


FORUM EMB. BUCH. LIMITED




N-H VIN

M.A.

1992







This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

The Roots of the Political Struggles in the
West Fujian (Minxi) Base Area

presented by

YIN, Nai-hsin

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M.S. degree in History

Stephen C. Auill

Major professor

Date Dec. 29, 1991



PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

| DATE DUE | DATE DUE | DATE DUE |
|----------|----------|----------|
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ | _____ |

MSU is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

c:\cric\datedue.pm3-p.1

**THE ROOTS OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES
IN THE WESTERN FUJIAN (MINXI) BASE AREA**

By

NAI-HSIN YIN

A THESIS

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

MASTER OF ART

Department of History

1992

697-4053

ABSTRACT

THE ROOTS OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE WESTERN FUJIAN (MINXI) BASE AREA

By

NAI-HSIN YIN

Using materials newly available, this thesis reviews two political struggles of the Chinese Communist Party (the Purge of the Social Democratic Party and the Anti-Luo-Ming Line Movement) taking place during the Soviet period, 1929-1934, in the base area in western Fujian, known as the Minxi base area. Because study on Communist movement in Minxi is still scarce, the main purpose of this thesis is to try to use Minxi base area as a case study to discover a comprehensive explanation of the CCP's intra-party struggle, and furthermore to question some opinions represented by previous scholarship, who focus on one side of history.

The roots of CCP's political struggles should be traced not only to the aspects of leadership, organization and ideology, but also to the aspects of ecological setting and local complication. Additionally, the function of each aspect changes with CCP's various aims. In terms of power struggle, this study finds that the interpretation of the principle of 'democratic centralism' plays a critical role in the political struggle in the soviet period, which constructs a unseen, most of time confusing, link between CCP's upper and lower levels; policy-making and local requirement. The conception of democratic centralism is so flexible that it could serve as a leverage of power operation. In the end, this study locates the social-organizational roots of two political struggles in minxi and builds a link between the history form the bottom up and from the top on the question of CCP's intra-party struggle.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------------|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| I. ECOLOGICAL SETTING AND THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT | 6 |
| 1 Socio-economic Situation | 7 |
| 2 Structure of Political Power and Complex of Local Leaders | 11 |
| 3 Educational Circles and the Origin of Communist Thought | 19 |
| 4 Concluding Remarks | 24 |
| II. THE COMMUNIST UPRISING AND THE FAILURE OF THE XI'NAN DISTRICT SOVIET | 27 |
| 1 Beginning of the Communist Movement | 28 |
| 2 Communist Uprisings and Case Studies of Local Power Struggle | 32 |
| 3 Concluding Remarks | 58 |
| III. THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES | 61 |
| 1 Establishment of the Minxi Soviet | 67 |
| 2 The Purge of the Social Democratic Party and The Struggle of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line | 84 |
| 3 Concluding Remarks | 94 |
| CONCLUSION | 97 |
| NOTES | 102 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 117 |

INTRODUCTION

The Western Fujian (Minxi) base area was one of the CCP's famous revolutionary base areas during the Soviet period, from 1929 to 1934. During this period, the base area went through several stages; the origin of the Communist movement, local uprisings and the establishment of a short-lived district soviet, the arrival of the Zhu-Mao Red Army and their help in building the Minxi base area, the establishment of the Minxi Soviet and its inclusion in the Central Soviet, and finally the loss of the base area.

What happened during the rise and fall of this base area? Essentially, according to the CCP's reasoning, what caused the Minxi Party's downfall were the political miscalculations of the left-oriented Party Central (the Li Lisan Line and Wang Ming Line), which caused a catastrophic political oppression known as the Purge of the Social-Democratic Party, and a mistaken line struggle, the Movement of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line. However, the purpose of this study is to try to discover other roots of the political struggles in Minxi as well. In addition to the high-level power struggle, the inherent ecological setting, the dialectic relationship between ideology and organization, and the confrontations among state-building, party construction and revolutionary work, all also contributed to political interaction in the Minxi base area.

Being in the mountainous border area between Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangxi, the Minxi base area had characteristics similar to other border base areas, such as the weakness of the anti-Communist authorities and economic backwardness. According to my observation, unique characteristics the Minxi base area had were: 1) the differences in the development of its core and peripheral areas were rather clear cut, so that we can

perceive the weakness of CCP control in the peripheral area; 2) left-wing organizations in the core area were prevalent before 1927, which offered the future local Communist leaders solid and complicated bonds to aid their development; 3) and no leader was really involved in high level power struggles, because of which it is less necessary to explore the topic of high-level power struggle in this study. Therefore, in this study I will emphasize the ecological setting, ideological interpretation and organizational evolution and try to explain the roots of the political struggle in Minxi from the bottom (the social aspect) and middle (the organizational aspect) angles, rather than from the top, although decisions made at the top were also critical to the development of lower-level organizations and local red areas as a whole.

In the first chapter, "Ecological Setting and the Origin of the Communist Movement," I would like to adopt Professor Elizabeth J. Perry's conceptions of "protective strategy" and "predatory strategy" to analyze the interaction between local power structure and ecological setting. To be sure, when Perry evolved her framework of "predatory-protective dichotomy," her case study was Huai-pei (Huaibei) and her time period covered over one century.¹ To study peasant revolution in light of the conditions of endemic uncertainty in Huai-pei and peasants' "profit maximization," Perry finds that:

the composition of local society played a critical role in determining the form of peasant unrest...In emphasizing the mediation of social structure, we have dispensed with any notion of a uniform peasant mentality capable of explaining rural rebellion. Some peasants are likely to operate by a calculus of risk minimization, but others will move more boldly to enhance their own positions. The variation is attributable in part to natural environment, in part to socio-economic position, and part of course to personality differences.²

By studying the cases of the Nien and of the Red Spears, she stated that "the first method of survival, termed the predatory strategy, entailed illegally expanding the resources of some members of the community at the expense of others, while the reaction against such assaults primarily adapted by ecologically more secure villages, the protective strategy, was an effort to preserve one's belongings in the face of predatory threat."³ Her study

demonstrates that neither the communities adopting the protective strategy nor the predatory strategy necessarily had positive tendencies toward revolution. However, the common point of the local leaders in adopting either strategy was not only to survive but also to preserve their own power without interference from outside. In the end, she concluded that:

The point, of course, is that there was no single legacy of traditional Chinese rebellion, but many such legacies, each adapted to the particular ecological exigencies under which it evolved and each differing perhaps in its suitability to the service of modern revolution.⁴

Although Minxi had a different ecological setting from Huai-pei, in terms of collective violence Perry's predatory-protective dichotomy is also appropriate to categorize two types of local leaders in Minxi, who I will call "protective elites" and "predatory elites." The study will show that the local leaders of peripheral areas, such as Wuping and Liancheng, had a tendency to adopt protective or predatory strategies to protect their power base, which made their territory inhospitable to the CCP.

In Chapter One and especially in Chapter Two, Professor Stephen Averill's argument is very helpful in examining the characteristics of local leaders, especially local Communist leaders. Averill has convincingly divided hill-country elites into three layers: the upper level, middle level and lowest level of the local elites. He focuses on the interaction between the local elites and the socio-economic setting in which they operated their networks of influence. The main observation he makes is that because of limited resources each stratum of local elites had its own span of influence, and they "differed markedly in their access to 'public bodies' and bureaucratic officials, their connections with bandit gangs and brotherhoods, and their attitudes toward education."⁵ Furthermore, believing that the lowest level of the local elites were the ones who had closest contact with the peasants, Averill explored the revolutionary tendency of this lower stratum of the hill-country elite. He tentatively concluded that:

Less detailed biographical data on other Jiangxi revolutionaries generally

supports this picture of a revolutionary leadership drawn mainly from the lower elite stratum, and especially its “declining households” (*poluo hu*). If the “declining households” (descendants of large landlord families then reduced in wealth and status as a result of the division of the family estates) provided much of the early elite support for the revolution, the “newly-emerging households” (*xingfa hu*: aggressive and hard-nosed families just risen from the ranks of the peasantry or small merchants) of the lower elite appear later to have become its most stubborn and effective opponents... In sum, of all the elite strata the lower elite was simultaneously the most open and most resistant to change: most open because its many “declining households” were willing to tamper with a *status quo* that offered them little prospect but further decline, and most resistant because its “newly-emerging households” were unwilling to jeopardize the smallest morsel of their hard-own gains. The dual nature of the lower elite as both facilitators of and obstacles to change made the question of how to deal with this group one of the most delicate and exasperating problems facing the Jiangxi revolutionary leaders.⁶

Based on Mao Zedong’s “Xunwu Investigation,” Averill’s analysis of the Jiangxi hill country fits the situation in Minxi quite well. (Xunwu county borders Fujian, and Mao said that social conditions there were typical of the tri-province border region.) Multifaceted functions of local elites and their variable access to resources did make Minxi’s local Communist leaders diverse and did influence their approaches to mass mobilization as well. One other notable aspect of the situation is the degree to which Communist intellectuals were concentrated in a few places. Before 1927, most of the left-wing organizations concentrated in the county seats of Shanghang, Longyan and Yongding, which formed the core area of the Communist movement in Minxi, and this drew many intellectuals to work in these capitals. Therefore most of the local Communist leaders in the core counties had ties with capitals, which helped them stage uprisings and afterwards develop strong political control.

Finally, in Chapter Three I will use Professor Arif Dirlik’s hypothesis of “the dialectic relationship between ideology and organization” to explore the principle of the system of democratic centralism and the conflict among revolution, party construction and state-building. From the documentary materials provided by multi-layered organizations, I attempt to show that, even before the formation of the Party Central’s leftist policy,

ecological setting, local power structure and the complicated relationship among multi-layered elites had caused many problems of CCP's control and this provided the background for the implementation of leftist policy. A further point I try to make is that, taking all into account, the forms of political struggles in Minxi escalating from social purge to ideological struggle were inevitable because of the local situation and the ambiguity of the interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism.

Nevertheless, this study tries to investigate the roots of political struggle in Minxi from the lower and middle angles, and to find a logical explanation for the CCP's intra-party struggle. The problems in the Minxi base area were not only exacerbated by wrong policies and the regions own local complexities, but also by ambiguous principles of control and confusing efforts in revolution and state-building, especially during the Soviet period. The roots of political struggle stem from all of these aspects.

I. ECOLOGICAL SETTING AND THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The importance of ecological setting to the development of Chinese Communist movement has been noticed by many scholars. For example, Elizabeth Perry's analysis of "protective-predatory activity," Roy Hefin's categories of the "radical hotbed counties, border area base counties and great rear area," and Stephen Averill's observation of the multiplicity of the local elites in hill country, all try to adopt some kind of framework to explain the interaction between the ecological setting, social structure and revolutionary movements. At any rate, their accomplishments offer subsequent scholars of the Chinese revolution a more structured ways to look into this topic.

Based on a case study of the western Fujian area (or Minxi, as it was generally abbreviated), I try to explore the complex development of the Communist movement. Because it is normally seen simply as a peripheral part of the Central Soviet area, the CCP base area in western Fujian has been neglected by scholars. Actually, although western Fujian base was similar in some ways to other base areas, the development of the Communist movement in this area also had its own uniqueness that deserves more attention. Because of the limitation of materials at hand, I can only undertake a tentative examination of the base area. Hopefully the study will not be blemished to an intolerable extent by these limitations.

Because of its isolated geographical location, with the Wuyi Mountains on its western edge marking the provincial border with Jiangxi and the Bopingling on its southeastern edge segregating it from southern Fujian, the region of western Fujian is an administratively and naturally separate area.⁷ From the Ming Dynasty to the end of Qing Dynasty the region

was included administratively in Dingzhou Fu (Ding prefecture), which included eight counties: Changding, Ninghua, Shanghang, Wuping, Qingliu, Liancheng, Guihua and Yongding. The so-called *Ding shu baxian* (eight counties belonging to Ding Prefecture) encompassed most of the main area of Minxi we are dealing with in this study, which also included four other counties: Longyan, Pinghe, Zhangping and Ningyang.⁸ Therefore the area was composed of twelve counties, making up twenty-three per cent of Fujian's area and with a population of 2.5 million people, according to a CCP report of July 9, 1930.⁹ Such a spacious and populous terrain was not easily mobilized. What ecological conditions could the CCP use to build a lasting revolutionary base area there for years, and to make it to an integral part of "Central Soviet Area" as well? I will seek to trace the ecological history of the revolution in this area and then, based on the limited sources available to me, to discover how the CCP mobilized people in various counties with various degrees of success.

1 Socio-economic Situation

Being a part of the Jiangxi-Fujian-Guangdong border region, the Minxi area possessed ecological characteristics typical of the CCP's revolutionary base areas in south-central China during the early stages of the Chinese revolution. It was mountainous, generally inaccessible and reputed to be weakly controlled by counter-revolutionary authority. This area had been considered a military stronghold since the Tang Dynasty because of its strategic significance, but it was relatively backward, both economically and culturally, compared with neighboring regions. During peaceful times, governments could control this area with official armies, but during periods of turmoil it was overrun with bandits. Besides, most of western Fujian's inhabitants, as in nearby Jiangxi and Guangdong, were Hakka. (There were also minority ethnic groups living in the mountain areas, like the Yao People who lived in the Bopingling.)¹⁰ Lineage organizations were powerful and

struggles for land and irrigation drainage among them were common, even escalating into armed affrays (*xiedou*). Their special dialect, customs and conception of solidarity all intensified the Hakkas' suspicion and hostility toward outsiders. The people living there were described as militant. After the massive Taiping Rebellion, which disturbed this area at least three times, the phenomenon of local militarization became prevalent in the western Fujian area.¹¹ Militia led by local elites, secret societies such as the Big Sword Society (*Dadao Hui*), and bandits were prevalent through this area.¹² By the Republican period western Fujian was known as a "bandit world."¹³

The area is located deep in the ranges between the Wuyi Mountains and the Bopingsling, drained by the Ding River flowing from north to south into the Han River Basin in Guangdong province, the Gong River (a branch of Jiangxi's Gan River system) flowing from east to west, and the Jiulong River and Sha River flowing east to the sea in southern and eastern Fujian.¹⁴ As we can see, the western Fujian area has a foot in each of three macroregions as defined by G. William Skinner: its southern parts drain into the Lingnan region, its western parts drain ultimately into the Middle Yangtze region, while streams in its eastern half feed into the Southeast Coast region.¹⁵ Consequently, although there are no major cities in the area, the economic evolution and literati circles of western Fujian were profoundly influenced by neighboring urban areas, such as Guangzhou, Chaozhou and Shantou in Guangdong province, Xiamen and Fuzhou in eastern Fujian, and Nanchang and Ruijin in Jiangxi province.

According to a CCP report, in western Fujian, eighty per cent of the population engaged in agriculture and only little more than ten per cent were workers. Among these who engaged in agriculture, landlords and rich peasants made up less than five per cent, middle peasants seventeen per cent, and poor peasants seventy-five per cent. At any rate, the average proportion of agricultural laborers, viewed by the CCP as the most revolutionary component among peasants, was less than five per cent. Furthermore, less than one per cent of the population in Changding county were agricultural workers, while there were

none in Xi'nan district of Yongding county, which was the first experimental locale of the CCP's land reform in western Fujian.¹⁶

This area was mountainous and the agricultural land was limited, but the population density was high, though variable. Twenty-two mu (one mu is approximately 1/6 acre) of agricultural land is the minimum for the average peasant household to support itself. However, the research of the Nationalist government in 1941 showed that if the agricultural land of Fujian province was distributed equally, each peasant household would own fourteen mu of land, which was still not enough to maintain their livelihood.¹⁷ What made it worse was the unequal distribution of agricultural land; a CCP report noted that sixty-five per cent was owned by a small number of private individuals, twenty per cent (the so-called "public agricultural land" or *gong tian*) belonged to lineages and associations, and only fifteen per cent was owned by other peasants.¹⁸

Despite the likely exaggeration of CCP reports, the stratification of peasantry and the maldistribution of agricultural land at least illustrates what was a common situation in South China, namely that wealthy people and powerful lineages possessed most of the natural resources, while most peasants had at least a little land, but few had enough to support themselves fully, so that tenancy was also prevalent in this area. Most poor peasants had to engage in the manufacture or growth of a variety of handicrafts and mountain products to make a living. Doubtless the overlap between poor peasants and handicraft workers was substantial.

As for urbanization in Minxi, its economic characteristics make Skinner's framework of macroregions relevant. Before the development of sea transportation, the Ding River was the main route for travelers between eastern Guangdong and north China. After sea transport developed, the demand for passenger service was reduced, while the transportation of commodities became much more prosperous. Imports from Guangdong and Jiangxi included salt, coal oil, marine products, foreign goods and grass cloth. Exports, such as tobacco, paper, timber and tea, were conveyed to Shantou and Chaozhou in

Guangdong.¹⁹ The most prosperous handicrafts in Minxi were paper, tobacco, timber and cloth. Consequently, the workers in these four kinds of handicrafts made up the main part of the worker stratum.²⁰

Because of being transit points for trade in the tri-province area, quite a few market towns emerged along riverine trade routes, such as the county seats of Longyan and Changding, and Xiabei town in Wuping county. The close economic inter-dependency among these three provinces can be well illustrated by the situation in Changding. Besides native merchants, there were four groups of merchants controlling the trade in Changding county: the Jiangxi group, the Guangdong group, the Longyan group and the Shanghang group.²¹ Because of the mountainous terrain and poor land transportation, there was an enormous demand for porters and boatmen to transport goods. The porters in this area were not only natives but also outsiders from Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. For example, in Xiabei town, most of the porters were from Jiangxi. As for the boatmen, most of them also engaged in farming.²² To summarize, we can see that the workers in this area were a complicated blend of handicraftsmen, porters and boatmen, many of whom were still part-time peasants. There was no modern industry in Minxi during this period, nor was there a genuine proletarian class.

Although production methods were backward in this area, the influence of the world market still had a profound impact. After the Opium War in the 1840's, imports of foreign cloth, paper and tobacco ruined the most profitable local trades. Bankruptcy of handicrafts resulted in tens of thousands of jobless workers. Fluctuation of world market prices devastated small peasants' agriculture. After the opening of trade ports such as Xiamen and Shantou, and the dumping of foreign goods, the demand for the old Changding-Longyan riverine trade route declined, which caused the unemployment of at least ten thousand porters. All the changes precipitated the social and economic deterioration of this area. The proportion in the population of the so-called "lumpen proletariat" (*yumin*) rose to twenty-five per cent, which provided a substantial resource for the recruiting of warlord

armies, bandit groups and even the CCP.²³

In sum, then, local militarization, economic bankruptcy, social miseries and a rising jobless population all contributed to the complicated political situation in this area.

2 Structure of Political Power and Complex of Local Leaders

The structure of political power in the western Fujian area should be examined at two levels: the provincial and the local. Political power at the provincial level I define as any kind of authority beyond the county level. Considering the CCP's base area from 1930 to 1934, I will try to show that political power at the local level was more critical to the CCP's control than their dealing with the provincial level.

During the 1920's and 1930's, most political power at the provincial level was held by warlords. Although the area was too destitute to support nationally powerful warlords, it was occupied by several small warlords who belonged to and switched among various factions under the Nationalist regime. In western Fujian, most of the warlords were natives and former bandits. While retaining their bandit disposition, they nominally accepted official military titles from the Nationalist government, but fought for power and spheres of influence constantly and violently. Mutual suspicion kept the warlords divided and cautiously watchful of each other. Additionally, their power was complicated by the wars between leading warlords, such as Jiang Jieshi, Li Zongren and Yan Xishan. It was the opening caused by the power struggle among warlords that the CCP sought to take advantage of. At the end of 1926, the army of the Northern Expedition conquered Fujian. The Nanjing government appointed Yang Shuzhuang, the Secretary of the Navy, to serve concurrently as the governor of the province. To maintain social order and to keep momentary peace in this area, Yang allowed local warlords to take charge of their own original power spheres. The main allocation of warlords' power areas in Minxi was as follows: Guo Fengming held the so-called *Ding shu ba xian* (eight counties of

Dingzhou), Cheng Guohui held the counties of Longyan and Zhangping, Lan Yutien held Shanghang, Zhang Zhen held Pinghe, and Lu Xingbang held the counties of Qingliu, Liancheng and Ninghua.²⁴ There were still other small warlords who occupied some places without interference from any kind of authority.

Clearly, warlord power in Minxi was scattered and unstable. One important aspect that deserves more attention is the interdependence and mutual resistance between the provincial and local political power. I will explore this subject later in this study.

Political power at the local level in Minxi was even more menacing and complicated to manipulate for the communists, because the Communists' challenge was more direct and compelling to the established order. I define the local level of political power as the power wielded by local elites. Despite the continuity or the discontinuity of its characteristics, the significance of the role the elite has played in Chinese society has been observed by many scholars. As Professor Averill notes, the attitudes and actions "of the lowest, largest, and most volatile stratum of the local elite,... were of crucial importance to all who sought to change the contours of Chinese rural society."²⁵ No matter whether they selected the revolutionary or the counter-revolutionary side, local elites tended to maintain or cultivate their political power in reference to the environment around them.

As I mentioned in the introduction, to analyze the local political structure thoroughly, I will try to employ Elizabeth Perry's and Stephen Averill's conceptions of the "protective gentry," the "predatory gentry" and "multi-tiered local elites" to look into the characteristics of local elites in the peripheral area of Minxi. Additionally, as Professor Roy Hofheinz presumes, one possible explanation of Chinese Communist success is 'the behavior of the Chinese Communists themselves.'²⁶ Likewise, I assume the strategy adopted by a local leader, whether he was a communist or not, affected the local revolutionary movement significantly. Following this point of view, Perry's framework seems to be really valuable, if we try to analyze the interaction between ecology and the strategy the local leaders adopted in their power bases to resist the interference from outside. I try to clarify my

reasoning with the following examples of several local leaders with various backgrounds and fates, whose main concerns were how to preserve their power. Areas of such local leaders proved to be uncontrollable for the CCP.

Minxi contains twelve counties. Although the general regional socio-economic setting has been mentioned above, circumstances varied somewhat in each section. With the cases I examine, I intend to make the point that the interaction between socio-economic setting and characteristics of local leaders is complicated.

In Minxi, there were quite a few local leaders who belonged to the category of "protective gentry." Most of the areas which tended to adopt protective strategies were economically richer but socially more backward than neighboring areas, with powerful lineage organizations and far from county seats and strategic market towns. In other words, these areas were closed and self-sufficient, in Perry's words, "more secure." The domination of powerful lineages was complete and the social position of elementary and middle school teachers was respectable, for they controlled a major path to the outside world. Accordingly, rural elites and school teachers in such areas could exert influence on peasants with little challenge.

A typical example of such an area was Wubei district (northern part of Wuping county), which was in the peripheral area. It contained four villages: Yongping, Dahe, Touxu and Xiangdian.²⁷ In the 1930s, because of long-standing complicated socio-political struggles among bandits, officials and lineages, there were two factions in the Wubei district, that of Lan Qiguan in Dahe village and that of Deng Liwen in Xiangdian village. Armed feuds between these two factions were common. Although brutal fights among leaders were serious, they also consistently and forcefully resisted any kind of authority that tried to penetrate their local strongholds, no matter whether it was the Nationalist government or the Communist army. Although their own area was highly militarized, the people in the Wubei district never tried to invade other areas.²⁸ There were some characteristics of Wubei society during 1920s-1940s that deserve more attention. First, there were many

intellectuals; as was common in China at that time, some of them got college degrees from prestigious universities in other provinces and some went overseas, but most of them graduated from local middle schools. After completing their studies, most of these intellectuals did not stay in prosperous urban areas; instead they went home and enjoyed the privilege of being intellectuals in a backward area. Because most of these intellectuals were scions of elite families, it was easy for them to get jobs as school teachers, to live at home without jobs, or even to become local leaders. The second characteristic of Wubei society was that every village owned its own arms, especially various kinds of modern guns and bullets. Although the number of guns differed from village to village, the fact that so many arms existed in villages was a reflection of how wealthy and powerful lineages were in this area. A third characteristic was that social order was relatively stable and outside bandits hardly disturbed this area. However, the Nationalist government could also not collect any kind of tax here, nor did the CCP achieve substantial control.²⁹ The Wubei district remained essentially a self-governed area until the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

The situation in Gutian village of Liancheng county was similar to that of Wubei district. Liancheng was one of the counties that the CCP could not have substantial control. A landlord and merchant from Gutian named Hua Yangqiao led a militia with more than seven hundred guns and thousands of followers. Hua's power base never expanded beyond his hometown, nor was he controlled by any kind of outside authority. Of course, out of necessity, this kind of local leader would cooperate with warlord armies to repress the Communist uprisings.³⁰ Anti-communism was their common interest and they also were strongly determined to preserve the existing socio-political structure. Clearly, such protective local leaders were definitely counter-revolutionary.

In contrast to this "protective strategy," some areas adopting a "predatory strategy" were formerly prosperous but small market towns that became bankrupt after the abolition of the old trade routes. These areas were naturally poor. During prosperous times, they

were targets of bandit attack, while later the social situation in these areas was exacerbated by the long-term occupation of bandits, or bandits who were nominally renamed militias, a phenomenon called *bing fei yi jia* (soldiers and bandits are one family). Therefore the characteristic of local leaders in these areas was more bandit- oriented; some were the so-called "social bandits," some were really predatory bandits.

