crime Rate

Reported to the Previous Year (Cases/ 10,000

Police (Index) Population)
1973 38,415 24.90
1974 41,732 1.086(+8.6%) 26.57
1975 45,824 1.098(+9.8%) 28.64
1976 43,936 0.958(—4.1%) 26.91
1977 47,868 1.089(+8.9%) 28.73
1978 48,640 1.016(+1.6%) 28.65
1979 52,512 l.079(+7.9%) 30.34
1980 52,350 0.996(—0.04%) 29.67
1981 51,292 0.979(-2.1%) 28.54
1982 44,622 0.869(-13.1%) 24.39
1983 51,427 1.152(+15.2%) 27.66
1984 52,168 1.014(+1.4%) 27.64
1985 60,707 1.164(+16.4%) 31.73
1986 93,181 1.537(+53.7%) 48.14
1987 89,468 0.960(-4.0%) 45.73
1988 88,215 0.986(-1.4%) 44.58
1989 90,340 1.024(+2.4%) 45.16

 

§ourcez Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989, p.238.
Table 3-3-4 shows criminal cases reported to the police in Taiwan since 1973.

From this table, it is apparent that the crime rate in Taiwan was basically stable until
1986. From 1973 to 1985, the overall crime rate as measured by cases per 10000
p0pulation shifted from 24 to 31. However, this figure ballooned in 1986 to 48.14.

After 1986, this number shifts in the range of 45. Official Statisticians blamed these

58

dramatic increases on the number of motorcycles, a most convenient tool for getting
around in Taiwan’s traffic but also a prime target for larceny (Chen, KS. 1988). Even
though motorcycle theft and ordinary larceny were under control after 1986, the
continued increase in motor vehicle thefts (See Table 3-3-5) and other violent crimes
have prevented Taiwan’s overall crime picture from receding to the level before 1985.

Table 335
Larceny in Taiwan

 

 

Crime
Comparison % in All Rate Motor
Larcenies with Cases (Cases/ Vehicle

Reported Previous Reported 10,000 Larcenies Theft

Year to Police Year to Police Pop.) Cases Cases
1973 20,941 54.51 13.57 -------------
1974 22,455 +7 .2% 53.81 14.29 ---—--— --------
1975 22,086 -1.7% 48.20 13.80 ------- --------
1976 19,105 -13.5% 43.48 11.70 --------------
1977 19,898 +42% 41.57 1 1.94 ---------------
197 8 22,354 +12.3% 45.96 13.17 ------- «mm
1979 24,023 47.5% 45.75 13.88 19,505 4,518
1980 26,650 +10.9% 50.91 15.11 21,549 5,101
1981 28,918 +85% 56.38 16.09 24,271 4,647
1982 25,238 -12.8% 56.56 13.79 20,448 4,790
1983 28,870 +14.4% 56.14 15.53 21,372 7,498
1984 27,969 -3.1% 53.61 14.82 21,254 6,715
1985 29,671 +61% 48.88 15.51 21,196 8,475
1986 48,510 +63.5% 52.06 25.06 38,872 9,638
1987 37,527 -22.6% 41.94 19.18 27,709 9,818
1988 40,399 +7.7% 45.80 20.41 23,316 17,083
1989 42,325 44.8% 46.85 21.16 17,790 24,335

 

Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989, pri238~240.

59
According to official statistics, larceny includes burglary. Official statisticians

categorize larceny into two kinds: larceny and motor vehicle theft. Table 3-3-5
demonstrates the changes in the rate of larceny in Taiwan from 1973. From this table,
we see that larceny was, and still is, the most common crime in Taiwan (Chang, P.W.
1990). Also, the rate of occurrence of larceny was stable, irrespective of the special
policies implemented by police agencies. It Shifted between 11 and 21 during these
years, except for 1986. Similarly, larceny was also stable from 1973 to 1989, except
for 1986. On the other hand, motor vehicle thefts grew every year except 1984, when
a ten percent decrease occurred compared with 1983.

In comparison to larceny, violent crimes became much more of a concern in
Taiwan, particularly from 1985 onward. Three kinds of crimes are regarded as violent
crimes, according to official Statistics. They are: homicide, robbery, and kidnapping.
Table 3—3-6 shows that violent crimes grew every year except 1976. With respect to
the violent crime rate, it also increased steadily from 0.92 in 1973 to an apex in 1989
at 3.14. In 1973, there was less than one case for every ten thousand people. By
1989, there were 3.14 cases per ten thousand people. Among these violent crimes,
robbery was the most noticeable (Wang, P.L. 1990), because it grew at a rate much
faster than the other two types of violent crimes. In general, the violent crime rate

was under 2.0 before 1984, and from 1985 on it never fell below 2.0.

60

 

 

Table 3-3-6
Violent Crimes in Taiwan

Year Violent Crimes Comparison % in All Crime Rate

Reported to With Cases (Case8/

Police Previous Reported to 10,000 Pop.)
Year Police

1973 1,423 3.70 0.92
1974 1,684 +18.3% 4.04 1.07
1975 2,039 421.0% 4.45 1.27
1976 1,586 -22.2% 3.61 0.97
1977 1,931 421.8% 4.03 1.16
1978 1,997 +3.4% 4.11 1.18
1979 2,083 +4.3% 3.97 1.20
1980 2,691 429.2% 5.14 1.53
1981 2,507 -6.8% 4.89 1.40
1982 2,824 +12.6% 6.33 1.54
1983 3,277 +16.0% 6.37 1.76
1984 3,261 -0.5% 6.25 1.73
1985 3,932 +20.6% 6.48 2.05
1986 4,579 +16.5% 4.91 2.37
1987 4,218 -7.9% 4.71 2.16
1988 5,040 +19.5% 5.71 2.55
1989 6,288 424.8% 6.96 3.14

 

Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Rppublic of China 1989, pp. 238-247.
3. The Change in Individuals’ Income

Compared with the 1950s and 19608, it is apparent that people in Taiwan are

much richer than ever before. Table 3-3-7 illustrates this change.

61

Table 3-3-7
Per Capita National Income and Income Distribution in Taiwan

 

 

 

_ = Unit: NT Dollar
Year At Current Comparison At 1986 Comparison Gini
Price with Constant with Previous Concentration
Previous Year Price Year Coefficient

1973 24,564 64,313 0.298
1974 32,408 +31.9% 62,331 -3.2% 0.287
1975 33,811 +43% 63,428 +1.7% 0.280
1976 39,559 +17 .0% 7 1,572 +12.8% 0.280
1977 45,330 +14.6% 76,813 +73% 0.284
197 8 53,303 +17.6% 84,316 +98% 0.287
1979 63,275 +18.7% 89,605 «16.3% 0.285
1980 77,575 +22.6% 92,098 +2.8% 0.277
1981 89,868 +15.8% 94,374 +25% 0.281
1982 94,647 +5.3% 96,944 +27% 0.283
1983 103,093 +89% 104,130 +7.4% 0.287
1984 114,511 +11.0% 114,903 +10.3% 0.287
1985 1 19,272 +41% 1 19,581 +40% 0.290
1986 137,992 +15.7% 137,992 +15.4% 0.296
1987 153,773 +11.4% 154,838 +12.2% 0.299
1988 165,884 +7 .9% 164,229 +61% 0.303
1989 181,936 +9.7% 174,407 +62% 0.303

 

Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989, pp.62-63.

This table shows that individuals’ incomes have increased every year since 1973, even
though during these years Taiwan has faced many crises, like the Petroleum Crisis in
1973 and 1974, the death of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975 and Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1988,
the break in diplomatic relations with the United States in 1980, and so forth. Even

when we standardize these incomes in terms of 1986 constant prices, we Still find that

62

the per capita national income increased each year for the last 17 years, with the
exception of 1974. The increase in individuals’ incomes can also be seen through the
growing number of people who own color TV sets, refrigerators, air conditioners,
washing machines, and so forth, as shown in Table 3-3-8.

Table 3-3—8
Number of Households Owning Certain Appliances In Taiwan

 

 

UnitzHouseholds/ 100 Households

Year Color TV Refrigerator Air Washing

Set Conditioner Machine
1976 23.48 74.19 3.62 38.60
1977 34.70 81.31 5.34 47.21
1978 46.57 86.35 8.68 53.96
1979 58.64 89.59 11.65 60.14
1980 69.29 92.28 14.40 64.73
1981 77.90 93.99 16.37 68.88
1982 83.12 94.33 17.16 70.52
1983 87.79 95.44 19.72 73.68
1984 90.41 96.13 22.91 75.49
1985 92.31 96.67 23.95 77.84
1986 94.42 97.1 1 25.45 79.49
1987 95.78 97.41 28.66 81.33
1988 97.34 97.93 34.29 83.97
1989 97.80 98.25 41.74 86.82

 

 

Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989, p.218.

These figures demonstrate that Taiwan’s people now enjoy a better life than they have
before. However, along with the growth in individuals’ incomes, the Gini

concentration coefficient, an indicator of income distribution, also became larger. This

63
number was 0.298 in 1973; it decreased and then increased to 0.303 in 1989, which

means, generally speaking, that the poor are becoming poorer, while the richer are
becoming richer. For radical theorists, this coefficient suggests that the crime Situation
in Taiwan has become worse, because of economic inequality. Table 3-3-7 also shows
the variations in the Gini concentration coefficient during this period.

4. The Change in Social Movements

Due to the complexity and diversity of Taiwan’s social movements (Shiao, SH.
1990; Pon, CK. 1991), it is difficult to give a precise definition of this term.
Therefore, the term used here is based on the NPA’S statistics. The NPA began
calculating these kinds of activities in 1986 in order to allocate its forces more
efficiently. These activities, which the NPA calls "gathering-mob-activities,"
following the definition used in the Criminal Act, have different goals and appeals.
The majority were conducted by the DPP, and appeal to political reform, such as "the
re-selection of the National Assembly," "the re-selection of the Legislative Yuan," and
so forth. Some have economic reform as their aim. Most of these, like the farmer
movement and the labor movement, can be connected with the DPP or the Labor
Party. Some set their sights on social reform, such as the "Rainbow Project," whose
aim was to rescue young prostitutes. Some target their reform efforts on the
environment, like the "anti-Dupont movement," and the "anti-nuclear movement. "
Also, some ask for reform in human rights, such as the "Old Soldier go home
movement," the "Native human rights movement," and so forth (Shiao, SH. 1990;
Chang, M.K. 1990; Pon, CK. 1991). The author labels all these activities

irrespective of their appeals, as "social movements."

54

Taiwan’s social movements can be categorized into three stages, as suggested
by Chu (Chu, Y.H. 1990). The first stage was from 1949 to 1977. In this period,
there were few social movements. Those that can be identified from that time period
include the Liu-Chi-Jan event in 1955, where a Chinese civilian was killed by an
American soldier and the public protested that the trial was unfair, and the Chung-Li
event in 1977, where Tung-Wai, which means "the outsiders of the KMT" and the
forerunner of the DPP, protested that the KMT played dirty tricks and cheated during
the election (Yu, Z.F. 1984; Hong, P.C. 1988; Chen, KS. 1988). From 1978 to 1985
was the second stage. In this period, Tung-Wai began a series of political challenges
to the authority of the KMT. As a result of the Kaohsiung event in 1979, in which
the Tung-Wai attacked police and military police in Kaohsiung City, injuring 83 police
officers and soldiers, most of the Tung-Wai leaders were arrested later that year and in
early 1980. Thus, the Tung-Wai’s anti-government demonstrations Stopped until 1981.
Other social movements, especially the environmental protection movement, also
emerged during this stage (Lu, Y.L. 1990). The third Stage began after 1986.

Because of the high frequency of these social movements, people in Taiwan became
tired of them. Many surveys, such as the survey conducted in 1986 by the Research
and Development Council of the Legislative Yuan, a 1987 China Times’ survey, and
the Public Order Research Forum’s survey in 1987, showed that people no longer
appreciated these movements (Chu, Y. P. 1989). In addition, some social movements,
like the "Old Soldier go home movement," had reached their goals, so social
movements during this stage were more peaceful than before, although some minor

conflicts occurred.

65

Taiwan’s scholars proposed lots of explanations for why these social
movements emerged. For instance, Shiao S.H. pointed out that this was because of
the emergence of social power, in comparison with economic and political power
which dominated this country from 1950 to 1980 (Shiao, SH. 1989 and 1990). Chang
M.K. believed that it was because the relationship between the state and society had
changed (Chang, M.K. 1989). In all these explanations, scholars ignored the KMT,
which, as a matter of fact, played an important role in allowing social movements to
occur. Whatever the factors which were crucial in causing the KMT to loosen its
control, without the KMT’S more democratic attitudes, either voluntary or involuntary,
change would not have occurred in this society.

For the purpose of this paper, we should also observe how these movements
changed. As pointed out earlier, because the data before 1986 are not complete, or in
some cases nonexistent, it is difficult to give a full picture. The research of some
scholars is helpful in determining the approximate number of social movements before
1986. For example, Liu’s Y.L. research pointed out that there were about 100 cases
of demonstrations in 1983, 133 cases in 1984, and 123 cases in 1985 (Liu, Y.L. 1990;
See Table 3-3-9).

In 1989, 6,303 activities were reported; this was the zenith of social
movements during the period from 1983 to 1989. Occurrences in 1989 were 63 times
those in 1983, 11 times those in 1986, and represented nearly a four-fold increase
compared with 1988. Most of these activities, about 73 percent, were related to
political affairs (Chen, K.C. 1990). Fortunately, during this period, few activities, only

56 cases, were related to violence, and most of these activities, 9,072 to be exact, were

66
considered legal (Chen, K.C. 1990). As for how these social movements influenced

Taiwan’s policing, details will be given later.

