ABSTRACT

ELITE RECRUITMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

By

Gary C. Shaw

Elite studies of Western industrialized societies emphasize the increasing importance of technical expertise as a variable influencing recruitment to elite positions. Recent studies of elite recruitment in the USSR reveal the same trends at work there. The purpose of this study is to examine and compare elite recruitment trends in four Eastern European countries to determine if similar forces are present there and to compare the responses of different communist parties to changes in skill requirements. All the parties considered in this study--the Bulgarian, the Czechoslovakian, the Hungarian, and the Polish--have publicly recognized some of the shortcomings of their economic systems and have made commitments to economic reform. These commitments should be reflected in elite recruitment patterns. The study, which focused on the Central Committees and the Politburos, covered the 1957 to 1968 period.

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Data for the study came primarily from two sources. The archive on Eastern European elites at the University of Pittsburg provided data for the 1957 to 1964 period. The author added data from the Radio Free Europe research departments to make the study as current as possible (1966 for the Central Committees, 1968 for the Politburos). Independent variables included: career patterns, skill attributes, education level, education area, age, penultimate office, ethnicity, father's occupation, revolutionary experience, and economic characteristics of place of birth. The major hypothesis of the study was that the data would reveal an increase in recruitment of elites with technical skills. Minor hypotheses were, first, the data would reveal an increase in recruitment of non-political professionals and, second, oligarchy, in communist societies, does not tend to age.

The major hypothesis was substantiated. Recruitment trends reveal an appreciable increase in elites with technical skills. However, each country responded differently to this change in skill requirements. Bulgaria experienced a significant increase in recruitment of non-political professionals but the other countries changed very little in this regard. Data on age indicate that communist elites are "able to impose their young upon the party."

Each country in the study revealed a distinct developmental pattern. The structure of opportunities for elite positions in each party was altered from 1957 to 1968, reflecting changes in skill requirements. The manner in which each recruitment system responded to these changes was determined by social, economic, and political forces at work in the country. The data revealed positive trends in cooptation of elites with rational-technical skills, but they also revealed that, in spite of fairly obvious economic imperatives, the strong role of ideology and politics frequently interrupts and often upsets trends that might be imputed to the need for economic rationalization.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems

Students of comparative politics have only recently developed the requisite theoretical and methodological sophistication for a truly comparative approach to the study of political phenomena. Unfortunately, this development has been quite uneven--most of the significant studies to date have concentrated on the Western democracies.[1] Students of communist political systems, strongly influenced by the totalitarian "paradigm," have been conspicuous in their failure to develop comparative approaches applicable to these systems.[2]

Recent trends in studies of communism reflect a growing awareness of the inadequacy of existing conceptual tools. This is, perhaps, an inevitable consequence of the "behavioral mentality," but it does indicate that scholars now recognize that communism is not an aberration but a very real alternative to the Western model of industrialization. It also reflects growing disenchantment with the totalitarian model. Communism is not a monolith; it is as diverse

in its political manifestations as democracy and certainly as difficult to conceptualize and analyze.

One of the major problems facing students of communist political systems is that of obtaining reliable data. This is particularly true of ruling parties, most of which have not been accessible to most forms of analysis. (Non-ruling parties can be penetrated, however, and are proving to be fruitful sources of data and theory.)[3] The data that have become available illustrate manifestations of pluralism or potential pluralism. Studies of decision-making in the USSR, for example, have revealed the conflicts inherent in the "bureaucratic system"--conflicts which are also present in other European communist systems but which have been modified and intensified by particular cultural and ethnic characteristics.[4] Ghita Ionescu has developed a useful approach for classifying the kinds of tensions that increase cultural pluralism.[5] Richard Burks is very successful in isolating the ethnic groups which communism appealed to in the inter-war period and which provided the leadership for native communist movements.[6] Dominant ethnic groups now control the Party in each of the Eastern European countries, but ethnic conflicts are still very salient in some areas as recent events in Czechoslovakia and Rumania illustrate.

Burks and Ionescu both isolate variables which can be defined, quantified, and compared cross-nationally. This is the direction in which studies of communism must now move. Paul Shoup, in a very useful bibliographical essay discussing

prospects for an empirical approach to communism, states that "the theoretical and methodological problems that must be overcome in developing a new field of comparative studies range over a wide area, from the development of typologies and dynamic concepts of evolution and change to the problem of gathering data and applying quantitative comparative techniques."[7] Alfred Meyer,[8] taking a slightly different approach, concludes that students of communism could benefit from analyzing communism in the context of frameworks already developed for studying non-communist systems, e.g., the bureaucratic model.[9] Other useful discussions of current methodological problems in comparative communism include Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics,"[10] and "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach,"[11] and Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism."[12] Richard Cornell, concentrating primarily on approaches for studying non-ruling parties, elaborates numerous hypotheses which could be analyzed to isolate similarities and dissimilarities in patterns of development.[13] Benjamin and Kautsky, conceptualizing communist movements as one variant of modernizing movements, derive measures for correlating communist party strength with level of economic development.[14]

Two points concerning the problems of conceptualization and model building are relevant. In the first place, comparison and model building need not be on a system level; indeed, until large gaps in existing data are filled,

specific sub-system comparisons appear to be the most fruitful level (e.g., elite stratification, levels of economic decision-making, role of the media, and so forth). A general theory of communism, though certainly a desirable end, will require a great deal of spade work if it is to be meaningful. Secondly, existing conceptual frameworks can usefully be applied to communist systems (e.g., structural functional analysis, systems analysis, decision-making theory, bureaucratic models, developmental typologies, elite-stratification models);[15] it is not necessary to develop whole new sets of theories or models to analyze and explain behavior in these systems although innovations certainly will be required. Even the totalitarian model, if used as an ideal type and not an empirical reality, can be employed profitably.

This raises a final problem relevant to the concern with conceptualization, developing typologies and model building. Duverger summed it up nicely almost two decades ago: "A general theory of parties will eventually be constructed only upon the preliminary work of many profound studies, but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties."[16] This problem is exemplified today in conflicts between area specialists and theory oriented generalists. Generalists assert that area specialists cannot be effective social scientists unless they utilize theoretical frameworks and techniques associated with behavioral research. Area specialists

counter this attack with the effective argument that empirical studies must be grounded on an understanding of the social forces operating in a given country to make research meaningful.

The necessity of an empirical approach to political science in general and communist studies in particular has been accepted by most competent scholars. The second problem remains, however. How can generalists purport to make contributions toward an understanding of political behavior without substantial grounding in area specialization? Frederic J. Fleron, in discussing this problem, concludes that the determining factor becomes the "realm of inquiry" in which one is operating.[17] He distinguishes between a context of discovery and a context of verification. If the student were operating in the context of verification a knowledge of culture and history would not be necessary. "The generalizations to be tested would already hypothesize which cultural and historical variables are relevant, and these are the only aspects of Russian culture and history which need to be known for the purpose of confirming or disconfirming those generalizations."[18] If the student were operating in the realm of discovery, however, presumably he would not know which cultural and historical variables were relevant to a given hypothesis and would have to "immerse" himself in cultural and historical studies. Conceptualization of the problem and the research strategy chosen become, in lieu of area specialization, crucial variables in determining

the validity of a general theoretical approach to research. The important point is that hypothesis testing and theory building can proceed without a complete groundwork of area specialization studies if scholars are competent methodologists.

The Study of Elites

Elite recruitment has long been recognized as one of the crucial variables affecting the style and substance of politics. Two variables relating to political leadership--the representativeness of elites and the manner of their selection--are important not only for an understanding of political events but also for analysis of the dynamic of the entire social system. The elite dimension, as Lasswell indicates, is always relevant--whether one is seeking to explain the past or present or predict the future, whether a question of trend, condition, projection, goal of alternative.[19] An evaluation of elite recruitment patterns provides a key means of entry into every political system. Elite analyses of pre and post World War II Germany, for example, have made a significant contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of fascism.[20]

Elite studies of Western societies have traditionally faced two conceptual problems: definition of elites and the development of satisfactory stratification models. These problems are exemplified in the Hunter-Dahl dispute which has plagued students of government in the United States.

In spite of the conceptual problems posed by "pluralist" societies, some very useful theoretical[21] and empirical[22] studies of elites in industrialized societies have been published recently. One of the goals of this study will be to test some of the empirical findings and hypotheses of these studies using data on East European elites. It may be possible to find some significant similarities between "capitalist" industrialized societies and communist industrializing societies in terms of stratification and recruitment of elites.

Although the studies mentioned above differ in terms of conceptualization of elite status and develop different kinds of stratification models, they are generally agreed upon the very crucial role expertise is assuming as a governing norm in elite recruitment. There is also a general agreement as to the kinds of variables which can be analyzed profitably. These include, for example, development of recruitment patterns, circulation of elites, skill and resources either required or possessed by elites, social origins, goals and interests, beliefs and styles of action, governing norms, perceptions of self and others, ethnicity, the role of external elites, and so forth.

Students of communist political systems are obviously limited in the kinds of analyses they can make. Many of the variables mentioned above cannot be empirically tested in authoritarian regimes. The totalitarian model militates against process oriented studies of communist societies.[23]

Despite recent changes in the structure of decision-making in these societies, few would argue that it is now possible to analyze patterns of interaction and conflict. We can begin to make inroads into these elite structures, however. Sufficient information is available to discuss recruitment patterns for higher positions, circulation, functional requisites, demographic attributes, and skill and resource requirements. Crucial questions remain, however; we have very little information concerning governing norms, goals, the relationship between values and background, and the internal decision-making process.

A few significant studies of communist elites have been published. These have generally been either studies of particular leaders (usually revolutionaries) or analyses of specific sub-groups.[24] Theoretically oriented studies of communist elites have emerged only in the last few years.[25]

The present study will be a comparative analysis of two specific sub-groups in four East European countries--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The sub-groups to be examined are the Politburos and Central Committees for each of these countries. Elite status will be defined as holding, or having held, a position in one of these two offices. This functional institutional definition of elites will avoid some of the problems of conceptualization mentioned above.[26] The assumption is being made that the "influentials," the "strategic elites," the "power elites," if you will, are represented in these institutionally

defined bodies. The study will make an empirical contribution to the general problem of theory building in communist studies and the more specific task of developing models to explain elite behavior in communist societies.

Elite Recruitment in Eastern Europe

This research project is designed to determine "opportunity structures" for the Central Committee and Politburo in each of the countries under investigation. Joseph Schlesinger developed the structure of opportunities concept in a recent study of political elites in the United States.[27] Elite behavior, as revealed in office-seeking situations, is explained as a function of political ambition. The kind of ambition a politician has ("discrete," "static," or "progressive") is dependent upon his reasonable chance for success in capturing or retaining a political office--in the "structure of opportunities" accompanying a given office. The structure of opportunities in any state is determined by structural characteristics, party organization and competition, size of electorate, and the kinds of offices available. Schlesinger devoted little attention to an investigation of personal attributes required for success in American politics.

Ambition theory would be very difficult to use in the context of communist politics. It is possible, however, to modify the opportunity structure concept so as to make it a useful analytical tool.

Political advancement in communist states is primarily a cooptive process. This is not to deny the importance of self-selection or office seeking ambition--undoubtedly these play a role in determining entry into and advancement within the elite structure. An individual is selected for a given position, however--this means that he must satisfy requirements as established by those responsible for that position. A basic assumption underlying this study is that political success, as measured by membership in a Central Committee or Politburo, is dependent upon functional contributions to the polity. An investigation of the kinds of individuals recruited into these bodies will reveal functional requisites as perceived by the dominant elites. I will be seeking to isolate and compare some of the personal attributes, career characteristics, and skills which are required for recruitment.

The dependent variable is membership in either the Central Committee or Politburo. Independent variables are: age, ethnicity, father's occupation, revolutionary activity, penultimate office, skills, and career. The study will cover a nine to fourteen year time span depending upon the country and office. A profile of elites will be made, based on the composition of the Central Committee and Politburo of each of these countries at the end of the New Course period early in 1957.[28] This will then be compared with a profile of elites in the Central Committee in 1966, and the Politburo in 1968.[29] All the individuals either recruited

into these bodies or dropped from them from 1957 to 1968 will also be analyzed in an attempt to isolate trends affecting recruitment.

The study will allow us to determine some of the basic trends influencing recruitment into elite positions. We will also be able to draw conclusions regarding changes in functional requisites for the society.

The major hypothesis of the study is that technical elites will become increasingly important in the decision-making process as communist states industrialize. Technical elites are defined as those elites who have had specialized training in technical fields and who have spent significant portions of their careers in technical work. (This definition will be elaborated below.)

Two minor hypotheses will be tested also in this study. The first of these, which elaborates the major hypothesis, is derived from two recent studies of elites in the USSR.[30] Frederic Fleron constructed a typology of leadership systems based on group political participation and the utilization of skills. He elaborates and defines four types of leadership systems according to elite response to functional requisites for an industrial society: "monocratic" (political elites force specialized elites to contribute their skills at no cost), "adaptive monocratic" (political elites either retrain members of the elite system or recruit into the system as replacements those cadres with necessary skills), "cooptative" (political elites coopt into

the system specialized elites who possess necessary skills), and "pluralist" (political elites share power with specialized elites on a competitive basis). His examination of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led him to conclude that the leadership system is a cooptative system--that is, specialized elites, who have already established themselves professionally, are drafted into the Central Committee to fulfill functional requisites for the society.

Fischer, who analyzed Communist Party officials in the USSR on three administrative levels, developed a leadership typology based on skills: "dual executive" (a Party official with extensive experience in both Party and technical work), "technician" (a Party executive with extensive technical but little Party work in the economy), "hybrid executive" (Party executive with technical training but no extensive work in the economy), "official" (Party executive with neither technical training nor extensive work in the economy). According to Fischer's analysis the dual executive type seems to be increasing in representation while the technician is decreasing in representation. In Fleron's typology this would indicate that the system was moving from a cooptative system to an adaptive system. (Fischer's analysis only covers a five-year period, however, so projection of trends is somewhat limited.)

A synthesis of these two studies suggests a minor hypothesis: analysis of recruitment in Eastern Europe will reveal a trend of increasing representation of professionals--

that is, of individuals who have established themselves in certain non-party career areas. I expect this to be characteristic of the Central Committee but not the Politburo. Studies of Politburos in Eastern Europe and the USSR reveal a tendency of continuous over-representation of professional politicians in the Politburo given their representation on the Central Committee.[31] I expect to discover two recruitment "systems," one increasingly stressing technical expertise as an important requisite and the other relying on political expertise as the primary requisite.

My second minor hypothesis is very familiar: "oligarchy tends to age." Duverger suggests a significant modification to this assumption. Centralized parties, he claims, are able to "impose their young upon the party."[32] A communist party elite has the authority to effect a relatively significant turnover in its elite structure, particularly at lower levels. I expect to find that Central Committees and Politburos again will differ in this respect with Central Committees being relatively stable in terms of age of members or possibly even declining in mean age as old party functionaries are replaced by younger, technically oriented elites.

