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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN CENTRAL ETHIOPIA

FROM MID-16TH TO THE EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

presented by

Tesema Ta'a

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degreein History

Date July IO, 1986

 

MS U i: an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

 

 

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[E 4‘s NW SE? 2 5 2005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN CENTRAL ETHIOPIA:

FROM THE MID-16TH TO THE EARLY-20TH CENTURIES.

BY

Tesema Ta'a

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1986

(/23 7/ S 8b

COPYright by
Tesema Ta'a
1986

ii

ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN CENTRAL ETHIOPIA:

FROM THE MID-16TH TO THE EARLY-20TH CENTURIES.
BY
Tesema Ta'a

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 challenged a wide
variety of historical interpretations of Ethiopia which
analyzed the country as a single cultural whole. The change
fully revealed Ethiopia as a society in which the history of
most of its peoples and cultures had not been properly
documented, distorted or neglected. Following the
revolution, however, many Ethiopianist historians,
anthropologists and other social scientists have begun to
look at Ethiopia and Ethiopian studies in a new light.
Mostly based on an effective use of various oral traditions,
linguistic evidence and socio-economic analyses scholars are
making tremendous efforts to investigate, explore, closely
examine, record and reinterpret the historical experiences of
Ethiopia's peoples and cultures. Such efforts, of which this
study is an integral part, will not only contribute towards a
better understanding of the Ethiopian society but also help
to correct historiographical imbalance, create a genuine

climate of equality and add to the storehouse of source

materials on Ethiopian studies.

Tesema Ta'a

This dissertation deals with historical experiences and
activities of the Macha Oromo in western central Ethiopia,
focusing on the transformation in the political economy of
the region. Political economy studies the relations of
production in their inseparable connection with productive
forces, thereby permitting us to get a clearer picture of the
interplay of the internal and external forces responsible for
the transformation experienced by the Macha Oromo over the
years. The interchange of labor and land is highlighted in
my research, although attempts have been made to tie up the
loose ends of the traditions regarding Oromo origin, social
organization, migration and settlement, particularly in

western central Ethiopia.

The Macha Oromo of western central Ethiopia experienced
two fundamental transformations in their political economy.
The first, between ca. 1750-1850, encompassed natural and
organic socio-economic and political changes which took place
following the Macha migration and settlement in western
central Ethiopia as sedentary mixed farmers. The shift of
the Oromo system of production from pastoralism to sedentary
mixed farming generated new developments with far reaching
consequences. As a dominant activity it increased the
capacity of production and reproduction of the community
leading to economic growth which in turn set in motion socio-

political and cultural changes. These changes were mainly

Tesema Ta'a

the results of internal developments and contradictions which
eventually led to the emergence of classes and the formation
of states. The subjective and objective conditions were
ripe enough and the transformation was largely undertaken to
cope with the circumstances and developed from the cultural
traditions of the society itself. The transformation of the
late-19th and early—20th centuries, however, by and large
stemmed from two external events beyond the control of the
Macha communities. These were the profound influence and
impact of European imperialism in northeast Africa and
subsequent creation of the Ethiopian empire under Menilek II.

Both events were not necessarily mutually exclusive.

During the heyday of European imperialism and internal
process of empire-building, the independent Macha states were
conquered and subjugated. Most of the Macha states lost the
freedom to guide or decide their own destinies and were
compelled to cope with the unparalleled socio-economic and
political changes imposed on them by force. The net result
was the beginnings of socio-economic stresses and strains for
the majority of the population in western central Ethiopia,

leading to mass poverty and complex contradictions.

To My Parents

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the result of four years of
graduate work at Michigan State University, and earlier
researches undertaken at Addis Abeba University. A number of
Institutions and personalities have directly or indirectly
contributed to the success of this work. They all deserve my

sincere gratitude and appreciation.

First and foremost I would like to thank the History
Departments of Addis Abeba University and Michigan State
university, which have given me the opportunity to pursue
graduate studies. In this regard my thanks also go to the
Institute of International Education (I.I.E) and Addis Abeba
University which provided me with a modest financial support
which supplemented my teaching assistantship salary and

helped me to make ends meet.

My sincere and most special gratitude and appreciation
go to my graduate advisor Dr. Harold Marcus for his close
guidance and advice. Dr. Marcus sacrificed his time and
energy in reading the drafts of my dissertation very
carefully and made the necessary suggestions and corrections.
He contributed a great deal to make the work appear in its

final form.

I extend my deep gratitude and appreciation to my

iv

doctoral committee members: Dr. David Robinson and Dr. Alan
Fisher of the history department and Dr. John Hinnant of the
Department of Anthropology at Michigan State University. All
of them have shown great interest in my work and had
contributed their share towards its success, particularlly,
Dr. David Robinson's insightful suggestions and constructive

criticisms were indeed very helpful.

Dr. Jay Spaulding and his wife Dr. Ledwien Kapteijns,
both Africanist historians associated with African Studies
Center at Michigan State University developed a great
interest in my work and were sources of inspiration and
encouragement. Dr. Jay Spaulding has contributed to my
thesis in no small way by recommending theoretically sound

research materials related to my work.

My special thanks go to my best friends Dr. Jim McCann and
his wife Sandi. Both helped me and my wife in making our
stay at Michigan State University comfortable and enjoyable.
I am also very grateful to all other colleagues and friends
who gave me material and moral support in writing this
dissertation. In this regard Dr. L. Rout, Dr. Alemu Beeftu,
Dr. Mamo Dibaba and his wife Nona, Dr. Kebede Daka and his
wife Yerusalem Nephtalem deserve a special recognition.
Particularly, I should express my sincere thanks to Dr.
Kebede Daka for devoting his precious time to type the final
draft of the dissertation meticulously.

V

Finally, I would like to properly acknowledge the role
of my wife Sara Daka who not only typed the first draft of my
dissertation but was also a constant source of encouragement.
Her love, hard work and full support have immensely

contributed to the success of my graduate work.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter I

The Oromo Origin and Migration : A
Critical Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter II

The Macha Expansion and Settlement in
Western Central Ethiopia . . . . . . . 35

Chapter III

Formation, Structure and Function of

states in Western Central Ethiopia:

The Case of Jima and Leqa Nekemte . . . 71
Chapter IV

The Macha Oromo States and the
Creation of Modern Ethiopian Empire. . . 115

Chapter V

The politics of Centralization and
Local Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Chapter VI
Imperial Land Policy: The Root of
Socio-Economic Contradictions and
Mass Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

CODCluSion O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 216

Bibliography 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O 221

vii

Map

Map

Map

Map

Map

Map

LIST OF FIGUERS

Origin and Expansion of the Oromo. . . .

The Macha Migration and Settlement in
Western Central Ethiopia . . . . . . . .

The Macha States of Western Central
Ethiopia in the Mid-ninteenth Century. .

Major and Minor Trade Routes in Western
Central Ethiopia in the Ninteenth Century

Welega Administrative Divisions . . . . .

Main Trade Routes Connecting Welega with
its neighbors. O O O O I O O O O O O O 0

viii

Page

37

85

92
163

184

KEY TO THE TRANSLITRATION SYSTEM.

I. The seven sounds of the Ethiopic alphabet are

represented as follows:

lst. (1 = Ba
2nd. n" = Bu
3rd. {L = Bi
4th I] 8 Ba
5th {5 = Be
6th {1 = Bi
7th {I = Bo

II. Regarding the sixth form in the above list, it must be
noted that the 'i' will be suffixed to the letter only if the
letter is vocalized or stressed. Otherwise it won't be
rquired at all. As a general rule also, the 'i' is not

required when the sixth form is the last letter of a word.

Example:
“930C = Memhir
Mm. = Memhire
412 C = Biddir

III. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

7‘ = sh

Shanqilla

= ch

q:

‘5 = n Naa , Naro
'7’ = zh

I

Gizh

ll
Q
I

Jarso, Nedjo, Boju

ix

IV. Glottalized sounds are represented as follows:
= q - Qoro
= t - Tef

ch - Macha

tse

= 8

20300130 9 3'9
ll

- P
d - Hide, Debo

V. Germination should always be indicated by doubling -

e.g. Fido Bokkissa, Qubsissa, Sisso

INTRODUCTION
The Ethiopian Revolution challenged a wide variety of
conventional historical interpretation and analyses of
Ethiopian society. It uncovered the socio-economic and
political realities of the historic empire: underdevelopment,
backwardness, social oppression and misery were Openly

admitted and fully recognized.

Since then, complex historical issues, inquiries and
problems, which needed objective intellectual explanation and
scholarly treatment, were brought to the surface. Shallow
and misleading phrases like ”the hidden empire,“ “the United
States of Abyssinia,‘ or ”the Japan of Africa” neither helped
to identify the nature of the country's intricate problems
nor suggested appropriate solutions. By reducing the country
into a single cultural unit, most works on Ethiopia lacked
analytical foundation, which made our knowledge about most of

its societies at best fragmentary.

Cognizant of these- facts, many of the concerned
Ethiopianists - historians, anthropologists and other social
scientists - began to look at Ethiopia and Ethiopian studies
in a new light. Contrary to the old imperial outlook and to
the dismay of the social chauvinists much attention is being
paid to the activities and historical experiences of
Ethiopia's multi-ethnic society and culture. It has become
increasingly clear in recent years that a monolithic analysis

1

2
and simplistic explanation of a country like Ethiopia, with
ethnic heterogenity, socio-economic divisions and cultural
diversity is not only unrealistic but also a major source of
misunderstanding. More and more scholars in the field are
convinced of the existence of not only a serious
historiographical imbalance but also of biases and
distortions about the peoples and cultures of Ethiopia.
Efforts are being made by interested scholars to remedy the
situation through the study of those peoples and cultures
whose history had not been properly recorded, distorted or
not written at all. As an integral part of such efforts,
this dissertation deals with the Macha Oromo activities and
historical experiences in western central Ethiopia, focusing

on the political economy of the region.

Today, west-central Ethiopia comprises Welega,
Ilubabor, Kefa and western Shewa administrative regions. It
is largely inhabited by the Macha Oromo, a Borana branch, who
had established themselves in the area between the Abbay and
the Gojeb rivers following the great migration of the
sixteenth century. The region is well known for its
excellent climate and fertile soil. Historically it is
renowned for gold, ivory, coffee and other forms of wealth.
Paradoxically however western central. Ethiopia remained one
of the unfortunate regions in terms of socio-economic
development, even by the country's standard. The

consequences of its underdevelopment are manifested in the

3
subsistence economy of its peasant majority, lack of improved
transportation and communication systems, inadequate
schools, industries, hospitals and the absence of a host of
other public services. We shall offer clues to some of the
reasons why contemporary Ethiopia in general and its west-
central zone in particular still suffer from the consequences

of underdevelopment.

With a special emphasis on Welega, from where most of
our data were obtained, this historical study closely
examines the issues of political economy and the dialectics
of internal and external dymanics which shaped the history of
the Macha from the mid-sixteenth to the early twentieth
centuries. Through a careful study of production and
relations of production, social formations, class structures
and the mechanism of transition, our descriptions and
analysis concentrate on the transformation of the Macha

political economy over the years.

The study consists of six chapters which are organized
so as to achieve methodological unity and logical
interpretation. Nevertheless, each chapter is also designed
to be self-standing with discussions of central themes and
concluding remarks to furnish adequate meaning in themselves.
Yet, all the chapters are intended to remain organically
integrated within the conceptual strategy of our frame of

reference. Our exposition begins with a general discussion

4
of the Oromo origin and migration and attempts logically to
explicate some internal and external factors which led to
their mass exodus. A detailed description of the Macha
expansion, settlement, social organization and their peaceful
and non-peaceful interactions with other peoples and cultures
in western central Ethiopia is given in chapter two.
Chapter three deals with state formation, structure and
function among the Macha, with case studies of Jima and Leqa

Nekemte as illustrations of the social dynamics at work.

The general socio-economic and political developments in
the independent Macha states during the advent of European
imperialism and the creation of the Ethiopian empire are
discussed in chapter four. Moreover, this chapter analyzes
Menilek's conquest in the late-19th century in terms of its
impact on the socio-cultural, political and economic life of
the conquered. It emphasizes the emergence, of the turn of
the century, of modern Ethiopia with its international
delimitations and ethnolinguistic composition. Chapter five
highlights Addis Abeba's systematic political and economic
centralization of the newly annexed entities in terms of
effective imperial control. Focusing on the indigenous
leadership and the survival of local autonomy in Welega, this
section clarifies the fusion and fission processes which
occurred between the administration of the regional governors
and those of imperial authorities. The final chapter

examines the appropriation, commoditization and reallocation

5
of land in relation to the increasing response of Addis
Abeba to the demands of the capitalist world economy. It
investigates the economic transformation from traditional
agriculture to sharecropping concentrating on the varied and
complex land tenure and taxation system and highlighting the

consequent mass poverty.

Specific problems associated with source materials are
treated in each chapter. Generally speaking, however, the
sources for this dissertation comprise: 1) written documents
in Ethiopian languages (Amharic and Geez): 2) accounts by
European travellers and missionaries of the nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries; 3) recent secondary literature:
and 4) traditions and oral histories collected mainly in
Welega in 1972—1973 and 1979-1980. We have attempted to
utilize the relevant information from all the four categories
of sources to assemble the facts clearly, express our ideas

and substantiate our arguments.

It is important to stress, however, that we have relied
principally upon traditions and oral data as the major
sources for this study. Although one usually encounters
various problems using oral sources, they have proved to be
indispensible in the reconstruction of the history of
societies where written documents are biased, distorted,
scarce or non-existent. In this study we have taken some

necessary measures to minimize or overcome the problems by:

6
l) a careful selection of informants; 2) conducting
individual and group interviews at different times; 3)
cautiously taking detailed notes of the information
transmitted; and 4) interpreting the oral data making cross

references with the available written literature.

CHAPTER I

THE OROMO ORIGIN AND MIGRATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL.

The Oromo form a large majority in seven of Ethiopia's
fourteen administrative regions and a significant minorityin
several others. Though one of the most numerous peoples in
Africa, their history is, for the most part, shrouded with
mystery. First, the Oromo did not possess a written language
to record their own history. Second, no serious historical
study on the Oromo has so far appeared. The third, and the
most important reason, is the fact that most of the written
accounts we have on Oromo history, culture, and ethnography
are full of distortions, biases and misunderstandings.
Mordechai Abir, who realized some of these shortcomings,
though belatedly, declared that the study of Oromo society
and culture was neglected by most historians.l Two unresolved
problems or issues have dominated the existing literature
since the sixteenth century. The first is the question of
the original homeland of the Oromo; and the second is
concerned with their migration or great expansion.2

In the early 19603, H. S. Lewis critically examined the
available literature on the origin of the Oromo and came up
what appears to be more convincing reconstruction. Based on
historical linguistics, he concluded that the Oromo ”originat-
ed in the area between and around lakes Shamo and Stephanie in
the area of the Galana Sagan and Galana Dulei, just south of

Bahargamo and mount Wolabo, in northwest Borana." His finding
7

8

has since been strengthened by H. C. Fleming's study of Cushitic
comparative linguistics and by E.Haberland's more or less
similar conclusions about the cradle of the Oromo.4

Interestingly enough, traditions we have collected in the
late 19703 on the subject strongly support Lewis's conclusions.
Our informants from Welega, western Shewa, Arsi, Hararge, Bale
and Sidamo administrative regions readily related that the
original Oromo homeland lay southeast of the Rift Valley Lakes
region, around the headwaters of rivers Dawa, Ganale and Wabi
Shibelle in south .central. of today's Ethiopia.5

Yilma Deressa's informants reported Haro walabu, Lake Abaya
and Hidi Dadi as early sites of Oromo settlement, reflecting the
basic unity and almost complete unanimity of the Oromo traditions
about the general location of their ancestor's origin.6 Yet, not
written and recognizable reference to the Oromo existed before
the middle of the sixteenth century, with the exception of Fra
Mauro's map of 1460, on which the term 'Galla' was used for the
first time in a written European source.7 From then on,
however, the record is relatively full of accounts by
contemporary Ethiopian and Portuguese writers. Most of these,

however, deal largely with wars between the Oromo and other

peoples of southern, northern and eastern Ethiopia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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10

8
Bahrey's History of the Galla is the earliest written

 

account on the Oromo available in Ethiopian languages. He has
been cited by historians, anthropologists, ethnographers, and
other students of Oromo history and culture. His book contains
invaluable items of information on Oromo ethnography and their
migrations. It must be pointed out, however, that Bahrey had
all the cultural, religious and ethnic biases of the 16th
century Christian society and he is clearly apologetic and
highly disconcerted about Oromo successes against the
aggressive Christian state. Nothing more illustrates his
frustrations and anxiety than the first paragraph of his
manuscript:

I have begun to write the history of the

[Oromo] in order to make known the number

of their tribes, their readiness to kill

people, and the brutality of their manners.

If anyone should say of my subject, 'why

has he written a history of a bad people,

just as one would write a history of good

people, 'I would answer . . . 'search in

the books . . . the history of Mahamad and

the Moslem kings has been written, and

they are our enemies in religion . . . 9

Bahrey looked at Oromo society from outside and could

not have appreciated the internal dynamics of their
political economy. His prejudices are obvious and easy to
discount or discard. But unfortunately, a number of writers
share Bahrey's prejudices towards the Christian kingdom, and

they have concocted desirable and misleading interpretation

of the Oromo migration which has survived for centuries.

11
The Portuguese Jesuit missionary, Francesco Alvarez, who
was in Ethiopia about 1526, fails to mention the Oromo in
his book.10 But the two observant historians, Pedro Paez and
Manoel de Almeida believed that God sent the Oromo to punish
”Abyssinia“ for refusing to recognize the Jesuit, Bermudez, as
its patriarchlealtasar Telles called the Oromo ”the scourage
that God had made use of against the Abyssinians."12 James
Bruce described them as, ”the most cruel that...[have] ever
appeared in any country [and who have] contributed more to
the weakening and reducing the Abyssinian Empire than all
their civil wars and all the foreign enemies put together}3
C. R. Markham states that the expansion of the Oromo, ”has
had the effect of checking national progress to this day, and
of throwing back a once-civilized people more and more into
barbarism and anarchy."14
On the other hand, C.F.Rey, who was in the country in the
19203 found an Oromo one of ”the best men [he] met in Abyssinia
. . . intelligent, loyal, hardworking, honest to a fault, and
capable of turning his hand to anything, from driving a team of
sixteen horses to running a dynamo.“ Rey's view is radically
different from the rest. But the major issue we are concerned
with here, is not whether the negative explanations of the
former were wrong, or the positive judgement of the latter was
right. Our point is, to show how partial, inaccurate and

naive the descriptions of many writers were in reference to

the Oromo, and the causes for their migration.

12
As mentioned earlier, the underlying factors and immediate
causes for the expansion of the Oromo have been the subject of
considerable controversy among scholars and students of Oromo
society. Neither Bahrey nor the chronicles of the Christian
kings, nor the Portuguese Jesuits, properly explain what
internal and external forces were responsible for the Oromo
migrations. One long-standing argument has it that in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Oromo inhabited much of
today's Ogaden and northern Somalia until they were
displaced by the Somali who lived in the extreme north of
the horn.1 According to this view, the Somali pushed the
Oromo into the highlands of the Christian .kingdom. But no
contemporary sources or later traditions mention the Somali
people pressing upon the Oromo and driving them out of their
homeland. It is irrational, moreover, to hold that the
Oromo, who later had the power to defeat well-organized
Christian, Muslim, and other states in Northeast Africa
“should have been so weak as to be driven away by the Somali,
who were culturally their equals."1‘7
Although nothing definite may be said about the reasons
for the Oromo migration, many scholars believe that there
were ecological and demographic causes. But the exact
nature of these, perhaps, evolutionary, demographic and
ecological causes as well as the immediate events which
triggered the Oromo mass movement remain to be clarified.

This effort must consider all available information in new

l3
and constructive ways. Analzing the issue of migration in
Africa, Aderanti Adepoju recently wrote:
The migration phenomenon in Africa can be
better understood within the context of
political and historical evolution of African
societies . . . . In the pre-colonial era,
population movements in Africa were associated
largely with the prevailing socio-political
and ecological conditions, especially internecine
warfare, natural dissasters and the search for
farm land . . . . The movements were, as a result,

unstructured, occurred in groups, and the migrants
were demographically undifferentiated.18

Even though Adepoju's analysis does not specifically deal
with the Oromo case, his remarks doubtlessly provide us with
a general context in which to reexamine some internal and
external forces - hitherto ignored or overlooked by scholars

- which led to the Oromo migration.

According to the tradition, the south central highlands
of Ethiopia, in which the Oromo used to live, especially the
land around Haro Wolabu and the head waters of Ganale and
Wabi Shebelle, were extremely fertile. There was plentiful
rain for grain cultivation and animal husbandry. Before the
first half of the sixteenth century, there was plenty of
pasture for the numerous herds and flocks that the Oromo
used to raise, and the period is traditionally referred to
as "the Golden,Age' of Oromo history.19 It seems therefore
that, in due course, the number of people and cattle
increased so much that there was overpopulation and

20
overgrazing. But besides these inherent factors for the

14
Oromo expansion, there were other external developments at
work which fueled or accelerated the already existing

situation, with far reaching consequences.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, conflicts
and military confrontations grew between the expanding
Christian kingdom in the north, the Muslim Sultantes in the
southeast and the so-called “pagan“ states in the southwest?1
According to the royal chronicles, ever since the
consolidation of their power in the middle of the thirteenth
century, the Christian emperors committed themselves to
expand their territory, to spread Christianity and to gain
full control over the Muslim principalities and the
southwestern kingdoms.22

The expansion of Islam in the southeast along the coast
and into the interior of the Horn had led to the
consolidation and establishment of a number of strong Muslim
sultanates including Ifat, Fatagar, Dawaro, Adal and Bale.
The southwestern states such as, Damot, were also growing
powerful enough to defend themselves, and to put up stiff
resistance against the Christian emperors.23 The main cause
of the conflict between the Christian kingdom, the Muslim
sultanates, and other states identified by most of the
literature was religion. A careful examination of the

evidence shows, however, that the major sources of the

continued contradictions between the different entities in

15

the Horn were complex politico-economic issues, which found
expression in terms of religion.24

During the 13th - 16th centuries, the major causes of the
struggle between the Christian emperors, the Muslim
principalities, and southwestern states were: 1) to gain more
land; 2) to obtain trade items such as gold, ivory, precious
skins, incense and slaves - for which the southwestern
kingdoms were the main sources; 3) and to control trade
route from the coast (Zeila) to the interior.25 The Christian
traditions and the laconic royal chronicles invariably report
the success of the Christian emperors over their enemies in
most of the wars. By the second decade of the sixteenth
century, however, the leader of the kingdom of Adal, Imam
Ibn Ibrahim E1 Ghazi, commonly known as Gragn (1506-1543),
emerged victorious against the Christian emperor, Lebna
Dengel (1508-1540)26 and overran the kingdom. In the year
1517, the Ottaman Turks defeated the Mamluks of Egypt and
had attained a super-power position, with an increasing
control over the trade in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean
complex. As the champions of Islam they not only became a
source of inspiration for the Muslims but were also ready to
support their holy wars in the region. Consequently, Gragn
had enjoyed a substantial military aid especially in firearms

27
from the Turks.

At about the same period the Portuguese and the Ottomans

16
sought alliance with the Christian and Muslim forces in the
Horn of Africa respectively. "In fact the Portuguese
believed that they could deprive the Muslim world of an
important source of its power by blocking the flow of trade
through the Red Sea and diverting the Nile waters from Egypt
28
with the help of Ethiopia.“ The Portuguese government
subsequently sent a contingent under the leadership of
29

Cristovao da Gama in 1453. The direct Portuguese
intervention, however, minimal it was, tipped the local
balance of power in favor of the Christian state. It is
important to note here that our purpose is not to rehash the
story of the Christian-Muslim wars but only to highlight
that the involvement of the international powers in the
conflicts of the Horn of Africa had affected the patterns of
population distribution in the region. Particularly it
increased pressure upon the internal socio-economic and
political dynamics of the pastoralist Oromo. Darrell
Bates's assessment is an excellent description of the
situation:

The fighting between the Abyssinian Christians

and the Muslim did not end with Granye's defeat

by the Portuguese, and it was for many years a

reccurring feature of the Abyssinian scene. The

[Oromo] peoples of the southern and western

highlands watched this struggle with interest.

They had suffered in their time from both parties,

and were waiting in the wings for opportunities. . .

to recover lands which had been taken from them. 30

By the sixteenth century, the Oromo were therefore

confronted with a series of external pressures from the wars

l7
and conflicts between the expanding Christian kingdom, the
Muslim sultanates and the southwestern states in which the
international powers intervened. Apparently, these external
pressures, examined in relation to the predominantly
pastpralist economy of the Oromo seem to provide us with more
or less logical explanation for the immediate causes of

their migration.

Pastoralism was the dominant Oromo mode of production
which determined and regulated the broader social, political
and economic relations within their own society as well as
with their neighbours. The Oromo were the highly mobile
people, with large herds of cattle constituting the backbone
of their socio-economic organization. A wider range of
territory with enough pasture, water, and freedom of
movement over an extended area were crucial for their
survival. ‘By the 15203, the pressures of the wars and
conflicts threatened the Oromo freedom to wander. The
external pressures aggravated the inherent problems of the
Oromo, putting the process of expansion into a higher gear,
leading to mass exodus. Migration which was a response to
the mounting socio-economic and political pressures forced
the Oromo to fight against the neighbouring Christians,

Muslims and ”pagans."

The Oromo were culturally homogeneous with common

genealogical ties and used to govern themselves according to

18

31
an egalitarian socio-political organization known as gaga.
It was a complex system which seems to have been in full
operation long before the sixteenth century. As a uniquely
democratic political system, it has for long captured the
immaginations of travellers, historians, ethnographers and
other social scientists.32 As the centeral institution of the
Oromo,gaga regulated the political, judicial religious and
ritual affairs of the society. ”According to the rules of
the 3393 system, holders of the most important political
offices were elected for a period of eight years, after
which they had to retire and hand over their offices to their
successors. Hence, no man could build up a position of
permanent power and authority."33 The gage system had
features in commom with what Engels calls the ”gentile
constitution'I of primitive societies.34 Under the system
every male Oromo belonged to one (a 3393) of five groups
(the missensgg. Once a man entered a gaga, he remained
in it for the rest of his life. For his first forty years,
however, his role and status in the community had to pass
through five different phases or grades, with each phase
comprising eight years.36 Other important Oromo social

organizations include the guabiye (possession) and the

gudifacha (adOption) institutions. These social organiza-

 

tions which came to be closely associated with the gada,
were developed by the Oromo primarily to cope with the

changing circumstances in the course of their migration and

l9

settlement, and are treated in detail in the next chapter.

Bahrey's description and Oromo traditions confirm that the
gag; system was common to all Oromo, and the structure of
their organization was essentially the same for all, although
the names given to each of the five grades might have
differed from tribe to tribe. It is also clear from the
sources that initially the Oromo were politically united
under the same system of leadership.37

None of our early sources on the Oromo, including Bahrey's

History of the Galla, indicates the origin of the gada.

 

Nevertheless many social scientists, particularly anthropolo-
gists have asserted that gaga originated from an age-organi-
zation generational paradigm, though how or why is still a
matter of conjecture. Haberland argues that 'since Oromo
culture is archaic and extremely simple, the complicated
nature of the gaga system makes it appear a foreign element.“
Gaga is an ancient Oromo term which means ”era“, and
indicates a system of cyclic change in time through which
all the male members of the community have to pass. As a
perpetually unfolding process, it “accomplishes what the
elaborate, and more static, cosmologies of many other
societies do, it makes sense of, and humanizes, the
universe."40 It must be seen as a constitutional device

naturally evolved by the Oromo over the millenia and has

what Engels described as: ”the fundamental features of

20
social constitution of primitive times before the
introduction of the state.'418een from the perspective of
later class societies, the system obviously had the
advantages of avoiding the exploitation of man by man and

the concentration of power in the hands of one man or group

for a long period of time.

Under the Oromo gada system, an abba boku (father

 

of the scepter) was chosen by consensus every eight years
from among the fourth grade. His responsibilities were to
maintain peace and order and to administer justice during an
eight-year-term of office. His principal functions were: a)
to chair the ggga assembly: b) to proclaim the laws; c) to
act as a ritual expert of the gag; cermonies; d) and to
supervise the election of important gage officials such as
the abba dula (war leader), abba sa'a (father of the

42
cow) and others. There was no obstacle or problem in the

 

process of the transfer of power, as illustrated by Bahrey's

interesting description:

They [Oromo] have neither king nor master
like other peoples, but they obey the Luba
during a period of eight years; at the end
of eight years another Luba is made, and
the first gives up his office. They do
this at fixed times: . . .43

When Oromo population increased, they split into various
44
groups, clans and families and spread out in all directions.

of the two major divisions mentioned by Bahrey, the Borana

21
were the group who generally took to the west and the south
while the Barttuma (Baraytuma) migrated, broadly speaking,45
eastwards. Not all Oromo moved: "When the Borana quit their
country, they do not all go, but those who wish to leave do
so, for they have no ruler who can enforce his order, and
each man does what seems best to him."46 It is quite clear,
therefore, that there always remained tribes, clans or

families of the Oromo in their previous habitat or in a chain

of settlements along the major routes of their migrations.

The Barttuma settled in what are today the Bale, Arsi,
Hararge and Welo administrative regions. The Borana, on the
other hand moved towards the north and nortwest, leaving the
lower Omo and Gibe River basins to their left. They divided
into the Tulama and Macha by the Awash River on the west.
yet another branch of the Borana still occupies regions of

47
southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.

The Oromo first raided Bale, between 1522-1530, which co-
incided with the Muslim-Christian War in Ethiopia, 1527-154g?
Nevertheless, the penetration of the Oromo was not always in
the form of raids and incursions. Bahrey and the Jesuit
missionaries did not mention that some Oromo had been making
peaceful settlements long before Gragn's conquest. The
"general impression of a sudden and overwhelming irruption
by a totally unknown people is . . . unrealistic and

49
legendary.”

22
The initial expansion of the Oromo can hardly be

considered as a migration ggymgggg. It was rather a more
gradual movement with the Oromo, like other pastoralist
societies, “launching raids and rapidly retreating."50 They
moved northward into the highlands, where they found better
land, water resources, and pasture. Every eight years, the
Oromo had to change their gaga officials who had to make
incursions into new lands not only to avoid scarcity of
pasture and water but also overgrazing. The first two ggga,
Melbah and Mudana (1522- 1538), conquered Bale; the third,
Kilole (1538-1546), occupied Dawaro: and the fourth, Biffole
(1546-1554), continued the invasion of Dawaro as well as
Fatagar?lThe fifth gaga, Michile (1554-1562), established
its headquarters in the central highlands south of present
day Addis Abeba, and launched a more planned attack on both
the Muslim and the Christian polities.S3 Referring to the
activities of Michile, Bahrey wrote:

. . . It was he who killed the Jan Amora

corps and fought against Hamalmal at Dago;

he divastated all the towns and ruled them,

remaining there with his troops, whereas

previously the Galla, invading from the wabi,

had returned there at the end of each campaign.

Our King Asnaf Sagad Galawdewos (1540-1559)

fought [him], starting from Asa Zanab.54

In 1559, the Muslim under their leader Nur Ibn Mujahid,

attacked the Christian kingdom to avenge their fallen leader.
Ahmed Gragn; and the Emperor Galawdewos was killed after a

55
bloody battle. The Barttuma Oromo, who had been watching

23
to exploit the situation, immediately fell upon the
victorious Muslims at Hazalo56 and wiped them out. Nur and
a few of his followers were lucky to escape and they
returned to protect Harar town from falling to the Oromo,
although they overran the surrounding areas, which they

began to occupy effectively, establishing the Ittu-Humbena

settlement.

Under their sixth gaga, Harmufa (1562-1570), the Oromo
advanced as far as Angot, Gan, Amhara and Begemdir (Gonder). As
reported in the chronicles, the first major defeat inflicted on
the Oromo by Emperor Sarsa Dengel in 1569, did not check their
advance. During the seventh gage, Robale (1570-1578), they
launched attacks on the Christian kingdom in three directions,
from Welo in the north into Gonder and Dembea, from the center
into Shewa and into Gojam in the west. In the period of the
eighth gada, Birmaji (1578-1586) they attacked Dembea and
regions of Lake Tana. The ninth gaga, Mulata (1586-1594;.9

invaded Tigray in the north, Gojam and Damot in the west.

58
In the early 17th century, during the reign of Susnyos

(r. 1607-1632), the Oromo continued their attacks on Gojam and
Dembea but were resisted strenuously by the Christian
emperors. In an attempt to break the resistance, the Oromo,
in 1617 formed what was popularly known as the Borana League.
But it collapsed shortly after the Oromo had crossed the

Abbay because they were defeated by Siela Kristos, the

24
59
emperor's brother. The Blue Nile gorges and the inaccessible
mountain fortresses were also equally responsible for
keeping the Oromo from the lands they coveted.
Nevertheless, they made tireless efforts to succeed, and the
Paris Chronicles reported five major attacks between 1639-
1658.60 By the time the Oromo had already established their
settlements in such areas as Bale, Dawaro, Fatagar, Shewa,
Damot, Ifat and Hararge. During the same period, the Welo,

Yejju and Raya Oromo settled in today's Welo administrative

region, stretching up to Lake Ashange in southern Tigray.

Bahrey attributed Oromo success to the fact that the
Christian population was divided into ten 'classes', out of
which only the last 'class' with very few soldiers who can
fight went to war. On the other side, all men among the
Oromo were trained in warfare, and even the Oromo women
assisted in fighting. Bahrey clearly attributed the success
of the Oromo to the numerical superiority of their fighting
men.61

Other scholars, however, have argued that the emperor
could marshal professional soldiers enough to confront the
Oromo warriors (usually 5,000-8,000 per battle), but they
lacked unity and discipline. According to this same
argument it is believed internal and external conflicts
diverted the attention of the Christian emperors, governors

62
and regiments and facilitated the victory of the Oromo.

25

Another argument says that the Muslim-Christian wars had
seriously enfeebled the Christian kingdom paving the way for

63
the success of the Oromo.

It is true that directly or indirectly many of the
factors given by scholars have contributed to the Oromo
victory. But most of these conventional views seem to put
too much emphasis on the external situations which might
have favored the Oromo. They tend to underestimate or
ignore the nature of the Oromo political economy and its
internal dynamics which played a decisive role in almost all
their confrontations. tzg?eir economic and political
organization and a clear division of labor allowed mobility,
flexibility and determination of forces and equality among
its members. Without any substantiation Donald Levine
recently asserted that '. . . the Oromo were technologically
inferior to the 'Amhara' when their expansion began. They
came on foot and had no weapon better than a wooden Spear."64
Yet Almeida clearly reports that the Oromo picked young and
able bodied men and who made an excellent use of shields,
axes, spears, clubs, swords and horses. They were committed
troops according to Almeida, because '. . . they go to war
and into battle determined and firmly resolved to conquer or
die.“ 65 Their pastoralism gave them the mobility to maneuver

strategically and tactically and to succeed against the

better equipped and armed Christians.

26
The pattern of Oromo expansion as well as the essence of
their culture have long been misunderstood and distorted in
the works of many writers. The traditional scholar Aleqa

Atsme, has likened the Oromo expansion to a flooding river
66
that moved mindlessly. Major W. C. Harris, the British

envoy to the court of Sahle Selassie of Shewa in the mid-
nineteenth century wrote:

Like the barbarous nations who were made the
weapons of Divine chastizement upon the
corrupted empire of Rome, they [the Oromo]
also brought darkness and ignorance in their
train, but were unable to eradicate the true
religion. Throughout the regions included
between the Nile, the Hawash, and the Gochob
[Gojeb], which may properly be termed Galla,
none but their own tongue is spoken: . . . 67

S. Pankhurst similarly disparges the Oromo in her
voluminous book; Ethiopia A Cultural history. She compares
their expansion to the incursions of the Huns and Vandals in
Europe, but totally ignored the nature of Oromo society and

culture, she commented:

When the Gallas invaded the Ethiopian highlands
they came as bold and intrepid warriors. Their
language lacked script; the Ge'ez with its
beautiful characters, which had been the medium
and the preserver of culture among the Agazian
settlers who had created the ancient Ethiopian
state, was unknown to the warlike Galla tribesmen
when they entered the rich highlands.68

E. Ullendorff, who must have read and taken for granted
the works of his predecessors, also affirmed that:
The Gallas had nothing to contribute to the

civilization of Ethiopia; they possessed no
material or intellectual culture, and their

27

social organization was at a far lower stage

of development than that of the population

among whom they settled. . . 69
It is important to note that fifteen years after, the revised
edition by the same author reads: ”The Gallas had little to
contribute to the semitized civilization; they possessed no
significant material or intellectual culture, and their
social organization differed considerably from that of the
population among whom they settled. . . .20 However, such
selection of words or phrases may reflect the author's

conscience but could hardly contribute to our understanding

of the Oromo or dismiss the original misconception.

Such arguments are full of cultural biases and
misunderstandings which may serve the interests of particular
individuals or groups. Concerning this subject, even more
could be cited from other literature. But those we have
already referred to are enough to illustrate the
distortions. On the other hand, as we have attempted to
show in this chapter, one could clearly observe that the
Oromo expansion was well thought out, carefully planned and
excuted. The Oromo seem to have been cognizant of the
contemporary political situations in their surroundings and
made a calculated move against the pressures exerted upon
them by their foes. The gaga system played an important
role in bringing vast lands in northeast Africa under their

control within a short span of time.

28

The migrations and further expansion of the Oromo
obviously took place in both densely and sparsely populated
areas. Sometimes, it involved considerable displacement of
other peoples, and the Oromo sphere was extended only by
dint of continuous war and bloodshed.71 They had overrun
various small kingdoms and social groups and absorbed new
ethnic elements in the process of expansion; and they had
in turn been influenced by other cultures?2 It is
significant to note, however, that it was the success of the
Oromo migration and settlement which put an end to the
Muslim-Christian wars as well as the south ward expansion of
the emperors until the second half of the nineteenth century.
As a result, the Oromo created a frontier between the
Amhara-Tigray-dominated north and the southern peoples laying

the foundation stone of modern Ethiopia, both in terms of

human and material resources.

