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Land Tenure Structures In The Agricultural Sector of Hounde, Burkina Faso: A Study In Rural Social Change and Development

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LAND TENURE STRUCTURES IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF HOUNDE, BURKINA FASO: A STUDY IN RURAL SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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ABSTRACT

LAND TENURE STRUCTURES IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF HOUNDE, BURKINA FASO:

A Study in Rural Social Change and Development

by Saidou Sanou

In the search for development in Burkina Faso, agricultural planners and policy decision makers have made little effort to study and comprehend fully the indigenous land tenure systems. Oftentimes, overgeneralization precluded the search for specifics and specificities. A general wisdom regarded african patterns of land ownership as presenting a communal characteristic, thus implying the existence of flexible and easily adaptable sets of customary rules regulating the access and disposal of agricultural lands. The specific rights and obligations attached to these lands were largely overlooked. Indeed, Africa was said to be "long in land and short in capital". Therefore, capital generation and accumulation were given prime consideration over any other issues.

Today, an increasing number of observers acknowledge the strategic importance of land issues in the process of agricultural development. In effect, farmers express a keen interest in securing their landrights both in areas where land is a scarce resource and areas where land is relatively abundant. In this study, an attempt is made to assess the communal

characteristic of land ownership in an agricultural district where land is relatively abundant. The in-migration phenomenon (population pressure on land) and the agricultural development process (modernization) are accounted for in order to analyze the restructuring of land tenure patterns.

Data were collected in 1984-85 through a sample survey which involved the interview of 141 respondents in six different villages of Western Burkina Faso. These data were supplemented by thorough discussions with the customary authorities of each village, the representatives of migrant groups and farmers' organizations, and agricultural extension officers posted in the district.

The data are presented in a series of tables in which the land tenure patterns of migrant farmers and farmers indigenous to the research area are contrasted and compared. Farmers engaged in improved or conservative farming are addressed separately. The villages are also contrasted and compared using the in-migration and developemt variables. The purpose was (1) to analyze the impacts of development on the traditional tenure system in high in-migration villages, and (2) to analyze the impacts of development on the traditional tenure system in low in-migration villages. The land tenure practices are labelled "communal", "individual", and "other".

The study reveals that the majority of respondents in the Hounde agricultural sector still retains the communal pattern of

land tenure organization. The individual pattern of land tenure is only emerging. Among farmers who engage in improved farm practices, those relatively younger appear to be more interested in the new form of tenure organization. The findings also suggest that in-migrant farmers predominantly adopt the individualized land tenure pattern. Nevertheless, the analysis at the village level shows that the behavior of the indigenous farmers varies depending on the development conditions of their villages. In a relatively high level of development setting, the indigenous farmers are heavily engaged in the process of land tenure individualization. A similar shift was not identified in low development settings even when the indigenous farmers adopt improved farm practices.

TO MY FATHER
WHO PASSED AWAY
JUST A FEW WEEKS BEFORE
MY DISSERTATION DEFENSE

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ACRONYMS

A.V.V.: Autorite de l'Amenagement des Vallees des Volta
C.F.A.: Compagnie Financiere Africaine
C.N.R.: Conseil National de la Revolution
D.F.N.: Domaine Foncier National
F.A.C.: Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation
F.A.O.: Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
I.C.R.I.S.A.T.: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
M.S.U.: Michigan State University
R.D.P.: Revolution Democratique et Populaire
S.A.E.D.: Societe Africaine d'Etudes et de Developpement
O.R.D.: Organisme Regional de Developpement
O.R.S.T.O.M.: Organisme de Recherches Scientifiques et Technique d'Outre-Mer

"...Some writers have claimed that land tenure in African States was feudal in kind; others dispute this contention, denying the utility of the concept of landed fief in Africa. Most of this discussion has taken place on a political-legal level. But there is one crucial and obvious difference which has been largely overlooked. It is a difference which means that African land tenure (and hence vassalage and landed fiefs) was unlike that which was obtained in much of Europe and indeed in much of the Eurasian Continent generally; and it has to do with the means of production rather than with productive relations, though its influence upon these relations is of considerable importance. Basically Africa is a land of extensive agriculture. The population is small, the land is plentiful and the soils are relatively poor. Moreover, one fundamental invention that spread throughout the Eurasian Continent never reached Africa south of the Sahara, with the exception of Ethiopia. I am referring to that Bronze Age invention, the plough."

Jack Goody

Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Until very recently, the systematic study of land tenure systems has not been a major preoccupation of scholars doing research on rural social change in Burkina. This neglect was certainly engendered by the common idea that land was plentiful and easily accessible. In addition, the rise of the "theory of land surplus" (Helleiner, 1966), coupled with an overemphasis on the communal character of the African land tenure in general, has not favored due regard for the internal dynamics of such tenure arrangements, let alone their relationship to the productive, social and political activities. Africa was said to be "long in land and short in capital". As a consequence, agricultural land policies have frequently lacked coherence as well as a long term perspective.

In the context of population growth and economic development, land availability has usually been analysed in terms of adaptation and/or conflict. Observers ordinarily suppose that the scarcity of land tends to bring about conflicts in its control and use, whereas a relative abundance of land tends to be viewed as favoring some form of adaptation to the changing context (Dozon, 1982). It is understood here that problems may arise because an abundance of land only seemed apparent and that scarcity of land is really the case. However, it is increasingly clear that conflicts may arise even in the case of true land

abundance. Today in Burkina, the Eastern and Western regions illustrate such a condition. Peasants develop a greater awareness of the importance of land resources and therefore tend to have a boundary maintenance reaction. Still, land is plentiful but its access becomes more and more difficult for new settlers. In general, land conflicts take the form of inter-ethnic or inter-lineage opposition on one hand, and intra-lineage (inter-generational and inter-sibling) disruption on the other hand. The former represents a departure from the traditional principles of cooperation and hospitality vis-a-vis new and old settlers. The second type of conflict is in essence a challenge to the elders' domination over the economic and social processes. Nonetheless, the agricultural development programs have long proceeded with little mention of land issues and policies.

Considered as a set of rules which regulate individual and group access, use, and transmission of rights and obligations over land, land tenure has never remained static. As societies grow and/or modernize, the land tenure systems also tend to bear the marks of the ideological, political and socio-economic changes that occur. In effect, before the Arabic and European influences, individual African societies had attained quite different levels of development. The social forms and the rules governing them were equally different. As African societies grew, they incorporated diverse elements based on Islamic laws, Christian philosophies, and British and French laws, among

others. This process is still going on today and should be adequately addressed in order to understand the dynamics involved in African land tenure systems. This is especially important since Burkina Faso is an agrarian society, and because land represents one of its essential assets. It would seem imperative therefore to exercise foresight by investigating the general characteristics of the changes taking place and the extent to which such processes alter or favor agricultural development.

The research presented here focuses on the particular land tenure and socio-organizational context of Western Burkina. It analyzes the specific patterns of land tenure in the agricultural sector of Hounde, and subsequently formulates some recommendations for alternative agricultural land policies in relation to development goals. Therefore, the study is broadly concerned with the land reform controversy[1/] and ultimately seeks to shed light on "what constitutes an efficient system of tenure, from the point of view of general economic development and social justice" (Levy & Havinden, 1982). Too often, agricultural land policies that seek to introduce changes in the tenure systems have not been developed from primary data bases and a specific agricultural context (Cohen, 1980)[2/].

1/ Debate on what direction a land reform should take in Africa. See section on literature review.

2/ This is partly true for the ongoing land tenure and agrarian reform in Burkina. Although the reform project takes into account the specific agrarian environment of Burkina, the National Technical Committee ackowledges that its final report was conceived and written in a one-month period and without any fieldwork. Moreover, it warns that "the study remains limited from a scientific point of view".

Working from a primary data set and a specific agricultural context should provide a much safer ground for the generation of sound policies. Such policies are indeed needed in order to avoid the growing social problems related to the access to, and the control over, agricultural land. The success of the agricultural development process would seem to be intimately tied to the land tenure patterns and policies which seek to reverse and resolve the strong trend of inter-ethnic, inter-lineage, inter-generational and inter-sibling land conflicts.

Land Availability in Burkina

Based on land use patterns, the national territory of Burkina is divided as follows:

Type of use	Area in square km.	Percent.
Rainfed land area	88,290	32.1
Irrigated land	874	0.3
Pastures	129,570	47.0
Forest and woodland	34,760	12.6
Other land	21,380	8.0
Total:	274,874	100.0

(Adapted from Bounkoungou,1983)

As shown above, more than 75% of the national territory is suitable for agricultural production. It is estimated that only one-third of this area is effectively planted every year. Some areas need land reclamation efforts (e.g., "bottom lands"). In addition, the extension of the cultivated land area is limited by factors such as poor soil quality, insufficient water resources, heavy human concentration, and water born diseases (tse-tse flies). Nonetheless, the country is forced to depend mainly on its agricultural production in order to survive, and more than 90% of its inhabitants reside in rural areas. In 1981, 5,726,000 people out of about 7 million total population made their living directly from agriculture. This corresponds to 80.7% of

the active individuals in the work force (F.A.O. Production Yearbook, 1981, Volume 35).

Table 1-1 gives some figures on the rural population according to the land area available to them. This table makes it very clear that there are regional disparities in the country. The rural density (inhabitants per square km. of arable land) reaches extraordinary levels in the Central region, inhabited essentially by the Mossi people. In contrast, the Sahel, Eastern and Western regions are less densely inhabited. As a rule, the maximum of 40 inhabitants per square kilometer is generally given as the ceiling level where the soil fertility could be maintained given the actual technological conditions.

The "cultural intensity coefficients" (C.I.C ,i.e.,area cultivated/arable land) afford more insight and show that the Yatenga (West Central region) is by far the most exploited area (70%). The Eastern region (about one-fifth of the national territory) remains the least exploited, with a coefficient of 13%. However, the low level of land area planted in the East should not lead us to ignore the growing land problems in that region. In his study of the Gourmantche agriculture, Swanson (1978) warns us in the following terms:

> The low population density, combined with the itinerant cultivation method, has not resulted in an orientation whereby the peasants show little interest in the maintenance of personal and family rights in land. The low density figure obscures the fact that personal and family landrights represent an urgent issue which is going to be a major problem in the future development of this region.

TABLE I-I: RURAL POPULATION AND AVAILABLE LAND RESOURCES POTENTIALS AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES

REGION	AREA in km²	RURAL POPULATION in I000's	AREA in I000 ha. ARABLE	PASTURES	PLANTED	C.I.C. (5)/(3)	AREA ha. per inhabt. AGRIC.	PASTURE	RURAL DENSITY inhab./km²
	(I)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Sahel Region	36,869	354	980	2,045	I40	I4	2.8	6.79	36
Central Region	93,99I	3,023	2,835	5,725	I,332	47	0.9	I.9	I07
- Yatenga	I2,293	493	350	800	244.5	70	0.7	I.6	I4I
- North	II,576	523	6I5	I,395	242.I	39	I.0	2.2	I03
- East	II,I65	432	325	5I0	I65.4	43	0.8	I.2	I24
- Center	2I,952	762	740	I,445	274.8	56	I.0	I.9	I03
- West	26,992	740	805	I,575	305.4	38	I.I	2.2	92
Eastern Region	49,992	403	I,550	3,0I0	203	I3	3.8	7.5	26
Western Region	93,765	I,447	3,560	5,I05	705	20	2.5	3.5	4I
- Volta Noire	24,782	623	930	I,780	304.5	29	I.5	2.8	62
- Hts-Bassins	2I,782	270	I,I50	I,475	I80.5	I7	4.3	5.5	23
- Comoe	I8,380	I86	750	950	86.8	I2	4.I	5.I	24
- Bougouriba	I7,480	350	720	900	I30.7	I8	2.0	2.5	5[illegible]
BURKINA FASO	274,[illegible]	5,227	8,925	I5,245	2,[illegible]	27	I.7	3.I7	52.5

N.B.: The total area given by the table is 274,[illegible] square kilometers; in fact, adding up the C.R.P.A. land area totals 274,500 square kilometers.
C.I.C. stands for Cultural Intensity Coefficient.

Source: Adapted from the Direction des Services Agricoles (I983).

Swanson goes on to show that the bigger the village, the more the peasants are obliged to borrow land. Therefore, the number of land borrowers tend to outnumber the permanent landright holders.

Such a situation raises at least two questions:

1) Will the customary landrights continue to be loosely applied, and if not, what will be their new interpretation?

2) How would the land borrowers react once conscious of their position as the majority group?

The Sahel region has a cultural intensity coefficient of 14%, but the area is the most hostile to the expansion of land suitable for agriculture, for obvious reasons. This region is more suitable for stock raising.

The Western region, on the other hand, is the backbone of agricultural production in the country and still maintains an average cultural density (20%). Therefore, it is not surprising that a heavy flow of migrants move toward that region. (See Maps 1 and 2). The research area -- the agricultural sector of Hounde--is part of the Western region; it is located within the O.R.D. des Hauts-Bassins (an agricultural extension body).

The agricultural sector of Hounde is among the ones receiving the most in-migrants (more than 25% of the total number of migrants). They come essentially from the Central region. The sector of Hounde has a total population of 45,422 people. However, the out-migration rate is very low. Only 857 people outmigrated in 1975, according to the last census.

MAP # I: Inter-provincial Rural Migration
(Male in-migrants/total population)



MAP # 2: Internal Rural Migration for males



The conjunction of a heavy flow of in-migration and a low rate of out-migration is likely to impose a significant impact on agricultural land issues due to the fact that most in-migrants engage in food raising. Thus, it becomes imperative to look at the differences in land tenure patterns between the two groups and to determine the influence of the in-migrants on the patterns of land allocation and transmission, and on the structures of control and landright enforcement, among other things.

Some Background to Land Regulations in Burkina

> The judicial and social aspects of land tenure system cannot be adequately understood without reference to the history of people. These systems have developed stepwise, were exposed to diverse influences before and after the period of colonization, and take new directions in the independent African States. (Biebuyck, 1963).

The only extensive survey on land tenure in Burkina was carried out by Boutillier (1964) under the aegis of the European Aid and Cooperation Fund (F.A.C.). The study did address the general land tenure features of the ten (10) main ethnic groups comprising the country. However, one cannot find definitive historical data that would help understand how the indigenous land tenure structures were established. More research in this area would have definitely broadened our view of the ongoing patterns and processes. On the other hand, unlike Senegal for example, no summary analysis has been made of the colonial and postcolonial legislative bills enacted by the successive administrations. Nonetheless, the efforts made by the Senegalese researchers are also relevant to the Burkina context as far as the colonial era is concerned. At that time,the administrative texts were written for the whole of the French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise) territory whose capital city was Dakar. The present chapter aims to bring together the essential characteristics of the prevailing land tenure arrangements and policies.

Characteristics of the Indigenous Land Tenure Patterns

Very few records exist on native rural communities that relate to land issues. One is confined to an attempt to make sense out of scattered and fragmentary events, or relying on discussions with old people in the community. It is commonly agreed that traditionally land was owned by a lineage and the landrights are then attributed to segments of lineage, allies, guests and new acquaintancies (Capron, 1973; Kholer, 1971 ; Boutillier, 1964). Such a particular feature makes each native group a "community of land", so to speak. This understanding prompted many observers to state that it does not make sense to analyse African land tenure systems as such, distinct from the socio-political and productive processes.

Bachelet (1968) noticed that the African land tenure systems comprise three levels: (1) Social and religious; (2) Judicial and political; and (3) Economic. He further states that it is the link between these three levels that explains the coherence of the traditional system; but also, it consecrates its archaism vis-a-vis the realities of the modern world.

The nature and content of the landrights one holds in Burkina depends generally on the level of affiliation with the land-owning lineage. Natives and historic allies tend to be granted permanent rights. Within a particular household (segment of the land-owning lineage), the landrights for individual cultivation depend on the relationships with the head of

household; i.e., the individual's position in the social and production process. In his research on the Mossi, Kholer shows that the brothers of the head tend to be granted bigger and better land areas than sons and women. Indeed, this type of "collective" land ownership and easy access that characterizes it, make sense especially when land is plentiful and the social and political control is quite absolute.

The area known today as Burkina Faso has sheltered a variety of political entities, kingdoms and empires. According to each type of political and social control, the different Burkinabe communities have developed quite similar forms of access and control over land. These groups are mainly agriculturalists and it is generally admitted that they display quite homogenous land tenure features. They enforce the same essential types of landrights (Boutillier, 1964). However, an in-depth analysis should account for the social and economic specificities proper to each region and group.

Among the various social formations, the Mossi socio-political organization has often been singled out and has been assimilated to a feudal system. Indeed, the prominent position of the Mossi chiefs does not necessarily imply their owning the land. In other words, they are not fief holders as was the Lord in Medieval Europe.

> The Mossi chiefs did not own the land, but they controlled it and assigned landrights to their subjects.
>
> (Skinner, 1964)

Nevertheless, other studies (Boutillier, 1964; Kholer, 1971), show how the Mossi chiefs were able to secure vast domains of land as well as the labor force by using their power position. Kholer, for example, cites the development of such use of power in the colonial era, especially with the systematization of cash crop production. This finding suggests that such practice is a deviation from the original role the chiefs held. An important error may consist of considering this as an intrinsic feature of the indigenous land tenure. Furthermore, looking at the actual land tenure patterns in the Kaya region, McMillan (1980) shows that the main factors determining the size and quality of holdings are the order of arrival in the village and the relationship to the chieftaincy. In effect, first settlement used to confer the title and role of "land master" or "earth priest". But, one should realize that during the conquest and building-up of the Mossi Empire, the Naba (Mossi chief) sometimes brought with him a "land master". This explains why the two institutions have sometimes a common origin even where the first settlers are from a different lineage. Again, this phenomenon should be considered a distortion of the original tenure administration.

To conclude, one may suggest that originally, the Burkinabe communities displayed the following land tenure characteristics:

1. The land was communally owned by a lineage or segment of a lineage; individual usage was understood within the limits of communal ownership of land.

2. The chief of the community, lineage or segment of lineage controlled land allocation and transmission to successive generations.

3. First arrival conferred the role of land master along with a permanent landright. Several groups settling together deserve permanent rights on various portions of land.

4. Land acquired from permanent right holders was assigned a temporary right of cultivation.

Mythical representations have been the backbone of customary land laws. Increasingly, those representations tend to lose ground concurrently with the development of new religions and the greater monetarization of the rural economy. Thus, Boutillier's suggestion to go beyond the sacred man/land relationship should be given some consideration. He added that:

> the land tenure system has to be related, on one hand, to the social and political organization, and to the economic system on the other.
>
> (Boutillier, 1964)

Characteristics of the Colonial and Post-colonial Land Bills

Colonial and post-colonial land laws have constantly attempted to alter and limit the applicability of customary landrights and regulations. Several administrative orders sustain this affirmation. These orders may be summarized as follows:

1. The decree of July 26, 1906 introduced the notion of land title which could be negotiated or purchased. It purports to consolidate customary landrights into private property rights.

2. The July 26, 1932 decree allowed the deliverance of an "administrative certificate" which opens the process of customary held land registration.

3. The decree of November 15, 1935 declared State property to be "vacant land without master"; included was all land unoccupied or unexploited for more than ten years.

4. The May 26, 1955 decree reorganized the land tenure arrangements first, by abrogating the 1932 and 1935 decrees and second, by defining a procedure whereby customary landrights are secured and titles called "livrets administratifs" are issued stating the conditions of one's land occupation.

5. The law # 77/60/AN of July 12, 1960 regulated the land of private domain, making the State a potential owner of all land not registered by that date. Yet, by 1984 only 5,446 land titles were delivered, most of which were in urban areas. This means that the State became potential owner of almost all rural land. This particular law has permitted the "expropriation" or dispossession of vast number of peasants in order to launch some agribusinesses (e.g.,the sugar company SO.SU.HV.- Societe Sucriere de Haute Volta).

6. The law # 29/63/AN of July 24,1963 allowed the Government to reserve for the State all portions of land where special construction is required (roads, bridges, etc...) and to consider State property all land sparsely inhabited or far from inhabited areas. This law served as the legislative basis for one

of the largest development projects ever conducted in Burkina; the A.V.V. (Amenagement des Vallees des Volta).

7. The most recent administrative order in land matters is the Ordinance # 50 of August 4, 1984. The State became the sole owner of the land (nationalization). As a high official of the present Government put it, every individual has an "eternal disposal right" on his/her investments; "from now on", he said, "the State is the 'land master'". The Ordinance tries to bind together customary landrights and colonial/post-colonial regulations. The decrees defining the concrete application of the Ordinance have yet to be approved.

In the past, the land bills have proven ineffective in transforming the secular land tenure practices in rural areas. At first, the legislators thought the peasants would readily accept the conversion of their customary landrights into private property rights. They were amazed by the indifference observed in this particular case, although such attempts had been successful in other areas (e.g., Buganda, Uganda). Second, the change process was made more subtle and even intended to secure first the customary landrights before trying to individualize them. The result remained the same: passivity of the peasants. The next step consisted of attempting to build up the State authority and to tolerate at the same time the indigenous practices (two separate courts of law). Hence, a dual system was officially recognized. By the same token, the State was recognizing its

inability to mold the different communities into the intended shape.

The ongoing land reform is another attempt by the State to reaffirm its authority (nationalization of land) and also to incorporate some basic features of indigenous land tenure practices. Thus, land cannot be privately owned. In essence, individuals have a usage right on land and a private property right on their investments. However, despite the discourse, the State cannot be a "land master" in the traditional sense; i.e., a role based on religious representations. Instead, the present action of the State is basically political.

Organization of the Thesis

The introduction is intended to lay out the main dimensions of the subject matter and to give some background on its development in Burkina Faso. Therefore, the introduction included: the problem statement, a statement on the land availability in the country, the characteristics of the indigenous land tenure, and finally a summary of the colonial and post-colonial land regulations.

The second chapter will detail the objectives of the study, address the data collection strategy and the methodology followed during the fieldwork. Lastly, the related literature and the theoretical framework that guides our analysis are presented.

The third chapter presents the research setting. It comprises the following sections: a statement on the unity and diversity of the Bwaba people, the general characteristics of the respondents, and the characteristics of the villages included in the survey.

The fourth chapter includes the following sections: (1) description of land holdings in the Hounde area, (2) modes of access to agricultural land in the study area, (3) landrights and land transmission to heirs, (4) the traditional norms and customs related to land, (5) land problems encountered or foreseen by the respondents, and (6) farmers'attitudes toward the Government land reform project.

Chapter five addresses the restructuring of land tenure in the agricultural sector of Hounde. The restructuring process is analysed at three different levels: (1) in relation to ethnic groups, (2) by considering the individual respondents as the unit of analysis, and (3) by comparing two pairs of villages having different levels of development and different degrees of in-migration.

The last chapter comprises the summary and conclusions of the study. Some policy implications are drawn in relation to the on-going land reform project.

