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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
THE MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS OF SELF-AWARENESS
IN TASK PERFORMING GROUPS

presented by

Janet A. Hymes

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M’A - degree in flit/"r: [921
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Major professor
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THE MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS OF SELF-AWARENESS

IN TASK PERFORMING GROUPS
By

Janet A. Hymes

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Psychology

1985

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the generous

contribution of ideas, time, and equipment from Norb Kerr, or the

constructive criticism, insight, and encouragement of Larry Messe' and
Linda Jackson.

And, for his efforts above and beyond the call of duty, my deepest
appreciation goes to my husband Bob, for his interest, his rigorous
analytical thinking, and his unflagging support.

I am sincerely grateful to all of you.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1
Social Dilemmas .................................................... 3
History of Research in Group Motivation Losses ..................... A
Indentifiability and Motivation Losses ................ . ........... 9
Dispensibility and Motivation Losses ............................ 11
Reciprocity and Motivation Losses ............................... 13
Distinction Among Social Loafing ................................ 1A

The Influence of Norms and Standards .............................. 14
Self-Awareness Theory ............................................. 15
Self-Awareness and Standards ...................................... 17
Hypotheses ........................................................ 25
METHOD .............................................................. 26
Overview .......................................................... 26
Design ............................................................ 27
Subjects .......................................................... 27
Task .............................................................. 27
Equipment/Apparatus ............................................. 27
Instructions .................................................... 29
Criterion ....................................................... 3O
Self-Awareness .................................................... 30
Procedure ......................................................... 30
Feedback .......................................................... 32
Ancillary Measures ................................................ 33
The Self—Consciousness Scale .................................... 33
Post-Experimental Questionnaire ................................. 34
RESULTS ............................................................. 35
Manipulation Check ................................................ 35
Performance Data .................................................. 35
Tests of Hypotheses ............................................... 36
Ancillary Measures ................................................ 38
Self-Consciousness Scale ........................................ 38
Analyses of Variance ......................................... ...38
Analysis of Post-Experimental Quuestionnaire .................... 40
DISCUSSION .......................................................... 42
REFERENCES .......................................................... 49
APPENDIX ............................................................ 58

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Proportion of Performance Trials Above Lowest Practice
Trial by Self-Awareness and Group Condition .......... 36

2. Proportion of Performance Trials Above Best Practice
Trial by Self-Awareness and Group Condition .......... 37

3. Trial of First Failure by Self-Awareness and Group
Condition ............................................ 37

4. Proportion of Performance Trials Above Lowest Practice
Trial by Self-Awareness, Group Condition and Social
Anxiety .............................................. 39

5. Proportion of Performance Trials Better Than Lowest

Practice Trial by Presence of Mirror, Group Condition
and Social Anxiety ................................... 40

iv

ABSTRACT
THE MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS OF SELF-AWARENESS
IN TASK PERFORMING GROUPS
By

Janet A. Hymes

This study explored the impact of self-awareness on performance
motivation losses in small groups. It was hypothesized that self-
awareness enhances individual susceptability to group (normative)
influence by increasing perceptions of discrepancies between performance
and a standard.

The norm of equity was predicted to provide the standard in group
settings that were conducive to the motivation losses caused by the
social loafing, free riding, and the sucker effects. These three types
of motivation decrements are characterized by distinct task parameters
and underlying mediators. Whereas decreased motivation was predicted in
the sucker analogue, increased motivation was predicted in the social
loafing and free rider analogues. Results did not, however, support the
hypothesis since the predicted group condition by self-awareness inter-
action did not occur. There was an unexpected finding of a social
anxiety by self awareness interaction. Implications of the findings for
the potential moderating effects of this trait variable on task perfor—

mance were discussed.

Introduction

Over 50 years ago, Ringleman recorded the occurrence Of a pheno-
menon that continues to prompt research efforts today (Moede, 1927). He
found that collective efforts were less efficient than individual ones;
that in fact, there was an inverse relationship Of group size to indivi-
dual productivity. Ringleman had individuals and groups of varying size
(from two to eight persons) participate in a simple rope-pulling task.
He first measured the total force exerted by each individual, then
computed the average force exerted per person when a group performed the
same task. A distinct pattern emerged. There was a nearly linear
reduction Of force per person as the size of the group increased.

Important theoretical developments bearing on Ringleman's findings
came about only with Steiner's (1972) more recent work. Steiner postu-
lated three factors to affect total group productivity: task demands,
member resources, and group process. According to Steiner, potential
group productivity is defined by the task demands and the group members'
resources. As noted by Steiner, the difference between a group's poten-
tial and actual productivity, which he termed process loss, is a conse-
quence of inefficient coordination of group members' efforts and/or
motivation losses. Motivation losses are implied when the members of a
group do not contribute their maximal effort to a group task.

Research efforts to define the determinants and mediators of group

motivation decrements have demonstrated that a number of underlying

processes operate to generate at least three distinct types Of motiva-
tion losses. These decrements have been termed the social loafing
effect (Ingham, Levinger, Graves & Peckham, 197A; Latane', Williams &
Harkins, 1979), the free rider effect (Kerr & Bruun, 1983), and the
sucker effect (Kerr, 1983).

The purpose of the present study was to extend the scope of pre-
vious group task performance research by taking into account the influ-
ence of self-awareness on human social interactions. The approach taken
here is founded on a premise basic to the work of Cooley (1902), Mead
(1934), and Shibutani (1961) -- that self-awareness is the essence of
social interaction. According to each Of these theorists, who concep-
tualize the self as a socially-derived entity, one can become self-aware
(an object to oneself) only by considering the vieWpoint of others.
Conversely, it has been demonstrated that being made self-aware leads to
taking the other's perspective (Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). According
to Mead, the "other" may be a specific, or a more generalized other.
This generalized other parallels William James' earlier (1890) concept
Of a "social self," which embodies the social norms and attitudes of an
individual. Consistent with this perspective is the empirical evidence
that self-awareness enhances susceptibility to social and normative
influence (Wicklund & Duval, 1971; Duval &: Wicklund, 1972; Duval, 1976).

Self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1979)
asserts that attention oscillates between environmental and self-focus,
sometimes outward, toward the environment, or inward, onto the self. In
applying the theory, the major assumption is that the proportion of time

spent in a self-aware state can be increased by introducing a self-

focusing stimulus. A great deal of research has been performed using
various manipulations to induce self-focused attention. The method most
used has persons act in the presence of a mirror; other techniques use
cameras, tape recordings of the person's voice, and audiences. The
theory also assumes that self—focus results in a gravitation of aware-
ness toward whatever aspect of self is most salient in a particular
situation and in the perception of discrepancies between that aspect of
self and an ideal or standard.

Two subsequent propositions derived from the theory of self-aware-
ness provide the basis for the present research: (1) a person who is
made self-aware is likely to perceive a discrepancy between on-going
behavior and a salient standard, and, (2) as a consequence, he or she
should reduce the discrepancy by altering behavior in the direction of
the standard. These prOpositions have received a great deal of empiri-
cal verification (Scheier, Fenigstein & Buss, 197A; Carver, 1974, 1975;
Froming, 1978; Gibbons, 1978) in a variety of situations.

Social Dilemmas. Much of the small group research that has inves-
tigated motivational issues has been based on broader political and
economic concerns. Mancur Olson's (1965) classic analysis in "The
Theory of Collective Action," for example, contains several propositions
relevant to small group research, although its perspective is that Of
economics. Olson's theory proposed that: members Of large groups will
contribute less than members of small groups when a public good is at
stake; anonymous individuals will contribute less toward a group goal

than will individuals whose identity is known; the effectiveness of an

effort toward achieving a public good will determine how much an indivi-
dual is willing tO do to Obtain a group (public) good.

Another classic analysis was performed by Hardin's (1968), in his
essay on "The Tragedy of the Commons." Hardin uses the idea of a common
cattle grazing ground which is eventually destroyed because each
rational individual herdsman acts so as to maximize personal profit in
an unrestrained addition of cattle. Hardin sees the rational pursuit of
self interest in the commons as inevitable. Stroebe and Frey (1982)
integrate social psychology and an economic theory of public goods.

