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TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE l|__|i l Ii MSU to An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 7 " CWfltfi-pd i THE INFLUENCE OF POWER ON HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES: A CONTEXTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND FANTASY-THEME ANALYSIS BY Closepet Nagaraj Ramesh A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1992 ABSTRACT THE INFLUENCE OF POWER ON HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES: A CONTEXTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND FANTASY-THEME ANALYSIS BY Closepet Nagaraj Ramesh The aims of this study are three: (1) To counter the psycho-analytic studies of hostage negotiations; (2) to sug gest a macro framework for the analysis of hostage negotia- tions; and (3) to question the efficacy of and suggest alternatives to present hostage negotiation strategies. In this contextual/descriptive/fantasy theme study I claim that police strategies of negotiation with hostage takers do not account for the influence of power nor for failed negotiations. A four-tier model of power is deline- ated, and a contextual/descriptive/fantasy-theme analytic method is used to study two failed and one successful police negotiation with hostage takers. It is argued that present police negotiation strategies may not only fail to resolve certain hostage situations but they also continue to invest the police the power to define meanings and to characterize the service they render the public. It is proposed that the search for alternatives should include community involvement in defusing crises, the use of SWAT teams only in special cases, and strategic withdrawal of police where resolving the hostage situation may lead to the death or serious injury of hostage takers, hostages, or police officers. To My Parents C.N. NAGARAJ & C.N. RAMA DEVI iiiT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Growing up is hard to do, and I have taken my time! Those who have asked me to hurry, and those who have helped me get there are my wise and kind committee members: Dr. William Donohue, Dr. Mary Bresnahan, and Dr. Steven Wilson. The outside committee member, Dr. Peter Manning, of the Depart- ment of Sociology, has been a guiding light through his many writings on the nature of police work and the culture of police organizations. To him, I am indebted more than he realizes. Dr. Frank Boster, Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Communication, enabled me to stick around when the going was sticky, and I owe him a tremendous amount of gratitude. My good friends, Rikki Meischke and Sandy Starnaman, gave me company, courage, and love, and they helped ease the pain of four years of graduate school! My fiancee, and soon to be wife, Lai Si Tsui has made me believe in myself, and her love for me and her zest for life has made me a different man. Intellectual comrade and soul companion, without her support this work would still be in the works! Finally, my parents, C.N. Nagaraj and C.N. Rama Devi, have waited the longest, believed the most, and from 10,000 miles away sent me the special love that only parents can send. Their dreams and their hopes will keep me working to be a better human being. iv Chapter One: Chapter Two: TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction The Nature of Hostage Negotiation Unique Nature Psychotherapeutic Model Interaction/Goals Model Need for Refinement (:hapter Three: The Nature of Power Conceptions of Power Power and Commonsense Social Scientific Analysis of Power Parsonian Conception of Power Conception of Power in Interpersonal Communication Studies Four Bases of Power: A Synthesis of Perspectives Ideological Power Institutional Power Relational Power Individual Power Research Questions Chapter Four : Methods Chapter Five: Contextual Analysis Descriptive Analysis Interpretive/Fantasy Theme Analysis The Search for Alternatives Transcripts Yarnell Bank Holdup Contextual Analysis Summary and Analysis Descriptive Analysis Summary and Analysis Fantasy theme Analysis Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Takers Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Other Negotiators Overall Summary p UNtOQO‘ Hid 23 25 26 27 31 36 39 52 57 61 65 67 67 68 69 77 78 80 80 85 88 99 100 101 116 131 138 Chapter Six: Frontier Airlines Hijacking 140 Contextual Analysis 140 Summary and Analysis 149 Descriptive Analysis 152 Summary and Analysis 159 Fantasy Theme Analysis 160 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police 161 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker 175 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Other Negotiators 188 Overall Summary and Analysis 196 Chapter Seven: Judson Dean Talley Incident 199 Contextual Analysis 199 Summary and Analysis 202 Descriptive Analysis 205 Summary and Analysis 215 Fantasy Theme Analysis 219 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police 219 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker 228 Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage and Other Negotiators 246 Overall Summary 251 Chapter Eight: Results and Discussion: What Does it All Mean, and Where Do We Go From Here? 255 Problems and Pitfalls in the Present Analysis 260 Alternatives to Present Negotiation Strategies 263 Alternative Police Action 271 Alternatives to Police Action 276 Footnotes 281 Bibliography 283 vi INTRODUCTION The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket (Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, 1907). Hostages have been taken to achieve personal, politi- cal, or monetary ends since the time of recorded history. Demon king Ravana took God king Rama's wife, Sita, hostage according to the great Indian epic Ramayana. Abram's neph- ew, Lot, was taken prisoner by the armies of four kings, and Abram‘s use of 318 selected men to rescue Lot has been characterized as a SWAT team operation (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986)! Kings, pirates, pirate kings, and just irate people have captured and taken people to demand, extort, and bar- gain for advantages. _But, it is claimed that it was the 1972 "Munich Massacre" which gave the impetus to 0.8. law enforcement agencies to develop modern hostage negotiations (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Taylor, 1983). Now most major American cities have their own police negotiation teams and SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams to respond to any hostage crises. On a national level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed negotiation strategies and techniques, and teaches them to its own agents, to law enforcement and military negotiators from all over the country, and to a number of 0.3. allies abroad (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). Recently, communication scholars have begun to study hostage negotiations (Rogan, Donohue, & Lyles, 1989; Rogan, 2 1989, 1990; Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991; Holmes, 1990). These scholars have analyzed police negotia- tion techniques (psychotherapeutic model), and tried to further the inquiry of communication strategies and tech- niques used by law enforcement agencies by studying them under the rubric of an interaction/goals model of communica- tion. In this study, I make a case for countering these micro/psycho-analytic studies by communication scholars with a macro/contextual-rhetorica1 analysis of such hostage negotiations. Goals 9: this Study This dissertation will deal with the issue of the adop tion of negotiation strategies by law enforcement agencies for resolving hostage (barricaded gunman) crises. It is claimed that the police use knowledge and skills developed in psychology and related disciplines to "form and develop a trusting, helpful relationship under the most adverse and stressful circumstances to help resolve hostage situations with a minimum of injury or loss of life" (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986, p. 4). I will argue that these "negotiations" do not reflect traditional bargaining dynamics, and that force or power is the more vital determinant in these situa- tions. The difference, I claim, between the traditional approach of law enforcement agencies in resolving these crises and the modern response is that in the former force and power were explicit, but in the latter they are 3 implicit. My first goal is to critique present hostage negotiation analyses by communication scholars, and make a case for the study of these situations from a power perspec- tive. APointing out that power, as a concept, has been neglected because of its supposedly unwieldy nature, I will redefine the nature of power, and propose a four-dimensional analysis of the concept. This will allow me to pursue my next goal, that of understanding how power influences the outcomes in hostage crises. The results from an analysis of actual hostage negotiation transcripts will then permit me to critique the police version of events, and pursue my final goal -- proposing alternative police action, and some alternatives to police action in hostage situations. Research Questions Question #1: What dimension/s of power are exhibited in hos tage negotiations, and how might they determine the outcome in different types of hostage situations? Or, why do cer- tain negotiations succeed, and why do others fail? Question #2: What are the problems in the existing strate- gies that the police pursue in resolving hostage situations; and what alternative strategies do the police, and communi- ties have in resolving hostage crises? Methods My research questions demand answers about the (1) con texts of particular hostage situations; (2) details of the actual negotiations; (3) interpretations about the contexts, 4 details, and outcomes of the events and negotiations that indicate the influence of power; and (4) alternatives avail- able to the police and the public in such situations. The nature of the questions determine the type of methods that would enable an effective analysis. A triangu- lation of contextual, descriptive, and fantasy theme analy- sis, I believe, would be an appropriate analytical tool for answering my two research questions. Chapter Arrangement This chapter is an introduction to the dissertation. Chapter two provides a description of the nature and types of hostage crises, sketches and critiques the prevailing models that seek to explain the outcomes of hostage negotia- tions, and provides a rationale for the study of such crises from a power perspective. In chapter three, I will expostulate on the nature of power by examining how power has been conceptualized by social scientists in general, by communication scholars in particular, and by commenting on the weaknesses and strengths of such conceptualizations. Synthesizing the description and critique, I then propose a four-tier or four-dimensional model of power, the adumbration of which will lead me to ask my two research questions. In chapter four I will delineate in detail the methods I am going to use to analyze the three transcripts. The three methods, used in triangulation, are contextual 5 analysis, descriptive analysis, and fantasy theme analysis. Chapters five, six, and seven will analyze separately the Yarnell Bank holdup case, the Frontier Airlines hijacking case, and the Talley hijacking case. These three chapters will enable me to answer the first research question. Chapter eight is the results and discussion chapter in which the results of the analysis of three transcripts are summarized and critiqued, and based on which an answer to the second research question is elaborated. Chapter Two: The Nature of Hostage Negotiations Negotiation is a prevalent form of social interaction. It characterizes not only formal activities like legal settlements, international disputes, and labor and manage- ment contracts, but also normal day-to-day activities like teachers and students negotiating class work, husbands and wives negotiating household responsibilities, and so on (Wilson & Putnam, 1990; Wall, 1985; Strauss, 1978; Zartman, 1976). Law-enforcement agents too are involved in various types of negotiations, and negotiations for the release of hostages and the surrender of hostage takers are becoming an important part of police work (Maher, 1977). Negotiation between the police and hostage takers, as opposed to tactical assault options, is becoming an increas- ingly accepted method of securing the release of hostages (Miller, 1980). As a forum of conflict communication, hostage negotiation thus presents an interesting opportunity for the study of human interaction. Domestic hostage negotiations provide a unique opportu- nity to study some of the more rare and diverse forms of human interactionl. In these crisis bargaining situations the police try to negotiate with hostage takers to get hostages released and hostage takers to surrender. Unique Nature The nature of hostage negotiations, in comparison to other types of negotiations, is unique. Holmes (1990) pro vides a few characteristics that make such negotiations unique. He points out that (a) police negotiators and hostage takers do not interact in the context of a relation- ship that has been previously defined; (b) the police and hostage takers are likely to have little specific informa- tion about the other party; (0) the demands of the hostage taker at the outset are unknown to the police, and in the case of many domestic hostage situations, unknown to the hostage taker as well; and (d) the negotiations take place in a clearly coercive context. Holmes fails to note, howev- er, that hostage negotiations also are unique because the hostage taker loses legitimacy (and thus power) for the reaSon that hostage taking is not an action sanctioned by law, and the hostage taker is therefore unlike any other bargaining partner. Reasons £9; Hostage Taking Why do people take hostages? The FBI groups hostage takers in four categories: (a) mentally unstable or emotion- ally disturbed persons who take hostages either to force an issue or as a plea for help; (b) criminals who are trapped while committing a crime and take hostages; (c) prisoners who hold prison guards hostage during rioting/uprising; and (d) terrorists who take hostages as an act of political 8 extortion (Fuselier, 1986; Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986). In a recent analysis, the FBI attributed between 52 percent (Fuselier, 1986) and 59 percent (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986) of hostage-takings to mentally unstable or emotionally distraught individuals. Strentz (1983) says that approxi- mately half of those who take hostages are not doing it for financial reasons. According to the FBI, persons who most frequently take hostages in the U.S. can be classified into four major psychiatric classifications: (a) paranoid schizophrenic and (b) depressed personalities who are usually responding to stressors that are the outgrowth of personal problems; and the (c) antisocial and (d) inadequate personalities whose acts are the outgrowth of criminal endeavors (Strentz, 1983). According to Strentz, till 1983 there were only five hostage situations in the U.S. that were politically moti- vated. These categorizations or distinctions are important because police negotiators treat incidents differently based on the characteristic of the hostage taking situation (Fuselier, 1986). For example, negotiators are told not to argue with mentally disturbed individuals because such individuals are not capable of acting rationally; to provide support and understanding to those who have taken hostages because of some domestic dispute; and to remind criminal hostage takers of facts while trying to convince the hostage 9 taker to accept his own physical safety in exchange for the hostages. What are the theoretical bases for such advice and practices? Prevailing Explanatory Models The psychotherapeutic model. The police believe that with an opportunity to communicate they can successfully resolve a hostage taking situation. The psychotherapeutic communication model that they have adopted for negotiating with hostage takers advocates active listening, paraphras- ing, illocutionary pauses, self-disclosure reciprocity, and open-ended questions as techniques for facilitating better communication (Rogan, 1990), and thus a positive resolution of hostage situations. Miron and Goldstein (1979), in a manual for police negotiators, prescribe certain message strategies that include calming the hostage taker, building rapport with the hostage taker, gathering information, and persuading the hostage taker to act in a particular manner. The police seek out those officers to be negotiators who have "good" communication skills, who can exercise patience, and who can stand long and tiring hours of work (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). While they do have profession- al psychologists/counsellors on their SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team, the police do not allow them to do the negotiating. These professionals are there only to monitor the situation, profile the psychological state of the 10 hostage taker, and provide advice on tactics the police might be able to use. Critigue. Some research on conflict behavior has posit- ed that communication plays a central role in conflict situations, and has a definitive effect on subjects' ability to successfully deal with and resolve conflicts. It posits that when subjects are provided with an opportunity to communicate, the number of unsuccessful interactions is reduced (Deutsch, 1960; Johnson, 1973). This is a rather simplistic explanation because in many instances communica- tion can escalate as well as de-escalate conflict intensity (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Rogan (1990) points out that the police model tends to view interaction as occurring within a "communicative vacu- um," independent from extraneous factors, noises, and other participants. It also views negotiation as unidirectional, where what the negotiator says relates to and affects the behavior of the hostage taker, but not reciprocally. More- over, the counselor-client interactions from which the model draws are non-conflictual and non-competitive, he points out. Rogan criticizes the police model as being inappropri- ate for the situations in which it is used. However, he does not explain why, if the model were inappropriate, the police are as successful as they in fact are in resolving such hostage crises. 11 Rogan (1990) cites the FBI claim that using tactics and strategies suggested by the psychotherapeutic model will be effective in resolving 96 percent of all hostage takings, and the Michigan State Police claim that they have used other tactical options in only 4 out of 400 incidents of hostage taking. The police and the FBI fail to fully account for this high success rate either. They claim that between 52 and 59 percent of all hostage takers are mentally unsta- ble. However, their therapeutic techniques must be success- ful in dealing with other types of hostage takers too. How can one explain this? It would be easy to claim that in such "crisis bargaining situations" the hostage takers are under great pressure, and therefore any calming techniques would enable the police to influence them to give up (see Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). But such an explanation cannot account for "unsuccessful" negotia- tions, unless of course we claim that the police techniques somehow failed to calm the hostage taker. To overcome this circular reasoning we must try and account more clearly for the giving up by the other 41 to 48 percent of the hostage takers who are not "mentally unstable," and for those situa- tions in which the police failed to either get the hostages released unhurt or to get the hostage taker to surrender peacefully. If the high success rate is due to the employment of a psychotherapeutic model, the question needs to be asked: why 12 do we need the police to resolve such situations? Why not psychologists, social workers, or any others trained to use those techniques? Is there any power given to the police that conditions the outcome of the hostage situation? The interactional perspective that communication scholars have used to analyze hostage negotiations fails to identify the larger social forces that grant certain power to police negotiators, and that which conditions the outcome of such negotiations. Interactioglgoals model. Recently, communication schol- ars have studied some aspects of these "crisis bargaining situations" (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). For example, Donohue and his colleagues have looked at relation- al issues, tracking how relationships between police negoti- ators and hostage takers improve or deteriorate during the period of negotiations (Donohue, Rogan, Ramesh, & Borchgre- vink, 1990), how trustworthiness is perceived in a hostage situation (Rogan, Donohue, & Lyles, 1989), and how control is gained and exercised in such situations (Rogan, 1989). Rogan (1990) has analyzed hostage taking situations to answer questions concerning the communicative conflict behavior of police negotiators and hostage takers. He has conceptualized hostage negotiations as functional goal-based interactions, in which negotiators and hostage-takers commu- nicate to satisfy identity goals (face behaviors), and 13 relational goals (integrative/distributive), goals which are marked by patterns of language intensity. Critigue. The studies by interpersonal communication scholars, while focusing on goals and conflict behaviors of interactants, skirt both the problem of why some negotia- tions fail, and what role power or power imbalances play in the resolution of such crisis bargaining situations. These studies are examples of what Lannamann (1991) calls inter- personal communication research using the cybernetic or systemic perspective. He points out that such studies mute "ideological concerns and fail(s) to remedy the disjunction between micro and macro influences on action" (1991, p. 185). Such studies simply point out that components (inter- actants) within the system are influenced by each other, that balance is sought to be restored within the system if any component malfunctions (conflict), and that there are some feedback loops (trust, control, face threats, goals, etc) that help the system regain homeostasis. This rather fuzzy conceptualization has led scholars to critique the systems perspective. The Proposed Alternative Model The influence g; power: Neeg fig; refinement. Success in hostage negotiation is not only a reflection of the usefulness of certain communication strategies but also a manifestation of the exercise of power in particular cultur- al/historical settings. The police succeed by gaining and l4 exercising control in such situations. The control they exercise is over space (restricting the physical environment of the hostage taker), over time (not allowing the hostage taker to rush them into doing things), and over interaction (managing the flow of conversation such that the hostage taker is maneuvered into a position from which the police want him/her to be negotiating) (Rogan, 1989). The police cannot bring about successful resolutions to hostage crises if they are hampered in setting the ground for "negotia- tions." Control has a two-fold manifestation in hostage negoti- ations (Rogan, 1989, p. 21). At one level, it includes con tainment of the incident within a single physical location. If the hostage taker is free to move from place to place he has more chips to play poker with the police.