1.

2.

29
Notes to chapter I

M. Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea (Jerusalem, Hebrew
University, Frank Cass, 1980), p. XIX.

The traditional view that the Oromo occupied most of the
Horn of Africa around the shores of the Gulf of Aden at the
beginning of tenth century until they were pushed by the
Somali is most fully presented by Cerulli (1957) and I. M.
Lewis (1959, 1960). For a similar or other views on the
Oromo origin see W. Budge, A History 9f Ethiopia: Nubia
and Abyssinia, Vol.II (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1928),
p. 341. Manoel de Almeida "The History of High Ethiopia or
Abyssinia,'Book IV, in some Records of Ethiopia 1593- -1646,
trans. & ed. by C. F. Beringham and G. W. B. Huntingford (London,
1954) pp. 133- 134. G. P. Murdock, Africa - Its People and
Their Culture History (New York, London, 1959), p.
319. Teklesadik Mekuria, Ye Ethiopia Tarik: Ke Aste Libne
Dingil Iske Aste Tewodros (Addis Ababa, Sept., 1953 E. C),
p. 226. Aleqa Taye, Ye Ethiopia Hizb Tarik, 6th edition
(Addis Ababa, 1958 E— C. )p. 38. Yilma Deressa, Ye Ethio ia
Tarik Be Asra Sidistegnaw Kifle-Zemen (Addis Ababa Hidar
I95 9 E. C. ),p. 213. I. M. Lewis ,Peoples of the Horn of Africa
Somali Afar and Saho (London Frank Cass and Co. Limited,
1976),p. 8. Aleqa Atsme, Ye Galla Tarik part I n. d., p. 29.
Tesfa Sellassie, Ye Galla Tarik, Part I, n. d., p. 1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

H.S. Lewis, ”The Origins of the Galla and Somali, Journal
gf African History VII, 1 (1966), 99.41.

H. C. Fleming, 'Baiso and Rendille: Somali outliers,"
Rassegna di studi etiopici, XX (1964), pp. 35- -96, V. E.
Haberland, Galla Sud - _Athiopiens (stutgart, 1963), pp.
769- 771.

 

 

 

Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, Kitila Challa, Nedjo,
Grazmach waltaji Dagago, Bodji; Haji Worji, Assela, Arsi,
Badaso Ogato, Dodola, Hussen Musa, Dire Dawa, Abdulahi
Ali, Gelmso: Ada Borana and Gelegelu Aoro, Negele: Yaie
Shone & Tola waya, Shoa; Guyo Boku and wako Roba, Sidamo;
interviewed by me and Tasew Merga (LL. B.A.A.University) in
1979 and 1976 respectively. I am indebted to Ato Tasew who
made some of the interviews and enabled me read the
manuscripts of his interviews. The text of my interviews is
deposited in the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, A.A.U.,
1980.

 

 

Yilma Deressa, Ye Ethiopia Tarik Be Asra Sidistegnaw
Kifle- Zemen (Add1s Ababa, Hidar 1959— EC), p.215.

 

 

 

See O.G.S. Crawford,Ethiopia Itineraries, Circa 1400-
1524, The Hakluyt Society, no.2, Second series, 109

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

30
(London, 1955), facing p. 21.

Bahrey's History of the galla is an invaluable and
indispensible primary source on 16th century Oromo society.
However, it should be subject to critical analysis in the
reconstruction of Oromo History. The text has various
shortcomings, including cultural and religious biases the
writer had against the Oromo, because of their successes
in war with the Christian state of Ethiopia. Originally,
the document was written in Geez and was translated into
Amharic by Blatta Mersie Hazen Woldekirkos in 1959 E.C. It
has also been translated and edited by C.F. Beckingham and
G. W. B. Huntingford in Some Records of Ethiopia
1593-1646 (London, 1954).

 

 

Bahrey, “History of the Galla," p. 11.

F. Alvarez, Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to
Abyssinia, During the Years 1520- 1527 (London, 1881).

 

 

 

 

 

P. Paez 'Historia de Ethiopia, Res. Aelt. II, 23. 346;
Almemida, “History of Ethiopia" Alta, V. 474-75. See also
Merid Wolde Aregay, "Southern Ethiopia and the Christian
kingdom 1508-1708, with Special Reference to the Galla
Migrations and their Consequences,” (Ph.D. Thesis,
University of London, School of Oriental and African
Studies, January 1971), p.163; hereafter Merid Wolde
Aregay, "Southern Ethiopia.”

 

B. Telles, The Travels of the Jesuits in Ethiopia,
(London 1710):PP . . . see also Almeida,'H1story of High
Ethiopia/Abassia,‘ in Some Records pf Ethiopia, p.134.

 

 

 

 

 

J. Bruce, Travels in Abyssinia and Nubia 1768- 1773.
(Edinburgh Adam and Charles Black, 1873), p. 86.

 

C. R. Markham, A History of the Abyssinian Expedition.
(London, 1869), p. 39- 40.

 

C. F. Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile, (New York
Negro Universities press, 1927), p. 37.

 

E. Cerulli, Etiopia Occidentale, II. p. 172, G. W. B.
Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia pp. LXXI-LXXII.

 

 

Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens, p. 773.

 

Aderanti Adepoju, ”Linkages Between Internal and
International migration: the African Situation,“
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 36, No.3,

 

1984, pp. 441-442.

19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.

33.

pp. 81-83.

31

Yilma Deressa, 13 Ethiopia Tarik, pp. 214-215.

 

Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens, p.772.

 

For a detailed treatment of the relationship between the
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and the Evolution of the
Ethiopian Christian state as well as the Muslim-Christian
wars in the Medieval period, see Tadesse Tamrat, Church
Lnd Lnd State in Ethiopia 1270-1527 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, _1972).

R. K. P. Pankhurst, The Ethiopian Royal Chronicles (Addis
Ababa, Oxford Univers1ty Press, 1967), PP. 13- 81.

 

 

Aleme Eshete, ”Whose History is Ethiopian History?”
unpublished conference papers, Addis Ababa, November
1982, pp. 6-7.

Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea, pp. 1-7.

 

Ibid, see also Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State,

 

Oankhurst, Royal Chronicles, pp. 49-69.

 

Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea, pp. 80-90.

 

Ibid., p. XVI.

Pankhurst, Royal Chronocles, pp.70-81.

 

Darrell Bates, The Abyssinian Difficulty: The Emperor
Theodrus Lnd the Magdala Campaign 1867- 1868 (Oxford,

 

 

 

1979), p. 7, also quoted 1n Mohammad Hassen, ”The Oromo of

Ethiopia, 1500- 1850: With Special Emphasis on the Gibe
Region, ' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, School of
Oriental and African Studies, 1983), p. 38.

H. S. Lewis, ”A Reconsideration of the Socio-Political
Organization of Western Galla,“ Journal pf Semitic

Studies, 1, 1 (1964), p. 69.

P.T.W.Baxter, 'Boran Age-Sets and Generation Sets: Gada, a
Puzzle or a Maze?” in P. T. W. Baxter and UriAlmagor (eds),
Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African
Organ1zations, (New York, St. Matin' 8 Press, 1978), p.

151, hereafter Baxter, "Borana Age- Sets,“ .

 

Jan Hultin, "Political Structure and the Development of
Inequality among the Mecha Oromo," Pastoral Production
and Society, London, Cambridge University Press, 1979,

 

 

p. 284; edited by Equipe ecologie et anthropologie des

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.
39.

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.
47.

32
societes pastorales.

F. Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and
the State," K.Marx and F.Engles, Selected Works, Vol. 3
(Moscow: Progeress Publishers, 1966), p. 266. According to
the gentile constitution . . . “Everything runs smoothly
without soldiers, gendarmes or police: without prisons;
without trials. A11 quarrels and disputes are settled by the
whole body of the concerned the gens or the tribe or the
individual gentes among themselves. . . . Those concerned
decide, and in most cases century-old custom has already
regulated everything. There can be no poor and needy . . .'

 

K. E. Knutsson, Authority and Change: A Study Lf the Kallu
Institution among the Macha Galla Lf Ethiopia (Gothenburg

 

 

 

 

Ethnografiska Musset, 1967), p. 163.

G. W. B. Huntingford, The Ga11a Lf Ethiopia: the kingdom Lf
Rafa and Janjero, (London, 1969), p. 41. Asmarom Legesse,

 

 

Gada: ThreeA _pproaches to the Study Lf African Society,

 

 

 

(New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 8.

Almeida, “History of High Ethiopia,“ p. 115. See also Merid
W/Aregay, I'Southern Ethiopia,“ pp. 157-159.

Baxter, 'Boran Age-Sets," pp. 169-170.
V. E. Haberland,Ga11a Sud-Athiopiens, p. 777.
J. Hinnant, “The Guji: Gada a Ritual System,” in P. T. W.

Baxter and UriAlmagor (eds), Age , Generation and Time:
Some Features Lf East African Age Organizat1ons (New

 

 

York, St. Matin' 3 _Press, 1978), p. 238.
Engels, ”The Origin of Family," p. 256.

Cerulli, “Folk Literature 9: the Gallas,” pp. 60-75.

 

 

Bahrey, “History of the Galla,‘ p. 115.

Blatta Mersie Hazen Wolde Kirkos, Zenah Le Abba Bahrey
Zetsehafo Belissane Geez (Addis Ababa: Amharic trans-

 

 

 

lation, 1959 E.C.)! pp. 33-34.

Lewis, “Origin of the Galla,' p. 33; G.W.B. Huntingford,
The Galla 9; Ethiopia, p. 11.

 

Bahrey, ”History of the Galla,“ pp. 113-114.

J.S. Trimingham, Islam 1p Ethiopia, (London.1976), p.9.
Cf. Baissa Lemmu, "The Democratic Political System of the
Galla of Ethiopia and the Possibilities of its use in the

48.
49.

so.

51.

52.

53.

54.
55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

33

Nation Building," (George Washington University: U.S.A.,
1971)] p010.

Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea, pp. 69-87.

 

Merid W/Aregay,'Southern Ethiopia,“ pp. 151-152: See also
Mohammad Hassen, "The Oromo of Ethiopia,“ pp. 10-100.

Trimingham, Islam i2 Ethiopia, p.86.

Ibid., p. 93.

Bahrey calls it Mesle, probably a corruption of

 

Michile, the traditional name of the gada which is

popularly used among the Oromo.

Baissa Lemmu, "The Democratic Political System," p. 5.
Citing oral historians, Ragassa Begna and Blatta Deressa
Amante in 1962.

Bahrey, “History of the Galla' , pp. 116-117.

William E1. Conzelman, Chronique g3 Galawdewos Roi di
Ethiopie (Paris: Librairie Emile Bouillon, Editeur, 1895),
pp. xxx—xxxx; C.F.R. Pankhurst,Roya1 Chronicles, pp.
70-73.

 

 

The exact location of Bazalo is unknown. It is identified
with Ayelu, east of the Awash river i.e, Mt. Hazalo in
Dawaro. According to Yilma Deressa (9p; cit., pp. 231-
235), most probably it was on the boundary line of Harar
and the Christian kingdom of the 16th century not far from
the town of Harar. See also M. Wolde Aregay, p. 200.

The dates entered here for all the gada are taken from
Almeda, Appendix, Qp.cit.I pp. 209-210. See also
Bahrey, History of the Galla,‘ pp. 115-123.

Emperor Susenyos was captured by Borana Oromo during his
child-hood. He lived under their custody for one and half
years. ”The Galla who took him prisoner loved bin and
regarded him as his son. . .' He was released in exchange
of some Oromo prisoners of war. See R. Pankhurst, Royal
Chronocles, pp. 94-95.

 

Beckingham and Huntingford, Some Records 9: Ethiopia,
pp. XC-XCI.

Ibid., See also R. Basset Etudes sur l'historie
d'ethiopie (Paris. 1881) which contains the work cited as
the 'Paris Chronicle' up to 1729.

 

61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.
71.

72.

34
Bahrey, "History of the Galla," pp. 125-127.

Merid W/Aregay, “Southern Ethiopia,“ pp. 314-315. He
emphasizes on the attacks of the Red Sea coastal areas by
the Turks (1557), the civil wars of 1560-1570 under Emperor
Minas and the series of religious controversies of the 16th,
17th and early 18th centuries which occupied the attention
of the emperors.

Abir, Ethippia and the Red Sea, pp. 69-87.

 

Donald Levine, The Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution 9; E
Multiethnic Society, (Chicago and London, the University
of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 88.

 

 

Almeida, "History of High Ethiopia,” pp. 136-137.

Atsme, lg Galla Tarik, Part I,pp.19-20: see also Mesfin
Woldemariam, AA Introductory Geography 9: Ethiopia
(Addis Ababa, 1972), p.16.

 

 

W.C. Harris, The Highlands 9; Ethiopia, Vol. III
(London, Gregg International Publishers, 1844), pp. 72-73.

 

 

S. Pankhurst, Ethiopia: A Cultural Histor (London, The
Leighton Straker Bookbinding Co. Ltd., 1955), p. 387.

E. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: AA Introduction 39 Country
and People (London, 1960), p. 76.

 

 

 

Ibid. See the Third Edition, 1973, p. 73.

Levine, Greater Ethiopia, p. 83: Huntingford, The
Galla pg Ethiopia, p. 19.

 

Trimingham, Islam lg Ethiopia, p. 8.

CHAPTER II

THE MACHA EXPANSION AND SETTLEMENT IN
WESTERN CENTRAL ETHIOPIA

The initial Oromo migration, the general directions of
their early movements and the related issues of clashes and
conflicts with the emperors and the Muslim sultanates were
documented by medieval sources. Nevertheless, the westward
expansion and settlement of the Macha Oromo, a Borana branch,
as well as their confrontations with the Omotic Kingdoms or
with the various Nilo-Saharan communities, remained mostly
unrecorded. There are very limited marginal references to a
few Omotic Kingdoms and to their relations with the medieval
Christian kingdom. But the data only transmit scanty
information on expeditions, collection of tribute and slave
raids by the Christian emperors. Consequently, the origin,
socio-economic and political structures of the Omotic
Kingdoms and other communities of southwestern Ethiopia such
as Damot, Enarya, Janjero, Kefa and others remain more or

less obscure.

We shall use available written accounts and the oral
traditions to highlight the Macha expansion and settlement,
to study their interaction with other peoples and cultures,
and to analyze the subsequent evolutionary and revolutionary

changes in their political economy in western central
35

36

Ethiopia.

Before the Macha Oromo migration into western central
Ethiopia, the region was largely inhabited by peoples
belonging to two major linguistic groupings: the Omotic and
the Nile-Saharan. Limited medieval sources indicate that the
Omotic peoples had a highly organized and well structured
kingship systems, while the Nilo-Saharans lived in a widely
scattered, segmented communities. Some of the most important
Omotic Kingdoms between the Abbay and the Gojeb rivers, the
area which more or less came under the direct control of the
Macha Oromo, include: Damot, Enarya, Bussase and Gonga.2 Some

of the Nilo-Saharans specifically mentioned by the traditions

were: Agadi, Gabato, Kaza, Masengo, Shiluk and Mac. These

 

were collectively called the shanqilla by the Amhara and
3

were usually known as dina by the Oromo.

According to the Christian traditions and Arabic
sources, the state of Damot dominated the whole region of
Shewa by the end of the thirteenth century. Its territorial
extent is unknown, but it probably controlled the land just
south of the Blue Nile and west of the sources of the Awash
River as far as the Didessa.4 Oromo traditions in Welega
refer to the people of the kingdom of Damot as the Damoto.
But unfortunately the traditions do not tell us much about

them except that they first resisted the Oromo expansion,

many were conquered and assimilated, and the rest fled

37

 

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3 <

 

 

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3

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it
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“uncut 3'
:

 

 

  

 

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0‘ 4w on; '

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l
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~000qu M u:- I My -

helm E Man In
(Ho In“ Cum-nun uni- mo *

Aha-584..."...
flap 2. The Macha Migration and settlement in Western Central

Ethiopia.
Adopted from Mohammed Hassen, “The Oromo of Ethiopia,“

p. 325.

38
northwards across the Abbay into Gojam region, where there
is today the important Awraja of Qolla-Dega Dagot.

By the end of the thirteenth century, Enarya was referred
to as part of the kingdom of Damot. But by the beginning of
the sixteenth century, it was virtually an independent entity
with a hereditary kingship system. Almeida reports that the
inhabitants were brave and intelligent, their occupation
sedentary farming with limited trade activities in slaves,
ivory and gold. He also indicated that the kings of Enarya
used to pay annual tribute in slaves and gold to the
emperor. The people of Enarya had put up a stiff
resistance against the Macha Oromo incursions at first.
Between 1550-1570, however, Enarya was conquered by the Limu

7
tribe of the Macha Oromo and was thereafter named Limu-Enarya.

The Bussase state was another Omotic kingdom in south-
western Welega. It was organized by the Bussase, who had
conquered part of the Mac (Nilo-Saharan) people over whom
they established a ruling dynasty called the Bussase in
Anfillo,8 prior to the advent of the Oromo. The Bussase
dynasty of Anfillo is clearly remembered as having put up a
long, tough resistance against Oromo expansion into their
region. It was a well organized state dominated by people
who originated in Kefaloand who spoke an Omotic language

related to Kafficho and Sinicho (Shinasha). It is not

absolutely clear from the traditions how extensive Bussase

39

territories were in pre-Oromo days, but they were closely
associated only with Anfillo. . There, they are said to have
built defensive trenches against the expanding Oromo and
held their own until the very end of the nineteenth century?1

Other important group of inhabitants in western central
Ethiopia were the Egpgg, who are said to have dominated
the whole region between the Dabus and the Didessa rivers
and their center at Tulu Yambel. According to the available
oral material, the 92333 whom Abba Bisqano had very well
organized, had a strong state which had for long withstood
the advance of the Oromo. Abba Bisqano is reputed to have
dug trenches around Tulu Yambel and put up a stiff
resistance against the Sibu, who were the spearhead of the

early Oromo expansion in the area.

The traditions about the 92293 are unanimous in point-
ing out that they were a leading grain-growing agricultural
people. Local informants narrate that the Qgpgg had an
ancient custom of saving representative measures of every
type of grain and other crops harvested every year for a
ritual consumption at an annual religious ceremony called
Eggpi3 It is most interesting to note that Xgpp is
the name of the leading sky-god traditionally worshipped by
the people of Kefa].4 Since the traditions on the Egpgg do

not tell us anything about their pre-Oromo ethnic and

linguistic affliations, this important ritual connection with

. 40
Kefa may indeed supply the missing link. It may well be that
the ggpqg, like the Bussase, were of Omotic origin and may
also have had historical ties with other Omotic peoples
further south. Today, there are no distinct 92293 groups
since they were completely assimilated - both ethnically and

linguistically - by the Oromo.

Among the Nile-Saharan pre-Oromo groups mentioned by the
traditions, the Agadi are believed to have occupied the area
east of the Tuqa mountain range, with present day Amuma as
their central habitat. None of the ethnographic monographs
refer to the Agadi. Remembered only in early traditions of
Oromo expansion into the area, they are said to have been
either annihilated or completely assimilated by the Gabato
among whom they took refuge. West of the region formerly
occupied by the Agadi lived the Gabato, who are said to have

been the largest group of the shanqilla when the Oromo first

 

came there. Their realms extended to the Didessa valley in
the west, and their modern descendants are still found in
the hot, lowland valleys of the Didessa and Anger rivers
into Ygich they were eventually pushed by the dominant

Oromo, who now occupy the more fertile and salubrious

highland regions of western central Ethiopia.

The Kaza, who now live in the hot Abbay valley in Limu,
Amuru and Gida woredas,are also said to have occupied parts

of the highland areas of today's Horo-Gudru awraja as far

41

west as Shambu town, from where they were later displaced by
the Oromo. Of the pre-Oromo inhabitants mentioned in the
traditions, the Shiluk and the Masengol7are most peripheral,
and their names are only barely mentioned. It is
interesting, however, to note that the Masengo especially
are said to have come from the Sudan, following the Abbay
valley, and to have dispersed southwards upon arrival at the
confluence with the Didessa which they are believed to have
taken in their southward migtrations. Today, the Masengo
are found in Ilubabor in large numbers, with quite a
sizeable group also living in Kelem awraja in the southwest
corner of Welega.18

Unlike the Omotic peoples we have described earlier, the

overall tradition about the system of production and way of

life of shanqilla groups indicates that they had a different

 

form of socio-economic formation. Many are said to have
still practised a hunting-gathering economy and lived in
caves and other natural shelters. The flesh of big and
small wild animals and a wide variety of root crops and
herbs were their major diets. But some others, like the
Mao, are specifically identified by the local traditions as
having attained a fairly advanced socio-economic
development. They are said to have practised mixed digging

l9
stick and hoe cultivation and animal husbandry.

Groups of Mao are today found widely dispersed in

42
different parts of western central Ethiopia, particularly in
Welega and Ilubabor regions. Many live in the hot lowland
area of the Didessa valley between Nekemte and Gimbi; others

in Asosa awraja further west; and there is a viable Mac

community in Anfillo Woreda as their major center. Although

the Mao now occupy a widely disconnected areas, the

traditions are quite explicit, that they inhabited a much
larger and continuous region prior to the arrival of the
Oromo. The special position given to the Mac in the
traditions, which remember them as the most developed of the

shanqilla, is’also connected with the apparently longer

 

interaction they seem to have had with the more organized

Bussase of Anfillo, discussed earlier in this chapter.

The wide dispersal of the Mao in western Ethiopia today
seems to have misled modern linguists, who have defined two
sub- divisions, namely Northern Mao and Southern Mao. While
the so- called Northern Mao is said to be Nilo-Saharan, the
Southern Mao is identified as Omotic.20 This is most
confusing not only because people having the same appellation
of Mac are divided into two distinct African language
families: but also because the Mao of Asosa might qualify as
a western Mao, a fact not taken into consideration by the
linguists. Yet, “Southern Mac“ is essentially the language
of the dominant Bussase minority, whip? has also been spoken

to some extent by their Mao subjects. It seems to us, then

that it would be less confusing to use Bussase to replace

43

South Mao in linguistic classification.

In the preceding discussion we have attempted to survey
the socio-economic and political life of the diversified
population groups in western central Ethiopia with which the
Macha Oromo came into conflict or contact as they expanded
westward. Meanwhile, the Macha Oromo continued to resist
the wars organized against them by Gonderine Christian
emperors in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

22
centuries. While most of the Nilo-Saharan shanqilla groups

 

lived in a scattered communities with a hunting-gathering
economy at the time, most of the Omotic peoples were already
well organized with a fairly strong kingdoms and
chieftaincies of their own. References in the early European
sources and local traditions indicate that the expanding
Oromo faced more challenges from the Omotics than they

generally did from the Nilo-Saharans in the area.

According to oral sources, the point of departure for
the Macha and Tulama expansion into most parts of Shewa and
western central Ethiopia was the reputed site of Oda Nabe,
where the Macha and Tulama kept a common 33g; center, to
which they sent leading representatives for regular
celebrations, long after they had moved out and settled in
areas further north and west. At Oda Nabe, the
representatives received instructions from the general

assembly on the basis of Oromo beliefs, customs and

44

folklore. Common strategies for further expansion were
discussed and attempts made to arbitrate internal conflicti?

In the course of their early migrations, the Oromo had
clearly developed traditional mechanisms to regulate the
tempo of their expansion, to minimize rival claims on newly
occupied territories, to avoid clashes among different clans
or tribes and possibly to harmonize relations with other
ethnic groups. The ggdg system permitted the Oromo to
articulate outstanding mechanisms such as the quabiig and

25
the gudifacha systems. The guabiye system refers to

 

established rights of precedence in the occupation of newly
conquered land. It aimed at resolving disputes that could
arise within individual claims as well as among different
tribes or tribal confederations. Tradition has it that the
quabiye system regulated land occupation rights within the
same clan by dividing the local community into generational
hierarchies. After a community established a new settlement
and population pressures and land shortage began to be felt,
the Appp, or elder families, had precedence over the
pAppA, or younger families, to retain occupation rights on
the settlement. Under these circumstances, it was incumbent
upon the gppgg to move ahead, conquer new lands and
establish their own guabiye as pioneers. To simplify the
implementation of this traditional rule, the gppgg families
often established their residence on the outer fringes of

the settlement so that whenever the need arose, they could

45
26

easly move out into new far away areas. Traditions collected
collected by Lambert Bartels in southwestern Welega also
clearly illustrate this point:

When we moved westwards, it was like this:

the eldest son always remained on his

father's land; the other sons went in search

of new land for themselves. Later, the sons

of those eldest sons, in their turn, followed

their relatives who went before them, and
joined them in the new country.27

This practice operated smoothly in the early days of
Oromo expansion and settlement, particularly in the event of
westward trek of the Macha. This strategy of obtaining
unrestricted access to fresh land seemns to have been
confused with the rules of primogeniturezgnd is perceived as
a major source of tension and contradiction among the Oromo
by some scholars. Nevertheless, the principle of
primogeniture was employed by the Oromo as a solution to the
problem of inheritance, evolved long after their settlement.
The concept of primogeniture, so important among the Oromo,
has been discussed at a greater length by a number of
anthropologists29 to explain the so-called less dramatic and
less observed Oromo expansion after the sixteenth century
therefore, a much later phenomenon that need not be confused

with the historic early expansion and settlement of the

Oromo.

Apparently the guabiye system also had traditional

sanctions to regulate land rights among different tribes

46
based on the same concept of hobo (elder families) and
chora (younger families). vOne of our best informants says:
According to the Oromo custom the eldest sons
in their family (the hangafa) remained at
the place of their father's residence by
inheriting the guabiye land of their fathers
while the younger sons had to move into a fresh
land. In the process of Oromo expansion this
was why the Tulama (elder family) remained in
Shewa and the Macha (younger family) moved
westwards and occupied their present location.30
The quabiye institution seems to have solved the
initial problems of land rights and allocation among the
expanding Oromo. It is important to realize, however, that,
over the long run, it did not prevent open conflicts and
serious clashes particularly between two clans or tribes.
War (dula) between the various Oromo clans and tribes
31
began in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Our informants report periodic clashes or quarrels (lolla)
between Macha and Tulama groups. Both claimed guabiye
rights on contiguous areas west and east of the head waters
of the Awash, Macha's claim being near Awash gudda (bigger
Awash) and Tulama's near Awash gualo (smaller Awash).
The competition between the two led to a series of quarrels
over grazing land and water resources. Intermittent efforts
were made by the highest authorities (gada officials) of
both groups to solve the problems, but the clashes lasted
for forty years until the Macha and Tulama eventually moved

32
their separate ways.

47

The Mecha-Tulama confrontation, raids and counter raids
on guabiye rights actually continued long after their
separation at the upper waters of the Awash.33 Since this
study is however centered on the political economy of western
Ethiopia, our main concern here will be the pattern of Macha
expansion and settlement in the region and the unfolding
historical developments. Macha traditions tell us that
before they moved further west they sent reconnaissance
squads to assess situations in the organized states of
Enarya and the other pre-Oromo peoples of the region.
Encouraged by positive reports from these squads, the Macha
are said to have moved and settled around the hill of Tute
Bisil Osole,34 located in the upper Gibe basin. Reputed for
its strategic importance, the hill remained the nucleus of
the Macha Oromo for five generations35 playing the role of

the Old center, Oda Nabe, and serving them as a point of

departure for their expansion west, northwest and southwards.

It was with this region as their major center that the
Macha organized themselves into two strong confederacies
known as A253 (four) and Sadacha (three),3:nd launched
their regular attacks on the pre-Oromo states of Enarya and
Damot. It was also here at Tute Bisil that the traditions
indicate a great increase in population and a sharp rise in
the number of Macha livestock as a result of natural

reproduction and frequent military expeditions. It is also

crucial to remember that it was after their permanent

48
settlement that the Oromo started to put more and more
emphasis on cultivation of crops and eventually became mixed

farmers par excellence. All these factors in turn brought

 

about a pressing need for more land, water resources and
pasture. The Macha consequently split into a number of
clans and subtribes including Leqa, Sibu, Sayo, Tume, Amuru,

Gudru, Nonno, Jima, Welega and Hulle.

These Oromo groups spread out from Tute Bisil and
eventually dominated the whole region between the Abbay in
the north, the Dabus river and Tulu Wolal in the west, and
the Gojeb river in the south. The southern wave of Macha
migration into the rich lands between the Didessa and the
Gojeb resulted in the Hulle branch, headed by the Sadacha
confederation, conquering the pre- Oromo populations and
eventually establishing the five Oromo Kingdoms of Limu,
Jima, Gera, Guma and Goma.39 The Tume tribe is said to have
moved on eastwards across many big rivers to inhabit parts of
Ilubabor. The others, Leqa, Sibu, Sayo, Guduru, Amuru and
Nonno are said to have gradually conquered the greater part
of what is now Welega administrative region.40 Although
there are some indications to the contrary, we have not come
across any reliable traditions to show that the Oromo
migrated further west than an imaginary line between the

41
Dabus river, Tulu Wolal and eastern Akobo river Valley.

As we have indicated earlier in this chapter, generally

49

speaking the Macha Oromo were confronted with stronger
challenges from the well organized Omotic Kingdoms than they
had from the dispersed Nilo-Saharan peoples. Very clearly,
in the direction of the Gibe, beginning with the state of
Enarya, not to mention Kefa and Janjero further south,
resistance against the Oromo seems to have been fierce, and
deeper penetration by the Sadacha confederation of the

Macha, at an early stage, became practically impossible. So
as an alternative, the Oromo settled in adjacent areas and
began to establish forms of economic relations based on the
concept of pioneers'rights to the guabiye land. The newly

arriving clans, lineages and families settled on the already
occupied land with certain obligations.42 This situation
seems to have set in motion an entirely a new trend in the

political economy of the Macha Oromo - which we shall

consider a little later.

The westerly Macha advance south of the Abbay
encountered serious resistance only from the Bussase of
Anfillo and the Ganqa subjects of Abba Bisqano.

The shanqilla (Nilo-Saharans), on the other hand,

H

who then occupied the rich highland plateau, were no match
(for the Macha Oromo who were better armed, better organized,
experienced and at a higher level of socio-economic
development. The traditions relate that the majority of
the shanqilla resisted only with bows and poisoned

arrows, while the Macha had effective cavalry and

50

infantry armed with spears, shields and a special weapon
43
called billa butta. Our informants also clearly indicate

 

the existence of internal conflicts among the pre-Oromo
population, another factor which is said to have contributed

to the success of the Macha.

Early reports, including that of Bahrey, invariably
exaggerate the brutality of the Oromo and their eagerness to
shed blood. Ample evidence, even from the chronicles, show
that the Oromo activities in this regard did not at all
match, let alone excel, those of the professional soldiers
of the emperors, who were always ready to enslave women and
children and to emasculate men?4 Though the Oromo were
undoubtedly fierce against their enemies, they had ways of
accommodating and integrating other peoples and societies,

which proved to be much more effective than the use of sheer

force.

Right from the very beginning of their sixteenth century
migration, the Oromo had evolved a meticulous mechanism by
which they could assimilate elements of reduced populations
or those with whom they established peaceful co-existence.
As a predominantely pastoral society with less
sophistication, Oromo socio-economic and political relations
were entirely based on egalitarian principles governed by the
gggg. At this stage, our sources do not indicate the

existence of"a class for itself” among the Oromo. Nonetheless,

51

since there was differentiation in the quantity of wealth
(cattle) possessed by individuals or groups, 'a class in
itself" might have existed as is often the characteristics of
many east African pastoralist societies. This sort of
situation was outlined by Engels in the case of the Iroquois
Indians who, like the Oromo, lived under the framework of
what he calls "the gentile constitution.“

There is as yet no room for slaves, not as

a rule, for the subjugation of alien tribes.

When the Iroquois conquered the Eries . . .

about the year 1651, they invited them to join

confederacy as equal members - only when the

vanquished refused were they driven out of

their territory.45

For the adoption of other peoples, the Oromo had an

ancient institution called gudifacha (also known as mogasa),

complete with its own sophisticated ceremonies and symbolic

rituals. In gudifacha there were individual and group

 

adoptions. The first was the adoption of a single male
child by sterile couples or by a childless widow for the
purpose of family continuity or social security. The second
involves the adoption of the clan or tribe. It could either
be intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic, but our informants report
that the latter was clearly the usual practice in the days
of Macha expansion.46 The whole procedure of gudifacha,

whether individual or group adoption was undertaken

according to gada customary laws.

During the gudifacha ceremony,gada officials and

 

52
elders were invited for ratification and blessings. In the
case of group adoption local drinks were served, two or more
bulls were slaughtered and a fabulous feast was given to the
people. As a symbol of the newly established unity of the

two groups, the representative of the adopting clan placed
47
meditcha, freshly cut off from the limbs of the sacrificial

bulls, on the wrists of the representative of the adopted

clan. Then the two representatives cut their respective
48 .
thighs, took some blood which they mixed together. Both

groups receive blessings from the gag; elders as well took

an oath to help each other in time of peace and war. A new
name was given to the adopted group, now fully incorporated
with the clan of the adopting Oromo. It is very significant
to underscore that the adopted were given exactly the same

privileges as the Oromo and were completely integrated in
49
the gada system, becoming free and equal to the “Borana“

Oromo. After a few generations it was almost impossible to

make any distinction between the Oromo and the adopted
50
group, and there was no ethnicity problem whatsoever.

. . . The conquest by the Galla, however,
has not involved any ethnic or social
separation between the first settlers and
the new comers. In contrast to areas of
Fulani conquest, or to Ankole, for example,
there are, in Jimma, no major group
distinctions on the basis of ethnic origin.
This seems to be generally true in all Galla
areas, and may be one aspect of the
"Universalistic' nature of Oromo society and
culture.51

Very clearly, the non-aggressive but perhaps persuasive

53

mechanism of gudifacha gave the Oromo an inexhaustible

 

capacity for incorporating large numbers of non-Oromo
communities, and this might partly explain the rapidity as
well as the dynamics of their expansion throughout the length

and breadth of the Ethiopian plateau.

Some of those pre-Oromo elements who refused to submit
were either eliminated altogether or had to escape to
inaccessible areas. As we have indicated earlier, it was in

this way that many groups, both shanqilla and Omotic, are

 

said to have moved either into inhospitable lowlands of the
river valleys, mountain fortresses or crossed the Abbay into

Gojam region.

In the absence of written records it has been impossible
to establish the exact chronologies for the early migrations
and final settlement of the Oromo in western central
Ethiopia. Karl Knutsson has forwarded a general,
approximate periodizationszwhich is often separated by 100
years simply for convenience, but not so much based on
concrete historical events. Such chronological construct is
not only vague and misleading but also an oversimplification
of a more complex process. Therefore, it is clear that no
plausible specific historical study on the subject has
appeared so far. However, we have made attempts recently to

establish a tentative dating for the Macha occupation of the

various parts of western central Ethiopia. This was done

54

mainly on the basis of informants' knowledge about the number
of generations elapsed their ancestral settlement in a
particular locality; and by cross reference to the available
dates from written sources.53

We can reconstruct that the Macha settlement in most of
the Gibe region and western Shewa around their gig; center,
Tute Bisil, was complete by the turn of the seventeenth
century. In the second half of the seventeenth and the
beginning of the eighteenth century the Macha had already
occupied northern Kefa, eastern Ilubabor, and northeastern
Welega. By the middle of the eighteenth century they had
moved into the western corner of Gojam (Wambara), central
and western Welega and Ilubabor, more or less completing
their expansion and settlement in western central Ethiopia.54
It is important to note, however, that these periods
represent the final Oromo conquest of their predecessors,

and the prolonged warfare between them seems to have taken at

least half a century.

As we have already pointed out in the first chapter, the
leaders of each 93g; had to conquer new territory.
Officials of each new Agggg at least had to match the
performance and the reputation of their historical
antecedents, otherwise they usually committed themselves to
do much more. Apparently, intelligence about the

availability of land and good pasture ahead of them in far

55
away places, was almost always a source of inspiration and
motivation for groups and individuals. The Oromo had
experienced many years of expansion and conquest and had
enjoyed victories in many of their confrontations with others
since the beginning of the sixteenth century; they therefore

evolved heroic traditions about pioneers and frontiersmen.

Among the Macha, the leaders of the earliest families to

clear and settle a newly conquered area had the honorific
55
title of degal saqui, which literally means "the Opener of

 

forests.“ They assumed very great responsibilities in the
name of and on behalf of their community. Since land was
the most vital economic resource, all members shared equal

communal rights and the degal saqui did not enjoy

 

exclusively in an individual sense. Symbolically, the
earliest families constituted what was termed as balbala
gudda (big door), while the remaining families were known as

balbala tina (small door). In the early Oromo society the

 

degal saqui or their sibilings did not enjoy greater

 

rights to the land or any other resources. As senior
representatives of the community, they officiated at the
distribution of land and had a decisive say in the
arbitration of all kinds of disputes, along with the ~39p3
42953 (father of the scepter), within their area of
influence.56 Originally they also fulfilled many ritual

duities such as slaying ceremonial bulls on such occasions as

the traditional rainmaking celebrations. Other than these

56
positions of traditional rainmaking importance given to them,

the degal saqui were ordinary members of their community.

 

The line of social interaction between them and the rest

were horizontally oriented rather than vertically.

Because the concept of private ownership of land hardly
existed among the Oromo, individual families could settle,
cultivate and graze their cattle anywhere. It was against
the customary law of any one person to enclose an extensive
tract as the sole owner. As a limited and inelastic
commodity, however, land had to be distributed and redistri-

buted for accommodation. Although the degal saqui had a

 

decisive voice together with the current abba boku, land

 

distribution for use among the Macha was _the task of the
chaffe, the public gathering of the local gggéf71n the

early period of Oromo expansion, land was relatively
plentiful and the exercise of communal rights, regulated by

the degal saqui together with the ruling gada, operated

 

fairly smoothly. Every household in the community was

58
entitled to its dogue for cultivation and for keeping and
59
raising its herds of cattle, sheep and goats. After many

generations, however, the gradual increase in the local
population and the influx of new Oromo clans overcrowded the
limited land supply. Traditions suggest that this situation
created tensions and exacerbated local feuds over land use.
The new state of affairs led to the development of a

hierarchy of land rights and an incipient stratification of

57
60
society into less and more favored classes.

