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THE 1928 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE SOUTH:
THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE VALUES

BY

Stephen F. Orwat

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1994

ABSTRACT

THE 1928 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE SOUTH:
THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE VALUES

By

Stephen F. Orwat

The 1928 Presidential Election in the South was a struggle to define
southern traditions and values. This was the first post-
Reconstruction election that showcased a split in the solid Democratic
South. The South was divided over whether to vote for racial
supremacy or religious conservatism. These were both traditional
southern values. A battle between southern Democratic forces over
the issue of true conservatism ensued. There was a question
between conservative values. The South was divided over which
tradition to champion, Prostestantism or white supremacy. This was
endemically an ideological struggle that was based on geography and
racial population. The southern states with the highest African-
American populations were more apt to vote with the racial
conservatives while those with the lower numbers aligned
themselves with cultural conservatives. This southern electoral

pattern has continued in more recent elections.

Copyright by
Stephen Francis Orwat

1 994

To Mom and Dad: for giving me the opportunity they never received.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my Master's advisor Professor David T. Bailey
for his constant analysis as well as all the help and encouragement
along the way. I would also like to thank Professor

William B. Hixson Jr. for igniting the political fires that had been
dormant for so many years. I would especially like to thank my wife
Ann Goodyear who has been tireless in her constant editing and kind
words. This product could not have been completed without her

special assistance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures vii

Introduction: The Changing Southern Electorate 1
1: The Southern Democratic Core 28

2: The Early Smith Support 65

3: The Upper South Opposition 85

4: The Peripheral South 109

Conclusion: Reflections About 1928 and its 1 28
Connection With Other Elections

Bibliography 1 37

vi

List of Figures

Chart: 1928 Presidential Election Voting 1 29
Percentages in the South

vii

Introduction: The Changing Southern Electorate

Since the Republican defeat in the 1992 US. Presidential Election, the
conservative coalition that it represents has been looking to broaden
its base. Conservative reverend and media mogul Pat Robertson has
recently been courting the American Catholic Church to try and form
a united political opposition to social and political liberalism.
Recently at the 1992 G.O.P. National Convention, the three main
speakers were a Northern Catholic, a Northern Protestant, and a
Southern Protestant. This is an example of the white conservative
mix that forms part of the modern religious right. The mostly
Protestant religious right and American Catholic hierarchy have
found themselves in agreement about how to stop the modernization
and development of American culture. They are trying to maintain
the origins of a society that they deem proper and self-fulfilling.
They fear both political and social change because it weakens their
base of power and leads to an evolving country that does not reflect
their beliefs.

This newfound political alliance would be a drastic shock to those

southern Protestants of 1928, many of whose descendants now

2

belong to the religious right. In 1928, the political and religious
groups whose issues were directly represented by the Pat Robertson
types of the world, are now in today's world, seeking this political
union. The Protestant religious groups of this earlier era were trying
to stop a social, cultural, and political change from occurring that was
similar to what the modern religious right/ Catholic coalition wants to
stop. Now these Protestant groups accept Catholics as good
Americans. They did not do so in 1928. Catholics were suspect and
retained pseudo-alien status. The question of Americanism was at
the heart of the 1928 election. It has always been a question in the
South. David M. Potter once described this problem as "'a somewhat
compulsive preoccupation with the question of this Americanism.” 1
C. Vann Woodward said in The Future of me Past that "'This
preoccupation has found expression in innumerable, often confusing
and contradictory efforts to define the national character.”2 In the
1928 election, white Southerners had to answer the question of who
was the better American, or more precisely, which group of pseudo-
Americans should be feared less; Catholic Northerners or African-
American Southerners. This will be classified as the cultural
conservatives versus the racial conservatives. This is the main
conflict that will be explored in this thesis.

Cultural conservatives and racial conservatives comprise the
majority of white southern feelings in this era. The association with
one group or another was related to and correlated with African-

 

1C. Vann Woodward, W( New York: Oxford University Press,
1989) p.134.

ZWoodward. W p- 143.

3

Americans' being a percentage of the population. As will be
described later, the 1928 presidential election results aligned with
the number of African-Americans in a southern state. The states
with the higher former slave populations voted with the Democrats
while all other southern states voted against Catholicism and the
problems related with cultural change. This election was a question
of southern conservatism. The South was and still is categorized as
the most conservative area of the country. Conservatism could best
be described as resistance to change or maintaining the status quo.
So the 1928 election became a look at which conservative belief
would win this struggle, those with the Protestant sensibilities who
tried to maintain their religious and cultural way of life (cultural
conservatives), or those more interested in white supremacy who
wanted and tried to maintain their particular cultural and economic
way of life (racial conservatives). This second group also supported
economic progressivism and they aligned with Smith partly because
he was more economically progressive than Hoover. But, the
progressivism these people supported was for whites only.

These two groups belief systems were based on prejudices that
were rooted in their culture. Race and culture were the guide
markers. This does not not mean that other prejudices did not exist
inside the culture. There was an inherent sexism and anti-semitism
that was endemic to much of the South, but they were not cutting
issues or did not have a great effect in relation to this election. It
should be equated in future areas of this paper that when animosity
toward Wall Street and big business is discussed, anti-semitic

thought was an underlying factor and issue.

4

Thus, there were two types of political leaders who struggled over
the question of Smith's candidacy: those who felt that Smith was a
general threat and those politicians who simply tried to follow
popular public opinion whether they ended up either in favor of or
against Smith. Two examples to note in the future were Alabama
Senator J. Thomas Heflin and North Carolina Senator Fumifold M.
Simmons. Both were against Smith but for different reasons. Heflin
tried to further his career through his opposition to Smith and
Catholics in general. He was a politician without any coherent agenda
and is classified in the second group. His agenda throughout his
career was not consistent and, if the political climate was right, he
could have supported Smith. Simmons, on the other hand, was
deeply troubled by the entire Smith agenda and is classified with the
first group. He acted behind the scenes to counter the activities of
North Carolina and the National Democratic Party when his personal
leadership role was fully secured. Unlike Heflin, he had nothing to
gain by his opposition except a clear conscience. The South was
composed of these two types of political leaders who lined the Smith
opposition inside the Democratic party.

The purpose of this paper is not to form a comprehensive opinion
of the presidential election of 1928, but to analyze the southern
Democratic political activity that year and observe the trends that
continue to lead the South. This study is state driven and
concentrates on each former Confederate state. The study's focus is
solely on the activities of southern society. The core of activity
happens both in the churches and the Democratic party because they
are the center of southern culture. This is top down history based on

5

the opinion of religious, political, and cultural leaders. A herd
mentality developed where the local population followed the
activities of its appointed or inherited leaders. The local journals set
or followed an agenda in their reporting and the citizenry towed the
line. It is very important to prove that this election was not an
anomaly and the activities of the southern states strongly
corresponded with the representational wishes of the electorate. The
election in each state was a reflection of the differing individuals and
beliefs of that state. These activities in many ways were very
different.

The purpose is not to determine whether religion or Prohibition
was the more important issue of 1928. The combination of the
problems Governor Alfred Smith faced led to the first substantial
break up of the solid South after Reconstruction.3 His lack of depth
and his inability to break from his provincial roots and his arrogance
about his heritage helped to alienate the Democratic southern

electoral base.
Sou them Conservatism and Importan t Historical Litera (are

In many ways the South feared an evolving and changing society.
It could be said that the South of the 1920's feared the arrival of the

 

3David Burner in - ' .. ' .- -'
W( New York: Knopf, 1968) believed that the totality of
Smith's problems which included religion, prohibitionist discontent, supposed
un-American status, and Republican connections damaged his candidacy. This

is compared to Allan Iichtman mmmmmgmmmnm
1228( Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979) who believed that

religion was by far the most important issue in the election.

 

6

twentieth century. In this era the US. Supreme Court was slowly
beginning to change its view of the law from being in a Newtonian
state (unchanging laws or in a state of inaction), to being in a
Darwinian state (or the continuing evolution of the law and society).
The South was facing a similar societal change.

The entire South was analyzed with puzzling conclusions in the
Mioo of the Sooth by Wilbur J. Cash in 1941, that helped to form the
ideological and cultural evolution that culminated in the conflict of
1928. This book pre-existed almost all books discussed in this
section and is in many ways the father of modern southern cultural
and historical study.4 The South was formed as an area of class
distinction. It was rigid in its social characteristics. Both of these
aspects were based on geography. The best lands, black-belt soils
and coastal plains, went to the earliest immigrants who organized
this type of society. Plus, this type of settling kept away new
immigrants. This led to an economic and social isolation that
separated the black-belt plantations from the upcountry regions.

In the post-helium era, the separation that the South previously
enjoyed came to an abrupt end. In taking many aspects of the
northern way of life such as Jim Crow and others, the southern
economic and educational system began to change and modernize.
The twentieth century South was becoming industrialized. What was
called by Henry Grady as the 'New South' was an industrial and

 

4C Vann Woodward in W( Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1951) could be described as the father of pure

Southern historical study, Howard W. Odum, Soogoern Rogions of too Uoigoo
WChapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936) in Southern

sociological study. and V 0 Key. W( New
York: Knopf, 1950) in Southern political science.

7
better educated South. This increased the standard of living in all

areas of the South, but the growth was uneven at best. This new
economic format forced the South to embrace a new standard of
education. Whether it did or not is still in question. It is true that

in the era of redemption, social services such as education were
drastically cut. With the help of northern investment capital, Grady
and others tried to convince the North that the South was trying to
change and personify the North. But, it emulated the North in only
superficial ways, keeping a southern way of life still firmly in tact.
The continuing struggle between change and the status quo faced the
'New South'.

After discussing the cultural developments behind 1928, the
political happenings that formed the southern political universe
should be discussed. The white South wanted to ensure that they
would control society. The easiest way to do this was to control
politics. African-Americans were perceived as being too uninformed
to be given the ballot. C. Vann Woodward in The Origins of the New

Sooth, 1877-1913 and J. Morgan Kousser in The Shaping of Southern

Politics: Suffrage Resmotion and the Establishment of the One-Pom
South 1880-1910, both described the movements that the southern

leaders made to change and then maintain their particular way of
life. Both described how southern disfranchisers legislated decreases
in opposition party votes (Republicans and Populists opposed to the

 

Democratic party) through gerrymandering, appointment, and money
requirements for office holders. Ballot box stuffing was also used in

the post-helium South due to fears that disfranchisement laws would
be overruled by radical Republicans. Once Reconstruction ended and

8

the era of redemption began, regressive legislation was gradually
passed. Poll taxes, secret ballots, and literacy tests disqualified both
African-American and poor white voters. Poor whites could only be
rescued by grandfather clauses. Economics was an underlying factor
because the elites who wanted to control society also controlled
economics. This separation of races and domination of white
economic elites, lead to the conflicts of 1928.

But, The Origins of the New South did even more. In his early
chapters, Woodward discussed the confused ideology of the South,
the political alliances and post-bellum relationships in the new two-
party structure of the Reconstruction South.5 This confused ideology
was a conflict between progressiveness, white supremacy, economic
change, and social activity. This relationship continues and is not just
a product of two-party politics, but is a product of the South itself.
Paraphrasing Karl Marx who believed that ideology was false or
constructed consciousness, it is important to understand that the
South viewed itself and still views itself ideologically. Woodward
articulated the point that the South viewed itself ideologically
because it had failed or continues to fail in other more important
areas.6 The confused ideology Woodward discussed continued to
present itself in close elections even if only one-party controlled

politics. This confusion was at the heart of 1928.

 

5 J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson Region, Race, and

Rogonsmioo'on; Esoays in Honor of C. Vaon Wooommew York: Oxford
University Press, 1982) p. xxiii.

6 The general ideas were raised in the preface of Kousser and McPherson,
R i n R n ' n

9

The southern people were fearful of changing their particular way
of life, this fear was at the heart of 1928. In the post-helium era, the
white South formed the way of life that the majority of the region
would have liked to continue indefinitely. But the South accepted
many of its cultural and societal characteristics from the North. C.
Vann Woodward's The So‘ooge Cmr of lim Crow and Eugene
Genovese's Roll or R 11' Th Worl e Si v s Ma described
how the South was searching for a social and economic model for its
future. Woodward described how the northern Jim Crow system,
installed in the 1830's, began and was deemed useful by the
Southerners in the immediate post-bellum era. Woodward believed
that as late as 1885, southern African-Americans were treated better
than those in the North and that northern separation and hatred of
African-Americans was stronger than in the South. Genovese
followed Woodward's lead and continued this North leading the
South theory.

As education gradually grew in the South, the mysticism and
uneducated view of the South by its inhabitants began to fade. 1928
was a struggle to retain this old tradition of social control through
mysticism. The rise of the use of science and education and the
decrease of religious belief led to what John Crowe Ransom stated in
@ Without Thunder as the growth of " the new religion of science."
He believed this change was from outside forces and not endemic to
the South. Ransom wrote this social dialogue in 1930 in the wake of
the Scopes trial. Ransom was opposed to modernization. He believed
that modernization would change the South forever. Religious belief
(inherently the Protestant religion) was at the core of the South's

10

societal structure. Society and science were moving faster than
religion, thus the need for religion was decreasing. Religion was
necessary in the southern society to keep in check its underlying
racial and social problems (Cash described the South as a place of
unreality and permeating with violence under the surface. Ransom
believed that religion kept African-Americans happy being
submissive to whites while keeping violence in check.).

James Thompson's Tried as by Fire: Southern Baptists and the
Religious Controversies of the 1920's explored southern religion of
the 1920's and correctly believed that it was the core of southern
society. It seems that along with Ransom, his view of southern
conservatism was rooted in religious control. Elite control was
enforced through religious mysticism and belief. Both the black-belt
and the religious elite believed that society would crumble without
the regulation of individual behavior. Historically, Southerners have
enjoyed the freedom of minimalistic central government control.
Southern society did not require central government due to its
strength of religion, family, and individual accomplishment. These
areas supplied the general needs that government usually fulfilled.
The growing excitement in educated southern circles regarding social
reform and scientific ascendency upset many. The South had a group
of conservative political and social leaders that functioned through
the use of religious control to maintain economic and social status
quo relationships. This continued social structure would force
individuals to cling to the traditional structure of southern society
that was formed by the conservative elite for their continued

existence.

11

But the use of religion had boundaries. African—American
Southerners could not be controlled by religion because they
attended different churches than did white Southerners. Genovese
believed that white churches did not satisfy their particular
character. But, many African-Americans were cognizant of the need
for whites to control society through religion. African-Americans
were already removed from the political system of the early
twentieth century by disfranchising laws and disfranchisement was
the direct result of traditionally conservative white southern beliefs.
White southern elites believed that they should maintain control of
'their' South because it had always been that way. But the conflict of
1928 remained the quest for the resolution of the question: what was
'their' South and who should they fight to try and maintain control
from, African-Americans or northern Catholics?7

The books used to define and describe the 1928 election are
mostly lacking in any detailed description of the South's role or
southern culture in general. The main political history book,

Prejuoice and the Old Politics: The Election of 1928, offers original
insights but lacks substantive analysis of the South. Edmund A.

Moore's A Catholic Runs For President: The Campaign of 1928, was
published in 1956. Moore was not a scholar and his view of the

South was uninformed and anachronistic. New insights were not

 

7 Other books that are important in this category are v.o. Key, Southern
Polio'os; In Stato goo Nation, the Twelve Agrarians, ["11 Take My Stan_o,(New
York: P. Smith,1951) and Kenneth K. Bailey in Soothern White Protestantism in
too Twontioth Contogfl Gloucester: P. Smith, 1964), and specially noted should
be George Tindall's The Eme_rgo_noo of tho Now Sooth, 1913-194§,(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967). Tindall's book was good for obtaining
facts but lacked a clear or definite thesis.

12
forthcoming. The two analytical quantitative books, Ruth Silva's

Rum, Religion, and Votes: 1928 Re—Examined and Roy V. Peel and
Thomas C. Donnelly's The 1928 Campaign: An Analysis were not
historical and did not characterize the election with long-term
analyses.

David Burner's The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Popty
in Transition 1916-1932, is a fine historical work that stands alone

 

when trying to characterize this election. Burner defined the
problems that Smith faced and generally categorized them in regard
to the southern culture. Burner believed that Prohibition and
religious prejudice were both equally damaging issues facing Smith.
The South wanted to defeat Smith because they feared outside
influence. But Burner did not understand the subtleties that existed
inside the South and in many ways his analysis was lacking because
of his failure to incorporate southern historical literature. Thus,
using all these books plus many others along with all related Ph. D.
dissertations, a total view of the South and the 1928 election can be

presented for the first time.
The Problems of the Democrats Leading Up To 1 928.

> The Democratic party has always existed with a confusingly
mixed ideology with differing internal beliefs. The rural party of
Jefferson and later, Jackson, had been based loosely on individual
sovereignty or a 'states rights' blend of liberties and freedoms that

13

allowed individuals to act on their own behalf.8 This blend was
successful in its early stages because the United States was originally
a Protestant, white male elitist ruled country. Those who controlled
society were in total control because in many ways their society was
a reflection upon themselves. This was the case in the South. The
southern states had exerted an inordinate amount of political and
social influence upon the US. until their failed secession and
subsequent defeat in the Civil War. As the power of Democrats in
the South and the southern region declined in general, the wave of
emigrating masses from Europe filled the void inside the Democratic
party. Poor, urban, Catholic immigrants, first from Ireland and then
later from eastern and southern Europe, exhibited an increasingly
strong position inside the national party. The Democratic party was
the natural outlet for these people. As early as the 1880's, Irish
began to control politics and patronage in many northern urban
areas. Government activities and politics were a natural extension of
their garrulous characteristics. Irish ascendence in the Democratic
party helped emigrants quickly assimilate into northern society. But,
there remained a natural regional, cultural, and political split with

the original Democratic emigrants; the Southerners. This growing

 

3 Jefferson and Jackson had an original conflict over centralization of
governmental power, individual freedom, and religious freedom plus other
minor philosophical and ideological differences. With these two leaders being
at the core of Democratic philosophy, it is easy to understand the evolution of
philosophical differences inside the party. By the 1924 Democratic National
Convention, David Burner in The Polit_i'cs of Provincialism, argues that the
party was splintered into three groups, urban conservative northeasterners,
rural conservative southemers, and radical westerners, p. 151. This was an
explosive mix of interest groups. When the elements Smith added in 1928 were
included, the groups became that much more volatile.

14

conflict would affect the 1920's and culminate at the 1928
presidential election.

In 1920, as urban America overtook rural America in population,
the struggle inside the Democratic party was becoming heated. The
changing population made the Democrats question whether agrarian
tradition of urban politics would control the party. The Progressive
northern/ southern coalition that President Woodrow Wilson formed
was in disarray. Catholics began to visibly dominate many cities
such as Boston and to a lesser extent New York. Many Southerners
saw these intruders as a threat to their sovereignty and freedom.
During this period Robert H. Wiebe in The Search For Order.
described a rural America filled with 'island communities' whose
separate existence was deteriorating because of the economic and
political influence being exhibited by urban America. These people
feared the unknown. They feared the erosion of power and control.
These communities' fears were cultural and from an uneducated
standpoint. They did not understand the changes around them. As
Wilbur J. Cash in The Mind of The South described, Southerners had
an irrational fear attached to their existence. They did not
intellectually discuss or understand the happenings around them.
Instead they just reacted. Leading up to 1928, many Southerners
feared both a physical and spiritual invasion of their territory by
these emigrating political and cultural usurpers. The anxieties and
insecurities of those in society often resulted in vitriolic discussions
about 'Americanism' and how these new people did not belong. This
insecurity and struggle was indeed a class conflict that affected the
North/ South split inside the party described above as well as a

15
black-belt/upcountry geographical split inside the South itself.9 The

fear resulting from a lack of self rule or regional sovereignty was at
the heart of the Democratic party and the issues of 1928.

The 1924 Democratic Convention was a struggle for the future of
the party. 1928 was the culmination of the battle that began in
1924.10 That year West Virginia Governor John W. Davis became the
party nominee but only after 9 convention days and 103 ballots.
That convention brought to the forefront the belief that Catholics had
enormous influence inside the party and in the rapidly growing US.
cities. Smith was doubly rejected by Southerners both because the
Ku Klux Klan disliked his religion and because the Anti-Saloon
League disliked his proposed modification of the Volstead Act, which
would have permitted local option and allowed the sale of light beers
and wines. Prohibition, religious liberty, and repudiation of the Klan
were respectively the most important issues of the convention.
These issues were not resolved as neither Smith nor the southern
favorite, former Southerner William Gibbs McAdoo, were able to
muster even a bare majority of ballots. The convention also
deadlocked over the proposed condemnation of the Klan in the party
platform. These three main issues were carried over to 1 928 with
McAdoo sitting on the sidelines and the Klan making a final stand
with its fleeting power base.

 

9 William B. Hixson Jr., Iljho Soup for tho Amoricap Right Wing; An gaggis
WWfincemm Princeton University Press.

1992) showed insight concerning conservative regional differences in a later

era.
10 Burner. Wop-179227-

16

During the 1920's, the Ku Klux Klan was a driving force inside
southern politics. The K.K.K. believed that their culture was proper
and everyone who was different was to be feared and eliminated.
Whether one was a member of the Klan or just a political bystander,
the Klan affected the perceptions of society. In 1924 there were
2,000,000 active and former members, along with their wives, who
were still active. They successfully stereotyped individuals with
their hatred that affected the meaning of words like "Catholic",
"Pope", or "foreigner".11 They instilled the impropemess of the
Catholic culture and intrusion many Southerners felt about Smith and
his followers increasing power inside the Democratic party. Both the
religious and Prohibition issues were of vast importance. They led to
drastic behavior being displayed by Southerners. These issues were
in many ways of equal importance. The South was the strongest area
of prohibitionist feeling in the United States. A.S.L. leader Wayne
Wheeler while flexing his prohibitionist muscles, said to Governor
Smith after a 1924 interview at the 1924 Democratic National
Convention, "Governor, you will never enter the White House." 12 This
was the epitome of how both the prohibitionists and southern
Protestants felt. Michael Monahan believed in his contemporary
work Do; Amerioa, that Prohibition was the reason for religious
bigotry, drug addiction and other problems.” There was an inherent

and unmistakable connection between the two issues that could not

 

11 Burner, Politigs of Ptovingialism, p.90.

12 Norman H. Clark, Dolivgt Us From Evp' : Ap totetpretation of Amorioan
ProhioitiomNew York: Norton, 1976) p. 115.

13 Clark, move; Us From Evil, p. 144.

17

be separated. This cohesion led leaders of both groups to efficiently
work together to defeat Smith. But Smith himself did not help his
own cause.