Table 3-3-9
Demonstrations in Taiwan

 

 

 

Number of Comparison with

Year Demonstration Previous Year
1983 100

1984 133 +33.3%
1985 123 -7.52%
1986 597 +385.3%
1987 1,278 +114%
1988 1,663 , +30.1%
1989 6,303 +279%

Source: 1. National Police Administration
2. Liu, Y.L. 1990

Policing Changes in the Republic of China Since 197 3

l. The Change in Police Forces

Beginning in 1973, the Size of police forces in the Republic of China
continually increased. In 1973, there were about 34,970 police officers; this figure
increased to 80,159 at the end of 1989, a three-fold increase. Meanwhile, the ratio of
policemen to population also underwent a significant change. In 1973, the ratio of one
policeman per ten thousand citizens was 23.52. This ratio has grown, until by 1989
this ratio had reached 35.14. This was almost a 150 percent increase. The alteration
of Taiwan’s police forces can be seen in Table 3-3-10. Between 1973 and 1989, the
percentage increase in the size of the police forces was well under ten percent every

year, except in 1981, 1984, and 1988. For these three years the percentage increases

67
were 11, 10, and 34, respectively. Officials have never explained why the police

forces were dramatically expanded during these years. The 1980 Kaohsiung event and
the increasing number of social movements after 1982, including the Tung-Wai’s
political activities, might help to explain these increases. Many scholars, particularly
in the domain of police administration, paid close attention to 1988’s growth, because
the expansion was so large. A primary reason for the increase in 1988 was likely due
to the lifting of Martial Law, and the passing of the National Security Act and the
Meeting and Parade Act. With the lifting of Martial Law, military authority had to be
transferred to the police. The passing of the National Security Act meant that the
police had a greater burden in defending Taiwan’s territory and controlling
immigration. The Meeting and Parade Act required police to take on the additional
responsibility of maintaining order during meetings and parades (Kao, CS. 1985,
1991; Wu, S.Y. 1989; Liu, S.L. and Chen, LC. 1990; Chen, M.C. 1990; Lin, ML.
1990). These legal factors lead to a rapid expansion of the police in 1988. After
1988, the rate of expansion decreased to only 2 percent in 1989.

As shown in Table 3-3-11, the percentages of police involved in various
functions were quite stable from 1976 to 1983. At the end of 1989, however, the
percentages for the various classifications of police altered. The percentage of peace
preservation police, whose main goal is to protect capital, national factories, and
control riots, increased significantly (Liu, S.L. and Chen, LC, 1990; Lin, ML 1990),
from 18.75 percent in 1976 to 37.3 percent in 1989. This alteration indicates that
there were some changes in Taiwan’s political and social conditions, because of the
close association between the peace preservation police and their mission to suppress

riots and social movements.

68

Table 3-3- 10
The Size of Police Forces in the Taiwan

        

 

Number of Comparison with

 

Year

 

Ratio of Police
Employee Previous Year Per 10,000 Citizens
1973 34,970 +1.52% 23.52
1974 36,331 +4% 24.04
1975 37,793 +4% 24.77
1976 39,532 +5% 25.08
1977 40,051 +1% 24.73
1978 40,447 +1% 24.70
1979 40,662 +1% 24.00
1980 43,592 +7% 26.59
1981 48,515 +11% 26.17
1982 49,826 +3% 25.91
1983 50,774 +2% 26.79
1984 55,655 +10% 25.25
1985 57,282 +1% 27.37
1986 57,943 +1% 28.10
1987 58,751 +1% 28.37
1988 78,500 +34% 32.00
1989 80,159 +2% 35.14

 

Source: 1. Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989, p. 252

2. National Police Administration

Table 3-3-11

Percentage of Various Police in Taiwan

 

 

Unit: %

Year Adm. Cli. Pea. Tra. Fire Hab. For. Other
P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P.

1976 43.08 5.83 18.75 2.90 6.50 5.20 1.27 13.41

1978 40.02 5.18 19.44 2.81 6.68 5.93 1.01 13.28

1983 39.88 5.14 19.21 2.77 6.80 8.96 1.01 13.22

1990 40.00 4.80 37.30 6.80 4.80 --- ---- 6.30

 

Source: National Police Administration

69

As for the association between social change and police forces, it is difficult to
determine at this moment. With regard to population and police forces, Table 3-3—2
and Table 3-3—10 illustrate that there is a trend toward increasing the size of the police
in Taiwan, although the increases are consistent. At first glance, it appears that the
increase in the percentage of police forces in the Republic of China did follow a
similar increase in population, because most of the percentage increases in the police
forces were between one and five percent, except in 1980, 1981, 1984, and 1988.
However, we are not certain that increases in population led to these changes. More
data are needed to support this argument.

The relationship between crime and police forces is also diffith to determine.
On the one hand, the number of criminal cases fluctuated; it declined sometimes, and
it increased at other times. On the other hand, larceny and violent crimes steadily
increased. However, even though police forces increased significantly in 1988, 1989’s
overall crime rate, including larcenies and violent crimes, did not decline. Does an
increase in criminal cases cause an expansion of police forces? Or are there other
variables involved? We are not sure at this moment.

The connection between individuals’ income and the size of police forces is
vague, too. Both show an increasing trend during this period, as can be observed in
Tables 3-3-7 and 3-3-10. Does this mean that Taiwan’s people need more police
officers, have higher demands for security, once they become richer? Or does the
NPA merely perceive that citizens demand more security? We still do not know.

Compared with the other three variables, the association between social

movements and police forces seems clearest. Most scholars claim that social

70

movements are, in fact, a direct reason for the great expansion of Taiwan’s police
forces. Table 3-3-9 and Table 3-3- 10 seem to support their arguments. However,
social movements, even political opposition movements, did not begin in earnest until
1987. As a matter of fact, political opposition movements appeared early in 1977, but
lasted for only three years until the unfortunate Kaohsiung event in 1980. At that
time, the struggles between the Tung-Wai and the KMT were also violent, but neither
the KMT nor the NPA chose to expand police forces to cope with these crises.
Hence, the association between social movements and the size of police forces requires
more data to substantiate it.

2. The Change in Police Expenditures

There are some difficulties in studying Taiwan’s police expenditures, just as
Huang, 8.8. and other scholars suggest (Huang, SS. 1990; Lin, ML. 1990; Peng, HE.
1990). A first difficulty arises from the complexity and diversity of the governments.
In practice, the Central Government of the ROC publishes its own budgets. In
addition to the Central Government, there are also two municipal governments (Taipei
and Kaohsiung), one Provincial Government (Taiwan), five city governments, and 16
Hsien (comparable to a county in the United States) governments. Each government
has its own budget, police budget included. Under these circumstances, it is hard to
analyze police budgets thoroughly.

A second difficulty is the multiple command of Taiwan’s policing. As
mentioned before, most of the police agencies in the Republic of China have at least
two superiors. These superiors all appropriate money to the police agencies. In

addition, the NSB also provides financial support to police agencies, as long as the

71
NSB believes there is a necessity. Therefore, police expenditures illustrated in Table

3-3-12 are only approximate. However, Table 3-3—12 is as complete as possible,
because the author added in all possible expenditures, including those of the NPA, the

TPPA, the TMPD, the KMPD, and other police departments.

 

 

 

 

Table 3-3-12
Police Expenditures in Taiwan
Unit: NT 3 1,000

% of

NPA

Funds

Budget at in the Budget at 1986
Current Total Constant

Year Price Index’ Budget Price Index’
1973 1,990,475 0 5,713,189
1974 2,780,677 +39% 1.16 5,41 1,983 -5.3%
1975 3,984,518 +43% 1.10 7,369,184 +36.2%
1976 5,040,319 +27% 2.03 9,094,765 +23.4%
1977 5,917,525 +17% 1.74 9,975,598 +9.7%
197 8 6,594,695 +1 1% 2.53 10,51 1,149 +5.4%
1979 8,205,003 +24% 4.32 1 1,915,485 +13.4%
1980 9,576,700 +17% 5.37 1 1,686,028 -1.2%
1981 12,000,731 +25% 4.29 12,587,299 +7.7%
1982 14,727,929 +23% 5.1 1 15,004,003 +19.2%
1983 16,086,192 +9% 3.83 16,168,652 +7.8%
1984 16,574,644 +3% 3.60 16,662,958 +3.1%
1985 18,794,166 +13% 4.16 18,926,653 +13.6%
1986 21,731,019 +16% 8.73 21,731,019 +14.8%
1987 23,478,461 +8% 9.43 23,357,005 +7.5%
1988 25,938,803 +10% 9.54 25,477,657 +91%
1989 32,571,099 +26% 13.02 30,640,733 +20.3%

 

 

Index“ means comparison with previous year.
Source: The accounting offices of the NPA, the TPPA, the T'MPD, and the KMPD.

 

   

72

Table 3-3-13
The NPA and Other Police Agencies’ Budget

 

 

Unit: NT $ 1,000
TPPA’s TMPD’s KMPD’S Cities &
Year NPA’s Bud et Bud et Bud ct Bu et Hsiens’ Budfiet
(% $3“) (%B?l£l ot)al (‘1:ng 03a! (‘1)ng (gal (@033?)
C! et Cl. 6 11 c
9632s 9652s is 3:31... 33s
1'0 1'0 ID ID ID
1973 0 342323 319609 95193 1233350
(17.20) (16.06) (4.78) (61.96)
1974 32121 411378 46036 130068 17467
(1.16) (14.79 (16.56 @623 (62.82
(+201 +44. (+ . ) (+416
1975 43744 597911 622639 189102 2531122
961% (15.01 (15.63 (4.753 (63.52
(+ .1 ) (+453 (+352 (+453 ) +44.
1976 102418 638678 953174 245515 3100534
8'05 (126 (18. 91 (319ng (61.58
(+1 .1 ) +6.82 (+53. (+ . ) (+225
1977 102918 815767 1161497 253169 3584174
1.74 (13.7 9) (19. 63 (4.283 (60.5
+4.9 (+27. 73 (+216 (+3.1 ) (+15.
1978 166826 907298 1238249 286826 3995496
(253 (13.76 (18.78) @353 (60.59
(+62.1 ) (+11. 2 +6.61 (+ 3.2 ) (+1l.4
1979 354070 1143760 1456644 373343 4877186
(4.32) ((13. 2606) (17.7% 8455? (59.4.47)
(+112.24) (+176 (+ .1 ) +22.
1980 514503 1343549 1816155 486337 5416156
(5.37) (14.03 (18.96 5.08 (56.513
(+453) (+17.4 (+246 (+ .2) (+116
1981 514514 2038770 57 688927 6752770
4.29 (16.99 (16.71 (5. 74 (56.2
( .00 ) (+51.7 (+10. (+41. ) (+246
1982 752578 2195291 2492476 745046 8542538
(5.11)) (13.84; (16.92 (5.06 (58.00
(+462 +7.68 (+246 (+8.1 (+266
1983 616051 2038729 3023231 957835 945
3. 83 (12.70) (18.79 (258952 (58.7
81 ) -7.13 (+21.2 (+ . ) (+106
1984 596300 314 3408851 998497 9527848
(3.60 (12.33) (20.5 (6.02 (57.48;
(-3.2 -0.76 (+12. 7 (+4.2 +0.82
1985 781078 2222616 4177534 1288204 10324734
(54.163 (11. 83; (22.23 (€685) (54.94
(+ 0.9 ) +9.86 (+22. 5 (+ .0 ) +8.3
1986 1896802 2351743 5099633 1482942 10889899
(8.73) (10.82) (23. 48 6. 82 (50.16
(+142.84) +5.81 (+22. (+ 5.1 ) +5.4
1987 22531574 243039 4923168466 172036385 12156389117
($6.70)) (+3278) (-3314; (+(16.03)1(+11.7
1988 2475298 2790229 5144681 2104148
(9.54} (10 76 (1983 ($11 (51.73
(+1.8) (+143 +4.1 (+ . ) (+103
1989 4213396271 4945938 497532540 246355652 153:9:38
(+7123) (+77. 23) (-3233 (£7.08) (+1888

 

Source: The accounting offices of the NPA, the TPPA, the TMPD, and the KMPD.

73
Police expenditures in the Republic of China have steadily increased over the

17 years from 1973 to 1989, though its growth rate was not comparable to the increase
in the size of police forces. Table 3-3-12 Shows that the rate of increase of police
budgets in most of the years exceeded 10 percent, except in 1983, 1984, and 1987.
During this 17-year period, police budgets in 1974, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1982, and
1989, grew at a rate of over 20 percent. However, if we consider the budgets in 1986
dollars, there were few changes in police budgets in Taiwan. As shown in Table 3-3-
12, only the budgets for 1975, 1976, and 1989 grew over 20 percent, and expenditures
for 1974 and 1980 even decreased. Though growth may not as dramatic as it first
appears, growth did occur and the reasons for it are many. In 1979, police documents
were computerized, the Airborne Squadron was established, and large expenditures
were made on building and equipment. Growth in 1981 was due to the expanding of
local police agencies’ budgets, although the NPA’s budgets remained almost the same.
For example, the T'PPA’S budget mushroomed almost 52 percent in this year, the
KMPD’S budget increased by 42 percent, the City and Hsiens police budgets grew by
about a quarter, while the budget of the TMPD increased by 11 percent. Growth in
1982 came mainly fiom the NPA; it increased its budgets about 46 percent. The
TMPD also raised its expenditures about a quarter, and the City and Hsien budgets
increased by more than 25 percent. Budget expansion in 1989 came primarily from
the NPA and the TPPA. The NPA’S budget expanded by 71 percent because of the
establishment of new police forces and the transfer of several police agencies from
other departments to the NPA’S control. The TPPA’s budget also increased by 77

percent in 1989. This was because some budgets, such as fire prevention, were

74
transferred from the Cities and Hsiens to the TPPA.

