ABSTRACT THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FROM l9h5 TO 1963 by Martha Ellen Palmer One of the consequences of World War II was the movement of ethnic Germans, Expellees, into Germany. Some seven to eight million of these peOple were sent between 1946 and 1950. Pre- sently, there are nine million EXpellees of the Federal Republic or about seventeen per cent of the total pOpulation; and there are an additional three million Soviet Zone Refugees. This means, if the broadest definitions of these groups are utilized to enumerate these peOple, that approximately twenty-five per cent of the pOpulation of West Germany did not reside in the present area before the War. The majority of EXpellees arrived during the economically difficult immediate post-war years for West Germany. These peOple came with only those possessions which they could carry, and without money and frequently lacking their professional licenses. The integration of these peOple into economic life has been a problem hampered not only by the lack of personal capital but also by housing shortages in urban areas, as well as damaged production capacity and tranSportation facilities in West Germany. The integration of the EXpellees has been facilitated mainly by the state and federal govern- Martha Ellen Palmer ‘!ments because they were the only agencies with sufficient funds jto conduct coordinated programs. Hessen in the Federal Republic was chosen as a sample area in which to examine the geographic consequences of the integration of Expellees into economic life. Hessen has a favorable balance of industry and agriculture, and approximates the national average of persons employed in these activities. Additionally, Hessen has maintained from 1945 to 1963 about the same percentage of Expellees of the total pOpulation as the nation. Most of the research was conducted in the state agencies of Hessen during the period of September 1963 to June 1964. State agencies have assembled statistics on the number of Expellees I assisted, money awarded, and characteristics of resettlement under various programs. Analysis of the data revealed that the changasand resultant geographic patterns in Hessen which govern- mental decisions have created include the internal movement of Expellees, develOpment of jobs in EXpellee and indigenous firms for EXpellees, the promotion of selected types of Expellee industries, and attempts to integrate as many refugees as possible in agriculture. Traditionally, the industrial might of Hessen has been concentrated in the south with a focus on Frankfurt. Secondary centers include Kassel and the Lahn-Dill area which contains the major cities of Giessen and Wetzlar. The center and that area of Hessen contiguous to the border with East Germany are rural with a predominantly agricultural economy. Governmental,7 I Martha Ellen Palmer policy has facilitated the movement of Expellees out of the agricultural areas where they were first settled into the major : industrial centers where employment was created for them. The government has also tried to entice industries into agricultural regions and use rural Expellees as the labor force. These measures, particularly aimed at EXpellee industrial entre- preneurs, did achieve some success in broadening the economic base of areas once dependent solely on agriculture. The Hessen government has eSpecially aided in the establishment of EXpellee textile, glass, musical instrument, and clothing firms. These industries augument the existing indigenous sectors of these activities and also are types of eStablishments which could be located in the dominantly agricultural areas. Settlement of Expellees in agricultural areas has been hampered by the small size of holdings and the limited area available for cultivation in Hessen. By 1960 some 2,500 Expellees owned farms, and some 150 market garden enterprises.q Most Expellees formerly active in agriculture who desired to continue this activity in Hessen have been provided with garden plots which are frequently associated with non-farm dwellings. These are located near the major urban centers and permit an Expellee to participate in industry or a profession and, if he chooses to do so, augment his income by the sale of produce from his garden plot. The net impact of the postwar resettlement of ExpelleesKLF has been a marked change in the intensity and distribution of . economic phenomena of Hessen. Government policy and decisions Martha Ellen Palmer have played a key role in influencing the nature of the resultant Spatial patterns as shown by the analysis of aSpects of the economic geography of Hessen. Expellees were first settled . mainly in agricultural areas but shifted eventually to the industrial Rhein-Main area of southern Hessen with the help. of several governmental monetary, credit, and housing programs. Approved;#\ch~V\fie~€v ’lvx K&Arvwaar\. Date Flat/C /(// / ?éy 7 THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FROM l9h5 TO 1963 By Martha Ellen Palmer A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Geography 1967 PREFACE One of the results of World War II was the movement of ethnic Germans from various EurOpean countries into Germany. Although.several hundred thousand arrived in the German area in advance of the Soviet Armies, most (some seven or eight million) ethnic Germans were deported between l9h6 and 1950. These peOple known as Expellees became the reSponsibility of the German governments and were never under the control of the occupation powers or the United Nations. By 1961 West Germany officially claimed some nine million Expelleesl or sixteen per cent of the total pOpulation plus three million Soviet Zone Refugees. The EXpellee pro- portion of the total pOpulation of the states of West Germany is as follows: Schleswig-Holstein - 27 per cent; Lower Saxony - 2k per cent; Bavaria - 17 per cent; Hessen - 16 per cent; Baden Wfirttemburg - 15.5 per cent; North Rhine Westphalia - 1h.5 per cent; Bremen - 13.9 per cent; Hamburg - 11.3 per cent; Rhineland Palatinate - 8 per cent; and the Saar - 1.4 per cent. East Germany contains an estimated 3.8 million;;33 Expellees. 1There are actually over 12 million Expellees in West Germany. The Federal Government enumerates however only those Expellees who have applied for identification cards. ii The addition of twelve million persons to the West German economy has presented enormous economic, political, and social problems for the federal and state governments. ,’The size of the task has been heightened because most came before 1950, at that time when the nation was trying to rebuild A after the War. Additionally, most Expellees were deported with only those possessions which they could carry, and without money and frequently professional licenses and other identifying papers. The state of Hessen, chosen to examine the manner in which_the Expellees were integrated into economic life, has had through the years about the same percentage of Expellees of the total population as West Germany as a whole. Additionally the economic structure is similar as indicated by the fact that both Hessen and West Germany have about fourteen per cent of their p0pu1ation employed in agriculture. The percentages for employment in industry and handicrafts are about #8 for the Federal Republic and #3 for Hessen. The favorable balancea of agriculture and industry in Hessen made it possible to examine the integration of Expellees in both of these activities. Hessen is located to the east of the Rhine River and borders the German Democratic Republic, and the West German states of Bavaria, Baden Wfirttemburg, Rhineland Palatinate, North Rhine Westphalia, and Lower Saxony. This location in West Germany means that almost every major tranSportation route connecting the north and south passes through Hessen. iii Although Hessen contains one of the major West German industrial regions, the state has a poor mineral resource base. The iron ores of the Lahn-Dill, important in the 1800's, are depleted. There are scattered deposits of brown coal but they too are of minor value. The only minerals currently of significance are potash and rock salt. The major industrial regions of Hessen are the Rhine- Main Triangle, Kassel, and the Lahn-Dill area which stretches from Giessen through Wetzlar to Limburg. The Rhine-Main Triangle focuses on Frankfurt, West Germany's financial capital. Within this region are the major cities of Wiesbaden, Darmstadt, Offenbach, and Hanau. Half of the 1962 pOpulation of Hessen of 4,921,000, was located in this area. The Specialities of the region include chemical, automotive, and machinery manu- facturing. This area is also the focus of the tranSportation routes uniting the north and south of West Germany. The city of Kassel, another industrialized area of Hessen, is not very extensive as it lacks additional cities. Kassel is located near the Soviet Zone in an agricultural region. The location of Kassel is a disadvantage as it is separated from its natural trading area by the closed border between East and West Germany, and other potential markets are some distance away. In 1961 the pOpulation of Kassel was 207,507 persons; this is about 20,000 less than its 1939 pOpulation. Now Kassel is one of the major West German cities for the construction of locomotives and buses. The Lahn-Dill region is an old industrial region. iv Although the once important iron ore deposits of this region are depleted; it still retains Specialities in metal industries which generally are concentrated in the cities of Giessen and Wetzlar. Wetzlar additionally-is the major Hessen center for the higthuality mechanical and Optical industry. There are two other urban centers outside of those mentioned which have at least local importance. Fulda and Hersfeld are centers for the textile and clothing industry; and Fulda has rubber manufacturing in common with Frankfurt. Although there are other cities and towns engaged in manufacturing their importance is small and the Operation highly localized. This is particularly true of the center of Hessen and the area along the border with Eastern Germany, which are predominently agricultural. These two areas present problems to Hessen and the federal government. There are few if any Opportunities in manufacturing; it is difficult to attract manufacturing enterprises; and the tax base is so poor that almost all aid for public programs must come from outside. This research into the manner in which Expellees have been integrated into economic life in Hessen was conduct- ed in both the United States and Hessen. Approximately one month was Spent in the National Archives in Washington, D. C. The records of the Military Government for the United States Zone and for Hesse were examined. This investigation yielded information on the economic conditions of Hessen from 1945 to V 1949 as well as data concerning the location of Expellees, numbers sent, totals in processing camps, and general knowledge of resettlement problems. The research in Hessen was carried out from September 1963 to June 1964. The most useful information came from the files of the Bureau for Expellees, Soviet Zone Refugees, Persecutees and Evacuees in the Hessen Ministry of Interior. The Hessen agencies which dealt with Expellee economics, housing, the administration of federal monies, agriculture, and general statistics either provided published reports or permitted the use of raw data which had not been organized for publication. Extensive interviews were also conducted with these persons who handled Expellee matters. Although contact was made with the Expellee lobby groups in Hessen and with individual Expellees, the material which they could provide was limited as in almost all instances they have not assembled Statistics. However, these peOple were helpful in eXplaining the EXpellee point of view to programs which the government has initiated, and also in identifying those problems which the Expellees found most pressing. It is exceptionally difficult to prOperly thank all the peOple who have helped to provide information and who have taken an interest in this research project. All of their con- tributions have been important and hOpefully I have not over- looked anyone. The following peOple should not, however, be held reSponsible for the interpretations of the data or for vi the conclusions; these are my reSponSibility alone. In the Federal Republic of Germany where most of the research was done appreciation is eXpressed to Frau Dreiling, Frau Henniger-Schenk, Frau Helmut Hocker, Freulein Charlotte Todt, Ministerialrat Puhala, Ministerialrat Metzlar, Ober- regierungsrat Sippel, Herr Fischer, Herr Helmut Hooker, Herr Gunter Vogelei, and those in the Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, and Hessen Ministerium des Innern-Landesplanung. I have Special appreciation.for the help of Dr. h. c. Wenzel Jaksch and Regierungsratin Doris Kaufmann—SchOffel. Dr. Jaksch, an Expellee himself and presently a member of the federal parliament, secured permission for me to work in the various Hessen ministeries, personally introduced me to many resource persons, and explained various programs and pro- blems in association with EXpellees in Hessen. Regierungsratin Kaufmann-SchOffel worked with me throughout my stay in West Germany. She gave invaluable assistance with EXpellee statis- tics, a field which She has been concerned with since 1946. Regierungsratin Kaufmann-Schbffel not only provided me with published and unpublished materials from her own department but also helped to secure them from others, provided personal introductions, and at times graciously acted as translator. I Should like also to thank the Deutsche Stiftung ffir EurOpaische Friedensfragen which helped to finance my research, the travels in association with it, and the purchase of mate- rials. Although this group is interested in Expellee affairs, at no time have they made suggestions or in any way tried to vii direct the research. In the United States, the staff Of the National Archives graciously assisted the research when I was examining the records of the Office of Military Government, United States Zone. I have Special appreciation for the help of Dr. Lawrence M. Sommers, Chairman of the Department of Geography at Michigan State University. Dr. SommerS helped with the design of the research and preparation of the manuscript. His critical comments and suggestions have been particularly useful. Lastly, I should like to thank my parents who more than any one else gave the inSpiration and support needed to complete this project. MEP. 1967 . viii TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACEOOOOOOOOO ..... 0.0.000...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO LIST OF TABLESOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO9000......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Xi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS......... ...... ............ ..... .....xiii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION............. ........ .... ..... .......... l l. The Problem 2. The Setting 3. Organization of the Remainder of The Thesis II. IMPORTANT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN HESSEN AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF EXPELLEES.......................... l7 1. 1945 to the Currency Reform (June 20, 1948) 2. Period of the Currency Reform Regional Balance of Industry in Hessen in the Early 1950's Conclusions 3. The General Recovery of the Hessen Economy Special Economic Development Areas of, Hessen Summary III. THE SPATIAL IMPACT OF MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS ON THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN.. 36 1. Federal Programs Bundesumsiedlung Soforthilfegesetz Lastenausgleichsgesetz Loans for the Establishment of Working Places (ArbeitSplatzdarlehen) Aufbaudarlehen fur die gewerbliche Wirtschaft und die freien Berufe Marshall Plan Fund 2. Land Hessen Programs essen Plan Resettlement Measures ix TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued Chapter 4 p Page 2. Land Hessen Programs Hessen Plan DeveIOpment of Hessen Plan Employment Summary Other Financial Programs for Expellees from Land Hessen Small Credits Action (Kleinkredite) Intermediate Aid and Large Credits Action Large Credits Action (Gross-Kredite) Allendorf, KreisJWarburg Summary 3. Kreis Program The Schlfichtern Plan Summary IV. THE SPATIAL IMPACT OF THE INTEGRATION OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN: THE EXAMPLES OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY.lO8 1. Agriculture Nebenerwerbstellen Expellee Farms Spezialstellen Landarbeiterstellen Distributions and Summary 2. Industry Expellee Glass Industry Musical Instruments Expellee Textile, Clothing and Other Industries Summary V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.... ...... . ........ . ........... 141 BIBLIOGRAPHYO 000000 00000000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0000000000000149 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Expellees Transported to Hessen in 1946 by Rail....... 8 2. Dwellings Available for Civilian Use in June, 1947 as Compared with 1939: Major Urban Centers in Hessen... 12 3. Percentage Distribution of Expellees and Indigenous Germans by Type of Industry in Hessen............... 15 4. Major Expellee Industries in Hessen, End. of 1947 - Beginning of 1948, by Percentage of Expellee Industry in the Area of Concentration............... 22 5. Number of Gemeinden by Regierungsbezirk in Hessen ‘with One and Two Industrial Firms byIType of _ Industrial Group: 1949.............................. 26 . Classification of Gemeinden in Hessen: 1949........... 28 . Classification of Hessen Gemeinden by Region: 1949.... 29 6 7 8. Unemployment in Hessen: l950—l959..................... 31 9. Expellee Unemployment in Hessen: 195041959............ 31 10. E ellees in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 x%byIar1____§d_'er)OO00.00.00.000000000000000...0.000.000... 38 11. Total Number of Persons to be Received Under Bundesumsiedlung Programs........................... 40 12. Settlers Accepted into Hessen by Program and Lander... 40 13. Distribution of Soforthilfe Monies in Hessen Under SOfOI‘thilfegesetZ (AI‘tiCle 1+6)od‘oooooooooooooooooooo [f7 14. Distribution of Lastenausgleich Monies in Hessen Under Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Articles 259 and 260). 55 15. Hessen Plan Credits Awarded from 1950 to December 12’19520000.00000000000000000000000000000.000000... 76 16. Money Awarded Under the Hessen Plan,l950 to December 195300 000000 OOOOOOOODCOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 77 xi LIST OF TABLES Continued Table Page 17. Number of Establishments and Employees, Including . Those Commuting to Work, in Allendorf, 1953 to 1962. 95 18. Number of Persons Settled in Agricultural Enterprises by Type, Under Settlement Programs in Hessen: 1949 to December 31, 19600000009000000.000.000.000000000012h 19. Size of Enterprises Established in Hessen, July 1, 191+9 130 December 31, 1963c-ooocooooooooooooooooooooolzs 20. Money Awarded Expellee Agricultural Entergrises in Hessen, July 1, 1949 to December 31, 19 3...........126 21. Expellee Firms and Employment in Selected Kreise, 1953, 1956, and 1962 (Firms with One or More EmployGBS)O0°00OODOOOODDOOOOQOOOOODOOO000.000.000.0013h 22. Expellee Glass Firms With Ten or More Employees in T Hessen, OCtOber 19479000000000.0000.00000000000003.0013? xii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure . Page 1. Hessen Location Map.................................. 2 2 Expellees in Hessen 19460.00.0000000000000DOOOOOOOOOO lo 3 Development Areas in Hessen (1963)................... 33 4. Housing oijundesumsiedlungSplan in Hessen 1950-1960. 43 5. Number and Type of Positions Created in Expellee Firms in Hessen Under Soforthilfegesetz Article 46 (1951°1952)oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo #9 6. Number and Type of Positions Created in Expellee Firms in Hessen Under Lastenausgleichsgesetz AI‘tiCleS 259 and 260 (1952-1956)uoooooooooooooooooo 58 7. European Recovery Plan Credit Awarded Expellees in Hessen Prior to 1963............................... 64 8. Hessen Plan Housing l950~1960........................ 67 9. Stand der Pendelwanderun auf der Basis des Gewerbesteuerausgleidhs"inden Hessischen Gemeinden 155000000O00000.0000QOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0009000000000. 7O 10. Movement of Expellee Families Under Hessen Plan l1951-19600oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooeooooo 7" 11. Hessen Plan: Number of New and Secured Positions lgSl'lgShoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 78 12. Small Credits Plan July 1, 1964 Money Repaid or to be Repaid by Expellees in Hessen................ 84 13. Intermediate Aid Plan (1948-1964) Money Repaid by Expellees in HessenOOOOOOO00OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 86 14. Hessen Large Credits Plan Money Repaid or to be Repaid by Expellees Prior to 1963.................. 87 15. Percentage Of Expellees in Hessen Population 1950....102 16. Percentage of Expellees in Hessen Population 1960....103 xiii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Continued Figure Page 17. Flow Chart Of Method of an Expellee Acquiring A Nebenerwerbstelle in Hessen.........................113 18. Acreage and Number of Nebenerwerbstellen Owned by Expellees and.Soviet Zone Refugees in Hessen 1949- 1963000000000.0000QOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOO0.00000000000115 19. Acreage and Number of Farms Owned by Expellees and Soviet Zone Refugees in Hessen 19h9-l963............120 20. Acreage and Number of Spezialstellen Owned by Expellee and Soviet Zone Refugees in Hessen 1949-1963........123 21. Percentage of Expellee Industrial Firms and Employees in Such Firms Based on All Firms and Employees Hessen: 1953, 1956 & 196200000000ooooooooooooooooooclzg 22. Number of Expellee Industrial Firms in Hessen 1962....132 xiv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Forced or voluntary migrations are not new on the earths' surface nor is there any indication that they are over. For purposes Of analysis these movements of peOple may be sub- divided into three categories - place of origin, migration, and resettlement. The first two have been well treated by geographers and others; it is the latter which has received small consideration. 1. The Problem It is the purpose of this dissertation to analyze the spatial_impact of governmental decisions on the economic inte- gration of ethnic Germans in Hessen, Federal Republic of Ger- many (Figure l). The ethnic Germans (Expellees)l were deport- ed from several European nations at the end of World war II. They were expelled into what are now known as the Federal Re- public Of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and were distributed among the various states of these two political entities. In 1961 in West Germany, Expellees numbered 8,956,200 or 15.9 per cent in a total population of 56,174,800.2 1 Generally an Expellee is an ethnic German who had his permanent residence outside the Third Reich and who now resides in the Federal Republic of Germany. 2Vertriebene und Deutsche aus der sowjetischen l F ‘ ‘\ NORTHRHINE WESTPHALIA _,.. OIERUHI lllllllG BAVARIA \OII 1‘“ ‘\.’.’:.. LEGEND Ramanwssaazmk mausnor RHINELAND Reelsnunesaezlfik' KASSEL REGIERUNGSBEZIRK wussamen :1 I AT PALM" E cm . nus BADEN WURTTEMBERG no- "IIIOI l a” “ 3 Although the expulsion of Expellees into West Germany has continued to the present on a small scale, the greatest); number had already arrived at the end of 1946. The deportation from their homelands was SO rapid that in most instances the Expellees had no time to plan for it and therefore arrived in a war-torn Germany with few possessions, little money, and no jobs or housing. The integration of these people into the Westm German economy and the resultant geographic patterns to a con— siderable degree were created or modified by governmental deci- J sions. Although many Expellees have been successful in economic life without governmental assistance, in most instances specific aid was necessary for their survival. Generally the government has decided to help Expellees;} ‘ . '1- n in one of the following ways: to create jobs for Expellees in industry, to move Expellees from areas of few employment possi- bilities to those Of varied and numerous Opportunities, and to aid financially, newly established Expellees' industries. The policies themselves have been originated mainly at the national and Lgng levels.3 The federal government has enacted considerable legislation to aid Expellees. The programs are not designed to change conditions in a particular Lang but rather to mitigate certain problems which are common to Expellees in all Lfinder. Bes tzun szone und dem Sow etsektor von Berlin. Sonderdruck aus Wirtschraft und Statistik l 12, p. 744. 