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A Context for Violence: Social and Historical
Underpinnings of Indo-African Violence
in a South African Community

presented by

Ashwin G. Desai

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

_____Ph.D._____ degree in __Sociology__

William A. Jaunce

Major professor

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A CONTEXT FOR VIOLENCE: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL

UNDERPINNINGS OF INDO-AFRICAN VIOLENCE

IN A SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY

By

Ashwin G. Desai

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1993

ABSTRACT

A CONTEXT FOR VIOLENCE: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INDO-AFRICAN VIOLENCE IN A SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY

By

Ashwin G. Desai

This study seeks to examine the basis for Indo-African conflict in Natal, South Africa, and its impact on the consciousness of these communities through an analysis of the 1945 and 1989 riots. In order to understand the basis for tensions that underlay Indo-African relations in the two periods under discussion, the complex set of economic, political and other socio-cultural variables characterizing the social organization of Indian and African people, and the relationship between these, is researched.

Ethnic divisions and conflict in South Africa are viewed as either being primordial or the result of state manipulation. This study shows how ethnicity is constructed and manipulated from above. Ethnicity has an existence beyond a mental construct. Whatever ethnicity's imaginary and ideological status, it also has a real, concrete and material existence.

The study also critiques a number of widely held views in South African social science on the nature of collective violence. It shows that participants in the riots do

not represent the "scum of the earth." Rather, participants are typical of the neighborhood in which the riots occurred. Riots cannot be seen as instrumental or consummatory; rather, they are a mixture of both. The study illustrates that a more useful approach is to explore the changing balance over time between (what one may call) the expressive and instrumental aspects of different types of disorders. To divide the actions of individuals into rational versus emotional-irrational types, as previous studies on the riots have done, is to deny the complexity of human behavior.

Almost all theories of civil violence have at some time been hailed as capturing the ultimate origins and nature of civil violence--wherever and whenever it occurs. This study supports the view of Rule (1988) and McPhail (1971) that riots are complex phenomena that cannot be understood by utilizing one theory. Riots display a heterogeneity and are best explained by a combination of theories.

The central contribution of this study is to discern, first, the general conditions engendering hostility between the host society and middleman groups. It then specifies under what conditions this hostility can translate into violence.

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Dissertation advisor: Dr. William Faunce

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During the writing of this thesis, I have incurred a number of intellectual debts. In South Africa, Karen Kohler was a constant source of support. Professor Vishnu Padayachee, sometime Special Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Durban-Westville, pointed me to new sources of information and new intellectual directions.

At Michigan State University, I owe the greatest gratitude to Professor Bill Faunce. Officially designated my "advisor," he was so much more than that. Bill was an excellent supervisor, not only in a technical sense, but was a kind, sensitive, and understanding human being throughout my Ph.D. program. Bill's wife, Sheila, cheerfully put up with phone calls at odd hours and provided encouragement and wisdom at crucial times. The rest of my committee, Professors Manning, Vanderpool, Marger, and John Hinnant from Anthropology, made valuable contributions which enabled me to sharpen my analysis.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC--African National Congress

BAAB--Bantu Affairs Administration Board

CAD--Department of Cooperation and Development

CBD--Central business district

COSAS--Congress of South African Students

FOSATU--Federation of South African Trade Unions

GDP--Gross domestic product

HOD--House of Delegates

ICU--Industrial and Commercial Workers Union

LA-- waZulu Legislative Assembly

NDB--Natalia Development Board

NEUM--Non-European Unity Movement

NIC--Natal Indian Congress

PAC--Pan Africanist Congress

PNAB--Port Natal Administration Board

SACTU--South African Congress of Trade Unions

SAIC--South African Indian Council

SADT--South African Development and Trust Land

SPP--Surplus Peoples Project

TIC--Transvaal Indian Congress

TUCSA--Trade Union Council of South Africa

UDF--United Democratic Front

On Thursday, 13 [illegible] African youth, George [illegible] that came to be known as the [illegible] injured and 142 dead. [illegible] seven Africans and 50 Indian [illegible] and 1,532 dwellings were [illegible] these were owned by Indian [illegible]

Thirty-six years later [illegible] township of Umlazi and erupted [illegible] in quick succession. In Inanda, the [illegible] in close proximity, the violence took a different turn [illegible] threatening Indian shopkeepers, landlords and [illegible]

Within a week, 42 Indian-owned shops and businesses stores, and houses were destroyed. One thousand Indian residents were forced to flee and seek refuge in the Indian township of Phoenix. Three Indians were snatched and burnt to death in the border area between Phoenix and Inanda. More than 50 Africans were killed in the violent upsurge, mainly at the hands of the police. During the violence, hundreds of armed Indian vigilantes massed on the border of Phoenix and Inanda. About 3,000 of them took to the streets of Phoenix and

INTRODUCTION

On Thursday, 13 January 1949, an Indian shopkeeper assaulted an African youth, George Madondo. This incident set in motion a chain of events that came to be known as the "1949 Durban riots." The riots left 1,087 people injured and 142 dead. Of the injured, 541 were African and 503 Indian. Eighty-seven Africans and 50 Indians lost their lives in the conflict. Some 710 stores and 1,532 dwellings were damaged or destroyed. The overwhelming majority of these were owned by Indians, and the attackers were Africans.

Thirty-six years later, a school strike and boycott spread out of the African township of Umlazi and engulfed KwaMashu, Clermont, Lamontville, and Inanda in quick succession. In Inanda, the only area where Indians and Africans lived in close proximity, the violence took a particular form: gangs of youths began threatening Indian shopkeepers, landlords, and residents.

Within a week, 42 Indian-owned shops and businesses and as many houses were destroyed. One thousand Indian residents were forced to flee and seek refuge in the Indian township of Phoenix. Three Indians were stabbed and burnt to death in the border area between Phoenix and Inanda. More than 60 Africans were killed in the violent upsurge, mainly at the hands of the police. During the violence, hundreds of armed Indian vigilantes massed on the border of Phoenix and Inanda. About 3,000 of them took to the streets of Phoenix and

1

surrounding Indian townships in a backlash against looters and rioters. The group was armed with shotguns, revolvers, swords, pangas, slashers, sticks, iron rods, and choppers.

This study seeks to examine the basis for such Indo-African conflict and its impact on the consciousness of these communities. The effect of the erosion of apartheid on Indo-African relations will be assessed.

The different histories, modes of incorporation, and the ecologies and economies of differing regions have an impact on the form that ethnic consciousness takes. This study will be situated within the context of changes in the political economy of the region in the post-war period.

In order to understand the basis for the tension that underlay Indo-African relations in the two periods under discussion, the complex set of economic, political, and other socio-cultural variables characterizing the social organization of the Indian and African people, and the relationship between these, needs to be researched. This relationship must be situated within the broad structural context of hierarchy, domination, and mobilization.

The major research questions to be addressed are:

1. What were the sources of Indo-African antagonism?

2. What were the general conditions exacerbating antagonisms?

3. Why did the violence take a particular form?

4. Who participated in the violence?

The dissertation is organized in the following way: Chapter 1 reviews the literature on the 1949 and 1985 riots, on studies of collective violence, and on the

relationship between ethnic competition and violence. The chapter also lays out the methods used in data collection in this study.

Chapter 2 presents the predisposing conditions to the 1949 and 1985 violence. Particular attention is paid to the economic conditions in the respective periods and their effects on Indians and Africans, the nature and character of political organizations formed or existing in Natal in the 1940s and 1980s, and the crises in segregation and apartheid in those years.

Chapter 3 focuses on the precipitating conditions to both riots and on the riots themselves. The social relations prevailing in Cato Manor in the 1940s and in Inanda in the 1980s are examined. In the analysis of the riots, particular attention is paid to the composition of the rioters, the organization of the riots, and whether they were anti-Indian or anti-apartheid.

Chapter 4, the final chapter, presents the summary and conclusions of the study. It then analyzes the possible impact of the move away from apartheid on the future of Indo-African relations. Suggestions for further research on collective violence and policy recommendations on the future of squatter communities are then presented.

Map 1: Location of the study area

AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA

200 km

PRETORIA
Roodepoort □ ■ Germiston
Johannesburg

Bloemfontein ■

Pietermaritzburg ■ ■ Durban

Study
Area

Cape Town □

East London

Port Elizabeth

Map 1:   Location of the study area.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

1.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews, first, the literature on the 1949 and 1985 riots, pointing to some of the weaknesses in the existing academic explanations of these incidents and the general literature on collective violence. It then focuses on the issue of ethnic competition and violence. These alternative theoretical approaches will be examined with a view to ascertaining the extent to which they offer a satisfactory explanation as to the conditions under which ethnic conflict may lead to violence directed at specific ethnic groups, especially when there exists a history of competition over the differential allocation of resources. The final part of the chapter provides an overview of the methods of data collection.

1.2 Review of Existing Literature on the Riots of 1949 and 1985

It may be useful as background to the riot studies to begin this review with a brief exposition of some of the more important writings in the general literature on race relations in South Africa.

Pluralists have written most widely on the nature of race relations in South Africa. A prolific writer from this school, van den Berghe (1967), has argued in this tradition that:

Social classes in the Marxian sense of the relationships to the means of production exist by means of definition, as they must in any capitalist country, but they are not meaningful social realities. Clearly, pigmentation, rather than ownership of land or capital is the most significant criterion of status in South Africa. (p. 267)

Wolpe (1970) pointed out that in explaining the position of, and relationships between, social groups, van den Berghe makes class irrelevant, and socioeconomic differences are treated as the outcome of racial definitions (p. 159). Relationships between social groups are seen solely as a function of racial ideology, attitudes, and prejudices. A member of a racial group is treated unequally, van den Berghe asserts, because s/he is defined as a member of that group.

Questions concerning the conditions in which such definitions or attitudes of hostility arise are not raised because, as Wolpe (1970) argues, sociologists who adopt this approach simply take these as given and, as a consequence, race relations are removed from both the economic and political structural context and treated as an area *sui generis* (p. 156). By seeing race prejudice as the basis for the differential incorporation of particular groups, "there is excluded from the analysis discrimination that is either economically motivated, or arises in or through the operation of the economic system, or that is a consequence of a particular distribution of power, or in any event, is not caused by race prejudice" (Wolpe, 1970, p. 162). The net result of not accounting for race prejudice in structural terms means that the bulk of the writing on race in South Africa remains at a descriptive level (Wolpe, 1970, p. 175).

In attempting to account for the phenomenon of continuing ethnic group solidarity, van den Berghe (1978) turns to sociobiology. This approach assumes that conflict between ethnic or racial groups is based on primordial sentiments, which, in turn, rest on the genetic tendency, derived from the kinship process, for such groups to practice "in-group amity/out-group enmity."

Van den Berghe's argument unfolds in the following way: ethnic relations are based on human nature, and human nature is to some extent aggressive and violent (Scott, 1990, p. 153). According to Reynolds (1980), this biological basis is viewed as "some innate primordial tendency based on our evolved nature to resort to aggression and violence, territoriality, etc., in order to achieve our ends" (p. 310). For van den Berghe (1978), ethnic and race relations are "extensions of the idiom of kinship. Ethnic and race sentiments are extended and attenuated forms of kin selection" (p. 403).

At a general level, the primordial approach has been critiqued for not addressing the issue of why ethnic identity can, and indeed often does, change or fluctuate in its intensity, as well as being differentially distributed at a given moment of time throughout a single group (Scott, 1990, p. 149).

In a sustained critique of the sociobiological approach to ethnic and race relations, Reynolds (1980) argues that the approach ignores the fact that rather than being a captive of his genes, man is capable of constructing the social and physical "reality" around him (p. 313). Developing this critique, Scott (1990) points out that if the conscious "decisions" of individuals are more important than their genes in determining how they relate to members of ethnic and racial

groups, then it should follow that instead of being somehow biologically fixed, these decisions are flexible (p. 156). They are open to influence by changing social, economic, and political circumstances.

The van den Berghe approach has limited explanatory value in the understanding of ethnic collective violence in South Africa. The 1949 riots, for example, would be viewed simply as a case of in-group enmity based on primordial sentiments. These, in turn, rest on the genetic tendency derived from the kinship process. However, competition over scarce resources might arouse "in-group amity/out-group enmity" without anything at all being "primordial" in these decisions. Such decisions, especially in a biological sense, are circumstances outside the ambit of van den Berghe's approach. His interpretation of the 1949 riots would, in all probability, parallel the explanation of the official Commission of Enquiry, which saw the riots as a violent instance of inherent racial conflict.

Van den Berghe's approach of treating racial groups as internally homogeneous and undifferentiated, and of assuming that race operates autonomously, unaffected by other social processes, to produce social inequalities (Wolpe, 1988, pp. 12-13), places limits on its explanatory value for understanding the contemporary violence in Natal, for example. Here, Zulus have attacked Zulus. Hindson and Morris (1992) have argued persuasively that while ideological differences clearly play an important part in the conflict, such conflict must be placed in the context of the class differentiation within the urban African population. The violence has seen African residents of poverty-stricken

shantytowns embarking upon crude booty-gathering raids on adjacent established African townships. By positing a race reductionist theory, van den Berghe "insulate[s] from enquiry conditions and processes which may be pertinent to the cohesiveness and fragmentation of racial groups" (Wolpe, 1988, p. 13). Thus, he cannot even begin to consider class differentiation within the urban African population as a factor in contemporary violence in Natal.

Marxists writing on South Africa have tended to replace the race reductionism of the pluralist school with an economic reductionism. This position holds that classes defined at the level of relations of production somehow naturally and inevitably engage in appropriate forms of class action (Bonner & Lambert, 1987, p. 341). As Wolpe (1988) points out, class is not merely conceptualized as an economic relation of production. It is also assumed that the economic relation immediately and directly defines the interests of the class entities which are constituted. No space is allowed for the contribution of noneconomic conditions to the formation of class interests (pp. 14-15). When sections of the working class coalesce around ethnic labels and turn on each other, for example Indian and African workers, this approach has limited explanatory value. The state is blamed for fomenting division, or divisions are blamed on treacherous leadership (usually the villainous petit-bourgeoisie) or are said to be an example of false consciousness.

The pluralist school played an important role in alerting social scientists to the continuing salience of race and ethnicity as social identities. However, instead of seeing these social markers as one identity resource among many

social identities, they saw it as the only resource. Similarly, Marxists saw class as the prime determination of social change. Both schools would have done well to heed the words of Ekekwe (cited in Shaw, 1986), who argues that

> there exists a certain dialectic between ethnicity and class that has to be appreciated in the search to understand politics in many post-colonial societies; the danger for the analyst is to ignore this dialectic and to deny either the phenomenon of ethnicity or that of class formation and struggle. (p. 587)

The neglect of the conditions that intensify ethnic divisions in South African social science is matched by the absence of noteworthy work on South African collective violence. The work of Clark McPhail, James Rule, Charles Tilly, and Turner and Killian has, as yet, not had an impact on research into collective violence in South Africa.

There have been numerous studies of the 1949 riots and to a lesser extent of the 1985 violence. Meer (1969, 1989) has studied both the 1949 and 1985 riots. Although she presents the studies separately, her conclusions are starkly similar. For Meer (1969), the 1949 riots were part of a white vendetta against Indians, manipulating African frustrations for this purpose (p. 36). In explaining the 1985 Inanda violence, Meer presents a theory of conspiracy:

> Inanda has been earmarked for "release" to Africans in terms of the 1936 Land Act, but . . . the Government [has not] enough money to buy off privately owned land. How better to short-circuit the whole process than . . . through a racial attack? (p. 36)

In critiquing conspiracy theories of urban violence, Lupsha (1969) argues that even if the theory contains a seed of truth, "one still has difficulty explaining the obvious mass support given riots without admitting that some more fundamental basis of unrest exists. For if people were content, the best

organized conspiracy should fail for lack of support" (p. 279). Meer does not explore why the 1949 and 1985 riots received widespread support from the African populace, and ends up characterizing the African participants in the 1949 riots as "disembodied abstract things" (Webster, 1978, p. 22). Similarly, Meer held that participants in the 1985 riots were mobs of criminals.

Black extra-parliamentary political organizations also tended to blame the state for the violence. The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), for example, accused the National Party of embarking "on a policy of inciting the Africans, and calling for an open pogrom on the Indians. They enrolled hooligans and other such elements for the purpose of burning, looting and raping, under the leadership of European thugs, and with the police conspicuous by their absence" (NEUM pamphlet, 1952, p. 31).

State-funded studies, on the other hand, have explained riots as a violent instance of inherent racial conflict. The official commission of enquiry into the 1949 riots argued that

> the zulu is by tradition a warrior. The veneer of civilization which has come to him during his urban existence is but a thin covering. When this breaks under the stress of emotion--especially the emotion of a mob--he again becomes one of the braves of Chaka. . . . The Native is hostile to strangers because they are different. (Riot Commission Report, 1949, p. 13)

The liberal white press saw the participants in the 1949 riots as a mob of savages motivated by some primeval instinct to violence. Thus, the Natal Witness editorial of 20 January 1949 commented:

> Recent events in Durban . . . have given us a taste of the Natives' penchant for violence. Octogenarians who remember Isandhlwana will have been neither shocked nor surprised at the primitive fury of the

rioters. They are aware of the smouldering passion inhibiting the Zulu soul which the veneer of civilization has barely dampened.

This argument begs the question as to why Indians and not whites were attacked and why the riots occurred in a particular period. There is a fundamental contradiction in the commission's explanation of the riots. On the one hand, it argues that racial riots are inevitable in a context where different racial groups are in close proximity since they are inherently antagonistic. On the other, it argues that the riots were an example of mob mentality, the work of "Native loafers," "Tsotse Boys," or the "I.W.W.," that is, the "I won't works."

Building on the initial insights of Webster (1978), Edwards and Nuttall (1990) have provided the most sophisticated analysis to date of the 1949 riots. Their argument is premised on the race-based and differential incorporation of groups into the hierarchy of the city--with whites at the top, Indians in the middle, and Africans at the bottom. This, they contend, laid the basis of competitive and antagonistic relationships between Africans and Indians at the level of employment, housing, and trade. According to Edwards and Nuttall, Indians came to be seen as a barrier to the upward mobility of the broad spectrum of the African community, ranging from workers to the aspirant African middle class. Their approach influenced my own analysis of the riots. However, their analysis remains limited in the absence of any attempt to use existing social science knowledge on ethnic collective behavior and riots. Edwards and Nuttall, for example, see only the instrumental ends of violence. They argue that "[t]he rioters had won their own victory: they had dramatically defied the authorities; they had looted shops and homes; and through popular force had driven Indian

residents from the shantytowns and neighboring districts" (p. 28). Yet there were clearly consummatory aspects to the violence. Note the District Commandant of Police describing events in Cato Manor: "While the men were clubbed to death, Indian women and young girls were raped by the infuriated Natives" (Report of the Commission, 1949, p. 5).

Rather than seeing the riots as consummatory or instrumental, rational or irrational, as Edwards and Nuttall appear to have done, a more useful approach is to explore the changing balance over time between what one may call the expressive and the instrumental aspects of different types of disorders.

Edwards and Nuttall also tend to ignore broader national political developments such as the crisis of the policy of segregation. It will be argued that the breakdown in the policy of segregation and the failure of the ruling United Party to develop an alternative policy is crucial in understanding the increase in violent urban conflicts in the second half of the 1940s.

Sitas (1986) and especially Hughes (1987) provide an in-depth analysis of the tensions that underlay the social relations between Indians and Africans in Inanda. Hughes traces the history of settlement of Africans and Indians in Inanda and the emerging divisions between the two groupings. Hughes also painstakingly sets out the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions African people in Inanda had to labor under in the 1980s. This approach was useful for my own analysis.

Building on the socioeconomic conditions of Africans, Hughes (1987) argues that "local people experiencing ever-increasing degrees of poverty and

deprivation" were a central catalyst for the violence (p. 353). While explicating the material considerations, Hughes neglects the nonmaterial factors such as culture, ethnicity, ideology, and individual or group psychologies which act to reinforce and reinterpret particular aspects of this material environment. These nonmaterial elements act as windows through which the particular actors concerned view the world and their place within it (Byerley, 1992, p. 3).

As Byerley (1992) reminds us,

> While an analysis of the prevailing material and political conditions should form the basis for any serious analysis of contemporary violence in South Africa this precondition should not be substituted for the analysis itself. Central to such an analysis is the question of how identities and alliances are constructed in particular localities and the role of ethnicity (and indeed other lines of social differentiation) in this construction. (p. 3)

What Hughes (1987) argues is that the reason Africans singled out Indian examples should be seen as the result of the way in which state policies have manipulated racial divisions over a long period, but more thoroughly so in the five years preceding the violence (p. 353). Ethnic mobilization cannot be seen simply as something foisted upon people by the state. The possible impulses from below emanating from the lived reality as experienced by the actors need to be researched. They cannot simply be discounted.

A large part of Hughes's problem is that she fails to recognize that riots are complex and differentiated phenomena. By approaching the riot as a monolithic phenomenon, Hughes fails to distinguish between the different phases of the riot and the differing intentions of groupings. Hughes (1987) tells us that Meer's account of events in Inanda should be treated as a useful "source book rather than a sustained analysis" (p. 332). Her own neglect of an engagement

with theories of civil violence and ethnic mobilization results in Hughes not faring much better than Meer. In fact, despite protestations to the contrary, Hughes, like Meer, sees the state as a manipulator of the Africans' attack on Indians.

However, none of these studies has attempted to address the following questions in any systematic way:

1.   What was the level of participation in the riots?

2.   Who were the participants?

3.   Were the riots spontaneous or planned, and if spontaneous, did certain groups subsequently provide the riots with leadership and organization?

4.   Was the violence anti-Indian, or were they conveniently available targets symbolizing white domination in general?

5.   Was the riot an irrational outburst directed against all authority or a purposeful anti-apartheid struggle?

6.   Were there any norms operating among the rioters?

7.   Were specific targets selected and bounds to action recognized?

It is only by explicating the prevailing socioeconomic conditions and addressing the above questions that one can move to an explanation of what the riots were all about.

This is not a general study of the political economy of Indian/African relations. It is nevertheless located within such a context and draws upon relevant aspects of this relationship in the two selected periods. The area of sociology in which it fits and to which it aims to contribute is the study of collective violence. The study uses various models of collective violence and

concepts related to this area as its primary conceptual and theoretical underpinning. The adequacy of this underpinning for explaining the two South African riots will be assessed. The following section reviews the existing literature on collective violence, with the aim of laying out my own conceptual framework.

1.3   Review of Literature on Collective Violence

> Whether the negative attitude against crowds originated in the "rational" defense of one's position, or in the "irrational" fear of the rising masses, or in both, is a matter of interpretation owing to one's perspective. We can take it for granted that in any threatened establishment there is both. (Graumann, 1986, p. 222)

The passage cited above effectively summarizes the various perspectives that have been taken in the literature on "the crowd." On one hand there are those who see the crowd as irrational, impulsive, and barbaric, while on the other there are those who see the crowd as comprising essentially normal people responding in a violent way against those they see as responsible in some way for their grievances. The first section provides a broad overview of the perspectives of the irrationalist and collective rational approach. The second part focuses on theories that gained currency in the aftermath of the American urban riots of the 1960s.

1.3.1   The Irrationalists

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed in Europe what many intellectuals saw as the imminent destruction of society. Rather than the march to heightened civilization, it was crime, moral degeneration, the disruption of

urban life, and the rise of left-wing revolutionaries that were seen as the order of the day. For many conservative and moderate intellectuals, civilization itself was under threat.

Early theorists of the crowd (for example, Freud, 1921; Le Bon, 1895/1960; McDougal, 1927; Tarde, 1910) considered that persons became deindividualized when they became part of a crowd; that is, they experienced a loss of rational control. Further to this, they argued that the person in the crowd underwent a regression to the "primitive" or "savage," and this resulted in the individual becoming no more than an "animal acting by instinct" or, in the case of Freud, unconscious impulses.

What triggers this situation? For Le Bon (1895/1960), there is a collective excitement produced by crowds. Faced with this situation, people quickly lose the critical reasoning faculties characteristic of day-to-day life. In close proximity to each other, people are more prone to the machinations of mob leaders. Stimulated by the crowd "mentality," individuals regress to more "primitive" types of reaction. Note Le Bon here:

> Isolated, a person may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd he is a barbarian--that is a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings. (p. 12)

It is the physical proximity of others that triggers crowd action. Rationality is abandoned, and people can be influenced willy-nilly.

Freud, by contrast, did not use this type of emotionalism when discussing crowds. He referred rather to the unconscious nature of "man" and how this surfaced in crowd situations. As Rey (1986) argues, crowd phenomena were,

for Freud, "more or less similar, but as it were <u>writ large</u>, to phenomena that, in the field of individual psychology, are hard to discuss because they are more inaccessible, better concealed by mechanisms of defense and resistance" (p. 55).

Both Le Bon and Freud considered the crowd to be under some form of mass hypnosis, but whereas Le Bon leaves this untheorized, Freud proposed that there exist two types of bonds in crowds. These bonds, he argued, exist on two planes, the one horizontal (between members of the crowd) and the other vertical (between the crowd and "the leader"). Freud further considered the horizontal bond to be a consequence of the vertical bond. Thus, crowd solidarity was a direct result of the identification of individuals in the crowd with a "leader" or "leading idea," and this identification led to the formation of the horizontal bond.

Le Bon, Tarde, and McDougal have been criticized for their pseudo-scientific approach to crowd studies. Appelbaum and McGuire (1986) draw attention to their "deliberate disqualification of the actions of the crowd, such that . . . crowds are seen as being criminal by nature, and are described as an 'evil force, a terrible serpent whose segments are composed of subjugated beaten down men'" (Tarde, 1893; cited in Appelbaum & McGuire, 1986, p. 32).

McPhail (1991) has shown how Le Bon's ideas were carried to and spread in the United States by the writings and lectures of Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago from 1916 until 1933 (pp. 5-9). The following quotation

from one of Park's works just before his retirement indicates his closeness to the ideas of Le Bon.

> The general characteristics of crowds have been well explored and may be rapidly summarized. . . . Social and personal distinction disappear. . . . Only those attitudes, passions and sentiments which are the common heritage of mankind remain. With the evolution of what Le Bon calls "the crowd consciousness" there is a corresponding loss of personality by the individual; the individual tends to act impersonally and to feel something less than the ordinary responsibility for his actions. (Park; cited in McPhail, 1991, p. 8)

The Le Bon-Park perspective of human beings transformed by the crowd was taken over and popularized by Herbert George Blumer. Crowds that engage in collective behavior, according to Blumer (cited in McPhail, 1991), are "queer, vehement and surprising . . . strange, forbidding and sometimes atrocious" (p. 13). For Blumer (cited in McPhail, 1991), crowd members are vulnerable to whatever suggestions complement their surging common impulses and dispositions to act because they lose the faculties of interpretation and self-consciousness and get caught up in the circular reaction of collective excitement and social contagion (p. 13).

The position of Le Bon, Park, and Blumer that for masses of people to act in common or in concert, they have to lose their individual consciousness and rationality has been found to be without logical or empirical foundation. McPhail (1991) points to a substantial body of evidence that shows, rather than the loss of critical thought and self-control during widespread disruption of routine behaviors and social relationships, human beings "remain in control of their wits and their behaviors. . . . It is characteristic of such problematic situations that

individuals' critical thinking and purposive control of behavior are enhanced rather than diminished" (p. 14).

1.3.2 The Emergent Norm Hypothesis

Social psychologist, Muzafer Sherif (cited in McPhail, 1991), argued that while individuals were not transformed by the crowd, the presence and actions of other individuals could be of consequence for how any one individual perceives and acts in a situation. For Sherif, social interaction was of consequence for the development of norms in ad hoc social situations including the crowd, and that those emergent norms became the standards in terms of which participants perceived those situations, organized, and controlled their behavior (pp. 61-62).

Turner and Killian (cited in McPhail, 1991) built on the seminal insights of Sherif to develop their emergent norm hypothesis. They define collective behavior as

> those forms of social behavior in which usual conventions cease to guide social action and people collectively transcend, bypass, or subvert established institutional patterns and structures. . . . Collective behavior refers to the actions of collectivities, not to a type of individual behavior. (p. 72)

In addressing the question of what brings people together, Turner and Killian (cited in McPhail, 1991) propose the following:

> How do people come together to form collectivities? . . . [We] shall stress the combined effect of (1) a condition or event that is sufficiently outside the range of "ordinary" happenings that people turn to their fellow human beings for help and support in interpreting and responding to the situation, and (2) the availability of pre-existing social groupings through which intercommunication can be initiated fairly easily. (p. 73)

The central concept in Turner and Killian's (cited in McPhail, 1991) theory of collective behavior is *the emergent norms*:

> We propose that *collective behavior takes place under the governance of emergent norms*. Some shared redefinition of right and wrong in a situation supplies the justification and coordinates the action in collective behavior. (p. 82)

McPhail (1991) has provided a comprehensive critique of the work of Turner and Killian, and it is unnecessary to repeat his work. However, two critical issues need to be addressed.

A central problem for Turner and Killian is that there is little agreement on what constitutes a norm. Norms have been utilized to refer to modal patterns of behavior and to prescriptions (or proscriptions) for behavior. Often they refer to both at the same time. Blake and Davis (cited in McPhail, 1991) have pointed to the problems of using norms as sociological explanations:

> The difficulty of proving the existence of the norm is great. As a consequence, there is a tendency to take regularities in behavior as evidence of the norm. When this is done, to explain the behavior in terms of the norm is a redundancy. (p. 948)

Turner and Killian have not escaped the problems associated with norms. McPhail (1991) points out that, especially in their earlier work, they inferred the presence and operation of the norm from the modal behavior it was supposed to explain (p. 98). This was tautological.

McPhail (1991) also points out that their theory provides no working definition of the collective behavior to which their theory is addressed (p. 99). Even the most elementary criteria for (a) recognizing a collectivity when we see one; or for (b) judging when collective, coordinated, or cooperative behavior has

occurred within or by a collectivity; or for (c) identifying recurring elementary forms of collective behavior are not provided.

> In short, there are no recipes or guidelines here for the field-worker who wants to attempt to identify, observe, and describe collective action, let alone for the researcher who wants to test Turner and Killian's hypotheses about the sources of collective action. (pp. 100-101)

1.3.3 The "Collective Rational" Approach

Another group of writers on the crowd--most notably Rude (11959, 1981), Cobb (1970, 1975), Hobsbawm (1971, 1972), Thompson (1963, 1971), and Tilly (1978)--by contrast, emphasize the crowd's behavior as a response to their subjugated position rather than in terms of the influence of mass hypnosis. They take issue with the supposed deviant nature of the crowd and argue that legitimate grievances lay behind and informed crowd behavior. Hobsbawm (1971), for example, argues that the "historical mob did not merely riot as protest, but because it expected to achieve something by its riots" (p. 111).

Similarly, Lefebvre (cited in Graumann & Moscovici, 1986) has contested the irrationality of the crowd, and argued that

> It is a most unconsidered view that sees such excesses as the outcome of "collective madness" or "a delinquent crowd." In such cases a revolutionary crowd is not unconscious and does not see itself as guilty; it is convinced that it is inflicting a just and deliberate punishment. (p. 9)

Whereas Le Bon, Tarde, and Freud concentrated on the transformation of the individual in crowd situations, the collective rationalists have stressed the social purposes of crowd violence. By and large they have analyzed crowd phenomena in terms of the composition of the crowd, the nature of the targets the crowd attacked, the historical context of the time, and the specific "spark" that

preceded the onset of crowd violence. Because of their concentration on Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the historical context tended to be one of urbanization of the peasantry, collapse of the nobility, rise of the bourgeoisie, decline of the clergy, and the emergence of a laboring class.

A leading figure in this approach is Charles Tilly. Tilly's early work in the mid-1960s confronted and attempted to debunk the position that violence resulted in "breakdowns in established moral solidarities" (Rule, 1988, p. 173).

By the mid-1970s, "Tilly sought to systematise his treatment of collective action within the polity" (Rule, 1988, p. 178). The seminal work concretizing these efforts is from <u>Mobilization to Revolution</u> (1978). In this work Tilly distinguishes between four bases of collective action.

1. The <u>organization</u> of the group or groups involved. Protest movements are organized in many ways, varying from spontaneous formation of crowds to tightly disciplined revolutionary groups. The movement Castro led, for example, began as a small guerrilla band.

2. <u>Mobilization</u>. This involves the ways in which a group acquires control over sufficient resources to make collective action possible. Such resources may include supplies of material goods, political support, or weaponry. Castro was able to acquire material and moral support from a sympathetic peasantry, together with many townspeople.

3. The <u>common interests</u> of those engaging in collective action, what they see as the gains and losses likely to be achieved by their policies or tactics. Some common interests always underlie mobilization to collective action. Castro

managed to weld together a broad coalition of support because many people had, or thought they had, a common interest in removing the existing government.

4.   <u>Opportunity</u>. Obviously, chance events may occur that provide opportunities to pursue revolutionary aims. Many forms of collective action, including revolution, are greatly influenced by such incidental happenings. There was no inevitability to Castro's success, which depended on a number of contingent factors--in the early stages, Castro's "invasion" was almost a complete fiasco. If he had been one of the 70 captured or killed, would there have been a revolution?

Collective action itself can simply be defined as people acting together in pursuit of <u>interests they share</u>--for example, gathering to demonstrate in support of their cause. There may be various levels of activism among those who engage in such behavior, some being intensely involved, others lending more passive or irregular support. Effective collective action, such as that which culminates in revolution, usually moves from (a) organization, to (b) mobilization, to (c) the perceiving of shared interests, and finally to (d) the occurrence of concrete opportunities to act effectively (Tilly, 1978, pp. 7-10).

For Le Bon, political actors are the victims of manipulation. For Tilly, collective action sees people acting together in pursuit of their interests. Action is purposeful and calculated. Note Tilly (1978) here:

1.   Collective action costs something.
2.   All contenders count costs.
3.   Collective action brings benefits, in the form of collective goods.

4. Contenders continuously weigh expected costs against expected benefits.
5. Both costs and benefits are uncertain because
    (a)   contenders have imperfect information about the current state of the polity
    (b)   all parties engage in strategic interaction. (p. 99)

The approach adopted in this dissertation avoids viewing crowds as rational or irrational. Rather, I follow Dunning, Murphy, Newburn, and Waddington (1987), who suggest that the terms "rational" and "irrational" are misleading and argue that "it might be more fruitful to see crowds not as 'rational' or 'irrational,' but rather to explore the changing balance over time between what one might call the 'expressive' and the 'instrumental' aspects of different types of disorders" (p. 24), "expressive" violence being the cathartic release of aggression, and "instrumental" violence being protest to redress grievances.

Rule (1988) makes a similar point when he argues that

there is much to suggest that crowd action is not always strictly purposeful, if by this we mean oriented only to instrumental ends. Some militant crowd action is clearly consummatory rather than instrumental, and such action often includes the sorts of hair-raising sadistic and destructive acts that inspired the anxiety-ridden visions of the irrationalists. Such actions appear to be ends in themselves, rather than means to some longer-term end. (p. 242)

1.3.4 Composition and Causes

In the discussion that now follows, the focus moves on to the question of who participates in collective violence, but with an eye towards using this to explain why violence actually occurs.

Proponents of the irrationalist school, Sighele and Le Bon, argue that it is those at the very bottom of the social heap who participate in riots. "Criminals,

madmen, the offspring of madmen, alcoholics, the slime of society, deprived of all moral sense, given over to crime--these compose the greater part of the revolutionaries," wrote Sighele (1892, p. 104). This "scum of the earth" theory of participation in violent events has been disputed by Tilly (1978) and his collaborators. They have argued that popular protest, both violent and otherwise, is a normal outgrowth of other popular collective action, and that participants are apt to be typical of the social groups whose interests the protests represent.

Analysts of the American riots of the 1960s also pointed to certain groups as the cause of the violence. Four theories gained some currency: the criminality (riff-raff) theory, the under or lower class theory, the recent migrant theory, and the teenage rebellion (youth) theory.

1.3.4.1 <u>The criminality (riff-raff) theory</u>. Three notions underpin the riff-raff theory:

1. only a small fraction of the black population (2% or 3% of the urban ghetto population) actively participated in the riots;

2. the rioters, far from being representatives of the black community, were mainly the "riff-raff," the young, unattached, unskilled, unemployed, uprooted, criminal (petty thieves, hustlers), and outside agitators; and

3. the overwhelming majority of the black population (the law-abiding and respectable 97% or 98% who did not join the rioting) totally opposed the riots (Fogelson, 1971, p. 27).

While the riff-raff certainly take part in urban violence, evidence gathered on the 1960 riots indicates that the bulk of the participants in the riots cut across

all class lines in the black community and the bulk of the rioters were the mature, employed, better educated, and more aware members of the riot community (Kerner, 1968, pp. 128-133).

Sears and McConahey (1973) contend that the Watts rioters were relatively well educated and politically sophisticated and that they held positive black self-images, and more freely criticized whites (p. 42). Oberschall (1968), in his study of the Los Angeles riot of 1965, found that the riot drew participants from all social strata within the predominantly lower-class Negro area in which it took place. While the lawless and rootless minority from the area were active, the riot could not be attributed to them, according to Oberschall. He argues that

> the riot is best seen as a large scale collective action, with a wide, representative base in the lower-class Negro communities, which, however much it gained the sympathy of the more economically well-off Negroes, remained a violent, lower-class outburst throughout. If there were numerous jobless among the participants and many youths from families with problems, it is precisely because such cases abound in the neighborhoods in which the riot occurred. (p. 329)

In looking at the number of participants, the Los Angeles Riot Study team found that 15% of the black adult population participated at some point during the rioting at one level or another (Greenburg, 1971, p. 280). The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders found that

> A total of 11.2 percent of Detroit's blacks over fifteen years of age and a remarkably high 43.4 percent of Newark's blacks between fifteen and thirty-five years of age are reported by the Survey Research Center to have participated in these two cities' disorders. (Greenburg, 1971, p. 280)

1.3.4.2 <u>The recent migrant theory</u>. According to this view, riots are basically the products of "culture shock." The riots, according to this view, are rooted in the inability of recent migrants to adjust to the stress and complexity of

urban ghetto living. It is argued that the failure to adapt, to acculturate to the norms and mores of the city, results in alienation from, and hostility towards, the economic and political system (Lupsha, 1969, p. 280).

Recent analyses, as well as historical data, indicate that the facts do not support the migrant assumption. According to Lupsha (1969), "it appears that this 'buck-passing' notion is not only incorrect, but that the counter-hypothesis-- that recent migrants act as a dampener to riots--may have some merit" (p. 280). Aggregate analysis of 76 pairs of riot cities and similar nonriot cities for the period 1959 through 1963 found, for example, that the recent migrant thesis (defined as rapid expansion of the black population) did not hold (Lieberman & Silverman, 1965). These researchers found that black in-migration tended to be greater in the nonriot control city. The data from the Kerner Commission (1968), which closely examined the socialization and residence patterns in Detroit and Newark, found that 74.4% of the rioters in these cities also grew up there (p. 130). Available data indicate that the recent migrant theory has little usefulness in explaining violence.

1.3.4.3 <u>The teenage rebellion (youth) theory</u>. This position argues that riots are the result of the overflow of the pent-up frustration and youthful exuberance of teenagers in the densely populated ghettos. According to Banfield (1968), riots are an "outbreak of animal--usually young, male animal-- spirits. Young men are naturally restless, in search of excitement, thrills, 'action'" (p. 187).

While youth make up most of the active members of rioters, Sears and McConahay (1973, p. 26) point out, the data indicate that every age group is represented in these outbursts. Oberschall (1968) notes that in the Los Angeles riot of 1965,

> Since 41 percent of those arrested were in the 25 to 39 age category, and a further 17 percent 40 years old and over, it is inaccurate to describe the rioters as mainly composed of irresponsible youth and young hoodlums. Unlike gang incidents and other outbursts that are confined to a particular age cohort, the Los Angeles riot drew its participants from young and old alike. (p. 328)

Lupsha (1969) points out that, considering that the median age in the New Haven riot area is approximately 17 years, these data suggest that the rioters were, in the main, the older and mature elements in the community (p. 282). It would appear, then, that more than just young men are "naturally restless" during riots (Upton, 1984, p. 34).

1.3.4.4 <u>The underclass theory</u>. The theory has wide acceptance among academics rather than among public officials. The "underclass" theory contends that riots are basically a class phenomenon, a building up of grievances of the hard-core poor (Upton, 1984, p. 30).

Evidence is contradictory. Fogelson and Hall (1968) state that about 75% of the persons participating in riots in Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Newark, New Haven, Boston, Plainfield, and Phoenix were employed (p. 58). Oberschall (1968) found in his study among the arrested rioters that only about 10% were in the nonmanual category, and of the remaining proportion only 9.4% were classified as skilled workers. Moreover, 22.6% of the arrested rioters were unemployed, compared with 13.2% for the Watts labor force in November 1965,

and 10.1% for South Los Angeles. The lower-class character of riot participation clearly emerges from these figures. Oberschall does note, though, that if there were numerous jobless among the participants, it is precisely because such cases abound in the neighborhoods in which the riot occurred.

1.3.4.5 Relative deprivation. By the mid-1960s, relative deprivation had gained major prominence in the literature offering explanation of civil violence. This work built on the deprivation-frustration-aggression (DFA) formulation of Miller and Dollard (1941). The theory of relative deprivation embraces two essential concepts. First, deprivation is not absolute but rather relative; that is, people compare themselves to some standard of reference. In sociological research the standard of reference is usually a group or status which an individual wishes to emulate. Second, because deprivation is relative, those who are most deprived in an objective sense are not necessarily the ones experiencing deprivation.

Gurr (1968) used the DFA model to explain the U.S. riots in the mid-1960s:

> The sociological and political cliché is that "frustration" or "discontent" or "despair" is the root cause of rebellion. Cliché or not, the basic relationship appears to be as fundamental to understanding civil strife as the law of gravity is to atmospheric physics: relative deprivation . . . is a necessary precondition for civil strife of any kind, and the more severe is relative deprivation, the more likely and severe is strife. Underlying this relative deprivation approach to civil strife is a frustration-aggression mechanism, apparently a fundamental part of our psychological make-up. When we feel thwarted in an attempt to get something we want, we are likely to get angry, and when we get angry the most satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of frustration. (pp. 52-53)

The DFA was tested in many examinations of the incidence of riots, collective violence, and demonstrations. Spilerman (1970, 1976) and Snyder (1979) found that socioeconomic and political deprivation yielded very low correlations with the incidence of U.S. riots between 1963 and 1972. A variety of measures of deprivation and frustration failed to differentiate participants from nonparticipants in the U.S. urban riots (McPhail, 1971).

If relative deprivation seeks to explain a violent event, the following would need to be established:

First, that the participants shared a single standard of justice, appropriateness, equity, minimal acceptability, or the like. Second, that the timing of the action ensued from the experience of the violation of this standard, as registered in evidence from the individual participants. Third, that actual participants in the violent action were distinguished from nonparticipants in the same population by their sense of violation of the key standard (Rule, 1988, p. 223).

This is a tall order that relative deprivation theorists have failed to fulfill. Thus, one must agree with Rule's (1988) assessment that, while the theory has made an undoubted "contribution to understanding some forms of civil violence . . . it falls distinctly short of the status of a viable theory" (p. 223).

1.3.4.6 _Smelser's value added model_. Following Parsons, Smelser (1962) analyzes human action in terms of four integrative elements in society: values, norms, mobilization into roles, and situational facilities (p. 32). Collective behavior occurs when any of these elements is disturbed.

Smelser adds to this framework six further determinants: structural conduciveness, structural strain, crystallization of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and social control. Each determinant contributes its own effect to the overall process.

The operation of these determinants is conceived as a value added process. Each determinant is a necessary condition for the next to operate as a determinant in an episode of collective behavior. As the necessary conditions accumulate, the explanation of the episode becomes more determinate. Together the necessary conditions constitute the sufficient condition for the episode (Smelser, 1962, p. 382).

Both sets of organizing constructs are required for a full explanation of any particular form of collective behavior which could take many forms, for example, panics, crazes, riots, hostile outbursts, or social movements.

Smelser's model has a number of positive features. It states that crowd behavior emerges out of wider social conditions under strain and that crowds are directed towards social change rather than merely "running amok." It attempts to account for a range of different forms of collective behavior, thus moving away from a picture of crowds as merely destructive. Rule (1988) points out that Smelser's model makes an important heuristic contribution in informing us that for any instance of collective behavior to occur--or indeed, for any other behavior --a variety of necessary conditions must be fulfilled. The fact that given circumstances have produced innovative action in the past has no bearing on the future if new actors view the same circumstances from different perspectives.

This way of thinking is an important corrective to the notion that collective behavior or any other social phenomenon results from a single "cause" that, once specified, leaves it firmly and permanently accounted for (p. 163).

However, Smelser has also been subjected to criticism. Chief among these are the following:

1. The theory is too broad and abstract, lacking in empirical criteria for specifying links between the real world and theory.

2. It is not clear that all six determinant factors are always necessary for crowd action to occur. Some studies of actual crowd events have not found all six factors operative.

3. The notion of structural strain is too loose and vague. It is unclear precisely what constitutes strain, and whether it is due to objective conditions or subjective perceptions of conditions.

4. Similarly, the notion of "generalized belief" is rather too vague. For example, Milgram and Joch (1969) claim that crowd members may hold diverse and contradictory beliefs. In addition, Smelser holds that this belief should be dominant among crowd members. Berk (1974) asks how dominant is dominant? Is it the only belief, or the only one in common, or the most important one in that situation?

5. The theory is not clear on what generates the generalized belief or how individuals came to share this viewpoint.

1.3.5 Ethnic Competition and Conflict

Ethnic competition and conflict do not inevitably lead to violence. In this section we shall look at some of the circumstances under which ethnic competition and conflict do assume violent forms.