In addition to these hypotheses the findings of some earlier studies (e.g., Burks' conclusions regarding the relationship between communism and ethnicity in the inter and post World War II period) will be analyzed. This will enable us to confirm or modify earlier trends in composition

of ruling bodies as the party moves from non-ruling to ruling status.

Finally, one of the basic criticisms of students of communism has been their failure to attempt to bridge the gap between their findings and the information we already have concerning political behavior in Western industrializing societies. In my concluding chapter I will attempt to analyze some conclusions and hypotheses from elite studies of non-communist societies on the basis of my findings in this study. I have selected, after examining elite studies by Keller, Lasswell, Knight, Duverger, Matthews, Bottomore, and Edinger, six hypotheses about elites in Western societies which can be discussed with the findings from this study.[33]

1. Everywhere careers are lengthened, with success coming only after years of work in specialized fields.

2. The "structure of opportunities" will be different for minority groups.

3. Members of the elite strata are becoming older at success.

4. The elite opportunity structure can be described as having a number of peaks; each scalable by specialized methods.

5. The trends toward expansion and specialization will be manifest in all elite pyramids.

6. Bureaucratic elites will gain dominance over political elites because of specialization.

Methodology

Most of the data for this study came from Carl Beck's archive at the University of Pittsburg. Beck has collected basic demographic and career information for all the individuals serving on the Central Committees, Politburos, Secretariats, and Councils of Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania from 1945 to 1965. (The data on the Central Committee of Rumania are incomplete, however, and for this reason I have decided not to include it in the study.)

Each individual has a card containing demographic data (e.g., birth, birthplace, father's occupation, ethnicity, education, training), and a card for each "career event" in his life. The career event cards contain information as to when the individual entered a particular status, special training, responsibilities, location, and when he left the status. There are over 900 possible career event statuses; the entire data deck contains just under 22,000 records. For purposes of this study, data from the career event cards will be collapsed and punched on the demographic cards. Some of the work of collapsing career events has already been done at the University of Pittsburg. Data on careers have been collapsed into eleven basic categories and the number of months each category is applicable to each individual has been summarized. The same has been done with data on skills; from a series of roughly 100 specialities, thirteen major

skills areas were constructed. Again, the number of months each skill area is applicable to each individual has been summarized. These subfiles will be employed in my analysis.

All these data are derived from East European sources. In addition to current periodicals, Beck and his associates had access to Radio Free Europe (Munich), the Sudost Institut (Munich), the Osteuropa Institut (Munich), the Osteuropa Institut (Vienna), the Sudetendentsche Archiv (Munich), and public and private libraries throughout the United States. Data for the most recent Party Congresses will come from several sources--Radio Free Europe publications, journals on Eastern Europe, and bibliographical sources. This data will be catalogued using the same criteria as the information above and placed on IBM cards.

Independent Variables

1. Age--upon joining party, at recruitment, in 1957, in 1966
2. Ethnicity--dominant, Slovak, Jew, other minority
3. Education--primary, secondary, university; education area or training
4. Father's Occupation--agriculture, industry, white collar
5. Revolutionary Activity (inter-war and World War II)--participated, did not participate
6. Penultimate Office--party, government, mass, control, agitation, professional, other

The other independent variables, skills and career patterns, are derived by totaling the number of months in career statuses (career) or specialized areas of work (skills). The number of career statuses have been collapsed from 900 to eleven by Beck and from eleven to nine by the author. Skills have been collapsed from 100 plus to thirteen by Beck and from thirteen to nine by the author. An individual is assigned a "career" and a "skill" if more than 50 percent of his career or skill focus is in a particular category; if the data do not reveal a clear pattern, an attempt will be made to classify him on the basis of his life history. When this is impossible he is classified as "not ascertainable."

7. Career--government bureaucrat; party bureaucrat; mass;[a] professional culture;[b] professional technical;[c] military; non-professional;[d] militant;[e] not ascertainable

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[a]This category includes non-communist parties, mass organizations, student youth organizations, trade unions, and communications.

[b]This category includes culture, health and education, and non-technical management and professions.

[c]This category includes all non-political, technical personnel--planning, managerial, economics, etc.

[d]This category includes skilled and unskilled labor, agriculture workers, artisans, clerks, etc.

[e]This category includes the "old revolutionaries," individuals who joined the party in the early 1900's and whose career pattern includes numerous career channels.

8. Skills--agriculture; industry;[a] administration; justice and law; control;[b] foreign relations; education and culture; manpower and labor; not ascertainable.

Turnover in composition of the Central Committees and Politburos was over 50 percent in all cases.

I have chosen to focus on the Central Committee and Politburo for several reasons. First of all, both bodies are concerned with the functioning of the entire social system and, theoretically, will represent divergent interests. This is particularly true of the Central Committee. Secondly, the Central Committee serves as an "elite pool" for the Politburo, Secretariat, and Council of Ministers. Third, we should expect that changes in the kinds of elites recruited into the Politburo or Secretariat will be preceded by changes in the Central Committee. Fourth, by focusing on the Central Committee we can isolate interests which are constantly represented (e.g., party bureaucrats, military) and those which become less crucial over time and decline in percentage representation (e.g., ethnic groups, mass parties). Finally, we can examine the way the "elite of the elite" (the Politburo) adapts to changes in functional requisites for society; that is, does the elite group change its composition to meet changes in functional requisites or

[a]This category includes all technical skills--planning, science, technology, commerce, economics, etc.

[b]This category includes communications, ideology, agitation, and propaganda.

does it recruit individuals who can supply skills on a sub-elite level (e.g., the Central Committee) and then draw on these individuals in special problem areas?

In a functional sense, the Politburo is the highest policy-making and decision-making body in a communist society. According to Stalin, "the Politburo is the highest organ, not of the state, but of the party and the party is the highest directing force of the state."[34] The Politburo represents a kind of fusion of the topmost pinnacles of the party and state. It serves as a forum for discussing and reconciling interests of the party, state, and other institutions. Members of the Politburo usually have specific responsibilities in the party or the government.[35] The actual decision-making process in the Politburo is obscure, but the primacy of the Politburo as a decision-making body is well established.

From a functional standpoint the Central Committee is harder to define. Nominally, it is responsible for the entire work of the party, including selection of members of the Politburo and Secretariat. In practice it has little independent power, however. The only, and very important, exception to this seems to be when the Politburo is unable to resolve a specific issue, as the Polish Politburo was in 1956, the Soviet Presidium in 1957, and the Czechoslovak Politburo in 1968. In crisis situations like these the Central Committee can exert a significant influence on the development of the polity.

The Central Committee performs other important functions as well. First of all, membership in the Central Committee is a privilege and a reward--in this sense it serves a legitimating function for elites. Second, it provides a means of access to key individuals and groups. Third, it serves as a source of information and knowledge for members of the Politburo and Secretariat.

The membership of the Central Committee, according to Gordon Skilling, affords a good picture of the power elite at the upper and middle levels.

> Although the committee itself, as a collective body, does not in fact exercise the power ostensibly belonging to it under the party statute, it represents a gathering of the most powerful persons from various walks of life. . . . A high proportion of the Central Committee, perhaps about a half, may be regarded as the "hard core" who run the country, occupying the important party and government posts.[36]

Analysis of the Central Committee would be useful for any scholar attempting to understand and predict change in a communist society.

A basic assumption underlying this study, and indeed all elite studies which rely mostly on social background data, is that our understanding of elite behavior and our ability to predict attitudinal change will be enhanced by awareness of social characteristics. Unfortunately, in the case of Eastern Europe and the USSR, it is impossible to conduct attitudinal studies to determine the validity of this assumption. Donald Searing, in a recent study of elite socialization in five Western countries, concluded that while

demographic and career variables were relevant for predicting attitudes some variables were more relevant than others.[37] Also, when compared cross-nationally, different variables emerge as being particularly meaningful for each country. The process of elite socialization, aside from social characteristics, is of crucial importance in forming attitudes. While the states under consideration in this study possess similar political systems they are very diverse in terms of culture, history, tradition, level of industrialization, and many of the other variables which influence the socialization process. We are going to be extremely limited as to the kinds of conclusions we can make concerning attitudinal change in the elite strata as a function of demographic/career variables. Nevertheless, this kind of a study is a necessary forerunner of attitudinal studies and, in spite of the limitations, will enable us to draw meaningful conclusions about recruitment patterns in communist industrializing societies.

NOTES

[1]See, for example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (1963); Robert Alford, Party and Society The Anglo-American Democracies (1963); Angus Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order (1966); Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959); S. M. Lipset, Political Man (1959); S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (1967).

[2]There are some notable exceptions to this observation. See, for example, Franz Borkenau, European Communism (1953); Richard Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (1961), and Zbignew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (1961).

[3]Some of the more recent studies of non-ruling parties include Thomas Greene, "The Communist Parties of Italy and France: A Study in Comparative Communism," World Politics, XXI, 1 (1968), 1-39; Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (1967); Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," American Political Science Review, LXI, 1 (1967). Richard Cornell has developed some useful hypotheses which can be utilized in studying communist non-ruling parties, "Comparative Analysis of Communist Movements," Journal of Politics, XXX, 1 (1968).

[4]Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (1958); John Armstrong, Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (1959); and Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agriculture Policy 1953-63 (1965).

[5]Ghita Ionescu, Politics of European Communist States (1967).

[6]Burks, op. cit.; see also Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (1966); J. F. Brown, The New Eastern Europe (1966); William E. Griffith, Communism in Europe, I (1964) and II (1966); Alvin Z. Rubenstein, ed., Communist Political Systems (1966); and Robert Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (1965).

[7]Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," American Political Science Review, LXII, 1 (1968), 185-205.

[8]See Meyer in "Symposium of Comparative Politics," Slavic Review, XXVI, 1 (1967), 1-29.

[9]See Robert S. Sharlet, "Systematic Political Science and Communist Systems," in "Symposium," op. cit., for a useful critique of the functional approach.

[10]H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII (1966), 435-451.

[11]H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics, A Comparative Approach," Journal of Politics, XXII (1960), 300-313.

[12]Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, XIX, 2 (1967), 242-257.

[13]Cornell, op. cit.

[14]Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," American Political Science Review, LXII, 1 (1968), 110-124. See also John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development (1968).

[15]See Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (1966) for a structural-functional approach to communist studies. Ploss, op. cit., is a useful example of a decision-making study as are Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (1966), and Joel L. Swartz and William Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (1968), 340-352. Alfred G. Meyer, in The Soviet Political System (1965), combines a systems analysis approach with bureaucratic model building. For a study of elite stratification see George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Lasswell and Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites (1965), and Carl Beck, Aggregative Career Characteristics of Eastern European Political Leaders, Occasional Paper, University of Pittsburg (1968). See Meyer in Edinger, Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies, for a developmental approach to communist studies.

[16]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (1954), p. xiii.

[17]Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies," Soviet Studies, XIX, 3 (1968).

[18]Ibid., p. 321.

[19]Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit., p. 4.

[20]See, for example, Daniel Lerner, "The Nazi Elite," in Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit.; Maxwell E. Knight, The German Executive, 1890-1933 (1952); Lewis Edinger, "Continuity and Change in the Background of German Decision-makers," The Western Political Quarterly, XIV, 1 (1961), and Edinger, "Post-Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic," American Political Science Review, LIV, 1 (1960).

[21]See, for example, T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (1964); Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (1963); Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political Decision-Makers (1961); Lewis J. Edinger, Political Leadership in Industrial Societies (1967); Carl Beck and James Malloy, Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis (1968).

[22]See, for example, Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (1966); Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit.; Donald Matthews, United States Senators and Their World (1960); and Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliament (1965).

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[26]Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Note of the Explication of the Concept 'Elite' in the Study of Soviet Politics," Canadian Slavic Studies, II, 1 (Spring, 1968), 111-115.

[27]Schlesinger, op. cit.

[28]The dates marking the end of the New Course, based on official pronouncements, are different for each country. They are January 13, 1957, in Bulgaria; June 13, 1957, in Czechoslovakia; February 26, 1957, in Hungary; October 27, 1957, in Poland.

[29]The closing dates for the study are quite uniform for the Politburos--January 1, 1969, for Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary, April 17, 1969, for Czechoslovakia. Recent data for the Central Committees of Poland and Czechoslovakia were not available although I did manage to get a small sample from the 13th Party Congress, KSČ, held in May, 1966. The closing date for Poland is January, 1966; for Bulgaria and Hungary, the most recent party congresses--November, 1966 and December, 1966, respectively.

[30]Fleron, "Soviet Political Elite," op. cit., and Fischer, op. cit.

[31]Fleron, "Soviet Political Elite," op. cit., 6; Elizabeth Powell, "Dynamics of Political Elite Recruitment--the Cases of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia," Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Georgia, 1969.

[32]Duverger, op. cit., 168.

[33]For propositions about elites see Keller, op. cit., 212-242; Lasswell, op. cit., 1-96; Bottomore, op. cit., 50-82.

[34]George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in Lasswell, op. cit., 98.

[35]H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (1966), p. 88.

[36]Ibid., p. 99.

[37]Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political Studies, I, 4 (January 1969), 471-501.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

The study of political development and social change is central to political science. Analysis of the recruitment and circulation of elites is just one of several sub-fields of this more general problem. Elites in communist societies, seeking to control the developmental process, stress the primacy of the political system over the economic system. A basic assumption of this study is that political elites cannot control socio-economic development, as thoroughly as they would like, without modifying their skill characteristics. That is, industrializing societies present socio-economic problems that political elites cannot cope with, unless they either acquire technical skills or share decision-making power with non-political elites who possess these skills. As Suzanne Keller concludes from her study of "strategic" elites in industrialized societies: "No single strategic elite can today know all there is to be known, and none can perform all the functions involved in social leadership."[1] The purpose of this chapter is to examine the developmental process in Eastern Europe, focusing on the interdependence of the

political system and the economic system in communist industrializing societies.

"The study of society," according to G. M. Sorokin of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Moscow, "rightly leads one to believe that the main criterion of social progress is the degree of development of productive forces."[2] Economic development is an essential prerequisite for achieving the goals of a communist society. Indeed, communist leaders are quite explicit in defining success in economic development as the ultimate criterion for determining the most progressive social system. The underlying assumption of communist economics is that economic laws can be made to operate in accordance with human will.[3] Decisions regarding allocation of resources, rate of economic growth, priorities in investment, and satisfaction of consumer demands can and should be made by political leaders. The chaos of the market and the inequalities of capitalism can be eliminated in a centrally planned economy. Economic progress can be consciously organized by society; human wants will be satisfied.

These assumptions, which are now under review by economists in Eastern Europe, were accepted by political leaders and applied in rebuilding the economic systems following World War II. Success in the economic sphere was considered essential, both for ideological and for pragmatic reasons. However, the ideological link between elites and masses was seriously weakened by events in the 1950's.