They make clear the distinction between private and public goods, noting
that public goods can be consumed by everybody regardless of their level
of contribution and prOpose that the non-excludability of public goods
induces free riding. This global perspective on social dilemmas has
proven useful in exploring motivation losses in small groups as well.

History of Research in Group Motivation Losses: The Group Size
Effect. Although a number Of factors contributing to the occurrence
of suboptimal levels of group motivation have been isolated in recent
investigations, most of the early research efforts focused on one media-
ting factor: group size. These studies typically use additive tasks, in
which the product is the simple sum (or average) of individual contribu-
tions, to examine performance in groups of varying size. While many of
the details Of Ringleman's study remain unknown, references to this
seminal work are found throughout the groups literature. Dashiell
(1935) cites Ringleman's findings, asserting that they support the

dictum that to include more than four persons in a group is uneconomical

since the effectiveness of the individual is reduced by almost 10 per-
cent with each additional person brought into the group.

Shaw (1960) investigated a slightly different aspect of group size.
He examined the extent of individual contributions to a group task (i.e.
number of activities a person performs relative to the total number of
activities involved in the task) and found support for his hypothesis of
greater performance motivation for greater task contribution. He reas-
oned that rewards stemming from favorable evaluations of a group product
shared among a large number of individuals were less motivating than
rewards that were shared by only a few.

Steiner (1966) made the important distinction between a group's
actual and potential productivity. He noted that the lack of speci-
ficity on this point obscured many experimental findings; he further
presented several models for conceptualizing the effect of group size on
potential productivity. Later studies would use the quantitative
difference between actual and potential productivity to Operation-
ally define motivation losses in small groups.

Zajonc (1966) used Ringleman's findings in addressing the issues of
how an individual's performance changes as a function of group partici—
pation and how to deal with division of labor problems in group re-
search. He noted that by extrapolation of Ringleman's findings that an
8-person group worked at only 49% of an "individual" capacity, members
of a 15-member group would then work at nearly zero capacity. In his
analysis (which is similar to Steiner's) Zajonc focused on the useful-

ness of applying a mathematical model to division of labor problems and

suggested using the mathematical solution as a standard for comparing
empirical findings.

Davis (1969) considered the relationship between group and task
from an informational perspective. He conceptualized tasks as inher-
ently either information reducing or information conserving. In the former
case, information about individual member's efforts or responses cannot
be exacted from the final group product, whereas, in the latter case,
group output preserves the individual contributions of its members.

This practical distinction enhanced methodological clarity for many
subsequent studies involving group task performance.

In two studies which were also prompted by Ringleman's findings,
Latane', Williams and Harkins (1979)sought to identify one set of poten-
tial causes and conditions of inefficient group output. Their findings
that there was a sizable decrease in individual effort when subjects
performed the physically taxing task of clapping and shouting in a
group mirrored prior findings of a group size effect. They termed this
decrease Of individual performance as a consequence of pooled effort
"social loafing".

An early study using archival data (Wicker, 1969) provided evidence
of a negative relationship between group (church) size and level of
member participation, involvement, and support. Latane and Darley
(1970) found an inverse relationship between group size and incidence of
helping behavior in both emergency and non-emergency situations in a
variety of settings. Replications of the social loafing effect have
been obtained using cheering and clapping activities (Latane et al.,

1979, 1980); rope pulling (Ingham, et al., 197A); and a motor production

task involving pumping air with a hand-held rubber bulb (Kerr & Bruun,
1981). The consistent finding across these studies was that while
collective group performance was enhanced somewhat by increasing group
size, performance was substantially smaller than the sum of individual
efforts. In each experiment, the designated procedure eliminated the
possibility that faulty coordination could account for the findings of
performance decrements. The study by Kerr and Bruun (1981) further
enhanced the validity of social loafing findings by maintaining a stable
group size for each individual subject throughout the experiment, rather
than having group size manipulated within subjects, as had previous
studies (Ingham et al., 1974; Latane et al., 1979). The findings of
Kerr and Bruun's (1981) research were consistent with those of previous
social loafing research.

Petty, Harkins, Williams and Latane' (1977) extended the findings of
social loafing effects to the area of cognitive activity. They had
subjects rate both a poem and an editorial as an individual evaluator,
or as part of either a 4, or a 16—member group. Their finding that
subjects perceive less cognitive effort as a group member than when
assuming sole responsibility for a task, is consistent with, and con-
tributes to the social loafing findings for physical tasks.

While the studies cited present a generally cohesive picture of
motivation losses related to group size, explanations Of this phenomenon
are varied and complex. For example, Latane and Darley (1979) suggest
that individuals may avoid engaging in costly group activities through a

diffusion of responsibility. According to this explanation the greater

the number of people available to respond in a group, the less person-
ally responsible any one individual may feel about performing the task.
The result of this attenuated sense Of responsibility is a net reduction
of effort as individuals reduce their share of the work load. Moreover,
since group size can have a direct impact upon actual and perceived
identifiability of members, it can also serve to affect each member's
proportional contribution tO the group product, their share of any
potential pay—off, or even the magnitude or uniqueness of their indivi-
dual contributions. Such decrements in the relative magnitude of one's
contribution, according to Shaw (1960), should have the direct effect of
decreasing one's inclination to work for the group. In addition, group
size might affect the perceived potential for redundancy of effort,
since as the number of persons in a group increases, the likelihood of
others making equivalent or even superior contributions also increases.
This redundancy Of effort, whether actual or perceived, is likely to
result in decreased motivation to fully commit oneself to work at the
task in the group setting. Moreover, as the number of participants
increase, the individuals comprising the group become less identifiable,
and therefore may expect less recognition or praise for substantial
efforts, as well as less blame or retribution for inferior efforts.

Even in the absence of an overt external reward for good perfor-
mance, an individual Operating according to a norm or equity may gener-
ate less self praise for a group product to which he or she contributed
only a fraction of the whole. Regardless Of the nature of the task, it
seems clear and has been suggested (e.g.,Kerr, 1983) that the indivi-

dual's expectation for praise or blame decreases with the size of the

group. Thus, group size thus has a two-fold effect: members who might
initially be inclined to work toward a group goal will reduce their
level of activity since their hard work may not even be noticed, much
less praised, while those members initially disinclined to fully engage
in group activity will slack off even more, since their lack of activity
will not be obvious in a large group.

Identifiability and Motivation Losses. As evidence of a group-size
effect was corroborated by findings Of research conducted in a variety
of task situations, researchers began to look for other variables that
might moderate motivation levels. In one early attempt to identify
variables other than group size that might affect group performance,
Shaw (1960) posited that a person whose efforts at a group task could
not be identified would be less motivated to work for the group, since
rewards related to approval would be low if individual contributions
were not identifiable. To examine the utility of this explanation, Shaw
had subjects participate in groups of varying size for "cooperative
studying," in which they were to abstract information from articles of
varying length. Since longer articles provided more information, the
length Of the article selected by each subject provided the measure of
motivation to work for the group. The results of this study were equi-
vocal, since it was not clear that identifiability had been manipulated.
In a later study, Sweeney (1973) did find that individuals who were
anonymous contributed less toward a group goal, although the very com-
plex procedure used in this study likewise prohibits a clear inter-

pretation of the findings.

 

Latane', Williams and Harkins (1979) had subjects shout and clap
as loudly as possible alone, and in groups of two, four, and six. While
the usual group size effect was found (within subjects), Latane' et al.
reasoned that individual outputs could only be evaluated and rewarded
when subjects performed alone, and therefore a "hide-in-the-crowd" ex-
planation (Davis, 1969) could account for the findings, since people
could avoid the negative consequences of slacking off when they perfor-
med in a group. Kerr (1981) also tested the possibility of an identi-
fiability mechanism using a task that involved pumping a rubber bulb,
for which the volume of air collected was recorded by a spirometer.
While some support for a hide-in-the-crowd explanation was found, the
evidence was not conclusive.