A second characteristic demonstrated in Table 3-3-12 is the increasing
significant role played by the NPA, especially after 1986. It also Shows the effects of
concentration, or the fact that the NPA’s budgets expanded rapidly, while other
agencies’ expenditures decreased. The NPA became more powerful because it owned
more. Also, local police agencies had less power to argue with the NPA, even though
they have never tried this before, because their resources were reduced.

For a long time, the Central Government of the Republic of China attempted to
consolidate local police budgets to its central control because high level officials were
convinced that as long as local governments had their own budgets this would hinder
the implementation of a unified policing effort. Since 1986, the Central Government
has accomplished centralization little by little, through the expansion of its budgets.
Relatively speaking, local governments have less power to speak for their own
policing policies.

A look at how much money the governments devote to police service provides
additional information about the state of policing in Taiwan. One study showed that at
least one out of every ten government employees is a policeman (Lee, Y.C. 1987), but
the budgets distributed to the police are not compatible to the size of the police forces.
As shown in Table 3-3-14, police budgets account for only a tiny part of the
government’s overall expenditures. Police expenditures were seldom over three
percent of the government’s overall budgets before 1987, with 1976 being the only
exception. Even at the highest level, which occurred in 1988 it was only 3.15 percent.
This indicates that the police in this country are not as important as many observers

think.

75

Table 3-3- 14
Governments Overall Budgets and Police Overall Budgets

 

 

Unit: 3 1,000

Year Government’s % of Police % of % of Total
Budget Growth Budget Growth Govt. Budget

1973 84879218 1990475 2.35
1974 98090176 15.56 2780677 39.40 2.83
1975 144079819 46.89 3984518 43.29 2.77
1976 167176396 16.03 5040319 26.50 3.01
1977 203492686 21.72 5917525 17.40 2.91
197 8 240687334 18.28 6594695 1 1.44 2.74
1979 283308692 17.71 8205003 24.42 2.90
1980 357945492 26.34 9576700 16.72 2.68
1981 478856313 33.78 12000731 25.31 2.51
1982 574728226 20.02 14727929 22.73 2.56
1983 603746946 5.05 16086192 9.22 2.66
1984 605660058 0.32 16574644 3.04 2.74
1985 644635513 6.44 18794166 13.39 2.92
1986 737407932 14.39 21731019 15.63 2.95
1987 774147152 4.98 23478461 8.04 3.03
1988 824302189 6.48 25938803 10.48 3.15
1989 1036485559 25.74 32571099 25.57 3.14

 

Source: 1. Huang, Shih-Shin (1990, p.114).
2. The accounting offices of the NPA, the TPPA, the TMPD, and the KMPD.

The associations between police budgets and population, crime, individuals’
incomes, social movements remain obscure. On the one hand, police budgets
increased over the 17-year period from 1973 to 1989; on the other hand, social
indicators varied over the same time period but not in ways that correlated to police

budget increases. Although population grew, we are not able to say that it was an

maamc
percent:
Taiwan
income
same P‘
grew s11
enlarger
expansi
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1986.0
social 1)
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76
increase in the population which led to the expansion of police budgets, because the

percentage increases were not parallel. In the same manner, individuals’ incomes in
Taiwan over this l7-year period grew, but the growth rate for per capita national
income were not compatible with the growth rates of police expenditures. During the
same period, the crime rate fluctuated both up and down, while police expenditures
grew steadily. Hence, we dare not say that crime was a contributing factor in the
enlargement of police budgets. The rise in social movements might explain this
expansion, as Lin suggests (Lin, M.L. 1990), because police budgets have
mushroomed since 1977. Unfortunately, Lin’s study failed to take into account the
inflation rate. At the same time, as even though Chiang Ching—Kuo announced, in
1986, that Martial Law would be removed, which meant that meetings and parades, or
social movements, would be legalized and thereof increase, the police budgets in 1987
and 1988 increased only mildly, 8.04 percent and 10.48 percent, respectively.
Therefore, we are Still not able to say with certainty that social movements were a
crucial cause of this expansion.

3. The Change in Police Organizational Structure

The structure of police organizations in the Republic of China had been altered
significantly between 1973 and 1989. The structure of the NPA enlarged to a grand
scale, while local police agencies shrunk, particularly the T'PPA. We will consider
these alterations in this section. And while the structure of the NPA will be the focus
of this discussion, we will also briefly look at the structures of other local police
agencies, like the TMPD, the KMPD, and the TPPA in order to present a full picture.

The NPA’S organizational chart experienced lots of changes during this 17-year

perio<
expan

expanu

stage 1

Centra
PUTPOS
In this
superv.
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NPA; c
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77
period. These changes can be divided into two stages: the ordinary stage and the

expanding stage. The ordinary stage began in 1972 and ended in 1985, while the
expanding stage started in 1986, and continues to the present. There were three
directors, Chiou, Koong, and Ho, during the ordinary Stage, whereas the expanding
stage was primarily initiated and directed by Director Lo.

In the ordinary stage, the NPA’s structure began to expand. However, the
Central Government and the director of the NPA did not enlarge its structure on
purpose; the expansion came about naturally as new missions were added to the NPA.
In this stage, several departments were transferred to or established under the NPA’S
supervision, control, and direction. These departments included: a) the Criminal
Investigation Bureau, which was founded in 1973 and has as its aim to investigate
serious crimes and direct the detectives of this country under a unified system; b) the
Entry and Exit Service Bureau, founded in 1972 to maintain Taiwan’s international
image; its forerunner was administered by the TPPH until it was transferred to the
NPA; c) the Airport Police Bureau, transferred from the T'PPA to the NPA in 1978,
managed the operation of the Chiang Kai-Shek Airport, a national property; d) the
Highway Police Bureau established in 1979 to oversee the operation of the Chung-San
Highway, the first national highway; and e) the Airborne Squadron, founded in May
1979 to support police operations and monitor traffic on the highways. The
establishment or transference of these new departments indicated that the Central
Government and the directors of the NPA had no intention to expand the structure of
the NPA because most of the functions of these agencies were central in nature.

Naturally, the establishment of some departments, like the Airborne Squadron, reflects

the belie
that tim

the ordi.

reasons
changin
smuggli
robbed i
1989. 1
establisl
Director
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78
the beliefs of the NPA’s Director Koong, because there was no need for such a unit at

that time. However, compared with the expanding stage, the structure of the NPA in
the ordinary stage was influenced less by personal ambitions.

The expanding Stage began during Lo’s term in 1986. There are several
reasons for this enlargement. First, there was the need to cope with Taiwan’s
changing environments, political and social. For instance, in order to decrease
smuggling across the Taiwan Straits and protect Taiwan’s fishermen from being
robbed by the Mainlanders, the Seventh Peace Preservation Corp was established in
1989. Also, a division called Security Inspection and many police Stations were
established to handle the responsibilities required by the National Security Act.
Director Lo’s own beliefs also played a key role in the expansion. During his term,
Lo, with no apparent rationale, not only established the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Peace Preservation Corps, but also transferred, with the Central Government’s
approval, several of the TPPA’S subordinate agencies, such as the First, Second, and
Third Peace Preservation Corps, and the Taiwan Police Academy, to its control.
These moves all happened in 1987. As a result, the NPA got stronger and more
powerful, while the T'PPA became weaker. This made the structure of the police in
the Republic of China, the allocation of police forces between central policing and
local policing, unbalanced (Lee, Y.C. 1987). Unfortunately, little attention has been
paid to this transference of power due to the hierarchical nature of leadership in
Taiwan’s policing. Nevertheless, a strong NPA is harmful to the neutrality of
Taiwan’s policing, which has been criticized as "regime police" (Bailey, 1985) and not

neutral (Li, CS. 1989). This situation becomes particularly important as the ROC

moves

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79

moves toward a more democratic society.

While the NPA’S Structure expanded, that of the TPPA shrunk. For example,
the First, Second, and Third Peace Preservation Corps, the Taiwan Police Academy,
the Airport Police Bureau were all transferred to the NPA between 1979 and 1987.
As for the TMPD and the KMPD, both of their Structures were not significantly
altered during the expanding stage, except in terms of the adjustment of their
jurisdictions.

An interesting fact which should be mentioned here is the curious relationship
between the NPA and the TPPA. At the present time, the T'PPA and the NPA are
located in the same place, and most of the officials of the TPPA are also involved in
the business of the NPA. As a matter of fact, the officials of the T'PPA are playing
dual roles. On the one hand, they execute orders fiem the T'PG, and on the other
hand, they execute orders from the Ministry of the Interior. A major reason for this is
to save money (Chen, LC. 1991). However, this makes many people nervous. As a
consequence, the structure of the TPPA will continue to shrink as long as the NPA

enlarges.

4. SUMMARY

In this chapter, the author reviewed social conditions and Taiwan’s policing
from 1973 to 1989. The examination included five major factors which might
influence Taiwan’s policing. However, no clear association between social change and
Taiwan’s policing emerged because of the vagueness of these relationships. Policing

in the Republic of China today is not dominated by law or system, but by individuals,

also d
resour
ofienu

Taiwa

 

 

 

80
primarily the high level officials of the KMT and the directors of the NPA. It was

also demonstrated that the role of the NPA became important and significant as its
resources, including more police forces and budgets, increased. This human-
orientation and the centralization of policing are, according to many, detrimental to

Taiwan’s move toward democracy and the function of policing.

I.I)efi

change
dusgax
indepcr

change'

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81
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY

1. Definitions of the Variables

The major purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between social
change and policing in the Republic of China from 1973 to 1989. In order to attain
this goal, this study uses Six variables to represent the concept of social change--the
independent variables of this study--and two variables dependent variables to stand for
changes in the police organizations. The six independent variables include population,
crime, individuals’ incomes, social movements, the opposition political party, and
Martial Law. The two dependent variables are the Size of police forces and police
budgets.

Following are the definitions of these variables:

1. Population: The registered population in Taiwan at the end of each year;
persons in the prisons and penitentiaries were included. These figures come from
Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1989.

2. Crime: All criminal cases known to the police at the end of each year.
These figures have been obtained from police statistics, not court statistics. The
source of the data is the same as above.

3. Individuals’ Incomes: Per capita national income. These numbers are based
on 1986 constant price and the New Taiwan Dollar (NTS), which means that the
discount rate has been taken into account. The source of this data is the same as
above.

4. Social Movements: AS mentioned in Chapter 3, a precise definition of

social movements is difficult to offer, because of the complexity and diversity of

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Organi

82

social movements in the Republic of China during the past several years. For the
purpose of this study, social movements denotes parades, meetings, and demonstrations
held in Taiwan, irrespective of whether or not an official approval has been issued to
conduct these activities. Furthermore, because of the limitations of the data from the
NPA, data before 1985 were taken from the research of Y.L. Lu, while data after 1986
are based on the statistics of the NPA.

5. Political Party: Currently, there are about 68 political parties in the Republic
of China. Of these, almost all of them are "foam parties," which means that few
political activities have been conducted by these parties or the party has only few
members. This research will focus on the major opposition political party only, that
is, the DPP. AS mentioned in previous chapters, the DPP’s political activities began in
1978, although the party was not formally formed until 1985. However, the year 1978
will be used as a point of departure. Also, for the purpose of analysis, this study will
a dummy variable to denote the appearance of the DPP. For the years 197 8 and
before when the DPP did not exist, the value of 0 will be assigned, while after 1979
the value of 1 will be given to indicate the appearance of the DPP.

6. Martial Law: Taiwan’s Martial Law was lifted in July 1986. For the
analysis of this study, this author will also make this a dummy variable. That is,
before 1987, a value of 1 will be given to denote that there was a Martial Law, while
a value of 0 will be assigned after 1988 to indicate that Martial Law no longer existed.

7. The Size of Police Forces: The current number of police officers,
irrespective of their duties, functions, and ranks, but not the numbers which appear on

organization charts or in police budgets. Police statistics in the Republic of China

reflex
budg
is oft
orgar
nunfi
nmnt
pohcr
the 01
subor

DCI’SOI

origin
Police
“Dors
bud gel
bud get

POUCe

Curren

2R

reDre.

83
reflect three numbers regarding the size of police forces: a) the current number; b) the

budget number, and, c) the organization chart number. The organization chart number
is often the largest number of these three, because it represents the proper Size of the
organizations. The budget number is, at the most, equal to the organization chart
number; nevertheless, due to budget limitations, this number is often less than the
number of the organization chart. Similarly, the current number means the size of
police officers at the current time, so it is often smaller than the budget number. On
the other hand, the size of police forces includes the numbers for the NPA and its
subordinate agencies, the TPPA, the TMPD, and the KMPD. Data are taken from the
personnel units of the NPA, the T'PPA, the TMPD, and the KMPD.