The effects of racial and ethnic cleavages on social organization have been largely neglected by social scientists. They regarded race and ethnicity as traditional forms that would evaporate as society underwent modernization. Marx and Engels believed racial and ethnic group cleavages would be subsumed in the modern order by larger identities based on class membership. Similarly, dichotomies such as Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity saw a movement from ascriptive group cleavages to affiliations based on rational principles of mutual interest. Despite these optimistic projections, ascriptive group cleavages remain an integral aspect of modern societies. For example, in the United States, ethnic identification rivals class as a predictor of political participation (Giles & Evans, 1986, pp. 469-470).

In South Africa the ongoing political violence has shown that in South Africa's industrial heartland, ethnic identities continue to persist. Defying the pronouncements and predictions of Marxist and modernization theorists, a significant section of the African working class in the Transvaal has organized itself into ethnically based bands (the "Zulus"), armed itself with "cultural weapons," and "taken on the Xhosas."

Young (1986) argues that "the two most important patterns of cleavage in Third World states are social class and cultural pluralism, not necessarily in

that order" (p. 119). In looking at the class-ethnicity relationship, it is important

to view these macrovariables as interrelated but analytically distinct.

Bienen (cited in Shaw, 1986) argues that class and ethnicity need to "be

understood situationally, that is, in specific social, political, economic and spatial

contexts" (p. 587). Similarly, Young (1986) holds that

> the impact of communal cleavages depends on situational factors, which
> articulate potential consciousness into activated group solidarity when a
> specific context is perceived as threatening group interests. ... Collective
> self-awareness is also indispensable to meaningful class political action.
> ... The mere existence of rural small holders, an urban working force, or
> stratification by occupation and income does not in and of itself create
> politics of social class. (p. 121)

No *a priori* assertions can be made about class/ethnicity interaction as it takes

different forms in different contexts.

One way of conceptualizing the persistence of racial and ethnic group

cleavages in modern societies is to emphasize the psychological aspects of

prejudice. This approach has mainly viewed discrimination as only serving the

need for ridding oneself of hostility, guilt, and fear. Although such an approach

explains individual instances of racial prejudice, it is less suited to explain

widespread organizational and systematic patterns of racial hostilities (Giles &

Evans, 1986, p. 470).

An alternative way of conceptualizing the persistence of racial and ethnic

cleavages that appears better suited to explain organizational and systematic

patterns of prejudice and discrimination is offered by the competitive ethnicity

approach. This model conceptualizes racial and ethnic groups not as vestiges

of premodern society but rather as vehicles for the pursuit of interest in modern

pluralist societies. The competition model of ethnic mobilization argues that ethnic mobilization is a consequence of the competition between groups for resources.

Olzak and Nagel (1986) argue that "modernisation increases levels of competition for jobs, housing and other valued resources among ethnic groups" and that "*ethnic conflict and social movements based on ethnic [rather than some other] boundaries occur when ethnic competition increases*" (p. 2; italics in original).

This view holds that, with modernization, the assignments of individuals to occupations and the distribution of societal rewards in general tend to be made increasingly on the basis of rational and achieved criteria that cross-cut ethnic boundaries. It does not follow that ethnic distinctions become irrelevant, however. The crucial element of such a situation is that members of different groups find themselves increasingly in a position to compete for the same occupations and the same rewards. The competitive tensions are manifested by a heightening of solidarity within the groups involved (Nielsen, 1985, p. 134). The competition model holds that it is when the cultural division of labor breaks down, thus opening the way for intergroup competition, that ethnic mobilization is most likely to occur.

In a critique of the competition model, Pinard (1987) argues that it is unidimensional and tautological.

> In one of its most common forms, social conflict after all involves, by definition, a striving for scarce goods which cannot be secured by all. Hence to argue simply that conflict is rooted in competition is tautological. But given that the reverse is patently not true—not all forms of competition

... lead to conflict--the basic theoretical problem is that of enunciating the intervening conditions under which it does. (p. 771)

In a later article, Pinard, together with Bélanger, specifies two conditions under which ethnic competition can lead to ethnic conflict:

1.   Competition must be perceived as unfair.

2.   Competitive relations must be relatively free from interdependence.

According to Bélanger and Pinard (1991), ethnic competition will be perceived as unfair when it is seen as violating accepted norms (e.g., when discriminatory practices prevail), when it is seen as involving unjustified threats to claimed rights and possessions (e.g., infringing on one's turf), or when the rules of the game themselves are contested or the outcomes of competition are seen as unbalanced (e.g., the same ethnic region wins government allocations more often than others). The main determinants of perceptions of unfairness are structural. Even if ethnic competition is "objectively" fair, it is likely to be perceived as unfair whenever it occurs within structures that generate grievances that spoil relations between competitors. This is likely to occur whenever the competition takes place within a larger context of ethnic inequality, subordination, or disadvantage of a class/economic nature (pp. 448-449). Bélanger and Pinard's second necessary condition argues that the competitors' relationships with each other must also be as purely competitive as possible or, to put it another way, as uncomplementary as possible. If high levels of complementarity or interdependence (or even dependence) are present, relationships are likely to be perceived as mutually beneficial and will therefore tend to be peaceful (although not necessarily friendly).

McPhail (1991) makes a similar point in relation to competition and conflict (pp. 221-222). Competition, according to McPhail, can be defined as the presence of two or more parties pursuing mutually exclusive objectives: one party's success is the other's failure. Some competition is regulated by rules or laws (that is, principles or systems of principles) to which competitors agree and which more or less regulate or prevent the kinds of clashes between competitors that would lead to dangerous levels of violence. McPhail argues that when competition for mutually exclusive objectives is not regulated in some fashion, hostility and conflict between competitors is probable if not inevitable. This holds true according to McPhail for small groups and for nation states. What needs to be emphasized is that in a context where parties perceive themselves to be pursuing mutually exclusive goals and the rules favor one party, the potential for conflict is heightened.

To assess the nature of competition between Indians and Africans, we will need, first, to understand:

1.   their structural location within the regional economy,

2.   whether one of the groups has been privileged in any way by the white ruling class, and

3.   whether the local and national state has generated structures for the meaningful representation of Indian and African interests.

To assess levels of interdependence, we will need to explore the social, economic, and political spheres that Indians and Africans inhabit to evaluate the nature and context of Indo-African interaction. This will allow us to assess

whether Bélanger and Pinard's necessary conditions for ethnic conflict exist or not.

Where there exist more than two ethnic groups which legislation, custom, or other forms of social control have ordered in a hierarchical system of relative privilege and advantage, it is necessary to understand why competition, conflict, and collective violence may occur only between some and not all of them at the same time. Under such complex, interactive circumstances, the violence which may occur (when the conditions laid out above are satisfied) is often directed at the middleman minority which may occupy a position of relative privilege in the system/structure of hierarchy.

1.3.6 The Middleman Minority

Relations between groups of different races or ethnic groups take a number of forms. One position an ethnic group can take is that of a "middleman minority." Blalock (1967) argues that some groups come to

> occupy intermediate positions owing to a competitive advantage or a high adaptive capacity. Such minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination of circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive mechanism over a prolonged period. (p. 79)

Middleman minorities have also been referred to as middleman trading peoples, migrant intermediation, marginal trading peoples, and permanent minorities. While there have been a variety of labels to describe middleman minorities, there is general agreement that a number of ethnic groups around the world have occupied a similar position in the social structure. Thus, Rinder (1958) has referred to the Armenians in Turkey, Parsis in India, and the Chinese

throughout the Pacific in this context (p. 9). Other social scientists have referred to the "middleman" role of the Japanese in the United States, the Asians of East Africa, and so on. Becker (1956) has offered the Jews as the epitome of the marginal trading people.

As Blalock (1967) pointed out, that which distinguished these groups is the economic role they came to play. Unlike most ethnic minorities, they occupy an intermediate rather than a low-status position. They are generally found in certain occupations, mainly trade and commerce, but also as labor contractor, rent collector, money lender, and broker. They play the role of middleman between producer and consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses (pp. 79-84).

Rinder (1958-59) argues that middleman groups arise in societies where there is a "status gap." Rinder defines a status gap as "the discontinuity, the yawning social void which occurs when superior and subordinate positions are not bridged by continuous, intermediate degrees of status." The "status gap" produces an economic gap because elites fear that through direct trade relationships "their prestige, their 'face,' their aura of superiority could be reduced" (p. 254).

Rinder (1958-59) points out that middleman minorities or people in the status gap are scapegoats *par excellence* (p. 253). According to Rinder, middleman minorities possess an important scapegoat feature in visibility.

> It does not matter whether these differentiating traits are cultural or biological; whether they have been voluntarily retained because of coercion from without; the resulting visibility is most important in identifying and isolating the scapegoat. (p. 257)

Another important characteristic that comes with life in the gap is vulnerability. The role of middleman easily becomes the role of "economic villain," especially at a time of economic crisis. For the "victims of adversity it is at least some comfort to explain their misfortune by attributing it to the evil machinations of villains rather than as a consequence of remote, complex and hardly comprehensible forces" (Rinder, 1958-59, p. 257).

Scapegoats, according to Rinder (1958-59), often deflect hostility away from the superior status group. "This is the classical function of the scapegoat, to attract and drain off in lightening-rod fashion, the hostility which might otherwise be more accurately directed toward different targets" (p. 258). This deflection of hostility onto the people in the gap is facilitated by the fact that they are more accessible. These people, unlike those of superior status, live in close proximity to their clientele.

Bonacich (1973) argues that, given the structural location of the middleman group, hostility from the host society is rational (p. 589). There is an inevitable conflict of interest between buyer and seller, renter and landlord, client and professional, to which middleman minorities, because they cluster in these occupations, become heir. A second general rationale for hostility arises from the solidarity of the middleman minority. Middleman groups are charged with being clannish, alien, and unassimilable.

However, even if there is a predisposition to hostility directed against middleman minorities, it does not automatically lead to violence. Here Waddington, Jones, and Critcher's (1989) notion of flashpoints is useful (p. 1).

They argue that in a context of economic and political deprivation, any incident can serve as a flashpoint for the outbreak of collective violence. Similar explanations have been invoked in American studies of the ghetto riots of the 1960s, with this type of incident described as "the match which lighted the powder keg" (Bowen & Masotti, 1968). Frequently, the actual flashpoint incident is only the latest one in a series of similar incidents, but to the extent that it crystallizes current feelings of discontent, it comes to be regarded as the "final straw" (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965, p. 888). Such metaphors implicitly recognize the existence of latent hostility based on a profound sense of grievance. In a context where the necessary conditions for ethnic conflict exist, any incident can serve as a flashpoint for the outbreak of ethnic collective violence.

Bonacich's (1973) model would benefit from further refinement. She argues that sojourning is a necessary condition of the middleman form. This condition generates particular economic and social consequences. The economic effects include a tendency toward thrift and a concentration in certain occupations (p. 585). The middleman minority uses its intermediate status and economic power to invest its time, talent, and resources in choosing select occupations, among them the independent professions, the shared characteristics of which are lateral mobility and liquidity. To expand its worth, the middleman minority practices personal thrift, even niggardliness, and delayed social gratification (Wong, 1985, p. 55).

Most Indian South Africans did not regard themselves as sojourners. In fact, their primary struggle was for full rights as South Africans. Large investments went into property, much to the chagrin of the white electorate. Fixed property is hardly a highly liquid form of asset holding. Indentured laborers overwhelmingly refused the free passage home at the end of indenture and sought a permanent stake in Natal. Few took advantage of the financial incentives offered as part of the Cape Town agreement to return to India. Sojourning then, it is argued, is not a necessary condition of the middleman form.

Issue must also be taken with Bonacich's (1973) assertion that the "same groups become middlemen wherever they go" (p. 588). Wong (1985) points out that this assertion means that the middleman minority is believed to be a group programmed by its cultural characteristics to occupy and fulfill its role in the society at large. In Bonacich's argument it is not social environments that determine the social position of those ethnic or racial groups who become middleman minorities but some predetermined inevitability (Wong, 1985, p. 56). It is this position that leads Bonacich to see the middleman form as limited to a very specific occupational and commercial group. Middleman minorities, we would argue, can have much more complex stratification structures. Thus, Indian ex-indentured laborers did not turn to trade or the professions but took up semi-skilled and supervisory positions in industries owned mainly by whites. It was those passenger Indians who came to South Africa of their own volition after 1875 who dominated trade. Later, many Indians turned to the "independent professions" to escape the legislative barriers that prevented expansion in the

commercial arena and upward mobility in the workplace. Middleman minorities can exhibit a much more complex social structure than Bonacich envisages.

Wong (1985) points to the arbitrariness with which the theory has been applied. He points to post-independence Southeast Asian countries where the diminution of the colonialist population has meant that the Chinese today are in a bilateral relationship with the various indigenous populations. However, there has been no serious re-evaluation of the status of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and they are still cast as a middleman minority. Similarly, a succession of Asian groups have been cast as a middleman minority in the United States without any specification of how such a group emerges in an ethnically heterogeneous society such as the United States.

In some post-colonial societies where whites constitute a significant settler minority with economic and political power, a triadic group configuration persists. In this context the middleman form can have validity. To reiterate, the middleman minority is not used here in Bonacich's sense of indicating a specific occupational and commercial grouping but simply as an intermediate grouping in the stratification system. This broadening of the middleman concept is useful for my own analysis as it more adequately captures the location of Indian South Africans within the economy and allows for an understanding of why broad sectors of the African population came to see Indians as an obstacle to their upward mobility. The concept of a middleman minority occupies an important place in the analysis to follow.

1.3.7 The Debate Over the Origin and Persist-ence of Ethnic Identification

Cultural pluralism continues to pervade the majority of nation-states. It is especially significant that this is not an exclusively "Third World" phenomenon (although this is primarily my focus in this section). Canada, Spain, Northern Ireland, and the unabating conflicts in Eastern Europe bear testimony to its worldwide existence. The heady pronouncements about the "inexorable integrative trends toward the national cores of the contemporary state system" no longer hold sway (Young, 1986, p. 115).

When the idea of nationalism began to prevail in Asia and Africa around the end of the nineteenth century, it was linked to an anti-imperial stance, and later in many instances to an anti-colonial revolt. Anti-colonial struggles were fought within the confines of territorial units structured by imperial partition, and it was these units that were inherited by the anti-colonial forces. The post-independence task then became one of "nation-building" and "national integration."

The post-independence zeal of nation-building was matched by a confidence that cultural pluralism would be quickly eradicated. This mood was epitomized by Sekou Toure of Guinea, who at the dawn of independence predicted that "in three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population" (Young, 1986, p. 127).

"Ethnicity, however, failed to cooperate with its many would-be-pall-bearers" (Vail, 1989, p. 2). One of the most cited interpretations of ethnicity is

that it was a construct of colonial governments and was foisted on subjected peoples to create and maintain divisions between them. This explanation was particularly attractive to progressive social scientists and political organizations in South Africa. They cited the South African government's Bantustan policies as an example of an attempt to "divide-and-rule."

There are many shortcomings in this attempt to explain the persistence of ethnic consciousness. It does not explain why, in a particular colonial state, where the same divide-and-rule policies were employed across the territory, an ethnic identity emerged more strongly among certain peoples than among others. It also paints African people as "empty vessels" who were duped by their colonial masters into accepting an ethnic identity. Finally, it does not explain how (long after the demise of colonialism and despite the strenuous efforts of African governments) ethnicity still prevails, and why in some areas it is beginning to emerge for the first time. "The clever blandishments of subtle European administrators are clearly insufficient to explain either the origins of ethnic consciousness or its continuing appeal today" (Vail, 1989, p. 4).

A second explanation had its origins in the Dual Economy model of "modernization" theory. Within this framework the work of Epstein (1958) and Mitchell (1958) pointed to the fact that as different cultural groups left their rural areas and interacted with each other in urban settings, a new ethnic consciousness emerged. It was in the urban setting that the various cultural groups developed stereotypes of themselves and others. This process was reinforced by employers favoring certain ethnic groups for particular types of

work and their deliberate use of ethnic differences to sow divisions within the workforce. This had the effect of building competition between ethnic groups into the hierarchically structured workforce. Thus, within this view, ethnicity was seen to have its roots in the modern urban workplace.

Vail (1989) points out that while this explanation is valuable because it emphasizes the notion that ethnic stereotypes mainly arose out of work situations and in urban settings, it still cannot serve as a general explanation of ethnicity's origin or, especially, its persistence (p. 4). Probably, the most obvious shortcoming of this explanation is the view that "rural Africa was preserved in some sort of 'traditional' pickle, antithetically opposed to 'modern' industrial Africa and largely untouched by the forces of change associated with capitalist expansion and urbanization" (Vail, 1989, p. 4). The work of Palmer and Parsons (1977) among others has debunked notions of the existence of "two Africas" isolated from each other. Rural areas in southern and central Africa, for example, did not remain untouched by historical changes. In fact, Vail points out that there is sufficient empirical evidence which demonstrates that "it is to the rural areas that one must look for most of the intellectual content of ethnic ideologies as they developed during the twentieth century in response to such change" (p. 5). This explanation also does not allow for the role of African intellectuals in retrieving and retelling stories of the "glorious past" which are crucial in defining ethnic identities and ethnic ideologies.

Third, there is an interpretation of the growth of ethnicity that points to the role of aspirant petty bourgeois groups. It is argued that with the imminent

demise of colonialism, petty bourgeois groups organized support along ethnic lines to ensure the advancement of their interests in the post-independence period. This secured the entrenchment of ethnic politics in many African countries.

This argument contributes to explaining why some cultural groups which had a "modernizing" petty bourgeoisie within them are more "tribal" than other groups within the same country which did not possess such a class. However, it is unable to account for ethnicity's appeal on its own.

> This is so because it goes too far in depicting ordinary people as being credulous, blindly accepting the ethnic party from their devious betters. It fails to explain why, today as in the colonial period, the ethnic message should find such resonance with ordinary people. Why, in short, have ordinary people chosen so often to support ethnic politicians rather than national politicians? (Vail, 1989, p. 5)

Finally, there is the primordialist explanation for the origin and persistence of ethnicity in Africa. This is a position held by Pierre van den Berghe (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for an evaluation of his work). Its continuing attraction is seen in two influential works on South Africa (Horowitz, 1991; Lijphart, 1988). This interpretation places people in accordance with inevitable, largely unselfconscious ascription: people belong to tribe X because they are born in tribe X and are, regardless of personal choice, characterized by the cultural traits of tribe X. Thus, one is a member of a tribe not by choice, but by destiny, and one thus partakes of a set of "proper" customs (Vail, 1989, p. 6).

A number of problems have been advanced with this interpretation. For one, this interpretation ignores the intellectual content of the ethnic message, the fact that it can change from group to group, and its uneven attractiveness among

different members of the same ethnic group. Also, by emphasizing the backward-looking, "primordial" aspect of ethnicity, this interpretation cannot account for the fact that the ethnic ideology has encapsulated within it a powerful acceptance of western education and skills and a willingness to "change with the times." "As an interpretation, the 'primordialist' explanation of ethnicity, on its own, is simply too ahistorical and non-specific to convince" (Vail, 1989, p. 6).

If one accepts that ethnicity is "quintessentially situational and multidimensional," then it becomes necessary "to accept that no one explanation suffices to 'explain' it wholly and in every instance" (Vail, 1989, p. 7). This study takes a lead from Vail in that it attempts to move the analysis of ethnicity beyond the more or less ahistorical stance of the current dominant interpretations towards a more specifically historical interpretation.

1.4 Explaining Collective Violence

A general shortcoming of sociological theories dealing with collective violence is that they are most often either excessively particular in their concern with inner-city riots or pitched at such a level of generality that the specifics of any piece of disorderly conduct is reduced to those elements that can be incorporated within a general theory of collective behavior. It would appear to me that one cannot attribute causation simplistically to a single factor. These grandiose claims have not been validated by empirical evidence. "Where not logically flawed to the extent of unfalsifiability, most of the theories appear to fit at least some sets of evidence. But all fall short of the rigorous requirement of accounting for variation in civil violence whenever and wherever it occurs" (Rule,

1988, p. 256). What we need to do is to accept that for civil violence "what appears as 'the same' effect may proceed from a variety of causes and that 'the same' causal influences may yield a variety of different effects in various settings" (Rule, 1988, p. 256).

Sociological *explanda* involve a range of explanations or theories. This does not mean that all theories are equally important. "What will appear as a key element of causation, as a basis for satisfying theory, will depend on the particular data under study and the interests of the analyst" (Rule, 1988, p. 258). It does not follow that all theories are valid "in their own terms." Theories of civil violence are invalidated, for example, if they specify conditions as necessary for the occurrence of violent episodes that in fact are not.

Rule (1988), building on the insights of Robert MacIver (1942) and Alan Garfinkel (1981), proposes that a model of theory and explanation suited to the peculiar and empirical constraints of social reality should at a minimum:

1. Identify connections—causal sequences or other durable associations—linking empirically falsifiable properties of social data, connections that can be shown to prevail throughout some range of instances;
2. Enable us to cite these empirical connections as bases for explanations for particular instances or groups of instances. (p. 230)

Theories of phenomena like civil violence involve uncovering dependency between the thing to be explained and another empirical influence or circumstance that holds not just in one case, but in a range of cases. However, this does not imply universal form and nonlimited scope. What we need to acknowledge is that "empirical connections in social systems may hold quite

widely, yet remain contingent on a host of contextual conditions, only some of which we can specify" (Rule, 1988, p. 234). What Rule is pointing to is the need to seek the *specific settings* in which a proposed explanatory factor may make the crucial difference between occurrence and the absence of the thing to be explained or its occurrence in varying forms.

Rule's position sensitizes us to the potential multiple explanations for civil violence. This does not mean that we need to explore every possible variable that contributes to an outbreak of civil violence. What we need to aim for are "theories of collective violence that specify particular connections that should apply in particular settings, drawing from the infinite range of logical possibilities those particular linkages that will matter empirically" (Rule, 1988, p. 264). A riot is a complex social phenomenon in which there often may be violent acts of several different types. Some may be spontaneous and consummatory, whereas others are planned as a means to specific ends. McPhail (1991) points out that most "students of the crowd [and of collective behavior] have proceeded to develop explanations for unanimous and homogeneous behavior, for phenomena that rarely occur and are short-lived, if and when they do occur" (p. xxviii). He argues persuasively that while people do behave collectively, "what they do together varies greatly in complexity, in duration and in the proportion of the gathering that actually participates" (p. xxviii). In short, heterogeneity is the rule rather than the exception (p. 221).

This position allowed for a more rigorous approach to collective behavior. As McPhail (1991) points out, previous "attempts to describe and explain the

crowd have been an impossibly large task to date. By breaking the task into smaller components, the problem is reduced to several tasks, each of more realistic proportions" (p. 185). This advice proved valuable. It allowed me to discern the different phases in the riots, the different targets, and the different motivations of the rioters.

1.5 Data and Methods

As pointed out in the previous section, civil violence is not a homogeneous phenomenon but is marked by diversity of types. Some parts of the riot may involve purposive, organized pursuit of collective interests, and others may be irrational acts by persons caught up in the emotional contagion of the mob. Different types of riots involve different antecedents. This study focuses on riots between a middleman minority and a majority in a context where both groupings are excluded from state power. It argues that two necessary conditions for conflict to emerge between the two groups are that the majority must perceive competition with the middleman as unfair, and there must be a lack of interdependence. If these two conditions exist, then any flashpoint can translate conflict into violence. The task is to explore the social, economic, and political relations between the two groups in order to ascertain whether the two conditions exist. In this regard, two methods have been widely used to study civil violence, the natural history and the value added approach. The approach in this study is distinguished from the natural history approach, which involves the claim that there exist certain empirical uniformities of sequence in the unfolding of an episode, and the value added approach, in which each determinant is a

necessary condition for the next to operate as a determinant in an episode of collective behavior.

This dissertation is based on case studies of the 1949 and 1985 riots. Case studies are useful because they allow for intensive research of single instances and therefore provide for great depth of information. However, one has to sacrifice the ability to generalize. Rather than testing hypotheses, case studies generate hypotheses and allow us to raise the right questions.

Much of the political violence in South Africa is simply given the label black-on-black violence or ethnic conflict. This is seen as a form of explanation. However, it is not enough to name an event and see it as a form of explanation. The challenge is to tell as much of the whole story as possible to understand a particular event or series of events, rather than just giving them a label such as ethnic conflict. We have to reveal relationships, fill in the gaps, provide a sense of history and process, and illustrate the circumstances giving rise to such events. The case study approach allows for empirical richness. A major part of the study is the historical narrative itself. In conducting the two case studies reported here, I utilized both primary and secondary data sources.

Skocpol (1984), commenting on the methodological basis of historical sociology, writes:

> Because wide-ranging comparisons are so often crucial for analytical historical sociologists, they are more likely to use secondary sources of evidence than those who apply models to, or develop interpretations of single cases. . . . From the point of view of historical sociology . . . a dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research--and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion--secondary

sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew. (p. 382)

Goldthorpe (1991) argues that Skocpol's position

shows the pressure that bears on grand historical sociologists to move towards the positivistic, Spencerian programme--"excellent" historical studies by specialists can be "the basic source of evidence" for the wide-ranging sociologist. Also revealing is the reference to "redoing the primary research"--as if it were apparent that the same result as before would necessarily emerge. (p. 226)

For Goldthorpe, in cases where sociologists need to conduct historical research, "they must be ready for a harder life--for research typically conducted, as one historian has put it, 'below the data poverty line'" (p. 226).

Following Goldthorpe, I have not relied solely on secondary sources, but have consulted primary material, as extensively as possible, so as to provide a further understanding of the riots. I have, however, also drawn upon secondary material where it offers direct value of its own or where no alternative was to hand.

There is a notable dearth of research both on the Durban region and on the political economy of Natal as a whole in the period between 1930 and 1950. In tracing a particular thread of Durban's social history, it has been necessary to negotiate the gaps in existing regional historiography and also to come to terms with some understanding of wider social, economic, political, and cultural processes.

In approaching this task, one is immediately confronted with the intractability of documentary sources. Since dominated classes have (understandably) seldom bequeathed written accounts of their experiences to

future generations, the historical track is made that much more difficult. In South Africa, when the lives of ordinary African people have had occasion to insinuate their way into official records, more often than not they appear as criminal statistics, fatalities in riots and industrial accidents, and, above all, as commodities of labor power.

The Durban Town Clerk's files, while sharing in the shortcomings of many official records, contain some valuable material. The files provided a detailed account of the administration of the Borough, but also yielded a vast range of written sources, mostly in the form of official and unofficial reports, petitions, resolutions of mass meetings, confidential police reports, and the like, which were highly suggestive of the nature of the lived experience of ordinary African people in Durban. The Report Books of Durban's Superintendent of Police and Durban's Magistrates and Criminal Court Records were also rich in information. The most useful of these were the Minutes of the Native Advisory Board, which provided some evidence of the ways in which Africans attempted to make collective decisions governing their lives. The 14 volumes of evidence to the Commission of Enquiry provided a wealth of information. Access was also gained to memoranda and press statements of the African National Congress and Natal Indian Congress. The major regional newspapers, including the Natal Daily News and Natal Mercury, were also consulted.

Wherever possible, these primary sources were cross-referenced in order to verify the information that was emerging. In turn, they were also assessed in relation to such secondary sources as do form part of the regional historiography.

In this way, an informal triangulation of cross-checking seemed to provide a sound sense of the veracity of both formal and nonformal primary sources.

Documentary materials such as these were complemented and supported by oral testimonies. Access was gained to interviews conducted by historian Iain Edwards as well as those collected by the now defunct Natal University Oral History Project. These latter interviews were conducted with residents of Cato Manor in the 1940s. The interviews were conducted with both leadership figures and ordinary residents. Through these interviews, insights were gained into everyday life in Cato Manor. The study also benefited from lengthy discussions with Dr. David Hemson, who has written a doctoral dissertation on dockworkers in the 1940s. It was possible, using these data, to validate much information within the oral tradition and between the oral and written sources.

For the 1985 violence, newspapers were used as the first line of information. However, this proved of limited value as a (partial) State of Emergency (restricting press reports) prevailed during this time. This meant that the information carried in newspapers was largely dependent on information supplied by the Police Division of Public Relations, the Office of the State President, and the Ministries of Law and Order, and Justice. The journal Indicator South Africa, which provided comprehensive accounts of the violence during the 1985 period, proved a valuable source. This allowed for the building of a chronology of events and for an amplification of the limited data contained in the press reports.

This dissertation benefited from having access to a study conducted by Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) immediately prior to the violence. The study was a social survey based on a rigorous random sampling of tenants in eight localities in Inanda. The 26 questions put to respondents covered four broad areas: life conditions (e.g., "What do you like most/least about living here?"), attitudes towards landlords (e.g., "Do you have any problems with your landlord?"), future developments (about improvements to living conditions, removals, and so on), and housing and population characteristics. Generally, answers in the first three categories revealed affective data—attitudes, opinions, and preferences, whereas those in the last category provided a more "factual" pool of information. A study conducted by the Surplus People's Project (SPP) (1983) provided valuable information on landlord-tenant relations. The SPP interviewed people who had opted for state-developed site service schemes. The interviews revealed tenant perceptions of their relations with landlords and insights into the socioeconomic conditions in the squatter settlements.

Access was gained to interviews conducted by the Institute of Black Research (of the University of Natal, Durban) with Inanda residents immediately after the violence. These interviews were done randomly, and sought African residents' perceptions of what caused the violence, whether there were strong anti-Indian violence sentiments before the violence, and who were the participants in the violence. Oral testimonies of Inanda residents conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research (of the University of Durban-Westville) a year after the violence were particularly useful. These interviews

targeted Indian and African landlords, warlords, and Inkatha and United Democratic Front leaders in the area. Lengthy discussions were held with academics who have research interests in Inanda. These academics included Dr. Michael Sutcliffe, Dr. Doug Hindson, Mark Byerley, and Maurice Makhatini, all based at the University of Durban-Westville.

A sample survey of perceptions of the 1985 riots undertaken by the Institute of Black Research also proved valuable. A sample of 408 respondents was drawn from the African, Indian, and colored townships in the greater Durban metropolitan area. Of the sample, 46.51% were Africans, 32.99% were Indians, and 20.49% were coloreds. The sample was randomly selected and devised to ensure a spatial spread of respondents. The interviews were conducted on the weekend beginning 23 August 1985, except for the African townships of Umlazi and Clermont, which were surveyed one week later.

The chronology and supporting data for the 1985 violence were, therefore, established using four major data sources: first, newspaper reports verified and amplified by information from the Indicator Project and its journal Indicator South Africa; second, a range of supportive data from empirical projects; third, oral data used (again) to verify and extend the empirical data; and finally, insights gleaned from expert consultation. Together, these sets of information provided a full and rich data base whose internal coherence could be checked with relative ease.

1.6 A Note on Terminology

African, Colored, White, Indian. Racial categories in South Africa are fraught with difficulty. Officially, for example, a black was defined as "a person

who is, or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa." The legislature was never able to define the colored category, other than negatively. A colored person is therefore part of a residual category: "a person who is not a White person or a Black" (Boberg, 1977, p. 99). With the rise of the Black Consciousness movement in the early 1970s under the leadership of Steve Biko, the official racial categories were rejected. While accepting that all South Africans were Africans, the Black Consciousness movement defined all those who were disenfranchised as black. This subsumed the categories African, Indian, and colored. It is for this reason that all speeches and writings of progressive politicians and academics were prefaced with the words "so-called coloreds." In this study, black refers to coloreds, Africans, and Indians. However, because apartheid entrenched real differences between the disenfranchised, the categories Indian, colored, and African have been acknowledged and utilized for analytical purposes. Colored refers to those of "mixed race," African to all indigenous Nguni-speaking South Africans, and Indian to all those who trace their ancestral heritage to the Indian subcontinent.

Black. A politically inspired progressive label used to describe Africans, coloreds, and Indians, i.e., all those who were discriminated against under the apartheid regime. Its origins lay in the Black Consciousness ideology, which attempted to unite other than white South Africans and make them feel proud of the label.

Xhosa. An Nguni language spoken by Africans living in the Eastern Cape (Transkei, Ciskei, etc.). The apartheid regime corralled Xhosa-speakers into two

separate homelands (Transkei, Ciskei) and gave them independence in 1976 and 1980, respectively.

Zulu. An Nguni language spoken mainly by Africans in Natal Province (KwaZulu and Natal). The apartheid regime attempted to set up an independent state (like Transkei) for Zulu speakers. This was rejected by KwaZulu's Chief Minister Buthelezi in favor of a high degree of autonomy over the police force, civil service, etc., within South Africa.

1.7 Summary

This chapter reviewed the previous work on the riots and the general literature on collective violence. The literature on ethnic competition and conflict was looked at with particular attention to the theory of middleman minorities. The studies on collective violence were found to be inadequate at a number of levels, especially at the level of seeking single causes for the outbreak of violence and treating riots as a single event. It was proposed that because riots are complex phenomena, it would be more productive to utilize a range of theories to study them. Also, because collective behavior almost invariably involves more heterogeneity of actions than is commonly assumed in the literature, it was suggested that the best way to study collective action is to break it up into smaller components.

Armed with the above theoretical insights, we now turn to the next chapter detailing the predisposing conditions to the 1949 and 1985 riots.

CHAPTER 2

PREDISPOSING CONDITIONS TO THE 1949 AND 1985 RIOTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by setting out the central features of, and outlining the most significant changes in, the political economy of Natal and (in its main port city) Durban during the period c1920-1950. Particular attention is paid to economic and political developments that had an impact on Indo-African relations.

The second part of the chapter examines developments in the political economy of Natal in the later period c1963-1985. A central focus of the chapter is an analysis of racial trends (Indian-African) in employment in this period. The political developments in the Indian and African communities in the 1980s are then discussed. An analysis of the crises in the policy of segregation and apartheid is undertaken for each period (the 1940s and the 1980s, respectively).

It is argued that these factors--the changes in the economic conditions in the respective periods, and their differential impact on Indians and Africans; the nature and character of political organizations formed or existing in Natal/Durban in the 1940s and 1980s, and the crises in segregation and apartheid in these years—constituted the major predisposing conditions to the 1949 and 1985 Indo-African riots.

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2.2 The Political Economy of Natal

In 1824 white settlers established a trading post in Durban. Within the next three decades Durban developed into a harbor town, which encouraged the expansion of secondary and tertiary economic activities. The former trading post experienced rapid expansion between 1870 and 1890, particularly in the shipping and allied industries. This was associated with increased production of raw materials, as well as diamonds and gold especially in the Northern cape and Transvaal (Swanson, 1968). Natal became a British colony in 1843.

British settlers found sugar-cane the most suitable crop for cultivation. However, from the outset they were plagued by labor shortages.

African labor could not be attracted on a consistent basis. African workers would often leave their place of employment for up to two months to look after their own crops. Frustrated, Natal planters turned to the idea of importing labor (Thompson, 1952).

It was the need for labor in Natal, especially on the sugar plantations, that led to the importation of indentured Indians into Natal. Upon the recommendation of the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir George Grey, the first group of Indian laborers arrived on 16 November 1860 (Meer, 1969, p. 10).

By the late 1870s, Indian immigrants consisted of three distinct groups: "indentured" immigrants who were under contract, "free" Indians who had completed their period of indentureship and who elected to remain in Natal rather than return to India, and "passenger" Indians who came to South Africa at their own cost (Bagwandeen, 1989, p. 4).

In looking at the shifts in the political economy of the region, one of the most significant in the post-First World War period was the growth in the urban population. The 1921 census reveals that 12% of Natal's population was urbanized. By 1951 the figure had leapt to 32%.

The urbanization of the Indian population was markedly rapid. In 1921, the figure stood at 21%. By 1951, the percentage of urbanized Indians stood at 74%. The percentage of Africans increased threefold, from 5% in 1921 to 16% in 1951 (Fair, 1982, p. 22). The move to the towns was motivated in part by the changes being wrought in the rural political economy of the region. Freund (1991a) has pointed out how Indian farming could not escape the twin pincers of legislation restricting access to the land and capitalist expansion and fell into decline. Similar processes squeezed out small-scale peasant or African tenant farming.

In the reserves where capitalist expansion was limited, a process of impoverishment had set in. Hemmed in by the 1913 Natives Land Act, the reserves came to be characterized by overpopulation, overcultivation, and overstocking. This degeneration was reflected in increasing male migrancy out of the reserves.

Industrialization also contributed to this urbanization process. (It is important not to postulate a "fit" between industrialization and urbanization. The latter grew at a much faster pace than the rate of industrial growth.) Industrialization was, in the main, centered within the greater Durban region. Thus, for example, by 1950, 70% of manufacturing employment in Natal was

concentrated in greater Durban (Burrows, 1959, p. 198). The central period of industrial expansion was in the 1940s. Stimulated by the war, Durban's economy continued to grow in the postwar period. There was growth in all the main manufacturing sectors--clothing, construction, chemicals, engineering, and food (Burrows, 1959, pp. 198-199).

The spread and growth of industrialization did not herald the birth of a full-blown proletarianization process. During the 1920s, migrancy characterized the labor force. This characteristic was reinforced by fluctuating labor demands of the docks linked to the level of shipping activity and the seasonal labor demand of the holiday trade. The growth of a manufacturing sector did not see the end of migrancy and the shift to more stabilized labor. An official government estimate for the year 1946 revealed that of the 104,100 or so Africans living in Durban, about 77,500 were migrants, and only 26,600 permanently urbanized (Kelly, 1989, p. 90). These figures must be read in the context that many African workers fell in the intermediate category of short-term migrants or weekly commuters. However, the persistence of migrancy, seemingly in defiance of the process of secondary industrialization, is remarkable.

The severing of ties with the rural areas was more complete among Indians. Between 1921 and 1946, the percentage of Indians employed in secondary industry rose from 9% to 21%. Employment of Indians in agriculture declined significantly in this period. Many Indian farmers and market gardeners also left the land as a result either of rising rents, lack of finance, a discriminatory

rail tariff, or lucrative opportunities in commerce and industry in the urban areas (Arkin, 1981, p. 171).

2.3 The City of Durban

The Natal region between 1920 and 1950 came to be characterized by a single major urban industrial center--Durban (see Map 2).

Kuper, Watts, and Davies (1958) have pointed to the unique racial composition of Durban compared to the other major cities in South Africa during this period. First, there was a high concentration of Indians within its boundaries: by the end of the 1940s, 40.16% of the total South African Indian population lived in Durban, as compared with 5.01% whites, 1.51% coloreds, and 1.57% Africans.[1] And second, whites, Indians, and Africans were represented in almost equal proportions (between 30% and 34%), with Indians as the largest group (Kuper et al., 1958, p. 50).

This numerical equality of the main racial groups in Durban was not reflected in their equal participation in the economic life of Durban. The 1951 census revealed the extent to which whites had come to dominate "white-collar" occupations. They made up 70.83% of the professional, technical, and related workforce; 67.57% of the managerial group; 86.31% of office workers, and 54.62% of salespersons. Of the black groups, only Indians constituted an appreciable proportion of workers in any of these categories--28.92% of the

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[1]These figures for Asiatics are based on the 1959 census. However, the number of Asiatics other than Indians, in South Africa as a whole is very small. The main migration of Indians was to Natal, and the restrictions on inter-provincial movement prevented them from leaving the province.

Map 2: Population distribution in Durban: Late 1940s-early 1950s.

managerial class and 36.72% of the salespersons. In each of the census categories pertaining to manual work, Africans provided a large proportion of workers, ranging from 38.45% in farming and fishing to 80.11% of service workers. The relatively poorly paid category of domestic servant was almost entirely African.[2] Kuper et al. (1958) pointed out that the census revealed that Indians participated in the economy of Durban at two levels--the white level of managers, salespersons, and employers, and the African level of manual work (pp. 64-65).

There was also a significant Indian trader community. Padayachee and Morrell (1991) point to two waves of Indian merchants. The first wave arrived some 10 to 15 years after the indentured Indians had arrived in 1860. They included very wealthy merchants as well as smaller traders. This second strand of smaller traders was later joined by a few formerly indentured laborers who had completed their contracts and managed to accumulate some capital. The second wave came to the fore in the post-World War I period. This wave marked a shift from wholesaling to retail trade. This group's activities were relatively more parochial, with direct importing from India, and international business ties, characteristic of the first wave, decreasing in importance (Padayachee & Morrell, 1991, p. 97). Padayachee and Morrell point out that because of the lack of

> white competition for Indian and African custom (by choice especially in the more remote rural areas), and African competition (by differentiated racial legislation and custom), the post-1914 Indian commercial sector (the second wave) was handed an "artificially protected market" in the

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[2]The figures are from Kuper et al. (1958), who draw on the 1951 census. Income data from Africans were not collected in the census.

racially segmented African and Indian retail and wholesale trade, especially in Natal. (p. 102)

"Race" was central to the "discourse of domination" (Boonzaier, 1988, pp. 58-67) in Durban. This manifested itself in a process that located whites at the pinnacle of a social hierarchy, Indians mid-way, and Africans at the base. However, these were not neatly compartmentalized groups. The groups were involved in complex interactions. Individual and communal life experiences and identities are influenced by social interaction at a number of levels. It is only through an understanding of the distinctive hierarchy of Durban which influenced the shaping of particular identities that we can move to an analysis of the causes of the 1949 riots. It is to this that we must now turn.

2.4   The Racial Hierarchy of Durban

This section analyzes the effects that the changes in Durban's political economy had on Indian-African relations. Central to this analysis are the developments in the labor market, housing, trade, and transport spheres.

2.4.1   Nonracialism and Segmented Labor Markets

Census figures showed a large increase in Durban's population between 1936 and 1951. This consisted of almost equal portions of Africans, Indians, and whites (Table 1).

The figures for Indians and whites show, in the main, the natural increase of a fully proletarianized population. Up until the mid-1930s, the majority of

Africans were male and migrant. Through the 1940s, the number of African

women increased substantially (Table 2).

Table 1

Population by Race, Metropolitan Durban, 1936-1951

Date	Africans	Indians	Coloreds	Whites	Total
1936	70,531	89,469	7,753	9,804	264,577
1946	113,612	117,065	11,449	130,143	372,269
1951	150,732	160,674	17,457	151,111	479,974

Source: Burrows, 1959b.

Table 2

Urban African Population by Gender, 1911-1951

Date	Male	Female	Total
1911	19,472	1,511	20,938
1921	38,438	6,345	44,783
1936	49,313	14,234	63,547
1946	82,268	30,068	112,336
1951	100,768	45,049	145,817

Source: Government Census; these figures are probably underestimates as official statistics have tended to underestimate the size of the urban population.

From Table 2 it can be seen that there was a significant increase of

African women between 1936 and 1946 (an increase of 15,834). There was also

a decreasing African masculinity rate. It decreased from 6.6:1 in 1921, to 3.4:1

In 1936, and to 2.1:1 in 1956 (Maasdorp & Humphreys, 1975, p. 10). Two main reasons have been advanced for the increased influx of African women.

> The first is economic and encompasses the effects of the breakdown of the subsistence reserve economies, which leaves women no alternative but to become migrants themselves. The second category encompasses personal reasons and involves the desire of women to live with their "migrant" husbands. (Creecy, 1979)

Benefiting from the increased markets brought on by the war and protection from foreign competition, the 1940s was a period of rapid economic growth. Manufacturing expanded significantly with an emphasis on capital intensity. Mechanization required a more stable workforce and also afforded opportunities for the employment of African women (Padayachee, Vawda, & Tichmann, 1985, pp. 13-14). This "permanency" in the urban areas also resulted from the erosion of the subsistence economy which meant "migrants" had nowhere else to go, a point captured poignantly by dockworkers leader, Zulu Phungula, in the following interchange:

> Controller of Industrial Manpower to leaders of dock workers: "If you do not wish to work for less than 8s a day, then, of course, you must go home and the other people will come and do the work." Zulu Phungula: "The Government must show us where to go because our homes are here in Durban." (Department of Labor File 1946, Minutes of Meeting, 11 March 1942; quoted in Hemson, 1977, p. 88)

The Indian population of Natal had become increasingly urbanized. In 1921, the percentage of Indians living in the urban areas of Natal was 54.8%. By 1946, the figure had risen to 68.0% (Arkin, 1981, p. 134).

> There was an upsurge in worker action during the early 1940s.

> While in the period between 1930 and 1939 a total of 26,254 Blacks had struck work for an average of 2.7 man days and a total loss of 71,078 man days, the corresponding figures for the period between 1940 and 1945

were 52,394 Black workers on strike for an average of 4.2 man days and a total loss of 220,205 man days. (Padayachee et al., 1985, p. 14)

Strike action in Durban took a particular form—it was characterized by the unified action of African and Indian workers who were mainly members of unions organized by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) (Hemson, 1977, pp. 100-101).

This nonracialism became evident in the 1937 strike at the Durban Falkirk Plant. Over 400 Indian and African workers struck because of the retrenchment of 16 members of their union, the then unrecognized Natal Iron and Steel Workers Union. The strikers were able to win most of their demands. The strike marked the start of Indian/African worker unity. This unity was important because with the number of African workers in the manufacturing industry growing, "a united working class was essential for strike action to be successful. Such unity in the paper-board making industry (where African workers were in the majority) and in the textile industry (where Indian workers were dominant) secured victories in both cases in 1942" (Hemson, 1977, pp. 100-101).

However, the response of employers to the Dunlop strike in December 1942 was to sow the seeds of racial conflict. The strike resulted from the dismissal of prominent members of the nonracial Natal Rubber Workers' Union, and the company's attempt to replace the Union with a "company" union. Both African and Indian workers supported the strike action. Management responded by recruiting African workers from the reserves. Union members were dismissed, and no more Indian workers were employed. Of the 378 African workers, 290 of them were dismissed. They were replaced by 581 new workers.