Demonstrations against the regime occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary--dissatisfaction with the economic system was in part responsible in all cases.[4]

Ideology is an important aspect of the theory of legitimacy of communist states:

> The meaning given in Marxist-Leninist political terminology to the word "ideology" is now generally understood as the reasons or faiths which lead the members of a "conscious" group, class or society, to see how their "praxis," i.e., their own creative action becomes the cause of change in their own surroundings and circumstances. Projected upon the background of legitimacy in a communist state ideology (or in this case using David Easton's precise expression: "The legitimating ideology") can be defined as the link of allegiance of the population to the expressed motives and values of the regime.[5]

One of the expressed motives of the regimes in communist societies, a motive which has been utilized to justify economic sacrifice, is that of developing the economic conditions for the transition to communism. Political elites maintain that society can develop and control the economic system and make it responsive to human needs.

In search of this goal communist elites reserved for themselves the "interpreter of reality" function for the whole of society. They assumed responsibility for all decision-making; they also were held responsible for the results. With failures in the economic and social spheres came challenges, from professionals and laymen, to the role of the party in the social system. As the ideological link declined pragmatic considerations increased in importance.[6] Support for the party as the interpreter of reality became

increasingly dependent upon its ability to meet real, immediate, tangible demands, that is, support for the party became contingent upon its ability to cope with and manage a developing socio-economic system and upon its ability to make available the goods and services demanded by the masses. This is especially applicable to Eastern Europe where economic prosperity and rationality appear to be more important issues than they are in the USSR. Eckstein and Bendix attribute this to two factors: greater willingness of Soviet citizens to accept power objectives and nationalism in lieu of economic success, and the late arrival of the Protestant work ethic as a cultural norm in the USSR.[7]

This is not to say that ideology is no longer an important variable influencing decision-making. The ideological goals of political elites are essentially the same as before. What is changing, it seems, are some of the underlying assumptions of the decision-making process. That is, political elites are becoming increasingly aware of the limits of political, ideological criteria as guides to decision-making in certain non-political areas, e.g., the economic system. Approaches stressing rationality, efficiency, pragmatism, and decentralization of decision-making are becoming increasingly important in Eastern Europe.[8] An examination of economic development in Eastern Europe will reveal some of the problems which are forcing elites to go beyond political considerations in economic

decision-making, and, presumably, which will be reflected in the elite recruitment pattern in each of the countries.

Economic Development in Eastern Europe

Industrialization in communist societies can be conceived of as occurring in two different, although not mutually exclusive, phases. The first phase, a period of extensive growth, occurred in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland in the 1950's. Transition to the second phase, a period of intensive growth, is now occurring in these countries. Each phase is distinguished by the kinds, quantity, and quality of inputs and outputs of the economic system and, theoretically, by the methods of administration.

Following World War II, political elites in Eastern Europe initiated a period of rapid industrialization which paralleled that of the Soviet Union. Economic development followed the Stalinist model, with emphasis on the development of heavy industry and concentration of decision-making power in the central party apparatus. High rates of economic growth were achieved through extensive inputs of capital and mobilization of labor reserves. During the extensive stage of economic development, the problems which accompanied the Stalinist planning system were mitigated by increasing capital and labor inputs. High growth rates can be stimulated and maintained for a period of time, but, as Ota Šik concludes, "as soon as the extensive development has passed a certain limit, or goes further under specific economic

economic conditions and brings insoluble internal economic contradictions, it is actually a special kind of ineffective, economically negative development, the consequences of an inadequate system of management which must be changed as soon as possible if there is not to be a catastrophe."[9] Economic growth rates in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the early 1960's supported Šik's observation.

Growth rates during the 1950's, as Table 1 indicates, were fairly impressive, exceeding or equaling those of Western Europe. Growth of industrial production was much greater in Eastern than Western Europe from 1950 to 1960 and about the same from 1960 to 1964.[10] Other industrial

TABLE 1

GROWTH OF GNP, PREWAR TO 1964[11]
(ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES)

	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1964	1951-1964
Bulgaria	5.9	7.3	4.3	5.9
Czechoslovokia	3.6	6.6	1.3	4.0
East Germany	7.2	4.9	2.7	5.1
Hungary	5.5	4.2	4.6	4.8
Poland	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.9
Rumania	8.6	3.5	4.9	5.7
Average East Europe	5.9	5.2	3.8	5.1
Average West Europe	5.3	4.7	5.2	5.0

measures--e.g., growth of heavy industry, fuels, energy, chemicals--also demonstrate the high growth rates in the industrial sectors of East Europe.[12] The percentage increase in gross national product declined noticeably in Eastern Europe from 1961 to 1964, however, especially in the industrially advanced countries of East Germany and Czechoslovakia (see Table 1, page 32).

The pattern of economic growth reflects the priorities of the Stalinist model, especially in terms of consumption and consumer welfare. (See Tables 2 and 3, page 34.) Lags in growth of consumption have influenced consumption levels. Table 3 is a comparison of per-capital consumption levels in West Germany and Austria, countries with the closest social and historical ties to East Europe, with consumption levels in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Data in Tables 2 and 3 indicate two serious economic problems which faced East European political leaders in the early 1960's. First of all, in spite of impressive growth rates in the industrial sphere, personal consumption remained relatively low. Belassa, for example, concludes that the real income per capita of the working population in Hungary was on the average about 10 percent lower in 1955 than in 1949.[13] Second, and perhaps even more serious, growth rates in the 1960's began to decline--especially in the economically advanced countries. The growth rates in Eastern Europe vary inversely with per capita GNP (in West Europe there is no

TABLE 2

GROWTH OF PERSONAL CONSUMPTION IN RELATION TO GNP[14] (RATIOS OF GROWTH RATES, IN PERCENT)

Country	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1964	1951-1964
Czechoslovakia	31	55	136	55
East Germany	160[a]	90	22	114
Hungary	36	100	84	71
Poland	85	84	76	84
Austria	100	100	112	104
France	111	83	114	102
Denmark	75	76	102	85
West Germany	86	105	106	97

[a]The high ratios recorded for East Germany from 1951 to 1960 result from mass migration to the West.

TABLE 3

COMPARATIVE LEVEL OF PERSONAL CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA[15]

Country	Prewar[a]	1950	1955	1960	1964
West Germany	100	100	100	100	100
Austria	81	82	78	79	79
Czechoslovakia	95	100	71	63	57
East Germany	85	54	68	68	60
Hungary	87	69	52	49	48
Poland	45	60	48	42	40

[a]1936 for West Germany; 1937 for Poland and Czechoslovakia; 1938 for the other countries.

clear pattern). This is another indicator of problems facing centrally planned and administered economies as they develop.

Reasons for the declining growth rates appear to be endemic in the management of the economic system. In the 1950's it was possible for political leaders to overcome the weaknesses accompanying centralized planning (lack of proper criteria for allocation of resources, the complexity of centralized decision-making, the problem of incentives, and the impediments to diffusion of technological innovations) by increasing inputs of manpower and resources. In the 1960's, however, the inefficiencies of the centralized model are more critical than they were during the formative period. The size and complexity of the economic system cause decision-making to be more wasteful than ever. Large labor reserves are either exhausted or significantly reduced. Quality and variety in production are now more important than quantity. This is particularly true for countries which are attempting to compete on an international level with other technically advanced societies. Transition from the extensive to the intensive stage of economic development is proceeding rapidly.[16]

Two prominent East European economists, the late Oscar Lange and Ota Šik, concur with this prognosis. Both men agree that a period of extensive development is necessary and both agree that it should be followed by radical changes in the system of management. Lange, in 1958, indicated that

the end of the transition period would be marked in part by substitution of methods of administration and management by new methods based on economic laws.[17] Šik, commenting on the developmental process, states:

> The decisive source for the growth of production is, on the one hand, the quantitative expansion of inputs, i.e., the volume of means of production and number of productive workers, and, on the other hand, the qualitative development of factors increasing the social productivity of labour, i.e., the technical improvement of means of production, increase in knowledge, abilities and experience of productive workers and leading personnel (by increasing their qualifications), the development of scientific knowledge and its application to technology, and progressive growth of social combination of labour (cooperation and division of labour).[18] (Italics added)

According to Šik, societies in Eastern Europe are entering the latter period--the period of intensive development. The measures he uses in Czechoslovakia to substantiate this conclusion include productivity of labor, development of industrial production, age of machines and equipment, trends in investment cost, and annual increments in productivity of labor and in the number of workers in industry.[19]

The old system of management should be changed completely in the period of intensive development. Šik, as Lange did much earlier, advocates the establishment of a socialist market, decentralization of decision-making, more involvement of economic specialists in the economic system (instead of in state planning agencies), and a complete revamping of the state bureaucracy. Economic decision-making should conform to economic laws; the role of central planning agencies should be specifically delineated. (Under the new

system central planning agencies remain in charge of distributing the bulk of investment resources for the economy in accordance with long range investment plans; they will directly control large investments of countrywide importance; and they will have adequate power to intervene directly into production activities of enterprises and industries.)[20]

Economists in Eastern Europe are very much concerned with the problems of economic efficiency and, evidently, quite serious in their attempts to introduce rationality into the economic system.[21] According to some economists, rationality demands at least some extension of the workings of the free market. This would, of course, threaten the very existence of the state's economic bureaucracy.[22] Opposition to reform programs is both ideological (the relationship of politics to economics) and practical (the entrenched position of a state bureaucracy). However, the necessity for reform seems inescapable. Ota Šik indicates that elites in Czechoslovakia have attempted to alleviate some of the pressures on the economic system by recruiting more specialists into economic management positions.[23] This, he says, will only serve as a stop-gap measure. (One of the problems initially facing political elites in the USSR and Eastern Europe was that of recruiting reliable, skilled personnel into management positions. This problem stimulated concentration of technicians into the central party bureaucracy. However, the percentage of trained individuals has increased to the point where it is possible to decentralize decision-making

and, as Šik indicates was occurring in Czechoslovakia, to increase the skill attributes of management personnel on all administrative levels.)

In spite of opposition from "dogmatists," economic reform has been initiated in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Reforms in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more extensive than those in Bulgaria and Poland, although the outcome of the Czech reform program is now in doubt. Poland and Bulgaria are experimenting with piecemeal reforms similar to those initiated in the USSR.

Reform will have to occur in two areas to be meaningful: first of all, changes in the system of economic administration and planning will have to occur and, secondly, technical rationality will have to increase as a norm governing recruitment of decision-makers. It is imperative, economists agree, for economic systems in the stage of intensive economic development to operate under a system which maximizes rationality in decision-making and efficiency in resource allocation. The implications of these criteria for the polity are important and opposition to reform is extensive, especially in Bulgaria and Poland. We cannot predict, on the basis of this study, the outcome of the struggle; however, we can determine if the changes which appear necessary in the composition of elite bodies are occurring. That reform of some kind is needed seems to be beyond dispute; whether recruitment to elite positions reflects this need is an empirical problem. (Unfortunately I can only partly

answer the question on the basis of this study since I have no way to test the relationships among career variables, attitudes, and behavior.)

Economic Development and Political Change

Almond and Powell, in a developmental approach to comparative politics, outline three dimensions on which systems can be compared to determine the level of development: role differentiation, secularization, and sub-system autonomy.[24] A more developed system is distinguished from a less developed system by higher levels of role differentiation and secularization ("secularization is the process whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action"), and by high sub-system autonomy.[25] In capability terms, those systems with high sub-system autonomy have relatively versatile and continuous capability; secularized systems utilize rational decision-making criteria. However, Almond and Powell indicate that "the dominant and legitimate culture of totalitarian systems is ideological in its intellectual characteristics. There are limits on rational calculation and analysis."[26]

The implications of Almond and Powell's framework for communist states are obvious: they will be "less developed" so long as they remain monocratic and ideological. There is general agreement among scholars on the decline of ideology in "mature" communist societies. Ionescu, for

example, states that "revolutionary fervour is gradually replaced by respect for efficiency and good administration . . . ideology is gradually being replaced by pragmatism."[27] The transition is not a smooth one, however, for there is considerable evidence pointing to a generational conflict between the old revolutionaries and the young rational administrators.[28] Technical rationality, it is claimed, will become the norm in economic decision-making. If this occurs there will be considerable spill-over into the political system, especially in societies stressing political control of economic development.

Barrington Moore and Herbert Marcuse both predicted technical rationality as a possible trend influencing leadership selection as the USSR industrializes.[29] Recent studies of elite recruitment in the USSR substantiate these predictions.[30] In mature communist societies the party will be forced to change its role from that of a system builder to that of a system manager. If it accepts this role it will have to recruit into the party apparatus individuals who possess the technical competence to manage the economic system. A developed, intensive economic system poses different management problems from an economic system in the extensive growth stage. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are now in the intensive stage of economic development, although there are differences among them in levels of development. Bulgaria remains more "suited" for the classical communist system of planning and management. Political

elites have followed the Soviet lead, however, and are experimenting with reform measures.[31]

The time period of this study, 1957-1968, is particularly well suited for analysis for several reasons. First of all, the countries under consideration were beginning to feel the dislocations in their economic systems discussed above. Second, the political atmosphere in Eastern Europe was relatively stable. Third, polycentrism in the communist world provided political leacers in Eastern Europe a little bargaining room with the USSR. Finally, the Soviet Union was having economic problems and was beginning to experiment with economic reforms. In short, there was both a rationale for reform and a favorable political atmosphere in which to effectuate it.

Elites in Eastern Europe have essentially two alternative responses to the dislocations of economic development and both of these have significant implications for the political system. On the one hand, political elites could continue to dominate economic decision-making and refuse to implement meaningful economic reform. If they choose this course it seems inevitable that economic development will be curtailed. Consequently the legitimacy of the party, which, to a large extent, is based on its commitment to economic development, would decline. The gulf between non-political elites and political elites, or between those stressing rationality in decision-making and those stressing ideology, would widen. Political leaders would become more dependent

upon the Soviet Union for economic assistance and political support and it seems inevitable that all this would lead to declines in social freedoms and to more repressive regimes.

The other course, that of effectuating changes in recruitment and decision-making criteria, poses somewhat different problems for political leaders. Milton Lodge concludes from his study of elite participatory attitudes in the Soviet Union that Soviet political elites are being forced to rely increasingly on specialists in decision-making situations. "Over the years all the elites, the Party included, increasingly came to rely on scientific knowledge and expert skills as crucial resources in the decision-making process."[32] He also noted that specialist elites increasingly described themselves as participants in the policy-making process, with economic elites indicating the greatest increase in perceived influence from 1957 to 1965, and making the greatest push for more influence in decision-making. Specialists increasingly feel they should be making policy.[33]

It seems reasonable to assume that political elites in Eastern Europe are faced with similar challenges. The party claim to authority in communist societies is linked to its claim to ideological supremacy.[34] However, Marxist ideology offers some objective standards against which the aspirations and the accomplishments of political elites can be measured. Ideological considerations are becoming less important in Eastern Europe--the party's role as the

"interpreter of reality" is becoming increasingly dependent upon its ability to meet tangible goals. It seems likely that non-political elites, stressing rationality in decision-making, are challenging the authority of the party in certain policy-making areas. The imposition of rationality as a norm governing recruitment and decision-making would carry with it a potential reduction of power over the economic system. It would also increase the possibility that elites in other non-political areas would seek more autonomy. In short, alterations in the recruitment and decision-making process could mean a reduction in power for political elites.