The model example of this kind of area was the Wunan area (the southern part of Wuping county). This area, located on the Jiangxi-Fujian-Guangdong border, consisted of nine townships. For example, Xiabei town, the seat of Xiabei township, had been an important commercial town along the Xiabei river since the Ming dynasty. Salt, rice, sundries and paper businesses had thrived and thousands of porters (most of them from Jiangxi province) and boatmen had been centered there. When social order deteriorated and imperialist commercial invasion intensified, Xiabei and other market towns in Wunan declined economically. A huge number of people in the area became jobless and were forced to become bandits or soldiers to make a living.³¹

Zhong Shaokui was a militia leader and former bandit chief in Wunan. Zhong's father, Zhong Youyue, was a Qing *xiucai* (the lowest examination degree at the county level), and owned a pawnshop. Although Zhong was not well-educated, he was still involved in elite circles. Beginning during an armed feud between the Zhong and Zeng lineages, Zhong started his bandit career by gathering a group of native followers and seizing guns from militias. In 1928, he joined the troops of Lan Yutian, one of the small warlords in Minxi who dominated Shangyang county and claimed leadership of Wunan.³²

In 1929, a Communist named Li Changming became Zhong's sworn brother in hopes of being able to use Zhong's force to build a soviet area. This method seemed to work at first. Zhong followed Li's plan to confiscate a landlord's guns and property, and then prepared to establish a personal military force. Although this cooperation was somewhat like a trade- off, it is fair to assume that Zhong's acceptance of Li's opinion was more due to his disposition of being a "social bandit" and his loyalty to friendship than to any real

appreciation of Communism. However, when his father's good friend, Liu Xiangting (also a Qing lower-degree holder), tried to persuade him to kill Li, Zhong allowed Li to escape from the town and then cut connections with the Communists.³³

Afterwards, Zhong kept augmenting his power base by fighting with provincial-level warlords and the Red Army. With his power getting stronger, Zhong changed his force's name from the Save Wuping Corps (*Wuping jiuxiang tuan*) to the Save Ding Prefecture Armed Corps (*Ding shu wuzhong jiuxiang tuan*). Although he seemed to stand with the counter-revolutionary side to suppress the Communist movement, actually Zhong did not have a clear-cut political stance. On the one hand, he attacked both warlord and Communist troops to increase his personal force, and on the other he implemented the policy of twenty-five percent rent reduction and restrained the rapaciousness of lineages to protect the poor in his base area.³⁴ Taking all of this into account, Zhong fits into the category of "predatory social bandit." When Zhong was killed by a Nationalist official, his followers retaliated and killed that official.³⁵

Besides such social bandits as Zhong, there were more bandits and soldiers who changed their allegiance back and forth between Red Army and warlord troops, such as Liu Liebo in Yanshi town in Longyan, Peng Shunrong in Shangfeng village in Wuping, and Zheng Seng in Xingqiao township in Changding.³⁶ They used their forces as leverage to bargain with various authorities and in taking advantage of chaotic situations. They not only lacked a firm political standpoint but also harmed local people as well. This kind of local leader caused what the CCP called *tufei wenti* and *liumang wenti* (the problems of bandits and hooligans). Most of them were executed by the Nationalist 19th Route Army after the CCP's Long March in 1934.

The local leader with the most complex characteristics may have been Fu Bocui. Fu was a member of the Nationalist Party before 1927, then joined the CCP and led a local Communist uprising, and became one of the leaders in establishing the CCP's base area. But at the end of 1929 he left his CCP position, stayed in his power base and resisted

the CCP's orders, due to a disagreement about the policy of land revolution. After being expelled from the CCP, Fu accepted several positions as militia leader from the Nationalist government. When the Minxi base area initiated a purge of the Social Democratic Party, Fu became the target of the purge. Despite this attack, Fu retained his local force until 1949 and then switched back to the CCP side. Because Fu's political stance is a complicated one, I would like to examine his characteristics from a social perspective and try to describe a more comprehensive picture of the origin of the CCP Minxi base area.

Fu was from a big landlord, although not the largest one, in the Jiaoyang village of Bei Si Qu (the fourth district of northern Shanghang county).³⁷ In the Republican period, Shanghang country was divided into more than twenty districts. The *Bei Si Qu* included twenty natural villages, and Jiaoyang village was one of them. Jiaoyang village was the political, cultural and geographical center of *Bei Si Qu*, with five hundred households and a population of two thousand people. It was richer than neighboring villages and was dominated by Fu's lineage.³⁸ This provided the basic socio-economic condition for adopting protective activity.

Belonging to the enlightened upper layer of the local elite, Fu pursued the western "new learning" and was very concerned about China's critical situation. In 1914, he went to Japan to study law and joined the Chinese Revolutionary Party organized by Sun Yatsen to overthrow the government of the northern warlords. The next year, he participated in the student movement to protest the Japanese government's infamous 21 Demands. When he went back in 1917, Fu organized an association for legal study, *faxue she*, in the county seat of Shanghang to fight the corrupt bureaucracy and gained the title "emperor of the students," which implied that he was influential among students. During the period of GMD-CCP cooperation, Fu was a left-wing member of the GMD and had a good relationship with Communist members. When the 'white terror' started in 1927, Fu fled to his hometown and continued anti-right-wing GMD activities underground. In September of 1927, when the CCP's Nanchang Uprising army passed through Minxi, Fu became a

Communist Party member with the recommendation of Luo Ming, a CCP commissioner of Fujian province.³⁹

Details of Fu's work in leading ulBei *Si Qu*'s Communist movement will be described later; here I will focus on the general relation between Fu's local orientation and the CCP's orders. When the development of the peasant movement in Jiaoyang village was booming, one of the leaders of the Minxi base area, Deng Zihui, came to oversee the whole movement. Observing that conditions in Jiaoyang village were ripe for land revolution, Deng suggested Fu organize a mass uprising and confiscate landlords' lands to distribute to poor peasants. Fu refused Deng's advice. He did not agree that the stage of mass uprising had come, and he preferred the system of "land collection" rather than land revolution. Eventually, Deng left without any agreement.⁴⁰

Similar situations occurred again in later years. For example, when Guo Boping, the party secretary of Shanghang county, ordered Fu to desert ulBei *Si Qu* to help other areas' movements in 1928, he refused again and stayed to preserve his followers and power base.⁴¹ Although the armed force of ulBei *Si Qu* had been renamed the Fourth Column of the Fourth Red Army, it seemed that it was hard for the CCP to have effective control over this armed force. Most of the time the armed forces of ulBei *Si Qu* planned to stay in their home area rather than follow the Fourth Red Army's adventuresome battles.⁴² Therefore the split between Fu and the CCP seems unsurprising. What is surprising was that although Fu was dismissed as a party member at the end of 1930 and was attacked by the Red Army, he still regarded himself as a Communist and cooperated with the Nationalist government and CCP guerrillas during the Anti-Japanese War period. He appears to have retained his position as local leader without any impediment. When the Communist victory came in 1949, he led his armed force back to the CCP side. Fu Bocui's example seems to show us that no matter what political stance he adopted, he would do what he could to protect his local autonomy, in terms of the collective good. I would like to assign Fu into the category of "protective Communist gentry."

The cases I have mentioned above focus on the influence between local leaders' characteristics and their own power bases. Clearly, the characteristics of local leaders were shaped by the original socio-economic setting. Prerequisite for the dominant influence of local leaders, as shown by the examples I have raised, was the condition of their power bases. In the peripheral areas, the socially conservative and self-sufficient ones produced local leaders inclined to adopt "protective activity," because the traditional ties of social structure in these areas were stronger. On the other hand, declining, poorer and minor market towns were easily occupied by predatory bandits and soldiers, because the old social structure had been disrupted by economic decay before the coming of outsiders.

To sum up, the areas far from major political conflict were easily controlled by existing local leaders. Although lots of effort had been made by Communists to penetrate the local power structure, the extent of success was still questionable during the Soviet period, since there were still some places untouched, which I have called the peripheral area. Although Perry's study focuses on north China, Fu's example, I think, undermines her argument about the CCP's land revolution making the compulsion of local people to adopt certain kind of strategic activity unnecessary. After all, as Perry is aware, the interaction between ecological setting and local activity is more subtle than can be expressed by any kind of simple framework.

3 Educational Circles and the Origin of Communist Thought

The function of educational circles as arenas of political struggle, which Averill has suggested, was more developed in the relatively advanced areas in Minxi, which I term "the core area," such as the county capitals and the vicinity of the seats of counties, than in the peripheral areas I discussed above. In such advanced areas, the established social structure was more in flux and open to outside influence, and inter-personal relationships were more complicated. The confrontation among elites and power struggles between local elites and

warlords were acute. No powerful individual or organization could control this kind of area completely. Of course, another important reason was that the best and highest level of schools was there. The upper layer of the local elites had strong networks of connection with major cities, and the middle and lowest layers of the local elites could establish personal relations with higher levels of power through educational circles in the major cities. According to Averill's observation, the "declining households" of the lowest layer of local elites was the main group making up the Communist leaders in Jiangxi. Although their most critical attribute was their close relationship with the peasants, which facilitated mass agitation, they were also involved in the social structure as a whole.⁴³ Besides, as we know, before the bloody suppression in 1927 most Communist intellectuals worked in the county capitals under the cover of GMD organizations and personal relations, most of which had been established earlier when they were studying in those cities. Therefore, to investigate the relationship between "educational circles" and the origin of the Communist movement is important not only for understanding the backgrounds of Communist leaders, but also for more deeply scrutinizing the political struggle of local elites in the major cities of Minxi.

As everywhere in China, changes from the end of the Qing dynasty had significantly affected the whole of Minxi. Since the abolition of the imperial examinations, the legitimacy of elite status had changed from success in competition for degrees to involvement in the new, Western-style educational system. Accordingly, educational degrees from the new-style schools became one kind of political capital. Except for a few vocational schools, the highest level of schools in Minxi were middle schools. Most schools were adapted from local or regional academies (*shuyuan*) and supported by Qing degree-holders, the so-called "enlightened upper-level elites." For example, the Provincial Seventh Middle School in the Changding county seat was adapted from the old Longshang Shuyuan, and its first principal was Kang Yong, who had received the *jinshi* (the highest exam degree) in 1892.⁴⁴

The power continuity of the old elite was strong, but it could not entirely overcome the solidarity of the rising power of young intellectuals. One reason was that, as Averill notes, the management and certification of education had changed, so that "...educational control was now much more firmly in the hands of school leaders themselves."⁴⁵ The other reason was that good elementary and middle schools were few. In general, most distinguished intellectuals in the same county were also alumni of the same elementary and middle schools. This kind of alumni relationship was as close as that between imperial degree-holders who had passed the examination in the same year, the so-called *tongnian* relationship. For example, most of the Communist intellectuals in Longyang county were alumni of the Kaiming Elementary School and of the Provincial Ninth Middle School.⁴⁶ Such a close alumni relationship helped them a lot when they were sent back to countryside to carry on the Communist movement and to fight with other local elites, but it also complicated the relationship between the young elites and the old ones, for the latter were frequently the teachers or the principals of the former.

Although the flood of the May Fourth Movement overwhelmed Minxi's young intellectuals, the backwardness of the area blocked their anxiety in searching for ways to save China. As a matter of fact, there was no example of what Roy Hofheinz terms a "radical hotbed" in the entire region.⁴⁷ Instead, the origin of Minxi's Communist movement was strongly influenced by neighboring urban areas such as Guangzhou and Xiamen. For lack of high-level schools, most ambitious intellectuals in Minxi had to go to other places to pursue further study, and it was in these urban areas that they learned of Marxism.

The earliest Communist organization in Xiamen was established by Li Jueming in 1926. Li was from Yongding county and studied in the Jimei Normal School (Jimei shifan xuexiao) in Xiamen. He attended the CCP's Second National Congress in Guangzhou, became a Communist member, and was sent back to Xiamen to develop the Communist movement there.⁴⁸ The Jimei Normal School attracted many Minxi intellectuals because it was tuition-free. In Longyan county, there was a so-called "Jimei fever" in the 1910s

and 1920s, indicating how popular this school was.⁴⁹ Although relevant evidence is scarce, it is probably safe to assume that most of the intellectuals interested in the Jimei Normal School were from the families of middle and lower-level local elites, though a few may have been from wealthy families. At any rate, many Communist local leaders in Minxi were graduates of the Jimei Normal School.⁵⁰

The other hotbed in which the Minxi communists were nourished was the Canton Peasant Movement Training Institute (Guangzhou nongmin yundong jiangxi suo). The Canton Peasant Institute was a product of GMD-CCP cooperation and was controlled by Communist members. The fifth and sixth classes of the Institute were most influential in developing Communist members, because Peng Pai was in charge of the former and Mao Zedong was in charge of the latter. Besides, during that period the CCP's Fourth National Congress, held in Shanghai in January of 1925, resolved to establish party organizations in industrial areas and big cities which had no Communist organizations yet. Therefore, the cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen became the points of emphasis in Fujian province. Under this direction, although Minxi was not a major target area, the intellectuals from Minxi were also profoundly affected.⁵¹

Besides the Canton Peasant Institute, there were many students from Minxi scattered around Guangzhou. Minxi students at Guangdong University organized the Ding Lei She (the Association of Ding Lei) and issued a monthly paper entitled *Ding Lei* (literally, the thunder of Ding prefecture), from March 25 to December 15, 1926. Basically the purpose of *Ding Lei* was in tune with the Northern Expedition. It called for the people in Minxi to learn the 'Three People's Principles,' and to stand up to fight the warlords. Because the leaders of the Ding Lei Association were Communists, the paper conveyed the ideas of Communism, although in a diluted populist form. It focused on awakening the consciousness of peasants. When the Nationalist troops marched into Minxi, the members of the Ding Lei Association decided to go back to their hometowns to join the revolutionary movement.⁵²

Of course, many other intellectuals and students in Minxi also tried to influence people's thought by using the forms of study associations and papers. Deng Zihui, one of the major leaders of the Minxi base area, organized the Qishen Shu She (the Qishen Study Society) in Longyan county in the spring of 1921 and issued the monthly paper *Yan Sheng* (the voice of Longyan). The members of the Qishen Study Society were progressive teachers and students, and *Yan Sheng* was the most influential and widely-read revolutionary paper in Minxi. Deng joined the CCP at the end of 1926 in Chongyi county in Jiangxi province.⁵³ Others, such as Lao Dahua and Guo Shangping, organized a study association in Shanghang county and printed the periodical *Huan Deng* (literally, changing light).⁵⁴

The connection between the educational circles and the origins of the Communist movement was close not only at the start but also during later stages. When the Communist intellectuals came home, they used their old relations in educational circles to begin their work, using techniques such as organizing alumni associations, becoming school teachers, or founding night schools and civilian schools to consolidate their relations and educate peasants.

I would like to stop here briefly to examine what kind of Communism the Minxi intellectuals perceived at this moment. It is clear that the spread of Communism in Minxi was later than in neighboring urban areas and was strongly influenced by those areas. There is little doubt that the teaching of Peng Pai and Mao Zedong at the Canton Peasant Institute had an important influence on their acceptance of Communism. That is, the essence of Communism (or more precisely Peng's or Mao's interpretation of Communism) had been adapted to Chinese reality. For someone who had never been directly affected by Peng's or Mao's thought, we can take Deng Zihui's experience as an example. In search of ways to make China rich and strong, Deng had gone through several phases of thought transformation, from reformism to anarchism to Communism. For him, Communism was more like an effective revolutionary guidance than a pure theoretical structure. He perceived that the revolutionary populace included the whole suppressed masses rather

than simply the proletarian class, which was weak in Minxi. In order to build a new and powerful China, he decided to devote himself to the revolutionary party to save the suppressed mass from misery.⁵⁵ Since the essence of Communism was to launch a successful revolution, he felt that the interpretation of ideology should fit the reality, or in other words that the ideology should be relatively flexible. Therefore, at the beginning, the Communist leaders in Minxi had little conflict between ideology and reality, as Peng Pai had in Hai-Lu Feng counties. But as the revolutionary movement in Minxi developed and the CCP wanted to control the whole movement, real problems arose. One concerned the principle of organization, the so-called "system of democratic centralism" and the tension among organization, ideology and reality that developed later in the soviet period. Another problem was conflict between state-building and revolution. I will discuss these problems in the latter part of this study.

4 Concluding Remarks

There is no certain relationship between ecological setting and revolutionary tendency, although the possibility of a relationship always exists. As Hofheinz observed, "...border area bases tended...to rank relatively high on scales of grievance potential, such as that of tenancy."⁵⁶ After examining all the ecological materials he could find, Hofheinz could only conclude that the best possible explanation of Chinese Communist success was the behavior of the Chinese Communists themselves. His argument is very tempting if we inspect the Minxi area as a whole. But I would like to point out that a revolutionary movement is too complicated to be explained by any single reason. All factors intertwine with each other. Although tenancy and banditry were prevalent in Minxi, some places where the land maldistribution was highest, such as Gutian township and the Wubei area, and some places where the bandit power was strongest, such as the Wunan area and Yangshi village, proved to be unproductive soil for the Communist movement. These cases show the strength

of local village structure, and of a parochialism that was against every kind of external force, regardless of whether it was revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Fu Bocui was another case. He was both a protective gentry and a Communist. He used Communism to improve peasants' conditions, while still preserving his position as a local leader. His case shows that the compound interactions among natural ecology, village structure and the characteristics of local leaders are hard to categorize. Likewise, in the places to which the Communist members had access, the type of strategy Communist intellectuals used to break through the established social structure was critical to the success of revolutionary development.

The extent of urban influence from Guangzhou, Xiamen and Fuzhou had significant impact on the evolution of socio-economic and literati circles in Minxi. Economic fluctuation affected people's lives in general. Peasants were bankrupt, workers were jobless, and mobility of the elite stratum was accelerated. In Minxi, the class line between the peasant and the worker was blurred. Some workers had land to cultivate, such as boatmen and handicraft workers, who had ties with land. Economic deterioration caused the growth of numerous 'lumpen proletarians' who were the members recruited by both Red Army and anti-Communist troops. Therefore, the composition of "oppressed people" in Minxi was not easily clarified, as the CCP always wanted to do. There were no industrial workers. Like other places in China, the early Communist movement was led by young intellectuals. Because there was no radical hotbed county in Minxi, the thought of Communism was basically brought to the region by returned intellectuals from Guangzhou and Xiamen. The confrontation between the old elite and the new elite was entangled with endemic factionalism and the new ideology and organization. In my opinion, the origin of the Communist movement was greatly shaped by the thoughts of Mao Zedong and Peng Pai. This feature profoundly affected the development of Communist movement and the CCP's political struggle in Minxi.

All in all, in this portion of the study, I have tried to show the complexity of social

structure in Minxi. The dynamics of peasant mentality, variety of local leaders, multiplicity of elite strata and method of accepting Communism, all together make up what I call the social roots of CCP political struggle in the Minxi base area. These social roots deeply influenced the development of the Communist movement, which I will discuss in the next part of the study.

II. THE COMMUNIST UPRISING AND THE FAILURE OF THE XI'NAN DISTRICT SOVIET

Those Communist uprisings occurring before the coming of the Zhu-Mao Red Army were essentially planned autonomously by local Communist leaders, although they had received the resolution of the August Seventh Meeting which gave basic directions about how to stage an armed uprising. The most important uprising was led by Zhang Dingcheng in Jinsha village of Yongding county in June 1928. The Yongding-Jinsha uprising succeeded in creating an army-occupied area, the Xi'nan District, in which the CCP experimented with the first land revolution in Minxi.

This chapter primarily investigates how the established social structure was exploited by the Communist revolutionary movement, and in particular how CCP members mobilized the masses to fight with local elites. In addition this chapter also tries to show that the organizational roots of political struggle in Minxi chiefly stemmed from the need of the CCP organizations to grow to match the development of the movement. During this organizational transformation, leadership layers were somewhat indefinite and personal relations among the leaders also overshadowed organizational structure, which caused misunderstandings among various levels of organization. Some scholars explain the transformation of the CCP's organizations simply from the perspective of political- ideological struggle, but in this presentation organization and politics are dialectically interrelated. Ideological and political struggles influenced the development of organizations, but the latter also helped the CCP intra-party power struggles.

Owing both to the deficiencies of the material at hand and the variable significance of uprisings, the descriptions of each uprising below vary considerably in length. Hopefully the

purpose of this study, which is to interrelate the local ecological setting, the characteristics of local Communist leaders and the function of CCP organization, will still be achieved.

1 Beginning of the Communist Movement

The beginning of the Communist movement in Minxi will be separated into two phases. The first phase was under the wing of GMD leftists and the purpose, at least on the surface, was to help the Nationalist Government's Northern Expedition. Recruited by GMD or CCP, real Communists thus mixed with GMD leftists. Usually these revolutionary young men cooperated with the local enlightened elites to fight with bad gentry and local bullies. That is, in the beginning of the Communist movement, because the identity of Communists was vague, not only did some potential Communists not yet view themselves as Communists, but also no genuine split between the young revolutionary intellectuals and the circle of the local upper elites occurred. Decisive separation occurred only at the start of the second phase of the early Communist movement, when the local upper elites perceived that the newly-rising force of young intellectuals threatened their social prestige even after the victory of the Nationalist army in 1926. Many local upper enlightened elites then turned to the GMD rightists for help in suppressing the leftists. Also, it was at this stage that the "white terror" forced many young revolutionary intellectuals to the CCP side; some changed sides out of political frustration, while some were exposed. Nonetheless, the whole procedure was not at all clear cut, because of the extremely intertwined local relations.

During the first stage, these young revolutionaries worked in county capitals, and the most important relations for them to hold were horizontal relations to other young people. During the second stage, on the other hand, they fled to their home villages and had to deal with vertical networks of multilayered local elites and the masses. But, of course, when they were looking for refuge in the countryside and working on peasant movements, it did

not mean that they cut relations with urban areas, because most upper elites in cities had ties with the countryside. A benign and relatively close relationship with upper elites in cities was helpful for the Communists in their efforts to construct a successful rural movement. According to the case studies, the most important relations for the Communist leaders to deal with were those with multi-layered rural elites. However, the whole situation was diverse and complicated. A more critical concern if we are to obtain more comprehensive knowledge about the CCP's political struggle in the Minxi base area is to investigate how the Communists manipulated their constant interactions with local structure.

At the beginning of the GMD-CCP cooperation in the spring of 1924 to subvert local warlord governments in Fujian, the GMD dispatched Jiang Dongqin, a GMD leftist from Yongding county, to establish a GMD organization in the province. Jiang recruited many party members in Xiamen; over one hundred of them were students of the Jimei Normal School, and more than half of them came from Minxi. As mentioned before, it was fashionable in Longyan county to study at the Jimei Normal School in the 1920s. When these Longyan young men went home as GMD leftists, they worked as teachers, organized a Jimei Alumni Association (Jimei Tongxuehui), and issued revolutionary propaganda.⁵⁷ Students also came back from the Canton Peasant Institute. They focused on peasant movements and set up peasant associations in cities and countryside as well. The advanced students in Changding county initiated the United Association of Students in the county capital.⁵⁸ In each county seat, there were various kinds of associations set up by young students and intellectuals to oppose power holders and promote anti-warlord ideas.

After the Nationalist army entered Fujian, the GMD leftists and CCP members jointly initiated several influential organizations to operate their power and cultivate activists, such as the Yan-Ping-Ning Political Inspection Office (Yanpingning Zhengzhi Jiancha Shu) in the Longyan capital, and the Ding Prefecture Political Office (including the so-called Ding Shu eight counties: Changding, Shanghang, Yongding, Liancheng, Ninghua, Qingliu and Guihua) in the Changding county seat. Under orders from the CCP's Min'nan

Special Committee (the origin of which will be mentioned later), both organizations held meetings with the GMD branches of every county and resolved to establish the Yan-Ping-Ning Institute for Cultivating Propaganda Members (Yanpingning Xuanchuan Renyuan Yangchengsuo) in the Longyan capital and the Ding Prefecture Eight-County Institute for Cultivating Social Movement Members (Dingshu Baxian Shehui Yundong Renyuan Yangchengsuo) in the county seat of Shanghang in March of 1927.⁵⁹ These two institutes were controlled by Communist members and their curricula resembled the Canton Peasant Institute.⁶⁰

The effect of these organizations was profound. They not only consolidated young revolutionaries from various counties but also cultivated and recruited many activists. Many Communists involved in later uprisings either had experience cooperating with each other in those organizations or were cultivated by those institutes. At any rate, relations among the young revolutionaries in Minxi were complicated by overlapping educational links and working bonds.