Williams, Harkins and Latane' (1981) noted that the previous
studies of social loafing, individual efforts were combined and sub-
merged in a group total since only a single instrument was used to
measure group productivity. Therefore, they set out to test the identi-
fiability hypothesis, by manipulating identifiability separately. Using
a shouting task, subjects were asked to produce noise alone, in groups
Of two and six, or in pseudogroups where the individuals believed that
one or five other peOple were shouting with them, but in which they
actually shouted alone. The social loafing effect was eliminated when
subjects were led to believe their efforts could be identified even when
they cheered in a group. Based on this evidence, Williams et al. con-
clude that identifiability is a critical factor in social loafing, and
thus it could be eliminated by making individual output identifiable.

In another test of the identifiability hypothesis, Harkins and Petty

10

(1982) had subjects participate in brainstorming and signal detection
tasks. Their data suggest that when a task is sufficiently unique or
challenging, group subjects work just as hard as individuals, even
though their efforts are not identifiable. However, these findings do
not in any way detract from the importance of the identifiability mech-
anism since the brainstorming task was intrinsically interesting (and
perhaps even fun),whereas tasks that would be expected to induce moti-
vation decrements would necessarily be somewhat aversive.

While lack Of identifiability in these studies consisted of the
subjects' knowledge that their individual output could be linked to them
by the experimenter, the concept resembles other conditions that also be
enhanced by a group setting, such as anonymity and deindividuation.
While any of these states or processes could account for the social
loafing findings, this demonstration of the identifiability mechanism
leads to the following predictions: social loafing will occur if
peOple's efforts are not identifiable even whether they perform as part
Of a group or alone; social loafing will not occur irrespective of
whether when peOple perform alone or in groups, if their efforts are not
identifiable.

Dispensability and Motivation Losses. In a test of Olson's (1965)
hypotheses regarding the nature of collective efforts, Sweeney (1973)
demonstrated that the free rider phenomenon could be replicated in a lab
setting. Sweeney used a physical task (stationary bicycle pedalling) in
which the level of motivation was Operationalized as the number of

revolutions Of the bike wheels performed in a series of one minute

11

trials. Several conditions varying perceived group size, identifi-
ability, and effectiveness of effort were used. The findings suggested
that individuals' effectiveness at a group task determines, in part, how
much effort they are willing to put into the task. In this study, the
group size effect was contingent upon perceived effectiveness. The
study nicely demonstrates the importance Of establishing a contingency
between action and outcome for effort to be maximal. From these find-
ings it is apparent that motivation to establish a contingency between
actions and outcomes may be stronger than the motivation to attain
outcomes per se.

Kerr and Bruun (1983) focused on the issue of dispensability of
effort. This line of investigation grew out of the observation that the
success of many collective endeavors may actually depend on the efforts
of one member, or only a few members. Using Steiner's (1972) task
taxonomy, which defines the permitted and prescribed processes under
which tasks may be performed, Kerr and Bruun (1983) predicted declining
motivation as group size increased for both conjunctive and disjunctive
tasks, where group product is determined by the least and most able
member, respectively. It was reasoned that where members anticipate
that the potential success of the group has little or nothing to do with
how much effort they expend (high ability members on a conjunctive task,
or low ability members on a disjunctive task), they will be less moti-
vated. An individual's sense Of dispensability, thus is enhanced with
increased group size since peOple perceive that the probability of a
superior or inferior performance by some other group member increases

with group size. In either case, members would work less hard.

12

In their series of studies Of the free rider effect, Kerr and Bruun
(1983) used a simple motor production task which involved either blowing
or pumping air into a spirometer. Consistent with their predictions,
perceived member ability had an Opposite effect on effort under disjunc-
tive and conjunctive task demands, providing evidence for the Operation
Of a dispensability mechanism. In these experiments, free rider effects
were found to parallel an increase in group size. It should also be
noted that this study demonstrates the Operation of a mechanism distinct
from that underlying social loafing effects since all group members'
efforts remained identifiable.

Reciprocity and Motivation Losses. The Sucker effect suggested by
Orbell and Dawes (1981), and supported empirically by Kerr (1983),
occurs when individuals realize that other group members are free riding
on their efforts. Observed performance decrements are attributed to an
attempt tO avoid playing the inherently aversive role of the sucker. An
individual's pursuit of self interest in this instance overrides con-
cern with Optimal group outcome. This hypothesis was supported in a
study by Kerr (1983) wherein consistent failure of a capable partner
caused a reduction in performance effort by the potential "sucker".

Kerr (1983) used a simple motor production task in which subjects
gripped a small rubber bulb in each hand and pumped as much air as
possible in 30-second trials; and in which the air was collected and
measured by a spirometer. The ability level of a subject's ostensible
partner was manipulated through false performance feedback. Findings

from this study indicate that reduced performance motivation on a dis-

13

junctive task can occur in a group setting when capable group member(s)
perceive that other group members are working at less than full
capacity.

Distinctions Among Social Loafing, Free Riding, and Sucker Effects.
Three basic distinctions can be extracted from the research findings
summarized above. Social loafing occurs only when individual efforts
are unidentifiable. In contrast, free riding occurs only when indivi-
dual efforts are perceived as unnecessary or superfluous to a group
outcome and, the sucker effect occurs only as a reaction to the per-
ception that other group members, while capable, are not doing their
fair share. Therefore, suboptimal motivation in a group setting is
characterized by features Of identifiability (social loafing), dispens-
ability (free riding), and reciprocity (sucker effect).

The Influence of Norms and Standards. In looking to the common
link among social loafing, free riding, and the sucker effect, we find
behavior that is "suboptimal" or "discrepant" in the sense that it is
inconsistent with standards determined by the task Objectives. When a
group task is performed, whether it is, like Ringleman's, a simple rope-
pulling task, or a more complex decision making task, such as that
undertaken by a jury, explicit or implicit rules and standards Operate
to affect performance. These rules or standards ultimately play a
significant part in determining the nature and quality Of the group
product. The concept Of standards cannot be invoked without the Obvious
question: Whose standards, or which standards are influential in a
particular setting? Social norms would be expected to exert consider-

able influence in a group setting in which strong personal standards are

14

not salient. On a basic level, a norm is a standard against which the
correctness of behavior is judged. While situation-specific norms can
emerge in small group settings, Davis' (1969) comments about the nature
of normative influence in adhoc groups is pertinent here. He notes that
group standards often derive less from the immediate performance-orien-
ted interaction than from some value, or basic assumption about what is
generally proper, appropriate conduct (i.e. a social norm).

In view Of the foregoing orientation, a theory of self awareness
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Carver & Scheier, 1981) may provide a mean-
ingful link between the three moderators Of motivation and group perfor-
mance. A basic presentation Of the theory of self awareness as well as
relevant research findings should serve to identify the salient features
of this theoretical framework and provide a foundation for its appli-
cation to motivation losses in task performing groups.

Self-Awareness Theory. Self awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund,
1972; Frey, Wicklund & Scheier, 1978; Wicklund, 1979) states that con-
sciousness is directed either toward or away from the self. Attention
directed toward the self can revolve around thoughts relative to one's
own attitudes, beliefs and feelings, or to more external aspects of self
such as the potential impression one is making on others. When atten-
tion is directed toward aspects of the self, a state of passive intro-
spection and/or self evaluation is dominant. In contrast, when atten-
tion is directed outward toward aspects of the environment, self evalu-
ation does not occur and the dominant theme is one Of active involvement

and manipulation of the environment. These two states of self awareness

15

are assumed to be mutually exclusive since attention cannot be simultan-
eously directed toward and away from the self. Attention, does, how-
ever, oscillate back and forth rapidly between these two states. An
increase in Objective self awareness, therefore, only implies incre-
ments in the relative amount of time a person spends in a state Of self
awareness.

Various methods have been employed to increase an individual's
state Of Objective self awareness, including mirrOrs, tape recordings of
the subjects' own voices, and cameras. The use of a mirror as a manipu-
lation of self awareness has been validated in studies by Carver and
Scheier (1978). In the theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier, 1978;
Wicklund, 1979), it is prOposed that when people are made self aware,
they are more likely to perceive discrepancies between their present on-
going behavior and salient standards, and they will be motivated to
lessen the discrepancy. Minimizing the discrepancy between behavior and
a standard Often takes the form Of acting according tO relevant (social)
norms (Diener, 1980).

