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A Contextual, Descriptive, and Fantasy-Theme Analysis

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Closepet Nagaraj Ramesh

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**THE INFLUENCE OF POWER ON HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES:
A CONTEXTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND FANTASY-THEME ANALYSIS**

By

Closepet Nagaraj Ramesh

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

THE INFLUENCE OF POWER ON HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES: A CONTEXTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND FANTASY-THEME ANALYSIS

By

Closepet Nagaraj Ramesh

The aims of this study are three: (1) To counter the psycho-analytic studies of hostage negotiations; (2) to suggest a macro framework for the analysis of hostage negotiations; and (3) to question the efficacy of and suggest alternatives to present hostage negotiation strategies.

In this contextual/descriptive/fantasy theme study I claim that police strategies of negotiation with hostage takers do not account for the influence of power nor for failed negotiations. A four-tier model of power is delineated, and a contextual/descriptive/fantasy-theme analytic method is used to study two failed and one successful police negotiation with hostage takers. It is argued that present police negotiation strategies may not only fail to resolve certain hostage situations but they also continue to invest the police the power to define meanings and to characterize the service they render the public. It is proposed that the search for alternatives should include community involvement in defusing crises, the use of SWAT teams only in special cases, and strategic withdrawal of police where resolving the hostage situation may lead to the death or serious injury of hostage takers, hostages, or police officers.

To My Parents

C.N. NAGARAJ & C.N. RAMA DEVI

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Chapter One: Introduction | 1 |
| Chapter Two: The Nature of Hostage Negotiation | 6 |
| Unique Nature | 7 |
| Psychotherapeutic Model | 9 |
| Interaction/Goals Model | 12 |
| Need for Refinement | 13 |
| Chapter Three: The Nature of Power | 23 |
| Conceptions of Power | 24 |
| Power and Commonsense | 25 |
| Social Scientific Analysis of Power | 26 |
| Parsonian Conception of Power | 27 |
| Conception of Power in Interpersonal Communication Studies | 31 |
| Four Bases of Power: A Synthesis of Perspectives | 36 |
| Ideological Power | 39 |
| Institutional Power | 52 |
| Relational Power | 57 |
| Individual Power | 61 |
| Research Questions | 65 |
| Chapter Four: Methods | 67 |
| Contextual Analysis | 67 |
| Descriptive Analysis | 68 |
| Interpretive/Fantasy Theme Analysis | 69 |
| The Search for Alternatives | 77 |
| Transcripts | 78 |
| Chapter Five: Yarnell Bank Holdup | 80 |
| Contextual Analysis | 80 |
| Summary and Analysis | 85 |
| Descriptive Analysis | 88 |
| Summary and Analysis | 99 |
| Fantasy theme Analysis | 100 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police | 101 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Takers | 116 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Other Negotiators | 131 |
| Overall Summary | 138 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Chapter Six: Frontier Airlines Hijacking | 140 |
| Contextual Analysis | 140 |
| Summary and Analysis | 149 |
| Descriptive Analysis | 152 |
| Summary and Analysis | 159 |
| Fantasy Theme Analysis | 160 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police | 161 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker | 175 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Other Negotiators | 188 |
| Overall Summary and Analysis | 196 |
| Chapter Seven: Judson Dean Talley Incident | 199 |
| Contextual Analysis | 199 |
| Summary and Analysis | 202 |
| Descriptive Analysis | 205 |
| Summary and Analysis | 215 |
| Fantasy Theme Analysis | 219 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Police | 219 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker | 228 |
| Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage and Other Negotiators | 246 |
| Overall Summary | 251 |
| Chapter Eight: Results and Discussion: What Does it All Mean, and Where Do We Go From Here? | 255 |
| Problems and Pitfalls in the Present Analysis | 260 |
| Alternatives to Present Negotiation Strategies | 263 |
| Alternative Police Action | 271 |
| Alternatives to Police Action | 276 |
| Footnotes | 281 |
| Bibliography | 283 |

INTRODUCTION

The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket (Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, 1907).

Hostages have been taken to achieve personal, political, or monetary ends since the time of recorded history. Demon king Ravana took God king Rama's wife, Sita, hostage according to the great Indian epic Ramayana. Abram's nephew, Lot, was taken prisoner by the armies of four kings, and Abram's use of 318 selected men to rescue Lot has been characterized as a SWAT team operation (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986)! Kings, pirates, pirate kings, and just irate people have captured and taken people to demand, extort, and bargain for advantages. But, it is claimed that it was the 1972 "Munich Massacre" which gave the impetus to U.S. law enforcement agencies to develop modern hostage negotiations (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Taylor, 1983). Now most major American cities have their own police negotiation teams and SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams to respond to any hostage crises. On a national level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed negotiation strategies and techniques, and teaches them to its own agents, to law enforcement and military negotiators from all over the country, and to a number of U.S. allies abroad (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).

Recently, communication scholars have begun to study hostage negotiations (Rogan, Donohue, & Lyles, 1989; Rogan,

1989, 1990; Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991; Holmes, 1990). These scholars have analyzed police negotiation techniques (psychotherapeutic model), and tried to further the inquiry of communication strategies and techniques used by law enforcement agencies by studying them under the rubric of an interaction/goals model of communication. In this study, I make a case for countering these micro/psycho-analytic studies by communication scholars with a macro/contextual-rhetorical analysis of such hostage negotiations.

Goals of this Study

This dissertation will deal with the issue of the adoption of negotiation strategies by law enforcement agencies for resolving hostage (barricaded gunman) crises. It is claimed that the police use knowledge and skills developed in psychology and related disciplines to "form and develop a trusting, helpful relationship under the most adverse and stressful circumstances to help resolve hostage situations with a minimum of injury or loss of life" (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986, p. 4). I will argue that these "negotiations" do not reflect traditional bargaining dynamics, and that force or power is the more vital determinant in these situations. The difference, I claim, between the traditional approach of law enforcement agencies in resolving these crises and the modern response is that in the former force and power were explicit, but in the latter they are

implicit. My first goal is to critique present hostage negotiation analyses by communication scholars, and make a case for the study of these situations from a power perspective. Pointing out that power, as a concept, has been neglected because of its supposedly unwieldy nature, I will redefine the nature of power, and propose a four-dimensional analysis of the concept. This will allow me to pursue my next goal, that of understanding how power influences the outcomes in hostage crises. The results from an analysis of actual hostage negotiation transcripts will then permit me to critique the police version of events, and pursue my final goal -- proposing alternative police action, and some alternatives to police action in hostage situations.

Research Questions

Question #1: What dimension/s of power are exhibited in hostage negotiations, and how might they determine the outcome in different types of hostage situations? Or, why do certain negotiations succeed, and why do others fail?

Question #2: What are the problems in the existing strategies that the police pursue in resolving hostage situations; and what alternative strategies do the police, and communities have in resolving hostage crises?

Methods

My research questions demand answers about the (1) contexts of particular hostage situations; (2) details of the actual negotiations; (3) interpretations about the contexts,

details, and outcomes of the events and negotiations that indicate the influence of power; and (4) alternatives available to the police and the public in such situations.

The nature of the questions determine the type of methods that would enable an effective analysis. A triangulation of contextual, descriptive, and fantasy theme analysis, I believe, would be an appropriate analytical tool for answering my two research questions.

Chapter Arrangement

This chapter is an introduction to the dissertation. Chapter two provides a description of the nature and types of hostage crises, sketches and critiques the prevailing models that seek to explain the outcomes of hostage negotiations, and provides a rationale for the study of such crises from a power perspective.

In chapter three, I will expostulate on the nature of power by examining how power has been conceptualized by social scientists in general, by communication scholars in particular, and by commenting on the weaknesses and strengths of such conceptualizations. Synthesizing the description and critique, I then propose a four-tier or four-dimensional model of power, the adumbration of which will lead me to ask my two research questions.

In chapter four I will delineate in detail the methods I am going to use to analyze the three transcripts. The three methods, used in triangulation, are contextual

analysis, descriptive analysis, and fantasy theme analysis. Chapters five, six, and seven will analyze separately the Yarnell Bank holdup case, the Frontier Airlines hijacking case, and the Talley hijacking case. These three chapters will enable me to answer the first research question.

Chapter eight is the results and discussion chapter in which the results of the analysis of three transcripts are summarized and critiqued, and based on which an answer to the second research question is elaborated.

Chapter Two: The Nature of Hostage Negotiations

Negotiation is a prevalent form of social interaction. It characterizes not only formal activities like legal settlements, international disputes, and labor and management contracts, but also normal day-to-day activities like teachers and students negotiating class work, husbands and wives negotiating household responsibilities, and so on (Wilson & Putnam, 1990; Wall, 1985; Strauss, 1978; Zartman, 1976). Law-enforcement agents too are involved in various types of negotiations, and negotiations for the release of hostages and the surrender of hostage takers are becoming an important part of police work (Maher, 1977).

Negotiation between the police and hostage takers, as opposed to tactical assault options, is becoming an increasingly accepted method of securing the release of hostages (Miller, 1980). As a forum of conflict communication, hostage negotiation thus presents an interesting opportunity for the study of human interaction.

Domestic hostage negotiations provide a unique opportunity to study some of the more rare and diverse forms of human interaction¹. In these crisis bargaining situations the police try to negotiate with hostage takers to get hostages released and hostage takers to surrender.

Unique Nature

The nature of hostage negotiations, in comparison to other types of negotiations, is unique. Holmes (1990) provides a few characteristics that make such negotiations unique. He points out that (a) police negotiators and hostage takers do not interact in the context of a relationship that has been previously defined; (b) the police and hostage takers are likely to have little specific information about the other party; (c) the demands of the hostage taker at the outset are unknown to the police, and in the case of many domestic hostage situations, unknown to the hostage taker as well; and (d) the negotiations take place in a clearly coercive context. Holmes fails to note, however, that hostage negotiations also are unique because the hostage taker loses legitimacy (and thus power) for the reason that hostage taking is not an action sanctioned by law, and the hostage taker is therefore unlike any other bargaining partner.

Reasons for Hostage Taking

Why do people take hostages? The FBI groups hostage takers in four categories: (a) mentally unstable or emotionally disturbed persons who take hostages either to force an issue or as a plea for help; (b) criminals who are trapped while committing a crime and take hostages; (c) prisoners who hold prison guards hostage during rioting/uprising; and (d) terrorists who take hostages as an act of political

extortion (Fuselier, 1986; Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986). In a recent analysis, the FBI attributed between 52 percent (Fuselier, 1986) and 59 percent (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986) of hostage-takings to mentally unstable or emotionally distraught individuals. Strentz (1983) says that approximately half of those who take hostages are not doing it for financial reasons.

According to the FBI, persons who most frequently take hostages in the U.S. can be classified into four major psychiatric classifications: (a) paranoid schizophrenic and (b) depressed personalities who are usually responding to stressors that are the outgrowth of personal problems; and the (c) antisocial and (d) inadequate personalities whose acts are the outgrowth of criminal endeavors (Strentz, 1983). According to Strentz, till 1983 there were only five hostage situations in the U.S. that were politically motivated.

These categorizations or distinctions are important because police negotiators treat incidents differently based on the characteristic of the hostage taking situation (Fuselier, 1986). For example, negotiators are told not to argue with mentally disturbed individuals because such individuals are not capable of acting rationally; to provide support and understanding to those who have taken hostages because of some domestic dispute; and to remind criminal hostage takers of facts while trying to convince the hostage

taker to accept his own physical safety in exchange for the hostages. What are the theoretical bases for such advice and practices?

Prevailing Explanatory Models

The psychotherapeutic model. The police believe that with an opportunity to communicate they can successfully resolve a hostage taking situation. The psychotherapeutic communication model that they have adopted for negotiating with hostage takers advocates active listening, paraphrasing, illocutionary pauses, self-disclosure reciprocity, and open-ended questions as techniques for facilitating better communication (Rogan, 1990), and thus a positive resolution of hostage situations. Miron and Goldstein (1979), in a manual for police negotiators, prescribe certain message strategies that include calming the hostage taker, building rapport with the hostage taker, gathering information, and persuading the hostage taker to act in a particular manner.

The police seek out those officers to be negotiators who have "good" communication skills, who can exercise patience, and who can stand long and tiring hours of work (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). While they do have professional psychologists/counsellors on their SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team, the police do not allow them to do the negotiating. These professionals are there only to monitor the situation, profile the psychological state of the

hostage taker, and provide advice on tactics the police might be able to use.

Critique. Some research on conflict behavior has posited that communication plays a central role in conflict situations, and has a definitive effect on subjects' ability to successfully deal with and resolve conflicts. It posits that when subjects are provided with an opportunity to communicate, the number of unsuccessful interactions is reduced (Deutsch, 1960; Johnson, 1973). This is a rather simplistic explanation because in many instances communication can escalate as well as de-escalate conflict intensity (Putnam & Jones, 1982).

Rogan (1990) points out that the police model tends to view interaction as occurring within a "communicative vacuum," independent from extraneous factors, noises, and other participants. It also views negotiation as unidirectional, where what the negotiator says relates to and affects the behavior of the hostage taker, but not reciprocally. Moreover, the counselor-client interactions from which the model draws are non-conflictual and non-competitive, he points out. Rogan criticizes the police model as being inappropriate for the situations in which it is used. However, he does not explain why, if the model were inappropriate, the police are as successful as they in fact are in resolving such hostage crises.

Rogan (1990) cites the FBI claim that using tactics and strategies suggested by the psychotherapeutic model will be effective in resolving 96 percent of all hostage takings, and the Michigan State Police claim that they have used other tactical options in only 4 out of 400 incidents of hostage taking. The police and the FBI fail to fully account for this high success rate either. They claim that between 52 and 59 percent of all hostage takers are mentally unstable. However, their therapeutic techniques must be successful in dealing with other types of hostage takers too.

How can one explain this? It would be easy to claim that in such "crisis bargaining situations" the hostage takers are under great pressure, and therefore any calming techniques would enable the police to influence them to give up (see Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). But such an explanation cannot account for "unsuccessful" negotiations, unless of course we claim that the police techniques somehow failed to calm the hostage taker. To overcome this circular reasoning we must try and account more clearly for the giving up by the other 41 to 48 percent of the hostage takers who are not "mentally unstable," and for those situations in which the police failed to either get the hostages released unhurt or to get the hostage taker to surrender peacefully.

If the high success rate is due to the employment of a psychotherapeutic model, the question needs to be asked: why

do we need the police to resolve such situations? Why not psychologists, social workers, or any others trained to use those techniques? Is there any power given to the police that conditions the outcome of the hostage situation? The interactional perspective that communication scholars have used to analyze hostage negotiations fails to identify the larger social forces that grant certain power to police negotiators, and that which conditions the outcome of such negotiations.

Interaction/goals model. Recently, communication scholars have studied some aspects of these "crisis bargaining situations" (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991). For example, Donohue and his colleagues have looked at relational issues, tracking how relationships between police negotiators and hostage takers improve or deteriorate during the period of negotiations (Donohue, Rogan, Ramesh, & Borchgrevink, 1990), how trustworthiness is perceived in a hostage situation (Rogan, Donohue, & Lyles, 1989), and how control is gained and exercised in such situations (Rogan, 1989).

Rogan (1990) has analyzed hostage taking situations to answer questions concerning the communicative conflict behavior of police negotiators and hostage takers. He has conceptualized hostage negotiations as functional goal-based interactions, in which negotiators and hostage-takers communicate to satisfy identity goals (face behaviors), and

relational goals (integrative/distributive), goals which are marked by patterns of language intensity.

Critique. The studies by interpersonal communication scholars, while focusing on goals and conflict behaviors of interactants, skirt both the problem of why some negotiations fail, and what role power or power imbalances play in the resolution of such crisis bargaining situations. These studies are examples of what Lannamann (1991) calls interpersonal communication research using the cybernetic or systemic perspective. He points out that such studies mute "ideological concerns and fail(s) to remedy the disjunction between micro and macro influences on action" (1991, p. 185). Such studies simply point out that components (interactants) within the system are influenced by each other, that balance is sought to be restored within the system if any component malfunctions (conflict), and that there are some feedback loops (trust, control, face threats, goals, etc) that help the system regain homeostasis. This rather fuzzy conceptualization has led scholars to critique the systems perspective.

The Proposed Alternative Model

The influence of power: Need for refinement. Success in hostage negotiation is not only a reflection of the usefulness of certain communication strategies but also a manifestation of the exercise of power in particular cultural/historical settings. The police succeed by gaining and

exercising control in such situations. The control they exercise is over space (restricting the physical environment of the hostage taker), over time (not allowing the hostage taker to rush them into doing things), and over interaction (managing the flow of conversation such that the hostage taker is maneuvered into a position from which the police want him/her to be negotiating) (Rogan, 1989). The police cannot bring about successful resolutions to hostage crises if they are hampered in setting the ground for "negotiations."

Control has a two-fold manifestation in hostage negotiations (Rogan, 1989, p. 21). At one level, it includes containment of the incident within a single physical location. If the hostage taker is free to move from place to place he has more chips to play poker with the police. He can raise new demands, alter old ones, raise the stakes, and bargain harder for whatever he wants. Thus the police begin with cordoning off the place where the hostage taker holds the hostage. Once bound in place, the hostage taker loses most options, and he himself becomes a hostage to the event. At another level, the police negotiator is responsible for guiding and directing the behavior of the hostage taker. This form of control is said to represent the most significant communication challenge to the negotiator (Rogan, 1989).

The police, in their practice, recognize the distinctions in both hostage takers and hostage situations, but they too skirt the issue of power. This failure to recognize the implications of power makes the police explanation of negotiation outcomes incomplete. As Folger and Poole (1984) caution, "Ignoring it (power) or pretending power differences do not exist is a sure formula for failure, because power is operating and will direct the moves and countermoves in the conflict" (p. 50).

Holmes' (1990) study of domestic hostage situations deals with power issues. He argues that "bargaining power is subjective power created in interaction" (p. 14), and he seeks to demonstrate that within the framework of Muir's (1977) "paradoxes of extortionate transactions." Holmes' analysis is exploratory, and his discussion of power and power bases is rather cursory. He also analyzes the paradox of hostage takers' power and not that of the police. To a large extent, his study also focuses on the micropractices of police negotiator and hostage taker, and ignores the macro aspects of hostage taking situations. This whets our appetite for a more careful and full-fledged study of power bases, of how the paradox of power affects both the police and the different types of hostage takers, of the changing power relationships in hostage crises and, most important, of how the complexities of the larger cultural and

historical settings impinge upon the treatment and resolution of hostage crises.

Interpersonal communication researchers have focused on the exercise of control by an individual upon another individual, and have thus sought answers as to how these individuals think through conflict situations and exercise and gain control. Lannamann (1991) points out that the ideology of interpersonal communication scholarship makes researchers theoretically committed to the idea of the individual as the "locus of personhood" (p. 187); and, when the unit of observation is restricted to the individual, "explanation is shifted to cognitive structures rather than social processes" (p. 188); the subjectivist reduction constricts inquiry to the perceptions of the knowing subject; "the focus on individual perceptions elevates the authority of the subjectivist reduction from a descriptive discourse to an explanatory and/or predictive science" (p. 193); and, the ignoring of the historical processes that have constructed the symbolic products allow interpersonal communications researchers to obscure the role of power. But as Hawes (1989) argues, the concepts of "cognition" and "cognitive/mental mediation" become unnecessary in the critical-theoretical formulation of ideology, consciousness, and the subject.

In the context of police hostage negotiations then, interpersonal communication researchers have treated the hostage taker as the "knowing subject" who has to be persuaded

by the police to do certain things, and have assumed that the hostage taker will or will not comply depending upon his "perception" of the situation.

The incomplete police picture and the partial scholarly agenda. Communication scholars have not questioned police claims that negotiation techniques have helped in resolving more than 90% of hostage situations. For example, they have not questioned the definition of "success," nor have they asked what "failure" means. They have not wondered what a four or five percent failure rate means in terms of human and material cost. They have not paid much attention to the possible ways of resolving hostage taking incidents. What the costs are of these successes and failures have also been ignored.

Scholars have gone ahead with the acontextual microanalyses under the assumption that certain communication techniques are helpful to the police, certain others are not, and that we should be engaged in inquiry that will enable the police to fine-hone their techniques in resolving crisis bargaining situations.

These micro-analytic studies tend to be done in the search for explanations of minutiae or for instrumental reasons. This particular type of instrumentality fails to question the prevailing social order, and the products of such scholarship is merely geared toward aiding institutions in place to carry on with their work more "efficiently."

This instrumental rationality rarely, if ever, is equipped to deal with and challenge the basic premises upon which knowledge claims are made and action chains are set in motion.

Communication scholars have ignored the socio-historical context in which such situations have arisen: for example, why so many hostage situations now, and only in this society? What are the societal forces that bring about an increase in such situations? Are the police necessary for dealing with these situations? Have there been a rash of hostage situations before? If so, where, and when? When were the police invested with powers to deal with such situations? Why? Given the police "agenda," what are the ways in which hostage situations can be resolved? How does such an agenda constrain other outcomes? What arguments can be made for the plausibility or implausibility of such outcomes? What sort of discourse is involved in the characterization of such situations? How/Can they be characterized differently? If different characterizations are possible, what alternatives or options do we have in dealing with such situations? A whole series of such historical/political/social questions are ignored by communication scholars. We need to ask them, and try and answer them before doing our "micro analyses." To have not done so, and to continue to not do so is/would be to ignore a basic principle

undergirding research -- that of "organized skepticism" (Smith, 1988).

A question may be posed whether it is the role of communication scholars to analyze macro-social structural and ideological issues. Given the fragmentation of knowledge in modern societies, the "specialization" of scholars, and the turf battles waged to delineate knowledge boundaries, we can succumb to this argument and say that communication scholars should look merely at "talk."

Lannamann (1991) points out that the lack of ideological analyses in the interpersonal communication field stems from three related characteristics of the field: (1) institutional demands for specialization have encouraged an artificial separation of interpersonal studies from larger social phenomena; (2) an early orientation to empiricism has vested interpersonal communication with a positivist heritage; and (3) fissures in competing theoretical treatments of interpersonal power has divided research literature in a way that mutes ideological concerns (p. 183).

If communication scholars in mass media and in cultural studies can extend their boundaries of inquiry by explicitly incorporating a variety of political, economic and sociological theories to study, for example, cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1976) and prime time television (Gitlin, 1980), why should interpersonal communication scholars be bounded by a positivistic and/or systems/cybernetic perspective?

Lannamann (1991) makes a strong case for interpersonal communication scholars disentangling themselves from this constrictive ideology. The study of hostage negotiations, I believe, lends itself as a case for extending the boundaries of interpersonal communication inquiry.

It is difficult, and may be impossible to understand interpersonal communication phenomena without an understanding of the social context within which such communication occurs. It may be argued, however, that we can borrow from others who have studied these social contexts and embed our analyses of hostage negotiation talk within such knowledge. Yes, it is possible, and if such contextualizing is done it would enhance the quality of communication studies. My quibble here is that we have not done such contextualizing, and that we have not made a serious attempt to embed hostage negotiation analyses within such knowledge. To continue to not do so would be to believe that we can learn about human interaction in such crisis bargaining situations through a narrow focus on talk.

Do the Practitioners Need More Theory?

It may be argued though that the police know what works, and that they need not have a fuller explanation of why what works works. Even in terms of the instrumental reasons which drive interpersonal communication research in this area, such an approach would be weak. The instrumental researcher would claim that probably the strongest benefit

of knowing why what works works is for purposes of socializing and training would-be police negotiators. Results based on an interactional/systems approach would not provide the police insights that this research is supposed to provide them.

This lack of a powerful explanation could affect the negotiation process in a number of ways -- it may take the police negotiators more time to complete negotiations (the average duration for resolving a hostage situation, according to one study, was 12 hours) (Fuselier, 1986); it may make them spend more resources (both in terms of time and effort); and it may lead to the failure of negotiations.

More important, and from a critical viewpoint, police claims of the efficacy of therapeutic techniques construct an incomplete social reality for the public, a reality that could lull them to be complacent about the nature of police work. People would therefore continue to place undue importance on police explanations of their work and not have the knowledge to seek any major changes of the structures of society.

It is important to realize that the societal framework within which hostage "negotiations" take place precludes certain outcomes and necessitates certain others. The outcome of hostage taking events are determined in certain ways when the police enter the scene -- hostages released, hostage taker kills himself or is killed; hostages released,

hostage taker surrenders; hostages killed, hostage taker surrenders; hostages killed, hostage taker kills himself or is killed. These are the only possibilities given the fact that the police act in certain ways given their social agenda.

Should we be then bound within this ideological framework, and by this instrumental rationality, for both understanding the problem and alleviating it? Studies done till now using the psychotherapeutic and the systems models do not provide us a good insight into the nature of the problem, nor do they explain why certain negotiations succeed and why some fail. They also ignore the larger social context that frames the problem of hostage taking, thus inhibiting the search for alternative solutions. I therefore propose that understanding the influence of power (of the police and of the hostage takers) in these crisis bargaining situations would enable us to tackle those questions ignored by the psychotherapeutic and systems models.

In the next chapter I will define and analyze the nature of power. I will review the literature on the nature of power, critique the various conceptions, and propose an alternative model that includes four dimensions or bases of power.

Chapter Three: The Nature of Power

In this chapter I will analyze the nature of power by examining how power has been conceptualized generally by social scientists, and by communication scholars in particular, and by clarifying the weaknesses and strengths of such conceptualizations. Following the critique, I will seek to answer the questions of the nature of power, and where power resides by identifying four bases of power -- the ideological, the institutional, the relational, and the individual. With that knowledge, it is possible to ask questions as to how the various bases of power affect the outcomes of hostage negotiations. Those research questions should allow a transition to the next chapter which deals with the appropriate methods to answer the research questions.

Russell (1938) tried to prove that just as "energy" is the fundamental concept in physics, "power" is the fundamental concept in the social sciences. Giddens (1984) points out that power cannot be regarded "as a second-order consideration" (p. 283) in the social sciences. I argue in this paper, as do Duke (1976) and Hocker and Wilmot (1985), that the core concept in conflict theory is not conflict as much as it is "power."

If we are to understand the dynamics of communication interaction between police negotiators and hostage takers,

we need to understand the nature of power, explicate the bases of power, and examine how they influence the outcome in these crisis bargaining situations. To argue that building trust, increasing relational intimacy, and catering to face needs help police negotiators to successfully resolve a hostage taking incident (Taylor, 1983) not only begs the question as to why we need the police to resolve such crises but directs our attention only to individual motives and behaviors and to relational outcomes, but not to historical and cultural settings within which such individual actions take place.

It is easier to describe the consequences of the use of power than to identify its nature. This has led to a positivistic account of power, which focuses attention only on observed behaviors, their sequence, frequency, and predictability. If we were to focus on the nature of power, however, we would be able to give a fuller account which would not only encourage reference to human beings as real entities with real properties and tendencies but also to human collectivities and how they affect societal interaction (Barnes, 1988).

Conceptions of Power

Power has been conceptualized in a variety of ways, and each adumbration has its strengths and weaknesses. The variety and complexity of the conceptualizations have led some scholars to reject the term, because power, for them,

is too broad a phenomenon and thus can not be operationalized (Pruitt, 1981). But operationalism can not be the sole guiding force in research. Therefore, I will summarize and critique the important conceptualizations, and present a version of power that draws on the strengths of the various conceptualizations.

Power and common sense. When we examine the common sense usage of the concept of power we find that power is treated as an entity or attribute which is possessed by people, things, and processes. We talk of the power of nature, of powerful persons, and certain sequences of actions as powerful. Common sense usage treats power as a capacity, not as something that is always manifest and actual.

Barnes (1988) maintains that it is sensible to retain this crucial feature of the common sense usage of power, that is, power should be treated, first of all, as a theoretical term referring to distributions of capacities, potentials, and capabilities.

Power, in the natural sciences, is the capacity to do work. Common sense usage does not differ from this definition. Power is thought of, for example, as an individual's capacity to get things done. Power may be manifest in any number of ways, and thus is often conceived of as a "generalized" capacity. Therefore behavior (or action) cannot be used to define power. However, it is true that power is

manifest in behavior. Finally, while common sense usage affirms that social power is "really there," it does not have much to contribute to the project of finding the nature and bases of power. Thus, sociological analyses are needed to break the circular reasoning involved in inferring power from its effects.

Social scientific analysis of power. Social scientists have researched and written extensively on power. The literature is so vast that it would be difficult to cite even the major works. Those who have written about power include economists, political scientists, sociologists, communication scholars, philosophers, linguists, and others. However, as Barnes (1988) points out, the mainstream of this literature has not come to grips with the nature and bases of power.

One common choice in this literature is to assign power to individuals rather than to institutions or entire societies. Secondly, most works attribute power to individuals only in so far as those individuals engage in certain social relationships with other individuals. Finally, the power of the individual is seen as manifest in the effects upon other individuals.

One reason for the popularity of this view is the apparent "scientific" quality of such definitions. Individuals are more amenable to observation than are institutions or societies. It is rather easy to describe individual

characteristics and their actions. Also, to define power in terms of its consequences is to make the concept of power "operational."

The second reason for the focus on individuals is that it facilitates moral and evaluative objectives (Lukes, 1974). For example, one may say the president of a company misused power and therefore he has betrayed the trust of the stockholders. Thus the incentives for accepting mainstream definitions are that they focus attention to what is observable, they caution easy generalization, and because they allow the pursuit of evaluative objectives. These definitions appeal to those who think they already know what power is, and so to those who merely seek to speak about it more "precisely."

Parsonian conception of power. Barnes (1988) notes that Parsons (1967) is one of the few who differs from the mainstream view in the sense that Parsons' concern is with the nature of power, and not with the effects of power. Parsons assumes that social power is just one specific kind of thing, which must be identified and described. Parsons says that just like money exists in the economic system, power exists in the political system.

Barnes (1988) points out, however, that while this analogy is rich and provocative it does not enable us to understand the nature of power. One reason is that we do not understand money itself clearly. If money itself is a

puzzling phenomenon how can we use it to understand power? To understand money or the use of money we must understand the nature of social order itself. As Barnes says, "Whether we talk of rights and obligations, or of roles and institutions, or of patterned social relationships, the import is much the same: we are talking of a presumed structure and orderliness in social activity, and a need to understand the nature and the basis of such structure and orderliness" (p. 20).

This was not a problem for Parsons because he had developed a general theory of society, and therefore his discussion of power and money was an easy extension of that theory. We do have a problem, however, because Parsons' general theory of society has been subject to numerous criticisms.

Critique of Parsons. Let me paraphrase Barnes' criticisms of the Parsonian social order: Parsons rejects individualistic theories of social order. He says that no society is constituted of isolated individual transactions. The validity of any transaction is not merely a matter for the parties involved in the transaction but is dependent upon wider considerations. Parsons is right because individual exchange is possible only with goods and rights which are "owned," and the institution of ownership is not accounted for in any individualist accounts of society.

So, if individuals cannot be expected to perform in society from out of "natural" inclinations, what is it then that makes them do so? Parsons claims that individuals are amenable to socialization, and that in the course of socialization values, rules, and norms are imparted. This reconstruction of human nature from without would stop the otherwise natural inclination of human beings to clash.

The next question then would be, how is it that the norms humans internalize are strife-reducing norms that encourage persisting orderly activity? Parsons posited that over time actions crystallize into functioning social systems and into persisting patterned action. Parsons' conception of society as normative order and socialization as introjection of norms became very popular. However, the functionalist sociology he inspired failed to sustain curiosity about the nature of social norms and their status as explanations of action.

Over the years it also became clear that although norms exist in societies it was untenable to explain social order by reference to internalized norms. Parsons' conception of norms fails to account for deviance and for social change, which themselves are ordered, patterned, and persistent forms of social activity. Also, norms cannot clearly account for the rich and complex details of social interaction. As Barnes (1988, p. 27) asks, "But where are the norms for the nuances?"

Becker (1964) claims that the apparent existence of a stable distribution of norms and values in society is not the product of stable individual value-orientations or personalities but the product of stable "contexts of action." Becker provides numerous examples of how people shed old values and adopt new ones.

Another criticism of normative determinism is regarding how "implications" can be derived from norms. How does a norm, separated from action or context, look, and how is it internalized? Presumably, it is some sort of a verbal formulation. But how can one draw particular implications from such a formulation? As Wittgenstein (1968, p.81) put it, "No course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule."

If we were to argue that implications are drawn from precedence, it could be pointed out that precedents are frequently unclear, and that implications are keenly contested before a dominant interpretation is established. Thus, Barnes (1988) argues that norms are "necessarily and irreducibly a public entity" (p. 30) and not a private one. Whether one acts correctly in relation to a norm can only be established from the response of other people. If we remove the coercive, internalized element from a normative order we can define norms as an aspect of members' knowledge. Therefore the normative order becomes a "distribution of knowl-

edge." But just knowledge is not enough. Only a degree of conformity at the level of action can explain social order, and therefore power, which is an aspect of the distribution of knowledge.

Following from the above, Barnes (1988) defines power as "the added capacity for action that accrues to individuals through their constituting a distribution of knowledge and thereby a society" (p. 57). While individuals do possess general capacities for action, and thus possess power, in ordinary society the available power is not just the sum of individual powers. The shared distribution of knowledge confers an additional capacity for action, and thus the overall capacity for action is larger and more wide ranging than that of the sum of individual powers. The additional power is, however, not equally available to all members of society. As actions become routinized and ordered, the discretion to direct them tends to get concentrated. So, Barnes concludes that "the possession of power is the possession of discretion: to gain power is to gain such discretion; to lose power is to lose such discretion" (p. 58).

Conception of power in interpersonal communication studies. In recent debates on communication research some scholars have pointed out the need to incorporate notions of power into the contexts of communication processes and outcomes (see Hall, 1989). Some also have noted that it is important to specify parameters and rules to identify the

powerholders and the dimensions and levels of power that they hold (Subervi-Velez, 1989).

Communication research is influenced to a large extent by other social sciences. The study of power, within the discipline, therefore bears a lot of similarity to the study of it in the larger field. A cogent summary of the nature and role of power in communication and conflict can be found in Folger and Poole's (1984) work. I will paraphrase their summary, and will point out some of the weaknesses in such a conceptualization.

Folger and Poole (1984) define power as the "ability to influence or control events" (p. 111), and argue that power is not the property of individuals but instead stems from relationships among members. Power carries weight only when endorsed by group members, and endorsements are given because of (a) social categorization, a process which "creates strong preconceptions about what types of people are usually powerful and what types are generally weak" (p. 112); (b) mystique -- "the magical aura" about power which inspires awe, and facilitates endorsement; (c) interaction in the immediate group, which is the primary means through which endorsement occurs; and (d) group values, whether it be abilities, knowledge, or personal characteristics.

How is power exercised? Folger and Poole (1984) point out that power takes on many guises in conflict. However, they discern four distinct modes in which it is exercised:

(a) directly in the form of physical, economic, and political resources used to force compliance; (b) virtually, where others' compliance is sought by communicating the potential use of direct force; (c) indirectly, where the use of power remains implicit and tacit; and (d) covertly, by hiding or suppressing potential issues, and thus masking the consequences of power.

Folger and Poole (1984), in their recommendations on how to deal with power issues in conflict situations, suggest that we should determine power resources in the situation and identify who holds power in that particular situation; identify power through its effects; identify the person/s who label/s the conflict, for such an ability to label is a sign of power; and identify those who are "conservative" or status quoists, for these are generally the members with power.

Critique of the interpersonal communication model of power. Lannamann (1991) notes that the mainstream definition of power is that it is a "communicative product or process through which one person affects an intended behavioral or attitudinal change in another person" (p. 184). While there are significant differences in the theoretical constructs of power, "the common assumption of these approaches to power in interpersonal communication studies is that the power is exerted by an individual upon an individual" (Lannamann, p. 184). Thus, one major shortcoming of the

interpersonal communication perspective on power is that it is long on the identification of power through the effects of power and short on the identification of it through the bases of power.

While Folger and Poole (1984) recommend that we identify powerholders in particular situations, the bias in communication research is to proceed directly to the study of behavioral manifestations (talk/interaction) of power rather than to the study of the origins of power. If, for example, some of the ways of exercising power is by hiding issues, or by implicit exercise, how can we know power is exercised by studying "behavior"? There are no explicit guidelines for studying this "hidden" exercise of power, thus making any such quest itself a "weak" quest.

The second approach to power in interpersonal communication is through the cybernetic or systemic perspective, Lannamann (1991) notes, and he points out that this perspective also "mutes ideological concerns and fails to remedy the disjunction between micro and marco influences on action" (p. 185). The Folger and Poole (1984) conception of power is very clearly influenced by the systemic perspective though they have cited some research on "issue control" that could be seen as an attempt to analyze present social order, and therefore bring ideological concerns/influences into the discussion of power.

Lannamann (1991) notes that the cybernetic orientation to interaction (and power) fails to address the ideological. By focusing on epistemological concerns, Lannamann notes, the cybernetic approach to power quibbles mainly with the conception of the "unilateral nature of power" (p. 185) and replaces it with the idea of "circular organization" (reciprocal actions that complement initial actions). The result, according to him, is an epistemology that is "essentially conservative of the existing social order" (p. 186) and which fails to critically analyze how ideological practices shape the interpersonal context.