Chapter 2 : OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY, DATA COLLECTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Objectives

Land matters have a strategic importance in Burkina Faso, as in most other agrarian African countries. Lately, the new Government, which took over two years ago, stepped in and indexed the area of land tenure as one of its priorities in the pursuit of the country's development goals.

Basically, the present study intends to analyse the nature and content of the existing land tenure systems in the context of agricultural development in the Western region of the country. Some policy implications of the agricultural land issues will be derived from this analysis. These implications will be based on the insights gained from the existing patterns of land tenure and a good knowledge of the specific, actual and latent, land problems encountered by the farmers or foreseen in the study area. Emphasis will be placed on the following specific objectives:

1. To describe the current patterns of land tenure in the study area. Particular attention will be given to the modes of access, types of landrights, forms of land inheritance, and structures of control and dispute settlement.
2. To identify the differences and similarities in land tenure patterns practiced by the different ethnic groups. The ideological and social-cultural traits of the different

groups as they affect land tenure as well as their individual social and economic experiences will be assessed. Although pure indigenous land tenure systems are no longer expected, it seems important to find out how the respective groups contribute in shaping the actual land tenure patterns.

3. To examine ongoing and latent conflicts over land. This might help understand the functioning of the structures of control and dispute settlement, and also locate the areas where corrective steps should be taken, especially in regard to the ongoing national land tenure and agrarian reforms.
4. To identify and to make sense out of the respondents'attitudes toward alternative tenure arrangements in the context of today's land reform project. It is important to know precisely what categories of farmers oppose, support, or have mixed feelings toward the nationalization of land , as well as the arguments they develop.

Data Collection

The study data were collected by using both quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry. This approach is based on the assumption that neither of these methods alone is sufficient to grasp completely and accurately social phenonema, especially in a developing country. Ideally, "the use of multiple methods serve to 'triangulate' the findings. That is, each method serves to 'correct out' erroneous data supplied by the other methods..." (Sanders, 1976).

A questionnaire schedule was administered to a sample of farmers (23 or 24 per village) in each of the villages included in the survey. A survey method often includes two types: a mailed questionnaire and an interview schedule administered by an enumerator. In this study, a mailed questionnaire to the respondents was ruled out because of the assumption of a high rate of illiteracy. As in most rural studies in Africa, interview schedules are used to record the information needed. Our questionnaire was first written in French and the interviewer translated it into the farmer's own language when administering the questionnaire. The transcription of the national languages in Burkina is only at a beginning stage.

Variables such as age of the head of household, cosmopoliteness, land holdings, categories of land and types of landrights were sought. Economic information includes cash earnings from farming and non-farming enterprises.

Illiteracy, language differences and interviewing through an enumerator may introduce biases and therefore inaccuracy in the data being generated. The survey questions and concepts used should make perfect sense in the real life circumstances of the farmers. This awareness called for a prior knowledge of the research environment and also a proper briefing of the interviewers on the objectives of the survey and the essential concepts used. Whenever possible, the first set of interviews was administered by the researcher himself with the assistance

of the field agent. The idea was to give an on-the-job training to all the interviewers. Beyond that, the research context also called for the use of corrective methods or techniques that enable one to overrule the actual deficiencies. This correction was provided first, by undertaking a reconnaissance survey in the study area (gathering secondary data) and above all, by introducing a qualitative method of data collection.

The qualitative method consisted of discussions with key informants in the study area; e.g., earth priest or village chief, representatives of migrant communities, and representatives of grass-root organizations. The intent was to supplement the sample survey and gain additional insights on specific dimensions of the subjects where formal questioning is likely to fall short. For example, land conflicts, relations with migrant communities, and traditional land tenure arrangements were discussed. All discussions took place in the presence of the field extension agent. The agent's help proved to be invaluable. Because they are known and generally respected by the farmers, these field agents were ideal in filling the need to create a climate of confidence, propitious to the generation of sound and reliable information.

The field work covered a six-month period, from November 1984 to April 1985. Six villages were systematically investigated: BONI (24 cases), LAMBA (23), MARO (23), SEBEDOUGOU (23) and TIORO (24 cases). In total, 141 heads of household (or

their representatives) were administered the interview schedule. Before the final interviews, we pre-tested the questionnaire in a village of the study area which was not included in the actual survey. The test helped to reformulate some of the questions in order to improve their comprehensibility or present them in a less sensitive manner.

Sampling

Sampling oftentimes involves a subjective judgment, especially in developing countries where concrete knowledge of the population characteristics is lacking. Here again, a reconnaissance survey was needed to become better acquainted with the research area. Discussions with the extension service and particularly with the chief extension officer of the research area greatly influenced the choice of the six villages composing the sample. The basic criterion was the ethnic composition of the villages. This criterion interrelates with the migration dimension since the region of study is Bwaba *par excellence.* Thus, the first village, BONI, is totally Bwaba, whereas LAMBA is totally migrant (Mossi). DOHOUN, on the other hand, is mostly Bwaba, whereas TIORO is mostly migrant. The fifth village, MARO, is inhabited by natives and migrants in almost equal proportion. The last village retained, SEBEDOUGOU, present the characteristics of two different groups of migrants (Mossi and Peul) who co-reside with the natives, the Bwa people.

The villages were chosen to represent the six agricultural sub-sectors of the area. Time and money constraints did not allow us to incorporate systematically the development criterion in the village selection process. All the villages included in the survey were purposely chosen. Only at the village level was a probabilistic sampling procedure used to select the individual respondents. The list of farmers was obtained from the extension service and 23 or 24 farmers were drawn, taking account of the ethnic composition of each village.

Lastly, two additional villages (SARA and BEKUY) were visited for follow-up purposes. These villages granted the land base upon which the LAMBA village was established. In Lamba, several viewpoints were given as to the nature of the landrights received from the customary owners. It appeared necessary to also record the viewpoints of the customary authorities themselves. By interviewing the earth priests of SARA and BEKUY, we were able to identify the types of landrights granted to the Mossi in-migrants of LAMBA and also we were able to obtain a good idea of the relationships among the two earth priests with their guests in LAMBA.

Data Limitations

The original design intended to select the survey villages according to two essential criteria: degree of inmigration and level of development. As mentioned above, the time and money constraints did not allow the systematic study necessary for the

incorporation of the second criterion. This would have involved extensive travel within the research area. Discussions with the extension agents was an inadequate substitute for an extensive reconnaissance survey. These discussions revealed that one could hardly find a village not touched by the development innovations being introduced. In the domain of improved seed utilization, for example, beside the use of several improved cotton seed varieties (main cash crop), some field agents noted the displacement of local food crop varieties by improved ones (e.g., peanut, sorghum and maize). These agents even feared the possibility of losing the local varieties forever. The general tendency has been to contrast villages like BONI and SEBEDOUGOU (leading innovators) with TIORO (least developed) where the practical involvement of the extension service is very recent. Our analysis will also accept this characterization.

Six months of field work proved just sufficient to gather the essential information needed. We feel that more investigation should be done in the future in order to deepen our understanding of the land tenure issues in the region. In particular, longitudinal data should be sought by following up the villages included in this first survey. In addition, the range of investigation should be broadened to include other villages and respondents. Finally, the first acquaintance gained with the authorities should be capitalized on to undertake in-depth discussions with individual farmers and the representatives of different communities.

Literature Review

We shall start by addressing the early conceptions relating to land tenure developed by various observers during the colonial era. Most of the significant writings on this subject about Africa date from that period. Secondly, we intend to recall the ongoing debate that questions the African land tenure structures as they relate to agricultural development. Thirdly, we shall come closer to the specific objectives of the study by looking at the approaches used by the few researchers who addressed those issues. Finally, the theoretical framework into which our concerns are grounded will be outlined.

Earlier Conceptions of African Land Tenure

Two opposing conceptions have dominated the early writings on African land tenure structures: the concept of eminent domain and that of vital forces ("collective" or "communal" land ownership).

The first conception guided the official colonial policy of Belgium. The French also applied it for a time before recognizing the local applicability of the Droit Coutumier (customary laws). Supposedly, the monarch or State ruler is the private owner of the land in his territory. The ruler is not only interested in the political and social control but also the control over land and its products. One of the chief proponents of this position was the Belgian jurist, Sohier. He derives this stand from his

study of the notion of "paternat" in the Bantou customary law. The French defense of the conception was a direct application of the medieval form of land tenure in France. As Robert (1955) notes, "The Lord of the Middle Ages, holder of the eminent right, was owner of the land".

This means that African states in the 19th century were merely equated with the European feudal systems. The same logic led the British to sign the "Uganda agreement of 1900", the basis for the establishment of individual freehold land tenure in Buganda. However, Richards (1963) refers to the Ganda chiefs of Buganda as follows:

> Unlike the fief holders in Medieval Europe, they (the chiefs) were rarely able to maintain heredity rights to their estates... Control over land in traditional system was always associated with the exercice of political rights and duties.

Although Jomo Kenyatta (1960) refers to the existence of a private (freehold) land tenure system among the Kikuyu of Kenya prior to the British arrival no other pre-colonial African state has been cited for practicing the freehold tenure system at that time[1/].

Basically, the concept of eminent domain proceeds from very sketchy and frequently undocumented parallels between African and European political and social systems (feudalism in particular).

1/ "What Ethnologists sometimes considered land sales were, in fact, mere exchanges within the same clan. Forbidding land sales is a restriction of property rights..." (Bachelet, 1968).

Furthermore, it generalizes what was sometimes imperfectly observed in some centralized political systems to the whole African Continent. Such generalization ignores the less centralized and even segmental societies which are widespread in Africa. Lastly, the theory of eminent domain is unable to explain adequately the existence of a "land master" or earth priest next to the political ruler and sometimes belonging to a different lineage.

The concept of vital forces, on the other hand, considers land as a natural element just like water and air for example. The common saying is that "land does not belong to anybody because it is not the product of human labor", or "land cannot be appropriated because it is a force which expresses itself only through crop production: the human being is just a mere usufructuary", or again, "land belongs to those who died, the few who are still living and the countless yet unborn" (Machyo, 1963).

The above views are philosophical conceptions which permeate all African rural social groups. Hence, the status of first occupant appears a key element in land relations. It implies in essence that a pact has thereby been signed between the first settler and the land. Successive generations and incoming settlers are expected to pay respect to this pact in memory of, and in symbiosis with the first occupants.

As mentioned above, first occupancy confers the title and role of land master. His function is first of all religious and then juridical. As a matter of fact, a mythical link exists between the land, home of the ancestors, and the descent groups, offspring of the first settlers. As earth priest, the customary authority seeks protection and prosperity for whomever lives on or occupies the land. He is the intermediary between the ancestors and the people. Such representations explain the importance of the land master in the assignment of new land and the supervision of the old under cultivation. Wrong doings, such as alienating or occupying someone else's land, are a source of punishment from the Gods and the ancestors. Hopefully, the earth priest is able to settle such problems by intervening between the faulty people and the ancestors. His judicial function stems from that circumstance. However, the juridical is undifferentiated from the religious. This gives more power to the former because of a fear of supernatural punishments which command even more respect than simple sanctions imposed on a human by a human. Capron (1973) refers to the relationship between these two levels in terms of the transition from a "mediation right" to a "right of authority" upon the group. He further notes that the first notion inspires the thinking of land tenure in Bwa society and the second notion organizes the tenure system.

Although the literature generally acknowledges the close relationship between the African land tenure systems and "animism" [1/] (e.g.,Biebuyck, 1963; Boutillier, 1964), no attempt has been made to relate systematically the new religions (Islam and Christianity) to land tenure practices. Common experiences suggest, however, that Islam tends to come closer to traditional practices than Christianity. Observers agree that Islam, as practiced in West Africa particularly, has been re-thought and adapted to the local customs and the indigenous psychic characteristics (Bachelet, 1968).

Lineage and kinship relations are the basic elements of political, social and economic organization in African rural societies. Because land is allocated and transmitted according to these precise group relations, the theory of vital forces has crystallized around the concept of communal or collective land ownership. Furthermore, it is suggested that inalienability and usage (or production) rights are the main features of the communal form of land tenure (Labouret, 1941). Hence, the notion of private property appears more alien to the indigenous tenure arrangements.

1/ This word has a definite pejorative connotation. The African peoples do not worship animals. These are just symbols. We shall use instead the notion of "fetishism" which "referred more generally to the 'primitive' phenomenon of endowing natural things with sacred and divine power" (Debrosses, in Ray, 1976).

Overall, the communal or collective conception of African land tenure structures has the merit of directing one's attention to the philosophical bases of land relations in Africa. Further, it describes the general (communal) form within which the social relations are embedded. However,experience shows that because observers have often remained at that general communal form, they have spoken in terms of an African model of land tenure: the communal land owership (e.g., FAO, 1966). It seems that one should transcend the general form of the phenomenon and look for the content of the relations which are built and being built around land. Such a qualitative shift may allow one to stick more closely to the concrete specificities of the societies being studied and hopefully to address the phenomenon in a dynamic perspective. This line of inquiry is supported by earlier discoveries that find a lack of a close relationship between land laws and the actual holding patterns (Colson, 1966). This means that one cannot go from the idea of communal tenure relations to a conclusion of the existence of any specific pattern of land holding. Only the concrete analysis of a given situation may help in discovering the actual patterns and in understanding them.

An on-going Debate: African Land Tenure Systems in the Process of Agricultural and Rural Development

A more recent trend in the literature questions the African land tenure structures as they relate to the agricultural development process. The point is to know whether the African

communal tenure systems constrain or promote the agricultural development process. A number of observers maintain that the systematization of freehold tenure is a prerequisite for rural development and modernization (Brannely, 1959; LaAnyane, 1971; Barrows, 1973). This line of argument is based on the following points:

1. The difficulty 'foreigners' to an area have in gaining access to land;
2. The precarious rights over land and the lack of incentives;
3. The multiple ownership situations, especially when tree crops are involved.

The opposing viewpoint questions the basis for the belief that African land tenure arrangements pose insurmountable obstacles to modern agricultural development (Famoriyo, 1978).

The latter acknowledges that the systems of land tenure do constitute to some extent a constraint on African agriculture. However, it remains an open issue as to whether reform is needed and, if so, what the nature of that reform should be.

It is important to realize that a good deal of the debate on African land tenure and modernization has remained academic and contains some misunderstandings or misreadings of the customary land laws which, by the way, are not written.

First, it is clear that land tenure arrangements in Africa have evolved tremendously. For example, the inalienability of land is no longer sacred in a number of areas and countries. For

instance, extensive modification of land tenure patterns has occurred among the Bete in the Ivory Coast and the migrant cocoa farmers in Southern Ghana (Hill, 1970).

Second, since the mid-fifties, Robert noted that the customary land laws do not contain an intrinsic judicial impossibility for land to be individually owned with exclusive rights. As a matter of fact, the roots of land tenure individualization are inscribed in the customary landlaws and are socially compatible. Thus, permanent landrights are attributed to segments of lineages and individual households. Those rights are transmissible through generations.

> As long as the social relations which give rights in land are maintained, the question of insecurity in land seldom becomes a live issue. (Uchendu, 1970).

In addition, the actual (quasi legitimized) practices show that land ownership tends to shift from major to minor segments of the lineage, including individual households (Robert, 1955; Boutillier, 1964; Kholer, 1971; Uchendu, 1970). Indeed, the individualization of land tenure arrangements has become the dominant practice in many parts of Burkina. It takes place concurrently with a weakening of the familial (i.e., lineage) authority vis-a-vis minor segments and individual households. In his study of the Bwaba in Western Burkina, Savonnet (1978) places the shift in focus from corporate units to individual households around the second World War era. Yet, the settlement pattern has

largely remained communal and the communities have retained the traditional forms of cooperation in general. However, the internal household organization of production and consumption tends to change. Corporate units of three or four generations give place to joint and nuclear types of households.

According to Savonnet, the following factors, among others, are responsible for the changes: introduction of commercial crops, improved transportation and trade networks, agricultural extension by the colonial State. Other studies in Burkina have attempted to analyse the process of formation of autonomous production units by looking at the particular household structure and inheritance patterns (Ancey, 1977). In the specific case of the Mossi people, Ancey is able to show the domination of elders, the very slow promotion of youngsters as heads of production units, and consequently the rationale for high rates of migration among young Mossi people.

Third, the difficulties arising in the relations between landholding groups and the newly arriving settlers do not necessarily have their roots in the customary land laws. They may be also related to whatever new factors are shaping the settlement and production conditions. For example, relatively recent court deliberations in Burkina (Swanson, 1978) and national legislation in Senegal (Castellu, 1978) have tended to provoke hostile attitudes on the part of landholding groups. Besides, widespread evidence shows that native groups are not

alone in having permanent rights to their land. As stated above, the type of landright one gets is closely related to the level and depth of relationships with the landholding groups. These rights may be therefore permanent or temporary, transmissible or not. Thus, the point is not the unpredictability of the rights in land but rather one of a correct reading of the relationships between the hosts and the guests. The criticism should more pertinently address the discriminate allocation of temporary and permanent landrights. Interestingly enough, the more in-coming settlers are integrated and socially controlled, the more likely temporary rights take on a permanent form. Policies which encourage the abuse of guests in the hosts' home are likely to backfire as long as it is true that the hosts are increasingly sensitive and conscious of land issues.

As to multiple ownership situations, one should bear in mind that tree planting, for example, is precisely associated with permanent landright holding, and conflicts usually arise when a temporary right holder plants trees. Such a practice means self-appropriation of permanent landright. Again, there is a growing tendency on the part of landholding groups to tolerate tree planting by temporary right holders. Whether this is a prelude to the transformation of temporary landright to permanent rights remains to be demonstrated.

A more tricky practice is the regulation set by landholding groups that forbids new settlers to harvest certain naturally

growing tree crops (e.g.,nere and karite). Land loaned or not, land under cultivation or not, always remains under the control of the first settlers as far as those tree crops are concerned. This appears clearly a limitation of right although the land itself is considered under somebody else's control.

Fourth, the question of whether or not the African land tenure systems constrain agricultural development has sometimes been discussed with the implicit assumption that a successful modernization and agricultural development in Africa has to reproduce the Western patterns of land relations, i.e., the systematic application of free-hold tenure (La-Anyane,1971; Ojo, 1978). This reasoning pertains to an approach to development that attempts to foster the prerequisites of industrial societies by abstracting institutions and norms which prevail in Western societies and not in agrarian societies. Instead, one cannot engage in a fruitful analysis of development process without addressing the goals such development purports to achieve for the beneficiaries themselves. Thus, we need to deal with the role of various indigenous social groups, their inter-relationships, and the nature and functioning of the social formations to which they belong. The necessary changes in indigenous norms and values need not reproduce the values and norms and therefore the structures and institutions of Western societies.

In this connection, we shall make a clear distinction between what was referred to, above, as individualization of

landrights in Burkina on one hand, and privatization of landrights on the other. The concept of individualization has reference to the communal characteristics and retains the traditional hierarchy of man-land relations. For example, a young Bwani farmer who engages in individual farming does so with the consent of the group which, then allocates him a piece of land. Sacrifices and land rituals are taken care of within the lineage by the senior person. In essence, the land remains land of the lineage. Privatization, on the other hand, introduces a new consciousness of man-land relations (non-existent here) whereby individual relationships are based on property ownership instead of the hierarchy of the dead, the living and the unborn.

As a form of communal ownership, the individualization of tenure systems has undoubtedly proven secure and compatible with modernization and agricultural development. Yet, experiences of the systematization of private land ownership in Africa have not proven synonymous with security of tenure. Very common criticisms of the Kenyan and early Ethiopian free-hold systems, for example, point to the social problems created by the emergence of landless and landed classes (Famoriyo, 1978; Cohen, 1980).

Indeed, African situations vary widely as to the existence and the intensity of free-hold tenure systems. In Burkina particularly, privatization of farmland is still a marginal phenomenon (McIntire, 1981). Until recently, it was practiced under the impulse of absentee owners who were mostly urban based

civil servants. Farmers rarely (if ever) buy and sell farmland among themselves[1/]. Thus, in contrast to some rural African regions, individualization of land tenure occurs without the exercise of private ownership per se (i.e., free-hold tenure) by the great majority of Burkinabe farmers. The modes of access to land remain largely through traditional norms and regulations. It is true, though, that the process of individualization is taking place concurrently with a weakening of the familial or lineage authority. Whether this is preparing a complete rejection of the traditional man-land relations remains an open issue.

Lastly, the communal tenure systems in Africa and Burkina tend to have some conservative features. In particular, the systems are biased in favor of kinship ties and socially powerful traditional groups. Furthermore, the elders of the landholding groups have room for converting very easily into individual land owners at the expense of other members of the group and the community as a whole. This seems the case in the emerging land markets just alluded to above. Although contrary to the dominant practice of customary land tenure, such a move may have been motivated by the changing ideological context and potential economic gains in selling land.

1/ Some literature (e.g., Kholer, 1971) and archive resources cite, however, practices of land alienation. It was mentioned in reference to the Central Plateau where land is clearly a scarce resource.

Despite its bias in favor of group elders and kinship ties, there is a basic wisdom in the communal ownership notion which can and should be preserved: every farmer deserves a piece of land proportional to his needs and labor resources (Labouret, 1941).

Modes of Access to Land and Landrights

The two notions are interrelated so that the way one gets access to a piece of land tends to determine the type of rights associated with that land. The literature generally focuses on three essential modes of access to land:

1. By being a member of the landholding group (first occupancy), or member of an allied group;
2. By virtue of being a relative of a landholding group (e.g., inter-marriage);
3. Or simply, by virtue of friendship or being guest in a village.

According to Biebuyck, it follows that every one could claim a piece of land for farming and thereby exercise a certain right regarding it (Biebuyck, 1963). In this connection, Kholer (1971) distinguished four types of landrights as outcomes of his study on the Mossi land tenure system in the Central Plateau. They are the following:

1. Usage right linked to the right of possession on a domain;
2. Usage right tied to residency;

3. Usage right resulting from an undetermined but long term borrowing;

4. Usage right resulting from a short term borrowing.

Kholer defines the right of possession as a supreme right like the one held by a landholding group by virtue of first settlement in a territory.

On the other hand, the national land survey conducted by Boutillier in 1964 differentiated three categories of landrights: (1) The earth priest landright; (2) The communal landownership right; and (3) The usage (or cultivation) right.

The above categories are better explained when Boutillier discusses the "types of tenure". He defines four such types:

1. Permanent usage right retained by a chief of lineage as the result of a communal ownership (54% of land);

2. Permanent usage right obtained through first occupancy of a vacant land (14%);

3. Usage right inherited from one retaining a permanent right as the result of a communal ownership (16%);

4. Temporary usage right obtained by borrowing a piece of land from a permanent right holder (26%).

The foregoing distinctions necessitate some comments and suggestions. First, one can notice that what was termed "the earth priest landright" does not have a practical respondent. It is true that the earth priest has a definite role in controlling and regulating land issues but his personal landright stems from

his being a member of a particular lineage: he is a communal right holder. Second, while Kholer sticks to the notion of usage right throughout his discussion, Boutillier tends to contrast communal and usage rights. The former right may be seen as permanent while the second is temporary. Third, the distinction permanent vs. temporary rights sounds more appropriate because it clarifies the two essential juridical domains. It remains that all landrights are considered, by essence, production or usage rights (Kholer's notion); the land itself being conceived as non-alienable and equally owned by the dead, the living and the unborn members of a lineage.