The development of CCP organization in this period was important to the contemporary movement and to the later uprisings as well. During the period of the Great Revolution, the CCP also grew along with the expansion of the GMD membership. The early CCP movement in Fujian was controlled by two agencies: Party Central controlled the region of northern and central Fujian centered on Fuzhou city, while the Guangdong Regional Committee supervised the region of southern and western Fujian centered on Xiamen city.⁶¹ Therefore, at the beginning, the Communist movement in Minxi was directed by the Guangdong Regional Committee. In June 1925, that Committee dispatched Lan Yuye to Xiamen to recruit. Lan focused on the hotbed of Communism, the Jimei Normal School, where he established the Xiamen branch of the Communist Youth League (CYL).⁶² In March 1926, the Guangdong Committee sent Luo Ming, who later became the secretary of the Fujian Provincial Committee and the chief target of a political purge, as a special commissioner to Xiamen to separate CYL and party. In April 1926, the Xiamen CCP

organization was formally established, with eighteen members and Ruan Shan, a native of Yongding county, as secretary. The Minxi Communist movement was under the control of the Guangdong Regional Committee until the establishment of the Min'nan Special Committee.⁶³

To meet with victory in the Northern Expedition, in January of 1927 the Guangdong Committee decided to establish the Min'nan Special Committee at the Zhangzhou county seat to consolidate control over Xiamen, Zhangzhou and Minxi. Luo Ming was appointed as secretary of this new organization. Under the Min'nan Special Committee were founded the Xiamen City Committee and party branches in Minxi counties.⁶⁴

The position of the Min'nan Special Committee was ambiguous. It was nominally guided by the Party Central but actually it had close relations with the Guangdong Committee and had a certain autonomy of its own. For example, in the spring of 1927, when Party Central sent Wang Hebo to Fuzhou to prepare for the establishment of the Fujian Provincial Committee, this plan was resisted by the Secretary of the Min'nan Special Committee, Luo Ming, and the members of the Fuzhou Special Committee. The reasons why they disagreed with the ideas of Party Central were not very clear. The ostensible reason was because the whole environment in Fujian was not safe yet, for the power of GMD rightists was still strong. But the Provisional Fujian Committee was finally established in December 1927 in an atmosphere of "white terror," with Chen Ming as its secretary. (Chen was a native of Longyan and one of the founders of *Yan Sheng*.)⁶⁵

One reason for the disagreement probably really was related to the wishes of a local organization to be free of the orders of the Party Central. However, the development of Communist movement and organization went hand in hand. The problems we are concerned with here are how the movement was directed by the organization and to what extent the lower organization was controlled by the higher ones. Besides, the effects of direction on different layers of organization are various. It is inappropriate to view the CCP organization as a whole, for this blinds us to some aspects of the confrontation among

multi-layered organizations which is important to the investigation of the CCP's intra-party disputes, at least during the Soviet period.

2 Communist Uprisings and Case Studies of Local Power Struggle

Before the Zhu-Mao Red Army arrived in January 1929, four main uprisings occurred in Minxi. They were the Longyan- Houtien uprising, the Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprising, the Yongding-Jinsha uprising and the Pinghe-Changle uprising. The first three will be used as case studies to examine the local power structure and how local CCP leaders capitalized on it with their own resources.⁶⁶

For example, compared with other areas, revolutionary development in Longyan was more active, and resulted in the first Communist uprising in Minxi. It would be proper to view Longyan as a relative "hotbed" in Minxi. But by what measure can the prevalence of Communist influence in Longyan be analyzed?

One measure is education. Of the two counties which possessed the most prosperous education environment in Minxi, Changding county did not have any Communist uprising until the Zhu-Mao Red Army came, but Longyan did. If, from another educational perspective, power struggles in educational arenas are critical to the Communist movement in the hill country, as Professor Averill suggests, why Longyan became a "hotbed" of Communist movement rather than Changding is another question demanding more systematic explanation.

If the way to evaluate the influence of the Communist movement is by the length of the uprising, Yongding should have been the "hotbed" in Minxi. But the short-lived Soviet of Xi'nan district, established after the Yongding-Jinsha uprising, is also a credible hotbed not only due to the uniqueness of the local ecological setting but also due to its leaders' characteristics and the operation of its CCP organization. On the other hand, the failure of the Xi'nan District Soviet revealed some other problems. It demonstrated not only the

weakness of the military force of the local CCP but also the weakness of peasant revolution. Definition of the peasant mentality is somewhat uncertain. However, by using Perry's predatory-protective dichotomy, I would like to assume that the main concern of any peasant community is to survive and to achieve profit maximization calculatedly. Peasants, therefore, are realistic and are limited by what they can see is good for them. It is this kind of peasant mentality that causes genuine contradiction of the CCP's revolution from the bottom up or from the top which questions the usefulness of "organization weapon" during the Soviet period when the CCP felt obligated to educate the masses rather than listen to them under the principle of the system of democracy and control.

Before the four Communist uprisings are examined separately, we must recognize that there were certain "peasant grievances" which prevailed in Minxi, such as heavy land rent, miscellaneous taxes and exploitation by bad gentry and local bullies. But, again, Professor Hofheinz's argument that no specific ecological theory can predict the success of the Communist movement applies also to Minxi. For instance, Changding and Liancheng had the highest land rent rates, seventy per cent and eighty per cent of the harvest, but they had no dominant Communist influence.⁶⁷ However, the following cases will show that the initial steps toward success of local Communist movements depended on how the Communist leaders used their own political resources to penetrate the established social structure, although that the particularity of various local structure also considerably restricted their approaches.

(1). The Longyan-Houtian Uprising

The chief Communist leaders of the Longyan-Houtien uprising were Deng Zihui and Guo Diren. Deng was born into a "declining household" and Guo was a son of a tenant farmer. Their personal backgrounds and characters were critical to the development of the Communist movement in Longyan, but to more completely understand their approaches to mobilizing the masses it is also important to be aware of the particularity of local circumstances, for both the local power structure and the social positions of the Communist

leaders significantly affected what approaches they tended to use.

According to the local gazetteer, Longyan was a mountainous county with only 22.56 percent of its land below 500 meters. Although agricultural land was limited and difficult to farm, sixty percent of the population were peasants. Among other occupations, twenty percent were merchants, fifteen percent were mountain-dwelling timber-cutters and paper-makers and five percent were intellectuals and self-employed people.⁶⁸ Of course, some people were involved in more than one occupation. The county's population density was very high, averaging 187.06 persons per square *li* (250,000 square meters). Figuring on the basis of peasant population and cultivable land, each person had 2.19 *mu*.⁶⁹ One source shows that a tenant household must have 24 *mu* of agricultural land to sustain living because of heavy land rent, and 12 *mu* were the minimum for an owner-farmer household. But peasant households cultivating only ten *mu* of land (either rented or owned) made up seventy percent of the total.⁷⁰ Because the county was unable to support all its residents, many local people sought their fortunes outside. Therefore, though the county was difficult of communication, it was still not out of touch with the outside world. The county had no large landlords; 40-50 percent of the land was in the hands of private families; the rest was public, such as lineage halls, bridges, roads and schools.⁷¹ Because of this, educational enterprises were prosperous.

Although according to rough observation from the materials at hand, the public funds of Longyan were not so rich as those of Changding, there still were many intellectuals after the end of the Qing dynasty, for most upper enlightened elites supported the development of western-style education. For example, the most famous elementary school, the "Kaiming School" (literally, the enlightening school), located in Huyang village, was built in 1910 by an eminent gentry, Zheng Bishan. Many young revolutionaries such as Guo Diren graduated from this school and were offered teaching positions later when they tried to find hiding places in the countryside. Local people always said Longyan teachers were from Huyang village and Tongbo village.⁷² These words proved how influential the Kaiming

school was.

Speaking of customs, although there were 110 lineages in Longyan county and the larger ones had their own areas of dominance, no armed feuds happened among lineages. *Xiang Gui* (village regulations) played an effective role in harmonizing relations among lineages and restricting residents' behavior.⁷³ Although basically class confrontation in Longyan was not very acute, local militarization still existed as a result of late Qing peasant rebellions and bandit raids. According to Deng Zihui's memoir, the old system of non-paid community leaders selected by lineage elders was abolished after 1923 when bandit activities became more and more violent. Also, a new type of militia organization called a protection corps (*baowei tuan*) was established, whose members were hired and controlled by the local elites.

From 1918 on, the faction in power in the Longyan capital was the gang of Du Lianru. Du was the county magistrate and had a personal power organization, the Gengshen Club (*gengshen* means the year 1920 in the Chinese lunar calendar), branches of which were scattered around the whole county. Unfortunately, because of the scarcity of material, Du's background is unknown. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Dus were not a large lineage in the county. Maybe that is why he built a modern-style club to consolidate his power net rather than using traditional village social structure. At any rate, he seemed not to be involved in any kind of educational activity; instead, he monopolized lawsuits, gambling, prostitution and the opium trade.⁷⁴ Du was a so-called "bad gentry." Against Du's dominant power, even in the countryside, the Communists in Longyan county tended to cooperate with other elites to break down his control. The following will show how Guo Diren and Deng Zihui used their personal social relation and organization in the prevailing local ecological setting to mobilize a mass movement.

Guo Diren's case is a typical example of how notably Minxi's young men were influenced by surrounding urban areas. Born into a tenant family, Guo, as did many young men in Minxi, went to the Jimei Normal School in Xiamen and then attended the

fifth class of the Canton Peasant Institute in the spring of 1926. In addition to learning of Marxism-Leninism and military discipline, students there went to observe the peasant movement led by Peng Pai in Hai-Lufeng. The whole learning experience impressed Guo so deeply that he studied everything earnestly and joined the CCP in June 1926.⁷⁵

Consequently, when he was dispatched to Minxi with the title of special commissioner of the GMD's Central Peasant Department, Guo worked with other young revolutionaries and organized various kinds of associations to develop their power and to recruit among intellectuals. As mentioned before, one of the most influential organizations they set up was the Yan-Ping-Ning Institute for Cultivating Propaganda Members, established in the Longyan county seat in March 1927. In January 1927 a Longyan Communist Party Branch was set up and Guo Diren was its organizational committee head. Although Guo and his friends devoted themselves to both intellectual work and the peasant movement during 1926 and 1927, their ties with the masses were not strong enough, for they focused on work in the county seat more than in the countryside. When the "white terror" came, almost all of the peasant associations were quickly destroyed.

As to the peasant movement during the period of the First Revolution in Longyan, Deng Zihui made some valuable comments. He said:

according to comrade Mao's direction, the CCP members in Longyan focused on the peasant movement from the beginning ... (but) peasants attending the peasant association did not gain any substantial benefit except to attend an organization which could not tightly consolidate the peasants to the revolutionary cause.⁷⁶

Deng's words, although ambiguous, meant that the Communists then were not concerned with the peasants' benefit and did not have close ties with the masses, which was pretty accurate about Minxi's peasant movement before 1927. However, not until Jiang Jieshi launched his April 12th Incident and Longyan's gentry headed by Du Lianru cooperated with the GMD rightists to suppress the leftists did Guo flee to his home village and commit himself totally to the rural peasant movement. From 1927 on, Guo Diren and

Deng Zihui cooperated with each other to organize the first CCP uprising in Minxi, the Longyan-Houtian Uprising.

Deng Zihui is an important figure in the Minxi Communist movement; he drafted the first document of Minxi's land revolution policy and he was a theoretician, too. Therefore Deng's experience deserves more study here. He was born in 1896 in Quanjing township, a small village in the vicinity of the Longyan county seat. The Dengs were the dominant lineage in this village with hundreds of households. Deng Zihui's ancestors had once been a notable family in this village, but the family had declined, and his father, Deng Hongbi, a late Qing lower degree-holder (*lingsheng*), only owned one *mu* of agricultural land and had to work as a doctor to support his family.⁷⁷ No matter how poor he was, Deng Hongbi still was viewed as a local gentry. He accepted an offer to become a principal of the *Tonggang* Elementary School and had a very good friendship with Zheng Bishan, the founder of the Kaiming School.⁷⁸ During Deng Zihui's childhood and adolescence he suffered from his mother's death and his father's departure to Guangdong province after losing a lawsuit. With his grandmother's and step-mother's help, Deng had gained a good education; after graduating from the *Tonggang* Elementary School, he passed the examination to the only middle school in Longyan county, the Provincial Ninth Middle School, and then went to Japan for further study in 1917 by being awarded public funds from the county. Deng did not finish overseas study both because of his own sickness and poverty, and also because of his frustration with imperialism. He responded to the movement of student strikes and went home in May, 1918. As many lower elites could expect, Deng got a job as a teacher at Tongang Elementary School right after he went home. But his teaching position did not last long and he had to set off to work in his cousin's sundry store for financial reasons.⁷⁹

Before going any further, for brevity's sake, I would like to divide Deng's later experiences into two aspects; the ideological aspect and the practical aspect. From these two aspects, I will show that sometimes the practical aspect of what a Chinese Communist does can actually reflect the ideological aspect of what a Chinese Communist thinks,

although he claims himself to be a believer of Marxism.

Working in his cousin's store was a turning point of Deng Zihui's life. There he had his first contact with Communist ideology and then became a CCP member. The store was in Jiebei Xu (a periodic market-town) of Chongyi county in southern Jiangxi province, the so-called Gannan area. Although in general this area was as inaccessible as Minxi, Jiebei Xu was open to the influence of big cities in Jiangxi, such as Ganzhou, Nanchang and Jiujiang, for it was located on a branch of the Gan river.⁸⁰ Deng Zihui stayed in Chongyi county off and on for more than six years between 1918 and 1927. From this we can see that before the Longyan-Houtian uprising Deng spent most of his time outside of Longyan. The point I am trying to make is how calculated Deng was in taking advantage of his personal relationship with local people from various classes, including multi-layered elites and peasants, to mobilize mass movements in Longyan.

There were several phases in Deng Zihui's thought formation. Before he associated himself with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, he had gone through confusing stages of thought. When the May Fourth Movement happened in Beijing in 1919, there was no similar reaction in the Chongyi county, but the variety of new thoughts still inspired young intellectuals in the countryside. Deng subscribed to so many papers, magazines and books that his collection attracted many young men around his cousin's store, and they called it a small library.

As he recalled in his memoir:

I only had one pure thought of patriotism ...but I could not find an effective way to show my love for country...My thought was confused. I had believed in various kinds of thought for saving my country, like Kang-Liang's constitutionalism, Zhang Jian's industrialism, Huang Yanpei's educationalism and Sun Yat-san's revolutionism. Only after the 'May Fourth Movement' in 1919 did my thought improve.⁸¹

Like many intellectuals in the 1920s in China, anarchism had occupied Deng's mind for a while. He said:

...I believed in anarchism in 1920. Under the past historical circumstances, Chongyi county was hardly influenced by new thoughts. Marxism-Leninism had not come until very late because of its poor communication. Although under such conditions having thoughts such as anarchism is also an advanced expression of patriotism, it is useless to hold a craving to save the country without a realistic method.⁸²

Since he read debates among the Communists and the anarchists in the periodicals *New Youth (Xin Qingnian)* and *The Communist Party (Gongchandang)*, Deng had pondered on both ideologies, anarchism and Communism, from the end of 1920 to 1921, and he decided to accept Marxism, the so-called scientific socialism, as his theoretical and practical direction. At the critical moment when Deng was making up his mind he was influenced by a young man, Chen Zanyong, who introduced him to the "Communist Manifesto" at the end of 1920. Chen, a native of Chongyi county, was very poor and had dropped out of school to be a cashier in the timber-workers' union; he was the first CCP member in Chongyi county.⁸³ Unfortunately, material about Chen's background and his relation with Communist members is lacking, but it seems likely that he had been influenced by the CCP's union work. At any rate, it was Chen who not only introduced Deng Zihui to read the "Communist Manifesto," but also approved Deng to be a Communist Party member in December of 1926. In this first period, then, Deng Zihui became a preliminary Marxist.

Because of the enlightenment he experienced in Chongyi county, when Deng went back briefly in the spring of 1921 to be a teacher in the Tonggang Elementary School, he was not a pure patriotic intellectual who did not know what to do any more; instead, his thought was armed with Marxism. From then on he tried to combine his ideology with practice. As an elementary school teacher, the first practical maneuver he made to confront the flawed society was to organize a study association, the *Qishan Shushe*. (Qishan is a shortened name of a mountain, Qimai Shan.) Most of the members of the Qishan Shushe were Deng's friends, alumni of the Provincial Ninth Middle School, and colleagues of the Tonggang Elementary School. They collected lots of books and papers and had frequent discussion meetings. Owing to his reading of sociology works in Chongyi, Deng was

able to influence his associates to favor revolutionary Marxism. In August 1923 this study association decided to issue a paper, *Yan Sheng*, to announce their ideas and to wake up the masses. (*Yan Sheng* means the voice of Longyan county.) Deng Zihui was the chief editor and writer.⁸⁴

As mentioned before, since Chen Jiongming, a big warlord, occupied southern and western Fujian, a group of bad gentry led by Du Lianru manipulated the county's affairs, using the Gengshen Club to streamline their power. Besides this native force, Lai Shihuang, a small Jiangxi warlord belonging to Chen Jiongming's bloc, actually took charge of Longyan until the arrival of the Northern Expedition Army. Like most warlords, Lai Shihuang exploited local people by extortionate levies and miscellaneous taxes. For example, he forced local people to plant opium and then taxed the seeds they used, which was fiercely resisted by Guo Diren and his friends. In 1923, Lai Shihuang even collected three years of taxes in advance under the name of "borrowing grain."⁸⁵

Besides trying to introduce new ideas into this county, the main purpose of *Yan Sheng* was to fight the warlord government's oppressive policies, especially the absurd taxes. According to Deng's memoir, *Yan Sheng* was influential and popular compared with other student papers. From September of 1923 to November of 1926, the paper published forty-four issues, with a circulation of more than six hundred and a market that included various provinces such as Jiangxi, Guangdong and Hubei, and even overseas areas.⁸⁶

Through this paper, Deng not only established his reputation in young intellectual circles, but also unveiled his talent at stimulating writing, which was one of the primary conditions for becoming a mass movement leader. During the period of *Yan Sheng's* publication from 1923 to 1926, Deng was not actually involved in any such mass movement activity, for he was living in Chongyi for most of that period, but he was still on the wanted list issued in 1927's "white terror." This was partly because his writings annoyed the persons in power, and partly because of a letter he wrote to a leading GMD leftist in Longyan when he was in Chongyi. In that letter he suggested that Longyan's revolutionaries ally with

Zheng Bishan's faction to oppose the Du Lianru faction.⁸⁷ Zheng was a good friend of Deng Zihui's father and had a reputation as an enlightened upper gentry. From this we can perceive that Deng's strategy was flexible.

To sort out the interaction between ideology and practice in molding Deng's mind, it is necessary to talk more about his ideological aspect. When he went to Jiebei to help his cousin again at the end of 1923, he reread the "Communist Manifesto" and used the principle of capitalism to analyze the social situation. He published an article titled "The Horrible Life" in *Yan Sheng* in March 1924 to portray the miserable cycle of the poor living in a capitalist system. Here he tried to point out the causes of social illness. On December 15, 1925, Deng wrote another article, "The Current Situation and the Future of the Suppressed Class in Longyan County" to call for the suppressed people to arm themselves and to take authority from the enemies, soldiers, capitalists and elites.⁸⁸ Now we can see that Deng Zihui had independently developed a theory similar to Mao's out of his own thinking and experience. He seems to have viewed the suppressed class as a whole, which could be testified to by his later experience. However, theoretically and practically Deng's road toward becoming a real Communist was not smooth at all.

With his friend's recommendation, Deng joined the GMD in Longyan and helped recruit the GMD leftists among his friends in the Qishan Shushe in 1925. When he went to Jiebei, he kept developing secret GMD memberships among his friends. When the Northern Expedition Army recovered southern Jiangxi, the GMD established a party headquarters in Chongyi in the winter of 1926, with Chen Zanyong on its standing committee and Deng Zihui on its executive committee. They used the GMD's name as a cover for operating an underground mass movement.⁸⁹ Deng's first contact with the labor movement was at this time, when he went to Ganzhou to purchase goods. In Ganzhou, he witnessed the force of the working class, attended various meetings of labor unions and got a chance to know the Communist labor leader, Chen Zanxian. After he went back to Jiebei, he initiated various kinds of peasant associations, traders' associations and shop clerks' unions. From

this practical demonstration, we can perceive that Deng tried to consolidate every possible force to fight the main enemy. In the meantime, Chen Zanyong asked him if he wanted to participate in the CCP. At last he became a Communist in December 1926.⁹⁰

In July 1927 Deng had to flee to his home town for refuge from pursuit by the police of both Chongyi and Longyan. Though he was safe in the countryside and kept his teaching job, he did not stop his work. He tried to resume contact with the CCP. Through the report of the Longyan Party branch, Deng's petition was approved by Luo Ming, the Secretary of the Min'nan Special Committee at that time, who was inspecting the work in Longyan county. Deng was ordered to take charge of the peasant movement.⁹¹ From then on, Deng cooperated with Guo Diren to foster the peasant movement and they took the Tonggang Elementary School as their operational base. Usually Guo organized secret peasant associations and arranged meetings, while Deng went to the meetings and lectured to the peasants. As we know, relationships among village residents were harmonious. Besides, what the leftists had done in the countryside did not get full appreciation from the peasants, for they tried to destroy a temple of a local god, which irritated local people very much. To intensify class confrontation on the one hand and to avoid estrangement from the masses on the other, Deng and Guo decided to start with the slogan of "reducing rent, reducing interest," which really gained the support of the poor and middle peasants.⁹²

While most places were still suffering from the "white terror," the political situation was quite exceptional in Longyan, owing to the power struggle among the local gentry. At the beginning of the counter-revolutionary brutality in 1927, Du Lianru, as the county magistrate, was willing to cooperate with the GMD rightists to suppress the leftists, but after that he refused to reopen the GMD organization. In August 1927, a commissioner of the GMD's Fujian headquarters, Zhan Diaoyuan, who was a big landlord in eastern Longyan and had conflicts with Du's faction, recommended a young leftist named Su Qingyun to lead the GMD organization there.⁹³ To strive for more breathing space, the CCP decided simultaneously to cooperate with Su and to continue fostering peasant movements.

Therefore Deng Zihui became the new GMD organization's secretary and Guo Diren its organization committee member.⁹⁴

The CCP's strategy seemed successful. From August to November 1927, they used the GMD's open organizations to mobilize peasants to implement rent and interest reduction and to set up peasant associations all over the county. As Deng recalled:

...the development of peasant associations has been rapid. From September to November, peasant associations in all urban and suburban areas except Xikou, Yanshi and Baisha, have executed rent and interest reduction ...Almost one hundred thousand peasants have joined the peasant associations. This is a new apex of the peasant movement in Longyan county.⁹⁵

In his memoir Deng mentioned several features of the peasant movements during this period. He thought the active peasants cultivated from secret peasant associations were more determined and stable than those from open organizations, because in order to establish secret peasant associations the Communists had to find out the peasants who were possible to be recruited by themselves and then enlarged the membership by personal relationships. He believed that in this way a strong core leadership was established. On the other hand, the openly established peasant associations under the cover of the GMD attracted many middle and rich peasants who supported the rent and interest reduction but tended to be shaky when the struggle was intensified to the point of land revolution. Besides, these kinds of open peasant associations were easily controlled by opportunists who thought only of their own interests and did not have solid relations with the masses.⁹⁶ Therefore, although the development of the peasant movement seemed overwhelming, the degree of consolidation in each place was various. When Longyan's "second white terror" came in November 1927, most peasant associations were destroyed completely, and only those in Baitu District were preserved.⁹⁷ After the second white terror, the CCP lost its base in the capital. They only could operate an armed uprising in the countryside. Houtian township of Baitu District therefore emerged as their only choice.

Houtian township was eleven kilometers from the capital with mountains on three sides,

topography which made it an important strategic position. There were 181 households in this village, eleven of them landlords and rich peasants.⁹⁸ Because Deng's home town, Quanjing village, was close to Houtian village, he and Guo Diren had done solid work on the peasants here. In other words, both of them had close relationships with the peasants. While the peasant associations were ruined in most places in Longyan, the Houtian Peasant Association was still able to keep so powerful that the local government could not interfere even after the second white terror.⁹⁹ At the end of 1927, the Longyan Party branch was reorganized into the Longyan County Committee, with its headquarters at Houtian village. The Secretary of the Longyan County Committee was Luo Huaisheng, who was dispatched by the Fujian Committee. Deng Zihui was the minister of the propaganda department and Guo Diren was the minister of the organization department.¹⁰⁰

Later the direction of the August Seventh Meeting was delivered there by a representative of the Fujian Committee, Chen Zukang, a Yongding native. The main points of the August Seventh Meeting were: to gain popular support, to prepare for armed uprising, to fulfill land revolution and to establish soviets. To follow these directions the Longyan County Committee first prepared an armed force. Because he had worked with bandits in Yongding county, Chen suggested that he should move a bandit army from Yongding to Longyan to help the Houtian peasants attack the county seat. Probably owing to the unhappy experience about asking help from outside armies or to lack of trust in bandits, the Longyan County Committee did not agree with Chen's suggestion. Chen Zukang did not give up his idea until the bandit force in Yongding refused to follow his orders. Disappointed, Chen left Longyan.¹⁰¹ This event reveals the conflict between orders from the supervisory level and the autonomy of local organizations during the revolutionary period.

To develop their own armed force, the Longyan County Committee established a Chinese boxing institute for young men, the Qingnian Guoshu Guan, to cultivate military discipline in selected members from the secret peasant associations. To counteract the young revolutionaries, Houtian's landlords and gentry organized an Old Men's Association

(Laoren Hui) and a martial arts institute for old men, the Laoren Quanshu Hui, to consolidate their power.¹⁰² It seemed that the Houtian Peasant Association could implement rent and interest reduction without cruel resistance not only because of its power but also because it acted in harmony with local customs. However, the class confrontation was inevitably intensified. After the 1928 new year's festival, rice prices soared and the peasant association decided to limit the price of rice and forbid rice exports. This decision infuriated the landlord class so much that they murdered the chairman of the peasant association. With this incident, the Longyan County Committee and the Houtian Party branch felt that conditions for uprising were ripe and they decided to arise on March Fourth.¹⁰³

The Fourth of March was a superstitious holiday dedicated to the god of General Guan Yu, the so-called Guandi. Under the festival atmosphere, the Houtian Party branch led the members of Qingnian Guoshu Guan to attack the Laoren Quanshu Guan and killed the murderer. The momentary victory came so fast that the Longyan County Committee decided to enlarge the uprising to other villages. Although they did announce the distribution of landlords' land to the poor peasants, the Longyan County Committee did not really implement it, for they were busy in heavy military activity. On the fifth day of the uprising, the Longyan warlord Chen Guohui led five hundred troops to besiege Houtian village and the uprising was soon suppressed. To preserve the revolutionary forces, the Houtian peasant army fled to a mountain area and was reorganized as the Longyan worker-peasant guerrilla force to keep working on suppressing counter-revolutionaries. In April 1928, Deng Zihui was transferred by the Fujian Committee to a new post as head of the Shanghang County Committee propaganda department.¹⁰⁴ He accepted this new position and began to supervise mass movement work in other areas.