Lannamann (1991) notes that media theorists, on the other hand, differ significantly from the individualist as well as the cybernetic approach to power by employing such concepts and categories as "class, institutions, the state, cultural elite, and so on" (p. 184). Power within such a perspective is not what emerges from the isolated dyad, but is a "set of influences emanating from features of the social, economic, and political landscape" (p. 185). Thus it is argued that while a microlevel analysis of power is necessary, the focusing on the smaller unit of analysis to the exclusion of larger social collectivities "masks the ideological basis of both what is studied and how we study it" (p. 185).

Lannamann (1991) therefore provides a new strategy for dealing with power in interpersonal contexts. A conception

of interpersonal power requires the discussion of three components, he posits: constraint, recursive pattern, and the role of the observer. A difference establishes constraint. For example, in interpersonal communication, to say that the wife takes care of the home is to identify her domain of experience and thus recognize how those experiences constrain her actions.

A recursive pattern of constraints is established as the initial distinctions/differences gain legitimacy through repetition, Lannamann (1991) points out. Once the pattern is established, the source or the history of the pattern is lost or obscured, and the pattern that is established can be described in terms of power.

Finally, it has to be recognized that participants in a relationship may experience power in a positive manner. Lannamann (1991) gives the example of a traditional marital relationship in which the husband and wife may explain the asymmetry of power in terms of personal choices and relational goals. However, an observer might explain the same choices as guided by social patterns of gender-role stereotyping. Thus the role of the observer is important in distinguishing the recursive constraints structuring a participant's distinction of recursive choices.

Four Bases of Power: A Synthesis of above Perspectives

From the discussion and critique of the common sense, mainstream sociological, Parsonian, and communication

science perspectives of power we can conclude that while each has to offer some useful and insightful analyses of power, all of them suffer from certain weaknesses. The common sense usage does not really allow any analysis of social power; the mainstream sociological perspective focuses on the effects of power, and favors the analyses of individual power; the Parsonian conception seeks to understand the nature of power, but falls into the trap of the individual norms explanation; and the interpersonal communication perspective, while explaining power as a relational outcome, has not effectively dealt with the ideological nature of relationships, and the effects of historical forces on the distribution and legitimation of power. To account for the individual, relational, and ideological bases of power, it might be useful to think of power as including four dimensions or bases -- the ideological, the institutional, the relational, and the individual -- with the ideological being the overarching dimension, and the individual being the micro dimension.

Power is embedded in a set of prevailing social processes, processes that define what is good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, right or wrong, and is manifest in the sanctioning of modes of conduct (to paraphrase Giddens, 1984, p. 18). This is the power of ideology. This power is expressed through discursive or non-discursive affirmations and sanctions (rewards and punishments for doing something

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good or bad, right or wrong) by institutions, formal or informal in their constitution. It is generated, dissipated, or shared in interaction (relational power) by individuals who bring certain histories, characteristics and resources (individual power) to the interaction.

The four dimensions have a dialectic relationship with each other. What I mean by this is that each dimension influences the other and is therefore in turn influenced. Thus they are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories in the manner of "scientific" categorization. How then do we evaluate them? Christians and Carey (1989) point out that while there is a convergence of thinking between "science" and "qualitative studies" on the significance of conceptual clarity, qualitative research is concerned with concepts that yield "meaningful portraits and not statistically precise formulations derived from artificial fixed conditions" (p. 370).

The emergence of power can be said to be dependent upon these bases. One can effectively exercise power if one can access or draw upon one, some, or all of the bases. The more the bases one can draw upon, the more powerful one is. Thus, we can conceptualize power as "multiple dependencies." This is very much in the tradition of a systems perspective. However, where I differ is to point out how some of these dimensions or bases are more influential or determinative of the outcomes. Such an identification is in the tradition of

critical social science, and marks this study as different from the ones previously done in the realm of hostage negotiations.

Thus, the police use of communication techniques should be studied in the context of the relative power distribution between the police and the hostage takers, for while neither of the two parties have "appealing best alternatives to a negotiated offer" (Fisher & Ury, 1981) what the police can offer, and what the hostage taker can demand are constrained by the ideological and institutional forces that direct and control such events. The sole focus on the relational aspects by the police and communication scholars therefore fails to provide us the necessary insight to understand why some hostage negotiations fail and why many succeed.

The police, in hostage negotiation situations, are able to draw upon the ideological and institutional dimensions more effectively because they are the sanctioned enforcers of law, while the hostage taker can and usually draws upon the relational and individual dimension to threaten and keep the police at bay. These dependencies may fluctuate depending upon the unique hostage negotiation situation. Why and how they fluctuate can be understood once the four dimensions are defined and their capacity to influence the outcome described.

Ideological Power

The modern concept of ideology, Foucault (1980) says,

is characterized by three interrelated qualities: (1) by definition, ideology is opposed to "truth", ideology being conceived of as "false representation"; (2) ideology is produced by an individual or a collectivity to hide the "truth", and consequently the analyst's task is to unmask this false representation; and reveal that (3) ideology is secondary to something more real. Foucault rejects all three claims, and suggests that if we see the problem of the subject, or representations, and of truth as social practices, then the notion of ideology becomes problematic. He points out that "behind the concept of ideology there is a kind of nostalgia for a quasi-transparent form of knowledge, free from all error and illusion" (p. 117). In this sense then, the concept of ideology is close to the concept of epistemology.

Therborn (1980), in a similar vein, points out that ideologies are not possessions, nor ideas possessed. They are social processes. Ideologies also need not refer to falseness, mis-cognition, and the imaginary as opposed to real character (as does a Marxian conception of ideology). He claims that in every society there is an ideological order of power, control, and domination. The control is exercised through the construction and maintenance of a particular order of discourse, and through the deployment of non-discursive affirmations and sanctions. The construction of a discursive order in a particular society is the

historical outcome of struggles waged by social forces at crucial moments of contradiction and crisis, he posits.

Therborn (1980) points out that the ideological rapport that binds a people to a given order of society is complex, but that it is possible to identify the main types of the mechanism that do the binding. These include: (a) accommodation -- which refers to a kind of acquiescence brought about by a particular social distribution of knowledge and ignorance; (b) inevitability -- which refers to obedience through ignorance of any alternative; (c) sense of representation -- when the rulers are obeyed because they are seen as ruling on behalf of the ruled, and because this situation is seen as good; (d) deference -- which is an effect of enunciations of what is good about the present rulers; (e) fear -- which means that beyond the frontiers of obedience there is only nothingness, chaos, suffering and death; and (f) resignation -- which, like fear, derives from considerations of what is possible in a given situation, but which is based on a more profoundly pessimistic view of the possibilities of change.

Societies vary in the extent of ideological diversity (social processes accepted as legitimate or not), and individual societies vary in ideological diversity between different periods in history. In a society where power relationships are fairly clear cut and stable we may not find a great deal of ideological diversity. This lack of

diversity sets limits on what Fairclough (1989) calls "ideological common sense." Thus, demands by individuals or groups that diverge from the "norm" are labeled "subversive" of the "legitimate" order.

Lannamann (1991) says that in interpersonal communication research, ideology is "often treated as a general term to refer to a 'society's beliefs, values, and attitudes'" (p. 180). He says that while this is useful for understanding the interpretive structures of a social system, it removes "from view the central role of contradictions between material practices and consciousness" (p. 180). What does this mean? It means that ideology is "stripped of its essential political dimension and becomes simply another word for world view or belief system" (p. 180). He argues therefore that ideologies are not "arbitrary punctuations" (p. 182) but reflect and reproduce "relations of power legitimized by institutions of law, education, media, family, and so on" (p. 182).

The police are an indication for the existence of a given order of society. The police (with the support of other societal institutions) exercise control through the construction and maintenance of a particular order of discourse, and they affirm certain actions and pass sanctions against others. The values which characterize many police subcultures, according to Buckner and Christie (1974), are solidarity of group members, a mentality of suspicion,

conservatism in both morality and politics (emphasis mine), a reluctance to disclose information about their work, and the use of ruses to control situations outside their legal authority.

In a hostage situation we need to find out how ideology plays a prominent role in circumscribing the interaction between the police and the hostage takers. To do this we have to understand how ideology influences the notion of law and order, and the description of crime, and how they in turn influence the process of labeling hostage takers and their acts. In the next few paragraphs I will summarize my ideas on these issues.

Law and order/crime. Shane (1980) defines law as "the regulation of relationships between persons and groups. This often entails interdiction of behavior that is considered inimical to public safety, well-being, or morality (p. 5) . While this definition seems straightforward and precise, it is fraught with ambiguity. It is necessary to analyze each of the concepts in the definition to understand the essentially ambiguous nature of law. The public here is conceived as some sort of monolithic group which has clear notions of what is good and what is bad for it based on its clear sense of the "moral."

Manning (1977) defines law as "governmental social control" (p. 22) and thus provides a more direct estimation of the nature of law. It is a common notion that a society's

laws reflect its customs. Manning (1985) says that the growth of the criminal law is proportionate to the decline in the consistency and binding nature of these customs or mores. Unlike in simpler societies, in modern, differentiated societies few values and norms are shared, he points out. Thus, social control through "the criminal law predominates in a society only when other means of control have failed" (p. 138). Similarly, Roucek and Patrick (1972) argue that while social control is as old as human society, informal, religious, and customary control have become less binding in modern societies which have relied more and more on formal governmental control, and government has become the "supreme agent or the ultimate source of power authorized to regulate behavior" (p. 15).

Law reflects the shifting power groups within the society, Manning (1985) argues, and says this leads to the further stretching of the bond between the moral and the legal. Laws contain rules on how to maintain order, but what is "order" is not defined. Order cannot ever be defined unambiguously because what constitutes order has differed from time to time, and is thus a matter of opinion and convention.

Like law, the notion of crime too is shaped by people's understandings. These understandings "shape and modify crime and the information out of which it emerges" (Manning, 1977, p. 256). He notes that "crime is not a single,

reified, constant, holistic phenomenon. It is diverse as to targets, settings, motives, consequences, costs, legal definitions, clearance rates, and perpetrators" (p. 350). However, he says that the police maintain "almost exclusive control over the definition and meanings of crime" (p. 366). This forms the basis of my argument that power stems from an ability to label events/acts/people (ideological control), and the police have had transferred to them this power by certain groups and classes of people who believe that they know what constitutes law and order.

Crime and crime control have ranked high on the agendas of governments (controlled by powerful groups/classes), with critics noting that such an agenda is enormously flawed. Some critics, like Manning (1977), feel that the public remains uneducated about police capacity for preventing or controlling various sorts of crime, and that the police employ the crime problem as "both a scare tactic and a rationale for their existence" (p. 370). More radical critics, dismissing "conventional criticism" -- criticism that focuses on police inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption, brutality, etc -- argue that the absence of a historical and class analysis "inevitably sets the stage for nihilism or a wishy-washy relativism, and their reform proposals are typically designed to shape new adjustments to corporate capitalism" (Platt & Cooper, 1974, p. 3). Such an analysis would recognize that crime is not committed just by people

who have "psychological or biological" problems, but that crime is also the outcome of economic, political, social, and institutional configurations. These configurations, and the presumption that crime can be identified and therefore controlled enable the labeling of acts committed by people that disturb public "order."

While the concepts of "law," "order," and "crime" may be fraught with ambiguities, we can see how powerful groups can control the adumbration of these concepts. Manning (1977) says that "control groups in modern society are power oriented" (p. 33), and that they "seek not only to survive in a competitive organizational environment but to expand their power and thus to maintain the deference granted by others" (p. 33). How do they do this? Roucek and Patrick (1972) list some "instrumentalities and techniques" of social control: custom and tradition, gossip, propaganda, education, religion, and government and law. The police are an institution established by law, and they use custom, gossip, education, propaganda, etc., to maintain the deference granted it by the public.

Active social control is defined as "a process by which social values are examined, and those that are dominant are identified, and by which collective action to protect them is exercised" (Manning, 1977, p. 33). The police, as a political and a power-oriented group, seeks to maintain and expand social control by maximizing "appearances through the

manipulation of expressive symbols and defending their instrumentally defined interests within an environment composed of numerous competing organizations and associations" (Manning, 1977, p.33). Below I will discuss how the labeling of hostage takers is an act of manipulating expressive symbols.

Labeling of hostage takers and their acts: Political hostage takers. A "political hostage taker," commonly termed a terrorist, is described by the police as someone who uses or threatens violence to "achieve a social, political, or religious aim in a way that does not obey the traditional rules of war" (Soskis & Linowitz, 1987). This description is a product of a particular type of ideological discourse, and framed to ignore the problem of "social order." This description also ignores the blatant flouting of the "rules of war" by governments or states.

The police description may account for some hostage takers, like in the Middle East, who are pitted against alien governments. But what about hostage takers, within societies, like the "Red Army" in Germany, and the IRA in Northern Ireland, whose members have taken hostages, or killed people to pressurize their own governments? Or what about hostage takers who may belong to "fringe groups" in society who seek a variety of changes -- members of animal rights groups, environment protection groups, anti-abortion groups, and so on? The police might simply brand them as

"mentally unstable," or "schizophrenic, paranoid" types (see, for example, Strentz, 1986). Thus, the label "mentally ill" can replace "political" and would be an act of manipulating "expressive symbols."

Is there any other way we can describe political hostage takers? Based on Therborn's analysis of the mechanism that binds people ideologically to a particular regime or order of society, we may define a political hostage taker as one to whom the mechanism (accommodation, inevitability, sense of representation, deference, fear, and resignation) is not binding. Such hostage takers may act in such a manner so as to question the societal forces that legitimate the mechanisms through their discourse and through sanctions and affirmations, or to question those members (the ordinary majority) who have allowed themselves to be bound by those mechanisms.

We could define political hostage takers as "victims" of the prevailing social order who compound the problem by victimizing innocent people (hostages) who become pawns in the political "game" between the hostage takers and the police who represent the prevailing "order."

Mentally ill hostage taker. While in the past almost every little community had its own "village idiot," few saw them as problems or disturbers of social order. In modern societies, however, the mentally ill are perceived as such, and the police, as protectors of public order, play a large

role in dealing with the mentally ill (Mann, 1973). Three decades ago, Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) reported that often a policeman's perception and evaluation of an individual's behavior was crucial in deciding whether the individual was sent to a jail, the state hospital, or some treatment facility.

Bittner (1967) reports that legal norms specify police involvement in the care, custody, and control of the mentally ill. This happens under two conditions: when a court order mandates the police to seek out, detain, and bring the person to a psychiatric facility, when the police are dispatched (via radio) to a situation involving a mental case, or when the police encounter someone who is defined as mentally ill.

Manning (1984) says that the category "mentally ill" is a "gloss on certain 'powerless' and unaccountable people whether or not a warrant has been issued" (p. 179). He quotes Teplin's (1983) research which found that suspects who were mentally ill had significantly higher arrest rates (47.6%) than did suspects having no mental disorder (28.2%). This was true regardless of the type and seriousness of the offense. Manning (1984) says that officers use arrest as a screening device, passing the buck to other agencies to take further decisions. In cases where it is known that a person is mentally ill, operators who receive calls from such persons do not take the matter further, regardless of the

content of the call. Manning reports that all calls from that address are treated as if they are from the same caller, and thus ignored.

The police labeling of the mentally ill in a hostage situation can be seen as another exercise in the manipulation of expressive symbols. The police list four types of mentally disturbed hostage takers -- the paranoid, the depressed, the antisocial, and the inadequate personalities. Drawing from the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, various analysts at the FBI Academy at Quantico have described paranoid schizophrenics (Strentz, 1986), the inadequate personality (Strentz, 1983), and the antisocial personality (Lanceley, 1981).

The descriptions of mental illnesses in these papers, similar to those published in medical journals, provide guidelines to individual negotiators for diagnosing the mental condition of the hostage taker so as to categorize him into one of the "mentally ill" groups. However, we have to remember that these negotiators have to come to conclusions based just on their talk over telephone or radio with the hostage taker. Thus, these papers paint broad brushstrokes of description, for example, characterizing male paranoid schizophrenics as experiencing sexual identity and religious orientation problems (Strentz, 1986), or the inadequate personality as being generally good-natured except for his inability to persevere in anything (Strentz,

1983). Such descriptions might lead negotiators to use these rather simple and easy generalizations to label the hostage taker and to proceed to use the style of negotiation prescribed, thus reifying the label, the negotiation, and the outcome.

Communication scholars, like the ordinary public, confident in police "professionalism," haven't inquired into the process of such a labeling activity. Indeed, people have psychological problems, and indeed, such people could take hostages. However, a lack of critical inquiry into both the incidences of such acts as well as the police perception and handling of them would be adding to the police power to manipulate expressive symbols. The acceptance of police labeling also means that we accept their "negotiation" strategies in such situations.

Criminal hostage taker. Serious crimes are called felonies, and include robbery, theft, rape, and murder. Minor crimes are called misdemeanors, and include some form of "disturbance of peace" like drunkenness or disorderly behavior. The criminal hostage taker, according to the police, is someone who has a previous crime record (the police do not specify whether the record includes felonies, misdemeanors, or both), or who has taken a hostage while in the act of committing a crime (again, no mention is made whether hostages are taken when committing a felony or a misdemeanor, though hostage taking itself would constitute a

felony). The police believe that it is easier for them to deal with criminal hostage takers because such persons know the ways of the police, and the police know something about the criminal mentality and may have knowledge of the offender because of his crime record.

To summarize, ideological power is the power to control meanings. This control is exercised by the police who almost exclusively have the power to define what is crime, label people who commit those crimes, and categorize the criminal acts. But the police don't just have ideological power. Ideological power is hollow without the sanctioning/affirming force of institutional power, and the police are vested with that force, in a sense, to match their bark with their bite.

Institutional Power

Institutions exercise power by sanctioning certain modes of conduct, and through discursive and non-discursive affirmations and sanctions. What are institutions? Giddens (1984) defines institutions as structural properties "hierarchically organized in terms of the time-space extension of the practices they recursively organize" (p.17). What he means is that interactants in certain settings reify the setting by using their knowledge of that institutional order (setting) to talk to each other. By talking to each other in a certain manner, or acting in certain ways, they render their exchange "meaningful." But this also leads to their

reproducing the institutional order. Thus it is that institutions become real. Giddens reminds us that this "reality" or "facticity" of institutional order is linked to power, which "it both expresses and facilitates in the details of the interaction" (p.331).

Debnam (1984) says institutions exercise power when they develop a "corporate" identity that acts as a motive on the minds of people. Another way of explaining a collectivity or institution exercising power is by referring to institutional rules which produce effects that do not necessarily represent what individual members might have decided if they had approached the problem afresh (pp. 18-21).

Let me give an example of how this occurs. Kirkham (1985), a Ph.D. in criminology, and teaching at an university in Florida, decides to experience firsthand the rigors of being a policeman. After a four-month training in a police academy, he becomes a patrolman with the Jacksonville-Duval county. Writing about one of his experiences dealing with a young man who had double-parked in the middle of the street, and how the situation escalated into a dangerous confrontation with the crowd that had gathered to witness the incident, he concludes, "As a policeman, however, I had come to realize that an officer can never back down from his responsibility to enforce the law. Whatever the risk to himself, every police officer understands that his ability to back up the lawful authority which he represents is the only thing

which stands between civilization and the jungle of lawlessness" (p. 32).

In Kirkham's case we see how the "corporate" identity influences one's estimation of the situation, and the alternatives available for resolving the situation. Manning (1988) therefore defines organizations (and here, I extend them to be synonymous with institutions) as "phenomena, representations of the meaning of membership, lenses by which the problem of the external world are routinized and made available to members, and power systems" (p. 34). Therefore the police, as an institution, graft onto the world their understandings of "social causation, justice, truth, obligation, duty, and the character of social and juridically bounded relations" (p.33).

Kirkham (1985) writes, "Free love advocates and hate-monger revolutionaries do not apologize for their group memberships, so why should someone whose appearance symbolizes a commitment to serve and protect society" (p. 35). Such feelings and sentiments can surely lead to the police acquiring a vested interest in maintaining these "constructed realities," and they will not hesitate to "manipulate performance figures, distort intelligence and misuse it systematically and intentionally to create 'crime waves,' and develop new, often self-serving strategies in response to their own assembled environmental creation" (Manning, 1988, p.34).

The other side of the coin, Manning (1977) points out, is that the police must carry out "fundamental control functions in American society, not only because such is their legal and political mandate but because there are precious few alternative means by which the construction and maintenance of public order can be accomplished" (p. 17).

The term "police" is derived from the Greek word for City, polis (Patrick, 1972). And, in fact, the evolution of police systems has followed the emergence and development of cities, Patrick (1972) points out. As an institution, the police are a powerful arm of the executive branch in all modern societies. Though the image and the actions of the police may differ from society to society (from the "brutal" police force in totalitarian societies to the "kindly" London "bobby"), police everywhere have increasing powers vested in them for maintaining "law and order." The police are "collectives", who follow "rules" for exercising power, and who expect and cause the "public" to act in certain ways.

The range of police functions is said to include (a) preserving order, (b) protecting life and property, (c) apprehending and arresting offenders, (d) preventing crime, (e) engaging in community services, and (f) protecting an individual's legal rights and freedom (Patrick, 1972). We can conclude with Bittner (1975), however, that the unifying factor in police work is the situationally justified use of

force or the threat of the use of force. Similarly, Shearing and Leon (1977) claim that what makes police work unique is police capability and police license: capability is the access to physical force and law enforcement; and license is the authority to use these resources.

The police are the ones vested with powers to deal with hostage takers because many of the hostage takers are armed with guns, and thus pose a threat to the lives of the hostages or others involved in the situation. The police, an armed force, are equipped and authorized to deal with such situations. They have the material and the option to storm the place where the hostage taker has taken refuge or is holding the hostages.

At this point, it is necessary to interject a short summary of the problem of gun ownership in this country. While there are no comparative figures available for the use of guns in crimes, the U.S. ranks highest in terms of per capita ownership of guns, and the highest rate of homicides using guns (Ellis, 1992). No hostage situation can be studied meaningfully without an analysis of the role guns have played in this society.

The police SWAT team, equipped with special weapons and trained in a variety of tactics to disarm, disenable, and capture people, is usually in place before negotiations begin with the hostage taker. One of the first things that the police seek to know in a hostage situation is whether

the hostage taker has and is threatening to use a gun. The possession of a gun by the hostage taker alters the police's "battle plans." The use of force to get the hostages released or to capture the hostage taker then is an option for the police depending upon their estimation of the hostage taker's mental status and/or the actual events that have marked the hostage situation. The use of force is resorted to only in a few cases, it is claimed, because the police have realized that it poses a threat to their own lives as well as that of the hostages (Taylor, 1983). However, the threat of the use of force influences (explicitly or implicitly) the negotiation process and the perceptions and outcomes of police talk. The "power" of the police is known to the police, the hostage takers, and those others in society who have delegated the authority to act to the police. Thus, the combination of ideological and institutional power should be recognized as the driving force enabling the police to "negotiate" with hostage takers.

Does it mean then building trust, reducing anxiety, and catering to face needs of the hostage taker do not contribute to the resolution of hostage negotiations? I will next elaborate on relational power, and how such power contributes to the outcomes in crisis bargaining situations.

Relational Power

Folger and Poole (1984) define power as the "ability to influence or control events" (p. 111), and see it as

stemming from relationships among members. If power is a relationship attribute it seems reasonable to argue that individuals can exert mutual power over each other. The theoretical positions that focus upon social relationships are social exchange theories and relational control theories. Chief among the former are Blau's (1964), and Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) theories. What they highlight is that power is determined by joint actions of individuals, that persons may enact behavioral alternatives which may reduce others' power, and that persons in power are never completely secure as needs and wants may change, thus redefining what is rewarding and costly to each other.

The "social categorization" process, as mentioned earlier, creates perceptions about who are powerful and who are weak. Such associations set up expectations that support or negate power moves by people from various categories of people, Folger and Poole (1984) posit. If the police are seen as powerful or as the upholders of law and order, their moves in hostage negotiations are endorsed by the "public" in the apprehending of the hostage taker.

This categorization process shapes members' perceptions of themselves. If they perceive themselves as strong they will have confidence in their power moves, and if they perceive themselves as weak, they have little confidence with their moves. If the hostage taker perceives himself as powerless we may see him give up easily. However, such a

perception could also lead to the hostage taker seeking to end the confrontation by killing himself or by some other precipitous action. This is what Folger and Poole (1984) term the dangers of weakness.

If the negotiating parties cannot get to trust each other, or if they do not empathize with the dilemmas of the other party, negotiations would be deadlocked. For example, the hostage taker must believe that he won't be shot after he has released the hostages, or that he will not be charged with crimes other than what the police indicate to him while negotiating for the release of the hostages. So it is important in a hostage situation for the police negotiators to get the hostage taker to trust them.

The central assumptions of relational control theories is that when individuals interact with each other, the messages they exchange communicate at two different levels simultaneously -- the content level and the relationship level (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). This is to say that a communication not only conveys information (content), but that at the same time imposes behavior (relationship). The important contribution of the relational control position is its focus upon actual messages that are exchanged in the interaction.

Communication scholars studying hostage negotiations have done so using the relational control perspective. They have studied how trust is built or undermined in the various

phases of different types of hostage negotiation, and they have done this using a "verbal immediacy" measure to determine the extent to which the relationship evolves in a more cooperative or competitive manner (Donohue et al., 1990). Their work suggests that the competitive/cooperative interaction follows certain patterns within the three types of hostage taking situations -- the criminal, the mental, and the domestic¹.

Fuselier (1986) points out that domestic hostage takers generally suffer from some form of depression due to domestic problems -- marital relations, child custody, and such issues. These hostage takers require support and understanding from the negotiators to enable them to trust the police. The focus then has to be on building trust by conveying empathy, calming the hostage taker, providing certain assurances, and getting the hostage taker to gain some perspective on the situation that would enable him to realize that releasing the hostage would be the best course of action available to him.

Language is the vehicle, and the means for the expression of power, and for building trust and intimacy in a relationship. Language, an abstract system of rules -- phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic (Gudykunst et al., 1989), serves as a means of expressing, manipulating, and transforming power relations (Giles and Wiemann, 1987). The police are trained to use language that would

enable them to build trust, reduce hostage taker anxiety, guide the hostage taker's thinking in particular directions, and so on. If they are to do that with any degree of success they have to know the characteristics of the hostage taker. It also means that the police negotiator should possess certain characteristics. Both of those will be discussed next as part of individual power.

Individual Power

As pointed out earlier, the mainstream approach to power is that it is a communicative product through which one person affects an intended behavioral or attitudinal change in another person (Lannamann, 1991). It is noted that there are a number of theories that have enabled this individualist conceptualization possible. These theories, according to Lannamann, include locus of control (Heider, 1958), individual motivation (Veroff & Veroff, 1972), traits (Rolloff & Barnicott, 1978), situation traits (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977), intentional versus unintentional power (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), ends versus means (Berger, 1985), and passive versus active responses to power and resistance to power (Berger, 1985).

The resources an individual can employ to exert power can be many. French and Raven (1959) and Wilmot and Wilmot (1978) list special skills or abilities, expertise about the task at hand, personal attractiveness or likability, control over rewards and/or punishments, formal position in a group

or organization, loyal allies, persuasive skills, and control over critical possessions as some of those resources.

Individual hostage takers and police negotiators bring certain unique resources, and characteristics to the hostage situation. Police negotiators are trained to talk and interact in certain ways that enable them to build trust, control the flow of interaction, guide the hostage taker to particular options, and so on. The police seek out those officers who have "good" communication skills, who can exercise patience, and who can stand long and tiring hours of work to be hostage negotiators (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). As such, we may not encounter much variability in the resources that individual police negotiators bring to the hostage situation.

Hostage takers, however, bring that variability. The personality of the hostage taker, and the reasons for which he has taken someone hostage are unique to a hostage situation. We have seen that the police categorize broadly hostage takers into the "criminal," the "mental," and the "political" types. It is claimed that the police mostly encounter the first two types in this country, and that it is rare for them to deal with a political hostage taker (Strentz, 1983).

The resources that a hostage taker brings into a hostage situation includes not only his mental/affective state and personality and physical characteristics but also the

number and type of hostages, the type/s of weapons he has in his possession, the number, varieties and specificity of demands he makes, the vulnerability of the physical locale in which he is holding the hostages, and so on.

Personality and physical characteristics of the participants involved in an interaction influence language behavior (Robinson, 1984). Scherer (1979) has reviewed studies showing that such qualities of individuals as extraversion and depression can be indicated linguistically. The police have to focus on various speech markers to estimate the hostage taker's mental status, and be mindful of their own speech to make sure it doesn't trigger negative reactions from the hostage taker. The speech markers of the hostage taker that the police have to focus on are what Laver and Trudgill (1979) call "psychological markers" (those that mark psychological characteristics of personality and affective state), and "physical markers" (those that mark physical characteristics such as age, sex, physique and state of health). The police have to be sensitive to some of their own "group markers" (those that indicate membership of a group) for, as Fuselier (1986) points out, some of the mentally disturbed hostage takers react in a hostile manner to "therapeutic" talk. These hostage takers have some history of being counseled, and they might carry a grouse against doctors or counselors.

The individual hostage taker has power -- over his own life, and the life of the hostage/s -- but he is constrained in the use of that power. As Giddens (1984) points out, "in power struggles the dialectic of control always operates, although what use agents in subordinate positions can make of the resources open to them differs very substantially between different social contexts" (p. 283-284).

While the hostage taker has the power to kill or maim the hostages or himself, the option is not attractive. If he kills the hostage/s he can expect either to be killed by the police or to be arrested, arraigned, and given a long prison term, or even the death sentence. If he kills himself, the hostage taker cannot get his demands met. The hostage taker also is weakened by the act of taking someone hostage because public perception of such acts is that it is against public order. Hostage taking is a "criminal act" and anyone who commits such acts immediately puts himself in a position of weakness. Thus, the "power" that the hostage taker has by holding someone hostage is indeed tenuous at best. Instead of enabling the hostage taker to act or to influence events, in real terms such an act disables the hostage taker to negotiate with those he has quarrels with.

It may be argued that the holding of hostages empowers the hostage taker at least temporarily, and that many "domestic" hostage takers do take hostages to overcome their feelings of powerlessness. The holding of hostages draws

media attention, and the hostage taker may enjoy a temporary "high" because of the attention (power). This argument is valid to the extent that one ignores the other social influences determining the situation. Once the hostage taker realizes the situation in which he has put himself, he recognizes his weakness. The only hostage takers who can use hostages as a "resource" and empower themselves are those who are mentally ill. They are powerful because they don't realize their situation.

I have argued that communication scholars have focused too much on the relational aspects of hostage negotiations to the detriment of a more basic analysis of the influence of power in such situations. I have tried to make the case for a re-analysis of the nature of power, and how power influences the outcomes in hostage negotiations. I have delineated a four-tier model of power to understand the nature and effects of power, and at this point it is necessary to ask how such a model enables us to study outcomes in hostage situations.

Research Questions

Question #1. What dimension/s of power are exhibited in hostage negotiations, and how might they have determined the outcome in different types of hostage situations? Or, why do certain negotiations succeed, and why do others fail?

Question #2. What are the problems in the existing strategies that the police pursue in resolving hostage situations,

and what alternative strategies do the police have in resolving hostage situations?

The first question will be answered by analyzing three actual hostage negotiation transcripts in chapters four, five, and six. These three chapters not only provide answers to the first question, they provide the plank for discussing the second question. Such a discussion is relegated to chapter seven. The discussion therein not only draws upon the results from chapters four, five, and six, but also includes an analysis of recommendations made by police professionals and academics regarding the alternatives available to communities in dealing with problems of law and order, and crime.

Chapter Four: Methods

In this study of hostage negotiations I have posited that power is the determining factor in the outcome of negotiations. I have argued that while therapeutic talk has its influence in guiding the hostage taker toward particular actions, such influence is only possible because of the play of power.

In the previous chapter I have described the nature and bases of power, and have argued for a macro analysis of the influence of power in hostage situations. Such analyses are needed to provide the bulwark for micro analyses of "crisis bargaining" situations which have predominated in the work of communication scholars in the past few years.

What are the methods that enable us to do fruitful macro analyses? In this particular instance, my research questions demand answers about the (1) contexts of particular hostage situations; (2) details of the actual negotiations; (3) interpretations about the contexts, details, and outcomes of the events and negotiations that indicate the influence and play of power; and (4) alternatives available to the police in such situations.

Contextual Analysis

Christians and Carey (1989) suggest that researchers involved in bringing out the distinctive elements of the

case should become "masters of context" (p.362). Context includes the immediate -- where, when, and what; and the background -- the social and historical contexts. Such research avoids the assumption that the phenomenon under study is autonomous.

For the purposes of this research endeavor I will not only provide the broad, general context for domestic hostage negotiations but also the immediate contexts of each of the hostage situations (through newspaper accounts of those hostage situations). Newspaper accounts would constitute secondary sources, and transcripts would constitute primary sources. For providing the broad, general context I will rely on newspaper accounts, and books and articles on hostage situations.

Descriptive Analysis

Hostage taking situations tend to be unique in the sense that contextual features differ from situation to situation. Thus, we may have two "mentally disturbed" hostage takers in two hostage taking situations, but the situations could differ in a number of important characteristics: the number of hostages held, the relationship of the hostages to the hostage taker, the place where the hostages are held, the demands of the hostage taker, the physical and the mental conditions of the hostages and the hostage taker/s, the time of police intervention, the length of negotiation, and so on. Newspaper accounts are incomplete

because reporters are not privy to the minute by minute transactions between the hostage taker and the police. It is therefore necessary to provide details of the negotiation through documentary research. Here, the documents include transcripts of actual hostage negotiations.

Interpretive Analysis/Fantasy Theme Analysis

People interpret. They do not merely react or respond; they interpret experience through the agency of culture (Christians and Carey, 1989). Interpretive research focuses on "the study of meanings, that is, the way individuals make sense of their world through their communicative behaviors" (Putnam, 1983, p.31). One of the basic tasks for social scientists then seems to be to interpret these interpretations to enable the understanding of human activities (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979; Denzin, 1983).

From the transcripts, we know both the hostage takers and police negotiators make meaning of each other's utterances. My task is to interpret the meanings they construct from their communicative behavior. The meanings that are germane to this study are those of power. How does the hostage taker interpret the police negotiator's utterances?

Interpretations can be done by analyzing discourse. Hostage negotiations can be termed "interactive discourse" which Smith (1988) describes as being "characterized by alternating source and receiver roles" (p. 237). Interactive discourse analysis includes systematic methods for

describing, explaining, and evaluating the structure and function of rules governing conversations (McLaughlin, 1984). However, my research is not concerned with discourse in that sense and thus neither specifically deals with linguistic questions, nor with the variations in the language of various social groups and group-member cognitions. I am interested in finding out how meanings are constructed both explicitly and implicitly by hostage takers and police negotiators not just through their talk but from their "situations."

What method/s do I have to do such an interpretation? Certain rhetorical analytic techniques provide some opportunities for such an exploration, especially **fantasy theme analysis** in the genre of **dramatistic criticism**. According to Bormann (1972, 1982), narrative discourse entails four related components: fantasy themes, fantasy types, rhetorical visions, and rhetorical communities. Fantasy themes are stories or dramatic references in a message that presents characters. The fantasy theme is essentially a "myth" about a particular incident "which is put forward as containing or suggesting some general truth" (Sykes, 1970). A fantasy type is a general category of recurring fantasy themes appearing in a series of related messages. Rhetorical vision refers to "shared fantasies or composite dramas that capture the imagination and allegiance of sizable groups of

people" (Smith, 1988), and a rhetorical community consists of the people who share rhetorical visions.

Since "fantasy theme analysis" is geared toward analyzing "narrative discourse" it may be asked how suitable it is for analyzing hostage negotiations. According to Foss (1989), Bormann (1972, 1982) not only extended the notion of fantasizing into a theory but also argued that such analysis would be appropriate in the study of the communication of social movements, political campaigns, organizational communication, and various other kinds of rhetoric. Glaser and Frank (1982) used fantasy theme analysis to study interpersonal discourse. Heisey and Trebing (1983) examined selected rhetorical documents of the Shah of Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini using fantasy theme analysis to identify each leader's rhetorical visions and strategies. Thus, there is precedence for using this analytical tool to examine a variety of discourse. My point too is that I am not only analyzing the actual transcripts of hostage negotiations but also secondary evidence like newspaper reports, writings by hostage negotiators, and analyses by social scientists. Supplemented by some critical commentary, I believe that fantasy theme analysis provides me a handy tool for interpreting the interpretations of hostage takers, police negotiators, and the "public," in whose realm the hostage drama is played out.

Another problem using fantasy theme analysis is that Bormann (1985) distinguishes between a "dramatic situation that takes place in the immediate context of the group and a dramatized communication shared by the group" (Foss, 1989, p. 291). For Bormann, the action unfolding in the immediate experience of the group would not qualify as a basis for the sharing of a group fantasy. Thus, my analysis of the actual hostage transcripts would be out of bounds within the fantasy theme framework.