A major contradiction began to develop between the
descendants of the first settlers and later immigrants. The
families of the pioneers naturally enjoyed the best available
land, and they also had the power to give plots to new
settlers through a special procedure called gubsissa
(allowing to settle). The gubsissa agreement imposed on
the new settler, the gppg, certain duties which clearly
underlined the subordinate nature of his status. The gppe

had to perform labor services to the degal saqui for a

 

specific number of days. At the initial stage the Qéflél
5392; received these labor services not as a personal
right but symbolically as the sign of pioneers' seniority.6At
first, the services were probably rendered to the whole

community were based on the rules of reciprocity. As time

went on, however, the degal saqui and other prominent

 

members of the community began to assume greater importance
and to appropriate rights to land and to labor as a matter
62
of personal authority.
It has already been pointed out that the Oromo had

assimilated some of the neighbouring societies through the

traditional gudifacha system. It is clear, however, that

 

they absorbed only similar people of Cushitic or Omotic
origins who enjoyed fairly well developed socio-economic and

political systems of their own. For a number of other

58
populations who were physically, linguistically, and
culturally distinct, assimilation was difficult, though
toleration and coexistence were possible. These included
many Nilo-Saharan speakers of dark complexions known as gipg

or shanqilla. In fact initially, the Macha Oromo fought

 

against these peoples and eventually drove them from the
cool, well watered highlands into dry, hot, lowland basins or
into virgin forests in western central Ethiopia.63
Gradually, as population grew and land became scarce, Oromo
families and clans began to move into the gipg areas. 2i22.

villages were raided by the Oromo adventurers who in time
began to take slaves whom they needed as laborers in addition
to their household members.64In his recent work, Bade Onimode
has pointed out a similar development in pre-colonial
Nigeria: ”With a passage of time, the tribal societies of
communal formations entered into increased contact with
neighbouring peoples, through migration under shifting
cultivation, and the growth of clans. This led to conflicts
with other clans over land, and to the systematic
organization of raids for the capture of land, animals,
treasure or people.'65 Under such circumstances, ambitious

Oromo leaders surrounded themselves with an increasing number
of personal followers, and tended to accumulate large

quantities of wealth in cattle, land and slaves which their

descendants inherited.

Another category of dependent people were groups of

59

isolated hunters and gatherers, blacksmiths, potters and
dressers of skin.66 Most probably, these were legacies from
earlier populations, many of whom already had very highly
stratified and "caste" societies. The Oromo also relegated
these people into the lower echelons of their society both
in terms of land rights and social groupings.67

It is not possible to identify specifically where and
when these developments began to take shape among the Macha
Oromo. It is very clear, however, that changes in the
intitial landholding system and productive activities had
already led to the weakening of egalitarian 33g;
organization in the Gibe basin and in western and
nortwestern Macha land by the first half of the eighteenth
century and mid-nineteenth century respectively.68 Disputes
over land caused armed conflicts among the neighbouring
groups. The Oromo seem to have made distinctions between
interethnic feuds, which they called Apia (quarrel), and
wars with non-Oromo peoples, which they termed ‘gpAA
(expedition). Traditions indicate that after the guabiye
rights to specific parts of the Macha region were
established, Oromo groups involved in a Aplg did not as a
matter of principle dispossess other Oromo of their guabiye
land. Among the Oromo there was a common recognition of
some sort of mystical bond between man and land which
signified a social and economic security and was impossible

69
to change through force of arms. The victors took as

60

booty cattle and other goods but left their Oromo enemy still
in control of land. In the case of clashes with the non-
Oromo, however, we are told that there were three
possibilities open to the Oromo: 1) making arrangements
with the enemy for co-existence and settlement in adjacent
areas; 2) assimilation and incorporation of the conquered
through gudifacha: 3) appropriation of the ecologically
best part of the land and other forms of property.70

Out of these peaceful and belligerent interactions and
experiences of the Oromo, there emerged in later generations
leading personalities, who had initially distinguished

themselves either as gada officials (Abba Boku -

 

father of the scepter, Abba Dula - war leader) or as the

71
degal saqui of their communities. Eventually, however,

 

 

these individuals and their descendants constituted a
hereditary nobility, who built up over the generations very
high positions of political and economic influence among their
people and then continuously growing personal following.
They also tended to accummulate large quantities of wealth
in cattle, land and other forms of property which their
direct offspring inherited. Popular titles such as 23mg
‘ggggg (big and influential man), apparently a new Oromo
concept, were given to them to signify their newly elevated
status, and their personal prominence started to interfegg

with the natural course of the gada rules and regulations.

It is interesting to note that this trend of socio-economic

61
development among the Macha, reported by local traditions,
is indeed reminiscent of Engels' analysis of the slow
transformation of classless communities into class societies
or a transition from 'a class in itself' to 'a class for itself:
. . . differentiation in wealth affecting
in turn the social constitution by creat-
ing first rudiments of a hereditary nobi-
lity . . . the degeneration of the old
intertribal warfare to systematic raids
. . . for the purpose of capturing cattle,
slaves, and treasure as a regular means of
gaining a livelihood. In short, wealth is
praised and respected as the highest treasure,
and the old gentile institution, are per-
verted in order to justify forcible robbery
of wealth.73
Such tendencies towards a new economic and political
order seem to have appeared among the Gibe Oromo who almost
immediately embarked on a system of production based on
sedentary agriculture besides animal husbandry. As Willam
Freund has recently put it, ”Agriculture transformed social
and cultural life in Africa. It allowed for vastly greater
population densities and for the consistent production of a
surplus beyond immediate consumption needs. Social
organization took on new complexities, the most fundamental
being the intensified concern with property rights over
74
rescources.‘ It is also apparent that the Gibe Oromo were
heavily involved in the system of exchange with one another
and other societies they encountered as they established

their permanent homes in the resourceful region. These

basic changes seem to have prompted the emergence of

62
social classes and superstructural transformations.

Explicating such historical processes Amilcar Cabral wrote:

The definition of classes within one or
several human groups is a fundamental
consequence of the progressive develop-
ment of the productive forces and the
characteristics of the wealth produced
by the group or usurped from others.
That is to say the socio-economic pheno-
menon 'class' is created and develops a
function of at least two essential inter-
dependent variables - the level of pro-
ductive forces and the pattern of owner-
ship of the means of production.75

63
Notes pp Chapter A;

l. Omotic and Nilo-Saharan are two of the four families of
languages spoken in Ethiopia, the other two being
Semitic and Cushtic. Linguists have recently identified
the Omotic languages mainly spoken by peoples in the Omo
river basin where it is supposed to have originated. The
name was coined by Fleming who made an extensive study
of the language and found out its distinctive features
from the Cushitic, See M. L. Bender, et.al., (eds),
Languages 32 Ethiopia, London, 1976).

1976).

 

2. The people mentioned in the literature as the Gonga are
popularly known as the ganga in the traditions of
Welega Linguistically they are closely related to the
Kefa people of southwest Ethiopia. Probably, the people
who are known as the Sinicho in Welega and the Shinasha
in Gojam belong to the same stock. See Conti Rossini,
“Studi su Popolazioni dell' Etiopia,” Revista degli
Studi Orientali, Vol. VI. (1914), PP. 404-415; cf.M.L.
Bender, et.al.,(eds), Languages Ap‘Ethiopia, pp.47-49

 

 

 

3. Interview: Ques Daffa Jamo, Aira, Negari Jammo, Gimbi,
Graz. Waltaji Dagago, Bodji; Graz. Deressa, Galla, Emiru
Gebre, Nekemte, July and August 1979. For ethnographic
survey of the peoples of the southwest and its border-
lands. See Ernesta Cerulli, Peoples pf the Southwest
Ethiopia and Its Boarderland, (London Intern. African
Inst. 1956).

 

 

4. Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State 12 Ethiopia, pp.
120-123, map, p 133.

 

5. Interview: Kenna Abdissa Mossa, Emiru Gebre, Nekemte;
Jalleta Aba Nama, Shambo, August - October 1979.

6. Almeida, "The History of High Ethiopia" p. 19.

7. G. W. B. Huntingford, The Galla pg Ethiopia, p. 20.

 

8. Cerulli, Peoples 2; the South West Ethiopia, p. 17;
Bieber, Kaffa El, Microfilm, Egg, A. A. U. p. 103:
Girma Mengistu, "The Busase of Anfillo, Quellem Wollaga: A
Historical Study,” (B.A. Thesis, A. A. U., 1973), pp. 1-3.

 

9. Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, Negari Jammo, Gimbi,
August 1979.

10. There are some indications that the Bussase was actually
the name of one of the clans in Kefa. V. L. Groltanelli,

ll.

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.

23.

64

I Mao, Vol. 1 (Roma, Reale Accademia D'Italia, 1940),
pp. 52- 56.

Interview: Negari Jammo, Gimbi, August 1979; see also Girma
mengistu, “The Busase,“ pp. 20-40.

See note 2 of this chapter.

Interview: Graz. waltaji Dagago, Bodji, Kitilla Challa,
Nedjo, Ques Jalleta wasse, Bodji, August 1979.

Huntingford, Some Records Lf Ethiopia, p. LIII, Conti
Rossini, Storia d' Ethiopia (Milan, 1928), p. 286.

 

Interview: Emiru Gebre, Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte July
1979.

Interview: Graz. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, Wolde Georgis
Beke, Arjo, Sept. 1979.

People whom the Oromo know as the Masengo call themselves
Majongo. They are known by different other names -
Majiano, Mashongo, Magianghir etc. According to Cerulli,
the Masengo live in the southwest boardered by the Oromo
in the north, the Mocha and the Gimira in the east and
southeast respectively and by the Anuak in the west. See
E. Cerulli, peoples pg the South West Ethiopia, pp.
38-40.

 

Interview: Graz. Negusse Kananie, Shambo, Oct. 1979. Ques

Daffa Jammo, Aira, Negari Jammo, Gimbi, August 1979.

Interview: Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte, Graz. Woltaji
Dagago, Bodji, August 1979, see also E. Cerulli, Peoples
Lf South West Ethiopia, pp. 16-17. A detailed treatment of
the Mao is given by V. L. Grottanelli, ; pp. 52- 56.

 

Bender, Languages i2 Ethiopia, pp. 47 and 56.

 

Grottanelli, A Ago, pp. 52 - 56.

Abir, ”Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa,” The Cambridge
History 9g Africa Vol. 4 (Cambridge university Press,
1975), pp. 558-562: edited by Richard Gray. According
to the Paris Chronicle, Iyasu I was successful against
the Macha Oromo of Limu-Enarya of the Gibe basin in
1703. Since the sources are almost silent of what

had taken place after, the defeat of the Macha might
have been temporary and was by no means a general set
back against their movement.

 

Interview: Emiru Gebre, Kanna Abdissa Mossa, Gebre

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.

65
Sellassie Guta, Nekemte, Sept. 1979.
Quabiye literally means possession or land holding
necessarily recognized by others. Interview: W/Georgis
Beke Kabule Mudda, Arjo, Gudeta Moroda, Digga, Sept. 1979.

Gudifacha literally means adoption in the sense of

 

bringing up a child. It is synonymous with mo assa
(Lit. naming) used also among the Oromo as soc1al adoption.

Interview: Emiru Gebre, Gebre sellassie Guta, Kenna Abdiss
Mossa, Nekemte, Gudata Moroda, Digga, Sept. 1979.

L. Bartels, “Studies on the Galla in Wollega,‘ journal pf
Ethiopian Studies, VIII: 1 (1970), p. 139.

 

According to the practice of premogeniture, the eldest sons
(the hangafa) receive the greater share of the guabiye
land. See Asmarom Legesse, Gada, pp.26-40.

Based on their studies among the Macha and their ancestors,
the Borana of southern Ethiopia, some anthropologists
believe that the rule of premogeniture creats strong
tensions and contradictions leading to fission and
expansion among the Oromo. However, it seems that the
rules of premogeniture among the Oromo became important

in relation to property inheritance only long after
settlement and not during the critical years of conquest
and expansion. See Jan Hultin, “Social structure
Ideology and Expansion: The case of the Oromo in Ethiopia,"

Ethnos, 40(1975), pp. 273-284. Asmarom Legesse, Gada,

pp. 26-45.
Interview: Kitila Challa, Nedjo, August 1979.
Merid W/Aregay, "Southern Ethiopia”, p. 307.

This aspect of Oromo tradition is highly diffused and has
been recorded by other writers. See Bahru Zewde,'Dejazmach
Jote Tulu (1855-1918),” (B.A. Thesis, H.S,I.U. Addis Ababa,
June 1970), p. 11. Yilma Deressa, Xe Ethiopia Tarik,

p.420, Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Gebre Selassie Guta,
Emru Gebre, Nequemte, August 1979.

 

Ibid; see also E. Cerulli, Etiopia Occidentale II,

p. 170.

 

Tute Bisil, also known as Oda Bisil, is frequently
mentioned in the western Oromo traditions from Jimma in the
south to Gudru in the north. Interview: Gudeta Moroda,
Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Digga, Sept. 1979.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

66

Guluma believes that staying of the Macha at Tute Bisil for
five generations is long. He argues that both oral
traditions and written sources agree that by the beginning
of the eighteenth century all the Macha tribes had occupied
their present habitat. See Guluma Gemeda, “The process of
State Formation in the Gibe Region: The case of Gomma and
Jimma,“ Proceedings Lf the Second Annual Seminar Lf the
Department Lf History A. A. U, Vol. 1,11984, pp. 133- 144.
Citing Guidi (ed), Annales Johannis_L Iyasu I et Bakaffa
II (Louain, 1961), PP. 252- 78. During Iyasu' s expedition
(1703- -l704), against the Macha, Gudru, Horo, Amuru, Liban,
Jima - Macha tribes had already occupied their present
areas. Nevertheless, if we consider the duration of time
Tute Bisil has served the Macha Oromo as a center for their
gada assembly, five generations may even be too short.

 

 

 

 

For the names and numbers of the tribe in the Afre and
Sadacha, Macha confederacies, see Bahrey' s geneological
table chapter 1, in Beckingham and Huntingford, Some
Records Lf Ethio ia, p. 109- -1103 See also Merid W7Aregay,
"Southern Ethiopia, p. 404.

Traditions report that Welega was one of the sub-tribes of
Macha at Tute Bisil. But after th Oromo expanded further
west, Welega is mentioned as a person's name among the Sibu
tribe and later on it became the name of the whole region.
Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, Graz. Waltaji Dagago,
Bodji, August 5 September, 1979.

Hulle was one of the biggest Macha tribes which expanded
south wards from Tute Bisil into northern Kefa. Jima oral
traditions also indicate that Hulle was divided into a
number of clans and sub-tribes who occupied northern Kefa,
and it is mentioned in connection with Oda Hulle as

their gada center. See Jima oral tradition: A project
jointly launched by the Institute of Ethiopian Studies and
the Department of history, A. A. U., Nov. 20 - Dec. 3, 19733
Yilma Deressa, Ye Ethiopia Tarik, p. 213.

Interview: Abba Jobir Abba Dula, Jimma, Nov. 21, 1973
Haji Osman Abba Diko, Jimma, Nov. 21, 1973: Abba Gaze

Abba Garo, Gera, April 2, 1974.

 

 

E. Cerulli, ”The Folk-Literature of the Galla of Southern
Abyssinia,” Harvard African Studies, Vol. III (1922),

p. 11. C.f. Yilma Deressa, 33 Ethiopia Tarik, pp. 213-
214.

 

 

Interview: Kenna Abdissa Mossa, Emiru Gebre, Nekemte,
August 1979.

Some of our informants claim that the Macha expanding
troops had even reached Roseires Wada Shinina in today's

42.

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.

49.

67

Sudan where they are said to have buried a spear, a
shield and billa butta facing west as the demarcation

of their guabiye land. Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte,
Negari jammo, Gimbi, August and Sept. 1979.

and Sept. 1979.

 

Guluma Gemeda, “The Process of State Formation," pp.
132-136.

A special weapon made of iron, sharpened on both sides
with a wooden handle which was used to cut off enemies'
heads. In the warfare between the shanquilla and the
Oromo at least three of the four military technologies
mentioned by J. Goody in West Africa (with the exception
of gun) were used, but it is very difficult for me to
say that the Oromo got the upper hand because of
their military technologies rather than because of

their productive techniques as J. Goody contends in the
case of Forest and Savana states. For me productive
techniques are significant for advancement in military
technologies, and both are not mutually exclusive. See J.
Goody, Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa,
(1971).

 

 

The raids and conquests undertaken by the Oromo in the
process of their expansion seem to have been blown out of
proportion; understandably because Bahrey and the other
authors might have suffered from them. R.Pankhurst, The
Royal Chronicles, pp.82-115, See also Merid W/Aregay

 

 

Southern Ethiopia, pp.315-316.

F. Engels, ”The Origin of Family," p.226.

Interview: Ta'a Woyessa, Ta'a Negari, Nekemte, June 1973;
See also Bekele Nadi, “Adoption among the Oromo of Sawa,“
Ethnological Society Bulletin, No.7, University College of

 

Addis Ababa, Dec. 1957, pp.83-91.

Pieces of skin with flesh cut from the limbs of the
animals slaughtered at the gudifacha ceremony.

 

Thigh is known as gudeda in Oromo, and the Oromo ususlly
identified it with procreation. Hence, the significance of
taking blood from this part of the body symbolizes that
the adopted group are by no means different from the other
Oromo children with blood ties.

Among the Oromo of western Ethiopia the term “Borana” is
used to distinguish the Oromo from the survivors of the
early inhabitants of the region who were referred to as
the “gabaro.” However, the term gabaro later came to be

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

68

applied to lineages of the subdued and assimilated
aborigineal population who, according to Cerulli, also
performed their own gada rituals at the same time as

the “Borana." Nevertheless, Jan Hultin claims that his
informants in the Sibu region of western Wollega,
“emphatically stated that theilma gerba were pure
Oromo." Be that as it may, the Borana considered the
"gabaro'l as having a lower social status compared to
themselves. See E. Cerulli, Etiopia occidentale,

p. 126; K. Knutson, Authority and Change, pp. 39,181:

E. Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens, p. 775: Jan
Hultin,'Politica1 structure and the developent of
Inequality.“ pp. 289-293.

 

 

 

 

Interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Digga, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa,
Gebre Sellassie Gutta, Nekemte, Sept. 1979.

H. S. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar, Ethiopia
1830- 1932. (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1965)

 

 

p. 38. See also E. Cerulli, Ethiopia Occidentale, Vol.1
(Roma, 1932), p. 126: A. d' Abbadie, 'Sur Les Oromo, Grand
Nation Africane,‘ Annales de la societe scientifique de
Bruxelles, IV (1880), p. 176.

 

 

 

Knutsson, Authority and Change, p. 184. The author has
divided historical periods and major events into five:
Expansion (1520-1600): Settlement (1600-1700):
'Tribalization” (1700-1800): Amhara expansion (1800-1880):
Ethiopization (1880 - ).

 

By assigning 23-25 years for each generation, the
calculation may have a marginal error of plus or minus
15 years. Interview: Graz. Tamru Gutta, Graz. Duguma
Oncho, Digga, July 1973: See also Guluma Gemeda,
”The Process of State Formation,” p. 143.

Leqa Nekemte informants report that they spent thirteen
to fourteen generations since they have settled in

the area while informants of Leqa Kelem say that
they have spent ten to eleven generations. The Sibu
traditions say that they lived for about eleven to
twelve generations in the Sibu country. Informants

in Jima, Amuru and Gudru in northeastern Welega relate
that twelve to thirteen generations have elapsed since
their settlement in that area. According to Oromo custom
it is the duty of the parents to teach their children to
count genealogies up to fifteen generations or more.
Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, Kitila Challa, Nedjo,
Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, Negari Jammo, Gimbi, Negussa
Kanaie, Shambo, Sept and Oct, 1979. See also
Huntingford, The Galla 2: Ethiopia, p. 19

 

69

55. There is a striking similarity between the respectful
degal saqui of the Oromo and the kilolo, a terri-
torial chief of the Luba of Angola, Cf. Jan Vansina,

Kingdoms Lf the Savanna (Madison, The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 70- 76.

 

56. Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, Gudeta Moroda, Digga,
Sept. 1979. See also Tesema Ta'a “The Basis for
Political Contradictions in Wollega: The Land Apportion-
ment Act of 1910 and its Consequences,” North East
African Studies, 6: 1-2 (1984), p. 181.

 

57. Interview: Galeta Kote, Ta'a Woyessa, Nekemte, August 1972.

58. Do ue is the Oromo term, apparently of ancient origin,
which means ”dung.” During the Oromo settlement in western
central Ethiopia, however, it was used to mean the right
to a share of land in the quabiye (possession) system.
This clearly reflects the transformation of the Oromo
from a predominantly pastoralist society into one of
sedentary mixed farmers. The possessor of doque was
entitled to utilize the resources of wilderness: water,
small and big game, firewood, and so forth.

59. Interview: Buli Anke, Ques Mathewos Chibsa, Mendi, Aug.
1979.

60. Interview: Kitila Challa, Nedjo, Buli Anke, Mendi,
August, 1979: See also Jan Hultin, ”Man and land in
Wollega, Ethiopia,” Gothenburg University (April
1977), p. l; and "The Oromo Expansion Reconsidered,“
Journal Lf Research Ln North East Africa, 1,3(1982),
pp. 188- 293.

61.A similar practice was popular among the Ibo in western
Nigeria. C.K.Meek has written: ”It should be noted that
strangers who have joined a local or kindered group have
no automatic right to a share in the common land ofthe
group. They may, however, be given a share as an act of
grace, and would be expected to give a gift of a few yams
at harvest to the senior elder or elders of the group.”
C. K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe,

(London: Oxford University_ Press, 1973), p. 102.

 

62. Tesema Ta'a, ”The Basis of Political Contradictions,“
pp. 181- 182.

63. Interview: Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte, Kabule Mudda,
Arjo, Sept. 1979; See also Tesema Ta'a, Ibid.

64. Interview: Kitilla Challa, Nedjo, Wolde Georgis Beke,
Arjo, Sept. 5 August 1979.

65.

66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

70

Bade Onimode, Imperialism and UnderdeveIOpment Ln
Nigeria: The Dialectics Lf Mass Poverty, (London,

 

 

 

Zed Press, 1983), pp. 11-12.
pp. 11-12.

Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, August 1979.
Interview: Emiru Gebre, Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte, 1979.

Guluma Gemeda, ”the Process of State Formation,‘I pp.
143, See also Tesema Ta'a "The Basis of Political
Contradictions, p. 182.

Land was personified among the Oromo: ”Land had eyes and
ears and could act upon men who usurped the rights of
the rightful owners even long after the latter had died
or moved elsewhere." J. Hultin, "Man and Land,“
p. 8. Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte,
Graz. Waltaji Dagago, Bodji, Aug, & Sept. 1979.

Interview: Graz. Deressa Galla, Gebre Sellassie
Gutta, Nekemte, July, 1979.

For example, as early as 1550-1570, an Oromo military
leader named Teso is mentioned in the literature during
the conquest of the state of Enarya by the Oromo. G.W.B.

Huntingford. The 9:111: 215 Ethiopia. p.20.

Interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Digga, Kenna. Abdissa
Mossa,Nekemte, Sept. 1979.

F. Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property
the State," in K. Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works,
Vol.1 (New York, International Publishers, 1968), p. 537.

Bill Freund, The Making Lf Contemporary Africa: The
Development Lf African Society Since 1800 (Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 22.

 

 

Quoted in Bernard Magubane, “The Evolution of the Class
Structure in Africa," in P. C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel
Wallerstein (eds. ), The Political Economy Lf Contemporary
Africa (Beverly, California: Sage Publications, 1976),
pp. 171- 172.

CHAPTER III
FORMATION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF STATES
IN WESTERN CENTRAL ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF
JIMA AND LEQA NEKEMTE

The study of the state and state-formation is an ”old
chestnut of African historiography."1 Nevertheless,
theoretical formulations based on empirical data in general
and specific case studies in many parts of Africa in
particular remain scarce. For instance, with the exception
of the Christian highland state, little has been researched

on the emergence of state among the different Ethiopian

communities.

It is important to note, however, that scholary works on
African states and state formation are still flourishing with
new inquiries, new approaches, interesting interpretations
and insights. Without necessarily going into the details of
the genesis of the objectives or the interests of these
studies, it is worthwhile to highlight some of the major
debates and controversial issues concerning the study of

African States.

During pre-colonial and colonial periods, as a
justification for colonialism, Africans were portrayed as
backward, savage and ignorant, as not able "to organize their
ownsovereignties."3 The need to penetrate into the interior

of Africa to introduce commerce, Christianity and

71

72
4
civilization was advocated by the Europeans. This pseudo-
philanthropy was an attempt by the colonial architects and
sympathizers to prove the dynamism and the decisiveness
of external stimuli to change the ”static" nature of African
societies. After the colonial era, partly as an argument
against the supports of colonialism, and partly based on the
assumption that state societies are 'better' than stateless
communities, African studies tended to dub the state and
state formation as achievements. But it has been argued that
the state has often been (and still may be) a tool or engine
of oppression and not civilization.5 Moreover, many African

societies, including the Oromo, peacefully lived together

without states.

Among the major contributions of Marxist thought was
the study of the origin of the state in pre-colonial
societies. Engels defined the state as "a machine for the
oppression of one class by another,"6 and showed its
connection with the dialectical emergence of social
classes. He perceived the state as an instrument of
arbitration or mediation between antagonistic classes with a
clear inclination of providing the class in control with the
means to secure and produce its hegemony. ”The state's
origin is therefore a consequence of the development of

social classes, and in its turn this is the product of a

transformation of the relations of production through which

73

the exploitation of man by man enters a previously
egalitarian society.'7

No anthropologist or historian explicitly questioned
Engel's analysis and theoretical construct. In contrast to
his view, however, Africanists implicitly have placed
emphasis on the correlation between the establishment of the
state and long-distance exchange. In 1964, Maurice Godelier
wrote: ”In West Africa, the emergence of the kingdoms of
Ghana, Mali, Songhai, etc ..... seems to be linked to
control of inter-tribal or enter-regional trade exercised by
tribal aristocracies over the exchange of precious products,
gold, ivory, skins, etc . . . between Black Africa and White
Africa."8 Here, state formation remains closely "linked to
the emergence of exploitation," but the state itself I'does
not operate in the sphere of immediate production,
where social relations are unchanged," and the ‘tribal
aristocracies' maintain their existence and hegemony by
controlling the distribution of the products.9 However, this
perspective which strongly attributes the state formation to
long-distance trade does not still explain the intial
organization and class relations of the west African Kingdoms
mentioned.10

In the late sixties, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch basing

her arguments on the low productivity in African agriculture,

asserted that, "Black Africa is undoutedly the part of the

74
world where agriculture was the least capable of producing
11

surplus value." She clearly stated that the aristocracy's
power is derived from its control over the commercial routes
and transactions. Although she seems to have devalued the
role of domestic systems of production and exchange by
putting emphasis on external (long-distance) trade, she still
maintained a reasonable doubt about the question of the
precise historical circumstances of state formation. She
wrote:

May be the state was not constructed as a

result of trade, but the aristocracy

strengthened itself through its grip on

major trade. . . Surplus value was extra-

acted from these long-distance exchanges,

and this surplus value enable the ruling

class to be reinforced through the accumu-

lation of prestige goods, sometimes hoarded,

more often wasted, in the framework of an

economy of ostentation.12

Samir Amin has also stressed that long-distance trade
can play a decisive role in certain formations through the
transfer of a portion of surplus. He argues that this role
of long-distance trade is particularly true in cases where
the surplus extracted by the dominant classes from the
producers of a given formation is limited owing to the low
development of production forces, successful resistance by the
13

dominated, or poor ecology of the region.

The arguments by Godelier, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch

and S. Amin overestimated the importance of the control of

75
the trade routes and long-distance exchange to the wealth and
power of African aristocracies; but none of them necessarily
links long-distance to the formation of states. In fact
Catherine Coquery Vidrovitch rightly concluded that ”long-
distance exchange and centralized power still (cannot)
necessarily be linked to each other."14 The conditions under

which long-distance exchange favors state formation remain

unclear.

Claude Meillassoux, a French anthropologist, analysed the
relationship between production and reproduction of a self-
sustaining peasant agrarian economy in a pre-colonial West
African setting. He observed that cultivation played a
dominant role where land is used as 'an instrument of labor'
and underscored the significance of labor on the basis of
production and reproduction. He contends that the social
organization of the peasantry is built first around the
relation of production and next around the necessity for
reproduction of the productive unit. Meillassoux does not
attribute state formation in pre-colonial Africa to long-
distance trade but rather to the internal dynamics of the
society. In his view the key to social transformation is
found in the relations of production.15
Another writer, Emmanuel Terray, in his case study of
the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman in West Africa, indicated the

crucial importance of domestic labor exploitation by the

76
local aristocracy especially from the 'captives', and
properly stressed the role of internal production relations
in the Gyaman social formation. He even remarked: "It does
not seem . . . that there is any necessary correlation
between the presence or absence of the state and the fact
that the circulation of goods should be organized and ensured
by aliens or 'nationals'."16 More recently, J. Lonsdale, in
his ‘Historiographical Survey of States and Social Process in
Africa' concludes: "There is no doubt that the consolidation
of class and the growth of states have been a joint process,
in Africa as elsewhere. They have entailed a
contradictory increase in the power to oppress and the
restraint of power. In Africa, as elsewhere, they have not

ended the struggles of the oppressed, but they have changed
17

their arenas . . . .'

With the preceding general debates and conflicting
conclusions, about state and state formation in mind, we
shall now deal with formation, structure and function of the
states in western central Ethiopia. It is important to note
here that the above arguments and conclusions will not only
provide us with a context for our discussions, but will also
help us to test and evaluate their validity in our case study

for a better understanding.

The exact nature of the internal and external factors

which led to the emergence of monarchial institutions among

77

the Oromo of Western Central Ethiopia are still unclear.
Scholars believed in decisive influence of the state
organizations with which the Oromo came into contact, while
others emphasized the revival of long-distance trade and the
spread of Islam in the region as the major factors for the
formation of Oromo states?8 Not surprisingly these earlier
writers have all sought, and found external causalities, just
as they have ignored two centuries of the internal dynamics
of change. Doubtlessly, some of the external factors mentioned
were relevant for the enhancement and consolidation of
authority among the Oromo groups or individuals but the role
of these external factors in the intial stages of social
differentiation and politico—economic transformation that
culminated in the formation of the states has become
increasingly questionable.19

In our view the historical significance of the
contributions of the domestic systems of production, exchange
(barter) and relations of production to the state formation
in any social setting cannot be underestimated. Towards the
end of the last chapter, we identified the changes in the
forms of production and distribution which gradually led to
the emergence of social classes among the Oromo. Based on
our case study of Jima and Leqa Nekemte we will attempt Ito
show how the stratification of the Macha Oromo into socio—
economic classes, the eventual control of some of the

resources by the dominant group, and the consequent

78

contradictions created the basis for the formation of states
in western central Ethiopia. Trade and the spread of Islam,
on the other hand, were encouraged by the rise of the
monarchies. They were used to reinforce the consolidation of
political power and as a basic justification for exploitation
and domination. The year 1750 more or less marked the end of
Macha expansion and conquest. Following their final
settlement, the Macha enjoyed relative stability, peace and
security for about a century under the leadership of their
local gggg councils. During this period, Christian
pressure from the north dissipated because of Oromo ascendence
to the imperial political leadership and the deterioration of
the monarchy owing to financial problems (reduction of
tribute — wealth), and the rise of very powerful and
virtually independent feudal warlords in Shewa, Gojam, Lasta,

Tigray and elswhere in the country.

In western central Ethiopia, agriculture and petty
commodity production expanded, and local weekly markets
flourished.20 Caravan trade, somewhat weakened or discouraged
during the Oromo expansion generally revived. The economic
growth set in motion socio-political and cultural
developments leading to the emergence of monarchical
institutions. The center piece of all these developments, as
we have indicated earlier, was the shift of the Oromo system

of production from pastoralism to sedentary mixed farming.

As a dominant activity, agriculture subordinated other forms

79

of social relations and through its capacity for production
its capacity for production and reproduction represented an
integrated system of socio-economic organization. It made
arable land the most impoftant economic resource and brought
about gradual but fundamental alterations in the Oromo
concept of seniority and hierarchy. The old basis of
senior's authority over the juniors steadly gave way to new
ones. Under such circumstances a tendency to base authority
not only on age but also on wealth, knowledge and skills
arose. As C. Meillassoux remarked in his study of the Guro
of Ivory Coast, "We see conditions emerge for a
transformation of society into larger and more highly
integrated units in which the functions of authority will be
exercised through more sophisticated social techniques
leading towards the building of a society hierarchised
according to social classes."22

Our knowledge about the early Oromo monarchies in
western central Ethiopia is obtained from the mid-19th
century travellers and missionaries including: Antoine d'
Abbdie (1880, 1890); C.T. Beke (1843): W.C. Harris (1844);
Walter C. Plowden (1868): G. Massaja (1886-1895): C.W.
Isenberg and Krapf (1843); A. Cecchi (1885-1887): and E.
Cerulli (1932-1933). These writers concentrated on the
physical geography of the land, some political developments,
general religious situations and on the conditions of caravan

trade of the areas they had visited.

80

If cautiously treated their descriptions are useful for
historical reconstruction, but they hardly cover the story of
the socio-economic transformation or the initial stages of
state formatiOn among the Oromo. Moreover, many of the early
authors have left behind contradictory pictures of the
society in their descriptions, which may at times create a
reasonable doubt about the reliability of their information.
For instance, Plowden who visited the Gudru Oromo from June
1845 to February 1846, wrote: "The frontier between Goodroo
and the province of Jimma, is an uncultivated battle-ground .
. . they dispute the pasturage in daily combats; and they
have now accumulated a mass of blood-feud . . . that render
peace almost impracticable .. . .33 Earlier he had indicated
that the daily life of the greater portion of the Gudru,
"accorded little with the blood-thirsty character, and
constant and ferocious warfare, ascribed to the Gallas by
common report.'24Continuing his description of the region, he
commented: ”Goodroo is . . . a specimen of nearly as pure a
republic as can exist, and one that would be almost
impossible in a wealthy or civilized nation . . .” 25

There were also another writer who presented
conflicting views about the political life of the Oromo in
the mid-nineteenth century. According to Antoine d' Abbadie,
”No Galla country between the Abbay and the Gojab is without

a settled form of government; for they are small republics,

with chiefs changed every eight years. Each tribe has

81

26
several chiefs . . ." This was essentially different from

Beke's contention who remarked that, “most of the Galla
countries are without any settled form of government. . ."27
Obviously in their eye—witness accounts, d' Abbadie, Massaja
and Plowden were referring to the local gada practices,

when they discussed the existence of 'republican form of
government' among the Oromo south of the Abbay. The issue at
hand, however, is whether internal or external factors were

mainly responsible for the decline of the gada system and

the emergence of states with new political orders.

In accordance with the conventional view, the Italian
scholar, E. Cerulli attributed the establishment of the Oromo
monarchies to the influence of Omotic peoples with whom the
Oromo came into contact or conquered.28 M. Abir considered
trade as the main factor for the formation of the Gibe states,
although he remarked that the transition to monarchical rule
among the Oromo was the result of long and complex socio-
political developments.29 Major W. Cornwallis Harris, one of
the mid-nineteenth century European visitors, indicated that
Islam was responsible for the rise of the monarchies. He
declared: " . . .it is only where the Moslem slave dealer has
successfully commenced the work of conversion to the creed
promulgated by the prophet, that this wild heathen race have

30
been brought to bow the neck to the yoke of kings.”

H. S. Lewis concluded that the conventional explanation

82

for the change in Oromo political system was “incomplete."
Based on his study among the Jima Oromo, he suggested, ' . .
. that the formation of the Galla states was due less to
borrowing and conquest than to political processes inherent
in western Galla culture and society.” Referring to the rise
of Macha Oromo monarchies, Lewis asserted: ”They emerged
after a long and steady developments of an agricultural
economy and powerful leaders with private armies who
controlled land, markets, and trade routes.'32His study was,
however, not explicit about the specifics of the internal
dynamics of formation of classes and class relations and
structures among the Oromo. His general remark is
significant only in so far as it draws attention to the
importance of the change in 'mode of production' that
necessitated the shift. But the conclusion, besides its
emphasis on warfare, does not address itself to the specific
historical circumstances of the transition. He is also
ambiguous about the sources of wealth for the monarchies'
political strength. Hence, the need for further

investigations of the subjective and objective conditions
‘which affected the transformation of the socio-political

organization of the Oromo is beyond dispute.

From our own case study, it will be clear that
‘there were at least two major sources of surplus
appropr iation of labor among the Macha communi ty : a)

gubsissa (settlement) work already mentioned in the

83

second chapter; b) captives (boju) of war or raids. As we

have tried to indicate in the last chapter, surplus
extraction by some of the pioneers, together with easy access
to the means of production (land) and other resources,
initially contributed to the rise of prominent families,
strong and ambitious leaders among the Macha, generating
increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth and
power. To these were added, at a later date, taxation from
the peasant communities, customs duties from the caravan

traders and market revenues.

Available traditions and travellers' accounts indicate
that throughout Western Central Ethiopia, dominant
personalities, clans and family groups emerged by the turn of
the century?3 Almost invariably, the founders of the new
ruling families came from the descendants of prominent
pioneers who had distinguished themselves during the early
days of Oromo expansion in the region. The traditions
also insist that these individuals had held elective posts
within the gada, titles of abba boku, abba dula
or served as degal saqui of their commuzity. Informants
also suggest that the attempt to subvert the egalitarian gada
system and to capture absolute power was often made by a
number of rival families within the same locality and clan?5

The reports of the travellers clearly state that, in

various parts of the Macha country, the major elective

84
positions were already becoming hereditary by the second half
of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth
centuries.36 There was also a tendency to disregard the
existing landholding system in favor of the arbitrary
dispositions of the local autocracy. Thus the successful
autocrats were those who initialy had benefited from surplus
appropriation of labor and accumulated large quantities of
wealth in cattle, land and slaves. Later on they developed
and consolidated their forces as a result of prolonged
conflict and maneuverings for political power. As a general
rule, better military organization, the ability to forge more
effective alliances, stronger control of local economic
resources and eventual dominance over long-distance trade

routes and the main market villages were the most decisive

factors for the success of the potential autocrat over his
rivals.37

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Western
Central Ethiopia was divided into a number of kingdoms and
principalities, among which were: the five Gibe monarchies of
Gera, Goma, Guma, Limu and Jima and Leqa Nekemte, Leqa Kelem,
Horo-Gudru and Ilu Abba Bora.38 All these states more or less

differed in political organization, prosperity and size,

though they showed similarity in their social formation.