The activities of both Governor and Mrs. Alfred Smith did not
help to pacify the Smith opposition. Both Al and his wife Katie failed
to transcend their cultural heritage. David Burner called this the
Politics of Provincialism, or the provincial activities and cultural
separation of groups inside the Democratic party. Between 1924 and
1928, Mrs. Smith had an audience with Pope Pius X], and flaunted
their meeting at inappropriate instances that were well publicized
throughout the sensitive and fearful South. Then, when Smith began
a push for the 1928 nomination, he filled his inner circle with unfit
and provincial leaders. Some, such as the industrialist John J. Raskob,
were former Republicans and captains of industry. This was a
double liability to southern Democrats with populist and
economically progressive leanings. Origins of the New Sopth
discussed the anti-foreign nature of the progressive movement in the
South. Smith failure to surround himself with both traditional
Democrats and traditional Americans damaged his chances of gaining
support with white southern Democratic society. This type of feeling
was apparent especially in chapter 14 entitled "'Progressivism--For
Whites Only'".14 Many papers throughout the South began to discuss

the nomination of Smith as a good thing because he was a sure loser

 

14 Kousser and McPherson, Rogion, Rago, and Rogons_tr_ugtion p. xxii-xxiv. It
must also be noted where homage is paid to Woodward and his analysis
concerning "Progressivism--For Whites Only", Kousser furthers this analysis
with a minichapter from The Shaping of Southern Politios (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974) entitled "Progressivism For Middle-Class Whites Only"
beginning on p. 229.

18

and it would rid the South and Democrats of him forever so the party

could maintain its traditional roots.

The Not So New Year of 1 928

The new year was not a particularly good one for Governor Smith.
He continued to be damaged inside the party by the haunting
regional and cultural issues that had weighed him down during 1924.
Throughout the South, negative reporting was prevalent inside its
papers. The local and regional journals began the year by endorsing
favorite son candidates and publishing many critical stories about
Smith. General Electric Chairman Owen D. Young, ex-Secretary of
War Newton D. Baker, Montana Senator Thomas J. Walsh, Missouri
Senator James A. Reed, Arkansas Senator Joseph Robinson,
Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison, Georgia Senator Walter F. George,
and Tennessee Representative Cordell Hull were popular candidates.
Every southern state except South Carolina had an anti-Smith paper
in operation. These papers printed numerous and well spirited
attacks against Smith and even the Democratic party in general. But
a type of two-party opposition structure had not formed yet in the
South because of the earlier disfranchising movement of the
redemption era.

There were two main groups that opposed Smith. The
organizational opposition to Smith was at first a loose coalition of
marginal southern Democrats and a group of right wing religious
xenophobes who feared the validation of Roman zealotry. They

wanted to keep cultural outsiders from becoming mainstream. Both

19

opposition groups were pre-formed left overs from 1924. But
neither were cohesive enough to counterattack Smith's powerful
organization in the pre-Houston convention period. One of the great
leaders of the anti-Smith movement was Senator Heflin.

Alabama Senator J. Thomas Heflin had a history of demagoguery
aimed at the Catholic Church. The one great issue that he
championed was animosity towards Catholics. This was a popular
issue in his home state and with Senate galleries. His activities on
the Senate floor and most of his memorable diatribes were
religiously related. He attacked the Catholic Church throughout 1927
and these attacks continued into the new year. He blasted the
Catholic Church in early January; and when Senator Joseph Robinson,

the Minority leader, came to the Church's defense. Heflin stated:

The Catholic machine threatens to break the party, to smash
the Democracy, if it does not nominate Smith. Let them break
it. Let them scatter it to bits as they did in 1924....The Catholic
machine of the he Pope of Rome, guided in this country by the
Order of Jesuits, is broadcasting political propaganda the
purpose of which is to bring about the nomination of Governor

Smith by the Houston convention.15
Heflin continued his attack invoking strong xenophobic terms
relating to "Americanism" and a Catholic‘s allegiance being " first to
Romanism and second to Americanism"16 Robinson stated that he
was " sick and tired" of Heflin's demagoguery and moved to defend
Smith. The two senators began a heated exchange during which
Heflin challenged the Majority leader to " make that speech in

 

15 Hugh D. Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama"(Ph. D.
dissertation, University of Texas, 1961), p. 90.

16 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama", p. 90.

20

Arkansas." Robinson stated that he would " make that speech in
Arkansas, and...will in Alabama, too." Heflin responded, " If you do,
they will tar and feather you." 17 Though the Senate and southern
newspapers almost unanimously supported Robinson in this conflict,
the Heflin style of partisan and libelous activity occurred throughout
the South. For example, a spurious Knights of Columbus oath
emanated from anti-Smith supporters in North Carolina. It was

described in and reprinted in the Congressional Record as

a blasphemous and infamous libel, a copy of which is hereto
attached, pretended to be an oath of the Knights of
Columbus....So revolting are the terms of this document and
so nauseating its pledges that the injury it did not merely
[cause] to the contestant but also to the Knights of Columbus
and to Catholics in general can hardly be measured in

terms.18

A House investigating committee "condemned the publication and
circulation of the Knights of Columbus oath and branded it as false
and libelous."19 But, nonetheless, the damage was done as this false
oath was widely circulated in North Carolina and throughout many

other southern areas.20

 

17 Edmund A. Moore, A Catholig Rons for Presioent,( New York: Ronald, 1956),
p. 82.

18 Stuart Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election In North Carolina"(Ph. D
dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1944). p. 117.

19 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election In North Carolina", p. 117.

20 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election In North Carolina", p. 117 from The
Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 3rd Session, p. 3216, I, , now
in the presence of Almighty God, the blessed Virgin Mary, the blessed St. John
the Baptist, the Holy Apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, and all the saints, sacred
host of Heaven, and to you, my Ghostly Father, the superior general of the
Society of Jesus, founded by St. Ignatius Loyola, in the pontification of Paul the
III, and continued to the present , do by the womb of the Virgin, the Matrix of
God, and the rod of Jesus Christ, declare and swear that his Holiness, the Pope is
Christ's vice regent and is the true and only head of the Catholic or Universal
Church throughout the earth: and by virtue of the keys of binding and loosing
given his holiness by my Savior, Jesus Christ, he has power to depose heretical

 

21

 

kings, princes, States, Commonwealths, and Governments, and they may safely
be destroyed. Therefore to the utmost of my power I will defend this doctrine
and his Holiness's right and custom against all the usurpers of the heretical or
Protestant authority whatsoever, especially the Lutheran Church of Germany,
Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway and the now pretended authority and
churches of England and Scotland, and the branches of same now established
in Ireland and on the continent of America and elsewhere, and all adherents
in regard that they may be usurped and heretical, opposing the sacred Mother
Church of Rome.

1 do now denounce and disown any allegiance as due to any heretical king,
prince, or state, named Protestant of liberal, or obedience to any of their laws,
magistrates or officers.

I do further declare that the doctrine of the Churches of England and
Scotland, of the Calvinists, Huguenots, and others of the name of Protestants, or
Masons to be Damnable, and they themselves to be damned who will not
forsake the same.

I do further declare that I will help, assist, and advise all or any of his
holiness's agents, in any place where I should be, in Switzerland, Germany,
Holland, Ireland, or America, or in any other kingdom or territory I shall
come to, and do my utmost to extirpate the heretical Protestant or Masonic
Doctrines and to destroy all their pretended powers, legal or otherwise.

I do further promise and declare that, notwithstanding I am dispensed with
to assume any heretical religion for the propagation of the Mother Church's
interest, to keep sacred and private all her agents' counsels from time to time,
as they instruct me, and not divulge, directly or indirectly, by word, writing,
or circumstance whatever, but to execute all that should be proposed, given in
charge, or discovered to me by you, my Ghostly Father, or any of This sacred
Order.

I do further promise and declare that I will have no opinion or will of my
own or any mental reservation whatsoever, even as a corpse or cadaver
(perinde ac cadaver), but will unhesitatingly obey each and every command
that I may receive from my superiors in the militia of the Pope and Jesus
Christ.

That I will go to any part of the world whithersoever I may be sent, to the
frozen regions of the North, jungles of India, to the centers of the
civilizations of Europe, or to the wild hunts of the barbarous savages of
America without murmuring or repining, and will be submissive in all things
whatsoever communicated to me.

I do further promise and declare that I will, when opportunity presents,
make and wage relentless war, secretly and openly, against all heretics,
Protestants and Masons, as I am directed to, to extirpate them from the face of
the whole earth; and that I will hang, burn, waste, boil, flay, strangle, and
bury alive these infamous heretics, rip up the stomachs and wombs of their
women, and crush their infants' heads against the walls in order to annihilate
their execrable race. That when the same cannot be done openly, I will
secretly use the poisonous cup, the strangulation cord, the steel poniard, or the
ieaden bullet, regardless of the honor, rand, dignity, or authority of the
persons, whatever may be their condition in life, either public or private, as I
may be directed to do, by any agent of the Pope or superior of the Brotherhood
of the Holy Father of the Society of Jesus.

In continuation of which I hereby dedicate my life, my soul, and all
corporal powers, and with the dagger which I now receive I will subscribe my

22

Earlier in the month, on January, 12, Houston was chosen as the
1928 Democratic National Convention city. This was done by
Democratic insiders because they realized that since William Gibbs
McAdoo dropped out of consideration in September 1927, Smith was
almost assured of the nomination. At this time the South was lacking
a great regional leader. No Southerners remained to occupy the void
created by McAdoo's departure from national politics. Thus, Smith
and his organization were able to dominate the 1 928 primary season
and capture the election through behind the scenes activity. This
was a political era before the primary season was the dominating
aspect of the nominating process. Southerners felt that the real
battle would begin at Houston and not with the primaries. But, Smith
amassed so much new support that when connected with his
remaining strength from 1924, his position was almost unbeatable.

 

name written in my blood in testimony thereof; and shall I prove false or
weaken in my determination, may my brethren and fellow soldiers of the
militia of the Pope cut off my hands and feet and my throat from ear to ear, my
belly open and sulphur burned therein with all the punishment that can be
inflicted upon me on earth and my soul shall be tortured by demons in eternal
hell forever.

That I will in voting always vote for a K. of C. in preference to a Protestant,
especially a Mason, and that I will leave my party to do so; that if two Catholics
are on the same ticket I will satisfy myself which is the better superior of the
Mother Church and vote accordingly.

That I will not deal with or employ a Protestant if in my power to deal with a
Catholic. That I will place Catholic girls in Protestant families that a weekly
report may be made of the inner movements of the heretics.

That I will provide myself with arms and ammunition that I may be in
readiness when the word is passed, or I am commanded to defend the Church
either as an individual or with the militia of the Pope.

 

All of which I, , do swear by the blessed Trinity and Blessed
sacrament which I am now to receive to perform and on my part to keep this,
my oath.

In testimony thereof, I take this most holy and blessed Sacrament of the
Eucharist and witness the same further with my name written with the point
of this dagger dipped in my blood and seal in the Face of this holy sacrament.

23

Smith's organization was ahead of its time in its modern efficient
structure, its early organization, and its domination and participation
in the nominating primaries. Then when the Smith group believed
that his nomination was highly probable, they selected Houston as
the convention city. It was a move to pacify the South (a southern
convention being the first since 1860). They further feared southern
reaction and later nominated a southern vice presidential candidate.
But this failed because the concentration of the Smith group
remained focused on regional and local issues. Smith continued to
surround himself with unfit, provincial, and former G.O.P. members
as advisors. This directly undercut his raising the corruption issue
connected with Wall Street, Teapot Dome, and the G.O.P. in general,
which could have been a major selling point for Smith.

The annual Jackson Day Dinner in Washington was not attended
by Smith, but was attended by McAdoo and many regional
candidates.21 This could have been a national springboard for Smith.
This national dinner had not been held since 1924 because of the
fear of restarting regional conflict. This could have been a forum for
Smith to bring the party together but was a lost opportunity.

'Dry' forces within the Democratic party united for the St.
Petersburg Conference in early March to strengthen a coalition to
stop any 'wet' candidate. F. Scott McBride the General
Superintendent of the A.S.L., Arthur J. Barton of the Southern Baptist
Convention, Bishop Cannon of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South
were the most important individuals to attend. These groups were

 

21 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama", p. 78, 79.

24

trying to unify themselves under a 'dry' Democratic banner, but were
quickly becoming anti-Smith groups. Their general language of
prohibitionist discontent was quickly becoming completely aimed at
Governor Smith. The A.S.L., W.C.T.U., and the many religious groups
were slow in their unification against Smith. They probably relied
too much on veto power through the Democratic party's 2/3rds rule
to nominate a presidential candidate. They did not realize that the
Smith forces were much farther ahead in their development. The
Smith forces already had the Northeast and Midwest in their pocket;
plus his victory in the California primary in May ended the
candidacies of Senators Reed and Walsh, and in the South (as you will
later see) Arkansas and Louisiana were already in Smith's column.
Smith's organization, despite all its provincial and regional problems,
was a modern efficient political machine without any similar
opposition at this stage. The Smith nomination was almost assured
before the major opposition groups began to mobilize.

The three major meetings of the religious and temperance
opposition to Smith, the St. Petersburg Conference in March, the
Southern Baptist Convention in Chattanooga, Tennessee in mid-May,
and the Asheville Conference in mid-July, were too late to stop his
nomination but were effective in stopping his election. For instance
the Southern Baptist Convention had 4,000 delegates representing 1 8
states and 3,700,000 members that stood to support prohibitionist
candidates only.22 A small group such as the "Southland Committee
of Safety" headed by H.H. DuBose of Nashville claimed that they could

 

22 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama", p. 142.

25

get 500,000 votes to stop the election of any 'wet' candidate.23 But,
it was important that these leaders were talking about the election of
and not the nomination of a 'wet' candidate. These were mostly
Democratic groups that had been shut out of the undemocratic
nominating process that was controlled by state leaders. By
nominating Smith, the Democrats had not understood the animosity
levelled against Smith inside his own party. The animosity was not
held by the rank and file political leaders, but by the religious and
prohibitionist fringe.

The Houston Conven tion

The 1928 Democratic National Convention opened on June, 26
with a mad rush to stop Smith. This of course was unsuccessfuL
Even though Religion and prohibitionist groups held prayer vigils to
stop Smith and favorite son meetings were held just prior to the
convention to find a unity candidate, the opposition was too late to
form. Many of the southern political leaders refused to participate in
any 'Stop Smith' campaign though especially those in Louisiana and
Arkansas.24 Even a bone 'dry' leader like Texas Governor Dan Moody
fought for his platform requirements but refused to join the 'Stop
Smith‘ group, composed not of major figures but often of fringe
politicos.

The convention was anti-climactic with Smith receiving 849 2/ 3
first ballots after several states switched. 734 1/ 3 was needed and

 

B Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama", p. 141.
24 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 In Alabama", p. 146.

26

he originally received 724 1/ 3. Smith received only 48 2/ 3
nomination votes from the South. He received 1 of 24 from Alabama,
17 of 18 from Arkansas, Louisiana's 20, 4 2/ 3 of 24 from North
Carolina, and 6 of 24 from Virginia. When, after Smith's nomination,
a parade erupted inside Sam Houston Hall, Mississippi, Virginia,
Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida (but only 3 non-southern
states did not join this celebration) refused to join the celebration.
The southern animosity towards him did not decline with Smith's
quick and relatively painless victory.

Senator Joseph Robinson, the future vice presidential candidate,
also was given a difficult response from the militant South. He
delivered a moving religious tolerance speech on the second day of
the convention that invoked the party's Jeffersonian origins. A
spontaneous parade followed with the playing of the song "Old-Time
Religion."25 Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia did not join this earlier celebration. The Southerners felt
unhappy because of a perceived alliance between Robinson and
Smith that many correctly believed had been in the works since
Robinson's defense of Smith against Heflin's attacks. Many from the
South formed a drive against Robinson's nomination led by K.K.K.
Imperial Wizard Hiram Evans. One would expect that the South was
happy to receive national recognition again with the first national
convention and vice presidential candidate since 1 860, but the anti-

Smith feelings were too strong.

 

25 Melvin Edward Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Fiorida"(Ph. D.
dissertation, Florida State University, 1976), p. 57.

 

 

 

27

The reasons that many in the South remained opposed to and
strengthened their opposition to Smith were becoming more
numerous daily. The Democratic Platform Committee crafted a 'dry'
plank that Smith believed he could not support. He was not changing
his personal positions for political gains. The means the Smith
supporters were using to pacify the South were surface procedures
only. Smith was not representing their true beliefs. This continued
to damage his chances in November. They had problems with
Smith's animosity towards Prohibition, his unfamiliarity with the
party's agrarian roots, his connection with big business and Wall
Street, and his weakness on racial hostility. These were against
important traditional southern Democratic values. Because Smith
was backing away from the traditional Democratic platform and
beliefs, it became easier in each state to refuse to support Smith and
actually to bolt the party. The only devices that kept Democrats in
line were the belief in white supremacy, the power of the local
machine, the activity of the daily newspapers, and the power of local

religious leaders.

1
The Southern Democratic Core

The southern Democratic Core was classified as; all southern states
connected and motivated by racial conservativism and Democratic
loyalty. They were: Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Georgia. These states were connected by long term political trends.
They remained loyal to the Democrats in almost every presidential
election between 1880-1960. The only dissentions that occurred
were Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina supporting the
Dixiecrats in 1948 and Mississippi voting third party in 1960. in
1928, by all indications the states with the highest percentage of
African-American inhabitants, voted with the Democrats because of
traditional white conservative values and beliefs. White supremacy
remained the rule in this area until refranchisement occurred. This
was also the reason why these states bolted the Democratic party in
the 1964 presidential election to support the new conservative party
of white supremacy, the Republicans. The G.O.P.'s nominee was
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona who carried South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and also Louisiana because of the
racial issue. Interestingly, Alabama was the only state from this

contingent that struggled to give Smith a 1928 majority.

28

29

Alabama: The Fight to Remain Democratic

Social Characteristics

Alabama was a traditional Deep South state defined by its large
former plantation economy, vast area of black-belt soils, immense
former slave p0pulation, and strong conservative Democratic party.
In 1930, the state maintained the fifth largest African-American
population in the South.1 Alabama was in the middle of the pack in
both urban population and income.2 However, when classifying this
election and southern political trends, race is the defining aspect.
The racial factor split the states geographically with the central area
of the state having a higher number of African-American residents
because of Alabama's black-belt soils and the remnants of the
plantation system. The predominantly white areas in the northern
and southern sections however, had only marginal soils and a legacy
of small farms.

Political Chgacteristics

Governor Smith had many opponents in Alabama. Many of
Smith's political contemporaries, including Senator Robinson, felt that
the attacks levelled against Smith in Alabama by Senator J. Thomas
Hefiin and the Ku Klux Klan, had little effect on the outcome of the
election.3 However, this assumption is misleading. Alabama did not
conform to the major trend of the 1928 election in the South; that

Smith would win on white supremacy and its connection to the

 

1 Howard W. Odum, Southorn Rogions of me Unitod Statos, p. 482.

2 Odum, Sopthm Regions of the Unitod States, pp. 18, 46.
3 Edmund A. Moore, A Catholig Runs for Prosioont, he continually repeats this
assertion throughout. This is a basis of his theory.

30

Democratic party. Heflin was an extremely important figure in
making Alabama an anomaly. His personal attacks on Smith helped
bolster the credibility of the bolters and placed loyal Democrats on
the defensive. The reasons for Smith's close victory in Alabama will
be explored.

The state's political leadership was relatively united until shortly
after the 1924 election. Heflin as senior Senator was the main figure
in Alabama's political universe. He was a longtime Washington
insider having been elected to the Senate in 1920 at the age of 51
after previously serving in the US. House of Representatives. He
lived for the support and adulation of the Senate galleries and held
many in awe with his spirited diatribes articulated in front of an
often empty chamber. He was a career politician who continued to
vie for public office long after his subsequent defeat and removal
from the Democratic party in 1930. The junior Senator Hugo Black
was a little known lawyer whose claim to fame having been elected
in 1926 at 41, was that he had been the Klan candidate in the
election. He ran on the issues of protecting southern culture and also
from fear of outsiders influencing the South.4 Black had hidden his
true feelings and his apostasy later ended as he became arguably the
greatest civil libertarian ever to sit on the US. Supreme Court.
Compared to these other two politicians, Governor Bibb Graves left a
remarkably small history. A Yale-educated lawyer and a Klan
candidate, he was elected because of the Klan's support at the 1926
ballot box.

 

4 Virginia Van der Veer Hamilton, Hugo Black: The Alabama Years( Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 133.

31

From the examples of Black and Graves it is clear that one of the
key participants in the Alabama political scene of the 1920's was the
Ku Klux Klan. Representing the rural whites in Alabama, the Klan had
a political and cultural stranglehold on the state and determined who
would hold most high offices. If one had Klan support, his chances of
election were greatly increased. The state Democratic organization
was controlled by popular opinion. When the Klan was strong and
popular, the Democratic organization gave them unanimous support.
When its press became negative in the mid to late 1920's due to
lynchings and scandal, the Democratic party began to take another
look at its relationship with the Klan. The Klan realized a class split
emphasized in Alabama of the elite versus the ordinary citizen.5 Klan
members were often the poor who felt a need to grasp power or
express their dislike about society. Klan supporters rivaled the non-
Klan members of the state organization throughout the 1920's.