Recent events in Czechoslovakia underscore another danger accompanying reform. Reform measures, it seems, must be limited to the economic system and must conform to Soviet expectations. The initiation of reform in one area, however, will almost certainly stimulate pressure for reforms in other areas.

This does not necessarily mean that the introduction of rationality as a norm in recruitment and economic reform would lead to a pluralist political system. Research by Gehlen and McBride indicate that elites with specialized skills have been present in the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1952.[35] Although there is evidence of conflicts in the decision-making process, there are few indicators of a trend toward a pluralist political system. Other factors, such as the role perceptions of specialized elites, linkages among and within elite groups, social traditions, and the

ideological commitment of specialized elites are also crucial in assessing the potential for a pluralist political system. It does seem evident that the political/cultural context in Eastern Europe would be more conducive to pluralism than that of the Soviet Union.[36]

The approach of this study is developmental--that is, it is assumed that the societies under consideration are developing societies (from an economic standpoint the point is beyond dispute), that they are characterized by secularizing value systems and increasing role differentiation. Whether they will develop sub-system autonomy, a necessary characteristic of democratic pluralism, as the society modernizes, cannot yet be determined. Democratic pluralism is a possible, although not a necessary, outcome of modernization.

The question of pluralism is beyond the scope of this study. A major effort will be directed towards examining the hypotheses outlined in the first chapter. An attempt also will be made to utilize Fleron's typology in analyzing the data, not only to increase our understanding of changes in the recruitment process but also to test the relevance of the typology to Eastern Europe.

The challenges of political and economic development, as the discussion above indicated, are intertwined in Eastern Europe. Political legitimacy depends ultimately on the ability of the parties to meet the technical requirements of an industrializing society and the social aspirations of the masses. This is incumbent upon them because of their

insistence on maintaining control of the entire social system. It seems the transition from an extensive to an intensive economic system will either force political elites to alter decision-making criteria and recruitment patterns to adjust to changes in the functional requisites, or force them to become even more reliant on the Soviet Union for economic and political support. Both alternatives have positive and negative consequences for the political leaders.

Summary

Political elites in Eastern Europe are confronted with system building problems--the central problem, according to Meyer, is that of establishing and/or maintaining authority.[37] The party claim to authority is being challenged by differing conceptions of rationality as defined by the professional elites. The masses are restive; indications are that they are escalating their demands for political and social liberties and material benefits. Crucial problem areas include economic reform, establishment of rationality in decision-making, a lessening of police power, elimination of arbitrariness in the legal systems, development of loyal, qualified cadres, reconciliation with ethnic groups, reconciliation with professionals, and attention to consumer demands.

There are also indications of antagonisms within the party bureaucracies. "Ideologically" oriented party members have differing perceptions of reality from those "pragmatically"

inclined. A substantial number of party bureaucrats are in danger of losing their positions if skill requirements are established. It is generally not necessary for government bureaucrats to possess technical skills--the British Civil Service functions quite well in a "generalistic" tradition. If political elites in Eastern Europe wish to maintain dominance over the entire social system, and maximize their independence from the USSR, they will be forced to alter recruitment and decision-making criteria so as to include specialists in crucial decision-making areas. In so doing they will risk losing some of their decision-making power to "rational" elites, however (and, it seems, run the risk of "socialist intervention"). The alternate course of action--to refuse to adjust to changes in the economic system--will lead to failures in the economic sphere, dissatisfaction among the masses, alienation from the professionals, and increased reliance on the USSR.

Analysis of the data, which follows in Chapters III and IV, will proceed on two levels. First of all, I will be seeking to determine if recruitment trends reflect the changes in the economic systems discussed above. Specifically, are there trends supporting the assumption that economic development will force political elites to alter recruitment criteria. If so, we should expect to see more individuals recruited with rational-technical skills, careers, and education areas, and fewer elites recruited with non-rational skills, careers, and education areas.

Second, variables will also be analyzed which, hopefully, will reveal characteristics of each party in a broader sense. That is, a discussion of changes as measured by demographic, career, and age criteria not only will improve our understanding of some of the forces influencing party recruitment trends in each country, but also will increase our ability to comprehend current policies and to make predictions regarding the future. This discussion will indicate something of the "nature" of each party as revealed by the attributes of its leaders.

NOTES

[1]Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 70.

[2]G. M. Sorokin, "Basic Trends of Economic Development in the Socialist Countries of Europe," in M. C. Kaser (ed.), Economic Development for Eastern Europe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 3.

[3]Oskar Lange, Problems of Political Economy of Socialism (Warsaw, 1958).

[4]Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 126-239.

[5]Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 24.

[6]Ibid., p. 25.

[7]Reinhard Bendix and Alexander Eckstein, "The Cultural and Political Setting of Economic Rationality in Western and Eastern Europe," in Gregory Grossman (ed.), Value and Plan: Economic Calculation and Organization in Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 245-254 and 263-265.

[8]See Grossman, op. cit.; Gregory Grossman, "Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, XV, 6 (November-December, 1966); and Michael Gamarnikow, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968).

[9]Ota Šik, Plan and Market Under Socialism (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1967), p. 50.

[10]Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe," in New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part IV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 883.

[11]Ibid., p. 880.

[12]Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, 1937-1962 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 119-165.

[13]Bela Belassa, The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 236;

see also Nicolas Spulber, The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 48-52.

[14]Ernst, op. cit., p. 886.

[15]Ibid., p. 887.

[16]Alexander Erlich, "Economic Reforms in Communist Countries," Dissent (May-June, 1967), p. 313.

[17]Lange, op. cit.

[18]Šik, op. cit., p. 48; see also Belassa, op. cit.; John M. Montias, Central Planning in Poland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Jan M. Michael, Central Planning in Czechoslovakia (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960); and Stanislaw Wellisz, The Economies of the Socialist Bloc (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

[19]Šik, op. cit., pp. 47-99.

[20]Erlich, op. cit., p. 317.

[21]p. J. D. Wiles, "Rationality, the Market, Decentralization and the Territorial Principle," in Grossman, Value and Plan, op. cit., p. 184.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Šik, op. cit., pp. 83, 84.

[24]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

[25]Ibid., p. 24.

[26]Ibid., p. 312.

[27]Ionescu, op. cit., p. 26.

[28]See Gamarnikow, op. cit., Chapter 6; Alfred G. Meyer, "Authority in Communist Political Systems," in Lewis Edinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 106.

[29]Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1954); Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 189.

[30]See, for example, George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society (Chicago: Atherton Press, 1968); Frederic

C. Fleron, "Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union," Comparative Politics, I, 2 (January 1969); Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," Problems of Communism, XV, 6 (1966), 56-61; Meyer, op. cit.

[31]J. F. Brown, "Reforms in Bulgaria," Problems of Communism, XV, 3 (May-June, 1966), 18.

[32]Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," in American Political Science Review, LXII (September 1968), 839.

[33]Ibid., pp. 827-834.

[34]Ibid., p. 834.

[35]Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," in American Political Science Review, LXII, 4 (December 1968), 1232-1241.

[36]Bendix and Eckstein, in Grossman (ed.), Value and Plan, op. cit., p. 245.

[37]Alfred G. Meyer, "Authority in Communist Political Systems," in Lewis Edinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 104.

CHAPTER III

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Elite recruitment trends, generally speaking, support the predictions outlined in the first two chapters. However, significant differences are revealed among the countries, reflecting levels of economic development, varying historical and social traditions, party origins, and elite-mass relationships.

Background Variables

Social origins of Central Committee members changed very little from 1957 to 1966. Table 4, page 52, compares members on the basis of father's occupation, population of place of birth at time of birth, and predominate economic characteristics of birthplace. The percentage of those coming from proletarian backgrounds has increased only moderately in Czechoslovakia and Hungary with both countries recording a larger percentage increase in individuals with agricultural backgrounds. Increases in both countries have come at the expense of those with white collar backgrounds; in Czechoslovakia this group has been virtually eliminated in the Central Committee. A sizeable increase in white collar representation is recorded in Bulgaria, however, this

TABLE 4

SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP[a]		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
Father's Occupation n=	30	26	35	46	15	37	43	41
Agriculture	53	54	23	28	40	46	25	24
Industry	20	8	66	69	27	29	44	51
White Collar	26	39	12	2	34	24	30	25
Total	99	101	101	99	101	99	99	100
Population of Birthplace at Time of Birth n=	53	56	44	58	22	23	45	54
100,000 plus	2	5	22	22	46	17	58	58
10,000-99,999	19	15	18	14	28	30	12	12
Under 9,999	79	80	61	64	28	52	29	30
Total	100	100	101	100	102	99	99	100
Economic Characteristics of Birthplace n=	48	41	44	62	22	23	52	54
Industrial	37	24	65	64	63	21	77	76
Agricultural	62	76	36	36	37	78	23	23
Total	99	100	101	100	100	99	100	99
N=	62	137	83	109	63	101	79	86

[a]In this and in subsequent tables the following abbreviations are used: BCP: Bulgarian Communist Party; KSČ: Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; HSWP: Hungarian Socialist Workers Party; PUWP: Polish United Workers Party.

time at the expense of the working class. The increase is understandable--Bulgaria has problems recruiting qualified, trained personnel--but the decline of members with working class origins is surprising.

If we compare representation of each sector with percentage contribution to GNP, Poland exhibits by far the best balance, 31 percent, 41 percent, and 28 percent, respectively in 1960.[1] The industrial sectors in Hungary and Poland contribute almost identical percentages to total GNP. Agriculture in Poland contributes a larger percentage to GNP than in Hungary, 31 percent and 24 percent respectively, yet the percentage of individuals from agrarian backgrounds in Hungary increased significantly from 1957 to 1966 while remaining stable in Poland. The data on population and economic characteristics of place of birth underscore this fact. The only country recording any significant change in birth population is Hungary. In terms of economic characteristics little change was recorded in Czechoslovakia and Poland but Bulgaria and Hungary made significant negative changes (negative in terms of what we might expect from Marxist parties).

In the case of Hungary two possible explanations for this un-Marxian behavior come to mind. First of all, the party apparatus in the larger cities, especially Budapest, was largely destroyed in the 1956 revolution and its aftermath. Party "liberals" who sided with Nagy were purged following the revolution. Kádár was forced to go outside

the cities, which party dogmatists controlled, in order to get support and to rebuild the party apparatus. Secondly, in 1958 party leaders in Hungary started a drive to collectivize agriculture, in spite of bitter opposition from the peasants. Agriculture remains a problem area in Hungary and attention to agricultural affairs is to be expected.

Data on skills, which will be discussed below, support the first explanation. Only 10 percent of the Central Committee members possessed skills in agriculture in 1966, but 78 percent of the members come from predominately agricultural areas. Kádár, it appears, has built his base of support on individuals from medium to small sized cities whereas the party under Rákosi derived most of its personnel from medium to large sized cities. (Zhivkov, in Bulgaria, gained control of the apparatus at about the same time Kádár did in Hungary and, like Kádár, faced serious opposition from factions within the BCP. Changes in Bulgaria and Hungary measured by economic characteristics of place of birth are significant and the problems faced by Kádár and Zhivkov in building a base of support undoubtedly influenced these changes. Similar changes occurred in the CPSU under Khrushchev.)

Ethnicity

With the exception of Poland, as Table 5, page 55, indicates, minority group representation has tended to be very stable in East Europe. Purges in the early 1950's

TABLE 5

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY GROUPS
IN CENTRAL COMMITTEES[a]
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
Dominant	96	94	77	77	92	93	77	85
Slovak	00	00	19	20	00	00	00	00
Jew	2	3	00	1	6	6	19	12
Other	1	3	3	2	1	1	4	3
Total	99	100	99	100	99	100	100	100

[a]Bulgaria: 91% Bulgar; Czechoslovakia: 66% Czech, 28% Slovak; Hungary: 93% Maygar; Poland: 99% Pole.

removed most of the prominent Jews from leading party positions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Ironically, Poland, which is the most ethnically pure, has the second highest percentage of minority group representation. Jews, who make up only .1 percent of the population, represented 19 percent of all Central Committee members in 1957 and 12 percent in 1965. (After the 1968 PUWP Congress, however, elites of Jewish origin had been almost completely eliminated from the Central Committee.)

Numerous explanations have been offered for the recruitment of minority group members into elite bodies. Two of these, association with revolutionary activity and expertise, will be examined here.

Table 6, which compares majority and minority groups for all countries on the relevance of revolutionary activity, supports the thesis that minority groups tended to become disproportionately involved in revolutionary movements.[2] (Revolutionary activity includes inter-war communist movements and guerrilla activity in World War II.)

TABLE 6

PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY FOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN EASTERN EUROPE

	Minority		Majority	
	1957	1966	1957	1966
Did Participate	65	47	51	39
Did Not Participate	35	53	49	61
Total	100	100	100	100
N =	43	45	261	329

Czechs were slightly more "revolutionary" than their Slovak counterparts. Jews, in all countries, were conspicuous for their involvement in revolutionary activity. In Poland, 72 percent of all Jews who were members of the Central Committee from 1957 to 1965 participated in revolutionary movements.

Jews and Slovaks in Poland and Czechoslovakia are better educated than their Polish and Czech counterparts. In Poland, 50 percent of the Jews in 1957 had university training as did 80 percent of the Jews in 1965 (Poles, 46

percent and 57 percent). The figures for Czechoslovakia are summarized in Table 7.

TABLE 7

FORMAL EDUCATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, KSČ (IN PERCENT)

	Czech		Slovak		Other	
	1957	1966	1957	1966	1957	1966
n =	65	85	16	22	2	3
Primary	55	50	45	32	50	00
Intermediate	9	11	00	9	50	00
University	13	20	25	28	00	66
Not Ascertainable	23	20	31	32	00	33
Total	100	101	101	101	100	99

The possibility that revolutionary activity and high education were mutually exclusive--that is, that minority members were selected either for their revolutionary credentials or their expertise, was also investigated. There is no support for this assumption; in fact there is a tendency for high education and revolutionary activity to correlate.

Career Characteristics

Education level of Central Committee members has risen in the last decade but not dramatically. Poland and Czechoslovakia have made the largest gains, but Czechoslovakia

is still lowest in terms of higher education. (Jeri Hendrych, following the 1966 Party Congress in Czechoslovakia, reported that 50 percent of the new Central Committee members and candidates had university training.[3] The data I have on the 1966 Central Committee is minimal and would not reflect this.)

TABLE 8

EDUCATION LEVEL OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
Primary	18	3	53	44	3	4	9	4
Secondary	29	11	8	10	6	7	2	6
University	27	30	14	25	31	35	46	57
Not Ascertainable	25	56	24	22	60	55	42	33
Total	99	100	99	101	100	101	99	100

The increases in the "university" category for Hungary and Poland reflect a large number of recruits from polytechnical schools. In percentage terms the number of Central Committee members with post-graduate work declined in Hungary and remained stable in Poland.