For our purpose we will deal with Jima and Leqa Nekemte,

not only because of the relative availability of source

85

 

 

 

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86

materials, but also because of certain striking historical
similarities between the two states. Although written
sources as well as traditions assign an unqualified
precedence to Jima, both emerged as powerful states in their
respective areas by the mid-nineteenth century. Both were
successful in establishing very strong hereditary dynasties
which managed to survive Menilek's conquest and continued to
rule until the early 1930's. Nonetheless, Jima was by far
stronger, better organized and richer than Leqa Nekemte.39

Following the Macha Oromo settlement in Western Central
Ethiopia, some of the widely dispersed clans, separated from
the mother tribes owning to geographical barriers, were
isolated and insecure in the new environment. Under such
circumstances they elected their own abba pgkg, if they
felt strong enough or abandoned their old affiliation and
associated themselves with a stronger clan and with a status
of a kglg4oor gubsissa. Naturally, the second
alternative resulted in the economic and political
strengthening of one clan at the expense of another. Jima
traditions suggest that it was the ususal case among the
stronger clans to come together and elect a mgtzi a
humble and respectable person, who could maintain their
unity. This was done either by the elderly member 23 certain

clans or by the leading members of all the clans, and the

procedure was heavily influenced by the gada system.

87

Traditions unequivocally maintain that before the rise of
mgtumma (kingship) all major clans in Jima (including the
Diggo, Harsu, Lalo, Badi, Hagalo and others) selected their
own abba bgkg and lived according to the ggga_ system.
In due course of time, however, the leading members of Jima
clans met at a place called Bake Ganji to elect a moti,
After a series of consultations and deliberations, they
unanimously elected a certain Abba Faro, a member of the
senior Diggo clan as the first magi of Jim:?

Abba Faro is said to have been a humble person, but
accepted the offer after being convinced by his wife and some
of his close friends. They advised him to request voluntary
contributions of cattle, grain, and free labor in return for
his services. The electorate willingly granted the request
and within no time Abba Faro became the wealthiest of all.
He recruited some supporters who could help him carry out his
responsibilities and maintain his authority.' Once conditions
for a cumulative accretion of power was available, the new
office became politically prestigious and economically
rewarding. It created an important center where all the
clans discussed serious matters of common interest, debated

them and made decisions. The office of the moti gradually

 

assumed greater excutive power. For specialization of roles,
stability and enforcement of authority, the institution was
structurally broken from the society at large. Eventually,

effective methods of surplus appropriation of labor were

88

introduced and voluntary contributions were transformed into
obligatory payments of taxes and corvee. The leadership and
influence of the abba 9953 was limited to his followers

in his own clan. M. de Salviac was referring to these two
seemingly contradictory organizational principles among the
Oromo, when he wrote: “Besides the political system [the
gada system], meshing with it, there exist another social

order based on property and wealth which establishes a
veritable landed nobility.'44 The unity of the clans was

promoted, increasing the political influence and social

status of the new leadership.

The establishment of a hereditary dynasty in Jima became
clearer, when Abba Faro was undisputably succeeded by his
eldest son, Abba Magal. It seems that most of the clan
members who were involved in the election of the moti did
not realize the consequences of their action and might have
simply thought it as another gada election. For instance,
when Abba Faro accepted the leadership offer, a member of the
Lalo clan is said to have remarked: 'You have elevated this
man today and put him on your headg, but tomorrow you will

find it difficult to put him down'. But no one seems to have

considered his statement seriously.

Under Abba Faro, the Diggo, who possessed relatively
larger gnahiye land even before, began to extend their

territory. They conquered Lalo, another Oromo clan, and Abba

89

Faro moved to a place called Jiren which became the capital
of Jima. By occupying jiren, the Diggo eventually controlled
the great market center known as Hirmata.46 It is reported
that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Abba Magal,
the successor of Abba Faro, was engaged in a series of wars
against his neighbours.47 His son and successor, Abba Jifar I
continued the wars, and, by about 1830, he succeeded in
pacifying the whole of Jima, putting it under a strict
control of his authority. From then on the state came to be
known as Jima Abba Jifar.48 Beke commented: " . . . Abba
Jifar, the king of . . . Jimma, is the most powerful of the
Galla monarchs, and his dominions are very extensive, having
been much enlarged by acquisitions lately made at the expense
of Limmu-Enarea, as well as in the south and west."49

Abba Jifar I, consolidated his power and made
administrative and political innovations. He left social
welfare and ritual roles to the local abba boku. The
general meetings of the gada council at Hulle continued
its function of settling disputes and handling family
affairs, but serious matters were referred to the mpg;
through the office of the 1121a 9225.0 Abba Jifar gave key
administrative posts to his brothers and relatives. He
claimed for himself the right to vast tracts of virgin
forests and newly conquered lands and granted 51large

portions to his family, followers and favorites who

constituted a class of nobility.

90

In the 1830's, Islam was introduced into Jima as the
state religion. A certain Muslim merchant named Abdul Hakim
had come from Gonder to Jima for trade, and succeeded in
converting Abba Jifar to Islam.52The mQt_i appreciated and
gave him a home in Jiren, near his own palace. Massaja
wrote: I'Embracing Islam, and declaring it the religion of the
court, he called to the kingdom a quantity of Mohammedan
saints to preach and make disciples." Massaja also commented
that Islam was taken up by ”the chiefs, the rich and the
court" and did not affect the masses, "who, having nothing to
gain, remained . . . 'pagan'?3 Nevertheless, many Muslim
traders from the north were given land and official positions
by Abba Jifar in return for their services and teaching. By
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most people in
Jima were Muslims.54 Islam, which found its way into the
already organized state of Jima in the mid-nineteenth

century, had, therefore, made its contributions to further

strengthen the power of the monarch.

The emergence of Jima Abba Jifar as a well organized and
powerful state, encouraged both local and long—distance
trade. Abba Jifar I is reputed to have provided safety and
security for merchants within the confines of his kingdom.
Each trader was assigned a protector (qggga or mggasa),
who facilitated travel and business. In return the moti
obtained luxury items such as knives, jewelry, swords, beads,

silk and cotton clothes, etc., in the form of gifts and dues.

91

The support given by the m ti, together with his favorable
attitude towards Islam, attracted long-distance traders, who
helped develop a dynamic local merchant class known as
afkala. Jima became a very busy cross-roads between Kefa,
Maji and Gimira to the southwest; Kullo, Konta and Uba to
the south: Guma, Gera and Ilubabor to the west; Limu, Nonno,
Leqa Nekemte and others in the northwest: and Shewa, Welo,
Gojam and Gonder to the north.55

In the second half of the nineteenth century, markets
developed all over Jima. Although it is very difficult to
tell the exact volume of internal or external trade, the
existing evidence suggests a gradual increase in both,
following the formation of powerful states in western
central Ethiopia. The frequency and number of commercial
caravans grew during the second half of the nineteenth
century, as the new developments permitted increasing
exploitation of wealth. M. Abir remarked: ”While northern
and central Ethiopia produced hardly any exportable
commodities, southern and southwestern Ethiopia were the
source of musk, ivory, gold and slaves for which Ethiopia was
famous throughout history."56

The consolidation of state power in Jima stimulated the
growth of trade, which, in turn, provided means enhancing the
strength and functioning of the state machinery. Abba Jifar

I died in 1855, but his successors continued to encourage

92

 

 

 
 
  
  
 
  

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Map 4. Major and minor Trade Routes in Western Central
Ethiopia in the nineteenth century.

Adopted from Mohammad Hassen, 'The Oromo of Ethiopia,“
p. 473.

93
57
trade. Abba Jifar II (r. 1878-1932) paid a special attention
to local and long-distance trade activities. He organized

officers at every gate (kella) of his kingdom to provide

 

security and to collect customs dues. In the process of
serving his ”limited” interest, he also facilitated the
interests of international commercial capitalism. During his
reign, Indians, Arabs and Greeks set up business and sold
manufactured goods for coffee, hides, skins, wax, ivory etc.,
Explaining the international connections of Jima's trade
activities, H. S. Lewis wrote:

Local products are collected and brought

to progressively larger centers, and are

finally taken by caravans to the outside

world. Manufactured products from foreign

areas follow the opposite course into the

Jimma countryside. Through the medium of

markets, the inhabitants of Jimma, who do not

live in towns or urban clusters, are con-

nected to Arabia, the Sudan, India, Europe,

0 O O .58

In the absence of any reliable statistics, it is very
difficult to know the exact amount of trade revenue obtained
by the rulers from the commerical networks of Jima state.
Evidence indicates that, local merchants only marginally
benefited from the caravan trade, which contributed very
little to the over-all economy of the kingdom. Other than
very low prices for the primary products, travellers also
report that caravan trade involved considerable smuggling,

blackmarketing and tax evasion, especially with precious items

like gold and musk. The definitive conclusion that the

94

prosperity of the southwestern Oromostates was derived from
transit trade needs therefore to be reconsidered. It seems
that caravan trade did very little even by way of helping the
kings of Jima to acquire arms and ammunition with
revolutionizing consequences for which it is given much
attention in African historiography. Augusto Franzoj who
visited Jima in 1882, reported that Abba Jifar II possessed

only fifty rifles and a few old pistols.63
The foundations of Jima's economy, therefore the real
basis of monarchial authority since the early days of its
inception, must have been agriculture, local exchanges and
other productive activities such as arts and crafts. Most
Jimans were agriculturalists heavily engaged in crop
production and animal husbandry. They grew a wide variety of
cereals and root crops such as tef, maize, finger millet,
sourgum, wheat, barley, peas, beans, potatoes, etc., and
coffee, chat, tobacco and in some areas, cotton were also

produced as cash crops.

Coffee, which originated in Kefa forest southwest of
Jima, grew wild all over the forest regions of western
central Ethiopia. Since the last decades of the nineteenth
century, it became Jima's (and eventually Ethiopia's) most
important cash crop. Besides farming, peasants in Jima
raised cattle, sheep, goats, chicken, horses, mules and

donkeys. Other than agriculturalists there were also a

95

significant number of merchannts (afkala), artisans and
craftsmen, specializing in wood and ironworks, pottery, gold
and silver smithing, weaving and bee hive keeping.64

The basic agricultural implement was the oxen-drawn plow
supplemented by hoes and digging sticks. A man who did not
possess oxen usually plowed another person's land in return
for the use of the animals on his own plot. Many peasant
communities mostly relied on their own household labor, but
traditions are consistent that there has been a great deal of
cooperation in social and economic affairs among the local
community. Plowing, harvesting and cattle grazing were done
in most cases through community cooperation.65 Traditions as
well as written accounts also show that there was an
extensive use of slave labor in Jima,66 and in other
neighbouring states, particularly by the rich peasants and
the ruling class. Jules Borelli observed that relations
between masters and slaves were not necessarily bad. Slaves
lived with their owners unless married, they had the right to
own property, could become agresaa (rich), and their
children could inherit their property?7 But because of their

social status, slaves were deprived of certain rights, and

their lot was by no means ideal.

Many of the wealthy (sgresfia) farmers and well-to-do
families used slave labor on their agricultural fields and in

other productive activities, greatly expanding surplus

96

production. Owning, buying and trading slaves were widely
spread in Jima. Abba Jifar II himself, reportedly had about
ten thousand slaves who served him as palace servants,
officials, soldiers, and above all as cultivators of his
royal estates (yaabbg). Very rich individuals, owned up to

a thousand or more slaves, and even simple farmers had one or
two. Slaves in Jima were prisoners of war, victims of
raiding mainly in southwest of Jima, criminals, or

defaulters. Indeed, Jima's beauty, prosperity, and opulence

owe much to slave labor.

Since the fortunes of Jima were mainly based on the
products of the land, agrarian questions colored all aspects
of the socio-economic and political concerns of the state
structure and function. The king of Jima exhibited a high
degree of political centralization, and authority at all
levels was derived from him. He was responsible for: the
maintenance of the guahiyg-land rights, administration of
justice, the defense of Jima's territorial integrity, and
ensuring enough extraction of surplus to support the
political elite. The monarch's political superiority was
perpetuated and reinforced by his ability to:69a) appoint,

dismiss, promote, demote or transfer officials; b) collect

and distribute materials of economic and symbolic value.

The kingdom of Jima was divided into several districts

(goro) adiministered by the moti (king). Ability and

97
loyalty were the criteria considered by the ‘mgti for the
appointment. Usually, the app; gggg exercised authority
over the districts other than those to which they themselves
belonged, to avoid any local bases of power or conspiracy.
Other minor officials like the abba ganda (father of the
village), 222; ggba (father of the market), game (war
(announcer), etc., who worked under the QQQQ gggg were
recruited by the app; qggg himself and appointed by the
moti. Although the app; 9959 himself had the right

 

to exercise some judicial authority within their districts,
serious criminal cases and other crucial matters were
referred to the mgti, and he gave his final verdict in
consultation with his judiciary council. The.mg;i had the
royal right to interfere in any affairs of great importance
at all levels of administration.70

The state of Jima had a more or less efficiently
centralized system of tax (bugi) collection. Each year,
officials known as abba gggg bps; were sent out from the
palace to the districts to collect taxes in kind or cash.
They were accompanied by tax assessors (abba £3232), who
checked that taxes were compatible with the population and
the resources of the district. The abba ggrg of each
district had to cooperate with the tax collectors, but was not
entitled to any portion of the revenues collected, which were

71
forwarded to the royal treasury.

98

Transit taxes were collected by royal appointees known
as abba kgllg, who were found at each gate of the major
trade routes. Market dues were collected by the appa gap;
or nagadras (abba 9239 negade). This official was also in
charge of all the activities of artisans, craftsmen and
hunters, who paid taxes either in their produce (clothes,
swords, shields, musk, ivory, buffalo horns, etc.) or in
terms of services to the palace. Usually, traders paid in
ample and beehive keepers in honey?2

Officials were recruited from among the members of the
royal family, wealthy men (soressa), slaves of the king who
proved dependable and loyal, and mercenaries from Gojam,
Gonder, Welo and Shewa, who mostly served as royal soldiers
and bodyguards.73 Official positions were remunerated by
exemption from taxation and corvee. Distinguished service
and loyalty were rewarded by land grants, gifts of cattle,
slaves and elite goods like clothes, shields, swords and
horses. Exemption from obligatory labor services meant
freedom from digging trenches for defense purposes, plowing,
weeding, planting and harvesting on the king's estates, and
construction of roads and other public works. On the other
hand, any attempt to evade corvee on the part of ordinary
citizens resulted in confiscation of property and
enslavement. Matters connected with wars, defense or offense
were the responsibilities of the abba gggg gage, who was

directly accountable to the mgti.

99
Jima's major source of revenue was the tax (£221):
annually collected from the general public, including
peasants, local merchants, artisians, craftsmen and slaves.
Customs from caravan traders was an additional source of
income. 'The king was the center of a network involving the
production and collection of various goods and their
redistribution elsewherefl“ Generally speaking, the kings of
Jima seem to have made an intelligent use of all the
resources at their disposal to build up their power and
prestige. They maintained their popularity successfully by
commanding public respect, and through carefully keeping the

balance between the traditional values of their society and

the demands of the state machinery.

Another powerful state which emerged towards the end of
the first half of the nineteenth century was Leqa Nekemte.
It was one of the local authocracies in Welega, which came
into existence primarily as a result of internal dynamics of
change within the Macha society. According to traditions,
the acknowledged founder of Leqa Nekemte was Bekere Godana
(r. 1841-1868), a member of the relatively small Naa
lineage (sagni) group of the Wayu clan, one of the five Leqa
clans?5 Born in Wama Mokofa east of Nekemte, he was the only
child of his family and, having lost his father in early
childhood, he was brought up by his mother Mughe with whom he
spent the early part of his life. All the traditions about

his early life indicate that he was a very sensitive and

100

restless young man who demonstrated special talent for
personal leadership among his peers.76

Bekere's paternal uncle, Bararti Amo, was the
acknowledged hangafa (elder) of the Naa, and had earlier
served as a noted abba bgkg. But now he was an old man,
with no sons of his own, and was harassed by his enemies in
his fight to defend the guabiye rights of his Naa group as
a whole. Thus having an energetic nephew was a god-send for
him, and Bararti formaly invited Bekere to join his family as
an adopted (gudifacha) son.77

Bekere willingly accepted the invitation, since the
adoption meant that he had the opportunity of becoming a
hangafa of the Naa lineage group - managing the quabiye
rights of land with its privileges - which he could easily
use as a base for power. Bararti Amo had quarrels with his
neighbours, particularly with Fido Bokkissa (abba boku of
the Kolobo lineage), who had considerable influence on the
other members of the wayu clan as a whole. The cause of the
conflict between the two lineage groups was that both had
ancient claims on the lofty position of hangaja of the

78
Wayu clan. Although Bararti was an old man, his .

adoption of Bekere as his son introduced avery Vital
element in the struggle between the lineages. This fits in
nicely with Meillassoux' observation: “The adoption by ‘wise

men' of young men who show great interest or inclination for

101

their skills helps to neutralise further possible rivals by
creating artificial link of filiation and . . dependence.
Later the granting of titles or rank to individuals versed in
certain 'sciences' will also identify them with senior group
which possess authority."79

Bekere plunged into the interclan conflict right away.
He soon began to be respected and admired, especially after
he killed four strong warriors of Bararti Amo's arch enemy.
As a result, his local Naa gada council elected him to the
office of abba dulgéo He was thus given yet another boost

and a much more secure foundation for greater power in the

region.

It was customary among the Oromo to offer a special gift
(kenna), to the abba.finla, at the time of his election.
The gift. often consisted of a bull, following the custom
of the gada system. Because of his unlimited ambitions
for his adopted son, Bararti Amo had, however, quite a novel
scheme. He advised Bekere to ask the assembly to grant him
sole control and monopoly rights over the hot lowland region,
called Handaq, between the Didessa and Anger rivers. Inspite
of its unusual nature, the request was granted, and Bekere
controlled the ivory—rich area. Both Bararti and Bekere
clearly understood the importance of ivory both locally for
the manufacture of precious luxury items and also for long-

82
distance trade. Handaq was also rich in cotton, wild

102

animals, wild honey and various forest products, and, above
all, the_dina (Nilo-Saharans) themselves, who had already
become an inexhaustible source of labor for the highland
Oromo. Once Bekere got popular recognition for his
possession of Handaq with all its resources, he made sure
that nobody else had access to it without his own permission.
He did this with the help of his followers.83

Bekere became very powerful, and he soon began to
transform his office of abba le_. He surrounded himself
with a large entourage and made the qongalae,4 the fighting
force of the gada, into his own personal army, rewarding
them with surplus from his estate. Many of his soldiers were
horsemen armed with spears, shields and axes. They were
trained with the help and advice of elderly members of the
Naa group, who also gave instructions on tactics and
techniques of war. Bekere used his warriors in many daring
attacks on neighbouring communities, which he looted and

raided.

Such cruel razzias went beyond the limits sanctioned
by the gada system. The raiding became increasingly more
personalized and arbitrary, and were mostly aimed at the
accumulation of power and wealth. Bekere attacked not only
non-Naa groups but also harassed people of his own lineage
who were either rich in cattle or showed signs of challenging

85
his presumptions.

103

Bekere deliberately ignored the basic tenets of
customary gada rules and regulations. He refused to share
the war booty except with his own loyal followers. He ignored
the superior powers of the abba b953, both of his own local
gada as well as those of related communities. He despised
the principles of peaceful arbitration on which the gada
assembly operated, and almost always resorted to force, even
against his fellow gada officials who challenged his
arbitrary manners. There are interesting traditions about
this phase of Bekere's rise to power, which indicate that he
explicitly tried to weaken the power of the gada officials
as well as those of the gada assembly. He is said to have
told the local elders that they should not interfere in
matters of war and relations with neighbouring communities.
He asked them to leave these entirely to him and to
concentrate their own efforts on religious tasks and customary
rituals such as the traditional rain-making and butta ceremonieg?

Bekere's personal followers increased, as men came in
search of personal adventure and the promise of booty. He
began to aim at establishing more formal and legitimate
authority over not only his fellow Naa and Wayu clansmen, but
also over all wara Leqa between wama and Didessa rivers,
and further east and west.88 Consequently, Bekere undertook a
series of armed confrontations against leading personalities.
He was successful in defeating Fido Bokkissa of the Kolobo

lineage, one of his strongest rivals, occupied Nekemte and

104

made it the center of his new domain. He established his
authocractic rule over the area between Wama and Didessa
rivers, assuming the title of mpg; (king) and exercising

ultimate authority beyond the traditional eight-year tenure.
The legitimacy for his position could no longer be drawn from
the principles of the gan system. The real basis for his

authority were his military prowess and efficient method of
surplus appropriation. In order to expand his territory
further, he continued periodic clashes with Danno Bera of

89
Arjo in the southeast and Genda Bushan of Sibu in the east.

Concerning his control of land, Bekere made use of his
success against Fido Bokkissa in a way which was almost
totally alien to Oromo tradition. He started dividing and
giving out pieces of land to his followers, whom he settled
on the areas that had been evacuated by his defeated rivals
and his men. Bekere's use and distributions of guabiye
rights, therefore, became another major source of power for
him. Absolute loyalty to Bekere and enthusiastic support of
his policies and activities provided a sense of security and

assured protection of one's rights.

Bekere placed himself at the center of a fairly strong
state structure. He set up a new administrative and judicial
machinery with offices of .mgtj, abba hiya (father of the
country), abba ggrp and ‘abba lafa. As a magi he

105
was the supreme head of a well organized administrative and a
judicial hierarchy. He created three judicial bodies which
looked after strictly legal matters at every level of the
‘mgtiis realms. The justices were elders and were elected
by the local people and approved by either the abba 13:3,
abba gggp or the abpa p113. They also indicated that
the old gada rules, regulations and procedures had astrong
impact or influence on the organization of the new legal
bodies of the state.90 Keeping peace and security in their
areas, collecting tribute due to the mpg; were some of the
responsibilities of the abba lafa. The app; gory, who
rulled over a much larger areas than the abba lain, were
responsible for maintaining law and order in their region and
collecting taxes from the peasant communities as well as
merchant caravans. The abba gggg had to be courageous and
capable to lead their people militarily in time of war. An
abba hiya had a number of abba ggrg under him and his
responsibilities were directly to the moti. Often the
abba hiya were his highest councillors. These lofty posts
were usually either held by the many sins of the .mgti

himself, or by his close relatives.

Bekere's rise to power and his effective control
encouraged trade. He made rules and regualtions for
Nekemte's Thrusday market, the ‘figke;lamma (lit. a field
where people come together), the biggest market in the whole

region. He gave orders to the app; gorg to protect

106

merchants whom he appreciated not only as additional source
of revenue but also of information. Each abba qggg in
Leqa Nekemte assigned guards to accompany traders up to the
territory of the next abba ggggz Traders from Gojam,
Shewa, Jima and other places began to frequent Leqa Nekemte
markets. Thus trade, particularly long-distance, gradually
flourished in the area following the consolidation of the

state apparatus.

Bekere died in 1868, fighting against his enemies, and
was succeeded by his son Moroda. He is remembered as a
founder of Leqa Nekemte hereditary monarchy with a fairly
complex state structure, which his offspring not only ruled
for generations but also expanded and consolidated.
Interestingly enough it was the same dynasty which continued
to rule the region even after the creation of the Ethiopian

Empire at the close of the nineteenth century.

In both of our case studies, traditions and written
accounts clearly illustrate that the gada institution had
become increasingly loose by the mid-nineteenth century, that
it failed to check ambitious individuals who violated the
existing gada rules and regulations. The mounting social
contradictions resulted in frequent warfare in which strong
war leaders emerged. Those who were either threatened or
sought fortunes clustered around the stronger groups or

individuals. The successful war leaders, who were themselves

107
the results of social forces, were able to increase the
number of their retinues by rewarding and distributing the
fruits of labor surplus and other war spoils. Success in
warfare was thus one of the mechanisms for accumulation of
the means of production and other forms of wealth in the
hands of a few powerful leaders, who in turn arranged and
organized the state machinery to maintain the form of

production relations they favored.

Thus, it is not unreasonable to assert that the natural
and organic socio-economic transformation, which led to the
emergence of classes - and above all to the appropriation of
surplus of labor by the dominant class - within the Macha
Oromo society, gradually effected the weakening of the
traditional gada institutions and the erosion of its
political function. The transformations brought about the
formation of states like Jima, Leqa Nekemte and others in
western central Ethiopia. These states, with their quasi-
feudal characteristics and structures continued to develop
independently until the last quarter of the nineteenth

century.

Notes to Chapter III

1. D. Crummey and C.C. Stewart (eds.), “Introduction," in uggee

9f Production 13 Africa: the pre-eolonial Ere (London:
Sage Publications, 1981) p. 12.

For recent publications, see W. Runciman, “The Origins of
States: the Case of Archaic Greece,“ ngperetive Studies 13
Society and History, xxiv: 3 (July, 1982), PP. 351 - 357.

J. Lonsdale, “States and Social Processes in Africa: A
Historiographical Survey,” African Studies Review, Vol.
xxiv (1981), p. 139.

4. A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution 1; Britieh West Africa

 

(London, 1971), pp. 1 - 105.

5. Lonsdale, “States and Social Processes," p. 139.

6. Engels, ”The Origin of Family Private Property,” p. 258; see
also Emmanuel Terray, “Long-distance Exchange and Formation
of the State: the Case of Abron Kingdom of Gyaman,” Eegnomy
and Societ , 3(1974), p. 315.

7. Ibid.

8. M. Godelier in Centre d'Etudes e; ge Recherches Marxistes,

§E§ 1e Mode 9e Production Asiatigue (Editions Sociales,
Paris, 1969), p. 87.

9. Emmanuel Terray, “Long-distance Exchange,“ p. 316.

10.

11.

12.

Recently Ledwien Kapteijns and Jay Spaulding attempted to
give some empirical grounding, on a riginal basis, for the
predominantly agricultural character of North East African
States. They specifically deny the role attributed to long-
distance trade. See Ledwien Kapteijns and Jay Spaulding,
'Pre-colonial Trade Between States in the Eastern Sudan,“
Afrieep Economie Histor ,' (1982), pp. 29-62. (Reprint in
Norman O'Neill and Jay O'Brien, (eds.), Eggngmy and Cleee
Lg the Sudan, forthcoming at Ithaca Press.

C. Conquery-Vidrovitch, "Recherches sur une mode de
Production Africain,“ Le Pensee, n. 144 (1969), p. 73.
According to Emmanuel Terray, the term surplus-value is used
out of context. He argues it is meaningless to use it
outside the capitalist mode of production and suggests the
necessity to speak of surplus labor or surplus product in
this case.

C. Conquery-Vidrovitch in Centre 4132151918 es; de W
108

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

109

Sur 1e feodalisme (Editions Sociales, Paris, 1971), p. 245;
See also Emmanuel Terray, Long-distance Exchange, p. 317.

S. Amin, 'sous-developpement et dependence en Afrique Noire,‘
Partisans, n. 64 (1972), p.7.

Conquery-Vidrovitch, “Recherches sur une mode,” p. 68.

Claude Meillassoux refers to three aspects of reproduction:

a) Social reproduction - sustaining a social system: b)
reproduction of labor force - the allocation of agents to
positions within the labor process; and c) human or
biological reproduction. See C. Meillassoux, Femmes, greniers

.23 ca itaux (Paris, 1977); idem, "From reproduction

to product1on,” Economy and Society, 5, 4(1976): idem,

“The Eeconomy in Agricultural Self-Sustaining Societies: A
Preliminary Analysis,‘I in Relations 9; Br gdgetign Merxist
Approaches to Economic Anthropolo ogy (London, 1978), pp. 127-
157; edited by D. Seddon, trans. by H. Lackner.

Emmanuel Terray, "Long-distance Exchange,” p. 68.
Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes,“ p. 205.

M. Abir, who was apparently inspired by the traditional
explanation, cited at the beginning of this chapter
emphasized caravan trade as responsible for the rise of
states in the Gibe region. M. Abir, “The Emergence and
Islamization of the Galla Kingdoms of the Gibe and the North
Ethiopian trade with these Kingdoms, 1800-1850,“ Addis
Ababa: mimeographed (1963): idem, ”The Emergence and
Consolidation of the Monarchies of Enarea and Jimma in the
first half of the Nineteenth Century," qu;nal.gf Afrigeg
Hie_g;y, vi, 2(1965), PP. 205- -219: see also E. Cerulli,
Etiep_e Qecidentale, vol. 1 (Rome, 1933), pp. 99-101: J. S
Trimingham, Islam jg Ethiopia (London, 1965), p. 199: M.
Abir, “Southern Ethiopia,“ in R. Gray and D. Brimingham

(eds.), Ere-gelgnial Africa Trade (London, 1970), pp.125.

Tekalign W/Mariam, ”Land, Trade and Political Power among the
Oromo of the Gibe Region: A Hypothesis,” A paper presented at
the Third Annual Seminar of the Department of History at Bahr
Dar (Addis Ababa University, April 17-22, 1985), pp. 2-3.

See. among others, A. Cecchi.m Zeile alle frehtiete.del

Caffa, III (Rome, 1886), passim; Soleillet, ngegee en
Ethiopie (Rouen, 1886), PP. 165, 169, 222.

M. Abir, Ethiopia. The Eta 9f the Btihees: .the Challenge at

Isles e_§ the Beesifieatie. 9f the Christian Emaite .1152:
1855 (London, 1968), pp. 44- 72.

Meillassoux, “The Economy in Agricultural Self-Sustaining

23.

24.
25.

26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.

36.

110

Societies," pp. 146-147: idem, Maidens, heal and Money,
(Cambridge University Press, 1981), PP. 3-32.

W.C. Plowden, Travels hp Abyssinia ahg the Galla Cepntry
with .22 Account gt‘g Mission tg'§§§_htt th 1848 (London,
1868), p. 306. The existence of constant and endemic
warfare among the Oromo appears exagerated in almost all
the reports of early writers. (see Cerulli, 1932-33:
Isenberg and Krapf, 1843: Beke, 1843: Cecchi, 1886:
Massaja, 1885). But it is important to underscore,
however, that warfare was not the exclusive characteristic
of the Oromo.

Ibid, p. 284.
Ibid, p. 307.

Antoine d'Abbadie, “Remarks on Dr. Beke's paper 'On the
Countries South of Abyssinia,” Athenaeum, n. 1042 (1847)

p. 1077: also quoted in A. Triulzi, I'The Gudru Oromo and
Their Neighbours in the Two Generations Before the Battle of
Embabo,” Journal pt Ethiopian Studies, xiii, 1 (1975), pp.
47-64.

C.T. Beke, 'On the countries South of Abyssinia,“ Journal of
the Royal Geographical Societ , London, Vol. xiii, 1843, p.
255.

E. Cerulli, Etiopia Occidentale, I, pp.99—101.

See note 18 of this chapter.

W.C. Harris, The Highlands pf Ethigpie, Vol. iii (London,
1844), p. 53.

H. S. Lewis, 'A Reconsideration of the Socio-political System
of the Western Galla,‘ Journal pf Semitic Stpdies, Vol. ix
spring 1964), p. 139: idem, h Galla Monarchy: Jimma .hhhe
Jifar,Ethiopia 1830-1932 Madison & Milwaukee, 1965), pp.33-
35.

Ibid, p. 143.

Bahru Zewde, "Dejazmach Jote Tulu," pp. 1-10: Tesema Ta'a,
”Administration of Leqa Nekemte," pp. 1-14.

Interview: Taa Negari, G/Selassie Gutta, Nekemte, July 1979.

Interview: Graz. Woltaji Dagago, Bodji, August 1979: Taa
Woyessa, Nekemte, June 1972.

d'Abbadie Papers, No. 213, p. 760: Massaja, miei

37.

38.

39.

111

trentacinque anni gt missione nella alta Etiopia, III (Rome
1925), p.142.

 

 

Interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga, July 1973: see also H.
S. Lewis, ”A Reconstruction of the Socio-political," p. 142

Some studies have appeared on such Oromo states as Jima,
Limu, Goma, Leqa Nekemte, Leqa Kelem and Gudru, no
comprehensive study has been conducted. The unpublished
Ph.D. thesis by Mohammad Hassen,”The Oromo of Ethiopia: With
Special Emphasis on the Gibe States," is the first attempt
along this line. It is a major contribution. Nontheless,
more remains to be done in the areas we have mentioned.

Lewis, 5 Galla Monarchy, p. xiv.

 

40. KLlu is the action taken by the clans or individuals who,

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

for different reasons, abandon their group for security and
protection - or even in the hope of tilting the balance of
power in their favor.

According to d'Abbadie, moti is the executive authority
which the Abyssinians call ne us, but the moti cannot
legislate laws and his major duty was to lead the army in
battle. M. Abir incorrectly uses moti and abba dual

(war leader) interchangeably. The word moti has its roots
from the Oromo word moe - meaning governed, dominated or
won. Other forms of the word are: motumma meaning kingship
or governorship; mosissa meaning let him govern; mLti
meaning king. It is also interesting to note that the Oromo
used the word moe for a dominant korma (bull), calling

it korma moe or —korma mosissa. See Tesema Ta' a (1980),

p. 107.

 

 

 

It is said that even interested Omotic communities,
participated in the elections. See Guluma Gemeda, ”The
process of State Formation," pp. 137-140.

Ibid.

M. de Salviac, Un Peuple Antique au My Le Menelik: les
Galla (Paris, H. Oudin, 1901), p. 195.

 

Guluma Gemeda, ”The Process of State Formation," p. 142.

The exact period of these developmentsis not clear. H. S.
Lewis says that it took place in the late eighteenth
century, while Guluma puts it in the first half of the
eighteenth century. See H. S. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy, p.
39; Guluma Gemeda, ”The process of State Formation,” p. 143.

 

Cecchi, II (1885), p. 540; Beke (1843), p. 260.

48.

49.
50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.
56.
57.

58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

63.

64.

65.

112

The king's real name was Sanna, and Jifar was the name of his
horse - Abba Jifar means ”owner of the dappled horse.”

Beke (1843), p. 259; also quoted in Lewis (1965), p. 41.

The kingdom was divided into tiny provinces (ggro),
administered for the moti by appointees selected on the
basis of loyalty and ability, and who could be dismissed at
his pleasure. Their official title is abba ggro.

Lewis (1965): PP. 40-41

Ibid. In fact, Lewis gives the date of Abba Jifar's
conversion to Islam as 1830. This was long after the
emergence of Jima as a consolidated state.

Massaja, (1889), VI, p. 10.

Lewis (1965), p. 42; see also Mohammed Hassen ”The Oromo of
Ethiopia," (1983), the last two chapters.

Lewis (1965), p. 49.
Abir (1968), p. 51.

For a brief discussion about the other kings of Jima (1855-
1878), see Lewis (1965), pp. 42-44; and Mohammed Hassen's
dissertation (1983), the last two chapters.

Ibid., p. 57.

Soleillet stressed that the highly alued exports - slaves,
ivory, gold, musk and later coffee fetched cheaper prices in
the southwest and were sold for twice or three times more at
the coast.

Massajia, trans. Vol. V (1925). pp. 85-86.
Abir (1968), p. 85.

Tekalign Wolde Mariam, ”Land, Trade and Political Power,"
pp. 7-15.

A. Franzoj, Continente Nero (Torino: Rouk and Fauale,
1885), p. 285.

Lewis (1965), PP. 49-55.

Temesgen Gobena, 'Gege, dabo and other communal labours
mainly among the Oromo of Western Sawa and wallaga,'

Ethnglggigal EQQLQLY Bulletin,No. 7 (University College of
addis Ababa, 1957), pp. 65-76.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.

113

G. Montandon, Ljesclavage e9 Abyssinie (Geneve, 1923). PP.
11-14.

J. Borelli, Ethiopia Meridionale (Paris, 1889), p. 289. On

p. 340 he reported that in Jima and its surrounding regions
slaves made up of almost half of the population - in some
places even more.

Lewis (1965), pp. 62-65. See also Tekalign Wolde Mariam,
"Some Patterns of Slave Acquisition in the Kingdom of Jimma
Abba Jifar (c. 1875-1932),” Ereeeediege ef the Seeend,Annge1

Seminar 9; the Department 9; niggery, Vol. 1 (A.A.U., 1984),
pp. 214-220.

Cerulli, (1932), p. 76.

Haile Mariam Goshu, “The Kingdom of Abba Jiffar II (1861-
1934)," B.A. thesis, History Department, A.A.U. (June 1979).

Mohammed Nasir, ”Economic History of Jimma Abba Jiffar (1878-
1930),' B.A. thesis, Economics Department, A.A.U. (April,
1973).

Ibid., See also Tekalign Wolde Mariam, “Land, Trade and
Political Power,” pp. 16-18.

Cerulli,ELiepie Qeeidegeele, I, p. 68; Abir (1968), p.80;
Lewis (1965), p. 98.

Lewis (1965), p. 98.

The major Leqa Clans were: Wayu, Dulecha, Burayu (Bilo),
Ghida and Leqa Sibu. See Tesema Taa, I‘Administration of Leqa
Nekemte,“ p.3.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Nekemte,
Sept. 1979.

Interview: Fitawrari Mekonnen Kumsa, Nekemte, in 1973.
Emiru Gebre, Kenna, Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, Sept. 1979.

Meillassoux, "The Economy in Abgricultural Self-sustaining
Society,“ pp. 138-139.

Interview: G/Selassie Gutta, Nekemte, Sept. 1979: see also L.
Bartels, “Studies of the Galla in Wollega," pp. 149-154.

Interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Digga,
1973. This incident makes a perfect comparison with the
wealth obtained by Jima's Abba Faro of Digga clan after his
election as a meti, which we have already discussed in

82.

83.
84.

85.
86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

92.

114
this chapter.

Interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, Sept.
1979.

Interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga, in 1973.

Qondala was the warrior group in the qade cycle which
belonged to the third grade in the gede classification.

Interview: Edossa Waqjira, Nekemte, August 1979.

Interview: Graz. Tamru Gutta, Nekemte, August 1979: Abdissa
Abbay, Ghimbi, April 1980.