(2). The Shanghang-Jiaoyang Uprising

The development of the revolutionary movement in Shanghang county was vital during the period of GMD-CCP cooperation. Several features about Shanghang were somewhat different from other counties. Because the trunk line of Minxi's main riverine route,

the Ding river, flows through it, the county attracted many boatmen and had the only hydraulic power plant in Minxi.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the county had relatively more industry than other places. The Shanghang Party branch was established in December 1926 by the returned young men from the Canton Peasant Institute.¹⁰⁶ Since the initiation of the Ding Prefecture Eight-County Institute for Cultivating Social Movement Members in January 1927, the Shanghang capital had attracted not only native young revolutionaries but also those from neighboring areas. At the same time, the Shanghang Party branch was expanded and an outsider, Lin Xinyao, became its secretary, which was not a common situation. (Lin was one of the founders of the Institute) Nonetheless the main CCP leaders in Shanghang county were Lin Xinyao and Xie Bingqiong, neither of whom were natives.¹⁰⁷ No matter how influential the CCP's activity had been in the county capital, when the white terror came, Lin Xingyao was killed, Xie Bingqiong fled back to his home in Wuping, and the local peasant movements had to be handled by the native Communists. The most successful peasant movement was operated by Fu Bocui in Jiaoyang township.

The ecological setting of Jiaoyang township and background of Fu Bocui have been briefly mentioned in the preceding chapter. I categorized Fu as a protective Communist gentry as a result of my analysis of the interaction between the ecological setting and his personality. Now I am going to focus on what advantage Fu's personal social position had on mobilizing the masses.

As I mentioned before, Fu had worked in the Shanghang county seat as a lawyer after he came back from Japan, and had gained the title of student emperor, showing his influence among students. Because he was one of the founders of the "Ding Prefecture Eight-County Institute for Cultivating Movement Members" and had taken charge of general affairs of the institute, inevitably Fu's name was on the wanted list in 1927, although he was not a Communist then. He started, however, to engage in the peasant movement when he fled to his home town and joined the CCP at the end of 1927.¹⁰⁸

Jiaoyang township was a mountain village located deep in the border country where

Longyan, Shanghang and Liancheng counties met. It is equally one hundred *hua li* away from each county seat. The whole natural setting made it a perfect place as a revolutionary base. As Fu recalled in his memoir, most of the residents in the Bei Si Qu (the four districts in the northern part of the county) were peasants and ninety percent of them were tenants and semi-self-cultivators. Agricultural workers and self-cultivators were few.¹⁰⁹ The heaviest burden for the people here, therefore, was land rent.

To foster a rent reduction movement, Fu first recruited a few aggressive members from the peasant associations as Communist members and formed a Jiaoyang Party branch. Then through the activities of the Communist party members, the peasant associations proposed slogans such as rent reduction, interest reduction and rent remission. Because the autumn harvest season had passed and rent had been submitted to the landlords, Fu Bocui suggested the landlords return 1/7 of the rent to the tenants and, because his family was one of the landlords, he set a pioneering example which compelled other landlords to follow his case. Using his prestigious position in the village as a son of a landlord family, an intellectual, and a leader of the peasant associations, Fu allied with other enlightened landlords and led the peasants to liquidate lineages' assets and to resist paying taxes to the government.¹¹⁰

With these visible profits, both the peasant associations and the CCP organization grew rapidly, even extending to neighboring villages; there were more than one hundred party members in the Bei Si Qu by the spring of 1928. The Bei Si District Committee was established in March, 1928. In the meantime, representatives of the Provincial Committee and the Shanghang County Committee, such as Ling Yizhu and Lan Hongxiang, were secretly dispatched to Jiaoyang township to conduct political and military education.¹¹¹

After the establishment of the District Committee, recalled Fu, a series of political and economic struggles were launched; they aimed at liquidating the public property managed by bad gentry and local bullies, usurping the leadership of the heads of the lineages, reducing the price of rice, prohibiting the smuggling of rice, and resisting the payment of tax or

money to the local government and army. As for land problems, Fu preferred the system of "land collective," which indicated that agricultural land confiscated from landlords and self-cultivators was farmed collectively by peasants without being distributed to the hands of peasants. Such a method, although destroying the form of private ownership, let each peasant have the same living standard no matter what kind of background he had.¹¹² This kind of land policy was viewed by the CCP as a policy generous to counter-revolutionaries, for it did not give poor and hired peasants special benefits. In fact, Fu did not kill any local gentry to activate the masses, as most CCP members did; instead, he was harsh on the problem of bandits. The CCP later criticized Fu for not dealing with the bandit problem properly due to his revolutionary limitation.¹¹³

Because the CCP's strategy of mobilizing the masses escalated step by step, from rent reduction to land confiscation, in the end most landlords could not stand the situation and fled from the village to ask help from the warlord Guo Fengming in the Shanghang county seat. To protect his base, Fu Bocui seized firearms from the local militia and organized a peasant army, but he did not plan to go outside of his base, at least in the beginning. When Deng Zihui came to Jiaoyang village in April of 1928 as a representative of the Provincial Committee to conduct the peasant movement after the failure of the Longyan-Houtien uprising, he urged Fu to incite an uprising and to intensify land revolution, as directed by the August Seventh Meeting.¹¹⁴ But Fu refused Deng's advice and Deng left without any success, which also demonstrated how limited the force of the CCP's organization was during the local uprising period.

Although Fu did not accept Deng Zihui's opinion about arousing an uprising in the first place, however, he was forced to lead the Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprising on June 25, 1928, as Guo Fengming's army with other local militias jointly attacked Bei Si District. Although this uprising was suppressed in a short time, Fu was still able to assemble the remnants of the defeated peasant army and formed a personal force to disturb local government by guerrilla warfare and to help the uprisings in Yongding and Longyan.¹¹⁵ The political

resolution of the Minxi First Party Congress criticized the Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprising because the Party did not lead the masses to kill local gentry, to distribute agricultural land, and to intensify land revolution as the mass struggle mounted to a peak.¹¹⁶

(3). The Yongding-Jinsha Uprising and the failure of the Xi'nan District Soviet

The Yongding-Jinsha uprising was the last one before the coming of the Red Fourth Army, and it achieved significant success. What made this uprising so successful that the CCP could establish a Soviet? The reason should be traced back to the uniqueness of the uprising location, Jinsha township, and to the characteristics of its leader, Zhang Dingcheng. However, compared with the other three uprisings, the most important question about the Yongding-Jinsha uprising is why the Xi'nan District Soviet failed. This study will show that the failure of the Soviet occurred not only because of military weakness, but also because of a peasant mentality which questioned the limited usefulness of organization.

Yongding is located in the border area between Fujian and Guangdong, with the Boping Mountains on its east side and the Yongding and Ding rivers flowing in parallel through it from northeast to southwest. Though the county was mountainous and generally inaccessible, these rivers made it open to Guangdong. Like most areas in Minxi, because of the lack of agricultural land and relative backwardness, the county had many inhabitants looking for living and education outside.¹¹⁷ In terms of customs, people here were militant and armed affrays among lineages were ferocious. The local government had to intervene to mediate the disputes when armed affrays got out of control.¹¹⁸ From 1923 to the end of 1925, the county had been occupied by several small warlords. The burden of tax, surcharge and military service was extraordinarily heavy on the people in general, and Jinsha township was one of the places which had been most intensely exploited.¹¹⁹

Jinsha township was in the vicinity of the Yongding county seat, which was a convenient area for the warlords to seize people for military service and to levy fiscal extortion. In this village, most of the agricultural land belonged to the so-called "absentee-landlords" who lived in the county capital and had agricultural land in the countryside. These landlords

not only asked the tenants to pay seventy percent of the harvest as rent no matter whether the harvest was good or bad (the so-called iron rent) but they also cooperated with local bullies in Jinsha village to monopolize tax. Besides taxes and rents, the interest on loans was high in the township, especially in years of bad crops.¹²⁰ These peasant grievances opened the door for the Communist movement.

During the CCP-GMD cooperation period, there were vital Communist organizations and movements in Yongding, although most of those concentrated in the county seat. The first CCP party branch in Minxi was established in this county. As in other counties, young intellectuals in Yongding were influenced by the neighboring urban areas and most of the revolutionaries were returnees from the Jimei Normal School and the Canton Peasant Institute, such as Ruan Shan, Lin Xinyao and Lu Zaoxi. They established a Party branch in Shanghu township (the Yongding county seat then), the first Party organization in Minxi, and set up the Ding Prefecture Eight-County Institute for Cultivating Social Movement Members in the county seat. In addition to the intellectual and peasant movement, the Yongding Party branch also focused its work on boatmen, for the Ding and the Yongding rivers flowing through the county were the main riverine routes in Minxi. By establishing the Yongding River Boatmen's Union, the CCP attracted almost all of the Yongding boatmen, about one thousand persons, to its side.¹²¹ As mentioned in Chapter One, the composition of boatmen in Minxi was a blend; most of them were also part-time peasants or the owner of boats. The heterogeneous nature of boatmen later caused criticism from upper Party levels.

No matter how successful the Yongding Party Branch was, when the suppression came in 1927, the CCP leaders fled to the countryside; Ruan Shan to Hulei village, Lu Zaoxi to Chendong township and Chen Zhen to Xiayang township.¹²² Without any doubt, the most successful peasant movement was fostered by Zhang Dingcheng in Jinsha township.

Zhang Dingcheng was born in a poor peasant family in Jinsha's Xihu Zhai in December, 1898. (*Zhai* means a stockaded village) In addition to farming, Zhang's father had to work

as a tobacco worker and a bricklayer as well to support his family. Because of poverty, Zhang Dingcheng could not continue education after graduating from the Yuzhi Xuetang, a junior primary school, until his maternal grandfather Fan Chunjiu returned to his hometown in Gumudu village. Although there is no specific evidence, Fan Chunjiu may have been a declining local gentry, for he had been the founder of the Yuzhi Xuetang. For study's sake, Zhang moved in with his grandfather and studied ancient books with him, mostly teachings of Confucius. Touched by his hard work, Zhang's parents and relatives tried every way they could to allow him to resume study in 1913. In 1916, again for lack of money, Zhang returned home to help farm after graduating from upper primary school. Many poor families experienced insults by bullies and corrupt officials, and Zhang's family also went through such situation due to debt and lawsuits when Zhang was thirteen years old. This made him perceive poor people's distress and fostered his urge to improve society.¹²³

In 1920, Zhang got a chance to assume a voluntary teaching job at an elementary school in the Shanghang county seat. Although he read lots of progressive books and met with many new ideas in the county seat, Zhang had not escaped from the Confucian stereotype yet. In 1924 the Jinsha villagers asked him to return to accept the job of principal at an elementary school, the Jinsha Public School. Zhang used the Confucian teaching to cultivate himself and to educate students as well, a style which attracted many poor children from neighboring areas. Because of his achievements and moral charisma, he was even elected as a *xiangzhang* (the head of Jinsha village) in 1925. By virtue of his moral strength, Zhang led villagers to fight local bullies and to reform bad customs, by which he gained lots of support and built up a substantial personal reputation. However, his effort annoyed the person in power and he was discharged after a year.

Because of a series of frustrations, Zhang also quit the principal's position and pessimistically planned to retire from public life. Although not living in real seclusion, Zhang started to learn how to be a Chinese herb doctor and tried to save his countryfolk by medical practice, as many traditional intellectuals did during times of anarchy.¹²⁴ Up

to this point, Zhang's ideology was still limited to reformist thought. In spite of his disappointments, Zhang Dingcheng was such a hot-blooded young man that he could not restrain his patriotism. When the tide of the Northern Expedition flooded Minxi in 1926, Zhang decided to go to Canton to look for a way to save the country. At first he wanted to take the entrance examination to the Whampoa Military Academy established by the GMD, but he missed the test date. Disappointed, he found a job as a voluntary teacher at an elementary school in Dapu county in Guangdong, which was adjacent to his home town. In Dapu, Zhang made a new friend, Yao Longguang, who was the Secretary of the CCP's Dapu County Committee. Yao introduced him to progressive magazines and books about Communism. Under Yao's influence, Zhang's thought gradually inclined to accept Marxism and revolution.¹²⁵ Zhang not only adjusted what he believed, but also put the teaching into action right away. By day he taught in the school, and in the evening he went back to Jinsha to foster the peasant movement. In the winter of 1926 when the Northern Expedition Army arrived in Yongding, the new Nationalist official imposed a forty thousand *yuan* levy on the Jinsha villagers. Zhang led hundreds of students and peasants to demonstrate in front of the county government office and forced the official to cancel the absurd levy. From then on, because of his personal endeavors to help people, Zhang was successful in organizing peasant associations all over Jinsha township and surrounding villages, which then engaged in a flurry of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal protests and demands for reduction of rent and interest. When the GMD headquarters appointed him to the position of committee member and director of the peasant movement, Zhang refused, for he felt indignant about the behavior of the GMD officials and he admired the CCP's proposals although he was not yet a CCP member.

Both the rightists' brutality in 1927's white terror and the CCP's determination in switching the focus of mass movement work from city to rural areas as massacre came confirmed Zhang's belief in Communism. In May, 1927, Zhang led some members of the Jinsha peasant association to participate in the Guangdong-Dapu uprising conducted by the

Dapu County Committee. This help was because his relationship with Yao Longguang. In June of the same year, Zhang joined the CCP party with Yao's recommendation and was dispatched to his home town to mobilize the masses.¹²⁶ From then on, Zhang Dingcheng started to lead the revolutionary struggle in Xi'nan District with the Jinsha Public School as the basis.

Xi'nan District refers to the suburbs around the Yongding county seat, which included over ten villages and more than twenty thousand people. Most residents were peasants and handicraftsmen. By the time of the uprising, due to Zhang Dingcheng's influence, most of the teachers in elementary schools were Communist party members or members of the Communist Youth League. When Zhang returned from Dapu, he established the Xi'nan Party branch, with himself as secretary.¹²⁷

Zhang's appeal to the masses was very subtle. Like Deng Zihui, he did not divide the people according to their background at the beginning; instead, he consolidated as many people as possible to fight specific targets. That is, he did not judge revolutionary inclination of people by background but by their attitude and behavior which made him able to cooperate with various kinds of people, even elites. To implant the root of organization among peasants, Zhang not only secretly restored and developed the former peasant associations but also openly initiated a *pingmin* school (a school for common people) to organize and to educate peasants. Besides organizational methods, Zhang appealed to the masses from a social perspective. He proposed the slogan of "harmonizing local community and pacifying lineages" (*he xiangdang mu zongzu*) to resolve the armed affrays among the lineages, and slogans of "no prostitution, no gambling, no opium" (*bu piao, bu du, bu xi ya pian*) to improve the local customs. These feudal-style slogans were welcomed by the local people and built up the CCP's reputation as well.

Because these proposals matched local people's needs, peasant association membership escalated swiftly to a figure of 4000-5000. From them, Zhang Dingcheng selected more determined peasants to form a secret army force, the "Iron and Blood Corps." (Tie Xue

Tuan) The Iron and Blood Corps adopted the form of a traditional secret society; every participant had to drink blood wine and take an oath.¹²⁸ On September 16, 1927, Zhang led members of the Iron and Blood Corps to help the Guangdong-Dapu uprising and brought guns from Dapu. Besides the firearms from Dapu, the main way to get military equipment for the Iron and Blood Corps was to raise funds from various types of local people on the pretext of guarding against bandits. Through such means, Zhang openly formed a personal army force with the support of the local gentry.

In October 1927, Luo Ming inspected the development of local movement in Minxi and delivered news of the August Seventh Meeting. When he came to Yongding, Luo discovered that the best conditions were in Jinsha township and he suggested that the uprising in Yongding should be centered in Xi'nan District with help from the surrounding villages of Hulei, Chengdong and Xiayang, where the movements were led by Ruan Shan, Lu Zaoxi and Chen Zhen. The aim of the uprising was to besiege the county seat. Under Luo Ming's direction, the Yongding County Committee was established in Jinsha township in November, 1927.¹²⁹ Thereafter Zhang Dingcheng began maneuvering step by step toward an uprising.

The first time Zhang got to manage a mass movement was at the 1928 new year's festival and the target he chose to fight was the miscellaneous tax on marriages, funerals and livestock slaughter, which was a most detestable tax for people during the festival period. Zhang deliberately persuaded gentry to present the petition to the local government. When the petition was refused and one of the most celebrated gentry was arrested, Zhang convinced the gentry, especially the enlightened gentry, to join the anti-tax struggle and to lead thousands of people to demonstrate in the county seat. In the end, local officials compromised, which boosted the CCP's prestige among the people still more. The Party members increased from four hundred to seven hundred, and the members of the peasant associations from five thousand to seven thousand.

The CCP's strategy of mobilizing people escalated step by step. With the first victory

and expansion of organization, Zhang planned to go further. In March when the spring dearth came (spring dearth is the period when former harvested grain is gone and new grain has not yet ripened), the Party organizationally mobilized the poor peasants to borrow grain from the landlords. In April, the struggle was intensified to the point of distributing the landlords' grain to the poor peasants (*fen liang chi da hu*). The peasant victory in Xi'nan District inspired neighboring villages to launch the same movements. However, the power of the peasant movement really terrified the landlord class in Yongding. They organized a committee to pacify the rural area (*Qing xiang wei yuan hui*) and suddenly seized six members of the Xi'nan District Committee on June 1, 1928. This provided the direct reason for the uprising.

On June 29, 1928, the Yongding County Committee started the uprising as previously planned. Zhang Dingcheng was the general commander and Ruan Shan and Lu Zaoxi were the vice- commanders. The uprising began in the villages of Huleiyang, Chendong and Xiayang led by Ruan Shan and Lu Zaoxi, but this was only a trick to lure the army from the county seat. It was the so-called device of *diao hu li shan* (to induce the tiger out of the mountain). As the counter-revolutionary army went to suppress the uprising in those villages, Zhang Dingzheng led four thousand Xi'nan armed peasants, most of whom were the members of the Iron and Blood Corps, to besiege the county seat and then breached the enemy defense to enter it on July 1, 1928. Although the enemy army returned quickly and got the capital back, the countryside surrounding the county seat was under the uprising masses' control.

When information about the Yongding-Jinsha uprising was conveyed to Shanghang, the Shanghang County Committee sent Deng Zihui to observe the whole situation. According to his own knowledge of the Longyang-Houtian and Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprisings, Deng suggested to the secretary of the Yongding County Committee that they stop besieging the county seat and start the land revolution. Agreeing to Deng's suggestion, the Yongding County Committee gathered the whole uprising army together and organized them into a

battalion of the Red Army with Zhang Dingcheng as its battalion commander and Deng Zihui as its Party Representative. This battalion of the Red Army was the first Red Army in Minxi. Its task was to suppress counter-revolutionaries, to seize militia firearms and to mobilize the masses to confiscate landlords' grain, clothing and livestock on the one hand, and to fight with the enemy army on the other hand.¹³⁰

At the same time, receiving the report from the Yongding County Committee, the Fujian Provisional Committee convened a meeting of general commissioners and resolved to establish the Minxi Special Committee to conduct the struggle in Minxi, so that the revolutionary movement in Minxi might develop into a new phase. On July 15, 1928, the Minxi Provisional Special Committee was established at Jinsha township with Guo Boping as its Secretary (Guo was a native of Dapu county in Guangdong and the secretary of Shanghang County Committee), Zhang Dingcheng as the head of the organization department and Deng Zihui as the head of the propaganda department.¹³¹

In the directive of July 25, the Fujian Provincial Committee ordered the Minxi Special Committee and the Yongding County Committee to establish Communist authority.¹³² Therefore Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui held a mass meeting to elect workers, peasants and soldiers as delegates to establish soviets in every village. In a short time, ten village soviets were established. In August of 1928 the Xi'nan District Soviet was established and promulgated many laws, such as a land law, a law purging counter-revolutionaries and a marriage law.

The central mission for the Xi'nan District Soviet was to implement the land revolution. Because there was then no specific land policy from the Party Central or from the Provincial Committee, Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng had to initiate a land policy based on the local reality. They got old peasants together to have discussions. They wanted to design a functional land policy listening to the old peasants, for the old peasants understood the land situation in every village. The peasants Deng summoned included tenants, poor peasants, middle peasants and rich peasants. After systematic analysis, they understood

that in the Xi'nan District the tenants and hired agricultural workers were the majority of the population. Therefore the principles of the land policy they set up were based on the interests of tenants and hired agricultural workers while trying to ally with middle peasants in order to attract as many people as possible. The main points of the land policy were as follows:

1. Confiscate the land belonging to landlords, rich peasants and the public while letting middle peasants keep their self-cultivated land.
2. Distribute the confiscated land to tenants and hired agricultural workers while allowing landlords and rich peasants also to gain some of it to make a living.
3. The unit to distribute land is the 'village.' Each village's land is allotted by its own villagers and original land boundaries cannot be changed.
4. The new amount of land received by each household is not even, but is in accordance with how many persons it has; land may be added from another household with too much, or may be subtracted from the amount the household owned before (*chou duo bu shao*).¹³³

At first, Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui chose Jinsha township as the so-called "experimental point" (*shi dian*) in which to try the land policy. After its success there, in ten days the land policy was executed all over Xi'nan District; each one of twenty thousand poor peasants gained an average three or four *dan* (a unit of weight of grain, equal to fifty kilograms) of agricultural land.¹³⁴ Although the tentative land policy had many defects and needed improvements, it succeeded relatively well in its aim of confirming the people's revolutionary determination. Under a very difficult situation, the Xi'nan District Soviet had lasted for almost half a year.

Because of severe enemy attacks and its isolated situation, the the Xi'nan District Soviet started to become unstable after November 1928. At first, according to Zhang's memoir, it was the so-called "intermediate elements" (*zhong jian fen zi*) who asked to stop fighting and to make an agreement with the enemy. To prevent such compromising mentality among people from going any further, the Party made a slogan: kill the person who advocates compromise. But it did not work. When the proposal to make a cease-fire became stronger and stronger, the Party had to accept it as the wish of people. People said to the Party:

“We all know that the land revolution of the Soviet is good for us and all of us advocate the Communist Party and the Soviet government. But now our base area is too small and too isolated. It will be the better method to preserve revolutionary force for the time being if we compromise with the counterrevolution and cover our red heart with white skin [the so-called bai pi hong xin] until you [the CCP] expand your work elsewhere.” [Red heart means the CCP and white skin means the GMD.]¹³⁵

At last, the CCP sent a representative of the people to negotiate with the Nationalist army and started to plan a retreat. Although at the end of 1928, the Xi'nan District Soviet was abolished, the CCP still controlled the main army force, the Iron and Blood Corps, restored the secret peasant associations and engaged in guerrilla warfare to suppress counter-revolutionaries and to save the gains of land revolution.

3 Concluding Remarks

From 1926 to the end of 1928, the CCP's development in Minxi was very significant to the future evolution, for Minxi's Communists prepared a new world to wait for the Red Fourth Army's arrival. As an investigation report on Pinghe county said:

From the end of 1927 to the end of 1928, during a series of anti-rent struggles, Changle peasants had gone through four armed struggles. The peasants here have a deep understanding of the land revolution and the classification is clear...Although they did not implement land distribution, the peasants do not pay rents and taxes after the anti-rent, anti-tax armed struggles, which has the same effect as the land distribution.

Pinghe county could have such change after a short uprising, not to mention the other areas which had gone through serious uprisings.

Each phase of the Communist movement had various impacts on both social structure and CCP organization. In the first phase, during the CCP-GMD cooperation period, the Communists came back from outside, mostly of them from Canton and Xiamen, to work in the county cities. They learned how to establish institutes and to work with each other on workers' and peasant movements to fight local government and bad gentry. Because the

county seat was the political and economic spotlight, it was natural for the Communists to work there to accumulate more political capital, such as intellectuals, students and public attention. Although Minxi's Communist movement was affected deeply by the teachings of Mao Zedong and Peng Pai, their work on the peasants was not totally successful at the beginning, for they focused on the city rather than the countryside. Although working in the cities had offered the young Communists first experience of communicating with the masses, the real beginning of learning how to stage a mass uprising was when they looked for a refuge in the countryside. However, it seems that the more success they got in working in the cities the more prosperous they would be in mobilizing the masses in the countryside, for the horizontal relationships they built and the experience they got in cities helped their future cooperation and strategy-making a lot. That is why the most animated development of Communist influence in the first phase was in the county seats of Longyan, Shanghang and Yongding, as were the uprisings; the Longyan-Houtian uprising, the Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprising and the Yongding-Jinsha uprising. Furthermore the active areas (Longyan, Shanghang and Yongding counties) could be viewed as the Minxi Party's core area, where the CCP could have relatively effective control, while other counties belonged to the peripheral area, where the disturbance of bandits and counter-revolutionary power were strong. Formation of the core area was not only due to the ecological setting, but also to the characteristics of local leaders. From the case studies provided above, we can perceive how influential the characteristics of the local leaders were in staging mass uprisings.