Also, since my analysis includes interpretations of individual actors' utterances, and not "group members' utterances," it will not fit snugly within the bounds of traditional fantasy theme analysis. But I believe methodological frameworks are plastic, and that one can creatively use them if they so lend themselves. Foss (1989) reminds us that fantasy theme analysis is appropriate when, for example, "group members begin talking about a conflict some of them had in the past or if they envision a future conflict" (p. 291). I argue that in a hostage situation, where the police and hostage takers are not negotiating face to face, each party tends to dramatize their messages for each other. Such dramatized messages may be termed "fantasies," similar to how Bormann characterizes group members' messages of characters, actions, and settings "that are removed from the actual current group situation in time and place" (Foss, 1989, p. 291).

Bormann's (1972, 1982) symbolic convergence theory is based on two major assumptions: the first assumption is that communication creates reality. Foss (1989) interprets this to mean that communication creates reality because of its capacity to "introduce form and law into a disordered sensory experience" (p. 289). This is the same as the notion that rhetoric is epistemic, which means that rhetoric creates knowledge.

The second assumption is that symbols not only create reality for individuals but that individuals' meanings for symbols can converge to create a shared reality for participants (Foss, 1989). Thus, while the message is important the sharing of the message is even more significant.

As indicated earlier, the basic unit of symbolic convergence theory and fantasy theme criticism is fantasy or fantasy theme. Fantasy, in this context, refers to the way events are interpreted creatively and imaginatively (Foss, 1989), and not in the popular sense of something unreal and "imaginary." The fantasy theme could be encapsulated in a word, phrase, or statement that "interprets events in the past, envisions events in the future, or depicts current events that are removed in time and/or space from the actual activities of the group" (Foss, 1989, p. 290). These fantasy themes tell stories that account for the group's experiences, and they become the reality for the members of the group.

We can analyze the group's fantasy theme, or rhetorical vision by examining three elements: setting, characters, and action. According to Foss and Littlejohn (1986), the interaction of these elements within a group determines what is legitimate "reality" or not for group members. This interaction also enables us to gain insights into the group's motives, values, attitudes, and so on. Bormann (1985) distinguishes between the actual situation that takes place in the immediate context of a group and a dramatized communication shared by the group. For example, in a hostage situation we should distinguish the events that occur in the immediate context of police negotiators and the police force involved in the action and the version that they share with each other and the public.

Fantasies are characterized by organizational and artistic quality, and they are designed to provide the most credible interpretation of the experiences of group members. Foss (1989) elaborates: "regardless of the qualities of the fantasies, they always present an interpretation or a bias and attempt to persuade others of the correctness of the perspective" (p. 291). She also points out that there exists a close relationship between fantasies and argumentation in that "shared fantasies are a necessary and prior condition for arguments" (p. 291). Thus the police, for example, might assume precedent or past experience as the

basis for arguing particular courses of action or outcomes of action.

The next important component in fantasy theme criticism is fantasy type. When a community shares similar scenarios involving similar scenes, actors, and settings they begin to share a fantasy type. Once such a type has developed, group members can simply provide the general story line of the fantasy type, and the audience is able to call up particulars of the entire scenario. Foss (1989) claims that fantasy types allow a group to fit new events or experiences into familiar patterns: "If a new experience can be portrayed as an instance of a familiar fantasy type, the new experience is brought into line with the group's values and emotions," (p. 292) she posits. In hostage negotiations we can see the categorization of hostage takers as criminals, the mentally ill, or terrorists providing the police necessary fantasy types. The public as well as the police themselves as audience can then recall or provide details of hostage taking events given the general story line spun by the police at the scene of the hostage taking event.

The next component, rhetorical vision, refers to a "unified putting together of the various shared fantasies" (Bormann, 1983, p. 114). The rhetorical vision contains fantasy themes relating to setting, actors, and actions that converge to form a coherent interpretation of reality. Foss (1989) indicates that rhetorical visions are often

integrated by the sharing of a dramatizing message that contains a master analogy. Examples of master analogies that Foss (1989) provides include the Cold War, Black Power, and the moral majority. What sorts of rhetorical visions do the police, the hostage takers, the media and the public have of hostage events?

The people who share and participate in a rhetorical vision form a rhetorical community. They not only share common symbolic ground but respond to messages in ways that are compatible with their rhetorical vision (Foss, 1989). Bormann (1983) states that the rhetorical community "will cheer references to the heroic persona in their rhetorical vision. They will respond with antipathy to allusions to the villains. They will have agreed-upon procedures for problem-solving communication. They will share the same vision of what counts as evidence, how to build a case, and how to refute an argument" (p. 115).

The rhetorical vision provides the motive for action. The actions may make little sense to those outside of a rhetorical community. Foss (1989) gives the example of a "martyr" or a "terrorist" whose willingness to die for a cause as an action propelled by a rhetorical vision, and an action that others might not understand or see as absurd. However, once we discover the rhetorical vision of the actor we can better explain why that individual acted that way.

Finally, what are the procedures for discovering the world view shared by a community? Foss (1989) advocates five: (1) finding evidence of the sharing of fantasy themes or a rhetorical vision; (2) coding the rhetorical artifact(s) for setting, character, and action themes; (3) construction of the rhetorical vision(s) on the basis of the fantasy theme/s; (4) naming the motive for the visions identified; and (5) assessment of the group's rhetorical vision.

From the contextual, documentary, descriptive and interpretive analyses, I expect to detect the constellation of forces -- the immediate and background contexts of hostage taking, the police's labelling process, the resources and skills each party employ, the individual characteristic of hostage takers -- that highlight the play of various dimensions of power. From this, I will be able to detect the deficiency in the advocacy of certain strategies for resolving hostage situations by the police and communication scientists.

The Search for Alternatives

What are the alternatives available to the police and the public in resolving hostage situations? It is my intention not only to understand hostage negotiations but to try and seek answers to how hostage situations can be dealt with. "Negotiations" are put forward as almost an ideal means for resolving such crises. However, we notice from

accounts in the media, as well as from transcripts of hostage negotiations that some negotiations fail and that such failure is costly in terms of human lives as well as resources that the police expend in dealing with such situations. Are there ways that would reduce or eliminate such costs? What are they? Can they be implemented and, if so, how? If not, why not?

Through critical commentary as well as analyses of other law and order situations (for example, the prudence of "high speed police chases") I hope to provide some alternatives for dealing with hostage situations.

Transcripts

The hostage negotiation transcripts were obtained from the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia by communication scholars in the Department of Communication, Michigan State University. The interactions were transcribed from original audio recordings provided by law enforcement officials at the scene of the incident. The transcripts that I have chosen to analyze are:

1) The Yarnell incident (January 15, 1977), in which William "Tony" Buffington shoots and kills his girlfriend Johnna Marie Jessee, then himself after holding the manager of the Yarnell branch of the Valley National Bank hostage for a protracted time and then releasing her.

2) Frontier Airlines hijacking (October 20, 1977). Michael Hannan hijacks a flight from Grand Island, Nebraska,

and orders the pilot to land in Atlanta. After a 10-hour standoff he releases all the passengers and crew but kills himself after failing to get his gay lover, George Stewart, released from prison.

3) Judson Dean Talley incident (November 29, 1984).

Talley, 20, hijacks an Augusta-to-Atlanta commuter plane and holds the pilot and co-pilot hostage after releasing the 10 passengers. He surrenders to the police after five hours.

The reasons for choosing these three cases is that the newspaper reports describing these incidents is much more detailed than the reports of other incidents, whose transcripts I have in my possession. Out of the 12 transcripts in my possession, I have been able to track down the newspaper reports of eight of them. Of these eight, three represented unsuccessful negotiations (where the hostage takers killed themselves), and five were successful negotiations (hostages released, and hostage takers surrendered). Given the nature of my research questions, I wanted to analyze at least two successful, and two unsuccessful negotiations. However, I had to trim the number of analyses to three because of the bulky nature of the analysis.

Chapter Five: Yarnell Bank Holdup

Contextual Analysis

Context. William Thomas Buffington (Tony), 31, and his girlfriend and accomplice, Johnna Marie Jessee (Whiskey), 22, died in an apparent murder-suicide after a 10-hour standoff with the police at the Valley National Bank branch in Yarnell, a small town of 750 in Arizona on January 14, 1977. Tony and Whiskey had planned to rob the bank on that Friday, early morning, and get away but their attempt was apparently foiled when, according to Whiskey, "evidently somebody saw us coming around the back" (Wayman, 1977, p. A-24).

According to the police, the day-long episode began at around 8:30 a.m. when Tony "forced" his way through the back door of the bank at gunpoint. The attempted bank robbery was aborted when a sheriff's deputy spotted Whiskey, who had a rifle in her hands, in a wooded area behind the bank. While the chronology of events as reported in the newspapers is a little confusing, it seems that Tony took four people in the bank hostage only when he knew that Whiskey had been arrested. He tried to negotiate his freedom for that of the safety of the hostages. Yet another chronology recounts that Mrs. Dunne (the bank manager) was in the bank at about 8:30 a.m. with teller Sue Welch, and Mrs. Welch's daughter

Mona, 11. Mrs. Dunne's husband, Gene, 56, arrived moments later with some mail. As Gene turned to leave, he was met at the door by Tony and forced back to a room where Tony directed Mrs. Welch to tape Gene's hands behind his back. At this time, Mrs. Dunne induced Tony to release Mona.

Meanwhile, the police who had exchanged some gunfire with Whiskey and arrested her, took her to a restaurant across the street from the bank. Tony, the police claim, called the restaurant and offered to exchange two of his three remaining hostages for his girlfriend. The police took Whiskey's shoes and coat and sent her into the bank. According to the Yavapai country sheriff, Harold "Curly" Moore, Tony and Whiskey were apparently ready to give up around 10 a.m., but changed their mind when they got a call from officials of the Valley National Bank who offered \$25,000 and a ride out of town if Mrs. Dunne was released unharmed.

FBI Agent David Small, however, told Tony that when the bank official came, "we are going to set him down and let him do nothing" (Wayman, 1977, p. A-24). Small then continued trying to persuade Tony to surrender. Shortly after noon, Tony told the police that he would release Mrs. Dunne at 3 p.m. and then determine what action he and Whiskey would take. But Mrs. Dunne was not released at the promised time. Tony wanted to talk to his mother in Amarillo, Texas before releasing Mrs. Dunne. Tony finally reached his

mother, talked to her, and then released the bank manager. Mrs. Dunne, the bank manager, ran from the bank building after Whiskey had picked up a pack of cigarettes that the police had thrown in front of the bank door.

After Mrs. Dunne had been released, Tony told FBI agent Small that he and Whiskey needed 20 minutes to think things over. At the end of that time he said that he had decided to kill Whiskey and then kill himself. The situation remained unresolved till 6:30 p.m. (Wayman, 1977, p. A-1) or 6:10 p.m. (Mills, 1977, p.1) when Tony called the police, and the police heard two gun shots. The police fired tear gas shells into the bank building as they entered it, and they found Tony dead with a massive head wound, and Whiskey bleeding from a wound in her left temple. Whiskey died in an ambulance en route to the hospital.

According to Wayman (1977, p. A-1), Tony had been working as a bartender in Yarnell since his arrival there six months previously. He was wanted on a fugitive warrant from New Mexico. Whiskey also worked briefly in a Yarnell bar.

The police, according to the newspaper, claimed that their attempts to convince Tony to surrender had been hampered by "unofficial telephone calls" and by bank officials' negotiations with the hostage taker. "Reporters and others messed up the negotiations, and we damned well don't appreciate it," one police official said (Schwartz, 1977,

p. A-1). But Dick Hopper, a public relations man for the bank, said the offer of \$ 25,000 and a getaway helicopter was discussed with law enforcement officials, including the FBI. Roger Young, assistant special agent-in-charge of the Phoenix FBI office, declined to comment on whether the bank's offer was approved or cleared by the FBI. He, however, said that constant phoning by outsiders was a "problem" but could not say if they directly affected the ultimate outcome of the hostage situation. Yet another police officer on the scene said they did not expect the bank would attempt to deal directly with the hostage taker. Also, during one of the calls to the bank by the media, Whiskey is supposed to have said, "any more calls and someone may get hurt" (Schwartz, 1977, p. A-24).

Tony, who claimed he was an ex-convict wanted in at least two states, New Mexico and Texas, had two requests: "I request for me and Whiskey both that we be buried somewhere close together," and that the medical examiners "don't cut us up, because they're gonna know what killed us. If I'm shot in the head with a 9-millimeter Smith and Wesson at close range, it's obvious I didn't die of a heart attack" (McCloy, 1977, p. A-24). Tony is also supposed to have recounted his experiences as a Green Beret in Vietnam. According to Mills (1977, p. 19), Tony had been "fired the night before from his job at a Yarnell bar."

Whiskey, a former art student, said she was being sued for \$15,000 because of a traffic accident the previous winter in Spokane, Washington. She told that she got involved in the bank robbery because Tony was her "old man."

Setting. Yarnell, a town with 750 residents (in 1977), is about 30 miles southwest of Prescott on U.S. 89 in Arizona, and about 50 miles northeast of Phoenix, Arizona.

During the negotiations, the police positioned themselves behind cars on the streets and on nearby rooftops, until the bank was surrounded. Stores in the two-block-long town were closed, and barricades were set up to reroute traffic away from the bank. According to Wayman (1977), "the town of 750 had become an armed camp" (p. A-24).

According to Mills (1977), it was a cold day in the mountain town of Yarnell, and police officers "pulled o gloves, coats and heavy coveralls or wrapped themselves in blankets against the cold" (p. 1). A "weird party atmosphere prevailed among some of the Yarnell residents," and while some talked quietly comparing what they had known of the two hostage takers, others drank beer and "shouted catcalls at police and newsmen" (p. 1).

Sheriff Moore said that six of Tony's friends were brought to the command post and talked over the telephone to the pair (however, only four of the friends' talk is available on the tape/transcript), trying to persuade them to release the hostage and give themselves up. One of the six,

Stich Hafey, said he wanted to offer his car for the two to escape but that he had drained the gas tank and shorted out the fuel gauge to make it read full. The FBI would not allow him to make the offer.

According to Mills (1977, p. 1), Whiskey had been apprehended behind the Old West-style bank by deputy sheriff Jody LaRue after Whiskey had fired a shot from her .30-caliber carbine and panicked and thrown the gun down.

Summary and analysis. There are certain questions that can be raised based on the contextual information that we could not have raised if we had merely analyzed the transcript. Asking these questions and answering them would enable us to understand the influence of power in these negotiations as well as to probe police actions critically.

The police blame unofficial calls by bank officials and the media for their failure to persuade the hostage takers to surrender. But could there have been other reasons for such a failure? For example, why did the police exchange the accomplice in the holdup, Whiskey, for two of the three hostages? There is no police explanation in the newspaper reports for this action. Whiskey, from being an accomplice apprehended by the police, is turned into a hostage taker in league with her boy friend, the actual hostage taker. This police action, at first glance, could be seen as effective bargaining -- two hostages released in exchange for one accomplice. But what they did by sending Whiskey back into

the bank was to complicate the negotiation process. Whiskey, it seems from the transcript, induces Tony to rethink the idea of giving up, and urges Tony to "blow her away." Tony tells one of the friends who talk to him that he and Whiskey had made a pact that if the holdup failed they would commit suicide rather than go to prison. Thus, the police, by sending Whiskey back, enable the carrying out of the pact. Strategically, therefore the initial police move can be characterized as hasty and ill thought out. The exchange did not empower Tony in any way except in the sense it enabled him and Whiskey to commit suicide as they had planned.

The police, however, blame bank officials and others for the failed negotiations. There is no evidence in the transcript that Tony's attitude hardened once the bank officials made the offer. Throughout the interaction one can perceive Tony's estimation of police work: he is aware of and knowledgeable about police methods and attitudes. He knows that he can't escape the clutches of the police if indeed they gave him a getaway car. Thus, the police act of blaming others is an example of the exercise of ideological and institutional power. It is the wielding of ideological power in the sense that they control the creation of meaning, in this case the public perception of hostage negotiations: one headline in the Arizona Republic (January 15, 1977, p. A-1) proclaims "Surrender plan obstructed by

'unofficial calls'." Institutional power, similarly allows the police in maintaining these "constructed realities" and creating self-serving strategies through the use of affirmations and sanctions.

The institutional power of the police is manifest in the number of policemen on the scene, and in their ability to control the physical environment. Wayman (p. A-24) reports that Yarnell had been transformed into an "armed camp." It can thus be argued that this heavy accumulation and display of force could have also led to the failed negotiations rather than the "unofficial calls" made by bank officials.

Tony and Whiskey were bartenders, and they were both on the run: Tony, with two warrants for his arrest for crimes committed in neighboring states, may have been trying to assure his escape from the police dragnet by fleeing to a distant place with enough money that would assure some anonymity: for after all, as long as he worked there would be a high chance for the police to trace him. Whiskey, with the threat of a \$15,000 lawsuit, was also trying to escape her way out of poverty or arrest. Neither therefore had much individual economic or social power. The only power they had was in their mini arsenal of guns, and the hostage they held.

We realize that the numerous friends who tried to plead with them to give up were also from the same or similar

economic and social backgrounds. Thus the two hostage takers could not tap any ideological or institutional power. The relational power they could and did tap was under the control of the police. However, Mills (1977, p.1) reports that some Yarnell residents shouted catcalls at the police and the media. These few, who might have sympathized with the hostage takers, of course would have had no institutional backing or larger public support for their antagonism toward the police and the media.

The hostage takers could have manipulated the media: after all, Tony was talking to an AP news reporter at the time of the suicide, and he could have made certain demands, or sought some ideological power. He could have done that by focusing on his status as a Green Beret fallen on hard times. Instead, the focus is on his more recent past as an ex-convict. The newspaper headlines label him a "gunman," and the information that he served in Vietnam is buried deep in the report on the incident, on page A-24.

To conclude, the context provides us some knowledge of the incident that illumines the use of power by the police in ways that are not or can not be perceived by the mere study of transcripts of hostage negotiations.

Descriptive Analysis

Following is the sequence of utterances in this fairly long hostage drama:

#0001 - #0026 = Tony and FBI Agent Small

#0027 - #0096 = Tony and his friend, Becky
 #0097 - #0182 = Whiskey and Becky
 #0183 - #0236 = Tony and Becky
 #0237 - #0368 = Agent Small and Tony
 #0369 - #0711 = Tony and his friend, Ernie Jones
 #0712 - #0790 = Agent Small and Tony
 #0791 - #0879 = Tony and his friend, Stich
 #0880 - #0931 = Agent Small and Tony
 #0932 - #1071 = Tony and Stich
 #1072 - #1158 = Agent Small and Tony
 #1159 - #1197 = Agent Small and the hostage, Mrs. Dunne
 #1198 - #1284 = Agent Small and Whiskey
 #1285 - #1315 = Agent Small and phone operator
 #1316 - #1339 = Agent Small and Tony
 #1340 - #1358 = Tony and his friend, Suzie
 #1359 - #1543 = Whiskey and Suzie
 #1544 - #1828 = Agent Small and Tony
 #1829 - #1883 = Agent Small and Mrs. Dunne
 #1884 - #2055 = Agent Small and Tony
 #2056 - #2089 = Agent Small and an Associated Press
 reporter
 #2090 - #2117 = Agent Small and Tony

In this part of the analysis I will provide details from the actual transcript of the negotiations between the police and the hostage takers. I do not have transcripts of the conversations that the hostage takers had with the news media

or with bank officials. Nor do I know the contents of the conversation that Tony had with his mother over phone. Also, as pointed above, the audio tape provided by the FBI does not contain conversations the hostage takers had with two of the six friends who are supposed to have tried to persuade them to give up. The transcript of the negotiation contains 2117 utterances.

The transcript begins with Agent Small telling Tony that the police won't hurt him and that he better give up. It is evident that Whiskey is with Tony because he complains that the police have confiscated some "dope" (drugs) that Whiskey had with her at the time of her arrest.

Soon (utterance #0027), Agent Small lets one of Tony's friends, Becky, to try and persuade Tony to give up. Tony uses a number of endearments when addressing her (#0042, #0048). Tony tells her he would not hurt anyone as long as the police did not try and storm the bank. To her entreatments that he give up, Tony replies that he doesn't like being arrested and put in jail, and that he hates the feel of handcuffs.

Whiskey then asks to speak to Becky (#0094) and she seems to be undecided about what she wants. Whiskey sounds suicidal (#0112) at times, and hopeful at times (#0122). She explains to Becky that she and Tony would not have done it if they knew they would be caught (#0145), and they did it because they wanted the money and wanted to get out of

town (#0153). It is also her belief that if they had been at the bank 15 minutes early they would've pulled it off (#0159).

Whiskey turns over the phone to Tony, and Becky once again tries to reason with him to give up, saying waiting only makes it worse (#0202). Tony is remorseful that they got caught, and admits that he had robbed a bank before but did not get caught (#0224 - #0228).

Agent Small takes over (#0237), and asks what Tony wants in terms of guarantees (#0249). Tony wants to be charged by federal officials and not local officials. Small says he will arrest Tony and that would make it a federal case (#0273), but Tony wants a U.S. attorney to call him and talk to him. When Small continues to point out that waiting only makes it worse, Tony admits that Whiskey and he have to sort out certain things. He tells Small that Whiskey wants him to "blow her up" (#0306). When Small protests that would be a dumb thing to do, Tony says that Whiskey doesn't want to go to the "joint for the lesbians" (#0313). Small admits that there are problems but Tony and Whiskey are getting "psyched up" (#0320).

Small persists in trying to persuade Tony that it is time they gave up, and waiting doesn't help. Tony complains that the other phone in the bank is "ringing off the hook" (#0325), and that he's having trouble talking to Small. At about this time, Small lets another of Tony's friends, Ernie

Jones, to talk to Tony (#0369). Ernie repeats that it will only get worse if Tony delays matters, and that it doesn't make sense to kill themselves. Tony repeats that Whiskey wants him to "blow her away" (#0410). Ernie also tells Tony that what Tony had told him some days before about robbing a bank was just "fantasy" (#0435). Ernie tells Tony that it would hurt Linda and Jason if he did anything foolish. Jason seems to be a young child who calls Tony "daddy" (#0441).

At about this time, Ernie, having failed to convince Tony to give up, says that Tony better release Mrs. Dunne before he and Whiskey killed themselves (#0461). Tony believes that since he has two prior convictions for bank robbery he will never get out of jail (#0498). Ernie repeats that if Tony is just going to hurt himself he better let Mrs. Dunne go (#0543). Yet again, after another bout of back and forth, Ernie says that he would rather be in the penitentiary than in the ground (#0609), to which Tony counters he wouldn't mind being dead. Ernie repeats that if that's the way Tony feels he better let Mrs. Dunne go (#0611). Tony tells Ernie that he will decide one way or another at 3 p.m., the bank closing time (#0652).

In the next sequence, Tony assures Agent Small that he'll come out of the bank at 3 p.m. or release Mrs. Dunne at that time. Small tries to reason with Tony the futility and the foolishness of trying to kill himself and Whiskey,

and once, in exasperation says that "you can end up in hell for doing something like that" (#0768). However, he fails to budge Tony from his earlier decision.

The next 88 utterances are exchanged between Tony and Stich, the man we know as having offered the FBI his car with the shorted fuel gauge. Stich tells Tony that he did something dumb the previous week and had the police surrounding his house, but had realized his mistake, given up, and suffered no consequences (#0809). Tony then recounts how Whiskey had fired two shots from the .30 caliber M1 carbine at two policemen as she was waiting behind the bank for Tony. Stich offers to come on over to the bank with some beer and "rap" with Tony and Whiskey. He also claims that he had just gotten out of jail after being in there for armed robbery and attempted murder.

Agent Small then talks again with Tony and points out that jail is not a very bad place to be because Tony can be warm in there and have three meals a day (#0906, #0908). Tony admits to feeling tired, and Small once again counsels him to give up soon.

Back again with Stich, Tony admits to having a conviction in Albuquerque, and three charges pending in Carlsbad. Stich then offers his car as a getaway vehicle (#0974) but Tony argues that he wouldn't be able to get very far in it. He then tells Stich that a man from the Valley National Bank in Phoenix had called and told him that he was going to be

arriving in Yarnell by helicopter and carrying some ransom money. Tony also tells Stich that the man had offered to be taken in as hostage if Mrs. Dunne, the bank manager, was released (#0987).

Stich, in turn, volunteers to be the hostage claiming that he would keep Tony better company than "that fart would" (#0994). Tony insists that he would let the bank manager go by 3 p.m., and he and Whiskey would decide what they would do with themselves. Stich wonders whether Tony has tied up the bank manager, to which Tony replies that "she's just sittin' here drinkin' coffee and eatin' fruit cake with us" (#1041). He also confesses that he has smoked his "last joint" and that he is feeling tired. Stich wonders if he Tony would let Mrs. Dunne go if he got a getaway car, but Tony dismisses the possibility of his being able to really get away in any car because the police would catch him anyway (#1064).

Back with Agent Small, the conversation turns to the number of police swarming over the place. Tony says he is nervous about all that activity, and asks Small to stop it. Small agrees to do that, and wonders what his conversation with Stich about the getaway car was all about. Tony says if he had a car and some "running room" (#1086) may be he could try to make a getaway. Small reminds him that "half the helicopters in the southern United States" were right there (#1089), and that he would not be able to get any

where. Small tries to convince Tony once again that there is no use sitting there and mulling over things, and that letting Norma go and surrendering themselves would be the best thing. But for Tony, Norma represents security, and he tells Small that the police would simply storm the bank if he let Norma go. Small suggests that Tony throw his gun out of the bank, and then he (Small) would enter the bank and escort Tony and Whiskey out (#1137).

Tony wavers, but then insists that he would let Mrs. Dunne go at 3 p.m., and that he and Whiskey would kill themselves. Small asks to talk to Mrs. Dunne, and he gives her instructions on what she should do immediately after she is released. He then talks to Whiskey, reminds her that she's just 22 years old, and that she would spend some time in a federal prison which "are a whole lot better" (#1211) than state prisons. Whiskey repeats that she would rather die than go to jail (#1216), and she reminds Small that he cannot understand her thinking because he is not the one inside the bank with a lot of policemen surrounding the building (#1236). She believes that if she left the building she would either get shot or have handcuffs on her (#1246).

Small tries to convince her that life in a federal prison is not all that bad but her responses are noncommittal. Small changes his tactics, and asks if Tony has any children. Whiskey says that he has a few scattered around

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but that he doesn't like kids anyway (#1272, 1278). Small rings off reminding them to call him back if they decide anything.

Next, a friend of Whiskey's, Suzie Tane tries to convince Whiskey to give up. Suzie is pregnant, and she and Whiskey talk about it. Suzie asks Whiskey to reconsider her decision, and points out that Whiskey can try and set her life right again. She also points out that people hurt their loved ones by killing themselves, and talks about her dad who did that (#1455).

Whiskey wants Suzie to get her a pack of cigarettes, and claims that she deserves to have a last smoke (#1510). Suzie continues to try and cajole Whiskey into giving up by telling her how much she wants to see her, as well as by arguing that living is better than dying even if it means spending a few years in jail.

Tony then asks to speak to Small, and asks him to do a favor by sending a pack of cigarettes. Small says he would exchange a packet of cigarettes for "one brownie" (#1554), probably meaning the gun that Tony has. Small insists that he has to get something in return for a packet of cigarettes, and Tony says he is going to let Mrs. Dunne out at 3 p.m. in exchange. They haggle over the "deal" for a long time, and finally come to a rather unspecific agreement about a deputy coming over and laying a packet of cigarettes at the bank door.

Small asks Tony not to succumb to Whiskey's idea of a suicide. "That woman over there is crazy," he tells Tony, and asks him to take no advice from a woman (#1636). Immediately thereafter, Small tells Tony that the cigarettes have been placed in front of the bank door, and assures Tony that there is no man hiding nearby to grab Whiskey when she picks up the cigarettes. Whiskey picks up the cigarettes, and Tony tells Small that he will contact him again after he has spoken to his mother.

Tony has trouble getting in touch with his mother, in Amarillo, Texas and when Small calls him to check, he tells him he is nervous about Jody (the local police sheriff) and his men on top of the roof of buildings in front of the bank shooting at him or Whiskey accidentally. Small asks if Tony is still listening "to the crazy girlfriend of yours" (#1807), and Tony replies that everything is settled between them, and that he and she would walk out as soon as he has finished talking to his mother (#1810).

Small then talks to the bank manager/hostage, and there is some confusion as to whether she is to run left from the bank or run right as soon as she is released. Small also wants to find out from her whether she has any idea about the state of mind of Tony and Whiskey, and she says she doesn't know (#1857).

Tony talks to his mother, and then tells Small that he would let the manager out if he got another pack of

cigarettes. Asked what they are going to do after releasing Mrs. Dunne, Tony says that he and Whiskey would have a smoke and then come out of the bank. "Give me and Whiskey 20 minutes," (#1955) Tony says, and Small wonders why they need 20 minutes. Tony retorts, "Now would I ask you a personal question like that" (#1961)? Small wonders whether it was Tony's mother who convinced him to surrender, and Tony says he didn't tell her anything about the hostage situation at all.

Small wants to make sure they are not thinking about suicide (#1996), and Tony says he and Whiskey will walk out after they had 20 or 30 minutes together. In explanation, Tony says with a laugh "You know, Goddamn might not get no more for a long time" (#2003). Tony lets Whiskey pick up the cigarettes after making sure there are no policemen hovering in sight, and then allows Mrs. Dunne to leave (#2043).

Not noticing them coming out after 20 minutes, Small wants to find out what's happening. He gets connected to an Associated Press reporter who tells Small that Tony wants the police not to "rush the bank because don't want anybody else to get hurt but me and Whiskey" (#2060). Small wants the AP reporter to get Tony to talk to him, but the reporter tells Small that his colleague, Mike, had just been told by Tony that he could hear the gun go off (#2082).

Small gets in touch with Tony and tries to convince him it is a "dumb thing to do" (#2093), but Tony says he wants to contact the newspeople to give some final instructions about where he and Whiskey should be buried. The last utterance is by Small, who tells Tony that "a best way to do this is stand up like a man" (#2117).

Summary and analysis. Throughout the almost nine-hour negotiation neither Tony nor Whiskey threaten the life of the hostage. While the two did plan to rob the bank, and Tony had a record of crime trailing him, at no point in the interaction with either the police or the numerous friends did the hostage takers use the hostage as a pawn in the crisis. The only demands were for cigarettes and for the police to not rush the bank. The hostage also reveals that she is not being harassed, and that the only discomfort she has is sitting on the ground. The hostage takers even try to make her comfortable by placing pillows on the ground on which she could sit. Thus, the individual power of the hostage takers is self-curtailed.

Throughout the interaction we see Tony wavering. His mood swings, however, don't affect his plans for the hostage: he intends to release her unharmed. He tells everyone who speaks to him that if at all anyone would get hurt it would be Whiskey and he, unless the police rushed the bank and there was a shootout. His demand that he be sent to a federal prison instead of a state prison is not something

that would raise the stakes in the situation. The police agent could blandly assure Tony he could go to a federal prison, and such assurance would not alter police plans in any manner. Tony's demands are half-hearted, and he makes them without any force or consistency. Tony is torn between surrender and suicide, and neither is a plan to enhance his individual power.

Fantasy Theme Analysis

In this part of the analysis it is necessary to find evidence of the fantasy themes and the rhetorical vision of the police, the hostage takers, and the friends of the hostage takers who try to convince the hostage takers to give up the hostage and surrender. As detailed in the methods section, we can estimate the fantasy theme/s and the rhetorical vision/s by coding the fantasy theme/s for descriptions of the setting, the characters, and the action. We can do this through an analysis of the actual hostage negotiation transcript. The fantasy themes and the rhetorical visions should provide us insights about the perceived and potential power and the exercise of that power by various actors in the drama.

Next, we need to find the participants' motivation for their rhetorical visions. How did the rhetoric deal with the problem of creating a social reality that enhanced or diminished the power of various actors involved in the drama? Following is a summary of the fantasy themes and the

rhetorical vision of the police, the hostage takers, and the friends of the hostage takers that the police brought in to persuade the hostage takers to give up. I have chosen representative samples of the characterization of settings, characters, and action to draw conclusions about the fantasy themes and the rhetorical visions. No coding scheme is drawn up nor every single utterance or word is pigeon-holed into a particular category. Instead, I have thoroughly and repeatedly read the transcripts to pick and choose what I considered were utterances that signified and symbolized the characterization of settings, actors, and action by the various participants in the events. I will begin with the police characterization of the events.

Fantasy Themes and the Rhetorical Visions of the Police

Setting. The newspaper reports do not contain any direct quotes from the local police or the FBI regarding the "setting." All of the description of where the events occurred are by the newspaper reporters. However, we get some inkling of the police perception of the setting through the transcript. The relevant utterances, all by Agent Small of the FBI (unless otherwise indicated), are the following:

#0271: My boss is standing right here.

#0283: We got a bunch of cars right here if you want.

#1211: ...everything you're from (?) Tony is the state

prison, which is ah some () are pretty mean. But federal prisons are a whole lot better.

The first utterance indicates to us, as well as to the hostage takers, that the police team is in place, and that there are people in charge of the negotiations other than the one who is talking to the hostage takers. This enables the one who is doing the talking to use the "boss" as the scapegoat if and when the hostage takers' demands are rejected. The boss is a person who the negotiator has to defer to and take instructions from. Hierarchy indicates power and the mystique of power. Effectively, the hostage taker's relational power is reduced. He can not manipulate the police negotiator because the negotiator can conveniently use the boss as an excuse for police intransigence or their unwillingness to negotiate certain demands. The hostage taker is forced to deal with someone who doesn't command the real authority, and as we all realize dealing with an assistant or an underling rather than with the boss indicates our own diminished status/power.

The second and third utterances refer to the hostage taker's demand that he be federally charged and taken to a federal prison than be charged by the local police and taken to a state prison. This is an indication that the hostage taker knows about prison conditions, and he fears entering a state prison more than he does being incarcerated in a federal prison. The police humor the hostage taker's "fantasy," and they indicate there are a fleet of cars ready to transport the hostage taker to a federal prison and that

indeed federal prisons are better than state prisons. This is an instance of establishing relationship with the hostage taker, and of empowering the hostage taker through the acceptance of his "fantasy."

#0906: Hmm. Well so what? You're gonna get three square meals a day.

#0908: ...be nice and warm. You'd get clothes.

This is the police "fantasy" about prison conditions. Life in prison, according to this fantasy, is not only not harsh but is indeed comfortable. The characterization of prison conditions by the police may be termed an exercise of ideological power through the agency of propaganda.

#1074: Hey there's guys all over the place ah?

#1087: You know how many helicopters are here?

#1089: You got about half the helicopters in the Southern United States right here.

#1131: Well you'd get out of town to either wreck the thing, or you run out of gas in Kingman or ah Flagstaff or wherever the hell you're goin () and when=

#1133: =you run out of gas, then we'll probably just come down there with choppers and rush ya.

#1141: ...But see it is you know I think the whole thing is dumb anyway 'cause just like you said we're gonna follow you in the helicopters and airplanes and everything else.

The above utterances indicate the institutional power that the police wield. Institutions, I have argued, exercise power by passing sanctions against certain modes of conduct and affirming others. Thus, as Bittner (1975) points out, the unifying factor in police work is the situationally justified use of force or the threat of the use of force. Clearly, in the above utterances, Agent Small characterizes the situation in a manner that builds the "fantasy" of the police as an organized and efficient force capable of and willing to exercise its institutional power.

#1243: It's not like ah what you see on television or movies or stuff like that. All we want to do is just end this thing=

#1249: =is that if you two would give up, you open the door, I walk out in the street there and you open that door, throw the gun out and then I walk up there and you two can come out.

#1797: You let the manager come out, and then ah we'll do just like we said. You go on over to the door, throw that gun out, and I'll walk over there, escort ya out to the car and bring you right over here to this phone. And you sit down here and have a cup of coffee, and you can call your mom. And you know you can call her in privacy or anything you want.

#2018: There's nobody by the door. All she's gotta do is open the door=

These utterances depict the police "fantasy" of how they treat hostage takers once they surrender. Agent Small clearly tries to distance himself and his police officers from the television and movie depictions of police work -- th movie and television depictions predictably, for the police, being untrue. We can interpret this "fantasy" as indicating the use of ideological power through "propaganda."

Actors. Actor or character themes describe the agents in the drama by ascribing qualities and assigning motives to them, as well as portraying them as having certain characteristics (Foss, 1989). In this section I will present some characterizations of the actors by Agent Small of the FBI who did the negotiating.

#0001: I'm not gonna hurt ya.

#0249: What do you want? What kind of guarantees do you want? I mean, I'd like to get this thing over with.

They got to get me back to Prescott.

#0267: I haven't lied to you at any point throughout this.

#0882: Hey, you know we plan to work with you, you know.