In order to avoid confusion in the terms used and, at the same time, to cover the essential types of landright, one should, first, distinguish the permanent and temporary production rights and then, delimit the necessary variations within each of the two domains. It follows that a temporary right is attached to a piece of land even when it is borrowed from a relative in the same village. On the other hand, allied groups may or may not be granted permanent landrights, usually depending on the length of time spent in the locality and the depth of relations with the hosts. For example, out of the three Bwaba family groups in Tioro, the earth priest considers two of them as "foreigners", although they have obtained permanent landrights on the land formerly occupied by their grandparents. The Peul allies in Sebedougou do not have permanent landrights. Their representative

said that when they arrived all the "bush" was already allocated to indigenous lineages.

Transmission of Landrights through Generations

Biebuyck (1963) and Kholer (1971) explicitly have addressed the issue of land transmission in Africa. Biebuyck was more concerned with the evolution of the patterns of land transmision, while Kholer looked at the particular case of the Kaya region in Burkina, after discussing a general model of succession regulations. The model pinpoints the essential features of inheritance in traditional African societies. They can be summarized as follows:

1. Women and single men are excluded from land inheritance, although they may be granted production rights, if necessary, by the new head in charge of the household;
2. The management of communal land is traditionally inherited by the younger brother of the head;
3. In case there is no uncle in the household, the older son of the head takes over;
4. All permanent landrights are transmissible to heirs;
5. When a permanent right holder has no heirs, his land goes to the earth priest, thereby becoming a communal land which can be allocated to whomever is in need.

> If a head of household has satisfatorily divided the production rights on all the land of his domain between his brothers and sons while retaining the right of possession,

> it happens that, upon his death, the production or usage rights become right of possession to the benefit of each former user. (Kholer, 1971).

It is our contention that, nowdays, this pattern has become a dominant practice. It is referred to as a land transmission inter vivos. This practice is concomitant with, and reinforces the dismissal of the traditional communal farming by extended families. Increasingly, couples and individual farmers prefer having their personal plots even though they still feel part of the broader household. The earth priest of Tioro, for example sees in this practice one important source of growing land problems. It becomes even more crucial when the household has a relatively small land base compared to the number of adult members. Sometimes households break up and nuclear or joint households are formed separately (Boutillier, 1964).

At this point, the distinction made by Biebuyck (1963) between adelphic and filial types of land transmission becomes essential. The adelphic transmision of land refers to the succession of a brother on communal land. The filial transmission corresponds to the takeover by a son of the rightholder. In Burkina, both modes of transmission are still practiced. However, the break up of extended families, coupled with the desire to own separate farm exploitations tend to strengthen the position of sons as heirs. Biebuyck may be right when he foresees the development of tenancy, share cropping or

land alienation in the long run. So far, the pattern of land transmission inter vivos has not brought about the above relationships in Burkina Faso.

Structures of Control and Conflict Resolution

This domain falls within the prerogatives of the earth priest when the village is taken as unit of analysis. It has not been given a separate recognition because, in general, land conflicts are not systematically analysed. Indeed, this is logical with the general idea which holds that in a situation of land abundance, there should be adaptation instead of conflict.

Although the earth priest is recognized as supreme authority in the village, individual cases of land conflicts are primarily handled by the concerned head of lineage or permanent right holder. This is true not only for the management of minor land conflicts, but also for some usual land rituals. Thus, some heads of household may say that they do not request the services of the earth priest on a regular basis for sacrificial purposes, or, they do request his services only when necessary. This does not make the supreme authority worthless but, it sets up a hierarchy in the structures of control and land conflict resolution. Therefore, only serious matters require the direct involvement of the earth priest. The Bwaba saying "who is chief of the lineage is chief of the land" only specifies the existence of a relative autonomy of each lineage. However, the earth priest remains the

supreme figure who bridges the solidarity and autonomy of a village vis-a-vis other villages. For example, a chief of lineage cannot negotiate individually a conflict involving a neighboring village. This is the prerogative of the earth priest. The group of lineage chiefs constitutes a council of elders which may help the earth priest in resolving conflicts.

The increasing number of in-migrants has modified a bit the above pattern. Land borrowers (temporary right holders) usually see in the earth priest the proper intermediary in getting access to a piece of land. Consequently, they tend to come directly to him should a land conflict arise. In this context, the earth priest will be more often consulted than usual.

The establishment of colonial and post-colonial administrative structures has added another dimension in dealing with land conflicts. It broadens the alternatives by making possible the intervention of the regional and national administrative authorities. Both conflicts between individuals and conflicts between villages may be taken to court. Some temporary right holders have sometimes seen in this new alternative a way to consolidate their position on a piece of land (Swanson, 1978).

More recently, another tendency has developed and has also tended to weaken the traditional structures of control. It takes place within the villages themselves and has to do with the deeper grounding of Islam in particular. The Moslem groups

(mostly Mossi in-migrants) tend to refer first to their Imam should a conflict arise. We shall come back to this when discussing the particular case of the village of Maro.

To summarize, a hierarchical structure of control and land conflict resolution in the traditional Bwa village may be suggested. It goes from the individual chief of lineages or permanent landright holders to the earth priest. Second, this hierarchy is extended to the administrative authorities with the establishment of the colonial rule and with the evolution of the country to nationhood. Third, the differentiation of the groups along religious lines (together with in-migration) introduced another structure of control. The latter usually competes with the authority of permanent landright holders and deals directly with the earth priest, the supreme authority in the village.

Differences in Land Tenure Systems

Boutillier (1964) found a basic homogeneity in the land tenure systems practiced by the Burkinabe ethnic groups. His conclusions relied mainly on the communal land ownership features encountered throughout the country. However, it may be contended that such generalization overlooks the typology of Burkinabe societies. Savonnet (1978), for example, distinguished three essential types of societies: centralized, communal and segmentary. Our study deals only with the two former types; centralized for the Mossi, and communal for the Bwaba.

The distinctive characteristic of the two types of societies (as far as land relationships are concerned) resides in the fact that, on one hand, the Bwaba are organized in autonomous village communities; each village owns a well defined land base. The different villages cooperate through their chiefs and councils of elders, in mutual respect for their territorial integrity. The Mossi people, on the other hand, have developed a very centralized politico-administrative structure. The individual villages are administered by a provincial authority, responsible, in turn, to the central power. This political structure has developed through successive conquests and has influenced the organization of the land tenure system to the extent where the role of the earth priest sometimes becomes strictly religious while the village political chief exercises the power to regulate the land matters. In some cases, the indigenous people were denied the role of earth priest to the benefit of the Mossi conquerors.

In the context of the research area, the Mossi groups are considered in-migrants. Therefore, it is not expected to see an exact and complete reproduction of the same political structures and land tenure organization they grew up with in their indigenous villages in the Central Plateau. However, the process of adaptation in the new environment is likely to bear the marks of some of their basic principles of cultural and social organization. In addition, Zahan suggested that the Mossi have

the characteristic not to be assimilated by their hosts, rather, they tend to assimilate those they are living with (Zahan, 1963). Furthermore, in a study of the Mossi rural migration Ancey noticed the adoption by the Mossi farmers of a deliberate extensive farming method (more extensive than back home), as if they feel the necessity to speed up in order to occupy the largest territory possible (Ancey, 1977).

The above elements are likely to provoke tensions and suspicions on the part of the indigenous people. More importantly, they are likely to introduce important variations in the tenure structures and regulations.

Theoretical Framework

The inquiry into the nature and content of the communal land ownership has a renewed importance today.In addition to the fact that the smallholders are the major target of agricultural development programs (focus of the general development efforts), the new Government has stepped in with a land reform project. Thus, efforts should be made to understand the precise nature of the land tenure arrangements and the direction of the changes taking place today.

Burkina Faso, as other African nations, is viewed as undergoing change and modernization. One dimension of change is the land tenure patterns. Existing man/land relations and

patterns today--the focus of this study--are no longer identical with the traditional customary patterns which were established in the past. Changes in the land tenure patterns have come about, it would seem, due to such forces as commercial crop production, agricultural extension strategies, improved transportation, population growth, the State policies affecting agricultural land, and the development of technology in general. Changes as important as the mode of access to land, types of rights in land, and forms of inheritance do not often occur without conflict. Hence, it is expected that the process of adaptation to changes in customary land patterns will produce dislocations and stresses, and therefore conflicts.

Burkina Faso is also viewed as undergoing change and modernization in social organization and in political and socio-economic attitudes and values held by the people. This particular study will not systematically consider these overall changes, except as they impinge upon the focus of the inquiry. The technological, economic and social change processes in Burkina are analysed in terms of the interplay between dominant and dependent forces and social formations. Concretely, the historical, political and economic dimensions reflect a clear influence and diffusion of western models of development. In particular, land tenure regulations sought to foster western norms and social relations.

Our framework has roots in the structural models of social change as developed by Meillassoux, Terray, Ancey, and others. The process of modernization is viewed as bringing about some kind of articulation between indigenous and western social forms.

> In the periphery, the earlier modes of production were not destroyed, in fact,..., the profitability of the colonial system depended on the ability of these modes to handle the costs of reproduction. (Klein, 1980).

This framework goes beyond a mere juxtaposition of traditional and modern structures (dualism), to question the logic of each social formation and the types of transition which result from their interactions. This means that rural Burkina is conceived of as in a state of transition. Structural adjustment and differentiations are occuring. In the same vein, the land tenure systems are changing and still are in the process of evolving. The communal principles of socio-economic organization are being displaced by more individualistic tendencies. As of now, however, the western type of private property relations do not constitute a notable pattern. The rural economy is characterized by its hybrid nature with a multi-structural characteristic. It is an important sociological task to investigate the ways in which the traditional and more modern systems of tenure influence one another and to understand the process whereby a given system gains control at a particular point in time. Such a line of inquiry will allow one to gain insights into "the mechanisms by which particular types of production are maintained and how they

are connected with other modes existing within the same macro-economic framework". (N. Long, 1975).

The basic hypothesis underlying this study suggests that the Burkinabe land tenure structures have changed and are changing. They are engaged in a dynamic process and cannot be identified with the patterns which prevailed during the pre-colonial era. These structures are neither feudal (National Committee on Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, 1984) nor do they present a private nature in the western sense.

From the point of view of the articulation theory, the development of commercial crops (essentially cotton in the Hounde sector) is accompanied by the elaboration of new forms of production organization and labor allocation within the household economy. For example, the extended production pattern tends to give way to "joint" or "nuclear" types of household organization. One of the implications of this is seen in the breaking-up of "communal" lands. Sons, brothers and nephews of the head of household take over individual farms which are mostly devoted to commercial crop production. Certain cereal crops (e.g., red sorghum)[1/] are being grown by individual (younger) farmers (Earth Priest of Tioro, personal communication, 1984).

This process, in some ways, affects the authority and control power of the elderly people (heads of household) upon the

1/ Red sorghum is seen as a "family crop" par excellence. It is used in social and religious ceremonies, including land rituals.

extended unit. In practice however, the authority of the elders is only shaken but, in many ways, their influence still stands strong. First, the ideological climate, the social norms and values have not followed the disintegration process at the same pace. Second, in the domain of land tenure, the traditional norms of access to land are still enforced. The transmission of land inter vivos (adelphic or filial modes) does not negate the basic norms of land allocation which prevail. In fact, the individual freedom (e.g., undertaking own business) is largely conceived of and expressed within the limits and, in last analysis, by the consent of the group (household, lineage, village depending on the type of decision involved). Viewed from this perspective, the head of household, the chief of lineage or the chief of village hold tremendous amount of authority and power. An individual farming enterprise is only possible if one can get access to a piece of land. Land allocation remaining in the hands of traditionally powerful groups, the process of individualization is, therefore, controlled and adapted to the ideological and social climate. The ongoing struggle between the more modern socio-economic patterns and the traditional ones has generated new structural adjustments which form an articulation between indigenous and western oriented social forms. Considering the household as unit of analysis, it may be hypothesized that the intensification of cash crop production leads to individualization of land tenure.

The agricultural extension bodies and the strategies they develop, the improvement of transportation networks, and the like, are support services and infrastructure which allow the State to carry out its agricultural development policies. Most development projects are also directed toward commercial crop production. They include technological packages (usually draft animal farming, use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides) in order to increase the productivity of indigenous farming systems. The development of cash crop production has resulted in pervasive social impacts in terms of income differentiation, access to improved technologies, etc. The analysis of these impacts as they relate to land tenure is not well established. However, it is clear that increased economic wealth may result in a better social position in the community. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that better financial potentials and agricultural equipment availability are likely to cause more demand in land resources. The inalienability of land means that these financial resources are not necessarily being translated into more land resources. Thus, wealthy farmers who happen to come from lineages with large land holdings are more likely to prosper best. However, the alternative of borrowing tracts of land being opened, the need for additional land as a result of a better economic base will tend to mean more land borrowing for those farmers.

The heavy flow of in-migration in the Hounde sector adds another dimension to the land issue. Migrants choose this area because of the relatively low population density. Peul and Mossi migrants come in with their respective backgrounds which impact on the indigenous patterns. At first, the co-existence is likely to mean cooperation, hospitality and adaptation on both sides. After a while, the process of adaptation is likely to develop new patterns of organization. The reaction of boundary maintenance on the part of the Bwaba will lead to more defined rules of land allocation and control (e.g., a chicken when bringing a new field under cultivation , a tine of cereal crop after harvest). Being more prompt to organizing on one hand, and constituting a very powerful Islamic community on the other, the Mossi people are likely to initiate new rules and regulations. For example, the Imam or the chief of a community will tend to play a leading role and represent globally the interests of their community (e.g., in case of land conflict, the members are likely to refer to the chief or the Imam). This may grow into a pressure group and a threat to the authority and power of the indigenous leaders.

The foregoing discussion enlightens the importance of the interplay of different groups and social forces in the region. Clearly, the authority of the traditional leaders is being threatened from two directions: the Mossi migrant groups on one hand, and the Bwaba younger generations engaging in individual farming on the other. An eventual unity between the two pressure

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groups may precipitate the breakdown of the traditional norms and regulations. However, such unity is very unlikely at present time for several reasons. First, the younger generations of today are tomorrow's local leaders. A threat to the actual power structure and authority is a threat to their own leadership in the future. Second, the younger generations tend to ally with the traditional authorities against the potential power of the Mossi migrant communities. As a representative of one of the Mossi communities in Maro put it, if the youngsters of the village are opposing them, they certainly do so with the consent of their fathers and uncles. The attitudes of the local authorities do not indicate otherwise, he added.

The authority and control power of the local authorities over the access and use of land is being threatened today from a third direction: the State. One important objective of the land tenure and agrarian reform is to do away with the "feudal" ownership of land, meaning the control of the traditional authorities over the access and use of land. However, the State intervention is qualitatively different from the threats mentioned above. Basically, the State aims to promote the collective use of land and to end the privatization of land. The successful takeover of traditional local authority roles by the State may win the support of both the migrant groups and the younger Bwaba generations who were somewhat penalized by earlier modes of access to land and, indeed, all farmers interested in a

better security of tenure. The State is not opposed to individual farming practices (Article 29, Presidential Ordinance on Land tenure and Agrarian Reform). As of now though, the concrete scope of the land tenure and agrarian reform project is not known. A reading of the decree indicates, however, a combination of individual and collective forms of land tenure, sustained by a State property on all lands.

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Chapter 3 : THE RESEARCH SETTING

Unity and Diversity of the Bwamu[1/]

The research was conducted in a Bwaba territory in Western Burkina. Map 3 shows that the complete territory of the Bwa people extends beyond the national boundaries inherited from colonialism. The Bwa people live both in the actual Malian and Burkinabe territories.

The ethnic entity called Bwaba is divided into several sub-groups which correspond roughly to various dialectal units. The difference between these dialects may vary from minor to complete lack of comprehension. This gives us a sense of social discontinuity within the Bwamu territory. However, a sense of unity also exists among these people who are conscious that they speak the same idiom. In addition, they are culturally bound together by the cult of the DO[2/].

1/ Because of the dialectal diversity, different names and expressions are utilized depending on the writer. Relying on the insights given by Le Moal and Capron, we will use Bwani (singular), Bwa or Bwaba (plural) to designate the people and Bwamu for both the language and the country.

2/ DO: "...ensures, by its presence in the bush, its power on rainfall patterns, its means of coercion upon the human community, the preservation of a constantly threatened equilibrium between natural and human reigns...; similarly, DO realizes the integration of human beings in the community." (Capron, 1973).



MAP 3: THE BWABA TERRITORY IN WEST AFRICA

The unity and diversity of the Bwamu may also be explained in more sociological terms. Intensive studies done by Capron (1973) and Savonnet (1978), for example, conclude that the Bwa people live in village communities. Such village communities are organized along two essential dimensions: lineage relations and village or communal integration. The kinship network constitutes one of the bases of social organization. Accordingly, each lineage tends to preserve its individual autonomy and internal hierarchy. Concurrently, the different lineages cooperate, as a unit, vis-a-vis other villages and communities. Thus, the community itself stands as a second level of organization.

> If asked about his/her origin, a Bwani will respond, invariably, by the name of his/her village; (s)he locates him or herself, right away, in relation to the community (s)he lives in daily and intensively... (Capron, 1973).

Undoubtedly, however, a Bwani is aware of the existence of other countrymen beyond his/her own village community. (S)he refers to them by their geographical location (e.g., beyond the rivers, or beyond the mountains), or by a dialectal difference (e.g., those who sound like sheep when they speak). The lack of precision, when referring to their countrymen, also testifies to a lack of overall political integration among the Bwaba. No organized political structure exists beyond the individual village communities. They are stateless societies.

A typical Bwa village is striking by its compactness. The houses are built very close to each others, with very small

pathways zigzagging between the buildings. One needs to be experienced to be able to find his/her way through this real labyrinth. An expert will be able to detect the boundaries of the different lineages comprising the village, the house of the ancestor/founder of the village, and various public places.

Nowadays, the physical structure of a Bwa village reflects the multiple innovations and impacts of the outside world: church, formal school, compounds of in-migrant groups, etc. Savonnet (1978) also noted that young Bwaba people tend to build their own houses on the outskirts of the village. These recent changes give another physical appearance to the Bwaba villages: the "old village" structure, at the center, is "attacked" by various symbols of innovation erected in the surroundings.

General Characteristics of the Sample

Out of 141 respondents interviewed, 50.4% are Bwaba, 45.4% are Mossi and 4.3% are Peul (See Table 3-1). The last two ethnic groups are considered in-migrants. However, a substantial difference exists between these migrant groups. The Mossi people are the last to arrive in the area and they originate from the Central Plateau. The Peul, on the other hand, are essentially from the northernmost part of the country, despite a popular saying that the Peul are from "everywhere and nowhere". This is so because they are mostly pastoralists and nomads. The distinctiveness of the Peul in our sample resides in their being

sedentary people. They practice farming as their primary occupation instead of stockraising which they hold as their secondary activity. In addition, the Peul are in their third or fourth generation as residents in the area. Furthermore, and most

TABLE 3-1: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

ETHNIC GROUP	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Bwaba	71	50.4
Mossi	64	45.4
Peul	6	4.3
Total	141	100.0

TABLE 3-2: RESPONDENTS BY VILLAGE OF ORIGIN

CATEGORY	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Natives of the Area	73	51.8
Migrants from same Area	3	2.1
Migrants from different Region	65	46.1
Total	141	100.0

importantly, Bwaba and Peul are historic allies (Boni earth priest, personal communication, April 1985). Their alliance was forged during the period of colonization in a common attempt to

fight the French invasion and domination in the region. Consequently, the Peul are readily welcomed and the younger generations even consider themselves as natives of the area. Table 3-2 supports this remark. One can observe that the natives outnumber the total number of Bwaba in the sample.

In fact, all the Mossi responded that they were migrants from a different region. Only one Peul admitted he migrated from another region (Southwest). On the contrary, two Bwaba have migrated from their original villages of birth to another village in the same area; they responded that they were not natives of the concerned village.

TABLE 3-3: HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD BY AGE GROUPS

AGE GROUP	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
17 - 35	28	19.9
36 - 55	80	56.7
56 - 75	27	19.1
over 75	6	4.3
Total	141	100.0

Age of the respondents

The average age of the heads of household is 47.6 years (the youngest 17 and the oldest 99 years). The frequency distribution by age groups is shown in Table 3-3. Group 1, aged 17 to 35 is

considered young. They have just started an individual farm, and usually their children are not old enough to work. Group 2, aged 36 to 55, is regarded as mature. The mature farmers have acquired a good deal of experience in farming and their children are old enough to help with farm work. Group 3, aged 56 to 75 is considered old. They have grown children, almost ready to take over the family business or to undertake their own. Group 4, aged 76 to 99 is very old. They usually have married children in the household, and therefore they are no longer actively involved in farming. The respondents regarded as mature are by far the most numerous (56.7% of the sample). This category is composed of the two major ethnic groups in about equal proportions: Bwaba, 50% and Mossi, 47.5%. Old and young heads of households are also well represented. Each group comprises about 20% of the sample.

If one considers the owning of draft animals and appropriate equipment[1/] as a measure of the degree of investment in farming, the data suggest that 73.7% of the mature farmers are willing to invest in agriculture. The young farmers are in the second position with 71.4%. About two-thirds of the very old and 63% of the old farmers are also willing to invest in agriculure. Thus, one may conclude that, in general, a very high percentage of farmers, regardless of age, is willing to invest in farming.

1/ Buying draft animals and appropriate equipment in Burkina is by far the most costly operation for farmers. The plough and its apparatus, plus a pair of draft animals amount generally to more than 10 times the average farmer annual cash income.

Size of the household

The household size of the surveyed farmers ranges from 1 to 24 members. The average size is 9.25 and a 4-member household is the most common. None of the farmers from Peul background have more than 17 members in the household. However, 7% of the Bwaba and 18.8% of the Mossi fall in that category. On the other hand, the frequency distribution of the 8 to 16-member household shows the following figures: Bwaba, 22%, Mossi, 22% and Peul, 2.1%. It follows that Mossi and Bwaba farmers tend to have larger households than Peul farmers. However, 49.3% of the Bwaba have up to 7 member units as compared with 32.8% for the Mossi. About 50% of the latter group are from households comprising 8 to 16 members.

As to the number of active members per household, 46.5% of the Bwaba and 57.8% of the Mossi have between 5 to 10 active members of the household. Therefore, the Mossi farmers tend not only to have larger households, but also they have larger numbers of active members in the household. Seven percent of the Bwaba and 9.4% of the Mossi households comprise more than 10 active members. None of the Peul households fall in that category.

