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LIE RaBY -

 

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY
l9l6 - 19‘”

presented by

Learthen Dorsey

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

 

 

 

Ph.D. degreein History
W 22/,2,
flajor professor

Date August ll, l983

 

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THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY,

1916 - 1941

BY

Learthen Dorsey

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1983

Copyright by
LEARTHEN DORSEY
1983

ABSTRACT

THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY,
1916 - 1941

BY

Learthen Dorsey

This study examines the development of the
colonial state and the changes it introduced into the social
and economic life of the Rwandan peasantry. It also des-
cribes the introduction<1fthe compulsory coffee cultivation
and its impact on both the ruling Batutsi oligarchy and
the Bahutu masses. A cash economy combined with the spread
of Christianity and western education transformed the ideas
and manners of the traditional society. How did ordinary
Rwandans or the peasantry cope with these changes? What
was the range of their options? These questions are
addressed here.

A combination of research methods and techniques
were employed. Primary and secondary source materials were
consulted in the United States, Belgium and Rwanda. Also,
coffee growers in Butare and other informants were ques—
tioned following an interview guide. As a result, this
study finds that the decision-making power and alternative
choices of Rwandans were severely limited by the demands of
the colonial state and the civilian administration or the
Batutsi oligarchy. State intervention in the economy,

designed to create capital surplus and facilitate the

Learthen Dorsey

develOpment of civil administration and the country's
infrastructure, was partially responsible for this.
However, the depression of the 19305 was also responsible
for changing the status of Rwandans. The economic crisis
severely weakened the emerging capitalist sector, and
threatened both colonial solvency and the colony's develop-
ment. To compensate for lost revenues, colonial officials
increased receipts, taxes and charges on the producers,
thereby severely weakening the small but growing African
capitalist sector.

At the same time, the state, in order to ensure the
growth of capitalism, was compelled to introduce cash crop
production, to reorganize the traditional structure and
standardize the lines of communication from the admini—
stration through chiefs and subchiefs, to the rural
population. While these measures fostered agricultural
development, they inadvertently tightened the stranglehold
of the Batutsi notables over Bahutu, and redirected indivi-
dual African initiative in the domestic economy for the
benefit of the state, and introduced into the country a
strict system of economic planning which guaranteed the

maximum productivity from the African masses.

To my mother and father
and my brothers, Jeff, Harrison
and George

iii

AC KNOW LE DGEMENTS

I want to thank the members of my committee for their
guidance, support and encouragement. I am deeply indebted to
Harry Reed for his friendship and guidance over the many
years. And I wish to thank David Robinson for those very
long and much appreciated critiques of each of the chapters
of the manuscript. Leslie B. Rout Jr. and the late
David Bailey are responsible for much of what I know about
Latin American history, and John Hinnant gave me the tools
for which I needed to do field work. As for Harold Marcus,
my chairman, I must extend a very special thanks. His
careful reading and scrutiny of the manuscript made the
difference.

No acknowledgement would be complete without an
expression of profound gratitude for the Ford Foundation
and the National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship. This
manuscript could not have been completed without their
financial assistance. Nor could I have conducted my research
without the full support and cooperation of my friends and
informants in Rwanda. Louis and Mathias were good friends
and translators, and the National University and the
Institute for Scientific Research at Butare provided

essential services.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.. ...... . ....... .. ............. . .............. .1
Chapter
I THE AFRICAN BACKGROUND AND THE GERMAN

COLONIAL STATEOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOC0.0.0....0.0.0.14

II THE BELGIAN COLONIAL STATE AND INDIRECT
RULE...0......OOOOCIOOOOCIOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO 41
III LABOR RECRUITMENT AND CAPITAL
DEVELOPMNT.....OOOOOCCOOCOOOOOOOOICOO0.00......90
IV THE EMERGENCE OF THE IMPERIAL STATE:
ECONOMIC CONSOLIDATION.........................l34
V THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY: COFFEE
PRODUCTION, 1920-1937...OOOCOOCOCOOOOOO ....... .166
VI EXPLOITATION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS...........206
VII THE COLONIAL STATE, EUROPEAN PLANTERS,
AND THEMETROPOLE.COOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOO0.0...0.00.246
VIII RETRENCHMENT AND RETROSPECTION.... ........... ..322
CONCLUSION..... ...... ....................................350

APPENDIX

I Table A-1. Volume and Value of
Imports, 1922-1959. ............ 366-369
II Table B-I(a). Volume of Foreign Trade,
1927-1960 ................... 370-372
III Table C-l. Principle Food Products
Exported to the Belgian‘
Congo from Ruanda-Urundi,
1928-1938................. ..... 373-374
IV Table D-l. The Principal Tax Receipts in
Rwanda and Burundi, 1925-1959
(in Belgian francs) ............ 375-379
BIBLIOGRAPHY... .......................... . ........... 380-400

vi

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

II

III

IV

VI

VII

VIII

IX

XI

XII

XIII

XIV

LIST OF TABLES

Coffee Exported from Rwanda and Burundi
to Foreign Markets, 1927 to 1938

(in kilos) . . . . . . .

Volume of Import and Export Trade in
the Belgian Congo, 1925 to 1932

Coffee Production in Eastern Zaire,

1928 to 1933 (in tons) .

Percentage and Actual Number of Africans
from Rwanda and Burundi at the Union

Miniére in Haut Katanga, 1926 to 1930 .

Taxes Paid in Belgian Francs in Rwanda

Territory in 1928 . . .

The Financial Position of Rwanda and

Burundi from 1922 to 1931

The Total Number of Agricultural and

Commercial Firms in Rwanda,

1923 to 1929 . . . . . .

Salaried Employment in 1933

The Principal Tax Receipts in 1932

(in francs) . . . . . . .

The Total Number of Coffee Trees Planted

During the Campaigns . .

Total Number of Hectares Planted in

Coffee in 1936 . . . . .

Q

9

O

O

Coffees Imported for Belgian Consumption,

1936 to 1939 (in tons) .

Import Duty on Coffees in 1938 (per

100 kilOS) o o o o o o 9

Coffee Cultivation in 1938

vii

p

104-104a

106

106

114

114

122

145

185

192

194

275

276

277

282

TABLE XV Total Value of Sales by Europeans and

ASian Firms in 1933 o o o o o o o o o o 9 332—335
TABLE XVI Minimum Purchasing Prices for Arabica
coffee en parche for Rwanda and Burundi
. 348

(in Belgian francs) . . . . . . . . . .

viii

INTRODUCTION

Fifteen to twenty years ago the dialectic of develop-
ment and underdevelopment was the near exclusive preserve
of left-liberal theorists. Marxist input and influence was
only secondary. But today the reverse is true. In fact,
since the 1960's, there has been intense debate and even
schisms among Marxists and quasi-Marxists over the
"new-Marxist paradigm that invaded development studies and
has stood apart from both classical Marxism and the liberal
sub-discipline of economic development."1 As a result of
the debate over this issue no common denominator has yet
to be established for the paradigm,2 and some observers
have become increasingly alarmed over the possibility of a
crisis in Marxist theory if divisions of interests and
opinions are not resolved. Still there are those who see
the current situations in development studies as constitut-
ing a paradigm shift, "because of the difficulty of identi—
fying a new-Marxist paradigm and because there has been no
major defection of liberals toward any alliance with
Marxism." Many insist that the dynamics of development
studies is best depicted as the waxing and waning of two
quite different traditions,4 each with its own debates and

problems, and addressing each other in eye-to-eye

confrontation at only a few modal points. Or perhaps the
issue could best be described as the pains of an emerging
or maturing discipline.

The most recent tendency in developmental theory,
however, is to see colonialism as a structure and as much
more than just political control or colonial policy.
Actually, the colonial system incorporated the colonial
state,5 and as a variant of the capitalist system, it
interacted with the various sectors of the traditional
society, and ultimately imposed its hegemony. Almost
simultaneously, the state found the means of extracting
from the peasant economies the fiscal resources to pay for
conquest and for its own institutionalization.6 An analy-
sis of the development of the colonial state, therefore, is
clearly vital for a fuller understanding of colonialism.
Only by understanding the colonial state's most salient
feature--its centrality in the political economy through
the unusual scope and intensity of its intervention into
social and economic 1ife--can we have a much fuller appre-
ciation for the dynamics of potential change within the
colonial system itself and in the development of capitalism.

According to Lonsdale and Berman, the state is the
historically conditioned set of institutions which secures
the social conditions for the reproduction of the dominant
or capitalist mode of production. Capitalism depends on

the accumulation of surplus values from labor power in its

continuing domination of an ever-changing process of class
struggle. But capitalism cannot secure this dominant posi—
tion for itself, primarily because of its competitive nature
and potential for conflict. Therefore, it relies upon the
state to provide the technical and legal conditions for
capitalist penetration--i.e., monetary and tariff rules,
property laws, social services and of maintaining the
hierarchy in class domination.7

They further contend that the state straddles not one
but two levels of articulation: between the metropole and
the colony as a whole as well as within the colony itself.
Because of this duality the colonial state was a subordinate
agent in restructuring local production to meet metropolitan
demands and the local factor of cohesion over heterogeneous,
fragmented and contradictory social forces within its bound-
aries. This "Dual Mandate" defined the dilemmas of the
colonial state. Since it was obliged to intervene more
directly in the economic life of the country than was
characteristic of the contemporary capitalist state, it had
to absorb these contradictions more directly into the
bureaucratic sphere. Consequently, disagreements over
colonial development were not between parties but between
officials, and when the metropole insisted upon financial
self-sufficiency, the colonial state inherited a sovereign
self-interest in the orderly expansion of its forces of

production.8

As the colonial state proceeded with its task of
social engineering, it often had to use force to achieve
the extraction of local labor for capitalist production
I and to generate peasant production of export crops. More
often than not, the state's preoccupation with ensuring
conditions of primary accumulation threatened political
order. Consequently, the state was frequently forced to
seek aCCOmmodation with the subject population in order to
govern and to continue the process of primitive accumula-
tion. Still the process of articulation raised the dilemma
of how far metropolitan interests could be pressed against
the interests of local producers in a colony, whether
African peasants or European settlers, of, internally, of
settlers over Africans, before provoking resistance and
undermining effective state control.9

By drawing on the current Marxist debate about the
nature of the capitalist state, this thesis argues that
during the colonial era, traditional Rwandan social and
economic and political institutions underwent profound
changes as the colonial states, both German and Belgian,
sought to incorporate African production into, the nation-
al and then the world economy. This study explores changes
from 1916 to 1941, and shows that as the colonial systems
organized the traditional society for production and as
one of them ultimately achieved its goal, not only was the

Rwandan economy severely distorted but traditional Bahutu

and Batutsi class alignments were further accentuated.
Organizing production required the transformation of the
traditional mode of production, described here as the
tribute-paying or tributary mode of production, where the

peasantry's (the Bahutu) "dominion eminens" over the soil
10

 

had been lost to feudal or Batutsi lords.
The goals of the colonial system were to replace a
subsistence economy with a cash economy, to spread
Christianity and western education, and to inculcate into
Rwandans a western mode of thought concerning government
and development. Like it or not, Rwandans experienced
escalating socio-economic changes which emanated from
vaguely understood sources. These changes had unantici-
pated consequences for both Bahutu and Batutsi. They
transformed their ideas and manners. How did ordinary
Rwandans or the peasantry cope with these changes? What
was the range of their options? These questions are ad-
dressed here. While the Bahutu peasantry had no control
in shaping colonial policy, it would be wrong to conceive
of them as disinterested observers or passive objects
waiting to be transformed by a new breed of social engineers.
Even if the current situation was not of their choosing,
they had to adapt their lives to new circumstances,
opportunities, and ideas.
As commercial agriculture and its infrastructure

developed within Rwanda, the demands for salaried labor

expanded. New forms of wealth affected the traditional
structure in different ways. For the Batutsi oligarchy.
the arbiters of the colonial structure, wealth increased
power, social stratification, and ethnicity. In fact
Newbury, in "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of
Clientship," also argues that social stratification between
Bahutu and Batutsi increased as a result of new economic
forms. She contends that employment gave workers, both
Bahutu and Batutsi, an opportunity to gain economic inde-
pendence and eventually a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the
chief. More significantly, colonial rule served as the
context for political change that resulted in the emergence
of ethnicity, social stratification, and, eventually,
organized attempts by oppressed groups to reject Batutsi
and, then Belgian domination.11

Newbury demonstrates that these changes occurred in
the western periphery, but she minimizes these changes for
the central plateau, where coffee production supplemented
salaried employment and created similar changes. She con-
tends that nowhere in Rwanda had there developed as large
a European population or as important an urban center as
was found in Bukavu and Kivu Province. In these urban
centers emigrant Rwandans from the western periphery were
exposed to new experiences and came into contact with ide-
ological alternatives which gave them an autonomy from the

local political structure--alternatives which were not

present in the same form in central Rwanda. But she fails
to realize that the modern economy not only generated eco-
nomic independence for some Bahutu throughout all of Rwanda,
but that it also produced class consciousness and higher
expectations. And the Bahutu could only achieve the latter
by gaining control of the means of production through a
political solutiOn.12
Helen Codere, in "The Biography of an African Society,
Rwanda, based on Forty—Eight Rwandan Autobiographies,"
probably comes closest to a comprehensive analysis of the
impact of the money economy on Rwanda. She contends that
new economic opportunities were beginning to blur the eco-
nomic differentials within each group of Rwanda. In fact,
by 1959 the Batutsi as a group were less distinguished by
their relative wealth than had formerly been the case.
She affirms that as a group they were much better off com-
pared to the Bahutu, and that they held a disproportionate
number of salaried jobs in civil service and education.
But where Bahutu had educational opportunities and quali-
fications, they were able to move into salaried employment
and into occupations such as teaching. Where they lacked
education, they pursued money income through wage labor,
including emigration to Uganda for such work and the pro-

duction and sale of cash crops.13

Consequently,.coffee
production was also instrumental in transforming Rwandan

society.

The development of coffee as a cash crop was the focus
of the changing relationship between the administration,
the peasantry, and the Batutsi oligarchy. As a result,
this study locates the principal dynamics of the growth of
the coffee economy not only within the Belgian colonial
state but in the depression of 1929 as well. Following
the analysis of B. Jewiewicki, in "The Great Depression
and the Making of the Colonial Economic Situation in the
Belgian Congo," African Economic History, 4 (Fall 1977),
this research shows that the Great Depression was also the
most important stage in the elaboration of the Rwandan
colonial economic structure, particularly when mounting
deficits had to be subsidized by the Metropole.

Moreover, the history of Rwandan coffee production
falls into three distinct phases, with some overlapping
because of external factors. The first lasted from 1920 to
1931, when efforts of colonial administrators met with
strenuous Opposition from the ruling Batutsi oligarchy.

The latter forced the administration to seek accommodations
and once these were accomplished, the second phase commenced.
From 1931 to 1937, the administration successfully expanded
coffee production among the African peasantry. The third
phase, which is not clearly delineated, ended in 1939,

when the coffee economy collapsed. In distinguishing the
final phase, one must also consider the Opposition to

African coffee cultivation from white planters in the rest

of Belgian Africa. Their opposition, which surfaced in
1927, contributed to the collapse of the Rwandan coffee
economy.

Between 1927 and 1939, European planters in
Stanleyville, Bukavu, and the Kivu and their representa-
tives at Brussels consistently voiced opposition to African

14 Some argued that the terrain

commercial cultivation.
was not suitable for coffee production, or that transporta—
tion to the coasts would make the coffee too expensive and
therefore uneconomic. Many maintained that Africans were

15 and that

incapable of cultivating such a delicate crop,
cotton would be more appropriate for them to grow. A few
associations asserted that African participation would
increase supply and deflate prices. They also feared that
African-grown coffee would confuse marketing procedures
and quality controls. Others questioned the rationale of
stimulating a luxury crop in an area frequented by disease
and famine. A more logical policy, they argued, would be
to concentrate African efforts on production to create
food reserves and establish exports to neighboring areas
such as Katanga.

Obviously the real issues were competition and low-
cost production. Commercial planters were preoccupied
with efforts or schemes to reduce labor costs, increase

yields, and attract workers for low wages. Almost any

proposal received careful scrutiny,16 and as the Great

10

Depression worsened and budget deficits increased, cost
efficiency became more acute. Aside from a solution to
the African problem, planters asked government for subsi-
dies, tariff reductions, and more regulations to assure
even cheaper labor costs, to maximize profits, and to re-
duce overhead. Consequently the reaction of colonials are
discussed within the context of the metropole's policy
pronouncements about African farmers and marketing controls
over their production. Thus, the research covers factors
within Rwanda and those external to it.

Although coffee is the single most important export
commodity of Rwanda, only limited research has been done
on its production. Various assumptions and descriptions
have been made of the industry in both academic circles
and institutions involved in making policies that directly
affect production and marketing activities. These discus-
sions and policy decisions, however, have not considered
the role of peasant economies vis-a-vis the colonial eco-
nomic structure and the international market systems.

For example, Belgian scholars, such as Phillipe
Leurquin, H. E. Van Tichelin, and Jacque Lefevre, concen-
trate on development and focus on African populations as
obstacles in terms of depletion of natural resources, pop-
ulation pressures, reliance upon traditional agricultural

17

methods, and general backwardness. They have not placed

African economies within the context of the Belgian

ll

colonial economic system. Nor have they acknowledged the
constraints of colonial state domination on African economic
development. This study corrects these omissions by uti-
lizing data from archives in Rwanda, Belgium, and the
United Kingdom and personal interviews conducted in Rwanda
from January 1977 to November 1979. The approach presented
here, however, relates not to economic history per se, but
to social history in its broadest conception--the inter-
action of economics, culture, and politics. Economics is
made central to the approach by the problematic assertion
that economic relations are fundamental but not determin—

ing in the process of social evolution and change.

INTRODUCTION

Notes

1See E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in
East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939
(New York, 1973; Walter Rodney, How Europe Upderdeveloped
Africa (London, 1972); Aidan Foster-Carter, "Neo-Marxist
Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment in E. de Kadt
and G. Welbans (eds.) §pciology and Development (London,
1974), pp. 67-105; and "From Rostow to Gunder Frank:
Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment,"
World Development, 4 (1976), pp. 67-108.

2Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production
Controversy," New Left Review, 107 (1978), pp. 47-77.

 

 

 

 

 

 

3Jean Lopans and David Seddon, "Marxism and Anthro-
pology: A Preliminary Survey," in D. Seddon (ed.) Relations
of Production (London, 1978), pp. 40-41.

4See Richard Heggath's "From Modernization Theory to
Public Policy: Continuity and Change in the Political
Science of Political Development," paper presented to the
49th ANZAAS Congress, Sociology Section, Auckland, New
Zealand, January 1979, where he argues strongly that liberal
theories of modernization have not disappeared so much as
undergone a change in form.

5Bipan Chandra, "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism
and the Colonial State," Journal of Contemporary Asia, X,
no. 3 (1980), p. 273.

 

 

6Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State,
Class, and Ethnicity," Daedalus, 111, no. 2 (Spring, 1982),
p. 75. Bruce J. Berman and J. M. Lonsdale, "Crises of
Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: the Develop-
ment of the Labor Control System in Kenya, 1919-1929,"
Canadian Journal of African Studies, XIV, no. 1 (1980),
p. 56.

7John M. Lonsdale and Bruce J. Berman, ”Coping with
the Contradictions: the Development of the Colonial State
in Kenya, 1895-1914," Journal of African History, XX, no. 4
(1979). p. 489.

 

 

13

81bid., p. 490.

9Berman and Lonsdale, "Crises of Accumulation,"
pp. 60-61.

10Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the
Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism (New York &
London, 1976), p. 13.

11See M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A
Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 178-179 and
263-266.

12M. Newbury,"0ppressionf' pp. 298-300 and 347 also
Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries
(Bergen-Oslo, 1969), pp. 9-38. The Rwandan experience
conforms to Barth's theory of displacement. When two or
more ethnic groups are competing for the same economic
resources in the same ecological niche, he contends that
one will either be replaced or accommodation involving an
increasing complimentarity and interdependence will develop.

13Helen Codere, "The Biography of an African Society,
Rwanda; based on Forty-Eight Rwandan Autobiographies,"
Institut National de Recherche Scientifique (Butare),
No. 12, (1973). Reprise d'une publication du Musee Royal
de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, p. 37.

14Agriculture et Elevaqe au Congo Belge, ll, 2
(December, 1928), p. 315; VI, 14 (October 15, 1932);
VI, p. 16 (November 26, 1932), pp. 183-6; and VII, 1
(January, 1934), p. 3.

15African Archives. Agri. 340, Dossier 207.
MinistEre des Colonies. Note pour la 6§me Directeur
Générale. Brussels, February 17, 1932; and Dossier 208,
MinistEre des Colonies. Note pour Monsieur le Ministre.
Brussels, February 19, 1932.

16"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi,"
Agriculture et Elevaqe au Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26,
1932). PP. 183-6.

17See Leurquin, "La Vie Economique du Paysan Ruanda,
1'exemple de Karama, Nyaruguru," Zaire, 11 (January 1957);
Van Tickelin, "ProblEmes du Développement Economique du
Ruanda-Urundi," Zaire, 11, (May 1957) and Lefevre,
Structures Ecgpomiques du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi
(Brussels, 1955).

 

 

       

 

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CHAPTER ONE

THE AFRICAN BACKGROUND AND THE

GERMAN COLONIAL STATE

The environment determines the conditions of produc-
tion, but it can be a limiting factor as well. Rwanda is
located in the Central African rift valley, slightly south
of the equator, in one of the highest lying areas of the
continent, equal distance from the Atlantic (2000 km) and
Indian (1200 km) Oceans.1 The country forms an elongated
block of highlands, bounded on the east and west by the
converging frontier of Tanzania and Zaire (formerly the
Belgian Congo) and in the north by Uganda. Rwanda is
separated from Burundi by the Akanyaru river in the south,
and in the extreme east by the Kagera river valley, which,
after a sharp northward bend, becomes Rwanda's eastern
border.

The climate can best be described as a tropical
highland type, with annual average temperature fluctuating
around 68°F in the central plateau region. But the drier
tropical lowlands in the Kagera river area can be extremely
hot, and the Congo-Nile dividing range in the north experi-

ences very cold nights with the temperature frequently

14

15

falling to the freezing point.2 The amount of rainfall
varies between 40 and 50 inches a year, but the volume and
frequency of precipitation varies markedly according to the
season, and heavy rainfalls are often succeeded by severe
droughts. The year is punctuated by a long dry season which
extends from May or June to mid-September; a short rainy
season from mid-September to January; a dry season of
several weeks intervening in January; and a much longer
rainy season, extending from the end of January to the
beginning of May. Any interruption of the cycle has meant
crop failures and near famine conditions.3

East of Lake Kivu, and traversing the entire region
from north to south are the giant peaks of the Congo-Nile
crest, reaching a maximum of 14,000 feet in the Virunga
chain. This region of old volcanoes, now covered with thick
tropical woodlands, merges into an undulating plateau with
altitudes varying between 4,500 and 6,500 feet. The typical
landscape consists of hills and valleys scattered with
eucalyptus trees and banana groves, alternating with patches
of luxuriant pasture. It is a fertile region, ideal for
herding and the cultivation of food crops. But it quickly
shades off in the east into the savannah zone, where vegeta-
tion may range from vast stretches of arid and treeless
grasslands to acacia scrublands and bamboo forests.4

Despite this surface impression of lushness and pros-

perity, Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the whole

16

of Africa. It lacks significant mineral resources, and its
economy has not progressed beyond the subsistence level.5
In fact, in 1977 the World Bank reported that annual growth
was only 1.5 percent in real terms and that the development
of agriculture, the country's major preoccupation, had been
slowed because of fiscal constraints and a lack of skilled
manpower for development planning and implementation.
Futhermore, nutritional standards, that presently only meet
about 75 percent of adult requirements, continue to decline
as population, increasing at 2.6 percent in recent years,
outgrows the food supply.6

A major source of economic stagnation lies in the
perennial pressures of overpopulation on the land. With
4.9 million inhabitants, Rwanda has the highest population
density in Africa--350 per square mile.7 At the present
rate of increase (2.6 percent per annum), its population is
likely to double in about thirty years.8 'The problem is
compounded by uneven distribution of population, with heavy
concentration on the central highlands, and a more sparse
distribution of population on the slopes to the east and
west. A smaller but equally dense strip of the pOpulation
is to be found along the shores of Lake Kivu, while the
northeast is a region of much lighter habitation.9 Because
of the density of population in relation to cultivated

land, the average planting surface for a family with six

children is 1.47 hectares (the maximum range is 2.92 hectares

l7

and the minimum 0.74 hectares).10

The only important cash crop is coffee, an Arabica
variety, introduced by the Belgians in 1931 under a compul-
sory cultivation program. -Arabica grows best at altitudes
ranging between 1400 to 1800-2000 meters, which includes
most of Rwanda with the exception of Virunga, the Congo-
Nile crest, and the region of Byumba. While the hilly top-
ography limits the planting surface, the yields are high
around the banks of Lake Kivu, the regions of Gisenyi,
Cyangugu, and portions of Ruhengeri closest to the border
of Kibuye. Superior yields in these areas are attributed
to soils enriched by volcanic activity. Production, how-
ever, tends to decrease on the hills of the Central Pla-
teau where the three prefectures of Kigali, Gitarama and
Butare account for nearly half of the planted surface of
the country, but where the yields are much lower because
soils are of inferior quality.*

Coffee is the principle source of foreign exchange and
provides monetary income for about half of the farmers. In
1975, 475,696 planters cultivated 58,583,148 coffee plants

on 36,566 hectares, or an average coffee plot of 7.7 ares

 

*My own interviews with coffee planters were conducted in
the prefecture of Butare from March to July 1978; all of
the farmers had planted their trees in the 1930s, and very
few had increased the number initially imposed, between

49 to 54 trees. Yields were quite poor and most planters
tended to neglect them with many complaining they were
much too old to maintain them.

18

per planter.11 These plots are widely dispersed and aver-
age about 123 coffee trees, which produce about 46 kilos
of parchment coffee per planter.12 In 1978 Rwanda produced
21,994 tons of parchment coffee and 16,275 tons of red
coffee beans, which were processed in three depulping mills:
RWANDEX at Kigali, RWANDEX at Gisenyi,** and the subsidiary
ETIRU at Ruhengeri, which closed in October 1978. Exports
for 1978 were 18,021 tons of red coffee beans which earned
4,533,000,000 BF*** for the country. Despite these earn-
ings, the entrepots of OCIR (Office des Cultures Industri-
elles du Rwanda) had record stocks of 10,500 tons.13
Surplus stocks are only part of the problem. Rwanda's
commercial sector suffers from isolation, and the country's
exports are periodically interrupted. For example, in 1978
an accident involving a chartered Rwandan cargo plane carry-
ing a portion of the coffee bags to the Kenya port of Mombasa
delayed shipment for two months. When Uganda closed its
borders in 1979 to truck traffic from Rwanda, the country
had to commission Air Rwanda to transport almost all of its

coffee to Mombasa. Incidents such as these siphon off valu-

able currency reserves, and in recent years the country's

 

**
The depulping mill at Gisenyi processes coffee beans from
the riparian regions of Lake Kivu.

***
The Belgian franc today is worth U.S. 5.0202.

19

total value of exports has been adversely effected by
declining prices and lower exports.

Coffee represented 64 percent of the total value of
exports in 1977; in 1978 the total value had declined to

14 Nonetheless, coffee remains the principle

58 percent.
export, coming before mining products, particularly cassi-
terite, and tea. Secondary commercial crops include
tobacco, barley and wheat in regions of higher altitude.
The main food crops, however, include beans, peas, sorghum,
cassava, maize, and bananas for the brewing of beer. These
and tree crops are cultivated on approximately 26 percent
of the land (34 percent is in permanent pasture and 6 per-
cent is forests) and in sufficient quantities to satisfy
the needs of domestic consumption. But one needs only
recall the famines of 1916 and 1943, which caused 50,000
and 36,000 deaths respectively, to realize the limits and
vulnerability of the country's domestic resources. In
fact, because of the density of population in relation to
cultivated land--only about one acre per person is used for
raising food for domestic consumption.15
Rwandan farmers necessarily practice intense cultiva-
tion, but an even further strain on land resources is the
high density of the cattle population, numbering more than
500,000. As in most pastoral societies of East Africa, the

herding of cattle had more than an economic significance;

ownership was not only an important status symbol, but also

20

an essential ingredient in the traditional socio-political
systems of Rwanda. Although the animals play a minor role
in the economy, these lyre-horned Ndanga cows use--or
destroy by overgrazing--1and that might better be in food
crops for the growing population. Their sheer numbers also
tend to accelerate the process of erosion on deforested
hillsides, with disastrous effects on soil productivity.
Moreover, the importance attached in the past to the owner-
ship of cattle is one reason why the adjustment of agricul—
tural production to the requirements of a fast-growing
pOpulation has proved such a difficult task, and why, until
recently, the most fertile areas remain overstocked and
overcropped.16
The overpopulation of man and beast has conspired with
the difficult terrain to retard the development of industry,

energy resources, and communications,17

even by African
standards. There are no railroads; of the existing 5,400
miles of poorly maintained roads, a third are classed as
fair weather roads or tracks, and virtually none was tarred
until recently. Steamers on Lake Tanganyika are the prin-
cipal carriers of products destined for export from Rwanda,
but the paucity of transport, coupled with a landlocked
position, have added to the difficulties of establishing
foreign trade patterns. Smaller trading operations are
largely in the hands of Indians and Arabs, who deal through

ports of Mombasa or Dar-es-Salaam.18 In short, the Rwandan

21

economy is very weak, and without foreign aid, the govern-
ment would not have sufficient reserves to implement most
of its ambitious development plans.

To a large extent, social change throughout much of
Africa has been primarily a rural phenomenon, but in Rwanda
real villages do not exist. Today, as in the past, the
hill remains the primary focus of socio-political and eco-
nomic aCtivity in the countryside. Beyond the hill there
is relatively little sense of unity among rural communities;
fragmentation and parochialism are the rule rather than the
exception. And in the absence of adequate communications,
the forbidding nature of the topography places further)
obstacles in the way of any large-scale socio-political and
economic mobilization. There is also the matter of ethnic
cleavages, a product of Rwanda's pre-colonial and feudal
heritage.

Rwanda developed its present territory partly through
conquest and partly through peaceful assimilation. Invad-
ing tribes were Batutsi pastoralists, whose origins are not
firmly established. However, their physical features sug-
gest ethnic affinities with the Oromo of southern Ethiopia.
These Batutsi drifted southward onto the plateau until they
made contact with the Bahutu agriculturalists, a short and
stocky people, who share physical characteristics with other
Bantu-speakers of Central Africa. Although their density

in relation to the Batutsi varies greatly from one region

22

to the next, they make up between 83 to 85 percent of the
total population. They were not the first people to inhabit
the region, however; the Batwa, a group of pygmoid forest
dwellers who now constitute less than one percent of the
present population settled Rwanda long before the Bahutu.19
Batutsi hegemony was consolidated by the 16th century,
when the central region of Rwanda was absorbed into the
nuclear kingdom, centered on Kigali. With the accession of
Ruganzu Ndori to power in the 17th century, a series of
invasions were launched against formerly independent Bahutu
areas which resulted in a further expansion of Rwanda's
boundaries. The final stage in the process, however, was
not completed until the latter half of the 19th century
under the reign of mgami Kigeri Rwabugiri, one of Rwanda's
most prestigious historical figures.20
Ethnic affinites provided a major integrative bond and
made for rapid assimilation in areas where the conquered
populations were already organized under a dominant Batutsi
lineage, as in the case of the Mubari, Bugesera and Nduga
regions. Bahutu, however, resisted but were overcome by
concentrated force.21 But in areas occupied by autonomous
Bahutu communities, Batutsi invaders were repulsed. These
communities had evolved their own state system, and it was
strong enough to resist Batutsi penetration for some time.22

Thus the effective annexation of the small Bahutu kingdoms

in the northern and eastern regions was not completed until

23

the early 19205, and would probably have taken even longer
if German and later Belgian authorities had not offered
military assistance.

For the most part, Batutsi overlords and population
were spread almost evenly throughout the country, except
for the northern regions of Ndorwa, Mutara, and Mulera
where the Batutsi never accounted for more than a tiny
fraction of the total p0pulation. In practice this meant
that the caste structure of the country was fairly rigid.23
Furthermore, the uniformity of the caste structure also
invited a similar uniformity of political organization.
The mwami followed a policy of subdividing the country in
order to prevent the possibility of resistance from larger
homogeneous units. He preferred to grant his vassals
separate hills, distributed about the countryside. Within
a few large fiefs, he carved out small dependencies where
devoted followers found excellent observation posts from
which to watch powerful vassals. The mwami also encour-
aged rivalries by giving to one vassal administration of
Bahutu lands, and to another, authority over the Batutsi

24

and the disposition of cattle. Finally, he drained off

the power of the great lords by making his capital a cen-
ter where chiefs came to pay court.25
The mwami, in the politically centralized state, was

the source and symbol of all authority. He alone could

confer legitimacy upon subordinates ranks, and because of

24

this, could be characterized as an absolute monarch. The
despotic character of the Rwandan kingship was nowhere more
clearly evidenced than in the bureaucratization of subordi-
nate political roles and the precarious tenure of the occu-
pants. The political system was one in which a triple
hierarchy of army chiefs, land chiefs and cattle chiefs--
all recruited from the dominant stratum--radiated from the
capital to the provinces and from the provinces to the
districts. Each province was entrusted to an army chief
and each district to a land chief and a cattle chief who
were responsible for the collection of tithes in produce
and cattle. From the triumvirate spread a vast network of
subchiefs from whom tribute was exacted for the higher
chiefs and the mwamis. How much power the chiefs and sub-
chiefs claimed for themselves, and for how long was
entirely dependent upon the mwami's grace.26 Consequently
the chiefs were bureaucrats in the sense that they did not
claim their position by right or inheritance or by virtue
of any prior connection with the area to which they were
appointed but served at the discretion of the mwami.

During the period of political consolidation and until
1930, when the Belgians deposed the reigning monarch, all
attempts at constitutional reform were generally interpre-
ted by the crown as a threat to its legitimacy. Rituals,
ideological symbols and myths carefully specified the limits

beyond which the monarchy could not innovate without

25

endangering its own legitimacy. Moreover, chiefly rule and
caste supremacy were both so intimately associated with the
pure authority of the crown that any statutory limitation
on the privileges of the dominant caste other than those
decreed by the mwami implied a corresponding limitation of
the powers of the crown.27
Rwandan society was hierarchical: each individual was
assigned a specific caste, and each caste a specific rank.
Clientship, however, served to link each layer of the hier-
archy in'a relationship of mutual dependence. At the core
of this relationship lay a feudal institution called
buhake, a cattle contract of pastoral servitude. A buhake
relationship was created when an individual, either a peas-
ant or Batutsi nobleman, voluntarily commended himself to
a patron in return for cattle and pasture land. His rights,
however, were those of usufruct: he was entitled to the
cow's milk and the calves. By the same token, the pasture
rights enjoyed by the client did not make him a landowner
but only a tenant at the mercy of his lord. In return for
these privileges, the client or vassal swore fealty and
recognized his duties of homage to his patron.28
In a society like Rwanda, where centralization of
authority was carried to an extreme, the need for protec-
tion was more deeply felt by the subordinate stratum, and

so, also, the need to establish reciprocal ties of obliga-

tion between inferior and superior. Moreover the role of

26

client and patron was not mutually exclusive. For example,
a man who had several clients could himself he the client
of an even wealthier individual, and so forth. In this
fashion, client-patron relationships formed a web of recip-
rocities embracing a wide segment of the population. The
only limits were the mwami at the top, who was the sole
proprietor of cattle and land and hence the supreme patron,
and, at the other extreme, the ordinary Bahutu peasant who
was too poor to impose his vassalage upon anyone but the
members of his own family.29
The institution of buhake was, in fact, exploitative,
because it provided the Batutsi aristocracy with agricul-
tural goods and services without significant reciprocity
and without the obligation to participate directly in the
productive process. It also gave the Batutsi chiefs greater
control over individuals and assured a retinue. There were
additional cravates: clients could lose their cattle or
land (the latter as a second form of ubuhake was guhakwa
y' ubutak "to pay court for the land") if the client ties
were severed. Clientage could also be inconvenient and
disturb the productive cycle, since the client was required
to pay homage regularly and carry out any personal services

30

demanded. Ironically, the institution gained its

greatest momentum during Musinga's reign. European admin-

istrators made demands upon Musinga and his chiefs and they,

31

in turn, required more of the Bahutu. With increased

27

duties, chiefs became more exacting and abusive, and
Bahutu were forced to seek protection; consequently buhake
increased.

In the predominantly Bahutu areas of the north there
developed a somewhat different kind of Clientage, based not
on cattle but on a land-lease contract between the original
owners of the land (bakonde), who were primarily of Bahutu
and Batwa extraction, and the Bahutu lineages which opened
the land up for cultivation (bagererwa). Under the system

of ubukonde, the bagererwa offered a tribute in kind to

 

the "landlord" in exchange for usufractuary rights over the
land.32
Because Rwanda's political and Clientage systems were
fully operational when the German established a military
post at Shangi in 1898, and because of the centralization
of the kingdom, the Germans administered on the basis of
indirect rule. This meant “by degrees, and almost imper-
ceptibly to the people . . . .the [sultan would] eventually
become nothing less than the executive instrument of the

Resident.33

German officials were attracted to this policy
not only because the centralized political system was
admirably suited to indirect rule but because they also
realized that any attempt to displace the traditional ruler
would probably have met with considerable resistance from

the local population. Moreover, the new government would

have required a far greater number of European administrators

28

than was available at the time. This consideration takes
an added weight when one recalls that of all colonial
administrations Germany's was among the most understaffed.
As late as 1913, the whole of German East Africa--a territory
larger than Nigeria--was administered by seventy European
officials. Moreover, the Batutsi aristocracy was viewed
with considerable sympathy by the German officers on the
spot, many of whom were Prussian noblemen.34
Captain von Grawert, the Resident of Burundi, in a

report of November 1905, expressed the full scope of German
policy in Africa, when he remarked that,

. . . the ideal of [the] unqualified

recognition of the authority of the

sultans from us, whether through taxes

or other means, in a way that will

seem to-them as little a burden as

possible; this will link their interests

with ours. This ideal will probably

be realized more easily in Rwanda,

which is more tightly organized . . .we

must first reestablish the old authority

of the sultan, which has generally

been weakened by wars with Europeans

and other circumstances.35
Following these guidelines, German authorities consistently
and successfully Sought to bolster the authority of the
king against his rivals. But just as the mwami needed the
support of the Germans to sustain his authority, the Germans
needed the support of the mwami to consolidate their power

over the country and to proceed with the task of adminis-

tration.

29

Shortly after the arrival of the Germans, a period of
factional rivalry ensued, centered upon a disputed succes-
sion to the throne and culminating in 1896 with the famous
coup of Rucuncu. The latter is a bench-mark in Rwandan
history because it marked the beginning of a long civil war
between the Bega and the Banyiginya clans, the royal houses
of Rwanda. The strife commenced after the death of mgami
Kigeri Rwabugiri in 1895 when the two royal families began
a bitter struggle for the kingship. The Bega was one of
the most prestigious of the several maternal clans from
which a future mwami could be chosen, but it had fallen
into disgrace by the mid-19th century. The Bega mounted a
campaign which made one of its own, Kanyogera, Queen Mother.
Nor was the Bega content until Kanyogera's own son, the
future mwami Musinga, had taken the throne. In November
1896, at Rucuncu, the succession was finally settled to the
advantage of the Bega after a brief but bloody "palace
revolution" during which mgami Rwabugiri's successor,
Rutalindwa, his.wife and three children lost their lives.36

Yuhi Musinga, the new mwami, was a minor at the time;
his mother, Kanyogera, acted as regent, together with his
maternal uncles, chiefs Kabore and Ruhinankiko. With this
triumvirate, the Bega proceeded to consolidate their hold
over the country. They systematically exterminated all
those who had opposed Musinga, and filled vacancies with

37

Bega chiefs. Those who escaped the purge fled north and

30

east. The activities of those in the north, however, cul-
minated in 1911-12 with the famous rebellion associated
with the names of Muhumusa, Ndungutse and Bassebya.
Northern Rwanda was still more or less independent from the
crown. The annexation of the region had taken place a
decade or so before the coup, under the reign of mwami
Rwabugiri, and although Rwabugiri had extracted a formal
pledge of allegiance from sbme of the local Kiga chiefs,
their loyalty to the monarchy was nonetheless highly
questionable.38

Hardier and sturdier than most ordinary Bahutu, the
Kiga people of northern Rwanda have always been looked upon
by their neighbors as a rebellious lot, fiercely individu-
alistic and contemptous of established authority. It was
among these rugged mountaineers that one of Rwabugiri's
wives, a presumably full-blooded Munyiginya named Muhumusa,
found refuge. She sought to crystallize the support of a
few local clans around a hard core of legitimist chiefs,
with a view to restoring her clan and her son Bileyeya to
the throne in Rwanda.39 In 1911 she proclaimed herself
Queen of Ndorwa and promised her followers that she would
soon liberate the country from the Europeans.

Muhumusa was the only member of the legitimist faction
who sought asylum in the north. Among the Banyigenya chiefs

who fled to the north, the most famous was Ndungutse, pre-

sumably Bilegeya's half brother through Muhumusa.

31

Ndungutse and a Batwa chief named Bassebya--described by
Father Dufays as "a famous and fearsome brigand, rapacious
and sanguinary4O--led sporadic insurrections throughout the
Rikiga and in particular in the marshy country surrounding
Lakes Bulera and Luhondo.41

The British captured Muhumusa and some of her follow-
ers at Bufumbiro (Uganda) on September 1911. Thereafter,
Ndungutse emerged as the chief spokesman of the legitimist
faction, claiming frequently that Bilegeya was the sole
legitimate heir. Ndungutse also emerged as a powerful
figure in his own right and came to be viewed by the local
populations as their savior and prophet who would restore
peace to the country and free the laboring masses from the
corvée (ubuletwa), an exaction made all the more intolerable
after the additional tribute which the Beta had apparently
tried to extract from the northern populations.42
Ndungutse's renown was somewhat ironic, considering he was
a Batutsi. His name became a symbol of anti-Batutsi senti-
ment, and by implication of anti-European sentiment as well.
Moreover his appeal as a leader was closely linked to the
emergence in the north of the Nyabingi movement, a magico-
religious cult which Muhumusa had used as a vehicle for
propagating her ideas and solidifying her support among
the people of the Mulera, Bukonza, and Buberuka (collec-

tively referred to as the Kiga).43

32

The Nyabingi developed a strong political attraction
for the Kiga, and the movement became a military arm in the
rebellion against the constituted authority of the court of
Rwanda. As the cult became increasingly xenophobic in
character and aggressive in its methods, the administra-
tion moved against it. After the murder of a Catholic
priest by a cult member, the Germans organized a punitive
expedition in the north. The commander, Lt. Godovius
sought to punish insubordinate districts and their people
and chiefs by causing the greatest possible damage, so as
to force submissions; and to install Batutsi chiefs who
were faithful to Musinga. The expedition was an unquali-
fied success on both counts. In April 1912, Gudovius's
troops attacked Ndungutse's village, near Ruhengeri, kill-
ing about fifty defenders, including Ndungutse. Later
military operations completely devastated the area and
eventually crushed the resistance. Gudovius appointed
loyal chiefs and assumed that the pacification was com-
pleted. The rebellion, however, was not destroyed; for
many years after the Belgian "reprise," the northern re-
gion remained the scene of recurrent outbreaks against

Batutsi chiefs and the administration.44

Gudovius's expe-
dition nevertheless had consolidated the position of the
monarchy in an area where it had never been firmly estab-
lished. In return the Germans could continue to count on

the complete loyalty of Musinga.45

33

The administration made every effort to strengthen and
consolidate the position of the crown. Punitive expeditions
served also to reinforce the absolutism of the monarchy,
and consequently the hegemony of the ruling caste. However,
very little was accomplished in the realm of civil adminis-
tration because the entire period of German oVer-rule was
largely devoted to punitive expeditions. Administrative
machinery set up by Germans did not amount to more than a
few strategically located police posts. Economically,
there were some modest accomplishments.

After extensive experimentation, the German residents
discovered that coffee was an ideal crOp for the country.
When the experiment began in 1913, additional crops, such
as cotton, tobacco, and rice were deemed feasible commer-
cial crops. But coffee had the most potential for success.
Native species grew in regions considered uncultivable by
the Bahutu farmers. The climate was suitable; the banana
groves which dotted the countryside created a quasi-forest
atmosphere, and also provided ideal shade conditions for
Arabica in higher altitude zones, acted as excellent regu-
lators of temperature and prevented soil erosion. The soil
was quite fertile since banana trees were burned annually,
and enriched compost from animal dung, other waste materi-
als, and fire ashes were added.46

Some Bahutu farmers were already familiar with the

cultivation of coffee.- In 1903, the Nyundo mission planted

34

coffee trees from some seedlings the White Fathers had
secured from Bukoba, where they had introduced coffee and
where the cultivation had undergone rapid expansion.47 In
1905 the White Fathers at Mibirizi received some selected
Guatemalan seedlings from the Amani experimental station.48
Some missions possessed a few hundred coffee trees of both
Bourbon and Guatemalan varieties for personal use. At
Save, the White Fathers had distributed several thousand

49 So, in imple-

coffee trees to their African catechists.
menting their program, German officials had a base from
which to start. In 1914, they planned to plant one million
trees, and to increase the number by one million annually,

so that by 1920 there would be six million coffee trees in
both Rwanda and Burundi. The administration felt that a
program of this magnitude would help meet the needs of all

of German East Africa, the metropole, and the world market.50
But, more significantly, successful cultivation would en-
able the Bahutu to pay their tax.

The Germans saw Rwanda as having potential for econ-
omic development and colonization, and believed that mod-
ern transportation, especially the railroad and labor, was
the key to economic success. The railroad would bring
trade, trade would produce money, and money would enable

Rwandans to pay taxes. According to some officials, the

railroad

35

was both a hope and an excuse; a hope,

that the economy would flourish as soon

as the railroad was built; an excuse

that there was no moneyleconomy because

there was no railroad.
Rail transportation was supposed to reduce costs of exports
from Rwanda, but there was no commercial activity to speak
of, nor was there a potential market for what Rwanda had to
offer. Neither could the administration guarantee that the
Batutsi would sell their cattle, given its prestige and
social significance. Nor could the colonial officials
guarantee that the economy would be reorganized to ensure
delivery of produce to the railroads; moreover, Bahutu were
subsistence farmers with very primitive agricultural methods.

While the Germans succeeded in planning for the econom-

ic future of the country, they failed entirely in economic
development, primarily because the war intervened before
development plans could be fully implemented. Finally,
there were too few competent people to initiate develop-
mental plans. Nor could the administration depend upon
Musinga to control his subjects, since his power declined
in direct proportion to the distance away from his capital
at Nyanza. Rebel chiefs could easily incite the latent
hostility of the Bahutu against the Batutsi. But these
were moot concerns because Rwanda fell in April-May 1916
as the German forces withdrew before the concentric attack
of superior Belgian and British forces. With the German

defeat went the Imperial vision and the railroad.52

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1Because of the distance, Rwanda must pay higher
prices for imports, and, export costs are much greater
because specialized transportation is required. Marcel
L. Heimo, "Reflexion sur les conditions et les perspec-
tives du développement Economique au Rwanda," Genéve-
Afrigue, VII, No. 1 (1968), p. 14.

2Ray Y. Gildea, Jr. and Alice Taylor, "Rwanda and
Burundi," Focus, XIII, No. 6 (February, 1963), p. 2;
Rene LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London, 1970), p. 13.

3

 

Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 3.

4LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 13-14; Gildea
and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 2.

5Themajor mineral found in Rwanda is cassiterite,
the chief source of tin. Approximately 2,750 tons were
mined in ndrthern Rwanda in 1957 (more recent figures are
not available). Other minerals mined to a lesser extent
and mainly in Rwanda are gold, beryl, tantalite, bastnasite
and amblygonite (rare minerals and sources of lithium), and
wolfromite (a source of tungsten). Gildea and Taylor,
"Rwanda and Burundi," pp. 4-5. LeMarchand, Rwanda and
Burundi, p. 14.

6The World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review, Rwanda
Report 1377-RW. Regional Projects Department, East Africa
Regional Office. Regional Office, (June 30, 1977), i.

7Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory
and Practice," Daedalus, 111, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), p. 109.
See W. H. Bayton, R. E. Downs, Yolande Jemai, S. E. Ross-
Larson, A Report on Assistance to a National Maternal and
Child Health and Family Planning Program in Rwanda (Wash-
ington, D. C., 1981), p. 1, where population density is
reported as 200 people per sq. km. and the natural increase
is placed at 3-3.3 percent.

 

36

37

8LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 15; Warren
Weinstein, "Rwanda-Urundi (Rwanda-Burundi)," in Divided
Nation in a Divided World, ed. Gregory Henderson,
Richard Ned Lebow and John G. Stoessinger (New York,1974),
p. 370.

9See Pierre Gourou, "Notice de la Carte de la Densité’
de la Population au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi."
Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Atlas Général du Congo
(Brussels, 1951); Pierre Gourou, "La Densité de la Popula-
tion au Ruanda-Urundi: Esquisse d'une Etude Géographique,"
Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Section des Sciences
Naturelles et Medicale, Mémoires, Tome XXI, fasc. 6
Brussels, 1953).

10

 

 

Heimo, "Reflexion," p. 12.

11Francais Bart, "Le Cafe dans l'Agriculture rwandaise:
l'example de Kidahire (Runyinya)fl Les Cahiers d'Outre Mer,
XXXIII, No. 132 (October-December 1980), p. 302.

12Because of the high population density, the average
area available for cultivating all crops is 92 ares per
farmer. Ibid.

13Ibid.

14Ibid., pp. 302-303.

15LeMarchand, Rwanda andlgurundi, p. 14; Gildea and
Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 4.

 

16LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 15; Gildea and
Taylor, “Rwanda and Burundi," p. 4. ~
17

Industrial production is primarily for local con-
sumption, and the principal commodities are bricks and
tiles, furniture, ready-to-wear clothing, soap and insec-
ticide. Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 5.

The availability of energy resources is a basic problem
affecting most of Africa. In Rwanda the problem is char-
acterized not only by irregular rainfall but also by a
general tendency toward drought which has already resulted
in the complete disappearance of permanent water in some
areas and by intensive and destructive erosion. The
available hydrographic system is made up rivers where the
upper courses vary greatly in levels. Or their middle
reaches vary so slightly in level that they become meander-
ing streams and in some places the water is almost stagnant.
United Nations Trusteeship Council. Study of ngulation,
Land Utilization and Land (New York, 26 March 1957),

pp. 31, 65 and 66.

 

38

18Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi,
LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 15-16.

19

 

Ibid., pp. 18-19.

20Jan Vansina, "L'Evolution du Royaume du Rwanda des
Origines 3 1900," ARSOM, XXVI, fasc. 2 (Brussels, 1962),
pp. 75-76. "“"

21A. d'Arianoff, "Histoire des Bagersera souverains du
Gisaka," IRQB, XXIV, fasc. 3 (Brussels, 1952), pp. 88 ff.

22
77-81.

23

Vansina, "L'Evolution du Royaume du Rwanda," pp.

LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 25.

 

24Ibid., p. 27

25Rapport sur l'Administration belge des territoires
occupés de l'Est Africain allemand (Brussels, 1921), p. 16.

26Jacques J. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in
Rwanda (London and New York, 1961), pp. 120.

27LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 31-32. For
additional information on the ritual and mythical imagery
of kingship, see the following: Maquet, The Premise of
Inequality, pp. 121; A. Kagame, "Le Code ESoterique de la
Dynastiédu Ruanda," Zaire IV, (1947), pp. 363-386: and
Marcel d' Hertefelt and André Coupez, La Royauté’Sacrée
de l'Ancien Rwanda (Tervueren, 1964).

28Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a
Community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Michigan, 1962), pp. 11-12; Jacques Maquet, "Rwanda Castes,"
in Social Stratification in Afrigg, eds. Arthur Tuden and
Leonard Platnicov (New York, 1970), pp. 118-120; and
R. Bourgeois, "Banyarwanda et Barundi: l'Evolution du
contrat de bail a cheptel au Ruanda-Urundi" (Brussels:
Academie Royale des Sciences coloniales. Classe des
Sciences morales et politiques, méhoires, N. 8., IX, No. 4,
(1958), pp. 6-7.

29

 

 

 

 

 

LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 36-37.

39

30M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century
of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 248-250.

311bid.

32LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 39.

33Ibid., p. 48. Also see Pierre Ryckmans, "Une Page
d'Histoire Coloniale: l'Occupation Allemande dans l'Urundi,‘
IRCB (Brussels), XXIX, (1953), fasc. 5; Adolphus Frederick,
Duke of Mecklenburg, In the Heart of Africa (London, 1910),
p. 46; and Anonymous, Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda
([Kabgayi], 1956), p. 14

34William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919
(Oxford, 1963), p. 127.

35

Ibid., p. 55.

361bid., pp. 57-58.

37Albert Pages, "Un Royaume Hamite au centre de
l'Afrique," IRCM (Brussels) 1 (1933), pp. 195-232.

38LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 58.

39J. M. Bessel, "Nyabingi," Uganda Journal, VI,
(1938-1939), p. 78.

4oFelix Dufays, Pages d'Epggée Africaine (Ixelles,
1928), p. 58.

41Ibid.

42 . /
Bega hegemony meant increased corvees and taxes;
the new chiefs, installed by the Bega sought only to
enrich themselves at the expense of their own people. The
Bahutu responded by answering Ndungutse's call in 1912 for
assistance when he threatened to invade the "central
kingdom." LeMarchand. Rwanda and Burundi, p. 59.

431bid., pp. 56-60.

44Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda, pp. 139 and 162:
Louis, Ruanda-UrundI, pp. 153-155.

45

 

 

Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, p. 157.

 

40

46G. Molitor. "L' Introduction et le Developpement de
la Culture du Cafeier (Arabica) chez les Indigenes du
Ruanda- -Urundi," extract from Le Materiel Colonial A. S. B. L.,
27th year, No. 6 (March, 1937), p. 161.

47G. Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement de
la Culture du Caféier," p. 159: Edmund LePlae, "Les
Plantations de Café'au Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-
1935), leur Importance," Institut Royal Colonial Belge,
memoire 8, III (1936), p. 217.

48Ephrem Twagirayezu, "Le Cafe Arabica et le Developpe-
ment economique du Ruanda et du Burundi" (Faculte des ,
Sciences politiques, sociales et economiques, Universite
Louvanium de Leopoldville, 1964), p. 43.

49The Bourbon and Guatemalan varieties introduced into
Rwanda by the White Fathers were propagated by the Germans.
But only the Guatemalan variety survived. Also, the trees
that were distributed to the mission' 3 catechists were
destroyed by Batutsi chiefs who objected to using pasture
for coffee production. LePlae, "Les Plantations de Cafe
au Congo Belge," pp. 217-218.

50CAMP. Notice sur le Ruanda--1916. Also when
Musinga heard that the Germans intended to introduce coffee
so that Bahutu would gain money to pay their tax, he
instructed his notables to drive their cattle through
fields under cultivation. Several years after the distri-
bution of thousands of coffee trees to the Bahutu there
were none left standing. Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only
Bad News," pp. 140-141.

51

 

Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, p. 175.

 

52See pages 321-338 of Donat Murego's Le Revolution
Rwandaise: 1959-1962, essai d'interpretation (Rwanda,
Publication de l'Institut des Sciences Politiques et
Sociales, 1959). Murego argues that German colonization
reinforced the Bahutu's general feeling of powerlessness
with respect to Europeans; it strengthened the arrogance
and authority of the Batutsi; and it intensified the
frustration of Bahutu vis-a-vis the dual authority of
Batutsi and the Germans. Furthermore, the Batutsi alli-
ance with the administration reduced tensions between
Batutsi and sanctioned the consolidation of their power
whereas, through the German army, the Bahutu opposition
was reduced to silence but not stifled.

 

CHAPTER TWO

THE BELGIAN COLONIAL

STATE AND INDIRECT RULE

The prime objective of the colonial authorities was
the development of the colony, so that it could eventually
complement the metropolitan economy and society. To
accomplish this task, colonial officials had to transform
the socio-economic structure of the traditional area. Con-
sequently, the first order of business was to determine how
the colony would be governed. The Belgians were not espe-
cially innovative in this regard. They decided to follow
their predecessor's example of indirect administration, and
proceeded to build an African bureaucracy. Almost simulta-
neously, officials restructured the tributary mode of pro-
duction in Rwanda, so that African labor could be extrac-
ted for capitalist production and the internal process of
primitive accumulation could commence. But as this chapter
shows, Rwandans, particularly the Batutsi oligarchy, resis-
ted the colonial state's efforts to restructure a produc-
tive system which served their interest. The end result
of Batutsi opposition was enough compromise on the part of

the administration to permit the evolution of a dual

41

42

colonial system--one which was traditional and another
which aspired to modernize the country.

The primary aim of the Belgian military effort in
Africa during World War I was to assume possession of
German territory for use as a pawn in negotiations. When
the peace negotiations opened, the Belgians hoped to trade
German East Africa for Portuguese territory on the south-
ern banks of the Congo river. But their hopes failed to
materialize, and the Milner-Orts agreement of May 30,

1919, left Belgium with only Ruanda-Urundi, which meant
that Belgium was locked out of German East Africa and lost
the southern bank of the Congo and the extreme eastern port
of Rwanda to the British which received the lion's share of
the ex-German colonies.1

The administrative status of the territory was finally
settled in 1924, when the League of Nations conferred a
class A Mandate on Belgium. On August 21, 1925, the
Belgian government enacted a law providing for administra-
tive union between their newly acquired mandate and their
Congo colony. Commenting on the practical implications of
the merger, the Belgian representative to the Permanent
Mandates Commissions stated in October 1925 that:

Rwanda (and Burundi) would take their
place on a footing of the most complete
equality side by side with our Congo
provinces and will enjoy all the benefits
of the large measure of decentralization

possessed by those provinces . . . . The
Belgian government thought it good . . .

43

not to double the already large central

services and the technical and medical

services established at Boma, but,

thanks to the administrative union,

to extend the working of these services

to the mandated territory.2

Although Rwanda had become an appendage of the Belgian
colony, it was five or six years later before it could
enjoy the full benefit of a civil administration.3 Day to
day tasks of the administration remained largely in the
hands of the military and at first did not extend very far
beyond the immediate requirements of peace and order.
Belgians were slow to initiate administrative reforms be-
cause the "customs and institutions were unlike any found
in the Congo." Moreover, Belgian military personnel, by
virtue of their training and background, showed little con-
cern for the social and political problems connected with
the tasks of colonial administration. Rwandan institutions
seemed strange to the Belgian officers on the spot. When
queried by the Permanent Mandates Commission about the pace
of civil administration, officials stressed repeatedly that
the administrative machinery the Germans had left behind
was "so rudimentary and inadequate that it could serve only
as a makeshift arrangement pending the introduction of a
new system."4
However, the early years of the Belgian mandate bore

the unmistakable imprint of the German legacy. The mili-

tary was entrusted with a wide range of administrative

44

functions; and, like their German counterparts, the Belgian
Residents were forced into a variety of roles, acting as
troubleshooters, judges, counsellors and law-enforcing
agents, and relying for assistance on a handful of European
deputies, "whose sphere of action depended on the Resident
and varied according to political circumstances."5
In 1925 the Belgian version of indirect rule received

something approaching an official formulation. Its basic

core is found in the 1925 Rapport sur l'Administration du

 

Rwanda-Urundi, and bore the authorship of Pierre Ryckmans,

 

Belgian's first Resident in Burundi:

The cooperation of the kings constitutes

an indispensable element of progress and
civilization . . . Without them the problem
of government would remain insoluble.

There are among the chiefs some who are
incapable imbeciles, who will never gain
authority . . . . There are those who are
irreducibly hostile and who will never
accept civilization . . . . These chieftaincy
crises are everywhere the great stumbling
block of [African] policies. To resolve
them by dismissing a bad chief and

by appointing in his place one more
amenable to European influences is tanta-
mount to submitting impotence for in-
subordination. Legitimacy is a moral
factor of incalculable importance.

These ideas were further elaborated upon in an article
which appeared in the Bulletion de la Société’Belge
d'Etudes et d'Expansion in 1925, in which Ryckmann again

emphatically stressed the importance of legitimacy:

45

Legitimacy is more powerful than

violence. The only smoothly func-

tioning organ between us and the

masses is the legitimate chiefs.

They alone, because they are legit-

imate, can induce acceptance of

necessary innovation.
He conceded that some chiefs might turn out to be "incap-
able, imbecilic, or irreducibly hostile, but that caution
should be used in dealing with these situations." Removal
from office was an extreme measure, adapted only as the
very last resort.

