STRATEGIES OF PUBLIC REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES DURING CHALLENGING TIMES By Michael J. Zeig A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education – Doctor of Philosophy 2015 ABSTRACT STRATEGIES OF PUBLIC REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES DURING CHALLENGING TIMES By Michael J. Zeig Higher education institutions face a number of challenges including constrained financial resources, increasing competition for a declining number of high school graduates, and growing calls for accountability from a variety of external sources. Public, regional universities, as institutions often considered to be “stuck in the middle” between major research universities and smaller niche colleges, are particularly susceptible to these challenges. This has led many scholars and observers of higher education to indicate that colleges and universities can no longer be all things to all people, and that clear strategies are needed to ensure the long-term sustainability of many institutions. Yet, strategy is an understudied area within higher education, specifically related to public, regional universities. Still, these institutions play a vital role in society, educating approximately four million students each year. This study focused on examining the strategy, changes in strategy, and influences on strategy of three public, regional universities. Administrative and faculty leaders were interviewed and documents reviewed at each institution in order to gain perspective about what occurred at these institutions during a challenging time within the higher education industry. Key findings include: (a) many similarities in what institutions did in response to recent challenges, but greater differences in how and why they took certain actions, (b) more minor changes and adjustments in tactics than large-scale changes in institutional vision, and (c) a confluence of external and internal factors influencing the strategic direction of institutions. Implications for future research, policy, and practice are considered, specifically related to institutional differentiation, the pursuit of prestige, the future of institutional change, and the importance of balancing external and internal factors in establishing institutional strategy. Copyright by MICHAEL J. ZEIG 2015 I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Krista and my parents Frank and Linda. Their collective support has been crucial to completing my PhD and this dissertation. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS An undertaking as large as a dissertation is not a singular journey. There are many people whose guidance and support helped me reach this final product. First, I want to thank Dr. Marilyn Amey, my dissertation chair and program advisor. Marilyn’s advice on both the macro structure and micro details of my dissertation were extraordinarily insightful and helped me unlock the full potential of this study. As my program advisor, her support of my administrative interests and discussions about career planning are much appreciated. I also want to thank Dr. Roger Baldwin, whose advice and guidance while his graduate assistant for three years taught me important lessons about conducting research. I particularly enjoyed our discussions about the “hot topics” of the day related to higher education that helped me form and be able to better defend my own positions on the crucial issues facing colleges and universities. Additionally, Dr. Brendan Cantwell and John Beck brought tough but fair questioning to my dissertation committee and raised important alternatives for me to consider. Their insights helped me develop a stronger argument. Finally, although I cannot mention them by name, this study would not have been possible without the cooperation from the study participants at each of the case study sites. A PhD program is more than a dissertation, and it is important to acknowledge those who contributed to my success in other ways. Kathy Wilbur has been a tremendous source of support during my program and is always willing to help connect me to leaders in the field of higher education, which has been invaluable in establishing my career. I want to acknowledge Dr. Michael Rao who provided me with my first opportunity to work in a president’s office at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). His inclusion of me in a range of his activities vi during my summer at VCU exposed me to a side of university administration that cannot be taught in textbooks. Additionally, Bill Beekman, Jane Miller, and Dave Byelich taught me helpful lessons about administration and leadership at Michigan State, and I appreciate their support of me completing my PhD and dissertation while working for them. Finally, I must acknowledge Dr. Pam Eddy who was the first professor to raise my interest in the field of higher education during my time as an undergraduate at Central Michigan University, and whose advice I continue to appreciate when we cross paths. Who knew this would all begin from serving as an undergraduate student on the provost search committee. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES xii CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT Definitions Purpose of the Study Research Questions Background of the Problem Revenue Perspective Expense Perspective Increasing Competition for Students Significance Preview of Next Chapters 1 2 3 4 4 4 11 15 19 20 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW What is Strategy? Types of Strategy Coherent Alignment Differentiation Mimetic Behavior Lack of a Cohesive Strategy How are Strategies Developed and Articulated? Industry Analysis Strategic Planning Resource Allocation Balanced Scorecard What Influences the Selection of Strategy? External Influences Internal Influences Why Institutions Might Change Strategies Summary 21 22 23 24 26 28 29 30 31 32 34 34 36 36 38 42 44 CHAPTER 3: METHODS Design of the Study Sample Selection Site Selection Participant Selection Data Collection Data Analysis Validity and Reliability Internal Validity Reliability External Validity 46 46 48 49 50 51 53 56 56 58 58 viii Limitations 59 CHAPTER 4: UNDERGRADUATE TEACHING UNIVERSITY Institutional Strategy Undergraduate Focus Institution of Opportunity Serving the Region High Quality Despite Limited Resources Recessionary Response Enrollment Sustainability Shift in Program Offerings Mission-Driven Financial Management Efficient and Lean Operation Revenue Enhancements Laser Focus on Mission Influences External Influences Student Demand Market Demand Competitors Governmental Policy Internal Influences Stakeholders Steady Leadership Summary 61 61 62 64 66 66 68 68 70 72 72 73 74 75 76 76 77 78 78 79 79 81 83 CHAPTER 5: COMMUNITY-DRIVEN UNIVERSITY Institutional Strategy Serving the Region Access Talent Pipeline Community and Business Engagement Enrollment Growth Quality and Academic Excellence Continuity of Strategy Recessionary Response Clear, Narrow, and Aligned Strategy Conservative Financial Management Contain Costs Increase Collaborations Revenue Enhancements Expansion of High Demand Programs Influences External Influences Market Demand Student Demand 84 84 85 85 86 86 89 90 92 92 93 94 95 95 96 99 100 100 101 102 ix Competitors Governmental Policy Internal Influences Stakeholders Institutional Commitment Summary 103 105 106 106 108 110 CHAPTER 6: BALANCING ACT UNIVERSITY Institutional Strategy Unclear, Schizophrenic, and Reactive High Quality Undergraduate Education Serving the Region and State Increasing Emphasis on Research and Graduate Programs Enrollment Sustainability Continuity of Strategy Recessionary Response Investing in Key Strategic Areas High Demand Academic Programs Student Success Initiatives Enhanced Recruitment Efforts Strategic Financial Management Low Administrative Costs Holding Positions Open Revenue Enhancements Influences External Influences Student and Market Demand Governmental Policy Competitors Internal Influences Senior Administrators and Board of Trustees Faculty and Shared Governance Administration / Faculty Divide Leadership Turnover Summary 111 112 112 114 116 117 121 126 127 127 128 130 131 132 132 133 133 134 134 134 136 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 CHAPTER 7: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS Strategy Continuity of Strategy and Recessionary Response External Influences Internal Influences Summary 145 145 148 150 152 154 CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION Strategy Strategic Frameworks 156 157 157 x Differentiation Pursuit of Prestige Institutional Change Degree of Change Future of Institutional Change Influences Resource Dependence Leadership Shared Governance Implications for Research Implications for Policy Implications for Practice Conclusion 160 162 168 168 171 175 175 178 180 183 187 190 194 APPENDICES APPENDIX A: Interview Guide APPENDIX B: Overview of Institutional Findings APPENDIX C: Overview of Key Takeaways 196 197 198 201 REFERENCES 202 xi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Interview Participants by Institution and Generic Title 52 Table 2: Overview of Institutional Findings 198 Table 3: Overview of Key Takeaways 201 xii CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT Bess and Dee (2008b) argued that increasing competition among higher education institutions, decreasing government funding, and increasing calls for accountability have increased the need for colleges and universities to develop sound strategies for the future. The current era of constrained funding at many colleges and universities specifically necessitates that institutions cannot try to be all things to all people (Morrill, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2001; Selingo, 2013). While many institutions face challenges, public institutions face a distinct challenge in responding to a steady decline in state support. Public, regional universities face an even greater challenge since they historically have not been as engaged in or as successful as their public research university counterparts at obtaining external resources (e.g., research funding, private donations) to complement state appropriations and tuition revenue (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Gladiuex, Hauptman, & Greene Knapp, 2010; Skinner & Miller, 2013). Given these financial challenges, it is vital to the financial survival of public, regional universities to maintain steady enrollment and a sufficient tuition revenue stream. However, a declining number of high school graduates (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012) and an increasing number of educational options (Rosen, 2013) may limit the ability of public, regional universities to meet their enrollment targets, potentially further exacerbating their financial woes. This increasing competition for students combined with a diminishing resource environment may require institutions to develop a clear strategy to distinguish themselves and ultimately survive and thrive in the future (Flynn & Vredevoogd, 2010). The exact strategies institutions pursue may differ, but in this challenging environment it is likely that institutions will need to identify and develop some form of an explicit strategy. 1 “Tweaking on the margins will not be enough to grapple with the kinds of pressures that are mounting” (Skinner & Miller, 2013, p. 55). Definitions Various scholars define strategy differently, which is examined in chapter two. For the purposes of this study, I utilized the following definition of strategy: A plan, method, or series of actions for obtaining a specific goal or aspiration, often in response to external challenges or competitors (Chaffee, 1985; Keller, 1983; Mintzberg 1987; Porter, 1991; Strategy, n.d.). There is not a universal definition of what constitutes a public, regional university, although this term is generally accepted in the lexicon of higher education. For the purposes of this study, public, regional university was defined by the following criteria: (a) an institution that through legislation or another formal and legal mechanism is established as a state institution; (b) is classified through legislation or another formal and legal mechanism as a university; and (c) is a member of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. Approximately 400 institutions in the United States meet these criteria (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2014). Among these institutions are universities that “range in size from approximately 1,000 students to more than 45,000 . . . are found in the inner city, in suburbs, towns and cities, and in remote rural America . . . are institutions of access and opportunity . . . are student-focused . . . and are ‘stewards of place,’ engaging faculty, staff and students with the communities and regions they serve” (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2014, para. 1). These institutions also vary in their level of autonomy. Some are part of a statewide system (e.g., California State University-Fullerton), some are regional campuses connected to a larger main campus (e.g., University of Michigan-Flint), and others are standalone institutions (e.g., University of North Alabama). What these institutions hold most in 2 common is that they largely focus on undergraduate education with some master’s programs and a small number of doctoral programs, mostly in applied fields such as education, and often enroll students of varying caliber from class valedictorians to students in need of remedial education (Henderson, 2009). Further pertinent details about this institutional sector emerge throughout the remainder of this chapter. Purpose of the Study The purpose of this research study was to better understand how public, regional universities respond to an increasingly competitive environment with increasingly constrained resources. Institutions make many decisions about the makeup of their student population, academic offerings, expectations of faculty, allocation of resources, and many other issues. In a less competitive environment or at a time when resources are bountiful, institutions may be able to pursue numerous goals and priorities in widely divergent areas. This may not be optimal, but a lack of competition and plentiful resources may make such an approach maintainable even if not ideal. However, in the current environment, a lack of a coherent and consistent strategy for making decisions and operating may lead an institution down an unsustainable path (Morrill, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2001). This study examined the institutional-level strategy of three public, regional universities, what influences the selection of strategy, and whether strategies changed in light of current environmental challenges. Since strategy has not been studied in great depth in higher education settings (Chaffee, 1985; Toma, 2012) and it is largely unknown how public, regional universities responded to a challenging environment (Skinner & Miller, 2013), studying this topic is important to begin to explore the issue of strategy within this sector of higher education. 3 Through a multi-site case study (Merriam, 2009), findings across three universities provide insights about what other similarly situated institutions may have experienced. Research Questions Since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008, public, regional universities have faced an increasingly competitive higher education environment with increasingly constrained resources, specifically compared to their public, research university counterparts. In this context, this study examined the following set of research questions for each of the three case study institutions. (1) What is the institutional strategy of the university? (2) Has the strategy of the university changed since 2008? If so, how? (3) What influences setting a strategy at the university? Background of the Problem In this section I describe the challenges facing colleges and universities nationally and how these challenges specifically impact public, regional universities. This is broken into three broad areas. I outline the factors contributing to an increasingly constrained resource environment first from a revenue perspective and then from an expense perspective. Then I review the factors resulting in increasing competition for students among higher education institutions. Revenue Perspective From 2008 to 2012, state funding for higher education decreased by 10.8% (Center for the Study of Education Policy, 2013). During this time, 12 states increased spending on higher education, but the remaining 38 states decreased funding, including 12 states that decreased funding by more than 20% (Center for the Study of Education Policy, 2013). This has led some 4 to argue that public institutions are no longer state-assisted, but simply state-located (Speck, 2010). Although state support for higher education trended downward during the Great Recession, many states have recently increased appropriations for public colleges and universities as the economy rebounds. However, overall state fiscal support for higher education remains below pre-recession levels (State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2014). Furthermore, the lingering effects of the recession and the growth in state spending in other areas, specifically Medicaid, negatively impact the ability of states to return to prerecession funding levels for higher education (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013c; State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013). As a result of decreasing state appropriations, public higher education institutions have responded by raising tuition. Since 1980, the growth of average tuition costs outpaced the rise in the consumer price index in each year (Archibald & Feldman, 2010). During the past decade, the average inflation-adjusted annual percentage increase of tuition and fees at public, four-year institutions was 5.2%. During the past five years, the total increase in tuition and fees at public, four-year institutions was 27%, compared to 13% at private, four-year institutions during the same time period (College Board Policy & Advocacy Center, 2012). The combination of declining state appropriations and rising tuition resulted in a new formula for financing public institutions. In 1987, tuition accounted for 23% of revenue for public colleges and universities nationally. By comparison, in 2012, tuition accounted for 47% of revenue, and in 22 states tuition accounted for more than 50% of public institutions’ revenue (State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013). Increasing tuition can help institutions cover a loss in state funding, but there may be limits to how much further tuition can be raised. Seventy-one percent of college graduates from 5 2012 carry a debt load, with an average debt of $29,400 per borrower (Institute for College Access & Success, 2013), and total outstanding student loan debt is more than $1 trillion (Chopra, 2013). If tuition continues to rise at its current rate the situation could worsen. By 2030, a four-year degree from a public institution is projected to cost an average of more than $40,000 per year (Chany, 2013), a 470% increase from the average cost in 2000 of just more than $8,500 per year (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). While tuition is projected to increase, families are contributing less to their students’ college education. Between 2010 and 2013, families’ average out-of-pocket contributions decreased by 35% (Sallie Mae, 2013). If tuition continues to increase at the same time familial contributions toward college declines, students may obtain larger debt loads in the future and student access may suffer (Heller & Rogers, 2006; Zusman, 2005). Additionally, even if colleges and universities are not concerned with the potential negative consequences of continued tuition hikes on students and their debt burden, there are growing political pressures for institutions to limit tuition increases (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013b, 2013c; Breneman, 2010). In some states, such as Kentucky and North Dakota, caps have been set for how high tuition can be raised (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013b). Several other states have frozen tuition at public colleges and universities, often, but not always, with the promise of increasing appropriations in return (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013b; Kelderman, 2013). Ultimately, the combination of declining state appropriations and the potential limits on further tuition increases leaves public institutions in a constrained resource environment with the potential for further challenges if current trends are not reversed. 6 State appropriations and tuition constitute the majority of revenues at public institutions, but additional forms of revenue exist, including, but not limited to, external research funding, private giving, and auxiliary enterprises (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002). However, these additional revenue sources often provide limited potential for improving an institution’s fiscal outlook, particularly for public, regional universities. Auxiliary enterprises such as housing, food service, and parking typically do not constitute a major revenue stream for institutions after accounting for the operating costs of these units (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002), and sometimes they actually lose money (Geiger, 2002). External research funding and private giving hold greater potential for helping an institution’s financial situation, but the quest to increase revenue in these areas does not manifest itself equally across all institutions. Public research universities often secure greater amounts of external research dollars and generally maintain larger endowments than public, regional universities (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Gladiuex, Hauptman, & Greene Knapp, 2010; Skinner & Miller, 2013). Public, regional universities can attempt to increase their research portfolio and fundraising efforts, but historically these institutions have not been as successful in these areas and there are often barriers, which will be described, to expanding such efforts. Institutions utilize external research funding to cover the costs of conducting a specific project. Costs may include wages for project investigators or graduate students, travel expenses, equipment, and supplies. Additionally, federally funded research provides institutions with “facilities and administrative” or “indirect costs” to support institutional expenses related to research that are not tied to a specific research project. These costs include facility construction and maintenance, utilities, and support for research administration and compliance activities. 7 These “indirect costs” are provided as a reimbursement to institutions to cover expenses already incurred in maintaining a research infrastructure (Association of American Universities, 2011). Both direct and indirect research funding can help institutions diversify and expand their revenue streams, but the pursuit of research funding has become increasingly competitive. Grant applications to the National Institutes of Health (2015) more than doubled from 24,151 in 1998 to 51,073 in 2014. The NIH only funded approximately 18% of its applicants in 2014 and the National Science Foundation (2013) typically funds fewer than 30% of its applicants each year. While grant applications are increasing, the amount of research funding available is decreasing. The implementation of the federal government sequestration in March 2013 reduced spending across almost all federal programs, including a 5.1% or $1.2 billion reduction in research and development funding (American Council on Education, 2013). Since the federal government accounts for approximately 60% of the research funding colleges and universities receive (Association of American Universities, 2011), a decrease in federal funding makes it increasingly difficult for institutions to maintain or expand their external research portfolios. It may be particularly difficult for public, regional universities to expand their research portfolio. Public, regional universities typically maintain a stronger focus on undergraduate teaching with few, if any, doctoral programs where research activities typically reside (Henderson, 2009). Another challenge public, regional universities have in securing research funding, especially compared to research universities, is that they are more likely to employ adjunct faculty who rarely engage in research activities (Bettinger & Long; 2006, National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). Furthermore, if public, regional universities want to expand their research activities, the cost of starting new research programs can often be prohibitively high. Ehrenberg (2002) argued that researchers are increasingly reliant on 8 “sophisticated laboratory facilities that are expensive to build and operate” (p. 94). Additionally, attracting high quality researchers often requires institutions to provide “$500,000 to $1,000,000 of funding to help young scientists set up their laboratories [with] the costs of attracting distinguished senior scientists often even larger” (Ehrenberg, 2002, p. 101). Public, regional universities typically cannot afford offering such large startup packages to top faculty who are most capable of securing multi-million dollar grants (Hall, 2009). Finally, “indirect cost” reimbursements received as part of obtaining federal grants may help support building part of an institution’s research infrastructure, but some institutions receive greater reimbursement rates than others. “Indirect cost” rates are set based on a variety of factors related to the estimated cost of conducting research at a given institution, with research institutions historically receiving greater reimbursement rates than other institutions (Association of American Universities, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2002). Research funding can provide financial benefits to some institutions, but public, regional universities have historically not been as involved in research, have high entry costs, and even if successful in expanding their research portfolio, receive smaller financial benefits in the form of “indirect cost” reimbursements than research universities. Fundraising provides an additional source of revenue to institutions that can be utilized in a variety of ways such as building an endowment, funding current operations, or supporting capital projects (Ehrenberg, 2002). However, just as the Great Recession negatively impacted state appropriations, it also negatively impacted philanthropic giving to colleges and universities. During the recession, new donations decreased and endowments plummeted (Council for Aid to Education, 2014). Even though giving levels have gradually returned to pre-recession levels and endowments have experienced a similar uptick (Council for Aid to Education, 2014), there are 9 additional barriers to public, regional universities increasing their fundraising levels as an expanded source of revenue. First, private institutions have historically maintained more robust fundraising operations than public institutions. Many public institutions did not expand their fundraising operations until state appropriations began to decline during the past couple decades (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Foderaro, 2011). Building a strong fundraising operation may be an essential first step to growing giving levels at public institutions. Proper, Caboni, Hartley, and Willmer (2009), while accounting for institutional size differences, found a strong correlation between the size of a fundraising staff and dollars raised. However, hiring new fundraising staff can be expensive (Masterson, 2011), especially since fundraising operations are often supported by an institution’s general operating budget and not with the philanthropic gifts raised (Ehrenberg, 2002). This means that at a time when institutions are receiving less money from the state, they may need to incur greater expenses in an attempt to grow their fundraising potential. Additionally, it often takes years to cultivate relationships with donors before they provide major gifts to an institution (Ehrenberg, 2002; Holmes, 2010). Public institutions that wish to increase their revenue through private giving may find that such efforts require large upfront costs with financial benefits taking years to materialize. Second, public, regional universities may be at a disadvantage in securing large gifts because they may not typically produce as many high-earning graduates as research universities. Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg (1998) found that students who attended elite private colleges had greater success in the labor market than students who attended other institutions, specifically public institutions. Hoxby (2001) and Hoekstra (2009) found similar results linking graduates from more selective institutions to greater future earnings. Furthermore, regional universities 10 typically maintain fewer graduate and professional programs than research universities (Henderson, 2009), and on average, individuals with advanced degrees have higher lifetime earnings than individuals whose highest level of educational attainment is a bachelor’s degree (Carnevale, Rose, & Cheah, 2011). The potential for increasing revenue through private giving may be limited without a wealthy alumni base since “alumni gifts make up a quarter of all giving to higher education,” making alumni the second highest group of donors behind foundations, which represent 30% of donations (Masterson, 2011, para. 23). Finally, private giving is typically viewed as a way to enhance revenues, but if not approached carefully it can actually cost institutions money. An increasing number of donors are placing restrictions on their gifts in order to influence the direction institutions pursue, which can cost the institution money if that direction diverges too far from its mission (Logue, 2006; Lubove & Staley, 2011). Even if a gift supports a well-established priority of an institution, Ehrenberg (2002) argued that gifts may add costs to an institution’s operating budget if the gift does not cover the full up-front and ongoing expenses of a project. While private giving can provide new financial resources for an institution, there may be limits to the extent to which it can help an institution’s overall financial situation. Expense Perspective Revenue only constitutes half of an institution’s financial picture; the other half is about expenses. If revenue is decreasing and there are barriers to reversing that trend, institutions may need to consider areas to cut costs. However, just as there are challenges to increasing revenue, there are also challenges to cutting expenses. At colleges and universities, salaries and benefits for faculty and staff consume the majority of institutions’ budgets (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002). With a large percentage of 11 the budget tied to personnel, it is difficult to cut costs without decreasing staffing levels. It can be particularly challenging to adjust faculty employment levels since faculty with tenure typically cannot be removed except for misconduct or financial exigency (Olivas, 2005; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2010). Additionally, many tenured faculty members are working longer than their predecessors and the number of faculty aged 60 and older is on the rise (June, 2012). These older professors typically have higher salaries than the more junior professors that would replace them, adding an additional strain on university budgets (Ehrenberg, 2002; June, 2012). One response institutions have taken is hiring more non-tenure track faculty, which provides greater financial flexibility to determine staffing levels on a year-to-year basis, but tenured and tenuretrack faculty still account for more than 40% of the faculty at public universities (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). Furthermore, hiring more non-tenure track faculty may not be a desirable option to some institutions since research suggests that the prevalence of nontenure track faculty may negatively impact student learning outcomes and graduation rates (Kezar, Maxey, & Badke, 2013). While some industries can identify labor efficiencies to cut expenses, higher education is different (Archibald & Feldman, 2010). Archibald and Feldman (2010) argued that the cost of employing highly skilled workers (i.e., professors) continues to increase with labor market demand, but productivity does not increase with greater spending. A manufacturing company can pursue technological advances at a high cost, but with the hopes of increasing outputs or achieving long-term production efficiencies. Higher education, however, as a service industry, has “considerable difficulty increasing the productivity of workers” (Archibald & Feldman, 2010, p. 39). Paying a professor more does not necessarily lead to an increase in teaching or research productivity (Archibald & Feldman, 2010; Selingo, 2013). Thus, colleges and 12 universities are left with increasing labor costs, but the same level of “production” from its faculty. Two other areas of high costs for institutions are state-of-the-art facilities and amenities, which are sometimes distinct but often interrelated areas (i.e., not all facilities are amenities and not all amenities are facilities). Although some may question the need for world-class facilities during austere times, facilities often serve more of a purpose than just providing a nice backdrop for a campus. Facilities and amenities are also an important factor in attracting students to campuses. Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013) found that students at all but the most elite institutions base their enrollment decisions on the amenities an institution offers. While more selective institutions have an incentive to improve academic quality and spend money on instruction and research in attracting prospective students, less selective institutions (e.g., public, regional universities) attract students by spending on consumption amenities such as new recreation centers and elaborate residence halls (Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013). One of the challenges for institutions in constantly trying to provide the best facilities and amenities is that the costs are high, not just to construct a new building, but operating and maintenance costs also increase with new construction. Ehrenberg (2002) indicated that annual operating costs for new buildings often comprise as much as four percent of the cost of the building. Furthermore, long-term or deferred maintenance on buildings years down the road add to the total expense of facilities on campus (Brinkman & Morgan, 2010). Many institutions face hundreds of millions of dollars in deferred maintenance costs, as buildings constructed during the enrollment boom of the 1960s and 1970s require an increasing number of repairs (Carlson, 2012; Ehrenberg, 2002). This can be particularly troubling for mid-size public universities that do not 13 have the revenue stream or endowment base of larger public or private institutions to cover large deferred maintenance costs each year (Carlson, 2012). Finally, even if institutions could identify potential areas to cut costs and realize savings, this is not always a desirable course of action. Institutions’ costs often rise as a result of attempting to provide a certain standard or quality of care for students or consumers and “there are no quick fixes [to cut costs] other than ones that diminish quality” (Archibald & Feldman, 2010, p. 259). Ehrenberg (2002) argued institutions’ costs are high because they go beyond providing a standard quality of service and become locked in an arms race driven by external rankings that results in and actually rewards high spending at colleges and universities. In a battle to be the best, institutions must offer high salaries to attract top faculty and provide high quality research and learning facilities to support faculty and students (Ehrenberg, 2002). Even if an institution wanted to lower its costs, it is difficult to unilaterally exit this arms race because of the prospect that competitor institutions could take advantage of decreased spending by another institution, and the internal politics in a system of shared governance almost guarantees a revolt if institutions cut costs to the detriment of faculty (Ehrenberg, 2002). Thus, institutions continue to increase spending to keep up with one another and avoid the risk of losing prestige compared to competitors (Ehrenberg, 2002). Overall, public, regional universities face a challenging financial future due to decreasing state appropriations, constraints (formal and informal) on raising tuition, their historically limited potential in diversifying revenue streams through research funding and private giving, and a limited ability or desire to cut costs. 14 Increasing Competition for Students Along with an increasingly constrained resource environment, public, regional universities also face another challenge: increasing competition for students. This competition results from a declining number of high school graduates, a historically small out-of-state recruiting base, and the rise of educational providers, particularly in the form of online education. Recent data indicate there are declining numbers of high school graduates. In 2012, for the first time in a decade, the number of high school graduates declined compared to the prior year and is expected to continue to decline annually through 2018. Even when growth returns, the number of high school graduates is not expected to return to the peak levels of 2011 until 2025 (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012). Not every part of the country is impacted equally. While the southern and western regions of the country are expected to see an overall increase in high school graduates by 2024-25, the northeast and midwest are expected to see continued declines even after nationwide growth returns (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012). Since recent high school graduates constitute the majority of students at public, regional universities, a decline in this population demographic could significantly impact these institutions (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013a). One way that institutions may be able to make up for a decline in high school graduates is by recruiting more adult students. There is a growing push for more adults to return to college and obtain degrees (Kelly & Strawn, 2011), which may provide opportunities for institutions to expand their traditional recruitment efforts. However, Rosen (2013) argued that for-profit institutions, due to their flexible schedules and career-oriented focus, are often more attractive 15 options for adult students than traditional colleges and universities. Not-for-profit institutions can and have increased flexible and career-oriented online and distance education offerings (American Association for State Colleges and Universities, 2013a), but for-profit institutions still maintain a larger percentage of adult students than other institutional types (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011). Another way some institutions have tried to maintain or increase their enrollment numbers is through greater recruitment of out-of-state and international students (Hoover & Keller, 2011; McMurtrie, 2012). Public institutions typically enroll a large number of students from the state within which they reside. This is particularly true of public, regional universities (Henderson, 2009). Since some states experienced greater declines in the number of high school graduates than others, institutions in states with declining high school populations are expanding their traditional recruitment pool of in-state students to include out-of-state and international students. However, as more institutions get involved in these recruitment efforts, the out-of-state and international recruitment markets are quickly becoming saturated (Hoover & Keller, 2011; McMurtrie, 2012). Additionally, public, regional universities may find it more difficult to recruit on a national and global scale than major research universities that have stronger brand name recognition in these arenas (Duderstadt & Womack, 2003). This may limit the ability of some universities to make up for declining in-state student enrollment with out-of-state or international students. Along with the decline in traditional-aged college students, a rise in the number of postsecondary education providers contributes to an increasingly competitive market for recruiting students (Rosen, 2013). Between 2005 and 2010 there were 483 new documented educational providers, with the greatest increase coming in the for-profit sector (Carnegie 16 Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2011). Christensen and Erving (2011) argued that for-profit online education providers are increasingly competitors to non-elite universities due to their ability to obtain regional accreditation, access to highly credentialed faculty resulting from an overabundance of PhD graduates who are unable to obtain tenure-track positions at traditional colleges and universities, and the low costs of providing an education with small or non-existent physical campuses. Although for-profit institutions recently experienced a drop in enrollments (National Student Clearinghouse, 2013), there are still an increasing number of educational options for students to consider, which could have a negative effect on enrollment levels at public, regional universities. Another factor contributing to a competitive market for students is the rise of community colleges offering bachelor’s degrees. As of 2010, 18 states authorized community colleges to offer a limited number of bachelor’s degrees in high-demand fields such as nursing and technical subjects (Russell, 2010). Smaller and mid-size public institutions are already viewed as susceptible to competition from community colleges. Community colleges offering four-year degrees may make such public institutions even more vulnerable (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2011). A growing number of states and institutions have created articulation agreements to encourage a seamless transfer between community colleges and fouryear institutions (Anderson, Alfonso, & Sun, 2006; Ignash & Townsend, 2000). However, if community colleges begin to offer more four-year degrees on their own, students may no longer need to transfer to another institution to obtain a bachelor’s degree in certain fields. More recently, there has been widespread growth in the creation of massive open online courses (MOOCs), which are offered for free or with a nominal credentialing fee to anyone around the world, often provided by some of the most prestigious institutions (Pappano, 2012; 17 Rivard, 2013a). The rise of MOOCs is too new to know if they may harm enrollments at traditional universities, but some readily acknowledge the potential for this to happen (Adams, 2012; Barber, Donnelly, & Rizvi, 2013). Bowen (2013) stated that as reputable organizations such as the American Council on Education begin to credential MOOC courses for transfer credit, traditional colleges and universities would likely consider accepting those credits. In fact, several institutions recently announced initiatives to grant transfer credit for students who pass MOOC courses (Rivard, 2013b). These institutions initially found minimal interest from students in receiving transfer credits (Rivard, 2013b), but it is impossible to predict how this new option will develop during the coming years. Ultimately public, regional universities will need to make a compelling case for why students should attend their increasingly expensive institutions at a time when cheaper, more convenient options may exist, including MOOCs (Bowen, 2013). If this compelling case is not made and enrollment declines, it would further exacerbate institutions’ financial situations. There is a confluence of factors resulting in public, regional universities operating in an environment of increasingly constrained resources and increasing competition for students. Left unaddressed, these factors could greatly impact the ability of these institutions to exist in the same form in the future as they do today. No single factor represents the entire problem and no single response will provide all the solutions. This complex set of issues facing public, regional universities will likely require a variety of actions driven by a clear, compelling, and focused strategy (Flynn & Vredevoogd, 2010). Therefore, trying to understand institutional strategy is important and the focus of this study. 18 Significance Public, regional universities enroll a large number of students, even if different definitions of this sector suggest slightly different numbers of institutions and students enrolled. As of Fall 2011, approximately four million students were attending an institution that is part of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (2013a), an organization whose membership is largely comprised of public, regional universities. Despite the significant number of students that attend these institutions, it is an understudied area of higher education (Henderson, 2009). Yet, it remains an important sector of higher education. Lyall and Sell (2005) argued that public, regional universities are the most vulnerable but most needed type of higher education institution due to their emphasis on undergraduate teaching. Furthermore, public, regional universities help add to the diversity of higher education institutions and fill a specific niche just like community colleges, liberal arts institutions, and research universities. This institutional diversity is a long-valued part of the American higher education system and is important for enhancing student access and fulfilling a variety of national and state economic needs (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973; Stadtman, 1980). The strategies of public, regional universities are particularly important since these institutions are typically the most “in-tune” with the needs of the workforce and provide many of the “frontline” workers necessary in a capitalist society (Keller, 1999; Rowley & Sherman, 2001). As institutions face constrained resources they will make difficult decisions about program offerings and enrollment size that could impact the ability to train the necessary number of highly educated workers needed to meet future employment demands (Kelly & Strawn, 2011). The strategies of public, regional universities are also vital because of their impact on institutional survival. An increasingly competitive environment and increasingly constrained 19 resources have recently been identified as a threat to the financial sustainability of non-flagship public institutions (Inside Higher Ed, 2013; Moody’s Investors Service, 2013). “Particularly for public colleges and universities, repositioning with respect to contemporary environmental demands is difficult – not only in terms of determining how to reconcile conflicting demands, but also in terms of determining the extent to which the organization can respond to demands that threaten its survival” (Gumport, 2000, p. 85). Gumport’s warning in 2000 may be even more pertinent today given the challenges facing public, regional universities following the Great Recession. Therefore, it is vital to understand how public, regional universities develop strategies for remaining viable in the future and what that future will look like. Preview of Next Chapters In this chapter, I identified the challenges facing colleges and universities nationally and how these problems specifically affect public, regional universities. A constrained resource environment coupled with increasing competition has placed public, regional universities in a precarious situation. This study examined how three universities in this sector responded to this challenging environment. In the next chapter, I review the literature on strategy from a higher education and business perspective, ways in which strategies are articulated, and potential influences on strategy. In chapter three, I outline the methods for this study including a set of criteria for how I selected the case study institutions and the types of data collected and analyzed. This is followed by presenting the findings for each of the case study sites, a cross-case analysis examining similarities and differences between the sites, and a discussion of findings in the context of relevant literature. 20 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW In chapter one, I provided evidence that public, regional universities face an increasingly competitive environment at the same time they have increasingly constrained resources. In establishing this context I presented an overview of potential responses (e.g., increase research funding, increase fundraising efforts) that universities might take given the challenges they face. At the same time, I presented an overview of reasons why some of these responses may prove to be more challenging than others for public, regional universities to pursue. In this chapter I focus on the literature about strategy at a macro level. There is extensive literature on the topic of strategy, covering a number of different fields and industries. Since this study is concerned with universities, the literature pertaining to higher education strategy is reviewed. In order to help further frame the study, this literature review also examines business strategy since the concept of strategy has a more extensive history in business than higher education (Chaffee, 1985; Toma, 2012). Therefore, it is important to consider strategy from a business perspective to provide a fuller framework for understanding strategy as it pertains to higher education institutions. There are numerous theories on business and higher education strategy, and this review highlights a few of the theories that appear to be most pertinent to the research questions posed in this study. The literature review begins with a consideration of the multiple meanings of strategy and how it is defined in this study. Next, I review three types of strategies organizations may maintain: (1) coherent alignment, (2) differentiation, and (3) mimetic behavior. I provide an overview of each type of strategy and how it may apply in a higher education setting. I also consider how colleges and universities may lack a clear or cohesive strategy. Next, I provide an overview of four ways in which institutions develop and articulate their strategy: (1) industry 21 analysis, (2) strategic planning, (3) resource allocation, and (4) balanced scorecard. Then I consider what the literature says about what external and internal factors may influence the selection of strategies at higher education institutions. Finally, I conclude by considering why institutions might choose to change their strategy. Instead of framing this study through a single conceptual or theoretical framework, this literature review provides a number of theories for consideration. Tolbert (1985) argued, “organizational phenomena are much too complex to be described adequately by a single theoretical approach” (p. 12). Instead, this literature review provides multiple theoretical underpinnings to use in considering the issue of institutional strategy at public, regional universities. What is Strategy? There are wildly divergent opinions and theories about strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2004). One general dictionary definition of strategy is: “a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result” (Strategy, n.d.). Kaplan and Norton (2004) stated, “The art of strategy is to identify and excel at the critical few processes that are the most important to the customer value proposition” (p. 43). Some scholars included the importance of the external environment in shaping strategy and responding to change (Chafee, 1985; Keller, 1983; Mintzberg, 1987). Porter (1991) specifically mentioned competitors in stating “a firm’s strategy is manifested in the way in which it configures and links the many activities in its value chain relative to competitors” (p. 8). Others defined strategy within the context of setting aspirations to reach certain goals or fulfill a specific mission (Mintzberg, 1987; Toma, 2012). Keller (1983) included the consideration of resources in defining strategy as a means for “agreeing on some aims and having a plan to defeat one’s enemies – or to arrive at a destination 22 – through the effective use of resources” (p. 73). Mintzberg (1994) cautioned that there is a common misconception between strategy and planning, indicating that “planning is one proposed approach to strategy making among several that are possible” (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 14). This results in Mintzberg (1994) arriving at his definition of strategy as “a plan, or something equivalent – a direction, a guide or course of action into the future, a path to get from here to there” (p. 23). Mintzberg (1987) argued the word strategy has been used to mean different things in different contexts and there is not a single, universal definition of strategy. For the purposes of this study, the definition of strategy, as written in chapter one, is: A plan, method, or series of actions for obtaining a specific goal or aspiration, often in response to external challenges or competitors. Types of Strategy There are a number of strategies an organization can choose to follow. For the purposes of this literature review, I focus on three types of organizational strategies that exist in the business and higher education sectors: (1) coherent alignment, (2) differentiation, and (3) mimetic behavior. These three strategies are reviewed because they seem most appropriate to the study of public, regional universities. This sector of institutions is often viewed as being “stuck in the middle,” not a narrow, specialized institution but also not a name-brand research university (Henderson, 2009). As a sector considered to be “stuck in the middle,” an institution’s strategic choices may likely come down to determining how much or how little to differentiate from other institutions. The three types of strategy reviewed each provide a way of understanding different levels of differentiation or lack thereof that institutions may pursue. I also consider how colleges and universities may lack a clear or cohesive strategy since it is possible that some institutions may not articulate or follow a specific strategic direction. 