8. The Police Budgets: The final budgets of each police agency, but not the
original or the closed budgets. The final budgets indicate the planned policies of each
police agency and the supervision of the councils at each level, which may have added
to or subtracted from these budgets. The original budgets, compared with the final
budgets, do not reflect the supervision of the councils at each level. The closed
budgets, due to time limitations, cannot reflect the real plans of police agencies.
Police budgets in this study include the final budgets of the NPA, the TPPA, the
T'MPD, and the KMPD. These budgets will be standardized on the basis of 1986

current price. Data come from the accounting offices of each agency.

2. Research Hypotheses
Because there are six indicators representing social change and two indicators

representing police organizations, this author will provide twelve hypotheses. These

hYP‘

 

hypotheses are:

4.2.1. H0:

H1:

4.2.2. H0:

H1:

4.2.3. H0:

H1:

4.2.4. H0:

H1:

4.2.5. H0:

H1:

4.2.6. H0:

H1:

4.2.7. H0:

H1:

4.2.8. H0:

H1:

4.2.9. H0:

H1:

84

The changes in the population have no association with the
changes in police budgets.
The changes in the population have an association with the
changes in police budgets.

The changes in the population have no association with the
changes in the Size of police forces.
The changes in the population have an association with the
changes in the size of police forces.

The changes in crime have no association with the changes in
police budgets.
The changes in crime have an association with the changes in
police budgets.

The changes in crime have no association with the changes in
the size of police forces.
The changes in crime have an association with the changes in
the size of police forces.

The changes in individual average income have no association
with the changes in police budgets.
The changes in individual average income have an association
with the changes in police budgets.

The changes in individual average income have no association
with the changes in the size of police forces.
The changes in individual average income have an association
with the changes in the size of police forces.

The changes in social movements have no association with the
changes in police budgets.
The changes in social movements have an association with the
changes in police budgets.

The changes in social movements have no association with the
changes in the Size of police forces. _

The changes in social movements have an association with the
changes in the size of police forces.

The appearance of the opposition political party has no
association with the changes in police budgets.
The appearance of the opposition political party has an
association with the changes in police budgets.

4.2.10 H0:

H1:

4.2.11 H0:

H1:

4.2.12 H0:

H1:

85

The appearance of the opposition political party has no
association with the changes in the size of police forces.
The appearance of the opposition political party has an
association with the changes in the size of police forces.

The existence of Martial Law has no association with the
changes in police budgets.
The existence of Martial Law has an association with the
changes in police budgets.

The existence of Martial Law has no association with the
changes in the size of police forces.
The existence of Martial Law has an association with the
changes in the size of police forces.

Here, H0 are the null hypotheses, and H1 are the alternative hypotheses.

3. Analysis and Statistics

Several Statistical techniques will be used to analyze the data. They are:

Person’s R and regression analysis.

1. Person’s R

A first goal of this study is to discover the relationship between social change

and police organizations. In order to attain this goal, we must measure the

associations between the dependent and independent variables. There are many ways

to measure this kind of relationship. Scholars in methodology mentioned that:

If interval or ratio variables (for example, age, income, grade point
average, and so forth) are being associated, one appropriate measure of
association is Person’s product-moment correlation (r) (Babble, 1986:

412).

Other methodologists, e.g., Hagan, also agree (Hagan, 1989). Because the data in this

research has the nature of interval, Person’s R will be used to analyze the data.

86
2. Regression Analysis

A second goal for this study is to determine the relative importance of the
independent variables in explaining the dependent variables. Regression analysis will
be used for this purpose (Babbie, 1986; Hagan, 1989). Four regression equations are
used in this research, to compare the relative importance of the independent variables.
These four equations can be divided into two categories: nonlagged model and lagged
model.

A. Non-lagged model

The non-lagged model is used to determine the relative importance of the
independent variables without lagging dependents or independent variables, that is, to
posit a contemporaneous relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. The observations on both sets of variables were taken during the same time
period. There are two regression equations in this model:

1) Force,= a + blPopu, + b2Crime, + b3Income, + b4Parade, + b5Mlaw, + b6Party, + e

Where Force, = the changes in the size of police forces at time t and t+1,
a = constant,
b1 to b6 = slope of each independent variable,
Popu. = the changes in the population at time t and t+1,
Crime, = the changes in criminal cases reported to police at time t
and t+1,
Income, = the changes in per capita national income at time t and t+1,
Parade, = the changes in the number of social movements at time t
and t+1
Mlaw, = the existence of Martial Law at time t,
Party. = thztzedxistence of the major opposition political party at time
t,

e = the random disturbance term.

87

2) Budget,= a + blPopu, + bZCrime, + b3Income, + b4Parade, + b5Mlaw, + b6Party, +

+ e
Where Budget. = the changes in the size of police budgets at time t and 1+],
a = constant,
b1 to b6 = slope of each independent variable,
Popu, = the changes in the population at time t and t+1,
Crime. 8 thechangesincriminal cases reportedtopoliceattimet
and t+1,
Income, = the changes in per capita national income at time t and t+1,
Parade, = the changes in the number of social movements at time t
and t+l
Mlaw, = the existence of Martial Law at time t,
Party, = the existence of the major opposition political party at time
t, and
e = the random disturbance term.
B. Lagged model
1) Force”: a + blPopu, + b2Clime, + b31ncome, + b4Paradet + b5Mlaw, + b6Partyt +
+ e
Where Force,3 = the changes in the size of police forces at time t and t+1
lagged for three years,
a = constant,
bl to b6 = slope of each independent variable,
Popu, = the changes in the population at time t and t+1,
Crime, = the changes in criminal cases reported to police at time t
and t+1,
Income, = the changes in per capita national income at time t and t+1,
Parade. = the changes in the number of social movements at time t
and 1+]
Mlaw, = the existence of Martial Law at time 1,
Party, = the existence of the major opposition political party at time
t, and
e = the random disturbance term.

88
2) Budget.,,3= a + blPopu, + b2Clime, + b3Income, + b4Parade. + b5Mlaw, + b6Party,

+ e
Where Budget", = the changes in the size of police budgets at time t and t+1
lagged for three years,
a = constant,
b1 to b6 = slope of each independent variable,
Popu, = the changes in the population at time t and t+1,
Crime, = the changes in criminal cases reported to police at time t
and t+1,
Income, = the changes in per capita national income at time t and t+1,
Parade, = the changes in the number of social movements at time t
and t+1
Mlaw‘ = the existence of Martial Law at time t,
Party, = the existence of the major opposition political party at time
t, and
e = the random disturbance term.

"There are two types of time lags: (1) lagged values of the exogenous variables
and (2) lagged values of the endogenous variables" (Ostrom, 1990: 58). In this
research, the dependent variables are lagged, because this author assumes the
relationship between independent variables (population, crime, individuals’ average
incomes, social movements, Martial Law, and the opposition political party) and
dependent variables (police budgets and the size of police forces) are not all
Simultaneously determined, therefore, some variables must be lagged for three years1

in order to find their association. For instance, the police budgets (T+3) and the Size

 

1The reasons for not lagging the effects of the independent variables for one and
two years is to match the procedures for budgeting with the publication of official
statistics. According to the estimation of the author, the effects of dependent variables
on the independent variables will not be seen until three years later, so a three-year lag
was chosen. However, one- and two- year lags will also be calculated as a
supplemental explanation once the significant relationships have been found.

89
of police forces (T+3) will be lagged for three years when exploring the connection to
social movements ('1). There are three reasons for this lag. First, this follows
Bailey’s study of 1985. Second, the lag is necessary because these variables are not
simultaneously determined. Third, this author believes that conflict theory is more
appropriate in explaining the changes in Taiwan’s policing, since it iS reasonable that
police or higher authorities will increase police officers and police budgets in order to
maintain their ruling status.

Before identifying the relative importance of the independent variables, one
further point Should be noted. The data set used in this research with has the nature of
a time series, which means it is a collection of data X. (t=1,2,...T) with the constant
interval between observations X. and X“, and with a certain order of the observation.
Therefore, the problem of autocorrelation or serial correlation, as identified by various
Statisticians may occur (Ostrom, 1990; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1984; Welch and
Corner, 1988; Johnson, Johnson, and Buse, 1987). According to Granger and
Newbold:

there are three major consequences of autocorrelated errors in regression

analysis: 1) estimates of the regression coefficients are inefficient; 2)

forecasts based on the regression equations are sub-optimal; and 3) the

usual significance tests on the coefficients are invalid (Granger and

Newbold, 1974: 111).

There are several ways to detect autocorrelation. One method is "eyeballing"
(Lewis-Beck, 1986), which means examining the correlogram to detect autocorrelation.
A second way to detect autocorrelation is through the Durbin-Watson d-statistic, a

more general way of detecting autocorrelation. Both techniques will be used to

identify autocorrelation.

90

With respect to eyeballing, Ostrom points out that we can examine the ACF
and PACF from the correlogram because:
when there is a positive autocorrelation the correlation
damp off smoothly and exponentially, whereas negative
autocorrelation produces an oscillatory and exponential
decay of successive correlations (Ostrom, 1990: 19).

With regard to the Durbin-Watson d-Statistic, it can be expressed as:

2:: (ac-91:4)2
d=
E a?
c

where the es are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression residuals. Ostrom

 

specifies that "d will tend to be small for positive autocorrelation, large for negative
autocorrelation, and somewhere in the middle for a random series" (Ostrom, 1990: 27).
Further, Durbin and Watson also established upper (d,,) and lower (dl) limits for the
significance level of d. A hypothesis is with first-order serial correlation, Ho: p=0, no
autocorrelation. The decision rules are (Johnson, Johnson, & Base, 1987: 312):

1) reject Ho if d < d, (positive) or if d > 4-d‘l (negative);

2) do not reject Ho if d‘, < d < 4d,; and,

3) test inconclusive if d, < d < d. or 4-du < d < 4—d..

Using these criteria, we are able to determine if autocorrelation has occurred. Once
autocorrelation is found, corrective action can be taken.

This corrective action can be called "Estimated Generalized Least Squares"
(EGLS). There are many approaches to EGLS estimations. Two of Ostrom’s
approaches will be used in this study, by way of SPSS/PC+, to obtain the EGLS
estimations. They are: PraiS-Winsten (PW) and Full Maximum Likelihood (ML). If

the results of the EGLS estimations demonstrate that there is no great variation in the

91
T-ratio, and the value of Rho is small (less than .4), it indicates that there is no

problem with autocorrelation in the OLS estimations. So, we can use the results of
the OLS to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
If autocorrelation is discovered in the OLS estimations, then we have to use the EGLS
estimations to explain the data.

In addition to R square, adjusted R square, standard error, and F value, a
regression analysis also yields the constant, the slope, the T value, and the Beta
coefficient. Beta, a standardized partial regression coefficient, is of most importance
to this study. By comparing the Beta value of the independent variables, we are able
to determine the relative importance of the independent variables (Johnson, Jr.,
Johnson, and Buse, 1987; Kachigan, 1986; Welch and Comer, 1988; Bohmstedt and
Knoke, 1988). However, some experts warn that Beta is not reliable, because it
rescales all the variables into standard deviation from the mean (Z-Score) and makes
the Standardized coefficient unit free. The statistical formula will be used in this study

can be seen in Appendix B.

4. Summary

In this chapter, the author has defined the dependent and independent variables
used in this research and presented twelve hypotheses that are to be tested. Short
descriptions of the statistical techniques which will be used in this study followed. Of
these, the problem of autocorrelation is most important, because spurious relationships
would result if it is not detected and corrected. EGLS estimations will be done as

long as the possibility of autocorrelation exists.

92
CHAPTER 5. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

1. Correlation Analysis of the Variables

In this section, the author will first present the general background of changes
in policing in the Republic of China and the social conditions under which these
changes occurred. Then, the analysis of the data will be presented.

A. General conditions in the Rppublic of China

During the seventeen years from 1973 to 1989, the average population in
Taiwan was 18,002,563, the average increase in the population was 283,913 per year,
and the average rate of increase was 1.57 percent. In regard to crime, there were
about 58,394 criminal cases known to the police per year on average. The number of
crimes increased 3,245 cases every year, and the yearly rate of increase was about
5.56 percent. AS for per capita national income, every person in Taiwan earned on
average about NT'S 103,875 during this period, with an annual increase of 6,881
dollars and a rate of increase of 6.62 percent per year. With respect to parades and
demonstrations, the data showed that about 600 cases occurred each year on average
from 1983 to 1989, and the yearly rate of increase was about 65.67 percent, with an
annual number of cases at 394. With regard to the size of police forces, there were
about 50,046 police officers involved in maintaining social order on average, and this
figure grew by a number of 2,824 and a rate of 5.64 percent each year. As to the
police budgets, about NTS 14,837,256 were distributed to the police organizations at
the central and local levels per year, with an average annual growth of NTS 1,557,972
and a growth rate of 10.5 percent. These figures demonstrate that on the one hand the

people in the Republic of China were becoming richer, and on the other hand that

93

there was a certain amount of unrest in Taiwan’s society, as reflected in the increase
in the number of crimes and social movements. The growing number of police
officers as well as the burgeoning police budgets indicate that, to some extent, the
KMT authorities were trying to keep this country stable and prosperous. All of these
figures are included in Appendix A. i

B. Analysis pf the erelptions

As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two data sets in this research. In order to
find out the relationship between social change and police organizations, we must
examine these two data sets simultaneously.

1. Correlation analysis of data set 1

In this data set, which was based on the absolute number of the variables, there
are some points worth noting.