Every effort should be made, therefore, to respect
the mwami's authority and personal prestige, since his
sanction and customary investiture conferred legality upon
a candidate chosen by European officials. While his power
could be curtailed if necessary, no one could or should

challenge his authority or outward prestige.7

Ryckmans'
argument reflected his awareness of the administrative
disaster caused in the Congo by the wholesale removal of
legitimate chiefs and their replacement by impotent "chiefs
of the whites." He regarded the Belgian position in Rwanda
as privileged because the mandate had a king who could act
as the prime legitimizer of Belgian colonial policies and
practices. Or as Ryckmans put it, the mwami would provide
"the familiar decor which permits us to act in the wings
without alarming the masses."8

But a year after his plea, hundreds of Rwandese chiefs

were dismissed from office and in some cases temporarily

46

replaced by chiefs of Bahutu extraction. The application
of the Ryckmans' policy was challenged from the outset by
the all-encompassing, absolutist character of the kingship
and the personal obduracy of Mwami Musinga. While the cen-
tralized character of the political system made administra-
tive control at the t0p relatively easy, the imposition of
administrative limitations upon the kingship was rendered
extremely difficult by the despotic nature of the office
and the mygmi's extreme suspicion towards Europeans. The
maze of intrigue and the double-dealing surrounding the
court was an additional factor. As long as this situation
was allowed to persist, one Belgian administrator contended,
nothing but chaos would prevail.9

Musinga and his chiefs' non-compliance or cooperation
was particularly disconcerting for those who wanted the
oligarchy's support in stimulating economic development.
Pierre Ryckmans, in a speech before the Société’des
Ingénieurs et Industriels in 1921, remarked that it was
essential to make the African a producer of coffee, cotton,
and flax because.their large scale production would offset

or absorb high freight costs.10

But if economic develop-
ment was to occur, the indifference of the traditional
administration had to change or be transformed. Making
them executive agents of European administration became a

necessary priority, otherwise African production could not

be developed nor effectively monitored. But during the

47

early years of Belgian administration, colonial officials
were not strong enough to affect any permanent reorganiza-
tion or change in the traditional political system, espe-
cially when the Belgians were instituting measures that
were designed to lessen Musinga's authority. For example,
in 1916, the Belgian resident, acting as the "Government
of Occupation," divided Rwanda into two separate adminis-
trative zones and instituted a policy of dealing with the
chiefs in each area. As a result of this policy, Musinga's
notables became more independent, and the mwami lost control
over them, since he could neither discipline them nor pro-
tect those whom the Belgians sought to punish. Thus both
his political power and prestige were progressively under-
mined.11
Since these changes to the political structure occurred
at a time of severe famine in the northwest, Batutsi dis-
content and hostility towards the Belgians grew. Rumors
began to spread that Musinga planned to resist Belgian
occupation. Fearing a full scale revolt, the administration
ordered Musinga to end the rumors, but to no avail. Com-
mander Malfeyt, military governor of the occupied terri-
tory, prevailed upon the White Fathers, who advised him to
direct his efforts to the Abega clan, Musinga's maternal
relatives. In December, 1916, the military governor
arrested and imprisoned Rwidegembya, a powerful Abega clan

member.12 Resistance from Musinga and the Batutsi

48

oligarchy came to a halt, but court intrigue and European
suspicion continued to affect the relations between the
occupational forces and the traditional society.

To prevent further deterioration in relations,
Malfeyt restored Rwanda to Musinga through Ordinance Num-
ber Five of April 1917 which reinstituted the former German
residency system. This action eliminated the direct command
of Belgian officers in field. Their impatience, ignorance,
and indiscriminate punishment and abuse of the Batutsi
notables had endangered the Belgian occupation and the

13 Commander

prestige of the traditional ruling elite.
Malfeyt then appointed Major DeClerck, a veteran of twenty
years in the Congo, as the first civilian resident of
Kigali, DeClerk sought to implement change by moral per-
suasion and compromise.

The Belgian resident informed the myami and the
Batutsi chiefs of the administration's desire to protect
the Bahutu from the arbitrary powers of the oligarchy.14
A series of decrees passed in July and August 1917 accom-
pliShed the following: Musinga lost the power of life and
death over his subjects;15 Batutsi chiefs could only com-
pel Bahutu to do two days of customary work (uburetwa)
instead of the three or more frequently demanded by the
notables. Moreover, farmers could keep all the produce

from their fields and the earnings from porterage without

the risk of confiscation by the chiefs. DeClerck also

49

encouraged Musinga to implement a decree which would double
the amount of land Bahutu farmers were currently cultiva-

16 To eliminate disputes over the control of men and

ting.
cattle, the resident limited the shebuja's or patron's

rights to recall cattle from the abagaragu or his client.

 

To reduce future famines, DeClerck also ordered all Rwandans
to plant manioc, a drought resistant tuber crop, and trees
which would contribute to more regular rainfall. While
Musinga submitted to these changes in the organization of
his kingdom, neither he nor his notables implemented them.
But DeClerck, anticipating resistance, instructed his per-
sonnel to inform Rwandans of these administrative changes.
However, the notables countered his actions by bribing
the abasemyi, the administration's interpreter. Consequent-
ly, the changes seldom, if ever, touched the masses of
Rwandans, and when a Muhutu managed to hear of these re-
forms, he had no means of obtaining them, since he could
not communicate with the administration without the assis-
tance of the abasemyi, whose fee he could not afford to
pay. In addition, there was the matter of reprisals from
offended or injured notables. Only those Bahutu who worked
at the missions learned the full meaning of the decrees and
prohibitions and were able to use them against the Batutsi

notables.17

The reforms were nonetheless a beginning, and
over the long run, colonial officials would slowly trans-

form the traditional society by courting the oligarchy.

50

Much of the impetus for the governmental reorganiza-
tion of the 19203 stemmed from the administration's attempts
to extend its control over regions beyond the central pla-
teau. The oligarchy not only resented the European pres-
ence but also the colonial government's persistent efforts
to modify the traditional system--all of which lessened
the Court's power and prestige. Of particular concern to
the Court was the potential disloyalty of those chiefs who
actively courted the Europeans as transformation and reforms
became permanent and the daily humiliation of compromise
which the Court had to endure. On the other hand, the
Belgians became increasingly disillusioned with the Court
as an agent of change, since it refused to be a willing
accomplice in the transformation of Rwanda. European offi-
cials also resented the extent to which their orders were
disregarded, and this dissatisfaction was relayed to offi-
cials in the colonial ministry. But, more importantly,
they were also concerned about the lack of economic pro-
gress, particularly when recent economic activity in Zaire
seemed to anticipate a similar and perhaps coordinated
development in Rwanda.18

Resident Mortehan and other officials agreed that
economic development in Rwanda was essential, and that it
could only take place if the administration gained firmer
control over the kingdom. So in September 1923, Mortehan

reminded the Court to reduce its demands on the Bahutu and

51

to provide security of land tenure for them. When the
Court and notables ignored his requests, Mortehan began to
deprive Musinga of the right to assign the responsibility
for making labor requisitions for Europeans. The adminis-
tration also believed that the Court's distribution of work
quotas according to political criteria rather than ability
to fill them led to inefficiency and delays. Moreover,
administrators in post areas had been ignoring the Court's
prerogative on assignments and had been distributing quotas
to notables in their own regions. The Court, however, had
retained control of the distributions within the central
kingdom. But, after some chiefs complained that Musinga
used work orders to punish them, Mortehan ordered the
mgami to confine his demands to one small region where most
of the commands were held by his favorites. In all other
areas, administrators assigned work quotas to the most im-
portant chiefs; where no one chief predominated, officials
named one individual to be 3525; chief for administrative
work projects.

Technically, every adult male performed 3525i, usually
for public work projects which became general in the 1920s.
The local chief, however, decided who actually participated,
and the type of work assigned to the individual for akggi
often depended on his standing with the hill chief. Refus-
al to perform 3523; was often the excuse used by a chief to

dispossess a person of his land.19

52

In establishing the position of the 232i; chief,
European officials were able to address two fundamental
problems simultaneously: geographic isolation and admin-
istrative control. Before 1923, commercial trade in north-
ern, central, and eastern Rwanda was oriented towards the
Bukoba-Mombasa route, primarily because of the favorable
rates merchants received for their hides. Products from
Southern Rwanda passed through the Bujumbura-Kigoma-Dar-
es-Salaam route, which merchants used to avoid the incon-
venience and cost of carriers from Bukoba.20 To transport
trade goods to either terminus required numerous African
carriers rather than mechanical transportation, since there
were few roads, and until road construction began, Rwanda
would remain isolated with trade confined to the peripheral
areas where water-transport systems and railroad traffic
facilitated trade. In 1923, the nearest road for automo-
biles went east from Mbarara in Uganda, and the telegraph
had come only as far as Kbale, Uganda. The only railroad
was the Kigoma and Dar-es-Salaam connection, and the cara-
van route connecting Cyangugu with Bujumbura was the only
road in Rwanda. All other routes were described as impor-
tant trails. The closest radio was located in Bujumbura.21

The creation of the gkggi chief meant that labor could
be mobilized more efficiently. As a result, the adminis-

tration was able to commence a road construction program,

and at the end of 1923, the year major construction began,

53

some two hundred and ten kilometers of routes carrossables
22

 

Between 1923 and 1927, the Butare-Kansi and

Butare-Lubonoa roads were constructed.23 In 1924, construc-

were built.

tion began on the Tanganyika-Kivu road; several bridges were
repaired; and segments of the road from Kamaniola to Bukava
were surfaced and enlarged. In the same year, twenty kilo-
meters of motorible road were constructed between Kigali
and Butare, and on the Nyanza to Kabgaye route thirteen
stone bridges were built, and three more were constructed
on the route from Kigali to Ruhengeri.24

Some of these projects were financed in part by a
five-year loan of twenty million francs from the colonial
office in 1925, to both Rwanda and Burundi for economic
development, at what it considered quite favorable terms:
amortization in thirty year annuities at six percent inter-
est, with the ordinary budget of the territory assuming the
interest and amortization charges. The territories would
receive the loan in five installments: 3.4 million francs
in 1925, 4.3 million francs in 1926, 4.3 million francs in
1927, and 4 million francs each in 1928 and 1929 for the
development of government services and public works proj-
ects.25 The metropole was evidently committed to develop-
ment in Rwanda, because the Ministry of Colonies issued
the territories 1.2 million francs to cover administrative

26

costs in 1924, and in lieu of the fact that Belgium was

recovering from the devastation of four years of war.

54

Moreover, the majority of her civil servants, private cap-
ital, and colonial interests were committed to the metropole
or in Zaire.

It should be emphasized, however, that none of the new
roads were paved; all were earth surfaced and few would
support the weight of vehicles over 8.5 tons. Because most
were set out hastily, they did not withstand the lorry
traffic which increased to and from Bujumbura and Uganda

27 Still these roads facilitated trade from

after 1923.
the interior, but most importantly, they helped to further
integrate the African labor force into the world market and
to increase the accumulation of capital.

While dismantling the tributary mode of production,
appropriating and regulating land, and building roads, the
state also implemented a tax system that not only reim-
bursed the government for the cost of building an infra-
structure and for providing services to Africans in the
productive sector, but which also forced Africans into the
labor market or labor pool for European enterprises. Be-
ginning with the first Belgian tax collection in 1917, when
Defawa was Deputy Resident at Nyanza, the administration's
head tax was five francs per adult males, and it remained
so until 1920 when the tax was lowered to 3.508F.28

By 1924, inhabitants living in European areas paid a

head tax of lSBF. Taxpayers living in areas near districts

bordering Bugarama, Rumonge, and Nyanza were charged five

55

francs, while those in exclusively African areas continued
to pay 3.50BF. The total amount collected that year was

29

1,049,222BF.50. In 1926, the rate in African areas re-

turned to five francs,30 but went to 7.50BF in 1927 and
continued to rise thereafter.31
Similar to the Germans, the Belgians also created a
dual tax system: one system was Operative for European
commercial and administrative centers, and a separate one
operated in the rural African sector. The rationale, of
course, was that the modern economy ought to assume a dis-
proportionate share of the burden for economic development.
As progress was made and more Africans were forced into the
world market, the tax rates for individual provinces were
increased and assessed according to ability to pay. This
procedure meant that Africans were assuming a major share

of the burden for the development of the mandate. A number

of supplementary taxes were also introduced for prestations

 

that had been paid in kind; others were levied, especially

32

on cattle, to finance Operations within the chiefdoms.

In 1920, individuals with more than five head Of cat-

tle paid a tax of lOBF, and in 1921 those with more than

33

ten head of cattle paid 7.SOBF. The charge was changed

to one franc in 1928, and continued to increase in subse-
quent years. The amount collected from the cattle tax in

31

1925 was 500,0003F. These supplementary and income taxes

were vital resources which the administration believed

56

would aid in raising the standard of living for Africans.
They reasoned that higher taxation, regardless of how they
were Obtained, would help "to overcome the African's repug-
nance to work," which European officials further believed
was "common and which prevented the African from making an
effort that would transcend his desire to produce only for
his immediate or primordial needs."35
The taxes were collected by Batutsi notables, who were
supervised by Europeans and a member of the clergy. Even
though this procedure did not curtail abuse, tax collection
was successful: in 1925, 287,367 adult heads of household
paid 1,089,94GBF in taxes; in 1926, the amount collected in
both territories was 4,237,1533F, and 5,319,569BF in 1927;
and in 1928 the total revenue contributed by 246,075 tax-

36 The

payers in bOth Rwanda and Burundi was 7,410,018BF.
administration attributed their apparent success to the
rigorous control instituted to end the abuses of a few un-
scrupulous collectors and to the elimination of large num-
bers of intermediaries, each of whom had taken percentage
of the tax collection.37
The tax revenues were largely devoted for servicing
the loans that financed the colony's public works. Roads
were especially important not only for lowering the cost
Of transport but also for reducing the need for carriers.38
The latter had been recruited since the German occupation,

but their numbers--in 1925, 71,912 men--39 had grown so

57

large as to cause a shortage of manpower in agriculture and
commerce, thus creating a dilemma for an administration com-
mitted to African commercial agriculture and European enter-
prises. The solution was tO be found in road construction.
Officials believed that the creation of the Bukavu-Uvira
road, due to begin construction in 1926, would speed the
shipment of merchandise from Lake Kivu towards Tanzania and
thereby reduce the need for carriers. Also the territories
of Nyanza, Gatsibu, and Butare were on the principal route
linking Kigali with Burundi, and since the former terri-
tories combined supplied 51,085 carriers (32,575 in 1925),
the administration believed that it had no choice, despite
the cost, but to construct a surface road from Bujumbura to
Butare.40

Officials also admitted that their own requirements
were partially to blame for the manpower shortage when they
remarked that the construction Of administrative centers
and the proliferation of individual companies increased

41 The adminis-

both the demand for carriers and laborers.
tration believed that road construction and mechanical
transport would improve crops and livestock and eradicate
famines. Moreover, roads would also facilitate reforesta-
tion of the country, which, in turn, would regularize the
flow of water from torrential rains.

Even though the creation of the akazi chief enabled

labor to be mobilized more efficiently, it also signaled

58

the first step towards the establishment of a civil service
to carry out the administration's orders promptly. The
government also consolidated its control and gained the
allegiance of the chiefs by permitting them to retain ten
percent of all taxes collected. The mgami received five
percent of this total and sub-chiefs and chiefs shared the

42

remaining five percent. Belgian Officials hOped that the

extra income would cause the Court and notables to lessen
their demands on the people and discourage corruption.43
Generally, tax collection followed an orderly proce-
dure: monthly taxes collected by the chiefs were turned
over to the provincial or territorial chiefs. Each month
the territorial chief took all tax returns to the terri-
torial office at Butare. The money was counted immediately
in the presence Of the provincial chiefs, and receipts were
given. When all taxes had been collected on a particular
hill, the tax registers were also brought to the territorial
Office. Illiterate chiefs were assisted by either literate
members of their families or by African secretaries attached
to the chiefs, but directly responsible to the administra-
tion which paid their salaries. To ensure their honesty,

44 With an effec-

these secretaries were rotated annually.
tive bureaucratic apparatus and salaried civil servants in
place, the administration could also channel its directives
and demands for requisitions more effectively to the masses

below.

59

Part of the reorganization policy also included the
extension of Belgian control outside the central plateau.
To legitimize its consolidation and expansion, the admin-
istration invoked the mwami's name, thereby extending not
only its own control to areas in the north of the kingdom,
the southwest, and along the eastern frontier, but also the
control of the nobility in areas where their influence was
only nominal. After 1923, Mulera, Kibali, Bukonya, and
Bugerura were brought under administrative control, and in
most cases with direct military action because of resistance
from some Bahutu lineages.

With an army of 650 men, the Belgians provided the
power required to extend their control not only in the
northeast but also in the southwest, and along the eastern

frontier.45

With the approval of Belgian officials, Batutsi
notables in these areas took large but fairly unified blocks
Of territory, which they then parcelled out to their follow-
ers. Bahutu, who were displaced, either remained without
land, sought Batutsi patrons or appealed to their lineage
heads for land.

The administration used this system of distributing
land in order to prevent the complex system of overlapping
commands similar to those in the central plateau. Within
each command, one notable ruled the people and where he

could obtain Bahutu sanction, he also ruled the land. As

an administrator and civil servant he collected the tax

60

and requisitioned labor for the Belgians. Depending upon

their size, these new domains became known as chefferies

 

and sous-chefferies. With expansion in these areas, Euro-

 

pean officials for the first time assumed such Court pre-
rogatives as the distribution of domains and the appoint-
ment and removal of notables. Incompetent chiefs were re-
placed, and officials sometimes used the death of a chief
to appoint more manageable or suitable candidates, although
generally the post was passed on to the deceased chief's
son.46

These changes indicated that the Court was no longer
the real authority in the kingdom. It no longer directed
the expansion of the central control in the outlying re-
gions, nor did it distribute commands or exercise authority
in the settlement of disputes or in the collection of taxes.
In 1926, to counter the colonial government's control, the
Court began spreading rumors about an imminent end to Bel-
gian rule. Musinga knew otherwise but hOped to diminish
the notables' desire to cooperate with Europeans by thus
playing upon their hopes and fears. Moreover, to counter-
act the growing influence of the White Fathers, Musinga
flirted with the Seventh Day Adventists, the most radical
Protestant group in Rwanda, an alliance which alarmed the
administration because they saw the millenial doctrine of
47

the Adventists as a dangerous invitation to social unrest.

Musinga's efforts, however, merely led to more governmental

61

reform and intervention.

The administration continued its program of regroup-
ing and consolidating administrative units throughout
Rwanda. Hundreds of scattered enclaves and small holdings
of cattle and land complicated administrative control and
development projects. To restructure and reduce these
areas into more easily identifiable geographical units,
the administration grouped sub-Chiefdoms of a given region
into chiefdoms, generally following the boundaries of the
"provinces" Of pre-colonial Rwanda. Chiefdoms were grouped
at the next highest level into territories, which consti-
tuted the lowest units of the European administrative struc-
ture. At the head of each territory was a European adminis-
trator (l'adminstrateur de territoire, A.T.) who was respon-
sible directly to the Belgian Resident at Kigali. Heading
each chiefdom was a chief (chef de chefferie) who was
usually appointed by the king with the consent Of the ad-
ministration, but most Often the local official made the
selection. Similarly, the chief or notable usually chose
his own sub-chiefs subject to the approval of the Territori-

al Administrator.48

The Belgians also urged notables to
exchange domains, regardless of their size or value, but
those who stood to lose evaded the issue or delayed taking

49 The administration did not press the issue of

action.
exchange until the famine of 1928 and 1929, when officials

removed a large number of notables from their commands and

62

merged their domains with others because they had failed to
execute relief measures. In fact, it was during the famine
that the Belgians proceeded to rearrange the commands on a
massive scale, using force where necessary, to get notables
to comply.50
Once the Officials used force, they received better
results. In Kigali, for example, the administration was
able to reduce the number of major notables from one hun-
dred and nineteen to seven and the number of minor notables
from three hundred and twenty-four to seventy-nine. By
1949 there were fifty-two chiefs and six hundred and twenty-
nine sub-chiefs holding their offices by appointment from
the mggmi, who in turn was supervised by the Resident at
Kigali.51
In 1928, a government report pointed to the creation
of an African civil administration staffed by a cadre of
newly educated men. At the time, however, the changes in
the traditional system lessened the influence Of the Court
and enhanced the local powers of the chiefs. Administra-
tive chiefs collected taxes for the Court and claimed all
labor services formerly due to traditional chiefs. Since
the administration had never formally settled the alloca-
tion Of many other rights, because the issues were too com-
plex or too sensitive or too burdensome, it encouraged the
new chiefs, who wasted little time in doing so, to appropri-

52

ate these powers wherever they could. The chiefs and

63

their dependents paid less and less attention to Musinga,
who had to mount a major campaign to intervene successfully
against "government chiefs."53 Moreover, as a result of
simplifying the traditional system, the masses below had
less Opportunity to turn rivalries among the powerful to
their own advantage. Nor did the traditional concern of
the notables for their men carry over easily into the bu-
reaucracy, where pleasing the Europeans was more important
than keeping the allegiance of their subjects. In many
ways, administrative agents were removed from the con-
straints Of traditional authority and comity, and they
came to demand more from their subjects.

The administration also realized that the organization
of production had to be changed. But this goal could only
be accomplished by stabilizing land tenure, appropriating
and regulating land as a function of the state, and by dis-
mantling the tributary mode of production in order to free
African labor.54 For change to commence, the Belgians had
to restrict the suddenly growing demands the feudal aris-
tocracy was making so that the Bahutu could meet Belgian
production demands in commercial agriculture and requisi-
tions, and be free for eventual employment in developing
European-dominated economy. SO as early as 1924, Belgian
Officials began a gradual reduction of dues in kind and in

labor. Their efforts were partially successful, especially

in the vicinity of administrative areas, but attempts to

64

provide security of land tenure for the Bahutu never materi-
alized,55 not for lack of laws or decrees but for the lack
of effective implementation at the local level by both
Batutsi and European Officials. The former listened polite-
ly and sought to evade the issue, while the latter tried
briefly to enforce administrative directives before being
distracted by other matters or succumbing to fears of harm-
ing the position of the Batutsi officials. Consequently,
Belgian decrees and enactments had little effect on the
hills (collines). Also, alienation of marginal land to
European commercial enterprises worked without a hitch,

only there were few takers, to the dismay Of the adminis-
tration.

Tribute payments (prestations) and corvée labor were
extremely heavy in areas where the traditional administra-
tion was strongest--the central plateau and Shangugu on the
western periphery--but less so in Mulera and Gatsibu in the

north and in eastern Rwanda.56

Both were inextricably in-
tertwined with the land tenure system, land clientships,

and political appointments. Theoretically, all land be-
longed tO the mggmi, and administrative control was exer-
cised by a cattle chief and a land chief appointed in each
district. While each was independent Of the other, their
differing jurisdiction could extend over the same territory:

the land-chief was responsible for dues from agriculture;

the cattle-chief took care of dues from stock, particularly

65

cattle. Aside from these primary functions, they were
responsible for settling disputes, assigning holdings, and
the more important functions Of levying and collecting
taxes.S7 Both operated at the district level, which was
divided into hills (collines) where there was no duplication.
The hill chief was a subordinate of both the cattle- and
land-chiefs, and each hill contained several neighborhoods,

58 Acting on

which were the smallest administrative units.
behalf of the mwami, chiefs and notables at each of these
levels ceded or granted the right of usufruct to retainers
and others wishing to settle in their respective areas. In
return for land or usufruct rights, Rwandans had to perform
corvee labor.59

Through his chiefs the mwami could collect taxes and

dues in produce (ikoro if intended for the mwami; ibikunikwa

 

 

for the chief, and dues in corvee labor for their fields,
uburetwa).6o
Chiefs could assess the sub-chief, who would collect
from the heads of households. At each administrative level
chiefs often demanded more than was required; they kept the
surplus, and Often administrative chiefs retained about
two-thirds of the impositions and agricultural produce be-
fore it reached the Court.61
The most exploitative aspects of the traditional sys-

tem were igikingi (pl. ibikingi) and corvee labor (uburetwa),

privileges that were generally dispensed by the Chieftains.

66

Igikingi involved land and pasture rights, constituted a
geographical area which included a number of households,
and was generally reserved for Batutsi arriving on a new
hill. When a mututsi paid court to the Chieftain by giv-
ing him a cow, the Chieftain, in turn, provided the new
arrival with amarembo over a certain number of households.
The rights of a Mututsi over these households were limited

tO igisigati (the right to pasture his cows on sorghum

 

stubble) during the dry season, but richer and more power-
ful Batutsi received from the Chieftain, as additional
irembo, the right to distribute unused agricultural lands
within their own igikingi, a right usually preserved to the
Chieftains. But more importantly, they also had the right
to claim the corvée work and dues that went along with an

62 It was this aspect which concerned

additional irembo.
the administration most.

Igikingi was exploitative because it forced the Bahutu
to seek a client. Officially, Bahutu could not be dis-
placed from their land, and they were under no obligation
to commend themselves to anyone. But, in fact, they had no
choice; their hold on their land was precarious, and they
could be harassed into providing services and gifts by a
politically stronger Mututsi. Therefore, they were feudal-
ized (guhakwa)un1ess they had a stronger patron. But they

could not escape in any event, since the Chieftain could

also grant corvée labor and dues in produce (ibihunikwa),

 

67

which were due him as uruharo--friend and patron.63

Of the various forms of land Clientship, uburetwa was
the most hated and humiliating for the Bahutu, since it
symbolized his servitude vis-a-vis the dominant minority.
However not every Muhutu performed uburetwa; it was usually
the poorest, those who were unable to supply food products
instead of labor. Others escaped uburetwa by seeking
buhake Clientship ties. Prior to the arrival of the Euro-
peans, igikingi Clientship and uburetwa was distinguished
by lack of uniformity. The character of imposition on
Bahutu varied from one region to the next, depending on the
extent of central government penetration. The variety of
arrangements assured substantial flexibility which was
eliminated during the colonial period. Consequently hos-
tility was strongest among Bahutu from strong lineages
which had enjoyed substantial autonomy in the past or be-
fore the arrival Of Europeans. Resistance to and resent-
ment of uburetwa'were particularly intense in those regions
which were not brought under Batutsi administration until
the colonial period. It is no accident that areas in the
northwest of Rwanda, and the former Bahutu kingdoms of
Bukungi and Busoozo manifested the strongest anti-Batutsi
sentiment in the politics Of the 1950s.64

Failure to comply with uburetwa and other corvee obli-
gations exposed a person to the possibility of being de-

prived of his land by the local chief. The result was a

68

significant decline in security of tenure for cultivation,
since it was often in the interest Of a chief to expel a
local landholder, and replace him with someone who then be-
came directly dependent on the chief for the land. The
previous tenant had to move, hoping to recommend himself as
a land client to another chief elsewhere. Therefore the
"legal“ demands which agents Of the state were authorized
to make on the population could be used as weapons; these
enhanced the chief's control, and thus increased the depen-
dence of their subordinates,65 most Often Bahutu.

While ibikingi also served as a power base for politi-
cal Officials,66 they also fragmented the country adminis-
tratively. Consequently, European officials introduced a
measure in 1926 which called for their gradual elimination.
According to the decree, no new igikingi could be granted.
When vacancies Occurred through death or for some other
reason, the ibikingi would be placed under control Of the
hill chief. To the administration this new measure was a
way Of distributing plots to cultivators who had insuffi-
cient land on the one hand, and eliminating fragmentation
of the central plateau on the other. Naturally, the gradu-
al reduction of ibikingi inadvertently increased the power
of the hill chiefs, who now had legal sanction to distrib-
ute land as a form of patronage. In 1929, ibikingi were
abolished by the administration, but their demise did not

come until 1961, when almost all Rwandans accepted their

69

disappearance. This slowness affirmed the colonial admin-
istration's inability to affect change beyond administra-
tive posts and confirmed the power of traditional adminis-
trative chiefs on the hills.

Ordinarily, the right to settle on unoccupied land was
granted by the chief. Although this right was irrevocable,
there were ways to force a Mututsi or Muhutu to abandon it.
Where residency was long established, clan or lineage chiefs
administered the land. Land could be loaned, but the borrow-
er was not permitted to make improvements by planting banana
plantations, coffee trees, or building a permanent house on
it, since any improvement would establish continuing rights
to the land. New lands could be cleared and added to a lin-
eage's holdings; others could be abandoned to become inkungu,
meaning they were returned to the authority of the Chieftain.
Rights over land were inherited from the lineage. But the
system became more complex when a feudal structure was added
to the basic tenure system. Different rights superimposed
themselves upon one another within the same holdings; for
example, one could have the right to the produce from a par-
cel of land, while another had the right to the first fruit
from it. Still another might have the right to graze his
cows on it. Since these rights were overlapping conflicts

67 But, in the final analysis, the limits to

were frequent.
an individual's land rights depended upon the power of his

particular patron.

70

Before individual land tenure was decreed until 1961,
the administration used a variety of techniques to ensure
the security of tenure for peasant farmers: in 1917 the
produce of Bahutu fields was protected; Ordinance Number
Forty-Nine of 31 December 1925, which sanctioned the com-
pulsory cultivation of non-seasonal crops, also compelled
chiefs and notables to surrender the land that their sub-

68 and Regulation Number Fifty-Two,

ordinates cultivated,
in the 19305, which permitted Territorial Agents to use
force to compel notables to give up new areas of land for
cultivation to their people, was used by the administra-

69

tion. The bulk of the Belgian effort, however, was con-

centrated on freeing African productive capacity from pres-
tations and corvée labor.7o
Belgian Officials stabilized and reduced the collec-

tion of the following prestations: imponoke, a payment in

cattle demanded by a patron to replenish herds; indabukirano,

 

or dues in land and cattle demanded when a Mututsi assumed
command of a hill; and abatora, the requisiting of bananas.71
The government reduced corvée labor to forty-two days per
year,72 and in 1926, the resident suppressed three hier-

archies Of Batutsi authority: the chef de l'ubuhake or

land chief, and chef de l'umukende or chief of the pasture,

 

and the chef d'ingabo or the military chief which required
73

 

dues in produce and in kind. The elimination of these

hierarchical ranks, however, did not have the desired

71

effect of reducing corvée labor or dues in kind. Because
the functions of these ranks were invested in one chief
instead of three, power became more concentrated, enabling
a smaller coterie of chiefs to increase their power and in-
fluence through even more exactions and retainers. So, in
1927, the government officially reduced corvee labor to one
day out Of seven.

The administration did not abolish all prestations and
corvée labor because it feared such actions would provoke
social and political collapse. These privileges and Obli-
gations expressed the ultimate authority of the chiefs over
their subjects and affirmed their power as administrators.
The Belgians were also aware that their pronouncements had
generated a great deal Of opposition. The government,
therefore, committed itself to a gradual reduction Of these
dues and privileges and established specific guidelines for
others. For example, corvée labor directed at serving the
interests of the collective, such as road construction and
other public works, was permissible, since European offi-
cials believed it was consistent with good administration.
Personal corvée due to chiefs and sub-chiefs was restricted
to fifteen days per year, but work performed in the interest
of the community remained at forty-eight days per year:74
The hill chief retained the right to intizo, or the use of

75

the labor of five men, for his personal uses. Chiefs

were also warned to pay for labor used in the creation and

72

maintenance of commercial crops. Corvée used in this way
would require a money payment of thirty to fifty centimes,

depending on the region:76

It was hoped that the imposi-
tion of a money payment would reduce the burden on the
Bahutu, instead of exposing and subjecting them to new and
harsh demands.77
In the same report, officials expressed concern that
work reductions not create laziness on the part of some
Bahutu. They also registered disquiet that economic Oppor-
tunities in the modern sector had produced indebtedness
among Batutsi chiefs, who "used their money foolishly by
indulging in the purchase of tents, motorcycles, and cars."
They hoped that these "whims," purchased on credit, would
not lead to or force arbitrary and extraordinary payments
in kind from Bahutu subordinates to aid the notables in
eradicating their indebtedness.78
By 1930, the administration's attempt to dismantle the
tributary mode of production had achieved mixed results.
Corvée labor had been reduced officially, but chiefs Often
ignored the decree and forced the Bahutu to work as many

days as the chief desired.79

As a result, the administra-
tion was forced to constantly supervise its policy Of re-
ducing traditional obligations. Young and literate Batutsi
tended to accept the reductions without much discussion,

but the more traditional chiefs viewed the administration's

policy as an attack on their prerogatives. They believed

73

the exercise of power had little meaning if no distinctions
could be made between the rights and privileges of the rul-
ing oligarchy and those of the subjugated Bahutu.80
Officials, however, appeared undaunted: the "facility
of young Batutsi for adaptation and the willingness of the
Bahutu to appeal to them for justice" strengthened the ad-
ministration's resolve to press on with the reforms. They
were also reassured because officially neither Musinga nor
his chiefs could plunder their subjects at will and distrib-
ute their property among their favorites. The Europeans
strongly believed that the Bahutu now possessed ownership
of their own labor, since it had officially been decreed
that notables could no longer claim their harvest or pos-
sessions. The Bahutu were obedient to the Batutsi, but
within the limits imposed by European Officials and the
latter were certain the Bahutu would fulfill their obli-
gations toward his traditional superiors and towards the

European administration.81

But, this was only veiled Op-
timism: Rwanda was in the midst of a famine, and the
Batutsi resisted extending the cultivation of food crops

in the marshy lowlands where they grazed. In retaliation
for their lack of response Belgian authorities used in-
creasingly harsh measures to try to force Batutsi Officials
to cooperate.

However, the Belgian distortion of buhake ties left

many Bahutu without the protection which had shielded them

74

in the past. Batutsi notables were able to manipulate
traditional laws and customs to gain more cattle and per-
sonal services from their clients. Others stole tax money
or forced laborers requisitioned to do 25221.t° work in

82 The administration remained aloof,

their fields instead.
since Officials feared that the Bahutu might exploit any
interference to reject the authority of the men whom the
European officials had appointed.83
The Belgians, however, were convinced that they should
strive to maintain and consolidate the traditional cadre
composed of the Batutsi ruling class, because of "its impor-
tant qualities, its undeniable intellectual superiority,
and its ruling potential." But the Belgians had good rea-
son to be concerned with the mentality of this class.
Court intrigue and duplicity, the notables' propensity to
satisfy their own self-interests, and the harshness of their
rule convinced the administration that their mentality had
to be gradually altered and their conception of authority
modified from one of domination, exercised solely for the
benefit of its holder, to one of a more humane power, to be
exercised in the interests of the people. Change had to come
through the schools, which the administration had established
to train an administrative cadre and to demonstrate that
Rwandans values were inferior to European ones.84

Mission education predated both Belgian colonialism

and secular education in Rwanda. Its progress stemmed from

75

Musinga's desire to counteract the influences of the admin-
istration on his notables, and success or failure fluctuat-
ed with Musinga's moods and intentions. Aside from provid-
ing religious instruction, missionaries ministered to the
needs Of the sick and provided agricultural and technical
instruction. The administration approved and encouraged the
last two as fOstering development and in 1929, the adminis-
tration even granted a special subsidy of 200,000 francs to
missions which organized "enseignement normal important.85
Naturally, the Catholic Fathers were highest on the hier-
archy of the administration's approval rating, since they
generally came from Belgium. The Protestants, and especial-
ly the Adventists, however, were regarded with some suspi-
cion, since their democratic ideals, in the case of the
latter, and millenary ideas had caused unrest and protest
among Africans in neighboring colonies.

Missions were highly visible and concentrated. Of the
four educational facilities in Nyanza territory, three were
Operated by missions: the Catholic Mission at Kabgaye of-
fered primary, university, and professional education, as
did the Protestant Mission at Iremera and the Seventh Day
Adventist mission at Gitwe.86 Missions were also a vital
component of the Official develOpmental policy, and by 1930
they could be found in almost every territory in the king-

dom. In fact, the administration encouraged their expan-

sion.

76

Musinga resisted administrative efforts to educate the
"sons of chiefs," for he feared that European education
would be used against him. He evaded orders that the "sons
of chiefs" attend school and instructed his notables to en-
roll the sons of their clients, bastard sons, or sons who
were Obviously stupid--a tactic he had used against the
Germans. Musinga's opposition ceased only when officials
told him they would train and rely upon the Bahutu and poor
Batutsi, to administer the country, rather than the young
Batutsi elite. Musinga insisted on and received the prom-
ise that young Batutsi notables would not be sent to mission
schools, and the Belgians agreed to open schools at Nyanza.

At the end of 1923, the school at Nyanza had five
European teachers and 167 students. Almost simultaneously,
schools in reading and writing French were organized infor-
mally at some of the administrative centers, again for the
”sons Of chiefs" and sub-chiefs or for those who sought to
qualify themselves for entrance into the central schools
at Nyanza.87 The following year the government created
additional schools in administrative centers and thirteen
in the chieftaincies. A special institution also directed
by Europeans was created at Shangugu to upgrade profession-
al education and to provide courses suitable to the domes-

88

tic industries in that particular territory. By 1928, a

director, one European teacher, an instituteur diplome,

 

and six African monitors taught a student body at Nyanza

77

of 323. From this enrollment, the following students left

during the year: 63 secrgtaires indigEnes and clerks who

 

entered the Service de l'administration; one clerk for the
resident's office, and eight monitors for the schools in
the "territory;" two young sub-chiefs who emigrated to
Katanga to direct the Manyarwanda village that Union
Miniere pr0posed to create; ten clerks for the recruitment
service of the Union Miniére du Haut Katanga; one clerk to
the experimental station at Rubona, and an additional clerk
for the superintendent at the school at Kamembe; one secre-
tary for Chief Kagondo; and one monitor to teach in the Kivu
district. The school at Nyanza also furnished more than
130 chiefs and sub-chiefs who, with some 64 African secre-
taries, facilitated the Operation of the African Tribunal
89

and tax collection for the administration.

The new chiefs (secretaires indigEnes), or as the

 

Rwandans called them, abakaraani (sing., umukaraani), with-

 

 

in the reorganization program were young, some only sixteen
or seventeen years Old. A significant number of them came
from poor Batutsi lineages or from mixed parentage. Those
from prestigious families occasionally encountered problems
because of their youth and inexperience. But, unlike those
who were poor, the latter usually managed to command some

respect because of their wealth and distinguished ancestry.
The poorer ones had a constant struggle to win Obedience,

especially if they had wealthy Batutsi among their subjects.

78

To prop up the prestige of the abakaraani, the administra-

 

tion provided them all with the cattle and clients of their
predecessors, leaving the former notables virtually

destitute.90

Naturally, this practice created resentment,
and the youthfulness of the new chiefs caused rivalry be-
tween themselves and their elders, the more traditionally
oriented notables.

As the administration drastically cut the number of
commands while simultaneously appointing abakaraani, nota-
bles realized that few of the Older generation would be
left to rule. Those few would have to please the Belgians,
and would also have to compete for the reduced number Of
commands. The embittered elder notables accused the 323k-
araani of aping the Europeans, while the young men scorned
their traditional habits. Individual rivalries expressed
themselves in a variety of ways. Those who were in favor
with administrators used their position against those who
were not, who, in turn sought the support of an agricultur-
al agent or the Resident himself. Many took advantage of
their relationships with missionaries to bring their rivals
into disfavor with the administration, or to ally themselves
with competing religious groups. By making cooperation with
the Europeans increasingly necessary, the reorganization
hastened the movement of nobles away from the Court, and

caused a shift of power to the few notables who were trusted

by the Belgians. The notables implemented the decisions of

79

the authorities--who were now Europeans--rather than
exercising power directly themselves.91

After 1925, the administration insisted that only men
with modern education be appointed to administrative posts.
Officials no longer needed to force Batutsi to attend the
school at Nyanza, instead young men began to scramble for
seats, where they expected to attract the attention of the
administrators. While the Belgians wanted notables to be-
come literate, they indicated more subtly their wish to
have them become Christians. By 1928 virtually all the
young men at the Nyanza school were Christians or were in
the process of converting, in a general effort to accommo-
date European wishes. Others turned to Christianity as a
way of protecting themselves against Batutsi who had become
Christians. But in most cases the great majority of people
accepted Christianity within the framework of Clientship:92
as their chiefs became Christian, so did they.

The heart of Belgian policy was based on maintaining
the traditional political structure. The Batutsi hierarchy
was the Obvious recipient of colonial power because they
could facilitate indirect administration and because of the
way the traditional system extended its control to all ele-
ments Of society. It was necessary to reshape the struc-
ture Of the traditional system to meet the demands of eco-

nomic development, fair and equitable administration, and

Christian civilization. At first, the government curtailed

80

abuse and dismembered the tributary mode of production, but
soon the reorganized administration had the effect Of gradu-
ally whittling away traditional patterns of society and
control. The modification and centralization of the tra-
ditional structure and function not only increased inequal-
ities within the traditional structures, they also caused
the administration to assume more and more of a central
role as protector, gradually replacing institutions which
historically had ensured security for the weak. As the
Batutsi struggled to maintain their position of privilege,
and as the colonial government worked to develop the land,
Bahutu found themselves subjected to more demands. If the
Belgians were supposed to be the new protector, the Bahutu
found them too few in number outside of the administrative
centers.93 They received little comfort from the African
tribunals, reorganized to give them more security, since

they were dominated by Batutsi. Nor did the administra-

tion's reforms in the area of prestation and corvée labor

 

lessen their burdens, since there was no effective enforce-

ment on the hill, and there were no Open channels to the

administration. So they had to seek other alternatives.
Those chiefs and sub-chiefs who were not eliminated

by the transformation found themselves in a new role as

agents and functionairies (civil servants) for the adminis-

tration--Obeying various directives to construct roads,

collect taxes, plant trees or drain swamps, and report

81

infractions. They had to fulfill their Obligations to the
Europeans or face the consequences. For the Bahutu, there
were new exactions calling for more than simple exchange
under the old rules of Clientship. Because of the Belgian
development policy, Bahutu became the central components
and the impetus for the take Off for the formation develop-
ment capital. They paid taxes which provided capital for
road construction and other development projects; they sup-
plied the labor needed to exploit raw materials, to plant
commercial crops, and to build the infrastructure which
would facilitate the colony's integration into the world
market and the "modernization" of Rwanda.

The administration was preoccupied with developing and
"civilizing the country in order to create a microcosm Of
middle-class Belgium within the heart of Africa." To ac-
complish this Objective, officials delegated authority to
the Batutsi at the grass roots levels, where the Bahutu
were doubly taxed, cowed into submission and silenced by
inadequately supervised chiefs as in the old days, but
without the checks and balances. The administration rec-
ognized the need to change Batutsi domination, but they
believed it had to be done gradually and by education.

The European Officials failed to realize that their aims
were in direct contravention to those Of the Batutsi who
did not wish to share power or lose their position of

privilege. It was naive to assume that a new elite,

82

given the rudiments of European education, would return to
their hills and perform miracles for the common good, es-
pecially when the common good would undermine their very
existence. Consequently, what the Belgians expected to
occur on the hill did not since the agents of change were
Opposed to any developments, tangible or intangible that
challenged their authority and control.

But there were successes for the colonial government.
The administration had created a functional bureaucracy
which enabled them to get production from the hills, how-
ever imperfectly. Second, the bureaucracy would eventually
make it easier for the administration to control and re-
cruit labor, in order to facilitate the smooth operation of
settler activities, particularly in the western periphery
where European commercial development had matured by 1920.
Commercial activity, either from subsidiaries Of firms
Operating in Zaire, Bujumbura, and on the central plateau,
or European settlements in eastern Zaire and the Kivu,
stimulated demand for African labor and food to feed it.
Finally, tax collection and road construction enabled the
government to gain additional capital to defray the cost
of development and to provide for African labor and

services.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 225-253.

 

 

2League of Nations. Permanent Mandates Commission,
7th session, 1925, p. 55.

3Anonymous, Historique et Chronologie du Ruanda
([Kabgayi], 1956), p. 25.

4League of Nations. Permanent Mandates Commission,
16th session, 1929, pp. 68-9.

5Gouvernement Belge. Ministére des Colonies.
Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda et de
l'Urundi, 1935 (Brussels, 1936), p. 64.

6

 

Ibid., p. 63

7Pierre Ryckmans, "Le probléme politique au Ruanda-
Urundi," Congo, I. No. 3 (1925), p. 410.

8Ibid.

9Alison L. Des Forges, "Defeat is the only Bad News:
Rwanda under Musinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale
University, 1972), pp. 237-238.

10"'Le Programme Economique dans le Ruanda-Urundi,"
Congo, I. (June, 1921), p. 259-260.

11Gouvernement Belge, Ministére des Colonies, Service
des Territoires des Colonies. Dossier AE/ll, No. 1847,
portefeuille 3288X. Archives Africaines, Brussels. Major
Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation de la
Residence du Ruanda et sur l'activite de l'Administration";
Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," pp. 206-208.

12Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News."

13gpig. Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation."

83

84

14Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 217;
Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation."

15
p. 22.

16Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News,"
pp. 213-219; Annonymous, Historique et Chronologie du

17Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News,"
pp. 219-222.

181bid., p. 286.

19CAMP. Derscheid Collection, Rapport etabli en
réponse au questionnaire adressé'en 1929 par M. 1e
Gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi a l'Administrateur du Territoire
de Nyanza; M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A
Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 187-9; and
Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 287-9.

20Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au
Rwanda du dernier quart du XIXeme siecle a 1950,"
(memoire de Licence, Louvain, 1974), 121-2.

21Fred E. Wagoner, Nation Building in Africa: A
Description of the Development of Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis,
the American University, 1968), p. 63.

Annonymous, Historigue et Chronologie du Ruanda,

22Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
p. 122.

23CAMP. Derscheid Collection.‘ Territoire d'Astrida.

/ . .
Rapport en reponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur,
1929, p. 5.

24
p. 30.

25Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925,
p. 104; 1926, p. 109.

26
p. 15.

Rapport presentéipar le Gouvernement belge, 1924,

 

 

Rapportypresenté par 1e Gouvernement belge, 1924,

27Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
p. 122.

85

28The fluctuation in the tax was attributed to a
commercial crisis in 1921, when a number of Asian and Arab
. merchants closed down. Local products such as food and
hides could not be sold. Historique et Chronologie du
Rwanda, P. 83; Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921,
p. 22; 1922, p. 25 and p. 33; 1923, pp. 18-19; Rapport
presentEpar le Gouvernement belge, 1926, p. 19.

29
p. 15.

30
p. 19.

31Rapport presenté’par le Gouvernement belge, 1927,
p. 18. The polygamy tax in 1929 generated 18,805 francs
and 18,185 francs in 1928. Prior to 1929, only the
Kiswahili merchants paid the tax, but the administration
decreed that after 1929 the tax would be extended to
everyone without distinction. Rapport presentéipar 1e
Gouvernement belge, 1922, p. 22.

32Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921, p. 22;
1922, p. 33.

33

 

 

 

Rapport presenté’par 1e Gouvernement belge, 1924,

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1926,

 

 

 

Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921, p. 22.

 

34Rapport presentépar le Gouvernement belge, 1925,
p. 16; 1926, p. 18; 1928, p. 19.

35
p. 19.

. 36Rapportpresenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925,
p. 19; 1926, p. 18; 1927, p. 18. In 1928, the colonial
government increased all taxes across the board because
Of the recent devaluation of Belgian currency, the in-
crease in the prices of all products, and the perceptible
increase in African salaries. Rapportypresentélpar le
Gouvernement belge, 1928, pp. 18-19.

37
p. 58.

38
p. 30.

39CAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941.

Rapport annuel (u.d.). Développement moral et social des
indigénes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

 

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928,

 

 

 

 

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925,

 

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924,

86

4oCAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1924-1941.
Rapport annuel (u.d.). Développement moral et social des
indigenes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

41
p. 62.

42CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material,
1925-1941. Residence du Rwanda. Ordre de service.
Kigali, p. 13. April 1927.

43Rapport presentépar 1e Gouvernement belge, 1925,
p. 58; 1926, p. 65; Des Forge, "Defeat Is the Only Bad
News," p. 289.

44CAMP. Derscheid Collection. Territoire des Nyanza.
Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur,
1929.

45

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1927,

 

Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," pp. 71-2.

46RapportAPresgnt6 par le Gouvernement belggL 1928,
P- 33; Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News,"
pp. 290-96.

47Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 317.

48Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1927,
pp. 37-8; 1928, pp. 37-42; 1929, pp. 37-48; Newbury, The
Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 123-124.

49Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News,"
pp. 323.-4o

SOIbid.

51Gouvernement belge, Ministére du Congo belge et
du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement
belge au Conseil de Tutelle des Nations Unies sur
l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année de 1949
(Brussels, 1950), pp. 25-26; CAMP. Derscheid Collection.
R. J. L. Schmidt, Rapport Politique de territoire de
Kigali, 1933; Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News,"
p. 324.

52

 

Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 325.

53Ihid.

87

54Rapportpresentéiypar le Gourvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société des Nations au Sujet de l'Adminis-
tration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année, 1925
(Brussels, 1926), p. 88.

55Rwandans did not receive full title to the land they
worked until shortly after the abolition of ubuhake in
1954.

56Consortium for African Microfilm Project (hereafter
CAMP). MF 1552, Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel [n.d.]. Développement moral et
social des indi Bnes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail;
Rapport presente par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, noted
that dues in kind and corvée labor were less severe in
Burundi, but in Rwanda they were quite heavy. Bahutu were
liable for tax payment and forced labor, p. 82.

57Jacques Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," in Social Strati-
fication in Africa, eds. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Platnicov
(New York, 1970), p. 101; Wagoner, "Nation Building in
Africa;" pp. 39-40.

58

 

 

Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," p. 101.
59
p. 58.

60Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a
Community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Michigan, 1962), p. 202.

6lgpig. Gravel, "A Play for Power," p. 13; Maquet,
"Rwanda Castes," p. 101.

62Gravel, "A Play for Power," pp. 214-215; Alexis
Kagame, Le Code des Institutions pplitiques du Rwanda
precolonial (Brussels, 1952), p. 97.

631. Reisdorff, Enqugtes fonciers au Rwanda,
(mimeographed, 1952), pp. 51-53; Gravel, "A Play for Power,"
pp. 215-216 and 223-224.

64M. Catharine Newbury, "Ubureetwa and Thangata; Com-
parative Colonial Perspectives," Colloque de Bujumbura
(4-10 September 1979), in La Civilisation Ancienne des
Pepples des Grands Lacs (Paris & Bujumbura, 1981),
pp. 140-141, and 144.

ngpig. p. 143. Rapport presenté'par 1e Gouverne-
ment belge, 1926, p. 67.

Rapport presenté’par le Gouvernement belge, 1925,

 

88

66Gravel, "A Play for Power," pp. 90-94.

67Ibid.

68Rapport presenté’par le Gouvernement belge, 1928,
p. 61; CAMP. Rapport annuel n.d. 3e Partie: Protection
du Travail.

GQIQiQ. See pages for the administration's reorgani-
zation from 1926 to the early 19305.

7°Ibia.

71In 1927, corvee labor of two days out of five days
labor by Bahutu was Officially reduced to one day out Of
seven. Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda, p. 25.

72
p. 12.

73Rapport presentéypar 1e Gouvernement belge, 1928,
pp. 38-40.

74

Rapportpresentépar 1e Gouvernement belge, 1924,

this.
75

p. 59.
76

p. 40.
77

Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925,
Rapport presentéapar 1e Gouvernement belge, 1928,

Ibid., p. 39.

781bid., p. 241.

79CAMP- Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. MF No. 34, Reel 3. Residence du Ruanda. Territoire
d'Astrida. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le
Gouvernor, 1929, p. 4.

80
p. 70.

81CAMP. Derschied Collection. Territoire d'Astrida.
Rapport en réponse au questionnaire, 1929, p. 4.

82

Rapport presenté'par le Gouvernement belge, 1929,

Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News, pp. 334-
335.

89

83Des Forge also notes that the Bahutu began to
emigrate to British territories to escape not only higher
taxes and increased demands for akazi, but also the burdens
imposed by the notables. Despite government efforts, they
were unable to stem the tide. Ibid., p. 335.

 

 

 

84Ibid., p. 241.

85Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929,
p. 61.

861bid., p. 77.

87Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1923, p. 15 and
p. 29.

88Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924,
p. 27.

89

CAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941.
Chapitre III: Instruction publique et l'établissement
d'enseignement (u.d.).

90Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 326.

911bid., pp. 326-330.

921bid., pp. 313-316.

93In 1929 the EurOpean population in Rwanda was 241:
58 were government agents and functionaries; 106 were
missionaries; one was a colon; and the remainder were con-
nected with European enterprises, either as doctors,
dependents, health inspectors, engineers, agricultural
agents, or commercants. Rapport presenté par le
Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 13.

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

LABOR RECRUITMENT AND CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT

The control and recruitment of labor was an integral
part of Belgium's economic policy for Rwanda. Since Euro-
pean enterprises were essential to the development of the
colony, administrative officials in Rwanda were expected
to facilitate the smooth operation of European ventures on
the central plateau and the western periphery, in eastern
Zaire, and the Kivu.1 By 1920, European industry and com-
merce were emerging in these areas. Firms with branches
and headquarters in Zaire and Bujumbura, EurOpean settle-
ments in eastern Zaire and the Kivu, and the Union Miniére
du Haut Katanga required larger amounts of African labor.
Consequently the administration created regulations for the
employment of labor and took an active role in recruiting.
The administration introduced taxes, which forced Rwandans
to seek employment in the capitalist sectors of Belgian and

British Africa, in order to secure money. To assure ade-

quate labor supplies, the state allied with the Batutsi oli-

garchy; which, in turn, for monetary considerations, acted
as auxiliary and mobilized labor whenever European firms

and the administration needed it.

90

91

Every effort was made to facilitate contractual labor:
Bahutu were exempted from akazi, and Batutsi notables re-

ceived money payment in lieu of ubureetwa service. Offi-

 

cials believed that by encouraging Rwandans to leave their
hills and seek employment with European enterprises, the
needs of industry and of colons would be fulfilled. At the
same time, employment would help the African workers acquire
some acquaintance with "superior" European habits and cus-
toms. Officials hOped that Rwandans would spread the know-
ledge Of these habits and customs to their hills. But in
reality, administrative control and recruitment of labor
guaranteed the development and accumulation of development
capital. Salaried employment facilitated tax payment and
increased consumer demand for imports, which generated ad-
ditional state revenues in the form of duties and tariffs.
By forcing many small producers from the land, the colonial
state also separated and developed capital and labor for its
expanding industrial centers and developing infrastructures
in neighboring Belgian and British dependencies.2

Most Rwandans emigrated for economic reasons. For ex-
ample, in 1916 the price of hoes was thirty-five centimes,
but by the mid-19205 they cost from three to four francs,
and finally from ten to fifteen francs by 1929.3 Since
other commodities also increased in price, it was quite
difficult, if not impossible, for most Africans to obtain

locally the necessary resources to pay taxes, purchase

92

cattle, hoes, and fabric for themselves and their families,
and satisfy needs which European contact and examples had
created for them.4 Consequently, they had to seek employ-
ment outside of their traditional areas. Some left for
Uganda to avoid going to Zaire, which could have absorbed
more labor, because Zaire was associated with Belgian ad-
ministrators whose harshness and strictness they disliked.
The Ganda or African peasant farmers, in contrast, had a
reputation for kindness, and Rwandans believed that they
could leave Ganda employers at any time.5
The most crucial determinant was the Congo franc-
sterling exchange rate. The slightest upward shift of ster-
ling was generally followed by a movement of Rwandan migrants
to the British areas. For example, in the late 19205, a
period of acute food shortage in Rwanda (and Burundi) and
of heavy immigration into Uganda, was also a period when
the franc was undervalued. The flow Of Rwandan migrants
was reversed by the British departure from the gold stan-
dard in September 1931, which Belgium did not imitate until
March 1955. Similar changes in the flow of Rwandan migrants
occurred following changes in franc-sterling parity in Sep-

tember 1939, June 1940, and September 1949.6

Such currency
fluctuations sustained the Banyarwanda, who trafficked in
currency speculation, exchanging British shillings for the

Belgian franc. Currency speculation was so profitable to

some Africans that the Union Miniére du Haut Katanga

93

(hereafter UMHK) had difficulty recruiting workers in
Gatsibu.7

Also, these ready but fluctuating supplies of immi-
grant 1abor, though well-suited to the needs of most Ganda
and European employers, tended to depress conditions of
employment in non-African domestic enterprises. The poor
quality of transient labor, and its willingness to accept
inferior conditions of pay and work, tended to hold down
the level of African wages and made employers unwilling to
risk a large outlay on accommodations, welfare, and
training.8 In his study of an African working class at
the Union Miniére, Higginson also found that recruitment
of workers from Rwanda and Burundi precipitated a drop in
African wage rates in Zaire.9

Charlotte Leubuscher discovered that, from 1920 and
1938, the competition for African labor between mining
companies of the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika and the agri-
cultural economy of Uganda also caused labor shortage in
British territories. The shortage did not result in any
considerable rise in African wage rates, but it did induce
employers to devote more attention to the housing and feed-
ing of workers and to the provision of better medical ser-
vices for them. Moreover, governments and employers also
collaborated in lessening the hardships of the journey be-
tween African villages and the place of work by providing

10

rest camps and better transport. While Higginson agrees

94

with this latter point, his analysis is less apologetic.
According to Higginson, the following agencies recruited
for labor in central and eastern Rwanda and Burundi in the
late 19205: Comité National du Kivu, Chemin de fer du Grands
lacs, some smaller European enterprises, and the Union
Miniére du Haut Katanga, the latter achieving the dominant
position in Rwanda. By 1929 its agents had extended its
recruitment to Muninga and Noba on the route towards
Butare.11 To facilitate recruitment, Union Miniére con-
structed new roads and convenient shelters for recruits,
and also assumed the responsibility for refurbishing roads
and footpaths in Butare, Gitega, Ngozi, and Nyanza that had
fallen into disrepair. He maintains that while these roads
facilitated Union Miniére's recruitment efforts in the
northeastern regions of Gatsibu and Ruhengeri, Officials
still had difficulty getting staples from Shangugu to the
recruitment camp at Bujumbura. Other roads no larger than
footpaths carried food to other recruiting camps Union
Miniere had established at Butare, Nyanza, and Ngozi. But
in most instances recruits from the famine belt in eastern
Rwanda did not receive fresh food in sufficient quantities
until they reached the staging camp at Bujumbura. He notes
that water was also a problem at the Butare Nyaruteja re-
cruitment camp, since the nearest source of water was
Akanyaru in the territory Of Butare, 154 kilometers away

and infested with tsetse flies.12

95

European enterprises could request state intervention
to assist in labor recruiting. For example, in 1925 the
state approved Union Miniére's request to extend its re-
cruiting in Rwanda and Burundi, in spite of the provisions
in Article 2 of the Charte Coloniale, which decreed that no
One could be compelled to work for individuals or companies.
These provisions were not deemed to be inconsistent with
the use Of official pressure to aid private enterprises.13
TO reverse the flow towards the Belgian Congo, officials
believed that it was necessary for Europeans to appeal to
African self-interest. They reasoned perhaps correctly
that "blacks were practical and their objections could eas-
ily be overcome, but only if material rewards were used to

attract them."14

At the beginning of 1925, day workers re-
ceived 25BF and by mid-year their wages had risen to 408F.
While the administration admitted that the latter amount
was insufficient, given the increasing costs of commodities
and the depreciation of the franc, it generally hesitated
to decree salary increases (although it eventually recom-
mended a wage increase of 80BF per day) "for fear of para-
lyzing the activities of companies whose credit was quite
limited."15

Administrative officials also realized that the low
wage structure made it difficult for commergants and

Swahili merchants at Kigali to attract enough workers,

since most Bahutu could receive much higher wages working

96

in British territories. Africans often complained that
wages hardly ensured subsistence, or provided enough for
them to purchase cotton material, since real purchasing
power had declined over the years, or "encouraged them to
leave the central plateau to journey west in search of
jobs." As the depression in the 19305 became more acute,
the administration became even more reluctant to increase
African wage rates in both the private and public areas.
Belgian authorities continued to be dependent upon the
Batutsi chiefs to recruit labor. As Newbury notes, chiefs
were responsible for securing work details upon administra—
tive demand for construction or road building. In their
role as recruiters for Europeans, these chiefs also gained
additional power over the population, since they decided
who should go and who would stay. Since recruitment and
salaried employment benefited both European commercial in-
terests and the administration, Officials were caught in
the dilemma of assuring "adequate" administrative authority
in the hands of the chiefs, on the one hand, and professing
the desire to control the abuses, on the other.17
Newbury comments, however, that in sending people to
work for Europeans, the chiefs were undermining their own
authority over the long run. Salaried employment gave
workers a chance to gain economic independence and eventu-
ally a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the chiefs. The chiefs

gradually became aware of this subversion during the 19305,

97

and began to hinder recruitment by threatening workers with
expulsion from the hill or by preventing them from leaving
the hill on the pretext that recruits had not performed
corvée obligations or completed work commissioned by the
administration. Others refused to grant permission for
leave to those who had already paid their taxes. A few
confiscated the property of those who left to work for
Europeans or abused their wives by making them perform

0 1
ubureetwa serVices. 9

 

Some Batutsi were also under great pressure to perform
a variety of roles. Those who failed to produce laborers
for Europeans, or work gangs for akazi, or were unable to
force cultivation of manioc and coffee could be dismissed.
Nevertheless, notables imposed exactions on their people
far in excess Of the legal limits permitted by colonial
regulations. Often administrative demands exceeded the
chiefs' capacities to fill them, because substantial seg-
ments of their labor pool were committed to EurOpean enter-
prises and were therefore exempt from.akagi. Also, the
system itself sanctioned the excessive exactions, since
the administration had deemed going to work for Europeans
as a positive good. And, if harshness of administrative
measures contributed to a desire to work in salaried jobs,
then such harshness was itself beneficial and justified.
Excessive demands served the goals Of the administration--

to pull more peOple into the labor market. Because of

98

this priority, attempts to regulate and control abuse were
ineffectual.20

Batutsi chiefs also viewed the demands they made on
their people from the perspective of power. The adminis-
tration, however, believed that the abuse of power would
lessen with education. In the interim, officials would
tolerate Batutsi excesses, or act upon them only when
abuses were brought to their attention. Also, authorities
convinced themselves that dismissal would serve as a de-
terrent, but this was true, however, only in the 19505,
when greater efforts were made to exercise supervision,
thanks to an intense United Nations surveillance Of the
mandate.

Economic development in the Belgian Congo and Uganda
in the 19205 was similar, but achieved radically different
results. Both attempted to integrate African producers
into their respective capitalist centers. The Entebbe
government established peasant cotton and coffee cultiva—
tion in order to create a mass tax-base and to make the
protectorate self-financing. Whitehall also wanted to en-
sure the British textile industry a cheap supply of cotton
and to build a market for British and Indian manufactured
products. Cotton was a suitable small holder cash crop
because of its simple technical needs and minimal capital
22

requirements, and the relative ease of cultivation.

The British succeeded for two reasons. First, the

99

world-wide collapse Of the commodity markets effectively
eliminated most European plantations in Uganda. Conse-
quently, the colonial Office felt confident enough to push
African cultivation, and African agriculture gradually
emerged as the mainstay of Uganda's economy.23 Second, the
government provided the capital needed to develop commer-
cial agriculture and to build ginneries. Since the rail-
road linked Uganda with the coast, transportation costs
were reduced. Public monies also built roads and provided
funds for research stations and agricultural services.24
These actions ensured the emergence of a black quasi-middle
class, but within restricted limits--Ganda did not partici-
pate fully in the economy, since they were denied commer-
cial licenses to Operate ginneries.25 The real economic
strength remained with European and Indian entrepreneurs,
who controlled marketing and processing facilities and

26 Nonetheless, the Ganda competed on equal terms

capital.
with non-African planters for black labor.