A special customary ritual ceremony of the Oromo gada
system with important symbolic significance of peace,
fertility and prosperity for the society.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, Graz. Tamiru Gutta,
Digga, in 1973.

Interview: Fitawrari Mekonnen Kumsa, Taa Woyessa, Nekemte in
1972.

The three legal bodies were known as Selge,_snene and Sade.
These courts of justice were designated by the number of
elders they constituted. Thus, on the Selge court sat nine
judges; on the Shane, five: and on the Sede, only three.
interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte,
June 1979.

Bekere had many wives and twelve sons, most of the latter
were given districts to rule where they owned fiefs.

Interview: Wakjira Osana, Digga, August 1973. For
comparative purposes one may think of the southern sennar
institution of the ”master of the road” which is very similar
to our description. See J.M. Schuver, Beisen gm eeegep
Nilqebiet (Gotha, 1884).

CHAPTER IV
THE MACHA OROMO STATES AND THE CREATION OF

MODERN ETHIOPIAN EMPIRE

As we have attempted to illustrate, the Macha Oromo social
formation was deeply rooted in the cultural traditions of the
society. Each of the dynasties, by and large, protected and
defended the basic quabiye land rights of its citizens.
The most share of the more fertile land, however,
invariably belonged to the kings and the nobility. In every
respect, the nobility was favored by the ruling elite.
'[They] differed from the common people in their increased
share of material possession, their manner of dress, their
place of residence, and even in their hair style."1

The leaders strengthened their legitimacy with the
support of the nobility, as promoters of peace, prosperity
and security of their people. The centralized monarchical
authorities and administrative organizations of the states
guaranteed more political stability and relative peace which
allowed cultivation of wider areas and the development of
internal and external trade. Artisans and craftsmen
increased their output to meet the needs for agricultural
implements and household untesils. Weavers and potters found

the opportunity to supply more of their commodities.

The Macha Oromo states, though varied in their socio-

political strength, had much in common. Sedentary

115

116

agriculture formed the backbone of their economy. Most of
the activities of crop production and livestock breeding were
handled by peasant communities and slave labor. In his
recent study of the growth and development of the Macha Oromo
states of the Gibe region, Mohammad Hassen has remarked:

Although the existence of [the Oromo states]

spanned no more than a few decades, this brief

period was packed with [or punctuated by] events

of crucial importance. It witnessed rapid

religious, social, cultural, political, indust-

rial and commercial progress unsurpassed in any

other Oromo areas of Ethiopia.2
Macha states shared a resourceful and fertile environment,
provoking envy among their neighbours. For instance,
Plowden, who visited the Gudru in the 1840's, admired the
fertility of the soil and the healthy climate of the region.
As he put it: “It is agreeable to the eye of a traveller: and
rare, to behold none of those squalid objects of disease and
misery, those swarms of beggars, that infest most countries,
and a land where, if luxury and magnificence do not astonish

3

his sight, extremes of poverty are equally unfrequent.“ In
the early-twentieth century, another European traveller,
A.H.S. Landor provided an ecological description of Macha

land:

There are few regions in Africa which are
richer than western and south-western por—
tions of Abyssinia - generally known as the
Galla country. Its picturesque mountain
masses are well wooded and the valleys are
regular gardens. The climate is ideal, water
for irrigation plentiful, and the soil so
fertile that it will produce anything with

117
the minimum labour. Two crops a year can be
grown without cultivation. All that is
necessary is to saw seeds any how; the land
does the rest. 4
Even though Landor's report might seem an
overexaggeration, the endowments of the Macha land are

beyond dispute. Historically it has been one of the areas of

Ethiopia rarely prone to famine.

The Macha Oromo states lacked unity against a common
enemy. They engaged in periodic wars and clashes among
themselves as well as against others for political supremacy,
although none was able to dominate permanently. Mohammed
Hassen was referring to this problem when he wrote: "Though
[the Macha Oromo states] had cultural homogeneity, common
language, . . . close commercial contacts, similar
administrative establishments, similar agricultural practices
and landholding system, they failed to coalesce into one
political entity.'5

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the
leaders of the Macha Oromo states and principalities between
the Abbay and the Gojeb rivers were embroiled in struggles
against one another. At this time two crucial historical
developments occurred which were to have a profound and
lasting effects on the political economy of the whole region.
Powerful warlords emerged in Gonder, Gojam, Tigray and Shewa,
and the European scramble for Africa started. The struggle

for supermacy among the northern worlds on one hand, and the

118
need to put an end to the Yejju Oromo dynasty of Gonder
on the other, produced a state of great turmoil, disunity and
lawlessness. European governments began to deal with the
kingdoms as separate entities to exploit the situation to
their advantage. This chaotic period of political strife

lent itself to brigandage and armed robbery.

Kassa of Qwara was born in 1818. He began his career as
a bandit (shifta) in western plateau of Gonder along the
major north-south trade route. At first he had quite a few
followers, but by sharing the fruits of his activities and
providing an effective leadership he attracted a large crowed
and strengthened his position. Soon he emerged victorious
against most of his rivals including the rulers of Gonder,
and ascended the imperial throne as king of kings, Tewodros
II of Ethiopia in 1855? Under the influence of a few of his
British advisors and friends, including W. C. Plowden and his
companion J. Bell, Tewodros aimed at feudal centralization,
administrative, military and social reforms, and diplomatic
relations with Queen Victoria of Britain. But his reform

programs brought him into a direct clash with the regional

nobility, the Orthodox church and the clergy.

His reign was characterized by a series of fightings
against a number of regional rulers who refused to submit to
his new vision of the Ethiopian Empire. To worsen the

situation, a serious misunderstanding between the British and

119

the emperor developed into a war. In 1867, Lord Napier led a
British punitive expedition against Tewodros to free the
British captives. The expeditionary force exploited the
internal differences and promised to arm Kassa of Tigray in
return for supplies and an unhindered march towards Magdala,
Tewodros's capital in 1868. At the Battle of Magdala, the
British emerged victorious owning to their supperior fire
power, and the king of kings is said to have committed
sucide.7

The British immediately withdrew, leaving behind a power
vacuum and civil war. A certain wagShum Gobeze of Lasta
claimed the throne as Emperor Tekla Georgis II. But shortly
thereafter, Kassa of Tigray, the most powerful warlord in the
north, who had received a substantial number of firearms from
the British expeditionary force destroyed Emperor Tekla
Georgis and was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia in
1872.8

The civil strife and political struggle in northern
Ethiopia had very little direct effect on Shewa, though
Tewodros appointed a new governor and took Menilek, the
province's hereditary prince, into captivity to Magdala. In
1865, Menilek managed to escape to Shewa, chased Tewodros's
men out of power, and became king. On the other hand, the
political drama and squabbles among the northern warlords had

no serious effect on the Macha states of western central

120

Ethiopia until late nineteenth century. They were virtually
independent and were able to hold their own in every respect.
However, Euro-Shewan commercial and diplomatic ties led to a
Shewan expansion and consolidation of power at the expense of
the adjacent Oromo population.9

In the 18405, King Sahle Sellassie (I. 1813-1847) of
Shewa was not only able to raise 30,000 - 50,000 soldiers "of
whom about 1,000 were armed with muskets,'lobut was also in a
position to direct more punitive attacks against the once
invincible Tulama and Karayu Oromo. Though not fully
successful, he already had expanded Shewan territory at the
expense of the surrounding Oromo, and styled himself 'king of
Shewa and the Galla11 It is important to note here that
firearms played a crucial role in the process of feudal
centralization in Ethiopian history. In the words of
Addis Hiwet: ”The introduction of firearms in the 19th
century created, for the first time in centuries, unevenness
and imbalance in the political-military resources at the
disposal of the various feudal warlords. This unevenness
itself was one of the factors that activated the moves
towards feudal centralization in the second half of the 19th
century."12

Although northern Ethiopia, particularly Tigray, had
enjoyed superiority in firearms, its leadership was caught up

in a serious contest against external attacks from the

Egyptians, the Mahdists and the Italian colonialism, and was

121
unable to consolidate internal power. Moreover, northern
Ethiopia was exhausted, its resources dissipated from long
years of protracted wars of feudal anarchy. No single
principality was in a position to bring about feudal
centralization. The strongest drive for "feudal
centralization - expansion, annexation and administration of
territories" came from Shewa, and was activated and nurtured
by European imperialism. The kingdom had acquired access to
the growing traffic in arms and ammunition, especially after
1870's. Already at this period, the British had secured a
dominant position on the Red Sea (colonized Aden in 1839),
the French had acquired possession of Obock (1862), and

Italy, though a late comer had gained a foot hold in Assab.

The last three decades of the nineteenth century saw
mounting inter-imperialist competition and rivalry. Control
of the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden-Indian Ocean complex and the
upper Nile basin was considered crucial by the European
powers. ”The need for cheap raw materials and agricultural
produce, an expanded market and cheap labour, all engendered
a renewed interest in colonies. The demands of the new
phase of capitalism led European bourgeois states into a
ferocious 'scramble for colonies'."l It was during this
period that the Ethiopian Empire was created in its ethno-
linguistic composition and territorial delimitation. Indeed,
its social-political fabric was formed in the heyday of

imperialism and in complicity with it. "External forces fed

122

imperial rule in Ethiopia and stimulated and fed Ethiopia's
territorial expansion.£5 Britain, France and Italy sought
complete control of northeast Africa in general and Ethiopia
in particular. Evidence clearly reveals that their
activities in the area had long term socio-economic and
political consequences and immediate effects on the local
balance of power.16European imperialism in the Horn of Africa
had, therefore, a much more profound impact than merely
breaking “down the historic isolation of . . . ancient
society."17

The process of empire-building in Ethiopia had a dual
character: 1) reunification of the northern Christian core
regions; 2) the conquest and subjugation of independent
kingdoms, principalities and traditional communities in the
south. Many Ethiopianist scholars, perhaps out of sympathy or
support for the predominance and perpetuation of the post-
Menilekian status quo, often ignore or overlook this
fundamental distinction. For them, the turbulent wars and
campaigns for political centralization, began by Tewodros II
(r. 1855-1868), continued by Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889), and
culminated under Menelik II (r. 1889-1913), had but one
justified and legitimate objective: the “reunification” or
the ”rebuilding” of the Christian empire.181n this connection

Getahum Dilebo is correct to have remarked: '. . .[many of]

the lands conquered and occupied by Menelik originally were

123

not the homeland of the Christians. . . , [many of] the
Oromo and the Shankila never had been under the Habesha
[Abyssinians] before Menelik. Hence Menelik's military
policy against [many] peoples were a flagrant imperial
conquest and consolidation, not 'unification' let alone
'reunification'."19

Moreover, the advocates of "reunification" fail to
qualify their assertions by refraining from making a clear
reference to the northern portion of today's EthiOpia,
predominantly inhabited by Amhara-Tigray population. Even in
the north where, historically decentralization had often
effectively compromised imperial rule, one needs to be
skeptical about using the term "unification" or
”reunification.” Menelik's conquest of the independent
entities in the south, southwest and southeast in the last
decades of the nineteenth century, does not at all qualify

for the ”reunification" or the 'reconquista' rehetoric.

So far, we have attempted to highlight the socio-
political conditions in the Macha states, northern Ethiopia
and the involvement of the external powers in the internal
affairs of northeast Africa in general. Now we shall show
how in the 18803, external pressures, the geo-political
configuration and the rich resources of Machaland had
unfortuate effects on most of the Macha states. We shall make

this clear by concentrating on local historical events in

124
relation to the conquest and systematic annexation of some of
the Macha states by the Shewans. For purposes of expediency
and continuity in our case study we will put emphasis on Leqa

Nekemte state among others in western central Ethiopia.

In the 18703, Moti Moroda (ca. 1868-1889) of Leqa
Nekemte, grew stronger and powerful in central Welega. He is
said to have been told by his father, Bekere, to take care of
his arch-enemies, Genda Bushan of Leqa Sibu in the east and
Danno Bera of Leqa Qumba in the southwest. Moroda took his
father's warnings seriously. He was not only successful in
defending his inheritance but was also able almost always to
score victories in the frontier raids and counter-raids
against the two Oromo leaders. He even attempted what his
father failed to accomplish. He started to expaned his
territory beyond the Didessa, in the country of the Sibu
Oromo,20in what is today Gimbi eureie_(district).

Moroda used the relatively small Leqa community in Gimbi
as a stepping stone for his southward expansion. According
to oral sources, the leqa communities, who had established
their own qgabiye across the Didessa, were a minority group
in a predominantly Sibu country. They had no meaningful
contact with the other Leqa groups. Though they were
continually harassed from all directions, they had always
fought others off and managed to survive well over a century.

In the 18703, they were particularly harassed by the Haru and

125

Nolle who lived immediately south of Gimbi town. Sori Dembi,
the local leader, who could not stand the attacks on his own,
crossed the Didessa, met Moroda and appealed for assistance?1

This created an opportune moment for Moroda, who had
always nourished strong ambitions for incorporating the rich
Sibu areas in the west. He quickly sent a contingent of
horsemen led by his own brothers, Amante and Bide Bekere,
which successfully repelled the enemies of Leqa Gimbi and
eventually brought them under control?2 Sori Dembi thought
that the Nekemte reinforcement was sent just to help him.
Moroda had, however, his own special political schemes. He
soon dispatched Abba Dawe, a renowned and most effective
negotiator to Gimbi, asking both Sori Dembi and his conquered
rivals to recognize his overlordship and pay annual tributes.
Sori Dembi, who had no alternative, opted for getting the
best possible treatment from Moroda. His defeated rivals
also accepted the tributary status grudgingly.23

Moroda appointed his brothers, Amante and Chibsa, in Barn
and Gimbi, respectively, in order to cement his newly acquired
suzerainty over them. This state of affairs brought about a
general sense of political crisis in the whole of Sibu
country. The threat of Leqa Nekemte aggression disturbed the
communities between the Didessa river and Ulla Lemenaf4 the

traditional boundary between the Leqa and the Sibu. To crush

the expanding forces of the Leqa, an inter-tribal alliance

126

with a take (an oath) was formed among the Sibu of Nedjo,
Bodji and Jarso. The allies agreed to follow the lead of
Wacho Debello of Jarso, a respected warrior with the
strongest local army. They planned to march together and
take Gimbi by surprise.25

However, Kono Faro, one of the leaders of Nedjo Sibu
betrayed the scheme, when he stealthily left for Nekemte, met
Moroda, and disclosed the plans of the Sibu. Moroda was thus
alerted and sent strong reinforcements to Gimbi.
Nevertheless, the Sibu forces managed to challenge the Leqa
army, raided Gimbi itself, and even forced Chibsa to withdraw
temporarily. More Leqa reinforcements were sent and in the
ensuing confrontations, Sibu resistance was broken and Nacho
Debello himself escaped farther to the west. Moroda's army
pursued him and managed to establish some degree of control
over the Bodji, Nedjo and Jarso Sibu as far west as the Jawe
river.26The state of Leqa Nekemte had thus gone a long way in
establishing a vast patronage throughout the region between

Wama in the east and Jawe river in the west on the eve of the

advent of the Gojame and Shewan forces in Welega.

Lack of unity among the Oromo was a major problem.
Migrations and the dispersal of the Oromo were considered as
fundamental basis of dissension. Some of the early writers
like Manoel de Almeida have commented that Oromo disunity

almost always made them vulnerable. Moreover, the formation

127

of classes and states among the Macha society had also
contributed to a further decline in Oromo cohesiveness as a
homogenuous big power. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the internal warfare, conflicts and rivalries among the
landlocked Macha Oromo autocracies on the one hand, and the
activities of the imperialist powers on the other, provided
excellent opportunities for the contending forces of Gojam
and Shewa to subjugate western central Ethiopia in the late

nineteenth century. This is particularly clear in the
traditions of Horo-Gudru Oromo, who became the first platform
for the Gojame-Shewan rivalrie327to gain control of the Macha
Oromo land. Located immediately south of the Abbay, with
plenty of pasture and water resources, Horo-Gudru was one of
the early sites of the Macha Oromo settlements. Since it was

the first bone of contention between the Gojame and the

Shewans, giving a brief background on the region is in order.

Local Oromo traditions relate that inhabitants of Horo-
Gudru were descendants of Jawe, believed to have been the
first ancestor of the Gudru, jima, Horo, Limu, Gida, and the
Amuru. The traditions further give even the names of the
more important pioneers, or the degel eegei, of these
groups. They were: Himbabo Dede for Gudru, Kotte Gobeyya for
Horo, Budo Birbirsso for Jima, and Gaje Gandayo for Amuru.
We are told that Himbabo Dede ledzgis Gudru to' occupy the

land from Anger river to Hora Dika. Kotte Gobayya's Horo

settlled between the Abbay and the upper Gibe river,

128
extending to the edge of the Chomen swamp. Budo Birbirsso
established the quabiye rights of his Jima people between the
Abbay and Mount Gorochan and also bordering on the land of
the Leqa Sibu to the southwest. The Amuru led by Gaje
Gandayo are said to have moved farther northwest and settled
between Tulu Chari and river Garchi.29
These were the earlier Oromo settlers who had priority in

quabiye rights. After some generations, however, they

seem to.have undergone the same type of socio-economic and
political transformations we have already discussed in the
preceding chapters. By 1880, the Italian traveller, Cecchi,
observed that the socio-political structure of most of the
Oromo south of the Abbay had considerably changed. He
reported that ”each tribe obeys one chief, who is normally
the eldest of the most ancient and powerful family which is
to be found among them.:30 Thus, by the nineteenth century,
the descendants of the four Oromo pioneers in Horo-Gudru were

not only organized into independent principalities but were

also engaged in conflicts with each other.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Abishe
Garba of Horo, the leader of one of the principalities, had
become the strongest in the area. He controlled the whole
region between the Anger in the west and Finchaa river in the
east. The Gudru led by Gama Muras and, later, by Jibat

31
Busho, came next in local importance, and the major trade

129

route connecting Gojam with Asendabo and farther south to
Jima Abba Jifar was under their control. Budo Birbirsso's
Jima had by the nineteenth century divided into two
conflicting and mutually independent groups, namely, the Jima
Rare led by Qadida Wanabe and the Jima Geneti by Sori Gela.
The other tribes in the region were also similarly divided
into hostile groups.32

In almost all the battles fought among the above
mentioned leaders, Abishe Garba of Horo used to emerge
victorious. This seems to have compelled his rivals to find
ways and means of getting rid of him. Informants argue that
the initial appearance of the Gojame leader, Ras Adal Tesema
in northern Welega, just south of the Abbay, was partly in
reaction to these internal conflicts among the local Oromo.
It is apparent that Abishe's continued successes had started
to draw some of his rivals into a coalition against him.
Marriage alliances and counter alliances for political and
diplomatic reasons were not uncommon among the Macha leaders.
Towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century, an
alliance was formed between Jibat Busho of Gudru and Qadida
Wanabe of Jima Rare. They took a .kaka (an oath), which
was cemented by a marriage alliance between the two houses.
The two wanted to use their long commercial contacts with
Gojam to help eliminate their common enemy, Abishe. They
crossed over to Gojam, allied themselves with Adal Tesema,

and invited his military intervention in their local

130

33
quarrels. This was for the Gojame leader, who had a strong

ambition to expand his domains beyond the Abbay and as far
south as the Gibe kingdoms, an opportune moment. He
reportedly welcomed the two Oromo leaders and agreed to help
them.34

Since Abishe was a very courageous leader with many
strong horsemen, it was expected that he would put up a stiff
resistance against Ras Adal and his Oromo allies. Ras Adal
crossed the Abbay and camped at Qoqor plain in Horo, not far
from Abishe's residence. Adal tactfully sent a message to
him through Jibat Busho and Qadida Wanabe promising to make
him master of Gida and Limu, besides Horo, and to provide him
with firearms for his own use. The unsuspecting Abishe took
Adal at his word and went to visit him at Qoqor with a few of
his horsemen. As soon as he arrived there, the Gojame leader
ordered his arest with his commanders, and some of his
horsemen were killed when they tried to protect their leader.
In a further rescue attempt Horo lost about 4,000 horsemen
and the Gojame troops then pillaged the province. Adal
subsequently resorted to "divide and rule,” appointed Abishe's
own brother Fandalala Garba as the ruler of Horo, and took
Abishe and a few of his commanders to Gojam as captives.35 He
also appointed one of his relatives, Fitawrari Yimar Goshu as
the Gojame Commander stationed south of the Abbay. Yimar

married a daughter of the deposed leader to soften relations

131
36
with the Horo notables.

Northeastern Welega henceforth became the Gojame sphere
of influence. The various local leaders who welcomed Adal
were given back their old jobs, and the gee is said to have
given the title of dejazmach to Sori Gela of Jima Geneti
who had welcomed him as an overlord with an extravagant
reception. Traditions clearly indicate that the advent of
the Gojame was a landmark in the history of the Oromo people.
A number of new developments are cited as having taken place
after they gained a foothold in northern Welega. The Gojame
simply proceeded with the establishment of Orthodox churches
and sent priests to convert the Oromo by persuasion or force.
Seven such churches are said to have been founded by Adal in

Horo-Gudru at the time.

More significantly, for the first time in the history of
the local Oromo, the characteristic feudal institution of
Christian Ethiopia began to be superimposed on Oromo
tradition, culture and society. Thus, we are told that as
soon as he returned to Gojam, Adal sent a number of soldiers
to Horo Gudru, assigning them to specific areas where they
were provided with all their needs by the local peoples.
Villages were divided among these soldiers, according to
their ranks, for this purpose?7 The Gojame influence is said
to have extended as far as Gindeberet and part of Liban in

38
the east, and Leqa Billo in the south. Our informants could

132

not remember the exact period of these events, but they say
that the Gojame involvement in the political affairs of
northeastern Welega began some years before the Battle of
Embabo in 1882, earlier than the Shewan encroachment on any
part of Welega.39

By about 1880, the most important areas in western
central Ethiopia which had not yet been brought under direct
influences of either the Gojame or the Shewans were: Moroda's
Leqa Nekemte, Genda Bushan's Leqa Sibu, Danno Bera's Leqa
Qumba, Jote's Leqa kelem and above all the five Gibe kingdoms.
It has already been pointed out, however, that peaceful trade
relations existed between these Oromo regions and the people
of Gojam or Shewa. But the approaching tide of the Gojame
hegemony over the neighbouring Oromo of Horo-Gudru was
already assuming threatening proportions. When Leqa Billo
fell under Adal's direct influence, Moroda was particularly

menaced.

40
In 1881, Ras Deresu, Adal's outstanding general

was sent to subdue more Oromo territories across the Abbay
and collect tribute.41 Because of the long distance involved,
Moroda hoped that the Gojame would not reach his areas. But
if they managed that, he thought, there was very little he
could do except to join them and make the best possible use

of their forces to his own advantage. Our informants clearly

remember that Moroda once exclaimed to his followers: ”It is

133

unthinkable that the Amhara will come. But once they come it
is impossible to challenge them}2 Moroda lacked firearms and
allies, since the Oromo leaders were periodically at war
with one another. Moroda convened his councils and other
notables to discuss strategy, and it was agreed that they would
show no sign of hostility but send a delegetion with tribute
to meet Deresu at Billo.43

Moroda sent his brother, Dibaba Bekere, with a
delegation and a tribute of gold and pledges of friendship to
Deresu.44The gesture was intended to make the gee bypass
Leqa territories and permit Moroda to retain his autonomy.45
Deresu accepted the tribute and later met Moroda at Digga,
west of Nekemte. In this, Moroda had already scored an
important success. He had deflected the Gojame forces to
march through the territories of his deadly rival, Danno Bera
of Leqa Qumba. In return for Moroda's cooperation, the gee
gave him the title of dejazmach and confirmed him as an
autonomous ruler over Leqa Nekemte?6 The £§§ is also said
to have baptized him and some of his followers in a tent at
Digga. He also gave them a page; and encouraged the building
of Yesus church, the first church in Leqa Nekemte.47

Traditions are unanimous that Deresu and his troops
continued their expedition into the Gibe valley and invaded

Guma. At the time its king was Abba Jobir, a Muslim, who is

said to have been very powerful. Although the five Gibe

134

monarchies had a keke (oath), among themselves, they seem
to have yielded to Deresu one by one mainly because of lack
of mutual trust.486era, Guma, Limu-Enarya, Goma and Jima were
very rich in gold, ivory and musk and paid these as tribute
to the £§§49 Moroda is supposed to have sent earlier
messages to warn the Gibe princes that it was futile to
fight. He advised them that it would be better to pay
tribute because the Oromo could not match the Gojame rifles,
still almost unknown in the Oromo lands. When Guma ignored
this advice and put up a strong resistance, Deresu devastated
the country, killed Abba Jobir and looted the region.50

Deresu's exploits had been followed very closely by
Menilek of Shewa. With a blend of diplomacy and force, he
was busy expanding his territory at the expense of the
surrounding Oromo, and had no intention of becoming a passive
observer to the unfolding drama. Ras Adal explained his
expansion south of Welega as far as Kefa by referring to his
title of 'king of Gojjam and Kafa' conferred by Emperor
Yohannes IV in 1881.511t seems that the 'carte blanche' given
to the king of Gojam was not recognized by Menilek. With the
help of Gobena, his talented Oromo general, the king had
already started to strengthen his position among the Oromo
peoples inhabiting the area between Shewa and Welega on one
side and the Gibe region on the other. He had brought under
his influence most of the intervening Tulama and Macha

52
peoples.

135

As soon as the news of the Gojame advances of 1881
reached Menilek, he promptly ordered his general, Gobena, to
march to Welega, pursue the Gojame forces, and check their
further successes. Our informants bring out very clearly the
tactics followed by Moroda, when he was faced by the
impending conflict over the Macha land between Gojam and
Shewa. We are told that the report of Gobena's arrival in
Welega reached Moroda while he was accompanying Deresu en
route to the Gibe kingdoms. He quietly took leave of Gojame
general at the Gabba river and is said to have immediately
returned to Leqa Nekemte.53

Gobena's advance into the heartland of Welega was
relatively easy. The rather desperate resistance of the Leqa
Nonno was broken without much difficulty and the Shewan forces
proceeded westwards?4 News of Gobena's victory and Shewan
military strength soon reached Moroda. He directed that his
brother Dibaba Bekere go to Gobena with a tribute of one
hundred wagets of gold and also together with some beef-
cattle and other food supplies. He also sent a message
assuring Gobena that his country was peaceful and that he had
no plans to resist his advance.55 Meanwhile, Moroda called a
conference of his notables and advisors to discuss how to
deal with the Shewan expeditionary force. He opened the
discussion by recalling that they had survived the Gojame

threat by offering tribute: he stressed that they were now

faced with the far stronger Shewans. He presented his

136
audience with two alternatives: to fight or to submit. Their
arms, he reminded them, were inferior and if they fought,
their rivals Tucho Danno, son and successor of Danno Bera of
Leqa Qumba, Genda Bushan of Leqa Sibu and other hostile
chiefs in the newly incorporated areas beyond the Didessa
would either rebel or ally themselves with the Shewans
against Leqa Nekemte. He advised them to agree to submit
peacefully.56 Moroda, in fact, sought to defend his strong

position in the region through an alliance with the Shewans,

and to use them against his local rivals or rebels.

When Dibaba Bekere returned from Gobena,. he reported
that the gee and his followers were very pleased with the
gifts and that Gobena wanted to visit. Moroda at once sent
Dibaba back to guide Gobena from Billo to Hinde, where the
.EQEi met him.57 Informants say that Tucho Danno of Leqa Qumba
was determined to fight and put up a strong resistance
against Gobena and his followers. When Moroda reported the
danger, Gobena invited Tucho to come and visit him at Hinde
and directed the messenger to suggest that Gobena did not

come to take over Leqa Qumba but to help Tucho strengthen his

position against his rivals and to foster friendly relations

with him.

Tucho trusted these words and rode to Hinde to meet
Gobena. He and his horsemen were respectfully welcomed and

served food and drinks. Meanwhile, Gobena's soldiers

137

surrounded the men and took control over Tucho's horse and
those of his followers. When Gobena asked Tucho to submit to
the Shewan rule, he had no other alternative but to submit.
Tucho was given the title of kennazmach and Gobena
appointed balambaras Lulseged, one of his followers, as a
governor of Arjo, leaving behind some of his soldiers to
maintain peace and order.58 This was quite a landmark in the
history of Shewa-Welega relations, since it constituted the
first occasion when an administrator was appointed in any
part of the region by the Shewan court. From this time
onwards a series of similar appointments were made over many
other areas in western central Ethiopia, thus paving the way

for the annexation of the whole region into the Shewan feudal

state system.

The traditions relate that there was a lot of discussion
and negotiation between Moroda and Gobena at the Shewan
camp. Gobena argued that it would be to the interest of
Moroda and his people to side with Shewa rather than with
Gojam. The ras informed him that all Tulama and Macha chiefs
between Shewa and Welega, including Yanfa Gudeta of Gedo on
the frontier between the two regions, had already submitted
to Menilek and joined forces with the Shewan army?9 On his
part, Moroda told Gobena that the Gojame forces had preceded
the arrival of the Shewans in the region, given him the title

of dajazmach, founded churches and even converted him and

some of his notables to Christianity. Thus, there was a

138

strong bond with Gijam, and he needed very strong and
convincing reasons to break off the relationship. He argued
that he did not want either money or land from the Shewans or
the Gojame, since he already had these in plenty himself. He
wanted only to be left alone with his people in peace and
tranquility. If he were to side with the Shewans, he wanted
to be assured of a strong and lasting bond of genuine friendship
between himself and Menilek. He insisted that the ties would
have to be direct and personal, and not exercised through the
intermediary of administrative officials.60

Gobena solemnly promised that no administrator would be
appointed in Moroda's territories and that the magi would
be directly responsible to Menilek as an autonomous ruler.
The traditions insist that Moroda's new alliance with Shewa
was sealed with a formal keke (oath) with Ras Gobena on
behalf of Menilek. In return, Moroda promised that he would
dissuade all other Oromo peoples in the area, and
particularly in Horo-Gudru, from actively siding with
Deresu. This was a considerable advantage to the Shewans,
since Teklehaymanot's forces were almost entirely dependent
on Horo-Gudru cavalry. Therefore, either their active
support on the side of Ras Gobena or at least their
neutrality in the Shewan-Gojame showdown would help Shewa

tremendously.

True to his word, Moroda advised the Oromo in the

139

region to keep aloof and not involve themselves in the
matters of the Gojame and the Shewans whom he considered as
interlopers. He also urged them privately to pay tribute to
whichever side won, rather than gamble by actively helping
one or the other.62 All this decisively tipped the balance of
power south of the Abbay against Teklehaymanot and in favor
of Menilek. The traditional account clarifies the results of
the Shewan-Gojame rivalry in the area: it should no longer be
in Menilek's own superior arms alone that we should seek his
successes at Embabo, but rather in the amicable relations he
forged with important sectors of the Oromo leadership
through Gobena's relentless efforts.63

Gobena continued his march to the southwest following
the same route that Deresu had taken to the Gibe valley.
Both Leqa and local Gibe traditions confirm that the two
forces actually met in the small kingdom of Guma and that
there were no clashes between them. Rather Deresu is said to
have offered to withdraw without a fight, leaving behind all
the tributes and war booties he had collected for his king,
Teklehaymanot.641n effect what this meant was that Deresu was
now abandoning all the advantages which Gojam had accumulated
in the Macha country south of the Abbay, ever since Adal
Tesema first led his forces into Horo-Gudru in the late
18703. The concession infuriated Teklehaymanot, who
immediately sent Deresu back into Welega, reinforced by

65
additional troops led by his son Ras Bezabeh. Gojam and

140

Shewa soon entered into a direct military confrontation which

66
culminated in Shewan victory at the Battle of Embabo in

Gudru, June 6, 1882. The battle was decisive for Oromo

history. In the words of Addis Hiwet:

It was not simple conquest for its own sake,

or the simple lure of empire-building, that
drove both the Gojjamite and Shoan feudalists
into expansionism. The motives were primarily
economic: the green and lush Oromo lands and
their boundless commodities (gold, civet,
ivory, coffee) and the prosperous markets of
Assendabo (whose population swelled to 100,000
on market days), Embabo, Jimma and Billo.
Minilik also saw another plausible rationale in
his drive for conquest and expansion: 'If powers
at a distance come forward to partition Africa
between them, I do not intend to be an indiffer-
ent spectator'. 67

By the victory at Embabo Menilek excluded Teklehaymanot
from the Oromo lands and access to and control of internal
markets for the export of gold, ivory, civet, hides and
coffee. The story of the Shewan-Gojame conflict has already
been told in a number of earlier accounts?8 Here, it suffices
to point out that Menilek himself as well as the traditions
emphasize the role played by the local Oromo allies in the
Shewan success at Embabo. The king acknowledged: ”Victory
was assured us at last by the impetuousity and bravura of our
[Oromo] cavalry which braved firearms and cannon with spears
alone to divide the enemy army in half and put it completely

69
to rout.”

Traditions also relate that the notorious Qadida Wanabe

141
of Jimma Rare effectively fought on the Shewan side, while
other important local leaders - with the exception of Gudru
chiefs — desisted from helping the Gojame. Oromo reluctance
stemmed from Gojame oppression during the few years of their
overlordship and the fact that they openly despised Oromo
70

culture and ways of life. By contrast, the Shewans had long
lived with Tulama and Macha peoples and had established
mechanisms of co-existence with Oromo socio-cultural
traditions. Moreover, a significant number of the Shewan
troops including Gobena himself, were Oromo or of Oromo
origin. In fact Menilek owed much of the extension of his
domains to Gobena. Triulzi's comment of some of his
achievements is a living tesfimony:

Menelik's successes in the south were due in

great measure to his Oromo general, Ras Gobana.

It was Gobana who had subjugated the [Macha]

areas south and west of Entotto. It was

through him that the rich tribute from the

conquered Oromo leaders reached the Sewan

court, and it was largely Gobana's cavalry

that had given the Sawans the upper hand at

the battle of Embabo. 71

Moroda congratulated himself on the victory of the

Shewans at Embabo, since he clearly had made the right
choice. Although he had avoided making the Gojame angry with
him, his role in the Shewan success was quite invaluable. His
advice to the local leaders to keep neutral was quite

decisive. His peaceful submission also served as a positive

example for the other major powers in the region such as Jote

142
72
Tulu of Leqa Kelem. Jote was given the title of dejazmach,
which was also confirmed for Moroda. As was the case with
King Abba Jifar II of Jima, the two Leqa rulers were now left
to administer their respective territories under the direct

overlordship of Menilek, while in all other Oromo areas

Shewan administrators were appointed.

Clear mutual advantages accrued from this arrangement
for Jote and Moroda on the one hand, and Menilek on the
other, though the former had lost their independence. While
their peaceful submission eased the pressure on the Shewan
forces in their early campaign in Welega, Moroda and Jote
could also use their alliances with Menilek to eliminate the
last remnants of the local opposition within Leqa Nekemte and
Leqa Kelem. Thus, Moroda succeeded not only in destroying
the traditional influential positions, which the Leqa Qumba
and Leqa Sibu rulers had prior to the Shewan advent, but he
also managed to bring the whole of Sibu country as far west
as the Dabus river under his direct control. For Jote, his
alliance with Menilek finally enabled him to break the
century-old resistance of the pre-Oromo inhabitants of the
Anfillo region.73

The Shewan hegemony over the Leqa was, however, not
undisputed. Ethiopian Chronicles and European travellers
have glossed over a number of vital developments in the area.

According to tradition, Garbi Jillo of Leqa Billo, Tucho

143

Danno of Leqa Qumba and Genda Bushan of Leqa Sibu allied to
resist the Shewans. Ligdi Bekere asked his brother, Moroda,
to side with the Oromo leaders against the Shewans, but he
refused. Ligdi prepared a little army of his own to fight
along with Tucho, Garbi and Genda against the invaders.
Ligdi is therefore remembered as a brave warrior and is
praised in songs.74 Gobena had to make at least two
expeditions against the Leqa while these devastated the
country, the inhabitants continued to refuse acknowledgement
of Shewan supermacy. Nevertheless, Gobena was victorious
over the majority of the Leqa Oromo and other dissidents,
owing to his firearms Menilek obtained from the Italians and
the French.75

Sometime after Gobena returned to Shewa, the newly
conquered Oromo organized a rebellion. Turi Gagan, the chief
of Nonno Rogie, Merdassa Konce, the chief of Nonno Migra, the
three Leqa groups (Leqa Billo, Leqa Sibu, and Leqa Qumba)
formed a league against their enemy. Ligdi Bekere again
joined the allies who scored a short-lived military success
against Gobena, who reportedly withdrew forced as far as the
Guder river.76Moroda remained loyal to Menilek because of his
rivalry with Genda Bushan of Leqa Sibu and Tucho Danno of
Leqa Qumba?7 and to preserve his position in general.
Informants blame his pragmatism for the collaboration with

78
the Shewans which robbed the Oromo of an assumed victory.

144

According to traditions in Leqa, Gobena appeared in
western most Welega in 1886. These local sources claim that
Gobena's appearance was the result of a call for help by
Moroda Bekere and Jote Tulu, who were threatened by a Mahdist
invasion and internal insurrection by strong and opportunist
leaders like Wacho Debello of Jarso, waqbulcho Kusa of Mendi
and Gonde Tuffa of Aira. When the Mahdists were advancing
from the west into the interior part of Welega, they received
help from the chiefs in Asosa such as Bambasi Abba Moti.
Other Oromo leaders, who were dissatisfied with Moroda's rule
and his collaboration with the Shewans, allied themselves
with the Mahdists. They expelled Moroda's appointees and
took over western Welega up to the Didessa river including

Kelem, Jote's country.

The Ansars and their allies made their center at Gute
Dilli in Nedjo and are said to have stayed for about a year.
They forced the people to drop their traditional beliefs and
accept Islam, banned alcoholic drinks, took wives without
permission, and exploited the economy. The oppressive and
exploitative activities of the Ansars in western Welega
provoked much hatred, discontent, hostility and struggle
among the public against them.79

Traditions also indicate that when the Ansars occupied
Kelem, Jote escaped and went to Nekemte and asked Moroda to

accompany him to Shewa and get help from Menilek. Moroda

145
answered that he had already sent messengers and was waiting
for a reply. Jote nonetheless continued his journey to
Shewa. En Route, he met Gobena and his army at Gedo, joined
up with him, and returned to Welega to fight against the
mahdist troops.80 Gobena, Jote and Moroda fought and defeated
the Mahdists and their allies after a hard fight. Many

Ansars were killed and others were harassed on their way back

to the Sudan.