The examples of Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng demonstrate that revolutionary work had to be done according to the local reality. The theory of Marxism and directions from supervisory level organizations could only provide guidance rather than workable tactics. Due to the peasant mentality and conception of localism then prevailing in Minxi, the local Communists needed flexibility to map out their uprisings, as they did to deal with the masses' requirements after uprisings. Therefore examples of local Communists going

against the suggestion of supervisors were not uncommon. Besides they not only demanded flexibility in interpreting the theory of Communism to fit the situation in the countryside, but also required the flexibility in operating organization. Thus Deng Zihui's analysis on establishing peasant associations stressed that a strong core leadership could only be founded with personal relationships. Therefore they depended on personal relationships to manage party affairs rather than on organization, which caused problems later criticized by the upper level of organization as, "the manipulation of Party members" and "non-division of Party organization and Soviet."

The abolition of the Xi'nan Soviet was an extreme example of the flexibility of policy-making to respond to the masses' requirements. From another point of view, we can say this was a complete compromise of ideal to reality. However, to take all into account, the theoretical and organizational confrontations were not acute until the establishment of the Minxi Soviet, for the pressure of state-building from upper-level organizations made less room for flexibility, as I will describe in the next chapter.

III. THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES

The intra-party struggles have attracted many scholars' attention. Most of them such as Benjamin I. Schwartz and John E. Rue have explained the roots of the political struggle from the perspective of power struggle.¹³⁶ However, in recent years, more and more scholars have noticed the roles local social structure and organization play in political struggles. That is, they have tried to understand a political event from a more comprehensive viewpoint. For example, Professor Stephen C. Averill has investigated the background of the "Futian Incident" from the angle of local complexity in his article "The Origins of the Futian Incident." (The so-called "Futian Incident" happened in the Jiangxi Soviet in December 1930, when Mao and the other Communist leaders contrived to attack a local Red Army. The incident resulted in a bloody catastrophe; many leaders opposed to Mao were killed.)

Nor do the facts presented in this essay support the simple contention that the Futian Incident was primarily caused by intra-party feuding between supporters of Mao and Li Lisan, and that it is thus best understood as another step in Mao's gradual climb into power within the national Communist movement. As indicated, serious intra-party strife did occur in the region, supporters of Mao and Li were deeply involved in it, and the animosities thus generated did much to build up stress along the fault lines within the revolutionary movement that were to rupture so violently during the Futian Incident itself. Yet the main lines of fissure within the movement were already apparent well before the tumultuous struggles of 1930, and they were incised far more deeply into the bedrock of socioeconomic structure and process in the region than the personal power struggles of ambitious individuals could obscure or transform.¹³⁷

Such a point of view is doubtless essential to the so-called "China-centered" approach, and is one of my main concerns in looking at the political struggles in Minxi as well.¹³⁸

In addition, another illuminating analysis is raised by Arif Dirlik, who convincingly establishes a dialectical relationship between ideology and organization in his well known book, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*. From the examination of the origins of Chinese Communism, he noticed a consistent tension between theory and practice of Marxism in China, rooted in anarchist thinking. He observed that:

The tension between ideology and organization persisted throughout the 1920s, and came to a head when the revolutionary movement ran into severe obstacles in 1927....The radicals who founded the Party became Communists before they were Marxists, and once they had done so, an *organizationally defined ideology* became for them a substitute for theoretical analysis:...Only after 1927, in other words, did they acquire a genuine familiarity with Marxism, and begin to apply it to the analysis of Chinese society in order to discover a revolutionary strategy appropriate to the social situation.¹³⁹

Dirlik's reasoning provides a very important insight into the relationship between CCP ideology and organization. Because his study focused on the origins of Chinese Communism, primarily on theoretical perspectives and on the early period of party history, Dirlik could only give tentative suggestions about the Party's development after 1927. It seems to him that the influence of anarchism sometimes was dormant but sometimes was active, depending on how stressful the environment was. To supplement early analyses, I will raise the point that the tension between ideology and organization, no matter whether it is termed anarchism or populism (as it was labeled by Professor Meisner¹⁴⁰), has been consistent through the whole period of CCP's revolutionary movement.

Dirlik also noticed the question of democracy, "both within the Party and in the Party's relationship to society in the process of revolution." He said:

The CCP, when it was established in 1920-1921 on Bolshevik premises, represented a political organization whose dictatorial nature conflicted with the democratic aspirations that had motivated May Fourth radicals, and could be clear in terms of coping with an oppressive political environment.¹⁴¹

In fact, the tension among Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorial nature of political organization and an oppressive political environment existed not only during the early period of CCP

development when the legacy of the May Fourth Movement was strong, but also in the later Soviet period when the revolutionary movement confronted the work of state-building. To take all into account, in this study I shall narrow Dirlik's theoretical premises down to more practical dimensions to investigate how the CCP dealt with the tension among ideology, organization and reality, consciously or unconsciously. By doing this, I attempt to prove that the ambiguous functions of ideology and organization considerably shaped the intra-party political struggle in Minxi. In other words, the line between ideology and practice is hard to draw since there is no universally accepted interpretation of Marxism, and so is the principle of operating an organization, the so-called "democratic centralism." As Zhu De said: 'practice which deviates from ideology is blind, while ideology which deviates from practice is hollow.'¹⁴²

The line between ideology and practice was so blurry that disapproval from upper levels of organization could result in serious criticism among the CCP members at lower levels, for every member saw things from a different point of view. Accordingly, the only way to prove their legitimacy was by favorable results. That is why the CCP members had to follow the rule that only the result of practice could certify the truth, for they hardly had an undisputed standard. The same vagueness can be found in the explanation of the principle of democratic centralism. The line between democracy and centralism was blurred, too. When should the Party listen to the lower level organizations and the masses, and when should it enforce the policy without dealing with disagreement from lower levels? Both the interpretations of Marxism and the principle of democratic centralism became central issues in power struggles.

Another way to investigate the CCP's political struggle during the Soviet period is from the angle that the CCP's effort in establishing the Soviet was an effort to proceed with the work of state-building during the revolutionary period, which caused an inevitable conflict between founding a bureaucracy at the top and responding to the masses' needs at the bottom. The function of organization therefore was caught in between. To mobilize the

masses, the organization had to respond to changing situations flexibly; but to undertake the work of state-building, it had to take the responsibility of educating the masses and enact the orders from the top. It is interesting to notice that the CCP tried to resolve this confrontation by a special method, the principle of democratic centralism.

Just as Deng Zihui commented that personal relationships could guarantee the reliability of leadership, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, the CCP local level organizations inclined to focus on personal relationships with the masses. Organization was the form, while personal relationship was the core. Consequently the pace of the development of local CCP organization always exceeded the development of local soviets; partly this was because the masses were not capable enough to build their own authority, partly because the CCP leaders were used to the old way of establishing their power. The main function of local CCP organization was to launch revolution and the purpose of the Soviet was to fulfill the work of state-building; both of these tasks were supposed to reciprocate and complement each other. However, the inefficiency of the Soviets caused suspicion and criticism from the upper level organizations.

Knowledge of how the roles of ideology, organization and personal relationship interacted in the CCP movement is very critical for understanding intra-party political struggle. This will help us to explain why every CCP purge tends to end up with ruthless and often uncontrolled political struggle, for various ideological interpretations, different levels of organizations and complicated personal relations all become intertwined.

During 1929-34, the Minxi revolutionary base area had experienced a dramatic decline, which was not only because of the military weakness but also because of the natural restriction of an isolated base area and the CCP's intra-party struggles. As the preceding chapters have shown, the Minxi area was generally inaccessible, suffering from agricultural bankruptcy and with weak counter-revolutionary force, especially the provincial-level warlords, which left room for local Communists to organize uprisings. Ironically, the reasons that made the success of the Minxi Communist movement possible

also became the reasons that made the CCP intra-party struggle and instability inevitable. For example, the local Communists used their social positions to infiltrate the local power structure to mobilize the masses; but later, the latter caused major problems to the CCP's control during the Soviet period. Likewise, Minxi's geographic setting close to the coastal urban macroregional cores let Minxi natives receive teachings of Mao and others from the Canton Peasant Institute, but the influence of Maoism later provoked the line struggles on the other hand.

For analysis sake, this chapter will be divided into three parts: establishment of the Minxi Soviet, the "Purge of the Social-Democratic Party" and the incident of "Anti-Luo Ming Line." From June 1929 to March 1930, during the first phase, there were multi-leveled organizations which were supposed to take the responsibility of conducting the revolutionary development in Minxi; the county committees, the Minxi Special Committee, the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army and the Fujian Committee. Among them, the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De was the most influential, not only because of its military force and Mao's theoretical guidance, but also because of its authority in the CCP organizational system during the revolutionary period, parallel with the provincial level of organization and directly responsible to the Party Central.

The Front Committee was so independent and powerful that it frequently interfered with the regular work of county committees, which was a subject of complaint by the Fujian Committee. Additionally, since the Minxi Communists were inspired by Mao's thought significantly before the uprisings, it is predictable that Mao could enrich his thought, the so-called "Maoism," in Minxi. As a result, some occasions which were critical to Mao's rise to a prominent position in the CCP occurred in Minxi during this period, such as the holding of the "Gutian Meeting" and conflicts over the proper land policy. However, not until the establishment of the Minxi Soviet and the implementation of the so-called "Li Lisan Line" in 1930 did the confrontation among multi-level organizations (or, as some

scholars believe, power struggles between Mao and Li) became so intense that they caused the tragedy of the "Purge of the Social-Democratic Party." I hope to demonstrate that the political struggle was only a result, a form, whose roots must be traced to the complicated evolution of local society and organization and to the conflict between revolution and state building, instead of only focusing on the power struggle among leaders. Power struggles were important, but I believe that certain other factors were important as well.

As to the two political struggles in Minxi, I try to differentiate their characteristics. The purpose of the CCP in launching the "Purge of the Social-Democratic Party" was to pacify the counter-revolutionaries in the Minxi area. Although it was a unique campaign in Minxi, there was a similar incident in the Gannan base area, the "Futian Incident", where the target was the AB Clique rather than the Social-Democratic Party. If we ask ourselves why the political struggle took such forms as the "Purge of the Social-Democratic Party" in Minxi, and why the whole campaign went out of control, we can only conclude that there must have been something else at work besides the high-level power struggles.

The incident of the "Anti-Luo-Ming Line" was a wide-ranging campaign. Party Central, headed by Wang Ming, commanded each base area to suppress the Luo Ming-Liners and, therefore, it was more like a line struggle and a power struggle within the party than the "Purge of the Social-Democratic Party" was. I also believe that the Movement of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line can be viewed as an escalation of struggle against the Social-Democratic Party's ideology, organization and reality.

Because some first-hand materials are available, it is possible to make a close investigation into the correspondence among different levels of organizations from March of 1929 to June of 1930. Although the period is short, it is still valuable, for it offers a picture of communication among the Minxi Special Committee, the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army and the Fujian Committee before the official formation of the Li Lisan Line. With an understanding of the communication among multi-level organizations, we can see that before the occurrence of the political struggles, many problems had already

emerged in Minxi affecting both upper and lower levels of organization. This provides a background for an examination of the leftist policy because it emphasizes the reciprocal interaction of revolution and state-building. From this standpoint, I will try to analyze the dilemma of revolution and state-building in Minxi later.

1 Establishment of the Minxi Soviet

The first supra-county organization to conduct the revolutionary movement in Minxi was the Minxi Provisional Special Committee, established on July 15, 1928 with its headquarters in Jinsha village. After the abolition of the Xi'nan District Soviet, the Committee's headquarters was forced to move to Shanghang and its Secretary, Guo Boping, fled and then betrayed the CCP. With the temporary failure of uprisings, the Fujian Committee, which was formally established in August 1928, commanded the Minxi revolutionary troops to go underground and employ guerrilla strategy to preserve their forces.¹⁴³

The first arrival of the Zhu-Mao Red Army in Minxi occurred somewhat by chance. To distract the government's major attack on Jinggangshan, the Zhu-Mao Red Army fled to Gannan, fought in one place after another and then traveled over the Wuyi Mountains to come to Changding on March 11, 1929. As soon as they arrived, the Zhu-Mao Red Army found out that Changding was a rich county with weak counter-revolutionary forces. When they stayed at Poxi village, thirty miles from the county seat, the secretary of the Provisional County Committee, Duan Fenfu, came to meet Mao and Zhu and to report the situation in Minxi and in Changding. This was the first time that Mao got any information about Minxi's revolutionary development.

Learning how weak Guo Fengmin's troops were, the Zhu-Mao forces decided to attack Guo's garrisons and to take over the Changding county seat. Without much resistance, the Zhu-Mao Red Army entered the county seat and killed Guo, which was a sweeping victory and encouraged the Minxi Communists a great deal. When they occupied the county

seat, the Red Fourth Army started to attack local bullies, procure money, and increase labor unions and peasant associations. Besides the work of social mobilization, the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army also reorganized the Changding Provisional County Committee into a formal County Committee. Then, based on the cooperation between the Front Committee and the County Committee, the Changding Revolutionary Committee was established as the first county level red regime in Minxi.¹⁴⁴ As mentioned in Chapter One, Changding had Communist movements before the arrival of the Red Fourth Army, but they had not carried out uprisings. The influence of the Red Fourth Army on the local Communist movement was therefore powerful, although it could be seen either an aid or a hindrance to the local Communist movement by higher-level authorities. Although the Changding warlords were shocked by the Zhu-Mao Red Army's take-over of the Changding county seat and Guo Fengmin's death, they could not cooperate with each other, which left plenty of room for the CCP's guerrilla strategy. At the same time, the Communists in the other counties became revitalized by the new circumstances. In the report to the Party Central on April fifth, 1929, Mao proposed his idea about fighting for both Jiangxi and Minxi.¹⁴⁵ However, the Zhu-Mao Red Army did not take the Minxi area seriously until Deng Zihui, then Secretary of the Minxi Provisional Special Committee, wrote a report to the Front Committee and asked the Red Fourth Army to come to Minxi.

On May 20th, 1929, the Zhu-Mao Red Army reached Minxi again. This time they achieved remarkable success, leading to the establishment of the Minxi Soviet on March 18th, 1930. The Red Fourth Army took Longyan and Yongding and reformed the Minxi local military force into the Fourth Column, with Fu Bocui as commanding officer. They also helped establish the Longyan Revolutionary Committee and Yongding Revolutionary Committee, with Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng as the chairmen. In the meantime, the Zhu-Mao Red Army led the Minxi local forces with the strategy of "mobilizing the masses by dividing troops and attacking the enemy by unified power" (*fenbing yi fadong qunzhong, jizhong yi dueifu diren*) to twice defeat Jiang Jieshi's attack from three provinces.

By such efforts, the Minxi base area was preliminarily formed, centered around Longyan, Yongding, Shanghang, and also including Liancheng, Changding and Wuping.¹⁴⁶ To pacify the newly-occupied area, the Red Fourth Army launched the so-called "July division of troops" (*qiyue fenbing*) to help the local Communists destroy militia and enforce land revolution. In a short time, Minxi's revolutionary situation had been swiftly enhanced; party branches increased to more than 180, party members to 1450, and millions of *mu* of land were redistributed.¹⁴⁷

Although everything seemed to move smoothly during this expansion period, confrontations between the leadership of the Red Fourth Army and higher administrative levels were emerging. Most scholars consider such confrontations only as part of Mao's power struggle with various levels of party leadership, but a more comprehensive explanation is desirable. For example, the reason Mao had been deprived of the position of Secretary of the Front Committee from June to October of 1929 was not only due to his conflict with the leader of the Provisional Military Committee, but also due to the unclear functions of the Front Committee and Provisional Military Committee, which left room for power struggles. The Front Committee focused on the work of political guidance, especially working to ensure party leadership in the Red Army, while the Provisional Military Committee was responsible for military operation. Both should help each other to develop the Communist revolution. To improve flexibility in a changing revolutionary situation, Mao tried to combine both kinds of work into one organization to make the function of the Front Committee more comprehensive. This led to resistance. The form was a power struggle, but there were deeper underlying reasons.

As a result, Mao lost his position as the Secretary of the Front Committee at the Seventh Party Delegates' Meeting of the Red Fourth Army on June 22, 1929, and Chen Yi took his place. It seemed that Chen was only a compromise choice. After the meeting, at the end of July, Chen and Deng Zihui went to the headquarters of the Fujian Committee to report the situation in Minxi and then Chen, representing the Front Committee, went

to Shanghai to attend a Party Central meeting on military affairs. His other purpose, obviously, was to seek Party Central's direction to resolve the confrontation in the Red Fourth Army.

Many scholars have emphasized the significance of Zhou Enlai's "September letter" and the Gutian Conference in confirming Mao's power. Here I would like to focus on how Zhou and Mao explained the principle of "democratic centralism", interpretations of which were so flexible that they could be used as an excuse for power struggle. In the "Party Central's directive to the Front Committee of the Red Fourth Army", the so-called "September Letter", Zhou emphasized the principle of the system of "democratic centralism". To settle the confrontation between the Provisional Military Committee and the Front Committee, Zhou said we should:

insist on the absolute leadership of the Party; ...Therefore to clarify the relation between the party leadership and the military leadership is very important ... Every authority of the Party should be attributed to the Front Committee, which is correct and can't be disturbed. The term 'patriarchal system' should not be abused to deny the authority of supervise organization and to cover the defect of undue democracy...¹⁴⁸

Zhou's words provided a preliminary interpretation of the principle of the system of democratic centralism, which confirmed the power of the Front Committee. With this affirmation from the top, Mao could develop his theory about how to create a proletarian foundation from peasants using educational methods. He said:

The origin of the incorrect thought in the Red Fourth Army Party is because most of the Party are composed of peasants and small bourgeoisie. But the leadership of the Party did not decisively struggle with these wrong ideas and lacked correct educational methods, which let these wrong ideas exist and evolve.

He also claimed that the Red Army was not only an army which should organize people and educate people, but also should subordinate itself to the leadership of proletarian thought and to people's revolution.¹⁴⁹ Though such dialectical thinking Mao suggested the

Party should both lead people and listen to people, which illustrates the ambiguity of the principle of the democratic-centralist system. When should the Party listen to the masses? When should the Party lead the masses? These uncertainties helped cause line struggles and intra-party struggles.

Although Mao lost his position as the Secretary of the Front Committee, by means of his personal charisma and the initial impact of Communist thought on Minxi's intellectuals, he could doubtless exert strong influence on and manipulate Minxi's Communist leaders. At Mao's advice, Deng Zihui decided to convene Minxi's First Party Delegate's Conference to map out a working agenda. On June 27, Deng, as the Secretary of the Minxi Provisional Special Committee, notified the county committees to select delegates to attend the meeting at Jiaoyang village in Shanghang. The meeting was held on July 20th, which was delayed a week at Mao's suggestion, and Mao and other representatives of the Front Committee were present in a supervisory capacity. After listening to reports from every county, Mao pointed out that Minxi had six helpful conditions which made a base area possible: 1) there were eight hundred thousand people who had experienced uprisings and land revolution; 2) the CCP organizations here were concrete and influential; 3) the relationship between CCP and people was close; 4) people's armed forces had been established; 5) Minxi's geographical setting was good for the CCP'S fight against enemy; 6) the clashes among the enemy could be exploited. Then he continued to articulate three basic principles for consolidating the Minxi base area:

1. To implement land revolution thoroughly.
2. To exterminate militia completely, to develop worker-peasant armed forces, and to expend outwardly gradually.
3. To develop party organization, to establish political authority, and to eliminate counterrevolutionaries.

At the end of the meeting, July 25 1929, the Minxi's First Party Congress approved many important resolutions on politics, soviet government, and land problems. Deng Zihui was elected as the Secretary of the Minxi Special Committee. All of the resolutions were

drafted by Deng, corrected by Mao and then accepted by the Congress.

Among these resolutions, the most important ones were the resolutions on politics and land problems, which made up the main points of Mao's theory of "New Democracy". According to Mao's analysis, the chief goal of the current revolution was land revolution, which could resolve the problem of people's livelihood, open up a road to agricultural capitalism, and therefore accomplish the first step of the Chinese proletarian revolution — the democratic revolution, which was a transitional stage to the ideal society of socialism.¹⁵⁰ The result of Mao's theory was to help adjust Marxism-Leninism to the needs of the revolution which had been practically enacted by Minxi Communists, especially Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng.

However, in spite of Mao's theory, the resolution on land problems was actually a combination of the "Jinggangshan Land Law" and the Xi'nan experience. The points of emphasis of the resolution were: to depend on the poor peasants and agricultural workers, to consolidate the middle peasants, to protect the stores, not to attack the rich peasants brutally, and to concentrate every effort on attacking the landlords.¹⁵¹ The intent of this resolution, apparently, was similar to the purpose of the land policy of the Xi'nan District Soviet; to appeal to the masses to support the revolution. The resolution also adopted some aspects of the Xi'nan land policy, such as "*chou duo bu shao*" and using the "village" as the unit of distributing land.

Before the interruption of the "Li Lisan Line" and the "Wang Ming Line", Minxi's land law was basically formed until April of 1931. The "Nanyang Conference" was held by the Front Committee and the Minxi Special Committee on May of 1930 to resolve conflicts over fertile and barren land. In addition to the principle of *chou dou bu shao*, they decided to add the principle of *chou fei bu shou*, which meant that a household receiving too much barren land could gain fertile land from the household having too much fertile land. "The Resolution of the Land Committee" issued by the Minxi Soviet on April 20th of 1931 decreed that peasants could have ownership of the land they received.¹⁵² The changability

of the land law demonstrated how flexible Mao and Minxi's leaders were in adjusting policies to people's needs.

Following the resolutions of the Minxi First Party Congress, every county started to implement land revolution, and then established county soviets. In a few months, the land of more than six hundred villages was redistributed and eight hundred thousand poor peasants gained land. By March of 1930, Deng believed that economic and political conditions were favorable enough that the time to build the Minxi Soviet had come. On March 18th 1930 the Minxi First Worker-Peasant- Soldier Congress was held (Deng was elected as the Chairman), and the Minxi base area was formally established.¹⁵³

In spite of the phenomenal growth, many problems were appearing during this period, not only the confrontation among the leadership of the Red Fourth Army, but also the discrepancy between the goals of state-building and revolution. Because some internal party material is available now, we can have a closer look into the communication among multi-level party organizations which reflects the various opinions on policy-making and execution. From the correspondence among the multi-leveled organizations, we can perceive that the subdivisions were complex and help explain why questions of communication among them were sensitive. For example, the position of the Front Committee and of the Fujian Committee were parallel; the latter could only give letters to the former rather than directives, but the Fujian Committee reported the action of the Red Fourth Army in Minxi to Party Central all the time. Another illuminating point from investigating the materials is that because most of the materials are from March 1929 to March 1930, we can understand that many problems emerged during that period before the official formation in June 1930 of the leftist policy known as the Li Lisan Line. This demonstrates that although a mistaken political line could greatly affect the local situation, its roots were more complicated than they appeared.

I would like to summarize the major problems which were discussed in the materials: (1) the influence of the Red Fourth Army; (2) the problems of bandits, counter-revolutionaries

and peasant mentality; (3) the defects of the Party organization; (4) the work of state-building; (5) economic difficulties — the “scissors’ crisis”. Most of these turned out to be the problems the Li Lisan Line tried to resolve.

(1) The Influence of the Red Fourth Army

In the report of April 20th 1929 to Party Central, the Fujian Committee mentioned how helpful the Zhu-Mao Red Army was in mobilizing the masses and expanding the party membership, although the Committee was also concerned that the local party was too dependent on military force to carry out ordinary work.¹⁵⁴ In a May report, the Committee emphasized the negative influence of the Red Fourth Army. They complained that the masses expected too much from the Red Fourth Army, so that when the Army left they felt disappointed.¹⁵⁵

In a letter to the lower organizations and the Front Committee on August 7th 1929, the Fujian Committee criticized the organization of the Minxi Special Committee as unhealthy, especially after the coming of the Red Fourth Army, as also were the county committees.

...The Fujian Committee thinks that you [the Minxi Special Committee and the Yongding Committee] assign too many cadres to the Red Army and neglect the party and soviet. Leaving incapable members to take charge of party and soviet work is not a good method, for the party should lead every thing...Since the Red Army has come to Minxi again, the organization of the Minxi Special Committee is not healthy even without routine work...¹⁵⁶

Accordingly they asked the Minxi Party to distribute cadres properly and to establish close relationships between lower and higher levels of organization to carry on ordinary work during struggle.

In the report of the inspector Xie Yunkang to the Fujian Committee on October 25th, Xie talked about the situation of the Fourth Column. The Fourth Column was reorganized from Shanghang and Yongding armed forces by the Red Fourth Army, with Zhang Dingcheng as the party representative and Tan Zhenlin as the chairman of the political department. (Tan, a native of Hunan province, was dispatched from the Red Fourth Army) Some of the cadres

of the Fourth Column were from the Fourth Red Army and some were promoted from the natives. Xie commented that the fighting power of the Fourth Column had been improved and he also noticed that, although it was subjected to the Minxi Special Committee, it had close relations with the Front Committee.¹⁵⁷

In an overall report to the Fujian Committee on November 6th, the Minxi Special Committee reported at great length on the problems in the Fourth Column.