Contrary to our expectations, only 9.9% of the households in the sample display a composite structure. This means that at least one household member has formed a distinct sub-unit within the larger household unit. A household was defined as any autonomous production unit. Therefore, a sub-unit of a household

refers to any semi-autonomous unit formed by a single person or couple (and immediate relatives) that depend on the main household at least for part of food, shelter or income. The head of the sub-unit and his dependents contribute their labor to the main household. They remain socially under the authority of the head of the main household but they tend to put more emphasis on their own farming enterprises, resulting in more economic independence.

More than half of the sub-units are headed by a brother of the main household head and 21.4% are formed by a son of the head. Other alternative forms were sub-units headed by a nephew, a father, and one case where both a brother and a son of the head created their own semi-autonomous units.

Religious affiliation

TABLE 3-4: RESPONDENTS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Fetishism	54	38.3
Christianity	20	14.2
Islam	67	47.5
Total:	141	100.0

The Islamic religion,as shown in Table 3-4, is clearly the most common religious affiliation, followed closely by Fetishism. Christianity (Catholics and Protestants) comes in last position.

When asked about the religious beliefs held by their parents, 68.8% of the farmers in the sample responded they are from a Fetishist background, 31.2% from a Moslem background, and none mentioned a Christian background. These figures are congruent with the fact that Christianity is a relatively new religion in Burkina. It was introduced right before the colonial takeover in the 19th Century.

TABLE 3-5: PERCENT OF ETHNIC GROUPS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

ETHNIC GROUP	FETISHISM (%)	CHRISTIANITY (%)	ISLAM (%)	TOTAL (%)
Bwaba	76.0	22.5	1.5	100.0
Mossi	0.0	6.0	94.0	100.0
Peul	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0

When related to the ethnic origin, only the Bwaba people are represented in each of the three religious groups. However, 76.0% of these people adhere to Fetishism. On the other hand, none of the Mossi farmers relate to Fetishism, and 94.0% are Moslems. Finally, all the Peul in the sample practice Islam. The common

religious beliefs between Mossi and Peul tend to bring them closer. It happens that the latter group serves as host for the Mossi migrants, a first step toward their integration in the larger community. It was the case in Sebedougou, for example.

TABLE 3-6: PERCENT OF AGE GROUPS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

AGE GROUP	FETISHISM (%)	CHRISTIANITY (%)	ISLAM (%)	TOTAL (%)
17 - 35	35.5	18.0	46.5	100.0
36 - 55	36.0	12.5	51.5	100.0
56 - 75	44.5	15.0	40.5	100.0
76 +	50.0	16.5	33.5	100.0

As shown in Table 3-6, the mature age group is the most numerous in the sample. These farmers are mostly Moslems or Fetishists (51.5% and 44.5%, respectively). The elders of the sample are mostly Fetishists or Moslems. Few of them adhere to the Christian faith.

Cosmopoliteness

This variable was measured by asking whether or not the respondent has had a "travel experience" in the past. Only a travel duration of more than six months outside the village of birth was considered a travel experience (Table 3-7).

In the survey, 66.7% of the farmers have had such an experience. Only 47 farmers interviewed had not taken a trip outside their village or they had not stayed for more than the required six months. As expected, all the Mossi farmers in the sample responded "yes" to the question as did 66.7% of the farmers from the Peul ethnic group. In contrast, 63.4% of the Bwaba did not have a travel experience that met the requirements.

Out of 94 cases having a travel experience, we have the following frequency distribution by destination of travel depicted in Table 3-7.

TABLE 3-7: TRAVEL EXPERIENCE BY DESTINATION

LOCATION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
In-country	45	47.9
Out-country	23	24.5
In and out-country	26	27.7
Total:	94	100.0

The "in and out-country" group is of a special interest because these farmers probably accumulated considerably more experience than the others. Only farmers from the Mossi ethnic group have had such experience (40.6% of the group members).

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However, 80.8% of the Bwaba and 50% of the Peul who did travel as defined travelled outside the country.

The following Table 3-8 summarizes the travel experience by ethnic group for the total sample.

TABLE 3-8: PERCENT HAVING TRAVEL EXPERIENCE BY ETHNIC GROUP

TRAVEL EXPERIENCE	BWABA (%)	MOSSI (%)	PEUL (%)	TOTAL (%)
In-country	5.3	40.4	2.1	47.9
Out-country	22.3	0.0	2.1	24.5
In and out country	0.0	27.7	0.0	27.7
Total:	27.7	68.1	4.3	100.0

It is quite interesting to note that the Mossi farmers who travelled outside the country also have in-country travel experience as well. None of the Mossi had out-country travel experience alone.

TABLE 3-9: PERCENT INDICATING PURPOSE OF TRAVEL BY ETHNIC GROUP

PURPOSE OF TRAVEL	BWABA (%)	MOSSI (%)	PEUL (%)
Rural jobs	77.0	82.0	100.0
City jobs	11.5	3.0	0.0
Education	7.5	9.5	0.0
Military	4.0	3.0	0.0
Simple visit	0.0	2.5	0.0

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As to the purpose of the trip, working in rural areas and especially at farm work was the most common experience. All the Peul travelled for grazing purposes as they were formerly engaged in cattle raising. On the other hand, Bwaba and Mossi were mostly hired as farm workers. Rural migrations outside the country were mainly to the Ivory Coast. Table 10 lists other job alternatives which were available to migrants. One may notice that the Bwaba are more willing to work in cities than the Mossi. This involves odd jobs, e.g., domestic or security guard in a warehouse or factory (mostly again in the Ivory Coast). In contrast, the Koranic education was achieved in Mali. The military service, on the other hand, was done in Senegal or France. Many of these veterans fought in the Indochina and Algerian wars.

Income distribution

The average annual cash income of the research area farmers is 213,056.64 CFA Francs[1/]. However, the range is over one million francs. This means that some farmers (in fact, 13% of them) do not generate any cash income from their farming enterprise, while the richest ones receive over one million annually. Table 3-10 shows the frequency distribution by income groups.

1/ C.F.A. Francs stands for the franc of the African Financial Community (Communaute Financiere Africaine). The exchange rate was about US $1 for 450 CFA Francs in 1985.

TABLE 3-10: CASH FARM PRODUCTS SOLD BY INCOME GROUP.

INCOME BRACKET (in CFA Francs)	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
0 - 49,999	Lower	42	29.8
50,000 - 99,999	Lower-middle	18	12.8
100,000 - 199,999	Middle	28	19.9
200,000 - 499,999	Upper-middle	42	29.8
over 500,000	Upper	11	7.8
Total:		141	100.0

The figures in Table 3-10 suggest that the low and upper middle income groups are the most frequently represented (each about 30% of the sample). At the same time, the middle income group comprises about 20% of the sample. It may be noticed also that the poor farmers (low income group) are almost four times as numerous as the richest ones (upper income group).

Income differences by ethnic group show the following relationships:

1. None of the Peul farmers appears in the low income group, while 50% of this group is in the upper middle income bracket.
2. 45.3% of the Mossi farmers are low income farmers, with 23.4% in the middle income group.
3. 42.3% of the Bwaba farmers earn between 200,000 and 500,000 CFA Francs annually (upper middle income group), while 18.3% are in the low income bracket.

Table 3-11 summarizes the level of income by ethnicity and Table 3-12 depicts the income distribution according to the age group of the respondents.

TABLE 3-11: INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNIC GROUP

INCOME LEVEL *	BWABA (%)	MOSSI (%)	PEUL (%)
Lower	18.5	45.5	0.0
Lower-middle	10.0	15.5	16.7
Middle	17.0	23.5	16.7
Upper-middle	42.0	14.0	50.0
Upper	12.5	1.5	16.7

TABLE 3-12: PERCENT OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUP

INCOME LEVEL *	YOUNG (%)	MATURE (%)	OLD (%)	VERY OLD (%)
Lower	35.5	26.0	33.5	33.3
Lower-middle.	14.5	9.0	22.0	16.7
Middle	21.5	21.0	15.0	16.7
Upper-middle	25.0	35.0	22.0	16.7
Upper	3.5	9.0	7.5	16.7

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets and Table 3-6 for age categories.

The Mossi have the largest proportion of their members in the low income group (45.5%). In contrast, no Peul farmer falls in that category. The latter group has the largest proportion of its members in the upper-middle income category where they outnumber their Bwaba counterparts (50% and 42%, respectively).

The mature farmers are the most numerous in all income groups, from low to upper income brackets, and they constitute the majority of the sample (56.7%). Young and old farmers are over represented in the low income group (See Table 3-12).

To conclude, it may be suggested that Peul and Bwaba farmers make more money from their farming activities than the Mossi farmers. However, one should not jump to the conclusion that the latter group is worse off than the other two. Other factors may be involved.

First, we are dealing here with cash income generated from the sale of farm products. A more complete picture would account for all the non-cash goods at the disposal of the farmer. For example, some producers won't sell food crops due to a high level of home consumption while others do. Almost three-fourths (72.3%) of the farmers are self sufficient in food. They produce themselves all the food needed in the household. On the other hand, many farmers take advantage of cash crop production and put a special emphasis on cotton farming.

Secondly, 40.4% of the farmers have sources of income, different from the cash income generated from the farming

enterprise. Mossi and Peul farmers tend to lead the Mossi, because they are substantially involved in trading, and the Peul, because they still practice their traditional profession, stock raising.

Characterisics of the Surveyed Villages [1/]

This section is devoted to a description of the general characteristics of the six villages where our investigation was undertaken, namely, the villages of Boni, Dohoun, Lamba, Maro, Sebedougou and Tioro. Two other villages, Sara and Bekuy, are considered only when dealing with the case of Lamba.

In this section, we shall also attempt to classify the villages by using two criteria: 1) the income level of the farmers, and 2) the use of improved farming technology (draft animal farming).

The Village of Boni

All the respondents in the village of Boni are Bwaba. While it may be considered the least influenced by migrant farmers, Boni can hardly be considered a conservative village. It is of easy access and posesses among the best infrastructure---a formal elementary school, an adult education center, an agricultural experiment station, and a missionary center.

1/ See Map 4 for the location of survey villages.



MAP 4: LOCATION OF SURVEY VILLAGES

TABLE 3-13: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, AGE DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF BONI.

RELIGION, AGE AND INCOME	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
Fetishism	20	83.3
Christianity	4	16.7
Total:	24	100.0
AGE GROUP		
17 - 35	4	16.7
36 - 55	18	75.0
56 - 75	2	8.3
Total:	24	100.0
INCOME LEVEL		
Low	2	8.3
Lower-middle	4	16.7
Middle	6	25.0
Upper-middle	11	45.8
Upper	1	4.2
Total:	24	100.0

As shown in Table 3-13, only two religious groups are represented in the village of Boni. About 83% of the respondents remain Fetishists and 16.7% have converted to Christianity. The latter group is composed exclusively of Catholics which reflects the presence of Catholic missionaries in the village.

The age distribution of the heads of household is quite normal: about 16% are young farmers, 75% are mature farmers, and

8% are old farmers. The size of the households tends to be relatively small, with 66.7% having less than 7 members. Consequently, 50% of the total contains only up to 4 active members (10 to 60 years old).

Almost half (about 46%) of the farmers in Boni village fall into the upper-middle income group. Another 25% are in the middle income level, with only about 8% in the low cash income category.

Slightly more than 83% of Boni farmers own draft animals and appppropriate equipment. Boni is one of the leading cotton producing villages in the Hounde sector. The farmers are considered experts in handling improved agricultural equipment. With about 6,000 inhabitants, Boni is the biggest village in our sample.

The Village of Dohoun

Three-fourths of the farmers interviewed in the village of Dohoun are from the Bwaba ethnic group, and 25% are Mossi. The latter community was established some 50 years ago. All the Mossi are from an Islamic background. About two-thirds of the Bwaba are Fetishists and the remaining one-third converted to Christianity.

Unlike Boni, the household heads tend to be older. Well over one-third are more than 55 years old and only 4.2% are under 35. On the other hand, the size of households and the number of active members are quite large. About 69% of the households comprise more than 4 active members.

TABLE 3-14: INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF DOHOUN

INCOME LEVEL *	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Lower	6	25.0
Lower-middle	4	16.7
Middle	5	20.8
Upper-middle	7	29.2
Upper	2	8.3
Total:	24	100.0

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets

About three-fifths (58.3%) of the farmers earn more than 100,000 CFA Francs (middle to upper income groups) and 25% of the respondents fall within the low income bracket (See Table 3-14).

Seven out of ten (70.8%) households use draft animals in farming. The village has long experience with agricultural development projects. In 1984, the village counted 1,790 inhabitants.

The village of Lamba

Lamba is a village exclusively inhabited by Mossi in-migrant farmers and was established in Bwaba territory about 20 years ago. The first settlers received production rights from the customary authorities in Bekuy. The very first settler was chosen by the farmers to be the chief of the village and his role was even recognized by the central administration. In 1984, the village of Lamba was inhabited by about 2,170 people, all Mossi, but coming mainly from two different areas of the Central Plateau.

The largest portion of the land being used today was granted by the traditional authorities of Sara. Yet, another farmer (different from the very first settler), may be considered the person managing the Sara granted land base. This farmer negotiated personally the production rights with the customary owners.

The village of Lamba is not only homogeneous ethnically (thus speaking a common language), but also the farmers have a common religious faith. Islam is the only religion practiced and it seems to be quite rigidly enforced. For example, one cannot find alcoholic beverages on the market.

Nearly half (47.8%) of the heads of household are mature farmers (36 to 55 years old). Although the extension service has not fully extended its services to this village, a large number

of farmers have had previous experience with development activities and the use of improved farming practices. Three-fifths (60.9%) of the farmers interviewed own a plough and draft animals. This percentage is quite high since no credit program was available to the farmers locally. Most farmers brought in their old farming equipment.

TABLE 3-15: INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF LAMBA

INCOME LEVEL *	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Lower	9	39.1
Lower middle	3	13.0
Middle	6	26.1
Upper middle	4	17.4
Upper	1	4.3
Total:	23	100.0

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets.

About half (47.8%) of the farmers fall within the middle to upper income brackets, despite the fact that 39.1% of the total are in the low income group (Table 3-15). One may consider the performance of this village generally good in view of the fact that it is a migrant community in a poorly equipped setting.

The Village of Maro

Maro village is inhabited by Bwaba and Mossi farmers in quite equal proportions. The sample includes 52.2% Bwaba farmers and 47.8% Mossi migrant farmers. These migrants have established two clearly distinct communities. The first settled earlier, about 20 years ago, and seems more aware of the land issues in the village. The second community was formed more recently and is bound together by a common religious faith: Islam. Therefore, this second Mossi community seems more homogenous and well organized.

The Bwaba farmers and the members of the first Mossi community are either Fetishists or Christians. Together, these two groups compose about half the sample. The other half (43.5%) adheres to Islam (Table 3-16). These farmers are all Mossi and they constitute a separate community.

Three-fifths (60.9%) of the heads of household are 36 to 55 years old; 26.1% are 17 to 35 and 13% are between 56 and 75 years of age. In other words, the majority of the farmers in Maro are in the mature group. No farmer is represented in the very old category.

The village of Maro has benefited from the technical advice and services of the agricultural extension service for a long period of time. The farming practices have improved satisfactorily and 78.3% of the farmers own draft animals and approriate agricultural equipment.

TABLE 3-16: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, AGE GROUP INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF MARO.

RELIGION, AGE AND INCOME	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
Fetishism	9	39.1
Christianity	4	17.4
Islam	10	43.5
Total:	23	100.0
AGE GROUP		
17 - 35	6	26.1
36 - 55	14	60.9
56 - 75	3	13.0
Total:	23	100.0
INCOME LEVEL *		
Lower	5	21.1
Lower-middle	3	13.0
Middle	7	30.5
Upper-middle	7	30.5
Upper	1	4.3
Total:	23	100.0

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets.

About two-thirds (65.1%) of the farmers in Maro are situated within the middle to upper income brackets and 21.7% are in the low income group. The village of Maro has a total population of about 1,300 inhabitants.

The Village of Sebedougou

This is the only village inhabited by three different ethnic groups. Sebedougou may be referred to as a "Bwaba-Peul" village because of the early settlement of the latter group, about a century ago. The senior members of the Peul community are from the same generation as the sons of the first Bwaba settlers. Today, these sons are in charge of the customary affairs of the village. The Mossi group settled very recetly, in 1980.

Sebedougou has a total population of 700 inhabitants. About three-fifths (60.9%) of the sample drawn is made up of Bwaba farmers, 26.1% are Peul, and 13% are Mossi (see Table 3-17). The last two groups adhere to the Islamic religious faith while the Bwaba are either Fetishists or Christians.

Despite its location (off the main road) and its small size, Sebedougou has achieved an excellent development level. The chief extension officer in Hounde believes that there is no need to maintain a permanent extension agent in the village. A very large percentage (87.0%) of the farmers practice animal draft farming. Only three farmers in the sample use the traditional hoe-farming method. The income distribution in Sebedougou supports once more the high standard achieved by this village.

More than eight-tenths (82.6%) of the farmers in the sample earn an income higher than 100,000 CFA Francs, i.e., the middle to upper income brackets. In addition, 21.7% of the farmers are

in the upper income group. Only 8.7% fall within the low income bracket.

TABLE 3-17: ETHNIC GROUP, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF SEBEDOUGOU.

ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND INCOME	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
ETHNIC GROUP		
Bwaba	14	60.9
Mossi	3	13.0
Peul	6	26.1
Total:	23	100.0
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
Fetishism	8	34.8
Christianity	5	21.7
Islam	10	43.5
Total:	23	100.0
INCOME LEVEL *		
Low	2	8.7
Lower-middle	2	8.7
Middle	2	8.7
Upper-middle	15	52.2
Upper	5	21.7
Total:	23	100.0

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets.

The Village of Tioro

Tioro is a Bwaba village with a majority of Mossi migrant farmers. In the sample, 87.5% of the farmers are Mossi and 12.5% are Bwaba.

Tioro is the smallest village in our sample, with only 370 inhabitants. The great openness of the village chief may explain the considerable number of migrants. However, he feels that potential problems exist due to the fact that migrants tend to occupy fraudulently several fields at the same time.

Tioro was covered by the agricultural extension service very recently. This explains the relatively low level of improved farming practices by farmers in the village. Only 45.8% of the farmers own a plough and draft animals. In addition, the income distribution shows that most of the farmers are in the low cash income category. Only 16.7% of the farmers in the sample fall within the middle to upper income brackets. Coversely, 75% of farmers are in the low income group (see Table 3-18).

TABLE 3-18: INCOME LEVEL IN THE VILLAGE OF TIORO.

INCOME LEVEL *	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Lower	18	75.0
Lower-middle	2	8.3
Middle	2	8.3
Upper-middle	1	4.2
Upper	1	4.2
Total:	24	100.0

* See Table 3-10 for income brackets.

Classification of Villages

As a general conclusion to this section, we are able to classify the surveyed villages according to the following two criteria: the level of income and the method of farming used by the farmers. A village will be considered to have attained a relatively high development level if more farmers are represented in the middle to upper income brackets than are in the low income group, and more farmers are using the draft animal technology as opposed to the traditional hoe-farming method. In addition, such villages present a number of development amenities, including good communication networks, improved extension centers, intensive cash crop production, better degree of farm mechanization, etc.

The summary Table 3-19 classifies the villages from the most developed (Sebedougou) to the least developed (Tioro). One can notice however, that Sebedougou and Boni are very close leaders, while Tioro is far behind the other five villages. This classification scheme allows us to ameliorate somewhat a difficulty referred to earlier as a data deficiency. Hence, on this basis, the development level of the vilages may be included as a variable in subsequent analyses.

The comparative analysis will focus on two sets of villages: two villages representing high in-migration settings and two villages in low development settings. In addition, the villages

will be contrasted according to three criteria: adoption of improved farming practices, level of income and existence or not of development amenities.

TABLE 3-19: SURVEYED VILLAGES BY LEVEL OF INCOME AND METHOD OF FARMING

VILLAGES	INCOME LEVEL		METHOD OF FARMING		N
	MEDIUM TO UPPER %	LOWER %	DRAFT %	HOE %	
Sebedougou	82.6	8.7	87.Ø	13.Ø	23
Boni	75.Ø	8.3	83.3	16.7	24
Maro	65.1	21.7	78.3	21.7	23
Dohoun	58.3	25.Ø	7Ø.8	29.2	24
Lamba	47.8	39.1	6Ø.9	39.1	23
Tioro	16.7	75.Ø	45.8	54.2	24

Chapter 4 - LAND TENURE IN THE SECTOR OF HOUNDE: ESSENTIAL DIMENSIONS

This chapter aims at presenting and discussing the essential dimensions that make up the land tenure systems in the Hounde agricultural sector. First, we shall present a description of land holdings in the Hounde area. Second, we shall discuss the material related to the objectives 1, 3, and 4 of the study. Regarding objective 1, we shall discuss successively the different modes of land acquisition, the types of rights associated with each category of land possession, the patterns of land transmission through successive generations, and traditional norms and customs related to land. In relation to the third objective of the study, the land problems encountered or foreseen by the respondents will be analyzed. Lastly, we shall assess the attitudes (favorable, not favorable, mixed) of the farmers and some village level interest groups, vis-a-vis the land reform project decided by the revolutionary government.

Land Holdings in the Hounde Area

A total of 141 residents in the Hounde agricultural sector were surveyed. Together, they hold a land area of about 900 hectares (i.e., 2,223 acres). The average land holding per farmer is 6.25 hectares. However, the range is about 200 hectares, with a minimum land holding of 1.5 hectares and a maximum of 200 hectares. Such a wide range portrays an uneven distribution of land holdings in the research area.

Table 4-1 displays the frequency distribution of land holdings according to five size groupings: small (1.5 to 4.4 hectares), semi-small (4.5 to 10.4), medium (10.5 to 20.4), semi-large (20.5 to 30.4), and large (over 30.5 hectares).

TABLE 4-1: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDINGS IN THE HOUNDE SECTOR

LAND HOLDING	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Small (1.5-4.4 ha.)	37	26.2
Semi-small (4.5-10.4 ha.)	66	46.8
Medium (10.5-20.4 ha.)	25	17.7
Semi-large (20.5-30.4 ha.)	8	5.7
Large (over 30.5 ha.)	5	3.5
Total	141	100.0

About one-fourth (26.2%) of the farmers hold between 1.5 and 4.4 hectares. of land. However, the semi-small acreage category (land holdings ranging from 4.5 to 10.4 hectares) contains almost half (46.8%) of the total number of respondents. In contrast, the remaining three groupings (medium, semi-large and large) comprise together a little over one-fourth (26.9%) of all farmers. This percentage roughly corresponds to the total number of farmers having small acreages of land. The large acreage category alone

comprises only 3.5% of the total sample. Overall, few farmers have large holdings but seven-tenths of the farmers hold semi-small and small acreages. In the following, we will look at the distribution of land holdings according to the ethnic, age and income variables (see Tables 4-2 through 4-4).