British subjects relied heavily on Rwandan laborers
from the northeast and the territories of Gatsibu, Kigali,
Rikira, and Ruhengeri, or from the Belgian Congo near

Rutshuru.27

Bahutu coming from Rwanda entered Buganda from
the southwest, using the three main crossings over the
Kagera River or the Kakitumba River which joins it at the

junction of the Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda borders.28

The other entry points, from east to west, were the Kyaka

100

and Murongo ferries, controlled by the Tanganyika govern-
ment, and the Kakitumba bridge, controlled jointly by
British and Belgian authorities who maintained customs
posts on the bridge. Finally, there was the Kabale road
over the mountain pass, leading from Rwanda to Kigezi.
Most migrants who used these points of entry ultimately
converged on Musaka township, the center of the fertile
country of Buddu, which absorbed many of the laborers and
which was on the main road to Kampala and to Kyagwe with

29 Labor sources

its sugar factories and other plantations.
were crucial to Uganda's sugar and cotton industries, and
if the supply of labor had been disrupted or restricted it
would have affected the country adversely.30
If not too ill or exhausted from the journey, Bahutu
peasants worked as porters on Ganda or Soga farms. Some
found employment in the industries Of Kampala, Jinja,
Lugazi; a few worked as herdsmen in northern Buganda and
Teso.31 Others processed coffee, tapped rubber, or worked
as clerks. If they arrived between December and April,
many found positions in cotton gins, or worked for the gov-

32 Outside of Buganda,

ernment on public work projects.
mine work was plentiful. In fact, some 8,250 Rwandans
worked in the mining industry in 1935, and in 1936 they
were 40 percent of the labor force in the six "representa-
tive" mines.33

In 1925, the majority of the 11,771 laborers recruited

101

by the Labor Department from the southwestern districts of
Uganda came from Rwanda and Burundi. Their numbers contin-
ued to increase, and were estimated at 100,000 annually dur-

34 When the famine

ing the latter part Of the 19205.
occurred in 1928, emigration increased dramatically. Offi-
cially some 50,000 entered Buganda during that year. In
1929, 19,934 came to Uganda from southern Rwanda and Burundi
and about 20,000 entered from northern and eastern Rwanda.
By 1930, when the conditions in Rwanda had returned to nor-
mal, the influx declined considerably--16,776 from southern
Rwanda and Burundi and 3,561 from northern and eastern
Rwanda. A modest decline continued thereafter because of
the depression, which caused wages to fall markedly--in
1928 the government had paid unskilled laborers 9% d. per
day, but by 1932 the rate was 4 d. per day.35
Despite depression conditions, Uganda continued to
serve as an alternative to employment in Rwanda or the
Congo throughout the 19305. While some immigrants returned
to Rwanda after obtaining their Objective, be it money for
tax purposes or some other necessities, there were Rwandans
who lived temporarily on plots where they were permitted to
cultivate cash crops, and some settled permanently. In
1931, it was estimated that some 76,844 Rwandans had set-
tled in Uganda. Official records also noted that by 1943

about 15,000 had established permanent residence in Bugunda

alone. The 1948 census recorded a total of 259,051

102

Rwandans in Uganda, of which about 192,844 were migrant
workers; the rest were probably permanent residents.36
Similar to its British counterpart, the Belgian Minis-
try of Colonies stressed colonial solvency in the Congo and
Rwanda. In the former, from 1907 to the end of the 19205,
the colonial government continued the economic policy of
Leopold's empire builders--state planning in order to gen-
erate capital to further the development of the colony.
Authorities expanded the Congolese economy by encouraging
increased production of raw materials. Almost simulta-
neously, through a policy of progressive taxation, it
forced the African population into the developing capital-
ist sectors. During the years 1920 to 1925, government
increased food production through compulsory African culti-
vation to meet the demands from mining companies, espe-

37 The latter had increased

cially Union Miniére, for food.
production and had embarked on an expansion program in
order to overcome the post-war slump in the commodities
markets, which almost bankrupted the industry.38
To facilitate recovery in general, and to attract for-
eign investors specifically, the Belgian government provid-
ed about 31,000,000BF between 1921 and 1925 as a guarantee
on capital invested in the Belgian Congo. The subsidy suc-
ceeded in attracting a large number of Belgian investors,
primarily middle-class, who were anxious to recoup some of

their losses incurred during World War I.39 Most were

 

 

    

 

   
 
      

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103

persuaded by the promise of substantial profits and the

40 As a result of the gov-

lure of currency speculation.
ernment's incentive, enough capital was accumulated to
finance railroad construction.

Between 1920 and 1925, the construction of railways
integrated the eastern Congo with the rest Of the country
and the Atlantic Ocean. Construction of the Vicicongo
network, between the Itimbiri and Dale Rivers in Orientale
Province, joined large tracts Of country on the Itimbiri
tributary. The Bukama-Port Francqui line Opened up large
areas of Lomani, Sankuru, and Kasai country. Repairs and
modifications were also made to the Leopoldville-Matadi
rail system. To integrate Katanga with the rest of the
Congo, the rail and river routes between the lower Congo,
Leopoldville, and Katanga were joined. This linkage not
only shifted traffic away from the Rhodesia railroads and
Beira, but also increased European population in the grow-
ing urban centers of Luluabourg, Elizabethville, and
Katanga, and facilitated European exploitation in the east-
ern region.41 Between 1924 and 1928, the construction of
the Chemin du Fer du Bas-Congo du Katanga (BCK) railway
line from Bukama to Kasai provided fresh outlets for food-

42 Improvements were also made

trading in western Shaba.
in agriculture services and other public facilities, such
as ports and air services.

The long range goal of the state's economic planning

104

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105

in Zaire (or Congo) was to create an infrastructure that
would continue to attract foreign finance and industrial
capital. A5 a result of the infusion of capital, the Congo
experienced an economic boom between 1923 and 1930, which
increased production and modernized the extractive indus-
tries, expanded the rail network and facilitated construc-
tion, and agricultural production. Exports were valued at
628,573,946BF in 1925 and 1,511,490,87lBF in 1930 (see Table
II, Volume Of Imports and Exports Trade, 1925 to 1932).
COpper production rose from 56,221 metric tons in 1923 to
138,949 tons in 1930. The production of diamonds rose from
318,979 carats in 1920 to 2,518,258 carats in 1930. Cotton,
palm oil, palm kernels, and coffee exports also experienced
notable increases.

Of the agricultural exports, cotton was exclusively an
African prerogative, although the processing was confined
solely to Europeans. Palm Oil and coffee production were
left to European producers,43 who were well established in
eastern Zaire by 1925, especially in the Kivu and Ituri,
with 1200 hectares and 1000 hectares respectively under
cultivation. As indicated in Table III, coffee production
continued to increase despite the depression and declining
world market prices and consumption (see Table III, coffee
Production in Eastern Zaire, 1928-1933). Competition from
African planters would therefore encounter strenuous

resistance when compulsory coffee cultivation

106

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table II. Volume Of Imports and Export Trade in the
Belgian Congo, 1925 to 1932.1
Year Imports Exports
Metric Value in Metric Value in
Tons Francs Tons Francs

1925 524,853 876,245,151 213,242 628,573,946
1926 631,584 1,293,197,242 203,678 729,301,977
1927 649,586 1,496,358,868 223,266 1,055,239,249
1928 736,054 1,624,498,658 257,633 1,227,867,419
1929 814,553 1,943,192,906 300,333 1,444,266,477
1930 712,286 1,581,315,177 340,317 1,511,490,871
1931 356,640 961,891,851 273,373 1,104,045,231
1932 182,878 464,631,939 206,240 667,922,436
SOURCE: Department of Overseas Trade. NO. 565, Economic

Situation in the Belgian Congo and the Territories of
Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933. Reported by Harold C.
Swan, Consul-General, Leopoldville (London, 1934), p. 11.

1Figures do not include transit traffic.

 

 

 

 

Table III. Coffee Production in Eastern Zaire, 1928 to
1933. (in tons)

Year Kivu Ituri Total
1928 64 119 183
1929 108 140 243
1930 699 161 800
1931 643 201 844
1932 793 305 1,098
1933 1,005 429 1,434
SOURCE: Raymond Brock, "Le Cafe’ Arabica et le Kivu,"

Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviEme année,
NO. 11 (January, 1935), p. 2.

107

was introduced in Rwanda during the 19305.

Despite increased agricultural production in Zaire,
the bulk of the country's economic growth and capital was
in its extractive industries. Naturally, this kind of eco-
nomic emphasis did not favor the development of either an
autonomous African capitalist class or a class of petty
European traders and commercial capitalists. In fact,
African areas were subjected to severe shocks: traditional
structures in the vicinity of capitalistic growth lost pop-
ulation, and in some places the demographic balance was
severely distorted. Also, excessive recruiting destroyed
the basis of the traditional apportionment of work between
Old and young, male and female.44 More than a million
African peasants were also subjected to a levy on their
agriculture-surplus.45 In western Shaba, the African cat-
tle industry was practically wiped out by an administration
that wished to see cattle husbandry in European hands.46

Paradoxically, however, colonial Officials did not
generally welcome European settlers and petty traders. In
the early 19205, European settlements were halted, primar-
ily because the colons had failed to carry their own weight.
The economic slump after World War I bankrupted many of
them. Other farming enterprises failed because of the high
cost of machinery and the inability of draught animals to
survive the tsetse fly. The high level of industrial wages

also made it impossible for European farmers to procure

108

47 But it may very well

labor at a cost they could afford.
have been that their role in the colony was more political
than economic. Since the dominant policy of the state was
to actively encourage large capital enterprises, an econo-
my based On the extensive exploitation of African labor by
industrial and commercial firms made it difficult for Euro-
pean agriculture to compete with big business in labor re-
cruiting or with African cultivators in price advantage.
European settlers only survived with the benefit of gov-
ernment subsidies and with a monopoly over some branches

of production, such as dairy farming, fresh vegetables and
fruits, poultry and pork for a European clientele, and the
cultivation of Robusta coffee. The production of fresh
agricultural produce was quite profitable for both Euro-
peans and Africans in Zaire as well as Rwanda, especially
for those living near the commercial, industrial, and ad-
ministrative centers along the routes of communication.

But in the beginning difficulties in transport limited the
geographical extension of commercial agricultural produce.48
The European enterprises, however, were maintained for
political reasons in peripheral regions, like Kivu, and on
the fringes Of the larger urban areas. Their presence
validated Belgium's possession of the colony at a time when
Greeks and other foreigners were numerically superior.49

Large capitalist undertakings, especially UMHK, were

nurtured by the state, and they relied upon European firms

109

from eastern Zaire and Rwanda to provide food for the
mines. In eastern Zaire, European settlers.had arrived
just after the war, and high prices for primary products
encouraged many to invest in farming. Consequently, large
plantations in coffee, cotton, and palm oil were developed
in the 19205, especially on the fertile soil of Kivu.
Settlers in Katanga and Ituri, however, established large
scale stock-raising and dairy enterprises. Some farmers
also specialized in Arabica coffee production, particularly
those in Haut-Ituri.50 Mostly, however, farmers throughout
eastern Zaire produced fresh fruit and vegetables, pork and
poultry for Europeans.

The European population increased slowly, but the Kivu
experienced the most rapid growth because of its appealing
climate, soil fertility, and altitude. In 1925, the Euro-
pean pOpulation was 190; it rose to 650 by 1928, and by

51

1931 the population was over 1,000. In the same period,

the total area used for agriculture doubled to 24,000
hectares and coffee production quintupled (see Table III).52
Europeans in these areas had very little difficulty re-
cruiting non-skilled labor for their farms and industries.
In fact, administrators in Kivu Province, and during the
19305 in Bukavu Province, used Cyangugu territory in Rwanda
as a labor pool. Labor recruitment from these areas was

quite intense from 1926 to 1929. Demands for labor were

so heavy that the administration in Kivu was forced to

110

close several areas to recruitment. Settlers in the Kivu
also wrote to Kigali requesting permission from the resi-
dent to recruit workers in Cyangugu.53
During the 19205, economic conditions in Rwanda were
still underdeveloped, except around Lake Kivu and Kinyaga.
Firms and settlers in these areas required African labor.
The lack of development in the rest of the country was
caused by an absence of infrastructure and capital invest-
ment. The majority of European firms Operating in Rwanda
were concerned with either commerce or agriculture.54
Most confined their operations to western Rwanda, near
cyangugu, in the north to Ruhengeri and Kisenyi, and on the

55 Administrators

Central Plateau to Kigali and Butare.
made every effort to facilitate labor recruiting in these
regions.

The largest employer during this period was the
Protanag, or the Société Coloniale de Produits Tonnants et
Agricoles, with a staff of nineteen Europeans by 1929, and

56 The com-

capital assets of 12.5 million francs in 1928.
pany initially planted coffee, but gradually introduced
black walnut trees to be exploited for tannin. By 1929
the company employed 1500 Rwandans from the Kinyaga area.
Its recruiting efforts were confined to Lusungu and
Kibazi (in present-day Kamembe and Karengera communes,

respectively), and approximately 80 percent of the avail-

able men in these areas were employed by the company.

111

Towards 1929, the Compagnie de la Ruzizi began to intro-

57 Also

duce cotton in the Bugarama region of Kinyaga.
there was the additional attraction for labor from Kinyaga,
because of the expansion Of plantations and mines in Kivu
Province.58 Concessions in Cyangugu and Kigali also
planted coffee and food crops.59 Société Plantations du
Tanganyika, with capital assets Of 1 million francs, ini-
tiated coffee cultivation in both Rwanda and Burundi.

This particular company sought to improve cultivation by
establishing nurseries and seed selection. It also ex-
pressed a desire to improve exportation methods through
the creation of an agency to oversee the sorting and clas-
sification of coffee. Eventually, the company hoped to
Open a processing mill, provided it could interest other
companies in a shared-cost agreement.60 This procedure
suggests that some companies either lacked adequate finan-
ces to expand rapidly, or tried to moderate risks through
shared ventures.

A 1929 Report, outlining the recruitment procedure
used by UMHK, Protanag, and Forminiére, noted that UMHK
employed about fifty Africans per day, while Protanag used
from 60 to 100 men daily, and Forminiére, employed about
400 men per day. Although the first two companies did not
receive any direct assistance from the administration at
Nyanza in recruiting laborers, workers arrived at the

Protanag camp, about four kilometers from the district

112

post at Nyanza each morning to offer their services.
UMHK had official sanction to recruit from territorial
authorities. Contractual workers reported directly to
various district posts, where they were informed of the
essential points of their contractual obligations. But
Forminiére, responsible for the construction of Ndeza road,
received even more assistance from Belgian officials, when
they directed notables to furnish five percent of the tax-
payers for the stretches of road passing through their
particular hill. Upon completion of the project, the
Bahutu returned to their fields without disturbing the
planting cycle.61
African salaries were low, despite the administra-
tion's assertion that wages were increasing along with the

62 While skilled

influx of Africans into the labor force.
workers like masons, carpenters, and chauffeurs might re-
ceive 1,0008F per month, workers in other categories rare-
ly received more than 400 francs per month. Clerks and/or
servants received a monthly salary of less than 300 francs:
unskilled laborers received a uniform rate of l.SOBF with-
out rations. Carrier or head porters, who had not declined
significantly despite efforts to create an infrastructure,
received between 3.4SBF and 4.9SBF, which included the

ration allowance for the trip.63

Laborers employed in the
construction of roads and other public works projects re-

ceived one franc per day. Private companies paid their

113

workers between l.SOBF and 2.0BF per day.64 Bahutu who

hired themselves out to other Rwandans received one to two
francs per day. But most Often they worked for food which
had to be shared with their families. For five hours work,
they might receive from one to one and a half kilos of beans

65 With the ex-

or perhaps three kilos of sweet potatoes.
ception of the skilled labor category, and considering that
African purchasing power diminished between 1922 and 1929
because of inflation and currency devaluation and depreci-
ation, wages in 1929 did not differ substantially from V
those in 1924. In that year, carriers received 0.6OBF per
day for a load of 25 kilos, day workers one franc, and spe-
cialists or skilled laborers from 1.258F to 7BF per day.66
Nor did wage rates for 1929 reflect the inflated value of
commercial exports between 1922 and 1929 (see Appendix I).
Although the volume of exports declined in certain years
during this period, the value of exports increased 14.6
times from 1922 to 1929.

The dominant recruiter in Rwanda was the Union Miniére
du Haut Katanga. Between 1925 and 1930, the company re-
cruited more than 10,900 Africans from Rwanda and Burundi

67

to work in the mines (see Table IV). On the average,

12 percent of the total work force came from the territor-
ies of Rwanda and Burundi, especially from Ruhengeri,
Kisenyi, Kabaya, Kigali, Butare, Gatsibu, and Rukira

68

Territories, where, in 1928, people paid the highest

114

Table IV. Percentage and Actual Number of Afrigans from
Rwanda and Burundi at the Union Miniere in
Haut Katanga, 1926-1930

 

 

 

Year Total Work Force Ruanda-Urundi Percentage
1926 13,200 1,101a 8a

1927 15,400 1,300 8

1928 15,900 1,300

1929 16,500 2,500 15

1930 15,700 4,700 30

 

SOURCE: John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Work-
ing Class," p. 292.

NOTES: aCAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,

1925-1941. Rapport Annual (n.d.) DéVeloppement Moral et
Social des IndigEnes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

Table V. Taxes Paid in Belgian Francs in Rwanda Territory

 

 

 

in 1928.

Territory Tax Payment Territory Tax Payment

(francs) (francs)
Butare 57,000fb Cyangugu 24,000fb
Nyanza 50,000fb Rikiro 32,000fb
Kigali 50,000fb Lubengera 22,000fb
Ruhengeri 46,000fb Kabaya 15,000fb
Gatsibu 39,000fb Kisenyi 12,000fb

 

SOURCE: John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Work-
ing Class," p. 301.

115

taxes. The two exceptions (see Table V), Kabaya and
Kisenyi, were not brought under administrative control
until rather late in the colonial period. During the fam-
ine in the late 19205, large numbers also came from cen-
tral and eastern Rwanda, areas most severely affected, to
seek work at Katanga.

After 1930, the number of Bahutu employed by Union
Minisre declined dramatically from 2,500 in 1931 to barely

400 at the beginning of 1932.69

While the depression
affected the need for labor, recruitment in Rwanda also
declined because of the success of Union Miniére's stabili-
zation program, the demand for labor in Rwanda and its
peripheries in the east and the west, the eagerness of
Belgian officials to increase the pace of development in
Rwanda, and international pressure from the League of
Nations,70 whose potential for criticism forced the Bel-
gians to proceed cautiously.

The stabilization policy, introduced in 1928, in-
volved the permanent settlement of workers and their fami-
lies in the neighborhood of the mines. Workers were sup-
plied with houses, medical services, and free education
for their children as inducements to remain in the area or
to sign new contracts. A graduated scale Of wages was
introduced and a training program to produce skilled work-

ers was also implemented. As a result of the policy, dur-

ing the first year, turnover was reduced about a third,

116

and in 1929, 45 percent of the labor force was stabilized:71

Whereas the average demand for recruits between 1921 and
1929 had been about 10,000 men a year, the number declined
to an annual average of 1800 between 1935 and 1942.72 By
1932, the policy was a dramatic success story, since the
Officials at the mines were able to announce that they no
longer needed recruits from Rwanda and Burundi.73
The decline of Rwandan recruits for the mines at
Katanga also coincided with the emergence of Bukavu as a
center of service and supply for settlers in the Kivu and
Kinyaga. Naturally, as a result, the flow of workers
shifted from Katanga to these areas; it was much closer to
home and wages were much better. Laborers were needed to
build and maintain buildings in Bukavu and to work as
skilled and semi-skilled workers in the trades, where their
services were in great demand by the industries of the town.
As we have already noted, the large number of European
plantations in the vicinity added to heavy labor demands
and workers from other areas of Rwanda, and especially
Kinyaga, were called on to supplement the local labor
supply:74 Naturally, wages were low: in 1926 pay varied
from 7BF to 60BF per month. The latter was exceptional
and generally reserved for gang or crew chiefs. But in
addition to salaries, some workers might receive daily

rations and a jacket and blanket each year. Those who

worked on a daily basis might receive from 25 to 50

117

centimes, but generally not rations.75 Despite low wages,
the economic connection between Rwanda and these areas
would continue to grow from the 19305 onward, and the eco-
nomic impact between the Kivu, Kinyaga, and surrounding
areas would be tremendous. Administrative personnel recog-
nized this fact when they announced in 1938 that Cyangugu
Territory was in the Kivu's sphere, and that the Territory

76 The

supplied it with manpower and diverse products.
1939-44 Report would also note that there had been a pro-
gressive transformation of African activity in the region
west of Cyangugu, where many Africans devoted themselves
to petty trade or gave their services to large enterprises.77
By 1947, 30 percent of the African adult male population
were employed by European establishments at Bukavu and by
colonists at Cyangugu.78
The major occupation of Rwandans on the periphery,
besides meeting the demands of the administration and
European establishments for labor, was producing food and
livestock for European firms for export to the mining cen-
ters in eastern Zaire, to include Bukavu and the Kivu. As
early as 1917, western Rwanda had acquired importance as a

79

provisioning center for parts of Zaire. By 1923, there

were some 27 firms Operating in the area; most were con-

cerned with either commerce or agriculture.80

Approxi-
mately 50 to 80 percent of the exports in the 19205 con-

sisted of foodstuffs (Appendix II and III). In 1922, for

118

example, 2,232 tons of food were exported, and in 1923,
6,647 tons.81 That year the Belgian Congo received 4,728
tons Of food, including peas, beans, maize flour, rice,
manioc flour, and maize. Officials were particularly en-
thusiastic about the potential of manioc and maize, because
production of the former had doubled between 1922 and 1923,
and the latter from one ton in 1922 to more than 700 tons
in 1923, as a result of intensive cultivation. They were
convinced that this kind of output would virtually assure
Rwanda's and Burundi's role as a food center for Katanga,82
which received almost all of the maize flour. In 1925,
2,615 tons of food were transported to the Congo;83 and
in 1947, 4,641 tons of food and 1,444 head of livestock
were exported there. The following year some 1,260 tons
of food, including coffee, tobacco, mats, and graisse
indigéne, and 1,438 head Of livestock went to the Congo.84
But in 1929, the volume of food exported was only 368 tons,
including manufactured products, and 1,146 head Of live
animals.85
The years 1928 and 1929 were of particular signifi-
cance; provisions were exported to the Congo when Rwanda
was in the midst of a famine. The problem of scarcity had
appeared as early as 1926, when food production began to
decline. Also, the demand for porters and laborers forced

many cultivators to leave their plots, and in 1927 insuf-

ficient rainfall brought the first signs of scarcity to

119

eastern Rwanda. Despite these signs, the officials con-
tinued to requisition labor and to ship food to the Belgian
Congo.86 By 1931, the volume of exports to the Congo was
more than 4,000 tons out of a total production of 5,307
tons.87 In 1932, total exports surpassed the 1927 level--
7,286 tons in 1932 versus 6,409 tons in 1927. Local pro-
duce shipped to Zaire amounted to 5,600 tons and 70,132

88 As Rwanda's agri-

head of livestock and 3,600 chickens.
cultural production recovered in the 19305 and as the
civil administration became more consolidated, Rwanda's

O O I \ O I
pOSltlon as a grenier a Vivres became an important compo-

 

nent of the overall agricultural policy, which consisted
of regularizing food production, introducing commercial

89 TO implement

crops, and improving pastoral potential.
these programs, the administration established a Service

de l'Agriculture and distributed about a dozen agronomes

 

 

throughout the different Territories of Rwanda. However,
this commitment to the colony's development created an
obvious dilemma for Belgian authorities--how to facilitate
internal development and to meet the demands for labor by
capitalistic centers on the periphery without reducing
badly needed capital.

To comply with these conflicting needs, Governor
Voisin and succeeding administrators sought to eliminate
abuses and relax traditional dues rather than restrict or

reduce labor recruiting or demands for labor. Voisin, in

 

120

fact, told his Officials to enforce existing labor protec-
tion laws, which were designed to protect the health and
security of Rwandans.90
He also recommended that the law Of 4 March 1929,
which made the resident responsible for recruitment of
labor in his territory, be "strictly" enforced. Residents
were also responsible for making sure that workers recruit-
ed for Katanga, as required by law, passed through the 21-
day indoctrination center at Kitega in Burundi, to receive

I O O I O 91
vaCCinations, phySical examinations,

92

and, during the
19205, screening for aptitude. In various decrees in
1930, additional labor rights and employer restrictions
were promulgated that refined the basic labor contract law

93 In 1939, Officials took a major step

Of 16 March 1922.
by permitting six categories of workers to buy Off their
traditional Obligations owed to their chiefs. The admin-
istration also excused workers whose work "contributed to
development." The categories included contract workers,
farmers with at least ten head of cattle, students attend-
ing school, and mission catechists. Also, those who worked
for the administration and seasonal workers absent from
their homes at least nine months Of the year were excused.
In 1944, this principle of "ransom" was applied to all
categories of workers, and henceforth notables were
obliged, at least theoretically, to pay cash in return for

services performed.94

121

Through the control and recruitment of labor, Belgian
authorities were able to force Rwandans out of the tradi-
tional sector and into the modern economy. In doing so,
they were able to facilitate the development of capital,
which ensured the solvency of the colony and built the
necessary infrastructure. Salaried employment also enabled
Rwandans to pay taxes and to purchase imported goods. It
also meant that Africans would assume a greater burden for
the development of the colony, as the ratio between local
revenues and subsidies from the metropole from 1922 to 1931
indicated (see Table VI). While some Bahutu could manipu-
late the labor system to their advantage in terms of cur-
rency speculation, food production, and work in British
territories, the majority had very few options. To refuse
to comply with labor demands meant retribution from the
notables, who had a greater degree of discretionary power
because of their role as the administration's men, and
from the administrators at the district post, who were re-
sponsible for getting Africans into the modern economy, be-
cause surplus capital had to be developed at any cost. Nor
did the increased demands for labor from the administration
and from European enterprises produce a corresponding in-
crease in African wages. The administration maintained an
artificially low wage structure in order to maintain and
encourage European investment in the colony. Quite often

any gains from wage increases were offset by inflation and

Table VI.

122

from 1922 to 1931.

The Financial Position of Rwanda and Burundi

 

 

Year

Public Debt

Advances from Abroad

Total Revenues

 

 

(francs) (francs) (francs)

1922 -- 1,000,000 2,931,241
1923 -- 1,200,000 3,424,792
1924 -- 1,200,000 5,084,317
1925 -- 3,400,000 7,044,317
1926 -— 5,300,000 10,548,091
1927 -- 5,700,000 15,381,689
1928 -- 4,000,000 23,381,689
1929 -- 11,873,334 26,157,073
1930 6,500,000 14,704,369 30,946,848
.1931 35,000,000 18,438,830 34,277,256
SOURCE: Department of Overseas Trade. 565.

Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo and the Terri-

 

tories of Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933.

 

Reported by

Harold C. Swan, Consul-General, Leopoldsville (London,

1934), pp.

64-65.

 

123

currency depreciations. For example, in 1926, rising
prices caused by the sudden decline of the franc during
the months of May-June curtailed African purchases of
imported goods.95

Even internal disasters did not diminish the admin-
istration's zeal to recruit labor and collect taxes. Dur-
ing the first year of the famine, Union MiniEre emerged as
the dominant recruiter in Rwanda. Despite serious food
shortages, the administration continued to permit the ex-
port of food to eastern Zaire, and as Appendix IV demon;
strates, local revenues continued to increase during the
years of the famine. These factors confirm that the
Rwandan peasants were tools of the state, and that their
decision-making power and alternative choices were severely
limited by the demands of Belgian officials and the civil-
ian administration or the Batutsi oligarchy.

The demand for African labor and the famine were in-
strumental in the integration of Rwandans into the capital—
ist peripheries of Eastern Zaire, western Rwanda, and
British East Africa. Supplying labor to these areas was
an integral part of Rwanda's economic program throughout
the colonial period. But it nonetheless created a dilemma
for colonial planners, who sought to stimulate development
while simultaneously using the colony as a labor and food
reservoir for the rest of Belgian Africa. Since restric-

ting labor recruitment would diminish the development of

124

capital, the only alternative left to the administrators
was to expand local agricultural production in order to

increase capital and to achieve greater efficiency with a
minimal cost to the metropole and disruption to the capi—

talist centers on the peripheries of the colony.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1European authorities in Zaire were given a similar
order in the form of a circular issued in 1922, which
emphasized the duty of officials to give all necessary aid
to private enterprises. However, "if moral authority,
encouragement, and favors failed, then marks of displea-
sure were to be imposed." Lord Hailey, An African Survey:
A Study of Problems Arising in Africa_South of the Sahara
(London, 1938), p. 645. M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of
Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda,"
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975),
pp. 272 and 278. Newbury also notes that the growth of
plantations and other enterprises in both Kinyaga and Kivu
Province contributed to the progressive augmentation of
the labor force. Labor demands for European establish—
ments in western Zaire competed with demands from Euro-
peans in Kinyaga. The development of urban centers at
Bukavu (opposite Cyangugu in Rwanda) from 1930 and higher
wages paid in Bukavu and Kivu in general added to the
labor drain on Kinyaga.

2Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System:
Its Colonial Incorporation as the Belgian Congo, 1885—
1960," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelop:
ment, eds. Guy Cran and Galen Hull (New York, 1979), p. 31.

3Ian Linden with Jane Linden, Church and Revolution
in Rwanda (New York, 1977), p. 166.

 

 

4Consortium for Africa Microfilm Project (hereafter
CAMP). MF1442. Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Developpement moral et
social des indigEnes. 36 Partie: Protection du Travail.

5O. Dak, A Geographical Analysis of the Distribution
of Migrants in Uganda (Makerere, 1968), pp. 5-6.

6P. S. Powesland, "History of the Migration in Uganda,"
in Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of
Immigrant Labor in Buganda, ed. Audrey D. Richards
Cambridge, 1954), pp. 49-50. Linden, Church and Revolution,
pp. 188 and 206.

 

 

 

 

125

126

7CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Developpement moral
et social des indigEnes. 3§ Partie: Protection du
Travail.

8Powesland, "History of the Migration in Uganda,"
p. 51.

9John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Work—
ing Class: The Union Miniére du Haut Katanga and the
African Mine Workers, 1907-1945," (Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1979), p. 296. He also notes that by
November 1928, the recruitment of Rwandans had become an
integral component of Union Miniére's plan to achieve
labor stabilization in Zaire. Also, recruitment in Rwanda
accomplished several short-term objectives for the company:
it enabled the company to recruit more tractable African
workers on long-term contracts (for three years), thus
ensuring a more stabilized work force. It also eased the
company's dependency on African labor from Northern
Rhodesia, who commanded and agitated for higher wages.

10Charlotte Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: A Study
of Economic Policy Under Mandate (London, 1944), pp. 9-10
and 57. She remarks that the shortage of African labor
experienced by Tanganyika's mines and agricultural employ-
ers produced an appreciable rise in African wages. In
the mines, the average monthly wage rose from 15/61 in
1935 to 17/30 Shs in 1938.

 

11Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class,"

121bid., pp. 295-296.

13Hailey, An African Survey, p. 645.

 

14CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Developpement moral et
social des indigEnes. 36 Partie: Protection du Travail.

15CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. MF No. 34, Reel 3. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport
en response au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929,
p. 72. CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Developpement moral et
social des indigenes. 36 Partie: Protection du Travail.

 

127

16CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Developpement moral et
social des indigEnes. 36 Partie: Protection du Travail.

17Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 282-283.

laIbid.

191bid., pp. 285-286.

20Ibid., p. 287.

21David J. Vail, "The Public Sector as Stimulus of
Innovation Adoption in African Smallholder Agriculture:
A Case Study in Teso District, Uganda," (Ph.D. thesis,
Yale University, 1971), pp. 19-20. Walter Elkan,
Migrants and Proletarians: Urban Labour in the Economic
Development of Uganda (London, 1960), p. 18.

22Jamal Vali, "The Role of Cotton and Coffee in
Uganda's Economic Development" (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford
University, 1976), pp. 67-68. C. C. Wrigley, Crops and
Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History (Kampala,
1959), pp. 37-41. Wrigley notes that while European
plantations would remain a valuable ingredient in Uganda's
economy, they could not become its principal substance.
Africans had lower overhead costs and "more modest expec-
tations."

23Walter Elkan, The Economic Development of Uganda
(London, 1961), pp. 26-28.

24Harry A. Reed, "Cotton-Growing in Central Nyanza
Province, Kenya, 1901-1939: An Appraisal of African
Reactions to Imposed Government Policy" (Ph.D. thesis,
Michigan State University, 1975), pp. 43-44.

25CAMP. -Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport annuel (n.d.). Developpement moral et
social des indigEnes. 3é’Partie: Protection du Travail.

26A. I. Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Trav-
ellers," in Economic Development and Tribal Change, p. 53;
see Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Des Sedentaires Devenus
Migrants: les motifs des departs des Burundais et des
Rwandais vers l'Uganda (1920-1960)," Culture et devel-
oppement, X, n. l (1978), pp. 77-78. Chretien maintains
that Kibungu in eastern Rwanda was most affected by
departure of emigrants. This region was also closest to
the British territories and was the most affected by fre-
quent drought. The western region was the least affected

 

 

 

 

 

 

128

because of the distance and because the area was more
productive than the eastern region. Moreover, there were
more ways to obtain money, since the area was more
developed.

27Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Travellers,"
pp. 53-54.

28Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda,"
pp. 39-40.

291bid., pp. 29-30 and 33.

30Dak, Migrants in Uganda, p. 1. When most arrived,
they were generally malnourished, ill-dressed, worn out
and often ill. Chretien, "Des Sedentaires Devenus
Migrants," p. 80.

31

 

Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians, p. 21.
32

p. 41.
33

Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda,"

Dak, Migrants in Uganda, pp. 7-8.

 

34Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda,"
pp. 36-38.

35Dak, Migrants in Uganda, pp. 7-8.

 

36Bruce Fetter, The Creation of Elizabethville,
1910-1940 (Stanford, 1976), pp. 144-145. The author notes
that between 1906 and 1926, the metropole intervened on
behalf of Union MiniEre, both politically and financially,
a half dozen times. But, during the boom of the late
19203, the power relationship was reversed, as the colonial
government became increasingly dependent on the copper
industry for revenue. In fact, Fetter remarks that Union
Miniere was responsible for 18 percent of colonial receipts
in 1926, 24 percent in 1930, and 32 percent in 1932.

37Jewsiewicki, "Unequal Development," p. 322. He
notes that the constant demand for food during the 1920s
and the desire to make the Katanga economy less dependent
on the south forced Haut-Katanga Industrial (hereafter HKI)
to search for supplies in the areas opened up to Chemin de
fer des Grands lacs Africains and the Kambove-Bukama rail-
ways: Lomami, Tanganyika, Moero, Orientale Province, and
Ruanda-Urundi. Between 1921 and 1925 supplies from these
areas increased by 18 percent.

 

 

129

38Jean-Phillipe Peemans, "Capital Accumulation in the
Congo Under Colonialism: The Role of the State," in
Colonialism in Africa, Vol. Four, (eds.) L. H. Gann and
Peter Duignan (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 170-177; George
Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba: A History of the Belgian
Congo (LondOn, 1962), pp. 194 and 196; and Roger Anstey,
King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under Belgian Rule,
1908-1960 (London and New York, 1966), p. 102. Supplying
the Allies with raw materials during the First World War
stimulated the Congo's economy. Commercial activity in-
creased as well. The annual output of copper at Katanga
increased from 7,400 tons in 1913 to 27,500 tons in 1917.
Consequently profits from the war enabled the Union
Miniere to pay a small dividend for the first time. The
collapse of the commodities market, however, caught the
Congo with accumulated stocks, which forced the price of
copper to drop as low as 670 a ton at the end of 1920.
In fact, mines throughout the world began to close down.
But the Board of Directors in Brussels instituted a re-
development plan and doubled output to reduce the cost of
production. They increased capital and installed new
plant equipment. Their program succeeded, and by 1921
Katanga had become the biggest producer of copper in the
world. Even though the price of copper had fallen to
657 a ton, the company was still able to show a profit.
Also, gold production increased to the point that the
Kilo-Moto mines in Orientale Province became a major
world producer.

 

 

 

 

 

39Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 103.

40Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System,"
p. 40.

41

Anstey, King Leopold's Legagy, pp. 103-105;
Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba, p. 85.

42Jean-Luc Vellut, ”Rural Poverty in Western Shaba,
c. 1890-1930," in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central
and Southern Africa, (eds.) Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), p. 305.

43

 

 

 

Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, pp. 106-107.

4Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Deuxiéme
année, no. 18 (September 8, 1928), p. 211.

45Peemans, "Capital Accumulation in the Congo'"

130

46
p. 305.
47

Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba,"

Jewsiewicki, "Unequal Development," p. 323.

48Jewsiewicki, ”Zaire Enters the World System,"
pp. 37-38.

49Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Europeen
au Congo Belge, 1910-1960: Questions Politiques et
Economiques," Journal of African History, XX, No. 4 (1979),
pp. 559-571. This article is drawn from his thesis. He
goes on to say that colons lacked political influence, in
the colony at least, until 1945, when they obtained statu-
tory participation in the provincial assemblies. Prior to
this date, Belgians living in Africa did not have the
right to vote in Belgium. Only the large companies ac-
tively participated in the political process in Belgium,
and only they manipulated parliament and approved policies
applicable abroad. Large companies controlled the activi—
ties of colons in areas under their control. For example,
the Regie des mines d'or de Milo-Moto had jurisdiction
over the colons in Ituri. These companies needed workers
and cheap food; they did not want the creation of local
political forces able to break the tradition of non-
interference from the colonial state in their affairs.

 

50Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Européen au Congo
Belge," p. 562; Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba, p. 196.

51Raymond Brock, "Le Café Arabica et le Kivu,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviEme année,
No. 1 (January 1935), p. 2.

52Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Europeen au Congo
Belge," p. 562. x

53

 

 

M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 280-
281.

54Rapport presente par 1e Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société’, 1927, pp. 79- 80; Rapport presenté’
par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1928,
p. 91.

55Annuaire Officiel du Ministére des Colonies—-de
Bel i ue (Brussels, 1926), p. 945; Annuaire Officiel du
Ministere des Colonies--de Belgique (Brussels, 1928),
p. 649, Rapportypresenté par le Gouvernement Belge au
Consei1 de la Société, 1929, p. 117.

 

 

 

 

 

 

131

56Annuaire Officiel du Ministére des Colonies-~de
Belgique (Brussels, 1928), p. 1088.

57Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 269-270;
Rapport presenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de
la Société, 1928, p. 117.

58

 

Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 270.

59Rapport presente par le Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société, 1928, p. 117.

60Annuaire Officiel du MinistEre des Colonies--de
Belgique (Brussels, 1928), p. 1080; "Les Plantations de
Cafe du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo
Bel e, Troisiéme année, no. 6 (March 23, 1929), pp. 88-89.

61CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en reponse au ques-
tionnaire par 1e Gouverneur, 1929, p. 74.

62Rapport present€;par 1e Gguvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Socigté, 1929, p. 71.

63

 

 

 

Ibid.

64CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en reponse au ques-
tionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 72.

65CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en reponse au ques—
tionnaire par le Gouverneur, p. 73.

66Rapportpresente'par‘le Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société, 1924, pp. 33 and 38.

67Newbury and Higginson give the total number as
7,000 and 10,000 respectively. Higginson's source notes
that in 1926, some 400 Africans were recruited from Rwanda
and Burundi. However, an official report for 1926 provided
the following figures: 2 July 1926, 277 recruits; 30 Au-
gust 1926, 288 recruits; 16 September 1926, 231 recruits;
1 November 1926, 172 recruits; and 27 November 1926, 133
recruits, making a total of 1,101 recruits. Newbury,
"The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 416. Higginson, "The
Making of an African Working Class," p. 301.

 

132

68Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 416, and
CAMP. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

69Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class,"
p. 301.

70Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 275.

71

Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba pp. 197-198. The

stabilization policy was also used in the diamond fields
'of southern Kasai, in the tin and gold mines of the Kivu,
and the plantations of the United Africa (Lever) Company.

72Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 119. The author
also notes that the number of recruits between 1935 and
1942 was of particular significance, since the copper mines
had expanded production to meet the wartime demands of the
allies.

73Hailey, An African Survey, pp. 702-703. Hailey
noted that despite the pronouncement the mines still
employed a certain number of Africans from Rwanda and
Burundi.

74

 

 

 

Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 275-276.

75CAMP. Rwanda. Be Partie: Protection du Travail.

76Rapport presente par le Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société, 1938, p. 76.

77Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 276, and
Rapport presenté’par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de

78Ministere de Colonies. Ministere du Congo Belge et
du Ruanda- Urundi. Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement Belge
a l' Assemblie Géherale des Nations Unies au sujet de 1' Ad-
ministration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' Anfige 1947
(Brussels, 1948), p. 61.

79Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au
Rwanda du dernier quart du XIXiEme a 1950" (Memoire de
Licence, Louvain, 1974), p. 75.

80Almost all export activity was dominated by Euro-
peans; only a few Asian firms were involved in the export
trade. Most were restricted to serving as intermediaries
between the European firms and Asian producers.
"La Rapport sur 1' Administration Belge au Ruanda- Urundi
pendant l' Annee 1923, " Congo I (January-May 1924), p. 756.

-

133

81Chambres des Representants, Session de 1923-1924.
Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi
presenté au Chambres (Brussels, 1924), p. 25.

82"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge au Ruanda-
Urundi pendant l'Année 1923," Congo I, (January-May,
1924), p. 752. Chambre des Representants, Session de 1923-
24. Rapport sur l'Administration Beige du Ruanda-Urundi
presente aux Chambres, p. 20.

83
p. 103.

84Rapportpresentépar 1e Gouvernement Belge, 1928,
pp. 80 and 84.

85

 

 

Rapport presenté;par 1e Gouvernement Beige, 1925,

Ibid., pp. 92 and 96.

86Rapportpresent'é'par le Gouvernement Belge, 1929,
pp. 96 and 100.

87Alison L. Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News:
Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896-1931" (Ph.D. thesis, Yale
University, 1972), pp. 342-343.

88
o. 157.

L

 

Rapportpresenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge, 1931,

 

89Rapportpresente'par 1e Gouvernement Belge, 1932,
pp. 128 and 130.

90Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
pp. 90 and 95.

 

 

 

91Rapport presentéipar le Gouvernement Belge, 1930,
p. 6.

921bid., p. 86.

93Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement BelgeL 1949,
p. 116.

94

Fred E. Wagoner, “Nation Building in Africa: A
Description and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda"
(Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 91-92.

95Ibid., pp. 92—93. Rapport presenté’par 1e Gouverne-
96
p. 103.

 

Rapport presente par le Gouvernement Belge, 1926,

 

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMERGENCE OF THE IMPERIAL STATE:

ECONOMIC CONSOLIDATION

State intervention and the attraction of the developed
sectors in eastern Zaire and in neighboring British terri-
tories stimulated capital formation in Rwanda. Capital
surplus was generated from African taxes and labor from
the mid—1920 to 1928; state intervention in the same period
increased steadily, facilitating development of civil ad-
ministration and the country's infrastructure. This chap-
' ter shows, however, that with the collapse of the world
economic system in 1929, the colonial state at the insis-
tence of the Metropole, was left to its own devices.
Transforming the country was an expensive business, and
the Metropole, preoccupied with its own domestic economy
and what had been the enormously profitable Belgian Congo,
could no longer subsidize the Rwandan economy. The latter
would have to support itself or sink. The Colonial Office
at Brussels sent Charles Voisin to increase economic pro-
duction and to maintain the colony's solvency. This chap-
ter explores the dynamics that were involved in the Voisin

administration from 1930 to 1933.

134

135

In 1928 and 1929, the world had experienced excellent
harvests. In fact, there was overproduction in wheat, cof-
fee, cocoa, palm oil and nuts, cotton and sugar, and sur-
pluses in copper, tin, lead, and aluminum production. The
markets for these products collapsed during the last quar-
ter of 1929 and continued into the following year.1 The
best prices for some varieties of Arabica declined from a
high of BF 25 to BF 15 per kilo by the end of November

1930.2

Declining agricultural prices undermined recently
established commercial enterprises in Belgian Africa.
Brussels advised its colonial officials to tell companies
Operating in the Congo and Rwanda to take "vigorous mea—
sures" to lower the cost of their products. Consequently,
companies worked to eliminate all expenditures on non-
productive fixed assets and non—essential branch operations
to lower costs; many also reduced European personnel and
increased the duration of contractual obligations.3 Agri-
cultural, mining, transportation, and commercial firms
were forced to revise their accounting methods and to drop
retail prices.4

Companies which were badly organized and managed, or
founded on pure speculation, collapsed. Only firms which
were firmly established or which agreed to the necessary
fiscal sacrifices survived. Struggling companies also re-

ceived government support, especially agricultural enter-

prises, which were hit hardest by the depression. The

136

creation of a crisis fund and agricultural credit helped
some to survive the economic decline. On March 25, 1930,
the government also helped out by cancelling export duties
for two years on vegetable products, palm oil, and sugar
cane,5 and by increasing import duties on commodities,
such as sugar, which competed with local produce. In
Belgium, whereas import duties on foreign beans rose 250BF
per ton for roasted coffee and 100BF per ton for unroasted
varieties, coffee coming from Belgian Africa entered the
metropole duty free.6
The economic crisis forced the colonial administration
to make up for lost revenues. Consequently, officials in-
creased receipts, taxes, and charges on producers (see
Appendix IV), severely weakening the small but growing

7 As the crisis intensified,

African capitalist sector.
Belgian officials were also confronted with drastic re-
dressments of their own, particularly in finances, econ-
omic develOpment, and administrative personnel. They had
over-develOped certain social services, in which either
had to be reduced or their expenses passed on to African
producers through increased charges.8

The economic crisis also pointed out the administra-
tion's over concern with economic development rather than
economic consolidation. For example, the commercial sec-

tors of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda had registered severe

complaints, since the mid 19203, with the administration

137

in Brussels about the high cost of transporting goods to
overseas markets. According to official reports, trans-
portation rates varied considerably and the disparities in
rates made very little sense. For example, water trans-
portation from Uvira to Kigoma on Lake Tanganika took
twelve hours, but cost as much as shipping merchandise
from Stanleyville to Leopoldville in nine days. Also, on
the Uvira to Bukavu route, a kilometric ton was BBF, but
it also cost 12BF from Kissengny to Rutshuru, a much
shorter distance. The rationale for the latter was oil
cost and the rapid amortization for the use of lorries
which had to traverse defective roads. Rather than resolve
the transportation problem, officials concentrated on ex-
panding‘and formulating development projects, with result-
ing overexpansion when the crisis developed. Then, crit-
ics called for a reassessment of development priorities,
and warned that further development in the Kivu, Rwanda
and Burundi, could not be accomplished without lowering
transport costs and mileage disparities.9

By 1931, the rock-bottom of the "world crisis" had
been touched, but its effects were not fully felt in Rwanda
until 1932, when the added instability of the monetary sit-
uation and of finances in general began to paralyze local
trade. In fact, commerce virtually stopped in 1931, when
Africans, in response to low world prices, kept their

hides off the market in the hope of an impending price

138

increase or used them to manufacture personal garments.10

Small, medium, and independent European enterprises virtu-
ally disappeared, except for Greeks in the hotel trades,
butchers and bakers.11 Requests for agricultural land
ceased, and a number of land contracts (concessions) were

12 In 1932, one European firm and thirteen Asian

cancelled.
ones were adjudged bankrupt. Three of the latter were

granted concordat apiés faillite, and two received pre-
13

 

ventive bankrupt certificates. Most farmers reduced
their activities; others abandoned their enterprises alto-
gether or turned to the production of food crops, instead

of sisal and coffee.14

Road construction on the Bujumbura-
Uvira-Cyangugu route could not be completed.15 Consequent-
ly, during 1932, the number of employed Africans, other
than porters, declined after road work and public projects
were terminated, because the colonial government lacked the
money to finance road construction.16
In 1931, the budget deficit of 5.9 million francs
forced the administration to reduce expenditures by de-

17 The following year,

creasing personnel and materials.
custom duties were again greatly reduced, receipts declined
by more than 50 percent (see Appendix IV), and officials
reduced expenditures principally on salaries and allow-
ances for European personnel, and material. These pro-
duced a 16 percent savings for the administration,18 but

could hardly stave off a possible default by the colonial

139

state. Outstanding loans owed to the Belgian Congo and

the metropole were due and had to be paid. From the begin-
ning of the mandate to 1929, Belgium had loaned the terri-

tories of Rwanda and Burundi 28.8 million francs which was

to be progressively amortized from 1926.

Brussels was supposed to receive 26,407,781 francs in
December 31, 1932, but because of financial problems, an
agreement on October 15, 1931, converted the debt to a
treasury bond. At the same time, in order to finance road
construction, the territories secured a second loan of 50
million francs at a low interest rate of 2 percent annually,
repaid in 1932 by converting it to a treasury bond. Both
Rwanda and Burundi also possessed a floating debt, which
was supported by both Belgium and the Belgian Congo. By
1932 seven million francs in bonds were held by Belgium and
96.5 million francs, including the converted treasury bond
of 50 million francs were owed to the Belgian Congo.19
Despite the mandate's indebtedness or because of it, gov-
ernment officials embarked on a "rationalized development
plan" in order to increase foreign exchange. Governor
General Voisin's primary mission was the implementation of
this kind of development.

When Charles Voisin was named Vice-Governor General
and Governor of the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi on 28 May
1930, he announced the government's official development

program in the preamble to the 1930 Annual Report. He

140

included, among other objectives: the regrouping of chief—
doms for better administrative control; the improvement of
livestock; reforestation; mineral prospecting; and the con—

20 In a speech before his administra-i

struction of roads.
tive officials in September of the same year, the governor
added the following projects: a program to remedy periodic
famine and the undernourishment of the Africans; the de-
velopment of markets so that Africans could get cash in
return for their excess production, which would in turn
stimulate their purchasing power; the participation of
Europeans in the economy;21 and the construction of
schools.22

The first program called for swamp drainage to pro-
vide new land, and the development of seasonal crops such
as manioc, which is resistant to excessively dry and wet
seasons, to supplement the African diet, especially during
periods of famine. To develop markets required the con—
struction of extensive road networks, so that lorries
could replace African carriers and connect markets with
commercial centers and ports. Although the goal of Euro-
pean participation in agricultural production was never
fully realized, Voisin's program provided land concessions
in areas of "vacant lands and limited pOpulation" in order
to improve the land and demonstrate proper cultivation

measures for Africans. European participation, however,

was more successful in the industrial and commercial

141

sectors. The land designed for European agricultural pro-
duction was much too marginal and unsuitable for European
settlement.23

The technical aspects of Voisin's program were refined
by Mr. M. Everaerts, the newly assigned agricultural direc-
tor and guiding influence for agricultural development from
1929 to 1954, but the substance of the program was not at
all new. The theoretical and practical applications of
much of it had been developed between 1916 and 1930, espe-
cially labor recruitment, wage employment, taxation and
trade in African foodstuffs (see Chapter III.)

Governor Voisin's development plan of 1930 also
called for reorganizing and standardizing the lines of com—
municatiOn, running from the administration through the
chief and sub-chief, to the rural population. It was be-
lieved that only through the modification of the tradition-
al structure and, correspondingly, its function, could de-

24 The

velopment or the civilizing mission be initiated.
vital links were the chiefs and sub-chiefs, and their role
was a pivotal one, provided they could be made to acquire

European values, which the administration assumed would

25 As chiefs became more

increase the rate of progress.
amenable to European influences or civilization, they
could better assume the responsibility for communicating
ideas and directives from the administration to the masses

below. They would implement directives related to the

142

cultivation of crops, swamp drainage, reforestation, road
construction, and tax collection. Those who were incapable
of following administrative orders and decrees would be
replaced, scolded, beaten, orjailed.26 Some chiefs would
also have their property confiscated, or administrative
officials would indiscriminately destroy the homes and
crops of the chief's subjects,27 to ensure compliance and
submission.

However, Voisin's administrative reorganization plan
was not entirely new either. A major program, begun in
the 19203 had attempted to regroup African chieftaincies
by amalgamating the hundreds of scattered enclaves and
small holdings that had developed as a result of the tra-

ditional land tenure system and ibikingi.28

The govern-
ment's goal to organize the country into Chiefdoms of
roughly the same size, with at least 100 taxpayers in

29 The earlier program also had extended administra-

each.
tive control and development projects as well as the ef-
forts of African agents on the hills. At the same time,
European officials increased the political power of their
chiefs, particularly where authority was exercised in the
public interest. Those who acted on the administration's
behalf were young educated notables, with a mOre evolved
mentality because of western education. These educated

chiefs eventually replaced the more traditional authori-

ties who the administration believed were incapable of

143

adapting their actions to new methods.30

To foster agricultural development, Voisin decided to
expand cotton, palm oil, coffee and tobacco, primarily be-
cause he believed high transportation costs prohibited the
development of other crops.31 He believed that the selec-
ted products would yield higher value, which would thus
offset high transport costs.32 The rationale for expanding
coffee cultivation was also based on the belief that coffee
would greatly influence the general economic growth of the
country, provided it was undertaken by Africans. The gen-
eral costs for blacks, "who have recourse to family labor
in planting, maintenance, and harvesting were quite low in
comparison with those which confronted the European culti-
vation efforts." Voisin and his officials also believed
Africans would profit from coffee production.33 Moreover,
Governor Voisin called for some modifications and more
rational development in animal husbandry. Only then, he
argued, would livestock occupy the preponderant place in
the balance of foreign exchange. But the real problem
here was supervision because much of the trade could not
be documented or taxed at the border (exit) points. Ac-
cording to administration estimates, at least 2,000 head
of cattle exited annually from the country unnoticed,
especially at points near frontier markets at Banyabongo

34

and the Bahunde of the Kivu district. This meant poten-

tial revenues were being lost.

144

Another feature of the new rationalized development
called for European participation in the economy, a policy
which the administration had sanctioned since 1925, when
it agreed to grant concessions of large tracts of land to

business interests.35

To protect the normal development
of the African population and to prevent monopolies by
foreign colonists and other foreigners, the administration
did not permit land transfers unless an equitable indem-

nity was transacted,36

and the Africans agreed to abandon
their rights.37 Densely populated agricultural land would
not be granted if African residential patterns would be
upset. Furthermore, concessions in these zones were usu-
ally limited to a maximum of 500 hectares, and a second
concession would be granted only after the first one was
in full production. Companies or owners also had to agree
to build schools and quarantine stations as part of the
social contract.38
In 1928 the legislative branch approved three agree-
ments which recognized the right of recipients to acquire
property rights to the land. Two limited land grants
could be chosen in deserted areas, generally in the prox-
imity of forests, or tse-tse infected regions, where of-
ficials hoped European methods could make these areas

39 . .
A restrictive clause to ensure

healthy and productive.
development recognized the right of ownership only if the

land was placed in production within a reasonable period

145

of time, and social obligations were entirely fulfilled.40

But as the table below indicates, despite what was appar-
ently a very liberal land policy, there were few firms in
Rwanda. Most were Indian and Arab firms which predomi-
nated throughout the colonial period. Increases after
1926 reflected non-European growth, and from 1923 to 1927

Belgian firms were never the majority.41

Table VII. The Total Number of Agricultural and Com-
mercial Firms in Rwanda, 1923-1929.

 

 

 

Total Number of Total Number of
Year Firms Year Firms
1923 27 1927 85
1924 29 1928 94
1925 77 1929 107
1926 71

 

SOURCE: "La Rapport sur l'administration Belge pendant
l'année 1923," Congo I~(Jan. - May, 1924), 756; Rapport
1925, 102; Rapport 1926, 103; Rapport 1927, 79; Rapport
‘1928, 91; and Rapport‘l929, 96.

 

 

 

To make investment in Rwanda more attractive and as
a response to the problem of limited financial resources
for new but floundering companies, the administration
changed its concession policy in significant ways. First,

it passed Ordinance No. 18 on June 28, 1929, creating a

146

system of progressive renewals for agricultural leases at
intervals of five years. The ordinance aimed to assist
struggling companies, which were allowed to retain their
profits until their holdings were in full production.42
Second, Voisin began to promote more vigorously the con-
cepts of partnership between Africans and Europeans and
protective zones. Both concepts worked side-by-side. For
example in areas designated as protective zones, companies
which agreed to assist Africans would be assured of a
monopoly for ten years. Protective zones would enclose an
area of 70,000 hectares or more, in which companies would
have full access to African labor and produce. By the end
of 1929, twenty-one protective zones had been leased or
were on the verge of being reserved.43
By permitting private enterprises to take "legiti-
mate" advantage of African labor and production, as well
as permitting companies to rationalizing their own capital,
officials believed development would be more efficient and

rational.44

To further justify their actions, the admin-
istration maintained that they would profit from the cre-
ation of European agricultural zones. The companies would
serve as demonstration agents and would provide the Ban-
yarwanda with seeds, cuttings, and selected plants. More—
over, observation would lead them to unconsciously use

more improved cultivation techniques.45 The concepts of

partnership and protective zones were good inducements for

147

European companies; the notables secured labor for them,
while various companies obtained export crops either di-
rectly from Bahutu farmers or, more frequently, from Hindu
and Arab agents. The latter held a near monoply in trans-
acting business with Africans; they served as middlemen
between EurOpean importers and African consumers, and be-
tween local producers and export houses, as well as for
industrial firms in regions adjacent to the Belgian Congo.46
The final components of the developmental strategy
were perhaps the most important. Voisin sought to encour-
age the growth of mining concessions as a means of aug—
menting foreign exchange. The first concession for the
exploitation of six deposits of tin was awarded to the
Minetain Society in 1930. Export production for that year
was 164 tons, but by 1949 the output had risen to 2,267
tons, and mineral exports would become the second ranking
source of foreign exchange after coffee.47
Then, there was the problem of insufficient pasture

and Rwanda's many cattle.48

The government believed that
cattle should be improved by breeding Rwanda animals with
European stock or with cattle from neighboring colonies.
Culling herds would also result in less animals that would

49 Batutsi notables

therefore require less pasture land.
vigorously resisted reductions, however, and the adminis-
tration never made much headway except in the area of im-

proving the health of the herds.

148

To combat famine, non-seasonal crops such as manioc
and sweet potatoes were introduced, and regulations im-
posed for their cultivation. The resident had the power
to require each able bodied adult male to maintain 35 ares
of seasonal and 15 ares of non-seasonal food crops. The
latter included manioc or above 1900 meters, potatoes.50
Manioc could be sown in bush land or on well drained

51 Since

slopes apart from each household's land holding.
the country lacked suitable storage facilities, the selec-
tion of these durable crops was a wise choice, and if
Bahutu farmers complied with the rules, famines would no
longer disrupt the productive cycle. Voisin strongly pur-
sued this program, and recalcitrants were subject to fines
of fifty to a hundred francs for failure to follow instruc-
tions to the letter.52
Other regulations decreed the use of bottom marsh
lands for agricultural purposes, a great source of irrita-
tion to the Batutsi notables, primarily because of the

need for dry season pastures.53

The notables found ways
to circumvent the new directive, usually through "benigned
neglect" or gracious non-compliance. Finally, since land
in Rwanda had been systematically depleted of its forests
by agriculturalists seeking new fields, Belgian officials
instituted a forest reclamation project, in which Banyar-

wanda had to plant commercial groves of fast-growing trees,

particularly eucalyptus, to be used as firewood and in

149

construction.54

Voisin's basic developmental goals were to improve
African agricultural production in order to resist the
threat of famine, to provide enough surplus for the African
to purchase the things he could not grow, pay taxes and to
create foreign exchange in order to maintain colonial sol-
vency. Government would support these goals by building
roads which would open the land; by finding markets which
would purchase the Africans' surplus production; and by
providing proper technical knowledge and supervision.
There were, however, some enormous and fundamental prob-
lems which prevented the achievement of these goals:
first, population was widely dispersed in a country of
precipitous slopes and denuded hillsides; second, there
was the social role of cattle expressed by imperatives and
taboos not only difficult to change but also deeply im-
bedded in the traditional political system. If the asso-
ciations of value and prestige attached to cattle could be
transferred to some other object or social manifestation,
then the technical solution of the problem of rational
stock breeding would be easy.

The third obstacle was the density and isolation of
the population, which meant that there were only limited
areas for expansion. The basic aim of the administration
was to enable a greater number to live on the already

crowded cultivated land by raising its productivity and

150

by encouraging private investment on non-productive land
or reclaimed land. Officials would mount campaigns to
control population growth and to stress the need for hard

55 But to teach this

work to increase food production.
kind of awareness was an expensive undertaking in the best
of times and certainly impractical in times of depression.
Moreover, given the spread of Catholicism, any discussion
of birth control would be difficult. To encourage foreign
investment in Rwanda was reasonable, but to expect this in
the 19303 was not.

A fourth obstacle was traditional land and tenure,
which sustained the Batutsi oligarchy, and the administra-
tion had to proceed slowly in order to avoid political in-
stability or even revolution. Even when it had the oppor-
tunity to completely dismantle the whole system of presta-
tions in 1938, the government refused because of the need
to support the power and prestige of traditional authority
through the symbol of allegiance which prestations repre-

56 Officials were prepared to leave this issue un-

sented.
resolved for some time and looked upon suppression as a
final objective. The fifth obstacle was the absence of
villages, which made it almost impossible to reach peOple
in order to provide technical, economic, and human ser—

vices.57

Even though the governor's program encouraged
the creation of open air markets, which would serve to

inspire surrounding stores and eventually villages, this

151

aspect of development would take time. In the meantime
schools and dispensaries would have to serve as a measure

58 The final

of village life in order to reach the people.
obstacle was Musinga.