First of all, owing to the way the Fourth Column had been formed (some officers and soldiers were transferred from the Red Fourth Army, while some were reorganized from local forces and peasant leaders), discipline was poor... The soldiers from the local forces could not stand strict military training, and the officers of peasant background were against the methods of scolding and beating the soldiers that the officers from the Red Fourth Army used. ...These confrontations caused more and more deserters from military service. Although the situation improved after the Fourth Column Party delegates' Conference, the split was still there.¹⁵⁸

In addition, the Minxi Special Committee also complained that the influence of the party organization in the Fourth Column was weak.

(2) The Problems of bandits, counter-revolutionaries and the peasant mentality

The Fujian Committee reported to Party Central on April 20th that because the number of bandits in Minxi was more than elsewhere, the bandit problem had not been dealt with effectively. Additionally, in this report, the Fujian Committee noticed various circumstances in the counties. For instance, Longyan's counter-revolutionary power was strong and the Third Party (*Disan dang*) was influential there, too. The masses in Shanghang lacked proletarian class consciousness because the living standard of tenants was better than in the other counties. Because of the brutal armed uprising before, the peasants in Yongding were more violent, which should be controlled.¹⁵⁹ In a May report, the Committee mentioned the active work of the "Reorganization Clique" (*Gaizu pai*) in big cities and the strong GMD counter-revolutionary propaganda.¹⁶⁰

The Yongding Committee's report on July sixth 1929 talked about how strong the counter-revolutionary power (militia, white army and bandits) was in Fu city and the

villages of Fengtian and Xia Hulei, etc. Not until help arrived from the Red Fourth Red Army could the Party control those areas, but the enemy would counter-attack whenever the Red Army was gone. Because peasants made up fifty percent of party membership (tenants were 32.5 percent, semi-tenants were 66 percent and semi-self-cultivator were 7.5 percent), many kinds of feudal conceptions among comrades were common, such as money-orientation, localism, individualism and skepticism to the Party.¹⁶¹ All of these aspects of peasant mentality impeded the effect of party education.

The Longyan Committee's report on July 9th also mentioned the work of purging counter-revolutionaries and bandits. The Longyan Committee killed three hundred local bullies and reorganized a bandit army in Yanshi township, led by Liu Leibo, into a guerrilla unit, with Lin Yizhu as the party representative.¹⁶² (Liu changed sides between the CCP and the Nationalist Government constantly.)

In the letter of October 6th, the Fujian Committee agreed with the opinion of the Party Central that the Zhu-Mao Red Army should march to the East River to help the people struggle in Guangdong province. Additionally, to overcome localism and to appeal to the masses to attend the Red Army, the Fujian Committee suggested the Red Fourth Army should take part of the Minxi armed forces to the battle area and they also insisted that the Minxi Party should focus on the workers' movement, for they believed that workers were not so localistic as peasants were.¹⁶³

In the report to the Fujian Committee on November 6th, the Minxi Special Committee mentioned that the bandit problem had become serious in Minxi.

Most party members had no knowledge of bandits, and there were no methods or appropriate personnel to work with them...Although there were fifty or sixty bandits who joined peasant associations in Wuping, and eighty of Liu Leibo's bandit gang were absorbed into guerrillas without further guidance. Nonetheless the CCP's influence on bandits was insignificant.¹⁶⁴

With little doubt, every level of organization perceived the seriousness of the problems of bandits, counterrevolutionaries and prevalent peasant mentality which significantly

hindered the CCP control in the area. The methods to overcome these problems were to purge counterrevolutionaries, to deepen the workers' movement and to improve the education of the masses. None of this work was easy to achieve, because of the inherent problems of socio-ecological system and the defects of the party organizations.

(3) The Defects of the Party Organizations

With regard to the direction of the local party, in the reports to Party Central in April and May, the Fujian Committee complained that urban work had not been improved, the quality of membership was low (peasants had been recruited without any qualification), and because of lack of personnel, they could not despatch enough cadres to supervise the work in the local area.¹⁶⁵

The Yongding Committee's report in July complained that the quality of cadres was not good enough, the inspecting work had not been executed well and although peasants and workers comprised the bulk of the membership (55% were peasants, 30% were workers and 15.8% were intellectuals), they did not dominate leadership; there were four intellectuals, two peasants and one worker on the Committee. The Yongding Committee also complained about the inability of party members' leadership of the masses.¹⁶⁶

In the letter of October 6th, the Fujian Committee pointed out two things that the Minxi Party should do to improve the work of organization. One was to establish the branch life style, the other was to improve local party organization. They said: "According to the report, only the local party organization in Longyan is in good condition, while others are in bad shape".¹⁶⁷

In the report to the Fujian Committee on November 6th, the Minxi Special Committee complained of the defects of the Wuping Committee.

With the tendency toward opportunism, the Wuping Committee could not respond to the masses' requirement and could not follow directions, either, which gave the opportunity of robbery and disturbance to Zhong Shaokui's bandit army...However the Wuping Party was dead.

In line with the variable party control in the counties, the Minxi Special Committee planned

Shanghang-Yongding-Longyan as the core area.¹⁶⁸

In the report of December 12th, the Minxi Special Committee talked about the problems of Party work in detail. They mentioned eleven faults that the Minxi Party had:

1. Everything was not led by the Party but by personal relations.
2. The life style of party branches has not been formed at the direction of the proletarian class. The party organizations of each county were not healthy, leadership was weak and the work of party branches was neglected. (The party organization of Yongding was better.)
3. The Minxi Party ignored the creation of a proletarian foundation; it gave no priority to central work, and had no patience with city work. The city work in Changding, Shanghang and Yongding was poor. Additionally, the bad members in the party had not been expelled.
4. The cultivation of cadres had not been increased with the enlargement of the red area, which caused a lack of cadres and a pileup of work.
5. Education work had been neglected, the political standard of party members was poor, and the activity ability of comrades was inferior.
6. The work of party, corps and mass organizations was not divided well; instead the work was manipulated by a few comrades.
7. Regular directives from supervisory levels of organizations (such as the county committee) were few, reports from party branches were not frequent, nor were the horizontal relationships among party organizations.
8. Discussion of political problems had not been apparent. For example, among the county committees, only the Longyan and Yongding committees had discussed once in a while. The worst one was the Shanghang committee.
9. Investigatory work had not been executed. The main problem was that the party organization below the county level did not dispatch inspectors to the lower level. In the meantime, the direction of words was not specific enough, nor were the answers to the lower level of organization fast enough. Therefore, without specific directions and strict supervision, decisions of the upper level could not be made and work of the lower level, especially the party branch, could not be established.
10. The relationships among comrades of lower and upper levels of organizations only depended on pure friendship, and lacked the spirit of collaboration. Especially there was no spirit of mutual-criticism and mutual-supervision among party branches. Such conditions were prevalent in Minxi.
11. Since breaking away from the period of "white terror," because the party organization had not been tight, many comrades became corrupt and neglectful. Such conditions were most serious in Longyan.¹⁶⁹

(4) The Work of State-Building

The definition of state-building was not clear during the Soviet period. I would like to

define the aim of state-building work during the soviet period as establishing the soviets and consolidating the soviets. To establish a soviet by the people, the Party emphasized that the work of the Party and the Soviet should be divided clearly to avoid "party monopolization" and the masses should be led by the worker-peasant-soldier government. Likewise the work between the Party and the Corps should also be divided properly. ("Corps" meant all kinds of associations set up by the CCP, such as the Communist Youth League and the Children's Corps. These organizations should be managed by the people themselves rather than the party.) As for consolidating the red regime, the Party stressed the work of purging counter-revolutionaries and expanding the red area. As a result, conservative and defeatist mentalities were seen as dangers to the work of state-building, so was neglect of the workers' movement.

In the letter of August 7th, the Fujian Committee emphasized that:

Although the attack from counter-revolutionaries was hard, the only way to break through such a siege was to enlarge the Communist influence aggressively rather than to defend conservatively.¹⁷⁰

In the letter of August 8th, the committee clearly insisted on this attitude :

"At any rate, the power of the counter-revolution around Minxi is weak, only if we can mobilize the masses to struggle, can we defeat the enemy...Never commit the mistake of defeatism and conservatism."¹⁷¹

Although the Committee believed that military victory was based on the support of the masses, the masses should be led by peasants, workers and soldiers. Therefore they considered how far the success the Soviet could achieve was important to the success of Communist revolution. In other words, they thought the work of state-building could help the work of revolution. In the same letter, the Fujian Committee kept telling the Minxi Party that no matter how hard it was the soviets had to implement the land policy, educate the masses, and increase the masses' class consciousness, otherwise the masses would not support the soviets. The Committee also asked the Minxi Party to fix the phenomenon that

est
tra
m
m
m
I
n
n
n

there were no intellectuals in village soviets, while there were few workers and peasants in the soviets beyond the village level. It warned the Minxi Party that if the situation was not improved quickly, the Party would lose contact with the people.¹⁷²

Another thing they noticed was the work of purging counter-revolutionaries. The Committee said that to consolidate the Soviet they had to suppress the counterrevolutionaries ruthlessly. "Although many rich peasants and small landlords will surrender to us when our government exists, most of them are opportunists...we have to treat them brutally".¹⁷³ Additionally, the Committee complained the Minxi Party's purge work was not severe enough.

As to the problem of the division of Party and Corps work, the Committee advised: "Party members should not monopolize all kinds of work. Some work should be left to the Corps". In a letter to the lower level organizations and the Front Committee, the Fujian Committee mentioned that according to CY comrade Deng's report (probably by Deng Zihui), the work deployment of the Minxi Party was too conservative and neglected the workers' movement in cities and the peasant movement around the county seats.¹⁷⁴

With regard to Soviet work, comrade Deng reported that in Shanghang's Beisi District Soviet, rich peasants and small landlords fought for leadership. Therefore, in the letter of September 6th, the Fujian Committee emphasized that Soviet leadership should be maintained in the hands of poor peasants and agricultural workers, and that the Party should not monopolize Soviet work. The Party should let the masses control their own business.¹⁷⁵ In other words, the function of Party and Soviet should be differentiated.

As to the development of the workers' movement, the Committee said: "The workers' movement is the only central work. The Minxi party has not established a workers' movement yet, for only Longyan's workers movement is good, while the workers' movements in the others are poor... The land revolution must be led by workers... The track of land revolution will not be correct unless the work of the workers' movement is established." Because the majority of workers in Minxi were boatmen, the Committee

designated Shanghang as the center of the workers' movement.¹⁷⁶ But according to inspector Xie's report on October 25th, although quite a few of the labor unions and workers' forces had been established, the workers' movement in Shanghang was still insubstantial. "Small merchants and poor people were not well mobilized and suspicious of their own authority".¹⁷⁷

Another thing that hindered the work of state-building was the peasant associations. In the report to the Fujian Committee on November 6th, the Minxi Special Committee talked about the negative influence of the peasant associations in the red area. There were two kinds of peasant associations: open and secret. The Minxi Special Committee said:

In the red area, every peasant joined the peasant associations, hence, as it turned out, the peasant associations seemed to be the real regime in the countryside. In the white area, peasant associations operated secretly. But even the soviet area had secret peasant associations, which caused the problem of the division of the Party and the Corps.¹⁷⁸

(5) Economic Difficulty — the "Scissor's Crisis"

Because he was dispatched by the Fujian Committee, inspector Xie Kangyun's observations appear to be exemplary of the point of view of the supervisory level. In his report on October 25th, Xie focused on Minxi's conditions, especially the beginning of declining economic conditions, the so-called "scissors' crisis". Xie explained that the occurrence of the "scissors' crisis" in the red area was inevitable because of the blockade between the white area and red area, which caused the price of goods in red areas to drop dramatically (especially the price of rice), while the price of the goods from the white area soared (especially the price of industrial products). This price disparity, called the "scissors", made it difficult for the people living in the red area to support themselves. Xie said:

The red area in the countryside must cause this kind of deteriorating result. That is why building sovereignty in the countryside will not succeed. We have to employ correct policies to save the situation, but the essential method is to try to enlarge the red area as much as possible.¹⁷⁹

To respond to the report of inspector Xie, the Fujian Committee issued a directive on November 11th on how to resolve the economic crisis in the red area, and it asserted that the Minxi Party had committed a mistaken rich peasant line in trying to resolve the crisis. The Fujian Committee agreed with the inspector's opinion about how to resolve the "scissors' crisis", and said:

The occurrence of the phenomenon [the scissors' crisis] is not coincidental. It is an inevitable result of the partial occupation and enemy's blockade... The first step to resolve this difficulty is to expand the red area into the white area... You [the Minxi Party] must correct the defeatism of the peasant's mentality.¹⁸⁰

Furthermore, the Committee also mentioned that establishing a sizable Red Army was the primary method to encourage the coming of a revolutionary peak. They asked the Minxi Party to recruit 3000 people into the Fourth Column in three months.

From the selective correspondence above, we can perceive that all of the advantageous or disadvantageous features of Minxi's ecological setting were exposed during the period of growth, including the predominant peasant mentality, the lack of a real proletarian class, bandit disturbances and multi-layered local elites. What made the whole situation more complicated was the previous experience of the local Communist leaders in plotting uprisings. The local Communists tended to believe that personal relations were the core of organizational activity. Additionally, the dialectical relationship between ideology and organization also contributed to the dilemma. The extent to which the local party was willing to follow orders from the supervisory level was certainly not absolute during the uprising period; the extent to which the upper level party organization was willing to let the local party have some autonomy was also decreasing during the Soviet period. This was also the dilemma of the principle of democratic centralism. The function of the soviet, corps and mass organizations was to make the masses learn how to manage their own business, which was to achieve the aim of democracy. By doing this, the Party was supposed to know what the masses wanted and to make policy, and then in return to educate and guide the masses, which was the purpose of centralism. When the Committee said

in the letter of August 7th that to consolidate the Soviet regime they had to pacify the counterrevolutionaries ruthlessly, the problem of "rich peasants" became critical, for the rich peasants were not the main target in the uprising period, while during the Soviet period the rich peasants became political and economic victims. But because the characteristics of rich and middle peasants were hard to define, and some Communist leaders such as Wang Yangyan and Fu Bocui were from rich peasant families, the problem of rich peasants became the core of political struggle.

Although the "Li Lisan Line" had not yet come to dominate the Party, the Fujian Committee's letter to the Minxi Special Committee and the Front Committee on January 8th of 1930 criticized the Minxi Party's strategy on the problem of rich peasants. They thought the Minxi Party followed a mistaken "rich peasant line." From the perspective of consolidating the soviet regime they said:

The Communist Party is the proletarian party, which does not allow two classes blending in the Party. Because the rich peasants belong to the exploiting class, all the rich peasants have to be excluded from the party organization. In other words, we have to eliminate the line and thought of the rich peasant in the Party. In the organizations, we must never allow rich peasants to mix in. As to the rich peasants who have become party members, we should exclude them through a line struggle ... Of course, those rich peasants who sacrifice their benefits and become decisive members are not the examples.¹⁸¹

But actually the real situation was more complicated. In addition, from the economic aspect, they complained:

As for the rich peasant problem, you [the Minxi Special Committee] intentionally committed the strategic mistake of 'rich peasant line'. Although you said you have to expand the red area to resolve the 'scissors' crisis', you have not offered specific methods, instead you spent lots of energy on making policy to save the economic situation, most of which turned out to be conservative methods... The most conservative trait is demonstrated by your approach to the anti-debt problem; to repay the debts of this year rather than of last year, to repay the debts of small merchants rather than of the landlords, and to repay the debts of the workers and peasants rather than of the gentry. Actually to repay the debts to the peasants and the small merchants is to repay the debts to the rich peasants. That is why the masses have not approved your decision.¹⁸²

Besides the rich peasant problem, the Committee strongly commanded the Minxi Party to enlarge the Red Army and to establish the Soviet as the highest authority in red area rather than the Party. They said:

All authority has to be attributed to the Soviet. The Soviet is the people's highest directive organization. The discussion and execution of all kinds of work, including struggle strategy, regulation of policy, action of the Red Army, and financial income, has to be done under the direction of the Soviet. The Party can only direct the Soviet work through the Corps. That is, decisions of the Party have to be brought by the Corps to the Soviet to be passed and implemented. No manipulation of the Party or person can be allowed.¹⁸³

However, from the stronger and stronger tone the Fujian Committee used, we can perceive that an organizational confrontation had developed. From the point of view of upper level organization, to consolidate the Soviet, the Minxi Party had to deal with the rich peasants and to divide the work of party organization and mass organizations properly, while from the point of view of lower level organization, appealing to more people (including rich peasants) was the best way to achieve revolutionary aims. When upper level organizations determined to execute the policy they thought was necessary to secure the red area, a massive tragedy ensued in Minxi, the "purge of the Social-Democratic Party". Such organizational confrontation certainly helped shape the ideological struggle, especially when the situation in Minxi was getting worse. The Commissioner of the Fujian Committee, Luo Ming, then started to resist the policies of Party Central, which caused a line struggle in the Soviet area, known as the "Struggle of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line".

2 The Purge of the Social Democratic Party and The Struggle of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line

Before describing these two incidents in Minxi, I would like to make it clear that, of course, the influence of the Third Communist International and the Soviet Union cannot be neglected. As analyzed above, many problems had emerged before the leftist policies

of the “Li Lisan Line” and the “Wang Ming Line” became dominant. Unsuccessful policies exacerbated the endemic problems in the red area. Actually the formation of leftist policy was influenced not only by the Third International, the theory of the “third period of capitalism” and the anti-rightist struggle, but also by new developments in China, including the new expansion of the red area and the warlord battles in North China beginning in May of 1930, which left the CCP with opportunities to exploit.¹⁸⁴ That is why the Fujian Committee and the Minxi Party were first convinced to implement the leftist policies, although Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng did express different opinions. Not until a tragedy occurred in Minxi did Luo Ming, then the provisional secretary of Fujian Committee, start to argue against the policy from the top. However, due to the ambiguity between ideology and reality, the interpretation of theory was a matter of judgement.

The Minxi Soviet was formally established at the Minxi First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Congress at the Longyan county seat on March 18th, 1930. Although the situation in Minxi seemed to move ahead, the influence of Li Lisan in the Party Central had started to affect the Minxi Party since March. On April 10th, the Minxi armed forces were reorganized into the Red 12th Army, controlled by Party Central, which was a sign of interference from the top. Until June 11th, Party Central, headed by Li, approved the resolution of “the new revolutionary climax and victory first in one or several provinces”, which symbolized the formation of the Li Lisan Line. Later, Li decided to stage a national uprising, centering around Wuhan in Hubei, and to concentrate the red armies to attack central cities. The new Red 12th Army was dispatched northward.¹⁸⁵ The influence of the Li Lisan Line in Minxi was profound on both organization and society.

The Minxi Second Party Congress was held on July 8th to convey Li’s policy; to concentrate all power to expand struggle to Guangdong and first of all to seize power in Fujian-Guangdong-Guangxi, and then to fight for revolutionary victory in the whole country. During the conference, although Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng insisted that the most important thing should be to consolidate the Minxi base area, they were criticized

as the “new rightists” and after the conference Deng was discharged from positions as the chairman of the Minxi Soviet and the political commissioner of the Red 21th Army. (The Red 21th Army was established in June 1930, by combining the Fourth Column of the Red Fourth Army and the First Column of the Red 12th Army, both of which were original Minxi armed forces.) Furthermore, the conference not only approved Li’s policy, but also emphasized the struggle with rich peasants, under the slogan of “anti-rich-peasant line”. The new secretary of the Minxi Special Committee was Guo Diren, and the new chairman of the Minxi Soviet was Zhang Dingcheng. Deng Zihui was assigned as the inspector of the Fujian Committee to central and southern Fujian.¹⁸⁶

To control the local party organizations more effectively, the Party Central commanded the Minxi Party to combine Party and Corps organizations and to form a “general action committee”. In September 1930 the Minxi General Action Committee was established. The Minxi Second Worker-Peasant-Soldier Congress was held in September. It also confirmed Li’s policy and decided to deepen the anti-rich-peasant struggle.¹⁸⁷ To be sure, although the Minxi General Action Committee took over executive work, the Minxi Special Committee and the Minxi Soviet were still nominally the highest party organization and government authority.

As a result of Li’s policy, the situation in Minxi was getting worse. Military defeat and continuous expansion of troops made thousands of soldiers desert, which left room for bandit disturbances. For example, the Red 12th Army was defeated in Guangdong, and when they came back the Longyan county seat was lost to militia from Yanshi, where counter-revolutionary activity was revitalizing. By October 1931, the size of the Red 12th Army declined from 4,000 to 600.¹⁸⁸

The combination of Party and Corps work into the Minxi General Action Committee paralyzed much routine work. That is, the corps organizations were inactive, and all the work was undertaken only by the Party and the Soviet. Owing to the abolition of the Corps organizations and the need for mass mobilization, the recruitment system of party members

was crippled and the secrecy of party organization was also ruined. As a CCP document said:

“...the decided policies of finance and land could not be enacted completely. The work of leading the masses and government is neglected... Organization is loosening and discipline is almost bankrupt.”¹⁸⁹

In addition, to reform peasant mentality the Minxi General Action Committee mobilized the Communist Youth League and the Children's Corps to demolish superstition, which upset the peasants, handicraftsmen and small merchants very much and disturbed the social order.¹⁹⁰ At the same time, the Party Central continuously dispatched representatives to Minxi to supervise policy implementation, which of course was a clear sign of interference from the top.

As for the anti-rich-peasant effort, interestingly, it did not significantly influence Minxi's land distribution. Although Li suggested that depending on the specific conditions the village soviets should use either the methods of distributing land by number of persons and by labor power, or the method of collective farms, the Minxi Special Committee resisted the command on the basis of local necessity and the resolution on “the problem of rich peasants” approved by the land policy that formed in the Nanyang Meeting.¹⁹¹ This kind of opposition demonstrated that the lower level organizations tried their best to preserve their own autonomy.

In early October, Party Central dispatched Shi Jian to Minxi. On the 7th, the United Meeting of the Minxi General Action Committee, the Military Commissioners of the Red 12th Army and of the Minxi Red Army School was held. Owing to the serious situation in Minxi and prevailing dissatisfaction among the masses and cadres, the meeting decided the Red 12th Army should halt its march to the Dong River, and instead should march to southern Fujian, and that the Red 21th Army and Red 20th Army should be reorganized into the New Red 12th Army, with Shi Jian as its political commissioner. Later Party Central assigned two other persons to become military and political commissioners, while

Shi Jian became the Chairman of the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Committee, which was a new organization established by high-level decision.¹⁹² Although the Li Lisan Line had been lightly restrained by demands from lower organizations and local reality, pressure from the top in a leftist direction still existed.

In September 1930, Party Central held the Third Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress (Sixth-Third Plenum) at Shanghai, which resolved to correct the policy of the Li Lisan Line; it stopped the national uprising and the concentration of the Red Army to attack central cities, and instead restored the work of the Party and Corps organizations.¹⁹³ The Li Lisan Line had been stopped by a power struggle at the top, but the aggressive approach to achieve revolutionary victory had not been given up.

According to the organizational resolution of the Sixth-Third Plenum, the Party decided to establish the Central Bureau in the central Soviet area, at Ruijin city in Jiangxi, to conduct the work of the party in the Soviet area. In addition, the resolution decided to combine both the Minxi Special Committee and the Dong River Special Committee into the Min-Yue-Gan Special Committee, with Deng Fa, the representative of Party Central, as secretary and chairman of the military committee. Hence the Min-Yue-Gan Special Committee took over the function of the Minxi Special Committee in guiding revolutionary and state-building work in Minxi. The new Committee was incorporated into the Central Bureau on January 15th 1931, as a result of which the Min-Yue-Gan border areas officially belonged to the Central base area. It is clear that the organizational change resulted from the changing situation and the intensifying pressure of control from the top. At the same time, with the changing organizational situation and the abolition of the Li Lisan Line, another leftist policy was forming, the Wang Ming Line. It was the "Wang Ming Line" that sharpened the political confrontation in Minxi.

At the end of 1930, Jiang Jieshi launched the first "encirclement campaign" (*weijiao*). On December 15th, the Longyan county seat was lost to the enemy. The headquarters of the Minxi Special Committee and the Minxi Soviet moved to Hugang township in Yongding.

Minxi was in a critical situation. At the same time, after the abolition of the Li Lisan Line, the Wang Ming Line started to dominate the Party. In January 1931, the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress (Sixth-Fourth Plenum) was held. Wang Ming, one of the returning 28 Bolsheviks, with the support of the Third International and the effort of suppressing the Li Lisan Line, seized the leadership of Party Central at the meeting. He believed that the major danger in the Party was rightist tendencies and the only way to counteract this mistake was to reform the leadership of every level of party organizations, which was a typical measure according to the principle of democratic centralism. Therefore the Party Central kept dispatching representatives and new cadres to the Central base area. At the beginning of 1933 losses in the white areas forced the Party Central to move from Shanghai to Ruijin.¹⁹⁴ From then on, the Wang Ming Line could be forcefully enacted in the Central Base Area.