In Chapter II it was predicted that a crucial variable influencing the ability of communist parties to adapt to industrialization would be the acquiring of technical skills by the party elite. The education level might

not be as important, in the final analysis, as the areas of specialization and competence of the elites.

Analysis was made in two areas to determine if there is a trend toward cooptation of individuals with technical skills. First of all, elites were classified according to education area or training and, secondly, they were classified according to the skills acquired in the course of their careers. The following tables summarize these results.

TABLE 9

EDUCATION AREA OR TRAINING
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
n =	46	62	65	88	52	90	59	69
Technical	11	32	17	29	17	20	32	37
Worker/Artisan	22	9	61	44	60	51	33	20
Education/Health	13	24	5	8	6	13	13	11
Control	15	11	5	5	4	6	5	7
Law	20	18	6	8	12	9	12	14
Agitation	20	6	6	6	2	1	5	10
Total	101	100	100	100	101	100	100	99
N =	62	137	83	109	63	101	79	86

These findings support the assumptions previously made regarding technical training. Substantial increases were recorded in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The relatively

low figures for Hungary and Czechoslovakia reflect differences in education systems. Most of the individuals in the "worker" category in these countries are skilled workers or artisans who have received specialized training. The data also indicate that the parties in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more active and/or successful in recruiting workers into the party apparatus than Bulgaria or Poland. Trade union leaders and workers generally favor economic reform measures. Union leaders in the recent crisis in Czechoslovakia were very active in their support for Dubcek. Hungarian union leaders, who are well represented in the Central Committee (see Table 10, page 61), are young, and generally of worker origin whereas their counterparts in Bulgaria and Poland tend to be white collar professionals.

If we make the assumption that elites with technical skills and labor leaders would be more likely to support reform measures and a rational economic system than, say, administrators and control personnel, then the recent, relatively bold reforms initiated in Hungary and Czechoslovakia are more understandable (see Table 10, page 61). In these countries the "rationalizing" elites account for about 50 percent of the Central Committee members in 1966. (Data for the 1966 Czechoslovak Central Committee would, I suspect, reinforce this conclusion.) It can be argued that the Central Committee possesses little real power to initiate reform so this conclusion is meaningless. Technically speaking, the Central Committee does not initiate reform but members of the

TABLE 10

SKILL CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
n =	62	136	83	109	63	100	59	65
Technical	15	25	37	45	38	39	23	28
Administrative	40	38	27	24	23	22	27	30
Manpower	5	2	4	3	13	15	4	3
Control	30	16	26	18	10	12	30	21
Education/Culture	3	9	5	8	6	6	9	12
Other	6	9	1	3	11	5	8	6
Total	99	99	100	101	101	99	101	100

Central Committee, most of whom occupy rather important party and state positions, implement the reforms. Also, it was the Central Committee in Czechoslovakia which made the final decision to oust Novotný and support Dubcek. Aside from the power relationship, the fact that high party and state personnel have spent most of their careers in technically oriented positions enhances the possibility of successful reform.

Figures 1 and 2, pages 62 and 63, respectively, indicate that the changes observed in terms of skill characteristics constitute definite trends in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Poland fluctuate widely but show small overall gains in percentage of elites with



Figure 1. Recruits and Members Possessing Technical Skills



Figure 2. Recruits and Members Possessing Control Skills

technical skills. Most noticeable is the increase in cooptation of technical elites in the 1960 to 1962 period in all countries. In Hungary this increase came at the expense of elites with control skills. The decline of technical elites in the 1963 to 1966 period in Hungary and Poland could reflect several things--a "backlash" by party generalists, fear of too much innovation by elites, a less than wholehearted commitment to reform, or the assumption that technical expertise was sufficiently represented on the Central Committee. The decline in Hungary came after the reforms were initiated (1966); in Poland it came before the reforms were initiated (1964). Perhaps Gomulka was forced to assure party regulars that reform would not result in a significant change in recruitment criteria in order to get the necessary support.

Recruitment of technical personnel increased in Bulgaria from 1963 to 1966. Bulgaria still remains lowest in percentage of elites with technical skills in the Central Committee; indications are that party dogmatists are less than enthusiastic about the recruitment of elites with technical qualifications.

Events in 1967 and 1968 in Czechoslovakia revealed that a rather significant transformation had occurred in the Czechoslovak Party. Recruitment of elites with technical skills was not curtailed in 1966 as it was in Poland and Hungary. Although it would be presumptuous to assume that this is what finally caused Novotný to lose control of the

party, it undoubtedly was a factor. There seems to have been more sentiment and support for continued cooptation of elites with technical expertise among middle level party elites in Czechoslovakia than in Poland and Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia had more serious economic problems than other East European countries. Party elites in Czechoslovakia would not be as threatened, on the whole, by emphasis on technical expertise as elites in Bulgaria and Poland since a larger percentage of them already possessed these skills. It will be interesting to see if events in Czechoslovakia will affect recruitment in other East European countries. The focus of the Polish Party Congress, which came after the intervention, was on ideological purity. Cooptation to the Politburo reflected this but data are not available on the Central Committee.

Career Patterns

Data on career patterns have been analyzed to determine changes in career types, which career types possess which skills and education areas, ages of different career types, penultimate office (which will give some indication of interpenetration of party and government), revolutionary activity and career patterns for minority groups.

Party Bureaucrat, predictably enough, emerges as the dominant career channel for all countries. Increases came primarily at the expense of militant and non-professional categories.[4] The predicted increase in the number of

professionals coopted into the Central Committee was supported only by Bulgaria. The other countries coopted more cultural professionals but the number of technical, non-party career types decreased in Czechoslovakia and Poland while remaining constant in Hungary (see Table 11).

TABLE 11

CAREER PATTERNS FOR CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
Government Bureaucrat	5	13	13	15	13	14	13	16
Party Bureaucrat	23	37	24	29	13	33	28	31
Mass	21	7	17	13	21	20	14	14
Professional (Culture)	10	16	5	10	13	13	6	11
Professional (Technical)	0	10	16	14	11	11	10	8
Military	11	9	4	4	2	3	10	8
Non-professional	2	1	4	6	22	2	1	1
Militant	27	7	12	6	3	3	14	9
Not Ascertainable	2	1	6	4	3	0	4	1
Total	101	101	101	101	101	99	100	99

The data indicate a bureaucratization and specialization of career channels in Eastern Europe. In this respect, differences among the countries have been reduced.

A closer examination of party bureaucrat, government bureaucrat, and mass channels based on skills and education area reveals some rather striking differences, however.

First of all, in terms of education area, party bureaucrats and mass leaders in Hungary and Czechoslovakia maintain their worker bias. Over 60 percent of the party bureaucrats received a workplace education as opposed to 27 percent and 13 percent in Poland and Bulgaria respectively (see Table 12).

TABLE 12

EDUCATION AREA OF PARTY BUREAUCRATS
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
n =	10	16	14	25	6	26	14	22
Technical	10	25	7	20	0	8	14	27
Worker	30	13	64	64	100	65	64	27
Health/Education	0	25	0	0	0	15	14	14
Control	20	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Law	20	31	7	4	0	12	0	9
Agitation	20	0	21	12	0	0	7	23
Total	100	100	99	100	100	100	99	100
N =	13	51	20	32	8	33	22	27

In terms of skill characteristics party bureaucrats in all countries in 1966 were primarily administrators (59

percent to 73 percent). Poland had the second lowest percentage with technical skills and the highest with control skills. Bulgaria was lowest in technical skills (8 percent) followed by Poland (14 percent), Hungary (15 percent), and Czechoslovakia (22 percent).

Government bureaucrats in Hungary and Czechoslovakia followed the general pattern as party bureaucrats although they were better educated. The percentage of government bureaucrats in Poland with technical educations was very high (85 percent) compared with Hungary (47 percent) and Czechoslovakia (50 percent). In terms of technical skill characteristics, however, the countries are very similar.

Over half of the mass leaders in Hungary were labor leaders (next high, Poland with 25 percent) with workplace educations. In the other countries they were generally leaders of cultural or political organizations with control or administrative backgrounds. Many mass leaders in Bulgaria and Poland are lawyers or professional people.

A breakdown of elites according to penultimate office allows us to isolate other important characteristics. We should expect, first of all, that industrializing countries with limited skilled manpower resources would concentrate most of these resources in central party and government positions. Second, we should expect declines in interpenetration of party and government personnel as career channels become established. Finally, declines in ideologues recruited

into the Central Committee and an increase in professionals are to be expected.

Table 13 summarizes changes in penultimate office over time. The percentage recruited directly from professional status increases in all the countries except Poland. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which have initiated meaningful reforms, are more willing to coopt professionals than Bulgaria and Poland--even though the former countries already have a much higher percentage of individuals with technical skills on their Central Committees than the latter. (Data on the Politburos, which is presented in the next chapter, makes this fact more understandable. The Hungarian Politburo is quite low in terms of elites with technical skills and professionals. Not so with Czechoslovakia, however. The Czechs are committed to reform and, evidently, not hesitant about sharing power with professionals.)

The data support the first expectation but with some country specific reservations. In terms of education level, central party officials tended to be more highly educated than regional leaders. In Bulgaria this was not the case, however; almost twice as many regional party leaders had high education as central party officials. High government officials, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, were better educated than party officials on any level. In Czechoslovakia very few government officials had university training but most possessed technical skills.

TABLE 13

PENULTIMATE OFFICE FOR CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1966	1957	1965	1957	1966	1957	1965
n =	59	136	72	105	53	98	75	85
Regional/Local Party	17	26	28	39	19	23	19	30
Other Party	15	12	11	10	6	10	12	11
High Government	27	31	17	14	31	28	33	34
Regional/Local Government	3	6	10	10	4	4	1	1
Mass	15	9	7	5	21	12	15	13
Control	8	7	1	1	2	2	8	6
Agitation	0	2	7	6	2	4	4	1
Professional	2	5	10	12	9	13	4	1
Other	12	3	10	4	7	3	5	4
Total	99	101	101	101	101	99	101	101
N =	62	137	83	109	63	101	79	86

A higher percentage of regional and local party leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary possessed technical skills than in Poland and Bulgaria (32 percent, 22 percent, 17 percent, and 13 percent respectively). Over 40 percent of the central party leaders in Hungary possessed technical skills, a larger percentage than in any other country. High government officials in Hungary were lowest in this category, however. All the countries coopted professionals into the

Central Committee in 1966; Hungary, once again, was highest in the percentage coopted with technical skills (77 percent). None of the coopted professionals in Poland possessed technical skills.

Interpenetration, as measured by the number of party bureaucrats holding government positions and the number of government bureaucrats holding party positions at the time of cooptation, has increased in three countries while holding stable in the fourth. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were significantly higher in this regard than Bulgaria and Poland. In Poland, career lines appear to be very well developed. The difference undoubtedly stems in part from a higher availability of trained personnel in Poland.

In summary, the percentage of Central Committee members in Poland and Bulgaria with formal technical training exceeds the percentage in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, however, the percentage with technical skills exceeds that of Poland and Bulgaria. Party personnel in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more actively involved in the economic system. This conclusion is supported by the data on interpenetration. Career lines appear to be more institutionalized in Poland and Bulgaria; individuals with technical training become administrators upon entering the party. These observations are supported by Carl Beck who, in a similar study, also concluded that the technician category was more relevant for elites in the Central Committees of Hungary and Czechoslovakia than Poland

and Bulgaria.[5] The party bureaucratic category was also less relevant, he concluded, for Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Party leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more worker oriented, have less specialized training in such areas as law and agitation, and are less ideologically inclined than those in Bulgaria and Poland.[6] Data on age and relevance of revolutionary activity will help explain these differences.

Age

Differences observed among Central Committees in career characteristics are reinforced by data comparing age at cooptation and age in 1957 and in 1966. Duverger's hypothesis is substantiated, at least by communist parties in Eastern Europe. The mean age of Central Committee members remained relatively stable from 1957 to 1966 (see Table 14). (In the Soviet Union, however, mean age of Central Committee members increased from 51 to 56 in the same time period.)[7]

TABLE 14

MEAN AGE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

	BCP	KSČ[a]	HSWP	PUWP
1957[b]	54 (SD=10)	52 (SD=10)	49 (SD=11)	49 (SD=6)
1966	53 (SD= 8)	47 (N/A)	48 (SD=10)	53 (SD=9)

[a]1966 statistics

[b]Mean age of United States senators, by comparison, was 55 in 1950.[8]

The only increase in mean age was registered in Poland; mean age in the other countries declined. Jerry Hough, in his analysis of party elites in the USSR, predicted continued economic problems unless older bureaucrats were removed.[9] Mean age for Central Committee members in 1966 in Bulgaria and Poland is just slightly lower than Central Committee members in the CPSU. The implications are undoubtedly the same.

Data on age at cooptation is given in Table 15. Age in cooptation in Bulgaria is about five years higher than in the other countries; this is compensated for, in the case of Poland, by a length of service which is about five years longer.

TABLE 15

MEAN AGE AT COOPTATION

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
1957[a]	46 (SD=11)	45 (SD=9)	43 (SD=10)	42 (SD=6)
1966	48 (SD= 7)	43 (SD=8)	44 (SD=10)	43 (SD=8)

[a]Mean age at cooptation for United States senators in 1950 was 50.[10]

Changes have occurred in the age distribution of party elites, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The mode for all countries except Bulgaria was 50 years in 1957; in 1966 it was 40 for Hungary and Czechoslovakia (see Figures 3 and 4, pages 74 and 75). In 1966, 67 percent of the Central Committee members in Hungary and 60 percent of



Figure 3. Mean Ages of Central Committee Members, 1957



Figure 4. Mean Ages of Central Committee Members, 1966

the members in Czechoslovakia were under 50. In Bulgaria and Poland the figures are 44 percent and 39 percent respectively. Sixty percent of the delegates to the Hungarian Party Congress in 1959 were under 40.[11] Kádár has rejuvenated the HSWP with an infusion of young blood; it seems likely that the same thing might have happened in Czechoslovakia. The dynamism of the parties in these countries will be affected by the ability of party elites to provide advancement opportunities for younger party members. A generation gap between higher and middle level party elites appears to have developed in communist countries. Those parties which can successfully bridge this gap, with a minimum of infighting, will be in the best position to bring about reform. The HSWP appears to be most successful in this regard.

An important variable influencing the prospects for economic reform and a more rational social system, is the age distribution associated with particular skill and career characteristics. The optimal distribution, it seems, would be a combination of young party bureaucrats, who are more prone to support reform, and older professional elites.

This is the situation existing in Hungary. The mean age of party bureaucrats and administrators is 43, that of professional technicians is 57, and those with technical skills 51. Individuals with control skills are 6 to 13 years younger than their counterparts in other countries (see Table 16, page 77).