3A Land is comparable to a state of the United States. Lander is the plural form. 4 However, the policies are administered at the L121 level by official agencies which have either been established for this purpose or have deéilt with problems of a Similar nature. The La g has occasionally initiated specific action arising from particular needs or goals. Frequently a federal project has coincided with the problems or Objectives of a Land, or support, primarily of a financial nature has been extended by the national administration. More Often than not, comprehensive projects have been too expensive fbr'small administrative units such as the Kreise (defined on page 7) to support. Emphasis is placed in this study upon the decisions and their economic-geographic effects; thus political motivations are not evaluated as variables. The programs which were sugges- ted but not adopted will not be considered. However, where “\ necessary, particular difficulties which the economic character: of Hessen imposed on the Expellees and their activities will ’ be examined,since many projects were designed to change both the critical situation Of the Expellee and those conditions which fostered it. Hessen was chosen as a laboratory for analysis of the impact of governmental decisions on the economic geography of resettlement. Of all the West German Lénder, the percentage of Expellees of the total population most closely approximates the national average (16 per cent in 1961),4 as does the area, population composition, and economic character. 4Vertriebene and Deutsche aus der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und dem Sowjetggktor von Berlin, loc. cit. 5 2. The Setting The three governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place shall be effected in an orderly and humane manner. With these words of the Potsdam Agreement, the tranfers of ethnic Germans from the above named countries were authorized. Although not specifically mentioned in the Agreement, almost 1 every other European nation seized the Opportunity to deport i some of its ethnic German population. “I Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement was implemented by a Control Council Plan of November 20, 1945. Under this Plan, it was decided that the Soviet Zone would receive 2,000,000 Germans from Poland and 750,000 from Czechoslovakia; the French Zone would accept 150,000 Germans from Austria (this provision was concluded after the Potsdam Agreement); the British Zone would receive 1,500,000 Germans from Poland; and the United States Zone would take 1,750,000 Germans from Czechoslovakia and 500,000 from Hungary. Under the Plan, all the transfers were to be completed between December, 1945 and July, 1946.6 In the same Control Council Agreement, the term "Expellees" was created. 5Potsdam Agreement, Article XIII, August 2, 1945. 6Allied Control Authority Directorate of Prisoners of ‘ war and Displaced Persons, Plan for the Transfer of the German Population to be Moved from Austria, CzechoslovakiaE Hungagy, and Poland into the Four Occu ied Zones of Germany Berlin: 20 November l9h5, CONL7P (45) 57. An Expense is considered to be a member of a German minority, whose normal place of residence is a country outside Germany or in that portion of Germany east of the Oder and Neisse rivers now under Polish administra- tion, and who is expelled therefrom and resettled within occupied Germany. On the other hand, a refugee is considered to be a German civilian whose normal place of residence is occupied Germany and who is homeless 7 or at some distance from his home because of the war, The Military Government accepted the term and officially de- fined an Expellee as follows: Expellees are ethnic Germans who are being deported from areas in new Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary and resettled in Germany in accordancg with the provisions Of Article 13 Potsdam Declaration. In November 19A5, the Ldnderrat9 Of the United States—\ Zone met. This congress decided with the approval of the United States Zone authorities that the ethnic Germans would be distributed on a percentage basis among the United States Zone Lander determined by the proportion of prewar population. Hessen, which had 27 per cent, was to accept 27 per cent Of the Expellees; Wfirttemberg-Baden would take 23 per cent and Bavaria 50 per cent.10 The representatives of the Hessen Regierungsbezirke 7OMGUS, DiSplaced Persons, Stateless Persons and Ref ees, Monthly Report, No. 6, 20 January 1946, p. 3? 8Military Government Re egg lations, Title 20, 20—104,l February 1946. 9The Landerrat was a congress legalized by Military Government to develop and coordinate policies of the Lander of the United States Zone. All decisions were subject to the approval or disapproval of Military Government. loOMGUS, Displaced Persons, Stateless wPersons and Refugees, Monthl Re ort (Cumulative Review), NO. 15, 8 May 1945 - 30 September 194 , p. 7 determined that the distribution within Hessen be conducted in a manner similar to the Landerrat agreement. A Regierungsbegirk, Of which there are three in Hessen, has no equivalent in the United States but is roughly Similar to a grouping Of counties. Within each Bezirk are Kreise; there are fortyweight in Hessen, nine Of WhiCh are cities, comparable to New England counties. Within each figgig, except for the nine cities, are the smallest administrative units,Gemeinden, which are equivalent to New England townships. The 27 per cent of the ethnic Germans who were to be domiciled in Hessen numbered 610,000 persons. In the Hessen subdivisions (Figure l), Regierungsbezirk Darmstadt was to integrate 230,000; Kassel 150,000; and Wiesbaden 230,000 persons]:1 The officials of the individual Regierungsbezirk were to subdivide their quota among the various urban and rural Kreise, but many factors prevented this from taking place. On January 26, 1946, the first train load of deported ethnic Germans arrived in Hessen. Table 1 indicates the number of Expellees officially received in Hessen in 1946. The planned schedule was never met. The period of greatest movement into Hessen and also the other United States Zone Lander was March through October. By December 1946 it became evident that there I were too many Expellees in camps. The overcrowded conditions ‘ coupled with cold weather, the inability of the German economy “a to integrate the new arrivals, critical food supplies, and llGrosshessisches Staatsministeruim, Der Minister fur Arbeit und WOhlfart, Staatskommission f.d. Flfichtlingswesen, lllc/5, 27 September 1946. ' A TABLE 1: Expellees Transported to Hessen in 1946 by Rail Number of Trains Expellees received Date flgg for U.S. Zong,, for Hggsen in Hessen January 8 2 1,417 February 42 17 19,860 March 75 29 3A,029 April 114 59 67,092 June 92 45 .A7,120 July 77 37 38,598 August 78 40 41,938 September 75 37 35,379 October 60 29 28,885 November 15 6 6,061 December 1 l 52 Source: Wolfgang Jaenicke and Dr. Martin Kornrumpf, "Vollstandige Liste der im November und Dezember 1946 nach Bayern und vom l. Januar bis 31 Dezember 1946 durch Bayern eingescheuterl Zfige mit Flficht- lingen," Flfichtlingsproblem in Bayern (Mflnchen: Bayerisches Staatsministeruim des Innern, January 1947), pp. 20-24. V {finadequate housing and clothing influenced General Clay to gsuspend further transports to the United States Zone in December} ){They were never resumed in large scale although Expellees con- tinued to be sent into Germany. Reliable figures of the number Of deported persons received in Hessen are not available although there are several estimates of final totals from official sources. The Hungarian and Czech Officials were required to send tallies of the numbers expelled. In general it appears that more persons were sent than were accounted for. Complications arose be- 12OMCUS (Signed Clay) November 1946, "Suspension of Expellee Movements into U.S. Zone Germany during Winter Months," V10164 (Teletype Message). 9 cause trucks and other carriers were used in addition to rail- roads. The Office for Military Government for Germany, United! j': I fStates Zone estimated that 23,422 ethnic Germans infiltrated 3into Hessen before the authorized transports commenced.13 The Expellees were to be registered twice; first when they were processed through the Hessen. reception points and second when they received their ration cards. The registration enumeration and the number of ration cards issued, however, do not corre- spond,and the figures of different official agencies for the number of Expellees received monthly do not agree. A11 trains destined for Hessen and the other Lander of the United States Zone entered through Bavaria. A schedule, which was revised as conditions warranted, was devised so that on a certain day every third, fifth, or eighth train was sent to Hessen. For the Expellee such handling was important in that families on different trains could easily be split and sent to different destinations. The delegates of Hessen at the Bavarian reception points assigned the local destination for those trains which were to proceed thereuu+ Figure 2 Shows the number and percentage Of Expellees in the total population in 1946 by Kreis. This distribution neither approximates the prewar nor postwar percentage distri- bution of the population of Hessen. The area of densest .- P 13OMG Greater Hesse, Historical Report, Jul 1 6- Ibcaggréi46, "Public Welfare, Refugees, Expellees, & DP'S," PP- ' - l[‘OMGUS, Dis laced Persons Stateless Persons and Refugees 8 May 1945-30 September 1946: (Cumulative Review), Monthly Report of Military Governor, NO. 15, p. 8. lO EXPELLEES IN HESSEN |946 NUMBER 81 PERCENTAGE OF KREIS POPULATION PERCENTAGE - 2|~25 - I8-20 I4—I7 {:1 9—13 [2 2—6 ' 0 000000 400 \600 3.600 moo nqooo H.300 225m “I. I IE9 “u 11 population in Hessen is the Rhein-Main complex, a triangular- shaped area including the cities of Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Offenbach, Hanau, and Darmstadt. Secondary regions of population concentration are Kassel, Giessen, and Fulda. The latter three are secondary industrial cores usually represented by one urban area. As Figure 2 indicates, the location of Expellees by percentage and actual number is lowest in the above-mentioned industrial centers. The greatest numbers of Expellees are in the agricultural central and northern regions of Hessen. The Allies deemed it important that the Germans be held responsible for the integration of Expellees into German life. The United States position is stated in the following instructions: As directed by and under supervision of Military Government, German authorities will be held responsible .5 for: a. Care, control, and reporting of ex-enemy a.” displaced persons, refugees, and expellees including payment for required goods, facilities and services; b. Reception and resettlement of refugees and expellees;... 5 The most important consideration for the settlement of Expellees was housing. The original scheme to process the the Expellees in camps, to register them according to occupa-s tional skills, and to settle them in areas where there was a demand for their skills, failedwbecause of the critical housing shortages in the cities. Table 2 shows the major urban centers of Hessen and the percentage of dwellings lsMilitary Government Re ulations, Title 20, 20-211. 7, 1 February 1946. 12 7...— TABLE 2: Dwellings Available for Civilian Use in June, 1947 as Compared with 1939: Major Urban Centers in Hessen Per cent of Dwellings Available in June City 1947 as Compared with 1939. Darmstadt 38.6 Frankfurt 64.4 Fulda 93.8 Giessen 61.2 Hanau 38.1 Kassel 38.7 Marburg 85.3 Offenbach 69.0 Wiesbaden 72.2 Source: OMGUS,(Stapistical:Appgx: No. 25_113l July 1947, Section XIII: Housingi Figure l, p. 93. This relationship was arrived at by subtracting from all houses those houses which were totally destroyed, those which were in need of extensive repair, those occupied by the Armed Forces, and those occupied by Displaced Persons. The latter two accounted for a very small percentage. avaflable in June 1947 as compared with 1939. In addition to the housing shortage which forced the \ settlement of Expellees in more rural areas, the integration ,2 \ _ of this group into economic life was hindered by its com— 5 /.r / position. Throughout the migration period there were com-j .--~ ‘_ . I plaints that the deporting countries were retaining ethnic German men with certain valuable industrial skills. For example, German miners were frequently withheld by Czechoslo- vakian Officials.16 16General E. F. Wood (POW and DP Division), Ad interum answer to General Clay’s long-hand note of 28 September, re German expellees from Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. 1 October 13 The Office of Military Government, United States )_1 Zone declared Frankfurt, Kassel and Wiesbaden and "other principal urban centers" closed to Expellees.l7 Soon added to the "closed list" were Bad Nauheim, Neu Isenburg, Bad Homberg, Kronberg, Oberursel, Assmannshausen, Hofheim, Wetzlar, and the city and rural Kreise of Hanau. A second classification, "critical",was devised. Critical areas were those with housing‘ shortages, but into which Expellees could be moved if absolutely necessary. German officials could force the city officials of critical areas to accept them. Moved from the closed to crit— ical classification were Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, and Kassel. The other cities on this list were Darmstadt, Limburg, Rfldesheim, Lorch, Giessen, and Offenbach (Figure l).18 The effect of the‘ housing limitations and changed plans in regard to areas in which Expellees could be settled was that domiciles were provided in rural areas which had housing but provided few job opportunities. Of the total sent to Hessen in 1946, about 33 per cent 19 were children, 39 per cent women and 28 per cent men. The age and sex structure proved not to be such a serious dis- advantage as was first imagined. Later figures revealed that the wartime destruction of the indigenous German population, especially of males in the economically employable age groups, L 1945 (carbon cOpy), and teletype message of 31 January 1946 to be relayed to give priority to German Czech coal miners and families for U.S. Zone. l7§§p§§hessisches Staatsministerium, loc. cit. 18Ibid. 19Mann, Neuburger in der Grosshessischen Wirtschaft, p. 29. 1h was severe, and that the age and sex structure of the Expellees was in accord with that of the indigenous population. In many} local areas the Expellees had a more favorable distribution of persons in the employable category percentagewise than did the indigenous population. The distribution of Expellees, especially Czechoslovakian, as indicated in Table 3 was also favorable when compared to the total population. It was determined early that integration of‘\ the new citizens would have to be in non-agricultural pursuitS:j The actual land area of Hessen available for cultivation could not be measurably increased, and the possibility of further dividing existing enterprises was impractical because the average farm size in Hessen in 1946 was 12.3 acres. Only a fraction of a percentage of all establishments contained more than 125 acres.20 Thus the greater number of persons trained {In industrial and commercial pursuits as opposed to agricul- . ltural was an advantage as these persons possessed skills which f )could be utilized. The percentages in Table 3 for ethnic Germans from Hungary are somewhat misleading. This group in 1946 only con- stituted 8 per cent of the total number of Expellees received in Hessen. Thus this does not alter very much the general occupational distribution, but shows that as a group Hungarian Expellees had a vocational structure out of balance with that of the indigenous pOpulation. The high proportion of these r 20Merforth, Neue Heimet In Hessen, Hessenministerium fur Landwirtschaft und Forsten und Sekretariat der Agarsozialen Gesellschaft (Gottingen: March, 1958), p. 4. 15 peOple in agricultural pursuits was a disadvantage as there were few Opportunities for integration in this economic sector. TABLE 3: Percentage Distribution of Expellees and Indigenous Germans by Type of Industry in Hessen Indigenous Expellees from_ b Type of Industry Popplationa Czechoslovakia Hupgagy Agriculture and Forestry 17.6% 25% I 75% 5 Industry and Trade 39.9 30 ) 17 Commerce and Transportation 13.6 30 ) Service and Intellectual Professions 15.6 15 8 aThe distribution figures of the indigenous population are based on prewar statistics. Service and Intellectual Pro- fessions includes military personnel. The source of this information was the Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, Hessen im Wandel der Letngn Hundert Jahre 1860-1960, I'II Erwerbstatigkeit, und Berufliche Gliederung. 2. Bevolkerung seit 1882 nach'Whmschaftsbereichen," p. 512. bThis information was taken from a report of the United States occupying forces entitled "Report on Expellee Problem in the U. S. Zone, 1946-March 1947," p. 9. The Germans from Czechoslovakia composed about 90 per centykjfl of the new citizens in Hessen, and those from Austria some 2 per cent. Early in December 1946, the major period of deportation ended. Movement of Expellees within and between zones con- tinued as families sought to reunite, but this did not really alter the patterns established by the end of 1946. The place-/‘, ment of Expellees in the rural areas of Hessen, the central 6” and northern sections in particular, was a pattern which had to be changed because these regions offered few employment Opportunities and presented conditions which led to consider- 16 able social and political unrest. This pattern continued3 until 1950, at which time the federal government and Lgpg Hessen began to pass legislation devised to facilitate the economic integration of Expellees. 3. Organization of the Remainder of the Thesis The individual programs which have been instituted by the federal, Lgpg, and fippip governments will be examined in Chapter 111. To evaluate the spatial significance of these plans, an understanding of the economic conditions of Hessen after 1945 is necessary. A brief economic-historical summary iswpresented in Chapter II. Only those conditions which have assisted or hindered the integration of Expellees into Hessen economic life are included. The last two chapters deal with the importance of Expellees to Hessen agriculture and industry and a summary and conclusions of the spatial economic impact of a politically forced resettlement problem. CHAPTER II IMPORTANT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN HESSEN AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF EXPELLEES Knowledge of the general and particular economic conditions of Hessen which have affected the Expellees is necessary to understand the various programs designed to promote Expellee integration. The postwar economic situa- tion has never been static and to a great degree reflects the overall recovery of the entire West German economy. This general recovery of the country has favorably bene-l, fited the Expellees. The changing economic situation and the position of the Expellees in relation to it can best be divided intO'guee phases. The first is the period from the deportaéYV tion to the Currency Reform (1946 to June, 1948). This was characterized by a dearth of production space for goods, paucity of raw materials, disrupted transportation net and markets, and administrative disorganization. The second phase, that of the Currency Reform and the following years (June, 1948 to 1956), is distinctive in that the Reform brought Expellees' economic affairs rapidly to a crisis. In an endeavor to mitigate Expellee difficulties, several Federal and Land Hessen programs were initiated. l7 18 It is difficult to establish an exact date for the last phase. The period began in 1956 when many of the goals of the Expellee programs were fulfilled. Some of the projects 'were discontinued and others, particularly those of the Hessen government, were altered in an attempt to strengthen certain depressed, economic problem areas. Within the changed plans,‘ the attention to an area was paramount and the solution Of Expellee problems,usually incorporated through preferential treatment, became a secondary aim. The first phase differed from the latter in a notice- able lack of planning. Any planning evidenced was hastily adjusted to meet a specific problem. During this period.j2 Expellees managed financially with little or no help from governmental organizations although the necessary administrative apparatus was established in this period. 1. 1945 to the Currency Reform (June 20,1948) In November;l945, the Military Government established the Fundamental Egg £9; the State pf Greater Hesse? AS a portion of this, the administration Of Expellee affairs was delegated to the newly formed State Refugee Agency. Although it was first intended that the Agency be a separate ministry in the Hessen government, in Operation it was formed as a department of the Bureau of Public Health in the Ministry for Labor and Welfare.1 The Bureau of Public Health worked through Kreise and Gemeinden welfare organizations. At best, the admin- o-i lFundamental Law of the State of Greater Hesse of November 27, 1945. OMGUS, 'Decree Regulating the Refugee 19 istrative communications and lines Of authority were weak re- sulting from the new organization on all levels and the enormity of the task at hand. The welfare organizations were to control: welfare assistance, provide medical treatment, keep records, and find the Expellees housing. The records for this period, 1946 to 1948, are pri— marily an enumeration of pots, pans, tables, chairs, blankets, shoes, clothing, china, and other everyday necessities which had to be collected for the Expellees. Military Government files contain thousands Of letters from Expellees complaining that during the deportationafl1.their personal goods had been confiscated and never returned. As the Expellees arrived with /. few personal belongings, it is quite understandable that the I efforts of the welfare agencies were directed to clothing and ‘ other such drives. When the Expellees were deported not only were their personal effects seized but also their working papers, licenses, and certificates of professional competence. The First Execu- tion Order of September 18, 1947, to the Refugee Law dealt with this situation and provided a method by which Expellees could be relicensed upon meeting the requirements of an examination administered in Hessen. This same Execution Order changed a situation which had made it more difficult for an Expellee to participate in economic life than an indigenous German. Law 104 of the Agency," Monthly Historical Report. Greater Lapg Hesse, October, 1945, p. . ' ' 20 Military Government had permitted indigenous Germans to establish firms with ten or less employees whether or not they had been passed by the deruazification boards. This did not include Expellees. Before any enterprise which they hoped to create could be approved by the apprOpriate guild or licensing body, the Expellee had to be cleared by a denazification board. Dr. Peter Paul Nahm, who was in charge of the Re- settlement Section Of the Refugee Service (established in 1947 as successor to the State Refugee Agency) pressed this issue with Military Government for Hesse? Dr. Nahm, in a memorandum to Military Government, stated that Expellees could not always present proof of innocence to the denazifica- tion boards as they were sent without papers and had been separated from peOple of their village who would be character ‘witnesses. He also stated that in some instances, indigenous Germans had worked to postpone Expellee examinations so avail- able jobs could be taken by them while the Expellee awaited processing.2 The Lgpg Refugee Service did reach an agreement with the Minister of De nazification. Expellees were to be processed SO that the number of Expellee cases passed upon monthly was equal to their proportion in the total population. An Expellee lawyer was also to be employed to handle special questions.3 Unfortunately permission for Expellees who had 2Memorandum from Dr. P. P. Nahm, Reqierungsbeauf- tragter to OMG Greater Hesse, March, 1947 (carbon OOpy). 3Ibid. w.“ . at. 21 not been passed by a chanazification board to establish a firm with ten or less employees was not granted. Conditions for integration of Expellees in this early period were anything but favorable. A constant source of irritation was the lack of plant space. Again and again in Hessen and Military Government records, grateful mention is made of the turning over by the Military of barracks, bunkers, and other such buildings for industrial and other use. The integration was slow and at first confused, pri— marily for two reasons. First, the new Hessen government and its hastily organized apparatus was solely responsible for the assimilation of Expellees; and in the early period had few. lgng term plans. Secondly, the Expellee was perplexed and not! 2 only had to COpe with a new environment but did not know where 1Opportunities existed, how to take advantage of them, and through (what governmental channels he could proceed to obtain help. Some Expellees had been able to reuestablish their former industries in Hessen. Table 4 presents this inform- ation for selected Expellee industries for the end of 1947 and beginning of 1948. Several of these were industries which were favored by the Hessen government. Hessen officials had determined that Gablonz,’+ glass— works, and musical instruments would be valuable additions to 4Portions of the world famous Gablonz industry (former- ly Czechoslovakian) settled in Hessen. The firms in Hessen produce very exquisite crystal ware, both utilitarian and ecorative pieces, primarily for export. The jewelry sections of this industry have tended to locate in Austria. 