The defeat at Dunlop was to have a significant negative impact on the attempts at nonracial worker action (Edwards, 1986).

By the mid-1940s, this joint action had evaporated. It was replaced by a strong Africanist perspective. Thus, the Natal Federation of African Trade Unions, which had five unions affiliated to it in 1947, "would not accept as a member any union which had non-Natives in its members roll, or which had a political creed" (Hemson, 1977, p. 109).

There were a number of factors that militated against nonracial worker action. First, there were structural constraints. The labor market was racially stratified. Three racially stratified labor markets could be distinguished in the mid-1930s. White workers dominated skilled positions, while white, Indian, and colored workers competed for semi-skilled positions. Africans and Indians vied for unskilled jobs. The racially stratified markets were reinforced by a general employer outlook that the "nimbleness of mind and finger," the "stability" and "responsibility" of Indians set them apart for semi-skilled jobs, while the "robust physical strength" and "unreliability" of Africans made them "suited" to unskilled labor (Smith, 1950, pp. 453-455).

> African and Indian unskilled workers often worked alongside each other, especially in factories, but social conventions had developed which demarcated specific occupations "African" or "Indian." Stevedores, for example, were Africans, municipal street cleaners were Indians. Amongst Africans, occupations were often connected to homeboy networks; racial cleavages were overlaid with regional and ethnic affiliations. (Nuttall, n.d., p. 3)

The growth of the economy in the early 1940s did not alter the position of African workers substantially. Indian workers were evenly distributed among the

three skill groups—32.5% skilled, 31.7% semi-skilled, and 35.8% unskilled—as compared to whites (2.1% unskilled) and Africans (83.5% unskilled) (Padayachee et al., 1985, p. 38). By the late 1940s, "African" skill levels had not altered significantly, and job turnover continued to be high. The average annual income earned by Indians in the manufacturing sector was R306 as compared to Africans R192 and whites R760 (Arkin, 1981).

The Industrial Conciliation Act (IC) of 1924 militated against formal workplace unionism for Africans and created obstacles to nonracial worker organization. The IC Act prevented Africans from having access to registered unions. This legislation also allowed white, Indian, and colored members of registered unions to separate their interests from those of African workers. Despite the constraints, the CPSA, building on the need for manufacturing to have sections of the African workforce, settled in the urban areas, and victories achieved in the strikes over wages in 1937 facilitated the spread of nonracial unions. However, by 1942, there began a shift in CPSA tactics. They began placing emphasis on organizing "parallels" and supporting independent unions as opposed to unregistered nonracial unions.

The effects of the Dunlop strike of 1942 probably influenced the CPSA's shift. Nuttall (n.d.) argued that the tactical shift also reflected African-Indian tensions in the workplace and beyond, and the problems of persuading Indian workers to join unregistered unions (p. 30). Padayachee et al. (1985) point out that Indian workers brought a particular cultural baggage to the workplace (p. 150). They carried with them particular religious and traditional beliefs and

customs, which were often obstacles to the recognition and development of their class interests. Thus, Billy Peters (quoted in Padayachee et al., 1985), a leading CPSA and unionist during the 1940s, points out that

> Indian workers come into the [trade union] movement with supernatural beliefs--their background and environment--what they were fed with from youth. No matter how much of scientific knowledge you tried to equip them with, those religious and supernatural beliefs remained. They could not discard their past. From this path you ask them to adopt a revolutionary outlook. (p. 150)

The assessment that there were advantages to be gained from registered unions participating in Industrial Councils on behalf of African parallels and the emergence of African independent unions probably also influenced this shift. The independent unions barely survived beyond 1946. The parallels were concentrated in those industrial sectors where mechanization was advancing rapidly, and where new unions, affiliated to the Durban Trades and Labor Council, had emerged. These registered unions consisted of largely semi-skilled machine workers, who had a material interest in preventing undercutting by cheaper African labor. The greater the number of workers these unions represented, the stronger their position. For these reasons the new registered unions sought to organize and control unskilled African workers. Parallels had a longer life than the independent unions, surviving into the late 1940s.

Second, one must seek the demise of joint action in the response of organizations which influenced both the unions and the general political terrain. The political organizations within the Indian and African communities displayed a narrow outlook on racial cooperation.

A. W. G. Champion, the Chairperson of the Natal ANC, in giving evidence to the Rural Dealers Licensing Inquiry Committee of 1941, called on the committee to give preference to African applicants in African areas (Hemson, 1977, p. 108). In the same year, Anton Lembede, later one of the founders of the ANC Youth League, called on Africans to stop being the milk cow of the other racial groups, and become an economic and political force to be reckoned with. Followers of Lembede wanted Africans to favor their own businesses and cooperatives, and frequently quoted a Black American phrase, "Let the money circulate among the color line" (Kirk, 1983, p. 31).

In 1944, the ANC Youth League was formed. Their position was not very different from that of Champion's. In 1944, Jordan Ngubane (cited in Gerhart, 1979), one of the founders of the League, wrote in Unkundla ya Bantu, the official mouthpiece of the ANC:

> As long as the African people are not welded into a compact organized group ... they will never realise their rational aspiration. When they meet other non-European groups, they will be an unwieldy encumbrance, serving the purpose of being stepping stones for the better organized groups. (p. 75)

The ANC did not develop a mass base in Natal. In 1945, their membership totaled 700, and by 1947 it had grown to 3,000. By 1949, membership figures had dropped to 1,200 (Kirk, 1983, p. 35).

The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) displayed a similar racial narrowness in the early 1940s. Up to 1945, they were led by a conservative leadership of A. I. Kajee and P. R. Pather. Hemson (1977) accurately sums up the leadership of both Congresses in the early 1940s:

The direction of political action was more towards aggressive defense of the trading, investment, and residential rights of the Indian people (the African National Congress in Natal, led by A. W. G. Champion, at this time being virtually dormant and almost limited to a pressure group making the same demands for the African people). (p. 108)

Padayachee et al. (1985) have pointed out that rather than reinforcing the nonracial impulse of the workers during strike action, the NIC under Kajee highlighted sectional and racial divisions among the striking workers by concentrating on Indian workers as part of the Indian community (p. 132). Thus, during the 1937 Falkirk strike, Kajee (quoted in Padayachee et al., 1985) warned, "This is the turning point. We must demand justice from higher powers, not only for these Indians, but for all other Indians who are ground down. Let us remember that we are Indians first and everything else after" (p. 104).

By the mid-1940s, leadership of the NIC had been wrested away from the conservatives. The South African Indian Congress (which consisted of the NIC and Transvaal Indian Congress) was now led by a high-ranking Communist, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, and Dr. G. M. Naicker. Signaling a new approach, a pact was signed with the ANC. The Dadoo, Naicker, Zuma pact was a commitment to united action.

However, at the local level, the Pact was met with opposition. The misgivings of Msimang from the Natal ANC are captured by Gerhart (1979):

> The Pact, Msimang implied, reflected a spirit of cooperation only at the leadership level: Dr. Naicker, who had signed for the Natal Indians, "represents a province in which he had, insofar as my executive committee is aware, done nothing to foster the spirit of co-operation. . . . Our Executive Committee has refrained from declaring what it knows to be the universal feeling of the Africans in the Province as it would not like to hasten a rupture within the ranks of Congress." (p. 104)

Despite the shift to a more militant, aggressive, and less accommodationist politics of the NIC, distrust of the motives of the Indian politicians was voiced, especially by the trading section of the African petty bourgeoisie.[3]

In opposing "all forms of racial oppression experienced by the Indian people, the Indian class leadership was brought into direct support for mass campaigns taking up the demands of the Indian petty bourgeoisie, a group which had an exploitative relationship with the masses of the African people" (Hemson, 1977, p. 108). In any case, "the unity of African and Indian workers in Durban was distant and broad co-operation and collective organization of the early 1940's had disintegrated" (Hemson, 1977, p. 108).

The role of the CPSA (after 1953, the SACP) in the building of nonracial trade unions has already been noted. The CPA's eventual support for the allied war effort meant that the CPSA did not embrace the strike action of the period enthusiastically. CPSA members who held leadership positions in unions neglected the latter work and concentrated on the war effort. The CPA's "diversion into questions outside the immediate concerns of working class and trade union politics and the subsequently diminished support of the CPSA in the defense and development of working class organization meant that the vitally important task of establishing sound democratic organizational structures . . . suffered a serious setback" during the war years (Padayachee et al., 1985, p. 166).

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[3]For differing interpretations of the nature of this shift, see Ginwala (1974) and Padayachee et al. (1985).

During the war years, despite the split labor market, ethnic divides were breached and nonracial worker action proliferated. The rapid expansion of the economy meant that intense competition for jobs was minimized. Also, the erosion of structural divides was facilitated by the CPSA and union activists motivated both by the need for unity to ensure success in wage negotiations and a commitment to nonracialism as a means to counter the divisive tactics of the state. However, from the mid-1940s there was increasing hostility between African and Indian workers.

> African workers saw the expansion of industrial employment and upward mobility in certain industries and occupations (for example, municipal employment and weaving) as being blocked by Indian workers. The rapid expansion of employment in manufacturing during the war years to some extent obscured this problem, but with the downturn of economic growth in the immediate post-war period, the lines of demarcation became clearer. (Hemson, 1977, p. 103)

Indian semi-skilled workers, after the Second World War, threatened by cheaper African labor, turned to an inward-looking unionism. In the lower-paid jobs where Indians and Africans competed, the economic downturn increased the intensity. This competition and the perception that Indians had better chances of moving into higher-paid semi-skilled jobs meant that Africans increasingly came to see Indians as "collective competitors and targets of frustration, rather than as co-workers" (Nuttall, 1989, p. 7).

Before moving on, it is necessary to delve in more detail into an important strand in African political organization in Natal because it reveals a distinctively ethnic outlook. The late 1920s was a turbulent period in the region. In the countryside, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), led by Allison

Wessels George Champion, swept through the countryside organizing work stoppages and demands for increased wages (Bradford, 1987). In Durban, a 1929 beer-hall boycott saw mass participation. In 1930 the Communist Party led a pass-burning campaign on "Dingaan's Day" (la Hausse, 1984).

This heightened political militancy produced responses from state and capital that moved beyond short, sharp, and brutal repression. They came to see Zulu ethnic nationalism and traditionalism as a defusing mechanism to the rising tide of militancy. The old Zulu hierarchy, once perceived as a threat to the old colonial order, now came to be viewed as an instrument to be co-opted in defense of an expanding capitalist order (Cope, 1968, pp. 422-432). As Marks (1989) has shown, the turbulence of the 1920s led architects of segregation, such as Zululand MP G. N. Heaton-Nicholls, to espouse the need to nurture ethnic-based organization to defuse class-based organizations and class consciousness (p. 217). In 1938, the Zulu Cultural Society was founded. Its aim was to preserve and promote the culture and customs of the "Zulu nation." It was funded by the Native Affairs Department in Pretoria and had among its patrons the Zulu Regent Mshiyeni ka Dinizulu.

However, Zulu ethnic nationalism was not simply imposed from above. It found resonance among the royal and chiefly order, who saw it as a means to perpetuate or resurrect its status and power. It also ironically found support among the Christian converts (*amakholwa*), the intelligentsia, and small-scale entrepreneurs. Education and the accumulation of capital were seen by this grouping as a means to upward mobility. Like the Muslim merchants of the

1900s who sought to distinguish themselves from the "coolies," this grouping wanted to hive themselves off from the African working class. They wanted to be fully assimilated into civil society. However, expanding segregationist legislation put a lid on opportunities for capital accumulation and their incorporation into civil society. Their entrance into civil society blocked and segregation forcing them backwards into the arms of the African poor, many in this grouping turned in the 1930s to one of the many institutional forms through which a wide popular Zulu constituency began to be mobilized and an elite Zulu identity constructed (la Hausse, 1984).

In the 1930s, Zulu ethnic nationalism was beginning to have a broad appeal to the old chiefly order, some members of the African intelligentsia, and small-scale entrepreneurs. This shared identification with the reconstructed Zulu ethnic nationalism was not as extraordinary as it first appears, for "on many occasions the new elite were indeed the old in new guise, the sons of chiefs and the aristocracy having had preferential access to the resources necessary for the acquisition of education and modern skills" (Marks, 1978, pp. 190-191). Other actors also saw the power of ethnicity to attract a broader constituency. Bradford (1987) has shown how the ICU of Natal was distinguished from the national ICU by its appeal to a Zulu ethnic consciousness (pp. 101-103).

This reconstructed Zulu ethnic nationalism was to bear heavily on the politics of the region. As Marks has noted, despite the development in the 1940s of a powerful

> pan-South African nationalist feeling which was chanelled into a
> revitalised ANC . . . the inter-war flirtation by the Natal elite with ethnic

nationalism nonetheless left its legacy, and it remained a powerful force at different levels in society, mediating perceptions of and responses to at times traumatic social change. (pp. 223-224)

2.4.2 Property and Housing

A vigorous anti-Indianism from the white population had begun to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century. This anti-Indianism in Durban was translated into a series of by-laws that restricted Indian right to residence and trade (Pachai, 1979, pp. 30-35). The Durban Land Alienation Ordinance of 1922, for example, empowered the Durban City Council to restrict ownership or occupation of municipal property. When new areas were developed by the Council, Indians were prevented from acquiring sites through the use of the Ordinance (Bagwandeen, 1983, p. 20).

In order to escape these strictures, Indians began acquiring land outside the municipal boundaries. In 1933, these areas became incorporated into the municipality and became known as added areas.

While the City Council restricted Indians' right to trade and residence, they sought to ensure that Africans' stay in the urban areas was temporary. Formal accommodation for Africans was woefully inadequate. Since African workers were regarded as "temporary sojourners," much of the accommodation was designed for single men. As African women entered the urban areas, they had to seek alternative accommodation. By the early 1940s, the lack of formal housing was to reach crisis proportions. During this time, Justice F. N. Broome (quoted in Ladlau, 1975), in his report on "native" grievances, concluded that "the

paramount grievance of Durban natives is that there is not sufficient housing accommodation for them" (p. 11).

In the 1920s and 1930s, Africans began to turn to the Added Areas just as Indians did in the early part of the century. However, while the Indians turned to the land as owners, Africans turned to it for tenancy. So emerged the "black belt" around Durban, "hemming it on nearly every side" (Maylam, 1983, pp. 413-414). "[J]ust inland from the Berea Ridge, where perhaps the greatest concentration of Indian land ownership was found in Mayville–Cato Manor, market gardening gave way to shack renting, especially with the great expansion of the African urban population during and after the Second World War" (Freund, 1991a, p. 271).

Shack settlements offered benefits that the formal townships, like Lamont and Chesterville, could not. The latter were subject to strict control by municipal authorities. Shackland accommodation was cheap and in close proximity to work places. Also, as Maasdorp and Humphreys (1975) point out, it created opportunities for the development of the informal sector.

> With the steady flow of migrants requiring shelter, African building contractors made their appearance and erected shacks for the new arrivals. Others operated as unlicensed traders (mainly fresh produce and general dealers), or as hawkers or pedlars of meat and offal on the roadside; in some areas unlicensed "buying clubs" functioned as shops. Some elderly women took in washing and in areas with no fresh water supplies, water for drinking and cooking was purchased from African carriers. Backyard motor mechanics, painters and other self-employed artisans were also found. (Maasdorp & Humphreys, 1975, p. 15)

As Edwards (1989) has recently shown, Africans, far from being passive victims, responded creatively to the urbanization process.

The municipal authorities' response in the 1930s to Durban's shack settlements was guided by four fundamental concerns:

1. The needs of employers had to be met. This meant accommodation had to be provided close to places of work.
2. Housing had to be segregated from the residential areas of whites.
3. The elimination of slums of shacks.
4. The housing of Africans in formal, controlled accommodation. (Maylam, 1983, pp. 419-420)

The Council was aware that the shack settlements helped to alleviate their own inability to provide officially licensed accommodation. However, the Council was determined to take action because, in their view, "shantytowns created conditions which allowed for the unrestricted entry of Africans into the city, and posed alarming health, sanitation and policing problems (Edwards, 1989, p. 67).

"Action" proved to be difficult. There were legal constraints to demolishing shacks. "In 1943 the position was that a shack could not be demolished without a court order; and to obtain a court order it was necessary to show that alternative accommodation existed" (Maylam, 1983, p. 423).

Concerned about the potential of shackland growth, especially in the Cato Manor Farm area, the Council tried to control existing shack settlements. This hinged on a policy of "pegging." Shacks were numbered and enumerated. All shacks built after "pegging" were destroyed. However, this only led to a process of "shack shifting." People simply established new settlements, much to the chagrin of the Council, in more central areas of the city.

Alongside "pegging," the Council served notices on landlords in Cato Manor, ordering them to provide essential water and sanitation facilities. Landlords opted for paying fines as it was considered cheaper than providing

services. Others evicted tenants, which exacerbated the process of "shack shifting." Clearly, the Council failed to develop a coherent response to the need for African housing. What the Council's policy did do was to "produce a militant African shantytown population growing weary of being continuously on the move" (Edwards, 1989, p. 71).

While the Council grappled with the issues thrown up by African urbanization, agitation from whites to restrict Indian land-ownership continued. In reaction to this pressure, the Natal Provincial Administration proposed a plan to divide the city into Indian, African, and white settlements (Ninth Interim Report, 1945).

The 1946 Indian Land Tenure Act was designed to facilitate this process. The Cato Manor area, incorporating the African township of Chesterville, and the shack areas in close proximity were earmarked for Indian residence. The Umlazi Mission Reserve, south of the municipal boundary, was to rehouse African shack dwellers.

The 1946 Act regulated the acquisition and occupation of property in Natal in both rural and urban areas. The Act created two kinds of areas, Controlled and Uncontrolled. The Controlled was white, the Uncontrolled was Indian. If a member of the "Asiatic group" had owned property in the Controlled Area before 21 January 1946 but had not occupied it, he could not do so after 21 January. Commentators have pointed to the fact that this was the harshest legislation against Indians to date (Bagwandeen, 1983; Pachai, 1979).

The Act led to the inauguration of a passive resistance campaign that had popular support from the Indian community. One rally attracted over 15,000 people (Bagwandeen, 1983). Africans, on the other hand, saw the 1945 proposals and the 1946 Act as hurting mainly them. The city was being divided between Indians and whites.

While Indians faced discriminatory provisions with regard to property ownership, they were not as acute as those faced by Africans. The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act was one among a myriad of discriminatory provisions. By 1951, Africans owned only 0.1% of the value of Durban's immovable property (Kuper et al., 1958, p. 31).

The proposals placed further strictures on landownership for an aspirant middle class and had profound effects for the shack dwellers. Despite the unattractive living conditions in the shack areas, it had its positive features. It was in the shantytowns that municipal controls could largely be escaped, while jobs and the city were in close proximity. Many shack dwellers felt that they were sacrificing these advantages, so that Indians could move in (Riots Commission, 1949, evidence, pp. 224-242).

Large landlords had begun to emerge in Cato Manor. By 1945, Sayed Omar owned a portion of land on which there were 164 shacks occupied by about 1,000 tenants. Another landlord housed 1,200 tenants (Maylam, 1983, p. 418).

Constantly under threat from legislation, the Council, and Indian landlords, housing became a volatile issue. The shack dwellers were prepared to confront

the municipality. In September 1947, there was a march on City Hall after the Council had destroyed 50 shacks in Cato Manor. There marchers refused to move despite the threatened use of force by police. The City Council capitulated and agreed to rebuild the shacks. However, the potential of lines of fracture between Indians and Africans was always close.

2.4.3 Traders

There were numerous attempts to curtail the expansion of the Indian trader class. Use was made of the Natal Dealers Act of 1897.

The Licensing Officer of Durban told the Lange Commission in 1921 that "we do what we can to restrict further Indian Licences" (quoted in Arkin, 1981, p. 165). Thus, out of 2,026 applicants for new licenses by Indians between 1909 and 1919, 876 or 43% were granted. Out of the 1,509 white applications, 1,392 or 92% were granted (Arkin, 1981, p. 166). Despite this, the size of the Indian trading class rivaled that of whites, as Table 3 indicates.

Table 3

The Number and Proportion of Trading Licenses Held by
Race Groups in Durban, 1930-1946

Year	Whites		Indians		Africans	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1930	3,931	76.02	1,164	22.52	76	1.46
1946	6,731	54.29	5,327	42.98	339	2.73

Source: Arkin, 1981, p. 169.

Indians dominated "non-European" trade in Durban. This monopoly was helped by the effective exclusion of Indians and Africans from white shops by a combination of high prices and racist shopkeepers and customers. It was this dominance that was to see the anti-black-marketeer campaign of 1946 take a particular form.

Just after the Second World War, the Communist Party galvanized thousands of Indian and African workers into protesting against the escalating food prices and frequent food shortages. During the war there was a spectacular rise in the price of basic foodstuffs, and many black families were unable to purchase sufficient food. A survey of African school children during the war revealed that 40% of them were suffering from clinical malnutrition (Walker, 1983, pp. 70-72). After the war, prices continued to rise, accompanied by shortages. These shortages were often caused by manufacturers and wholesalers withholding supplies and the uncontrolled growth of black marketeering (The Guardian, 1 April 1946). Many traders who operated black-market enterprises did it in cahoots with the manufacturers, suppliers, or municipal inspectors appointed to stop such practices (The Guardian, 26 December 1946). Many general dealers charged double or more for other basic food (Ilanga lase Natal, 15 February 1947). Many in the Indian working class were suffering as a result of the increased prices. In Cato Manor, Indian workers would often walk from shack to shack selling the "juicy inside leaves of cabbages":

> After work they [Indians] would be around. Some would have gardens but not many. They were workers and they took the outside leaves for

themselves--you know a soup--water and leaves and boil it up with curry. They would offer us the inside for some money or whatever. (Interview with T. Shabalala, 31 June 1985; quoted in Edwards, 1989, p. 19)

Both white employers and the City Council reacted unsympathetically. Many Indian traders appeared more concerned. Some sought the assistance of the Communist Party to distribute basic foodstuffs at regulated prices (The Guardian, 6 July 1946). However, the chaotic conditions in the shops often led to accusations of overcharging or short-changing. These conflicts were inevitable and cannot merely be ascribed to traders' deliberate duplicity. However, these incidents provided further anti-Indian images which permeated important aspects of Africans' daily life (Edwards, 1989, p. 21).

In May 1946, the Communist Party began organizing food raids. The raids involved entering shops, searching for stockpiled products, and redistributing them.

Both Indians and Africans participated in this struggle. However, despite the fact that white traders were also involved in black-market activities, the campaign centered around Indian traders. There were probably three broad reasons for this. First, the state was more likely to intervene if white shopowners were raided. Widespread anti-Indianism among Durban's whites meant that the state would be less prone to act if only Indian traders were targeted. Second, Africans and Indians shopped, in the main, at Indian stores. This made mobilization easier. Third, leaders of the Natal Indian Congress (many of whom came from the ranks of the Communist Party) sought to use the campaign as a weapon against traders who supported conservative Indian politicians.

For Party members the campaign represented a "people's revolt." The events of January 1949 were to indicate that

> many African participants of the 1949 food campaign were drawing different conclusions to those reached by Party activists. For many participants in the campaign the chief benefit was the obtaining of scarce goods, a short-term gain. A key element in the success of direct action had been the threatened use of violence. If many drew the lesson that threats of collective violence were vital to achieving short-term goals, others would have been influenced by the rejection of legality implicit in the food campaign. Direct action by ordinary people went beyond constitutional protest politics and overturned legally entrenched property relations. (Edwards & Nuttall, 1990, p. 11)

What was also apparent was the absence of state intervention because Indian as opposed to white shops were involved. The "lessons" of the 1946 food campaigns were drawn upon in January 1949. Whereas in 1946 the shops were carefully selected, in 1949 the campaign was shorn of this sort of discipline.

From the 1930s, the Indian monopoly was challenged by an increasing number of aspirant African traders, hoping to take advantage of the rapidly expanding urban population and rising black real incomes between 1936 and 1947. Unable to raise capital because of property-ownership controls and coming up against the interests of established licensees, African traders argued that they should have exclusive trading rights over areas occupied predominantly by Africans (Torr, 1985, pp. 159-162). While this was government policy, African traders wanted it extended to include shack areas such as Cato Manor. As Indian traders moved to block competition from African traders, the latter turned to anti-Indian rhetoric. This anti-Indianism found resonance among the petty traders and thousands of consumers. Applications for pedlars' licenses, and the development of cooperative schemes, mushroomed in the late 1940s.

The period 1946 to 1950 was the time of the African cooperative movement. This movement was different from past attempts. It had distinctly political overtones. "During the late 1940s African workers saw the cooperatives not merely as a single element in their everyday lives, but the vital organizational structure through which they could commence the task of transforming their economic and political position in the city" (Edwards, 1989, p. 41).

Two economic principles underpinned the development of the cooperatives. While the notion of profit was not opposed, it revolved around the concept of an acceptable profit. This concept led to a militant critique of existing practices.

> Look, if you go into an Indian store and want to buy something you know that you are being cheated. The Indian also has a family and has to live but so does the African who works there. You knew your brothers were getting peanuts so you were getting cheated. (Interview with C. Khumalo, 7 July 1985; quoted in Edwards, 1989, p. 42)

The cooperative (it was believed) offered a means of gaining a foothold in the city's redistributive cycle of capital.

The second economic principle was that money, goods, and services should circulate as quickly as possible. "Workers should bring into the community as much of their salary as possible, and involve themselves in selling and buying. It was through this cycle of selling and buying that a community of workers, families and 'unemployed' would unite" (Edwards, 1989, p. 43).

The economic dimensions and radical aspects of the cooperative movement are seen in an article written by a cooperative leader:

> As an oppressed group there is a tendency, natural and understandable, to place too much accent on politics. In a sense this cannot be avoided.

> The vote, however useful it is, is not everything. There are other powerful forces at work besides the vote, one of them being economic power. The man who wields a financial whip is often the master, the ruler, the law. We therefore congratulate the growth of the Co-operative Movement in Durban. (*Ilanga lase Natal*, 16 August 1947)

For this cooperative leader, the cooperative movement was "much more powerful, in membership and accumulated funds, than the Congress" (*Ilanga lase Natal*, 16 August 1947).

"From its inception in the mid-1940's the popular cooperative movement had been a distinctively 'African,' and even more narrowly a 'Zulu' phenomenon, drawing racial, national and ethnic boundaries to advance material interests" (Edwards & Nuttall, 1990, p. 12).

Despite the efforts of African pedlars and cooperatives, Indian-owned shops in the shack areas and central business district continued to receive African customage. Indian shops had the attraction of credit bargaining over the prices, and goods packed in small quantities.

The Indian trader came to be seen as a barrier to African interests. As an African tearoom proprietor lamented, Indians only bought from Indians:

> The next door tea-room is Indian owned. . . . Africans are supposed to deal with Africans, but Africans go into the shop next door. I can't complain because I have an Indian landlord. So I share the Africans with him. But Indians only buy with him. . . . They are very particular to buy from their own people. (quoted in Kuper, 1965, p. 293)

African calls for Indian shopowners to employ Africans were ignored. Indian traders vociferously objected to the granting of sole trading rights to Africans in African residential areas. "For Africans, the force of ethnic consciousness in trade was clearly evident" (Edwards, 1989, p. 38).

2.4.4 Transport

In 1930, the Motor Carrier Transport Act was passed. The Act allowed for the "coordination and planning of motor transportation" at the local level, through the establishment of a Local Transportation Board (LRTB). It was hoped that the Act would prevent the expansion of small-time private bus operators.

However, rather than curtailing, the Act often strengthened the position of private operators. The Act enabled the holder of a motor carrier certificate, as an existing operator, to oppose the application of any would-be new operator who wanted to secure a certificate on a route which the established operator already served. The existing operator could also apply for more certificates for new services which might coordinate with their existing undertakings. The LRTB vetted applications and heard objections (Torr, 1985, pp. 4-5).

The LTRB could also curtail competition in those areas where there were no railways. As Stadler (1981) points out, in practice this meant that existing operators were protected and were greatly advantaged when trying to obtain more licenses. In Durban this meant the protection of Indian bus operators since they had established a hegemonic position in the 1920s.

In 1930, the Bus Owners' Association was set up. Membership consisted of one white and 104 Indian bus owners. No Africans were members. African ownership in Durban was restricted to four buses.

In the mid-1940s, the Durban City Council began trying to control the African transport system. However, the Bus Owners' Association successfully

frustrated these attempts. The Transport Enquiry Commission set up in the period reported that

> The private operators, through the Bus Owners' Association, have vigorously opposed any attempt by the City Council to encroach upon what they consider to be their rightful preserves in the matter of non-European passenger transportation, and have been very successful in their representations to the Local Transportation Board. (The Scott Baldwin Report, Provincial Notices Nos. 250 and 332, 1945, p. 60)

The City Council found an ally in the aspirant African petit-bourgeoisie. The latter realized that any attempt to break into the "transportation market" was predicated on the breaking of the Indian monopoly.

The attempt by the aspirant petit-bourgeoisie to enter the market was met with opposition by the Bus Owners' Association. This created hostility on both sides. As Torr (1985) notes, the constant refusal to African operators applying for licenses in favor of incumbent Indian bus operators "created tensions amongst members of the aspirant petit-bourgeoisie class" (p. 8). The superintendent at Lamontville warned in 1948 that "the native population were now becoming openly hostile to the Indian bus drivers who entered their location" (quoted in Torr, 1985, p. 8). Torr also points to tensions between Africans and Indians over the transport issue in other townships and locations. A Women's Committee in Clermont called for a quota policy to facilitate African enterprise in the face of entrenched Indian operators. This call was followed by the stoning of an Indian bus by about 70 women. When two licenses were obtained by Indians in the late 1940s to serve an almost exclusively African area, it was met with strong objections. The residents demanded that the municipality or an African be granted a license (Torr, 1985, p. 20).

Using the provisions of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, Indian bus operators managed to stave off the interventions of the City Council and the aspirant petit-bourgeoisie. The African working class had to undergo increased hardship as a result of the monopoly. For example, in Chesterville, a municipal by-law stopped any private bus service from entering the confines of the township.

> The Act and the Bus Owners' Association prevented the municipality from operating bus services to and from the township. The residents of Chesterville suffered the consequences of an inadequate bus service, as the buses available to them could only travel to the outskirts of the township, leaving them to walk the remainder of the way. (Torr, 1985, p. 9)

The service was erratic. On the often overcrowded buses,

> the payment and charging of fares was often a disputed business. . . . Physical violence on the buses was common. Such conditions affected African and Indian passengers alike, but they were commonly refracted through a racially-defined lens. (Nuttall, 1989, p. 14)

By the late 1940s, the provision of adequate bus facilities had become an intensely conflictual issue.

Developments in the labor market, housing, trade, and transport heightened Indian-African tensions. Spanning the entire African community, from workers to the aspirant African middle class and petty producers of commodities and services, Indians came to be seen as barriers to their upward mobility.

2.5 The Crisis of Segregation in the 1940s

The political structure that underpinned state policy from the 1920s was segregation (Wolpe, 1972, p. 432). The peculiar feature of this policy was the maintaining of a labor force that was migrant and temporary, returning to the

Reserves in between periods of work and retaining the means of production in the African economy or having claim to such means. The exploitation of migrant labor-power of this kind enabled the capitalist sector to secure an increased rate of surplus value. How is this effected?

When the migrant laborer has access to a means of subsistence outside the capitalist sector, as he has in South Africa, then the relationship between wages and the cost of the production and reproduction of labor-power is changed. That is to say, capital is able to pay the worker below the cost of his reproduction. In determining the level of wages necessary for the subsistence of the migrant worker and his family, account is taken of the fact that his family is supported, to some extent, from the product of agricultural production in the Reserves. It becomes possible to fix wages at the level of subsistence of the individual worker. The extended family in the Reserves is able to fulfill "social security" functions necessary for the reproduction of the migrant work force. By caring for the very old, the sick, and the migrant laborer in periods of "rest," and by educating the young and so on, the Reserve families relieve the capitalist sector and the State from the need to expend resources on these necessary functions (Wolpe, 1972, pp. 434-435).

In the early period of capitalist development in South Africa (the period of gold mining), the Reserve economy provided the major portion of Africans employed in capitalist production at any given moment, with supplementary subsistence and was thus a crucial condition of the reproduction of the migrant working class. The crucial function thus performed by the policy of segregation

was to maintain the productive capacity of the pre-capitalist economies and the social system of the African societies in order to ensure that these societies provided a portion of the means of reproduction of the migrant working class.

Through a combination of factors there emerged a decline in the productive capacity of the pre-capitalist economies. This resulted in a decrease in the agricultural product of the Reserves, which meant that the contribution of the Reserves towards the subsistence necessary for the reproduction of the labor force was diminished. This threatened to reduce the rate of surplus value through pressure on wages and posed, for capital, the problem of preventing a fall in the level of profit.

The system of producing a cheap migrant labor force generated rural impoverishment, while at the same time it enabled extremely low wages to be paid to Africans in the capitalist sector. But increasing rural impoverishment, since it removes that portion of the industrial workers' subsistence which is produced and consumed in the Reserves, also intensifies urban poverty. This two-fold effect of capitalist development has the potential to generate conflict, not only over wages, but also over all other aspects of urban and rural life. Clearly, the nature, form, and extent of actual conflicts generated by structural conditions will depend not only upon the measures of state control but on the complex conjuncture of political ideologies and organization, trade unions, the cohesion of the dominant sector, and so on. Although these may vary, what is stressed here is the tendency for these structural conditions which center on the system of cheap labor to generate conflicts (Wolpe, 1972, p. 444).

The Second World War produced a period of very rapid economic growth in South Africa; it saw massive expansion of industrial production, and the period also saw a rapid influx of Africans into the urban areas. The degeneration of the rural economy contributed to this surge into the urban areas. Despite a large group of workers having no agricultural subsidy to their wages, the state increased its efforts during the 1940s to force African workers to maintain their rural ties through proclamations requiring rural residents to return regularly to keep up their rights to land, through the establishment of "villages" for the landless, and also through the operation of the Urban Areas Act. This Act made it extremely difficult for African people not born in the urban areas to qualify for residence. Despite these regulations and policies, this period saw an acceleration in the number of African workers who brought their families to the urban areas and demanded the rights to urban working-class residence and a level of wages to the cost of the reproduction of their labor in urban conditions (Hemson, 1979, p. 342).

African workers struggling to maintain themselves and their families in urban conditions were under pressure from Native Administration officials, landowners threatening eviction, and declining real wages. They responded with militant struggles in the workplace and the community. Strike action increased, and thousands of African workers participated in squatters' movements and bus boycotts. There were militant rural struggles at Witzieshoek and in the Transkei (Davies, O'Meara, & Dlamini, 1984, pp. 17-18). These were some of the signs

of the growing assault on the whole society (and the structure of cheap labor power which underpinned it) which confronted the state in 1948.

In Durban, social services in black areas were largely ignored for the simple reason that white ratepayers alone were enfranchised. According to the prevailing ideology of Stallardism, all Africans were "temporary sojourners" in the white man's city, and small groups of Indian municipal voters that had existed had been disenfranchised in 1924. Stallard had led a Commission which reported in 1922 that the towns were the white man's preserve and that "the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister" (quoted in Davenport, 1969, p. 95).

In 1948, of the total African city population of 150,000 persons, there existed licensed municipal, Union Government, private employer and private nonemployer, and African-owned accommodation for 82,700 people. This accommodation was both incapable of satisfying the existing demand and the expected increase in the African population of the city (Durban Housing Survey).

By the late 1940s, there was official single accommodation for 654 African women in the Thokoza Municipal Hostel in Grey Street. The hostel was totally overcrowded and unhealthy. Facilities and conditions in the municipal and South African Railways and Harbour Services male hostels were possibly more unsatisfactory than conditions at Thokoza. Officially, the Somtseu Road Men's

Hostel could accommodate 4,456 people, but there were often up to 13,000 people crowded into the hostel (Durban Housing Survey, pp. 324-336).

In 1948, it was estimated that, of the total African population of Durban, 67,300 people had no official accommodation. Some lived in the backyard hovels in and around Durban, while the remainder lived in the shantytown sprawls. By the late 1940s, the densest, most popular area of shantytown settlement was in the Mkhumbane[4] area of Cato Manor Farm (Edwards, 1989, pp. 119-120).

In 1951, the average African family was estimated at 2.7 persons, while the average density of the Cato Manor Farm shantytown dwellings was 8.8 persons per shack. With regard to the provision of health facilities in African residential areas, it was openly admitted that municipal, provincial, and Union government health services had, to all intents and purposes, broken down (Broome Commission, memorandum to the Durban City Council, Chapter 3). For Africans moving between such residential areas and their places of work and other locales within the city, the transport system had long been inadequate. By the late 1940s, employers, among others, were calling for drastic changes to the local road transportation network as it affected African commuter traffic. Also, by the late 1940s, there were only 282 municipal-, Indian-, or African-owned buses available for African passengers, the two main African bus ranks, Warwick Avenue Market and Dalton Road, being overcrowded and disorganized

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[4]Mkhumbane was the name Africans in Durban used to refer to Cato Manor.

(Industrial Employers Association, Natal Section, Annual Report 1949-1950; Torr, 1985).

As late as 1948, a City Council Commission under Justice Broome had reported on appalling conditions in the locations and had recommended the immediate rehousing of 23,000 shack-dwellers as a matter of "social urgency." The Council disregarded this message of the high probability of social tension. The Council was aware that Durban's white ratepayers would not be prepared to foot the bill for rehousing. As long as the locations and compounds provided docile cheap labor, they were serving their function. Besides, although the Council had assumed formal control of these locations in 1931 when the municipal boundaries had been extended, they had never established any kind of *de facto* control, and these locations had developed their own subsystems to exercise social control. When order did break down the weekend of the riots, it was a case of the police and army establishing control in these areas for the first time rather than a case of their attempting to reestablish their authority.

The policy of segregation was in tatters by the end of the 1940s. The policy had generated rural impoverishment and intensified urban poverty. Forced into the margins of the city, Africans tenaciously hung onto the shantytowns as it was their only means of maintaining a toehold in the urban areas. Both the local and national state displayed an incapacity to deal with the surge of Africans into the cities.

Africans did not accept the appalling urban conditions passively. Where there was scope for leverage, African communities were quick to attempt either

to resist increased subsistence costs or to reduce the price of survival. In Johannesburg, the Alexandra bus boycotts of 1940 and 1945 and the squatters' movement of 1944 to 1947 stand out as epic mass struggles with the City Council (Lodge, 1985, pp. 13-15). In Durban, conflict was to take a different form.

The ruling United Party failed to develop a coherent alternative plan to segregation that could appeal to the white electorate. Originally formed in 1934 to organize together all sections of capital, it tried to appease all conflicting demands and adopted vacillating and extremely contradictory politics. The National Party was able to use the political space afforded by a political alliance under the banner of a militant Afrikaner nationalist ideology that ushered in the policy of apartheid.

2.6 The Intervening Years: Birth and Early Development of Apartheid (1950-1963)

The policy of apartheid developed as a response to this urban and rural challenge to the system. Within its framework, apartheid combined both institutionalizing and legitimating mechanisms and overwhelmingly coercive measures. At the most general level, that of control of the African political challenge, apartheid entailed the removal of the limited rights that Africans and "coloreds" had in the Parliamentary institutions of the White State; the revision of old and the introduction of a whole complex of new repressive laws which made illegal militant organized opposition—security police, the Bureau of State Security, the army, and police and army reserves. In the economic sphere,

measures were introduced to prevent or contain the accumulation of pressure on the level of wages.

With regard to labor, the National Party government enacted a variety of measures to maintain the circulation of African labor between the reserves and wage labor and to provide a basis for "rural urbanization." Amendments were made to African labor legislation to encourage a more efficient migrant labor system. Labor bureaus were established to direct the supply of labor, and tribal government was strengthened to reinforce controls over the industrial army of labor (Hemson, 1979, p. 356).

Black people responded to the apartheid onslaught with militant action. In 1949, the ANC adopted a new radical "Program of Action," which set out a policy of mass action, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience. This was followed in 1952 by the Defiance Campaign. Although the Defiance Campaign was eventually broken, it did have a number of positive political effects. It led to closer cooperation between the ANC and other political organizations, especially the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress (NIC and TIC). This created the conditions for the establishment of the Congress alliance and the series of mass mobilizing activities culminating in the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955. At the same time, the formation of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955 brought a greater level of unity to the struggle of militant trade unions (Davies et al., 1984, p. 26).

The widespread mobilization spearheaded by the Congress Alliance had its effects on the economy. The manufacturing industry, suffering from the

ravages of a militant workforce and the importation of cheap manufactured goods, "lurched from instability in the early 1950s into decline and ultimately crisis" (Innes, 1984, p. 173). By 1959, industrial output recorded a negative growth rate of 1.4% compared to a growth rate of 7.2% in 1954. Capital took fright and began to flee the country. By the end of 1960, South Africa faced a balance-of-payment crisis more severe than any experienced since 1932 (Innes, 1984, p. 173).

Faced by this mounting crisis, the state moved decisively into the economic and political spheres.

> Import controls were intensified, the bank rate was raised, foreign exchange facilities reduced, restrictions placed on the commercial banks' stock exchange dealings and, most important of all, in June 1961 the "Blocked Rand" system came into being (placing restriction both on the repatriation of capital by non-South African residents and on the remittance of funds abroad by South African residents). The effect of these combined measures was that by the end of 1961 a favorable balance of payments position (of R86m) had been achieved and by February 1962 the foreign exchange and gold reserves had recovered to over R316m. (Innes, 1984, p. 73)

At the same time, the state launched a campaign of sustained repression that resulted in the banning of the ANC and PAC and the effective crushing of black political resistance by 1963. The NIC, TIC, and SACTU, while not banned, were forced out of existence by the sheer weight of repression.

The crushing of political resistance ushered in the next phase of apartheid. This was marked by a ten-year uninterrupted boom. The immensity of the economic boom was indicated by the fact that, while the GDP increased by 5.2% between 1957 and 1962, it jumped to 9.3% between 1963 and 1968 (Innes, 1984, p. 188).

It was during this period that the state promoted advisory bodies for Indians and "coloreds." The role of the Bantustans changed. They became increasingly the dumping grounds for those workers made superfluous by the rapid mechanization of industry and agriculture. The Bantustans also began to assume a political role. In response to the demand for political rights for all, the Bantustans were to be prepared for "self-government" and eventual "independence." The African masses were to be told that political rights would be granted to them but only on a tribal basis in one of the ten so-called ethnic "homelands."

It was during this period that the policy of separate development was consolidated. The Group Areas Act was used to remove "black spots" in the white areas and strict racial residential separation came into being. Political aspirations of Indians and "coloreds" were to be met through advisory bodies and those of Africans within the Bantustans. Underpinning all this was a sophisticated state apparatus.

From the 1950s, there was a greater centralization of power with regard to urban policy. The central state increasingly took upon itself the task of regulating the presence of Africans in urban areas in accordance with government policy. At the same time as this process of centralization was occurring, controls over the presence of Africans in urban areas were steadily being tightened. Stricter influx control was to be the chief mechanism for achieving this. The measures were implemented with much zeal. For instance,

prosecutions under the pass laws increased from a total of about 280,200 in 1951 to about 631,300 in 1970 (Savage, 1986, pp. 194-195).

Hindson (1983) has argued that influx control after 1952 was simply not designed to enforce temporary migration. It also aimed to stabilize a section of the urban African proletariat, thereby reinforcing the differentiation between migrants and those with more permanent (Section 10) urban rights. This stabilization went hand in hand with another dimension of the state's attempt to tighten control over urban Africans—its housing policy.

State housing policies in the 1950s were designed to "remove black freehold rights in these areas, segregate the races, control movement and reduce the economic burden of blacks on the state and on local authorities" (Morris, 1981, p. 69). The principle of residential segregation was entrenched and rigidified in the 1950 Group Areas Act. The principle was put into practice with the construction of vast African townships. According to the "ideal," these townships were to be sited as far as possible from white residential areas, but reasonably close to industrial areas. Spatial segregation was to be reinforced by buffer zones and by natural or other barriers. And townships were to be designed and sited in such a way that they could be cordoned off in the event of a riot or rebellion, and the resistance suppressed in open streets (Maylam, 1990, pp. 69-70).

The combination of economic growth and repression facilitated a period of "social peace" as compared to the 1940s and 1950s. It was during this period

that the policy of apartheid was consolidated. However, by the mid-1970s the wheels were to start to come off.

2.7   The Political Economy of Natal/Durban (1963 to 1985)

Bell (1983) has pointed out that the South African labor market is unusually rigidly segmented on a regional basis, and each region has a distinctive racial structure (p. 26) (see Table 4).

Table 4

Racial Composition of Manufacturing Employment in
the Main Industrial Regions (%)

Region	Whites	Asians	Coloreds	Africans
Cape Peninsula	16.5	1.5	68.8	13.2
Durban	13.5	32.6	4.2	50.0
PWV Region	30.4	1.3	6.2	62.0

Source: Bell, 1983, p. 25.

As Table 4 shows, the colored proportion of the labor force is substantially higher in the Cape Peninsula than the Asian proportion in Durban-Pinetown. Indeed, the Durban-Pinetown region is unique in the country as a whole in that, in addition to the white component of its population, it has both a substantial proportion of Asians and a high proportion of Africans. By contrast, the Cape has a higher proportion of coloreds but a very small proportion of Africans; and the PWV region has the highest proportion of whites but also, among the three metropolitan centers, the largest proportion of Africans.

Table 5 shows that the period 1959-60 to 1976 was characterized by a general tendency for the proportion of Asian workers to increase.

Table 5

Racial Composition of the Labor Force:
Durban-Pinetown, 1960-1976 (%)

Date	Whites	Asians	Africans
1959-60	20.2	31.0	48.8
1967-68	16.9	35.2	47.9
1970	15.3	36.3	48.8
1972	14.2	35.5	50.3
1976	13.5	36.7	50.3

Source: Bell, 1983, p. 37; figures for coloreds were included with those of Asians.