Alabama Democrats had a long history of hostility in their
relations with Governor Smith. Alabama's known political split was
related to geography. The black-belt was a staunch conservative
area that wanted the continuance of the status quo while the
outlying northern and southern areas were more concerned with
economic progress and the need to advance. They had a need for
what C. Vann Woodward entitled chapter 14 of his Origins of the Now
m "Progressivism-For Whites Only". This natural split between
these two regions, which would help define the 1928 election in

Alabama, became what v.0. Key called a " progressive-conservative

 

5 Hamilton, H ° Th Al Y p. 149.

32

cleavage" within the dominant Democratic party.6 Because only one
party existed, it did not eliminate a second set of ideologies that were
natural to the formation of a second party.7 However, that second
party could not exist under the Democratic party system in the South
because, in this era, tradition forced the South to elect only
Democrats. Not until the national Democratic party's abandonment of
white supremacy would a true second party form in the South.
During this earlier era, a second party did not exist because African-
Americans could not vote and the political elite legally excluded any
other group from being the white supremacy party due to suffrage
restriction and other voting laws. A politician like Hugo Black had to
carry the banner of white supremacy to become elected, even though
he would later prove to have had covert motives. This split within
the party allowed leaders like Black and later Governor James Folsom
and Senator Lister Hill to oppose Heflin type leaders. Black preceded
both Folsom and Hill. They were all progressives who were
continuously challenged by arch conservatives like Heflin. This was
a product of the two factions that were formed inside one party in
Alabama. They would split regarding Smith. The early coalition that
formed against Smith would later dissolve, but its impact was
obvious. This effect will later be explained.
Tho olectton of 1924

Alabama was almost unanimously opposed to Smith's two
national nomination campaigns. With the help of the Klan, Alabama

 

6 v.0. Key Jr. W p. 37.

7 Key. Wharton. this is a basis of his general
theory.

33

often led brutal attacks against Smith at the 1924 convention.
Alabama however, was also one of the weakest supporters of William
Gibbs McAdoo's candidacy. The delegation split its support with
favorite son candidate, Representative Oscar W. Underwood.8
Underwood led a fight against the Klan that led to this split. But
Smith's candidacy damaged those of both Underwood and McAdoo.
Alabama remembered the struggle with Smith and used it as
ammunition against him in 1928. The struggle of 1924 led to the
formation of deep scars inside that state.
Transition; The Elogtions of 1926

The early fear and hostility displayed toward Smith was
showcased in the 1926 Senate race won by Black. Two students of
the election, Ralph M. Tanner and Linda Hamilton, are unanimous in
this analysis.9 In 1926 Black openly attacked Smith by using
xenophobic fear and religious hostility to win the election. His
attacks were more mild than the rhetoric Heflin displayed in the
Senate. The campaigns of 1924 and 1926 harmed Smith in Alabama
because people recognized the universal dislike most state
Democratic leaders had for him. This was important because
Alabama had a visible split in its Democratic organization, meaning
that there were two ideological groups arguing about Smith. This
was a product of the "progressive conservative cleavage" formulated
by V.O. Key.

 

3 David Burner. Wmlll. 124-125.
9 Ralph M. Tanner, "The Wonderful World of Tom Heflin. " W

36,( 1983), 163-174, and Hamilton, B ' T A1 Y , are

unanimous in this conclusion.

34

Although the Klan's strength peaked in 1926, its power in
Alabama would remain prominent until the 1930's.10 The Klan was
the major backer of the victorious Black and Graves campaigns in
1926. In 1928, with the help of the Anti-Saloon league, the Klan
would select the complete Alabama slate of delegates to the Houston
convention. The universal opposition of Smith prior to the
convention would take different paths after Houston.

Tho Elgoon of 1928

The year began ominously for the Smith campaign in Alabama.
Heflin began to attack both Smith and Robinson again. On January
1 8, Heflin began a two hour diatribe against the Catholic Church and
Catholics in general that would become too much for the Senate
Minority Leader to withstand. Heflin stated to a crowded Senate

gallery that

The Catholic machine threatens to break the party, to smash the
Democracy, if it does not nominate Smith. Let them break it.
Let them scatter it to hits as they did in 1 924....The Catholic
machine of the Pope of Rome, guided in this country buy the
Order of Jesuits, is broadcasting political propaganda the
purpose of which is to bring about the nomination of Governor
Smith by the Houston convention.11

Heflin continued his assault and finished his remarks by vowing his
allegiance to the Ku Klux Klan. Robinson rebutted Heflin by stating
the he was "'sick and tired' of Heflin's anti-Catholic speeches" and
that no person " 'who is a Democrat in the finest sense of the word

would ever proscribe another man because of the man's religion.” 12

 

10 Hugh D. Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama"; he
discusses this in chapter 2.

11 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 90.
12 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 90.

 

 

 

 

35

Heflin returned in like fashion when he stated that Robinson would
be threatened with "'tar and feathers‘ " if he repeated his remarks in
Alabama.” The level of animosity felt between the two could not be
overstated. This led to public discussions of allegiance throughout
the party and the South.

Heflin's famous conflict with Robinson was portrayed as an
embarrassment by the major leaders and journals of the state. The
Birmingham Agfliflo editorial board was very harsh in its
criticism of Heflin, and later called the problem "Heflin's Folly". They
stated that Heflin was not speaking for or reflecting the opinions of
Alabamians, but was speaking only in "defense of himself." Heflin
embarrassed the entire state with his "astounding exhibition of rabid
intolerance, shockingly wretched taste and naked disdain for the
most precious of American principles." They conveyed the belief
that he was solely playing personal power tactics for his own gains. 14
Heflin nonetheless, believed that his personal support was stronger
than that of the party. He was soon defeated in a Senate vote of
support for Robinson 34 to 1 ( Black abstained), and was widely
criticized throughout the South. Throughout these troubles, Heflin's
hill country supporters remained faithful, as did the Klan. Both
groups continued to listen to his criticisms of Smith. Heflin set the
agenda with his virulent attacks, claiming that Smith was unreliable
on both African-Americans and the continuance of the southern
status quo. His largest fears were for continued white supremacy
and rule by the white Protestant majority. He stated that the

 

13 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 90.
14 Birmingham Agooflotold, 149.28 p. 6, 1-22-28 p. 6.

 

 

 

 

 

36

Democratic ticket "would be strong in Rome but weak in the United
States."15 His racial attacks were striking because they were
supported by the Klan. Since it was the top white supremacy group
in the state, the racial fear that the Democrats would use to gain
votes was greatly weakened in the predominantly white hill country
by Heflin and the Klan. At the same time, Alabamians did not have
to fear that social change would be initiated by the Republicans.
Therefore, it was an effective tactic that their political and spiritual
leaders used when stating, as Heflin did, that the upcoming election
was a question between "the God of white supremacy or the false god
of Roman social equality".16 People often chose the Republicans and
white supremacy if they felt Heflin was credible. Because the
election was a conflict of race versus culture, if one felt that the
Republicans' stance, as supported by the Klan and Heflin, aligned
with one's racial and cultural prejudices, why shouldn't one

defect/ bolt? Party affiliation did not matter to many Alabamians if
the party did not stand for the issue one felt was pre-eminent.

At the Houston convention the Alabama delegation realized
quickly that they had been defeated and Smith clubs began to
appear throughout the state.17 The 23 to 1 nominating vote the
delegates cast against both Smith and Robinson was not completely
indicative of the Klan militancy alone but of a more pervasive Deep
South hostility because the only other Deep South state to give Smith
any delegates was Louisiana. But Alabama was especially hostile

 

15 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama" ,.p 194.

16 Hamilton. Wheaten 151
17 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama" , p. 177.

37
toward Robinson because of the perceived deal arranged with the

Smith forces. The evidence of this arrangement was not complete,
but the Alabamians jumped to the worst conclusion. For example,
the delegation did not join the spontaneous parades to celebrate
Smith's nomination or to celebrate Robinson's earlier "Old Time
Religion" speech.” They refused to support their fellow Southerner
and vice presidential candidate because they believed that he was
disloyal to the cause. After the convention, as mainstream Alabama
aligned with the rest of the Deep South in its support of Smith, the
Klan-ASL-Heflin stronghold in the hill country remained militant in
resisting the Democratic candidates. The state political leadership
continued to fortify its position. Even though Senator Black and
Governor Graves both quietly acquiesced, the Democratic
organization mobilized every major political figure except Heflin
behind Smith and the major journals quickly called for loyalty and
victory. Nonetheless the Smith campaign was still in trouble.

July began as the Alabama W.C.T.U. and most small Christian
journals endorsed Hoover. The Klan continued its covert work with a
newly initiated '1in white' Republican party, which purged its
organization of any African-Americans and placed only lifelong
Democrats, Houston delegates, W.C.T.U. and A.S.L. members, and
former Democratic nominees and officeholders as G.O.P. electors on
the November ballot.19 The false Knights of Columbus oath was
distributed throughout Alabama along with damaging accusations

 

13 Melvin E. Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida(Ph. D.
dissertation, The University of Florida, 1976), pp. 54-58.

19 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 230.

38

regarding Smith's daily consumption of alcohol and Mrs. Smith's
fitness as a national figure. The Klan also attacked Smith's
appointment of African-American Ferdinand Morton to the post of
Civil Service Commissioner in New York City, to a general weakness
on the racial issue. They continued to argue that the Republicans
were the true white supremacy party in 192 8.

Hill country ministers were particularly influential in their
support of Heflin. Religious sermons throughout the state continued
with renewed strength to attack Smith.20 By all indications, through
the support of ministers, Heflin and the Klan's religious attacks were
at the forefront of their thoughts and actions. Heflin realized that
religion was the most important issue with his people in the rural
hills. Pe0ple had questioned his motivation as an anti-Catholic.21
Whatever they were, he realized he could exploit the problems his
constituents had with the Catholic nominee. Heflin found an issue to
mobilize his electorate and further his political interests. His
activities as well as that of his allies made the election in Alabama
much closer than it should have been.

After a late start, the Democratic party mobilized its forces and
spread its message. The party organization was located solely in the
black-belt. Heflin's main group of supporters were small white
farmers in the hill country. This was also where the Klan's power
source resided. But, the black-belt was where the election was won.
A small minority of party members actually split ranks to join the

 

20 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 241.

21 J. Mills Thornton, "Alabama Politics, J. Thomas Heflin, and the Expulsion
Movement of 1929." mm April(1968). pp.96-97.

 

39

Heflin/ Klan forces in this area, but their numbers were small. It
should be noted that at a post-Houston convention meeting of
bolters, not one single leader of note attended the meeting.22 The
effectiveness of the Heflin/ Klan campaign was marginal with black-
belt Democrats. This was a key to Smith's victory. The Democratic
party remained strong in the face of adversity. The Democrats tried
to spread their message. Congressman W.B. Oliver, the new state
campaign chairman and small time career politician, spun Heflin's
message into a counterattack when he said that "a vote for Smith
would be a vote for 'white supremacy' and a vote against ‘social
equality.”23 Oliver then reminded Democrats of Tammany's support
to stop the 1890 Force or Federal Elections Bill which would have
negatively affected the South's one-party political system. The
Democrats finally realized that those were the important issues to
consider. Thus they spread an effective message. By making Smith
seem like a traditional Democrat, they could counter the opposing
argument and spread their message of status quo rule. Their surge
of activity, plus the newfound hostility Heflin encountered, was
barely enough for a Smith victory.

Heflin's attacks remained strong throughout the early and middle
stages of 1928, but his rhetoric received diminished results as the
November election neared. His last hurrah was on September, 2 1
when he unequivocally stated, "'80 help me God, I will vote against
Al Smith if they read me out of the Democratic party and drive me

 

22 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 214.
23 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 419.

40

from every Senate committee!”24 At a November 2nd Birmingham
rally, Heflin was effectively heckled throughout his address with
insults and shouts of '"Hurray for Smith'".25 Heflin had finally
reached the precipice. As the election momentum shifted in favor of
Smith, Heflin realized that his political future was in question.
Alabama swiftly moved to ban bolters and Heflin was left without a
party.26 More intelligent politicians like Black and Graves quietly
supported Smith and remained in power. They allowed the
mainstream Democratic machine to dictate policy, undermine the
power of bolters, the Klan, the A.S.L., and ministers to give Smith a
victory in Alabama.

Alabama gave every Democratic nominee for president, except
Smith, large majorities from 1872-1944, 1952 and 1956. Smith
squeaked by with a victorious majority of 7,071 votes from a total
number of 248,521 being cast or a margin of 5 1.4% to 48.6%. The hill
country/black-belt split was evident in every county with a 50%
African-American population going for Smith while those with only
4096 split 50/50.27 Heflin and Klan activity helped the Republicans
gain respectability in this election. The poor white farmer in the hill
country who had a previous post-helium fascination with the
Republican party, again found it mildly acceptable. Hoover and the
Republican party played almost no role in the election except for
aphoristic comparisons made between Smith and Hoover on the

 

24 Hamilton. Hmfilarkzlhahlaharnaleara p- 154.
25 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 344.

26 Thornton, "Alabama Politics, J. Thomas Heflin"; this article must be read to
understand this complex happening.

27 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama," p. 469.

41

issues of Americanism and race. The traditions of Democratic social
control and white supremacy were more important than that of
Roman dominance and a loss of social control. The electorate sided
with the party that they felt would maintain social white supremacy
traditions and religious sovereignty even though both groups stated
that those issues were most important to them. Traditional
allegiance and the strength of the Democratic party were too difficult

for the anti-Smith forces to overcome.

Mississippi: Statewide Smith Support

Wis

By many accounts Mississippi and South Carolina were the two
strongest Democratic states of this era. They consistently supported
Democrats on the national level, they crushed all two-party
opposition, and they had dominant Democratic organizations. This
assertion was never more clear than in 192 8. Every aspect of
Mississippi society was affected because of its rural agricultural
nature. In 1930 Mississippi was the most rural, the second poorest,
and the one with the highest percentage of African-Americans in the
South.28

Mississippi's statewide character was closely connected to its
geography. Mississippi is divided by two different regions.
Mississippi has a natural geographic division between a delta and an

upcountry region. The delta contains rich soils, some of the best soils

 

28 Odumionthnnltegmnmmhnireiflares pp. 18. 46. 482.

42

in the South, that were utilized under the plantation system.. The
upcountry provided only marginal agriculture for later arriving and
less fortunate white settlers. Race, religion, politics, economics, and
general ideology were also five connected issues in the '
understanding of Mississippi. Here, the physical delta/upcountry
divide formed the split in the five issues described above. This
reflected itself in cultural terms. In the delta region, people
generally were consumed by race, against Prohibition, economically
conservative, and politically reactionary. In the upcountry they
generally opposed these issues or were indifferent. This indifference
was a product of white disfranchisement. Whites were disfranchised
usually only in the upcountry because this was where high levels of
poverty existed. They could not afford to pay poll taxes. Because of
this, the level of political activity among whites was lower. But the
one issue that kept both white geographic regions together was race.
The white fear of African—American ascendency united this state.
The African-American population density alone would indicate a
Smith victory, but Mississippi was Democratic for other reasons as
well.
Polittgl Charagteristtcs

Mississippi had a strong Democratic organization. During most of
his twenty two year reign as senator, beginning in 1919, Byron
Patton ( Pat) Harrison was the nominal head of the state organization.
Harrison was a former District Attorney when elected to the Senate.
He was wildly popular with the public. His true ideological stance
was in question because his views often evolved with that of public
opinion. Harrison was a good organizer and figure head when

43

compared to Governor and future Mississippi Senator, Theodore
Bilbo. Bilbo was re-elected Governor in 1928 after being elected 12
years earlier. Bilbo‘s style was more emotional and vitriolic than
Harrison's, and he did not have good organizational skills. He was an
emotional speaker who did his best on the campaign stump
caucusing white populism and support for "'the people'".29 He
grabbed important racial and progressive economic issues and used
them to his advantage because they were important to the electorate.
Being a emotional leader and not a rational organizer forced Bilbo to
acquiesce to Harrison's ascension to the top of the state political
ladder.

Mississippi politics generally revolved around a strongly united
white population that was not openly divided by class. Mississippi
was fanatical about race and this quieted the outward differences in
Class. Class conflict was only important in national elections if the
racial issue was completely secured.30 Because of this there were not
deep divisions inside the Democratic organization. The race question
led to white political unity. Few other issues were raised in
Mississippi and, after the Houston convention, Smith had and easy

road to victory.

 

29 Chester A. Morgan, Whton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press,1985), p. 33.

30 This assertion was more important in national politics. State politics in the
disfranchising era(I classify this era as roughly 1890-1960)often grappled
with class differences. The conflict between wealth and poverty was an issue
throughout Bilbo's and former US. Senator and Mississippi Governor James
Vardaman's careers. Theory of William F. Holmes in JamesLjommamlho
WBaton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), especially
formative years pp. 25-30 and Chester A, Morgan in W
Nougat, especially pp. 33-35, 46, 48, 51-59.

Tho Elgtion of 1928
Not unlike other southern states (except Louisiana and Arkansas)

Mississippi entered 1928 as a state strongly united against the
candidacy of Al Smith. During the 1924 campaign Mississippi had
been one of the strongest supporters of William Gibbs McAdoo. State
papers, such as the black-belt delta stronghold Jackson w
reveled in reporting stories about eastern scandals with implied
connections to Smith. As soon as Smith's nomination seemed
imminent, the papers quickly aligned with the dominating party
machinery. Dm News editor Frederick Sullens, an influential
Mississippian, wrote a strong endorsement of Democratic tradition on
April 1 5th. Concerning Smith's nomination chances, he stated that
the mums "is a Democratic newspaper at all times, and under all
circumstances."31 This was very early and strong support for Smith.
This was an example of delta strength inside the Democratic party.
Even though Smith was not the nominee, party insiders like Sullens
understood that he was the clear leader and the strongest candidate
even though they were personally against him. Editors such as
Sullens, who tried to set the agenda in favor of Smith and the
Democratic party, were successful. They forced local Democratic and
religious leaders to follow their lead. This strengthened the national
Democratic stance in Mississippi. These types of local leaders set the
tone for the fall campaign. Prominent citizens and politicians
throughout the year carried the party line comparing their
Democrats with the hated Republicans. They stated their beliefs

 

31 Jackson mums, 4-15-28, p. 8.

45

comparing the two party's, saying that some Democrats " may drink
liquor occasionally, and some others may have been known to cuss
when adequately provoked, but they do not plunder the public
treasury."32 These types of statements indicated a quick reversal
from stories earlier in the year concerning Smith. During the pre-
Houston convention period, the state's papers maintained a strong
Democratic allegiance even though only two papers endorsed Smith
by name, the Natchez Democrat and the Greenville Daily Democrat.33

At the Houston convention Mississippi sent an uninstructed, but
nevertheless, anti-Smith delegation. Even though Prohibition played
only a minor role in this election, a measure to oppose any 'wet'
candidate at Houston failed to receive majority support.34 The
Mississippi responsibility in Houston was the assurance of status quo
white supremacy rule. Mississippi cast all 20 of their nominating
votes for Senator Harrison but then changed their votes after the
Smith nomination. The final count was 9 1/2 for Smith, 8 1/ 2 for
Harrison, and 1 for Bilbo.35 The acquiescence to Smith showed
Mississippi's allegiance to the Democratic party and closely
resembled the actions of South Carolina.

Every major state paper strongly aligned itself with Smith after
the Houston convention, except those in the Southeastern area of the
state. This was significant because the only counties that did not

 

32 Jackson mm 4-15-28, p. 8.

33 Donald B. Kelley, "Mississippi Public Opinion in the Presidential Elections of
1928 and 1960: A Study in the Continuity of Ideas"(Ph. D. dissertation, Tulane
University, 1965), p. 30.

34 Kelley, "Mississippi Public Opinion in the Presidential Elections of 1928 and
1960", pp. 14-16.

3:6lgelley, "Mississippi Public Opinion in the Presidential Elections of 1928 and
1 p. 17.

46

support Smith in November were in this same area. The state papers
were regionally representational because they aligned with the real
feelings of their region.

Mississippi's leading politicians made it easier for Smith to sweep
the state in November. Senior Senator Pat Harrison was the political
pragmatist who often allowed ideology to be seconded by reality.
Harrison quickly realized the national power Smith amassed.
Harrison used this to his advantage in Mississippi and in other
southern states. He and Arkansas' Senator Joseph Robinson quietly
aligned themselves with Smith in hope of being rewarded with the
vice presidency. Harrison was instead named a top advisor to the
campaign after the Houston convention.36 But, Harrison did much
more. He campaigned throughout the South and often defended the
ticket in hostile areas. At a county fair that August, he said that in
regard to the future of Smith and the Democratic party, he had a
"sword drawn in its defense)"37 This was a powerful image for a
Southerner to use. When a Southerner waved the 'bloody shirt' for
such a southern pariah as Smith, strong feelings were conveyed.
Harrison put his personal reputation on the line for this ticket in
radio addresses and on the stump.

Junior Senator Hubert D. Stephens, as well as Governor Theodore
G. Bilbo, were strong opponents of Smith until after the Houston
convention. Stephens gave his full endorsement in early July, while
Bilbo followed a little more reluctantly later that month. Bilbo then
wholeheartedly race baited on behalf of Smith. This was something

 

36 Birmingham Arranging. 7-21-28, p. 1.
37 Arkansas Gazono, 6-27-28, p. 1.

47
he did not need to be forced to do. For example, he charged that

Hoover once danced with a African-American woman on a train. It
did not matter how preposterous the charge, the local and regional
papers reprinted the claim with alacrity. Bilbo's activities were
generally very successful. More positive activities followed for
example on July 19, when Mississippi's most important figure from
the past, former Senator John Sharp Williams, formally endorsed the
ticket because he was "a Democrat and a white man."38 This
epitomized the reasons why Mississippians voted for Smith;
traditional allegiance to party and white supremacy. These were the
two reasons why Smith was assured victory.

Comm

The leading issue of the post-Houston convention campaign was the
regional cohesion and unity of the South. During the stretch for
November, the main issues were white supremacy and Democratic
loyalty. Mississippi, as much as any other state, backed Smith with
blind allegiance. Most journals, religious organizations, and
Democratic groups followed the mores of the populace and state
leaders. There were a few Baptist groups and newspapers opposed
to Smith, but his religion and the Prohibition factor were non-
existent after the Houston Convention.39 Smith carried 79 of 82
counties with a 82.2% to 17.8% or 124,538 to 27,030. With the
exception of three rebellious southeastern counties, the campaign

was quiet and successful.