First, the SPSS computer printouts Show that all the relationships between
independent and dependent variables are Significant, at the .05 level. Also, with few
exceptions, the associations between the independent and dependent variables are all
significant, at the .01 level. These results can be seen in Tables 5-1-1 and 5-1-2. The
results demonstrated in Tables 5-1-1 and 5-1-2 seem to imply that the relationship
between the independent and dependent variables are statistically perfect.

a. The relationship between social change and the size of police forces

 

94

Table 511
Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and the Size of Police Forces

 

 

 

Popu. Crime Income Parade Mlaw Party Forcel Force2 Force3
Force .902 .846 .960 .758 -.813 .732 .940 .915 .935

.(DO .1110 .1110 .000 .1110 .001 .000 .000 .000
Foreel .903 .834 .944 .833 -.696 .695 .918 .912

.000 .(DO .1110 .1110 .1113 .(XJO .000 .000
Force2 .965 .891 .974 .622 -.588 .730 .982

.000 .1110 .1110 .013 .021 .002 .000
Force3 .956 .891 .986 .672 -.659 .667

.000 .000 .000 .1110 .010 .(Xl9

 

 

Thefigmesinthefirstlineaer,andthefigmesinthesecondlinearep.

According to Table 5-1-1, there is a close relationship between the size of
police forces, the first dependent variable of this Study, and the Size of the population,
individuals’ average incomes, the number of criminal cases and social movements, and
the existence of Martial law and an opposition political party. It also shows that, on
the one hand, there is a positive relationship between the size of police forces and the
size of population, crime, income, social movements, and the existence of an
opposition political party, while on the other hand, the association between the size of
police forces and the existence of Martial Law is negative. It implies that once the
size of population, crime, income, and social movements are large and there is an
opposition political party, then the size of police forces will be large. It also indicates
that the size of police forces will be small as long as there is a Martial Law. Even if
we delay the effects of these independent variables on the size of police forces for
three years, there are few variations, which means that all the relationships between
the dependent and independent variables are Still significant. That is, there is a close

relationship between these variables.

 

95
b. The relationship between social change and police budgets

Table 5-1-2
Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and the Size of Police Budgets

   

Popu. Crime Income Parade Mlaw Party Budgetl Budget2 Budget3

 

Budget .950 .W .989 .745 -.690 .750 .989 .980 .981
.11!) .(XX) .11!) .001 .(XJQ .001 .(XX) .11!) .(XX)
Budgetl .964 .892 .994 .702 -.671 .760 .990 .978
.(XX) .(XX) (XX) 002 (D4 .001 .(I'X) .(XX)
Budget2 .966 .866 .987 .710 -.7(X) .741 .986
Budget3 .970 .863 .974 .731 -.695 .733

 

Thefiguresinthefirstlinearer,andthefiguresinthemcondlinearep.

Table 5-1-2 demonstrates the connections between police budgets and the
independent variables. According to this table, there is a close relationship between
police budgets and the size of population, crime, income, social movements, and the
existence of Martial Law and an opposition political party.

Second, it demonstrates that the associations between the size of police budgets
and the size of the population, crime, income, social movements, and the existence of
an opposition political party are positive, which implies that once the size of
population, crime, income, and social movements are large and if there is a major
opposition political party, then a large police budgets will be maintained in this
country.

Third, there is a negative relationship between police budgets and the existence
of Martial Law. This suggests that police budgets will be small when Martial Law is
under operation.

Fourth, just as with the size of police forces, the impacts of the independent

 

96
variables on the police budgets remained almost unchanged when we delay the police

budgets for three years.

The results illustrated in Tables 5-1-1 and 5-1-2 seem to support all the
hypotheses of this study. However, statisticians warn that correlation analysis only
shows the covariance and relationship individually and ignores the impacts of other
independent variables, which means that this kind of association might be spurious.
Therefore, we have to examine other figures to determine whether these relationships
are valid.

2. Correlation analysis of data set 2

A major defect in the data set 1 is that it merely shows the relationship of the
absolute numbers between the dependent and independent variables. Take the
relationship between the size of the population and the Size of police budgets as an
example. From the analysis of the data set 1, we are only aware that the police forces
and the police budgets will be large as long as the size of the population is large.
This is not helpful to explain the changes in the scale of the dependent variables. We
must transform this data set to understand the associations between the changes in the
population and the changes in the size of police forces. Statisticians, e.g., Wonnacott
and Wonnacott, suggest that we can use the relative number instead of the absolute
number of the variables to observe their relationships. Therefore, a second data set
was established. Data set 2 is based on the year-differences between each of the
variables. For example, we subtract 1974’s population from 1973’s and we get a first
figure of population; then, we subtract 1975’s population from 1974’s to get the

second number, and so forth. After these subtractions, the cases for this data set

 

97

become 16, that is N=17-1=16. The results of the correlation of data set 2 are shown

in Tables 5-1-3 and 5-1-4.

a. The relationship between social change and changes in the size of police forces

Table 5-1-3
Correlation Analysis Between Social Change and
Changes in the Size of Police Forces

 

 

Popu. Crime IncomeParade Mlaw Party Forcel Force2 Force3

 

Force -.216 -.209 .066 -.017 -.651 .318 -.107 -.308 .018
.422 .437 .809 .950 .(X)6 .231 .705 .284 .954
Forcel -.405 -.034 .047 .925 -.614 .271 -.129 -.327
.134 .905 .867 .(DO .015 .329 .660 .275
Force2 -.296 .567 .417 -.114 .271 .187 .114
.304 .034 .138 .698 .349 .523 .712
Force3 -.247 -.l33 .517 -.l38 .166 .091
.415 .665 .070 .652 .588 .768

 

Thefigmesinthefirstlinearer,andthefiguresinthesecondlinearep.

Table 5-1-3 demonstrates, overall, that the variation in the size of police forces
in the Republic of China has no significant relationship to changes in the population,
the number of criminal cases known to police, individuals’ incomes and the number of
social movements, and the existence of a major opposition political party. However,
the changes in the size of police forces has a significant association with the existence
of Martial Law. This implies that changes in population, crime, per capita national
income, social movements, and the existence of an opposition political party have
nothing to do with changes in the size of police forces in this country.

There is, however, a close and negative relationship between Martial Law (r:-
.651, p=.006) and variations in the size of police forces. This indicates that if Martial

Law is maintained in this country then the changes in the size of police forces will be

 

98
small; and if Martial Law removed from the Republic of China, then the changes in

the size of police forces will be large.

Second, if we delay the effects of social change on the changes in the police
forces for one year, we discover that there is a Significant association between the
changes in social movements (r=.925, p=.000) and the existence of Martial Law (r=-
.614, p=.015) and the changes in the size of police forces. This means, on the one
hand, that the changes in the size of police forces will be large if there were great
changes in the number of social movements in the previous year, and on the other
hand, that if there was a Martial Law in effect during the previous year, then the
changes in the size of police forces will be small. This seems to suggest that we can
use the changes in social movements and the existence of Martial Law during the
previous year to predict changes in the Size of police forces in the following year
because of their close relationship. Nevertheless, the correlation analysis only yields
the results which consider how the dependent and independent variables move together
without considering the impacts of other variables, therefore, it is dangerous to draw
such a conclusion. We need more information to support this argument.

Third, if we delay the impacts of social change on the changes in the size of
police forces for three years, no significant relationships can be discovered. This
seems to imply that the changes in the social conditions three years earlier had no
effect on the changes in the size of police forces because of their insignificant
relationship. It also means that the authority of the KMT or the police might expand
the size of police forces subjectively, that is, they did not take social change into

consideration when they enlarged the size of police forces. Finally, it is likely that the

99
government expands the Size of police forces based on the data of the previous year,

because results in Table 5-1-2 show that there is a close, positive relationship between
force and forcel (r=.940, p=.000), forcel and force2 (r=.918, p=.000), force2 and
force3 (r--.982, p=.000). However, we need more information to confirm this
assertion.

b. The relationship between social change and changes in police budgets

The relationship between social change and changes in police budgets are not
like the associations mentioned above. Table 5-1-4 shows the results of the
relationship between social change and changes in police budgets.

Table 5-1-4

Correlation Analysis Between Social Change
and Changes in Police Budgets

 

Popu. Crime Income Pm Mlaw Party Budgetl Budget2 Budget3

 

Budget -.566 .210 .414 .767 -.616 .317 .225 -.067 .581
.022 .436 .111 .001 .011 .231 .419 .820 .037
Budgetl -.506 .183 .742 .348 -240 .279 .072 -239
.054 513 .002 .204 .388 .313 .807 .431
Budget2 -.438 -.154 .288 .173 -.428 .135 .048
.118 599 .319 .553 .127 .645 .877
Budget3 -.280 -.012 .025 .469 -590 .061
.355 .968 .937 .106 .034 .843

 

 

Thefiguresinthefirstlinearer,andthefigmesinthewcondlinearep.

From this table, we first discover that the changes in police budgets have no
significant relationship to the variations in the number of crimes, the changes in the
per capita national income, or the existence of an opposition political party. These
three variables cannot help to explain the fluctuations in police budgets.

Second, we find that there is a close connection between the changes in police

100
budgets and the variation of the population (r=-.566, p=.022), the fluctuation in the

number of social movements (r=.767, p=.001), and the operation of Martial Law (r=-
.616, p=.011) at a .05 level. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between
changes in the population and variations in police budgets. This means that when the
population in this country grows, the police budgets decrease. At the same time, the
association between the changes in social movements and the variations in police
budgets is close and positive. It implies that once the number of social movements
increases, more budget will be distributed to police organizations. The opposite is also
true: When the number of social movements decreases, so do police budgets. On the
other hand, there is a close but negative relationship between the operation of Martial
Law and the variation in police budgets. It suggests that as long as there is a Martial
Law in effect, then the variation in police budgets will be small, and when there is no
Martial Law the variations of police budgets will be large.

If we delay the impacts of these social changes on the changes in police
budgets for three years, then no significant relationship can be found between police
budgets and all six independent variables. To some extent, it seems to indicate that
the association between social change and the changes in police budgets is a
Simultaneous phenomenon. In addition, it is also likely that the KMT or the police
authorities subjectively decide to increase police budgets and fail to take social change
into their considerations. A third possibility is that the KMT or the police authorities
change police budgets according to the data of the previous year, because Table 5-1-2
demonstrates that there is a close and positive association between budget and budget.l

(r=.9891, p=.000), budget,l and budgets (r--.9898, p=.000), and budget, and budget,3

101
(r=.9860, p=.000).

If we delay the effects of social change on the changes in police budgets for
one year, we find that only the changes in the per capita national income have an
impact on the changes in police budgets, because r=.742, p=.002. This means that if
there is a significant increase in individuals’ incomes in the previous year, then the
following year’s police budgets will also increase significantly. Again, we require

more information to determine whether or not this association is spurious.

2. Comparisons of the Variables

In addition to identifying the relationships between dependent and independent
variables, a second goal of this Study is to discover the relative importance of the
independent variables in explaining the size of police forces and police budgets.
Consequently, it is necessary to compare one independent variable to another. In
order to do this, the author developed eight regression models. By way of these
models, we are able to determine the relative importance of the independent variables.

Data set 1

a. The relative importance of the independent variables
in determining the Size of police forces

1. Non-lagged model for the size of police forces
The OLS results for this model are:

Force: -4627.56 + .0032Popu, - .024Clime, +
(-.172) (1.59) (-.246)

+ .119Income. - .039Parade, -
(.982) (-.061)

 

102

— 16975.98M1aw, + 2362.241>arty, + 1:,
(-5.428) (1.009)

R2 = .987, s.e. = 1985.29, D~W = .869
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

To understand whether this model is proper or not, we have to examine the
statistic from the Durbin-Watson test first. For a model with seventeen cases (N =17)
and Six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d.=0.554, d,=2.318, 4-d,=3.446, and 4—
d,,=1.682. Therefore, if

d< 0.554; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.554< d< 1.682; inconclusive.

1.682< d< 2.318; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.318< d< 3.446; inconclusive.

d< 3.446; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

Because the (1 statistic for this model is .869 and falls into the area classified as
inconclusive, so we must check other data to find out whether or not a problem of
autocorrelation exists.

The next way to identify whether or not the problem of autocorrelation exists is
by reviewing the correlogram of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial
autocorrelation function (PACF) of the residuals. As Shown in Figures 5-2-1 and 5-2-
2, we find that there is no smooth nor oscillatory decay in the ACF, which means
there is no autocorrelation. But, the PACF shows a single spike at lagl, which means
that the possibility of autocorrelation still exists. Under these circumstances, we are
not sure whether there is an autocorrelation. However, the initial rho appearing in the

first lag was .565. Experts suggest that it is better to use the EGLS estimations in

place of the OLS estimations, if rho > .3 (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, the results from

 

103

the EGLS estimations replaced the OLS results, as Shown in Table 5-2- 1.