22 TABLE 4: Major Expellee Industries in Hessen, End of 1947 - Beginning of 1948, by Percentage of Total Industry, Area of Concentration, and Percentage of Expellee Industry in the Area of Concentration ‘1' , Percentage Industry Percentage of Total Concentra- of Total Ex- Hessen Industry tion Area pellee Indus- % try this cat- egory in this area -% Musical Instruments - Gross-Gerau 75 Gablonz - Obertaunuskreis 63 Toys 45 Giessen (Land) 29 Glass Works & Glass Manufacturing 36 Limburg 20 Ceramics 26 Witzenhausen 30 Textiles ll Gelnhausen 22 ‘Woodworking ll Dieburg 14 Leather WOrking 6 Friedbur 21 Stone & Earth 3 Giessen ILand) 23 Clothing - Frankfurt a.M. 15 Source: Der Hessische Minister des Innern als Staatsbeauf- tragter ffir das Flfichtlingswesen, 1-7 March, No. 2093148, p. 2. the economy of Hessen as there had been little or no develop- ment in these sectors. For this reason the establishment of such firms was encouraged. The other industries were more); often than not founded with no governmental help. Leather working, textiles, and toys had been major handicraft industries of Expellees in their home countries. Toys, leather working, and other handicraft industries required little capital, machinery, or space for production and thus ‘were established relatively easy. Textiles, which were major Expellee industries, were deemed important by Hessen officials in charge Of economic affairs as they were considered valuable 23 supplements to this economic sector in Hessen. It was also hoped that these new firms would be established in the induse. trially underdeveloped areas of Hessen, the central section and border region. Although Hessen officials did encourage the founding of specific types of Expellee enterprises, the attempts were minor in most industries (long range planning was absent and there was considerable confusion about objectives) and many Of the attempts proved impossible or impractical. The Currency Reform brought this period to a close. Although the Reform J ‘ did little to help the Expellee directly, its chief value was'; the impetus which it gave to constructive action, both Of immediate and long range planning. 2. Period of the Currency Reform The Currency Reform of June 20, 1948 had serious effects on Expellee industries in Hessen. From the arrival of the Expellees until the Reform less than two and a half years had elapsed, insufficient time to build and firmly establish new enterprises. Only a few firms had adequate machinery, tools, supplies, and/or good markets. The revaluation Of the Reichsmark was not in itself the crucial issue. This measure applied to all, not only to the Expellees. If anything, the stabilization of the currency 1‘? aided those firms which were dependent upon the export market. Rather it was the tightening Of credit policies which threaten- edexpellee industries. Expellees had been dependent on the‘ open financial market for loans, and when the Reform was 24 instituMfl‘dEW'could no longer receive credit or extensions of credit as they could Offer little or no security. The role which the government had assumed is summarized by the following: Credit in this period (the period prior to the Currency Reform) was relatively easy to procure: in reality it was more important and more difficult to Obtain the means of production, licenses, permits of rationed materials, and goods. The possibilities of help from public sources in relation to this were very modest; however, they supported Expellees and refugees in their endeavors as much as they were able. This generalized statement for the entire West German economy was true also of Hessen. Until the middle of June, Expellees in Hessen had established firms as follows: industry~700; handwork-5600; commerce-3200; trucking and storage~l30; and hotel and tourist services-60; or a total of 9690. It was estimated that about one-half were established without Land 6 help. Although not specifically indicated, those founded without the help of the Land were probably small handicraft firms. The seriousness of the effects of the Currency Reform on Expellee firms in Hessen was indicated in a regular news report from the Refugee Service. By July 15, 1948, approxif.‘ mately one month after the start of the Reform, some 250 5Lastenausgleichsbank, Die Gewerblichen vertriebenen und Fluchtlingsbetriebe Erfolgte, und ungel”oste Aufgabex der Eingliederungi (Bad Godesberg; December l955),p . 5. 6Doris Schdffel (Regierungsratin KaufmanneSchOffel), "Des Fluchtlingsproblem in Hessen," Das Deutsche Fluchtlings Problem: Sonderheft der Zeitschrift fur Raumforschung. (Bielefeld, 1950), p. 68. 25 Expellee firms had urgently requested financial help from Hessen. "These are mostly enterprises which until now have received no state aid, and now suddenly are robbed of all cash without being viable production units." The Currency Reform had helped focus attention on the serious economic plight of Expellees. As a result of this, several programs were initiated that were designed to meet specific Expellee problems. The effectiveness of the - plans, particularly those initiated by Hessen, were hamper- ed by the poor regional balance of industry in Hessen. Regional Balance of Industry_in Hessen in the Early 1950' . In economic strength, the Rhein-Main area of south HeSsen is one of the more important in West Germany. The focus of this region is Frankfurt a.M. and it contains the important cities of Darmstadt, Hanau, Offenbach, and Wies- baden as well as numerous other urban areas. The remainder of Hessen, the central and northern sections, is predominantly rural and contains only a few manufacturing centers. A report from the Landesplanungsamt described the 8 economic structure of Hessen in 1949. This report used the smallest political units, the Gemeinden, for its analysis. The criteria used in describing the Hessen Gemeinden are the geographic location, the position in respect to the transpor- A 7Hessisches Staatsministerium, Der Minister ffir Arbeit und WOhlfart, Staatsbeauftragter fur das Flfichtlingswesen, 1-10 July l9h8, 12765/48. 8Des Hessische Ministerprasident, Landesplanung, Die 26 tation net, available water supply and its potential development for industry, other fuels present for industrial use and their development potentials, the tax base, and an estimation of pro- duction space. In 19h9, there were 2,706 Gemeinden in Hessen. Of these, 750 had manufacturing establishments. However, 3A7 contained only one firm, 270 had two, and only 133 had more than two.9 Table 5 shows the location of industry by Regigrungsbgzigk for TABLE 5: Number of Gem inden by Re ierun ezi k in Hessen with One and TF0 Industrial Firms by Type of Indus- trial Group: 1949 ‘_Regig;gggsbesigk Regierungsbezirk ffiggigzgfiggbggizk Industrial Darmstdt Kassel iesbaden G on 1 F1 m 2 Firms 1 Firm 2 Firms 1 Firm 2 1. Mining Ind. 20 22 37 24 39 25 2. Ceramics & Glass - 2 l 3 - 4 3. Metal + Metal Working 10 9 7 5 19 13 4. Fine Mechan- ical & Optics 2 3 3 6 8 8 5. Chemical 6 4 4 2 4 2 6. Wood & Wbod working 33 2h 54 32 26 13 7. Printing 2 2 - l - 2 8. Leather & Leather 4 l 2 2 4 h Wbrking 9. Textile Processing 15 15 9 ll 12 6 10. Agricultural Processing 5 5 6 7 7 8 ll. Remaining 1 l 2 1 E a Source: Der Hessiche Ministerprasident, Landesplanung, D . G er o to 1m essen und hr Ent i 1 8 l iesbaden: Nai 1952 , able B, p. . Ge rborte in Hessen un ihre Entwicklun smB lichkeit, V01. I & II ines‘EEHenW: i'. ' ' " ' " 9IQ1Q., I, 1. 27 those places with one and two industrial establishments. . Groups 1, 6, and 10 were relatively strong. The first two represented raw material oriented industries and group 10 was characterized by the manufacturing of perishable commodities. There were in Hessen a total of 347 Gemeinden with only one manufacturing industry. Groups 1, 6, and 10 accounted for 227 of these. Of the 270 Gemeinden with two manufacturing establishments, 180 were represented by Groups 1, 6, and 10. The Landesplanungsamt estimated that possibilities of industrial expansion were very limited and rested with the 750 Gemeinden which already had manufacturing activity; how- ever, it was determined that those with industries of Groups 1, 6, or 10 alone could not bear substantial expansion. Thus it was estimated that only 120 Gemeinden had definite potential, and of these only 90 were characterized by having two establish- ments. The report further described the existing structure by type of industrial area. Four groups were identified: 1) Ba;- lungsorte-cities with concentrations of manufacturing within which more than 50 per cent of those employed were working in non—agricultural firms, 2) Zentren g2; gewerblichen Wirtschaft e centers within Kreise with a lesser degree of manufacturing, 3) Hauptorte - those Gemeinden located in areas with a well- developed transportation net but with a narrow industrial base, and A) Nebenorte - those Gemeinden away from the main transpor- tation routes but with local advantages for manufacturing activity in agriculture or forestry, or develOpment of recrea- 28 tional industries.lO Table 6 presents the distribution. TABLE 6: Classification of Gemeinden in Hessen: 1949 Regierungs- Number of Zentren Hauptorte Nebenorte bezirk . _,AM“Ballungsorte Darmstadt 5 32 36 ll Kassel A 26 30 10 Wiesbaden 7 22 50 j Hessen Totals 16_’ 80 116’ 26 Source: Der Hessische Ministerprasident, Landesplanung, Die Gewerborte im Hessen und ihre Entwicklungsmbglichkeit Wiesbaden W, p. 5. The position of Hessen is further clarified if Table 6 is organized differently. The Regierungsbezirk Darmstadthas two components — a portion located in south Hessen and the other in central Hessen (Figure 1). These are separated by the Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden. When the divisions are changed to north Hessen-Regierunggbezirk Kassel without Hunfeld and Fulda; middle Hessen, the central portion of Regierungsbezirk Darmstadt, and Hunfeld and Fulda; and southern Hessen, which is comprised of Regierungsbezigg'Wiesbaden and the southern portion of Regierungsbezirk Darmstadt, the comparisons of manufacturing centers are clarified. Table 7 presents this amended picture. From this Table, the stronger economic development of south Hessen is more clearly portrayed. South Hessen has eleven of the sixteen major urban areas of Hessen (Ballungsorte) lOlbld., p. 5. w 29 TABLE 7: Classification of Hessen Gemeinden by Region: 1949 — V‘w v' — vw Section . Number of ,Ballungsorte, Zentren “Hauptorte Nebenorte North Hessen A 26 3O 10 Huddle Hessen 1 12 12 5 South Hessen __11 42 _7A 11 Hessen Totals 16' 80 116’ 26 and just over half of the secondary centers (Zentren). Addi- tionally, it contains more than 60 per cent of the Hauptorte. If Nebenorte are excluded on the basis that their manufactur- ing activities are highly restricted and localized, then south Hessen contains nearly 60 per cent of the manufacturing centers; middle Hessen - 12 per cent; and north Hessen some 26 per cent. Thus as an economic region, south Hessen clearly had greater strength than the rest of Hessen. It was within this regional structure that the Expellee had to be integrated. The problem was heightened because expansion potential in agriculture was estimated to be severely limited. W In addition to a poor regional balance of industry, the?~ \ Expellee had been domiciled in rural areas. In the early 1950's; unemployment was high, and housing in cities where employment / opportunties might exist was at a premium. The important phases for the Expellees of nearly all aspects of the governmental programs were concluded by 1957. 30 In some instances the programs continued but more often than not the major goals shifted to emphasis away from the Expellee to the improvement of the Hessen regional, economic balance. Also, by the end of 1956, the marked recovery of the general , economy of West Germany became an important factor in bringing i to a close some of the programs. 3. The Generaerecovery of the Hessen Economy It is impossible to determine exactly when the economic structure of Hessen changed from one in which there were too many persons seeking too few jobs to one in which there was a general need for employees. However, this change became evident by the end of 1956. Employment came more slowly for , y the Expellee than the indigenous citizen, partly due to the ’ fact that the Expellees were settled primarily in agricul- tural regions which provided few employment opportunities. After 1950, the total number of unemployed Expellees began to diminish. This was a result of the resettlement of , 7L Expellees from agricultural areas to industrial regions, pro- if grams to create new jobs to be filled primarily by Expellees, direct financial aid to Expellee industries, and the recovery of the entire West Germany economy. Tables 8 and 9 below show the transformation of the unemployment situation in Hessen from 1950 to 1959. In the general population of Hessen, Expellees have usually constituted about 17 per cent. As Table 9 indicates, the percentage of unemployed Expellees was above 17 per cent 31 TABLE 8: Unemployment in Hessen by Regions: 1950 - 1959 North Hessen South and Middle Total Numbers Year Percentage of Hessen Percentage of Persons Unemployed of Unemployed Unemployed 1950 15.9 7.2 129,960 1951 14.0 5.8 112,319 1952 12.9 5.8 110,C93 1953 12.4 5.9 111,629 1954 11.8 5.5 107.941 1955 8.8 3.6 76,873 1956 7.2 2.7 62,756 1957 6.7 2.5 58.892 1958 7.0 2.4 58,988 1959 4.7 1.4 36.458 Source: Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, "Die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit 1947 bis 1959 in Hessen " Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, 15th Year, Vol. 1 Janu- ary: 1960), Table 10, p. 10. TABLE 9: Expellee Unemployment in Hessen: 1950-1959 Total Number of Un- Of 100 Ex. the Of 100 Unemploy- Year Employed Expellees following were ed the following Unemployed were Expellees 1950 36,100 13.7 27.8 1951 31,300 12.1 27.9 1952 24,500 10.2 22.2 1953 29,900 10.1 26.8 1954 27,h00 -* 25-h 1955 20,600 - 26.8 1956 14.700 - 23.4 1957 12,900 - 22.0 1958 13,100 - 22.2 1959 6.400 - 17.4 Source: Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, "Die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit 1947 bis 1959 in Hessen " Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen, 15th Year, Vol. 1 Janu- ary, 1960), Table 10, p. 10. *Information concerning the percentage of unemployed Ex- pellees based on those registered as employed and unem- ployed was not assembled after 1953. 32 until 1959; in 1959 the two were roughly similar. The higher percentage of unemployed Expellees was indicative of the pro- blems of economic integration which they were experiencing. The last year for figures concerning the percentage of unem- ployed Expellees in the Expellee population was 1953. For this year north Hessen reported a greater number of unemployed (12 to 16 per cent) than the other divisions. The region centering on Marburg, a persistent economic problem area, had over 29 per cent unemployed. Somewhat high also were Giessen, with 11.5 per cent of the Expellee labor force unemployed; Limburg, with 9.8 per cent; and Wetzlar, with 7.8 per cent. Indications are that these areas are no longer a serious problem.11 Special Economic Development Areas of Hessen As the programs corrected the poor distributional pat- tern of Expellees, more jobs were created, and the upswing of the Hessen economy was assured, many of the programs were con- cluded and others, notably those of the Hessen government, were changed. The emphasis was focused on the Hessen Development Areas (Forderungsgebiete), of which there are two in Hessen - the Border Area (Zonenrandgebigp), and the Area of Economic Re- organization (Sanierungsgebeit). These areas (Figure 3) are dominantly agricultural and have a poorly developed industrial structure. The general character of these areas has been discussed previously in the llHessisches Statistisches Landesamt, Staat upd Wirt— schaft in Hessen, 15th Year, "Die Entwicklung des Arbeitslosig- keit 1947 bis 1959 in Hessen," (January: 1960), I, 10. 55 DEVELOPMENT AREAS IN HESSEN I963 WAIDECK \\\\a\ a. x . \\ BORDER AREA ’«1’3 AREA OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION - AREAS IN BOTH PROGRAMS "I!" 3 use 'u 3h section concerning the industrial classification of Hessen Gemeinden. Both federal and Land programs have attempted to encourage the development of industry in these regions. The Area of Economic Reorganization is characterized simply by the lack of industry, and within the villages there are few commercial or service establishments. The possibilities of trading with nearby urban centers are also restricted because of the lack of efficient public transportation facilities or service. This region of Hessen is perhaps economically the most stagnant because of its relative isolation from major urban centers. The Border Area exhibits in some regions these same characteristics though in most portions not as extremely. This area has been of concern to thermmdonal government (a federal program contains measures for improving the entire area along the boundary between East and West Germany) and to Hessen. Part of the problems of economic development stem from the disruption of prewar service areas of cities in this region and the develOpment of new ones in West Germany. In Hessen, T the only major city which has not reached its prewar pOpulationé level is Kassel. Its service area was largely in what is now East Germany. Presently the city must compete with urban areas with which it formerly had little contact. Fulda, Hunfeld, Bad Hersfeld and Bebra, other important although secondary cen- ters, have also suffered because of the disruption of service areas. At one time, when the border was not closed, Hessen authorities feared that in this area of high unemployment, West German citizens would turn to the Soviet Zone for help and 35 emphmmmnt To prevent this, the Land and federal governments provided investment funds and other subsidies to attract industry to this area. They also improved the transport structure and employed preferential rates for firms locat- ing here. Although the Expellees in 1966 figure less prominently in these programs than they have in the past, they still re- I ceive special rates of interest and more lenient periods of I I l I loan repayment. Two ideas are encompassed here: first, the Expellees still need help in establishing anew former enter— prises in Hessen; and secondly, Expellees are more easily able to move into this region. The latter has a sound psychological! base; becausethe Expellee is relatively new to Hessen he has not developed strong emotional or sectional ties as have 4—- ‘7 indigenous Germans. Thus he can, if it is economically .J feasible, move more easily. Summary In Hessen the economic integration of Expellees was partially shaped by certain regional and structural economic conditions. The regional imbalance of industry, the first settlement of Expellees in agricultural regions, the lack of employment opportunities, and the need for financial assistance to establish or secure newly founded Expellee industries were areas which federal and Lang programs attacked. The major plans which have aided Expellee economic integration in Hessen and their spatial impact will be examined in Chapter III. CHAPTER III THE SPATIAL IMPACT OF MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS ON THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN There have been several ways in which the government has attempted to integrate Expellees into economic life in Hessen. Generally the attempts may be categorized as follows: 1) to move Expellees to areas with many and varied employment Opportunities; 2) to supply direct financial aid or to pro- vide securities for credit for Expellee firms; and 3) to ex- tend credit to those enterprises which would create new jobs to be taken by Expellees. Rarely has any program encompassed more than one of these goals. The plans which have been in operation in Hessen have originated at the federal, Land, and figgis levels. In Hessen there have been periods during which one or more pro- grams have been in operation from any given level. For con- venience of analysis, the major programs will be examined individually by type of political unit, i. e., federal, Lang Hessen, or local. 1. Federal Programs The federal government has initiated various schemes to promote the economic integration of Expellees. Although 36 37 the programs have been administered at the Land level, they have not been designed to ameliorate particular conditions in any one Lang, but rather to treat those problems which all Expellees in the Federal Republic of Germany have had in common. Excluding agriculture, which is discussed in Chapter IV, there have been several national programs in operation in Hessen. These have been the Bundesumsiedlung, Soforthilfe, ,Lastenauggleich, the distribution of selected European Recovery Funds,and special credit measures which have been administer- ed via the Lastenausgleichsbank. Only the Bundesumskfllugg‘was‘x not a plan to aid the Expellee financially. I Bundesumsiedlung In 1949 the federal administration officially began a;} program of resettlement of Expellees between Lander. The need had arisen from the unsatisfactory and uneven initial settle- ment of Expellees in West Germany in relation to the total population (Table 10). Heavy wartime destruction of major 7} industrial areas had forced the temporary settlement of Ex- pellees in undestroyed regions, and the majority had been domiciled in agricultural Lander - Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, and Lower Saxony. As these Lander had a poorly developed (industrial base in 1949, sufficient job Opportunities could not be created. The national government therefore authorized the resettlement of Expellees from Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Schleswig-Holstein into the other Lander of West Germany. This 38 TABLE 10: Expellees in the Federal Re ublic of Germany in 1949 (by Landaz) e Expellees Percentage of Percentage of Land ' in 1000’s ‘Expellees of Expellee Total Land Population - Pepulation Schleswig-Holstein 888 33 12.1 Hamburg 91 6 1.3 Lower Saxony 1767 26 24.1 Bremen 39 7 0.5 North Rhine Westphaliall83 9 16.1 Hessen 675 16 9.2 Rhineland Palatinate 75 3 1.0 Baden-Wfirttemberg 70% 11 22.6 Bavaria 191 21 .1 Totals 7335 16 100.0 (average) Source: Statistical Pockethook on Expellees, Section 1, Table 3; "Development of Population 1946 to 1953 by Lander (Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office, 1953), p. 5. movement was authorized under four different programs or technically one plan with four different phases. Although political maneuvering for redistribution of Expellees extended back to the first movements of these people into West Germany, authorization was not granted until 1949. Article 119 of the Grunggesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik 2“ Deutschland von 23 Mai 1949 allowed such distribution. This article was translated into workable form by the "Verordnung fiber die Umsiedlung von Heimatvertriebenen aus den Landern Bayern, Niedersachsen, und Schleswig-Holstein von 29. November 191.9."1 f l"Verordnung fiber die Umsiedlung von Heimatvertriebenen aus den Landern Bayern, Niedersacnan, und Schleswig-Holstein von 29. November 1949," (BGBl 3.4, 1950). 39 The first program was limited primarily by housing availability. After transfer had been authorized and persons to be moved had been accepted, housing became the determining factor. There was a time lag between construction authoriza- tion and the completion of new housing units. For this reason, quotas had not been fulfilled by 1951. Then,in 1953,the third phase to move Expellees among Lander was initiated and,in 1956,»~ the fourth movement which is still in effect. The programs have provided resettlement for 1,050,000 persons in all West Germany. By June 30, 1963, 1,008,715 (96.1 per cent) people were resettled. The quota for Hessen was 39,600 divided as follows: 8,000 under the program of November 29, 1949; 7,000 under the program of May 22, 1951; 9,000 under section one and 6,000 under section two of the third program; and 9,600 under the last program of June 5, 1956.2 When a comparison is made with other Lander, Hessen has never been a major recipient of the resettlers (Table 11). The reason that Hessen did not need to accept more is that K the percentage of Expellees in relation to the indigenous I population was just about the same as the national average. Thus, in the move to equalize this type of prOportion, the percentage of Expellees in the total population of Hessen needed little adjustment. v— 2Der Bundesminister fur Vertriebene, Flfichtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte, Geschaftsstatistik fiber die Umsiedlun , Stand;30y§uni 1963, No. A2 I 5c-6940-1097/63. #0 "v ,2? fir—f TABLE 11: Total Number of Persons to be Received Under Bundesumsiedlung Programs Land Number of Persons North Rhine Westphalia 518,300 Baden Wfirttemberg 218, 900 Rhineland Palatinate 125,500 Hamburg 65,150 Hessen 39, 600 Bremen 19,500 Total 1,050,000 Source: Der Bundesminister fur Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte , Geschaftsstatistik uber die Umsiedlung, Stand: 30 Juni 1963, Az I 5c- 6940-1097/63, 28 August 1963. p» 2. 