Besides massive conscription for soldiers and serious interference with the operation of local organizations, the most destructive aspect of the Wang Ming Line was its land policy. In the name of Party Central, Wang Ming published a land law in the *Red Flag Monthly* (*Hongqi Yuekan*) on March 5th 1931. The land law was completely against Mao Zedong's principles of land revolution, which were to depend on poor peasants and agricultural workers, to consolidate middle peasants, and to offer rich peasants living expenses. Like Li Lisan, the emphasis of Wang Ming's land law was anti-rich-peasant; it provided no land for landlords and bad land for rich peasants. Because the definition of rich peasant was vague in China's countryside, the result of implementing Wang's land law was that it not only complicated the classification in villages but also eroded middle peasants' benefit, which created an anti-middle-peasant environment. In addition, because it emphasized the leadership of agricultural workers in the village, labor unions of agricultural workers were established, which produced confrontations between agricultural workers and poor peasants.¹⁹⁵

The movement for land investigation made the situation in villages even worse. On

August 8th 1932, during the period of Jiang Jieshi's fourth encirclement campaign the Central Bureau resolved that to complete the land investigation and then to resolve the land problem was one way to counteract the enemy's attack. In the beginning the Minxi Party did not follow the order enthusiastically because of the anti-Luo-Ming Line, and Mao tried to drag the movement into the right track, but under pressure from the top, the Minxi Party finally executed it. Because carrying out the land investigation involved redistributing land and reclassifying the masses, the Minxi base area fell into total chaos. Some former rich peasants, although they had participated in revolutionary work, were persecuted again, while others were forced to join bandit gangs.¹⁹⁶ Although many efforts had been made by leaders of lower level organizations to change the Wang Ming Line, the leftist policy was not modified until the Long March in 1934.

With little doubt, from 1931 to 1934 lots of damage in Minxi was caused by these policies. Once again I will demonstrate that the reasons for this were profound, and involved various factors, such as ecological settings, characteristics of local leaders and the dialectical relations among ideology, organization and reality; these factors also helped explain the Purge of the Social Democratic Party.

(1) The Purge of the Social-Democratic Party

As mentioned above, the Li Lisan Line caused lots of problems, such as military defeats, many military desertions and the revitalization of counter-revolutionary power. More important, these problems intensified the inherent difficulties in Minxi: the control of multi-layered local gentry, the prevalent peasant mentality and the emerging economic crisis. That was why, when the situation was getting worse and the Party Central believed that the reason was because counterrevolutionaries were hiding in the revolutionary ranks, the Minxi Party became convinced that the only way to consolidate the red area was to purge counter-revolutionaries, as the Fujian Committee had advised before. In September 1930, according to directions from the Fujian Committee that "to consolidate the Soviet area we must purge the counter-revolutionaries", the Minxi Soviet established the Committee

for Purging Counter-Revolutionaries (*sufan weiyuanhui*), with Lin Yizhu as chairman. Although Lin was the chairman of the Purge Committee, I believe the whole situation was still under the control of Deng Fa, a representative of Party Central, then the secretary of the Min-Yue-Gan Special Committee. At first the purge movement was influenced by the similar movement in Gan'nan, the purge of the AB Clique. Any person who had a defeatist mentality, did not work hard enough or ran away from military service, was in danger of being seen as a counter-revolutionary. Therefore a distrustful atmosphere was prevalent and rumors were rampant in Minxi, such as that the activity of the Reorganizational Clique was strong in Yongding, that the influence of the Third Party in Shanghang and Yongding was powerful, and so on.¹⁹⁷ However, the purge movement started to go out of control when it focused on Fu Bocui. This was also the beginning of the purge of the Social-Democratic Party.

The Social-Democratic Party (SD Party) was a party established by the Second International, which was criticized as revisionist by Lenin's Third International. To respond to directions from the Third International to intensify the struggle with the Social-Democratic Party in May 1929, the Party Central issued an order to every party organization to be aware of the influence of reformism in China on misleading revolutionary recognition in the Party, and to see the Third Party as the most dangerous enemy. Therefore in China, the SD Party was related to the Third Party, while in Minxi the Party perceived persons who betrayed the CCP as members of the Third Party.¹⁹⁸ Such distortion shifted the counter-revolutionary targets from outside to inside the party, and made Fu Bocui become the victim of the purge.

As analyzed in the first chapter, Fu was a "protective gentry" with revolutionary tendencies. In terms of localism, he retained great autonomy even under the CCP regime. After the First Minxi Party Congress on the 29th of July, 1929, Fu left his position as the commander of the Fourth Column, went back to his home town and cut contact with CCP, for his behavior had been criticized. At the end of 1930 the Min-Yue-Gan

Speci

some

to the

the S

soldie

they

impor

O

was c

cadre

SD P

Sovie

whole

seek

the fo

T

comm

Red

Com

Lu Z

Corp

dama

Special Committee expelled him from the party. The reason of starting the purge was somewhat vague and evidence was lacking. In January 1931, in a memorial ceremony to the vanguards of Communist movement, some soldiers yelled the slogans of "support the Second International" and "long live the Social-Democratic Party" by mistake. These soldiers were arrested under the charge of being members of the SD Party. Under torture, they admitted that Fu was the secretary of the SD Party and some other cadres also held important positions in the SD Party.¹⁹⁹ Therefore a tragedy was instigated.

On the first of March 1931, the Minxi Soviet held a purge meeting in Hugang, which was called the "Hugang Meeting". In this meeting, the Minxi Soviet sentenced seventeen cadres to death. On the sixth, the Minxi Soviet proclaimed that Fu was the leader of the SD Party and that the Gutian-Jiaoyang area was a nest of the SD Party. Then the Minxi Soviet sent the Red Army to attack Fu's base area without any success. However, the whole situation was getting serious and many suspects fled to the Gutian-Jiaoyang area to seek protection.²⁰⁰ Under the control of Wang Ming, a directive from the Party Central on the fourth of April 1931 said:

The enemy attacks the Soviet area from all sides and the white terror prevails. They try to penetrate our organizations and the Red Army to carry out destructive work. Minxi's so-called Social-Democratic Party, Jiangxi's AB Clique and the Reorganization Clique in other places, from Jiang Jieshi to Fu Bocui, all have complete connection and strategy...[we] must exterminate counterrevolutionaries inside the Red Army, inside the government, and inside the party organization, with brutal methods on the side of proletarian class.

The damage the purge had done in Minxi was serious. Thirty-five executive commissioners in the Minxi Soviet government were dead. Half of the cadres in the Red Army were victimized. Thousands of people had been killed, including the local Communist leaders who had led uprisings, such as Changding's Wang Yangyan, Yongding's Lu Zaoxi and Chen Zhen, Longyan's Chen Jinghui, etc. Organizations of the Party and Corps were shaken, and the reputation of the Party among the masses was reduced. The damage was so critical that many cities in the central area, such as Longyan-Yongding-

Shanghang, were taken by the Nationalist army. In July 1931, Hugang was lost and the headquarters of the Min-Yue-Gan Special Committee and the Minxi Soviet moved to Baisha village in Shanghang. Even Zhang Dingcheng, the chairman of the Minxi Soviet and Luo Ming, the commissioner of the Min-Yue-Gan Provincial Committee, were suspected.²⁰¹ However the whole situation was so destructive that the Party Central noticed it.

With the victory against Jiang Jieshi's third encirclement campaign and Party Central's demand to correct the purge movement, although it still believed purging of counterrevolutionaries was necessary, the surviving local leaders got a chance to fight back. Taking advantage of Deng Fa's absence and in the name of the people, Zhang Dingcheng, Guo Diren and Luo Ming sentenced the ex-chairman of the Purge Committee, Lin Yizhu, and other people who had taken charge of the purge movement to death under the charge of being members of the SD Party.²⁰² Although this eased the purge of the SD Party somewhat, the purge movement did not entirely stop until the Long March.

(2) The Movement of the Anti-Luo-Ming Line

I believe that the Anti-Luo-Ming Line movement was an inevitable result of intensifying from social-political struggle to ideological struggle. Additionally the intensified pressure of state-building from the top and Mao Zedong's profound influence in Minxi can not be neglected, either. After the Party Central moved to Ruijin in 1933, the policy of the Wang Ming Line could be enacted forcefully. Under the additional pressure of Jiang's fourth encirclement campaign and the destructive consequences of the land investigation movement in the countryside, Luo Ming finally fought with the Party Central. When Mao arrived in Changding to rest in October 1932, he was dismissed from the position of political commissioner of the First Corps of the Red Army. Although he did not have dominant power in Party Central, Mao could use his personal relations with other leaders to manipulate his power network. When Luo Ming visited Mao, Mao suggested how to overcome Jiang's attack. Luo accepted Mao's opinions. Luo held a conference of the Fujian Committee, conveyed Mao's directions and gained approval. Luo was assigned as

a general representative to Longyan-Yongding-Shanghang to conduct guerrilla warfare.

However, victory over Jiang's fourth encirclement campaign was achieved by somewhat automatic operation of lower level organization. When one of the main leaders of the Party Central, Gu Bo, came to Ruijin and asked the Fujian Committee to adopt the method of aggressive attack, Luo Ming wrote a report asking the Party Central to revise its policy. In this report, Luo emphasized several points: military power should be concentrated in Minxi to consolidate the base area, proper local autonomy should be preserved, and the Party should not take over the work of government. Consequently, his opinions were criticized as showing "disappointment with the revolution, opportunism, and conservative defeatism". The Party Central concluded: "The formation of the Luo Ming Line is not accidental. It has historical and social roots". Therefore it decided to launch an anti-Luo-Ming Line struggle among organizations.²⁰³

The anti-Luo-Ming Line struggle spread from top to bottom, from the Fujian Committee to the village soviets. Any person who had different opinions was attacked. From its launching in February 1933 to the start of the Long March in 1934, many higher-level and experienced cadres such as Zhang Dingcheng and Guo Diren were criticized, as were the leading cadres of lower level organizations. In Jiangxi, many cadres were punished as so-called "Jiangxi Luo-Ming Liners". After all, this struggle was a struggle between the Wang Ming Line and the Mao Zedong Line. The result of this movement was the loss of the Soviet area.²⁰⁴ But in the end, it turned out to be a contribution to the confirmation of Maoism.

3 Concluding Remarks

To take all into account, the factors of ecological setting, the characteristics of the local leaders, confrontation between state-building and revolution and the dialectical relation between ideology and organization, all contributed to the CCP's intra-party struggle

during the Soviet period, as demonstrated by the correspondence among the multi-level organizations.

Actually the words with which Li Lisan criticized the work of a special committee in Jiangxi showed that the Party Central understood the problems in the soviet area and had the same opinion as the provincial committee on how to resolve the problems in the red area, such as exterminating the counterrevolutionaries, expanding the red area and strengthening the leadership of the Party. Li said: " [the special committee] lacks a correct theoretical political base. It was surrounded by peasants' conservatism and wrong political theory...now only the method of changing the conservatism of peasant mentality can eliminate landlords and overcome the opportunist of the rich peasants".²⁰⁵ But the problem was that when the Party Central tried to force the local party organization to fulfill its policy, the flexibility the local party needed to respond to local situations was quietly lost, which can be seen as a confrontation between state-building and revolution. Furthermore the principle of the system of democratic centralism legitimized the Party Central's right to impose its idea on the party cadres and the masses rather than to listen to them.

To contrast the results of the pressure from the top and the declining autonomy of the local party, the abolition of the Xi'nan District Soviet provided an example of how peasant mentality and local complexity could bring an authority down during a revolutionary period, a situation which could not be tolerated during the state-building era. Besides, personal orientation of organizational activities was not appropriate to the task of bureaucracy-building from the top, either. However the reciprocal help between state-building and revolution that the CCP hoped for was hard to achieve. Most expedient methods to stage an uprising became obstacles for state-building work during the Soviet period. When the intellectual backgrounds of the so-called petty bourgeoisie helped the local Communist leaders to penetrate local power structure from 1927-29, the same backgrounds made them vulnerable later. In the end, the purge of the Social-Democratic Party and the Anti-Luo-

Ming Line struggle seemed inevitable and many local leaders were killed or punished for their intellectual backgrounds and different opinions.

from

pea

to h

proo

line

mot

of t

ecol

the

for

of th

mul

rebu

and

orga

ecol

I

inter

bank

and c

CONCLUSION

When the focus of scholarly studies of the Chinese Communist revolution changed from looking for a general explanatory pattern to studying local context, the roles of peasants, party, state, rural elite, and various manifestations of international forces had to be taken into account in local situations, and the development of the revolutionary processes there traced. In doing that, most such studies suggested that "...the boundary lines between appeals and organization, domestic and international factors, structures and motivations, break down".²⁰⁶ That is why Perry also believes that "there is no single legacy of traditional Chinese rebellion, but many such legacies, each adapted to the particular ecological exigencies under which it evolved and each differing perhaps in its suitability to the service of modern revolution".²⁰⁷ Although she did not look for a general explanation for the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution, Perry did discover the importance of the mediation of local social structure. Likewise, Stephen Averill noted the function of multi-tiered local elites was critical to the CCP's revolutionary work. This study tries to rebuild linkage between generalization and local uniqueness, between history from the top and from the bottom, by noticing how the dialectical relationship between ideology and organization, and the ambiguous principle of democratic centralism, interact with the local ecological setting.

In chapters one and two, I have shown how the characteristics of local leaders interacted with aspects of Minxi's ecological setting, such as local militarization, economic bankruptcy, widespread peasant grievances, and the differential development of peripheral and core areas. In the peripheral area, where the villages were backward, self-sufficient,

and relatively centrally-located, lineages were strong and local elites had determination and power to resist any interference from outside. Such villages tended to adopt "protective strategies". Examples of such places were the Wubei area and Changding's Liancheng township. When the small market towns in these areas declined, and their local social structure began to be destroyed by outside influences, they tended to produce "predatory gentry", such as happened in Wu'nan area and in Longyan's Yanshi township. Although the peripheral area generally proved to be the unproductive territory for the Communist revolution, the case of Fu Bocui in Shanghang's Jiaoyang village revealed how thoroughly revolutionary tendencies and protective characteristics could be combined in a single local leader.

The Minxi Communist movement originated and developed in the core area, Shanghang-Yongding-Longyan. Before 1927's massacre, in the county seats the returned revolutionary intellectuals from Guangdong and Xiamen, most of them belonging to the lower layer of local elites, worked together and cultivated power networks by initiating left-wing organizations, cooperating with enlightened upper elites and fighting warlords. Although under the influence of Mao Zedong's and Peng Pai's teachings the Minxi revolutionaries focused on the peasant movement from the beginning, they did not have real contact with the peasants until 1927. When the "white terror" came, the alliance between upper and lower elites broke and the revolutionary young men fled to the countryside. It was in the countryside of the core area that the young Communist revolutionaries learned how to mobilize the masses. However, working in the county seats allowed the Communist intellectuals to accumulate political capital and to develop solid relations with other lower level elites, which substantially affected later uprisings. The local uprisings staged by Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng demonstrated the sorts of strategies lower elites could adopt to mobilize the masses according to the resources at hand. Deng Zihui was an elite from a "declining household", while Zhang Dingcheng rose from a poor peasant family, but no matter what background they had, they tried to appeal to as many people as possible

and gained help from organizations and other young revolutionaries, who also took refuge in the countryside. Therefore to stage fruitful uprisings, Deng and Zhang followed the orders of the Party on the one hand, and developed their own functional strategies on the other. By doing this, they kept local autonomy. The abolition of the Xi'nan District Soviet illustrated how much flexibility a local party needed to respond to the requirements of the people. That is, during the period of local uprisings, local autonomy was allowed and the nature of dictatorial political organization was restrained. But after the Minxi base area was established, the whole situation was different.

The linkage between local structure and CCP policy was how the party interpreted the principle of democratic centralism and how they dealt with the dialectical relationship between ideology and organization. From the CCP's internal documents, we can perceive that before the formation of the leftist Party Central many problems in the red area had emerged already, such as prevalent peasant mentality, counter-revolutionary activities, economic crises, inadequate Soviet work and weakness of party leadership. By then even the leftist Party Central understood the situation in Minxi quite well. The difficult issue here was how to deal with the situation properly. From the higher-level point of view, the only way to solve these problems was to expand the red area, to pacify counter-revolutionaries ruthlessly and to refine the party organization, that is, to proceed with the work of state-building and revolution. From the local party's point of view, the situation was more delicate to handle. Therefore when the Party Central used the principle of democratic centralism to ask the lower-level party to enact the left-line policy more forcefully and the latter did not do so satisfactorily, higher-level criticism of conservatism intensified, and so did suspicion. Consequently, the pressure from the top became stronger and stronger.

Because the problems in Minxi were perceived both by the lower and upper levels of organizations, the beginning of left-line formation was not resisted by the local party; instead, the local party assented to the policy and tried to implement it properly. Besides

the influence from the Third International, the distortion of terminology and the local complications made the whole development in Minxi get out of control. At the beginning of the campaign to purge counterrevolutionaries, targets were deserting soldiers and pessimistic party members. When the target turned to Fu Bocui and the Social Democratic Party, the tragedy started. Primarily, the catastrophe of the Purge of the Social Democratic Party was a result of aggressive policies and intertwined local complexities, and I believe, the latter was more at the core of the issue, for even the orders from the top could not stop it.

As to the Anti-Luo-Ming Line Movement, it was an escalation of struggle from the social-political aspect to the ideological aspect. Owing to the principle of democratic centralism, Luo Ming felt it legitimate to report his different opinions to the Party Central. Likewise, the Party Central was legitimate to correct the wrong thinking among the lower-level organizations by the principle of democratic centralism. Not until the loss of the Central base area would the Wang Ming Line be abandoned and Maoism form, which was also an evidence of lack of universally accepted interpretation of Communism. As a result, the outcome of practice became the only measure to judge the legitimacy of ideological interpretation. However the factors of ideology, organization and reality all interacted complexly to contribute to the CCP's intra-party political struggle.

To sum up, the social roots of the political struggle in Minxi should be traced back to its ecological setting and characteristics of local leaders, including both counter-revolutionaries and revolutionaries. Its organizational roots were the various degrees of autonomy the upper level of organizations could tolerate, and the confusing explanation of the principle of democratic centralism. Social roots were different in different areas, while organizational roots could be found in all of the CCP's Soviet areas. That was why the Purge of the Social Democratic Party was unique in Minxi, while the Anti-Luo-Ming Line Movement prevailed in the whole Central base area. Such an interaction constructed the linkage between local society and CCP's organization and significantly modified the form and the

content of the political struggles in Minxi.

NOTES

1. Elizabeth J. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845-1945*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, P.253
2. Ibid., p.250
3. Ibid., p.4
4. Ibid., p.257
5. Stephen C. Averill, "Local Elites and Communist Revolution in the Jiangxi Hill Country," in *Chinese Local Elites and Structures of Dominance*, edited by Joseph esherick and Mary Rankin, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p.44
6. Ibid., pp.45-46
7. *minxi geming genjudi shi* (The History of the Minxi Base Area), beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1987, p.1
8. Hu shidu, *Changding feiluan shi* (The History of the Bandit Chaos in Changding), Taizhong, Taiwan: Renwen chubanshe, 1973, p.7
9. *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.1
10. Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.12
11. Hu Shidu, "Xiantong nianjian taipingjun cuanrao Dingzhou zhi jingguo" (The Episode of the Taiping Army Harassing ding Prefecture During the years of the Emperors of Xianfeng and Tongzhi), in *Changding wenxian*, Vol.1 1974, p.37
12. Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* pp. 79-80
13. "Zhonggong fujian shengwei guangyu Minxi zhengzhi jingji zhuangkuang yu jinhou gongzuo fangzhen de jue ding, 3/8/1929" (The Decision of the Fujian Committee on the Work direction of the Minxi Pokitics and Economy, March 8, 1929), in *Hongsijun ru Min he gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao (xubian)*, (The Continued Edition

of Material of the Red Fourth Army Entering Fujian Province and the Gutian Meeting), edited by Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1980, p.2

14. Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.9
15. G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth- Century China," in his *The city in Late Imperial China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977, pp.211-49
16. "Zhonggong Minxi di yi ci daibiao dahui zhi zhengzhi jueyi an, 07/10/1929" (The Political Resolution of the Minxi First Party Congress, July 10, 1929), in *Hongsijun ru Min he Gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao*, edited by Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1979, pp.69-70
17. "Minxi tudi wenti niaokan" (An Aerial View of the Problem of Minxi Land), in *Fujian sheng nongcun jingji cankao ziliao huibian* (The Reference Material Collection on the Fujian Rural Economy), edited by Fu Jialin, Fuzhou: Economic research jnstitution of Fujian Bank, 1941, p.173
18. "Zhongong Minxi di yi ci daibiao dahui..."p.69
19. Chen Maogong, "Dingjiang: Minxi Yuedong zhi da dongmai" (The Artery between Minxi and Eastern Guangdong: the Ding River), in *Changding Wenxian* Vol. 3, 1977, p.33
20. *Minxi geming...* p.3
21. Hu shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.85
22. Wang Pingbing, "Minxi muchuan gongren yundong de huiyi lu" (The Memoir of the Boatman Movement in Minxi), in *Minxi wencong*, 1982:4, p.49; Wang Zengneng, "Dang nian Wuping de shangye zhongzheng-Xiabei" (The Chief Industrial Town in Wuping in Those Years-Xiabei), in *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, Vol.5, 1985, p.7
23. "Zhonggong Minxi di yi ci daibiao dahui..." p.72
24. *Minxi geming...* p.34
25. Averill, "Local Elites..."p.48

26. Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns," in *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, edited by A. doak Barnett, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, p.77
27. Jie Yuan, "Wubei fengjian geju qingkuang zuitan" (Review on the Situation of the Feudal Occupation in Wubei District), in *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, Vol.5, 1985, p.56
28. Ibid., pp.57-59
29. ibid., pp.59-63
30. Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.78
31. Wang Zengneng, "Dang nian Wuping de..." pp.3-10
32. Shi Qinglan, "Zhong Shaokui fuchenlu" The History of Zhong Shaokui's Rising and Falling), in *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, vol.6, 1985, pp.1-3
33. Ibid., p.3
34. Ibid., p.11
35. Ibid., pp.8-9
36. Shi Zheng, "Jiefang qian Yanshi zhengzhi gaikuang" (The general Political Situation in Yanshi Township Before the Liberation), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, Vol.11, 1985, pp.55-56; Yu Bo and Shan Nong, "wu e bnu zuo de Pen Shunrong: (The bully Committing Every Kind of crime, Pen Shunrong), in *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, Vol.6, 1985, pp.18- 32; Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.79
37. chen Saiwen, "Fu bocui yu Jiaoyang baodong" (Fu Bocui and the Jiaoyang Uprising), in *Fujian dangshi yuekan* (Fujian party history monthly), 1988:8, p.41
38. Fu Bacui, "Tudi geming chuqi Shanghang bei si qu nongmin wuzhuang douzheng: (The Peasant Armed Struggle in Bei si Qu in Shanghang during the Beginning of the Land Revolution), in *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, Vol.7, 1983, p.1
39. Chen Saiwen, "fu bocui yu Jiaoyang baodong..." p.41
40. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan* (The biography of Deng Zihui), Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986, pp.68-70
41. Fu Bocui, "Tudi gemin chuqi..." p.7

42. Fu Bocui, "Mao zhuxi shuailing hongsi jun jinru Minxi" (Chairman Mao Leading the Red Fourth Army Entering Minxi), in *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, vol.7, 1983, pp.19-29
43. Averill, "Local Elites..." pp.12-14
44. Hu Shidu, *Changding feiluan...* p.47
45. Averill, "Local Elites..." p.29
46. Guo Jie, "Kaiming xuexiao shi" (The History of the Kaiming Elementary School), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, Vol.11, 1985, pp.88-90
47. Hofheinz, "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success..." pp.72-75. Hofheinz observes that the Communist influence could be classified by three quite different types of relationship with the countryside: the radical hotbed type of county, the border area base county and the great rear area. As to the "radical hotbed" type of county, it includes areas where the movement obtains the intense commitment of a significant minority. "The converts were often younger intellectuals, such as schoolteachers, or native peasant leaders." These radical hotbeds produce more than their share of future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, such as Hunan, Haifeng and parts of Guangdong or Shanxi.
48. Lin Jin, "Fujian zaoqi jiandang shihua" (The History of the Party Establishment in Fujian in Early Period), in *Minxi wencong*, 1982:1, p.76; "Di yi ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi Fujian dang de zuzhijigou, lingdao ren yuan bian dong qingkuang ji qi zhuyao huodong" (The Organizations, Changing Leadership and Main Activities of Fujian Party in the Period of the First Revolution), in *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, vol.17, 1986, pp.243-4
49. Chen Dashan, "yanren (ershi niandai) qiaoxue jimei gaikuang" (The General Situation of the Longyan People Studying in Jimei Normal School), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, vol.11, 1985, pp.100-4
50. *Minxi geming...* p.12
51. *Ibid.*, pp.11-17
52. Jian Cheng and Guo Tien, "Dingshu qingnian cai Guangzhou chuangban de ding lei" (The Newspaper of Ding Lei, Published by the Changding Young Men in Guangzhou), in *Dangshi ziliao yu yanjiu*, 1986:4, pp.54-56
53. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* pp.28-42

54. *Minxi geming*... pp.8-9
55. Jiang Boying, *DengZihui zhuan*... pp.23-28
56. Hofheinz, "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success..." p.75
57. *Minxio geming*... p.17
58. Ibid., pp.17-18
59. Ibid., pp.21-25
60. Ibid. p.24
61. "di yi ci guonei geming zhanzheng..." p.241
62. Lin Jin, "Fujian caoqi jiandang..." p.78
63. "Di yi ci guonei geming zhanzheng..." p.244
64. Ibid., p.245
65. Lin Jin, "Fujian caoqi jiandang..." p.84 *Minxi geming*... p.236
66. *Minxi geming*... pp.46-70; Lai Jian'an, "Luelun Pinghe baodong de ji ge wenti" (Several Comments on the Problems of the Pinghe Uprising), in *Fujian dangshi yuekan*, 1988.8, pp.44-6. Changle village was located far from the county seat and the uprising was basically managed by the Communist member, Zhu Jilei, who was a native of Jiufeng village in Pinghe. In contrast to the comment on the Jiaoyang uprising, the directive of May 7, 1928 from the Party Central to the Fujian Committee criticized that the Pinghe-Changle uprising "was only a drama of burning and robbery performed by eight hundred people...which committed a serious mistake of adventurism." The criticism indicated that the whole procedure of Pinghe uprising was not managed as delicately as the Longyan- Houtian and Shanghang-Jiaoyang uprisings were.