Land Distribution by Ethnic Group

The Peul farmers are represented only in the two smallest size categories. They are equally distributed in these groups. More fortunate than the Peul without matching however the Bwaba, the Mossi farmers are represented in four different groupings, from small to semi-large acreage categories. However, more than half fall within the semi-small acreage group. In addition, about one-fourth of the Mossi farmers are found in the small acreage group.

The Bwaba are the only farmers appearing in all five groupings. The distribution follows the same pattern as the Mossi group except in two instances. First, the Bwaba farmers outnumber the Mossi by almost 2 to 1 in the medium size category. Second, Bwaba farmers are represented in the large acreage group and the Mossi are not. Overall, the land distribution by ethnic affiliation shows that the indigenous Bwaba farmers have access to relatively larger holdings. As in-migrant groups, the Mossi tend to be better off than the Peul. The former have access to semi-large holdings whereas the latter's largest holdings do not exceed 10 hectares (semi-small acreage).

TABLE 4-2: LAND HOLDINGS BY ETHNIC GROUP

LAND HOLDING *	BWABA %	MOSSI %	PEUL %
Small	22.5	28.0	50.0
Semi-small	41.0	53.0	50.0
Medium	24.0	12.5	0.0
Semi-large	5.5	6.5	0.0
Large	7.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

* See Table 4-1 for size of land holdings.

TABLE 4-3: LAND HOLDINGS BY AGE

LAND HOLDING *	YOUNG %	MATURE %	OLD %	VERY OLD %
Small	50.0	21.0	18.5	16.7
Semi-small	43.0	49.0	44.5	50.0
Medium	7.0	24.0	15.0	0.0
Semi-large	0.0	3.5	15.0	16.7
Large	0.0	2.5	7.0	16.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4-4: LAND HOLDINGS BY INCOME LEVEL

LAND HOLDING*	INCOME LEVEL				
	LOWER %	LOWER-MIDDLE %	MIDDLE %	UPPER-MIDDLE %	UPPER %
Small	45.0	44.5	21.5	9.5	0.0
Semi-small	40.5	44.5	60.5	52.5	18.0
Medium	7.0	5.5	14.5	26.0	55.0
Semi-large	2.5	5.5	3.5	7.0	18.0
Large	6.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	9.0

Chi square = 42.93
D.F. = 20
Significance = .0021

* See Table 4-1 for size of land holdings.

Land Distribution by Age

As shown in Table 4-5, about half the young farmers fall within the small acreage category. In addition, no farmer has a total land holding exceeding 20 hectares. The large acreage category is distributed among the three other age groups according to the following proportions: one-fifth are very old and two-fifths are in mature and old age groups, respectively.

The single most important percentage, comprising more than one-fourth of the total sample size, is represented by farmers in the mature age group and all possess semi-small acreages of land. However, it should be kept in mind that the mature age group comprises 56.7% of the total sample.

Land Holdings by Level of Income

In theory, the individual income level should not influence the access to land where customary rules regulate land allocation. However, in order to keep abreast of the changing rural scene, we decided to test the relationship between income and size.

Table 4-6 shows that all income levels at least had access to acreages up to semi-large plots of land (i.e., up to 30 hectares). In addition, 4.8% of the low income group hold large acreages of land. Furthermore, 9.1% of the upper income group hold a large acreage of land. In other words, the low income farmers outnumber the upper income farmers in the large acreage category.

The above findings allow us to conclude that income level alone cannot fully explain the pattern of land holding distribution in the research area. Other factors come into play. For example, the ethnic membership was singled out earlier as a key variable influencing the distribution of land holdings. The indigenous Bwaba farmers have access to larger land holdings than the in-migrant Mossi and Peul farmers.

Modes of Access to Agricultural Land

The data suggest four different modes of access to agricultural land in the study area: by first occupancy, by inheritance, by borrowing, and by gift. Thus, a farmer may gain

access to a piece of land because of his belonging to a landholding lineage but, he may also use friendship ties to achieve the same result. We shall discuss later the difference which exists between these two modes of access by looking at the types of right attached to each piece of land. It remains that the membership of a landholding group opens up many more alternatives to gain access to a piece of land. Outsiders to the village have basically two alternatives (borrowing and gift) whereas members of a landholding group have at least three alternatives (inheritance, borrowing and gift). The possibility to acquire a piece of land by first occupancy is greatly reduced due to the relatively long duration of settlement in the survey villages. We shall see also that this form of access to land is a privilege of native farmers of the area.

Land Acquisition by First Occupancy

First occupancy is a situation whereby a farmer is the first to claim a piece of land. The process involves discussion with the customary authorities of the village of residency and, eventually, with the neighboring villages. These authorities, along with the elders of the locality, are usually able to ascertain whether or not the piece of land being sought belongs to another individual or group.

About twelve percent of the respondents in the survey acquired a piece of land by first occupancy. These farmers are

all from the Bwaba ethnic group. In addition, they are all indigenous to the village where they acquired such land.

Table 4-7 gives the frequency distribution of first occupancy by amount of land possessed.

TABLE 4-7: LAND ACQUIRED BY FIRST OCCUPANCY, BY SIZE OF HOLDING

FIRST OCCUPANCY BY SIZE (in Ha)		FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Small	(1 - 4 ha.)	6	35.3
Semi-small	(5 - 10 ha.)	5	29.4
Medium	(11 - 20 ha.)	4	23.5
Semi-large	(21 - 30 ha.)	1	5.9
Large	(90 or more ha.)	1	5.9
	Total:	17	100.0

About one-third of the farmers who gained access to land through first occupancy fall within the smallest size category. At the other extreme, only one farmer reported a very large acreage (90 ha or more). The latter is a member of the lineage of first occupants in the village. These people usually consider all the village land base as their own, except for the land they attributed to allied groups, if any. This means that their land possession includes all land lent out to temporary right holders.

Typically, one is able to gain access to a piece of land by first occupancy only when it remains unclaimed within the village territorial limits. Assuming that the villages have been settled

long enough so that all potential agricultural lands are already claimed, one may suggest that only farmers of a certain age actually hold land by first occupancy. However, the particular conditions of the Western region (relative land availability) may allow even younger farmers to hold such land. The cross tabulation of first occupancy by age of the head of household shows that 82.4% of the first occupancy landholders were 36 years of age or older and 17.6% of the farmers were under 36 years old. Thus, as shown in Table 4-8, mature and elderly farmers are not alone in obtaining land on a first occupancy basis.

TABLE 4-9: LAND ACQUIRED BY FIRST OCCUPANCY, BY AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD

LAND ACQUIRED BY FIRST OCCUPANCY	AGE GROUP Under 36 %	36-55 %	56-75 %	76 + %	TOTAL %	N
Yes	2.1	5.7	2.8	1.4	12.1	17
No	17.7	51.1	16.3	2.8	87.9	124

While the access to land through first occupancy seems to obey the customary regulations, it remains strange why indigenous Bwaba farmers are sole beneficiaries. The age factor and land availability in the area in general do not explain such distribution. The examination of the concrete conditions in each village may help us uncover the unexplained (see section on the

comparative analysis of the villages) unless the boundary maintenance reaction contains the key to the enigma.

Land Acquisition by Inheritance

Land acquisition through inheritance is another form of land acquisition where only indigenous Bwaba farmers are represented. These farmers constitute 30.5% of the sample, and 60.6% of the Bwaba group. The latter figure shows that a majority of Bwaba farmers gain access to land through the inheritance network. Moreover, it tends to lend some support to Kholer's point making land inheritance a privilege of groups holding permanent landrights. In effect, land borrowing (which is assigned a temporary right) appears an option left essentially to outsiders.

Table 4-10 presents the distribution of land inherited by size of holdings.

TABLE 4-10: LAND ACQUIRED THROUGH INHERITANCE, BY SIZE

LAND ACQUIRED BY INHERITANCE		FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Small	(1-4 ha.)	10	23.3
Semi-small	(5-10 ha.)	21	48.8
Medium	(11-20ha.)	7	16.3
Semi-large	(21-30ha.)	2	4.7
Large	(90 or more ha)	3	7.0
Total		43	100.0

About seven-tenths (72.1%) of the farmers in this category have small or semi-small acreages (i.e., up to 10 hectares of land). However, about 12% of the sample fall within the semi-large to large acreage categories. This percentage is relatively important given that 20 hectares represents a large amount of land in this part of the world. The literature generally admits a production capacity of 1 ha. per adult male given the low technological potential among African smallholders in general.

About three-fifths (62.8%) of the farmers holding land through inheritance fall within the mature age bracket, i.e., 36 to 55 years old. If we add the senior age group, this percentage rises to nearly 84% of the total number of farmers who inherited a piece of land (compared to 76% in the total age distribution). Thus, the age of the farmer seems to be an important variable in inheriting a piece of land. This is consistent with one of the recent findings which notes that a majority of farmers acquire land for the first time after being married[1/]. This is based on a societal norm or belief which considers one responsible only when married and raising a family. However, the amount of land inherited is not proportional to the age of the farmer. In other words, older farmers do not necessarily hold larger tracts of land. For example, the two farmers most advanced in age (over 76

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(1) S.A.E.D. (Societe Africaine d'Etudes et de Developpement): "La dynamique des regimes fonciers et des systemes agraires dans le Burkina Faso " (1984). Study realized with a F.A.O. funding.

years) hold between 1 and 10 hectares of land. In contrast, two mature farmers inherited more than 32 hectares of land.

TABLE 4-11: LAND ACQUIRED THROUGH INHERITANCE, BY AGE OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD

LAND INHERITED?	AGE GROUP Under 36 / 36 - 55 / 56 - 75 / 76 +				N
	%	%	%	%	
Yes	25.0	34.0	26.0	33.0	43
No	75.0	66.0	74.0	67.0	98

Land Acquisition Through Borrowing

Land borrowing has a long standing tradition among African farmers. Historically, it was first used for humanitarian purposes and later for the need to have new (or a large number of) subjects under one's political leadership (Skinner, 1964).

Nowadays in the Hounde area, both indigenous and in-migrants ethnic groups are land borrowers: Bwaba, 33.8%; Mossi, 25% and Peul, 100%. The Bwaba farmers borrow land in order to supplement their actual holdings. Ideally, Mossi and Peul should present the same characteristics of exclusive land borrowers by virtue of being in-migrant groups and therefore, would not be holding permanent landrights. The peculiar case of the Mossi in the sample (low percentage of land borrowing) may be explained in two ways, namely by a misuse of the concept of gift and by the

landright controversy in the village of Lamba where the first migrant settlers claim they were given the land by the customary authorities. We shall come back to this issue in subsequent sections.

A total of 46 farmers (32.6% of the sample) obtained access to land through borrowing. The figures in Table 26 indicate that farmers over 75 years of age do not borrow land. They do acquire land on a first occupancy basis. Second, among the farmers who borrow land, the age group 36 to 55 is the most represented group just like in the first occupancy category. Third, about one-third of land borrowers are young farmers of less than 36 years of age. The distribution of the amount of land borrowed shows, however, that 77% of the farmers in this age group borrow small acreages, i.e., less than 5 hectares of land. In contrast, about the same proportion of senior farmers borrows between 5 and 20 hectares of land.

TABLE 4-12: SIZE OF LAND ACQUIRED BY BORROWING, BY AGE

SIZE IN Ha.	AGE GROUP			N
	17 - 35 %	36 - 55 %	56 - 75 %	
Up to 4 Ha.	77.0	24.0	25.0	18
5 - 10 Ha.	23.0	48.0	75.0	21
11 - 20 Ha.	0.0	28.0	0.0	7
Total:	100.0	100.0	100.0	46

It should be noticed that farmers do not borrow land in amounts exceeding 20 hectares. Almost half (45.7%) borrow between 5 and 10 hectares and only 15.2% of the farmers borrowed between 11 and 20 hectares.

Land Acquisition Through Gift

Gift giving is a very common practice in agrarian societies. It may be thought of as a means to maintain and develop human and group relationships. Therefore, gift giving tends to include not only relatives but also allies and friends. A wide variety of things may be object of gift, including a piece of land.

As may be expected, giving out a piece of land (for good) does not happen indiscriminately. The donor has to be sure he is doing the right thing and that the beneficiary really deserves such a gift. This explains why in practice, giving out a piece of land tends to be restricted to relatives of the same or affiliated families.

In our survey, 92.2% of the farmers who said they received a piece of land as gift are from the Mossi ethnic group. The surprising nature of this finding determined the need to investigate the issue further. It turned out that the concept of gift was sometimes used to mean borrowing by some Mossi farmers (case of Tioro). In the village of Lamba, the situation was more complex. The village land base may be divided into two categories according to who granted the right of cultivation. The first was

granted by the customary authorities of Bekuy and the second, by the authorities of Sara. The dispute concerns the first land base. The beneficiaries contend they were given the land when they first settled. However, when asked if they plan to occupy the land indefinitely, these farmers replied "no". It seems that although they speak in terms of gift, these respondents still feel they have an undetermined but temporary landright. This differs from the basic understanding of gift giving which is a permanent transaction in essence.

Landrights and Land Transmission to Heirs

In this section, we are concerned with the logic behind land transmission to heirs and its relationship with the type of right attached to the piece of land being inherited. Landrights are labelled "permanent" or "temporary" and the transmission of land to heirs followed two essential modes, filial or adelphic.

Table 4-13 presents a summary of landrights according to each category of land possessed by the respondents.

TABLE 4-13: LANDRIGHT BY TYPE OF LAND ACQUISITION

TYPE OF LAND ACQUISITION	PERMANENT RIGHT %	TEMPORARY RIGHT %
First occupancy	100.0	0.0
Inherited	100.0	0.0
Borrowed	0.0	100.0
Gift	94.0	6.0

All lands acquired through first occupancy or inherited from parents are considered permanently owned by their beneficiaries. In constrast, all lands borrowed are assigned a temporary right. The right attached to the fourth category of land (gift) seems less straightforward. Most of the respondents (94%) considered that they have a permanent landright, but a number of deviants (6%) felt their right was only temporary. However, in a previous section, we pointed out that gift transactions are traditionally permanent in essence. Why then do some farmers feel the gift received should be assigned a temporary landright? The only Bwaba farmer in this case considered that upon his death, the permanent right holder is entitled to repossess his land. The other respondents (who were Mossi farmers) regarded the gift lasting only for the time they remain in the area. The feeling that they have migrated temporarily seems an established pattern among the Mossi people in our sample. They usually expect to return home one of these days.

Tables 4-14 presents the data on land transmission to heirs according to each category of land. The land transmission alternatives labelled 'other' comprises the following patterns of response: (1) Land repartition among heirs, (2) Do not have heirs because all living relatives are women, (3) Temporary migration, the relatives cannot expect to inherit. The last type of response follows logically the pattern described above about Mossi migrants. As a matter of fact, only Mossi farmers responded likewise.

Table 4-14 shows that most lands acquired through first occupancy are transmitted along the adelphic mode (82.4% of cases). Given the fact that mostly senior farmers have access to land on a first occupancy basis, one can assume that the land was acquired in the name of the entire lineage, i.e., on a communal basis. Therefore, the brother of the head of household should have priority over the son during the transmission process. On the other hand, the transmission pattern is quite equally distributed among the adelphic and filial modes for all remaining land categories. The significant variable deciding the choice of one mode of transmission over the other is the presence or lack of a male sibling of the head within the household. In nine-tenths of the cases, the presence of a brother in the household corresponds to the choice of an adelphic mode of land transmission. Alternatively, when the household has a nuclear characteristic, the filial mode of land transmission is chosen. The discussions with key informants revealed the same principle. The important factors in deciding who takes over the farming enterprise are age and labor contribution. Among a brother and a son, both members of the household, priority is given to the brother. If the head has a living brother who was not, however, an active member of the household, the active son has the right to take over the enterprise upon his father's death.

TABLE 4-14: TRANSMISSION OF LAND ACQUIRED BY FIRST OCCUPANCY, INHERITANCE, BORROWING, AND GIFT

TRANSMISSION	FIRST OCCUPANCY	INHERITANCE	BORROWING	GIFT
Adelphic	82.Ø	44.2	52.Ø	36.Ø
Filial	12.Ø	55.8	42.Ø	54.Ø
Other	6.Ø	Ø.Ø	6.Ø	1Ø.Ø
N=	17	43	43	5Ø

Traditional Norms and Customs Related to Land

Traditional Authorities in Bwaba Society

Three different authorities are usually encountered in Bwaba society: the earth priest or land master, the "chief of the bush" and the village chief. Each has a precise domain of action and authority.

The earth priest handles the issues of land tenure organization and makes sure that all the traditions of the lineage related to land are perpetuated.

The chief of the bush is concerned with all the matters that take place in the bush, ranging from the usual activities like hunting, fishing and wild food gathering, to disputes in the bush that result in bloodshed.

The village chieftancy is a relatively recent administrative institution. This chief is generally referred to as the "chief of the white folks", meaning the one who was chosen to deal with French colonialists. He became the counterpart of the central administration in the period following the achievement of political independence in 1960.

The earth priest and the chief of the bush cooperate very closely. The latter may be seen as the deputy earth priest. In villages with homogenous ethnic composition, meaning that all the vilagers have descended from the same lineage, the three domains of authority are usually handled by a single individual. The village of Bouahoun in the Hounde sector is an example. On the other hand, the domains of authority and related powers are decentralized when several indigenous allied groups settle together. In Boni, for example, the Gnoumou family assumes the role of earth priest and chief of the bush; the Bonde family, on the other hand, handles the role of village chief.

The latter role is generally seen as less important than those seeking to protect and perpetuate the customs and mores of the ethnic group. During the colonial era, the practice has consisted of sending a brother of the customary authority to represent the village vis-a-vis the colonial authorities. This has contributed to the separation of authority domains within the village.

To summarize, it may be suggested that originally, the exercise of customary authority was centralized at the level of the first occupants of the village. Factors like the integration of allied groups and the need to devote first priority to ethnic cultural matters led the original authorities to delegate some of their power to other groups and individuals different from the earth priest.

The Functions of the Earth Priest

It follows from the above presentation that the earth priest (or land master, or customary authority) is the leading authority in the village> He intervenes as the repository of the customs inherited from his ancestors. In the domain of land tenure, his services as usually solicited, first of all, when a new field is being brought under cultivation, possibly at the beginning of every planting season, and lastly after harvesting and before the new crops are consumed. On these occasions, sacrifices are made and the earth priest prays for the welfare of the whole community.

Every household or family contributes to these rituals. As a general rule, a live animal is immolated (usually a chicken) when a new field is brought under cultivation or before planting. After harvesting, a certain quantity of red sorghum is offered by

the heads of household for sacrifice purposes[1/]. Thus. these two practices have evolved as the most important customs to which every farmer is expected to conform. However, the diversification ofreligious beliefs, the relative autonomy of native family groups (lineages) in a diversely composed village, the migration phenomenon and the breaking up of extended family systems are factors which have contributed to the distorted application of land rituals. For example, the chiefs of lineage perform individually their own rituals before each planting season. Therefore, the individual segments of lineage do not need to duplicate the same rituals. On the other hand, many in-migrants (land borrowers) just content themselves, first, with donating a chicken to the earth priest (or the permanent right holder) when they bring a new field under cultivation and second, they content themselves with offering annually a certain quantity of a cereal crop to the earth priest or permanent right holder, depending on who granted the production right. One may notice also that the in-migrants do not necessarily grow red sorghum, therefore, the sacred crop is very often replaced by any other food crop.

Land rituals are basically Fetishist practices. By perpetuating the culture of his ethnic group, the earth priest also performs a religious duty. However, it sometimes happens

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1/ "Any honest earth priest knows what to do with the cereal crops received from the community members" (The earth priest of Tioro, personal communication, April 1985).
This statement was an answer to the diverse interpretations around the post-harvest donations to the earth priest.

that the earth priest adopts the Christian faith. Although he continues the Fetishist religious practices, such a priest tends to sense ambivalence when performing the customary functions (case of the earth priest of Sebedougou who is Protestant).

The reaction of Moslem communities is even more critical. For example, the Mossi Moslem community in Maro succeeded in obtaining a waiver for the practice of animal immolation. These farmers see in this ritual a blatant contradiction with their religious beliefs. They made the waiver of Fetishist practices a condition of their settlement in the village. They agree, however, to honor annually the donation of a measure of a cereal crop to the holder of the permanent landright. The representative of the Mossi Moslem community in Maro sees the latter practice as compatible and even conforming with the teachings of the Koran. In principle, the teachings of the Koran request a tenth of the production. Here, the customary authorities generally request a tine (about 15 kilograms). This is sometimes seen as a departure from the symbolic gesture which seems to be what the custom requires.

To conclude, it may be said that the authority of the earth priest is alive and still well established in rural communities. This is more readily observable in homogenous villages based on a single lineage settlement. It tends, however, to be shadowed by the relative autonomy of individual lineages in diversely composed villages. The intervention of the chiefs of lineage in

religious as well as social matters should not be overestimated. It should be seen as a division of duties and responsibilities at the village level.

The most significant threat to the original power structure of the Bwa society stems from the integration of formerly autonomous village communities into a larger network of regional and national centers of decision. In spite of these administrative innovations, the establishment of a customary court (in addition to a western type court of law) had maintained and reinforced, in some ways, the authority of the customary chiefs. However, a great and decisive blow is to be expected with the take over of the revolutionary government in August 1983. In particular, the customary regulations and control over land matters is likely to be broken down with the implementation of the agrarian reform project.

Farmers' Attitudes and Behaviors Regarding Land Rituals

Who requests the services of the earth priest and why? The summary Table 4-15 groups the respondents in three categories according to ethnic membership.

Nearly three-fourths of the Mossi farmers do not request the services of the earth priest. While this seems congruent with earlier discussions, it is surprising that only two-thirds of the Bwaba, and 100% of the Peul observe complete allegiance to their earth priest.

TABLE 4-15: PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING USE OF EARTH PRIEST SERVICES BY ETHNIC GROUP.

ETHNIC GROUP	YES %	NO %	IF NECESSARY %	TOTAL %	N
Bwaba	66.2	31.0	2.8	100.0	71
Mossi	26.6	73.4	0.0	100.0	64
Peul	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	6

Although they are both in-migrant groups, the Peul differ from the Mossi by the closeness of the former to the local traditions. Their religious affiliation (Islam) does not constitute a serious obstacle. None are opposed to the role played by the earth priest. However, two of the Peul respondents admitted they tend to have mixed attitudes because of their Islamic affiliation.

On the other hand, the attitudes expressed by the Mossi farmers are straightforward; 60.3% are not favorable to the role played by the earth priest. They advance many reasons to support or justify their reactions and attitudes:

1. 15.9% feel they should tolerate local customs
2. 15.9% just act to protect their own interests (right of cultivation)
3. 58.7% put up their religious beliefs
4. 1.6% would seek the services of the earth priest depending on the matter at stake

5. 7.9% oppose "other reasons", including that God is the sole master, or such allegiance may open to a type of exploitation by the earth priest, or just because their own parents did not observe allegiance to an earth priest.