34 TABLE 12: Settlers Accepted into Hessen by Program and Lander Settled From Program I Program 11 Program III Pro ram IV 11/29/49 5/22/51 2/13/53 6/5 56 Schleswig-Holstein 4000 2250 2993 650 Lower Saxony 2000 1800 5448 1980 Bavaria 2000 2950 102 4433 Total Received 8000 7000 14543 70 3 Quota for Hessen 8000 7000 15000 9600 Percentage of Total Quota Settled in Hessen Schleswig—Holstein 99.9 Lower Saxony 94.2 Bavaria 88.0 Source: Der Bundesminister fur Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte Geschaftsstatistik uber die Umsied- 1m4g, Stand: 30 Juni 1963, A2 I 5c- 6940—1097 3, 18August 1963, p. 2, 34. Table 12 includes information concerning the number of settlers accepted into Hessen, the Lander of origin, and the 41 program under which they were sent. Bavaria sent more Expellees to Hessen than the other two Lander but fell farthest short of supplying the full quota. In reality the Bundesumsiedlung has been more impor- tant to the Lander which have sent Expellees than to those which have been the recipients. This was particularly true in the instance of Hessen, which was expected to receive only 3.8 per cent of these people. Although undoubtedly the re- settled Expellee has benefited as well as the individual Land in accepting selected types of laborers, the greater benefits accrued to the Lander which were sources of these people._ For thquggd sending Expellees, the gains were to be estimated' in reduced unemployment, unemployment compensation, and agita- tion in political circles. Hessen as a reception Lang directly benefited by the addition of workers, but more important was the indirect impetus which was given to the creation of the Hessen Plan, which is discussed in another section of this chapter. In the first program, the Expellee submitted an application for resettlement. This was then examined by a committee from the recipient Land to determine if the Expellee possessed professional skills which could be utilized in the ‘ngg. In Hessen the committee sought the cooperation of; business and industry so that a person could be moved and "I established in an urban area in which employment awaited him. In the first phase only those for whom jobs could be pro-73 " . vided qualified for resettlement. In the later programs, 42 undertaken when jobs were more plentiful, more consideration was given to applications of older persons and those with large families. The majority of the Expellees under the Bundesum;_7 siedlungsplan were settled in the Hessen industrial areaslj This was made possible by the special housing which the federal and Lang governments provided. It would have been impractical to move Expellees from agricultural areas of one Land to similar regions in another. For this reason the requisite housing units constructed, ‘were not located directly in the urban areas but were built in the umland. Figure 4 indicates the general distribution of the Bundesumsiedlung housing. The pattern of settlement of the .Bgndesumsiedler must be inferred from this as no records were maintained which would provide information about those who found other housing. In Hessen, most of the Expellees were moved into the Rheianain area, in the vicinity of Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Offenbach, Hanau and Darmstadt; the Lahn-Dill region focusing on Limburg, Wetzlar and Giessen; and into gagig Bergstrasse to take advantage of employment opportunities in Mannheim or Ludwigshafen. The occupational capabilities of the Expellees are also not known; again no records were kept about this aspect of their resettlement. Herr Fischer in his letters and in an 3Letter from J. Fischer, Landesarbeitsamt Hessen, Frank- furt, am Main, 4 April 1964. Herr Fischer served as a repre- sentative of the Hessen Labor Bureau on the Hessen committee which received applications for settlement under the Bundesum- .siedlungsplan. 45 HOUSING OF BUNDESUMSIEDLUNGSPLAN IN HESSEN I950- l960 WHZEIII USE W 30* and: DWELLINGS CONSTRUCTED {331‘s M‘am leTllAl-IIONBRG UNDER menus: “m" BUNDESUMSIEDLUNGSPLAN ° IN HESSEN: :950- |960 0 Number of units ’ . . . o o o 00 a e s s u 12 so flute l AA interview stated that the relationship between the job assumed upon resettlement in Hessen and that previously followed was rather high, between 55 and 60 per cent.A The most difficult placements were those of persons trained as commercial professionals, sales personnel, and other white collar workers. In the period which intervened between the deportation and Bundesumsiedlungsplan a large portion of these Expellees had reached 50 or 60 years of age. Because they could only be employed for a relatively short time before retirement and because of the costs of pension compensations, it was difficult to locate firms willing to hire them. Although this plan is technically still in effect, ~P after 1956 the intensity of housing construction and transfer of individuals was greatly reduced. The last section of the present program has not been completed with respect to the total number of persons to be resettled, and there appears to be no basis to continue. This program represents, however, the first major attempt of the federal government to aid Expellees. It is 9e;9 the only plan of this type; the others have dealt mainly with providing money as compensation or loans to the Expellees, and within the confines of this study, as credit or funds to develop Expellees' industries or to create jobs for Expellees. thid., and interview with Herr Fischer on April 15, 1964. A5 ngprthilfegesetz The Soforthilfegesetz, Gesetz zur Milderung dringendes sozialer Notstande (The Immediate Aid Law), was enacted on August 8, 1949. The administrative apparatus and operation was effected a few months later. For those sections of the law'which applied to Expellee industry, the actual administra- tion took place from 1951 to the first quarter of 1952. This brief period in no way derogates the Soforthilfe but rather is a consequence of its replacement by the Lastenausgleichs- gesetz. Also, to a degree the Soforthilfegesetz was an experiment and many of the weaknesses which resulted either . from legal form or administration were corrected in the Lastenausgleischsgesegg. Article 46 of the Soforthilfegesetg provided funds as T“ credit-to Expellee firms and those of other groups with valid M/ 1 indemnity claims5 if additional jobs could be created within I theirfactories. These positions were to be taken primarily by the Expellees as the definition of the indemnity groups at that time was narrow and Soviet Zone refugees had not become a serious problem. The jobs created with these funds were to last for a minimum of eight years. Under this law also, the credit could not be used for capital investment or purposes 5In general all federal programs have considered as members of the indemnity groups those persons persecuted under National Socialism for political, religious or racial reasons; returning prisoners of war, indigenous Gerhans who lost properties in the Eastern Territories or who lost their livelihood because of the War, Expellees, and Soviet Zone Refugees. \a.. \- #6 other than that of forming additional positions. The distribution of funds by occupation and those persons eligible to receive such credit is indicated in Table 13.7 The number of applications which were originally submitted is a good indicator of the need for federal assist- ance, and the difficulty of administering such a program. Additional difficulties were encountered also. Many firms~ which had been awarded money had to refuse it because the manufacture of additional products which would result from the new positions could not be economically justified or could not be marketed without expansions in that area. Al- though information is not available, it appears that many of the Expellee firms were barely viable units, encountering difficulties in production, and in locating permanent markets. For many of these, additional products could not be handled. Figure 5 indicates the number of positions created in Expellee industries in Hessen with the loans from the Soforthilfe- gesetz (Article 46); where it was not possible to determine the type of industry a question mark has been placed in the circle 6Soforthilfegesetz, Article 46. —— 7The information for the discussion of the ngorthilfe- gesetz "Dauerarbeitsplatze" and of the Lastenausgleuhsgesetz Arbeitsplatzdarlehen" unless otherwise indicated is taken from a report by Herr Wilhelm Partes. Partes helped to administer both Soforthilfe and Lastenausgleich funds. When the "Arbeits— platzdarlehgg" was terminated in 1956,Partes went to the Lasten- ausgleic shank in Bad Godesberg and went through the files of individual cases to prepare a report about this work in Hessen. The report which is half typed and in longhand was never utilized because there was no need, some of the tables were so detailed that individual firms could be identified,and some of the economic classifications as "mattresses" were not generally recognized. A7 'eied axeu uo penutquoo etqam JO used stqm .nuowhumwv snowmen eau nu nakedauwphmm unowmuomnom oHQmHomeuoo owed on! mnmahou muonomquw was opmwvmnunewnowmw mee.em mao.ma was mae.mo mom.oa -o.a Hopes som.ea mae.e cow mam.o~ moo.m mom mascanac oao.oa mos.m aha mmm.Hm Nem.e can camaemnoncwnonm NmH.om fine.“ men Nme.cm «no.0 ems ncoaaoaxm macaumOHHmm< woman: was meowueowdan< oHnmpmooomns emo.ma ome.m tea, oea.ma Saw.m cam Hosea ooa.m moo om NNS.~ owe on meaaaeaom emm.m coca mo 0mm.o cmea we oaneonnowaonm owm.m maaa em. wmm.4 mama moa ncoaacaam. msowquHHmm< nopneaaooom mom.oo eHH.HH com mmm.am moeom «mus Hence soo.o~ Amen can amm.- omen mow waaaanaom oeo.mm cans New «ma.em moot can *camaemaoncmaonm Neo.e~ capo omm cmH.Hm mmmw can nccaaoaam naoaanoaaaaa ocapaapsm III hhpmnvcH homo: anew honaaz a 0» counmhu mwnH Bonk Hmuoa ache Abe cacapwe nacho cmaaaaaomom coca: gonna: an cease: on anatomom no acacanaaanan "NH mumda 48 .omma.oa.ma .m canoe .ehoacm custom "cannon .oamoom HanowmmoHOHm cohoagao handovnomouufi honpo use .nhohxma .mhopoou mounaonw haemouso endogenouohm cosh: enH* moo.e com um mmm.m oa4.~ sen scape aoa.a mam em mwm.a Hem m4 waacacacm moe.a own em mom.m mam oaa opwHoonncwnocm ome.a mom on eoa.m. Hm~.H «ma nocaacaxm mnowpmowamm< ponds: use muoapuofiagm< oapmpgooomnb no ea m Heo.a Hon um Hence I I - New em m weanacaom mm a a awn as ea camaoaAonowaocm cm OH H was oea ma oooaaoaxm I mnowpmufianma pmpnmaabubm moo.e emm mm .ooo.aa Hae.~ mmm Hosea eoa.a mam am oom.a man we sentences mme.a mom mm emm.m new Sufi opmaemaonomaoom ooe.a «am an mom.m Hem.a sea nocaacawm ncoacooaaaa< ooocaanom. in oooa Home: noel. My tenanz , in owed - . . awash _ ,.mmoh .heasm21 was *mdowmmomohm seam w .I, mphmhqudum , on mundane many scam nacho donndodooIIMH mgm<9 4:9 NUMBER AND TYPE OF POSITIONS CREATED IN EXPELLEE FIRMS IN HESSEN UNDER SOFORTHILFEGESETZ ARTICLE 46 |95I 4952 IVIlIlEIIIAUSEI UIIEIIAIIIIIS ® GEIIIIAIISE - ’IAIIAUIIIS , 7 I, i5 T IIIIEIIGAII (‘ FRAIKFIIII .'/ \\‘ if?” . > , TYPE OF POSITIONS IEXIIIE ElEUIICAl AUTO IID. IOYS lEAIIIEI PUIlISIIIIG IIIIIEI 091K“ GLASS CIA"! SHOES IIIISIES HACIIIIE COISIlIICIMI IEIAl WORM“ WOODWOIKIG SIOIE I EAIIII ID. MUSICAI IISIIIIIHIS DRY Clflllfi l. "I“ fill WORKIIG root All "II IEIAllIG .IOI DWI“ IOI Ilflllflil A - . 6 I2 2| :0 50 72 90 20s IEPSG WIESIADEI GERAU / y; 05 4.3g INDEEA [MEEBN levee: IISSII IlIlSll' 0' mum. "I!“ upon. (II'lIAlSIlIJ NUMBER OF POSITIONS IDEUENEEEI 50 which is prOportional to the number of jobs created in Expellee industries. Although the ngorthilfegesetz was enacted before the Border Area became a vitally important issue in West Germany there were hOpes that this region would benefit substantially under the plan. Clearly in Hessen it did not. In figgig Hersfeld and the city of Fulda no money was awarded any firm; and for all positions added in Expellee industries in Hessen only 27.4 per cent were formed in this region (for all firms this was 26.8 per cent). This relationship is important be- cause Expellees were the major group eligible for the new positions, yet by 1951 they had not been moved from this area which presented so few opportunities. The lack of develop-I ment here to a degree reflects the structure of Article 46; the loans could not be awarded to firms which were not owned I by Expellees or other members of the indemnity groups8 and could only be granted to those firms already in operation. Except for the greater Kassel area, the Border Region was unattractive for industry; the transportation net was poorly developed and marketing possibilities were poor within the region. Under Article 46 of the Soforthilfegesetz,no firm of any type received funds in the Eggisg of Dieburg, Fritzlar- Homberg, Hersfeld, Wolfhagen, or Fulda (city). The cities 1* f ‘ '— 8Expellee firms were defined as those in which at least 50 per cent of the capital was owned by Expellees, and which could not continue operation if the Expellees were removed from ownership. 51 of Frankfurt, Hanau, and Offenbach in southern Hessen received little assistance. This is the only program of this type in which the area of south Hessen did not dominate. Although these cities were Open to Expellees who wished to settle there, the destruction and paucity of housing and other faci- lities retarded Expellees inwmigration. I The Kreise in which the most jobs were created were Darmstadt, Limburg, Giessen, and Schlfichtern. Hessen Officials had encouraged the establishment of the Expellee glass indus- try in Limburg, and in West Germany. This had became a much- prized industry. It is understandable that under this federal program that it received support. Eggig Schlfichtern had implemented its own program to assist Expellees and in the course of develOpment in 1951 had asked federal Officials for Soforthilfe funds which at that time had not been adminis- tered. The federal government viewed the requests of this figgig with favor and the money was immediately forthcoming for an Expellee textile industry. By industrial classification, the greater number Of positions were established in the Expellee textile industry (26.8 per cent), and machine construction and repair (9.6 per cent). Important Expellee skills such as the making Of musical instruments and leather goods, only received limited support as they were predominantly handicraft industries and expansion was limited. Under the Soforthilfegesetz, Article 46, 184 firms creating 3192 new positions received funds; 110 Expellee firms accounted for 1600 of the jobs. However, it 52 is likely that more than 1600 jobs went to Expellees as the Soforthilfegesetz was designed principally for them; but there is no way to determine the jobs by number or type that went to the Expellees. Article 46 of the Soforthilfegesetz proved to be very successful despite being in Operation for such a short period of time. The method had been found to assist Expellees and reducemunemployment. The Lastenausgleichsgesetg, the successor to the Soforthilfegesetg, used basically the same methods and removed some Of the difficulties which were structured into the Soforthilfegesetz. Lgstenausgleichsgesetg (Equalization of Burdens Law) The Lastenausgleichsgesetz has provided the broadest framework for the federal government to assist Expellees and members of the other indemnity groups.9 Under this law, the indemnity groups have seen provisions for agriculture, housing construction, household goods, rent, pro-rated pay- ment for possessions destroyed or unclaimable, stipends for the elderly, old age homes, orphanages, education, nursery schools, industry, handwork, commerce, and professions. The programs have reached into almost every phase of life and are providing substitution for livelihoods which were suf- ficiently altered or lost. Financial aid for the integration of Expellees into West German economic life has come in two basic forms; it A 9 See footnote 5 in this chapter. 53 has been provided mainly as direct credit and as assistance in creating jobs for Expellees. Because of the administrative structure which was developed, other federal programs, not directly a part of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz have been admin- istered through the Lastenausgleischsbank. The two most impor- tant programs from the Lastenausgleichsgesetz for the integra- tion of Expellees have been the Arbeitsplatzdarlehen and the Agfbaudarlehen:fur_die_gewerbliche Wirtschaft undgfreienBerufg (Loan Program for Manufacturing and the Free Professions). Both programs have been concluded. Loans for the Establishment of WorkingAPlaces (Arbgipa-Ii platzdarlehen).-Articles 259 and 260 of the Lastenausgleichs— gesetz continued the provisions of Article 46 of the Sofort- Ifilfegesetg to aid the formation of new jobs for Expellees. The important deviation was the availability of credit to firms / not owned by members of the indemnity groups, but in which jobs could be created for them. Within this broadened frame nearly any firm which would provide additional jobs could qualify for funds. For this reason, the decisions concerning the establishments tO be selected for enlargement became difficult. There was some apprehension that if only viable firms were chosen, then the new or those in the beginning years of Operation and still not securely established would not benefit and receive desperately needed funds. And it was also feared that if new establishments were selected, even though they needed funds, then the money might be given to economically unsound firms which would eventually fail. A 54 middle ground was accepted; the loans for the creation of I new jobs were generally awarded economically sound firms which lacked credit for such expansion.10 The provisions Of Articles 259 and 260 of the Lasten- ausgleichsgesetz were in effect from the second quarter of 1952 until December 31, 1956. Although this program was in operation for a longer period of time than the Soforthilfegesetz, less money was awarded Expellees in Hessen and fewer jobs were created. Table 14 presents information for the general distri- bution of Lastenausgleich monies under Articles 259 and 260 in Hessen by group, type of industry, and tXal applications submitted, rejected and accepted. Although the basis of P, eligibility to receive such monies had been expanded as com- pared to the Soforthilfegesetz, in Hessen fewer applications were submitted for the working place loans and less money was granted. The latter indicates the interest placed by the government on the economically underdeveloped areas, particular-, 1y the Border Area. The focus on these regions intensified from the start Of awarding monies to the termination in 1956 and tended to exclude firms which were not located in these areas. .No firm of any type was granted funds in the Kreise Kassel, Dieburg, Obertaunus, Gross-Gerau, Biedenkopf, Frizlar- Homberg, Ziegenhain, or the city of Hanau. Moreover no lOPrasident des Bundesausgleichsamts, lO Jahre_Lasten- ausgleich (Bad Hamburg: 1959), p. 56. llPartes Report, loc. cit. All!‘ ll.l!lll|lll.'.l IInlllIoA 55 '933d gxeu uogpgnu quoo etqam mcowmmommom masthepwmsoo umOH .muowhpmwu shoummm can aw hahmasowphmm cg: mumahoo msosowwusw one euwwpmnemownommh 0 used spy; men. can an oma.mm mem.m 0mm mm~.mm moo.o mam Hence . d: a damn .m Ni: 3mg: ooh: AS cantata mwm co m ma~.o www.a cm mo~.w «we.a 4m comaomaonomeonm HHm on o mme.m saw an em~.e aeo.a mo nccaaoaxm mcowquHHmm< dogmas: use msowumowaam< manmpmeeomaa mom am ma mom.e mom.a eaa ooe.m Ho~.~ mma Hence oma cm a mam.m oao.a mo eo~.e emo.a we wcaaacaca mHH cm a meo.~ Hmo cm Hma.m Has an camaomconomnocm me ma N oa~.a Hem ca mem.a cam Hm nooaaoawm msowumowamm< pouneaaooom 3.: Km 3 RES 48;. com 206m coma o3 H38. 0mm sea om moe.ma cem.e cam mao.am 0mm.e mmm mascacaom coo om ma Hmm.m meo.~ om omm.aa mmm.~ mma accwaomnonowaocm can mm m mmo.e mmH.H mo mmm.m mam.a om nccaaoaxm ncoaceoaaaa< cocoaaaam an oooa .zn oooa . z— honoz mnow honfisz mono: mnow Lens: .2“ COOH mpHMHOHUGm: hhumsvcH I_ Mono: inflow hoaasz macho op tenants many scam _ Hence 88 can Rm 3832 awn.» nmnOHOwaamsmummA nous: commom aw amaze: sowed mnmnmummq HO :owusnwhpmwa ”4H mqmde .ll.1ll.l-' III) [3 g' I 56 .OmmA.OA.qA m cAnny .ahoacm custom ”cocoon mom.A oem aA moe.A o0m am Annoy mAm as A owm mAA 0A weAcAnacm omm AeA 0A omo emA a ccmAcwaoncmacnm om mm A non co m ncoAAogxm mGOAmeAHmQ< cOxOAQD paw mGOApOOAAgQ< manmummoomsb «me mm b mnA n: m Ampoaw m NA m cm A cAaamaom own as A no mA N caonmaoncwaonm cm 0 A om om N ncoAAcaxm mGOAAOOAHQQ< copsoaaooom Oms.A mmm mm omm.A mmm mm Acpoe 0mm mm o 0AA ANA AA chaAeacm 0mm.A com AA mwo «AA AA opromacnowconm ONA mm A Ame om 0A nccAAcaxm ncoAcnoAAaaA ocaoAanam .za 000A mecca—I noon _ acaasz .zn oooA Acco:_ once _tcaa:z mCHCAmfimm £ mGOAmmOmOAm cosh mmosAmdm mzopo on ccpcmho mwna Bosh dmflnwpuoollca mnm5li designated specifically for Expellee use. In general this ‘ rounded out the federal programs as it provided credit, securities, or collateral for investment purposes in Expellee firms. The loans have been long term with low interest rates and although preference has been shown small and medium sized enterprises, money has been granted also to large firms. In Hessen from 1950 to 1953, 8,593,000 DM were granted to 175 Expelle firms. The Expellee textile industry received 2,236,000 DM (24 cases); construction - 813, 000 DM (18 instances); l8"Die Lastenausgleichsbank in Dienst der Vertrie- benen und Fluchtlingswirtschaft, " 15 Jahre VHWZIOB in Hessen (vertretung der Heimatvertriebenen Landesband Hessen, Frank- furt: Franz W. Wesel,1963), p. 31. 63 and Gablonz firms - 252,000 DM (15 cases).19 By December 31, ‘~ 1962, Expellees in Hessen accounted for 73 per cent of the ' cases and 67 per cent of the total money awarded under the program.20 Due to the manner in which information concerning this program is published it is impossible to separate by industrial classification the money loaned Expellees from that granted other indemnity groups in Hessen. Figure 7 indicates the total amount of money made available to Expellees by figgig from the start of the programs until July 1, 1963. This information only includes that money which was profitably used and does not include that which could not be paid back. The Expellees in the Hessen indus- trial areas received the most money and the Development Areas little in comparison. The reasons for the lack of development in these regions, as discussed, include the distance away from the major urban areas, the poorer transport net, and the proximity to the Soviet Zone. When the ERP credit program for Expellees was initiated, there was little attention to the Development Areas. This situation changed and after 1955 great emphasis was placed on this aspect of the program. By this date, a very successful ,Lgng program, the Hessen Plan, was nearly concluded. Under this program, Expellees were being moved out of the agricultural L 19Bank-ffi'r Vertriebene und Geschfidigte (Lastenaus- gleichsbank Aktien esellschaft), Vierter Jahrggbericht, 3 Geschaftsjahr 125§~ Bad Oxbsberg Tabelle 1. .. 20Lastenausgleichsbank (Bank ffir Vertriebene und Geschadigte), Jahresbericht 1262 (Bad Godesberg), Tabelle l. 64 TO l963 EUROPEAN RECOVERY PLAN CREDIT AWARDED EXPELLEES IN HESSEN PRIOR mum ‘ _. HOFGEISMAI 5 IO0,000 OM 65 areas, i.e., the Development Areas. The amount of credit made available after 1955 was greatly increased. This resulted partially from the closure of Articles 259 and 260 of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz and the realization that Expellee economic problems could better be solved by advancing invest- ment credit rather than creating new jobs. And by this time, the Expellees had been moved into the urban areas, particularly those of southern Hessen. The change of locational pattern of Expellees affected many of the programs. The movement of the Expellees was carried out, primarily under the Hessen plan. 2. Land Hessen Programs Hessenplan In January 195l,the Hessen Ministerprasident officially stated the goals of the Hessenplan. These were: a) the re- settlement within Hessen of 100,000 Expellees; b) the construc- tion of 25,000 individual Expellee dwelling units in urban areas; 0) the creation of 25,000 new jobs in industry and manufacturing for Expellees in Hessen's economically under- developed areas; and d) the development of 3000 agricultural enterprises. Discussions of parts "a," "b," and "c" are included in this section; point "d" is considered in Chapter IV. The Hessenplan was the first major Lang program.}3{ realistically designed to solve the problems of high Expellee unemployment and unfavorable settlement conditions in rural Kreise. In essence, the Expellees were either to be moved I 51(Dr. h. c. Wenzel Jaksch Der Hes en lan 1250- 1254 (Deutscher Gemeindeverlag G.m.6:H., I954), p. . 66 toplaces of employment or jobs were to be brought to them. The plan to change the spatial distribution of Expellees" began in 1950 and has continued into the 1960's; however, the number moved has diminished yearly since 1957. Resettlement Measures.