‘ He can raise new demands, alter old ones, raise the stakes, and bargain harder for whatever he wants. Thus the police begin with cordoning off the place where the hostage taker holds the hostage. Once bound in place, the hostage taker loses most options, and he himself becomes a hostage to the event. At another level, the police negotiator is responsible for guiding and directing the behavior of the hostage taker. This form of control is said to represent the most signifi- cant communication challenge to the negotiator (Rogan, 1939). 15 The police, in their practice, recognize the distinc- tions in both hostage takers and hostage situations, but they too skirt the issue of power. This failure to recog- nize the implications of power makes the police explanation of negotiation outcomes incomplete. As Folger and Poole (1984) caution, "Ignoring it (power) or pretending power differences do not exist is a sure formula for failure, because power ie operating and will direct the moves and countermoves in the conflict" (p. 50). Holmes' (1990) study of domestic hostage situations deals with power issues. He argues that "bargaining power is subjective power created in interaction" (p. 14), and he seeks to demonstrate that within the framework of Muir's (1977) "paradoxes of extortionate transactions." Holmes' analysis is exploratory, and his discussion of power and power bases is rather cursory. He also analyzes the paradox of hostage takers' power and not that of the police. To a large extent, his study also focuses on the micropractices of police negotiator and hostage taker, and ignores the macro aspects of hostage taking situations. This whets our appetite for a more careful and full-fledged study of power bases, of how the paradox of power affects both the police and the different types of hostage takers, of the changing power relationships in hostage crises and, most important, of how the complexities of the larger cultural and 16 historical settings impinge upon the treatment and resolu- tion of hostage crises. Interpersonal communication researchers have focused on the exercise of control by an individual upon another indi- vidual, and have thus sought answers as to how these indi- viduals think through conflict situations and exercise and gain control. Lannamann (1991) points out that the ideology of interpersonal communication scholarship makes researchers theoretically committed to the idea of the individual as the "locus of personhood" (p. 187); and, when the unit of obser- vation is restricted to the individual, "explanation is shifted to cognitive structures rather than social process- es" (p. 188); the subjectivist reduction constricts inquiry to the pepceptions of the knowing subject; "the focus on individual perceptions elevates the authority of the subjec- tiVist reduction from a descriptive discourse to an explana- tory and/or predictive science" (p. 193); and, the ignoring of the historical processes that have constructed the sym- bolic products allow interpersonal communications research- ers to obscure the role of power. But as Hawes (1989) argues, the concepts of "cognition" and "cognitive/mental mediation" become unnecessary in the critical-theoretical formulation of ideology, consciousness, and the subject. In the context of police hostage negotiations then, interpersonal communication researchers have treated the hostage taker as the "knowing subject" who has to be persuaded 17 by the police to do certain things, and have assumed that the hostage taker will or will not comply depending upon his "perception" of the situation. The Tncomplete police picture ehg The partial scholarly agenda. Communication scholars have not questioned police claims that negotiation techniques have helped in resolving more than 90% of hostage situations. For example, they have not questioned the definition of "success," nor have they asked what "failure" means. They have not wondered what a four or five percent failure rate means in terms of human and material cost. They have not paid much attention to the possible ways of resolving hostage taking incidents. What the costs are of these successes and failures have also been ignored. Scholars have gone ahead with the acontextual microa- nalyses under the assumption that certain communication techniques are helpful to the police, certain others are not, and that we should be engaged in inquiry that will enable the police to fine-hone their techniques in resolving crisis bargaining situations. These micro-analytic studies tend to be done in the search for explanations of minutiae or for instrumental rea sons. This particular type of instrumentality fails to question the prevailing social order, and the products of such scholarship is merely geared toward aiding institutions in place to carry on with their work more "efficiently." 18 This instrumental rationality rarely, if ever, is equipped to deal with and challenge the basic premises upon which knowledge claims are made and action chains are set in motion. Communication scholars have ignored the socio-histori- cal context in which such situations have arisen: for exam- ple, why so many hostage situations now, and only in this society? What are the societal forces that bring about an increase in such situations? Are the police necessary for dealing with these situations? Have there been a rash of hostage situations before? If so, where, and when? When were the police invested with powers to deal with such situations? Why? Given the police "agenda," what are the ways in which hostage situations can be resolved? How does such an agenda constrain other outcomes? What arguments can be made for the plausibility or implausibility of such outcomes? What sort of discourse is involved in the charac- terization of such situations? How/Can they be character- ized differently? If different characterizations are possi- ble, what alternatives or options do we have in dealing with such situations? A whole series of such historical/politi- cal/social questions are ignored by communication scholars. We need to ask them, and try and answer them before doing our "micro analyses." To have not done so, and to continue to not do so is/would be to ignore a basic principle 19 undergirding research -- that of "organized skepticism" (Smith, 1988). A question may be posed whether it is the role of communication scholars to analyze macro-social structural and ideological issues. Given the fragmentation of knowl- edge in modern societies, the "specialization" of scholars, and the turf battles waged to delineate knowledge bound- aries, we can succumb to this argument and say that communi- cation scholars should look merely at "talk." Lannamann (1991) points out that the lack of ideologi- cal analyses in the interpersonal communication field stems from three related characteristics of the field: (1) insti- tutional demands for specialization have encouraged an artificial separation of interpersonal studies from larger social phenomena; (2) an early orientation to empiricism has vested interpersonal communication with a positivist herit- age; and (3) fissures in competing theoretical treatments of interpersonal power has divided research literature in a way that mutes ideological concerns (p. 183). If communication scholars in mass media and in cultural studies can extend their boundaries of inquiry by explicitly incorporating a variety of political, economic and sociolog- ical theories to study, for example, cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1976) and prime time television (Gitlin, 1980), why should interpersonal communication scholars be bounded by a positivistic and/or systems/cybernetic perspective? 20 Lannamann (1991) makes a strong case for interpersonal communication scholars disentangling themselves from this constrictive ideology. The study of hostage negotiations, I believe, lends itself as a case for extending the boundaries of interpersonal communication inquiry. It is difficult, and may be impossible to understand interpersonal communication phenomena without an understand- ing of the social context within which such communication occurs. It may be argued, however, that we can borrow from others who have studied these social contexts and embed our analyses of hostage negotiation talk within such knowledge. Yes, it is possible, and if such contextualizing is done it would enhance the quality of communication studies. My quibble here is that we have not done such contextualizing, and that we have not made a serious attempt to embed hostage negotiation analyses within such knowledge. To continue to not do so would be to believe that we can learn about human interaction in such crisis bargaining situations through a narrow focus on talk. he the Practitioners Need More Theory? It may be argued though that the police know what works, and that they need not have a fuller explanation of why what works works. Even in terms of the instrumental reasons which drive interpersonal communication research in this area, such an approach would be weak. The instrumental researcher would claim that probably the strongest benefit 21 of knowing why what works works is for purposes of socializ- ing and training would-be police negotiators. Results based on an interactional/systems approach would not provide the police insights that this research is Supposed to provide them. This lack of a powerful explanation could affect the negotiation process in a number of ways -- it may take the police negotiators more time to complete negotiations (the average duration for resolving a hostage situation, accord- ing to one study, was 12 hours) (Fuselier, 1986); it may make them spend more resources (both in terms of time and effort); and it may lead to the failure of negotiations. More important, and from a critical viewpoint, police claims of the efficacy of therapeutic techniques construct an incomplete social reality for the public, a reality that could lull them to be complacent about the nature of police work. People would therefore continue to place undue impor- tance on police explanations of their work and not have the knowledge to seek any major changes of the structures of society. It is important to realize that the societal framework within which hostage "negotiations" take place precludes certain outcomes and necessitates certain others. The outcome of hostage taking events are determined in certain ways when the police enter the scene -- hostages released, hostage taker kills himself or is killed; hostages released, 22 hostage taker surrenders; hostages killed, hostage taker surrenders; hostages killed, hostage taker kills himself or is killed. These are the only possibilities given the fact that the police act in certain ways given their social agenda. Should we be then bound within this ideological frame- work, and by this instrumental rationality, for both under- standing the problem and alleviating it? Studies done till now using the psychotherapeutic and the systems models do not provide us a good insight into the nature of the prob- lem, nor do they explain why certain negotiations succeed and why some fail. They also ignore the larger social context that frames the problem of hostage taking, thus inhibiting the search for alternative solutions. I there- fore propose that understanding the influence of power (of the police and of the hostage takers) in these crisis bar- gaining situations would enable us to tackle those questions ignored by the psychotherapeutic and systems models. In the next chapter I will define and analyze the nature of power. I will review the literature on the nature of power, critique the various conceptions, and propose an alternative model that includes four dimensions or bases of power. Chapter Three: The Nature of Power In this chapter I will analyze the nature of power by examining how power has been conceptualized generally by social scientists, and by communication scholars in particu- lar, and by clarifying the weaknesses and strengths of such conceptualizations. Following the critique, I will seek to answer the questions of the nature of power, and where power resides by identifying four bases of power -- the ideologi- cal, the institutional, the relational, and the individual. With that knowledge, it is possible to ask questions as to how the various bases of power affect the outcomes of hos- tage negotiations. Those research questions should allow a transition to the next chapter which deals with the appro- priate methods to answer the research questions. Russell (1938) tried to prove that just as "energy" is the fundamental concept in physics, "power" is the fundamen- tal concept in the social sciences. Giddens (1984) points out that power cannot be regarded "as a second-order consid- eration" (p. 283) in the social sciences. I argue in this paper, as do Duke (1976) and Hooker and Wilmot (1985), that the core concept in conflict theory is not conflict as much as it is "power." If we are to understand the dynamics of communication interaction between police negotiators and hostage takers, 23 24 we need to understand the nature of power, explicate the bases of power, and examine how they influence the outcome in these crisis bargaining situations. To argue that build- ing trust, increasing relational intimacy, and catering to face needs help police negotiators to successfully resolve a hostage taking incident (Taylor, 1983) not only begs the question as to why we need the police to resolve such crises but directs our attention only to individual motives and behaviors and to relational outcomes, but not to historical and cultural settings within which such individual actions take place. It is easier to describe the consequences of the use of power than to identify its nature. This has led to a posi- tivistic account of power, which focuses attention only on observed behaviors, their sequence, frequency, and predict- ability. If we were to focus on the nature of power, howev- er, we would be able to give a fuller account which would not only encourage reference to human beings as real enti- ties with real properties and tendencies but also to human collectivities and how they affect societal interaction (Barnes, 1988). ConceptTons g; Egyep Power has been conceptualized in a variety of ways, and each adumbration has its strengths and weaknesses. The variety and complexity of the conceptualizations have led some scholars to reject the term, because power, for them, 25 is too broad a phenomenon and thus can not be operational- ized (Pruitt, 1981). But operationalism can not be the sole guiding force in research. Therefore, I will summarize nd critique the important conceptualizations, and present a version of power that draws on the strengths of the various conceptualizations. Beyep ehg common eehee. When we examine the common sense usage of the concept of power we find that power is treated as an entity or attribute which is possessed by people, things, and processes. We talk of the power of nature, of powerful persons, and certain sequences of ac- tions as powerful. Common sense usage treats power as a capacity, not as something that is always manifest and actual. Barnes (1988) maintains that it is sensible to retain this crucial feature of the common sense usage of power, that is, power should be treated, first of all, as a theo- retical term referring to distributions of capacities, potentials, and capabilities. Power, in the natural sciences, is the capacity to do work. Common sense usage does not differ from this defini- tion. Power is thought of, for example, as an individual's capacity to get things done. Power may be manifest in any number of ways, and thus is often conceived of as a "gener- alized" capacity. Therefore behavior (or action) cannot be used to define power. However, it is true that power is 26 manifest in behavior. Finally, while common sense usage affirms that social power is "really there," it does not have much to contribute to the project of finding the nature and bases of power. Thus, sociological analyses are needed to break the circular reasoning involved in inferring power from its effects. Social scientific analysis e: power. Social scientists have researched and written extensively on power. The literature is so vast that it would be difficult to cite even the major works. Those who have written about power include economists, political scientists, sociologists, communication scholars, philosophers, linguists, and others. However, as Barnes (1988) points out, the mainstream of this literature has not come to grips with the nature and bases of power. One common choice in this literature is to assign power to individuals rather than to institutions or entire socie- ties. Secondly, most works attribute power to individuals only in so far as those individuals engage in certain social relationships with other individuals. Finally, the power of the individual is seen as manifest in the effects upon other individuals. One reason for the popularity of this view is the apparent "scientific" quality of such definitions. Individ- uals are more amenable to observation than are institutions or societies. It is rather easy to describe individual 27 characteristics and their actions. Also, to define power in terms of its consequences is to make the concept of power "operational." The second reason for the focus on individuals is that it facilitates moral and evaluative objectives (Lukes, 1974). For example, one may say the president of a company misused power and therefore he has betrayed the trust of the stockholders. Thus the incentives for accepting mainstream definitions are that they focus attention to what is observ- able, they caution easy generalization, and because they allow the pursuit of evaluative objectives. These defini- tions appeal to those who think they already know what power is, and so to those who merely seek to speak about it more "precisely." Earsonian conceptioh QT peyeg. Barnes (1988) notes that Parsons (1967) is one of the few who differs from the mainstream view in the sense that Parsons' concern is with the nature of power, and not with the effects of power. Parsons assumes that social power is just one specific kind of thing, which must be identified and described. Parsons says that just like money exists in the economic system, power exists in the political system. Barnes (1988) points out, however, that while this analogy is rich and provocative it does not enable us to understand the nature of power. One reason is that we do not understand money itself clearly. If money itself is a 28 puzzling phenomenon how can we use it to understand power? To understand money or the use of money we must understand the nature of social order itself. As Barnes says, "Whether we talk of rights and obligations, or of roles and institu- tions, or of patterned social relationships, the import is much the same: we are talking of a presumed structure and orderliness in social activity, and a need to understand the nature and the basis of such structure and orderliness" (p. 20). This was not a problem for Parsons because he had de veloped a general theory of society, and therefore his discussion of power and money was an easy extension of that theory. We do have a problem, however, because Parsons' general theory of society has been subject to numerous criticisms. Cthigue g: Parsons. Let me paraphrase Barnes' criti- cisms of the Parsonian social order: Parsons rejects indi- vidualistic theories of social order. He says that no society is constituted of isolated individual transactions. The validity of any transaction is not merely a matter for the parties involved in the transaction but is dependent upon wider considerations. Parsons is right because indi- vidual exchange is possible only with goods and rights which are "owned," and the institution of ownership is not ac- counted for in any individualist accounts of society. 29 So, if individuals cannot be expected to perform in society from out of "natural" inclinations, what is it then that makes them do so? Parsons claims that individuals are amenable to socialization, and that in the course of social- ization values, rules, and norms are imparted. This recon- struction of human nature from without would stop the other- wise natural inclination of human beings to clash. The next question then would be, how is it that the norms humans internalize are strife-reducing norms that encourage persisting orderly activity? Parsons posited that over time actions crystallize into functioning social sys- tems and into persisting patterned action. Parsons' concep- tion of society as normative order and socialization as introjection of norms became very popular. However, the functionalist sociology he inspired failed to sustain curi- osity about the nature of social norms and their status as explanations of action. Over the years it also became clear that although norms exist in societies it was untenable to explain social order by reference to internalized norms. Parsons' conception of norms fails to account for deviance and for social change, which themselves are ordered, patterned, and persistent forms of social activity. Also, norms cannot clearly ac- count for the rich and complex details of social interac- tion. As Barnes (1988, p. 27) asks, "But where are the norms for the nuances?" 