By and large, the religious concern constitutes the main obstacle for the Mossi's allegiance to the local earth priest. More than half (58.7%) put up their own religious preferences. Nonetheless, a good percentage (about 16%) tolerates the local customs. These farmers may also be primarily motivated by the need to acquire and/or retain some land for cultivation.

Lastly, the divergent attitudes among the Bwaba farmers appear more critical for the survival of local customs and institutions. They are the indigenous people and therefore they may be considered the repository of the traditions and the principal agents of the reproduction of the Bwaba social order. Why then, do 31% of the indigenous people say they do not request the services of the earth priest? Two categories of people should be distinduished. First, we have those who do not request the services of the earth priest but perform similar rituals within their lineage groups. This is explained in the section dealing with the hierarchy of authorities in the Bwa society. A second category of people represents those who have a divergent attitude toward the role performed by the earth priest as such. The latter appears in the following figures:

1. 77.1% of Bwaba farmers react favorably to the role played by the earth priest;
2. 15.7% have mixed feelings; and
3. 7.1% are not favorable to the role performed by the earth priest.

The farmers not favorable to the role performed by the earth priest oppose it for the following reasons:

1. The earth priest should be considered a mere "chief of the bush";
2. There is a difference in religious beliefs;
3. They do not believe the magical power of the earth priest really works (e.g., assuring soil fertility or a good rainy season).

The farmers who have mixed feelings toward the role played by the earth priest may be classified into the following four categories in order of importance:

1. Those who stick to the hierarchy of authority when dealing with the customs related to land;
2. Those who are sensitive to the difference in religious beliefs;
3. Those who do not believe that the magical power of the earth priest really works;
4. Those who believe that the earth priest tends to act for his own benefit (cf. grain donation).

On the whole, it is clear that the influence of religious beliefs permeates the three ethnic groups. The diverging religious belief is mentioned by 84.1% of the Mossi, 11.4% of the Bwaba and 4.5% of the Peul. This influence is far greater among the Mossi farmers than other ethnic groups. It tends to be an important factor in the weakening of the role of the customary authority. Moreover, the validity of the mythical representations is questioned. Doubts are created about the magical capability of the customary authority on the basis of the farmers' practical living experiences (rainfall, soil depletion). Even some indigenous farmers tend to deny the involvement of the earth priest in the regulation of land matters: "He should play the role of a chief of the bush". In other words, there is a weakening of the position of the earth priest in the rural communities as the repository of local customs and as a "land master" who regulates the tenure arrangements.

Who actually does practice the customary land rituals? The weakening of the role performed by the earth priest or land master is <u>not</u> followed by a total rejection of the local customs related to land. The figures show that the majority of farmers remain attached to the practice of customary land rituals.

When asked if they practice customary sacrifices, 55.3% of the farmers responded positively, 41.1% said 'no', 2.8% practice them once-in-a-while and 0.7% responded only when necessary.

The cross-classification of the practice of customary sacrifices by the religious membership of the respondents shows some interesting results, as follows:

1. The practice of sacrifices runs across religious lines. About all (96.3%) of Fetishists, about one-third (35%) of Christians and more than one-fourth (28.4%) of Moslems do observe land rituals. Fetishists, Christians and Moslems comprise 39.9, 5.0 and 13.5%, respectively.

2. Only farmers from Islamic and Christian background responded 'no' to the question regarding the practice of customary sacrifices -- 20.7 and 79.3%, respectively. Persons having Islamic and Christian affiliation account for 8.5% and 32.6%, respectively.

3. Nearly 4 percent of the Fetishist farmers practice land rituals once-in-a-while or only when necessary. Christians and Moslems also practice the rituals once-in-a-while -- 5% and 3%, respectively.

In summary, one can conclude that the practice of land rituals is strongly related to the Fetishist faith. However, all Fetishists do not systematically practice these rituals. Lastly, the conversion to new religions (Islam and Christianity) do not prevent one from continuing to practice traditional customs related to land (which are Fetishist in essence).

How does the ethnic background relate to the ritualistic land behavior of farmers? We examine this question by cross

tabulating the ethnic variable with the sacrifice behavior of farmers. The figures read as follows:

1. About 8 out of 10 (83.1%) of the Bwaba farmers do practice land rituals, but 12.7% do not.
2. About 7 out of 10 (73.4%) of the Mossi farmers do not practice land rituals, but 23.4% do observe these customs.
3. Two-thirds (66.7%) of the Peul do practice land rituals, but 33.3% do not.

As indigenous people, the Bwaba farmers take the lead in the practice of land rituals. They are followed closely by the Peul, their allies. In contrast, the Mossi farmers are noted for not practicing the indigenous customs related to land in large numbers.

The analysis of farmers' attitudes and behaviors regarding the customary practices tends to reflect an apparent contradiction. On one hand, the attitudes toward the role performed by the earth priest, the traditional leading customary authority, is weakening, although on the other hand, the practice of local customs still stands strong among the large majority of farmers. Two important factors explain the weakening of the earth priest authority: the religious diversification and the questioning of the validity of some mythical representations.

Although very limited in scope (less than 6% of the respondents), the second factor is pernicious in that it tends to differentiate the judicial and religious dimensions in the role

performed by the earth priest. To put it in Capron's terms, the conditions suggest that the "right of mediation" by the earth priest is not necessarily followed by the "right of authority" upon the group. We should recall that the first notion inspires the thinking of land tenure in Bwa society and the second organizes the tenure system. In other words, a new situation is being created whereby farmers retain the original thinking of land tenure but tend to reject the supremacy of the earth priest in the judicial domain. The religious diversification is likely to reinforce this tendency. As a matter of fact, the fear of supernatural punishments, gauge of the earth priest power, is increasingly losing ground. The questioning of the validity of some mythical representations, including the magical power of the earth priest, shows that farmers become more interested in the achievement of concrete results (e.g. rainfall, more crop) instead of mere spiritual food.

Land Problems in the Hounde Sector

The data on land problems were collected with the knowledge that this area was extremely sensitive especially for migrant groups. Many Mossi farmers, for example, were reluctant to speak up about their problems. Most merely said: "I do not know of any land problems". However, we were able to learn that this was not always the case. For instance, days after covering the village of Maro we were called upon by one of the Mossi representatives. He

had realized that, after all, this was an opportunity to voice his complaints and denounce what was felt as discrimination against his community. On this occasion, the representative gathered all the community members in a formal discussion session.

Open Land Disputes in the Research Area

Out of 141 interviews in the survey, only 4, or 2.8% of the respondents revealed they had opened disputes over land issues. The dispute cases involved the following:

-- Two cases of controversy between temporary and permanent landright ownership;
-- One instance of 'wild occupancy' of land;
-- One case where the village chief denied the usage right to a farmer.

First, in every instance in-migrants and/or farmers who do not hold permanent right to their land were involved. Second, only one of the cases was brought to the regional district court and could not be definitively solved anyhow. Third, all the other cases were successfully dealt with locally, under the discretion of the permanent right holder or the customary authority. To conclude that local authorities are more efficient in solving land issues may be somewhat risky given the limited number of cases and doubts about their representativeness.

The Land Issues in the Village of Lamba

In our preliminary discussions with the extension agents, we were informed that a case was pending in the regional district court concerning about one-third of the land base in the village of Lamba. However, we could not get the farmers to talk openly about the case during the individual interviews. Therefore, we managed to hold a discussion session with a group of first settlers in the village [1/]. The point of the dispute was to establish the exact nature of the landrights granted to the first Mossi settlers by the customary authorities of Bekuy. The first settlers of Lamba claim that when they first arrived 20 years ago, they received temporary production rights from the customary authorities. Two years later, the settlers asked for a conversion of the temporary production rights into permanent gift of land. They assert that an agreement was concluded granting them permanent (gift) rights on occupied lands. The village chief, who finally deserted in 1984, was designated as supreme manager of the granted land base. The customary authorities of Bekuy maintain that no such agreement was concluded. In practice however, and for about 18 years, the same village chief served as intermediary between the village of Lamba on one hand, and the customary authorities of Bekuy and the regional administration in Hounde on the other hand. As part of his duties, the village

1/ The village chief was obliged to flee because of various hostilities against him. He could not be reached for comments.

chief regularly collected taxes for the administration and regularly collected a tine of grain per household for the customary authorities. What went wrong in the meantime and why did everybody, including many villagers, the extension service, and the customary authorities, seem to blame the departed village chief?

The information gathered points to one possible explanation. The village chief ended up having too much power and started acting as the owner of the land granted. He was the only person able to receive new settlers and to grant them a permanent production right. Some farmers have also complained that upon harvest, after collecting a tine of grain per household, the village chief consistently returned a lesser quantity of grain to the customary authorities.

Today, after the desertion of the village chief, the customary authorities of Bekuy do not seem very worried about the disputed nature of landrights held by the Mossi migrant farmers established in Lamba. The desertion of the contested village chief may have brought, indirectly, a solution to the land issue. Perhaps another reason, though less discussed by the customary authorities, has to do with the suppression of their customary right of control over land by the 1984 Presidential Ordinance. Lastly, the community elders in Lamba have a peculiar comprehension of the concept of permanent production right allegedly granted 18 years ago. To them, a permanent landright

means the right to use a piece of land until the day of final departure. A senior member of the migrant community forcefully stated: "We cannot identify the landrights we hold here with the ones we may have back home. First, in our villages of origin, we cultivate the lands of our fathers and grandfathers. Second, we do not consider ourselves permanent residents in Lamba".

Potential Land Problems in the Research Area

The foreseen sensitivity of the farmers to discuss openly their land disputes prompted the idea to ask a general question on the areas where the individual farmers felt land problems may arise. For each case, we recorded what was perceived as the single most important problem. Table 36 summarizes the answers given by the respondents.

TABLE 4-16: POTENTIAL LAND PROBLEMS IN THE HOUNDE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

TYPE OF PROBLEM	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Boundaries	41	29.1
Respect of customs	19	13.5
Reserved (forest) lands	1	.7
In-migration	13	9.2
Unspecified duration when lending	2	1.4
No problem	50	35.5
Other	15	10.6
Total:	141	100.0

First, it is important to stress that 35.5% of the sample farmers did not mention any latent land problems that might rise in their communities. It is also significant to know that only in-migrants gave such an answer. This may indicate that they were determined not to speak up on land problems in their respective communities. Second, 13.5% of the farmers felt that the single most important land problem may come from the lack of respect for traditional customs related to agricultural land. These farmers (all Bwaba) were indirectly referring to the migrant farmers who, we have seen are less willing to engage in customary land practices. However, about 9% of the farmers did address directly the in-migration phenomenon as a potential source of land disputes in the research area. This means that inter-ethnic conflicts may be of serious concern in the years to come.

Third, the low percentage (.7%) of farmers who mentioned the issue of reserved forest lands does not adequately represent the dimension of the problem in some villages like Maro and Sebedougou. The discussions with the commnity leaders in those villages revealed a much greater need to bring some of the forest lands under cultivation. In the Maro region, for example, some farmers have already disregarded the national legislation and started claiming the land reserved by the State for the purpose of forestry development.

To conclude this section, we must first acknowledge that our fieldwork was a valuable learning experience on how to approach the study of land conflicts in Burkinabe peasant communities. The administration of a questionnaire schedule was largely insufficient in collecting the appropriate data. Both indigenous and in-migrant groups were reluctant to discuss their land conflicts. The most significant insights were obtained through intimate discussion sessions with informants. The seemingly harmonious relationship between indigenous farmers and Mossi in-migrant farmers appears plagued with hostilities once the respondent felt confident enough to speak up. The participation of extension field workers in the discussions helped establish the needed climate of confidence.

By and large, the latent and effective land conflicts place indigenous and migrant groups in opposition. Among the latter group, only the Mossi in-migrants are concerned. The few Peul farmers in the sample (village of Sebedougou) appear more integrated and accepted in their community. According to the cases encountered, the nature of the land conflicts revolves around the distinction between temporary vs. permanent landrights.

Farmers' Attitudes Toward Government Land Reform Project

We are not primarily concerned with an analysis of the on-going land reform per se. However, our field work was carried out

in the context of the reform and the study may help situate the Presidential Ordinance in proper perspective. A significant aspect of the reform concerns the decision to nationalize all land in the country. The intent of this section is to discuss the attitudes expressed by individual farmers vis-a-vis that decision. We will also assess these reactions according to the ethnic, income level, age, and land holding variables.

TABLE 4-17: FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD LAND NATIONALIZATION

ATTITUDE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Favorable	56	39.7
Not favorable	58	41.1
Mixed	4	2.8
Refused to answer	23	16.3
Total:	141	100.0

A little less than half (41.1%) of the respondents were not favorable to the governmental decision to nationalize. In addition, about one-sixth of the farmers interviewed refused to answer the question asked. Most were from the Mossi ethnic group (20 Mossi and 3 Bwaba). The decision not to answer the question reflects a general climate of reticence on the part of the interviewees to take what was clearly considered as a political stand in response to a governmental action[1/]. In fact, chances

1/ The question was however re-written in order to avoid a very high level of refusals to express a clear stand.

are that a refusal to answer the question may mean a negative feeling toward the decision of nationalization. In such case, the great majority of farmers would rather oppose the government action since only 39.7% expressed a favorable attitude.

Table 4-18 presents a cross-classification of the expressed attitude of the respondents vis-a-vis land nationalization according to ethnic affiliation. About two-thirds of the Bwaba respondents are not favorable to the decision of nationalization. In contrast, a little more than two-thirds of the Mossi respondents are favorable to the decision. Out of 6 Peul farmers in the sample, 5 are favorable and only 1 is not. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the government decision is supported in largest proportions by in-migrant respondents.

TABLE 4-18: EXPRESSED ATTITUDE TOWARD LAND NATIONALIZATION BY ETHNIC GROUP

ATTITUDE	BWABA %	MOSSI %	PEUL %
Favorable	29.4	70.5	83.3
Not favorable	64.7	29.5	16.7
Mixed	5.9	0.0	0.0
N	68	44	6

The mature farmers (aged 36 to 55) lent the most support to the nationalization act as compared to other age groups (see Table 4-19). This age group is closely followed by younger farmers, aged 17 to 35. Interestingly, the respondents aged 36 to 55 are those who led the opposition. Indeed, more are opposed than favorable to the decision. Finally, among the elderly, we found about the same percentage on both sides of the issue.

TABLE 4-19: EXPRESSED ATTITUDE TOWARD LAND NATIONALIZATION BY AGE GROUP

ATTITUDE	17 - 35 %	36 - 55 %	56 - 75 %	OVER 75 %
Favorable	68.0	39.5	47.6	50.0
Not favorable	32.0	54.5	52.4	50.0
Mixed	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0
N	25	66	21	6

In theory, one may be inclined to hypothesize that the larger the landholdings of a farmer, the more likely (s)he will oppose the decision of land nationalization. However, the data show that the one farmer who has more than 50 hectares of land is favorable to land nationalization. Moreover, out of 12 farmers holding more than 20 hectares, only 5 are not favorable to

nationalization. Therefore, more than half of these farmers are favorable (See Table 4-20)[1/].

In Table 4-21, we cross-tabulated the income level of respondents with their expressed attitude toward land nationalization. Overall, the data suggest a close match across income groups between those who support and those who oppose the decision of land nationalization. In fact, twice as many respondents of the upper income group favor rather than oppose the decision. The respondents of the lower and middle income groups were favorable in the same proportions. The respondents of the lower-middle and upper-middle income groups expressed the same proportion of negative feeling. In conclusion, the income level of the respondents is not a clear indicator of attitudes toward land nationalization.

TABLE 4-20: EXPRESSED ATTITUDE TOWARD LAND NATIONALIZATION BY LAND HOLDINGS

ATTITUDE	SMALL %	SEMI-SMALL %	MEDIUM %	SEMI-LARGE %	LARGE %
Favorable	43.0	47.3	47.8	62.5	50.0
Not favorable	53.5	50.9	43.5	37.5	50.0
Mixed	3.5	1.8	8.7	0.0	0.0
N	28	55	23	8	4

1/ This pattern accouts solely for expressed attitudes. A few farmers in the large landholding category did not answer the question on land nationalization.

TABLE 4-21: EXPRESSED ATTITUDE TOWARD LAND NATIONALIZATION BY INCOME LEVEL

ATTITUDE	LOWER %	LOWER-MIDDLE %	MIDDLE %	UPPER-MIDDLE %	UPPER %
Favorable	50.0	44.0	50.0	44.0	54.5
Not favorable	45.8	56.0	46.0	56.0	27.5
Mixed	4.2	0.0	4.0	0.0	18.0
N	24	16	26	41	11

The foregoing section has utilized the ethnic, age, income and landholding variables to look at the farmers' attitudes toward the government decision to nationalize land resources. Only the ethnic variable appears to influence strongly the decision of the respondents. In-migrant groups tend to lend support whereas indigenous Bwaba farmers mostly oppose the decision of nationalization.

Chapter 5: THE RESTRUCTURING OF LAND TENURE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF HOUNDE

Ethnicity and Improved Farming Practices in the Process of Land Tenure Individualization

African land ownership is frequently regarded as being communal because, originally, land resources were held exclusively by a lineage as opposed to individual farmers. In this study, land tenure individualization is defined as a process whereby individual households slowly win control over land at the expense of the lineage to which the individual farmer belongs. The adoption of a filial mode of land tenure transmission by an individual household is utilized as a proxy variable which is an indicator of the individualized land tenure pattern.

In their respective studies, Biebuyck (1963) and Kholer (1971) have shown that the management of communal land resources is traditionally inherited by the younger brother of the head. This corresponds to the adelphic mode of land transmission which portrays the communal form of social organization. On the other hand, Boutillier (1964) called our attention to a trend away from this traditional pattern by addressing the breaking up of extended family systems which, previously, tended to reinforce the communal form of organization. However, Boutillier's study did not make clear what new pattern was replacing the old (communal) one. Our contention is that the adoption of a filial mode of land transmission is the new form of social organization

gaining acceptance among Burkinabe farmers in general and the farmers in the agricultural sector of Hounde in particular. This process corresponds to the adoption of a nuclear type of family organization as opposed to the extended family organization. It also indicates that these farmers enter another form of labor allocation and organization whereby active members in the household are limited to husband, wife(s) and their offspring.

The land tenure pattern adopted by a given household will be labelled "individualized", "communal", or "other", when such pattern corresponds, respectively, to a filial, adelphic, or any other mode of transmission. This operationalization stems from the discussion on landrights and land transmission to heirs in Chapter 4 above. The data analyzed is prospective since the respondents were asked who will inherit the land presently in their possession.

In the following, we will analyze the process of land tenure individualization by using four essential variables: ethnicity, land holding size, type of farming system and age of the respondents. The farming system practiced by an individual household will be labelled "improved" or "conservative" according to three essential criteria:

Improved Farming System		Conservative Farming System
(1) Emphasis on cotton production;	vs.	Emphasis on food crops production;
(2) Draft farming	vs.	Hoe farming;
(3) Cash sale earnings superior to 100,000 CFA francs.	vs.	Cash sale earnings inferior to 100,000 CFA Francs.

When they do not meet all the criteria described above, the farming system practices are considered mixed.

The following hypotheses will be tested:

1 - In-migrant (Mossi) farmers will engage in individualized land tenure practices to a greater extent than indigenous (Bwaba) farmers. This relationship is expected to hold for all sizes of holdings and age groups.

2 - Farmers using improved farming practices will engage in individualized land tenure practices to a greater extent than farmers not using improved farming practices. The relationship is expected to hold for all sizes of holdings and age groups.

3 - The adoption of improved farming practices will lead to an individualized land tenure pattern among Mossi in-migrants to a greater extent than among Bwaba farmers.

4 - Farmers in more developed villages will engage in individualized tenure patterns to a greater extent than those in relatively less developed villages.

Mossi In-migrants and Individualized Land Tenure Practices

Our concern in this section is to look at the individual responses of two ethnic groups to innovations, namely the adoption rates of individualized land tenure patterns by the Bwaba and Mossi ethnic groups. We expect however that the Mossi farmers will engage in individualized land tenure practices to a greater extent than Bwaba farmers, although these practices are

relatively new to both groups. A number of reasons sustain this hypothesis. First, the Mossi people are not indigenous to the research area. They originate from the Central Plateau where land has become a scarce resource due to the combined effects of soil depletion and heavy human concentration. Considering that they migrate with their immediate household members, the son of the head of household (rather than the brother who is absent and did not contribute his labor) is likely to take over the family business. Therefore, the Mossi migrants are less likely to keep up the communal pattern of land tenure organization. In addition the Mossi in-migrants are more cosmopolitan and therefore more open to innovations. Many had some experience as farm laborers in the plantation economy of the Ivory Coast where private land ownership was already developed in full scale. Furthermore, the phenomenon of in-migration is likely to activate a boundary maintenance reaction on the part of the Bwaba people, and foster the need to preserve their cultural identity by sticking to their traditional norms and customs.

Table 5-1 presents a cross-tabulation between land transmission patterns and ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The data reveal that more than half of the Mossi farmers utilize the individualized pattern, while more than 6 out of 10 Bwaba remain attached to the communal practice. However, about one-third of Bwaba farmers already engage in individualized land tenure practices. Thus, while the communal pattern is reversed

among the Mossi, the process is well underway for the indigenous Bwaba farmers. The Gamma value of .50 indicates a quite strong degree of association between land tenure patterns and ethnic group.

TABLE 5-1: LAND TENURE PATTERN AND ETHNIC AFFILIATION

TENURE PATTERN	ETHNIC GROUP	
	BWABA	MOSSI
	(in percent)	
Individualized	33.0	54.1
Communal	63.0	36.1
Other	4.0	9.8
Total	100.0	100.0
N	70	64

Gamma (computed for Individual and Communal categories) = -.50

Note: A negative sign indicates that a prediction of reverse order is more accurate. A positive sign would mean that a prediction of same order is more appropriate. (See Muller, 1970).

The percentage of Mossi farmers exceeds Bwaba farmers in adhering to the individualized land tenure pattern in all age groups (Table 5-2). However, the percentages are very close in the 17-35 age group, 46.2% Bwaba and 50% Mossi. This is certainly due to the relatively large number of young Bwaba farmers who adopt tenure arrangements other than individual or communal. Two types of responses were given by these farmers. Some felt that

the business should be managed by whomever is regarded the most capable to do so. Second, we encountered the idea that land should be divided among the active household members. Thus, the land may be inherited by an individual other than the younger brother or the son of the head of household.

TABLE 5-2: AGE GROUP AND TENURE PATTERNS AMONG BWABA AND MOSSI FARMERS

TENURE PATTERN	AGE AND ETHNIC GROUP					
	17 - 35		36 - 55		56 +	
	BWABA	MOSSI	BWABA	MOSSI	BWABA	MOSSI
	(in percent)					
Individual	46.2	50.0	40.0	48.5	6.0	83.0
Communal	30.8	50.0	60.0	40.5	94.0	17.0
Other	24.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0
N	13	10	40	37	17	12
Gamma *	0		-.28		-.98	

* The Gamma value is computed for the Individual and Communal categories.