Auto- Stand.
Lag Corr. Err. -1 —.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 75 1
l l I I l I l n
I r l l r l l l
1 .565 .223 ********.**
2 .074 .215 *
3 -.127 .208 . ***
4 -.345 .201 .*******
S _.548 .193 ***.*******
6 -.458 .185 **.******
7 —.125 .176 **
8 .058 .167 *
9 .158 .157 ***
10 .167 .147 ***
11 .094 .136 **
12 .010 .124 *
13 -.017 .111 *
14 -.007 .096 *
15 .000 .079 *
Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations *
Figure 5-2-1
ACF of OLS Residuals in the Size of Police Forces
Pr—Aut- Stand.
Lag Corr. Err. -1 - 75 -iS -.25 0 .25 .5 .15 i
1 .565 .243 I I l *********.*
2 -.359 .243 *******
3 .032 .243 *
4 -.398 .243 ********
5 -.289 .243 ******
6 -.084 .243 **
7 .076 .243 **
8 -.163 .243 ***
9 .006 .243 *
10 -.302 .243 ******
11 —.108 .243 **
12 —.100 .243 **
13 .021 .243 *
14 -.066 .243 *
15 -.047 .243 *
Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations *

 

 

 

Figure 5-2-2
PACF of OLS Residuals in the Size of Police Forces

 

 

Table 5-2-1
The Comparison of OLS and EGLS Estimations in the Size of Police Forces

 

 

 

 

a bl b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
Constant Popu Crime Income Parade Mlaw Party Rho D-W
OLS 4627.6 11132 -.024 .120 -.040 -l6976 2362.2 .87
(-.17) (1.59) (~25) (.98) (-.06) (—5.43) (1.01)
ML -23490.3 .1047 -.025 .052 .051 482% 1336.2
(-.93) (2.60) (~39) (.57) (.12) (-9.18) (.68)
PW -24502.7 .m48 -.026 .048 .058 -18296 1304.1 1.54
(-.96) (2.62) (-.40) (.53) (.13) (-9.31) (.67)

 

where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

From this table, we see that the results from the ML and the PW analyses are
quite similar, and that there is a great change when we compare the results from the
PW and the ML to the OLS results. Of most importance is the change in the
population statistic. In the OLS, its t-ratio=1.59, which means it has no significant
relationship to police forces. However, both the ML and the PW produce results that
indicate there is a significant relationship between the size of the population and the
Size of police forces, because the t-ratios of the ML (2.60) and the PW (2.62) both
fallen into the area which requires rejecting the null hypothesis (df=16-l-6=9,
tms=2.26). This means that the effects of the population on the Size of police forces
had been underestimated. We can use either the PW or the ML to explain this
situation. For the purpose of this study, this author chooses to analyze the PW,
because the ML does not yield the post Durbin-Watson statistic, which still leaves the
uncertainty of autocorrelation. Nevertheless, the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.54) of the
PW is still in the area considered inconclusive, so we have to check the ACF and the
PACF of the PW to find whether or not there is a problem of autocorrelation. Figures
5-2-3 and 5-2-4 are the correlograms of the PW.

Autocorrelations:

Auto- Stand.

Lag Corr. Err.

1 .219 .223

2 -.167 .215

3 .077 .208

4 -.080 .201

5 -.276 .193

6 -.367 .185

7 -.167 .176

8 .055 .167

9 .032 .157

10 .050 .147

11 .114 .136

12 .027 .124

13 -.001 .111

14 -.021 .096

15 .002 .079
Plot Symbols:

Partial Autocorrelations:

105

 

 

 

ERR#1
-1 -.75 -.5 —.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
l l l 1 l 1 l l
I I I I I I I
****
***
**
**
. ******
*******
***
*
i
*
**
i
*
*
*
Autocorrelations *
Figure 5-2-3
ACF of EGLS Estimation in the Size of Police Forces
ERR#1
—1 .75 —.5 -.25 0 25 .5 7 1
l l 1 l l 1 l l
I I I I I I I I
**** .
*****
****
****
***
********
*
*

Pr-Aut- Stand.

Lag Corr. Err.

1 .219 .243

2 -.226 .243

3 .190 .243

4 -.221 .243

5 -.157 .243

6 -.386 .243

7 -.072 .243

8 —.042 .243

9 .003 .243

10 -.057 .243

11 -.090 .243

12 -.211 .243

13 -.080 .243

14 -.107 .243

15 .046 .243
Plot Symbols:

*

**
****
**
**

Autocorrelations *

Figure 5-2-4

 

*

 

PACF of EGLS Estimation in the Size of Police Forces

106
As shown in Figures 5-2—3 and 5-2-4, we find that there is no smooth nor

oscillatory exponential decay in the ACF. The PACF shows that there is no spike at
lagl. Furthermore, the rho statistic is small (.219). So, we are certain there is no
problem of autocorrelation. In turn, we can use the PW estimation to explain the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

According to the PW estimation in Table 5-2-1, we find there is a close

relationship between the size of the population (t-ratio=2.62, t-significance=.028), the

 

existence of Martial Law (t-ratio=-9.31, t-significance=.000), and the size of police
forces. This means that the Size of police forces will be large if the size of the
population is large. Also, it means that the size of police forces will be small if there
is a Martial Law in effect. The remaining four independent variables have little
impact on the size of police forces.

2. Lagged model for the size of police forces

The OLS results for this model are:

Force.,,= 2835.427 + .0006Popu, - .101Critne, +
(.112) (.383) (-1.642)

+ .317Income, - 581qu + 1886.534Mlaw, -
(3.478) (-l.632) (1.056)

- 1391.291>artyt + e,
(-.902)

R2: .991, s.e.: 1050.702, D-W= 1.436
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
Again, to understand whether this model is proper or not, we have to examine

the statistic from the Durbin-Watson test first. For a model with fourteen cases

107
(N=14), because of a three-year lag, and six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d,=0.389,
¢=2.572, 4-d.=3.611, and 4-d.=1.428. Therefore, if

d< 0.389; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.389< d< 1.428; inconclusive.

1.428< d< 2.572; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.572< d< 3.611; inconclusive.

d< 3.611; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

The (1 statistic for this model is 1.436, which falls into the area of accepting the
null hypothesis, so we are certain there is no problem of autocorrelation.

Accordingly, from the equation above, we can draw three conclusions. First,
the associations between these six independent variables and the size of police forces
three years later all fall into the area which requires accepting the null hypothesis at a
level of .05 (df=14-1-6=7, tw=2.36), except the per capita national income (t-
ratio=3.478, t-significance=.01). This means that there are no significant relationships
between the size of the population, the number of crimes, the number of social
movements, the existence of Martial Law, the existence of an opposition political
party, and the size of police forces. In other words, these social conditions have no
impact, statistically, on determining the size of police forces three years later.
However, there is a close and positive connection between the per capita national
income and the size of police forces. The size of police forces three years later will
be large if the people’s incomes are large.

Second, because R’=.991, s.e.=1050.702, it indicates that this model as a whole
explains about 99 percent of the total variance with a Standard error of 1050.702. This
also means that this is a very good model for predicting the size of police forces three

years later.

108
Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the per capita

national income (Beta=1.321) is the most powerful factor in predicting the size of
police forces three years later, because its absolute value is the largest.

B. The relative importance of the independent variables
in determining the size of police budgets

1. Non-lagged model for the amount of police budgets
The OLS results for this model are:

Budget; -43837454.5 + 2.877Popu, + 32.281Cn'me, +
(-4.87) (4.30) (.998)

+ 862.240Paradc. - 540211.295Mlaw. -
(3.973) (-.517)

- 1235078.134Party, + q
(-1.579)

R2: .995, s.e.= 663606.729, D-W= 1.775
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

In checking the (1 statistic first, we find that for a model with seventeen cases
(N=17) and six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d.=0.554, du=2.318, 4-d.=3.446, and 4-
d,,=1.682. Therefore, if

d< 0.554; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.554< d< 1.682; inconclusive.

1.682< d< 2.318; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.318< d< 3.446; inconclusive.

d< 3.446; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

After reviewing the Durbin-Watson test, we find that there is no problem with
autocorrelation, because the statistic of the DW test is 1.775 and falls within the area

which requires accepting Ho, which means that the results in this equation will not be

underestimated or overestimated. Accordingly, we can determine the relative

109
importance of the independent variables.

Based on the equation above, several findings are clear. First, the relationships
between the size of police budgets and the number of crimes, the size of incomes, and
the existence of Martial Law and an opposition political party all fall into the area
which requires accepting the null hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=17-6-1=10,
tw=2.23). Therefore, the null hypotheses for these four independent variables should
be accepted. In other words, there is no significant relationship between these four
independent variables and the size of police budgets. On the other hand, this equation
also shows that there is a close and positive association between the size of the
population (t-ratio=4.301, t—significance=.0016) and the number of social movements
(t-ratio=3.97 3, t—significance=.0026) and the size of police budgets. This indicates that
police budgets will be large when the size of the population and the number of social
movements are large.

Second, the statistic of R2=.995, s.e.=663606.729, means that this model as a
whole explains almost 99 percent of the total variance with a standard error of
663606.729. It also means that this model is very useful in predicting and explaining
the size of police budgets, because the R2 is so high.

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the size of the
population is the most powerful predictor in explaining the Size of police budgets,
because it has the largest value among them, which is .59035.

2. Lagged model for the size of police budgets

The OLS results for this model are:

 

110

Budget.+3= -50043328.6 + 3.449Popu. + 48.761cntne. -
(-2.987) (2.88) (1.20)

- 29.174Income, + 483.11Parade, -
(-.486) (2.057)

- 1641340.896Mlaw, + 32154.082Party, + et
01-392) (.032)

R2: .989, s.e.= 693592.208, D-W= 2.425
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

Again, to understand whether this model is proper or not, we have to examine
the statistic of Durbin-Watson test first. For a model with fourteen cases (N=14),
because of a three-year lag, and six regressors (K=6), at a .05 level, d.=0.389,
d.=2.572, 4-d.=3.611, and 4-d,,=1.428. Therefore, if

d< 0.389; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.389< d< 1.428; inconclusive.

1.428< d< 2.572; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.572< d< 3.611; inconclusive.

d< 3.611; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

Because the (1 statistic for this model is 2.425, which falls into the area which requires
accepting the null hypothesis, we are certain there is no problem of autocorrelation.
From the equation above, we can make several observations. First, the associations
between these six independent variables (except for the size of the population) and the
Size of police budgets all fall into the area which requires accepting the null
hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=14-1-6=7, t.m=2.36). Also, there are no significant
relationships between the number of crimes, the amount of per capita national income,

the number of social movements, the existence of Martial Law, the existence of an

opposition political party, and the Size of police budgets three years later. On the

l 1 1
other hand, there is a close and positive relationship between the size of the population

(t-ratio=2.88, t—significance=.02) and the size of police budgets, which means that if
the population is large in a given year, then three years later police budgets will also
be large.

Second, because R’=.989, s.e.=693592, this model as a whole explains about 99
percent of the total variance with a standard error of 693592. This also means that
this is a good model for predicting the Size of police budgets three years in the future
in the Republic of China.

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the size of the
population (Beta=.834) is the most powerful predictor in explaining the size of police

budgets three years later, because its absolute value is the largest.

Data set 2

A. The relative importance of the independent variables
in determining the variation in the Size of police forces

1. Non-lagged model for changes in the Size of police forces
The OLS results for this model are:

Force,= 18539.10 + .0015Popu, - .303Clime, +
(4.50) (.1 17) (-.618)

+ .053Income, - 4.215Parade, -
(.628) (-9.327)

- 18223.03Mlaw, + 1921.51Party, + c.
(-11343) (2.239)

R2 = .952, s.e. = 1332.14, D-W = 2.394

where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

 

 

112

To understand whether this model is proper or not, we must examine the
results of the Durbin-Watson test first. For a model with sixteen cases (N=16) and Six
regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d,=0.502, d.=2.388, 4-d,=3.498, and 4-d.=1.612.
Therefore, if

d< 0.502; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.502< d< 1.612; inconclusive.

1.612< d< 2.388; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.388< d< 3.498; inconclusive.

d< 3.498; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

Because the (1 statistic for this model is 2.394, it falls into the area considered as
inconclusive, so we have to check other data to find out whether a problem of
autocorrelation exists.

The method for identifying the problem of autocorrelation involves reviewing
the correlogram of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation
function (PACF) of the residuals. As shown in Figures 5-2—5 and 5-2-6, we find that
there is no spot in force“, and there is no exponential decay in the ACF. Also, the

PACF shows that there is no spike at lagl. So, we are almost certain there is no

problem of autocorrelation.

113
Autocorrelations: XFORCE Residual

Auto- Stand.
Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5

 

l 1 1 l l 1
I I

 

I I I I
1 —.218 .228 . ****
2 -.381 .220 .********
3 .211 .212 . ****
4 -.109 .204 . **
5 .053 .195 . *
6 .067 .186 . *
7 -.021 .177 . *
8 -.114 .167 . **I
9 —.024 .156 . *
10 .048 .144 . *
11 -.033 .132 . *
12 .017 .118 . *
13 .006 .102 . *
14 .000 .083 . *
Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations *
Figure 5-2-5

ACF of OLS Residuals in the Changes in the Size of Police Forces

Partial Autocorrelations: XFORCE Residual

Pr-Aut- Stand.