The above utterances provide us Agent Small's characterization of himself. He is not mean, he is honest, and he wants to work with the hostage takers in resolving the situation. This is the technique advocated by the police to build trust and gain the confidence of the hostage takers. From a fantasy-theme perspective, however, we can see this ("we're

good guys") depiction as a rather feeble and ineffective attempt at sharing relational power through a masked characterization of police work.

#0300: If I was you, I wouldn't want to come out either. This is a rare instance where the "mask" falls, and Agent Small's real face is revealed. Does Tony, the hostage taker, consciously or unconsciously, register this, and does this utterance contribute to and reinforce Tony's understanding of himself and his situation?

#0310: Hell, you got more sense than that. You don't want to shoot her. What do you want to shoot her for?

#0776: =you're not dying from a disease or something like that, are you?

#0778: (I) Suppose you got a healthy body and a healthy mind, right?

#1095: Well, if you were really lookin out for yourself you'd give up.

By characterizing Tony as a "rational" person who is able to think through problems and sort out options, Agent Small may be seen (above) as attempting to empower Tony as an individual capable of logical thinking/acts. One of the fantasy themes of the police regarding hostage takers who have a record of committing crimes is that such individuals are "rational," and therefore easy to convince about giving up. Fuselier (1986) advises police negotiators that, "the negotiation process in this case should be a reality-oriented

discussion, helping the HT to recognize the facts of the situation and convincing him to accept his physical safety in return for the release of hostages" (p. 4).

#0768: You know ah you know you can end up in hell for do'n something like that

The above utterance can be seen as Agent Small's characterization of Tony as a moral/religious person who should understand the consequences of his action not rationally but spiritually. It's possible that the "hell" that Agent Small refers to could be long-term imprisonment, and that is delivered as a threat to deter Tony from harming the hostage. I have rejected that inference because the utterance follows Tony saying he would kill Whiskey and then kill himself.

Is moral suasion empowerment? One may conclude that the police negotiator here is seeking to shore up the religious/ spiritual facet of the hostage taker's character to enable the hostage taker to act "morally," and as a ruse to resolve the situation successfully.

#0726: Well you're putting her through you know a lot of misery over there.

#0728: Poor woman.

The above two utterances indicate Agent Small's characterization of Tony as a "caring" person. Caring people don't hurt or distress people. Agent Small is referring to Mrs.

Dunne, the hostage, and how she must be miserable in the bank waiting for Tony to release her.

#1630: You got that crazy woman of your -- that woman over there. I think that woman over there is crazy. Talkin about gettin killed, you know.

#1632: Yeah, she putting dumb ideas in your head.

#1634: I'll tell you, I wouldn't ever listen to a woman=

#1636: =I've been around too many of them, and I just would not take any advice from a woman.

Here is an attempt at some sort of "male bonding." Tony is being characterized as a rational person being influenced by an irrational woman. Not only that, women as a class are depicted as unreliable/foolish. This "fantasy" may be characterized as an attempt at relational empowerment -- two males relating to each other as "buddies/partners" and facing the unfathomable world of women together.

#1976: Well she probably ah glad to hear from ya.

This is Agent Small's response when Tony tells him he's just finished talking to his mother. Tony is being characterized here as a "son" whose mother is glad to hear from him. Sons have duties, and sons should be responsible. Sons don't do anything to hurt their parents. This "fantasy" is being invoked to remind the hostage taker of his moral and filial duties.

#2089: What's this guy, 37 years old? That's as old as I am. Got a lot left in life. You know you take a...

attitude, you you look like one little problem you can't handle it.

#2117: ...A best way to do this is stand up like a man. This is the final "fantasy" -- man as courageous, stoical, persevering, and wise. Tony is urged to act like a "man." These are Agent Small's final attempts at building trust and at relational empowerment. This is a fantasy which seeks to discover in any male, whether criminal, imbecile, disempowered, or disenfranchised the quality of "manliness" which makes that male act courageously, stoically, wisely.

#1203: Well you know something, you're only 22 years old. This is Agent Small talking to Jesse/Whiskey (Tony's female accomplice). Small is invoking the "fantasy" of youth. Small is seeking to empower Whiskey by implying that when she gets out of prison she would be still young, and thus be able to enjoy what life would have to offer her.

#1217: Boy, I tell you, you must not think much of your life.

#1223: =You know something else, you know you you sound a little bit immature to me because=

#1227: =if you come up against a problem you just can't give up. You can't say, my God I've got this problem, I got to kill myself.

The fantasy of the immature, unwise young woman is being invoked by Agent Small to counter Whiskey's rather

nonchalant and bitter responses. This may be seen as a rather weak attempt at empowering Whiskey as an individual.

Action. Action themes, or plotlines deal with the action of the drama. The actions in which the actors engage comprise action themes (Foss, 1989). The characterization of the actions of self and others is a further indicator of analysis of power in the stages regarding the following this is a 2760V

hostage drama:

#0281: ...Hey listen. I'm tellin' you you don't have to worry about this. You can -- we'll charge you federally, I guarantee it. We'll charge you for attempted bank robbery -- robbin' the bank...

The plotline here is that Agent Small will be in complete charge about what happens after the hostage takers surrender. These assurances, supposedly, will contribute to a win-win approach which would find a solution to the problem that is acceptable to both parties (see Taylor, 1983). The characterization of negotiation tactics, in these crisis bargaining situations, as constituting a win-win approach is patently false. One can surmise what actually would happen once the hostage taker surrenders. Unlike in traditional negotiations, where there are formal written agreements, these negotiations do not have any binding. The police negotiator merely uses these assurances as a ruse, and as a way to "calm" the hostage taker, rather than as a real

bargaining agreement. These assurances constitute a "fantasy," and they are possible to articulate because of the institutional power vested in the police.

#0283: ...And then ah, if you want me to walk over there I will, and if you don't wanna... all you have to do is put your hands you know up, and no one will shoot you. There'll be no problem. The federal government will get you an attorney...

#0750: And ah, you go down to Phoenix, and you get the federal public defender and that's all they do. They just defend people with federal charges against them.

If indeed the hostage taker gets charged federally (and there is no evidence in police literature that that is what happens or is recommended), he would indeed get some court-appointed attorney to defend him (which would be the case even if he is charged by the state). Thus, the above assurances have just the value of a "calming technique," instead of representing any real bargaining.

#0302: ...You throw your gun out, there's no one's gonna rush you. I'll walk over there if you want.

Police negotiators are trained to build rapport with the hostage takers. For the hostage taker, who is confined in a building, and whose communication lines are limited too, the police negotiator becomes the window to the world. The negotiator can then characterize himself as a friend/confidant who has the hostage taker's well-being at heart. But

that, we realize, can be true only to a limited extent and represents a "fantasy" that both the police negotiator and the hostage taker have to share for a successful resolution of the hostage crisis. Asking Tony to throw the gun out is a strategy to weaken and disempower Tony, and if he allows himself to be disempowered he has Agent Small's assurance that he will walk out to the bank and "save" Tony from the state police. Tony therefore has to choose between losing "individual" power (getting rid of the gun) and gaining "relational" power (the protection of Agent Small).

#0762: But if you ah like if you hurt Whiskey or you hurt

Norma over there you're gonna go to Florence. You know because we won't have anything to do with it. You get charged with murder or whatever you do to 'em. And that's just dumb, they haven't done anything to you.

#1143: and then ah we're gonna get ya in the long run.

That's why the best thing to do now is just to ah chuck it in... (emphasis added).

The reference to Florence here is a reference to a state prison. Since Tony initially makes the demand that he be sent to a federal prison, Agent Small uses this threat to keep Tony from precipitating matters. Next, he reminds Tony of the "long arm of the law," and that it would be foolish for Tony to imagine that he can get away from the police. Emphasis is added to the phrase "chuck it in" because police negotiators are trained not to use words like

"surrender" and "hostage." Agent Small therefore prefers to say "chuck it in" rather than "surrender." Taylor (1983) says the word "hostage" is too impersonal, and if police negotiators use it they allow the hostage taker to distance himself from his hostages. The word "surrender" is said to convey a feeling of failure, which may constitute a precipitating factor in such situations. Thus, in the two utterances above we see the play of both institutional and relational power.

#1582: ...I can't see any police. There, right across the street the parking lot looks empty to me...

#1592: Well, I tell you what, we can get a package of cigarettes out into that parking lot out in the front and she's gonna have to walk out into the parking lot and get 'em.

#1596: Why, we're not gonna shoot her. Nothin's gonna happen to her.

#1650: Yeah. There's guys on the roof. You can see 'em, all you have to do is look out.

#2030: OK, he wants the guy in the yellow hat to leave and the guys on the roof to back up. Ok, how's that?

All of the above utterances indicate police presence around the bank building, a presence that makes the hostage takers jittery. Here we see a clash between the police fantasy of a benign force, and the hostage taker's fantasy of the police as a violent force. It seems here that the police

negotiator is not successful in building relational power, and that in fact this show of force reminds the hostage taker of the institutional power of the police.

Rhetorical visions of the police. The third step in fantasy theme analysis is to look for patterns in the fantasy themes and to construct the rhetorical visions from the patterns. To do this we have to determine which themes are major and which are minor (Foss, 1989). We then have to construct the rhetorical vision/s from the patterns of fantasy themes discovered. Major setting themes should be linked with the characters and the actions that the characters are performing. Next, the critic looks for motives for the rhetorical vision/s. The final step is to assess the rhetorical vision/s. How well did the rhetorical vision deal with the problem of the hostage situation? Did it help or hinder the generation of police-image and hostage taker-image conducive to the resolution of the crisis? Finally, how did the rhetorical visions create or re-create the notion of power?

The major setting themes of the police include prison conditions and life in prison, and the police in place and organized such that the hostage taker would have little chance to escape from that setting. The actor themes include police negotiator as honest and fair, hostage taker as rational and moral, woman as irrational and immature, and men as courageous, stoical, and wise. Action themes include

the characterization of bargaining as a win-win situation, police as bargaining in good faith, and the police ready and

From the above themes we can draw some conclusions of the rhetorical vision/s of the police: the hostage taker can be an active agent but should act only in particular ways for the police to reciprocate in good faith, and the hostage taker to benefit from his actions. This is paradoxical, and the hostage taker can resolve the paradox either by surrendering or by killing himself and/or hostage. The police seek to resolve the hostage taker's dilemma by painting the picture of prison life in rosy hues. The hostage taker can accept the picture by being rational, moral, and stoical. However, he has to first escape the tentacles of female "irrationality and immaturity" if he has to have the police bargain in good faith. We know from the events that the rhetorical visions of the police were not effective. They were not effective because the police had to contend with a more powerful vision, the vision of the hostage takers. The police vision did not empower the hostage takers. In fact, their vision merely corroborated the hostage takers' vision of the police: the police were armed, gathered in force, and would hit back severely if the hostage takers acted contrary to police expectations. To some extent, the police vision of prison contradicted the hostage takers' vision of prison. This vision may have sought to enhance the hostage takers'

individual power but was not concrete and detailed enough for the hostage takers to accept it finally.

Fantasy Themes and the Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Takers

Setting. How do the hostage takers perceive their situation? Do their fantasy themes of the setting indicate that they possess individual power or do they indicate their powerlessness? Following are some of the utterances culled from a careful reading of both Tony's and Whiskey's talk during the negotiation process:

#0062: I don't wanna go, I don't wanna get locked up. I hate them handcuffs.

#0072: A whole, a whole army of good lawyers couldn't help me.

Early on in the negotiations we discover Tony's fantasy of the situation. Prison implies getting "locked up," which means not only the loss of freedom but the loss of individual power. His reference to what lawyers can do for him indicates the hopelessness that he feels in his situation, and the inability of anyone to empower him.

#0215: Aw hon, there ain't nothin you can do. There ain't nothin nobody can do.

This is uttered in reply to Becky's offer to help Tony and Whiskey in any way she can. Once again, it offers us a glimpse of the bleak vision of their situation, and the utter lack of power they possess.

#0219: Humph. Humph. Dead meat.

In reply to Becky's suggestion that if Tony walks out just then it wouldn't "gonna cost so much," Tony characterizes his own belief -- literally, it could mean that the police would shoot and kill him, or figuratively, that which awaits him, prison, is a form of death. Both fantasies indicate the powerlessness of the hostage taker.

#0284: What about all them turkeys standing out there, them civilians with all them shotguns and shit?

#1712: Hey would ya would ya tell Jody to get off of that top of that cafe deal up there, he's makin me nervous. This is what Tony sees from inside the bank, and this is in reply to Agent Small's promise that no one would shoot Tony. Tony's reference to "civilians" could be to plainclothes police, or to local people armed with shotguns and ready to kill the hostage takers if the police fail. If indeed they are local people supplementing the police force, with or without police agreement, it would mean that the hostage taker is doubly powerless: he has to confront the institutional power of the police, and the individual/ideological power of the local people. His reference to Jody is to the Yavapai county Deputy Sheriff, Jody LaRue. Tony seems to know that local police are more trigger happy, unlike federal agents who are better trained in dealing with such situations. This -- his knowledge of police methods -- and the gun and the hostage he is holding, to some extent,

constitutes the individual power of this hostage taker.

#0472: Oh shit, I already got one federal conviction on me.

I got bond and didn't go back for the sentencing.

#0498: Hey man I got two prior convictions on me for the same goddamn thing, and it ain't gonna be no worse. I never will get out (from) behind that bar.

#0751: There ain't much to defend here.

#0945: Hey I've done got a conviction in Albuquerque now.

I've got three more charges pending in ah in Carlsbad= Tony has left behind him a trail of criminal acts, and realizes that with this latest crime he has no chance of ever getting out of prison. Thus his fantasy theme of his future is one of being locked up in a prison forever.

#0576: Well we wasn't plannin on gettin caught but had decided if we did get caught that we wouldn't go to jail.

#0889: I'm gonna turn... I'm gonna turn ah, I'm gonna turn Norma loose and I don't know whether Whiskey and me will come out or not.

#0943: =when they bust me man there ain't gonna be no () twenty fuckin years.

This indicates that the two hostage takers had contemplated suicide as an option if they were caught in the act of robbing the bank, and they are still thinking about that option. The choice of that option must have been based on their fantasy of life after "conviction" -- separation and

prison for twenty years -- a loss of individual power.

#0771: You sure that ain't where we at now?

This is the rhetorical question posed by Tony when Agent Small tells Tony that he might end up in hell if he shot himself and Whiskey. Hell is being holed up in the bank surrounded by the police, and awaiting to give up and go to prison.

#0830: Now my car(bine) over there in that damn lot, 30 caliber. Had 90 rounds taped on it, and Whiskey she fired two at the police and then they got her.

#0834: Yeah she scared the shit out of one of 'em. He didn't know she was there, she just =

#0836: =come over the top and started blastin this dude like shit.

The hostage takers' individual power before being caught or surrounded was the possession of guns and ammunition. At that point they could do battle with the police -- "scare the shit out of them."

#0987: Yeah the dude from Phoenix called and told me that he was come'n up in a chopper and bringing some more money, and we'd exchange hostages and I'd keep him for a hostage. Go from there and they they ain't go'n for that.

#1066: Yeah but they ain't gonna let me out of here. I know that and they know that.

The only chance for the hostage takers to gain some power is to exchange the bank manager for money and a new hostage -- the bank's representative who is to arrive in Yarnell on a helicopter with the money. But Tony knows that this fantasy is not going to work out because the police would not let that happen.

#1116: =that's my security.

#1124: Aw yeah, but you're gonna if I let her go, you're gonna gonna fill this son of a bitch up with tear gas and then ah...

#1571: Hell, what good's a hostage without a gun?

The hostage takers' individual power consists of the hostage (Mrs. Dunne) and a gun that Tony has. The gun and the hostage is their security against the threat of the police storming the bank. If they let the hostage go, Tony knows what will happen, and he also realizes that just the hostage would not constitute any security without a gun.

Actors. How do the hostage takers perceive themselves and other actors in the hostage situation? Our estimation of their fantasy themes would enable us to better gauge the power of the police and the hostage takers.

#0084: Whiskey's sittin over there playing with the balloons.

#0086: She's blowing balloons up and makin 'em whistle like she had good sense.

Early on in the drama, Tony tells Becky, one of the numerous friends who talk to them, about what Whiskey is doing.

Whiskey is 22 years old, and may be still a child in some ways. Tony is her "old man," and he perceives her here as a young, and rather simple woman who is blowing balloons to while away the time and make sense of their situation. We realize that such a woman may have the power of the child -- to be petulant, to be impulsive, to be demanding; but also to be innocent, simple-minded, even naive.

#0106: What those, those dupes tell you full of shit that everything's gonna be all right?

This is Whiskey characterizing the police when she hears her friend say that the police are going to sort it all out for them. We have to remember that she has been apprehended by the police, had her shoes and coat taken from her, as well as some "dope" (drugs) that she was carrying before being sent into the bank in exchange of the other hostages. She has experienced police treatment, and her fantasy of them is as dupes and liars. She is here undermining the relational power that the police are trying to build with the hostage takers through their friends.

#0114: Oh shit... you don't straighten this out like that.

Once you got=

#0116: =a record, you always got a record.

This is Whiskey's fantasy of what awaits her in the future if she were to surrender, and it is in response to her

friend saying that she can straighten out her life once she gets out of prison. Serving time in prison robs the individual of power, and such a person may never be able to lead a normal life, according to Whiskey's perception.

#0171: So, yeah she's fine. She's drinkin coffee and smokin cigarettes whenever she feels like it, yeah. Tony ain't gonna hurt her really.

Whiskey tells Becky what the bank manager is doing. At no time does she or Tony threaten the manager's life. This is evident throughout the transaction, and is an indication of the rational/humane side of the hostage takers. This rationality, however, is also an indication of the loss of the hostage takers' individual power. For, the police know that a rational hostage taker is more controllable than an irrational one. The hostage takers have clearly decided not to use the bank manager as a pawn in negotiating with the police, and this indicates a loss of leverage the hostage takers might have had in transacting with the police. However, the police cannot be completely sure about these verbal assurances, and we can conclude that as long as the hostage takers held their hostage they would be vested with some individual power.

#0305: Me and Whiskey ain't got all our shit straight yet. This indicates the hostage takers' waffling over their future course of action. Are they going to surrender, or are they going to kill themselves? Such an ambivalent

fantasy could temporarily enhance the hostage takers' power because the police negotiator would be hardpressed to sort out and decide on negotiating strategies.

#0313: Yeah but (she) don't want to go to the joint for the lesbians.

#0410: Whiskey wants me, Whiskey wants me to blow her away and=

#0578: She's just an accomplice but she done shot some cops twice.

#1216: I'd I'd rather die than go to jail, yeah.

#1448: Ah ha. Shit I gave that up a long time ago.

#1450: Cause a lost cause.

Whiskey's fantasy of prison is as a place where the female prisoners are lesbians. There is no indication in the transcript that she has previously been incarcerated in a prison and that she had to deal with lesbian prisonmates. This vision of prison seems to frighten Whiskey more than any loss of freedom. Here, we may interpret Whiskey's fear as a fear of her loss of femininity and the loss of control over her body: both would constitute a strong diminution of individual power.

The fear of those prison conditions makes Whiskey seek death. She wants Tony to kill her, and she claims that death is a better option than going to prison. Death may constitute for Whiskey the only way to redeem herself in the situation she is trapped in. This can be perceived through

utterances #1448 and #1450, both of which indicate Whiskey's hopelessness.

#0983: Yeah but they ain't gonna let me outta here with no

Tony perceives the institutional power of the police as an overwhelming force. The police will not let him out of the bank with a hostage. His record of crime, and his experience in prison have made Tony aware of the institutional power confronting him in this situation. Such an awareness is an indication of the hostage taker's estimation of his diminished individual power.

#0240: Yeah, I know all about them court appointed lawyers, that last one I had sold me down the river for ten years.

Tony knows what the system has awaiting for him, and that the promises of Agent Small that he will have lawyers arguing his case don't mean much. Tony's fantasy of court-appointed lawyers is that they can not be trusted. Here we see his vision of the institutional system in place -- a system that will not really seriously try to empower him.

#0522: I don't want no publicity. I didn't want the most shit stuff we got.

This is Tony's reply to his friend Ernie's comment that he would not get any more publicity staying longer in the bank holding the hostage. In Tony's fantasy he is a hostage taker caught in the act of committing a crime, and he does

not believe he can empower himself by seeking publicity. He has no quest for ideological or institutional empowerment. He does not believe the press will provide him any support except to record the events or thwart the police from storming the bank without good reason (#0197).

Action. Following are the utterances that provide insight into the hostage takers' perception of the action:

#0009: Why don't you roll me up a couple of joints got out of that dope you got off my old lady and send 'em over?

#0011: Ya, she did have. You all took it away from her.

The police confiscate whatever "dope" that Whiskey has with her when they apprehend her and send her over to the bank in exchange for the other hostages. The consumption of drugs would alter the hostage takers' mental status, and mind-altering drugs could make the hostage takers more erratic/irrational in their dealings with the police.

During the course of the day's events there is mention of drugs three or four times, and once Agent Small anxiously inquires if Tony has been smoking "dope." Tony reveals that he has smoked the last of his "joints," and rues the fact the police confiscated the stuff from Whiskey. This action constitutes a stripping away of the hostage takers' individual power.

#0126: Honey, I... shot at a cop, ya know. They ain't, they ain't... they had a gun in the back of my head. That's why I turned down.

#0151: Why did we do it?

#0153: Honey, because we didn't have any money and we had to leave town.

#0159: Shit, if w'd been here 15 minutes earlier we'd pulled it off, you know.

The above utterances, by Whiskey, summarizes why she and Tony did what they did, and how their plan failed. Whiskey, we read in the newspaper account, panicked and threw down her gun after firing a shot at a policeman. From her account, and the newspaper's, it seems that Whiskey was not an expert at handling a gun. Thus, she is unable to make use of the power in her hands to keep the police at bay. When she drops the gun, or is forced to, she loses her individual power.

Whiskey, also once a bartender, has to pay a \$15,000 fine incurred in a traffic accident (Wayman, 1977, p. A-24). Tony, working as a bartender, is a fugitive on the run. To rob a bank and flee constitutes to them the vision of freedom from their present troubled existence. In Whiskey's estimation, all that they needed was an extra 15 minutes to accomplish their fantasy of freedom.

#0197: I know the longer the longer we stay in here the more, the more the longer we got to live you know. And the more them uh reporters will be up here to to see me, if they blow me away without a without a good reason and a you know...

#0532: They'd rush this bank in about five minutes after she went out that door.

#0546: I ain't tryin to prove nothin. I just ain't wantin to get those handcuffs on me just right now. You know.

#1070: They're startin to swarm around the joint here. Tell them don't come in this son of a bitch rushin.

Tony says he is playing for time so that there are more media people covering the event. He is not seeking publicity but instead sees the media as savior -- they are going to make sure that the police are not going to act without having some good reason to do so. In Tony's vision the reporters constitute an "institutional power" who will report on and check the abuse of power by the police.

The other utterances of Tony's describe the tenuous and rapidly eroding power of the hostage takers. The police swarming around the bank is an indication that they might be preparing to storm the bank, and that increases the hostage takers' anxiety and fear. Tony also believes that once he releases the hostage the police would come rushing into the bank, and in such a melee most probably he and Whiskey would be hurt or killed. The hostage therefore constitutes a power resource. But he also has promised that he would not harm the hostage. So, his dilemma is how to face the situation. In his vision, he is indeed powerless.

#1246: Well as far as I can see the minute we walk outside if we don't get shot we're gonna get handcuffed.

#1522: I ain't gonna do it right now. I ain't ready to go yet. I ain't ready for them to put those handcuffs on me yet. I got till three o'clock, so I'm gonna enjoy it while I can.

This is the fantasy of Whiskey, and it is similar to Tony's. **Both** fear they will get shot or get arrested. Neither **option** is a "real" option in the sense that a normal human **being** would choose them. The three o'clock deadline is one **set** by Tony, and we perceive here the hostage taker's power **to** control the situation to some extent.

#1810: Uh we gonna come out as soon as I talk to my mom.

#1894: Well I'll let her out the door and let her get clear and everything and then I'll call you and get ya to come over here or something.

#1921: No, I didn't tell her nothin about that. I just talked to her.

#1969: No, my mother don't even know that we're nothin is goin on. I just called and talked to her.

Why does Tony want to talk to his mother? The fantasy theme **here** seems to be that a son is duty-bound to bid farewell to **his** mother. He does not tell her what condition he is in, **and** this act is that of the "stoical man" doing what he has **to** do -- to not make his mother anxious or worried, and yet **have** the chance to have one last conversation with her.

This act seems to be a last, desperate attempt by Tony to **regain** some stature as a good human being.

#2015: You got everybody back out of the way, they ain't gonna try and grab my girl are they?

#212: I just wanna make sure me and Whiskey get buried together.

Tony wants to make sure that when Whiskey opens the bank door to let the bank manager out and pick up the pack of Cigarettes that Agent Small has promised she is not arrested by the police. Whiskey is his partner-in-arms and he wants her by his side finally. The last utterance is another indication of the strong bond between Tony and Whiskey, and their vision of the world after death. That vision can be perceived as a final act of mutual empowerment for Tony and Whiskey.

Rhetorical visions of the hostage takers. The major fantasy themes of the hostage takers about the setting include that of the prison as a place where they would be locked up forever, as something that would separate them for long, and as a place rife with lesbians. Another major setting theme is that of their situation in the bank: the situation is impossible with no chance of resolution, and a situation that is deadly. Hell is what they are in. They see themselves surrounded by the police as well as civilians who are inimical to their interests.

The main actors are perceived as the police who are seen as powerful, as liars and dupes, vindictive, and as the ones who would decide the course of action when the hostage

is released. The hostage takers portray themselves as indecisive and as posing no harm to the hostage. They see themselves as powerless and as having no option but to commit suicide. The media are seen as a check to unwarranted police action, and court-appointed lawyers are characterized as dupes.

Their action of trying to rob the bank is characterized as a last ditch effort to regain control of their lives. Tony thinks that if and when he releases the hostage the police would come storming into the bank. Thus the hostage and the gun he has in his possession are means of controlling police action. For Tony and Whiskey death constitutes the only and real solution, and in death they see themselves bound together. Being buried next to each other symbolizes togetherness.

From the above, we realize that the rhetorical visions of these two hostage takers make them powerless individuals facing the righteous action of the powerful police. I say righteous because they do not question police action; they are merely aware of them and afraid of them. They are not angry that the police are "dupes," but their duplicity is seen as accepted police behavior in such situations. In their rhetorical vision the future is bleak and dangerous, and death provides the only way out. In death they seek togetherness and something of their lost dignity and power.

These strong rhetorical visions make almost all police maneuvers and machinations coe to naught.

Fantasy Themes and the Rhetorical Visions of the "Other Negotiators"

One of the unique characteristics of the Yarnell bank holdup situation is the involvement of numerous friends of the hostage takers in the negotiation process. The police call in six people (of which we have interactions of only four) -- Becky, Ernie Jones, Stich, and Suzie Tane. All seem to have known the two hostage takers well, and they try to reason with them to release the hostage and to surrender. Most of their talk, and they do quite a lot, can be characterized as reasoning, pleading, cajoling, and appealing. I will pick out a few utterances as representative samples of their talk, and identify their rhetorical visions of the hostage situation. This section will not be as exhaustive as the sections on hostage taker and police negotiator talk. I will also not analyze them under the separate headings of situation, actors, and action.

ON80 = Becky

ON81 = Ernie Jones

ON82 = Stich

ON85 = Suzie Tane

#0033 ON80: Why don't you um come on out before it gets worse, Tony?

#0053 ON80: The more you fight the worse trouble there is.

#0059 ON80: Well, they aren't gonna hurt you if you just come on out.

#0178 ON80: Well, you'll have to you know pay for it, but may be it won't be near as bad if -- if -- if you just come out and get it over with you know.

#0214 ON80: I told Whiskey I'll do everything I can for both of you. If you just...

Becky's fantasy themes deal with the idea that police retribution would be more severe the longer they had to work to resolve the situation. If only Tony and Whiskey would give up immediately then the police would treat them fairly. The police are clearly seen as the upholders of law and the possessors of the authority to pass sanctions against certain actions and approve certain others.

Becky's statements could be interpreted another way: they could be seen as the understanding of the human mind. The rhetorical vision then would be that the human mind is incapable of withstanding ambiguity or that it would suffer severely from the strain of ambiguity. Becky could be responding to the commonsensical notion in Western societies that all acts should have definite and quick closures. Quick, clear closures are seen as enhancing individual power, and delay and ambiguity are seen as diminishing individual power.

Another theme that we can identify from her utterances is that of the good friend willing to go the extra mile to

help the person in distress. This can be seen as enhancing the hostage takers' relational power. But such power is available only on the enactment of certain actions which the hostage taker might perceive as the loss of individual power.

#0407 ON81: It gets worse and worse and worse, and minutes pass and it gets that much worse. So why don't ya throw that old thing out to ole little brother out here. You know, I wouldn't ask you if it wasn't right Tony.

#0439 ON81: Hey look man, you know we've been good friends since I been here, a long time. I wouldn't lie to ya on purpose, would I? But look, this is gonna be best way, really gonna be the best way. And ah I'd like to see ya do it ah I know ah you know Linda, it's gonna crack her up. Jason's, look what kind of effect it's gonna have on him? And I know deep down in your heart you do care about Jason 'cause ah he does call you daddy.

#0451 ON81: Well yeah, but much rather be behind the slammer than I would be six feet under ground.

#0461 ON81: All we're gonna do is just ah, if you want to waste yourself and waste ah Whiskey let Miss Dunne come out. You may (don't?) have to make her suffer in the middle of that for the rest of your (her?) life=

#0539 ON81: =hurt her and they'd, there wouldn't be no building there.

#0605 ON81: =Well you know, there's deals and there's deals and there's deals son, you know you can't give up

#0675 ON81: And then I'll walk right out with you and the federal men can come up and take you into custody.

I'll do that. How's that?

Becky's fantasy themes of the good friend, of a closure-seeking mind, of the institutionally powerful police are all repeated in Ernie's utterances. In addition, there is the fantasy that life is better than death, and that one can find opportunities and openings ("there's deals and deals") that could lessen the suffering and lower the payment for present actions. All these may be seen as attempts at enhancing the hostage takers' individual power consequent to the doing of certain actions demanded by the institutionally powerful police.

Yet another fantasy is that hostage takers involved in violent actions have their compassionate side that should guide further moves: thus, the appeal to save Mrs. Dunne the experience of witnessing the violent deaths of the hostage takers. So too is the appeal to paternal instincts: Tony is "daddy" for Jason (newspaper accounts don't shed much light on the personal side of the two hostage takers, and the transcripts contain allusions to events and people that are

hard to interpret). Ernie's appeal to compassion and paternal instincts at once enhances Tony's relational power and diminishes his individual power: his ability to act unilaterally is curtailed while his stature in the eyes of others is enhanced.

#0869 ON82: Yup, and I'll bring us a couple a cans of beer and let you and me shoo--shoot the breeze man. At least let's find out what's on your mind, and I'll tell you what was on my mind the other weekend. I know you can't say no good golly.

#0877 ON82: Yeah, I just got out of jail myself, armed robbery, attempted murder, no big thing. Well I'm thirsty. These guys won't let me drink out here. And them beers are gettin hot.

#1067 ON82: Do you want me to ask somebody if I can call 'em? They'd drive a car up here so you can leave, and no shootin. 'Cause if you do any shootin I'm gonna whip your ass.

One among the four friends has a set of fantasy themes that differs from the other three. Stich, the man who offers to lend Tony his car as a getaway vehicle, is trying to bilk both Tony and the police. It seems from the interaction between Tony and Stich, the police were not in control of the situation. Stich's fantasy is that of the con artist's: people are gullible and they can be manipulated. Stich does not really care whether the police succeed or

whether Tony resolves his problem: he is merely there for the ride, and he hopes the ride will enhance his power. He first makes offers to Tony -- that he will lend him his car, and that he will bring some beer and chat and drink with Tony -- and then seeks police okay for his plans. Thus, both the police and Tony have to consider the offers, absurd as they might be. Tony is skeptical of the success of these plans, but a man in his situation cannot reject them. The police have to give thought to the offers because the offers have already been made to the hostage taker! They know that the offers could have changed the psychological status of the hostage taker, and they would be wary of rejecting the proposals out of hand. Stich thus has both Tony and the police in a bind but neither succumb to Stich's fantasies. However, the police claim that the bank's offer to Tony might have skewed the outcome is very well applicable to Stich's offers to Tony.

#1405 ON85: Well you know you don't really hurt yourself,
you hurt all the people that love you.

#1455 ON85: I can't understand anybody giving up their life.
I can't understand that Johnna you know. I just can't.
It's been eight years since my dad died and ya--you
know, he hurt us more by it than he did himself.

#1527 ON85: You may appreciate life a hell of a lot better
when you come out.

#1541 ON85: =I'm not doing this for anybody but me.

Suzie's fantasy themes are similar to Becky's and Ernie's. She sees life after prison holding possibilities for Tony and Whiskey. She also perceives life as more desirable than death, and believes that those who kill themselves do more harm to their loved ones than they do to themselves. Such a fantasy enhances the hostage takers' relational power and diminishes their individual power.

Suzie says she is appealing on her own and not at the behest of anyone, probably meaning the police. She's not a police stooge but has the concerns of her friends in her heart. This claim has the effect of enhancing the relational power of the hostage takers and diminishing the institutional power of the police.

Summary of the friends' rhetorical visions. Three out of the four friends, whose interactions are available to us, have the rather clear vision that life is worth living despite severe current problems. They also think that life would change for the better in the future. They believe suicide is a cop out, and one friend visions suicide causing more pain to the living than to the one committing the suicide. In their vision life extracts a certain price for wrong actions, and if one pays the price dutifully one can re-emerge empowered. All these visions have the effect of enhancing the hostage takers' individual and relational power. Where they might have failed is in the abstraction of their visions: none can promise nor guarantee the

well-being of the hostage takers except in the most general of terms. These visions might have thus had only momentary effect, and they were no match for the more powerful and dark rhetorical visions of the hostage takers.

Overall Summary

From the contextual analysis it is evident that the police are able to define the situation to the press and the public as they wish. Blame for the hostage takers' suicide is quickly transferred to unspecified bank officials who are said to have offered the hostage takers ransom money, and thus raised the hopes of the two for escaping the police. The police also fail to account for their unwise exchange of Whiskey for two of the hostages. This particular exchange is the more plausible reason for the failure of negotiations than the one posited by the police.

From all three analyses we can glean that the hostage takers knew and complained about the show of force by the police: there were police on rooftops across the bank, there were police across the street and around the bank, and the little town of Yarnell had been converted into an armed camp. All these undermined whatever relational trust that the police negotiator was trying to build. Thus the rhetorical visions of the police were not able to overcome the distrust that the hostage takers felt toward police action.

Whiskey and Tony had made a pact before they launched on their bank heist: the pact was they would commit suicide

if their plans failed. This was a powerful rhetorical vision based on their fantasy themes about prison life. The police negotiator and other negotiators were unable to create rhetorical visions more powerful than the hostage takers', and thus failed to empower the hostage takers.

Chapter Six: Frontier Airlines Hijacking

Contextual Analysis

Context. Thomas Michael Hannan, 29, after having comandered a Frontier Airlines Boeing 737 with 30 passengers and four crew members at Hall County Airport in Nebraska on October 20th at 7:30 a.m., died from a gunshot wound he inflicted on himself late that night inside the plane which was by then at Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia. Hannan had released 18 passengers earlier at the Kansas City Airport, Missouri where the plane had landed for refueling, and other passengers and two stewardesses at the Hartsfield airport. The two pilots of the plane, Captain E.J. Curtis and copilot G.H. Jones, and Hannan's lawyer Roger Thompson were inside the plane when Hannan committed suicide.

According to The Atlanta Constitution (Staff, 1977, p. 6-A) the events that led to the hijacking all began a month and a half before the actual hijacking. On September 2nd two men wearing military uniforms and carrying handguns and an attache case burst into the National Bank of Georgia at 3033 Northside Parkway in Atlanta, and demanded money. They were given \$7,000 and they fled in a rented car. However, someone noted down the license plate number and the car was

traced to the rental agency from where Hannan had rented the car.

The next day, September 3rd, FBI agents waited near the home of George David Stewart's (Hannan's 29 year-old gay friend involved with Hannan in the bank robbery) mother in Eight Mile, Alabama, a suburb north of Mobile. Hannan and Stewart, accompanied by two 16-year-old runaway boys they had befriended, were arrested without incident.

Stewart and Hannan were booked into the Fulton County jail on September 15th after being returned from Alabama and indicted on September 6th. Trial was set for December 2nd. Bond was reportedly set at \$50,000 on each man but was reduced to \$25,000 each by a federal magistrate on September 30th. The magistrate also approved a request that Hannan be allowed to travel to Grand Island, Nebraska to take care of business matters.