23 Coherent Alignment One type of business strategy is described by Leinwand and Mainardi (2010) and is called the coherence premium. The coherence premium is based on the premise that “sustainable, superior returns accrue to companies that focus on what they do best” (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010, p. 87). Leinwand and Mainardi argued, “Coherent companies build deep, scalable expertise in just a few areas and align their strategy and day-to-day decision making to take advantage of them” (p. 88). This system provides companies with the benefits of aligning resources with priorities, creating efficiencies of scale, and creating alignments between strategy and decision-making (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010). Porter (1991) suggested there is value in companies developing a clear, consistent and focused strategy. Porter indicated that organizations can pursue many positions, but “choice is essential because there are logical inconsistencies in pursuing several types of advantage or different scopes simultaneously” (p. 8). Historically, successful firms have been found to develop a set of consistent internal goals and policies that permeate across units; the goals and policies align with external opportunities and threats; and the goals are focused on the firm’s set of unique strengths (Porter, 1991). However, “most companies don’t pass the coherence test because they pay too much attention to external positioning and not enough to internal capabilities. They succumb to intense pressure for top-line growth and chase business in markets where they don’t have the capabilities to sustain success” (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010, p. 87). When Anheuser-Busch tried to expand beyond the beer market into the snack food market the company found that the distribution of those two product lines differed more greatly than anticipated, and long-standing competitors in the snack food business had built-in advantages of 24 market share and production efficiencies compared to Anheuser-Busch (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010). It is difficult to apply the coherence premium to colleges and universities in the same way as to businesses. Many colleges and universities offer programs in a variety of fields and maintain multiple and overlapping missions most commonly related to teaching, research, and service (Birnbaum, 1988). The coherence premium may be most applicable to colleges and universities in examining when and where institutions expand. Even the largest universities do not maintain majors and programs in every field at every degree level (e.g., bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate). In examining decisions for opening and closing programs, institutions may choose to evaluate what their strengths and weaknesses are and whether they can reasonably compete in a specific area. Skinner and Miller (2013) found that one university, East Carolina University, went through a process of academic prioritization that included closing several programs that were not viewed as aligned with the university’s strategic direction. This could be seen as an example of an institution following a coherence premium strategy. Hendrickson, Lane, Harris, and Dorman (2013) argued the most focused institutions “only add programs, services, or responsibilities that advance their basic purpose and are in harmony with their core values” (p. 13). On the other hand, an institution expanding into an area in which it has not historically been involved would be the opposite of following a coherence premium. Some institutions create strategic plans with so many goals and objectives that it is impossible to point to a coherent direction the institution is pursuing (Stafford, 1993). Due to their multiple missions, colleges and universities may not be able to follow a coherence premium in the same manner as 25 a for-profit business, but Stafford (1993) contended that even large universities should identify a few top priorities that can separate them from competitors. Differentiation Another business strategy to consider is Kim and Mauborgne’s (2005) blue ocean strategy. The concept behind blue ocean strategy is that in a competitive marketplace, organizations compete with each other in a crowded environment trying to beat each other at the same game, which results in a bloody red ocean of competition (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). Red ocean strategy is often related to incremental changes around cost structure and product differentiation, but substantial differentiation is difficult in a crowded marketplace (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). Blue ocean strategy is about creating a value innovation and “opening up new and uncontested market space” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 12). Kim and Mauborgne (2005) found that strategic planning processes often keep companies focused on red oceans and traditional competitors. They concluded that companies should instead focus on how they can create a unique value proposition by reducing and eliminating non-unique elements and creating and expanding the unique elements of their company. For example, Cirque de Soleil created a new profitable segment of the entertainment industry at a time when traditional circuses were losing money. This was accomplished by eliminating high cost, low draw elements such as animals and famous clowns. These elements were supplanted with new, unique elements such as artistic music and dance (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). As it applies to postsecondary education, the concept of blue ocean strategy offers a good explanation for how land-grant universities and community colleges were formed to meet a specific need in the higher education marketplace. Land-grant universities were founded in the mid-to late-1800s to provide a pragmatic education in practical fields such as agriculture and the 26 mechanical arts, and community colleges provided a two year training ground as higher education enrollments boomed during the 1960s and 70s (Rosen, 2013; Thelin, 2004). More recently, blue ocean strategy may explain the rise of for-profit institutions. For-profit institutions found that certain segments of the population (i.e., adult and other non-traditional learners) were less concerned with the physical aspects of a college campus and extracurricular involvements compared to traditional-aged college students (Rosen, 2013). Instead, these students were interested in flexible course schedules built around a career-focused curriculum and advising structure. Instead of competing in the crowded marketplace with traditional providers, for-profit institutions provided a new, unique value proposition to a particular clientele (Rosen, 2013). It is fairly easy to see how specific segments within the larger higher education industry are differentiated from one another (e.g., for-profit institutions compared to liberal arts colleges). However, it is more difficult to find distinctive differences between institutions within the same segment of higher education. Yet, Leslie and Fretwell (1996) found that most successful institutions develop some type of niche, often the “combination of geographic, economic, and programmatic openings that institutions can fill” (p. 84). Types of distinctiveness may include: “building on existing strengths,” “meeting the basic educational and services needs of the community or region,” or “offering programs in fields either that are growing or in which a need is not being met for a given population” (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996, pp. 254-256). In a competitive environment, the institutions that focus on differentiating and distinguishing themselves in some way will likely be the most successful (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011). 27 Mimetic Behavior “U.S. higher education is notable for its segmentation – the impressive institutional diversity that offers most prospective students several options. But segmentation invites mission creep, as institutions seek the advantages that they perceive are at the next level” (Toma, 2012, p. 141). Toma (2012) argued institutions are not “inclined to actually pursue different activities or similar activities in different ways” (p. 152). “Regardless of marketing claims by institutions, academic programs among them are rarely different in meaningful ways, and the student experience away from the classroom at residential institutions is relatively standard,” everyone has an honors program, learning communities, study abroad options, freshmen seminars, and fitness centers (Toma, 2012, p. 120). Instead of differentiating themselves, many institutions pursue a strategy of imitation or mimetic behavior (Christensen & Erving, 2011). A mimetic approach, also referred to as isomorphism, has resulted in many institutions becoming obsessed with “moving to the next level” (Toma, 2012, p. 118) because this is viewed as the “preferred route to increased legitimacy and autonomy – and the greater resources perceived to accompany these” (Toma, 2012, p. 120). O’Meara (2007) and Toma (2012) further stated that institutions not only have similar aspirations but they maintain similar strategies in pursing these aspirations, namely recruiting top students and faculty, increasing research activities, adding graduate programs, building the newest and best learning facilities, and developing a message of being “on the move.” In a study of 38 colleges and universities in the Atlanta region, Toma found that most of the institutions wanted to move to the next level. That meant comprehensive universities offering more graduate programs and research universities increasing their research profile on a national stage (Toma, 2012). Synthesizing years of research, O’Meara (2007) indicated that “institutions that are recently vulnerable to market 28 trends” (p. 157) are most often among the institutions striving to reach “the next level,” commonly referred to as the pursuit of prestige. Isomorphism has not always been a prominent force in higher education. The original rise of land-grant colleges and universities and community colleges are examples of institutions forming around diverse missions (Thelin, 2004). Mission differentiation was particularly prominent in the 1950s and 1960s as state coordinating bodies attempted to avoid duplication and allocate resources effectively among diverse institutions (Bastedo & Gumport, 2003; Clark, 1983). However, Birnbaum (1983a) found that institutions have become more homogeneous over time due to competition for scarce resources and faculty at all institutions being trained at a small number of major research universities. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued, “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations” (p. 151). This is particularly true in well-established fields such as higher education where legitimization among peers is important and often pursued by following similar activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Toma, 2012). For example, Morphew (2009) identified numerous examples of universities maintaining an explicit goal to move to the “next level” in the Carnegie classifications schema. Public, regional universities may face particular pressure to emulate research universities as they seek legitimization among their peers during uncertain and challenging times (Hall, 2009; Henderson, 2009). Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Although there are several conceptualizations of types of strategies, there is also the possibility that an organization does not maintain a clear or cohesive strategy. Kim and Mauborgne (2005), referencing business strategy, stated that many companies do not maintain “a strategy at all but rather a smorgasbord of tactics that individually make sense but collectively 29 don’t add up to a unified, clear direction that sets a company apart” (p. 82). Although this statement was made about for-profit businesses, it may apply equally as well to higher education institutions. Colleges and universities often maintain a set of ambiguous and diffuse goals (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Cohen & March, 1974). Additionally, they are typically organized in a loosely coupled manner that allows individual units to operate autonomously from one another (Weick, 1976). These factors lead organizations to pursue multiple directions that may not always coherently align with one another (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Davis, 2007; Toma, 2012). Bess and Dee (2008b) provided a particularly strong summary on the possibility of higher education institutions lacking a clear or cohesive strategy: No omnibus conceptualization of strategy fits the complexity and nuances of the problems facing colleges and universities. A naïve view of strategy suggests that it is possible, indeed imperative, to set goals, identify the means to achieve them, establish timetables, monitor progress, and utilize feedback. This conceptualization assumes that the issues in contemporary college and university organizational life can be apprehended through rationality and logic and that, from the conclusions of this appraisal, the future can be predicted and planned for with some certainty. (p. 741) The possibility of an institution lacking a clear strategy is important to consider given the often comprehensive and diffuse nature of public, regional universities. How are Strategies Developed and Articulated? Mintzberg (1987) commented that strategy is not something that can be seen; it is unlikely that an institution would have in any one document a clear and comprehensive articulation of its strategy. Therefore, in order to examine institutional strategy, it is important to understand the multiple ways in which an institution may develop and express its strategy. The following forms are explored here: (a) industry analysis, (b) strategic planning, (c) resource allocation, and (d) balanced scorecard. These were selected because they represent a full cycle of institutional planning including environmental scanning (i.e., industry analysis), strategy 30 articulation (i.e., strategic planning), implementation (i.e., resource allocation), and evaluation (i.e., balanced scorecard). Each helps provide an understanding of areas to look toward in deciphering an institution’s strategy. Industry Analysis Porter’s (1979) conception of strategy places an organization within the broader marketplace of its industry. Porter (1979) argued, “The essence of strategy formulation is coping with competition” (p. 2). There are different forces that shape the competition of each industry but five common forces are: (1) threat of new entrants, (2) threat of substitute products, (3) bargaining power of customers, (4) bargaining power of suppliers, and (5) competitive rivalry within an industry (Porter, 1979). The prospect of new entrants threatens to cut into an organization’s market share. Substitute products are a threat if they offer a new angle while providing the same results, often at a lower price. Customers can exert power if products are undifferentiated and the customers then determine which product they desire. Suppliers can exert power over organizations by raising prices or changing the quality of goods and services provided. Rivalry exists in situations where there are numerous competitors of roughly equal size and power and there is a lack of product differentiation (Porter, 1979). These forces shape the marketplace of an industry and require organizations to respond and craft a strategy for dealing with each of the forces. “Strategy can be viewed as building defenses against competitive forces or as finding positions in the industry where the forces are weakest” (Porter, 1979, p. 8). In examining the higher education landscape utilizing Porter’s five forces, it is clear that at least a few of these forces may apply to current colleges and universities. In terms of new entrants, the rise in educational providers, particularly in the for-profit sector may serve as a 31 threat to other traditional institutions (Rosen, 2013). Online education is increasingly viewed as a substitute for a residential college experience (Martinez & Wolverton, 2009). Students who are able to take federal financial aid and loans to any college of their choosing have many choices and gain some power in their decision-making process (Martinez & Wolverton, 2009). The increasingly crowded marketplace causes competition among many institutions, with it often difficult to differentiate between the products they offer (Toma, 2012), a scenario Porter (1979) considered ripe for rivalry. The prevalence of competitive forces within the higher education sector provides a context from which colleges and universities craft their strategies. Strategic Planning Strategic planning is a relatively new phenomenon in higher education. During the 1960s and 1970s when strategic planning boomed in the business sector, higher education was focused mainly on expansion and new facilities, but not necessarily a comprehensive plan for the entire institution (Dooris, 2002). In the 1970s and 1980s, a confluence of challenges including shifting student demographics, technological advances, and increasing scrutiny from external stakeholders caused higher education institutions to rethink the need for strategic planning, which culminated in Keller’s (1983) landmark book on higher education strategic planning, Academic Strategy. In its infancy, strategic planning in colleges and universities was viewed as a “disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it” (Bryson, 1988, p. 4). By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, strategic planning came under criticism for being too linear (Birnbaum, 2000; Mintzberg, 1994; Schmidtlein, 1990). Rowley, Lujan, and Dolence (1997) argued that the linear model that was typically used successfully in business did not work as well for higher education because institutions often maintain more comprehensive missions and more stakeholders 32 maintain authority over various aspects of the organization compared to private businesses. In response to these criticisms, more institutions made efforts to “listen to the market, to encourage the emergence of good ideas, to allow employees to contribute, to help managers recognize opportunities and make good decisions, [and] to help an organization flourish amidst change” (Dooris, 2002, p. 3). Now strategic planning focuses more on organizational learning, creativity, and flexibility than an explicit linear plan to move an organization from one point to another (Dooris, 2002; Keller, 1999). At its core, strategic planning is intended to provide institutions with a set of goals or priorities to pursue over an upcoming period of time. Rowley, Lujan, and Dolence (1997) posited “the end product of strategic planning is not so much to write a ‘plan’ as it is to change thinking and introduce a model in which ongoing decisions are made strategically” (p. 67). How this occurs can vary. Keller (1997) argued that strategic planning was too new to higher education and institutions too varied for there to be one “proven set of procedures” (p. 163) for institutions to follow in establishing strategic plans. Despite differences in planning processes, it is fairly common for most plans to involve: (a) an external scan of the environment; (b) identification of institutional strengths and weaknesses, typically done through a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis; (c) the delineation of a mission, vision, and goals or priorities; (d) metrics to monitor the success of meeting goals and priorities; and (e) the development of such a plan in a generally collegial and inclusive manner (Morrill, 2007; Rowley, Lujan, & Dolence, 1997). Other than these broad characteristics, there are numerous ways institutions craft, implement, and resource their plans (Mintzberg, 1994; Morrill, 2007; Rowley, Lujan, & Dolence, 1997). Regardless of the exact manner in which an institution 33 develops its strategic plan, the plan can provide insights about the general strategy of an institution (Rowley, Lujan, & Dolence, 1997). Resource Allocation Closely tied to the process of strategic planning is resource allocation, specifically aligning resources with strategic priorities. Resource allocation is not a strategy in and of itself, but it can often be an indicator of an institution’s strategy. Rowley and Sherman (2001) argued, “Control of the budget is control of the strategic plan and control of the campus” (p. 174). Chabotar (1999) commented, “In a sense, the budget becomes the plan with dollar signs added” (p. 18). Keller (1983) made a similar argument in stating that an institution that is serious about strategic planning “needs to put some of its money where its mouth is” (p. 168). However, Mintzberg (1994) found that it is rare for planners to have budgetary authority. If budgetary decisions are made in isolation of planning decisions it is unlikely that there will be strong alignment between strategic priorities and financial resources. Regardless of whether an institution effectively aligns its financial resources with its espoused priorities, the budget is ultimately “the financial representation of the institution’s plans-both strategic and operational [and] even a cursory review [of the budget] will suggest the relative importance of the mission components” (Goldstein, 2012, p. 2). Balanced Scorecard The balanced scorecard is a management tool that is often utilized in business to translate strategic objectives into measurable indicators that “allow managers to look at the business from four important perspectives” (Kaplan & Norton, 1992, p. 72). The balanced scorecard changes the focus from the traditional emphasis on profits to also considering the customer, internal, and innovation and learning perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The scorecard brings together 34 many disparate parts of an organization and can help show where an organization stands and where it needs to go to achieve its objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The intention is that focusing on areas such as customers, internal employees, and developing a culture of learning and innovation will lead to good financial outcomes without explicitly focusing on only the bottom line (Kaplan & Norton, 1993). Different industries and firms within industries require different scorecards. The balanced scorecard is not widely used in higher education since it was originally devised with a focus on customers purchasing tangible goods from for-profit businesses (Beard, 2009; Karathanos & Karathanos, 2005). However, it may become more useful as external entities increase their scrutiny of colleges and universities and seek clear measures of the value institutions provide (Stewart & Carpenter-Hubin, 2001). Umashankar and Dutta (2007), in applying the balanced scorecard concept to higher education, identified what the four business perspectives of the scorecard would look like at colleges and universities. The customer perspective would be related to students, parents, faculty, staff, alumni, and society at large; the operations perspective would deal with the implementation and delivery of services; the innovation and learning perspective would deal with faculty and staff development; and the financial perspective would be most similar to business and deal with the monetary bottom line (Umashankar & Dutta, 2007). However, each institution may develop its own unique scorecard. Ohio State University identified diversity, student learning, academic excellence, outreach and engagement, and resource management as its key indicators to track utilizing a balanced scorecard approach (Stewart & Carpenter-Hubin, 2001). The overarching idea is that a balanced scorecard could allow colleges and universities to identify their top priorities and regularly 35 measure and monitor performance in those areas, serving as a snapshot of an institution’s strategy. What Influences the Selection of Strategy? Having reviewed types of strategy and ways institutions articulate their strategies, it is next important to understand what factors influence the selection of strategy. In the following sections some of these influences are explored from an external and internal perspective. External Influences Kezar (2014) argued that changes at colleges and universities are increasingly driven by the external environment as opposed to intentional changes brought upon by internal debate and consideration of a range of alternatives. In chapter one, I described a range of externally-based challenges facing public, regional universities. These included decreasing state appropriations due to poor economic conditions, demographic shifts resulting in a projected decline in high school graduates, and increasing competition for students specifically from new and expanding online education options. I will not discuss these specific influences again, but it is important to remember that these are each examples of external factors that may influence an institution’s strategic direction. Here I add to these external influences, specifically highlighting some of the theoretical underpinnings of how external factors influence strategy. Organizations depend on resources from a variety of sources and those dependencies often influence the decisions and actions of organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When resources are centralized among a few providers, greater power accrues among those providers over the organizations to which they provide resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, public universities have historically been reliant upon state government funding. As a result, public universities have been subject to varying amounts of control by the states that may dictate 36 what strategies an institution pursues (Tolbert, 1985). In Georgia, for example, “there is a benefit in the funding formula for offering more graduate education, thus contributing to the desire to inflate [institutional] missions” (Toma, 2012, p. 149). In response, organizations often try to limit their dependencies and, therefore, control of external entities over their organization (Pfeffer, 1987). Morphew (2002) argued that institutions are constantly seeking new revenue through “distance education, technology transfer, or new degree programs in graduate education,” (p. 212) among other initiatives. However, when organizations attempt to limit their reliance on one source of funding (e.g., state appropriations), they often create new dependencies upon another source of funding (e.g., private donations) (Pfeffer, 1987). Regardless of what external entity provides resources to an organization, Hannan and Freeman (1977) asserted that organizational strategy is often reactive to the external environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) found that “power accrues to those [academic] departments that are most instrumental in bringing in or providing resources which are highly valued by the total organization” (p. 470). Those units that bring in greater amounts of external resources also end up receiving a greater share of institutional resources through internal budgetary processes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). This means that an institutional strategy, at least in terms of which units receive resources, may be dictated more by a response to external funding sources than by a rational decision-making process within the organization. Besides reliance upon certain external entities for resources, organizational strategies can also be influenced by external entities that do not provide resources but are members of the same industry. Toma (2012) indicated that universities are good at benchmarking and comparing themselves to other universities and are also influenced by national higher education 37 associations. Bess and Dee (2008a) argued that “colleges and universities are embedded in institutional environments where state governments, professional associations, accreditation organizations, and other external agents generate rules, regulations, and requirements for organizational performance, leading colleges and universities to adopt practices that conform to institutionalized expectations” (p. 142). Universities often find it easier to imitate market leaders and well established organizations rather than risk following a unique but untested strategy (Toma, 2012). Therefore, strategy is often dictated by industry peers rather than determined uniquely at each college and university. This type of strategy may be labeled as mimetic, with the reason for following that strategy being to increase legitimacy among external peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). “Positioning for prestige is the standard strategic direction chosen across higher education . . . prestige is to higher education as profit is to corporation” (Toma, 2012, p. 119). Internal Influences “Institutions certainly are influenced by powerful, external factors such as demographic, economic, and political conditions, yet they are also shaped by strong forces that emanate from within” (Tierney, 1988, p. 3). How these internal forces manifest within an institution depends on the makeup of that organization. Scott and Davis (2007) identified three basic types of organizations: (1) rational, (2) natural, and (3) open systems. Rational organizations “are collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 29). Natural organizations are “collectivities whose participants are pursuing multiple interests, both disparate and common, but who recognize the value of perpetuating the organization as an important resource” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 30). The open systems perspective views organizations as “congeries of 38 interdependent flows and activities linking shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resource and institutional environments” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 32). The prior examination of external influences on colleges and universities aligns with the open systems perspective, but higher education institutions also display characteristics of a natural system organization. Complex organizations such as colleges and universities often maintain numerous goals across loosely coupled units, sometimes with limited consistency and coordination (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Davis, 2007; Toma, 2012). Additionally, the long-standing tradition of shared governance within higher education institutions provides for multiple constituencies to maintain authority within institutions, specifically governing boards, the president and senior administrators, and the faculty (Birnbaum, 1989; Kezar & Eckel, 2004). Each of these internal stakeholders has the potential to influence strategy. As the legal and fiduciary agents of colleges and universities, trustees are officially responsible for their institutions’ mission and strategic direction (American Association of University Professors, 1966; Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2010; Birnbaum, 1983b). Additionally, some trustees who are particularly heavily engaged in their work, or what some may call activist, may influence the broad strategic directions of an institution through the power of personality or other informal means (Bastedo, 2005). Presidents and senior administrators, whether through their formal authority to make decisions or their ability to frame challenges, also play a major role in determining institutional strategy (Kempner, 2003; Neumann, 1995; Zusman, 2005). In the case of presidents, “there is a natural instinct to grow their colleges” (Rosen, 2013, p. 8), both because presidents across all institutional types are often uniformly trained at major research universities and because it is difficult for a president to 39 pursue a non-growth strategy without the board, faculty, and/or alumni revolting (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011; Rosen, 2013). Presidents want bold, exciting plans and stories to tell donors, which often drives institutional strategy (DeMillo, 2011). Although boards, presidents, and senior administrators maintain the most formal authority to establish and influence an institution’s strategic direction, faculty play a unique role in higher education institutions with the potential to influence strategic decisions (Birnbaum, 2004). Colleges and universities are an example of a professional bureaucracy, where faculty retain some power and authority as subject-matter experts within the organization. Within professional bureaucracies, individuals often tie their identities not only to their organizations but also to their larger professional network (Mintzberg, 1979). At colleges and universities, many faculty earned advanced degrees from research universities where the culture and norms may differ from those of a public, regional university (Birnbaum, 1983a, 1988). Therefore, the strategy of public, regional universities may be influenced by a set of stakeholders who advocate for their current institutions to follow the same strategies as the research institutions at which they were trained (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011; Henderson, 2009; Henderson & Kane, 1991). Faculty unions are another internal factor that may influence strategy. Faculty unions have been a growing part of American higher education governance since the 1970s, with unions most likely to exist at public over private institutions and at regional over research institutions (Altbach, 2005; Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). It is debatable what influence unions have on institutional governance, but unions may exercise varying degrees of authority on issues ranging from promotion and tenure policies and salaries and benefits to being consulted on institutional 40 budget matters; each of which may impact an institution’s ability to set a certain strategic direction (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). Faculty senates are another entity internal to institutions that exert influence over strategic decisions. Faculty senates often maintain significant authority over academic matters including the integrity of an institution’s curriculum, the development and approval of new courses and programs, changes to or closings of programs, and establishing graduation requirements (Tierney & Minor, 2003). The exact authority a faculty senate maintains depends upon each institution’s structure and commitment to shared governance. Tierney & Minor (2003), in a national study of faculty senates, found 47% of institutions follow a “fully collaborative decision-making” model with shared responsibility for decision-making between administrators and the faculty, 27% follow a “consultative decision-making” model with more authority residing with administrators, and 26% follow a “distributive decision-making” model with specific responsibilities assigned to different administrative and faculty units. Regardless of the level of formal authority faculty senates maintain, Birnbaum (1989) argued that faculty senates often exercise significant informal authority as a deliberative and symbolic body that can serve as a resistance to change. Such informal authority may not result in a faculty senate imposing its strategic will upon an institution, but can help shape the direction of an institution by becoming a grounds for vetting and speaking out on administrative strategic initiatives on both academic and non-academic matters (Birnbaum, 1989). As one might expect in an organization with multiple internal stakeholders involved in decision-making processes, it is often internal politics, not a rational set of decision-making criteria that dictate what decisions are made (Dill, 1984; Eckel, 2002; Hackman, 1985; Volk, Slaughter, & Thomas, 2001). Mintzberg (1979) contended that when power lies with a group of 41 professional and highly skilled workers, they often maintain a high degree of autonomy over their work and may be able to pursue their own strategies. In this type of environment, “everybody must agree on the change, not just a few managers or professional representatives. So change comes slowly and painfully, after much political intrigue and shrewd maneuvering by the professional and administrative entrepreneurs” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 67). Rhoades (2000) argued that many provosts and deans have tried to take politics out of decision-making processes with little success. Such politics may not only dictate who gets what, but also may expand the number of people and units getting something altogether. As institutional leaders attempt to please too many people and provide something for everyone, institutions are often left without a coherent strategy (Stafford, 1993). Why Institutions Might Change Strategies There are numerous external and internal factors that influence the selection of strategy. In a dynamic and shifting environment, organizations are often forced to respond to their changing circumstances (Burke, 2011; Gumport, 2000; Kaplan & Norton, 1996, 2004). Porter (1991) stated, “The problem is not selecting good strategies but creating a flexible organization that learns and is able to continually redefine its strategy” (p. 16). Kaplan and Norton (1996) added, “the planned strategy, though initiated with the best of intentions and with the best available information and knowledge, may no longer be appropriate or valid for contemporary conditions” (p. 19). For example, organizations may change directions as they become dependent upon new resource providers or current resource providers change priorities (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); resource constraints may thwart institutional ambitions (Harris, 2011); or, a visionary and often times new leader may take an institution in a new direction (Asimov, 2013; Kiley, 2013; Rosser & Penrod, 1991). Given the number of challenges that public, regional 42 universities face, a number of institutions may have found it necessary to change their strategies during the past several years. Most organizations establish an intended strategy, but over time a different, emergent strategy may develop (Mintzberg, 1994). “The real world inevitably involves some thinking ahead of time as well as some adaptation en route . . . emergent strategies are not necessarily bad and deliberate ones good; effective strategies mix these characteristics in ways that reflect the conditions at hand” (Mintzberg, 1994, pp. 24-25). Hendrickson, Lane, Harris, and Dorman (2013) believe this “allows an institution to use its mission as a lens to interpret changes in the environment and connect institutional aspirations with what is happening in the world” (p. 12). Just as organizations change for a variety of reasons, how they change also differs. There are two basic degrees of change, first-order changes and second-order changes. First-order changes involve minor tweaks and improvements and are often referred to as transactional, whereas second-order changes are transformational changes with significant adjustments to institutional mission and values (Burke, 2011; Kezar, 2001). First-order changes are more common in higher education than second-order changes, but there are still a number of examples of second-order changes within the industry (Goodman, 1982; Kezar, 2001). One well-known change story occurred at Elon University. Struggling to meet enrollment targets, remain solvent, and create a name for itself outside its immediate geographic region, Elon changed its entire strategy in the 1980s (Keller, 2004b). Elon moved from “a lowcost to a medium-cost college” and created a niche market of “students from loving, affluent families with average and slightly above-average academic credentials” (Keller, 2004b, pp. 1213). In 2006, Cleveland State University sought to become a stronger research university and set a goal to increase its annual research portfolio from $30 million to $50 million. However, in a 43 difficult economy and an intensely competitive fight for external research dollars, Cleveland State struggled to meet this goal. As a result, university leaders decided to cut spending on research activities and re-focus on undergraduate teaching and improving its graduation rate (Kelderman, 2011). Morphew (2009) offered several examples of institutions seeking to become more comprehensive and move into new classifications within the Carnegie schema, and Baker and Baldwin (2014) identified a number of liberal arts colleges increasing professional and vocational programs. Regardless of how organizations change, these examples demonstrate the possibility of institutions switching strategies, often quite drastically from previous directions. Summary Despite the abundance of theories about organizational strategy, there is little empirical research about the strategies of colleges and universities (Chaffee, 1985; Toma, 2012). Specifically, there are no known studies looking at the institutional-level strategies of public, regional universities coming out of the Great Recession. Skinner and Miller (2013) explored some of the particular tactics one university implemented in response to the Great Recession, but this study did not explore the broader issue of a macro institutional strategy. The existing theoretical literature about strategy helps provide a basis for understanding what may be occurring at public, regional universities. However, empirical research is important to add to this body of literature, specifically as it relates to the understudied sector of public, regional universities. Chapter one outlined the challenges facing public, regional universities and why it may be necessary for these institutions to develop clear, compelling, and focused strategies. In chapter one it was also established that there may be limits to the types of actions public, regional universities can take in the current environment of increasing competition and 44 constrained resources. This chapter outlined some of the broad theoretical underpinnings of what an institutional level strategy might look like, what might influence the creation of that strategy, and what might cause an institution to change strategies. In chapter three, I delineate the methods that were utilized to answer the research questions posed at the beginning of chapter one. 45 CHAPTER 3: METHODS In the first two chapters I described how public, regional universities face an increasingly competitive environment with constrained resources, especially since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008. In order to examine the strategies of particular institutions and what influences the selection of those strategies, I conducted a multi-site qualitative case study (Merriam, 2009) to explore the following research questions for each of three case study institutions: (1) What is the institutional strategy of the university? (2) Has the strategy of the university changed since 2008? If so, how? (3) What influences setting a strategy at the university? Design of the Study This study was based on an interpretive/constructivist epistemology (Creswell, 2009; Merriam, 2009). Interpretive research, often used interchangeably with constructivism, “assumes that reality is socially constructed, that is, there is no single, observable reality. Rather, there are multiple realities, or interpretations, of a single event” (Merriam, 2009, p. 8). This approach was selected because Mintzberg (1987) indicated that “no one has ever seen a strategy or touched one; every strategy is an invention, a figment of someone’s imagination” (p. 16). Therefore, in order to study the concept of strategy it was important to utilize a research approach that recognizes the existence of multiple realities and seeks to describe, understand, and interpret a specific phenomenon rather than searching for and predicting an absolute truth (Merriam, 2009). The study design was a multi-site qualitative case study (Merriam, 2009). Qualitative studies are useful for exploring a phenomenon in depth to understand the nuances and intricacies 46 of complex situations (Creswell, 2009). Since strategy and what influences the selection of strategy can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, it was important to develop a deep understanding of this topic and the intricate details of what occurred within each institution. In a study of why certain colleges chose to become comprehensive universities, Morphew (2002) utilized a quantitative approach to test correlations between certain institutional factors and an institution’s decision to become a university. Morphew acknowledged, however, that such an approach does not allow one to examine the motivations or influences behind such decisions. The focus of my study was on such motivations and influences. I was not seeking to identify correlations or make causal inferences based on a set of institutional characteristics and how those characteristics are tied to an institution’s strategy. I conducted case studies because they are useful for examining “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 2008). This study considered why public, regional universities select certain strategies and how and why strategies may have changed since the Great Recession. Additionally, case studies can be useful in exploring relatively unknown phenomenon (Merriam, 2009). Although strategy has been studied extensively in the business sector, it has been explored in a more limited manner within the context of higher education institutions (Chaffee, 1985; Toma, 2012). Specifically, I utilized a multi-site case study approach (Merriam, 2009) examining three public, regional universities. I was interested in what occurred in the larger sector of public, regional universities, but decisions about strategy and what influences those decisions occur at an institutional level. Therefore, it was important to conduct this study with individual institutions as the unit of analysis. As described in chapter one, the higher education segment of public, regional universities is large and complex. Therefore, studying three institutions allowed me to 47 consider similarities and differences between institutions within this sector and provide richer and fuller analysis on the issue of strategy within public, regional universities as opposed to what could be gleaned from a single case study site (Merriam, 2009). However, limiting the study to three institutions still allowed me to study each institution in sufficient depth to understand a topic as broad and ambiguous as institutional strategy. Although qualitative research typically follows an inductive method of making meaning of a phenomenon without deductively testing specific hypotheses or theories, it is often still grounded in the context of existing theories (Merriam, 2009). In the literature review, I described three theories and conceptualizations of strategies that institutions may follow: (1) coherent alignment (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010), (2) differentiation (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005), and (3) mimetic behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). I also examined some of the external (e.g., resource providers) and internal (e.g., faculty autonomy) factors that may influence the selection of a strategy. This study, through induction, utilized these frameworks to help understand and explain what is currently taking place at three public, regional universities, without limiting my consideration by focusing on only one or two theories. Sample Selection Case studies require both the selection of a site to study and the selection of individuals from the site to participate in the study (Merriam, 2009). Purposeful sampling is often utilized in qualitative studies in order to allow the researcher to “select a sample from which the most can be learned” (Merriam, 2009, p. 77). In making my sample selection decisions, I utilized a criterion-based approach whereby I delineated the specific attributes I was looking for in my sample and why those attributes were important for fulfilling my study (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993). 48 Site Selection In chapter one, I outlined a number of challenges facing public, regional universities. However, those challenges do not impact each of these nearly 400 institutions equally. Therefore, it was vital that I selected case study sites facing many of the challenges most common to this sector of higher education in order to provide a reasonable representation of what additional universities within this sector face. In order to further ease comparisons across case study sites, I selected each institution from within the same state and reveal that state in order to provide important contextual information about the context in which the case study institutions operate. The state I selected my case study sites from is Michigan. Four-year public universities in the state of Michigan experienced many challenges during the past several years, including one of the largest declines in state appropriations in the country (State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013), and one of the largest declines in high school graduates across the country (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012). These challenges helped ensure the case study institutions faced many of the same difficulties as other public, regional universities. Additionally, Michigan provided a strong context for selecting case study sites since Michigan does not maintain a statewide governing system for higher education (McGuinness, 2014). This was important because it allowed me to examine institutions with a large degree of autonomy and flexibility in setting their own strategic direction (Bracco, Richardson, Callan, & Finney, 1999). Once I selected Michigan as the state context for my study, I identified potential sites to approach about participating in this study through an expert nomination process (Dexter, 1970). I worked with a representative of the President’s Council of State Universities of Michigan to 49 help identify public, regional universities in the state that based on the representative’s professional expertise were thought to provide a rich example for this study. Once potential sites were identified, I contacted the president’s office of each institution, described my study, and provided a list of potential interview participants and institutional documents needed to complete the study. Based on this initial outreach, three of the five president’s offices I contacted agreed to help facilitate their institution’s participation as a case study site. Each institution provided me with a main point of contact to help coordinate all aspects of the site study. Participant Selection The individuals I interviewed were chosen based on their relevant involvement in helping establish or being close observers of the process of establishing institutional strategy. In rational organizations, with clear hierarchies, this is relatively easy to determine by looking at an organizational chart (Bess & Dee, 2008b; Scott & Davis, 2007). However, the long-standing tradition of shared governance within higher education institutions indicates that multiple constituencies are involved in decision-making processes (Birnbaum, 1989; Kezar & Eckel, 2004). At various points in the evolution of colleges and universities, authority has shifted among different players, mainly between boards of trustees, presidents and senior administrators, and the faculty (Duryea, 2000; Thelin, 2004). Recently, administrators, specifically presidents, are viewed as maintaining more power and authority in making large institutional decisions compared to boards and faculty (Duderstadt, 2000; Duryea, 2000; Gingsberg, 2013; Keller, 2004a; Zusman, 2005). This is viewed as particularly true at non-research institutions (Clark, 2010). Given the history of shared governance at colleges and universities, but with a current bend in favor of administrative decision-making, I chose to mainly interview administrators but also included faculty representatives from each institution. 50 For each of the three case study sites, I reviewed the organizational structure of the institution and identified potential interview participants including the president, each vice president, additional cabinet-level direct reports to the president, and faculty members in leadership positions with the faculty senate, faculty union, or academic department/center. I shared this list with my main point of contact at each institution, who suggested which individuals were most involved in discussions of institutional strategy at the university (Jones, Torres, & Arminio, 2014). This was important since organizational structures and position titles vary across institutions, and it was vital that each of the individuals I interviewed could provide substantial insights about institutional strategy and what influences the selection of strategy at their institution. Each institutional gatekeeper also helped identify the best way to reach out and setup an interview with each participant, sometimes through my direct contact and other times using the gatekeeper as an intermediary for an introduction. There was not a pre-set number of interviews I sought at each institution, but I remained conscious of interviewing a similar number of people in similar positions across the three sites. Table 1 below provides a full list of interviewees by generic position title (to mask institutional and individual identities). Data Collection I utilized two sources for data collection: documents and interviews. Although each institution labels and categorizes documents differently, I reviewed the following types of documents at each institution: mission, vision, and values statement; strategic plan; annual and long-term budget; marketing and branding plan; capital campaign plan; enrollment management plan; and state of the university addresses. I reviewed the current version of these documents and, where applicable, prior versions dating back for six years since this case study is bounded within the six year period since the start of the Great Recession in 2008. I reviewed each 51 institution’s documents prior to conducting interviews at that case study site in order to familiarize myself with the context and history of the institution, providing for a more robust interview discussion. Table 1: Interview Participants by Institution and Generic Title Undergraduate Teaching University President Chief Academic Officer Chief Financial Officer Chief Enrollment Officer Chief Advancement Officer Faculty Leader 1 Faculty Leader 2 Community-Driven University President Chief Academic Officer Chief Financial Officer Chief Enrollment Officer Chief Advancement Officer Chief Public Relations Officer Chief of Staff Faculty Leader 1 Faculty Leader 2 Balancing Act University President Chief Academic Officer Chief Financial Officer Chief Enrollment Officer Chief Advancement Officer Chief Public Relations Officer Faculty Leader 1 Faculty Leader 2 In-person interviews lasting approximately one-hour each were conducted with the key university stakeholders previously identified. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed with the permission of the interviewee. I also took field notes to record nonverbal cues and contextual information (Merriam, 2009). Interviews followed a semi-structured format as is common in qualitative research (Merriam, 2009). There were specific questions I explored with each individual, but based on the individual’s position there were some areas I explored in more depth with some participants than others. I utilized an interview guide as a framework for each interview (Merriam, 2009). After developing my initial interview guide I conducted two pilot interviews with individuals in similar positions to my study participants. Based on my observations from the pilot interviews and feedback from the pilot participants about the likelihood of garnering the information I was seeking from the guide I developed, I made minor adjustments to the interview guide prior to beginning my first full study interviews. 52 My questions focused on the following three topic areas: (1) the determination and articulation of an institutional strategy, (2) the influences on selecting a strategy, and (3) how and why strategies changed, if they did, during the Great Recession. Determination and articulation of institutional strategy questions focused on areas related to goals and aspirations, positioning compared to competitor, peer, and aspirational institutions, and major institutional decisions (e.g., program expansion or contraction, financial sustainability). Questions about influences on the selection of a strategy focused on what external and internal forces influence institutional decision-making. Questions pertaining to possible changes in strategy during the Great Recession focused on identifying what aspects of the original strategy changed and what factors led to making such a change. See Appendix A for a complete version of the interview guide. Data Analysis In keeping with standard qualitative research practices, I began preliminary analysis of data throughout the collection process (Merriam, 2009). I reviewed documents prior to conducting any interviews and began recording general notes and observations about the institution. Once I began interviews, I reviewed field notes after each interview to look for emerging themes and points of contention across interviews. This preliminary analysis throughout the data collection process at each case study site allowed me to develop and explore tentative themes and ideas with participants (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Ongoing analysis also helped me determine when I met an appropriate point of saturation in the data and whether additional participants were necessary. Saturation means, “successive examination of sources yields redundancy and that the data you have seem complete and integrated” (Glesne, 2011, p. 193). Following document reviews and interviews at each case study site, I determined that I obtained sufficient information to provide a robust analysis of each site. I determined that the 53 final interviews at each institution yielded mainly redundant information and that additional interviews would not add material value to understanding the case study institution. Once all data were collected, I utilized the software program NVivo to organize and analyze my data. I coded data from each institution separately, following a thematic analysis process “searching through the data for themes and patterns” (Glesne, 2011, p. 187). I began with an open coding process of the transcribed interviews, trying to be as expansive as possible in highlighting pertinent information and assigning a code to each piece of highlighted data (Merriam, 2009). Documents were analyzed in a similar manner. I specifically focused on parts of the documents related to institutional strategy. For example, marketing and branding plans often included information about color schemes and the use of logos that was not particularly relevant to a study of institutional strategy. These sections of the documents were not coded. Additionally, budget documents did not lend themselves to coding in the same manner as textual documents. In analyzing budget documents, I made observations about trends in monetary allocations among units and coded those observations. Throughout the analysis process I looked for information that shed light on the institution’s strategy, specific choices that were made about what direction/s to pursue, signs of what influenced decisions, and whether strategic directions changed during the Great Recession. I utilized a constant comparative approach to examine how the data related to one another (Glesne, 2011). I also looked for contradictory information. “A strength of qualitative research is that it can help reveal underlying complexities . . . therefore, [it] is important to be aware of the tensions that exist and where and why people differ from the norm” (Glesne, 2011, p. 188). These alternative explanations that did not fit emerging patterns were also marked with appropriate codes. 54 Coding was the first step in the analysis process. Next, it was important to “produce explanations and build models” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 78). Following my initial analysis, I condensed codes into groups or categories using an analytical coding process. Richards (2005) described analytical coding as “coding that comes from interpretation and reflection on meaning” (p. 94). Categories encompassed multiple individual codes and began to provide an interpretation of the larger meaning of the data. I sought to limit the number of categories to ensure they were more broad-based and analytical than overly detailed and descriptive, but I did not set a predetermined number of categories to utilize (Merriam, 2009). Allowing categories to emerge both in terms of their labels and the overall number helped ensure I did not analyze data with preconceived notions in mind (Merriam, 2009). I also followed Merriam’s (2009) guidelines for developing categories: [Categories] must be responsive to (i.e., answer) the research questions and . . . 1. Be as sensitive to the data as possible 2. Be exhaustive (enough categories to encompass all relevant data) 3. Be mutually exclusive (a relevant unit of data can be placed in only one category) 4. Be conceptually congruent (all categories are at the same conceptual level) (p. 186) Once categories were developed, I further organized these under the three broad research questions related to strategy, change, and influences. Then I wrote descriptive and comprehensive findings sections for each of the three case study sites. The length of the findings for each university differs based upon the complexity of the institution and congruence or lack thereof across participant responses. Next I re-engaged in the analysis process, analyzing the findings of the three cases in comparison to each other. Similar techniques were utilized during the cross-case analysis as were utilized when analyzing the individual cases, consistent with the standard protocol of multi-site studies (Merriam, 2009). In writing the cross-case analysis I 55 focused on highlighting the major similarities and tensions among the three sites related to the original research questions. Although differences existed across the three sites, the cross-case analysis provides a framework for understanding what generally occurred across the institutions (Yin, 2008). Finally, I wrote the discussion section interpreting the individual and cross-case findings in the context of the literature previously reviewed. Validity and Reliability It is important in any research study to be able to convince the reader of the trustworthiness of the study, typically done by employing rigorous techniques that ensure the study’s validity and reliability (Merriam, 2009). This study followed several of the suggested methods of accounting for internal validity, reliability, and external validity (Merriam, 2009). Internal Validity Internal validity (also referred to as credibility) is concerned with whether the findings of the study match reality (Merriam, 2009). I utilized adequate engagement in data collection, triangulation of the data, seeking alternative explanations, peer review, and reflexivity to ensure internal validity (Merriam, 2009). Adequate engagement in data collection was ensured through interviewing a variety of stakeholders and seeking further data until a point of redundancy was met (Merriam, 2009). Triangulation of the data helps ensure there is ample support for findings from a variety of sources (Merriam, 2009). I collected data through multiple methods (i.e., documents, interviews), from multiple sources (i.e., several documents, 7-9 interviews per institution), and relying upon multiple theories (see chapter two) to confirm emerging findings (Denzin, 1978). In the analysis section, I outlined steps I took to look for and highlight alternative explanations contrary to the most common patterns and themes identified. I also engaged in a peer review process to ensure I presented findings in an unbiased manner. I asked a 56 colleague to review the interview transcripts and findings section for one of the case studies to examine whether the content and organization of the findings were congruent with the raw data (Merriam, 2009). Based upon the peer reviewer’s feedback, I reviewed that case’s findings along with the other two cases, making revisions to account for alternative ways of interpreting the data. It is also important that I briefly reflect upon my position as the researcher and the biases and assumptions I brought to this project. I came to this study with a familiarity with both the literature and practice of strategy at colleges and universities. In chapter two I presented some of the strategy literature I believed to be most relevant to this study. Although most of this material was reviewed prior to embarking on my data collection, I continued to review pertinent literature throughout data collection and writing stages to ensure the best literature framework for interpreting the study findings. I also came to this study with prior work experience in multiple university presidents’ offices where I was involved in and surrounded by conversations and projects related to institutional strategy. I saw examples of institutions maintaining clear and cohesive strategies and institutions lacking a strategy. I witnessed institutions trying to emulate competitors and I witnessed institutions focusing on a unique niche. I also saw different external and internal stakeholders influence strategy to varying degrees across institutions. I came to this study with no preconceived notions of what is most appropriate for public, regional universities or what I was most likely to find in terms of their strategy. I worked diligently to separate my professional experiences from the data I collected and only drew interpretations supported by the data. 57 Reliability The purpose of reliability is to allow for a study to be replicated. This is problematic for qualitative researchers “because human behavior is never static” (Merriam, 2009, p. 220). As a result, qualitative researchers are more concerned with the consistency and dependability of their findings rather than an ability to duplicate a study with the same results. Merriam (2009) identified the creation of an audit trail as one way to demonstrate the reliability, consistency, and dependability of a study. An audit trail indicates how decisions are made throughout a research study (Merriam, 2009). Throughout the research process I recorded in a journal the decisions and rationale for decisions about the sites selected, how contact was made with the case study institutions, documents collected, interview participants chosen and how they were contacted, the full list of initial codes, and the full list of categories and explanations of categories. If a reader had questions about how and why decisions were made, this would allow them to track each of my decisions and determine whether they think my decisions were appropriate for this study. External Validity “External validity [commonly referred to as transferability or generalizability] is concerned with the extent to which the findings of one study can be applied to other situations” (Merriam, 2009, p. 223). To establish external validity I sought variation in interview participants, provided rich, thick descriptions of the data, and made modest extrapolations of the data. Conducting interviews with a variety of participants in different positions across the case study institutions “allows for the possibility of a greater range of application by readers or consumers of the research” (Merriam, 2009, p. 227). Additionally, I provided rich, thick descriptions of the data to ensure participants’ voices were evident in the findings, which is important to allow a reader to assess the transferability of findings to their situation (Lincoln & 58 Guba, 1985). Finally, I did not attempt to generalize my conclusions beyond the scope of the study. There may be some useful findings from the study that relate to the larger sector of public, regional universities, but I did not make broad generalizations. Instead, I leave it to readers to determine how much of the study applies to other similarly situation institutions based on my descriptive findings and thematic analysis. Limitations Although case studies allow for an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon, they also have limitations, specifically related to the ability to generalize findings beyond the confines of the study (Merriam, 2009). This study explored the issue of strategy at three public, regional universities out of approximately 400 that exist according to the definition in this study. The individual challenges these institutions face and the makeup of the institutions (e.g., size, types of programs) may differ from other public, regional universities. However, an in-depth study of the strategy of three public, regional universities was important to undertake to add to the nascent literature on this topic. Case study research has been criticized for its reliance on the ability of the researcher to determine what aspects of the case to study and how to interpret the data. In this study I needed to make particularly important decisions in how I interpreted signs of an institutional strategy since Mintzberg (1987) argued that strategy is often left open to one’s imagination. Despite this limitation, I previously outlined rigorous steps that I took to ensure valid and reliable interpretations of the data. Finally, this study was only possible due to the candor of study participants and access to both public and private institutional documents. However, this required the promise of confidentiality to study participants and the larger institutions at which they are employed. As a 59 result, I am only able to provide generic descriptions of each case study institution as opposed to detailed descriptions and specific facts. This may limit readers’ ability to fully understand the activities of each case study institution, but I believe the generic descriptions I provide are sufficient for understanding the institutional phenomena at each site. Furthermore, to mask participants’ identities, I refer to individuals by generic titles such as “administrator” and “faculty member” throughout the remaining sections. Although it may be beneficial to understand exactly what participants made certain comments (e.g., what quotes can be attributed to institutions’ presidents), that would violate confidentiality agreements. Since this study is concerned with institutional actions, I do not believe this lack of exact attribution of quotes detracts from the study. Still, this is noted as a potential limitation. In the following chapters, I present findings from each of the case study sites, examining institutions’ strategies, potential change in strategies, and influences on strategic decisions. Then I provide a cross-case analysis of the similarities and differences between the sites and a discussion placing the findings in the context of relevant literature. 60 CHAPTER 4: UNDERGRADUATE TEACHING UNIVERSITY The first university examined prides itself on its laser focus on providing a high quality undergraduate education for students with a range of academic abilities, mainly hailing from the immediate geographic region. As a relatively young institution, it experienced significant growth in its enrollment and physical infrastructure during the past few decades. Now nearing its perceived capacity (9,000-11,000 students), the institution’s focus is on a sustainable enrollment number rather than constant growth. Continuing is the institution’s commitment to remaining a mainly undergraduate teaching institution (75-85% undergraduate enrollment), even as it watched many of its statewide peers increasingly add graduate programs. Participants indicated the university would rather concentrate on being an excellent teaching institution than a sub-par research university. The university relies on strong fiscal management and low administrative costs to ensure maximum resources are directed toward the undergraduate experience, while also remaining one of the most affordable four-year institutions in the state. Despite its limited resources, the university emphasizes quality and excellence in all its endeavors. It provides many high impact experiences for students in the form of study abroad, undergraduate research, and internship programs, all actions linking back to the mission of providing a high quality undergraduate experience, and making “Undergraduate Teaching University” (UTU) a fitting moniker. Institutional Strategy The university’s institutional strategy can be broken into three broad categories: undergraduate focus in both teaching and student services, being an institution of opportunity in terms of access and completion, and serving the surrounding region. Across these categories there is a desire to maintain high quality, despite limited resources. 61 Undergraduate Focus Across interviews, individuals mentioned UTU’s strong focus on undergraduate education. Some of the comments describing UTU’s focus were: “For the most part what we do here is basically related to undergraduate education,” “being a first-class undergraduate teaching institution,” and “the goal is to be a very good undergraduate teaching institution that is also accessible economically.” Although some of these comments may amount to platitudes heard at many institutions, participants indicated that UTU also follows its undergraduate mantra in action. The university maintains a limited number of master’s programs (fewer than 15) and is not actively increasing its graduate portfolio. One administrator indicated, “We don’t have PhD programs and never will.” The reason for this focus was summarized well by one participant. I’ve always been critical of regionals that went through the process of mission creep. You’re in a state right now where you have, what, 11 universities offering doctorates? You probably ought to have two, maybe three . . . You have a lot of regional universities trying to become research institutions, but they don’t have the funding or the brainpower to do it. In consequence, you have a lot of weak doctorate programs . . . How do you offer a doctoral program? Well, you herd your undergraduates into a classroom and you put a TA in front of them. We were determined not to succumb to that siren song; to seek prestige by offering doctorates and going through this mission creep. We thought, and concluded, that we’d much rather be a first-rate undergraduate teaching institution than a thirdgrade doctoral institution. Since UTU offers mostly undergraduate programs, it naturally follows that a strong emphasis is placed on the classroom environment. One administrator succinctly summed how UTU focuses on the undergraduate experience, stating, “Emphasizing very high quality teaching, small class sizes, and student mentoring. That’s been our focus since day one.” High quality teaching at UTU begins by placing mostly tenure-stream faculty in the classroom, not graduate teaching assistants or part-time instructors. One administrator indicated, “The faculty that we have here are all PhDs. We don’t have grad assistants teaching courses.” Additionally, the 62 university’s faculty contract ensures no more than 25-30% of instruction comes from part-time faculty members. This is viewed as a way to enable students to meaningfully engage with their instructors. “You look at the quality of the educational experience, so someone that really wants to learn and tie-in with the faculty member is pretty precious,” stated one person. Small class sizes further contribute to a nurturing environment where students build connections with faculty. One faculty member said, “We have relatively small classes so you can begin relationships with your faculty . . . because our average class size is 24.” Another faculty member added, “There are very few classrooms that are set up to have more than 35 students in a class.” Along with an emphasis on small classes taught by tenure-stream faculty, UTU also helps faculty members become strong teachers. “Now our goal is to get young, good faculty and to make sure that they go through strategies that when they are in the classroom they have more of a profound effect on that student’s success,” said one person. Another individual added, “We help new faculty become better teachers. There’s a program that’s in place. There’s an orientation for two years for young faculty members to get their feet on the ground.” Along with a heavy emphasis on high quality classroom experiences, UTU also promotes meaningful engagement opportunities and support services for its students outside the classroom. One individual described this by stating, “I think we created an environment for students to engage in all kinds of different opportunities to make their experience here more meaningful.” When questioned on what areas of the university were newly created or expanded during the past several years, multiple individuals mentioned a variety of student services ranging from increasing undergraduate research, study abroad, and internship opportunities to greater residential and student life programming and enhanced academic support services such as tutoring. Each of these areas is viewed as providing meaningful opportunities for students. For 63 example, in describing undergraduate research opportunities, one individual noted, “They have an experience here as an undergraduate student in a facility that they couldn’t have that experience with any other university in the state.” Another person, in describing a new worldclass recreational facility, indicated the facility is about more than providing a social outlet for students, but also about creating transformational experiences for kinesiology and athletic training students who can practice what they learn in and out of the classroom setting. Institution of Opportunity UTU enrolls a diverse range of students and prides itself on being an “institution of opportunity.” Nearly 50% of UTU’s students are first-generation college students and more than 75% of students receive some form of financial aid. The university keeps tuition rates lower than many of its peer institutions in order to remain an affordable option. This emphasis on access was described by participants in some of the following ways: “the broad goals and aspirations for our institution is truly to be an open access institution for first generational students,” “we’re also not trying to become a highly selective institution, that’s not our mission,” and “that would be the way I would describe it the most, to be a source of opportunity for the region.” The university’s emphasis on access results in a student population with varying ranges of academic ability. Individuals acknowledged that this led to less than excellent retention and graduation rates. First to second year retention rates are historically below 70% and six-year graduation rates have been below 50% for at least the past ten years. However, as part of the focus on being an “institution of opportunity,” administrators remain committed to and feel an obligation to help all students graduate once enrolled. One administrator described these efforts by stating, “we will provide opportunities for students that fit a broad range of academic profiles, 64 and for those who we admit in good faith at the lower end, we’re seriously trying to provide, we’re still working on this constantly, trying to find that magic bullet that helps the kids with multiple deficiencies and basic skill sets to get up to speed so that they can be successful here.” This has been an increasing emphasis during the past several years as the university implemented more “intrusive” programs designed to identify and work with at-risk students sooner as opposed to more passive approaches in the past. Ultimately, participants indicated the institution is only fulfilling its access mission if the students entering the institution graduate. Despite widespread commitment to access at UTU, some individuals questioned how far access should extend and what the right blend of students is for the institution. A couple participants wondered whether the university would be better served by admitting more academically strong students who may require fewer resources once enrolled. Another individual expressed concern about the ability of some students to succeed at the university. This individual remained supportive of the university’s access mission, but also argued, “If we’re admitting a cohort of students whose chances for success are unacceptably low, then it’s not ethically appropriate for us to admit students who have very little chance of succeeding.” This individual continued to discuss the “juggling act” the institution plays between “maintaining that core mission of being the school of opportunity while providing what you need to provide to recruit the best and better students.” Although no one argued these are mutually exclusive goals, it was clear across interviews that there are varying interpretations of how far the institution’s commitment to access should extend. Regardless, one faculty member indicated that the institution needs to “make certain that once they [students] come here, we are doing all we can on our end to help them be successful.” 65 Serving the Region There is a strong regional focus embedded in the activities of UTU. Many of the institution’s strategic planning documents and public communications pieces highlight the university’s commitment to the surrounding region, its role as a major regional employer, and student and faculty partnerships with local businesses and community organizations. The vast majority of students enroll from the immediate surrounding geographic region or other parts of the state and remain there following graduation; the university constantly surveys the surrounding areas for current and future employment needs in determining academic program offerings; and, the limited number of graduate programs offered at UTU are practical, skillsbased programs with a strong focus on regional needs. This regional emphasis is long-ingrained at UTU. As one individual stated, “We have a region to serve. We bear the name of a regional alignment.” Another person added, “We were a regional public college and we always wanted to appeal to the local population . . . it’s really to try to increase education attainment on this side of the state.” High Quality Despite Limited Resources Although UTU enrolls students with a range of academic abilities and maintains a more narrow scope of programs than more “elite” institutions, the university cares deeply about maintaining high quality across its academic offerings. Individuals acknowledged that the breadth of quality offerings at the institution does not match those of a major research university, but the institution is focused on being the best it can be in a more limited scope of offerings. One administrator indicated the institution’s first goal is quality and described this as “academic quality, quality of our students, and quality of our environment” Another person added that the goal “is not just to provide college graduates for the sake of college graduates, but to provide 66 educated credentialed folks who can perform at a very high level in the workplace.” Providing high quality opportunities exists for all students. “We tried to create special opportunities for the very gifted . . . and we tried to provide support services for those who we think have the capacity to do it, but who will require extra effort.” Although resources do not exist for every program to be competitive relative to national peers, the institution strategically focuses on creating programs of distinction that reflect the best the institution has to offer. UTU also prides itself on maintaining a low price point relative to its statewide peers. “I think the administration is taking great pride, for obvious reasons, in remaining among the lowest cost state universities. That helps us recruit. When financial times are tough we still remain a very attractive option and that’s served us well,” said one faculty member. Another individual added, “we’ve tried to maintain a price position that’s relatively low . . . it’s to maintain a low price point relative to our sister institutions.” Despite this emphasis on maintaining a low price point, the institution has maintained focus on high quality offerings, in part being able to do so by “focusing on our mission and moderately growing,” according to one administrator. However, there is concern across the institution that it is difficult to be perceived as a high quality institution while at the same time trumpeting a low price point. One administrator argued, “We offer high value and we’re constantly dealing with the issue of perception that if you run an efficient university at a fair price there must be something wrong with the quality because how can you be of quality when you’re half as expensive as other institutions in the state.” A faculty member pointed out the importance of verbiage when discussing the issue of price, stating, “We continue to remain among the most affordable institutions in the state. I have to make sure I don’t say cheapest. We try to remain the most affordable, not the cheapest . . . When you hear cheap, you’re not buying Cadillac, you’re buying a Chevy.” This was reinforced 67 by another administrator who indicated a preference for dropping the explicit emphasis on a low price point altogether and instead marketing the institution as a great value for students. The stated desire of individuals was not to move away from actually remaining a low cost institution, but in finding a way to reconcile the perception that low cost equals low quality, when in fact, many at the institution believe UTU offers a very high quality undergraduate-focused experience. Recessionary Response Many individuals at UTU described the institution as one that progressed through the natural maturation process any relatively young university would, growing in both size and complexity during the past few decades. This growth occurred along a fairly linear trajectory, with the institution maintaining focus on the same broad institutional strategy described previously. Throughout its history, and particularly during the Great Recession, the university maintained flexibility around specific strategies and initiatives, while always adhering to the same macro vision. Minor adjustments were made, specifically related to moving from a pattern of enrollment growth to enrollment sustainability, and a shift from education programs to health programs due to changes in demand. However, the institution’s strong fiscal management and ability to remain mission-driven in word and action prevented significant contractions and other hardships typically connected to the recessionary period and experienced by many other colleges and universities. Enrollment Sustainability For most of UTU’s existence there was an ability to grow naturally; meaning as a young institution there was almost always more physical capacity available than students enrolled. “We have consistently, with very little exception, we have increased our student body by two to three 68 percent year, after year, after year,” said one individual. Currently, the institution is shifting its focus to developing a steady and sustainable enrollment profile, due to both a perception that the institution is nearing full capacity and recognition of the declining high school student population in the state. As one administrator said, “growth isn’t there naturally [anymore].” Another administrator argued “there’s a sense amongst some of us that we were chasing growth.” With the institution experiencing declining enrollments the past two years, there is a new focus on “right-sizing” enrollments because “the golden years are over with.” However, the exact size of the institution moving forward is far from resolved, as evidenced by one individual’s statement on the matter. The conversation I think I’d like to see us have is, what is a desirable footprint size of this campus going forward? What business model should we have? What revenue base should we have to support this institution? . . . We had one or two groups over the years that call it “right-sizing” the institution. From time to time there has been some discussion about that, but up until two years [ago] the reality has always been growth. We could always count on two, three, four percent growth each year. If it was there, like anyone, we accepted it. Although UTU is now focusing on recruiting slightly smaller entering classes, it is also doing so more aggressively given the competition for the decreasing number of high school graduates in the state and nationally. UTU’s approach in this area has been largely focused on expanding its traditional recruitment territory. One initiative has been to increase on-campus housing options to accommodate non-commuter students. “Fifteen years ago we were predominately a commuter-based institution. Now 60% of our students come from outside commuting distance,” stated one participant. “We’re pretty close to the same ratio that many well-known residential campuses have as far as residential students through total enrollment,” another person mentioned. This specifically helped the university expand recruitment efforts beyond its traditional four county surrounding area. UTU has not greatly expanded enrollment 69 numbers from out-of-state students, but a large push has been made in recent years to increase the international student population, and it nearly tripled during the past several years. Even as UTU remains committed to serving the surrounding region first, one administrator argued that expanding recruitment efforts is about more than meeting enrollment goals, but also about expanding the institution’s reach, which is also good for the region. Our primary responsibility is to a region, but we also think that we serve that region well by expanding and thinking more expansively. There’s a focus on a region, a region whose name we bear, there is also a larger statewide and even an international mission. We can’t do it well with a region or ourselves without thinking expansively. Finally, the institution is focused on exploring online offerings to cater toward student demands because as one faculty member argued, “We want to be responsive to do that. If we don’t serve that need we’re going to be the losers.” Yet, as another individual acknowledged, “we’re about 10 years behind the ball on this [online education],” and the institution only recently began examining a comprehensive approach to designing and offering more online options within its curriculum. Overall, with “natural growth” no longer a viable option, UTU is exploring alternatives to reach a broader range of students, with the goal of maintaining a consistent and sustainable year-to-year enrollment profile. Shift in Program Offerings Despite its smaller range of academic offerings compared to in-state peers, UTU still maintains a comprehensive balance of programs, mainly in the traditional arts and sciences, along with some professional programs. One administrator argued this is important since there are ebbs and flows in student demand and the institution needs to ensure it has enough programmatic flexibility to adjust to those demands. However, the institution also prides itself 70 on not “chasing” niche programs with high demand one year that may quickly fade away. One administrator offered a scathing indictment of opening programs with too narrow a focus. One of the things we thought about in business schools—these niches come and go. So you got some, I hate to say this, some very strong hotel hospitality programs . . . They create an internship at a motel and soon they got a hotel hospitality program. Or recreation management, that was hot for a while. Everybody wanted to develop a country club, you know, and some of the shabbier business schools all of a sudden hire someone who worked in a country club once and they claim they have a recreation management program. A couple of our sister universities by the way, public institutions, had to do this too. We academically reject the notion of niche programs. I don’t want to have a golf management program. I don’t think it serves students well in the long run. As a result of trying to avoid opening “niche” programs, individuals interviewed could not recall a recent example of an existing program closing completely due to declining demand. Despite UTU’s emphasis on sustainable academic offerings, it has not been immune to cyclical changes in student demand, most specifically in regards to declining enrollment in education programs and rising interest in health programs. In response, the university drastically increased health program offerings while tapering down (but not closing) education programs. The university added a new facility for heath programs and increased faculty in those departments. In some cases, entirely new health programs were created, while in others existing programs shifted focus to better align with student health interests. For example, one person pointed out, “We’ve transitioned from physical education to athletic training and kinesiology as a much broader, more scientific approach to Phys [sic] Ed.” As new faculty were added to growing programs, the university reduced faculty in other areas. “We were able to do that I think strategically, and we will do it not painlessly, but bloodlessly just with retirements,” stated one administrator. Still, at least one individual warned that UTU must be careful not to overreact to the current demand cycle and fall into the trap of niche programs. This individual argued, 71 “We know that the demand in health sciences is on a balloon that’s going to deflate . . . You have to be alert to what the next bubble is going to be.” Mission-Driven Financial Management A large reason why UTU has been able to navigate a difficult recessionary period while remaining true to its broad goals and aspirations is the result of strong fiscal management conducted in a mission-driven manner. First, the institution already maintained a lean operation and continually evaluates opportunities for further efficiencies. Second, the university strategically expanded revenue sources in alignment with its mission. Finally, fiscal decisions are made with the institution’s mission in mind, preventing the existence of ancillary activities not core to the heart of the institution. Efficient and Lean Operation. UTU prides itself on being a lean and efficient institution. “I think the facts, the numbers show us as an efficient organization” and “we’ve always been a lean organization; we grow with our growth” were a couple comments describing UTU’s administrative and operational structure. One administrator argued, “I say, well we’ve been a lean organization. Sounds a little general but it’s the reality . . . We do not [have] some of the layers of administration that others do.” Additionally, the university constantly evaluates savings opportunities. Some of these initiatives include not accepting credit cards for tuition payments, installing energy-efficient lighting across campus, and classroom schedule modeling to ensure fuller sections of course offerings. Participants indicated some of these may seem small, and are likely done at other institutions, but “it’s a combination of 100 little things that add up to big things and big savings subsequently.” As one administrator argued, “I think we were able to get through this past 10-12 years because we did not have a bloated costs base and we were able to still find additional efficiencies, and just like right now we’re still in that 72 mindset. We’re always looking for other cost reductions.” Furthermore, UTU consciously evaluates the full costs of beginning any new initiative. For example, the university owns undeveloped property that could accommodate additional buildings, but administrators indicated they carefully consider the ongoing operational and maintenance costs associated with new space before undertaking a project even if some upfront expenses could be covered. As a result of strong and conservative fiscal management, a number of individuals indicated UTU did not feel the same degree of pain as other institutions during the recent recession. One participant said, “The good news is I think we have been smart overall over the years with money and financial stability. We have challenges, but we don’t have a crisis.” Another person added, “This is not an institution that is or was struggling, per se, during that period of time . . . it’s not a stark dark place with a lot of misery in it. People have been pretty appreciative of what’s happened, or maybe what’s happened here over the past 10 or 15 years.” While UTU was not and is not immune to challenges, individuals indicated the institution did not go through any “significant reductions.” “In fact, we added additional staff. If you look at our faculty line headcount during that period of time, and our administrative staff and so forth, we had some pretty healthy growth in those numbers opposed to some institutions that lay people off.” Revenue Enhancements. Coupled with UTU’s strong fiscal management of existing resources, participants indicated the institution’s success has only been possible with additional revenue enhancements. Most specifically, decades of enrollment growth, coupled with rising tuition rates, has made it possible to offset declining state appropriations. One administrator summed this by stating, “The enrollment growth did I think in some extent offset the appropriation decline. The other piece of that of course would be the tuition price.” Another 73 administrator echoed this sentiment and said, “We were able to selectively invest because we had income from growth, even as the bottom was falling out of state appropriations.” UTU still remains one of the lowest cost institutions in the state and recently experienced some enrollment declines, but, overall, individuals indicated that prior enrollment growth and modest tuition increases were essential to weathering the recent recessionary period. UTU, like many institutions, also continually evaluates opportunities to increase funding from sources other than state appropriations and tuition. However, this has not always been a high priority at the institution or one with large windfalls. “I don’t think that has been a high priority. We are always in pursuit of grant money . . . The foundation is always looking for donors and we always have a fundraising campaign of some kind going on and stuff like that, but there is no sense that I can see that we need to do anything to raise money per se,” stated one individual. Others echoed that the university is not well-positioned to increase external research funding as a teaching-intensive institution. Still, during the past several years efforts increased in terms of private fundraising, and the university explicitly linked its fundraising goals to the university’s strategic plan. Although fundraising efforts do not rival those of larger institutions (UTU’s endowment is less than $100 million), a growing focus on increasing external support is viewed as important to helping build areas of distinction at UTU. “I think strategically our private fundraising has allowed us to do things that we couldn’t just raise the tuition to do,” argued one administrator. Another individual added, “Private fundraising has helped us create the distinctive qualities of our university. Endowed chairs, endowed programs, and endowed scholarships have all augmented and helped define who we are.” Laser Focus on Mission. Perhaps most of all, participants discussed how the institution’s laser focus on mission-based activities ensures resources are not wasted on initiatives that veer 74 widely from the macro institutional strategy. One administrator described this as, “sometimes it’s not cutting, it’s just avoiding. I think we’ve been very careful, you probably have heard this phrase before, the ‘mission creep,’ we’ve been very careful not to be moving out into multiple areas that really don’t contribute to the core mission of the institution.” A faculty member added, “We have tried to keep our eyes on who we are and just be better at that and not try to overreach . . . just because there might be some short-term gain in that . . . I think every institution is tempted, that’s kind of the dynamic of an institution is that continual expansion, expansion. I think for whatever reasons we have been more constrained in that and I think that has helped us.” This is most explicitly exercised in program offerings mainly at the undergraduate level and avoiding opening programs that may not have sustainable long-term student demand. “We don’t subscribe to the just because everyone else is doing it, we’re going to do it [mantra],” said one individual. Another person added, “I also think that when we do have money . . . we don’t build programs unless they’re sustainable.” This is particularly important because one administrator argued that despite UTU’s ability to currently mange through the recession well, things are only going to get worse with declining high school students putting strains on future enrollment projections and the inevitability of tuition elasticity preventing future large tuition hikes. Influences Individuals at UTU indicated there are a number of external and internal factors that influence the strategic direction of the institution. Rather than any individual factor dictating strategy, it is a confluence of factors that help frame the institution’s direction over time. Specifically, one individual referred to this as “the confluence of initiative and opportunity,” 75 opportunity framed by external factors and initiative coming internally from within the institution. External Influences In describing how external forces influence strategy at UTU, one administrator opined that there are “certain realities not influences” that must be dealt with, and that the question then becomes “what best can we make of this situation?” At UTU, external influences or “realities” include student demand, market demand, competitor institutions, and governmental policy. Student Demand. Although current students are part of an institution and might be considered an internal influence, student demand is treated as an external influence in this study since it is often related to prospective students who are at the time external to the institution. “Enrollment now drives everything. I don’t care what anybody says, if you don’t have students, then you have to cut programs or you got to do something. Something’s got to give.” That statement by one participant describes the mindset of many individuals at UTU. While the institution’s core mission of providing undergraduate programs based in the arts and sciences is long-established, many of the specific programmatic directions at the institution are influenced by student demand. Another administrator argued, “Everything we do all relates back to the number of students we serve and the quality of student that we serve, but you have to have numbers to be able to continue what we start. To support the programs that we have, to support, obviously, the number of faculty that we have, the number of beds that we have, you need students.” This can be seen in how the institution tailored back education programs as fewer students enrolled in those fields. In the reverse, it can be seen with the increase of health programs, driven in large part due to student interest. Student interest also sparked UTU’s 76 exploration and development of more online programs. In describing the university’s movement into online education, one faculty member stated, “it’s also what students want . . . the reality of the marketplace is that students are demanding and expecting more and more opportunities to do some things online.” At the same time, one individual remarked that it is vital to not blindly follow the “whims” of 18 year olds. “One of our, I guess, other strategic objectives is to maintain institutional balance when the whims of 18 year olds change in relative short order.” However, this individual also acknowledged the ultimate need to be responsive to some demands. “We don’t make the market. We have to respond to it.” Market Demand. UTU is also responsive to market demands and regional employment needs. “We’re reacting to the market; we’re trying to react to the market in a very professional way,” said one participant. “One of the areas that has expanded, I think it’s true in our economy, has been in the health and human services . . . The job market and student interest is pushing that,” said another individual. The growth in healthcare programs at the university is specifically linked to the growing healthcare needs in the immediately surrounding area and the university responding to employment demands. However, the university tries “to be responsive to the needs of the region . . . [but] not to be reactionary to market forces by creating programs we are not committed to on a long-term kind of basis,” said one administrator. For example, one person relayed that the university seriously considered opening a chemical engineering department due to the presence of a major employer in the region that hires heavily from that field. However, administrators determined opening that program would be too expensive and there were already sufficient colleges and universities offering similar degrees so UTU did not create such a program. 77 Competitors. UTU does not set its strategy to exactly match peer and other surrounding institutions, but it is aware of competitors’ activities and conscious of the need to be responsive to industry trends in an increasingly competitive environment. Participants specifically mentioned that a declining high school population in the state makes it vital to monitor other institutions’ tuition, financial aid, and marketing efforts to remain appealing to prospective students. “When you’re a state institution, in many ways, at least for many of us the regional schools, you’re competing for the same students, so you don’t want to be behind in any area, and if you see an opportunity to be ahead, you kind of go for that,” said one person. Another individual opined, “A lot has to do with student recruitment. Where are you going to fit? What will you sell? What works? It’s a competitive marketplace and it’s going to be nothing but more competitive.” Practically, this often means providing services and amenities common at other institutions. For example, one faculty member shared, “Right now there’s some thinking about creating a teaching and learning center here on campus. That’s pretty much standard on a lot of campuses our size . . . that other comparable schools are doing it is not a bad reason to look at it either . . . I don’t think it’s a sign of insecurity if you care about what your competitors are doing.” Monitoring competitors does not mean UTU emulates everything they do. However, as one individual stated, “Today, the competition is fierce and we’re competing against other institutions that have their own value propositions . . . You have to understand your business and you have to understand the business environment.” Governmental Policy. Although UTU resides in a state without a strong central coordinating body for four-year colleges and universities, governmental policy still influences strategic decisions at the institution. At a macro level, there is a recognition that, “there’s going 78 to be more focus and more outside pressure from governmental units,” according to one person. Another participant added, this is specifically true related to “our responsibility to graduation rates and retention,” which is why some administrators recently re-considered the proper blend of the incoming freshman class in order to improve retention and graduation rates. One area where governmental policy greatly influenced UTU is with changes in continuing education requirements for K-12 teachers. “That policy wasn’t a policy driven by us. That was a policy driven by the governor.” As a result, enrollment in education programs dropped during the past few years and graduate programs in those areas have been tailored back. Internal Influences Understanding what internal factors influence strategy at UTU can be broken into two streams: understanding what stakeholders are involved in decision-making and understanding the institution’s steady leadership culture. Stakeholders. Participants indicated UTU operates in a fairly top-down manner, with a handful of senior administrators driving most aspects of institutional strategy, with guidance and approval from the board of trustees and occasional dialogue with faculty on academic matters. The president, provost, and vice president for finance were identified as the major players in determining institutional direction, and specifically major budgetary and resource allocation decisions. Some comments, from both administrators and faculty members, about this centralized decision-making structure included: “I think you can probably count on your fingers the number of people who really influenced the direction . . . The planning processes were largely more bringing others on board,” “I think this top-down approach is benefitting the university,” and “I think if you have good people in those top positions [it works].” 