The implementation of economic transformation lay in
the efficiency of the chain-of-command, running from the
administration through the chiefs and sub-chiefs to the
rural masses. The vital links were naturally the chiefs.
In this regard the administration was willing to respect
and reinforce the authority of the Batutsi oligarchy, but
only "to the extent where its functions follow our civil-

"59 This aim also meant persuading

izing directives.
Musinga to take his duties "seriously" and to participate
"actively" in the administration of his territory. Euro-
pean official and missionary personnel expressed the belief
that Musinga was supposedly indifferent to those things
which "did not satisfy his egoism and instincts." He was
concerned only with ”keeping his peOple in a state of stag-
nation and with resisting the works of civilization."60
They also believed that the roots of chaos and indifference
lay in the existence of an autocratic, powerful monarchy
who remained captive to the whims of a band of sycophantic
courtiers.61
The crisis came to a head in 1931, with the dismissal

of Musinga and the accession to the throne of his eighteen;

year-old-son, Rudahigwa (hereafter Mwami Mutara). The

152

origins of the crisis, according to one version, can be
traced back to 1926, when it was alleged that Musinga had
attempted sodomy with sons of his notables serving at the
palace at Nyanza. This incident caused a breach between
Musinga and his chiefs, for which he blamed the White

62 Whether

Fathers, saying they had exaggerated the facts.
there is any truth to these claims is difficult to say,
but what is beyond question is that Musinga's relations
with the Catholic Church had never been very cordial.
According to Alexis Kagame, "Musinga was bitterly Opposed
to missionary enterprise, because it undermined his
authority."63
Musinga openly distrusted Catholic missionaries, and
he adopted an attitude of passive resistance toward the
administration, an attitude which Professor Marzarotti
attributed to the influence of Musinga's traditional back-
ground. Consequently it was difficult for anyone to change
his mental outlook. The limitations which the administra-
tion had imposed upon him contributed to his hostile atti-
tude and latent surliness.64
But what really incensed officials was Musinga's sys-
tematic opposition to all European progress and improve-
ments, his preoccupation with the past, and finally his
conduct during the 1928-29 famine. Musinga had failed to
support reforestation and cultivation of compulsory food

crops,65 but during the famine, he tried to get the

153

government to compel his starving people to supply him
with the customary food tribute. The administration
naturally refused the request, but persuaded him to leave
his capital to tour the kingdom and encourage the peOple
to plant food crops and trees for the reforestation pro-
gram. Musinga travelled "with little enthusiasm," and his
entourage "exacted tribute in food and cattle from the
pe0ple."66
These actions were frustrating, since the administra-
tion's solution to the famine was to extend food crop
cultivation in the marshy lowlands, where crops could grow
even if rainfall was below normal. Officials were also
thoroughly disgusted with the Batutsi notables, who tended
to ignore orders to clear and plant the marshes. Notables
were more concerned about the fate of their cattle which
constituted their sole wealth. Since the wet lowlands
offered the only certain source of pasturage during
drought, Batutsi notables blocked the extension of culti-

67 The frustrated Belgians sought Musinga's

vation there.
help in getting the Batutsi to act. The king enthusias-
tically punished any of his opponents who disObeyed the
orders, but he did no more than his notables to extend

68 Faced with the task of governing the king-

cultivation.
dom without the cooperation of the notables, Governor
Pastiaux tried conciliation and returned to the earlier

policy of propping up the notables' prestige and

154

69 The governor also ordered that measures

authority.
which had been disrupting buhake, one of the major griev-
ances of the notables, be stopped. In the future, no
notable would lose his client except as punishment for

70 But the major problem was still, what

misbehavior.
should be done with Musinga?

In September 1931, Governor General Tilkens of the
Belgian Congo visited BishOp Classe in order to set the
date for Musinga's deposition. He was introduced to
Rudahigwa, and a week later Batutsi notables were called
to Kigali ostensibly for discussion‘about the economic
crisis, but really to isolate Musinga in Nyanza. He was
conveniently alone when he was informed that his son would
succeed him. The king, who seemed to have expected the
news, cried a little and left on November 16, 1931, for
exile at a special residence at Kamembe in the western
part of Rwanda, and ultimately to Moba, Katanga, where he

71

died on Christmas Day in 1944. Only pg Drapeau Rouge,

 

the Manchester Guardian, and the Queen Mother protested
72

 

his deposition--the last even threatened suicide.
Although the new mwami displayed no more sympathy to-
wards Europeans than his father, his methods were quite
different. Where Musinga openly challenged missionaries
and administrators, Rudahigwa had a special talent for
working within the confines of the established superstruc-

ture, rather than against it. Mwami Mutara had come of

155

age when European rule was already firmly established,
and was better able to accommodate himself to the norms of
the new system. More important, he was a product of
mission schools; he shared with the new generation of
educated Batutsi elite the western training and education
which his father so conspicuously lacked. The deposed
Musinga was never able or willing to work out a mutually
satisfactory relationship with the incipient "class" of
mission educated Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs and the
resulting tension played a part in his dismissal.73
According to LeMarchand, the new generation of chiefs
fully sensed the significance of the social forces that
lay behind the spread of Christianity. These chiefs real-
ized that the preservation of their traditional claims-
ultimately depended upon their endorsement of the new
creed. Musinga viewed the adoption of Christianity as
nothing short of a betrayal of his authority. Christian-
ity meant the desacralization of the mwami-ship, and the
relegation of the office-holder to a subordinate position.
Musinga's obduracies stemmed from his own unwillingness to
accept any sort of limitation that would alter either the
sacredness of his office or the structure of his authority.
Therefore, the drastic alterations eventually wrought into
the system in the name of administrative efficiency made
74

Musinga all the more suspicious of Belgian intentions.

With a new mwami in place, the administration

156

completed its political reforms, or reorganization, and

75

implemented other economic reforms. For example, tra-

ditional taxes in kind and in work, owed to the Batutsi

76 The

notables, was replaced by an annual money payment.
new tax procedure freed Africans from porterage of produce
delivered in tribute and from the billeting and provision-
ing of prestation workers--burdens never considered in the
evaluation of African customary contributions; and permit-
ted farmers to devote more time to the production of their
crops. Although the government wanted to eliminate all
corvees and prestations, and replace them with a flat money
payment, it decided instead to regulate them in order to
prevent abuse.7.7
The administration was concerned with economic devel—
opment, and any potential controversy was to be avoided.
This particular issue might have caused considerable insta-
bility, and was perhaps the one issue that might have united
the competing functions of Batutsi noblemen. The adminis-
tration, as a result, took the safest course, but it inad—
vertently tightened the stronghold of the Batutsi notables
over Bahutu. This issue more than any other, demonstrated
the relative strength of thenotables as co-rulers, and it
accentuated the inconsistencies in the colonial policy,
especially since modernity implied the elimination of

values and constraints harmful to the develOpment process.

On the whole, the period from 1928-1931 was the apex

157

of the Belgian attempt to "rationalize and standardize"
lines of control, and in doing so, the sanction of the
Batutsi oligarchy as arbiters of the colonial system was
confirmed. The famine convinced the administration that
develOpment and African survival could not be accomplished
without the nobility. Nor could reforms be instituted
without first considering how they would effect the court
and the Batutsi notables. As arbiters of the system, the
notables increased their potential for wealth in the new
economy--for certain corvee and prestation they would re-
ceive a money payment. Moreover, they were part of the
civil service and held the dominant places in the educa-
tional system which confirmed access to the Belgian admin-
istration. On another level the same period foreshadowed
the consolidation of the Rwandan colonial economy, and the
domination of it by the state and international economic
systems. The former would redirect individual African
initiative in the domestic economy for the benefit of the
state. The economic crisis had severely weakened the emer-
ging capitalist sector, and threatened both colonial sol-
vency and the colony's development. The international
economy would provide foreign exchange through the pur-
chase of African surplus, allowing Africans to pay taxes
and purchase imported goods.

With reorganization complete and the state in control

of the economy, the government could facilitate the

158

expansion of coffee production. Only with well-organized,
efficiently functioning productive and administrative sys-
tem could colonial officials hope to encourage and profit
from economic development. Passive resistance, a recal-
citrant king, and Batutsi chiefs impeded consolidation,
moral and social progress, and economic development or
"the civilizing process." But the administration was pre-
pared to implement its plans by any means, even to the
extent of deposing the traditional monarch in favor of his
son Charles Mutare Rudahigwa, "who was more amenable,
open, and intelligent."78 Only by standardizing and regu-
lating a system of dual colonialism or overrule in which
the administration and the Batutsi elite coexisted side by
side or on top of each other could Belgian authorities
control a doubly exploitative relationship between the
masses and the Batutsi. Transforming the productive and
administrative system created profound social changes, and
a dual system of overrule also served to contain the expec—
tations and aspirations of the Batutsi oligarchy, and con-
sequently the African masses, who also had the potential
for disruption. While European administrators monitored
the colonial system as a whole, the Batutsi oligarchy su-
pervised the productive efforts of the African population.
The key to the whole system, however, was effective man-
agement from the top and compliance from the Batutsi who

dominated the masses below.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1Georges Van Der Kerken, La Crise Economique en
Afrique Belge: Situation Actuelle et Perspective d'Avenir
(Brussels, 1931), p. 25.

2Ibid., p. 39.

 

3Ibid., p. so

4E. Du Bois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale,
1932-34," Bulletin 1' Institut des Sciences Economiques
Sixiéme Anfiee, No. 2 (1935), p. 133.

5Other decrees prolonged this temporary exemption
until December 31, 1935, and a decree of June 17, 1933,
extended the exemption to cotton fabrics manufactured in
the colony. Du Bois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale,"
pp. 133-34.

6In 1935, another decree levied a 300 BF per ton
export duty on unroasted coffee coming into Belgian Africa
and which might be reexported duty free into Belgium. An
additional decree authorized the Ministry of Colonies to
reduce the statistical tax collected for certain commodi-
ties at the same time customs duties were collected for
products entering or leaving the country. Du Bois, "La
Politique Economique Coloniale," p. 134.

7Also, by 1929 the number of non-African commercial
firms in the mandate territories was 261, but by the end
of 1930 the total had declined to 226. Ministére de
Colonies. Ministére du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi.
Rapport presenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de
la Socigté'des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du
Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1930 (Brussels, 1931), p. 112.

8Van Der Kerken, La Crise Economique, p. 59.

 

9Ibid., p. 64.

159

160

10Actually this process had begun in 1930, when pur—
chases from the Belgian Congo had begun to decline. Also
appreciable decreases occurred in other export commodities
to the Belgian Congo--l,212 tons in 1930 compared to 1,526
tons in 1929, a decline of 20 percent. A large segment of
the decline was in hides, in spite of a reduction in duty
from 10 percent to 3 percent ad valorem. Rapport 1930,
pp. 29 and 113.

{3"Varietés," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
Cinquieme Année, No. 4 (February 21, 1931), p. 61.

12

 

Rapport 1931, p. 48.

13Rapport 1932, p. 29

14Ibid., p. 156.

15"Vari§tes," p. 61.

16Consortium for African Microfilm Project (hereafter
CAMP). Film NO. 34. Reel I. J. M. Derschied Collection.
Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, (1933),
p. 58.

17Rapport 1931, p. 28.

18Rapport 1932, p. 250.

 

19Ibid.

20Gouvernement Belge. Ministere des Colonies.Rapport
presenteypar le Gouvernement belge sur 1' Administration
du Ruanda et de 1' Urund1, 1930 (Brussels, 1931), pp. 5- 6;
a decree of 18 December 1930 established forest areas and
prohibited the cutting of wood without a permit, punishable
by a fine not to exceed $100.00_and one month in prison.
Large forest preserves along the Congo-Nile Divide and the
slopes of the volcanoes were created in 1934. Pierre Leroy,
Legislation du Ruanda-Urundi (Usumbura, 1949), pp. 61- 63.

21Fred E. Wagoner. "Nation Building in Africa: A
Description and Analysis of the Deve10pment of Rwanda,"
(Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 78-81.

 

22Rapportpresente’par le Gouvernement beige, 1930,
p. 5.

23Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," pp. 82—87.

24

Alison L. Des Forges. "Defeat is the Only Bad News:
Rwanda under Musinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale
University, 1972), p. 237.

161

25Rapport sur l'Administration belge du Ruanda et
l'Urundi, 1923. (Brussels, 1924), p. 71.

26

 

Rapport presente par le Gouvernement belge, 1930,
O. 5.

1.

27Des Forge, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," p. 263.

28
p. 46.

29Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda also notes that
the figure would later be raised to 300 taxpayers, p. 25.

30
p. 46.

31Tobacco production was already well established in
Kigali, Nyanza, Gatsibu, and Ruhengeri. Also there was a
flourishing domestic trade. Buyers purchased 281,350
tobacco leafs from African farmers in Mulera, and at
Kisenyi the Kamembe mill purchased 281,000 tobacco leafs.
Religious missions at Rwaza and Njundo bought 600,000 and
204,000 tobacco leafs respectively in 1926. Small traders
purchased more than one million tobacco leafs from African
farmers. In 1929, Kisenyi and Mulera produced 200 tons.
Although the industry lacked sufficient market outlets
from 1934 to 1937 and production consequently declined in
certain areas, tobacco production remained constant through—
out 1938. Even today, it is a small but viable industry.
As a result of the administration's cotton campaign, 1,900
hectares were in production by 1932. Though plagued by
repeated attacks from grasshoppers (which destroyed more
than 100 hectares) and plant damage caused by the rose
worm (ygp rose) and other parasites, 856 tons were pro-
duced in 1932. Planters averaged 90 kilos per hectare.
By 1937, 724 tons of cotton was produced on 4,250 hectares.
Although the 1936-37 cotton season had been a particularly
good one because of adequate rainfall, cotton was still
plagued by cryptagamical attacks and damaged by insects
and parasites. Also, planters received only 1.10BF per
kilo at government supervised markets. These 12,440
African cotton farmers produced on the average 219 kilos
and received approximately 240BF for their efforts. The
major cotton region was Bugarama in Cyangugu territory,
producing 253,000 kilos in 1937 and 335,570 kilos in
1938. But because of low prices, planters received one
franc per kilo at markets supervised by the administra-
tion. By the end of 1938, there were also two ginning
mills in the mandated territories. Rapport 1926, pp. 94
and 99; Rapport 1929, p. 91; Rapport 1934, p. 132;

Rapport presentexpar 1e Gouvernement belge, 1929,

 

Rapport presente par le Gouvernement belge, 1929,

 

 

 

162

Rapport 1937, p. 141; and Rapport 1938, p. 149 for tobacco
and Rapport 1932, p. 112; Rapport 1937, p. 139; Rapport
1938, pp. 76, 147, 149, and 200 for cotton.

32

 

 

 

Rapport 1930, p. 106.

33Ibid., p. 114.

341hid.

35Rapport 1925, p. 79.

36In 1929, the government added the following provi-
sions to its concession policy: the official survey
report had to show that the land was unoccupied and would
not be needed by Africans in the future. These reports
were supposed to be thoroughly scrutinized by the resi-
dent, and then by the governor who had the final appro-
val. Rapport 1929, p. 38.

37Rapport 1926, p. 145. However, the 1929 Report
noted that alienations were exceptional. In principal,
administrative officials only consented to long term leases
for 30 years, following a provisional contract of occupa-
tion for a period of five years during which half the land
should have been placed in production. Rapport 1927, p. 31
and Rapport 1929, p. 38.

38

 

 

Rapport 1927, p. 31.

 

39Rapport 1929, p. 38.

 

4OIbid.

41"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge pendant
l'Année 1923," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1924), p. 756; Rapport
1924, p. 38; Rapport 1925, p. 102; Rapport 1926, p. 103;
Rapport 1927, p. 79; Rapport 1928, p. 91; and Rapport
1929, p. 96.

 

42Rapport 1929, p. 88.

43In 1930, the total number of European and Asian

agricultural enterprises in Rwanda had been reduced to 15.
The total area in full production was only 5,745 hectares
and 50 ares. But Europeans and Asians held much more land
in the following categories: 14,782 hectares 75 ares 58
cent'ares were devoted to private ownership; 11,881 hec-
tares 75 ares were on lease arrangements; 2,843 hectares
on long term lease arrangements; and 1,948 hectares in the
hands of missions. About 73.4 percent of the European and

 

163

Asian land was in fallow: 4.18 percent in food crops;
6.20 percent in coffee; 14.7 percent in forestry; and 1.3
percent in fruit trees. Société Coloniale des Produit
tannant et Agricole (Protanag), perhaps the largest com-
pany in Rwanda had 1,115 hectares in production in
Cyangugu in 1930. About 350 hectares of it was in coffee.
Protanag used specialized technical personnel and equip-
ment, such as tractors and adaptable ploughs. However,
the company did not survive the economic crisis and col-
lapsed in 1934, despite its efforts to liquidate some of
its less profitable assets. Other European companies
were located in the following areas: five in Gatsibu;
three in Kigali; one in Cyangugu; two in Lubengera; and
two in Ruhengeri. Most of these enterprises cultivated
food crops and coffee. Rapport 1929, p. 39; Rapport 1930,
pp. 112, and 149-150; and Rapport 1934, p. 87.

44

 

Rapport l929, p. 39.

45The administration also envisaged the eventual
creation of individual land tenure systems among the Ban-
yarwanda, but this was way off in the remote distant
future. Ibid.

46Rapport 1930, p. 112.

 

47£pig., pp. 149 and 336; Wagoner, "Nation Building
in Africa," p. 83.

48Over-grazing and an excessive cattle pOpulation
remains a severe problem for Rwanda. Even in 1933 there
were some 80,000 head of cattle, which at a rate of at
least 2.5 hectares per head of cattle, required some
300,000 hectares for adequate grazing. However, the total
area of the country is just 265 hectares and only 243,151
hectare were suitable for agriculture and animal husbandry.
With 60,000 adult farmers cultivating 68,763 hectares,
there was not sufficient land for pasture, unless yields
on pasture lands could be increased. So the concern shown
by the administration was a real one. CAMP. Film No. 34
Reel I. J. M. Derschied. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport
de Sortie de Change (1933), p. 59.

49CAMP. Congo Manuscript. J. M. Derscheid Collec—
tion. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouver-
neur, 1929, p. 44.

50A. Becquet, "Moyens mis en Oeuvre et les Results
Obtenus dans le Lutte contre la Famine au Ruanda,"
Journées d'Agronomie Coloniale, (June 23-24, 1933), p. 4.

 

164

1Pierre Bettez Gravel, "A Play for Power. Descrip-
tion of a Community in Eastern Rwanda: (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Michigan, 1962), p. 68.

52Ian Linden, Church and Revolution, p. 206.

 

53Gravel, "A Play for Power," p. 82

541hid., pp. 73-74.

55Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," p. 83.

56Rapport 1938, p. 75.

57Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," p. 185.

58Ibid.

59Rapport 1930, p. 5.

60Ibid., p. 60.

61Rene LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London,
1970), p. 70.

62

 

Louis de Lacger, Rwanda (Kabgayi, n.d.), pp. 531—
538.

63Alexis Kagame, Yuhi Musinga: pp Regne mouvemente
(Unpublished M.S.).

64
p. 66.

65Rapport 1929, 48. Congo Manuscript. "Folder No. 9.

"Silhouette: M. Georges Sandrart." Alison L. Des Forges.
"Defeat is the Only Bad News," p. 343.

66

 

 

Permanent Mandates Commission, 16th session (1929),

 

Rapport 1929, pp. 48-49.

 

67Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," pp. 343-

344.

68Ibid., p. 344.

69Ibid., p. 346.

7°Ibid., pp. 346—7.

165

71Rapport 1931, pp. 242-243; Wagoner, Nation Building
in Africa, p. 95.

72

 

Rapport 1931, p. 247.

 

73LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 70.

 

74Ibid.

75In 1938, officials remarked that the mwami's role
was collaborative, and in this capacity he would make
periodic tours of his kingdom and report on the results to
the Resident. Rapport 1938, p. 13.

76

 

Rapport 1931, p. 87.

 

77;pi9., and Rapport 1934, p. 70.

 

78Rapport 1931, p. 58.

 

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY:

COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1920-1937

The famine of 1928-29 in Rwanda and the Great Depres-
sion of the 19303 were bench marks in the economic and
colonial history of Rwanda. Both were instrumental in
introducing into the country a strict system of economic
planning which guaranteed the maximum productivity from
the African pOpulation. Increased productivity was nec-
essary in order to counter future famines, the drastic re-
duction in investments, and the sharp decline in the prices
of raw materials and agricultural commodities on the world
market. Economic dislocation not only threatened the sol-
vency of the colonial economy but could have also led to
political upheaval and instability. The famine, the de-
pression, and the fear of economic stagnation and politic-
al instability led to a policy that Africans must carry on
farming at all costs in order to maintain the economic ac-
tivity and development of the colony. This policy found
legal pronouncement in the late 19203 and legal enforce-
ment in the 19303, when the government instituted compul-

sory cultivation of export crops. Even though the decline

166

167

in agricultural export prices could have been balanced by

a sharp increase in the volume of exports, the administra-
tion believed, and perhaps correctly 30, that this increase
would only have been achieved by reinforcing economic con-
straints. The administration accomplished this end, how—
ever, by enforcing strict divisions of labor between Afri-
can producers and foreign capital. As this chapter shows,
African producers were restricted to the production of pro-
duce, at prices fixed by the administration, whereas for-
eign interests obtained an effective monopoly over the
industrial processing of these products and thus were able
to profit from the added value.

The history of Rwandan coffee production falls into
three phases. The first, from 1920 to 1931, includes the
formative years which were characterized by opposition
from the Batutsi oligarchy. The second, 1931 to 1937, com-
prises the administration's successes with the introduction
and extension of the product throughout Rwanda. The final
phase, although not clearly delineated, ends in 1939, when
the industry collapsed from events neither Rwandans nor the
colonial administration could control. This chapter will
explore only the first two phases. Because the final phase
involved events external to Rwanda, it will be discussed
in Chapter Seven.

When Voisin decided to extend coffee cultivation in

1931, feasibility studies nor the creation of new technical

168

facilities were required, because as early as 1920, coffee
nurseries had been constructed by the government, and in
1921, 1000 coffee plants were distributed to African farm-
ers. In 1923, officials made every effort to extend cof-
fee growing in the African areas, and they predicted that
the first harvest by Bahutu chiefs would be sold in 1924.1
This forecast demonstrated how little officials knew about
coffee, since it takes several years for young trees to
bear fruit. With extreme optimism, they proceeded to con-
struct nurseries, to train African monitors, and to dis-

tribute coffee plants (about 100,000) in 1923.2

In 1924,
however, drought severely damaged the coffee nurseries
created in 1923, and only a tenth of the plants distrib-
uted to Africans were able to develop.3

Undaunted by this initial setback, the administration
purchased 500 kilos of seed to establish new nurseries in
each of the residences. It also obtained 12,000 new plants
from the Catholic mission at Mibirizi, which were planted
in the territory of cyangugu.4 In 1924, the government
distributed 100,000 young plants, the Catholic missions
about 30,000, and several administrative posts lesser quan-
tities. Guatemala, Bourbon, and Robusta were varieties
given to African farmers,5 but the administration ulti-
mately decided to concentrate on Arabica, since it was

considered superior to the other species. Furthermore,

it was quite sturdy, and thus able to withstand harsh

169

weather conditions.6 Total coffee production for both
territories was 22 tons in 1924.

In 1925, in a policy shift, Belgian agricultural offi-
cials compelled Batutsi chiefs and notables to provide
additional land to Bahutu farmers, and they intensified the
coffee campaign.7 However, the former measure enactment did
not result in increased production, primarily because there
was resistance from some Bahutu who considered the produc-
tion of coffee as having no immediate contribution to their
daily food requirements, and from Batutsi, who failed to
implement the instructions, because he believed coffee cul-
tivation was a threat to their power.8

In 1926, Territorial agents, either at their own ini-
tiative, or with the assistance of Batutsi chiefs, estab-
lished several nurseries in the provinces of Kihunya, Ba-
ganza, Mirenge, and Bumbogo. Officials hoped eventually
to distribute coffee plants to Bahutu farmers who had be-
come proprietors of their own land. .Similar efforts had
produced successful results in cyangugu territory, where
a census revealed that Africans had 30,000 productive cof-
fee plants. Officials were also pleased that the program
instituted in cyangugu had occurred without the use of
force.9 Success in Cyangugu generally and in the mandate
specifically encouraged the administration to extend coffee
growing to the warmer parts of the country in lower alti-

tude zones.10

170

The mandate produced only ten tons of coffee in 1927,
since extremely dry weather conditions and hail had severe—
ly damaged coffee trees. Still a large number of nurseries
were established around administrative posts, missions, and

11 Nor did the disaster dis-

on the hills during the year.
rupt agricultural development plans. Although the admin-
istration closed some agricultural facilities, like the
experimental agricultural station at Lusungu (closed on
February 25, 1927),12 officials also began to centralize
newer stations and expand the functions of existing ones.
A new station, located between Nyanza and Butare in
southern Rwanda, was opened at Rubona. Among its many
functions was the responsibility of introducing cash and

13 After the closing of the Karuzi station

new food crops.
in 1935, the administration concentrated all of its efforts
at the Rubona station. While the Kisozi station in north-
ern Rwanda was still charged with the selection of wheat,
coffee and food plants, specifically suited for the areas
of high altitude, the Rubona station was responsible for
devising, on a much larger scale, experiments on coffee

and on food crops like manioc and sweet potatoes, and with
determining whether these crops could be introduced in
temperate zones. Rubona also conducted experiments in

soil regeneration and in improving the breed of cattle.14

Although Rubona assumed some responsibility for training

African monitors after 1930, in 1927 the Kitega station

171

in Burundi trained African agricultural personnel as moni-
tors for crops, forestry, and animal husbandry.15
In 1928 and 1929, African planters at Butare and
Kigali received 15BF per kilo for their coffee. By the end
of November 1930, the best varieties of Arabica commanded

16 The relative decline in coffee

only 10BF per kilo.
prices coincided with the increasing pessimism of some Bel-
gian officials about the future of coffee in the African
area. They complained that little progress had been made
since 1927, which they attributed to the African complaints
that coffee competed with their food production and re-
quired too much care.17 But others, however, were undaunt-
ed, and voiced the belief that coffee would one day become
a great source of wealth, provided it received government
support in terms of technical and scientific assistance,
easy transport terms, and limited fiscal and social ex-
penses. They called for more frequent visits to African
farms by members of the Agricultural Service, so that the
people could be instructed in the proper care of coffee
plants. These officials believed that European expertise
would improve the yield of agriculture considerably.

To teach African farmers what European called methods
of rational cultivation--1and and seed selection, sowing
in rows and alternate sowing, the proper use and arrange-
ment of compost, irrigation and drainage--agricultural

18

agents were placed in each territory. These officials

172

concluded that the lack of progress in African agriculture
had more to do with adequate care rather than any African
attitude. They cited as evidence the stunted growth and
high mortality rate of coffee plants after the first
harvest.19 They were also convinced that coffee growing
could be profitable despite declining prices. Moreover,
the coffee was the principle way of loosening the hold of
the traditional political authorities and pastoral and
land patrons. At the same time profits from coffee would
not only increase the purchasing power of the inhabitants,
but it would also have beneficial effects on all commerce,
both domestic and foreign.20
By 1930 there was further evidence to suggest that
coffee could be profitable. During the late 19203, the
world market prices of 20 francs per kilo had encouraged
Belgian speculators to invest heavily in Arabica coffee
plantations in the Kivu and Ituri. It was then believed
that the Kivu could become another Kenya: excellent cli-
mate, the condition of the land, and the relative ease in
which cheap labor could be recruited were causes for that
kind of optimism. Even when the coffee market collapsed
several years later, Belgian investors still believed that
the price per kilo would eventually reach the pre-war
level of llBF, so companies in the Kivu continued to in-

21

crease coffee acreage. Similar optimism prevailed with

respect to the future of coffee cultivation in Burundi.

173

Albert Gille, commenting on the participation of Africans
in coffee production, noted that demographic and political
and psychological factors were ideal and would remain so,
as long as the reforms in the traditional political struc-
ture were moderated and Europeans supervised all phases of
coffee production.22

Commercial agriculture, though small in volume, was
dominated by Europeans. African production was insignifi-
cant, but the administration in Rwanda hoped that both sec-
tors would expand, and was excited when several private
groups proposed to finance the extension of African culti-
vation. Under their plan, technical assistance, coffee
seedlings, and tobacco plants would be provided. They had
apparently even secured financial assistance from Belgian
financiers to back the venture. But the plan collapsed
because Brussels believed the proposal was contrary to the
United Nations mandate prohibiting privileged commercial
concessions. There were, however, other explanations:
while the Belgian Foreign Office had already decided to
sponsor African commercial agriculture, the colonial appa-
ratus was not yet ready to assume this responsibility, for
the reorganization of the administrative structure was
still in progress. Also, officials needed time to prepare-
for Batutsi Opposition, which had surfaced in 1927 when
23

Governor Marzorati sought to increase coffee cultivation.

Administrative officials were convinced that the

174

Batutsi notables would resist any encroachment on their
grazing lands, just as the Batutsi believed, with good
reason, that Belgian colonialism would lessen their influ-
ence and power. In 1925, the administration consolidated
the authority of notables through the creation of African
tribunals. More importantly and even more threateningly,
Belgian authorities prohibited the collection of certain
dues in kind and reduced prestations or corvee labor, of-
ficially to one day out of seven or fifty-two days per
year.24 In 1926, officials abolished three hierarchical
ranks, which, until then, had retained with them certain
powers of command which cut across those of the Chieftains
of the various hills. These ranks had also called for
dues on the part of producers to be given to the men who

25 The Batutsi saw Marzorati's efforts

held the positions.
favoring commercial agriculture as an additional encroach-
ment on their prerogative and political influence, although
they did not understand that these actions presaged the
dismantling of the tributary mode of production.

Although the administration could anticipate the Tutsi
elite's reaction to the introduction of cash crops, they
were surprised by the response of Bahutu planters, who re-
fused to add an alien crop to their traditional subsistence
pattern. They understood what the administration did not

grasp; land was in short supply because of population pres-

sures and soil infertility. More significant were the

175

limited size of family holdings, the large number of
cattle, and the specter of frequent famines. But the ad-
ministration was confident that the crop was suitable for
Rwanda, and for this reason "felt coffee would one day be-
come a great source of wealth."26 However, for the sake
of caution, the cultivation program, initiated by Voisin
in 1931, was extended in stages, not only to avoid risks
that were inevitably involved in a much greater dispersal
effort but to also give the administration time to mobil-
ize its cadre. Moreover, the program was first initiated
by chiefs and literate Batutsi, and would be introduced
gradually among the Bahutu as African monitors were created
to instruct them. Officials also promised to subject cof-
fee to rigorous health standards, and African fields would
be supervised by a specialized staff, who would determine
the best land to use in order to prevent depreciation of
the product. They would classify coffee into categories
and mill and process it by modern techniques.27
In spite of insufficient technical personnel, Voisin's
initial trials were quite satisfactory.28 During the 1931-
1932 coffee campaign, the administration followed proced-
ures used in other parts of East Africa, particularly the
clean-weeding process, the use of notables as demonstration

29 To dis-

agents and model fields of 250 to 1,000 plants.
tribute seedlings and to facilitate the 1931 coffee cam-

paign, thirty agronomists and agricultural agents, with

176

the encouragement of the governor, supervised the creation
of nurseries, planted seedlings, and began to monitor

plantations.30

Free seedlings were distributed and the
Agriculture Service supplied demonstrations on mulching
techniques, not easy tasks when you consider that thirty
agricultural personnel were responsible for both terri-
tories, and thousands of African novices were being en-
couraged to participate in the campaign. To augument its
own efforts, the government also relied upon the nurs-
eries of private companies that had adopted the principle

31 To avoid encroaching upon cultivated

of collaboration.
lands, officials chose to plant coffee on virgin lands and
on poor pasture areas. In November 1931, additional cof-
fee seedlings were distributed, and by the end of the rainy
season, 448,300 plants were cultivated by African farmers.
By the end of December of the following year, Rwandan
farmers under administrative supervision, had planted an
additional 309,850 coffee plants.32
Because notables were indifferent and neglected their
coffee cr0ps, initial results were mediocre. There were
also logistical, technical, and environmental problems that
had to be overcome, especially when fields were located on
denuded ridges far away from the notable's homestead. Nat-
urally the failure rate was fairly high,33 and of the more

than 764,000 coffee plants cultivated by December 1932,

only 465,000 plants survived. Losses were attributed to

177

several factors other than exposure. First, thousands of
Africans were encouraged to plant without ever having prac-
ticed the cultivation of coffee or without having received
the promised professional instruction. Consequently, many
plants etiolated immediately after planting. Second, oth-
ers were attacked by parasites--yg£4g£i§ and mole crickets--

34

which caused a great deal of damage. Severely weakened

plants were destroyed, and several fields had to be aban-

35 Decaying plants were replaced, while

doned entirely.
surviving ones were given extreme care. Many were trans-
planted to an artificial environment and intercalated with

albizzatephrosia plants, banana trees, and other leguminous

 

plants to provide shade. Officials instituted terracing on

very high slopes and the mulching of coffee fields during

the dry season.36

From this point on, many believed coffee planting

37 Government officials

would have satisfactory results.
were buoyed by the spill over effect of the campaign, for
the total amount of coffee exported from the mandate in
1931 was 65,147 kilos, and the foreign exchange earned from

exports amounted to 322,296BF.38

Some European planters
were more realistic, since they recognized that it would
take from six to twelve years before the surviving plants

39 The following year

would have serious possibilities.
Rwanda produced 70 tons of coffee, and when the 1933 cam-

paign began, about 1,500,000 coffee plants were cultivated

178

in the first quarter of the year throughout the mandate.40

Generally these plants were cultivated on the versant of
hills or wantonly on slopes, the only available land. Some
terracing was arranged to retain rain water and to prevent
deep channeling and erosion.41
During the 1932-1933 campaign, the administration ex-
tended coffee cultivation to the Bahutu farmers. To ensure
success the administration sought to simplify planting pro-
cedures, and African initiative was severely circumscribed.
Monitors, assisted by a European, selected and demarcated
fields and staked out the holes for plants. The extreme
supervision was a formidable task, for agents travelled
from hill to hill to demonstrate the proper planting tech-

42 The territorial agents would

nique and provide counsel.
also participate in a monthly meeting with the Batutsi
chiefs and sub-chiefs, to discuss food crOps and the prog-
ress of the coffee campaign and reforestation, prestations
and taxes, and new policy pronouncements, regulations and
ordinances. During these meetings, African tax collectors
were required to verify their accounts, and individual
cases were heard and judged.43

To facilitate supervision over geographical areas,
agricultural personnel grouped individual parcels into
tens or hundreds. Instead of concentrating nurseries in

the principal urban centers, the Agriculture Service con-

structed and distributed nurseries throughout the various

179

provinces. Generally these nurseries serviced<xmzor more
hills, and most were built near streams, although place-
ment depended upon the density of the surrounding popula-
tion. During planting, Bahutu farmers were given between
forty-nine and fifty-four plants from the local nurseries
and instructed to plant them in a line near their enclo-
sures and among their banana trees or among other shade
plants.44
Rwandan farmers were also responsible for the construc-
tion and maintenance of post nurseries. Bahutu prepared
flower-beds, fashioned thousands of poles for cloches, man-
ufactured papyrus mat covers, and collected thousands of
baskets of decayed manure. African planters performed
these tasks without difficulty, but quite passively, and
the construction of bedding baskets, a bottomless basket
made from bamboo lath-work and held together by fibres
from banana leaves, seemed to tax some peOple because of
the amount of work involved and their other obligations.
As a result, the Chief of the Agriculture Service, Mr.
Everaerts, abandoned bedding and generalized the method of
planting bare roots. This method practiced in Burundi
with some success, rationalized the work needed before
transplantation. The latter technique was used during
the 1933-34 campaign.45
Operations were unified further during the 1935-36

campaign, and attempts were made to complete

180

transplantation from the nurseries to the homestead in one
day and when atmospheric conditions were ideal and the sky
overcast. If haziness and humidity were ideal, and if rain
immediately followed planting, the success rate was gener-

46 But weather, of course, could not be

ally 90 percent.
predicted, nor did the administration have the manpower.
Insufficient European personnel continued to plague the ad-
ministration's develOpment policy. For example, the number
of European personnel available from the 1935-36 campaign
was less than in the 1933-34 operation. During the earlier
period, sixty-nine Europeans were responsible for adminis-
tering the territory of Rwanda, in addition to the forty-
three Europeans attached to the vice governor general's
staff at Bujumbura. There were, however, only twenty-three
agricultural personnel, including two agricultural special-
ists with the governor's staff, responsible to the whole

mandate.47

In the 1935-36 campaign fifty-eight Europeans
administered Rwanda, but there were only fifteen agricul-
tural personnel for both territories. Thus officials had
little choice but to entrust a greater share of the respon-
sibility for coffee cultivation to their African cadre. As
a result, training African monitors was a vital increment
in the whole development strategy, despite the administra-
tions reluctance to entrust them with the responsibility
for this delicate project. During the late 19303, African

monitors for both Rwanda and Burundi numbered over 500.48

181

The Belgians also instituted guidelines to regulate
the processing and sale of African coffee. According to
the draft decree, henceforth coffee would be purchased only
by those with a special licence, just as processing would
require a separate permit. Theoretically, every processor
had the right to purchase African coffee in the mandate,
but, the government reserved the right to establish a mini-
mum purchasing price to protect Africans from unscrupulous

mill owners.49

In 1933, the government formulated the cri-
teria for determining how the minimum price for coffee
would be established. The formula for a minimum price
would consider market fluctuations, the conditions of pro-
cessing mills, machine parts, and production difficulties
and it would also be based on one-third of the average val-
ue of the market price at Anvers. The minimum quotation
would apply only to the freshly picked cerise rather than
processed green beans.50
With the exception of the purchasing licence and the
minimum purchasing price, the commercialization of coffee
was otherwise free. As the government believed Africans
would sell poorly processed beans, it instituted quality

controls,51

just as it had issued Ordinance No. 90/A.E. of
November 21, 1931, to distinguish white-produced coffee
from black. The ordinance outlined the packaging and label-

ing procedure for coffee exported from the Belgian Congo,

Burundi, and Rwanda. Coffee had to be placed in sacks of

182

a particular dimension and marked in large letters of no
less than five centimeters high with the following informa-
tion: name or mark of the planter, plantation, company, or
the commercial expeditor of African coffee; "IND" to indi-
cate African brands of coffee; and finally the name of the
province. The ordinance did not apply to re-exported

52 but labeling coffee in this manner was obviously

coffee,
designed to placate the unfounded fears of planters who
voiced opposition to African coffee cultivation and who be-
lieved the African product would lower market value. How-
ever, the government efforts did not stifle European oppo-
sition.

By the end of the first quarter of 1933, 1,900,000
plants had been distributed, and by the end of the year 1.5
million had survived. In March and April new nurseries
were established, and some six million seeds were sown, but
many did not germinate, because sowing had occurred too
late. Plants that were quite small at the beginning of the
dry season develOped slowly, so in November and December,
only 400,000 plants were placed in production.53 However,
in the nurseries established in October, more than 10 mil-
lion seedlings were planted. Germination was perfect, and
the officials expected that at least 2.5 million coffee
trees would be planted during the 1934-35 agricultural

54

season.

While the administration expanded coffee productions

183

to generate foreign reserves, it sought to minimize the
financial drain on its own treasury, in order to save money.
"Colored" clerks and assistants replaced European personnel
in the administration for a savings of one million francs.
Reductions to European staff continued as ten European civ-
il service posts were eliminated in 1934. Subsidies to re-
ligious missions and European agricultural concerns were

readjusted,55

and a new policy of collaboration with Euro-
pean enterprises and investors was devised. On the other
hand, the administration claimed it had not reduced expen-
ditures for essential services to blacks, such as medical
care, disease eradication, and technical equipment for the
coffee campaign.56
Nor did depressed conditions thwart the administra-
tion's development plans in the mandate or its optimism.
Rather, officials concentrated on selected develOpment pro—
jects and the completion of existing ones. Construction
of the road from Ruhengeri to Kabale in Uganda was still
in progress, and the administration anticipated the road

57 But a number of

would be open to traffic by April 1935.
other public work projects were abandoned or severely cur-
tailed. Consequently the number of Africans employed by
the government declined, but there was an almost simulta-
neous increase in African employment at missions and mining

companies. Churches needed African labor because they had

extended Operations--the Church Missionary Society at

184

Shyira and the White Fathers at Rwamagana.58 Mines which
had increased production in 1935 needed large amounts of
labor, especially the following European firms--Somuki in
Kigali, Minetain in Kisenyi, and auriferous mines in the
territories of Biumba, Butare, and Muhinga.59
Officials also noted that while contract labor was

declining, day labor registered steady increases.60 The
elimination of contract labor reflected the unhealthy state
of European industrial and commercial enterprises. Savings
could be made by hiring day laborers. Salaries also de-
clined, and as Table VIII indicates, the wages of all cate-
gories of workers were affected in 1933. In addition to
the pay-scales shown in Table VIII, mining companies paid
day workers l.SOBF per day; missions paid the same workers
.75BF to 2.00BF. Protanag, on the other hand, success-
fully generalized the piecework method, and instituted the
following salary scale in 1933: ground clearing, 2.1lBF
per day; wood cutting, 1.58BF per day; surveying, 1.7.BF;
laborers, 2.40BF per day; spotting, 2.62BF; and planting,

1.4GBF.61

But despite low African wages the administration
was extremely optimistic because of the increased mining
activities.

A new cassiterite mine opened in 1934 in Kibuye Terri-
tory, and the latter supplied workers for the Katumba mine

in Neighboring Kisenyi. Between 1200 to 1500 porters were

required to transport Katumba's cassiterite to the port at

185

Table VIII. Salaried Employment in 1933.

 

 

Kinds of Work Salary Scale
(francs)

 

Laborers and

Agricultural Workers 1 per day
Masons 6 to 8 per day
Carpenters 6 to 8 per day
Blacksmiths 6 to 8 per day
Painters 5 to 7 per day
Chauffeurs 100 to 400 per month
Clerks 75 to 300 per month
Typists 200 to 800 per month
Cooks 75 to 200 per month
Servants 50 to 150 per month
Roadmen 40 to 100 per month
Capitas-vendeurs 25 to 100 per month

 

SOURCE: Rapport presenteypar 1e Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Societe des Nations au sujet de l'Administra—
tion du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Annee 1933 (Brussels,
1934), p. 123.

 

 

186

Kibuye.62 By 1934, Kigali had become the most important
mining center in the country, employing 1,800 Africans,
4,000 by the end of 1935, and 6,000 workers in 1936.63
Mining and the success of the coffee campaign were causes
for additional optimism, and they might compensate for the
collapse of prices on the world market.

The government believed that African coffee plants
were generally well maintained. It noted that those plant-
ed on slopes, terraces, or supported by hedges of legumin-
ous plants prevented erosion. ‘Also African monitors tra-
veled extensively throughout the country providing assis-
tance and inspecting fructifications. Officials also re-
marked that Africans were beginning to understand the bene-
fits of growing coffee, but that African production wasn't
equivalent to the number of trees planted,64 since young
coffee trees planted during the 1931-32 campaign had been
deflowered in order to prevent the spread of dis pagk; and
since the peasant cultivator needed to learn proper pro-

65 Officials failed to mention that

duction techniques.
Africans faced formidable obstacles; that it was extremely
difficult to cultivate young plants on rugged terrain, in
varying altitude zones, and on a variety of soil types,
and that the government's personnel were either ill-suited
and often ill-prepared to provide competent assistance to

African coffee farmers.

However, the view from the metropole was as optimistic

187

as that from officials in the colony. For example an
article appearing in Courrier d'Afrique, and reprinted in

Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge in 1935, reported

 

that the presence of the Agriculture Service had improved
coffee production and prevented the development of dis-
eases; nor had the presence of Europeans impeded African

coffee growing.66 In a later piece, Agriculture et

 

Elevage au Congo Belgp was equally complimentary about the

 

government's efforts, though not entirely convinced that
the campaign would work, because the government had forced
EurOpean interests out of Arabica coffee production*. Also
officials had rejected all offers of assistance from firms
wanting to provide Africans with selected plants, assis-
tance and supervision. While the experiment was both bold
and daring, the article also noted that it was still too
soon to draw definitive conclusions. This was obviously a
lukewarm endorsement, despite what it had acknowledged as
"encouraging production figures."

As of January 1, 1934, 1,317 hectares of coffee or 8
percent of the total crop area of both territories was in
production, compared to 878 hectares a year earlier. The
article, while noting that this was an impressive begin-
ning, remarked that production might prove to be insignifi-

cant in the end. The real issue, however, was not African

 

*
See Chapter VII.

188

production, because officials had the cooperation of the
notables, who enforced quotas and the Agriculture Depart-
ment, which conducted periodic inspections of African
fields. The final proof would be the product, which would
be harvested in two to three years. Only then would "we"
know if the planting had been perfect and the plants prop-
erly cared for.67
According to the article, coffee was a delicate crop
which demanded extreme care. The slightest neglect would
prove fatal, and improper maintenance could become a source
of infection for every plant in the region, since mildew
from the genre hemileia vastatrix--the most potent larva
enemy of the coffee plant--spread quite quickly. Conse-
quently the experiment should not have been implemented
without collaboration with European companies. The latter
could have supplied enough white agents to monitor African
planters and "compel" them to maintain their trees in sat-
isfactory condition. The government lacked sufficient
personnel to oversee this phase of African coffee produc-
tion. And even if the coffee was free of disease, there
would still be the problem of harvesting and processing.68
The article was obviously an attack on the government,
and it supported the European planter interests. There
were, to be sure, obvious weaknesses in the government's

coffee campaign, but neglect to the point of precipitating

an outbreak of die back or hemileia vastatrix was not one

189

of them. The administration was extremely conscious of
planter opposition, and it took pains to prevent the spread
of disease. During the 1931-32 campaign young coffee trees
were deflorated in order to prevent the spread of dip pagk.69
The article's belief that the harvesting and proces-
sing of coffee beans would create problems for Africans was
more on the mark, but it was easily rectified with time and
experience. Coffee berries-must be gathered as soon as
they mature, as premature harvest or delay cause the beans
to lose much of their quality.‘ Since beans do not all ma-
ture at the same time, trees require constant inspection.
The article questioned whether Africans were capable of
providing this kind of care and surveillance. Most African
farmers, it asserted, would be content "just" to send their
wives or children to the fields, several times, to make a
clean sweep of the berries without regard to maturity.70
Then there was the problem of processing the beans,
either by the dry or wet method. In the former process,
extreme care had to be taken not to break the berries; in
the wet procedure, one had to determine when fermentation
has taken place. The article expressed reservations about
the Africans' ability to manage these procedures, noting
that the experiment in Uganda had in recent years in-
spired these reservations. The 1934 coffee crop had been

of inferior quality. Although the article acknowledged

the government's attempts at quality control, it expressed

190

the belief that closer collaboration between European com-
panies and African coffee farmers would serve as a far

71 Given the magnitude of the

better control mechanism.
Belgian coffee campaign, the economic crisis which affec-
ted technical requirements, the wide range of soil types
and climate where coffee plants were distributed, and the
Africans' unfamiliarity with the crop, it was amazing that
the end product did not generate even harsher criticism.
The reservations about processing procedures were the kind
that good farmers would easily resolve, provided coffee was
profitable.

As far as the government was concerned, the only real
issue remaining was protecting African growers from Asian
traders, who it charged with depreciating the real value of
the product. Moreover, the Asians lacked suitable proces-
sing facilities and tended to mix ungraded coffee. There-
fore, officials called for vigilance against exporters of

72

bad coffees. But in some ways both the administration

and Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge missed the point

 

entirely. In 1935, Arabica coffee from Belgian Africa just
was not selling at Anvers., In fact, very little activity
was taking place with either arabica or robusta. Buyers
disregarded both varieties in the face of consumer
disinterest?3

But in terms of African production, the coffee cam-

paign was an unqualified success. Officials could boast

191

that 15,422,000 coffee trees had been planted in both ter-
ritories by 1935. The official report to the League of

Nations noted that coffee enabled Africans to earn enough
money to pay taxes and to buy necessities without leaving

74 Table IX shows that in 1932, Afri—

the country to work.
can taxes accounted for 71 percent of total government re-
ceipts, and as the tax tables in Appendix IV reveal, this
percentage remained fairly constant throughout the 19303.
The Belgian representative to the League of Nations,

Mr. Halewyck de Heusch also told Permanent Commission of the
mandates that no distinction was made between coffee coming
from African and European planters on the foreign market.
Evidently, he was unaware of Ordinance No. 90/A.E., passed
in 1931 and implemented on 1 January 1935, which required
that the provenance of coffee, whether European and African,
be printed on all bags before exportation. Mr. de Heusch
told the Permanent Commission that the costs were much
higher for EurOpean producers than for Africans, and that
this was a major factor in the administration's decision to

discourage European operations.75

This was an unusually
frank admission that government policy was to limit Euro-
pean participation in coffee production, particularly when
it was difficult for white planters to receive a clear
statement on the same issue from Brussels.

By the 1936-37 campaign all the kinks in the program

were ironed out. However, the administration was still

192

Table IX. The Principal Tax Receipts in 1932 (in francs)

 

 

 

Tax Receipts
African head tax 11,000,000
Polygamy tax 550,000
Cattle tax 2,900,000
Income tax 1,300,000
Personal rates

and taxes 621,000
Custom receipts 3,500,000

 

Source: Swan, Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo
and the Territories of Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933,
p. 65.

 

concerned with saving man-hours and transportation time,
and generally with reducing work to a minimum, especially
in all public work projects associated with the coffee

76

campaign. In the interest of efficiency, a new procedure

was introduced with respect to the creation and location of

77 One to two malt-houses or hot bed nurseries

nurseries.
were established in each chieftaincy. Seedlings or plants
were placed in each hot bed, a slight distance apart, or
250 seedlings per square meter, in order to save space
(approximately 60 percent). When this phase was completed,
each taxpayer was required to build a 2.5 to 3 meters long

and 1.5 meters wide flower bed alongside of his homestead

(rugo). Once the flower bed was built, farmers were

193

required to take and transplant a hundred young plants from
the administration's new nurseries. Officials believed
that with the creation of these individual nurseries, Afri-
cans would pay more attention to maintenance, and monitors
would pay more attention to instructing farmers on the most
rational way to plant their coffee. By the end of the 1936
campaign 8.5 million coffee trees had been planted in Rwanda
(see Table X). African production, it was noted, achieved
good or excellent results, and Africans received 2.50 to
3.50BF per kilo. The same source also remarked that the
campaign was drawing to a close, since regions were becom-

78 By the final year of the campaign 75 per-

cent of all taxpayers had at least 60 coffee trees.79 By

ing saturated.

the end of December 1937, some 21 million coffee trees had
been distributed in the following categories: 500,000 to
notables, 700,000 to Batutsi sub-chiefs, and 19,000,000 to
individual Bahutu taxpayers. Approximately50,000 to
60,000 Rwandan planters participated in the campaigns.80
The administration also continued its efforts to shift
the burden of developing the country to the African peas-
antry, despite signs of economic recovery. In 1937, offi-
cials established an African Savings Fund (les caisses des
trésorerie), which had all the features of forced savings
and seemed to be a veiled supplementary tax for develop-

ment projects. Each able-bodied adult male was required

to pay an assessment of two francs; additional monies came

Table X. The Total Number of Coffee Trees Planted During
the Campaigns.

 

 

 

Campaigns Rwanda Burundi Total
Prior to 1931 447,000 110,000 557,000
1931-1932 414,000 156,000 570,000
1932-1933 930,000 850,000 1,780.000
1933-1934* 801,000 884,000 1,685,000
1933-1934** 2,000,000 3,100.000 5,100,000
1934-1935 3,430,000 2,300,000 5,730,000
1935-1936 478,000 797,000 1,275,000
1936-1937 2,150,000 2,233,000 4,383,000
1937-1938 524,000 476,000 1,000,000

 

SOURCE: Rapport presenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Adminis-
tration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1935 (Brussels,
1936). p. 134. For the years prior to 1931 to the 1934-
1935 campaign.

1935-1936 campaign. "Varietés: les Plantations
Indigenes de Café'au Ruanda-Urundi." Agricglture et

Elevage au Congo Belge, Dixiéme Annee, No. 7 (July, 1936),
p. 110.

 

 

 

1936-1937 campaign. Rapport presenté'par le
Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Socigté'des Nations
pp sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant
l"Année 1937 (Brussels, 1938). p. 141

1937-1938 campaign. Rapportpresentéipar 1e
Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au
sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'AnfiEe

1938. (Brussels, 1939), p. 149.

 

 

 

 

*
**The f1rst campaign.
The second campalgn.

195

from the costs of legal proceedings before the African
tribunal. Africans could not use the fund to make personal
loans but could only make deposits and withdrawals. The
government, however, could use the fund for expenditures
related to internal administration and economic development

81 The fund and the dispro-

projects in African districts.
portionate taxation of Africans generally prompted the
League of Nations to complain about the disparities in
taxes between Europeans and Africans, noting that those
paid by Europeans had not increased in the same proportion.
The Belgian response was a characteristic understatement,
that the growth of tax revenues from Europeans "must neces-
sarily be slower." European companies, it explained dis-
tributed their dividends a year after profits were report-
ed. Thus, the prosperity of 1936 was actually registered
in 1937 when companies paid taxes for the preceding year.82
Nothing was said about low level of European taxation, nor
did the League receive any promise that African taxation
would be moderated. Actually, African taxes increased pro-
gressively during the Second World War (see Appendix IV).
When the League of Nations collapsed, officials felt
even more confident about charging Rwandans for the privi-
lege of creating an infrastructure designed to take
"things" out of the country. During World War II, offi-

cials established Caisses du Pays. While portions of the

head and supplementary taxes were allotted to the Caisses

196

du Pays, taxes on cattle injections, receipts from the
mwami's fund and the territorial tribunals, disciplinary
fines, imposed by Batutsi notables, profits from loans made
by Caisses du Pays, gifts and subsidies from the government
were also deposited. Expenditures for general administra-
tion, construction, and improvements and extensions of lo-
cal roads were paid from Caisses du Pays, while the supple-
mentary funds paid the salaries of personnel in the Agri-
culture Department, purchased material like pyrethrum,
subsidized medical units, the Karuzi farm, and pig breeding
operations.83
The additional funds may have been instituted to com-
pensate for the absence of European investment, which was
minimal in the best of times, but almost non-existent be-
cause of the German occupation of Belgium. Or they might
have reflected the growth of African income; more likely
they stemmed from the needs of a government forced to rely
entirely upon its own budgetary resources. With the war,
the colony could no longer count upon regular subsidies
from a government in exile. Rather than allow the war to
complicate development, the administration simply expanded
the African tax base. In fact, the government's self-reli-
ance did not begin with the war, but rather had its ante-
cedents in the depression, when the metropole indirectly
directed its overseas cadre to solve its own problems. In

other words, local Belgian officials were responsible for

197

the colony's solvency.

By the beginning of World War II, the colonial state
completely dominated the economy. It exerted rigorous con-
trol over the limited economic surplus and the traditional
system. And since ownership of the means of production was
invested in the state, control over the utilization of sur-
plus (actually labor) was also concentrated there, through
employment Opportunities with the state and the production
of an agricultural surplus which the state transferred to
the capitalist centers in the form of cash crops or coffee
production. By maintaining an artificially low level of
wages, the state also created the conditions for the con-
tinued growth of an economic surplus, which could be con-
tributed to finance the accumulation of capital (in Rwanda's
case foreign exchange earnings and African taxes). Compul-
sory cultivation of coffee and other cash crops proved to
be a powerful means of expanding production, and low wage
levels promoted the growth of economic surplus, which when
exported overseas gained valuable foreign exchange. But
compulsion rather than free market agricultural production
by Africans permitted the retention of low prices and en-
sured supplies where the European economy most need them--
overseas and on Rwanda's peripheries. It also acted as a
regulator for controlling the prices paid to the producer.

Compulsory cultivation was also a powerful means for

providing taxation to finance development requirements.

198

The head and supplementary taxes were linked to the growth
of African income. Also increases in purchase prices en-
larged the fiscal base during a period of increasing expen-
ditures when officials were obliged to rely entirely on its
own budgetary resources, especially taxes on Africans.

Thus the system of mandatory crops, the monopoly of the
transformation of agricultural goods, and fixing of minimum
prices (in practice the real prices paid) for the marketing
of industrial products were combined with dp'iagpp monopoly
of the purchase of agricultural goods. The depression,
therefore, gave the State unparalleled importance in the
planning and control of the economy. The colonial govern-
ment was fOrced to rescue the capitalist economy and its
various interests or risk making colonialism appear un-
profitable to the metropole. In the course of this rescue
operation the burden of the depression was placed squarely
upon the non-capitalist African economy, i.e., upon Afri-

can agriculture, which was sheer exploitation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge au Ruanda-
Urundi pendant l'Annee 1923," Congo, I (January-May, 1924),
p. 754.

2Ibid., p. 755. Chambre des Representants. Session
de 1923-24. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-
Urundi presenté'aux Chambres (1924), p. 16.

3Chambre des Representants. Session de 1923-24.
Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pre-
ssnfélaux_shambres (1924). p. 35-

4Ibid.

 

 

5Ministere de Colonies. MinistBre du Congo Belge et
du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté'for 1e Gouvernement
Belge au Conseil de la Socigté des Nations au sujet de
l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1925
(Brussels, 1926), p. 97.

6J. De Ryckman de Betz, "La mise en valeur du Ruanda—
Urugdi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Quatriéme
Annee, No. 8 (April 19, 1930), p. 121.

7Rapport 1928, p. 61. Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evo-
lution du Commerce au Rwanda du dernier quart du XIX’Eme
siecle a 1950," (Memoire de Licence, Louvain, 1974), p. 95.
Compulsory cultivation, conceived and elaborated by Edmund
LePlae during the Ministry of Jules Renkin, was modeled on
imperial rule in the Netherland's possessions. It sought
to ensure African farmers of a monetary income for tax pay-
ments. Bogumil Jewsiewicki. "Notes sur l'Histoire Socio-
Economique du Congo," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, III
(1927). P. 225. Rapport 1928, p. 61.

 

8Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
p. 98.

9CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941. Rapport Annuel [N.D.]. DéVeloppement Moral et
Social des Indigénes. 3 E'Partie: Protection du Travail.

199

200

1onanda and Burundi exported 21 tons of coffee in
1926. Growers received 13.50BF per kilo at the coffee
market at Bujumbura. Five tons of the over-all production
was shipped to the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika territory
received sixteen tons. Rapport 1926, pp. 100 and 105.

11

 

Rapport 1927, p. 74.

 

12The Lusungu agricultural station was also responsi-
ble for seri culture, and the station was directed by a
European agronomical engineer. One hundred Africans were
employed on six-month contracts, to maintain the station's
fifteen hectares of soja, tobacco, grapefruit, grains,
black wattle, mulberry plants, and jutes. Rapport 1926,
p. 81 and Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
p. 85.

13Rubona possessed one of the two experimental accli-
mation stations in the mandate territory; the second sta-
tion was located at Ndendezi in Burundi. However, the
latter was closed in 1929, because officials believed the
area was not suitable for experimental farming. But be-
cause the station had successfully cultivated 7,000 quin-
quina plants, the Agriculture Service continued to maintain
these plants. Rapport‘1926, p. 81; Ruzendana, "L'Evolution
du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 85; and Rapport 1929, p. 68.

 

14Rapport 1935, p. 115.

15The station maintained coffee nurseries and dis-
tributed coffee seeds and saplings for reforestation.
Rapport 1927, p. 89.

 

leRappgrt 1222, 94 and Georges Van Der Kerken, La Crise
Economique en Afrique Belge: Situation Actuelle et Per-
§pective d'Anenir (Brussels, 1931), p. 39.

17Rapport 1929, p. 91.

18CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. .J. M. Derscheid Collec-
tion. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport en reponse au ques-
tionnaire par le Gouverneur (1929), p. 47.

19Rapport 1929, p. 91.

zoRuzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda,"
pp. 98-99.

21Raymond Brock, "Le Café'Arabica et le Kivu," Agri-
culture et Elevage au Congo Belge IX, 1 (January, 1935),
pp. 1-2.

 

201

22Albert Gille, "Les Cultures IndigEnes de Cafe en
Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge VIII,
(2 February 1934), pp. 22-23.

23Edmund Leplae, "Les Plantations de Cafe au Congo
Belge au Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-1935), leur
Importance," Institut Royal Colonial Belge mémoire 8,
III (1936), pp. 219-220.

24Rapport 1924, pp. 10-12 and Rapport 1925, p. 83.

 

25
p. 220.
26

LePlae, "Les Plantations de Cafe au Congo Belge,"

Ibid 0

27Rapport 1930, p. 107.

 

28G. Molitor, "L' Introduction et le Developpement de
la Culture du Cafeier (Arabica) chez les Indigenes du
Ruanda-Urundi," Le Materiel Colonial A. S. B. L., 27° Annee,
No. 6 (March, 1937), p. 163.

29"Le Culture de Cafeier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congp Belge, Huitieme Annee,
No. 1 (January, 1934), p. 13.

30Edmund LePlae, "Les Plantations de Cafe au Congo
Belge," p. 220. Also the State's agronomists were young
men with very little training. J. DeRyckman de Betz, a
representative of the Syndicate Agricole des Cafés du Kivu,
recommended that trained personnel from the Netherlands
or Britain be brought to the colony, as was done in the
Kivu by Saak. J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur
du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
Quatriéme Annee, No. 4 (February 22, 1930), 52, and
J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur du Ruanda-Urundi,"
p. 122.

31

 

"Cafeier Arabica du Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

32MinistEre des Colonies. Ministere du Congo Belge
et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presente par 1e Gouvernement
Belge au Conseil de la des Nations au sujet de l' Adminis-
tration du Ruanda-Urundiypendant l'Annee 1932, (Brussels,
1933), p. 113.

33Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Developpement,"
pp. 166-7.

34"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda—Urundi," p. 13.

202

35
p. 167.
36

Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Developpement",

Ibid.

37“Cafeier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

38Belgium received 59,229 kilos of coffee, valued at
280,396,BF; France, 100 kilos at 47SBF; Tanzanyika Terri-
tory, 4,034 kilos at 25,381BF; Uganda, 1484 kilos at
14,844BF; and Zanzibar, 300 kilos at 1,200BF; Rapport
1931, p. 130.