On October 5th Hannan was freed on a \$25,000 bail while Stewart remained in jail. Hannan and Stewart were supposed to appear on Thursday, October 20th, in the U.S. District Court in Atlanta and plead guilty in the bank robbery case. The court appearance was postponed to Friday at the request of Hannan's attorney Thompson, because Hannan had told Thompson that he was detained in Nebraska with a stomach ailment.

At 7:15 a.m. (all times EST) on Thursday, October 20th, Hannan bought a ticket on Frontier's flight 101 bound for

Denver and reached the security area ten minutes later. Before a security officer could inspect his bag, Hannan opened it and took out a sawed-off shotgun, and threatened to shoot the security guard. He then boarded the plane and ordered the pilot to take off. At 7:45 a.m. the pilot radioed that there was a man with a gun in the cockpit who wanted the plane to be redirected to Atlanta. The plane landed at Kansas City at 8:25 a.m. to refuel. Eighteen passengers, mostly women and children, and a heart patient were allowed to leave the plane. According to Ayres, Jr. (1977, p. A-19), Mr. Lyel Hertz, an old high school friend of Hannan who was on the plane, and who had tried in vain to get Hannan to give up, was instrumental in negotiating the release of women and children at Kansas City. At that point Hannan demanded three million dollars, two parachutes, two machine guns and two automatic pistols, and the release of his friend Stewart.

At around that time, Frontier Airlines president Alvin Feldman asked to be allowed to replace the passengers as a hostage, but the request was refused. It is not clear who refused the request, Hannan or the FBI. The plane took off for Atlanta around 10 a.m. despite word from the FBI that it would not be allowed to leave the ground. Around the same time, federal officials removed Hannan's friend Stewart from Fulton county jail and took him to an undisclosed location.

At 12:05 p.m. the plane landed at Hartsfield airport and taxied to an apron near the cargo loading area where the FBI and the police had set up a command post. The plane arrived late at Hartsfield because of minor pressure problems. At 1 p.m. the FBI confirmed that negotiations had begun with the hijacker. About an hour later, in answer to a request for food, 16 hamburgers and 16 milkshakes were cartons of cigarettes were delivered to the plane.

Hannan issued a 5 p.m. deadline at 4:15 p.m. for meeting his demands and said that a lot of people would die if the demands were not met. At about 4:45 p.m. Hannan's father gets on the radio and pleads with his son to give up before anyone gets hurt. The 5 p.m. deadline passes and the FBI continues to negotiate with Hannan. Half an hour after the deadline expires, Hannan's attorney, Thompson attempts to get Hannan to give up, and while Hannan doesn't give up he allows the stewardesses to leave the plane around 6 p.m.

Two and a half hours later, and the negotiation deadlocked, Thompson tells Hannan that Stewart is at the airport, and he can talk to him in about 10 or 15 minutes. Hannan does talk to Stewart who tells him it is time to give up. Fifteen minutes later Hannan agrees to release the passengers as soon as details can be worked out, and that his attorney can come to the plane to talk about the release. At 9:23 p.m. all aboard the plane except the two

pilots are let go, and Hannan and Thompson begin negotiations on his surrender. Around 10 p.m. Hannan walks back to a darkened portion of the plane, sits down on a seat, places gun to his chest, and pulls the trigger.

One of the passengers on the plane said he never felt threatened during the whole episode, and that he first came to know that the plane was being hijacked when it was nearing Kansas City. The unidentified passenger, a businessman from Hastings, Nebraska, said the mood in the plane was quiet from Kansas City. Hannan had allowed passengers to use the restrooms on the plane but had declined the businessman's request that he be allowed to walk around in the back of the plane. Hannan had joined the passengers in the luncheon in Atlanta, and had shown concern about their going hungry.

According to Stewart (1977, p. 8-A), Hannan was born in Sioux Falls, South Dakota and lived there until moving with his parents to Grand Island, Nebraska in 1966 when his father found work at the Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant. That same year Hannan had graduated from a local high school, and classmates recalled that Hannan was one of the nicest guys they knew but who had later got "spaced out" on drugs. He attended the University of Nebraska for a year and a short time later had entered the army. Hannan had seen "extensive action" in Vietnam but on his return was mostly unemployed. In 1976 Hannan met Stewart in Berkeley,

California, had stayed there for a while, and then moved to Mobile, Alabama, where Stewart had family and friends.

Stewart, who attended the University of South Alabama in Mobile, was once arrested by Mobile police for parading a downtown Mobile street in full Nazi regalia and carrying a pistol under his coat. He told police that he was an anti-Zionist and that he believed Jews were the cause of the world's problems. After meeting Hannan, Stewart had spent some time in Mobile with him before going to Atlanta to work and live with him.

The reporters for the The Atlanta Constitution were able to pick up quite a bit of the radio conversation between the hostage taker and the police. In one report titled "He Didn't Want 'Soap Opera'" (October 21, 1977, p. 6-A), the reporters say a "wild drama played itself out over the radio between accused hijacker Mike Hannan and FBI agent Don Cochran, the main negotiator for police." They go on to report snippets of conversation dealing with Cochran negotiating for the release of stewardess Bobby Carr who had a 4 year-old daughter, and characterize Hannan as maintaining a "dulcet" voice and speaking calmly and articulately all day.

According to the report, the theme of the exchanges centered on Hannan's feeling that the police were stalling. The police in turn kept insisting that Hannan surrender. While Hannan never raised his voice, the report says he "grew colder" as the day wore on, and he specifically

threatened to shoot people on the plane. He also became more fatalistic.

Some of the exchanges over the radio that the paper reported are as follows:

and Allen (1977), shortly before 5 p.m. Hannan's father arrived at Atlanta and began talking to Hannan. He is reported to have told his son, "...Your mother's here... we're pretty worried. Isn't it better, huh, to walk away from this mess" (p. 6-A). In another report (p. 7-A) a fuller account of the talk between father and son is given. The gist of the conversation is the same, with the father pleading that Hannan release the stewardesses immediately and surrender. He also asks, "...Mike, are you still trying to get David out? How do you figure to do that?" The reference to "David" is a reference to David Stewart, Hannan's gay friend.

The following day, Schwartz and Allen (1977, p. 1-A) report that a pair of Atlanta SWAT officers had Hannan lined up clearly in the sights of their high-powered rifles for nearly a minute, but were under orders not to shoot because the police were convinced from the conversations with Hannan that he would not harm anyone.

It is also reported that the two pilots who flew the hijacked plane told that Hannan talked about suicide almost constantly from the moment he commandeered the jet at Grand

Island. Hannan was said to have told them that he didn't have anybody to live for and that he had an empty, meaningless life. While they had confidence Hannan would surrender, they also heard him say that "if he had to go that maybe some people would have to go with him."

Filling in some details of what happened the previous day, the paper reports that one of the women passengers mistook Hannan to be a security agent of the airline because he sat very quietly on the run to Kansas City. Commenting on the incident, one of the FBI agents felt Hannan "was a bright man but a stupid crook." Tracing the events, he said that even during the Atlanta robbery the previous month Hannan had rented the getaway car in his own name. This time, his demands for a pair of parachutes reflected the same lack of thinking or planning, according to the police. There is just no way that anyone can parachute out of a Boeing 737 because the plane has no rear door, and the side doors can not be opened outward in flight against the tremendous pressure of the plane's slipstream, the police said.

The Atlanta Constitution has provided brief character sketches of a number of people involved in the hostage incident. Important to this analysis are the sketches of FBI agent Don Cochran, and to a lesser extent that of Hannan's lawyer Roger Thompson. Cochran is described as a calm and unassuming man who smoked a pipe and displayed a dry wit, and negotiated with Hannan for over six hours. Cochran, a

Maryland native and 28-year veteran of the FBI was trained in hostage negotiations. A team of FBI psychologists pieced together a profile of Hannan to enable Cochran to better negotiate with Hannan. At the time of the incident he was also the public relations man for the Atlanta FBI office.

Cochran, 47 year-old father of four, said that Hannan's suicide was a distinct possibility and he had tried to "beef him up as far as possible" (Allen, 1977, p. 6-A). "Personally, it bothered me that somebody had lost his life, yeah, but not because I'd talked to him. Not more than somebody who'd been run over by a car (whom) I didn't even know. I've no personal feeling toward him one way or another," Cochran told reporters. He also revealed that he was never nervous in a crisis situation but only before and after tackling the situation.

The newspaper characterizes Hannan's lawyer as coming on like "gangbusters" (p. 6-A), and that while Cochran was soothing and "dulcet-voiced," Thompson "barked." Thompson represented Hannan in the earlier bank robbery case. In his talk with Hannan he tried to stall for time (just like Cochran did) and believed that with the passage of time chances of Hannan surrendering would improve. Asked about the "tremendous risk" he took by entering the plane to talk to Hannan, he said that he did not realize it at the time but did later.

Thompson said he realized fully that Hannan might kill himself only when the hijacker let the passengers off the plane and then stayed inside. The plan was for Hannan to come off the plane too. The lawyer said, "I'm sorry when any human being takes his life. That's a tragic loss" (p. 6-A). The report concludes that despite the outcome "Thompson and Cochran had done their best" (p. 6-A).

Summary and analysis. A headline in The New York Times (October 22, 1977, p. A9) says "Lawyer Says Hijacker 'Chose Suicide Over Prison'". The pilots report that Hannan was suicidal from the time he hijacked the plane. Cochran, the FBI agent admits that he recognized the suicidal tendencies too and that he therefore tried to "beef him up," meaning he tried to shore up the morale of the hijacker. This is in the police tradition of using psychotherapeutic techniques to enhance the relational power of the hostage taker. In this case, it is evident they did not work. However, one report in The Atlanta Constitution credits the police for having done their best, and that is a fairly explicit approval of police methods for resolving such crises.

Hannan's lawyer rues that his client killed himself but he too doesn't find anything remiss in the way the "negotiations" were conducted. FBI agent Cochran is disappointed and feels let down, but he has "no personal feelings one way or another." From the newspaper reports it is clear that

the media too found nothing lacking in the police attempts to resolve the situation.

The last eleven passengers released from the plane were weary but smiling, it is reported. Many of them reported that Hannan was friendly to them, and one of them said "He was very nice, very kind," while another said "I feel sorry for the young man. He gave no indication we should have concern" (Ayres; Jr., 1977, p. A9). None of them seem to have expressed anything adverse about the police handling of the crisis.

What do the above indicate in terms of the possession and sharing of power? Hannan possessed individual power -- he had hostages and he had a gun. However, the nature of his demands (guns, money, and the release of a fellow felon) contradicted the manner of his demeanor (suicidal, nice, soft-spoken, kind), and diminished his individual power. This decrease in individual power encouraged the police negotiator to build trust and confidence ("beef him up") and thus increase relational power. However, given the nature of police functioning in such situations (playing by the book to establish control over space, time, and conversation) they also dithered, played for time, and so lost the chance of establishing trust initially. All their later attempts to "beef him up" therefore should be seen as matters of protocol that the hostage taker rejected because he "saw" through the.

The media's characterization of the event/outcome and of individual players involved reflects the ideological and institutional powers vested in and exercised by the police. None of the newspaper reports call to question any of the police tactics to resolve the situation. It is perceived as a situation that should be obvious to any onlooker, and is described as such -- gay lover, bumbling criminal with suicidal tendencies holding hostages in a hijacked plane, and hard-working, intelligent, professional police trying to resolve the situation succeed in getting the hostages released, but alas, despite their efforts, cannot save the hostage taker.

No alternatives are suggested, and the event is mined only for simple quirks of characters, setting, and so forth that would "interest" the papers' readers and not in any way "disturb" them. There is no doubt that the police tried to get Hannan to surrender, and in this task they were helped by Hannan's own lawyer, Roger Thompson.

With the advantage of being a well-known lawyer with friends in the right places, Thompson could be characterized as a powerful individual. However, he had as much or as little impact as the police in the management of the crisis. Could we then conclude that there was no other way for the crisis to be resolved, and that Hannan was bound to kill himself whatever the solution offered? The descriptive and interpretive analyses may shed more light on this situation,

and until we do those analyses we can not come to such a conclusion.

Descriptive Analysis

In this part of the analysis I will provide as complete a narrative of the hostage negotiations as is necessary based on the actual hostage negotiation transcript. The actual sequence of recorded conversation is not provided because of the extremely numerous interruptions in the talk between various people on the plane (hostage taker Hannan, copilot Jones, Captain Curtis, flight attendant Karr) and the others on the ground (air traffic controller, FBI agent Cochran, lawyer Patrello, lawyer Thompson, and Hannan's friend Stewart).

The transcript seems to be complete from the time flight 101 lands at Hartfield International Airport and the time Hannan's lawyer Thompson tells Hannan that he is on his way to the plane to go talk to him. What is missing is the conversation between Hannan and his father, as well as the final negotiation between Hannan and his lawyer. So, the last 30 minutes of talk that Hannan and Thompson had seems to be privy to them, and we have only sketchy newspaper reports about that conversation as recounted by Thompson to the newspapers. Whether Thompson was debriefed by the FBI, and whether they drew any conclusions/ lessons from the debriefing is not known to me.

After the initial, brief exchange between the air traffic controller and copilot Jones, FBI agent Cochran establishes radio contact and asks to speak to Hannan who refuses to talk directly but relays his demands through the copilot and the pilot. The major demand of money, guns, and parachutes is made only in passing, and the initial exchange is all about getting Wendy's hamburgers, fries, and milkshakes for the 16 people on board the plane. The first major turn in the negotiation comes at utterance #0072 when Hannan demands that his friend Stewart bring the food onto the plane. When Cochran replies that it would take quite some time to cut through the red tape and get Stewart to the airport, Hannan replies that he doesn't like the "game" Cochran is playing (#0074). As the details of the food order are worked out, Cochran asks how Hannan would like the food delivered. Hannan says that it would be best to have Stewart bring the food. Cochran plays around for time, says he will have to check with his boss about the food order (#0115), and then asks Hannan what his relationship is with Stewart (#0126). After a pause, he asks if Stewart is a relative, and Hannan replies "second cousin" (#0127).

Cochran asks what would happen if Stewart didn't want to talk to him, and Hannan says it would be Stewart's decision and he would go on from there. Cochran says one of the officials with him wants to know why Hannan was "doing this"

(#0136), and Hannan replies, "I'm empty" (#0137), and that it wasn't the time and place to talk about that (#0139).

Cochran pleads for the release of the two flight attendants but Hannan says they're needed on the plane to do "stewardess work." Cochran tries to keep Hannan talking by asking him about his school and the basketball team (#0165) but Hannan, after responding a little, walks away from the radio. Cochran asks the pilots to try and get Hannan to answer questions because "we'd like to keep him talking on the, uh, radio as much as possible" (#0171).

At about this time one of the flight attendants, Bobby (Roberta) Kerr comes on the radio and tells Cochran that her four year-old daughter is in nursery school in Denver and could someone make sure and contact the school so that she'll be okay. This gives Cochran the leverage necessary to ask Hannan to let Kerr talk to her daughter directly. He tries to get Hannan to talk but his responses are brief and noncommittal. Kerr comes on the radio again (#0228) and says that Mike (Hannan) is willing to let her go if the police would let Stewart come talk to him. Cochran's reply, in turn, is noncommittal. Kerr tells Cochran that her husband was killed in a car accident the previous year (#0240), but that some relatives may be able to go pick her daughter Monique up from school.

The next ten or twelve utterances are all about how to get the food on the plane. Cochran suggests that Kerr

should walk down and pick up the food, but Hannan insists that someone climb up a ladder and pas the food through the pilot's window. Hannan is afraid that once Kerr gets out she will not come back.

Cochran tries once again to get Hannan to let Kerr go but Hannan insists that he first talk to Stewart. When Cochran persists that Kerr should be let go because getting Stewart out to talk to Hannan would take a longer time, Hannan not only refuses but threatens that if "you're not going to cooperate with me, then I, things are going to come down to a deadline" (#0283). Cochran repeats that he's looking for a good gesture on Hannan's part, and that while Hannan could take unilateral steps he could not because he "can't move Washington" ((#0291). Hannan doesn't buy the line, and accuses Cochran of stalling for time (#0292). He also rejects the quid pro quo that he let Kerr go in exchange for food.

A large part of the tape at this point is indecipherable and my speculation is that the FBI has garbled the tape for reasons only known to them. This could not be the part of the tape where Hannan talked with his father because Cochran mentions later that Hannan's parents would be there in a little while and he could then talk to them (#0345).

Cochran checks with the pilots whether Hannan has the gun in his hands and is told that he has it at all times (#0318). He tries to get Hannan to reveal his plans in case

Stewart refuses to come and talk, and Hannanexasperatedly tells him that "I'm in a position where I really don't have anything to lose" (#0336). Still further, he says "...wanna play God, that's their problem" (#0346), and we can speculate that he is characterizing the actions of people who are delaying his talk with Stewart.

At this point, copilot Jones asks how deep in trouble Hannan is, and what would happen if he gave up right then (#0350). Cochran replies that no charges have been filed on the day's incidents. He also asks whether Hannan would like to talk to his lawyer, Jay Roger Thompson. The copilot tells Cochran that if he could do something about getting Stewart over to the airport that would be some relief (#0358). He also tells Cochran, when Hannan is out of earshot, he and the pilot could be of help. Cochran tells him to "come in and warn us" if Hannan gets too "uptight" (#0368).

Around this time Hannan says he's setting a 5 p.m. deadline (#0378), and warns that if his demands are not met some people will die (#0380). Frank Patrello, one of the two attorneys for Hannan, begins negotiations with Hannan (#0387) and tells him that Thompson, the main attorney is going to be there soon to sort out the problem. He asks for information from Hannan about the incident, and Hannan replies that "this is, uh, a whole new case in itself... desperation I guess you could call it" (#0392).

When Cochran comes on the radio again (#0396) he tries to convince Hannan that he should give up for the sake of his parents and loved ones. He assures Hannan that he could see Stewart if only he lay down his gun and walked out. The next important turn in the conversation comes when Cochran asks if Hannan would like to talk to his parents who had then arrived at the airport (#0423). However, the transcript does not contain the conversation between Hannan and his father that is reported in The Atlanta Constitution.

Roger Thompson, Hannan's lawyer, arrives by helicopter at the airport and begins negotiations with Hannan (#0442). He asks Hannan what he needs (#0446), and Hannan replies "Need an honorable way out" (#0447). Thompson points out that the hostages are innocent people, and wonders what Hannan means by honorable way out. Hannan repeats that once he gets to talk to Stewart he would led the stewardesses out (#0455). He then reminds Thompson of the other demands including the ransom of three million dollars. Soon Thompson calls and tells Hannan that "Frank has been working with these fuckin' feds. They move like bureaucrats move... I've kicked some asses. We're trying to get Stewart out here" (#0476).

The next part of the conversation revolves around when Hannan is going to release the flight attendants, and Thompson insists that Hannan should act in good faith and release te two immediately. He also tells him about the court case

regarding the bank robbery, and that Stewart has agreed to plead guilty. Soon, Hannan agrees to let the women go (#0504).

Stewart is brought to the airport and he talks to Hannan (#0528). Stewart congratulates Hannan on "your, uh, inspiring feat" and tells him that it takes a lot of nerve to do what Hannan has done (#0532). He also relays the information that Thompson would come on board the plane and escort Hannan out. Stewart says what Hannan did is very impressive and that "you probably made people like the Baader Meinhof roll over in their graves..." (#0536). Stewart tells Hannan not to commit suicide, and that he better surrender when Thompson comes aboard the plane.

The next turn that Stewart has with Hannan he says that Hannan cannot make this a political incident, and that the only place they could fly to would be Cuba, and that may not be possible too because the Cubans may not allow them in (#0540). Stewart's talk is difficult to decipher, and the above paraphrasing is a "bold" interpretation of the rather confusing talk. Stewart repeats that Hannan should not think of suicide, and that after doing a "stretch" in prison "reality might make us, you know, a little better" (#0542). He also tells Hannan "don't waste yourself for me or for anybody else. Let the passengers go" (#0544).

Thompson resumes conversation with Hannan, and tells him that he is going to drive up to the plane with Cochran,

and that he alone would climb up to the door and that Hannan should help open the door and grab and pull him inside. The last utterance is by Thompson saying "Okay buddy, stand by. I'm on my way" (#0557).

Summary and analysis. The first thing to consider is whether Agent Cochran is able to establish any rapport with Hannan, and whether that enhances either of the party's relational power. All of Cochran's attempts to build trust fails for two reasons: one, the delay, both perceived and real, in meeting the hostage taker's simpler demands -- the demand for food, and the demand to have Stewart brought over to the airport to talk to him; and two, Hannan's refusal to respond to and listen to Cochran's overtures. It seems that Hannan is fully aware of the "deceptive" attempts of the police to gain control of the situation, and does what the police don't want him to do: not respond. Even Cochran's attempt to know what Stewart's relationship to Hannan is is met with an oblique response that confounds any attempt at relationship building.

Hannan has "individual power" in the form of hostages, and the sawed-off shotgun he keeps constantly at the ready. The other component of individual power is Hannan's proclaimed belief that he has nothing to live for. He uses the hostages to keep the police at bay, and uses the gun upon himself in a gesture that denies the police a power ascendancy. Also, what enables Hannan to maintain individual

power is his refusal to acknowledge the plight of flight attendant Kerr, and his lack of an explicit response to his parents' entreaties.

The pilots, in some instances, enhance Hannan's relational power by telling Cochran that things could be sorted out easily if only Stewart would be brought to the airport to talk to Hannan. They believe that that is what is holding up the resolution of the crisis. But they also diminish Hannan's individual power by seeking to know from Cochran how they can assist him in apprehending Hannan. This complicity with the police pits them against Hannan.

Neither the lawyer's (Roger Thompson) bluster, nor Stewart's nervous acknowledgement of his lover's "brave" actions seem to have added anything to Hannan's individual or relational power base. It would have been very helpful if the final conversation between Thompson and Hannan could have been recorded somehow to enable us to better estimate the final outcome. Not knowing what exactly transpired between the two makes this part of the analysis incomplete.

Fantasy Theme Analysis

In this part of the analysis I will provide evidence for the fantasy themes and rhetorical visions of the police and the hostage taker, as well as those of the other negotiators. I will do this in the same manner I analyzed the previous transcript.

Fantasy Themes and the Rhetorical Visions of the Police

Setting. Following are a representative sample of police negotiator utterances that capture for us his understanding of the setting of the event:

#0031: Do you realize that all of this has to be cleared through the FAA in Washington, the Department of Justice in Washington, and a number of other agencies, local and federal, before any action can be taken?

#0043: 10 - 4. We have, uh, discussed some of the problems, but we don't know the full extent of the problem, and we're trying to ascertain it now so we can get necessary paperwork going to get the clearances needed.

#0115: I forwarded your request to the boss who's gonna let me know, uh, my boss what, when and if, uh, your demand will be met as far as the hamburges are concerned.

#0179: The guy up to the food shop, he's ordering it now. It was right in the middle of lunch hour, so they had to, uh, stop things and get the order together, but you'll have it, have it in a little while...

The police negotiator uses these, and is advised to use these, types of characterization or description of the setting to gain time, to slow things down. But these descriptions can become so routinized that they could become "real" -- fantasy themes that indicate to the hostage taker the police are not all powerful, that they are beholden to other powers elsewhere (people and agencies in Washington,

or even the guy at the foodshop), and that as an institution working in cooperation with other institutions in this society the institutional power of the police is circumscribed by other agencies and individuals.

#0146: How are they needed? You got, uh, other people there that you control. We gotta talk to a lot of people, and they want to know how you're cooperating, what, what the story is, and they're concerned for the safety of the people out there.

#0203: Yeah, she's fine, but the little girl may be a little bit apprehensive if her mother isn't there. Think it'd be good if Bobby could call, uh, herself on the phone. Talk with her daughter.

This is a continuation of the first theme, but with a twist. The police negotiator asks Hannan why he needs the stewardesses when he has other hostages. The fantasy theme here is that the giving up of two hostages does not in any way diminish the individual power of the hostage taker. In fact, such an act would enhance the credibility of the hostage taker, and therefore the hostage taker's relational power would increase -- he would gain the trust of the powers out there.

The police negotiator refers to one of the stewardesses' (Bobby Kerr's) little child in Denver waiting for her mother. This utterance may be seen as further support for the above theme that Hannan would gain the trust of people

if he did a good deed like showing concern for a lonely child waiting for its mother.

#0217: How do you like the weather here in Atlanta? Pretty nice isn't it this time of year?

#0221: I thought it was supposed to be cold out there this time of year. Spent some time out in California, didn't you, Mike? You with me, Mike? Ground control to 101...

Police negotiators are advised to make small talk to reduce hostage takers' anxiety levels as well as distract them from the matter at hand. However, these can be recast as fantasy themes that enable the police to paint benign pictures of a world that they share in common with the hostage takers, pictures that would enhance the police's relational power. However, the second utterance indicates the absurdity as well as the futility of trying to use these fantasy themes sometimes -- as the negotiator tries to get Hannan to make small talk, the latter walks away from the radio enhancing his own individual power and weakening the relational power of the police.

#0262: Mike, you got all the trump cards. Uh, we're not gonna do anything. Uh, just, uh, uh, the girl will come out and pick it up and go right back in. We're gonna let her come back. We won't interfere with her at all, and, or would attempt any, uh, thing funny. we're going to do, play it straight.

This is where Agent Cochran tells Hannan that if he lets the stewardess Kerr out of the plane to go pick up the food, the police would indeed let her do just that. This is in response to Hannan's demand that the food be passed in through the pilot's window. There are two fantasy themes in this utterance: one, that Hannan holds all the "trump cards," and that he is powerful and is in control of the situation; two, that the police will let Kerr just pick up the food and go back to the plane. This second theme is difficult to characterize because it is so ill-conceived and so poorly conveyed. There is no attempt made in the utterance to clarify that Kerr, once she got out of the plane, would be taken to speak to her daughter on the phone, then would pick the food and re-board the plane. That she would merely pick the food up and walk back in conveys to the hostage taker that the police are out to undermine his power brazenly.

#0345: Look, uh, this thing is not all that bad. Your parents will be here in a little while and, uh, you can walk away with this, uh, real easy like and, uh, get, get yourself squared away, and we think, uh, what your parents think, and, and I agree with them that you're a pretty good fella, and you can, you can make something of yourself. It's never too late to, to, uh, start shaping up and, and, uh, straighten it up and get, get moving in the right direction. You're at a crossroads now.

This is an oft-recurring fantasy theme in police conversations: to assure the hostage taker that he has not done any thing that merits severe punishment helps the police to shore up the hostage taker's ebbing power and to underplay the institutional power of the police and other institutions that threaten the hostage taker.

#0398: It may be a long story, and, and there may be some misgivings, but you owe them, uh, something. They've, they've tried, uh, and, the best they could, and, and worked, and sometimes maybe it wasn't the right thing they did but, uh, they tried, and you can't stop trying to, to, uh, help the people you love. If you want to see David, uh, just put the gun down and come on out, and we'll take you to see David, no problem.

This is an attempt to shore up the relational and individual power of the hostage taker. Cochran is referring to the possible disaffection between Hannan and his parents. He points out that Hannan owes a good deed to the people who love him, and that the good deed would be to put the gun down and walk out of the plane.

Actors. Following is a sample of utterances that reflect the fantasy themes of the police regarding the actors involved in the hostage drama:

#0159: Mike, you've been at the university for a number of years. You know, uh... educated. You know what the, what the story is. When people start making decisios,

you gotta be reasonable in the matter. We're trying to be reasonable with you.

The fantasy theme here is that those people who have attended an university are educated and therefore reasonable people and, they will make reasonable demands. Hannan is educated, having attended the University of Nebraska, and should therefore be reasonable, no matter if he has done an unreasonable thing like hijacking a plane and taking people hostages! Reasonable people can be expected to respond to situations in a predictable manner, and the police seek to stress that quality in the hostage taker more than anything else. More rational the hostage taker, the more control the police have over the situation, except that rationality may dictate to some hostage takers that the situation is so futile that their only way out is to kill themselves.

#0177: Okay. Uh, I hear you, Mike. I hear you on that and, uh, but, uh, I always kinda like to feel women are a little something special, and I like to keep 'em out of, uh, situations like this. They get a little nervous.

The fantasy theme here is that women are the "weaker sex." Hannan has already released all the women and children in Kansas City except the stewardesses. He's holding the stewardesses because "they're needed" to serve food and take care of the remaining passengers and crew on the plane. Whether or not the release of the two stewardesses would

diminish Hannan's individual power is a difficult question to answer. There's no reason to believe too that the police would gain an advantage by asking for the stewardesses' release.

#0246: May be he thinks things are better off the way they are. May be he doesn't want to get into, uh, any more involvement.

By characterizing Stewart (Hannan's gay friend) as someone who could be having second thoughts of further getting involved with Hannan, Cochran is sowing doubts in Hannan and is weakening his bargaining power. Additionally, he is weakening Hannan's individual power by questioning the strength of Stewart's friendship and commitment to Hannan.

#0278: ...uh, force you. We're just trying to make this thing as easy on everybody as possible, but we do feel that Bobby with her little girl out in Denver, you heard her husband was killed in an accident. That little child has just one parent, and we want to get that girl out of there.

Continuing from the analysis of the previous utterance, we can posit that the only reason the police demand Bobby Kerr's release is that she has a young child waiting for her in Denver, and that Bobby is a single parent who has to take care of her child.

#0291: I'm not in a position to speed things up. I would if I could, but, uh, I can't move Washington. You know,

you've been in the army. You know the bureaucratic ways that the bureaus up there go through, and we have to live with that now. Uh I can't control that, but you can control the situation that we're talking about. Agent Cochran depicts himself as a cog in a huge bureaucratic machine, and thus as a person who has little control over how quickly events get resolved. He seeks to get Hannan identify with the situation by harping on Hannan's service in the army. This fantasy theme can be seen as an attempt at depicting the police as less powerful.

#0396: No, Mike you gotta consider your parents, your brothers, and uh, the people that, uh, love you and have faith in you, and, uh, they're thinking about you, and, and they're worried about you, and they want to see you, you, everything turn out well, and, uh, you owe something to them too, don't you?

Parents and siblings are depicted as loving, caring people who would be hurt if their son/brother hurt other people/himself. The hostage taker is seen, despite his situation, as a dutiful son/brother, and it is his duty therefore to not do anything that would hurt his parents and siblings.

Action. Following are utterances that enable us to understand the action from the perspective of the police.

#0009: This is Don Cochran. I understand you have a problem aboard. I'm here to see if I can help.

All of the day's events is described in one word, "problem"! A classic line for an FBI agent to come in and establish his control and authority. This remark is directed to the pilots of the plane but is overheard by the hostage taker. This simple, clear utterance at once establishes the institutional power of the police. They'll guide the events and resolve the problems. In this simple charge-taking maneuver the police establish their fantasy theme of being keepers of peace and order.

#0075: It's not a game we're playing. It's just that we, we have to go through all the, uh, agencies and, and what not. It takes time. We can't do it right now, but it'll take time.

#0150: We're not playing games, Mike. We're, we're trying to help everybody. We're just trying to help you, as well as the people on the plane. We're not playing games with anybody, don't (you?) believe me.

Both these utterances seek to describe police action: they're taking the hostage taker and his demands seriously, and any delay in their response could be attributed to "outside agencies." The police are also there to "help" the hostage taker and those others caught in the web of action. As those who are going to "help," and not merely do the bidding of the hostage taker, the police reiterate their institutional power.

#0211: 10-4. We are in that position now that we're not, uh, about to do anything to disturb, uh, the situation or to do anything that would cause Mike to do anything. Another classic understatement by the police in response to the pilot's conveying of Hannan's sentiment that he would not do anything foolish if the police did not do anything foolish. This is some sort of temporary truce that both tacitly agree to, and that which indicates the acknowledgment of each other's power.

#0335: We're cooperating in every manner possible, Mike.

We're doing everything humanly possible, uh, to resolve this to the benefit of everybody concerned, so nobody gets hurt. That's the main thing. We don't want anybody hurt.

The description of police action is a fantasy theme that conveys the diminished power of the police: they're doing everything possible to humor the hostage taker, meet his demands. As long as they are described as doing the hostage taker's bidding it may be assumed that they're conveying to the hostage taker that he is individually powerful, and that the police's institutional power is being controlled by the hostage taker.

#0341: We're working on 'em, we're working on 'em, trying to, to get, uh, necessary clearance, but you're making it difficult by not giving us the answers we need to have.

The onus of inaction is sought to be transferred to the hostage taker who is "not giving us the answers." If things are not moving it's not because the police are not trying but because the hostage taker is not cooperating. This is a fantasy theme that seeks to convey the idea that the hostage taker is still in control of the situation and is therefore powerful. With this strategy the police can then seek concessions from the hostage taker.

#0347: Nobody's playing God. Uh, you're, you're causing a lot of hurt to a lot of people like, uh, Bobby's little girl out in Denver, and Bobby and the other stewardess there and, and the passengers in the plane and their families. That's causing hurt, and, uh, I don't think you wanna do that.

Hannan's actions are cast in the restricted frame of the "immediate" -- people who are being affected and the anxieties and fears that they have -- rather than being described in the context of the larger societal framework. This enables the police to convey the idea that the hostage taker is still powerful and that he has control over people's lives.

#0368: Uh, we're just trying to keep him cool, and we don't wanna get him alerted we're pushing too hard. Uh, you think he's getting too uptight, uh, try to come in and warn us.

When Hannan is out of earshot, the pilots ask Cochran what actually is happening, and his reply provides us a rare look into the "schizophrenic" world of hostage negotiations: the police try to convey to the hostage taker a make-believe world, a world that's "accepted" by a hostage-taker only if he "conspires" with the police to accept it, and another world that is the "real" world, one in which the police try to do things in preparation for an event that my belie the conspiracy! What is important to notice here though is the conspiracy behind the conspiracy, and the police trying to retain and exercise their institutional power to thwart the hostage taker.

#0419: Uh, but, uh, right now, uh, they're working on it, and, uh, we'd like a little additional time... uh, the priest at it, the chaplain at it, the county jail, uh, also is concerned about you. He called. I didn't catch his name, and he wants to help. Uh, your parents want to help. Everybody wants to help you, Mike. Uh, take advantage of that. It's, it's the only way out is to listen to what they have to say and work with them. They can show you the light, right way to go.

The mention of parents and the chaplain is a device to invoke whatever moral and religious authority that the hostage taker may be subservient to. The invoking of these authorities diminishes the hostage taker's individual power to carry out unilateral actions. This also aligns the

parents and the church with the police and thus increases the ideological power of the police.

Rhetorical visions of the police. The rhetorical visions of the police, in this incident, are fairly limited because the hostage taker is not a loquacious interactant. Hannan's answers are brief, brusque, and to the point. He refuses to engage in talk with Cochran, and therefore restricts the full and free play for the working out of police visions.

As in the analysis of the previous transcript, I will identify the major setting themes and see how the actor and actions themes of the police are tied together to the former. This will enable me to tease out the police rhetorical vision/s.

Agent Cochran tries to convey to Hannan that the situation is controlled by government agencies in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and elsewhere, and that the police on the scene are beholden to those agencies for getting Hannan's demands met. This is the major setting theme which provides the framework for the rest of the events. Another setting theme influencing the events is the fate of one of the stewardesses' small child in Denver. The third theme, which seems common to all hostage situations, is that the situation for the hostage taker is not all bad, and that there are people who will support and help him if he gives up without harming anyone.

The major actor themes include that of the hostage taker as an educated, reasonable human being; the police as beholden to outside agencies, and therefore not all powerful; the stewardesses, two women, as the most vulnerable and frail of the hostages; and the hostage taker's friend in prison as someone who may not be willing to go along with the hostage taker's plans for escape.

The police characterize the action as being controlled by the hostage taker who is not cooperative. They also claim that they are taking the demands of the hostage taker seriously but their freedom to act is restricted by other agencies.

Given the limited fantasy themes of the police their rhetorical visions can be characterized as limited and weak. The taciturnity of the hostage taker seems to have largely contributed to the police's inability to articulate any powerful vision. Do weak police visions enhance or diminish the hostage taker's power? The police claim that they tried to "beef up" the hostage taker. A good beefing up is possible through the conveying of powerful rhetorical visions -- visions that should paint concrete and credible word pictures for the hostage taker about what awaits him if/after he releases the hostages and surrenders. Despite the police claim that they tried to do so, a reading of the transcript shows that they indeed did not/could not do so.

What were the rhetorical visions of the police? One, and I can recognize only one, is that an educated person is a responsible, caring and moral person, and should do nothing to belie that. Were the police successful in conveying that vision, and did the hostage taker accept that vision? Well, the release of the hostages indicates that the police were successful in conveying that vision. However, the suicide of the hostage taker indicates that the police vision was incomplete and weak, and failed to impress or empower the hostage taker.

Fantasy Themes and the Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker

Hannan is a cryptic and taciturn hostage taker. His responses to Agent Cochran as well as others who speak to him is brief, almost always monosyllabic. Sometimes, the pilot or co-pilot pass on messages on behalf of Hannan, and even then it is very brief and to the point. As such it will be a hard task to fathom his fantasy themes and rhetorical visions.