 

38 Jackson m 7-20-28, p. 8.
39 Kelley, "Mississippi Public Opinion in the Presidential Elections of 19 28 and
1960",p. 28.

48

South Carolina: Maintenance of the Status Quo

C cs

In 1928, South Carolina provided a rather uncomplicated view of
the election because all 45 counties were carried by Smith. In fact,
from 1920 to 1944, every county was carried by the official
Democratic presidential candidate. This was a product of South
Carolina's political system which was the key to understanding its
political activities. There were two reasons South Carolina was going
to be carried by Smith. First, 45.6% of the population was African-
American. This supports the theory that the highest African-
American populated states would vote for the Democrats. Secondly,
its was the poorest southern state with a per capita income of
$261.00 in 1930.40 Thus, there was a level of economic
dissatisfaction among the voters. But this point probably was
unimportant because of the complete Democratic one-party
dominance displayed inside the state. South Carolina‘s recent history .
suggests that from 1884 through1944, almost unanimous vote totals
were cast for the national Democratic presidential candidates. There
were other reasons for this happening.

liti h t s

South Carolina had a long history of repressing the mass of society
to maintain status quo rule.41 This state was founded by a group of
strong elites who were originally given the largest tracts of land to

 

40Odum.$21lrhstrn.litigions.rithefluraLShrai. pp. 482. 46.
41 Kousser. WW5. p. 85.

49

start plantations. Because of the number of large plantations,
African-Americans outnumbered whites by 3 to 2 throughout the
state, often 10 to 1 in the black-belt. Racism was an issue that
political leaders used to direct attention from the true economic
plight of society.42 This racial split was based on geographic
conditions. The eastern half of the state's soil was a fertile coastal
plain where plantations were created. The western half was part of
the Appalachian mountain range with only marginal lands. These
later lands were occupied by less successful, small white farmers.
This geographic split did not lead to a racial split at this time.
Racially obsessive voting was maintained throughout the state even
where African-American populations were non-existent. This was
invariably connected to the Democratic party's successful
disfranchisement of African-Americans and poor whites during the
late nineteenth century.43 Those people who felt racial supremacy
was a non-issue had been effectively removed from the active
electorate. Racism had been successfully used as a visible tool to
maintain white rule and keep white class divisions from developing.
The almost unanimous vote total helped as an indicator. The success
of disfranchisement was only a temporary panacea for South
Carolinians. They were fearful of African-American control.
Throughout the era of slavery, white South Carolinians felt that a
slave revolt was a real possibility. There was a known economic

disparity inside the state. v.0. Key in Tho Shaping of Southern
PontiQs, used his South Carolina chapter to thoroughly discuss this

 

42 Key. WW pp. 129-131.
43 Kousser. Ihehhapinanamrherniolincs. pp. 85-87. 145-152.

50

phenomena. He described the geographic split as one of the better
man vs. the poor man. This was both a cultural and class division
which was a product of the overt racism displayed by the state's
politicians.44 With this harsh difference in class wealth and racial
disparity, the elite's fears of losing control to the majority of society
were real.45 Thus, they tried to eliminate class conflict through the
means of racial control. Thus, they chose a political system and filled
it with politicians who would resist both social and economic change
because they gained power through that system.

Status quo rule allowed South Carolina's politicians to remain in
office. This new era of status quo rule began in 1880 with the
induction of a literary test and fee for replacement of election cards.
This eliminated any formation of a second party.46 This condition
was challenged at the turn of the century with the agrarian rebel
Senator 'pitchfork' Benjamin Tillman. Tillman began his political
career as a man of the people but soon aligned with the elite. V.O.
Key in Soothern Politics, in fact described Tillman in a similar
manner. Status quo rule continues today with traditional southern
conservative J. Strom Thurmond. South Carolina has a history of
continuing to re-elect its politicians with blind obedience as long as
they maintain their type of society.

 

44 Key, S rn P li ' 'In S Nati 11 pp. 136.
45 This topic is more fully developed in Chandler Davidson's, Rago go Cgss in
WMceton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

46 Kousser. IhaShaangnLSontharnlzoltttcs. pp- 87-88-

51

Baokground: The Election of 1924
During the convention and presidential election of 1924, South

Carolina supported the candidacy of William Gibbs McAdoo. The
state was hostile to Smith because he was not viewed as the best
candidate. His views on Prohibition, immigration, and religion were
not seen as being in South Carolina's interests. But the state was not
overly angry with his positions because they were not discussed nor
were clearly obvious to South Carolina's delegation. The state had a
history of remaining uninformed about politics in this era because
state politicians felt that they would surely vote for a Democrat
anyway. Smith's views really did not matter as long as racial
supremacy was assured. South Carolina was taught to support
Democrats solely because of party loyalty. Thus, it did not matter
about the outcome of the 1924 convention, every county in the state
supported the Democratic nominee.
Transition

Between 1924 and 1928, few important events occurred. John
Richards was elected Governor and his beliefs closely aligned with
his predecessors. Then, the state did not openly prepare for the
1928 election because of its unthinking obedience to the party. This
was again because they cared about the key issues of white
supremacy, state freedom, and the conservative status quo. As the
1928 campaign began, race was the main issue when any issue was
discussed.
The Elootion of 1 928

Entering the election year, Governor Al Smith was the front

runner in the race for the Democratic nomination. Every major

in:

816

52

political leader in the South, sooner or later, took a public stand
regarding the Smith issue. South Carolina's three top political
leaders, Governor John J. Richards, and Senators Coleman L. Blease
and Ellison D. 'Cotton Ed' Smith remained conspicuously silent on the
Smith issue. Richards was a recently elected businessman who was
installed at age 63 by political regulars to serve their purpose.
Blease was a former governor who yearned for higher office. Thus,
the party gave him the 1924 nomination to the US. Senate at age 56.
He was perceived as a Tillmanesque man of the people, but he
passed few pieces of legislation and discussed issues only during
election campaigns. "Cotton Ed" Smith was a longtime senator
elected in 1909 at 46 and served until 1941. He was known as
"Cotton Ed" because throughout his political career he was one of the
leaders of the northern Cotton Association and by 1928, he was a
senior Senate voice from the South. For instance, comprehending
"Cotton Ed's" idiosyncrasies allows us to understand South Carolina's
political leaders of this era. Senator Smith was a politician of many
words but few actions. He often stood on issues that were safe, often
leaving the electorate unaware of his political stance. This
perspective allows one to realize the taciturn way he would later
react to Governor Al Smith's candidacy. When he became the senior
Southerner in the Senate, he advised new freshmen Southerners that
their only requirements to remain in power were that constant
support of states rights, tariffs for revenue only, and white

7
supremacy. On all other issues one could remain silent.4

 

47 Harold B. Hinton, Cordon mm; A Biogtophx(Garden City: Doubleday, 1942), p.
94.

53

The religious leaders of the state were silently aligned with the
wishes of the Democratic party. South Carolina's unchanging
philosophy was enhanced by local community ministers who did not
participate in anti-Smith activity inside South Carolina or in
neighboring states. Inactivity was prevalent at all levels of society
because of the race issues. There was not an active Republican party
that countered the Democrats to give an opposing voice to champion
white supremacy. South Carolina's ministers mimicked the three
main political leaders lack of activity. But, endorsements were given
by these political leaders during the campaign. Blease did not have
any quarrels with Smith and publicly vowed to support him on April
4th if nominated.48 later in April, Blease gave a speech attacking
Hoover on the issue of race, calling it the only important issue in the
state.49 He often stated that Hoover personally ordered
desegregation at the Treasury Department and the Office of the
Interior specifically for African-American votes.50 This was widely
reported in the South and was continuously effective in the black-
belt areas. But, until the Houston convention commenced, Blease
was not cognizant with the issues and ideas championed by Governor
Smith and Democratic Chairman John J. Raskob. This was part of the
reason why South Carolina was so stoical towards and accepting of
Smith. They were ignorant of his personal platform. After their
years of blind party support, they began to take Democratic issues
for granted. Even South Carolina's major journals reacted in this

 

43 Charleston Evomng Post, 4-5-28, p. 4.

49 Charleston W, 4-26-28, p. 1.
50 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 122.

54

manner. The state's two major newspapers, the Charleston fioni_ng
Post and the Columbia Stat were true Democratic journals. They
were partisan in their coverage to Democrats and printed favorable
articles about Smith as early as April to prepare readers for his
possible nomination. They quietly carried the party line.

At the Houston convention, the state's delegation followed the
lead of their three top leaders and happily united under the Smith
banner. Even though they did not give Smith any votes to nominate,
they joined both celebratory parades that started after Smith's
nomination and Robinson's earlier religious toleration speech. The
state delegation understood that Democratic loyalty was the most
important aspect to maintain as long as this aligned with white
supremacy and continued status quo rule. The Charleston Evening
m believed that the acceptance of Smith was done fully in the
name of white supremacy.51

Governor Richards waited until after the Democratic Convention to
publicly endorse Smith. Richards was an avid prohibitionist and
church member.52 He wanted to view a united party before fully
endorsing the candidate. His endorsement was reported in many
papers throughout the South to help galvanize Smith's faltering
campaign. Senator Smith endorsed the candidate but received little
print because he was in poor health. More likely, "Cotton Ed" played
safe politics by remaining quiet on all controversial issues. None of
South Carolina's politicians left much of a legislative record. They

 

51 Charleston Evoning Post, 7-4-28, p. 1.
52 Arkansas Gaggo, 7-5-28, p. 6.

55

left mainly fiery election year speeches about the "Negro problem"
and other race baitings.

The issues in the November campaign were few. White
supremacy, elite rule, and state sovereignty were South Carolina's
main concerns.53 Smith's victory in the state was already assured by
his ascendence in Houston. The party bureaucracy, top party leaders,
local ministers, and journals aligned together for the post-convention
push to November. They believed that inactivity would show
support and thus remained quiet in their united support for the
Democratic candidate. After the convention, Blease stated that if he
and other southern Democrats would have understood Smith and
Raskob's views, "'few, if any, of the southern states would have
participated in the Houston Convention.”S4 Nonetheless, Blease
remained relatively silent in his public support for and private
animosity toward Smith. Many of the southern politicians were
familiar with one type of Democratic party; one that generally
aligned on most major issues. This cultural split was new to them
and many did not prepare by doing their political homework.

There was no evident division against Smith inside South Carolina.
Due to its united front against African-American's, a religious, racial,
or political opposition force did not materialize. The state's major
papers reportedly did not have any problems with the three main
issues because they stated that Smith accepted states rights. Their
definition of states rights was somewhat Jeffersonian, meaning free

practice of religion and non-intrusion into race relations. They made

 

53 Charleston W 7-4-28, p. 4
54 M.E. Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 86.

56

little mention of Hoover before or after the election. It seemed he
was a nonentity. They chose not to explore the issues concerning the
election. The lack of consciousness concerning the election was a
phoneme of South Carolina. From its main politicians, to its
ministers, its journals, and its electorate, South Carolina remained
relatively uninformed because of its blind allegiance to their party's
cause.

South Carolina had relatively inactive support for Smith. Its
major political leaders and local electorate lined up in the Smith
column because of race and tradition. There was not any noticeable
split in upcountry and coastal plain votes due to disfranchisement
and because as stated earlier, separate cultural or class identity did
not exist. This was because race was used as a diversionary force by
South Carolina leadership. Nonetheless Smith received 62,700 votes
to Hoover's 5,858 or a 91.5% to 8.5% margin. The overall voter
turnout was lower than in 1920 or 1932, but South Carolina's one
party dominance and tradition was too powerful to fight.

Georgia: The Figh t for Tradition

Wham—rim
Georgia was possibly the epitome of a southern state. Georgia had

both Upper and lower South characteristics. It had a medium size
black-belt, both cotton and tobacco lands, as well as a hilly region
and coast. 55 The usual geographic divide between the more and less

 

55 Odum,S R U ' s p. 18.

57

successful citizens and farmers occurred. The central black-belt
region was filled with wealthy conservative Democratic farmers and
former plantation owners. They maintained society, controlled
economics, and Operated the Democratic party machinery. The less
fortunate farmers in the northern and southern regions of Georgia
struggled economically and socially to survive. The Democratic party
was not as strong as in other Deep South states and was not able to
quell class conflicts. Minor discrepancies existed between whites in
Georgia that were not evident in Mississippi or South Carolina.
Georgia's African-American population was the fourth largest in the
South, which would indicate Georgia's natural white supremacy
Democratic leanings.56 Most African-Americans resided in the
central black-belt region.
Politicg Characterisocs

Unlike other southern states, Georgia did not have an ironclad
Democratic organization. Personality politics was probably its most
important factor.57 Without a strong organization, its political
leadership was almost always in a transitional phase. But, in the
Reconstruction or Redemption periods, Georgia did not have a history
of G.O.P. or Populist party problems. State politicians found race
baiting successful and because racial animosity was strongly evident,
a natural Democratic white majority developed.58

Georgia's junior Senator Walter F. George was an important figure
in southern politics and the nominal leader of his state's political

 

56 Odum,S f U s p.482.
57 Key. Wanna. pp. 106-109.
53 Kousser. Wes. Pp- 209-217-

58

activities. George was a young man of 42 when elected in 1922, but
quickly became well known regionally. He was a lawyer and former
state Supreme Court Justice before serving 35 years in the US.
Senate. Senior Senator William J. Harris was a less important figure.
He was a lifelong bureaucrat before being elected to the US. Senate
in 1918. He was a product of party patronage. Beyond George and
the state's fragmented leadership, the key to understanding its
politics is like taking a southern opinion poll. Georgia usually
followed the tide of Deep South feelings.
mired

The 1924 campaign and election were similar to the happenings
in the remainder of the South. A strong animosity for Smith existed
but the state Democratic party's actions were not overly hostile. The
years between 1924 and 1928 were not particularly harsh for
Governor Smith in Georgia. He was universally opposed in 1924, but
the hostility he experience was endemic to the entire South. Georgia
did not lead or initiate any known activities against Smith and
remained loyal to southern tradition in its opposition to Smith.
Ultimately it delivered a strong majority for the nominee Governor
Davis in the 1924 presidential election.
Tho Elgtton of 1928

There was no strong transitional period in Georgia. The election
year began with the same dilemma facing Alabama, meaning that
both state's would soon become political battleground's because they
were targeted by the national A.S.I.. and Bishop Cannon.59 Georgia's

 

59 Memphis Qommern’dhnneal. 9—15-28. p. 1.

59

struggle was mild when compared to Alabama's, primarily because
Georgia did not have a Heflin type opposition leader. Georgia's main
political leaders would remain loyal to the Democrats.

1928 began in Georgia with the favorite son candidacy of Senator
George. George was a longtime popular middle of the road
pragmatist. He received almost total support throughout the state as
well as early endorsements from the two major papers, the Atlanta
Jogpat and Atlanta Coostitppon. These journals also strongly
criticized Heflin's conflicts with Robinson, Smith, and the Catholic
Church. They backed the good people of Alabama and spoke of
tolerance?0 The Jo_u_rpalp_ and the Constitotion both supplied their
readers with a good selection of relatively unbiased two-party
reporting. Inside the papers, the anybody but Smith sentiment was
strong as the realization that George would not receive the
nomination became evident. Anti-Smith sentiment remained strong
until the Houston convention and it was not evident that Georgia
would support him after his nomination. This was unlike Mississippi
and South Carolina which openly and eagerly vowed in their major
journals to support Smith. The ordinary animosity that the South felt
for Smith was displayed in Georgia and inside these two major
journals.

As the Houston Convention approached, Smith seemed to gain
momentum in Georgia?1 Inside the state, Georgians began to realize
that Smith would be impossible to defeat. This view was

 

60 Atlanta Jottmat, 1-19-28, p. 6.
61 Robert s. O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia"(Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Georgia, 1972), p. 39.

6O

championed publicly by the editor of the Consptotion Clark Howell,
who in several May editorials, realized that Smith's nomination was
almost assured. Howell and other editors did not like Smith and felt
that he was probably their last choice.62 But they still fought hard
against him because of both their loyalty toward George and their
belief that they wanted to "'save the Democracy' in Georgia."63
Georgia's state nominating convention unanimously supported
Senator George. Thus they were sent to Houston to support the state
candidate. Georgia still showed a strong animosity to Smith at the
Houston convention. The delegation refused to change its votes to
unanimously support both Smith and later Robinson after they were
nominated. They also did not join either of the pro-Smith
spontaneous parades that erupted. This type of negative reaction
left Smith in a precarious position in the next months. Without a
strong party organization and the known targeting of the state by the
A.S.L. and the Cannon disciples, it would be a close election. A key to
this election would be leadership.

The state leaders, Senators William J. Harris and George, Governor
Iamantine G. Hardman, and former politicians like Hoke Smith, began
to unite in favor of a November victory. They decided to actively
campaign for a Smith victory. The general feeling of most politicians
and newspapers was that they were "not pleased with the selection
of Smith and Robinson but they enjoined all Democrats in Georgia to
support the nominees of the party."64 Their continued hostility was

 

62 O'Deil, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", pp. 41-44.
63 O'Deli, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 43.
64 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 49.

61

evident, but their devotion to the Democratic party was great.
Following Georgia's unanimous support of George at their state
convention, the top politicians publicly endorsed Smith. Senators
Harris, George, and Hoke Smith travelled throughout the state and
the South campaigning. Harris and George constantly waved the
'bloody shirt'. Senator Harris' favorite traveling speech included
strong references regarding Hoover's 'personal' order to "revoke the
segregation law" while he was the Secretary of the Department of
Commerce.65 Senator George used a traditional approach, and told
his audiences to battle Republicanism and those Democrats who
"have joined with the ancient enemy."66 The Atlanta Constitution in
June, and then later immediately before the election, made an effort
to refresh the voters memories and disseminated the story that
Tammany Hall secretly paid to defend Jefferson Davis against
prosecution and was the lone remaining northern friend of the
South.67 Without any major political defections or political rallies in
favor of Hoover, the opposition was not part of the Democratic
organizations. The opposition would come solely from religious
groups.

The conflict in Georgia was again between white supremacy,
religion, and Prohibition. Prohibition was a main factor only in the
pre-convention period. Many urban journals tried to "unite anti-
Smith elements in Georgia by using the prohibition issue, something

 

65 Arkansas Gazom 8-31-28, p. 1.

66 Memphis WWI. 7-27-28. P. 1-
67 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 151.

62

with which most Georgians could agree."68 Religious groups carried
the torch of Prohibition to cover their hatred of Catholicism and
immigration. Both major religious publications in Georgia, the
Wesleyan Citrts_ti_an_ Advocfle and the Baptist Christian Index
vehemently opposed Smith throughout the year.69 The anti-Smith
groups that did form were religious Prohibition groups based on
church membership. Baptist groups told parishioners to oppose any
candidates who were against Prohibition. These groups conveyed the
message that Smith's allegiance was to the Papacy and not the US.
Constitution, thus their freedom was in question. The Atlanta
Copstttptim criticized ministers and religious groups in general for
using "their pulpits to preach politically-oriented sermons."7O If one
connects this approach to other social factors like the social status
quo, xenophobia, immigration, and belief that white supremacy was
assured, the church was effective.

The Georgia Republican Party worked quietly in the background
of politics. The major state Democratic papers did not cover its
activities.71 What hurt Georgia was that only two Republican
journals in the state covered the G.O.P. and both were African-
American papers. There was not a strongly successful 'Iin white"
movement to remove African-Americans from the party.72 But the
strength of the Democratic organization had to be questioned.
Without any major politicians except former congressman William D.

 

68 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 43.
69 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p.40.
70 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 88.
71 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", p. 43.
72 O'Dell, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Georgia", pp. 44, 4s.

L"I

10

IE

PUD

63

Upshaw, the marginal victory by the Smith forces had to be related
to organizational weakness or the inordinate amount of strength that
religious groups displayed in Georgia. But, one has to remember that
Georgia was the only truly Deep South state not to follow the
Dbdecrat bolt in 1948. This activity could correlate to a
progressiveness, especially regarding white supremacy, that is more
evident in the Upper South. Georgia's relatively high African-
American population was either more benign or more densely
packed with the outlying regions of the state being unaffected, thus
being allowed to vote for the G.OP. But, if one believes the assertions
that Georgia did not have a strong post-reconstruction Progressive or
Republican party, the only reason for the natural Democratic
majority to widely abandon its party would be the strength of
religious leaders. Nonetheless, religion and white supremacy marked
the dividing line in loyalty. It depended which party or candidate an
individual or town believed which led those people to vote in that
certain direction. The election was issue oriented; white supremacy
or Catholic animosity were the two driving issues. Persuasion led
Georgians to make their proper ideological decision.

The final vote total was 5696 to 44% or 129,604 to 101,800 in
favor of Smith. The natural split between the central black-belt and
the hills and cotton region was emphasized. The quick activity
following the Houston convention led to the Smith victory. The major
politicians and journals actively supported Smith and their cause of
remaining in power. If more politicians or if major newspapers
would have abandoned Smith, his victory would have been in

question. But, Georgia's major leaders were quick to respond to

Smith'
nuinh
black?

supret

64

Smith's candidacy. The relative progressive nature of Georgia
mainly led to the closeness of the election. Georgians outside of the
black-belt felt that religion was more important than white
supremacy and this led to the tight race.

2
The Early Smith Support

Governor Smith was not universally opposed in the South during the
pre-Houston convention period. Louisiana and Arkansas were and
still are connected in both cultural and political terms. Both
exhibited a mildness in race relations and a need to explore
progressive economic agendas. Also, in modern times, these two
states maintained a local and national allegiance to the Democratic
party. This was connected to both states being areas of extreme
poverty which was their closest similarity. Plus, they both showed
early support for the Smith campaign.

Louisiana: The Movement of Machine Inclusion

Social characteristics

Louisiana did not have the staunch one-party tradition exhibited
in other Deep South states. Over the last century and a half,
Louisiana's white majority has had serious flirtations with both the
Populist party and the G.O.P.. White Louisianians have never been
fully united in their political or social views. This was because

Louisiana was the only southern state with a large percentage of
65

66

Catholics.1 This was important because Louisiana's Catholic region
was both geographically and politically separated from the
remainder of the state. It was also the area of Smith's strongest
intrastate support. The 1928 election was a continuation of
Democratic majorities because every parish in the state returned a
majority for Al Smith. But there was a noticeable electoral power
shift in this election that was related to a geographic and religious
split. The results of the election will prove that any real political
unity was a misnomer.