 

__q

 

Lag Corr. Err. -1 -.75 -15 -.25 0 25 5
I l I I 1 I
1 -.218 .250 . ****
2 -.450 .250 .*********
3 -.010 .250 . *
4 -.285 .250 . ******
5 .058 .250 . *
6 -.077 .250 . **
7 .123 .250 . **
8 —.179 .250 . ****
9 -.028 .250 . *
10 -.174 .250 . ***
11 —.063 .250 . *
12 -.134 .250 . ***
13 -.032 .250 . *
14 —.045 .250 . *
Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations *
Figure 5-2-6

PACF of OLS Residuals in the Changes in the Size of Police Forces

——H

114

From the equation above, we can say that, first, the association between the changes in
Size of the population, the changes in the number of crimes, the changes in the per
capita national income, the existence of an opposition political party, and the changing
size of police forces fall into the area which requires rejecting the alternative
hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=16-l-6=9, tm,=2.26); therefore, the null hypotheses
should be accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between the changes
in the Size of the population, the changes in the number of crimes, the changes in per
capita national income, the existence of an opposition political party, and the changes
in the Size of police forces. On the other hand, the connection between the changes in
social movements (t-ratio=-9.327, t-significance=.0000), the existence of Martial Law
(t—ratio=-11.343, t-Significance=.0000), and the changes in the size of police forces
fall into the area which requires accepting the alternative hypothesis, which means
there is a close but negative relationship between the alterations of social movements,
the existence of Martial Law and the changes in the size of police forces. Regarding
the relationship between the alteration in social movements and the change in the size
of police forces, this means that when changes in social movements are small, then
changes in the size of police forces will be large. In the same manner, the relationship
between Martial Law and the change in the size of police forces indicates that the
changes in the Size of police forces will be large if there is no Martial Law, and as
long as there is a Martial Law, the changes in the size of police forces will be small.
Second, the statistic of R2 is .95233, s.e.=1332.143, which means that this
model as a whole explains almost 95 percent of the total variance with a standard

error of 1332.143. This also means that this is basically a very good model for

1 15
predicting and explaining the changes in the Size of police forces.

 

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the existence of
Martial Law is the most powerful predictor of changes in the size of police forces,
because its absolute value is the largest.

2. Lagged model for the changes in the size of police forces

The OLS results for this model are:

Forcem= 1635.420 -.00809Popu, - .114Crime. +

 

(.242) (-.395) (-2.217)

+ .239Incomet -.317Parade, + 1395.276Mlaw, -
(1.662) (-.729) (.843)

- 177.427Party, + e,
(-.157)

R2= .663, s.e.= 1269.692, D-W= 1.677
where the numbers in parentheses are t—ratios.

Again, to understand whether this model is proper or not, we must first
examine the statistic of the Durbin-Watson test. For a model with thirteen cases
(N=13), because of a three-year lag, and six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d.=0.528,
du=2.692, 4-d.=3.452, and 4»d.,=l.308. Therefore, if

d< 0.528; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.528< d< 1.308; inconclusive.

1.308< d< 2.692; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.692< d< 3.452; inconclusive.
d< 3.452; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

 

 

Because the (1 statistic for this model is 1.677, which falls into the area which requires
accepting the null hypothesis, we are certain there is no problem of autocorrelation.

Based on the equation above, we can make several observations. First, the

116

 

associations between these six independent variables and the size of police forces all
fall into the area which requires accepting the null hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=13-
1-6=6, tom=2.45). This means that there are no significant relationships between
changes in the size of the population, the number of crimes, the per capita national
income and the number of social movements, and the existence of Martial Law and an
opposition political party and the changes in the size of police forces three years later.
It also indicates that the effects of social change on the changing size of police forces

do not have a delayed impact.

 

Second, because R’=.663, s.e.=l269.692, it indicates that this model as a whole
explains about 67 percent of the total variance with a standard error of 1269.692. This
also means that this is not a very good model for predicting changes in the Size of
police forces three years later into the future in the Republic of China.

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the per capita
national income (Beta=.798) three years ago is the most powerful predictor in
explaining changes in the size of police forces, because its absolute value is the
largest.

B. The relative importance of the independent variables
in determining the variations in police budgets

1. Non-lagged model for the changes in police budgets
The OLS results for this model are:

Budget: 987103.037 + 1.931Popu, + 30.745C1ime, +
(.321) (.198) (.773)

 

+ 692.735Par'ade, - 770327.425Mlaw, +
(2.051) (-.642)

117

+ 182647.465Party, + e,
(.285)

R3: .660, s.e.= 995410.564, D-W= 2.280
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

Also, we check the d statistic first. For a model with sixteen cases (N=16) and
six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d.=0.502, d_=2.388, 4-d,=3.498, and 4ed.=1.612.
Therefore, if

d< 0.502; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.502< d< 1.612; inconclusive.

1.612< d< 2.388; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.388< d< 3.498; inconclusive.

d< 3.498; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

After reviewing the Durbin-Watson test, we find that there is no problem with
autocorrelation, because the Statistic of the D—W test is 2.280 and falls into the area
which requires accepting Ho, which means that the results will not be underestimated
or overestimated. Accordingly, we can determine the relative importance of the
independent variables.

According to equation above, we can say that, first, the relationships between
the changes in police budgets and these six independent variables all fall into the area
which requires accepting the null hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=l6-6-1=9, t.m=2.26).
Therefore, the null hypotheses for these six independent variables should be accepted.
In other words, there is no significant relationship between these six independent
variables and the changes in police budgets.

Second, the statistic of R2=.65951, s.e.=995410.563, which means that this

model as a whole explains almost 66 percent of the total variance with a standard

 

 

 

 

1 18
error of 995410.563. It also means that this model is not very useful in predicting and

explaining changes in police budgets, because the R2 is not as high as the R2 is for the
model of police forces.

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that the variation in social
movements is the most powerful predictor in explaining changes in police budgets,
because it has the largest value among them, which is .60375.

2. Lagged model for the changes in police budgets

Budgetm= 3891221.727 - 3.603Popu, + 11.998Crime, -
(.675) (-.206) (.274)

- 51.818Incomq + 84.032Parade, -
(-.423) (.227)

- 1320507.856Mlaw, - 283184.326Party, + e,
(-.936) (-.294)

R2: .388, s.e.= 1082356064, D-W= 2.115
where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

Again, to understand whether or not this model is proper, we must first
examine the statistic of the Durbin-Watson test. For a model with thirteen cases
(N=13), because of a three-year lag, and six regressors (K=6) at a .05 level, d.=0.528,
du=2.692, 4»d.=3.452, and 4-d.,=1.308. Therefore, if

d< 0.528; reject Ho: positive autocorrelation.

0.528< d< 1.308; inconclusive.

1.308< d< 2.692; do not reject Ho: no autocorrelation.

2.692< d< 3.452; inconclusive.

d< 3.452; reject Ho: negative autocorrelation.

Because the d statistic for this model is 2.115, which falls into the area which requires

accepting the null hypothesis, we are certain there is no problem of autocorrelation.

 

 

119

From the equation above, we can make several observations. First, the

 

associations between these six independent variables and police budgets all fall into
the area which requires accepting the null hypothesis at a level of .05 (df=13—1-6=6,
tw=2.45). This means that there are no Significant relationships between changes in
the Size of the population, the number of the crimes, the per capita national income,
and the number of social movements, and the existence of Martial Law and an
opposition political party, and changes in the size of police budgets three years later.

Second, because R2=.388, s.e.=1082536, it indicates that this model as a whole

 

explains about 39 percent of the total variance with a standard error of 1082536. This
also means that this is not a good model for predicting changes in police budgets three
years in the future in the Republic of China.

Third, the Beta coefficients in this equation illustrate that Martial Law (Beta=-
.507) is the most powerful predictor in explaining changes in police budgets, because
its absolute value is the largest. Nevertheless, the negative Sign suggests that changes

in police budgets three years later will be small as long as there is a Martial Law.

3. Findings
From the discussion above, we find that some results contradict each other.
For instance, in data set 1, we find, through correlation analysis, that the associations

between the size of police forces and all six independent variables are significant;

 

however, the regression analysis of the same data demonstrates that most of the
relationships between the size of police forces and the independent variables are not

significant. The question is, then, what is their "true" relationship? In this regard, \

120

 

statisticians point out that:

In regression analysis, a whole function is estimated (the regression

equation); but correlation analysis yields a single number--an index

designed to give an immediate picture of how closely two variables

move together (W onnacott and Wonnacott, 1984 :426).
When we consider the relationship between police forces and these Six independent
variables as a whole, controlling for the other five independent variables, then there is
no Significant relationship between them. However, if we consider them one by one,
and exclude the impacts of the other independent variables, then some significant

relationships between dependent and independent variables are likely to be found.

Following is a discussion of the correlation and regression analysis.

 

A. Dependent variables: the Size of police forces

Table 5-3-1
The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis
in the Size of Police Forces

 

 

Independent Correlation Regression
Variables r p testing t-ratio Sig-t testing
Popu. .9026 .000' reject H0 2.622 .0277‘ reject H0
Crime .8461 .000' reject H0 -.401 .6976 accept H0
Income .9597 .000' reject H0 .525 .6123 accept H0
Parade .7580 .000' reject H0 .134 .8963 accept H0
Mlaw -.8132 .000‘ reject H0 -9313 .0000‘ reject H0
Party .7321 .001' reject H0 .665 .5225 accept H0

 

* means a significant relationship at a .05 level.

Four points can be drawn from this table. First, the relationships between the

 

size of police forces and these six independent variables might be spurious if we

merely observe their associations by way of correlation analysis. Correlation analysis

121
only shows the relationship between one, Single dependent and one, single independent

variable without taking the impacts of other independent variables into consideration.

Second, in order to find out the true relationship between the dependent and
independent variables, we have to use the results of the regression analysis to
determine their associations. Just as in the demonstrations in Table 5-3-1, we find that
the relationship between the size of the population, the existence of Martial Law, and
the size of police forces fall into the area which requires rejecting the null hypothesis,
and all other connections of the four remaining independent variables to the size of
police forces fall into the area which requires accepting the null hypothesis. This
indicates that the associations between the numbers of the crimes, the per capita
national income, the number of social movements, and the existence of an opposition
political party and the size of police forces are not significant, controlling for the
other independent variables. In other words, these four independent variables have
little impact, if any, on deciding the Size of police forces in this country.

Third, the relationship between the existence of Martial Law and the size of
police forces are Significant but negative. This means that the size of police forces in
the Republic of China will be small as long as Martial Law is maintained. At the
same time, the association between the size of the population and the size of police
forces are significant and positive, indicating that the size of police forces will be
large if the size of the population is large.

Fourth, a succeeding question is, Are we capable of knowing how large the

expansion of police forces will be from the changes in the independent variables?

122
B. Dependent variables: the changes in police forces

Table 5-3-2
The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis
in the Changes in Police Forces

Independent Correlation Regression

 

 

Variables r p testing t—ratio Sig-t testing
Popu. -.2160 .422 accept H0 .117 .9095 accept H0
Crime -.2089 .437 accept H0 -.618 .5517 accept H0

Income .0656 .809 accept H0 .628 .5458 accept H0
Parade -.0172 .950 accept H0 -9.327 .0000‘ reject H0
Mlaw -.6508 .006' reject H0 -11.34 .0000' reject H0
Party .3175 .231 accept H0 2.239 .0520 accept H0

 

* means a significant relationship at a .05 level.

Table 5-3-2 reveals several important findings. First, from the correlation
analysis, we find that five independent variables, including changes in size of the
population, the number of crimes, individuals’ income, and the number of social
movements, and the existence of an opposition political party, have little impact on
determining changes in the size of police forces, because their associations are not
significant. However, the existence of Martial Law has an impact on changes in
police forces because of the significant relationship between the existence of Martial
Law and changes in police forces (r=—.6508, p=.006). The negative sign between their
associations suggests that changes in police forces will be small if there is a Martial
Law. Nevertheless, the author must acknowledge that this connection might be
spurious, because the correlation analysis did not take into account the impacts of the

other independent variables. Therefore, it is necessary to examine their relationships

 

 

123
again through regression analysis.

Second, from the regression analysis, we find that four independent variables,
which include changes in the size of the population, the number of crimes, the per
capita national income, and the existence of an opposition political party, do not help
to explain changes in the size of police forces, because their associations are non-
significant.

Third, changes in the size of police forces in Taiwan are mainly determined by
changes in social movements and the existence of Martial Law, because their
connections are significant. Concretely, changes in the size of police forces will be
large, or the expansion of police forces will be large, if changes in the parades and
demonstrations (social movements) are small, and vice versa, because of the negative
Sign. For conflict theorists, this finding is not convincing, because, presumably, if the
changes in parades and demonstrations are large, then the changes in police forces
should be large, too. This author believes that there are several reasons for this
finding: a) the results from the correlation analysis show that the covariance between
changes in social movements and changes in police forces are not significant (r=-
.0172, p=.950), even though there is a negative Sign; b) the most noticeable expansion
of police forces in the Republic of China happened in 1988, when 19,749 police
officers were recruited, a 33.6 percent increase compared to the previous year; during
the same period, the increase in parades and demonstrations was not as significant as
that of the size of police forces; and c) there was a gleat increase in parades and
demonstrations in 1989, but the increase in police forces was small. Table 5-3-3

illustrates activity from 1986 to 1989.

 

 

124

Table 5—3-3
The Comparison Between Changes in the Size of Police Forces and Social Movements

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Police Changes Changes in Parades Changes Changes
Forces in # % in # in %
1986 57943 661 1.14 597 474 79.4
1987 58751 808 1.39 1278 681 114.07
1988 78500 19749 33.6 1663 385 30.13
1989 80159 1659 2.1 1 6303 4640 279.01

 

 

This table and the factors aforementioned are all helpful in explaining why changes in
police forces and social movements occur in different directions. However, there is a
significant and positive relationship between changes in social movements and changes
in the size of police forces one year later (t-ratio=6.995, t-Significance=.0002). This
means that changes in social movements for the previous year will influence changes
in police forces for the next year. It might also suggest that the association between
the two are not Simultaneously determined, and that the effect of social movements on
the size of police forces might be seen in the following year.