Setting. Following is a representative sample of Hannan's utterances that indicate to us his idea of the setting or the situation:

#0107: As soon as you get, uh, Mr. Stewart and bring him out here, and he can bring the hamburgers up to the plane, and I'll speak with him and see how he feels about, uh, the situation and go from there.

For Hannan, like for most hostage takers, the situation is fluid despite some demands being laid down. The situation and the demands could also change, and the fantasy theme for the hostage taker is that as time passes, and some demands are met, things could change. While Hannan begins with specific demands, he is not persistent in presenting them. This weakens his individual power and therefore his ability to counter the institutional power of the police.

#0139: This isn't the time and the place to talk about that.

In response to Cochran's query as to why Hannan feels "empty," Hannan answers as above, and one can perceive that he's not going to humor the FBI agent with a confession session, and it is so because not only has he certain expectations about the setting in which one does confess to the "empty" feeling but that such a confession may weaken his individual power, and thus the ability to bargain.

#0149: Well, I set forth some, uh, simple demands, and if they're met then everyone will be just fine and dandy. But if you're gonna play games with me, then things are gonna come down to, uh, something.

#0443: Well, sir, there's not a problem yet. Uh, the only problem that's going to occur is if, uh, people don't meet the demands that I've set forth.

The demands here are left unstated, but one realizes that Hannan is more serious about his "simple" demand -- that of meeting with his friend Stewart -- than he is about his

other demands. His idea about what is going to happen if his simple demand is not met is not clear, but one can perceive that his veiled threat is a way of exerting some individual power to have his way. Once again, we can perceive Hannan's weak fantasy themes.

#0253: The food wasn't one of my demands, sir. It was just, uh, out of consideration for everyone, uh, needed some food. The demands were, number one, starts with (being) able to talk with Mr. Stewart.

Cochran's attempt to use food as leverage fails here as Hannan claims that food was not what he wanted. With such a claim he retains the power that he has.

#0292: No, I'm not in control of the situation. As far as the paperwork, uh, in certain circumstances, you would, you know as well as I do that things can be done if the right people tell those people to do it -- and you're just stalling for time.

By rejecting the notion that he is in control Hannan reasserts his individual power to label a situation. He retains some power by denying that he has power. Further, by telling Cochran what the police can do in such situations, he does what Cochran tries to do to him -- show where power resides. By telling the police what type of institutional power they have, Hannan not only retains his power to reason but undercuts the ideological power of the police to label a situation.

#0344: Seems to me to be a very simple request to start with to get Stewart out here in exchange (for the) lady so that the little girl will be in good shape.

#0455: I want David Stewart out of jail, and him to come to this plane, and as soon as he gets to this plane, and I can talk to him, then the stewardess can leave. I want three million dollars, and I want two machine guns, and two 45 caliber pistols... ammunition.

Hannan retains his power by describing how he is willing to bargain. Usually, in hostage situations the police try to do this. The difference between the first and the second utterance is that Hannan realizes that the police are slow to respond to his bargaining scheme, and so raises the ante by repeating his original demands (not in the transcript, but what the newspaper reports he demanded when he first landed the plane in Kansas City). By raising the ante Hannan betrays his frustration, and I interpret this as a loss of power. Any expression of threat without the actual carrying out of the threat reduces the individual's power (Folger & Poole, 1985).

#0392: This is, uh, a whole new case in itself... desperation I guess you could call it.

#0447: Need an honorable way out.

#0461: Time is running out, sir.

#0491: This is a different situation now.

#0506: I have no alternative but to stick with what I started with.

The above expressions indicate that Hannan sees (correctly) that by hijacking a plane and holding hostages he has done something that changes vastly his adversarial role with the police (state) that began with Stewart and he robbing a bank. He also realizes that with this changed situation his options are more limited, and that he is faced with more dire consequences than the ones he faced after robbing the bank. These dire consequences (not articulated) make him seek an "honorable way out" or repeat his initial demands for friend, money, and guns. That the only honorable way out (once again not articulated) for him could be suicide makes his threats/demands weak, and thus weakens him. His fantasy that "time is running out" could be interpreted either as a threat to do harm to others or to himself. That it is not fully articulated makes the police more confident about the hostage taker's indecision and, therefore, his weakness.

#0535: Sounds too good.

When Stewart explains what will happen once Hannan surrenders, the latter cannot believe it. His skepticism can be interpreted as a pointer to his beliefs about the world: people will not get off easily for committing the crime he has committed. He thus reaffirms the institutional and

ideological power of the police, and his own diminished power by expressing skepticism.

DActors. How does Hannan perceive the various actors involved in the drama? Here, Hannan's cryptic pronouncements and descriptions shed more light than they did on the setting. Following is a set of those utterances that tell us about Hannan's perception of the actors:

#0127: ...second cousin.

#0245: I don't see any reason why he wouldn't want to come out to the airport.

#0247: Well, he's not. He won't be involved if he doesn't want to be involved. I'll just speak with him is all.

#0459: I need to see him, sir.

When Cochran asks what sort of relationship Hannan has with Stewart, and there is a perceptible pause, he reframes the question to ask how Stewart is related to him. "Second cousin" is vague enough to imply any kind of relationship, and Hannan, it is evident throughout his interaction with Cochran, doesn't want to confide in the FBI agent. The confiding of a homosexual relationship, or the articulation of it, might have been construed by Hannan as a loss of privacy, and the confiding of it to a police agent, a loss of power. Also, the articulation of a homosexual relationship in front of two men, the pilot and the co-pilot, might have also been perceived by Hannan as jeopardizing his relationship with them.

Hannan believes that Stewart has enough reason to come see him, and no reason to avoid him. We can interpret that Hannan is confident enough about Stewart's concern/love for him that he does not believe Stewart would refuse to come to the airport to talk to him. He also makes clear that he will not force Stewart or induce him to join him in the hostage/escape plot.

Finally, the "need" to see Stewart indicates Hannan's desire to convey to Stewart the import of his actions and the reasons for them. It seems that that is the only "closure" Hannan is seeking for the sequence of events. Such a closure would reaffirm his "power," and Stewart's acknowledgement of his actions would be some sort of redemption for the past failures of their life together.

#0137: I'm empty.

#0290: Well, I have probably just as much concern for that young girl as you do, and possibly more, and that is more of a reason why you should speed things up.

#0296: I'm not here to make a good showing.

#0336: That's what we're talking about, so let's, like I said before, it's imperative that you (get) things going because, uh, I'm in a position where I really don't have anything to lose.

#0338: There's no help needed.

#0493: (You have) an honorable man here. You have my word, uh, to, as soon as David sh-, as soon as I see him,

then I'll, I'll trade David for the two women.

Hannan characterizes himself as being "empty," perhaps meaning that he has gone beyond the point where anything can be recovered. He has burnt all his bridges, and he has nothing to live for. This makes him at once powerful and powerless. He is powerful in the sense that he can do anything because he has nothing to lose. He is powerless because he can gain nothing. This is the paradox he is confronted with, and he therefore rejects all help, for none can help him. Because he cannot gain anything, he also disclaims any need to make a good showing. Thus, whichever position he wishes to take he finds none. The only thing he clings on to and affirms is his basic goodness -- his concern and his honor -- and that's what makes him, paradoxically, less powerful.

#0176: Need the girls here to, uh, do stewardess work.

He retains the stewardesses not because he sees them as pawns he can bargain with but because there is a practical need for them: to take care of the other hostages on the plane. Such a characterization makes it possible for him to distance himself from one of the stewardesses' plight. This gives him power.

#0346: ...wanna play God, that's their problem.

This is Hannan's response to Cochran's claim that Hannan's parents are there and they want to help him set his life right again. This may indicate that Hannan doesn't believe

anyone can help him, and if they think they can then they're claiming some supernatural powers. That miscognition is

#0348: You think my head's screwed around wrong and,
uh, ...can may be say the same thing of you. But, like
I said before, this is, uh, bigger than both of us.

#0420: ...only people that can help is the people who are
making the, the decisions on the demands.

#0465: Sir, the best way you can help me is to tell the
people that I'm serious and, uh, I guess that's about
it.

Neither parents nor lawyers can help him, he believes. We can surmise that for him the people who are making the decisions on the demands are the police and other government agencies involved. He clearly vests the police and other agencies with institutional and ideological power. This realization makes him powerful to the extent he can insist that he deal with the police and any such agency involved. This weakens him to the extent he cannot build or retain any relational power through his parents and his lawyers.

#0451: There is no such thing as innocent people. Babies are innocent, but, uh, as far as, uh, the rest of the people are concerned.

In reply to his lawyer's comment that there are innocent people on the plane, Hannan takes the Biblical/philosophical position that we are all "sinners." This stance enables him

to thwart attempts by the negotiators to evoke sympathy for the hostages, and thus allows him to retain some individual power. By retaining some power to describe situations and label people, Hannan weakens the ideological power of the police.

Action. Following are a sample of utterances that indicate to us how Hannan perceived the action:

#0074: I don't like that game you're playing.

#0111: It shouldn't take more than a half hour to get Stewart out here. All that's necessary is a little transportation... not buying that paperwork.

#0390: ...been here two or three hours now, and, uh, I set forth some demands, and they're stalling... think, uh, talking with me is going to accomplish something. Just like it is the rule for the police to seek more time, so it is for the hostage takers to claim that the police are stalling and purposefully delaying or slowing down the action. From the newspaper reports, it is evident that the police had Stewart whisked away from the county prison as soon as they heard the plane was headed for Atlanta. That means, most probably, they had Stewart at the Hartsfield Airport even before the plane landed there. But Hannan had no way of knowing it. However, he guesses right that the police could get Stewart to the airport quickly enough, and that they are not telling him the truth when they claim that

it involves a lot of paperwork. This delaying and "playing games" are police strategies to weaken the hostage taker's resolve to carry on with whatever original intentions he started out with. To counter this, Hannan repeats that such a delay, and attempts to talk to him would not resolve anything. We can see this as his attempt to reassert or regain his power.

#0158: ...already showed 'em my good faith act, and, uh, go from there.

#0334: As soon as you start cooperating with me, then (we can) get this show on the road.

Here we see Hannan countering police descriptions of events that have taken place. By retaining the ability to counter those descriptions, and exercising that ability, Hannan reaffirms his individual power and challenges the ideological and institutional power of the police.

#0283: () Kansas City, and right now I'm in a position where () to you. I'm just going to wait, and if you're not going to cooperate with me, then I, things are going to come down to a deadline.

#0378: I'm setting a 5 o'clock deadline.

#0380: ...not the point either. The point is I've set some demands, and if they're not met, then the people are going to die.

We can see how Hannan raises his threats a notch as time passes and he perceives police inaction. Earlier we saw he merely complained that the police were playing games, and

not cooperating. Now, in utterance #0283 we see him, for the first time, telling the police what is going to happen if they don't cooperate with him. The mention of a deadline is rhetorically symbolic. Till such a mention, one can perceive the situation as fluid. With the mention of a deadline the character of the action changes, and the hostage taker sets a new tone to the events: he reasserts his power. This enables the continuation of the negotiation, and Hannan's ability to take the next step.

The next step he takes is to mention what the actual deadline is. This further crystallizes the action, and challenges the police to take the hostage taker more seriously. This is a graduated step toward the next, which is what is going to happen if the police don't cooperate before the deadline. Hannan says people are going to die if there is no action to satisfy his demands by 5 p.m. He doesn't mention who is/are going to die. Will he kill any of his hostages, or will he kill himself? This last step can be characterized as another graduated step that would lead to the next where he would threaten who he would kill. While we can characterize these graduated threats as enhancing the hostage taker's power, or at least enabling him to retain his power, we can also perceive how the police would enhance their preparedness to counter the threats of the hostage taker. Hannan might have realized that too, but we don't get a peek into his mind on whether he does so.

Rhetorical visions of the hostage taker. The major setting themes in Hannan's utterances are that the situation he is in is a completely different one, with much more serious consequences, than the one he was involved with Stewart originally, and that he is the only one who is responsible for it and has to pay the price for. He doesn't have an accomplice, and he doesn't know whether he will get one. So, the situation can be characterized as a fluid one in which Hannan desperately hopes that he will have an accomplice, and that they can escape together somewhere. This vision of escape to a safe haven is a common vision for hostage takers.

But in this setting Hannan perceives himself as essentially alone. He doesn't have anything to lose, nor has he anything to gain, except may be the sympathy and concern of his friend. He doesn't have faith in any other actors -- not his parents, not his lawyers, and of course, not the police. He sees himself as an honorable man seeking an honorable way out. But the only honorable way proposed, surrender, doesn't seem ennobling to him.

He thinks the police are playing games with him and stalling for time. He rejects all their attempts to play psychiatrist and counsellor with him, and in an attempt to get them to honor his demands he gradually increases his threats to an extent where the only next step he could take would be to kill a/some hostages or kill himself. He claims

he is a concerned and honorable human being, and he therefore has to eliminate the option of killing other human beings. Left is the option for suicide, which he takes.

The rhetorical vision of Hannan can be summarized as one in which life is bleak, and dark, and one in which there are punishments for crimes committed. He doesn't question the authority of those who would punish him, and nor does he believe that they have anything to offer him in solace. He doesn't wish to be punished by others, so he punishes himself.

Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Other Negotiators

In this part of the analysis I will briefly sketch the fantasy themes and rhetorical visions of two people who played significant parts in the hostage drama: Jay Roger Thompson, Hannan's attorney; and George David Stewart, Hannan's accomplice in the bank robbery, and alleged lover. I will ignore the utterances of the two pilots, though they have substantial interactions with the police negotiator. The reason for doing so is that they mostly act as conduits or channels to Hannan and the police negotiator, and don't themselves contribute their views of the situation. I will also ignore the other attorney, Frank Patrello, because he plays the role of a stand-in for Thompson. There are also minor segments where stewardess Bobby Kerr speaks with the police negotiator. These exchanges are very perfunctory and

deal with such things as where Kerr's daughter goes to school, what is th telephone number of so and so, and such other matters.

I will first analyze David Stewart's utterances. These analyses will not be structured as the analyses of Hannan's and Cochran's utterances. Setting, actor, and action themes are analyzed together, and then rhetorical visions will be interpreted.

#0532: I'd like to congratulate you on your, uh, inspiring, uh, feat. It's, it's very impressive, and it takes a lot of nerve to do that.

#0536: Well, uh, not, i-i-i-it's not what you wanted. Uh, thank you. I appreciate it, and it's very, very impressive. It's loyal, and uh, I 'm sure that you probably made people like the (Baader Meinhof) roll over in their graves, if they're listening. But you've accomplished what you can accomplish as a man at this point. The rest, man, you can, you can serve yourself better. Think of yourself. You can get, uh, you know, uh, nothing's gonna happen to you. Uh, well, Thompson assures me that. I'm not gonna tell you what to do. Uh, but I've been with these people all day, and you know I don't trust, uh, I don't trust policemen any more than you do now, but, uh, I'm pretty sure that, uh, you know, I, I'm almost certain that, well, with Thompson coming on board, he's offered to substitute

himself, uh, for the passengers. You know, and I don't think that he wants to commit suicide or anything like that. So, go ahead and, uh, surrender. There's nothing else to do, man. It's just gonna be, uh, a bloody thing.

#0540: Michael, uh, there's one bad thing about this situation, uh, based on my conversation with Thompson and Patrello. You haven't, uh, count your demands in any political etiology or anything. The only place we could go would be out of this country, fly to say Cuba, and I don't think (their) consular would let us in there. Uh, see, the thing is those countries would be embarrassed by.... Uh, well, it, it, just, based on my viewpoint, you know, to whatever it means, it doesn't look good. If it did, I would come down there with you and...

#0542: Michael, don't commit suicide or anything like that. Go ahead and just, uh, surrender. Don't, don't take off or anything like that. Uh, I can, I can, you know, do a stretch... something like that, and may be a little space between our, ourselves and reality might make us, you know, a little better, but, uh, but, uh, this, this is just futile. You know, there's nowhere to go, and according to, uh, my knowledge of this plane, it can only go back as far as, uh, () Island or in the opposite direction we're gonna have to stop again, and on down the road () or something like

have, you have my sympathies. I admire what you do. It's very, very manly, very impressive, and I appreciate your () and your loyalty, loyalty to me. Right now, your life means more than just throwing it away. It doesn't serve any purpose just to, you know, just to waste yourself like that. You need a purpose, and this is just, it, it's futile. You're not obligated to me or anything like that. Just think about yourself from here on in.

#0544: Okay. Uh, everybody around here is breathing a sigh of relief, so I, I don't, I've looked at some of their faces, and they don't look like they're gonna shoot you or anything like that () have confidence, and, uh, Thompson, Thompson's all right. Patrello, he's, he's okay. Most of these guys around here seem to be kind of honest.... See, once you get out of it, man, we can talk, you know, you'll have time to look things over, and this, this is, you know, uh, uh, just get out of it, man. It's, it's not worth it, you know. Don't, don't waste yourself for me or for anybody else. Let the passengers go.

Stewart is loquacious, a little nervous, and gives us inklings to events that the others don't. Some of the fantasy themes that we can identify from his utterances are that Hannan has done a "manly thing," tha the hijacking is an

impressive feat, and that the act indicates Hannan's tremendous loyalty to him (Stewart). This may be seen as an affirmation of the Hannan's individual power. He, however, sees no alternative to surrendering. All other options are difficult and may/will not bear out. He believes that it can not be considered a political hijacking, and that they can not fly out to Cuba. But the mention of the Baader Meinhof indicates a political fantasy theme and the questioning of the ideological and institutional power of government agencies.

His characterization of the actors is also interesting. The lawyers and the police are okay, though he doesn't trust the police. This indicates his distrust of institutional power. He is impressed by Hannan's loyalty but doesn't consider himself worthy of a human sacrifice. He doesn't believe that anyone else either is worthy of such a sacrifice. Suicide doesn't serve any purpose and is a futile act.

Given these, how could Stewart's rhetorical visions be characterized? I don't know how much Stewart was coached by the police and the attorneys to say certain things, and how much of what he said exceeded the bounds set for him by those people. There are also parts of his talk that seem to be deleted. Despite such concerns, one can say with some assurance that two visions of Stewart's are rather strong and clear: one, that Hannan's acts are manly, impressive

acts that symbolize and reaffirm a lover's loyalty; and two, life is better than death, and death as a sacrifice for another human being is foolish. These two visions could be considered as contributing to the support of Hannan's sagging morale, and thus to enhancing Hannan's individual power.

Next, I will analyze Roger Thompson's utterances. Following are a representative sample of his talk:

#0442: Mike, this is Roger. I've been in Washington all day. I just got in. Just got to the airport. Need to talk to you. What's the problem, buddy?

#0450: () honorable way, Mike. We're not dealing with a, we're dealing with innocent people. That's not the honorable way. Uh, you and I have got to figure an honorable way out. Tell me what you mean by honorable way.

#0464: It's not different when men do what men (). You gotta understand that. I'm not only your attorney, I'm your friend. I wanna help you. Now give me some time to find out what's going on. I'll get back to you. Okay?

#0476: Okay, Mike, I recognize your voice. Look, Frank's been working with these fuckin' feds. They move like... bureaucrats move. I've kicked some asses. We're trying to get to Stewart out here. You, you realize what sort of thing this is. You know, it's

nationwide now. Everybody knows about it. It's, we gotta, we gotta go to the AG. That's the attorney general in Washington, but I'm kicking asses, so stand by. Okay?

#0494: Mike, I can believe that, but these people don't know you. They don't know you at all. They've never seen you before. I know you're, you're an honorable man, and that your word's good, but they don't, and they're telling me if I'm gonna be your representative, I've got to have some show of good faith from you. Have that much confidence in me, Mike, to let the women go. Keep the men. We'll get Stewart out here and talk some more. Think about it. Tell me what you think now.

#0516: I haven't had a chance to talk to David yet. I finally got them to bring him here to the airport. He's almost here. I want to go down and talk with David and tell him what the situation is. Then I'll get back to you. Okay?

#0539: Dave's a little nervous, as you can tell, but what he's telling you is straight. There's really nothing we can do at the airport. We've got to do it in court. I'm gonna be with you. I'll come out to the plane. I've got their solemn promise, and I, there's an agent here that I've known personally for 15 years () wouldn't lie to me () not gonna be any funny business.... They've done everything I've asked them to do

so far. I'm convinced there's not gonna be anything, but let's go in, and let's fight our court battle....

#0541: Mike, this is Roger. What do you think? We're not hurrying you for the decision, but David and I think that we can help you, that you're going down the, a deadend alley now, and it's not worth it, so let me try to help you, and you, you've already helped Dave all you can....

#0547: Okay. Um, Dave and I agree this is the only way, and I give you my word. I'm gonna do everything I can to help you, and I am personally convinced, and I've been in this profession a long time, that there's not gonna be any violence. I want you to tell me how you wanna handle the passengers leaving the plane so that I can come to you. I want you and I to walk out as two men, as a team, go into court together....

Thompson comes across as a gruff, honest, powerful person who is willing to "kick ass" to get things moving. That was designed to impress Hannan (The Atlanta Constitution, October 22, 1977, p. 6-A), Thompson confided to reporters. The major themes that Thompson conveys to Hannan is that, now he is in charge, he can get people to speed up matters, but that is possible only if Hannan agrees to release the stewardesses. That exchange is described as an honorable way out for Hannan. This is meant to increase Hannan's rela-

tional power. Thompson seeks to increase Hannan's trust in him, and thus provide support to Hannan's sagging morale.

Thompson also tells Hannan that the airport is not the place to resolve matters, and that they should take this together to court. He conveys the idea that they can work together as a team, and this is another tactic to increase Hannan's relational power. Characterizing bureaucrats as bumbling and slow-moving, but the people on the scene as trustworthy and reliable, Thompson paints a reassuring picture for Hannan about events that will take place if he releases the hostages and then surrenders. By telling Hannan that he's an honorable man, and that he has helped Stewart as much as he could, Thompson further seeks to make Hannan feel good about himself.

Powerful men can help set matters right if only those who have made mistakes cooperate, seems to be the most evident rhetorical vision that Thompson conveys. His rhetorical visions are conveyed through the delineation of the practical courses of action rather than moral courses, though there are appeals to the latter.

Overall summary and analysis. I indicated earlier, at the end of the contextual analysis, if one had to make a judgment about the options available to the police that would enable them to have Hannan surrender it would have to wait until after the end of the fantasy theme analysis. From the descriptive analysis and the fantasy theme analysis

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I can conclude that neither Cochran's nor Thompson's visions were powerful enough or appropriate enough for dealing with someone who is deeply depressed/distressed. Cochran's efforts at making small talk is inappropriate because he treats Hannan as he would a 19 year-old college sophomore instead of a 29 year-old adult. To talk about the Cornhuskers to someone like Hannan reflects the simplistic manner that police use therapeutic techniques. To use delaying tactics in dealing with such a person also shows how the police use power without finesse. Finally, Cochran does not articulate any vision to Hannan that might have made him think twice about killing himself.

Thompson's bluster is yet another misdirected and ill-used technique in dealing with Hannan. What Hannan needed to overcome his own deep and dark vision of his life and the world was a vision that was balanced and mature. By talking to Hannan the way that Cochran and Thompson did, they merely reaffirmed their fantasy theme that Hannan was a bumbling and pathetic person.

Finally, Stewart's visions, while a little more appropriate, were also weak because of the breathless and nervous quality of his talk. Thus, he too could not provide the relational and individual support that Hannan needed to climb up the dark stairs in his mind to empower himself and to express his interest in living. Not knowing what happened in the final exchange between Thompson and Hannan it

is difficult for me to make a complete assessment of Thompson's fantasy themes and rhetorical visions. If, however, they were of the same character and tone that he used when talking to him over the radio, he would have had little influence in changing the rhetorical visions of Hannan.

Chapter Seven: Judson Dean Talley Incident

Contextual Analysis

Context. Judson Dean Talley, 21, a former Marine hijacked an Augusta-to-Atlanta Eastern Metro Express commuter plane on Thursday, November 29, 1984 but surrendered to police after holding the aircraft's two pilots for four hours (Plott & Roughton, Jr., 1984, p. 1-A).

Talley, of Athens, Georgia dressed in blue jeans and sweater purchased a one-way ticket to Atlanta boarded the plane carrying 10 passengers and two crew. Talley identified himself as "Mr. Smith" when he bought the ticket, and passed security check without incident. He carried a duffle bag and a bottle of Sprite, and spent much of the flight drinking whiskey and soda, and trying to talk with the little kids sitting behind him. A passenger sitting next to him said that Talley kept the duffel bag on his lap and was very protective of it.

Talley released the 10 other passengers on Flight 1962 unharmed just after the plane arrived in Atlanta at 11:44 a.m. One of the passengers said that though they suspected something was wrong, the passengers did not realize at the time that the plane had been hijacked. The co-pilot, Tia Weaver was allowed to leave the plane an hour before Talley surrendered.

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Twenty minutes into the flight, Talley went to the front of the plane, opened the cockpit door and began talking to the pilot. According to another passenger, Talley "tore off the door handle" to the cockpit (Plott & Roughton, Jr., 1984, p. 18-A). Talley kept tapping the pilot on the shoulder and tried talking to him but the pilot mostly ignored him, the passenger said.

When the plane landed Talley kept his position behind the pilot's seat. Federal and local authorities moved into the area where the plane was parked, and negotiations began soon after with FBI agents talking to Talley on the radio in the plane. About three hours after the plane landed, three trays of sandwiches, apples and milk were rolled to the plane on Talley's demand. A few moments later, Tia Weaver, the co-pilot left the plane. Less than an hour after that Talley walked out of the plane and surrendered. The picture on the front page of The Atlanta Constitution (November 30, 1984) carries a caption stating "FBI agents wrestle suspect Judson Dean Talley to ground at Hartsfield Airport Thursday."

Lawrence T. York of the Atlanta FBI office said that Talley had threatened to blow up the plane. Police marksmen had surrounded the plane, and even practiced an assault on an identical aircraft. A subsequent search of the plane revealed no explosives. State officials said Talley had been released just a day before from an Augusta mental

hospital where he had spent four days getting treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. Mrs. Sally Talley, Judson's grandmother, said that her grandson was taken to an Athens hospital the previous Sunday by his girlfriend, and was later taken by his mother to the Augusta Regional Hospital. Sally Talley told newsmen that her grandson lived at her house sometimes, and that his parents had been divorced for ten years.

One of Talley's first demands was that he speak to Tina Barron, a state employee whose niece Talley had known on a casual and social basis. Tina Barron was the only person he knew in Atlanta and he asked for her, said a police official. Ms. Barron was taken to the airport and she spoke to Talley three times over a period of two and a half hours. She assured Talley that people cared for him and that he would receive any help he needed. This was in response to Talley's complaint that "he needed help and nobody would help him" (November 30, 1984, p. 1-A).

The FBI led Talley away in handcuffs and he was lodged in the Douglas County Jail awaiting arraignment the next day on federal charges of aircraft piracy and interfering with an aircraft crew. If convicted of both, Talley could have faced a maximum of 40 years in jail.

The next day, a federal magistrate ordered psychiatric tests for Talley while he was being held in the Douglas County Jail. An assistant U.S. attorney said he would ask

the magistrate that Talley be sent to a federal prison in either Lexington, Kentucky, or Springfield, Missouri, for extra tests.

Appearing before the magistrate, Talley was described as being "cocky but edgy" (Hopkins, 1984, p. 1-A), and that he insisted on speaking for himself. However, the magistrate appointed a lawyer from the federal defender program to represent Talley temporarily. Talley told his lawyer that the police did not allow him to bring a newspaper or his Bible into the courtroom.

Mrs. Wilson, Talley's mother said that she warned her son three weeks before the hijacking incident that "he was a time bomb waiting to go off" (Hopkins, 1984, p. 16-A). She told reporters that her son had a traumatic experience while serving in the Marines in Hawaii, and that he had not received an honorable discharge from the Marines. Police said that Talley was on probation for "multiple DUI offenses" in Athens.

Ms. Barron, the woman who talked to Talley during the hostage incident, said that her niece told her that the previous week Talley had drunk heavily in her apartment and thrown gasoline into an open fireplace burning his hands slightly. He had showed the girl and her friend some dynamite he had in a bag.

Summary and analysis. One of the first things we should note is that Talley released all the passengers

almost immediately after the plane landed in Atlanta. In fact, we cannot be even sure that he tried to hold them as hostages. The newspaper report is not clear on this aspect. It is just reported that the passengers left the plane unharmed. Ordinarily, it might be expected that a man serious about getting his demands met would have tried to hold on to as many bargaining chips as he could muster: it seems in this situation the hostage taker is not keen on such a bargaining strategy.

Second in importance are the demands that the hostage taker makes. Talley demands food, a friend's aunt with whom he wishes to talk, and psychiatric help. None of these are demands that can be perceived as further complicating the hostage situation. They also do not threaten the lives of the hostages or the hostage taker, though the claim that he has a bomb in his possession may be seen as problematic. If, however, he did not claim that he had a bomb or a gun in his possession, the police could have easily stormed the plane and taken Talley prisoner. Thus, we can conclude that all of Talley's demands were fairly easy to meet.

Third in importance is the threat that Talley makes. He says that he would blow up the plane if his demands are not met. But his demands are easy to meet, and so his threat can be estimated as less than serious. Moreover, there's no evidence from the security check that he went through that he might be carrying any firearms or

explosives. That indeed he might have explosives on him is a possibility because of his service in the Marine Corps, and that he might have had some dynamite in his possession before is confirmed by his girlfriend the next day. If the police had that information the day of the incident, they might have believed more strongly that Talley might be carrying some such material with him.

Fourth in importance to consider is the relative youth of the hijacker. He was not yet 21 when he hijacked the plane. According to the newspaper reports, he would have turned 21 three days after the incident. However, the police could have been wary of his Marine Corps experience, and discounted his youth.

Finally, what needs to be taken into context is the stage or setting for this drama. The Hartsfield International Airport is the second busiest airport in the country, and police, FBI, and other security reinforcements would have been in place within minutes to deal with the situation. A hijacker/hostage taker in such a situation would be confronting one of the most powerful combined police forces in the nation, and he would be doing that in the glare of big city media attention.

If we take all these points into consideration, it is easy to conclude that Talley had a lot of individual power to counter the ideological and institutional power of the police.

Descriptive Analysis

Once again, I am not going to list the sequence of utterances between the various actors involved in the incident because of the numerous short exchanges and interruptions that characterize the whole negotiation.

The transcript begins with Talley cursing, and asking the police negotiator to send "the fuckin' steak and eggs" (#0001). Talley seems to be exasperated, delirious and in a foul mood for he continues to curse and berate the FBI negotiator, Frank. He tells Frank that he's not dealing with "your average hijacker" (#0003). Captain Gill confirms that Talley wants food to be delivered, and he tells Frank to call his wife and his copilot's husband and tell them everything's okay (#0012). He also tells Frank that the plane is running low on battery power and needs some electrical hookup to enable good radio contact (#0018).

Frank tells Talley that he will send the food in exchange for Tia, the copilot (#0024). Talley, parodying the Allstate Insurance television advertisement, says Tia is in "good hands," complains that he's "pissed off" and that he is also hungry (#0025).

The next few exchanges are between Frank and Captain Gill about getting power hooked up to the plane, and about the radio not working well. This goes on for some time, and Talley once again exasperatedly joins the conversation and tells Frank that if he can't get the radio connection set up

properly to "call AT&T" (#0063). It's 1:35 p.m. by then, and two hours since the plane landed in Atlanta, and Talley tells Frank that he can sit around for a longer time without food than his hostages, and he first wants to talk to Tina. He complains that he's sitting in the "blind" and all that he can hear is jets taking off (#0079).

When Frank asks Talley to hang tight and trust him, Talley becomes impatient, says he's getting tired of sitting around, and wants to know what is being done about getting Tina to the airport. He sarcastically tells Frank that Tina works for Governor "Joe Buttonheads" and that Frank better get her soon (#0087). He shouts at Frank saying "you keep fuckin' bullshittin', you're pissing me off" (#0089).

Talley tells Frank that he'll not have the food brought in unless he gets to talk to Tina. He also volunteers to let the hostages go when he talks to Tina (#0095). Frank wonders what would happen if Tina refuses to go on board and talk to Talley, and Talley implies that dire consequences may follow (#0101).

Frank wants to know how the bomb that Talley is carrying works, and Talley says a 120 degree turn and 140 degree Fahrenheit would set the dynamite off (#0103). He tells Frank that he would not hurt Tina if she came on board the plane (#0108), and that it is a "shame that someone who has the drug rehab problem has to go to such extremes" (#0110).

When Frank asks Talley to trust him, he responds saying "I can't trust anything I don't see" (#0114). Frank repeats that he needs information about whether Tina knows Talley (#0121), and Talley responds that if Tina refuses to talk to him he would like to speak to his mother, Carole Wilson (#0122). Frank's queries bothers Talley, and he angrily responds that he's getting "pissed off" and that he is "willing to die so that people my age can live a more abundant life" (#0136).

When Frank contacts the plane again he says he wants to convey "some great news" to Talley (#0144), and when the captain responds for Talley, Frank threatens that "put him on or else I'm not gonna even talk to anybody" (#0146). When Talley responds, Frank tells him that Tina has arrived but she doesn't want to come on the plane (#0152), and this exchange leads to another round of threats by Talley (#0155). Talley asks that he be allowed to speak to Tina on the radio (#0163) and further tells Frank that he's "tired of you bullshittin' me Frank" (#0165). When Frank responds "you got to trust me son" (#0168), Talley replies that "I have distrust in my whole United States Government" (#0169).

When Frank asks for details of Talley's military service, he responds with the necessary information but also warns that if Frank kept asking him such questions "you're gonna divulge classified information across the airwaves and they, the, uh, commies are gonna pick 'em up" (#0175).

When Frank persists in asking for more information, especially about the rehabilitation program, Talley explodes, "Big fuckin' deal. Why do you keep lying to me? I'm tired of you lying to me Frank, come on, be for real" (#0179). Not making the progress he wishes to make in the interaction, Frank tells Talley he'll have Tina there in minutes, and then Talley could "see what type of integrity that we're talking about. This is the FBI talking to you Judson..." (#0187).

While Frank tries to create the impression that trust has been established between him and Talley (#0189), the latter perceives activities around him that contradict the former's claims (#0192). So, he angrily calls off saying that Frank can carry on the talk with the pilot until Tina talks to him. But he begins talking to Frank again and tells him that everyone is getting edgy, and that he would feel reassured if Tina came. If she didn't he might die on the airplane (#0199).

A few exchanges later, during which Talley promises that he'll let people go and surrender if only he can talk to Tina, he's still met with Frank's delaying tactics, and responds in anger and desperation (#0210). Talley then leaves it to the captain to be "arbitrator" (#0212), but when Frank repeats his old line that Tina is somewhere in the airport Talley curses him, accuses him of sending

"common propaganda" (#0220), and tells im that he's merely negotiating for time (#0223).

Still later, and without there being any progress in the negotiation, Talley explodes in anger (#0236), then exasperatedly asks for food (#0239), and petulantly tells Frank, "I'm gonna sit here and I'm gonna keep shouting. I'm not gonna give you a deadline, you decide when the deadline is" (#0245).

Frank tells Talley that food is on the way, and when the captain asks whether it's coming on "the yellow truck or what?" (#0254), Frank says he doesn't know. Talley replies saying that he wanted the food brought out on a specific truck, and that "if you cannot meet that, all I'm asking for and that is my basic needs, as in Maslow's theory, food, shelter, and clothing. If you can't send it out, if you gotta get your FBI men on a truck to try to get on this goddamn plane, then send them on" (#0258).

There's more similar exchange with Talley complaining and Frank prevaricating, and finally Frank telling Talley that he will get Tina to talk on the radio (#0277). Tina does finally get on the radio (#0288), and Talley responds, "I'm listening to ya Tina baby" (#0291). He tells her that all he wants is help, that he had tried to send a "congressional letter" but "they had refused to accept it" and that he had exhausted all means of getting help (#0293).

The exchange is limited to just one turn, and Frank comes on to ask Talley about the bomb (#0302). It is Talley's turn to "bullshit" as he tells Frank that "I'm not allowed to divulge that under... the nuclear war act... established in 1951... I apologize for... it but it's classified material. I haven't seen you, I haven't seen your access card, I don't know you have access to that bomb" (#0303); and further, when Frank queries how the bomb works, he tells him "I want you to read off plan 5500. Sit down and if you can get access to that document of plan 5500, sit down and read it, and then you will find out how things work" (#0307).

When Frank asks Talley to speak a little slowly (#0310), Talley takes out his ire against Frank telling him "that's your problem, obviously you were trained in classified material and you were trained in central intelligence agency type of deals. Obviously, you should be able to take and listen to what I say, take my orders and act on them. If you can't, you don't deserve to be with the FBI, you should be fuckin' sweeping the fl... street gutter, let's face it" (#0311).

After a little more such bizarre conversation, Frank comes on to say that copilot Tia's husband has heart problems and that he is very concerned about his wife (#0318). Tia tells him to tell Ted that she's okay but a little scared (#0319). When Frank asks Talley whether he heard

about Ted's heart problem, Talley replies that he too has a heart problem (#0325), and that Tia has not told any such thing about her husband. Frank asks whether Talley would allow Tia to talk to her husband, and Talley agrees.