The proportion of Indian workers increased from 31.0% in 1959-60 to 36.7% in 1976. African workers increased from 48.8% in 1959-60 to 50.3% in 1976. This increase in the African workforce was not accompanied by any reduction in the share of Indians in manufacturing employment in the region. There was also a general tendency for Asian workers to move upwards into more skilled occupations in the job hierarchy. Bell (1983) found that, in comparison with colored workers, who compete directly with and substitute for Africans rather than whites in the Cape Peninsula, Asians are in much more direct competition with whites than with Africans.

An important factor in the Asian propensity for upward mobility was that the level of educational attainment of the economically active Asian population was substantially higher than that of the other black groupings, as Table 6 indicates.

Table 6

Educational Attainment of the Economically Active
Population of South Africa, 1981 (%)

Education	Whites	Asians	Coloreds	Africans
No education	0.1	1.1	13.6	40.5
Primary	1.5	23.6	45.7	43.9
Standard 6 to 9	51.3	59.4	37.2	14.9
Standard 10	30.3	10.1	2.2	0.5
Degrees & diploma	16.8	5.8	1.3	0.2

Source: Bell, 1983, p. 54.

The structure of educational attainment of Asians was indeed closest to that of whites in 1981. While 10.1% of Asians had a Standard 10 education, only 2.2% of coloreds and 0.5% of Africans had reached the same level.

In the Durban-Pinetown area, it was Asians who penetrated the semi-skilled, technical, and nonmanual levels of the occupational hierarchy. Africans continued to predominate at the lower ends of the occupational hierarchy and suffered heavily as the economy contracted.

Indians continued to hold a significant proportion of trading in the Durban area, as Table 7 shows.

Table 7

The Number of Trading Licenses Held, by Race, in Durban, 1950-1975

Year	Whites		Indians		Africans		Total
	Actual	%	Actual	%	Actual	%	
1950	7,870	50.95	7,044	45.60	533	3.45	15,447
1955	9,617	53.83	7,728	43.26	519	2.91	17,869
1960	10,817	54.88	8,297	42.10	597	3.02	19,711
1963	10,913	53.75	8,661	42.65	731	3.60	20,305
1975	12,191	56.44	8,834	40.90	572	2.66	21,597

Source: Arkin, 1981, p. 293.

The press often highlights tales of success stories, workers who became entrepreneurs, such as F. Reddy, once a factory machinist. By 1982, he was the proprietor of a clothing factory with 600 workers (Natal Mercury, 1982 supplement). Mr. Moodley of Pietermaritzburg had, by that year, been able to advance in life from foreman to factory manager to shoe factory owner (Post Supplement, 16 November 1983). Sylvia Singh, a machinist made redundant in 1977, borrowed machines, got space from her old boss, and with an advance and cheap vinyl, began the successful manufacture of luggage (Fiat Lux, VI(5), 1982).

In manufacturing, the proportions of Indian ownerships, partnerships, and private companies all increased over the period 1959-60 to 1976. For the first two categories, the proportion grew from 12% to 14% of the white number. For private companies the proportion increased from 1.7% to 2.5%. Although the number of Indian-owned companies was very small by comparison to those owned by whites, Indians owned 86.5% of all non-white-owned private companies in 1976 (Arkin, 1989, p. 64).

In the 1940s, the Indian merchant was the most visible part of the Indian community. It was the merchant who came to define Indo-African relations because of the particular form that the interaction took. Beyond the merchant class and those who found stable jobs as semi-skilled operatives in the manufacturing industry, many Indians experienced extremely harsh and insecure living conditions. In 1943-44, more than 70% of Indians were estimated living at or below the poverty datum line, whereas 40% were so poor they could be called destitute (Ginwala, 1974, p. 303). In the 1940s, tuberculosis was still prevalent among the Indian working class. Diets were sparse, malnutrition was a serious issue, and most families were in debt. The Magazine Barracks, home to thousands of Indian municipal employees, opened in 1880. Before the First World War, it was condemned by the municipality as being not fit for human occupation, but it continued to exist for another half century. Conditions for railway workers and life in their barracks were as bad. Unemployment was endemic even in the best years the economy experienced (Freund, 1991b).

By the 1980s, the Indian working class had carved a greater space for itself in the greater Durban economy. It had secured itself a mid-level in the occupational hierarchy. By 1973, over 30% of Indian workers in manufacturing were estimated to be supervisors, artisans, or apprentices (Freund, 1991b). Unemployment had declined considerably. One report on the Indian labor supply in 1978 estimated that unemployment in the potentially economically active labor force was 3.3% for those over 25 and 5.5% if the 15-25 age group was included in the count. The merchant also continued to retain a significant place in Durban's economy.

With the economy growing rapidly in the 1960s and the black resistance movement in disarray, the state was well placed to implement the policies of apartheid. Central to these policies were the provisions of the Group Areas Act, which was used as a basis for the implementation of a comprehensive system of racial zoning (see Map 3). Indians were hard hit by the Group Areas Act, as Table 8 illustrates.

Table 8

The Number of Families Disqualified by the Group Areas Act,
by Race: 1950-1972

Race	No. of Families Resettled	No. of Families to Be Resettled	No. of Families Disqualified
White	1,513	135	1,648
Colored	44,855	27,538	72,393
Indian	27,694	10,641	38,335

Source: Arkin, 1984, p. 234.

Map 3: Population group areas in Greater Durban in the 1980s.

By 31 December 1972, 1,513 white, 44,855 colored, and 27,694 Indian families had been moved countrywide. By 1974, the Ministry of Community Development estimated that a total of 41,782 Indian families had been disqualified, some 276,000 people (Schlemmer, 1967).

One of the fundamental objectives of the Group Areas Act was to curb Indian trading. "The question of Asiatic traders in rural areas, very often in areas carrying a large native population, is causing much concern. There is no doubt that there are too many such traders and that their numbers should be reduced" (Report of the van der Merwe Commission, U.G. 49/50).

Numerous commentators have pointed out how Indian traders suffered under the Group Areas Act (Arkin, 1981; Maasdorp & Pillay, 1977). Maasdorp and Pillay found, in their fieldwork on the effects of the Group Areas Act, that it caused "considerable bitterness" in the Indian community (p. 169).

While not wanting to minimize the horrendous effects of the Group Areas Act and the psychological damage of apartheid, Indians clearly benefited during the apartheid years. They began more distinctively to resemble a middleman minority, albeit it taking a different form to Bonacich's model. Bonacich did not account for a middleman minority extending its role beyond trade with subordinate groups and coming to occupy a middleman position in the industrial sector dominated by white ownership.

Within the African community, a growing number of people enjoyed mobility and enlargement of their earning and spending capacity. From about 1973, African employment in the areas such as personnel relations, clerical and

design departments, foreman and supervisory positions increased. While mainly employed in junior positions, it did mean increased status and income for some. Sitas (1986) found in a sample of companies in the monopoly sector of Durban's economy that while only 2% of African employees held the above positions in the 1960s, by the 1980s the figure had grown to 10% (pp. 99-100). This group was joined by those who found employment in the enlarged state bureaucracies and urban homeland authority structures since the 1960s. Also, an expanding trader class found rich pickings in the racially exclusive market of the townships under the patronage of the KwaZulu government.

Probably the most striking feature of the economic structure of the African community was the growing unemployment and increasing poverty. The economic downswing beginning in the mid-1970s had a disastrous impact on Durban's African community. Between 1982 and 1985, there was a reduction of Durban's labor force by 20%. A 1983 selected sample of leading firms in each of Durban's industrial sectors showed dramatic cutbacks in employment. In many other firms, although levels of employment remained constant, large numbers of workers were put on short-time, which decreased earnings (Sitas, 1986, p. 99).

This growing unemployment was accompanied by the rapid spread of poverty. Youth unemployment spiraled, exacerbating the already intolerable living conditions in the townships. Sitas (1986) points to a study on youth unemployment that noted that "if for years no new entrants on the labor market were employed, if furthermore the young workers in employment were the first

to go, then . . . there is a pressing suspicion that the interrelationship between black youth, unemployment and underemployment is high" (p. 100). The study concluded that economic crisis had created a bitter generation of young unemployed people. Even those in employment oscillated from enforced casual labor in industry to the lower rungs of the grading hierarchies--to be laid off first, due to lack of experience (Sitas, 1986, p. 100).

Now that the economic structure of the Indian and African communities has been laid out, we need to turn to political developments. First, we need to focus on shopfloor relations between Indians and Africans. It was in this arena that many activists in the trade union and wider progressive movement felt a united working class cutting across racial divides could be forged.

2.8   Indo-African Relations on the Shopfloor

Carrim (1986) conducted 59 unstructured interviews with organizers and shop stewards of a cross-section of emergent and established trade unions in Natal in the early 1980s. This was done in order to develop an understanding of the relationship between Indian and African workers.

In looking at day-to-day relations, most of the African shop stewards felt that Indians were "very different" and pointed to cultural differences. They saw Indian workers as clannish in their relationships with Africans. Indian shop stewards also said that the Indian workers brought up the 1949 riots. Some of the African shop stewards thought that Indians were afraid of them: "They still got that . . . we can turn around against them. They are not free with us all the

time. We are free. . . . They still got that . . . you know, we can attack them" (Carrim, 1986, p. 55).

When shop stewards from progressive unions were asked why there were not more Indians in their unions, they pointed to the racial division of labor as the central obstacle. They said that Indians are more skilled and better paid and "nearer to management," so they did not feel the need to join unions, or at least did not see enough in common with lower-skilled African workers to belong to the same unions as they did. Where Indian workers belonged to unions, they seemed to prefer company unions or the established unions which did not confront management (Carrim, 1986, p. 46).

Many shop stewards thought that management deliberately fostered the racial division of labor. For example, it was pointed out that Indians were put "on staff" and paid monthly, while Africans were paid weekly. Marie (1986), in her research, found similar examples of bosses encouraging workers to see each other in racial terms. For example, management offered only Indian workers transport on a daily basis (p. 116). Many of Carrim's (1986) interviews pointed to management intimidation of Indian workers if they wanted to join unions: "Management is putting a fright in the Indian workers from joining the union. I have seen that. They want to join the union--but can't, because of management" (p. 47). This, though, still begs the question--why should Indian workers be more easily intimidated than African workers? Part of the answer must be attributed to the fact that Indian workers in general have much more to lose, with their better jobs and better pay. But also, because they are "nearer the management,"

they are probably more susceptible to its influence. They are more vulnerable, too, because they generally occupy an intermediate position, not just on the shopfloor but in some respects in wider society as well.

Coming into the 1980s, many Indian workers shunned the emergent progressive trade union movement and retained membership in the conservative Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA).

It is important now to look at political forces organizing in the Indian and African communities.

2.9   Political Organizations in the Indian Community

In 1964 the government set up the South African Indian Council (SAIC). In 1981 it became a fully elected body but continued to have purely advisory powers. In 1981, there was a massive boycott of the elections.[5] The SAIC came to espouse the interests of the Indian merchants. The strategy of the SAIC was to win concessions from the Indian trader class by emphasizing their acceptance of residential separation. Thus, Councilor A. M. Rajab was to state in October 1970 that

> the Group Areas Act was fundamentally designed to separate the races residentially in order to remove friction. To this the Indians have no objections. The Act, however, goes far beyond its original purpose and deprives hundreds of Indian traders of their livelihood on the grounds presumably that their presence created the possibilities of racial friction. (SAIC Memorandum, October 1970)

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[5]For history of the SAIC, see Desai (1987).

Also, many in the SAIC preferred supporting the South African government because of a fear of majority rule. Thus, the chairperson of the SAIC in 1972, H. E. Joosub, argued that

> [we] have to consider the several bloody riots in Natal . . . when large numbers of Indians were killed in Bantu fury. For those and other reasons we are not impressed by arguments used by expatriate organizations that we are stooges and that we should not in any way co-operate with the government. (p. 424)

Clearly, many of the merchants in the SAIC benefited from the sheltered markets provided by separate development, which meant, in the words of Joosub (1972), "apartheid is not always bad, however, much of the word may be used as a term of abuse against South Africa" (p. 424).

In 1984, the SAIC was replaced by the House of Delegates (HOD), a constituent of the tricameral parliament. The HOD continued the old SAIC tactic of attempting to win concessions by expressing allegiance to the National Party.

The other main strand existing in Indian politics was the Natal Indian Congress (NIC). The NIC rejected participation in government structures and sought political unity with the African majority. The NIC led the campaign to boycott the 1981 SAIC elections. However, it failed to develop a mass base and its politics remained reactive.

Despite its supposed nonracial nature, the NIC continually emphasized in its discourse its commitment to the "Indian people," "our community," "our people." For the NIC, the Indian community was a self-contained unit engaged in alliance politics with other communities (Singh & Vawda, 1988, p. 13). Thus, for Yacoob (1983), an NIC executive member,

that there are Indians, coloreds, Africans and whites (national groups) in our country is a self-evident and undeniable reality. It is a reality precisely because each of those national groups has its own heritage, culture, language, customs and traditions. (p. 7)

Since the State structured domination along racial and ethnic lines, the NIC's struggles involved mobilizing the Indian people against the State's actions. Nonracial action was limited, and when it occurred it was limited to interaction at the leadership level.

What the NIC and SAIC did contribute to was the "homogenization" of the Indian community. This process was also facilitated by the State's creation from the 1960s of large, exclusively Indian working-class suburbs in Durban. Indian working-class consciousness came to be bound with the future of these communities. Here community came to be defined in class and racial terms.

2.10 African Political Organizations

Inkatha was re-formed in 1975 to consolidate the power base of Chief Buthelezi and his supporters in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and to create Zulu unity on the basis of refusing independence but participating in the system of homeland government. For Inkatha, Zulus were a single nation, among other nations in South Africa. Inkatha's discourse emphasized Zulu dignity and the promise of cultural liberation. Often this Zulu nationalism was couched in an anti-Indianism (Mare & Hamilton, 1987).

Inkatha was able to develop a support base through a series of patronage systems. Traders, in order to ensure access to the lucrative racially exclusive markets of the townships, needed the support of the Inkatha-dominated advisory

boards and local councils. A bureaucratic petit-bourgeoisie of civil servants came to rely on homeland self-government for employment. In the hostels it exercised influence through patronage mediated by councilors and indunas.[6] Support was not only gained through patronage. Inkatha's revival of ancestral rituals, local justice systems, and the attempt to reinvigorate traditional familial relationships and discipline all had their own particular appeal to the urban proletariat. This appeal was facilitated by the fact that a significant number of the proletariat had active links with the rural areas (Schlemmer, 1985). Many were also newly urbanized, having entered the labor market in the 1960s for the first time. This went some way towards "explaining the stubborn survival of cultural formations, symbolism, and ideologies that betray(ed) a continuum between the country and city" (Sitas, 1986, p. 93).

However, Inkatha failed to develop a local leadership in the townships. By the early 1980s, its working-class support had no home in an Inkatha-aligned trade union movement. These factors contributed to its support being ephemeral. Its brutal suppression of the 1980 schools boycott had also alienated many in the townships. Inkatha orientation was to ensure stability in the townships. To this end, it opposed all forms of mass action. This meant it was always Janus-faced: part liberatory, part repressive.

By the early 1980s, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) emerged as the dominant trade union grouping in the region. Unlike

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[6]Indunas—councilor or headman appointed by a chief; African foreman of any band of workers.

the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in the 1950s, it chose an independent path and emphasized point-of-production organization based on shop steward leadership. It refrained from links with the black petit-bourgeoisie and community-oriented struggles.

Resident associations and student organizations existed with pockets of support in the African townships. It was the United Democratic Front, formed in 1983, that was to bring these groupings under one banner.

2.11   The UDF and the Building of Nonracialism

The UDF brought together all organizations, associations, and groups that were ready to oppose the State's reform policy on a popular democratic platform. There were two notable absentees from the Front—Inkatha and FOSATU.

The UDF led the opposition to the tricameral elections. However, the campaign remained an essentially NIC one. Because the HOD was directed at the Indian community, the UDF organized Indian opposition. Its appeals were couched in a language that appealed to the "Indian community." We see here how the State is able to compartmentalize opposition despite the best intentions of political organizations.

Beyond the opposition to the elections to the HOD, the UDF initiated no other mass action in Durban. Energy was directed at a national level, and the UDF "did not develop a coherent grassroots approach to consolidate its base. On the ground rather it and its affiliates became increasingly involved in conflict with Inkatha" (Sitas, 1986, p. 103). Alongside worsening relations with Inkatha, by 1985 the distance between the UDF and the unions had increased.

Most crucially, the launch of the UDF facilitated the beginnings of the comrades movement in Natal. Consisting of school pupils, young unemployed and employed people (under 35), they were at the helm of political struggle throughout the insurrection years of 1984 to 1986.

2.12 The Crisis of Apartheid--The 1980s

By the mid-1970s, the economic boom of the 1960s had petered out and was replaced by an acute economic recession. The period also saw a heightening of mass struggle on a number of fronts—armed struggle, the trade unions, and struggle by community, women's, students', and other organizations. The 1973 strikes and the 1976 uprising were probably the key events leading to the eventual near collapse of the main pillars of urban apartheid in the 1980s.

By the early 1980s, the level of control over urban Africans was weakening. The military came to replace municipal officials and Administration Board personnel as the agents of control in many townships.

Maylam (1990) points to the growth of shack settlements around the major urban areas in the 1980s as a further symptom of the weakening of state control (p. 81). Housing represented a form of control in itself. In the 1940s, shack settlements had mushroomed in South African cities. From the 1950s, the state began to clear these uncontrolled zones by moving their occupants into newly built townships. In the 1980s, there was a return again to the situation of the 1940s, although on a much larger scale. The state had lost control of the black housing situation, and in the process another pillar in the urban apartheid edifice began to crumble.

The fiscal base of urban apartheid also began to weaken. This had implications for the structures of co-option and collaboration. In 1977 the state passed the Community Councils Act. In contrast to their predecessors, the Community Councils were given some powers; the allocation of accommodations and trading sites and the maintenance of essential services were the most important ones. But the position of the Community Councils was severely circumscribed. Their powers were subject to the will and decisions of the minister. There was an uncertain division of power between the Community Councils and the Administration Boards. The fiscal base of the Councils was weak as employer levies and liquor profits still went to the Administration Boards. And the Councils, which tended to be dominated by businessmen and traders pursuing their own interests, lacked any real popular legitimacy, especially in the larger urban areas where council election polls often fell below 10% (Maylam, 1990, p. 83).

Community organizations also opposed the black local authorities. During June 1977, the Soweto Council and the Council at Dobsonville on the West Rand stopped operating when the majority of members resigned as a result of pressure from community organizations (Survey of Race Relations, 1977, p. 5). In 1980, community councils came under further attack from the mass protests centered around rent campaigns and education boycotts. So strong were these protests by the mid-1980s that yet another pillar in the urban apartheid edifice began to collapse.

Alongside this, the whole system of influx control was beginning to collapse. Influx control was a key mechanism for trying to realize the contradictory objectives of the State: the need to secure a suitable supply of labor while minimizing the presence of Africans in urban areas. It was a contradictory objective, calling for both the inclusion and exclusion of urban Africans. Maylam (1990) points out that there was a much more fundamental contradiction to the system of influx control (p. 72). The increasing displacement of the "surplus" urban population to the bantustans exacerbated overcrowding and poverty in those rural areas. This, in turn, put pressure on people to defy influx control by moving to urban areas, where there was a better chance of subsisting.

The state responded to the urban crisis with the Riekert Report in 1979. The Riekert Report represented a shift from strict Verwoerdian ideology by recognizing the right of urban Africans to remain in cities and towns of white South Africa. Riekert (cited in Hindson, 1987) argued that *de facto* permanence be acknowledged in law, not merely through administrative fiat (p. 83). This permanent proletariat would constitute a class of "urban insiders" who would be given preferential access to employment and housing. At the same time, stricter control would be exercised over the "outsiders," those without permanent urban rights (Maylam, 1990, p. 80).

However, Hindson (1987) has pointed out that attempts to implement the Riekert recommendations from 1979 to 1984 all met with failure.

The strategic aim of strengthening the division between urban and rural Africans was not achieved. The five years following the publication of the

Riekert Report, and especially the period of recession since mid-1982, witnessed the dramatic surfacing of structural conditions underlying territorial apartheid. The period was characterized by a deepening crisis of bantustan legitimacy, the exposure of desperate rural poverty, the flight of impoverished Africans from the countryside to the cities and the mushrooming of peri-urban squatter settlements inside and outside the bantustans. (p. 85)

The ultimate tendency was for the whole system to break down.

In Durban the general state policy was to facilitate the incorporation of African townships into KwaZulu. In early 1977, KwaZulu was declared a self-governing territory, and KwaMashu was incorporated into the bantustan shortly thereafter. In August 1973, administration of African townships passed from the Durban City Council to the newly constituted Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB)—one of 22 Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs) created throughout South Africa. In April 1984, the PNAB was succeeded by the Natalia Development Board (NDB).

State policy in the early 1980s was to "encourage" urban Africans living in "white" areas to relocate to the bantustans through a comprehensive bantustan "development" program. This program, according to Booth and Biyela (1988), relied upon two tactics--the promotion of housing in the bantustans and the freezing of housing development in "white" areas (p. 636). Bekker and Humphries (1985) point out, for example, that in 1982, 60% of the work load of the PNAB's Department of Technical Services (responsible for the development and maintenance of townships, infrastructure, housing projects, and other community facilities) was taken up with projects in KwaZulu (p. 36). On the other hand, in Lamont, situated in "white" Durban, for example, comprehensive

freezing strategies were employed from the early 1960s. These included a freeze on the acquisition of new land, a total halt on housing construction, and restricting occupancy of houses to rental basis only. In 1984, the Hankinson Commission, investigating housing in Natal, found that in the previous 22 years not one new dwelling had been provided in Lamont (Booth & Biyela, 1988, p. 636).

In 1977, a report for the church organization, Diakonia, described Lamont township as "a place fraught with problems—crime, alcoholism, illegitimacy, unemployment, fear, insecurity and pent-up frustrations. The township is just a dormitory, a place where you come back to sleep" (Daily News, 28 January 1977).

State policy led to an even further deterioration in material conditions in African townships in "white" areas in Natal. This deterioration was reinforced by a significant change in the financial fortunes of township administrations in "white" areas. Bekker and Humphries (1985) point out that while only 1 of the 22 Boards sustained a deficit in 1975-76, by 1982-83 only 3 of the 14 Boards were budgeting for a surplus. In 1979-80, the aggregate surplus on the Administration Boards' current accounts was R19,696,373, yet by 1982-83, the deficit stood at R32,140,057 (p. 132). The state was not prepared to intervene as it would have contradicted its aim of ensuring the townships were financially self-sufficient. Of course, any support would have negated its policy of freezing developments in "white" areas.

According to Booth and Biyela (1988), a third tactic (used to remove surplus African labor in "white" areas) involved raising the cost of urban residence (p. 637). This was done by increasing rents and costs of public transport and other services. The strategy was to force surplus members of the African urban population in "white" areas to relocate in the homelands as living in the towns was found to be economically difficult.

One of the consequences of this freezing of development in the formal townships was the growth of squatter settlements on the fringes of central Durban. One of the largest such settlements was at Inanda. Between 1966 and 1979, the population of Inanda grew by 137% (Schlemmer, 1985) and was to further increase by almost 400% between 1977 and 1985 to reach a population of about 250,000 in 1985 (Hughes, 1987).

While the material conditions in the formal townships had steadily deteriorated, conditions in the squatter settlements were much worse. Inanda was particularly hard hit because it was caught in limbo between KwaZulu and "white" South Africa. One survey revealed a lumpenproletariat of some 15% and an estimated 40% to 50% unemployment of the economically active population (Sitas, 1986, p. 101).

A more detailed focus on the conflictual relations that existed in Inanda and how they played themselves out will have to await the next chapter.

2.13 Squatter Settlements, Resistance, and Violence

It is significant that both riots took place in squatter settlements. In the settlements there were no formal authority structures. In the 1940s, this was

typical of all settlements. In the absence of any formal authority, new forms of combination were often created to ensure some measure of collective security. Many of the combinations were ethnically based. Authorities described violence in the squatter settlements as "faction fights" or "tribal wars." However, work by historians and sociologists has shown that these conflicts often reflected a struggle to secure the barest necessities of life--such as a job, or a roof over one's head--in a situation in which resources were in desperately short supply (Bonner & Lambert, 1987).

In Benoni, Transvaal, in the 1940s, intense competition was bred over what meager resources existed. Often this competition turned violent, especially over access to housing. Following a violent confrontation in 1949, the Township Superintendent commented,

> It is known but not proved that for some time these [gangsters] have extorted considerable sums of money from the unfortunate and gullible native people by every conceivable pretext such as the offer of physical and legal protection, housing material, representation to the Council, employment, etc. The outbreak of fighting is usually an indication that a rival racketeer is trying to gain control. (quoted in Bonner & Lambert, 1987, p. 346)

Among the most notorious of these gangs were the "Russians," who were distinguished by the Sotho blanket in which followers draped themselves. As these groups began to carve up the location into separate fiefdoms, so-called "faction fights" flared up. To begin with, conflict was located among rival factions of "Basotho" such as the Matsieng and Molapo. By August 1949, it had widened to embrace conflicts between "Xhosa" and "Basotho" (Bonner & Lambert, 1987, p. 345).

Bonner and Lambert's (1987) research into Benoni revealed, first, differentiation and layering of the African population whereby one sector was relatively more advantaged in terms of houses and jobs and, second, an introversion of competition and conflict along internal lines of fracture (p. 347). Often ethnicity and layering interpenetrated or overlapped. For example, in the 1949 riot between "Xhosas" and "Basotos," the Xhosas approached the emergency squatter camp from the direction of Wattsville, the squatter camp that was the emergency home of the more recently arrived Basotho. A similar, although not entirely analogous, context framed the fight of 1954, where the "Zulus" dominated the hostels at Benoni, while the "Russians" controlled the Indian section. Their central thesis was that the scale and rapidity of urbanization, the lack of basic services and resources, and the multiple lines of fracture in Benoni's urban population ensured that popular energies would be absorbed in communal struggles aimed at minimally meeting basic wants. Those same factors likewise inhibited sustained large-scale mobilization.

In squatter camps nearer central Johannesburg, squatter communities were prepared to engage in direct collective action against authorities that attempted to undermine their presence in the urban areas. This was facilitated by the fact that the camps were led by individual, powerful leaders. As Stadler (1979) has shown, these leaders issued squatter "permits" for a fee, they had an organization that regulated entry to the camps, expelled nonmembers, administered facilities, and punished offenders against regulations with fines and beatings (p. 105). All outsiders were subjected to their discipline, and they also

controlled trading in the areas and charged traders a fee for the right to enter the camps. "What particularly irked the Municipality was the way in which the movement displaced the state as the effective power in the areas under their control" (Stadler, 1979, p. 105).

What was central to the squatter movements was their determination to remain in the urban areas. The squatter camps made possible the consolidation of family life. The shantytowns also provided means beyond wage labor in which to acquire cash. In a context where many were not fully employed or were unemployed, this was particularly crucial. In Mkhumbane, for example, the range and assortment of activities was far more diverse than in any other single area of the city.

> From the selling of passes, often supplied from pickpockets operating on the busses to and from Mkhumbane, the making of leather belts, the collecting and selling of empty "White man's liquor" bottles, the dagga networks extending to Pondoland and northern Zululand, to fruit, vegetable and cooked meat vendors, to the shackshops and ubiquitous *sheebeen* queens. (Edwards, 1989, p. 83)

Shack settlements were more than just a response to housing shortages. As capitalist expansion and the tightening of central and local state controls served to close down various forms of urban space of subordinate groups, shack settlements served to open spaces. Durban's main shack settlement, Cato Manor, for example, enabled Africans to occupy a sizable portion of Durban's physical space in an area that was within easy commuting distance of both the southern industrial and the central business and residential network. Similarly, in Johannesburg, the local authorities responded to the massive increase in the number of black families in the urban areas by trying to drive them out of the

freehold areas within the municipal boundaries and the inner city. However, as Stadler (1979) notes, squatter movements successfully exploited the precarious opportunities presented during the Second World War to establish a viable community on Johannesburg's southern boundaries.

Over weekends, workers from hostels and barracks throughout the city flocked into the Mkhumbane to partake of diverse forms of entertainment on offer. Edwards (1989) argues that the circulation of money, goods, and services created a sense of unity and community in Mkhumbane (p. 84). According to Edwards, Mkhumbane's economy was based around the need for money to circulate rapidly within the shacklands. Together with the cooperatives, the main venue for the redistribution of money was the *stokvel*. The *stokvel* host would buy meat and alcohol and often hire musicians. People would move between various *stokvels*, the only constraints being the need to pay the required entrance fee and willingness to spend money. At the end of the *stokvel*, the master of ceremonies would give the host a list of how much each guest had spent. There was an extremely strong moral compulsion on the host to attend *stokvels* held by his guests and to spend equal if not larger amounts.

Shack settlements were a form of resistance. It was a resistance to Stallardism, which proposed that the right of Africans to be in urban areas rested solely on their willingness "to enter and minister to the needs of the white man" (quoted in Davenport, 1969, p. 95). It was a resistance to a system that sought to secure the labor-power of Africans while minimizing their presence as people.

Life in squatter settlements is particularly volatile because law, administrative regulation, and control over property are not determined by the apparatus of the central or the local state, for these are external to such areas. The local state does not intervene as a mechanism of allocation, access, distribution, or enforcement of rights to residential resources. These functions are based on the ability of social groupings in these areas to exercise localized control over the material resources central to urban reproduction and therefore to claim and enforce ownership of them. Even if these groupings have *de jure* ownership of land, they cannot rely on the repressive apparatus of the state to ensure that rents and levies are collected. Squatter leaders have to demonstrate their own capacity to ensure that rents are paid. Violence is thus inscribed in the very relations of reproduction, and consequently, it also breeds resentment, conflict, and resistance. This occurs not only between the dominant and dominated, between the employed and unemployed, but critically within the dominant shacklord grouping. Squatter leaders depend on sublieutenants or committees to exercise control, ensure community discipline, stifle dissent, and extract surplus. The considerable pecuniary gain and attraction of greater personal power encourage lieutenants to attempt to displace one another or hive off to form their own communities or indeed attempt to take ultimate power in the area. Squatter camps are often involved in power struggles at the center. The social relations of power are thus simultaneously characterized by volatility and stasis as the locus of power and control shifts around.

2.14 Summary

The chapter lays out the racial hierarchy that begins to emerge in the 1920s as urbanization gathers momentum. Whites locate themselves at the top, Indians in the middle, and Africans at the bottom. Africans and Indians compete at the levels of the labor market, housing, trade, and transport. Indians come to be perceived as blocking the upward mobility of Africans. Attempts at building interdependence through multiracial political and worker organizations fail. The competitive relations intensify as the economy contracts, and the policy of segregation collapses. The chapter then moves to the racial hierarchy of the city in the 1980s. It was found that Indians had consolidated themselves as a middleman minority. While some Africans enjoyed greater upward mobility, unemployment and poverty spiraled. It was Africans who were most hurt by the economic downswing in the latter part of the 1970s. Africans and Indians continued to compete for the scarce resources of jobs, trading opportunities, and land. This competition took place in the context of a militant challenge by Africans to the urban apartheid edifice. The intervening years had failed to build any interdependence between the two communities. Africans came to see Indians as privileged by the apartheid state and therefore competition with them as unfair. The final part of the chapter focuses on squatter settlements and how the social relations that prevail within them lend themselves to violence.

The central discussion in this chapter revolved around the emergence and then the gradual consolidation of a racial hierarchy and a racial competition since the 1940s. Evidence of this was found by looking at what was going on in the

economy at large, especially in the spheres of the labor market, housing, trade, and transport. An additional set of factors was looked at because of their impact on developing a racial hierarchy and competition. These factors were: the nature and character of the political economy itself, for example, rapid urbanization, industrialization, segmented markets; the role of the state's segregation policies; the role of the local state's interventions; and the part played by the fragmentary nature of politics in Durban (Natal Indian Congress, Zulu nationalism, and the like). Attempts to counter this in the form of nonracial trade unions and multiparty alliances were also pointed to.

A similar set of organizing categories was used for the 1980s--that is, the labor market, trade, and so on. In each of these, the role of the apartheid state, local state, and oppositional political groups was examined.

Both periods ended with a comparative analysis: in the late 1940s the breakdown of segregation and the emergence of apartheid and in the early to mid-1980s the breakdown of grand apartheid, and a lack of clarity about what is to emerge (the current conjuncture of uncertainty).

We now move from looking at the general sources of Indo-African antagonism and the conditions exacerbating them to a more particular attention to the character of the riots.

CHAPTER 3

THE RIOTS OF 1949 AND 1985

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, an analysis of the predisposing factors to the violence was undertaken. Here the more subjective issues that precipitated the violence in their specific locales are examined.

In this context, the first part of this chapter looks at the social relations in Cato Manor in the 1940s. This is followed by a discussion and analysis of the riot itself. Particular attention is paid to whether or not the riots were planned, the composition of the rioters, and whether it was anti-Indian or anti-apartheid. The second part of the chapter focuses on the history of Inanda and the events immediately preceding the riot. In the final section, an in-depth discussion of the 1985 violence is undertaken.

3.2 Cato Manor, The Center of the Storm

As documented in Chapter 2, the growth of squatter settlements around Durban was linked to the municipal authorities' refusal to accept permanent African residence. By the 1940s, the city's native policy was still geared towards a migrant labor system, based on service contract passes and single-sex hostels situated in the city center. Durban's highly restrictive African housing policy, however, made little impression on the scale of African settlement in the city.

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Starting in the 1920s, but escalating sharply from the late 1930s, thousands of rural immigrants began to rent shack sites. A central point of shack settlement became the predominantly Indian-owned Cato Manor area just west of the Berea ridge. The real growth of Cato Manor took place from the middle of the 1940s. By 1948, out of the more than 150,000 Africans officially believed to be resident, legally or illegally in the city, reliable estimates put the total African population of Cato Manor Farm at 29,000. By 1950, the African population of the area could have constituted approximately 20% of the total African population of the city (Edwards, 1989, p. 57).

Cato Manor was not just a demographic phenomenon. It was a contested space, the main focus of a specifically African struggle for land and urban rights in a city that had consistently denied these. Mkhumbane became a territorial and ideological symbol central to the squatter populism of the late 1940s. Influential Zionist preachers in the shantytowns referred to Mkhumbane as the "promised land."[7] Through both the cooperative movement and the emergence of new forms of squatter leadership, Cato Manor embodied alternative structures of economic and political power in the hostile city.

Relationships among Africans living in the Mkhumbane shack settlements were based around highly complex ownership and tenancy agreements. An individual shack cluster was often owned by a number of people, both Indian and African. Some of the African part-owners lived in this cluster, others not. Both

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[7]Zionism in this context does not refer to the attempt to reestablish a Jewish nation. The Church of Zion referred to here is an African church, with no links to the international Zionist movement.

owners and tenants sublet rooms. By the late 1940s, a process of differentiation had emerged between tenants and those now known as shacklords.

Leadership in Mkhumbane was often determined by a person's access to key material resources. But with the complex shack ownership and tenancy agreements evident in the Mkhumbane shacklands, there were many people who could claim such power. The major leaders of Mkhumbane emerged through a protracted struggle among the shackland residents. These were the "mayors" of Mkhumbane. Power was often gained through successfully reducing the authority of others during the course of battles over the control of space and resources in the shacklands. Battles were fought by shack residents who were organized into local vigilante forces. These were the *impis*, mainly comprised of the underclasses of Mkhumbane society. Receiving either payments of cash or kind or various forms of preferential treatment from leaders and shack residents, the authority of such bands ranged over much of Mkhumbane. However, these vigilante bands had a wider purpose. In many ways the protection of local areas was left to such groups. Through the *impis*, the shack residents asserted their desire to remain residents in a Mkhumbane not controlled by any unwanted external power. Shack leaders also gained influence through distributing patronage within their particular settlements and through their concern with the day-to-day problems of shack residents.

Influence within the shacklands was not, however, solely related to ability to control material resources or successfully mobilize and maintain support through either direct coercion or patronage. Respected persons were often

those who could explain to residents the power and future of the shantytown community. Among these were the leaders of the many militant Zionist groups that came to be established in Mkhumbane (Sundkler, 1976, p. 77). Many of the original members originated from the Charlestown area, an important Zionist shrine, and had moved into the shantytowns as a result of the Union Government's resettlement policy in northern Natal. Others appeared either to have followed or later become supporters of Esau Makatini, a Zionist descendant of the Le Fleur peasant family who had fought against white land acquisitions in the East Griqualand area and in South West Africa. Having a well-established liturgy, much of which was centered around the need for land, the Zionists gained widespread acceptance among people vigorously asserting the right to declare Mkhumbane their home (Sundkler, 1964).

Zionist priests constantly depicted the struggles of the Mkhumbane residents in terms of images directly lifted from the Old Testament and a past Zulu rural prosperity. Such leaders imbued residents with the means to both understand and legitimize their struggles within the city. Within a shackland community living on clearly contested terrain and, furthermore, both outside of direct chiefly authority and rejecting the leadership of the urban African elite, a new leadership defined the nature of shackland residents' struggles.

Women formed a very important constituency in Cato Manor. Women began to enter Durban in increasing numbers in the early 1900s. Those African women who did not take up domestic employment or register as washerwomen moved into prostitution or the informal brewing trade. In 1907 it was estimated

that a quarter of African women resident in Durban were involved in the beer trade (la Hausse, 1984, pp. 48-49).

It was not surprising that women played a significant part in opposing the municipality's monopoly over beer production and sales in the 1920s and 1930s. Brewing and prostitution provided the only real means of subsistence for African women who could not find work either as domestic servants or as washerwomen. Roughly one-tenth of the 10,000 African domestic servants were female. A few hundred women eked out a living as washerwomen, an occupation that by 1928 was virtually closed to Africans. African women tended to occupy a highly tenuous position within the town. For example, in the mid-1920s, police rounded up and "deported" hundreds of women who were, if not already brewing, all potential brewers (la Hausse, 1984, p. 137).

While African women felt the rigorous influx measures most forcefully, they also were the first to feel impoverishment in the rural areas of Natal. Rural impoverishment drove African women into Durban and its peri-urban surroundings. If they began brewing, they faced the repression of the Borough Police, who continued to raid shebeens[8] in support of the beer monopoly and the urban native policy to which it was allied.

Hounded out of the city center, women turned to the shacklands. The shacklands provided greater protection from the municipal authorities. Some women emerged as shebeen "queens." They employed men as bodyguards and

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[8]Shebeen—an establishment in which formerly illicit home-brewed beer was sold, or other beer was sold illicitly without a license, usually by African women known as *queens.*

for the various menial tasks so essential to illicit liquor manufacture. Likewise, women would be taken on for serving shebeen clientele. Children would be paid to collect empty bottles for liquor. For women, involvement in petty commodity production and exchange was vital to their survival as they had no access to established formal industrial and commercial employment. For men and women who, whether married or not, desired to live together, it was mainly in the shacklands that this was possible. Women developed a vital stake in maintaining Cato Manor as home. Importantly, they had already shown in the 1920s and 1930s a capacity for organized militant action.

Over weekends, the number of people in Cato Manor was swelled by male barrack and hostel dwellers. Most of them were dock workers who had a long history of resistance to their conditions of employment. Beyond the factory floor, dock workers had taken up wider economic and political issues (Hemson, 1979).

The hostel dwellers formed an important link between the struggles in the city center and Mkhumbane. It was mainly the hostel dwellers who brought stories of the attacks on Indian property and persons as they entered Cato Manor on the Friday after the rioting began.

The diversity of Cato Manor was unified under the rubric of the ideology of "New Africa." This was an ideology that was formulated in the factories and the African residential areas of Durban. While it is difficult to discern a consistent strand running through the ideology, "New Africa" was used to refer to the militancy of the later 1940s. "The ideology thrived on change, and change and redefinition became self-justifying" (Edwards, 1989, p. 12). "Within the political

culture of 'New Africa' were important notions of African ethnic unity, the acceptability of revenge, and a disrespect towards established notions of legality" (Edwards, 1989, p. 51).

Elgee (1981) has shown how an "ideology of vengeance" had developed from the early 1900s in Natal's rural locations. One of the central reasons for violence in rural areas was the diminishing access to land. Districts began to regard their territory and grazing facilities as sovereign entities, to be guarded and fought for in the event of encroachment by other districts. The increasing pressure of overpopulation generated a fierce competition within the tribe over grazing grounds and land for cultivation (Clegg, 1981, p. 188).

In Zulu martial thinking, fighting with sticks is considered as "playing," and, indeed, stick-fighting is referred to as *ukudlala ngenduku* (to play with sticks). In Zululand, "playing" between districts in the form of the *umgangela* took place after weddings.

There were rules to prevent serious injury or death. If a man was killed at an *umgangela*, the killer "has no court case" because they were both "playing" and it was an unfortunate accident. Clegg (1981) argues that, in a context of increasing competition for grazing grounds and land for cultivation, "play" fighting became impossible (pp. 188-189). Losing a "play" stick fight with another district immediately reflected on one's district's ability to protect and defend its estate. This was compounded by the fact that when a man was killed in such a clash, the dead man's district had to revenge his death, for to neglect to do so would give the killer's district the impression that the dead man's district was incapable

of standing together as a corporate group to protect its estate. If vengeance is not exacted, it will be said that the people of that district "have not built their homesteads firmly," which reflects on the district's "firmness." Clegg found that because feuding had its roots in boundary disputes and land-hunger, territorial affiliation to a district often overrode clan and even immediate family loyalty, if either lived in another district (p. 190). It was this notion of vengeance based on the need to defend or show the capacity to defend one's territory that was imported into the urban areas as part of the ideology of "New Africa."

"New Africa" was to take its own particular form in Mkhumbane. Running through the lives of the shantytown communities was their future in those areas. Wedged between municipal authority and the power of Indian landlords and traders, shack residents felt constantly threatened. It was the need for permanent residential facilities that translated into "a consciousness which was both defensive and highly aggressive" (Edwards, 1989, p. 77). This aggressiveness was imbued with a chauvinism that "produced a politically conservative form of millenarian populism which exaggerated the qualities of one's own perceived group and belittled and vilified the social norms of those perceived to be outsiders" (Edwards, 1989, p. 55).

For the residents of Mkhumbane, the "struggle" centered around making the area their permanent home. The fact that the land was in Indian hands constantly put their "permanency" under threat. This was exacerbated by municipal policy. Indian traders also blocked African aspirations to accumulate capital. Africans wanted exclusive trading rights in the shacklands. These

issues, when fused with the "millenarian populism" of the time, made for a constantly volatile situation.

For the municipality, the solution to the squatting "problem," especially at Cato Manor, would be found if Durban was allowed to acquire land at Umlazi for a new township. The threat of the shantytowns would be destroyed through physical removal to areas of formally controlled housing. The municipality saw the city being divided up into broad zones of white, African, and Indian settlements.

The 1946 Indian Land Tenure Act supported this vision. The Act had direct consequences for Africans in Durban. The Cato Manor district and other African shack areas were to become the exclusive preserve of Indians. Africans would also lose the municipally owned Chesterville township. The plan was to move Africans as far away from the city center as possible. In one broad sweep, Africans across the class spectrum were faced with their greatest threat: the wealthy few who had bought small sites in greater Cato Manor, the new African shacklords who had sprung up as intermediaries between landowners and tenants, the newly secure occupants of Chesterville township, and the thousands of squatters who were struggling to make "Mkhumbane our home."

Already within Cato Manor there was a thirst for more land. Both shacklords and tenants wanted to own whole shacks. Indian landowners and shackrenters were easily identifiable obstacles in the drive for more property. African material interests in the shacklands found common ground with those of the more established African elite, who had long sought to advance their

interests through segregationist rhetoric and anti-Indianism. "African" areas "belonged" to Africans and should be an exclusive preserve for "African" accumulation.

Municipal and state policy during the later 1940s had a crucial impact on anti-Indianism in African society. The municipality's legal campaigns against Indian landowners, and especially the 1946 legislation, propelled Indians into the no-man's-land between squatters and the authorities. Aspirant African landowners expressed their material interests and stood to gain political mileage by attacking specifically "Indian" interests. African political and clerical leaders popularized the view that the 1946 Acts divided the city between whites and Indians, and cast Africans out (Riots Commission 1949, Evidence, pp. 224-242).

In a very real sense, to Africans whose class positions ranged from those of aspirant landowners to *lumpen* squatters, Indians generally seemed to be favored by the 1946 legislation. The mass of Durban's Africans developed at least some material interest in anti-Indianism.

This was exacerbated by the National Party's campaign for the 1948 election, in which anti-Indianism was to reach new heights. C. R. Swart (later to be Minister of Justice) told audiences that Indians were "an undesirable and foreign element" and needed strict government supervision. Mr. Sauer (later Minister of Transport) promised: "We, as a Government, want to help you in Natal. . . . The government will not allow one part of the Union to become dominated by an Eastern Philosophy" (Durban Town Clerk's Files, 10 November 1948).

The National Party's election manifesto stated that "the Party will strive to repatriate or move elsewhere as many Indians as possible; the present ban on Indian immigration, inter-provincial movement and penetration will remain and be more stringently maintained" (Ginwala, 1974, p. 134).