In the mid-18803, a direct relationship had been created
between the rulers of Leqa Nekemte, Leqa Kelem and Menilek's
government. This relationship was to survive for a long time,
particularly in the case of the Leqa Nekemte ruling house and
the central government. According to an agreement between
Menilek and Moroda, no armies or commanders (neftegnneeh)
were to be settled in Moroda's lands, but he was to pay an
annual tribute in gold of five hundred wagets, hundred
fereeula of ivory and unspecified amount of grain and honey.
He also had to render military support to Menilek to whom he
entrusted the guardianship of his son Kumsa, soon baptized
Gebre Egziaber with menilek as his god-father.81

A strong vassalage had been created by Menilek in Leqa.
The king's rule was however, only indirect, and the internal
affairs of Leqa Nekemte were entirely in the hands of Moroda
and his officials. Taxes and tributes were collected by the

hilihflis (an Amharic term given to the local notables) of

146
each district and were paid directly to Moroda who remitted a
fixed annual tribute to Menilek. Our informants indicated
that the new political arrangements between Moroda and
Menilek, necessitated an increase in taxes and tributes than
what were traditionally required to run the state of Leqa
Nekemte. The extra charges were designed to cover the annual
tribute sent to Addis Ababa. The local landholding system
remained intact, at least initially. The annual tribute may
not have been a burden in the eyes of the local rulers, for
gold and ivory were reportedly in abundance in those days?2
Nevertheless, it is beyond a shadow of doubt that it was an
additional burden for the peasants, who were asked to pay
more than what they usually did. In fact it marked the .
beginnings of serious strains and stresses in the political
economy of the Macha states. As we shall see in the next
chapters, the maintenance of the status quo did nothing or
very little in shielding the tribute-paying subjects against
the socio-economic hardships brought about by the new state

apparatus.

The growth of Moroda's power and influence in Leqa
Nekemte and that of Jote in Leqa Kelem helped Menilek in his
systematic annexation of much of western central Ethiopia.
At the same time it also initially spared the people of both
regions from the direct settlement and feudal exploitation by
the Shewan neftegnneeh. In contrast, the peasants of Horo-

Gudru, Leqa Qumba, Leqa Sibu and Leqa Billo and other hostile

147
groups were exposed to direct Shewan oppression right from

the beginning.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1.
2.
3.
4.

7.

8.

10.

11.

Tarik g3 Tewodios).

Mohammad Hassen, ”The Oromo of Ethiopia,“ p. 391.

Ibid., p. 384.

Plowden, Travels ip Abyssinia., p. 307.

 

A. H. S. Landor, Across Widest Africa: 52 Account pf Egg
Countpy and the Pegple pf EasternZ ”Central.;gpg Western
Africa, pp Seen During 2 Twelve Months Journey from
Jibbuti pp Cape Verde (London, 1907), pp. 120-1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mohammad Hassen, “The Oromo of Ethiopia," p. 393.

Girmachew Tekla Hawaryat, Tewodros, Tarikawi Drama
(Addis Ababa, 1956): Tsegaye Gebre Medhin, ”Tewodros,"
Ethiopia Observer, Ix, No.3 (1965): S. Rubenson,King

pf Hinge Tewodros pf Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie
I University, 1966, largely based on Tewodros' Chronicles
by Zaneb, Ye Tewodros Tarik and Wolde Mariam,

 

 

 

 

Rubenson, Tewodros pf Ethiopia, pp. 67-92; H. Stern,

The Captive Missionary: Be1ng pp Account pf Country and
People of Abyssinia, Embracing a Narrative pf Kin
TheodoreTE Life, and His Treatment pf Political an
Religious Missions (London, 1868), pp. 340-380; H. G.
Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-
1913 (Oxford, 1975), PP. 28:32.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For a detailed study of Emperor Yonannes IV, see Zewde
Gebre Sellassie, Yohannes $2.2: Ethiopia: A Political
Biography (Oxford, 1975).

 

 

Marcus, The Life and Times pf Menelik II, pp. 7-14:
R. H. K. Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire
(London, 1975), pp. 62-65.

 

 

J. Krapf, Travels and Researches 13 East Africa (London,
1960), p.31.

 

 

The political and economic benefits derived from Sahle
Sellassie's several military expeditions against the Oromo
on the Shewan plateau provided a solid foundation for the
kingdom; see Ed Simone, “The Amhara Military Expeditions
Against the Shawa Galla (1800—1850): A Reappraisal.“ in

Proceedings pf the First United States Conference pp
Ethiopian Studies, edited by H. G. Marcus and John Hinnant

(et a1), Michigan State University (May 1973), pp. 135-

141.

 

 

148 ,

149

12. Addis Hiwet, Ethiopiqy From Autocracy pp Revolution
(London, 1975), p. 10.

13. Ibid. pp. 2-4: Haile Kiros Asmerom, Emergence,
Expansion and Decline of Patrimonial Bureaucracy ip

Ethiopia 1907 1974 An Attem t pp Historical
Interpretation (Amsterdam, 1978), pp. 65-67. Hereafter,
Bureaucragy i2 Ethiopia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

14. Ibid.

15. D. Crummey, “State and Society: 19th century Ethiopia,“
Modes pf Production ip Africa: the Pre-Colonial Egg
(London: Sage Publications, 1981), edited by D. Crummey
and C. C. Stewart.

16. R. Caulk, "The Origins and Development of Foreign Policy
of Menelik II, 1865 .- 1896.“ (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of London, 1966): idem, "Firearms and
Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century,"

Journal of African History 13 (1972), pp. 609- -630: H.
Marcus, —'Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia From
1865 to 1900,“ in Colonialism in Africa, edited by
Lewis Gann & Peter Duignan, V31.1(Cambridge University
Press, 1969), PP. 420-61.

 

 

17. J. Markakis, Ethiqpia Anatomy of A Traditional Polity
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 2- 3.

18. Abir, Tpe Egg pf Egg Princes: R. Pankhurst, Economic
History of Ethiopia 1800 - 1935 (Addis Ababa, HSIU, 1968)
Rubenson, —The Survival of —Eth1opian Independence (London,
1976): R. L. Hess ,Ethiopia the Modernization of Autocracy

(Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1970).

 

 

19. Getahun Dilebo, ”Emperor Menelik's Ethiopia, 1865-1916:
National Unification Or Amhara Communal Domination,“
(Ph.D. dissertation, Howard University, 1974), p. 124: see
also Asefa Jalata, “The Ethiopian Empire: The Politics of
Development and National Liberation Movements.“ (M. Sc.
thesis, university of California, Davis, 1984), PP.26-28.

20. Leqa and Sibu claim to have a common ancestor.
Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, July 1979,

21. Sori Dembi is said to have succeeded Donjo Gawo, a
venerated Abba boku of Gimbi.

22. Interview: Berhanu Gemta, Estifanos Tesema, Gimbi, April
1980.

23. Moroda is also said to have sent Abba Dawe to Naro Gelet
of Daleti and Danno Tumtu of Guliso, calling on them to

150

recognize him as a moti and pay tributes in gold and
ivory. He offered to let them rule their own areas, and
they are said to have accepted his messages. Interview:
Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Nekemte, Sept. 1979.

24. Ulla Lemena literally means the “gate of Arundinaria
Alpina,“the site which marks the guabiye land boundary
between the Leqa and the Sibu.

25. Interview: Kitla.ChalLa, Nedjo, August 1979.
26. Interview: Graz. Waltaji Dagago, Bodji, August 1979.

27. The long-standing trade relations between Welega and
Gojam existed, according to travellers' accounts (Massaja,
1885-6) and oral sources. At the same time there were
trade contacts between Shewa and Welega through the
Billo-Nekemte route.

28. Hora Dika is located northeast of Shambu - west of the
confluence of river Finchaa and the Abbay in Gudru land.

29. Tulu Chari is found in the northwestern part of Horo
woreda. River Garchi has its source in Habe Dongoro
woreda southeast of Shambu town. It is a tributary of the

Anger river.

30. Cecchi, II (1885), p. 555; also quoted by Triulzi, “The
Gudru Oromo,“ p. 57.

31. Jibat Busho a leading Borana member, one of the
descendants of the pioneers, was the successor of Gama
Muras who came to power in the 18703. see Massaja, . miei
trentacinque anni g; missione nell' alta Etiopia, II
(Milan, 1885-6), p. 199.

 

32. Interview: Baissa Birru, Baissa Gonfa, Shambu, Oct. 1979.

33. Interview: Graz. Negussa Kanaie, Baissa Gonfa, Shambu,
Oct. 1979.

34. Interviewz Jaleta Gulti, Jaleta Abba Nama, Shambu, Oct.
1979. Other than reasons given by our informants for the
Gojame intervention, there are references in the
literature to earlier Gojame raids below the Abbay and
their involvement in the local quarrels. See Arnauld d'
Abbadie, Douze ans dans la haute Ethiopie, I(1868), p.
258: Terefe Wolde Tsadik, “Unification of Ethiopia,“ p.
75. However, as Triulzi put it: “The fertility of the
Gudru district and its commercial importance as the main
highroad for the southern trade must have been sufficient
incentive for Gudru's northern neighbours to intervene.“

 

 

151

Triulzi, “The Gudru Oromo,“ p. 60.

35. Interview: Graz. Negussa Kanaie, Baisa Gonfa, Shambu,
Oct. 1979. See also Triulzi, “The Gudru Oromo,“ pp. 46-
58. Abishe was never allowed to return and died in
captivity in Gojam.

36. R. A. Caulk, “Territorial Competion and the Battle of
Embabo, 1882.“ Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Xiii(1975),
p.67.

 

37. Interview: Jaleta Gulti, Jaleta Abba Nama, Graz. Negussa
Kanaie, Shambu, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, Sept.
and Oct. 1979.

38. Cecchi, II (1885), PP. 554-555: see also Triulzi, “The
Background to Ras Gobena's Expeditions to Western Wallaga
in 1886 - 1888: A Review of the evidence.“ Proceedings of
the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies
(Michigan State University, 2-5 May 1973), pp. 143-144.
edited by H. Marcus with John Hinnant; (hereafter,
Triulzi, Gobena's Expeditions,“).

 

 

 

39. Based on some travellers' accounts, R. A. Caulk placed the
intervention and increasing activity of Ras Adal below
the Abbay in the decade after 1872, which more or less
agrees with our oral sources. See Caulk, “Territorial
competion and the Battle of Embabo,“ pp. 67-68.

40. Ras Adal was crowned Negus Teklehaymanot as “King of
Gojjam and Kafa“ on January 20, 1881 by emperor Yohannes
IV. see Bairu Tafla, “Two of the Last Provincial Kings
of Ethiopia,“ Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. XI,

1 (1973), pp. 36-37. A. Cecchi, who attended
Teklehaymanot's coronation, states that the title, negus
was given him as a reward for his subjugation of Gudru
and Jima Rare. He also commented that Yohannes was pleased
to hear about the political conditions in the Gibe
kingdoms, which he intended to annex. see R. A. Caulk,
“Territorial Competion and the Battle of Embabo,“ p. 68.

41. Bairu Tafla, “Two of the Last Provincial Kings,“ p. 37.

42. The statement in Oromo was: “Amari hindufaan sobaa
dufnaan hinlolaan sobaa,“ Interview: Kenna. Abdissa
Mossa, Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Nekemte, in 1973. Moroda's
comment reflects the massive propaganda work that was
built around the strength of the Gojame troops at the
time.

43. Interview: Graz.Tamiru Gutta, Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga,
Nov. 1972. The Gojame depended on the north for

45.
‘6.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.
55.

152

firearms. Teklehaymanot obtained a considerable amount
of firearms from Yohannes IV as his loyal vassal and ally
since about 1874. See R. A. Caulk, “Firearms and
Princely Power,“ p. 622.

44. Interview: Taa Woyessa, Nekemte, in 1973: Emiru Gebre,
Nekemte, in 1979.

Triuzi, “Gobena's Expeditions,“ p. 144-146.

Informants from Lega Nekemte realized that Moroda's new

title, dejazmach, given by Ras Deresu was inferior to

his status as moti (king) and that it was a demotion.

But they claim that Moroda accepted the new title without
knowing that it seriously compromised his sovereignty.

Interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Digga,
in 1973.

 

Abebe Ambatchew, “Field Trip to Neqemte,“ Ethnological
Society Bulletin, 6(University College of Addis Abeba,
1957), p. 13.

Interview: Blatta Deressa Amante, Debrezeit, April 8,
1962. I am indebted to Baissa Lemu of AAU who allowed me
to read the manuscripts of this particular interview.

Bairu Tafla, “Two of the Last Provincial Kings,“ pp. 37-
38. ’

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Emiru Gebre, Nekemte,
Sept. 1979: see also Gebre sellassie, Tarik Zemen Ze
Dagmawi Menelik Negusse Negest Ze Ethiopia (Addis Abeba,

 

Berhanina Selam Matemia Bet, 1959 E. C. ), p. 101.

Bairu Tafla, “Two fo the Last Provincial Kings,“ pp. 37-
38, see also note 41 of this chapter.

Interview: Blatta Deressa Amante, Debrezeit, April 8,
1962. Gobena was given the title of ras by Menilik in
1879, and by this period he had already undertaken his
diplomatic activities with the Shewan Oromo chiefs,
inducing them to join him in raiding their neighbors who
refused to collaborate with him in favor of of Menilik.
see R. A. Caulk, “Territorial Competition and the Battle
of Embabo,“ pp. 70-71.

Interview: Olgira Aba, Graz, Tamiru Gutta, Digga, in 1973:
see also R.A. Caulk, “Territorial Competition and the
Battle of Embabo,“ p. 78.

Cerulli, “The Folk—Literature of the Galla,“ p. 74.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Graz. Tamiru Gutta,

56.

57.
58.

59.
60.

61.

62.
63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

153

Nekemte, in 1973.

Interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga,
Nov. 1973; Emiru Gebre, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, in
1979; Fitawrari Balla Molla, Gimbi, in 1973.

Interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga, Nov. 1972.

Interview: Bassazinew Aleme, Kabule Mudda, Woldegiorgis
Beke, Arjo, in 1979.

Interview: Graz. Woltaji Degago, Bodji, August 1979.

Interview: Graz. Tamiru Gutta, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa,
Nekemte, in 1973.

Terefe Wolde Tsadik, “The Unification of Ethiopia,“ pp.
76-77: see also H. Le Roux, Menelik 2E nous (Paris,
1902), p. 308.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Kenea Taa, June 1973.

In fact the great store of modern munition in Menilek's

possessions were obtained only after 1882, following his
success at the Battle: of Embabo. see R.A. Caulk,
“Territorial Competition and the Battle of Embabo,“ p.75.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Kenea Taa, Nekemte, in
1973: informants from Jima also report that there were no
clashes between the Gojame and the Shewan army at Guma.
Interview (by the History Department of AAU, in 1974,
deposited at Egg): Graz. Abba Bulgu Tigre, Guma, April
1974; Abba Digga Abba Jobir, Guma, April 1974; see also
R.A. Caulk, “Territorial Competition and the Battle of
Embabo,“ pp. 77-79; Bairu Tafla, “Two of the Last
Provincial kings,“ pp. 37-39.

Gebre Sellassie, Tarik Zemen pg Dagmawi Menelik, pp.
102 - 103.

 

Himbabo is a plain in Gudru which was occupied by Himbabo
Dede, one of the pioneers in Horo-Gudru as the uabi e

of his group. The traditions relate that the p1a1n was
named after him. Earlier researchers have used the name
“Embabo“ instead of its traditional name, Himbabo. The
exact reason of the change is not known, but it is likely
that it either originated from misprnounciation or was
delibarately altered by Menilek's Chronicler.

Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia From Autocracy pp Revolution, p.
4; see also Greenfield, Ethiopia A New Political,
History Appendix III, pp. 464 - 465.

 

 

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

 

154

R. A. Caulk, “Territorial Competition and the Battle of
Embabo,“ pp. 64-88; idem. “Firearms and Princely
Power,“ pp. 609-630; H. Marcus, The Life, and Times,
pp. 68-70; Bairu Tafla, “Two of the Last Provincial
Kings,“ pp. 35-42; Gebre Sellassie, Tarik Zemen fig
Dagmawi Menelik, pp. 100-115.

 

Menelik to president of France 20 July 1882, Ministere
des Affaires etrangeres, Paris, memoires et Documents,
Afrique/62, French translation fols. 567-569: cited by
R.A. Caulk, “Firearms and Princely Power,“ pp. 620 - 625.

The Gojame were particularly against gada ritual
ceremonies and traditional religious practices which
helped the Oromo to maintain their identity. Interview:
Graz. Negussa Kenaie, Baissa Gulti, Shambu, Oct. 1979.

Triulzi, “Gobena's Expeditions,“ p. 143: see also J.
Borelli, Ethipie Meridionale, Journal de mon voyage aux
pays Amhara, Oromo et Sidama, Septembre a —Novembre 1888
(Paris,1890), pp. 150- -l66; Henri Audon, “Voyage au Choa
(1884 - 1888)“ Le Tour du monde 58 (1889), p. 138: R. A.
Caulk, “Firearms and Princely Power,“ p. 620.

 

 

Interview: Olgira Aba, August 1973: Negari Jammo, Gimbi,
Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, in 1979.

Interview Graz. Woltaji Daggago, Bodji, August 1979.
Oromo

Geberen hinkoti gindin hinbakaasa

Ishen kaan hinsobdi Ligditii dabarsa

Abba etiibakassa.
English translation

The farmer farms and the plow tills

Leave it to Ligdi others are lyers (cowards)

The great challenger and brave.

Interview: Kenea Taa, Nekemte, August 1973.

Cerulli, “The Folk-Literature of the Galla,“ pp. 74-80.

Ibid.

Interview: Fitawrari Balla Molla, Gimbi, July 1973.

Interview: Kenea Taa, Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Graz. Tamiru
Gutta, in 1973: see also Cerulli, “The Folk-Literature of
the Galla,“ pp. 80-83.

79.

80.

81.

82.

155

Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, Graz. Woltaji Degago,
Bodji, Ques Jaleta wasse, Bodji, in 1979.

Interview: Negari Jammo, Gimbi, Buli Anke, Mendi, Ques
Mathewos Chibissa, Mendi, in 1979.

It is interesting to note that almost similar
arrangements were made between Menilek and Sultan Abba
Jifar II of Jima. Menilek offered Abba Jifar terms which
'secured complete local control and immunity from
Abyssinian interference in return for an annual tribute
and assistance in the war against Kaffa', Jima's enemy.
See Major C.W. Gwynn, “A Journey in Southern Abyssinia,“
Geographical Journal, XXXVIII, 2(1911), PP. 118. 133;

J. G. Vanderheym, Une Expedition avec lg Negous Menelik

(Paris, 1896), PP. 90 - 110: H. Marcus, “Motives, Methods
and Some Results of the Unification of Ethiopia During
the Reign of Menelik II,“ ggoceedings pf the Third
International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Addis

Ababa, 1969, pp. 275 - 276.——

 

 

 

 

 

Interview:- Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Graz. Tamiru Gutta, in
1973.

HAPTER V
THE POLITICS OF CENTRALIZATION AND

LOCAL AUTONOMY .

The close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century mark a great turning point in the history
of Ethiopia in general and that of the Macha states in
particular. The Ethiopian empire was strengthened and
consolidated under Menilek II. The political center of
gravity shifted from northern to south-central Ethiopia.
The shift and the subsequent increasing centralization also
changed the political landscape of the newly annexed
territories with dramatic consequences. The administrative
structures, the socio-cultural organizations and the
economies of the conquered regions were gradually relegated
to the needs and interests of the ruling class in the empire,
their foreign allies, and collaborators among the local
elites.

After Menilek's conquest, the Macha states were
incorporated into the Ethiopian empire. Indigenous
institutions were largely demolished or gradually
transformed. The indigenous leadership was either removed
or deprived from taking independent action on any crucial
matters, where it was maintained. Addis Abeba issued
significant socio-economic and political directives and
policy decisions affecting Macha society. The central
government under Menilek enforced uniformity in a land of

156

157
diversity. To enhance the process of consolidation and
centralization of the imperial power at Addis Abeba, general
guidelines of administrative duties and responsibilities

were given to the leaders of the conquered regions.

To survive indigenous leaders had to demonstrate
loyalty and obedience, and had to maintain a delicate balance
between their own and imperial interests. Among the duties
and responsibilities of the local leadership were: 1)
collection of taxes and payment of annual tribute; 2)
maintenance of peace, order and security; 3) proper
implementation of orders from Addis Abeba; 4) recruitment of
soldiers and laborers in support of the central government;
5) the encouragement of Christianity and the Amharic
language; 6) undertaking reforms in administration and public
works on the models provided from Addis Abeba - with little
or no financial backing from the central treasury; 7) and
loyalty to the emperor.1

There is an array of written sources on late 19th and
early 20th century Ethiopia. But they concentrate almost
invariably on Menilek's conquest, foreign policies, the
establishment of a centralized authority and "modernization."
Many appreciate and admire Menilek's undertakings for the
”creation of a large economic unit' in northeast Africa. P.
H. G. Powell-Cotton, a British visitor to Ethiopia in 1900,

wrote:

158
To . . . Addis Ababa came grains and spices,
peppers and condiments from every corner of
the kingdom, coffee from Harar and ...cotton
from the banks of the Blue Nile, gold from
Beni Shongul, and civet from the Galla country
while salt from far north of Tigre is the
current change for a dollar. . . In fact here
you can feel the commercial pulse of Abyssinia
. . . gather what she wants from the foreigner
and what she has to offer in exchange. 2
An American diplomat, Robert Skinner, who visited Addis
Abeba in 1902, reported: “Menelik has created the United
States of Abyssinia - a work for which he was endowed by
nature with the constructive intelligence of a Bismarck, and
the faculty for handling men by sheer amiability of a
3
McKinley." At about the same period, other European
travellers made similar remarks about the safety and security
of the caravans, traders and visitors in the country. Hugues
Le Roux, a French journalist, commented: "When onesets foot
in Abyssinia, one is in absolute safety . . . to one's life
and . . . belongings. It is a safety more secure than that
offered by well trained police . . . of Europe or America. I
was able to go to the other side of Wollega, to cross
Abyssinia from one end to the other, without once being
4
robbed.”
A serious paucity of written sources, however, becomes
obvious when one wants to deal with local socio-economic and
political conditions. The scarcity of documents is even

greater, more specifically, for the study of class

structures, adminstrative and power relations between the

159

provincial governors and the central government on the one

hand and the impacts of these structures and relations on the
public at large, on the other. Based on the sources at our
disposal, our major task in this chapter is to consider the
exercise of power by Addis Abeba in relation to the

duties and responsibilities of the local leadership; and
briefly discuss issues of centralization vis-g-yia local
autonomy with their consequences on the subject population.
In order to get a clearer grasp of the complex problems
involved we will concentrate on a case study from Welega. A
general background of the process of centralization is,
however, quite pertinent to provide a context for our

exposition.

As revealed in the last chapter, Gobena presented the
Oromo leaders with a diet consisting of both threat and
reward. He promised local autonomy for those who submitted
peacefully and agreed to pay annual tribute, and to punish
ruthlessly those who refused. As was the case with Jote and
Moroda, most of the Macha kings opted for Gobena'a promise of
local autonomy and submitted without resistance. Within a
period of one year:

Ras Gobena took over Jimma and received tribute
from Abba Jifar, the Sultan. He entered limmu,
from whose king, Abba Gomal, he received submiss-
ion and tribute. Camping at Limmu, Gobena sent
messengers demanding the submission of Abba Dula,
the king of Guma, Abba Rogo, the king of Goma, and
Gummiti Gane, Queen—regent for the young king Abba

Rosa, king of Gera, all. . . acknowledged him as
their lord and paid tribute. 6

160
Most Macha leaders believed that they would enjoy the
promised autonomy and saw their salvation in a peaceful
submission with no resistance. They retained personal
authority at the cost of their own sovereignty and
independence of their people. They realized too late,
however, that they had no meaningful authority under Menilek's
vigorious program of centralization. Whatever authority they
had was derived from the emperor administering his laws and
gathering his taxes. Eventually, many Macha leaders found
themselves as the deceived agents of the Addis Abeba
government.7
In fact the political plight of the Macha Oromo leaders

manifested itself as early as 1886, when Gobena fell out of
favor because he had acquired too much personal power. After
Gobena's remarkable victory at Embabo and spectacular
success in obtaining the submission of the Macha rulers,
Menilek entrusted him with the administration of the rich
Gibe kingdoms. HOping that his general would conquer the
powerful Kefa Kingdom, which was then independent, Menilek
also named Gobena the 'neggs of Kafa'. Nevertheless, Gobena's
promotion backfired and led to the eclipse of his political
career.

. . . this appointment resulted in a different

and menacing problem. The popularity of Gobena

and the high title he received aroused the envy

and perhaps the jealousy of officials surrounding

Menilek. The possibility that Gobena, backed by
various Galla chiefs, would defy Menilek's autho-

 

161
rity and set up a federated empire of Galla

territories seemed to many imminent. Indeed,

their suspicions could be substantiated by some
material evidence.9

Menilek not only withdrew Gobena's title of {nggns of
Kafa' but also removed him from the administration of the
Gibe states. He reallocated the Gibe region except Abba
Jifar's Jima, to three Menzian appointees: Goma and Gera
went to Dejazmach Beshah Aboye, Limu to Dejazmach Wolde
Georgis Aboye, both of them his cousins; and the kingdom of

11

Guma and Ilubabor to Dejazmach Tesema Nadew. This and
similar steps were the center piece of Menilek's
centralization policies, particularly in the newly annexed
territories - for it is always difficult for the oppresser to
trust the oppressed. As Harold Marcus has written:

Menilek's rule was consolidated through

changes in the southern political economy

and the creation of a new class of colon-

ial, feudal landlords whoseexistence and

prosperity were dependent upon imperial

supremacy and who therefore could be re-

lied upon to support imperial policies of

centralization. 11

Following its annexation to the Ethiopian Empire (ca.
1886), Welega was divided into three provinces. Leqa Nekemte
and its dependencies under the governorship of Dejazmach
Kumsa (1889 - 1923), son and successor of Moroda, Leqa Kelem

under Dejazmach Jote Tulu, Arjo and Horo-Gudru administered

by officials directly appointed by Menilek. The divisions

162

were made simply for the convenience of the central
government in Shewa and did not at all take into consideration
the socio-economic and political needs of the local people.
The central government's primary goal was the satisfaction
of its own institutional needs through alterations in the
fiscal and social structures of the conquered regions. The
use of Arjo as the capital of the representative of Shewa,
theoretically only the administrator of Arjo and Horo-Gudru,
is a clear illustration of this phenomenon. Located at the
southern edge of the whole region, Arjo was obviously ill-
suited as a center of administration for areas extending as
far northwest as Limu and northeast as Gudru. It was

completely inconvenient for the bulk of the population.

But Arjo conveniently connected to Leqa Nekemte had
positioned the Shewan's to weaken the strongest elements of
resistance put up by the Danno Bera family of Leqa Qumba; and
also helped them to check the movements and activities of the
nominally autonomous ruler of Leqa Nekemte. From time to
time, the Shewan troops marched from Arjo through Leqa
Nekemte territories ostensibly to maintain peace and order in
the districts of Horo-Gudru, while they collected all kinds

of intelligence regarding the Oromo governor's activities.

Finally, Arjo also served as an important station for
the supervision of the continued loyalty of Jote, the Leqa

Kelem ruler, who had a common frontier with Arjo at Nolle

163

 

 

 

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164
13

Kaba and Lalo Kile. There, strong Shewan garrisons
outflanked, in a Sense the force of leqa Nekemte, whose power
over the Sibu country was thus highly compromised. Local
traditions transmit the strong position of the governor of
Arjo vis-a-yis Kelem and Nekemte by giving him the title
of 'yebelay tebaki,‘ which literally means "superintendent."
Such administrative arrangements and an effective utilization
of spy networks were at the core of Menilek's policy and his
advisors particularly concerning the subjugated regions.15

The Ethiopian socio-economic formation, with its
conglomeration of peoples, was characterized by a variety of
modes of production, and the northern Ethiopian feudal
variant was doubtlessly dominant.161n Welega, as elsewhere in
the newly annexed territories the traditions of Ethiopian
feudalism were imposed with stronger centralized control
effecting basic changes in relation to the major means of
production. Each of the local administrative units in Welega
exercised considerable power internally as if they were self-
sufficient entities, and at the beginning both Leqa Nekemte
and Leqa Kelem were left alone to manage their local affairs
more or less as in the former days. Nonetheless, they were

fully obliged to accept orders and to follow and implement

instructions from Addis Abeba.

The Shewan governor stationed at Arjo was given sweeping

local powers which he exercised on behalf of the emperor. He

 

165

was accompanied by a large number of soldier-settlers
( ggjtegnnoch ), which be stationed in a various parts of the
districts. They were provided with all their needs by the
labor of the local peasants, based on Menilek's regulations
of 1892, which laid down the standard of what was to be
required of the conquered people.17 According to some
traditional accounts, Dejazmach Demissew Nesibu, who was the
governor at Arjo from 1897 to 1916,18 had as many as 30,000
followers. Our informants tell us that, locally, these
soldiers were known as the Goudagg. The exact reason for
this common name is not clear as yet; but some elders report
that the Shewan troops predominantly consisted of individuals
who either served the emperors at Gonder or were of figggagg
origin.19 They are still remembered as very unruly and
oppressive soldiers who despised the local people, whom they
considered as inferior beings. The creation of subservient
relationships between the peasants and the soldiers often
exposed the farmers to arbitrary demands for all sorts of
supplies. This form of oppression continued with the
unfolding of the twentieth century. It is reported that, in
comparison with conditions in the areas where the Gondazg
were stationed, life in Kelem and Nekemte was rather blissful
for the local peasants. Nevertheless, as the central state

apparatus strengthened its grip, they too had become victims
20

of the same system.

The governor of Arjo appointed his own officials without

 

 

166
any appreciable consultation or participation of the local
people. These officals received the characteristic Ethiopian
feudal titles in accordance with the size and importance of
the district they ruled.21 While Shewan administrators
occupied the higher echelons of power, some of the most loyal
members of the local Oromo elite were given subsidary titles

approproiate to the levels and types of services they

rendered in the feudal establishment. Thus, we are told that

the titles of mislene (wgrgda administrator), abggaz
(sub-wgrgda administrator), gggg (district 'chief”),

22
and ° a—sh (village-head) were used in this order to

denote the local administrative hierarchy under each Shewan
gggi or governor. In most cases, however, even these

relatively minor positions - with the exception of those of
the .gggg, and chiga-shum - were actually given to

members of the Shewan community. The hereditary rulers of
Leqa Kelem and Leqa Nekemte were instructed by Menilek's
government to adopt the same model and pattern of local

administration which we shall discuss a little later.

The impact and the exact nature of the Shewan feudal
order will have to be studied in greater detail. For our
purpose, however, the traditions transmitted by informants
from Arjo and Horo-Gudru clearly represent a fairly general
picture of the situation throughout the region. We were told
that the peasants had multiple obligations towards the Shewan

military colonists, which in Arjo and Horo-Gudru were

 

167
reportedly particularly severe and harsh. Each Oromo family
had to pay his overlord the equivalent of 5 - 10 thalers
annually, to be remitted to the central government. Our
informants were, however, skeptical and insisted that the

Shewan appointees kept most of the money for themselves.

Each peasant household also had to deliver an asrat,
that is, one-tenth of his harvests for storage in case of
emergency.23Furthermore, the peasants had to share one-fourth
of all their produce with Shewan ngftggggggh who lived
entirely on these proceeds. Besides the "legal“ dues
established by the Shewan state machinery, there were a

number of other occasional payments and obligatory labor

services imposed arbitrarily by individual neftegnna.

Our informants reported that the Shewan soldiers could
appropriate heads of cattle, sheep and goats or pack animals
belonging to the peasants. The realities of such actions are
clearly pointed out in the works of two Ethiopian writers:
Gebre Hiwet Bykedagn (1886-1919), and Afewerk Gebre Iyesus
(1868-1947). Gebre Hiwet published Ase Menilek'na_fithigpia
(Emperor Menilek and Ethiopia), a scathing criticism of
Menilek's laisggg -.§ai;§ policies. He preferred to
interpret the word 'soldier' as the Ethiopian 'peasant's
worst enemy.'24 Afewerq Gebre Iyesus in his Ityopya g2
Voyageur 33 Abyssinia, a biting satire, reported that the

Ethiopian feudal officials, “eat, drink, sleep and grow fat

 

168

as a sheep kept for the Easter feast at the expense of what
the poor have; the latter are unceasingly despoiled without
mercy.“ 25

Members of the peasant family were also expected to
render sundry labor services to the neftegnna. These
included looking after the mules and horses 26of the
naftegna, fetching water and fire wood for him, building
houses and fences, clearing paths and constructing wooden
bridges for his convenience, and running errands for him
wherever he so desired.27 While these stories of the
relationship between the neftegnnoch and the peasants are
related with considerable bitterness by our informants from
Arjo and Horo-Gudru, Leqa Nekemte traditions recount them
with much gratitude for their own relatively better fortune
under an indigenous leadership which protected them from the
most distasteful aspects of the Shewan hierarchy which it
otherwise tried to emulate.28

Even in Nekemte and Kelem, however, the Shewan presence
was being felt more and more as the years went by. This
growing Shewan intervention resulted in strained relations
and a constant tug of war, particularly between Leqa Kelem
and Addis Abeba. Leqa Kelem's local autonomy turned out to
be more apparent than real as early as Nov. 1908, when the

region was directly entrusted to Fitawrari Sahle Giorgis

(brother of Ras Tesema Nadew). In 1909, Jote was imprisoned

169
in Addis Abeba on the pretext of secret dealings with the
British Colonial government in the Sudan and misgovernment or
maladministration. Under the leadership of Mardassa, Jote's
son, many people reacted sharply and expressed their
discontent by taking up arms against the new governor and his
supporters. Although the rebellion was temporarily
suppressed, it was not completely quelled until Jote was
released and reinstated as a governor in 1912. These and
other related stories of Leqa Kelem have been discussed in
detail elsewherezgand need not be repeated here. The general
process in which the Shewan central court began to be more
directly involved in the internal affairs of Leqa Nekemte, the

reactions of the local leadership and the subsequent

developments are the major subjects of our discussion.

After an abortive attempt by the Shewan nobility to
impose an Amhara governor over Leqa Nekemte, Menilek
recognized Kumsa (Gebre Egziabher ca. 1889-1923) as Moroda's
successor with the title of dejazmagh. Kumsa was Menilek's
godson and had stayed at court for some time,30 where the two
established close personal relationship. During his
childhood, Kumsa had received a church education, which
taught him obedience, loyalty and piety - the cardinal
principles of the Ethiopian Orthodox church. As a general
rule all officials under Menilek were obliged to be

absolutely loyal and obedient to the emperor, and to

implement his policies to the best of their ability. Very

170
early on Kumsa knew that, for the security of his position,
he had to maintain a delicate balance between his own
interests and those of Addis Abeba. He demonstrated his
collaboration by building a number of Orthodox churches in
many districts, to spread Christianity to win the hearts and
minds of the people. Being instructed from Addis Abeba, he
created a new administrative system and reformed many of the
customary laws his father and grandfather had been content to
31

leave in force.

According to Leqa informants Kumsa was a remarkable
ruler, an able governor, who enjoyed great favor with emperor
Menilek. He won the emperor's full trust by paying more
tribute than expected, but at the expense of the peasants.
As a European diplomat once observed:

Dejazmach Gebre-egzabihier, commander of
many Galla lands . . . has come to bring

his annual tribute of 500 ounces of Gold.

He has added to it lots of grain and little
ivory. I had expected to see man brutalized
by slavery and attitudes of absolute command.
Instead, he is svelt young man, who speaks
perfect Amharic and who lives and acts like
an Ethiopian chief(s).32

Kumsa was also fortunate, because the governorship he
had inherited , from Nedjo up to the Dabus river, extended
over some of the most fertile and populous areas in Ethiopia,
rich in gold, cotton, grain and cattle. Nevertheless, it

must be pointed out that by the turn of the century Addis

Abeba's accelerated program of political centralization and

 

171

reallocation of resources have begun to affect Kumsa's region.
Menilek's gold concession in Nedjo to his Swiss advisor, Mr.
Alfred 119, to which the governor was made inspector of
production was an excellent example.33

Kumsa had initiated many new projects and his
governorship marks a watershed not only in the politico-
administrative history of Leqa Nekemte but also in religion.
He had had a church education and thought that his plans
could be made more effective, if people could educate their
children at least how to read and write. In order to please
the £233 and the clergy, the dejazmach built churches and
church schools all over Leqa Nekemte, which greatly
facilitated the expansion of Orthodox Christianity. He
recruited debteras and priests from Gojam, Gonder and
Shewa, in addition to those sent from the central church at
Addis Abeba.34 But most were immigrants who came in search of
fortune in the name of spreading Christianity. The Orthodox
priests largely concentrated on attacking the Oromo social
practices and traditions which they felt offended Christian
morality, rather than on doctrinal instructions. They and
the dejazmach strongly pushed for conversion. This was done
to enhance centralization and control, and above all for its
immediate economic benefit. The peasants paid the priests
one ample per child or person for baptism; and 15-20 kilos

35
of teff or one thaler to bury the dead.