The captain tells Frank that if he could tell Tina that if she could come out and talk to Talley "this whole thing would be over in five minutes" (#0335), and he repeats the message a little later (#0339). At this point Frank takes a break, and a new negotiator, Margo, comes on (#0346) but only briefly.

When Frank asks how things are (#0351), Talley tells him, "I'm on the inside, you on the outside looking in. You tell me how we're doin' Frank" (#0352). Frank calls Talley as "Judson," and Talley angrily tells him that he has asked him a "thousand times" to call him Dean or Talley (#0354). The next few exchanges are about the "bomb," and Talley gives a rather fairly detailed description of the phantom bomb (#0356). He also tells that there are 50 more dynamite sticks in the hold of the plane (#0362), and when Frank wants to confirm that, Talley leads him on another wild goose chase.

There is a quick change in action when Frank asks Talley that Tia be let off the plane in return for Tina talking to him (#0367), and Talley quickly agrees (#0368). He lets Tia go, and then asks Frank what he is going to do in turn for him. Talley tells Frank that he'll throw the

bag carrying the "bomb" out of the window if only his demands are met (#0379). The captain confirms that Talley would throw the bag out if Tina is brought in front of the plane where Talley could see her (#0381). The captain tells Frank that he would talk to Talley "so we don't have to talk back and forth" (#0388).

When Frank repeats that he wants to know why Talley wants to see Tina (#0395), Talley angrily replies, "I'm waiting to recognize someone that I fuckin' know. If you can't understand that, you can't understand my fuckin' demands. I'm tired of fuckin' dealing with you, okay, Goddammit" (#0398). Frank softens down, and the captain repeats why exactly Talley wants to see Tina (#0400). But when Frank says he will have to consult with his superiors about it, Talley responds that "...all bargain has been stopped. You've got my goddamm demands. All communications are stopped" (#0405).

Frank comes on back and asks that the captain and Talley walk down separately after Talley has seen Tina (#0410), and Talley responds that he will walk out "arm in arm" with the captain (#0411). Frank dithers, and Talley once again bursts out in anger. The captain comes on and tells Frank that "since I'm right here with him I can guarantee you that, if you just put her out in front of the truck and uh, we both walk off and leave the bag on, nothing's gonna happen" (#0418).

Frank says things can't be worked out so easily, and Talley airs old complaints and some new ones (#0420), threatens to "fuck" Frank up with his Uzi, and berates Frank about taking so long to get Tina: "...four fuckin' hours to do somethin' like this, that's the reason our government's in control with a bunch of fuckheads like you..." (#0426). Frank tells Captain Gill that he's concerned about everyone getting off the plane safely (#0431), which leads to another Talley outburst (#0449), to Frank's seeking a little more time to resolve the matter (#0453), and to yet another invective-filled outburst by Talley (#0454). Attempts by Frank to calm Talley down is unsuccessful as Talley observes a number of vehicles pulling up closer and closer to the airplane and he fears an assault on the plane soon (#0460).

Frank takes a break, and Margo begins negotiations (#0462) repeating that they are all working to resolve the situation without anyone getting hurt (#0464). Talley demands a pack of Marlboro cigarettes and says he's willing to pay for them (#0468). Talley tells Margo to tell Frank to approach the plane because he, Talley, is sick of bargaining (#0477), and that there's only 30 minutes more for them to resolve the situation. Margo tries to reassure him and Talley tells him that he wants "to hear the truth. I don't wanna hear a bunch of fuckin' computer cases on this, okay?" (#0481). He also wants to know what's happening to

his request to see his mother (#0483), and threatens to blow up the plane in 27 minutes and 25 seconds (#0485).

With Margo asking for more time (#0491) because he has to jump a lot of hoops to get Talley's requests met (#0493), and telling Talley that somethings were delayed because a wire came off his headset (#0497), Talley responds in exasperation, "Amazing, I'm glad that we don't have a war or anything goin' on because during a major crisis you all would fuck up. Just think, a wire came off with Frank, uh, you all pullin' that bullshit on me again... come on, two wires don't break in a row in a crisis. If it does, you all are fuckin' up. You all are dealin' with somebody's lives here..." (#0498).

Margo complains that Talley is making him a little nervous with the language he's using (#0499), and Talley tells him that he's also nervous because of all the movement of vehicles around the plane (#0500). Margo tells Talley to check his headset wires again because there's a lot of static, and Talley responds in frustration, "...tell me that wires are failin', wires are failin', the plane is gonna fall... I don't like that" (#0506). He airs more doubts about what actually the police may be up to by complaining, "...you all decided our fate, you all want him to walk off the plane first, you all waanna put a bullet in my head. I know exactly what you all want to do" (#0510).

Frank comes back and asks if it's okay if Talley speaks only to Tina before the deadline and not also to his mother (#0517), and Margo comes back to inform that Tina would come talk in just a few minutes (#0525). Talley responds that there's only 13 minutes left, and after that "this fuckin' plane may blow up" (#0526), and berates Margo saying "I see why Ronald Reagan fired all the air traffic controllers... it's understandable why we ever went to war. Right now, we'd be in a world of shit with people like you all runnin' the towers" (#0528). With this diatribe Talley effectively silences Margo.

Tina comes on the radio (#0538) and assures "everything's gonna be okay" (#0542), that she has "contacts in politics" and would get any help Talley needed (#0544). Tina tells him to get off the plane and that she'll take care of him, and that he has to trust her (#0560). The last utterance is from Captai Gill who says that Talley is off the airplane (#0561).

Summary and analysis. Obviously, the most interesting and colorful of utterances in this hostage situation are those of Talley who mocks, berates, curses, uses biting sarcasm, and any other verbal tool he can use to get the police to do something about his request. He is articulate and he is impatient, and the police negotiators' responses are dull, stodgy, and repetitive. From newspaper accounts we know that they were preparing to storm the plane, and the

indication of such a plan is in the prevarication of police talk and the suspicion voiced by Talley about vehicles moving all around the parked plane.

Talley uses a strategy of verbal assault to get his demands. This is the only power he has as an individual. He uses his Marine Corps background to befuddle the police about the nature of the bomb he is supposedly carrying. His demands are simple and non-threatening, and the pilot, more than once, talks in support of Talley's request. The pilot is even willing to get off the plane "arm-in-arm" with Talley.

The police claim that Ms. Barron (Tina) was responsible for talking Talley out of the plane is a half-truth. It was what Talley demanded, and the talk he has with Tina is almost perfunctory. The police claim that Ms. Barron was the aunt of Talley's girlfriend, and that she was the only one he knew in Atlanta also seems rather fishy. Why doesn't Talley mention his girlfriend? Why, if he had met Tina only once, did Talley address her as "baby"? Why, after allowing Tina to talk briefly with Talley, and he seemed willing to give up, the police revert to their old strategy of playing cat and mouse? One reason could be that they really feared Talley had some contraption on the plane that would blow it up, and they wanted to make sure everyone got off safely. This is an example of the inefficient and slow movement and response by the exercisers of institutional power. The

hostage drama was played out for four hours when the whole incident might have been resolved the first time that Tina talked to Talley, half-way (#0288) through the four hour episode.

What other reasons could there be for the police to delay the resolution of the hostage situation?

There is no mention in the newspaper reports of police doubts, their fear for the safety of the two pilots, nor the reason/s for having Tina speak thrice (only twice according to my count in the transcript) to Talley. In fact, Tia, the co-pilot is released very soon (#0368) after Talley talks to Tina for the first time, and Tina barely has one turn in the conversation before she is cut off! All these are indications that the police had other motives for delaying the resolution -- motives that are not evident in their recounting of the event to the newspapers, nor in their utterances transcribed from the audiotape. With the information I have, it would be hazardous to speculate that the police might have used this situation as a fire-drill: an event where they could play out their preparedness for a more serious event. This preparedness included the action plan for storming the plane, and in fact, the actual storming of a dummy plane, and the testing of the verbal and negotiation skills of their police agents.

Stretching the negotiations out to four hours, whether deliberate or unplanned got the media attention, and thus

the next day's headlines. The last hijacking of a plane to Hartsfield was in 1977, seven years before this incident, and this incident could have come as a publicity bonanza for "good police work." If this sort of speculation is even only half correct, we see here the display of ideological power of the police: the police ability to manipulate "reality," their ability to label situations, and their control over information.

The police negotiators, once in charge of the negotiations, do not take kindly to others' reading of the situation nor to their suggestions for action or resolution of the problem. After a rather tedious and directionless dialogue that Frank has with Talley, and Talley sulks off, the Captain responds to one of Frank's request to talk to Talley this way:

#0145: Okay, he can hear every word you say.

To which Frank responds bluntly and threateningly:

#0146: I gotta talk to him Captain. Put him on or else I'm not gonna even talk to anybody. I wanna talk to him...

Yet another time, the Captain gives his view of what would happen if Tina came to talk to Talley:

#0335: ...I can uh, pretty much assure the, the girl in there, uh Tina, that uh, if she would come out here and talk to him this whole thing would be over in five minutes.

What is Frank's response to this? There is none! One

realizes here how the world of the police negotiators is controlled by their own agenda, and their own reading of the situation. What might have been resolved quickly, and with very little cost, is dragged on for four hours, with the SWAT in place and practicing assaults on a dummy plane, and with a predictably high cost in terms of resources -- men, material, and money.

Fantasy Theme Analysis

Fantasy themes and rhetorical visions of the police.

Even though two police negotiators, Frank and Margo, interact with Talley, it is Frank who does more than 90 percent of the talking to Talley, and I will therefore focus exclusively on Frank's utterances. As with the previous two transcripts, I will provide a representative sample of utterances dealing with the setting, actors, and action, and then interpret those in terms of the power they express.

Setting. Following are some utterances that indicate the police reading of the situation:

#0024: I want you to know that... I have everything all set to go. What I'd like you to do is to let... Tia walk out of the plane, and I'll bring the shipment right over to you right now, okay?

The police see this as a bargaining situation where food would be shipped for the release of the co-pilot, Tia. The police do not give away anything unless in exchange for something. The rationale is that this will uild an

atmosphere of mutual bargaining leading to trust. However, all such police bargaining moves may be seen as a steady chipping away of the power of the hostage taker.

#0086: Judson, now listen to me. I've done everything I can to help you right now, and I'm trying to get you some food. All I want you to do is to hang tight, trust me, that's all you have to do. We're gonna get Tina here, right now she's en route to the airport, okay?

#0121: I have to know these things before I can send this lady aboard. I don't know whether you know her or she knows you or what. That's why I'm asking these questions.

The accumulation of information on the hostage taker is said to enable the police team to plan for contingencies. Such an exercise is an indication of the police quest for control and certainty. The belief here is that more information the police have is better, and a corollary to this of course is that less information the hostage taker has more control the police can exercise. This is a recurring fantasy theme in hostage negotiations, and the above examples are an indication of such a theme.

#0156: Okay, well here's what we're gonna do, we're gonna get... Tina in a position so that you can observe her from the plane... that's the first thing that we're gonna do, and from there we'll... see what happens. We can work this other thing out, okay Judson?

#0187: Just a few more... minutes, I'll have her here, and then you'll... see what type of integrity that we're talkin' about. This is the FBI talkin' to you Judson. I've been talkin' to you now for about an hour, and I understand what you're going through. I'm trying to work the thing out for you, for both of us, for everybody. I don't want anybody to get hurt at this thing, okay?

#0196: ...I wanted to talk to you anyway. I know that you realize that this is probably the busiest airport in the nation, and it takes time to get her here, but she's coming. I have been assured that she's en route right now, okay. She is at the airport. We're trying to get her to this location.

#0211: Okay, I had just talked to her on the... phone. I had just located her, I talked to her, and she agreed to come to the airport, and she's en route right now to the airport, that's all I can tell you...

All of the above utterances provide us clues to the working of the police mind. The bluster, the delaying tactics, and the prevarications are all part of the police fantasy that they can exercise control over the flow of events. Thus, we have the hostage taker becoming hostage to the police plan. The hostage taker doesn't know what is happening outside, and is thus beholden to the police for whatever description of the events taking place.

#0259: There is no FBI men on the thing. All we gonna do is bring the food out to you just as you requested.

With all the vehicles moving around the parked plane in a suspicious and threatening manner, Talley wonders what's happening, and Frank claims that nothing devious is being planned or executed. Here too, the hostage taker has to rely on police assurances about the nature of the activity.

#0314: ...tell me about the caps that are on that bomb, and that'll help me out a great deal if you could.

#0363: You're tellin' me you have fifty more sticks of dynamite in the hold of the plane?

Frank is very concerned about the "bomb" that Talley is supposedly carrying. A lot of time is spent trying to learn about the details of this phantom bomb. Of course, the police do not know whether Talley is lying or not, but it is also the inefficiency of their system that they ignore all the relational messages that are being sent, and focus on the content. The content of the messages keeps changing from time to time, and yet the police persist in pursuing that grail.

#0401: ...just stand by for a minute because I have to consult with my superiors. I can't make this decision. Just hold on for a second and... we'll see what happens, okay Captain?

#0419: ...Captain, because... we're discussing the matter right now, there's a lot to be taken into

consideration... just stand by... we're working on...

#0429: Okay... Captain, I'm sure tat you can understand our position... I'm very concerned about Dean, I'm very concerned about yourself, and... all that we're trying to... I've just been told that we're getting... doctors here and help will be available for him when he comes off the plane, and this is really what I was concerned about...

Frank ignores all that the Captain says and conveys, and is intent on telling the Captain how he should look at the situation. The situation as perceived by the police is more important than the one observed by the Captain. Matters are delayed because superiors have to be informed and their advice taken; they are delayed because there are numerous experts studying the situation and giving advice as to how to proceed, and so on. The police fantasy that a systematic attempt to understand the situation, and then resolve it according to set procedures, is a powerful indicator of the institutional power they command and exercise.

Actors. Following is a set of utterances by Agent Frank that reflect his characterization of the actors involved in this hostage drama:

#0115: I trust you. I haven't seen you, but I know you're an intelligent guy, you're smart, and I'm sure that we can work together on the thing. All I ask you to do is to trust me...

#0304: That's a good point Judson, you're always thinking my man, that's very good...

#0308: Okay, very good. You're the bomb expert...

These remarks are to be seen more as attempts to increase relational power of the hostage taker than as true indicants of the police assessment of the hostage taker. By praising Talley, and calling him an expert, Frank seeks to enhance Talley's estimation of himself, and to underplay his own expertise.

#0139: Well let me tell you this, I'm with the FBI, all you have to do is to trust me. I won't lie to you at all Judson...

The image of the FBI as a powerful and trustworthy agency is something that a Marine could relate to and accept. More important to note is the self-assessment of Frank. The FBI, to him, conveys a picture of a powerful and professional agency. When he says "trust me," he is conveying the idea that the FBI and its officers know how to take care of things. FBI agents are, to him, trustworthy people who do not lie. Would such a "fantasy theme" be effective in dealings with hostage takers like Talley? He ignores all such claims, and we can say the insistence on conveying a particular institutional image, and therefore of power, can be ineffective.

#0431: Okay Captain, I appreciate your hanging in there with us because I'm sure that you understand our problem...

The captain of the plane is perceived as a comrade-in-arms. This particular pilot clearly might have had problems perceiving himself as one because all his suggestions, and his assessment of the situation are ignored by the FBI. How he might have understood the problems of the FBI is not clear, but the captain's silence on the issue does convey to me the idea that he kept his counsel and wisely kept quiet. However, his repeated efforts to tell Frank that a particular course of action would lead to a quick resolution of the problem is a clear indicant that he thought the FBI was unnecessarily prolonging the crisis. Frank's quest to get the captain's support indirectly undermines or reduces the power of the hostage taker, both individual and relational.

Action. Finally, I have a set of utterances that indicate to us how the police perceive the action:

#0032: Okay, I want you to know that we're hooking the power up right now. We can't give up the time limit on this thing. We're trying to do the best we can...

#0072: ...Because the first thing I want him to know is that I promised him that I would get the power back, right? I've done that...

As the plane is parked on the tarmac and the pilots and Talley seek to talk to Frank, their radio connection gets weak, and they suggest that the police hook up an additional power supply to the plane. Forty utterances later we have a confirmation from Frank that power supply is renewed, and

that he has therefore fulfilled the first promise. We can read in the first utterance Frank's rejection of any deadline. Such a rejection is a blow to the hostage taker's power. Deadlines provide the person who lays one a clear advantage of power. However, if he cannot carry out his threat, or if his deadline is rejected, such a person ends up less powerful than he was before laying the deadline.

#0104: We're really not negotiating. You haven't given me anything. I'm the one who's giving up everything Judson. I'm trying to get the girl here. She's on her way...

#0457: She's in Athens as you very well know, and she's on her way here. We're trying to bring her here by... helicopter as I've told you... I'm trying to work on one demand at a time...

The first utterance is an example of the police's power to describe situations in a manner of their choosing. At that point in the interaction Talley has had none of his demands met, the demands being for food and to see and talk to Tina. Yet, Frank frames the situation in such a way that it is Talley is the one who is not cooperating. Talley has nothing to give in exchange except the pilots.

Frank's insistence that the police are doing their best in getting Tina, and Talley's mother Carole to the airport belies the actual situation. At various stages of the negotiation Frank contradicts himself about where actually

Tina is -- on the way to the airport, just then contacted over phone, in the airport, in the airport and talked over the phone, with him at the airport, and so on -- and thus his protestations that the police are trying their best to get and Tina and Carole to the airport must've frustrated and angered Talley more than reassured him. Such contradictory messages and delaying tactics surely did not contribute to enhancing the relational power of the hostage taker, nor did they increase the trustworthiness of the police.

#0189: I understand you... I've talked to you for a... long time. I feel like we've established a rapport with each other, and a bond of trust with each other...

This directly contradicts Talley's comments throughout the negotiation process how he distrusts Frank and all of what he represents. Thus, we can interpret Frank's comments as nothing more than perfunctory police talk rather than a representation of reality in any fashion.

Rhetorical visions of the police. The rhetorical visions of the police are captured less in their words than in the space/time they are strung out: what I mean is that the police are not explicit about most things. Their visions are revealed more in their questions, and how many times and when they are asked than in their answers. Thus a mere summing up of their setting, actor, and action themes may not give us the necessary tools to unearth their rhetorical visions.

Given the police insistence on knowing about the phantom bomb, coupled with their insistence on ignoring the simple demands of the hostage taker and the suggestions of the captain, we can fathom that the rhetorical vision most powerful in the minds of the police negotiators would be that of a crazed Marine bent on some creative havoc. They ignore his myriad pleas for help till such time they make sense of his sparse and deceptive revelations about the phantom bomb.

The other powerful rhetorical vision is that the police know best. This vision ties in with their ideological and institutional agendas. We know from newspaper reports that the SWAT team practiced assault and capture maneuvers on a dummy plane, and in pursuing such a tactic the police negotiators should've been instructed to ignore the pleas of the hostage taker and the advice of the pilot till such time the SWAT team was ready with their maneuvers. These two rhetorical visions best sum up the exercise of ideological and institutional power by the police.

Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage Taker

Fantasy themes of the hostage taker. Judson Dean Talley is a loquacious hijacker/hostage taker, and I don't have the difficulties deciphering his fantasy themes/rhetorical visions that I did with Hannan's talk in the previous analysis. Following is a careful selection of utterances that

represent Talley's setting, actor, and action themes. From them I will interpret the rhetorical visions of Talley.

Setting. The utterances below represent to us how Talley perceived the situation he was trapped in. As before, I have had some difficulty in deciding whether a particular utterance is representative of the setting or of the action. Given that difficulty, I have, in cases where I could not decide, chosen to represent it as a description of the setting rather than the action.

#0025: ...Okay, I did not want to, I'm not letting anyone go, besides, uh, we're gonna stay here. You're not talking me out of the two people who are in the plane with me. I've established communications with them. I'm gonna break communications with you at this point. They know what my demands are, and until they're met I'm just gonna sit here. 10-4. I'm gettin' a little pissed off, I'm a little hungry. 10-4.

Talley has taken the least number of hostages he could, and he is reluctant to let them go without having his demands met. He believes that he has established some rapport with his hostages, and is quite confident about expressing that feeling to the police. This belief gives him a degree of individual and relational power which he uses with some bravado against the police.

#0063: Communication is gettin' worse and worse, and, uh, I realize it may not be your fault, and I'm very aware of

the fact that the pilot and co-pilot are doing all they can do. Damn it, if you can't get communications established, call AT&T. 10-4.

Since the nature of his demands are simple and the number of demands he makes are few, and since he believes that he has established some trust with the pilots, Talley exercises a lot of freedom in the way he interacts with the police. He curses them, he berates them, he mocks them, and he uses humor to humor himself and to castigate the police. "Call AT&T" is only one of the many sarcastic remarks he directs at the police. I don't think he adopted this conversational style as a deliberate strategy, but he uses it frequently. This is a clear expression of individual power aimed less at undermining institutional power but used more as a cudgel to pressurize the police to take action.

#0067: ...11:35 was when we landed. It is now 1:35, the clock is running. Find Tina, find someone who's willing to talk to me, okay...

#0079: Frank, this is Dean, uh, I've been sitting here and I've been waiting and waiting and waiting. I've talked to no one (except) you, your, two of your uh, hostage arbitrators for the Federal (Bureau) of Investigation or either the Federal Aviation Administration. Now I've told you my demands. I told you what I want. I wanna talk to Tina, no food, no nothing. I can sit here and I can last longer than my hostages can.

Nothing, I wouldn't do nothing until my demands are met. Now tell me where Tina is, and you tell me what you're doing to get her here. You tell me what you're doing to help me, and I'll be more than willing to help you, but, but I'm sitting here in the blind, and I'm in the blind, and all I hear is jets taking off.

#0095: The food will not be brought without Tina.... will release all hostages when talk to Tina. Tina is my ticket off this plane. I'll talk to Tina. Anybody else, refuse...

The three utterances above represent to us and to the police what exactly Talley feels about the situation and what exactly he wants. To cast it in the language of a fantasy theme, all matters would be resolved quickly for Talley if only Tina comes and takes care of him. All that the police need to do to help him is find Tina for him.

Another theme is that he is not in control of the situation. He is inside a plane, and he doesn't know what is happening. He is wary of what is happening outside, and perceives that he is vulnerable. To counter this vulnerability he keeps his two hostages, or yet, he can regain his confidence if Tina would come and talk to him.

#0103: ...I'll tell you exactly how my bomb works: a 120 degree is what it takes to set off the electronical control on it, 140 degree fahrenheit is what it takes to set off the dynamite. Now, if you want that on your

hands then live with it; if you don't, get me some fuckin' help. I'm tired of negotiating with you...

#0317: Like a solar cell, nothin' more than a battery operated... If I take and I stick to my heart a battery operated solar cell, then it goes down to my back, and it goes through my leg, and when it touches my dynamite, then...

#0362: Frank, I'm telling you somebody gave me the explosives to blow this fuckin' plane up if I want to. I've got fifty more sticks in the hold.

#0364: Negatory. I have them hidden somewhere. I've only got five sticks in my bag, only, well as a matter of fact I've only got three. I left two in my motel room.

#0366: All I do is remove the battery from myself, keep it out of my reach. Take the battery, chuck it out the fuckin' window, whatever I want to do with it, just keep it away from the bomb, take and pull the fuses out of the end of the dynamite and walk off the plane... it's not gonna explode unless it has somethin' causing it to explode, it's very powerful though.

The more the police ask him about his bomb the more creative Talley becomes in describing it. That these fantasies could be so well developed is because of his training as a Marine. Thus he puts to effective use the knowledge he has gained about explosives to befuddle the police negotiators. But by doing this he is running the risk of the police taking him

too seriously, seriously enough to jeopardize his life.

While he exercises individual power by graphically describing his bomb, he loses power because the police could then launch an assault to "defuse" the bomb, and in the process injure him or even kill him.

#0192: Four to my right, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, there's one leaving, to my (right), to my left. That's just my front side. I don't know what you got on the back side. I can only see what I can see in front of me. I don't have eyes in the back of this plane...

#0500: I'm sorry if I'm makin' you a little nervous... makin' me a little nervous with these fuckin' gate cars around here. You keep runnin' um over here... I see one, I see a fire truck, I see another firetruck, I see a white truck, I see a blue truck, I see a white truck, I see a white truck and a white truck, I see a white car and a white car, two yellow cars, another car behind it, I see the white car, I see three pink cars, another pink car, I look to my right and I see another safety car...

As a Marine, Talley is trained to watch out for danger and to interpret the movement of people and objects surrounding him. We can realize how perceptive he was when we read in the newspaper accounts about police preparation to launch an assault on the plane. This fantasy theme that the police

are readying to do something in preparation to apprehend him or disarm him is a recurring one in this interaction. This is a clear indication of the institutional power of the police. However, Talley's reading of the situation and his verbalization of his suspicions would've made the police more concerned about the success of an assault on the plane.

#0347: Number one stepped out. That's two negotiators down, you're the third. Come on Margo, I'm gonna let you talk to the the co-pilot. I'm gonna let you know everything's okay on flight 1962.

When Frank takes a break, another FBI agent, Margo continues the negotiation. There's no indication in the transcript about who the first negotiator was. Talley's response to these changes is to continue his mocking banter, and cursing and complaining. By responding to Margo the way he does, Talley re-establishes his power. Margo is not able to change the pattern of exchanges, and that indicates the continuing influence of Talley's verbal assault on the police agents.

#0352: You tell me, I'm on the inside, you on the outside lookin' in. You tell me how we're doin' Frank... everyone's happy, uh, we're sitting here, I've had me a couple, I've had me two half sandwiches, the pilot drank his, I witness, 13WMAZTB Maken Milk, 8 oz. The co-pilot has to use rest room. She's more than welcome to go use the rest room anytime she wats to...

With this particular type of banter Talley exercises a fair amount of control over the interaction. Talley enjoys talking and cursing, and he has a sense of dark humor. He uses sarcasm effectively. He also establishes a good relationship with his two hostages, especially with the pilot, Captain Gill.

#0371: ...I let all hostages except for one off the plane...

I let the whole damn slue (?). I coulda' taken two kids with me, two... females, and about three males with me to begin with. I let 'em all off except for the pilot and co-pilot off, now I let the co-pilot off due to the fact that her husband is... goin' through coronary problems... Now tell me, what the hell you're gonna do for me?

#0449: I fuckin' met my moral obligations to you and to the fuckin' democratic society we live in, and goddammit I've asked for two fuckin' simple demands and you've not met 'um yet...

#0454: ...I replaced (?) the time at approximately 11:30.

Now it's now 3:15. I'm tired of fuckin' doin'... I'm givin' you to fuckin' 4:00, your fuckin' time's runnin' out buddy, you got 43 fuckin' minutes to... meet my demands. Have my mother standin' out there by that fuckin' thing, and have Tina standin' out there... I'll get off this fuckin' plane, and I'll walk off here with this Captain, otherwise I'll blow the son-of-a-bitch

up. You got it Frank, that's your, that's my fuckin'... you go toward either phones now buddy.

Talley intelligently assesses his own actions as well as those of the police. He has not taken any of the passengers as hostages, and he claims that this is a show of his goodwill. By releasing the passengers without fuss, he has robbed the police of an effective bargaining strategy: other than asking for the release of the pilots, the police don't have anything to put pressure on Talley. Talley, by letting go of the passengers, empowers himself. Again, it would be difficult to speculate whether he did that deliberately; but it is not difficult to state that his individual power was vastly improved by that act.

This enables him to verbally jerk the police around. His use of invectives, his constant swearing, and his description of himself and his demands, enable him to create a fantasy theme of the setting that energize him, build a rapport with the pilot, and establish a degree of control over the bargaining process that is rarely achieved by a hostage taker. However, it should be finally noted that the police do exercise their control over the overall negotiations, but they do it with little finesse and a lot of cost and inefficiency.

Actors. Following are a set of utterances by Talley that represent his perception of the actors involved in the incident:

#0108: Frank, I'm not happy. I won't be happy till Tina gets here. I'm not gonna hurt anyone as I said, if Tina comes aboard the plane, I'm not gonna hurt her, I trust Tina...

#0114: How can I trust you, when I can't see you. I can't trust anything I don't see...

#0169: Frank, I have distrust in my whole United States Government, uh, I've tried to find trust in it... I'm of the opinion that I can't get trusted, and that's why I'm resorting to such tactics...

#0175: I served at Camp H.M. Smith Wyeth, with Commanding General and the Commander in Chief... I worked in the classified material control center...

The above four utterances give us a composite picture of Talley. He is a trained Marine, and despite his mental health problems he is able to keep and exercise his wits about essential things. He is bright and quick, and his outbursts have a quality of controlled irrationality that keeps the police guessing. He uses his Marine credentials effectively, and manages to convey his need for help convincingly. He is suspicious of the police, and he lets them know about his suspicions. He also conveys clearly that he is not intending to hurt anyone.

#0136: ...I'm tired of dealing with you people who are trying to talk me into releasing people. I'm gettin' a little pissed off. The more and more I get pissed off,

the less and less... either of our circumstances, we'll all die. I'm willing to die so that people my age can live a more abundant life.

The more the police delay, the more Talley characterizes himself as an angry and frustrated person. He then uses the opportunity to threaten the police with drastic actions. The fantasy that he is willing to die so that others his age can live better is the only time he casts himself as a hero or martyr. Most of the time though he focuses on his problems and his simple demand that he get to talk to Tina.

#0184: ...why do you keep tellin' me lies? If you can't (produce) what I want you to produce, they why don't you be honest and objective with me and tell me you can't meet my demands...

#0203: ...You've been trained in hostage crisis, hijacking situations, that's your job. I respect you for that Frank, that's what the FBI has trained you to do, just like the Marine Corps trained me to do what I'm doing right now...

#0307: You're the one who works for the Federal... Bureau of Investigation, and it's your responsibility to understand those type of things. It's not my responsibility, the only thing I'm supposed to do is be trained to kill and to do it as fast as I can and to the best of my ability...

#0311: ...that's your problem... obviously you were trained in classified material and you were trained in Central

Intelligence Agency type of deals, obviously you should be able to take and listen to what I say, take my orders and act on them. If you can't, you don't deserve to be with the FBI, you should be fuckin' sweepin' the... street gutter, let's face it.

Talley keeps the police effectively at bay by sounding sufficiently serious about his phantom bomb, and then teasing them about knowledge that they should possess for dealing with such crises. His abuse of Frank is an effective way of venting his frustration about Frank's delaying tactics. He also accuses of Frank of being a liar. With these types of tactics Talley is able to maintain his individual power to an extent, and keep a check on the institutional power of the police.

#0293: I'm just tryin' to get help, Tina... all I want is help, and I'm willin' to let the pilot and the co-pilot go. I'm gonna come off of here if they'll put me into a drug rehab where I can get help. I've tried my best, I tried my best to write a letter. I tried to send a congressional letter yesterday before I left the drug rehab. They refused to accept it... I'm sorry that I have to get to this point that I need help...

When Tina is allowed to speak on the radio with him, Talley tells her about his problem, and how he is forced to take the drastic step of hijacking a plane to focus people's attention on his problem. The fantasy theme here is that he

is alone and sick and that an oppressive and uncaring system is ignoring his pleas for help.

#0377: ...the only person here is me and Barry. Me and Barry are the only people on here. I respect Barry, and I don't want Barry to go up with me...

Barry is Captain Gill, and he and Talley seem to have established enough understanding that they are willing to speak kindly of each other. Talley has thus established his relational power base, and he uses that effectively to argue with the police.

#0426: (Why) does it take you four fuckin' hours to do somethin' like this? That's the reason our government's in control with a bunch of fuck heads like you...

This is yet another instance where Talley bludgeons the police with words. While it does seem four hours is not a long time for the police to resolve a hostage situation, especially at a busy airport like Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport, the reading of the transcript provides good support for Talley's grouse against the police.

#0547: Yes, I trust you Tina. If I didn't trust you I wouldn't have called you to begin with.

Talley expresses his trust in Tina. The fantasy theme here is that of Tina as savior. Not knowing much about Tina's background, nor about her relationship with Talley, it would be difficult to speculate how she got to acquire the mantle

of savior. The police explanation that she was the only person Talley knew in Atlanta, and that's why he wanted to talk to her somehow doesn't ring true.

Action. Following is a representative sample of Talley's utterances on the actions he perceives around him:

#0089: You could establish communication between she and I.

Don't bullshit me, you keep fuckin' bulshittin', you're pissin' me off. The longer you bullshit me, you're pissin' me fucking off.

Talley believes that his demands are so simple that they can be met without much effort by the police. He cannot fathom the mind of the police except that they're trying somehow to pull one over him. He does not ask himself the question as to why he should have hijacked a plane to have those simple demands fulfilled. What drove him to make such a "statement"? The police fantasy themes all revolve round that question, while for Talley that question is answered simply: no one was willing to listen to him unless he made that strong statement. The chasm between these two themes are difficult to bridge, and that drives Talley to scream and shout at the police, and berate them for their tardiness and their suspicious behavior.

#0116: I've given you all the time that you need, I've given you over an hour and a half. You all tried to tell me she was out on her lunch hour. I sat back and I laughed about it. I'm tired of laughing, okay? 10-4.

#0163: Quit lying to me. If you're talking to Tina, put her on the radio with me. She's in no danger if she gets on the radio with me, she's in no danger, repeat, no danger if she gets in radio contact with me.

Why does Talley want to talk to Tina? If we can step into the mind of the police, then we can see the wheels turning and stopping at some label like "inadequate personality," or "depressed individual" (Strentz, 1983, 1986) to describe a person like Talley. Such a label would then allow them to plan ways of dealing with the hostage taker. Their focus will be on strategies taught them in police academies, and the hostage taker's many pleas don't get read as can be by a lay person or by the hostage taker himself. Talley, intelligent as he is, realizes that the police may be wary of letting him talk to Tina. So, he tries to tell them that he's not the kind of person who would use the opportunity to hurt himself or his interactant. Thus, understanding the police mind as he does, Talley possesses the power to try and reshape police reality.

#0199: ...I'm tired of bein' bullshited. I'm looking around and I see everybody gettin' a little edgy, the security's gettin' a little edgy, I'm gettin' a little edgy, and the... more tense it gets the longer we'll wait, the longer it's gonna be to deal with things...

#0218: Frank, you've already told me she was in the airport. You have no proof of it, you haven't seen her, you

haven't established communications with her. You're going on intelligence, intelligence's bum fuckin' idiots... bullshit me if you want to, keep tryin' to bullshit me...

The inconsistencies in police assurances as well as their description of events makes Talley frustrated and angry. He keeps track of Frank's assurances and realizes how he is being lied to, and so gives vent to his grievances. By letting the police know that he knows that they are lying and using delaying tactics he also lets them know that he is an attentive person and cannot be caught by surprise by the police.

#0266: I see one man getting into a yellow truck now. He's stalling, shit, if you all want to bring the food, you all can bring it. If you all want to keep stallin', then keep stallin' Frank, keep stallin' for time because you're buying your own time.

Just as I pointed out when analyzing the utterances depicting the setting, here too I can point out that Talley keeps track of the action around the plane. The movement of vehicles in the vicinity of the plane constitutes clear danger to him, and his fantasy theme here is that the police are getting ready to launch some action to capture him.

#0420: I could use some fuckin' steak and eggs. The only thing you brought me was shitty ham and cheese. I haven't talked to anybody but Tina... but just one

second, you haven't even told me where my mom is. You told me that you were in contact with her, and as soon as you got in touch, contact with her that she was bein' planed this way. I'm tired of you bullshittin' with me frank.

This is further proof that Talley keeps fairly rigorous score, though he might be underestimating the time necessary for the police to get his mother from Athens to Atlanta. By keeping the police on their toes regarding his demands, Talley exercises considerable individual power to counter the power of the police to control and direct the events.

#0559: ...they'd just shoot me.

When Tina pleads that Talley better walk off the plane, he voices the fear that most hostage takers who know the ways of the police give expression to: the police would shoot at him once they see him getting out of the plane. This characterization of the police is a powerful fantasy theme: it indicates that in the minds of those breaking the law and confronting the police, the police are a vindictive force. The police cannot be trusted to not harm the hostage taker, Talley is saying, and this indicates that for all the "relational talk" that the police talk, they have a difficult time getting the hostage taker to trust them.

Rhetorical visions of the hostage taker. Tina is the fantasy woman who is going to rescue him from whatever prison that he is in, and the police are thwarting that

happening: this is the overriding rhetorical vision that Talley projects. Another vision, equally powerful, is that only such a drastically dramatic action as hijacking a plane can make people realize that he needs help.

Many hostage takers, it is claimed, don't even know what their demands are (Holmes, 1989), and the police thus try and guide them through whatever mental blocks impeding the understanding of their problems. This enables the police to build trust, and thus gain the release of the hostages and the surrender of the hostage takers, it is pointed out. In Talley's case the demands are very clear, and he unwaveringly holds on to them. His rhetorical vision of the condition he is in and what is needed to enable him to overcome that is stated emphatically.