TABLE 16

DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN--CAREER AND SKILL CATEGORIES, 1966[a]

	BCP	KSČ[b]	HSWP	PUWP
Mean Age	53	53	48	53
Career				
Government Bureaucrat	0	2	5	1
Party Bureaucrat	- 4	- 4	- 5	- 5
Mass	7	4	- 2	- 1
Professional (Culture)	2	- 2	0	2
Professional (Technical)	- 5	- 4	9	5
Military	- 2	- 2	- 8	1
Skills				
Technical	-11	- 3	3	0
Administrative	- 2	- 3	- 5	- 1
Labor	- 3	10	0	- 3
Control	1	6	- 2	0
Culture	3	0	0	- 1

[a]Career or skill mean minus the mean for all members.

[b]1965 figures.

In Bulgaria, the opposite situation obtains with party bureaucrats (M=49) and administrators (M=51), who are older than the professional technocrats (M=48) and elites with technical skills (M=42). Control of the party apparatus thus remains in the hands of older, non-technical elites.

The pattern in Poland is similar to that in Hungary, with party bureaucrats ten years younger, on the average, than professional personnel and five years younger than elites with technical skills. Elites with administrative skills are about the same age as those with technical skills.

Table 16, page 77, summarizes deviations from the mean (in years) for career and skill categories.

Revolutionary Activity

Over half of the party elites in Bulgaria and Poland in 1966 participated in revolutionary or guerrilla activity before or during World War II (see Table 17). This fact is important for two reasons. First of all, associations made in the course of these activities seem to have carried over into the political sphere. Both Bulgaria and Poland have influential partisan organizations; in the case of Poland, the Partisans, who are allied with several veterans organizations, are presenting very real challenges to Gomulka's leadership. They are seeking to increase Poland's autonomy vis-à-vis the USSR and they also appear to be supporting economic reform--for nationalistic purposes. Gomulka is forced to rely on orthodox party members for support and

TABLE 17

PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1956	1966	1957	1965	1957	1965	1957	1965
Did Not Participate	16	47	52	56	66	77	28	43
Participated	83	53	48	44	33	22	72	57
Total	99	100	100	100	99	99	100	100

this lessens his own maneuvering room. Secondly, "revolutionary" types are less likely to be interested in rationalizing the economic system. This is, of course, an observation which cannot be supported empirically but there is a good deal of support for it among students of communism.

In Czechoslovakia and Poland, revolutionary types are concentrated in government, mass and military career patterns. Almost half of the party bureaucrats in Bulgaria had revolutionary experience, along with 89 percent of the mass leaders and 85 percent of the military leaders. Most of the revolutionary types in Hungary occupy government positions (47 percent of the government bureaucrats had revolutionary experience) but only 10 percent of the mass and none of the military career types fit this category. Revolutionary activity seems to be a very minor factor in Hungary, and in Poland and Czechoslovakia the category applies primarily to mass, control, and government personnel. Only in Bulgaria have party leaders failed to move the revolutionaries into government positions. In Poland, however, there is still a sizeable percentage of party bureaucrats with revolutionary experience (41 percent) as compared with 19 percent in Hungary.

Career Paths for Minority Groups

Two countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, had sizeable minority representation in their Central Committees.

In each instance, minority group career patterns varied from the majority.

In 1957, 25 percent of the Slovaks in the Central Committee exhibited professional technical career patterns and only 5 percent of the Czechs. This fact indicates differences in party composition and economic development between Slovakia and the Czech lands. The party in Slovakia, relative to its counterpart in Bohemia, was small and elitist. Slovaks also dominated the military and militant career paths. In 1965, however, this pattern had changed, with Slovaks relying disproportionately on the party apparatus for advancement (45 percent as opposed to 25 percent for Czechs).

Jews, in Poland, concentrated either in the party apparatus or the professions. This was true both in 1957 and 1965. Also, most of the diplomats in the Central Committee were Jews. Reports on the 1968 Party Congress indicate that Jews have been virtually eliminated from the PUWP Central Committee.

(Data on subsequent education--party, military, foreign party, etc.--which I planned to include, were not sufficient to draw any meaningful conclusions. The data do indicate that Hungary is lowest of the countries in terms of subsequent party or military education; Poland is the highest.)

Summary

The discussion above indicates the difficulty in making broad generalizations about political change in Eastern Europe. It seems that there are country specific reservations for virtually every conclusion made. Nevertheless, change has occurred--it is possible to isolate trends and make some observations regarding the nature and composition of each of the Central Committees.

Table 18, page 82, reveals the direction of change in each of the countries. The figures are derived by subtracting the percentage of individuals in each category who were members of the 1957 Central Committee and who have been dropped, from the percentage of individuals in each category who have been added to the Central Committee since 1957. Direction and magnitude of change can be ascertained from the table but not the relative strength of each category represented in the Central Committee.

Generally speaking, the predictions made in the first two chapters have been substantiated. The percentage of individuals with technical skills and technical education or training increased significantly in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (see Table 19, page 84). Hungary, which had a high percentage of individuals in these categories, changed very little. Poland registered small gains but remained low relative to the other countries.

TABLE 18

CHANGES IN COMPOSITION--
CENTRAL COMMITTEE[a]

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
Education Area				
Agriculture and Mining	2	- 3	- 1	0
Technical	23	23	- 1	12
Skilled Worker/Artisan	-11	-13	- 2	-22
Agriculture Worker/ Farmholder	- 4	-12	- 2	- 5
Education/Culture	14	0	7	- 9
Health/Social Services	8	5	1	3
Control	- 7	- 1	5	3
Law	- 1	2	- 5	6
Agitation	-23	0	0	11
Skills				
Agriculture	- 1	- 8	1	5
Industry	12	17	0	6
Administration	0	- 2	- 3	6
Justice	- 2	1	- 4	- 1
Manpower	- 3	- 9	3	0
Control	-15	- 8	3	-22
Foreign Affairs	0	1	- 4	- 1
Education and Culture	8	10	3	7
Career				
Government Bureaucrat	10	3	- 1	10
Party Bureaucrat	18	5	15	1
Mass	-19	- 4	2	4
Professional (Culture)	7	10	0	7
Professional (Technical)	7	- 4	3	- 7
Military	- 4	- 3	2	- 6
Non-professional	1	3	-23	0
Militant	-21	- 8	1	-10

[a]Percent added in each category since 1957 minus percent dropped who were members 1957.

The data support the hypothesis that "rational" skills (technical, health, education) would increase in importance while non-rational skills would decrease (control, ideology). Control skills increased slightly in Hungary but

representation in the Central Committee remained very low. Poland, while registering a substantial decrease in control skills increased the percentage of elites with "non-rational" education areas (agitation, control). Most of these are regional or local party officials.

The prediction that the data would reveal an increase in recruitment of professional personnel is only partially substantiated. Bulgaria made the largest percentage increase, 13 percent to 26 percent. Czechoslovakia and Poland increased slightly and Hungary, which had a relatively high percentage in 1957, did not change.

Each country exhibits a rather distinct developmental pattern. Many factors influence the manner in which political elites perceive and solve problems--these factors include, historical origins of the party, ideological orientations of elites, party members and masses, the relationship between the party and the masses, and the level and rate of economic development. Table 19, page 84, listing contingency coefficients for major variables, gives some indication of the relative strength of the variables used in this study to determine changes in elite composition. These variables, unfortunately, measure only one kind of change. Intensive analysis of internal party affairs and attitudinal surveys are needed to analyze other major factors influencing party operations.

Perhaps the most striking conclusion we can draw from the data is the stability of recruitment trends in the

TABLE 19

CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
Father's Occupation	.1500	.2076[a]	.1034	.2078[a]
Birthplace: Population	.0000	.1090	.1630	.0316
Birthplace: Economic Characteristics	.2567[a]	.0744	.2634[a]	.1081
Formal Education	.3258[a]	.1516[a]	.1833[a]	.0538
Education Area	.2798[a]	.1802[a]	.0469	.0842
Skills[b]	.1264[a]	.2046[a]	.1004	.0173

[a]Corresponding x^2 value significant at the .05 level.

[b]Technical skills only.

parties. Skill and resource requirements have influenced cooptation but the elites recruited into the Central Committee of each party retain a high degree of internal consistency. This is particularly true in the case of Hungary (see Table 18, page 82); a significant transformation occurred in terms of background characteristics but career and skill characteristics remained quite stable. The only exception to this was the emergence of the party bureaucratic career type. In percentage terms, rational skill groups were well represented in the Central Committees of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1957. Party bureaucrats increased in Hungary but they tend to be young and, evidently, pragmatic.[12] Hungary and Czechoslovakia retain their

worker bias; party leaders in Bulgaria and Poland are older, with revolutionary experience, better educated, with a higher percentage having professional backgrounds and educations. In short, assuming that younger elites with technical skills, industrial workers, and party officials who have been involved in the economic system are more likely to support reform than party bureaucratic types, the disposition for reform and willingness to accept it has been much higher in Czechoslovakia and Hungary since 1957 than in Poland and Bulgaria. The percentage of elites with technical skills was higher in the former two countries in 1957 than in the latter two in 1966. Conflicts between technocrats and party apparats were not as likely to occur in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, in Chapter II it was noted that East European economies were making the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth. Economists generally agree on the necessity of employing rationality as a guide to decision-making in an intensive economic system. Recruitment trends in Hungary and Czechoslovakia indicate that decision-makers in these societies have anticipated these changes in decision-making criteria. For example, it became clear in the Czech reform program that decision-making criteria had altered from 1957 to 1966 and that non-political elites were sharing decision-making power with political elites. The reform program in Hungary anticipates that a similar approach will be taken there. Recruitment trends in Poland and

Bulgaria indicate that political elites in these countries are aware of the problems posed by economic development but are reluctant to share decision-making power. Bulgaria, which is still relatively underdeveloped, has not yet experienced the kinds of economic problems discussed here. There is, however, general agreement among economists on the precarious condition of the Polish economy. Political decision-makers in Poland are still unwilling to risk the uncertainties accompanying reform.

NOTES

[1]Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe," in New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part IV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 878.

[2]R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[3]Radio Free Europe, "New Czechoslovak Central Committee," June 14, 1966, p. 4.

[4]See Chapter I, page 17, for an explanation of Career types.

[5]Carl Beck, Aggregative Career Characteristics of Eastern European Political Leaders, Occasional Paper, University of Pittsburg (1968), pp. 41, 42.

[6]Radio Free Europe, "New Czechoslovak . . . ," loc. cit.

[7]Alexander Dallin and Thomas Larson, Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 29.

[8]Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Durham, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 14.

[9]Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elite--In Whose Hands the Future," Problems of Communism, XVI, 2 (1967), 20.

[10]Matthews, op. cit., p. 14.

[11]William E. Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe, I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), 215.

[12]Francois Fejtö, "Hungarian Communism," in William E. Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe, I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), 219.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITBURO

It is extremely difficult to draw conclusions regarding the functioning of the Politburo or the priorities and tactics of Politburo members from the kinds of data employed in this study. The Politburo, unlike the Central Committee, is a small decision-making body--the personalities of one or two individuals can completely dominate. Many factors besides those we are considering affect an individual's personality. Dubcek and Novotný, for example, are very similar in terms of background characteristics but their perceptions of reality are obviously quite different.

It is also much harder to classify Politburo members in terms of skill and career attributes--many are generalists, most have long and diversified party backgrounds. The "professional bureaucratic politician" is just beginning to emerge in Eastern Europe. The Party elites under consideration in this study are a wide assortment of revolutionaries, mass leaders, agitators, young technocrats, and old party functionaries.

In spite of these drawbacks, analysis of Politburo members in terms of background, career and skill characteristics will increase our understanding of the recruitment

process. First of all, we will be able to evaluate the "fit" between the Central Committees and the Politburos. Second, we will be able to determine whether the structure of opportunities differs for Politburo and Central Committee members. Third, comparison among the countries will help explain different approaches to problem solving. Fourth, we will be able to determine if the Politburos are being affected by the changes in skill requirements evidenced in the Central Committees. Finally, we will increase our understanding of the information source of the Politburo--that is, the level at which individuals with non-political expertise are sharing in the decision-making process. Analysis of the Central Committee has revealed an increasing number of individuals with non-political, rational skill attributes sharing power at this level. One purpose of this chapter is to determine if they are also sharing power at the "elite pinnacle" and, if so, in which countries.

Background Characteristics

It was noted in Chapter III that the expectation of an increase in the percentage of elites coming from proletarian backgrounds and larger industrial cities seems justified according to Marxist philosophy. The data, summarized in Table 20, page 90, indicate that while this expectation is supported in some countries it does not seem to be a very important consideration in others.

TABLE 20

SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Father's Occupation n =	8	7	7	4	6	12	9	11
Agriculture	63	43	14	50	66	50	11	27
Industry	0	14	57	50	0	25	22	54
White Collar	38	43	28	0	33	25	67	18
Total	101	100	99	100	99	100	100	99
Population of Birthplace at Time of Birth n =	9	12	9	7	6	9	9	16
100,000 plus	0	8	11	14	34	22	44	44
10,000-99,999	11	16	22	14	17	11	44	25
Under 9,999	89	76	66	72	50	66	11	31
Total	100	100	99	100	101	99	99	100
Economic Characteristics of Birthplace n =	7	11	9	8	6	9	9	15
Industrial	14	27	77	38	50	33	78	73
Agricultural	86	73	22	63	50	67	22	27
Total	100	100	99	101	100	100	100	100
N =	11	17	9	13	12	15	9	16

Trends in Hungary and Poland, as measured by father's occupation, do support this assumption. Both Politburos declined in percentage of individuals from white collar backgrounds and increased in percentage from working class

families. Party elites in Bulgaria, however, increased their white collar bias. This, in part, is a reflection of the recruitment process of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the inter-war years. Lacking a labor movement of any significance, Bulgarian communists focused their attention on middle class intellectuals. The Communist Parties in Poland and Hungary had similar recruitment problems but, unlike Bulgaria, they have altered their recruitment processes to include greater representation of proletarians. Bulgaria does not possess the skilled manpower base of Hungary and Poland. Party elites in Bulgaria exhibit many of the characteristics of communist elites in less developed societies.

Data on the other two background variables, population and economic characteristics of birthplace, do not conform to what we might expect from Marxist parties. Changes in Czechoslovakia reflect a very significant alteration in the power relationship between the Czech and Slovak Parties. In 1957, only one Politburo member was from Slovakia; Slovaks now have a majority on the Politburo. The Communist Party in Slovakia has "modernized" in terms of skill and career patterns, but it still operates in an underdeveloped society. The Hungarian Politburo mirrors changes in the recruitment process initiated by Kádár following the revolution. These were discussed in the previous chapter.

Ethnicity

The last Jew was removed from the Polish Politburo in the 1968 Party Congress (see Table 21). This marks the first time since 1947 that there has not been a Jew on that Politburo. Bulgaria also was ethnically pure in 1968. It appears that nationalistic tendencies have taken their toll of the inter-war, ethnic minority communist leaders.[1]

TABLE 21

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF EAST EUROPEAN POLITBUROS

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Majority	10	17	7	6	10	13	8	16
Slovak	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0
Jew	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	11	17	9	13	12	15	9	16

The most significant change has occurred in Czechoslovakia where Slovaks now have a majority (as opposed to 11 percent in 1957). This transformation resulted, in part, from circumstances surrounding the attempted liberalization and Soviet intervention in 1968. Slovaks, who have been more interested in autonomy than liberalization, were not as adamant in opposition to the intervention as were the Czechs. It seems likely that the ratio will be altered but

the situation is so unsettled that prediction is impossible.