-The resettlement of 100,000 Expellees from agricultural to industrial regions necessitated the construction of some 25,000 dwellings,as the size of the average Expellee family was estimated at four persons. Because of wartime destruction of the major urban areas and?’ slow rate of reconstruction, Hessen officials realized that: the only housing which could be available for Expellees i would have to be that newly constructed. Figure 8 indicates the number of dwellings built under the Hessen Plan for Expellees. Elfichtlingsonderbau housing (not included in Figure 8) was made available to Expellees who were moved in 1950; this however was provided by a different program. As Figure 8 shows, the greatest number of dwellings ‘were constructed in south Hessen, concentrated in the cities of Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Darmstadt, Offenbach and Hanau. The primarydfocusfiwas_thebcity of Frankfurt. This city has been able to absorb the most Expellees. It is the economic center of Hessen, and contains many large industrial units such as the Opel automobile factory. The other south Hessen centers: were selected either because they could provide employment ' primarily in light manufacturing or they were within com- muting distance of Frankfurt. 6'7 HESSEN PLAN HOUSING |950 — 1960 ll IIIIIA(I O .. . .9 Im o m V. '\ no s—smu» it :9 DWELLINGS CONSTRUCTED UNDER HESSEN PLAN 1950-I960 Number of units 05 l0|5 20 E Scout: flllSJlOllSlIG IVISIOI, HESS" IlIlSIIV I" lll’lllol. (HIPIIIlISIlIJ‘ 68 The second large center was the city of Kassel. Although greatly damaged by the war, Kassel was selected because it was the major city of the Border Area which also could provide some jobs. The third region, focusing on the light industrial center of Wetzlar and Giessen and secondary Hessen manufacturing regions, could also provide employment for Expellees. -The development of Hessen Plan housing in Hersfeld encouraged the branches of Expellee textile and handicraft industry in this area by constructing dwellings in the vicinity of the new firms. And lastly, the units in eastern Marburg were focused on the two cities of Allendorf and Neustadt which developed into a showcase for Expellee industry.22 Two of the earliest difficulties which arose in the administration of the Hessen Plan was determination of the industrial areas in Hessen in which to settle Expellees, and selection of the appropriate families to be moved. Hessen officials had the difficult task of determining which indus- trial areas ‘would be best to select for the housing construction. The cities of Frankfurt, Darmstadt and Kassel ‘were clearly industrial centers, but the selection of others was a problem. According to Dr. Jaksch in Der Hessenplan 125 - ,1254 the first Schwerpunktkarte of Hessen was developed to 23 This map is reproduced permit the most objective decisions. 22Please see the section on Allendorf in this chapter. 23(Jaksch), loc. cit., p. 21 and an interview with Dr. Jaksch on October 22, 1963. Presently Dr. Jaksch is a 69 as Figure 9. The determination of focal cities (Schwerpunkte) from this map (The Position of Communiting in 1950 as Reflected by the Business Tax Distribution in the Hessen Gemeinden) was simple and effective. If the town in which people had their residence contained few employment opportunities then people commuted to areas of employment. In Figure 9, Gemeinden and cities in which the net movement of commuters is into the area are shown in black. The other shaded patterns indicate Gemeinden from which people commute; the class divisions are: a) striped pattern-- more than 10 per cent of the resident population moves outside the Gemeinden for employment; b) medium dotted-5 to 9.9 per cent; 0) lightly dotted - l to 4.9 per cent; and d) white - less than 1 per cent. For the Operation of the Hessen Plan, two important patterns emerged. The first was Gemeinden or cities attracting} ‘workers; these areas were identified by the black pattern I (Figure 9). The second was those areas from which 10 per cent) or more of the residential population commuted; these were indicated by the stripes. This second group was of primary importance for those selecting most desirable sites for housing construction as these areas were always in the umlandS of the major cities. In a real sense, areas with 10 per cent .member of the Bundestag. In 1951 he was the Head of the Bureau for Expellees, Soviet Zone Refugees and Evacuees in the Hessen Ministry of Interior. 70 HAND DER PEIDELVIAIDEWIG AUF DER BASIS DES 6EWEIBESIEIIERAUSGLEI(HS IN DEN HESSISCHEN GEMEINDEN 1950 nae-In! Inn“ GIIIHSSYAND MAI I"! lunolmllun .— alumnae-val m J, «fl’ifi‘ we}, ’ gvo fit ‘ waggvee: i%¢%!i" 57.: as... O V o ’ -éggér‘ ' ' ' 1 0'" {EA A‘fir‘t . \r ,2. ‘ (“9"‘I I “O \\3- Q“ :4 ‘§ at?! . w? e 9.: ”a . -~rmsga: 3'0 '3'? J h ‘2‘: clan-mm m D II “I“ “I'll“ nus-m out-1m m E -W-"I-Ull ‘m um cumin-hunt “W Figm 9 71 or more of the population commuting to work represented an (t '\ immediate tributoryamea of a city and were thus selected as locales for the new dwellings. The major cities themselves contained limited opportunities for construction of homes as they either did not have enough space for large scale housing projects or land prices were too high for residential uses. When Figures 8 and 9 are compared they show a high correlation between these areas which were identified as a; tributary areas (striped pattern in Figure 9) and the actual numbers of housing units constructed (Figure 8). The selection of sites for housing construction was obviously dependent upon the identification of a major industrial region and the limits of the service area of such a city. The selection of Expellees to occupy the new dwellings was a difficult problem. Committees operating as delegates for a Regierungsprasident screened applications on the basis i. of various criteria ordered in degree of relative importance. f Expellees who commuted the greatest distance were given;$1. preference. Although in some instances Expellees worked at such a distance from their families that they could return home only on weekends or once a month, the majority of :;.£ Expellees effected by the Hessen Plan were moved shorter distances. Probably the majority had to leave early in the morning and return late in the evening. The difficulties} of commuting great distances meant that Expellees had to pay greater amounts of money for transportation than others who 72 lived closer to their jobs. In some cases those who were so far away that they could only be with their families on week- ends had to pay two rents. The second criteria for selection was the length ofw time a person had been commuting. Those who had commuted the longest period of time, i.e., the most months or years, were given preference over those who had done it for shorter periods. Family size and the number of minor children were also important. Every effort was made to unite the worker;; , with his family, and preference was given to those with .- larger families. Those domiciled in substandard housing 'were moved before those living in adequate housing. The age of the Expellees was not firmly established in the ranked criteria. When two cases of equal hardship were considered; usually the older person was given pre- ference. Similar preference was given to physically disabled persons. The missing criterion was job skills. The Hessen)? Plan unlike the Bundesumiedlung did not use job skills as a primary criterion. When the Hessen Plan was in Operation, an Expellee;%g; working in an area of industrial concentrafien submitted an ‘” application for a new dwelling unit. This meant he had already found a job and wanted his family to-either join him f‘ in the urban area or be moved closer to the place of M employment. Those Expellees who had not ventured to the city 2‘Fitnterview'with Frau Henniger-Schenk on April 16, 1964. Frau Henniger-Schenk worked in the Expellee Bureau when the Hessen Plan was devised and it was her task to co- ordinate movement and dwelling construction. 73 undoubtedly had found housing rapidly as it was more readily available in rural areas, but they were either not moved under the Hessen Plan or were moved near the end of the program. About the only instance when there was an exception was when a representative of the Hessen Labor Bureau or a committee requested that an Expellee with a particular occupational skill be moved. Figure 10 indicates the net number of families moved under the Hessen Plan. The figure does not include,howeven, those families moved within a particular figgig; this movement of people from inadequate housing or closer to their place of employment was of minor importance. A pattern is formed by”) the number of families moved from the central and northern [ portions of Hessen and the dominance of south Hessen as a recipient area. The records indicate that fewer Expellees moved from north Hessen than from the central and very southern parts. For those in the north, the longer commuting distances“1 to an industrial concentration area and the concommitant ! longer period of family separation were deterrents to the finding of jobs there. This made the Hessen Plan less effective since those who stayed with their families were last to be moved to the new housing areas. However, in total, the Hessen Plan was effective in providing for the movement of Expellees from rural to industrial areas. It is true that less than the intended 100,000 persons 'were movedrwunder the program approximately 80,000 ExpelleeST; were relocated (this figure includes those moved within a 74.— MOVEMENT OF EXPELLEE FAMILIES UNDER HESSEN PLANI I95I-I960 net loss net gain 0 _. , ’ ' . r'WITZFNHA_USEN _ ' I IV ‘ More . - ".0 a» -~ \ / . M".::°:§§s:§: ' ' I I / A 9o a ' so... ,/ //‘/% . ’/ ._,o.. @NKENBW' mnzun-uomm‘ / 4...... ’ 63"“ . / /...’ / ///,-‘oe ’ ' '0‘ 0‘: ‘0‘0' 0 6 90 fi' RV . 6% o’e“e’e’e’o'.s'.%° - , ”o’e:¢‘o°.’o’o’e:e:e’ozo’e . . 99.9% o e o 99 999 000.09 M A R B U Kg ’o’e'e°e%::30’ “’9‘ M ARBURG (“w \»7 $9 I 0606 ‘ .v;9,v.’¢:e:o¢ e ’e’e‘e’e’e' e - c 09009.. eooeoeev asses 300090 009. cc. ,_ O u 03‘ O a: K W e I co 9:. 9. o?" I [II D GIESSEN \_\V(FTILA:RCL.1 II 6 _ e V e co coo. co 9 ’z’e’g‘fe'ée’e’o‘c’ 9% severe o 0.00.99’ 0 o ’ 0. 6% g ’0’:’:‘ )‘0’0’ 0‘... . ' 0.0 ~ 0 '9 §c K :3: e?" co :fipitze’e‘eo “2.3.? .« OOOOOO‘OO o,:,o.:,eee.o K 3:5,: scmuqnm :0 .,. O '9' ‘0 D 0' 9 030%: ’o '9‘. '0” 0‘ ’3 0.0 ¢. ’0‘ .v v 0 a z? ’0 Q 6 e e ,e 5.00 O 0 0 9:0 9 ’9 . o o,» 9.0 ’0’. e o, ‘9 .9, O a. ’n as 6‘ O '0 < x a, On! F onimuulgs .-\r 0 z\ >‘ \/ e.,; 7 FRANKFURT m Am . \ ' ' / vflflfii/ NET LOSS «I EAMHJES C] 55-95 NET GNN FAMHJES IIO-I98 274-293 456—505 584-723 I256 3725 no gom DIREEBI Source: FILES, HOUSING DIVISION, HESSEN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. (UNPUBLISHED.) L Figure 10 MEP'GE ‘Wm‘k 4‘ -‘ ,y ——~——_. p: \m m d1 de th af. of we: fre not Hes: in E inc: mark did : crea1 75 Eggig but not those who accepted the agricultural Nebenerwegh- stellen). However, the change of the spatial distribution of! Expellees-their movement from rural to urban regions-was effected. The phase of the program which was intended to create new jobs was not as successful. DeveIOpment of_Hessen Plan Employment.-The creation of 25,000 new jobs for Expellees was beset with serious difficulties. One of the earliest problems involved a decision as to whether or not non-Expellee firms could accept the special funds. At the beginning of the 1950's an affirmative decision would have severely limited the scope of this phase of the Hessen Plan. Not many Expellee firms were in a position to expand production facilities, and frequently these were small and medium sized units which did not require extensive mechanization. The acceptance of fig Hessen money indicated that new workers would be employed in a firm. This necessarily involved additional machinery,j. L increased production, or perhaps even the location of new 3 markets for the product. For these reasons many eligible firms did not apply for funds because the guarantee of new Jobs created too many additional problems. The Hessen officials foresaw such a situation and in response to it enlarged the number of eligible firms. Expel- lees who owned or managed firms were eligible as well as those firms which were at least owned in part (50 per cent) by Expellees. To this was added those firms in which at%@ least 60 per cent of all employees were Expellees, even though 76 these firms were owned by indigenous Germans. In the latter instance, the employment percentage had to be maintained for the duration of the loan.25 By the end of 1952 over 20,000,000 DM had been advanced under the Hessen Plan. The money had been given to 99 firms and four cities, for repairing and providing usable production space. The distribution of funds is indicated in Table 15. TABLE 15: Hessen Plan Credits Awarded from 1950 to December 12, 1952 Bagfigxyngahezizk No. of Total Money No. of New No. of Jobs Firms DM Jobs Maintained Darmstadt 21 6 ,483, 000 lh69 100 Kassel 54 8, 269, 000 2897 132a Wiesbaden 25 5,262,000 1362 2%} 99 0, 014, 000 5733 22 7 0f the above the following was awarded to Expellee firms: Darmstadt 5 390,000 128 60 Kassel 5 550,000 50 270 Wiesbaden 5 552L7OQ_ 114 6 15 1,492,700 292 ”“95" 0f the total the following was awarded to Soviet Zone Refugee firms: all Bezirke 20 3,300,000 l760 10 Source: Handwritten copy of a report given to Hessischen Landtag concerning Hessen Plan dated 2.3.1953. f 25Richtlinien des Hessischen Ministers der Finanzen, des Ministers fur Arbeit, Landwirtschaft und Wirtschaft und des Hessischen Ministers des Innern als Staatsbeauftragter fur das Fluchtlingswesen fur die Ubernahme von Staatsbur schaften durch das Land Hessen. (Staats Anzeiger No. 24, 16. 51). The policy which was indicated here and the establishment of eligible persons or corporate bodies was followed until the Hessen Plan was changed in 1957. 77 The city of Darmstadt received 1,700,000 DM, Eschwege~ 50,000 DM, Marburg-150,000 DM, and Schlfichtern-50,000 DM - to repair work buildings and then rent space to enterprises beginning Operations. The effort contributed about 275 new jobs to the Hessen Plan.26 In 1953, in addition to those shown in Table 15, a further 2093 Jobs were created and some 1807 maintained,27 bringing the totals to 7826 and 4024 respectively. The Hessen Plan credits were granted chiefly to small and medium sized firms, and as the time passed the Plan became more closely coordinated with the attempts of the Hessen government to strengthen the Development Areas. Regionally the division of Hessen Plan credits is indicated in Table 16. TABLE 16: Money Awarded under the Hessen Plan, 1950 to December'1953 Regierungsbegirk Cases A»Credit in DM Darmstadt 42 9,138,000 Kassel 98 10,098,000 ‘Wiesbaden 50 8 8 000 190 “7234—2 ,1 z..oo"""o Source: Jaksch, Der Hessenplan 1950~l954, p. 48. Figure 11 indicates by Kreis the approximate 26Handwritten copy of report given Hessen Parliament concerning Hessen Plan dated 2.3.53. 27The Hessen government provided funds to assure the continuation of jobs for Expellees. In many instances. if this money had not been provided the Jobs would have been discon- tinued. These working places are indicated in the category "Jobs Maintained." '78 HESSEN PLANS NUMBER OF NEW AND SECURED POSITIONS I95| - I954 mum FIAIKEIEIG NAIIUIG HESSEN PLANZ NUMBER OF NEW AND SECURED POSITIONS I95I-I964 “do II III"! .. 'lllTIMII IOIIIIISIAI III “IIIIII VII llllluflfllll III ”I"! IIPOIT. ISSII In!“ 0! IIIIIIOI. n." " 79 distribution of the number of working places established or stabilized under the Hessen Plan for the period from 1951 to 1954. The most jobs were created and maintained in the f. Rhein-Main triangle. The relatively lower disbursement of funds in central and northern Hessen reflects the smaller ' fi.3 number of firms there as well as fewer firms which could use the money. As the funds were made available many firm owners realized that the conditions of the loans could not be fulfilled as Expellees were not always available to accept employment.28 Although in many instances they were 7 I" unemployed, they did not live near enough to a place of ’/’,. ”f \ n \ employment to take a position and could not move there as /, housing was not available. The housing section of the Hessen Plan helped to coordinate the development of jobs for Expellees with the construction of dwellings in those areas with employment opportunities, but there was always a time lag befgrgmhgusingwas,availab1e. H In 1957 the provisions for the grants of credit were amended. Albeit political motivations were a partial cause, the general economic situation of Hessen had remarkably improved. The necessity of creating jobs for the unemployed was being replaced by the need for workers to fill new positions. The Hessen Plan was changed and appeared under the name of the 28Der Hessiche Minister des Innern - Landesamt ffir Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge and Evakuirte-und Landesaus- gleichsamt, Report No. 1/1954, p. l. 8O §tgukuzyggp§§s§rungsplgn. The altered objectives are trans- slated as follows: Credit is to be used first to help promote the economic development of Hessen's Development Areas and to create new Jobs there. The creation of new jobs, if such are the terms of credit grant, may be covered if the accept- ance of such an obligation is impractical for the firm. Credit may be granted to maintain positions insofar that it is necessary to consolidate gredits heretofore granted to firms by the state.2 Credit after 1957 could be used for plant investment as well' as forming new jobs. Under the Strukturverbesserungsplan persons or corporate bodies entitled to receive funds had to be located 30 in the Development Areas. The money was not restricted in use to those firms owned by members of the indemnity groups. Expellees were, however, given preferential treatment in rates of interest and the length of the loan period. The program, though, was clearly a device to improve the economically weak‘ areas. By July 1, 1964 a total of 37,733 jobs had been created or maintained (Regiergngsbezirk Darmstadt- 16,887 places; Kassel - 15,151; Wiesbaden - 5695) and an additional 18,727 were still 31 to be formed. There is no way to determine hOW'many of these ‘were in Expellee firms. However, based on the average cost for new jobs it is estimated that some 4345 were located in Expellee 29Der Hessische Minister des Innern als Staatsbeauf- tragter fur das Fluchtlingswesen, Ubersicht fiber die wichtiggtgg bf entlich n K edit and Bur schaftsaktien des Bunde und as seen Stand 15. 12 3 , x a , 23. 30;b d. 1964 31Hessische Treuhandverwaltung, Unpublished Records, 81 enterprises. It is not unreasonable to assume that Expelleesf~ occupied at least 60 or 70 per cent of all positions. Some 55 per cent were developed by 1953 under the Hessen Plan when the Jobs were to accomodate Expellees. Although the program was altered after 1957, its importance cannot be underestimated. The reasons for the change, as mentioned above, were the general growth of the Hessen economy and the need for workers, the fact that the new positions could not always be taken by Expellees, and the movement of Expellees to the major urban areas. Summary.-The movement of Expellees and their families to urban centers-primarily the Rhein-Main, Lahn-Dill, and Kassel areas-was the most effective aSpect of the Hessen Plan and the most necessary. Both portions, housing and Job ~ka information, of the Hessen Plan were well formulated and represented a realistic approach to the problem of high unemployment of Expellees because of their initial settlement in agricultural regions. Although the general upswing of the: Hessen economy helped to diminish this unemployment, the creation of new jobs in agricultural areas and the movement of Expellees to urban areas were major contributions to the favorable solution of this problem. 0t r Fi anc 1 Pro rams for E ellees from Land Hessen Hessen has advanced a considerable amount of money to Expellees for economic integration through other programs. many of these have been associated with the Land committments I 82 to assume obligations for full or partial share of security acceptance or lowered interest rates in the federal programs. Other financial measures have been developed solely by the Land. In general the develOpment of independent credit policies by Hessen occurred after the Currency Reform. The only exceptions to this were regarding money advanced to industries accorded preferential treatment and a security acceptance policy. The security policy had very limited effect and the money which was not used in one year was re-appropriated for the following year. The Currency Reform sharply pointed up the need for some type of credit program, and in response to i this, Hessen constructed loan programs for Expellees. Small Credits Action (Kleinkredite).-The Small Credits Action was initiated in 1949 and money for this program has been voted annually in the Hessen "household" budget. At first the amount of the loan was not to exceed SOOODM.and could only be extended to those Expellee firms which were not able to secure credit from private institutions.32 This program fitted well with the aims of Article 72 of the Gesetz fiber die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebengn und Flfightlinge of 1253. Article 72 states that the establishment of independent activities of Expellees and Soviet Zone refugees in agriculture, professions, and industry should be promoted A- 32Prof. Dr. Gerhard Albrecht, 21:. a_l. Die wirschaft- liche Eingliederung der Heimatvertriebene in Hessen: Unter- suchungen zum deutschen Vertriebenen-und Flfichtlingsgroblem ed. Prof. Dr. Bernard. Pfister; Berlin: Duncker und Humbolt, 1954), P- 124- 83 through the use of public funds. Thus, this Hessen credit program satisfied federal legislation and continues to do so in a somewhat modified manner. Presently credit may not exceed 20,000 DM.33 Figure 12 indicates the total amount of money used or in the use under the Small Credits Actions, but not that which was loaned and could not be returned. Clearly the lar- gest sums were advanced to those Expellee enterprises located in south Hessen. 'The Hessen Economic Development Areas did not receive much assistance; there were fewer enterprises and the firms needed less help as the Soforthilfe, Lastenausgleich, Marshall Plan and Hessen Plan monies were available to firms in these areas. Thus enterprises in this region could not qualify for the Small Credits Action. 0f the major credit programs of Hessen for Expellees the Small Credits has been one of the most successful. It was designed specifically for Expellees having difficulties finding financing and has been changed to meet the growing need for assistance. Intermediate Aid and Large Credits Action.-The Expellees have also been included in two other credit programs of Hessen, the Large Credits (Gross-Kredite) action and the Intermediate Credits (Ubergangshilfen) action. The latter was hastily temporized after the Currency Reform to grant a limited amount 33Unofficial description of credit measures, adminis- trative procedures, credit levels and other guidelines in use by the Hessische Treuhandverwaltung in 1963 and 1964. 84: HESSEN SMALL CREDITS PLAN MONEY REPAID OR TO BE REPAID BY EXPELLEES PRIOR TO l963 HOFGEISNAR "MEL“! a a flAIKElms nutun-uonme "gm” (fangs guranium“ guns 9 AleElD :19 a. 1 % g g wnzun elem g omuml % a summer: a "5.63 PRIEDBERB a mu lAUTERBACH unsure g scmucnml D I I a ummmus ' i f IIIIIIIIII|. .. IIIIIIIIII| E“ = 3 en E 5 5| 5 ‘V. mm W' 2 E F». 2 . MONEY REPAID OR TO BE NEWS ERMCH 5 40,000 DM In“. IIIIIAIIVIIIIHIII, IMO“. ( (IIIIIIISIII IICOIIS.) flute 12 85 of money for a short period of time to bridge the period after the Currency Reform until it was thought that the firms would again be viable. Figure 13 indicates the money loaned Expellees under the Intermediate Aid action. As of July 1, l964,all loans which could be repaid had been repaid. A total of 65,115 DM had been returned; a further 21,337 DM could not be repaid. This latter!) figure gives some indication of the number of Expellee firms / which could not survive the period of the Currency Reform. With this program, as with others, there was no special atten- tion focused on the Development Areas as at the inception of the program they had not been designed. The money was loan- ed to those firms who made justifiable applications regardless of their location. The most money was placed in Frankfurt which had a total of 12,750 DM repaid; the other areas of concentra- tion were Fulda (Landkreis) and Wiesbaden which had 10,000 DM and 6665 DM respectively which were repaid. Again south Hessen as a unit received the most money and the central section little,‘> because firms here generally were handicrafts and required little I support. ’ The Large Credits Action (Gross-Kredite).-The Large Credit Action reveals a similar type of distribution (Figure 14). The factors accounting for this are somewhat different, however, as this program was not designed for Expellees. They were included in it almost as an afterthought. Expellees in Hessen under ngg programs or in West Germany under federal aid have never been encouraged to establish large scale enterprises.l 86 INTERMEDIATE AID PLAN 09484964) MONEY REPAID BY EXPELLEES . IN HESSEN B [Hulls 9 HTWIUSg INEIG‘II = a; i . 5 . 5 .. MONEY REPAID BY "* v ' EXPELLEES IERGSTRASSE % 5 500 DM ’ n... 13 .