Certain social characteristics are important to understand. In
1930, Louisiana had the third highest southern African-American
population with 36.9%.2 In addition, Louisiana has a history of
extreme poverty.3 This alone again would seem to indicate a Smith
victory because of the white supremacy vote and relatively greater
support of a progressive economic agenda. But Louisiana was not as
fanatical as other Deep South states regarding race and one must
discuss the limitations of Smith's progressive agenda. This agenda
could be described bettwr as being less conservative than Hoover's
agenda. What helped Smith in this area was that the G.O.P was
battling corruption and it opposed the McNary-Haugen Bill which

 

1 Kousser. Whittier p 12 William Forbes Adams

discusses Catholic emigration to Louisiana and migratory effects on the
original French Catholic population in W
MWWew York: Russell & Russell, 1932) p. 379-
380.

2 Odum, Soothopp Rogions of tl_ie United Stotos, p. 482.

3 This was a key point in understanding the political and social motivations of
Louisianians, T. Harry Williams, Hpoy Long(New York, 1969) and Alan

Brinkley, Vi t H er C Gr
WVintage Books: New York, 19182) understand this while Key,

MW passed over this important point

67

would liberalize a few aspects of farm policy primarily by helping
raise prices and by subsidizing farmers' incomes. The G.O.P. would
lose many progressive votes in the South based on this issue.
Louisiana was concerned with progress because of its economic
situation. Also as stated earlier, Louisiana had an abnormally high
percentage of non-Protestant church members. 3 1.66% of white
church members were Catholic.4 This showed a diversity in the
population that helped Smith gain new voters and will be explained
later.
Politioal Characteristics

The Catholic population resided in the southern Louisiana delta
parishes. These counties traditionally opposed conservative
Democratic candidates on the state and national level. Because
Smith's political and social beliefs matched those of this area, a new
ephemeral Democratic alliance would be created if traditionally
conservative Protestant Democrats remained loyal to the party. The
overall geography of the state was important. The delta parishes
were the strongest areas of Catholic residence, but were the weakest
traditional Democratic supporters. The Catholics were despised
because of their religious traditions, alcoholic overindulgence, Mardi
Gras celebrations, and French ancestry but would be the base of
Democratic national support in the future.

The Protestants of the northern and Florida parishes (connected

to Florida) were traditionally conservative Democrats with a learned
difference with the Catholics. Some called the Northerners

 

40dum, R ° f U' s p.142.

68

Louisiana's 'cotton' Democrats, meaning that their agricultural
existence was similar to that of the remainder of the southern black-
belt. This was an insult because Louisianians prided themselves on a
separation from the other southern states; they were different! But
racially both Catholics and Protestants had areas with large African-
American populations. The key would be if the Smith forces could
find a middle ground of assimilation and understanding between the
two distinctly different Louisianas.

The key to the future victory of Smith was the nomination of 35-
year old Huey Long as the Democratic gubernatorial candidate early
in 1928. His political ascendancy was rapid. Long was born to a
Populist politician in Winn Parish, Louisiana in 1893. He never
received a high school diploma or a law degree but still became an
intelligent and successful lawyer. He soon entered politics and was
elected Louisiana Railroad Commissioner at age 25. He had a natural
flair for politics and was flamboyant in almost all his activities.
When he entered the US. Senate in 1932, he wore outrageous clothes
and refused to follow the conservative party line or act in the
subservient manner traditionally reserved for freshmen Senators.5

long was in almost total control of the state after his election as
Governor was assured. He had a previously formed political
machine, but its domination was not assured until his ascendence
was complete. His election was a step to dominate most state

functions. local and national newspapers quickly began calling him

 

5 Brinkley, v ' - H ' Great
W. p. 42-

69

"'the dictator of Louisiana,“ or his personal favorite, "'the Kingfish.'"6
In early 1928, the pro-Long Democratic faction quickly assumed
power, created a dominant and efficient political organization, and
aligned themselves with the Smith political organization. Louisiana's
two Senators, Joseph D. Ransdell and Edwin S. Broussard were above
intrastate squabbles and were solely interested in national
government affairs in Washington. They were not factors in state
and local government because inside the state they did not have any
real power. Louisiana was controlled by the Kingfish. They could
stay out of his way in Washington; but that was until Long decided to
relocate to the Senate. The important factor to remember in
Louisiana was who controlled politics or could form a strong machine.
Long's machine became the real arm of Government.

The regional and religious split inside Iouisiana was shaped by
liberal and conservative leanings. The Populist party and the G.O.P.'s
previous strongholds were in the Catholic region of Iouisiana, while
the Protestants generally exhibited traditional southern conservative
leanings and most Democratic organizations in the pre-Long era were
in alliance with the Protestant majority.7 But Long's support was
class based: his voters were poor whites of both Protestant and
Catholic backgrounds. At the same time he was able to control the
elite through the use of patronage.8 He provided enough jobs to

former opponents and the powerful to secure his future activity.

 

6 Brinkley, v ' f - F C ' Gr
mitigation. p. 9-
7 Kousser, Th ' f s liti pp.74-75, 153-164..

8 Brinkley, Voioos of Protost; Hpox Long, Paths: Copghlin Q tho Greot
mansion. pp- 22-25-

almo
use 0
Olga
0ng
State

IllOIl

7O

Electoral Background
The Long organization was already fighting for power during the

gubernatorial campaign of 1924. He was defeated by a Protestant
elite/Ku Klux Klan coalition. That same year the Louisiana delegation
to the Democratic convention was an anti-long group that aligned
with the Protestant South and was chosen to strongly oppose Smith.9
In 1928 however, the new voters being the Catholics of the delta
parishes, would elect Long and thus help him establish a group of
electors which was sent to Houston.10 long would not let an anti-
Long group of presidential electors to again be chosen in 1928.
Tpapsipon

On the surface, state political activities were uneventful until
Long's nomination as Governor. Between 1924 and 1928
Long slowly fortified his control of Louisiana. Then in 192 8, the
"recently nominated Democratic gubernatorial candidate" assumed
almost complete control of the entire state through the systematic
use of patronage, political intimidation, force of personal conviction,
organizational speed, and sheer numbers of people in his
organization.1 1 Long frenetically united his forces and fortified the
state for the proposition of supporting Smith in the upcoming
months. Machine control became the key to Smith's future victory in

Louisiana as it was connected to Long's ascendency.

Tho Elootion of 1928

 

9 Barbara Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana." topistaoa
mstoty, 18, (1977), p. 408.

10 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", pp. 405, 406, 408.
11 Wingo. "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", pp. 408.

an a
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71

Long believed that his future control of the state was connected to
an alliance with the perceived national party nominee Al Smith. The
Smith/ Long connection would validate his rule. Smith's slow rise to
national power loosely coincided with that of Long's. They both used
the 1924-1928 period to build a strong organization to meet their
political purposes. The alliance that they built reflected the general
feelings of Louisiana. This was because Smith's viewpoints aligned
more closely with Iouisiana's than with any other southern state.
Louisiana's Catholic population was a driving factor for this event.
Protestants were also affected because of their close geographic
proximity to Catholics. Protestants and Catholics had their
differences, but unlike most other southern voters, the Protestant
majority realized that Catholics were not chimeras. They continued
to support the Democratic party.

Upon entering the convention phase, the Louisiana delegation had
to grapple with the question of Prohibition. The Houston delegation
had many anti-prohibitionists including the Louisiana National
Committeeman, Colonial Robert Ewing. But, Ewing was closely
aligned with Long and thus became a Smith supporter. What also
helped Smith was that Ewing was also the publisher of the New
Orleans St_a_t_os and the Shreveport limos. 12 Along with the New
Orleans Times- Pioaypno, Louisiana's three major newspapers were
pro-Smith in the pre-Houston convention period. These three
papers gave early and strong support for the Smith campaign.

Coincidentally, there was also a June meeting of southern newspaper

 

12 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", p. 408.

tom
Smit
seat
the '
View
in 1
real
Wert

DEN

72

publishers at New Orleans in which they pledged their total support
for the Smith Campaign.13

With Long's power and control, it was clearly evident that if he
supported Smith, the Louisiana delegation would follow his rule.
Because Long believed that the future nominee was Smith and power
followed a Smith alliance, he lined his forces up prior to the Houston
convention. It was said that Louisiana pledged its convention to
Smith so that long knew that his political followers could then be
seated. Long did this to increase his power base. Plus, he despised
the use of religion in politics to defeat opponents.14 Long unhappily
viewed the bigoted attacks levelled against Smith in 1924 and again
in 1928. In many ways, the Longites were political pragmatists who
realized that Smith was assured the Democratic nomination. They
were much more practical, racially sensitive, and politically
perceptive than the remainder of the South.

At the Houston convention, every Louisiana delegate was pro-
Long and pledged to Smith. Smith received all 20 of Louisiana's
ballots. Louisiana was the only southern state to unanimously
support Smith at Houston. Louisiana did not protest Smith's positions
nor oppose his choice for the vice presidency. Long was able to limit
the effectiveness of the election issues inside his state. The old 1924
Protestant faction pushed religion, Prohibition, and white supremacy
in that order.15 Because that faction was out of power and, as

described earlier, Long's systematic effectiveness in formulating his

 

13 New Orleans limos-ligamno, 6-24-28, p. 1.
14 Williams. Husxhzna. p- 326-
15 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", p. 41 1.

73

political machine was superb, the 1924 coalition's pronouncements
against Smith were ineffective. Generally, the arguments against
Smith regarding Prohibition and religious belief only had effect in
the northern and Florida parishes. These areas were traditionally
the strongest Democratic counties, primarily because of their Anglo-
Saxon origins and cotton growing practices.16 These areas exhibited
a noted decline in their Democratic majority totals for Smith. The
southern Baptist newspaper the Baptist Message did the most
damage to Smith in these Protestant regions of the state.17 The
Mesgge used the usual prejudicial religious arguments to influence
its readers.

It must be discussed that Louisiana had a strong G.O.P.
organization in place to fight Smith. But this organization had a
minimal effect on the election because of the strength of the Long
organization. Nonetheless, the G.O.P. delegation to the Republican
National Convention was purged of "'negro patronage elements'" and
was the first southern group to fully endorse Hoover's candidacy.18

In Louisiana, Smith received the strongest support from rural
counties. There was a connection to Long's support and the quest for
economic progressivism. These rural parishes strongly supported
Populists and Republicans in the past, but during this election there
was much discussion regarding the need for flood relief work on the
Mississippi River. This issue of economic progress and new federal

government intervention was championed by the Longites. Smith's

 

15 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", pp. 423-425.
17 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana". p. 415.
18 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", pp. 406, 407.

SUPPO
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74

supporters praised his position that the "federal government should
assume full responsibility for flood control." 19 This position was
popular with the rural voter. If Smith could have continued this
'people's candidate' approach formulated by Long, he could have
generated even more rural community support. Throughout the
South, economic progressivism was needed and wanted by the
electorate. This relationship was mentioned in the Alabama chapter
regarding C. Vann Woodward and white progressivism. This was
important in understanding Louisiana and the South. Long made his
living saying things such as, "'about sixty-five or seventy percent of
the entire wealth of the United States is owned by two percent of the
people...wealth is fast concentrating in the hands of the few.'"20
Ideas vocalized in this way were successful with poor white
audiences. Progressive radicalism had a voice in the South. If Smith
could have harnessed it with the continued belief that people could
maintain their social and religious sovereignty, he could have set a
positive agenda and been a much more successful, if not a nationally
victorious candidate.
Conclusion

Louisiana had a high voter turnout for the election and returned a
Smith victory of 76.3% to 23.7% or 164,655 to 5 1,160. This majority
was similar to that of 1924 in number, but Smith's support differed
in its geographic strength. He had higher vote totals in the Catholic
delta but lower totals than Davis in the traditional Democratic areas

 

19 Wingo, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Louisiana", p. 422, New Orleans
statos, 8-30-28, p. 1.

20 Brinkley, v - C ' Gr
Depression. p- 8.

 

75

of the northern and Florida parishes. White supremacy and religious
animosity only played a minor role in the traditional Democratic
counties because of the lack of an outlet for displeasure. The areas
where southern states would support Hoover, were those areas with
a past connection to the Progressive party of the Reconstructionist
era. Since this tradition existed in the Catholic areas that supported
Smith, the voice of opposition did not really materialize in the
northern and Florida parishes. The natural split in the state was
quelled by its own Democratic traditions. Louisiana was the only
southern state whose former Reconstruction era second-party
opposition supported Smith in strong numbers. The Long support
was a major factor that led to Smith's victory. Smith's non-
traditional voter support did not hinder Iouisiana's long term trend
of Democratic support, but it did not unite the state in the long term
either.

Arkansas: Support For The Local Candidate

httis

Arkansas is a tricky state to understand and classify for both the
1928 election and inside the South itself. It was unlike other
southern areas. Like Louisiana, it did not have a history of race
baiting. But Arkansas was not a Deep South state because it lacked a
former plantation economy and large former slave population. It is
easier to classify it as an Upper South state even though Arkansas
could be geographically connected to the Middle West. Its

76

Democratic allegiance was related to its combination of extreme
poverty and inherent progressive nature. Society was not extreme in
its class divisions as economic subsistence was more common than
citizens with opulent lifestyles. The entire state was fighting for
economic success because Arkansas was composed of poor people
living in rural areas. In 1930 Arkansas had the third lowest African
American population in the South, 25.6%, was the third poorest
southern state, and second most rural.21 Arkansas was also one of
the last southern states to develop and become populated. Except for
a few counties in the southeast, Arkansas mostly consisted of

marginal lands.

Politioal Chmcteristics

Arkansas political leadership was made up of a relatively fluid
group of individuals in a loosely structured party organization based
in the southeastern delta region. Joseph T. Robinson was the nominal
state leader and coordinator of state political activities. He was a
well connected lawyer, educated at the University of Virginia. His
education validated his good southern roots. He ascended to the
Democratic leadership in the US. Senate after being elected at age 41
in 191 3. The junior Senator was Thaddeus H. Caraway who was
elected at age 49 in 1920. Caraway was known as a progressive,
especially regarding agricultural issues. He was the quieter
colleague, but both were deeply loyal to their party and state.

Arkansas was a geographically and politically divided area with
an upcountry and a delta region. The delta region had a high

 

21Oduin,s R ' U' s pp.18,46,482.

77

African-American population and also maintained the strongest
traditional white Democratic allegiance in the state. The Ozark
upcountry had traditionally flirted with the G.O.P. and the
Progressive party in the post-bellum era. Arkansas political
independence in this earlier era was stronger than in most southern
states.22 The state's geographic split caused a political division which
was evident in most elections. The upcountry region had
traditionally abandoned the Democratic fold and helped Arkansas
build one of the stronger Republican organizations.23 At the turn of
the century, Governor Jeff Davis era, the state was surprisingly
united through a populist style of Democratic agrarian radicalism. It
is interesting to note that during this era, the state was ideologically
but not racially divisive; a type Of non-racial conformity coalesced.
Economics and not race was the focal point even though race
preoccupied most of the remainder of the South. Since class division
was not and never became a cutting issue, race was not used as a
political dividing point by the elite to control economics. Plus, the
number of elite leaders was small as was the African-American
population. These characteristics made Arkansas unlike any other
southern state. In this earlier era, state unity under the banner of
progressivism remained a key issue. Arkansas' Democratic party has
a history of progressive behavior. From Jeff Davis, both Senator
Thaddeus Caraway and his wife Senator Hattie Caraway, to Senator
Dale Bumpers and President Bill Clinton, Arkansas has carried the

progressive banner. Unlike other southern states, its agrarian and

 

22 Kousser,Th S ' fS rn " p.123.
23 Kousser. WWW. 122-123-

78

political leaders did act on behalf of its citizens. This played a role in
forming the 1928 Smith coalition.

Backgropnd and Transition from 1924

Arkansas did not show any support for Smith in 1924 but limited
its animosity to only marginal complaints. There was not a major
transition between 1924 and 192 8. The major state leaders
remained in power. But, the party generally realized that victory
over the Republicans was more important than continued infighting.
This helped shape its 1928 agenda.

Tho Election of 1928

Either by fluke or by cognitive action, Arkansas' political
organization unknowingly joined the Smith juggernaut early in 192 8.
Senator J. Thomas Heflin continued his history of anti-Catholic
demagoguery and began specifically attacking Governor Smith from
the Senate floor. Smith was immediately defended by Senate
Minority leader Robinson. Robinson's rebuttals and counterattacks
against Heflin received the unanimous support of the Senate.24 As
discussed earlier, the Heflin-Robinson conflict was a focal point of the
election. This was a rallying point for Arkansas which proudly
supported its Senator.25 Because of Robinson's defense Of Smith, he
gained the attention of the Smith backers in New York. Realizing that
he could have problems in the South in November, Smith secretly

chose Robinson to be his southern vice presidential candidate in

 

24 Birmingham Ago-mo, 1-20-28, p. 1.
25 Arkansas Qazotto, 1-21-28, p.1, 1-24-28, pp. 1, 6.

79

January.26 Arkansas and the remainder of the South were largely
unaware of this event even though many anti-Smith/pro-Robinson
Democrats discussed the possibility of this alliance. They used this as
a rallying point to oppose the Smith/ Robinson ticket at Houston.
Smith hoped this would mollify southern animosity.27

The early national backing that Robinson received by the Smith
forces made many Southerners question Robinson's true political
intentions. This forced many southern political leaders to criticize his
later activity at the Houston convention. The local reaction to the
Robinson/Heflin conflict received more print and discussion in
Alabama than in Arkansas. Both the Arkansas _G_a_ze_tto and the
Arkansas fimocrat, based in Little Rock, underreported the ensuing
Robinson-Heflin conflict. The Gaflo was more reserved in its
positive reporting because it was a strong prohibitionist paper. The
Gozottots reporting overshadowed journalistic objectivity. One must
remember that in this era newspapers were ideologically based.
Most papers tried to force their own agenda on their readership.
Plus, many readers subscribed to newspapers to get a certain point
of view. The Gazog was unsettled by Smith's 'wet' leanings. They
did their best to report events early in the campaign regarding anti-
Smith activities throughout the South.28

 

26 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 186.

27 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 186.

28 Good examples of anti-Smith reporting was Arkansas Gazotto, 1-22-28, p. 3,
2-20—28, p. 1,which discussed anti-Smith fervor and discussed Hoover, Coolidge
and G.O.P. positives. 3-24-28, p. 1, showed negative headlines about Smith
being on the defensive regarding corruption and other issues.

80

Arkansas was a G.O.P. and ASL target state in 1928.29 But it did
not land in the Republican column for many reasons. One has to
examine Robinson's effectiveness in his home state to realize why
Arkansas voted for Smith. As early as the middle of March, the
Arkansas delegation to the Democratic National Convention assured
Smith of at least 9096 support.30 The final actual delegate count was
17 to 1 in favor of Smith. This infuriated the Cam which claimed
in an editorial the next day that 90% of Arkansas' Democrats were
not in favor of Smith.31 A charge of political chicanery and
undemocratic representation swept the state. It was likely that
because of the enormous support Robinson had inside the state, along
with the loyal activities of junior Senator Thaddeus Caraway,
Arkansas remained Democratic. Robinson was admired and well
liked. In Arkansas, people respected his defense of the Democratic
party and Smith. His speeches were reported throughout the state.
A memorable speech about religious freedom was delivered in
Philadelphia on March, 18 and was partly transcribed by the Gaoetto
for its readership. Robinson stated that a citizen had an "'inalienable
and supreme right to exercise his religious faith in his own
manner.'"32 This was effective speech making and helped to shape
the early opinions of the Arkansas electorate. Senator Caraway often
travelled and delivered speeches defending both Smith and

Robinson. He had strong name recognition and Arkansas voters felt a

 

29 Memphis WWI. 7-23-28, p. 1, Arkansas Gaootto, 3-6-28, p.1.
30 Arkansas ngtto, 3-23-28, p. 1.
31 Arkansas game, 3-24-28, p. 6.
32 Arkansas smog, 3-19-28, p. 1.

81
loyalty to him. After his death in 193 1, this recognition partly

allowed Arkansas voters to elect his wife to his Senate seat. Caraway
regularly was united in defense of the ticket throughout the South
with Senators Duncan U. Fletcher of Florida and Walter F. George of
Georgia.33 These Senators sacrificed themselves for the Democratic
ticket. This meant that if things went badly, they could have harmed
their future political viability.

The preconvention activity of the local electorate and local
journals were slanted in favor of the anti-Smith forces. The
Smith/ Robinson ticket remained a well kept secret. Often Hoover
received more coverage in headlines and articles. A.S.L. activity was
widely promoted and Anti-Smith rallies were openly held without
public retribution. This type of activity soon ended. A rally in Pine
Bluff sponsored by the Reverend EE. Tull was the last hurrah for the
anti-Smith movement in Arkansas. The June, 18 rally saw many
loyal Democrats cheer for Hoover as Tull wildly endorsed him and
charged that the corrupting influence of Tammany was not wanted
by Southerners. Inside Arkansas the agrarian economic issue was
important, Tull reminded his audience, many of whom were farmers,
" 'what would Smith know about flood relief, immigration and labor
problems, and the tariff issue?”34 This was effective because the
Gagotto earlier chastised Smith for his organizations questionable
methods of operating campaign finances.35 This opened Smith

 

33 Birmingham Asthma. 5-31-28. p. 1. Memphis Commercialanmai. 8—2-28.
p. 13, 8-23-28, p. 1.

34 Arkansas Qazotto, 6-19-28, p.8.

35 Arkansas Qazotto, 5-28-28, p. 1, 3.

82

problems in two areas. It was a highly effective technique to attack
a candidate with issues that were fresh in the public's mind. For one,
the smell of corruption and big business cronyism inside Tammany
was widely known. Tull compared the Americanism of the
candidates with Hoover being a world-wide spokesman for America,
a trained engineer, and the son of a farm family. Secondly, Tull
compared this to Smith's 'wet', immigrant, and Tammany
connections. Tull was feverishly cheered.36 His speech was
symptomatic of Smith's southern problems and was in may ways
repeating what other ministers were preaching. The difference in
Arkansas was that after the Houston convention, these activities

halted.