There are several theoretical distinctions between self-awareness
as proposed by Wicklund and Duval (1972), and as proposed by the recent
work of Carver and Scheier (1981). A brief comparison of these theories
is warranted because of the extensive citing of both orientations in the
literature. Wicklund and Duval's is essentially a drive theory, whereas
Carver and Scheier take a cybernetic, control theory approach to self-
awareness. The former posits that self-focus induces an aversive drive
state that is the consequence of attention to discrepancies between

actual behavior and a relevant standard Of comparison. A reduction of

16

the aversiveness of the drive state can be achieved by shifting behavior
in the direction Of the standard. For the latter, the behavioral shift
is a natural consequence Of cognitive processes involving a discrepancy-
reducing feedback loop. The important point is that both theories
predict a comparison of present state (on-going behavior) with a salient
standard when self focus is induced.

Self Awareness and Standards. Social comparison processes involve
using socially-derived information as a basis for determining the appro-
priateness of behavior. This process, therefore, is one Of attempting
tO establish a standard. Social norms are standards widely recognized
and accepted by members Of a culture. Personal ethical and moral dicta
are standards that individuals use to guide behavior across a range of
Situations. In a narrower context, instructions given in an experimen—
tal lab setting may be seen as standards, as well. While self—awareness
theory predicts enhanced adherence to salient standards, without addres-
sing the issue Of the number Of potential standards or the potential
for standards to conflict in a given situation, a great deal of research
has demonstrated that self-awareness leads to enhanced susceptibility to
group and normative influence.

Opinion conformity is one way in which self awareness has been
shown to increase susceptibility to group control. Wicklund and Duval

(1971) demonstrated that heightened self awareness leads to increased

agreement with the modal Opinion of a positive reference group. In a

later study, Duval (1976) informed subjects that their Opinions were shared

by 5%, 50%, or 95% Of a sample Of 10,000 students. When subjects who

17

perceived their opinion to be in the minority performed a subsequent
ambiguous dot estimation task, they adjusted their estimates to agree
with the (bogus) estimates Of two confederates to a much greater degree
if they were self-focused.

Productivity at a task has also been shown to increase with self-
awareness. In an investigation of social facilitation effects, Wicklund
and Duval (1971) predicted that task performance would be facilitated to
the extent that self-awareness was induced. The hypothesis was based on
a corollary of self—awareness theory which states that self evaluation
is an inevitable result Of self focus. Using a task that involved
copying German prose, the occurrence of self evaluation in the presence
Of a mirror was predicted to lead to increased efforts to perform well.
Consistent with predictions, self aware subjects demonstrated signifi—
cantly higher rates of performance than non-self aware subjects.
McDonald (1980) also demonstrated that self-awareness leads to increased
productivity at a task where "amount" Of writing was established as a
standard Of correctness. After receiving negative or positive feedback
about their level of creativity, subjects were requested to respond to a
visual cue by writing as much as possible about it. When told that the
visual cue task was related to the first creativity task, self aware
subjects wrote significantly more when they had received negative feed-
back about their creativity On the first task. This study offers strong
evidence that when people are self aware and perceive a negative dis-
crepancy between their behavior and a standard, they attempt to reduce
the discrepancy, which in this case was accomplished by increased task

persistence.

18

A study by Wicklund and Ickes (1972) yielded indirect evidence that
self-awareness increases comparisons with a standard. In this research,
subjects who anticipated making a decision gathered more information
relevant to the decision when self focus was high than when it was low.
In an extension of this line of reasoning, Scheier and Carver (1983)
suggested that the seeking of concrete information relevant to a perfor-
mance standard is indirect evidence Of an attempt to compare one's
behavior with a standard at a more abstract level. Subjects in their
study were to replicate (by drawing) geometric figures by referring to a
slide projected image Of the figure. The number of times a subject
pressed a button to gain a five second viewing of the geometric figure
was the dependent measure. Consistent with predictions, subjects who
were exposed to a mirror made more frequent comparisons with the stan-
dard. TO further generalize the comparison process to the use Of per-
formance norms, Carver and Scheier (1981) presented subjects with a task
ostensibly testing their abstract reasoning skills. Subjects could
choose from two sets Of test items, one for which there were performance
norms available, and the other for which norms were not available. As
predicted, when self focus was induced, subjects chose significantly
more items for which norms were available, indicating that self aware-
ness results in more frequent comparisons with the performance of others
as a basis for determining the adequacy of performance.

In a series Of studies, Scheier and Carver (1983) found the same
pattern: self focus led to the seeking out of concrete information that

facilitated a more abstract comparison between actual behavior (perfor-

19

mance) and a salient standard. Invoking a widely accepted social norm
against cheating, Deiner and Wallbom (1976) found that when given the
Opportunity to cheat, self aware subjects cheated less on a test than
non-self aware subjects. It has also been found that self-awareness
results in increased aggression when subjects are told aggression is
normative (Carver, 1974), but leads to decreased aggression when told it
is antinormative (Scheier, Fenigstein & Buss, 1974).

Since the original theory states any salient standard will in-
fluence behavior when self-awareness is induced, Diener and Srull (1979)
addressed the issue of whether self-awareness increases adherence to
personal standards, all types of norms, or only social norms. Using a
perceptual judgment task, subjects were given systematically-varied
bogus feedback regarding their own performance level relative to their
personal standard of success, and relative to a social standard Of
success (a standard ostensibly set by their peers). The subjects' voice
and TV image were used to induce self-awareness. The major finding here
was that non—self focused subjects relied more on personal standards of
accuracy in evaluating their performance, whereas when self awareness
was induced they relied more on social standards of accuracy. These
findings also Offer evidence that self aware subjects were more con-
cerned about their social aspects of self, and felt more pressure to
comply with a social standard. Diener and Srull (1979) conclude that
self-awareness leads to a social perspective in a social situation,
since self-aware individuals evaluate their performance from this
external vantage point. Froming, Walker & Lopyan (1982) also demon-

strated increased adherence to a perceived social norm when self-aware—

20

ness was manipulated via an audience, and to a personal standard when
self-awareness was manipulated by a mirror.

The steering of behavior in the direction of social norms is evi-
denced in a study by Beaman, Klentz, Diener and Svanum (1979). Using
children as subjects in a field study, a significant decrease was found
in transgressive behavior when subject's self-awareness was heightened.
Children who were admonished to take only a single piece of candy from a
bowl did so significantly more Often when a mirror was placed behind the
bowl. In another study using the same setting, (Beaman, Klentz and
Diener, 1979) children were either asked their name and address or were
left anonymous. When a mirror was placed behind the bowl to induce self
awareness, individuated children were found to abide by the standard of
taking only one candy, while non-self focused children did not.

The result of free riding, the sucker effect, and social loafing is
always a discrepancy between what is Optimal and suboptimal group
effort. In view of the extensive evidence that self-awareness results
in attempts to reduce discrepancies between behavior and a salient
standard, inducing self-awareness in a group performance setting should
reduce the discrepancy between Optimal and suboptimal group performance
(i.e. the discrepancy caused by reduced motivation). The efficacy of
evoking norms as a means Of eliminating the deleterious effects of a
social dilemma or a commons problem has been suggested. Dawes (1980)
notes that norms, which are somewhere between conscience and coercion,
are a possible solution, since they have the ability to motivate people

in the absence Of any threat Of censure. Norms would be expected to

21

Operate in the same manner in the small group setting as in the hypo-
thetical commons situation. the small group setting.