\ .. I 8'7 LARGE CREDITS PLAN JULY I, I964 MONEY REPAID OR TO BE REPAID BY EXPELLEES IN HESSEN “ A! a g M - rmzuuonme -_ mums umune memo» omuUI'S gym," smuuum IIEGMIAI g, .nunmn ummuuus L 5 NAHTAIIIUS = - "TERI“ g I: rum IUMDE' FRAIKTUR : ‘ 'ffENMCN GROSS-GER“! a " gxulucmm ”m" MONEY REPAID OR TO BE 5 o 5 D 5 = uole II Illu a ammo! REPAID ERIACII g IERGSTIIASSE 6 l0,000 DM “use: mum TIIIIIIVIIIMTIIC. lJ.lm.IIIPIIlI$III HINTS.) "u" u “““““ 88 The rationale was that with a given amount of money as many people as possible should be helped, and for this reason large scale firms received little official encouragement. However, the need was recognized, so the Expellee was permitted access to an indigenous assistance program, that of large credits. This program in Hessen has been identified more by the amount of credit- loans over 20,000 DM - rather than the size of the enterprise to which it may be granted; although implicit K in the plan is the thought that such loans would only be needed by large-scale firms. The relative lack Of Expellee participation reflects 5 ' the small number of large firms and the fact that they have ‘6 not had to resort to this type Of credit policy because Of the numerous measures designed specifically for them. The Marshall Plan objectives, for example,closely approximated those of the Q33 program . In addition to the Hessen Plan and general credit measures of the ngQ, Hessen has tried to finance specific Expellgehsettlements. The most successful and most notable of these has been Allendorf which illustrates the results of channeling Hessen monies into one area. Aligngorf, Kreis Marburg The story of the post-war development of Allendorf{, the largest Expellee settlement in West Germany,“+ and the 34Wolfgang Mischnick, "Bundesminister fur Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge und Kriegs eschadigte in Hallo Stadt Allendorf, Egggg Dg; Hgimgt 126 3 Buchdruckerei J.A. Koch, Marburg; 1963), p. 89 establishment of Expelless' industries is the best example of the use of public monies to assist Expellees in one areaij Allendorf today is a model community and is a showcase for the f Hessen government to indicate the manner in which Expellees and - Soviet Zone Refugees have been resettled, and also to demonstrate that industrial communities can be successfully founded in agricultural areas. The ironical part of the development is that during WOrld war II, Allendorf was the focus of the largest concentration of munitions manufacture in continental Europe. After the war, Allendorf with its various production units became the property of the United States Military Govern- ment and was to be dismantled for reparations and totally removed from the landscape. many of the Expellees who had been domiciled in the surrounding area realized, however, that the buildings could be used for plant space, or for dwellings. Thus, a long series of petitions and informal requests for the use of the buildings were placed with the,§;gi§, Lgng, and military Officials. Military Government in response to legitimate requests agreed to allow firm managers to rent space. There were, however, various difficulties involved with this procedure. Applicants were required to submit their applications to several different Offices before a final decision could be reached. A serious deterrent to the establishment of a firm was the military provision that space could not be purchased.’ A three year lease only could be Obtained, no future renting 90 options were guaranteed, and the Military Government could demand that the entire area be vacated within twenty-four hours.35 Such provisions made it difficult for a firm owner to find T;fi credit. Credit companies considered these operations as insecure and thus refused to help. Most of the firms were not in a position to begin without outside financial help andi thus were forced to withdraw their applications. Despite the difficulties, production began in Allendorf. A glass factory, owned by a former Silesian, received support from the Hessen Ministery of Economics. This and a knitwear factory established by a former Berliner were the pioneer firms.36 By the middle of 1948, seven additional firms had been established and employed about 470 persons. These included a soap factory, an air conditioning firm which had moved from a nearby community (and later had to move back), an electrical appliance; firm, a repair shop, and three woodworking establish- ments. Shortly afterward, six more factories were added to the Allendorf complex. Of these firms, five were owned by Expellees and included a textile firm, a printing establishment, a stocking factory, a weaving mill which soon went into receivership, and a woodworking firm. The indigenous firm was an iron foundry.37 After'l950 the economic situation in Allendorf began 3sDr. Hans-Joachim Gumms1,Die Industriesi d1 1; :uf .,. GelHn-e der a small; n Soren; stof erk in Allen oor re * u r-. ; Published by the Hessiche NUnister des Innern-Landes- p nung-Wiesbaden; 1957), p 32. 36w... p. 33. 37Ibid., p. 37. 91 to improve rapidly. There were two basic reasons for this. One was the release Of this area from military ownership and the second the start Of the Hessen Plan, Soforthilfe, Lgstegguggleich, and the Marshall Plan. As the successful establishment of new industries in Allendorf proceeded and the difficulties of finding production space became more and more apparent, the Military Government liberalized and then relinquished its control of Allendorf. The first move was the extension of the renting contracts from three to five years and the second was to give control of the area to ngg Hessen in 1949. This last was in the best interests ‘ of all concerned, since the munitions equipment and raw materials had been removed and the military had no use for the buildings. Reason officials then created an agency to direct the develop-i ment Of Allendorf as a model community for Expellees, Soviet /} \Zone refugees and evacuees. Dr. Gummel in his investigation into the development of Allendorf discusses the need for financial help in Hessen. His research rsvealed.that the Ministry of Economics had advanced initially a total of 60,000 DM to firms which were just beginning production in Allendorf, but that this proved to be insufficient.38 Financial help was then made available from various sources. The Small Credits Action was available for some firms which ‘were having difficulties in starting or in the first phases of production. In other instances money from the Large Credit Action was available, as was also Hessen Plan Credit. Still 38Ip1d., p. 52. 92 other sources were Sofozthilfg and Lastenausgleich funds with the general maximum level set at 35,000 DM per case, and Marshall Plan funds which carried the stipulations that middle and large sized enterprises could be accommodated as well as those which could not be handled under Soforthilfe or Lastenaus ei provisions. Gummel also reports that in answer to a questionnaire, six Expellee owners or managers reported that Lg g Hessen credit aid was very important for the initial development of their firms (one person enumerated both ngg and federal monies). In six other cases, Hessen credit (two indicated federal aid also) was very important for the further development of the firm; and only in three instances was the credit assistance from private sources termed "very important" or "important." In his investigations of firms with over 10 employees between 1948 and March 15, 1955, Gummel reports that the Expellee percentage of ownership of such firms and also of employment in these firms began to diminish. In March of 1955, there were twenty-three firms employing more than ten persons; of these eleven were owned by Expellees and accounted for 69.8 per cent of the total employment.39 After 1958, the Expellee-indigenous relationship changed further. Indigenous firms began to move rapidly into Allendorf; some were owned 3?;pég., pp. 50-56. A note is necessary to validate the source. Dr. ummsl used the develo ment of the Allendorf area as the tOpic of his dissertation. he work was accepfied by the Hessen government and republished in full by them. e work has also been cited in other Hessen governmental publications as well as some from the city of Allendorf. 93 by persons who could take advantage of special provisions for those whose production units suffered severe wartime damage and others were branch firms from other parts of West Germany.“0 The addition of firms was an absolute economic necessity for Allendorf since the entire Allendorf region dis- played high unemployment characteristics. On December 31, 1953, of the 1420 households in Allendorf, 528 household heads ‘were unemployed, and an additional 227 families were receiving partial subsistence moneyfPl The unemployment at the end Of 1954 totalled 15.2 per cent.42 Expellee and evacuee firms could not be added rapidly enough to provide the jobs needed, so other firms wishing to change their location or desiring to develop branch establishments were encouraged. Additionally, those firms which had already been established in Allendorf 'were frequently not in a position to expand their operations because they were housed in bunkers, barracks, or buildings which were formerly munition production units; the type of plant space which they occupied made production costly and ‘hoThis information was assembled for the advertisement sections of the following publications: Stadt Allendogf, Ve lei- h der Stadtrechte 1 Oktober 1&60 (Stadtverwaltung Stadt Allen- dorg, Buchdruckerei J. A. Koch; rburg), and Hallo Stadt A11 n- gorf (Magistrat in Stadt Allendorf, J. A. Koch; Marburg; 1963). 41 Hallo Stadt Allendorf: 1252 to 1262: 10 Jahre Arbeit €fir Stgdt Allendorf, Ein Rechensc aftsbericht von Bur ermeister gistrat in tadt llendorf; J. S. Koc ; Marburg), p. 9. AZGummel, loc. cit., p. 110. Gummel gives as comparison figures at this time, based on 100 possible workers, 4.6 per -cent unemployed in the Federal Republic; 4.7 per cent in Hessen; 9.2 per cent in Marburg city and Landkreis; and 13.7 per cent in the economic district of Kirchhain to which Allen- dorf belongs. 9h inconvenient. Many Of these firms were still occupying these same units in 1964. Not only were existing firms hindered in their growth by either the lack of or the nature Of production space available to them, but the general industrial structure pro- vided difficulties. Early plans had envisioned Allendorf as a concentration point for the textile and glass industries. The earliest firms Of this type established here had to utilize local workers, both Expellee and indigenous. Few of these people had ever been engaged in this type of work and therefore did not have the requisite skills. As a consequence, industrial diversification was encouraged. Table 17 indicates the total number of establishments and employees, including commuters, in Allendorf during the period from 1953 to 1962. In this table all establishments are enumerated-industrial, handiwork and commercial. The statistics presented not only indicate the rapid growth of Allendorf, but the importance of Allendorf to the surrounding area as evidenced by the number of psOple commuting to work in the city. It is difficult to determine the exact amount of money used for the development Of Allendorf. Some indication can be obtained from the tasks which were accomplished. Under the Hessen Plan seventy dwellings were constructed, an additional fifty were provided by the Flfichtlin sson erb u program and .another thirteen were built as Bundesgmsiedlung housing. The government also helped to finance dwelling construction by 95 private firms in the area.“3 TABLE 17: Number of Establishments and Employees, Includin Those Commutingto Work, in Allendorf 1953 to 19 Year Establishments Total Employees Commuters 1953 73 1290 141 1954 102 1368 183 1955 122 1922 377 1956 146 2829 1095 1957 163 2894 1260 1958 168 3766 1933 1959 177 5010 2718 1960 193 5951 3007 1961 204 6266 3106 1962 209 6416 3004 Source: Hallo Stadt Allendorf: 1252 to 1262; 10 Jahre Arbeit fur Stadt Allendorf Buchdruckerei Joh. Aug. Koch; rburg , p. 13. From the financial summation of the Burgermeister of Allendorf the following information was provided. In the period from 1953 to 1962, some 7,526,433 DM were invested in the construction and reconstruction of facilities in Allendorf such as schools, public buildings, streets, lighting, water and electrical supply, a fire department, a public swimming pool, and the renovation of damaged buildings. Of this the city itself financed 59.4 per cent of the cost, the federal govern- ment 14.3 per cent, Hessen 20 per cent, and Eggig Marburg 6.3 per-cent.4h 43Information provided by Frau Deiling who maintains records concerning housing construction and placement of individuals in the Hessen Ministry Of Interior. p 21 44ggiie Stadt Allendorf: 1253 to 1263, 10c. cit., 96 Summa;y.-By 1960 unemployment within Allendorf and the surrounding area had been reduced and was no longer a major problem. Considerable industrial growth had been achieved and further development was assured. Allendorf has become a model community for Expellees and other members of the special indemnity groups. It visably supports the thesis of the -1 Hessen government that industry can be develOped in dominantly“ agricultural areas. 30W In Hessen, only one Kgggg has developed a special program for the mitigation of EXpellee economic problems. All Kreise, however, have participated in federal or ngg plans. Few Kreise have the financial ability to initiate extensive pro- jects, but Kggig Schlfichtern did launch a program to aid Expel- lees. This was started in 1949, just before the federal govern- ment and ngd Hessen instituted comprehensive action to aid the economic integration of Expellees. It was in operation for one year; then the other plans which had the same objectives as those set forth by the Hggig were advanced and there was no longer need for it to continue. The Schlfichtern Plan45 Bemeen 1939 and 1946 Kreis Schluchtern had grown A5Unless otherwise indicated, all the information con- cerning the Schlfichtern Plan was taken from Ludwig Neundorfer and Hermann Michler, Die Gesichte vom Schlfichtern lan: lei Schrifteg ffir den Staatsburger, (Published by the Institut zur Orderung Uffentlicher Angelegenheiten; Frankfurt A/M., Verlag thzner, VO. II: 1950). 97 rapidly in population from 32,386 to 46,739 persons. Of the increase of some 14,350, about 9,500 were Expellees. The remainder represented some natural increase, as well as the addition of people evacuated from the neighboring large cities during the War. As the Expellees arrived in Schlfichtern, they were distributed among the Gemeinden according to the availability of dwelling space. The Expellees came predominantly from Czechoslovakia and Silesia and as a group had a more favorable age and sex structure than did the indigenous population. There were proportionally fewer old peOple in the Expellee population than in the indigenous one and the ratio of women to men in the age groups from twenty to twenty-five was not as great. Occupationally, as a group, the Expellees also had more industrial skills than the indigenous citizens, although they were not located so they could take advantage of them. The early efforts of the Egggg welfare organizafions, church groups, and the Red Cross had provided the Expellees the bare necessities of life but not employment. By 1949, a survey of the Kreis revealed that five Expellees had been able to establish industries, but these, with the exception of a textile factory, were home industries and provided limited employment Opportunities. Not only was their share of indus- trial ownership small, but the Expellees constituted 20 per 'cent of those on the unemployment rolls which was just about the same ratio as in the total population. Kgggg,officials had been trying to find a solution to 98 the unemployment problem when they quite accidentally were placed in contact with the Soziagraphische Institut in Frank- furt, a/M. An agreement was concluded whereby the Institut would survey Schlfichtern and prOpose possible ways to change the economic structure and also help by advising a committee of Schlfichtern residents on courses of action. The survey showed that there were no real development possibilities in the agricultural sector; that Schluchtern did contain three large firms in which one-third Of the employees were women; that after the War, twelve firms with a total employment of 650 persons had been established in Schlfichtern; and that the handicraft section of the economy contained 1000 industries employing 2800 persons (Expellees in this sector owned 250 firms and employed 270 persons). It was decided to try to create new positions in firms which were already established, rather than to finance the founding of new firms, and that consideration should be given the continued employment of women as this would help the general circulation of money in the Kggig. The committee was able to locate twelve firms which would be able to create 430 new positions with an investment of 2000 DM for each new job. This group also realized that) if these positions were to be taken by persons living in Schlfichtern, then dwellings for their use would have to be built near theihctofies. These two provisions (jobs and residences) in effect would strengthen the already existing industrial areas of Schlfichtern, notably the cities of 99 Schlfichtern and Steinau. The major difficulty of planning became the finding of sources Of money to finance the two-fold program. The committee estimated that the housing projects would cost about 1,860,000 DM and the industrial expansion some 1,500,000 DM. In December of l942lgggig Schlfichtern requested assistance from the Federal government which had established the Soforthilfe earlier that year to aid the Expellee economic situation. By spring 1950, a total of 1,058,000 DM had been provided Schlfichtern for industrial expansion of which private sources advanced 972,000 DM and the Soforthilfg 618,000 DM. When Operationalized, the estimates of 2000 DM for each new position were found to be too high. Only 1,300 DM were needed. Thus, a total of 460 new jobs were created. The housing program was also supported by funds from the Soforthilgg and from the Federal Ministry for Agriculture for the develop- ment of Nebenerwerbstellen.46 Although, as before indicated, the Schlfichtern Plan was terminated in 1951 after being in Operation for one year. It had two important consequences, namely, the expansion of existing industries and the construction of housing units for 'workers near the industry. Although these developments are neither new nor revolutionary, this was the first time they were used to ameliorate Expellee economic difficulties. Ther” experiments in solving the Expellee problem which were 46The Nebenerwerbstellen are described in Chapter IV in the section on Expellee agriculture. lOO conducted in Schluchtern were watched very closely by Hessen governmental Officials and were later applied to the state of Hessen under the Hessen Plan. Landrat Jansen of Schluchtern has aptly summed up the development and results of the Schlfichtern Plan. . . . the Schlfichtern Plan had been a good initial sounding from which the further good develOpment of ,Kgggg Schluchtern was established, [End the Krei§7 has emer ad from its decade-long outSpoken position of need. Summary The major federal, gap; and local plans in Hessen have done much to assure the integration of Expellees. They have been designed to handle certain types Of problems; those stemming from faulty areal distribution of Expellees and the provision of financial resources for those who were poor credit risks. The Bundesumskdlungsplan was the first device to attack the problem created by the settlement of Expellees in agricultural areas. The program successfully domiciled transferred Expellees primarily in the urban regions of the Rhein-Main triangle, Bergstrasse, and the Lahn-Dill. At the same time as the first movements of the Bundesumsiedler began, Kreis Schluchtern with federal and private assistance began to move Expellees within the Kreis to newly created jobs 47Letter of April 5, 1964, for Landrat Jansen concern- ing the Schlfichtern Plan. It appears that Landrat Jansen was the guiding force behind the development and favorable execution of the Schluchtern Plan and that he has continued his interest in the economic integration of Expellees in that Kreis. 101 in urban areas. The state government of Hessen early in 1950 enabled a Lang program to move Expellees from agricultural to urban areas and also to create new positions. The Officials of Hessen knew that the shifts Of Expellees at the ngg level were possible if housing was provided, as had been evidenced by the very successful Schlfichtern Plan. The Hessen Plan pro-, , vided for the construction of housing units for Expellees V33 ‘within commuting distance Of the major cities. As was true of most plans, south Hessen became the major concentration area, with lesser emphasis upon the secondary regions of Iahn-Dill and the city of Kassel. Figures 15 and 16 indicate the success primarily of the Hessen Plan. Figure 15 showing the percentage of Expellees of the Hessen Gemeinden population in 1950, presents the situation Of Expellees just prior to the movements carried out under the Hessen Plan or Bundesumsiedlung Plan. Clearly,7 . the proportion of Expellees in central and northern Hessen is greatest, with many Gemeinden reporting over 25 per cent in this category. These areas are agricultural and in some instances semi-mountainous (the areas north and northwest of Wiesbaden and the Egggg Dieburg). The figure also shows that those Gemeinden which are contigxuaus to the major cities.‘ of interior Hessen (Giessen, Marburg, Kassel, and Fulda) did I‘M not have high Expellee percentages, because when the Expellees were first settled these areas were already taken by evacuees. The result was that the Expelkes were domiciled in llll-T-II ilq-I-fifih: .1“ N‘ lc-UU...I. fink-i QIU=Qc-‘Hk\ j PERCENTAGE OF EXPELLEES HESSEN POPULATION 5R. IN . \ a» \\A , 4" as” 4a \ as gssfisRs 1950 as, emav- .. , essays she‘s; w (was. 'G or at ‘ “’\ “’5 ’1‘» V e s. \\\\\ ° ' erases? .. ~ 0 ‘- w“ in ample-12's...» ,, ' VA“ 6 sessile-$4 “63‘s. 5.. i“ ‘e,’ WV “t 3354‘ films 3.1.1:: "‘i-s""'$§e"' ass «as»? aka? 3.3 ... c "We gave, 4‘21?” 793'“ a” g‘ s“ ’5’ 4‘ “has“ 9‘" ‘ {you}! _ if "$‘ area's a, n A" §e :q @‘s V) ""fi‘ 4» ,1 messes-raw» at». ... Mag . z.'“‘MWg‘ ”is. i as? s} as , assesses seas ~tranfers. «saw assess.- ”Massages. e as . ' ‘P’d e, J i I 535" sex. a , . .., @é‘éik Q'iwks‘s fififianf? Essay “is? 9;; r E 7°? 5' 4‘ ‘DvfifiaQ’Eé-b Dfiiai‘ssss‘l, 741%.} g, magma»... “News? as Q sea , as gammy}: massage s33: ‘- ‘ stare!" .qt 2:? tfsqfifi-i. saw eye. #9 s. -. seamless: sass ’ ‘" me “finalists? ass as v as Vévfis’setb eye‘s“ a: .. is?“ ”fig-Rm? séfifisssss sees-see as. swfsiee eras. ‘I. mgfizaggmggpgp as. s ease s.» ass" a- i‘sss’ r assess. s We s“ ‘i' ”the "5%”! P- .3 "‘ “M6 t fiw \ A? 0&6“ ag§93ll F§V $9ng s‘g" ‘ a". ’ 0 finish as be. 1223. {ks “ifsfié'fifiya . w “ . o 5 IO I5 20 Wfifi'géfigfi‘ggz‘ scale is Illas g “PRODUCED WITN PERMISSION OF DES NESSISHES MINISTER DES lNNERN-lANDESPlANNUNG. JUNE 3, I964 TRON TN! IA! NEIIATVERTRIEIENE I950 HESSEN (1953). Figure 15 IN HESSEN NU - a\\\\V PERCENTAGE OF EXPELLE ES POPULATION: I950 (BY GEMEINDEN) TO I50 7.. I51 — 20.0°/e 20.|-25_O "4. 25.! —30.0 ‘70 OVER 30.I "4. FOREST AREA MEP ‘66 BOT 14.-(.1 .OUEDL jg PERCENTAGE OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN POPULATION“ I960 “a. fl”; \4, R ”‘27 s, : 4o ’_ ”WNW, “s A ‘ I. I. Q \\\| § 9‘. "T£?‘.a¢§VF‘(\\¢-fifim ' (I S’OQQQMssg‘S‘l-L‘g,&k ARM? “as; as s". w» “I ‘z “I“ «s 5" V s “QM/394104 t W 4%."..1’ .9 a _, comic \ ‘ ‘ wpésg.3m£fi'~§3: was @Ibrfifilfara'y ‘* )fl roaév' U73 ' 23°33 : U‘ . ' "‘13; W ‘5 ‘9' «>2: 0qu W _ 4533‘ V ., I N‘ Qt g " " II F I "‘gfi‘rfi.‘ A .‘Mr I, 3% 2 o «4% \ l m g (r: 9 .‘ . § s. ‘ V AV &% \&& - I .‘ 6’:- ifiw’ fig; 9‘ “ “~ 4 ”saw“ e ' figsagiaaam‘zm’m .. . I \g, (r, g» gasgmséiw g, “é! sea, «44 Q.\» ‘ was as «NW *1 ’ D:u%9{\§l gfit’ég W - #HEE Was Wfév ngg‘ PERCENTAGE OF EXPELLEEq WW‘fi'w '3» IN HESSEN POPULATION |960 ‘Wpfig . kfifig (BY GEMEINDEN) I $3 5“ 64‘ «I, O TasmIe—l: nIiI: 20 ”k? @59% To I5/ « $9 ., 4‘11?!“ I5.I--2O,o°/o aflfi Emmy» «rs-w gm" :I E] 25I-3o.0% - OVER 30.I% m FOREST AREA COMPUTED FROM S/G RELIGIUSZUGEfiOflE‘KfiTLEAMILIEN§TAND QND VERTBIEBENE (COPIES OF T W HESSISGHES STATISTISTHES LANDESAMT) AND STATISTISCHE BERIgj E STATIS'IISCHEN LANDESAMT=WOHNBEVOLKERUNG DER HESSISG E Figure 16 MFP '66 930T 115 ACREAGE AND NUMBER OF OWNED BY EXPELLEES AND SOVIET ZONE REFUGEES IN HESSEN l949-l963 HOFGEISHAI WAlDECK c , eaI - r- O we: r Ixmm© , IEIIUIGO IIEDEIKOP NAIIUIG ‘ EIGAII uul- In sum 2 . so " 50-I60 I6I -349 350- 449 450 -500 "fl" 1' II! '00 Sum: IISSII IIIISYIV M AIII‘IU‘III All ""81“. IKOIIS. IIIPIIHSIIIJ 104 areas in which pressure for housing was minimalji The housing construction authorized under the_Hessgn Plan and the subsequent movement of Expellees is primarily responsible for the changes which are shown by Figure 16 which pictures the situation in 1960. This figure indicates .} r .