39"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

4olgig-7 Rapport 1932, p. 113.

41"Cafeier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

42Rapport 1933, p. 145.

 

43Rapport 1934, p. 69.

 

44Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Developpement,"
pp. 167-68.

45The method of planting was extremely hazardous, es-
pecially in areas of irregular and dry climate in the
central and eastern regions of Rwanda. Ibid., pp. 168-

46Ibid., pp. 169-170.

47Rapport 1933, p. 145.

 

48Between 1931 and 1938 an average of 65.8 Europeans
served in the Rwandan administration and in the same period
Europeans in the Agricultural Service ranged between 10 and
23 for both territories. Rapport 1931, p. 15; Rapport 1932,
pp. 18 and 20; Rapport 1933,1pp.23 and 26; Rapport 1934,
p. 26; Rapport 1935, pp. 29 and 32; "Territoire sous Mandat,"
Congo I (Jan.-May, 1937), p. 187; Rapport 1936, pp. 21-22
and 24; "Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1938),
p. 225; Rapport 1937, pp. 26-7 and 119; "Territoire sous
Mandat," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1939) p. 101; Rapport 1938,
pp. 25-26, 28, and 128-29.

49

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rapport 1933, p. 145.

 

203

50"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour
le Séance du jeudi 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage
au Congo Belge, Septiéme Annee, No. 6 (May, 1933), p. 65.

51

 

 

Rapport 1933, p. 145.

 

52Rapport 1934, p. 263.

 

53Rapport 1933, p. 145.

 

54Ibid., p. 146.

55Rapport 1934, pp. 33-34.

 

56Ibid.

57Ibid.

58Rapport 1933, p. 122.

 

591hid.

601bid.

61Rapport 1935, p. 123.

 

62Ibid., p. 71.

63Cafe’ier par les indigEnes du Ruanda-Urundi," p. 23

64Ibid.

65Ibid.

66"Variétés," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
Neuvidme Annee, No. 4 (April, 1935), p. 61. This notice
also confirmed that Rwandan coffee initially sold on the
market was often of inferior quality and "presented badly."
But after the institutions of controls on exported coffee,
these problems were eliminated and the quality improved
greatly.

67"La Politique du Cafe dans les Territoires sous
Mandat,";griculture et-Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviBme
Annee, No. 8 (August, 1935), pp. 123-34.

68Ibid., p. 124.

69Rapport 1933, p. 122.

 

204

70"La Politique du Cafe dans les Territoires sous
Mandat," p. 124.

711bid.

72"Declarations de M. Le Gouverneur General Ryckmans,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvieme Annee,
No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

73C. J. Alloncius, "Le Marché du Café'a Anvers,
12 Novembre 1935, "Rapport de la Banque Belge d' Afrique,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvieme Annee,
No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

74"Declarations de M. le Gouverneur Géhéral Ryckmans,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviEme Annee,
No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

75"La Culture du Cafeier par les IndigEnes du Ruanda-
Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Dixieme
Annee, No. 3 (March, 1935), p. 34.

76
p. 171.

77Additional quality controls were also instituted in
1937 by the Service de l'Agriculture for coffee exported
abroad. Also an Ordonnance 101, issued in 1937, prohibited
the shipment of green coffee beans containing excess mois-
ture. On March 16, 1937, the Governor General's Ordinance
No. 34/A.E. was passed. It established standards for
quality control and the packaging of exported unripe cof-
fee. Article II prohibited the exportation of the follow-
ing kinds of coffees: unripe, musty coffees; unripe cof-
fees containing rotten beans and possessing a nauseous
odor; unripe coffees with more than 2 percent foreign
materials; and unripe coffee with more than 10 percent
black beans. Article III authorized the export of unripe
coffees with more than 6 percent broken beans, and pro-
vided that the coffee sack carried the notation "brisures"
in capital letters at least 5 centimeters high. The lat-
ter were governmental responses to European opposition to
African coffee. Rapport 1939, pp. 141 and 215-216.

78"Variétés: les Plantations Indigénes de Café’au
Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
DixiEme Annee, No. 7 (July, 1936), p. 110.

79
p. 172.

 

 

 

 

Molitor, "L'Introduction et le D5veloppement,"

 

 

 

Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Developpement,"

205

80Rapport 1937, p. 141. "Superficie des Plantations
de Caféiers au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi," Agricul-
ture et Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviEme Année, No. 1
(January, 1935), p. 12.

81Rapport 1937, p. 71.

82Ibid., p. 57

83Ministére des Colonies, MinistEre du Congo Belge et
du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du
Ruanda-Urundi pendant les Années 1939-1944 (Brussels,
1947), p. 35.

 

CHAPTER SIX

EXPLOITATION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

.Rwandans responded to colonial rule as did other Afri-
cans. Batutsi Opposed colonial penetration and consolida-
tion. During the imperial phase both Batutsi and Bahutu
rebelled against Belgian hegemony. Even during the depres-
sion, there were instances of Rwandan noncompliance with
Belgian rule. In 1930 chiefs in Kisenyi refused to follow
orders and to participate in the economic development of
the region.1 The following year the Deputy at Gitebe in-
formed the Resident at Kigali that Bahutu in the region
north of Budaha had refused to help repair the administra-
tive office in the district of Kibuye, and, he reported
that tax collection was proceeding with difficulty.2 His
comments portended the disturbance which occurred in 1932,
when Bahutu in northern Rwanda led a tax revolt to protest
their treatment at the hands of Batutsi tax collectors.3
Before the revolt was crushed by Batutsi forces, twenty
Bahutu protestors had fought a pitched battle with an equal
number of Batutsi combatants, six households had been burn—
ed to the ground, and several head of livestock, some food,

and personal affects had been confiscated.4 In 1935,

206

207

another tax incident occurred at Kabaya in Kisenyi terri-
tory, where military forces occupied the area for non-
payment of taxes.5

That same year and during the month of March, some
300 to 400 highlanders (Bahutu from Ruhengeri most likely),
led by an old clan elder, unexpectedly presented themselves
before a dispensary in Nyanza Territory (on the Central
Plateau) and refused vaccination, charging that the Batutsi
had poisoned the vaccine. They invaded the compound and
held some Batutsi prisoners until they had an audience with
the mpami, who was able to calm them and secure the release
of the prisoners. The next day, the police occupied the
compound and arrested the demonstrators.6 Obviously, they
were protesting Batutsi over-rule and European intrusion
into their lives.

The boldness of the northerners was expected, for they
had a reputation for independance and daring and for re-
sisting both Batutsi and Belgian consolidation. But the
episode must have been an unusual spectacle for the perma-
nent denizens of Nyanza, where calm and caution were expec-
ted modes of behavior. One could expect incidents to occur
in the north, on the periphery of the country, where Batu-
tsi concentration and administrative presence were minimal.
On the other hand, little or no resistance, or for that
matter, response came from the Bahutu coffee planters in

the central area, and especially from those living in

208

Butare Territory for fear of reprisals. While those inter-
viewed expressed grievances against the Batutsi and the
Belgians, and admitted that social tension existed on the
hill between Batutsi and Bahutu, their responses also dem-
onstrated that they did not act upon these feelings or
tensions, for fear of annihilation or harsher punishment.
Fear kept some Rwandans subservient.

Prior to the colonial period, Rwandans were differen-
tiated by economic functions--the Bahutu as agricultural-
ists and the Batutsi as pastorialists. During the imperi-
alist phase, a new division was superimposed, so that by
the 19303 a capitalist and pre-capitalistic economy existed
together. Western ideas and cash crop production accentua-
ted existing differences. Clientship and corvee obliga-
tions denoted class inferiority and extended social dis-
tance. The Bahutu and Batusi communities were further
fractured by relations of domination and exploitation, and
ethnic cleavages.

The incident involving northern Bahutu at the dispen-
sory, however, suggest that the concepts of class and class
consciousness varied throughout Rwanda. Because northern-
ers did not have the same closeness and duration of contact
with the Batutsi as the Bahutu of central Rwanda, they were
substantially different in the way they perceived them-
selves and the Batutsi. The northerners had greater clan

solidarity, more cultural pride, and a deeper attachment to

209

their political institutions. But more important, heritage
of messianic activity resulting from the imposition of both
Batutsi and European over-rule gave the northern Bahutu a
greater sense of class consciousness. Also early in the
nineteenth century, northern Rwanda had been the birthplace

7 The latter solid-

of the spirit-possession Nyabingi cult.
ified class consciousness and produced a tradition of pro-
test in northern region.

Nyabingi, meaning one who possesses great riches, is
believed to have been the title of a murdered Queen of
Karaqwe who reigned in the eighteenth century. According
to one tradition, the Nyabingi sect served as the vehiCle
through which the queen's spirit enacted vengeance upon her
murderers and other disloyal subjects. Consequently, the
Nyabingi evOlved into a magico-religious sect acting pri-
marily as a protecting authority against the Batutsi and
Europeans for its devotees. A British authority and colo-
nial civil servant with firsthand knowledge of the sect re-
ported that one outstanding feature of the cult's methods
was the alleged power of self-transformation of personality
and appearance exercised by its individual priests.8 The
cult's rapid develOpment in northern Rwanda was closely re-
lated to the expansionist drive of mpami Rwabugiri in the
late-nineteenth century. Later the Nyabingi added opposi-

tion against established authority, and in particular

against Batutsi to its magico-religious trappings.9 The

210

cult also provided various political fugitives from the
court of mpgmi Musinga with an organizational base against
the ruling dynasty. Muhumasa achieved political authority
in Ndorwa through the Nyabingi, and she also managed to
"bend to her will all but the most courageous and indepen—
dent characters among the northerners." It was also
through the Nyabingi that Ndungutse recruited his large
following at Kiga. Over time, the sect transferred much
of its hostility from Batutsi to Europeans, causing Brit-
ish, Belgian and German officials countless problems at
the outbreak of the First World War.10
The climate of messianic unrest experienced by the
northern population made them all the more receptive to
forms of protest against established authority. The con-
straints originating from the "external" forces of control
--Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs--were difficult to endure.
Something of a vicious cycle developed; the northern Bahutu
were from the outset psychologically conditioned to rebel
against the power of the chiefs, who, in turn, were given
greater freedom of repression than was ordinarily tolerat-
ed, which only invited further attempts at rebellion. The
stringency of chiefly rule under the mpami made rebellion
all the more probable, once any violence occurred.11 At
the same time, repression united the northern Bahutu into

effective action.

The Bahutu on the central plateau, in contrast, were

211

marginalized. They did not function as an integrated mass.
While they obviously attributed their plight to the "objec-
tive functioning of the system," they were inhibited from
effective action by feelings of inferiority. They may well
have believed that the Batutsi were more intelligent, re-
fined and courageous, and that Bahutu were dim-witted,

gross and cowardly. Thus the corollary proposition was

that Batutsi were born to rule and the Bahutu to be ruled.12
And because many of the Bahutu probably saw themselves
through the eyes of the Batutsi, they had little incentive
to compete with the overlords. Hence the attitude of sul-
len resignation and passive obedience. Still, they were
conscious of themselves as an oppressed class and recogniz-
ed the reality of their repression. But instead of chang-
ing this reality, they consciously accepted the roles

13 Nowhere

allotted to them, that is, their caste position.
is this sense of inferiority more prevalent than in the
actual words of the coffee planters interviewed in 1978.
Each of those interviewed had planted coffee in the
early 19303 and 19403, and most of them had planted about

fifty-four plants.14

In almost every instance, coffee also
occupied the smallest planting surface, with food crops,
manioc, and banana groves occupying larger plots. Most

of the informants believed that if coffee occupied a much
larger area, "they would die of hunger."15 Most were

plagued by the memory of recent famines and the scarcity

212

of land. As one planter put it,

it was very dangerous to cultivate just

coffee during this particular time; after

I received my property I planted coffee

on the smallest portion [plot], and

reserved the largest portion to food

crops.16
Only those planters willing to rent or to purchase land or
to become land-clients felt secure enough to increase cof-
fee acreage.17

Available land, either reclaimed marsh areas, aban-

doned fields or unoccupied lands, was secured from the hill
or local chief through leasing or from a Batutsi patron as

a land-client. Leasing (or ukwatisha) a field for crops

 

conferred permanent possession but not ownership, since the
land could not be sold to foreigners without the chief's
consent. However, the land could be exchanged with a
neighbor (ukugurara umulima) without the chief's permission.
Scheduled rental fees either commenced after the first or
second year of occupation, depending upon whether the land
conferred was virgin or developed. Payment could be made

in tools, produce, livestock, beer, or a few days of work.18
Where land was purchased, no compensation was made to the
hill chief, nor were rental fees paid to the previous land-
owner. However, if someone requested land but did not wish
to purchase it, he simply consented to or agreed to pay all
the rental fees to the chief or to the private individual
19

who granted him usufruct rights.

To become a land-client, a Muhutu entered into an

213

arrangement where he agreed to perform certain services
(some say for two years or more), either domestic or per-
sonal, for a Mututsi in exchange for the use of a parcel
of land. If the arrangement lasted or if one was able to
maintain his patron's "amitie," the Muhutu acquired perma-
nent ownership of the land. To seal the bargain, the cli-
ent offered the patron either some well-prepared pots of
beer, a portion of the harvest, or a cow, the gift depend-

20 However, fealty

ing on the size of the land involved.
in exchange for land was bothersome because "you had to do
everything he asked, go everywhere he wanted to go, and

21 The latter was extremely

give him pots of honey beer."
irksome, because honey beer required long preparation and
was reserved for special occasions.

Actual land purchases were quite common throughout
Rwanda, but were very rare among my poor informants. Be-
sides tax obligations, which were considerable (if one had

22 Planters used surplus in-

additional wives and cattle),
come to pay workers engaged in their fields, to purchase
clothing and food for the family members, livestock (includ-
ing cows) and farm implements, and to improve their homes.23
However, most of the informants agreed that even with addi-
tional land they would increase food crops and banana

groves (the latter being a more stable source of additional
income) in the same proportions as their original holdings.24

None specialized solely in coffee production: the risks

214

were much too great. Nor was there much incentive for
them to do so, since there were no farm loans for African
farmers or "commoners" despite the administration's insis-

25 Most of the farm-

tance that such funds were available.
ers interviewed had never heard of agricultural loans;
others maintained that only chiefs or "great men" had ac-

cess to them.26

Presumably the "greats" had more security
or assets than did peasant farmers. But of even greater
consequence was the allocation of labor and time, and the
unsavory aspects of compulsory cultivations: subsistence
farmers performed traditional obligations for the chiefs
and forced labor (akazi) for the administration.

For the most part, coffee did not require more time
than other crops. In cases where poor quality soils or
plot size required more time most planters said their ef-
forts were usually compensated at harvest time by the money
received for the crop. The more prosperous farmers praised
coffee highly, and they stressed that they did not neglect
their trees. Most devoted between one to two days per week
to care for them and spent the remainder of their time (or
with the assistance of family members in most instances)
tending to other cr0ps--their own and frequently those of
the Batutsi. One farmer maintained that while the initial
planting was time consuming (i.e., in weeding and mulch-
ing), if properly maintained coffee required less attention.

But a few, especially those with poor quality soil and

215

smaller family units, believed that the money received from
coffee was not commensurate with the amount of time and ef—
fort invested. Therefore, it was time which could be used
elsewhere. Another planter compared his planting duties to
a form of corvée labor, and because of it, fled the country
for Uganda.27 If one considers the added productive burden
imposed by the Belgian and the traditional chiefs, then the
monetary reward does not appear equitable. They were expec-
ted to perform various tasks for Batutsi patrons and for
Batutsi who were not patrons. ~These tasks took a surprising
amount of the farmer's time. Several farmers voiced the un-
justice of it, when they remarked that,

we worked in their coffee fields daily,

while we planted or tended to our own

coffee trees, only one or two days a

week. We also carried their litters,

often as far as Bujumbura [Burundi].28

The system was, indeed, unfair: chiefs and sub-chiefs

had the most extensive fields and the added advantage of

Bahutu labor.29

Naturally, social tensions and resentment
on the hills between Batutsi and Bahutu increased. Some
Bahutu begin to question traditional values, and the social
hierarchy, the traditional personal bonds, and the old pres-
tige were no longer accepted without question. In fact,

the masses of Bahutu began to discuss, criticize and, at

the same time, to demand reform and abolition of all in-

30

justices. Some even questioned the role of the mwami,

Because he no longer seemed supreme, especially in the

216

presence of whites, who tended to treat the mwami with

disrespect, at best, or as an equal.31

Irregardless of
emerging protest, the exactions inflected upon Bahutu were
extremely burdensome. The Batutsi oligarchy, as one chief
put it, "continue to suck the muscles from us,32 a prOper
assessment when you consider that farmers had their own
households and enclosures to maintain and to keep in repair.
A typical household or compound (rugo) required a tre-
mendous amount of productive effort to maintain as well.
Often built in the middle of a field, it consisted of one
or more houses, a granary, and perhaps a stable or an old
house used as a beermaking shed, all surrounded by an enclo-
sure made of a growing hedge. The typical productive house-
hold generally consisted of a nuclear family: father,
mother, and their offspring. But often among the children
could be found some of the father's brothers‘ children or
the children of a daughter or of a sister of the household
head for whom the bride's price had not been paid. Others
in the household might include parents and/or grandmother,
or even his wife's parents. The mother usually had her own
hut within the compound or nearby, as would the household
head's grown, but unmarried sons. A married man could also
have unmarried "brothers" and "sisters" in his compound.33
Women took care of the household in general and of the

children. In addition, they performed light duties in the

fields. The farmers built their own houses, granaries, and

217

enclosures and kept them in repair. Besides weaving large
storage baskets, they gathered the water and bunches of
bananas necessary for beermaking, and they made the beer.

34 and

Banyarwanda cared for the cattle, goats and sheep,
they tended their own fields. Frequently the farmer and
members of his family performed these same tasks for
Batutsi.

Proceeds from coffee did not compensate for the added
productive burden imposed by Belgian imperialists either.
Many of the informants associated Belgian rule with an in—
creased work load: "we grew their coffee, planted their

35 In 1944,

forests and built their roads without pay."
residents were also empowered to compel Banyarwanda occupy-
ing farm land or pasture land, to plant hedges and ditches,
as anti-erosion measures.36 Belgian rule reduced many Ban-
yarwanda to "l'etat de machine de travail." Many lamented
that "we wake up early in the morning working for them; we

37 But the most odor-

had very little time to do our work."
ous aspect of compulsory work was forced labor (akgpi), or
public work projects, which Bahutu described as "strenuous"
and "difficult."38
Rwandans were forced to work on roads (most informants
could recall the Kigali-Gitarama-Butare road project), re-
forestation and terracing, or they transported bricks for

the construction of administrative offices. One farmer re-

marked that each person had to transport 100 bricks in the

218

morning; "the sub-chiefs forced us to carry them."39

While they were not paid for their labor, they did receive

compensation:

they beat us and we were watched so

that we would not abandon these pro-
jects and leave the country. I went
there to protect my family. No one

could escape these projects. These

projects took place everywhere.4o

Physical punishment wasn't an exaggeration. All the infor-
mants emphasized this aspect of akazi. One farmer summar-
ized the feelings of quite a few when he remarked,

I trimmed anti-erosion hedges; I
planted for important Batutsi and
in tree plantations. These pro-
jects were directed by a chief or

a sub-chief. Everyone had his own
parcel and if an individual could
not do both he was severely beaten.
I performed these projects from my
youth until the day of independence
(1962).41

There were never any exceptions because akazi was the
law, and Rwandans believed Belgians had the power to enforce
it. In fact, no one dared to contest either the power of
the Belgians or Batutsi for fear of being harmed or beaten

42

unmercifully. Instead of protesting, "we did what we

were told, that way we had no trouble from the Belgians.43
But the fact is they had no choice but to comply since

"one either faced either the Belgians or the Batutsi," or
both. White administrators were the judges, and their de-

cisions were transmitted by chiefs who had daily contact

with the African farmers. Many informants maintained that

219

the Batutsi continued to humiliate them, despite the Bel-
gians and their reforms.44 Some even contended that the
Belgian presence only intensified the harshness of Batutsi
rule and enabled them to "posture."45
The Batutsi had a lot to lose if they did not comply
with administrative demands. They cultivated the best
lands, and they had access to an extremely large work force,
which helped them to increase their personal wealth. Under
Belgian law, they could command corvée labor, and they also
had access to prestations from land rentals. Food was the
most common form of payment, but they could also receive
honey, beer, hoes, hides and manufactured objects like mats
and baskets. They possessed large herds, which they could
distribute among their Batutsi and Bahutu retainers. Some
owned spacious homes constructed of grass, and by 1933,
others already lived in houses constructed of baked bricks
and covered with tiles. A few even owned automobiles and

motor bikes.46

Because of their position in the adminis-
tration (and even before the arrival of Europeans), most
Batutsi led a life without any anxieties from a material
standpoint. However, all of these advantages could be lost
if one were suddenly dismissed by the administration for
unsatisfactory performance. Consequently Batutsi chiefs
ran roughshod over the Bahutu to satisfy administrative

demands.

While there was never any violent opposition to coffee

220

planting or Belgian rule, some Bahutu emigrated rather than
accept compulsory cultivation. But flight could have ex-
treme consequences, for sometimes the lands of emigrants
could be confiscated by the chiefs. It must have been a
common practice, because in 1937, the administration per-
mitted emigrants to transfer or sale their fields to family
heads or clan members. These transfers or sells were re-
corded with the Provincial Tribunal, and the assignments
included fields used for both crops, pasture and coffee.
If, however, an African abandoned his fields without in-
forming his sub-chief or without selling or transferring
the land to another African, then the property could be
confiscated.47
While it cannot be determined how many Bahutu were
forced to leave because of difficulties, the general im-
pression is that the Belgians and the Batutsi cadre had the
country pretty much under control: those who refused to
plant coffee were punished severely;45 those who were un-
cooperative were either shunned or forced into exile by the

49 Other recalcitrants were chased

overseers or the chiefs.
from "their birthplace" if by chance they incurred ill-
feeling from whites or the chiefs. The same respondents
expressed the futility of his condition when he said:

. . . so you can see, there was no trouble

on the hill with respect to coffee.

Anyway people preferred to plant coffee
rather than do compulsory or akazi labor.50

221

An informant from Zivu hill in the sector of Shyanda

remarked that rebellion would have been suicide; rather

51

than plant coffee "some just left the country." But the

general feeling is that Rwandan farmers "were resigned"
(sommes resignes), and the Belgians were very much aware of
it. In much of their ethnographic literature and adminis-
trative reports submitted to the League of Nations, Belgians
characterized the Mahutu as a "docile" peasant "who was
stubborn and suspicious, taciturn and placid, but capable

of fierce obstinancy under the appearance of a passive res-

ignationl'52 As one farmer put it, "we were accustomed to

obeying orders, so we did not resist; we were accustomed to

53

doing things without much reasoning." Others were simply

afraid or perhaps just realistic:

How can you protest against someone
more powerful than you? The rulers
bring you whatever he wishes, makes
you do whatever he wants . . . ." We
didn't have the choice of agreeing or
not agreeing. We had not to judge,
but to obey their orders because they
were stronger than we.54

One planter admitted to destroying coffee and planting ban-
ana trees in retaliation for a severe beating. But he had
to take refuge in the Belgian Congo, and those who followed

his lead were also forced to flee to Burundi or to British

55

territories. Others blamed the chiefs and the mwami for

not exercising leadership or for collaborating; some, the

56

absence of weapons, fear or self-interest. But only one

222

of my informants seemed to have assessed the situation
properly:

The Belgians joined force with the

Batutsi, so we were powerless to

revolt. Besides we were accustomed

to forced labor and planting7coffee

was the same as all others.

Bahutu were certainly overburdened, even if wives,
children and family members helped to minimize the burden.
The majority of the informants had to augment their subsis-
tence with cash income from other sources in order to meet
basic family needs. Every effort was made to find addi-
tional income. The Banyarwanda needed money to pay the
administration's head tax, and if he had a second wife,
then he had to pay a polygamy tax. His tax burden in-
creased if he had cows, for which he had to pay a cattle
tax. Moreover, Rwandans might want cash to buy items from
the world markets which were substitutes for essentially
traditional goods, such as hoes, machetes, and clothing.
He needed money to buy items of secondary importance, such
as salt, soaps, European type beer, bicycles, or to pay
school fees, purchase kerosene and imported palm oil. Cof-
fee production alone rarely furnished sufficient money for
these cash expenditures. Therefore, many sold their labor
locally if they could or went abroad if they could not.
Those who remained at home took jobs with the administra-

tion, became teachers in mission schools, carpenters in the

building trades, or policemen for the chieftaincies.

223

Others traded food products or homemade utensils such as
mats or baskets. Many found employment with the agricul-
tural and medical services, or as road and mine workers,
the latter being the most preferred since such work gener-
ated a higher cash income than agricultural labor.58
Those who did not have money to pay taxes or were
unable to feed their families hired themselves out as day

59 Where no local

or contract workers in the urban centers.
Opportunities for work existed, a Banyarwanda exported his
labor. Those on the eastern border might go to Buhaya in
Tanganyika, or to Uganda, which, for some was easier of
access, although much further afield. Those closer to the
western border went to the Kivu to find work. However, the
majority of the informants either relied upon their child-
ren to earn additional money or resorted to selling food
crOps and livestock to supplement their income. Besides
beans and vegetables, the most common source of additional
income was bananas. Some claimed they earned between 200
and 1000 francs per month from the sale of bananas or ba-
nana beer.60
The Batutsi on the other hand, comprised two distinc-
tive types of elite, associated with different periods of
history. These elite categories included traditional and
non-traditional elements. The traditional elite were a

small number of chiefs and many more sub-chiefs, who were

almost totally lacking in education, but because of ties

224

to the traditional system did not lack wealth. In contrast,
the non-traditional elite were those who had received sub-
stantial western education and almost in consequence rela—
tive wealth. They were much younger than their traditional
counterparts. As a result, substantial differences of at-
itude prevailed among them, but ethnic composition strength-
ened their sense of solidarity and class consciousness, in
spite of the government's preference for the younger gener-
ation. From the early 19303 onwards, Belgian officials
used the young Batutsi as reservoir of skilled manpower
that replaced "backward, incompetent or refractory chiefs."61
An additional source of solidarity among Batutsi, accord-
ing to LeMarchand, stemmed from their shared consciousness
of belonging to a cultural elite whose claims to superi-
ority were inscribed in the history of Rwanda. Higher edu-
cation strengthened their claims to deference, and it gave
them the means to write about their own culture, to eval-
uate it in the light of other cultures and, ultimately to
give it new meaning. In this fashion, the Batutsi were
able to inculcate a sense of cultural pride and unity among
various sections of the Batutsi stratum.62
Batutsi administration was extremely harsh, and the
general impression conveyed by Bahutu informants and the
records is that the lot of the masses was unquestionably

worse under Belgian rule than at any time in the past.

Few Belgians, however, would have conceded this fact

225

without drawing attention to the "positive" side of the
record, or without emphasizing "the advantages" derived
from the importation of Pax Belgica, from the construction
of roads, hospitals and dispensaries; from improvements in
the quality and quantity of food crops and the margin of
economic security this provided for the peasant masses.
But if those were indeed appreciable gains, their costs in
terms of human labor, taxation and regimentation was ex-
tremely heavy. When added to customary tithes, tributes,
corvées, the "civilizing" aspect of the Belgian presence
made the rule of the Batutsi chiefs a singularly uncivi-
lized one. Those chiefs whom the administration rated as
"elite" or "excellent" were also those who were the object
of the greatest resentment from the masses of Bahutu.
Furthermore, the Batutsi monopoly of chiefly positions ex-
acerbated ethnic tensions in two ways: their awareness of
both the advantages and inconveniences of their role made
the Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs remarkably status con-
scious as a group vis-a-vis the Bahutu masses; and because
they were looked upon as agents of the European administra-
tion, the Batutsi chiefs were generally held responsible by
the peasantry for all the hardships and sufferings associ-
ated with colonial rule.63
Economic recovery in the late 19303 could not have
been accomplished without Batutsi assistance. They mobil-

ized labor resources and work crews, and they supervised

226

cr0p production. The Belgian report of 1937 affirms the
success of their efforts to implement economic recovery,
when it noted that Butare's economic improvement stemmed
from the extension of coffee production and the sale of
foodstuffs to the mines at Kabulantwa in Bujumbura and to
the Nyongwe mines in Cyangugu.64 Because of Batutsi ef-
forts or administration and Belgian over-rule, Ruhengeri
emerged as the most important center for food production,
and the report for that year remarked that all disposable
land was being cultivated. The territory had even outpro-
duced other areas in coffee: 400 tons of the 1200 tons

65 Through mobiliza-

exported in 1937 came from Ruhengeri.
tion efforts, more and more Bahutu were employed by the
mines--7,000 were employed as non-permanent laborers by
mining companies in Kigali. In 1938 these same workers
were replaced by 3,432 permanent workers, engaged under
contract,66 indicating that companies were willing and
could afford to pay higher wages to stabilize their labor
force. These signs of economic growth persisted through-
out the year: Cyangugu territory furnished 250 tons of
food for the mining center at Nyongwe in 1938.67 Large
quantities of food were purchased by local tradesmen in
Ruhengeri and by company officials for their mines in

68 Signs that prosperity had trickled down to the

Kigali.
lowest levels were evident, when officials remarked that

Bahutu farmers used their access to greater resources,

227

like the sale of coffee, cotton, and foodstuffs to become
owners of cattle. Officials also noted that exceptional
coffee growers would earn more than a thousand francs a
year.69

Still the Mututsi role as administrator could be ex-
tremely precarious, especially when economic conditions
declined. For example, in 1938, more than 22 million cof-
fee trees were planted and production amounted to 3,000
tons. Signs of economic deterioration were evident:
prices on the world market were still quite low; parchment
coffee experienced a 40 percent decline while unparched
coffee decreased by 37 percent. These low quotations

70

caused Bahutu interest to wane. In fact Africans were

quite reluctant to care for any crOp that did not have an
immediate bearing on the all too recent danger of famine,71
and declining prices for agricultural commodities only made
things worse. Consequently, the Batutsi were required to
monitor the masses quite closely, as a result brutality and
harshness increased. To counteract African apathy, the
Agriculture Department tried to improve the efficiency of
African plantations by fertilizer, mulching, and by cut-

72 Officials also used force

ting down unproductive trees.
and penalties for those who failed to produce or assist in
the production effort. Batutsi officials were fined for
failing to provide adequate supervision of coffee trees

and for failing to inspect the quality of coffee brought

228

to the markets by Bahutu farmers under their jurisdiction.
Fines were also levied against notables who failed to have

their peOple mulch coffee fields,73

and the ultimate penal-
ty was dismissal.

Exactions and supervision became more intense during
the Second World War. When the German Army invaded Belgium
on May 10, 1940 and the Belgian Army was forced to surren-
der on May 27, the Rwandan peasants were affected directly.
Economic mobilization for Rwanda and Burundi and the Bel-
gian Congo commenced in the Fall of 1940 when the Anglo-
Belgian agreement was concluded. In order to provide the
allies with such necessities as tin and rubber, production
levels had to be increased and African labor mobilized.74
In Rwanda, both cassiterite, used in the manufacture of
tin, and tin mining were greatly extended in the west and
northeast regions of the country and in the territory of
Kigali. The principle mining societies--Minetain, Somuki,
Mirudi, Mindfor and Georuanda--produced 12,454 tons of

cassiterite between 1940 and 1944..75

Related to the growth
in production was the necessary increase in farming for the
internal markets (i.e., to feed the workers in the mineral
centers of both Rwanda and the Belgian Congo) and the
mobilization of labor to produce for the war effort. War
production was extremely demanding: African males living

in traditional areas were obliged to devote a total of

sixty days a year to paid and unpaid work of importance to

229

his local community. By 1944 obligatory labor had in-
creased to 120 days a year.76
Because of war mobilization peasant life began to de-
teriorate. The administration demanded labor for reclama-
tion of swamps (to make more productive land available),
clearing roads and construction. In addition to these de-
mands there were the continuous burdens of compulsory food
and cash crops. Moreover, the Batutsi continued to squeeze
the maximum in ubuletwa and corvée labor from the Bahutu.
But the oligarachy was not completely exempted; their cat-
tle were requisitioned to provide for meat and milk. Also
the effect of pegging cattle prices at a level below their
market value prevented owners from receiving a fair return
for their cows. Cattle requisitions during the war enrich-
ed Belgian middlemen and impoverished Batutsi cattle owners.T7
Not only did Banyarwanda have to contend with these exac-
tions, but they also had to compete for space with European
colonists. Between 1940 and 1947, the number of EurOpean
agricultural settlers rose from 42 in 1940 to 137 in 1947

78 Land concessions for Euro-

in both Rwanda and Burundi.
pean agriculturalists also rose from 2,679 hectares to
7,552 hectares in the same period.79 According to the ad-
ministration, European colonists came to Rwanda and Burundi
to participate in the cultivation of pyrethrum which was

important during the war. Others attributed the increase

in European settlers to the importance assumed by the town

230

of Costermansville, situated in the immediate vicinity.
The town needed supplies and timber which Europeans in
Ruhengeri, Biumba, Kisenyi, and Cyangugu furnished.80
As Rwanda was pressed to become economically viable,
Bahutu became increasingly resentful of Belgian rule. Yet
they did not rebel. Revolutionary consciousness (or class
consciousness) and an intellectual cadre had not yet devel-
oped, and would not materialize until after the war.81
Instead, the Bahutu put up with hard work, discomfort, and
the lack of freedom. They accepted the order of nature and
believed that things would always remain the same. Revolu-
tion was remote or impossible, because of Belgian power and
Batutsi over-rule. Those who might have led the Bahutu
were quickly disposed of by the Belgian authorities. For
example, Musinga might have served as a focal point of
struggle, especially when he reportedly hailed the German
invasion of Belgium as the end of colonial government. But
when a number of Batutsi began to take a renewed interest
in Musinga, he was hastily deported to the Belgian Congo.82
Drained and weakened by three years of wartime mobili-
zation, customary and unofficial corvée labor and other ex-
actions, Rwanda succumbed in 1942 to a famine that cost the
lives of at least 300,000 people. Traditional foodstuffs
(i.e., peas, sweet and ordinary potatoes) were blighted by

mildew and destroyed by a severe drought and by insects.

An epidemic of typhus brought Rwanda to near paralysis.

231

Food reserves were quickly exhausted. The administration
poured in and transported about thirty-two million francs
in emergency food supplies, which comprised about thirty

83 By mid-

percent of all receipts for both territories.
1944, the famine abated, partially in response to a large
manioc harvest and to a compulsory food-crop program enac-

84

ted by the government in 1943, but deaths from famine did

not stop until July.85

To forestall the danger of future
famines, the administration's program set aside, after
1943, thirty percent of the land for the cultivation of
manioc, sweet and ordinary potatoes. Furthermore, each
farmer was obliged to build up food stocks at the rate of

86 and all adults and

60 kilos per head of the population,
able bodied inhabitants living in the traditional areas
were required to cultivate 35 ares (100 square meters equal

7 of seasonal and 25 ares of non-seasonal food

one are)8
crops. Rwandans were also compelled by law, Ordinance No.
70/AIMO of 20 November 1944, to plant hedges, dig ditches,
and to carry out other types of anti-erosion works. The
same ordinance gave the resident the power to require each
adult African farmer or herdsman to save, as directed by
the local authorities, all products such as ash, cow dung,
household refuse, and to use them for fertilizing his

fields.88

All of these devices were designed to increase
productivity through soil conservation and to reduce the

specter of famine. But while these measures were being

232

enacted, there was no letup in the demands for forced
labor, traditional corvee and exactions from Batutsi admin-
istrators and patrons, the most significant drains on the
Banyarwanda's productive effort.

While increased food production and adequate storage
could eventually prevent famine, the administration none-
theless refused to face the situation squarely. The pre-
carious ecological balance in Rwanda meant the country
could not produce enough food to feed itself and its neigh-
bor in the Eastern Congo as well, while producing coffee
for the world market and supporting the vestige of a tra-
ditional feudal system. The administration was certainly
aware that periodic famines were caused partly by irregu-
lar distribution of food and population. The famine of
1928-29 and the subsequent relief programs had brought
these facts to the attention of the administration. There
was very little it could do about natural forces and re-
settlement programs were largely unsuccessful. But it
never really seriously considered reforming the traditional
feudal system; when some efforts were made, they were gen-
erally compromises which benefited or pleased no one.
Rather than eliminate the stranglehold of the feudal system
(because officials feared revolution), the administration
extended and dedicated itself toward conserving institutions
and traditions within the traditional society. Or they

tried to ensure the production of a food surplus in good

233

harvest years by compulsory food programs, without moder-
ating their own demands or those of the Batutsi.

The administration believed that by substituting dues
in kind and work for money payment, the abuse and indiscre-
tion of the chiefs would vanish. But this did not happen;
corvee labor, akazi, and demands from the administration
and the traditional structure increased, so that the agri-
cultural investment and food production cycles were hin-
dered. The former never developed fully and food produc-
tion cycles were subject to frequent interruptions, so
much so that the country eventually became dependent upon
foreign imports to supplement basic needs and caused Bahutu
to emigrate to find additional income in order to survive.

A tremendous amount of labor had to be expended on the
soil and on stock to produce consumer goods. It was not
enough for the head of a household to possess a certain
amount of capital in land and cattle, but he had to also
command and control the labor of his wife, unmarried sons,
and daughters. As head of the rugo, a Muhutu could make
all of these dependents work in the fields and fortunately
for him, he could require his sons to give tribute labor
to the political authorities in his stead or to carry out
services for his patron. Thus a family head could command
and control enough rights to capital goods and land to make
his rugo self-supporting in the best of times, with a cer-

tain surplus for his chief and his lord. But with colonial

234

consolidation and Batutsi over-rule, these rights were not
his own. The ultimate control of the factors of production
was not his. As we have seen, labor, land, and cattle were
theoretically invested with the state and in all practical-

ity belonged to the Batutsi.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1Gouvernement belge. MinistEre des Colonies. Ra ort
presente par le gpuvernement belge au conseil de la SociZte
des Nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi
pendant l'année 1930 (Geneve, 1931) p. 58.

 

2Consortium for Africa Microfilm Project (hereafter
CAMP). Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Terri-
toire de Lubengera. No. 39/P.I. Gitebe, January 18, 1931.

3The disturbance began on February 17, 1932, in the
province of Ndorwa in Ruhengeri territory. A Mututsi chief,
Kanabulenge, went to Bugarakata hill to collect taxes and
to conduct a census registration. When he called on those
who had not paid, they appeared, armed with lances and ar-
rows. They told Kanabulenge that they had only a few
francs, and when Kanabulenge insisted, the crowd began to
show "insolence," but they dispersed. Two days later, a
tax collector was beaten and chased by a crowd of people at
Kinyababa hill in the same region. On the third day,
Kanabulenge tried to collect taxes from the Bahutu at an
Bugarakata hill. But despite appeals to the head of the
abasingaba clan elder, the prospective tax payers refused
to appear, and warned that they would resist being brought
before him. Sometime later that day, the Bahutu took the
initiative and attacked Kanabulenge and his party. A bat-
tle ensued near Lake Bulera, where Kanabulenge and his men
had fled. In the battle, one of Kanabulenge's men was
wounded. Out numbered, Kanabulenge's party sought refuge
in a rugo of an old chief near the chapel-school of the
White Fathers at Kinyababa. Bahutu pursuers surrounded the
but and lay seige for 16 hours before Kanabulenge took the
offensive. In the struggle, a second man was seriously
wounded, but Kanabalenge succeeded in chasing the attackers
away.

On February 21, or the next day, the abasingaba at-
tacked Kanabulenge. But by this time, Kanabulenge had re-
ceived reinforcements who, in retaliation, began to loot
Bahutu herds and burn their huts." In the battle between
Kanabulege's forces and the abasingaba clan, it was report-
ed that eight abasingaba were wounded and one was killed.
CAMP Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941.

235

236

Territoire du Rwanda-Urundi. Pro. Justitia [Dépositions].
Ruhengeri, March 3, 1932.

4For a very different version of the same incident,
see CAMP, Rwanda. Miscellaneous. Archival Material,
1925- 1941. Territoire du Mulera. Rapport sur les evene-
ments qui se sont d’roules fin fevrier . . . , March 18,
1932; Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi, Pro Justitia [Deposi-
tion], Ruhengeri, March 2,1932.

5Rapport 1935, p. 30.
6

 

Ibid., p. 74.

7Rene Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London, 1970),
p. 100.

8J. E. T. Philipps, "The Nyabingi: an Anti-European
Secret Society in Africa," Con o, 1 (1928), p. 318.

9

 

Ibid., pp. 316-317.

10J. M. Bessel, "Nyabingi," Uganda Journal, VI (1938-
1939), p. 78.

11Northerners were on the vanguard of the revolution-
ary movement in 1959. See Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi,

12

 

Ibid., p. 43.

13Ibid., pp. 96 and 134. Le Marchand also notes that
the very nature of the dyadic relationships (i.e., those
based on reciprocal obligations between patron and client)
was the reason why Bahutu had little consciousness of them-
selves as a group. The roles, norms and statuses associa-
ted with clientage structure tended not only to block the
emergence of a separate Bahutu consciousness but to posi-
tively reinforce the attachments of the individual Bahutu
peasant to his lord. The result, up to a point, has been
to hamper the development of any sort of corporate ties
other than those based on feelings of personal allegiance.

14Some respondents had planted less than the magic
"54" trees. However, only one had less than 47, although
a few had planted 60 or more initially. One planter cul-
tivated 200 coffee trees and had 480 in 1978. Those who
increased the number of trees generally did so after in-
dependence in 1962. See 264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78,
band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 206
Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); Shyande,

237

Kagunga, Butare (1978), band (?); 204 Ngoma, Butare (1978),
band (?);207 Shyanda, Munazi, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?);
223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 21/3/78, band (?); 228 Mbazi,
Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 236 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare,
28/3/78, band 6; 239 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaza, Butare, 29/3/78,
band 9; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 245
Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi,
Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa,
Butare, 4/4/78, band 27.

15200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?); another
planter voiced the feelings of many when he remarked that
"to concentrate solely on coffee production is to invite
famine." See 223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 21/3/78, band (2).
Others believed that increasing the number of coffee trees
would require additional labor. In fact, "nobody would
cultivate just coffee. Coffee caused a lot of pain; we
were dying because of it, even the chiefs who had many
coffee trees. I cultivated other crops because when you
don't have enough beans and sweet potatoes, you can't work
in your coffee field even if you had more trees." See 224
Ngoma, Sahera, Butare 21/3/78, band (?); 230 Mbazi,
Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 240 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga,
Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

16200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?). See
Phillippe Leurquin's "Les limites physiques de la produc-
tion de subsistence," in Bulletin de l'Insitut de Recherche
economiques et sociales (Universite de Louvain), XXIII,

No. 2 (1957), pp. 59-66. Leurquin argues that it is not
the shortage of land that limits production but the phys-
ical limitation imposed by the "stagnant" technology. The
truth, however, is that Rwanda terrain is characterized by
precipitious slopes and summits, valleys which are suscep-
table to flooding, and soil which is of poor quality.

17264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 265
Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi,
Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 200 Shyande, Zivu, Butare, (1978),
band (?); 203 Ngoma, Butare, (1978), band (?); 204 Ngoma,
Butare, (1978), band (?); 206 Shyanda, Save, Butare,
10/3/78, band (?); 207 Shyanda, Munazi, Butare, 10/3/78,
band (?); 208 Shyanda, Karama, Butare, 11/3/78, band (?);
213 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 15/3/78, band (?); 215 Shyanda-
Save, Butare, 16/3/78, band (?); 238 Mbazi, Mwulire,
Butare, 28/3/78, band 7: 239 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare,
29/3/78, band 9; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band
11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 248
Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi,
Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 258 Ngoma, Cyarwa,
Butare, 4/4/78, band 25.

 

 

238

18CAMP. J. M. Derschied. Film No. 34. Reel I.

Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, (1933),
pp. 29-30, and 50.

19Ibid., p. 30. Batutsi also leased out their fields,
or even a portion of a banana field for several years. In
this particular case the person who leased the land would
place his hut on it and would pledge or agree to cultivate
two days or a week for the landowner. If the person who
leased the land died, a member of the family, either the
wife or father, would carry out the agreement and these
have the right to the produce of the field. The report
also notes that a Mututsi would sometimes lease land from
a Muhutu, but the opposite was more frequent. Ibid., p. 50.

20232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5; 233
Mbazi, Mbazi, Batare, 25/3/78, band 5; 237 Mbazi, Mbazi,
Butare, 28/3/78, band 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwubire, Butare,
28/3/78, band 7; 241 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78,
band 7; 245, Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10;

246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 249 Mbazi,
Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo,
Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 254 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare,
1/4/78, band 17; 255 Ngoma, Sahera, Butate, 1/4/78, band
17; 256 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 3/4/78, band 17; 257 Ngoma,
Cyarwa, Butare, 4/14/78, band 27; Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare,
4/4/78; band 27; 260 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band
24; 261 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/14/78, band 27, 262 Ngoma,
Cyawa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 25; 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare,
13/4/78, band 14.

21232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5; 233
Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78.

22The head tax was the same for all Africans, except
the rate varied from district to district according to the
resources of the district. For example, Africans whose
verified annual income exceeded 9000BF net were exempt from
head tax and were liable to income tax. In 1948 only 604
Africans paid income tax. According to Belgian official
estimates the head tax corresponded on the average to
something less than one month's income, or 8 to 9 percent
of the annual income. They also claimed it was not too
high, but many informants felt it inopportune or an incon-
venience. Most paid the tax during the first three or
four months of the year. The polygamy tax, an assessment
for less than 10 percent of the population, was a tax on
wealth, as was the livestock or cattle tax. United Nations
Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on Ruanda-
Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 4th Session,
Supplement No. 2, (1950), p. 34.

 

 

239

23232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5;
233 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5; 237 Mbazi, Mbazi,.
Butare, 28/3/78, band 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78,
band 7; 241 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7;
245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 246 Mbazi,
Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 249 Mbazi, Muhororo,
Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare,
30/3/78, band 23, 254 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 1/4/78, band
17; 255 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 1/4/78, band 17; 256 Ngoma,
Nkubi, Butare, 3/4/78, band 27; Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare,
4/4/78, band 27; 262 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band
25: 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 13/4/78, band 14.

24Ibid.

25Agricultural loans for Africans did not materialize,
as government policy, until August 5, 1941, when Ordinance
Law, No. 365/bis/Agri was passed, creating the Fonds spe-
cial de credit agricole indigene. The fund received advan—
ces drawn on the treasury and by voluntary contributions
from the treasuries of the African circonscription and
extra-customary centres. The law authorized the fund to
make loans of more than 5,000BF to Africans circonscriptions,
African towns, extra-customary centers, African cooperatives,
legally recognized African agricultural association, or
African private persons. Loans to Africans could not ex-
ceed 10, 000BF except in special cases which were duly jus-
tified and had the consent of governor general, who,
regardless of the amount, considered each request on the
proposal of an African agricultural credit committee, after
consultation with local African authorities. Moreover,
loans could only be granted for the purpose of crop develop-
ment and stock-breeding, harvesting, preparation and pres-
ervation of the products of farming and stock-breeding and
improvement of farming conditions. Loans were limited to
ten years and were subject to an interest rate of 4 percent
annually.

In 1947, a modification of another Ordinance, No.
125/AIMO of April 27, 1942, gave the governors of each
province the authority to grant loans of 5,000BF or less to
Africans in traditional areas. The interest rate for these
loans was 5 percent annually. United Nations Trusteeship
Council (hereafter UNTC). Study of Population, Land Utili-
zation and Land System in Ruanda (New York, March 26,1957),
pp. 79- 80. Also see Archives Africans, Ministere des
Colonies. Carton Agri 106/Dossier 47. FEDECAME: Accord
de Mexico, 1957, 4d Direction General, Agriculture. Forets,
Elevage, Colonisation, 1 Ere Direction a FEDECAME. Credit
accordes en faveur de la production du Café'.

 

240

26264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 265
Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi,
Butare, 27/4/78, 235 Mbazi, Mobazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band
6; 243 Mbazi, Cyibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 245 Mbazi,
Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni,
Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare,

4/4/78, band 27.

27201 Shyanda, Kagunga, Butare, (1978), band (?);
203 Ngoma, (?) Butare, (1978), band (?); 216 Shyanda,
Munamira, Butare, 16/3/78, band (?); 241 Mbazi, Gihindamu-
yaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 243 Mbazi, Cyibabara,
Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare,
30/3/78, band 11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band
11; 249, Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 257
Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27; 259 Ngoma, Cyarwa,
Butare, 4/4/78, band 25; 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 13/4/78,
band 14; 264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, band 21, 27/4/78.

28227 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

29243 Mbazi, Cyibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

30Rapport 1945-46, p. 35.

31204 Ngoma, (2). Butare, (1978), band (2); 206 Shy-
anda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 207 Shyanda, Munazi,
Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare,
21/3/78, band (?); 228 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78,
band 4; 236 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78; band 6; 239
Mbazi, Gihindamuyaza, Butare, 29/3/78 band 9; 247 Mbazi,
Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Bu-
tare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78,
band 11; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27; 264
Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi,
Butare, 27/4/78, band 21.

32249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14.

33Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a
community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Michigan, 1962), pp. 56-57.

34237 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 6. Also see
200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (2) 238 Mbazi,
Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7.

35UNTC. Study of P0pulation, p. 61.

 

36Ibid., pp. 65-66.

241

37210 Shyanda, Kiziguro, Butare, 13/3/78, band (2).
Also see 251 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 31/3/78, band 18.

38Ibid.

39259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare 4/4/78, band 27.

40266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21.

41249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14.

42238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7.

43204 Ngoma, (?), Butare, (1978), band (?).

44Abuse was a double-edged sword; the Batutsi were
themselves subject to abuse from the Belgians. See 205
Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?); 242 Mbazi, Kiba-
bara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

45234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5 and 6;
235 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 6; 245 Mbazi,
Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10. -

46CAMP. J. M. Derscheid Collection, Territoire d'
Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, September 23, 1933,
pp. 5-6.

47CAMP. Rwanda, Archival Material, 1925-1941. Resi-
dence du Ruanda. L'inspection de la S/Chefferie Rubindo
a fait l'Objet d'un rapport spébial en date du 15/1 denier.
Ruhengeri, January 23, 1937.

48205 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?); 206
Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?).

49Ibid.

50206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?).

51220 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 20/3/78, band (2); 227
Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

52M. Molitor, "L'Introduction et le développement de
la Culture," Le Material Colonial (A.S.B.L.), XXVIII, No. 6
(March, 1937), p. 157. Also see CAMP, J. M. Derscheid
Collection. Territoire de Biumba, Rapport de sortie de
charge (Stevens, 1933), pp. 2-6; United Nations Trusteeship
Council. Study of Population, Land Utilization and Land
(26 March 1957) PP. 1-12.

 

242

53226 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

54231 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4-III;
234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5 and 6.

55231 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4;
234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, bands 5 and 6.

56246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11;
247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 250 Mbazi,
Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23.

57259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78 band 27; 213 Shy-
anda, Save, Butare, 15/3/78, band (?); 234 Mbazi, Mbazi,
Butare, 25/3/78, bands 5 and 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare,
28/3/78, band 7. Gravel, A Play for Power," pp. 166-167.

58United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories
in East Africa, 1954. Report On Ruanda-Urundi. Trustee--
ship Council Official Recordsy 15th Session, Supplement
No. 2, (1955), p. 10.

59CAMP. J. M. Derscheid. Film No. 34, Reel I.
Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge (1933),
pp. 50-51.

60264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21; 265
Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi,
Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 204 Ngoma, (2), Butare, (1978),
band (?); 205 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?);
235 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 6; 236 Mbazi,
Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78 band 6; 242 Mbazi, Kibabara,
Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 243 Mbazi, Cyibarara, Butare,
29/3/78, band 7; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78,
band 10; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11;
247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 248 Mbazi,
Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo,
Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 251 Mgoma, Sahera, Butare,
31/3/78, band 18; 252 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 31/3/78,
band 18.

61Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes and Reports,
18th Session (1938), p. 17.

62LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 136.

 

63Ibid., p. 125

64Rapport 1937, p. 72.

 

65Ibid., p. 73.

243

66Rapport 1938, pp. 75-76.

 

67Ibid.

68Ibid., p. 77.

69Ibid., p. 151.

70$2l§or PP- 77, 149, 151, and 162.

71Fred E. Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa: A
Description and analysis of the Development of Rwanda,"
(Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 82-83;
Rapport 1939-1944, p. 82.

72

 

Rapport 1939-1944, p. 82.

 

73Batutsi notables could also be fined for failure to
perform the following activities: get their people to the
yaws medical examinations; conduct a census of the Africans
living on their hills; provide enough workers for public
work projects; submit tax receipts on time; implement re-
forestation programs; and instruct their people to plant
food crops in marsh areas. CAMP. Rwanda. Archival Mate-
rial 1925-1941. Appendix. Residence du Ruanda. Sous
Chef Rubindo (Mulera), Ruhengeri. Extrait du Cahier des
Punitions Disciplinaires, February 1, 1937.

74Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under
Belgian Rule, ‘1908-1960 (London & New York, 1966),
pp. 143-144.

75A. Michiels and N. Laude, Notre Colonie: Congo
Belge et Ruanda-Urundi. Gébgraphie et Notre Historique
(Brussels, 1949), p. 291.

76

 

 

Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 146.

 

77Ian Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (New York
1977), p. 207.

78United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa,
1949. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council
Official Records, 4th Session, Supplement No. 2. (1950),
p. 33.

79Ibid. European settlers and land concessions
occurred mainly in the territories of Biumba, Ruhengeri,
Kisenyi and Cyangugu.

 

 

 

 

244

80U. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report
on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records,
4th Session, Supplement No. 2. (1950), p. 33.

81See Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda,
pp. 220-281; Fred E. Wagoner, Nation Building in Africa:
A Description and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda
(Ph.D. Dessertation, The American University,1968), chap-
ters 3 and 4; Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A
Century of Clineship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), chapters 8 and 9;
Gravel, "The Play for Power," chapters 4 and 5; and
LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi Parts II and IV. These
sources describe the factors and influences that led to the
political emergence of the Bahutu as the dominant political
force and Rwanda as an independent nation.

82

 

 

 

 

Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, p. 207.

 

83Rapport 1939-1944, p. 16.

84Rapport 1945-46, p. 35.

 

85Congo Manuscripts, Folder No. 9. "Figures Colo-
niales: Georges Sandrart, ancien resident du Ruanda et de
l'Urundi," Pourquoi Pas, No. 106 (February 11, 1952),
p. 107.

860. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report
on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records,
4th Session, Supplement No. 2, (1950), p. 21.

87United Nations Bulletin. "Tribal Traditions Hinder
Progressi'XVI. No. 7 (April 1, 1954), pp. 267-268.

88U. N. Trusteeship Council. Study of Population,
pp. 61 and 65.

 

 

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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE COLONIAL STATE, EUROPEAN PLANTERS, AND THE METROPOLE

Direct intervention by the state helped to transform
the economic structure of Rwanda, and by a number of quite
imperceptible transitions the Rwandans were themselves
transformed. However, not everyone was satisfied with
either transformation. The following discussion demon-
strates that the Belgian planters in Africa had a clear con-
cept of their interests vis-a-vis Africans and the colonial
government. Almost simultaneously with their arrival in
Belgian Africa, planters began to organize themselves into
commercial associations. As archival sources indicate, the
Ministry of Colonies at Brussels could not ignore strong
commercial associations. These maintained strong parent
bodies at home, which campaigned loud and long for their
brothers in Africa. The most powerful lobbied their sena-
tors at Antwerp, the major entrepot for coffee, and at the
legislature and the Minstry of Colonies at Brussels. While
white planters were willing to compromise on such issues as

zones g3 protection, they refused to budge when it came to

 

African coffee cultivators, even though the latter were not
serious competitors. Brazil and emerging producers in

Africa generally were more important in creating the glut

246

247

on the coffee market. Consequently Belgian planters plead-
ed for special price support systems and protective tariffs,
and other considerations from a Metropole, which was often
indifferent or for the most part had other fish to fry "or
beans to burn."

Planters also felt betrayed by the Metropole, because
it responded to their difficulties as if they were Africans.
Consequently, in asserting themselves as Belgian citizens,
the planters became less tolerant in their dealings with
Africans. These feelings, as, this chapter shows, stemmed
from a misplaced perception that Africans in Rwanda and in
the eastern Congo were competitors. Intolerance was a qual-
itative change, since planters in their initial role as
colonizers had willingly assisted the administration in
bringing "civilization" (or civilizing, as the administra-
tion called it) to Africans. The white farmers entered in-
to the partnership arrangement with Africans, as defined in

part by the concept of zones g2 protection, and participat-

 

ed in the campaign to extend African coffee cultivation.
However, this chapter reveals that as the imperial phase
became more entrenched, the role of the planters changed
from colonizers to producers in competition with their
African partners, and this new status created a crisis of
confidence, racism, and protest, which were expressed
through the various planter societies.

The home and colonial governments responded to the

248

planters pleas for protection as Belgian citizens with sym-
pathy, but in the end weighed the planters interests against
those of the Africans and decided that neither was of much
consequence when the Metropole's interests were at stake.
This chapter confirms that decision-making in terms of pro—
duction and economic development was a state prerogative,
and that the interests of both white and black planters
were secondary.1 The metropole and therefore the colonies
were cost-conscious advocates of "rational and orderly ad-
ministration and development." Subsidies and price supports
were expensive but costs could be passed on to someone else.
Protective tariffs, on the other hand, were dangerous to
international trade, especially if Brazil and other export-
ers decided to reciprocate. Therefore, limits had to be
placed on production. Many studies demonstrate that in the
resolution of conflict between white and black, the colonial
power resorted to its own self-interest regardless of
ideology or commitment.2

The year 1933 was also a pivotal one for the govern-
ment's rationalized development plan. Voisin had departed
on June 8, 1932, leaving General Commissioner G. Morteham,
as the interim Vice Governor General.3 Morteham presided
over a major policy debate concerning the role of Euro-
peans in the Rwandan econOmy. The controversy, according
to white planters, centered around a major contradiction

between the government's support of zones g2 protection for

 

249

Europeans and its policy of African coffee cultivation at
the expense and exclusion of European planters and settlers.
gppgp pg protection were viewed as concessions: the govern-
ment would grant 500 hectares with 99-year-leases to com-
panies that would plant crops and raise livestock and adopt
the "civilizing" principle or collaborate with African farm-
ers. Holders of these concessions had a virtual monopoly
on African labor and the exclusive right to purchase com-
mercial crops from African farmers within a protecthmaradius
of 15 kilometers or 70,000 hectares.4 Participants were
required to install a processing mill and to furnish schools,
quarantine stations, and seeds for their African charges.
These zones, according to the administration, were devised
to eliminate Asian and Indian competition and to rational-
ize economic develOpment.5 Most planters and companies
were concerned that the zones had hardly increased since
their conception in 1929, despite the urging of Union Agri-
cole des Régions du Kivu at Brussels and intervention from
the Ministry of Colonies.6

While there were many features and counter prOposals
to the concept of pppp§_§g protection, planters were quite
concerned about the licence provision, introduced in 1932,
to purchase African produce. However, since the licences
would only be granted to those who had received authori-

7

zation to install a processing mill, planters understood

that this feature meant that only "une société reconnue"

250

with adequate capital could purchase these licences.8 The
issue not only angered and confused planters, but also di-
vided members in the colonial government. Voisin may have
-been a casualty of divided opinion at the Colonial Office.
Upon his return to Brussels and in a meeting before the
Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu on November 9, 1932,

Voisin remarked that zones d3 protection, which would short-

 

ly be discussed in the Conseil Colonial, were indispensable
in the fight to ward off anarchy, represented by the
Asiatic and Hindu influence in the economic future of Rwanda
and Burundi.9

The government added more fuel to the issue, when it
announced in 1933 that African agricultural development was
the sole task of the Service Agricole de la Colonie. But
at the same time, it insisted that the government still
needed the cooperation and assistance of European planters'

to instruct African farmers.10

Officials asserted that pro-
tective zones should be rationalized and protected from
competition outside of the zones. But their next statement
must have completely astonished the white planters, for it
directly contradicted the Colonial Office's previous state-
ment. Officials remarked that "only European processing
operations, such as coffee mills, distilleries, oil fac-
tories would be authorized to build plants outside of the

zones of European settlements and concessions."

Bahutu farmers would provide these plants with quality

251

products and labor at the lowest possible price.11 In

short, the administration was sanctioning free trade and
auctioning off African labor and produce to the highest
bidders. European planters and companies were infuriated
and felt the government had reneged on the promise to pro-
tect their interests and access to African goods and ser-
vices. Many felt that the government had also betrayed
them, since they had responded to the earlier policy of
collaboration.12 Some were thoroughly disillusioned, when
the President of Union Agricole du Kivu (hereafter Unaki)
informed them in February that the government no longer

13

supported the principle of protective zones, but would

rather introduce a decree in the Conseil Colonial, whereby
the mandated territory would no longer grant protective
zones to those who cultivated coffee. Instead, the govern-
ment would sell general licences to those wishing to pur-
chase African coffee beans.14 The government hOped this
procedure would standardize the processing of coffee, to
ensure

. . . that the product for European

markets was uniform in all of its

characteristics . . . and would create

and maintain this standard in order

to establish confidence in the good

name of the product, since the market

price often depended upon the reputation

of the product.15

Officials believed that the only way to achieve a standard-

ized product was to concentrate all production in a

252

16

processing mill. To secure a licence, a company or group

had to offer the "prOper monetary guarantee," for construc-

17 In short, the Colonial

tion of a mill to process coffee.
Office had changed its mind. While its previous position
had been collaboration with both European settlers and
private enterprise, now it would collaborate with only those
who could afford to contribute to the development of Rwanda.

The desire of the Ministry of Colonies to control Euro-
pean access to African goods and services reflected a re-
assessment of colonial policy in Belgian Africa generally,
and the role of African agriculture in development specif-
ically. As a result of an administrative debate at Brus-
sels, which commenced in the mid-19203, two opposing fac-
tions emerged to support conflicting development strategies.
One placed a stronger emphasis on African agriculture to-
gether with the slowing-down of industrial development, and
the other favored capitalism and industrialization.18 A
speech in 1933 by Prince Leopold finally tipped the balance
"compromise" in favor of agricultural and moderated indus-
trial develOpment,19 the latter designed to placate the pro-
capitalist lobby.