 

172

Among the newly constructed churches, St. Mary's church
was built on the model of Menilek's church at Entoto. Kumsa
employed a certain Italian engineer named Giorgio to build
the church. The Italian was one of the captives at Adwa
whom Menilek sent to Nekemte at Kumsa's request for an
engineer. Even today St. Mary's church is one of the best
buildings in the town.36 Materials and labor for church
construction were provided by the balabats and the local
peasants. At first land was set aside either by the local
administrator, the balabats, or the governor for the
construction site. Usually a high place was chosen to build
a church to make it visible from a distance and for security.
At the churches converts attended services, the non-
Christians were baptized and the dead were buried. All the
people in the area where a church was built were responsible
to pay tithe directly to the priests appointed by the head of
the congregation, usually one tenth of their harvest
irrespective of their religion.37

Apparently the advent of Orthodox Christianity in Leqa
Nekemte did not face much resistance because: 1) it had an
enthusiastic support from the local governor, his appointees
and the new Oromo converts, with strong backing from the
abgg (head of the church) and the imperial court in Addis
Abeba; 2) the gag; system was already weakened by the rise
of mggi, and the office of the abba ‘hgkg and butta

ceremonies associated with it were declining; 3) the gain

173
institution, which rose as a reaction to the new socio-
economic and political circumstances, was not sufficiently
strong among the population to offer resistance;38 4)
increasing economic strains and hardships made more people
destitute, inhibiting society's culture from flourishing —
people did not have enough leisure to think of their religion
and tradition; 5) an inferiority complex arose amongest the
Oromo in which the attitudes of the elites and overlords
towards the Christian culture played a significant role.
Strictly speaking, though it failed to effect complete
integration for which it was designed by Addis Abeba, the
spread of Orthodox Christianity together with Amharic
language made a significant contribution towards the

centralization policy of the imperial government.

Perhaps the most important step taken by Dejazmach Kumsa
was the creation of a new administative machinery, according
to instructions he received from Addis Abeba. For all
practical purposes the provincial administrative structure
became an extension of the ‘ghigi (imperial court) in almost
every respect. Local appointments and dismissals remained
Kumsa's prerogatives. Many of those who received the title
of {itaurggi were Kumsa's close friends or those who
distinguished themselves by capturing finiftas (bandits) or
by their effective administration. The local .gbba ggggg and
other notables in each region were allowed to continue to

lead their people as long as they showed loyalty and

174

obedience. Higher responsibilities of administration,
including collection of taxes were, however, entrusted to
special appointees from among his relatives and other Leqa
people. Thus he appointed his uncles as governors:
Fitawrari Amante Bekere in Haru, Fitawrari Dibaba Bekere in
Bodji and Fitawrari Chibsa Bekere in Sibu Metoes. He also
appointed Fitawrari Makko Bosho as a governor in Gimbi and
Fitawrari Borcha Gurre as a chief judge in Nekemte among
others. It must be remembered that many of these appointees
had served as administrators and military commanders during
Moroda's period and had long years of experience.39

Kumsa modelled his provincial court on the emperor's
but governed with considerable autonomy from Addis Abeba
during the pre-Adwa-years. He was responsible for almost all
the internal affairs of his province, except for capital
punishment which was referred to Menilek. Kumsa had full
authority over the collection of customs duties and market
revenues in his domain until 19003. His major obligation to
the central government was to pay an annual tribute of 500
wagets of gold and 100 feresula of ivory?0

After Adwa, however, Menilek sent a number of
negadrasoch to Nekemte, to collect revenues at customs gates
and markets. Negadras Tana and negadras Sartsa Wold, with a
few escorts each, were assigned to Nekemte and Mendi

respectively. The negadrasoch were instructed to impose dues

175

on all traders who did not possess any stamped permit from
another negadras?l They were also directed to report to Addis
Abeba about important economic and political matters.
Accordingly Negadras Sartsa Wold informed Menilek that
Kumsa's government was rich enough to double his tribute in
gold to conpensate for a growing decline in the ivory
harvest. Menilek immediately ordered Kumsa to pay 1000
wagets of gold yearly?2

Other than adrasoch, Menilek sent resident agents
from time to time. For instance on June 6, 1909, he sent Ato
Mulatu and Ato Haylennaw, allegedly. to inspect Kumsa's
administration of justice. They were not paid by the
central government and Kumsa was ordered to provide for all
A their expenses?3 They were neither judges nor advisors, but

with all probability they were members of Menilek's Spy

network.

Addis Abeba's interference and involvement in the
internal affairs of Leqa Nekemte and other 'autonomus'
regions in western central Ethiopia was intensified right
after Adwa. The change is reflected in a letter which
Menilek sent to Kumsa on July 8, 1899, authorizing Negadras
Yigezu to be in charge of the customs duties in Leqa Nekemte,
in violation of his old promise to Moroda of non-
interference. In the letter, Menilek ordered Kumsa to assist

Yigezu to do his job of collecting market revenues and

176

customs duties at every gate in Nekemte efficiently. The

dejazmach was also instructed to provide food and lodging

for the negadras and his servants? Moreover, it is

interesting to note that Menilek, in another letter to Kumsa
(Megabit 15, 1896; March 1904), clearly warned the governor
not to negotiate any treaty or agreement with the British in
the Sudan, but to refer everything of political importance to
Addis Abeba. Explaining that love and friendship existed
between Ethiopia and Britain, Menilek told Kumsa that he
might correspond with them on minor matters such as trade, to
strengthen the relationship?5 From the point of view of Addis
Abeba, sending resident agents, customs collectors and strict
orders to Kumsa was to tighten the control of the central
government by gradually eroding local autonomy. It is also
important to note that the resident agents were supposed to
compile a complete evaluation report on the governor's
administration which could be utilized by the central

government either for approval or disapproval of the

indigenous leadership.

Apparently, Dejazmach Kumsa seems to have understood
Addis Abeba's message when he expressed his dissatisfaction
about the presence of resident agents and customs collectors
in his province. He not only saw it as a threat to his
economic benefits but also feared that he would be removed if
they created serious misunderstandings with the crown through

involvement in the internal matters of his country. In one

 

177

of his letters, he complained to Menilek that customs duties
of both internal trade and transit trade from other parts of
Ethiopia to the Sudan had become too high. He explained that
merchants had appealed to him several times because from
Billo to Nekemte, there were three different posts levying
duties. They were run by Negadras Yigezu, Negadras Tana and
Negadras Haile-Georgis, each of whom took five percent in
cash from foreign and local traders. Kumsa and the merchants
were very bitter and thought the proliferation of taxation
was unfair.46

Relations between Kumsa and Addis Abeba became
increasingly less cordial after Menilek had appointed his own
agents and tax collectors to Leqa Nekemte. Informants
indicate that Kumsa and Menilek's appointees were never on
good terms and the latter always criticized the governor in
their reports.47 Nevertheless, Kumsa proved his capability in
administration through his cooperative efforts, loyalty and
obedience, which impressed Menilek.48 When constructing a
road from Addis Abeba to Addis Alem in 1902, Menilek ordered
Kumsa to provide 4,200 workers including soldiers and
farmers.49 Kumsa recruited the men from all over Leqa
Lekemte, and reportedly the workers were supposed to have
toiled until the end of the project with no pay?0

The people of Leqa Nekemte also helped finance the

construction of the railway from Djibuti to Addis Abeba,

 

178
when, in 1908, Menilek wrote to Kumsa explaining the need to
complete the project. He ordered Kumsa to impose a special
tax in cash, and recommended that the landless should pay
cattle tax, while land owners should pay a property tax. It
must be underscored that this was in addition to the regular
taxes which were required of the peasant producers to support
the non-productive classes of the society. Even though
according to all indications the peasantry was already taxed
almost to the limits of its capacity, Kumsa accepted the
orders and the recommendations, taxed the people in cash and

sent the money to Addis Abeba.

The 1880s agreement between Moroda and Menilek not to
settle soldiers in Leqa was preserved into the early
twentieth century. But even this aspect of Leqa's autonomy
came to an abrupt end. On December 30, 1906, one thousand
three hundred figggagg and their families, under the command
of Balambaras Bekele, were sent by Menilek from Addis Abeba
to live in Nekemte. Most of these soldier-settlers were
veterans with long years of imperial service, and they were
fed and housed by Kumsa according to Menilek's orders.52 Our
informants very well remember that the Gonggre did not work
to earn a living since their needs were met by the governor.
Though they lived in Nekemte, they were not subject to
Kumsa's authority, but were placed under the jurisdiction of

Dejazmach Demissew of Arjo. Whenever a court case arose

between the ggnggge and the local Leqa people, the matter was

 

179

referred to Arjo for the protection of the soldiers. The
local people complained because of extra expenses of travel
to Arjo, where they were supposed to go to seek justice. The
practice was particularly problematic and inconvenient for
the Leqa farmers.53

Informants relate that the angarg, after being in Leqa
for some years, began to act like bandits, plundering the
local people, confiscating their sheep, goats, grain, honey,
cattle etc., especially on market days. Serious clashes
occurred between the two parties, but informants do not
clearly remember why the Qondare took such ferocious
actions. Kumsa was outraged and sent a strong message to
Addis Abeba, where Lij Iyasu, Menilek's grandson, had come to
power. He complained in particular about the behavior of
Balambaras Bekele, the leader and spokesperson for the
Qonfiare who presented their demands to Kumsa. The governor
held him responsible for all the unlawful acts of the
soldiers under his command, and in his letter Kumsa asked
Iyasu to move the andgrg out of his territory. He offered
to continue to supply them wherever they might then be
settled.54 Iyasu immediately instructed Ras Demissew of Arjo
to take the Gondare, and he accepted them as permanent
settlers.55 The shift of the angage camp from Nekemte to

Arjo was a great political relief to the Leqa governor.

It is important to point out that the resettlement of

 

180

the ggndare in Arjo avoided the administrative problems
associated with court cases and open clashes between them and
the Leqa peasants already described. But the physical
transfer of the nggare, however, did not solve the
economic problems of the peasantry. In fact it seems to have
increased their burdens. Essentially, this was made clear in
Kumsa's another letter to Iyasu in which he complained that
providing the Qondare in Arjo had cost him MT $ 10,000
year. In the same letter, Kumsa also brought to Iyasu's
attention that he paid MT $ 13,000, additional amount
according to the arbitrary orders of Ras-Betwoded Tesema, the

56
regent.

Kumsa had been so upset that he reportdly had prepared
for a rebellion against Tesema. He made Nedjo, west of
Nekemte his second capital and gave orders to his men to dig
a big trench , about four meters deep and six meters around
the town, today known as .ggta Nedjo (the trench of Nedjo).
Kumsa then collected arms and food supplies on top of Mount
Chochi, west of Nedjo, overlooking the confluence of the
Didessa and the Dabus rivers. According to this Leqa
tradition, however, war did not break out because Ras Tesema
died suddenly in 1911. Kumsa whose enemy had died and who
was apparently satisfied with Iyasu's rule and actions
returned to Nekemte and continued his close cooperation with

57
Addis Abeba.

181

Although Kumsa was clearly responding to the internal
and external socio-economic and political demands and
pressures of the turn of the century, our informants credit
him with the expansion of coffee plantation, trade and
education. They report that after the Bela Shangul
expedition in 1897-98, Ras Mekonnen and Kumsa came back to
Nekemte where Mekonnen and his troops spent some days?8
exchanging views on the general conditions of agriculture and
particularly the development of cash crops. Ras Mekonnen,
who had learned a great deal about the demands of coffee in
foreign markets through his earlier diplomatic missions to
Europe, asked Kumsa whether he has already begun the
cultivation of coffee or not. Kumsa answered that there was
not any pressing demand for growing coffee on a large scale,
since local needs were easily satisfied with wild coffee or

by limited cultivation.

The La: convinced Kumsa that if he would encourage the
spread of coffee cultivation throughout his region, the
peasants would be able to pay their taxes and he would earn a
lot of cash for his own use as well as meet the demands of
Addis Ababa. Mekonnen promised to send some coffee beans
from Harar with someone who could give special training to
the Leqa people in planting coffee. He kept his promise, it
is said, sending Balcha Wolde Tsadik with a sack of coffee.
Kumsa and his advisor chose plots of land in 80110. Tsege,

and Sankora in Sasiga Hgggda west of Nekemte as experimental

 

182
stations. These areas proved to be excellent for coffee, and

are still renowned for its production.

After finding out that the soil and climate were suitable
for coffee, Kumsa distributed coffee to the governors and
balabats and issued an auaj (edict) ordering the
peasants to plant coffee extensively. Based on the detailed
information he received from Ras Mekonnen and, later, from
Addis Abeba he predicted the relative rise of price in coffee
higher than any other crop and encouraged farmers to plant
it.59 Many people grew coffee following the governor's
advice, and around 1910 it became one of the dominant export
items, particularly through Gambela on the Baro river. 60
Nonetheless, coffee very rarely fetched as good a price for
the local producers as it did for the few foreign retailers

and wholesalers, even in the later days of relatively improved

transportation.

Kumsa seems to have appreciated the importance of
improvements in the conditions of roads, the security of
traders and in increasing trade activities. He built roads
and bridges and ,paid much attention to the safety of
caravans. Several important routes were constructed within
Leqa and others which led to Arjo, Kelem, Gambela, Gudru,
Jima Rare, and , through Asosa, to the Sudan. Through these
routes Leqa Nekemte was linked to Kefa, Shewa, Gojam, Gonder

and the Sudan. Adrien Zervos reported that Nekemte was a

 

183
place of considerable commercial significance, with about
seventy foreigners and more than a score of import-export
agencies in the 19203 and 19303. He also pointed out that
the businessmen were mostly Indians, but there were also a
number of Greeks, Libanese, Armenians, Italians, Americans
and Arabs?1 Most importantly in the early twentieth century
it was believed that the influx of foreign interprise and
capital would assist the government to carry out internal
reforms and improvements paving the way for the capitalist
road of development.62 It is important to note that such
beliefs and orientations were largely the results of
increasing political centralization and closer relations with

the west which, in turn, contributed to the further

consolidation of the imperial power.

Though on a less grand scale, Kumsa published an edict
ordering the people to keep roads in repair and instructed
the .hflléQEL§ and the app; ggggs to supervise their
maintenance. In 1907 he constructed a bridge over the Dabus
river;63for the Didessa bridge, Kumsa employed a Greek
engineer, Yani Mangos, in July 1920, for MT $43,000.64 An
additional MT $ 2,200 had been spent, Kumsa claimed when he
wrote to Zewditu in 1921, describing his new bridge as
seventy five meters long, fifteen meters high and four and
half meters wide.65 The Didessa bridge facilitated
communication between Gimbi and Nekemte, while the Dabus

bridge joined Asosa to Gimbi, providing easier access to and

 

184

 

 

                 

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185

from the Sudan for traders, travellers and government
missions. The construction of roads and bridges contributed
greatly to the strengthening of a centralized administrative
control.66

Kumsa was an Orthodox Christian, but he was tolerant of
other religions. He showed much interest in the secular
teaching given by foreign missionaries. When Menilek sent a
group of Swedish Evangelical Missionaries he accepted and
helped them to establish themselves in his territory. Soon
the missionaries became active in teaching, and converting
the people and were able to attract many followers. They
opened schools at Nedjo, Bodji and Nekemte?7 Kumsa is said to
have particularly welcomed Onesmos Nesib, the translator of
the Bible into Oromo. He had already heard about the
ranslation and was eager to have a copy.68 Kumsa's
willingness to allow theestablishment of the missionaries in
the long run helped the spread of education in Welega. The
missionaries also built churches and hospitals in the region,
including the Nekemte hospital which was for a long time run
and staffed by Swedish missionaries.69

From the preceding discussion and pieces of evidence, it
is not difficult to understand that Leqa Nekemte's local
autonomy was increasingly threatened particularly during the

post—Adwa period. By all accounts the survival of Leqa

Nekemte's autonomy was in the personality of Kumsa, the

186

strong traditions of the indigenous leadership, and the
friendly ties his father had established with Menilek.
Kumsa's administrative reforms and activities and his efforts
to maintain smooth relationship with Addis Abeba greatly
enhanced the process of centralization. Kumsa respected the
imperial orders and satisfied the financial and labor demands
by Addis Abeba without necessarily giving due consideration
to local needs. He was able to preserve his authority and
successfully avoided the direct ngftggnna settlement in
his territory in large numbers. Nevertheless, it should be
underscored that the maintenance of local political structure
was by no means a guarantee to shield the peasants against
exploitation which was embodied in the system. Most of the
peasants who were not yet part of the money economy, faced
financial difficulties. By the turn of the century
traditional socio-economic structures and functions which were
not organized along “modern lines" had encountered a real
challenge and a painful experience. Most significantly the
governor's close collaboration with Addis Abeba in accepting
and fully implementing a new land policy, reinforced feudal
domination and centralized control. It had an unparalleled
effect of transforming the socio-economic and political life

of the majority as we shall see next.

 

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

Haile Kiros Asmerom, Bureaucracy-lg Ethiopia, passim;
see also Paulos Daffa, Oromo: Beitrage zur politischen

Geschichte Athiopiens (Fort Lauderdale, 1984), pp. 67-79.

P.H.G. Powell-Cotton,.A_§porting Tr'p Through Abyssinia
(London, 1902), p. 108.

Robert P. Skinner, Abyssinia-g: Today (London, 1906),
p. 141.

Le Roux, ”New Trials,“ 894; see also Oscar T. Crosby,
"Personal Impressions of Menelik," The Century Magazine,
LXIII, 6 (April 1902), pp. 883-884; Landor, Across
Wildest Africa, pp. 125, 138; also cited by H. Marcus, in
”Motives, Methods and Some Results of the unification of
Ethiopia,“ pp. 269-280.

Menilek and his generals claimed to have used this method
according to the provisions of fetha nagast (law of
kings) which states 'when you reach . . . a land to fight
against its inhabitants, offer them terms of peace. If
they accept you . . . the men who are there shall give
you tribute, . . .if they refuse the terms of peace and
offer battle, go forward to assault and oppress them,
since the Lord your God will make you master of them'.
See fetha pagast, p.501; also quoted in Markakis,
Ethigpia, p. 104. The first text appeared in Geez in the
fifteenth century with adaptations from Egyptian Coptic
text. It has been translated into Amharic and English.
It contains various selections on property, canon,
family, criminal law and kings. ‘

Bairu Tafla, "Three portraits: Ato Asma Guyorgis, Ras
Gobena Daci and Sahafi Tezaz Gabra Sellassie," qggrnal g;
Ethiopian Studies, 5, 2 (1967), p. 147. Hereafter, ”Three
Portraits."

Even the celebrated autonomy of Jima Abba Jifar was more
apparent than real. The king served as a chief who dealt
with law and order among the subjects, raising taxes for
Menilek. He paid the largest single provincial tribute -
the wealth with which he bought an illusory autonomy.
For instance Cerulli reported that Abba Jifar paid MT S
87,000 as an annual tribute and MT $15,000 for the king's
army in 1928. He collected hut tax at the rate of MT $5
per hut. See Cerulli, Etiopia Occidentale, Chapter vi.

Bairu Tafla, "Three Portraits," p. 148. Gobena took an
Amharic name and became 'negus Michael of Kafa'.

187

10.

ll.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

188

M. Gruhl, The Citadel 2f Ethiopia, the Empire 9? a Divine
Emperor (London, 1932), p. 182; see also A. Triulzi,
'Gobana's Expeditions,” pp. 143-156.

In the mid-18803, some of the other appointees of Menilek
included: Fitawrari Haile Mariam Gulilat, his grand
nephew, to the Macha; Dejazmach Haile Mariam Wolde
Michael, cousin, to Toke and Botor (a region between Jima
and Macha); Ras Darge, uncle, to Arsi; Dejazmach Wolde
Ashagre, to Sodo and Gurage; Dejazmach Desta Darge,
cousin, to Chilalo; Dejazmach Wolde Gabriel Abba Saitan,
to the Itu, Dejazmach Mekonnen Wolde Michael (father of
the late Emperor Haile Sellassie). to Harar. Borelli,
Ethiopie Meridionale, pp.150-51; Atsme,.le Galla Tari ,
II, pp. 63-64; see also Getahun Dilebo, “Emperor menelik's
Ethiopia," pp. 82-85.

H. Marcus, The Life and Times gf Menilek II, p. 196.

In Ethiopia such arbitrary administrative divisions become
most common after 19008. Under the Ministry of Interior
Menilek's empire was crudely divided into three broad
regional groupings: a) Shewa at the center; b) the
northern region - Tigray, Gojam, Welo and Gonder; c) the
southern region - south of Shewa from Harar as far as the
Blue Nile including western territories, Jima and Kefa.
There were a total of 34 provinces to be effectively
coordinated and supervised. See Mahteme Sellassie Wolde
Maskal, Zikre Neger (Addis Abeba, 1950), pp. 100-120.

Nole Kaba and Lalo Kile are the two areas beyond the
Didessa river where the Shewan garrisons were stationed.
They were strategic areas.

Interview: Memhire Abebe G/Medhin, Memhire Yegezu W/Hana,
Aejo, Sept. 1979.

Charles W. McClellan, “State Transformation and Social
Reconstruction in Ethiopia, the Allure of the South"

Internetignel lggzpal.ef Afrigen agggies, 17, 4(1984),
p. 661.

For a series of debates, opinions and views on Ethiopian
feudalism or feudal mode of production in Ethiopia, see
Gene Ellis, ”The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to
understanding Ethiopia,“ 'Ige Journal.e§ Modern African
Studies, 14, 2 (1976). pp. 275-295; D. Crummey,
"Abyssinian Feudalism,” Past egg Present, 89 (1980). PP.
115-138; idem, “State and Society: Ninteenth century
Ethiopia,“ in Modes_gf production i3 Africa: the gee-
Colonial egg. edited by D. Crummey and C.C. Stewart
(California, 1981). PP. 227 - 249; Allan Hoben, "Family,

l7.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

189

Land and Class in Northwest EurOpe and northern Highland
Ethiopia," in Proceedings 9; hhe First United States
Conference 9h Ethiopian Studies, edited by H. Marcus (East
Lansing, Michigan, 1975), p. 157.

In 1892, Menilek and his advisors decided to provide for
the maintenance of the professional soldiers from public
storehouses in the provinces. Rights over payment in kind
and labor services were also entrusted to provincial
garrisons. See Gebre Sellassie, Chronigue g3 Regne ge
Menelik II, he} gee ggIs g; Ethiopie Vol. 1 (Paris, 1930 -
1931). pp. 285-286.

Informats relate that the following people were the
governors of Arjo and Horo-Gudru: Ras Luelseged (ca.
1884-1887); Fit. Tekle (ca. 1888-1896) Ras Demissew (ca.
1897-1916 - with an interruption of three years in which
Fit. Ibssa was appointed as a governor). Interview: Ato
W/Georgis Beke, Ato Kabule Muda, Arjo, Sept. 1979.

Interview: Bassazinew aleme, Kabule Mudda, Arjo, Sept.
1979.

Interview: Wolde Georgis Beke, Bassazinew Aleme, Arjo,
Sept. 1979. For a general discussion on army and society
in Ethiopia, see R.A. Caulk, ”Armies as Predators:
Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935,' The

Internetignel Qggrnallgf African Historical Studies, 11, 3
(1978). PP. 457-493.

The governor of Arjo and Horo-Gudru, appointed by the
central government, had in turn, the right and freedom of
appointing whom ever they favored from among the soldiers,
as woreda governors. Therefore, Dejazmach Demissew
appointed: Fit. Gebre in Mako Woreda, Fit. Hailemariam in
Nole Kaba, Fit. Eshete Bona in Horro, Fit. Afessa in Ghida
Ayana, Fit. Shibeshi Aydagne in Dapo Hanna, Dejazmach
Desta Eshete in Jima Geneti, Fit. Yilma Syoum in Gudru and
Fit. Tesfaye in Limu. Interview: W/Georgis Beke, Arjo,
Sept. 1979.

A.m¢elene governed a gggege, an abegaz governed half

of a woreda, an abba goro ruled over a number of
chiga-shum, who themselves represented people living in
two or more villages.

Informants report that there had been a net-work of
granaries established in various areas of the region where
grain crops were collected to be used in time of war or
famine. It is also said that such crops became highly
helpful during the Battle of Adwa in 1896. Interview:
Kabule Mudda, Arjo, Graz. Negussa Kanae, Shambo, Sept. &

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.
31.

32.

33.

34.
35.

190
Oct. 1979.
L. Fusella, trans., 'Menelek e l'Etiopia in un testo

amarico del Baykadan,” Annali dell' Instituto
Qniversitario Orientale g; Napoli, 4 (1952), p. 138.

 

Afewerq gebre Iyesus, Ityopia: Guide 93 voyageur eh
Abyssinie (Rome, 1908), p. 182, as quoted in Caulk,
“Armies as Predators,“ pp. 465-467.

Pack animals (horses and mules) of the neftegnna were
given to the peasants to be looked after and fed well. It
is reported that the fatness of each of the animals was
measured by a rope before they were given to the peasants.
Interview: Wolde Georgis Beke, Arjo, Baissa Birru, Shambo,
Sept. & Oct. 1979.

Interview: W. Georgis Beke, Kabule Mudda, Arjo, Jaleta
Gulti, Shambo, Sept. 8 Oct. 1979.

Interview: Kenna. Abdissa Mossa, Gebre-Sellassie Gutta,
Neqemte, Sept. 1979.

Bahru Zewde, “Dej. Jote Tulu," pp. 40-55; see also A.
Triulzi, “Social Protest and Rebellion in Some Gabbar
Songs from Qellam Wallagga.‘ in Wings at the Elm

Internepipnal Qppfegepee pp Ethiopian Studies, Rotterdam,
1980, edited by Joseph Tubiana, p. 178.

Markakis, pp. 104-105.

Bairu Tafla, “Four Ethiopian Biographies: Dejazmach
Garmame, Dejazmach Gabra-Egziabher Moroda, Dejazmach
Balcha and Kantiba Gabru Desta,” Jpngpel pf Ephippiep
Studies, 7, 2 (1969), p. 147.

Capucci to Salimbeni, Janu. 15, 1893, in Salimbeni to MAE,
Feb. 26, 1893.

F.O. 1/45 Gwynn's report to foreign Office, Cairo May 19,
1901, p. 5; Menilek to Kumsa, Pagumie 5, 1898 (Sept. 15,
1905); Amharic letters written to and from Dejazmach
Kumsa, letter book page, 29 (From the collection of
W/Atsede H/Mariam, grand daughter of Dejazmach Kumsa. I
am indebted to her for allowing me to read the letters and
take notes, hereafter Kumsa Ms.).

interview: Graz. Duguma Oncho, Digga, 1973.
Interview: Duguma Oncho, Digga, 1972, Kajela Dinka, Mendi,

1979; see also Negaso Gidada and D. Crummey, “The
introduction and Expansion of Orthodox Christianity in

36.
37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

52.

53.
S4.

191
Qelem Awraja, Western wallaga from about 1886 to 1941.”
Journal pf Ethiopian Studies, Vol. x, 1 (1972).
Interview: Tamiru Gutta, Nekemte, 1972.

Interview: Duguma Oncho, Digga, 1972, Kejela Dinka, Mendi,
1979.

Knutsson,‘Apphp;ipy end Qhange (1967); idem, "Social
structure of the Mecca Galla,‘ Ethnol , II, 4 (Oct.
1963), p. 507.

Tesema Taa, “Administration of Leqa Nekemte,“ pp. 26-27.
Interview: Gebre Sellassie Gutta, Nekemte, 1973.

Menilek to Kumsa, Miazia 7, 1900 E.C., Kumsa Ms.

Kumsa to Iyasu, Nekemte, Megabit 2, 1905 E.C. (March 9,
1913), Kumsa Ms.

Menilek to Kumsa, Ginbot 20, 1901 E.C. (June 6, 1909),
Kumsa Ms.

Menilek to kumsa, Hamle 3, 1891 E.C. (July 8, 1899), Kumsa
MS.

Kumsa to Menilek, Megabit 15, 1896 E.C. (March 23, 1904),
Kumsa Ms.

Kumsa to Menilek, Nekemte, Tahasas 2, 1898 E.C. (Dec. 11,
1905), Kumsa Ms.

Interview: Balla Molla, Gimbi, July 1973.
Interview: Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, June 1973.

Menilek to Kumsa, Addis Abeba, Tikmte 17, 1895 E.C. (Oct.
27, 1902), Kumsa Ms.

Interview: Mekonnen Kumsa, Nekemte, July 1973.

Menilek to Kumsa, Yekatit 28, 1900 E.C. (March 6, 1908),
Kumsa Ms.

Kumsa to Menilek, Nekemte, Tahasas 21, 1899 E.C. (Dec. 30,
1906), Kumsa Ms.

Interview: Olgira Aba, Digga, 1973.

Kumsa to Iyasu, Nekemte, Tir 6, 1905 E.C. (January 13,

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.
60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.
67.

192
1913), Kumsa Ms.

Interview: Moga Engida, Getema, July 1973.

Kumsa to Iyasu, Nekemte, Megabit 2, 1905 E.C. (March 9,
1913), Kumsa Ms.

interview: Tamiru Gutta, Digga, 1973.

The Bela Shangul expedition was undertaken against Shiek
Khojele of Asosa (Aqoldi) and other leaders in the region
who sought alliance with the British against Ethiopia.
Kumsa of Nekemte, Jote of Kelem and Ras Mekonnen of Harar
led a large army towards the Sudanese border and were
successful in obtaining Shiek Khojele's submission after a
nine-months' campaign. For a detailed discussion of the
expedition see Atieb Ahmed Dafalla, “Shiek Khojele Al-
Hassan.' pp- 42-50: A Triulzi. Salt. field and Lssitimasy
aggluds .LQ ths Hisfgry 2f 2.29-maals land. Bela Shangul
Wallagga, Ethiopia (ca. 1800-1898), Napoli, 1981.

Interview: Tamiru Gutta, Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte, 1973.

The importance of Gambela trade route in western Ethiopia
rapidly increased after the Anglo-Ethiopian frontier
treaty signed on May 15, 1902. See R. Pankhurst, the
Trade of Southern and Western Ethiopia and the Indian
Ocean Ports in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth

Centuries.“ Journal 9f Ethigniaa Studies. 3. 2(1965).
pp. 69-71. ‘

Adrien Zervos, L'empire d'Ethiopi : .Ie miroir fie

l'Ethippie mpgerne, ISQS-l935 (Alexandrie, Egypte: 1936),
pp. 397-399.

C. Rey, 19 the gpppppy pf phe Blue Nile, pp. 188-195.

Kumsa to Menilek, Nekemte, Miazia 1, 1899 E.C. (April 8,
1907), Kumsa Ms; See also F.O. 371/1294 (1912).

 

 

Contract paper Yani Mangos and Kumsa, Nekemte, Sene 6,
1913 E.C. (June 13, 1921) Kumsa Ms.

Kumsa to Zewditu, Nekemte, Sene 6, 1913 E.C. (June 13,
1921), Kumsa Ms.

Interview: Tamiru Gutta, Digga, 1973.
For a detailed study of missionary activities in Welega,

see Gustav Aren, EyepgeIieeI Pioneers I9 Ethigpia:_Q;igip§
9f ths Exaggelisal ChursD.Mekaas Xesus (Uppsala. 1978);

I

68.

69.

193

see also Terfasa Diga, "A Short Biography
ca. 1850-1931,' (B.A. thesis, A.A.U., May

Interview: Edosa Gemechis, Nekemte, 1973.

Interview: Tamiru Gutta Digga, Nov. 1972.

of Onesmos Nesibu
1973).

CHAPTER VI
IMPERIAL LAND POLICY: THE ROOT 0F SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS AND MASS POVERTY1

Before the recent revolution, Ethiopia had one of the
most complex and diverse land tenure and taxation systems in
the developing world. The forms were so varied and
complicated that John Cohen has noted "it is almost
impossible to impose any taxonomical order on them, unless
it is understood that the description is operating at only
the highest level of generality."2 Nevertheless, the general
tendency among researchers has been to divide the
Ethiopian land tenure systems into two: 1) "communal-
individual" holding in the north."3 which had institutions of
hereditary monarchical rule and Orthodox Christianity, with
Amhara-Tigray ethnic groups playing a dominant role
politically; and 2) private ownership in the south, where
northern landlords enjoyed freehold at the expense of tenants
from the Oromo and other ethnic groups. The justification
alleged for this dichotomy is that the north comprises the
historic heartland of Ethiopia, whereas the south came under
the control of the north only in the last decades of the
nineteenth century.

But as A. Hoben has successfully shown, a number of
problems result from such generalities.4 Without altogether

abandoning this broad division, this chapter will closely

examine the apportionment, appropriation, commoditization and

194

195

reallocation of land in relation to the increasing response
of Addis Abeba to the demands of the capitalist world
economy. It will investigate the economic transformation
from traditional agriculture to sharecropping focusing on the
varied and complex land tenure and taxation systems evolved

by the turn of the century:

Some scholars - in particular A. Hoben, S. F. Nadel, and
Berhanu Abebe - have dealt with the issues of land tenure,
taxation, and administration in Gojam, Eritrea, and Shewa,
respectively. Their studies, however, either focus on the
complex land tenure and taxation system in the northern
regions of Ethiopia (which is different from the area under
study) or analyze the genesis and perpetuation of an
effective centralized government rule which administered the
land and the people in the conquered regions. Studies of the
latter type usually ignore such signifficant and crucial
historical issues as land ownership, taxation, local
administration, and consequent developments in the production
and distribution of wealth which not only have a direct
effect on power and authority but also determine the standard

of living.

Instutionalization of a new land tenure system was one
of the main features of Menilek's reigm. In the newly
annexed territories of western central Ethiopia, he

5
introduced what is known as the guelad or gasha system

196

by issuing hpgjg (edicts). The land proclamation of 1909-

1910 required the measurement of all land and its
redistribution on the basis of military, political and
religious services to the central government.6 The procedure
affected Welega seriously since the guabiye rights of the

indigenous people were wiped out, rendering them legally
landless. Land was central. to their life. “From the land
comes sustenance, status and often political power,".7 one
observer has noted. Among the agricultural societies of
highland Ethiopia, to have rights over land is to be human.
"To be landless is to be subhuman."8 The confiscation forced

most people in welega into tenancy, reducing their standard

of living.

The land measurement proclamation not only underscored
but also manifested the slow but steady transformation of
Ethiopian society during the last part of the nineteenth and
the first decade of the twentieth century. During this
period the whole continent of Africa began to be fully
integrated into the world economic system of capitalism.10
After the defeat of the Italians at Adwa (1896), Menilek's
empire came into closer and more meaningful contact with

major European powers than it had earlier. The Europeans

acknowledged Ethiopia's 'sovereignty' and negotiated various

modi vivendi which enabled the emperor not yonly to speed

up, but also complete the empire's expansion and

centralization. “Diplomatic missions were established by

I97

Italy, France, Britain and Russia in Addis Abeba. As a
result, foreign ideas and knowhow began to influence the
emperor's internal policies, quite visibly in the
introduction of . . . the first school and the first railway
line."11 Therefore, subsequent attempts at some degree of
"modernization" required more intensive exploitation of
Ethiopia's resources; Addis Abeba sought effective control of

the newly conquered and exceptionally fertile and populous

regions, rich in gold, ivory, and slaves.

The economic strain caused by Ethiopia's rather heavy
investment in firearms and the increasing internal and
external political .pressures necessitated new sources of
revenue. Since land was certainly Ethiopia's most plentiful
commodity, its measurement and taxation were paramount to the
central government. The traditions transmitted to us
indicated that Menilek's need for money was accurately
perceived by the people. Our informants reported that the
emperor issued the land measurement proclamation in order to
earn cash for the purchase of firearms and ammunition, not
only to strengthen internal and external security but also to
support a growing central and local administrative machinery
run by a large number of permanent civil, military, and
religious functionaries.12

Prior to the proclamation of 1909 - 1910, there were
three concrete claims on the products of land in Arjo, Horo-

Gudru, and Leqa Nekemte and its dependencies. First, the

I98

Oromo peasantry had guabiye rights on extensive stretches

of still unmeasured land which they cultivated and on which
they raised large herds of cattle, sheep, and goats. The
guabiye system in which a large majority had more or less
enjoyed an unrestricted access to land, reflected the
predominance of group right over individual prerogative.
Land was transmitted through generations and was recognized
as the collective property of the society at large. Second,
Shewan administrators in Arjo and Horo-Gudru had been granted
the full services of the local Oromo families. Third, the
official policy of converting the Oromo to Orthodox
Christianity required land for the support of the clergy who
were to staff the new churches established throughout
Welega 13discussed in the last chapter.

It is clear that the land measurement proclamation set
out to identify and put legal limits on the separate claims
of the local peasantry, the prdominantly alien feudal
hierarchy, and the incipient organization of the Orthodox
Church in Welega. Local elders still remember distinctly
that they were told “the land will be measured and §I§§p or
a third portion, shall be given to you.'14 Menilek's
interpretation of giggp, a concept allegedly going as far
back as Menilek 1,15 seems to have minimized local resistance
to the proclamation. It apparently misled the local people
into believing the land would be separated into three equal
portions only, and that they would be left the hIssp, that

16
is, one-third of the land they had occupied. The government

199

used the term simply to indicate that together with the
church and the feudal hierarchy which had been superimposed
on them, the local people consituted one of the three
elements with claims on land. It seems clear that the
government did not intend to apportion three equal shares,

but instead confiscate vast tracts, declare them yemengist

 

meret (state or crown land), and offer them for sale to

anyone with ready cash.

Menilek intended to add to his reservoir of flexible
resources to be doled out as gifts to the nefteghnoch
(soldiers), settlers, civil servants, and aristocrates as
maderia or gult;7 and to churches as 'semonsfs Equally
important for the emperor was the ability to generate revenue
from the sale of "superfluous" land. When local inhabitants
realized that the fourth factor was also involved they became
very bitter. They felt deceived by a government which they
believed had promised them a §I§§p or a third portion but
had actually left them only the Ihhh, or one-fourth of
their ancestral land, confiscating the remaining three-
fourths.19 The process undoubtedly created a deep-rooted
suspicion of state authorities, for various contradictory

traditions have been transmitted, making the task of analysis

and interpretation very difficult indeed.

The standard land measure used was a rope (usually made

of leather) 67 meters long. A rectangle 8 ropes-wide and 11

200

ropes-long constituted a guelad, or ghghh, appro-
ximately equivalent to 395,032 square meters.20 The local
people were asked to identify the land on which they claimed
guabiye, rights, and the area was then measured into units
of ghghh or guelad. A certain number of ghghg depend-
ing on the settlement patterns of the people, was declared to
constitute the quabiye land on which the local Oromo could
continue to exercise their ancient communal rights. The
amount was rather arbitararily delimited on the basis of what
the offical on the spot felt would satisfy the immidiate
needs of the local people. Some gashas or portions of

21 '

gasha were then demarcated. and distributed as special

tenures called maderia and riste-gult (a slight modifi-

 

cation of the old ghIp system) among the Shewan officials and
soldiers settled in the area, the amounts depending on rank
and position in the feudal hierarchy?2 Rights to maderia

land were ususally given temporarily, only for as long as
individuals served in a special official capacity. Riste-
EElE rights were granted to the emperor's favorites for life
and were made hereditary. In return, the settlers performed
judicial, military, and administrative functions. Some land
was set aside for church use regardless of whether there were
churches in the locality.23 Finally, the extent of the
“superfluous" land was ascertained; it was measured in ghhhh,

carefully demarcated, and declared state land, also called

gizh meret, or land for sale. The government encouraged

 

 

201

migrations from the north and the settlers were sold land at

nominal prices, or simply allowed to occupy it.