Official speeches are not, of course, read by the participants in the riots, but official attitudes filter through into popular consciousness and set the limits within which people feel permitted to act. Senator Lowen described it as follows:

> Statements made during the recent campaigning for elections to the Senate had created strained relations. The withdrawal of family allowances and pensions of Indians and the continued and deliberate stigmatizing of Indians by such allegations that they were an undesirable element and that they should be repatriated had created conditions which led to the attack. . . . Speeches by Government Ministers such as Schoemann, Swart, Jansen and Malan propagated hatred against the Indians by the Europeans and the Native and greatly enhanced the likelihood of such an explosion. (quoted in Webster, 1978)

The United Party MP Stuart put it equally bluntly:

> When you spend the whole of the last year talking about going to deport all Indians and how the Indian is gong to be eliminated, how he is going to be wiped out . . . the impression must necessarily arise among the less educated that as the Indian is going to be wiped out it is a pleasure to help wherever the opportunity occurs. That is the first fruits of loose talking on race relations. (Kirkwood & Webb, Evidence to Inquiry)

During the late 1940s, various forces interacted to foster and generalize anti-Indianism among Africans: the daily experiences of Africans as squatters, consumers, and commuters; the tenor of African political rhetoric; and the state's differential policies towards Indians and Africans. The housing and land question, more than any other in Durban's black politics of the 1940s, brought African-Indian relations to the fore. This flowed from Durban's historical policies,

from racial patterns of settlement, from state intervention during the 1940s, and from distinctly communal mobilization by Africans and Indians.

3.3 The 1949 "Disorders"

While there were potentially numerous points of conflict between African and Indian, there were no indications during early January 1949 of there being an "explosion." What was the "spark" that set off the conflict?

3.3.1 The "Spark"

On Thursday, 13 January 1949, an Indian shopkeeper assaulted an African youth, George Madondo. While the injury was not serious, there was a lot of blood. Although violence was not abnormal in that part of the world, the incident took place in a potentially volatile context. It happened in the vicinity of a crowded Victoria Street, in close proximity to the central bus depot, where thousands of Africans and Indians congregated before making their way home. Victoria Street was a particularly busy area, for it contained numerous market stalls and Durban's largest "Native" beer hall. The incident took place on Thursday, the traditional day off for male domestic workers, many of whom would have congregated at the beer hall.

The domestic servants could have been the key factor triggering the collective violence. They were part of the *amalaita* gangs, famed for their stick-fighting abilities. There were some 20,000 male domestic workers in Durban at the time (Burrows, 1959, pp. 150-152). Seeing the bloodied figure of Madondo,

the *amalaitas* probably responded. The initial confrontation, the assault on an African youth by an Indian man,

> merged with the corporate grievances and frustrations to focus African anger on key symbols in the race hierarchy: Indian shops and buses. . . . In the heat of the moment, Indian individuals became targets, corporately associated with "Indian" symbols. (Nuttall, 1989, pp. 19-20)

Within minutes, Victoria Street became a cauldron of violent confrontation. Shops were looted, and buses were peppered with stones and other missiles. There were already signs that the State would not be overly keen to protect Indian property. Through the 1940s, white municipal politics was geared to placing a barrier on Indian property rights. This position coalesced with the newly elected 1948 Nationalist government, who announced their intention to repatriate Indians.

The police took little action to protect Indian property and individuals being attacked. By Thursday night, 48 Indians and 4 Africans received hospital treatment for riot injuries. By 11 p.m., the looting began to peter out. That night in the hostel dormitories and shacklands, the events of the day were undoubtedly keenly discussed.

Of course, the story-telling was mixed with rumor. Madondo's head, it was claimed, was cut off and placed in a mosque. In fact, Madondo had been treated at a hospital and discharged. More important, the message that was probably spread was that there were "easy pickings" at shops in the Indian commercial center. In the large hostels at Somtseu Road (8,000 residents) and Bell Street (1,500 residents), plans were apparently hatched for another attack on the Indian shopping center during the lunch hour of Friday, 14 January. "Runners" spread

these plans to all the hostels, as far north as the Coronation Brick and Tile compound on the banks of the Umgeni.[9] A city hostel manager was to remark subsequently that the levels of anger and excitement of the residents were unprecedented. While there was no formal organization, it was the informal social networks of the hostels and workplaces that came to the fore in this period.

At lunchtime on Friday, some 2,000 Africans converged on the Indian commercial center. The police, having heard the rumor, had increased their number with white civilians, armed with batons. However, policing was difficult as the crowd had broken up and the looting was carried out in small groups.

Individual Indians were robbed. All the while white onlookers gathered, their inaction probably seen as approval. Some even joined the looting. White shops close by were not touched. "The 'rules of the riot,' developed the day before, had been rapidly learnt; confine assaults to Indians to avoid the full deployment of white power" (Nuttall, 1989, p. 22). In the afternoon, looting of shops in Umgeni and South Coast Roads began.

Photographs of the rioters are revealing of who they were. They were overwhelmingly young men who wore the clothes of employed workers and petty traders rather than those of the unemployed lumpenproletarians (Natal Archives, 3/Durban 4/1/3/1580.323 B, 2: Durban City Corporation memo to Riots Commission, 11 March 1949).

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[9]Edwards and Nuttall (1990, p. 25) have noted that similar ways of organizing operated just as effectively during the 1973 Durban strikes, and migrants' attacks on the residential area of KwaMashu during the 1980 school boycott in Durban. (Plans of the attack were to spread to other hostels.)

3.3.2 The Second Phase

At 4 p.m. on Friday, about 1,000 Somtseu Road hostel residents moved towards the city center. Their focus of attack was once again the Indian shopping area. The authorities, however, were beginning to perceive the strong possibilities of the violence encroaching on the white areas. The riots were showing distinct signs of challenging white authority itself (Riot Commission 1949, Evidence, G. Bestford, pp. 31-54; Natal Mercury, 17 January 1949). The police met the mass just as they were entering the Indian area. When warning shots were ignored, the police fired into the crowd. Four people died on the scene, and the crowd rapidly dispersed.

As news of the police shootings spread, the focus of the riots shifted to the shack areas, especially Cato Manor. It was on Friday night, in the shack areas, that the massacres, the burnings, and rapes were to take place.

The layout of the shack areas created a number of problems for the police. The shacks were located on steep slopes, in tight clusters, the clusters separated by dense bush. Roads were few. All this the residents were aware of, for they knew the police raiding parties had to operate in small numbers to be effective. The residents of the city hostels attracted to the shebeens of Cato Manor over weekends also knew the terrain well. Unlike Somtseu Road, the police would not be able to confront the rioters as a single cohesive force.

Friday night was to see the Jacobs area and especially Cato Manor engulfed in violence. Indian houses and shops were destroyed, and many

Indians were killed or assaulted. While some Africans tried to protect Indian families and property, these were a minority.

The intensity of the attack had completely destroyed the Indian presence in Cato Manor designated for them by the authorities. The only state building in Cato Manor, the post office, was destroyed. If there had been others, they probably would have met the same fate.

Late on Friday night, the police began to respond. It was probably the militancy of the rioters rather than the attacks on Indian people and property that facilitated the police "show of force." Machine guns were brought into action and sometimes fired "for five minutes at a time." A news reporter remarked that these were scenes reminiscent of the Second World War (Daily News, 15 January 1949).

It is difficult to ascertain who the rioters were. It is almost certain that the city hostel dwellers were there as well as lumpen elements (Riots Commission 1949, Evidence, pp. 152-162). Rather than being mere bystanders to violence perpetrated by marginal elements, as tenants, customers, and petty traders, there was a strong basis for shack residents to be involved in the violence against Indians.

Although there were isolated incidents throughout the weekend, by Saturday morning the violence had petered out. The rioters had managed to destroy Indian presence in the shantytowns and neighboring districts. By Saturday afternoon, there were almost 25,000 Indian refugees in the city. If the

rioters felt victorious, the state had also achieved a short-term objective: the rioters had been harshly reminded of the state's capacity for violence.

For Edwards and Nuttall (1990), the violence in Cato Manor amounted to a pogrom: the organized extermination and expulsion of all Indians (p. 27). Mkhumbane was to be liberated.

The potential lines of conflict in Cato Manor were outlined earlier. There was an acute realization that if Mkhumbane was truly to be "home," then Indian control of the land and trade had to be eroded. The cooperatives had largely failed to do this. "Indians stood in the way of African shackdwellers' ambitions. . . . Aware of municipal weakness in controlling shantytowns through looting and killing Indians, power could be avenged in a way that would produce a social class in which African control could be established" (Edwards, 1989, p. 51).

Africans quickly moved into what was left of Indian shops while roadside stalls selling fruit and vegetables proliferated. A resident poignantly captured the complete change in the social relations of Cato Manor: "The blacks were now at an advantage as the Indians had left. The Indians did leave. We beat them up. We burnt them" (quoted in Edwards, 1989, p. 52).

However, the "liberated zone" was not to last for long. The broad unity of the community led by a diverse leadership was difficult to hold once the enemy had been destroyed. When the state intervened in the 1950s, these weaknesses were to be readily apparent.

3.3.3 After the Violence

Immediately after the riot, the national leaders of the African National Congress (AND), the South African Indian Congress, and the Communist Party of South Africa met in Durban. They sought ways to minimize the potential for further conflict. A statement was issued by the Natal Indian Congress and ANC leaders, G. M. Naicker and A. W. G. Champion, respectively, condemning the violence. Later they toured the city with loudspeakers, calling for calm. Champion's role was ironic, for he was known for his anti-Indian views.

The attempt to build black unity against the state, increasingly noticeable in public pronouncements from the Natal Indian Congress and ANC, received a severe setback by the violence. In the zeal to heal the racial rift, the anti-state aspect of the violence was ignored. In any event, the Congress leaders would have found it difficult to harness.

Beyond the NIC and ANC, there were those who saw the advantages the riots had created. There were potential gains for traders, local squatter leaders, and political activists and ordinary workers and shack residents. Popular attempts were made to take advantage of the riots in Cato Manor, especially in the Booth Road area. After a fortnight, Indian refugees began to trickle back to their homes, but Booth Road remained a "no-go" area. Indian buses were boycotted in Booth Road and the main Cato Manor terminus. Buses laid on by the municipality were used instead. African-driven cars and small lorries also found a lucrative market as pirate taxis (Sunday Tribune, 20 February 1949). Hundreds of stalls set up by petty traders filled the road in a few days, hoping to

take advantage of new possibilities created by the demise of Indian competition. Applications for pedlars' licenses poured in, while many set up shop without the necessary permission (Natal Archives, 15 February 1949).

The general boycott of Indian buses did not last long. But at Booth Road, by the end of February, Indian buses were only carrying around 25% of their pre-riot traffic (Natal Archives, 25 February 1949).

Pickets in small groups, dressed in khaki, sought to enforce the boycott. At whose behest they acted remains unclear, although the new pirate taxi-operators had the most to gain by the boycotts. With the presence of the pickets, violence became a feature of the boycott, but there was widespread support. This is evidenced by Indian buses being booed on arrival at the terminus and stoned en route to their destinations (Natal Archives, 30 May 1949). The certificates allowing municipal buses to operate from Booth Road were due to expire at the end of February. This would mean that the route would once again be the exclusive domain of Indian-owned buses. Rumors that Africans would burn all the Indian buses if this happened began to do the rounds. Responding to the rapid spread of the rumors, 500 Indians sought the safety of refugee camps. People continued to be receptive to the spirit of the riots. As if accepting this, police patrols were increased, and the municipal bus certificates were renewed.

While conservatives in the Durban ANC and Native Advisory Board agreed to participate in a joint council with the Natal Indian Congress to "promote mutual understanding" (Karis & Carter, 1973, p. 287), they also sought to use the

riots to increase their leverage with the municipality. They particularly sought to promote the interests of an aspirant commercial middle class. Thus, they were keen supporters of segregation policies that denied Indian traders access to "Native" areas (Natal Archives, 4 March 1949; Natal Mercury, 17 January 1949).

The state moved in to consolidate its position. A ban was placed on all public meetings until the middle of February. About 100 Africans were charged with public violence and given sentences of hard labor. Armored cars patrolled the city, and prosecution of pirate taxis and illegal street traders was stepped up (Natal Mercury, 26 January and 19 February 1949). Alongside this, the Zulu paramount chief was called in to address hostel and shackdwellers. This was done in order to renew the legitimacy of municipal authorities and to warn against further rioting (Ilanga, 22 January and 5 March 1949).

The municipality also needed to address the longer term policy responses to the riots. A common perception among whites was that there were too many Africans in the city. The Native Administration Department, under orders from the City Council, began tightening influx control in December 1949.

The future of Cato Manor was also an issue. Beyond the problems of health and housing, Cato Manor had displayed during the riots a seething militancy with which the City Council felt ill at ease. The municipality was divided on how to deal with the issue. Some felt that all the shack residents should be removed—by force, if need be. Others argued for controlled site and service schemes on expropriated land in the area. This was to be a central concern in the 1950s.

In the next section, an in-depth analysis of the violence is undertaken.

3.4   Composition of the Rioters

Irrationalists Sighele and Le Bon argue that it is those at the very bottom of the social heap who participate in riots. "Criminals, madmen, the offspring of madmen, alcoholics, the slime of society, deprived of all moral sense, given over to crime—these compose the greater part of the revolutionaries," wrote Sighele (1892, p. 104). The political implications of this position are patent. It does not allow for the notion that crowd action might be a response to authentic interests or needs. As noted in Chapter 2, this "scum of the earth" theory of participation in violent events has been disputed by Tilly and his collaborators. They have argued that popular protest, both violent and otherwise, is a "normal" outgrowth of other popular collective action, and that participants are apt to be typical of the social groups whose interests the protests represent. There have been convincing studies of ghetto rioting in the United States which depicted participants as typical residents of the neighborhoods involved (Caplan, 1970; Fogelson & Hill, 1968).

Studies of the 1949 riots have tended to support the "scum of the earth" thesis. The official commission of inquiry into the riots reported that it was the "Native loafers," the "Tsotse Boys," or the "IWW," i.e., the "I won't works," who "took a leading part in the assaults upon Indians, in the destruction of property and in the looting" (Riots Commission Report 1949, p. 19). For Meer (cited in Webster, 1978), the rioters were mere puppets manipulated by whites. She characterized African participants as "disembodied abstract thing[s]" (p. 22).

However, documentary and photographic evidence challenges this view. The *amalaita*[10] gangs were certainly central to the violence. But the rioters also consisted of dock workers, ricksha-pullers, and *ngoma* dance troupes. Press photographs of the lunchtime attack give some indication as to the composition of the rioters. They were, in the main, young men. One photograph did reveal an ululating woman leading a group. Most were relatively well dressed; they wore the clothes of employed workers and petty traders rather than unemployed lumpenproletarians. One march seemed to be led by a dance troupe, probably a "traditional" *ngoma* dance troupe. This type of "traditional" dancing was officially organized by the municipality as a form of recreation. In another photograph, the red-trimmed calico uniforms of domestic servants were prominent.

The following discussion provides some background details about the groups involved in the riots.

3.4.1 *Amalaita* Gangs

By the early 1900s, domestic service was almost exclusively the preserve of African males. The duties of the "houseboy" ranged from cleaning and cooking to gardening and stable keeping. Domestic servants were invariably supplied with accommodation on the property of white householders for whom they worked. Variously described as "hovels," "dens," or "*kias*," servant quarters rapidly evolved into meeting and living places for the houseboy's comrades and

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[10]Amalaita—stick fighters, street desperados.

relatives. If the householder refused the request of a "decent servant" to permit "strange kaffirs" on their premises, more often than not, the domestic servant would desert his employer. In many instances, "houseboys" rented rooms from Indian landlords in the center of town. Apart from receiving, in most cases, food and accommodation from employers, the domestic servant was also supplied with a uniform. The, at times, tenuous form of social control represented by domestic servants' living quarters was echoed by the red-trimmed, khaki knickerbocker suit worn by "houseboys." While denying his individuality and affirming his subordinate social position, the uniform could become the basis of self-assertion. When a white city councilor warned Durban's white community against employing "daring young thieves" as houseboys, he was acknowledging the criminal activities of the *amalaita* gangs (la Hausse, 1984, pp. 31-32).

The origins of organized groups of African criminals or bandits have been traced back to the "secret society" of robbers on the Rand in the 1890s. Many of the members of the secret society of criminals known as the Ninevites, or the *isigebengu*, returned to their place of origin in Natal when the South African War broke out in 1899. It was in the towns of Natal, particularly Durban, that these ex-Johannesburg elements found jobs as "houseboys" and, together with other sections of the town's African population, formed *amalaita* gangs. While it is possible to overemphasize the social banditry aspect of these gangs, certainly in Durban they were responsible for many thefts in white households. (For a general discussion on social banditry, see Hobsbawn, 1972).

By 1902, the *amalaita* gangs in Durban, characterized by their colorful clothing, their fondness for the concertina, and the inseparability from two fighting sticks, were being described in the local press as "not merely groups of turbulent umfaans [but] organized bands, having for their object the terrorising of the police and the defiance of authority. . . . They parade in military formation, yelling and cursing till midnight" (Natal Mercury, 6 July 1902).

In 1916, the Chief Magistrate noted that *amalaita* activities were "getting too frequent" and stated that they should not be tolerated. He ordered lashes as punishment for these youths, who, armed with sticks, mouth organs, and decorated with the *umshokobezi* (a colorful headgear widely used by rebels during the Bambatha rebellion), caused increasing unease in the eyes of white authority (Marks, 1970, p. 252). In one court case, 19 youths, whose average age was 18, were charged with "maliciously congregating, disturbing the peace and being armed with sticks" (Natal Archives, Durban Criminal Records, D Court, 1910-1949, Case heard 3 January 1916).

Shebeens and beer halls were the meeting places of the *amalaita* gangs. At least six *amalaita* gangs comprising over 150 Africans, many of whom were domestic servants, made shebeens their arena for intergang fighting. In addition to these organized bands of militant youths, nine gangs of organized housebreakers, each under the control of a single head, were also involved in the brewing trade, distributing brews throughout the town (la Hausse, 1984).

During the opposition to the municipality's beer monopoly in the 1920s, the *amalaita* had displayed a high degree of militancy. On successive Sundays

in May 1929, groups of Africans numbering between 300 and 800 marched from the ICU Hall in Prince Edward Street to Sydenham, three kilometers away, where mass meetings were held. A witness to the march on 5 May described it in the following terms:

> They were an organized body--headed by a brass band preceded by a native in Highland costume--a kilt. . . . Many of them were dressed in uniform and carried sticks in military positions. They kept step and paraded as a military body. (Native Riots Commission, Minutes of Evidence, p. 24, Evidence of C. W. Lewis)

There was strong *amalaita* gang involvement in these protests. Later it was to emerge that ICU leader Champion and *amalaita* gangs had entered into an alliance during this period (la Hausse, 1984, p. 202).

The day of the assault of George Madondo, a Thursday, was the traditional day that domestic servants, core members of the *amalaita* gangs, congregated around the Victoria Street beer hall. The existence of organized groupings who were not averse to fighting made for a quick, violent retaliation. On the Thursday and Friday, *amalaita* gangs were central to the attacks on Indian persons and property.

3.4.2 *Ngoma* Dance Groups

After initial reticence, municipal authorities began to encourage *ngoma* dances in the 1930s. The Chief Constable saw particular benefits from the control of this popular form of recreation. It provided cheap popular recreation for workers and supplied an alternative to the patronage of shebeens over weekends, an activity that always carried with it the threat of labor disruption. Furthermore, the holding of *ngoma* dance competitions encouraged divisions

within Durban's African popular classes, especially if they were organized along tribal lines.

White officials understood *ngoma* dancing to be a form of recreation, unlike the "melting pot," provided by the dance hall, for migrant workers. However, the line between using "traditional" Zulu dancing as a means of social control and the potentially oppositional character of *ngoma* dancing was a fine one. By the late 1930s, there was increasing evidence that unemployed and *lumpen* elements in the town were finding a place within the ranks of *ngoma* dancers and reorganizing them along *amalaita* gangs. Some reports also suggested that dancers were really *amalaitas* "in disguise" (la Hausse, 1984, p. 274).

3.4.3 Ricksha Pullers

The men who were responsible for pulling more than 900 rickshas were invariably viewed by Durban's white burgesses as the most rowdy, threatening, and drunken section of the town's African workforce. The distinctive "uniform" of the ricksha puller clearly assisted in the forging of some degree of group consciousness among these men. Based on the red-trimmed knickerbocker uniform of domestic servants, the ricksha pullers' attire extended to include elaborate headgear and striking designs sewn onto their clothes. The consciousness of ricksha men in Durban of their position within the subordinate classes in the town found lucid expression in a number of important strikes. The two most important of these strikes occurred in 1918 and 1930. On these

occasions, the almost 1,000 ricksha pullers came out *en bloc* in protest at their exploitation at the hands of Durban's ricksha owners (Hemson, 1979, p. 169).

3.4.4 Dock Workers

The dock workers in Durban had a long history of resistance to the general level of wages in the area and their specific conditions of employment. In a broader context, they had taken up issues of wider economic and political struggle. They had led the struggles against the poll tax, against passes, and against the institution of a municipal monopoly of brewing. By the early 1940s, dock workers consisted of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 workers employed by the day by four stevedoring companies and the South African Railways and Harbors.

Accommodation for the dock workers was mainly in barracks constructed by the municipality. Living conditions in the barracks were appalling. The Smit Commission reported that the Bell Street compound was "overcrowded, dirty, and quite unfit for the purpose for which it was being used" (quoted in Hemson, 1978, p. 92).

Dock workers took a leading part in the violence. Easu Laflete, a Cato Manor leader, said in evidence to the Commission of Inquiry that the worst attackers of Indian property in Cato Manor came from the Point barracks in the dock area through the central area of the town into Booth Road and then into Cato Manor itself (Riots Commission, Evidence, Vol. 1, p. 159). In the Report of the Commission, the fact that African males were "herded together" in compounds was considered a contributing factor to the riots. "Such

congregations of men are ready to tinder any spark, and it is clear that the compound dwellers took an important part in the excesses" (Riot Commission, 1949, p. 20).

3.4.5 Civilian Guards

In Mkhumbane, it was the civilian guards in the employ of the self-styled "mayors of Mkhumbane" who were central to the violence. They consisted of lumpenproletarians and employed shack residents who fell under the shacklord's patronage. However, the civilian guard were not acting as "disembodied abstract thing[s]." They were, in all probability, acting on behalf of the shacklords with a specific purpose. Moreover, they were well-integrated members of Mkhumbane involved in the prevailing social networks.

Having gained a comprehensive picture of the composition of the rioters, it is important to turn our attention to how activity was generated among the rioters--how were they informed of the riot, and how and where were they recruited? This will allow us to come to some understanding of whether the riots were spontaneous or organized.

3.5   1949--Spontaneous or Organized?

It is argued here that the critical violence on Thursday, 13 January 1949 was not organized. It was a spontaneous reaction to the bloodied figure of George Madondo. While it was spontaneous, certain circumstances allowed for a collective response. The targets were Indians, who, because of their distinctive physical traits, could easily be singled out. If the violence had been between

Mpondo and Zulu or Hindu and Moslem, targeting the "enemy" would have been much more difficult, especially in the teeming cauldron of Victoria Street.

Sociologists Turner and Killian (1987) argue that people come together to form collectivities through

> the combined effect of (1) a condition or event that is sufficiently outside the range of ordinary happenings that people turn to their fellow human beings for help and support in interpreting and responding to the situation, and (2) the availability of pre-existing social groupings through which intercommunication can be initiated fairly easily. (p. 9)

Similarly, Rule (1988) points to the existence of evidence which indicates that civil violence is more likely to occur the greater the solidarity among would-be participants. "Thus participants in race riots share a minimal solidarity in being able to recognize potential allies and antagonists in terms of their race, even if the particular individuals involved are unknown to one another" (p. 266).

The collective response was probably facilitated by the *amalaita* gangs in the area. The *amalaitas* controlled the streets and parks at night and were renowned for their stick fights (la Hausse, 1991). Their composition was exclusively male, mainly domestic servants. The fact that it was an African/Indian conflict and there were organized groupings in the area that had a developed culture of violence facilitated a spontaneous violent collective response.

The fact that the assault took place close to a congested bus terminus also contributed to the immediate violent reaction. More important was the close proximity of the "Native Eating House" and a municipal beer hall. The latter was

an important meeting ground of dock workers, in addition to the *amalaitas*, and of *ngoma* dance groups.

In a strict sense of being unplanned, the riot can be said to have been spontaneous. But in the sense that participants tended to hold a stereotype of "the Indian" in collective and symbolic terms as an alien exploiter (before the riot actually began) implies, one could argue, that the riot was structurally predetermined because the social structure incorporated ethnic and racial groups at different levels, and Indians were perceived to benefit by this differential incorporation.

On Thursday night in the compounds and locations, an informal collective planning took place for an attack on Indians. Giving evidence to the Commission, a compound manager said: "Friday's riots were planned. Word went round that there would be a united attack on the Indians in the afternoon. Most compounds got the message" (Riots Commission, 1949, Evidence).

Numerous African witnesses at the Inquiry confirmed that it was generally known that an attack was to take place at noon on Friday—the rumors were that Indians had been killing Africans in the Indian quarter. Clearly, the rumors found fertile ground because of the structurally determined stereotypes held by communities of each other. In plural societies, the perception of people tends to be in stereotyped racial categories, but systematic evidence of these stereotypes is circumstantial during the period of the riots. A decade later, van den Berghe (1962) undertook a survey of racial attitudes in Durban, where he found strong antithetical stereotypes held by Africans and Indians of each other. Africans

described Indians as "dishonest" and "exploitative"; Indians described Africans as "violent" and "uncultured."

Turner and Killian (1972) emphasize that since "collective behavior develops through a communication process, . . . [then] conditions that facilitate communication and mobilization are essential" (p. 61), for example, ecological concentrations and arrangements of people, social control conditions that allow or preclude the formation of collectivities, and significant symbols. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the attack during the Friday lunch hour, and later that afternoon, on the "Indian quarter" was organized. The main impetus for this attack came from the hostel dwellers. Plans of the attack were spread to all the hostels, as far north as the Coronation Brick and Tile compound on the northern banks of the Umgeni River (Nuttall, 1989, p. 22). One hostel dweller tells of his boxing club being the lever through which he and his friends were mobilized to take part in the "Zulu against Indian war" (Sitas, 1986, p. 19). One participant in the riots recalls that he gathered with others at the place where "the boys urinate at the Point" (KCAV interviews, T. Dlamini, 17 June 1981). These plans were also facilitated by a certain homogeneity of action and thought that the hostels imposed.

The *amalaita* networks would also have been involved. As distributors of liquor to the myriad of shebeens, they had a vast network that made for quick communication. Similarly, the *ngoma* dance groups had a network of communication.

The second phase of the riots, beginning at 4 p.m. on Friday, saw the rioters, having grown confident from the lunch-time forays, presenting a broader challenge to the local state. The vicious police reaction put a stop to this challenge and contributed to the violence being deflected from the city center to Cato Manor.

The events of Friday in the city center were quickly carried into Cato Manor. This was facilitated by the special municipal buses which were laid on to remove commuters quickly from the city center. The late-afternoon buses going into Mkhumbane were full as usual. But the mood of the commuters verged on hysteria as accounts and rumors of the day's conflict mixed with panic and heightened expectation. For the buses were not simply carrying Mkhumbane residents or those seeking weekend entertainment in the shacklands. There were many who had been involved in the street brawls of the day, and they spoke of coming to attack the Indians in Mkhumbane. The "shared excitement" thesis as a contributor to violent collective behavior has been too quickly dismissed. Theories that argued for the long-term rationality of collective violence "have typically viewed shared emotional states as epiphenomenal without explanatory significance of their own. Yet many violent sequences appear to depend directly on dissemination of some highly emotional news of no inherent strategic significance" (Rule, 1988, p. 244). Of course, violence would not occur "in the absence of enduring contention between two racial groups" (Rule, 1988, p. 244). As we have seen in Cato Manor, Indian monopoly of land, housing, trade, and transport had long been a contentious issue.

This "shared excitement" undoubtedly contributed to what generated the violence in Cato Manor. However, the violence was soon taken over by the "leaders" of Mkhumbane. Most of the leaders who acquired respect within particular shantytown areas of Mkhumbane, as a whole, often gained such power through successfully reducing the authority of others during the course of battles over the control of space and resources in the shacklands. These were the "mayors" of Mkhumbane. Many petty leaders owed their power, in crucial respects, to their ability to mobilize shack residents into local vigilante forces. These were the "*impis*," mainly comprised of the underclasses of Mkhumbane society. Receiving either payments of cash or kind or various forms of preferential treatment from leaders and shack residents, the authority of such bands ranged over much of Mkhumbane. However, these vigilante bands had a wider purpose. In many ways, the protection of local areas was left to such groups. Through the *impis*, the shack residents asserted the desire to remain residents in an Mkhumbane not controlled by any unwanted external power. However, influence in the shacklands was not limited to those who controlled material resources or those who maintained support through coercion or patronage. Considerable influence was wielded by Zionist priests who told of the struggles of the Mkhumbane residents couched in terms of images lifted directly from the Old Testament and a past Zulu rural prosperity.[11] Recalling "how we Zulus had lived in this land before the White man and how things should be,"

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[11]While there is no evidence of Zionist preachers actually playing a leadership role in the violence, there is a high probability of participation by their followers.

such leaders provided residents with the means to both understand and legitimize their struggles within the city (Edwards, 1989, pp. 78-79).

It was this leadership that promoted the idea of a community united in its attempt to create a "New Africa." It was this that gave impetus to the idea that Mkhumbane was somehow different. These attitudes underlay the conception of Mkhumbane as an alternative society.

> Firstly a rejection of authority, particularly municipal, police or Indian authority that originated from outside of the perceived spatial boundaries of the African shantytowns. Secondly, a desire to establish and legitimate Mkhumbane as a new haven existing outside of the patterns of conflict present in the rest of the city. Finally the articulation of a new morality, a consciousness aimed at escaping from subjection to a dominant ideology. (Edwards, 1989, pp. 54-55)

The "shared excitement" produced by the earlier events in the city center provided new opportunities for the leaders of Mkhumbane. Shack leaders led their *impis* into battle. As the *impis* overran Indian holdings, they were pegged and guarded against others (NIO memo to Riots Commission, 11 March 1949; KCAV interviews 305, T. Diamini, 17 June 1981; Riots Commission Evidence, G. Bestford, pp. 31-54). *Impis* now became popularly known as the civic guard. The civic guard led the fight for the liberation of Mkhumbane. This meant the organized extermination and expulsion of all Indians. The violence went beyond looting, beating, and breaking to include murder, rape, and burning.

These actions indicate the difficulty in classifying violent collective behavior as rational or irrational, purposeful or unorganized, instrumental or consummatory. As Rule (1988) notes,

> There is much to suggest that crowd action is not always strictly purposeful, if by this we mean oriented only to instrumental ends. Some

militant crowd action is clearly consummatory rather than instrumental, and such action often includes the sorts of hair-raising sadistic and destructive acts that inspired the anxiety ridden visions of the irrationalists. Such actions appear to be ends in themselves, rather than means to some longer-term end. (p. 242)

Certainly the riots of 1949 involved both consummatory and instrumental actions. The looting and beating in the city center and the murder, rape, and burning were more likely consummatory rather than instrumental. However, the *impis*, presumably sent into battle by the "mayors" and priests, had a potential objective—the removal of Indian authority and its replacement by their own.

3.6   1949—Anti-Indian or Anti-Apartheid?

Anti-Indianism in African society was fueled by municipal and state policy during the 1940s. The 1946 Indian Land Tenure Act gave the regional zoning proposals legislative force. The Act had major implications for Africans in Durban. The Cato Manor district and other African shack areas were set aside exclusively for Indian occupation. The rationale for this was that Indians owned the land so they only had the right to residence. However, the municipally owned Chesterville township (completed the year before) was also earmarked for Indians. What was clear was that the plan was to ensure that Africans were not allowed to settle in any significant numbers within the immediate confines of the city. These zoning proposals affected all classes of Africans: the wealthy few who had bought small sites in greater Cato Manor, the new African shacklords who had sprung up as intermediaries between landlords and tenants, the newly secure occupants of Chesterville township, and the thousands of squatters who were struggling to make "Mkhumbane our home."

Squatters responded in diverse ways to evictions and threats of evictions. Durban did not have the growth of large-scale squatter movements, defiantly occupying vacant municipal land, as had occurred on the Rand during the 1940s (Stadler, 1979). The Natal African Tenants and Peasants Association was weakly organized and focused its attention on taking up individual squatter complaints in paralegal fashion. At times, white authority was targeted. However, most often those in closer proximity, the new subclass of African shack renters, and Indian landowners were the targets of the squatters.

Within Mkhumbane, relationships that had developed around ownership and tenancy were highly intricate. Ownership of an individual shack cluster was held by a number of people, both Indian and African. Some of the African part-owners operated as absentee landlords, while others resided in the cluster. Both owners and tenants sublet rooms. By the late 1940s, through a series of struggles, there emerged shacklords, the mayors of Mkhumbane. Crucial to the shacklords' maintenance of their territorial power was the formation of vigilante forces made up of lumpenproletarians and employed shack residents. Edwards (1989), while not denying the despotic and undemocratic style of shacklords, paints a romantic vision of shack leaders operating

> within the restrictive bounds of a collective community consciousness which stressed the need for social stability and proletarian ordinariness. . . . [T]hrough the *impis*, the shack residents asserted their desire to remain residents in an Mkhumbane not controlled by any unwanted external power. (pp. 78-79)

However, the *impis* were there to protect and broaden the territorial power of the shacklord. Power was based on access to the instruments of force.

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Shacklords were not modern-day Robin Hoods. Their victims were the poor and the downtrodden. Edwards's (1989) own interviews with Cato Manor residents reveal how crucial the threat of violence was in the relationship between shacklord and tenant. Note Mr. Ndlovu's recollections

> When you wanted to ask a question about something that was troubling you, you spoke to the man who owned your place. You know that because you are giving money to him and you are staying in his place that he would help you. He would be very cross if he knew that you did not do this. He was there to help you. (p. 78)

and Mrs. Phewa's reminiscences:

> If you wanted anything, a shack, or if KwaMuhle says you must leave Durban and go back to your home, or a shebeen, then you must go to your leader. They will fix it for you. Even if you want a shackshop, then you must ask your mayor and . . . <u>if you did not talk to him and give them money to fix it, then they are after you</u>. (p. 79, emphasis mine)

It was their access to the means of violence that "protected" the African shacklords during the riots of 1949. Squatters did not have the organizational capacity to take on the *impis*. Indian landlords and shack renters were much more vulnerable. Rinder (1958-59), in writing about the people in the status gap, argues that, in addition to "their visibility and vulnerability, these people live in proximity to the people they serve. Their settlement, enclave, ghetto, district, or what-have-you, is not removed like the homes of those in the traditionally upper status but is usually located with convenient access to their clientele" (p. 258). This was certainly the case with Indians as opposed to the white power holders. White power, especially economic power, was one step removed and difficult to target. "Where white power was more plainly revealed, its very strength made resistance costly and encouraged accommodation with it. Collective memories

included the armed suppression of the 1906 poll tax uprising in the Natal countryside, and the police street shootings in Durban in 1929-30" (Nutall, 1989, p. 15).

The search for ever more land became a crucial issue in Cato Manor. Power and finance came from access to property. Indian landowners were barriers to the hunger for more land. The ideological disposition of the more established African elite who sought to advance their interests through segregationist rhetoric and anti-Indianism found a resonance with African material interests in the shacklands. "African" areas "belonged" to Africans and should be the exclusive preserve for African accumulation.

The 1946 Act fueled the prevailing anti-Indianism. Clerical leaders used their church bases to popularize the view that the 1946 Acts divided the city between whites and Indians and pushed Africans to the periphery. Political leaders did the same (Riots Commission, 1949, Evidence, pp. 224-242). Senator Brookes, in his testimony, pointed out that the feeling among Africans that the city was being divided between Indians and whites was exacerbated "by the maps issued by the Natal Provincial Post-War Reconstruction Committee, which colored European areas blue, Indian areas pink, and Native areas brown, and allowed little in the way of Native areas" (Riots Commission Report, 1949, p. 19). In a very real sense to Africans, whose class positions ranged from those of aspirant landowners to unemployed squatters, Indians generally seemed to be favored by the 1946 legislation. The rabid anti-Indianism of the newly elected National Party also received extensive media coverage. While many of the

squatters were illiterate, it was a common sight in the late 1940s for an "educated" African to be seen reading from a newspaper to a group gathered round (NIO memo to Riots Commission, 11 March 1949).

Rider (1958-59) argues that where people in the status gap do not have access to forces to protect them and where the social, cultural, and political context of the status gap encourages aggression by the host community, "the possibility of communal violence is endemic" (p. 259). In the city center, the looting of the shops and the powerlessness of the Indian shopowners to prevent the looting provided a stimulus for the renewed attacks the next day. The "rules of the riot" developed the day before had been rapidly learnt: confine looting to Indian shops to avoid the full deployment of white power.

The territorial aspect gave a distinctiveness to the rioting in Cato Manor. As buses unloaded commuters, other forces were also at work. Gangs of migrants moved in, ordinary residents of Mkhumbane grouped together, and the shack leaders sent their *impis* into battle. The vision of "New Africa" encouraged "a belligerent, vibrant concept of revenge. Revenge was to play a vital role in an ideology that endeavored to create new institutions and levels of consciousness that would enable Africans to transform their marginalized status in the city" (Edwards, 1989, p. 13). It was in this context that one of the "mayors" of Mkhumbane, Esau le Fleur, was to tell the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots: "I think [these killings] are justified—if you go into a snake's hole and keep prodding the snake, when the snake comes out he will bite you" (Riots Commission, Evidence, 1949).

For most Africans in Durban, struggles centered around gaining permanent residence. Mkhumbane came to embody that struggle: "It was an African city, Mkhumbane. It was not Thekwini, it was ours. That was what Cato Manor was for" (Interview with Mr. B. Mthethwe, quoted in Edwards, 1989, p. 77). In Cato Manor, it was the Indian presence that was a threat to African permanence. The 1946 Act earmarked Cato Manor for the exclusive use of Indians. Indian landownership placed limits on the "mayors" and squatters' hunger for more land. Indian monopoly on trade made alternative forms of capital accumulation difficult. Indian presence in Cato Manor was a barrier to the ambitions of the shantytown residents. While the riots took the form of an anti-Indian pogrom, a potential effect was to make Mkhumbane safe for an African population whose status was constantly threatened by a state policy that refused to recognize them as a permanent part of the city. After the riots, leaders of Mkhumbane called on the City Council to recognize that Africans were the sole authority in the area (MNAD; H 18/CM, Vol. 1; Sworn Affidavit of Mr. Esau Makatini, 15 March 1949). A civilian guard was formed to control the newly won area and to prevent any attempt by the police to enter the shantytown (KCAV; interview with Mrs. A. Mzimela, 21 July 1982).

By the late 1940s, the municipality appeared to shack residents to have virtually accepted the permanence of the shacklands. As Cato Manor became more and more densely populated, so it became less accessible to police. In any case, police limited their operations to occasional forays. Internal, unofficial authority structures emerged in the settlement. In one particular shack

community, a self-appointed headman exercised administrative authority by letting sites, collecting rents, and taking on responsibility for the maintenance of order (Durban Housing Survey, 1952, p. 377).

However, the continuing presence of Indian landowners and traders threatened the future of the shantytown communities. The 1946 Indian Land Tenure Act envisaged Cato Manor as being "given" to Indians. Attempts to ensure that as much of their own money should circulate within the shantytowns as possible through stokvels and cooperatives came up against Indian trading and other commercial ventures. For example, Indian-owned shops and merchants effectively competed with African cooperatives through offering credit facilities and in offering certain goods like paraffin or bars of soap, at vastly reduced prices. Unlike the squatter leaders in Johannesburg, African leaders in Cato Manor could not dominate access to trading licenses. Here the Indian traders held sway and effectively used existing legal mechanisms to maintain their monopoly.

In directly addressing the issue of whether the 1949 riots were anti-apartheid or anti-Indian, we need to understand, following McPahil (1991, p. 185), that while people do behave collectively, what they do varies greatly in complexity, in duration, and in the proportion of the gathering that actually participates. The lunchtime attack on the Indian quarter on Friday was largely limited to looting. While the action of some looters was described in some accounts as that of a savage mob, other descriptions and material, such as a

lunch-hour photograph on Pine Street, where looting was occurring, show

Indians, whites, and Africans walking unalarmed.

> Pedestrians helped themselves to goods through broken windows. An eyewitness observed a ricksha puller loading up his vehicle with successive armloads of women's shoes. The unreality of it all provoked laughter and heckling. Individual Indians were jostled on the pavements; some were robbed of their Friday pay. (Nuttall, 1989, p. 22)

The rioters observed certain bounds, directed their aggression at specific targets, and selected appropriate means for the ends they intended to obtain. The fact that no deaths resulted from the direct action of the rioters is indicative that certain bounds and limits were observed.

Seen in their general context, the 1949 riots had, as an underlying influence, an attempt to gain full control over Cato Manor and so ensure African permanence in Durban. In the immediate aftermath of the riots, a civilian guard was formed to ensure that Cato Manor did not fall into the hands of any external authority. Shantytown leaders also endeavored to compel the City Council to accept the fact of Africans now controlling their own territory.

Oberschall (1968) argues that, in order to distinguish a riot from a revolt or rebellion, we must examine what collective goals and demands are voiced by the actors (pp. 340-341). If their actions are directed at overthrowing the constituted authorities, if political demands are voiced such as the resignation of certain leaders and officials, if an attempt is made to achieve physical control in the area or territory by forcing out the existing authorities and substituting for them other authorities, then one is dealing with a revolt, rebellion, insurrection, or uprising. If, on the other hand, the main purpose of the action is to inflict

damage and/or injury upon certain groups or a category of persons, such as police, merchants, or whites in general, then one is dealing with a riot. While the events in Cato Manor involved no intention to overthrow the government itself and therefore stopped short of an insurrection or rebellion, following Smellie's definition of a riot in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, it was more than just a riot. There was an attempt to achieve physical control in the area by forcing out the existing authorities (Indian landlords) and substituting for them other authorities. The events in Cato Manor were part of African resistance to the particular form which urban apartheid had taken in Durban.

The parallels between the 1949 riots and the attacking and looting of Korean businesses in Los Angeles in 1992 are stark. After the Watts riots of 1965, Asian businesses moved into the south-central area, replacing Jewish shopowners who had left. In the last ten years, Koreans have gained a virtual monopoly of trade in the area, developing a Korean enclave.

The Los Angeles riots were sparked off when a suburban jury acquitted four white Los Angeles police officers of beating a black motorist. When the looting initially began, there were open calls from within the black community for the looting and burning to happen in the white areas of the city. When a meeting, called on Wednesday, April 29, by black leaders to formulate a political response to the acquittals, heard that looting had begun a few blocks away, one speaker implored, "Don't do it in our community!" People took up chants suggesting alternative targets. "Beverly Hills!" shouted one group (Meyerson, 1992, p. 23). A black city fire inspector, Chauncey Hughes, who lives in West Adams, a

midcity neighborhood in the heart of the riot-torn area, told a news reporter: "This may be sad to say, but most people here who were thinking about what would occur were just hoping it would be taken outside the community . . . that just once they would make them pay" (The Guardian Weekly, 8-14 May 1992).

Unlike 1965, the riots reached beyond south-central Los Angeles. However, the anticipated attacks on white residential areas did not come. The riot rapidly moved up Western and Vermont Avenues, engulfing the stores of Koreatown. About 600 Korean-owned retail outlets were damaged in the south-central area and about 200 in Koreatown.

Lawrence Aubry, a member of the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, argued that Korean merchants had become a visible lightening rod for the discontent of the black community. Blacks in Los Angeles, he pointed out, have remained poor as, one after another, immigrant groups have arrived and climbed past them to prosperity. "It's illogical, but it's convenient to target the Koreans" (New York Times, 2 May 1992).

Koreans were more convenient targets. The white suburbs were more remote and would be protected with more zeal. Korean shops were more vulnerable both in terms of their location and police inaction. A Korean businessman told a reporter that when shops were burning he called the police every five minutes; there was no response (New York Times, 2 May 1992). Several young Koreans told Mike Davis that they were especially bitter that the south-central shopping malls controlled by Alexander Haagen, a wealthy contributor to local politics, were quickly defended by police and National Guard,

while their stores were leisurely ransacked and burnt to the ground (Davis, 1 June 1992).

But it is not just their visibility, vulnerability, and accessibility that explains the looting and burning of Koreatown stores. Relations between blacks and Koreans had been tense since the videotaped fatal shooting of a 15-year-old black girl, Latasha Harlins, in 1991. The tension was exacerbated when a white judge let the grocer off with a $500 fine and some community service. Davis argues that since that judgment some ethnic explosion had been virtually inevitable.

> The several near-riots at the Compton courthouse this winter were early warning signals of the black community's unassuaged grief over Harlin's murder. On the streets of South Central Wednesday and Thursday, I was repeatedly told, "This is for our baby sister. This is for Latasha." (Davis, 1 June 1992).

Hostility to Koreans was fueled by the charge that they were clannish, alien, and inassimilable. This clannishness was picked up by Inder Singh, chairperson, National Federation of Indian American Associations, who remarked: "The violence in Koreatown could have been avoided had the Korean Americans not isolated themselves to such a degree from the mainstream. Like the Indians, they prefer to stay aloof" (India Today, 31 May 1992).