In his speech before the Belgian Senate on July 25,
1933, LeOpold informed the assembly that Belgium could no
longer simply exploit African holdings. Instead, he pro-

posed thaf development be emphasized. He urged a new agri-

cultural policy to create African paysannats, where blacks

253

could acquire property and enjoy economic freedom, a right
guaranteed by the Colonial Charter. Within this context,

Africans would cease to be simply an outil pg production
20

 

for capitalist enterprises. Responding, however, to the
on-going economic crisis, Le0pold supported the policy to
maintain the current level of production, and asserted that
it was even the duty of the state to support those whom the
economic crisis had placed in jeopardy, an obvious ploy to
gain support from the industrialists. He also counselled
the government to refrain from extending commercial agricul-
tural development for a certain number of years and concen-
trate on the development of African agriculture, which was
far cheaper than European endeavors.21
While the duke did not exclude foreign participation
altogether, he urged that EurOpeans be restricted to econom-
ic pursuits that were currently beyond the capacity of Afri-
cans such as purchasing, transportation, and the export
trade. Most auditors of the prince's talk predicted cor-
rectly that it would have a profound affect on the adminis-
tration's new agricultural policy, since in reality it was
intended to signal a new policy direction. But they also
recognized that it would not be implemented without a fight
from capitalist interests,22 whose primary concern was Afri-
can labor. The new policy did not provide more freedom for

blacks, but rather had the effect of binding them to the

capitalist structure, as agricultural laborers or tenants

254

on large plantations. What emerged from this new policy

by the late 19303 was a system of enforced divisions of

labor between African producers and foreign capital.
Belgian planters reluctantly accepted the Metropole's

new policy towards zones g3 protection and the licencing of

 

new processing mills. But the President of Union Agricole
des Regions du Kivu (hereafter Unaki), Pierre Ryckmans, in
an April 12 meeting, warned colonial officials and the
metropole that his organization would no longer assist Afri-
can coffee planters. The government's policy change had
seriously injured Unaki's investors, and planters did not
appreciate the government's slight of their efforts to en-
courage cultivation and to maintain protective areas, while
"simultaneously implementing the [African development] pro-

"23 In a central

grams envisaged by Postaux and Voisin.
committee meeting the following day, President Ryckmans
read a c0py of the letter drafted by the committee and sent
to the Minister of colonies. The committee asked for a re-
examination of the government's licencing procedure in
Rwanda. The text of the letter also included a warning
that if the licence procedure was not removed from the pro-
tective zones, the "promotion of collaboration between
African and European farmers in the planting and processing
of coffee would be seriously jeOpardized." There was also

a reminder that Unaki had dedicated its personnel and capi-

tal assets to create nurseries and supervise African

255

planting, whereas those who held commercial licence to col-
lect African crops were not concerned with extending the
coffee campaign or fighting disease harmful to agriculture.
The letter expressed the hope that all concerned could work
together towards a program that would safeguard the princi-
ples of free trade and protect private capital so that pri-
vate enterprise could play a decisive role in the develop-
ment of African agriculture in the mandated territory.24
The Central Committee's reference to private capital
in the letter was actually to some "millions of francs"
which the committee claimed it and other European companies
had invested over a five-year-period in the African coffee
cultivation campaign in Rwanda and Burundi, for which they
received neither compensation nor consideration. Instead
they were to be placed on the same footing as mill owners
who could now purchase coffee plants from the Africans.
The administration's response, read at Unaki's meeting on

May 31, 1933,25

was not at all sympathetic, since the objec-
tive of the new licence procedure was designed to create

new capital equipment rather than award advantages to dis-
gruntled planters. During the proceedings, several plan-
ters expressed fears that the position taken by the govern-
ment would mean that African produce would be reserved
exclusively for the mills within the protected areas. One

planter interpreted the government's stance as the creation

of a state controlled production system. And he remarked

256

that "absolute commercial freedom would hamper the standard
of living of African farmers." But in reality the African's
status would not change.

The meeting closed with some goOd news: planters at
Bujumbura (Burundi) had gained some concessions from the
Governor General. The latter approved Unaki's request to
form a cooperative, which would process African coffee and
establish a central processing mill. But they received no
other concessions, and by the time the General Assembly of

26

Unaki met at Brussels on December 31, 1933, the zone 92

protection and commercial licences were sounding their last

 

hurrahs. Mr. Ryckmans won reelection, and the General
Assembly discussed price differences in the trading licences
granted to Indians and Europeans--the former paid 2,000BF
and Europeans 10,000BF. The differential was consistent
with the administration's plan, especially so when viewed
with the decree requiring EurOpeans to construct their com-
mercial buildings with durable (brick) material.

Between the administration's response to Unaki's re-
quest for the re-examination of the licence procedure and
the meeting of the General Assembly at Brussels, the Minis-
try of Colonies had conducted a tour of northeastern Congo
in order to evaluate European and African agriculture

27 While the final report was not at all dis-

development.
posed toward extending African coffee cultivation in cer-

tain areas in the northeastern region (among other things,

257

it might be too costly to implement),28 one attachment pro-
vided the rationale from the administration's commercial
policy with respect to Europeans. The report (actually an
extract from the annual report of the Service de l'Agricul-
ture Kibali-Ituri), entitled Note Pour Monsieur 1e Directeur
Géhéral Claessens, reaffirmed that the only admissable pol-
icy in the Belgian colony was collaboration between the
races in all areas of administration, evangelism, mining,
industry, commerce, transportation, and agriculture. How-
ever, the depression, the low prices for commercial agri-
cultural products, and the high cost of transportation
hampered agricultural development to such an extent that
some planters could not survive without protective tariffs
or export subsidies. This was especially true for coffee,
whose transportation costs were exorbitant, and therefore,
it was not economically feasible for European planters in
the Kivu and Ituri. In fact many European planters were on
the verge of ruin.

African planters, by contrast, were in a much better
position, but would only survive by taking over European
food crops and coffee production. The Agricultural Depart-
ment noted that an emphasis on African production would not
mean the ruin or collapse of European enterprises. It sim-
ply meant that the Europeans would have to specialize in
areas that were beyond the administrative, technical, and

financial capabilities of the African planters. EurOpeans

258

would specialize in processing produce, transporting and
selling products for the world market. If indeed the colo-
nial government wanted Europeans to concentrate their ef-
forts in specialized areas then the licencing and construc-
tion policies made sense, for licencing was far cheaper than
the prospects of possible subsidization of European agri-
culture which required high capitalization.

Rather than speculate on the reasons for the price
differentials for commercial licences, the General Assembly
decided they would accept the government's policy on pro-
tective zones and collaboration, for only time would tell
whether the absence of their technical support would ad-
versely affect African production in the protective areas.
For their part, the assembly also decided not to oppose the
government's efforts to expand coffee growing among Afri-
cans. Instead, it would again wait until the experiment
failed or succeeded or until it proved harmful to EurOpean
crops. Unaki did not have long to wait. For the follow-
ing year its members were forced out of Rwanda and Burundi,
not by African competition but from actions taken by the
Colonial administration to preserve coffee production as an
exclusive African prerogative.

Prior to the November 5, 1934, meeting of Unaki, the
Ministry of Colonies suspended European coffee production
with compensation in the protective zones of the mandate.

Rwanda and Burundi were appropriate starting points:

259

European settlement was minimal and unorganized.29 Unaki
did not respond immediately, because Pierre Ryckmans had
been appointed Governor General of the Belgian Congo and

30

Ruanda-Urundi. So the new President, Raymond Brock offi-

31 When the

ciated at the February 13 session in 1935.
meeting was called to order, the following were in atten-
dance: the presidents of the Kivu and Ruanda-Urundi
branches of Unaki and Senator Robert Godding, who became
Minister of Colonies in 1940, but who in 1935, was a member
of Unaki's central committee. Naturally the major topic
on the agenda was the suppression of Unaki's activities in
Rwanda and Burundi. Once the assembly had disposed of the
issue of compensation for dispossessed members (which it
believed would not be adequate), they discussed mobiliza-
tion through membership in a new organization-—the Associ-
ation des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo.32
The Association, composed of members from Unaki and
similar groups, and presided over by Professor LePlae,
would defend the interests of both European robusta and
arabica producers in Belgian Africa. It would also support
the fight to protect Congolese coffees in Belgium, which
would be accomplished by forming an alliance with the
Association des Intergts Coloniaux, a group operating out
of Brussels and presently lobbying the Colonial Office for

favorable transport tariffs for the colonies. The General

Assembly was also informed that Mr. Brock would represent

260

Unaki in the Comité’de l'Association des Planteurs de
Café333 also a Brussels' based group. This collaboration,
members were told, would enable Unaki to carry out defen-
sive Operations in Belgium. The membership was also asked
to recruit new members and even to form alliances with such
disparate group as the Crédit Agricole d'Afrique. The
Assembly then went on to discuss the "African problem" and
agricultural credit.

Both issues were pressing ones. African competition
was perceived as real, and Brock told the assembly that
"he had been led to a very distinct position against Afri-
can coffee planting." His opposition was couchedjxrpater-
nalist terms. He warned that by 1938 the Belgian market
would be inundated with surplus coffee production; conse-
quently, African efforts should be directed toward some
other crops, such as tea, quinquina, fruit trees, silkworms,
castor oil. Measures would also have to be taken to limit
European settlers; otherwise "our own plantations will
cease being economical,“ because of overproduction. So
within one year Unaki had come full circle On African cul-
tivation--from no opposition in December 1933 to a "dis-
tinct position against it" in February 1935.

Overproduction was certainly a problem, but planter
indebtedness was even more pressing. The metropole had
responded to the economic crisis by granting agricultural

credit, and interest payments were due and some members

261

were having difficulty meeting them. Some planters had
used loans with relatively high interest and amortization
charges to renovate plantations and to purchase equipment.
But continuous low prices for coffee and for other produce
had effected profit levels, and many planters and agricul—
tural societies experienced difficulty raising capital
costs. Capital was so short that according to the Associ—
ation des Planteurs de Café'du Congo, the planters willing-
ness to sell inadvertently (because they were compelled to
sell at any price) brought coffee prices below normal.

34 Not only had the latter contributed to under

parity.
capitalization, but it also neutralized the advantage from
the import duty exemption granted to Belgian coffee
growers.

A.P.C.C. expressed what the colonial office had feared
in 1934--that the import duty exemption of 2.50BF per kilo
would not work. In fact, it was hardly beneficial to
planters because of high transportation costs. Brokers and
wholesalers also claimed that they could barely pay the
differential required to inflate Belgian coffee prices,*
and resisted larger quantities of Belgian coffee because

consumers only purchased Brazilian and Columbian coffees.35

 

*

Robusta coffees of identical quality sold on the inter-
national market for 4.70BF per kilo (in Belgium 4.70 BF +
2.50BF import duty tax per kilo = 7.20BF per kilo); Belgian
coffees (except African brands) sold for 5.20BF. Whole-
salers and brokers paid the difference by passing the
amount on to their consumers.

262

In 1934, Belgium impOrted 46,000 tons of coffee, including
16,000 tons from Belgian Africa; therefore 30,000 tons were
subject to customs duty (some 75 million francs).36 The
metropole, however, feared that before long the Belgian
market would become saturated with unsalable coffees from
its own colonies, given their potential for expanding pro-
duction. Coffee surpluses would lower prices considerably,
and then it would be necessary to consider some alternative
solution. The Metropole was aware that some planters pre-
ferred restricting coffee planting in their colonies. Some
administrators at home even suggested granting export sub-
sidies to encourage planters to seek foreign markets for

37 In the end Belgium combined both alterna-

their coffees.
tives, primarily, because it had no other options, given
the possibility of increasing stocks and Brazilian manipu-
lation of the international coffee market.** Not only did
Brazil control the price levels of coffee but it also held
the dominant position in terms of consumer preference in
Belgium. Consumers could be weaned from this preference

by effective advertising and promotion, and through sur-
charges, but circumvention of Brazil's control of the mar-
ket, a position it had consolidated during the first decade

of the twentieth century, could pose some enormous inter-

national problems.

 

** "
Brazil produces between 50 to 60 percent of the total

world production, and therefore controls the international
market. '

263

Once it became obvious that coffee prices would not
rise above SBF per kilo, the Metropole began to ponder
(out loud) the idea of restricting coffee cultivation.
Almost immediately, the Association des Planteurs de Cafe.
du Congo, the Société ForestiEre et Commerciale du Congo
Belge (hereafter Societe Forescom) and Senator Godding
concurred and asked the Minister of Colonies to appoint a
study group to investigate the problem. These same groups
also began to urge the restriction of African coffee cul-

tivation.38

The Minister of Colonies demurred, but in 1935,
administrators in the Brussels colonial office commented
that opposition to African cultivation was mounting and
"appear to be a major preoccupation of the European or
Congolese plantation societies." In fact, the Association
des Planteurs de Café'du Congo and Societe Forescom pro-
tested "daily," and "numerous complaints," perhaps orches-
trated by the planters themselves, were being received at
the same rate. Therefore, Director General Claessen final-~
ly agreed to support Senator Godding's suggestion of a study
commission. At the urging of the Minister of Colonies,
Claessen also agreed to undertake the mission and in August,
1935, left for Belgian Africa.39
The director general's decision stemmed from his in-
vestigation of Senator Godding's criticism of Governor

Ryckmans' support of African coffee growing in Rwanda and

Burundi. Apparently the Senator had misstated himself; the

264

director general's review discovered that Ryckmans had said
that Africans coffee cultivation should be curtailed and
that the range of crops diversified, which was contrary to
Senator Godding's statement. Given this information,
Claessen informed the Minister to disregard Senator GoddingHs
suggestion of a study tour for fear that this action might
offend the Governor.40 However, Claessen's decision may
have also been a move to prevent the issue from becoming
politicized or an attempt to moderate Senator Godding's
influence on the Ministry of Colonies, for Godding's criti-
cism of Ryckmans wasn't that far off the mark.

When Ryckmans was nominated Governor General of the
Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi on September 1934, he had
just published a book, La Politique Colonial, which was
extremely sympathetic to African agricultural development.
In fact, Ryckmans wrote that colonization should cease if
African rights were violated by Europeans. He argued that
Africans should be the first to benefit from the Belgian
presence in Africa, and that it was the responsibility of
the MetrOpole (through prOper monitoring) to make sure this
became a reality. The book also provided an explanation
for Pierre Ryckmans' waffling on certain colonial issues,
since he also believed that the Metropole ought to balance
the interests of colons and Africans. He further consid-
ered that governmental monitoring was absolute--because he

feared if the settlers were left to their own devices,

265

they would promote their own interests at the expense of
the African.41 In any event, "African policy should be
flexible"; and he also believed that "civilizing didn't
occur overnight or within a generation."42
By October 2, 1935, Rubbens had decided to limit cof-
fee production in all the Belgian colonies, and as a result
of Claessen's study tour, to implement other protective
devices for marketing the product.43 The ministry evi-
dently asked the governor general at Leopoldville for his
opinion, because on November 8, Ryckmans replied by tele-
gram that he could not support prohibiting coffee produc-
tion in Rwanda and Burundi, "where the crop was the only
possible resource for Africans."44 He suggested that the
import duty of 2.50BF be replaced with a consumption tax on
all coffees consumed in Belgium, including Congolese vari-
eties. In addition, a valuation produce tax should be
levied on Congolese coffees, and the revenues be returned,
however, to the colony as a subsidy. While he made no men-
tion of the government's plan to restrict Belgian coloni-
zation in the Kivu,45 he did propose the creation of a
stabilization or maintenance fund exclusively for European
coffees. He believed the latter would compensate for the
prohibitions placed on the extension of existing coffee
plantations and future ones as well. In fact, Ryckmans and
Unaki envisioned the maintenance fund as a panacea for the

coffee problem:

266

. . . thirdly, the creation of a [price]
support fund to maintain existing
European plantations [but] excluding
African plants and all future planta-
tions (stop) This would make prohi-
bition unnecessary, facilitate

the placement of Congolese coffees

on other market, improve Belgian/
Brazilian relations, and provide
effective capital for all plantations
at very little cost (stop) Unaki is in
full agreement (stop).4

Although it was not clear how the fund would improve
Belgian/Brazilian relations, a stabilization fund was a
credible idea as an internal price support system. But it
never took hold during the 19303. The other recommendations
were also credible from where the administration in Brus-
sels stood, because these devices would not be credited to
their accounts. In fact, they would generate additional
income for the state. The valuation tax as a subsidy, how—
ever, made good sense economically only if it were also
passed on to consumers. Limiting European settlement was
also consistent with the metropole's grand design to sub-
stitute African production for European production (in
agriculture) because of the former's lower capital overhead.

While the metropole proceeded to draft a decree limit-
ing coffee production in its colonies, Unaki and its allies
continued their offensive to moderate the decree's impact
on their interests. In an interview with the Inco-presse,
Service Colonial Belga of Antwerp, Unaki informed the Bel-

gian public in November, that the vast coffee program in

267

Rwanda and Burundi was a drain on the public treasure, and
even if it were terminated it would still constitute a bad
investment. Furthermore, the release noted,

. . . the Africans' competitive advantage was

unfair; they were relieved of all

charges such as rents and personal

taxes. These advantages were harmful

to planters on the national market,

and even though the government

appeared to be concerned about

overproduction and quality controls,

its policy on African coffee culti-

vation or the absence of one, results

in declining prices for Congolese

coffee in Belgium.47
Unaki, therefore, recommended that the government should
follow A.P.C.C.‘s suggestion and limit coffee cultivation
for three years. The society also introduced new wrinkles
by advocating quotas on foreign coffees entering Belgium
and a subsidy for Congolese coffee surpluses re-exported

48 Unaki lauded the

from Belgium to other overseas markets.
valuation tax and the other proposed subsidies.

Unaki's accolades for the government's price support
systems and the valuation tax were misplaced, and their
receptivity to any kind of subsidy demonstrated a gross
ignorance of international market selling and government's
participation in it. The valuation tax and price support
systems in the form of subsidies are traditional devices
used to promote the marketing and selling of coffees domes-

tically and overseas, none of which is ever beneficial to

the planter in the long run. For one thing, valuation

268

taxes often generate hostility among consumers and inadver-
tently reduce consumption. Since Belgian coffees were not
preferred, consumers certainly would not pay more for them.
If the valuation tax worked, there was the additional prob-
lem of returning the tax as a subsidy to the planters.
First of all, if the subsidy was not paid immediately but
was deferred to some later date, then it could be subject
to inflation. As a result, the planter would receive less
than the value added tax. Secondly, there was always the
problem that coffees would not be sold in sufficient quan-
tities to make the subsidy beneficial.

The re-exportation tax subsidy would have the same
effects as the valuation tax, except that if successful,
it could be profitable to planters. Brokers or wholesalers
would be given a special monetary incentive to sell Bel-
gian coffee surpluses abroad. Consequently, there was the
likelihood that market outlets for Belgian coffees would
increase. If this happened, Belgian coffee brokers, roast-
ers, the planters, and the metropole would benefit mone-
tarily. The farmer would benefit from the tax; the plant-
ers from increased markets overseas; and the metropolitan
government's treasury from additional revenues.

While Unaki's press release did not demonstrate an
awareness of international marketing systems, it was de-
signed to arouse public animosity toward wasteful govern-

ment spending and Africans. In the process Unaki distorted

269

the truth. Although Rwandans did not have to pay rent for
their own land, they paid more taxes than the European set-
tlers and societies combined. For example in 1935 (see
Table D-l, Appendix IV) the income, personal rates and taxes
(European and Asian categories) were 1,248,001.99BF and
614,451.34BF respectively. Rwandans, on the other hand,
paid 12,147,975.75BF in head, polygamy and cattle taxes.
Consequently, Unaki's accusation was designed to generate
public hostility against government spending and "uncivil-
ized“ Africans. They did not stop there; Unaki also ac-
cused Africans of contributing to the devaluation and
defamation of Congolese agricultural products on the world
market. Unaki noted that currently coffee brokers do not
"dare announce that their coffee are of Congolese origin
nor that they are African Arabica brands." Unaki also
accused African Arabica of "lacking uniform tastefl'and the
Union informed the Belgian public that "African coffees
could not be improved."49

To protect themselves from African coffees, Unaki re-
quested the following measures: "a tax of 2.50BF on all
African surplus coffees in Belgium that are sent elsewhere."
This measure would relieve the congestion on the domestic
market and permit the government to recover funds which it
had paid out to develop the African cultivation program.
They also proposed the creation of a single department

which would publicize Congolese coffee through an

270

50 The proposals were for-

aggressive propaganda campaign.
warded to Governor General Ryckmans; he responded by memo-
randum on November 23, 1935 and rejected outright all
schemes designed to change the status quo for African agri-
cultural development. But Ryckmans expressed approval for
the creation of a coffee bureau.51
The Association des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo ended

the year with a salvo of its own, on December 24, when it
reprimanded the Ministry of Colonies for its "illogical"
and "prejudicial" treatment of European coffee planters,
"after [the Ministry] had engaged these same planters,
through an intensive and official propaganda campaign, to
invest their capital in the cultivation of coffee." The
association also chastised the ministry for its lack of
support and hostility by stating that,

the energy, demonstrated by our planters,

and the tenacity they have shown in order

to overcome these difficult times, merit

more than inertia,--not to mention the

hostility,--that they frequently encounter--

without any consideration for our interests.

[This kind of attitude] is difficult to

swallow. 52

The association was also critical of territorial admin-

istrators and their agents, whom it accused of implementing
policies contrary to the interest of European planters,
such as demanding a salary increase for Africans equal to

the devaluation of Belgian currency. Planters, according

to the association, were particularly upset because

271

inflation and the higher costs for consumer's goods would
cancel out any benefit a salary increase would make.
Furthermore, the association argued that the territorial
agents had no right to oppose the employment of women and
children as coffee pullers, for it was easier than any
other kind of work; nor refuse to aid in recruiting African
laborers.53
While the association told the Ministry of Colonies
there were other examples it could cite of "unjustifiable
and untimely intervention on the part of the Territorial
Administrator," whose "job was to facilitate the work of
European planters, rather than obstruct their activities
by following to the letter, administrative rules and regu-
lations that often have no reason for being." However, the
association paused long enough to say that they fully sup-
ported a ministerial report which recommended a publicity
campaign for Congolese coffees to increase consumer inter-
est. The association also informed the ministry of a
recent action taken by France to import 10,000 tons of cof-
fee from Belgian Africa (8,000 tons of robusta and 2,000
tons of Arabica) at a reduced customs rate of 50 percent.
The association hoped the Belgian government would recip-
rocate in some way, then perhaps the quota could be raised
to 20,000 tons.54

The association's request that the ministry respond

to the French initiative apparently was not that unusual,

272

nor were the ministry's efforts to secure additional mar-
kets for coffees. For example in January 1936, the minis-
try informed the Planters Association of a memorandum from
the consul general in Nairobi suggesting the sale of the
Belgian coffee there. In fact the suggestion was initiated
by the Trade Association of Kenya, which also offered sev-
eral inducements such as access to an international ship-
ping lane from the port of Mombasa, where ships left regu-
larly for Europe, the United States, South Africa, Egypt,
and for countries in the Far East. Preferential and re-
duced freight rates, handling and commission charges from
the Congo/Uganda border and special storage facilities in
the Kenya Highlands were also offered. Moreover, the Trade
Association advised the consul general that Belgian plant-
ers could sell their coffees at public auction or directly

to established buyers.55

Although this proposal was refus-
ed, it later became the basis for a 1938 trade arrangement
that permitted Belgian Africa to ship a portion of its cof-
fee (4,083 tons from the Congo and 3,000 tons from Rwanda
and Burundi) directly to foreign markets, primarily to
London and British East Africa.56
Direct marketing was an excellent idea, considering
coffees were a glut on the metropolitan market. Since Bel-
gian consumers preferred high quality Brazilian and Colum-

bian brands, retailers re-exported lower qualities to other

overseas markets. Therefore, it would be more economical

273

to ship these coffees directly from Africa, thus avoiding
the triangular shipments rates involved in commissions,
storage, freight and so forth. Direct shipment also gave
planters a better financial return.57
Everyone had reason to be concerned about the market-
ing of coffee; prices continued to stagnate and surpluses
continued to grow in 1936. Some individuals cited lack of
initiative and believed that "those who pronounced the word
overproduction when there was the [possibility] of resale
[abroad] are only preoccupied with the limited interests

"58 The colonial administration,

of their own companies.
however, was a bit more realistic. In February, it proceed-
ed to modify Article 12 of the Law of May 8, 1924, which
would provide legal sanction in the colonies to restrict

and limit coffee cultivation for Europeans and, reluctant-

ly, for African planters.59

Further coffee expansion was
to be prohibited, and coffee production was to be managed
more efficiently. Quality controls were to be established
before shipment abroad, and licences were to be issued,
certifying the condition and origin of the coffee.60
In March 1936, a Coffee Committee established by the
Ministry of Colonies examined and approved the proposal.
Shortly thereafter, the ministry sent a draft decree to the
Conseil Colonial,61 to prohibit the creation of new coffee

plantations and the extension of existing ones, with the

exceptions of existing trees, replacements, or those

274

interplanted among other crops to increase yields.62 The
prohibition did not apply to the coffee campaigns in Rwanda
and Burundi either, whose coffee planting was not restric-
ted until 1938, despite vocal protest from European plant-

63 After considerable debate, lasting

ers in the Kivu.
several months, the ministry passed the decree on July 22,
1936, temporarily restricting coffee planting for a period
of eight years (to March 2, 1945).64

The Metropole actually had no other choice but to
limit coffee production. Official reports indicated that
coffee yields for the 1936-1937 crOp year would be between
17,000 to 18,000 tons, and estimates for 1937-1938 were
23,000 tons. Only about 50 percent of these totals would
be shipped to Belgium, where coffee could not be readily

absorbed,65

and the surplus would only further reduce
prices, currently at l.SOBF per kilo. The glut and de-
flation were possibilities, given the number of hectares

in production in 1936 (see Table XI) and the existing sur-
plus of 2,400 tons.66 The prohibition was no panacea, but
it was an appropriate starting point, only after the Metro-
pole encouraged its people to sell the coffee to others.
Quality controls and subsidies were designed to improve
quality to a large extent, but the colonial office also
sought foreign markets for coffee, not an easy task, con—.

sidering that Belgian coffees were not selling in Europe

and were the least preferred (see Table XII) in Belgium.

275

 

 

 

Table XI. Total Number of Hectares Planted in Coffee
in 1936.
Belgian Congo
Europeans
In full production 37,501
New 18,757
Total 56,258
Africans
In full production 377
New 2,599
Total 2,976
Rwanda and Burundi (Africans only)
In full production 9,692
New 9,130
Total 18,822

 

SOURCE: Archives Africaines, Brussels, Ministére des
Colonies. Carton Agri. (341) No. 497, S‘Eme Direction
Géhérale 3 Monsieur L. Orts, Secrétaire de l'Union des
Producteurs de CaféL Annexe: Situation de la Culture
du Cafe au 31 Decembre 1936. Brussels, December 11,

1937.

276

 

 

Table XII. Coffees Imported for Belgian Consumption,
1936-1939 (in tons).

Country ‘iggg .lgél 1239 iggg
France 3,811 5,862 4,595 1,311
Holland 52,741 42,234 46,234 29,894
British Indies 2,671 3,211 1,480 3,602
Dutch Indies 7,466 8,310 6,567 4,985
United States 3,163 2,009 3,985 3,010
Guatemala 1,944 2,854 2,534 3,053
Haiti 39,453 59,988 47,466 54,386
Brazil 221,067 196,814 201,482 250,055
Columbia 3,786 4,769 4,920 4,452
Misc. 9,946 11,649 7,044 10,362
Total 346,048 337,700 326,700 365,110
Belgian Congo 177,781 173,520 189,365 182,102
TOTAL Q.M. 523,829 516,309 547,212

511,220

 

SOURCE:
Divers:
Dossier

Colonies, Brussels,

1940.

Carton Agri. (343), 194g,- Dossier E. Cafe.-
Marchés, Politiques Cafe Robusta, et etc.,
E-3, Mévente des Arabicas, Comptoir des Cafes

Victor DeHae S‘M. Van den Abeels, au Ministére des

(with annexe).

Antwerp, April 12,

277

Table XIII. Import Duty on Coffees in 1938 (per 100 kilos).

 

 

 

 

Countries Belgian Francs
Italy 3,654
Hungary 3,630
Austria 3,146
Germany 1,914
Spain 1,860
Czechoslovakia 1,781
France 700
Denmark 560
Greece 536
Switzerland 478
Portugal 369
Sweden 323
Argentina - 418

 

SOURCE: Carton Agri (342, Dossier No. 528, Limitation des
Plantations de Cafe, No. 528/12, Annexe I, Union des Pro-
ducteurs de Cafe du Congo Belge, Note confidentielle, p. 3.
Brussels, April 22, 1938.

278

As Table XII demonstrates, Belgian coffees were actu-
ally in competition not only with those of Brazil and the
rest of Latin America but also with the produce of the
colonies of several other European nations. In addition,
most EurOpean countries imposed stringent import duties on
foreign coffee (see Table XIII). Brussels, however, be-
lieved it could address or even redress this issue through
improved processing techniques and price support of subsi-
dies to encourage producers and wholesalers to seek for-
eign outlets for their product. As early as February 1936,
six months before the ordinance limiting coffee was passed,
the metropole considered prOposals to licence imports of
all coffees. To guarantee quality control, the Commission
Economique Interministereille would issue licences only if
the entering coffees met certain standards and were ship-

67 While this mea-

ped directly from the country of origin.
sure would eliminate dumping, it could also antagonize
major producer-countries and invite retaliation. To make
the new system more palatable for the foreign countries
and their producers, but especially for Brazil, the metrop-
ole repealed import duties on plantation coffees on April
4, 1936.68

The administration would exercise quality control at
the source or before coffees were shipped overseas from

the colonies. While the quantity of coffee coming from

the provinces would not be limited, it would have to meet

279

"certain" quality specifications.70 The licencing system,
so the administration believed, would stimulate the rehab-
ilitation of "good coffees," and it would be profitable to
"our merchant marines and to the port of Anvers," because
it would provide the merchant fleets with about 3 million

1

francs of freight (or about 55BF per ton)..7 By year's

end, however, only the segment establishing quality con-

72 The administration

trols at the point of exit remained.
at Brussels, undoubtedly concerned about retaliation, had
discarded the rest of the proposal.

Henceforth, however, coffees would not receive export
authorization from Belgian Africa without possessing suf-
ficient quality of cleanliness: odors had to be signifi-
cantly reduced (i.e., less moisture would be permitted)
and foreign material could not exceed 2 percent of the
total weight, nor contain more than 10 percent black or
partially black beans, and bags could only contain a fixed
percentage of broken pieces.73

In 1937, the Colonial Office at Brussels even con-
sidered a private initiative from Comité’National du Kivu
to establish a COOperative marketing board for coffee, and
agreed to contribute half the capital in the form of an
interest free loan of 250,000BF from the Fonds de Coloni-
sation. But confronted with Belgian devaluation, selling

Arabica was particularly difficult; the Comité'consequently

planned to concentrate its efforts on organizing the sale

280

74

of Arabica. The cooperative also considered a working

relationship with the coffee board of Kenya to improve the

reputation of Arabica coffees.75

Unfortunately, this ini-
tiative collapsed, because it was impossible to unite set-
tlers and planters into a single organization. In fact,
the Chamber of Commerce of Costermansville protested rig-
orously against the venture, because it believed the
Comite National was much too diversified and not represen-

76 This particu-

tative of the coffee planters as a whole.
lar episode demonstrated that the planters were not as
unified as they wanted to appear; nor did they always agree
on the best way to defend their interests. However, they
could unite when faced with an external threat, coming

from the African areas in the Kivu, Rwanda, and Burundi or
from the larger plantation owners from Brazil.

Government efforts to create a marketing board for
coffees were dismal failures, primarily because it had no
rational approach to the problem. While it fully under-
stood the magnitude of the situation, the administration
really had no consistent way to attack it. The metropole
was eager to experiment but evidently had little persis-
tence, when it came to achieving a solution. The licen-»
cing procedure was discarded for fear of offending Brazil;
the marketing board was abandoned because of planter oppo-

sition. Yet the metropole clearly understood that there

was not much time left: coffee stocks were increasing,

281

and, as Table XIV shows, potential surpluses loomed even
larger despite the prohibition ordinance of 1936. Moreover,
prices continued to stagnate--the average selling price for
Robusta in 1938 was 3BF per kilo and for Arabica, 5.50 to
6.00BF per kilo. The government noted that Arabica was
selling at 2BF per kilo below its real value. Attempts to
improve Arabica's uneven quality, fermentation and drying,

77 Nor was the price

however, had not closed the price gap.
likely to go up, as long as existing surpluses remained on
the market. And moving stocks was almost impossible, giv-
en the import duties imposed by some consumer countries
(see Table XIII).

The situation for Robusta was somewhat better. Bel-
gians were beginning to acquire a taste for it, particu-
larly if it was mixed with other blends, and efforts at

78

quality control had improved its reputation. The counter-

offensive against Brazilian coffees, initiated in 1936, was

79 The immediate

beginning to change consumer preference.
problem, however, was to eliminate surplus Arabica from
the national market. Consequently, Minister Rubbens de-
cided to grant a regressive three-year subsidy (bonifica-
tion) of 1.50BF, 1.00BF and .50 centimes for each kilo of
Arabica sold on foreign markets. There was also the pos-
sibility that some inroads could be made on the German
quota of 2,000 tons.80 But some experts doubted this

would happen, since Germans were partial to good quality

282

Table XIV. Coffee Cultivation in 1938.

 

 

A. European Plantations (in hectares)
Robusta : 38,598

Arabica + 17,660

Total 56,258 hectares (of which 2/3 are in
full production).

B. African Cultivation (in hectares)
Belgian Congo 1 2,400
Rwanda-Burundi + 12,400 (or 19 million coffee trees)

Total 14,800 hectares (of which 2/3 are in
full production).

 

SOURCE: Archives Africaine, Brussels. MinistBre des
Colonies. Carton Agri. (342), Dossier [Café, 1935-1939],
Rapport Pour M. le Ministre, p. 1. Brussels, May 30, 1938.

robusta.81

The metrOpole, however, was only fooling itself,
especially if one considers that most foreign markets, in
an attempt to improve their own trade advantages, were
applying protectionist devices and restrictive quotas
against their competition. British protectionism, in fact,
was partially responsible for the accumulation of Arabica
stocks on the Belgian market.82

Prior to 1938, much of the African Arabica produced in

Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi went to Britain, British

283

East Africa, South Africa, Canada, Syria, and the United
States. But after the reinforcement of protectionism the
London market evaporated, and the Belgian market was forced
to assume the production.* As Arabica stocks accumulated,
European planters, particularly the Union Belge des Colons
du Kivu (hereafter Ubelco) at Costermansville, demanded
the suspension of Arabica-growing in the African areas.
The Union was especially concerned about the 1939 exten—
sion campaign in Rwanda and Burundi. In a March telegram
to the Ministry of Colonies, Ubelco told officials that a
favorable decision would have considerable psychological

83 In a much

effect on retailers with surpluses at Antwerp.
more detailed memorandum of March 12, 1938, Ubelco told
the ministry that the request to curtail production was
justified because "the pressure from African production in
Rwanda is partly the reason Arabica coffee from European
plantations do not sell." But at the same time, Ubelco
made a startling admission when it also told the minister
that African and European coffees were of similar quality.

The Union also said African coffees could be sold for a

franc or l.SOBF less, "primarily because Africans don't

 

*See Table XIV, which indicates that European grown Arabica
was quite small in comparison to Robusta production. Also
Africans were the largest producers of Arabica.

284

have multiple production costs that are usually detrimental
to the profit level of EurOpean planters."84
Ubelco's remarks were significant for several reasons.

First of all, it is the first time that European planters
admitted that African coffees were not inferior.86 Second-
ly, Ubelco's statements were thinly veiled requests for
Europeans to receive special consideration because times
were so bad. This attitude was even more marked when
Ubelco went on to say that Africans had "received more
assistance than European planters." Ubelco concluded by
saying the union or European planters had not opposed the
introduction of Arabica coffee production in Ruanda-Urundi,
"primarily because the condition of the market was more
favorable than it is today." And Ubelco wondered whether,

they [the administration] could, at this

time, approve the Ruanda-Urundi coffee

project that is designed . . . to provide

Africans with indispensable resources

[with which] to eliminate the poverty

that exists in the country, when [in

fact] the present economic condition

of Ruanda-Urundi has improved to such

an extent that these considerations 86

appear, in large measure, unwarranted.
Ubelco noted that Africans also enjoyed many other advan-
tages as a result of European colonialism: road construc-
tion throughout the country enabled them to sell produce

87 In

profitable; and mines provided them with employment.
other words, what more could they possibly want?

Ubelco, in citing these benefits, felt justified in

285

asking the minister to end the 1939 extension program in
Rwanda and Burundi. Termination would unquestionably re-
lieve European anxiety and allow more profit once African
competition was removed. In other words, Ubelco wanted the
metropole to save whites from economic ruin, "particularly"
as one commentator observed, "those settlers who have put
their capital and efforts of many years into the planting
of Arabica in the Kivu province."88
The metropole's proposed telegraphic reply of March 17,

1938, was quite cryptic and non-committal:

Took note of your telegram of March 12

(stop) We anticipate revenues to permit

the exportation of "Arabica" to places

[markets] other than Belgium (stOp) For

surplus we point out that the develop-

ment of African coffee plants [in Rwanda

and Burundi] have reached saturation

pOint.89
But the next day, the Secretary General in the Colonial Of-
fice was more specific, recommending termination of the
1939-extension project, as well as advising officials in
Rwanda and Burundi to concern themselves solely with re-
placing new plants for old.90

However, not all officialdom was certain that the sus-

pension would be perceived as fair to African planters. In
a memorandum of March 25, 1938, Governor General Ryckmans
reminded the ministry of his position on African agricul-
tural development, and warned that it might be impossible

to defend such a decision before the League of Nations.91

286

In sharp contrast Governor Jungers of Ruanda-Urundi com-
mented that the crisis in the Arabica coffee trade was in-
deed a real one.92 He planned to stop the extension cam-
paign as soon as the current crop of young plants were put
into the ground; and advised his staff not to create new
nurseries in 1939, but to concentrate on replacement and
proper maintenance.93 Apparently no one but Ryckmans was
concerned about the metropole's commitment to African
development.

In April 1938, he again told Minister Rubbens that he.
opposed the restrictions on several counts. First, it
would have no effect on decreasing production, since inten-
sive cultivation on existing hectares would probably be the
consequence of any restriction, a particularly prophetic
point. Ryckmans repeated his notion that any restriction
would have serious political and psychological repercus-
sions, although he did not elaborate. He added that sus-
pension represented a renunciation of the government's com-
mitment to African coffee planters in Ruanda-Urundi.
Finally, he expressed concern that Africans would not ful-
ly comprehend the abrupt policy change.

The African will not be able to under-
stand that overnight we establish a
law which makes him plant a coffee tree
while at the same time we penalize him
when he does not plant!94
Ryckmans also thought that this change in policy would

be offensive to the African since the administration

287

"prohibits him from planting at a time when he was just
beginning to see, from personal experience, that planting
coffee was in his own best interest." He also had reason
to believe

. I
. . . p1 l'Europeen touche une
prime a 1' exportation en con-
trepartie de l' interdiction de
s'etendre l'indigEne,se verra
appliquer 1'interdiction sans
aucune contrepartie.95

Ryckmans' point of view evidently prevailed to some
extent, for during a Colonial Council debate the scope of
the decree to suppress the 1939-extension of the coffee cam-
paign in Ruanda and Urundi was expanded. During the debate,

one member commented on the decree's duplicity, in discus-

96

sing the decline in world Arabica prices. While exagger-

ating the issue, he asked somewhat rhetorically,

By limiting it [coffee production],
aren't we going to ruin and hamper
the magnificent efforts of more than
400,000 African planters who live

in Ruanda-Urundi, [on the pretext]
of protecting several dozen European
settlers? Couldn't some other
measures be envisioned to assist
European planters, such as

granting a subsidy for each kilo

of coffee harvested?

While it can not be determined how much the council
member's questions changed the focus of the debate, what

emerged from the Conseil Colonial was an ordinance with the

 

following title: "project de decret sur limitation tempor-

aire des plantations de cafe au Congo Belge et au

288

97 Thus, the suspension had been extended

Ruanda-Urundi."
to include the Belgian Congo. The change showed that the
council was more concerned with coffee surpluses than in
the interests of a few Belgian settlers. Members felt a
need to stabilize the national market, because a recent
study predicted that unless Arabica production was stabi-
lized the output from both Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi would
be 35,000 tons of coffee in four years, an amount that Bel-
gium could not possibly absorb, so the Conseil's decided to

98 To make the

suppress further extension in both colonies.
decision acceptable to European planters, the council rec-
ommended they be given subsidies to finance the next har-
vests and reduction on transport costs, neither of which
would be accorded to Africans. The decree also emphasized
that neither robusta or Arabica planting was to be extended
until the general economic situation changed.99
The planters concluded that they had been hoodwinked
by the metropole. Whereas the initial decree was intended
to restrict Arabica plantations in Rwanda and Burundi, what
emerged was a total ban on the extension of all varieties.
Although many planters immediately sought to lay the ques-
tion before the Conseil de Colonisation and Unaki, in order
to plan a concerted counter-attack, others were more con-
cerned that the decree had been taken without any prior

consultation with colonial officials or with private groups,

such as the provincial government, the Comité National du

289

100 These were the most affected and the

Kivu, or Ubelco.
most vocal in protesting when their interests were at stake
--a point which the administration knew all to well. Other
planters, however, were consoled by the subsidies offered
by the government.

Brussels then turned its full attention to the subsidy
issue, and proved that even the simplest device can be made
so complex as to be unresolvable. From February 1938 to
May, l940--the day Germany invaded Belgium--the subsidy is—
sue remained an albatross around the administration's neck.
Nothing seemed to work or Operate for very long; the admin-
istration constantly reversed itself or meticulously exam-
ined every proposal, so that in the end, subsidies were a
confused and tangled mess.

The first request for a free export subsidy or an al-
lowance of 2BF for 5,000 tons of unsaleable stocks of
Arabica at Antwerp, proposed in early February, was rejec-
ted out of hand by the administration, because it consti-

101

tuted dumping. In March, a comprehensive request for an

annual subsidy of 6 million francs was proposed by Senator
Godding, to permit the colonies to establish a marketing

board which would sell Arabica overseas and licence foreign

102

coffees entering Belgium. Because it would require an-

nual grants from the Colonial Budget, the Ministry of Colo-

103

nies rejected the proposal. However, the metrOpole

granted a 1.50BF per kilo rebate to those European planters

290

who successfully exported their Arabica coffees overseas.
The subsidy or rebate was designed to correct the diffi-
culties encountered in recent months by Arabica in the
Belgium market.104
In 1939, market conditions at Antwerp continued to de-
teriorate, and by July they were critical not only for Ara-
bica but robusta as well. The reasons for adverse market
conditions for robusta were quite complex, but stocks for
the latter, which had suddenly grown to 7,500 tons,105 was
one factor. The sudden increase was attributed to the in-
tensive cultivation practiced by Belgian planters who had
anticipated the restrictive ordinances of 1936 and 1938.*
As a result young plants were entering into the harvest
cycle, and some agronomical experts in the administration
also feared that intensive cultivation of robusta had the
capacity to increase yields by 40 percent.106 Moreover,
the selling prices of robusta fluctuated between 3.90 and

4.11BF, compared to the world price of 3.00BF,107

making
other coffees much cheaper to purchase. Brazil was the
major culprit in weakening the world market prices and the
major cause for the deterioration of the Belgian market.

At the beginning of the year, it had begun to dump Rio No.

7, which sold for 3.16BF per kilo (Rio No. 5, introduced

 

*See p. 286 for Governor Ryckmans' prophecy and pages 287-
288 for the colonial debate on the intensive cultivation
issue.

291

earlier, sold for 3.0mm,”8

thus underselling Belgian
Congo robusta.

In order to move robusta off the national market, the
Ministry granted a subsidy Of 70 centimes for every kilo
exported elsewhere. The export subsidy was to last twelve
months,109 but because of the outbreak of the war in Eur-
ope, it only lasted for two. Brussels suspended the ex-
port tariff in September for fear that it would not receive
adequate supplies of coffee for its own nationals.110 Con-
sequently the situation worsened as stocks accumulated at
Antwerp. These were sold at a loss, and they were added to
coffees which previously had buyers on the foreign markets.

The stocks which had accumulated at Antwerp prior to
the Nazi invasion stemmed partially from intensive culti-
vation practiced in Belgian Africa. By utilizing the land
to the fullest, planters hOped to increase profit margins
and to circumvent the decrees of 1936 and 1938 limiting the
extension of coffee plantations. Evidently the practice
did not generate sufficient profits, for in February 1939,
the Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge approached
Minister Rubbens and requested a reexamination of the de-
cree limiting the extension of coffee acreage. Represen-
tatives of the Société Anonyme complained that all planters
were experiencing difficulty in adhering to the ordinance,

which it believed was actually reducing present production

levels, even though this was not the intent of the decree.

292

The situation was particularly pressing at the Societe's
Benga station, where 600 hectares was planted in coffee.111
The Societe was considering replacing 150 hectares of
the oldest trees that were planted in 1928. Under the 1938
ordinance, it could only plant on new soil if equivalent
hectares were destroyed in the old plantation. The soci-
ety's argument, however, was that the 150 hectares in ques-
tion would not become productive until after the third year.
In order to maintain current production levels, it would
have to plant 150 hectares in young plants and simulta-

112 The

neously maintain the 150 hectares planted in 1928.
ploy was of course against the law, but in the Societews
view, the policy of immediate destruction of plants was
"anti-economic and does not conform to the intent of the
ordinance." The organizations currently produced 500 tons
annually, but if they followed administrative policy to the
letter, production in three or four years would decline 120
tons. Consequently, it wanted the ministry to reinterpret
the decree and permit the Société to retain the old plants
until the new plants matured. The older plants would then
be destroyed, since planters (and the SociétE) would enter
into a contract to destroy the old tree three years after
the replacement plants were functioning.113
The Société had enlisted the aid of Senator Godding,

who wrote to the ministry the same day the organizations'

memorandum was mailed. The senator had also written to the

293

4th Direction General earlier in January but without satis-
factory results. The director general had replied in vague
terms and concluded by saying that such a plan would be ex-
tremely difficult and expensive to monitor.114 However, on
March 7, he recommended to the ministry that the matter be
studied, in spite of the difficulties that would be involv-
ed in monitoring the destruction of older acreage.115
The issue came to a head at the May 19 meeting of the
Union des Producteurs de Cafe’du Congo Belge in Brussels.
The colonial office was ably represented by Director
General Van Den Abeele, Inspector General Heys, and G. E.
Sladden, the Colonies' coffee expert. Senator Godding was
also in attendance. The Union sought to persuade colonial
officials to permit the destruction of old trees three or
four years after new ones had been planted and had become

116 The Union also argued that reclamation and

productive.
replantation, within the existing hectares, as suggested by
the administration, would be extremely costly, especially
the reclamation of exhausted land. Those.who had tried to
rejuvenate land containing old coffee trees, they claimed,
had achieved only mediocre results. Moreover, they believ-
ed that the written pledge to destroy old trees was an ade-
quate undertaking. Even if the decrees were repealed,

117 Under

planters would still uproot old trees as pledged.
the new scheme, Congolese coffee "would not be subject to a

slow decline," and the objectives of the ordinances of 1936

294

and 1938 would be maintained. Better still, the amor-
tization of their own capital equipment would be preserved
as well.118

The administration was not impressed. In responding
to the Union's argument that the present ordinance would
impede the export of coffee from the Belgian Congo, admin-
istrative officials told them that any decline would stem
from their own negligence. In fact, they could cite numer-
ous instances where planters had put in new hectares,
"applied a vague kind of pruning and inadequate mulching,
and then expected these plants to produce for them."119
If yields were declining, it was because the soil was ex-
hausted or damaged from lack of adequate terracing and
maintenance. When trees were trimmed improperly, the
structure of the trees became deformed. "Obviously, it was
easier to plant trees and to expect them to grow, then to
perform operations which would make them.more productive."120
The maintenance of the decree, "as it is presently inter-
preted, would not effect the amount of coffee exported, if
planters adopt more rational methods of cultivation."
Officials also argued that periodic spraying, inclusive
pruning and judicious amounts of shading would double the
average yield of coffee trees, then less than 700 kilos, in
two or three‘years.121 The current regulations offered

practical solutions to the problem of overproduction and

were also designed to direct planters toward more rational

295

cultivation methods, to improve the quality of coffee, and
to stimulate diversification. The last, according to colo-
nial officials, would provide greater balance to the plan-
tation economy. But more importantly, there would not be
the problem of control.122

Colonial officials realized that it would be almost
impossible to force planters to destroy even the most mar-
ginally productive fields or bushes. Planters who had
initially argued for a reexamination because they needed to
redistribute general costs as much as possible and to amor-
tize the costs of processing, would use the very same
points against destroying plants when the time arrived.
And how would the verification be done? Monitoring imposed
a considerable task on limited agricultural personnel, who
would have to determine precisely the areas to be destroyed
or replanted. The procedure would require not only the re-
tention of statistical data but would also involve consid-
erable cost. With the depression and existing commitments,
the ministry was in no mood to assume this cost too. The
financial component alone made the whole request, from the
vantage point of the administration, unrealistic, but the
planters and their supporters persisted.

A week later, the Association des Planters de Café'du
Congo joined the fray at the request of Senator Godding and
Mr. Moeller, president of the association. They requested

a meeting with Director General Van den Abeele in Brussels

296

to discuss the reinterpretation. While Van den Abelle was
adamant about the maintenance of the existing ordinance, he
did relent somewhat by stating the administration's willing-
ness to reassess the ordinance within two years (to August
1940). By then, he believed the colonial government would
be in a better position to judge the effectiveness of the
ordinance and to render a decision about its maintenance,

123 The planters and their support-

suppression, or change.
ers were undaunted by this ploy to table the issue. Al-

though they remained inactive until June, when an alternate
solution was suggested. Instead of asking for replacement
parcels, the Union ought to approach the colonial officials

124 The

with some kind of formula for production quotas.
latter would eliminate the need for an elaborate bureau-
cracy, would be considerably less expensive, and would not
require the destruction of coffee trees. By limiting each
plantation to a particular production ceiling, which could
nOt be surpassed, the colonial government could estimate
the maximum of amount of financial assistance needed to
assist planters in achieving production levels without hin-
dering the operations of each individual concession. The
production ceiling would be fixed (and uniform) according
to the type of coffee cultivated--Arabica or robusta. How-
ever, there would be no need to limit or expand the number
of hectares planted, since the restriction would be placed

on the amount of tonnage produced.125

297

The government's reply was essentially the same as it
had always been. On June 20, 1939, it informed the Union
that the existing ordinance would not be modified, and re-
stated the reasons it had put forth in the May 19 meeting
with the Union des Producteurs de Cafe du Congo Belge. At
the same time, officials admitted that the existing decree
was expedient as long as stocks existed on the market at
Antwerp. Offers of financial incentives to encourage ex-
portation of coffee to overseas' outlets would still be

126

available, and there was the possibility of terminating

the ordinance in August 1940, to be discussed by the Colo-

127 But as far as the administration

nial Council in July.
was concerned, the matter was closed until the Conseil
Colonial made a decision on the proposed modifications.

With the cancellation of the export subsidies in Sep-
tember, there was little chance that the ordinance would be
changed. Although international events changed the situa-
tion entirely, settlers at Uele, the Kivu, Biaro, and plant-
ers associated with Unaki, Comite National du Kivu, and the

128 Settlers com-

Kreglinger group continued to protest.
plained about administrative incompetence, the emigration

of Banyarwanda, and the creeping pauperization of the popu-
lation. Others felt they were being slighted, because the
mining industries, considered more important to the war ef-

fort than agriculture, received greater financial assis-

tance. Still others begin to fight among themselves,

298

questioning the credentials and suitability of reprsenta-

129 Colonial officials in Brussels and

tive associations.
in the colonies responded in kind, especially to charges of
favoritism and incompetence.

At the beginning of 1940, the replacement issue was
superceded by the situation in the Arabica coffee market at
Antwerp. Many planters were too preoccupied with survival
to carry on the struggle to repeal the 1938-ordinance.
Arabica prices had increased slightly because customers an-
ticipated shortages, and there was hoarding. As a result,
planters sold their product for 9BF per kilo on the nation-
al market at Antwerp and from 4.50 to 5.00BF per Kilo
locally. Still the coffee surplus was 2,000 tons, and
buyers expected another shipment of 1,000 tons in early
February. In spite of a slight price increase, the prog-
nosis was critical because some roasters had reported no
sales for the past two months. Also officials argued that
plantations in the Kivu and Ituri were no longer economi-

130 By February, the situation was so

cally feasible.
acute that unsaleable Arabica stocks produced a credit
coagulation, making it difficult for wholesalers to obtain
money to purchase coffee and planters to secure loans to
pay other creditors. In fact, planters in the Kivu and
Ituri faced bankruptcy, and others found it difficult to

pay bank loans. Naturally, they pressured the national and

colonial governments to reinstitute the export subsidy in

299

order to relieve the market congestion and to improve the
precarious position of commercial coffee buyers and
growers.131 But it was doubtful whether the subsidy would
have improved the buyers' positions or the planters'
finances. Submarine warfare in the Atlantic made lenders
reluctant to grant loans; wholesalers were also plagued
with high insurance costs for coffee consignments shipped
from the colonies.

There were a few futile attempts to resurrect the re-
placement issue in March, despite the administration's rul-
ing in November 1939 that the ordinance would not be amend-

132

ed or repealed. Aside from a few technical points,

133 As far as the ad-

nothing new was added to the debate.
ministration was concerned the matter was closed, although
accumulating stocks at Antwerp remained a problem. In
March, the administration had considered numerous propos-
als, involving quotas and the institution of the re-export
subsidy of 1.50BF per kilo. But these measures were dis-
carded for fear that they might invite retaliation.134
Even when, on March 29, 1940, the Comite'Economique Inter-
ministériel proposed the stabilization of the importation
of foreign coffees in Belgium on the basis of the 1938
import levels, which were 10 percent lower than those Of
1939, the colonial office refused for fear of Brazilian

135

reprisals. Most officials, however, supported the re-

institution of the export allowance (bonification) of

300

1.50BF per kilo of Arabica exported directly from the Bel-

136 even though they knew

gian Congo to oversea's markets,
that oversea's outlets were problematical. The allowance
served only as a morale booster for planters and nothing
more. Most countries had already taken measures to stop
the importation of foreign products from entering their

countries. Many observers wondered out loud why Belgium

137 The subsidy issue was still

had not done likewise.
being debated when the Nazi's invaded Belgium in May, ren-
dering the issue moot.

With the surrender of Belgium to Germany in May 1940,
the planters lost their principle market. In the colony,
the governor general repealed all other export duties and
customs surtax on Arabica coffee. The 10 centimes licence
tax was also revoked, since the creation of a new coffee
marketing board* in November assumed the licencing function.
However, by May the coffee economy in the colony had truly
collapsed and was not revived until 1942, when exports rose
appreciably, thanks largely to the Office du Cafe and some

138

arrangements made with the allies. Robusta struggled on

until, in 1941, it found markets in Egypt and in the
Sudan.139
When the planters found themselves in difficulty in

1934, they united and turned to the metropole for help.

 

*See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the Office du Cafe:

301

The defeat over the zone g3 protection issue had taught

 

them that they could bring pressure to bear only if they
were a unified lobby. They demanded not only subsidies and
quotas to protect and sell their coffee, but they also
asked the metropole to eliminate their African competitor
as well. Planters also sought to regain their own identity
and confidence as Europeans and Belgian citizens vis-a-vis
their African counterparts. Using their associations and
through letters and press releases, they succeeded in re-
minding officials who they were and what they had done dur-
ing the colonial phase to "civilize" or develop African
agriculture and to bring prosperity to the colonies. These
actions warranted respect and special consideration.

The metropole, committed to African agricultural de-
velopment because of its low capital overhead, acquiesced
in part to the demands of the European planters primarily
because alternative solutions--either quotas on foreign
coffees or the authorization of re-export subsidies--would
have invited retaliation. The realistic solution would
have been to replace EurOpean producers with Africans, for
they could produce more for less. Africans did not require
the services associated with the European "civilized" life
or the power of a European planter lobby. The crisis, how-
ever, in international economies and the coffee markets
made the substitution impossible. The metropole, however,

could make coffee production more efficient, and at the

302

same time eliminate marginal European planters with only
minimal cost to the administration. Consequently, rather
than restrict the prohibition against the future extension
of planting to Africans, the ordinance was expanded to in-
corporate European producers as well. However, the met-
ropole's overriding concern was that commercial agreements
with Brazil could not be jeopardized. In fact, the general
policy of the Belgian government for the 19303 could be
characterized as

n'aggravant pas sensiblement les

conditions d'importation d' un

product interessant et n'ayant

d'autre but que de protéger un

produit national dont la production

se trouve d'ailleurs Stre l'objet

de limitation legal.140

The administration understood that Brazil controlled

the international market. Therefore, the only solution was
to encourage its planters to decrease their productive ca-
pacity, dump their coffees in Europe if possible, for even
lower prices, or find new outlets in Africa, Asia Minor, or
North America. But because of the extreme economic dis-
location within the industrialized nations brought on by
the depression, no solutions would work for very long. Re-
covery meant creating protectionist devices to achieve oneks
own advantage. Consequently the administration experiment-
ed with a number of its own devices and plans in an attempt
to sell its coffees. The war and the invasion by Nazi Ger-

many provided the ultimate solution: the opportunity to

start over again.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1For examples of the role of the state and its rela-
tion to production and economic development, see the fol-
lowing studies: Martin Legassick's "South Africa: Capi-
tal Accumulation and Violence," Economy and Society, III,
No. 3 (August, 1974), pp. 253-291; B. J. Berman's and
J. M. Lonsdale's "Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and
the Colonial State: the Development of the Labor Control
System in Kenya, 1919-1929," Canadian Journal of African
Studies, XIV, No. l (1980), pp. 55-81; and M. L. Morris,
"The development of capitalism in South African Agricul-
ture: class Struggle in the Countryside," Economy and
Society, V, No. 3 (August, 1976) pp. 292-343.

2See William B. Cohen's The French Encounter with
Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880 (Blooming-
ton & London, 1980); Rhoda Howard's Colonialism and Under-
development in Ghana (New York, 1978); and Elena L. Berger's
Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924
to Independence (Oxford, 1974).

 

 

Cohen argues that the images formed in the course of
interaction between Europeans and non-Europeans in the
fifteenth century helped shape white reactions to non-
EurOpeans. These images became deeply implanted in French
culture and exercised a pervasive influence over later
generations of Frenchmen. However, in the eighteenth cen-
tury, despite deeply entrenched French beliefs in black
inequality, Africans were treated better in Africa, when
the French wanted to make political and commercial inroads
than in the racially rigid plantation societies in the
West Indies and the Indian Ocean. By the nineteenth cen-
tury, French tolerance in West Africa had given way to
racism, in the light of French expansionist aims and
imperialist dreams, economic and geopolitical considera-
tions, and when the French had acquired a preponderance of
power relative to Africans. To limit an emerging colored
elite, French closed entry to education and employment
opportunities and tried to take away political rights
previously granted. As French imperialism advanced,
French dependence on the assimilated populations of
Saint-Louis ceased, and a new relationship between white
and black, which was more rigid and racially exclusive,

303

304

was established in the Senegambia, Western Sudan, and the
west coast of Africa south from Senegal to Gabon. The late
nineteenth century change in French attitude and course of
action was also in response to a perceived change in
British policy; to prevent areas from falling under British
control, the French launched a conquest of their own.

See pages XV-XIX, 120-129, 169-178, and 254-282.

Howard describes how capitalist development in Ghana
was circumscribed by an external bourgeoisie bolstered by
the power of a foreign state. She maintains that in colo-
nial Ghana, the state acted on behalf of the metropolitan
bourgeoisie as long as their interests coincided. Colonial
rule was imperial rule, and imperial interests were not
always the same as the interests of the expatriate business-
men, even though they were given the right of consultation
with the colonial and home governments (through the Colo-
nial office) and possessed considerable influence in the
financial decisions made by the colonial state. She notes
that racial lines were drawn between Africans and Europeans
and conflicts were expressed in trading and administration.
But competition in both economics and politics had been
conducted on a fairly balanced basis until the mid-nine-
teenth century for the former and until the beginning of
the twentieth century for the latter. Nor did the British,
in the beginning, consider themselves as a superior race
dealing with an inferior one. A number of intermarriages
took place between the original European traders in Ghana
and aristocratic African trading families. European toler-
ance collapsed, however, when European firms began to re-
organize in a way that minimized the need to use African
traders. Direct shipment to European employees on the
coast were substituted for shipments consigned on credit
to African trading partners. Howard maintains that the
change to direct shipping was in part a deliberate attempt
to remove African competitors, who were experiencing dif-
ficulties with repayment of debts, and the acquisition of
specie to pay customs duties or to pay cash for agricul-
tural produce. Europeans consistently undercut African in
sales and overpriced them in purchasing. These devices
pushed African traders out of the market. The decline of
African traders as a significant economic force was accom-
panied by their exclusion in other spheres as well.
Ghanaians were systematically excluded from the Gold Coast
Chamber of Commerce by the turn of the century, as well as
from government. See pages 15-17 and 146-186.

In Berger's study of the development of the mining in-
dustry on the Zambian copperbelt, she demonstrates that the
state's attitude toward labor disputes, conflict between
white and black laborers, and economic Opportunity for

305

African workers were often influenced by economic consider-
ations. During the depression, the British government re-
fused to consider a plan to stabilize the labor force at
the Northern Rhodesian COpper companies because labor mi-
gration provided a means of gaining taxes from Africans.
The administration also believed that a continued policy

of labor migration would not alarm the white community,
since such a policy was not likely to encourage the acqui-
sition of industrial skills by African workers. And the
importance of copper supplies in Britain's war effort in
19403” outweighed adherence to the wavering principle of
equal opportunity or gradual integration for Africans in
the economy. Similarly, the British government was reluc-
tant to accept the recommendations of the Dalgleish Commis-.
sion on African employment opportunities because it feared
labor unrest by whites at a time when copper production
was strategically important to the United Kingdom.