For the government, it was irrelevant whether state land
was already occupied. In fact, it would be more valuable if
it was settled, since the presence of a potential labor force
of most of the former owners was the important element in the
value of the land. It is interesting to note that the
appropriation of the unpaid surplus took different forms.
Although there was a relative increase of money-rent in the
last few years of Menilek's reign, surplus appropriation
maintained a basically precapitalist mode. Ground rent not
only took the form of toiling on the lord's land but alsov
entailed laboring on the hpth (government farm land), the
produce of which was sent to the palace granary. Another
form of surplus appropriation was stationing soldiers and
assigning mislene (government agents) to supervise the
fulfillment of labor obligations as well as to take other
punitive measures.24

It was labor, not land peg £2: which supported the
hierarchy of governors, priests, and soldiers who lived off
the surplus provided by the peasants. A ghehh of land
was considered fertile if it was settled and comfortably
supported a member of peasant families. Such a geehe was the
most expensive to buy and cost between 40 and 50 Maria Teresa

thalers. A sparsely settled gasha was classified lem-tef,

202

or semifertile, and cost only 25 thalers. Finally, a completely
unoccupied EEEEE was declared peg, or nonfertile, and
cost only 10 thalers. That this classification was based on
settlement and not on the intrinsic fertility of the land was
often mentioned by our informants. They related that the
unoccupied lands were very often the richest in natural
resources and that some of the most valuable natural
porducts-such as honey, ivory, civet musk, and gold were
generally obtained from them. Later, coffee also thrived in
these so-called nonfertile areas.26

The living conditions of most Oromo and other peasants
were negatively affected by the land alienation and
fragmentation caused by the land measurement proclamation.
Absentee ownership became dominant, and a major source of
social conflict evolved?7 The negative effects began with the
notion of the sovereign's right to grant large estates while
the majority of the indigenous inhabitants were left with the
option of sharing the hngp. This sharing itself had the
inherent weakness of encouraging further fragmentation from
generation to generation. The officials sent out to measure
the land were clearly unsympathetic toward the peasants.
They employed fraud, intimidation and force to deprive the
peasants of their ill-defined rights and often located the
so-called §I§§p for communal use in areas unfit for
agriculture.28 Sometimes they even cheated on the size of the

rope used for measurement, and our informants reported that

in some areas the survey was made three or four times.

203

Officials purposely made unequal measurements which resulted
in the creation of large and small gashas, favoring some to
the detriment of others. Those who were affected, therefore,
continuously appealed to the governors for a remeasurement of
their land. Such appeals, we are told, we;: more frequent in

Arjo and Horo-Gudru than in Leqa Nekemte, probably because

governors in the former areas were outsiders.

Moreover, the terminology and the legal procedures were
alien to the language and culture of the local people. The
courts used Amharic. Anyone with a case to appeal had to ask
an Amharic speaker to put his application in written form.
After filing his case, he had to have someone who knew
Amharic interpret his arguments before the judges. Amharic
was used even if the judges knew Oromo, the language of the
indigenous inhabitants.30 Naturally, this created conflicts.
On more than one occasion, Some of the most courageous and
resourceful peasants traveled all the way to Menilek's court
in Addis Abeba to appeal their cases.31 Nevertheless, the
results were generally unfavorable. As H. Marcus has pointed
out, ”in judicial proceedings between northerners, and
southerners, his [Menilek's] judgment was qualified by
political and administrative needs. He invaggably favored

naftanna in their disputes with gabbars,‘ that is he

favored the gun bearers over the rent payers or serfs.

The peasants who lived on maderia meret had no claims

 

204

on the land. They worked the land only on the surfferance of
the owner, who could impose difficult conditions or even
evict them. The same was true of the peasants who had long

settled and lived upon lands now classified as gizh meret,

 

or land for sale. They automatically lost all title and all
right to tenure of the ancestral land they tilled. They had
the option of buying it from the state, which the majority
33
simply could not afford, or of living as tenants. Leqa
Nekemte traditions indicate that, contrary to what happened
in Arjo and Horo-Gudru, Dejazmach Kumsa gave his own people a
grace period of about ten years during which they could
34

complete payments for their land. This suggests that if the
lordland peasant were both Oromo, although the relationship
was clearly one of inequality, the regime was not so harsh as
it was in areas controlled by Amhara-Tigray lords. This view
is strongly supported by M. Stahl:

The peasants of Jimma and Wollega were

also reduced to gabar status. They

escaped, though, an invasion of Shewan

soldiers. It is reasonable to believe

that the exploitation of the peasantry

in Wollega [Kelem and Nekemte] and Jimma

[Abba Jifar's domain] never approached

the brutality experienced elsewhere. This

was in all probability due to the ethnic,

cultural and sometimes genealogical

affinity between landlords and peasants.35

Even in Leqa Nekemte, however, it was mainly Kumsa's

Oromo officials and relatives who could in the end afford to

buy tracts of land. The actual Oromo beneficiaries were

therefore, the hereditary ruling aristocracy, a few notables

205

and their clients while an overwhelming majority lost. In
Arjo and Horo-Gudru, land could be bought but was mostly
purchased by non-Oromo, mainly from Shewa and other northern

provinces.

The other important objective of the land measurement
proclamation was to systematize and regularize taxation in
the country and to ensure that taxes were paid by all people?6
The principal burden of taxation, however, almost always fell

on the peasantry. Large landowners were either undertaxed or

exempted.

With the exception of samon meret, or church holdings,

 

taxes were levied on all types of land in Welega, bringing to
an end the earlier tax rates which were reportedly "softer"
than the new ones. Even the peasantry, which continued to
scrape a communal existence from the so-called §I§§p land,
was not spared. For the purpose of taxation, the §I§§p land
was registered in the name of the senior member of the local
lineage who collected contributions from his fellow peasants
and paid the annual dues on their communal land. Those who

were given maderia meret as well as the individuals who

 

bought gizh meret were also liable to pay the annual tax to
the state. Nonetheless, we are told that holders of maderia
meret usually refused to pay tax, and the government did not

37
force the issue.

206

Our informants are unanimous about the rate of taxation
imposed on the various categories of land. On every gasha of
I23, fertile land, a tax of 15 thalers was paid annually; on
lem-tef, or semifertile land,3;0 thalers; and on tef, or non-

fertile land, only 7 thalers. For the majority of the Oromo

peasantry, those living on the Sisso-quabiye land, this rate

 

proved heavy. Peasants unable to pay were forced to abandon
their claims. In such cases the land was readily taken over
by local administrators or their relatives who were prepared
to pay the tax arrears, an act which automatically registered
the land under their names. Farmers who could afford to pay
their taxes faced the difficulty of obtaining cash. The
situation forced them to sell their cattle or grain at very
low prices and also stimulated the production of cash crops
to meet the government's demands. It is said that many
peasants went to officials and declared their inability to
pay the annual tax, preferring to become landless just to
avoid the pressure of paying taxes from year to year.39

The imperial land policy in general and the land
measurement proclamation of 1909-1910 in particular caused a
basic transformation in the socio-economic and political
relations of the people of Welega. The law added to the
dissatisfaction and discontent generated by the Shewan
conquests and subsequent domination.40 The greatest
beneficiary was the centeral government, which confiscated

and sold vast tracts classified as ”surplus.” Increasing

concentration of ownership in the hands of a few began in

207

earnest; it was to become the greatest single socio-political
and economic problem in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia. At the
same time, Menilek ensured that the Oromo and other people
throughout Welega paid for the maintenance of the colonial
machinery which he had imposed upon them. The other sector
of the society which benefited was the local feudal hierarchy
emerging in the so-called “autonomous” areas such as Leqa
Nekemte. Moroda and Kumsa were very good students of
Menilek, whose political model they followed in restructuring
their own society. Their relatives, local friends, and
servants came to constitute an increasingly heavy burden on
the peasantry. They extracted for themselves great portions
of land, and they took control over water sources and every
41

facet of production. In essence, land in Welega, as in other
parts of Ethiopia, was a political commodity, the
distribution and granting of which greatly enhanced imperial
control. In the words of R. Pankhurst:

The most unifying factor in land tenure was

the granting of land by the sovereign on the

basis of service [or royal blood ties]. Such

grants had their roots in economic and social

conditions and were essential to the whole

system of government. The existence of a large

and highly developed social hierarchy necessi-

tated an extensive system of tribute and tax-

ation and rent.... The granting of land was

[one of the ways] in which rulers could re-

munerate or reward their followers, churches

and persons in need. 42

Menilek died in 1913, but his system of land tenure and

taxation survived well into the 19708, although modified by

208
the introduction of a written constitution and other decrees,
proclamations, and institutions during the time of Emperor
Haile Sellassie (1930-1974). The new emperor increased
taxation and thereby raised the price of land. Many more
Oromo and others were forced off the land or became tenants.
Land grants and the registration of land as private property
and a commercial commodity continued unabated. In fact, the
various tax forms introduced by Haile Sellasssie meant "that
most of the taxes were paid by the peasantry, and the
landlord merely passed on part of them to the tax
43

collectors." The land grant orders (taxation and
registrations) became major surces of nepotism, bribery and
corruption. This situation led to a process of polarization
in rural agricultural communities in Welega and elsewhere.
The number of landless people grew, relatively slowly but the
cummulative figure was significant, while the rich, who
gained the monoply over vast estates, decreased as a
percentage of the population and increased in authority. As
Stahl explains:

While the great majority of the people remained

small scale-farmers [and landless tenants] a

minority managed to accumulate land through

political manipulation and/or through purchase.

The emerging landlords did not engage in agri-

cultural production themselves but collected

rent from the peasants living on their land.

The rate of exploitation can be indicated from

the obligations imposed on tenants; they usually

paid 1/3 or 1/2 (at times 3/4) of their harvest

to the landlord, but in the case of coffee [cash

crop] . . . the tenants shared [it] equally with

the landlord. . . Tenants had to work for their

landlord on different occasions and give him
food (beer, eggs, grain) on important holidays.45

209

Our informants indicated that the peasants tried to
resist systematic expropriation of their land. They often
expressed discontent either through peaceful appeals or by
resorting to uprisings, which were mostly isolated and
spontaneous. They were unsuccessful because of the tight
control of the administration and the repressive measures
imposed by the government's soldiers, who forced the peasants
to obey the laws and respect the highly venerated authority
of the emperor.46

In 1930 Haile Sellassie indicated his intention to
reform the land tenure system as part of his "modernization"
schemes. 47Articles 6 through 17 of the 1931 constitution
vested in the emperor the power and prerogative to undertake
any reform measures.48While he was preparing to implement the
reform, the Italo-Ethiopian war (1936-1941) broke out, and
his plans were thwarted. Whether the land reform envisioned

by Haile Sellassie prior to the war could have satisfied the

peasants cannot be determined.

During the occupation, the Italians followed their own
land policy. They claimed to have found no definite
instrument establishing clearly the former land tenure
system. The Italian government consequently set up a ”Royal
Commission” to deal with all problems pertaining to the

ownership of land. The commission was instituted "to

210

ascertain the actual de-facto and de-jure position of all
landed property, to settle controversial points.'49A detailed
survey was started but never completed owing to continued
resistance to Italian rule almost everywhere in the countrg?
Although the colonial land policy ended with their expulsion
in 1941, it nonetheless allowed many gabbars to escape, at
least temporarily, the most oppressive aspects of serfdom
by undermining feudal obligations.51

The imperial land grant orders issued by Haile Sellassie
from 1942 through 1967 were special instruments for
transferring vast tracts of land from peasants and pastoral
communities to private hands.52 According to a study of the
land tenure system before the Ethiopian Revolution, 59
percent of the population had been reduced to tenancy in
Welega and were required ”by law to hand over up to three-
fourth of their produce to landlords who often were
absentee."53 The antagonism between the landless masses and

the few landed aristocrats grew ever sharper, and the corrupt

administration of the ancien regime made the contradictions

 

more acute by worsening the general conditions of the
peasantry. A major cause of mass poverty, the archaic
landholding system subjected the masses to disease, hunger,
exploitation, and ignorance and blocked the country's
development in conjunction with the international economic
order. Conditions were ripe for the revolution which erupted

in 1974.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. This chapter is largely based on the article which
appeard as "The Basis for political Contradictions in
Wollega: The Land Apportionment Act of 1910 and its
consequences,” in Northeast African Studies, Vol.6, 1-2
(1984). PP. 179- 197.

 

2. J. M. Cohen, "Peasants and Feudalism in Africa: The Case
of Ethiopia,“ Canadian Journal of African Studies 7, l
(1974); PP. 155- 57.

 

 

3. The term is used by Mesfin Wolde Mariam in reference to
the northern Ethiopian highlands of Eritrea, Tigray,
Gonder, Gojam, northern Welo (Wadla-Delanta, Lasta, Wag),
and northern Shewa (Minjar, Bulga-Tegulet, Menz, Yifat,
and Merhabete). He also applies the term to areas
wherever the land is owned by local peasants in the
southern parts of the country. The term indicates that
ownership is communal but usage is individual. See
Mesfin Wolde Mariam, An Introductory Geography 9;
Ethiopia (Addis Abeba: 1972), p. 85.

 

4. A. Hoben, ”Social Anthropology and Development Planning
in Ethiopia,“ Journal 9; Modern African Studies 10, 4
(1972). pp. 564-67.

5. Gasha is an Amharic word meaning "the land in which we
settle after we expel Galla from it by our might,
strength, and wisdom.“ Galla is the name given to the
Oromo by others. See Atsme Giorgis, The history of the
Galla, 2 Vols., unpublished manuscript, Addis Ababa,
n.d., p. 5. According to other sources asha means
land cultivated in return for military seerce. The term
is most common in the conquered regions of Shewa, Welo,
Hararge, Kefa, Welega, Gamo Goffa, Bale, Sidamo,
Ilubabor, and Arsi. The size of the gasha is
determined by population density (productive labor) and
quality of the soil. For a detailed analysis of the term

asha, see J. Mantel- -Niecko, The Role of Land Tenure

in the System of Ethiopian Imperial Government in Modern
Times (Warszawa: 1980), pp. 81- 82. guelad was a cord
made of fiber or leather. Later the term applied to the
piece of land measured by the cord.

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. Land measurement is said to have begun in shewa by Yekuno

21]

10.

ll.

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.

212'

Amlak in the 12705. It was also undertaken in Gonder

by

Emperor Adiam-Seged (1682-1706), one of the Gondarine

kings. It was known as the quelad system. When dispute
arose between owners of land in the adjacent areas,
share of each was measured by the quelad to settle the

dispute. See Gebre-Wold Ingida WOrq, 'EthIopia'

Traditional System of Land Tenure and Taxation,“
Ethiopian Observer, 5 (1961). PP. 302-303. According

to R. Pankhurst, however, measurement was not initiated
elsewhere until the time of Menilek II, which began in
Shewa in 1879-1880. See R. Pankhurst, State and Land in

 

Ethiopian Histogy (Addis Abeba: Oxford University Pres§7

1966)! pp. 120-210

H. C. Dunning, “Land Reform in Ethiopia: A Case Study in
None-development,” U. C. L. A. Law Review 18, 2 (1970),
p. 271, citing Mesfin Wolde Mariam, ”Some Aspects of Land
Ownership in Ethiopia” (1965, unpublished).

Ibid.

Interviews: Grazmach Deressa Galla, Nekemte, and Ques
Daffa jammo, Aira, August and September 1979.

Samir Amin, 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black
Africa: Historical Origin,” Journal of Peace Research 2
(1972), p. 106.

 

 

 

Haile Kiros Asmerom, Bureaucracy Ih Ethiopia, p. 68.
Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, August 1979.

Menilek to Kumsa, 13 January 1904 (5 Tikimt 1896 E.C.),
Kumsa MS.

Interview: Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte, Kitila Challa,
Nedjo, and Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, August and September
1979.

It is said that Menilek I separated the land into three
equal parts for the church, the crown, and the people.
See Demissie Gebre Michael, “A Proposal to contribute to
Economic Development in Ethiopia,” (M.A. Thesis, The Ohio
State University, 1964), p. 32.

Sisso is an Amharic word literally meaning one-third.

Informants report they were promised a sisso by the
government according to the land proclamation of 1909-
1910, but when land was measured they were given only
one- -fourth of their guabiye land. They were confused by
the action of the government. The sisso did not
represent what it actually meant (one-third) but rather
remained a misnomer. Hence, the concept of sisso in

the

213

relation to the land proclamation of 1909-1910 will have
to await further investigation and more definitive
interpretation.

1?. Maderia was land temporarily granted to prison guards,
veterans, soldiers, and so forth, for their services.
Gult was a fief-like imperial grant. It refers to the
land from which the grantee was fully entitled to collect
taxes and tributes. Gult rights were usually given
either to members of the aristocracy who offered services
to the crown or to religious institutions. People who
had gult could be taken away as easily as it was given.

18. Samon is land granted to the church. It is a type of
tenure in which the primary interest in the land (”le
droit eminent") is vested in the state, and the church
only has the right to collect land taxes.

19. Interview: Graz. Deressa Galla, Nekemte, July 1979. The
indigenous people were allowed to have one-fourth of the
land on condition that they supplied labor for the
settlers and paid various taxes, dues, and thithes for
the imperial court and the church.

20. In Leqa Nekemte, Fitawrari Dinsa Shone's “arm” was used
as a standard to measure the rope. He is said to have
been one of the tallest persons in the area. The rope
was 134 "arms" long or approximately 67 meters.
Interview: Taa Negari, Nekemte, June 1979. See Mahtema
Sellassie Wolde Mesquel, "Land Systems in Ethiopia,"
n.d., in Amharic, pp. 1-3. For a rough comparison of the
size of a guelad (gasha), see Gebrewold Ingda Worq in
Ethiopia Observer 5 (1961): p. 303.

 

21. The demarcations separating one guelad/gasha from
another were usually rivers, brooks, big trees, springs,
hills, mountains, and stones. Interview: Graz. Deressa
Galla Nekemte, July 1979.

 

22. A ras or dejazmach received 1,000 abbars (tenants): a
fitawrari, 300; a melkagna (chief oi 1,000 men, usually a
district officer), 200 - 300: a quenazmach, 150; a
shambel (chief of more than 100 men), 70: a metoaleqa
(chief of 100 men), 40; a hamsaleqa (chief of 50 men),
25; ordinary soldiers, popularly known as neftegnna (gun
bearers), were given 20, 15, or 10 according to their
seniority. Interview: Quenazmach Abdissa Mossa, Nekemte,
June 1973.

 

23. Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, August 1979.

24. Negatu Alemu, ”On the Mode of Production in Ethiopia,"

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
38.

39.

214

Ethiopian Marxist Review, no. 1 (August 1980), p. 12.

J. E. Howard, Public Administration in Ethiopia: A Study
in Retrospect and Prospect (Groningen: 1955), p.64.

 

Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, Negari Jammo, Ghimbi,
and Graz. Negussa Kanae, Shambo, August and October 1979.
Most of the areas in the Anger, Didessa, and Dabus
valleys were considered nonfertile, including forest
lands, but they were very rich in natural products and
have since become the best coffee growing areas. Today,
they are the best state farmlands in the region.

Marx explaines that such proprietorship of land creates
impediments to the development of ”social productive
forces of labor, social concentration of capital, large
scale cattle-raising, and the progressive applicationg of
science."See Karl Marx, capital, Vol. 2 (New york:
International Publishers, 1967), p. 807.

Interview: Kitila Challa, Nedjo, August 1979.
Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, September 1979.

P. T. W. Baxter, 'Ethioipia's Unacknowledged Problem: The
Oromo,” African Affairs 77, 308 (1978), p. 288.

Interview: Gudeta Moroda, Digga, and Gebre Sellassie
Guta, Nekemte, September 1979. My informants relate that
many people from Arjo, Horo-Gudru, and Leqa Nekemte
travelled all the way to Addis Abeba to complain that the
land given them was too little.

H. Marcus, The Life and Times gf Menilek I; of Ethiopia:
1844-1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 197.

Interview: Ques Daffa Jammo, Aira, 1979.
Tesema Ta'a, ”Administration of Leqa Nekemte," pp. 38-39.

M. Stahl, Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in
Agricultural Development (Stockholm, 1974), p. 50.

Interview: Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, 1979. R. Pankhurst,
“Tribute, Taxation and Government Revenues in Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Century Ethiopia (part 1), “Journal of
Ethiopian Studies 5, 2(1967), p. 37.

Interview: Gudeta Moroda, Digga, September 1979.
Interview: Graz. Tamiru Guta, Digga, August 1979.

Interview” Emiru Gebre, Nekemte, and Ques Daffa Jammo,

 

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.
47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

215
Aira, 1979.

For the analysis of the nature of relationship
established between Shewa and the conquered parts of the
Ethigpigg empire under Menilek II, see Stahl, Ethiopia,
pp. - 0

Interview: Kabule Mudda, Arjo, September 1979.

R. Pankhurst, Economic History pf Ethiopia 1800 I 1935
(Addis Abeba: Haile Sellassie I University Press, 1968),
p. 135.

 

 

Zaltan Gyenge, Ethiopia 93 the Road pf Non-Capitalist
Develgpment (Budapest: 1976), p. 11.

For a detailed analysis of the polarization process in
rural Ethiopia under Haile Sellassie, see H. Marcus,
Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936
(Berkeley, 1986), chapters 5-7. and J. M. Cohen and D.
Weintraub, Land and Peasants ip Imperial Ethiopia
(Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1975).

 

 

 

 

M. Stahl New Seeds ip_Old Soil: 5 Stud of the Land
Reform Process ip Western Wollega, Eth1opi§ 1976
(Uppsala: 1977), p. 18.

 

 

 

 

Interview: Graz. Tamru Guta, Digga, 1973.
Zaltan Gyenge, Ethiopia, p. 15.

M. Perham, The Government pf Ethiopia (London: Faber and
Faber, 1948), pp. 411-12.

Quaranta Ferdinando, Ethiopia: Ag Empire 33 the Making
(London: P. S. King and Sons, 1939), pp. 5-6.

Ibid.

J. Derrick, Africa's Slaves Today (New York: Schocken
Books, 1975), pp. 150-58. -

Stahl, Ethiopia, p. 67.

“Ethiopia Measures for Rural Transformation," Ministry pf
agriculture and Settlement, February 1978, p. 5.

 

CONCLUSION

Although every chapter in this study has a brief summary
based on the themes discussed, I think a general conclusion is
appropriate to summarize in what ways the research has
succeeded in accomplishing its task. What is the
significance of focusing on political economy in the study of
social transformation? Is the knowledge of the interchange
of labor and land highlighted in this dissertation useful
to the study of the history of pre-colonial and colonial
African societies? Though it is up to the experts in the
field to judge, I am convinced that the answer to the above

questions is in the affirmative.

My study is essentially different from most of the
analyses on African historiography in general and those of ‘
pre-revolutionary Ethiopia in particular which deal with
socially undifferentiated peoples and cultures and obscure
the reality of ethnic domination and class exploitation.
From the start it suggests that Oromo studies have not only
been neglected but that most of the available written
accounts of their past have also been full of distortions,
biases and misunderstandings. As a matter of fact the
absence of any published comprehensive historical work on the

Oromo is a clear proof.

Concerning the long-standing debate about Oromo origins

216

217
and causes of their migration in the sixteenth century; this
study has come up with additional evidence that indicates
south central Ethiopia as their original homeland. As to
the causes of the Oromo migration, this research emphasizes
the nature of the Oromo political economy and the external
pressures of the era in which the expansion occurred. The
study also underscores the role of the Oromo in laying the
foundation of modern Ethiopia in terms of human and material
resources in relation to other peoples and cultures in the

region.

By concentrating on the Macha Oromo expansion, patterns
of settlement, social organization, peaceful and non-peaceful
interactions with other peoples and cultures, I have
attempted to explicate the socio-economic and political
dynamics of change. Evidently, the predominance of sedentary
mixed farming over the pastoral economy enhanced the growth
of productive forces among the Macha, necessitating a change
in the social relations of production. Earlier systems of
socio-political and cultural organizations, such as the
gada, were gradually transformed, and social values were
either replaced or modified. The result of these new
developments within the Macha Oromo was the accumulation of
large quantities of wealth in cattle and land by individuals,
usually elders or other traditional leaders. These wealthy
individuals eventually constituted a hereditary nobility

leading to the emergence of socio-economic classes and

218

superstructural establishments.

As the case study of Jima Abba Jifar and Leqa Nekemte
illustrates, it was the transformation of the mode of
production which gave birth to the emergence of socio-
economic classes leading tothe formation of the Macha states.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which underestimates the
historical significance of domestic systems of production,
exchange and relations of production in favor of external
causalities, my study clearly shows the crucial role of the
domestic political economy in the formation of states. As
one of its major contributions the research indicates the
sources and importance of surplus appropriation to state
formation, structure and function among the Macha community.
Through the case study, particularly that of Leqa Nekemte,
the dissertation reveals the importance of agriculture in the
process of state formation in Ethiopia, thereby differing
greatly from the analyses found in most of the existing
literature, which concentrates on the study of kingdoms and
states after they have existed for a long time. Moreover, my
study underlines the significance of the indigenous
superstructural establishments and institutions of the socio-
economic development on which they are based. The importance
of this internal dynamics is reflected in the prosperity of
the Macha states until the advent of European imperialism,
Menilek's conquest and the subsequent creation of modern

Ethiopia.

219

My dissertation further portrays how imperialism,
through its covert and overt forms of influence and
involvement, upset the internal balance of power not only in
Ethiopia but also in the whole of northeast Africa in the
late-19th and early-20th centuries. It was at this critical
period in the history of African societies that the Ethiopian
empire evolved with its present international boundaries. My
explanation about the creation of modern Ethiopia goes beyond
the usual approach of treating Menilek's military and
diplomatic successes. By considering the external
developments and the internal socio-economic conditions and
power relations within the Macha states during and after
Menilek's conquest, my study spells out other factors which
favored the creation of the modern Ethiopian empire. Unlike
most conventional views, my finding emphasizes the
consequences of the connections between imperialism and

empire building upon the subject peoples.

The feudal socio-economic and political ties that were
established between the regional or provincial governors on
the one hand, and the unbalanced commercial and diplomatic
relations between Addis Abeba and the industrial European
powers on the other, had unfortunate effects on the majority
of Macha population in western central Ethiopia. Integration
into the world economic system of capitalism exerted new
economic and political pressures on the imperial government.

In response to these pressures and to centralize and

220

consolidate its political and economic control, Addis Abeba
issued new fiscal and land policies and enforced new laws.

It concentrated on changing the superstructure in terms of
the European 'model', often conflicting with the traditional
administration and value systems from the core of the empire
down to the local levels. Such imposed changes from above
destabilized the traditional political economy and brought
about unparalleled socio-economic strains and stresses to the
majority of the Macha society. Strictly speaking, these
forceful changes by and large benefited the ruling class, the
nobility, a few local elites and their cohorts generating

more complex contradictions.

So far I have summarized the major themes of the
discussions and the contributions of the dissertation to a
better understanding of the history of the Macha Oromo of
Ethiopia. It is important to point out, however, that the
study is part of continuing research. Much remains to be
done in this field either by way of area coverage in
collecting oral sources and traditions or in presenting a
definitive and exhaustive interpretation, both of which are

bound to take more time and further research.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Ethiopian Language (unpublished)

Atsme Wolde Sellassie. Ye Galla Tarik, part II dealing with
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Bajjirond Tadesse. 'Ye Benishangul Guzonna Ye Sheikh Khojele
Asazzan Amuwmuat,“ (From the Collection of Dr. R.
Caulk H. S. I. U. History Department).

Bakura Siyom Tilahun. 'Ye Asossa Benishangul Tarik," I.E.S.,
H. S. I. U.

"Ye Dejiazmach Habtemariam Achir ye Hiywat Tarik,“ (From

Emahoy Agitu's personal document in Nekemte's old
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II. Ethiopian Language (published)

Gebre Sellassie, Tarik Zemen g3 Dagmawi Menelik Negusse
Negest 23 Ethiopia. Addis Abeba: 1959 E. C.

 

 

Girmachew Tekla Hawaryat, Tewodros, Tarikawi Drama. Addis
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Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Maskal, Zikre Neger. Addis Abeba:
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Mersie Hazen Wolde Kirkos, Zenah Lg Abba Bahrey Zetsehafo
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Taye, XE Ethiopia Hizb Tarik, 6th edition, Addis Abeba: 1958
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Yilma Deressa, Ye Ethiopia Tarik Be Asra Sidistegnaw Kifle-

Zemen. Addis Abeba: 1959—E.C.

 

 

III. Theses

And Alem Mulaw. "Begemdir and Simen (1910 - 1930). B.A.
Thesis, Addis Abeba, History Department, 1971.

22)

 

222

Atieb Ahmed Dafalla. “Sheik Khojele Al-Hassan and Bela-Shangul
(1825 - 1938)," B.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba, History
Department, 1973.

Bahru Zewde. "Dejazmach Jote Tulu (1855 - 1918),” B. A.
Thesis, Addis Abeba, History Department, 1970.

Baqqala Galata. “Asossa: People and Local Government”,
B.A Thesis, Addis Abeba, Department of Public
Administration, 1969.

Baissa Lemmu. "The Democratic Political System of the Galla
of Ethiopia and the Possibility of its use in the
Nation Building," M.A.Thesis, USA. George Washington
University, 1971.

'Berhanu Dibaba. “A Historical Study of Trade in Northern
Illubabor and South Western Wollega,” B.A.
Thesis, Addis Abeba, History Department, 1973.

Daba Hunde. A Portrait of Social Organization and
Institutions of the Oromo of Jibat and Macha in
the nineteenth century till the Conquest of
Minilik II," B.A. Thesis Addis Abeba: History
Department, 1972.

Darkwah, R.H.K., "The Rise of the Kingdom of Shoa 1813 -
1889,” Ph. D. Dissertation, London, 1966.

Girma Mangistu. ”The Busase of Anfillo, Qellem Wallaga: A
Historical Study," B.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba: History
Department, 1973.

Guluma Gemeda. "Gomma and Limmu: The Process of State
Formation Among the Oromo in the Gibe Regions c.
1750 - 1889,“ M.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba University
1984.

Habtemariam Seyoum. ”Military Organization and Armament
Acquisitions of Minilik II,“ B.A. Tjhesis Addis
Abeba, History Department, 1967.

Hayla Mariam Goshu. "The Kingdom of Abba Jiffar II (1861-
1934),” B.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba: History Department,
1970.

Hultin, J. “Man and Land in Wollega, Ethiopia,“ Gothenburg
University, April 1977.

Legesse Lemma. ”The Political Economy of Ethiopia 1875-
1974: Agricultural, Educational and International
Antecedents of the Revolution,” Ph.D.

223

Dissertation, Notre Dame: Indiana: Economics
Department, September 1979.

Maniazewal Asefa. "The Resistance in Begemdir, Gojjam and
Wallaga,‘ Addis Abeba: 1970.

Merid Wolde Aregay. “Southern Ethiopia and the Christian
Kingdom 1508 - 1708, With Speical Reference to the
Galla Migrations and Their Consequences," Ph.D.
Dissertation, London, 1971.

Mohammad Hassen. I'The Oromo of Ethiopia: With Special
Emphasis on the Gibe States,“ Ph. D. Dissertation,
London, 1983.

Mohamed Nasir. “Economic History of Jimma Abba Jiffar (1878-
1930),' B.A. Thesis Addis Abeba: Economics Department,
1973.

Nagasso Giddada. “The Introduction and Impact of
Christianity in Qellem Awraja: Western Wollega:
1886 - 1941,” B. A. Thesis Addis Abeba: History
Department, 1971.

Tekalign W/Mariam. ”Slavery and Slave Trade in the Kingdom of
Jimma (c.1800 - 1935),” M.A. Thesis, A.A.U. 1984.

Terfassa Digga. 'A Short Biography of Onesimos Nesib (c.
1850 — 1931),“ B.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba: History
Department, 1973.

Tesema Ta'a. “Administration of Leqa Nekemte Between 1850 -
1923,” B.A. Thesis, Addis Abeba: History Department,
1976. '

. "The Oromo of Wollega: A Historical Survey to
1910," M. A. Thesis, Addis Abeba: History
Department, 1980.

Tsehay Berhane Sellassie. "Menelik II Conquest and
Consolidation of Southern Provinces,“ B.A. Thesis,
Addis Abeba, History Department, 1969.

IV. Archival Materials.

a) The following Amharic letters and contract papers of
Dejazmach Kumsa (Gebre - Egziabeher) are from the collection
of Woizero Atsede Habtemariam, his grand daughter. Most are
correspondances between the local governor and Addis Abeba.
Those consulted or copied by the author include:

224

Menilek to Kumsa/Pagume 5, 1898; Sept. 15, 1905.

u ' ” Miazia 7, 1900: April 15, 1908.

n " ' Ginbot 29, 1901; June 6, 1909.

. " " Hamle 2, 1891; July 8, 1899.

. ” " Megabit 2, 1905; March 9, 1913.

I " ' Megabit 15, 1896.

. fl ' Tahasas 2, 1898; December 11, 1905.
n " ” Tiqimt 17, 1895: October 27, 1902.

n ' ” Yekatit 28, 1900: March 6, 1908.

n " " Meskerem 30, 1895; October lo, 1902.
n " ” Ginbot 4, 1895; May 11, 1903.

Kumsa to Menilek/Tahsas 21, 1899: December 30, 1906.
' ' " Miazia 1, 1899; April 8, 1907.

Contract letter, Yani Mangos & Kumsa/ Hamle 5, 1921;
July 13, 1921.

Kumsa to Zewditu/ Sene 6, 1913: June 13, 1921.
Kumsa to Ras Teferri/Megabit 2, 1913: March 9, 1921.
b) From the collection of Dr. A. Triulzi.

Sudan Government Archives, Sudan Intelligence Report
(SIR), W.0/106/234.

Public Record Office (London) Gwynn, C.W., F.0 1/45,
inclosure 4 in No.1, to Foreign
Office, Cairo, May 19, 1901.

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'225

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Abebe Ambatchew. ”Field Trip to Neqemte," Ethnological
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Abir, M. Ethiopian and the Red Sea. Jerusalem: 1980.

 

. Ethiopia, The Era of the Princes: the Challenge of
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Addis Hiwet. Ethiopia, from Autocracy pg Revolution.
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Hultin, Jan. "Political Structure and the Development of
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Knutsson, K. F. Authority and Chagge: AStudy of the Kallu
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2: African History, Vii, l, 1966.

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. A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar, Ethiopia 1830-
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Lewis, I.M. Peoples Lf the Horn Lf Africa Somali, Afar and

Saho London: 1976.

Le Roux, H. Menelik pp nous. Paris: 1902.

Lonsdale, J. "States and Social Processes in Africa: A

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Marcus, H. The Life and Times Lf Menilek II Lf Ethiopia:

 

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VI. Oral Informants

The following is the list of principal informants
interviewed at differnt intervals from September to August of
1972-73, and between June and October in 1979. The
interviewee were selected on the basis of their knOwledge
about the Macha Oromo traditions and historical experiences.
Some of our informants had served in local administration or
observed it in action in the early twentieth century. Most

were excellent oral informants.

Name
Abdissa Mossa (Kenna.)
Abebe G. Medhin (Memhire)
Alfaki Abuhazim (Ato)
Ali Alkafi (Ato)
Al-Khalifa Hamad (Ato)
Al-Mahdi Abdrahman (Ato)
Ashek-Halis Ahmmed (Ato)
Baissa Birru (Ato)
Baissa Gonfa (Ato)
Balla Molla (Fit.)
Basazinew Aleme (Ato)
Buli Anke (Ato)
Daba Tiki (Ato)
Daffa Jammo (Ques)
Deressa Amante (Blatta)
Deressa Galla (Graz.)
Duguma Oncho (Graz.)
Edosa Gemechis (Ato)
Edossa Wakjira (Ato)
Emiru Gebre (Ato)
Etafa Biyana (Ato)
Gebre Sellassie Gutta (Ato)
Geleta Kote (Ato)
Guda Limmu (Ato)

Gudeta Moroda (Ato)

232

Place
Nekemte
Arjo
Asosa
Bambasi

n
Gimbi
Asosa
Shambo
Shambo
Gimbi
Arjo
Mendi
Digga
Lalo Aira
Debrezeit
Nekemte
Digga Bendi

Nekemte

n
u
Gimbi
Nekemte
n
Nedjo

Digga

Age
66
53
55
67
73
34
115
80
70
82
75
88
97
65
85
85
70
65
42
56
80
60
83
72
87

Name
Hailemariam Argaw (Ato)
Jaleta Abba Nama (Ato)
Jaleta Gulti (Ato)
Jaleta Wase (Ques)
Kaba Gobu (Ato)
Kabule Mudda (Ato)
Kanea Taa ( Ato)
Kejela Dinka (Ato)
Kitila Challa (Ato)
Mathewos Chibsa (Ques)
Mekonnen Kumsa (Fit.)
Moga Engda (Bala.)
Negari Jammo (Ato)
Negussa Kenaie (Graz.)
Olana Bati (Ato)
Olgira Aba (Ato)
Taa Negeri (Ato)
Taa Woyessa (Ato)
Tamiru Gutta (Graz.)
Wakjira Osana (Ato)
Woldegeorgis Beke (Ato)
Wolteji Degago (Graz.)

Yigezu W. Hana (Memhire)

233

Place
Bambasi
Shambo
Bodji
Arjo
Komto
Nedjo
n
Mendi
Nekemte
Getema
Gimbi
Shambo
Nekemte
Digga Kolobo
Wama
Jato
Digga Fododdo
Getema
Arjo
Bodji

Arjo

Age
48
73
90
62
60
80
60
56
61
56
65
74
78
94
58
77
60
62
78
81
63
98
84