- " k”. / that there has been a decrease of the high percentages of Expellees in the total population in the central and northern areas by 1960. The lower percentages in these areas attest to the successful movements of Expellees carried out under the Hessen Plan. South Hessen shows generally a somewhat higher per- centage of Expellees than in l950€8 However, in terms of real numbersthe increase was great. The resettlement of Expellees under the Bundesumsiedlungsplan and Hessen Plan was responsible for the major gains in the areas around Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Hanau, and Offenbach. The programs to financially asstat the integration of Expellees into economic life have been complex. Certain plansjg. or portions of legislation have attempted to create Jobs for ’ Expellees. The major period when this type of action was importantwwas between 1950 and 1956. The Soforthilfegesetz, (Article 46) and its successor the Lastenausgleischsgesetg (Articles 259 and 260), were concerned with the formation of jobs to be taken by Expellees. fl, 48The change between the two figures is slightly height- ened by the change in definition of Expellees. In 1950 an Expel- , lee was defined by former place of residence; in 1960 by the possession of an 'A" or "B' registration card. The registration 105 When Expellee firms which received money are examined a pattern of dispersion emerges. The money was given to Expel- lee firms already in existence and therefore the major agricultural area and the Border Region appear quite dominant. This is understandable as the Soforthilfegesetz in particular 1} was in operation when the Expellees were just beginning to be moved from the agricultural sections. The pattern of distribu- tion of the smaller amount of Lastenausgleich monies for this type of program is similar. The Hessen Plan also contained provisions for the creation of jobs for Expellees,but these were difficult to administer and of limited success. South Hessen (Frankfurt, Offenbach and Darmstadt) and north Hessen (Kassel) became minor areas of concentration. The Border Region which became a region of importance in the Hessen Plan after 1956 had not yet achieved significance. Hessen also attempted to create positions for Expellees in agricultural areas when it promoted and helped to guide the develOpment of Allendorf in Ergig Marburg. This community has now become a model of good planning and is an indication of the successes which can be achieved. The last activity which federal and Lang programs have supported has been the direct financing of Expellee activities. This has been complex as both federal and Land governments have given loans, provided securities or have underwritten portions of securities for loans from private in Hessen is estimated to be over 90 per cent effective and thus does not distort the picture too greatly. 106 institutions, provided money to lower the ratio of interest, and in some instances have helped to pay the interest. The major programs have been concerned,howeven with the extension of credit to Expellees. When the federal and Land programs are examined most have specified the size or type of enter- prise to be supported; where the size of the firm has not been specifically stated the intent has been made clear by the maximum size of the loan which has been available. The Hessen Large Credits Actions and certain Marshall Plan funds have dealt primarily with large scale enterprises. The Marshall Plan funds were dispersed primarily in south Hessen; those of the Large Credits Action (technically a non- Expellee program to which Expellees have been given access) has been awarded firms in the Border Zone. Other credit programs - the Aufbaudarlehen ffir die gewerbliche Wirtschaft und die freie Berufe, Small Credits Action - have had good areal coverage; however, south Hessen has been a major recipient area. The planning of federal, state and local institutions for the economic integration of Expellees has been a signi- ficant factor in the resolution of certain Expellee problems. Although Expellee problems motivated the development of fix ? ., 5' ‘ -.-.—.uu.a—...-_ . legislation, the end result was important contributions to the economic_development and thus the economic’geography l of Hessen. The integration of Expellees into agriculture has -__,—-——v--- been difficult but nonetheless they have helped to round out this sector of the economy also. Additionally, they have lO7 contributed certain types of industries and handicrafts which; / I ’ .' y \ have helped to balance indigenous activities. The spatial impact of Expellee agricultural and industrial activities is discussed in Chapter IV. CHAPTER IV THE SPATIAL IMPACT OF THE INTEGRATION OF EXPELLEES IN HESSEN: THE EXAMPLES OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY 1. Agriculture The integration of Expellees into agriculture in Hessen has been a formidable task. Three factors-the limited amount of land available for cultivation, the already small size of land holdings, and the relatively large number of Expellees who had been active in agriculture prior to expulsion-have been particularly important in shaping the problems. Hessen contains about 5,279,000 acres of which 2,528,545 acres (48 per cent) are utilized for agriculture. Only 6h.h per-cent of the land available for agriculture 15""~ suitable for cultivation, and an additional 0.5 per cent is devoted to vineyards and orchards. Because of the semi- 'mountainous character of parts of Hessen, an effort has been made to withdraw land from cultivation and return it to meadow or forests.l lDer Hessiche Minister ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Die Hessische Landwirtschaft in Zahlen (Wiesbaden: 1962). p. 8, 108 109 A second condition which has hampered the integration of Expellees into this economic sector has been the structure of the size of holdings. In 1949, 40 per cent of the holdings in Hessen were under five acres, and 31 per cent were between 5 and 12.5 acres. Generally subdivision of the holdings to J accommodate Expellee farmers has been economically impossible, and in the postwar period there has been an attempt to con- solidate holdings. By 1960 the respective percentages were 36 and 27.8 per cent.2 Some 55,000 Expellee families which had been directly engaged in agricultural pursuits in the country which deported them came into Hessen. Some 40,000 were families of farmers, and 15,000 were laborers' families.3 These people moved into a situation in which the already-small farm holdings could not realistically be further divided, and additional land was not available for production. The integration of Expellees into agriculture in Hessen therefore progressed slowly. 'Military Governments for Hesse had optimistically surveyed the situation and had decided that the Expellee would receive land which could be appropriated from the nobility and certain federal or state holdings. g and Helmut Blume, Das Land Hessen und seine Landschgften: Porsch- gggen zur Deutschen Landeskunge Regensburg: Joseph Habbel, 51 , 55, 29. In Hessen the amount of land in cultivation has been reduced by 44,110 acres between 1947 and 1961. 2Der Hessiche Minister ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten, -1090 c190, p. 16. 3M. Merforth, Neue Heimgt im Hessen (GEttingen: Hessen— .ministerium ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten und Sekretariat der Agrarsozialen Gesellschaft; 1958), pp. 8-9. 110 Although a law was passed for this purpose and some lands were’ seized, the effect was negligible as the Military Government lacked time to provide for subdivision and distribution. Little was done for the Expellee until after 1948. If an Expellee acqutnxiland, he usually did so through his own efforts, and, more often than not, had little money left for seed, animals, construction, buildings, or machinery. The near lack of \ Expellee integration into agriculture prevailed until 1949.“."l The first successful attempt at integration was initiated with Das Flfichtlingsiedlungsgesetz vom 10 August ,1242.5 This law provided the basis for the development of certain_types of agricultural establishments for Expellees and outlined the areas of responsibility for the various private, ,ng , and federal agencies. The appropriation of funds and further creation of administrative apparatus were established in later laws and directives. In the legal forms, those Expellees who were agri-. ’ culturalists (that is to say, those who were active in an ,.' agricultural pursuit as farmer, farm hand, or were employed by a firm directly engaged in the handling or administration of agricultural products before expulsion) were eligible for a: ‘V 4Oberregierungsrat Dr. Metzlar, Hessenministerium ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Interview on April 22, 1964. 5Das Flfichtlingssiedlungsgesetz vom 10 August 1252, Vorschriftensammlung, Dr. Dr. Hermann Sellschapp Hamburg: Agricola Verlag: 1951). 6The major laws with subsequent revisions include the Siedlungsfbrderungsgesetz vom 15.5.1255, the Bundesvertrie— benen esetz om 1 . .l , the Lastenausgleichsgesetz vom lg. . 252. lll fer various types of ngg and federal help in order to re:establish their occupation in the Federal Republic. This A has been the general sense and objective of all the enactments and directives. However, since in most instances it has been impossible to provide farms, other types of establishements have been V16. devised. The one unit which has accommodated the most Expellees in agriculture in Hessen and in the other states of west ..._-..- 5"“; l I“ 1 Germany has been theLNebenerwerbstelle., This is an interesting , type of resettlement unit, as it is designed to establish the former connection with agriculture although in itself it is notwa true agricultural enterprise. Nebenerwerbstellen The Nebenerwerbstelle is a unit located in the neighbor- hood of an individual's place of employment. This was first described in the Flfichtlingssiedlungsgesetz vom 10 August 1242. Presently the total area of a Nebenerwerbstelle must be at least 2993 square yards (less than half an acre) and of this plots; however, in most instances they are located in conjunction_- ‘with a dwelling. An Expellee must own at least half of the land;1 or have building rights to half and be willing to rent the other / half for a period of twelve years.8 7Nebenegygrbstelle is singular; Nebenerwerbstellen, the plural form. 8Richlinien ffir die landliche Siedlung und fur Mass- nahmen zur Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur durch Aussiedlung und 112 Eligible for the Nebeneguezbstellen under present legislation are those Expellees who were farmers or who are presently active in a profession associated with agriculture. The latter condition demands that the person has been continuously employed in the associated profession for at least one year or if associated with these activities in some white collar position the added income is needed to maintain his family.9 The process for acquiring a Nebenerwerbstelle is not handled by the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry alone. Figure 1? outlines the channels for processing applications and awarding money. A Siedlungsgegellschaft (development firm)~ notifies the Ministry that it is able to purchase a certain amount of land in a given location and is willing to build Nebenerwerbstellen in that location. The Ministry, if agreeable, 'will make arrangements so that money can be advanced from the f‘ Hessen ngdesbagk in Frankfurt. ' Expellees who are interested in acquiring a Nebengg: ;u§;bstelle place an application with the Ministry's gglggzgmt. Many times they are advised that the Siedlgggsgesgllgchgft plans to build the associated dwellings and are thus referred there. The first processing begins at this level. If acceptable the application is then moved to the Landeskulturggt and then may reach the final proofing committee which is established in the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry. If the application f T Aufstockung landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe (Wiesbaden: Hessen- ministerium ffir Landwritschaft und Forsten, 25 September 1957). 17.682/57. 7-9. 9Ibid. 113 FLOW CHART OF THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR AN EXPELLEE ACQUIRING A NEBENERWERBSTELLE IN HESSEN Applications:;:> Credit K’ ‘\\ ' \ Siedlungsgesell- r --------- Kulturamt schaft I Expellee T I I I I , Q Money—5 I ' II V Landeskulturamt Hessen Landesbank I II \ i \ . \ I \ Decisions \ l \ / \ _ / Q Hessen Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry and Proofing Committee Source: Herr Gunter ngelei, Hessisches Ministerium fur Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Interview, 22 April, 1964. Figure 17 114 is accepted, the committee determines the types of credit for which an Expellee is eligible based on his private resources. The money may come from one or more ngg or federal sources. The pattern for the location and development of Nebenegwerb- tellen, however, does not originate directly with the Hessen NUnistry of Agriculture and Forestry but with the development concerns. Figure 18 indicates the number and acreage of Nebenerwerbstellen by Kreise. South Hessen clearly stands out as a major concentration area of these units. The focus is on the cities of Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Hanau, Offenbach, Darmstadt,and.the Mannheim - LudwigshafeII‘gglggg (gaggg Bergstrasse) although the cities themselves contain few of these units. Briefly,this latter fact has resulted from high prices for land in the cities and the inability of agriculture to compete favorably with industry for its use.10 , Most of the units are therefore located within commuting‘: _,distance of the major cities. The areal distribution resemblesVU W "that of Hessen Plan housing which also has been constructed ‘5‘ (:near urban centers where work was available. The Nebenegwgrb- i9] stellen in south Hessen are very small; the need to accomodate / as many Expellees-as possible dictated the minimal size. A second area of concentration is the Lahn-Dill which includes the cities of Wetzlar, Giessen and Limburg. The size of the units here is also small. Within this region, the public f 10This situafion is well explained by Marten Boesler, Baulandfrggen aus agragpolitisher Sicht (Frankfurt: Arbeits- gemeinschaft zur verbesserung der Agmumtruktur in Hessen e.V., 16.10 1959), Sonderheft 5, pp. 1-18. 116 transportation net is not as dense as in south Hessen, nor is service as frequent. This has tended to reduce the effective commuting distance so the units are clustered close to the cities. The third area of concentration of Nebenerwerbstellen focuses on the city of Kassel and as in the other regions is not in the city itself. Within this region the possible commuting_distance is controlled by the sparceness of the transport net in a similar manner to the Lahn-Dill region. The small number of units here is a reflection of the relative lack of job Opportunities. Other than in the case of Kassel ngg, the size of establishments tends to be larger than in the other concentration areas. With few exceptions the locational pattern of Ngbgg— eggsrbstellen has been established through the activities of the Siedlungsgesellschaft. In some instances an Expellee finds land which he can use, and then he contacts the Siedlung — gesellschaft. The methods of processing the application are the same. The Nebenerwerbstellen have received major criticism." The dividing of land into small parcels seems to the anti- thesis of the West German effort to increase the size of agricultural holdings in order to compete favorably in the European Economic Community. Associated with this criticism is the contention that many Nebenerwerbstellen do not exhibit a true agricultural character. This unfortunately is all too true. The Hessen Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry has no 117 apparatus for checking the use of these establishments. The only real control is that loans be repaid and that any unit must be sold back to the Siedlungsgesellschaf . In one sense both criticisms are just, and in another they are not. Whatever primary motive inspired the creation\. of the Nebenerwerbstellen,these small parcels of land really ‘ exist to pacify the Expellees. The creation of a great ;.v§ number of farms in Hessen for Expellees was an impossibility and thus these people were forced into non—agricultural pursuits. The Nebenerwerbstelle at least provided space for-'Jewg a garden and some identification with the land to help the {v psychological adjustment of the uprooted Expellee agriculturalist.) Governmental officials realize that these units I“. are not important agricultural contributors. For this reason they make no effort to supervise them or collect information concerning production. They hope that the integration process‘;\;fl was made more pleasant and that possibly an Expellee may augment his income by owning one of these plots. A third criticism leveled against these holdings has been that they have been used by Expelkxs to gain owner- ship of their own dwellings. Nebenerwerbstellen in most instances have two parts, the garden plot and a dwelling. This criticism is in many instances true; but the Nebener- ;werbste11en have been visualized by officials as a partial solution to the problem of housing shortages. The Nebener- werbstelle cannot really be presented as a true agricultural enterprise, even though it has been the major device for 118 integrating former Expellee agriculturalists into the economy. There have been other attempts to involve the Expellees in agriculture. In decreasing order of effectiveness after the Nebenerwerbstellen have been the complete farm, the Spezial- stellen, and the_Landarbeiterstellen. Egpelleg Farms The program to create viable farms for Expellees has defined those eligible by the same criteria as that for the Nebenerwerbstellen. The limitations of this program have rested with the number of farms which could be created. Article 1, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Fluchtlings— siedlungsgesetz and Article 39 of the later Bundesvertriebenen- gesetz outlined the manner in which complete farm units could be made available to Expellees. These laws provided for the acceptance of guslaufende Hofe or wfiste Hbfe. The distinction between the two is that auslaufende Hefe ("run down farms") are farms which are owned by persons who are too old or too incapacitated to Operate them, and who have no heirs who will or can operate them. If such a person will permit an Expellee Eggggntigz;§ssume ownership of the farm, then favorablefitax measuresiare available to him and special provisions are advanced to assure hima suitable dwelling. Wfiste Hbfe ("unutilized farms") are farms which once were viable units (this refers not to the size of the enterprise but to its useL and upon which farm buildings are usable at least in part. Again special tax provisions are available to encourage the release of the property by rent or purchase to the Expellee. 119 The advancement of ngd or federal monies for these farms is dependent upon the viability of the enterprise. The program tries to encmnage the continued existence of farms which otherwise on death of the owner might be divided among the heirs into units too small to be profitably farmed. Figure 19 indicates the amount of land and number of farms in Hessen which are owned by Expellees and Soviet Zone refugees, under the auslaufende HUfe or wuste HUfe programs. Although Soviet Zone refugees are included, their percentage of ownership is very small, probably between 5 and 8 per cent. However, there is no way to separate their enterprises from those of the Expellees in the statistics. The distribution of the number and acreage of farms owned by Expellees and Soviet Zone refugees shown in Figure 19 represents a contrast to the location of Nebenerwerbstellen indicated by Figure 18. The most farms have been developed in the central section of Hessen and not the industrial areas of Rhein-Main, Lahn-Dill, and Kassel. The lack of development of farms in the industrial regions is a reflection of many factors. Here land prices” are high and agriculture cannot favorably compete with industry. The areas surrounding the major cities also provide limited opportunities for even medium-sized farms as the farms compete with residential uses for land. The Taunus Mountains, located in Rheingaukreis, north Wiesbaden, Unteriaunuskreis, Usingen, and Maintaunuskreis, restrict the amount of land available for farm usage in that 120 ACREAGE AND NUMBER OF FARMS OWNED BY EXPELLEES AND SOVIET ZONE REFUGEES IN HESSEN I949-I963 MOFGEISIAI «do I- III" [:1 I.” - l2|-|35 [:1 ZI-50 W |36-l50 u 5I-Ioo - Isl-zoo ' iii-53:: Acres Items: ml Illlflfl 0| Mlltlfllll All Mutt“. mom (II'IIIISIIIJ 00 «o 173 I100 ”00 Noun 1’ up to 121 part of Hessen. Much of the area is in steep slope and mechanization of agriculture is impossible. This same type of situation is also present in the Odenwald of Erbach and southern Dieburg, and in the Westerwald area of Dillkreis and Biedenkopf. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry presently is attempting to remove land from cultivation in these areas, based on sound conservation practices. It is hOped that afforestation will be pursued. As Figure 19 indicates, in the central section of I Hessen, the traditional agricultural area, the most opportunities for the creation of Expellee farms have been provided. Here also the average size of Expellee holdings is larger than in south Hessen. Despite the difficulties involved in obtaining f“ complete farms for Expellees, this program has provided about'f 3000 units for these people. Spezialstellen Spezialstellen are intensive, single-product_farm A units and although very small should be productive enough to ;/ provide a family with a livelihood. The varieties of produc- tion units include nurseries, vineyards, vegetable farms, fruit farms, and fish farms. In Hessen the Ministry of Agriculture has indicated that the size of these units should be between 2.5 and 15 acres, and that technical experts should determine, -as a condition of settlement and financial aid from,ngg or federal sources, that they will be viable units.ll llRichtlinen ffir die landliche Siedlung und fur Mass- nahmen zur Verbesserung der A rarstruktur durch Aussiedlung und Aufstockung landwirtschaf licher Betriebe, loo. cit., p. 6. 122 As with the other programs, Expellees are eligible for Spezialstellen if they were formerly farmers and wish to .be active in this profession again. In most instances, the unit is to provide an Expellee with a full time occupation. Figure 20 indicates by §2§3§g_the distribution of the Spezialstellen owned by Expellees and Soviet Zone refugees in Hessen. Many of these are market oriented and surround the larger urban areas. The pattern tends to conform largely to the distribution of cities. Landarbeiterstellen The Lgndarbeitegstellen are available for Expellees .and others who are employed in agricultural occupations as farmhands, or in special enterprises such as vineyards or horticultural units, or are connected in some way with a forestry unit.12 The program was not designed specifically for Expelles, and thus they do not receive preferential treatment. \ The Landarbemaetelle is similar to a Nebenerwerbstelle) in that it contains a garden plot and in some instances a . dwelling. The distribution is different, however; Laggarbeiter- ? I stellen are concentrated in the major agricultural regions of Hessen. Digtgibutiong ggd Summagy The resettlement of Expellees in Hessen in agricultural lZIbid. * 125 ACREAGE AND NUMBER OF SEEZIALSIELLEN OWNED BY EXPELLEES AND SOVIET ZONE REFUGEES "WWW IN HESSEN I949-I963 O woum d sen : 0% IA umuns M6 0 Q 1| “all!!!“ IIIISII' OI ‘ " """""""""""""" fl... 2. IE’ 3‘ 124 professions has not been an easy task, but, nevertheless, much has been accomplished. Table 18 indicates the achievements of the various programs from 1949 to December 1960. Expellees dominate thecomplete farms, Nebenegflerbstellen and Spezial-A —’—-/ staléen programs, as these were designed mainly for them. Their participation in the Landarbeiterstellen plan has been much smaller. 1% TABLE 18: Number of Persons Settled in Agricultural Enter- prises by Type, Under Settlement Programs in Hessen: 1949 to December 31, 1960 Type of Enterprise Number Of Persons Expellees Indigenous Total Complete Farms 2580 359 2939 Nebenerwerbstellen 8760 392 9152 S ezialstellen 154 50 204 ,Lfifigarfieiterstgllen 501 , 881 1 82 Total 11,995 1682 13, 7 Source: Hessen Fordert das Dorf (GBttin en: Sekretariat der f— Agrarsozialen CeseIlscHaft e.V. , p. 13. During the period from July 1, 1949 to December 31, 1963 some 14,589 agricultural enterprises of Expellees and Soviet Zone refugees were established; 699 belonged to the Soviet Zone refugees,and 131 owners failed to report their former place of residence. The total number of persons accommodated was 63,113. In area 142,605 acres were provided for the resettlement.13 Table 19 indicates the distribution by size of the enterprises. 13Records of the Hessen Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Unpublished). 