In terms of racial relations, she notes that the Afri-
cans were tolerated in the towns out of fear of a labor
shortage, but the normal relationship between white and
black was that of master and servant, a circumstance‘ which
she asserts, froze the position of the African in a mixed
society. He gained little protection from the colonial
system for the government's wary concern for employer's
rights often neutralized its duties of trusteeship. Fur-
thermore the color bar was extended to the field of employ-
ment in transportation and construction industries and
government service until 1939. See pages 19-21, 32-54,
and 106-111.

3Vice Governor General Junger was appointed to his
post on June 30, 1932. He was instrumental in reducing
food prestations. In 1932, every able-bodied adult male
was required to provide notables with three kilos of peas
or beans and six kilos of sorghum each year. One-third was
allotted to the notables of the province or the chieftain,
and the remainder went to the sub-chief. Food prestations
of honey, beer, hoes, hides, straw mats, and other manu-
factured objects were still provided for specialists, but
units would be fixed in order to avoid excessive abuse.
However, the same proportional distribution among chiefs
and sub-chiefs would prevail. Rapport 1932, 17; Rapport
1933, p. 118.

4

 

Ibid.

5Rapport 1929, 39; J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en
Valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elgvage au Congo
Belge 1V, 4 (February 22, 1930), 52-3; and "Documentation
sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au
Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26, 1932), 183-6.

 

 

 

 

306

6Agricultural et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixiéme Annee,
No. 14 (October 15, 1932), p. 159.

7"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixieme Année,
NO. 16 (November 26, 1932), p. 183.

8"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi.
Reunion de l'Union Agricole du Kivu du jeudi 2 Mars 1933,
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septieme Annee,
No. 5 (April 1933), p. 52.

 

 

 

9"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi,
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixieme Année,"
No. 16 (November 1932), p. 183.

10"Agriculture Indigene: Grandes Lignes du Programme
Agricole du Gouvernement," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo
Belge, NeuviEme Annee, No. 5 (May 1935), pp. 72-3.

11"Agriculture IndigEne: Grandes Lignes du Programme
Agricole du Gouvernement," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo
Belge, Neuviéme Annee, No. 5 (May 1935), p. 73.

12"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi.
Reunion de l'Union Agricole du Kivu du jeudi 2 Mars 1933,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septiéme Année,
No. 5 (April 1,1933), p. 52.

13"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour
la Seance du Jeudi 23 fevrier 1933, " Agriculture et Elevage
au Congo Belge, Septieme Année, No. 6 (May 1933), p. 64.

14"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda—Urundi,
Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu (Unaki). Reunion du 12
Avril 1933, "Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
SeptiEme Annee, No. 7 (June 1933), p. 78.

15"Union Agricole des Region du Kivu. Rapport pour
la Seance du Jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elev-
age au Congo Belge, Septiéme Annee, No. 6 (May, 1933),
p. 64.

16"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour
la Seance du jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933, " Agriculture et Elev-
age au Congo Belge, Septieme Annee, No. 6 (May 1933),
pp. 64- 65.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

307

17"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour
la Seance du jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et
Elevage au Congo Belge, SeptiEme Annee, No. 6 (May 1933),
p. 65.

18Jean-Luc Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba,
C. 1890-1930." in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and
Southern Africa, (eds.) Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 308-9.

19

 

 

Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba," p. 309.

20E. Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale,
1932-34," Bulletin l'Institut des Science Economiques,
Sixieme Annee, No. 2 (1935), p. 138.

21Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-
34," p. 138.

22Ibid., pp. 138-9.

23"Documentation sur 1e Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi,
Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu (Unaki), Réhnion du 12
avril 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congp Belge,
Septieme Année, No. 7 (June 1933), pp. 78-79.

24"Les Zones de Protection du Cafe en Ruanda-Urundi,"
Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septiéme Annee,
No. 6 (May, 1933), p. 66.

25"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi,
Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu (Unaki), Reunion du 31
Mai 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Copgo Belge, Septieme
Annee, No. 7 (June 1933), pp. 79-80.

26"Documentation sur le Kivu et 1e Ruanda-Urundi,
Union Agricole des Region du Kivu (Unaki)," Agriculture et
Elevage au Congo Belge, HuitiEme Annee, No. 1 (January,
1934), pp. 2-3.

27Archives Africaines, Brussels. MinistEre des Colo-
nies (hereafter AA-B, MDC). Carton Agri (341), No. 370/6,
Memorandum with 3 annexes, Inspection Generale de l'Agri-
culture et des Foréts 5 Monsieur 1e Ministre des Colonies,
Culture du Cafe Kibali-ituri. Leopoldville, November 17,
1933.

 

 

308

28See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 370/6.
Inspection Generale de l'Agriculture et des Forets‘d Mon-
sieur 1e Ministres des Colonies. Leopoldville, November
17, 1933. According to this memorandum the government
planned an extensive coffee campaign in the following Afri-
can areas: the territories of Faradje, Aru, Geti, Beni and
Lubero. The inspector general, however, was not supportive
of the policy because the campaign might prove to be too
costly and was much to close to EurOpean settled areas.
There were technical problems to be considered. He also
told the Ministry that even though Rwanda and Burundi had
access to sufficient agricultural personnel, they had not
achieved the "desired" results, and the government "ought
to exercise prudence."

29"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi
(Unaki), Assemblée Géhérale du 13 fevrier 1935," Agricul-
ture et Elevage au Congo Belge, NeuviEme Annee, No. 4
(April 1935). pp. 51-53.

30This was a common practice in Belgian's colonial
history. Many of its leading colonial officials often came
from private enterprises with dealings in the colonies.
However, their performandes in terms of support for colo-
nial or African interests were never consistent. As a
result Belgian colonial policy was often confused and
erratic. Pierre Ryckmans is an excellent example. Unaki
expected much from their former president, but he often
disappointed them with his fluctuating tendencies. In his,
declaration, carried by the Matin du Congo, he promised
that he would assist settlers and their efforts, but em-
phasized at the same time that he was not a wizard and that
his powers were limited. He could not alter the social and
economic conditions in Belgian Africa with a magic wand.
But he would do what was practical. He would support colo-
nization and would exempt settlers from the security deposit
of 10,000BF demanded from all Belgian immigrants at the
frontier. Those who had failed in the colonies would be
sent home free-of-charge, but those willing to work would
receive free land and government technical assistance.

 

 

 

However, he seemed to waiver on the question of com-
mercial crops, noting that this issue was "much more
complex." He told Europeans that fruit crops and vegeta-
bles could be profitable exports, but was less clear on
coffee production, offering some vague share-cropping scheme
in conjunction with established companies in settled areas.

In an interview on Ruanda and Burundi, conducted while
on an inspection tour, Ryckmans followed the government's
line by maintaining that African coffee cultivation

309

represented an excellent prospect, because it would enable
them to remain home (i.e. not leave their own country),

pay their taxes and purchase necessities. He further main-
tained that coffee "is unquestionably suitable for this
agricultural people." Certainly this was not Unaki's
position. "Declaration de M. 1e Gouverneur General
Ryckmans." Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuviéme
Annee, No. 12 (December 1935), pp. 184-186.

31"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi
(Unaki), Assemblee Generale du 13 fevrier 1935," p. 52.

32See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 384, Associ-
ation des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo (hereafter A. P. C. C. )
a M. le Ministre des Colonies 3 Bruxelles. Anvers, Febru-
ary, 1935. In 1935, the Association placed its membership
at 355 planters, nearly all were Belgians, with some 410
coffee plantations comprising 53,000 hectares. In this
memorandum, APCC also went on record as being opposed to
extending coffee cultivation to African planters and ex-
pressed opposition to the recent propaganda campaign.
Over production, it reminded the ministry, would ruin every-
one and contribute to the loss of both foreign and domestic
capital investment. Consequently it formally asked the ad-
ministration to delay its African agricultural campaign in
the Congo for several years. It maintained that African
plant elaeis, hevia, and food crOps, were more likely to
provide enormous benefit to the colony without injuring
existing enterprises. When the crisis has passed, Africans
could entertain the idea of planting coffee.

33Also see AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 314,
Annexe, Association des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo a M.
1e Ministre des Colonies, Fondant d' un Comité des Planteurs
de Cafél Anvers, January 12, 1934. The association noti-
fied the ministry of the formation of a committee to defend
the interests of its members.

34AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 335, Annexe III,
Association des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo (hereafter APCC)
a la Commission Permanent des Transports de l' A. I. C. B.
Anvers, N. D. (but this note from Mr. R. Cambier was attach-
ed to a memorandum for A. P. —C. C. of September 24, 1934, to
the Minister of Colonies). Also see "Documentation sur 1e
Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi (Unaki), Assemblée Generale du 13
fevrier 1935," p. 52.

35See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 335,5 eme
Direction Generale, Note Pour 1e 4 eme Direction Generale,
with 3 Annexes. Brussels, July 26, 1934; and Annexe I,
Notes sur le Moyen de Relever le Cours des Cafes Congolais,
par M. Gelliaux. Tely, June 8,1934.

 

310

36Annexe I, Notes sur le Moyen de Relever 1e Cours
des Cafes.

37Carton Agri (341), No. 335, 5 Eme Direction Generale,
Note Pour 1e 4 Eme Direction Géhérale. See AA-B, MPC.
Carton Agri (341), No. 343, Senat a M. Paul Tschoffen,
Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, August 29, 1934; and No.
334, Annexe, Ministére lr Bureau, Note Pour 1a 5 eme Direc-
tion Generale. Brussels, July 16, 1934. Memorandum 343
contained information about quality controls for both
European and African coffees.

38Agri (341), No. 384, A.P.C.C. a M. le Ministre des
Colonies a Brussels. Anvers, February, 1935; and No. 384/b,
Senat a Monsieur 1e Ministére des Colonies. Anvers,
February 8, 1935.

39E-L No. 5, MinistEre des Colonies, 5 Eme Direction
Generale, 1e Directeur General, Note Pour Monsieur 1e
Ministre. Brussels, July 24,1935. Also see E- 8, No. 7,
Ministere des Colonies, 5 eme Direction General a Monsieur
R. Godding. Brussels, August 5, 1935.

4OIbid.

1Pierre Ryckmans, La Politique Coloniale (Brussels,
1934), pp. 10-12.

42

 

Ibid., pp. 43-44.

43See Carton Agri (341), No. 417, Télégramme d' Etat
regu du Gouverneur General Ryckmans. Costermanville,
No. 12, November 8, 1935. This telegram is a response to
memorandum y-3-283 of October 2, 1935, which contained the
Colonial Offices decision to limit coffee. Director Gen-
eral Claessen's return cannot be determined exactly, but
the inspection tour lasted about 5 to 6 weeks, for the
Colonial office forwarded its decision to Ryckmans on
October 2.

44Ibid.

45See Carton Agri. (341), No. 418, Depeches du Congo
Belge: Inco-presse, Service Colonial Belga, Depeche No.
1350, T. S. F. Anvers, November 23,1935. This press dis-
patch informed its readers that Unaki was opposed to the
government's policy of discouraging European settlement in
the Kivu.

4°No. 417, Telegramme d'Etat. Costermanville: NO- 12:
November 8, 1935.

311

47N0. 418, Depeches du Congo Belge: Inco—presse,
Service Colonial Belga. Anvers, November 23, 1935. Unaki
praised government efforts to help planters fight against
the powerful "organizations" (marketing boards) by creat-
ing an organisation permanents.

48

 

Ibid.

49No. 418, Depeches du Congo Belge: Inco-presse,
Service Colonial Belga. Anvers, November 23, 1935.

SOIbid.

51No. 418, Annexe, Dépéches du Congo Belge, Inco-
presse, Service Colonial Belga, dépeche No. 351, TSF,
Heure Léo, No. 314. Anvers, November 23, 1935.

52Carton Agri (341), No. 426, Association des Plant-
eurs de Cafe du Congo a Monsieur 1e Ministre des Colonies.
Anvers, December 24,1935.

53Ibid.

5402. cit.

55Carton Agri (343), 1936 - Kenya, Dossier E. Cafe
Divers: Marches; Politique Cafe Robusta, etc.; E-l,
Ministere des Colonies, 4 eme Direction 3 M. 1e President
de 1' Association des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo (with one
attachment and Appendix "A"--Transport). Brussels, Jan-
uary 13, 1936. For the Association des Planteurs de Café
du Congo's response, see memorandum for the Association a
M. le Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, January 15, 1936.

56Carton Agri (343), 1940 - Dossier E. Café'Divers:
E-3 Mévente Arabica, No. 643/2, Ministere des Colonies,
5 éme Direction Generale. Note Pour 1a 4 Eme Direction
Generale. Brussels, January 31, 1940. Also see Carton
Agri (341), No. 484,1ncopresse, Les Debouches Pour 1e Cafe
Belge au Kenya. Costermansville, October 9,1937. This
press release notes that the most of coffee harvested in
Central Africa is of average qualities and is ordinarily
consumed in the United States, Canada, South Africa, and
Syria. Also in the agreement, transportation tariffs had
been reduced appreciably by the railways of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika. Incopresse notes that an agreement had
been reached to reorganize the commercialization of coffee
by the Association du Commerce du Cafe de 1' Afrique
Orientale, the Bourse du Café de l' Afrique Orientale, and
a union or liaison between the coffee planters of East Afri-
ca and the intermediaires of a Comité Permanent composed of
producers and merchants.

312

57Carton Agri (343), 1936 - Kenya; E- 1, Annexes, Cof-
fee Trade Association of Kenya a le Consulat General a
Nairobi. Nairobi, August 7,1938. For a report on the
Ugandan and Kenyan coffee production from 1907 to 1934 by
Ministry of foreign Affairs, also see Carton Agri (341),
No. 370, with 4 Annexes. BruSsels, September 21, 1934.
These reports note that there was similar opposition to
African coffee cultivation by European settlers in Kenya
and Uganda. British colonists believed that African pro-
duction should be restricted because it was unwise to
encourage the production of the same product in the same
area. Secondly, it was also unwise to extend African cof-
fee production when there was over production in Brazil
(p. 12). Also see No. 312, The Liverpool Trade Review,
(January, 1934), p. 26.

58See Carton Agri (341), No. 425, Annexe, M. Rene
Hebette a Monsieur le Directeur General. Brusse1,Janu-
ary 14,1936. Hebette apparently believed that the weak-
nesses in the commercialization of Belgian coffees were
everyone's fault: Brazil for its "duplicity" and "smear
tactics" against Belgian coffees; planters for their
"lethargy and inertia for only earning 50 million francs
out of 250 million francs coffee industry in the metrOpoleJ'
If only the latter made a little effort, they could double
the quantity of coffee sold in Belgium and create new
markets in the European hinterland. Growth required an
organization devoted exclusively to the commercialization
of coffee. Hebette may have been correct, since no cen-
tral marketing board existed in the colonies or the metrop—
ole. Hebette opposed restricting coffee production; unity
and additional market outlets were the answers.

59No. 436, Annexe, Association des Planteurs de Café
du Congo a Monsieur Ed. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies.
Anvers, March 12,1936.

60No. 428, Ministre des Colonies a M. 1e Gouverneurs
General a Leopoldville. Brussels, February 13,1936.

61No. 436, 5 Bme Direction Générale, Pour le Ministre,
1e Directeur. Chef de Service, E’M. 1e President de l'
A.P.C.C. Brussels, March 23, 1936.

62
1936.

63Carton Agri (343), Dossier, Limitation des Planta-
tions de Cafe, No. 528, Service de 1' Agriculture, Territoire
Ruanda-Urundi a Monsieur 1e Gouverneur General du Congo
Belge a Leo-Kalina (with 3 annexes). Usumbura, March 30,
1938.

No. 439, Incopresse. Costermansville, March 23,

313

64Carton Agri (110), Dossier 59, MinistEre du Congo
Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Accord International du Congo,
Washington: 4 eme Direction G6nera1e, 3 eme Direction
a M. le Ministre du Commerce Exterieur. Brussels, July
31,1959. According to C. Dupont, the Royal Inspector,
only the Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi restricted cof-
fee production for eight years, while the countries of
Latin America expanded production in the same period.
See also Carton Agri (342), Dossier Cafés C/I, Réglementa—
tion, Limitation des Plantations de Caféiers Anciens
Dossiers: C/I/3 du Ministre des Colonies, 5 eme Direction
G6n6ra1 a M. 1e Gouverneur General a Leopoldville. Brus-
sels, March 20, 1946. C/I/S, 5 eme Direction G6n6rale, 1e
Directeur G6n6ra1, Note Pour M. le Ministre des Colonies,
Brussels, October 8,1946. C/I/8,5 6me Direction General
a M. le Gouverneur G6n6ra1 a LeOpoldville. October 16,
1946. C/I/9, Gouvernement G6n6ra1, Agriculture et Colo-
nisation, Congo Belge a M. le Ministre des Colonies (the
series of memoranda contains annexes as well). Leopold-
ville, October 29, 1946.

The decision to repeal the decree limiting coffee
plantations was not a unanimous one. While some adminis-
trative personnel in the Ministry believed the decree should
be repealed because conditions had changed drastically and
because foreign markets absorbed Belgian coffees, some
technical experts wanted to restrict some areas<n1the basis
of inadequate soil types. The director general believed
abrogation of the ordinance should be accompanied by diver—
sification in the form of vegetable production, robusta
coffee and, in suitable areas, palm oil and quinquina. The
governor general and Mr. Sladden, the agricultural expert
of the colony and director of the Office du Caf6, Opposed
the abrogation entirely. Both believed that a repeal would
pose serious danger to the coffee industry, which would be
exposed to une 6valuation d6sordonn6e, especially if the
international market experience a coffee shortage.

 

Instead of eliminating the ordinance, the decree
should be replaced by a much more "supple" piece of legis-
lation, which would harmonize the development of coffee
cultivation in Belgian Africa with the world market.
Sladden also feared that the repeal would stimulate a drain
on African labor and inadvertently harm food and oleaginous
production. Robert Godding, the Minister of Colonies, re—
jected the governor general's and Sladden's advice, and
repealed the ordinance. Godding believed that the time had
come to reinstate commercial freedom, and he urged the gov-
ernor general "to support the abrogation because it is
government policy to support commercial freedom in the areas
of activity where freedom is compatible with the general

314

interest." But Ryckmans persisted in opposing the action
on the grounds that it would be disruptive to African pro-
duction, and advised a year's delay before a final decision.
In the memorandum of October 29, 1946, the governor general
acknowledged the minister's letter of October 16, 1946, and
reported that the legislative texts limiting coffee planta-
tions has been eliminated by legislative ordinance No. 277/
Agri of 25 September 1946. The memorandum is signed, "Pour
1e Vice-Gouverneur G6n6ral, E. Jungers, remplacant 1e
Governeur G6n6ral, 1e Secr6taire G6n6ral, I. de Thibault.
The former senator had evened the score, and with Ryckmans'
dismissal, settled some old antagonisms.

65Carton Agri (341), No. 454, 5‘6me Direction G6n6rale,
Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, Spetember 2, 1936.

66Carton Agri. (343), Dossier [Caf6, 1935-1939], No.
547, Rapport Pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, May 30, 1938,
pp. 4-5.

67Carton Agri (341), No. 428, Ministre des Colonies a
M. 1e Gouverneur G6n6ral 3 Leopoldville. Brussels, Febru-
ary 13, 1936.

68Carton Agri (342), Dossier Caf6'C/11, R6glementation,
c/ll/4: Union des Planteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge a
Monsieur Staner, Directeur au Ministére des Colonies.
Brussels, February 9, 1945.

’ 70No. 428, Ministre des Colonies 3 M. 16 Gouverneur
Gen6ral E Leopoldville. Brussels, February 13, 1936.

71Ibid.

72Carton Agri (341), No. 458, MinistEre des Colonies,
5 Eme Direction Générale, Note Pour la 4 Eme Direction
G6n6rale. Brussels, December 4, 1936. The Association des
Planteurs du Caf6 and several other societies supported the
licence procedure, for they believed that only 25 percent
of the coffee coming from the colony contributed to its
bad reputation.

731bid.

74Carton Agri (343), 1937-Dossier E-gbas, Pr6t Plant-
eurs Caf6Kivu, No. 428/10, No. 7526, Comit6 National du
Kivu a M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, March 23, 1937. No.
428/9, Ministére des Colonies, 4 Eme Direction Générale,
2 Eme Direction, Note Pour M. le Directeur G6n6ral du
Service de l'Agriculture. Brussels, April 14, 1937.

 

 

315

75Carton Agri (343), 1939-Dossier E-gbas, Pr6t
lanteurs Caf6 Kivu. No. 428/37, Comit6 National du Kivu
M. le Ministre, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 7, 1940.

761937-Dossier E-gbas, Pret Planteurs Caf6 Kivu, No.
428/12, Gourvernement G6n6rale Affaires Economiques E M.
16 Ministre des Colonies (with annexe). Leopoldville,
July 16, 1937. For the Cooperative response to the Chamber
of Commerce's charges, see No. 428/11, Soci6t6 C00p6rative
des Planteurs du Kivu 6 Monsieur le Ministre. Costermans-
ville, September 10, 1937.

77Carton Agri (342), Dossier [Caf6, 1935-1939], No.
547, Rapport Pour M. 1e Ministre, p. 3. Brussels, May 30,
1938.

78

P
\
a

Ibid. ' pp. 3-4

79Carton Agri (341), No. 452, SIEme Direction Gén6rale,
Note Pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, September 2, 1936.

80No. 547, Rapport Pour M. le Ministre, p. 3. Brus-
sels, May 30, 1938.

81Ibid., pp. 5-6.

82Ibid., p. 5.

83Carton Agri (341), No. 512, T616gramme d' Etat,
Ubelco au Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, March,
1938.

84Carton Agri (342), Dossier, Limitation des Planta-
tions de Caf6, No. 528, Annexe III, Union Belge des Colo-
nies au Kivu (Ubelco) 3 M. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies.
Costermansville, March 12, 1938.

85See Carton Agri (341), No. 343, Sénat E'M. Paul
Tschoffen, Ministre des Colonies, Brussels (with Annexe).
Anvers, August 29, 1934. The quality of European coffee
is discussed in these memoranda. The senator agreed that
Belgian coffees were processed quite badly; he had actually
seen coffee that had received only the crudest preparation,
either because of negligence or lack of technical expertise;
nor did Africans comply with minimum standards of quality,
processing or sorting.

86N0. 528, Annexe III, Ubelco'd M. Rubbens, Ministre
des Colonies. Costermansville, March 12, 1938.

871bid.

316

8892. cit.

89Carton Agri (341), No. 514, Ministere des Colonies,
4 eme Direction G6n6rale, 3 eme Direction, projet te164
gramme, Ubelco, Costermansville. Brussels, March 17, 1938.

90Carton Agri (341), No. 513, 5'6me Direction G6n6ral,
Pour 1e Ministre, 1e Secr6taire G6n6ral a Monsieur le
Governeur du Ruanda-Urundi, Usumbura. Brussels, March 18,
1938.

91Carton Agri (342), Dossier, Limitation des Planta—
tions de Caf6, No. 528, Annexe II, Governement G6n6ral
Affaires Economique Congo Belge a M. 16 Ministre des
Colonies. Leopoldville, March 25, 1938.

92No. 528, Service de 1' Agriculture, Territoire
Ruanda-Urundi a M. 1e Gouverneur G6n6ra1 du Congo Belge a
Leo—Kalina (with Annexes). Usumbura, March 30,1938.

93No. 528, Annexe I, Service de 1' Agriculture, Ter-
ritoire Ruanda-Urundi a Monsieur 1e President de 1' Union
Belge des Colons du Kivu a Costermansville. Usumbura,
March 30, 1938.

94No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Caf6,
No. 528/12, Gouvernement G6n6ra1 Affaires Economiques Congo
Belge a M. 1e Ministre des Colonies a Brussels.’
Leopoldville, April 22,1938.

951bid.

96N0. 527, Annexe 1, Projet de D6cr6t sur la Limita-
tion temporaire des plantations de caf6 au Congo Belge et
au Ruanda-Urundi (1938).

97Ibid.

9892. cit.

99No. 527, Annexe II, S‘Bme Direction G6n6ra1e, Note
Pour Monsieur le Ministre. Brussels, N.d.

100No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Café', No.
528/12, Prescobel a Brussels, Information coloniales,
Costermansville, Tuesday, July 14,1938.

101No. 528, Limitation des Plantation de Caf6, No.
528/10, 4'6me Direction G6h6rale, 3 Eme Direction, Note
Pour M. 1e Ministre, p. 2 (with Annexe). Brussels, March
22, 1938.

317

102Ibid. Annexe, Rapport: Subvention de 6,000,000
de la Metropole, pp. 1-3.

103No. 528/10, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale, 3 6me Direc-
tion, Note Pour M. 1e Ministre, p. 2.

104Carton Agri (341), No. 525, T616gramme d'Etat
exp6di6 au Gouverneur G6n6ra1, Leopoldville No. 84. Brus-
sels, April 7,1938. No. 526, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale,
3 6me Direction 6 Governeur G6n6ral, Leopoldville, Brus-
sels, April 11,1938. For a proposal of a comprehensive
subsidy of 50 million francs submitted by the Union des
Producteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge, see No. 528/1L
U. P. C. C. 6 Monsieur Van den Abeele, Directeur G6n6ral au
Minist6re des Colonies (with three annexes). Brussels,
April 23, 1938.

105Carton Agri (343), 1939-Dossier E, Caf6-Divers,
Marchés Politi ue Caf6 Robusta, etc., Dossier No. 608/3,
Annexe, Soci6t Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge 6 M.
Van den Abeele, Directeur G6n6rale au Ministre des Colo-
nies. Brussels, July 4,1939. No. 608/5, t616gramme,
4 6me Direction G6n6ra16, 3 6me Direction du Governeur
G6n6ra1 6 Leopoldville. Brussels, July 12,1939.

106Carton Agri (343), 1939- Dossier E, Caf6-Divers:
Marchés, Politique Caf6 Robusta, etc., E— -2, No. 608,
5 6me Direction G6n6rale, 3 6me Direction, Inspecteur
G6n6ral ff. de Directeur G6n6ral. Brussels, July 1, 1939.
He also notes that their inability to sell coffee overseas
stems from the weakness of the world market price and from
lack of initiative on the part of "our" brokers at Antwerpen
in searching for foreign markets.

107No. 603/3, Annexe, Soci6t6 Anonyme de Cultures au
Congo Belge 6 M. Van den Abeele. Brussels, July 4,1939.

108No. 608, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale, 3 6me Direction,
Inspecteur G6n6ra1 M. de Directeur G6n6ra1. Brussels,
July 1, 1939.

109No. 608/5, T6l6gramme, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale,
3 6me Direction au Gouverneur G6n6ral 6 _Leopoldville.
Brussels, July 12,1939. No. 608/6, 4 6me Direction G6n-
erale, 3 6me Direction 6 M. 16 President de 1' Union des
P.C.C. Brussels, July 17,193L

110Carton Agri (342), Dossier Caf6 C/1l: R6glementa-
tion; C/11/4. Union des Producteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge
6 Monsieur Staner. Directeur au Minist6re des Colonies,
p. 1. Brussels, February 9, 1945. The suspension lasted

 

318

until May 1940, when Germany invaded Belgium. The export
subsidy granted for Arabica was also suspended.

lllCarton Agri (342), Dossier, Caf6 1935-1939, No. 591
Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge a M. 1e Ministre
des Colonies, pp. l—2. Brussels, February 22, 1939.

112Ibid., pp. 2-3.

11392. cit.

114For a reference to Senator Godding's memoranda of
January 4 and February 22, 1939, see No. 593, annexe, 5 6me
Direction G6n6rale, Note Pour 1a 4 6me Direction G6n6rale.
Brussels, March 3, 1939.

115No. 593, 4 6me Direction 66n6ra1e, 3 6me Direction,
Note Pour la 5 6me Direction G6n6rale (with annexe).
Brussels, March 7, 1939.

116Dossier No. 528, 2 6me Direction G6n6rale, Limita-
tion des Plantations de Caf6, No. 528/40, 1a R6union du 19
Mai 1939, 11 heures, du U.P.P.C., pp. 1-2. Brussels, May
22, 1930.

117Ibid., p. 2.

118Ibid., pp. 2-3. Representatives of the U.P.P.C.
also wanted the administration to sanction an annual re-
placement rate between 10 to 20 percent of the total area
in production.

1191bid., p. 6.

lzolbido' pp. 6-70

1211bid., pp. 7-8.

1221bid., p. 3.

123No. 528/41, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale, Note Pour M.
1e Ministre. Brussels, May 26, 1939.

124No. 528/42, Annexe, Ren6 Brasseur 6'la Union Pro-
fessionnelle des Producteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge, p. 2.
Brussels, June 5, 1939.

1251bid., p. 2.

‘ 126No. 528/44, Pour 1e Ministere 1e Secr6taire G6n6ra1,
5 eme Direction G6n6rale, 6 M. le President de l'Union

319

Professionnelle des Producteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge et

du Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels, June 20, 1939. For the Secre-
tary General's response to Senator Godding about the gov-
ernment' s decision see No. 528/45, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale,
Pour 1e Ministre, le Secr6taire G6n6ral 6 M. Godding, Admin-
istrateur D616gu6 de la Soci6t6 de Cultures au Congo Belge

a Bruelles. Brussels, June 24, 1939.

127Ibid. See also No. 528/47, Compagnie de 1' Uele
6 M. 1e Directeur G6n6rale du Service d' Agriculture au
Minist6re des Colonies (with annexe)Kurukwata, par Aba,
July 17, 1939. The Conseil Colonial would also discuss
several related issue: first, the maintenance of the exist-
ing decree for only two more years (or to August 15, 1940);
second, an amendment to the decree permitting annual and
bi-annual renewal of planting (but the amount would not
surpass 10 percent of the total planting area); and third,
the total repeal of the decree and a return to the status
quo. Also the administrative director, P. de Schlippe of
the Compagnie de l'Uele warned the administration that any
decision of the abrogation of the decree could possibly
lead to more intensive cultivation on existing hectares.
Consequently, he desired an immediate repeal of the 1938
ordinance. Also see No. 528/48, Union des Producteurs de
Caf6 Belge 6 M. 1e Ministre des Colonies. Brussels, Au-
gust 3,1939. The Producers Union supports the August 15,
1940, termination because of the three alternatives it is‘
the least damaging to their interests.

128No. 528/49. Union des Producteurs de Caf6'du Congo
Belge (U.P.C.C.) 6 Monsieur 1e Ministre des Colonies. Brus-
sels, September 8, 1939. No. 528/53, 5 6me Direction G6n-
6ra1e, Note Pour M. le Ministre, par M. Van den Abeele,
pp. 1-5. Brussels, November 25, 1939.

129No. 528/51, t616gramme regu, adress6 au Ministre
des Colonies de l' Unaki 6 Costermansville (with 3 annexes).
Costermansville, November 21,1939. Annexe 1, t616gramme
d'Etat, re u du Gouverneur General Ryckmans, Leopoldville,
No. 34, December 15, 1939. Annexe II, t616gramme re u de
Costermansville de 1' Ubelco. Costermansville, Dece er 13,
1939. Annexe III, 5 6me Direction G6n6ral, Pour 1e Ministre,
le Secr6taire G6n6ral 6 M. 1e Gouvnerneur General,
Leopoldville, November 27,1939.

130Carton Agri (343), 1940-Dossier H, Cafe: Taxes
Diverses, H/6, 5 6me Direction G6nerale. Note Pour 1e
3 6me Direction G6n6ra1e. Brussels, January L 1940. No.
643/2, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale, Note Pour 1a 4 6me Direc-
tion G6n6rale. Brussels, January 31, 1940. No. 643/6,
4 6me Direction G6n6rale, 3 eme Direction, Note Pour M.

320

1e Ministre. Brussels, Februar 13, 1940. Also see Carton
Agri (343), 1940- -Dossier E. Cafe Divers; Dossier E- 3,
M6vente des Arabicas, Minist6re des Colonies, Note Pour 1a
4 6me Direction G6n6rale. Brussels, n. d. This memorandum
notes that the harvest from the Ituri region, which took
place between November 1939 and January 1940, would reach
the market shortly, and that the harvests from the Kivu,
Rwanda and Burundi (due to be gathered from May to July)
would arrive in several months. It also reports that Afri-
can production might be as much as 6,000 tons and would not
receive adequate prices.

131No. 643/1, T616gramme re u, adressé'au Ministre des
Colonies. Costermansville, January 28,1940. No. 643/4,
T616gramme regu de la Chambre de Commerce de Costermans-
ville 6 Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, February
7, 1940. No. 643/6, 4 6me Direction 66n6ra1e, 3 6me Direc-
tion, Note Pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, February 13,
1940.

132Carton Agri (342), Dossier No. 528- 2 6me, No. 528/
53, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale, Note Pour M. 1e MiniStre,
par M. Van Den Abeele, p. 4. Brussels, November 25, 1939.

133For Senator Godding's criticism of the ordinance
of 1938 and his new plan, see the following: Carton Agri-
(342), Dossier No. 528, C/l/l, Anciens Dossiers, No. 528/60,
R. Godding'6 M. 1e Ministre des Colonies (with annexe).
Brussels, March 28, 1940. For the Ministry's response,
see C/l/l, No. 528/61, 5 6me Direction, Note Pour M. Minis-
tre. Brussels, April 3, 1940.

134Carton Agri (343), 1940-Dossier E, Café'Divers;
No. 643/7, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale, Note Pour M. 1e
Ministre, Brussels, March 1, 1940.

13SCarton Agri (343), 1940 - Dossier E, Caf6 Divers;
E- 3, M6vente des Arabica, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale, 1 ere
Direction, Note Pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, April 2,
1940. Memorandum also notes that the Office of Economic
Affairs objected to the proposal as well.

136E-3, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale, 1 6re Direction,
Note Pour M. 1e Ministre, Brussels, April 2, 1940.

137E-3, Comptoir des Cafés Victor de Hae, p. 3.

138Dossier Caf6 C/11:R6glementation; C 111/4, Union
des Producteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belge 6 Monsieur Staner,
pp. 1- 2. Brussels, February 9,1945.

321

139Ibid., p. 3.

\ 140Dossier E-3, MéVente des Arabicas, No. 643/10,
5 eme Direction Géhérale, Note Pour M. 1e Ministre, 1e
Procés—verbal de la Réunion du 28 mars 1940 de la sous-
Commission ébonomique Interministérielle. Brussels,

April 3, 1940.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RETRENCHMENT AND RETROSPECTION

The war and the collapse of the coffee market caused
only slight inconveniences that required minor shifts and
modifications to an African productive system which had
been successfully integrated into the world capitalist
system for two decades. Since the late 19203' the metropole
and the colonial state had embarked upon a program to make
the mandate economically viable. The state had created an
infrastructure to move African production into the inter-
national trade network. By grafting the mandate terri-
tories to its international trade system, the state simply
made it possible for Rwandans to join their brothers in the
eastennKivu and the rest of Belgian Africa, and their Afri-
can counterparts in the British territories of East, Cen-
tral and Southern Africa im making produce and minerals
available to an already functioning mercantile system,
which was accustomed to periodic dislocation. Consequently
the war was just a minor but profitable irritant for the
capitalist mercantile system.

This chapter will also show that the state required a

professional staff of EurOpean settlers and technical

322

323

services personnel to teach African cultivators to produce
for an international market and to improve plant varieties.
The Office du Caf6 Arabica and the Institute National pour
l' Etude Agronomique du Congo Belge (hereafter Ineac) were
devised to assist the state with these tasks. Where these
services were not available and in cases where the state
was not or could not be present, it relied upon Europeans
regardless of nationality, Asian and Indians to perform
marketing functions.

To get commodities out of Rwanda (and Burundi), there
were two main international export routes. The eastern
route was by lake steamer to Kigoma and then by Tanganyika
to Dar-es—Salaam. The western exit involved crossing the
lake to Albertville and continuing by Belgian rail and
river route to Matadi, situated 80 miles up the estuary of
the Congo River and the transshipment point of the Chemin de
fer de Matadi '5 Leapoldville (C.F.M.I.).1 From 1919 to
1927 however, nearly all products shipped to Europe from
the eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi were transported by
way of Dar-es-Salaam via Kigoma. In 1922, nearly 3,300 tons
were shipped through this route, and in 1927, more than
5,000 tons.2 Most shippers using the eastern lane preferred
the Bujumbura-Kigoma exits over the Bukoba—Mombasa route
because of rising freight costs and the rising prices of
carriers to Bukoba.3

A shift to the west route began in 1931, when tariff

324

reductions in the Belgian Congo, caused several exporters
to use the Bujumbura-Albertville-Stanleyville-Matadi route.
For example some 190 tons of cotton and 23 tons of coffee
were exported by this route. In 1932, 311 tons of cotton,
87 tons of cassiterite, and 38 tons of coffee were exported
westward.4 In 1935, the shift became more apparent: east
coast trade remained more or less stationary at 17,000 tons,
while the west coast overseas trade had grown to 18,000
tons.5 The favorable rate structure and the low cost of
transport over the vast area of the Belgian Congo accounted
for the attraction of the western route. Most of the cof-
fee was shipped via Matadi and only a little by the east
coast route. In 1938, some 2,224 tons went by the Belgian
Congo route and only about 640 tons to Dar-es-Salaam.

The movement of imports, however, did not follow the
same pattern. In the 19203, imports came via Dar—es-Salaam.
In 1926, 1,805 tons of foreign commerce were shipped to
Rwanda and Burundi via this route, and 203 tons moved from
Matadi. In the late 19303; the east-west route still held
sway, although the volume of traffic moving from west to
east had increased considerably: 5,132 tons of imports via

7 It was much

Kigoma versus 3,995 tons by way of Matadi.
cheaper for importers, who did not possess Belgian subsi-
dies or inducements, to go through the Suez-Canal rather

than to chance the Atlantic and the long overland and water

route through the Belgian Congo.

 

325

However, lake traffic and indirect shipment of imports
was another matter, particularly during the 19303 when large
quantities of oil and construction materials, salt, cement
and sheet metal, the durable materials required for road
building and construction, were imported from the Belgian
Congo. Merchandise shipped through the ports of Lake Tan-
ganyika in 1936, 1937, and 1938 amounted to 10,000, 13,000
and 14,000 tons respectively.9 Belgian and British firms
monOpolized the traffic on the Lake. Mavricas Limited of
Kigoma had chartered lines to move merchandise on the Lake:
the I333, with a capacity of 300 tons and under the Belgian

Flag and the Good Adventure with a carrying capacity of 40

 

tons and flying the British Flag. Mavricas Ltd., the rail-
way company of the Upper Congo, the Great African Lakes
Company, and the Tanganyika railways handled all freight
and passenger traffic.10
In the eastern half of the Belgian Congo, rail move-
ent dominated and freight was handled by several organiza-
tions: the privately owned Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au
Katanga (B.C.K.), the leading rail operator in Belgian Afri-
ca in both tonnage and the volume of freight transported;
Chemins de fers du Congo Supérieurs aux Grands Lacs Afri-
cains (C.F.C.S.); and the Vicicongo lines. The B.C.K. line
had financial ties with the Union Miniére du Haut-Katanga

(U.M.H.K.), and both were subsidiearies of the Société'

Generale. Otraco, another company which dominated

 

 

326

transportation in the western half of the Congo Basin,
operated the 58 mile line of the Chemins de fer du Kivu,
running from Uvira on Lake Tanganyika to Kamaniola. The
greatest density of traffic on the system occurred on the
Elizabethville-Jadotville section because of the movement
of heavy minerals plus food coming from the Kasai and Lake
Tanganyika areas to the mining and industrial centers of
the region. More than 50 percent of the total traffic was
in minerals. The transport system of the C.F.C.S. comprised
673 miles of rail line: 78 miles from Stanleyville to
Panthierville; 443 miles from Kindu to Albertville; and 152
miles from Kabalo-Kabango. These lines were intercepted by
1,096 miles of water routes on the Lualaba (193 miles from
Panthierville to Kindu; 491 miles from Kangolo to Buhama;
and 412 miles from Lake Tanganyika). The Kamina-Kabalo cut-
off had strategic and economic significance, because it
offered an alternate national route to the eastern Congo,
Lake Kivu, and Rwanda and Burundi; it reduced the number of
transshipments from the last two areas via the route to
Matadi from 7 to 5 and transport distance from 2,244 to
1,957 miles.11
The trading partners of Belgium or Belgian Africa in-
cluded Britain and her colonies in Asia and the Near East,
including India; British colonies in east, central, and
southern Africa; and Germany, France, Italy, Holland,

Switzerland, Portugal. These countries and regions took

327

livestock, dairy products, vegetables, fruits and coffee
(for the volume of the latter see Table I) in exchange for
processed meats and fish, flour and cereals, processed veg—
etables and sugar, salt (a major commodity), petroleum and
other industrial oils, cement, printing material, unbleachai
muslin, machines (including parts), farming implements (hoes

12 But as Appendices I and II demonstrate,

and machettes).
the dominant economic and commercial relationships were be-
tween the Belgian Congo and Rwanda and Burundi, particular—
ly from 1930 to 1938 when the Congo garnished approximately
50 to 60 percent of the export trade.

The volume and value of the export trade during this
period reflected not only a growing economic relationship
amongst the Belgian colonial possessions, but they also af-
firmed the growth of African agricultural production gener-
ally, despite the poor quality soils and unpredictable cli—
mate. If left to their own devices, African farmers could
have profitted considerably from their own labors, agricul-
tural production, especially of food crops, contributed
much to the export trade. Even the famine, which virtually
destroyed the trade between 1929 and 1932, as Appendix III
shows, did not prevent African producers from surpassing
earlier production levels, nor from earning even larger
quantities of francs for the state. Aware of this trade,
officials enc0uraged the consolidation of the economic re-

lationship between the mandate and the Belgian Congo. For

 

328

example in 1927, they informed both the metropole and the
League of Nations that this economic relationship "contin—
ues to develop." In exchange for large quantities of food
and livestock, the Belgian Congo supplied Rwandans with
large quantities of "Congo-made hoes," and the report notes
that the exchanges took place at the market of Kamembe in
eastern Rwanda.13
While the intra-colonial trade in food was increasing
in importance, animal hides remained the principal commer- _
cial activity in the mandate.14 This particular item prob- I
ably brought higher returns than food; it certainly was
much more develOped as a commercial product. However, as
hides declined in importance because of decreasing demand,
the export of cattle became more important especially in

the 19305.15

And as livestock rose as a principal commod-
ity, the significance of food crops declined, particularly
between 1929 and 1930, when there were prohibitions against
the exportation of food because of famine in the mandate.16
By 1934, however, African produce again led the list of ex-
port items, followed by hides, tin, coffee, and beeswax.17
In 1937, the export of food crops to the Belgian Congo were
almost double those of the preceeding year--4,652 tons in
1937 versus 2,224 tons in 1936. The cattle and smaller
livestock trade in the mid-19305 had a different experience.

From 1934 to 1936 the trade was erratic, primarily because

of Batutsi reluctance to sell their cows. But by 1937 and

329

1938 the trade stabilized as the administration's policy
of reducing herds took effect.

Imports, on the other hand, were not a significant fac-
tor in the economic life of Rwanda until after the Second
World War, when the metropole commenced to repair the infra-
structure neglected during the war and the depression.

From 1920 to 1940, the volume of imports from the Belgian
Congo fluctuated betwee 20 to 60 percent, and finally sta-
bilized between 50 to 60 percent after 1940.. In fact the
years 1937 to 1947 (see Appendices I and III) were favor-
able trade years for the mandate territories, since export
volume exceeded imports. However, this advantage was off-
set because the mandate countries paid more for their im-
ports and received less for their export items. The ex-
treme fluctuations in imports prior to 1940, however, sug-
gest that despite Rwanda's expanding agricultural produc-
tion, consumption of imports was comparatively weak. The
low wage structure and the income Africans earned from theh:
crops lessened their purchasing power. And during the
19305, when the metropole reduced subsides to the mandate,
the colonial administration was forced to curtail building
and road construction projects. As a result of these fac-
tors, import fluctuations were quite large.

By the 19303 the Rwanda economy had been transformed
structurally, but it was not as yet a fully functioning

capitalist economy. Vestiges of the tributary mode of

330

production remained despite the substitution of money pay-
ments for dues in kind, and other elements of the feudal
system were still an intrinsic and structured part of the
wider system. The Batutsi had managed to retain their prive
ileged position within the society, to the extent that they
were able to garnish considerable amounts of the country's
surplus production for themselves without contributing mon-
etarily to the support of the state. Still there was a
functioning system of commodity exchange or market rela-
tions, which was essentially capitalist, although linked or
attached to the precapitalist mode of production. Both
systems shared land, labor, and the fruits of production.
The marketing system was a prerogative which the state
had allocated to the European and Asian minority through fa-
vorable concession legislation.* Europeans dominated the
most profitable commercial establishments, although they
were frequently outnumbered by Asian and Arab merchants.18
For example, in 1936, Asians sold the foreign firms 4,028
tons of food crops, 253 tons of palm oil, 40 tons of butter,
1,200 tons of coffee, and 2,010 tons of raw cotton (from

19

11,000 cotton planters). These firms, in turn, ginned

20 and either

African cotton and processed African coffee,
shipped these items overseas themselves or sold them to ex-

porters and 10cal coffee or cotton agents.

 

*See Chapter 2,

 

 

331

Commercial establishments, in turn, profitably sold
manufactured items to Africans, as Table XV demonstrates.
In 1933, non-African merchants from the ten provinces in
Rwanda sold 10.6 million francs worth of goods to them. Ihu
four of these provinces, African purchases constituted
ninety or more percent of the total sales, and in only one
province were African purchases less than fifty percent of
the total value. It should also be noted that in those
instances where total African commerce exceeded ninety—
eight percent, Africans were highly integrated into the
marketing systems of the capitalist peripheries. For ex-
ample Kamembe and Kibuye were food graneries and were the
closest in proximity to the capitalist core of western
Congo or the Kivu region, while Kibungu shared the eastern
border with British Tanganyika. This conclusion holds even
for later years, when commercial activities continued to
increase and as some provinces expanded sales as the com-
mercial sector matured (see total value of sales for 1935,
1936, and 1938 of Table XV). Table XV is also significant
because it indicates the weakness or absence of a truly
African entrepreneurial or merchant class. Africans did
not purchase European made articles from one another, but
were instead the exclusive clientele of European and Asian
merchants. Africans did not frequent African establish-
ments, primarily because for the most part there were very

few of them. Most Rwandans were purchasers and producers,

 

‘1 ——.— - m.__.________,._ A - _, _ __ _,

332

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian
Firms in 1933.

 

 

 

 

Rwanda Amount of Sales % of Sales
(Francs Belges) to Africans
Kigali 3,501,000.00 52
Nyanza 2,920,000.00 90
Astrida (Butare) 1,344,426.00 33
Kamembe 813,000.00 99
Kibuye 90,000.00 99
Kisenyi 838,709.35 64
Ruhengeri 1,001,269.50 67
Biumba - -
Gabiro 83,000.00 72
Kihungu 70,435.00 , 98.5
Total 10,661,839.85

 

SOURCE: Rapport presente par le Gouvnernement Belge au
Conseil de la Société pendant l'Annee 1933
(Brussels, 1934), p. 159.

 

 

333

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian

Firms in 1935.

 

 

Rwanda Amount of Sales
(Francs Belges)

% of Sales
to Africans

 

 

Kigali 4,366,390 30
Nyanza 3,668,000 98
Astrida (Butare) 1,829,558 62
Kamembe 1,097,000 99
Kibuye 50,000 100
Kisenyi ‘ 443,410 64
Ruhengeri 1,082,192 98
Biumba 50,000 97
Gabiro 125,000 95
Kibungu 91,166 99
Total 12,802,716

 

SOURCE: Rapport 1935, p.

 

142.

 

334

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian

Firms in 1936.

 

 

Rwanda Amount of Sales
(Francs Belges)

% of Sales
to Africans

 

 

Kigali 6,234,000 50
Nyanza 4,380,000 99
Astrida (Butare) 2,332,000 92
Shungugu (Kamembe) I 1,225,000 99
Kisenyi 2,081,000 46
Ruhengeri 1,607,000 99
Biumba 343,000 99
Kibungu 107,000 ?
Total 18,309,000

 

SOURCE: Rapport 1936, p.

 

147.

 

335

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian
Firms in 1938.

 

 

Rwanda Amount of Sales
(Francs Belges)

% of Sales
to Africans

 

Kigali

Nyanza

Astrida (Butare)
Shangugu (Kamembe)
Kisenyi

Ruhengeri

Biumba

Kibungu

7:
2:
4,

1,
3:

653,000
287,000
527,000
672,000
834,000
770,000
840,000
121,000

36
99
69
99
79
72
98
100

 

SOURCE: Rapport 1938,

 

p.

161.

336

not entrepreneurs.

In addition to marketing African crops and monOpoliz-
ing African purchases, EurOpeans produced specialized crops,
but on smaller scale. For example in 1932, 5.15 percent of
non-African concessions were devoted to food crops, 4.95
percent to coffee and 6.85 percent to fruit trees.21 Al-
though Europeans might augment African production, their
major function was to provide the expertise needed to market
and to process African production, for Africans did not
perform these tasks.

Prior to the Second World War, Rwandans purchased an
almost invariable variety of manufactured goods: light man-
ufactured goods which were for personal use--textiles, food-
stuffs and provisions which augmented the food they could
no longer produce, ornaments, liquor (including European
beer) and tobacco. Very few of their imports were invest-
ment goods of any description, i.e., construction goods,
fuel, machinery and transport supplies. Construction goods
were used by Europeans primarily and only to a limited ex-
tent by Africans. The state used heavy duty material to
build mines, government buildings, storage sheds, individ-
ual residences, and to construct roads; the Africans used
these materials primarily for their own housing needs and
perhaps secondarily for retail shops. Few investment goods
in the African area, however, had any long term uses, or

could be used to develop infrastructure. African income

337

and savings were much too low to supply capital for a basic
infrastructure or a merchant class, except in rare in-
stances. Salaries were much too low, and African produc-
tion belonged to the state.

Rwandan production of foodstuffs, hides, cassiterite,
cotton and coffee for the export trade created foreign ex-
change earnings to augment subsidies from the metropole and
to sustain the colonial development process, which was
limited to maintaining an infrastructure and to facilitat-
ing the flow of African material and labor out of the coun-
try via one or the other international routes. The colo—
nial state provided the essential services and expertise
required to make Africans efficient and productive workers.
Nowhere was this more evident then in the attention and
care given to coffee production.

Colonial coffees lost their principle market when Bel-
gium became inaccessible in May 1940, the coffee had ex-
treme difficulty in finding new markets. But thanks large-
ly to government efforts, the coffee export trade had grown
appreciably by 1942. Markets were secured in the Sudan,

Egypt, the Union of South Africa and the United States,22

23 Prior to the War, the economic

and prices increased.
crisis had been more damaging to Arabica coffees than to
Robusta. Consequently the colonial government and repre-

sentatives of the government in exile in London gave pri-

mary attention to the creation of a marketing board for

338

Arabica in 1940.24 After some foolish delays, a board was

authorized through the passage of an Ordinance Law, No.
337/Agri of October 15, 1940.

The Ordinance Law enabled the governor general to
enact legislation, subject to legislative approval by the
ministers meeting in Conseil and Mr. Vleeschauwer, Minis—
ter of Colonies, on behalf of the King of Belgium. With
this power, the governor general passed Ordinance No. 378/
Agri, on October 15, 1940, establishing the Office du Cafe
Arabica. The board was headed by G. E. Sladden, the chief
agronomist and a coffee expert. A second Ordinance, No.
379/Agri, issued the same day, established the licensing
provision or procedure to be issued by the new office, for
the exportation of Arabica coffees "from the territory of
Rwanda-Urundi and the provinces of Stanleyville and Coster—

mansville."25

In November 1940, legislative ordinance No.
418/A.E. of October 30, 1940, was implemented. The latter
regulated the export of Robusta coffee shipped to the
"Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt," and provided a special
licence for coffees shipped from the vicinity of the pro-
vince of Stanleyville. .This licence was obtained from the
chef de la Province. However, on September 10, 1941, the
Office du Cafe'Robusta was created, with headquarters in
LeOpoldville, thus centralizing the marketing procedure.

The two offices differed only in the composition of

their respective commissions and standing committee

339

/
(comite permanent).26

Together they attempted to introduce
better farming, harvesting and processing methods. They
were responsible for the maintenance of installations and
the shipment of coffee exports. Both offices purchased
African coffee at a stated price and sold it to exporters.
To ensure quality both offices ensured-that all varieties
were of uniform standards. Moreover, they supervised Afri-
can farmers, and performed the pulping, fermentation, wash-

ing and drying of coffee.27

Thus Africans had only to
gather the crop and carry it to official stations. The

. . . I .
offices were also respons1ble for asse851ng a remunerat01re

 

gage on coffees exported from the provinces in the Belgian
Congo and the territory of Ruanda-Urundi.28 Finally, the
offices formed necessary liaison between scientific re-
search bodies like the Institut National pour l'Etude Agro-
nomigue du Congo Belge (Ineac), which was responsible for
developing the best plant varieties.29
Ineac, created in 1935, succeeded the Regie des Plant-
ations de la Colonie, which was plagued with incompetence
and lacked autonomy. The new institute coordinated virtu-
ally all biological and animal research carried on in Bel-
gian Africa. Its work included the selection, improvement,
and introduction of all plants of possible economic value,
as well as reforestation, social maintenance and care, the

creation of new food crops for Africans, acclimatization

and the improvement of cattle, tropical veterinary research

340

and the study and introduction of new agricultural indus-
tries. The agricultural personnel of the mandate and in
the Belgian Congo remained in close contact with Ineac sta-
tions in Rubona and Yangambi. Young agronomists attended
stages of six months to a year at Ineac stations. Some
shorter training sessions (stages de perfectionnement) wen:
also provided for duty personnel and directors of the agri-
cultural departments during their tenure in Africa.30
After the marketing boards were created, an Ordinance
(No. 92/A.E.) was passed on March 3, 1941, permitting the
Governor of Ruanda-Urundi to authorize a minimum price
which commercial intermediaires could pay for African cof-
fees 32 parche.31 The same ordinance also authorized the
governor to purchase parchment coffee harvested in the ter-
ritory but remained unsold from exporters and coffee bro-
kers.32 The latter measure was designed to stabilize cof-
fee production, and the former to protect Africans from
unscrupulous merchants. But it also had the effect of com-
pletely divorcing Rwandans from participating in the mar-
keting process. A final measure regulating the coffee in-
dustry was passed on July 6, 1946: Ordinance No. l39/A.E.
fixed the date and time African coffees that could be sold
at local markets which were supervised by officials or Afri-
can monitors of the Office du Café'IndigEne du Rwanda-

33

Urundi. With the passage of this measure, African depen-

dency was complete. While the ordinance assured the

 

 

 

341

producer of correct payment and quality control, and pre-
vented the sale of moist coffee beans, it further defined
the African's role as producer. Africans would not be left
to the devices which determine rational economic judgments,
instead these decisions would be made for them.

These and other institutional pressures designed to
increase production eliminated the material basis of eco-
nomic development for Rwandans within the normal framework
of capitalism, primarily because they suppressed the profit
motive in the development of production, thereby prohibi-
ting the growth of an autonomous capitalist structure in
the traditional area. ~Administrative price control policy,
compulsory cultivation and tax policies were the most dam-
aging for Africans. As we have seen, compulsory cultiva—
tion expanded production, while price controls kept prices
and African incomes low. A low wage structure was an im-
portant element in promoting the growth of economic surplus,
just as the head and polygamy and cattle taxes were levied
to force African into EurOpean industries and wage employ-
ment and to enlarge the fiscal base of the administration
during a period of increasing expenditures during the 19305.
By depressing wages and levying taxes, administrative policy
inhibited the development of African rural capitalism. Al-
most simultaneously these policies extended the process of
proletarianization in the rural areas, since they limited

disposable income and impoverished those who were forced to

 

342

seek employment, either inside or outside of the rural area.
By using these devices to detach African agricultur-
alists from market influences as well, the administration
was also able to make African agriculture respond to Euro-
pean economic interests--compulsory rather than free market
agricultural production by Africans permitted the retention
of low prices and ensured supplies where the European econ-
omy most needed them, the mining areas of Katanga and the
eastern Kivu which were the metropole's most productive
areas. It was no accident that the administration encour-
aged the sale and trade of African produce. As appendix IV
shows, trade was extremely profitable for the state. From
1925 to 1929, custom receipts increased from 2.7 million
francs to 8.4 million. During the depression, receipts
fluctuated annually until 1935, when the rate of increase
returned to predepression levels--7.3 million francs in
1935 to 13.1 million francs in 1937. But they fell in 1938
because of events in Europe. By 1941 receipts were fifty
percent higher than those of 1937, indicative of increased
international trade during the war years. Growth in Afri-
can taxes for the same period were much more spectacular
and reveal that the heavy burden on Africans of supplying
the state with revenues. The state's monopolistic trade
position for the same length of time institutionalized un-
equal exchange vis-a-vis the state and the Rwandan peasant-

ry. And since the structure of the colonial economy has

343

changed very little since independence this relationship
persists.

Proponents have argued that cash-cropping promotes and
facilitates the processes of economic development and en—
courages technological innovation, raises worker skills,
increases the range of goods that can be purchased, stimu-
lates new wants, and creates new areas of production or
higher productivity. Exports enable the state to pay for
those goods and services needed for development but which
it lacks the capacity to produce, and they provide an im-
portant source of direct government revenue.34 However,
these postulates are based upon a free market economy with
full direct participation by producers and their represent-
atives.

This was not entirely the case in Rwanda. Rather than
leave the producers to the free market forces, the colonial
state manipulated and intervened in the production and dis-
tribution system. Because of rigid government control the
agricultural economy did not induce self-sustained industri-
alization. However, it did create enough linkage effect for>
some small-scale enterprises to develop, and it provided
alternative earning opportunities for some farmers, particu-
larly evident in Kinyaga or western Rwanda. They grew crops
to supplement subsistence income. While this kind of activ-
ity has potential, it has not as yet generated a full-time

alternative occupation for African agriculturalists generaflyu

344

However, it provided and continues to provide security
against bad harvests, and to a limited extent it generates
some surplus for a few Rwandans in Kinyaga.

For the majority of Rwandans, the state's agricultural
economy created impotence, inequality, and indifference. The
traditional elite, as a result of transformation or change
brought about by the colonial state, lost status (i.e. sover—
eignty) but gained powers at the expense of the population at
large. Bututsi siphoned labor and agricultural surplus from
below and consequently accentuated class divisions and dis—

tinctions. The majority, with little or no control over the

 

means of production, exercised little interest in the state's
develOpment plans, since planning did not facilitate the pro-
vision of social and productive services and economic infra-
structure or afford greater and more diversified consumption
for them. Nor should the state have received their support,
since no attempt was made to know their needs as the major-
ity perceived them. Instead the state's economic plan con-
doned commodity production, and in doing so, almost threat-

35 Even those services that the adminis-

ened subsistence.
tration committed to Africans were either so technocratic
or demeaning (in terms of abuse) that the peasantry's appre-

ciation or awareness of the efforts being made by the state

 

were undermined. No social contract existed between the
state and the African masses; consequently the development

process had little meaning or relevance for them.

 

 

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1Rapport presente’par 1e Govnernement Belge au Conseil
de la Société des Nations au sujet de 1' Administration du
Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' Annee 1932 (Brussels, 1933),
p. 103. William A. Hance and Irene S. von Dangen, "Matadi,
Focus of Belgian African Transport," Annals of the Associ-
ation gf_American Geographers (March, 1958), pp. 41-42, 50,
56 and 57. The authors note that between 1906 and 1928
the southeastern portion of the Congo used ports of Beira
and Mozambique and the Union of South Africa. To induce
Congo trade to flow via Matadi, two special systems of com-
modity and through-rates were adopted in 1932. The pull of
the Lobito route, opened in 1932, and to a lesser extent of
Beira on the mineral traffic area remained very strong.

2Chambres des Representants. Session de 1923-24.
Rapport sur 1' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pre-
senté aux Chambres (Brussels, 1924), p. 18. Rapport 1925,
p. 89. Rapport 1927, p. 67.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3Rapport 1925, p. 103.

 

4Rapport 1932, p. 103.
5

 

Rapport 1937, pp. 160-161; Rapport 1938, pp. 170-171.

 

 

6Rapport 1926, p. 103.

 

7Rapport 1937, p. 131. The figure of 3,995 tons does
not include imports designated for the Belgian Congo.

 

8Rapport 1930, pp. 29 and 120.
9

 

Rapport 1937, p. 132 and Rapport 1938, p. 242.

 

10"Rapport sur 1' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi
pendant l' Annee 1934," Congo, II (June-December, 1935),
p. 767. i

11

 

Hance and Dangen, "Matadi," pp. 61-63.

345

 

346

12Rapport 1927, pp. 81-102. The list of imported items
and countries are fairly consistent, except in the late
19308 when Japan, Tanganyika, the United States, Britain and
Uganda became major importing nations after the metropole.
See the following annual reports: Rapport 1928, pp. 93-116;
Rapport 1929, pp. 97-122; Rapport 1930, pp. 123-148; Rapport
1933, pp. 162-191; Rapport 1934, pp. 148-179; Rapport 1935,
pp. 147-180; Rapport 1936, pp. 153-186; Rapport 1937, pp.158
-189; and Rapport 1938, pp. 168-199.

 

 

 

 

 

 

13Rapport 1927, p. 9.

 

14Rapport 1929, p. 96.

 

 

15Rapport 1930, p. 113.

lGIbid.

17"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May, 1937):
p. 190.

18

Rapport 1924, p. 38; Rapport 1925, p. 11; Rapport
1926, p. 103; Rapport 1927, p. 79; Rapport 1928, p. 91;
Rapport 1929, p. 96; Rapport 1930, p. 112; "Rapport sur
1' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant 1' Annee
1934," Congo, II (1935), p. 773.