Houston was a relatively pleasant experience for the Arkansas
delegation. Most learned in the weeks leading up to the convention
that their senior Senator was to become their vice presidential
candidate. He was also positioned to give an important speech about
religious toleration. The speech was highly successful with the
Arkansas delegation. This helped the delegation lead a spontaneous
parade. Many in Arkansas believed that the Robinson candidacy
could lead to a newly found pride and respect for both the state and
the South, and Robinson remained a major figure at the convention
Primarily because of his speech. The Goootto editorial board, top
politicians, and citizens believed that he was expected to lead a
united South to victory in the the post-convention period.37

 

36 Arkansas Gozotto, 6-19-28, p. 1, 8.
37 Arkansas Gm 6-30-28, p. 6.

83

The Arkansas G_az_otto began to issue pro-Robinson articles
relating to the Vice Presidency. Editorials were printed that
conveyed the regional message that the South must not use religion
as a barrier to any person's election as president.38 Because of
Arkansas' low African-American population, race did not become a
vibrant election issue. As stated earlier, Arkansas did not have a
history of race baiting. This occurrence was reflective of the high
vote totals the G.O.P. received. But, despite this, the connection
between Robinson and Smith caused Arkansas to proudly participate
on the national stage. The feeling in Arkansas was one of a new
found national acceptance. The feeling of a 'new day' in Arkansas
and the South was evident. Many felt that the post-bellum political
decline of the South was about to end. The good feelings of the
Wilson Administration were to begin again. This feeling was an
Arkansas catharsis and not even the prohibitionist m would let
the state down. The Cm printed an editorial on August, 7
questioning the loyalty of the state's prohibitionist Democrats. They
raised an alarming tone with their rhetoric when they asked that
"Before southern Democrats separate themselves from their party on
the prohibition issue, they should 'think and reason' whether there is
any 'drier' place for them to go than their own party. "39 The
Democrats had a strong 'dry' party platform. They were the party
that wrote the Prohibition Amendment. These two features were
respected inside Arkansas. Prohibition was a vibrant election issue
inside Arkansas! The Gaoog and state political leaders were fearful

 

38 Arkansas om 6-29-28, p. 6.
39 Arkansas Gazotto, 8-7-28, p. 6.

84

that the A.S.I.. targeting of the Arkansas would lead to an
embarrassing defeat in November. Arkansas tried to separate itself
form anything negatively related to the Smith-Robinson ticket. In
early July the Arkansas Democratic party announced that all party
bolters would be banned. These swift moves instilled confidence in
local Democrats. Hoover only remained a minor figure inside the
state because Of the perceived loyalty Arkansas had for Robinson.
G.O.P. activity was a product of the historical and natural success
they had during the post-Reconstruction era. From July to
November, anti-Smith activity was quiet on all fronts. The level of
activity would remain minimal.

Cmdnsm
Originally, the 1928 presidential campaign received more

negative coverage from the Arkansas papers than from any others in
the South. Undoubtedly Arkansas' reaction to Smith changed when
Robinson was nominated to second place on the ticket. The election
would have been much closer without Robinson's unfailing support.
Arkansas was also the state with the lowest African-American
population to cast a majority for Smith. Without Robinson, the state's
history of racial cohesion would have led to a much closer election.
The 10 of the 75 counties that Smith lost were in the predominantly
white upcountry. The vote total was 60.5% to 39.5% or 1 19,196 to
77,784. This election continued a political trend; Arkansas did not
return a Republican majority from 1880-1960 in any presidential
election. Race, Prohibition, and religion were peripheral issues
because of Robinson's position on the ticket.

3
The Upper South Opposition

Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee were the Upper South
opposition. These states were united in their low percentages of
African-American population, the strength of post-bellum opposition
political parties, and strong intrastate opposition leaders or groups.
These states were able to oppose Smith for these three reasons which
were connected with their quest to maintain cultural conservative

values.

Virginia: The Byrd Machine Versus a Changing Political Tide

Sgtoi Chgcteristics
Virginia was the only southern state in 1928 that was

experiencing a movement away from traditional southern beliefs and
values. Its movement from the Democratic party preceded the civil
rights party realignment of the 1950's and 1960's. One cause was
that Virginia was experiencing a migratory influx similar to that of
Florida. This dispersed the traditional values that were expressed
throughout the remainder of the South. But Virginia's connection

85

86

with the core of the Democratic party was already waning because it
began to lose traditional values. Virginia, with its relatively high
standard of living (fourth in the South in 1930), plus its low African-
American population, was a state that by all indications should have
favored Hoover.1 Virginia had a natural two-party tendency rooted
in its history. During the 1880's, Virginia was a strong independent
state, and its Readjuster movement was the strongest anti-
Democratic force in the South.2 The Democrats were not securely in
power and their hold on the state would decline as the twentieth
century progressed.3 This general party weakness had dire
consequences for the Democrats in 1928.
Political Characteristics

Unlike any other southern state, Virginia operated like a
centralized political oligarchy. Its localities acted together in
complete unison, but only after the centralized power center had
spoken.4 The problems with the machine's power was that Virginia
regularly had the lowest number of Democrats voting or participating
in primaries.5 Historically, Senator Thomas S. Martin controlled the
machine for many years with the help of Bishop Cannon. After
Martin's death in 1919, the party was looking for a leader, but
because politics did not supply one until the ascendency of Governor

 

lOdum,S Sopthm Rogions of tho Unitoo Sate , pp. 18, 46.
2 Kousser, The msmn mg of Soothe et_'n_ Poiip‘os s.,pp 171- 173.
3 Stephen F.1awson,Blgok Bgnots: Voong Rights m the sooth, 1244 -1962(New

York, Columbia University Press, 1976), he sets the time frame for
refranchisement of the South and its effect on the national electorate.

4 Key. Wigwam pp. 21-23.
5Key. n P " 'InS N ' p.20;Kom.Mapmgh

ionrhemfiolttirapp- 179-181-

87

Harry F. Byrd in 1926, Bishop Cannon was its preeminent figure until
the late 1920's. Cannon was not happy when he lost some of his
power to Byrd. In Virginia the conflict between the two forever
"severed the the Anti-Saloon League's ties to the Democratic
organization."6 This did not however diminish Byrd's political
effectiveness in the long run. He would serve in the US. Senate until
his death in 1965 and become a chief power broker in the South.

Bishop Cannon was a potent figure inside the state because he
headquartered his Methodist Episcopal Church, South in Virginia
where its strength emanated throughout the southern region. The
A.S.I.. was also active mostly in Virginia and North Carolina. The
alliance these two groups maintained was effective in this area
because they were strong enough to set their own agenda. The
Democratic party was forced many times to acquiesce to Cannon or
compromise its beliefs because of the strength his organization
maintained.
Bockgropnd

The years between 1924 and 1928 were important because they
set the tone for the 1928 election. Cannon and Byrd became enemies
when Byrd was elected governor in 1926. This was partly because
Byrd was elected to power without Cannon.7 This created a rift
between the two leaders.8 The natural animosity that these leaders

had for each other increased because of Governor Smith's campaign

 

6 James R. Sweeney, " Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats: The Party
leaders and the Campaign of 1928." thimahagazmuflismnamd
hingranhx. 90. (1982). p- 404-

7 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p.404.

3 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", pp. 404, 405.

88

struggles. Cannon had the upper hand because his fight against
Smith began in 1924, while Byrd only began to champion Smith's
cause later in 1928. Byrd would eventually back Smith because that
opposed Cannon's position.
The Election of 1928

Besides the Presidential race, Virginia Democrats had a
competing interest that affected the 1928 election; Byrd's and
Cannon's personal animosity toward each other, though Byrd now
controlled Virginia's political machine. Religious prejudice was the
top issue of the election, partly due to its emphasis by Cannon. The
conflict over Smith only increased statewide tensions between the
two leaders. Byrd was not wildly in favor of Governor Smith as a
presidential candidate, but the coolness he displayed could never be
described as hostile. In fact, Byrd began working for Smith before
other major state figures did. Though opposed to many of Smith's
beliefs and aware of the problems Smith's candidacy would cause in
Virginia, Byrd was a political pragmatist who realized that Smith was
the strongest candidate and would be nominated in Houston.

At the Houston convention the Virginia political leaders Governor
Byrd, Senators Claude A. Swanson and Carter Glass decided that the
Virginia delegation would cast 6 of its 24 votes for Smith with the
remainder going to Cordell Hull Of Tennessee.9 This was the third
highest southern nominating vote total for Smith at the convention.
Virginia acted kindly throughout the convention with its sole overt

 

9 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 406.

89

hostile reaction was not joining the parade following Smith's
nomination.

The major sticking point between the state party and Governor
Smith was Smith's stand on Prohibition. He refused to endorse the
'dry' party platform. This was difficult for Senator Glass to accept
because he was an author of the Eighteenth Amendment. However,
Glass refused to damage the party at the convention and stated that
in regard to a letter Smith wrote to the convention refusing to accept
Prohibition, the nominee's statement was "'typical of the candor and
courage of the writer.” 10 This was a product of Glass' extreme
sensitivity to Smith's uncertain national political position. Glass had
strong views concerning religious prejudice. He once stated that
Smith's religious views "'would not, as it certainly should not, cause
him to lose Virginia or any other southern state at the election.” 11
But this statement was an underestimation of the strong feelings that
Cannon and many Virginians had concerning Smith.

After the return of the delegation to Virginia, Byrd travelled
throughout the state and the South, countering attacks on Smith. But,
his speeches were negative and defensive.12 Byrd was not able to
set a positive agenda, but instead found himself continually
defending Smith against Cannon and his followers. In their personal
battle, Cannon had the natural advantages mentioned earlier, the low
African-American population and relative economic prosperity. He
also had a head start in the propaganda war that ensued. Cannon's

 

10 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 408.
1 1 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 404.
12 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 422.

90

people canvassed the state with the flier "Is Southern Protestantism
More Intolerant Than Romanism?"13 This was a vicious piece of
propaganda distributed late in the campaign to over 148,000
Virginians. The Smith/ Byrd forces did not have time to defend
themselves against this attack. That flier was on the minds of the
voters when they entered the voting booth. Its effect was multiplied
when one realizes that the A.S.L. also successfully distributed the
bogus Knights of Columbus oath throughout Virginia.14 Cannon spoke
during all stages of the campaign and his rhetoric grew more
venomous. He then simultaneously organized and registered
thousands of new voters against Smith.15

The anti-Smith forces were in full motion well before the pro-
Smith forces. This quick start was a difficulty the Byrd/ Smith forces
had to overcome. For example, while Governor Smith's acceptance
speech did not occur until August, 22, the wildly successful Asheville
Convention was held on July, 19. This was a meeting of 'dry'
southern Democratic forces who wanted to defeat Smith. Prominent
Democratic prohibitionists such as Senator Glass were invited, but did
not attend.16 The attending convention forces pledged their
"'unswerving allegiance to the principles of true Democracy,‘ and
their 'determination to labor to preserve the spirit, ideals and unity
of southern Democracy.”17 They fully believed that Smith had

 

13 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 410.

14 This was noted earlier in this thesis.

15 Henry C. Ferrell, Ctgugg A, Swanson of Virgt'pt'o; A Politigal
Bjogrophyflexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 146.

16 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", pp. 199, 200.
17 Reagan, "The Presidential Campaign of 1928 in Alabama", p. 201.

91

abandoned the principles of the Democratic party with his pledge to
soften the Eighteenth Amendment. They also stated a general dislike
for the Democratic Campaign Chairman John J. Raskob, a 'wet' former
Republican, as well as the corruption of Tammany Hall politics. They
articulated a positive argument with which many Virginians and
Southerners could and would agree. This was not just open ended
hyperbole or rhetoric, it was a coherent argument and a public
statement of purpose that would prove effective in November. The
convention leaders also protected themselves by stating their
allegiance to the Democratic party and their promise to return after
Smith's defeat. The convention invigorated the already united Upper
South forces while the Byrd organization remained relatively
unaffected until after Smith's acceptance.

Senator's Glass and Swanson followed Governor Byrd's earlier
initiatives with endorsements on August, 24th and 26th,
respectively. State Democratic Chairman J. Murray Hooker was also
relatively inactive until late August. The Democratic party's
structure forced itself to wait until the top acted before the localities
followed. Except for Byrd, the Virginia organization did not actively
begin to fight until late August or early September, many months
after the re-activated Cannon and A.S.l. anti-Smith forces.

The Democratic party's support for Governor Smith moved at a
hectic pace once it began, but the late start was a hindrance. The
Norfolk toggor-Dispatoh stated that "'for the first time since 1 896
the Democratic state organization is stirred into getting out its vote

92

by a systematic canvass in the state at large.”18 However this
statement was made on October 23rd. The anti-Smithites were now
being bolstered by more propaganda and G.O.P. funds. The
Republicans targeted Virginia early in the campaign, and they were
not loosening their grip.19

The local state papers followed the party line but did not begin to
actively campaign for Governor Smith until after his acceptance
speech. Their vocal support was generally aligned with that of the
prevailing Democratic organization. The Richmond News Leaoor was
quick to criticize Heflin in his early battle with Robinson and it
recognized the power of the Smith movement before the Houston
convention. But, the News Leader did not caucus for Smith until it
became evident he was backed by the party. By October, the paper
was openly comparing the candidates, the platforms, and the pro-
and anti-Smith groups. On October, 12 the editorial board attacked
the anti-Smith group by stating that they were in fact making
Governor Smith stronger through their preaching and that a backlash
would occur.20 The News Leader also examined the religious bigotry
levelled against Catholics in general. They led the news on October,
24 with the reprinting of a speech by Senator Glass where he stated
that those who used religious prejudice against the Democratic party
were cowards. They were " 'willing for the Catholic boys to give up
their lives for their country but they're not willing for them to hold

 

13 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 416.
19 Memphis CommerciaLApneaL 7-23-28 p- 1-
20 Richmond MiG-1248 p. 8.

93

office.”21 The Norfolk ledger-Dispatch generally followed the same
pattern with its support for Smith peaking at the election.

Virginia was won by the anti-Smith forces as Hoover carried the
state 54.0% to 46.0%. The key to Hoover's victory was probably the
number of new voters registered by Cannon. Hoover received twice
as many votes as President Coolidge received in 1924, even though
Smith still received more votes than Davis.22 The late start by the
Democrats crippled their drive toward victory. They did not have
enough time to start a positive drive nor convey a positive message.
The support they received from the local journals was similar to the
remainder of the South. The single difference was the length of time
it took both the Democratic organization and the journals to organize
and support Smith. Cannon's early start in organization and his
already entrenched anti-Smith group were formidable obstacles to
overcome. The evolving endemic trends in Virginia described
earlier, along with the slow campaign start, were too much for the

Democrats to overcome.

North Carolina: The Power of Sena tor Simmons

W
North Carolina was always an uncertain state in close elections for

the Democrats, even though they carried the state in every
presidential election but one between 1880 and 1960. Many of these

 

21 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 418.
22 Sweeney, "Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats", p. 425.

94

races were toss ups. The reasons for close elections were closely
related to the states' geography and political history. The dominant
geography is similar to that of the remainder of the South, only in
North Carolina the fertile soil is located on a coastal plain with a
mountainous region containing marginal lands in the states' western
half. During the antebellum era, North Carolina had fewer slaves and
plantations than most of the South. This kept a distinct class and
race division from being formed.23 North Carolina had a relatively
low African American population of 29% in 1930.24 This was the
fifth lowest in the region. The level of racial hatred in North Carolina
was greater than in the rest of the Upper South but it did not
approach that of the Deep South. Mildness in race relations plus a
progressive educational agenda distanced North Carolina from other
southern states. With these variables working against each other the
key to the equation became the activities of the anti-Smith leader;
North Carolina's venerable Senator Furnifold M. Simmons.
Poll Ch ct ristics

North Carolina's Democratic political machine was thoroughly
controlled by Senator Simmons.25 His ideas and beliefs were
stamped on the party's major activities. If he did not like an issue
that the party was championing, the support for the party issue
would almost surely remain marginal. Beginning with his election to
the US. Senate in 1898 at the age of 43, he slowly united the state

 

23 Key,S P 11' 'In s N ' n pp.207,208.

24 Odum, Sopthor_n Rogions of tho United Stotos, p. 482.
25 Stuart Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina"(Ph.D.
dissertation University Of North Carolina, 1944), p. 6.

95

under his political control.26 As with other machines, in most areas
Simmons' organization handpicked statewide officeholders. He was
able to control judicial, bureaucratic, and general party organization
appointments. The other political leaders in North Carolina were
relatively unimportant because they were followers and not leaders
at all. For example, longtime Senator Lee S. Overman served with
Simmons in all but five years of his 27 year tenure, but his mark on
North Carolina politics was almost inconsequential. His one great
accomplishment was passing the 1918 Overman Law which widened
the president's power in transferring functions from one department
to another. But inside North Carolina, Senator Simmons activities
were they real key.
Baokground

The conflict between Senator Simmons and Governor Smith began
in 1924 when the Simmons organization supported McAdoo and
aligned itself with the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan was powerful in North
Carolina because Senator Simmons knowingly approved of its
activities. This connection continued during the 1928 campaign and
helped lead both groups together in their opposition to Smith. Both
Simmons and the Klan believed that religion was a key issue in
society. This led the North Carolina Democratic party to oppose
Smith in 1924 and favor any candidate whose views opposed
Smith's.27 Because the Klan was connected to Simmons in North
Carolina, the state was one of the strongest Smith opponents before

 

26 Key, P li ' - s N ' n p. 212; Dekins, "North Carolina",
p. 6.
27 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", p. 17.

96

the 1924 convention. But, in November they quickly returned to the
Democratic fold to return a healthy majority for the party nominee,
Governor Davis.
The Election of 1928

1928 was long election year for North Carolinians. The state
party was at a crossroads. The party would split in its views
regarding Smith. The reason for this was because of the personal
beliefs Of Simmons. Both prior to and after the Houston convention,
Simmons remained low key in his public activities. Publicly, most
understood that he remained unhappy with the civic and political
figure that was Al Smith. Unlike the loud, gesticulating, unorganized
South Carolinian senators of this era, Simmons was often quiet in
public but a feverish organizer in private. Publicly, he often stated
that he was not plotting against Smith.28 He supported the local
Democratic ticket, but remained quiet regarding the national
campaign. But his behind the scenes actions often spoke louder than
his words. For example, he introduced Senator Heflin at a New Bern
anti-Smith rally on May, 2 1.29 Many regional politicians visited
Simmons in April to help formulate their later activities regarding
Smith.30 Later Simmons would resign as Democratic National
Committee National Chairman because of Smith.31 Simmons gave his
political blessings to Bishop Cannon and Reverend Arthur J. Barton so
they could hold the Asheville Convention in North Carolina to state

 

28 Charlotte Opservor, 5-2-28, p. 1.

29 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", p. 25.

30 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", p. 24.

31 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", pp. 58-60.

97

their opposition to Smith.32 The states that Cannon visited were
connected to the anti-Smith movement. North Carolina, Florida, and
Virginia received the most visits from Cannon because he had
friendly political connections in those states.

At the Houston convention, Cordell Hull was the chosen candidate
of the North Carolina delegation. It was surprising that North
Carolina was not overly hostile to Smith at Houston. The state
delegation did not lead demonstrations, and its only open protest was
in not joining the "Old Time Religion" caucus after Senator Robinson's
speech. This could be directly related to the rule of Simmons. Work
behind the scenes and through the organization was more important
than false publicity. At nomination time, North Carolina gave Smith
his fourth largest vote from the South with 4 2/ 3 from a possible 24
votes.

Whereas other politicians who strongly opposed Smith lessened
their attacks after the Houston convention, Simmons did not. His
support for Hoover grew stronger as did his public gesturing against
Smith. He resigned all posts with the Democratic National Committee
on July 25th. He stated his open support for the Brood Axo, which
was a violent anti-Smith publication.33 Simmons personally
distributed anti-Smith pamphlets and circulars and refused to
endorse Smith.34 These mailers supplemented those distributed by
local churches and the Anti-Saloon League as organized by Cannon
and Barton.

 

32 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", pp. 24, 52.
33 Charlotte 9pm 8-31-28, p. 4, Dekins, "North Carolina", p. 60.
34 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", pp. 60, 61, 121.

98

North Carolina also held numerous anti-Smith meetings. These
meetings were used to both bolster the statewide anti-Smith forces
and also to strengthen Simmons' power base. Simmons was the
state's only major politician who openly backed Hoover. Governor
Angus Mclean, statesman Josephus Daniels, Senator Lee S. Overman,
and former Governor Cameron Morrison all actively supported Smith.
In addition, many other politicians endorsed Smith immediately after
the Houston convention. Many of Simmons' contemporaries attacked
his stance, but he remained firm. This was partly because he had the
organizational strength to support his activities. Because of
Simmons, North Carolina was the only state with a fully statewide
Democratic anti-Smith organization.3S Statewide political leaders
attacked Simmons, but he built an anti-Smith organization filled with
powerful bureaucrats and professional politicians.36

During the beginning of the year, the local newspapers operated
similarly with other southern journals. The Charlotte Obsorver was a
strong Democratic daily that often published many pro-Smith and
overly subjective reports related to Democratic and subsequently
Republican issues. The large amounts of quantitative material leads
one to believe that political interests were important. But, as the
threats of a Smith victory materialized, the reporting turned negative
once again until after the Houston convention. Some editorials prior
to the convention used the term "fiidng up" to describe the activities
of Smith and Tammany politicians.37 The m did not portray

 

35 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", p. 64.
35 Dekins, "The 1928 Presidential Election in North Carolina", p. 71.
37 Charlotte 12125311311. 6-20-28, p. 8.