79 Although senior administrators drive most of the strategy at UTU, this occurs within the context of working closely with the university’s board of trustees, which has been consistently supportive of the mission and vision of the institution. One administrator, in discussing board governance, indicated that who trustees are, how they get selected for boards, and what their motivations are often dictates how they act in their positions. This individual continued to state that the university has been fortunate over the years to not have many renegade trustees pushing their own agendas onto the institution. Still, the Board exerts influence through its oversight function. One administrator indicated that the UTU Board often “doesn’t develop ideas, but can support or kill them.” Recognizing this, administrators work closely with the board on strategic planning and view the strategic plan as “our commitment, our contract with our governing board.” Another individual, in describing board influences at UTU, stated: We worked with the board. We’ve had a good board, been very lucky about that . . . I never took the board for granted. We always had to persuade the board. I understand who made the decisions. The issue of going into more housing, of moving enrollment size, and tuition—had to bring the board along on that. We worked the board pretty hard, a lot of communication with the board that no one else saw. Although most major strategic decisions at UTU fall to senior administration, there is a cordial relationship between the administration and the faculty. “I think there’s a lot of trust between the faculty association and the president,” opined one faculty member. Another faculty member indicated, “Over the years there have certainly been more times of great contention than others, but because the university is not in a financial crisis it makes it easier for grownups to go into a room and figure out what’s the right thing to do.” Faculty input is most influential on curricular matters. “When you get into academic affairs . . . then you start getting department chairs and faculty involvement,” said one person. While there was an acknowledgement that some curricular proposals come from the administration, one administrator indicated, “The best 80 ones are when the initiate [sic] comes from within. The program sees the opportunity to do something and takes it, rather than top-down we’re going to start the new program get on board.” While administrative support is needed to fund most academic initiatives, participants also indicated faculty support is needed to execute academic matters regardless of who initiates an idea. Steady Leadership. A large influence on UTU’s strategic direction, and specifically remaining consistent in that direction, is strong, steady leadership. “That really goes back to having consistent leadership over a long period of time too. Our academic leadership has been very sound,” opined one participant. Another individual added, “I think some of it can be attributed to leadership between the president and the vice president for finance . . . They have been here awhile.” One administrator argued that the consistency in leadership has prevented too much shifting back and forth, and a faculty member mentioned this as a reason why the institution has been able to avoid “mission creep.” While long-term leaders can provide consistency, individuals also mentioned that the type of leaders hired is equally important. One person stated: One of the tragedies that sometimes befalls institutions is, is when a president comes in and tries to make the institution the kind of place he or she wants to be president of. I’m not going to name any names, but there’s one where a guy who really wanted to be a Big 10 research one institution president, but didn’t get it– passed over–goes to a regional university and tries to turn it into the place he wanted to be a president of. It didn’t work. The short-term presidencies, they’re building their reputations, they’re building a resume more than they’re building the institutions sometimes. At UTU there is a strong commitment to the vision of being a strong regional, undergraduate institution. “To the degree that we’re on the same page with that, that goes a long way in trying to deal with whatever conflicts and disagreements we have,” said one person. This was echoed by another individual who said, “I think the beliefs and the core values that the university has, 81 again, a commitment to undergraduate education, is shared by the entire community, including the board and the faculty.” Participants indicated that a commitment to this culture is carefully cultivated. “There’s no simple way to create an institutional culture, but we’ve tried to create a culture . . . You’re going to have a culture. If you don’t decide what you want it to be, it’s going to happen anyway, so you better figure it out,” argued one person. With the culture and institutional values widely supported across campus, there is a conscious effort to hire additional people in this mold. This includes hiring faculty committed to teaching. We recruit faculty, we don’t mince any words, we explain clearly what the mission of this university is, what their primary responsibilities are going to be, and they have to convince us that they’re committed to what we’re doing here. If they’re looking for a one or two course teaching load and all these research opportunities, then they probably picked the wrong place. They need to be at an R1 environment. We’ve hired a lot of faculty that come from R1 environments. They were successful there, but they found that the part of academia that provides them with the most gratifying professional rewards here are interacting with students in a classroom and working with students on research projects. One particularly key transition at UTU is that of hiring a new president. Turnover in a key leadership position often raises the possibility of change. Participants indicated the presidential transition is not expected to result in a major shift in course, but it has raised questions of what the institution will look like in the future. “I think that’s a question that’s going to be explored perhaps more broadly from this point forward given the transition to a new president. There are some of us here in the executive leadership roles that want that type of discussion. The bigger question is, what should we be?” asked one administrator. Another individual noted, “I see the current president now going through, I don’t want to say he’s cleaning house, but I think he’s setting his direction, and his direction, even though it’s in the 82 same periphery, the same lens of the past president, it is kind of in a direction with a different strategy. We’ll see what happens.” Summary UTU grew in enrollment and physical infrastructure during the past couple decades, but remains largely focused on being an undergraduate teaching institution, accessible to a diverse range of students, and committed to supporting and connecting with the surrounding community. Due to its smaller size compared to state peers, strong fiscal management, and a laser focus on only undertaking activities connected to its mission, UTU weathered the recessionary period without major contractions or changes to its strategic direction. Subtle shifts were made regarding some academic program offerings and there is a new focus on enrollment sustainability instead of enrollment growth, but UTU remains steadfast in its commitment to being an undergraduate, regional institution without any stated desires of becoming more like a research or other type of institution. Steady and consistent leadership is a major factor in this consistent vision, which is supported by administrators, faculty, and the board of trustees. Not completely immune from external pressures, UTU views student and market demands, competitor institutions, and governmental policy as forces that frame opportunities, but do not fully dictate strategy. UTU is committed enough to its mission to not change its strategies on a whim, but nimble enough to adjust around the edges to remain sustainably viable and competitive. 83 CHAPTER 5: COMMUNITY-DRIVEN UNIVERSITY The second university studied was described by its participants as maintaining a unique compilation of parts that provides it with a relatively rare niche within the higher education community. As one administrator described it, “the customary way of thinking about higher ed doesn’t fit us very well.” This university is strongly focused on serving its surrounding region, which is typical of many regional institutions. It is also a high access institution with many firstgeneration students, Pell-eligible students, students of color, and transfer students. Yet, it maintains high academic quality and excellence, both in its incoming student profile (closely resembling the profile of one of the flagship institutions in the state) and in its academic rigor and expectations for current students. It serves a largely undergraduate population (75-85% undergraduate enrollment), and many of the academic programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels are geared toward professional disciplines (e.g., business, education, health). Still, the university takes pride in the comprehensive liberal arts base it provides to all students. It is not trying to be all things to all people, with a laser focus on expansion only as it fits within its current strategic framework and long-standing mission to serve its surrounding region. This institution may be best labeled as Community-Driven University (CDU). Institutional Strategy CDU maintains a clear focus that was articulated consistently across interviews and a review of institutional documents. That is not to say there is a monolithic view among everyone at CDU, and those differences will be revealed throughout this chapter, but there is general agreement about what type of institution CDU is and what it maintains as its main goals and aspirations. CDU is focused on serving its region, enrollment growth, and maintaining high academic quality and excellence. 84 Serving the Region Serving the region is the beginning point for almost all of CDU’s activities. One administrator opined, “As a regional university we have a particular mission to respond to the emerging needs and opportunities of our region and not to try and be all things to all people.” She continued, “So I think that’s sort of inherent in the nature of a regional university, but even particularly so at this regional university, is really trying to identify, for example, if we’re going to create a new program, is really trying to identify what is the unfilled need, where’s the pain, and how can we help address that pain. Then create just enough of that, not too much.” Another administrator argued that many institutions claim to be responsive to the needs of its region and “they have the language, but not the commitment. We really want to make our impact . . . in this region.” That impact is most evident through the university providing access to a four-year education, serving as a talent pipeline for the local economy, and engaging with the community and local businesses to address needs and solve problems. Access. CDU is committed to providing access to a wide variety of students. Due to the majority of its students being transfer students and/or Pell-eligible students, CDU has made efforts to keep costs low and provide financial assistance to remain an affordable option for prospective and current students. “It [financial aid investments] helps us keep our tuition increases lower, it helps us provide access to individuals that wouldn’t normally be able to come here and that’s an important part of our vision,” said one administrator. Another component of providing access is catering to the needs of non-traditional students. Many of the university’s graduate programs hold evening classes that are accessible for working adults. “People have [also] been interested in the number of people in the area who started a bachelor’s degree and never finished it. That happens quite a bit because of family emergencies or being laid off from 85 work or some other kinds of unforeseen circumstances. There’s an interest in recruiting these people who are non-traditional students,” added a faculty member. Talent Pipeline. Once students gain access to CDU, the university feels an obligation to produce strong graduates as a pipeline of talent to help fill the needs of the local economy. One administrator stated, “it’s become crystal clear to me that we are part of our economic upswing and recovery, and the future of our region and our state for that matter, because so many of our graduates stay here and work here and commit their lives to this region.” Approximately 80% of CDU’s students come from within the state and approximately 80% of its graduates remain in the state post-graduation, most in close proximity to the university and the local community. Part of providing a talent pipeline for the community goes beyond simply graduating students; it is about “helping to educate the men and women who are emerging as leaders” and “preparing our students for the workplace of the future and what the economy is going to demand,” according to two separate administrators. Additionally, it is about preparing students in fields that are vital to the economy, particularly when it comes to graduate programs. One administrator argued, “We have really important graduate degrees that are really important to the region and the economy . . . Our engineering PhD programs are really relative to what’s needed in the region. Our undergraduate graduates and our graduate graduates in master’s and PhD programs are doing research in really relevant economic growth need disciplines.” Community and Business Engagement. Another component of serving the region is for the institution as a whole (faculty, staff, and students) to engage with the local community and businesses in mutually beneficial relationships. In some cases this means colleges and departments aligning their programs with specific industries. “In engineering we’re very oriented to the auto industry whereas engineering at research universities is probably interested 86 in some other areas . . . the college of business . . . that’s also oriented towards the auto industry,” according to one faculty member. Engagement with local businesses extends beyond formal degree programs and includes short-term training courses. One individual mentioned, “if industry is looking for a training in a particular area, short-term training, we will put it together and we will offer it through the [program name masked] for their employees.” Program alignment with local needs is one way to engage with the community. Another type of engagement is through research and project-based partnerships. One faculty member stated, “we serve businesses and things like that in various ways . . . We kind of call them research projects, kind of a hybrid of research and consulting I suppose often involving students in that. A mix of industry partners, faculty, staff and students.” These relationships exist across the university and are often developed and managed at a unit level. However, the university recently developed a central administrative initiative to create more strategic partnerships with the business community. As one individual described it, “it’s like an initiative to create something to better facilitate relationships with outside entities. I think that’s how I’d characterize it. For example, if some organization wanted the university to do something, it would be clear to them how to come and interact with the university in order to make that happen and it would be easier to get students involved in that.” The goal is to help serve the surrounding region by helping meet the business and community needs of all types of external entities from for-profit businesses to non-profit community organizations. Although a main emphasis at CDU has historically been on providing for the region, there is a certain amount of reciprocity that comes with those external relationships. First, it provides students with hands-on experiential learning opportunities and can also provide faculty with access for research projects and other scholarly creative endeavors. Additionally, the 87 institution often ends up learning as much from the organizations they interact with as the organizations learn from them. “We want those relationships to be beneficial to the organization, but also beneficial to the campus, allowing us to design better programs . . . We can bring that back through the partnerships that we have,” said one administrator. There are also some largely beneficial and unexpected benefits from community engagement. One administrator provided the following as an example: We’re in the process now of forming an executive leaders advocacy group of really high-profile CEOs who have no reason to be affiliated with us and may not know very much about us initially, but because they have passion and commitment for the revitalization of the region in general terms and their businesses in particular, and once they understand that we can be a real player in helping them achieve some of what’s important to them, they’re willing to help. Those are some of the people we’re trying to get involved in this group. I call them unexpected champions. These are people who no one would expect to see aligned with us and they get why we’re important, and when it’s known some of the people who are involved, I mean we haven’t gone out public with this yet, but it’s going to grab people’s attention and it’s going to give us some cachet and street credibility. Although service to and engagement with the region is important to CDU, at least one administrator thinks the university needs to focus more on the mutual benefit portion of those relationships. This administrator noted: We all agree with the vision . . . and the only rubbing point for any of us is mutual benefit. It can’t just be us providing resources . . . Yes, I’m glad we’re altruistic, but I’m much more interested in how does that altruism and that service help advance them [students], help them learn, help them respond to a changing economy, be able to reinvent themselves in the face of change, take leadership roles in their community. None of the study participants disagreed with the notion of serving the region, but there is a growing recognition that there needs to be a reciprocal benefit for the institution and its students and faculty. 88 Enrollment Growth Another major goal and aspiration of CDU is enrollment growth. Everyone interviewed mentioned enrollment growth as a major strategic priority and this is also clear from institutional documents, most prominently within the institution’s strategic plan. The impetus for growing enrollment appears to be twofold. First, enrollment growth is viewed as an extension of serving the region. One administrator argued, “We have a moral imperative for educating more collegeeducated people in our state and our region.” Another administrator added that more students “will mean a bigger impact for the region.” Second, enrollment growth is a major goal for the sustainability of the institution. One administrator bluntly stated, “the reality is we are tuition dependent, so enrollment growth is a financial imperative for us.” And the institution believes it has the capacity to grow by at least another 1,000 to 3,000 students beyond its current enrollment of approximately 9,000-11,000 students. This aspiration, however, is not solely financial. Administrators believe that maintaining a larger student body will also enhance all students’ educational experience. “I’m the strongest candidate for saying we cannot have the kind of academic excellence we want to have without surveying enrollment growth because enrollment growth is the engine which will allow the faculty to have a greater number of programs, programs that go into greater depth. If you want academic excellence then you have to want enrollment growth and if you want enrollment growth you really need to be supporting academic excellence. So they’re mutually supportive,” argued one administrator. Although enrollment growth is widely viewed as an institutional goal, the ideal enrollment number and how to reach that size is more contentious. During the past several years enrollment has grown slightly but not to the full levels many believe the institution could sustain 89 given its physical infrastructure capacity. Undergraduate enrollment has risen, but that has been countered by a decline in graduate enrollment, largely attributed to the recession causing employers to reduce employee reimbursements for graduate pursuits. With the recession showing signs of ending, some administrators are hopeful that greater enrollment growth may be possible. “There’s been a target enrollment number for a number of years, going way before I arrived a year and a half ago. There’s been incremental slow progress toward that goal, but first we had to survive the decline from the deep recession and the impact that had on enrollment,” said one administrator. Although a few administrators believe the ending of the recession places the institution in a prime position to again aggressively pursue enrollment growth, other individuals disagree. One person mentioned that it would be difficult to grow enrollment with the declining number of high school graduates in the state. Another individual mentioned that talk of growing the campus by a few thousand students is premature and the institution needs to focus on smaller growth first, stating, “The campus also needs to experience that growth . . . [to understand] it can grow.” Another administrator concurred and argued that initial growth will lead to further growth as the institution becomes more attractive to students and institutional stakeholders understand how to grow. This person also warned that growth needs to happen incrementally, not with thousands of students at a time. How this aspiration plays outs remains unclear. As one faculty member opined, “What do we aspire to? Well, it’s a part of being bigger, though we don’t seem very good at actually doing that.” Quality and Academic Excellence As evidenced in the discussion of enrollment growth, there is a belief at CDU that student access, enrollment growth, and excellence go hand-in-hand. While CDU is proud of the access it 90 provides to a wide range of students, it also wants to be considered a first choice institution within its region. Its entering class profile is on par with one of the flagship institutions in the state and markedly higher than other public, regional universities within the state. Although some individuals readily acknowledge that enrollment growth would be easier by lowering the quality of incoming students, CDU “never had the appetite to grow by lowering the admission standards. The faculty has always been very opposed to that and administration has supported that,” one faculty member stated. The directive from senior leaders at the institution has always been to grow, but maintain quality, which has been possible with increased investments in meritaid to attract high quality students. An additional piece of quality and academic excellence is to provide a strong educational experience once students are enrolled. At CDU this means pretty specific things, “Meaning it’s just not words, but it’s assuring ourselves it’s the very programs delivered in an effective way, in a way that measurably leads to improvement of students’ understanding of things,” argued one senior leader. Another added, “I feel strongly about the quality of what we’re providing, I don’t want to mess with the quality.” Academic quality and excellence is enhanced through increased investments in co-curricular experiences. CDU is in the process of re-inventing its student experience with a comprehensive focus on the entire student experience from initial enrollment through graduation and including post-graduation success. This is being accomplished through a focus on student support services to increase retention, an increasing number of affinity groups for students to become connected to, and tying extracurricular activities more explicitly to the curriculum. Student engagement is part of CDU’s service to the community, but several administrators also talked passionately about what a transformational experience college is for 91 students and how important it is for students to be engaged for their own growth and development. Continuity of Strategy The institutional strategy articulated by participants and within institutional documents has existed at CDU for several years. The university began as an institution dedicated to serving its region and it has continued to do so throughout its history. Multiple people mentioned that the current goals and aspirations began under a former president and have continued during the tenure of the current president, who has held the presidency for more than 10 years. During the current president’s tenure there have been broad discussions across campus about the institution’s direction and alternative pathways were considered. In the end, the institution chose to continue following the same direction previously described. Many individuals view this positively across campus. As one person stated, “I think a lot of times schools will put out a five-year plan and at the end of the five years they’re doing something else. We’re doing a lot of things that are different than what was going on five or ten years ago when I came, but the new things that we’re doing are still feeding the same vision . . . and I don’t think the vision is going to go away.” Recessionary Response Many institutions maintain similar goals to CDU. CDU, like many institutions, has also faced significant challenges during the past several years. In order to achieve its goals and aspirations CDU developed a clear, narrow, and aligned strategy, followed a conservative approach in financial management, and invested and expanded in key strategic areas. 92 Clear, Narrow, and Aligned Strategy Although the goals and aspirations of CDU remained relatively constant during the past several years, more recently the institution has become “a lot more laser focused,” said one administrator. Another administrator added that groups of people used to be able to propose ideas, and faculty specifically could propose new majors, and they might often receive rubber stamp approval. However, faced with a challenging environment and resource constraints, CDU has been “forced to do more with less and so it’s up to us to again to go back to what is the mission and vision and the goals of the university and that’s where we should be concentrating our money, time, and other resources,” said one administrator. “Now,” another administrator added, “there’s a stronger lens that we look through on any decision that we make as it relates to spending money.” The vision of the institution is clear (an important accomplishment in its own right according to one participant), the focus is narrow and not expansive to be all things to all people, and decisions are made in alignment with that vision. The vision and strategy of CDU lives and breathes within its strategic plan, originally adopted in the mid-2000s and recently re-affirmed within the past couple years. The overarching vision did not change in the plan, but the institution became more laser focused and strategic in the execution of its vision. “The strategic plan is this real mix of things like things you can just go fix . . . and then things that are strategic in nature . . . I think we’re kind of getting to the point now where we could actually have a strategic plan that’s strategic,” opined a faculty member. Although one administrator acknowledged that true strategic planning within higher education institutions is challenging, “what our strategic plan has done is it has allowed us to really identify what is important to us and what we do well and really focus on how do we improve in areas and what’s important to the university.” Another administrator added, “we now have a process to 93 review project requests proactively so that we can make determination in our budget planning, ‘is this the most strategic project that we should be doing?’” Most of those interviewed felt that CDU was being strategic in the execution of its vision. However, some expressed that the institution could be doing even more in this area. For example, one administrator noted that he felt particular segments of the institution were being strategic (e.g., academic affairs, enrollment management), but that across units there was less collaboration and strategic thought. Another administrator noted that “Right now we do fantastic things, but if you ask us what we do, well we do this, we do that, we do this, we do that and it’s a kind of a buffet. It’s great, we do a lot of it, but what pulls it together?” This is a minority viewpoint across participants, but demonstrates the lack of complete agreement on how focused administrators think the institution is as a whole. Conservative Financial Management CDU is not immune to financial difficulties but these difficulties have not caused it to change its goals or aspirations. One faculty member indicated, “I mean it’s kind of fascinating because . . . you’d think we’d be flat broke and there’d never be raises and that’s just not the reality.” This is in part due to an extremely conservative approach to financial management at CDU. “We’ve been the exact opposite of frivolous. We’ve been careful and intentional on having supporting investments on buildings and student life programming and other things that really complement and support a great academic experience and I’m very proud that we could and should be a role model for how we’ve spent our money as an institution and spend the taxpayer money and our donors’ money on the right things here,” said one administrator. Multiple other individuals provided a chorus of replies about the conservative nature of budgeting at the institution and careful resource management leading up to and through the 94 recession as reasons why the institution came through the past several years in a strong financial position. Contain Costs. CDU has still had to manage its resources wisely and contain costs. Whenever possible, CDU has looked for operational efficiencies that result in cost savings from the non-academic portion of the institution. One individual stated, “There have been a lot of efforts at cost reductions.” Most notably efforts have been made to centralize information technology services across campus to reduce redundancies and consolidate positions through natural attrition. This helped eliminate a top-heavy structure of several IT administrators but few front-line IT staff members. “We had five directors and eight people were reporting to them in total. So we structured out those high-paid positions down to a couple and hired many many more worker bees centrally,” one administrator noted. Another example of centralizing operations occurred recently with graduate admissions. Previously each college handled its own graduate admissions process, which not only led to operational inefficiencies but also resulted in a lack of a coordinated effort to strategically manage graduate enrollment levels. As a result, “a second kind of administrative reorganization of which we’ve been involved in is to try to get more central support for the graduate application process,” according to one administrator. Increase Collaborations. Besides efforts to pursue operational efficiencies, CDU has made efforts to pursue collaborations. One individual noted, “This collaborative stuff isn’t adding a lot of additional expense, it’s using resources differently.” This in turn has led to what another administrator coined as “the decade of collaboration on campus.” For example, when the university re-structured one of its colleges to expand into the area of health professions programs, this was done almost entirely through the re-purposing of existing units and 95 collaborations across colleges to develop a new innovative curriculum without adding new faculty lines. One administrator explained: When we created the new [college name masked], in other days we might well have said, “and we need to start off with a $1 million staff budget there . . . and we need to have 20 faculty for the new college.” We’ve figured out an alternative way, which is that we’re going to build the curriculum largely, not completely, 80-90% around existing faculty and their existing areas of teaching. It’s very innovative. When students in the new health professions programs need to enroll in business-related classes, those are offered directly through the business college instead of hiring a new faculty member in the health area with a business specialty. This innovation is largely viewed positively across campus. “You might say we’re forced into innovation, really brilliant innovation, so you might say the constraint actually helped us,” argued one administrator. Collaborations have not been solely internal. CDU has a long history of maintaining partnerships with external stakeholders that allow it to offer programs and services it might not otherwise be able to afford and provide on its own. For example, “In the areas of manufacturing and engineering . . . our engineering college is really noteworthy for the fact that maybe 50% of its funding comes from industry. The faculty, the programs are, and for a long time, have been organized around relationships with the industry,” according to one administrator. A more recent example is in the area of student housing where a new residence complex was developed in collaboration with a private housing company as a means to become more attractive to potential students. This project was only able to be undertaken because the capital financing came from a private developer that owns and operates the complex and developed a relationship with the university. Revenue Enhancements. Along with cost containment and cost-sharing efforts, CDU has worked to expand and increase revenue streams to offset a decline in state appropriations. 96 One key way CDU has expanded revenues is through enrollment growth. This is widely recognized across campus as imperative not only as a means to serve the region and provide access to a college education, but as a means to remain financially stable as an institution. “We understand if we do increase enrollment that leads to a healthier budget here at the university and allows us to do more with those funds,” said one administrator. Another individual added, “So in our budget planning we know that to have more financial resources we have to keep growing enrollment and for an institution our size that’s really important to be more financially efficient. We have capacity on campus with the current classroom space with smart re-scheduling to be able to grow without necessarily adding classrooms.” This is a key point about growing. At least one administrator worried that growing enrollment could add costs in new space and faculty requirements, but other administrators pointed out that strategic enrollment growth can help the institution meet its full capacity without necessarily adding costs that would negate any increased tuition revenue. Part of strategic growth is expanding recruitment efforts toward international students, many with the ability to pay full tuition without discounts. This recruitment expansion strategy also includes targeting a greater number of older, non-traditional students, some looking to obtain advanced degrees and others who began college but never received a bachelor’s degree and are now looking to return and finish their degree. CDU has not undertaken large recruitment efforts in out-of-state domestic markets, mainly due to a lack of on-campus housing available for those students, but overall the focus is clearly on enrollment growth. Closely linked to enrollment growth is the issue of tuition rates. Although CDU has suffered declines in state appropriations, hikes in tuition have countered those declines. One faculty member candidly stated, “I mean the reality, and I think this is true everywhere in the 97 state, is that tuition has been increased to offset that [declining appropriations] and then it’s only if you start saying you can’t raise tuition to offset that where you’re really in trouble.” Another individual added: The state constitution gives control of tuition to the boards of regents, governors, and trustees and that is, to me, an institutional arrangement which was life saving for the universities . . . we’ve been able to increase our tuition, not at crazy rates, but at a good enough rate to keep our commitment to academic excellence, our commitment to financial aid, and student access, and our commitment to, what I refer to as the, a fair working environment, which largely means a positive salary program annually. We’ve been able to do that . . . we have been able to build our budget around a moderate level of tuition increase, which the board was willing to support. That meant our overall operating budget never declined. Additional participants indicated that the ability to increase tuition to offset declines in state appropriations helped maintain academic quality at the institution. “We even thought about bringing our tuition down. It would just kill us. It’s a quality issue,” opined one individual. Along with growing enrollment and increasing tuition, CDU pursued revenue in new areas, including increasing efforts in fundraising and external research funding. However, these areas were not mentioned as often as revenue expansion through enrollment growth or tuition increases. One reason is that individuals acknowledged that although CDU is successfully increasing fundraising and grant activity, the institution historically has not been setup in a manner to yield large successes in these areas. On the fundraising side, there has not been a sustained and comprehensive fundraising strategy between large campaigns, resulting in an endowment of less than $100 million. On the research side, many of the institution’s programs are geared toward practical applications and partnerships with industry as opposed to research that is attractive to major federal agencies that award multi-million dollar grants. Cost containment efforts, increased collaborations, and an emphasis on expanding and increasing revenue streams helped CDU navigate a treacherous financial situation. The 98 institution has not experienced layoffs and has even provided raises in some recent years. However, a constrained resource environment continues to be a consideration in long-range institutional planning. One administrator argued, “The opportunity cost is we haven’t been able to take big risks or make big expenditures and investments.” This is noticeable in several areas including the institution lagging in wireless capabilities across campus, general technological upgrades, and customer relationship management systems. Additionally, one administrator worried that cost containment efforts previously limited to the non-academic side of the institution may eventually, out of necessity, reach the academic side. This individual stated, “I feel like we’re not very far from a time when the universities here have to rethink the delivery of courses, the biggest costs of course is faculty. It’s anathema to even express these ideas. I do it only because I’ve signed this consent [for anonymity].” This person continued to express concern that the financial model on the academic side may soon require rethinking the nature of academic programs and academic matters may no longer remain free from efficiency efforts and cutbacks. Still, CDU has come out of a very difficult period in a strong financial position due to conservative financial management of the institution. Expansion of High Demand Programs One of the benefits of sitting in a stable, even if not envious financial state is the ability to continue to pursue one’s vision. A faculty member indicated, “Our president has made it clear that there would not be reductions in faculty and in fact there have been some new hires so that he wanted to come out of the recession with a healthy faculty.” An administrator added, “There never has been a hiring freeze . . . One year senior officers and deans did not get a raise, but every other year everybody has gotten a raise . . . nobody’s ever been laid off, no RIFs [reductions in force]. Where is the impact? I don’t really think that we have been seriously 99 damaged.” Another faculty member indicated, “you see other universities that are, I don’t know what you call it, disbanding programs entirely. That can be hard on the institution I think. I don’t believe that we have done that.” Not having to deal with massive retrenchment has allowed the institution to make necessary investments to expand and grow in key strategic areas. Given the needs of the region, along with the need to attract students, CDU has made a conscious and strategic effort to create new and expand programs in high demand areas, specifically related to engineering and the health professions. This includes growth in both undergraduate and graduate programs. “I think there’s a lot of development right now of graduate programs. Graduate enrollment is beginning to come out of its recession era slump, more so than undergraduate actually,” argued one administrator. Another individual added, “More and more the master’s degree is the new bachelor’s degree, you need that kind of specialization. So to me, in this state, it makes complete sense that we are building robust graduate programs.” Again, many of these programs have come into existence through collaborations across existing units and are not always completely new creations. However, these areas of growth and expansion demonstrate the institution’s emphasis on programs in demand by the region and among students. Influences CDU’s strategy is influenced by a number of factors; some more pervasive than others. The focus in this section is on the major external and internal factors influencing large strategic decisions and directions at CDU. External Influences A number of external factors influence CDU’s strategic direction. As a “communitydriven” institution, responding to local constituent demands in the form of employers and 100 prospective students is pervasive. Additionally, CDU is influenced by competitor institutions and governmental policies. Market Demand. The external environment plays a significant role in the strategic direction of CDU. One major area of influence is responding to market forces and interests. This influence was mentioned across interviews more than any other external or internal factor, and is most noticeable in terms of the academic offerings at CDU. CDU is consciously aware of the employment outlook, particularly in its immediate region, and regularly relies upon market surveys in determining programs to add, expand, or contract. As one administrator noted, “we’ve been responding to business and industry from the beginning, and the programs have grown to meet that need . . . all of the new programs we’re doing are deeply market researched.” This helps CDU meet its goal of serving the region and developing a future pipeline of talent for the region. “We are able to focus on select programs that are needed now and in the future for job growth,” said one administrator. Another administrator added that CDU has “outstanding degree programs that are really relevant to our economy.” CDU’s response to regional economic needs is most evident in its evolving portfolio of academic programs, specifically in the fields of business, engineering, and health professions. During the heart of the recession, some business and engineering programs, specifically at the graduate level, were scaled back as automotive companies in particular cut back paying for tuition credits for their employees. With the automotive industry returning to prosperity, so too have CDU’s investments in programs related to that industry. In terms of why these programs are created, one administrator stated, “Our engineering PhD programs are really relative to what’s needed in the region. Our undergraduate graduates and our graduate graduates in master’s and PhD programs are doing research in really relevant economic growth need 101 disciplines. So it wasn’t prestige-driven, it was market-driven.” This administrator added that the institution’s pursuit of a new engineering building is connected to local needs. “It’s a need for the region. It’s not a want or a desire. It’s something that’s really important to our region,” he stated. The creation of a wide variety of health professions programs is similarly in response to regional needs. These programs were emphasized “to contribute to the improvement and build out of the healthcare industry in our region” and to “really honor what’s needed in our region for education and health and human services,” two separate administrators indicated. Although CDU is responsive to market and employer needs, it does not do so blindly. In fact, CDU prides itself on not creating niche programs that are so specifically tailored as to risk future low enrollment if demand changes. Additionally, CDU always vets major programmatic decisions through university committees to consider feasibility and institutional fit. One example is avoiding expansion into a nursing program despite external pressure to create a RN to BSN nursing completion program. One administrator explained: We had been assured there’s a huge growing need for it and thousands of people out there who want it and [told] you could really have a very strong program. Then at the end it seems that is one of those things, which has a hump of demand, but maybe not such sustained demand. We also came to the conclusion that to create that program would be pretty intensive in terms of costs. It’s part of the reason that we chose not to go in the direction of clinical things. So our best efforts are directed. We worked with a firm called [firm name masked], which helps us to vet proposed new programs like the public health programs for example. Market forces are a factor in determining strategic directions at CDU, but are not followed blindly without consideration of the short and long-term feasibility of such programs and fit with the institution’s capabilities. Student Demand. Closely aligned with responding to market interests is the manner in which CDU responds to student needs and interests. One administrator stated, there is always 102 consideration of the questions: “where are the students and what do they need right now?” Another administrator added a similar sentiment: “What do students want? What do we need to be doing for the students to make them successful?” This response to student interests manifests itself in programmatic offerings at CDU. For example, “the College of Business has started a lot of one-year master’s programs, which apparently people are more interested in now than the MBA,” according to one faculty member. The institution has also noticed a trend in students being interested in more “job-relevant majors,” which has resulted in the creation of a business minor for liberal arts students with the intention of attracting the student who “wants to maybe become an entrepreneur . . . [and that] will allow her to be better prepared for getting and keeping a job.” This response to student demand is clearly felt in the health professions field. According to one administrator: More students indicate a health major taking the ACT than any other area, more students who apply here indicate health as an interest than any other, and more students who enroll in the freshman class had some kind of health designation than any other . . . so hundreds of students say, “I’m pre-med.” What we worked out is they’re pre-med because they don’t have other options, but it’s really the health profession. We wanted to have a platform where we could build out a certain type of health profession program, gave a lot of thought to what kind of programs those should be. Competitors. Along with responding to local market and student interests, another large external factor that influences the strategy at CDU is the existence of competitor institutions. This is at the forefront of the minds of those interviewed, as evidenced by some of the following statements: “we are keenly interested, I think, in what the other campuses in our state are doing because we are affected by that,” “I think competition has definitely driven some of this,” “I think we’ve always got to be aware of what our peers are doing,” and “the competition in the marketplace is really intense.” This competition has been particularly felt in the area of student recruitment. CDU is located in a large population center, which means there are many students 103 to draw from, but there are also many schools in the area competing for students. As a result, CDU “increased the amount of money spent on advertising and marketing.” However, this alone is not enough to deal with increasing competition among institutions. One administrator lamented the fact that competitor institutions are making it easier to transfer credits into the institution and are creating better partnerships with community colleges than CDU. Another administrator expressed concern about not being able to keep up with the same level of financial aid packages that other institutions are offering. “That’s going to be a major problem because [person’s name masked] feels like we’ve poured money into scholarships and it’s not sustainable . . . my position is in this competitive market we’re not investing at the rate that other schools are investing,” this administrator argued. While CDU monitors surrounding institutions, it does not automatically copy them. For example, one administrator stressed, “It’s critical to differentiate ourselves.” One way is by not copying academic programs in areas where the market is already saturated. According to one individual, “If we know that a program that we’re looking to establish on campus is already offered at a lot of our competitor schools in the area we may take pause and look a little bit closer. We don’t want to replicate a bunch of programs that are already offered.” One example is in the area of health professions. CDU added a number of programs in high demand health fields but chose not to offer clinical programs since several other universities already offer strong clinical programs. Additionally, there was a viewpoint that clinical programs “weren’t well suited to the rest of the university. So what we have focused on are the kind of programs that are not clinical, they relate better to the strength we have in arts and sciences, the strengths we have in engineering and business as well.” One administrator captured particularly well the balance 104 between being aware of the competition while at the same time focusing on the institution’s own strategy. If we’re focusing on what the students need and our region needs and focusing on that as the primary focus and aware of what our competitors are doing, I think that’s the right type of strategy. Then we have to be less aware of trying to oneup the competitor, but if we have a strategic vision on what does the student need, what does the marketplace need, and what does the state and region need . . . that’s different than thinking about what is X competitor doing and what is B competitor doing, and let’s go do what they’re doing. I’m not saying to not be aware of that. I’m just saying that if we’re truly mission-driven, vision-driven on students and student needs and market and state, let’s have our primary focus there and an awareness and understanding of the competitive nature of our competitors and what they’re doing. Despite most participants indicating that CDU watches but does not necessarily copy its competitors, one person felt differently. “Ultimately, I don’t think we resist the pressure. The pressure is built into the system. To me the whole system is designed to want everyone to be a research university.” This individual provided as an example the fact that research expectations for faculty increased every few years to more closely resemble expectations at major research universities. Still, the majority of people felt that the institution as a whole typically resists pressures to emulate its peers if such imitation would stray too far from the intended strategy of the institution. Governmental Policy. Another external factor exerting influence at CDU is the state policy environment. Specifically, CDU resides in a state that during the past few years has implemented performance metrics that influence a portion of the legislative appropriations process. Although the performance metrics are relatively new and impact a minor portion of the institution’s state appropriation, the influence on the institution’s strategy has already been felt in some areas. One administrator argued: Fortunately or unfortunately the state has some performance metrics that have been introduced that play into our state allocation each year . . . I think, quite 105 frankly, some of the performance metrics from the state have driven some of this, allows us to become a little bit more laser focused on the goals and objectives . . . We know that our appropriations go up if we score better on the performance metrics. I think that some of the work that our strategic plan has done, particularly related to student success, is driven by the performance metrics in one area. Although at least one administrator feels state policy is beginning to influence the institution’s strategy, several other administrators mentioned the de-centralized and autonomous nature of governance of higher education in the state as a factor that allows CDU to pursue its own strategic direction, particularly in terms of programmatic offerings, without influence from statelevel entities. Administrators indicated they must demonstrate that new programmatic offerings are not duplicative and that demand exists, but could not recall any new program proposals being rejected at the state level. This autonomy provides great ease for institutions, CDU included, to respond to market and student demand. Internal Influences Although the external environment plays a major role in influencing CDU’s strategy, there are also important internal influences. Specific strategies may be constrained or enhanced by certain external factors such as the economy or competition, but ultimately internal actors make sense of and interpret the external environment and determine how to respond in light of various possibilities. Stakeholders. First, it is important to acknowledge the different types of individuals that influence strategy at CDU. CDU maintains a fairly collaborative environment with a variety of people offering input on large strategic decisions. In terms of the overarching institutional strategy, the board of trustees provides significant freedom to the administration in crafting the institution’s vision and is more likely to approve an initiative or specific direction than to advocate specific strategies. In terms of who in the administration initiates the overarching 106 strategy, it begins with the president who early in his tenure developed a broad vision for the institution centered on serving the surrounding community. This vision, however, was thoroughly vetted with administrators, faculty, and other groups. Ultimately, the president allowed room for other executives, deans, and faculty members to interpret a broad strategic framework and implement it in a manner that best fit their particular segments of the institution. According to one administrator, “it’s a very decentralized environment, it’s not top-down, it’s definitely bottom-up.” One area where it is clear that there is shared authority in making strategic decisions is in terms of expanding academic programs. Most interviewees indicated that program expansion typically arises from the faculty. Comments on this topic from two faculty members included: “you can’t really make important changes without the consent of the faculty members on the executive committees [of the colleges]” and “the administration can’t do anything without the cooperation of the faculty . . . ultimately the faculty has to cooperate. The administration cannot really propose programs.” However, most individuals readily acknowledged that administrative support was key to helping proposals succeed. “The administration has to subscribe to some support for a new program” and “there is a very serious vetting process which requires that the proposers and the dean demonstrate market demand, the integrity of the academic proposal, and all of that needs to be taken into account before the provost is willing to support,” were a couple comments on the role administrators play in making programmatic decisions. Although it is most typical for faculty to propose and administrators to vet and ultimately support or reject proposals, recent pressures brought administrators more actively into the mix. Multiple individuals noted that the expansion into health fields was largely driven by the provost in response to a strategic opportunity to develop programs in a high demand area for the region. 107 This also illuminates how the external environment framed a possibility, but internal actors (i.e., the provost in consultation with others) interpreted that opportunity and decided whether it made sense for the institution to pursue. Although CDU maintains a fairly collaborative culture, there is still occasional tension between stakeholders when decisions are made. One example is the speed at which administrators prefer to make decisions compared to faculty members. One faculty member opined that “there was some tension between maybe the administrators who wanted it [expansion of health programs] to be super, super fast and the faculty who wanted to go a little slower.” Another example, mentioned by one administrator, is tension that occasionally exists between the academic and non-academic portions of the institution and the two sides not always working together collaboratively on major initiatives. For example, there is a concern that colleges often make enrollment projections without adequately consulting with enrollment management staff, sometimes leading to poor strategic decisions being made simply because the right people were not at the table when decisions were made. Institutional Commitment. While it is important to know which individuals are involved in strategic decision-making at CDU, their commitment to the institutional vision is also critical. At CDU, there is a stable leadership team devoted to the vision and direction of the institution. The current president has been in position for more than 10 years. Although there has been turnover among other senior administrators during the president’s tenure, many key members of the senior administrative team have been at the institution in some capacity for several years. This continuity, combined with an influx of new talent, caused one person to opine, “Frankly I think right now we have one of the best leadership teams in higher education.” 108 Steady leadership alone does not influence CDU’s strategy. The fact that constituencies across the institution are committed to the same general vision also helped the institution remain focused on a consistent macro strategy for a longer period of time. “It’s one thing to say this is the mission of the university. It’s another thing to actually have people who care about that. You can over time, just by people retiring and hiring new people, you can get more people who care about that,” said one faculty member. Building this commitment has taken time, but as the prior quote indicates, commitment to the vision is built through hiring people who share the same values and commitments. One administrator mentioned that the provost is keen on hiring deans with a university-wide perspective, not just a narrow college-level agenda. At the faculty level, some well-credentialed researchers are not hired if they appear uncommitted to teaching and outreach activities. With such hiring practices in place, one administrator said, “it feels like at least half of the professional people we’ve hired all came because of that [regional] vision.” At CDU, as might be expected at any institution of moderate size, there is not a universal commitment to the articulated institutional vision. One administrator offered, “I used to say everybody agreed on the vision for this campus, but everybody’s vision was different . . . It was a very personal vision and I think we still have some of that. We’re pretty committed to the community, regional vision, but if you scratch the surface a little bit you’d find that some of the faculty don’t know what that means.” In other instances individuals may know what the institutional vision means but still choose to ignore that vision. For example, one person stated, “There’s no question that the previous [college name masked] dean was more geared towards and used to talk openly about what we want to do is become more of a research university, so his agenda was research, research, research.” That dean is no longer employed at CDU and the new dean in that area is viewed as more committed to the regional vision of the institution. Individual 109 aspirations contrary to those of the institution may always exist, but there is a belief at CDU that stable and committed leadership prevents divergent ambitions from moving the institution away from its intended strategy, goals, and aspirations. Summary CDU managed through a difficult period with a steadfast commitment to its strategy of serving the surrounding region, providing access to students, and maintaining high academic quality and excellence. Due to strong financial management, strategic cost containment, and revenue expansion through enrollment growth and tuition raises, CDU has not scaled back many core operations, and in fact has consciously made efforts to invest in priority areas, specifically in high demand academic areas. CDU remained committed to its current trajectory for the past several years largely due to a steady leadership team and genuine commitment across institutional stakeholders to the stated vision of the institution. External factors influenced some of the directions CDU pursued and will continue to frame future decisions, but internal stakeholders responded to external influences in the context of remaining committed to the university’s community, regional vision. 110 CHAPTER 6: BALANCING ACT UNIVERSITY The final university studied is a large, complex university, enrolling more than 20,000 students. It offers more than 50 graduate programs, including several at the doctoral level, along with a rich array of baccalaureate programs. It also maintains a number of satellite campuses across the state and throughout the country. Its division one intercollegiate athletics status provides occasional national exposure. Despite its current comprehensive nature, the university’s historical roots are as a Normal School and its main campus continues to serve a largely residential, undergraduate population, with students hailing nearly 90% from within the state. This dichotomy of regional roots but growing national exposure often results in the institution being pulled in different directions. On the one hand there are some individuals at the institution who believe the university is an aspiring research university, ratcheting up research expectations and seeking increased national reputation. On the opposite spectrum, there are individuals who believe the university is and always should be focused primarily on undergraduate education. There are also those who believe an appropriate balance between national research and regional undergraduate expectations is possible, but there is a constant tension among stakeholders about what that balance should be. This balance-seeking has been notable during the past several years as the institution underwent several major leadership changes, including a presidential transition and turnover among key university trustees, which has resulted in shifting foci across the institution. By most accounts this university is being pulled in multiple directions often leaving it as a “Balancing Act University” (BAU). 111 Institutional Strategy It is difficult to pinpoint a consistent and cohesive institutional strategy at BAU. This is not to indicate that individuals at BAU lack opinions about the institutional vision, but rather the differing nature of such opinions leads to an often muddled and unclear picture. To best grasp the current state of BAU’s vision as an institution, this section is divided in the following manner. First, I provide an overview of what has been described by some individuals as the unclear, schizophrenic, and reactive nature of BAU. Next, I describe a broad compilation of pieces that best reflects the complex and divergent nature of BAU’s vision: providing high quality undergraduate education, supporting the needs of the region and state, an increasing emphasis on research and graduate programs, and re-evaluating and seeking a sustainable enrollment profile. These aspects of BAU’s vision were compiled through triangulating disparate opinions across institutional stakeholder interviews and document review. However, it is important to note that this broad compilation of a vision should not be confused for a uniform and consensus opinion across campus. Finally, I end this section with an overview of whether BAU’s vision changed and evolved during the past several years. Unclear, Schizophrenic, and Reactive Interviews with administrators and faculty members revealed there are a number of individuals at BAU who are unclear about the overall goals and intentions of the university. Upon being asked about the institution’s overarching vision, one administrator stated, “If I’m going to be honest with you, I don’t know if we know that clearly yet . . . It’s hard for me to say that we’re aligned in the right direction because I don’t know if we’ve defined that enough.” Another administrator added, “I think if you’re asking the overall question, ‘What’s the vision for the future?’ I don’t know that there is one. I think it is much more reactive than it is 112 proactive.” This was echoed by another individual who noted, “I think we’re probably a little schizophrenic . . . I think we’re very reactive in how we use our resources on this campus.” Despite some opinions suggesting that the institution lacks a coherent vision, the university does have a written strategic plan. However, some individuals indicated the strategic plan does not provide further clarity regarding the institution’s direction. “The strategic plan, it feels like it’s kind of all over the place. We have some of these mandates, but how do they really fit and what is the bigger picture?” questioned one faculty member. This lack of clarity largely stems from whether the institution is pursuing a strategy more aligned with that of a regionally focused undergraduate institution or an aspiring national research university. “In many ways some of the turmoil that’s been on campus in the past, I think, is because the school is kind of going through this schizophrenia a little bit. ‘Are we a teaching school? Are we a research-one school? Or is there somewhere in between?’” added another faculty member. Another individual added, “The tension between research and undergraduate has been there since I hit campus . . . I do think that tension is very real.” Although there are several individuals who find the institution’s strategy muddled and unclear, this causes differing levels of concern among individuals. One individual stated, “If we don’t figure out a way to no longer try to be everything to everyone, we’re not going to be able to continue becoming a better university.” Another administrator opined: I told the president, I said that’s a problem right there. If I walk up to this alumni or this employee, this faculty member, I’ll ask them the same question. Am I going to get the same answer? Absolutely not. That’s the problem I said. If nobody is giving the same answer we have an identity crisis. How can you sell something when you don’t know what you’re doing? You don’t know why you’re here. On the other hand, another administrator questioned if an overarching, coherent vision is necessary. 113 Fine, there’s a tension, that doesn’t bother me. I was looking at some other campuses around the state and saying I just don’t think they’re in any different position than we are from that standpoint . . . In ten years I believe we will be very different. So we might fall into a vision as opposed to having set a vision. This individual continued by stating that her main concern is that students get to the university and graduate. “If I know that students are getting there and ultimately graduating and have succeeded, then okay that is our job. That is what our goals should be . . . I’m not sure the [larger] vision matters.” High Quality Undergraduate Education A number of individuals at BAU believe its primary objective is to provide a high quality undergraduate educational experience, and this is reflected in both word and deed. BAU’s mission and vision statements utilize student-centered language, and student success is listed as the first pillar of its strategic plan. Although these documents contain additional foci, the emphasis on students first is important to a number of individuals across campus. Comments from individuals on this topic included: “we are primarily an undergraduate teaching institution. I think, at least in my tenure, we will continue to be a primarily undergrad teaching institution,” “I think the institution is grounded in being a teaching and learning institution,” and “I believe our overall goal is to provide a very strong undergraduate education experience for students . . . probably a special emphasis on undergraduate students.” Such comments may be common across a multitude of institutions, but a number of individuals at BAU believe its actions follow its words. One individual noted that the institution has always put most of its resources toward undergraduate education and another individual mentioned that the institution continues to invest additional resources into the undergraduate enterprise on campus. Others pointed toward the university’s emphasis on a solid teaching record in its promotion and tenure criteria, programs designed to help faculty develop strong instructional methods, and the fact that most courses are 114 taught by faculty members and not graduate students as indicators of the university’s commitment to undergraduate education. It is important to point out that the individuals strongly supportive of this undergraduate focus do not believe it should be the only focus, simply that it should be the primary focus and that other initiatives should be complementary. For example, one individual relayed a story about being questioned on BAU’s focus on teaching versus research. I’ll be asked often by faculty, even students sometimes, “are we research or are we teaching?” I don’t think those two things are mutually exclusive, we’re both. Primarily teaching, but we do research also. I think that research really informs teaching. I think the scholarship, particularly with our students, there’s so many of our students that have an opportunity at the undergraduate level to get involved with faculty members and graduate students and are doing graduate research. I think they complement each other. Another individual added, “We are emphasizing research more and growing our research, but we will always be a teaching institution. The president is adamant about that. The Board of Trustees is adamant about that. First and foremost we’re a teaching institution.” BAU’s emphasis is not simply to educate undergraduate students, but on providing a high quality educational experience through competitive academic programs. One broad institutional goal is to increasingly be viewed by students as a “first-choice” university, not a backup school to the state’s flagship institutions. This is partly done through concentrating on areas where the university can offer the “first, best, or only” academic program in a given area. One individual stated, “There are programs within the university that compete very strongly on national and international levels . . . certain programs will compete with ‘top tier-ish’ type of schools.” This is very important to BAU and it aligns its resources within these areas, most specifically in the areas of STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) and health professions programs. Although some of these programs, such as those in the health professions, are at the 115 graduate level, several other areas of strength exist within the undergraduate curriculum. For example, one faculty member noted, “I look at, for instance, our School of Music, and we have a national profile to an extent. That comes primarily through the activities of our undergraduates, not our graduate students.” Maintaining such programs with a national profile is viewed by individuals at BAU as part of providing a high quality educational experience to its students. Serving the Region and State Besides an emphasis on undergraduate education, several individuals at BAU pointed toward a complementary goal of meeting regional and state needs. One way this is accomplished is by not only offering high quality academic programs, but by offering programs in demand by local and state employers. As one administrator stated, “We’re here to educate students, to provide an educated workforce, to be an economic engine for the state.” The university is consciously aware of needs across the state and develops academic programs appropriate to those needs. The university was founded as a Normal School to help meet the state’s needs for more teachers. Administrators believe that the university’s development of a medical school was done for similar reasons to help meet the state’s need for more primary care physicians. The types of programs offered have evolved, but “we’ve evolved to meet the needs of the state,” said one individual. Another way BAU meets the needs of the region and state is by providing education to a different student population than research or liberal arts institutions. At BAU there is a “history and mission of servicing students who are aspiring to get into the middle class and above,” said one administrator. Other individuals added that BAU serves the needs of students who do not get into top tier institutions. “We end up turning these students around and getting them the skills to become better educated,” said one faculty member. BAU still emphasizes high 116 academic quality and has not lowered its admissions standards even during times of challenging competition for students. In fact, BAU maintains one of the largest honors programs in the state and added new merit-based scholarship packages to its repertoire within the past couple years. Still, the idea of access and serving students who are sometimes less well-prepared is important to BAU. “Access is very important to us. There were conversations last week when the Board of Trustees was in town about the fact that we do give access to many, many students. Where you have universities who are what I would call ‘cream of the crop’ students only, that is not our mission.” As such, the board and administration have made a point to keep tuition rates low and affordable for all types of students, maintaining one of the lowest cumulative tuition increases in the state over the past five years. Increasing Emphasis on Research and Graduate Programs The goals and aspirations of BAU beyond its traditional regional institution focus is best summed with the following quote: “I would classify us at this point as an aspiring national university . . . what you’ll see moving forward is the research emphasis that you need to have if you’re going to be a major university.” This sentiment can be found in institutional documents as well. The university highlights its size in comparison to national peers and includes in its strategic plan an aspiration to be a “national leader in higher education.” Additionally, the university in its accreditation visit several years ago asked the accrediting agency to review the feasibility of the institution “making the transition to an institution with increased scholarship and national prominence.” It is clear that a number of individuals view BAU’s national aspirations linked directly to increasing research productivity. “I think we would love to be a research extensive [university] . . . we’re research intensive right now. Yes, more far reaching, and that’s really pushed at a lot of 117 different levels,” said one faculty member. Another faculty member added, “Certainly it has become much more research intensive . . . I think there’s a much more aggressive research agenda in the university than there used to be . . . the new money is going to develop on the research side of the program.” This has manifested itself in a number of ways including departments and colleges raising the criteria for faculty to receive promotion and tenure and new faculty hires being evaluated based on their potential research agenda. Yet, research productivity remains broadly defined. One administrator stated: Quality does not necessarily mean more external research dollars. I would love it if it did. Quality does not mean more papers. It really means quality. Quality does not define itself by being science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Quality defines itself by being as good as you can be in the field in which you are. Please help us understand what the national standards are for that area. Although the definition of research expectations differ across campus, there is still an increasing expectation for faculty to be research active, contributing to the university’s external research funding more than tripling during the past several years. Along with a growing emphasis on research activity, there has also been a recent focus at BAU on increasing graduate programs. The university maintains a goal to increase the number of graduate students on campus, and it offers a number of high demand graduate programs, specifically in education and information systems. Additionally, the university maintains several high quality health professions graduate programs, which have expanded due to growing demand during the past several years. Still, the university’s graduate offerings do not compare to those of a major research university; at least not yet. One administrator indicated, “We’re going to see more students who want to come here for graduate programs [in the future].” This same individual acknowledged, “of course we’re not a research university yet.” 118 Although the aspiration of growing graduate programs at BAU may not yet be fully realized, one area of graduate education that plays a large role in BAU’s institutional strategy is the establishment of a medical school. “I think the medical school drives a lot of this. Because our identity is sort of changing and ebbing with the addition of the medical school . . . I think in terms of positioning, I think BAU is really trying to position itself as one of the more research focused institutions in its area of the state with the addition of the medical school,” stated one individual. As an important piece of BAU’s institutional strategy, the medical school received a significant amount of resources. “That [the medical school] was a very significant investment that the university is making” and “there’s a lot of resources put in the medical school” were a couple comments on this topic. However, a number of individuals hope the medical school will bring recognition and additional resources of its own back to the university. “It [the medical school] may well serve to bring up the exposure of the university nationwide and make it more appealing to different types of students,” said one individual. Another person added, when specifically discussing the state of external research funding, “There is a lot of hope and expectation that through the College of Medicine there will be more success in the research area.” Given the earlier description pertaining to undergraduate education, it is not surprising that efforts across campus to increase research and graduate activity have caused tension. A number of individuals bemoaned the investment of new resources in research activity and the medical school. “Depending on who you ask it’s how much travesty and all this stuff, but it’s here to stay, it’s not going anywhere,” said one faculty member. Along with concerns about the shift in direction of the institution, there is also concern that even if the shift in direction is desirable, the university has not fully aligned its actions with its aspirations. For example, one 119 faculty member indicated that despite changes in some departmental bylaws, there are still high teaching requirements at the institution, not consistent with what would be needed for faculty to pursue an active research agenda. This individual continued by questioning the feasibility of the university pursing a larger research focus. We put research in there [the strategic plan]; nobody has ever done a study of this institution of how many research active faculty do we have. Of these research active faculty, what does their research activity look like? Because I would argue that I love my friends in [department name masked] who might have a lot of publications, but they’re not research active . . . Nobody on this campus really knows how many research active faculty are there. To put these measures in and then have this lofty goal of being research extensive, I don’t even really think we know where we’re starting. What does this end goal look like when we don’t know where we’re starting? The end goal is defined by Carnegie, that’s not defined by us. My question has always been, is that achievable given who we are right now? Or what do we have to do at this end to get there? Nobody has taken any study or analysis has ever been done with that, which would be what I would say we need to begin with. Although there are some detractors of BAU’s research aspirations, others argued it is not mutually exclusive from the institution’s original undergraduate focus and question whether it may actually serve to enhance the undergraduate experience. “Does it [research activity] take away from the undergraduate educational experience? Possibly. I don’t know that it has to though . . . I think there has been an interest to increase research that’s conducted on campus. Whether that’s with faculty, yes, but also offering undergraduate research experience that they wouldn’t typically have. To me that’s kind of the broader high quality educational goal.” Another administrator added that increasing research expectations helps elevate the entire institution, which in turn attracts top faculty and results in a stronger educational experience for students. “I think it’s actually good for us to become a national university for many other reasons. It will help our research and presence because of the quality of the faculty that we have, [and] become better known as a national university and as a regional university,” said one 120 individual. A faculty member added, “I think that our faculty, if we’re to be viewed as a high quality university, our faculty has to be viewed as high quality faculty,” and that often means remaining research active according to both faculty and administrators. Similarly, with the university’s medical school, some individuals think it diverts from the undergraduate mission of the institution while others view the type of medical school formed as an extension of the university’s original mission. BAU’s medical school was formed with the explicit intent to train primary care physicians to serve the immediate local region and state, which is projected to experience a massive shortage of physicians in the coming decades. Through its initial classes, the medical school has drawn students largely from the state and more immediate local region. Still, the medical school has come to epitomize the frustrations of some individuals about the future direction of BAU. One faculty member provided a strong summation of the current tension across campus regarding the undergraduate teaching versus research and graduate programs emphases. I think everyone is in agreement that research isn’t going away. That is a part of the university and will remain so. I would bet it’s always about middle ground on this. I bet if you talk to 600 faculty members, tenure-track faculty members, if you talk to all 600 of them I would say, I bet, 400 would say, “We’ve got a pretty decent balance right now. I’m enjoying my research. I’m enjoying my teaching.” There would be 100 on either side that will go on, “I wish it was just teaching. I wish we could be a lot more research heavy.” Regardless of the exact breakdown of the number of individuals supporting different visions at BAU, it is clear there is tension between those supporting a more undergraduate focus and those supporting a more research and graduate heavy focus. Enrollment Sustainability During the past several years, BAU experienced large fluctuations in its enrollment, particularly among its entering undergraduate class. The university went from a record-high 121 number of first-year students to a couple years of sharp declines, with a recent return of an increased number of entering students. These fluctuations led to a re-evaluation of the university’s overall enrollment goals. According to one administrator: We had an enrollment bump last year. We were down significantly from where we had been before. This fall it looks like we’re going to be way up. But what the board has said to us, and what the president wants to do, is to have our institutional research folks look at the demographics going forward and a lot of other data and decide this is about the number of students that we can sustain going forward. When that number is announced, probably in the fall, that will start driving along these other strategic pieces. The key to institutional leaders is to focus on what a number of individuals referred to as “rightsizing” the institution and finding the “best” size for the institution that is sustainable. To one individual that number is clear and that number is lower than previously held on campus. This individual acknowledged that it would not be easy to work toward a steady decrease of approximately 1,000 students from the university’s current enrollment. However, this individual indicated, “We’re going to keep vetting the number, but we believe it’s sustainable in the long term, at a high quality, and this is going to drive it. A quality student body with a sustainable number.” Similarly to BAU’s academic vision, its enrollment vision is not clear and accepted across the entire institution. There is a general consensus that BAU is working toward a sustainable enrollment number, but several individuals questioned whether that number has been determined or if it is possible to determine at all. “We’re having some of those discussions and they’re profitable discussions to have. Is there a correct number? Absolutely not,” stated one administrator. This individual continued, “The demographics of the students will change and the delivery will change. I don’t obsess over the correct number, that’s not one of the things that keeps me awake at night. I’d like it to be continued going upward, at least be stable, but I’m not 122 going to worry about it.” Another individual added, “I don’t think we’ve ever had a hard and fast number in our head as to how many we on the one hand wanted and on the other hand needed . . . is there a set number? No.” While BAU works through establishing a sustainable enrollment number, one thing is clear and accepted, the university will maintain its same academic standards for entering students. One administrator noted: The reality is that we didn’t have to lose enrollment in 2012, ’11, or ’13. And the reality is I found out after the fact and got very pissed about it, that big jump in enrollment in 2010 [was] with some folks in admissions let[ting] people in who shouldn’t have gotten in . . . our retention rate dropped from 78-79% down to 75%. Students came in the back door of this university who shouldn’t have been here. That said, in ’11, ’12, and ’13 if that was allowed to happen, we didn’t have to lose any enrollment, but we wouldn’t have the quality of students we wanted. Another individual added: I believe that I can get a number of students, but the question is can I get the right profile of student? That’s what the question is. Everybody can get numbers. There’s people around every day. You can use financial aid to leverage whatever number you want. It may not be a successful model, but you get numbers of students. The question is, is it the right mix of young people or any person that’s going to make the college experience meaningful? That’s what I lose sleep over. Although BAU is adamant about maintaining its same admissions standards, it is still taking steps to ensure a sound enrollment number. One way this is being accomplished is with a strategic focus on expanding the traditional recruitment area. With a declining high school population in the state, BAU is looking toward more out-of-state and international students. “We’ve got to go to those states that have more potential students than they do capacity,” stated one administrator. This individual continued, “it’s not just states because we’re also starting to recruit international . . . we will have the largest number of international students next year we’ve ever had.” While this has been an increasing focus at BAU for several years, individuals recognized that every university in the state is following a similar approach, and it can often be 123 difficult for a more regionally based school without a national reputation to recruit out-of-state and international students. One area where the university feels it has an advantage over other institutions is in online and distance education enrollments. BAU maintains satellite campus locations across the country, and enrollment through these distance education centers increased in recent years. A number of administrators think this is an area that can have sustained growth, and that branch campuses in strategic out-of-state areas can pay dividends with recruiting out-of-state students to the main campus as well. “There’s some perceived awareness of the institution. You may not be starting from scratch, you just have to define, expand your brand awareness [when recruiting outof-state],” said one administrator. Along with physical off-campus locations, BAU also expanded its online course offerings. “Our online numbers are growing. More and more students are taking online courses,” said one administrator. “Online learning is an area where you have seen growth and much more interest on the part of the university in being able to provide some of that,” added another individual. Online offerings are viewed as a way to expand access as part of BAU’s commitment to educational attainment for all types of students. This was articulated by the following statement: Not every course to teach you should be doing online, we’d never advocate that, but to the extent that we could adapt the teaching and the delivery, whether it’s face-to-face or online, hybrid, I think you adapted. For me online is all about access. It’s about access . . . These are adult learners with day jobs and students. You give them access through online and provide an education that doesn’t require them to be in [city of main campus masked] at 9 o’clock on Tuesday morning when they have something that they have to do. It makes all the difference in the world. While BAU’s online offerings help expand its reach beyond campus, it has also been a strategy to help its residential undergraduate population. In response to losing student credit hours due to 124 students taking general education courses over the summer at community colleges, along with student complaints about needing scheduling flexibility while trying to work and attend school at the same time, the university expanded online offerings for its traditional on-campus student population. Now almost half of the undergraduate online credit hours are from students who are full-time on-campus students. This is viewed as a positive development for students who are able to take an occasional online course that better matches their in-semester and summer schedules. It is also beneficial for the university in limiting the loss of tuition dollars from students taking courses at other institutions and transferring those credits to BAU. Although other universities are also increasing satellite locations and online offerings, BAU views itself as maintaining at least a current competitive advantage in these areas. “We’re one of the early adopters for off-campus distance education” and “we were pioneers in distance learning back in the early 70s, so we’ve had a lot of experience and power behind this,” were some of the comments about BAU’s position in this realm. This early-mover advantage has led to BAU receiving high rankings and recognition, particularly in its online undergraduate programs and education and business graduate programs. However, this status is one individuals recognize will be difficult to maintain due to stiff competition among peer institutions, some of whom have more resources to devote to catching up in these areas. Of course, distance and online education are not without detractors on campus. Individuals indicated that a number of older professors dislike occasional online teaching duties. There is also concern about ensuring quality educational delivery and the integration of main campus and off-campus/online offerings. One faculty member opined, “We have to position ourselves to be able to take advantage of the online opportunities. We have been doing well . . . How we [main campus] mesh with that is probably the biggest unknown I think facing us and 125 facing higher ed in general . . . The more we can make that distance education viable, at the rigor that we expect it to have, and have an ease of delivery that the public demands, how we make that work will be really telling.” Although distance education and online offerings are deeply ingrained at BAU, participants indicated that the extent to which these offerings expand vis-à-vis traditional main campus offerings is a concern among a number of faculty members. Continuity of Strategy Across the variety of institutional goals maintained at BAU, albeit sometimes conflicting or unclear goals, there is also a debate of whether such goals are long-standing or evolving. Most individuals acknowledged there have been changes within the university during the past several years, but opinions differed on whether the overarching goals and priorities of the institution changed or just the tactics for achieving the same broad vision. The increase in research activity and creation of the medical school were two areas in which individuals most felt the university’s overarching vision shifted. “I think the medical school drives a lot of this because our identity is sort of changing and ebbing with the addition of the medical school,” commented one faculty member. Another faculty member added, “I know that they [goals] have evolved. I’ve been here 13 years and I talk to my colleagues who have been here 20 plus years and the school has changed dramatically . . . Certainly it has become much more research intensive . . . The goals have changed there.” This was reinforced by an administrator in stating, “The research is certainly different than it would’ve been on that campus 20 years ago. I don’t think there was even talk about research on the campus, just knowing what I know of some of the history from other people, some of the reading I’ve done, it was strictly undergraduate education. I do think that has changed a bit.” 126 Although other administrators acknowledged the ratcheting up of research expectations as relatively new to BAU, they found the overarching vision of the university to be constant over a number of years. “I don’t think the mission, if you look at it from the one hundred thousand foot level, I don’t think that has changed a lot” and “I think they [institutional goals] probably existed in some way for at least a few decades to be honest with you,” were a couple comments on this topic. More specifically, one administrator noted, “I don’t think our role has changed a lot. We’re here to educate students, to provide an educated workforce, to be an economic engine for the state of Michigan.” The specifics of that have changed depending on the needs of the state, but even those evolutions did not occur overnight. For example, much of the growth in the sciences at BAU, which is also where most of the increased research activity exists, was in discussion through the tenures of at least three university presidents. To the group of individuals in this opinion base, BAU has slowly increased research and graduate activities, but always within the broader umbrella of serving undergraduate students first along with responding to the needs of the region and state. Recessionary Response Although the clarity and cohesiveness of BAU’s overarching vision are debatable, there is greater consensus around the institution’s response to a period of significant challenge during the Great Recession. The university’s response falls into two broad categories that can be labeled: investing in key strategic areas and strategic financial management. Investing in Key Strategic Areas Despite some challenges with fluctuating enrollment numbers and declining state appropriations, BAU’s leadership has maintained an upbeat focus for the future. We’ve been talking about the recession. What we’ve done here, we haven’t retreated. We have looked at a vision into our future and we’ve moved towards it 127 . . . If we retreated because of the recession we wouldn’t be putting a state-of-theart building up or opening a college of medicine. I think our vision and direction requires us to make some decisions, stretching ourselves. You can’t move forward by just sitting still. This attitude about moving forward, focusing on the future, and not relenting from the highest aspirations permeates institutional documents, most specifically the institution’s strategic plan. During the past several years, the attitude of “do not retreat” translated into specific investments in high priority areas even when budgets were constrained. Throughout a challenging period, BAU invested in high demand academic programs, particularly in science and health fields, student success initiatives, and enhanced recruitment efforts. High Demand Academic Programs. Approximately three years ago BAU underwent a comprehensive review of its academic offerings, which resulted in eliminating a few dozen programs and investing several million dollars in top-priority programs deemed essential to the current and future success of the institution. Many of the high priority programs were in the health and science disciplines. For example, the university is investing significant resources in a new state-of-the art sciences building on campus. “Biological research has changed and the facility going up is state-of-the art. It will put, not a new face, but a different face on the university as far as scientific research and biological and biomedical sciences. The STEM areas in healthcare, as I said earlier, are the areas that we’re really driving here,” commented one administrator. Many of the health professions programs continue to expand and are only capped by facility constraints. The university is focusing on high-demand academic programs and investing resources in those areas as a means of pushing forward despite difficulties in other areas. The counter to investing in high demand programs is BAU’s decision to eliminate or reorganize struggling programs. One faculty member agreed with this program prioritization 128 process and commented, “I think that economic concern drove the prioritization in an effort to make the curriculums a little more streamlined and make sure we’re not throwing money at programs that aren’t producing . . . we did have some dead wood I think in the university and non-producing programs.” Many of these programs have fallen within the humanities, social science, and fine arts disciplines. One administrator noted that it has not always been a case of eliminating programs altogether, but in how to most effectively utilize resources to deliver a range of programs. We have a PhD in history. The provost and I are having these discussions right now, do we need a PhD in history? Now, should we have history? Yes. Then it becomes the question of, do we need a department of history? Or even a department of art? What I mean by that, do you need art courses? I believe [yes] at a university level as part of that liberal arts base. Do you need history courses? I believe you do. You need sociology, psychology courses—of course you do. Do you need these departments and these majors to be a strong university? That’s part of the debate and it will be part of the angst as we move forward. It is important to note there is a belief across campus that the university has attempted to stay true to a strong liberal arts core even as increasing emphases have been placed on STEM and health-related fields. “We haven’t abandoned philosophy, religion and those sorts of things,” said one administrator. Another individual added, “I do value and understand the importance of a good liberal base. We educate and graduate leaders here at BAU. In order to do that, students who can communicate, think, and reason is critically important.” One of the ways BAU invested in its academic offerings during a difficult financial period was from utilizing reserve resources for two years to prevent cuts within academic colleges. BAU follows a responsibility-centered budgeting system where tuition revenue and unit expenses flow through academic colleges, not central administration. This resulted in some academic colleges faring better than others in recent years. However, each college, through prudent planning, was able to build reserve funds during brighter times. With the president’s and 129 board’s approval, reserve accounts were utilized to prevent drastic cuts in academic areas. Individuals at BAU felt this was the right choice to make. “When you get into difficulty, this is what your rainy day money is for, to tide you over. It cannot be a permanent base, but it is a solution . . . I think that was the right decision rather than drastic cuts because that was going to hurt programming. Frankly, we had the financial wherewithal to do it,” said one administrator. This sentiment was echoed by another individual stating, “Every year each one of those colleges has very significant carry-forwards. It was before we were going to touch anybody, faculty-side or non-faculty side, those are your reserves, use them. They’re carry-forwards—use them. Because we do have the money, we do have the resources and because we have them we know we don’t have to take these other kinds of actions. So, why should we?” Student Success Initiatives. Along with investments in academic programs, BAU has also concentrated efforts on increasing student support services. One individual indicated these initiatives are captured in the catchall term “student success.” During the past few years BAU created a new division of student services, re-organized several of the offices within that division, and created a new office devoted to student success, specifically related to retaining students. The university doubled the number of advisors along with increasing investments in student leadership and co-curricular activities. These collective efforts are captured by the following quote. Student success is goal number one. Okay, where are we investing money? Well we’re putting into place a new advising workbench. We’re putting into place new predictive software to help us advise our students as to where they should be, what they should think of as an alternative career if they’re not doing well where they are without losing very many credit hours. We’re putting money into enhancing the opportunities for study and work here on campus so that students can have the kind of tutoring/mentoring that they need here. We just put out a proposal trying to get some money for a STEM academy that would help us with the STEM areas and then again it’s advising, mentoring that sort of thing 130 addressing specifically underrepresented minorities, socioeconomic classes that tend to be underrepresented, gender bias in both directions. Enhanced Recruitment Efforts. A third area where BAU invested resources is in enhancing student recruitment efforts. The university’s efforts to reach more out-of-state and international students as well as to expand distance and online education efforts have already been described. Additional monetary investments have also been made in an effort to not only “not retreat,” but to proactively tackle environmental challenges in the student recruitment area. One area of significant financial investment is in student financial aid. For many years the university did not change its financial aid packages and found itself losing potential students to other universities offering larger awards. “We have for the first time increased the demographics of the students receiving scholarships to be competitive. It’s specifically being competitive because we’re actually increasing the scholarships amongst those students who normally would have not got a scholarship here . . . We know that we’re being competitive now. We’re attracting students that last year we weren’t attracting,” argued one administrator. In keeping true to maintaining the same academic credentials for admittance to the university, financial aid packages were designed with that profile student in mind. One administrator noted, “It didn’t so much change the profile of who they [admissions] accepted, it was more scholarship dollars in order to lure students.” Another mechanism for luring more students to BAU and increasing its national profile at the same time occurred through monetary investments in marketing activities. As one individual commented, “We have not marketed proactively for a number of years. We have aggressively and with concerted focus gone out there and we’re marketing [now].” Another administrator added, “The marketing and the branding, those are all a piece of what the admissions folks know has to happen so that there is just more of a personality, a character or something that draws 131 people here.” Despite an environment of generally constrained resources, the university increased its spending on marketing activities as an effort to not retreat but better compete during challenging times. Strategic Financial Management At the same time BAU has made strategic investments in key areas as part of a “do not retreat” strategy, the university has also been able to weather a difficult financial environment as a result of careful, strategic management. This has been done through working to keep administrative costs low, holding positions open following natural attrition, and seeking increased revenue from non-tuition and non-appropriations sources. Low Administrative Costs. BAU prides itself on keeping its administrative costs low, allowing it to invest more resources toward academic priorities. “When you compare us to our peers for the number of students, we generally have fewer bodies all the way around . . . we’ve always been lean on the administrative side,” stated one administrator. According to internal data, the university believes it spends the lowest percentage of its budget on administrative costs in the state and among the lowest in the country. There is a similar belief pertaining to low benefits costs due to the university’s self-insurance plan. Despite low costs, BAU is constantly seeking additional ways to cutback in order to keep tuition affordable. “We’ve been going through budget reductions like everybody else for what seems like forever. That’s kind of just an ongoing sort of a thing. We’ve made a lot of changes, reductions,” said one individual. Another administrator pointed out that reductions historically happen on the non-academic side. While the university prides itself on cutting administrative expenses before academic expenses, one individual noted that the university could do a better job of reigning in costs on the academic side as well. 132 Holding Positions Open. One of the most common ways BAU keeps costs low is by holding positions open during times of natural attrition. The university experienced a series of layoffs about ten years ago, but has not actively cut personnel since that time. However, the university is careful not to replace individuals when positions are open unless there is a strategic need to continue that position. Holding positions open applies to both the academic and nonacademic side of the institution. “We are seeing tenure-track lines that upon retirement are not being filled with tenure-track lines, but are being filled with part-time lines,” said a faculty member. One administrator questioned, “Should we be adding in professors in X areas believing it’s going to decline? The answer will be no. That is controlled by the provost in any new tenure, tenure-track faculty [decision]. We can control that . . . through attrition.” Revenue Enhancements. Similarly to many institutions, BAU recognizes that it cannot continue to rely solely upon state appropriations and tuition dollars to operate. Although there is recognition of the difficulty in increasing external dollars to the university through research grants and fundraising, particularly compared to major research universities, the institution recently ramped up efforts in both areas. This can be seen through the university’s emphasis on increasing its academic research profile and investing resources in programs with a greater likelihood of obtaining external resources. “Research brings in grant dollars. The programs that can apply for and get a million dollar grant have become more important to the university than before,” opined one faculty member. Top priority academic programs, specifically the college of medicine helped the university increase its fundraising efforts as well, resulting in the institution’s best fundraising year last year. Still, individuals recognized the need to further increase funding in these areas in order to remain competitive in the future. 133 Overall, BAU managed its financial resources well during a difficult period of time. This allowed it to remain competitive and invest in its top strategic priority areas. As a result, one individual indicated they do not believe the university truly experienced a difficult period of time. “I think it [the university] has been so well managed for so many years from a financial and an administrative standpoint that it just has not experienced the kinds of probably cutbacks that maybe some other campuses have . . . I’m not sure everybody on campus appreciates that quite honestly. I don’t think they do . . . we have just not had to experience, I don’t think, that difficult of a time.” Through strong financial management and a desire to not retreat, BAU managed through a challenging economic period in the state without as drastic of cutbacks as might have been expected. Influences Just as BAU’s strategic vision is complex, so too are the factors that influence the strategy of the university. This includes both external and internal sources of influence. External Influences A strategic plan is only as good as the day it’s written, but every class that we admit is going to have a different expectation about the educational experience . . . it [the strategic plan] is not the law. It has to be nimble enough to respond when we find that environmental factors, consumerism, commerce, education, technology—whatever influences that are out there cause us to do something different we need to be prepared to do something different or the strategic plan is for naught. This quote from one administrator frames how BAU is subjected to a number of external factors that can influence its strategic direction. The factors most prevalent in shaping the institution’s strategy are student and market demand, governmental policy, and competitors. Student and Market Demand. BAU’s strategy is greatly influenced by the students who enroll at the university and the employers who seek the institution’s graduates. This is 134 particularly true in terms of determining the set of academic programs offered at the institution. As one administrator succinctly stated, “we know from our own enrollment data where the demand is.” Administrators and faculty then work to develop programs that respond to student demands. One faculty member argued in favor of this approach, stating, “we have to look at social trends. If social trends are for CSI, NCIS and everybody wants to be a forensics scientist, why would we not think about it? . . . It’s kind of dumb to think we’re in this bubble that isn’t influenced by all these social forces.” Given strong student demand in STEM and health professions fields, the university invested heavily in these programmatic areas. This does not mean the university devalues liberal arts programs, but it is simply responding to student demand. “If tomorrow all the students that applied here wanted to major in history, foreign language, sociology – not social work, but sociology – very rapidly we would be a very different university than the direction in which we’re going. To fight against the market to me is just not a natural reaction,” argued one administrator. This is particularly crucial since declining state support has made the institution more dependent upon student enrollment and tuition dollars, increasing the importance of offering high demand degree programs. The reason students are choosing certain majors over others is largely economic. One administrator summed this belief, “I think the institution, appropriately so, has responded to what they have seen and heard from students who are very pragmatic and want to be able to major in something that’s going to have a positive result for them. Subsequently, we’re also seeing a drop in enrollment in the social science programs, art programs, other places that they think they might have an interest in may not result in employability.” Individuals recognized the importance of maintaining a strong liberal arts base, but also felt compelled to respond to students’ interests and job market demands. One administrator argued, “we have looked at 135 where do we think the state needs graduates, what are those programs. Then you get criticized if you do that because people say you’re just chasing jobs, and you get criticized if you don’t. It’s kind of interesting.” The combination of student interests and employer demands is summarized well by one administrator who explained why the university began an engineering program. “That program [engineering] has grown, but that was really driven by two things; by young people who were interested in that, but by also future employers in the state who said, ‘We’ll hire your students if we know we can pick up some engineering students.’” To meet student interests and employer demands the university closely monitors economic forecasts and communicates with external constituencies. “I think the medical school is a perfect example of external constituencies . . . You know, hospitals, communities, etc. who said we hire your physician assistants, we hire your physical therapists, these are great students, would you ever consider opening a college of medicine? It’s an external force that gets a university or an entity to think about it,” said one person. Student demand for the medical college was evident from the thousands of applicants for the inaugural classes with less than 100 available spots. However, student interests and market demands do not always align and the institution is careful not to chase programs where demand is more artificial upon closer examination. For example, one administrator indicated there is a high demand for nursing programs from students, but “the market is saturated too because every place has a nursing program.” Thus, the institution held off on opening a nursing program. Governmental Policy. Another external factor that influences the strategy at BAU is governmental policy. As a state institution, BAU is responsive to the demands of governmental entities. For example, the state recently implemented a performance-based funding formula as part of its appropriations process. This includes establishing an upper limit for tuition increases 136 the past few years, with BAU always complying. Additionally, there has been an increasing emphasis on graduating more students with STEM degrees, a factor in BAU’s shifting focus toward these programs during the past several years. At the federal level, increasing direction from the federal government impacts certain strategic moves undertaken by BAU. For example, as the federal government establishes research funding priorities, the university is responsive to the government’s interests by aligning academic programs with potential funding streams. Furthermore, as the Department of Education explores potential accountability metrics, the university is monitoring what those metrics may include and how it would respond. One administrator mentioned an increasing interest from the federal government in faculty productivity. “Some of the other public databases are NSF and NIH databases on faculty research expenditures. If that’s what the government is using it’s got to be something that we’re considering.” Although governmental policy often results in the university aligning its strategy with prescribed priorities, the generally autonomous nature of higher education within the state also allows BAU to pursue its own strategies free from major state constrictions. “It’s [a] combination of not being part of the system and less oversight by the legislature. I think those are fantastic things. It’s enabling us, and not just us, but across the board other universities, to respond much more rapidly to the needs of our students and the desires of our faculty. I think that is absolutely fantastic. That puts us in a position where I think we can recover from what has been an economic disaster of the last decade,” argued one administrator. There are still some constrictions and resource incentives for pursuing certain initiatives, but BAU largely has the freedom to determine its own strategic direction. 137 Competitors. BAU, like many institutions, finds itself in constant competition with other institutions, both based on geographic location and institution type. Individuals at BAU indicated a number of factors have led to increasing competition among institutions: a declining high school population in the state, community colleges beginning to offer four-year degrees, and the emergence of more online and distance education providers. This increasing competition was described by one individual in the following manner, “Now all of a sudden because of the competitive nature, everybody’s kind of playing in the same pool and now it’s become a pond.” As a result, BAU has found it important to monitor and appropriately respond to actions by their competitors. One administrator indicated, “I think it’s very important to see what the competitors are doing. We look at competitors . . . We pay attention in particular to what competitors are doing. This is about fighting and competing for good students and faculty . . . It’s important that we look at best practices, we try to do that, be it academic or administrative. We do try to mimic best practices.” In terms of direct decisions made due to competitors, individuals pointed to the institution re-vamping its financial aid packages, offering more online courses for on-campus students to take during summer months while away from campus, and constantly adding and improving facilities to compete for new students. This monitoring of and responding to competitors is viewed as a normal part of the higher education community and a necessary and positive tactic. One administrator argued, “I think it’s good to learn from each other. I think, at least in my experience, most schools do. You don’t just go into a cocoon and say ‘I’m going to do it this way.’ You figure out what’s good to be done.” A faculty member, in talking about the importance of remaining competitive vis-à-vis peer institutions said, “I think also as we look at some of our public institutions, and I won’t name names, some fall to the wayside because they’re not ramping up their value, their 138 contributions to the greater higher education community. They’re probably not going to exist in five to ten years.” Several other individuals mentioned the importance of remaining vigilant in keeping up with the competition. Even in areas where BAU excels, individuals mentioned how quickly it is possible to fall from the top, especially to institutions that may have greater resources available. There was also concern expressed by individuals of preparing to compete with yet to be known sources of competition. One faculty member, in talking about massive open online courses (MOOCs), provided a telling synopsis of the ability for the competitive landscape to change quickly and impact BAU. The whole distance education thing, which as much as people grouse about it, it’s just not going away. Alright, MOOCs are probably dead, but as a colleague of mine put it, she’s pretty smart, she said, “MOOCs are like Napster now.” You remember Napster was that downloading service? Napster failed brilliantly, but Napster made the space that iTunes inhabits. If it hadn’t been for Napster, iTunes wouldn’t have happened. MOOCs are much the same. MOOCs are failing, but what’s going to replace MOOCs? Overall, a combination of factors external to BAU is influencing its strategic direction. Market and student demands influence the nature of academic program offerings, governmental policy helps shape which areas the university invests resources in, and institutional stakeholders are constantly monitoring and responding to competitor institutions, both traditional and nontraditional. Internal Influences While factors within the external environment influence the strategic choices of BAU, ultimately internal stakeholders interpret what is occurring in the external environment and make decisions for the institution. This is most often determined and articulated by senior-level administrators with the advice and support of the board of trustees, but there is also faculty input through the traditional university shared governance system. However, there are tensions 139 between the administration and faculty that factor into how internal stakeholders influence strategy at BAU. Such tensions are partially driven by a lack of consensus over the future direction of the institution, but also stem from turnover in a number of key leadership positions during the past several years. Senior Administrators and Board of Trustees. Most major initiatives at BAU are administratively-driven. The creation of the medical school, the academic program prioritization process, and changes in departmental bylaws to include more stringent research expectations are examples of major strategic initiatives driven by administrators. When individuals were asked what internal stakeholders most influence the institution’s strategic direction, responses included: “it’s a combination of the deans and senior administration” and “certainly from the president and the cabinet.” Some comments directly toward specific initiatives included: “there’s a lot of push back from upper administration to get these bylaws so that they are up to a standard that I think is extremely acceptable” and “the med school . . . that was not a grassroots thing . . . all of a sudden the president gets up and says ‘we’re going to have a medical school.’” Due to the nature of BAU’s responsibility-centered budgeting model, a large degree of authority lies with academic college deans and not just central administrators. One individual mentioned that nearly three-fourths of the university’s budget is controlled by the deans, providing them with a great deal of influence over the types of strategic initiatives pursued at the college-level. Ultimately, any major strategic initiative at BAU is vetted and approved by the board of trustees. Although the board may offer direct ideas to the administration on occasion, more often the board provides feedback on potential strategic options. For example, some individuals mentioned that the board is adamant that the university maintain its status as a teaching first institution. At the same time, the board approved the creation of a medical school upon the 140 recommendation of the president and senior administrators. In describing the interplay between the president and the board, one administrator indicated, “No question for any of these programs, the ultimate saying is a recommendation from the administration and then Board of Trustees support . . . the board has to approve about 90% of what happens.” Faculty and Shared Governance. Although many of the proposals pertaining to large strategic initiatives at BAU are driven by the administration, the faculty maintains a voice in the process. Ultimately, the faculty, whether at the department, college, or university-wide faculty senate level, must approve many of the proposed changes to program offerings and promotion and tenure criteria before final administrative and/or board of trustees approval. Additionally, faculty are often consulted, even if only in an advisory manner, on university planning and budgetary matters. One administrator describing the planning process said, “Our planning process is probably, I want to assume, typical. I talked to the presidents and folks at other campuses. It was very comprehensive and it involved our constituent groups. It involved faculty and students and alumni, business and political leaders, it was very inclusive.” More recently, the university implemented a process for reviewing new initiatives with major budgetary implications, which includes input from faculty leaders. Through that committee, faculty and administrative representatives evaluate proposals that require resources and offer recommendations to the president, many of which are directly followed. A discussion of faculty influence at BAU would not be complete without mentioning the influence of the faculty union on campus. The power of the union was mentioned in several interviews. “It’s a union campus and a very strong union campus, which I think impacts a lot of decisions that are made by administration,” stated one faculty member. This individual went on to indicate that although the union does not maintain much authority in terms of program 141 openings and closures, there is significant room for input on items such as promotion and tenure criteria as well as the general ability to organize a large subset of faculty in favor of or against major university initiatives. One administrator recognized this source of influence for the faculty and stated, “Now coming up with a plan, coming up with a strategy is one thing, implementing it in a higher ed environment is entirely different. We have a lot of unions. We have a lot of tenure and tenure-track faculty. So you can’t just eliminate a program, but we can start having those conversations.” Administration / Faculty Divide. Regardless of where one believes the ultimate authority at BAU lies, it is clear that tensions exist between the administration and faculty in determining major strategic directions. One faculty member noted, “This campus, more than any other that I’ve been on, is, I think, when the administration makes some decisions, starts to think about visioning and these long-term goals, there’s a lot of apprehension on the part of faculty . . . I think faculty are very suspect of administration on this campus.” Individuals pointed toward two major reasons for why distrust and animosity exists between the administration and certain subsets of faculty: a breakdown in faculty contract negotiations a few years ago and what some consider to be a lack of transparency in the creation of the medical school. Despite some dissension from faculty over administratively-driven initiatives, a number of individuals did not find this to be problematic. First, several individuals believed the environment between the administration and faculty is improving as the memories of the tense contract negotiations fade with time. Second, as one faculty member indicated, “I don’t think it [faculty resistance] stops the administration from pursuing [their initiatives].” Ultimately dissension does not prevent progress. Finally, one administrator aptly noted, “There’s always dissension about which direction the university [is going]—it wouldn’t be a university if 142 someone wasn’t pissed off. It’s where you’re suppose to have the debate is here, it’s our job. Yes, there’s some dissension, of course.” While dissension may not be viewed as the most favorable outcome, it is recognized as a natural part of the university decision-making process. Leadership Turnover. Part of the general tension at BAU regarding its future direction stems from the university experiencing a period of significant turnover in key leadership positions. During the past several years, the university experienced a presidential transition, turnover of dozens of vice presidents, deans, and other senior administrators following the presidential transition, and the natural replacement of several board members who held significant influence over the university’s strategic direction. This level of turnover was viewed by many individuals as partially responsible for the pull between different groups regarding the university’s direction as an undergraduate or research-focused institution. One individual explained the initial shift toward greater national research expectations and now slowly back toward a more undergraduate-focused institution as directly related to the individuals on the board of trustees and the presidents during two different periods of time. I think two very different approaches and two very different boards of trustees at the time these people have served. That makes a difference too . . . You do have to look at the leaders. [Former president’s name masked] was, still is, very young in his career and for him to be able to turn around and say this is what we did at the campus I was at, it leads to jobs. [Current president’s name masked] is in the last job he’ll probably have, so it’s very different administrations, very different presidencies. As the new leadership team at BAU becomes more established, there is hope that it will lead to greater consensus and stability in the institution’s direction. “I think there’s where, as a cabinet, we are just starting to really generate that excitement,” one administrator stated in describing the cohesion that is beginning to build among the senior leadership team at BAU. 143 Summary BAU is a large, complex university that maintains several goals and priorities. Although this is common among many institutions, BAU is currently being pulled in two distinctly different directions: maintaining its historical focus as an undergraduate, regionally-focused institution or continuing to expand and grow its national research university aspirations. Although many on campus believe these goals do not have to be mutually exclusive, there is some tension among various stakeholders regarding which direction the university should more greatly pursue. As such, some believe BAU is muddling through without a clear and focused vision. What is more clear is that the university is largely responding to student and employer needs in establishing its broad academic focus on STEM and health professions fields, and internal stakeholders frame many of their decisions in light of the current external landscape. Despite some tensions and lack of clarity at BAU, the university has been generally successful in filling academically sound classes and maintaining a mix of strong academic programs, several with national reputations. 144 CHAPTER 7: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS In chapters four, five, and six I provided findings from each of the three case study institutions. An overview of key findings from each institution can be found in Table 2, located in Appendix B. In this chapter, I turn my attention to a cross-case analysis. Across the three universities studied there are many similarities in institutional strategy, continuity of strategy, recessionary response tactics, and what influences strategy. This is not surprising since the institutions maintain similar missions and characteristics common to the public, regional university sector. Despite many similarities, the three universities also have large and subtle differences. This cross-case analysis frames the most crucial areas of similarity and difference between the case study sites prior to discussing and interpreting findings in the final chapter. This chapter is divided into sections on strategy, continuity of strategy and recessionary responses, external influences, and internal influences. Strategy The institutional-level strategies of the three case study institutions fit the basic mold of a public, regional university described by Henderson (2009). The universities studied maintain their main focus on undergraduate education in the traditional arts and sciences with a smattering of professional and pre-professional programs and a limited number of graduate programs mostly aligned with regional employer needs (Henderson, 2009). This undergraduate focus is reflected by the emphasis placed on high quality teaching, which to these institutions begins by ensuring tenure-system faculty teach the majority of courses. High quality to these institutions also means maintaining fewer large lecture courses that are common at major research universities and placing a strong emphasis on support services for students of all academic abilities. 145 Although each institution is committed to undergraduate education, a difference exists in how Undergraduate Teaching University (UTU) and Community-Driven University (CDU) approach graduate education compared to Balancing Act University (BAU). UTU and CDU each provide several master’s programs, mainly in professional fields, but UTU has no doctoral programs and CDU offers minimal doctoral programs. Although BAU does not offer near the number of master’s and doctoral programs as a major research university, the university recently opened a medical school and offers more doctoral programs than either of the other two case study sites. Many BAU graduate programs are aligned with regional market needs, but some individuals also view graduate education as an opportunity to increase the national profile and recognition of the institution; a sentiment found less commonly among participants from UTU and CDU. On the enrollment front, all three universities enroll 80-90% of their students from within the state. Additionally, each institution expressed a commitment to serving students who could not attend more highly selective institutions either due to academic or financial constraints. UTU intentionally remains one of the lowest cost four-year institutions in the state in order to promote student access; CDU prides itself on serving a high number of first-generation students many of whom are transfer students and Pell-eligible students; and, BAU believes in enrolling less academically prepared students it can help to meet their full potential. These characteristics of enrolling students mainly from the immediate surrounding region and providing access to a different type of student than major research universities and elite liberal arts colleges are common to public, regional universities (Henderson, 2009). Reflective of the diverse profiles of students at public, regional universities, all three institutions also maintain quality academic standards while emphasizing access. UTU indicated 146 a strong focus on decreasing the retention and graduation gaps between well-prepared and less prepared students. CDU, while serving many first-generation students, is also proud of its entering student profile being on par with one of the state’s flagship institutions. BAU recently increased marketing efforts to be viewed as students’ “first-choice” institution, and despite some recent enrollment struggles, consciously refused to lower academic admissions standards just to help meet financial targets. While the geographic and academic profile of entering classes is similar across the case study institutions, the overarching enrollment strategies of the three universities differ. Participants at each institution, faced with a declining high school population in the state and increasing competition for those students, talked at great lengths about overall enrollment numbers as part of their institutional strategy. For two institutions this meant developing a new sustainable enrollment number, but for the third this meant seeking enrollment growth. UTU and BAU articulated their enrollment strategy as “right-sizing” and seeking a sustainable enrollment number. Although their strategy is similar, the reasons differ. UTU, following years of natural growth as a relatively young and maturing institution, is nearing full capacity and seeking a more sustainable enrollment profile instead of continued growth just for the sake of being larger. On the other hand, BAU recently experienced a couple years of enrollment declines, accelerating the need to develop a more sustainable long-term enrollment plan without wild fluctuations each year. On the opposite end of the spectrum, despite recognition of the declining high school population in the state, CDU is focused on enrollment growth. Individuals expressed their belief that the institution has the physical and human resources capacities to grow, and they view growth as a natural offshoot of better serving the surrounding region by educating more students. 147 Another strategic aspect for each university is a connection to the immediate surrounding region. Although participants from each institution discussed this as a key component of their institutional strategy, CDU discussed this to the greatest extent. UTU and BAU provided perfunctory examples of aligning academic programs with regional needs and graduating students as a future talent pipeline for the region. However, CDU’s participants talked about serving the region not just as an ancillary portion, but as the main component of its institutional strategy. One of the main aspects of serving the region that CDU engages in to a greater extent than UTU and BAU is working directly with business and community leaders on academic, research, and outreach projects. These activities are present at the other institutions, but they exist to a greater extent and were discussed more prominently by individuals at CDU. Continuity of Strategy and Recessionary Response UTU and CDU differed greatly from BAU in the continuity of maintaining the institutional-level strategies described. At UTU and CDU, the macro vision, goals, and aspirations of the institution have been relatively stable. The institutions are content with following the mold of a traditional public, regional university. Growth in enrollment and academic programs occurred at both institutions, along with subtle changes at the margins of the broad institutional-level strategy, but changes largely fell within the same broad strategic framework. This constant vision at UTU was articulated and tended to by one long-serving president with a presidential transition currently underway. At CDU, the constant vision began under a previous president and continued under the current president, who has been in place for several years. On the other hand, BAU has had a less stable and consistent institutional-level strategic direction during the past several years. First, individuals at the institution disagree about whether 148 the university even has a coherent strategy at the moment. The strategy at BAU was often described as unclear, schizophrenic, and reactive. Furthermore, the reason for this view is tied to an ongoing tension at the university between its undergraduate, regional roots compared to its growing research and national aspirations. Although individuals disagreed about the extent of shifting goals on campus, it was largely accepted that at least some significant strategic changes occurred during the past several years. Much of the confusion around BAU’s current institutional strategy was attributed to the differing visions between the current and former president, which is discussed in greater depth in the internal influences section. BAU may have experienced greater large-scale directional changes during the past several years than UTU and CDU, but all three institutions faced a myriad of financial challenges brought on by the recent recessionary period. Faced with many of the same challenges (e.g., declining high school population, declining state appropriations), the three case study institutions took fairly similar approaches in responding to these challenges. The overarching response from the three institutions was to sharpen the institution’s focus, invest in high priority areas, and diversify revenue streams. At UTU and CDU, numerous participants indicated their university does not try to be all things to all people in order to limit resources spent on ancillary activities unrelated to the university’s mission. This avoidance of succumbing to “mission creep,” as some called it, was heightened during the past several years. BAU, even though it maintains more numerous and less consistently aligned goals than UTU and CDU, recently completed an academic prioritization process that eliminated a few dozen low-demand academic programs as a means of sharpening its focus. 149 Across all three institutions, maintaining a clear focus was supplemented by continuing to invest in the highest priority strategic areas. BAU specifically maintained a mantra of “do not retreat” during recent challenging times. All three universities made investments during this time in high demand academic programs, specifically in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) and health fields as student and market demands shifted in those directions. Additionally, each institution invested resources in recruitment (e.g., expanding recruitment beyond the immediate geographic region, re-framing financial aid programs) and retention (e.g., increasing student support services) efforts. Another common response to financial challenges across all three institutions was in efforts to increase and diversify revenue streams. First, it cannot be ignored that all three institutions increased tuition to offset declines in state appropriations. Even with each institution’s emphasis on trying to remain accessible to a broad spectrum of students across socioeconomic statuses, each institution’s largest revenue enhancement during the past several years came from tuition increases. In terms of diversifying revenue streams beyond traditional state appropriations and tuition sources, each institution expanded external fundraising efforts. However, in each instance, individuals indicated fundraising efforts greatly lag behind those of major research universities and private colleges. An additional area of revenue expansion for CDU and BAU, but not UTU, has been through increasing external research grants; although also with limited success compared to research university counterparts. External Influences Given the fact that each of the three case study institutions are located in the same state and are subjected to many of the same financial challenges stemming from the Great Recession, it is not surprising that across institutions individuals discussed external influences on strategy in 150 a similar manner. At each of the institutions, student and market demands influenced academic program offerings, which led to an increase in STEM and health-related programs as well as a rise in professional and “job-relevant” programs. Many participants discussed the need to be responsive to these influences in order to meet enrollment goals. CDU and BAU also discussed the importance of providing academic programs that meet and support regional needs; CDU specifically related to the automotive industry and BAU specifically related to health fields. UTU also offers programs connected to student and market demand, but individuals at UTU discussed an equal emphasis on being careful not to over adjust to cyclical market demands. Similarly to carefully responding to student and market demands, individuals at each institution indicated they monitor peer institutions to be cognizant of best practices and remain competitive. This is particularly relevant in the area of enrollment management where participants mentioned that increasing competition for students resulted in the need to evaluate initiatives such as marketing efforts and financial aid packages in comparison to competitor institutions. Although individuals at each institution mentioned the importance of monitoring competitors, participants also indicated their institutions do not automatically emulate peers. For example, CDU explored offering clinical health programs like many surrounding institutions, but determined they had insufficient infrastructure capacity and lacked local student demand to warrant creating such programs. Likewise, UTU continues to watch peer institutions add graduate programs, but remains steadfast in its primary focus on undergraduate education. Overall, each institution appears to monitor competitor institutions to stay current, but only respond to and occasionally emulate peers within the confines of their institutional capabilities. An additional area of external influence felt by each institution is government policy. Each institution bemoaned cuts in their state appropriations as a negative influence on their 151 operations. On the positive side, each institution indicated the de-centralized and autonomous nature of higher education in the state provides needed flexibility for responding to external challenges. Individuals at CDU indicated they were only able to manage through the recession due to the autonomy that allowed them to raise tuition when appropriations declined. Although autonomy exists for institutions to function largely free from state constraints, some state policies still impact university operations. For example, participants at UTU indicated a state policy deemphasizing graduate education for school teachers contributed to a decline in enrollment and shrinking of their education programs. Additionally, people at CDU and BAU mentioned the state’s performance funding system influences institutional thinking about student success and how to achieve better graduation rates. Internal Influences The same three groups of internal stakeholders maintain influence over the strategy at the case study institutions: the board of trustees, the president and senior administrators, and the faculty. All three groups hold influence over some parts of institutional strategy, but the intersection of how these groups set strategy differs across the institutions. At UTU and CDU, strategy is largely driven by the president and senior administrators, with support and minimal interference from the institution’s board of trustees. At both universities a steady, long-term leadership team, specifically long-serving presidents, provided a level of continuity and stability to the institution that resulted in a consistent strategy even during difficult times. UTU is in the midst of a presidential transition, which is raising questions of how to frame the institution for the future, but there are currently no signs of significant changes to the macro institutional strategy. 152 At BAU, strategy is largely influenced by the president and senior administration with support from the board, but changes in the president and key board members during the past several years resulted in a shift back and forth between focusing mainly on undergraduate education compared to a more research-oriented focus with national recognition aspirations. It should be noted that the former president and former board members generally held similar institutional visions with one another, and the current president and current board members also maintain similarly aligned visions for the institution with one another. However, tension exists between the former and current visions. It is debatable if this shifting focus was driven more by the president or board at any given time, but two things are clear: the board at BAU is more directly involved in influencing the macro-level strategy than at UTU and CDU, and shifting priorities between the former and current president/board combinations caused some tension and confusion across campus as to the past, current, and future strategic direction of the university. The extent to which the faculty are engaged in setting institutional strategy differs across the three institutions. At UTU there is little faculty input on macro-level strategic issues, but the strategic direction is largely accepted across the institution and there are generally harmonious relations between the administration and the faculty. At CDU there are many more formal opportunities for the faculty to influence the institution’s strategic direction and the university recently underwent a strategic re-evaluation process, inclusive of significant faculty input, that ended with the affirmation of the current strategic direction for the next several years. The greatest source of tension between the administration and the faculty at CDU is less about substance and more about the speed at which decisions are made, with the administration often wishing to move more quickly in making decisions than the faculty. At BAU there is tension between the administration and the faculty about the future strategic direction of the institution 153 and how much to shift focus toward greater national research aspirations. This tension also stems from lingering issues related to a contentious faculty contract negotiation several years ago. However, some tensions appear to be slowly subsiding as the administration and faculty develop a more congenial working relationship. Although administration/faculty interactions differ across the case study institutions, one similarity is that faculty influence at all three institutions is greater on specific academic programmatic and curricular matters than large scale institutional planning on issues such as enrollment management and the overall portfolio of degree types and levels offered. Summary The three case study institutions maintain many similarities in their institutional strategy, continuity of strategy, and what influences strategy, but they also differ in key areas. UTU maintains the narrowest focus on undergraduate education, CDU has the strongest engagement with its surrounding community, and BAU offers the most comprehensive array of degree programs, particularly at the graduate level. UTU and CDU maintained a consistent strategy during the past several years, with BAU’s strategy continuing to evolve as it seeks a balance between a historical undergraduate focus and growing graduate and research emphases. Each university responded to major financial strains in a similar manner of conservative financial management, investing in high priority areas, and increasing and diversifying revenue streams. Each is also largely influenced by the same set of external factors: student demand, market demand, competitor institutions, and governmental policy. Differences exist in how internal stakeholders influence strategy with faculty playing the largest role at CDU. Additionally, UTU and CDU have had steady leadership and a culture of shared commitment to their institutional vision, while BAU experienced greater turnover among key administrators and board members, 154 with less agreement about institutional priorities. Now, I turn to a discussion of key findings related to relevant literature. 155 CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION At the beginning of this study I set out to examine the macro issue of how public, regional universities framed their institutional-level strategy in light of a number of financial challenges. Specifically, I sought to answer three research questions about each of three case study institutions. (1) What is the institutional strategy of the university? (2) Has the strategy of the university changed since 2008? If so, how? (3) What influences setting a strategy at the university? In examining these questions for each of the institutions, I also provided a cross-case analysis highlighting similarities and differences across the institutions. Overall, I found many similarities related to “what” institutions did both in terms of strategies and changes. However, examining “how” institutions implemented strategies and “why” they implemented specific strategies produced differences across the institutions. Although three case studies cannot provide definitive answers about an entire sector of higher education, collectively these cases begin to provide a picture about the activities of public, regional universities during challenging times. In order to best frame my discussion, it is important to note the concepts of strategy, change, and influences often overlap one another. It is difficult to discuss one area without referencing the others, likely a sign of the complexity of higher education institutions and general muddiness of the concept of strategy (Mintzberg, 1987; Scott & Davis, 2007; Tolbert, 1985). The discussion chapter is broken into three broad sections, one each on strategy, changes in strategy, and influences on strategy, with key takeaways provided in Table 3, located in Appendix C. Each of the sections inevitably contain overlapping content. For example, in the 156 strategy section, there are instances where it is impossible to discuss a specific strategy without also considering the influences on that strategy. However, breaking the discussion section into broad areas, with occasional overlap, best reflects how institutions operate. Strategy At the beginning of this study I provided a definition of strategy as: A plan, method, or series of actions for obtaining a specific goal or aspiration, often in response to external challenges or competitors (Chaffee, 1985; Keller, 1983; Mintzberg 1987; Porter, 1991; Strategy, n.d.). Faced with a series of external challenges, many financial in nature, I examined how three public, regional universities framed their institutional-level, macro strategy for surviving and thriving. In considering the theoretical literature about organizational strategy, I provided several frameworks for understanding strategy: coherent alignment (Leinwand & Mainardi, 2010; Porter, 1991), differentiation (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005; Leslie & Fretwell, 1996), mimetic behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Toma, 2012), and the lack of a clear or cohesive strategy (Bess & Dee, 2008b; Cohen & March, 1974; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Although the goal of this study was not to deduce a specific strategy for each institution based upon each framework, it is useful to begin by examining how the three institutions’ strategies generally fit within these frameworks. This is followed by a discussion of institutional differentiation and the pursuit of prestige. Strategic Frameworks Undergraduate Teaching University’s (UTU) strategy is best represented by Leinwand and Mainardi’s (2010) coherence premium that argued “sustainable superior returns accrue to companies that focus on what they do best” (p. 87). UTU is not a corporation focused on profitable returns, but follows the same concept of developing expertise in a specific niche and 157 focusing the entire energy of the organization on being the best in that area. UTU’s narrow focus is being a high quality undergraduate education institution. One participant made this point particularly well by stating, “We thought, and concluded, that we’d much rather be a first-rate undergraduate teaching institution than a third-grade doctoral institution.” Another sign of being a coherent organization is that internal policies align with the organization’s goals (Porter, 1991). It is clear that at UTU, policies such as a cap on the number of adjunct faculty who can teach courses and limits on large lecture classes are examples of internal policies aligning with the goal of being an undergraduate-focused institution. Like many universities, UTU still maintains some complexity in its goals, but the institution carefully guards against succumbing to “mission creep,” specifically by not actively adding graduate-level programs. As one individual noted, “We don’t subscribe to the just because everyone else is doing it, we’re going to do it [mantra].” Community-Driven University (CDU) also maintains a number of elements reflective of coherent alignment. In describing how the institution responded to recent external challenges, one individual stated, “it’s up to us to again to go back to what is the mission and vision and the goals of the university and that’s where we should be concentrating our money, time, and other resources.” The broad community-oriented mission of CDU has continued for more than a decade. During that time the institution ensured growth is aligned within that broad framework, and can point to hiring practices designed to vet candidates for a commitment to the communityoriented vision. A prime example is the recent change in engineering deans from a theoretical research focused dean to a more community and regionally focused dean. There are also elements of a differentiation strategy evident at CDU. Literature on differentiation often focuses on major differences, such as the rise of community colleges in the 158 1960s and 70s or the more recent growth of for-profit institutions (Rosen, 2013; Thelin, 2004). However, Leslie and Fretwell (1996) argued that developing a niche can often be through a “combination of geographic, economic, and programmatic openings that institutions can fill” (p. 84). There are some key differences at CDU that distinguish it from peers, specifically within its geographic region. One administrator argued, “The customary way of thinking about higher ed doesn’t fit us very well.” That is largely due to CDU’s equal emphasis on quality and access. CDU enrolls many first-generation and Pell-eligible students while maintaining an incoming student profile on par with one of the flagship institutions in the state. Differentiation also comes in the form of offering graduate programs that are neither job credential programs (common at for-profit institutions) nor major research programs (common at state flagship institutions), but programs with an emphasis on applied research aligned with community economic needs. These examples may not be completely unique to CDU, but these elements provide CDU with a differentiated mission and vision from most of the other institutions in the state and the more immediate geographic region. Balancing Act University (BAU), particularly compared to UTU and CDU, lacks a clear and cohesive strategy. Internal stakeholders provided differing accounts of the institution’s strategy, with some emphasizing an undergraduate focus and others touting the university as an aspiring national research university. Maintaining these diverse pursuits does not necessarily indicate a lack of coherence. In fact, some individuals at BAU argued that research and graduate education efforts directly enhance the undergraduate experience at the university. However, the inability for internal stakeholders to consistently describe a similar macro-level vision for the institution indicates some lack of a clear and cohesive strategy. Kim and Mauborgne (2005), indicated that organizations, specifically businesses, often maintain “a smorgasbord of tactics 159 that individually make sense but collectively don’t add up to a unified, clear direction” (p. 82). This is reflected at BAU as evidenced by a couple of key quotes: “The strategic plan, it feels like it’s kind of all over the place . . . We have some of these mandates, but how do they really fit and what is the bigger picture?” and “I think if you’re asking the overall question, ‘What’s the vision for the future?’ I don’t know that there is one. I think it is much more reactive than it is proactive.” Although BAU currently lacks a strong strategic coherence, some individual aspects of BAU’s strategy are reflective of mimetic behavior. O’Meara (2007) and Toma (2012) argued many institutions emulate the behavior of peer and aspirational institutions, specifically in the hopes of “moving to the next level” (Toma, 2012, p. 118). One common mimetic behavior is adding graduate programs and increasing research expectations for faculty, both evident at BAU. Although individuals at BAU did not explicitly discuss their strategy in terms of copying other institutions, a goal of increasingly being viewed as a national research university was evident from several interviews. In one instance this goal was explicitly stated. “I would classify us at this point as an aspiring national university . . . what you’ll see moving forward is the research emphasis that you need to have if you’re going to be a major university,” said one administrator. Differentiation A major component of examining an institution’s strategy involves looking at the degree to which an institution differentiates itself from competitors (Christensen & Erving, 2011; O’Meara, 2007; Toma, 2012). O’Meara (2007) and Toma (2012) indicated that many higher education institutions do not differentiate themselves either in what their macro strategies are or how they pursue those strategies. Additionally, many scholars believe that higher education institutions have become more homogenous over time (Birnbaum, 1983, Morphew, 2009; Toma, 160 2012). Not surprisingly, numerous strategies at the case study institutions are common across many colleges and universities, specifically within public, regional universities (e.g., undergraduate focus, serving the surrounding region, emphasizing student access). It would be difficult to argue that any of the three institutions differentiate themselves to the extent of following a blue ocean strategy that could re-frame the entire higher education industry (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). However, it would also be a mistake to label these universities as simply mimicking the behavior of peer and aspirational institutions, with the negative connotations mimetic behavior often carries (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011). Across interviews, individuals discussed the need for differentiation even though many institutional actions are similar to those at other colleges and universities. Toma (2012) argued that many institutions have honors programs, learning communities, study abroad options, freshman seminars, fitness centers, and so on, and the three cases study institutions offer many of those same opportunities. Although many of those opportunities are not unique, institutions offer them because students demand them and because research indicates they are beneficial for students (Kuh, Kinzie, Schuh, & Whitt, 2010). Differentiation may be important to a certain extent, but it is reasonable for institutions to offer a range of opportunities and services that are known to have the most positive impact on students. Additionally, differentiation within the field of higher education may need to be examined at a more localized level instead of on a national stage. More than half of freshmen attend a college or university within 100 miles and another approximately 30% attend an institution between 101 and 500 miles of their homes (Egan, Lozano, Hurtado, & Case, 2013). Therefore, institutions may only need to differentiate themselves from other institutions within a few hundred mile radius to remain competitive in attracting prospective students. Products with 161 national markets such as technology gadgets may require companies to constantly innovate and differentiate themselves from all competitors. The location of a company’s headquarters may make minimal difference in determining who that company competes with for customers. However, the locations of colleges and universities matter a great deal in competing for students. The three case study institutions may not be highly differentiated on a national scale, but when compared with other higher education institutions in the state or an even more localized region, these institutions offer students a unique experience compared to other nearby options. This aligns with Leslie and Fretwell’s (1996) description of developing a niche based partly on geography. This does not mean institutions should not concern themselves with differentiation, but that differentiation within higher education may be better viewed through local rather than national markets. Pursuit of Prestige One of the common reasons provided for why higher education institutions mimic each other’s behavior is that institutions are in a constant pursuit of prestige (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; O’Meara, 2007; Toma, 2012). Institutions seeking legitimacy among their peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), or more bluntly, succumbing to “Harvard envy” (Rosen, 2013), pursue the same activities in the same way as the most highly ranked institutions (O’Meara, 2007). It is clear across the case study institutions that prestige is sometimes an implicit, if not explicit motivator. One dictionary defines prestige as: “reputation or influence arising from success, achievement, rank, or other favorable attributes” (Prestige, n.d.). Participants at each of the universities took pride in sharing their institutions’ achievements and plans for future success. Across the institutions, individuals regularly emphasized a focus on offering high quality 162 programs and services. Participants at UTU and BAU mentioned maintaining selective programs of “high distinction” that could bring national exposure to the university. Additionally, although each institution provides access to a greater number of less prepared students than major research universities, each also takes pride in enrolling students who could have chosen to attend more highly ranked institutions. Across the case study institutions, the degree of prestige-seeking differs. UTU is mainly interested in quality undergraduate programs and not seeking prestige through adding graduate programs, specifically at the doctoral level. Several individuals mentioned a desire to remain a high quality undergraduate teaching institution rather than a floundering research university. UTU may not care about chasing prestige in the form of graduate programs, but individuals still expressed concern about how some elements of prestige provide legitimacy in the eyes of prospective students. Administrators expressed frustration that UTU’s efforts to remain a low tuition institution is sometimes interpreted by prospective students as UTU being a low quality institution. These individuals wondered if the institution would be better served by moving to a high tuition, high aid model common among many prestigious institutions. At CDU there were minimal explicit discussions of pursuing prestige. In fact, there was a recent transition with one of the deans that senior administrators thought was too focused on increasing research expectations at the expense of maintaining a community-oriented focus. The main emphasis at CDU is to be a national model of a community-engaged institution. Still, some individuals saw things differently. One administrator at CDU, in talking about remaining mission-driven, said, “I don’t think we resist the pressure. I think the pressure is built into the system . . . The whole system of higher education is built toward becoming a research university.” Another individual, in a sign that reputation still matters, touted the university’s 163 executive leaders advocacy group and indicated, “These are people who no one would expect to see aligned with us . . . but it’s going to grab people’s attention and it’s going to give us some cachet and street credibility.” BAU probably partakes in the greatest pursuit of prestige. The university recently opened a medical college and ratcheted up research expectations for faculty to receive promotion and tenure. One administrator explicitly described the institution as an aspiring national research university. Another individual, while discussing the medical school, said, “I don’t doubt at all that [former president’s name masked] thought if we had a medical school . . . would it add to prestige? Yes, it would.” In another sign of reputational care, administrators consciously chose to maintain the same level of admissions standards throughout a period of enrollment decline even though it meant missing financial targets. In its broadest sense, if prestige is about quality, success, and achievements, the three case study institutions certainly are in the pursuit of prestige. However, it would be difficult to argue that public, regional universities should not be concerned with pursuing excellence in each of their endeavors. Within the higher education literature, the pursuit of prestige often focuses more specifically on institutions trying to increase reputation by moving beyond their traditional foci. This often includes adding graduate programs, increasing research expectations, and attracting higher quality students (O’Meara, 2007). Examples of each of these exist to varying degrees at the case study institutions. However, it is important to go one step further and examine how and why certain actions are pursued to better understand if reasons other than the pursuit of prestige influence why institutions act in the mimetic fashion they often do. Based upon interviews across the case study institutions, and examining the actual actions of these institutions, some actions that may be deemed as the pursuit of prestige have plausible alternative 164 explanations such as providing students with transformational educational opportunities, responding to external demands, and simply trying to survive through financial challenges. First, a number of individuals cited the value of offering undergraduate research and other high impact opportunities such as studying abroad and internships to students. One administrator said, “If you look at what’s happening here at CDU [listed several high impact student experiences] . . . that’s not a frivolous prestige thing . . . that’s transformational, that’s not prestige.” In the case of providing undergraduate research opportunities, one prerequisite is to have a research active faculty. One can debate the proper balance between teaching and research at public, regional universities, but faculty research can also provide benefits to undergraduate students. Ratcheting up faculty research expectations to the point where tenuresystem faculty teach fewer courses and do not include undergraduate students in their research projects may be an indicator of the pursuit of prestige. However, at each of the case study institutions, efforts were made to include undergraduate students in faculty research projects. This quote from an administrator at BAU further explores the relationship between teaching and research. I’ll be asked often by faculty, even students sometimes, “are we research or are we teaching?” I don’t think those two things are mutually exclusive, we’re both. Primarily teaching, but we do research also. I think that research really informs teaching. I think the scholarship, particularly with our students, there’s so many of our students that have an opportunity at the undergraduate level to get involved with faculty members and graduate students and are doing graduate research. I think they complement each other. Second, CDU and BAU both added graduate programs in recent years, but it is important to examine why that occurred. One person at CDU argued, “More and more the master’s degree is the new bachelor’s degree, you need that kind of specialization. So to me, in this state, it makes complete sense that we are building robust graduate programs.” This sentiment is 165 consistent with expert projections that master’s degrees will continue to grow in demand (Pappano, 2011; Selingo, 2013; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). CDU and BAU pointed to examples of how new graduate programs help meet market demands. Neither is adding graduate programs in the arts and humanities just to increase graduate numbers. They added programs in high demand STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) and healthrelated fields. At BAU, there is no denying the addition of a medical school adds prestige, but individuals clearly pointed to the decreasing number of primary care physicians in the state as one reason for opening the medical school. Additionally, the medical school is focused in its curriculum and clinical placements on training primary care physicians for under-served communities. At CDU, new engineering master’s and PhD programs are directly tied to the rebounding auto industry. In talking about these programs, one individual stated, “Our engineering PhD programs are really relative to what’s needed in the region. Our undergraduate graduates and our graduate graduates in master’s and PhD programs are doing research in really relevant economic growth need disciplines. So it wasn’t prestige-driven, it was market-driven.” Finally, one factor associated with pursuing prestige, improving entering students’ academic profiles (O’Meara, 2007), may be just as much about institutional survival as pursuing prestige. Increasing merit-based aid may be viewed as prestige-driven as a means to attract students with higher ACT and SAT scores and GPAs. However, participants largely described this tactic as a way to ensure financial survival as competition for students increased due to a declining high school student population in the state (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012). “We have for the first time increased the demographics of the students receiving scholarships to be competitive. It’s specifically being competitive because we’re 166 actually increasing the scholarships amongst those students who normally would have not got a scholarship here,” said one administrator at BAU. At CDU, one person stated, “My position is in this competitive market we’re not investing at the rate that other schools are investing.” While additional merit-based scholarships may attract higher quality students, the case study institutions are largely offering packages just to remain competitive in attracting their typical profile students. Prestige is a vague concept and it can be difficult to identify exactly when it is occurring (O’Meara, 2007). O’Meara (2007) acknowledged different institutions pursue prestige in different ways. While O’Meara identified a set of typical prestige-seeking activities, the list is not definitive. Therefore, it is important to take a holistic view of what institutions are doing, how they are doing it, and why they are doing it in examining the possibility of institutions pursuing prestige. In each of the examples related to graduate education, faculty research expectations, and increasing entering student profiles, individuals did not frame decisions through the lens of increasing rankings or changing classifications like some institutions explicitly do (Ehrenberg, 2002; Morphew, 2009). Institutional stakeholders discussed responding to student, community, and economic demands. Some may question whether individuals would talk openly about activities as prestige-driven and that is a fair point to consider. However, the alternative explanations provided were not just participants’ theoretical arguments; they were supported by visible actions. Additionally, in instances where prestigedriven activity was evident, those were noted throughout this section. Prestige is an inherent part of higher education. In Toma’s words (2012), “Prestige is to higher education as profit is to corporation” (p. 119). The examples provided from the three case study institutions do not definitively answer the question of whether some public, regional 167 universities are in the pursuit of prestige. However, if these institutions were on trial for pursuing prestige, there would certainly be reasonable doubt as to their motivations in either direction. Institutional Change Higher education literature (Flynn & Vredevoogd, 2010; Henderson, 2009; Skinner & Miller, 2013), external factors (e.g., declining state appropriations, declining high school population), and media coverage (Carlson, 2012; Kelderman, 2011) point to a dire state of affairs for today’s colleges and universities, specifically public, regional universities. A number of individuals are increasingly calling for traditional higher education to change (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011; Rosen, 2013; Selingo, 2013). However, the case study institutions emerged from a difficult period of time largely without making major changes in institutional strategy. In this section I discuss how institutions changed, when they changed at all, and the future of institutional change. Degree of Change Despite all the challenges the case study institutions faced during the past several years, they did not lay off faculty or staff, although it was common to hold positions open following natural turnover; institutions did not cut wages, although salary increases were rare; and institutions generally did not experience an overall decrease in enrollment, although UTU and BAU experienced enrollment fluctuations with certain years more troubling than others. BAU also faced some budgetary difficulties for a couple years, but managed through that situation utilizing institutional reserves and then returning to a more stabilized budgetary state. As a result, these three institutions largely maintained the same macro-level strategies since 2008, with more tweaks and adjustments in tactics (e.g., shifting resources from low demand to high 168 demand programs, changing recruitment strategies) than wholesale changes in the institution’s macro-level vision. Literature on change typically describes two degrees of change. First-order changes are subtle changes or adjustments that do not significantly alter the core mission of an organization. Examples of first-order change include adding sub-units to an organization or changing internal processes. Second-order changes involve transformational changes to an institution’s core mission and values (Goodman, 1982; Kezar, 2001). For example, Baker and Baldwin (2014) found a number of liberal arts colleges are increasingly adding pre-professional and vocationallyoriented programs; a significant departure from the core structure of a traditional liberal arts college. At the three case study institutions, there were many instances of first-order change. The universities added and subtracted academic programs based upon market and student demand, institutions increased financial aid packages to compete for students from among a shrinking pool of high school graduates, and institutions made a number of operational changes to decrease administrative costs. None of these changes altered the basic mission of public, regional universities of serving a largely residential, economically diverse undergraduate population from the surrounding region and offering programs and services that directly and indirectly benefit the local region and state (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2014; Henderson, 2009). There were some instances where change bordered between first and second-order change. For example, the institutions’ expansion of recruitment efforts internationally and outof-state, expansion of online course offerings, and increase of merit-based aid begin to alter the makeup of public, regional universities beyond their traditional composition. However, these 169 examples only represent a portion of the institutions’ activities. While the three universities increased numbers of international and out-of-state students, they each still enroll 80-90% of their students from within the state. Online course offerings are only a nascent development at UTU. BAU maintains a wider array of online offerings, but has done so for decades; hardly a new strategic development. Online strategies were hardly discussed among participants from CDU. Additionally, increases in merit-aid did not eliminate each institution’s continued focus on access for less advantaged students. If these “borderline” first-order/second-order changes expanded, they may become full blown second-order changes. However, these changes currently manifest themselves more as tactical responses to challenges than full-scale organizational change. Second-order change was most evident at BAU. The expansion of graduate programs, specifically the opening of a medical college, ratcheting up of faculty research expectations, and increasing interest in being viewed as a national university are evidence of the institution moving away from its public, regional university roots. However, some individuals at BAU argued these changes were made within the confines of remaining true to the mission of public, regional universities. Some participants indicated opening a medical school is directly related to serving the surrounding region that needs more primary care physicians. On the other hand, others indicated that an increased focus on graduate education and research came at the expense of undergraduate education. I labeled this institution “Balancing Act University” in the findings section for the very reason that it is being pulled in two opposite directions. Some second-order change is evident at BAU, but it is not entirely clear if changes toward a national research university will continue to expand or if efforts to re-focus on being an undergraduate-first institution will fully return. 170 Overall, first-order changes across the case study institutions appear to be externallydriven. Institutions faced a challenge such as a declining high school population in the state and responded with new tactics such as expanding recruitment territories. Second-order changes appear to be more internally driven. No one interviewed at BAU indicated that an increasing graduate education and research focus arose from the external financial challenges facing the institution. Instead, institutional leadership at the time chose to pursue these changing foci on their own volition. Graduate programs were added in accordance with perceived programmatic demand, but they were not added out of a perceived necessity that those programs were needed for institutional financial survival. Changes largely resulted from administrators making a conscious choice about the institution’s strategic direction as opposed to external factors forcing the institution down a certain path. The Future of Institutional Change Given the many signs pointing toward a period of difficulty and change for public, regional universities, how have the case study institutions been able to manage through the past several years without major changes? At UTU and CDU, a steady leadership team led by longserving presidents provided continuity during a challenging time. At all three institutions, conservative financial management and cost-cutting measures in non-academic, non-personnel areas (e.g., energy costs) and some expanded efforts to increase external funding (e.g., fundraising, external research grants) helped prevent major cuts to mission-critical areas. Perhaps the single largest reason for institutions not needing to change their overall strategies was due to the ability to raise tuition to offset a decline in state appropriations. This resulted in these institutions maintaining a relatively constant budgetary status (adjusting for inflation) during the past several years. The sources of funds shifted, but these institutions likely did not 171 feel compelled to implement macro-level strategic changes because they did not experience an overall decline in resources. Individual tactics were adjusted to account for a changing environment, but the broad strategic frameworks remained fairly constant. If the case study institutions have not yet experienced significant change even during one of the most challenging times in higher education, does that mean their macro-level strategies will remain constant indefinitely? Not necessarily. In fact, there is evidence that the challenges institutions faced during the past several years may have more of a delayed than immediate impact. If state appropriations do not increase in the future, and especially if they decrease again, institutions may no longer be able to offset declines with tuition hikes. A couple quotes from participants capture this concern. One participant stated, “I also think we have a constraint from the standpoint of students’ ability to pay. I have a real concern about the higher ed model . . . At what point in time do students decide that, you know what, it’s not worth getting out of college with $30,000 in debt.” Another individual added, “Are parents and students always going to be willing to pay $20,000 to $70,000 per year to send their son or daughter to a residential college so that they can begin the process of growing up after high school? Yes, some will, but again I think there will be more and more that are making the decision to, ‘You know what? I don’t think so.’” Concerns from participants about the ability to raise tuition further match concerns nationally about high student debt loads (Chany, 2013; Institute for College Access & Success, 2013). Additionally, participants acknowledged additional constraints placed on them from politicians seeking to limit future tuition hikes (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013b, 2013c; Breneman, 2010). If concerns about the ability to increase tuition in the future continue to materialize, it may cause new challenges. One person indicated that an inability to raise tuition might mean 172 finding resources in different ways such as trying to increase enrollment numbers. With the already tight competition for students in the state, that might result in adjusting a strategic decision about the profile of entering classes. “I think the university probably is going to have to make a decision at some point in the next two to three years about whether we will maintain the quality or whether we will grow,” said one individual. Another participant mentioned that even slightly lower tuition caps enforced by the legislature might require closing programs and laying off faculty and staff. As institutions face a potential future of unknown state support and a constrained ability to continue to raise tuition, they might have to determine when and where to cut spending. At the case study institutions, individuals indicated cuts during the past several years were largely contained to non-academic units, preserving the ability to pursue the same broad strategic frameworks academically. However, some individuals warned cuts might no longer be avoidable on the academic side. One person indicated budgets have been balanced on the backs of administrative cutbacks, but the university needs to start looking at ways to cut from the academic side. Another individual said, “Universities have done a lot of work on cost containment. Almost all of it has happened on the non-academic side. I feel like we’re not very far from a time when the universities here have to rethink the delivery of courses, the biggest costs of course is faculty. It’s anathema to even express these ideas. I do it only because I’ve signed this consent [for anonymity].” In general, individuals do not foresee a full return to rosier times. “I don’t really see this surplus of money that will allow us to build more buildings, increase salaries, or provide more university support to health benefits,” said one participant. If these concerns for the future come to fruition, institutions may need to make larger strategic shifts than they have in the past. 173 There is also some concern that an increase in competition in the form of for-profit institutions, online education, and the rise in community colleges offering four-year degrees may require public, regional universities to rethink their strategic frameworks (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2011; Bowen, 2013; Christensen & Erving, 2011; Rosen, 2013). Although the case study institutions did not feel any immediate impacts from these competitors, the future may hold a different outcome. One administrator at CDU argued, “The biggest threat to us in serving this community is to make sure that we’re actually a viable option for higher education in the next 20 years and I just don’t mean financially. I mean a model of what we’re doing.” This individual continued to discuss the threat of community colleges offering increasing numbers of four-year degrees at a cheaper price than four-year institutions and the low instructional cost model of for-profit institutions. At BAU, one faculty member provided a strong summary of how massive open online courses (MOOCs) may not be a threat to BAU today, but could be in the future. MOOCs are probably dead, but as a colleague of mine put it, she’s pretty smart, she said, “MOOCs are like Napster now.” You remember Napster was that downloading service? Napster failed brilliantly, but Napster made the space that iTunes inhabits. If it hadn’t been for Napster, iTunes wouldn’t have happened. MOOCs are much the same. MOOCs are failing, but what’s going to replace MOOCs? There are a number of models out there right now. Nothing is really leaping to the front, but we have to position ourselves to be able to take advantage of the online opportunities. As challenges mount in the future, institutions may be forced to undertake larger change initiatives. Handy (1994) argued that organizations often do not change when they are still having success, but that waiting to change until challenges are more disruptive can have detrimental effects. The process of change is often long and messy (Cawsey, Descza, & Ingols, 2012; Kezar, 2001), which is why it is often necessary for organizations to begin the process of change before it may be completely necessary. Although major changes have not yet occurred, 174 participants wondered how much longer institutions can remain immune from many of the challenges they face. Skinner and Miller (2013) warned, in an article specifically about public, regional universities, “Tweaking on the margins will not be enough to grapple with the kinds of pressures that are mounting” (p. 55). These pressures may not have resulted in large changes at the case study institutions yet, but if pressures continue to grow, larger changes may materialize in the future. Influences Institutional strategy is a complex and often abstract concept, especially related to higher education institutions (Bess & Dee, 2008b; Mintzberg, 1987). Many factors, both external and internal, influence institutions’ strategic choices (Tierney, 1988). External factors such as declining state appropriations and market-driven programmatic demand clearly influenced the case study institutions’ decision-making during the past several years. However, institutional leaders ultimately interpreted and determined how to respond to both external and internal forces. External factors such as economic conditions and demographic shifts and internal factors such as union collective bargaining agreements may have dictated the menu of available options for administrators to pursue, but university leaders still made the final selections. In this section, I discuss institutions’ responses to a shift in resource providers, the impact of the types of leaders and length of service of leaders on institutional strategy, and the state of shared governance in influencing institutional-level strategies. Resource Dependence In the previous sections, discussion began about institutions’ responses to external challenges and how student and market demands and competitor institutions help frame strategic choices. Responses to these external factors demonstrate a shift in institutions’ resource 175 dependence from state appropriations to tuition. As the share of institutional resources at the three case study institutions shifted from the state to student tuition dollars (State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013), institutions adjusted accordingly. Across all three institutions, individuals mentioned governmental influences they responded to such as adjusting enrollment and retention strategies based upon a new state performance funding system. However, the number of mentions of state influences paled in comparison to the times individuals discussed the need to respond to student and market programmatic demands and competitor institutions in order to maintain a sufficient tuition revenue stream. It is not surprising that institutions adjusted tactics in response to external demands. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that when organizations are dependent upon different entities for financial resources, those entities accrue power and influence organizational decisions. Student and market programmatic demand clearly drove the expansion of STEM and health programs at all three institutions. Institutional interests in developing more online course offerings are also tied to goals of enhancing tuition revenue. Additionally, with increasing competition among institutions for a limited pool of high school graduates, the case study universities carefully monitored and selectively emulated competitor institutions to remain attractive to prospective students. Since institutions’ attempts to increase resources from fundraising and grant-seeking produced minimally positive results, the universities studied focused most of their efforts on ways to ensure a sustainable stream of tuition dollars. Pfeffer (1987) warned that as institutions limit their dependency upon one source of funding they often create new dependencies upon another source of funding. Although institutions largely offset their dependence upon state appropriations by raising tuition, and in some cases increasing enrollment, the case study institutions are now increasingly dependent 176 upon tuition resources. This could be dangerous in the future due to reasons already discussed such as concerns about high tuition rates, student debt loads, and a declining high school population (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013b, 2013c; Breneman, 2010; Chany, 2013; Institute for College Access & Success, 2013; Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2012). Furthermore, institutions need to remain vigilant not to over-adjust to student and market programmatic demands that are often cyclical. Selingo (2013) warned, “Tailoring majors for employers assumes they always know what they want in graduates and that colleges can quickly respond to those needs” (p. 8). Selingo believes neither is the case. An additional concern from some individuals is that a large reliance upon tuition revenue may result in institutions ignoring the liberal arts and other low demand disciplines. One individual said, “The liberal arts are incredibly important and I think we’ve done a disservice by reducing them to skills . . . I think it’s going to take a whole lot of courage by a whole lot of people to make productive change and not throw out the liberal arts . . . It’s not about throwing everything out and starting over.” Another person added, “The university needs to decide how important it is to have a strong component of the arts, including a thriving liberal arts department. That’s part of being a university as opposed to being a trade school.” Individuals across the three institutions indicated there are efforts on each campus to not ignore the liberal arts. CDU added a liberal arts minor for business majors, and some BAU academic administrators utilize the acronym STREAM instead of STEM, as a way of including reading and the arts as important programs. However, most evidence points toward institutions investing heavily in natural science and health programs. This raises the question of what the future will hold. One individual said, “The future of the university is going to be reflected in the culture of 177 our society. If society insists that higher education is about getting a job . . . we’re going to turn into a trade school.” As institutions respond to external influences, one area to watch will be the extent to which institutions remain committed to the liberal arts and social sciences. Returning briefly to the ideas of differentiation and the pursuit of prestige, these concepts considered together are often discussed in terms of a lack of differentiation equating an institution pursuing prestige by emulating higher ranked institutions. However, there are some signs that a dependence upon tuition dollars may result in institutions providing more degrees in professional and vocational fields and offering more online courses in response to student demand. Moves in these directions would actually emulate more of a for-profit, trade school, or community college model rather than a research university model. Leadership “Institutions certainly are influenced by powerful, external factors such as demographic, economic, and political conditions, yet they are also shaped by strong forces that emanate from within” (Tierney, 1988, p. 3). At the case study institutions, senior administrators, specifically the presidents, provided the strongest internal influence on institutional strategy. Although decisions are almost always made within the context of external challenges and opportunities, internal leaders often interpret external factors and frame institutional strategy in response (Kempner, 2003; Neumann, 1995; Zusman, 2005). For example, UTU could likely find student demand to add graduate programs in high demand fields if so desired, but the former president consciously decided to keep the institution focused on undergraduate education. Additionally, CDU does not have to focus as much on community outreach as it does, but two consecutive presidents ingrained that emphasis into the university’s DNA. Finally, BAU opened a medical 178 school partly in response to a demand for more primary care physicians. However, this decision required significant discussions between the former president and the board to determine that was the strategic direction BAU wanted to pursue. It was not blindly pursued simply due to some perceived external demand. Across institutions, decisions were not made in the absence of considering the external environment, but internal leaders also played a large role in determining specific institutional responses. With leaders, especially presidents, playing such a prominent role at the case study institutions, it is important to consider what can be learned from the leaders at each institution. Leslie and Fretwell (1996) argued that there are often advantages associated with long-term presidents, including deep institutional knowledge, stability, and continuity. Long-servingpresidents at UTU and CDU directly contributed to the coherence and consistency of strategies at these institutions. On the other hand, BAU’s fluctuations and uncertainty in its macro strategy, may be partly attributed to a change in leadership a few years ago. Simply changing leaders, however, does not necessarily mean institutional strategies will change. Beyond leadership stability, it is important to examine the motivations of leaders. UTU is currently undergoing a presidential transition, but there are no signs of the institution’s strategy changing. Similarly, CDU did not change strategies during its last presidential transition that took place approximately ten years ago. BAU, on the other hand, experienced some strategic confusion during its last presidential transition as the university examined the appropriate balance between national research university aspirations with its historically undergraduate focus. When asked to account for this change, one individual at BAU said: I guess I see it not so much as prestige or not prestige, but leadership and then what the goals of those leaders were. You do have to look at the leaders. [Former president’s named masked] was, still is, very young in his career and for him to be able to turn around and say this is what we did at the campus I was at, it leads to 179 jobs. [Current president’s name masked] is in the last job he’ll probably have, so it’s very different administrations, very different presidencies. One administrator at UTU echoed this sentiment about the impact of career ambitions on presidential actions. I’m not going to name any names, but there’s one here, a guy who really wanted to be a Big 10 research one institution president, but didn’t get it—passed over. Goes to a regional university and tries to turn to it into the place he wanted to be a president of. It didn’t work. The short-term presidencies, they’re building their reputations, they’re building a resume more than they’re building the institutions sometimes. As institutions consider filling future leadership vacancies it is important to recognize the motivations and ambitions of the individuals hired and their commitment to institutional vision. This does not mean that BAU’s strategic changes are negative or positive, or that any future changes in the macro strategic directions of UTU and CDU would be negative or positive. Rather it is important to recognize that leaders matter (Kempner, 2003; Neumann, 1995; Zusman, 2005). If an institution wants to remain on a similar path, hiring a president committed to the institution’s current vision would make sense. If an institution is seeking strategic change, it may require hiring a president with a new vision (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996). Boards of trustees and other stakeholders must make that determination, but the case study institutions demonstrate how institutional strategy can be influenced by different lengths in tenure and career ambitions of presidents. Shared Governance Higher education institutions maintain a history of shared governance unique from many other types of organizations (Birnbaum, 2004; Mintzberg, 1979). Faculty maintain particular authority over many academic and curricular matters at their institutions (Tierney & Minor, 2003). However, findings in this study lend credence to more recent literature indicating 180 administrators, specifically presidents, maintain greater authority in establishing an institution’s strategic direction compared to the faculty (Duderstadt, 2000; Gingsberg, 2013; Keller, 2004a; Zusman, 2005). Faculty at the three case study institutions were involved to varying degrees in providing input on macro strategic matters. However, even where faculty were the most involved, at CDU, they were largely asked to respond to the strategic framework developed by the administration and not as involved at the ground-level of determining the institution’s direction. This study raises the question of what level of faculty influence, formal or informal, exists on any large strategic matters. Each case study institution maintains a faculty senate and two of the institutions have a faculty union. At each university there are clear delineations of power and authority between the faculty and the administration, specifically on curricular matters. However, in terms of determining an institution’s size, profile of its entering class, and even the general pursuit of certain degree programs, administrators maintain significant influence. Individuals at CDU indicated the administration initiated the university’s buildup of health programs. At BAU, the faculty senate approved the formation of the medical school, but it was largely an administratively-driven initiative. Additionally, across institutions there was a general acknowledgement that administrative control of the purse strings limits the potential of faculty-driven initiatives if they do not align with administrative interests. Duderstadt (2000) warned that given the rapidity at which decisions increasingly need to be made at higher education institutions, power is shifting toward presidents and senior administrators. This is illuminated by a quote from a faculty member at CDU, “there was some tension between maybe the administrators who wanted it [expansion of health programs] to be super, super fast and the faculty who wanted to go a little slower.” As pressures on higher 181 education institutions continue to mount, it will be important for colleges and universities to respond and adapt quickly. However, it will also be important to respond and adapt effectively and with respect to long-standing principles of shared governance. There are no indications at any of the institutions that faculty input is completely ignored, though it pales in comparison to the decision-making authority of senior administrators. Therefore, it will remain crucial for institutions to identify ways to protect the tradition of shared governance in the future. An additional component of shared governance involves the role of boards of trustees. The boards at UTU and CDU have largely allowed institutional leaders to establish the universities’ macro strategic visions. At BAU, the board has not dictated every aspect of the university’s direction, but at various times provided a push in general directions. Specifically, several years ago, the BAU board was a strong advocate and supporter of the university increasing graduate education and research activity, including the opening of a medical college. More recently the board is supportive of the current president’s re-focus on undergraduate education Overall, across all three institutions, boards influenced the institutions’ broad strategic frameworks less than presidents and senior administrators. Even in instances of boards being more active, as at BAU, most strategic initiatives stem directly from internal administrative recommendations. This is not surprising given indications that board influence has waned during the past few decades vis-à-vis presidents (Duderstadt, 2000; Duryea, 2000). However, as external pressures increase, university trustees may find themselves engaged in more discussions about the future strategic directions of their institutions (Ewell, 2006; Miller, 2011; Zeig, Baldwin, & Wilbur, 2014). As the legal and fiduciary agents of institutions responsible for upholding institutional mission, heritage, and values (American Association of University 182 Professors, 1966; Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2010; Birnbaum, 1983b), it is important that boards are cognizant of the higher education landscape and provide attentive oversight of institutional strategy (Baldwin, 2005, 2012; Kezar, 2006). It is equally important for boards not to micromanage their institutions (Legon, 2012; Novak, 2012), but the challenges colleges and universities face and the potential for significant institutional change demand boards have a strong voice in considering major shifts in direction. Implications for Research This study examined strategy, change, and influences affecting both at three institutions. This comprehensive view allowed me to examine several interacting components of institutional actions and interpret findings utilizing several organizational theories. Since there are limited studies of public, regional universities, specifically related to their strategies during the recent recessionary period, this study provides a solid background for pursuing future research along similar streams. In particular, it would be beneficial to drill down more deeply into each of the major areas of this study on strategy, change, and influences. Institutional strategy remains an understudied area within higher education (Toma, 2012). The main organizational theories utilized to understand strategy in this industry are mimetic behavior compared to differentiation or the lack thereof among many colleges and universities (Bastedo & Gumport, 2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Toma, 2012). Recent literature considers mimetic behavior in a largely negative light (Christensen & Erving, 2011; DeMillo, 2011; Rosen, 2013; Selingo, 2013), but this study raises the issue of how much some institutions need to differentiate themselves on a national scale if they largely compete on a more localized level. As long as the majority of students attend colleges and universities close to home (Egan, Lozano, Hurtado, & Case, 2013), it may not be crucial for a regional university in Michigan to 183 dramatically differentiate itself from a university in California. This does not mean differentiation is entirely unimportant, but it does lend credence to the question of how much differentiation is needed for individual institutions to be successful. To explore this issue I recommend considering the perspectives of external stakeholders such as prospective students and their parents, employers, and community leaders that observe and compare institutions for various purposes. Understanding how external stakeholders view institutional differentiation would shed light on the degree to which differentiation is crucial to an institution’s long-term viability. From an institutional perspective, I recommend continuing to examine not just what institutions do, but how and why they pursue certain activities. As this study showed, and as the literature indicates, many institutions pursue similar activities in a similar manner (O’Meara, 2007; Toma, 2012). However, I believe higher education literature does not fully explore how and why institutions pursue similar initiatives. Specifically, the literature on the pursuit of prestige often assumes actions such as increasing faculty research expectations and adding graduate programs are directly linked to an institution’s desire to improve their reputational standing (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Ehrenberg, 2002; Toma, 2012). As evidenced in this study, there are often alternative explanations for why some of these prestige activities are pursued, including responding to student programmatic demand, the desire to provide transformational educational experiences, or to ensure financial sustainability. Future research should continue to explore not just what institutions do but why they pursue certain activities. I recommend identifying particular institutions based upon the existence or absence of certain prestige activities and examining what influenced those decisions. It would be particularly 184 beneficial to examine documents pertaining to specific actions to better understand the reasons behind decisions. On the topic of change, this study indicates that significant external financial challenges may not immediately force large-scale institutional change. However, there are signs that greater change may be in the pipeline for the institutions studied and the larger sector of public, regional universities if the same set of external challenges persist. Therefore, it will be important to continue to monitor and study the impacts of financial challenges within this sector of higher education to explore potential delayed impacts. Specifically, it will be imperative to examine the prevalence of second-order compared to first-order changes (Goodman, 1982; Kezar, 2001). In this study, I argued that many of the institutional responses to recessionary challenges were first-order changes related to adjusting tactics rather than transforming institutional vision. For example, increasing out-of-state recruitment efforts to account for a declining in-state high school population was a change, but it did not drastically alter the makeup of the three institutions studied. However, if in five or ten years a public, regional university enrolls a much larger percentage of out-of-state students, it would beg the question of whether that shift eventually constitutes a second-order change (Goodman, 1982; Kezar, 2001). Similarly, adding a couple graduate programs in high demand fields may not represent a large-scale change, but continuing to add graduate programs in the future may eventually tilt the scales toward a secondorder change within the institution. There is a significant body of literature on organizational change as it pertains to higher education institutions (Cameron, 1984; Gumport, 2000; Kezar, 2001), but it is vital to continue studying change given the significant external challenges many colleges and universities faced during the past several years. I recommend identifying particular institutions that have and have 185 not changed significantly to compare their stories and better understand when, why, and how change occurred. Baker and Baldwin’s (2014) study of change in the liberal arts sector provides a good model for how to study change through the purposeful selection of institutions meeting particular criteria. Replicating this study within the public, regional university sector could be beneficial. Finally, as I mentioned regarding both strategy and change, it is important to understand what influences certain strategies and changes. Specifically, it is necessary to better understand the balance between external and internal influences. There are sound theories for understanding influences on organizations such as resource dependency theory related to external influences (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the nature of loosely coupled organizations from an internal perspective (Weick, 1976). What appears to be missing in the literature is a more thorough examination of the interplay of internal and external influences. This study demonstrated that there is often a confluence of factors that impact institutional decisions. Across the three case study sites, external factors appear to frame the environment in which the institutions operate, but senior administrators ultimately choose the final strategic directions of their universities from a set of possibilities. Since there are many factors that influence decision-making, future research would likely require larger samples in order to search for commonalities that transcend the unique peculiarities of any one decision. I continue to believe that public, regional universities face many constraints and are often “stuck in the middle” between major research universities and smaller, niche colleges and universities (Henderson, 2009). Further research would help illuminate the activities of public, regional universities in light of significant external financial challenges. In my recommendations, I mentioned the importance of purposefully selecting institutions to study to 186 provide enlightening examples for comparison. It will be equally important to study institutions from a range of states to understand how different governance structures and state economic conditions influence organizational strategy and change. Implications for Policy From a state policy perspective, it is important to recognize the link between state appropriations, tuition, and student debt. The evidence that appropriations declines lead to tuition increases and tuition increases lead to greater student debt levels is well known and obvious to those who study higher education, but it still merits discussion due to its large resource implications (Institute for College Access & Success, 2013; State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013). The institutions I studied largely managed through the recent recessionary period without making major strategic changes or facing significant internal cuts because they replaced lost state appropriations with tuition revenue. However, if state appropriations do not return to previous levels, there may be limits to how much further institutions can increase tuition without negatively impacting student access (Heller & Rogers, 2006, Zusman, 2005). Yet, if institutions do not offset appropriations declines with tuition hikes, they may soon face significant budgetary constraints that force them to rethink their macro institutional strategies. This concern for the future is reflected throughout participant interviews and is a prevalent theme throughout the higher education literature (DeMillo, 2011; Flynn & Vredevoogd, 2010; Selingo, 2013). As states grapple with budgetary constraints of their own (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013c; State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013), it is difficult to foresee a return to pre-recession funding levels for higher education institutions. However, given the known link between educational attainment and economic prosperity 187 (Business Leaders for Michigan, 2015), state policymakers would be wise to invest additional resources in higher education. The fact that some institutions, including the three I studied, did not experience drastic negative impacts during the recent recessionary period should not be assumed to be indicative of their ability to continue to handle state budget cuts without adverse effects. At the same time, colleges and universities would be wise to continue to seek ways to diversify their revenue streams beyond counting on a return in state appropriations or the ability to raise tuition further. Public, regional universities face challenges in increasing fundraising efforts and obtaining external research dollars compared to their research university counterparts (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Gladiuex, Hauptman, & Greene Knapp, 2010; Skinner & Miller, 2013), but such efforts may become increasingly necessary given the negative outlooks related to state appropriations and tuition. At the federal level, it may be increasingly vital for federal student aid programs to grow as student tuition bills and loans increase. This may be particularly important for public, regional universities that serve a wide range of students, including many from low-income families (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2014; Henderson, 2009). Additionally, as the federal government continues to explore developing a national college ratings system and potentially tying a portion of federal student aid to performance, it is crucial to consider what explicit and implicit messages a ratings system would send to institutions (Field, 2014). As demonstrated in this study, institutions often make decisions based in part upon external forces. The factors institutions may be measured on in a ratings system (e.g., net price, graduation rates, employability of graduates) may influence institutional decisions about the student enrollment profile they seek and the academic programs they offer. Higher education in the United States is noted for its vast array of institutional types, fulfilling the needs of a 188 diverse range of students (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973; Stadtman, 1980; Toma, 2012). Any ratings system, specifically if it is tied to the disbursement of federal student aid, should take into consideration the missions and purposes of various types of institutions. Another policy issue that is important to consider is the degree to which states encourage institutions to offer certain degree programs, with the current focus on STEM fields. In recent years, several states incentivized institutions to offer more STEM programs through performance-based funding mechanisms, with this applying to the three institutions I studied as well (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). Interest in promoting STEM programs is not surprising given the rapidly rising employment opportunities in STEM and related health fields (Carnevale, Smith, & Strohl, 2013), and there is nothing inherently wrong with offering academic programs to meet market demands. However, state policymakers and institutional leaders should tread cautiously to avoid focusing on STEM and other currently high demand programs at the expense of other fields of study. First, as discussed by a few study participants, job markets tend to be cyclical in nature, and it can be dangerous to over-react to the market and create potentially unsustainable programs. This is a sentiment echoed by Selingo (2013). Second, even if programs seem to have a long-term sustainable student demand, individual institutions may not have the capacity to offer such programs. This is why BAU considered but ultimately did not pursue a nursing program and CDU considered but ultimately did not pursue clinical health programs. Third, despite the current focus on STEM and health programs, it is important for policymakers and institutional leaders to recognize the continued value of the liberal arts and humanities. Hart Research Associates (2013) found that nearly all employers value an individual’s ability to think critically and communicate clearly more than their undergraduate major, and a majority of 189 employers favor individuals receiving a broad liberal education. This was acknowledged by individuals at each of the case study institutions, but it will remain vital to continue to support the liberal arts in both word and deed despite increasing external pressures to mainly focus on high demand fields. Additionally, state policymakers should consider the appropriate balance between promoting high demand degree programs while acknowledging the importance of a well-rounded education that is often difficult to measure but equally important (Carnevale, Smith, & Strohl, 2013). Implications for Practice Higher education institutions are complex organizations and each often maintains its own history and culture that makes recommending specific actions for practice difficult. However, based on this study, I offer several broad conclusions for institutions to consider related to strategy, change, and influences affecting both. First, it is important to recognize that while institutions may always maintain multiple goals and priorities (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Cohen & March, 1974), there may be some benefit to sharpening focus in light of growing external financial challenges. Sharpening focus begins by institutional leaders being able to articulate an institution’s macro mission and vision. The strategic frameworks at UTU and CDU were clear and well known among each of the individuals interviewed. At BAU, some individuals indicated they were unsure of the strategic direction of the institution, which contributed to the confusion between the university’s research aspirations and historical undergraduate focus. Strategic planning may occasionally be met with glazed over eyes and questions about its worth, but the case studies demonstrate the importance of a well-articulated institutional vision. This does not mean any university will or should perfectly align each of its parts with one another, but a clearly 190 and consistently stated strategy can help provide a framework for making decisions, particularly during challenging times. Second, in light of numerous challenges and at times a rapidly changing external environment, institutions must balance remaining true to their strategy with being flexible enough to adapt and change (Gumport, 2000; Kezar, 2014; Leslie & Fretwell, 1996). My recommendation in this area is to avoid extreme reactions. Ignoring the changing external environment (e.g., declining high school population, increasing online education options) will likely place an institution on an unsustainable long-term trajectory. The longer institutions take to adapt to their evolving circumstances, the more difficult it may be to implement large-scale changes. However, it is equally vital for institutional leaders to avoid the temptation to change just for the sake of change (Kezar, 2001). Many of the calls for change within higher education bemoan “Harvard envy” or the concept of institutions mimicking the top-rated colleges and universities (Christensen & Erving, 2011; Rosen, 2013). However, it is important to recognize that many calls for change do not offer a unique path to follow, but instead advocate for institutions to mimic a different set of institutions, often for-profit and online education providers. Yet, if public, regional universities all began increasing online and distance education programs, those actions would quickly look the same across the country. Individual institutions would have changed strategies, but would not have differentiated themselves in any substantial manner. In evaluating the need to change, I recommend administrators focus less on listening to the loudest critics or seeking the greatest sources of differentiation and instead evaluate choices in light of their own mission, vision, values, and institutional capacity. Obviously, maintaining a clear understanding of one’s macro strategy aids in evaluating change opportunities. 191 Colleges and universities, specifically public institutions, will always be influenced by external factors such as demographic and economic trends as well as external stakeholders such as government officials and employers (Kezar, 2014). It is necessary to consider external forces in making decisions, but institutional leaders can also influence the external environment themselves. Specifically, trustees, administrators, and faculty should help frame the conversation about the future of higher education and not shrink into accepting the harshest criticisms of the academy. The need to change and adapt should be acknowledged and in some cases actively pursued, but in other instances change may not be appropriate. For example, years of research offers proof of the value of in-person instruction from tenured faculty in small classes coupled with high impact co-curricular activities such as study abroad and service learning (Kuh, Kinzie, Schuh, & Whitt, 2010). While it should not be assumed that this is the only way to provide an education, it is crucial for institutional leaders to extoll the virtues of their current models and find an appropriate balance with new alternative methods. In times when higher education can often seem under constant attack, a couple quotes from this study provide a playbook for how institutional leaders may respond to critics. One administrator opined: I think you do have to put it into perspective . . . our average debt load is about the national average of about $24,000 and of course that’s a meaningful amount of money, but it’s not crushing. It’s a car loan for a moderate sized car, and what do you get out of that? You don’t get transportation for three years, you get a lifetime of professional success. It seems like a really good investment. Another individual argued: Many of our students are first-generation college students, so we’re transforming lives. What a positive impact that has on that person’s family forever . . . so we’re providing access, academic excellence, most of our graduates stay here, we have outstanding degree programs that are really relevant to our economy . . . it’s become crystal clear to me that we are part of our economic upswing and recovery, and the future of our region and our state for that matter, because so many of our graduates stay here and work here and commit their lives to this region. 192 Finally, it is important to consider what role various internal stakeholders (e.g., trustees, administrators, faculty) should play in making institutional strategy and change decisions. It is clear from the case studies, and consistent with the literature, that presidents and senior administrators largely set the strategic direction of institutions (Duderstadt, 2000; Duryea, 2000; Gingsberg, 2013; Keller, 2004a; Zusman, 2005). This means it is crucial for boards when they hire presidents and presidents when they hire other administrators to ensure a mutual fit between new hires with institutional culture. At UTU and CDU, long-serving presidents and consistency in presidential visions across multiple presidents led to strategic cohesion, whereas at BAU, differing visions between a former president and board with the current president and board resulted in some strategic confusion. This does not mean that long-serving presidents are preferable, and Leslie and Fretwell (1996) warned that such presidents can often prevent necessary adaptations and changes over time. Rather than making a universal claim as to the “best” type of president or transition plan between presidents, I recommend that when boards hire presidents, they carefully consider the priorities and motivations of individual candidates and the needs of the institution. Differing circumstances may make a short-term or long-term presidency more preferable than the other, and at times a commitment to an existing vision or acting as a change agent may be more preferable than the other. Likewise, the same considerations should be made when presidents hire vice presidents and so on across the institution. Beyond administrator influence, trustees at the case study institutions appear to largely approve strategic recommendations, but not necessarily suggest those directions, and faculty are often allowed an opportunity to provide input on plans, but typically on already formulated ideas. Based on the interviews I conducted, I do not believe either group’s voices are completely muted 193 or ignored at any of the case study institutions. However, as institutions continue to grapple with growing challenges that may result in major strategic shifts, it will be important for both groups to exert appropriate influence. Trustees at state colleges and universities are the public overseers of those institutions and should take an active role in determining the appropriateness of any major shifts from the institution’s historical mission. Trustees should not micromanage the institutions they serve, but major decisions such as increasing the percentage of graduate compared to undergraduate programs or drastically changing the profile of the student body should be made with trustees as strong partners, not just a rubber stamp to a decision already made (Baldwin, 2005; Kezar, 2006; Legon, 2012; Novak, 2012). In terms of faculty input, it is crucial to recognize the important role faculty play in the life of institutions and they too should be consulted as partners, not just as a pro forma matter when institutions make major strategic decisions (Birnbaum, 2004). At the same time, faculty should recognize the pressures institutions face and provide tangible, constructive feedback in a timely manner to ensure their voices remain beneficial and relevant. Conclusion Higher education institutions are complex organizations, and organizational phenomena such as strategy are often messy and abstract (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Mintzberg, 1987; Scott & Davis, 2007; Tolbert, 1985). I began this study seeking to examine the strategy, changes, and influences affecting both at three public, regional universities. Since strategy has not been studied as in depth within higher education as in business (Chaffee, 1985; Toma, 2012), and since public, regional universities are a minimally studied sector of higher education (Henderson, 2009; Skinner & Miller, 2013), this study purposely took a macro examination of many organizational issues. Taking a macro view provided an important perspective of how three 194 institutions responded to a number of challenges during a difficult period of time for higher education. Many studies examine a narrow slice of organizations, but it is difficult to understand any individual component of an organization without considering the big picture. What I found in this study is that on the surface “what” institutions do may often appear to be similar, but examining “how” and “why” institutions do what they do helps illuminate the strategy and change decisions being made. Public, regional universities face a number of significant external financial challenges. Although the case study institutions show minimal drastic changes stemming directly from the challenges of the recent recessionary period, these institutions and the larger higher education industry are not free from future constraints. Continuing to study organizational strategy and decision-making will help scholars and practitioners better understand what is occurring within colleges and universities during a challenging time. 195 APPENDICES 196 APPENDIX A: Interview Guide 1. What do you view as the university’s broad goals and aspirations? 2. Approximately how long do you think these goals and aspirations have existed? If they have changed within the past 5-10 years, when did they change? Why did they change? 3. What do you view as the university’s strategy or plan for achieving these goals and aspirations? 4. What are a few key areas within the institution that have been newly created or expanded since 2008? 5. What are a few key areas within the institution that have closed or been contracted since 2008? 6. Describe actions the university has taken in response to a constrained resource environment. 7. Describe actions the university has taken in response to an increasingly competitive environment for attracting students. 8. How do you determine what your goals, aspirations, and strategy will be? 9. What factors, individuals, and/or groups (internal and external) influence the institution’s goals, aspirations, and strategy? Which of these hold the most prominent influence? How is this influence exercised? 10. How do you view the university in the larger higher education marketplace? 11. How important is it to the university to monitor what other institutions are doing? 12. Is there anything else you would like to share about your institution’s strategy or what influences that strategy? 197 APPENDIX B: Overview of Institutional Findings Table 2: Overview of Institutional Findings Institutional Strategy Undergraduate Teaching University Undergraduate Focus: offers mainly undergraduate programs with a strong emphasis on quality teaching by tenure-system faculty; limited professional master's programs Institution of Opportunity: affordable option with an emphasis on enrolling, retaining, and graduating students of all abilities Serving the Region: enrolls students mainly from the immediate surrounding area; academic programs aligned with regional needs High Quality Despite Limited Resources: constant struggle to convince individuals of their value given the institution's low cost Community-Driven University Quality and Academic Excellence: student profile on par with one of the state's flagship institutions; ongoing initiative to better align student support services with the curriculum Enrollment Growth: goal to fill perceived greater capacity, but exact number undetermined Serving the Region: student access, talent pipeline for the local economy, and addressing community and business needs 198 Balancing Act University Tension between being a national research university versus a regional, undergraduate institution results in an often unclear, schizophrenic, reactive strategy Enrollment Sustainability: shifting focus to "right-sizing" the institution; maintaining the same admissions standards Serving the Region and State: providing education to a wide range of students; offering programs that meet regional and larger state employment needs High Quality Undergraduate Education: not as sole emphasis, but as main emphasis; increasing focus on being a "firstchoice" institution Increasing Emphasis on Research and Graduate Programs: most notably with the new medical school; causes tension both in terms of whether it is the appropriate strategy and whether it is even being pursued effectively Table 2 (cont’d) Evolving: historically an undergraduate-focused institution, and not changing that component, but increased research and graduate focus during the past decade Clear, Narrow, and Sharpened Focus: most Recessionary Laser Focus on Mission: resources not Aligned Strategy: evident through Response wasted on ancillary increasingly emphasized academic prioritization activities unrelated to due to recessionary process that eliminated a university's mission; pressures; not trying to few dozen programs does not succumb to be all things to all "mission creep" people Mission-Driven Conservative Financial Strategic Financial Financial Management: Management: cost Management: low one of the leanest containment, administrative costs and administrative structures specifically in nonholding positions open and lowest cost academic areas following natural institutions in the state attrition Revenue Enhancements: Revenue Enhancements: Revenue Enhancements: prior enrollment growth continued emphasis on increasing fundraising and tuition hikes (albeit enrollment growth as a efforts and seeking of modest compared to means to financial external research grants peers) provided stability; increasing resources when state fundraising and external appropriations declined; research efforts with limited, but growing some, but limited fundraising efforts success Shift in Program Expansion of High Invest in Key Strategic Offerings: moving away Demand Programs: Areas: remained from education specifically engineering aggressive by investing programs and more and health professions in high demand heavily into health programs at both the academic programs, programs due to undergraduate and student success changing demand graduate levels initiatives, and enhanced recruitment efforts Enrollment Sustainability: shift from enrollment growth to sustainability due to reaching desired capacity Continuity of Strategy Long-standing: consistent macro vision with natural growth and expansion aligned with strategic direction Long-standing: across multiple presidents and recently re-affirmed 199 Table 2 (cont’d) External Influences Internal Influences Student Demand: influences program offerings Student Demand: influences program offerings, specifically related to "job-relevant" majors Market Demand: Market Demand: influences program influences program offerings, but university offerings as an offshoot remains committed to of serving regional sustainable, not flash-in- needs the-pan programs Competitors: monitored Competitors: monitored, and selectively emulated but with an emphasis on in order to remain remaining true to the competitive, specifically institution's vision related to enrollment Governmental Policy: Governmental Policy: felt most significantly performance funding through legislative influencing conversation policy negatively about student success; impacting education appreciative of graduate program autonomy that allowed demand raising tuition as state appropriations declined Stakeholders: top-down Stakeholders: driven by from senior the president and senior administrators with leadership with little Board support; healthy interference from the relationship with the Board; faculty provide faculty, but faculty significant input, with provide more input on occasional tension with day-to-day academic the administration over matters than macro the speed of decisioninstitutional strategy making Leadership Culture: Leadership Culture: long-term leadership steady, long-term provides continuity and leadership provides a culture of commitment continuity and a culture to a shared vision; of commitment to a current presidential shared vision transition not changing vision, but raising questions of framing the institution for the future 200 Student Demand: influences program offerings; shifting toward STEM and health fields Market Demand: influences program offerings; university monitors market trends and also hears directly from employers Competitors: monitored and selectively emulates best practices to remain competitive Governmental Policy: responsive to state performance funding formula and national research agenda, but largely autonomous due to state's higher education structure Stakeholders: driven by senior administration with support from the Board; some tension exists between the faculty and administration about the university's direction, but this relationship is improving Leadership Turnover: one reason for a fluctuating vision is a recent presidential transition along with the turnover of key board members with replacements often espousing different visions APPENDIX C: Overview of Key Takeaways Table 3: Overview of Key Takeaways Differentiation Many institutions maintain similar strategies and tactics for achieving those strategies. However, many institutional similarities (e.g., honors programs, learning communities) are pursued because of their known value to students. Additionally, in examining institutional differentiation, it may be more important to look at higher education as a localized market than a national market since most first-year students still attend college close to home. Prestige is built into the higher education system, and many institutions pursue Pursuit of prestige implicitly, if not explicitly. Part of pursuing prestige often includes Prestige emulating higher ranked institutions to increase national reputation. However, the case study institutions demonstrate that sometimes activities such as increasing graduate programs and research expectations are pursued in response to student and market demands and financial survival. Prestige may be part of the equation, but not the entire reason for some institutional actions. The three case study institutions largely did not change their macro Degree of institutional strategies in response to external financial challenges. One Change institution that pursued larger changes did so mainly due to internal leadership deliberations. Instead, institutions adjusted tactics more than undertaking massive transformations in institutional identity. Institutions largely avoided large-scale changes since their resource base Future of remained fairly constant during the past several years. Declines in state Institutional appropriations were offset by tuition increases. However, as pressures Change continue to mount and the ability to continue to raise tuition is constrained by a variety of factors, larger institutional change may be on the horizon. As institutional resources shifted increasingly from state appropriations to Resource student tuition, institutions responded by catering to student programmatic Dependence demands. Institutions may face future challenges if projected declines in high school students leads to stagnant or decreasing enrollments and fewer tuition resources. Additionally, universities should be careful not to over-adjust to current programmatic demands that may be cyclical. The commitment of leaders, specifically presidents, to an institution’s vision Leadership plays a large role in determining whether institutions change strategies. Length of service and continuity between successive presidents’ visions also contribute to strategic consistency. Although faculty continue to maintain formal and informal influences at Shared universities, these are greater on tactical matters than broad institutional-level Governance strategy. Boards of trustees exert varying levels of influence depending on the specific board and institution, but largely defer to administratively-driven strategic choices. As institutions grapple with potentially significant strategic changes in the future, it will be increasingly important to ensure both faculty and boards of trustees maintain a strong voice in those deliberations. 201 REFERENCES 202 REFERENCES Adams, S. (2012, July 17). Is Coursera the beginning of the end for higher education? Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com Altbach, P. G. (2005). Harsh realities: The professoriate faces a new century. In P. G. Altbach, R. O. Berdahl, & P. J. Gumport (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first century: Social, political, and economic challenges (pp. 287-314). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. American Association of State Colleges and Universities. (2011). Dynamics affecting public higher education financing in fiscal year 2012. Washington, DC: American Association of State Colleges and Universities. American Association of State Colleges and Universities. (2013a). Delivering in challenging times: 2012 annual report. Washington, DC: American Association of State Colleges and Universities. American Association of State Colleges and Universities. (2013b). State outlook: July 2013. Washington, DC: American Association of State Colleges and Universities. American Association of State Colleges and Universities. (2013c). Top 10 higher education state policy issues for 2013. Washington, DC: American Association of State Colleges and Universities. American Association of State Colleges and Universities. (2014). Members. Retrieved from http://aascu.org/members/ American Association of University Professors. (1966). Statement on government of colleges and universities. Retrieved from http://www.aaup.org/report/statement-governmentcolleges-and-universities American Council on Education. (2013). The likely impact of sequestration on higher education. Retrieved from http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Sequestration-Paper013013-Revised.pdf Anderson, G. M., Alfonso, M., & Sun, J. C. (2006). Rethinking cooling out at public community colleges: An examination of fiscal and demographic trends in higher education and the rise of statewide articulation agreements. Teachers College Record, 108(3), 422-51. Archibald, R. B., & Feldman, D. H. (2010). Why does college cost so much? New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 203 Asimov, N. (2013, October 30). Janet Napolitano outlines grand vision for UC. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com Association of American Universities. (2011). University research: The role of federal funding. Washington, DC: Association of American Universities. Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. (2010). Statement on board responsibility for institutional governance. Washington, DC: Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. Baker, V. L., & Baldwin, R. G. (2014). A case study of liberal arts colleges in the 21st century: Understanding organizational change and evolution in higher education. Innovative Higher Education. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1007/s10755-014-9311-6 Baldwin, R. G. (2005, January/February). Trespassers in the grove of academe? Trusteeship, 13(1), 19-22. Baldwin, R. G. (2012, September/October). Bridging the different worlds of faculty and boards. Trusteeship, 20(5), 28-29. Barber, M., Donnelly, K., & Rizvi, S. (2013). An avalanche is coming: Higher education and the revolution ahead. Retrieved from the Institute for Public Policy Research website: http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2013/04/avalanche-iscoming_Mar2013_10432.pdf Bastedo, M. N. (2005). The making of an activist governing board. The Review of Higher Education, 28(4), 551-570. Bastedo, M. N., & Gumport, P. J. (2003). Access to what? Mission differentiation and academic stratification in U.S. public higher education. Higher Education, 46(3), 341-359. Beard, D. F. (2009). Successful applications of the balanced scorecard in higher education. Journal of Education for Business, 84(5), 275-282. Bess, J. L., & Dee, J. R. (2008a). Understanding college and university organization: Theories for effective policy and practice (Vol. I). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. Bess, J. L., & Dee, J. R. (2008b). Understanding college and university organization: Theories for effective policy and practice (Vol. II). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. Bettinger, E. P., & Long, B. T. (2006). The increasing use of adjunct instructors at public institutions: Are we hurting students? In R. G. Ehrenberg (Ed.), What’s happening to public higher education? The shifting financial burden (pp. 51-70). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 204 Birnbaum, R. (1983a). Maintaining diversity in higher education. San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass. Birnbaum, R. (1983b). System arguments for diversity. In M. W. Peterson (Ed.), ASHE reader on organization and governance (3rd ed.) (pp. 345-357). Needham, MA: Ginn Press. Birnbaum, R. (1988). How colleges work: The cybernetics of academic organization and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Birnbaum, R. (1989). The latent organizational functions of the academic senate: Why senates do not work but will not go away. The Journal of Higher Education, 60(4), 423-443. Birnbaum, R. (2000). Management fads in higher education: Where they come from, what they do, why they fail. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Birnbaum, R. (2004). The end of shared governance: Looking ahead or looking back. New Directions for Higher Education, 127, 5-22. Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. (2007). Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theories and methods. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (2008). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Bowen, W. G. (2013). Higher education in the digital age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bracco, K. R., Richardson, R. C., Callan, P. M., & Finney, J. E. (1999). Policy environments and system design: Understanding state governance structures. The Review of Higher Education, 23(1), 23-44. Breneman, D. W. (2010). Are the states and public higher education striking a new balance? In C. D. Lovell, T. E. Larson, D. R. Dean, & D. L. Longanecker (Eds.), Public policy and higher education (pp. 101-113). New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc. Brewer, D., Gates, S., & Goldman, C. (2002). The pursuit of prestige: Strategy and competition in U.S. higher education. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Brinkman, P. T., & Morgan, A. W. (2010). Financial planning: Strategies and lessons learned. Planning for Higher Education, 38(3), 5-14. Bryson, J. M. (1988). Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Burke, W. W. (2011). Organization change: Theory and practice (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 205 Business Leaders for Michigan. (2015). Business leaders’ insights: How higher education can help Michigan become a top ten state. Detroit, MI: Business Leaders for Michigan. Cameron, K. S. (1984). Organizational adaptation and higher education. Journal of Higher Education, 55(2), 122-144. Carlson, S. (2012, May 20). How the campus crumbles: Colleges face challenges from deferred maintenance. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. (1973). The purposes and the performance of higher education in the United States. Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. (2011). Updated Carnegie classifications show increase in for-profits, change in traditional leadership. Retrieved from http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/newsroom/press-releases/updated-carnegieclassifications Carnevale, A. P., Rose, S. J., & Cheah, B. (2011). The college payoff: Education, occupations, lifetime earnings. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce. Carnevale, A. P., Smith, N., & Strohl, J. (2013). Recovery: Job growth and education requirements through 2020. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce. Cawsey, T. F., Descza, G., & Ingols, C. (2012). Organizational change: An action-oriented toolkit (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Center for the Study of Education Policy. (2013). Grapevine compilation of state fiscal support for higher education results for fiscal year 2012-13. Retrieved from the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association website: http://www.sheeo.org/resources/ publications/grapevine-compilation-state-fiscal-support-higher-education-results-fiscal Chabotar, K. J. (1999). How to develop an effective budget process. New Directions for Higher Education, 107, 17-28. Chafee, E. E. (1985). The concept of strategy: From business to higher education. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), Higher education: Handbook of theory and research (Vol. 1) (pp. 133-171). New York, NY: Agathon Press. Chany, K. A. (2013). Paying for college without going broke. Framingham, MA: The Princeton Review. 206 Chopra, R. (2013). Student debt swells, federal loans now top a trillion. Retrieved from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau website: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/ Christensen, C. M., & Erving, H. J. (2011). The innovative university: Changing the DNA of higher education from the inside out. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Clark, B. R. (1983). The higher education system: Academic organization in cross-national perspective. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Clark, B. R. (2010). Small worlds, different worlds: The uniqueness and troubles of American academic professions. In S. R. Harper & J. F. L. Jackson (Eds.), Introduction to American higher education (pp. 19-31). New York, NY: Routledge. Cohen, M. D., & March, J. G. (1974). Leadership and ambiguity: The American college president. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company. College Board Advocacy & Policy Center. (2012). Trends in college pricing 2012. New York, NY: The College Board. Council for Aid to Education. (2014). Voluntary support of education 2013. New York, NY: Council for Aid to Education. Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. DeMillo, R. A. (2011). Abelard to apple: The fate of American colleges and universities. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Denzin, N. K. (1978). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Dexter, L. (1970). Elite and specialized interviewing. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Dill, D. D. (1984). The nature of administrative behavior in higher education. Educational Administration Quarterly, 20(3), 69-99. DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147160. Dooris, M. J. (2002). Two decades of strategic planning. Planning for Higher Education, 31(2), 26-32. 207 Duderstadt, J. J. (2000). A university for the 21st century. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. Duderstadt, J. J., & Womack, F. W. (2003). The future of the public university in America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Duryea, E. D. (2000). Evolution of university organization. In M. C. Brown II (Ed.), Organization & governance in higher education (5th ed.) (pp. 3-15). Boston, MA: Pearson Education. Eckel, P. D. (2002). Decision rules used in academic program closure: Where the rubber meets the road. The Journal of Higher Education, 73(2), 237-262. Egan, K., Lozano, J. B., Hurtado, S., & Case, M. H. (2013). The American freshman: National norms fall 2013. Los Angeles, CA: Higher Education Research Institute. Ehrenberg, R. G. (2002). Tuition rising: Why college costs so much. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eide, E., Brewer, D. J., & Ehrenberg, R. G. (1998). Does it pay to attend an elite private college? Evidence on the effects of undergraduate college quality on graduate school attendance. Economics of Education Review, 17(4), 371-376. Ewell, P. T. (2006, November/December). Do we make the grade? Trusteeship, 14(6), 8-13. Field, K. (2014, December 19). Obama’s college-ratings plan arrives, but most specifics stay behind. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Flynn, W. J., & Vredevoogd, J. (2010). The future of learning: 12 views on emerging trends in higher education. Planning for Higher Education, 38(2), 5-10. Foderaro, L. W. (2011, January 15). Amid cuts, public colleges step up appeals to alumni. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com Geiger, R. L. (2002). The American university at the beginning of the twenty-first century: Signposts on the path to privatization. In R. M. Adams (Ed.), Trends in American and German higher education (pp. 33-84). Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Gibbs, G. (2007). Analyzing qualitative data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Gingsberg, B. (2013). The fall of the faculty: The rise of the all-administrative university and why it matters. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 208 Gladiuex, L. E., Hauptman, A. M., & Greene Knapp, L. (2010). In C. D. Lovell, T. E. Larson, D. R. Dean, & D. L. Longanecker (Eds.), Public policy and higher education (pp. 67-86). New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc. Glesne, C. (2011). Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. Goldstein, L. (2012). A guide to college and university budgeting: Foundations for institutional effectiveness (4th ed.). Washington, DC: National Association of College and University Business Officers. Goodman, P. S. (1982). Change in organizations: New perspectives on theory, research, and practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Gumport, P. J. (2000). Academic restructuring: Organizational change and institutional imperatives. Higher Education, 39(1), 67-91. Hackman, J. D. (1985). Power and centrality in the allocation of resources in colleges and universities. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30(1), 61-77. Hall, D. E. (2009). Building bridges: What state comprehensive universities and research institutions could learn from one another. Teacher-Scholar, 1(1), 55-63. Handy, C. (1994). The age of paradox. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929-964. Harris, N. F. (2011). Planners as sensemakers and sensegivers: Reshaping austerity in college and university planning. Planning for Higher Education, 39(2), 51-54. Hart Research Associates. (2013). It takes more than a major: Employer priorities for college learning and student success. Washington, DC: Hart Research Associates. Heller, D. E., & Rogers, K. R. (2006). Shifting the burden: Public and private financing of higher education in the United States and implications for Europe. Tertiary Education and Management, 12(2), 91-117. Henderson, B. B. (2009). The work of the people’s university. Teacher-Scholar, 1(1), 5-29. Henderson, B. B., & Kane, W. D. (1991). Caught in the middle: Faculty and institutional status and quality in state comprehensive universities. Higher Education, 22(4), 339-350. Hendrickson, R. M., Lane, J. E., Harris, J. T., & Dorman, R. H. (2013). Academic leadership and governance of higher education: A guide for trustees, leaders, and aspiring leaders of two- and four-year institutions. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing. 209 Hoekstra, M. (2009). The effect of attending the flagship state university on earnings: A discontinuity-based approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(4), 717-724. Holmes, R. J. (2010). The challenge of funding fundraising. New Directions for Higher Education, 149, 27-37. Hoover, E., & Keller, J. (2011, October 30). More students migrate away from home: Public universities expand recruitment efforts in quest for out-of-state money. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Hoxby, C. (2001). The return to attending a more selective college: 1960 to the present. In M. Devlin & J. Meyerson (Eds.), Forum futures: Exploring the future of higher education (pp. 13-42). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Ignash, J. M., & Townsend, B. K. (2000). Evaluating state-level articulation agreements according to good practice. Community College Review, 28(3), 1-21. Inside Higher Ed. (2013). The 2013 Inside Higher Ed survey of college and university business officers. Washington, DC: Inside Higher Ed. Institute for College Access & Success. (2013). Student debt and the class of 2012. Oakland, CA: Institute for College Access & Success. Jacob, B., McCall, B., & Stange, K. M. (2013). College as country club: Do colleges cater to students’ preferences for consumption? (Working Paper No. 18745). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Jones, S. R., Torres, V., & Arminio, J. (2014). Negotiating the complexities of qualitative research in higher education (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. June, A. W. (2012, March 12). Aging professors create a faculty bottleneck: At some universities, 1 in 3 academics are now 60 or older. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1992). The balanced scorecard – measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review, 70(1), 71-79. Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1993). Putting the balanced scorecard to work. Harvard Business Review, 71(5), 134-147. Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1996). Strategic learning & the balanced scorecard. Strategy & Leadership, 24(5), 18-24. Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (2004). How strategy maps frame an organization’s objectives. Financial Executive, 20(2), 40-45. 210 Karathanos, D., & Karathanos, P. (2005). Applying the balanced scorecard to education. Journal of Education for Business, 80(4), 222-230. Kelderman, E. (2011, October 30). A regional public university scales back its research ambitions. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Kelderman, E. (2013, July 15). States strike budget bargains with higher education. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Keller, G. (1983). Academic strategy: The management revolution in American higher education. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Keller, G. (1997). Examining what works in strategic planning. In M. W. Peterson, D. D. Dill, L. A. Mets, & Associates (Eds.), Planning and management for a changing environment: A handbook on redesigning postsecondary institutions (pp. 158-170). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Keller, G. (1999). The emerging third stage in higher education planning. Planning for Higher Education, 28(2), 1-7. Keller, G. (2004a). A growing quaintness: Traditional governance in the markedly new realm of U.S. higher education. In W.G. Tierney (Ed.), Competing conceptions of academic governance: Negotiating the perfect storm (pp. 158-176). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Keller, G. (2004b). Transforming a college: The story of a little-known college’s strategic climb to national distinction. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Kelly, P., & Strawn, J. (2011). Not just kid stuff anymore: The economic imperative for more adults to complete college. Retrieved from the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems website: http://www.nchems.org/pubs/docs/ NotKidStuffAnymoreAdultStudentProfile-1.pdf Kempner, K. (2003). The search for cultural leaders. The Review of Higher Education, 26(3), 363-385. Kezar, A. J. (2001). Understanding and facilitating organizational change in the 21st century: Recent research and conceptualizations (ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 284). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Kezar, A. J. (2006). Rethinking public higher education governing boards performance: Results of a national study of governing boards in the United States. Journal of Higher Education, 77(6), 968-1008. Kezar, A. J. (2014). How colleges change: Understanding, leading, and enacting change. New York, NY: Routledge. 211 Kezar, A. J., & Eckel, P. D. (2004). Meeting today’s governance challenges: A synthesis of the literature and examination of a future agenda for scholarship. Journal of Higher Education, 75(4), 371-399. Kezar, A. J., Maxey, D., & Badke, L. (2013). The imperative for change: Fostering understanding of the necessity of changing non-tenure track faculty policies and practices. Los Angeles, CA: Pullias Center for Higher Education. Kiley, K. (2013, April 2). Purdue’s outsider. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from http://www.insidehighered.com Kim, W. C., & Mauborgne, R. (2005). Blue ocean strategy: How to create uncontested market space and make the competition irrelevant. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation. Kuh, G. D., Kinzie, J., Schuh, J. H., & Whitt, E. J. (2010). Student success in college: Creating conditions that matter. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. LeCompte, M. D., & Preissle, J. (1993). Ethnography and qualitative research design in educational research (2nd ed.). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Legon, R. (2012, July/August). On my agenda: There are no winners. Trusteeship, 20(4). Retrieved from http://agb.org/trusteeship/2012/7/my-agenda-there-are-no-winners Leinwand, P., & Mainardi, C. (2010). The coherence premium. Harvard Business Review, 88(6), 86-92. Leslie, D. W., & Fretwell, E. K. (1996). Wise moves in hard times: Creating & managing resilient colleges & universities. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Logue, A. C. (2006, May). Gifts with strings attached: How to avoid getting tangled with restricted gifts. University Business. Retrieved from http://www.universitybusiness.com Lubove, S., & Staley, O. (2011, May 14). College gifts now coming with strings attached. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com Lyall, K. C., & Sell, K. R. (2005). The true genius of America at risk: Are we losing our public universities to de facto privatization? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Martinez, M., & Wolverton, M. (2009). Enriching planning through industry analysis. Planning for Higher Education, 38(1), 23-30. 212 Masterson, K. (2011, February 2). Donations to colleges rose, if only slightly, in 2010. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com McGuinness, A. C., Jr. (2014). State policy leadership in the public interest: Is anyone at home? In L. F. Goodchild, R. W. Jonsen, P. Limerick, & D. A. Longanecker (Eds.), Public policy challenges facing higher education in the American west (pp. 71-90). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. McMurtrie, B. (2012, November 12). China continues to drive foreign-student growth in the United States. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com Merriam, S. B. (2009). Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363. Miller, E. R. (2011). Public higher education governing boards: The role of social networks (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (Order No. 888045930) Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Mintzberg, H. (1987). The strategy concept I: Five Ps for strategy. California Management Review, 30(1), 11-24. Mintzberg, H. (1994). The rise and fall of strategic planning. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Moody’s Investors Service. (2013). US higher education outlook negative in 2013. New York, NY: Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. Morphew, C. C. (2002). A rose by any other name: What colleges became universities. The Review of Higher Education, 25(2), 207-223. Morphew, C. C. (2009). Conceptualizing change in the institutional diversity of U.S. colleges and universities. Journal of Higher Education, 80(3), 243-269. Morrill, R. L. (2007). Strategic leadership: Integrating strategy and leadership in colleges and universities. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Mortimer, K. P., & Sathre, C. O. (2007). The art and politics of academic governance: Relations among boards, presidents, and faculty. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. National Center for Education Statistics. (2011). The condition of education 2011 (NCES Publication No. 2011-033). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. 213 National Center for Education Statistics. (2012). Digest of education statistics 2011 (NCES Publication No. 2012-001). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. National Conference of State Legislatures. (2015). Performance-based funding for higher education. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/performancefunding.aspx National Institutes of Health. (2015). Research project grants: Competing applications, awards, and success rates. Retrieved from http://report.nih.gov/nihdatabook/index.aspx National Science Foundation. (2013). About funding. Retrieved from http://www.nsf.gov/ funding/aboutfunding.jsp National Student Clearinghouse. (2013). Spring 2013 current term enrollment estimates report. Herndon, VA: National Student Clearinghouse. Neumann, A. (1995). On the making of hard times and good times: The social construction of resource stress. The Journal of Higher Education, 66(1), 3-31. Novak, R. (2012, September/October). State policies and practices to improve board governance. Trusteeship, 20(5), 31-35. Olivas, M. A. (2005). The legal environment: The implementation of legal change on campus. In P. G. Altbach, R. O. Berdahl, & P. J. Gumport (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first century: Social, political, and economic challenges (2nd ed.) (pp. 226-252). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. O’Meara, K. (2007). Striving for what? Exploring the pursuit of prestige. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), Higher education: Handbook of theory and research (Vol. 22) (pp. 121-179). New York, NY: Agathon Press. Pappano, L. (2011, July 22). The master’s as the new bachelor’s. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com Pappano, L. (2012, November 2). The year of the MOOC. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com Pfeffer, J. (1987). A resource dependence perspective on interorganizational relations. In M. S. Mizruchi & M. Schwartz (Eds.), Intercorporate relations: The structural analysis of business (pp. 22-25). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1974). Organizational decision making as a political process: The case of a university budget. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19(2), 135-151. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row. 214 Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Business Review, 57(2), 137-145. Porter, M. E. (1991). Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 95-117. Prestige. (n.d.). In dictionary.com online dictionary. Retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prestige?s=t Proper, E., Caboni, T. C., Hartley, H. V., & Willmer, W. K. (2009). More bang for the buck: Examining influencers of fundraising efficiency and total dollars raised. International Journal of Educational Advancement, 9(1), 35-41. Rhoades, G. (2000). Who’s doing it right? Strategic activity in public research universities. The Review of Higher Education, 24(1), 41-66. Richards, L. (2005). Handling qualitative data. London, UK: Sage Publications. Rivard, R. (2013a, March 22). Coursera’s contractual elitism. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from http://www.insidehighered.com Rivard, R. (2013b, August 8). Rubber hits the road. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from http://www.insidehighered.com Rosen, A. S. (2013). Change.edu: Rebooting for the new talent economy. New York, NY: Kaplan Publishing. Rosser, J. N., & Penrod, J. I. (1991). Strategic planning and management: A methodology for responsible change. In J. F. Williams II (Ed.), Strategic planning in higher education: Implementing new roles for the academic library (pp. 9-34). Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. Rowley, D. J., Lujan, H. D., & Dolence, M. G. (1997). Strategic change in colleges and universities: Planning to survive and prosper. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Rowley, D. J., & Sherman, H. (2001). From strategy to change: Implementing the plan in higher education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Russell, A. (2010). Update on the community college baccalaureate: Evolving trends and issues. Washington, DC: American Association of State Colleges and Universities. Sallie Mae. (2013). How America pays for college 2013. Newark, DE: Sallie Mae. Schmidtlein, F. A. (1990). Why linking budgets to plans has proven difficult in higher education. Planning for Higher Education, 18(2), 9-23. 215 Schuster, J. H., & Finkelstein, M. J. (2010). The American faculty in perspective. In S. R. Harper & J. F. L. Jackson (Eds.), Introduction to American higher education (pp. 5-18). New York, NY: Routledge. Scott, W. R., & Davis, G. F. (2007). Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural, and open system perspectives. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Selingo, J. J. (2013). College unbound: The future of higher education and what it means for students. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Skinner, R. A., & Miller, E. R. (2013). Après le déluge at state u: A comprehensive public university responds to the great recession. Change, 45(2), 50-56. Speck, B. W. (2010). The growing role of private giving in financing the modern university. New Directions for Higher Education, 149, 7-16. Stadtman, V. A. (1980). Academic adaptations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Stafford, R. (1993). Sheep in wolves’ clothing, or how not to do strategic planning. Planning for Higher Education, 22(1), 55-59. State Higher Education Executive Officers Association. (2013). State higher education finance FY 2012. Boulder, CO: State Higher Education Executive Officers Association. State Higher Education Executive Officers Association. (2014). State higher education finance FY 2013. Boulder, CO: State Higher Education Executive Officers Association. Stewart, A. C., & Carpenter-Hubin, J. (2001). The balanced scorecard: Beyond reports and rankings. Planning for Higher Education, 29(2), 37-42. Strategy. (n.d.). In dictionary.com online dictionary. Retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/strategy?s=t Thelin, J. R. (2004). A history of American higher education. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Tierney, W. G. (1988). Organizational culture in higher education: Defining the essentials. Journal of Higher Education, 59(1), 2-21. Tierney, W. G., & Minor, J. T. (2003). Challenges for governance: A national report. Los Angeles, CA: Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis. Tolbert P. S. (1985). Institutional environments and resource dependence: Sources of administrative structure in institutions of higher education. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30(1), 1-13. 216 Toma, D. J. (2012). Institutional strategy: Positioning for prestige. In M. N. Bastedo (Ed.), The organization of higher education: Managing colleges for a new era (pp. 118-159). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Umashankar, V., & Dutta, K. (2007). Balanced scorecards in managing higher education institutions: An Indian perspective. International Journal of Educational Management, 21(1), 54-67. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013). Occupational employment projections to 2022. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/pdf/occupational-employmentprojections-to-2022.pdf Volk, C. S., Slaughter, S., & Thomas, S. L. (2001). Models of institutional resource allocation: Mission, market, and gender. The Journal of Higher Education, 72(4), 387-413. Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(1), 1-19. Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education. (2012). Knocking at the college door: Projections of high school graduates. Boulder, CO: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education. Yin, R. K. (2008). Case study research: Design and methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Zeig, M. J., Baldwin, R. G., & Wilbur, K. M. (2014). Great expectations: A longitudinal study of new university trustees (First Phase Report). East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Center for Higher and Adult Education. Zusman, A. (2005). Challenges facing higher education in the twenty-first century. In P. G. Altbach, R. O. Berdahl, & P. J. Gumport (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first century: Social, political, and economic challenges (2nd ed.) (pp. 115-162). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 217