These rhetorical visions, pointed above, empowers him to challenge the police, and question their actions and motivations. They are steadfastly held on to despite police attempts at questioning the validity of those visions. These rhetorical visions, more importantly, are positive visions: Talley believes that he needs help to get better, and that some people will enable him to get that help which has been denied earlier. This positive vision is what sustains Talley during the police questioning, and this is what enables him to challenge the institutional force of the police. Talley releases the hostages and surrenders himself

not because the police enabled him to, but because of his own strength of vision and despite police obstacles.

Fantasy Themes and Rhetorical Visions of the Hostage and Other Negotiators

Once again, as with the other two transcripts, it is necessary to understand the role played by other negotiators. In this particular incident, the role of the other negotiator, Tina, is less important, I will argue, than the role of one of the hostages, the pilot of the hijacked plane, Captain Gill. The pilot voices his opinion, suggests to the police how the crisis can be resolved quickly, and clearly expresses his trust of Talley. The lack of police acknowledgement of the pilot's role in the crisis resolution is another indicator of the ideological power the police possess and use in these situations. Also, the police claim that if it were not for Tina Barron the situation "would have still been going on" (Plott & Roughton, Jr., 1984, p. 1-A) is false, or only partially true, because Talley demands he see and talk to Tina, or to his mother Carole Wilson.

Following is a sample of Captain Gill's utterances:

#0018: Okay... gettin' low on the battery out here, so we need to have the AP hooked up as soon as we can, so we can like, keep the radio uh, line open.

#0049: Okay, your radio is... we can't even reach you anymore... we know it's... not our radio 'cause we're

calling and... talked to operations okay. So, I don't know if your batteries gone dead, or you need to change your location over there, somethin'.

Captain Gill confirms the problems that the police are having making radio contact with the plane. But given the doubts that Talley voices over the rather unbelievable police claims that all sorts of wires are coming off and that's why they are having problems with the radio, one wonders how much of the initial delay was real, and how much of it was manipulated by the police to gain time.

#0143: Yea, he wants me to talk to ya. What do you want?

#0145: Okay, he can hear every word you say.

#0388: Okay, let me talk to him real fast and get everything straight so we don't have to talk back and forth.

The captain is willing to talk for Talley, and tells the police that with his mediation things could be worked out much faster. Of course, he does not realize that the police are playing for time. Captain Gill is clearly of the opinion that there is too much talking back and forth, and that nothing much is being accomplished. His fantasy theme here is that the police would respond to him much more clearly and quickly, and that the crisis could be resolved quickly with his mediation. His support is for Talley, and his wish is to help Talley sort out the problem quickly.

#0216: Yea, I think everything's fine. It's just uh, as

soon as you get... Tina up here things will be a lot better.

#0335: ...I can pretty much assure the, the girl in there, uh Tina, that uh, if she would come out here and talk to him this whole thing would be over in five minutes.

#0339: ...like I said, I think () out here and talk to him, we'd be all be off the airplane here in about five minutes.

#0418: Uh, listen Frank uh, ...situation here since I'm uh, right here with him, uh, I can guarantee you that uh, if you just put her out in front of the truck and uh, we both walk off and leave the bag on, nothing's gonna happen.

#0381: Uh, Frank this is Barry, uh, Captain Gill. He wants you to bring Tina down here just uh, within vision and at that time... he'll uh, do somethin' else for ya, and he said he'd throw the bag out the window... just... as long as he can see her.

These statements cannot be any more stronger in their expression of the captain's belief that the situation could be resolved in "five minutes" if only Tina came out and talked to Talley. In fact, it is evident that Tina spends just about that time finally to get Talley off the plane. So, all along the captain's faith and his interpretation of the situation is right on the mark. Also, the support he expresses for Talley through these statements may have had a

salutary impact on Talley's perception of himself as well as his final move to surrender. This support for Talley increases his individual and relational power, and helps him counter the various police strategies.

#0463: Yea, understand that uh, he's just gettin' tired of uh, waitin' and gettin' tired of seein' all these other cars uh, pull up by the other uh, yellow and uh, yellow vehicles out here.

#0516: Yea we're doin' fine, just uh, waitin' on you all. These statements by Captain Gill confirm the delaying tactics of the police, as well as their ominous and threatening moves to intimidate the hostage taker. The explicit mention of these events by the captain provides Talley the relational support necessary to bargain with the police. These utterances might have also had the effect of slowing down the police plans for an assault on the plane, and hastened them a little to fulfil Talley's demands. To conclude, the captain's rhetorical visions can be described as follows: the hostage taker is not a dangerous person but someone who is seeking help, and the police can resolve the crisis without any trouble if only they hastened to meet the simple demand of the hostage taker.

Next, I have below a sample of Tina's utterances that enable us to interpret her fantasy themes and rhetorical visions. Given the very few exchanges that do take place between her and Talley there is little that one can identify

as fantasy themes or a rhetorical vision. An attempt is made, however, to tease them out:

#0284: Dean, I'm here. Dean, I'm here. This is Tina.

#0292: What's going on?

When the police claim that Ms. Barron talked three times to Talley (The Atlanta Constitution, November 30, 1984, p. 1-A), the public or readers of the newspaper might envision that the exchanges between Tina and Talley were substantial. The first exchange begins at utterance #0284 and ends at #0293, and the gist of it is in the two utterances I have recorded above! Utterance #0293 is by Talley, and that is the most substantial utterance in the exchange. Thus, the actual exchange reveals less than what the brevity of it reveals: making the assumption that it was Tina who put a stop to the interaction (and this assumption may be completely false), it might be interpreted that Tina was afraid to talk to Talley lest he reveal plans for endangering his own life or that of others. Yet another interpretation could be that Tina was afraid that Talley might reveal something about the nature of their relationship (since he addresses her as "Tina baby") which might be false or embarrassing, or both.

#0542: Dean, please I wanna help you. Everything's gonna be okay, I promise you that.

#0544: Dean, you know I have contacts in politics. I will get you any help you want, anybody you wanna talk to,

no one, everything's gonna be okay. I wanna help you,
I wanna see you.

#0546: Don't you trust me? Don't you trust me?

#0548: Come on Dean, you trust me. You know that I am not
gonna tell you a lie. You know I'm right here with
you, I'll be with you the entire time.

#0560: Trust me Dean, trust me. I'm here to help you and
then you call me to help ya. I'm here to help you.
Please Dean now, help me, come on out here and help me,
get off the plane now, come on baby please, do it for
me. Dean, please.

The two fantasy themes in the utterances above, which are part of the last (second, according to the transcript I have, and third, according to the police) exchange between Talley and Tina, are trust and help. Talley tells Frank that he trusts Tina, and Tina confirms his trust in her. Help is the other theme, and Tina tells Talley she is there to help him but Talley has to help her help him. He can help her by getting off the plane, and once he does that she would help him. How she would help him is not very clear, except that she will use her influence to get people to help him. These two themes are enough to create the rhetorical vision of a caring and concerned world, and Talley responds by getting off the plane.

Overall Summary

What led to the successful resolution of this

particular hostage taking even, and how much were the police responsible for that successful resolution? It might be best to begin with the newspaper report of this event: the headline for this lead, frontpage story in The Atlanta Constitution (November 30, 1984) says "Man arrested in hijacking at Hartsfield." This rather bland headline captures the essence of the police role in the event: they arrested the hijacker. But who was responsible for enabling the police to arrest the hijacker? The police claim, and the newspaper reports, it was Ms. Tina Barron. Both the claim and the report mislead the reader.

The person most responsible for enabling the police to arrest the hijacker was the hijacker himself: it was Talley's actions of releasing all the passengers immediately after the plane landed, making simple and clear demands, exercising some control over the interaction with the police negotiators, and acquiring the trust of the captain of the plane that led to his arrest!

The second person most responsible for Talley's arrest was the captain of the plane. Without his help, support and confidence, Talley might have proved a more difficult and irrational person to deal with. The captain was Talley's ally: and here I want to make clear that this did not make him a victim of the "Stockholm syndrome" (Strentz, 1979). The captain did not make it difficult for the police to

resolve the situation; he only made it difficult for them to fail to resolve the situation.

Only finally was Tina responsible for Talley's arrest. She only had a symbolic role. While one might point out that she was a powerful symbol for Talley and so enabled him to walk out of the plane, one cannot argue that she persuaded him to do so. This might seem like semantic hair-splitting, but I will argue that this distinction is important: it is important because it challenges the police version of events, and thus the police control over the labeling process. If hostage crises are to be resolved by means other than "police negotiation," we need to question the police version of events, and how those versions enable the police to continue to claim that they are good at resolving such situations.

How does the police version here help them construct a rhetorical vision that they were responsible for resolving the crisis? After all, they claim it was Tina who helped resolve the crisis. Let us go back to the newspaper report: according to Georgia Bureau of Investigation Director Phil Peters, Tina talked to Talley on three occasions over a period of two and a half hours before he decided to give up. What does this indicate? It tells us that Talley needed a lot of persuasion before he gave up. It also tells us (implicitly) that the police guided the interaction between Tina and Talley. Furthermore, it indicates that hostage

negotiation is a complex and time-consuming business, and that the police therefore need to have other options and alternatives (like storming the plane, or having their sharpshooters shoot at the hostage taker) if these long, drawn-out negotiations fail.

However, from my analysis of the transcript I discovered that the police need not have spent so much time to resolve this crisis. If they had enabled an early resolution they need not have practiced the assault on an identical aircraft, nor had their marksmen take aim at the hostage taker. If those things had not happened the media would have seen the crisis as much less dangerous, and so would not have made that the lead story in the newspapers and on television (I am making a guess about television coverage based on the knowledge that this was the lead story in The Atlanta Constitution). Since the media guide a lot of the public perception of police work, the relegation of the story to a less prominent spot would also relegate the importance of police work. Thus my claim that it is important to challenge or question the police version of events.

Chapter Eight

Results and Discussion: What Does It All Mean, And Where Do We Go From Here?

A quick summing up of the analyses of the three transcripts would answer the first research question I posed. After answering the first question, I will point out the weaknesses in the present analysis and make suggestions for improvement. Next, I will take up the second question and propose alternatives that can not only enable the resolution of such hostage crises more efficaciously but also recast the police role in such negotiations. My first research question was as follows:

Question #1: What dimension/s of power are exhibited in hostage negotiations, and how might they have determined the outcome in different types of hostage situations? Or, why do certain negotiations succeed, and why do others fail?

In Chapter 3 ("The Nature of Power") I argued that the common sense usage of the term "power" does not allow the analysis of social power; that the mainstream sociological perspective focused on the effects of power, and favored the analysis of individual power; that the Parsonian conception of the term sought to understand the nature of power, but fell into the trap of the individual norms explanation; and that the interpersonal communication perspective, while

explaining power as a relational outcome, had not effectively dealt with the ideological nature of relationships, and the effects of historical forces on the distribution and legitimation of power. I then proposed a four-dimensional concept of power, including the ideological, institutional, relational, and individual dimensions. After having adumbrated on those four dimensions, I discussed how they might influence the process of different types of hostage negotiations. To find out how and if they did influence negotiations and negotiation outcomes, I proposed using the analytical tools of contextual, descriptive, and fantasy theme analyses.

From the set of a dozen transcripts available to me, I chose to analyze three: the Yarnell Bank holdup situation; the Frontier Airlines hijacking; and the Judson Dean Talley incident because these incidents attracted media attention and were widely reported. These media reports were important and necessary for me to do the contextual analyses. The first two crises ended with the hostages being released, but with the hostage takers killing themselves; and the third ended with the hostages being released, and the hostage taker surrendering to the police.

I analyzed the transcripts in chapters four, five, and six, and provided summaries of results for each one of them at the end of those three chapters. I will now quickly

recount those summaries to answer the first research question.

In the Yarnell Bank holdup case, the rhetorical visions of the police confirmed and reiterated the institutional power that they exercised. Their attempt at increasing individual and relational power of the hostage takers was weak because they could not conjure a concrete and attractive post-hostage crisis situation rhetorically. Furthermore, the contextual analysis showed that the institutional power of the police was displayed extravagantly and so might have undermined the already weak rhetorical vision of the police.

In contrast to the weak rhetorical vision of the police, the hostage takers had a strong and concrete set of rhetorical visions that essentially contradicted the police vision, and which empowered them to resist the police vision. Such an empowerment, paradoxically, meant that the only way for them to escape the crisis was to succumb to the crisis. The rhetorical visions of the hostage takers' friends who pleaded for their surrender, while more concrete and persuasive, and which enabled the augmentation of the hostage takers' relational power, could not counter the force of the institutional power of the police nor the rhetorical visions of the hostage takers.

In the Frontier Airlines hijacking situation, the police denied themselves the opportunity of constructing

rhetorical visions attractive to the hostage taker by delaying the building and exchange of relational power. By emphasizing their lack of immediate institutional power to meet the demands of the hostage taker, they construct a more threatening vision of such institutional power residing in places outside the control of the hostage taker. Such a vision of ominous institutional power simply made a suicidal hostage taker more suicidal. All attempts at relationship building by the police were thus rejected by the hostage taker.

The other negotiators in this case, Hannan's lawyer, and Hannan's gay friend were not able to empower Hannan. Not knowing how the last half hour of the hostage situation was handled by Hannan's lawyer it is difficult to assess the rhetorical vision of Mr. Thompson, the lawyer. In a newspaper report (Ayres, Jr., October 22, 1977), Mr. Thompson claims that Hannan chose suicide over prison. It would be too pat a claim for me to make that Thompson's rhetorical vision was weak. If, however, Thompson's style of interaction with Hannan face-to-face was the same as that over the radio, it might not be too pat to conclude that such a manner of talk could not have provided the relational power that a suicidal hostage taker needed to overcome the threat of insitutional power and the lack of individual power.

When at last Hannan's gay friend is allowed to talk, he does elaborate certain attractive and concrete rhetorical

visions. Why Hannan cannot be moved by them or be empowered by them is a little difficult to answer. My speculation is that the police waited too long to get Stewart to talk to Hannan, and that by that time Hannan's resolution to kill himself might have become stronger. Also, Stewart's manner of speaking might have indicated to Hannan that not all that he was saying was voluntary and/or real: Stewart sounds nervous and agitated, and Thompson intervenes to explain why that is so. Furthermore, Hannan would have realized that he would be serving a longer prison sentence than Stewart, and that there would be little chance of them getting together again. All these would have led to a tremendous sense of loss of individual power, and thus to his ultimate suicide.

Finally, in the Judson Dean Talley case the police succeed in getting Talley to surrender despite their failure to interpret the situation correctly. There is no particular police rhetorical vision worth noting, and their delaying tactics, threatening movements, and disregard of the pilot's advice are not enough to dismantle the powerful rhetorical vision of Talley. Talley's individual power stems from his firm belief that he needs psychiatric help, from the simple demand he makes and holds on to, and the relationship he builds with the pilot (hostage).

To summarize, it will come as no surprise that the institutional power of the police is the pivot around which hostage negotiations revolve. How they use it will

determine the hostage takers' responses. Hostage takers can use their individual power effectively if their demands are relatively simple, and if they can create and hold on to clear rhetorical visions. Relational power had little significance in any of the three crises. Where it did play a part, the police had nothing to do with it: Talley and the pilot established trust between each other and used that to counter the institutional power of the police.

Finally, the role of ideological power is not evident in the transcripts themselves. However, we can identify its role when we do the contextual analyses. In all three cases we can make out how the police define the situations to the public/press. I have noted the differences between their claims about how events transpired and the sequence of events evident in the transcripts: the claim that bank officials thwarted the surrender of hostages takers in the Yarnell crisis; that FBI Agent Cochran did his best to beef up the morale of Hannan; and that Tina was responsible for getting Talley to surrender. Thus ideological power plays a potent role in enabling the police to construct and maintain certain realities, and thus define their own role in society.

Problems and Pitfalls in the Present Analysis

No analysis of social phenomena can claim to depict completely or explain fully the phenomenon being analyzed.

In the present instance there are a few problems that need to be addressed:

One, the three transcripts analyzed do not very well represent the variety of hostage crises that the police have dealt and continue to deal with. The police list four major types of hostage takers (Fuselier, 1986): (a) "Mentally disturbed" persons (the paranoid, the depressed, the antisocial personalities, and the inadequate personalities); (b) criminals trapped during the commission of a crime; (c) Prisoners who are revolting; and (d) political terrorists attempting to produce social change through the threat or use of violence. The three cases I have analyzed represent a small part of the gamut of hostage negotiation situations.

Two, I have chosen three cases that are rather high-profile, and they might thus represent the more difficult of cases that the police try to resolve. Of the 12 transcripts I have in my possession, eight represent successful resolutions, and four are unsuccessful. Airplane hijackings and bank robberies can be considered to pose more danger than other situations, and it may be unfair to present these cases as representative of hostage situations that police deal with.

Three, the cases I have analyzed are eight and 15 years old. The two crises, in which the hostage takers committed suicide, occurred in 1977. Police negotiators might have fine-honed their techniques in the intervening 15 years.

According to Taylor (1983), the concept of hostage negotiations was a product of the 1972 Munich Olympic tragedy. If so, five years of practicing such an approach might not have been enough to represent the best of police negotiation abilities. In defense of my analyses, however, I can point out that the police did exhibit the techniques and strategies advocated in the FBI training manuals. Furthermore, even in the 1984 Judson Dean Talley case I recognized very little difference in the formulaic approach adopted by the police.

Four, the analysis might have profited if I had talked to the police negotiators, hostages, and other negotiators involved in the crises. Tracking down these individuals may not have been very difficult, but I had to abandon the idea because of time and resource constraints. Another problem that I would have had to confront, even if I had made the attempt and contacted these people, was the time that had elapsed since the hostage crises and how well they could remember what they did and said.

Five, the audio tapes that I have in my possession do not contain all of the talk recorded during the crises. The reason why some parts are erased or garbled is difficult to fathom. Does the FBI, who provided us these tapes, have any specific reason for giving us these versions of the tapes? The pursuit of answers to this question might be rather

difficult to someone who has not established professional connections with the FBI.

Finally, the fantasy theme analysis of transcripts, while interesting and revealing, do not reveal enough to enable making completely convincing arguments about the role and play of power. Critics may argue that my claims/results are predictable: if the hostage takers killed themselves then the police use of institutional power is evident; and if the hostage takers surrendered then the police use of relational power is evident; or if the hostage takers killed the hostages then their individual power is evident, and so on. However, my analyses and discussions, I believe, go beyond making such claims. Fantasy theme analysis was fashioned as an analytical tool to study small group discussions, political campaigns, and organizational communication. I have tried to make good use of this tool to analyze hostag transcripts, and as far as I know this is the first time anyone has tried to use such a tool for such a purpose. Hopefully, the weaknesses in this analysis are not so many as to constitute a fatal flaw. Given the nature of my research questions, few other tools would have enabled me to answer them as did a combination of contextual, descriptive, and fantasy theme analyses.

Alternatives to Present Negotiation Strategies

I have talked about the conclusions we can draw about the dimensions of power exhibited in hostage negotiations,

and why certain negotiations succeed and why others fail. At the end of Chapter 3 ("The Nature of Power") I had put forward two research questions, and the discussion till now has focused on answering the first question, the more important of the two questions. It is time now to turn to try and answer the next question.

Question #2: What are the problems in the existing strategies that the police pursue in resolving hostage situations; and what alternative strategies do the police, and communities/citizenry have in resolving hostage situations?

This question is asked in the tradition of police studies that "strains toward social ameliorism and reform" (Manning, 1985a, p. vii). This might come as a surprise to those who have claimed that the police indeed have changed their tactics in resolving hostage crises in the past two decades, and that such reforms have been successful and dramatic. For example, Taylor (1983) states that "In recent years, however, the way in which police respond to barricaded situations has changed dramatically, and the change seems to have been well accepted by both the public and law enforcement officials across the country" (p. 64).

Given these changes, the focus has been on fine-honing the new tactics in which "police use patience and time in dealing with such situations" (Taylor, 1983, p. 64). Researchers, including those from communication studies, have

thus concentrated in studying the negotiation techniques and strategies that the police use, and how those techniques and strategies can be more effectively used.

I have pointed out above, in response to Question #2, the problems in the existing negotiation strategies that are more fundamental than just a matter of better communication. In this regard, Manning's (1985a) comment is extremely pertinent: he says, "It seems clear that policing is as much shaped as shaper. It is a container of social forces, processes, power, and microeconomics and it is dependent on societal politics, economics, public beliefs, and even international tensions.... Police organization shapes and adopts technology to its ends; technology alters routine police practice little" (p. viii). I will include "negotiation" within the technology metaphor not just because it is a "technique" but also because these negotiations are supported by the sort of technology that the police have traditionally surrounded themselves with: arms, ammunition, communication technology, transportation, etc.

If "negotiations" are part of "technology" then they too must alter routine police practice little. They do not, if we mean by police practice the adoption of an authoritarian worldview, the manipulation of facts and figures for self-promotion and for continued support of the authoritarian worldview, and the continuation of their avowed duties of maintaining law and order, and apprehending criminals.

However, we may believe that such "negotiation" strategies have reduced to an extent the death of innocent hostages, witnesses, bystanders, police officers, and suspects. What this "extent" is, however, is not clear except for the claim that negotiations have led to the successful resolution of about 96 percent of such crises. Other than this particular statistic, police literature is very coy about revealing how else the adoption of these techniques have reduced the costs of resolving hostage crises.

Would a reduction of costs, and efficient resolution of such crises justify the use of negotiation strategies by the police? Manning (1985a) points out that policing is neither cost-efficient nor easily managed, and my three case studies indicate the same. But the problems of policing go beyond cost-efficiency and easy management as I have argued in Chapter 3 ("The Nature of Power"), and even if it were to be shown that the police have managed to reduce significantly the costs of resolving hostage crises, the more serious problems of policing remain.

The key problem of policing, Manning (1977) says is that "the police maintain almost exclusive control over the definition and meanings of crime and the nature of their public service" (p. 365-366).

I am less concerned with policing in general than with the police role in hostage crises. Hostage crises are unique, emergency events for which the police are equipped

as a paramilitary force. But Manning (1977) points out that these events are also the ones that cause organizational chaos and the use of excessive but unfocused efforts. Hostage crises are also the kind of events with dramatic payoff for the police because the public and the media acclaim such police work, and also where individual police officers emerge as heroes. Given the nature of these events, and given the fact that the police are the ones equipped to deal with such events, can one meaningfully argue for alternatives?

If I am to lay out a case for alternatives to police action or alternative police actions in hostage crises, it is best to begin with some alternatives proposed for more ordinary, mundane and day-to-day police duties. Wilson and Kelling (1989) argue that police foot patrol, for example, elevates the level of public order in neighborhoods. They believe in the police role of "watchmen," and that we should return to our "long-abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals" (p. 381). Walker (1989), however, argues that the Wilson and Kelling thesis is based on a misinterpreted police history, and that if there is any merit in the style of police patrol that Wilson and Kelling advocate, that style "will have to be created anew" (p. 383).

Walker says that the Wilson and Kelling model resurrects the old myth of the friendly cop on the beat, and

their idea that the police served the needs of local neighborhoods and thereby enjoyed political legitimacy is based on a romanticized version of nineteenth century community or neighborhood life.

In a similar vein, Manning (1989) argues that much of the discussion about community policing is based upon unstated assumptions about the aims and objectives of such policing. These assumptions tap basic political sentiments like yearning for the past and the wish for personalized treatment, he points out. Manning (1989) lists ten of the unstated assumptions, and after discussing each one, comes to the conclusion that these assumptions are "ideologically based and wishful extensions of a political and moral perspective" (p. 402). He argues that if a community policing scheme is to be successful it would require "structural and legal change, changes in habits of dispute settlement and definition, in organizational structure, in performance evaluation, and in reward structures within the police" (p. 404).

Other alternatives suggested and practiced include citizen patrols and "volunteer watchmen," perhaps the best known of them being the "Guardian Angels" (Wilson & Kelling, 1989). Another tradition is that of the "vigilante" (Wilson & Kelling, 1989), whose members took the law into their own hands, and acted as judge, jury, executioner as well as policeman.

Wilson and Kelling (1989) say that though citizens can do a great deal to control crime and maintain order, "the police are plainly the key to order-maintenance" (p. 380). Manning (1977) also maintains that in modern, complex societies police are a necessary force, though the restructuring of police organizations could do a lot to improve the functioning of police and the service they render society. In this regard, he recommends that citizen involvement in policing should be encouraged, that external means of control of the police should be linked to internal means of executing the actual punishment or sanctioning of the police, citizen patrols and block watches be used to assist the police in routine tasks, and private guards, either those hired by contract or employed by a particular industry or organizations, should be allowed to create linkages with the police. Can these alternatives be considered, in any manner, for resolving hostage situations?

Hostage crises, or to use the police terminology, "barricaded gunman situations," are rather uncommon events, in the sense that they do not occur as frequently as other law and order problems. They are, however, I believe increasing and have increased in the past two decades, though there are no explicit police record of these events -- not in police literature on hostage negotiations, nor in the yearly accumulation and presentation of crime data in the nation. The police are called upon to use special skills

and tactics to resolve these situations, and have therefore trained hostage negotiators responsible for communication with the hostage takers. Such a trend in setting up specialized units has become commonplace, and most major American cities have such specialized units ready to move into action when called upon to do so (Taylor, 1983).

Since hostage crises are rare events, and since such crises are tackled by specially trained police units, can we really think of alternatives that could, for instance, involve the community as alternatives advocated in the case of ordinary police action do?

It is claimed that the prevailing police philosophy behind hostage negotiations is that protection of human life is the most important concern, including the life of the hostage taker or suspect (Taylor, 1983). The adoption of such a philosophy stems from the need for a more humane, sophisticated, and professional mode of policing, it is pointed out (Taylor, 1983). While the adoption of such a philosophy is laudable, and the claims of a high rate of success in such hostage negotiations may be true, how do we account for failed negotiations, and how can we question the police version of events -- both in successful and failed negotiations? A look at these problems again might enable us to figure out if indeed there can be alternatives to police action, and to alternative police actions.

From the analysis of three transcripts we have got some insight into why some negotiations fail: the reasons for failure include excessive show of force, unwise exchange of demands, and the inability to provide strong/positive rhetorical visions to enable the empowerment of hostage takers (the Yarnell case); delaying tactics, including delaying the meeting of simple demands like food for the hostages, inappropriate and weak conversational strategies, and an inability to convey strong and sound rhetorical visions (Frontier Airlines case). Even where the negotiation succeeded, like in the Judson Talley case, it was more through the efforts of the hostage taker and the hostages than through the efforts of the police, efforts which seemed more doomed to failure than to success (show of force, excessive and unnecessary delay in responding to hostage taker's demands and ~~hostage alternative, police contribution to the police of~~ "no show of

weapons" seems more like a statute on the books for decorative and display purposes rather than one that is actually used. Or else, the "no show of weapons" is literally taken to mean just no show of weapons and not no show of force. In the Yarnell case, the newspapers indicate that Yarnell was converted to an armed camp, and the transcripts indicate that the hostage takers were aware of being surrounded by policemen on rooftops, in vehicles across the street, and that the hostage takers explicitly demanded that these

forces be moved back. The Yarnell incident took place 15 years ago, in 1977, and it may be the case now that the police do not employ or display so much force. However, even in 1984, during the Judson Talley incident, the police used threatening maneuvers that agitated the hostage taker and put him on guard. Unless the police realize that "no show of weapons" should mean "no show of force," they are contributing to the failure of negotiations or to the delay in resolution of problems.

Stalling for time is said to contribute to building rapport (Taylor, 1983). It is claimed that with the passage of time, positive relationships between hostage taker and police negotiator can develop. I have commented on the psychological nature of police negotiation strategies, and how such strategies may be ineffective given the distribution of power among the negotiation interactants. In all three cases that I have analyzed there is no indication that this strategy proved effective. In two cases it led to the death of the hostage takers, and in the other case there is no evidence that the police negotiator gained the trust of the hostage taker.

The problem with the psychological (formulaic) approach is that the negotiator becomes a prisoner to doctrine, and thus loses the freedom for innovative action. The formulaic approach is not also geared to empowering the hostage taker: in fact, any increase of power for the

hostage taker is perceived as problematic and leading to the delay in the resolution of the crisis and the increased potential for violence (Taylor, 1983). I have pointed out how such an approach is detrimental to building trust and to the quicker resolution of some crises.

Yet another problem is in the meeting of simple demands of the hostage taker. Police are advised to follow the "win-win" approach, and that in essence means both sides win something. Taylor (1983) says a classic example of this approach is an exchange of hostages for food. This, rather glib assessment of the win-win approach, is what makes such a strategy problematic. Unequal exchange, or the demand for such unequal exchange, and the delay in working out such exchanges sometimes contributes to the exacerbation of the crisis, or it even leads to the failure of negotiations.

While an exchange of hostages for police officers or other people is not acceptable (like in the Yarnell case), nor is an extended and exhausting negotiation for food or cigarettes a successful approach. Both in the Frontier Airlines case, and in the Judson Talley negotiation the delay in negotiating the delivery of food led to complications and to the losing of trust. That the police dithered in the delivery of food to a hostage taker who was depressed and suicidal (Frontier Airlines case) shows how this formulaic approach is pockmarked with problems. This power play

that the police engage in contradicts the claim that their new approach is a humane mode of policing.

Third, if the police are to enable the likes of Tony and Whiskey (Yarnell case), and Hannan (Frontier Airlines) to escape the paradox of their situation, and provide them a "honorable way out," tactical withdrawal of police forces may be necessary. Without such a withdrawal the hostage takers will choose the option of suicide. It may be argued whether tactical withdrawal is indeed feasible, and whether the police should go to such an extent to save the lives of "criminals." How realistic is such a proposal?

Without testing there is no way of assessing such a proposal. However, we may try and figure out the consequences of such action. What would have happened if Tony and Whiskey had been allowed a getaway car, and the police had assured them that they would not be apprehended? The two might have still decided to commit suicide. There is no guarantee that they would have decided otherwise. But at least the police would have emerged the humane force they claim they want to be. What if the two had taken the getaway car and tried to escape? Given their access to modern technology that enables them to track and trace vehicles and people, the police could have apprehended the two later when they would be less prone to succumb to the lure of suicide. Would not the police be wasting time and money and resources trying to trace and track the two? Yes, money and resources

would have to be spent, but not as much as they did turning Yarnell into an armed camp, shutting off all local businesses, and rerouting traffic the whole day. Cost management is not a police virtue anyway, and cases like that of Tony and Whiskey, and of Hannan are not so commonplace that the police would be spending such effort and money in all hostage crises.

As a case in point, it may be pertinent to discuss the problems associated with police car chases and how the police are rethinking about the efficacy and the costs of such high speed chases (ABC News, March 13, 1992). According to this television news report, 314 people were killed in police car chases in 1990, and property and vehicle damage was severe. The police are now therefore pursuing alternatives to these high profile, high speed chases. They are effectively using helicopters to track those drivers whom they want to apprehend, and they are allowing some drivers to escape because the costs are more than the benefits in these cases. Thus, if the police can think of alternatives here, why can't they in hostage crises?

Finally, the police lack in rhetorical skills, and in the ability to analyze their own rhetoric as well as that of the hostage takers'. The focus of police negotiations is to manipulate hostage taker behavior through psychological techniques of delay, exchange, and avoidance of negative trigger words like "surrender" and "hostages." Only to a

minor extent do these techniques focus on rhetoric, and the ability to create word pictures through the creative use of language for empowering hostage takers. My analysis of the three transcripts provide some indication about the nature of the deficiency, and may be police training programs will from now on use not only the services of psychologists but also that of rhetoricians and language teachers.

Alternatives to police action. The recommendations I make for alternative police actions puts me right in the midst of those scholars whom I have labeled as "instrumentalists." I realize that instrumentalism takes various forms, and that even "social ameliorism" is a form of instrumentality. In my defense, I will point out that I have argued for a reanalysis of hostage negotiations based on the notion of power and the sharing of power by various interactants in a hostage drama. I do not just proceed from the point of view of the police, and I do not just make recommendations to fine hone their present techniques. I have questioned those techniques, and I will now propose some alternatives to police action that will further distinguish my analysis from the earlier analyses of hostage negotiations by other scholars.

One alternative to police negotiation is community action. Instead of the police trying to negotiate hostage releases in situations that involve simple domestic disturbances or where there is little threat to the hostages,

community residents could be involved in the resolving of those situations. The arrival of police, and their involvement in the negotiation process heightens the seriousness of many a simple situation, and it would be in the interests of the community that they find ways to sort out such problems.

The over-reliance on police action has made the criminal justice system extremely powerful, and it is necessary for citizens to reclaim some control over their community life if they are to loosen the police stranglehold in defining crime and describing the nature of their (police's) public service.

Given the nature of modern society, and the complexity of the many systems and sub-systems that govern, manage and direct it, can we seriously expect individual communities to reclaim the power to manage the lives of their community members? Is this not an utopian ideal, and a harking back to a mythical past where life was predictable, things were simple, and power was shared among community members? No claim is being made that the criminal justice systems in the past were better, and that people lived in some sort of relative harmony in communities across this nation. This is not a treatise to compare the past with the present; instead, it seeks to analyze the present and provide some solutions to the problems besetting criminal justice systems' handling of hostage crises. The solutions that I propose, however, follow from the questioning of police's

definition of their service in such hostage crises, and thus are more fundamental and far-reaching than those proposed by scholars who have not questioned the police definitions.

In this spirit then, I will make a final proposal that is an alternative to police action. Most police negotiation teams use a clinical psychologist as consultant during hostage crises. Fuselier (1986) strongly advises that such consultants do not do the actual negotiation. The police team should be the ones in charge of negotiations, and the consultant must be used to assess the current mental status of the hostage taker and that of the negotiator himself, he recommends. Fuselier (1986) further explains that "It should be clearly established that he is a consultant to law enforcement personnel, and as such, his opinions will be asked, but he will not have the power or authority to enforce any decisions" (p. 11). This civilian consultant's services are used only if he is willing to accept "the idea that after hours of attempted negotiation, it may be necessary to attempt to capture or even kill the HT" and "would be willing to assist in whatever response is necessary to end the hostage incident" (Fuselier, 1986, p. 11).

These recommendations not only show how the civilian is coopted into the belief systems of the police, but how the police maintain authority and control over "their" turf and thus control the definition of meanings. I therefore propose that the negotiating team is headed by a civilian who

will decide the fate of the action in consultation with the police officer in charge, and that the clinical psychologist and/or language consultant be parties to the decision-making process. Such a process will help recast police power to define meanings and explain their public service. It is thus that I term this proposal an alternative to police action, and not alternative police action. In alternative police action, it is the police themselves who decide different courses of action without the involvement of civilian experts and authorities.

Conclusion. Power was a determinant in police action against hostage takers before. Power continues to be a determinant in police negotiation with hostage takers now. I have tried to show in this work how power influences the outcome in hostage negotiations. To do so, I have had to first describe the nature of power. Having done so, I analyzed three actual hostage negotiation transcripts through a triangulation of contextual, descriptive, and interpretive (fantasy theme analytical) methods. Based on the results of such an investigation, I have proposed some alternative police action in such hostage negotiations, as well as some alternatives to police action that would enable the public to reclaim some power to define meanings and to exercise some control over the description of police work.

No claim is being made that the present strategies of the police is not more effective than the ones they used

before. Indeed, negotiations do accomplish more than the purely assault options that the police used before. Negotiations strategies do provide an effective non-lethal tool to the police in resolving most hostage situations. Thus, no suggestion is being made that the police go back to their old "shoot first and then ask" style of hostage crisis strategy. This study, however, asks the more subtle question of whether the present negotiations strategies are as "non-lethal" and as effective as the police claim they are, and tries to answer them as well as the constraints of the study permit. The answer seems to be, at least at first blush, that police claims of success are not as strong as their literature describes.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 2:

1. Domestic hostage situations should be distinguished from international hostage situations. The dynamics, the processes, the issues involved, and the actors participating in international hostage situations are very different from the domestic situations. International hostage situations frequently, and most often include airplane hijackings by members representing groups that are fighting political battles against governments and states that they consider are inimical to their interests. The most often cited such instances are hijackings by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members, Islamic groups in the Middle East, and so on. Such hijackings involve third-party States/governments, and negotiations have to take into account a variety of international and diplomatic protocol. This particular study focuses on domestic hostage situations, and not on international hostage situations.

Chapter 3:

1. I have noted that the FBI categorizes hostage takers into (a) "mentally disturbed" persons; (b) criminals trapped during the commission of a crime; (c) prisoners who are revolting; and (d) political terrorists attempting to produce social change through the threat or use of violence (Fuselier, 1986). However, Donohue and his colleagues (1989, 1990, 1991) have used the term "domestic hostae taker" to distinguish the type of hostage taker who is less mentally disturbed than the more severely mentally disturbed hostage taker. A domestic hostage taker would then be one who, for example, would hold his children, or wife, or girlfriend hostage and demand that his problems (usually in the nature of a domestic quarrel) be solved.

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