30 Becker (1964) claims that the apparent existence of a stable distribution of norms and values in society is not the product of stable individual value-orientations or personalities but the product of stable "contexts of action." Becker provides numerous examples of how people shed old values and adopt new ones. Another criticism of normative determinism is regarding how "implications" can be derived from norms. How does a norm, separated from action or context, look, and how is it internalized? Presumably, it is some sort of a verbal' formulation. But how can one draw particular implications from such a formulation? As Wittgenstein (1968, p.81) put it, "No course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule." If we were to argue that implications are drawn from precedence, it could be pointed out that precedents are fre quently unclear, and that implications are keenly contested before a dominant interpretation is established. Thus, Barnes (1988) argues that norms are "necessarily and irre- ducibly a public entity" (p. 30) and not a private one. Whether one acts correctly in relation to a norm can only be established from the response of other people. If we remove the coercive, internalized element from a normative order we can define norms as an aspect of members' knowledge. There- fore the normative order becomes a "distribution of knowl- 31 edge." But just knowledge is not enough. Only a degree of conformity at the level of action can explain social order, and therefore power, which is an aspect of the distribution of knowledge. Following from the above, Barnes (1988) defines power as "the added capacity for action that accrues to individu- als through their constituting a distribution of knowledge and thereby a society" (p. 57). While individuals do pos- sess general capacities for action, and thus possess power, in ordinary society the available power is not just the sum of individual powers. The shared distribution of knowledge confers an additional capacity for action, and thus the overall capacity for action is larger and more wide ranging than that of the sum of individual powers. The additional power is, however, not equally available to all members of society. As actions become routinized and ordered, the discretion to direct them tends to get concentrated. So, Barnes concludes that "the possession of power is the pos- session of discretion: to gain power is to gain such discre- tion; to lose power is to lose such discretion" (p. 58). anception e: peyep Th interpersonal communication spudies. In recent debates on communication research some scholars have pointed out the need to incorporate notions of power into the contexts of communication processes and outcomes (see Hall, 1989). Some also have noted that it is important to specify parameters and rules to identify the 32 powerholders and the dimensions and levels of power that they hold (Subervi-Velez, 1989). Communication research is influenced to a large extent by other social sciences. The study of power, within the discipline, therefore bears a lot of similarity to the study of it in the larger field. A cogent summary of the nature and role of power in communication and conflict can be found in Folger and Poole's (1984) work. I will paraphrase their summary, and will point out some of the weaknesses in such a conceptualization. Folger and Poole (1984) define power as the "ability to influence or control events" (p. 111), and argue that power is not the property of individuals but instead stems from :elationships among members. Power carries weight only when endorsed by group members, and endorsements are given be- cause of (a) social categorization, a process which "creates strong preconceptions about what types of people are usually powerful and what types are generally weak" (p. 112); (b) mystique -- "the magical aura" about power which inspires awe, and facilitates endorsement; (c) interaction in the immediate group, which is the primary means through which endorsement occurs; and (d) group values, whether it be abilities, knowledge, or personal characteristics. How is power exercised? Folger and Poole (1984) point out that power takes on many guises in conflict. However, they discern four distinct modes in which it is exercised: 33 (a) directly in the form of physical, economic, and politi- cal resources used to force compliance; (b) virtually, where others' compliance is sought by communicating the potential use of direct force; (c) indirectly, where the use of power remains implicit and tacit; and (d) covertly, by hiding or suppressing potential issues, and thus masking the conse- quences of power. Folger and Poole (1984), in their recommendations on how to deal with power issues in conflict situations, sug- gest that we should determine power resources in the situa- tion and identify who holds power in that particular situa- tion; identify power through its effects; identify the person/s who label/s the conflict, for such an ability to label is‘a sign of power; and identify those who are "con- servative" or status quoists, for these are generally the members with power. Critigue e: the interpersonal communication model f pgye_. Lannamann (1991) notes that the mainstream defini- tion of power is that it is a "communicative product or process through which one person affects an intended behav- ioral or attitudinal change in another person" (p. 184). While there are significant differences in the theoretical constructs of power, "the common assumption of these ap- proaches to power in interpersonal communication studies is that the power is exerted by an individual upon an individu- al" (Lannamann, p. 184). Thus, one major shortcoming of the 34 interpersonal communication perspective on power is that it is long on the identification of power through the effects of power and short on the identification of it through the bases of power. A While Folger and Poole (1984) recommend that we identi- fy powerholders in particular situations, the bias in commu- nication research is to proceed directly to the study of behavioral manifestations (talk/interaction) of power rather than to the study of the origins of power. If, for example, some of the ways of exercising power is by hiding issues, or by implicit exercise, how can we know power is exercised by studying "behavior"? There are no explicit guidelines for studying this "hidden" exercise of power, thus making any such quest itself a "weak" quest. The second approach to power in interpersonal communi- cation is through the cybernetic or systemic perspective, Lannamann (1991) notes, and he points out that this perspec- tive also "mutes ideological concerns and fails to remedy the disjunction between micro and marco influences on ac- tion" (p. 185). The Folger and Poole (1984) conception of power is very clearly influenced by the systemic perspective though they have cited some research on "issue control" that could be seen as an attempt to analyze present social order, and therefore bring ideological concerns/ influences into the discussion of power . 35 Lannamann (1991) notes that the cybernetic orientation to interaction (and power) fails to address the ideological. By focusing on epistemological concerns, Lannamann notes, the cybernetic approach to power quibbles mainly with the conception of the "unilateral nature of power" (p. 185) and replaces it with the idea of "circular organization" (recip- rocal actions that complement initial actions). The result, according to him, is an epistemology that is "essentially conservative of the existing social order" (p. 186) and which fails to critically analyze how ideological practices shape the interpersonal context. Lannamann (1991) notes that media theorists, on the other hand, differ significantly from the individualist as well as the cybernetic approach to power by employing such concepts and categories as "class, institutions, the state, cultural elite, and so on" (p. 184). Power within such a perspective is not what emerges from the isolated dyad, but is a "set of influences emanating from features of the social, economic, and political landscape" (p. 185). Thus it is argued that while a microlevel analysis of power is necessary, the focusing on the smaller unit of analysis to the exclusion of larger social collectivities "masks the idelological basis of both what is studied and how we study it" (p. 185) . Lannamann (1991) therefore provides a new strategy for dealing with power in interpersonal contexts. A conception 36 of interpersonal power requires the discussion of three components, he posits: constraint, recursive pattern, and the role of the observer. A difference establishes con- straint. For example, in interpersonal communication, to say that the wife takes care of the home is to identify her domain of experience and thus recognize how those experi- ences constrain her actions. A recursive pattern of constraints is established as the initial distinctions/differences gain legitimacy through repetition, Lannamann (1991) points out. Once the pattern is established, the source or the history of the pattern is lost or obscured, and the pattern that is established can be tieascribed in terms of power. Finally, it has to be recognized that participants in a relationship may experience power in a positive manner. Lannamann (1991) gives the example of a traditional marital relationship in which the husband and wife may explain the aSymmetry of power in terms of personal choices and rela- tional goals. However, an observer might explain the same c31'1C>:i.ces as guided by social patterns of gender-role stereo- tYping. Thus the role of the observer is important in distinguishing the recursive constraints structuring a Participant's distinction of recursive choices. % Bases gt; Power: A Synthesis :3 above W From the discussion and critique of the common Sense, m"i‘j—l‘lstream sociological, Parsonian, and communication 37 science perspectives of power we can conclude that while each has to offer some useful and insightful analyses of power, all of them suffer from certain weaknesses. The common sense usage does not really allow any analysis of social power; the mainstream sociological perspective fo- cuses on the effects of power, and favors the analyses of individual power; the Parsonian conception seeks to under- stand the nature of power, but falls into the trap of the individual norms explanation; and the interpersonal communi- cation perspective, while explaining power as a relational outcome, has not effectively dealt with the ideological nature of relationships, and the effects of historical forces on the distribution and legitimation of power. To account for the individual, relational, and ideological bases of power, it might be useful to think of power as including four dimensions or bases -- the ideological, the institutional, the relational, and the individual -- with the ideological being the overarching dimension, and the individual being the micro dimension. Power is embedded in a set of prevailing social proc- eSSes, processes that define what is good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, right or wrong, and is manifest in the sal‘totioning of modes of conduct (to paraphrase Giddens, 1984, p. 18). This is the power of ideology. This power is exI>:l:'essed through discursive or non-discursive affirmations and sanctions (rewards and punishments for doing something F!!- I." e ..t On. ’1 (J. 1‘; rs) . n n (f 38 good or bad, right or wrong) by institutions, formal or informal in their constitution. It is generated, dissipat- ed, or shared in interaction (relational power) by individu- als who bring certain histories, characteristics and re- sources (individual power) to the interaction. The four dimensions have a dialectic relationship with each other. What I mean by this is that each dimension influences the other and is therefore in turn influenced. Thus they are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive catego- ties in the manner of "scientific" categorization. How then do we evaluate them? Christians and Carey (1989) point out that while there is a convergence of thinking between "ascience" and "qualitative studies" on the significance of conceptual clarity, qualitative research is concerned with concepts that yield "meaningful portraits and not statisti- cally precise formulations derived from artificial fixed Conditions" (p. 370). The emergence of power can be said to be dependent upon these bases. One can effectively exercise power if one can aceess or draw upon one, some, or all of the bases. The more the bases one can drawn upon, the more powerful one is. Thus, we can conceptualize power as "multiple dependencies." This is very much in the tradition of a systems perspective. H0wever, where I differ is to point out how some of these dimensions or bases are more influential or determinative of the outcomes. Such an identification is in the tradition of 39 caritical social science, and marks this study as different from the ones previously done in the realm of hostage nego- tiations. Thus, the police use of communication techniques should be studied in the context of the relative power distribution between the police and the hostage takers, for while neither of the two parties have "appealing best alternatives to a negotiated offer" (Fisher & Ury, 1981) what the police can offer, and what the hostage taker can demand are constrained to)? the ideological and institutional forces that direct and <:<:ntrol such events. The sole focus on the relational ' alsspects by the police and communication scholars therefore :Eaails to provide us the necessary insight to understand why £3<>me hostage negotiations fail and why many succeed. The police, in hostage negotiation situations, are able to‘ draw upon the ideological and institutional dimensions more effectively because they are the sanctioned enforcers <1f' law, while the hostage taker can and usually draws upon the relational and individual dimension to threaten and keep thE! police at bay. These dependencies may fluctuate depend- ing upon the unique hostage negotiation situation. Why and ho“? they fluctuate can be understood once the four dimen- sions are defined and their capacity to influence the out- °°me described. W M The modern concept of ideology, Foucault (1980) says, 40 is characterized by three interrelated qualities: (1) by definition, ideology is opposed to "truth", ideology being conceived of as "false representation"; (2) ideology is produced by an individual or a collectivity to hide the "truth", and consequently the analyst's task is to unmask this false representation; and reveal that (3) ideology is secondary to something more real. Foucault rejects all three claims, and suggests that if we see the problem of the subject, or representations, and of truth as social prac- tices, then the notion of ideology becomes problematic. He z>ntrolling various sorts of crime, and that the police employ the crime problem as "both a scare tactic and a rationale for their existence" (p. 370). More radical Cr itics, dismissing "conventional criticism" -- criticism tPeat focuses on police inefficiency, mismanagement, corrup- tion, brutality, etc -- argue that the absence of a histori- can, and class analysis "inevitably sets the stage for nihil- ism or a wishy-washy relativism, and their reform proposals are typically designed to shape new adjustments to corporate capitalism" (Platt & Cooper, 1974, p. 3). Such an analysis w<>uld recognize that crime is not committed just by people 46 ethoihave "psychological or biological" problems, but that <2rime is also the outcome of economic, political, social, 21nd institutional configurations. These configurations, and ‘tLhe presumption that crime can be identified and therefore controlled enable the labeling of acts committed by people that disturb public "order." While the concepts of "law," "order," and "crime" may be fraught with ambiguities, we can see how powerful groups czian control the adumbration of these concepts. Manning ( 1977) says that "control groups in modern society are power c>zriented" (p. 33), and that they "seek not only to survive £111 a competitive organizational environment but to expand 1:11eir power and thus to maintain the deference granted by <31:hers" (p. 33). How do they do this? Roucek and Patrick (21972) list some "instrumentalities and techniques" of £3<5cial control: custom and tradition, gossip, propaganda, GBCiucation, religion, and government and law. The police are an instituition established by law, and they use custom, gessip, education, propaganda, etc., to maintain the defer- erace granted it by the public. Active social control is defined as "a process by which £3(Dicial values are examined, and those that are dominant are i‘C‘itentified, and by which collective action to protect them is exercised" (Manning, 1977, p. 33). The police, as a 19<>Zlitical and a power-oriented group, seeks to maintain and e)‘F‘and social control by maximizing "appearances through the 47 Inanipulation of expressive symbols and defending their instrumentally defined interests within an environment (zomposed of numerous competing organizations and associa- tzions" (Manning, 1977, p.33). Below I will discuss how the J.abeling of hostage takers is an act of manipulating expres- ssive symbols. Labeling QT hostage takers ehg pheT; eepee Political hostaqe takerep. A "political hostage taker," commonly termed a terrorist, is described by the police as someone who uses or threatens violence to "achieve a social, politi- czal, or religious aim in a way that does not obey the tradi- tLional rules of war" (Soskis & Linowitz, 1987). This de- scription is a product of a particular type of ideological (iiscourse, and framed to ignore the problem of "social <3rder." This description also ignores the blatant flouting (of the "rules of war" by governments or states. The police description may account for some hostage takers, like in the Middle East, who are pitted against alien governments. But what about hostage takers, within societies, like the "Red Army" in Germany, and the IRA in Northern Ireland, whose members have taken hostages, or killed people to pressurize their own governments? Or what about hostage takers who may belong to "fringe groups" in society who seek a variety of changes -- members of animal rights groups, environment protection groups, anti-abortion groups, and so on? The police might simply brand them as 48 "mentally unstable," or "schizophrenic, paranoid" types (see, for example, Strentz, 1986). Thus, the label "mental- Sly ill" can replace "political" and would be an act of mnanipulating "expressive symbols." Is there any other way we can describe political hos- ‘t:age takers? Based on Therborn's analysis of the mechanism t:hat binds people ideologically to a particular regime or c>rder of society, we may define a political hostage taker as c>ne to whom the mechanism (accommodation, inevitability, ssense of representation, deference, fear, and resignation) :is not binding. Such hostage takers may act in such a nnanner so as to question the societal forces that legitimate i:he mechanisms through their discourse and through sanctions iand affirmations, or to question those members (the ordinary Inajority) who have allowed themselves to be bound by those mechanisms . We could define political hostage takers as "victims" of the prevailing social order who compound the problem by victimizing innocent people (hostages) who become pawns in the political "game" between the hostage takers and the police who represent the prevailing "order." hentally T11 hostage taker. While in the past almost every little community had its own "village idiot," few saw them as problems or disturbers of social order. In modern societies, however, the mentally ill are perceived as such, and the police, as protectors of public order, play a large 49 rwole in dealing with the mentally ill (Mann, 1973). Three Ciecades ago, Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) reported that c>ften a policeman's perception and evaluation of an individ- Llal's behavior was crucial in deciding whether the individu- all was sent to a jail, the state hospital, or some treatment facility. Bittner (1967) reports that legal norms specify police jgnvolvement in the care, custody, and control of the mental- ]qy ill. This happens under two conditions: when a court cxrder mandates the police to seek out, detain, and bring the 13erson to a psychiatric facility, when the police are dis- ;Jatched (via radio) to a situation involving a mental case, (or when the police encounter someone who is defined as Inentally ill. Manning (1984) says that the category "mentally ill" is a."gloss on certain 'powerless' and unaccountable people ‘whether or not a warrant has been issued" (p. 179). He quotes Teplin's (1983) research which found that suspects who were mentally ill had significantly higher arrest rates (47.6%) than did suspects having no mental disorder (28.2%). This was true regardless of the type and seriousness of the offense. Manning (1984) says that officers use arrest as a screening device, passing the buck to other agencies to take further decisions. In cases where it is known that a person is mentally ill, operators who receive calls from such persons do not take the matter further, regardless of the 50 (content of the call. Manning reports that all calls from tihat address are treated as if they are from the same call- ear, and thus ignored. The police labeling of the mentally ill in a hostage ssituation can be seen as another exercise in the manipula- 1:Lion of expressive symbols. The police list four types of indentally disturbed hostage takers -- the paranoid, the Clepressed, the antisocial, and the inadequate personalities. [Jrawing from the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnos- t:ic and Statistical Manual, various analysts at the FBI Ikcademy at Quantico have described paranoid schizophrenics (Strentz, 1986), the inadequate personality (Strentz, 1983), and the antisocial personality (Lanceley, 1981) . The descriptions of mental illnesses in these papers, ssimilar to those published in medical journals, provide {guidelines to individual negotiators for diagnosing the Inental condition of the hostage taker so as to categorize him into one of the "mentally ill" groups. However, we have to remember that these negotiators have to come to conclu- Sions based just on their talk over telephone or radio with the hostage taker. Thus, these papers paint broad brush- Strokes of description, for example, characterizing male paranoid schizophrenics as experiencing sexual identity and religious orientation problems (Strentz, 1986), or the inadequate personality as being generally good-natured except for his inability to persevere in anything (Strentz, 51 21983). Such descriptions might lead negotiators to use these rather simple and easy generalizations to label the 110stage taker and to proceed to use the style of negotiation lorescribed, thus reifying the label, the negotiation, and 1:he outcome. Communication scholars, like the ordinary public, (zonfident in police "professionalism," haven't inquired into t:he process of such a labeling activity. Indeed, people tiave psychological problems, and indeed, such people could i:ake hostages. However, a lack of critical inquiry into tooth the incidences of such acts as well as the police [merception and handling of them would be adding to the loolice power to manipulate expressive symbols. The accept- ance of police labeling also means that we accept their "negotiation" strategies in such situations. grimiheT hgepege taker. Serious crimes are called felonies, and include robbery, theft, rape, and