When one outcome or product defines a group effort, individual
contributions to that outcome become important. If equal praise or
rewards for good performance, as well as blame for poor performance are
shared by all group members, individuals who contribute more to the
group effort will feel that they are under-rewarded. The norm Of equity
suggests that group members' rewards be commensurate with their efforts.
In group performance settings where only one or a few of the members
carry the burden Of the work, the norm of equity would be expected to
exert great influence. Additionally, some research has shown (Chase &
Gibbons, 1975) that individuals are more likely to maintain the norm of
equity when they are self-focused. Gibbons, Wicklund and Rosenfield
(1979) noted that more overpaid workers agreed to do extra work in the
presence of a mirror than in the absence of a mirror. Similarly, Reis
(1978) notes greater productivity among overpaid subjects in
the presence of a mirror than in the absence of a mirror. These find-
ings support the idea that individuals who perceive they are overpaid
will raise their performance to make it consistent with their rewards,
and this response to the equity norm is heightened under high self-
awareness conditions. Subjects who were responsible for their perfor-
mance (but not those who were not) demonstrated this heightened response
to the equity norm in a study by Greenberg (1980). These empirical
findings provide a basis for predictions regarding the effect of self-

awareness on motivation in task—performing groups.

22

Recall that in a social setting with standards held constant, self-
awareness has a greater impact on adherence to social than to personal
standards, because Of the social perspective subjects have of themselves
(Deiner and Srull, 1979). Since a task performing group is a social
setting, social standards should prevail when individuals in the group
are made self-aware. Additionally, in view of the many findings regar-
ding adherence to standards and norms generally, and the findings of
increased responsivity to the norm of equity specifically, under con-
ditions Of heightened self-awareness, the norm of equity would be expec-
ted to be extremely influential in instances of free riding, social
loafing and the sucker effect.

In sum, a synthesis Of the research findings in group motivation
and self-awareness predicts that when group conditions are conducive to
motivation decrements, performance will be enhanced by increasing
self—awareness among group members. Since distinct mediators determine
the occurrence Of social loafing, free riding, and the sucker effect,
however, their associated motivation decrements would not be uniformly
attenuated by increases in self-awareness. For example, if the
reward for group performance is fixed (i.e. each member's reward is the
same) regardless of individual contribution, the norm of equity dictates
that each member Of the group should do an equal share of the work. If
some members find that they are doing more than others, a situation
descriptive of the person in the position Of the sucker, efforts may be
reduced in an attempt to make the situation equitable. In instances Of
free riding and social loafing, however, self-awareness should produce

an attenuation Of motivation decrements, since the only way to maintain

23

equity is to try and work as hard as others when there are fixed rewards
for a group task.

In the context of the present research, the norm of equity was
expected to have a potent impact for several reasons. The study in-
volved only male subjects, who have been shown to abide strongly by the
norm Of equity in reward distribution, while females are more likely to
distribute rewards equally (Lane & Messe', 1971; Reis & Jackson, 1981).
Moreover, as suggested and subsequently demonstrated by Kerr (1983), the
aversiveness Of playing the sucker is stronger for males than for
females, perhaps, in part, because of its violation Of the equity rule.
The induction Of self-awareness in this case would, therefore, cause the
sucker to become aware Of, and respond to, the norm Of equity by reduc-
ing performance. In this instance, self-focused attention is predicted
to decrease motivation to perform at one's best.

However, in the case of social loafing, increased self-awareness is
predicted to attenuate motivation loss. This is so since equity is
satisfied only when each member gives equal effort toward a task when
the rewards are fixed. Inducements to social loafing are created by
using an additive task which is performed anonymously. Since norms
operate in the absence Of potential group censure, self—awareness should
increase the salience Of the equity norm, and lead to greater perfor-
mance, even when performance is anonymous.

Free riding is characterized by the perceived dispensability of
effort. Since the equity norm proscribes free riding, there should be

an attenuation Of the usual motivation losses associated with free

24

riding when self-awareness is heightened. However, self attributions
for group success or failure are less likely to occur as a result of
self-focused attention if it appears a group standard is being met
regardless of one's efforts. As Kerr (1983) points out, free riding may
arise from an incomplete, albeit perfectly rational analysis of a situ-
ation in which self interest can be served without substantially harming
the collective product. In this case no discrepancy may be perceived
between behavior and a salient standard. The problem, of course, is
that all group members may employ the same rationale, and reduce their
efforts. In this case, if the equity rule is invoked, motivation losses
will not be Observed; if equity is not invoked, the motivation decre-
ments usually associated with free riding should occur.

In summary, three specific hypotheses were examined in the present
research: In group performance settings conducive to free riding and
social loafing, the norm Of equity will be invoked when self-awareness
is induced, and motivation will be enhanced. In settings conducive to
the sucker effect, the norm Of equity will be invoked and motivation to

perform will be decreased.

25

Method

Overview. The occurrence Of motivation losses in group performance
settings is largely determined by specific features Of the task itself,
and further depends upon the factors or processes underlying those
losses. Therefore, certain task criteria must be met in order to create
a situation with conditions conducive to social loafing, free riding or
the sucker effect. Since the likelihood Of social loafing is a function
of the identifiability Of individual members' efforts, and both the
sucker effect and the free rider effect occur whether or not an indivi—
dual is identifiable, distinct sets of instructions were used in
administering the experimental tasks.

The instructions were used to create the impression among subjects
that they were participating in either a task where their individual
efforts were additively combined, or in a task where only the best
member's efforts were needed to succeed. Instructions additionally
informed subjects either that their efforts were individually recorded,
or that they were being combined with their partner's (obscuring the
source of the success or failure on a trial). Kerr and Bruun (1983)
demonstrated that free rider effects occur when only one group member's
score counted as the group score, in disjunctive or conjunctive tasks
(Steiner, 1972). Moreover, additive tasks, where the group product is
the simple sum or average of individual contributions, have been shown
to be appropriate for demonstrating social loafing effects (Williams,

Harkins, & Latane, 1982; Kerr & Bruun, 1981).

26

Design. A 2x3 factorial design was used to assess the effects of
self awareness (mirror, no mirror) and group condition (free riding,
social loafing, sucker effect) on the dependent measure of performance
on an air pumping task.

Subjects. Subjects were 111 undergraduate males from introductory
psychology classes who received extra credit toward their grade for
their participation.

Task. The experimental task was designed to be a simple motor
production task in which subjects grasped a small rubber sphymo-
graph bulb in each hand and pumped as much air as possible in 30 seconds
by quickly squeezing the bulbs. The air pumped was collected and
measured with a Becker—Delft Godart Pulmotest spirometer. The nature of
the task reduced the potential impact of individual differences in
ability since it demanded no particular talent or skill, and further
used each subject's performance during practice trials as a baseline
against which to compare actual performance. This type of task further
eliminated the possibility of performance decrements due to coordination
losses. Any overall losses in performance, therefore, could only be
attributed to declining motivation or fatigue.

Equipment/Apparatus. A box labeled flowmeter was clearly visible
from each of the experimental booths. This box was located on a table
approximately five feet away from the row Of booths. The flowmeter
projected two input spouts tO which were attached latex hoses running to
each Of the experimental booths. These latex hoses were clearly marked

"blue" and "yellow" indicating the color code assigned to the subject at

27

the beginning Of the experimental session. Between the individual hoses
was an input spout with a t-coupler which was used in the social loafing
condition where group members' efforts were combined. In this additive
condition, each Of the separate hoses were joined via the t-coupler,
ostensibly to combine the air pumped by both of the team members.
Directly above each of the input spouts was a small rectangular box with
three vertically arranged lights (red, yellow and green). The green
light was used to indicate to a subject when to start at the pumping
task; the amber light indicated success at a particular trial, and the
red light was not used. The boxes were marked with the subjects' color
code. A third identical box marked "group box" was used tO signal
subjects in the additive (social loafing) condition. This box was
normally kept out of sight during the practice trials, and placed on the
flowmeter just prior to beginning the performance trials, at which time
the individual boxes were removed. While the hook-up of the latex hoses
and the instructions indicated that the flowmeter was recording the
amount Of air pumped during a trial, the amount of air was actually
being recorded by a pulmotest spirometer monitored by the experimenter,
who was stationed in a curtained booth at the front of the lab.

The Becker-Delft Godart Pulmotest spirometer recorded the amount of
air (in mililiters) pumped by each subject. The apparatus was Operated
by the experimenter who reset the recording device after each practice
and performance trial. Results were recorded on chart paper labeled with
the subject's name, feedback and mirror condition as well as the time

and date to insure proper identification.