 

 

19"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May, 1938),
p. 229.
20

Rapport 1938, p. 200.

21Rapport 1932, p. 156.

 

221bid., p. 3.

23Archives Africaines, Brussels, MinistEre des Colo—
nies. Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café'C/ll: R6glementa-
tion; C/II/4, d'Union des Producteur au MinistEre des
Colonies, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

24Ibid., p. 2.

25Ibid. The Office du Café'Arabica in Rwanda was re-
constituted in 1946 as the Office du Caf6 Indidéne du
Ruanda-Urundi, but not without complaint. Two commercial
houses in Rwanda, Genex and Old East charged that OCIRU was
a violation of commercial freedom. But the actual issue
involved was their commercial activities, which the two
houses feared would be eliminated under OCIRU. See Carton

Agri (342), d'Ordre des Pieces No. B/I/23-OCIRU. Note Pour

 

 

347

M. 1e Gouverneur General, Office du Cafe IndigEne du
Ruanda-Urundi et Liberté Commerciale, du President O.P.A.,
G. Sladden, Leopoldville, January 9, 1946; and No. B/I/28,
du MinistEre des Colonies, S'Eme Direction Géhérale, 1e
Directeur General, Note Pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels,
February 28, 1946.

26Carton Agri (343), Dossier Café C/II; Réglementa-
tion; C/II/4, p. 4. United Nations Visiting Mission to
East Africa. Report on Ruanda-Urundi, 4th Session. Sup-
plement No. 2, 1950, p. 24. In 1950 the supervisory com-
mission of O.C.I.R.U. in Rwanda and Burundi consisted of
three administrative officials, two Africans, who repre-
sented the interests of planters, and four individuals
chosen for their "competence." The latter represented the
coffee manufacturers and exporters.

27George E. Sladden and L. Michel, "Methodes de Com-
mercialisation du Caf6 Arabica produit par les Indigene du
Ruanda-Urundi,9 Numero Spécial du Bulletin Agricole du Congo

 

 

Belge, XLIII (1952), pp. 63-64.

28Carton Agri (342), Dossier Caf6 C/II: Réglementa—

29A. Becquet, "L'Organisation du Service de l'Agricul-
ture au Congo Belge," _griculture et Elevage au Congo Belge,
XXX, No. 7 (July, 1939), p. 98.

30

 

Ibid 0

31The minimum price was calculated from the selling
prices on foreign coffee markets and took into consideration
expenses incurred, factory output and a normal gross profit
for the exporter. As Table III below demonstrates, these
prices were constantly revised. U. N. Visiting Mission to
East Africa. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. 4th Session, Sup-
plement No. 2, (1950), p. 24.

—-7""“r""—-

 

 

 

 

 

 

348
Table XVI. Minimum Purchasing Prices for Arabica Coffee
pp parche for Rwanda and Burundi (in Belgian
francs).
Ordinance Ordinance
No. 17/A.E., No. 23/A.E.,
April 7, 1941 April 21, 1943
Kisenyi, Kibuye 2.35 4.15
and Bugarama
Buture, Nyanza, 2.10 3.80
Ruhengeri and
Kabaya
Gitarama 2.00 3.70
Kigali 1.80 3.45

 

SOURCE: Archives Africaines, Brussels. Ministere des
Colonies. Carton Agri (342), Dossier Cafe C/ll:
Reglementation; C/11/4, d'Union des Producteurs
de Cafe du Congo Belge a M. Staner. Directeur
au Ministere des Colonies, p. 6. Brussels,
February 9, 1945.

 

 

 

og-

 

 

349

32Carton Agri (342), Dossier Cafe C/II: Reglementa-
tion; C/II/4, p. 6.

33Ibid.

34Jimmye S. Hillman, "The Role of Export Cropping in
Less Developed Countries," Journal of Agricultural Eco—
nomics, LCIII, No. 2. (May, 1981), p. 376.

35According to Bryceson, an emphasis on subsistence
production offers very little revenue for state accumula-
tion. So the state's decision to compel Africans to plant
specific food crops, as an anti-famine measure, must have
been done with some reluctance. Deborah Fahy Bryceson,
"Peasant Commodity Production in Past-Colonial Tanzania,"
African Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 325 (October 1982), pp. 558-
559.

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUS ION

When Europeans finally entered Rwanda in 1894, they
reportedly found a highly centralized feudal state with
rigid class differentiation between the Batutsi aristocracy,
the subjugated Bahutu, and the pariah Batwa. In 1907, the
Germans established their government, but until 1916 they
accomplished little beyond building a small number of
administrative centers and inter-connecting roads. The
Germans followed the principle of indirect administration,
which was continued by the Belgians when they were assigned
administrative control by the League of Nations. In the
19203, with the introduction of a full-scale colonial
government, the period of effective contact with Europeans,
and the transformation of the country, began.

Once the Belgians assumed control of the mandate,
their policy had two clearly linked aims: the economic
development of the colony and the welfare of the African
population. Both of these aims were largely fulfilled in
the sense intended by the administration, that is to say
that a profitable crop like coffee was widely cultivated
throughout Rwanda, and many paternalistic social programs
were undertaken. These successes, however, did little to

equip Rwandans with the skills and infrastructure needed to

350

351

initiate, sustain, or expand economic growth, or to permit
Rwandans to feed themselves, sell their surplus, create
savings and purchasing power, construct schools to educate
their children, or to form institutions and agencies for
effective government. Consequently, since independence in
1962, Rwanda has been wracked by intermittent stagnation or
even prolonged economic regression. The compulsory nature
of the colonial economic structure and the corresponding
indirect participation by Africans in commercial agriculture
was partially responsible for this situation. Moreover,
Belgian officials were not able to carry out the goals that
they had set for themselves.

Initially, the administration based its policy upon
two basic premises: first, that the African's basic needs
were economic and, second, that a vigorous national economy
would stabilize society. To accomplish these objectives,
they believed that Rwanda, which was historically and geo-
graphically isolated, had to be brought into the modern
world. But the link-up could not be done without stabilizing
the traditional political structure. Since the Batutsi
oligarchy was in place, European officials, after reshaping
its structure, believed they could rely upon Batutsi
administration to oversee the masses. They hoped that as
the "civilizing process" took hold, abuses would be
curtailed; and that other reforms such as hierarchical

I I ’ I
command structure, reductions in corvee and prestations

 

 

 

due-.hw .

 

352

would lead to the dismemberment of the traditional mode of
production or the feudal system, in which Batutsi controlled
the allocation of labor and land. These were realistic
expectations and reforms, but very little came of them,
primarily because of the administration's failure to follow
through. 'Failure to eliminate the feudal system retarded
capitalist development, and subsequently the emergence of

a free wage labor system divorced entirely from agricultural
production.

The reforms of April 1917, establishing a hierarchical
command system and attempts to decentralize administration
at the local level were modified because the Batutsi oli-
garchy refused to cooperate with an obvious attempt on the
part of officials to lessen their power and control. When
Musinga and his notables threatened rebellion, Malfeyt was
forced to restore the former German residency system, which
left the Batutsi as mediators and arbitors between the
administration and the masses below.

Similarly, attempts to reduce corvee and prestations
failed because of the half-hearted measures and weaknesses
of the administration. The official approach was gradually
to replace tribute payments in kind with money payments
from the taxable surplus from African production, rather
than wipe the slate clean and deal immediately with Batutsi
opposition to change. The piece—meal approach gave the
oligarchy time to undernine the administration's efforts

through intimidation, threat and non-compliance. The

 

 

‘4 '

 

353

Batutsi understood thoroughly that, money payment notwith-
standing, as more demands were placed upon their system and
on the Bahutu, their position of privilege and prestige
would be reduced. Therefore, the oligarchy fought to retain
their power as the administration worked to develop the
land. The competing and dissimilar goals of the Batutsi

and the Belgians made the traditional society unstable and
set the stage for a major confrontation between the
colonizer and the oligarchy.

By 1928 the mandate was in total disarray. The
intrigues of Musinga and his royal court had brought the
administration's development plans to a halt. The famine
which occurred that same year decimated the countryside.
These events made it more apparent that the administration
would have to compromise with the notables. Famine relief
could not be accomplished without their aid, nor, for that
matter, could economic development. Tranquility was
paramount, if Rwandans were to become effective producers.
The administration thus assured the young notables that
changes in the traditional system would be moderated and
that the Bahutu would be left in their charge, except in
matters pertaining to colonial development projects. Still
this was not enough; there was the problem of what to do
with Musinga and the old guard.

First of all, the Belgians set about replacing many of
the recalcitrant chiefs and, in 1930, moved against Musinga,

who had grown weak because of the defection of his young

 

 

 

 

354

notables, the disarray among his more traditional supporters,
who were being removed by the administration, and his own
isolation stemming from his inability to accomodate Catholic
missionaries and Catholicism. With the deposition of
Musinga, the administration accelerated its reorganization
program, extended compulsory cultivation throughout Rwanda,
announced a propaganda campaign for coffee cultivation,
increased the Head Tax by 50 percent, and continued construc-
tion of infrastructure. Before the Great Depression,
traditional agriculture received minimal attention primarily
because of high transportation and tariff costs. The major
foci of the colonial state were on labor recruitment, food
production (in the western region), and mining exploration.
Rich veins of tin had been discovered in eastern Rwanda in
the 19205, and several Belgian banks and business firms
provided capital for this industry.1 The provisioning of
eastern Zaire from western Rwanda was also well established
during this period. Colonial officials were encouraged to
comply with European requests for labor, and Union MiniEre
du Haut Katanga was the prime contractor of African labor in
the ocuntry in the late 19205. Rwandans emigrated as
laborers to British territories as well.

The state's reorganization program in the 19305
reduced corvee and prestations even further, centralized
geographical units for better administration, and replaced
chiefs and consolidated chieftaincies. These measures

allegedly standardized and regulated a system in which

 

355

Belgian officials and the Batutsi elite coexisted, or dual
colonialism, so to speak. But in any event, together they
controlled a doubly exploitative system in which the Bahutu
peasantry were totally subordinated. Transforming the pro-
ductive and administrative system created profound social
changes, and a dual system of over-rule served to retard the
expectations of the Bututsi oligarchy and to contain the
aspirations of the African population. While the European
administrators monitored the colonial system as a whole, the
Batutsi supervised the productive effort of the African
population. The key to the whole system, however, was the
effective management from the top and compliance from the
notables who dominated the masses below. With reorganization
completed, the colonial state proceeded with its coffee
campaign.

The government's decision to extend coffee cultivation
stemmed partly from a reassessment by the metropole of the
African's role in agricultural production and partly from the
effects of the Great Depression. As the Belgian process of
modernization began, the metropolitan government soon
realized that "civilizing" was an expensive business, and
they were unable to provide all the funds, particularly
during the 19303. Belgian officials concluded that "civil-
izing" must be paid for out of profits or the "undelivered
portion" of the African wages. This increment, plowed back
into the country, into roads and transportation, conservation

measures, health and educational facilities, became the

u
I _

 

 

 

356

“civilizing sinking fund." As the metropole's needs
increased for more visible signs of economic progress, more
and more Rwandans were forced into the modern sector to
facilitate its development, and consequently more and more
demands were placed on the Bahutu to maintain the solvency
of the colony. Cash crop production was only part of this
process.

Because coffee had been produced on a limited scale
since 1920, the decision to extend cultivation in Rwanda did
not need feasibility studies, and by 1930 there was consid-
erable evidence that production could be profitable. World
market prices of 20 BF per kilo had encouraged Belgian
speculators to invest heavily in arabica coffee plantations
in the Kivu and Ituri during the late 19203. It was then
rumored that the Kivu could become another Kenya: excellent
climate, the condition of the land, and the relative ease by
which cheap labor could be recruited caused official
optimism.

Despite some initial setbacks the official government
campaign was quite successful. Free seedlings were distrib-
uted; the Agricultural Service supplied demonstrations on
mulching techniques and built coffee nurseries throughout
the country. Although coffee prices fell during the 19305,
production increased to 70 tons in 1932, 152 tons in 1933,
and 223 tons in 1934.2 Within these years, the average

price paid for African coffee ranged from 2.50 BF to 4 BF

357

per kilo. By 1935 the volume of exports also experienced
increases in cotton, produce, beeswax, hides, and tin.
Therefore, other sectors of the economy were expanding as
well.

Reliance on African agriculture, however, was a major
preoccupation in official colonial circles long before the
Great Depression forced the metropole to take action; and
even before African commerical production had matured, the
authorities decided to discourage European settlement and
their encroachment into the coffee and tobacco industries.
The population density was already high in areas where the
soil was relatively fertile, and European settlers and
commercial enterprises aggravated pressures on the land.
African labor was much cheaper and transportation and tariff
costs were high. Also, a total reliance on Africans meant
that savings could be made on those services that Europeans
required and expected.

The colonial debate in the mid-19205 brought the
matter to a head. Those against the administration's
position called for massive infusions of private capital and
industrialization, while proponents emphasized African agri-
culture, not industrial development. The debate continued
until 1933, when the metropole announced a policy favoring
African agriculture and moderate industrial development.
Naturally the settlers were alarmed by this pronouncement
and immediately mobilized to protect their interests.

Between 1927 and 1939, European planters in Stanleyville,

 

 

358

Bukavu, and the Kivu and the representatives at Brussels
consistently voiced opposition to African commercial
cultivation.

White settlers and especially coffee planters had
reason to fear competition from African planters. The
depression had reduced prices for agricultural commodities
generally, and Brazil's manipulation of the coffee market
subjected the already low prices to extreme fluctuations.
Moreover, coffees from Belgian Africa were the least
preferred in Europe and in the metropole. Consequently
African competition was completely undesirable. As the
Great Depression worsened and budget deficits increased, the
administration at home became more conscious of cost effi-
ciency. Previously, financial assistance to planters was
confined to grants and loans; Africans received famine
relief and expenditures for normal education and public
works.3 In the past, private enterprises were given special
incentive to invest in the "empire." Some firms received
extensive land concessions for growing coffee and the black
wattle tree valuable for its tannin extract.4 Those who
adopted the "civilizing" principle or collaborated with
African farmers gained concessions of 500 hectares with 99
year leases. Individual holders had a virtual monopoly on
African labor and produce within a limited (15 km. radius)
"protective zone"; companies had 70,000 hectares with access
to African labor and the exclusive right to purchase the

commercial crops from African farmers. Participants were

 

 

 

359

only required to install a processing mill and to furnish
schools, quarantine stations, and seeds for their African
charges, as part of the social contract. These zones were
devised, however, to also eliminate Asian and Indian
competition and to rationalize economic development.5

During the Depression, European settlers were perceived
as a drain on the treasury because of their repeated demands
for subsidies, tariff reductions, and regulations to assure
even cheaper labor costs. The relief was expensive for the
metropole to provide, and it believed that its efforts to
extend decrees to either cancel export duties on certain
commercial commodities, such as vegetables, palm oil, and
sugar cane, or to provide exemptions to cotton fabrics manu-
factured in Belgian Africa were more than adequate.6 Goods
coming from the colonies already entered the metropole duty
free, and a decree of 1934 leavied a 300 BF per ton export
duty on unroasted coffee entering the "empire,"7 in order to
restrict the entry of foreign coffees, which might be
re-exported duty free into Belgium.

Authorities also sought other ways to reduce costs.
Land reclamation became an integral component of the agri-
cultural program. Chemical fertilizer, however, was not
considered, because of the terrain and the traditional
nature of agriculture in Rwanda, and because of its expense.
Since famine would disrupt the productive cycle, the resident
governor had the power to require each able bodied, adult

male to maintain 35 acres of seasonal and 15 acres of

 

 

 

360

non-seasonal food crops. The latter included manioc, to be
replaced by potatoes in areas above 1900 meters.8 Lacking
suitable storage, the selection of such durable crops was a
wise choice. While reluctant to graft a capitalist model of
production onto their traditional forms, Africans were able
to adjust. Rwandan farmers accepted imposed crops, the
burden of taxation to support the colonial infrastructure,
traditional dues and corvee, and akagi for the modern
sector. Even today many remarked that coffee was beneficial,
for it "gave us money to pay taxes and to buy things."
Economic development assisted some Africans, and was
apparently beneficial to the country. Trade figures for
1935 indicated that Rwanda was thoroughly integrated into
the international market economy. Export earnings for that
year were 45 million francs, 70 percent from Belgium and
the remainder from Japan. Imports were valued at 39 million
francs, of which 10.3 millions francs were attributed to
Belgium and 18.1 million francs to Japan.9 Surplus revenues
from international trade were invested in the country only
to the extent that they facilitated the flow of goods to
markets overseas; otherwise, profits were retained or gar-
nished by the colonial state. Some funds were repatriated
to Belguim in order to repay development loans, but most
revenue was used to maintain the colonial government. As
we have seen, the general expansion of trade by the colonial
state was a sign of Rwanda's transition from a pre-capitalist

to a semi-capitalist economy during the imperial phase.

 

 

361

Compulsory cash crops and the sale of foodstuffs stimulated
economic growth, but prevented the rational evolution of a
diversified economy. Without rigid control by the state,
the international economy and free market forces might
possibly have activated Rwanda's agricultural economy along
different lines. But once the basic infrastructure for
trade was established the colonial state had fulfilled its
own needs for revenues by encouraging imperial trade and
commerce. Africans were only marginal beneficiaries, and
only those who could effectively manipulate the system
benefitted.

Dependence upon coffee to provide foreign exchange in
a structurally imbalanced economy continues to plague
Rwanda. Between 1929 and 1941, economic legislation was
based on the belief that Africans could only be farmers,
and political changes and social actions consequently barred
all effective participation by the Bahutu and the Batutsi
in industry and commerce. Compulsory cultivation and the
pervasive colonial state, embodied in the metropole and in
Belgian civil servants in the mandate, stifled the spirit
of initiative and innovation within the traditional systems.
Nowhere in Rwanda did chiefs, notables and peasant farmers
take responsibility in economic production. They did not
even exercise any real responsibility in the performance of
menial tasks, such as public works, irrigation projects, and
in the construction and upkeep of stretches of roads and of

public buildings, which were basically the business of

 

 

 

362

Rwandans. Belgian colonialism effectively eliminated direct
African participation in all spheres of influence and
decision-making. Economic planning, as well as the pur-
chasing, processing, and marketing of coffee and other
export crops, was executed by Europeans with the help of
mainly unskilled African labor, quasi—governmental agencies
and societies, and Arab, Hindu, Greek and Indian merchants,
although Asians were phased out of the export trade after
1930 and limited to intermediaries in the domestic economy.
At independence, when the colonial state apparatus was
removed in 1962, the economic structure collapsed. The
new government was unable to function because of lack of
experience.

Almost all production was abandoned, and coffee and
other produce was left in the fields to rot; during the
period of transition and consolidation, African simply
refused to produce or to tend to their fields. Because of
"indirect administration," Rwandans were ill-equipped by
training or experience to operate or to recycle the dregs
left by the Belgians into productive capacity. Belgian
colonialism effectively had eliminated influential African
participation in the world market economy. Thus, after
independence, there was no African management, and Rwanda
continued to depend upon expatriates to perform essential
functions in the commercial sector.

In the final analysis, the absence of an African

management class in Rwanda, able to take charge, has much to

 

 

363

do with the excessive intervention from the state (both in
the metropole and in the colony) during the colonial period.
State intervention successfully converted coercive force
over Rwandans into a legitimate authority, which Africans
reluctantly accepted. But while this conversion promoted
change, it also preserved continuity within the traditional
areas. The retention of the feudal system and the onset of
colonialism was responsible for impeding the formation of a
viable middle sector, because it distorted the process of
primitive accumulation. Since there were no white settlers
in any great numbers in Rwanda and little possibility of
attracting foreign capital, the state's land policy and
taxation on African households, designed to force workers
into the capitalist sector, were used instead to foster the
development of a viable African middle sector, capable of
sustaining the development of the country. Failure to dis-
member the feudal system, coupled with the Great Depression,
meant that valuable labor reserves had to serve two masters--
the state and the traditional Batutsi oligarchy. African
labor was used to maintain the solvency of the colony, as
well as the life style of the Batutsi notables, but there
was little opportunity for the peasantry to acquire capital.
Even expanded peasant production during the 1930s
failed to transform the feudal system or to encourage
economic specialization. The oligarchy was too entrenched,

and the Bahutu could not be completely divorced from

364

subsistence agriculture, primarily because the risks were

too great: peasant life was precarious. Moreover, while

the Bahutu could be made to produce for foreign markets and
could dominate the coffee economy from 1931 to 1939, and
while earned export income and other revenues increased
annually until the Second World War, the state could not
create sufficient security to wean them away from subsistence
agriculture and toward economic specialization. The
environment was a limiting factor in this process, but

state and Batutsi exactions were more debilitating.

 

 

CONCLUSIONS

Notes

lAlison L. DesForges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News:
Rwanda Under Musiinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale
University, 1972), p. 323.

2Rapportpresenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du
Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Annee 1934 (Brussels, 1935), p. 131.
Production totals for 1933 and 1934 include tonnage for
Burundi.

 

3Rapport 1924, p. 15; Rapport 1925, p. 104; Ra ort
1929, p. 61; and Edmund Le Plae, "Les Plantations de CafE au

Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-1935), leur Importance,"
Institute Royal Colonial Belge memoire 8, 111 (1936), p. 225.

 

 

4DesForges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 323.

5Rapport 1929, p. 39; J. De Rykman de Betz, "La Mise
en Valeur de Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Eleyage au Congo
Belge IV, 4 (February 22, 1930), pp. 52-3; and "Documenta-
tion sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et
Elevage au Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26, 1932),
pp. 183-6.

6E. Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-
34," Bulletin l'Institute des Sciences Economiques, VI, 2
(1935), pp. 133-34. Also, companies that were ill-
conceived, ill-directed, or founded on pure speculation
collapsed.

 

 

 

 

7Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale,
1932-34," p. 134.

8A. Becquet, "Moyens mis en Oeuvre et les Resultats
Obtenus dans le Lutte contre la Famine au Ruanda," Journees
d'Agronomie Coloniale, (June 23-24, 1933), p. 4.

 

9"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo, I (January-May
1938) p. 228.

365

 

 

APPENDIX

 

 

 

Table A-1.

APPENDIX I

Volume and Value of Imports, 1922-1959.

 

366

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160

140

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367

F — imports (tons)
— — imports (francs)

 

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Years 1 936-1959

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1 000

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600

400

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Millions of Francs Belges

 

 

 

368

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APPENDIX II

Table B-l(a) Volume of Foreign Trade 1927-1960

 

 

 

 

 

 

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APPENDIX I II

Table C-l. Principle Food Products Exported to the Belgian

Congo from Ruanda-Urundi, 1928 - 1938

 

 

 

APPENDIX III

373

 

 

 

 

Table C-l. Principle Food Products Exported to the Belgian
Congo from Ruanda-Urundi, 1928-1938.
. All Other
Cattle Livestock Food Products*
Francs Francs Francs
Belges Belges Metric Belges
Year Head (1,000) Head (1,000) Tons (1,000)
1928a 1,068 213.6 360 22.4 1,018.5 1,223.2
1929b 1,146 290.8 -- -- 269 506.9
1932C 15,860 2,755.8 54,517 1,104.9 708 412.2
1933d 6,999 978.1 25,969 476.2 1,306 678.0
1934e 3,103 452.6 13,811 208.9 2,709 1,315.5
1935f 4,050 708.7 22,750 386.7 2,256 1,814.8
19369 33,600 7,140.0 115,000 2,070.0 2,244 2,591.1
1937h 27,000 9,600.0 34,750 1,055.0 4,652 4,918.6
19381 28,000 10,350.0 50,000 1,820.0 5,751 3,344.5

 

 

*Products included are: beans, peas, sorghum, manioc
flour, rice, fruits, palm oil, butter, coffee, peanuts, palm
nuts, dry fish, maize flour, maize and wheat.

SOURCES AND NOTES:

EPapport presenté'par Ze Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la
Société'des Nations au sujet db l'Administration de Ruanda-Urundi pendant
Z'Anne’e 1928 (Brussels, 1929), 96.

tliapport 1929, 100. Also 65 kilos of raw meat were
exported at a value of BF 4,527.

cNo itemized totals for 1930 and 1931. Products for
1932 included 155 pigs, valued at BF 19,500, and 3,600
chickens, valued at BP 7,200. .mqmor61932, pp. 128 and 130.

Table

at

at

at

at

at

BF

BF

BF

BF

BF

374

C-1. Continued

 

<1%1ppori: 2933, pp. 162 and
35,840 were exported.

7iapp0rt 1934, pp. 148 and
13,800 were exported.

E’apport 1934, pp. 149 and
52,220 were exported.

gRapport 1936, pp. 153 and
39,000 were exported.

rRapport 1937, pp. 158 and

JRapport 1938, pp. 168 and
50,000 were exported.

164.

150.

151.

155.

160.

171.

Also

Also

Also

Also

Also

265

120

373

200

283

pigs,

pigs,

pigs.

pigs,

pigs.

valued

valued

valued

valued

valued

 

Table D-l.

APPENDIX IV

The Principal Tax Receipts in Rwanda and Burundi,

1925-1959 (in Belgian francs).

 

 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS AND DISSERTATIONS

Adolphus Frederick, duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. In the
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Amin, Samir. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social
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Anstey, Roger. King Leopold's Legacy: the Congo Under
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Bayton, W. H.; R. E. Downs; Yolande Jemai; S. E. Ross-Larson.
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Berger, Elena L. Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule:' the
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Brett, E. A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East
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Cohen, William B. The French Encounter with Africans:
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Dak, O. A Geographical Analysis of the Distribution of
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Des Forges, Alison L. "Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda
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d'Hertefelt, Marcel and Andre Coupez. La royaute sacrée
de l'ancien Rwanda. Tervuren: MusEe royal d'Afrique
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Elkan, Walter. Migrants and Proletarians: Urban Labour
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380

 

381

Elkan, Walter. The Economic Development of Uganda.
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Fetter, Bruce. "The Colonial Tie in the Making of
Elisabethville." Ph.D. thesis, University of
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. The Creation of Elisabethville, 1910-1940.
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Gravel, Pierre B. "A Play for Power: Description of a
Community in Eastern Rwanda." Ph.D. thesis,
University of Michigan, 1962.

Higginson, John E. "The Making of an African Working Class:
the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga and the African Mine
Workers, 1907-1945." Volumes I and II. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Michigan, 1979.

Howard, Rhoda. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana.
New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978.

 

Kerken, Georges van der. La crise economique en Afrique
belge. Brussels: E. Bruylant, 1931.

 

Kimble, George H. T. Tropical Africa. Volume II. Society
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LeMarchand,'Ren5. Rwanda and Burundi. London: Pall Mall
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Leubuscher, Charlotte. Tanganyika Territory: a Study of
Economic Policy Under Mandate. London: Oxford
University Press for the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1944.

 

 

Linden, Ian, with Jane Linden. Church and Revolution in
Rwanda. New York: Manchester University Press]
Africana Publishing Company, 1977.

 

Lord Hailey. An African Survey: a Study of Problems
Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. London:
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Louis, William Roger. Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919. Oxford:
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Maquet, Jacques J. The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda.
London & New York: International African Institute,
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Martelli, George. Leopold to Lumumba: a History of the
Belgian Congo. London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1962.

 

 

Michiels, A. and N. Laude. Notre Colonie: Congo belge et
Ruanda-Urundi. Geographie et Notice Historique.
Brussels: Edition Universelle (S.A.), 1949.

 

 

Newbury, Catherine Atterbury. "The Cohesion of Oppression:
a Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda." Ph.D.
thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975.

Reed, Harry A. "Cotton-Growing in Central Nyanza Province,
Kenya, 1901-1939: an Appraisal of African Reactions
to Imposed Government Policy." Ph.D. thesis, Michigan
State University, 1975.

Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
Washington, D. C. : Howard University Press, 1974.

 

Vail, David Jeremiah. "The Public Sector as Stimulus of
Innovation Adoption in African Smallholder Agriculture:
a Case Study in Teso District Uganda." Ph.D. thesis,
Yale University, 1971.

Vali, Jamal. "The Role of Cotton and Coffee in Uganda's
Economic Development." Ph.D. thesis, Stanford
University, 1976.

Wagoner, Fred E. "Nation Building in Africa: a Description
and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda." Ph.D.
thesis, American University, 1968.

The World Bank. Agricultural Sector Review. Rwanda Report
1377-RW. Regional Project Department, East Africa
Regional Office, June 30, 1977.

Wrigley, C.C. Crops and Wealth in Uganda: a Short Agrarian
History. Kampala: East African Institute of Social
Research, 1959.

 

B. ARTICLES AND PAPERS

Bart, Frangois. "Le Café'dans l'Agriculture rwandaise:
l'exemple de Kidahire (Runyinya)," Les Cahiers
d'Outre-Mer XXXIII, No. 132 (October-December 1980),
pp. 301-317.

 

 

Berman, B. J. and J. M. Lonsdale. "Crises of Accumulation,
Coercion and the Colonial State: the Development of
the Labor Control System in Kenya, 1919-1929,"
Canadian Journal of African Studies XIV, No. 1 (1980),
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383

Bessel, J. M. "Nyabingi," Uganda Journal VI (1938-39),
pp. 73-86.

 

Bryceson, Deborah Fahy. "Peasant Commodity Production in
Post-Colonial Tanzania," African Affairs LXXXI,
No. 325 (October 1982), pp. 547-567.

 

Chandra, Bipan. "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism and the
Colonial State," Journal of Contemporary Asia X,
No. 3 (1980). pp. 272-285.

 

Chretien, Jean-Pierre. "Des sedentaires devenus migrants:
les motifs des departs des Burundais et des Rwandais
vers 1' Uganda (1920-1960)," Culture et developpement
X, No. l (1978). PP. 71-101.

 

Foster-Carter, Aidan. "From Rostow to Gunder Frank:
Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Under-
development," World Development 4 (1976), pp. 167-180.

 

. "The Modes of Production Controversy," New Left
Review, No. 107 (January-February 1978), pp.

. "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Under-
development," in E. de Kadt and G. Welbams, eds.
Sociology and Development. London: Tavistock
Publications, 1974, pp. 67-105.

 

Gildea, Ray Y., Jr. and Alice Taylor. "Rwanda and Burundi,"
Focus XIII, No. 6 (February 1963), pp. 1-6.

Hance, William A. and Irene S. van Dongen. "Matadi: Focus
of Belgian African Transport," Annals of the
Association of American Geographers vol. 48, No. 1
(March 1958), pp. 41-72.

 

 

Heggath, Richard. "From Modernization Theory to Public
Policy: Continuity and Change in the Political
Sciences of Political Development," a paper presented
to the 49th ANZAAS Congress, Sociology Section.
Auckland, New Zealand, January 1979.

Heimo, Marcel Ch. "Réflexion sur les conditions et les
perspectives du développement ébonomique au Rwanda,"
Genéve-Afrique VII, No. l (1968), pp. 7-29.

 

Hillman, Jimmye S. "The Role of Export Cropping in Less
Developed Countries," Journal of Agricultural
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384

Jewsiewicki, Bogumil. "Le colonat agricole Européen au
Congo belge, 1910- 1960: questions politiques et
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"Notes sur l'Histoire socio-Economique du Congo,"
Etudes d'Histoire africaine III (1972), pp. 209-241.

 

. "Zaire enters the world system: its colonial
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1979, pp.

 

 

Kagame, Alexis. "Le code Esoterique de la Dynastié’du
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Legassick, Martin. "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and
Violence," Economy and Society III, No. 3 (August
1974), pp. 253-291.

 

LePlae, Edmund. "Les Plantations de Cafe au Congo belge:
leur histoire (1881-1935), leur importance," Institut
Royal Colonial Belge, mémoires 8, III (1936),
pp. 1-248.

 

Leurquin, Phillipe. "La vie économique du Paysan ruanda,
l'exemple de Karama, Nyaruguru," Zaire II (January
1959). pp. 41-67.

Leys, Colin. "African Economic Development in Theory and
Practice," Daedalus III, No. 2 (Spring 1982),
pp. 99-124.

Lonsdale, John and Bruce Berman. "Coping with the Contra-
dictions: the Development of the Colonial State in
Kenya, 1895-1914," qurnal of African History XX,
No. 4 (1979). PP. 487-505.

 

Lopans, Jean and David Seddon. "Marxism and Anthropology:
A Preliminary Survey," in D. §eddon, ed. Relations of

 

Production. London: Cass; lTotowa, N. J.
distributed by Biblio Distribution Centr_/, 1978,

PP-

 

Maquet, Jacques J. "Rwanda Castes," in Arthur Tuden and
Leonard Platnicov, eds. Social Stratification in
Africa. New York: Free Press, 1973, pp. 93-124.

 

Molitor, G. "Campagnes de propagande pour 1' Introduction et
le developpement de la Culture du Cafeier Arabica chez
1' indigene du Ruanda-Urundi," Journees d' Agronomie
colonial (Louvain, 1937), pp. 238- 249.

 

 

 

-3... .1“..-—

L' ‘1 3;."

 

 

385

Morris, M. L. "The Development of Capitalism in South
African Agriculture: Class Struggle in the Country-
side," Economy and Society V, No. 3 (August 1976),
pp. 292-343.

 

Newbury, Catherine A. "Ubureetwa and Thangata: Comparative
Colonial Perspectives," in Colloque de Bujumbura (4-10
septembre 1979). La Civilisation ancienne des peuples
des Grands Lacs. Paris: Editions Karthala; Bujumbura:
Centre de CiVilisation Burundaises, 1981, pp. 138-147.

 

 

Peemans, Jean-Phillipe. "Capital Accumulation in the Congo
under Colonialism: the Role of the State," in Peter
Duignan and L. H. Gann, eds. Colonialism in Africa,
1870-1960. Volume Four: The Economics of_Colonialism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975,
pp. 165-212.

 

 

 

Phillips, J. E. T. "The Nyabingi: An Anti—European Secret
Society in Africa," Congo I (1928), pp. 310—521.

Powesland, P. S. "History of Migration in Uganda," in
Audrey I. Richards, ed. Economic Development and
Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in
Buganda. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd. for the
East African Institute of Social Research, 1954,

PP-

 

 

"Le programme economique dans le Ruanda-Urundi," Congo I
(June 1921). pp. 253-269.

"La Rapport sur 1' Administration belge au Ruanda-Urundi
pendant 1' annee 1923, " Congo I (January-May 1924),
pp. 747- 757.

"Rapport sur 1' Administration belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant
1' annee 1934, " Congo II (June-December 1935),
pp. 765- 778.

Richards, A. I. "The Travel Routes of the Travellers," in
Audrey I. Richards, ed. Economic Development and
Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in
Buganda. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd. for the
East African Institute of Social Research, 1954,

PP-

 

 

Ryckmans, Pierre. "Le problEme politique au Ruanda-Urundi,"
Congo I, No. 3 (1925), pp. 120-162.

 

 

 

386

Sladden, George E. and L. Michel. "Methodes de Commerciali-
sation du Cafe arabica produit par les Indigenes du
Ruanda-Urundi," Numero special du Bulletin agricole du
Congo belge XLIII (1952).

 

"Territoires sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May 1937),
pp. 184-191.

"Territoires sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May 1938),
pp. 223-230.

"Territoires sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May 1939),
pp. 99-106.

van Tichelin, H. E. "ProblEmes du Developpement economique
du Ruanda-Urundi," Zaire II (May 1957), pp. 451-474.

Vellut, Jean Luc. "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, c. 1890-
1930," in Robin Palmer and Neil Parson, eds. The
Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and South AfEIEa.
Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1977, pp. 294-316.

Weinstein, Warren. "Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda-Burundi)," in
Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G.
Stoessinger, eds. Divided Nations in a Divided World.
New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1974, pp.

Young, Crawford. "Patterns of Social Conflict: State,
Class, and Ethnicity," Daedalus III, No. 2, (Spring
1982). Pp. 71-98.

C. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
Permanent Mandates Commission, 7th Session, New York, 1925.
Permanent Mandates Commission, 16th Session, New York, 1929.

Permanent Mandates Commission. Minutes and Reports, 18th
Session, New York, 1938.

U. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on
Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council, 4th Session,
Supplement, No. 2, 1950.

United Nations Trusteeship Council. Study of Population,
Land Utilization and Land System in Ruanda-Urundi,
prepared by the Secretariat to the Committee on Rural
Economic Development of the Trust Territories,

26 March 1957. T/AC.36/L.60.

 

 

 

387

D. CONGO MANUSCRIPTS, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN

Folder No. 9. "Figures coloniales, Georges Sandrart:
Ancien Resident du Ruanda et de l'Urundi, Pourquoi
Pas, No. 1 (November 2, 1952), pp. 107-108.

E. CONSORTIUM FOR AFRICA MICROFILM PROJECT (CAMP),
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

MF 1552. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1916-1919.
Notice sur le Ruanda--l9l6.

Film No. 34, Reel 1. J. M. Derscheid Collection.
Territoires du Ruanda-Urundi. Residence du Ruanda.
Territoire d' Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de charge,
etabli par Monsieur Andre Servranckx, administrateur
territorial de 1 ere cl. ayant administré’le
territoire d' Astrida depuis 1e 27 aofit 1932. Astrida,
September 26, 1933.

Film No. 34, Reel 2. J. M. Derscheid Collection.
Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi. Résidence du Ruanda:

Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge.
September 23, 1933.

Territoire de Biumba. Rapport de Sortie de Charge,
de l'Administrateur territorial, A. J. F. Stevens,
du territoire de Biumba. October 12, 1933.

Film No. 34, Reel 3. J. M. Derscheid Collection.
Territoire de Ruanda-Urundi. Residence du Ruanda:

Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport etabli en reponse au
questionnaire adressé en 1929, par M. 1e Gouverneur
du Ruanda-Urundi a 1' Administrateur du Territoire
d' Astrida.

Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport etabli en reponse au
questionnaire adressé’en 1929, par M. 1e Gouverneur
du Ruanda-Urundi a 1' Administrateur du territoire de
Nyanza, M. Lenaerts.

R. J. L. Schmidt. Rapport politique de territoire de
Kigali, 1933.

 

 

388

ME 1552. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material,
1925-1941:

Developpement moral et social

Rapport annuel zfi.d
E rtie: Protection du Travail.

17 -
des indigenes. 3 Pa
Chapitre III: Instruction publique et d'etablissements
d'enseignment ZP-d;/-

Province du Ruanda-Urundi. Residence du Ruanda.
No. 840/org. 5. Ordre de service, 1e resident du
Ruanda, Morteham. Kigali, April 13, 1927.

Province du Ruanda-Urundi. Residence du Ruanda.
No. 1117/P.I.C. Monsieur 1e Délegue de Ruhengeri, 1e
resident du Ruanda, G. Morteham. Kigali, May 22, 1928.

Résidence du Ruanda. Territoire de Lubengera.
No. 39/P.I. Monsieur 1e résident, 1e Déléguél
Gitebe, January 18, 1931.

Pro-Justitia. Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi.
ADéposition/. Ruhengeri, March 2, 1932.

Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi. Residence du Ruanda.

No. 14/R. Annexe I: 1'inspection de la S/Chefferie-
Rubindo a fait l'objet d'un rapport spécial en date du
15/1 dernier. Ruhengeri, January 23, 1937.

Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi. RéSidence du Ruanda.
No. 87/P.I.G.-44. Sous-chef Rubindo (Mulera), M.
Rubbens, administrateur d'territoire. Ruhengeri,
February 1, 1937.

F. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF RWANDA, BUTARE, RWANDA

Anonymous. Historique et Chronologie du Ruanda.
AKabgayi/, 1956.

Codere, Helen. "The Biography of an African Society,
Rwanda: based on Forty-Eight Rwandan Autobiographies,"
Institut National de Recherche Scientifique,
Publication No. 12 (1973).

 

Kagame, Alexis. Yuhi Musinga: un Regne mouvemente.
Unpublished manuscript.

Leroy, Pierre. Legislation du Ruanda-Urundi. Usumbura
(Bujumbur§/: s. 1., 1949.

 

389

 

Murego, Donat. [La revolution ruandaise, 1959-1962: Essai
d'interpretation. Louvain: Publications de
l'Institut des Sciences politiques et sociales, 1975.

 

Reisdorff, I. Enquetes fonciéres au Ruanda. Texte
polycopié, 1952.

 

Ruzindana, Emmanuel. L'éyolution du commerce au Rwanda du
dernier quart du XIXéme siécle 5'1950. Louvain:
mémoire de licence, polycopié, 1974.

 

 

Twagirayezu, Ephrem. "Le café’arabica et 1e developpement
economique du Rwanda et du Burundi." Université'
Lovanium de Leopoldville, Faculte des Sciences
politique, sociales et economiques, 1964.

G. ROYAL LIBRARY, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Agriculture et Elevage au Congo belge et dans 1e Colonies
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Deuxiéme annee, No. 18 (September 8, 1929),
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SixiEme année, No. 14 (October 15, 1932), pp. 158-162.
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"Agriculture indigEne: grandes lignes du programme
agricole du Gouvernement," Neuviéme annee, No. 5
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Alloncius, C.-J. "Le Marché'du Café E'Anvers, 12
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Becquet, A. "L'Organisation du Service de
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Brock, Raymond. "Le café'arabica et 1e Kivu,"
Neuviéme annee, No. 1 (January 1935), pp. 1-4.

"Le Culture du Cafeier arabica au Ruanda-Urundi,"
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"La Culture du Cafeier par les IndigEnes du Ruanda-
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390

"D6clarations de M. 1e Gouverneur General Ryckmans,"
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De Ryckman de Betz, J. "La mise en valeur du Ruanda-
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. "La mise en valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," QuatriEme
anneé, No. 8 (April 19, 1930), pp. 121-123, and 125.

"Documentation sur le Kivu et 1e Ruanda-Urundi,"
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"Documentation sur 1e Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi.
R6union de l'Union Agricole du Kivu du jeudi 2 mars
1933," SeptiEme ann6e, No. 5 (April 1933), p. 52.

"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi. Union
agricole des Régions du Kivu. Reunion du 12 avril
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"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi. Union
agricole des Régions du Kivu," Huitiéme ann6e, No. 1
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"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi.
Assembl6e g6n6ra1e du 13 fevrier 1935," Neuvféme
ann6e, No. 4 (April 1935), pp. 51-53.

Gille, Albert.N "Les Cultures indigenes de caf6 en
Urundi," Heitieme ann6e, No. 2 (February 1934),
pp. 22- 23.

"Les Plantations de Caf6 du Ruanda-Urundi," TroisiEme
ann6e, No. 6 (March 23, 1929), pp. 88-89.

"La politique du caf6 dans les territoires sous
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"Superficie des plantations de caf6iers au Congo belge
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"Union agricole des Régions du Kivu. Rapport pour la
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"Variétés," CinquiBme ann6e, No. 4 (February 21,
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391

"Variétés," Neuvigme ann6e, No. 4 (April 1935), p. 61.

"Vari6t6s: les plantations/indigenes de Caf6 au
Ruanda-Urundi," Dixieme annee, No. 7 (July 1936),
p. 110.

"Les Zones de Protection du Caf6’en-Ruanda-Urundi,"
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Annuaire official du MinistEre des Colonies (de Belgique).
Brussels: A. Lesigne, 1921-1959.

Becquet, A. "Moyens mis en oeuvre et les r6sultats obtenus
dans la lutte contre la famine au Ruanda," Journ6es
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Bourgeois, R. Banyarwanda et Burundi. L'6yolution du
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d'Arianoff, A. Histoire des Bagesera: souverains du
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Dubois, B. "La politique 6conomique coloniale, 1932-1934,"
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Dufays, Felix. Pages d'epogée africaine. Ixelles:
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Gourou, Pierre. La Densit6 de la Population au Ruanda:
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Naturelles et Medicales, m6moire, Tome XXI, fasc. §/,
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. Notice de la Carte de la Densit6 de la Population au
Congo belge et au Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels: Institut
Royal Colonial Belge, Atlas Géheral du Congo 1951.

 

 

Gouvernement belge, MinistEre des Colonies:

Major Declerk. "Rapport d' ensemble sur la situation
de la R6sidence du Ruanda_ et sur 1' activit6 de
1' Administration." in. d_/.

 

Rapport sur l'Administration belge des territoires
occupés d6 l'Est Africain Allemand. Brussels:
Imprimerie E. Guyst, S. A., 1921.

 

392

Rapport sur l'Administration belge du Ruanda et de
l'Urundi, 1921-1923. Brussels: Goemaere, 1922-1924.

 

 

Rapport present6 par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année, 1924. GenEve:
Société des Nations, 1925.

 

 

 

Rapportpresent6 par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Soci6t6 des Nations au sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Ann6e, 1925-1926. Brussels:
F. Van Gompel, Imprimeur-Editeur, 1926-1927.

 

 

Chambre des Representants, Session de 1923-1924.
Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi
presente aux Chambres. Brussels: F. Van Gompel,
Imprimeur--Editeur, 1924.

 

 

Rapport presenté'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Societe des Nations au Sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda—Urundi pendant l'Année, 1927-1932.

Brussels: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1928-1933.

 

 

Rapport present6'par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Société des Nations au Sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant 1'Ann6e, 1933. Brussels:
Imprimerie E. Guyot, S. A., 1934.

 

 

Rapport present6 par 1e Gouvernement Belge au Conseil
de la Soci6t6 des Nations au Sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant 1'Ann6é, 1934-1946.

Brussels: Etablissements Generaux d‘Imprimerie,
1935-1948.

 

 

 

Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement Belge 3'1'Assemblée
Générale des Nations Unies au Sujet de l'Administration
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année, 1947-49. Brussels:
Etablissements Géhéraux d'Imprimerie, 1948-1950.

 

 

 

Service des Territoires des Colonies; Dossier AE/ll,
No. 1847, portefeuille 3288X. ln.d;/.

Kagame, Alexis. Le Codes des Institutions politiques du
Rwanda Precolonial. Brussels: Editions du Marais,
1952.

 

Lefebrve, Jacques. Structures 6conomiques du Congo Belge et
du Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels: Edition de Treurenberg,
1955.

 

393

Leurquin, Philippe. "Les limites physiques de 1e production
de Subsistence," Bulletin de 1' Institut de Recherche
6conomiques et soc1a1es (Universit6 de Louvain),
XXIII, No. 2 (1957). Pp. 48- 66.

 

 

Molitor, G. "L' Introduction et le D6veloppement de la
Culture du Caf6ier Arabica chez les Indigene du
Ruanda-Urundi," Le Materiel Colonial A. S. B. L., 27 6me
Ann6e, No. 6 (March 1937), pp. 154- 180.

 

Pages, Albert. "Un Royaume Hamit6 au centre de l‘Afrique,"
IRCM (Brussels), I (1933), pp. 195-232.

Ryckmans, Pierre. La Politique Coloniale. Brussels: Les
Edition Rex, 1934.

 

. "Une Page d' Histoire Coloniale: 1' Occupation
Allemande dans 1' Urundi," IRCB (Brussels), XXIX

"Tribal Traditions Hinder Progress in Ruanda-Urundi,"
Bulletin Nations Unies XVI, No. 7 (April 1954),
pp. 267-269.

 

Vansina, Jan. L'6volution du royaume Rwanda des Origines 3
1900. Brussels: Academie Royale des Sciences
d'Outre-Mer, 1962.

 

H. AFRICAN ARCHIVES, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Carton Agri (106), Dossier 47, FEDECAME: Accord de Mexico,
1957, 4 eme Direction G6n6ra1, Agriculture, For6ts,
Elevage, Colonisation, l ere Direction a FEDECAME.
Crédit accordes en faveur de la production du Caf6.

in. d_/.

(109), Dossier 54--Caf6, Groupe d'Etude du Caf6 5'
Washington, 1959: International Bank of Reconstruc-
tion and Development, L. Baranysi, History of
Commodity Agreements (Economic Staff Report, 1959).

 

 

(110), Dossier 59, Ministere du Congo belge et du
Ruanda-Urundi, Accord International du Congo,
Washington: 4 eme Direction G6n6rale, 3 Eme Direction
a M. 1e Ministre du Commerce Extérieur. Brussels,
July 31,1959.

(340), Dossier 207, Ministere des Colonies, Note pour
la 6 eme Directeur G6n6rale. Brussels, February 17,
1932.

 

 

‘ -—-~' -1... 1r _:r

 

394

Carton Agri (341), No. 417, T616gramme d' Etat regu du
Gouverneur G6n6ral Ryckmans. Costermansville, No. 12,
November 8,1935.

, , No. 418, D6peches du Congo Belge: Incopresse,
Service Colonial Belga, D6péche No. 1350, T. S. F.
Anvers, November 23,1935.

 

, , No. 418, Annexe, Depeches du Con o Belge,
Incopresse, Service Colonial Belga, Dep che No. 351,
T. S. F., Heure L60, No. 314. Anvers, November 23,
1935.

 

, , No. 425, Annexe, M. Ren6.Hebette 3 Monsieur 1e
Directeur G6n6ra1. Brussels, January 14, 1936.

 

, , No. 426, Association des Planteurs de Caf6 du
Congo 3 Monsieur 1e Ministre des Colonies. Anvers,
December 24, 1935.

 

, , No. 428, Ministre des Colonies a M. 1e
Gouverneur G6n6ral a Leopoldville. Brussels,
February IL 1936.

 

, , No. 436, Annexe, Association des Planteur de
Cafe du Congo 3 Monsieur E. Rubbens, Ministre des
Colonies. Anvers, March 12, 1936.

 

, , No. 436,5 eme Direction G6n6rale, Pour 1e
Ministre, 1e Directeur, Chef de Service 3 Monsieur 1e
President de 1' APCC. Brussels, March 23,1936.

 

 

, , No. 439, Incopresse. Costermansville, March
23, 1936.
, , No. 452, S‘Eme Direction G6h6ra1e, Note pour

 

1e Ministre. Brussels, September 2, 1936.

, , No. 454, 5 6me Direction 66n6ra1e, Note pour
1e Ministre. Brussels, September 2, 1936.

 

, , No. 458, Ministere des Colonies, 5 eme
Direction G6n6ra1, Note pour la 4 eme Direction
G6n6rale. Brussels, December 4, 1936.

 

, , No. 484, Incopresse, Les D6bouch6s pour 1e
Caf6 Belge au Kenya, Anvers, 9 octobre 1937.
Costermansville, October 9, 1937.

 

, , No. 512, T616gramme d'Etat, Ubelco au Ministére
des Cclonies. Costermansville, March 1938.

 

 

 

 

395

Carton Agri (341), No. 513,5 eme Direction G6n6ra1, Note
pour le Ministre, 1e Secretaire G6n6ral a Monsieur 1e
Gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi, Usumbura. Brussels,
March 18, 1938.

, _, No. 514, Ministere des Colonies, 4 eme
D1rection G6n6rale, 3 eme Direction, projet t616—
gramme, Ubelco, Costermansville. Brussels, March 17,
1938.

, _, No. 525, T616gramme d' Etat exp6di6 au
Gouverneur G6n6ral, Leopoldville, No. 84. Brussels,
April 7,1938.

, , No. 526,4 eme Direction G6n6rale, 3 6me
D1rection a Gouverneur G6n6ral, Leopoldville.
Brussels, April 11,1938.

, , No. 527, Annexe II, S'Bme Direction G6n6rale,
Note pour Monsieur 1e Ministre. Brussels, (1938).

, No. 527, Conseil Colonial sur un projet d6cret
limitant temporairement les plantations de Caf6 au
Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi (with 3 Annexes).
Brussels, July 8, 1938.

, , No. 52L Annexe I, Projet de d6cret sur la
limitation temporaire des plantations de caf6 au Congo
Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi (1938).

 

W, No. 528, Annexe III, Ubelco a M. Rubbens,
M1n1stere des Colonies. Costermansville, March 12,
1938.

, No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Caf6,
No. 528/10, 4 6me Direction 66n6rale, 3 6me Direction,
Note pour M. 1e Ministre (with annexe). Brussels,
March 22, 1938.

, No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Caf6,
No. 528/12, Prescobel a Brussels, Information
coloniale. Costermansville, Tuesday, July 14, 1938.

, No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Caf6,
No. 528/10, Annexe, Rapport: Subvention de 6,000,000
de la Metropole. (1938).

, , No. 528/12, UPCC a Monsieur Van den Abeele,
Directeur G6n6ral au Ministere des Colonies (with 3
Annexes). Brussels, April 23,1938.

 

—

 

 

396

Carton Agri (341), No. 547, Rapport pour M. 1e Ministre.
May 30, 1938.

Carton Agri (342), Dossier Caf6s C/I, R6glementation,
Limitation des Plantations de Caféiers Anciens
Dossiers: C/I/3, du MinistEre des Colonies, S'Eme
Direction G6n6ral'3 M. 1e Gouverneur G6n6ral 3'
Leopoldville (with annexes). Brussels, March 20, 1946.

: C/I/S, 5 eme Direction G6n6rale, 1e Directeur
Géneral, Note pour M. 1e Ministre des Colonies (with
annexes). Brussels, October 8, 1946.

, : C/I/8, S‘Eme Direction G6n6rale S'M. 1e
Gouverneur G6n6ral E Leopoldville (with annexes).
Brussels, October 16, 1946.

 

: C/I/9, Gouvernement G6n6ral, Agriculture et
Colonisation, Congo Belge a M. le Ministre des
Colonies (with annexes). Leopoldville, October 29,
1946.

, _, Dossier Caf6 C/II, R6glemenation, C/II/4:

Union des Planteurs de Caf6 du Congo Belgea Monsieur
Staner, Directeur au Ministere des Colonies.
Brussels, February 9, 1945.

, Dossier, Limitation des Plantations de Caf6,
No. 528, Annexe III, Union Belge des Colonies au Kivu
(Ubelco) a M. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies.
Costermansville, March 12, 1938.

, , No. 528, Annexe II, Gouvernement G6n6ral
Affaires Economique Congo Belge a M. le Ministre des
Colonies. Leopoldville, March 25, 1938.

, No. 528, Annexe I, Service de 1' Agriculture,
Territoire Ruanda-Urundi a Monsieur le President de
1' Union Belge des Colons du Kivu a Costermansville.
Usumbura, March 30, 1938.

, , No. 528 Service de l'Agriculture, Territoire
Ruanda-Urundi a Monsieur 1e Gouverneur G6n6ral du
Congo Belge E'Leo-Kalina (with 3 annexes). Usumbura,
March 30, 1938.

, , No. 528/12, Gouvernement G6n6ral Affaires
Economiques Congo Belge a M. le Ministre des Colonies
a Brussels. Leopoldville, April 22,1938.

 

 

 

397

Carton Agri (342), Dossier LCaf6, 1935-19327, No. 547,
Rapport pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, May 30, 1938.

, , No. 591, Soci6t6 Anonyme de Cultures au Congo
Belge a M. 1e Ministre des Colonies. Brussels,
February 22,1939.

, , No. 593, Annexe, 5 6me Direction G6n6rale,
Note pour la 4 6me Direction G6n6rale. Brussels,
March 3, 1939.

, _, No. 593, 4 eme Direction G6n6rale, 3 eme
Direction, Note pour la 5 eme Direction Générale (with
annexe). Brussels, March 7,1939.

_, Dossier No. 528- 2 eme, Limitation des Planta-
t1ons de Caf6, No. 528/40,1a R6union du 19 mai 1939,
ll heures, du U. P. P. U. Brussels, May 22,1939.

, , No. 528/41, S'éme Direction G6n6rale, Note pour
M. 1e Ministére. Brussels, May 26, 1939.

 

, , No. 528/42, Annexe, Ren6 Brasseur a la Union
Professionnelle, des Producteurs de Cafe du Congo
Belge. Brussels, June 5, 1939.

 

, No. 528/44, Pour 1e MinistEre 1e Secr6taire
Généra1,5 6me Direction G6n6rale, S‘M. 1e President
de 1' Union Professionnelle des Producteurs de Caf6 du
Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels, June 20,
1939.

, , No. 528/45, 5 eme Direction G6n6rale, Pour le
Min1stere, 1e Secr6taire G6n6ral a M. Godding,
Administrateur D6l6gu6 de la Soci6t6 de Culture, au
Congo Belge a Brussels. Brussels, June 24,1939.

, F, No. 528/47, Campagnie de l'Ue16 a M. le
D1recteur G§h6rale du Service d'Agriculture au
Ministere des Colonies (with annexes). Kurukwata,
par Aba, July 17,1939.

, ,_Uo. 528/48, Union des Producteurs de Caf6
Belge a M. le MinistEre des Colonies. Brussels,
August 3, 1939.

, , No. 528/49, Union des Producteurs de Caf6 du
Congo Belge S'Monsieur le MinistEre des Colonies.
Brussels, September 8, 1939.

 

398

Carton Agri (342), No. 528/51, telegramme regu, adressé’au
Ministre des Colonies de 1' Unake a Costermansville
(with 3 annexes). Costermansville, November 21, 1939.

, , No. 528/51, Annexe III, 5 Ema Direction
Ganeral, Pour le Ministre, 1e Secretaire General a

M. le Gouverneur General, Leopoldville. Leopoldville,
November 27, 1939.

 

, , No. 528/51, Annexe II, télécramme regu de
Costermansville de l'Ubelco. Costermansville,
December 13, 1939.

 

, , No. 528/51, Annexe I, télééramme d'Etat, regu
du Gouverneur Général Ryckmans. Leopoldville, No. 34,
December 15, 1939.

 

, No. 528/53, S'Bme Direction Generale, Note pour
M. le Ministre, par M. Van den Abeele. Brussels,
November 25, 1939.

 

, , Dossier No. 528, C/I/I, Anciens Dossiers,
No. 528/60, R. Godding E'M. le Ministre des Colonies
(with annexe). Brussels, March 28, 1940.

 

, , No. 528/61, s'ame Direction, Note pour M. 1e
Ministre. Brussels, April 3, 1940.

 

, , Dossier Caf6 C/II, Reglementation: C/II/4,
Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge‘a
Monsieur Staner. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

 

, No. B/I/23--OCIRU, Note pour M. 1e Gouverneur
General, Office du Café Indigene du Ruanda-Urundi et
Liberté Commerciale, du President 0. P. A., G.
Sladden. Leopoldville, January 9, 1946.

 

, , No. B/I/28--OCIRU, du Ministere des Colonies,
5 eme Direction Generale, 1e Directeur General, Note
pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, February 28,1946.

 

Carton Agri/ (343), 1936--Kenya, Dossier E, Caf6 Divers:
Marches; Politique Café Robusta, etc.; E- l, Ministére
des Colonies, 4 Eme Direction a M. le President de
l'Association des Planteurs de Cafe du Congo (with one
attachment and Appendix "A"--transport). Brussels,
January 13, 1936.

, , 1937--Dossier E-gbas, Pret Planteurs Caf6 Kivu,
No. /428/9, Ministere des Colonies, 4 eme Direction
Generale, 2 eme Direction, Note pour M. 12 Directeur
Général du Service de l'Agriculture. Brussels, April
14, 1937.

 

 

 

"5" .

 

 

113-qr—

399

Carton Agri (343), No. 428/10, No. 7526, Comit6 National du
Kivu a M. le Ministre. Brussels, March 23, 1937.

, , No. 428/12, Gouvernement G6n6rale Affaires
Economiques a M. le Ministre des Colonies (with
annexes). Leopoldville, July 16,1937.

, N2. 428/ll, Societ6 Cooperative des Planteurs
du K1vu a Monsieur le Ministre. Costermansville,
September 10,1937.

, , l938--Kenya: E- 1, Annexes, Coffee Trade
Association of Kenya a le Consulat General a Nairobi.
Nairobi, August 7,1938.

 

, , l939--Dossier Ejgbas, Pret Planteurs Caf6
Kivu, No. 428/37, Comite National du Kivu a M. 1e
Ministre. Brussels, February 7,1939.

, , l939--Dossier E, Caf6 Divers; Marchés,

Politique Caf6 Robusta, etc.: Dossier E-2, No. 608,
5 eme Direction G6n6rale, 3 eme Direction, Inspecteur
Gén6ral ff. de Directeur G6n6ral. Brussels, July 1,
1939.

, , No. 608/3, Annexe, Soci6t6 Anonyme de Cultures
au Congo Belge a M. Van den Abeele, Directeur G6n6rale
au Ministre des Colonies. Brussels, July 4,1939.

 

, No. 608/5, t616gramme, 4 eme Direction
Générale, 3‘Bme Direction du Gouverneur Gén6ral a
Leopoldville. Brussels, July 12,1939.

 

, , No. 608/6, 4 6me Direction Gén6rale, 3 6me
D1rection a M. le President de 1' Union des P. C. C.
Brussels, July 17,1939.

, _, l940--Dossier H, Caf6'; Taxes Diverses H/6 5 eme
Direction G6n6rale, Note pour la 3 6me Direction
G6n6rale. Brussels, January 2,1940.

, , No. 643/1, T616 egramme regu adress6 au Ministre
des Colonies. Costermansville, January 28,1940.

 

, _, No. 643/2, Ministere des Colonies, S'éme
Direction Générale, Note pour la 4 eme Direction
G6n6rale. Brussels, January 31,1940.

, , No. 643/4, T616§ramme regu de la Chambre de
Commerce de Costermansville a Ministere des Colonies.
Costermansville, February L 1940.

 

 

 

400

Carton Agri (343), No. 643/6, 4 6me Direction G6n6rale,
B‘Eme Direction, Note pour M. 1e Ministre. Brussels,
February 13, 1940.

, , No. 643/7, 5‘6me Direction G6n6rale, Note pour
M. 1e Ministre. Brussels, March 1, 1940.
, , No. 643/10, 5 6me Direction 66n6rale, Note
pour M. 1e Ministre, 1e Procgs-verbal de la R6union
du 28 mars 1940 de la sous-Commission Economique
Interministerielle. Brussels, April 3, 1940.

 

, , 4 6me Direction G6n6rale, 1 Ere Direction,
Note pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, April 2, 1940.

 

, , Comptoir des Cafés Victor de Hae a‘M. Van den
Abeele, au Ministere des Colonies, Brussels.
Antwerp, April 12, 1940.

, , l940--Dossier E, Caf6'Divers, Dossier E-3,
Mévente des Arabicas, Ministére des Colonies, Note

pour la 4 6me Direction G6n6rale. Brussels, n.d.