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99

Smith in a glowing light. The usual issues discussed and emphasized
were religion, Prohibition, and Tammany corruption in that order.
The notable difference in North Carolina was the lack of fighting
spirit exhibited inside both the Democratic party and the local
newspapers. This was related to the opposition Senator Simmons
felt towards Smith. The Observer even continued to print some anti-
Smith articles and editorials after the Houston convention. An
unusually harsh editorial was published on August 5th. This
editorial openly criticized Smith for questionable fund raising
techniques and personal questions of character, calling him a
"dope".38 This word was used by the Observer with a dual meaning
of both stupidity and corruption. But, Simmons strong control of the
Democratic organization had a rippling effect on all parts of society.
The Democratic journals, grassroots political organizations, and other
marginally pro-Smith groups were unmotivated for good reasons.
Since the state leader was unsupportive and hostile, many of his
followers were unsupportive and hostile, or at most ambivalent. This
lack of general support allowed openly pro-Hoover groups to use
North Carolina as a springboard of support.

Simmons sacrificed his political future to ensure Smith's defeat in
192 8. His open but relatively quiet opposition was highly effective.
Even though his opposition was a public issue that was widely
discussed in the local papers, his activity was quiet when compared
to that of Senator Heflin. He and Heflin would both pay dearly for

 

38 Charlotte Mg, 8-5-28, p, 8.

their ac
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39 K01

100

their activity and would both be defeated in 1930. But both
continued their anti-Smith activity until election day.
Met;

The 1928 election in North Carolina was relatively close. In
comparing the number of southern electoral splits since 1880, the
power of Senator Simmons became more evident. The general
election characteristics surrounding North Carolina were less
important than the alacrity that the Simmons organization showed in
its opposition to Governor Smith. Hoover was only relevant because
he opposed Smith. Any moderate Republican candidate would have
received the state's support with the battle lines that were drawn.
In 1928 Hoover carried a majority of counties with a 54.9% to 45.1%
or 348,928 to 286,227. But, North Carolina did not vote Republican
in either 1952 or 1956 when Virginia, Florida, Texas, and Tennessee
did. North Carolina remained loyal to the party in these later years
when its 1928 allies abandoned the state. Thus, one could conclude
that North Carolina was either a closer state or a state Smith should
have carried in 192 8. Without Simmons' opposition to Governor
Smith, the Democrats would have almost surely held firm.

Tennessee: The Return to a Two-Party Struggle

Social Characteristics
Tennessee had a post-bellum history of strong two-party political

struggle.39 Disfranchisement lessened the competitiveness of the

 

39Kousser, S ’ 8 th 11' p.214.

101
G.O.P. on both the state and national levels, but the threat of G.O.P.

rule was still strong. This was because Tennessee had two natural
geographic regions that facilitated a political split. The upcountry
was a mountainous area with bad soils, those who were last to the
state or had unforeseen problems in their migration were forced onto
these lands. Most of these settlers were not able to make a positive
economic living in this area. The bluffs area, on the other hand,
resembled the delta of the lower South. Fertile soil fostered a
plantation type economy for the counties on the Mississippi River
and especially in the area near Memphis. This area was a densely
populated former slave area. The upcountry or cumberland area had
a natural geographic split with the lower or bluffs region. This
created a perfect breeding ground for a class and party split inside
the state. In 1861, for example, eastern Tennessee was a Union
stronghold while the remainder of the state supported the
Confederacy.40 Primarily because of this split, as well as the low
African-American population of 18.3% in 1930, the Democratic party
had a relatively unstable future inside the state.41

Tennessee voted Republican in the presidential elections of 1920,
1928, and 1952-1960. Even during the New Deal era when
seemingly every southern county voted Democratic, the cumberland
region remained true to the G.O.P.. In every election between 1880
and 1960, the same two-party trend was evident. The same counties
consistently voted with their party allegiance, disfranchisement not
withstanding. An individual candidate's strength or weakness had

 

40 Key. W p. 59.
41 wmmmmmma p- 482.

little e
fierce.
becau
with

V.(
tradit
Africa

with r

102

little effect on these trends. In close elections, competition was more
fierce. 1928 was important to understand in Tennessee primarily
because it closely correlated with this 80 year regional trend.
Poli c h c eristics

v.o. Key described Tennessee as a state with two one-party
traditions. East Tennessee was traditionally Republican with few
African-Americans and Middle and West Tennessee was Democratic
with more African-Americans and plantation style agriculture.42

Tennessee's main political leaders were Democrats even though a
political machine existed for both parties. Cordell Hull was the
nominal state leader. He was the only true national leader inside
Tennessee. He was a member of the US. House of Representatives
from 1907-1921 and 1923-31. He was elected to the US. Senate and
served from 1931-1933 when he was appointed Secretary of State.
His distinguished career culminated with the Nobel Peace Prize in
1945 for helping to organize and create the United Nations. Even
with these credentials, he did not run the Tennessee machine.
Tennessee's two Senator's were Kenneth D. McKellar and Lawrence D.
Tyson. McKellar served from 1917-1953, but was not usually a
major figure in intrastate politics. Tyson was a short term, mostly
transitional figure. It was a conglomeration of forces that operated
Tennessee's democracy. The truth was that the individual leaders
were not as important as the general regional and party trends that
existed though. The state fit neatly inside a pattern.

 

42 Key, P 11 - s N n p.59.
43 Memphis mm 1-20-28. D. 6.
44 Hinton. mm D- 182-

103
Ba nd

Tennessee was not at the forefront in the battle against the
candidacy of Al Smith in 1924. like many other secondary southern
states, it showed a general animosity for the candidate and aligned
itself in a regional coalition. But, beyond this, its activities were
minimal. In the 1924 election, Tennessee supported the candidacy of
Governor Davis against Coolidge in a close race.

The Election of 1928

The year began without any major events. Tennessee was slowly
coasting through the nomination process. The state was not at the
pinnacle of national politics. Tennessee's leading paper, The
Memphis Commercgl ADM, was quick to commend Robinson and
to criticize Heflin for standing for " issues foreign to every conception
of tolerance and justice. "43 The Appeal vehemently supported
Robinson and toleration. later, the Democratic party announced on
May 1 0th that statesman Cordell Hull would receive the unanimous
support of the state at the Houston convention. This was widely
popular with both the Democratic journals and the Democratic party.
Hull was a US. Congressman and marginal Presidential candidate.
He had the full support of the Tennessee delegation. Because Hull's
support was so strong and widespread within the Tennessee
Democratic ranks, the party used it to attack Smith's stand on the
issues, especially Prohibition. Hull was an almost fanatical dry and
remained cool to Smith throughout 192 8. Realistically Hull
understood the limitations of his candidacy and never took his

 

104

chances seriously.44 But Hull and the Tennessee Democratic
organization did take Smith seriously. Tennessee was a leading
prohibitionist state. On numerous occasions throughout the year,
Protestant and prohibitionist groups met in Tennessee to galvanize
their opposition to Smith or any other 'wet'. The Methodist Education
Association was a regular mouthpiece in Memphis for anti-Smith
sentiment. It was important to understand the strength of anti-
Smlth forces inside the state. A strong anti-Smith figure, Bishop H.H.
Dubois, chairman of the Southland Committee of Safety for the
Southern Methodist Church, resided in Nashville and held a great
deal of power. The Southland Committee of Safety believed in
maintaining traditional southern beliefs. This was where he pledged
to "defeat presidential aspirations of any wet Democrat."45

The local Democratic machine was not active in its support of
Smith. Cordell Hull was in many ways nominally supportive of
Hoover because of the liquor question.46 Former Governor Malcolm
R. Patterson penned a widely syndicated daily column on politics and
statewide activities called 'Day by Day'. His writings were relatively
conservative and politically pragmatic. He was in many ways feeling
the political wind currents in order to make the popular decision.
Several columns of his are worthy of recognition. His June, 14
column was especially laudatory of Hoover and his June, 19 column
had questionable motivations. In the latter, he was discussing a
speech given in Syracuse, N.Y. by Heflin in which a stage collapsed

 

45 Memphis 99W 5-5-28. p- 1-
46 Hinton. mum. p- 182-
47 Memphis WM 6-19-28, p- 6.

105

during Heflin's speech which caused concern. Patterson stated with a
mild bit of sarcasm that it " must be especially pleasing to the Pope to
hear that he had no hand in the collapse of the platform upon which
Senator Heflin stood or connived at it as a method of securing
religious control in the United States. "47 An educated person would
realize his criticism of Heflin and Patterson's animosity toward
religious bigotry. But a typical reader of the Commercial ApM
could have misunderstood this sarcastic approach and this could
have heightened religious tensions. Beyond this event, Patterson's
columns were rather mild. He began the year discussing a regional
coalition of Democratic support to win the presidency. It was an
issue related to which region could gain more support over the other.
This was what happened in 1924, and was the symptom of the two-
thirds nomination rule. Patterson wrote many pro-Smith columns
that continued throughout the year, but only after Smith's
nomination at Houston. He was reserved and mildly supportive of
Hoover until early July. He then followed the political wind currents
inside the Democratic party and felt comfortable supporting Smith.

A big step for Patterson was when his column compared Smith's and
Woodrow Wilson's Prohibition stance favorably. He believed earlier
that the party and the federal government should not be active
regarding the Prohibition issue.48 This was a commonality between
Patterson and Smith. This type of quiet support continued until the
election. But Patterson strategically placed pro-Hoover comments

and editorials that gave the impression that he was either having

 

48 Memphis W 2+28. p- 6-

106

second thoughts about Smith, or just fence sitting.49 Patterson's
support of both Smith and Hoover was the product of a politically
divided state.

At the Houston convention, Tennessee unanimously cast its votes
for Hull. But, Tennessee was a difficult state to pacify. The
delegation did not join either the Smith nominating parade nor the
"Old Time Religion" celebration after the Robinson speech. This was a
reflection of the unhappiness that the state felt about the nominee.
This was an example of general Democratic political weakness inside
the state because of Tennessee's long-term political trends discussed
earlier.

After the Houston convention, everything inside Tennessee
remained relatively quiet until Smith's mid—October visit. Part of the
reason for this inactivity was that an aggressive campaign for
Governor Smith or Senator Robinson did not materialize. As late as
the end of July, a firm organization was not in place for the elections
stretch drive.SO Nonetheless, Smith was greeted with reassuring
screams and rebel yells as thousands met his train in Nashville.
Senator Kenneth D. McKellar and Governor Harry H. Horton claimed
that Tennessee was a safe state for Smith.51 The Commercial Apfl
was more prophetic. It regularly carried Association Press articles
regarding the tenuous hold Smith had in the South. G.O.P. officials

believed that they were assured of Tennessee's electoral votes as

 

49 The 6-14-28, p. 6 column should be recognized because of its many
outwardly positive comments about Hoover.

50 Memphis WW 7-19-28. p. 1.
51 Memphis W 10-13-28, p. 1.

107

early as July 23rd.52 Tennessee was one of the Upper South states
being targeted by the son.53

The Memphis Commercig Apfl and the Nashville B_anne_i_' were
invaluable sources for the study of Tennessee politics. The first
paper resembled the best pro-Democratic journals the South had to
offer. Much of its political reporting was one-sided, especially in the
pre-Houston convention period. It resembled a Deep South black-
belt paper. It was early in its support of Senator Robinson in his
struggle against Senator Heflin. The Commercial Apfl also
regularly ran daily letters to the editor column. This column closely
followed political happenings. Many of the letters that were
reprinted, represented the support that the paper issued for
individual candidates. The daily letters were too numerous to
reprint but the stack of work taken together showed a good example
of the AM readership's general ideological stance. For example,

when the Smith nomination was assured, very few negative letters

 

were reprinted regarding the New York Governor. The Banner was a
pro-Democratic paper but more reserved than its black-belt
counterpart. This was a definite examme of the differing support
Smith received inside the state. This was a regionally and
geographically motivated divide.

n on

Hoover carried Tennessee 55.4% to 44.6% or 195,388 to 157,143.
This was very close to the 15,000 to 40,000 vote margin predicted

 

52 Memphis W 7-23-28. p. 1-
53 Memphis Warm 7-23-28. p. 1.

108

by a confidential source reporter in September.54 The state split in
the same fashion as in 1920, 1952, and 1956. The same counties
exhibited the same long term trends. Tennessee, because of its
historical intra-regional division, along with an inherently weak
candidate, voted with the Republicans. But, the weakness of the
party and its inability to build a strong pro-Smith organization were
an issue. The Democrats never mobilized their forces and when they
tried to build a Smith coalition, they were too late. In many ways, it
was a Republican victory by default because their activity was
behind the scenes.

 

54 Memphis W 9-12-28, p. 1.

4
The Peripheral South

Florida and Texas were both fringe states inside the southern region.
Their connections with the South were limited. Both were sparsely
populated and received a large influx of new residents in the post-
bellum era. The issues of economic and cultural control were more
important than traditional racial repression. Florida and Texas' quest
for economic progress was the motivation behind the 1928 election.
The underlying factor was their limited connection with traditional

Democratic values.

Florida: The Failure to Remain Loyal

Smial Characteristics

Florida was a traditionally strong Democratic state until the
1920's. Since then, Florida has slowly evolved into a fringe state
inside the southern region. Partly because of geographic conditions,
Florida wavered in its allegiance to the Democratic party. Parts of
Florida's northern sector consisted of traditional cotton and tobacco

109

110

lands while the southern sector's agriculture was mostly citrus and
vegetables. This was unlike any other region of the South. Because
of this, southern traditional agricultural labor systems were not
fortified statewide, meaning that the state agricultural pattern had a
regional diversity. The northern area was primarily occupied by
early settlers with the southern areas becoming more densely
populated during this era. As the population moved south, lands that
were removed from the Seminole tribe were gradually populated by
relatively prosperous farmers and land developers. Many were
migrants from the North looking to maximize their capital
investments. Their key concern was not southern traditionalism, but
capitalism. They did not have a natural allegiance to the Democratic
party. The quest for economic success allowed Florida's farmers to
acquire the highest per capita farm income by 1930.1 This lack of
attachment to the Democratic party, the entrepreneurial quest of the
population, and the state's relatively low, 29.4% African American
population were good indicators of a Smith defeat.
Political Charggeristics

Politically Florida was not factionally divided and did not consist
of any strong party organization.2 Florida was a free wheeling
political climate where self-fulfillment was more important than
allegiance.3 Florida was not engulfed in the strong Democratic and
southern traditions that connected the deep South and could not be
classified with these states. Florida was a politically divided state

 

lOdum,S R i U ' S p.46.
2 KEMWMMP- 83.
3 Key. We; pp. 82-82.

111

with mixed beliefs. Because of this, there was no one key political
figure who could unite Florida. Florida's longtime Senators were
Park Trammell and Duncan U. Fletcher. Trammell was a former
Governor from 1913-1917 and Senator from 1917-1936. He was an
uncontroversial politician interested in re-election. Fletcher had a
stronger connection to the National Democratic Party. He wanted to
ascend the political ladder and often volunteered for Presidential
commissions and other publicized duties. The Governors of this era
were relatively unimportant men who were only regional figures.
The main variation that remained inside the state was that racial
politics were important in the traditional northern region while a
type of capitalist quest existed in the southern area. This area was
more economically motivated because settlers recently migrated
there because of cheap land and economic opportunities. They were
not connected to traditional Democratic politics and few African-
Americans resided in these areas.
We

The era between 1924 and 1928 was relatively unimportant.
Migration was the key factor. The state Democratic party
maintained a general dislike for Governor Smith and followed the
general regional animosity. Because the character of the party was
amorphous, it inaction was of little affect. The general conflict that
occured inside Florida in 1928 was a product of the difficulty
Governor Smith faced inside the South and the endemic regional
difference inside Florida.

112

The Elgtion of 1928
As described above, Florida's geography is important to

understand. This affected the 1928 election. The major politicians
and issues were regionally divided. Smith's long held arrogance in
the face of Prohibition supporters and the flaunting of his urban
provincialism were important handicaps. These resurgent divisions
were not anticipated by the early national pro-Smith supporters.
Florida remained politically quiet until the Houston convention when
the state Democratic delegation was provided with a platform to vent
its anger. The delegation refused to caucus for Smith or Senator
Robinson when nominated. They did not join the victory parade that
marched throughout Sam Houston Hall. Florida held firm at
nomination time and continued to support its candidate, Senator
Walter F. George of Georgia.4 Whereas other states aligned with their
old Democratic traditions, Floridians refused to swallow the bitter pill
of Smith. Many politicians predicted early into the Houston
proceedings that if Smith was nominated, Florida would vote
Republican.5

During the post-convention period, Florida's major politicians
played an active, if minor, role in Governor Smith's candidacy.
Senator Fletcher was the state chairman of the Florida Smith
campaign. He traveled throughout Florida and discussed the
religious question. He was generally aligned with conservative
causes and what later became the Prohibition alliance. This was

 

4 Melvin Edward Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida",(Ph.D.
dissertation, Florida State University, 1976), p. 58.

5 Memphis W 7-23-28. D. 1. and Hughes, "Florida", P- 52-

113

ironic because those people who used religion against Governor
Smith were members of prohibitionist groups. Nonetheless, he
battled hard both inside and outside Florida for Smith during the
campaign. Less can be said for the junior Senator Park Trammell.
Trammell was running for re-election and did not want to face
controversial issues. Thus, he played smart politics and endorsed the
party while distancing himself from Smith. Trammell refused to
openly endorse Smith. This hurt Smith and damaged his credibility
statewide. Trammell's motivations were Heflinesque because he was
trying to further his own political fortunes. He blamed illness for his
inactivity in the campaign. He wrote to a member of the Democratic

party almost two weeks after the election that:

Due to having been sick for some three of four weeks I was
unable to take an active part in the campaign. From the result I
do not believe, however, that it would have been different if I
had been otherwise situated.6

Full endorsements from officials such as former Governor John W.
Martin and other high officials, arrived late, if at all. Most felt
obligated to openly endorse Smith only in the last six weeks of the
campaign.7 Most major journals and religious leaders often
discussed the state Democratic organizations non-support of Smith.
There were many top party leaders who supported Smith
immediately after the Houston convention. But, unlike the Deep
South states, this support was marginal because Florida was not

 

6 Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 133.
7 Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", pp. 134-138.
8 Hughes, "The 1923 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 163.

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114

overtly race conscious. Their level of racial animosity was not
statewide and was focused mostly in the northern half.

The statewide Democratic organization actively organized pro-
Smith clubs. These clubs were a major factor in making Florida a
toss-up state. "Smith For President" clubs were in 65 of Florida's 67
counties prior to the election.8 The support in these organizations
seemed to grow and peak immediately before the election. The clubs
resorted to open race baiting for votes and reminded Floridians to
remember its history with advertisements saying "White Supremacy,
Now and Forever—The Only Issue in Florida and the South" printed
in parts of the state.9 The problem with this approach was that
Florida's religious journals and organizations often declared race a
non-issue because Florida felt assured that white supremacy would
continue. This lead them to believe that cultural and not racial issues
would be at the forefront. Plus, many felt that Smith was weak on
the race issue. His connection with southern Democrats on this issue
was marginal. Many Democrats read the anti-Smith Democrat's
counter to the above advertisement which was also printed in a few
journals that stated “Tammany Draws No Color Line'" and "'Don't Be
Deceivedl Herbert Hoover Stands for White Supremacy and 1 00 Per
Cent Americanism.”lo The Smith clubs also had to deal with the past
animosity Florida harbored against their candidate.

Religious journals that were often aligned with loyal state
politicians increased their animosity against Governor Smith. These
journals became increasingly important because their dedicated

 

9 Hughes, "The 1923 presidential Election in Florida", p. 16.
10 Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 16.

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115

readership was wide. The Florida flags]; Witness was a
prohibitionist paper that refused to support any 'wet' candidate.
Florida's religious papers tried to weaken Smith by printing that he
was weak on racial questions. The Chipley Banner stated that Smith
appointed more African-Americans to " public positions in New
York...than have been appointed by the Federal Government under
Republican rule, in all the rest of the United States.”11 With this
criticism it was often inferred that Smith was an outsider and did not

 

understand the southern culture.

As the election approached, hostile organizations often decreased

 

their rhetoric or received less newsprint in local mainstream
journals. This was not evident in Florida. The Florida Times Union
from Jacksonville and the Tampa Tribune often continued to print
critical news reports. Both papers discussed the perceived Smith
connection to Wall Street and the Teapot Dome corruption in front
page headlines. But the Times Unien wrote pro-Hoover editorials
and reprinted positive articles only prior to the conventions. Even
after June, the two paper's perceived non-support of Hoover was
conveyed through a surprisingly objective eye. This was not the
normal method of operation for southern Democratic or even neutral
southern papers. The Eugene did not run positive editorials or
stories about Smith prior to July. Only his negatives were discussed
as the Houston convention neared. During the Republican pre-
convention period, Hoover received many positive stories. These
stories consisted of the traditional accolades. The Tribune and the

 

11 Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 17.

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116

limefllnign did not align with the general trends exhibited
throughout the South. They did not markedly accelerate their
support for Smith during the election's stretch drive.

Florida's population growth played a large role in the changing
conditions of the electorate. By 1930, Florida had over 50% more
people than in 1920.12 The immigration from a newly completed
highway which would later become Interstate-75, plus the scarcity
of a populace, led to increased urban development and growing
numbers of northern migrants. These migrants altered the core of
Florida's political structure. Florida did have a history of political
dual partyism due to its experiments with Populism and the G.O.P. in
the post-bellum era.13 But it still maintained a large African-
American population in 1 930. Florida had the highest African-
American population of any state that carried a Hoover majority.
Arkansas, for example, had a 4% lower total. Of course other
considerations had to be made with Senator Robinson being a large
factor in the Smith victory in Arkansas. But, nonetheless, the new
composition of the changing electorate affected the election. Florida's
northern section returned strong majorities for Smith, while the
southern two—thirds strongly supported Hoover. Most of Florida's
migrants moved to the southern areas. The strong twentieth century
growth in Florida gradually led to a decrease in both the number of
African-Americans and the tradition of Democratic allegiance in
Florida

 

12 Key. WW p.86.
13 Kousser. W p- 212-213-

117

gen—clusm
Hoover's majority was larger in Florida than in any other

southern state. He carried 42 of 67 counties with a 57.95% to Smith's
40.45% or 145,860 to 101,764. The victory for Hoover can be
credited to the weakness of the state Democratic organization, the
marginal support of many major political leaders, and the failure of
two of the states' major papers to fully back Governor Smith. He
received more support in the post-convention period, but that
support was not enough for victory. The large African-American
population itself should have made the vote total closer but could not
ensure a Smith victory. But the lack of a faithfully entrenched
traditional white supremacy Democratic party allowed Governor
Smith to be defeated by a large margin. Race baiting was an
effective issue only in the northern part of the state, while religious
animosity was effective in the southern part of the state. In the end
result, prosperity, decreasing African-American population, and new
migrating white residents were the key factors.