125 TABLE 19: Size of Enterprises Established in Hessen, July 1, 1949 to December 31, 1963 Acres 0 to 1.25 to 5 to 12.5 to 25 to 50 to Over 1.25 5 12.5 25 50 75 75 Number of units 9535 1060 731 1188 1626 301 148 Source: Unpublished Tables of Hessen Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, "Ergebnis der Forderungsmassnahmem auf- grund des Flachtlingssiedlungsgesetzes und des Bundesvertriebenengesetzes zu Gunsten der vertrie- bene Landwirte und Sowjetzonenfluchtlinge." fl All enterprises of 12.5 acres or more are farms. The distribution by size of Expellee and Soviet Zone refugee farms is in line with that of those owned by indigenous Germans. This has been true even though larger farms available for ownership may have been split into two units. Although the supposition was not verified, farms over 75 acres were probably acquired by Expellees through marriage. The small units are" also distinctive as almost all are Nebenerwerbstellen. The A i(.f Lgndarbeiterstellen tends to be slightly larger (averaging , ' from 2 to 7 acres) because they were developed in agricultural areas where moreland was available. Three types of units, the S ezi latellen, Nebenerwerbstellen and Landarbeiter- stellen are included in the 1.25 to 12.5 acre categorhas. Table 20 indicates the methods of financing Expellee agricultural integration. In Chapter III the various sources\) of aid for industry were identified and these same sources supported agriculture. The most outstanding feature of the 126 .>Hpmmaom cam waswfisownm< mo >HpchHE commom scum meanmw pmzmwfinsqcs «common qmwvmmmcmsmnmfiHunwnuwijn.soaw* moo.NoH.mmn mmm.omo.wm se¢.mes.msv mew.omv.ew secs: HH< Lapse omm.sma.esv ome.som.sm cos.soe.mom vse.ssv.os seaweed sauce emm.omm.m www.0nm.m seasons cowuosoam xhoz oom.nsm.es coo.cms ooe.mmo.ms ooo.mov.s wusasseouom ooo.mo~.v ooo.wmm.m ooo.oem seas sunsets: mecsm cowwosnpwcou mmm.HoH.oem mam.env.om vee.ooo.vmm ves.oms.vH semesm smscs< Mammmmm *ooo.ooe.me osm.sms.oes sws.mms.mv sme.mmo.oos oov.v~o.ss cease: Hench amonmvca new: mcmou mcmog comm amonmacH >cwmnsw wouzom mane: ccomusoa cw >oco: ow ovoa .a >Hsh .cmmmo: cm memwuanmvcm Hmnavasuwum< wwaqoaxm vmucm>m< >cco: moofi .Hm Hwnaauoa «ON mum per cent of the population. Expellee Textile, Clothing and Other Industries The Expellee prOportion of the textile and clothing industries have provided important additions to those sectors \ in Hessen. In textiles, Expellee firms constitute 24 per cent , ) / of all firms and employ slightly over 11 per cent of all I/” persons active in this industry. The clothing industry ' represents about 17 per cent of all firms, but only employs,~ 10 per cent of the total workers. 1 The Expellee division of the textile industry is concentrated in Bergstrasse- 11 firms which employ some 1010 persons; Offenbach - 6 firms with 77 employees; Giessen (Lang) - 4 firms with 182 employees; waldeck - 3 firms with 26Marek. 1.9.9.2412. 27_I_b_i_.g_., and Viktor Wilheim and Dr. Adolf Fuchs, "Die Musikinstrumenten Industrie in Hessen," 15 Jahre VHW/IOB in Basses. 3"— 140 118 employees; and Ziegenhain - 3 firms with 74 employees.28 The clothing industry although important does not show such a strong concentratkm. Nine firms of the Expellee clothing industry with some 208 employees have been located in Frankfurt. If Summary.-Expellees have IlOt been able to establish .Vf3' industrial firms easily in Hessen as their low percentage of 7) firms and employees of all firms and employees indicates (Figure 21). They have been more successful in light industrial) activity than in heavy because the capital investment and f production space requirements have been less in light industry. ’ The Expellee industries have aided the Hessen economy in two distinct ways. They have been established in the .73.} interior and Border Area where there was previously little - manufacturing; and they have helped to round out or diversify. the kinds of industry in Hessen. The greatest contribution . of augmenting weakly developed industrial branches has been in . glass, musical instruments, textile, and clothing manufacturing.¥) These industries have been encouraged by the Hessen government and their successful establishment reflects considerable governmentalassistance. 28Unpublished records from the Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. The employed totals may be too low, as in Giessen for example, in an advertisement in the book OB s e one Expellee textile firm owner reported that he employed 208 persons. CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The task of integrating Expellees into Hessen economic life has fallen largely to the government. This, however, does not indicate that Expellees themselves have not assumed responsibility; rather, it is the reflection of disturbed conditions of the time. In 1945 and 1946 the Hessen economy ‘9'2 (and West German as well) was thoroughly disrupted; industrial plants, housing, and the transportation net had been destroyed; food, clothing and fuel for civilian uses were scarce. Into this settingxmne thrust the Expellees who came with few I I. , . material possessions. In a very real sense, the assets with at’ which the Expellees arrived were skills and hOpe. In 1946 the] solution to Expellee problems was to settle them in those areasin which housing was available, namely, the rural areas, f l and to issue them rations and hope that they could find some f’ employment. The only governmental commitment of economic 53;: help was to establish certain industries which would help to round out a future Hessen economy. Although in the years immediately following 1945 2’ r + an Expellee could not move as housing construction in the"‘ urban areas had not begun, many of them tried to establish Ml\,i\#\ their former enterprises in Hessen. The initial efforts were beset with difficulties Of Which the major ones were 141 142 finding suitable production space, machinery, a market, and procuring raw materials. This period was ended_when the Currency Reform was enacted. The subsequent revaluation 1* _._,.__. ____4 /~-._ r” - of the mark and the establishment of stringent credit policies 1 placed Expellee firms in a very precarious position. Those Expellees who had been venturous enough to establish firms could not survive without outside assistance and the founding of new firms was nearly impossible. Undoubtedly if the government had not intervened, Expellees would have eventually established themselves in the 79!)? economic life of Hessen, but the process would have been much slower and only a very small percentage would have managed +793 to be independently employed. The federal and Hessen govern- ments were the only institutions able to initiate programs which could reach every Gemeinde of Hessen, and every facet of economic life. If the governments had not assumed responsibility_ ‘ -. .I . )~ for the integration of Expellees, then they would have faced it; the unredeeming task of providing massive unemployment and welfare payments. The programs which the federal and Hessen governments devised to assist the integration of Expellees into the economic life of Hessen have had great impact on the economic geography of the area. The programs and their geographic effects are summarized below. ’ The cognizance that the initial settlement of Expelleesfz%: was unfavorable led to the development of the Bundesumsiedlung f.3; plan which moved Expellees from other Lander into Hessen, and 143 the Hessen Plan which moved Expellees within Hessen. Both ~— M_ \ _,_...._......____’ “Mu-t“ \mH—‘fl— programs shifted Expellees from agricultural areas with few job Opportunities to urban centers. Figures 15 and 16 indicate‘ the scope of this movement as the percentages of Expellees in 1950 in the Hessen agricultural Gemeinden can be compared with ' the percentages of Expellees in these same Gemeinden in 1960. The south Hessen area centered on Frankfurt, Hanau, Offenbach, Darmstadt and Wiesbaden has received the greatest number of / the relocated Expellees. This region, the industrial core of Hessen, could best supply employment Opportunities for the Expellees. The integration of Expellees into agriculture has produced two patterns: one which focuses on the major Hessen I urban areas and the other on the agricultural center. The s ' Nebenerwerbstellen, although too small to be major agricultural \______ ,_ _ contributors, have absorbed more Expellee farmers than any .’ y ,4” J J \’ . r other type of units. The Nebenerwerbstellen are located 'within the commufing area of major cities, principally those of south Hessen, and are located so that an Expellee may be _1 firemployed in a non-agricultural profession but still maintain ()his tie to the land and perhaps augment his income by its . \_cultivation. Although the Hessen Ministry for Agricultureflya and Forestry does not directly influence the selection of sites for these units, it does indirectly by advancing or not advancing funds to the settlement corporations. The establishment of Expellee farms and Spezialstellen was an attempt to employ on a full time basis as many 14h Expellees in agriculture as possible. The Hessen Ministry of {LJ Agriculture and Forestry has encouraged the release to Expellees of farms by owners who are not able to operate them. Thus, 9%; most Expellee Operated farms are in the traditional agricultural areas in central and northern Hessen. This program has been limited in the number of people who can be accommodated. The) size of Expellee farms, however, compares favorably with those; of indigenous Germans. Spezialstellen which are primarily market oriented holdings are very small and located near the major Hessen urban centers. These units have been created by the Ministry or settlement firms, with the condition that they be viable ; units. Almost all Expellee farms and Spezialstellen have beenfifrtv .assisted with federal and/or Lang funds which have been used 33 for rental or purchase of land, and machinery, and for the con:7 struction and renovation of dwellings and farm buildings. : The programs to integrate Expellees in agriculture, although limited by the number of farms which could be created_ ‘have been successful. By 1960 some 2,580 Expellees owned 26¢“. ‘iu , ((their own farms, 154 owned S ezialstellen, and 8,760 were in : ‘3 1 L possession of Nebenerwerbstellen. The development of employment for Expellees has produced several distinct patterns. The creation of new jobs and the stabilization of uncertain ones was covered by the Soforthilfegesetz (Article 46), the Lastenausgleichsgesetz lHessen FOrdert das Dorf (GOttingen: Sekretariat der AgrarsoziaIen Gesellschaft e.V.), p. 13. 145 (Articles 259 and 260) and the Hessen Plan. Under the Soforthilfe-- gesetz a considerable number of working places were financed in {A central and northern Hessen. This distribution reflected thefi fiérstipulations of the law that the jobs could be financed only I fin those firms which were owned by members of the indemnity 'groups; and most of these firms at that time were located in ‘the areas of initial settlement. \» \ / Both the Lastenausgleichsgesetz and Hessen Plan broad-- (ened the base of the eligible firms with the condition that the x \ jobs be created primarily for Expellees regardless of owner- ship. Under these programs firms located in the major Hessen51}} urban areas received the most assistance. This is an indica- (37 tion of the greater number of firms eligible for assistance, the decision to develop housing for Expellees in the major centers (Hessen Plan), and also effort to coordinate the development of housing and employment opportunities. Other,\x but lesser concentrations,have been the Border Area and the Area of Economic Development. The promotion of the economically underdeveloped areas when compared to the development of south Hessen appears not to have been too successful. These regions have offered few advantages for firms such as nearness to markets, skilled labor pools, a well developed transportation net, and fuelul , I . ,0 (‘7 X - \ . a working places in the Border Area and Area of Economic Re-. ! ‘ l t \ organization,no matter how few, is an unqualified success.y supplies. However, the development of Expellee firms and The building of ten firms in a region having none is 146 relatively much more important than developing ten in a region with several hundred. Expellees have figured importantly in the Hessen regional programs. The government has tried,where possible, to utilize their skills in industries located here. One reason for this has been the location of Expellees in the f I‘- underdeveloped regions under the initial settlement; thus;},§ new firms and jobs were utilized both to promote the region} and employ theihqxflke. Expellee'firms have been encouraged to locate in these areas also. The Hessen government realized ’ that Expellee firms could be more easily attracted than othersT because the Expellee did not have sectional ties in Hessen. (’ The city of Allendorf, £321§,Marburg is an example of a very successful effOrt to establish industry, notably Expellee industry, in interior Hessen4.as is also the founding of \ manufacturing firms and the promotion of jobs, particularly/;’ in textiles, in the Border Region. The awareness that EXpellee firms needed financial ) q is“ ;,{i ;, assistance for establishment, to develop better production space,-and to purchase machinery led to several decisions. &The more important ones have been the emphasisjgnflsmallm ‘Land medium_§ized firms and also that funds be used to )< ““"T::; "a a”.-.ll _H,_,~,,_#,,\\flf- promote those already in operation rather than to SQYPlOP 4- s-rv—wui m , he. . _ new ones. Expellee firms located in the leading Hessen urban ~_ areas have been awarded the major portion of monies advanced under the Marshall Plan andthe Hessen loan programs. South awv Hessen focusing on the Rhein-Main triangle, has been the 147 principal recipient region. This area has been the most attractive for those firms desiring to find skilled labor pools, and to be near the market on a well developed transporta- tion network. Lastly, the Hessen government in particular has decided to promote certain Expellee industries in order to establish or augment activity in Specific sectors of industry. The decision to encourage the founding of glass, textile, musical instrument, and clothing firms was based on the absence or underdeveloped condition of these industrial branches in Hessen. The government has also supported the associated handiwork sectors of these industries. The location of these industries 3}; has a commonality in that they generally are positioned outside of the Rhein—Main triangle of south Hessen. The glass industry has been concentrated in firgig Limburg, Obertaunus, Maintaunus, and to a lesser extent in Kassel, Fulda and Untertaunus. The musical instrument firms are in the region of Nauheim, Gross- Gerau; and the textile and clothing industries with a somewhat dispersed pattern still have a weak concentration in the border, central, and very southern areas. ‘ ' -V 4 \b. ‘ , 0/ ‘ The patterns which the governments have helped toLQx; create in the integration of Expellees in Hessen economic LI, life may be categorized simply as follows: 1) the promotion of Expellee industries of particular types; 2) the utilization) of Expellee industries to help change the dominantly agricultural character of the Border Area and interior Hessen; 3) the development of jobs in industry, particularly Expellee 148 firms, to employ Expellees with concentrations in agricultural central and northern Hessen and the southern industrial region; 4) the relocation of Expellees in the major urban \ centers when enough jobs could not be created for them in the agricultural areas; and 5) the development of agricultural kl enterprises, with an emphasis on Nebenerwerbstellen which are “ located in industrial areas and thus permit an Expellee to integrate in industry. This analysis of the postwar settlement of Expellees in Hessen, Federal Republic of Germany indicates that it has resulted in a marked change in the economic geography of Hessen. Government policy and decisions have played a key role in accounting for the spatial patterns of Expellee related economic activity. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books_ Blume, Helmut. Das Land Hessen und seine Landschaften. Forschungen zun Deutschen Landeskunde. Regensburg: Joseph Habbel, 1951. Gummel, Dr. Hans-Joachim. Die Industriesiedlung auf dem Gelande der ehemali en S ren stoffwerke in Allendorf Kreis Marburg. Wiesba 'en: Der Hessische Minister des Innern - Landesplanung, June, 1957. Hessisches Ministerium ffir Wirtschaft und Verkehr. Die Hessische Wirtschaft nach dem Krieg. 1950. Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees. Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office, 1953. Male Albrecht, Prof. Dr. Gerhard, gt, a1. "Die wirtschaftliche Eingliederung der Heimatvertriebenen in Hessen," U tersuchun en zum deutschen Vertriebenen-und Fluchtlin 3- problem. (Ed. Prof. Dr. Bernard Pfister, Berlin: Duncker und Humbolt, 1954). Held, Colbert 0. "Refugee Industries in west Germany," Eco omic Geo ra h , 32 (1956). Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, "Die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit 1947 bis 1949 in Hessen," Staat und Wirtschaft in Hessen (15 Jahrgang), Heft 1. Wiesbaden: 1960. Nuller, Dr. Herbert. "Die Ansiedlung des Deutscthhemischen Glasveredlungsindustrie," Forschung und Leben: Bonner Beitrag zur Raumforschun , Reihe A. Neundorfer, Ludwig und Hermann Michler. "Die Gesichte vom Schlflchternplan," Kleine Schriften ffir den Staatsbur er, 11 (1950). 149 150 Reports (Published) Federal Republic of Germany Bank fur Vertriebene und Geschaxiigte (lastenausgleichsbank Aktiengesellschaft). Vierter Jahresbericht, Geschaftsjahr 1953. Bad Godesberg: 1953. Lastenausgleichsbank. Die Gewerblichen Vertriebenen und Flficht- lingsbetriebe Erfolgte und Ungelbste Aufgabe der q , Eingliederung. Bad Godesberg: December 1951.“ Lastenausgleichsbank (Bank fur vertriebene und Geschadigte). Jahresbericht 1962. Bad Godesberg: 1963 President des Bundesausgleichsanrts. 10 Jahre Lastenausgleich. Bad Homburg: 1959. Sonderdruck aus Wirtschaft und Statistik l 6 12. Vertriebene und Deutsche aus der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und dem Sow etsektor von Berlin: Er ebnis der VOlksz hl am 6. Juni 1261, pp. 721, 742- 747. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden. VOlkszahlung vom 6 Juni 1961: Vertriebene und Deutsche aus der sowjetischen Besatzun szone und dem Sow'etsektor von Berlin nach findern ung Religionszugehbrigkeit. Fachserie A, orbericht 9. Mainz: W. Kohlhammer O. m. b. H., 1961. Hessen Government Busch, Dr. Hans und Oberregierungsrat Harold vetter. Die soziale Wohnun sbau im Lande Hessen. 11 Folge. Munchen: Adolf Widmann-Verlag, 1963. Der Hessische Ministerprisident, Landesplantung. Die Gewerborte in Hessen und ihre Entwicklungsmbglichkeit. Vols. I and II. Wiesbaden: 1957. Der Hessische Minister des Innern. Der Lastenausgleich 1m Lande Hessen. Wiesbaden: September 19 O. . Der Hessiche Minister des Innern-Landesausgleichsamt. Uber Zwei Milliarden DM aus dem Lastenausgleich im Lande Hessen. Frankfurt: 195 Der Hessische Minister ffir kmdwirtschaft und Forsten. Die Hessische Landwirtschaft in Zahlen. Wiesbaden: 1962. Hessisches Ministerium des Innern, Staatsbeauftragter fur das Fluchtlingswesen. Hessen und das F1Uchtlingsproblem: ein 151 Rechenschaftsbericht ger Zahlen und Tatsachen., Wiesbaden: L. Schellenbergische Buchdruckerei G.m.b.H., 1949. Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. Arbeitsstattenzahlung 1261. Vol. 2, nr. 2. Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt..~ ”Hessen ip wandel der Letzten Hundert Jahre 1860-1960. . (Jaksch, Dr. h. c. Wenzel). Der Hessenplan_1950-l25g. Deutscher Gemeindeverlag G.m.b.H., 1954° Mann, Regierungsrat Welter. VNeuburger im der grosshessiscpen Wirtschaft. Merforth, M. Neue Heimat in Hessen. GOttingen: Hessen- ministerium f5; Landwirtschaft und Forsten und Sekretariat den Agrarsozialen Gesellschaft, March, 1958. Office of Military Government Allied Control Authority, Directorate of Prisoners of war and Displaced Persons.” Plan for the Transfer of the German Po ulation to be Moved from Auptria. Czechoslovakia, Rppgary and Poland into the Four Occu ied Zones of Germany. CONL7P (45 57. Berlin: 20 November 1945. Office of Military Government Greater Hesse. prlic Welfare, Refggees, Eypellees and DP's: Historical Report July 194 -December, 194 . OMGUS. "Decree Regulating the Refugee Agency," Monthly Historical Report, Greater Land Hesse. October, 1245. OMGUS- Dis laced Persons Stateless Persons and Ref ees: Monthly Report 20 January 1256. No. 6. OMGUS. Report on Eypellee Problem in the U. S. Zone 1246- Eazah_1211- OMGUS. Stgtistical Annex: 1-31 guly 1252: SectionXIII: Housing. No. 25. ' Other Boesler, Martin. Baulandfragen aus agrappolitischer Sicht. Vol. 5. Frankfurt: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Verbes- 152 serung der Agrarstruktur in Hessen e.V., 16.10.1959. Hallo Stadt Allendorf. Marburg: Buchdruckerei J.A. Koch, 1963. _Hallo Stadt Allendorf, Verleihun der Stadtsrechte,r Marburg: Buchdruckerei J.A. Koch, 1960. Hgllo Stadt Allengopf. Woche def Heimat 1263,“ Marburg: Buchdruckerei J. A. Koch, 9 3. Hallo Stadt Allendorf: 1253-1265: 10 Jahre Arbeit fur Stadt Allendorf, Ein Rechenschaftsbericht von Bur ermeister. rburg: Buchdruckerei: J. A. Koch, 1963. Hessen Fbrdert das Dorf. GOttingen: Sekretariat der Agrarsozialen Gesellschaft e.V., 1961. Jaenicke, Wolfgang and Dr. Martin Kornrumpf. Fluchtlingsproblem in Bayern. Mfinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, der Staatssekretar fur des Fluchtlingswesen, January 1947. SchOffel, Doris. "Das Fluchtlingsproblem in Hessen," Das Deutsche Fluchtlingsproblem: Sonderheft der Zeitschrift fur Raumforsch g. Bielefeld: F. Eilers Verlag G.m.b.H., 1950. pp. 66- 9. 10 Jahre Musikinstrumenten-Industrie: Nauheim. Dettingen: Kolb Verlag, 1957. 15 Jahre VHWZIOB in Hessen. Baden: vertretung der Heimat- vertriebene Landesverband Hessen, Frankfurt. 1963. Reports and Records (Unpublished) Federal Republic of Germany Der Bundesminister ffir vertriebene, Flfichtlinge und Kriegs- geschadigte. Geschaftsstastick uber die Umsiedlung: Stand 30 Juni 1963. A2 I 5c-6940-1097/63. Hessen Government Der Hessische Minister des Innern als Staatsbeauftragter fur das Flflchtlingswesen, 1-7 March 1948. 2093148. . 3-9 Oktober 1949. 59p20/h9. . Ubersicht fiber die wichtigsten Offentlichen Kredit-und Burgschaftsaktien des Bundes und des Landes Hessen: Stand 15.6.1963. x/2a (2). 153 Der Hessische Minister des Innern, Landesamt ffir Vertriebene, Flfichtlinge und Evakuierte - und Landesausgleichsamt. No. 1/1954. Erlass des hessisches Ministeriums des Finanz vom 14.2.1949. Grosshessisches Staatsministerium, Der Minister ffir Arbeit und Wohlfart, Staatskommission fur das Flfichtlingswesen. lllC/S. 27 September 1946. Hessenministerium des Innern. Records from Housing Division concerning housing construction and movement of Expellees and others. Hessenministerium fur Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Ergebnis der FOrderungsmassnahmem auf grund des Flfichtlingssiedlungs- gesetz und des Bundesvertriebenengesetzes zu Gunsten der vertriebene Landwirte und Sowjetzonenflflchtlinge. 1949-1963. Hessenministerium ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten. Records of location, area, and type of settlement unit occupied by Expellees for period 1949-1963. Hessische Treuhandverwaltung. Unofficial description of credit measures, administrative procedures and credit levels used with Expellees for those funds administered by the Hessische Treuhandverwaltung. Hessische Treuhandverwaltung. Current records for 1962 and 1963 of funds administered by this organization. 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(POW and DP Division) Ad Interium answer to General Clay's long hand note of 28 September, re German Expellees from Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. 1. October 1945 (carbon copy.) Puplic Documents Federal Republic of Germany Bundesvertriebenengesetz (Gesetz fiber die Augelegeneheiten der Vertriebenen und Fluchtlinge), 19 August 1953. Das Flfichtlingsiedlungsgesetz (Gesetz zur FOrderung der Einglieder- ung von Heimatvertriebenen in die Landwirtschaft), 10 August 1949. Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Gesetz fiber den Lastenausgleich), 14 August 1952. Soforthilfegesetz (Gesetz zur Milderung dringender sozialer NOtstande), 8 August 1949. "Verordnung fiber die Umsiedlung von Heimatvertriebenen aus den Landern Bayern, Niedersachsen, und Schleswig-Holstein von 29 November 1949," BGBL. 3.4.1950. 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Wiesbaden: Hessische Ministerprasident-Landesplanung, 1950. 9.2mm Hessenministerium des Innern. Personal interview with Frau Henniger-Schenk. April 16, 1964. Hessenministerium des Innern. Personal interview with Regierungsratin Kaufmann-SchOffel. September 1963- June 1964. Hessenministerium ffir Landwirtschaft und Forsten. Personal interview with Ministerialrat Dr. Metzlar. April 22, 1964. Hessenministerium fur Landwirtschaft und Forsten. Personal ingerviews with Herr Gunter VOgelei. April 21 & 22, 19 4. Personal interview with Dr. h. c. Wenzel Jaksch, Hessen Representative. October 22, 1963. Personal interview with Fraulein Charlotte Todt, Translator for U.S. Air Force, Wiesbaden, March 8, 1964. Personal Interview with J. Fischer, Landesarbeitsamt, Frankfurt a.M. April 15, 1964. Letter from Landrat Jansen, Kreis Schluchtern. April 15, 1964. 156 Letter from J. Fischer, Landesarbeitsamt, Frankfurt a.M. April 4, 1964. "1.111111111111111“