Revolutionary activity was relevant for all minority members in 1957 (as opposed to 74 percent for majority members). In 1968, however, minority members were lower than majority members in this attribute (33 percent-64 percent). In 1957, none of the minority personnel had a high education whereas in 1968 they tended to have higher education levels than majority members. Revolutionary activity, it appears, was probably an important factor in 1957 but of little significance in 1968.

Career Characteristics

The education level of Politburo members increased slightly in the last decade (see Table 22, page 94). There is very little difference between education levels of Politburo and Central Committee members (see Table 8, page 58). Hungary is an exception to this, with a larger percentage of Central Committee members having high educations than Politburo members. This is in keeping with Kádár's policy of sharing decision-making power in certain areas with non-political specialists, both in and out of the party.

What is even more interesting is the change in kind of education in the high or university category (see Table 23, page 94). In all the countries except Hungary there is a noticeable shift toward coopting elites with polytechnical educations as opposed to those with university educations.

TABLE 22

EDUCATION LEVEL OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Primary or Less	36	12	56	38	58	40	33	18
Secondary	36	36	22	15	17	27	0	12
University	27	29	22	37	25	27	56	56
Not Ascertainable	0	24	0	9	0	7	11	14
Total	99	101	100	99	100	101	100	100

TABLE 23

EDUCATION AREA FOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WITH HIGH EDUCATIONS (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
n =	3	5	2	5	3	4	5	9
Polytechnical	0	40	0	40	0	0	0	44
University	100	60	100	60	100	100	100	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99
N =	11	17	9	13	12	15	9	16

Data on education area for all Politburo members and on skills developed during their careers reinforce this conclusion. Hungary, once again, is a conspicuous exception to what appears to be a discernible trend, that is, a

significant increase in technical skill attributes for Politburo members in Eastern Europe (see Tables 24 and 25).

TABLE 24

EDUCATION AREA FOR POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
n =	10	11	9	13	10	13	8	14
Technical	10	27	11	39	10	16	25	50
Worker	30	18	67	15	50	45	37	14
Health/Education	0	18	0	0	20	15	13	0
Control	20	9	0	8	20	8	13	7
Law	20	18	22	31	0	15	13	14
Agitation	20	9	0	8	0	0	0	14
Total	100	99	100	101	100	99	101	99
N =	11	17	9	13	12	15	9	16

TABLE 25

SKILL CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Technical	11	24	0	53	18	26	0	32
Administrative	56	41	55	15	28	20	44	38
Manpower	0	6	11	8	27	20	11	6
Control	33	18	22	15	18	20	44	19
Education/Culture	0	6	0	0	9	13	0	0
Other	0	6	11	8	0	0	0	6
Total	100	101	99	99	100	99	99	101

The Hungarian Politburo is quite similar to the Central Committee in terms of education area but not in terms of skills. Control skills, which are very low in the Central Committee, account for over 25 percent of the skill attributes in the Politburo. Technical skills are lower in the Politburo than the Central Committee, especially when the category is subdivided into industrial and agricultural skills. Only 13 percent of the Politburo members in 1968 have technical-industrial skills as opposed to 29 percent of the Central Committee members. However, most of the Politburo members with control skills are ideologists who have been supplying the theoretical justification for the reform program (Komocsin, Szimrai, Ilku). The point is that technical expertise is not nearly as well represented on the Politburo as on the Central Committee.

This is not true of the other countries. In Bulgaria and Poland technical skills are represented in about the same proportion in the Politburo and Central Committee. Technical skills in the Czechoslovak Politburo are more prominent than in the Central Committee (53 percent to 45 percent, respectively). (The "Czechoslovak Politburo" I am referring to is the one headed by Husak which was installed in April 1969. The Dubcek Politburo is very similar, as measured by my variables, to the Husak Politburo.)

What is particularly interesting is the radical change which has occurred in the Czechoslovak and Polish

Politburos. Technical skills, which were not represented at all in 1957, are well represented in 1968. It is also interesting to note that administrative skills are highest in Bulgaria and Poland--just as in the Central Committee.

Career Patterns

Party Bureaucrats dominate the Eastern European Politburos in 1968 (see Table 26, page 98). Most of the changes that have occurred result from a decline in the "militant" category. In all countries the percentage of professionals represented on the Politburo is below that of the Central Committee, although the difference in the case of Bulgaria is very small. The percentage of professionals has increased in all countries, however. The data indicate that the Hungarian Politburo probably relies more on specialists outside the Politburo than any other country; the other Politburos seem better equipped to function without relying on sub-elites for expertise. Politburo members, with the exception of those in Hungary, are gaining the requisite non-political skills to manage an industrializing society. A sharing of decision-making power with other elites is most likely in Hungary. (Aggregate data will not allow us to make definite conclusions. The role of Ota Šik in Czechoslovakia, for example, is completely obscured in this kind of gross analysis.)

TABLE 26

CAREER CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Government Bureaucrat	0	0	33	23	8	13	0	13
Party Bureaucrat	44	41	33	38	25	33	0	31
Mass	0	18	11	8	33	27	33	13
Professional (Culture)	0	12	0	8	8	13	0	6
Professional (Technical)	0	12	0	8	0	0	0	6
Military	11	6	0	8	0	7	11	13
Non-professional	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
Militant	44	12	22	8	17	7	56	19
Total	99	101	99	101	99	100	100	101

Age

Politburo members in Eastern Europe are young--in most cases the mean age of Politburo and Central Committee members in 1968 is almost the same (compare Table 27, page 99, with Table 14, page 72).

Hungary has experienced little change as measured by mean age and standard deviation. Mean age in Bulgaria has remained at the same level but the distribution has changed significantly (see Figures 5 and 6, pages 100, 101).

TABLE 27

MEAN AGE OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
1957	54 (SD=6)	58 (SD=9)	51 (SD=7)	50 (SD=6)
1968	54 (N/A)	49 (N/A)	48 (SD=7)	50 (SD=9)

Mean age in Czechoslovakia decreased significantly from 1957 to 1968. This is true for both the Dubcek and Husak Politburos. In Poland the mean age did not change in spite of the cooptation in 1968 of Stanislaw Kociolek (35), Josef Tejchma (41), and Jan Szydlak (43).

Comprehensive economic reform has occurred in the countries with younger Politburo members. Over 30 percent of the Politburo members in Poland and Bulgaria have a mean age of 60 or higher as compared with 18 percent and 13 percent in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. (The relatively high figure for Czechoslovakia reflects the presence of Svoboda, certainly no opponent of reform.) The mode for Czechoslovakia is 40; for the other countries it is 50.

Mean age at cooptation is given in Table 28, page 102. Hungary is the only country in which mean age at cooptation was lower for Politburo members than for Central Committee members (see Table 15, page 73). The Hungarian Politburo is not only the youngest in Eastern Europe, it is also the most homogeneous in terms of age and age at cooptation. It will be interesting to see if it will maintain



Figure 5. Mean Ages of Politburo Members and Candidates, 1957



Figure 6. Mean Ages of Politburo Members and Candidates, 1968

TABLE 28

MEAN AGE AT COOPTATION FOR POLITBURO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
1957	45 (N/A)	50 (SD=11)	48 (SD=9)	42 (SD=4)
1968	52 (SD=11)	49 (SD=9)	41 (SD=6)	48 (SD=8)

this distinction. The Polish Politburo, as the figures in Table 28 indicate, was not able to keep mean age low. (Mean age at cooptation for Cabinet members in the United States, by contrast, is about 54.)[2]

There is virtually no difference in terms of age among elites with technical, administrative, and manpower skills within each country. Elites with control skills are much higher than the mean in all countries except Hungary. Professionals are higher in all countries except Czechoslovakia where they are, on the average, ten years below the mean. Party Bureaucrat, as in the Central Committee, was generally lower than other career categories. Military elites in all countries except Hungary were 10 to 20 years above the mean--the only military elite on the Hungarian Politburo was 8 years below the mean. Government bureaucrats tended to be slightly above the mean.

In short, older elites in all Politburos were generally control, military, or professional personnel. Party bureaucrats and elites with technical skills were below the

mean. Older "political" elites possess either control or administrative skills.

Revolutionary Activity

Revolutionary activity, as might be expected, was more relevant for Politburo than Central Committee members (compare Table 29 with Table 17, page 78). The only exception to this is Czechoslovakia. It is interesting to note that Hungary has changed least in this regard. This is, once again, consistent with Kádár's policy. He is rationalizing the economic system but making few changes in the party apparatus--as far as we can determine with the kinds of variables employed here.

TABLE 29

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY RELEVANT
(IN PERCENT)

	BCP		KSČ		HSWP		PUWP	
	1957	1968	1957	1969	1957	1968	1957	1968
Not Relevant	0	18	44	77	33	40	11	38
Relevant	100	82	56	23	66	60	89	62
Total	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100

Minority Career Paths

The only country with sizeable minority representation on the Politburo in 1968 is Czechoslovakia. Czechs and Slovaks, as in the case of the Central Committee, exhibit

different career and skill attributes. Slovaks rely more on the party apparatus--64 percent of the Slovaks are party bureaucrats as opposed to 18 percent of the Czechs. Czechs possess more technical expertise (87 percent) than the Slovaks (28 percent). These figures are consistent with our understanding of the situation in Czechoslovakia: the data reflect differences between the two communist parties in terms of history, personnel, and operational milieu.

Summary

The trend towards cooptation of elites with rational skills, which was confirmed in our analysis of Central Committee members, seems to be influencing cooptation into the Politburo as well. The percentage of elites with technical educations and technical skills increased significantly in Czechoslovakia and Poland (see Table 31, page 106). Bulgaria also registered sizeable increases but remained low relative to the other countries. The Hungarian Politburo, as the data in Table 30, page 105, indicate, was the most stable of all in terms of variables affecting recruitment patterns.

Perhaps the most interesting finding of this entire study is the stability of the recruitment process in Hungary (see Table 30, page 105, and Table 31, page 106). The Politburo and Central Committee of the HSWP contained the highest percentages of elites with technical skills in East Europe in 1957. Neither body has experienced much change since

TABLE 30

CHANGES IN COMPOSITION--POLITBURO[a]

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
Education Area				
Agriculture	-13	3	0	0
Technical	31	27	6	42
Worker	-11	-45	-25	-25
Education/Culture	23	3	14	-25
Health/Social Services	0	3	0	0
Control	-18	3	-11	8
Law	2	- 4	15	-17
Agitation	-18	7	0	17
Skills				
Agriculture	- 6	10	14	14
Industry	21	45	-14	36
Administration	-13	-34	-14	6
Justice	0	- 3	0	7
Manpower	5	- 3	7	0
Control	-17	- 8	3	-59
Foreign Affairs	5	-11	7	0
Education/Culture	5	0	0	0
Career				
Government Bureaucrat	0	- 9	7	29
Party Bureaucrat	- 4	8	1	36
Mass	15	- 8	8	-20
Professional (Culture)	10	10	7	7
Professional (Technical)	15	10	0	7
Military	-11	3	7	- 6
Non-professional	0	0	-14	0
Militant	-29	-15	-14	-53

[a]Percent added in each category since 1957 minus percent dropped who were members 1957.

then. In fact, the only two changes in Hungary, as measured by all my variables, which are statistically significant, are the emergence of the party bureaucrat career channel and the cooptation of elites with rational skills ("rational" skills include technical, education, health, social services, and cultural skills).

TABLE 31

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR x^2 TESTS
(DROPS AND ADDS ONLY)

	BCP	KSČ	HSWP	PUWP
Central Committee				
Education Area				
Technical	.01	.01	--	--
Education/Health	.01	--	--	--
Skills				
Technical (Agriculture and Industry)	.05	--	--	--
Industry	.02	.01	--	--
Rational (Industry, Health, Education)	.01	.02	.05	.02
Career				
Professional	.02	--	--	--
Party Bureaucrat	.01	--	.01	--
Politburo				
Education Area				
Technical	--	.02	--	.05
Skills				
Technical	--	.001	--	.05
Rational	--	.001	--	.05
Career				
Professional	.05	--	--	--
Party Bureaucrat	--	--	--	.05

Continuity in the recruitment process, in spite of economic reform (which began in Hungary in 1958), is probably one of Kádár's greatest assets. Party functionaries are not faced with the spectre of a rising crop of technocrats challenging their positions; elites of working class origin and with working class experience are still very visible in

higher party circles. Kádár faced two problems in 1957--reconciliation with the masses and gaining the loyalty of party members, especially the dogmatists who were suspicious of his liberal tendencies. He appears to have been successful on both counts. Decision-making in non-political areas is shared with elites at the Central Committee level and outside the party. The requirements for recruitment to elite positions have not changed: party elites are young; turnover is high; the party has retained its worker bias. The average party functionary cannot help but be reassured by the continuity of the party in spite of changes in the economic system. Reform would not appear as threatening as, say, in the case of Bulgaria where Zhivkov has been promoting younger elites with rational skills to high party positions.[3]

Both the Central Committee and the Politburo in Czechoslovakia made significant changes in requirements for cooptation. The two bodies are now more similar in terms of background characteristics than they were in 1957. The Central Committee and Politburo both express commitment to the reform program. Unfortunately, the situation is less than ideal for testing hypotheses.

The changes in Bulgaria and Poland indicate that elites are aware of skill requirements for a modernizing society. In these countries, unlike Hungary, it appears that elites with the requisite skills are being coopted into the Politburos. This approach, assuming the technical elites

are more "rational," could ultimately have a greater impact on the party apparatus than Kádár's approach. Rational elites in Bulgaria and Poland are in a position to share in political decision-making. Cooptation of elites with technical skills is more noticeable in the Politburo than the Central Committee in Poland.

Changes in recruitment patterns for Politburo members have increased the similarity between the Politburo and Central Committee in each country. The assumption that the data would reveal two recruitment patterns does not seem to be valid. The "structure of opportunities" for the two bodies became more similar from 1957 to 1968.

All countries have responded to changes in skill requirements by coopting elites with technical skills. The response has varied from country to country, however. In Hungary, technical elites are coopted at the Central Committee level but not in the Politburo. In Czechoslovakia they have been coopted at both levels and the percentage of elites with technical skills is high at both levels. The percentage in Bulgaria and Poland remains low relative to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and, unlike Hungary, professional-technical elites in Bulgaria and Poland share decision-making power in the Politburo. The Hungarian Party has changed little and retains a strong worker bias. The Bulgarian Party has made substantial changes and has increased its elitist bias. Economic reform will be difficult in Poland and Bulgaria;

party elites seem to have decided to maintain complete party control of economic decision-making but party elites in middle and lower level administrative positions in both countries lack the requisite skills (and, apparently, the dispositions) to effectuate meaningful reform. Zhivkov, in particular, faces a good deal of opposition from dogmatists within the party.