28

Instructions. Subjects were given the cover story that resear—
chers were interested in how individuals with various personality traits
or characteristics perform tasks as work teams. They were also told that
the study involved the effects Of feedback on performance and that there
were two conditions in the experiment: a feedback condition, and a no-
feedback condition. In the feedback condition, an amber light would
light up after a trial if they were successful; if not successful, their
amber light would not light up. In the nO-feedback condition, subjects
were told that their amber light was completely disconnected, and they
would receive no feedback following a trial. (This last treatment was
only used in the social loafing condition). Subjects were further
instructed that in order to make the research situation more like a real
job, each of the team members would receive 15 cents for each trial on
which they succeeded, for a total Of $1.35 if they succeeded on all nine
trials.

The instructions indicated that a fixed success criterion Of 350 ml
of air pumped in a 30-second trial would be used. Subjects in the free
rider and sucker conditions were instructed that in order for the team
(group) to succeed at a trial, it was only necessary for one of the
members of the team to pump more than the 350 mls. In the social
loafing condition, however, subjects were instructed that only the total
volume of air pumped as a team determined the success Of the team. In
which case a total of 700 ml of air was needed for a team to be success-
ful at a trial. Subjects were directed to do their best and pump as

much air as possible on every trial.

29

Criterion. After subjects performed the four practice trials,
experimenters gauged the subject's worst trial. A line was drawn on the
chart paper, which was then used as the actual criterion which needed
to be met or exceeded for a successful performance trial.

Self Awareness. Self-awareness was manipulated by the presence of
a large (4'x3') mirror which was placed against the inside right hand
wall of the experimental booth. The mirror was large enough to insure
the reflection of the subject's face and entire bOdy. With the subject
seated at a desk in a small booth, it was impossible for him to avoid
his reflection. Additionally, since the task demanded only that the
subject use his hands, and look at the feedback lights at the end of a
trial, it was not likely that the mirror acted as a distractor from
performance Of the task. Moreover, since looking in the mirror was
unavoidable unless each subject stared directly at the floor or ceiling,
it is assumed that the subjects had a full view of himself during the
entire experimental session.

Procedure. Subjects were run individually, but each was told that
the experimental session would involve another subject with whom he
would perform the assigned task. When a subject arrived for the session
he was met by the "other subject" who was actually a confederate who ran
the experimental session. Written instructions placed in an envelope
and posted at the lab informed subjects to wait for their partner before
entering the lab and then to seat themselves in the booth to which they
were assigned according to a color code. Once in the isolated booth,
the subject received further written instructions to put on the head-

phones and indicate to the experimenter that he was ready to begin by

30

pressing a telegraph key, that he was ready to begin. All of the rest
Of the prerecorded instructions were delivered to the subject over the
headphones, and the subject had no more contact with the confederate
"subject."

After explaining the nature Of the study and the task in general
terms, the tape recorded instructions explained the manner in which the
equipment, which was visible to the subject, would be used. Subjects
were told they would be given a series of practice trials which would be
initiated when they heard the word "ready" followed by a chime. When
the chime sounded a green light would also go on, (on the rectangular
box above the flowmeter) indicating that the team should begin pumping.
After 30 seconds a second chime would sound and the green light would gO
Off, which was the signal to stop pumping. Subjects were given 45
seconds to rest between trials. After going through the four practice
trials, there was a pause in the instruction tape and the subjects
received more information about the experimental procedure, including
the criteria for success on a trial.

Subjects were told that the nine performance trials would follow
the same procedure as the practice trials. The experimenter then began
the series of performance trials. At the completion Of the nine trials,
subjects were instructed to Open the envelope on the desk in their booth
and respond to the two enclosed questionnaires. When subjects handed
the experimenter the completed questionnaires they were thanked, paid
for their participation, and debriefed. The confederate experimenter

indicated that he was the experimenter rather than a real subject, and

31

asked subjects to make a pledge Of confidentiality regarding the nature
Of the experimental task.

In the free rider and sucker conditions, the task was information
conserving (Davis, 1969) in that it was possible to measure, and make
the subject aware Of, individual contributions to the group product.
While the subject's efforts were indiVidually recorded in all three
conditions Of the experiment, only subjects in the free rider and sucker
conditions believed that their individual efforts were recorded. This
procedure allowed the direct identification Of motivation increments or
decrements in all three conditions and also allowed the subject to see
the performance efforts of a (confederate) partner in the free rider and
sucker conditions. In contrast, subjects in the social loafing con-
dition performed at an information-reducing task, wherein individual
efforts could not be distinguished by the subject.

Feedback. In the free rider condition, subjects received the
following feedback information: On the practice trials the subject
always succeeded, while the partner/confederate succeeded on all but the
second trial. For the performance trials, the subject succeeded only if
performance exceeded the criterion line, while the partner (confederate)
always succeeded.

In the sucker condition, the feedback was the same for the practice
trials. Again, for the performance trials, the subject succeeded only
if performance exceeded the criterion line. The partner/confederate,
however, always failed after the first performance trial.

In the social loafing condition, the feedback was the same for the

practice trials. However, there was no feedback for either the subject

32

or for the partner/confederate in this condition during the performance
trials. A brief explanation of these feedback manipulations should
clarify their intended effects. In the free rider condition, if the
subject sees that his partner is always succeeding, it is an invitation
to free ride since the team probably will succeed without the subject's
own efforts. In the sucker condition, if the partner successfully
performed on the practice trials, yet consistently failed on the per-
formance trials, the subject should question the intentions and sincere
efforts of the partner. In this instance, the subject would conceivably
begin to feel that he was playing the "role of the sucker." In the
social loafing condition, individual efforts were additively combined,
masking the extent of individual contributions; no feedback about per-
formance further obscures the subject's and the partner/confederate's
performance efforts. These preconditions lead to the potential to

social loaf.

Ancillary Measures

Upon completion of the experimental task, subjects were asked to
respond to several questions about their perceptions of the experimen-
tal procedures. Some of these items served as manipulation checks.
Subjects additionally responded to the Self-Consciousness Scale, a per-
sonality measure described below.

The Self Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975).
The Self Consciousness Scale is a measure of an individual's trait or
tendency to direct attention toward the self. The scale contains 23

items with each item rated on a scale of O (extremely uncharacteristic)

33

to 4 (extremely characteristic). See Appendix I for the complete ver-
sion of the scale. Factor analyses of the scale have consistently
generated three factors: Private Self-Consciousness, Public Self—Con-
sciousness and Social Anxiety. Private Self-Consciousness is the
tendency to focus on one's internal states, i.e. emotions, attitudes,
and motives. Public Self-Consciousness is the tendency to be aware of
oneself as a social object. It involves the taking Of an outside obser-
ver's perspective and the impression one is making on others. Social
Anxiety is defined as a reaction to the state of being self-conscious
and is characterized by a general discomfort in the presence of others.
Factor loading and norms were shown to be similar for both males and
females in the original scale. The instrument also has been shown to
have a high level of test-retest reliability. For the present study, a
median split was performed on the entire sample to define high or low
scores on the scales.

Post-Experimental Questionnaire. Subjects were asked to answer
several questions regarding their impressions of the experiment. Sub—
jects were asked first whether they were in the feedback or no feedback
condition. This item allowed for the elimination from analyses subjects
whose performance may have been affected by a misunderstanding of the
procedure and the manipulations involved. The remainder of the items
focused on the subjects' perceptions of the procedures; these were

presented in a 7-point Likert response format.

34

Results

Manipulation Check. Subjects were asked whether they were in a
feedback or no feedback condition. Of the 111 subjects, five reported
incorrectly that they did not receive feedback. These cases were
nevertheless retained in the final analyses, since their data did not
differ substantially from those of the overall sample.

Performance Data. Three indices of performance were calculated.
For each index, the amount of air pumped on each of nine trials was
compared with the subject's baseline, established during the four pre-
ceding practice trials. This procedure eliminated the effect Of initial
individual differences in subjects' hand and arm strength in the final
analyses.