Texas: Prohibition, The Unifying Issue

W
Traditionally Texas has been viewed by outsiders as not being a

true southern state.14 Texas' lack of traditional southern agricultural
patterns, its small African-American population, and its limited
allegiance to the Democratic party have led to this conclusion. The

 

1“ Foner. Beeenmretien. p. 196.

118

1928 election affirmed these beliefs. Texas had a large non-
Protestant population, mostly Roman Catholic. Texas was originally
aligned with the southern states during the Civil War because the
eastern half of the state closely resembled the remaining South and
this was the only area of Texas that was densely populated at this
time. Civil War era east Texas held high numbers of slaves and
participated in familiar southern agricultural patterns. 15 By the end
of the 1920's, however, Texas' African-Americans fell to 14.7% of the
population while its per capita income was second in the South only
to Florida.16 The decreasing African-American population was a
product of positive migration trends. Economics is the key to
understanding Texas. In many ways, Texas viewed itself through
dollar signs.17 Also, as will be explained later in the paper, Texas
was fanatical about the enforcement of Prohibition. Plus, Texas also
had the second best educated and second most urban population in
the South.18 Texas' low African-American population, fanaticism
about Prohibition, economic quest for wealth, and relative general
prosperity favored the G.O.P. and it was only reasonable to believe
that they would carry the state.
P liti Ch e tic

Governor Dan Moody was the key figure in Texas' one—party rule.
Since Reconstruction and until the transformation of party allegiance

 

15 Key. Wilton. p- 254-
16Odum,S SuernRi S epp.,46482.

17 Key W. p 254. and this statement is the

basis of Chandler Davidson' 5 We. Texas elites used
race to separate classes while not allowing the less fortunate to racially unite
in fighting them.

180dum.somhern_negions_orihe_united_natespp. 18. 94.

119

in the 1956-1964 era, Texas was dominated by a Democratic
machine. Moody had won the Governorship by beating Miriam
Ferguson in the 1926 Democratic primary and easily beat his
Republican opponent to become the state's youngest elected
Governor. Moody was also an almost fanatical 'dry' who used that
issue to win elections. This was an issue that was and still is
important to Texans. But Texas' political trends have been
manipulated by the elite in the post-bellum era. The elite often used
what they felt was an unimportant issue to build their economic
power and control of Texas.19 In the 1920's and early 1930's they
used Prohibition as this lightning rod. They found a leader in Moody
to champion their cause so they could increase their wealth in the
prosperous economic times of the 1920's. It was undeniable that the
1920's was a good era for Texas' economic leadership.
£39m

Texas was not a fanatical anti-Smith state. Its activities were not
out of the ordinary for a marginal southern state. Its political
leadership was focused on the maintenance of the status quo. It did
not matter whether that meant Prohibition or the continuance of
prosperous but proportionately unfair economic times. In the 1 924—
26 era, then Governor Miriam Ferguson, serving for her husband
former Governor J ames Ferguson (legally forbidden to run because
he was convicted of embezzlement while Governor of Texas), had an
ongoing dispute with the University of Texas. This dispute had

 

1 9 Davidson. Whittier. is the key to understanding Texas
general trends. Davidson does not begin his study until 1936, but the ideology
of the state still was prevalent and was a product of its development.

 

 

 

120

populist overtones, with the Fergusons fighting the administration
and university professors over academic high salaries. The dispute
would be resolved with the election of Moody.

Texas supported Democratic nominee Governor John W. Davis in
1924. The gubernatorial transition of 1926 was the main political
development in Texas during the 19244928 era. It has been
recognized that the South was aware of Smith's weakness and tried

to limit his political future. Texas was not an exception to this trend.

Smith's general characteristics were at the core of the cultural
problems that Smith's opponents had in the South and in Texas. As
Smith and his organization grew in 1927 to become a 1928 threat,
southern Protestant churches perceived him as a threat to "Southern
Protestant sensibilities."20 This perception was at the core of the
cultural conservative reaction.
The Elgtlgn of 1228

Prohibition was the most important issue in Texas' society.21
Throughout its history, Texas has been sensitive to the powers and
controlling influence of alcohol. Even today Texas maintains this
position and still has numerous 'dry' counties. In the 1920's, the
'wet' and 'dry' issue seemed to be a rallying point for many. But, as
in other states, this issue tended to be associated with other causes.
The attacks on Governor Smith's character related to Prohibition
were personal attacks on all immigrants. The fear associated with
Smith was an irrational fear that was discussed in Wilbur Cash's

 

20 Richard Bennett Hughes, "Texas Churches and Presidential Politics, 1928 and

1960"(Ph. D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1968), p. 14.

21 Woodward, 99W noted that by 1876 Texas had the most
restrictive Prohibition laws in the South, p. 171.

W in

 

1 2 1
Mind ef the Seeth. But this irrationality led to the belief that Smith's

constituents would outwardly change society or even relocate to the
South. The endemic character of the South could be changed
altogether. Cash discussed the fear of outsiders during this era in

stating that,

the restaurants of the Greeks and the stores of J ews-who were
usually thought of as aliens even when their fathers had fought
in the Confederate armies-did multiply rapidly in the country in
these years of town growth, and now and then a wandering alien
from the North would turn up to take a job in the mills, promptly
to be made so uncomfortable that he usually fled.22

The internal workings of Texan society would thus be altered
because of the questionable morals of these individuals. Individual
sovereignty would be interrupted and communities would have to
answer to higher authorities for their actions. Thus, a loss of states'
rights would take place and consequently would be connected to a
loss of economic sovereignty. These issues were important to Texas
leadership. However irrational, many felt that Al Smith or even the
Pope would become a tough national ruler. Nonetheless, Texas
politicians and church leaders conspired from early 1 927 until the
election of 1928 to protect the perceived threat to "Southern
Protestant sensibilities" as stated earlier. But, unlike other southern
states, Texas failed to make mention of bigger issues and believed
that it was motivated by a single issue.

Texas had many state newspapers that conveyed an impression
of unattachment with the remainder of the country. The most
important daily journals, the Dallas Mernmg Newe and the Austin

 

22 C3811. WW I). 305.

122

Ameriegi, primarily reported information relating only to local and
state issues. Their reporting was much more state-driven than any
of the other southern newspapers cited. Partly because of Texas'
large geographic size, its isolated geographic nature, and its
perceived sovereignty, Texans felt outer issues were of little
importance and continued to focus their attention on intra-state
issues.
The Texas Republican party also made Prohibition the key issue.

It closely aligned itself with church leaders. The general popularity
of Hoover, plus the division between 'wet'/'dry' forces, led G.O.P.
organizers to be upbeat about their chances.23 The G.O.P. received
support from many disgruntled local Democratic organizations. The
Democratic delegation was split between the Moody group and the
ultra 'drys'. The ultra 'drys' were mostly religious fanatics that cared
less about politics and more about traditional values and
fundamental beliefs. The ultra 'drys' refused to back Smith at all.24
The Moody group, on the other hand, refused to bolt the party if
Smith was victorious.25

The mixed delegation met in Beaumont on May, 23 to decide on
its candidates.26 A chord of harmony was struck because both sides
agreed that they should only support a 'dry' candidate with a
prohibitionist platform. The Beaumont Conference also attacked past
Republican corruption in the past and corrupt eastern leaders. This

 

23 Arkansas Gm 4-4-28, p. 1.

24 Austin Ameeiean, 5-11-28, p. 1.
25 Austin Amefim 5-12-28, p. 1.
25 Austin Amerjean, 5-24-28, p. 1.

123

picture of a corrupt East adversely affected the reputation of
Governor Smith. Whenever eastern corruption was mentioned,
Raskob and Smith were connected to the larger picture of different
regional priorities. But, at the Houston convention, Governor Moody
wisely controlled his state delegation with strong centralized
organization. He was waiting to feel the political currents and to
protect Texas and his political position from embarrassment. The
Texas delegation cast its support for favorite son candidate and
former US. Congressman Jesse Jones. Jones ultimately received
unanimous support from the delegation, but remained quiet about
any prevailing issues. Moody acted intelligently and did not allow
Texas to become swept away with negative emotion and join other
states protests against Smith. Texas marched with the vast majority
of states to celebrate both Governor Smith's nomination and the
feelings of celebratory party euphoria after Senator Robinson's "Old
Time Religion" speech. But the once united Texas delegation
remained split on Smith and departed Houston disgruntled. This
divided group created a weakened Democratic organization and
Texas Democrats did not ban their party bolters in 1928.27 Without
unity, the party could not prohibit bolters and effectively campaign
for Smith. The party refused to endorse Smith and engaged in a
continual power struggle.28 This activity almost ensured a G.O.P.
victory and the continuance of economic rule by the elite and the
Republican party.

 

27 Memphis WM 8-12-28. p- 10.
23 Charlotte 9m 9—12-28, p. 1.

124

The G.O.P. remained quiet regarding the majority party's discord
but continued its campaign of highlighting Hoover's agrarian and
traditional background. The G.O.P. captured the state primarily
because of these issues as well as because of Governor Smith's
political belligerence. Governor Smith refused to support the
Eighteenth Amendment, dooming his candidacy in Texas. The Austin
Amefleae stated in a May 13th editorial, that "If Gov. Smith can and
does accept the Eighteenth Amendment as a part of his platform, he
will become the favorite in the betting to defeat Hoover".29 Governor
Smith did not do this, thus Texas did not support him. Seth Shepard
McKay described the election as extremely easy to analyze in m

Pglities: 1906-1944. He said that:

As had been the case in Prohibition contests over the past
twenty years, it was freely predicted and generally agreed
that Smith would carry South Texas...while Hoover presumed
to be a dry, would lead in North Texas and would have the
advantage of the greater voting strength in this part of the
state.30

The issue of the election was also driven by the political aspirations
of the powerful Governor, Dan Moody.

Moody overshadowed every other state figure. He was the
primary and preeminent figure in Smith's Texas battles. Moody was
a diehard prohibitionist who openly discussed his opposition to Smith
early in the campaign. Neither the local papers nor Moody ever
unequivocally stated that they would support the Democratic
Presidential nominee. This behavior was Inconsistent with other

 

29 Austin Arneggan, 5-13-28, p.1.
30 Seth Shepard McKay, MW( Lubbock Tx., Texas Tech
Press, 1952), p. 179.

125

southern states. Moody would eventually publicly support Smith
after the Houston convention, but he tested the political winds to
maintain long term control of Texas' political activities. At the
Houston convention, Moody was perceived as being one of the most
important politicians in the South primarily because of the sheer size
of Texas.31 Moody realized the problems that average Texans had
with Smith. His cool reception toward Smith throughout the
campaign was an intelligent long-term political decision. But from
the campaigns early days until election day, the acrimony Moody
directed toward Smith did not noticeably diminish. He earlier
delivered a stirring speech on April 8th that stated his firm
opposition to Smith in all forms.32 But he soon realized that it was
more important to be on the winning side of the aisle. He mildly
supported Governor Smith after the Houston convention, but also
remained strong in his prohibitionist stance.

Texas Senator Morris Sheppard, the co-author of the Eighteenth
Amendment, endorsed Smith in mid-September. He made a
conservative address to the nation during a programmed radio
broadcast. This address was necessary for political purposes.
Sheppard could now state that he followed the party at its time of
need. Senator-elect Thomas Connally was also a mildly vocal
supporter of Smith. He travelled to several states to speak on
Smith's behalf.33 Connally was trying to familiarize himself with the

 

31 Tampa legume, 6-23-28, p. 1.

32 Dallas Morninwm 4-9-28. p- 8.
33 Hughes, "The 1928 Presidential Election in Florida", p. 154.

126

national Democratic circles as he often spoke with senior Democratic
statesmen.
We

The activity at and immediately after the Houston convention
almost assured a Smith defeat. The final vote total was surprisingly
close with the G.O.P. winning 51.9% to 48.1% or 372,324 to 344,542.
The vote was split between traditionally conservative east Texas and
the states' northern and western parts. Texas did not vote
Republican again until 195 2. But Texas understood its actions and
did not blindly follow the lead of the Democratic party or
prohibitionist leaders. Governor Moody and Senator -elect Connolly
both ran on the same day and received strikingly different vote
totals than Smith received. Moody beat his G.O.P. opponent 82.6% to
17.4% and Connolly beat his 81.3% to 18.7%. The gubernatorial,
Senatorial, and Presidential races received relatively equal vote
totals which indicates that they were of equal importance in the
voters eyes. In the final outcome, Moody and the other state
politicians did little to support Smith and made little or no effect
with helping to organize or strengthen the Texas' grass roots political
organization. None of these leaders were true Smith supporters. But
they gave Smith marginal support so he could remain respected in
public party circles. Also, the lack of a large African-American
population, along with Smith's persistence in attacking the Eighteenth
Amendment, plus the good economic times for the Texas elite, led to
Smith's defeat. Smith's small success in Texas could be connected
with the large percentage of Mexican Catholics who supported Smith

127

in several southeastern counties. But, ultimately their support was
overmatched by the Protestant majority.

Conclusion--Reflections About 1928 and Its
Connection With Other Elections

The 1928 presidential election was intrinsically a conflict and
struggle between the differing motivations of the southern
electorate. It was once believed that the South was one dimensional,
lacking depth and diversity. 1928 disproves this myth. It is true
that Governor Smith carried the majority of the South's electoral
votes with a 64 to 62 victory, and a margin in the popular vote of
52.12% to 47.86%. This simple assertion is problematic because it
does not describe the reasons for this division. Why did this
happen? What actually split the southern political establishment in
1928? The graph on the following page shows two things: the
percentage of African-Americans in a southern state's population and
the percentage of votes the Democrats and Republicans received in
regard to that percentage. The dark line is the African-American
population percentage for the pro-Smith state. The line with
horizontal slashes shows the African-American population
percentage of the anti-Smith state. The white line shows the actual
percentage of votes Smith received from that state (The state's vote
is immediately to the right). The geography shows that as the

128

129
Table: 1928 Presidential Election Voting Percentages in the South

 

 

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Southern States

130

percentage of African-Americans population decreased in pro—Smith
states, the total Smith vote also decreased. Arkansas is not included
because of Senator Robinson's place on the ticket and strong intra-
state support.

The ultimate conclusion is that the states with the highest
African-American populations voted with the Democrats and all
others voted with the Republicans. But this explanation is also too
superficial. The election was much more complex.

There are several long term southern political trends that evolved
between the end of Reconstruction and the national realignment of
the 1964 election. A continuous linear connection was present. The
trends and connection that have been discussed are numerous. The
core Democratic South (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Georgia), only occasionally failed in its unwavering support of
Democratic presidential candidates (three in 1948, one in 1960). It
supported Democrats in every other election. The second Democratic
group—the Smith supporters (Louisiana, Arkansas), displayed a
political pragmatism connected to economic progressivism and racial
issues. They maintained a very strong connection to the Democratic
party and this connection is still strong at the national level. The
Upper South (North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee), displayed a
natural difference with the core Democratic South because of the
differing type of conservatism in each area. They maintained the
belief that race was not the most important issue in their political
universe and instead voted with their minds in connection to their
state's political past (These states had a strong post-bellum

131

connection with the Populist and Republican parties). But, North
Carolina was a transitional state and should not be classified with
Virginia and Tennessee. It would remain loyal to the Democratic
party during the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections when the
later two supported the Republicans. 1928 was an anomalous for
North Carolina because of Senator Simmons activities. The
peripheral-South (Florida, Texas) was motivated primarily by issues
of economic growth. They were the least 'southern' of these states,
largely because they had the strongest influx of new emigrants in the
post-bellum era and continually abandoned their Democratic roots
after the 1928 and especially the 1944 presidential election. But the
explanations are still more numerous.

States that supported Smith were often deeply influenced by the
individual activities inside that state. The issues that were effective
were: the number of or power of state leaders who had strong
feelings concerning Smith after the Houston convention; the time it
took for that state to mobilize; the success the Democrats had in
setting a positive political agenda for Smith inside that state; and the
issues which were most important to the politicians and voters of
that state.

The southern states in the 1 928 presidential election were really
very different from each other. Undoubtedly there was a
racial/ cultural split that was connected to the intrinsic differences of
each southern state. Each state faced different motivations with
differing consequences. African-American population was also a key
as it helped to dictate whether a state would favor racial

conservative policies or cultural conservative policies. The

132

geographic region with large numbers of African-Americans voted on
the basis of white supremacy, while all other areas voted for cultural
conservatism. Intrastate support and opposition was extremely
important as it helped to set an agenda for the election. Mobilization
was an important issue. It was connected with the question of
setting an agenda. The issues of white supremacy, religion,
Prohibition, Smith's combined provincialism, Democratic party
strength, and economic destiny were of unequal importance in
different regions. The endemic traits of the South dictated the
activities and success of Governor Smith. In many ways, his success
in 1928 was in the hands of the forces of southern regionalism.

The presence of southern conservatism was prevalent
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century South. Racial and
cultural conservatism were both preeminent issues during the 1928
presidential election and they led to a divergence in the once solid
nationwide Democratic coalition. A problem was that under these
overt conservative beliefs were covert reasons for this ideology.
Racial conservatism was a cover used to protect economic and class
divisions from forming. Cultural conservatism was a cover to protect
set societal structures and economic success. The reasons for both
were interrelated. The maintenance of the status quo was most
important. Beginning in 1928, the Democratic party was beginning to
become the party of change and this affected the inherent
conservative beliefs of the South. The South was shocked to
understand that Al Smith was moderate on race relations and
accepting of G.O.P. leaders into his inner circle. The once strong party
boundaries in our two-party system were slowly dissolving. What

133

was once accepted as Democratic and Republican was progressively
changing. This was connected to future activities inside the party in
the post-1928 period.

During the New Deal era, the South quickly accepted Roosevelt's
positive economic policies with alacrity until Senator Pat Harrison
and others realized that behind the scenes the national party was
trying to liberalize racial policy and include African-Americans into
the national economic picture. A backlash occurred during the mid-
term elections of 1938 when President Franklin Roosevelt's
progressive candidates did not receive support from southern
politicians in the South and were soundly defeated in the primaries
effectively ending the passage of effective New Deal legislation.
Roosevelt's candidates were viewed as opposition candidates.
Southern politicians generally began to openly question New Deal
policies and their effect on the South in the future. This was an
openly united conservative reaction to these progressive policies. It
could be stated that economic progressivism could and should not be
connected with racial and cultural progressivism. 1

The Democratic party faced an ideological crossroads during the
1 948 presidential election year. Race was the issue that motivated
the party's two opposing sides. Northern progressives championed
civil rights and Southerners supported status quo white supremacy.
In the final outcome racial progressivism began to gain the upper
hand as the the Democratic party of Hubert Humphrey was victorious

 

1 Again the words of Woodward and Kousser play a role in the "Progressivism-
For Whites Only" theory. It is extremely relevant and is closely related to the
demolition of the Democratic conservative-progressive coalition of this era.

134

over the Democratic party of Strorn Thurmond. More interestingly,
once progressive Southerners such as Thurmond, Alabama's George
Wallace and "Big Jim" Folsom, Louisiana's Earl Long, Florida's Claude
Pepper and many others were either defeated by conservative
Democrats or re-educated by the party to reject progressivism when
it was connected to African-American progress. This was connected
to their individual political viability and the future composition of
the South. In the post-World War II era there was a major
disjunction in the Democratic party and to conservatives in general.2
The Upper/ Deep South conservative cultural/ racial divide remained
prominent though. The elections of between 1948-1960 saw the
Deep South remaining loyal to the Democrats because of white
supremacy and racial conservatism with the Upper South accepting
the G.OP. because of economic policies and the northernization of the
Party. The realignment of 1964 was important to note because the
Deep South strongly supported the G.O.P. for the first time in its
history with the Upper South supporting the Democrats. This similar
divide was also notable in 1968.

It seems that with the end of Prohibition and the integration of
Catholics due to the suburbanization of American in the 1950's, the
enemy of southern cultural conservatives had changed. The social
chemistry of Protestant and Catholics was becoming united. An
alliance between these old enemies was slowly becoming a reality as
liberal intellectuals were becoming more prevalent inside the

 

2 Hixson' s book W is the most important

source on this phenomena.

13S

Democratic party. Liberal theories regarding social activism, sexual
freedom, racial integration, and welfare politics were becoming the
focal point of conservative disgust. Southerners found these theories
being championed by their party and the national conservative
realignment had started again in full force by the mid-term elections
of 1 958. Southern Democrats realized that the party they once knew
was no more and now more often began to seek salvation with the
once hated Republicans.

The conservative reaction of the 1 950's was connected to the loss
of conservative ideals. A changing America was detrimental to the
southern way of life. White Southerners would not trade economic
progress for racial equality. Furthermore, by the 1970's, it became
more apparent that this trade was no longer necessary as affirmative
action robbed whites of jobs that belonged to them. Many
Southerners viewed the problems affirmative action programs had in
the North and realized they had made the right decision. By the
1 972 presidential election, the North and the South became
politically united in a conservatism that extended past the 1 988
presidential election. But unlike the national unity felt in Roosevelt's
election of 1932, the party structure had changed with the
Republicans holding the mandate. With the acceptance of racial and
cultural change by the Democratic party on the national level, white
Southerners opposed progressive policies because of the inclusion of
African-Americans. This change in the Democratic party was a direct
result of the national party's attack on conservatism. Change was
equated with fear. In 1928 the South did not fear Al Smith but
feared the twentieth century and the issue of a changing South. In

136

1938 the South did not fear President Roosevelt's candidates, but the
policy of an outsider trying to dictate and change southern culture.

In 1948 much of the Deep South accepted the politics of the
Dixiecrats because they discussed a southern continua of belief.
Conservatism would remain in place. In 1964, 1968, and 1972, these
issues were alive, vibrant and connected to the questions regarding

the 1928 presidential election.

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