These conclusions are based on the assumption that elites with rational skills will have a tendency to react "rationally"--that is, not ideologically--to social problems. However, factors other than ideology often influence decision-making (e.g., intra-party factional disputes, international politics, influence of non-party elites, public sentiment), and these factors may force "non-rational" decisions on party elites. Our conception of what is and what is not rational is relative; approaches to problem-solving cannot finally be classified "rational" and "non-rational." What this study has attempted to do is to determine if political leaders are gaining the requisite technical skills to administer an industrializing society. This much we can establish. Whether or not they will react "rationally" (as we define it) is problematical; many factors influence decision-making. The study has tentatively justified this assumption, however, because the parties with the highest percentages of elites with rational skills are taking, or have attempted to take, more realistic approaches to solving problems of economic development than the parties with fewer technical elites.

NOTES

[1]R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[2]Lewis J. Edinger, ed., Political Elites in Industrialized Societies (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 289.

[3]J. F. Brown, The New Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 15-19.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The hypotheses and findings are summarized at the end of each chapter. In this chapter, rather than repeating these, I will approach the problem of elite recruitment from slightly different vantage points. Fleron's typology will be employed to examine and classify recruitment patterns in Eastern Europe. A brief summary will be made of general trends in each country. And, finally, the hypotheses presented in Chapter I, which were drawn from studies of elites in non-communist societies, will be analyzed with the findings from this study.

According to Fleron, political elites, who do not possess the skills necessary to manage an industrial economy, have at least four alternative courses of action: to try to get the specialized elites to contribute their skills at no cost, to either retrain members of the political elite or recruit into the system as replacements new cadres with the necessary skills, to coopt into the system members of the specialized elites who possess skills, or to share power on a more or less competitive and equal basis as in a pluralist system.[1] The latter two recruitment systems, the "cooptative"

and the "pluralistic," are distinguished by the presence of professional elites in political offices. The cooptative system is distinguished from the pluralistic system by the presence of institutionalized advantage for professional politicians and by the method of replenishing the political elite.

Fleron's analysis of the USSR led him to conclude that the leadership system is a cooptative system--that is, specialized professional elites are present in political offices (which distinguishes it from the monocratic and adaptive systems) and the political elites possess institutionalized advantages (which distinguishes it from the pluralistic system). He then goes on to argue that it will be possible for political elites in the USSR to maintain control of the polity by having access to the specialized skill requirements necessary for an industrial society without having to compete with the specialized elites for political power.

The elite recruitment systems in Eastern Europe are also cooptative. Professional elites are present in each Central Committee and Politburo.[2] Political elites in each body possess institutionalized advantages.

This is not an adequate description of the recruitment process, however. The comparative approach, which Fleron did not employ, has revealed substantial differences among the countries considered in this study. A brief country-by-country description will illustrate the point. In

this analysis only professionals with technical skills will be discussed.

Bulgaria, in 1957, had no professionals holding elite positions in the Central Committee and the Politburo. In 1968, there were thirteen professionals in the Central Committee and two in the Politburo. There were, however, elites with technical skills in both bodies in 1957. Bulgaria, it seems, moved from an adaptive system to a cooptative system from 1957 to 1966.

Czechoslovakia, in 1957, had thirteen professionals on the Central Committee and none on the Politburo--the presence of professionals on the Central Committee is enough to classify the system as cooptative. In 1968, there were fifteen professionals on the Central Committee and one on the Politburo--the system is still cooptative. During the 1957 to 1968 period, however, there was a larger percentage increase in political elites with technical skills. It seems, in other words, that the system is both adapting and coopting whereas the Bulgarian system is only coopting.

The recruitment system in Hungary resembles that in Czechoslovakia. In 1957, there were seven professionals in the HSWP Central Committee and none on the Politburo; in 1968 there were eleven professionals on the Central Committee and none on the Politburo. In percentage terms, there was no change, either in representation of professionals or of political elites with technical skills. The recruitment system, in this sense, seems to be at an equilibrium--balanced between

coopted elites with technical skills and political elites with technical skills or balanced between an adaptive and a cooptative system.

There were eight professionals on the 1957 PUWP Central Committee; in 1966 there were seven. While the percentage of coopted professionals declined, the percentage of recruited political elites with technical skills increased in both the Central Committee and the Politburo. The recruitment system, it seems, is more adaptive than cooptative.

If we adopt as our criterion of "professional" the requirement that elites must be coopted directly from a professional, non-political status, the picture changes slightly. Poland is still more adaptive than cooptative; Bulgaria, however, is static. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are both adaptive and cooptative--but they change in different ways. It is the party elites in Hungary, and the government elites in Czechoslovakia, who noticeably increase their technical skills.

In short, although Fleron's typology provides an alternative to the totalitarian-pluralism dichotomy, it is limited by its definitional requirements. Communist elite recruitment systems coopt and they adapt; it is as important to determine how they are changing as it is to classify them in a particular category. Fleron, it seems, has restricted the explanatory value of his typology by making his categories mutually exclusive. A given recruitment system can be classified but there is no way to analyze the dynamic of the

system or to adequately compare it with other recruitment systems. For example, is the system more or less cooptative now than it was ten years ago? Is it more or less cooptative than another system? Also, it seems necessary and useful to apply these distinctions to various elite bodies within a system. Altering the categories in the typology would make it less precise, perhaps, but the typology would then be more useful in analyzing and comparing elite recruitment trends.

Elite Recruitment and Economic Change

Since 1948, societies in Eastern Europe have been experiencing a period of rapid industrialization. In Chapter II, some of the ramifications of this process for the organization and administration of the economic system were discussed. Economists agree that a centrally administered economic system, making the transition from an extensive to an intensive period of development, will require changes in organization, administration, and decision-making criteria. It was predicted that these changes would be reflected in elite recruitment patterns.

Data presented in the third and fourth chapters support this prediction. Recruitment patterns in Czechoslovakia, the country with the highest level of economic development in this study, demonstrated the greatest response to changes in skill requirements. Czechoslovakia was also at the

forefront in the drive for economic reform. This is certainly not surprising, considering the slowdown in her growth rate and her strong dependence on exports of high quality goods to Western markets. Ota Šik, who is generally considered to be the architect of the Czechoslovak reform, concluded that a complete overhaul of the state economic bureaucracy would be required and that economic decision-making would have to conform to principles of rationality and efficiency. Recruitment trends, in both the Central Committee and Politburo in Czechoslovakia, indicate a positive response to these criteria. Prior to the 1968 Intervention, political elites in Czechoslovakia appeared quite willing to share decision-making power with non-political elites.

Elite recruitment trends in Bulgaria, which is the least developed country in the study, revealed the lowest percentage of individuals with technical expertise of all Central Committees. Bulgaria, like Rumania, has not yet experienced the problems of a qualitative economic system. Party leaders are aware of the problems which the more advanced economies are experiencing; economic reforms have been initiated and the percentage of elites with rational skills is increasing. The kind of response to changes in skill requirements--emphasis on cooptation rather than adaptation--indicates that rationalizing elites will probably face serious opposition from entrenched party and government bureaucrats.

It is difficult to rank Poland and Hungary in level of economic development. Statistics indicate that they are quite similar, although Hungary is slightly higher in most of the measures Ernst employs. At any rate, they both have entered the qualitative growth period and are experiencing, to a lesser extent, some of the problems which are plaguing Czechoslovakia. The very different responses of the two parties, as indicated by economic reform and recruitment patterns, have not resulted from differences in level of economic development.

Political leaders in both countries have long been aware of problems in the economic sphere. Belassa, in his study of the Hungarian economy, concluded that the "structure of the Hungarian economy as found in 1956 presented difficulties in the way of further growth."[3] Kádár began to initiate reform measures as early as 1958. The economic reform adopted in 1966 will require a complete reorganization of the economic system. Recruitment to elite positions reflects the need for technical expertise and rationality in decision-making. The decision-making process in Hungary permits increasing participation by non-political elites.

Gomulka, in 1957, created an Economic Council in Poland and charged it with the task of preparing a blueprint for a new Polish economic model. The Council proposed complete reorganization of the economic system. Only minor piecemeal reforms have been implemented, however. The reform program adopted in 1966 is a very cautious approach, although

it seems that a thorough reform is necessary. Elite recruitment reflects this cautious approach, the percentage of elites with rational skills is increasing but quite slowly. The party seems reluctant to share decision-making power with non-political specialists, preferring to concentrate on increasing the skill attributes of party and government bureaucrats. Political elites in the highest party positions are acquiring technical skill attributes, but at the middle range level the percentage with technical skills remains low. Political considerations still dominate economic decision-making in Poland. It appears as though an economic crisis similar to that in Czechoslovakia may be required to force changes in recruitment patterns and decision-making criteria.

Trends in recruitment reveal a constant interplay of politics and economics. Generally speaking, a rise in percentage of elites with technical skills is balanced with an increase in percentage with control skills or an increase in percentage of party bureaucrats. Intra-party conflicts, about which we have little information, and changes in the internal balance of power undoubtedly influence recruitment patterns. Thus a graph of the pattern of cooptation of rational elites will show gains and losses within each country and significant differences among the countries. We still lack an adequate understanding of the dynamics at work in each party (and in the bloc) to make bold predictions regarding the future of rationality as a governing norm in decision-making. The data revealed positive trends in

cooptation of elites with rational-technical skills, but it also revealed that, in spite of fairly obvious economic imperatives, the strong role of ideology and politics frequently interrupts and often upsets trends that might be imputed to the need for economic rationalization. Conflicts among rationality, ideology, and politics are far from resolved in Eastern Europe, as events in 1968 illustrated. (These include, for example, the intervention in Czechoslovakia and the theme of the Fifth PUWP Congress, which stressed ideological purity in the face of serious economic problems.)

The Comparative Study of Elites

One of the most conspicuous shortcomings in the field of comparative politics has been the failure of scholars to bridge the gap between studies of communist and non-communist societies. The slow demise of the totalitarian model, which emphasized differences between communist and non-communist societies and similarities among communist societies, is in part responsible. The present study, which has focused on only one aspect of the developmental process, has underscored the diversity among communist societies. Our ability to conceptualize, analyze, and explain developmental processes would be greatly enhanced by studies which bridge the conceptual gap between communist and non-communist societies. A comparative analysis of the dynamics of elite recruitment and elite stratification would make useful contributions,

both to the study of comparative politics and to the study of political development.

At the outset of this project some propositions were presented about elite behavior in non-communist societies, propositions which could be analyzed with the findings of this study. These will be discussed very briefly below. In spite of problems of conceptualization and comparability, problems which could be reduced in a research design, it is obvious that a comparative study of elite behavior would be both enlightening and heuristic.

1. Everywhere careers are lengthened, with success coming only after years of work in specialized areas.

Data on communist elites support this hypothesis. Career lines, in all countries, are more established and specialized now than they were in 1957. Party bureaucrats are younger, but elites with special skills--professionals, mass leaders, foreign affairs specialists--are generally older in 1966 than they were in 1957.

2. The "structure of opportunities" will be different for minority groups.

Recruitment patterns in Eastern Europe definitely support this proposition. Elites from minority groups concentrate in particular career and skill areas (e.g., Jews in Poland were disproportionately drawn to foreign affairs and the professions; Slovaks relied heavily on the party bureaucracy in 1966, and professional careers in 1957). Minority

elites also participated more in revolutionary activity, and have higher education levels than elites from the dominant ethnic group.

3. Members of the elite strata are becoming older at success.

Age at recruitment, for Central Committee members, changed very little in Eastern Europe from 1957 to 1966. This is not true of the Politburos, however. Age at recruitment increased substantially in Bulgaria and Poland from 1957 to 1968. In Czechoslovakia it remained stable, and it declined in Hungary. Political elites are younger now at recruitment than in 1957, while specialized elites are older. The data, broadly speaking, support Duverger's hypothesis that "communist elites are able to impose their young upon the party." Thus the elite strata has declined in age in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, remained stable in Bulgaria, and increased slightly in Poland. (Data on the Fifth PUWP Congress, held in November 1968, would probably reveal a decline for Poland also.)

4. The elite opportunity structure can be described as having a number of peaks, each scalable by specialized methods.

Data on East European elites support this hypothesis. Representatives of the "peaks" in the Central Committee--party, government, mass, professional, military, culture--are distinguished by varying career and skill attributes.

These attributes vary from country to country, but within each country the career paths are fairly well established.

5. The trends toward expansion and specialization will be manifest in all elite pyramids.

This study has been concerned with only one elite pyramid--the party. Data on Central Committees and Politburos support the hypothesis, however. Elites were definitely more specialized in 1966 than in 1957. Representation of the two non-specialized career paths, non-professional and militant, declined significantly. The percentage of elites with general administrative skills also declined, and there was an increase in percentage of elites with specialized skills (technical, agriculture, social welfare, etc.). The number of representatives from various "elite pyramids" increased while the number from mass organizations declined, again indicating increased specialization. All the Central Committees and Politburos increased in size.

6. Bureaucratic elites will gain dominance over political elites because of specialization.

The power relationship between political and bureaucratic elites cannot be ascertained from these data. It is obvious that elites with rational skills are increasing in percentage representation on elite bodies, and, as Czechoslovakia in 1968 indicated, they are probably becoming more powerful vis-à-vis the political elites. The relationship varies from country to country, however, so a general prediction would be difficult. Political elites in Hungary, it

appears, share decision-making power with non-political elites. In Czechoslovakia, before the intervention, it was obvious that non-political elites had increased their involvement in the decision-making process. Political elites in Poland and Bulgaria are carefully guarding their power and, barring some unforeseen event, it appears that the influence of non-political elites will be tightly controlled. In short, while it is apparent that rational elites have improved in their power relationship with the parties in the last decade, it would be impossible to predict that they will gain dominance. Politics and ideology, in communist societies, have not yet taken back seats to economic rationalization, although the data would seem to indicate that struggles for power are likely to increase.

Prospects for Future Research

This study has stimulated at least as many questions as it has answered. A country-by-country analysis seems essential to discuss the most obvious questions: Why the different approaches to decision-making? What determines the role and power of technical elites in a communist society? Which social, cultural, historical, geographical variables exert the greatest influence over the developmental process? Why are political elites more willing to share decision-making power in one communist society than another? Under what conditions are rational elites most likely to dominate

decision-making? Does the increased involvement of rational elites in political decision-making increase the potential for developing sub-system autonomy? The data in this study provide good starting points for further comparative and country specific studies.

NOTES

[1]Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change," Polity, II, 2 (Winter, 1969).

[2]Fleron's definition of a specialized elite is different from mine, however. A specialized elite, in his typology, is one who spent at least seven years in a professional or technical vocation before entering political office. These individuals were classified as "coopted." A professional elite in my study is defined as having spent at least half of his career in a professional or technical vocation. Since we would find more specialized elites in Eastern Europe using Fleron's definition than mine, it seems safe to assume that this definitional requirement is satisfied.

[3]Bela Belassa, The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 235.

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