The first measure, BETLOW, consisted of the proportion of perfor-
mance trials on which the subject's score exceeded his or her own lowest
practice trial score. The second index of performance, BETHIGH, consis-
ted Of the proportion of performance trials on which the subject's score
exceeded his own best practice trial score. A final index, trial of
first failure (TFF), was defined as the first performance trial in which
a subject failed to meet his own lowest practice trial score. If
subjects did not have a performance trial below their practice trials,
their TFF score was set to the value of 10, reflecting that there was no

trial of first failure.

35

Tests of Hypotheses. Two—way analyses of variance were performed
to assess the effects of self awareness and group condition on the three
performance measures. Contrary to predictions, there were no signifi-
cant interactions for any of the three measures. Table 1 presents the
means for BETLOW. As the means show, the presence of the mirror across
the group conditions did not have a differential impact upon subjects'
pumping performance, F(2, 105):.075, p:nS. Moreover, neither main
effect was significant, either for mirror, F(1,105):2.17, p < .15, or

group condition, F(2,105):1.58, p < .21.

Table 1. Proportion of Performance Trials Above
Lowest Practice Trial by
Self Awareness and Group Condition

Group Condition

Self

Awareness Free Rider Sucker Social Loafing
Mirror .67 .54 .58

No Mirror .73 .61 .69

 

As the means in Table 2 attest, for BETHIGH the interaction between
group condition and presence of the mirror also was not significant,
F(2,105):.96, pzns. Once again, there also was no significant main
effect for either group condition, F(2,105):.85, or presence of mirror,
F(1,105):.20, both p's ns. As would be expected, relative to their
BETLOW scores, subjects had a smaller prOportion of performance trials

that were better than their best practice trial.

36

Table 2. Proportion of Performance Trials Above
Best Practice Trial by
Self Awareness and Group Condition

Group Condition

Self .
Awareness Free Rider Sucker Social Loafing
Mirror .31 .19 .17
No Mirror .20 .17 .23

 

The analysis of variance using TFF as a dependent measure yielded
similar results. The values presented in Table 3 show that the presence
of the mirror did not interact with group condition to differentially
affect first failure rates, F(2,105):.13, p:ns. Furthermore, there was no
main effect for either the presence of the mirror, F(1,105):.224, or

group condition, F(2,105):2.09, both p's:ns.

Table 3. Trial of First Failure by Self Awareness
and Group Condition

Group Condition

Self

Awareness Free Rider Sucker Social Loafing
Mirror 4.88 3.95 5.41

No Mirror 4.72 4.39 6.00

 

37

Ancillary Measures.

Self Consciousness Scale. As noted above, previous research on the
Self Consciousness Scale (see for example, Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss,
1975) consistently have generated three subscales: private self-con-
sciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety. In the pre-
sent case, however, a blind factor analysis of the items revealed only
two reliable scales. These scales corresponded to the public self
consciousness (items 6, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21; alpha:.82), and social
anxiety scales (items 4, 8, 10, 12, 23; alpha:.74) in the research of
Fenigstein et al. For each scale, reliability was maximized by ex-
cluding an item whose factor loading was low. The third factor, that
corresponding to the private self consciousness scale, yielded an in-
adequate reliability (alpha:.53).

A median split was then used to divide subjects on both the public
self-consciousness scale (HPUB) and the social anxiety scale (ANX).
Subjects with a score of 17 or less on HPUB were designated as low in
public self-consciousness; a score of 18 and above identified a subject
as high in public self-consciousness. Subjects with a score of 11 and
lower on ANX were designated as low in social anxiety; whereas those
with a score of 12 or higher were identified as high in social anxiety.
This procedure resulted in two new factors (Public Self-Consciousness
and Social Anxiety) which were then added to the original design of the
study.

Analyses of Variance. The potential effects of both Public Self

Consciousness (HPUB) and Social Anxiety (ANX) were then assessed in

38

separate analyses of variance on the three dependent measures. While

there were no main effects or interactions for the Public Self

Table 4. Proportion of Performance Trials Above
Lowest Practice Trial by Self Awareness,

Group Condition and Social Anxiety

Social Anxiety

Low High
Self Awareness
Mirror .66 .52
No Mirror .66 .71

 

Consciousness factor, there was a marginally significant 2-way inter-
action of Social Anxiety and presence of the mirror on BETLOW, the
proportion of performance trials exceeding the subject's lowest practice
trial score, F(1,99):3.55, p,<.O6. An examination of the means in Table
4 indicates that while subjects low in Social Anxiety were unaffected by
the presence of the mirror, the performance level of subjects high in
Social Anxiety was substantially lower when confronted with a mirror.
An analysis of simple effects confirms the nature of the interaction,
demonstrating that for subjects high in Social Anxiety the effect of the
mirror was to substantially reduce performance levels, F(1,99):5.27,
p < .05.

The means for BETLOW for the full design including the Social

Anxiety factor are presented in Table 5. As the means in the Table

39

indicate, there was a consistent trend across group conditions such that
performance was lower for high anxiety subjects in the presence of a

mirror relative to those high anxiety subjects not exposed to a mirror.

Table 5. PrOportion of Performance Trials Better than
Lowest Practice Trial by Presence of Mirror

Group Condition by Social Anxiety

Low Anxiety High Anxiety

Presence of Mirror

Group

Condition Mirror No Mirror Mirror No Mirror
5;:ESQ-"m"?73"”??-"""'TEE""""T233”
Sucker .57 .60 .52 .63
Social Loafing .72 .68 .38 - .71

 

Analysis of Post—Experimental Questionnaire. Analyses of variance
were also conducted on several post-experimental items. A significant
main effect of group condition was found for the item, "To what extent
did you feel taken advantage of by your partner?", F(2,103):5.95,

p < .004. A post—hoc analysis using the Tukey procedure revealed signi-
ficant differences between the free rider and sucker conditions indica-
ting that subjects in the sucker condition felt more taken advantage of
(M:3.00) than those in the free rider condition (M:1.71). Consistent
with these results, subjects also correctly perceived their partner as
apparently giving least effort in the sucker condition (M:3.79), while

giving greatest effort in the free rider and social loafing conditions

40

(M:5.8 and 6.0, respectively), F(2,103):38.53, p < .001. This pattern

of results suggests that the group condition manipulations were

effective.

The perception of being taken advantage of, however, did not affect
subjects' self-perceptions. Analysis revealed that regardless of their
group condition, all subjects perceived that they tried equally hard at

the pumping task, F(2,103):.317, and felt equal responsibility for the

group success, F(2,103):1.48, p < .23.

41

Discussion

It was hypothesized that self-awareness would affect member motiva-
tion in task performing groups by enhancing susceptibility to normative
influence. Self-awareness was predicted to increase perceptions of a
discrepancy between performance and a standard and to alter behavior in
the direction of the standard. Equity, which is an inherent aspect of
group performance settings, where social loafing, free riding and the
sucker effect occur, was predicted to provide the standard. Since the
underlying task mediators and parameters for these performance settings
are different, reference to a standard of equity predicts a differential
impact on free riding, social loafing, and the sucker effect. Although
the predicted interaction of self-awareness and group condition did not
occur, there was an unexpected finding of a social anxiety by self-
awareness interaction. Specifically, subjects high in social anxiety
demonstrated performance decrements when self-aware, while the self-
focus manipulation had no impact on subjects low in social anxiety.

It will be recalled that self awareness was predicted to increase
motivation in the social loafing and free riding analogues, and to
decrease motivation in the sucker analogue. It was found, however, that
self-awareness influenced only the behavior of subjects who were dispo-
sitionally high in social anxiety, and regardless of task parameters,
performance for these subjects was substantially inferior to their low

social anxiety counterparts.

42

While self—awareness theory (Wicklund, 1979; Carver and Scheier,
1981), predicts enhanced susceptibility to normative influence when
self focus is high, it has also been shown that external standards will
be pre-empted in the presence of strong affect (Scheier, 1976; Scheier &
Carver, 1977). Self-focused attention in their studies led to increased
responsivity to the transient affective states of anger, attraction,
repulsion, elation and depression, rather than to salient standards.
Presumably, whenever strong affect is experienced, heightened self-focus
enhances the salience of the affect rather than the salience of
behavioral standards. Social anxiety involves a high degree of physio-
logical arousal and negatiVe affect; it has been defined as an
"aversive, cognitive-affective reaction characterized by autonomic
arousal and apprehension regarding impending potentially negative out-
comes" (Leary, 1983). In an extensive review, Wine (1982) notes that
the strong evaluative component of anxiety serves as a trigger for
heightened emotional reactivity. Buss (1980) states that uncertainty,
conspicuousness, and evaluation are all potential causes of social
anxiety, which can become so intense as to interfere with even ordinary
situations.