murder. Minor crimes are called misdemeanors, and include some form of "disturbance of peace" like drunkenness or disorderly behavior. The criminal hostage taker, according to the police, is someone who has a previous crime record (the police do not specify whether the record includes felonies, misdemeanors, or both), or who has taken a hostage while in the act of committing a crime (again, no mention is made whether hostages are taken when committing a felony or a misdemeanor, though hostage taking itself would constitute a 52 felony). The police believe that it is easier for them to Cieal with criminal hostage takers because such persons know 1:he ways of the police, and the police know something about t:he criminal mentality and may have knowledge of the offend- eer because of his crime record. To summarize, ideological power is the power to control :naeanings. This control is exercised by the police who almost exclusively have the power to define what is crime, Juabel people who commit those crimes, and categorize the (Iriminal acts. But the police don't just have ideological power. Ideological power is hollow without the sanctioning/affirming force of institutional power, and the pnelice are vested with that force, in a sense, to match their bark with their bite. Inseiphtional m Institutions exercise power by sanctioning certain Inodes of conduct, and through discursive and non-discursive affirmations and sanctions. What are institutions? Giddens (1984) defines institutions as structural properties "hier- archically organized in terms of the time-space extension of the practices they recursively organize" (p.17). What he means is that interactants in certain settings reify the setting by using their knowledge of that institutional order (setting) to talk to each other. By talking to each other in a certain manner, or acting in certain ways, they render their exchange "meaningful." But this also leads to their 53 Jreproducing the institutional order. Thus it is that insti- 1:utions become real. Giddens reminds us that this "reality" (or "facticity" of institutional order is linked to power, Vehich "it both expresses and facilitates in the details of 1:he interaction" (p.331). Debnam (1984) says institutions exercise power when tzhey develop a "corporate" identity that acts as a motive on t:he minds of people. Another way of explaining a collectiv- :ity or institution exercising power is by referring to :institutional rules which produce effects that do not neces- ssarily represent what individual members might have decided :if they had approached the problem afresh (pp. 18-21). Let me give an example of how this occurs. Kirkham (1985), a Ph.D. in criminology, and teaching at an universi- ‘ty'in Florida, decides to experience firsthand the rigors of being a policeman. After a four—month training in a police academy, he becomes a patrolman with the Jacksonville-Duval county. Writing about one of his experiences dealing with a young man who had double-parked in the middle of the street, and how the situation escalated into a dangerous confronta- tion with the crowd that had gathered to witness the inci- dent, he concludes, "As a policeman, however, I had come to realize that an officer can never back down from his respon- sibility to enforce the law. Whatever the risk to himself, every police officer understands that his ability to back up the lawful authority which he represents is the only thing 54 which stands between civilization and the jungle of lawless- ness" (p. 32). In Kirkham's case we see how the "corporate" identity influences one's estimation of the situation, and the alter- natives available for resolving the situation. Manning (1988) therefore defines organizations (and here, I extend them to be synonymous with institutions) as "phenomena, representations of the meaning of membership, lenses by which the problem of the external world are routinized and made available to members, and power systems" (p. 34) . Therefore the police, as an institution, graft onto the Vvorld their understandings of "social causation, justice, tlruth, obligation, duty, and the character of social and juridically bounded relations" (p.33) . Kirkham (1985) writes, "Free love advocates and hate- monger revolutionaries do not apologize for their group memberships, so why should someone whose appearance symbol- izes a commitment to serve and protect society" (p. 35). Such feelings and sentiments can surely lead to the police acquiring a vested interest in maintaining these "construct- ed realities," and they will not hesitate to "manipulate IDeerformance figures, distort intelligence and misuse it s)(stematically and intentionally to create 'crime waves, ' and develop new, often self-serving strategies in response to their own assembled environmental creation" (Manning, 1988, p.34). 55 The other side of the coin, Manning (1977) points out, is that the police must carry out "fundamental control functions in American society, not only because such is 1:heir legal and political mandate but because there are Earecious few alternative means by which the construction and rnaintenance of public order can be accomplished" (p. 17). The term "police" is derived from the Greek word for czity, pgTTe (Patrick, 1972). And, in fact, the evolution of [Dolice systems has followed the emergence and development of (zities, Patrick (1972) points out. As an institution, the {Dolice are a powerful arm of the executive branch in all Inodern societies. Though the image and the actions of the snolice may differ from society to society (from the "brutal" snolice force in totalitarian societies to the "kindly" London "bobby") , police everywhere have increasing powers ‘vested in them for maintaining "law and order." The police iare "collectives", who follow "rules" for exercising power, and who expect and cause the "public" to act in certain ways. The range of police functions is said to include (a) Preserving order, (b) protecting life and property, (c) apprehending and arresting offenders, (d) preventing crime, (£3) engaging in community services, and (f) protecting an iridividual's legal rights and freedom (Patrick, 1972). We can conclude with Bittner (1975) , however, that the unifying falctor in police work is the situationally justified use of 56 force or the threat of the use of force. Similarly, Shear- ing and Leon (1977) claim that what makes police work unique is police capability and police license: capability is the iaccess to physical force and law enforcement; and license is the authority to use these resources. The police are the ones vested with powers to deal with 110stage takers because many of the hostage takers are armed Vvith guns, and thus pose a threat to the lives of the hos- 1:ages or others involved in the situation. The police, an iarmed force, are equipped and authorized to deal with such :situations. They have the material and the option to storm ‘the place where the hostage taker has taken refuge or is liolding the hostages. At this point, it is necessary to interject a short :summary of the problem of gun ownership in this country. ‘While there are no comparative figures available for the use of guns in crimes, the U.S. ranks highest in terms of per «zapita ownership of guns, and the highest rate of homicides lasing guns (Ellis, 1992). No hostage situation can be istudied meaningfully without an analysis of the role guns llave played in this society. The police SWAT team, equipped with special weapons and tirained in a variety of tactics to disarm, disenable, and c=apture people, is usually in place before negotiations tIegin with the hostage taker. One of the first things that t:Ihe police seek to know in a hostage situation is whether 57 ‘the hostage taker has and is threatening to use a gun. The jpossession of a gun by the hostage taker alters the police's "battle plans." The use of force to get the hostages re- .leased or to capture the hostage taker then is an option for izhe police depending upon their estimation of the hostage 1taker's mental status and/or the actual events that have Inarked the hostage situation. The use of force is resorted 1:0 only in a few cases, it is claimed, because the police tiave realized that it poses a threat to their own lives as Vvell as that of the hostages (Taylor, 1983). However, the ‘threat of the use of force influences (explicitly or implic- .itly) the negotiation process and the perceptions and out- <:omes of police talk. The "power" of the police is known to ‘the police, the hostage takers, and those others in society tvho have delegated the authority to act to the police. 'Thus, the combination of ideological and institutional power should be recognized as the driving force enabling the police to "negotiate" with hostage takers. Does it mean then building trust, reducing anxiety, and (Batering to face needs of the hostage taker do not contrib— llte to the resolution of hostage negotiations? I will next elaborate on relational power, and how such power contrib- Lltes to the outcomes in crisis bargaining situations. Relationa 1 Power Folger and Poole (1984) define power as the "ability to Milafluence or control events" (p. 111), and see it as 58 stemming from relationships among members. If power is a rwelationship attribute it seems reasonable to argue that iJadividuals can exert mutual power over each other. The tdieoretical positions that focus upon social relationships Eire social exchange theories and relational control theo- lries. Chief among the former are Blau's (1964), and Thibaut Eand Kelley's (1959) theories. What they highlight is that Ibower is determined by joint actions of individuals, that Eaersons may enact behavioral alternatives which may reduce <>thers' power, and that persons in power are never complete- Zly secure as needs and wants may change, thus redefining Vehat is rewarding and costly to each other. The "social categorization" process, as mentioned Gearlier, creates perceptions about who are powerful and who Eire weak. Such associations set up expectations that sup- ;£>ort or negate power moves by people from various categories of people, Folger and Poole (1984) posit. If the police are seen as powerful or as the upholders of law and order, their Irl<>vverless we may see him give up easily. However, such a 59 perception could also lead to the hostage taker seeking to end the confrontation by killing himself or by some other precipitous action. This is what Folger and Poole (1984) term the dangers of weakness. ' If the negotiating parties cannot get to trust each other, or if they do not empathize with the dilemmas of the other party, negotiations would be deadlocked. For example, the hostage taker must believe that he won't be shot after he has released the hostages, or that he will not be charged ‘vith crimes other than what the police indicate to him while laegotiating for the release of the hostages. So it is important in a hostage situation for the police negotiators to get the hostage taker to trust them. The central assumptions of relational control theories is that when individuals interact with each other, the messages they exchange communicate at two different levels simultaneously -- the content level and the relationship level (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). This is to say that a communication not only conveys information ( content), but that at the same time imposes behavior ( relationship). The important contribution of the relation- a 1 control position is its focus upon actual messages that are exchanged in the interaction. Communication scholars studying hostage negotiations have done so using the relational control perspective. They haVe studied how trust is built or undermined in the various 60 pflnases of different types of hostage negotiation, and they lmave done this using a "verbal immediacy" measure to deter- nnine the extent to which the relationship evolves in a more cnooperative or competitive manner (Donohue et al., 1990). frheir work Suggests that the competitive/cooperative inter- iaction follows certain patterns within the three types of Ilostage taking situations -- the criminal, the mental, and 1:he domesticl. Fuselier (1986) points out that domestic hostage takers gyenerally suffer from some form of depression due to domes- tzic problems -- marital relations, child custody, and such :issues. These hostage takers require support and under- sstanding from the negotiators to enable them to trust the I>olice. The focus then has to be on building trust by czonveying empathy, calming the hostage taker, providing czertain assurances, and getting the hostage taker to gain some perspective on the situation that would enable him to realize that releasing the hostage would be the best course of action available to him. Language is the vehicle, and the means for the expres- 8 :ion of power, and for building trust and intimacy in a ereelationship. Language, an abstract system of rules -- phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic (Gudykunst Gert; al., 1989), serves as a means of expressing, manipulat- ing, and transforming power relations (Giles and Wiemann, 1987) . The police are trained to use language that would 61 enable them to build trust, reduce hostage taker anxiety, guide the hostage taker's thinking in particular directions, and so on. If they are to do that with any degree of suc- cess they have to know the characteristics of the hostage taker. It also means that the police negotiator should possess certain characteristics. Both of those will be discussed next as part of individual power. Individual m As pointed out earlier, the mainstream approach to power is that it is a communicative product through which one person affects an intended behavioral or attitudinal Change in another person (Lannamann, 1991) . It is noted that there are a number of theories that have enabled this individualist conceptualization possible. These theories, according to Lannamann, include locus of control (Heider, 1958), individual motivation (Veroff & Veroff, 1972), traits (Roloff & Barnicott, 1978), situation traits (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977), intentional versus unintentional Power (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) , ends versus means (Berger, 1985) , and passive versus active responses to power and r‘esistance to power (Berger, 1985) . The resources an individual can employ to exert power can be many. French and Raven (1959) and Wilmot and Wilmot (1978) list special skills or abilities, expertise about the t-ask at hand, personal attractiveness or likability, control o\Ier rewards and/or punishments, formal position in a group 62 or organization, loyal allies, persuasive skills, and con- trol over critical possessions as some of those resources. Individual hostage takers and police negotiators bring certain unique resources, and characteristics to the hostage situation. Police negotiators are trained to talk and interact in certain ways that enable them to build trust, control the flow of interaction, guide the hostage taker to particular options, and so on. The police seek out those officers who have "good" communication skills, who can exercise patience, and who can stand long and tiring hours of work to be hostage negotiators (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986) . As such, we may not encounter much variability in the resources that individual police negotiators bring to the hostage situation. Hostage takers, however, bring that variability. The personality of the hostage taker, and the reasons for which he has taken someone hostage are unique to a hostage situa- tion. We have seen that the police categorize broadly hostage takers into the "criminal," the "mental," and the "political" types. It is claimed that the police mostly e“counter the first two types in this country, and that it is rare for them to deal with a political hostage taker (Strentz, 1983) . The resources that a hostage taker brings into a hos- t-age situation includes not only his mental/affective state and personality and physical characteristics but also the 63 number and type of hostages, the type/s of weapons he has in his possession, the number, varieties and specificity of demands he makes, the vulnerability of the physical locale in which he is holding the hostages, and so on. Personality and physical characteristics of the partic- ipants involved in an interaction influence language behav- ior (Robinson, 1984). Scherer (1979) has reviewed studies showing that such qualities of individuals as extraversion and depression can be indicated linguistically. The police have to focus on various speech markers to estimate the hostage taker's mental status, and be mindful of their own speech to make sure it doesn't trigger negative reactions from the hostage taker. The speech markers of the hostage taker that the police have to focus on are what Laver and Trudgill (1979) call "psychological markers? (those that mark psychological characteristics of personality and affec- tive state), and "physical markers" (those that mark physi- cal characteristics such as age, sex, physique and state of health). The police have to be sensitive to some of their own "group markers" (those that indicate membership of a group) for, as Fuselier (1986) points out, some of the Inentally disturbed hostage takers react in a hostile manner ‘to "therapeutic" talk. These hostage takers have some 111story of being counseled, and they might carry a grouse against doctors or counselors. 64 The individual hostage taker has power -- over his own life, and the life of the hostage/s -- but he is constrained in the use of that power. As Giddens (1984) points out, "in power struggles the dialectic of control always operates, although what use agents in subordinate positions can make of the resources open to them differs very substantially between different social contexts" (p. 283-284). While the hostage taker has the power to kill or maim the hostages or himself, the option is not attractive. If hezkills the hostage/s he can expect either to be killed by tune police or to be arrested, arraigned, and given a long prison term, or even the death sentence. If he kills him- self, the hostage taker cannot get his demands met. The hostage taker also is weakened by the act of taking someone hostage because public perception of such acts is that it is against public order. Hostage taking is a "criminal act" and anyone who commits such acts immediately puts himself in a position of weakness. Thus, the "power" that the hostage taker has by holding someone hostage is indeed tenuous at best. Instead of enabling the hostage taker to act or to influence events, in real terms such an act disables the hostage taker to negotiate with those he has quarrels with. It may be argued that the holding of hostages empowers the hostage taker at least temporarily, and that many "domestic" hostage takers do take hostages to overcome their feelings of powerlessness. The holding of hostages draws 65 media attention, and the hostage taker may enjoy a temporary "high" because of the attention (power). This argument is valid to the extent that one ignores the other social influ- ences determining the situation. Once the hostage taker realizes the situation in which he has put himself, he recognizes his weakness. The only hostage takers who can use hostages as a "resource" and empower themselves are those who are mentally ill. They are powerful because they don't realize their situation. I have argued that communication scholars have focused too much on the relational aspects of hostage negotiations to the detriment of a more basic analysis of the influence of power in such situations. I have tried to make the case fom a re-analysis of the nature of power, and how power influences the outcomes in hostage negotiations. I have delineated a four-tier model of power to understand the nature and effects of power, and at this point it is neces- sary to ask how such a model enables us to study outcomes in hostage situations. Research Questions Question #1. What dimension/s of power are exhibited in hos tage negotiations, and how might they have determined the outcome in different types of hostage situations? Or, why do certain negotiations succeed, and why do others fail? Question #2. What are the problems in the existing strate- gies that the police pursue in resolving hostage situations, 66 and what alternative strategies do the police have in re- solving hostage situations? The first question will be answered by analyzing three actual hostage negotiation transcripts in chapters four, five, and six. These three chapters not only provide an- swers to the first question, they provide the plank for discussing the second question. Such a discussion is rele- gated to chapter seven. The discussion therein not only draws upon the results from chapters four, five, and six, but also includes an analysis of recommendations made by rxolice professionals and academics regarding the alterna- ‘tives available to communities in dealing with problems of law and order, and crime. Chapter Four: Methods In this study of hostage negotiations I have posited that power is the determining factor in the outcome of negotiations. I have argued that while therapeutic talk has its influence in guiding the hostage taker toward particular actions, such influence is only possible because of the play of power. In the previous chapter I have described the nature and bases of power, and have argued for a macro analysis of the :Lnfluence of power in hostage situations. Such analyses are lmeeded to provide the bulwark for micro analyses of "crisis bargaining" situations which have predominated in the work of communication scholars in the past few years. What are the methods that enable us to do fruitful Imacro analyses? In this particular instance, my research questions demand answers about the (1) contexts of particu- lar hostage situations; (2) details of the actual negotia- tions; (3) interpretations about the contexts, details, and outcomes of the events and negotiations that indicate the influence and play of power; and (4) alternatives available to the police in such situations. Contextual Analysis Christians and Carey (1989) suggest that researchers involved in bringing out the distinctive elements of the 67 68 case should become "masters of context" (p.362). Context includes the immediate -- where, when, and what; and the background -- the social and historical contexts. Such research avoids the assumption that the phenomenon under study is autonomous. For the purposes of this research endeavor I will not only provide the broad, general context for domestic hostage negotiations but also the immediate contexts of each of the hostage situations (through newspaper accounts of those hos ‘tage situations). Newspaper accounts would constitute secondary sources, and transcripts would consitute primary sources. For providing the broad, general context I will redy on newspaper accounts, and books and articles on hos- tage situations. Qescriptive Analysis Hostage taking situations tend to be unique in the sense that contextual features differ from situation to Situation. Thus, we may have two "mentally disturbed" hostage takers in two hostage taking situations, but the situations could differ in a number of important character- istics: the number of hostages held, the relationship of the hostages to the hostage taker, the place where the hostages are held, the demands of the hostage taker, the physical and the mental conditions of the hostages and the hostage taker/s, the time of police intervention, the length of negotiation, and so on. Newspaper accounts are incomplete 69 because reporters are not privy to the minute by minute transactions between the hostage taker and the police. It is therefore necessary to provide details of the negotiation through documentary research. Here, the documents include transcripts of actual hostage negotiations. Interpretive Analysistantasy Theme Analysis People interpret. They do not merely react or respond; they interpret experience through the agency of culture (Christians and Carey, 1989). Interpretive research focuses «on "the study of meanings, that is, the way invididuals make :sense of their world through their communicative behaviors" (Putnam, 1983, p.31). One of the basic tasks for social scientists then seems to be to interpret these interpreta- tions to enable the understanding of human activities (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979; Denzin, 1983). From the transcripts, we know both the hostage takers and police negotiators make meaning of each other's utter- ances. My task is to interpret the meanings they construct from their communicative behavior. The meanings that are germane to this study are those of power. How does the hostage taker interpret the police negotiator's utterances? Interpretations can be done by analyzing discourse. hostage negotiations can be termed "interactive discourse" which Smith (1988) describes as being "characterized by alternating source and receiver roles" (p. 237). Interac- tive discourse analysis includes systematic methods for 70 describing, explaining, and evaluating the structure and function of rules governing conversations (McLaughlin, 1984). However, my research is not concerned with discourse ’in that sense and thus neither specifically deals with linguistic questions, nor with the variations in the lan- guage of various social groups and group-member cognitions. I am interested in finding out how meanings are constructed both explicitly and implicitly by hostage takers and police negotiators not just through their talk but from their "situations." What method/s do I have to do such an interpretation? Cemtain rhetorical analytic techniques provide some opportu- nities for such an exploration, especially fantasy theme analysis in the genre of dramatistic criticism. According to»Bormann (1972, 1982), narrative discourse entails four redated components: fantasy themes, fantasy types, rhetori- cal visions, and rhetorical communities. Eantasy themes are Stories or dramatic references in a message that presents Characters. The fantasy theme is essentially a "myth" about a particular incident "which is put forward as containing or suggesting some general truth" (Sykes, 1970) . A fantasy flag is a general category of recurring fantasy themes appearing in a series of related messages. Rhetorical Xisign refers to "shared fantasies or composite dramas that capture the imagination and allegiance of sizable groups of 71 people" (Smith, 1988), and a rhetorical community consists of the people who share rhetorical visions. Since "fantasy theme analysis" is geared toward analyz- ing "narrative discourse" it may be asked how suitable it is for analyzing hostage negotiations. According to Foss (1989), Bormann (1972, 1982) not only extended the notion of fantazising into a theory but also argued that such analysis would be appropriate in the study of the communication of social movements, political campaigns, organizational commu- nication, and various other kinds of rhetoric. Glaser and JFrank (1982) used fantasy theme analysis to study interper— somal discourse. Heisey and Trebing (1983) examined select- «ed rhetorical documents of the Shah of Iran and the Ayatol- lah Khomeini using fantasy theme analysis to identify each leader's rhetorical visions and strategies.' Thus, there is precedence for using this analytical tool to examine a variety of discourse. My point too is that I am not only analyzing the actual transcripts of hostage negotiations but also secondary evidence like newspaper reports, writings by hostage negotiators, and analyses by social scientists. Supplemented by some critical commentary, I believe that fantasy theme analysis provides me a handy tool for inter- pretdng the interpretations of hostage takers, police nego- tiators, and the "public," in whose realm the hostage drama is played out. . 72 Another problem using fantasy theme analysis is that Bormann (1985) distinguishes between a "dramatic situation that takes place in the immediate context of the group and a dramatized communication shared by the group" (Foss, 1989, p. 291). For Bormann, the action unfolding in the immediate experience of the group would not qualify as a basis for the sharing of a group fantasy. Thus, my analysis of the actual hostage transcripts would be out of bounds within the fanta- sy theme framework. Also, since my analysis includes interpretations of individual actors' utterances, and not "group members' utterances," it will not fit snugly within the bounds of traditional fantasy theme analysis.’ But I believe methodo- 1C’gical frameworks are plastic, and that one can creatively use them if they so lend themselves. Foss (1989) reminds us that fantasy theme analysis is appropriate when, for exam- ple "group members begin talking about a conflict some of 0 them had in the past or if they envision a future conflict" (P~ 291). I argue that in a hostage situation, where the POI ice and hostage takers are not negotiating face to face, each party tends to dramatize their messages for each other. Such dramatized messages may be termed "fantasies," similar t° how Bormann characterizes group members' messages of Characters, actions, and settings "that are removed from the aetual current group situation in time and place" (Foss, 1939 . p. 291). 73 Bormann's (1972, 1982) symbolic convergence theory is based on two major assumptions: the first assumption is that communication creates reality. Foss (1989) interprets this to mean that communication creates reality because of its capacity to "introduce form and law into a disordered senso- ry experience" (p. 289) . This is the same as the notion that rhetoric is epistemic, whichmeans that rhetoric creates knowledge. The second assumption is that symbols not only create reality for individuals but that individuals' meanings for Symbols can converge to create a m reality for partici- pants (Foss, 1989). Thus, while the message is important the sharing of the message is even more significant. As indicated earlier, the basic unit of symbolic con- vergence theory and fantasy theme criticismis fantasy or My theme. Fantasy, in this context, refers to the way eVents are interpreted creatively and imaginatively (Foss, 1989), and not in the popular sense of something unreal and nil"‘aginary." The fantasy theme could be encapsuled in a Word, phrase, or statement that "interprets events in the past, envisions events in the future, or depicts current QVents that are removed in time and/or space from the actual actiVities of the group" (Foss, 1989, p. 290). These fanta- sy themes tell stories that account for the group's experi- ences, and they become the reality for the members of the group . 74 We can analyze the group's fantasy theme, or rhetorical vision by examining three elements: setting, characters, and action. According to Foss and Littlejohn (1986), the inter- action of these elements within a group determines what is legitimate "reality" or not for group members. This inter- action also enables us to gain insights into the group's mo tives, values, attitudes, and so on. Bormann (1985) distin- guishes between the actual situation that takes place in the immediate context of a group and a dramatized communication shared by the group. For example, in a hostage situation we should distinguish the events that occur in the immediate context of police negotiators and the police force involved in the action and the version that they share with each Other and the public. Fantasies are characterized by organizational and artSistic quality, and they are designed to provide the most or edible interpretation of the experiences of group members. FOSS (1989) elaborates: "regardless of the qualities of the falrItasies, they always present an interpretation or a bias and attempt to persuade others of the correctness of the per‘Spective" (p. 291)‘. She also points out that there exiSts a close relationship between fantasies and argumenta- tion in that "shared fantasies are a necessary and prior cm“iition for arguments" (p. 291) . Thus the police, for example, might assume precedent or past experience as the 75 basis for arguing particular courses of action or outcomes of action. The next important component in fantasy theme criticism is fantasy type. When a community shares similar scenarios involving similar scenes, actors, and settings they begin to share a fantasy type. Once such a type has developed, group members can simply provide the general story line of the fantasy type, and the audience is able to call up particu- lars of the entire scenario. Foss (1989) claims that fanta- sy types allow a group to fit new events or experiences into familiar patterns: "If a new experience can be portrayed as an instance of a familiar fantasy type, the new experience is brought into line with the group's values and emotions," (P- 292) she posits. In hostage negotiations we can see the categorization of hostage takers as criminals, the mentally ill. or terrorists providing the police necessary fantasy tYpes. The public as well as the police themselves as andience can then recall or provide details of hostage taking events given the general story line spun by the I“ml-ice at the scene of the hostage taking event. The next component, ghgtggiga; yigign, refers to a "unified putting together of the various shared fantasies" (Bormann, 1983, p. 114). The rhetorical vision contains tautasy themes relating to setting, actors, and actions that °°“Verge to form a coherent interpretation of reality. Foss “939) indicates that rhetorical visions are often 76 integrated by the sharing of a dramatizing message that contains a master analogy. Examples of master analogies that Foss (1989) provides include t_h_e Cold WarJ Black Power, and the moral majority. What sorts Of rhetorical visions do the police, the hostage takers, the media and the public have of hostage events? The people who share and participate in a rhetorical vision form a rhetorical 9mg. They not only share common symbolic ground but respond to messages in ways that are compatible with their rhetorical vision (Foss, 1989) . Bormann (1983) states that the rhetorical community "will Cheer references to the heroic persona in their rhetorical vision. They will respond with antipathy to allusions to the villains. They will have agreed-upon procedures for Problem-solving communication. They will share the same ViSion of what counts as evidence, how to build a case, and how to refute an argument" (p. 115) . The rhetorical vision provides the motive for action. The actions may make little sense to those outside of a rhe tQt‘ical community. Foss (1989) gives the example of a "mar tyr" or a "terrorist" whose willingness to die for a cause as an action propelled by a rhetorical vision, and an action that others might not understand or see as absurd. However, “‘CE we discover the rhetorical vision of the actor we can batter explain why that individual acted that way. 77 Finally, what are the procedures for discovering the world view shared by a community? Foss (1989) advocates five: (1) finding evidence of the sharing of fantasy themes or a rhetorical vision; (2) coding the rhetorical artifact(s) for setting, character, and action themes; (3) construction of the rhetorical vision(s) on the basis of the fantasy theme/s; (4) naming the motive for the visions identified; and (5) assessment of the group's rhetorical vision. From the contextual, documentary, descriptive and interpretive analyses, I expect to detect the constellation Of forces -- the immediate and background contexts of hos- tage taking, the police's labelling process, the resources and skills each party employ, the individual characteristic 0f hostage takers -- that highlight the play of various dimensions of power. From this, I will be able to detect the deficiency in the advocacy of certain strategies for res»<>lving hostage situations by the police and communication scientists. 1% Search fog Alternatives What are the alternatives available to the police and the public in resolving hostage situations? It is my inten- tion not only to understand hostage negotiations but to try and seek answers to how hostage situations can be dealt “it-h. "Negotiations" are put forward as almost an ideal means for resolving such crises. However, we notice from 78 accounts in the media, as well as from transcripts of hos- tage negotiations that some negotiations fail and that such failure is costly in terms of human lives as well as re- sources that the police expend in dealing with such situa- tions. Are there ways that would reduce or eliminate such costs? What are they? Can they be implemented and, if so, how? If not, why not? Through critical commentary as well as analyses of other law and order situations (for example, the prudence of "high speed police chases") I hope to provide some alterna- tives for dealing with hostage situations. Transcripts The hostage negotiation transcripts were obtained from the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia by communication Scholars in the Department of Communication, Michigan State University. The interactions were transcribed from original amCiio recordings provided by law enforcement officials at the scene of the incident. The transcripts that I have chOsen to analyze are: 1) The zeppell igeigeflt (January 15, 1977), in which William "Tony" Buffington shoots and kills his girlfriend J°hnna Marie Jessee, then himself after holding the manager of the Yarnell branch of the Valley National Bank hostage ft”? a protracted time and then releasing her. 2) Frontier Airlines hijacking (October 20, 1977). “ichael Hannan hijacks a flight from Grand Island, Nebraska, 79 and orders the pilot to land in Atlanta. After a 10-hour standoff he releases all the passengers and crew but kills himself after failing to get his gay lover, George Stewart, released from prison. 3) Judson Dean Talley incident (November 29, 1984). Talley, 20, hijacks an Augusta-to-Atlanta commuter plane and holds the pilot and co-pilot hostage after releasing the 10 passengers. He surrenders to the police after five hours. The reasons for choosing these three cases is that the newspaper reports describing these incidents is much more detailed than the reports of other incidents, whose tran- scripts I have in my possession. Out of the 12 transcripts in my possession, I have been able to track down the news- Paper reports of eight of them. Of these eight, three represented unsuccessful negotiations (where the hostage takers killed themselves), and five were successful negotia- ti(311$ (hostages released, and hostage takers surrendered). Gi\'en the nature of my research questions, I wanted to analyze at least two successful, and two unsuccessful nego- tiations. However, I had to trim the number of analyses to thli‘ee because of the bulky nature of the analysis. Chapter Five: Yarnell Bank Holdup Contextua 1 Ana 1ys is Context. William Thomas Buffington (Tony), 31, and his girlfriend and accomplice, Johnna Marie Jessee (Whiskey), 224. died in an apparent murder-suicide after a 10-hour standoff with the police at the Valley National Bank branch in.‘Yarnell, a small town of 750 in Arizona on January 14, 1977. Tony and Whiskey had planned to rob the bank on that Frticiay, early morning, and get away but their attempt was apparently foiled when, according to Whiskey, "evidently scuneebody saw us coming around the back" (Wayman, 1977, p. A-24) . According to the police, the day-long episode began at aITDLInd 8:30 a.m. when Tony "forced" his way through the back dCNDI: of the bank at gunpoint. The attempted bank robbery was aborted when a sheriff's deputy spotted Whiskey, who had a rifle in her hnds, in a wooded area behind the bank. Whi 1e the chronology of events as reported in the newspapers is a little confusing, it seems that Tony took four people in the bank hostage only when he knew that Whiskey had been arr‘ested. He tried to negotiate his freedom for that of the safety of the hostages. Yet another chronology recounts that Mrs. Dunne (the bank manager) was in the bank at about 8‘3() a.m. with teller Sue Welch, and Mrs. Welch's daughter 80 81 Mona, 11. Mrs. Dunne's husband, Gene, 56, arrived moments later with some mail. As Gene turned to leave, he was met at the door by Tony and forced back to a room where Tony directed Mrs. Welch to tape Gene's hands behind his back. At this time, Mrs. Dunne induced Tony to release Mona. Meanwhile, the police who had exchanged some gunfire with Whiskey and arrested her, took her to a restaurant across the street from the bank. Tony, the police claim, called the restaurant and offered to exchange two of his tarree remaining hostages for his girlfriend. The police t<>ok Whiskey's shoes and coat and sent her into the bank. 4A£:cording to the Yavapai country sheriff, Harold "Curly" llc>ore, Tony and Whiskey were apparently ready to give up aI:‘ound 10 a.m., but changed their mind when they got a call fr‘om officials of the Valley National Bank who offered $ 25,000 and a ride out of town if Mrs. Dunne was released LlY‘aharmed. FBI Agent David Small, however, told Tony that when the bElnk official came, "we are going to set him down and let hIi'Lm do nothing" (Wayman, 1977, p. A-24). Small then contin- ‘Jiad trying to persuade Tony to surrender. Shortly after rNoon, Tony told the police that he would release Mrs. Dunne at 3 p.m. and then determine what action he and Whiskey Would take. But Mrs. Dunne was not released at the promised time. Tony wanted to talk to his mother in Amarillo, Texas before releasing Mrs. Dunne. Tony finally reached his 82 mother, talked to her, and then released the bank manager. Mrs. Dunne, the bank manager, ran from the bank building after Whiskey had picked up a pack of cigarettes that the police had thrown in front of the bank door. After Mrs. Dunne had been released, Tony told FBI agent Small that he and Whiskey needed 20 minutes to think things over. At the end of that time he said that he had decided ‘U: lcill Whiskey and then kill himself. The situation re- imuir1ed unresolved till 6:30 p.m. (Wayman, 1977, p. A-1) or 6:113 p.m. (Mills, 1977, p.1) when Tony called the police, and the police heard two gun shots. The police fired tear gas shells into the bank building as they entered it, and they found Tony dead with a massive head wound, and Whiskey bleeding from a wound in her left temple. Whiskey died in an ambulance en route to the hospital. According to Wayman (1977, p. A-l), Tony had been wOli'kziJ'ag as a bartender in Yarnell since his arrival there six nuonths previously. He was wanted on a fugitive warrant frOmNew Mexico. Whiskey also worked briefly in a Yarnell bar. 'The police, according to the newspaper, claimed that theii: attempts to convince Tony to surrender had been ham- Pered by "unofficial telephone calls" and by bank officials' negotiations with the hostage taker. "Reporters and others messea.up the negotiations, and we damned well don't appre- Ciate it," one police official said (Schwartz, 1977, 83 p. A-1). But Dick Hopper, a public relations man for the bank, said the offer of $ 25,000 and a getaway helicopter was discusssed with law enforcement officials, including the FBI. Roger Young, assistant special agent-in-charge of the Phoenix FBI office, declined to comment on whether the bank's offer was approved or cleared by the FBI. He, howev- er, said that constant phoning by outsiders was a "problem" but could not say if they directly affected the ultimate outcome of the hostage situation. Yet another police offi- cer on the scene said they did not expect the bank would attempt to deal directly with the hostage taker. Also, during one of the calls to the bank by the media, Whiskey is supposed to have said, "any more calls and someone may get hurt" (Schwartz, 1977, p. A-24). Tony, who claimed he was an ex-convict wanted in at least two states, New Mexico and Texas, had two requests: "I request for me and Whiskey both that we be buried somewhere close together," and that the medical examiners "don't cut us up, because they're gonna know what killed us. If I'm shot in the head with a 9-millimeter Smith and Wesson at close range, it's obvious I didn't die of a heart attack" (McCloy, 1977, p. A-24). Tony is also supposed to have recounted his experiences as a Green Beret in Vietnam. According to Mills (1977, p. 19), Tony had been "fired the night before from his job at a Yarnell bar." 84 Whiskey, a former art student, said she was being sued for $15,000 because of a traffic accident the previous winter in Spokane, Washington. She told that she got in- volved in the bank robbery because Tony was her "old man." Setting. Yarnell, a town with 750 residents (in 1977), is about 30 miles southwest of Prescott on U.S. 89 in Arizo- na, and about 50 miles northeast of Phoenix, Arizona. During the negotiations, the police positioned them- selves behind cars on the streets and on nearby rooftops, until the bank was surrounded. Stores in the two-block-long town were closed, and barricades were set up to reroute traffic away from the bank. According to Wayman (1977), "the town of 750 had become an armed camp" (p. A-24). According to Mills (1977), it was a cold day in the mountain town of Yarnell, and police officers "pulled o gloves, coats and heavy coveralls or wrapped themselves in blankets against the cold" (p. 1). A "weird party atmos- phere prevailed among some of the Yarnell residents," and while some talked quietly comparing what they had known of the two hostage takers, others drank beer and "shouted catcalls at police and newsmen" (p. 1). Sheriff Moore said that six of Tony's friends were brought to the command post and talked over the telephone to the pair (however, only four of the friends' talk is avail- able on the tape/transcript), trying to persuade them to release the hostage and give themselves up. One of the six, 85 Stich Hafey, said he wanted to offer his car for the two to escape but that he had drained the gas tank and shorted out the fuel gauge to make it read full. The FBI would not allow him to make the offer. According to Mills (1977, p. 1), Whiskey had been apprehended behind the Old West-style bank by deputy sheriff Jody LaRue after Whiskey had fired a shot from her .30- caliber carbine and panicked and thrown the gun down. Summary and analysis. There are certain questions that can be raised based on the contextual information that we could not have raised if we had merely analyzed the tran- script. Asking these questions and answering them would enable us to understand the influence of power in these negotiations as well as to probe police actions critically. The police blame unofficial calls by bank officials and the media for their failure to persuade the hostage takers to surrender. But could there have been other reasons for such a failure? For example, why did the police exchange the accomplice in the holdup, Whiskey, for two of the three hostages? There is no police explanation in the newspaper reports for this action. Whiskey, from being an accomplice apprehended by the police, is turned into a hostage taker in league with her boy friend, the actual hostage taker. This police action, at first glance, could be seen as effective bargaining -- two hostages released in exchange for one accomplice. But what they did by sending Whiskey back into 86 the bank was to complicate the negotiation process. Whis- key, it seems from the transcript, induces Tony to rethink the idea of giving up, and urges Tony to "blow her away." Tony tells one of the friends who talk to him that he and Whiskey had made a pact that if the holdup failed they would commit suicide rather than go to prison. Thus, the police, by sending Whiskey back, enable the carrying out of the pact. Strategically, therefore the initial police move can be characterized as hasty and ill thought out. The exchange did not empower Tony in any way except in the sense it enabled him and Whiskey to commit suicide as they had planned. The police, however, blame bank officials and others for the failed negotiations. There is no evidence in the transcript that Tony's attitude hardened once the bank officials made the offer. Throughout the interaction one can perceive Tony's estimation of police work: he is aware of and knowledgeable about police methods and attitudes. He knows that he can't escape the clutches of the police if indeed they gave him a getaway car. Thus, the police act of blaming others is an example of the exercise of ideological and institutional power. It is the wielding of ideological power in the sense that they control the creation of mean- ing, in this case the public perception of hostage negotia- tions: one headline in the Arizona Republic (January 15, 1977, p. A-l) proclaims "Surrender plan obstructed by 87 'unofficial calls'." Institutional power, similarly allows the police in maintaining these "constructed realities" and creating self-serving strategies through the use of affirma- tions and sanctions. The institutional power of the police is manifest in the number of policemen on the scene, and in their ability to control the physical environment. Wayman (p. A-24) reports that Yarnell had been transformed into an "armed camp." It can thus be argued that this heavy accumulation and display of force could have also led to the failed negotiations rather than the "unofficial calls" made by bank officials. Tony and Whiskey were bartenders, and they were both on the run: Tony, with two warrants for his arrest for crimes committed in neighboring states, may have been trying to ‘assure his escape from the police dragnet by fleeing to a distant place with enough money that would assure some anonymity: for after all, as long as he worked there would be a high chance for the police to trace him. Whiskey, with the threat of a $15,000 lawsuit, was also trying to escape her way out of poverty or arrest. Neither therefore had much individual economic or social power. The only power they had was in their mini arsenal of guns, and the hostage they held. We realize that the numerous friends who tried to plead with them to give up were also from the same or similar 88 economic and social bacgrounds. Thus the two hostage takers could not tap any ideological or institutional power. The relational power they could and did tap was under the control of the police. However, Mills (1977, p.1) reports that some Yarnell residents shouted catcalls at the police and the media. These few, who might have sympathized with the hostage takers, of course would have had no institution- al backing or larger public support for their antagonism toward the police and the media. The hostage takers could have manipulated the media: after all, Tony was talking to an AP news reporter at the time of the suicide, and he could have made certain demands, or sought some ideological power. He could have done that by focusing on his status as a Green Beret fallen on hard times. Instead, the focus is on his more recent past as an ex-convict. The newspaper headlines label him a "gunman," and the information that he served in Vietnam is buried deep in the report on the incident, on page A-24. To conclude, the context provides us some knowledge of the incident that illumines the use of power by the police in ways that are not or can not be perceived by the mere study of transcripts of hostage negotiations. WM Following is the sequence of utterances in this fairly long hostage drama: #0001 - #0026 = Tony and FBI Agent Small #0027 - #0096 89 Tony and his friend, Becky #0097 - #0182 = Whiskey and Becky #0183 - #0236 = Tony and Becky #0237 - #0368 = Agent Small and Tony #0369 - #0711 = Tony and his friend, Ernie Jones #0712 - #0790 = Agent Small and Tony #0791 - #0879 = Tony and his friend, Stich #0880 - #0931 = Agent Small and Tony #0932 - #1071 = Tony and Stich #1072 - #1158 = Agent Small and Tony #1159 - #1197 = Agent Small and the hostage, Mrs. Dunne #1198 - #1284 = Agent Small and Whiskey #1285 - #1315 = Agent Small and phone operator #1316 - #1339 = Agent Small and Tony #1340 - #1358 = Tony and his friend, Suzie #1359 - #1543 = Whiskey and Suzie #1544 - #1828 = Agent Small and Tony #1829 - #1883 = Agent Small and Mrs. Dunne #1884 - #2055 = Agent Small and Tony #2056 - #2089 = Agent Small and an Associated Press reporter #2090 - #2117 = Agent Small and Tony In this part of the analysis I will provide details from the actual transcript of the negotiations between the police and the hostage takers. I do not have transcripts of the con- versations that the hostage takers had with the news media 90 or with bank officials. Nor do I know the contents of the conversation that Tony had with his mother over phone. Also, as pointed aove, the audio tape provided by the FBI does not contain conversations the hostage takers had with two of the six friends who are supposed to have tried to persuade them to give up. The transcript of the negotiation contains 2117 utterances. The transcript begins with Agent Small telling Tony that the police won't hurt him and that he better give up. It is evident that Whiskey is with Tony because he complains that the police have confiscated some "dope" (drugs) that Whiskey had with her at the time of her arrest. Soon (utterance #0027), Agent Small lets one of Tony's friends, Becky, to try and persuade Tony to give up. Tony uses a number of endearments when addressing her (#0042, #0048). Tony tells her he would not hurt anyone as long as the police did not try and storm the bank. To her entreat- ments that he give up, Tony replies that he doesn't like being arrested and put in jail, and that he hates the feel of handcuffs. Whiskey then asks to speak to Becky (#0094) and she seems to be undecided about what she wants. Whiskey sounds suicidal (#0112) at times, and hopeful at times (#0122). She explains to Becky that she and Tony would not have done it if they knew they would be caught (#0145), and they did it because they wanted the money and wanted to get out of 91 town (#0153). It is also her belief that if they had been at the bank 15 minutes early they would've puled it off (#0159). Whiskey turns over the phone to Tony, and Becky once again tries to reason with him to give up, saying waiting only makes it worse (#0202). Tony is remorseful that they got caught, and admits that he had robbed a bank before but did not get caught (#0224 - #0228). Agent Small takes over (#0237), and asks what Tony wants in terms of guarantees (#0249). Tony wants to be charged by federal officials and not local officials. Small says he will arrest Tony and that would make it a federal case (#0273), but Tony wants a U.S. attorney to call him and _talk to him. When Small continues to point out that waiting only makes it worse, Tony admits that Whiskey and he have to sort out certain things. He tells Small that Whiskey wants him to "blow her up" (#0306). When Small protests that would be a dumb thing to do, Tony says that Whiskey doesn't want to go to the "joint for the lesbians" (#0313). Small admits that there are problems but Tony and Whiskey are getting "psyched up" (#0320). Small persists in trying to persuade Tony that it is time they gave up, and waiting doesn't help. Tony complains that the other phone in the bank is "ringing off the hook" (#0325), and that he's having trouble talking to Small. At about this time, Small lets another of Tony's friends, Ernie 92 Jones, to talk to Tony (#0369). Ernie repeats that it will only get worse if Tony delays matters, and that it doesn't make sense to kill themselves. Tony repeats that Whiskey wants him to "blow her away" (#0410). Ernie also tells Tony that what Tony had told him some days before about robbing a bank was just "fantasy" (#0435). Ernie tells Tony that it would hurt Linda and Jason if he did anything foolish. Jason seems to be a young child who calls Tony "daddy" (#0441). At about this time, Ernie, having failed to convince Tony to give up, says that Tony better release Mrs. Dunne before he and Whiskey killed themselves (#0461). Tony, believes that since he has two prior convictions for bank robbery he will never get out of jail (#0498). Ernie re- peats that if Tony is just going to hurt himself he better let Mrs. Dunne go (#0543). Yet again, after another bout of back and forth, Ernie says that he would rather be in the penitentiary than in the ground (#0609), to which Tony counters he wouldn't mind being dead. Ernie repeats that if that's the way Tony feels he better let Mrs. Dunne go (#0611). Tony tells Ernie that he will decide one way or another at 3 p.m., the bank closing time (#0652). In the next sequence, Tony assures Agent Small that he'll come out of the bank at 3 p.m. or release Mrs. Dunne at that time. Small tries to reason with Tony the futility and the foolishness of trying to kill himself and Whiskey, 93 and once, in exasperation says that "you can end up in hell for doing something like that" (#0768). However, he fails to budge Tony from his earlier decision. The next 88 utterances are exchanged between Tony and Stich, the man we know as having offered the FBI his car with the shorted fuel gauge. Stich tells Tony that he did something dumb the previous week and had the police sur- rounding his house, but had realized his mistake, given up, and suffered no consequences (#0809). Tony then recounts how Whiskey had fired two shots from the .30 caliber Ml carbine at two policemen as she was waiting behind the bank for Tony. Stich offers to come on over to the bank with some beer and "rap" with Tony and Whiskey. He also claims that he had just gotten out of jail after being in there for armed robbery and attempted murder. ’ Agent Small then talks again with Tony and points out that jail is not a very bad place to be because Tony can be warm in there and have three meals a day (#0906, #0908). Tony admits to feeling tired, and Small once again counsels him to give up soon. Back again with Stich, Tony admits to having a convic- tion in Albuquerque, and three charges pending in Carlsbad. Stich then offers his car as a getaway vehicle (#0974) but Tony argues that he wouldn't be able to get very far in it. He then tells Stich that a man from the Valley National Bank in Phoenix had called and told him that he was going to be 94 arriving in Yarnell by helicopter and carrying some ransom money. Tony also tells Stich that the man had offered to be taken in as hostage if Mrs. Dunne, the bank manager, was released (#0987). Stich, in turn, volunteers to be the hostage claiming that he would keep Tony better company than "that fart would" (#0994). Tony insists that he would let the bank manager go by 3 p.m., and he and Whiskey would decide what they would do with themselves. Stich wonders whether Tony has tied up the bank manager, to which Tony replies that "she's just sittin' here drinkin' coffee and eatin' fruit cake with us" (#1041). He also confesses that he has smoked his "last joint" and that he is feeling tired. Stich won- ders if he Tony would let Mrs. Dunne go if he got a getaway car, but Tony dismisses the possibility of his being able to really get away in any car because the police would catch him anyway (#1064). Back with Agent Small, the conversation turns to the number of police swarming over the place. Tony says he is nervous about all that activity, and asks Small to stop it. Small agrees to do that, and wonders what his conversation with Stich about the getaway car was all about. Tony says if he had a car and some "running room" (#1086) may be he could try to make a getaway. Small reminds him that "half the helicopters in the southern United States" were right there (#1089), and that he would not be able to get any 95 where. Small tries to convince Tony once again that there is no use sitting there and mulling over things, and that letting Norma go and surrendering themselves would be the best thing. But for Tony, Norma represents security, and he tells Small that the police would simply storm the bank if he let Norma go. Small suggests that Tony throw his gun out of the bank, and then he (Small) would enter the bank and escort Tony and Whiskey out (#1137). Tony wavers, but then insists that he would let Mrs. Dunne go at 3 p.m., and that he and Whiskey would kill themselves. Small asks to talk to Mrs. Dunne, and he gives her instructions on what she should do immediately after she is released. He then talks to Whiskey, reminds her that she's just 22 years old, and that she would spend some time in a federal prison which "are a whole lot better" (#1211) than state prisons. Whiskey repeats that she would rather die than go to jail (#1216), and she reminds Small that he cannot understand her thinking because he is not the one inside the bank with a lot of policemen surrounding the building (#1236). She believes that if she left the build- ing she would either get shot or have handcuffs on her (#1246). Small tries to convince her that life in a federal prison is not all that bad but her responses are noncommit- tal. Small changes his tactics, and asks if Tony has any children. Whiskey says that he has a few scattered around l‘!‘ fav EXC Prc ret‘ M. .H. b‘mE 96 but that he doesn't like kids anyway (#1272, 1278). Small rings off reminding them to call him back if they decide anything. Next, a friend of Whiskey's, Suzie Tane tries to con- vince Whiskey to give up. Suzie is pregnant, and she and Whiskey talk about it. Suzie asks Whiskey to reconsider her decision, and points out that Whiskey can try and set her life right again. She also points out that people hurt their loved ones by killing themselves, and talks about her dad who did that (#1455). Whiskey wants Suzie to get her a pack of cigarettes, and claims that she deserves to have a last smoke (#1510). Suzie continues to try and cajole Whiskey into giving up by telling her how much she wants to see her, as well as by arguing that living is better than dying even if it means spending a few years in jail. Tony then asks to speak to Small, and asks him to do a favor by sending a pack of cigarettes. Small says he would exchange a packet of cigarettes for "one brownie" (#1554), probably meaning the gun that Tony has. Small insists that he has to get something in return for a packet of ciga- rettes, and Tony says he is going to let Mrs. Dunne out at 3 p.m. in exchange. They haggle over the "deal" for a long time, and finally come to a rather unspecific agreement about a deputy coming over and laying a packet of cigarettes at the bank door. 97 Small asks Tony not to succumb to Whiskey's idea of a suicide. "That woman over there is crazy," he tells Tony, and asks him to take no advice from a woman (#1636). Imme- diately thereafter, Small tells Tony that the cigarettes have been placed in front of the bank door, and assures Tony that there is no man hiding nearby to grab Whiskey when she picks up the cigarettes. Whiskey picks up the cigarettes, and Tony tells Small that he will contact him again after he has spoken to his mother. Tony has trouble getting in touch with his mother, in Amarillo, Texas and when Small calls him to check, he tells him he is nervous about Jody (the local police sheriff) and his men on top of the roof of buildings in front of the bank shooting at him or Whiskey accidentally. Small asks if Tony is still listening "to the crazy girlfriend of yours" (#1807), and Tony replies that everything is settled between them, and that he and she would walk out as soon as he has finiShed talking to his mother (#1810). Small then talks to the bank manager/hostage, and there is some confusion as to whether she is to run left from the bank or run right as soon as she is released. Small also wants to find out from her whether she has any idea about the state of mind of Tony and Whiskey, and she says she doesn't know (#1857). Tony talks to his mother, and then tells Small that he would let the manager out if he ot another pack of 98 cigarettes. Asked what they are going to do after releasing Mrs. Dunne, Tony says that he and Whiskey would have a smoke and then come out of the bank. "Give me and Whiskey 20 minutes," (#1955) Tony says, and Small wonders why they need 20 minutes. Tony retorts, "Now would I ask you a personal question like that" (#1961)? Small wonders whether it was Tony's mother who convinced him to surrender, and Tony says he didn't tell her anything about the hostage situation at all. Small wants to make sure they are not thinking about suicide (#1996), and Tony says he and Whiskey will walk out after they had 20 or 30 minutes together. In explanation, Tony says with a laugh "You know, Goddamn might not get no more for a long time" (#2003). Tony lets Whiskey pick up the cigarettes after making sure there are no policemen hovering in sight, and then allows Mrs. Dunne to leave (#2043). Not noticing them coming out after 20 minutes, Small wants to find out what's happening. He gets connected to an Associated Press reporter who tells Small that Tony wants the police not to "rush the bank because don't want anybody else to get hurt but me and Whiskey" (#2060). Small wants the AP reporter to get Tony to talk to him, but the reporter tells Small that his colleague, Mike, had just been told by Tony that he could hear the gun go off (#2082). 99 Small gets in touch with Tony and tries to convince him it is a "dumb thing to do" (#2093), but Tony says he wants to contact the newspeople to give some final instructions about where he and Whiskey should be buried. The last utterance is by Small, who tells Tony that "a best way to do this is stand up like a man" (#2117). Summary egg analysis. Throughout the almost nine-hour negotiation neither Tony nor Whiskey threaten the life of the hostage. While the two did plan to rob the bank, and Tony had a record of crime trailing him, at no point in the interaction with either the police or the numerous friends did the hostage takers use the hostage as a pawn in the crisis. The only demands were for cigarettes and for the police to not rush the bank. The hostage also reveals that she is not being harassed, and that the only discomfort she has is sitting on the ground. The hostage takers even try to make her comfortable by placing pillows on the ground on which she could sit. Thus, the individual power of the hostage takers is self-curtailed. Throughout the interaction we see Tony wavering. His mood swings, however, don't affect his plans for the hos- tage: he intends to release her unharmed. He tells everyone who speaks to him that if at all anyone would get hurt it would be Whiskey and he, unless the police rushed the bank and there was a shootout. His demand that he be sent to a federal prison instead of a sate prison is not something 100 that would raise the stakes in the situation. The police agent could blandly assure Tony he could go to a federal prison, and such assurance would not alter police plans in any manner. Tony's demands are half-hearted, and he makes them without any force or consistency. Tony is torn between surrender and suicide, and neither is a plan to enhance his individual power. Fantasy Theme Analysis In this part of the analysis it is necessary to find evidence of the fantasy themes and the rhetorical vision of the police, the hostage takers, and the friends of the hostage takers who try to convince the hostage takers to give up the hostage and surrender. As detailed in the methods section, we can estimate the fantasy theme/s and the rhetorical vision/s by coding the fantasy theme/s for de- scriptions of the setting, the characters, and the action. We can do this through an analysis of the actual hostage negotiation transcript. The fantasy themes and the rhetori- cal visions should provide us insights about the perceived and potential power and the exercise of that power by var- ious actors in the drama. Next, we need to find the participants' motivation for their rhetorical visions. How did the rhetoric deal with the problem of creating a social reality that enhanced or diminished the power of various actors involved in the drama? Following is a summary of the fantasy themes and the 101 rhetorical vision of the police, the hostage takers, and the friends of the hostage takers that the police brought in to persuade the hostage takers to give up. I have chosen representative samples of the characterization of settings, characters, and action to draw conclusions about the fantasy themes and the rhetorical visions. No coding scheme is drawn up nor every single utterance or word is pigeon-holed into a particular category. Instead, I have thoroughly and repeatedly read the transcripts to pick and choose what I considered were utterances that signified and symbolized the characterization of settings, actors, and action by the various participants in the events. I will begin with the police characterization of the events. Setting. The newspaper reports do not contain any direct quotes from the local police or the FBI regarding the "setting." All of the description of where the events occurred are by the newspaper reporters. However, we get some inkling of the police perception of the setting through the transcript. The relevant utterances, all by Agent Small of the FBI (unless otherwise indicated), are the following: #0271: My boss is standing right here. #0283: We got a bunch of cars right here if you want. #1211: ...everything you're from (?) Tony is the state prison, which is ah some ( ) are pretty mean.’ But federal prisons are a whole lot better. 102 The first utterance indicates to us, as well as to the hostage takers, that the police team is in place, and that there are people in charge of the negotiations other than the one who is talking to the hostage takers. This enables the one who is doing the talking to use the "boss" as the scapegoat if and when the hostage takers' demands are re- jected. The boss is a person who the negotiator has to defer to and take instructions from. Hierarchy indicates power and the mystique of power. Effectively, the hostage taker's relational power is reduced. He can not manipulate the police negotiator because the negotiator can convenient- ly use the boss as an excuse for police intransigence or their unwillingness to negotiate certain demands. The hostage taker is forced to deal with someone who doesn't command the real authority, and as we all realize dealing with an assistant or an underling rather than with the boss indicates our own diminished status/power. The second and third utterances refer to the hostage taker's demand that he be federally charged and taken to a federal prison than be charged by the local police and taken to a state prison. This is an indication that the hostage taker knows about prison conditions, and he fears entering a state prison more than he does being incarcerated in a federal prison. The police humor the hostage taker's "fantasy," and they indicate there are a fleet of cars ready to transport the hostage taker to a federal prison and that l03 indeed federal prisons are better than state prisons. This is an instance of establishing relationship with the hostage taker,and of empowering the hostage taker through the Aacceptance of his "fantasy." #0906: Hmm. Well so what? You're gonna get three square meals a day. #0908: ...be nice and warm. You'd get clothes. This is the police "fantasy" about prison conditions. Life in prison, according to this fantasy, is not only not harsh but is indeed comfortable. The characterization of prison conditions by the police may be termed an exercise of ide- logical power through the agency of propaganda. #1074: Hey there's guys all over the place ah? #1087: You know how many helicopters are here? #1089: You got about half the helicopters in the Southern United States right here. #1131: Well you'd get out of town to either wreck the thing, or you run out of gas in Kingman or ah Flagstaff or wherever the hell you're goin ( ) and when= #1133: =you run out of gas, then we'll probably just come down there with choppers and rush ya. #1141: ...But see it is you know I think the whole thing is dumb anyway 'cause just like you said we're gonna follow you in the helicopters and airplanes and every- thing else. 104 The above utterances indicate the institutional power that the police wield. Institutions, I have argued, exercise power by passing sanctions against certain modes of conduct and affirming others. Thus, as Bittner (1975) points out, the unifying factor in police work is the situationally justified use of force or the threat of the use of force. Clearly, in the above utterances, Agent Small characterizes the situation in a manner that builds the "fantasy" of the police as an organized and efficient force capable of and willing to exercise its institutional power. #1243: It's not like ah what you see on television or movies or stuff like that. All we want to do is just end this thing= #1249: =is that if you two would give up, you open the door, I walk out in the street there and you open that door, throw the gun out and then I walk up there and you two can come out. #1797: You let the manager come out, and then ah we'll do just like we said. You go on over to the door, throw that gun out, and I'll walk over there, escort ya out to the car and bring you right over here to this phone. And you sit down here and have a cup of coffee, and you can call your mom. And you know you can call her in privacy or anything you want. #2018: There's nobody by the door. All she's gotta do is open the door= 105 These utterances depict the police "fantasy" of how they treat hostage takers once they surrender. Agent Small clearly tries to distance himself and his police officers from the television and movie depictions of police work ~- th movie and television depictions predictably, for the police, being untrue. We can interpret this "fantasy" as indicating the use of ideological power through "propaganda." Actors. Actor or character themes describe the agents in the drama by ascribing qualities and assigning motives to them, as well as portraying them as having certain charac- teristics (Foss, 1989). In this section I will present some characterizations of the actors by Agent Small of the FBI who did the negotiating. #0001: I'm not gonna hurt ya. #0249: What do you want? What kind of guarantees do you want? I mean, I'd like to get this thing over with. They got to get me back to Prescott. #0267: I haven't lied to you at any point throughout this. #0882: Hey, you know we plan to work with you, you know. The above utterances provide us Agent Small's characteriza- tion of himself. He is not mean, he is honest, and he wants to work with the hostage takers in resolving the situation. This is the technique advocated by the police to build trust and gain the confidence of the hostage takers. From a fantasy-theme perspective, however, we can see this ("we're 106 good guys") depiction as a rather feeble and ineffective attempt at sharing relational power through a masked charac- terization of police work. #0300: If I was you, I wouldn't want to come out either. This is a rae instance where the "mask" falls, and Agent Small's real face is revealed. Does Tony, the hostage taker, consciously or unconsciously, register this, and does this utterance contribute to and reinforce Tony's under- standing of himself and his situation? #0310: Hell, you got more sense than that. You don't want to shoot her. What do you want to shoot her for? #0776: =you're not dying from a disease or something like that, are you? #0778: (I) Suppose you got a healthy body and a healthy mind, right? #1095: Well, if you were really lookin out for yourself you'd give up. By characterizing Tony as a "rational" person who is able to think through problems and sort out options, Agent Small may be seen (above) as attempting to empower Tony as an individ- ual capable of logical thinking/acts. One of the fantasy themes of the police regarding hostage takers who have a record of committing crimes is that such individuals are "rational," and therefore easy to convince about giving up. Fuselier (1986) advises police negotiators that, "the nego- tiation process in this case should be a reality-oriented 107 discussion, helping the HT to recognize the facts of the situation and convincing him to accept his physical safety in return for the release of hostages" (p. 4). #0768: You know ah you know you can end up in hell for do'n something like that The above utterance can be seen as Agent Small's characteri- zation of Tony as a moral/religious person who should under- stand the consequences of his action not rationally but spiritually. It's possible that the "hell" that Agent Small refers to could be long—term imprisonment, and that is delivered as a threat to deter Tony from harming the hos- tage. I have rejected that inference because the utterance follows Tony saying he would kill Whiskey and then kill himself. Is moral suasion empowerment? One may conclude that the police negotiator here is seeking to shore up the reli- gious/ spiritual facet of the hostage taker's character to enable the hostage taker to act "morally," and as a ruse to resolve the situation successfully. #0726: Well you're putting her through you know a lot of misery over there. #0728: Poor woman. The above two utterances indicate Agent Small's characteri- zation of Tony as a "caring" person. Caring people don't hurt or distress people. Agent Small is referring to Mrs. 108 Dunne, the hostage, and how she must be miserable in the bank waiting for Tony to release her. #1630: You got that crazy woman of your -- that woman over there. I think that woman over there is crazy. Talkin about gettin killed, you know. #1632: Yeah, she putting dumb ideas in your head. #1634: I'll tell you, I would't ever listen to a woman= #1636: =I've been around too many of them, and I just would not take any advice from a woman. Here is an attempt at some sort of "male bonding." Tony is being characterized as a rational person being influenced by an irrational woman. Not only that, women as a class are depicted as unreliable/foolish. This "fantasy" may be characterized as an attempt at relational empowerment -- two males relating to each other as "buddies/partners" and facing the unfathomable world of women together. #1976: Well she probably ah glad to hear from ya. This is Agent Small's response when Tony tells him he's just finished talking to his mother. Tony is being characterized here as a "son" whose mother is glad to hear from him. Sons have duties, and sons should be responsible. Sons don't do anything to hurt their parents. This "fantasy" is being invoked to remind the hostage taker of his moral and filial duties. #2089: What's this guy, 37 years old? That's as old as I am. Got a lot left in life. You know you take a... 109 attitude, you you look like one little problem you can't handle it. #2117: ...A best way to do this is stand up like a man. This is the final "fantasy" -- man as Courageous, stoical, persevering, and wise. Tony is urged to act like a "man." These are Agent Small's final attempts at building trust and at relaional empowerment. This is a fantasy which seeks to discover in any male, whether criminal, imbecile, disempow- ered, or disenfranchised the quality of "manliness" which makes that male act courageously, stoically, wisely. #1203: Well you know something, you're only 22 years old. This is Agent Small talking to Jesse/Whiskey (Tony's female accomplice). Small is invoking the "fantasy" of youth. Small is seeking to empower Whiskey by implying that when she gets out of prison she would be still young, and thus be able to enjoy what life would have to offer her. #1217: Boy, I tell you, you must not think much of your life. #1223: =You know something else, you know you you sound a little bit immature to me because= #1227: =if you come up against a problem you just can't give up. You can't say, my God I've got this problem, I got to kill myself. The fantasy of the immature, unwise young woman is being invoked by Agent Small to counter Whiskey's rather 110 nonchalant and bitter responses. This may be seen as a rather weak attempt at empowering Whiskey as an individual. Action. Action themes, or plotlines deal with the action of the drama. The actions in which the actors engage comprise action themes (Foss, 1989). The characterization of the actions of self and others is a further indicator of analysis of pofiéceinthestagesnegghidtignthe Fotlonimg thien&a2760V hostage drama: #0281: ...Hey listen. I'm tellin' you you don't have to worry about this. You can -- we'll charge you federal- ly, I guarantee it. We'll charge you for attempted bank robbery -- robbin' the bank... The plotline here is that Agent Small will be in complete charge about what happens after the hostage takers surren- der.- These assurances, supposedly, will contribute to a win-win approach which would find a solution to the problem that is acceptable to both parties (see Taylor, 1983). The characterization of negotiation tactics, in these crisis bargaining situations, as constituting a win-win approach is patently false. One can surmise what actually would happen once the hostage taker surrenders. Unlike in traditional negotiations, where there are formal written agreements, these negotiations do not have any binding. The police negotiator merely uses these assurances as a ruse, and as a way to "calm" the hostage taker, rather than as a real 111 bargaining agreement. These assurances constitute a "fanta- sy," and they are possible to articulate because of the institutional power vested in the police. #0283: ...And then ah, if you want me to walk over there I will, and if you don't wanna... all you have to do is put your hands you know up, and no one will shoot you. There'll be no problem. The federal government will get you an attorney... #0750: And ah, you go down to Phoenix, and you get the federal public defender and that's all they do. They just defend people with federal charges against them. If indeed the hostage taker gets charged federally (and there is no evidence in police literature that that is what happens or is recommended), he would indeed get some court- appointed attorney to defend him (which would be the case even if he is charged by the state). Thus, the above assur- ances have just the value of a "calming technique," instead of representing any real bargaining. #0302: ...You throw your gun out, there's no one's gonna rush you. I'll walk over there if you want. Police negotiators are trained to build rapport with the hostage takers. For the hostage taker, who is confined in a building, and whose communication lines are limited too, the police negotiator becomes the window to the world. The negotiator can then characterize himself as a friend/confi- dant who has the hostage taker's well-being at heart. But 112 that, we realize, can be true only to a limited extent and represents a "fantasy" that both the police negotiator and the hostage taker have to share for a successful resolution of the hostage crisis. Asking Tony to throw the gun out is a strategy to weaken and disempower Tony, and if he allows himself to be disempowered he has Agent Small's assurance that he will walk out to the bank and "save" Tony from the state police. Tony therefore has to choose between losing "individual" power (getting rid of the gun) and gaining "relational" power (the protection of Agent Small). #0762: But if you ah like if you hurt Whiskey or you hurt Norma over there you're gonna go to Florence. You know because we won't have anything to do with it. You get charged with murder or whatever you do to 'em. And that's just dumb, they haven't done anything to you. #1143: and then ah we're gonna get ya in the long run. That's why the best thing to do now is just to ah gppgk 1; ip... (emphasis added). The reference to Florence here is a reference to a state prison. Since Tony initially makes the demand that he be sent to a federal prison, Agent Small uses this threat to keep Tony from precipitating matters. Next, he reminds Tony of the "long arm of the law," and that it would be foolish for Tony to imagine that he can get away from the police. Emaphasis is added to the phrase "chuck it in" because police negotiators are trained not to use words like 113 "surrender" and "hostage." Agent Small therefore prefers to say "chuck it in" rather than "surrender." Taylor (1983) says the word "hostage" is too impersonal, and if police negotiators use it they alow the hostage taker to distance himself from his hostages. The word "surrender" is said to convey a feeling of failure, which may constitute a precipi- tating factor in such situations. Thus, in the two utter- ances above we see the play of both institutional and rela- tional power. #1582: ...I can't see any police. There, right across the street the parking lot looks empty to me... #1592: Well, I tell you what, we can get a package of ciga- rettes out into that parking lot out in the front and she's gonna have to walk out into the parking lot and get 'em. #1596: Why, we're not gonna shoot her. Nothin's gonna happen to her. #1650: Yeah. There's guys on the roof. You can see 'em, all you have to do is look out. #2030: OK, he wants the guy in the yellow hat to leave and the guys on the roof to back up. Ok, how's that? All of the above utterances indicate police presence around the bank building, a presence that makes the hostage takers jittery.‘ Here we see a clash between the police fantasy of a benign force, and the hostage taker's fantasy of the police as a violent force. It seems here that the police 114 negotiator is not successful in building relational power, and that in fact this show of force reminds the hostage taker of the institutional power of the police. Rhetorical visions pf &thhe poliCe. The third step in fantasy theme analysis is to look for patterns in the fanta- sy themes and to construct the rhetorical visions from the patterns. To do this we have to determine which themes are major and which are minor (Foss, 1989). We then have to construct the rhetorical vision/s from the patterns of fantasy themes discovered. Major setting themes should be linked with the characters and the actions that the charac- ters are performing. Next, the critic looks for motives for the rhetorical vision/s. The final step is to assess the rhetorical vision/s. How well did the rhetorical vision deal with the problem of the hostage situation? Did it help or hinder the generation of police-image and hostage taker- image conducive to the resolution of the crisis? Finally, how did the rhetorical visions create or re-create the notion of power? The major setting themes of the police include prison conditions and life in prison, and the police in place and organized such that the hostage taker would have little chance to escape from that setting. The actor themes in- clude police negotiator as honest and fair, hostage taker as rational and moral, woman as irrational and immature, and men as courageous, stoical, and wise. Action themes include 115 the characterization of bargaining as a win-win situation, police as bargaining in good faith, and the police ready and From the above themes we can draw some conclusions of the rhetorical vision/s of the police: the hostage taker can be an active agent but should act only in particular ways for the police to reciprocate in good faith, and the hostage taker to benefit from his actions. This is paradoxical, and the hostage taker can resolve the paradox either by surren- dering or by killing himself and/or hostage. The police seek to resolve the hostage taker's dilemma by painting the picture of prison life in rosy hues. The hostage taker can accept the picture by being rational, moral, and stoical. However, he has to first escape the tentacles of female "irrationality and immaturity" if he has to have the police bargain in good faith. We know from the events that the rhetorical visions of the police were not effective. They were not effective because the police had to contend with a more powerful vision, the vision of the hostage takers. The 0’. .' police vision did not empower the hostage_takers. In fact, their vision merely corroborated the hostage takers' vision of the police: the police were armed, gathered in force, and would hit back severely if the hostage takers acted contrary to police expectations. To some extent, the police vision of prison contradicted the hostage takers' vision of prison. This vision may have sought to enhance the hostage takers' 116 individual power but was not concrete and detailed enough for the hostage takers to accept it finally. Fentesy Themes and the Rhetorical yieippe pf ppe flpepege ers Setting. How do the hostage takers perceive their situation? Do their fantasy themes of the setting indicate that they possess individual power or do they indicate their powerlessness?.4Following are some of the utterances culled from a careful reading of both Tony's and Whiskey's talk during the negotiation process: #0062: I don't wanna go, I don't wanna get locked up. I hate them handcuffs. #0072: A whole, a whole army of good lawyers couldn't help me. Early on in the negotiations we discover Tony's fantasy of the situation. Prison implies getting "locked up," which means not only the loss of freedom but the loss of individu— al power. His reference to what lawyers can do for him indicates the hopelessness that he feels in his situation, and the inability of anyone to empower him. #0215: Aw hon, there ain't nothin you can do. There ain't nothin nobody can do. i This is uttered in reply to Becky's offer to help Tony and Whiskey in any way she can. Once again, it offers us a glimpse of the bleak vision of their situation, and the utter lack of power they possess. 117 #0219: Humph. Humph. Dead meat. In reply to Becky's suggestion that if Tony walks out just then it wouldn't "gonna cost so much," Tony characterizes his own belief -- literally, it could mean that the police would shoot and kill him, or figuratively, that which awaits him, prison, is a form of death. Both fantasies indicate the powerlessness of the hostage taker. #0284: What about all them turkeys standing out there, them civilians with all them shotguns and shit? #1712: Hey would ya would ya tell Jody to get off of that top of that cafe deal up there, he's makin me nervous. frhis is what Tony sees from inside the bank, and this is in :zreply to Agent Small's promise that no one would shoot Tony. 'I‘ony's reference to "civilians" could be to plainclothes jzoolice, or to local people armed with shotguns and ready to 1:111 the hostage takers if the police fail. If indeed they sure local people supplementing the police force, with or ‘vvithout police agreement, it would mean that the hostage taker is doubly powerless: he has to confront the institu- ' tional power of the police, and the individual/ideological IDCJwer of the local people. His reference to Jody is to the lfarvapai county Deputy Sheriff, Jody LaRue. Tony seems to know that local police are more trigger happy, unlike feder- iiil (agents who are better trained in dealing with such situa- tions. This -- his knowledge of police methods -- and the gun and the hostage he is holding,to some extent, 118 constitutes the individual power of this hostage taker. #0472: Oh shit, I already got one federal conviction on me. I got bond and didn't go back for the sentencing. #0498: Hey man I got two prior convictions on me for the same goddamn thing, and it ain't gonna be no worse. I never will get out (from) behind that bar. #0751: There ain't much to defend here. #0945: Hey I've done got a conviction in Albuquerque now. I've got three more charges pending in ah in Carlsbad= {Tony has left behind him a trail of criminal acts, and real :izes that with this latest crime he has no chance of ever qgetting out of prison. Thus his fantasy theme of his future its one of being locked up in a prison forever. jl0576: Well we wasn't plannin on gettin caught but had decided if we did get caught that we wouldn't go to jail. ' d?0889: I'm gonna turn... I'm gonna turn ah, I'm goona turn Norma loose and I don't know whether Whiskey and me will come out or not. a¥()943: =when they bust me man there ain't gonna be no ( ) twenty fuckin years. This indicates that the two hostage takers had contemplated Suicide as an option if they were caught in the act of 17‘311bing the bank, and they are still thinking about that c>Eniion. The choice of that option must have been based on their fantasy of life after "conviction" -- separation and 119 prison for twenty years -- a loss of individual power. #0771: You sure that ain't where we at now? This is the rhetorical question posed by Tony when Agent Small tells Tony that he might end up in hell if he shot himself and Whiskey. Hell is being holed up in the bank surrounded by the police, and awaiting to give up and go to prison. ;#0830: Now my car(bine) over there in that damn lot, 30 caliber. Had 90 rounds taped on it, and Whiskey she fired two at the police and then they got her. ;#0834: Yeah she scared the shit out of one of 'em. He didn't know she was there, she just = #0836: =come over the top and started blastin this dude like shit. 'The hostage takers' individual power before being caught or surrounded was the possession of guns and ammunition. At 'tlhat point they could do battle with the police -- "scare the shit out of them." #0987: Yeah the dude from Phoenix called and told me that he was come'n up in a chopper and bringing some more money, and we'd exchange hostages and I'd keep him for a hostage. Go from there and they they ain't go'n for that. #1066: Yeah but they ain't gonna let me out of here. I know that and they know that. 120 The only chance for the hostage takers to gain some power is to exchange the bank manager for money and a new hostage -- the bank's representative who is to arrive in Yarnell on a helicopter with the money. But Tony knows that this fantasy is not going to work out because the police would not let ‘that happen. #1116: =that's my security. £91124: Aw yeah, but you're gonna if I let her go, you're gonna gonna fill this son of a bitch up with tear gas and then ah... £91571: Hell, what good's a hostage without a gun? frhe hostage takers' individual power consists of the hostage (Mrs. Dunne) and a gun that Tony has. The gun and the lhostage is their security against the threat of the police storming the bank. If they let the hostage go, Tony knows ‘what will happen, and he also realizes that just the hostage would not constitute any security without a gun. Actors. How do the hostage takers perceive themselves land other actors in the hostage situation? Our estimation ‘of their fantasy themes would enable us to better gauge the power of the police and the hostage takers. :#0084: Whiskey's sittin over there playing with the bal- loons. #0086: She's blowing balloons up and makin 'em whistle like she had good sense. 121 Early on in the drama, Tony tells Becky, one of the numerous friends who talk to them, about what Whiskey is doing. Whiskey is 22 years old, and may be still a child in some ways. Tony is her "old man," and he perceives her here as a young, and rather simple woman who is blowing balloons to ‘while away the time and make sense of their situation. We realize that such a woman may have the power of the child -— to be petulant, to be impulsive, to be demanding; but also to be innocent, simple-minded, even naive. #0106: What those, those dupes tell you full of shit that everything's gonna be all right? This is Whiskey characterizing the police when she hears her friend say that the police are going to sort it all out for them. We have to remember that she has been apprehended by the police, had her shoes and coat taken from her, as well as some "dope" (drugs) that she was carrying before being sent into the bank in exchange of the other hostages. She has experienced police treatment, and her fantasy of them is as dupes and liars. She is here undermining the relational power that the police are trying to build with the hostage takers through their friends. #0114: Oh shit... you don't straighten this out like that. Once you got= #0116: =a record, you always got a record. fiDhis is Whiskey's fantasy of what awaits her in the future :if'she were to surrender, and it is in response to her 122 friend saying that she can straighten out her life once she gets out of prison. Serving time in prison robs the indi- vidual of power, and such a person may never be able to lead a normal life, according to Whiskey's perception. .#0171: So, yeah she's fine. She's drinkin coffee and smokin cigarettes whenever she feels like it, yeah. Tony ain't gonna hurt her really. INhiskey tells Becky what the bank manager is doing. At no 1time does she or Tony threaten the manager's life. This is cavident throughout the transaction, and is an indication of ithe rational/humane side of the hostage takers. This ra- ‘tionality, however, is also an indication of the loss of the lhostage takers' individual power. For, the police know that e hurt or killed. The hostage therefore constitutes a Power resource. But he also has promised that he would not harm the hostage. So, his dilemma is how to face the situa- ‘tlion. In his vision, he is indeed powerless. i531246: Well as far as I can see the minute we walk outside if we don't get shot we're gonna get handcuffed. 128 #1522: I ain't gonna do it right now. I ain't ready to go yet. I ain't ready for them to put those handcuffs on me yet. I got till three o'clock, so I'm gonna enjoy it while I can. This is the fantasy of Whiskey, and it is similar to Tony's. Both fear they will get shot or get arrested. Neither option is a "real" option in the sense that a normal human being would choose them. The three o'clock deadline is one set by Tony, and we perceive here the hostage taker's power to control the situation to some extent. #1810: Uh we gonna come out as soon as I talk to my mom. #1894: Well I'll let her out the door and let her get clear and everything and then I'll call you and get ya to come over here or something. #1921: No, I didn't tell her nothin about that. I just talked to her. ‘ #1969: No, my mother don't even know that we're nothin is goin on. I just called and talked to her. Why does Tony want to talk to his mother? The fantasy theme here seems to be that a son is duty-bound to bid farewell to his mother. He does not tell her what condition he is in, and this act is that of the "stoical man" doing what he has to do -- to not make his mother anxious or worried, and yet have the chance to have one last conversation with her. This act seems to be a last, desperate attempt by Tony to regain some stature as a good human being. 129 z¥2015: You got everybody back out of the way, they ain't gonna try and grab my girl are they? £9212: I just wanna make sure me and Whiskey get buried together. Tony wants to make sure that when Whiskey opens the bank (floor to let the bank manager out and pick up the pack of (cigarettes that Agent Small has promised she is not arrested lay the police. Whiskey is his partner-in-arms and he wants tier by his side finally. The last utterance is another :indication of the strong bond between Tony and Whiskey, and 1their vision of the world after death. That vision can be 19erceived as a final act of mutual empowerment for Tony and Whiskey. Rhetorical visions g; the hostage takers. The major :fantasy themes of the hostage takers about the setting :include that of the prison as a place wherethey would be llocked up forever, as something that would separate them for Zlong, and as a place rife with lesbians. Another major ssetting theme is that of their situation in the bank: the ssituation is impossible with no chance of resolution, and a asituation that is deadly. Hell is what they are in. They asee themselves surrounded by the police as well as civilians ‘who are inimical to their interests. The main actors are perceived as the police who are aseen as powerful, as liars and dupes, vindictive, and as the cDnes who would decide the course of action when the hostage 130 is released. The hostage takers portray themselves as indecisive nd as posing no harm to the hostage. They see ‘t:hemselves as powerless and as having no option but to 1<:ommit suicide. The media are seen as a check to unwarrant- ead police action, and court-appointed lawyers are character- ized as dupes. Their action of trying to rob the bank is characterized ass a last ditch effort to regain control of their lives. fDony thinks that if and when he releases the hostage the foolice would come storming into the bank. Thus the hostage aand the gun he has in his possession are means of control- Iling police action. For Tony and Whiskey death constitutes i:he only and real solution, and in death they see themselves Ioound together. Being buried next to each other symbolizes togetherness . From the above, we realize that the rhetorical visions (of these two hostage takers make them powerless individuals facing the righteous action of the powerful police. I say Irighteous because they do not question police action; they Eire merely aware of them and afraid of them. They are not Eingry that the police are "dupes," but their duplicity is sseen as accepted police behavior in such situations. In ‘t:heir rhetorical vision the future is bleak and dangerous, Ennd death provides the only way out. In death they seek ‘t:ogetherness and something of their lost dignity and power. 131 (These strong rhetorical visions make almost all police Inaneuvers and machinations coe to naught. mums: One of the unique characteristics of the Yarnell bank luoldup situation is the involvement of numerous friends of 1the hostage takers in the negotiation process. The police (:all in six people (of which we have interactions of only four) -- Becky, Ernie Jones, Stich, and Suzie Tane. All sseem to have known the two hostage takers well, and they try 1:0 reason with them to release the hostage and to surrender. lflost of their talk, and they do quite a lot, can be charac- 1terized as reasoning, pleading, cajoling, and appealing. I ‘dill pick out a few utterances as representative samples of their talk, and identify their rhetorical visions of the luostage situation. This section will not be as exhaustive ass the sections on hostage taker and police negotiator talk. II will also not analyze them under the separate headings of ssituation, actors, and action. 0N80 = Becky ON81 = Ernie Jones ON82 = Stich 0N85 = Suzie Tane iP0033 ON80: Why don't you um come on out before it gets worse, Tony? £30063 0N80: The more you fight the worse trouble there is. 132 fi¥0059 0N80: Well, they aren't gonna hurt you if you just come on out. a¥0178 ON80: Well, you'll have to you know py for it, but may be it won't be near as bad if —- if -- if you just come out and get it over with you know. £30214 0N80: I told Whiskey I'll do everything I can for both of you. If you just... I3ecky's fantasy themes deal with the idea that police retri- laution would be more severe the longer they had to work to Iresolve the situation. If only Tony and Whiskey would give \Jp immediately then the police would treat them fairly. The lpolice are clearly seen as the upholders of law and the lpossessors of the authority to pass sanctions against cer- i:ain actions and approve certain others. Becky's statements could be interpreted another way: i:hey could be seen as the understanding of the human mind. CEhe rhetorical vision then would be that the human mind is :incapable of withstanding ambiguity or that it would suffer sseverely from the strain of ambiguity. Becky could be Iresponding to the commonsensical notion in Western societies ‘i:hat all acts should have definite and quick closures. ‘CQuick, clear closures are seen as enhancing individual izpower, and delay and ambiguity are seen as diminishing filndividual power. Another theme that we can identify from her utterances is that of the good friend willing to go the extra mile to 133 luelp the person in distress. This can be seen as enhancing 1the hostage takers' relational power. But such power is zavilable only on the enactment of certain actions which the .Iuostage taker might perceive as the 1055 of individual Ipower. 2&0407 ON81: It gets worse and worse and worse, and minutes pass and it gets that much worse. So why don't ya throw that old thing out to ole little brother out here. You know, I wouldn't ask you if it wasn't right Tony. #0439 ON81: Hey look man, you know we've been good friends since I been here, a long time. I wouldn't lie to ya on purpose, would I? But look, this is gonna be best way, really gonna be the best way. And ah I'd like to see ya do it ah I know ah you know Linda, it's gonna crack her up. Jason's, look what kind of effect it's gonna have on him? And I know deep down in your heart you do care about Jason 'cause ah he does call you daddy. £30451 ON81: Well yeah, but much rather be behind the Slammer than I would be six feet under ground. .i30461 ON81: All we're gonna do is just ah, if you want to waste yourself and waste ah Whiskey let Miss Dunne come out. You may (don't?) have to make her suffer in the middle of that for the rest of your (her?) life: 134 #0539 ON81: =hurt her and they'd, there wouldn't be no building there. #0605 ON81: =Well you know, there's deals and there's deals and there's deals son, you know you can't give up #0675 ON81: And then I'll walk right out with you and the federal men can come up and take you into custody. I'll do that. How's that? Becky's fantasy themes of the good friend, of a closure- :seeking mind, of the institutionally powerful police are all :repeated in Ernie's utterances. In addition, there is the fantasy that life is better than death, and that one can find opportunities and openings ("there's deals and deals") ‘that could lessen the suffering and lower the payment for present actions. All these may be seen as attempts at «enhancing the hostage takers' individual power consequent to ‘the doing of certain actions demanded by the institutionally powerful police. Yet another fantasy is that hostage takers involved in ‘violent actions have their compassionate side that should figuide further moves: thus, the appeal to save Mrs. Dunne the experience of witnessing the violent deaths of the hostage 1takers. So too is the appeal to paternal instincts: Tony is ‘"daddy" for Jason (newspaper accounts don't shed much light n the front page of The Atlanta Constitution (November 30, :1L984) carries a caption stating "FBI agents wrestle suspect Judson Dean Talley to ground at Hartsfield Airport Thursday . " Lawrence T. York of the Atlanta FBI office said that Talley had threatened to blow up the plane. Police marksman had surrounded the plane, and even practiced an assault on ‘11 identical aircraft. A subsequent search of the plane :"¢3‘realed no explosives. State officials said Talley had been released just a day before from an Augusta mental 201 hospital'where he hd spent four days getting treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. Mrs. Sally Talley, Judson's grand- mother, said that her grandson was taken to an Athens hospi- tal the previous Sunday by his girlfriend, and was later taken by his mother to the Augusta Regional Hospital. Sally tralley told newsmen that her grandson lived at her house sometimes, and that his parents had been divorced for ten years . One of Talley's first demands was that he speak to Tina IBarron, a state employee whose niece Talley had known on a <=asual and social basis. Tina Barron was the only person he linew in Atlanta and he asked for her, said a police offi- ccial. Ms. Barron was taken to the airport and she spoke to fiDaJley three times over a period of two and a half hours. She assured Talley that people cared for him and that he would receive any help he needed. This was is response to Talley's complaint that "he needed help and nobody would help him" (November 30, 1984, p. 1-A). The FBI led Talley away in handcuffs and he was lodged in the Douglas County Jail awaiting arraignment the next day on federal charges of aircraft piracy and interfering with ‘11 aircraft crew. If convicted of both, Talley could have 1Eaczed a maximum of 40 years in jail. The next day, a federal magistrate ordered psychiatric tests for Talley while he was being held in the Douglas c‘3’lamty Jail. An assistant U.S. attorney said he would ask 202 the magistrate that Talley be sent to a federal prison in either Lexington, Kentucky, or Springfield, Missouri, for extra tests. Appearing before the magistrate, Talley was described as being "cocky but edgy" (Hopkins, 1984, p. 1-A), and that he insisted on speaking for himself. However, the magis- trate appointed a lawyer from the federal defender program to represent Talley temporarily. Talley told his lawyer that the police did not allow him to bring a newspaper or his Bible into the courtroom. Mrs. Wilson, Talley's mother said that she warned her sson three weeks before the hijacking incident that "he was a time bomb waiting to go off" (Hopkins, 1984, p. 16-A). She t:old reporters that her son had a traumatic experience while serving in the Marines in Hawaii, and that he had not re- ceived an honorable discharge from the Marines. Police said that Talley was on probation for "multiple DUI offenses" in A thens . Ms. Barron, the woman who talked to Talley during the hostage incident, said that her niece told her that the Previous week Talley had drunk heavily in her apartment and t111-own gasoline into an open fireplace burning his hands 8J..i.ghtly. He had showed the girl and her friend some dyna- mite he had in a bag. Summary and analysis. One of the first things we 311°111d note is that Talley released all the passengers 203 almost immediately after the plane landed in Atlanta. In fact, we cannot be even sure that he tried to hold them as hostages. The newspaper report is not clear on this aspect. It is just reported that the passengers left the plane unharmed. Ordinarily, it might be expected that a man serious about getting his demands met would have tried to hold on to as many bargaining chips as he could muster: it seems in this situation the hostage taker is not keen on such a bargaining strategy. Second in importance are the demands that the hostage itaker makes. Talley demands food, a friend’s aunt with whom lee wishes to talk, and psychiatric help. None of these are (lemands that can be perceived as further complicating the 110stage situation. They also do not threaten the lives of i:he hostages or the hostage taker, though the claim that he ilnas a bomb in his possession may be seen as problematic. If, however, he did not claim that he had a bomb or a gun in his possession, the police could have easily stormed the plane and taken Talley prisoner. Thus, we can conclude that all of Talley’s demands were fairly easy to meet. Third in importance is the threat that Talley makes. He says that he would blow up the plane if his demands are l"ICDt; met. But his demands are easy to meet, and so his t11:l':eat can be estimated as less than serious. Moreover, there's no evidence from the security check that he went through that he might be carrying any firearms or 204 explosives. That indeed he might have explosives on him is a possibility because of his service in the Marine Corps, and that he might have had some dynamite in his possession before is confirmed by his girlfriend the next day. If the jpolice had that information the day of the incident, they might have believed more strongly that Talley might be carrying some such material with him. Fourth in importance to consider is the relative youth of the hijacker. He was not yet 21 when he hijacked the plane. According to the newspaper reports, he would have turned 21 three days after the incident. However, the police could have been wary of his Marine Corps experience, and discounted his youth. Finally, what needs to be taken into context is the stageor setting for this drama. The Hartsfield Interna- 1tional Airport is the second busiest airport in the country, land police, FBI, and other security reinforcements would have been in place within minutes to deal with the situa- tion. A hijacker/hostage taker in such a situation would be confronting one of the most powerful combined police forces in the nation, and he would be doing that in the glare of big city media attention. If we take all these points into consideration, it is e§.sy to conclude that Talley had a lot of individual power ‘39 counter the ideological and institutional power of the DO lice. 205 Descriptive Analysis Once again, I am not going to list the sequence of utterances between the various actors involved in the inci- dent because of the numerous short exchanges and interrup- tions that characterize the whole negotiation. The transcript begins with Talley cursing, and asking the police negotiator to send "the fuckin' steak and eggs" (#0001). Talley seems to be exasperated, delirious and in a foul mood for he continues to curse and berate the FBI negotiator, Frank. He tells Frank that he's not dealing 'with "your average hijacker" (#0003). Captain Gill confirms that Talley wants food to be delivered, and he tells Frank to call his wife and his copilot's husband and tell them leverything's okay (#0012). He also tells Frank that the lplane is running low on battery power and needs some elec- ‘trical hookup to enable good radio contact (#0018). Frank tells Talley that he will send the food in ex- <=hange for Tia, the copilot (#0024). Talley, parodying the Allstate Insurance television advertisement, says Tia is in "'good hands," complains that he's "pissed off" and that he is also hungry (#0025). The next few exchanges are between Frank and Captain Gill about getting power hooked up to the plane, and about ‘t311e radio not working well. This goes on for some time, and Talley once again exasperatedly joins the conversation and talls Frank that if he can't get the radio connection set up 206 properly to "call ATGT" (#0063). It's 1:35 p.m. by then, and two hours since the plane landed in Atlanta, and Talley tells Frank that he can sit around for a longer time without food than his hostages, and he first wants to talk to Tina. He complains that he's sitting in the "blind" and all that he can hear is jets taking off (#0079). When Frank asks Talley to hang tight and trust him, Talley becomes impatient, says he's getting tired of sitting around, and wants to know what is being done about getting ‘Tina to the airport. He sarcastically tells Frank that Tina ‘works for Governor "Joe Buttonheads" and that Frank better