The riots took place at a time of deepening economic recession. During times of economic hardship, middleman minorities become vulnerable to attack. As Davis points out:

> Culturally distinct "middleman" groups--ethnic entrepreneurs and the like--risk being seen as the personal representatives of the invisible hand that has looted local communities of economic autonomy. In the case of Los Angeles it was tragically the neighborhood Korean liquor stores, not the

skyscraper corporate fortress downtown, that became the symbol of the despised new world order. (Davis, 1 June 1992, p. 746)

Evans and Novak argued, in the Washington Post, that the riots confirmed Professor Edward Banfield's judgment in the 1960s that rioters were after "fun and profit." Writer Jen Nessel argues that the riots had a political dimension:

> There are people here and around the country saying that after the first couple of hours it wasn't political. Sure it wasn't exactly "This CD player is for Rodney King," but a woman looting an armload of diapers that she couldn't afford to buy would suggest to me that the insurrection was entirely political. Since when are poverty, unemployment, pent-up rage, alienation and disenfranchisement not political? (Nessel, 1 June 1992, p. 747)

What is clear is that gangs looted in a well-organized way. Journalist Martin Walker witnessed children with mobile phones coordinate the movements of their gangs with the arrival of police and fire trucks, warning looters when police were on their way (The Guardian Weekly, 8-14 May 1992).

However, like the 1949 riots in South Africa, the riot in Los Angeles must be seen in its broader dimensions. Along with Korean shops, black-owned shops and shopping malls were looted and burnt. Walker is correct in attributing most of the violence and looting

> to have-nots against the haves, in the American city where the contrasts between the vastly rich and the really poor are as sharp as in any Third World capital. And many of the new fires were along the Santa Monica freeway, a border zone where the ghetto leads into Hollywood and the riches of Beverly Hills. (The Guardian Weekly, 8-14 May 1992)

3.7 Inanda—1985

The media billed the 1985 violence as a repeat of 1949. However, the 1985 violence was different in a number of respects. It was more widespread, stretching across all African townships. It saw African pitted against African in a number of townships. New social groupings had emerged in the African community, the comrades and warlords. These groups fought running battles during the violence. However, when the violence reached Inanda, there was a recurrence of African attacks on Indians. This aspect of the 1985 riots provides an opportunity to examine another instance of violence in Indian/African relations.

3.7.1 Overview of the Violence

The 1984-85 period witnessed the most sustained resistance to National Party rule. Across the Cape, Vaal Triangle and East Rand, resident associations, the UDF and unions coalesced to launch consumer boycotts and mass stayaways. State-fostered local government collapsed as councilors became targets of the resistance. By mid-March 1985, more than 10,000 people had been arrested on unrest-related charges. For the month of April, official sources recorded 1,549 unrest incidents. By July 1985, the violent resistance that had begun in 1984 could count 350 homes of black policemen damaged or burnt and 174 physical attacks on policemen.

Through this period, the massive black townships of greater Durban—KwaMashu, Umlazi, and Inanda—remained relatively calm. Just as academics began reaching for their word-processors to explain this phenomenon, Durban

exploded. As if to make up for the 18-month lag, the upsurge was ferocious. Within seven days, scarcely a shop or government building in the sprawling townships remained unscathed.

It was the assassination of UDF leader, Victoria Mxenge, that sparked the violence in Durban's townships. The violence, however, took particular forms in different areas. In Inanda, the violence was directed against Indian shopkeepers, landlords, and residents. In order to begin to understand why the conflict took the form it did in Inanda, we need to understand the local history of the Inanda area as well as of African-Indian relations in Durban.

3.7.2 History of Inanda Prior to the Cato Manor Removals

The name "Inanda" has encompassed several different areas. Today it is the officially demarcated "Released Area 33" that is called Inanda. This area consisted in the nineteenth century of three farms: Piesant River, Groeneberg, and Riet River. By the 1870s, ownership of farms in "Released Area 33" was no longer in the hands of producers. All the farms were acquired by individual or company speculators. With colonial rule and the concomitant arrival of private property, independent African producers were transformed into tenants, required to pay rent in cash.

Indians who had completed their indentures began to seek land in Inanda in the second half of the 1860s. Many migrant Indians took advantage of the indenture system, which made provision for the grant of land. This was a more attractive option than a free return passage to India or the renewal of indenture.

Between 1860 and 1885, 26,954 indentured workers arrived in Natal from India, but only 1,716 returned. The overwhelming number chose not to reindenture and joined the ranks of the "free Indians."

Freund (1991a) has recently shown that "between the phase of indentured labor and the emergence of a large class of industrial workers much of the Indian population went through a peasant phase of production, characterised by intense market commitment and family labor exploitation" (p. 263). This Indian peasantry was to enjoy quick success. In Inanda, Indians were the main producers of all crops other than sugar (Freund, 1991a, p. 268). With the main production unit being the extended family, reliance on a paid labor force was minimal.

A number of commentators have pointed to easier access that Indian simple-commodity producers had to credit vis-a-vis African cultivators. Hughes (1987) has also pointed out that whereas Africans were charged rent per hut, Indians were charged per acre. "The former could well have been more expensive and restrictive. To bring more hands into the fields would have meant more huts and therefore more rent—and after 1875, more hut tax" (p. 337). Increasingly, African tenants turned to intermittent wage labor in order to maintain a presence on the land. This, however, further impinged on their ability to compete.

African landownership in the Inanda area was limited. The Matiwane family owned 281 acres. Dr. J. L. Dube purchased 200 acres in Piesang River. In 1901 he set up the Christian Industrial School in the area that came to be known as Dube's Farm. Isaiah Shembe acquired a portion of the Piesang River

Farm. He called his settlement Ekuphakameni, which became the home of the Amanazaretha religious sect (Hughes, 1987, p. 338; Sundkler, 1976). There were those who owned smaller acreages, many of which consisted of small stands.

The 1913 Land Act prevented African purchases in "white" South Africa. Faced with discriminatory legislation in town, Indian traders sought land outside the municipal boundaries. Particularly restrictive was the Dealers' Licences Act. The Act made it difficult for traders to open "a new branch, to break a partnership into its component elements, or to pass on a business to an heir. Also, "those with property holdings were indirectly affected by the Act if persons leasing business premises from them were refused renewal of license, and those with debtors among the petty traders stood to lose if their debtors were forced to shut up shop" (Swan, 1985, pp. 68-69).

The shift to land purchases was not met with sympathy by African landowners. Indians, after all, were unaffected by the 1913 Land Act. A member of the Matiwane family remarked that "the Indians are not like the Natives, because the Indians have the Imperial Authorities to look after their interests" (Hughes, 1987, p. 338).

The settlement of Indians increased sharply in Inanda. At the end of 1904, Mahatma Gandhi established his Phoenix Settlement in the area. By 1936, Indians constituted 52% of the population in the Inanda Division. In Durban they made up 34% of the population, in Lower Tugela 33%, and in Pietermaritzburg 12.5% (Buchanan & Hurwitz, 1949, p. 444).

In 1936, the Land Act designated Inanda a "released area." This meant once the state had purchased the necessary land, Released Area 33 would be incorporated into the neighboring African reserve. Expansion of Indian land interests was curtailed, and it was to be "African landowners, entrepreneurs, churches and those attached to power structures in the reserve who would purchase land from Indian sellers" (Hughes, 1987, p. 339).

The 1930s marked a long period of agricultural stagnation that was to last until the 1970s. The number of Indian-owned farms reached 2,575 in 1920/21 and declined slightly to 2,545 in 1925/26. In 1945, 1,229 Natal Indian cane growers farmed (and largely owned) 71,620 acres of land. The number was 1,604 in 1961, 1,835 in 1970/71, and 1,817 in 1979/80. Acreage was also relatively stagnant. Growers farmed 68,485 acres in 1954, 56,992 in 1961, and 61,040 in 1970/71, with little further increase thereafter (Freund, 1991a, p. 272).

It was estimated in 1975 that 81% of Indian farmers along the coast had incomes of less than R1,000 per annum and 62% earned under R500. A survey found one-third to be illiterate, with a limited ability to comprehend English (Davies & Greyling, 1978, p. 35). Many farmers had to seek temporary wage work in order to retain a foothold on the farm.

> By the early 1950s, it could be said that while independent farmers lived better and had larger incomes than the declining number of Indian fieldworkers on white-owned sugar farms, they earned less money under harsher living conditions than the skilled and even semi-skilled workers in the mills. (Freund, 1991a, p. 275)

The discriminatory legislation that placed severe restrictions on Indian landownership contributed to the agricultural stagnation. The Durban Land

Alienation Ordinance of 1923 was extended to the whole of Natal. This placed strictures on the further acquisition of land by placing racial qualifications on transfers. The 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure Bill placed restrictions on Indian land purchase, and the Group Areas Act had the effect of Indians losing land. Alongside this, while the state made a concerted effort to support white farming, Indian farming interests were largely ignored. They were denied access to state credit institutions and, both in the recruitment of labor and buying of equipment, were given no support. Marketing boards were exclusively white.

Freund (1991a) points out that there was a second and probably more important contributory factor to the stagnation—the actual course of capitalist development. He argues that

> [f]or the majority of peasants, capitalisation of the land, the rising money value of land, itself directly squeezed the peasantry. The bind of poverty would not have been loosed had more land simply been legally available. The problem was rather that of the cost of improving the land and labor conditions. Inexorably as land became more valuable and developed in conjunction (necessarily) with state assistance, the smallholder became more marginal. (p. 277)

There was another important stratum to the Indian peasantry: the market-gardeners. Faced with the capitalization of land values, the competition of white farmers made competitive by state assistance for the transport of goods, and discriminatory legislation, many market-gardeners in the 1920s and 1930s turned to industrial work. Some were able to take advantage of the rapidly growing African urban population during and after the Second World War. In the Cato Manor-Mayville area, probably the area of the greatest concentration of Indian landownership, market-gardeners turned to shack renting. There were richer and

easier pickings in farming people than vegetables. In 1958, the removal of Africans to KwaMashu began. Despite violent protests in 1959 and 1960, the removals continued. By 1966, the evictions were completed. Eighty-two thousand people had been removed from the settlement. During this process, Morris (1981) points out, some 30,000 to 40,000 people were unaccounted for. Many of the missing were to make their way to Inanda. Some had no option because they did not qualify for housing in KwaMashu; others found the settlement not to their liking.

African squatters provided a lifeline for the market-gardeners of Cato Manor in the 1940s. It is ironic that their removal was to provide a lifeline for the Indian landowners of Inanda.

3.7.3 The Expansion of Inanda

The South African government has, especially in the post-1948 period, made a concerted effort to control black urbanization, mainly through segregated locations and influx control. By the early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that this elaborate attempt at social engineering was being openly breached. Beyond the formal system of planned residence, shack populations numbering millions were springing up across the country (see Map 4).

According to Schlemmer (1985), the overall number of informal dwellings around Durban between 1966 and 1979 increased by 137% (p. 169). He pointed out that more recent research in a somewhat wider area of Greater Durban than the 1979 demarcation estimated the number of informal units at 130,000, housing 1,400,000 people. This meant that more than half the black population

Map 4: Informal settlements around Durban in the mid-1980s.

of the Durban functional region was housed in informal or shack settlements (Schlemmer, 1985, p. 169).

Inanda, the country's largest concentration of shackdwellers, was central to this growth. Table 9 shows the increase in population between 1977 and 1985. This figure is also probably an underestimate. Jeffery (1990) estimates the population of Inanda to have been over 660,000 in 1987.

Table 9

Population of Inanda, 1977-1985

Year	Population
1977	68,000
1979	80,000
1982	100,000-200,000
1985	250,000

Source: Hughes, 1987, p. 342.

3.7.4 Authority Structure of Inanda

Numerous commentators have pointed to the fact that "one of the more noteworthy features of the situation of blacks in South Africa has been the rigidity of their formal community dispensation and administration. . . . It is not far-fetched to speak of 'total system' planning for blacks in their homes and working lives in South Africa" (Schlemmer & Giliomee, 1985, p. 167). However, in the squatter camps no administration existed to register residents, provide services and urban infrastructure, and maintain the environment.

In Inanda the first two decades of growth took place without any formal authority structure. The Durban City Council protested that Inanda falls outside the Durban municipal area and therefore was not its responsibility. The fact that "Inanda has for more than a century been used by the Durban economy as both a labor reserve and dumping ground for the economically expired" was conveniently forgotten (Makhatini, 1991, p. 3). The state, on the other hand, claimed that it was the onus of the landowners themselves to develop Inanda as they were housing squatters for personal profit (Interview with Mr. Makhoba, Chairperson of the Inanda Landowner's Association, 29 February 1990; cited in Makhatini, 1991, p. 3).

In the absence of a formal authority structure, considerable power fell to shacklords. Makhatini (1991) has pointed out that tenants who paid annual rents did this through an *induna* or caretaker appointed by the landlord (p. 2). If monthly rent was paid, it was done directly to the landlord. Research conducted by Wellings and Sutcliffe (1985) indicates that the landlord-tenant relationship was much more complex.

Landownership in Inanda was also complex. Africans, Indians, and whites owned land under freehold. The South African Department of Development Aid possessed land administered by the KwaZulu government. Alongside this, religious leaders owned land on which they developed villages for their followers, and in other areas chiefs and headmen controlled the use of land.

Indian tenants numbered about 2,000. Most rented land from Indian landlords. There was some racial mixing in these areas. Other areas such as

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those under the KwaZulu administration were exclusively African. A large number of Pondos had settled in the Piesang River and Bambayi areas. For Pondos, squatter camps are their only alternative since they are ineligible for township housing administered by the KwaZulu government.

Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) point to the intricate tenurial structure that underpins the complex demographic and social composition of Inanda. Three different kinds of tenants are found in the area. Some tenants pay the landlords a site fee for access to a piece of land. They then build their own house. Others pay rent to the landlord for a room. Finally, there are subletters who pay rent to the "official" tenants (p. 9).

There also exist different kinds of landlords.

> On the one hand, there exists a minority of landlords who actually possess title deeds and who collect rent from all tenants living on their property. On the other hand, there are a number of other "landlords" who do not actually legally own the land. Some landlords have, for example, "bought" pieces of land without actually registering such transfers in the deeds office. Other landlords simply control certain parcels of land. These landlords collect rents from tenants as if they "own" the land. In these cases the "legal" landlords are either absent or are the state. (Sutcliffe & Wellings, 1985, pp. 9-10)

3.7.5 Social Structure and Social Relations

Given the fact that for two decades during its rapid growth Inanda was not recognized by the authorities, it is not surprising that few facilities existed for its 250,000 people. The area contains no piped water, no electricity, no sewage system, and no parks or recreation facilities. Access to health services and education is limited.

A number of studies have contradicted the popular belief that squatter communities were mainly homes to recent migrants from the rural areas. Møller (1978), in a sample of Inanda residents, found, for example, that 31% had previously lived in rural areas, 35% had lived in the formal townships of Durban, and 34% had previously lived in the informal townships surrounding Durban.

Sutcliffe and Wellings' survey in 1985 reinforced Møller's findings. Their study found on average that tenants spent almost nine years in their present residence. When this is added to the two-thirds who had previously lived in the greater Durban region, Inanda reflects a fairly stable community.

In looking at the demographic characteristics, it is noticeable that children at school made up a relatively small proportion of each household (19%). Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) point out that the surveys indicate that the tenant households were, in the main, not "families" in the normal sense of the word. The households were often not "nuclear" familiar, nor were they "extended" families. Rather, many households consisted simply of a number of (usually adult) people brought together to be within easy commuting range of Durban (p. 33).

In Schlemmer's (1985) study of squatter communities in the Greater Durban area, he found that tenants had an average schooling of six years. Those in the formal townships had an average of 11.4 and hostel migrants 1.5 (p. 174). The majority were semi-skilled or unskilled workers (Schlemmer, 1985, p. 175). Sitas (1986) pointed to the high degree of youth unemployment in Inanda that "had created a bitter generation of young unemployed people. Even

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those in employment have oscillated over the last decade from enforced casual labor in industry to the lower rungs of grading hierarchies--to be laid off first, due to lack of experience with further economic hardships" (p. 100).

Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) found that 45% of the economically active tenants were unemployed (p. 33). They point out that this high level of unemployment is especially significant if one considers that:

1. The opportunities for black work-seekers to find employment were reduced as the recession intensified; and

2. Informal networks of mutual aid in shack settlements are not as well developed as they may be in, for example, rural areas where extended families play a significant role.

By the mid-1980s, household size averaged 9.5 (Sutcliffe & Wellings, 1985, p. 30), and there were 100 to 230 people per hectare (Hughes, 1987, p. 342). Sources of income through vegetables or small stock were curtailed or ceased to exist altogether as the settlement expanded. For many in Inanda, the situation was desperate.

In order to complete this overview of the social structure and social relations in Inanda, we need to discuss the position of the traders and landlords in the area.

3.7.6 Landlords and Traders

Indians. While Indian landholdings remained stagnant, the average size of farms declined. The holdings of individual families were split in passing from one generation to another. By the early 1960s, it was not uncommon to see

several strips or paths of land of various patterns, shapes, and sizes in juxtaposition. Thus, Christopher (1965) comments that "the main feature of Indian farming is its small scale and tending towards fragmentation" (p. 167). There was an increasing turn to income beyond the farm. Rajah (1966), in a study of agrarian patterns among Indians in the Inanda magisterial district, found that only 27% of the 116 farmers surveyed depended solely on the farm for their income.

Commenting on Indian landownership on the North Coast, Davies and Greyling (1978) maintained that "the land system constitutes a major problem for the present and future physical and social development of Indian rural areas" (Part One, p. 43). Many in Inanda were to turn to "shack farming."

Indian traders were also well placed to take advantage of accelerating black urbanization. In the Lower Tugela and Inanda Magisterial Districts along the North Coast, Indians dominated the commercial enterprises. Heath (1986) found that of the 3,299 urban commercial licenses issued in the Districts, 46 (1.4%) were to blacks, 732 (22.2%) were to whites, and 2,521 (76.4%) were to Indians. Heath also noted that

> rural commercial enterprises show some clustering where there has been marked subdivision of Indian or Black owned land and where "informal" settlements have developed. . . . Many of the rural Indian owned enterprises are located close to the KwaZulu border in a "gateway" location on a main through-route. In this way they are able to intercept local trade from KwaZulu which might otherwise reach the large centers. (p. 20)

Many of these rural enterprises with modest turnovers were transformed by the new market. In Inanda itself, many of the large "shack farmers" were also traders.

Africans. Leo Kuper pointed to the stratification that was taking place in black communities in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite this differentiation, the destiny of Kuper's "African Bourgeoisie" "remained tied to the destiny of the black majority" (Sitas, 1986, p. 88). Given the fact that Kuper's bourgeoisie was not a fully fledged capitalist class, Sitas views them as a petit-bourgeoisie. With the advance of monopoly capital there emerge two factions of this petit-bourgeoisie: a "traditional" petit-bourgeoisie consisting of traders and township businessmen and a stratum of professionals. Durban's African traders

> were shown to be anti-Indian, racialist and supporting the apartheid policy of homeland independence and development. . . . They were a stratum, an embattled and vulnerable segment of a petit-bourgeoisie trying to monopolize an ethnic market in the midst of oppressive laws, restrictions and competition. (Sitas, 1986, p. 88)

A. W. G. Champion, the ANC leader of the 1940s, reemerged in the 1960s as a propagandist of this position. Hughes (1984) points out that Champion and other African landlords and traders "couched their class protectionism in explicitly anti-Indian terms" (p. 4). Champion, a resident of Inanda, sought to remind the residents of the area that "when Indians were very arrogant, the Africans took sticks to them in 1949. . . . They beat them up and made them close their shops. Yes, the enrichment of Africans from stores and buses started in 1949, it started like that" (quoted in Hughes, 1987, p. 4).

Following the passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, African petit-bourgeoisie interests sought a dominant share of the spoils in Inanda. Champion welcomed the Act: "The Government today insists on separation. The beauty of this policy to me is our obtaining a way to build up industries in the area where we live" (quoted in Sitas, 1986, p. 90).

Inanda being a "released area" allowed the claim for exclusive African advancement in African areas. By the mid-1980s, out of the 700 landowners, 500 were African. The landowners were organized into the Inanda Landowners Association and the Piesang River Landowners Association.

African traders were organized into an association called Inyanda. After initial hesitation, Inyanda joined Inkatha in August 1976.

3.8   The Build-Up to August 1985

Schlemmer, concluding his research on Inanda undertaken in 1983, stated that "at this stage the shack-dwellers in the country's largest concentration are very highly discontented because of the lack of . . . rudimentary services, but they are far from militant."

Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985), who had spent two months prior to the violence conducting research into Inanda, found the transformation of Inanda "into places where looting, violence and intimidation became the order of the day . . . was extremely rapid and almost beyond comprehension" (p. 2). For Makhatini (1991), "the 1985 violence directed against Indians and the visibly rich is difficult to understand" (p. 4).

Despite these views, there had been a series of crises over the six years prior to August 1985 that had heightened tensions in Inanda.

3.8.1 The Water Crisis

In 1979, most parts of Natal experienced a severe drought. Many in Inanda began to feel the effects as they were dependent on streams and springs for water. Water had to be bought for as much as R1.50 a barrel (Surplus Peoples Project (SPP), Vol. 4: Natal, 1983, p. 391). An Indian shopkeeper sank a borehole and began selling water (Natal Mercury, 14 April 1979). The authorities turned a blind eye to this mounting crisis.

When, not unsurprisingly, a typhoid epidemic broke out in Inanda, an emergency committee was set up to organize water relief. The committee saw its function as "to defuse immediate problems and not to attempt any solution of long-term problems" (SPP, 1983, p. 391). The Urban Foundation proposed a scheme for a permanent water supply costing R2.5 million to implement (Daily News, 28 March 1980). The scheme, however, did not receive the support of the Department of Co-operation and Development (CAD). What the crisis did was to force the Department of CAD to assume responsibility for Inanda.

3.8.2 The Department of CAD and the Building of Newtown

The coming of the Department of CAD to Inanda began with a series of removals. On 15 July 1980, the Department put forward proposals for a site and service scheme on South African Development and Trust (SADT) land in RA 33.

The Urban Foundation, an organization funded by big business, was to offer assistance.

Within five weeks the sites were surveyed and pegged dust roads bulldozed, pit latrines with corrugated iron shelters dug on each site, and water stand-pipes put in every 800 meters. Without prior consultation, residents in the Amaoti area in the northeastern section of RA 33 were informed they could apply for the site and service scheme that came to be called Newtown. By mid-August 1982, the scheme was reported to be full, with 25,000 divided into three sections.

In a SPP survey, it was found that many thought they would be moving into a formal township. Some respondents said they were told they would be given Section 10 rights if they moved. However, residents of Newtown had to go through the labor bureau at Verulam or KwaMashu to get legally approved work.

Living conditions at Ematendeni (the place of tents), as Newtown came to be known, were extremely poor. People were given a tent for six months, a surveyed site, serviced with a latrine and a waterpoint nearby. Services in the form of schools, recreational facilities, or street lights were nonexistent. Writing in 1983, the SPP reported that

> it does not seem that Inanda Newtown can be regarded as a pilot project, testing ways and means of accommodating the other residents of informal settlements in the area. It appears rather to have been a once-off response by the central government to a crisis situation in which it was facing mounting pressure from influential sources in the private sector to act. As at New Crossroads in Cape Town, Inanda Newtown is to be regarded as an exception and cannot, at this stage, be seen to represent a fundamental breakthrough in either housing or influx control policies on the part of the State. (p. 404)

What the removal to Newtown did do was to create tensions between differing interest groups in Inanda. During the removals, a Liaison Committee was set up by the Verulam Magistrate for RA33. The committee did not include any of the people being removed. It did include KwaZulu MP and prominent landowner, Rogers Ngcobo. For the landowners, the removals meant a loss of tenants--tenants whom the state expected them not to replace. Mr. Ngcobo opposed the committee on the basis that it had been selected before any consultation. A new liaison committee emerged with Mr. Ngcobo as chairperson.

At the same time, a Residents' Committee was formed at Newtown. While it is unclear how representative the body was, it soon came into a conflictual relation with the Liaison Committee. During the SPP survey, it was rumored that an attempt had been made on the Residents' Committee Chairperson's life by Mr. Ngcobo's "men," since he was seen as a threat to Mr. Ngcobo's power in the area (SPP, 1983, p. 401).

3.8.3 Evictions and the State/Landlord/ Tenant Crisis

The state began evictions on SADT land in RA33. In mid-February 1982, 43 notices of eviction were given to families in Nhungwane in RA33. They were given until April 1. On the day of the eviction, about 100 women picketed the offices of the Verulam magistrate. After representations from the KwaZulu government and PFP MP Ray Swart, a reprieve was granted. As the Chief Commissioner of Natal bluntly put it, this did not mean a general reprieve: "People who squat in Inanda Newtown could expect to be prosecuted 'as and

when they are discovered'" (Sunday Tribune, 4 April 1982). Through a series of technical arguments, lawyers were able to win stays of evictions.

The state began to pressure Indian landlords to evict tenants. In October 1981, Indian landlords in Amaoti were told by the Department of Health to provide services such as water and sanitation or evict their tenants. African landlords did not receive the same notice. The SPP found that landlords were being pressured by a threat from the Department of CAD that the land would simply be bought by the SADT. The Commissioner at Verulam pressured one Indian landowner to provide the names and reference book numbers of tenants on the land (SPP, 1983, pp. 405-406). Some landlords succumbed and allowed shacks to be razed by officials. The SPP commented at the time that these "actions by Indian landlords exacerbate ill-feeling between tenants and landlords in the area" (SPP, 1983, p. 406).

The Indian landlords were caught in a difficult situation. They were being asked to provide services at immense cost by the state, at precisely the time that their own future was looking increasingly tenuous. While the landlords were being asked to upgrade or evict, a plan for Inanda commissioned by the state was receiving prominence. The plan involved the upgrading of squatter settlements rather than their removal (Daily News, 14 April 1982).

The plan recommended that all land owned by non-Africans should be expropriated and given to the KwaZulu government. The Report estimated that 326 Indian landowners would lose their properties (Daily News, 8 June 1983).

A few landowners sold their properties before the violence. Many hesitated because of the low prices offered.

> We will go although we do not want to. We have been trading here since 1903 . . . but we want fair compensation. The only commercial land offered to us is in the Phoenix complex and the price is so high that with the compensation money paid we would not be able to even purchase the site, let alone build premises and wait to develop new businesses. (shopkeeper, quoted in Meer, 1985, p. 152)

At the beginning of 1984, newspapers reported that Indian landowners were being molested, threatened, and victimized by African tenants. Under banner headlines like "Inanda Timebomb," Indian tenants complained that they were being assaulted (Sunday Tribune Herald, 26 February 1984). The Department of Community Development received reports of the "acute possibility of Indian women being raped." The government appealed to the Durban City Council to rehouse the 4,500 Indians living in Inanda. The state was probably keen to consolidate Inanda into KwaZulu. It would be a further step in the development of the homeland system that the state was still wedded to. It would also mean that capital would continue to have access to African labor without the state having to concede Section 10 rights. The KwaZulu government was also pressurizing the state to give it Inanda. This was one of the few areas surrounding Durban that did not fall under its jurisdiction.

The removal of the Indian presence would smooth the process of consolidation. However, the City Council refused to rehouse the Indian residents. It argued that it already had a waiting list of 17,500 families, and the Inanda residents were not its liability (Natal Mercury, 28 February 1984).

After initial publicity of the government plans for Inanda, not much was heard. Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) found in their research, however, that the plan and subsequent developments gave rise to a number of rumors.

First, there was talk that the South African government was in the process of selectively expropriating Indian land in the area and that this expropriation might be extended to include African-owned land as well. There had, for example, recently been a concerted move to buy out certain Indian shops and landholdings in the area. When the African landowners approached Dr. L. Rive (Chairman of the KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council) about this, he replied that African-owned land would only be expropriated in order to improve the road and water infrastructure.

Second, it was alleged that meetings had recently been held under the auspices of Inkatha at which there were discussions around the question of how to get the Indians out of Inanda so that the area could properly become part of KwaZulu. While the allegation about Inkatha being behind such moves is extremely difficult to verify, recent consolidation plans drawn up by a South African government-appointed commission quite clearly support the incorporation of parts of Inanda into KwaZulu.

Third, during the unrest we heard of a meeting of certain African landowners and shopowners on the weekend preceding the unrest (27 July 1985). The specific purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to get Indians out of Inanda. It was suggested to us that an African landowner was behind these moves, presumably to set himself up as Mayor when the area became a

proclaimed township, and to ensure that he was well poised to monopolize commercial undertakings in the area.

And fourth, there was some dissatisfaction being expressed that officials of the South African government were saying one thing to Inanda people and doing another. This was especially true in the case of people forced to move because of the building of the Inanda dam. In terms of the conditions laid down by the KwaZulu government in agreeing to the removals, "those removed should have a choice of resettling in Inanda's RA33, in other KwaZulu tribal areas their land might result in a similar uprooting for them" (Sutcliffe & Wellings, 1985, p. 13).

By the mid-1980s, there were deep divisions within Inanda. The next section provides a detailed look at these divisions.

3.9 Inanda—Sitting on the Time Bomb

A number of lines of division ran through the community. The most prominent was the relationships between African tenants/consumers and Indian landlords/retailers, and between African and Indian landlords/retailers.

3.9.1 Tenants/Consumers and Indian Landlords/Retailers

The aftermath of the Soweto uprisings saw the first substantial attempt by the state to revamp apartheid policy. The Riekert strategy adopted in 1979 was based on the premise that a clear distinction could be drawn between urban and rural Africans. Urban "insiders" would supply industry's need for a more skilled and productive workforce. Rural "outsiders" would be sealed out of urban labor

markets and confined to the bantustans. Upward occupational mobility would lead to social stratification within the urban African population, and labor market controls would differentiate more sharply between "insiders" as a whole and "outsiders."

In the Durban context, Inanda residents would fall into the latter category. Residents with Section 10 rights had preferential access to jobs in the major cities/towns and better provision of services. Section 10 rights were mainly restricted to those in formal townships inside "South Africa." "Squatters" in Inanda would have found it increasingly difficult to break into the job market.

The worsening position of the "outsiders" was exacerbated by changes in the labor market in the 1970s and 1980s. Hindson (1991) argues that this period saw the rising skill and wage composition of the employed workforce, accompanied by occupational and residential stabilization (p. 231). Alongside this, one had growing unemployment and the permanent exclusion of increasing numbers from the wage economy. It was those in the squatter camps with limited skill and educational levels who bore the brunt of these developments in the labor market.

It is not surprising, given the above context, that Sitaw (1986) estimated unemployment in Inanda to be approximately 40% to 50% of the economically active population. Caught in a web of poverty, meeting rental payments became increasingly difficult. Landlords turned to coercion to collect rents. In the absence of any local government in Inanda, landlords/retailers wielded immense power. Organizing to resist the repressive tactics of the landlords was difficult.

In the formal townships, residents experienced the landlord as a collective entity (the local government). By contrast, Inanda residents' relation to landlords was individualized to small groups of households and individual landlords. Organization to redress grievances is much more difficult in the individualized cases.

Informal sector activity (one of the few avenues open for those permanently excluded from the wage economy) also found it difficult to survive competition with the Indian retailer. The retailer could buy in bulk and sell on credit. In any case, those involved in the informal sector probably did their purchasing from the local retailer.

The State also deepened lines of fracture between Indian landlords and tenants by forcing them to provide services or evict tenants. This was done at a time when the State was touting a plan to expropriate Indian-owned land. It is significant that the State did not call on African landlords to provide services. The State was keen to draw Inanda into KwaZulu. The National Party's attempt to modify apartheid policy in the wake of the Soweto uprisings did not go beyond the premises of territorial apartheid. It was believed that urban Africans would accept marginally strengthened local government structures while casting their votes as citizens in one or the other of the bantustans. Rural "outsiders" were still to be accommodated (economically and politically) within the bantustans. It wanted to achieve the consolidation of "black spots" into the bantustans with as little expense as possible. In Inanda the cost of consolidation would involve compensation to 326 landowners. The State did acquire two portions of land in

the Piesang River area from Indian owners (Urban Foundation, 1980, p. 16). However, it did not continue this process, probably finding the exercise too exorbitant.

The relationship that came to be established between landlords/retailers (mostly Indian) and tenants/consumers (mostly African) was one in which the landlords-cum-retailers wielded a significant amount of power in the area, and specifically over the conditions of life of their tenants. Often the landlords threatened the very presence of the tenants in the area. When the opportunity arose to remove the position of the landlords, it was taken. This power is reflected in the SPP survey cited earlier, which enquired into the reason for moving to the site and service scheme at Newtown. One of the things that appeared to be attractive about the new scheme was that tenants would be able to escape "fussy" landlords. Many tenants reported that the landlords had a "dictatorial" attitude to them and tried to control their daily lives. What emerges clearly in the survey material is that tenants found themselves subject to the whims of the landlord. "Here there is the prospect of building our own house. Where we were, we were going to remain lodgers for the rest of our lives," said one of the respondents in the SPP (SPP, Volume 4, 1983, p. 396).

There was no real community of interests between Indian and African tenants. When African residents found employment, it was at the lowest rungs of the employment hierarchy. The majority of people employed in the formal sector were semi-skilled nonmanual laborers (Urban Foundation, 1980, p. 32). Indian workers, unfettered by legal constraints and with better educational levels,

also had increased chances not only of finding a job but also of moving up the job hierarchy. Often Indian tenants were seen to be favored in their relationship with Indian landlords. In any case, many of the 2,000 or so Indian tenants bore some familial relation to the landlord.

3.9.2 Indian and African Landlords and Retailers

Indian and African landlords and retailers did not develop any "alliance of interests." Rather, the relationship was competitive and often antagonistic. Africans were restricted from acquiring more land through the provisions of the 1913 Land Act. Indians, their own attempt to expand within the confines of central Durban curtailed by legislation, began to turn to places like Inanda. "Protected" from competition by Africans, Indians were able to expand their landowning and trader interests.

When the influx of squatters started in the early 1960s, the African petit-bourgeoisie wanted a share of the market. They saw the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 as a means not only to break into the lucrative market provided by the squatters but also as a weapon to completely wipe out Indian competition. For this to happen, Inanda needed to be consolidated into KwaZulu. However, this did not happen because the central state claimed it did not have the finance to purchase land from Indians, a prerequisite for consolidation.

The affiliation of Inyanda (a traders' association) to Inkatha brought a new dimension into the fray. Inkatha over the years had failed to make any inroads

into Inanda (the UDF by August 1985 had no substantial presence either). Incorporation would be a quick "fix" to this problem as policing and local government functions would fall into the hands of the KwaZulu government. Here the interests of Inyanda and Inkatha coalesced. Incorporation would remove Indian competition at one go.

Inkatha brought in a particular strand of ethnic politics. For Inkatha, the affiliation of Inyanda was one more brick in the building of the Zulu nation. The interests of the Zulu nation had to be weighed up against the interests of the Indian "nation." Buthelezi was prone to using the ethnic card. He had accused the UDF of being manipulated by Indians. When criticized by students at the University of Durban-Westville (a predominantly Indian institution at the time), he reminded Indians of what had happened in 1949. Mare and Hamilton (1987) point out that racism and racial stereotyping had emerged in KwaZulu and Inkatha politics at different times (pp. 151-152). Thus, Buthelezi, in an obvious reference to the Natal Indian Congress, argued that there is "an African level [of fighting apartheid] whose dynamics can only be grasped by Africans," and that "Africans resent being seen just as a mass of brown, that must be guided by the brains of other race groups." Chief Sithole told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) that "when the Congress (ANC) was composed only of Africans, there were no problems, but that the trouble started when different nations were allowed to join. We must be wary of these Indians because they want to use us as their tools, as a ladder for them to reach their goals." This ethnic chauvinism was particularly inflammatory given the fragility of social relations in Inanda.

The state meanwhile was arguing that it could only support development if Indians moved out. This would allow for land to be incorporated into KwaZulu. Indian tenants were keen to move, but only if they were given access to subsidized state housing. Indian landlords and shopkeepers demanded adequate compensation.

Thus, the KwaZulu government, the central state, and African business interests had a stake in the removal of Indian presence. It is hardly surprising in this context that at a meeting called by the Inanda Liaison Committee on 25 or 26 July 1985, a speaker called for Indians to be driven out since they had refused to sell the land and were blocking development (Meer, 1989, p. 154).

3.9.3 The "Spark" for the Violence

On 1 August, a prominent UDF leader, Victoria Mxenge, was assassinated outside her house in Umlazi. Protesting the assassination, a school strike and boycott spread out of Umlazi and engulfed KwaMashu, Clermont, Lamontville, and Inanda in quick succession.

While the spark that set off the spiral of violence was the assassination, the form that the violence took displayed a significant degree of specificity in the different areas. In Inanda, gangs of youths began threatening Indian shopkeepers, landlords, and residents. The threats gave rise to mass panic. When on 6 August, two Indian-owned shops and houses were looted and burnt, hundreds of Indians left Inanda and sought refuge in the adjoining Indian township of Phoenix. By the end of the week, 42 Indian-owned shops and businesses and as many houses were destroyed, while 2,000 Indian refugees

pondered their future in Phoenix. The media and many in the Indian community billed Inanda 1985 as a repeat of the 1949 riots.

3.10 Inanda—August 1985

On the night of 5 August, a group of youths besieged the house of a policeman in Ntuzuma, a township adjacent to Inanda. The policeman fatally shot one of the youths. "The following, the 'rolling strike,' now enraged, reached Inanda" (Hughes, 1987, p. 348). That afternoon the looting of Indian-owned shops began. This pattern was to continue through Wednesday and Thursday. An eyewitness reported that on Wednesday "at about 1 p.m. a mob besieged the Phoenix Cash Store and looted it once the owner, Ebrahim Jeebhai, left. They went on a kilometer further to loot Laljeeth Rattan's store and then into two Indian homes" (Meer, 1985, p. 155). Ranjith Rammarain was informed on Wednesday that family and friends were trapped in Inanda. An initial rescue attempt was repulsed by a stone-throwing crowd. Fully armed, he made a second, more successful attempt by "riding shotgun" in a truck: "It had been a rough ride. It was frightening because at Ntuzuma crossing we were stoned and then when we got to Inanda near Cassim's store it happened again" (Natal Mercury, 7 August 1985). The scene that greeted Rammarain when he got to Inanda was the burned-out shells of buses and cars still in their parking lots. Rammarain's own house lay in ruins. The only thing left untouched was the temple in the yard, with the red flag dedicated to the Hindu god, Hanuman, still adorning the roof.

Another family told of how they begged a military contingent to give them protection while they moved their family and some of their belongings. The

military refused. "They did not even get off their vehicles and left after stopping by for about two minutes." The family managed to get away. The next day, Thursday, at about 1:30 p.m., when members of the family returned to collect what remained, they saw the Casspirs (military vehicles) stationed in front of the shop, but when a building opposite was about to be attacked by a mob, the Casspirs disappeared. The shop was burnt soon thereafter. It seemed to them that the Casspirs were almost protecting the crowds in their burning and looting (Meer, 1985, p. 159).

As over a thousand Indian refugees made their way into Phoenix, tensions and anger heightened in the sprawling township. On Friday, 9 August, armed groups massed on both sides of the Inanda/Phoenix divide "spoiling" for a fight. While the confrontation did not materialize, both sides followed each other in ransacking and ultimately destroying the Ghandi Phoenix Settlement—a shrine of peace. As Hughes (1987) comments:

> The tragic symbolism of the burning of the Ghandi Settlement went far beyond the immediate act of the violent destruction of a "place of peace." It signified also the void of political organizations and ideas on all sides of the Group Areas divide, which would have allayed, or at least toned down, the confrontations. (p. 350)

It is tragically ironic that it was at the Settlement that "peace camps" had been held to bridge racial divides in the early 1970s.

While the drama unfolded at the Ghandi Settlement, a new factor had entered the fray. A resident in Ntuzuma reported on Friday the 9th that Inkatha supporters armed with sticks were going house to house, trying to persuade people to join them. "They are taking anybody. They say there are people they

want to kill" (Daily News, 9 August 1985). Inkatha *impis* armed with spears began to engage UDF-aligned youth in KwaMashu and Umlazi. By Saturday they had seized control.

The Lindelani *impi* which had tamed Kwamashu now turned their attention to Inanda. The *impi*, however, met with sustained resistance. A series of attacks was beaten off by Inanda residents. Many in Inanda turned against Inkatha since the attacks were carried out in its name.

On Sunday (the 12th), Inkatha called a meeting to establish peace in the Phoenix and Inanda areas. About 5,000 Inkatha supporters and 100 Indians attended the meeting. Oscar Dhlomo, General Secretary of Inkatha, told the meeting that Inkatha had taken control of the townships in order to put an end to the violence, to protect property, public buildings, and businesses (Sitas, 1986, pp. 111-112). The last incident of violence in Inanda, identifiable as part of the August upsurge, came exactly a week after it had all begun. On Tuesday, 13 August, the burnt bodies of three Indian men were found on the Phoenix/Inanda border. They were all from the same family: a father, his son, and his brother-in-law (Hughes, 1987, p. 351; Jacobs, 1985, p. 6). This brought the death toll to 70.

3.11   Analysis of the 1985 Violence

3.11.1   Overview

South Africa's black townships were engulfed in mass action and political violence throughout 1985. Durban's townships were relatively quiet, seemingly out of "sync" with the patterns of conflict in the rest of the country. The singular explanation, touted by the media, for this situation was the moderating influence

of the Inkatha movement (Sitas, 1987, p. 86). In August, all this changed. Durban's townships exploded, leaving some 70 dead and over 1,000 people injured. The violence in Inanda needs to be understood in the context of the general conflict in Durban's townships.

There were two broad phases to the violence. The first phase, involving mainly students, was a direct response to Victoria Mxenge's assassination. The second was a violent response to the protests from within Inkatha ranks.

In the first phase, beginning on Monday, 5 August, schoolchildren, mainly in KwaMashu, Umlazi, Clermont, and Lamontville, began moving from school to school recruiting pupils to join the protest. They were joined by hundreds of youths not at school or unemployed.

This initial phase displayed both an angry and euphoric mood. Sections of these vast processions were visibly angry about the assassination and were completely defiant towards police presence; sections were also chanting and in good humor and were inviting everyone to join them (Sitas, 1986, p. 105).

The focus of the protests was homeland government or other quasi-political targets. In Umlazi, the Administration Building of the KwaZulu government was burnt. Numerous attempts were made to burn down policemen's houses. Many of the dominant trader/councilor businesses were also attacked. Leading Inkatha member, Wellington Sabelo's shop was attacked in Umlazi. The local post office was also destroyed.

In KwaMashu, a crowd of 2,000 to 3,000 tried to attack the KwaMashu shopping complex, where many of the major township interests (and big

business chain stores) reside, but were dispersed by police. A shopping center in Ntuzuma was razed to the ground. Schools and school principals were attacked; cars that were too "posh" and vehicles with business logos were hijacked and often burnt.

By Thursday afternoon, Inkatha began to mobilize to gain control of the townships. Students, already in some disarray from the vicious response of the police, were no match for Inkatha's *impis*. In the larger townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi, Inkatha was quickly able to assume control.

In Inanda, events were somewhat different. Protesting pupils were joined by gangs of youths who began threatening Indian shopkeepers and residents that they would burn their property and houses. Some 1,000 Indians left their homes and sought refuge in the Indian township of Phoenix. Many of the shops and houses after their abandonment were then looted and burnt. Inkatha found Inanda very difficult to subdue. Numerous attacks were repulsed through Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. It was only on Sunday that Inkatha *impis* were able to march into Inanda.

3.11.2 Composition of the Rioters

Central to the 1985 violence were the youth (later known as the comrades movement) and the *impis* led by warlords who attempted to return "law and order" to the townships. This section looks at the social origins of both groups.

3.11.2.1 The comrades movement. Sociologist Ari Sitas (1991) points out that through the influence of the media, the word "comrade" conjured up images of unemployed black youth with no future, no hope, busy destroying

everything in their way (p. 1). The media picture is of young men, hungry men, with hardened features and red eyes—exactly what happens to the myth of a primal Africa when a patriarchy collapses and the age-sets run loose: a new version of barbarism. The "older" version, Inkatha, strikes back.

Sitas argues that one cannot equate "comrades" with unemployed black youth. Sitas's interviews with more than 200 members of the comrades movement in Natal revealed that while most comrades are young (under 35 years of age) and come from embattled working-class households, among the phenomenon one will find full wage-earners, informal sector vendors, university graduates, political activists, schoolchildren, shop stewards, petty criminals, and lumpenproletarians. Seventy-two percent of the youths came from working-class households; 15% came from a lower-middle-class stratum of civil servants, businessmen, and traders; 6% came from professional middle-class backgrounds; and 6% came from no households whatsoever, but had existed since their early years in the streets.

The ages ranged from 14 to 31: 60% were under 18 years old, 24% were under 24, and the rest were over 24. Only 6% were women, all over 18 and under 24. Most of the under-18s were or were supposed to be at school. Most of the rest were unemployed (53%) and/or casually employed (21%). (Of these, 65% had the U.S. equivalent of Grade 11 or Grade 12.) A smaller grouping was made up of those working in factories and shops and in the commercial and distributive sector (13%); 8% were tertiary education students, and 5% were clerks or trainee managers.

The comrades movement possessed a diversity of constituents. At one end of the spectrum, one could find a 14 year old who grew up in a harsh environment, abandoned by parents and raised by youth gangs, an expert survivor and petty criminal; and a 27 year old, ex-COSAS, Fort Hare fine art graduate, semi-employed democratic-socialist intellectual. In between, there is a union shop steward, a sprinkling of young mass-production workers, and a mass of unemployed.

The 1985 violence saw the comrades movement pitted against Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha, the KwaZulu homeland structure, and the central state.

3.11.2.2 <u>Warlords and *Impis*</u>. *Impis* allied to Inkatha were central to the attempt to turn back the comrades movement that was sweeping across the townships. The most conspicuous of the *impis* were from Lindelani, led by Thomas Shabalala. Shabalala was typical of the warlords who controlled the informal squatter areas around Durban.

Warlords arose in the absence of any formal structure in the squatter camps. The local strong man organizes his own vigilantes to curb the crime in his area. To pay his vigilantes he creates a tax base from rents or a household levy. Minnaar (1992) points out that, eventually, such an urban warlord needs either to protect himself from rivals or keep the KwaZulu government from interfering in his activities, so he opts for some sort of recognition by formally joining Inkatha (p. 3). The various warlords tend to join Inkatha mainly because in KwaZulu this relationship is based on a *quid pro quo*—as a reward for being left alone, they will undertake to deliver a certain number of men for Inkatha rallies

and also provide "soldiers" for any fighting that needs to be done. They sometimes bus vigilantes to other warlords who might need assistance or organize vigilante attacks on UDF/ANC strongholds.

Shabalala was elected spokesman for the people of Lindelani in 1984. He also became the chairman of the local Inkatha branch and later KwaZulu (KLA) MP for Lindelani and, eventually, an Inkatha Central Committee member. When, in 1983, he moved into the area that later became known as Lindelani, he formed what he called his "community guard force" since there were no street lights or police station in the area. Residents of Lindelani claim they have to pay R20-00 a month (some say R3-00 for "rent" and R5-00 to cover the costs of the township's police, the rest for other charges such as water and Inkatha membership dues) for living under the protection of Shabalala's private army. Over and above his regular force of guards, Shabalala often calls on male residents for guard duties to protect his house or patrol the streets of Lindelani at night. The young people are "asked" to attend meetings on a regular basis for the purpose of securing the "correct social and moral behavior of the children" (Minnaar, 1992, p. 12).

It was Shabalala's *impis* who led the counter-reaction to the comrades, taming KwaMashu and attacking Inanda.

Both sides of the political spectrum had similar ideas on the composition of the rioters. The NIC/UDF blamed the violence on "thugs and hooligans" (Sunday Tribune Herald, 18 August 1985). Oscar Dlomo, then general secretary

of Inanda, saw the violence as the work of "faceless criminal agents and as examples of 'hooliganism and lawlessness'" (Natal Post, 14-17 August 1985).

While it is true that criminal elements had their day in the violence, the core of the protesters were the youth who were later to coalesce into the comrades movement. Their targets were specific: homeland government buildings and its leadership, business interests, "agents of the system" like policemen and rich people made conspicuous by their consumption patterns in areas of widespread poverty and squalor. One sees the parallels between Dhlomo's characterization of the protectors as "faceless criminal agents" and the media picture of young men, hungry men with hardened features and red eyes with the irrationalist position of seeing the crowds as being criminal by nature, and as an "evil force, a terrible serpent whose segments are composed of subjugated beaten-down men" (Tarde, 1893; cited in Applebaum & McGuire, 1986, p. 32).

The protesters were to form the core of the comrades that was to develop into a full-scale social movement in the region. Sitas (1991), in his research, found that comrades were bound together by a leveling idea (pp. 6-8). They distinguish themselves from those, for example, with cars or money who are able to flee their locality. They obey the codes of a metaphor: they are the soldiers of the liberation movement, and a militarization of their subculture is endemic. Between the leveling idea of belonging to the "have nots" and the militarized culture of resistance, there is a cultural formation that is about "style" in everyday common behavior. You belong because of the way you sing, the slogans you

know, the lineages you have learnt, the way you speak to each other. Among comrades are not only the fighters. There are, too, the thinkers and the resource people. Leaders range from worker leaders to ex-Robben Island prisoners, student militants, university graduates, and hundreds of unemployed youth. "Resource" people include church workers and criminals. In 1985 the comrades had not achieved organizational or ideological coherence. However, particular symbols were being targeted, and it is probable that the protesters consisted of the diversity that was later to emerge as the comrades movement. While the protesters of 1985 had many "faces," it is clearly incorrect to categorize them as "faceless criminals."

Similarly, one cannot simply label the *impis* as "thugs and hooligans" or another example of "the smouldering passion inhabiting the Zulu soul which the veneer of civilization has barely dampened" (The Natal Witness, 20 January 1949). The *impis* were acting at the behest of the warlords. It has already been argued that because of the absence of legal and administrative regulation, violence is inscribed in the very relations of reproduction of the shantytowns. Morris (1992) has pointed out that peaceful coexistence between different squatter leaders, shantytown warlords, or lieutenants is necessarily a transient phenomenon, for each is driven by a compelling force to expand his territory and range of tenants at the expense of the other. Warlord intervention in the 1985 violence was driven by two objectives: putting down the challenge to Inkatha and extending their own sphere of influence.

In Inanda, events were different from Cato Manor of 1949. In Inanda, it was only after most of the Indians had left that the burning and looting took place. In the initial violence, it was only Indians who were targeted. There were powerful interests that would have liked the Indians thrown out of Inanda—the central government and the KLA. African landowners and shacklords were also keen to buy out Indian property. However, there is no evidence that the initial threats made by youth were done at the behest of any organized interests. Indian shopowners were probably seen as the most vulnerable sector in the community. Once they responded to the threats by fleeing, the looting and burning took on their own momentum. Unguarded shops in a context where the forces of law and order are nonexistent are difficult to resist. Where there is a general upsurge, it is probably impossible, especially where the owners have fled the area. Youth were joined in the looting by unemployed adults, old people, and workers.

Most commentators have argued against seeing the violence as being anti-Indian. Meer's position in this context has been mentioned. Similarly, Sutcliffe and Wellings (1985) argued that

> Prior to the unrest, no deep-seated racist or anti-landlord sentiments existed in the Inanda area. Thus, we believe one cannot build a model of the unrest which paints it as an African-Indian confrontation. Such simplistic analysis only lends credence to the racist explanations provided by the South African government and its mouthpiece, the South African Broadcasting Corporation. (p. 40)

However, many factors do point in the direction of anti-Indian sentiment. These include: the simple observation that Indian property was largely targeted in Inanda while that of African "businessmen" was not; this compares to the

situation in the rest of Durban's settlements at the time where African-owned businesses bore the brunt of the attacks; the attacks on the Gandhi settlement; the battle lines which formed between Phoenix and Inanda, with Indian vigilantes arming themselves in preparation for an attack on Phoenix; and the fact that African warlords rapidly moved in to take control over Indian-owned land, and that there was never any attempt to reinstate the Indian landowners.

However, one cannot argue that the rioters were all similarly imbued with an anti-Indian consciousness. We need to try to differentiate between the rioters. The youth, who marched through KwaMashu, Ntuzuma, and into Inanda and were joined by the youth there, had singled out apartheid agents and symbols of privilege as targets. In Inanda, while there were Indian and African landlords, Indians dominated the commercial enterprises. These were the immediate symbols of privilege that were attacked. When the students were routed by the police, they lost control of the situation. It was then that the *lumpen* youth from Inanda moved in. Prior to the violence, levels of crime were very high. Most shops were heavily encased in iron grilles at night, and a few of the larger Indian homes enclosed by high barbed wire fencing and, after dark, in glaring spotlight. Gangs had moved into the area and cornered areas of influence for themselves. Hughes (1987) quotes one commentator as referring to the gangs as "social bandits turned blood-suckers—some at least may be traced back to Cato Manor days" (p. 343). The abandoned Indian shops and homes became easy targets of opportunity for these organized "bandits." Unexpected opportunities also arose for ordinary residents. Meer (1989) describes one such event:

We spoke to Beatrice, who has taken over the Govender house--six very dark rooms with a veranda. She had rented a room from them for the last fifteen years. That she had been close to them was reflected in her distinctly Indian-accented English. She said she was a member of Inkatha. "When they came to attack, I hid the Indians and I told them that this was my house." After the mob left, the Indians took what they could carry and went away. She says she will buy the house now because the Govenders will not come back. (p. 50)

Many unemployed adults, old people, and workers joined in the looting.

The Inkatha counterattack was planned. Buthelezi made his intentions clear: "There was no way in which they would accept being terrorised by other blacks aided and abetted by misguided children and their thugs" (Sitas, 1987, p. 109). The real organized violence came from Inkatha *impis*. On Thursday the 8th, Inkatha began to mobilize. Hundreds of *impis* began scattering groups of youth and conducting house-to-house searches for stolen goods. KwaMashu, Ntuzuma, and Umlazi were brought under control. In Inanda, Inkatha warlords subdued the youth and criminal elements and began to take the place of the absent Indian landlords.

The interests of the warlords and Inkatha coalesced. The warlords were attracted by the possibilities of pecuniary gain and personal power. Inkatha was keen to extend its influence into Inanda and see off Indian landlords as this would facilitate the consolidation of Inanda into KwaZulu.

While African merchants/landlords clearly had a stake in the removal of their Indian counterparts, they did not take an active part in the violence. The African landlords were, of course, in an invidious position. They had not wholeheartedly supported incorporation into KwaZulu because they were worried that their own land would be threatened in a consolidation program.

Once warlords had settled in, they began to move against those interests that were opposed to incorporation. African landlords were forced to flee or support Inkatha. Youth, civic, and church organizations were violently repressed. According to Makhatini (1991),

> Warlords presented themselves as Inkatha representatives to people. They recruited and collected Inkatha subscriptions. They were said to be lobbying the KwaZulu government to negotiate with the central government for the incorporation of these areas into KwaZulu, which would ensure permanence of the squatters and their own perpetual power. They traveled to Ulundi and returned with promises of aid from KwaZulu if enough people joined the Inkatha organization. (p. 8)

In spite of the existence of criminal gangs who looted, the behavior of the majority of looters lends itself to sociological explanation in terms of theories of collective behavior in riot situations. It has been suggested by Quarantelli and Dynes that looting can be seen as a rather violent beginning to a process of collective bargaining concerning rights and responsibilities of certain communities. Looting, they argue, is an index of social change. It is also an instrument of societal change. They suggest that the pattern of looting passes through roughly three stages in a rioting situation. First, there is a primarily symbolic looting stage where destruction rather than plunder appears to be the intention. Then a stage of conscious and deliberate looting begins. Finally, there is a stage when plundering becomes the normal socially supportive thing to do, and property rights are redefined to achieve some kind of transfer of material goods (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1968).

If we consider the violence in Inanda, we can see a similar pattern revealed, especially if we see stages one and two as running into each other.

The most widespread form of looting seems to have been during stage three, when it became the normally supportive thing to do. It could also be argued that the riots were the rather violent beginning to a process of "collective bargaining" concerning rights and responsibilities of certain communities. The warlords took advantage of the absence of Indian landlords and traders to initiate a process of "collective bargaining" via the KLA with the central state for incorporation into KwaZulu.

In the early 1980s, Inanda acted as a safety net for those Africans struggling to maintain a toehold in the vicinity of Durban. Residents were prepared to take on all comers in their striving to free themselves of any external authority. The initial targeting of Indian shops must be seen as part of the broader upsurge that targeted symbols of wealth and privilege. Indian shops were obviously the softer option. African traders and their families, if experiences in other townships were anything to go by, would have mounted determined resistance. In any case, Indians were the dominant trader class, the more outstanding symbols of wealth. The looting of Indian houses and shops should not be seen as straightforward expressions of racial hostility. As Oberschall (1968), writing with reference to the 1965 Los Angeles riots, reminds us, looting's

> attraction to people lacking the consumer goods others take for granted needs no complex explanation beyond the simple desire to obtain them when the opportunity to do so involves a low risk of apprehension by the police. Such action is facilitated by low commitment to the norms of private property expressed in the propensity of "the poor to seek a degree of elementary social justice at the expense of the rich," the fact that others were doing the same thing, and the fact that the stores sacked in this case belonged to "Whitey." (p. 338)

The African community was not homogeneous, but it was united in fighting off any outside authority that would jeopardize its already precarious existence close to central Durban. This is seen by Inanda's determined resistance to attempts to Inkatha *impis* to control the area. On Thursday, a heavily armed *impi* from the Lindelani squatter camp arrived at the Inanda settlements of Bambayi and Amaouti, attacking everyone in sight.

> They had seriously miscalculated the situation because the crowds set upon them and sent them off with a few killed and many injured. . . . The *impis* returned at 2 a.m. for a surprise attack, and again, the community was ready and they repulsed *impi.* It returned twice more the next evening and was again repulsed. In the process everybody turned against Inkatha, because the attacks were carried out in its name. The second largest concentration of deaths occurred in this conflict. (Sitas, 1986, p. 111)

In Inanda, the warlords consolidated their position after a prolonged struggle. However, as their collusion with Inkatha hastened Inanda's incorporation into KwaZulu, the community led by the youth began to confront the warlords. By early 1989, violent confrontation had become more organized,

> and the first warlord areas to fall were used as springboards for attack on further areas. Inkatha came under siege. Some warlords fled their areas. Others and their followers were killed. By the end of the year most of Inanda had been liberated and youth and civic organizations were gaining support. . . . This situation saw the landlords gain control of their land and new relationships formed with them. (Makhatini, 1991, p. 4)

The community was able, in most cases, to negotiate mechanisms for the payment of rent to landlords.

Recently, warlords have begun to reappear in Inanda. In many cases, landlords have made the short leap to warlordism. In the absence of legal and administrative measures, it is difficult to sustain a rent-paying scheme that relies

on the goodwill of the tenants. This is made all the more difficult when tenants are poverty stricken. Social relations in shantytowns are alternately characterized by volatility and stasis as the locus of power and control shifts around.

Inkatha's determination to restore "order" in 1985 reveals the upsurge as developing into a broader people's revolt. In the 1940s, the struggles were of a more limited nature. For one, the number of Africans in the urban areas was limited. Education levels were extremely low, and resources were limited. Communication at local and national levels was limited. This meant that resistance was often isolated and easily put down. By the 1970s, much of this had changed. South Africa's transition to monopoly capitalism created the objective conditions for a broadly based union movement with national linkages. The expansion of secondary schooling and tertiary education created the conditions for student organizations. The youth, many of whom had lived all their lives in the urban areas, began to organize. Localized struggles were replaced by struggles that spread countrywide. Resistance was much more intense and prolonged. A broad stratum of black intellectuals began to play a pronounced role in the extra-parliamentary movement. A number of white academics lent their skills and resources to the union movement. The shop stewards of the 1970s emerged as highly experienced working-class leaders with significant constituencies in the early 1980s. After a few false starts, workers and youth organizations began to synchronize their struggles by the beginning of the 1980s.

When the struggle for Durban's township began in August 1985, most of the African townships in the other major urban centers were in turmoil. Many townships of the Eastern Cape resembled liberated zones, with street committees performing civic functions. The 1985 Durban upsurge cannot be seen in isolation from those national developments. It was part of a broad-based, people's revolt by people who had no political rights in the urban areas. In different regions the struggle took different forms. In most cases those regarded as "aliens" within the communities were expelled. In the Eastern Cape these were identified as community councilors and black policemen. In Durban these aliens were identified as the rich and wealthy.

3.12 Summary

The chapter focused mainly on the character of the riots. In looking at participation in the riots of 1949, the "scum of the earth" thesis was not supported. While the *amalaita* gangs participated in the violence, dockworkers, ricksha pullers, and *ngoma* dance troupes were participants in the violence. The riots were found to have both instrumental and consummatory actions. While the riots were anti-Indian, they were stimulated and guided by conditions related to the changing context of apartheid. The focus then shifted to the 1985 violence. There are important points of difference from the 1949 riots. A large part of the violence was African versus African. There were different battle lines. The comrades took on the symbols of power and privilege in the different townships. The *impis* fought the comrades. African residents of Inanda united to fight off Inkatha-aligned *impis*. Also there was Indo-African violence. While the 1949

riots can be more easily classified as anti-Indian, the 1985 violence was a much more complex phenomenon. There were, however, situational conditions within Inanda that were similar to those giving rise to the anti-Indian rioting in Cato Manor in 1949. These conditions appear to have produced similar outcomes in Inanda in 1985.

In Chapter 2 the objective and structural features of the political economy of the region were examined with a view to identifying those factors that may have created the underlying predisposing impetus for the violence in 1949 and 1985. In this chapter the argument was carried beyond this through an analysis of the more subjective grass-roots features and history of the specific locales of Cato Manor and Inanda. Here the objective was also to identify the factor or factors that acted as a spark or trigger for each of the riots and to proceed to an analysis of several key questions that impact upon (and hopefully contribute to) sociological debates about the origins and development of "ethnically" based instances of collective violence. These key questions are:

1.   Which social groups or classes constituted the rioters?

2.   Were the riots specifically anti-Indian, or were aspects of the violence directed at symbols of the apartheid edifice?

3.   Were the riots spontaneous or planned or some complex, phased combination of both?

4.   What were the similarities and differences between the two instances?

The analysis of the 1949 riots revealed that while gangs participated in the violence and probably gave the riot its initial impetus, dockworkers and ricksha pullers who had a history of militant working-class action were also central to the riot. The riot itself had both spontaneous and planned aspects and represented a complexity of anti-Indian and anti-apartheid violence.

The 1985 riots illustrated a complex, phased combination of both spontaneous and planned aspects. Similarly, the riots had both anti-Indian and anti-apartheid dimensions. However, unlike the 1949 riots, the 1985 violence had broader dimensions. The violence engulfed most of Durban's African townships. In these townships there was a particular targeting of symbols of wealth, power, and privilege. The riots also revealed emerging divisions within the African community. The comrades movement, loosely aligned with the UDF, fought running battles with *impis* led by warlords linked to Inkatha. The latter were widely perceived to be a surrogate of the apartheid state by the comrades movement. Thus, the violence in Inanda went beyond an anti-Indianism. The most bloody battles were fought between the African community from the area and Inkatha-aligned warlords. In 1949, similar divisions did not emerge. Contrary to the pronouncements of political organizations of all hues at the time, the 1985 riots were not the work of thugs and hooligans but represented a broad spectrum of the squatter communities.

The chapter also looked at the role of the state, local state, and oppositional groups in each period. In the 1940s, the local state exacerbated tensions between Indian landlords and African tenants in Cato Manor. Initially,

the City Council insisted on Indian landlords providing essential services to Cato Manor. If they failed to comply, the landlords had to evict their tenants. Later in the 1940s, the City Council's zoning proposals earmarked Cato Manor for exclusive Indian use. Indian presence came increasingly to be seen as a threat to African permanence in Cato Manor. Political organizations did nothing to allay these concerns. Leadership figures in both the African and Indian communities were prone to a narrow ethnic chauvinism.

In Inanda in the 1980s, the state, local state, and Inkatha for diverse reasons were keen to see the removal of Indians from the area. Progressive political organizations like the UDF failed to move beyond the racial boundaries constructed by the apartheid state and build a multiracial constituency. Indian political organizations, operating with the state-sponsored tricameral parliament, and Inkatha espoused a narrow ethnic ideology.

Thus, what the chapter unveils is how the state, local state, and oppositional political groups in each period "took advantage" of the local history and features of each of these areas to further their own objectives and how, therefore, any convergence between objective/structural factors, on the one hand, and subjective/structural features, on the other, combined to produce the conflagration that was Cato Manor in 1949 and Inanda in 1985.

The next chapter provides an analysis of the violence.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Introduction

This final chapter presents a summary of the study and the major findings. It then focuses on the implications of the erosion of apartheid on Indo-African relations. Using the study as a basis, policy recommendations are made with the aim of reducing the potential of ethnic collective violence. Suggestions are then made for further research on collective violence, and the contribution of the study is assessed.

4.2 Summary and Analysis

In Chapter 2, we traced the relationship between the Indian and African communities at a political, economic, and social level in the 1940s. Both groups interacted at the level of the labor market and trade. Indians were advantaged in both spheres. At the level of the labor market, Indian workers with their better levels of education and their legally permanent status in the urban areas moved much more quickly up the job hierarchy. These advantages in the competition for jobs were reinforced by a general employer outlook that the "nimbleness of mind and finger," the "stability," and "responsibility" of Indians set them apart for semi-skilled jobs, while the "robust physical strength" and "unreliability" of Africans made them "suited" to unskilled labor (Smith, 1950, pp. 453-455). The

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competition for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs often led to antagonism between Africans and Indians. Thus, Nuttall (1989) has noted that the competition for lower paid jobs and the perception that Indians had better chances of moving into higher paid semi-skilled jobs meant that Africans increasingly came to see Indians as "collective competitors and targets of frustration, rather than as co-workers" (p. 7). While there were successful attempts at multiracial worker action in the early 1940s, by the late 1940s the "broad co-operation and collective organization of the early 1940's had disintegrated" (Hemson, 1977, p. 108). Despite strenuous attempts by the leadership of the NIC and the national leadership of the ANC, a similar lack of unity pervaded political relations.

In the 1940s, the African petit-bourgeoisie began to challenge the dominance of Indian trade in African areas. They began by attempting to obtain trading and transport licenses. Indian business interests cleverly used legal mechanisms to ward off African competition.

In the case of trading licenses, the Commission of Enquiry into the 1949 riots found that whenever an African trader applied for a trading license nearby, the Indian shopkeeper would oppose it--the African being invariably new at the trade would often be operating from "unhygienic premises," a technical legal objection, and his application would be refused. This was the same tactic used by white traders against Indian competition from the 1880s onwards (see Padayachee & Morrell, 1991). This led to the emerging African trader class perceiving their advancement as being blocked by Indian traders. In the words of the Commission (1949):

When the Indian storekeeper—usually through council—very naturally, raises objections on this ground [that the shop is unhygienic] to the acquisition of trading rights by his potential competitor, the Native regards this as further evidence of the Indian's callidity and obstructive tactics. (p. 14)

Of course, Indian traders were helped by the fact that they also had historical advantages over African competitors. Padayachee and Morrell (1991) point to how, in the period c1875-1914, "limited access to capital, geographic restrictions on their mobility, trade and licensing barriers, language, educational and technical disabilities (most related directly to racial discrimination)" were contributory factors to restricting the expansion of an African commercial class.

Some of these restrictions and disabilities either did not apply to Indians or were less severe, both in terms of the laws themselves and/or in their application. In other instances such as in education, Indians were themselves able to mobilize the resources to overcome the discriminatory allocation of state funds, giving them an important advantage in terms of (English) language ability and technical proficiency and skills. (Padayachee & Morrell, 1991, p. 102)

In looking at the "Native" consumer, Rinder (1958-59) notes, "the roles of middleman, of merchandiser, money-lender, and the rest place the people in the gap in the position of playing the economic villain vis-a-vis the people they service" (p. 258). In the context of increasing economic hardship, the role of villain becomes more pronounced. In the post-Second World War period, this was the case. "Prices were rising and the Africans found that the Indian storekeepers with whom they dealt were demanding greatly increased prices for the flour, mealie-meal, sugar, condensed milk and so on, which were so important in their diet. Therefore, there grew up among the Africans, not unnaturally, profound irritation against the Indians" (Palmer, 1957, p. 156). The

Commission noted that "the Native had difficulty in understanding why the cost structure would wax after the war has come to an end. To him the explanation was simple, and he attributed world economic trends to the rapacity of the Indian."

In the case of transport licenses, the Motor Carrier Transportation Act tended to operate in favor of those who were already established in business as the law laid down that no new license may be granted if transportation facilities are already in existence in that area. Indian bus owners who dominated transport to African townships used the Act to prevent Africans gaining access to licenses. This led to much hostility. To quote from the Commission (1949),

> When a Native applicant desires to make an inroad into an area which is already served by an Indian service . . . the Indian protects the rights vested in him by the Statute by protesting to the Board concerned against the issue of a certificate to the Native applicant. The Native does not understand the policy of the law. All that he understands is that he is obstructed by the Indian, and his blood pressure goes up. His impression is that the Board—or the Government—gives the Indian preferential treatment, and that the Indian secures this by bribery and corruption. (p. 17)

At the level of land and housing, there was a close interaction between Indians and Africans. However, the relationship was marked by tensions. Africans who wanted to settle with their families or who sought to escape the strictures of hostel life were forced to reside outside the old municipal boundaries. In the shacklands that developed beyond the boundaries, Africans rented sites from Indian landlords in the main. Given the fact that there was no administrative or legal mechanism for the extraction of rent, the relationship between tenant and landlord was fraught with tension. Africans also had to

compete with potential Indian tenants for the best sites. Indians were often advantaged in this competition because of familial ties. African landlords also emerged. Often not having *de jure* rights, they claimed *de facto* control. They maintained this control through vigilante forces who acted as barriers to these ambitions. The struggle for land and housing took place in a context where centrally established and socially accepted juridical demonstration of rights, codified in administrative rules and regulations and which could be legally challenged and enforced through the repressive apparatus of the state, were absent. The ability to control an area also implied an ability for access to force. Violence was inscribed in the very social relations of the shacklands.

The competitive relations between Indians and Africans in all these contexts took place within a particular economic and political context. It took place in a period when the policy of segregation which underpinned state policy was crumbling. The system which was designed to produce a cheap migrant labor force generated rural impoverishment. This undermined the very logic of segregation, which was predicated on the migrant worker's family supporting itself in the rural areas. Rural impoverishment was accompanied by the intensification of urban poverty. With thousands of rural Africans streaming into the urban areas, the ruling United Party could not settle on an urban strategy to meet the new conditions nor develop an alternative accumulation strategy. The United Party was eclipsed by the National Party in the 1948 elections, so inaugurating the policy of apartheid. The riots took place at a time when the Durban City Council had decided on a "hands-off" approach to the shacklands.

With the National Party having just assumed power, it had not developed a response to the issue of squatter settlements. In Cato Manor there was an absence of any external regulation in the form of the local and national state. As if perceiving a weakness at the level of the ruling class, the ANC began to adopt a more radical posture. This could also have been fueled by the period of economic contraction following the boom period of the war years.

From analyzing these predisposing conditions to the 1949 riots, the analysis moved to understanding the social relations prevailing in Cato Manor, the center of the violence. It was held that the actual form violence takes in any particular case is largely influenced by issues specific to the locale in which the violence occurs. Gaskell and Bennewick (1987), among others, argue that when one looks for the flashpoints of violence, "locale" is a critical element in the search for an explanation (p. 17).[12] They argue that the local context in which the events occur needs to be examined along with the national context--political change, economic recession, and so on--and the material deprivation experienced by subjugated communities. This is elaborated by Parry, Moyser, and Wagstaff (1987) in the following manner:

> Locality may be a crucially important factor in crowd mobilization and in understanding the aftermath of disturbances. National trends in unemployment and economic recession are refracted through the prism of locality into the conditions in which the individual functions. However mobile our society, the local spatial dimension is a necessary and major part of our experience.

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[12]It is important to note that "locality" is not a sociological variable--rather, a site in which particular and perhaps but not necessarily unique combinations of variables influence social outcomes.

Unable to settle in the city center, many Africans resorted to finding an abode in the shacklands surrounding the outer rim of the city, a phenomenon Maylam (1983) has referred to as Durban's "black belt." The most popular of these settlements was Cato Manor. In the 1940s, thousands of rural migrants took their places in Mkhumbane.

In the main, sites were rented from Indian landlords. These landlords often relied on African *indunas* to collect rent and maintain control. There was also a group of African landlords who, while often not having *de jure* ownership of the land, developed a *de facto* ownership. Sometimes this was done through striking a bargain with an Indian owner. Mostly it was achieved through beating off the attentions of other aspirant landlords. These "mayors" of Mkhumbane maintained their power through vigilante forces.

For many of the residents, Cato Manor represented a last toehold in the urban environment. Loss of this abode would inevitably mean a drift back to the impoverished reserves. For many it would be the "walk of death." With influential Zionist preachers touting Mkhumbane as the "promised land," Mkhumbane was not just some transient camp, it was the final resting place.

Africans in Cato Manor tried to engender some economic muscle through the development of a cooperative movement. From the outset, the cooperative movement was defined as distinctly African and sometimes more narrowly as a Zulu phenomenon. However, the cooperative movement could not break the stranglehold of the Indian trader. The challenge of the African trader was also warded off.

Indian presence came to be seen as the immediate threat to the future of African residents in Cato Manor. Although often acting at the behest of the local state, it was the Indian landlord who was the instrument of evictions. The 1946 Act earmarked Cato Manor for Indians. Indian landlords acted as a barrier to the "mayors" of Mkhumbane, extending their influence. Indian traders blocked the aspirations of the cooperative movement and the African petit-bourgeoisie, hoping to break into a lucrative market. With the City Council adopting a "hands-off" approach to Cato Manor, Indians came to be seen as acting as the local state, which privileged themselves.

The diverse African constituents who were Mkhumbane were united under the rubric of the "New Africa." Central to the ideology was an appeal to African ethnic unity. This appeal had a number of impulses. For the African petit-bourgeoisie, it translated into an appeal for Africans only to trade in African areas. Young (1986) also tells us that the conditions associated with modernity give rise to psychological settings conducive to affirmation of cultural identity. "The social insecurities of new urban environments, the sense of aloneness engendered by the city and workplace, create a powerful craving for reinforced primary ties that can give security, meaning, and mooring to the vast and marginalized populations of the primate agglomerations" (p. 126). African women who were pushed out of the city center, women who suddenly arrived in the city in search of the husband with whom contact was long lost, the migrant "forced" off the land, and many others in Mkhumbane would have found resonance with Isaacs's argument (cited in Young, 1986) that insecure people

who are torn loose from all moorings cling hard to wherever they can find a "place where they belong, and they are finding this place more and more . . . in [cultural] affinities with their ineffable significance and their peculiarly coercive powers" (p. 126).

Underpinning the ideology of "New Africa" was the notion of vengeance imported from Natal's rural locations and based on the need to defend or show the capacity to defend one's territory. Ethnicity is a resource that is available for adoption and reconstruction in the context of competition and conflict over scarce resources. Instead of historical or traditional lines of social division simply being replaced by more "modern" ones, they are reconstituted, blending together, in new and unanticipated ways, both traditional and "modern" lines of social differentiation.

In turning to the riots themselves, the initial violence was a spontaneous reaction to the beating of George Madondo. The spontaneous response was facilitated by a few factors. The participants shared a minimal solidarity in being able to recognize potential allies and antagonists in terms of their race. There were groupings of *amalaitas* in the vicinity who were well versed in the art of street fighting. Rule (1988) argues that news of atrocities to a particular group may move members of the group to violent actions that would never otherwise have occurred (p. 268). Such developments, however, are not likely without there being enduring tensions or clashes of interest that establish targets of such action. Evidence to the Riot Commission indicates that the Africans tended to perceive Indians as alien exploiters.

The Friday lunchtime excursion into the Indian quarter was organized. This attack was marked by the fact that the rioters observed certain bounds, directed their aggression at specific targets, and selected appropriate means for the end they intended to obtain. The Friday afternoon march looked beyond the Indian quarter and was perceived by the police as a broader challenge to the white powerholders.

Brutally put down in the city center, the riot moved into Cato Manor. Commuters bringing news of the events in the city center provided the violence. *Impis* acting at the behest of the "mayors" of Mkhumbane drove Indians out of Cato Manor and staked out the vacated areas on behalf of their bosses. The only government building, the post office, was destroyed. If there had been more buildings, they would probably have met with the same fate. The violence went beyond looting, beating, and breaking to include rape and arson. Beyond the *impis* the general African population had a rationale for the expulsion of Indians-- their presence, more than the machinations of the local and national state, constituted a threat to their future existence in Cato Manor, their last hope in a hostile city.

Most analysts of the 1949 riots fall into the trap that many students of collective behavior fall into--that of seeing the crowd as homogeneous and displaying unanimity of behavior. McPhail (1991) argues that while people do behave collectively, "what they do together varies greatly in complexity, in duration, and in the proportion of the gathering that actually participates" (p. 185).

This allows us, according to McPhail, to break the study of crowds into simpler components, making the task more manageable and therefore simpler.

This approach has allowed us to view the 1949 riots as both spontaneous and planned. While the riots were purposeful and targeted and selected appropriate means for the ends, they also had consummatory aspects.

This approach to collective behavior allows us also to understand whether the riots were anti-Indian or anti-apartheid. The riots went through different phases and had different objectives. There was the spontaneous reaction to the beating of George Madondo. The Friday lunchtime attack was limited to looting and the robbing of individual Indians. There was a perception that the police would not protect Indian shops, as long as the white shops were left alone. The Friday afternoon march had a broader scope. It widened across the north and south of the city. A white motorist was stoned. This was a challenge to the broader power relations of the city. Recognizing this, the "city fathers" responded with brute force.

Cato Manor became the center of the violence. Here the riots were a complexity of anti-Indian and anti-apartheid violence. The particular brand of ethnic unity under the rubric of "New Africa" fueled an anti-Indianism. It also had a material basis. The riots were also directed at the particular form urban apartheid had taken. Africans were temporary sojourners, and their position in Cato Manor was always under threat. However, the power struggle between the National and United parties and the inability of the City Council to develop a unified response to the squatter issues (this was related to their lack of capacity

to implement a policy in the absence of support from the national state and the lobby from local capitalists who saw the squatter camps as a reservoir of cheap labor) resulted in a "hands-off" approach to Cato Manor. Indian landlords were asked to upgrade Cato Manor. Indian landlords were also asked to evict African tenants. Indians were to be given Cato Manor. It was Indian presence that was the immediate threat to Africans. Expelling Indians would consolidate African permanence. Permanence was the crucial issue. Immediately after the riots, armed *impis* guarded Cato Manor against "outsiders." A message was sent to the City Council--"Leave us alone."

The analysis of the 1949 riots has raised serious doubts about the notion that the rioters represented the "scum of the earth." While the *amalaita* gangs were certainly central to the violence, the rioters also consisted of dockworkers and ricksha pullers, who had a long tradition of militancy. The participants in Cato Manor were typical residents of the neighborhood.

Between the 1950s and 1980s, significant changes were wrought on the political economy of South Africa. National Party rule was met with sustained resistance by the dominated classes led by the ANC. However, the state was able to deal a crushing blow to extra-parliamentary organizations in the early 1960s. The relative stability that followed was used to elaborate the policy of apartheid. The Group Areas Act was wielded to ensure strict residential separation, while the homelands were seen as meeting the aspirations of Africans. This structuring of society was facilitated by a ten-year economic

boom. It is no wonder that this period has been dubbed the "golden years of apartheid."

By the mid-1970s, the economy was lurching into crisis. This crisis was accompanied by a resurgence of political activity in the African community. The African working class, its numbers significantly enlarged in response to the economic expansion of the 1960s, began to demand higher wages and better working conditions. The youth, a generation born and raised in the urban ghettoes, scorned the homelands as vehicles for their political aspirations. Stung by the intensity of the 1976 rebellion, popularly known as the "Soweto riots," the state attempted to foster a privileged stratum of Africans in the urban areas. At the same time, the state moved to "upgrade" channels of communication with the Indian and colored communities, sectors of which were beginning to ally themselves with anti-state extra-parliamentary organizations. However, as the economic downturn continued into the 1980s and resistance widened, the state turned to repression.

During this period the racial ordering of Durban did not alter significantly. Indians continued to predominate at the semi-skilled levels of the occupational hierarchy. Africans filled the unskilled jobs and suffered greatly as the economy contracted. At the level of trade, Indians held 40.9% of trading licenses in Durban in 1975 as compared to the 2.66% held by Africans. Indians began more distinctly to resemble a middleman minority. By contrast, Durban's African community suffered under the impact of the economic downswing. Growing unemployment was accompanied by widespread poverty. At the level of

organization, Indian workers were not attracted to the independent trade union movement, opting instead for the conservative federation, TUCSA.

When black political organizations began to re-emerge in the 1970s, it did not herald a return to the cooperation reminiscent of the Congress alliance. The NIC recovered from the slumber of the 1960s to reflect increasingly the politics of the NIC of the early 1940s. The resurrected Inkatha echoed the politics of the Zulu society of the 1940s. The Society was founded in 1937. Like the early Inkatha, it fought for state recognition for the scion of the Zulu royal house as paramount and the preservation of Zulu tradition and custom (Marks, 1989, p. 217). By 1945, A. H. Ngidi, Chairman of the Zulu Society (an offshoot of the Natal Bantu Traders' Organization), was talking about vast commercial ventures and the rehabilitation of the reserves "agriculturally, industrially, commercially, educationally and socially." He argued that the Zulu should be persuaded to sell their cattle in order to accumulate capital to start stores "and displace Indians and Europeans as exploiters of the people" (quoted in Marks, 1989, p. 223). As Marks noted, Ngidi's politics did not envision any disengagement from the state. Ngidi had major ideas for the "restoration" of the reserves based on the reduction of African livestock (which would be preceded by the regulation and definition of all occupied land, and on the closer settlement).

Ngidi thought all reserves in Natal and Zululand should include special zones for townships (Marks, 1989, p. 223). Similarly, Buthelezi's Inkatha was geared towards accumulating as many townships and as much land as possible to bolster the KwaZulu bantustan. Its politics were that of collaboration with the

state and a shying away from mass campaigns and struggles. Zulu pride and the harking back to traditionalism became its rallying cry. The emergence of the UDF in 1983, despite its platform of nonracialism, failed to make any impact on breaching ethnic divides. In fact, it tended to exacerbate them. The NIC top brass dominated the UDF leadership in the region. Buthelezi was cleverly able to use this. When the UDF criticized Inkatha, Buthelezi labeled it as symptomatic of Indian hostility towards the Zulu.

This lack of interdependence at a political level was matched by cultural divides. Kirk (1983) argues that factors of endogamy, family kinship, language, and religion, which were most effective in maintaining Indian cultural distinctiveness, were viewed by Africans as being anti-African (p. 16).

As already alluded to, the boom of the 1960s was replaced by an acute economic recession in the mid-1970s and 1980s. This was accompanied by a heightening of mass struggle which threatened the urban apartheid edifice.

During the 1960s, urban apartheid reached the peak of its functionality. However, by the second half of the 1970s, cracks began to appear. With the apartheid state unable to shore up the bantustan economies, the drift to "white" South Africa gathered pace. Influx control was unable to stem the tide. However, both the central and local state refused to provide any social services for the Africans it regarded as outsiders.

In Durban, the "outsiders" were particularly badly off. The state's policy was to freeze any development in townships in "white" South Africa. The priority was to upgrade townships under KwaZulu control. Many Africans were to find

a "home" in shack settlements, the largest and fastest growing of which was at Inanda. In the early 1980s, no single authority claimed control over Inanda.

In the 1940s, the growth of shack settlements had signaled the state's loss of control of the black housing situation. From the 1950s, the state began to clear these uncontrolled residential zones by moving their occupants into newly built townships. In the 1980s, there was a return again to the situation of the 1940s, although on a much larger scale.

The breakdown in urban apartheid was accompanied by a growing assertiveness of the dominated classes. By the late 1970s, worker, student, and civic organizations were challenging the authority of the state. By the mid-1980s, as Administration Board personnel lost control, the military began to make their appearance in many townships.

After setting the broader structural context, the analysis moved to an understanding of the economic and social relations prevailing in Inanda. In the quest for land, Indians were privileged vis-a-vis Africans. They could own land in Durban, although this privilege had been severely restricted since 1943 and more comprehensively since 1946. African land ownership was, except for a few exempted areas, restricted to the Reserves in terms of the 1913 Land Act.

As noted in Cato Manor, this restriction produced particular tensions. Inanda's expansion occurred in a period of rapid economic growth between 1963 and 1973. This expansion had a profound influence on Inanda's social structure. For the landowners, the waves of shack dwellers brought new sources of income—as tenants. For shopowners, many of whom were also landlords,

tenants were also consumers. Both African and Indian landlords and traders competed for this lucrative market. However, from the outset, Indian attempts to acquire land in Inanda were seen to have an unfair advantage. Thus, as early as 1914, an African landowner complained that because Indians did not fall under the ambit of the 1913 Land Act, they were placed in a more advantageous position in acquiring land in Inanda (Hughes, 1987, p. 338). The provisions of the 1950 Group Areas Act were also seen to hurt the African landowner at the expense of the Indian. Hughes points to one African landowner in Inanda, for example, who had land expropriated on more than one occasion for the demarcation of Indian Group Areas (p. 340). Similarly, in Inanda through the 1970s and 1980s, the manner in which licenses were issued allowed Indian traders to stave off competition from aspirant African traders.

In Released Area 33, licenses were issued under the Licenses and Business Hours Ordinance of 1973. The licensing officer was based at Verulam, with the chief magistrate being the licensing officer. In certain cases, licensees have to gain authority also from provincial authorities and, since 1973, from the Department of Planning Act (No. 88 of 1967). In addition, African licensees had to gain approval from the Department of Co-operation and Development. The Urban Foundation in a study of Inanda found that this tortuous route and the extra step required of potential African licensees advantaged Indian traders since they had greater resources to stay the course (Urban Foundation Natal Region, Basic Planning Information on Inanda, 1980, pp. 49-50).

A strong anti-Indianism emerged from within the ranks of the African "traditional" petit-bourgeoisie in the 1960s and 1970s. Like their counterparts in the 1940s, this petit-bourgeoisie responded to oppressive laws, restrictions, and competition by trying to use ethnic markers to monopolize an ethnic market.

Using the logic of the state's separate development policy, the African petit-bourgeoisie claimed Inanda as their own. The affiliation of the traders' association, Inyanda, with Inkatha moved the traders from an anti-Indianism into the realm of Zulu nationalism, which went beyond a simple class protectionism. African landlords were also keen to see the last of the Indian landlords as this would create the opportunities for the expansion of their own interests.

Indian landlords were placed in a difficult situation by the state. They were constantly being pressurized to evict tenants or provide essential services. Uncertain about their future in Inanda, some landlords opted for eviction. The relationship between Indian landlords and African tenants was marked by tension. Powerful interests were lined up against Indian presence for diverse reasons. The position of African landlords, traders, and tenants has been explicated. For the state and Inkatha, the removal of Indians would allow for the incorporation of Inanda into KwaZulu.

All this must be seen in the context of the poverty and degradation that was Inanda (40% to 50% of the economically active population was unemployed). A water crisis in the early 1980s had led to a typhoid epidemic. Removals by the Department of CAD to site and service schemes had created tensions within Inanda. As the broader economic crisis started to have an impact

on the African tenants of Inanda, Indian landlords turned increasingly to coercion to extract rent.

The spark for the violence came from outside Inanda. On 1 August 1985, UDF leader Victoria Mxenge was murdered in Umlazi. Protesting the murder, a school strike spread out across Durban's African townships. School students, together with the fledgling comrades movement, led the protests. The focus of attacks was the township "rich," particularly those allied to the KwaZulu government and symbols of the latter (there was an overwhelming perception that Inkatha was behind Mxenge's murder). On Wednesday, 6 August, the protests reached Inanda. Two Indian-owned shops and houses were looted and burnt. These events led to a mass exodus of Indians. Indian shops and houses were looted and burnt.

By this time, Inkatha *impis* led by warlords began to take on the youth. They were able to assume control of KwaMashu and Umlazi. In Inanda the African community was broadly united in fending off Inkatha attacks. The most intense and bloody violence took place in the three days that Inkatha tried to enter Inanda.

In trying to discern whether the violence was spontaneous or organized, it is important to break down the violence into different phases. The initial violence was a spontaneous reaction to Inkatha, who were perceived to be implicated in the killing. However, within this spontaneity, there would, in all probability, have been some coordination through the emerging youth structures in the different townships.

The Inkatha response was organized. The townships were to be wrested back by Inkatha from the militant youth. Unlike the "social change" that facilitated the looting of the abandoned Indian shops and homes, the Inanda communities' repulsing of the warlords had strong elements of planning and coordination.

Can the 1985 violence in Inanda be seen as anti-Indian? It had its anti-Indian dimensions. Indian shops and houses were targeted. No attempt was made to reinstate Indian landowners. Warlords justified their occupation of Indian-owned land on the basis that Indians were aliens. This aspect of the violence is crucial and must be understood. However, simply to see the violence as anti-Indian is not to see the full story. The youth challenged the authority of Inkatha in all the African townships, an organization perceived by them to be a surrogate for the South African state. This uprising gelled with resistance struggles in the townships of the Transvaal and Eastern Cape. In Inanda the violence went beyond the looting and burning of Indian shops and houses. The community rose up to defend Inanda against the incursions of Inkatha-aligned warlords. The 1985 riots were no more exclusively anti-Indian than the 1992 Los Angeles riots were anti-Korean.

In looking at the composition of the rioters, we were able to discern that the youth came from different backgrounds and that the violence was directed at particular targets. Similarly, the *impis* were not just "thugs and hooligans" but consisted of a broad spectrum of the squatter communities and were acting at the behest of warlords. Violence also occurred in a context where Africans and

Indians were disenfranchised, and there existed no legitimate channels for the raising of problems.

Lieberson and Silverman (1965), in their study of the 76 riots in the United States between 1913 and 1963, found that the more direct the relation between voter and government, the less likely are riots to occur. They argue that a more responsive government makes riots less likely because it provides regularly institutional channels for expressing grievances (p. 896).

In South Africa, parliament was an overwhelmingly white institution (coloreds had limited access through white representatives until 1956). As outlined earlier, urban "native" policy was predicated on Africans having no political rights in the urban areas, and they could never expect to acquire them. From the 1920s until the 1970s, by which time the homelands and national states had been created, the Stallard doctrine was followed sufficiently closely to eviscerate the administration of urban African communities of civic content, and to make even the simplest communication between administration and subject, or the least problematic negotiation over the provision of services, extraordinarily complex and ridden with overt conflict (Stadler, 1987, p. 103).

If in the formal townships social services and institutional channels for the resolving of grievances were largely nonexistent, in the shack settlements the situation was much worse. It is significant that the events of 1949 and 1985 unfolded in the city's largest shack settlements of the time.

Durban's main shack settlement in the 1940s, Cato Manor, enabled subordinate groups, mainly African, to settle in an area that was within easy

commuting distance of the city. Both the local and central state abrogated any responsibility for the provision of social services. As long as developments in Cato Manor did not challenge the white power structure, the city fathers were content with the "hands-off" approach. After all, Cato Manor provided a labor supply without the municipality needing to outlay much for the workforce's residential upkeep. It was in this context that internal, unofficial authority structures emerged in the settlements. Landlords had to rely on the threat of brute force to ensure the timely payment of rent. Areas became divided into feifdoms patrolled by armed guards protecting access to resources like water, maintaining peace, and constantly on the lookout to extend their sphere of influence. Landlords began operating as administrative authorities by letting sites, collecting rents, and taking on responsibility for the maintenance of order. Similarly, in Inanda, the white city council refused to take responsibility for the provision of social services and mechanisms for the administration of the area. Indian landlords wielded tremendous power through the use of African *indunas*. The *induna* did not have recourse to legal mechanisms if rents were not paid and relied on access to the instruments of violence.

The lack of institutional forums for the airing of grievances and settling of disputes resulted, in many African communities, in "collective bargaining by riot." This was a phrase coined to describe English working-class action during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is instructive to note in this context that the relationships of police and other agencies of law enforcement toward urban

Africans were shaped largely by the assumption that Africans were rightless

subjects. As Stadler (1987) has noted,

> any serious modification of a police function that was primarily repressive
> in character was largely precluded by the logic of Stallardism and
> Verwoerdism. The police were mainly concerned with enforcing influx
> regulations, controlling the liquor trade, and with political repression. . . .
> Scarcely any element of the black population was secure from the
> possibility of criminalisation. . . . The use of anti-vagrancy laws and influx
> control to control political activities like boycotts and stay-aways, which
> African communities regarded as legitimate, has meant that relations with
> the police were strained at best, and, at worst, a state of war. (p. 107)

This thesis has looked at the conditions under which violence breaks out

between a middleman minority and an indigenous majority where both do not

have access to state power. First, for ethnic competition to turn to ethnic conflict,

two necessary conditions were specified:

1.   Ethnic competition is perceived as unfair.

2.   Competitors' relations must be as uncomplementary as possible.

The 1949 riots took place in a particular context. There was an economic

contraction following the boom period during the war years. It was also a time

of political crisis. The policy of segregation was in tatters, and the ruling United

Party had just been replaced by the National Party. The intense struggle for

power at the level of the ruling class was met with increased militancy from the

ranks of the dominated classes. The 1985 Inanda riots also took place in a

context where the ruling class faced a political and economic crisis. The boom

years of the 1960s and early 1970s were replaced by an economic downturn.

At the same time, the whole edifice of urban apartheid was beginning to crumble.

This took place in a prolonged period of heightened militancy and substantial organization within the ranks of the dominated classes.

What was also significant was that neither the African nor the Indian communities had any legitimate institutional channels through which to raise grievances. This was particularly so in the shantytowns of Inanda and Cato Manor. Here the local and national state largely abrogated its administrative and control functions.

The 1949 and 1985 riots occurred in conditions under which ethnic conflict is most likely to turn violent:

1.   Society was going through a phase of economic contraction. This phase had particular characteristics that lend themselves to violent conflict between the host society and middleman minorities. Growing impoverishment of particular classes exacerbates class conflict. New classes emerge that compete with the middleman minorities. Such competing classes possess both business and managerial skills and some capital. During the period of economic contraction, the ruling bloc and the new classes find the middleman minority to be a convenient scapegoat for the increasing impoverishment. This scapegoating is facilitated by the wealth the middleman minority possesses relative to the majority it does business with.

2.   The state's legitimacy was in question.

3.   Sections of society were excluded from political power or were alienated.

Why would an indigenous majority strike out at a middleman minority rather than at a white ruling class which, after all, sets the "rules of the game"?

This has much to do with the structural location of the middleman minority. They have an immediate relation to the indigenous population as buyer and seller, renter and landlord, client and professional. In the struggle for the scarce resources of land and housing, jobs, and the opportunities for capital accumulation, it is the middleman minority that the indigenous majority come up against. The former are visible, accessible, and vulnerable because of the immediacy of their spatial location and the lack of a security force to protect their interests. Whites, on the other hand, are one step removed. They live and trade apart from the indigenous population and are protected by a repressive apparatus. This line of argument ties in with the deprivation and resource-mobilization theories. Groups must be disadvantaged enough to be dissatisfied (the deprivation theorists' argument) but also resource-rich enough to be able to challenge dominant groups (the resource-mobilization argument) (Bélanger & Pinard, 1991, p. 449).

However, this does not mean that the white power remains unchallenged where a middleman minority prevails. Rule (1988) points to how militant success in one setting "may succeed in getting people to think what was previously unthinkable about possibilities for social change." In this context, we saw how the riots of both 1949 and especially 1985 broadened into a challenge to the white power structure.

In tracing the relationship between Indians and Africans, we argued that it lacked interdependence, and the competition for resources was perceived by Africans to be weighted in favor of Indians. However, these factors do not explain why antagonism was not directed at whites who set the rules of the game. In this context, the competition theorists have argued that as ethnic disparities increase, the likelihood of competition and conflict decreases because of shortages in the disadvantaged group of resources, especially that of leadership, and of motivational factors like incentives and expectation of success. Bélanger and Pinard (1991) argue, however, that moderate structural disadvantage, which is more common in ethnic relations than in class relations, does not entail serious shortages of these elements and thus does not prevent competition and conflict (p. 449). This ties in with the deprivation and resource-mobilization theories. Bélanger and Pinard point out that their argument implies a curvilinear relationship between ethnic inequality and nonroutine collective action: groups must be disadvantaged enough to be dissatisfied (the deprivation theorists' argument), but also resource-rich enough to be able to challenge dominant groups (the resource-mobilization argument). Middleman minorities are visible, vulnerable, and accessible. They have an immediate relation with the indigenous population as buyer and seller, renter and landlord, client and professional. Whites, on the other hand, are one step removed. They live and trade apart from the indigenous population and are protected by a repressive apparatus.

To summarize, this dissertation aimed to provide an understanding and interpretation of the conditions that underpinned Indo-African antagonism in Durban and to explain why this antagonism translated into violence in particular periods. Two violent episodes were focused on--the 1949 and 1985 riots.

In Chapter 1, a broad-ranging review of literature on collective violence was undertaken. Following Rule, it was argued that any specific act of violence can possibly be explained by several theories; that is, the theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Also, it was emphasized that a riot is a complex social phenomenon in which there may often be violent acts of several different types. The importance of considering multiple causes for the same events of collective violence prefigured a theme adopted in the rest of the study.

Another major focus of the chapter was the continuing salience of ethnic competition and the conditions under which such competition can lead to ethnic conflict. Following Bélanger and Pinard, two conditions were specified: competition must be perceived as unfair, and competitive relations must be relatively free from interdependence. In this context, Bonacich's (1973) theory of middleman minorities was reviewed given the location of Indian South Africans in the country's political economy, wedged between the African majority and white minority who hold state power. However, Bonacich's theory was elaborated to account for middleman minorities that move beyond the roles of trader and landlord and occupy a "middle" position in industries owned by whites.

Chapter 2 set out the predisposing conditions to the 1949 and 1985 riots. Focusing initially on the 1940s, the discussion revolved around the emergence

and the gradual consolidation of a racial hierarchy and of racial competition. The changes in Durban's political economy during the 1940s heightened social conflict in a number of spheres. Evidence of accumulating Indo-African tensions in the decade were gathered by examining developments in the economy at large, with a particular focus on the labor market, housing, trade, and transport.

This discussion was followed by an assessment of particular factors that had an impact on developing a racial hierarchy and competition. These factors were: the nature and character of the political economy itself, the role of the state's segregation policy, the role of the local state's interventions, and the part played by the fragmentary nature of politics in Durban. Attempts to counter this in the form of nonracial trade unions and multiparty alliances were also looked at. A similar set of organizing categories was used for the 1980s. The labor market, trade, and so on, were examined, and then for each of these, the role of the apartheid state, local state, and so on, were looked at.

The discussion of both periods was situated in a broader national context. The 1949 riots took place in the aftermath of the collapse of the policy of segregation and the newly elected National Party's failure to develop a response to deal with the thousands of Africans streaming into the major urban centers. This was also a period of economic contraction following the boom period of the war years. The 1985 violence occurred in the context of the collapse of urban apartheid and an acute economic recession. This was accompanied by the growing militancy and national character of black political and civic organizations.

Chapter 3 laid out the more subjective issues that precipitated the violence in their specific locale and analyzed the character of the riots. Beginning with the 1940s, the chapter described the sources of Indo-African antagonism in Cato Manor. There was a competitive relationship between emergent African traders/ landlords and their Indian counterparts who were more established. Indian traders with their superior access to credit and other historical advantages were able to ward off African competition. This only served to exacerbate antagonism. The relationship between Indian landlords and tenants was often volatile given that there was no administrative or legal mechanism for the extraction of rent.

Africans across the class spectrum had one common objective--making Cato Manor their permanent home. Indians came to be seen as a constant threat to this aspiration because legal ownership of the land was held by Indians. This insecurity was fueled by the white local authority, which indicated the desire to move Africans out of the area and retain Cato Manor for exclusive Indian use. Running through the lives of Africans in Cato Manor was the ideology of "New Africa." Together with the appeal to African ethnic unity, the ideology legitimized vengeance. This notion, with its roots in Natal's rural locations, was predicated on the need to defend (or indicate the ability to defend) one's territory.

The riot itself had both spontaneous and planned aspects. For example, while the "spark" for the riot was a spontaneous reaction to the beating of George Madondo, the lunchtime attack on the Indian quarter the next day was organized. Similarly, while the riots were purposeful and targeted and selected appropriate means for the ends, they also had consummatory aspects. The riots were also

a complexity of anti-Indian and anti-apartheid violence. In Cato Manor, the violence was directed at Indians. However, the riots also challenged the particular form urban apartheid had taken. In order to consolidate their precarious position in Cato Manor, the rioters were prepared to take on the white local authority. Similarly, earlier in the city center the riot displayed distinct signs of expanding into a general challenge to the broader power relations of the city. The composition of the rioters challenges the notion of existing studies that they represented the "scum of the earth." While the *amalaita* gangs were certainly central to the violence, the rioters also consisted of dockworkers and ricksha pullers, who had a long tradition of militancy. The participants in Cato Manor were typical residents of the neighborhood.

Moving to Inanda during the early 1980s, significant divisions had emerged between Indian landlords/traders and their African counterparts. Using the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 as a lever, the African petit-bourgeoisie sought to make Inanda their exclusive preserve. Because the Indian petit-bourgeoisie were their immediate competitors, this struggle often translated into an anti-Indianism. Like Cato Manor of the 1940s, the absence of administrative or legal mechanisms for the extraction of rent often produced a particularly volatile relationship between landlord and tenant. This was exacerbated by the policies of the local and national state. The local state argued that Inanda was an illegal settlement and therefore it was not prepared to allocate resources to the area. The central state presented Indian landlords with a choice: evict the tenants or provide essential services. Uncertain about

their future in Inanda, some landlords opted for eviction, adding to the already volatile relationship with African tenants. The fact that the state did not make similar demands on African landlords meant that eviction was seen in racial terms. For the state, the removal of Indians would allow incorporation of Inanda into KwaZulu, facilitating the objective of balkanizing South Africa into different homelands. Inkatha had similar objectives since this would have led to the extension of their influence in the region. What was clear by the 1980s is that significant players both within and outside Inanda were lined up against Indian presence in the area, albeit for diverse reasons.

In turning to the character of the riots themselves, it was argued that the only way of understanding the violence was to break it down into different phases. This allowed for the perception that the riots had both spontaneous and planned aspects. Similarly, while the riots had their anti-Indian dimensions, they certainly went beyond this. For example, in Inanda the violence moved beyond the looting and burning of Indian shops and houses to an uprising against attempts by Inkatha-aligned warlords to move into the area. Contrary to statements by some social scientists and political organizations, the rioters did not simply consist of young, hungry men with red eyes and hardened features, but rather represented a broad spectrum of the squatter communities.

Rule (1988) calls for theories of civil violence that specify particular connections that should apply in particular settings. This dissertation is, in a sense, a response to this challenge. It attempted to set out the conditions under which violence breaks out between a middleman minority and an indigenous

majority where both do not have access to state power. The findings, however, move beyond these narrow confines and lend themselves to a more general applicability.

The dissertation focused on the South African situation where a white minority holds state and economic power. The findings have applicability in post-colonial situations where the indigenous majority gain state power but economic power resides in the hands of transnationals and advanced industrialized countries and small local trade continues to be dominated by the old middleman minority. Often in these circumstances the new holders of state power have acted against the monopoly of the middleman minority who are more visible, vulnerable, and accessible than the transnationals and advanced industrialized countries. Malaysia and Uganda are two well-known examples. A case that is unfolding presently is that of Kenya. Journalist Joe Khamisi wrote recently that "As political tensions rise in advance of Kenya's general election, the vulnerable Asian community is in a dilemma. Its members must quickly decide whether to stay on and risk becoming victims of post election strife or seek temporary refuge abroad" (Daily News, 23 November 1992). The increasing vulnerability of Asians in Kenya comes in the context of the country's first multiparty election in more than two decades.

Over the last century, Kenyan Asians have gained substantial holdings in the retail, manufacturing, and service industries. More recently, Asians have benefited from close association with the regime of President Daniel Arap Moi, who has allowed them preferential treatment in the allocation of tenders and

foreign exchange. Two opposition parties have already indicated that if they come to power they will punish Asians who have benefited from a close relationship with the regime. All this comes at a time when growing political violence has already caused at least a dozen deaths. "The Asians have not yet been touched but some hear they will be attacked if the election temperature hots up. Because of their relative wealth and their cultural aloofness, the Asians have suffered most during past riots and political disturbances" (Daily News, 23 November 1992).

Rinder (1958) refers to hostility directed towards people located in the "status gap." Similarly, Bonacich (1973) refers mainly to situations in which whites hold state power and the middleman dominates trade with the indigenous people. My own analysis, while making some refinements to the middleman concept, is located within the South African experience and parallels the scenario painted by Rinder and Bonacich. However, the experiences of Uganda, Malaysia, and more recently Kenya indicate the middleman concept has applicability in situations where whites have vacated state power and the indigenous majority have assumed power. In other words, the middleman thesis has relevance beyond the "status gap."

Yancy, Eriksen, and Jualiani's (1976) notion of emergent ethnicity proved useful in understanding the narrowly ethnic response of Africans in the urban areas, particularly in the 1940s. Africans in Durban's Cato Manor were often newly arrived from Natal's rural areas. The notion of transplanted cultural heritage could, however, not explain the unity prevalent in Cato Manor since the

residents often came from areas where factional fighting and bloody vengeance reigned over any notions of a common cultural heritage (Clegg, 1981). The intense residential concentration of Cato Manor that was spatially segregated from other racial groups and the constant threat to their existence in the area facilitated a unified ethnic consciousness. This was reinforced by informal networks, common institutions and services (shebeens, the Zionist church, cooperatives, burial, and saving societies).

The notion of emergent ethnicity has less resonance for Durban of the 1980s. Here we see two broad types of responses from Africans. First, there is the mainly older resident in the urban area who still has links with the rural areas, believes in traditional authority (tribal chiefs), and is responsive to the calls of Zulu nationhood espoused by Inkatha. Second, ranged against this, was a younger grouping born in the urban area, anti-traditional authority, committed to building an African (and often multiracial) unity across tribal lines, and militantly opposed to the South African state and the bantustan governments. This group saw an affinity with the UDF and Mkonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the then-banned ANC. What began to emerge in Durban's African townships in the 1980s was a struggle around notions of ethnicity, nationalism, traditional authority, or, put more crudely, "the role and duties of a Zulu in urban areas."

Yancey et al.'s theory does not envisage circumstances where the particular form that ethnic identity takes is a site of intense struggle and conflict. One gets the impression from their work that if there exist common occupational positions, residential stability and concentration, and dependence on certain

institutions and services, there is a strong probability that an ethnic consciousness will emerge and persist. However, there is a lack of any consideration of how political forces can intervene in this process. The theory, for example, cannot make sense of the violence in Natal, where Zulus are pitted against Zulus. Part of this struggle is about the meaning and interpretation of ethnic symbols. Yancey et al.'s theory needs to be reformulated to accommodate forces beyond the structural-like political organizations which often play an important part in determining the shape and form of ethnic identity.

4.3 State Responses to the Persistence of Ethnic Identities

One of the legacies of colonial conquest and exploitation in South Africa was racial domination. It was upon this bequest that the policy of apartheid was built. Central to apartheid was the designation of political rights (and to a large extent economic opportunities) on the basis of racial criteria.

Under the system of apartheid, Africans, Indians, and coloreds were denied political rights and were excluded from access to the major decision-making institutions in the society. Residential, educational, and other services and facilities were segregated by law. Interracial marriage and sexual intercourse were prohibited by law until 1985 (Stadler, 1987, p. 12).

The central component of the policy was the creation of the homeland system. Building on policies started by previous governments, the Nationalist government elected to power in 1948 made the program of establishing reserves in rural areas the cornerstone of apartheid. Totaling some 14% of the land in South Africa, the policy envisaged upgrading the reserves into homelands that

would allow Africans to enjoy full political rights there. It was envisaged that the homelands could also become fully "independent states." This policy allowed for a more systematic attack on African political claims outside the homelands. Stadler (1987) makes the point that

> there was never a serious intention to make these states economically self-sufficient, and there has never been much doubt that they are the creatures and clients of the South African state. . . . The trappings of independence ceremonies, separate police forces, civil services, political executives, and legislatives have not concealed the de facto hegemony of the South African regime. . . . The policies they pursue are continuous with and complementary to the objectives of the South African state. Their economies are dominated by South African interests.

Through the homelands, the state sought to create a compliant African leadership, divide Africans along ethnic lines, and drive a wedge between those having access and those excluded from permanent status in "white" South Africa. Crucially, it came to serve the purpose of securing an inexpensive and politically acquiescent reserve army of African workers.

Attempts to characterize the nature of the South African state in the post-1948 apartheid era have led to vigorous debate. An influential perspective has been Kaplan's (1980) argument that the capitalist state in South Africa can be classified as a bourgeois democracy, albeit of a racially exclusive kind. Murray (1987), while accepting the basic tenets of Kaplan's position, contends that Kaplan's position conflates political representation with the franchise and therefore ignores mechanisms other than electoral participation in a centralized parliamentary body through which the dominant classes secured hegemony over subordinate classes. According to Murray, the historical *differentia specifica* of

South Africa's capitalist state has not been its hermetically sealed "racial exclusivity" per se, but its racially differentiated forms of political representation. What distinguished the bourgeois-democratic form of state is the way in which racial domination served as a principal mode of social organization (p. 108).

Underpinning the state's attempt to create differentiated forms of political representation for those excluded from the central parliament was the element of coercion to maintain hegemony. This differed with regard to the white electorate, where consent was the central feature. Shaken by the multiracial mobilization of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s, the state also sought to ensure that the political aspirations of Africans, Indians, and coloreds were channeled through separate institutions. To this end the state promoted the South African Indian Council and the Colored Representative Council in the early 1960s. Largely filled with state appointees, the bodies had purely advisory powers.

The South African state sought to ensure that economic and political power was concentrated in white hands, that there was a steady stream of cheap black labor, and that the disenfranchised did not pose a threat to state power or disrupt the process of capital accumulation. It sought to achieve this by allowing limited political representation along strict racial and ethnic lines and prohibiting interracial political bodies. Underpinning this was a barrage of laws and an all-pervasive and sophisticated repressive apparatus. It was this system that led David Welsh to argue that black people "must rank among the most highly

controlled and bureaucratically regimented people in any modern industrial society" (quoted in Murray, 1987, p. 99).

This form of control gave the police force a particular profile. The police force priorities lay with enforcing influx regulations, controlling the liquor trade, and political repression. With the middle and upper echelons of the police force staffed exclusively by whites displaying open allegiance to the ruling National Party, it was not surprising that the police were often accused of being unwilling to prevent violence within and between black communities unless it constituted a broader challenge to white authority. After all, conflagration within black communities gave credence to the prevailing apartheid ideology that Africans were inherently violent and relationships between racial and ethnic groups were inherently antagonistic.

With the persistence of ethnic identification in Africa that often translated into politicized communalism, numerous state strategies have been mooted and implemented to deal with the phenomenon of the persistence of ethnic identification in Africa. While a comprehensive survey was beyond the scope of this study, a brief review of such strategies, which tried either to suppress ethnicity or privilege it, will be attempted.

The most immediate state reaction was a form of authoritarian containment, what Kasfir (1975) referred to as "departicipation." This usually took the form of military intervention or one-party regimes (or some combination of the two).

Young (1986) points out that containment and departicipation had immediate benefits in dampening intercommunal tensions. However, he also argues that

> the authoritarian state has its own infirmities over time. Its powerholding groups may be drawn from narrow ethnic segments, as in Idi Amin's Uganda. Containment lowers political emotions but does not necessarily win consensus. . . . Autocratic containment policies do not necessarily suppress ethnicity along with dissent. Rather, they force cultural pluralism into informal channels, which may themselves become institutionalized. (p. 128)

Another strategy designed to deal with politicized communalism is consociationalism. This model associated with Arend Lijphart proposes a system of consensual multiethnic power sharing as opposed to majority rule. The basic argument is that a plural (deeply divided) society can become stable and democratic through elite accommodation and cooperation (grand coalition). The autonomy of deeply divided societies is institutionally guaranteed (segmented autonomy), and there is strong respect for principles of proportionality (in elections, allocating civil service appointments, and granting government subsidies), as well as mutual veto rights (Taylor, 1992, p. 91). Lijphart's work has generated immense interest in South Africa (see, e.g., Taylor, 1992).

Rather than attempting to abolish or weaken divisions, under consociationalism ethnic polarization into communal blocs is encouraged, institutionally entrenched, and legitimated. For Lijphart, interethnic contact is seen inevitably to lead to hostility, and segmented autonomy is designed to limit the potential of interethnic contact.

Taylor points out that Lijphart accepts the basic tenet of apartheid--that ethnic contact leads to friction, and therefore segregation must be pursued. Thus, Lijphart appears as an apologist of apartheid policy. "Ethnic differences are an unalterable fact and what the government's widely despised policies have succeeded in doing is not to manufacture artificially but to counteract and soften them artificially" (Lijphart, 1989; quoted in Taylor, 1992, p. 5).

This study has indicated that it is precisely the competitive relations and the lack of interdependence that created the conditions for Indo-African violence. The challenge is not to politicize ethnicity by entrenching ethnic groups into communal blocs, but to create the conditions for interdependence.

The different attempts to deal with ethnicity have politicized it. Even authoritarian containment has forced cultural pluralism into informal channels, which then became institutionalized. Kofele-Kale (1984), writing about Cameroon between 1960 and 1982, captures this process succinctly:

> The scramble to secure, establish and consolidate an ethnic power base has contributed to the politicization of ethnic loyalties at both the leadership and mass levels. To the extent that identification with an ethnic group was a necessary precondition for remaining in power, the need to rekindle banked ethnic feelings and to rediscover long forgotten ethnic roots became an all-consuming passion for the ethnic barons. . . . At the mass level . . . is the inevitable retreat into an ethnic sanctuary since the individual peasant or worker now sees the structure as the only reliable avenue for upward mobility. For these people, politics now revolves around the ethnic group and its spokesmen and women since it was they who ultimately can deliver essential services to their communities. (quoted in Young, 1986, p. 129)

Mare is entirely correct when he argues that ethnicity, as a social identity in South Africa, needs to be separated from political mobilization, manipulation, and the fanning of ethnic sentiments. The ethnic identities held by individuals

should be protected in a Bill of Rights based on individual rights and freedoms. There should be no constitutional provision for the rewarding of groups along the lines of their group identity. At a general level, where ethnicity motivates immediate behavior, it will have to be sensitively and self-consciously depoliticized and severed from the arena of competition and resources, privilege, power, and rights in the future transformation (Mare, 1992, p. 107).

There are strong indicators that the major South African political parties are not counting on a narrow ethnic base. The ANC's 48th National Congress in July 1991 elected a National Executive with a 34% "non African" membership (Africa South, August 1991). Also, as Taylor (1992) points out, "all ANC campaigns are marked by non-racialism in the design of posters, make-up of crowds and voicing of aims; the history of resistance to apartheid has a strong non-racial thread" (p. 117). The erstwhile Afrikaner National Party has also moved beyond ethnic confines. The majority of MP's in the Indian and colored sections of the tricameral parliament now belong to the National Party. A Cabinet reshuffle has seen coloreds and Indians enter this exclusively white domain. Even Inkatha is accelerating its drive to recruit membership in Indian and white areas. It has already succeeded in attracting a few senior National and Democratic Party members into its ranks. Its strident Zulu nationalism is being replaced by calls for a broader South Africanism, albeit with strong regional underpinnings. This move has probably been motivated by authoritative surveys indicating that the ANC holds a majority of Zulu support outside Natal (Orkin, 1989, p. 83). Inkatha leadership has realized it cannot rely exclusively on a Zulu

base. Its call for federalism and/or strong regional government is likely to galvanize considerable support among whites and Indians in Natal.

The latest deal between the National Party and the ANC calls for a five-year government of national unity, consisting of all parties winning more than 5% of the vote in a nonracial national election. This deal has discarded notions of entrenching ethnic groups into communal blocs. If parties want to be major players in the new government, they will have to have an appeal beyond an ethnic base. The ANC's agreement to a government of national unity indicates its willingness to drop any notion of identifying itself with the "nation," of being the voice of the "people," and propagating the policy choices of one party as the general will of people as a whole. This was the path followed by many dominant parties in Africa with disastrous consequences.

4.4   The Future of Indo-African Relations

It has become an almost clichéd response from black extra-parliamentary political organizations that political violence is the result of the intensification of the apartheid system. However, the present conjuncture is witnessing a heightening of violence at a time when apartheid institutions and policies are being eroded.

Hindson and Morris (1991) have shown how declining economic growth, rapid urbanization, and the growth of shackland residential areas have been part of the very process that has caused massive dislocation, upheaval, violence, and a general heightening of political conflict within the urban metropolitan areas. The harsh reality, they argue, is that racial, ethnic, and class antagonisms held

in check under classic apartheid have re-emerged in the present period of liberalization and deracialization.

In Natal, central to the present violence is the growth of shantytowns on the metropolitan periphery of Durban. In the absence of central or local state control, many of the shantytowns have fallen under the sway of warlords.

In the absence of legal mechanisms for the extraction of payments and the exercise of control, warlords rely on sublieutenants. The warlords' capacity for force has often to be demonstrated. The warlord authority structure, according to Morris (1992), is bedeviled by internal rivalry, intrigue, and disloyalty (p. 6). Lieutenants continuously fight for favor or attempt to hive off to form their own squatter communities. As a result, many of the shantytowns are marked by internal power struggles. Warlords are also constantly on the lookout for more land because it is the means of appropriating surplus in the form of rent, taxes, levies, and so on.

There has also been increasing conflict between shantytown residents and residents of the formal African townships. In many instances, attacks emanating out of the squatter camps and led by warlords have been crude "booty"-gathering raids, with houses being looted and the "spoils" spirited into the shantytowns.

In one such raid in December 1989, armed men from the Lindelani squatter camp entered F section of the neighboring formal African township of Ntuzuma. Fifty-one houses were looted, seven vehicles burnt, and several people killed. Newspaper reports indicated that many of the looters were

newcomers to the urban areas recruited into the raiding parties with the promise that if they joined they could keep what they looted (Natal Witness, 8 December 1989; Sunday Tribune, 8 December 1989).

Commenting on the raid, Minaar (1992) argues that, beyond the ongoing struggle between Inkatha and UDF supporters, the ostensible reason for the attack was the objective of the warlords to engender a climate of fear so that people would abandon their areas. This would allow the warlords to move in and rent out the land, thus increasing their tax base. It is noteworthy that Lindelani squatters characterized the African township dwellers of Ntuzuma as "Indians," signifying squatter perceptions of better living conditions in Ntuzuma and justifying attacks on this basis (South, 20 December 1989).

The spatial location of Indian townships makes them vulnerable to attack from shantytown residents. The large working-class Indian townships of Phoenix and Chatsworth are contiguous to African residential areas. Over the past few years, African squatters from Inanda have sporadically entered the Indian township of Phoenix and looted households. In some areas of Phoenix that border Inanda, houses have been abandoned after consistent attacks. In recent times, African squatters have taken to occupying vacant land in Indian suburbs, producing new sources of tension. One such area is Reservoir Hills. A survey conducted in 1988 found that 96% of the Indian residents objected to the squatters, 25% were in favor of the forced removal of squatters, while 13% felt that influx control laws should be reintroduced to curb the number of Africans entering the urban areas (Chetty, 1988, pp. 38-44).

Indian community leaders have accused the squatters of corrupting Indian youth by selling alcohol and drugs. Neighborhood watches have sprung up in the Indian suburbs. Some of the watches have been accused of becoming vigilantes, enforcing an after-dark curfew on African movement in Indian areas (D. Soni, personal memo).

The erosion of apartheid and the concomitant "rising expectations" are likely to see competition in the labor market. Here Africans are likely to come up against Indians dominating semi-skilled and supervisory positions in the Durban-Pinetown area. Because of the better educational levels of the Indian workforce, they will be difficult to dislodge, increasing antagonism.

The present conjuncture throws up increased possibilities for ethnic mobilization. Young (1986) points out that the dominance of a given cultural segment and social class may be preserved over long periods by prescriptive belief, external support, or simple coercion (p. 123). At those points of historical rupture when these institutions of domination dissolve, there is a high possibility of violent confrontation, as social revolution is fused to communal animosities. Young points to the African examples of Rwanda in 1959 and Zanzibar in 1964. In Asia, a similar escalation of violence accompanied the last days of the British Raj in India and the immediate post-independence period. Singh, in an introduction to a book by Akbar (1988), argues that Mahatma Gandhi believed that Hindu-Muslim riots were engineered by the British in pursuance of their divide-and-rule policy, and that when the British were finally driven out of India, the two communities would learn to live in peace and harmony. Singh makes the

point that the British often prevented riots from escalating, especially if the perception was created that the British did not have the capacity to maintain stability. It was only during the last years of the Raj that Hindu-Muslim conflicts achieved the proportions of civil wars in which people were killed by the thousands. It is estimated that in the two months following the partition of the country, ten million people had been rendered homeless and almost half a million were dead. Violence escalated, not when British rule was at its height, but when it was at its weakest.

Ethnicity is a powerful mobilizer because the symbolic resources available are more powerful and involve more intensely felt emotions and fears than are likely to emanate out of a class framework. Bell (1975) contends that contemporary ethnicity is more salient than class "because it can combine an interest with an affective tie" (p. 169). Young (1986) points out that in addition to the larger reservoir of affective symbols for subjective mobilization,

> political claims and action by communal segments tend to have high visibility. Because cultural pluralism frequently rests on readily perceived markers—language, phenotypical stereotypes, publicly observed rituals— on the crucial issues of overall resource allocations and domination of public institutions, communal imbalances are swift to be recognised and have more immediate emotional impact. (p. 122)

In Natal, one has a political leadership in the form of Inkatha, which is prepared to utilize ethnic symbols (whatever their historical validity) to mobilize membership. This appeal is often couched in an anti-Indianism. This gels with material interests of its support base when Africans, in the deadly competition for scarce resources (land, housing, jobs, services, and the like), perceive Indians as advantaged via the apartheid system. Increasingly, Indian community leaders

have responded to deracialization with appeals to the need to maintain the "Indian way of life." Young (1986) points out that with the onset of electoral politics in Africa, many politicians "found the ethnic pathway to clientele-creation irresistible as the surest and swiftest way to consolidate a following" (p. 122). Many politicians in Natal, both in the African and Indian communities, are making similar noises.

Indo-African relations have to be understood in the context of the effects of the decline and decay of apartheid as a coherent and articulated system. The process of decline and decay has, in particular, affected the struggles of larger numbers of poor people for resources in conditions where the chiefly rural order is less able than before to deliver acceptable conditions for subsistence according to older lines of clientage.

Hindson and Morris (1991) point out that the breaching of the spatial order of apartheid has unleashed an often violent struggle for access to basic resources—land, water, shelter—in as close proximity as is possible to the economic and productive core of the province. It is, thus, the decline and decay of apartheid, rather than its intensification, that has increased the possibility of violence, of the breakdown of law and order. It is precisely this conjuncture that has thrown up increased possibilities for ethnic competition, lending itself to conflict and violence between African and Indian.

4.5   Cultural Pluralism and the Politics of Nation Building

The present violence in South Africa, widely portrayed in the media as ethnic conflict, has generated an increased interest in consociationalism. This

view, popularized by Arend Lijphart, proposes a system of consensual multiethnic power sharing, as opposed to majority rule. The way to avoid ethnic conflict, Lijphart (1985) argues, is to ensure that ethnic interests are met through communal blocs that are institutionally entrenched and legitimated (pp. 106-107). This segmental autonomy, according to Lijphart, limits the potential of interethnic contact, which is seen to invariably erupt into hostility. Lijpart's views, cited above, that ethnic differences are unalterable and that government policies have counteracted and softened them, resonate with the National Party's apartheid policies.

This study has indicated that it is precisely the competitive relations and the lack of interdependence that created the conditions for Indo-African violence. The challenge is not to politicize ethnicity by entrenching ethnic groups into communal blocs, but to create the conditions for interdependence. Aronson and Bridgeman (1984) have shown how structured interdependence in the desegregated classroom in schools increases the self-esteem, the morale, the interpersonal attraction, and the empathy of students across racial and ethnic divisions. At a general level, where ethnicity motivates immediate behavior, it will have to be sensitively and self-consciously depoliticized and severed from the arena of competition and resources, privilege, power, and rights in the future transformation. The ethnic identities held by individuals should be protected in a bill of rights based on individual rights and freedoms. There should be no constitutional provision for the rewarding of groups because of their group identity.

This must be accompanied by a determined program to reduce inequalities. As Allport (1954) reminds us,

> Prejudice ... may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups. (quoted in Aronson & Bridgeman, 1984, p. 313)

While these issues will have to await the renewing of the negotiating process and will, to a large extent, be determined by the particular strengths of the ANC and the National Party during this conjuncture, it is important that the Lijphart thesis be challenged by research findings of the sort that this study has produced, as this will shape attitudes at the negotiating table.

There are immediate issues, however, that can be addressed more speedily. This pertains to the squatter settlements which often border Indian townships. It is here that the most immediate danger of Indo-African conflict lies. For example, houses in Phoenix that border Inanda have been abandoned because of the threats of attacks. Residents in Phoenix have responded with neighborhood watches. These patrols have virtually imposed a night curfew on African presence in Phoenix. The situation demands a coherent policy towards squatter settlements.

The following are some broad recommendations in this regard:

1. One of the legacies of apartheid is that while white local municipalities have substantial local autonomy, African local authorities are tied to central or KwaZulu government control. African local authorities also have no

viable tax base. First, one needs to establish some coherence to urban government. A first step would be the creation of a single metropolitan region with a single tax base. This could be done by eradicating separate town councils for white and African areas and creating one controlling council for the Durban Functional Region. This would ensure some coherence for urban development and create one tax base for the area.

2.   One of the consequences of apartheid planning is the availability of large tracts of vacant or underutilized land close to urban opportunities (Development Action Group, WIP, July 1992). These areas should be opened up for low-income housing, simultaneously easing pressure on the peripheral African areas.

3.   The standardization of tenure in the KwaZulu homeland needs to take place. Presently, one has tribal tenure, occupational rights, deed of grant, 99-year leasehold, and some freehold in operation. Also, as Minaar (1992) points out, tenure should not be so tenuous that warlords can force occupiers off and then squat illegally on land without fear of being evicted by the authorities (p. 16). Often, in the absence of legal tenure, the occupation rights of those physically in possession are recognized by the authorities. This situation favors the use of force by warlords to bring land in the immediate vicinity of their operations under their direct control.

4.   Squatter communities need official recognition. In Durban, many squatter communities are not acknowledged by the Durban City Council and so do not fall under KwaZulu government control either, because the land is in

"white" South Africa. This state of limbo has allowed warlords to flourish. Once a town board or local authority is established, the power of the warlord is undermined. Residents would then pay their rents and levies for services (water, lights, and refuse removal) directly to the town council.

4.6 Further Research on Collective Violence

First, we need an adequate theory of ethnicity, something that I do not think we have, at least not in South Africa. Such a theory, if it hopes to assist in understanding the violence, would not just have to account for the continued presence and effect of ethnic forms of consciousness, but would also need to integrate within it:

- the relationship and intersection of nationalism(s) and ethnicity;

- the relationship/intersection of culture and ethnicity (Is ethnicity merely culture "gone bad," i.e., the negative ways in which cultural specificities express themselves in conflict situations? Or are culture and ethnicity two separate but related phenomena?);

- the relationship between ethnicity and material deprivation or privilege, in particular the claim to land and associated resources;

- the creation/manipulation of ethnicity through the practices of colonialism and apartheid, and the subsequent re-creation/manipulation of ethnicity by particular figures (such as Buthelezi). Important in this would be the creation, manipulation, and/or existence of "differences" between groups which assist in the definitions of "insiders" and "outsiders"; and

- the propensity toward violence as a means of problem solving within any particular ethnic group, how this varies between ethnic groups, and under which conditions this propensity is likely to be "triggered."

We must tie this search for a theory of ethnicity to a theoretical approach that attempts to integrate all the varied factors that come to bear in violent situations, of which ethnicity is but one. My point is that if we accept that the current violence is multidimensional (being influenced by economic issues, politics, national and regional forces, psychological factors, cultural differences, historical influences, and so on), then a theory of ethnicity, however elaborate, can only help to explain a small, albeit necessary, part of the violence.

Second, we have very few ethnographic studies in South Africa. Such accounts would focus on the lived reality of the individuals of ethnic groups in daily life. The accounts need not focus on violent incidents alone, as one can probably learn a lot from studies that focus on "normal" daily life practices of the particular cultural/ethnic groups with which one is concerned. Here I have in mind issues like authority and decision-making structures and processes, age and gender relations, and so on.

Most research on violence actually lacks detailed accounts or explanations by the antagonists themselves. Our data sources are extremely limited due to the kind of reporting and monitoring of violence that is going on. Reporters seldom actually interview the antagonists themselves and generally focus on the victims in the aftermath of the violence. Likewise, monitoring groups

seldom give accounts by the "actors" themselves and tend to rely on "informants" who paint a particular picture, not necessarily consciously or incorrectly, but nevertheless an interpretation that leaves out aspects that may be valuable to researchers. Can this be corrected by researchers actually ferreting out the antagonists?

A major facet of violence that we know very little of in South Africa is that of the psychology of the crowd—that is, of violence that is mass-based and not perpetrated by hit squads/assassins. Even in the latter, however, a psychological explanation could be informative, in this case focusing on the individual rather than the crowd. I get the impression that there are many thousands of people who have been involved in acts of violence (against their will or otherwise) who have never managed to eliminate their sense of guilt, if you will, a widespread guilty conscience exists that we have not understood or dealt with.

The dynamics of crowds has likewise received little attention in the South African literature on violence. Here I am thinking of the mechanisms of crowd formation and mobilization, the slogans, the statements by leaders within the crowd, and the like, as well as of the actual spatial configuration and setting. Is the spatial setting conducive to violent outbreaks in, for example, the central business district where crowds are hemmed in by buildings and streets and their exits restricted by such physical factors as well as by the spatial location of police and oppositional groups? How does this differ in townships, squatter settlements, and hostels? What are the triggers that can turn a peaceful crowd

into a violent one? Actions such as police brutality, attacks on vulnerable individuals, brandishing of weapons, derogatory slogans, and the like, all play a part in this "triggering," as does the lack of prior contact between the organizers of marches and the authorities.

Organized and spontaneous crowd formations also require further research and comparison. How do spontaneous crowds form and develop? Are organized crowds less likely to respond violently than spontaneous crowds? I would think so, but this requires investigation.

The legitimation of the use of violence by individuals or by "groups" and political or other leaders also requires further investigation. At an individual level, this could only be done by talking to the actual perpetrators of violence in any incident. Do crowds or individuals or leaders actually believe their use of violence to be legitimate? If so, why, and what needs to be done so as to remove the "need" to resort to violence as a means of expression (in the last instance)?

The actions of police, hitmen, assassination squads, and the like, in perpetrating violence need exposure. Their links to the state or other groups, their motivations, and the extent of their operations need clarity.

I think that the relationship between age, gender, and violence requires further elaboration. To some extent, the political violence has a generational and gender element to it. On one side, Inkatha supporters appear to be largely older men (but some younger men are also present), while on the other side, ANC supporters appear to be largely young men/youth. I am talking here of violent

confrontations and not of general supporters. Is there a propensity for violence among particular youth, for example, the poor, the unemployed, and so on? If this is so, why is it, and how can we change this? What has been the experience of women in violence, as participants or mainly as victims? How does this relate to ethnicity, machoism, and feminism?

The presence of alternative socializing mechanisms needs to be considered in a period where the family is torn apart and where schools have virtually ceased to function. Here I am thinking of whether the political or gang structures of the youth fulfill a socializing role. What other mechanisms/ structures fulfill this role?

The role of "homelands" and traditional authority structures in the violence is important. Is the current violence an indication that such groups see their days as numbered and are resorting to violence as a last-ditch attempt to entrench their present position? To what extent can a "modern" urban culture coexist peacefully with a traditional premodern and rurally based culture? Are we witnessing the birth pangs of a "modernizing" society being torn from its roots?

The actions of landlords and how these threaten other authority figures may well be important, too. What are their relations to the land, the traditional authorities, and the tenants? Is this the birth of a nascent capitalist class based within the sphere of reproduction rather than production?

What is the role of traditional healers, witches, and the like, in the violence? I have heard mention that each side in a conflict often has the "help" of a *sangoma* to ensure their victory. Is the side with the most powerful *sangoma*

victorious in the conflict? How do the actors themselves conceive of the assistance of such parties?

4.7 Contribution of the Study and Concluding Remarks

Ethnic divisions and conflict in South Africa are viewed as either being primordial or the result of state manipulation. This study has shown how ethnicity is constructed and manipulated from above. However, it has also been sensitive to the popular impulses that come from below. Ethnicity has an existence beyond a mental construct. Whatever ethnicity's imaginary and ideological status, it also has a real, concrete, and material existence. There is something there that we call ethnicity, whether it be "signs" (displays) or the playing out of the social identity as individuals negotiate their way through certain social relations. It is held that this approach is much more productive to understanding the bases for ethnic divisions than the primordial or state-manipulation explanations.

This study also sends a clear signal to progressive social scientists that we have to understand the basis of ethnic divisions. The understanding of the basis of ethnic conflict has been a neglected area of study. A central reason for this neglect is that progressive social scientists in South Africa believe that a discussion of ethnic divisions gives the concept an unwarranted status and deflects the debate from the essential problem of the deeper forces that create and exploit ethnicity. To argue that to study Indo-African violence gives the concept of ethnic divisions unwarranted status (as many colleagues at the University of Durban-Westville have argued!) does not hold water. As Guy

(1992) reminds us, whatever one's attitude to the nature and reality of ethnic conflict may be, ethnic categories are being used and abused increasingly by participants and observers both inside and outside South Africa and are reinforced daily in the media—domestically and internationally. Ethnicity in South Africa has become an issue to which all those with an interest in South Africa have to respond, if for no other reason than if one avoids the recognition and study, this leaves the field open to its abuse. This is an intellectual battle to be fought that will not be won if progressive social scientists ignore the issue. This is not just an academic battle. It has implications for urgent questions of policy.

The study also debunks a number of widely held views in South African social science on the nature of collective violence. It has shown that participants in the riots do not represent the "scum of the earth." Rather, participants are typical of the neighborhood in which the riots occurred. Riots cannot be seen as instrumental or consummatory; rather, they are a mixture of both. The study illustrated that a more useful approach is to explore the changing balance over time between what one may call the expressive and instrumental aspects of different types of disorders. To divide the actions of individuals into rational versus emotional irrational types as previous studies of the riots have done is to deny the complexity of human behavior. The study also goes beyond naming an event as ethnic conflict based on primordial sentiments or black-on-black violence and seeing that as a form of explanation. This tells us nothing about why violence takes place in particular historical periods.

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Almost all theories of civil violence have at some time been hailed as capturing the ultimate origins and nature of civil violence--wherever and whenever it occurs. This study supports the view of Rule and McPhail that riots are complex phenomena that cannot be understood by utilizing one theory. Riots display a heterogeneity and are best explained by a combination of theories.

The central contribution of this study is to discern, first, the general conditions that engender hostility between the host society and middleman groups. It then specifies under what conditions this hostility can translate into violence.

Middleman minorities are not an anachronistic aberration from traditional societies. They are a pervasive and growing phenomenon in modern societies. The challenge is to understand what causes them to persist and why, and under what conditions they engender hostility and violent reaction.

Academics and the media have all too often presented ethnic violence in South Africa in crude, stereotypical terms of tribal Africa. It is hoped that my approach encourages a more nuanced, subtle, contextualized research agenda into the issues of ethnic identity and conflict, and in this way contributes to the intensifying struggle for democracy in South Africa.

APPENDIX: GLOSSARY

Amalaita--Stick fighters, a street desperado.

Black--The terms colored, African, white, and Indian in this thesis refer to the statutory definition, which existed until recently, of persons in South Africa. The term "black" refers to coloreds, Indians, and Africans.

Impi--An armed band of men, especially those engaging in *faction fights.*

Induna--Councilor or headman appointed by a chief; African foreman of any band of workers.

Kia--Detached servants' quarters.

Mkhumbane--This was the name Africans in Durban used to refer to Cato Manor. The name came from a stream that flows through the area. Mkhumbane and Cato Manor are used interchangeably in the text.

Panga--A large, broad-bladed knife used for heavy cutting of bush, etc., and as a weapon.

Sangoma--An African witch doctor, usually a woman, often claiming supernatural powers of divination.

Shebeen--An establishment in which formerly illicit home-brewed beer was sold, or other beer was sold illicitly without a license, usually by African women known as "queens."

This section has relied heavily on J. Brandford and W. Brandford, <u>Dictionary of South African English</u> (1991).

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