The question arises as to how uncertainty, conspicuousness or
evaluation played a role in a non-evaluative setting, where performance
took place in private booths. Recall that the only instructions were to
"do your best"; there were no implications for a poor performance, and
subjects' performance was not observed. Mandler and Sarason (1952) have
shown that the divided attention and the self-deprecatory thinking of

strongly anxious persons occurs only for performance situations that are

43

highly ego-involving, and which are perceived as a reflection of signi-
ficant personal dimensions. Participants in the present study all were
males who were predominantly in their late teens and early twenties
(college freshmen), and that hand-arm strength was paramount to task
performance. It is plausible that the males who were high in social
anxiety felt their masculine identity was at stake in this situation.
This line of reasoning has support in the developmental literature.

High school seniors (males) revealed the importance they placed on
several personal dimensions by indicating that if they could be remem-
bered by their peers for one of three things (brilliant student,
athletic star, most popular) they would want it to be for their athletic
ability (Coleman, 1961). Assuming that physical strength, endurance and
athletic prowess are important dimensions along which the young males in
this study evaluate themselves and others, it is likely that the task
was ego-involving. In this case, interference from self-devaluing cog—
nitions about potentially negative outcomes (failure) on an ego-invol-
ving task predicts impaired performance.

That the performance of highly anxious people is due to the severe
interference of negative, self-devaluing cognitions, has been
demonstrated (Wine, 1982). However, investigations of the effect of
anxiety on performance have generally involved the use of cognitive
tasks or complex visual-spatial or motor tasks which require a high
degree of attention and cognitive effort. It is not immediately clear
why behavior took the form of performance decrements when the task used

in the present research was non-evaluative and extremely simple,

44

requiring only minimal attention, and certainly no cognitive effort.
Here, clinical assessment research provides an answer. Physiological
reactions to anxiety include changes in one or more indices, such as
heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and most relevant to the
present findings, changes in muscle tension (Borkovec, Weerts &
Bernstein, 1977). A corollary to the physiological arousal accompanying
anxiety is a constriction of muscular activity due to tenseness. Such a
reaction obviously would contribute to the poorer performance by the
highly socially anxious subjects at this type of task.

Findings by Jackson and Latane' (1981) suggest that socially
anxious peOple will seek out co-performers in an attempt to hide-in-the-
crowd so as to diffuse personal responsibility for potential failure.

In the present study, the pattern of means does suggest that subjects
high in social anxiety took advantage of a co-performer and attempted to
hide in the crowd in the social loafing condition. In this group condi-
tion, subjects were told their performance efforts were combined with,
and indistinguishable from their partners'. It is here that lowest
performance rates are found for the highly socially anxious subjects.

One conceptual.difficulty regarding the impact of social anxiety on
performance motivation involves the timing of the anxiety questionnaire
administration. Perhaps subjects used their questionnaire responses in
an effort to justify low levels of effort on the experimental task.

This alternative explanation cannot be ruled out since the measure was
administered immediately following performance of the experimental task.

The failure to obtain the predicted relationship between self-

awareness and group condition, while surprising, is not entirely incon—

45

 

sistent with findings from other self-awareness research. One possibi-
lity is that the mirror, used as a manipulation of self-awareness in-
duced a state of private, rather than public self-awareness. Carver

and Scheier (1981) suggest that the type of stimulus used to induce
self—awareness determines, in part, the nature of self-awareness experi-
enced. They posit that a mirror directs attention to private aspects of
self such as feelings, moods, and attitudes, while a camera has the
effect of increasing awareness of oneself as a social object, leading to
a concern with outward, observable aspects of self, such as the impres-
sion one's appearance or behavior is making on others.

A mirror may therefore make salient any discrepancies between on-
going behavior and a personal value. A camera, in contrast, is predic-
ted to bring to attention discrepancies between on-going behavior and
standards brought about through social interaction. Thus, the use of a
mirror in the present context may have induced private, not public self-
awareness. Subjects may have simply reflected on personal goals or
transient mood states rather than becoming more aware of discrepancies
between their behavior and a social norm. Use of a self-awareness
manipulation for the sake of inducing public self-awareness may have
been more apprOpriate.

Another possible explanation for the lack of findings may be
that the task itself was not overtly "social", since the subject and
his partner interacted for only a few minutes prior to participating in
the task, and further, the task was performed in isolated booths. The

procedures and lab setting in this case may have contributed to a focus on

46

 

task performance while keeping interpersonal interaction mininal.
Although the elimination of subject interaction may control for

the potential confounding effects of a personal characteristic (e.g.,
friendliness) on the willingness to work for the group, this procedure
also reduces the interpersonal aspects needed to create a social per-
spective. In the present case, subjects may have simply not

focused on norms relevant to the group situation, and as a result,
failed to use them to guide their own individual behavior.

Possible explanations for the failure of predictions regarding self-
awareness and group motivation involve the particular group conditions
and task parameters. The equivalent performances for subjects,
regardless of group condition or self-awareness, might indicate that the
legitimacy of the task itself was in question. The data from the post-
experimental questionnaire, however, indicated that all but a few of the
subjects knew which experimental condition they were in, and that they
tried hard at the task and felt some sense of personal responsibility
for the task. Moreover, all subjects simply might have worked hard at
the task, ignoring any implications of feedback about their partner.
This level of effort might be expected if the onus of carrying a free
rider or a social loafer was not enough to warrant a reduction of
effort. If the task was tiring and difficult, but not especially aver-
sive, the disincentive to perform may not have been strong enough. The
subject may have been acting according to a sense of "noblesse oblige"
rather than responding to a standard of equity.

Without the comparison afforded by a control condition, in which

neither motivation nor self-awareness are manipulated, conclusions can be

47

tentative, at best. It is not possible, given the design used here, to
establish that free riding, social loafing, and the sucker effect
actually occurred, only that conditions replicated those used in past
research (Kerr & Bruun, 1981; 1983; Kerr, 1983). It is also probable
that the standards in a particular setting need be clear cut and obvious
in order for them to affect behavior. While it certainly is reasonable
to expect the norm of equity to influence behavior under the conditions
of the present experiment, equity was not the only standard that could
have been used. Subjects may have used a standard such as the idea of
"noblesse oblige" mentioned above. The task instructions, which reques-
ted that subjects do their best, also provided a standard for perfor-
mance. The equivalence in performance for all subjects (except those
who were highly anxious and made to be self-focused) indicates that they
may have used the instructions to "do their best" as a standard.

The present research serves to generalize findings regarding the
impact of self—awareness on affect to include social anxiety. Further
research is needed to address issues concerning the specificity of norms
or standards in task performance, the strength of incentives and dis-
incentives to perform, and the potential moderating effect of social
anxiety. Regardless of the conclusions drawn from additional research,
the findings from this study help to define contexts in which self-
awareness may not influence adherence to social norms, and offer some
insight about the potential impact of social anxiety on individual

efforts in task-performing groups.

48

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57

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS QUESTIONNAIRE

Please respond to the following statements by indicating for each one
how characteristic it is of you. Circle the number which best reflects
how you see yourself.

1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

5. I reflect about myself a lot.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

58

10.

11.

I'm concerned about the way I present myself.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

I have trouble working when someone is watching me.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

I never scrutinize myself.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

I get embarrassed easily.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

I'm self-conscious about the way I look.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

59

12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

14. I usually worry about making a good impression.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

15. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

16. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in
the mirror.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

17.I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching
myself.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

6O

18. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

6'

19. I'm alert to changes in my mood.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

20.I'm usually aware of my appearance.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

21.I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a

problem.
1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

22.Large groups make me nervous.

1 2 3 4
Extremely Extremely
Uncharacteristic Characteristic

61

"NINANI