Unlike the Mossi pattern, only young Bwaba farmers engage in relatively larger proportions in individualized tenure practices. They appear to be leading the change in land tenure arrangements among the indigenous people. This finding lends some support to the general belief that young farmers tend to be more open to innovations than older farmers. The difference in the behavior of

older Bwaba and older Mossi may be explained by the fact that the second group is more cosmopolitan in general. They are therefore more inclined to accept innovations.

Another variable was introduced, namely the total amount of land held by the respondents. The data show that more than half (53%) of Mossi farmers holding small acreages of land engaged in the communal pattern of land transmission. Conversely, only 35.5% of this category of Mossi farmers adopted the individualized pattern. This is the only instance in which a larger proportion of Mossi farmers adopted the communal pattern as opposed to the individualized pattern of tenure organization.

TABLE 5-3: SIZE OF HOLDINGS AND TENURE PATTERNS AMONG BWABA AND MOSSI FARMERS.

TENURE PATTERN	SIZE OF HOLDING AND ETHNIC GROUP					
	1.5 - 4.4		4.5 - 10.4		10.5 +	
	BWABA	MOSSI	BWABA	MOSSI	BWABA	MOSSI
	(in percent)					
Individual	46.7	35.5	38.0	57.5	19.0	80.0
Communal	46.7	53.0	55.0	33.5	81.0	20.0
Other	6.6	11.5	7.0	9.0	0.0	0.0
N	15	17	29	32	26	10
Gamma*	.14		-.45		-.89	

* The Gamma value is computed for the Individual and Communal categories.

Beyond the small acreage category, Mossi farmers outnumber their Bwaba counterparts in adopting the individualized pattern of land tenure. We note further that the percentage of Mossi farmers adopting such land tenure pattern increases with an increased size of land holdings. The percentage of adoption runs from 35.5% (semi-small acreage category) to 80% for farmers holding more than 10.5 hectares of land. Thus, the larger their land holdings, the more extensively the Mossi farmers practice an individualized land tenure pattern. On the other hand, we observe an inverse tendency for the Bwaba farmers. An equal proportion of small size farmers adopts the individualized and communal patterns. However, farmers holding more than 4.5 hectares of land predominantly engage in the communal pattern of land tenure. Thus, the larger the land holding, the less likely the Bwaba farmers are to engage in the individual land tenure pattern. In general, the Gamma values in Table 5-3 indicate a strong degree of association, except for the small acreage category. The absolute values of Gamma range from .14 to .89.

Overall, it can be concluded that Mossi migrant farmers in the agricultural sector of Hounde predominantly adopt the individualized land tenure pattern. However, an exception exists when they hold small pieces of land. In the latter case, half the farmers retain the communal land transmission pattern while only a third engage in the individualized pattern. The Bwaba farmers are less involved in the individualized tenure practice.

Only small size Bwaba farmers and young Bwaba farmers adopt such a pattern in relatively large numbers.

Improved and Conservative Farming Systems as they Relate to Land Tenure Individualization

For a long time, the sector of agriculture was considered the area which should be harnessed to finance the country's development efforts. Thus, agricultural policies focused on commercial crop production as a means to generate foreign exchange. French extension services and research institutions provided the conceptual and organizational framework for agricultural production and farmers involvement in the process. Since then, the generation of improved technologies and their adoption by farmers constituted the backbone of agricultural development programs. The technologies generated and the agricultural development strategies implemented were by no means neutral. For example, the adoption of improved farming practices by the indigenous farmers means that these producers enter new types of production relations by producing for national and international markets. Thus, they are obliged to adopt new production norms by acquiring the right inputs and improved technologies, by hiring labor, etc. However, the social environment in which they produce does not change at the same pace. Therefore, these producers will adapt the new production patterns to their own environment. For example, they may

complement the need for labor by using the extended family relations. Thus, cousins or nephews may work on the farm without being paid labor per se. However, these relatively distant relatives do not have the same status as the immediate members of the household. The household head who made the investments will pass on the business to his immediate relative (i.e., his son). Because the development strategies focus on individual farmers (e.g., contraction and payment of loans) they impact quite significantly upon the traditional patterns of production and social organization which are primarily group oriented. Although the developed farmers retain some traditional features, the end result is qualitatively different from the original forms. Thus, the agricultural development policies also lead to new social differentiations among the farmers. A first group of innovators gained social recognition and was drawn into more modern patterns of production. A second group of farmers maintained skepticism and retained primarily traditional patterns of production organization. Considering land tenure individualization as a new form of social organization, we expect that farmers using improved farming practices (therefore, more open to innovations) will engage in individualized land tenure practices to a greater extent than farmers who preserve conservative farming systems and production organization.

TABLE 5-4: FARMING SYSTEM AND LAND TENURE PATTERNS

FARMING SYSTEM	LAND TENURE PATTERNS				N
	INDIVIDUAL	COMMUNAL	OTHER	TOTAL	
	(in percent)				
Improved	40.0	55.4	4.6	100.0	65
Mixed	47.0	47.0	6.0	100.0	53
Conservative	47.4	36.8	15.8	100.0	19

GAMMA (computed for Individual aand Commuanl categories) = -.14

Table 5-4 presents the results of a cross-tabulation between the types of farming system and the forms of land tenure practiced by the respondents. We note that more respondents in the Improved farming category adopt the communal as opposed to the individual form of land tenure organization (55.4% and 40% respectively).

Farmers in the mixed farming system category are equally distributed between the individual and communal land tenure patterns (47% each).

As far as farmers engaging in conservative farm practices are concerned, 47.4% adopt the individual pattern of land tenure and 36.8% stick to the communal mode of organization. Compared to the first category (i.e., farmers engaged in improved farming), a higher proportion of farmers using conservative farm practices engages in individual land tenure organization. Additionally, mixed farmers adopt the individual land tenure pattern in

slightly higher proportions than improved farmers (47% vs 40%). Thus, farmers using improved farming do not engage in the individual land tenure practices to a greater extent than conservative and mixed farmers. The Gamma value of .14 also corroborates this conclusion. It indicates a weak degree of association between farming system and land tenure pattern and, therefore, fails to support the hypothesis as stated.

When the relationship between farming system, land tenure patterns and size of land holdings is examined (Table 5-5), the findings suggest that the smaller size land holders who practice improved farming are more likely to adopt the individual land tenure pattern than those practicing conservative farming on the same size land holding. The inverse relationship holds for larger size land holders, that is, the larger the size of land holding, the less likely the improved farmers are to adopt the individual land tenure pattern. The proportion of improved farmers who engage in individualized land tenure pattern tends to decrease with increasing size of land holdings. In addition, the proportion of farmers in the small size land category practicing improved farming and individualized land tenure pattern is greater than the proportion of farmers practicing conservative farming and individualized land tenure. On the other hand, the proportion of conservative farmers who engage in individual land tenure tends to increase in the medium land size category and decrease in the larger land size category (see Table 5-5). This

relationship suggests that the adoption of improved farm practices does not have the same meaning for all respondents as far as its implication for land tenure organization is concerned. We shall examine this difference in meaning in the next section.

The percentages of mixed farmers in Table 5-5 do not show any great disproportions. Only in the medium land size category that slightly more farmers adopt the individual over the communal pattern of land tenure.

TABLE 5-5: SIZE OF HOLDINGS, FARMING SYSTEMS AND LAND TENURE PATTERN

TENURE PATTERN	SIZE OF HOLDING AND FARMING PRACTICES								
	1.5 - 4.4			4.5 - 10.4			10.5 +		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)								
Individual	50.0	44.4	33.5	42.5	52.0	71.0	33.3	44.4	33.3
Communal	50.0	50.0	44.5	48.5	44.0	14.5	66.7	55.6	66.7
Other	0.0	5.6	22.0	9.0	4.0	14.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
N	8	18	9	33	25	7	24	9	3
Gamma *		.06			-.18			-.18	

(1) = Improved, (2) = Mixed, (3) = Conservative.

* The Gamma values are computed for Individual and Communal categories.

Table 5-6 presents the data relating farming system, land tenure patterns and age of the respondents. Only for the young are improved farming practitioners more likely to adopt the

individual land tenure pattern than farmers engaged in conservative farming.

TABLE 5-6: AGE GROUP, FARMING SYSTEM AND LAND TENURE PATTERN

TENURE PATTERN	AGE GROUP AND FARMING PRACTICES								
	17 - 35			36 - 55			56 - 75		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)								
Individual	43.0	63.5	0.0	41.0	46.4	50.0	33.5	45.5	50.0
Communal	43.0	27.5	100.0	59.0	50.0	25.0	66.5	45.5	50.0
Other	14.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	25.0	0.0	9.0	0.0
N	14	11	1	39	28	12	9	11	6
Gamma *	-.30			-.15			-.02		

(1) = Improved, (2) = Mixed, (3) = Conservative.
* The Gamma values are computed for Individual and Communal categories.

Among farmers aged 36 to 75, conservative farming practitioners are more likely to engage in individual land tenure pattern than improved farming practitioners. On the other hand, the proportion of farmers with improved farming practices who adopt a communal tenure organization increases with increasing age.

The mixed farming practitioners outnumber the improved farmers in adopting the individual land tenure pattern in all ages. However, the conservatives are even more numerous when farmers are 36 years of age and older.

To conclude, our evidence shows that the adoption of improved farming practices in the agricultural sector of Hounde is not accompanied by a reversal of the communal patterns of land transmission and household organization. The individual mode of land tenure organization is only emerging. The data suggest that among farmers who engage in improved farm practices, those who hold smaller sizes of land and those relatively younger appear to be more interested in the new form of tenure organization. In fact, most young farmers hold small and semi-small sizes of land (see Table 4-3). Therefore, the finding is congruent with the general belief that younger farmers are more likely to innovate than older farmers.

Overall, the hypothesis stating that farmers who use improved farming practices will engage in individualized land tenure to a greater extent than those who are using conservative farming practices is not supported by the data. This finding may be explained by the fact that land tenure individualization does not constitute a significant departure from the basic traditional norms of the farmers. It seems to be compatible with the indigenous understanding of man/land relations. Therefore, this new form of land tenure organization was adapted to the circumstances and adopted even by farmers seeking the preservation of the original patterns of production and social organization. Regarding improved farming practitioners, it seems that their adoption of new production patterns is not followed by

a rejection of the tradional social relations. In other words, the traditional norms remain rather strong in these communities.

Meaning of the Adoption of Improved Farming Practices for Both Ethnic Groups

The first hypothesis dealt with the practice of individualized land tenure patterns by Bwaba and Mossi farmers. The data suggest that Mossi farmers engage in the new pattern of tenure organization to a greater extent than Bwaba farmers. The second hypothesis addresses the effect of improved farming practices on land tenure patterns. The results show that the farmers involved in improved methods of farming do not engage in individualized tenure practices to a greater extent than those who use conservative farming methods. The present section aims to assess the joint effect of ethnicity and improved farming practices on land tenure organization. The question we need to answer is whether the adoption of improved farming practices has a different meaning for one or the other ethnic group. The Mossi farmers are more likely to engage in land tenure individualization in greater proportions because they are in-migrants and therefore removed from the immediate influence of their original customs and norms. On the other hand, despite the adoption of improved farming practices, the indigenous Bwaba farmers are expected to be more influenced by the norms and traditional patterns of their communities. They are also likely to have a boundary maintenance reaction vis-a-vis the migrant community.

TABLE 5-7: FARMING PRACTICES AND LAND TENURE PATTERNS, BY ETHNIC GROUP

TENURE PATTERN	ETHNIC GROUP AND FARMING PRACTICES					
	BWABA			MOSSI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)					
Individual	35.0	32.0	0.0	50.0	56.5	53.0
Communal	61.0	63.5	100.0	42.9	36.5	29.4
Other	4.0	4.5	0.0	7.1	7.0	17.6
N	46	22	2	14	30	17
Gamma *		.11			-.07	

(1) = Improved, (2) = Mixed, (3) = Conservative.
* The Gamma values are computed for the Individual and Communal categories.

Focusing first on the performance of Bwaba farmers involved in improved farming practices, the data in Table 5-7 show that a lesser percentage engages in individual land tenure pattern as opposed to the communal pattern (35% and 61%, respectively). As far as Mossi farmers are concerned, 50% of those practicing improved farming also adopt the individual land tenure pattern. A lesser percentage (about 43%) adopts the communal mode of land tenure organization. In other words, the first results in Table 5-7 show that the Mossi farmers practicing improved farming are represented in greater proportions in the individual pattern of land tenure organization when compared to the proportion of Bwaba farmers also practicing improved farming. However, the adoption

of improved farming practices has almost no effect for the Mossi. About half the conservative and improved farmers adopt the individual land tenure pattern. The effect of improved farming practices seems stronger for the Bwaba (35% vs 0%) but the low number of conservative cases (N=2) casts some doubt on the reliability of the percentages. Indeed, comparing improved Bwaba and mixed would also suggest that farming system has no effect for the Bwaba either.

Second, comparing the performance of Bwaba farmers engaged in improved farming on one hand, and those engaged in conservative farming on the other, we note that all Bwaba engaged in conservative farming also adopt the communal mode of land tenure organization. However, the small number of observations aamong conservative farmers do not allow a strong conclusion. A quite large number of Bwaba farmers are represented in the mixed farming system and most of them (63.5%) adopt the communal mode of land tenure organization.

Turning to the performance of Mossi farmers engaged in improved farming on one hand and those engaged in conservative farming on the other hand, we note that a slightly greater percentage practicing conservative farming adopts the individual land tenure pattern as opposed to the communal pattern. Compared to the above finding on Mossi farmers engaged in improved farming and individual tenure pattern, we can conclude that the type of farming practices does not matter for Mossi farmers. Whether

practicing improved or conservative farming, they engage in the individualized land tenure pattern in greater proportions. The percentages of mixed farmers also confirm this conclusion. More than half of Mossi mixed farmers adopt the individual land tenure pattern. Nevertheless, a good number of conservative Mossi farmers are classified under "other" mode of land tenure organization. These farmers consider that they hold temporary landrights and cannot transfer their land to heirs (see section on landrights and land tenure transmission to heirs).

Overall, two essential conclusions can be drawn from this section:

1- The Bwaba's adoption of improved farming practices does not seem to determine the choice of an individual land tenure pattern. The improved, mixed and conservative farmers predominantly adopt the communal mode of land tenure organization.

2- The Mossi farmers are equally likely to engage in the individual tenure pattern whether they practice improved, mixed or conservative farming.

Several reasons may explain why improvement leads to individualization for the Bwaba but not for the Mossi. One may certainly include the need for Bwaba farmers to assert their cultural identity vis-a-vis Mossi in-migrants.

Comparative Analysis of Survey Villages: Impact of Development Activity on the Traditional Bwaba Tenure System

In this section, we intend to discuss more specifically the cases of Boni, Dohoun, Maro, and Tioro. The other two villages (Sebedougou and Lamba) are left out because of their particular context. Lamba is exclusively inhabited by Mossi in-migrants and Sebedougou comprises three different ethnic groups (Bwaba, Mossi and Peul).

Boni and Maro are considered relatively developed. First, they have a very high adoption rate of improved farming practices. Second, more than three-fifths of the farmers in these villages earn better than 100,000 CFA Francs annually (see Table 3-19). Third, the villages of Boni and Maro benefit from a variety of development amenities such as well established extension services, good communication networks, training centers, etc. On the other hand, Tioro and Dohoun are considered less developed. First, 25% or more farmers are in the low income group and less than 60% of the farmers fall into medium to upper income groups (see Table 3-19). Second, these villages are poorly equipped.

We expect that the development amenities in the villages of Boni and Maro will act as facilitating factors in breaking away from traditional norms and practices.

Because of the migration phenomenon in the area, we will perform the test at two different levels. First, we will compare

the villages of Boni and Dohoun in order to account for the impacts of development activities with a minimal Mossi influence. Second, the comparison between the villages of Maro and Tioro will reveal the same impacts with the presence of Mossi farmers in relatively large numbers.

Impacts of Development on Traditional Bwaba Tenure System in Low In-migration Villages

TABLE 5-8: LAND TENURE PATTERNS AND FARMING PRACTICES AMONG BWABA IN BONI AND DOHOUN

LAND TENURE	FARMING PRACTICES IN BONI AND DOHOUN					
	BONI			DOHOUN		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)					
Individual	56.0	62.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Communal	44.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
Other	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N	16	8	0	12	12	0

(1) = Improved, (2) = Mixed, (3) = Conservative.

The data in Table 5-8 show that in the village of Boni, the majority (56.0%) of farmers with improved farming practices engage in land tenure individualization. One should recall that Boni is exclusively inhabited by Bwaba farmers. Thus, the above result seems contradictory with the previous data (Table 5-1)

showing that indigenous Bwaba farmers remained largely attached to the communal pattern of land tenure organization, aand with Table 5-7 which showed that even improved Bwaba were predominantly communal. However, accounting for the context of villages such as Boni, we can find indication that these Bwaba farmers may have been influenced by the development amenities they benefit from. The development effect seems to determine their adoption of the individual land tenure pattern.

Conversely, all improved farmers in the village of Dohoun adopt the communal mode of land tenure organization. By comparing the latter finding with the Bwaba's performance in Tables 5-1 and 5-7, it would seem that the Dohoun farmers account for a good part of the fact that Bwaba remained largely attached to the traditional mode of land tenure pattern (Table 5-1) and also the fact that even improved Bwaba were predominantly communal (Table 5-7). Several factors may explain the Dohoun situation. This village is often cited for having vigorously resisted the colonial takeover. The people are proud of their cultural identity which they seek to preserve. Dohoun is also located in a remote area and lack a good communication network. Finally, Dohoun ranks far behind Boni in terms of farmers' income levels and the adoption of improved farm practices.

In reference to the data presented in Table 5-1, one may deduce that the Bwaba farmers who adopt the individual land tenure pattern come primarily from villages presenting a number of development amenities.

Impacts of Development on Traditional Bwaba Tenure System in High In-migration Villages

The villages of Maro and Tioro will be utilized in order to illustrate the impacts of Mossi in-migrants on Bwaba villages. Although the village of Maro does not match the level of farm mechanization, cash crop production, and income level found in Boni, it ranks ahead of the village of Tioro because of the agricultural services extended (e.g., agricultural credit program), the availability of a number of other amenities (train station, formal school,etc.), and the overall income level of farmers. In contrast, Tioro does not even have its own agricultural extension post (the extension agent comes from another village), let alone the basic development incentives like a credit program which enables farmers to acquire improved technologies.

In Tioro, the Mossi migrants constitute about 85% of the total population. As mentioned earlier, the large number of in-migrants is certainly due to the willingness of indigenous people to help in-migrants to find a piece of land. On the other hand, the village of Maro has many fewer in-migrants. But with about 50% of Mossi in the sample, the village of Maro is regarded the most influenced by in-migrants in the high income and relatively developed group of villages in the research area.

In general, we expect that Bwaba farmers will tend to engage in land tenure individualization in Maro. However, they will be

particularly conservative in Tioro where the level of development is low and Mossi in-migrants are present in relatively large numbers.

Comparing the performance of Bwaba farmers in Maro and Tioro (Table 5-9), we note first of all that 43% of the farmers practicing improved farming in Maro also adopt the individual land tenure pattern. In Tioro, no Bwaba farmers engaged in improved farming adopts this land tenure pattern (Table 5-10). These farmers rather choose the communal pattern of land tenure. Therefore, the data in Table 5-9 suggest that in a relatively developed setting (Maro), a significant number of indigenous Bwaba farmers who are engaged in improved farming practices are also more likely to adopt the individual pattern of land tenure organization than they would be in a less developed setting.

TABLE 5-9: LAND TENURE PATTERNS AND FARMING PRACTICES IN MARO, BY ETHNIC GROUP

LAND TENURE	FARMING PRACTICES AND ETHNIC GROUP					
	BWABA			MOSSI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)					
Individual	43.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	78.0	0.0
Communal	43.0	50.0	100.0	0.0	11.0	0.0
Other	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	100.0
N	7	4	1	1	9	0

TABLE 5-10: LAND TENURE PATTERNS AND FARMING PRACTICES IN TIORO, BY ETHNIC GROUP

LAND TENURE	FARMING PRACTICES AND ETHNIC GROUP					
	BWABA			MOSSI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(in percent)					
Individual	0.0	N/A	0.0	100.0	43.0	58.5
Communal	100.0	N/A	100.0	0.0	57.0	33.5
Other	0.0	N/A	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
N	2	0	1	2	7	11

(1) = Improved, (2) = Mixed, (3) = Conservative.

Table 5-10 shows that only Mossi farmers adopt the individual land tenure pattern in low development setting (Tioro). In addition, the majority of Mossi farmers practicing conservative farming engage in individual land tenure. This finding suggests that even in an undeveloped village, and for farmers practicing conservative farming, the Mossi are more likely to adopt individual . rather than communal land tenure organization. However, the small number of respondents practicing improved farming in these two villages should be noted. This may impair the reliability of the percentages computed for those villages.

Overall, the adoption of improved farming practices leads Bwaba farmers in Maro to engage in individualized land tenure practices in large numbers (Table 5-9). However, the data in

Table 5-7 did show that Bwaba farmers practicing improved farming do not predominantly choose the individual land tenure pattern. Thus, there seems to be a development effect which works toward the involvement of Bwaba farmers in the new land tenure pattern, in confirmation of hypothesis 4. In Tioro however, only the Mossi in-migrants account for the same practice. No indigenous farmer is engaged in the individualized pattern of land tenure in the latter village. Two reasons may explain this level of performance: (1) the poor development conditions in Tioro, and (2) the high sense of community developed by the indigenous farmers. The latter reason may be linked to the boundary maintenance reaction which is activated once a relatively large in-migrant community is established in the village.

Summary

The analysis of the likelihood that Mossi in-migrants engage in land tenure individualization to a greater extent than indigenous Bwaba tend to confirm the hypothesis. A comparison of the performance of farmers from both ethnic groups who engage in improved farm practices as opposed to those who practice conservative farming suggests that the former practice the individualized pattern of land tenure in larger proportions. However, the improvement of farming practices has not brought about a complete reversal in the communal patterns of land transmission and household organization for the total sample, and

notably among the indigenous farmers. In general, more farmers retain the communal mode of organization. Nevertheless, the analysis at the village level shows that the behavior of the indigenous farmers varies depending on the development conditions of their villages. In a relatively high level of development setting (e.g., Boni), the indigenous farmers are heavily engaged in the process of land tenure individualization. A similar shift was not identified in a relatively low development setting (e.g., Dohoun) even when the indigenous farmers adopt improved farm practices.

Chapter 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The main objective of this study was to analyse the nature and content of the existing land tenure systems in the context of agricultural development in the Hounde sector. The data suggest the existence of a double effect of continuity and change. On one hand, traditional cultural and social relations in handling land matters tend to persist. On the other hand, changes are being introduced through development programs by the adoption of improved farming practices and commercial crop production. The phenomenon of in-migration also contributes to the process of change through the diffusion of new types of experiences.