Zhu Jilei entered the Jimei Normal School in the fall of 1923 and was dismissed because he participated in a student strike. In March 1926, introduced by Luo Ming, Zhu attended the fifth class of the Canton Peasant Institute and joined the CCP in June of the same year. It seemed that Zhu did not have such working experience with other revolutionaries in city as the Longyan and Shanghang Communists did, for he went back to home town right after graduation from the Canton Peasant Institute. From his educational record, it was appropriate to assume

that Zhu was born in a poor and was not involved in any specific gentry circle. Another presumption is that Jiufeng and Changle townships might be poor and only had a few of intellectuals. However Zhu looked for comrades among poor intellectuals and then focused on the peasant work. At the end of 1926, Zhu established the Pinghe Party Branch in jiufeng township and assumed the position as a secretary. In September of 1927, the Pinghe County Peasant Association was established with Zhu as its chairman. The development of peasant movement in Pinghe county mounted to a peak when the peasants violently resisted to pay rents and taxes, and to serve military assignment. By the time of uprising, there were less than eighty Party members in Pinghe county.

The uprising was aroused on March 8, 1928, after the government seized peasant representatives on the way to the peasant congress. being infuriated, the masses asked for uprising. To respond the mass requirement, the Pinghe County Branch set up an uprising committee with Zhu as the general commander. Besides the Changle peasant army, Zhu asked the peasant armies of Yongding county and Dapu and Yaoping counties in Guangdong for help. Because of imperfect communication and poor discipline of peasant armies, the besiege of the county seat was destroyed by the warlord army in three hours.

67. *Minxi geming...* p.2
68. *Longyan xianzhi* (Longyan Gazetteer), Chapter 2, p.12, and Chapter 4, p.75
69. *Ibid.*, Chapter 17, p.26
70. "Minxi tudi wenti..." p.173
71. *Longyan xianzhi...* Chapter 7, p.1
72. Guo Jie, "Kaiming xueshiao..." pp.85-93
73. *Longyan xianzhi...* Chapter 6, p.2; Guo Yi'an, "Tongbopian fengwu Shiling" (The Trivia of the customs in the Tongbo Village), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, Vol.11, 1985.6, p.14
74. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng huiyi lu" (The Memoir of the Longyan People's Struggle), in *Fujian dangshi zilizo*, Vol.2, 1983, p.2
75. Zheng Xueqiu, Cheng Xianhai, Zhang Zhaosheng and Guo Xiang, "Guo diren," in *Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan* Vol.15. (The Biographies of the History of the Chinese communist Party), *Zhonggong dangshi renwu yanjiuhui* (ed.), Xi'an: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1988, pp. 357-60

76. Deng Zuhui, "Longyan renming geming..." pp.2-4
77. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* pp.1-3
78. "Deng Zihui gei Zheng Fengnien (Bishan) de xin: (The Letter of Deng Zihui to Zheng Bishan), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, Vol.11, 1985.6, pp.21-22
79. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* pp.3-22
80. Ibid., p.22
81. Ibid., p.24
82. Ibid., p.25
83. Ibid., pp.26-27
84. Ibid., pp.28-29
85. Ibid., pp.29-34
86. Ibid., p.34
87. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin..." p.4
88. Ibid., pp.37-9
89. Ibid., pp.40-43
90. Ibid., pp.41-43
91. Ibid., p.52
92. Ibid., pp.53-57
93. Deng Zihui, "Longyan remin..." p.9; Lian Shaopeng, "Yi xinyan tongzhi she he Su Qingyun" (To Memorize the Association of New Longyan comrades and Su Qingyun), in *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, Vol.11, 1985, pp.41-45. Su was a native of Longyan, and had been one of the founders of *Xinyan tongzhi she* (the Association of the New Longyan Comrades) in Xiamen city in 1926 when he worked as an editor in a newspaper company. As many Longyan young men did, Su went back to the county to engage in reform work. Although he was not a Communist, Su was forced to leave for Xiamen for refuge in 1927. With Zhan Diaoyuan's support, Su got a chance to return and to reestablish GMD work in the county in 1927.

94. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* p.59
95. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng..." p.11
96. Ibid., pp.9-10
97. Ibid., P.12. The second white terror was caused by a minor uprising in Longyan capital. According to the direction from the Min'nan Special Committee, the Longyan Party branch looked for a chance to organize an armed uprising to match with the tide of the Nanchang Uprising. Owing to the lack of its own armed force, the Longyan Party branch planned to welcome a passing army to the county seat to help the uprising, which was a battalion of army divided from the Nanchang Uprising and led by Jiang Guangnai and Cai Guohui, led his army fleeing out of the capital. During the absency, Guo Diren led thousands of people to repress counter- revolutionaries. But the Jiang-Cai army only stayed for two days, then Chen Guohui's army came back and executed a ruthless suppression, the so-called "second white terror" in Longyan county.
98. *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.43; Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* pp.62-3
99. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng..." p.13
100. Ibid., P.14
101. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng..." p.14
102. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* p.64
103. Ibid., p.65
104. Ibid., pp.65-8
105. Wang pingbing, "Minxi muchuan gongren yundong de huiyi" (The memoir of the Boatmen's Movement in Minxi), in *Minxi wencong*, 1982:4, pp.48-9; *Fujian sheng dituce* (The Fujian map), Fuzhou: Fujiansheng ditu chubanshe, 1982, pp.71-2
106. *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.14
107. Ibid., pp.14-24
108. Chen Saiwen, "Fu bocui yu Jiaoyang baodong" (Fu Bocui and the Jiaoyang Uprising), in *Fujian dangshi yuekan*, 1988.8, p.41

109. Fu Bocui, "Tudi geming chuqi Shanghang bei si qu nongmin wuzhuang dozheng" (The Peasant Armed Struggle in the Bei Si Qu of Shanghang during the Beginning of the Land Revolution), in *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, Vol.7, 1983, p.1
110. Chen Saiwen, "Fu Bocui yu Jiaoyang..." p.42
111. Fu bocui, "Tudi geming chuqi..." p.2
112. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* p.69
113. "Zhonggong Minxi di yi ci daibiao dahui zhi zhengzhi jueyi'an" (The Political Resolution of the Minxi first Party Congress), in *Honsijun ru Min he Gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao* (The Material of the Red Fourth Army Entering Fujian and the Gutian meeting), edited by Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin cubanshe, 1979, p.79
114. Jiang Boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* p.69
115. Chen Saiwen, "Fu Bocui yu Jiaoyang..." p.43
116. "Zhonggong Minxi di yi ci daibiao dahui..." p.79
117. *Fujian sheng dituce...* p.69-70
118. *Shishi xinbao* (Current Affair Newspaper), 1935-07
119. Fan Yuanhui, "Jinsha Baodong" (The Jinsha Uprising), in *Yongding wenshi ziliao*, Vol.1, 1982, p.28
120. Ibid., pp.27-9
121. Wang Pingbing, "Minxi muchuan gongren..." p.49-50
122. Chen Zhen and Zhu Jing, "Yongding baodong yu Zhang Dingcheng tongzhi" (The Yongding Uprising and Comrade Zhang Dingcheng), in *Fujian luntan* (The Fujian Forum), 1982:1, p.6
123. "Zhang Dingcheng", in *The Biographies of the Chinese Communists*, vol.36, 1988, pp.177-8
124. Ibid., pp.178-9
125. Ibid., pp.179-180
126. Ibid., p.180

127. Zhang Dingcheng, *Zhongguo gongchandang chuangujian Minxi geming genjudi* (The Chinese Communist Party Establish Minxi Revolutionary Base Area), Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982, p.6; "Zhang Dingcheng..." p.180-181
128. Chen Zhen and Zhu Jin, "Yongding baodong..." p.6; Fan Yuanhui, "Jinsha baodong..." pp.30-31; "Zhang dingcheng..." pp.181-183
129. Chen Zhen and Zhu Jin, "Yongding baodong yu..." pp.6-7
130. Ibid., pp.7-8
131. Jiang Boying, *Minxi geming genjudi shi* (The History of the minxi Revolutionary Base Area), Fuzhou: fujian renmin chubanshe, 1988, p.345; Lian Yin, "Mianhuai Zhang dingcheng tongzhi zai Fujian geming dozheng zhong de gongji" (To Memorize Zhang Dingcheng's Accomplishment in the Revolutionary Struggle in Fujian), in *Fujian luntan* (The Fujian Forum), 1982:2, pp.31-32
132. Jiang boying, *Minxi geming genju...* p.345
133. Jiang boying, *Deng Zihui zhuan...* pp.71-73
134. Kong Yongsong and Qiu Songqing, *Minxi geming genjudi de jinji jianshe* (The Economic Construction in Minxi Revolutionary Base Area), Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1981, pp.12-21
135. Zhang dingcheng, *Zhongguo gongchandang chuanjian...* pp.19-20
136. Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1951, pp.127-204; John E. Rue, *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1935*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966, pp.157-237
137. Stephen C. Averill, "The Origin of the Futian incident..." pp.66-67
138. Paul A Cohen, *Discovering History in China*, New York: Columbia University press, 1984, pp.196
139. Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1989, pp.267-69
140. maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp.197-209
141. Ibid., p.271

142. *Zhongyang geming genjudi shiyao* (The Excerpts of the History of the Central Revolutionary Base Area), edited by Kong Yongsong, Lin Tianyi and Dai Jinsheng, Nanchang: Jianxi renmin chubanshe, 1985, pp.314
143. *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.56; Jiang Boying, *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.346
144. *Minxi geming genjudi...* pp.58-65
145. Ibid., p.67
146. Ibid., pp.68-77
147. Ibid. pp.77-81
148. *Zhongyang geming genjudi shiyao...* pp.80-81
149. *Minxi geming genjudi...* pp.94-96
150. *ibid.*, pp.106-113
151. Ibid., p.113
152. Kong Yongsong and Qiu Qngsong, *Minxi geming genjudi de jingji jianshe*, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1981, pp.14-16
153. *Minxi geming genjudi...* p.120
154. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei baogao — Minxi zuijin qingkuang ji shengwei dui Minxi douzheng de guliang yu zhishi (4/20/1929)" (The Report of the CCP Fujian Committee on April 20th 1929, the Current Situation in Minxi and the Estimation and Direction on Minxi's Struggle), in *Hongsijun ru Min he Gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao* (The material of the Red Fourth Army Entering Fujian and the Gutian meeting), edited by the Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1978, pp.6-13
155. "Zhonggong fujian shengwei gei zhongyang de gaogao — junshi, dangwu yu difang gongzuo qingkuang (5/1929)" (The Report of the Fujian Committee to Party Central on May 1929, the Situations of Military, Party Affairs and Local Work), in *Hongsijun ru min he Gutian huiyi wenxian zhiban* (The Continued Edition of the material of the Red Fourth Army Entering Fujian Province and the Gutian Meeting), edited by the Research Instituton of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzzhou:Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1980, pp.19-20

156. "Xunshiyuan Xie Yunkang gei Yongding xianwei bing zhuan Minxi tewei, sijun qianwei de sn (8/07/1929)" (The Letter of the Fujian Committee on August 7th 1929 to the Yongding Committee, minxi Special Committee and the Front Committee), in the em Hongsijun ru Min... (the continued edition), pp.70-71
157. "Xunshiyuan Xie Yunkang gei zhonggong Fujian shengwei de baogao — guang yu Jin Dinghan ru Min yu women de yingfu fangce deng qingkuang he wenti (10/25/1929)" (The Report of the Inspector, Xie Yunkang, to the Fujian committee on October 25th 1929 — Concerning the situations and problems of Jin Dinghan's troops entering Fujian Province and Our counterplans), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), p.137
158. "Zhonggong Minxi tewei baogao — Mnxixi baodong ji zhengquan, wuzhuang, qunzhong zuzhi qingkuang (11/06/1929)" (The Report of the Minxi Special committee on November 6th 1929 — the Situations of Minxi Uprisings, Political Power, Armed Forces and People Organizations), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* p.173
159. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei baogao — Minxi zuijin qingkuang ji shengwe du Minx douzheng de guliang yu shishi (4/20/1929)..."pp.15- 16
160. Ibid., pp.20-21
161. "Zhonggong Yongding xianwei baogao — zhengzhi,wuzhuang douzheng, zuzhi, xuanchuan gongzuo, ji kuodahui jueyi an (7/06/1929)" (The Report of the Yongding Committee on July 6th 1929-Politics, Armed Struggles, Organizations, the Work of Propaganda and the Resolutions of An Enlarged Meeting), in *Hongsiju ru Min...* (the continued edition), pp.49-54
162. "Zhonggong Longyan xianwei ge Fujian shengwei de baogao — Hongsijun sancixi ru Yan hou, dang zuzhi yu wuzhuang de fazhan qingkuang ji dangqian gongzuo jihua (7/09/1929)" (The Report of the Longyan Committee to the Fujian Committee on July 9th 1929 — The Developmental Situations of Party Organizations and Armed Forces after the Third Time Arrival of the Red Fourth Army in Longyan, and the Current Working Plans), in *Hongsijun ru Min...*(the continued edition), p.60
163. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei ge Minxi tewei, sijun qianwei de xin — guangyu Minxi dang de gongzuo renwu (10/06/1929)" (The Letter of the Fujian Committee to the Minxi Special committee and the Front committee on October 6th 1929 — Concerning the Tasks of the Minxi Party), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* pp.120-122
164. "Zhonggong Minx tewei baogao — Minxi baodong ji zhengquan, wuzhuang, qunzhong zuzhi qingkuang (11/06/1929)..." pp.169-170

165. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei baogao Minxi zuijin qingkuang ji shengwei dui Minxi douzheng de guliang yu zhishi (4/20/1929)"... pp.12-14; "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei gei zhongyang de baogao — junshi, dangwu yu difang gongzuo qingkuang (5/1929)"... p.22
166. "Zhonggong Yongding xianwei baogao — zhengzhi, wuzhuang douzheng, zuzhi, xuanchuan gongzuo, ji kuodahui jueyi an (7/06/1929)"... pp.52-55
167. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei gei Minxi tewei, sijun qianwei de xin — guangyu minxi dang de gongzuo renwu (10/06/1929)"... pp.121-122
168. "Zhonggong Minxi tewei baogao — Minxi baodong ji zhengchuan, wuzhuang, qunzhong zuzhi qingkuang (11/06/1929)"... pp.159-161
169. "Zhonggong Minxi tewei gei shengwei de gbaogao — guangyu dangwu wenti (12/12/1929)" (The Report of the Minxi Special Committee to the Fujian Committee on December 12th 1929 — Concerning the Problems of Party Work), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* pp.175-177
170. "Zhonggong fujian shengwei gei Yongding xianwei bing zhuan Minxi tewei, sijun qianwei de xin (8/07/1929)"... pp.69-70
171. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei gei Minxi tewei, Yanwei ji hongsijun qianwei xin — Mn Yue Gan san sheng fandong junfa hujiao de singshi he women de douzheng celue (8/08/1929)" (The Letter of the Fujian committee to the Minxi Special committee, Longyan committee and the Front committee on August 8th 1929 — the Situation of the Min-Yue-Gan Warlords' Attack and our Strategy of Struggle), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), p.82
172. Ibid., p.83
173. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei gei Yongding xianwei bing zhuan Minxi tewei, sijun ganwei de xn (8/07/1929)"... p.72
174. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei zhi Minxi tewei ji sijun qianwe xin — muqian zhengju yu hongjun fan san sheng huijiao'went (9/06/1929)" (The Letter of the fujian committee to the Minxi Special Committee and the Front Committee on September 6th 1929 — the Problem of the Current Political situation and the red Army's Counter-Tri-Provincial Attack), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), pp.92-93
175. Ibid., pp.94-95

176. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei ge Minxi t4ewe, sijun qianwei de xin — guangyu Mnxì dang de gongzuo renwu (10/06/1929)"... pp.121-122
177. "Xunshiyuan xie Yunkang gei Fujian Shengwei de baogao — guanyu Jin Dinghan ru Min yu women de yingfu fangce deng qingkuang he wenti (10/25/1929)" (The report of the Inspector, Xie yunkang, to the Fujian committee on October 25th 1929 — concerning the Strategy we have to face Jin Dinghan's Army and other Problems), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), p.132
178. "Zhonggong Mnxì teweì baogao — Minxi baodong j zhengchuan, wuzhuang, qunzhong zuzhi qngkuang (11/06/1920)"... pp.169-169
179. "Xunshiyuan Xie Yunkang gei zhonggong Fujian shengwei de baogoa — guangyu Jin Dinghan ru Min yu women de yingfu fangce deng qingkuang he wenti (10/25/1929)"... pp.138-140
180. "Zhonggong Fujian shengwei gei Minxi xunshiyuan ji Minxi teweì de zhishi — Minxi zhengzhi fenxi yu jinhou gongzuo renwu (11/10/1929)" (The Directive of the Fujian committee to the Minxi Inspector and the Minxi Special Commttee on November 11th 1920 The Analyses of the Minx's Political Situation and the TAsk from Now on), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), p.147
181. "Zhonggong fujian shengwei gei Minx teweì ji hongsijun qianwei xin — zhengzhi xingshi, Minxi dang de guoqu ji jinhou gongzuo (1/08/1930)" (The Letter of the Fujian Committee to the Minxi Special Committee and the Front Committee on January 8th 1930 — the Political Situation and the Previous and Subsequent Work of the Minxi Party), in *Hongsijun ru Min...* (the continued edition), pp.150-151
182. Ibid.,p.153
183. Ibid., p.156
184. *Zhongyang geming genjud shiyao*... pp. 149-151
185. *Minxi geming genjudi shi*..., pp.132-133
186. Ibid., pp.134-135
187. Ibid., pp.137
188. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng..." p.31
189. Ibid., pp.137

190. Deng Zihui, "Longyan renmin geming dozheng..." pp.31-32
191. Kong Yongson, Qiu Songqing, *Minxi geming genjudi de jingji...* pp.24,110
192. Ibid., p.138
193. Ibid., p.138
194. Ibid., p.202
195. Ibid., pp.209-210
196. Ibid., pp.211-215
197. Jiang Boying, "Minxi suqu de suqing minzhu shehui dang shijian pingshu" (The Comment on the Purge of the Social-Democratic Party in Minxi Soviet), in *Minxi wencong*, 1982:1, pp.90-91
198. *Zhongyang geming genjudi shiyao...* p.213
199. *Minxi geming genjudi shi...* p.143
200. Jiang Boying, *Minxi geming genjudi shi...* pp.187, 353
201. *Minxi geming genjudi shi...* p.146
202. *Minxi geming genjud shi...* p.146; Jiang boying, *Minxi geming genjudu shi...* p.356
203. *Minxi geming genjudi shi...* pp.202-206
204. Ibid., pp.206-208
205. *Zhongyang geming genjudi shiyao...* p.189
206. Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revoluton," in their *Single Sparks: Chnese Rural Revolutions*, Armonk, New Youk: M. E. Sharpe, 1989, p.33
207. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries...* p.257

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Averill, Stephen C. "Local Elites and Communist Revolution in the Jiangxi Hill County." in *Chinese Local Elites and Structures of Dominance*, ed. Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

———"The Origins of the Futian Incident (1990)." Unpublished paper. 1990.

CCP Central Committee for Collecting Materials of Party History. "Di yi ci guonei geming zhangzheng shiqi Fujian dang de zuzhi jigou, lingdao ren yuan biandong qingkuang jiqi zhuyao huodong" [The organization, changing leadership and main activities of the Fujian party during the First Great Revolution]. In *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, 1986, 17:241-53.

Chen Dashan. "Yanren (ershi niandai) qiaoxue jimei gaikuang" [The general situation of the Longyan people studying in Jimei Normal School during the 1920s]. In *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 11:100-13.

Chen Maogong. "Dingjiang: Minxi Yuedong zhi da dongmai" [The artery between Minxi and eastern Guangdong: the Ding River]. In *Changding wenxian*, 1977, 3:31-34.

Chen Saiwen. "Fu Bocui yu Jiaoyang boadong" [Fu Bocui and the Jiaoyang Uprising]. In *Fujian dangshi yuekan*, 1988, 8:41-43.

Chen Xianhai, Guo Xiang, Zhang Zhaosheng, and Zheng Xueqiu. "Guo Diren." In *Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan* [The biographies of the Chinese Communists], ed. Zhonggong dangshi renwu yanjiuhui, 15:357-78. Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1988.

Dai Jinsheng, Lin Tianyi, and Kong Yongsong. *Zongyang geming genjudi shiyao* [The

basic history of the Central Revolutionary Base Area]. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1985.

Deng zihui. "Longyan renmin geming douzheng huiyi" [The memoir of the Longyan people's struggle]. In *Fujian dangshi ziliao*, 1983, 2:1-44.

Fu Bocui. "Tudi geming chuqi Shanghang Bei Si Qu nongmin wuzhong douzheng" [The peasant armed struggle in Bei Si Qu in Shanghang during the Beginning of the land revolution]. in *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, 1983, 7:1-18.

———"Mao zhuxi shuailing hongsijun jinru Minxi" [Chairman Mao led the Fourth Red Army entering Minxi]. In *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, 1983, 7:19-29.

Fu Jialin. "Shanghang." In his *Fujian sheng nongcun jingji cankao ziliao huibian* [The collection of economic materials of Fujian villages], Fuzhou, 1 (1941):87-98.

———"Minxi tudi wenti niaokan" [An overview of the problem of land in Minxi]. In his *Fujian sheng nongcun jingji cankao ziliao huibian*, Fuzhou, 1941, pp.173-83.

Goldstein, Steven M. and Hartford, Kathleen. "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution." In *Single Sparks: Chinese Rural Revolutions*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, pp.1-35.

Guo Jie. "Kaiming xuexiao shi" [The history of the Kaiming Elementary School]. In *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 11:85-93.

Guo Tian, and Jian Cheng. "Dingshu qingnian zai Guangzhou de Ding Lei" [The newspaper of Ding Lei, published by the Changding young men in Guangzhou]. In *Dangshi ziliao yu yanjiu*, 1986.4, pp.54-56.

Guo Yi'an. "Tongbopian fengwu shiling" [The trivia of the customs in Tongbo village]. In *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 11:12-20.

Hu Shidu. *Changding feiluan shi* [The history of the bandit chaos in Changding]. Taizhong, Taiwan: Renwen chubanshe, 1973.

———"Xiangtong nianjian Taipingjun cuanrao Dingzhou zhi jingguo" [The episode of the

Taiping Army harassing Dingzhou during the years of the emperors Xianfeng and Tongzhi]. In *Changding wenxian*, 1974, 1:37-48.

Hongsijun ru Min he Gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao [The material of the Red Fourth Army entering Fujian and the Gutian Meeting]. ed. Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1979.

Hongsijun ru Min he Gutian huiyi wenxian ziliao (xubian) [The continued edition of the material of the Red Fourth Army entering Fujian and the Gutian Meeting]. ed. Research Institution of Fujian Provincial CCP Committee for Party History and Party School, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1980.

Hofheinz, Roy, Jr. "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns." In *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, ed. A. Doak Barness, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp.3-77.

Jiang Boying. *Deng Zihui zhuan* [The biography of Deng Zihui]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986.

Jie Yuan. "Wubei fengjian geju qingkuang zuitan" [Review of the situation of the feudal occupation in Wubei district]. In *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 5:56-63.

Lai Jian'an. "Luelun Pinghe baodong de jige wenti" [Several comments on problems of the Pinghe uprising]. In *Fujian dangshi yuekan*, 1988.8, pp.44-46.

Longy an xianzhi [Longyan Gazetteer]. Nanjing: Nanjing University, 1945, pp.12-75.

Minxi geming genjudi shi [The history of the Minxi Base Area]. ed. CCP Longyan Research Committee of Party History, Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1987.

Perry, Elizabeth, J. *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845-1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980.

Skinner, William, G. "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth — Century China." In *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977.

Shang Nong, and Yu Bo. "Wu e bu zuo de Pan Shunrong" [The bully committing every kind of crime, Pan Shunrong]. In *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 6:18-32.

Shi Winglan. "Zhong Shaokui fuchenlu" [The history of Zhong Shaokui's rising and falling]. In *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 6:1-17.

Shi Zheng. "Jiefang qian Yanshi zhengzhi gaikuang" [The general political situation in Yanshi township before liberation]. In *Longyan wenshi ziliao*, 1985.6, 11:55-57.

Wang Pingbing. "Minxi muchuan gongren yundong de huiyilu" [The memoir of the boatmen's movement in Minxi]. In *Minxi wencong*, 1982, 4:48-55.

Wang Zhengneng. "Dangnian Wuping de shangye zhongzheng — Xiabei" [The chief industrial town in Wuping in those years — Xiabei]. In *Wuping wenshi ziliao*, 1985, 5:7-12.

Zhang Dingcheng. *Zhongguo gongchandang chuangujian Minxi geming genjudi* [The Minxi Revolutionary Base Area established by the Chinese Communist Party]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293010555310