Fourth, there is a Significant and negative relationship between Martial Law
and changes in police forces. This means that the expansion of police forces will be
small if there is a Martial Law; it also means that changes in the size of police forces

will be large once Martial Law is removed.

 

 

125
C. Dependent variables: the size of police budgets

 

Table 5—3-4
The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis
in the Size of Police Budgets

 

 

 

 

Independent Correlation Regression
Variables r p testing t-ratio Sig-t testing
Popu. .9498 .000' reject H0 4.301 .0016' reject H0
Crime .9040 .000' reject H0 .998 .3418 accept H0
Income .9893 .000' reject H0 1.341 .2094 accept H0
Parade .7452 .001' reject H0 3.973 .0026' reject H0
Mlaw -.6903 .002' reject H0 -.517 .6166 accept H0
Party .7497 .001‘ reject H0 -1.579 .1455 accept H0

 

* means a Significant relationship at a .05 level.

Just as with the associations between the size of police forces and the six
independent variables, the relationships between the Size of police budgets and the
independent variables might be spurious if we merely observe their associations by
way of correlation analysis. This is because correlation analysis only shows the
relationship between one, sin gle dependent and one, single independent variable,
without taking the impact of other independent variables into consideration.

Therefore, we must use the results of the regression analysis to determine their
associations. As demonstrated in Table 5-3-4, we find that only the relationship
between the size of the population, the number of social movements, and the Size of
police budgets fall into the area which requires rejecting the null hypothesis. All the
connections of the four remaining independent variables to the size of police budgets

fall into the area which requires accepting the null hypothesis. This indicates that the

 

126

associations between the number of crimes, the amount of the per capita national
income, the existence of Martial Law, the existence of an opposition political party,
and the size of police budgets are not significant, controlling for other independent
variables. These four independent variables have little impact, if any, on deciding the
size of police budgets in this country.

On the other hand, the relationship between the Size of the population, the
number of social movements and the size of police budgets are significant and
positive. This means that the size of police expenditures will be large if the size of
the population and the number of social movements are also large, and vice versa.

However, the results presented in Table 5-3-4 cannot explain the fluctuation
scale of police budgets. A closer look is required to see how police budgets fluctuate
in relation to social change.

D. Dependent variables: the changes in police budgets

Table 5-3-5

The Comparison Between Correlation and Regression Analysis
in the Changes in Police Budgets

 

 

 

 

Independent Correlation Regression
Variables r p testing t-ratio Sig-t testing
Popu. -.5661 .022' reject H0 .198 .8477 accept H0
Crime .2095 .436 accept H0 .773 .4592 accept H0
Income .4137 .111 accept H0 .486 .6387 accept H0
Parade .7666 .001' reject H0 2.051 .0704 accept H0
Mlaw -.6156 .011' reject H0 -.642 .5371 accept H0
Party .3174 .231 accept H0 .285 .7823 accept H0

 

 

 

* means a significant relationship at a .05 level.

 

 

127

Table 5-3-5 reveals two important conclusions. First, from the correlation
analysis, we find that half of the independent variables, including the changes in the
number of crimes and individuals’ income, and the existence of an opposition political
party, have little impact on determining changes in the size of police budgets, because
their associations are not significant.

On the contrary, changes in the population (r=-.5661, p=.022), changes in
social movements (#7666, p=.001), and the existence of Martial Law (r=-.6156,
p=.011) have an impact on the fluctuation scale of police expenditures, because of the
Significant relationships among them. The negative Sign between the changes in
population and the changes in police budgets indicates that their alterations are in an
opposite direction. In other words, the fluctuation in police budgets will be large as
long as the changes in population are small. Reasons for this are obvious: the
population changes in Taiwan Show a decreasing trend, while the changes in police
budgets demonstrate an increasing trend. The negative relationship between the
existence of Martial Law and changes in police expenditures indicates that the changes
in police budgets will be small if there is a Martial Law, and vice versa. The positive
relationship between the changes in social movements and the changes in police
budgets indicates that more budgets and resources will be devoted to police agencies
as long as the parades and demonstrations increase. Nevertheless, this author must
once again point out that this connection might be spurious, because the correlation
analysis did not take into account the impact of other independent variables.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine their relationships again through regression

analysis.

128
Second, from the regression analysis, we find that all six independent variables,

which include changes in the size of the population, changes in the number of crimes,
changes in per capita national income, changes in social movements, the existence of
Martial Law, and the existence of an opposition political party, cannot explain the
changes in the size of police budgets, because their associations are non-Significant.
This result suggests that it is difficult to use these independent variables to predict
changes in police budgets. However, the author must reiterate that there is a
Significant and positive relationship between the changes in per capita national income
for the previous year and changes in police budgets for the following year (t-
ratio=2.557, t-significance=0.338). This means that if the change in per capita national
income is large, then the change in police budgets will be large, too.

E. Hypotheses testing

Based on the discussion above, we find that only two hypotheses (4.2.8 and
4.2.12) of the twelve were supported by the data; the remaining ten were in the area
which requires accepting the null hypotheses (see Tables 5-3-3 and 5-3-5). Therefore,
three observations can be made. First, changes in social movements have a negative
association with changes in the size of police forces. This means that the change size
of police forces will be small if the change in the number of social movements is
large. The reason for this finding was demonstrated earlier.

Second, the existence of Martial Law has a negative association with changes
in the size of police forces. Thus, expansion in the Size of police forces will be small

if there is Martial Law; and if there is no Martial Law, police forces will expand

greatly.

 

 

 

129
Third, the equations reveal that it is not difficult to predict the size of police

forces and the size of police budgets from the six independent variables because all
the equations Show a high R-squared statistic. On the other hand, all the equations
presented earlier illustrate that it is not easy to predict changes in police forces and
police budgets because the R-squared statistic is not as high as those for the size of

police forces and the size of police budgets.

4. Summary

In this chapter, the author used two sets of data and, through correlation and
regression analysis, demonstrated the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. In general, correlation analysis in the data set 1 demonstrated
that the relationships between the independent and dependent variables were all
significant; but few significant associations between the dependent and independent
variables were found through regression analysis by using the same data set. Using
data set 2, few significant relationships were found between dependent and
independent variables, either by using correlation or regression analysis. Because of
the limitation of correlation analysis, which merely demonstrates the connections
between one dependent and one independent variable without considering the impact
of other independent variables, the author has used regression analysis to explain the
results. The major findings of this study are that: a) only two variables (Martial Law
and social movements) are helpful in explaining changes in police forces in the
Republic of China; and b) no variables can explain changes in police budgets in this

country.

130
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS

1. Suggestions

As a pilot study in this area in the Republic of China, there are several
implications and suggestions that can be drawn from the discussions and findings
presented in previous chapters.

For the authority of the KMT and the NPA, the discussions and findings
suggest two points:

a) There is almost no significant relationship between social change and the
changing size of police forces and police budgets, either in lagged or nonlagged
models. This implies that the NPA did not expand the Size of police forces and police
expenditures in response to social change. As a result, the resources of the police
might be wasted. This is especially inappropriate for a country like the Republic of
China, because it lacks natural resources.

b) Based on the discussion in Chapter 3 and many experts’ opinions, a highly
centralized police system is harmful to democracy in the Republic of China and
detrimental to the development of local police. Therefore, a balance of police forces
and budgets between the central and local governments is needed, and the relationship
between the central and local governments at the present time should be re-examined
and re-adjusted.

For later researchers who will be interested in this domain, the findings of this
study suggest two alterations for subsequent research:

a) Almost no significant relationships were found between the dependent and

independent variables, with few exceptions, which may mean the length of time for

131

this study was too short. Hence, data over a longer time period, twenty or thirty
years, is likely to be required to conduct further Studies in this area.

b) The scope of this research was too broad to discuss thoroughly. Therefore,
further researchers should restrict the scope of their studies. Researchers could focus
on a single factor, such as the impact of political factors (Martial Law and the DPP),
the influence of economical factors (unemployment rate, inflation rate, the Gross
National Product, and so on), the effects of crime factors (rascals or gangs, guns,
violent crime, larceny, and so forth), the impact of demographic factors (population
numbers, population Structure, ethic component, and so on) on policing, and to observe
their connections. A review of one of these factors and its impact on policing would
help readers better understand the relationship between social change and policing.

c) In order to draw a real picture and detemrine causation between social
change and police organizations, factor or path analysis' is required. However, this
study merely identified the relative importance of the independent variables, which
was insufficient to determine their causation.

d) AS Rattinger suggests, "bureaucratic momentum" exists whereby "the budget
administered by a government bureaucracy in any given year is expected to amount to
an approximately fixed percentage higher than the one the previous year" (Rattinger,
1975:575). Therefore, it is better to include the budgets and the size of police forces

for the previous year into the model in order to predict the budgets and police forces

 

‘For example, the relationship between the number of crimes and the size of police
forces is difficult to determine. It is possible that the size of police forces can be used
as a dependent variable to explain the changes in the number of crimes, just as in this
study. Also, the number of crimes can be used as a dependent variable to explain the
changes in the size of police forces. A path analysis helps to clarify their relationship.

132

for the coming years.
c) The relationship between centralized and decentralized police systems and
their connections to democracy is another important issue, thus suggesting the need for

a comparative study of police forces in different countries.

2. Conclusion

Although this author was convinced that changes in Taiwan’s social conditions
have great impact on the police forces and police budgets, the results obtained by this
research did not support this assumption. Most of the hypotheses presented in Chapter
4 were not supported by the data. Even though the results did not support the author’s
hypotheses, this research was valuable for several reasons.

The findings and discussions in this study illustrate that a different approach
should be employed when exploring the policing of a country which is different from
the policing of the United States of America and Britain. Political factors might have
more impact in deciding the policing in the Republic of China than is the case in the
United States, hence, more emphasis should be put on politics if we study policing in
Taiwan. Similarly, in a country like the Republic of China, which has a prosperous
economy and an unstable democracy, politics plays a more important role in
determining its policing needs. Researchers who wish to explore policing in South
Korea, a country with a Situation similar to the Republic of China’s, should put their
emphasis on political factors rather than economic or social factors.

Also, the findings and discussions presented in this study demonstrate that, in

general, there is difficulty in predicting changes in police budgets and police forces

 

133
from social change. Individually, however, the existence of Martial Law and changes

in social movements are useful predictors in explaining the changing size of police
forces in the Republic of China. This finding supports the author’s argument that
political factors are much more important than social or economic factors in studying
the policing of any given country like the Republic of China.

The impact of this study on policing in the Republic of China is hard to
ascertain. Police authorities may derive from the study the importance of learning
how to allocate their resources more efficiently, and of expanding the size of police
forces and police budgets in response to social change. Police researchers may
understand from this study the need for drinking about policing in a broader way,

especially in terms of the relationship between policing and democracy.

 

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APPENDD(

 

151

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AUPPWEDHDUJKIA
1. Data Set 1

Year Popu. Crime Income Parade Mlaw Party Force Budget

1973 15564830 38415 64313 0 1 0 34970 5713189
1974 15852224 41732 62331 0 l 0 36331 5411983
1975 16149702 45824 63428 0 l 0 37793 7369184
1976 16508190 43936 71572 0 1 0 39532 9094765
1977 16813127 47868 76813 0 l 0 40051 9975598
1978 17135714 48640 84316 0 1 0 40447 10511149
1979 17479314 52512 89605 0 l 0 40662 11915485
1980 17805067 52350 92098 0 l 1 43592 11686028
1981 18135508 51292 94374 0 1 1 48515 12587299
1982 18457923 44622 96944 0 l 1 49826 15004003
1983 18732938 51427 104130 100 1 1 50774 16168652
1984 19012512 52168 114903 133 1 1 55655 16662958
1985 19258053 60707 119581 123 1 1 57282 18926653
1986 19454610 93181 137992 597 1 1 57943 21731019
1987 19672612 89468 154838 1278 1 1 58751 23357005
1988 19903812 88215 164229 1663 0 1 78500 25477657
1989 20107440 90340 174407 6303 0 1 80159 30640733

2. Data Set 2

Year Popu. Crime Income Parade Mlaw Party Force Budget

1974 287394 3317 -l982 0 l 0 1361 -301206
1975 297478 4092 1097 0 1 0 1462 1957201
1976 358488 -1888 8144 0 1 0 1739 1725581
1977 304937 3932 5241 0 l 0 519 880833

 

152

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1978 322587 772 7503 0 396 535551
1979 3436(1) 3872 5289 O 215 1404336
1980 325753 -l62 2493 O 2930 -229457
1981 330441 -1058 2276 O 4923 901271
1982 322415 -6670 2570 0 1311 2416704
1983 275015 6805 7186 100 948 1164649
1984 279574 741 10773 33 4791 494306
1985 245541 8539 4678 -10 1717 2263695
1986 196557 32474 18411 474 661 2804366
1987 218002 -3713 16846 681 808 1625986
1988 2312(1) -1253 9391 385 19749 2120652
1989 203628 2125 10178 4640 1659 5163076

 

153
APPENDIX B

1. Pearson’s R

_);‘ (Y—‘Y'l (x-I?)/(N-1)

 

KY SY SK

2. Statistic for Regression Analysis

A. Coefficient of Determination

82
R2 = "Y
H 32,, 52,,
B. Beta Coefficient
B=rXY
C. T Test
b-B

 

134

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