Continuity and Change in the Bwaba Land Institutions

An institution is regarded as a set of sanctioned relations that unite individuals within a group. It involves fairly established and recognized apparatus through which a given idea takes a concrete form and is put to work in order to meet the needs of society. The Bwaba land institutions are shaped along the dominant conception of man/land relations and work in harmony with the structure of power and authority of the Bwa society.

The Bwaba land tenure system is based on the concept that a prescribed area of land belongs to a vast family (lineage) of which many are dead, few are living and countless are still unborn. The exercise of customary authority is centralized at the

level of the first occupants of the village. The earth priest or land master is the supreme authority who makes sure the above thinking concerning the land tenure system is preserved and perpetuated through generations. His "right of authority" allows him to organize the land tenure on the basis of the traditions inherited from his ancestors. This authority is reinforced by a common fear of supernatural punishments because of the undifferentiated nature of the religious and judicial roles performed by the earth priest. He performs land rituals (religious role) for the benefit of the whole community and also intervenes in matters of land regulation and settlement of disputes which correspond to a juridical role. The latter is sustained and given weight on account of the former.

Because the Bwa people are organized in village communities and because of a relative organizational autonomy of the different lineages in diversely composed villages, the established authority of the earth priest tends to be somewhat shadowed by the role played by these individual lineages (e.g., performance of land rituals at the lineage level). However, the intervention of the chiefs of lineage in religious as well as land tenure matters should not be overestimated. It should be seen as a division of duties and responsibilities,one of the distinctive characteristics of the Bwa village communities. A significant threat to the original power structure of the Bwa society stems from the integration of formely autonomous village

communities into a larger network of regional and national centers of decision. A second concern comes from the introduction of new religions (Islam and Christianity) which contrast with the essentially fetichist practices that sustain the religious function of the earth priest. Thirdly, the questioning of traditional mythical representations by some indigenous farmers and doubts created about the magical capability of the earth priest are factors that affect the norms and established apparatus of the Bwa land institutions. This trend is reinforced by some provisions contained in the Presidential Ordinance on Tenure and Agrarian Reform (e.g., Article 25). Undoubtedly, a nationally defined structure will be set up in a near future.

Current Patterns of Land Tenure in the Hounde Agricultural Sector

The survey data show four modes of access to agricultural land in the research area: (1) inheritance, (2) first occupancy, (3) borrowing, and (4) gift. Thus, in contrast to many African countries, land purchase, renting or share cropping are forms of ownership alien to the context of study. All four alternatives of access to land are opened to indigenous farmers, whereas outsiders have basically two alternatives: land borrowing and gift transaction. The land tenure characteristics are summarized as follows:

1 - The land is communally owned and the individual usage is understood within the limits of this communal ownership.

2 - The lineage or segment of lineage controls land allocation and transmission to successive generations.

3 - First settlement confers the prerogatives of customary authority and also permanent landrights in the prescribed area. Several lineages settling together all deserve a permanent right on various portions of land. They share the different customary responsibilities as well.

4 - Land acquired from a permanent right holder is assigned a temporary right of cultivation. Guests of indigenous lineages and, in fact, all in-migrants, tend to be confined to this position of temporary right holder. Hence, they have relative insecurity on their land holdings.

Looking at the distribution of holdings by ethnic group, we found that only indigenous Bwaba farmers held large acreages of land (i.e., more than 34 hectares). The Peul farmers are confined to the two smallest size categories (i.e., no more than 10 hectares). The Mossi farmers, however, have access to semi-large holdings (i.e., up to 30 hectares of land). Yet, the pattern of land holding is not related to the income level of farmers. On one hand, every income level had access to all sizes of land, from small to semi-large holdings. On the other hand, it was found that the low income farmers outnumber the upper income farmers in the large holding category. Moreover, the age variable

also does not explain the bias of land distribution in favor of indigenous farmers. Given the relative availability of land in the study area, it was finally concluded that the ethnic affiliation is the determinant factor in securing substantial tracts of land. This tendency was apparent in the few alternatives opened to outsiders to gain access to a piece of land and it was also reinforced by the indigenous boundary maintenance reaction observed in areas where in-migrants settled in relatively large numbers.

Differences and Similarities between Bwaba and Mossi Land Tenure Patterns in the Research Area

Mossi and Bwaba farmers were represented in almost equal proportions in the sample (45.4% and 50.4%, respectively). Both ethnic groups have large size households and a large number of active members in their units of production. However, most Bwaba were Fetishists and most Mossi were Moslems. The difference in religious beliefs is a significant cultural distinction that influences the way these groups relate to land rituals and to the religious role performed by the customary authority. In addition, the Mossi farmers are characterized by their cosmopoliteness and a great majority travelled in and outside the country. Conversely, most Bwaba did not leave their village of birth for a period of six months or more. Thus, they have been less exposed to the outside world and have confronted other cultural and

social experiences to a lesser degree. Therefore, the combined effect of in-migration and outside sponsored development activities represents new socio-cultural and economic factors which impinge upon the indigenous social life and patterns of organization.

Most Mossi farmers have negative attitudes toward Bwaba land rituals. They do not request the customary services offered by the earth priest and about two-thirds affirm clearly that they are not favorable to the role performed by this traditional authority. The difference in religious beliefs constitutes the main obstacle for the Mossi's allegiance to the role performed by the earth priest. In contrast, most Bwaba react favorably to the religious role of the earth priest. However, a minority either expresses a mixed feeling or states a negative attitude in regard to the role performed by the local customary authority. Two essential reasons explain such attitudes: (1) some indigenous farmers have adopted new religious beliefs, and (2) some others, less numerous,challenge the "right of authority" of the earth priest upon the entire group, i.e, his direct involvement in land tenure regulation. The above reasons act as a unifying factor between the majority of Mossi farmers and a minority of indigenous Bwaba.

A second unifying factor between Bwaba and Mossi stems from their common involvement in the process of land tenure restructuring in the study area. On the whole however, Mossi

farmers appear the leading group in adopting the new pattern of land tenure individualization. This was observed both in low and high development settings. While the communal pattern of land tenure organization is completely reversed among the Mossi, it still remains the dominant practice among the Bwaba in general. Only at the level of relatively developed villages is it that the Bwaba farmers engage quite heavily in the new individualized pattern of land tenure organization. The latter suggests that the adoption of a new pattern of land tenure by Bwaba farmers is strongly associated with relatively highly development settings. The same pattern is only emerging in villages with a low degree of involvement in development actions.

Process of Land Tenure Restructuring and Relevancy of the Articulation Theory

The analysis of social processes and development in agrarian countries has long been dominated by the dualist perspective that perceives the formation of two distinct sectors of production: the traditional sector, characterized by its backwardness, and the modern sector, a factor of progressive change. Hence, the development efforts were designed to boost the modern sector at the expense of the traditional backwardness. The merit of the articulation theorists is to go beyond the dualist interpretation of social processes in agrarian countries and show the adaptation of indigenous social forms to the new (colonial) order.

Balandier (1970) noted that we can no longer speak of African tradition as a self-sustaining social order because it was disorganized by the capitalist order. Sine (1975) added that the African tradition is no longer an order, it was perverted, disarticulated vis-a-vis a newly emerging system and articulated otherwise.

As far as land tenure systems are concerned, the disarticulation of the communal order is seen, for example, in the breaking-up of extended family networks and the concession of individual forms of production organization.

However, the communal form of land tenure organization retains some strength and even sometimes determines the course of actions. For example, the preservation of original modes of access to agricultural land determines and limits as well the initiatives of young progressive farmers. Yet, the communal order is not self-sustaining in that its adherents also engage, for example, in cash crop production and commercial forms of production organization. However, we need a more comprehensive assessment of the relative strength of the communal relations because a potential danger (apparent in Sine's writing) might be to ignore altogether the sometime decisive role played by some traditional customs and social relations and to proceed solely on the basis of an abstract theoretical interpretation.

The articulation theory is nevertheless a useful instrument in analysing the process of restructuring land tenure in Burkina.

It allows one to grasp the process of change in a dynamic perspective in terms of the interplay between various and sometimes contradictory forces.

Policy Implications

This study was carried out in a particular context. A land tenure and agrarian reform is underway and purports to transform the social and economic basis of the current land tenure and agrarian structures in the country. Although limited in scope (Hounde agricultural sector), our study may help to rethink some conceptual issues and hopefully redirect the project emphases.

The land reform project was designed under the assumption that "the land and agrarian rights of Burkina Faso were marked by a bourgeois and feudal seal and therefore used against the working masses" (Presidential Ordinance, 1984). In effect, the land bills passed between 1906 and 1963 were designed to limit and alter the applicability of customary landrights. Ultimately, these bills sought to replace customary landrights by private property rights in the western sense. In practice however, only the State, some private corporations and a few private individuals benefitted from these legislative orders. The successive land bills have proven ineffective in transforming the secular land tenure practices in rural areas.

Our study suggests that land inalienability is still enforced by the rural masses. Contrary to some African countries

(e.g., the Futa region in Senegal), chiefs and permanent right holders do not receive any dues or ground rents. Some observers have mistakenly identified the offering of chicken or tine of cereal crops to the land master or permanent right holder with a form of rent paid by land borrowers. However, all the earth priests we discussed this matter with insist on the symbolic nature of such customs. The real issue posed by the Ordinance is whether or not the secular land tenure practices can be characterized as feudal. As it seems, this concept is utilized to mean that customary authorities are fief holders. Two essential points militate against this contention: (1) the land is communally held by lineages, and (2) the customary authority is just a coordinator of land matters. He cannot be seen as a State ruler. Besides, many Burkinabe societies are Stateless, including the Bwaba society. Therefore, the use of the concept of feudalism is all-embracing and obscures rather than illumines the analysis of specific variables (Goody, 1977). Such a theoretical flaw has a practical implication because the customary authorities are sometimes wrongly targetted. Our own experiences and discussions reveal, for example, that not all customary authorities oppose the nationalization of land resources by the State. It is important to realize that they are promoted at their position of customary authority as senior members of the lineage of first occupants. The process of cultural and social change in general teaches us that even the customary authorities are sometimes

uncomfortable in the role they are supposed to perform. For instance, some do not recognize themselves in the fetishist practices which constitute, indeed one basis of customary land tenure organization.

"It is now universally acknowledged that the functions of Government are not restricted to the maintenance of Law and Order. The Government has in the mid-20th century more important functions to develop the economy in every aspect." (Pratt, 1973) However, the Governmental reform action should not be designed to alienate the very people who are favorable to its own enterprise. Such action should be grounded first and foremost on a good knowledge and stand of the various forces involved.

The biased distribution of land holdings in favor of indigenous farmers and subsequent insecurity of outsiders to gain access and maintain possession of their land were singled out as essential factors creating inter-ethnic oppositions and conflicts. Therefore, any land tenure and agrarian reform should seek a solution to these sensitive areas. It is understood that not all regions in the country are experiencing identical land problems. Thus, a comprehensive research effort is needed in order to understand the depth and breadth of existing problems and to specify the necessary solutions along regional specificities.

Pratt (1973) contended that "the study of the best form of tenurial transition in any developing situation is best left to

the Agricultural Economist rather than the Agricultural Technician or even the Pure Social Scientist". However, only a page later he contradicted the above statement by pointing out the essential dimension of the educational factor: "It is necessary for Governments in particular to embark upon policies to educate the people about the necessity for changes in the institutional framework, changes in land tenure, and changes in the method of fragmented holdings". Is the Agricultural Economist the sole Social Scientist dealing with social institutions? Our contention is that tenurial reform involves more than economics. Man/land relations encompass cultural and sociological dimensions and a reform necessitates the collaborative efforts of all social scientists. Agricultural, Forestry, and Livestock Technicians should also contribute, especially in the domains of land surveys, forest and livestock management. The importance of a comprehensive basic research in these matters cannot be overestimated.

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APPENDIX

Republic of Upper Volta
Unity - Labor - Justice

National Council of the Revolution

Presidency of the Republic.

Ordinance #50/84/Pres
On the Tenure and Agrarian
Reorganization.

The President of the National Council of the Revolution (C.N.R.)
Chief of State,

-- Considering the proclamation of August 4, 1983;
-- Considering the Ordinance #83 - 001/CNR/Pres of August 4, 1983 establishing the National Council of the Revolution;
-- Considering the decree #83 - 021/CNR/Pres of August 24, 1983 nominating the Government;
-- Considering the Ordinance #82 - 021/CNR/Pres of November 14, 1983 reorganizing the territorial administration;
-- Considering the Law #77 - 60 - AN of July 12, 1960 regulating the land of private domain in Upper Volta, together with its modifications and addenda;
-- Considering the decree of September 29, 1928 regulating public domain together with its modifications and addenda;
-- Considering the decree of July 26, 1932 reorganizing land property in French West Africa;
-- Considering the decree of May 20, 1955 on the tenure and domanial reorganization in French West Africa and its decree of application of July 10, 1956;
-- Considering the Law #29 - 63 - AN of July 24, 1963 authorizing the Government to put aside for the State portions of land where special constructions are built, or land scarcely inhabited or far from metropolitain areas;

ORDERS,

PREAMBLE

Burkina Faso, as underscored in the Address of Political Orientation, because of imperialist domination and exploitation, remains a backward agrarian country where the primary sector (essentially agriculture and animal husbandry) employs more than 90% of the population without being able to ensure food self-sufficiency to the brave Burkinabe people.

This situation, on the whole paradoxical, joins together with other facts to explain rural exodus, the massive out-magration of young people from our villages toward other countries, but also and above all toward big national urban centers, thus, generating numerous social problems, the more urgent of which is the issue of shelter. These two economic and social facts situate well enough the importance of land in our country, notably since the creation of the National Council of the Revolution (C.N.R.) and the launching of the Democratic and Popular Revolution (R.D.P.).

To give all its meaning and real breath to the revolutionary principle "the power and all the power to the people" and to guarantee our militant people the material, political and juridical conditions needed for its full self-realization, the C.N.R. and its Government, translating the deep rooted aspirations of the essential classes and social groups of the R.D.P., working masses and peasants notably, decided to elaborate a new statute of land and to enumerate the chief principles for a reorganization of the rural world.

In effect, the revolutionary objectives of food self-sufficiency and a shelter for everyone cannot be achieve without a tenure and agrarian system which allows a rational settlement and use of land viewed as grounds, i.e., from the point of view of productivity and social justice.

Because of the interaction between socio-political structures on one hand, tenure and agrarian structures on the other, the land and agrarian rights of Burkina Faso were marked by a bourgeois and feudal seal and therefore used against the working masses.

The struggle engaged on August 4, 1983 by our militant people is an anti-imperialist struggle, i.e., a struggle for national independence, thus, a struggle for a true economic independence. It is in this noble direction that one should consider and comprehend the on-going tenure and agrarian reform which purports to promote our country's economy on the basis of its own resources and to improve the physical conditions of all the working masses.

Fatherland or death, we shall overcome!

Article 1: It was created a National Estate Domain (D.F.N.) comprising all lands within the national territory and those acquired by the State and secondary public bodies outside the country.

TITLE 1 - ON THE CONSISTENCE OF THE D.F.N.

Article 2: The National Estate Domain comprises:
a) The land formely defined or classified as public domain of the State and secondary public bodies;
b) The land controlled by the State and the private domain of secondary public bodies, assigned or not, conceded or not;
c) The land assigned titles and belonging to individual or legal entities under a private right;
d) The land held under customary rules;
e) The land located in foreign countries and belonging to the State and to the secondary public bodies.

Article 3: The National Estate Domain is the exclusive property of the State by full right.

Article 4: The land titles formely assigned to individuals (physical or legal) are nullified. They may be replaced by usufructuary titles.

Article 5: The land of the DFN, except those located in foreign countries and those which might be conceded through the international convention in charge with a delimitation of national boundaries with neighboring countries, are inalienable, not prescriptible and not seizable.

TITLE II - ON THE EQUIPMENT OF THE DFN

Article 6: The Ministers in charge with Urbanism and Territorial Administration should proceed, each in his/her own domain and before any equipment of cities and towns, with the determination of the administrative boundaries and the conception of a blue print of equipment and urbanism.

Article 7: The initiative of parcelling out cities and towns belongs both to the Minister in charge with Urbanism and the Minister in charge with Territorial Administration.

Article 8: The procedure of parcelling out comprises the following steps:
1) On request of the proper authority, the surveyor launches a survey of the area to be parcelled out, mandatorily followed by a survey report;

2) On this basis, the town planner writes a proposal of housing development which is then submitted to a technical committee comprising the local administrative authorities and the executive body of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (C.D.R.) of the concerned city or locality;

3) The final proposal is adopted by a conjoint administrative order of the Ministries in charge with Urbanism and Territorial Administration.

Article 9: The Ministers in charge with Agriculture, Livestock, Water and Forests must proceed, before any harnessing of the rural space, to the elaboration of a systematic pedological survey in order to evaluate the land according to ecological zones.

Article 10: The equipment of the DFN distinguishes between two types of zones: the urban zones intended for housing development and subsequent activities; and the rural zones where agricultural, forestry and livestock activities are undertaken.

TITLE III - ON THE MANAGEMENT OF D.F.N. LAND

Chapter 1 - On the Management Principles

Article 11: The Minister in charge with National Domains and, by delegation, the secondary public bodies and Burkinabe diplomatic and consular representations in foreign countries, assure the management of the DFN.

Article 12: The Minister in charge with National Domains will proceed to the establishment of cadastre in urban and rural zones.

Article 13: Some real estate of the DFN, because of their nature, destination or assigment, benefit from particular measures of management and protection. They are:
a) waterways and their beds, sources and their dependencies, lakes, ponds, and their acquisitions in their legal boundaries;
b) railways, roads, telegraph or telephone lines and services, lines of communication of any nature together with their legal acquisitions and dependencies;
c) airdromes, airports, airterminals so as their dependencies together with their acquisitions and easements, as defined by international regulations and national legislations;
d) pieces of work executed for public utility in order to use water and convey energy;
e) pieces of work for the nation's land and air defense;
f) public monuments, markets and demarcated cimeteries;

g) deposits of ore and quarries;
h) generally, goods of any nature designed for direct public usage.

Article 14: The real estate enumerated in Article 13 entail riparian estates of public utility whose nature and importance are determined according to the assigned destination of the concerned pieces of ground.

Article 15: No compensation is due to the building or equipment owners because of these easements except when the full exercise of the easements necessitates the destruction of buildings or plantations belonging to private individuals.

Article 16: The policing, preservation and usage of the goods enumerated in Article 13 are regulated by the authority whose prerogatives includes the servicing of concerned lands.

Chapter II - On the Different Occupancy Titles

Article 17: National administrative offices occupy the DFN land by assignment which is an administrative title that grants a usufructuary right.

Other public or private legal entities of Burkinabe or International rights and private individuals have the advantage of:
a) a lease (short or undetermined term);
b) a urban licence to inhabit or to serve a writ (granting the beneficiary the property on his/her realizations and equipments);
c) ordinary or special administrative permits strictly personal and subjects to repeal, granting to individuals or collectivities the right to extract materials, to install intake of water, to exercise hunting, fishing or wood cutting rights, or to open a business.

Chapter III - Conditions of Allocation, Occupancy and Exploitation

Article 18: Urban or rural land of the DFN are allocated to those who have a real social need, without regard to sex or marital status, according to priorities set by the texts.

In some instances, occupancy of DFN land requieres the payment of dues.

Any beneficiary of a usufructuary title of a DFN land is requested to occupy and exploit it according to its assignment and specific conditions.

Article 19: The urban land of the DFN reserved for housing projects are allocated by committees comprising mandatorily competents executive members of CDR, according to the principle of a plot by individual or by household.

Article 20: The allocation of rural land is made under the same conditions, with the participation of the village CDR executive body.

Article 21: The management of rural space will proceed with an integration of all the activities of the rural world, i.e., agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry; taking into account the natural vocation of the designated zone in a food self-sufficiency perspective.

Article 22: Any national or local social and economic development project will comprise necessarily a forestry program with afforestation in form of grove screens, plantation, green spaces or public parks.

Article 23: Any portion of the national territory may be reserved in the event the preservation of the flora, fauna, soil, underground, water, atmosphere and, in general when the preservation of a natural milieu presents a special interest and when it is important to preserve this milieu against any degrading effect and to substract it from any artificial intervention likely to alter its appearence, composition, or evolution, as set by the provisions in the Forestry Code.

Article 24: For a better integration of the activities of the rural world, a pastoral space will be set aside in each zone according to the conditions set by the Rural Code.

Article 25: Rural masses must be organized in democratic structures for the occupancy and the rational exploitation of the rural space. Any modernization action in agriculture, animal husbandry or soil conservation must have this collective strategy.

Article 26: In areas equiped by the State or areas under its prerogatives, the forms of collective occupancy and exploitation must be applied.

Article 27: The equipment of peasant's associations will be essentially undertaken by the self-managed popular saving and land banks.

Article 28: The Ministers in charge with rural development and the national secretary of CDR will ensure the establishment of these democratic structures.

Article 29: Yet, this does not exclude individual or familial forms of occupancy and exploitation.

Article 30: The education, information and training of peasant masses must be integrated in their CDR structures.

Article 31: The exchange of experiences and training of the peasant masses will take place through inter-village, inter-departmental and inter-provincial relations, in form of meetings, conferences, fairs, mass literacy.

Article 32: Price fixing of agricultural and livestock products must associate the democratic organizations of farmers and pastoralists.

Article 33: The Ministers in charge with trade and rural development, conjunctly with the national secretary of CDR, will organize the marketing structures of agricultural and livestock products by privileging inter-provincial exchanges for the sake of a national market organization and integration.

TITLE IV - ON THE ACTUAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEE OF DIFFERENT REAL ESTATES

Chapter 1 - On the Actual Rights of Different Real Estates

Article 34: Advertising is not a condition of the existence or validity of State property whose conclusive and absolute force stems from the present Ordinance.

Article 35: State property on the real estates located in foreign countries and the usufructuary titles recognized to secondary public bodies and to private individuals are real rights which are submitted to advertisement in conditions stated by decree.

Article 36: The actual rights of real estates referred to in Article 35 may be engaged in dealings in the forms and conditions set by the texts.

Chapter II - On the Guarantee of Real Estate Actual Rights

Article 37: In order to promote trading and industry, some real estate actual rights, the list of which will be established by decree, will be submitted mandatorily to advertising.

Article 38: The State organizes and secures directly the advertisement of these real estate actual rights and authorizes their dealings.

In advertising, the civil responsibility of the State is covered by an insurance fund, the creation and functioning of which will be stated in a decree.

Article 39: The present Ordinance nullifies all previous contrary provisions, especially those stated in the Law #77/60/AN of July 12, 1960 and the Law #29/63/AN of July 24, 1963, together with their modifications and addenda.

Article 40: Decrees will state, where needed, the clauses of application of the present Ordinance which will be published in the Official Gazette and executed as State Law.

Ouagadougou August 4, 1984

Captain Thomas Sankara.

N.B.: This Ordinance was passed before the name of the country changes from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso.