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THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY, 1916 - 1941

By

Learthen Dorsey

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1983

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ABSTRACT

THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY,
1916 - 1941

By

Learthen Dorsey

This study examines the development of the colonial state and the changes it introduced into the social and economic life of the Rwandan peasantry. It also describes the introduction of the compulsory coffee cultivation and its impact on both the ruling Batutsi oligarchy and the Bahutu masses. A cash economy combined with the spread of Christianity and western education transformed the ideas and manners of the traditional society. How did ordinary Rwandans or the peasantry cope with these changes? What was the range of their options? These questions are addressed here.

A combination of research methods and techniques were employed. Primary and secondary source materials were consulted in the United States, Belgium and Rwanda. Also, coffee growers in Butare and other informants were questioned following an interview guide. As a result, this study finds that the decision-making power and alternative choices of Rwandans were severely limited by the demands of the colonial state and the civilian administration or the Batutsi oligarchy. State intervention in the economy, designed to create capital surplus and facilitate the

development of civil administration and the country's infrastructure, was partially responsible for this. However, the depression of the 1930s was also responsible for changing the status of Rwandans. The economic crisis severely weakened the emerging capitalist sector, and threatened both colonial solvency and the colony's development. To compensate for lost revenues, colonial officials increased receipts, taxes and charges on the producers, thereby severely weakening the small but growing African capitalist sector.

At the same time, the state, in order to ensure the growth of capitalism, was compelled to introduce cash crop production, to reorganize the traditional structure and standardize the lines of communication from the administration through chiefs and subchiefs, to the rural population. While these measures fostered agricultural development, they inadvertently tightened the stranglehold of the Batutsi notables over Bahutu, and redirected individual African initiative in the domestic economy for the benefit of the state, and introduced into the country a strict system of economic planning which guaranteed the maximum productivity from the African masses.

To my mother and father
and my brothers, Jeff, Harrison
and George

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Fifteen to twenty years ago the dialectic of development and underdevelopment was the near exclusive preserve of left-liberal theorists. Marxist input and influence was only secondary. But today the reverse is true. In fact, since the 1960's, there has been intense debate and even schisms among Marxists and quasi-Marxists over the "new-Marxist paradigm that invaded development studies and has stood apart from both classical Marxism and the liberal sub-discipline of economic development."[1] As a result of the debate over this issue no common denominator has yet to be established for the paradigm,[2] and some observers have become increasingly alarmed over the possibility of a crisis in Marxist theory if divisions of interests and opinions are not resolved. Still there are those who see the current situations in development studies as constituting a paradigm shift, "because of the difficulty of identifying a new-Marxist paradigm and because there has been no major defection of liberals toward any alliance with Marxism." Many insist that the dynamics of development studies is best depicted as the waxing and waning of two quite different traditions,[4] each with its own debates and problems, and addressing each other in eye-to-eye

confrontation at only a few modal points. Or perhaps the issue could best be described as the pains of an emerging or maturing discipline.

The most recent tendency in developmental theory, however, is to see colonialism as a structure and as much more than just political control or colonial policy. Actually, the colonial system incorporated the colonial state,[5] and as a variant of the capitalist system, it interacted with the various sectors of the traditional society, and ultimately imposed its hegemony. Almost simultaneously, the state found the means of extracting from the peasant economies the fiscal resources to pay for conquest and for its own institutionalization.[6] An analysis of the development of the colonial state, therefore, is clearly vital for a fuller understanding of colonialism. Only by understanding the colonial state's most salient feature--its centrality in the political economy through the unusual scope and intensity of its intervention into social and economic life--can we have a much fuller appreciation for the dynamics of potential change within the colonial system itself and in the development of capitalism.

According to Lonsdale and Berman, the state is the historically conditioned set of institutions which secures the social conditions for the reproduction of the dominant or capitalist mode of production. Capitalism depends on the accumulation of surplus values from labor power in its

continuing domination of an ever-changing process of class struggle. But capitalism cannot secure this dominant position for itself, primarily because of its competitive nature and potential for conflict. Therefore, it relies upon the state to provide the technical and legal conditions for capitalist penetration--i.e., monetary and tariff rules, property laws, social services and of maintaining the hierarchy in class domination.[7]

They further contend that the state straddles not one but two levels of articulation: between the metropole and the colony as a whole as well as within the colony itself. Because of this duality the colonial state was a subordinate agent in restructuring local production to meet metropolitan demands and the local factor of cohesion over heterogeneous, fragmented and contradictory social forces within its boundaries. This "Dual Mandate" defined the dilemmas of the colonial state. Since it was obliged to intervene more directly in the economic life of the country than was characteristic of the contemporary capitalist state, it had to absorb these contradictions more directly into the bureaucratic sphere. Consequently, disagreements over colonial development were not between parties but between officials, and when the metropole insisted upon financial self-sufficiency, the colonial state inherited a sovereign self-interest in the orderly expansion of its forces of production.[8]

As the colonial state proceeded with its task of social engineering, it often had to use force to achieve the extraction of local labor for capitalist production and to generate peasant production of export crops. More often than not, the state's preoccupation with ensuring conditions of primary accumulation threatened political order. Consequently, the state was frequently forced to seek accommodation with the subject population in order to govern and to continue the process of primitive accumulation. Still the process of articulation raised the dilemma of how far metropolitan interests could be pressed against the interests of local producers in a colony, whether African peasants or European settlers, or, internally, of settlers over Africans, before provoking resistance and undermining effective state control.[9]

By drawing on the current Marxist debate about the nature of the capitalist state, this thesis argues that during the colonial era, traditional Rwandan social and economic and political institutions underwent profound changes as the colonial states, both German and Belgian, sought to incorporate African production into, the national and then the world economy. This study explores changes from 1916 to 1941, and shows that as the colonial systems organized the traditional society for production and as one of them ultimately achieved its goal, not only was the Rwandan economy severely distorted but traditional Bahutu

and Batutsi class alignments were further accentuated. Organizing production required the transformation of the traditional mode of production, described here as the tribute-paying or tributary mode of production, where the peasantry's (the Bahutu) "dominion eminens" over the soil had been lost to feudal or Batutsi lords.[10]

The goals of the colonial system were to replace a subsistence economy with a cash economy, to spread Christianity and western education, and to inculcate into Rwandans a western mode of thought concerning government and development. Like it or not, Rwandans experienced escalating socio-economic changes which emanated from vaguely understood sources. These changes had unanticipated consequences for both Bahutu and Batutsi. They transformed their ideas and manners. How did ordinary Rwandans or the peasantry cope with these changes? What was the range of their options? These questions are addressed here. While the Bahutu peasantry had no control in shaping colonial policy, it would be wrong to conceive of them as disinterested observers or passive objects waiting to be transformed by a new breed of social engineers. Even if the current situation was not of their choosing, they had to adapt their lives to new circumstances, opportunities, and ideas.

As commercial agriculture and its infrastructure developed within Rwanda, the demands for salaried labor

expanded. New forms of wealth affected the traditional structure in different ways. For the Batutsi oligarchy, the arbiters of the colonial structure, wealth increased power, social stratification, and ethnicity. In fact Newbury, in "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clientship," also argues that social stratification between Bahutu and Batutsi increased as a result of new economic forms. She contends that employment gave workers, both Bahutu and Batutsi, an opportunity to gain economic independence and eventually a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the chief. More significantly, colonial rule served as the context for political change that resulted in the emergence of ethnicity, social stratification, and, eventually, organized attempts by oppressed groups to reject Batutsi and, then Belgian domination.[11]

Newbury demonstrates that these changes occurred in the western periphery, but she minimizes these changes for the central plateau, where coffee production supplemented salaried employment and created similar changes. She contends that nowhere in Rwanda had there developed as large a European population or as important an urban center as was found in Bukavu and Kivu Province. In these urban centers emigrant Rwandans from the western periphery were exposed to new experiences and came into contact with ideological alternatives which gave them an autonomy from the local political structure--alternatives which were not

present in the same form in central Rwanda. But she fails to realize that the modern economy not only generated economic independence for some Bahutu throughout all of Rwanda, but that it also produced class consciousness and higher expectations. And the Bahutu could only achieve the latter by gaining control of the means of production through a political solution.[12]

Helen Codere, in "The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda, based on Forty-Eight Rwandan Autobiographies," probably comes closest to a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the money economy on Rwanda. She contends that new economic opportunities were beginning to blur the economic differentials within each group of Rwanda. In fact, by 1959 the Batutsi as a group were less distinguished by their relative wealth than had formerly been the case. She affirms that as a group they were much better off compared to the Bahutu, and that they held a disproportionate number of salaried jobs in civil service and education. But where Bahutu had educational opportunities and qualifications, they were able to move into salaried employment and into occupations such as teaching. Where they lacked education, they pursued money income through wage labor, including emigration to Uganda for such work and the production and sale of cash crops.[13] Consequently, coffee production was also instrumental in transforming Rwandan society.

The development of coffee as a cash crop was the focus of the changing relationship between the administration, the peasantry, and the Batutsi oligarchy. As a result, this study locates the principal dynamics of the growth of the coffee economy not only within the Belgian colonial state but in the depression of 1929 as well. Following the analysis of B. Jewiewicki, in "The Great Depression and the Making of the Colonial Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo," African Economic History, 4 (Fall 1977), this research shows that the Great Depression was also the most important stage in the elaboration of the Rwandan colonial economic structure, particularly when mounting deficits had to be subsidized by the Metropole.

Moreover, the history of Rwandan coffee production falls into three distinct phases, with some overlapping because of external factors. The first lasted from 1920 to 1931, when efforts of colonial administrators met with strenuous opposition from the ruling Batutsi oligarchy. The latter forced the administration to seek accommodations and once these were accomplished, the second phase commenced. From 1931 to 1937, the administration successfully expanded coffee production among the African peasantry. The third phase, which is not clearly delineated, ended in 1939, when the coffee economy collapsed. In distinguishing the final phase, one must also consider the opposition to African coffee cultivation from white planters in the rest

of Belgian Africa. Their opposition, which surfaced in 1927, contributed to the collapse of the Rwandan coffee economy.

Between 1927 and 1939, European planters in Stanleyville, Bukavu, and the Kivu and their representatives at Brussels consistently voiced opposition to African commercial cultivation.[14] Some argued that the terrain was not suitable for coffee production, or that transportation to the coasts would make the coffee too expensive and therefore uneconomic. Many maintained that Africans were incapable of cultivating such a delicate crop,[15] and that cotton would be more appropriate for them to grow. A few associations asserted that African participation would increase supply and deflate prices. They also feared that African-grown coffee would confuse marketing procedures and quality controls. Others questioned the rationale of stimulating a luxury crop in an area frequented by disease and famine. A more logical policy, they argued, would be to concentrate African efforts on production to create food reserves and establish exports to neighboring areas such as Katanga.

Obviously the real issues were competition and low-cost production. Commercial planters were preoccupied with efforts or schemes to reduce labor costs, increase yields, and attract workers for low wages. Almost any proposal received careful scrutiny,[16] and as the Great

Depression worsened and budget deficits increased, cost efficiency became more acute. Aside from a solution to the African problem, planters asked government for subsidies, tariff reductions, and more regulations to assure even cheaper labor costs, to maximize profits, and to reduce overhead. Consequently the reaction of colonials are discussed within the context of the metropole's policy pronouncements about African farmers and marketing controls over their production. Thus, the research covers factors within Rwanda and those external to it.

Although coffee is the single most important export commodity of Rwanda, only limited research has been done on its production. Various assumptions and descriptions have been made of the industry in both academic circles and institutions involved in making policies that directly affect production and marketing activities. These discussions and policy decisions, however, have not considered the role of peasant economies vis-a-vis the colonial economic structure and the international market systems.

For example, Belgian scholars, such as Phillipe Leurquin, H. E. Van Tichelin, and Jacque Lefevre, concentrate on development and focus on African populations as obstacles in terms of depletion of natural resources, population pressures, reliance upon traditional agricultural methods, and general backwardness.[17] They have not placed African economies within the context of the Belgian

colonial economic system. Nor have they acknowledged the constraints of colonial state domination on African economic development. This study corrects these omissions by utilizing data from archives in Rwanda, Belgium, and the United Kingdom and personal interviews conducted in Rwanda from January 1977 to November 1979. The approach presented here, however, relates not to economic history per se, but to social history in its broadest conception--the interaction of economics, culture, and politics. Economics is made central to the approach by the problematic assertion that economic relations are fundamental but not determining in the process of social evolution and change.

INTRODUCTION

Notes

[1]See E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939 (New York, 1973; Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London, 1972); Aidan Foster-Carter, "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment in E. de Kadt and G. Welbans (eds.) Sociology and Development (London, 1974), pp. 67-105; and "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development, 4 (1976), pp. 67-108.

[2]Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," New Left Review, 107 (1978), pp. 47-77.

[3]Jean Lopans and David Seddon, "Marxism and Anthropology: A Preliminary Survey," in D. Seddon (ed.) Relations of Production (London, 1978), pp. 40-41.

[4]See Richard Heggath's "From Modernization Theory to Public Policy: Continuity and Change in the Political Science of Political Development," paper presented to the 49th ANZAAS Congress, Sociology Section, Auckland, New Zealand, January 1979, where he argues strongly that liberal theories of modernization have not disappeared so much as undergone a change in form.

[5]Bipan Chandra, "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism and the Colonial State," Journal of Contemporary Asia, X, no. 3 (1980), p. 273.

[6]Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity," Daedalus, 111, no. 2 (Spring, 1982), p. 75. Bruce J. Berman and J. M. Lonsdale, "Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: the Development of the Labor Control System in Kenya, 1919-1929," Canadian Journal of African Studies, XIV, no. 1 (1980), p. 56.

[7]John M. Lonsdale and Bruce J. Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: the Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914," Journal of African History, XX, no. 4 (1979), p. 489.

[8]Ibid., p. 490.

[9]Berman and Lonsdale, "Crises of Accumulation," pp. 60-61.

[10]Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism (New York & London, 1976), p. 13.

[11]See M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 178-179 and 263-266.

[12]M. Newbury,"Oppression," pp. 298-300 and 347 also Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Bergen-Oslo, 1969), pp. 9-38. The Rwandan experience conforms to Barth's theory of displacement. When two or more ethnic groups are competing for the same economic resources in the same ecological niche, he contends that one will either be replaced or accommodation involving an increasing complimentarity and interdependence will develop.

[13]Helen Codere, "The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda; based on Forty-Eight Rwandan Autobiographies," Institut National de Recherche Scientifique (Butare), No. 12, (1973). Reprise d'une publication du Musee Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, p. 37.

[14]Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, 11, 2 (December, 1928), p. 315; VI, 14 (October 15, 1932); VI, p. 16 (November 26, 1932), pp. 183-6; and VII, 1 (January, 1934), p. 3.

[15]African Archives. Agri. 340, Dossier 207. Ministère des Colonies. Note pour la 6ème Directeur Générale. Brussels, February 17, 1932; and Dossier 208, Ministère des Colonies. Note pour Monsieur le Ministre. Brussels, February 19, 1932.

[16]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26, 1932), pp. 183-6.

[17]See Leurquin, "La Vie Economique du Paysan Ruanda, l'exemple de Karama, Nyaruguru," Zaire, 11 (January 1957); Van Tickelin, "Problèmes du Développement Economique du Ruanda-Urundi," Zaire, 11, (May 1957) and Lefevre, Structures Economiques du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (Brussels, 1955).


UGANDA
Kagitumba
Ruhengeri
Ndorwa
Mulera
Biumba
Gatsibo
LAC
MUJUNJU
Goma
Gisenyi
Bushiru
Buganza
Gatumba
KIGALI
Kaleh
ILE
IDJWI
Kibuye
KABGAYI
Gitarama
Kibungo
LAKE
BISONGOU
Nyanza
Gikongoro
Bukavu
Cyanguqu
Kinyaga
Butare
Bugarama
TANZANIA

CHAPTER ONE

THE AFRICAN BACKGROUND AND THE GERMAN COLONIAL STATE

The environment determines the conditions of production, but it can be a limiting factor as well. Rwanda is located in the Central African rift valley, slightly south of the equator, in one of the highest lying areas of the continent, equal distance from the Atlantic (2000 km) and Indian (1200 km) Oceans.[1] The country forms an elongated block of highlands, bounded on the east and west by the converging frontier of Tanzania and Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) and in the north by Uganda. Rwanda is separated from Burundi by the Akanyaru river in the south, and in the extreme east by the Kagera river valley, which, after a sharp northward bend, becomes Rwanda's eastern border.

The climate can best be described as a tropical highland type, with annual average temperature fluctuating around 68°F in the central plateau region. But the drier tropical lowlands in the Kagera river area can be extremely hot, and the Congo-Nile dividing range in the north experiences very cold nights with the temperature frequently

falling to the freezing point.[2] The amount of rainfall varies between 40 and 50 inches a year, but the volume and frequency of precipitation varies markedly according to the season, and heavy rainfalls are often succeeded by severe droughts. The year is punctuated by a long dry season which extends from May or June to mid-September; a short rainy season from mid-September to January; a dry season of several weeks intervening in January; and a much longer rainy season, extending from the end of January to the beginning of May. Any interruption of the cycle has meant crop failures and near famine conditions.[3]

East of Lake Kivu, and traversing the entire region from north to south are the giant peaks of the Congo-Nile crest, reaching a maximum of 14,000 feet in the Virunga chain. This region of old volcanoes, now covered with thick tropical woodlands, merges into an undulating plateau with altitudes varying between 4,500 and 6,500 feet. The typical landscape consists of hills and valleys scattered with eucalyptus trees and banana groves, alternating with patches of luxuriant pasture. It is a fertile region, ideal for herding and the cultivation of food crops. But it quickly shades off in the east into the savannah zone, where vegetation may range from vast stretches of arid and treeless grasslands to acacia scrublands and bamboo forests.[4]

Despite this surface impression of lushness and prosperity, Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the whole

of Africa. It lacks significant mineral resources, and its economy has not progressed beyond the subsistence level.[5] In fact, in 1977 the World Bank reported that annual growth was only 1.5 percent in real terms and that the development of agriculture, the country's major preoccupation, had been slowed because of fiscal constraints and a lack of skilled manpower for development planning and implementation. Futhermore, nutritional standards, that presently only meet about 75 percent of adult requirements, continue to decline as population, increasing at 2.6 percent in recent years, outgrows the food supply.[6]

A major source of economic stagnation lies in the perennial pressures of overpopulation on the land. With 4.9 million inhabitants, Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa--350 per square mile.[7] At the present rate of increase (2.6 percent per annum), its population is likely to double in about thirty years.[8] The problem is compounded by uneven distribution of population, with heavy concentration on the central highlands, and a more sparse distribution of population on the slopes to the east and west. A smaller but equally dense strip of the population is to be found along the shores of Lake Kivu, while the northeast is a region of much lighter habitation.[9] Because of the density of population in relation to cultivated land, the average planting surface for a family with six children is 1.47 hectares (the maximum range is 2.92 hectares

and the minimum 0.74 hectares).[10]

The only important cash crop is coffee, an Arabica variety, introduced by the Belgians in 1931 under a compulsory cultivation program. Arabica grows best at altitudes ranging between 1400 to 1800-2000 meters, which includes most of Rwanda with the exception of Virunga, the Congo-Nile crest, and the region of Byumba. While the hilly topography limits the planting surface, the yields are high around the banks of Lake Kivu, the regions of Gisenyi, Cyangugu, and portions of Ruhengeri closest to the border of Kibuye. Superior yields in these areas are attributed to soils enriched by volcanic activity. Production, however, tends to decrease on the hills of the Central Plateau where the three prefectures of Kigali, Gitarama and Butare account for nearly half of the planted surface of the country, but where the yields are much lower because soils are of inferior quality.*

Coffee is the principle source of foreign exchange and provides monetary income for about half of the farmers. In 1975, 475,696 planters cultivated 58,583,148 coffee plants on 36,566 hectares, or an average coffee plot of 7.7 ares

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*My own interviews with coffee planters were conducted in the prefecture of Butare from March to July 1978; all of the farmers had planted their trees in the 1930s, and very few had increased the number initially imposed, between 49 to 54 trees. Yields were quite poor and most planters tended to neglect them with many complaining they were much too old to maintain them.

per planter.[11] These plots are widely dispersed and average about 123 coffee trees, which produce about 46 kilos of parchment coffee per planter.[12] In 1978 Rwanda produced 21,994 tons of parchment coffee and 16,275 tons of red coffee beans, which were processed in three depulping mills: RWANDEX at Kigali, RWANDEX at Gisenyi,** and the subsidiary ETIRU at Ruhengeri, which closed in October 1978. Exports for 1978 were 18,021 tons of red coffee beans which earned 4,533,000,000 BF*** for the country. Despite these earnings, the entrepots of OCIR (Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda) had record stocks of 10,500 tons.[13]

Surplus stocks are only part of the problem. Rwanda's commercial sector suffers from isolation, and the country's exports are periodically interrupted. For example, in 1978 an accident involving a chartered Rwandan cargo plane carrying a portion of the coffee bags to the Kenya port of Mombasa delayed shipment for two months. When Uganda closed its borders in 1979 to truck traffic from Rwanda, the country had to commission Air Rwanda to transport almost all of its coffee to Mombasa. Incidents such as these siphon off valuable currency reserves, and in recent years the country's

---

** The depulping mill at Gisenyi processes coffee beans from the riparian regions of Lake Kivu.

*** The Belgian franc today is worth U.S. $.0202.

total value of exports has been adversely effected by declining prices and lower exports.

Coffee represented 64 percent of the total value of exports in 1977; in 1978 the total value had declined to 58 percent.[14] Nonetheless, coffee remains the principle export, coming before mining products, particularly cassiterite, and tea. Secondary commercial crops include tobacco, barley and wheat in regions of higher altitude. The main food crops, however, include beans, peas, sorghum, cassava, maize, and bananas for the brewing of beer. These and tree crops are cultivated on approximately 26 percent of the land (34 percent is in permanent pasture and 6 percent is forests) and in sufficient quantities to satisfy the needs of domestic consumption. But one needs only recall the famines of 1916 and 1943, which caused 50,000 and 36,000 deaths respectively, to realize the limits and vulnerability of the country's domestic resources. In fact, because of the density of population in relation to cultivated land--only about one acre per person is used for raising food for domestic consumption.[15]

Rwandan farmers necessarily practice intense cultivation, but an even further strain on land resources is the high density of the cattle population, numbering more than 500,000. As in most pastoral societies of East Africa, the herding of cattle had more than an economic significance; ownership was not only an important status symbol, but also

an essential ingredient in the traditional socio-political systems of Rwanda. Although the animals play a minor role in the economy, these lyre-horned Ndanga cows use--or destroy by overgrazing--land that might better be in food crops for the growing population. Their sheer numbers also tend to accelerate the process of erosion on deforested hillsides, with disastrous effects on soil productivity. Moreover, the importance attached in the past to the ownership of cattle is one reason why the adjustment of agricultural production to the requirements of a fast-growing population has proved such a difficult task, and why, until recently, the most fertile areas remain overstocked and overcropped.[16]

The overpopulation of man and beast has conspired with the difficult terrain to retard the development of industry, energy resources, and communications,[17] even by African standards. There are no railroads; of the existing 5,400 miles of poorly maintained roads, a third are classed as fair weather roads or tracks, and virtually none was tarred until recently. Steamers on Lake Tanganyika are the principal carriers of products destined for export from Rwanda, but the paucity of transport, coupled with a landlocked position, have added to the difficulties of establishing foreign trade patterns. Smaller trading operations are largely in the hands of Indians and Arabs, who deal through ports of Mombasa or Dar-es-Salaam.[18] In short, the Rwandan

economy is very weak, and without foreign aid, the government would not have sufficient reserves to implement most of its ambitious development plans.

To a large extent, social change throughout much of Africa has been primarily a rural phenomenon, but in Rwanda real villages do not exist. Today, as in the past, the hill remains the primary focus of socio-political and economic activity in the countryside. Beyond the hill there is relatively little sense of unity among rural communities; fragmentation and parochialism are the rule rather than the exception. And in the absence of adequate communications, the forbidding nature of the topography places further obstacles in the way of any large-scale socio-political and economic mobilization. There is also the matter of ethnic cleavages, a product of Rwanda's pre-colonial and feudal heritage.

Rwanda developed its present territory partly through conquest and partly through peaceful assimilation. Invading tribes were Batutsi pastoralists, whose origins are not firmly established. However, their physical features suggest ethnic affinities with the Oromo of southern Ethiopia. These Batutsi drifted southward onto the plateau until they made contact with the Bahutu agriculturalists, a short and stocky people, who share physical characteristics with other Bantu-speakers of Central Africa. Although their density in relation to the Batutsi varies greatly from one region

to the next, they make up between 83 to 85 percent of the total population. They were not the first people to inhabit the region, however; the Batwa, a group of pygmoid forest dwellers who now constitute less than one percent of the present population settled Rwanda long before the Bahutu.[19]

Batutsi hegemony was consolidated by the 16th century, when the central region of Rwanda was absorbed into the nuclear kingdom, centered on Kigali. With the accession of Ruganzu Ndori to power in the 17th century, a series of invasions were launched against formerly independent Bahutu areas which resulted in a further expansion of Rwanda's boundaries. The final stage in the process, however, was not completed until the latter half of the 19th century under the reign of mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri, one of Rwanda's most prestigious historical figures.[20]

Ethnic affinites provided a major integrative bond and made for rapid assimilation in areas where the conquered populations were already organized under a dominant Batutsi lineage, as in the case of the Mubari, Bugesera and Nduga regions. Bahutu, however, resisted but were overcome by concentrated force.[21] But in areas occupied by autonomous Bahutu communities, Batutsi invaders were repulsed. These communities had evolved their own state system, and it was strong enough to resist Batutsi penetration for some time.[22] Thus the effective annexation of the small Bahutu kingdoms in the northern and eastern regions was not completed until

the early 1920s, and would probably have taken even longer if German and later Belgian authorities had not offered military assistance.

For the most part, Batutsi overlords and population were spread almost evenly throughout the country, except for the northern regions of Ndorwa, Mutara, and Mulera where the Batutsi never accounted for more than a tiny fraction of the total population. In practice this meant that the caste structure of the country was fairly rigid.[23] Furthermore, the uniformity of the caste structure also invited a similar uniformity of political organization. The mwami followed a policy of subdividing the country in order to prevent the possibility of resistance from larger homogeneous units. He preferred to grant his vassals separate hills, distributed about the countryside. Within a few large fiefs, he carved out small dependencies where devoted followers found excellent observation posts from which to watch powerful vassals. The mwami also encouraged rivalries by giving to one vassal administration of Bahutu lands, and to another, authority over the Batutsi and the disposition of cattle.[24] Finally, he drained off the power of the great lords by making his capital a center where chiefs came to pay court.[25]

The mwami, in the politically centralized state, was the source and symbol of all authority. He alone could confer legitimacy upon subordinates ranks, and because of

this, could be characterized as an absolute monarch. The despotic character of the Rwandan kingship was nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the bureaucratization of subordinate political roles and the precarious tenure of the occupants. The political system was one in which a triple hierarchy of army chiefs, land chiefs and cattle chiefs--all recruited from the dominant stratum--radiated from the capital to the provinces and from the provinces to the districts. Each province was entrusted to an army chief and each district to a land chief and a cattle chief who were responsible for the collection of tithes in produce and cattle. From the triumvirate spread a vast network of subchiefs from whom tribute was exacted for the higher chiefs and the mwamis. How much power the chiefs and subchiefs claimed for themselves, and for how long was entirely dependent upon the mwami's grace.[26] Consequently the chiefs were bureaucrats in the sense that they did not claim their position by right or inheritance or by virtue of any prior connection with the area to which they were appointed but served at the discretion of the mwami.

During the period of political consolidation and until 1930, when the Belgians deposed the reigning monarch, all attempts at constitutional reform were generally interpreted by the crown as a threat to its legitimacy. Rituals, ideological symbols and myths carefully specified the limits beyond which the monarchy could not innovate without

endangering its own legitimacy. Moreover, chiefly rule and caste supremacy were both so intimately associated with the pure authority of the crown that any statutory limitation on the privileges of the dominant caste other than those decreed by the mwami implied a corresponding limitation of the powers of the crown.[27]

Rwandan society was hierarchical: each individual was assigned a specific caste, and each caste a specific rank. Clientship, however, served to link each layer of the hierarchy in a relationship of mutual dependence. At the core of this relationship lay a feudal institution called buhake, a cattle contract of pastoral servitude. A buhake relationship was created when an individual, either a peasant or Batutsi nobleman, voluntarily commended himself to a patron in return for cattle and pasture land. His rights, however, were those of usufruct: he was entitled to the cow's milk and the calves. By the same token, the pasture rights enjoyed by the client did not make him a landowner but only a tenant at the mercy of his lord. In return for these privileges, the client or vassal swore fealty and recognized his duties of homage to his patron.[28]

In a society like Rwanda, where centralization of authority was carried to an extreme, the need for protection was more deeply felt by the subordinate stratum, and so, also, the need to establish reciprocal ties of obligation between inferior and superior. Moreover the role of

client and patron was not mutually exclusive. For example, a man who had several clients could himself be the client of an even wealthier individual, and so forth. In this fashion, client-patron relationships formed a web of reciprocities embracing a wide segment of the population. The only limits were the mwami at the top, who was the sole proprietor of cattle and land and hence the supreme patron, and, at the other extreme, the ordinary Bahutu peasant who was too poor to impose his vassalage upon anyone but the members of his own family.[29]

The institution of buhake was, in fact, exploitative, because it provided the Batutsi aristocracy with agricultural goods and services without significant reciprocity and without the obligation to participate directly in the productive process. It also gave the Batutsi chiefs greater control over individuals and assured a retinue. There were additional cravates: clients could lose their cattle or land (the latter as a second form of ubuhake was guhakwa y' ubutak "to pay court for the land") if the client ties were severed. Clientage could also be inconvenient and disturb the productive cycle, since the client was required to pay homage regularly and carry out any personal services demanded.[30] Ironically, the institution gained its greatest momentum during Musinga's reign. European administrators made demands upon Musinga and his chiefs and they, in turn, required more of the Bahutu.[31] With increased

duties, chiefs became more exacting and abusive, and Bahutu were forced to seek protection; consequently buhake increased.

In the predominantly Bahutu areas of the north there developed a somewhat different kind of clientage, based not on cattle but on a land-lease contract between the original owners of the land (bakonde), who were primarily of Bahutu and Batwa extraction, and the Bahutu lineages which opened the land up for cultivation (bagererwa). Under the system of ubukonde, the bagererwa offered a tribute in kind to the "landlord" in exchange for usufractuary rights over the land.[32]

Because Rwanda's political and clientage systems were fully operational when the German established a military post at Shangi in 1898, and because of the centralization of the kingdom, the Germans administered on the basis of indirect rule. This meant "by degrees, and almost imperceptibly to the people . . . .the [sultan would] eventually become nothing less than the executive instrument of the Resident.[33] German officials were attracted to this policy not only because the centralized political system was admirably suited to indirect rule but because they also realized that any attempt to displace the traditional ruler would probably have met with considerable resistance from the local population. Moreover, the new government would have required a far greater number of European administrators

than was available at the time. This consideration takes an added weight when one recalls that of all colonial administrations Germany's was among the most understaffed. As late as 1913, the whole of German East Africa--a territory larger than Nigeria--was administered by seventy European officials. Moreover, the Batutsi aristocracy was viewed with considerable sympathy by the German officers on the spot, many of whom were Prussian noblemen.[34]

Captain von Grawert, the Resident of Burundi, in a report of November 1905, expressed the full scope of German policy in Africa, when he remarked that,

> . . . the ideal of [the] unqualified recognition of the authority of the sultans from us, whether through taxes or other means, in a way that will seem to them as little a burden as possible; this will link their interests with ours. This ideal will probably be realized more easily in Rwanda, which is more tightly organized . . .we must first reestablish the old authority of the sultan, which has generally been weakened by wars with Europeans and other circumstances.[35]

Following these guidelines, German authorities consistently and successfully sought to bolster the authority of the king against his rivals. But just as the mwami needed the support of the Germans to sustain his authority, the Germans needed the support of the mwami to consolidate their power over the country and to proceed with the task of administration.

Shortly after the arrival of the Germans, a period of factional rivalry ensued, centered upon a disputed succession to the throne and culminating in 1896 with the famous coup of Rucuncu. The latter is a bench-mark in Rwandan history because it marked the beginning of a long civil war between the Bega and the Banyiginya clans, the royal houses of Rwanda. The strife commenced after the death of mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri in 1895 when the two royal families began a bitter struggle for the kingship. The Bega was one of the most prestigious of the several maternal clans from which a future mwami could be chosen, but it had fallen into disgrace by the mid-19th century. The Bega mounted a campaign which made one of its own, Kanyogera, Queen Mother. Nor was the Bega content until Kanyogera's own son, the future mwami Musinga, had taken the throne. In November 1896, at Rucuncu, the succession was finally settled to the advantage of the Bega after a brief but bloody "palace revolution" during which mwami Rwabugiri's successor, Rutalindwa, his wife and three children lost their lives.[36]

Yuhi Musinga, the new mwami, was a minor at the time; his mother, Kanyogera, acted as regent, together with his maternal uncles, chiefs Kabore and Ruhinankiko. With this triumvirate, the Bega proceeded to consolidate their hold over the country. They systematically exterminated all those who had opposed Musinga, and filled vacancies with Bega chiefs.[37] Those who escaped the purge fled north and

east. The activities of those in the north, however, culminated in 1911-12 with the famous rebellion associated with the names of Muhumusa, Ndungutse and Bassebya. Northern Rwanda was still more or less independent from the crown. The annexation of the region had taken place a decade or so before the coup, under the reign of mwami Rwabugiri, and although Rwabugiri had extracted a formal pledge of allegiance from some of the local Kiga chiefs, their loyalty to the monarchy was nonetheless highly questionable.[38]

Hardier and sturdier than most ordinary Bahutu, the Kiga people of northern Rwanda have always been looked upon by their neighbors as a rebellious lot, fiercely individualistic and contemptous of established authority. It was among these rugged mountaineers that one of Rwabugiri's wives, a presumably full-blooded Munyiginya named Muhumusa, found refuge. She sought to crystallize the support of a few local clans around a hard core of legitimist chiefs, with a view to restoring her clan and her son Bileyeya to the throne in Rwanda.[39] In 1911 she proclaimed herself Queen of Ndorwa and promised her followers that she would soon liberate the country from the Europeans.

Muhumusa was the only member of the legitimist faction who sought asylum in the north. Among the Banyigenya chiefs who fled to the north, the most famous was Ndungutse, presumably Bilegeya's half brother through Muhumusa.

Ndungutse and a Batwa chief named Bassebya--described by Father Dufays as "a famous and fearsome brigand, rapacious and sanguinary[40]--led sporadic insurrections throughout the Rikiga and in particular in the marshy country surrounding Lakes Bulera and Luhondo.[41]

The British captured Muhumusa and some of her followers at Bufumbiro (Uganda) on September 1911. Thereafter, Ndungutse emerged as the chief spokesman of the legitimist faction, claiming frequently that Bilegeya was the sole legitimate heir. Ndungutse also emerged as a powerful figure in his own right and came to be viewed by the local populations as their savior and prophet who would restore peace to the country and free the laboring masses from the corvée (ubuletwa), an exaction made all the more intolerable after the additional tribute which the Beta had apparently tried to extract from the northern populations.[42] Ndungutse's renown was somewhat ironic, considering he was a Batutsi. His name became a symbol of anti-Batutsi sentiment, and by implication of anti-European sentiment as well. Moreover his appeal as a leader was closely linked to the emergence in the north of the Nyabingi movement, a magico-religious cult which Muhumusa had used as a vehicle for propagating her ideas and solidifying her support among the people of the Mulera, Bukonza, and Buberuka (collectively referred to as the Kiga).[43]

The Nyabingi developed a strong political attraction for the Kiga, and the movement became a military arm in the rebellion against the constituted authority of the court of Rwanda. As the cult became increasingly xenophobic in character and aggressive in its methods, the administration moved against it. After the murder of a Catholic priest by a cult member, the Germans organized a punitive expedition in the north. The commander, Lt. Godovius sought to punish insubordinate districts and their people and chiefs by causing the greatest possible damage, so as to force submissions; and to install Batutsi chiefs who were faithful to Musinga. The expedition was an unqualified success on both counts. In April 1912, Gudovius's troops attacked Ndungutse's village, near Ruhengeri, killing about fifty defenders, including Ndungutse. Later military operations completely devastated the area and eventually crushed the resistance. Gudovius appointed loyal chiefs and assumed that the pacification was completed. The rebellion, however, was not destroyed; for many years after the Belgian "reprise," the northern region remained the scene of recurrent outbreaks against Batutsi chiefs and the administration.[44] Gudovius's expedition nevertheless had consolidated the position of the monarchy in an area where it had never been firmly established. In return the Germans could continue to count on the complete loyalty of Musinga.[45]

The administration made every effort to strengthen and consolidate the position of the crown. Punitive expeditions served also to reinforce the absolutism of the monarchy, and consequently the hegemony of the ruling caste. However, very little was accomplished in the realm of civil administration because the entire period of German over-rule was largely devoted to punitive expeditions. Administrative machinery set up by Germans did not amount to more than a few strategically located police posts. Economically, there were some modest accomplishments.

After extensive experimentation, the German residents discovered that coffee was an ideal crop for the country. When the experiment began in 1913, additional crops, such as cotton, tobacco, and rice were deemed feasible commercial crops. But coffee had the most potential for success. Native species grew in regions considered uncultivable by the Bahutu farmers. The climate was suitable; the banana groves which dotted the countryside created a quasi-forest atmosphere, and also provided ideal shade conditions for Arabica in higher altitude zones, acted as excellent regulators of temperature and prevented soil erosion. The soil was quite fertile since banana trees were burned annually, and enriched compost from animal dung, other waste materials, and fire ashes were added.[46]

Some Bahutu farmers were already familiar with the cultivation of coffee. In 1903, the Nyundo mission planted

coffee trees from some seedlings the White Fathers had secured from Bukoba, where they had introduced coffee and where the cultivation had undergone rapid expansion.[47] In 1905 the White Fathers at Mibirizi received some selected Guatemalan seedlings from the Amani experimental station.[48] Some missions possessed a few hundred coffee trees of both Bourbon and Guatemalan varieties for personal use. At Save, the White Fathers had distributed several thousand coffee trees to their African catechists.[49] So, in implementing their program, German officials had a base from which to start. In 1914, they planned to plant one million trees, and to increase the number by one million annually, so that by 1920 there would be six million coffee trees in both Rwanda and Burundi. The administration felt that a program of this magnitude would help meet the needs of all of German East Africa, the metropole, and the world market.[50] But, more significantly, successful cultivation would enable the Bahutu to pay their tax.

The Germans saw Rwanda as having potential for economic development and colonization, and believed that modern transportation, especially the railroad and labor, was the key to economic success. The railroad would bring trade, trade would produce money, and money would enable Rwandans to pay taxes. According to some officials, the railroad

> was both a hope and an excuse; a hope, that the economy would flourish as soon as the railroad was built; an excuse that there was no money economy because there was no railroad.[51]

Rail transportation was supposed to reduce costs of exports from Rwanda, but there was no commercial activity to speak of, nor was there a potential market for what Rwanda had to offer. Neither could the administration guarantee that the Batutsi would sell their cattle, given its prestige and social significance. Nor could the colonial officials guarantee that the economy would be reorganized to ensure delivery of produce to the railroads; moreover, Bahutu were subsistence farmers with very primitive agricultural methods.

While the Germans succeeded in planning for the economic future of the country, they failed entirely in economic development, primarily because the war intervened before development plans could be fully implemented. Finally, there were too few competent people to initiate developmental plans. Nor could the administration depend upon Musinga to control his subjects, since his power declined in direct proportion to the distance away from his capital at Nyanza. Rebel chiefs could easily incite the latent hostility of the Bahutu against the Batutsi. But these were moot concerns because Rwanda fell in April-May 1916 as the German forces withdrew before the concentric attack of superior Belgian and British forces. With the German defeat went the Imperial vision and the railroad.[52]

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

[1]Because of the distance, Rwanda must pay higher prices for imports, and, export costs are much greater because specialized transportation is required. Marcel L. Heimo, "Reflexion sur les conditions et les perspectives du développement économique au Rwanda," Genève-Afrique, VII, No. 1 (1968), p. 14.

[2]Ray Y. Gildea, Jr. and Alice Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," Focus, XIII, No. 6 (February, 1963), p. 2; Rene LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London, 1970), p. 13.

[3]Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 3.

[4]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 13-14; Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 2.

[5]The major mineral found in Rwanda is cassiterite, the chief source of tin. Approximately 2,750 tons were mined in northern Rwanda in 1957 (more recent figures are not available). Other minerals mined to a lesser extent and mainly in Rwanda are gold, beryl, tantalite, bastnasite and amblygonite (rare minerals and sources of lithium), and wolfromite (a source of tungsten). Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," pp. 4-5. LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 14.

[6]The World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review, Rwanda Report 1377-RW. Regional Projects Department, East Africa Regional Office. Regional Office, (June 30, 1977), i.

[7]Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory and Practice," Daedalus, 111, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), p. 109. See W. H. Bayton, R. E. Downs, Yolande Jemai, S. E. Ross-Larson, A Report on Assistance to a National Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning Program in Rwanda (Washington, D. C., 1981), p. 1, where population density is reported as 200 people per sq. km. and the natural increase is placed at 3-3.3 percent.

[8]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 15; Warren Weinstein, "Rwanda-Urundi (Rwanda-Burundi)," in Divided Nation in a Divided World, ed. Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow and John G. Stoessinger (New York,1974), p. 370.

[9]See Pierre Gourou, "Notice de la Carte de la Densité de la Population au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi." Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Atlas Général du Congo (Brussels, 1951); Pierre Gourou, "La Densité de la Population au Ruanda-Urundi: Esquisse d'une Etude Géographique," Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Section des Sciences Naturelles et Medicale, Mémoires, Tome XXI, fasc. 6 Brussels, 1953).

[10]Heimo, "Reflexion," p. 12.

[11]Francais Bart, "Le Café dans l'Agriculture rwandaise: l'example de Kidahire (Runyinya)," Les Cahiers d'Outre Mer, XXXIII, No. 132 (October-December 1980), p. 302.

[12]Because of the high population density, the average area available for cultivating all crops is 92 ares per farmer. Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., pp. 302-303.

[15]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 14; Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 4.

[16]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 15; Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 4.

[17]Industrial production is primarily for local consumption, and the principal commodities are bricks and tiles, furniture, ready-to-wear clothing, soap and insecticide. Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," p. 5. The availability of energy resources is a basic problem affecting most of Africa. In Rwanda the problem is characterized not only by irregular rainfall but also by a general tendency toward drought which has already resulted in the complete disappearance of permanent water in some areas and by intensive and destructive erosion. The available hydrographic system is made up rivers where the upper courses vary greatly in levels. Or their middle reaches vary so slightly in level that they become meandering streams and in some places the water is almost stagnant. United Nations Trusteeship Council. Study of Population, Land Utilization and Land (New York, 26 March 1957), pp. 31, 65 and 66.

[18]Gildea and Taylor, "Rwanda and Burundi," pp. 5-6; LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 15-16.

[19]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[20]Jan Vansina, "L'Evolution du Royaume du Rwanda des Origines à 1900," ARSOM, XXVI, fasc. 2 (Brussels, 1962), pp. 75-76.

[21]A. d'Arianoff, "Histoire des Bagersera souverains du Gisaka," IRCB, XXIV, fasc. 3 (Brussels, 1952), pp. 88 ff.

[22]Vansina, "L'Evolution du Royaume du Rwanda," pp. 77-81.

[23]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 25.

[24]Ibid., p. 27

[25]Rapport sur l'Administration belge des territoires occupés de l'Est Africain allemand (Brussels, 1921), p. 16.

[26]Jacques J. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda (London and New York, 1961), pp. 120.

[27]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 31-32. For additional information on the ritual and mythical imagery of kingship, see the following: Maquet, The Premise of Inequality, pp. 121; A. Kagame, "Le Code ésoterique de la Dynastié du Ruanda," Zaire IV, (1947), pp. 363-386: and Marcel d' Hertefelt and André Coupez, La Royauté Sacrée de l'Ancien Rwanda (Tervueren, 1964).

[28]Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a Community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 11-12; Jacques Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," in Social Stratification in Africa, eds. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Platnicov (New York, 1970), pp. 118-120; and R. Bourgeois, "Banyarwanda et Barundi: l'Evolution du contrat de bail à cheptel au Ruanda-Urundi" (Brussels: Academie Royale des Sciences coloniales. Classe des Sciences morales et politiques, mémoires, N. S., IX, No. 4, (1958), pp. 6-7.

[29]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 36-37.

[30]M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 248-250.

[31]Ibid.

[32]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 39.

[33]Ibid., p. 48. Also see Pierre Ryckmans, "Une Page d'Histoire Coloniale: l'Occupation Allemande dans l'Urundi," IRCB (Brussels), XXIX, (1953), fasc. 5; Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Mecklenburg, In the Heart of Africa (London, 1910), p. 46; and Anonymous, Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda ([Kabgayi], 1956), p. 14

[34]William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919 (Oxford, 1963), p. 127.

[35]Ibid., p. 55.

[36]Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[37]Albert Pages, "Un Royaume Hamite au centre de l'Afrique," IRCM (Brussels) 1 (1933), pp. 195-232.

[38]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 58.

[39]J. M. Bessel, "Nyabingi," Uganda Journal, VI, (1938-1939), p. 78.

[40]Felix Dufays, Pages d'Epogée Africaine (Ixelles, 1928), p. 58.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Bega hegemony meant increased corvées and taxes; the new chiefs, installed by the Bega sought only to enrich themselves at the expense of their own people. The Bahutu responded by answering Ndungutse's call in 1912 for assistance when he threatened to invade the "central kingdom." LeMarchand. Rwanda and Burundi, p. 59.

[43]Ibid., pp. 56-60.

[44]Historique et Chronologie du Rwanda, pp. 139 and 162: Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, pp. 153-155.

[45]Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, p. 157.

[46]G. Molitor. "L'Introduction et le Développement de la Culture du Caféier (Arabica) chez les Indigènes du Ruanda-Urundi," extract from Le Matériel Colonial A.S.B.L., 27th year, No. 6 (March, 1937), p. 161.

[47]G. Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement de la Culture du Caféier," p. 159: Edmund LePlae, "Les Plantations de Café au Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-1935), leur Importance," Institut Royal Colonial Belge, memoire 8, III (1936), p. 217.

[48]Ephrem Twagirayezu, "Le Café Arabica et le Développement économique du Ruanda et du Burundi" (Faculté des Sciences politiques, sociales et économiques, Université Louvanium de Leopoldville, 1964), p. 43.

[49]The Bourbon and Guatemalan varieties introduced into Rwanda by the White Fathers were propagated by the Germans. But only the Guatemalan variety survived. Also, the trees that were distributed to the mission's catechists were destroyed by Batutsi chiefs who objected to using pasture for coffee production. LePlae, "Les Plantations de Café au Congo Belge," pp. 217-218.

[50]CAMP. Notice sur le Ruanda--1916. Also when Musinga heard that the Germans intended to introduce coffee so that Bahutu would gain money to pay their tax, he instructed his notables to drive their cattle through fields under cultivation. Several years after the distribution of thousands of coffee trees to the Bahutu there were none left standing. Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," pp. 140-141.

[51]Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, p. 175.

[52]See pages 321-338 of Donat Murego's Le Revolution Rwandaise: 1959-1962, essai d'interpretation (Rwanda, Publication de l'Institut des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1959). Murego argues that German colonization reinforced the Bahutu's general feeling of powerlessness with respect to Europeans; it strengthened the arrogance and authority of the Batutsi; and it intensified the frustration of Bahutu vis-a-vis the dual authority of Batutsi and the Germans. Furthermore, the Batutsi alliance with the administration reduced tensions between Batutsi and sanctioned the consolidation of their power whereas, through the German army, the Bahutu opposition was reduced to silence but not stifled.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BELGIAN COLONIAL STATE AND INDIRECT RULE

The prime objective of the colonial authorities was the development of the colony, so that it could eventually complement the metropolitan economy and society. To accomplish this task, colonial officials had to transform the socio-economic structure of the traditional area. Consequently, the first order of business was to determine how the colony would be governed. The Belgians were not especially innovative in this regard. They decided to follow their predecessor's example of indirect administration, and proceeded to build an African bureaucracy. Almost simultaneously, officials restructured the tributary mode of production in Rwanda, so that African labor could be extracted for capitalist production and the internal process of primitive accumulation could commence. But as this chapter shows, Rwandans, particularly the Batutsi oligarchy, resisted the colonial state's efforts to restructure a productive system which served their interest. The end result of Batutsi opposition was enough compromise on the part of the administration to permit the evolution of a dual

colonial system--one which was traditional and another which aspired to modernize the country.

The primary aim of the Belgian military effort in Africa during World War I was to assume possession of German territory for use as a pawn in negotiations. When the peace negotiations opened, the Belgians hoped to trade German East Africa for Portuguese territory on the southern banks of the Congo river. But their hopes failed to materialize, and the Milner-Orts agreement of May 30, 1919, left Belgium with only Ruanda-Urundi, which meant that Belgium was locked out of German East Africa and lost the southern bank of the Congo and the extreme eastern port of Rwanda to the British which received the lion's share of the ex-German colonies.[1]

The administrative status of the territory was finally settled in 1924, when the League of Nations conferred a class A Mandate on Belgium. On August 21, 1925, the Belgian government enacted a law providing for administrative union between their newly acquired mandate and their Congo colony. Commenting on the practical implications of the merger, the Belgian representative to the Permanent Mandates Commissions stated in October 1925 that:

> Rwanda (and Burundi) would take their place on a footing of the most complete equality side by side with our Congo provinces and will enjoy all the benefits of the large measure of decentralization possessed by those provinces . . . . The Belgian government thought it good . . .

> not to double the already large central services and the technical and medical services established at Boma, but, thanks to the administrative union, to extend the working of these services to the mandated territory.[2]

Although Rwanda had become an appendage of the Belgian colony, it was five or six years later before it could enjoy the full benefit of a civil administration.[3] Day to day tasks of the administration remained largely in the hands of the military and at first did not extend very far beyond the immediate requirements of peace and order. Belgians were slow to initiate administrative reforms because the "customs and institutions were unlike any found in the Congo." Moreover, Belgian military personnel, by virtue of their training and background, showed little concern for the social and political problems connected with the tasks of colonial administration. Rwandan institutions seemed strange to the Belgian officers on the spot. When queried by the Permanent Mandates Commission about the pace of civil administration, officials stressed repeatedly that the administrative machinery the Germans had left behind was "so rudimentary and inadequate that it could serve only as a makeshift arrangement pending the introduction of a new system."[4]

However, the early years of the Belgian mandate bore the unmistakable imprint of the German legacy. The military was entrusted with a wide range of administrative

functions; and, like their German counterparts, the Belgian Residents were forced into a variety of roles, acting as troubleshooters, judges, counsellors and law-enforcing agents, and relying for assistance on a handful of European deputies, "whose sphere of action depended on the Resident and varied according to political circumstances."[5]

In 1925 the Belgian version of indirect rule received something approaching an official formulation. Its basic core is found in the 1925 Rapport sur l'Administration du Rwanda-Urundi, and bore the authorship of Pierre Ryckmans, Belgian's first Resident in Burundi:

> The cooperation of the kings constitutes an indispensable element of progress and civilization . . . Without them the problem of government would remain insoluble. There are among the chiefs some who are incapable imbeciles, who will never gain authority . . . . There are those who are irreducibly hostile and who will never accept civilization . . . . These chieftaincy crises are everywhere the great stumbling block of [African] policies. To resolve them by dismissing a bad chief and by appointing in his place one more amenable to European influences is tantamount to submitting impotence for insubordination. Legitimacy is a moral factor of incalculable importance.

These ideas were further elaborated upon in an article which appeared in the Bulletion de la Société Belge d'Etudes et d'Expansion in 1925, in which Ryckmann again emphatically stressed the importance of legitimacy:

> Legitimacy is more powerful than violence. The only smoothly functioning organ between us and the masses is the legitimate chiefs. They alone, because they are legitimate, can induce acceptance of necessary innovation.

He conceded that some chiefs might turn out to be "incapable, imbecilic, or irreducibly hostile, but that caution should be used in dealing with these situations." Removal from office was an extreme measure, adapted only as the very last resort.

Every effort should be made, therefore, to respect the mwami's authority and personal prestige, since his sanction and customary investiture conferred legality upon a candidate chosen by European officials. While his power could be curtailed if necessary, no one could or should challenge his authority or outward prestige.[7] Ryckmans' argument reflected his awareness of the administrative disaster caused in the Congo by the wholesale removal of legitimate chiefs and their replacement by impotent "chiefs of the whites." He regarded the Belgian position in Rwanda as privileged because the mandate had a king who could act as the prime legitimizer of Belgian colonial policies and practices. Or as Ryckmans put it, the mwami would provide "the familiar decor which permits us to act in the wings without alarming the masses."[8]

But a year after his plea, hundreds of Rwandese chiefs were dismissed from office and in some cases temporarily

replaced by chiefs of Bahutu extraction. The application of the Ryckmans' policy was challenged from the outset by the all-encompassing, absolutist character of the kingship and the personal obduracy of Mwami Musinga. While the centralized character of the political system made administrative control at the top relatively easy, the imposition of administrative limitations upon the kingship was rendered extremely difficult by the despotic nature of the office and the mwami's extreme suspicion towards Europeans. The maze of intrigue and the double-dealing surrounding the court was an additional factor. As long as this situation was allowed to persist, one Belgian administrator contended, nothing but chaos would prevail.[9]

Musinga and his chiefs' non-compliance or cooperation was particularly disconcerting for those who wanted the oligarchy's support in stimulating economic development. Pierre Ryckmans, in a speech before the Société des Ingénieurs et Industriels in 1921, remarked that it was essential to make the African a producer of coffee, cotton, and flax because their large scale production would offset or absorb high freight costs.[10] But if economic development was to occur, the indifference of the traditional administration had to change or be transformed. Making them executive agents of European administration became a necessary priority, otherwise African production could not be developed nor effectively monitored. But during the

early years of Belgian administration, colonial officials were not strong enough to affect any permanent reorganization or change in the traditional political system, especially when the Belgians were instituting measures that were designed to lessen Musinga's authority. For example, in 1916, the Belgian resident, acting as the "Government of Occupation," divided Rwanda into two separate administrative zones and instituted a policy of dealing with the chiefs in each area. As a result of this policy, Musinga's notables became more independent, and the mwami lost control over them, since he could neither discipline them nor protect those whom the Belgians sought to punish. Thus both his political power and prestige were progressively undermined.[11]

Since these changes to the political structure occurred at a time of severe famine in the northwest, Batutsi discontent and hostility towards the Belgians grew. Rumors began to spread that Musinga planned to resist Belgian occupation. Fearing a full scale revolt, the administration ordered Musinga to end the rumors, but to no avail. Commander Malfeyt, military governor of the occupied territory, prevailed upon the White Fathers, who advised him to direct his efforts to the Abega clan, Musinga's maternal relatives. In December, 1916, the military governor arrested and imprisoned Rwidegembya, a powerful Abega clan member.[12] Resistance from Musinga and the Batutsi

oligarchy came to a halt, but court intrigue and European suspicion continued to affect the relations between the occupational forces and the traditional society.

To prevent further deterioration in relations, Malfeyt restored Rwanda to Musinga through Ordinance Number Five of April 1917 which reinstituted the former German residency system. This action eliminated the direct command of Belgian officers in field. Their impatience, ignorance, and indiscriminate punishment and abuse of the Batutsi notables had endangered the Belgian occupation and the prestige of the traditional ruling elite.[13] Commander Malfeyt then appointed Major DeClerck, a veteran of twenty years in the Congo, as the first civilian resident of Kigali, DeClerk sought to implement change by moral persuasion and compromise.

The Belgian resident informed the mwami and the Batutsi chiefs of the administration's desire to protect the Bahutu from the arbitrary powers of the oligarchy.[14] A series of decrees passed in July and August 1917 accomplished the following: Musinga lost the power of life and death over his subjects;[15] Batutsi chiefs could only compel Bahutu to do two days of customary work (uburetwa) instead of the three or more frequently demanded by the notables. Moreover, farmers could keep all the produce from their fields and the earnings from porterage without the risk of confiscation by the chiefs. DeClerck also

encouraged Musinga to implement a decree which would double the amount of land Bahutu farmers were currently cultivating.[16] To eliminate disputes over the control of men and cattle, the resident limited the shebuja's or patron's rights to recall cattle from the abagaragu or his client. To reduce future famines, DeClerck also ordered all Rwandans to plant manioc, a drought resistant tuber crop, and trees which would contribute to more regular rainfall. While Musinga submitted to these changes in the organization of his kingdom, neither he nor his notables implemented them. But DeClerck, anticipating resistance, instructed his personnel to inform Rwandans of these administrative changes.

However, the notables countered his actions by bribing the abasemyi, the administration's interpreter. Consequently, the changes seldom, if ever, touched the masses of Rwandans, and when a Muhutu managed to hear of these reforms, he had no means of obtaining them, since he could not communicate with the administration without the assistance of the abasemyi, whose fee he could not afford to pay. In addition, there was the matter of reprisals from offended or injured notables. Only those Bahutu who worked at the missions learned the full meaning of the decrees and prohibitions and were able to use them against the Batutsi notables.[17] The reforms were nonetheless a beginning, and over the long run, colonial officials would slowly transform the traditional society by courting the oligarchy.

Much of the impetus for the governmental reorganization of the 1920s stemmed from the administration's attempts to extend its control over regions beyond the central plateau. The oligarchy not only resented the European presence but also the colonial government's persistent efforts to modify the traditional system--all of which lessened the Court's power and prestige. Of particular concern to the Court was the potential disloyalty of those chiefs who actively courted the Europeans as transformation and reforms became permanent and the daily humiliation of compromise which the Court had to endure. On the other hand, the Belgians became increasingly disillusioned with the Court as an agent of change, since it refused to be a willing accomplice in the transformation of Rwanda. European officials also resented the extent to which their orders were disregarded, and this dissatisfaction was relayed to officials in the colonial ministry. But, more importantly, they were also concerned about the lack of economic progress, particularly when recent economic activity in Zaire seemed to anticipate a similar and perhaps coordinated development in Rwanda.[18]

Resident Mortehan and other officials agreed that economic development in Rwanda was essential, and that it could only take place if the administration gained firmer control over the kingdom. So in September 1923, Mortehan reminded the Court to reduce its demands on the Bahutu and

to provide security of land tenure for them. When the Court and notables ignored his requests, Mortehan began to deprive Musinga of the right to assign the responsibility for making labor requisitions for Europeans. The administration also believed that the Court's distribution of work quotas according to political criteria rather than ability to fill them led to inefficiency and delays. Moreover, administrators in post areas had been ignoring the Court's prerogative on assignments and had been distributing quotas to notables in their own regions. The Court, however, had retained control of the distributions within the central kingdom. But, after some chiefs complained that Musinga used work orders to punish them, Mortehan ordered the mwami to confine his demands to one small region where most of the commands were held by his favorites. In all other areas, administrators assigned work quotas to the most important chiefs; where no one chief predominated, officials named one individual to be akazi chief for administrative work projects.

Technically, every adult male performed akazi, usually for public work projects which became general in the 1920s. The local chief, however, decided who actually participated, and the type of work assigned to the individual for akazi often depended on his standing with the hill chief. Refusal to perform akazi was often the excuse used by a chief to dispossess a person of his land.[19]

In establishing the position of the akazi chief, European officials were able to address two fundamental problems simultaneously: geographic isolation and administrative control. Before 1923, commercial trade in northern, central, and eastern Rwanda was oriented towards the Bukoba-Mombasa route, primarily because of the favorable rates merchants received for their hides. Products from Southern Rwanda passed through the Bujumbura-Kigoma-Dar-es-Salaam route, which merchants used to avoid the inconvenience and cost of carriers from Bukoba.[20] To transport trade goods to either terminus required numerous African carriers rather than mechanical transportation, since there were few roads, and until road construction began, Rwanda would remain isolated with trade confined to the peripheral areas where water-transport systems and railroad traffic facilitated trade. In 1923, the nearest road for automobiles went east from Mbarara in Uganda, and the telegraph had come only as far as Kbale, Uganda. The only railroad was the Kigoma and Dar-es-Salaam connection, and the caravan route connecting Cyangugu with Bujumbura was the only road in Rwanda. All other routes were described as important trails. The closest radio was located in Bujumbura.[21]

The creation of the akazi chief meant that labor could be mobilized more efficiently. As a result, the administration was able to commence a road construction program, and at the end of 1923, the year major construction began,

some two hundred and ten kilometers of routes carrossables were built.[22] Between 1923 and 1927, the Butare-Kansi and Butare-Lubonoa roads were constructed.[23] In 1924, construction began on the Tanganyika-Kivu road; several bridges were repaired; and segments of the road from Kamaniola to Bukava were surfaced and enlarged. In the same year, twenty kilometers of motorible road were constructed between Kigali and Butare, and on the Nyanza to Kabgaye route thirteen stone bridges were built, and three more were constructed on the route from Kigali to Ruhengeri.[24]

Some of these projects were financed in part by a five-year loan of twenty million francs from the colonial office in 1925, to both Rwanda and Burundi for economic development, at what it considered quite favorable terms: amortization in thirty year annuities at six percent interest, with the ordinary budget of the territory assuming the interest and amortization charges. The territories would receive the loan in five installments: 3.4 million francs in 1925, 4.3 million francs in 1926, 4.3 million francs in 1927, and 4 million francs each in 1928 and 1929 for the development of government services and public works projects.[25] The metropole was evidently committed to development in Rwanda, because the Ministry of Colonies issued the territories 1.2 million francs to cover administrative costs in 1924,[26] and in lieu of the fact that Belgium was recovering from the devastation of four years of war.

Moreover, the majority of her civil servants, private capital, and colonial interests were committed to the metropole or in Zaire.

It should be emphasized, however, that none of the new roads were paved; all were earth surfaced and few would support the weight of vehicles over 8.5 tons. Because most were set out hastily, they did not withstand the lorry traffic which increased to and from Bujumbura and Uganda after 1923.[27] Still these roads facilitated trade from the interior, but most importantly, they helped to further integrate the African labor force into the world market and to increase the accumulation of capital.

While dismantling the tributary mode of production, appropriating and regulating land, and building roads, the state also implemented a tax system that not only reimbursed the government for the cost of building an infrastructure and for providing services to Africans in the productive sector, but which also forced Africans into the labor market or labor pool for European enterprises. Beginning with the first Belgian tax collection in 1917, when Defawa was Deputy Resident at Nyanza, the administration's head tax was five francs per adult males, and it remained so until 1920 when the tax was lowered to 3.50BF.[28]

By 1924, inhabitants living in European areas paid a head tax of 15BF. Taxpayers living in areas near districts bordering Bugarama, Rumonge, and Nyanza were charged five

francs, while those in exclusively African areas continued to pay 3.50BF. The total amount collected that year was 1,049,222BF.50.[29] In 1926, the rate in African areas returned to five francs,[30] but went to 7.50BF in 1927 and continued to rise thereafter.[31]

Similar to the Germans, the Belgians also created a dual tax system: one system was operative for European commercial and administrative centers, and a separate one operated in the rural African sector. The rationale, of course, was that the modern economy ought to assume a disproportionate share of the burden for economic development. As progress was made and more Africans were forced into the world market, the tax rates for individual provinces were increased and assessed according to ability to pay. This procedure meant that Africans were assuming a major share of the burden for the development of the mandate. A number of supplementary taxes were also introduced for prestations that had been paid in kind; others were levied, especially on cattle,[32] to finance operations within the chiefdoms.

In 1920, individuals with more than five head of cattle paid a tax of 10BF, and in 1921 those with more than ten head of cattle paid 7.50BF.[33] The charge was changed to one franc in 1928, and continued to increase in subsequent years. The amount collected from the cattle tax in 1925 was 500,000BF.[31] These supplementary and income taxes were vital resources which the administration believed

would aid in raising the standard of living for Africans. They reasoned that higher taxation, regardless of how they were obtained, would help "to overcome the African's repugnance to work," which European officials further believed was "common and which prevented the African from making an effort that would transcend his desire to produce only for his immediate or primordial needs."[35]

The taxes were collected by Batutsi notables, who were supervised by Europeans and a member of the clergy. Even though this procedure did not curtail abuse, tax collection was successful: in 1925, 287,367 adult heads of household paid 1,089,946BF in taxes; in 1926, the amount collected in both territories was 4,237,153BF, and 5,319,569BF in 1927; and in 1928 the total revenue contributed by 246,075 taxpayers in both Rwanda and Burundi was 7,410,018BF.[36] The administration attributed their apparent success to the rigorous control instituted to end the abuses of a few unscrupulous collectors and to the elimination of large numbers of intermediaries, each of whom had taken percentage of the tax collection.[37]

The tax revenues were largely devoted for servicing the loans that financed the colony's public works. Roads were especially important not only for lowering the cost of transport but also for reducing the need for carriers.[38] The latter had been recruited since the German occupation, but their numbers--in 1925, 71,912 men--[39] had grown so

large as to cause a shortage of manpower in agriculture and commerce, thus creating a dilemma for an administration committed to African commercial agriculture and European enterprises. The solution was to be found in road construction. Officials believed that the creation of the Bukavu-Uvira road, due to begin construction in 1926, would speed the shipment of merchandise from Lake Kivu towards Tanzania and thereby reduce the need for carriers. Also the territories of Nyanza, Gatsibu, and Butare were on the principal route linking Kigali with Burundi, and since the former territories combined supplied 51,085 carriers (32,575 in 1925), the administration believed that it had no choice, despite the cost, but to construct a surface road from Bujumbura to Butare.[40]

Officials also admitted that their own requirements were partially to blame for the manpower shortage when they remarked that the construction of administrative centers and the proliferation of individual companies increased both the demand for carriers and laborers.[41] The administration believed that road construction and mechanical transport would improve crops and livestock and eradicate famines. Moreover, roads would also facilitate reforestation of the country, which, in turn, would regularize the flow of water from torrential rains.

Even though the creation of the akazi chief enabled labor to be mobilized more efficiently, it also signaled

the first step towards the establishment of a civil service to carry out the administration's orders promptly. The government also consolidated its control and gained the allegiance of the chiefs by permitting them to retain ten percent of all taxes collected. The mwami received five percent of this total and sub-chiefs and chiefs shared the remaining five percent.[42] Belgian officials hoped that the extra income would cause the Court and notables to lessen their demands on the people and discourage corruption.[43]

Generally, tax collection followed an orderly procedure: monthly taxes collected by the chiefs were turned over to the provincial or territorial chiefs. Each month the territorial chief took all tax returns to the territorial office at Butare. The money was counted immediately in the presence of the provincial chiefs, and receipts were given. When all taxes had been collected on a particular hill, the tax registers were also brought to the territorial office. Illiterate chiefs were assisted by either literate members of their families or by African secretaries attached to the chiefs, but directly responsible to the administration which paid their salaries. To ensure their honesty, these secretaries were rotated annually.[44] With an effective bureaucratic apparatus and salaried civil servants in place, the administration could also channel its directives and demands for requisitions more effectively to the masses below.

Part of the reorganization policy also included the extension of Belgian control outside the central plateau. To legitimize its consolidation and expansion, the administration invoked the mwami's name, thereby extending not only its own control to areas in the north of the kingdom, the southwest, and along the eastern frontier, but also the control of the nobility in areas where their influence was only nominal. After 1923, Mulera, Kibali, Bukonya, and Bugerura were brought under administrative control, and in most cases with direct military action because of resistance from some Bahutu lineages.

With an army of 650 men, the Belgians provided the power required to extend their control not only in the northeast but also in the southwest, and along the eastern frontier.[45] With the approval of Belgian officials, Batutsi notables in these areas took large but fairly unified blocks of territory, which they then parcelled out to their followers. Bahutu, who were displaced, either remained without land, sought Batutsi patrons or appealed to their lineage heads for land.

The administration used this system of distributing land in order to prevent the complex system of overlapping commands similar to those in the central plateau. Within each command, one notable ruled the people and where he could obtain Bahutu sanction, he also ruled the land. As an administrator and civil servant he collected the tax

and requisitioned labor for the Belgians. Depending upon their size, these new domains became known as chefferies and sous-chefferies. With expansion in these areas, European officials for the first time assumed such Court prerogatives as the distribution of domains and the appointment and removal of notables. Incompetent chiefs were replaced, and officials sometimes used the death of a chief to appoint more manageable or suitable candidates, although generally the post was passed on to the deceased chief's son.[46]

These changes indicated that the Court was no longer the real authority in the kingdom. It no longer directed the expansion of the central control in the outlying regions, nor did it distribute commands or exercise authority in the settlement of disputes or in the collection of taxes. In 1926, to counter the colonial government's control, the Court began spreading rumors about an imminent end to Belgian rule. Musinga knew otherwise but hoped to diminish the notables' desire to cooperate with Europeans by thus playing upon their hopes and fears. Moreover, to counteract the growing influence of the White Fathers, Musinga flirted with the Seventh Day Adventists, the most radical Protestant group in Rwanda, an alliance which alarmed the administration because they saw the millenial doctrine of the Adventists as a dangerous invitation to social unrest.[47] Musinga's efforts, however, merely led to more governmental

reform and intervention.

The administration continued its program of regrouping and consolidating administrative units throughout Rwanda. Hundreds of scattered enclaves and small holdings of cattle and land complicated administrative control and development projects. To restructure and reduce these areas into more easily identifiable geographical units, the administration grouped sub-chiefdoms of a given region into chiefdoms, generally following the boundaries of the "provinces" of pre-colonial Rwanda. Chiefdoms were grouped at the next highest level into territories, which constituted the lowest units of the European administrative structure. At the head of each territory was a European administrator (l'adminstrateur de territoire, A.T.) who was responsible directly to the Belgian Resident at Kigali. Heading each chiefdom was a chief (chef de chefferie) who was usually appointed by the king with the consent of the administration, but most often the local official made the selection. Similarly, the chief or notable usually chose his own sub-chiefs subject to the approval of the Territorial Administrator.[48] The Belgians also urged notables to exchange domains, regardless of their size or value, but those who stood to lose evaded the issue or delayed taking action.[49] The administration did not press the issue of exchange until the famine of 1928 and 1929, when officials removed a large number of notables from their commands and

merged their domains with others because they had failed to execute relief measures. In fact, it was during the famine that the Belgians proceeded to rearrange the commands on a massive scale, using force where necessary, to get notables to comply.[50]

Once the officials used force, they received better results. In Kigali, for example, the administration was able to reduce the number of major notables from one hundred and nineteen to seven and the number of minor notables from three hundred and twenty-four to seventy-nine. By 1949 there were fifty-two chiefs and six hundred and twenty-nine sub-chiefs holding their offices by appointment from the mwami, who in turn was supervised by the Resident at Kigali.[51]

In 1928, a government report pointed to the creation of an African civil administration staffed by a cadre of newly educated men. At the time, however, the changes in the traditional system lessened the influence of the Court and enhanced the local powers of the chiefs. Administrative chiefs collected taxes for the Court and claimed all labor services formerly due to traditional chiefs. Since the administration had never formally settled the allocation of many other rights, because the issues were too complex or too sensitive or too burdensome, it encouraged the new chiefs, who wasted little time in doing so, to appropriate these powers wherever they could.[52] The chiefs and

their dependents paid less and less attention to Musinga, who had to mount a major campaign to intervene successfully against "government chiefs."[53] Moreover, as a result of simplifying the traditional system, the masses below had less opportunity to turn rivalries among the powerful to their own advantage. Nor did the traditional concern of the notables for their men carry over easily into the bureaucracy, where pleasing the Europeans was more important than keeping the allegiance of their subjects. In many ways, administrative agents were removed from the constraints of traditional authority and comity, and they came to demand more from their subjects.

The administration also realized that the organization of production had to be changed. But this goal could only be accomplished by stabilizing land tenure, appropriating and regulating land as a function of the state, and by dismantling the tributary mode of production in order to free African labor.[54] For change to commence, the Belgians had to restrict the suddenly growing demands the feudal aristocracy was making so that the Bahutu could meet Belgian production demands in commercial agriculture and requisitions, and be free for eventual employment in developing European-dominated economy. So as early as 1924, Belgian officials began a gradual reduction of dues in kind and in labor. Their efforts were partially successful, especially in the vicinity of administrative areas, but attempts to

provide security of land tenure for the Bahutu never materialized,[55] not for lack of laws or decrees but for the lack of effective implementation at the local level by both Batutsi and European officials. The former listened politely and sought to evade the issue, while the latter tried briefly to enforce administrative directives before being distracted by other matters or succumbing to fears of harming the position of the Batutsi officials. Consequently, Belgian decrees and enactments had little effect on the hills (collines). Also, alienation of marginal land to European commercial enterprises worked without a hitch, only there were few takers, to the dismay of the administration.

Tribute payments (prestations) and corvée labor were extremely heavy in areas where the traditional administration was strongest--the central plateau and Shangugu on the western periphery--but less so in Mulera and Gatsibu in the north and in eastern Rwanda.[56] Both were inextricably intertwined with the land tenure system, land clientships, and political appointments. Theoretically, all land belonged to the mwami, and administrative control was exercised by a cattle chief and a land chief appointed in each district. While each was independent of the other, their differing jurisdiction could extend over the same territory: the land-chief was responsible for dues from agriculture; the cattle-chief took care of dues from stock, particularly

cattle. Aside from these primary functions, they were responsible for settling disputes, assigning holdings, and the more important functions of levying and collecting taxes.[57] Both operated at the district level, which was divided into hills (collines) where there was no duplication. The hill chief was a subordinate of both the cattle- and land-chiefs, and each hill contained several neighborhoods, which were the smallest administrative units.[58] Acting on behalf of the mwami, chiefs and notables at each of these levels ceded or granted the right of usufruct to retainers and others wishing to settle in their respective areas. In return for land or usufruct rights, Rwandans had to perform corvee labor.[59]

Through his chiefs the mwami could collect taxes and dues in produce (ikoro if intended for the mwami; ibikunikwa for the chief, and dues in corvee labor for their fields, uburetwa).[60]

Chiefs could assess the sub-chief, who would collect from the heads of households. At each administrative level chiefs often demanded more than was required; they kept the surplus, and often administrative chiefs retained about two-thirds of the impositions and agricultural produce before it reached the Court.[61]

The most exploitative aspects of the traditional system were igikingi (pl. ibikingi) and corvée labor (uburetwa), privileges that were generally dispensed by the chieftains.

Igikingi involved land and pasture rights, constituted a geographical area which included a number of households, and was generally reserved for Batutsi arriving on a new hill. When a mututsi paid court to the chieftain by giving him a cow, the chieftain, in turn, provided the new arrival with amarembo over a certain number of households. The rights of a Mututsi over these households were limited to igisigati (the right to pasture his cows on sorghum stubble) during the dry season, but richer and more powerful Batutsi received from the chieftain, as additional irembo, the right to distribute unused agricultural lands within their own igikingi, a right usually preserved to the chieftains. But more importantly, they also had the right to claim the corvée work and dues that went along with an additional irembo.[62] It was this aspect which concerned the administration most.

Igikingi was exploitative because it forced the Bahutu to seek a client. Officially, Bahutu could not be displaced from their land, and they were under no obligation to commend themselves to anyone. But, in fact, they had no choice; their hold on their land was precarious, and they could be harassed into providing services and gifts by a politically stronger Mututsi. Therefore, they were feudalized (guhakwa)unless they had a stronger patron. But they could not escape in any event, since the Chieftain could also grant corvée labor and dues in produce (ibihunikwa),

which were due him as uruharo--friend and patron.[63]

Of the various forms of land clientship, uburetwa was the most hated and humiliating for the Bahutu, since it symbolized his servitude vis-a-vis the dominant minority. However not every Muhutu performed uburetwa; it was usually the poorest, those who were unable to supply food products instead of labor. Others escaped uburetwa by seeking buhake clientship ties. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, igikingi clientship and uburetwa was distinguished by lack of uniformity. The character of imposition on Bahutu varied from one region to the next, depending on the extent of central government penetration. The variety of arrangements assured substantial flexibility which was eliminated during the colonial period. Consequently hostility was strongest among Bahutu from strong lineages which had enjoyed substantial autonomy in the past or before the arrival of Europeans. Resistance to and resentment of uburetwa were particularly intense in those regions which were not brought under Batutsi administration until the colonial period. It is no accident that areas in the northwest of Rwanda, and the former Bahutu kingdoms of Bukungi and Busoozo manifested the strongest anti-Batutsi sentiment in the politics of the 1950s.[64]

Failure to comply with uburetwa and other corvée obligations exposed a person to the possibility of being deprived of his land by the local chief. The result was a

significant decline in security of tenure for cultivation, since it was often in the interest of a chief to expel a local landholder, and replace him with someone who then became directly dependent on the chief for the land. The previous tenant had to move, hoping to recommend himself as a land client to another chief elsewhere. Therefore the "legal" demands which agents of the state were authorized to make on the population could be used as weapons; these enhanced the chief's control, and thus increased the dependence of their subordinates,[65] most often Bahutu.

While ibikingi also served as a power base for political officials,[66] they also fragmented the country administratively. Consequently, European officials introduced a measure in 1926 which called for their gradual elimination. According to the decree, no new igikingi could be granted. When vacancies occurred through death or for some other reason, the ibikingi would be placed under control of the hill chief. To the administration this new measure was a way of distributing plots to cultivators who had insufficient land on the one hand, and eliminating fragmentation of the central plateau on the other. Naturally, the gradual reduction of ibikingi inadvertently increased the power of the hill chiefs, who now had legal sanction to distribute land as a form of patronage. In 1929, ibikingi were abolished by the administration, but their demise did not come until 1961, when almost all Rwandans accepted their

disappearance. This slowness affirmed the colonial administration's inability to affect change beyond administrative posts and confirmed the power of traditional administrative chiefs on the hills.

Ordinarily, the right to settle on unoccupied land was granted by the chief. Although this right was irrevocable, there were ways to force a Mututsi or Muhutu to abandon it. Where residency was long established, clan or lineage chiefs administered the land. Land could be loaned, but the borrower was not permitted to make improvements by planting banana plantations, coffee trees, or building a permanent house on it, since any improvement would establish continuing rights to the land. New lands could be cleared and added to a lineage's holdings; others could be abandoned to become inkungu, meaning they were returned to the authority of the chieftain. Rights over land were inherited from the lineage. But the system became more complex when a feudal structure was added to the basic tenure system. Different rights superimposed themselves upon one another within the same holdings; for example, one could have the right to the produce from a parcel of land, while another had the right to the first fruit from it. Still another might have the right to graze his cows on it. Since these rights were overlapping conflicts were frequent.[67] But, in the final analysis, the limits to an individual's land rights depended upon the power of his particular patron.

Before individual land tenure was decreed until 1961, the administration used a variety of techniques to ensure the security of tenure for peasant farmers: in 1917 the produce of Bahutu fields was protected; Ordinance Number Forty-Nine of 31 December 1925, which sanctioned the compulsory cultivation of non-seasonal crops, also compelled chiefs and notables to surrender the land that their subordinates cultivated,[68] and Regulation Number Fifty-Two, in the 1930s, which permitted Territorial Agents to use force to compel notables to give up new areas of land for cultivation to their people, was used by the administration.[69] The bulk of the Belgian effort, however, was concentrated on freeing African productive capacity from prestations and corvée labor.[70]

Belgian officials stabilized and reduced the collection of the following prestations: imponoke, a payment in cattle demanded by a patron to replenish herds; indabukirano, or dues in land and cattle demanded when a Mututsi assumed command of a hill; and abatora, the requisiting of bananas.[71] The government reduced corvée labor to forty-two days per year,[72] and in 1926, the resident suppressed three hierarchies of Batutsi authority: the chef de l'ubuhake or land chief, and chef de l'umukende or chief of the pasture, and the chef d'ingabo or the military chief which required dues in produce and in kind.[73] The elimination of these hierarchical ranks, however, did not have the desired

effect of reducing corvée labor or dues in kind. Because the functions of these ranks were invested in one chief instead of three, power became more concentrated, enabling a smaller coterie of chiefs to increase their power and influence through even more exactions and retainers. So, in 1927, the government officially reduced corvee labor to one day out of seven.

The administration did not abolish all prestations and corvée labor because it feared such actions would provoke social and political collapse. These privileges and obligations expressed the ultimate authority of the chiefs over their subjects and affirmed their power as administrators. The Belgians were also aware that their pronouncements had generated a great deal of opposition. The government, therefore, committed itself to a gradual reduction of these dues and privileges and established specific guidelines for others. For example, corvée labor directed at serving the interests of the collective, such as road construction and other public works, was permissible, since European officials believed it was consistent with good administration. Personal corvée due to chiefs and sub-chiefs was restricted to fifteen days per year, but work performed in the interest of the community remained at forty-eight days per year.[74] The hill chief retained the right to intizo, or the use of the labor of five men, for his personal uses.[75] Chiefs were also warned to pay for labor used in the creation and

maintenance of commercial crops. Corvée used in this way would require a money payment of thirty to fifty centimes, depending on the region.[76] It was hoped that the imposition of a money payment would reduce the burden on the Bahutu, instead of exposing and subjecting them to new and harsh demands.[77]

In the same report, officials expressed concern that work reductions not create laziness on the part of some Bahutu. They also registered disquiet that economic opportunities in the modern sector had produced indebtedness among Batutsi chiefs, who "used their money foolishly by indulging in the purchase of tents, motorcycles, and cars." They hoped that these "whims," purchased on credit, would not lead to or force arbitrary and extraordinary payments in kind from Bahutu subordinates to aid the notables in eradicating their indebtedness.[78]

By 1930, the administration's attempt to dismantle the tributary mode of production had achieved mixed results. Corvée labor had been reduced officially, but chiefs often ignored the decree and forced the Bahutu to work as many days as the chief desired.[79] As a result, the administration was forced to constantly supervise its policy of reducing traditional obligations. Young and literate Batutsi tended to accept the reductions without much discussion, but the more traditional chiefs viewed the administration's policy as an attack on their prerogatives. They believed

the exercise of power had little meaning if no distinctions could be made between the rights and privileges of the ruling oligarchy and those of the subjugated Bahutu.[80]

Officials, however, appeared undaunted: the "facility of young Batutsi for adaptation and the willingness of the Bahutu to appeal to them for justice" strengthened the administration's resolve to press on with the reforms. They were also reassured because officially neither Musinga nor his chiefs could plunder their subjects at will and distribute their property among their favorites. The Europeans strongly believed that the Bahutu now possessed ownership of their own labor, since it had officially been decreed that notables could no longer claim their harvest or possessions. The Bahutu were obedient to the Batutsi, but within the limits imposed by European officials and the latter were certain the Bahutu would fulfill their obligations toward his traditional superiors and towards the European administration.[81] But, this was only veiled optimism: Rwanda was in the midst of a famine, and the Batutsi resisted extending the cultivation of food crops in the marshy lowlands where they grazed. In retaliation for their lack of response Belgian authorities used increasingly harsh measures to try to force Batutsi officials to cooperate.

However, the Belgian distortion of <u>buhake</u> ties left many Bahutu without the protection which had shielded them

in the past. Batutsi notables were able to manipulate traditional laws and customs to gain more cattle and personal services from their clients. Others stole tax money or forced laborers requisitioned to do akazi to work in their fields instead.[82] The administration remained aloof, since officials feared that the Bahutu might exploit any interference to reject the authority of the men whom the European officials had appointed.[83]

The Belgians, however, were convinced that they should strive to maintain and consolidate the traditional cadre composed of the Batutsi ruling class, because of "its important qualities, its undeniable intellectual superiority, and its ruling potential." But the Belgians had good reason to be concerned with the mentality of this class. Court intrigue and duplicity, the notables' propensity to satisfy their own self-interests, and the harshness of their rule convinced the administration that their mentality had to be gradually altered and their conception of authority modified from one of domination, exercised solely for the benefit of its holder, to one of a more humane power, to be exercised in the interests of the people. Change had to come through the schools, which the administration had established to train an administrative cadre and to demonstrate that Rwandans values were inferior to European ones.[84]

Mission education predated both Belgian colonialism and secular education in Rwanda. Its progress stemmed from

Musinga's desire to counteract the influences of the administration on his notables, and success or failure fluctuated with Musinga's moods and intentions. Aside from providing religious instruction, missionaries ministered to the needs of the sick and provided agricultural and technical instruction. The administration approved and encouraged the last two as fostering development and in 1929, the administration even granted a special subsidy of 200,000 francs to missions which organized "enseignement normal important.[85] Naturally, the Catholic Fathers were highest on the hierarchy of the administration's approval rating, since they generally came from Belgium. The Protestants, and especially the Adventists, however, were regarded with some suspicion, since their democratic ideals, in the case of the latter, and millenary ideas had caused unrest and protest among Africans in neighboring colonies.

Missions were highly visible and concentrated. Of the four educational facilities in Nyanza territory, three were operated by missions: the Catholic Mission at Kabgaye offered primary, university, and professional education, as did the Protestant Mission at Iremera and the Seventh Day Adventist mission at Gitwe.[86] Missions were also a vital component of the official developmental policy, and by 1930 they could be found in almost every territory in the kingdom. In fact, the administration encouraged their expansion.

Musinga resisted administrative efforts to educate the "sons of chiefs," for he feared that European education would be used against him. He evaded orders that the "sons of chiefs" attend school and instructed his notables to enroll the sons of their clients, bastard sons, or sons who were obviously stupid--a tactic he had used against the Germans. Musinga's opposition ceased only when officials told him they would train and rely upon the Bahutu and poor Batutsi, to administer the country, rather than the young Batutsi elite. Musinga insisted on and received the promise that young Batutsi notables would not be sent to mission schools, and the Belgians agreed to open schools at Nyanza.

At the end of 1923, the school at Nyanza had five European teachers and 167 students. Almost simultaneously, schools in reading and writing French were organized informally at some of the administrative centers, again for the "sons of chiefs" and sub-chiefs or for those who sought to qualify themselves for entrance into the central schools at Nyanza.[87] The following year the government created additional schools in administrative centers and thirteen in the chieftaincies. A special institution also directed by Europeans was created at Shangugu to upgrade professional education and to provide courses suitable to the domestic industries in that particular territory.[88] By 1928, a director, one European teacher, an instituteur diplome, and six African monitors taught a student body at Nyanza

of 323. From this enrollment, the following students left during the year: 63 secrétaires indigènes and clerks who entered the Service de l'administration; one clerk for the resident's office, and eight monitors for the schools in the "territory;" two young sub-chiefs who emigrated to Katanga to direct the Manyarwanda village that Union Miniere proposed to create; ten clerks for the recruitment service of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga; one clerk to the experimental station at Rubona, and an additional clerk for the superintendent at the school at Kamembe; one secretary for Chief Kagondo; and one monitor to teach in the Kivu district. The school at Nyanza also furnished more than 130 chiefs and sub-chiefs who, with some 64 African secretaries, facilitated the operation of the African Tribunal and tax collection for the administration.[89]

The new chiefs (secrétaires indigènes), or as the Rwandans called them, abakaraani (sing., umukaraani), within the reorganization program were young, some only sixteen or seventeen years old. A significant number of them came from poor Batutsi lineages or from mixed parentage. Those from prestigious families occasionally encountered problems because of their youth and inexperience. But, unlike those who were poor, the latter usually managed to command some respect because of their wealth and distinguished ancestry. The poorer ones had a constant struggle to win obedience, especially if they had wealthy Batutsi among their subjects.

To prop up the prestige of the abakaraani, the administration provided them all with the cattle and clients of their predecessors, leaving the former notables virtually destitute.[90] Naturally, this practice created resentment, and the youthfulness of the new chiefs caused rivalry between themselves and their elders, the more traditionally oriented notables.

As the administration drastically cut the number of commands while simultaneously appointing abakaraani, notables realized that few of the older generation would be left to rule. Those few would have to please the Belgians, and would also have to compete for the reduced number of commands. The embittered elder notables accused the abakaraani of aping the Europeans, while the young men scorned their traditional habits. Individual rivalries expressed themselves in a variety of ways. Those who were in favor with administrators used their position against those who were not, who, in turn sought the support of an agricultural agent or the Resident himself. Many took advantage of their relationships with missionaries to bring their rivals into disfavor with the administration, or to ally themselves with competing religious groups. By making cooperation with the Europeans increasingly necessary, the reorganization hastened the movement of nobles away from the Court, and caused a shift of power to the few notables who were trusted by the Belgians. The notables implemented the decisions of

the authorities--who were now Europeans--rather than exercising power directly themselves.[91]

After 1925, the administration insisted that only men with modern education be appointed to administrative posts. Officials no longer needed to force Batutsi to attend the school at Nyanza, instead young men began to scramble for seats, where they expected to attract the attention of the administrators. While the Belgians wanted notables to become literate, they indicated more subtly their wish to have them become Christians. By 1928 virtually all the young men at the Nyanza school were Christians or were in the process of converting, in a general effort to accommodate European wishes. Others turned to Christianity as a way of protecting themselves against Batutsi who had become Christians. But in most cases the great majority of people accepted Christianity within the framework of clientship:[92] as their chiefs became Christian, so did they.

The heart of Belgian policy was based on maintaining the traditional political structure. The Batutsi hierarchy was the obvious recipient of colonial power because they could facilitate indirect administration and because of the way the traditional system extended its control to all elements of society. It was necessary to reshape the structure of the traditional system to meet the demands of economic development, fair and equitable administration, and Christian civilization. At first, the government curtailed

abuse and dismembered the tributary mode of production, but soon the reorganized administration had the effect of gradually whittling away traditional patterns of society and control. The modification and centralization of the traditional structure and function not only increased inequalities within the traditional structures, they also caused the administration to assume more and more of a central role as protector, gradually replacing institutions which historically had ensured security for the weak. As the Batutsi struggled to maintain their position of privilege, and as the colonial government worked to develop the land, Bahutu found themselves subjected to more demands. If the Belgians were supposed to be the new protector, the Bahutu found them too few in number outside of the administrative centers.[93] They received little comfort from the African tribunals, reorganized to give them more security, since they were dominated by Batutsi. Nor did the administration's reforms in the area of prestation and corvée labor lessen their burdens, since there was no effective enforcement on the hill, and there were no open channels to the administration. So they had to seek other alternatives.

Those chiefs and sub-chiefs who were not eliminated by the transformation found themselves in a new role as agents and functionairies (civil servants) for the administration--obeying various directives to construct roads, collect taxes, plant trees or drain swamps, and report

infractions. They had to fulfill their obligations to the Europeans or face the consequences. For the Bahutu, there were new exactions calling for more than simple exchange under the old rules of clientship. Because of the Belgian development policy, Bahutu became the central components and the impetus for the take off for the formation development capital. They paid taxes which provided capital for road construction and other development projects; they supplied the labor needed to exploit raw materials, to plant commercial crops, and to build the infrastructure which would facilitate the colony's integration into the world market and the "modernization" of Rwanda.

The administration was preoccupied with developing and "civilizing the country in order to create a microcosm of middle-class Belgium within the heart of Africa." To accomplish this objective, officials delegated authority to the Batutsi at the grass roots levels, where the Bahutu were doubly taxed, cowed into submission and silenced by inadequately supervised chiefs as in the old days, but without the checks and balances. The administration recognized the need to change Batutsi domination, but they believed it had to be done gradually and by education. The European officials failed to realize that their aims were in direct contravention to those of the Batutsi who did not wish to share power or lose their position of privilege. It was naive to assume that a new elite,

given the rudiments of European education, would return to their hills and perform miracles for the common good, especially when the common good would undermine their very existence. Consequently, what the Belgians expected to occur on the hill did not since the agents of change were opposed to any developments, tangible or intangible that challenged their authority and control.

But there were successes for the colonial government. The administration had created a functional bureaucracy which enabled them to get production from the hills, however imperfectly. Second, the bureaucracy would eventually make it easier for the administration to control and recruit labor, in order to facilitate the smooth operation of settler activities, particularly in the western periphery where European commercial development had matured by 1920. Commercial activity, either from subsidiaries of firms operating in Zaire, Bujumbura, and on the central plateau, or European settlements in eastern Zaire and the Kivu, stimulated demand for African labor and food to feed it. Finally, tax collection and road construction enabled the government to gain additional capital to defray the cost of development and to provide for African labor and services.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

[1]William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 225-253.

[2]League of Nations. Permanent Mandates Commission, 7th session, 1925, p. 55.

[3]Anonymous, Historigue et chronologie du Ruanda ([Kabgayi], 1956), p. 25.

[4]League of Nations. Permanent Mandates Commission, 16th session, 1929, pp. 68-9.

[5]Gouvernement Belge. Ministère des Colonies. Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda et de l'Urundi, 1935 (Brussels, 1936), p. 64.

[6]Ibid., p. 63

[7]Pierre Ryckmans, "Le problème politique au Ruanda-Urundi," Congo, I. No. 3 (1925), p. 410.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Alison L. Des Forges, "Defeat is the only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972), pp. 237-238.

[10]"Le Programme économique dans le Ruanda-Urundi," Congo, I. (June, 1921), p. 259-260.

[11]Gouvernement Belge, Ministère des Colonies, Service des Territoires des Colonies. Dossier AE/11, No. 1847, portefeuille 3288X. Archives Africaines, Brussels. Major Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation de la Residence du Ruanda et sur l'activite de l'Administration"; Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," pp. 206-208.

[12]Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News."

[13]Ibid. Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation."

[14]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 217; Declerk, "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation."

[15]Annonymous, Historique et chronologie du Ruanda, p. 22.

[16]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 213-219; Annonymous, Historique et chronologie du Ruanda, pp. 22-23.

[17]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 219-222.

[18]Ibid., p. 286.

[19]CAMP. Derscheid Collection, Rapport etabli en réponse au questionnaire adressé en 1929 par M. le Gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi a l'Administrateur du Territoire de Nyanza; M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 187-9; and Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 287-9.

[20]Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda du dernier quart du XIXème siecle à 1950," (Mémoire de Licence, Louvain, 1974), 121-2.

[21]Fred E. Wagoner, Nation Building in Africa: A Description of the Development of Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, the American University, 1968), p. 63.

[22]Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 122.

[23]CAMP. Derscheid Collection. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 5.

[24]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 30.

[25]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 104; 1926, p. 109.

[26]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 15.

[27]Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 122.

[28]The fluctuation in the tax was attributed to a commercial crisis in 1921, when a number of Asian and Arab merchants closed down. Local products such as food and hides could not be sold. Historique et chronologie du Rwanda, P. 83; Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921, p. 22; 1922, p. 25 and p. 33; 1923, pp. 18-19; Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1926, p. 19.

[29]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 15.

[30]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1926, p. 19.

[31]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1927, p. 18. The polygamy tax in 1929 generated 18,805 francs and 18,185 francs in 1928. Prior to 1929, only the Kiswahili merchants paid the tax, but the administration decreed that after 1929 the tax would be extended to everyone without distinction. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1922, p. 22.

[32]Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921, p. 22; 1922, p. 33.

[33]Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1921, p. 22.

[34]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 16; 1926, p. 18; 1928, p. 19.

[35]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, p. 19.

[36]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 19; 1926, p. 18; 1927, p. 18. In 1928, the colonial government increased all taxes across the board because of the recent devaluation of Belgian currency, the increase in the prices of all products, and the perceptible increase in African salaries. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, pp. 18-19.

[37]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 58.

[38]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 30.

[39]CAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (u.d.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

[40]CAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1924-1941. Rapport annuel (u.d.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

[41]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1927, p. 62.

[42]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941. Residence du Rwanda. Ordre de service. Kigali, p. 13. April 1927.

[43]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 58; 1926, p. 65; Des Forge, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 289.

[44]CAMP. Derscheid Collection. Territoire des Nyanza. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929.

[45]Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," pp. 71-2.

[46]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, p. 38; Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 290-96.

[47]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 317.

[48]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1927, pp. 37-8; 1928, pp. 37-42; 1929, pp. 37-48; Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 123-124.

[49]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," pp. 323-4.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Gouvernement belge, Ministère du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge au Conseil de Tutelle des Nations Unies sur l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année de 1949 (Brussels, 1950), pp. 25-26; CAMP. Derscheid Collection. R. J. L. Schmidt, Rapport Politique de territoire de Kigali, 1933; Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 324.

[52]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 325.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Rapport presenté par le Gourvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au Sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année, 1925 (Brussels, 1926), p. 88.

[55]Rwandans did not receive full title to the land they worked until shortly after the abolition of ubuhake in 1954.

[56]Consortium for African Microfilm Project (hereafter CAMP). MF 1552, Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel [n.d.]. Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail; Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, noted that dues in kind and corvée labor were less severe in Burundi, but in Rwanda they were quite heavy. Bahutu were liable for tax payment and forced labor, p. 82.

[57]Jacques Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," in Social Stratification in Africa, eds. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Platnicov (New York, 1970), p. 101; Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa;" pp. 39-40.

[58]Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," p. 101.

[59]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 58.

[60]Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a Community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 202.

[61]Ibid. Gravel, "A Play for Power," p. 13; Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," p. 101.

[62]Gravel, "A Play for Power," pp. 214-215; Alexis Kagame, Le Code des Institutions politiques du Rwanda precolonial (Brussels, 1952), p. 97.

[63]I. Reisdorff, Enquêtes fonciers au Rwanda, (mimeographed, 1952), pp. 51-53; Gravel, "A Play for Power," pp. 215-216 and 223-224.

[64]M. Catharine Newbury, "Ubureetwa and Thangata; Comparative Colonial Perspectives," Colloque de Bujumbura (4-10 September 1979), in La Civilisation Ancienne des Peuples des Grands Lacs (Paris & Bujumbura, 1981), pp. 140-141, and 144.

[65]Ibid. p. 143. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1926, p. 67.

[66]Gravel, "A Play for Power," pp. 90-94.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, p. 61; CAMP. Rapport annuel n.d. 3e Partie: Protection du Travail.

[69]Ibid. See pages for the administration's reorganization from 1926 to the early 1930s.

[70]Ibid.

[71]In 1927, corvee labor of two days out of five days labor by Bahutu was officially reduced to one day out of seven. Historique et chronologie du Rwanda, p. 25.

[72]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 12.

[73]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, pp. 38-40.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1925, p. 59.

[76]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1928, p. 40.

[77]Ibid., p. 39.

[78]Ibid., p. 241.

[79]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. MF No. 34, Reel 3. Residence du Ruanda. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouvernor, 1929, p. 4.

[80]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 70.

[81]CAMP. Derschied Collection. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire, 1929, p. 4.

[82]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News, pp. 334-335.

[83]Des Forge also notes that the Bahutu began to emigrate to British territories to escape not only higher taxes and increased demands for akazi, but also the burdens imposed by the notables. Despite government efforts, they were unable to stem the tide. Ibid., p. 335.

[84]Ibid., p. 241.

[85]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 61.

[86]Ibid., p. 77.

[87]Rapport sur l'Administration belge, 1923, p. 15 and p. 29.

[88]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1924, p. 27.

[89]CAMP. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941. Chapitre III: Instruction publique et l'établissement d'enseignement (u.d.).

[90]Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 326.

[91]Ibid., pp. 326-330.

[92]Ibid., pp. 313-316.

[93]In 1929 the European population in Rwanda was 241: 58 were government agents and functionaries; 106 were missionaries; one was a colon; and the remainder were connected with European enterprises, either as doctors, dependents, health inspectors, engineers, agricultural agents, or commercants. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 13.

CHAPTER THREE

LABOR RECRUITMENT AND CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT

The control and recruitment of labor was an integral part of Belgium's economic policy for Rwanda. Since European enterprises were essential to the development of the colony, administrative officials in Rwanda were expected to facilitate the smooth operation of European ventures on the central plateau and the western periphery, in eastern Zaire, and the Kivu.[1] By 1920, European industry and commerce were emerging in these areas. Firms with branches and headquarters in Zaire and Bujumbura, European settlements in eastern Zaire and the Kivu, and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga required larger amounts of African labor. Consequently the administration created regulations for the employment of labor and took an active role in recruiting. The administration introduced taxes, which forced Rwandans to seek employment in the capitalist sectors of Belgian and British Africa, in order to secure money. To assure adequate labor supplies, the state allied with the Batutsi oligarchy; which, in turn, for monetary considerations, acted as auxiliary and mobilized labor whenever European firms and the administration needed it.

Every effort was made to facilitate contractual labor: Bahutu were exempted from akazi, and Batutsi notables received money payment in lieu of ubureetwa service. Officials believed that by encouraging Rwandans to leave their hills and seek employment with European enterprises, the needs of industry and of colons would be fulfilled. At the same time, employment would help the African workers acquire some acquaintance with "superior" European habits and customs. Officials hoped that Rwandans would spread the knowledge of these habits and customs to their hills. But in reality, administrative control and recruitment of labor guaranteed the development and accumulation of development capital. Salaried employment facilitated tax payment and increased consumer demand for imports, which generated additional state revenues in the form of duties and tariffs. By forcing many small producers from the land, the colonial state also separated and developed capital and labor for its expanding industrial centers and developing infrastructures in neighboring Belgian and British dependencies.[2]

Most Rwandans emigrated for economic reasons. For example, in 1916 the price of hoes was thirty-five centimes, but by the mid-1920s they cost from three to four francs, and finally from ten to fifteen francs by 1929.[3] Since other commodities also increased in price, it was quite difficult, if not impossible, for most Africans to obtain locally the necessary resources to pay taxes, purchase

cattle, hoes, and fabric for themselves and their families, and satisfy needs which European contact and examples had created for them.[4] Consequently, they had to seek employment outside of their traditional areas. Some left for Uganda to avoid going to Zaire, which could have absorbed more labor, because Zaire was associated with Belgian administrators whose harshness and strictness they disliked. The Ganda or African peasant farmers, in contrast, had a reputation for kindness, and Rwandans believed that they could leave Ganda employers at any time.[5]

The most crucial determinant was the Congo franc-sterling exchange rate. The slightest upward shift of sterling was generally followed by a movement of Rwandan migrants to the British areas. For example, in the late 1920s, a period of acute food shortage in Rwanda (and Burundi) and of heavy immigration into Uganda, was also a period when the franc was undervalued. The flow of Rwandan migrants was reversed by the British departure from the gold standard in September 1931, which Belgium did not imitate until March 1955. Similar changes in the flow of Rwandan migrants occurred following changes in franc-sterling parity in September 1939, June 1940, and September 1949.[6] Such currency fluctuations sustained the Banyarwanda, who trafficked in currency speculation, exchanging British shillings for the Belgian franc. Currency speculation was so profitable to some Africans that the Union Minière du Haut Katanga

(hereafter UMHK) had difficulty recruiting workers in Gatsibu.[7]

Also, these ready but fluctuating supplies of immigrant labor, though well-suited to the needs of most Ganda and European employers, tended to depress conditions of employment in non-African domestic enterprises. The poor quality of transient labor, and its willingness to accept inferior conditions of pay and work, tended to hold down the level of African wages and made employers unwilling to risk a large outlay on accommodations, welfare, and training.[8] In his study of an African working class at the Union Minière, Higginson also found that recruitment of workers from Rwanda and Burundi precipitated a drop in African wage rates in Zaire.[9]

Charlotte Leubuscher discovered that, from 1920 and 1938, the competition for African labor between mining companies of the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika and the agricultural economy of Uganda also caused labor shortage in British territories. The shortage did not result in any considerable rise in African wage rates, but it did induce employers to devote more attention to the housing and feeding of workers and to the provision of better medical services for them. Moreover, governments and employers also collaborated in lessening the hardships of the journey between African villages and the place of work by providing rest camps and better transport.[10] While Higginson agrees

with this latter point, his analysis is less apologetic.

According to Higginson, the following agencies recruited for labor in central and eastern Rwanda and Burundi in the late 1920s: Comité National du Kivu, Chemin de fer du Grands lacs, some smaller European enterprises, and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the latter achieving the dominant position in Rwanda. By 1929 its agents had extended its recruitment to Muninga and Noba on the route towards Butare.[11] To facilitate recruitment, Union Minière constructed new roads and convenient shelters for recruits, and also assumed the responsibility for refurbishing roads and footpaths in Butare, Gitega, Ngozi, and Nyanza that had fallen into disrepair. He maintains that while these roads facilitated Union Minière's recruitment efforts in the northeastern regions of Gatsibu and Ruhengeri, officials still had difficulty getting staples from Shangugu to the recruitment camp at Bujumbura. Other roads no larger than footpaths carried food to other recruiting camps Union Miniere had established at Butare, Nyanza, and Ngozi. But in most instances recruits from the famine belt in eastern Rwanda did not receive fresh food in sufficient quantities until they reached the staging camp at Bujumbura. He notes that water was also a problem at the Butare Nyaruteja recruitment camp, since the nearest source of water was Akanyaru in the territory of Butare, 154 kilometers away and infested with tsetse flies.[12]

European enterprises could request state intervention to assist in labor recruiting. For example, in 1925 the state approved Union Minière's request to extend its recruiting in Rwanda and Burundi, in spite of the provisions in Article 2 of the Charte Coloniale, which decreed that no one could be compelled to work for individuals or companies. These provisions were not deemed to be inconsistent with the use of official pressure to aid private enterprises.[13] To reverse the flow towards the Belgian Congo, officials believed that it was necessary for Europeans to appeal to African self-interest. They reasoned perhaps correctly that "blacks were practical and their objections could easily be overcome, but only if material rewards were used to attract them."[14] At the beginning of 1925, day workers received 25BF and by mid-year their wages had risen to 40BF. While the administration admitted that the latter amount was insufficient, given the increasing costs of commodities and the depreciation of the franc, it generally hesitated to decree salary increases (although it eventually recommended a wage increase of 80BF per day) "for fear of paralyzing the activities of companies whose credit was quite limited."[15]

Administrative officials also realized that the low wage structure made it difficult for commerçants and Swahili merchants at Kigali to attract enough workers, since most Bahutu could receive much higher wages working

in British territories. Africans often complained that wages hardly ensured subsistence, or provided enough for them to purchase cotton material, since real purchasing power had declined over the years, or "encouraged them to leave the central plateau to journey west in search of jobs." As the depression in the 1930s became more acute, the administration became even more reluctant to increase African wage rates in both the private and public areas.

Belgian authorities continued to be dependent upon the Batutsi chiefs to recruit labor. As Newbury notes, chiefs were responsible for securing work details upon administrative demand for construction or road building. In their role as recruiters for Europeans, these chiefs also gained additional power over the population, since they decided who should go and who would stay. Since recruitment and salaried employment benefited both European commercial interests and the administration, officials were caught in the dilemma of assuring "adequate" administrative authority in the hands of the chiefs, on the one hand, and professing the desire to control the abuses, on the other.[17]

Newbury comments, however, that in sending people to work for Europeans, the chiefs were undermining their own authority over the long run. Salaried employment gave workers a chance to gain economic independence and eventually a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the chiefs. The chiefs gradually became aware of this subversion during the 1930s,

and began to hinder recruitment by threatening workers with expulsion from the hill or by preventing them from leaving the hill on the pretext that recruits had not performed corvée obligations or completed work commissioned by the administration. Others refused to grant permission for leave to those who had already paid their taxes. A few confiscated the property of those who left to work for Europeans or abused their wives by making them perform ubureetwa services.[19]

Some Batutsi were also under great pressure to perform a variety of roles. Those who failed to produce laborers for Europeans, or work gangs for akazi, or were unable to force cultivation of manioc and coffee could be dismissed. Nevertheless, notables imposed exactions on their people far in excess of the legal limits permitted by colonial regulations. Often administrative demands exceeded the chiefs' capacities to fill them, because substantial segments of their labor pool were committed to European enterprises and were therefore exempt from akazi. Also, the system itself sanctioned the excessive exactions, since the administration had deemed going to work for Europeans as a positive good. And, if harshness of administrative measures contributed to a desire to work in salaried jobs, then such harshness was itself beneficial and justified. Excessive demands served the goals of the administration--to pull more people into the labor market. Because of

this priority, attempts to regulate and control abuse were ineffectual.[20]

Batutsi chiefs also viewed the demands they made on their people from the perspective of power. The administration, however, believed that the abuse of power would lessen with education. In the interim, officials would tolerate Batutsi excesses, or act upon them only when abuses were brought to their attention. Also, authorities convinced themselves that dismissal would serve as a deterrent, but this was true, however, only in the 1950s, when greater efforts were made to exercise supervision, thanks to an intense United Nations surveillance of the mandate.

Economic development in the Belgian Congo and Uganda in the 1920s was similar, but achieved radically different results. Both attempted to integrate African producers into their respective capitalist centers. The Entebbe government established peasant cotton and coffee cultivation in order to create a mass tax-base and to make the protectorate self-financing. Whitehall also wanted to ensure the British textile industry a cheap supply of cotton and to build a market for British and Indian manufactured products. Cotton was a suitable small holder cash crop because of its simple technical needs and minimal capital requirements, and the relative ease of cultivation.[22]

The British succeeded for two reasons. First, the

world-wide collapse of the commodity markets effectively eliminated most European plantations in Uganda. Consequently, the colonial office felt confident enough to push African cultivation, and African agriculture gradually emerged as the mainstay of Uganda's economy.[23] Second, the government provided the capital needed to develop commercial agriculture and to build ginneries. Since the railroad linked Uganda with the coast, transportation costs were reduced. Public monies also built roads and provided funds for research stations and agricultural services.[24] These actions ensured the emergence of a black quasi-middle class, but within restricted limits--Ganda did not participate fully in the economy, since they were denied commercial licenses to operate ginneries.[25] The real economic strength remained with European and Indian entrepreneurs, who controlled marketing and processing facilities and capital.[26] Nonetheless, the Ganda competed on equal terms with non-African planters for black labor.

British subjects relied heavily on Rwandan laborers from the northeast and the territories of Gatsibu, Kigali, Rikira, and Ruhengeri, or from the Belgian Congo near Rutshuru.[27] Bahutu coming from Rwanda entered Buganda from the southwest, using the three main crossings over the Kagera River or the Kakitumba River which joins it at the junction of the Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda borders.[28] The other entry points, from east to west, were the Kyaka

and Murongo ferries, controlled by the Tanganyika government, and the Kakitumba bridge, controlled jointly by British and Belgian authorities who maintained customs posts on the bridge. Finally, there was the Kabale road over the mountain pass, leading from Rwanda to Kigezi. Most migrants who used these points of entry ultimately converged on Musaka township, the center of the fertile country of Buddu, which absorbed many of the laborers and which was on the main road to Kampala and to Kyagwe with its sugar factories and other plantations.[29] Labor sources were crucial to Uganda's sugar and cotton industries, and if the supply of labor had been disrupted or restricted it would have affected the country adversely.[30]

If not too ill or exhausted from the journey, Bahutu peasants worked as porters on Ganda or Soga farms. Some found employment in the industries of Kampala, Jinja, Lugazi; a few worked as herdsmen in northern Buganda and Teso.[31] Others processed coffee, tapped rubber, or worked as clerks. If they arrived between December and April, many found positions in cotton gins, or worked for the government on public work projects.[32] Outside of Buganda, mine work was plentiful. In fact, some 8,250 Rwandans worked in the mining industry in 1935, and in 1936 they were 40 percent of the labor force in the six "representative" mines.[33]

In 1925, the majority of the 11,771 laborers recruited

by the Labor Department from the southwestern districts of Uganda came from Rwanda and Burundi. Their numbers continued to increase, and were estimated at 100,000 annually during the latter part of the 1920s.[34] When the famine occurred in 1928, emigration increased dramatically. Officially some 50,000 entered Buganda during that year. In 1929, 19,934 came to Uganda from southern Rwanda and Burundi and about 20,000 entered from northern and eastern Rwanda. By 1930, when the conditions in Rwanda had returned to normal, the influx declined considerably--16,776 from southern Rwanda and Burundi and 3,561 from northern and eastern Rwanda. A modest decline continued thereafter because of the depression, which caused wages to fall markedly--in 1928 the government had paid unskilled laborers 9½ d. per day, but by 1932 the rate was 4 d. per day.[35]

Despite depression conditions, Uganda continued to serve as an alternative to employment in Rwanda or the Congo throughout the 1930s. While some immigrants returned to Rwanda after obtaining their objective, be it money for tax purposes or some other necessities, there were Rwandans who lived temporarily on plots where they were permitted to cultivate cash crops, and some settled permanently. In 1931, it was estimated that some 76,844 Rwandans had settled in Uganda. Official records also noted that by 1943 about 15,000 had established permanent residence in Bugunda alone. The 1948 census recorded a total of 259,051

Rwandans in Uganda, of which about 192,844 were migrant workers; the rest were probably permanent residents.[36]

Similar to its British counterpart, the Belgian Ministry of Colonies stressed colonial solvency in the Congo and Rwanda. In the former, from 1907 to the end of the 1920s, the colonial government continued the economic policy of Leopold's empire builders--state planning in order to generate capital to further the development of the colony. Authorities expanded the Congolese economy by encouraging increased production of raw materials. Almost simultaneously, through a policy of progressive taxation, it forced the African population into the developing capitalist sectors. During the years 1920 to 1925, government increased food production through compulsory African cultivation to meet the demands from mining companies, especially Union Minière, for food.[37] The latter had increased production and had embarked on an expansion program in order to overcome the post-war slump in the commodities markets, which almost bankrupted the industry.[38]

To facilitate recovery in general, and to attract foreign investors specifically, the Belgian government provided about 31,000,000BF between 1921 and 1925 as a guarantee on capital invested in the Belgian Congo. The subsidy succeeded in attracting a large number of Belgian investors, primarily middle-class, who were anxious to recoup some of their losses incurred during World War I.[39] Most were


FRANCAISE
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ITURI
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KIBALI
ORIENT
UGANDA
EQUATEUR
STANLEYVILLE
COQUILHATVILLE
PONTHIERVILLE
GOMA
AFRIQUE
BUKAVU
KINDU
KASAI
KIVU
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LEOPOLDVILLE
PORT-FRANCQUI
MANIEMA
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LUSAMBO
TANGANYIKA
KABINDA
ALBERTVILLE
MATADI
LULUABOURG
KABINDA
KATANGA
ANGOLA
HAUT
ELISABETHVILLE
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persuaded by the promise of substantial profits and the lure of currency speculation.[40] As a result of the government's incentive, enough capital was accumulated to finance railroad construction.

Between 1920 and 1925, the construction of railways integrated the eastern Congo with the rest of the country and the Atlantic Ocean. Construction of the Vicicongo network, between the Itimbiri and Uele Rivers in Orientale Province, joined large tracts of country on the Itimbiri tributary. The Bukama-Port Francqui line opened up large areas of Lomani, Sankuru, and Kasai country. Repairs and modifications were also made to the Leopoldville-Matadi rail system. To integrate Katanga with the rest of the Congo, the rail and river routes between the lower Congo, Leopoldville, and Katanga were joined. This linkage not only shifted traffic away from the Rhodesia railroads and Beira, but also increased European population in the growing urban centers of Luluabourg, Elizabethville, and Katanga, and facilitated European exploitation in the eastern region.[41] Between 1924 and 1928, the construction of the Chemin du Fer du Bas-Congo du Katanga (BCK) railway line from Bukama to Kasai provided fresh outlets for food-trading in western Shaba.[42] Improvements were also made in agriculture services and other public facilities, such as ports and air services.

The long range goal of the state's economic planning

Table I. Coffee Exported from Rwanda and Burundi to Foreign Markets, 1927-1938 (in kilos)

Country	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Belgium	4,413	25,265	23,771	449	59,229	790	98,266
Tanganyika Territory	6,048	3,119	6,409	10,797	4,034	21,270	6,660
Zanzibar	2,040	-	-	-	300	-	-
Belgian Congo	11*	620	?	?	?	-	11,746
France	-	-	75	74	100	105	-
Uganda	-	-	143	-	1,484	73,950	3,871
Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	30	-

*In tons instead of kilos.

SOURCE: Rapport presenté par le Gouvernment Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' année 1927 (Brussels, 1928), pp. 81 and 84; Rapport 1928, pp. 93 and 96; Rapport 1929, p. 97; Rapport 1930, p. 123; Rapport 1931, p. 130; Rapport 1932, p. 131; Rapport 1933, pp. 162, 164 and 166.

Table I. Coffee Exported from Rwanda and Burundi, 1927-1938 (in Kilos).

Country	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Belgium	217,045	605,425	1,297,981	2,140,950	2,492,520
Tanganyika Territory	410	11,452	17,688	120	572,440
Zanzibar	-	-	-	-	3,270
Belgian Congo	38,134	22,292	1,000	1,280	-
France	100	2,010	-	-	-
Uganda	-	-	-	-	271,599
Egypt	-	-	-	-	-
England	-	40	40	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	30
United States	-	-	-	-	50,230

SOURCE: Rapport 1934, pp. 148, 150 and 152; Rapport 1935, pp. 149, 141 and 153; Rapport 1936, pp. 153 and 157; Rapport 1937, pp. 158 and 162; Rapport 1938, p. 173.

in Zaire (or Congo) was to create an infrastructure that would continue to attract foreign finance and industrial capital. As a result of the infusion of capital, the Congo experienced an economic boom between 1923 and 1930, which increased production and modernized the extractive industries, expanded the rail network and facilitated construction, and agricultural production. Exports were valued at 628,573,946BF in 1925 and 1,511,490,871BF in 1930 (see Table II, Volume of Imports and Exports Trade, 1925 to 1932). Copper production rose from 56,221 metric tons in 1923 to 138,949 tons in 1930. The production of diamonds rose from 318,979 carats in 1920 to 2,518,258 carats in 1930. Cotton, palm oil, palm kernels, and coffee exports also experienced notable increases.

Of the agricultural exports, cotton was exclusively an African prerogative, although the processing was confined solely to Europeans. Palm oil and coffee production were left to European producers,[43] who were well established in eastern Zaire by 1925, especially in the Kivu and Ituri, with 1200 hectares and 1000 hectares respectively under cultivation. As indicated in Table III, coffee production continued to increase despite the depression and declining world market prices and consumption (see Table III, coffee Production in Eastern Zaire, 1928-1933). Competition from African planters would therefore encounter strenuous resistance when compulsory coffee cultivation

Table II. Volume of Imports and Export Trade in the Belgian Congo, 1925 to 1932.[1]

Year	Imports		Exports	
	Metric Tons	Value in Francs	Metric Tons	Value in Francs
1925	524,853	876,245,151	213,242	628,573,946
1926	631,584	1,293,197,242	203,678	729,301,977
1927	649,586	1,496,358,868	223,266	1,055,239,249
1928	736,054	1,624,498,658	257,633	1,227,867,419
1929	814,553	1,943,192,906	300,333	1,444,266,477
1930	712,286	1,581,315,177	340,317	1,511,490,871
1931	356,640	961,891,851	273,373	1,104,045,231
1932	182,878	464,631,939	206,240	667,922,436

SOURCE: Department of Overseas Trade. No. 565, Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo and the Territories of Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933. Reported by Harold C. Swan, Consul-General, Leopoldville (London, 1934), p. 11.

[1]Figures do not include transit traffic.

Table III. Coffee Production in Eastern Zaire, 1928 to 1933. (in tons)

Year	Kivu	Ituri	Total
1928	64	119	183
1929	108	140	243
1930	699	161	800
1931	643	201	844
1932	793	305	1,098
1933	1,005	429	1,434

SOURCE: Raymond Brock, "Le Café Arabica et le Kivu," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième année, No. 11 (January, 1935), p. 2.

was introduced in Rwanda during the 1930s.

Despite increased agricultural production in Zaire, the bulk of the country's economic growth and capital was in its extractive industries. Naturally, this kind of economic emphasis did not favor the development of either an autonomous African capitalist class or a class of petty European traders and commercial capitalists. In fact, African areas were subjected to severe shocks: traditional structures in the vicinity of capitalistic growth lost population, and in some places the demographic balance was severely distorted. Also, excessive recruiting destroyed the basis of the traditional apportionment of work between old and young, male and female.[44] More than a million African peasants were also subjected to a levy on their agriculture surplus.[45] In western Shaba, the African cattle industry was practically wiped out by an administration that wished to see cattle husbandry in European hands.[46]

Paradoxically, however, colonial officials did not generally welcome European settlers and petty traders. In the early 1920s, European settlements were halted, primarily because the colons had failed to carry their own weight. The economic slump after World War I bankrupted many of them. Other farming enterprises failed because of the high cost of machinery and the inability of draught animals to survive the tsetse fly. The high level of industrial wages also made it impossible for European farmers to procure

labor at a cost they could afford.[47] But it may very well have been that their role in the colony was more political than economic. Since the dominant policy of the state was to actively encourage large capital enterprises, an economy based on the extensive exploitation of African labor by industrial and commercial firms made it difficult for European agriculture to compete with big business in labor recruiting or with African cultivators in price advantage. European settlers only survived with the benefit of government subsidies and with a monopoly over some branches of production, such as dairy farming, fresh vegetables and fruits, poultry and pork for a European clientele, and the cultivation of Robusta coffee. The production of fresh agricultural produce was quite profitable for both Europeans and Africans in Zaire as well as Rwanda, especially for those living near the commercial, industrial, and administrative centers along the routes of communication. But in the beginning difficulties in transport limited the geographical extension of commercial agricultural produce.[48] The European enterprises, however, were maintained for political reasons in peripheral regions, like Kivu, and on the fringes of the larger urban areas. Their presence validated Belgium's possession of the colony at a time when Greeks and other foreigners were numerically superior.[49]

Large capitalist undertakings, especially UMHK, were nurtured by the state, and they relied upon European firms

from eastern Zaire and Rwanda to provide food for the mines. In eastern Zaire, European settlers had arrived just after the war, and high prices for primary products encouraged many to invest in farming. Consequently, large plantations in coffee, cotton, and palm oil were developed in the 1920s, especially on the fertile soil of Kivu. Settlers in Katanga and Ituri, however, established large scale stock-raising and dairy enterprises. Some farmers also specialized in Arabica coffee production, particularly those in Haut-Ituri.[50] Mostly, however, farmers throughout eastern Zaire produced fresh fruit and vegetables, pork and poultry for Europeans.

The European population increased slowly, but the Kivu experienced the most rapid growth because of its appealing climate, soil fertility, and altitude. In 1925, the European population was 190; it rose to 650 by 1928, and by 1931 the population was over 1,000.[51] In the same period, the total area used for agriculture doubled to 24,000 hectares and coffee production quintupled (see Table III).[52] Europeans in these areas had very little difficulty recruiting non-skilled labor for their farms and industries. In fact, administrators in Kivu Province, and during the 1930s in Bukavu Province, used Cyangugu territory in Rwanda as a labor pool. Labor recruitment from these areas was quite intense from 1926 to 1929. Demands for labor were so heavy that the administration in Kivu was forced to

close several areas to recruitment. Settlers in the Kivu also wrote to Kigali requesting permission from the resident to recruit workers in Cyangugu.[53]

During the 1920s, economic conditions in Rwanda were still underdeveloped, except around Lake Kivu and Kinyaga. Firms and settlers in these areas required African labor. The lack of development in the rest of the country was caused by an absence of infrastructure and capital investment. The majority of European firms operating in Rwanda were concerned with either commerce or agriculture.[54] Most confined their operations to western Rwanda, near Cyangugu, in the north to Ruhengeri and Kisenyi, and on the Central Plateau to Kigali and Butare.[55] Administrators made every effort to facilitate labor recruiting in these regions.

The largest employer during this period was the Protanag, or the Société Coloniale de Produits Tonnants et Agricoles, with a staff of nineteen Europeans by 1929, and capital assets of 12.5 million francs in 1928.[56] The company initially planted coffee, but gradually introduced black walnut trees to be exploited for tannin. By 1929 the company employed 1500 Rwandans from the Kinyaga area. Its recruiting efforts were confined to Lusungu and Kibazi (in present-day Kamembe and Karengera communes, respectively), and approximately 80 percent of the available men in these areas were employed by the company.

Towards 1929, the Compagnie de la Ruzizi began to introduce cotton in the Bugarama region of Kinyaga.[57] Also there was the additional attraction for labor from Kinyaga, because of the expansion of plantations and mines in Kivu Province.[58] Concessions in Cyangugu and Kigali also planted coffee and food crops.[59] Société Plantations du Tanganyika, with capital assets of 1 million francs, initiated coffee cultivation in both Rwanda and Burundi. This particular company sought to improve cultivation by establishing nurseries and seed selection. It also expressed a desire to improve exportation methods through the creation of an agency to oversee the sorting and classification of coffee. Eventually, the company hoped to open a processing mill, provided it could interest other companies in a shared-cost agreement.[60] This procedure suggests that some companies either lacked adequate finances to expand rapidly, or tried to moderate risks through shared ventures.

A 1929 Report, outlining the recruitment procedure used by UMHK, Protanag, and Forminière, noted that UMHK employed about fifty Africans per day, while Protanag used from 60 to 100 men daily, and Forminière, employed about 400 men per day. Although the first two companies did not receive any direct assistance from the administration at Nyanza in recruiting laborers, workers arrived at the Protanag camp, about four kilometers from the district

post at Nyanza each morning to offer their services. UMHK had official sanction to recruit from territorial authorities. Contractual workers reported directly to various district posts, where they were informed of the essential points of their contractual obligations. But Forminière, responsible for the construction of Ndeza road, received even more assistance from Belgian officials, when they directed notables to furnish five percent of the taxpayers for the stretches of road passing through their particular hill. Upon completion of the project, the Bahutu returned to their fields without disturbing the planting cycle.[61]

African salaries were low, despite the administration's assertion that wages were increasing along with the influx of Africans into the labor force.[62] While skilled workers like masons, carpenters, and chauffeurs might receive 1,000BF per month, workers in other categories rarely received more than 400 francs per month. Clerks and/or servants received a monthly salary of less than 300 francs: unskilled laborers received a uniform rate of 1.50BF without rations. Carrier or head porters, who had not declined significantly despite efforts to create an infrastructure, received between 3.45BF and 4.95BF, which included the ration allowance for the trip.[63] Laborers employed in the construction of roads and other public works projects received one franc per day. Private companies paid their

workers between 1.50BF and 2.0BF per day.[64] Bahutu who hired themselves out to other Rwandans received one to two francs per day. But most often they worked for food which had to be shared with their families. For five hours work, they might receive from one to one and a half kilos of beans or perhaps three kilos of sweet potatoes.[65] With the exception of the skilled labor category, and considering that African purchasing power diminished between 1922 and 1929 because of inflation and currency devaluation and depreciation, wages in 1929 did not differ substantially from those in 1924. In that year, carriers received 0.60BF per day for a load of 25 kilos, day workers one franc, and specialists or skilled laborers from 1.25BF to 7BF per day.[66] Nor did wage rates for 1929 reflect the inflated value of commercial exports between 1922 and 1929 (see Appendix I). Although the volume of exports declined in certain years during this period, the value of exports increased 14.6 times from 1922 to 1929.

The dominant recruiter in Rwanda was the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. Between 1925 and 1930, the company recruited more than 10,900 Africans from Rwanda and Burundi to work in the mines (see Table IV).[67] On the average, 12 percent of the total work force came from the territories of Rwanda and Burundi, especially from Ruhengeri, Kisenyi, Kabaya, Kigali, Butare, Gatsibu, and Rukira Territories,[68] where, in 1928, people paid the highest

Table IV. Percentage and Actual Number of Africans from Rwanda and Burundi at the Union Minière in Haut Katanga, 1926-1930

Year	Total Work Force	Ruanda-Urundi	Percentage
1926	13,200	1,101[a]	8[a]
1927	15,400	1,300	8
1928	15,900	1,300	8
1929	16,500	2,500	15
1930	15,700	4,700	30

SOURCE: John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class," p. 292.

NOTES: [a]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport Annuel (n.d.) Développement Moral et Social des Indigènes, 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

Table V. Taxes Paid in Belgian Francs in Rwanda Territory in 1928.

Territory	Tax Payment (francs)	Territory	Tax Payment (francs)
Butare	57,000fb	Cyangugu	24,000fb
Nyanza	50,000fb	Rikiro	32,000fb
Kigali	50,000fb	Lubengera	22,000fb
Ruhengeri	46,000fb	Kabaya	15,000fb
Gatsibu	39,000fb	Kisenyi	12,000fb

SOURCE: John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class," p. 301.

taxes. The two exceptions (see Table V), Kabaya and Kisenyi, were not brought under administrative control until rather late in the colonial period. During the famine in the late 1920s, large numbers also came from central and eastern Rwanda, areas most severely affected, to seek work at Katanga.

After 1930, the number of Bahutu employed by Union Minière declined dramatically from 2,500 in 1931 to barely 400 at the beginning of 1932.[69] While the depression affected the need for labor, recruitment in Rwanda also declined because of the success of Union Minière's stabilization program, the demand for labor in Rwanda and its peripheries in the east and the west, the eagerness of Belgian officials to increase the pace of development in Rwanda, and international pressure from the League of Nations,[70] whose potential for criticism forced the Belgians to proceed cautiously.

The stabilization policy, introduced in 1928, involved the permanent settlement of workers and their families in the neighborhood of the mines. Workers were supplied with houses, medical services, and free education for their children as inducements to remain in the area or to sign new contracts. A graduated scale of wages was introduced and a training program to produce skilled workers was also implemented. As a result of the policy, during the first year, turnover was reduced about a third,

and in 1929, 45 percent of the labor force was stabilized.[71] Whereas the average demand for recruits between 1921 and 1929 had been about 10,000 men a year, the number declined to an annual average of 1800 between 1935 and 1942.[72] By 1932, the policy was a dramatic success story, since the officials at the mines were able to announce that they no longer needed recruits from Rwanda and Burundi.[73]

The decline of Rwandan recruits for the mines at Katanga also coincided with the emergence of Bukavu as a center of service and supply for settlers in the Kivu and Kinyaga. Naturally, as a result, the flow of workers shifted from Katanga to these areas; it was much closer to home and wages were much better. Laborers were needed to build and maintain buildings in Bukavu and to work as skilled and semi-skilled workers in the trades, where their services were in great demand by the industries of the town. As we have already noted, the large number of European plantations in the vicinity added to heavy labor demands and workers from other areas of Rwanda, and especially Kinyaga, were called on to supplement the local labor supply.[74] Naturally, wages were low: in 1926 pay varied from 7BF to 60BF per month. The latter was exceptional and generally reserved for gang or crew chiefs. But in addition to salaries, some workers might receive daily rations and a jacket and blanket each year. Those who worked on a daily basis might receive from 25 to 50

centimes, but generally not rations.[75] Despite low wages, the economic connection between Rwanda and these areas would continue to grow from the 1930s onward, and the economic impact between the Kivu, Kinyaga, and surrounding areas would be tremendous. Administrative personnel recognized this fact when they announced in 1938 that Cyangugu Territory was in the Kivu's sphere, and that the Territory supplied it with manpower and diverse products.[76] The 1939-44 Report would also note that there had been a progressive transformation of African activity in the region west of Cyangugu, where many Africans devoted themselves to petty trade or gave their services to large enterprises.[77] By 1947, 30 percent of the African adult male population were employed by European establishments at Bukavu and by colonists at Cyangugu.[78]

The major occupation of Rwandans on the periphery, besides meeting the demands of the administration and European establishments for labor, was producing food and livestock for European firms for export to the mining centers in eastern Zaire, to include Bukavu and the Kivu. As early as 1917, western Rwanda had acquired importance as a provisioning center for parts of Zaire.[79] By 1923, there were some 27 firms operating in the area; most were concerned with either commerce or agriculture.[80] Approximately 50 to 80 percent of the exports in the 1920s consisted of foodstuffs (Appendix II and III). In 1922, for

example, 2,232 tons of food were exported, and in 1923, 6,647 tons.[81] That year the Belgian Congo received 4,728 tons of food, including peas, beans, maize flour, rice, manioc flour, and maize. Officials were particularly enthusiastic about the potential of manioc and maize, because production of the former had doubled between 1922 and 1923, and the latter from one ton in 1922 to more than 700 tons in 1923, as a result of intensive cultivation. They were convinced that this kind of output would virtually assure Rwanda's and Burundi's role as a food center for Katanga,[82] which received almost all of the maize flour. In 1925, 2,615 tons of food were transported to the Congo;[83] and in 1947, 4,641 tons of food and 1,444 head of livestock were exported there. The following year some 1,260 tons of food, including coffee, tobacco, mats, and graisse indigène, and 1,438 head of livestock went to the Congo.[84] But in 1929, the volume of food exported was only 368 tons, including manufactured products, and 1,146 head of live animals.[85]

The years 1928 and 1929 were of particular significance; provisions were exported to the Congo when Rwanda was in the midst of a famine. The problem of scarcity had appeared as early as 1926, when food production began to decline. Also, the demand for porters and laborers forced many cultivators to leave their plots, and in 1927 insufficient rainfall brought the first signs of scarcity to

eastern Rwanda. Despite these signs, the officials continued to requisition labor and to ship food to the Belgian Congo.[86] By 1931, the volume of exports to the Congo was more than 4,000 tons out of a total production of 5,307 tons.[87] In 1932, total exports surpassed the 1927 level--7,286 tons in 1932 versus 6,409 tons in 1927. Local produce shipped to Zaire amounted to 5,600 tons and 70,132 head of livestock and 3,600 chickens.[88] As Rwanda's agricultural production recovered in the 1930s and as the civil administration became more consolidated, Rwanda's position as a grenier à vivres became an important component of the overall agricultural policy, which consisted of regularizing food production, introducing commercial crops, and improving pastoral potential.[89] To implement these programs, the administration established a Service de l'Agriculture and distributed about a dozen agronomes throughout the different Territories of Rwanda. However, this commitment to the colony's development created an obvious dilemma for Belgian authorities--how to facilitate internal development and to meet the demands for labor by capitalistic centers on the periphery without reducing badly needed capital.

To comply with these conflicting needs, Governor Voisin and succeeding administrators sought to eliminate abuses and relax traditional dues rather than restrict or reduce labor recruiting or demands for labor. Voisin, in

fact, told his officials to enforce existing labor protection laws, which were designed to protect the health and security of Rwandans.[90]

He also recommended that the law of 4 March 1929, which made the resident responsible for recruitment of labor in his territory, be "strictly" enforced. Residents were also responsible for making sure that workers recruited for Katanga, as required by law, passed through the 21-day indoctrination center at Kitega in Burundi, to receive vaccinations, physical examinations,[91] and, during the 1920s, screening for aptitude.[92] In various decrees in 1930, additional labor rights and employer restrictions were promulgated that refined the basic labor contract law of 16 March 1922.[93] In 1939, officials took a major step by permitting six categories of workers to buy off their traditional obligations owed to their chiefs. The administration also excused workers whose work "contributed to development." The categories included contract workers, farmers with at least ten head of cattle, students attending school, and mission catechists. Also, those who worked for the administration and seasonal workers absent from their homes at least nine months of the year were excused. In 1944, this principle of "ransom" was applied to all categories of workers, and henceforth notables were obliged, at least theoretically, to pay cash in return for services performed.[94]

Through the control and recruitment of labor, Belgian authorities were able to force Rwandans out of the traditional sector and into the modern economy. In doing so, they were able to facilitate the development of capital, which ensured the solvency of the colony and built the necessary infrastructure. Salaried employment also enabled Rwandans to pay taxes and to purchase imported goods. It also meant that Africans would assume a greater burden for the development of the colony, as the ratio between local revenues and subsidies from the metropole from 1922 to 1931 indicated (see Table VI). While some Bahutu could manipulate the labor system to their advantage in terms of currency speculation, food production, and work in British territories, the majority had very few options. To refuse to comply with labor demands meant retribution from the notables, who had a greater degree of discretionary power because of their role as the administration's men, and from the administrators at the district post, who were responsible for getting Africans into the modern economy, because surplus capital had to be developed at any cost. Nor did the increased demands for labor from the administration and from European enterprises produce a corresponding increase in African wages. The administration maintained an artificially low wage structure in order to maintain and encourage European investment in the colony. Quite often any gains from wage increases were offset by inflation and

Table VI. The Financial Position of Rwanda and Burundi from 1922 to 1931.

Year	Public Debt (francs)	Advances from Abroad (francs)	Total Revenues (francs)
1922	--	1,000,000	2,931,241
1923	--	1,200,000	3,424,792
1924	--	1,200,000	5,084,317
1925	--	3,400,000	7,044,317
1926	--	5,300,000	10,548,091
1927	--	5,700,000	15,381,689
1928	--	4,000,000	23,381,689
1929	--	11,873,334	26,157,073
1930	6,500,000	14,704,369	30,946,848
1931	35,000,000	18,438,830	34,277,256

SOURCE: Department of Overseas Trade. No. 565. Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo and the Territories of Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933. Reported by Harold C. Swan, Consul-General, Leopoldsville (London, 1934), pp. 64-65.

currency depreciations. For example, in 1926, rising prices caused by the sudden decline of the franc during the months of May-June curtailed African purchases of imported goods.[95]

Even internal disasters did not diminish the administration's zeal to recruit labor and collect taxes. During the first year of the famine, Union Minière emerged as the dominant recruiter in Rwanda. Despite serious food shortages, the administration continued to permit the export of food to eastern Zaire, and as Appendix IV demonstrates, local revenues continued to increase during the years of the famine. These factors confirm that the Rwandan peasants were tools of the state, and that their decision-making power and alternative choices were severely limited by the demands of Belgian officials and the civilian administration or the Batutsi oligarchy.

The demand for African labor and the famine were instrumental in the integration of Rwandans into the capitalist peripheries of Eastern Zaire, western Rwanda, and British East Africa. Supplying labor to these areas was an integral part of Rwanda's economic program throughout the colonial period. But it nonetheless created a dilemma for colonial planners, who sought to stimulate development while simultaneously using the colony as a labor and food reservoir for the rest of Belgian Africa. Since restricting labor recruitment would diminish the development of

capital, the only alternative left to the administrators was to expand local agricultural production in order to increase capital and to achieve greater efficiency with a minimal cost to the metropole and disruption to the capitalist centers on the peripheries of the colony.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

[1]European authorities in Zaire were given a similar order in the form of a circular issued in 1922, which emphasized the duty of officials to give all necessary aid to private enterprises. However, "if moral authority, encouragement, and favors failed, then marks of displeasure were to be imposed." Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London, 1938), p. 645. M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), pp. 272 and 278. Newbury also notes that the growth of plantations and other enterprises in both Kinyaga and Kivu Province contributed to the progressive augmentation of the labor force. Labor demands for European establishments in western Zaire competed with demands from Europeans in Kinyaga. The development of urban centers at Bukavu (opposite Cyangugu in Rwanda) from 1930 and higher wages paid in Bukavu and Kivu in general added to the labor drain on Kinyaga.

[2]Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System: Its Colonial Incorporation as the Belgian Congo, 1885-1960," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, eds. Guy Cran and Galen Hull (New York, 1979), p. 31.

[3]Ian Linden with Jane Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (New York, 1977), p. 166.

[4]Consortium for Africa Microfilm Project (hereafter CAMP). MF1442. Rwanda. Miscellaneous archival material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[5]O. Dak, A Geographical Analysis of the Distribution of Migrants in Uganda (Makerere, 1968), pp. 5-6.

[6]P. S. Powesland, "History of the Migration in Uganda," in Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labor in Buganda, ed. Audrey D. Richards Cambridge, 1954), pp. 49-50. Linden, Church and Revolution, pp. 188 and 206.

[7]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[8]Powesland, "History of the Migration in Uganda," p. 51.

[9]John E. Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class: The Union Minière du Haut Katanga and the African Mine Workers, 1907-1945," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1979), p. 296. He also notes that by November 1928, the recruitment of Rwandans had become an integral component of Union Minière's plan to achieve labor stabilization in Zaire. Also, recruitment in Rwanda accomplished several short-term objectives for the company: it enabled the company to recruit more tractable African workers on long-term contracts (for three years), thus ensuring a more stabilized work force. It also eased the company's dependency on African labor from Northern Rhodesia, who commanded and agitated for higher wages.

[10]Charlotte Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy Under Mandate (London, 1944), pp. 9-10 and 57. She remarks that the shortage of African labor experienced by Tanganyika's mines and agricultural employers produced an appreciable rise in African wages. In the mines, the average monthly wage rose from 15/61 in 1935 to 17/30 Shs in 1938.

[11]Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class," pp. 293-294.

[12]Ibid., pp. 295-296.

[13]Hailey, An African Survey, p. 645.

[14]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[15]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. MF No. 34, Reel 3. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 72. CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[16]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (U.D.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[17]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 282-283.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., pp. 285-286.

[20]Ibid., p. 287.

[21]David J. Vail, "The Public Sector as Stimulus of Innovation Adoption in African Smallholder Agriculture: A Case Study in Teso District, Uganda," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1971), pp. 19-20. Walter Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians: Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda (London, 1960), p. 18.

[22]Jamal Vali, "The Role of Cotton and Coffee in Uganda's Economic Development" (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1976), pp. 67-68. C. C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History (Kampala, 1959), pp. 37-41. Wrigley notes that while European plantations would remain a valuable ingredient in Uganda's economy, they could not become its principal substance. Africans had lower overhead costs and "more modest expectations."

[23]Walter Elkan, The Economic Development of Uganda (London, 1961), pp. 26-28.

[24]Harry A. Reed, "Cotton-Growing in Central Nyanza Province, Kenya, 1901-1939: An Appraisal of African Reactions to Imposed Government Policy" (Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1975), pp. 43-44.

[25]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport annuel (n.d.). Développement moral et social des indigènes. 3é Partie: Protection du Travail.

[26]A. I. Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Travellers," in Economic Development and Tribal Change, p. 53; see Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Des Sedentaires Devenus Migrants: les motifs des départs des Burundais et des Rwandais vers l'Uganda (1920-1960)," Culture et développement, X, n. 1 (1978), pp. 77-78. Chretien maintains that Kibungu in eastern Rwanda was most affected by departure of emigrants. This region was also closest to the British territories and was the most affected by frequent drought. The western region was the least affected

because of the distance and because the area was more productive than the eastern region. Moreover, there were more ways to obtain money, since the area was more developed.

[27]Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Travellers," pp. 53-54.

[28]Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda," pp. 39-40.

[29]Ibid., pp. 29-30 and 33.

[30]Dak, Migrants in Uganda, p. 1. When most arrived, they were generally malnourished, ill-dressed, worn out and often ill. Chretien, "Des Sedentaires Devenus Migrants," p. 80.

[31]Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians, p. 21.

[32]Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda," p. 41.

[33]Dak, Migrants in Uganda, pp. 7-8.

[34]Powesland, "History of Migration in Uganda," pp. 36-38.

[35]Dak, Migrants in Uganda, pp. 7-8.

[36]Bruce Fetter, The Creation of Elizabethville, 1910-1940 (Stanford, 1976), pp. 144-145. The author notes that between 1906 and 1926, the metropole intervened on behalf of Union Minière, both politically and financially, a half dozen times. But, during the boom of the late 1920s, the power relationship was reversed, as the colonial government became increasingly dependent on the copper industry for revenue. In fact, Fetter remarks that Union Minière was responsible for 18 percent of colonial receipts in 1926, 24 percent in 1930, and 32 percent in 1932.

[37]Jewsiewicki, "Unequal Development," p. 322. He notes that the constant demand for food during the 1920s and the desire to make the Katanga economy less dependent on the south forced Haut-Katanga Industrial (hereafter HKI) to search for supplies in the areas opened up to Chemin de fer des Grands lacs Africains and the Kambove-Bukama railways: Lomami, Tanganyika, Moëro, Orientale Province, and Ruanda-Urundi. Between 1921 and 1925 supplies from these areas increased by 18 percent.

[38]Jean-Phillipe Peemans, "Capital Accumulation in the Congo Under Colonialism: The Role of the State," in Colonialism in Africa, Vol. Four, (eds.) L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 170-177; George Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba: A History of the Belgian Congo (London, 1962), pp. 194 and 196; and Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960 (London and New York, 1966), p. 102. Supplying the Allies with raw materials during the First World War stimulated the Congo's economy. Commercial activity increased as well. The annual output of copper at Katanga increased from 7,400 tons in 1913 to 27,500 tons in 1917. Consequently profits from the war enabled the Union Minière to pay a small dividend for the first time. The collapse of the commodities market, however, caught the Congo with accumulated stocks, which forced the price of copper to drop as low as 670 a ton at the end of 1920. In fact, mines throughout the world began to close down. But the Board of Directors in Brussels instituted a redevelopment plan and doubled output to reduce the cost of production. They increased capital and installed new plant equipment. Their program succeeded, and by 1921 Katanga had become the biggest producer of copper in the world. Even though the price of copper had fallen to 657 a ton, the company was still able to show a profit. Also, gold production increased to the point that the Kilo-Moto mines in Orientale Province became a major world producer.

[39]Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 103.

[40]Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System," p. 40.

[41]Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, pp. 103-105; Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba, p. 85.

[42]Jean-Luc Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, c. 1890-1930," in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, (eds.) Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), p. 305.

[43]Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, pp. 106-107.

[44]Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Deuxième année, no. 18 (September 8, 1928), p. 211.

[45]Peemans, "Capital Accumulation in the Congo," pp. 188-189.

[46]Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba," p. 305.

[47]Jewsiewicki, "Unequal Development," p. 323.

[48]Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System," pp. 37-38.

[49]Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Européen au Congo Belge, 1910-1960: Questions Politiques et Economiques," Journal of African History, XX, No. 4 (1979), pp. 559-571. This article is drawn from his thesis. He goes on to say that colons lacked political influence, in the colony at least, until 1945, when they obtained statutory participation in the provincial assemblies. Prior to this date, Belgians living in Africa did not have the right to vote in Belgium. Only the large companies actively participated in the political process in Belgium, and only they manipulated parliament and approved policies applicable abroad. Large companies controlled the activities of colons in areas under their control. For example, the Régie des mines d'or de Milo-Moto had jurisdiction over the colons in Ituri. These companies needed workers and cheap food; they did not want the creation of local political forces able to break the tradition of non-interference from the colonial state in their affairs.

[50]Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Européen au Congo Belge," p. 562; Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba, p. 196.

[51]Raymond Brock, "Le Café Arabica et le Kivu," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième année, No. 1 (January 1935), p. 2.

[52]Jewsiewicki, "Le Colonat Agricole Europeen au Congo Belge," p. 562.

[53]M. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 280-281.

[54]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1927, pp. 79-80; Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1928, p. 91.

[55]Annuaire Officiel du Ministère des Colonies--de Belgique (Brussels, 1926), p. 945; Annuaire Officiel du Ministère des Colonies--de Belgique (Brussels, 1928), p. 649; Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1929, p. 117.

[56]Annuaire Officiel du Ministère des Colonies--de Belgique (Brussels, 1928), p. 1088.

[57]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 269-270; Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1928, p. 117.

[58]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 270.

[59]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1928, p. 117.

[60]Annuaire Officiel du Ministère des Colonies--de Belgique (Brussels, 1928), p. 1080; "Les Plantations de Café du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Troisième année, no. 6 (March 23, 1929), pp. 88-89.

[61]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 74.

[62]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1929, p. 71.

[63]Ibid.

[64]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 72.

[65]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. Territoire de Nyanza. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, p. 73.

[66]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1924, pp. 33 and 38.

[67]Newbury and Higginson give the total number as 7,000 and 10,000 respectively. Higginson's source notes that in 1926, some 400 Africans were recruited from Rwanda and Burundi. However, an official report for 1926 provided the following figures: 2 July 1926, 277 recruits; 30 August 1926, 288 recruits; 16 September 1926, 231 recruits; 1 November 1926, 172 recruits; and 27 November 1926, 133 recruits, making a total of 1,101 recruits. Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 416. Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class," p. 301.

[68]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 416, and CAMP. 3è Partie: Protection du Travail.

[69]Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class," p. 301.

[70]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 275.

[71]Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba pp. 197-198. The stabilization policy was also used in the diamond fields of southern Kasai, in the tin and gold mines of the Kivu, and the plantations of the United Africa (Lever) Company.

[72]Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 119. The author also notes that the number of recruits between 1935 and 1942 was of particular significance, since the copper mines had expanded production to meet the wartime demands of the allies.

[73]Hailey, An African Survey, pp. 702-703. Hailey noted that despite the pronouncement the mines still employed a certain number of Africans from Rwanda and Burundi.

[74]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," pp. 275-276.

[75]CAMP. Rwanda. 3è Partie: Protection du Travail.

[76]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1938, p. 76.

[77]Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression," p. 276, and Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société, 1939-1944, p. 38.

[78]Ministere de Colonies. Ministere du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement Belge à l'Assemblie Générale des Nations Unies au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1947 (Brussels, 1948), p. 61.

[79]Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda du dernier quart du XIXième à 1950" (Mémoire de Licence, Louvain, 1974), p. 75.

[80]Almost all export activity was dominated by Europeans; only a few Asian firms were involved in the export trade. Most were restricted to serving as intermediaries between the European firms and Asian producers. "La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1923," Congo I (January-May 1924), p. 756.

[81]Chambres des Representants, Session de 1923-1924. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi presenté au Chambres (Brussels, 1924), p. 25.

[82]"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1923," Congo I, (January-May, 1924), p. 752. Chambre des Representants, Session de 1923-24. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi presenté aux Chambres, p. 20.

[83]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1925, p. 103.

[84]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1928, pp. 80 and 84.

[85]Ibid., pp. 92 and 96.

[86]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1929, pp. 96 and 100.

[87]Alison L. Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896-1931" (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972), pp. 342-343.

[88]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1931, p. 157.

[89]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1932, pp. 128 and 130.

[90]Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," pp. 90 and 95.

[91]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1930, p. 6.

[92]Ibid., p. 86.

[93]Rapport soumis par le Gouvernement Belge, 1949, p. 116.

[94]Fred E. Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa: A Description and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda" (Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 91-92.

[95]Ibid., pp. 92-93. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1939-1944, pp. 63-65.

[96]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge, 1926, p. 103.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMERGENCE OF THE IMPERIAL STATE: ECONOMIC CONSOLIDATION

State intervention and the attraction of the developed sectors in eastern Zaire and in neighboring British territories stimulated capital formation in Rwanda. Capital surplus was generated from African taxes and labor from the mid-1920 to 1928; state intervention in the same period increased steadily, facilitating development of civil administration and the country's infrastructure. This chapter shows, however, that with the collapse of the world economic system in 1929, the colonial state at the insistence of the Metropole, was left to its own devices. Transforming the country was an expensive business, and the Metropole, preoccupied with its own domestic economy and what had been the enormously profitable Belgian Congo, could no longer subsidize the Rwandan economy. The latter would have to support itself or sink. The Colonial Office at Brussels sent Charles Voisin to increase economic production and to maintain the colony's solvency. This chapter explores the dynamics that were involved in the Voisin administration from 1930 to 1933.

In 1928 and 1929, the world had experienced excellent harvests. In fact, there was overproduction in wheat, coffee, cocoa, palm oil and nuts, cotton and sugar, and surpluses in copper, tin, lead, and aluminum production. The markets for these products collapsed during the last quarter of 1929 and continued into the following year.[1] The best prices for some varieties of Arabica declined from a high of BF 25 to BF 15 per kilo by the end of November 1930.[2] Declining agricultural prices undermined recently established commercial enterprises in Belgian Africa. Brussels advised its colonial officials to tell companies operating in the Congo and Rwanda to take "vigorous measures" to lower the cost of their products. Consequently, companies worked to eliminate all expenditures on non-productive fixed assets and non-essential branch operations to lower costs; many also reduced European personnel and increased the duration of contractual obligations.[3] Agricultural, mining, transportation, and commercial firms were forced to revise their accounting methods and to drop retail prices.[4]

Companies which were badly organized and managed, or founded on pure speculation, collapsed. Only firms which were firmly established or which agreed to the necessary fiscal sacrifices survived. Struggling companies also received government support, especially agricultural enterprises, which were hit hardest by the depression. The

creation of a crisis fund and agricultural credit helped some to survive the economic decline. On March 25, 1930, the government also helped out by cancelling export duties for two years on vegetable products, palm oil, and sugar cane,[5] and by increasing import duties on commodities, such as sugar, which competed with local produce. In Belgium, whereas import duties on foreign beans rose 250BF per ton for roasted coffee and 100BF per ton for unroasted varieties, coffee coming from Belgian Africa entered the metropole duty free.[6]

The economic crisis forced the colonial administration to make up for lost revenues. Consequently, officials increased receipts, taxes, and charges on producers (see Appendix IV), severely weakening the small but growing African capitalist sector.[7] As the crisis intensified, Belgian officials were also confronted with drastic redressments of their own, particularly in finances, economic development, and administrative personnel. They had over-developed certain social services, in which either had to be reduced or their expenses passed on to African producers through increased charges.[8]

The economic crisis also pointed out the administration's over concern with economic development rather than economic consolidation. For example, the commercial sectors of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda had registered severe complaints, since the mid 1920s, with the administration

in Brussels about the high cost of transporting goods to overseas markets. According to official reports, transportation rates varied considerably and the disparities in rates made very little sense. For example, water transportation from Uvira to Kigoma on Lake Tanganika took twelve hours, but cost as much as shipping merchandise from Stanleyville to Leopoldville in nine days. Also, on the Uvira to Bukavu route, a kilometric ton was 8BF, but it also cost 12BF from Kissengny to Rutshuru, a much shorter distance. The rationale for the latter was oil cost and the rapid amortization for the use of lorries which had to traverse defective roads. Rather than resolve the transportation problem, officials concentrated on expanding and formulating development projects, with resulting overexpansion when the crisis developed. Then, critics called for a reassessment of development priorities, and warned that further development in the Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi, could not be accomplished without lowering transport costs and mileage disparities.[9]

By 1931, the rock-bottom of the "world crisis" had been touched, but its effects were not fully felt in Rwanda until 1932, when the added instability of the monetary situation and of finances in general began to paralyze local trade. In fact, commerce virtually stopped in 1931, when Africans, in response to low world prices, kept their hides off the market in the hope of an impending price

increase or used them to manufacture personal garments.[10] Small, medium, and independent European enterprises virtually disappeared, except for Greeks in the hotel trades, butchers and bakers.[11] Requests for agricultural land ceased, and a number of land contracts (concessions) were cancelled.[12] In 1932, one European firm and thirteen Asian ones were adjudged bankrupt. Three of the latter were granted concordat après faillite, and two received preventive bankrupt certificates.[13] Most farmers reduced their activities; others abandoned their enterprises altogether or turned to the production of food crops, instead of sisal and coffee.[14] Road construction on the Bujumbura-Uvira-Cyangugu route could not be completed.[15] Consequently, during 1932, the number of employed Africans, other than porters, declined after road work and public projects were terminated, because the colonial government lacked the money to finance road construction.[16]

In 1931, the budget deficit of 5.9 million francs forced the administration to reduce expenditures by decreasing personnel and materials.[17] The following year, custom duties were again greatly reduced, receipts declined by more than 50 percent (see Appendix IV), and officials reduced expenditures principally on salaries and allowances for European personnel, and material. These produced a 16 percent savings for the administration,[18] but could hardly stave off a possible default by the colonial

state. Outstanding loans owed to the Belgian Congo and the metropole were due and had to be paid. From the beginning of the mandate to 1929, Belgium had loaned the territories of Rwanda and Burundi 28.8 million francs which was to be progressively amortized from 1926.

Brussels was supposed to receive 26,407,781 francs in December 31, 1932, but because of financial problems, an agreement on October 15, 1931, converted the debt to a treasury bond. At the same time, in order to finance road construction, the territories secured a second loan of 50 million francs at a low interest rate of 2 percent annually, repaid in 1932 by converting it to a treasury bond. Both Rwanda and Burundi also possessed a floating debt, which was supported by both Belgium and the Belgian Congo. By 1932 seven million francs in bonds were held by Belgium and 96.5 million francs, including the converted treasury bond of 50 million francs were owed to the Belgian Congo.[19] Despite the mandate's indebtedness or because of it, government officials embarked on a "rationalized development plan" in order to increase foreign exchange. Governor General Voisin's primary mission was the implementation of this kind of development.

When Charles Voisin was named Vice-Governor General and Governor of the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi on 28 May 1930, he announced the government's official development program in the preamble to the 1930 Annual Report. He

included, among other objectives: the regrouping of chiefdoms for better administrative control; the improvement of livestock; reforestation; mineral prospecting; and the construction of roads.[20] In a speech before his administrative officials in September of the same year, the governor added the following projects: a program to remedy periodic famine and the undernourishment of the Africans; the development of markets so that Africans could get cash in return for their excess production, which would in turn stimulate their purchasing power; the participation of Europeans in the economy;[21] and the construction of schools.[22]

The first program called for swamp drainage to provide new land, and the development of seasonal crops such as manioc, which is resistant to excessively dry and wet seasons, to supplement the African diet, especially during periods of famine. To develop markets required the construction of extensive road networks, so that lorries could replace African carriers and connect markets with commercial centers and ports. Although the goal of European participation in agricultural production was never fully realized, Voisin's program provided land concessions in areas of "vacant lands and limited population" in order to improve the land and demonstrate proper cultivation measures for Africans. European participation, however, was more successful in the industrial and commercial

sectors. The land designed for European agricultural production was much too marginal and unsuitable for European settlement.[23]

The technical aspects of Voisin's program were refined by Mr. M. Everaerts, the newly assigned agricultural director and guiding influence for agricultural development from 1929 to 1954, but the substance of the program was not at all new. The theoretical and practical applications of much of it had been developed between 1916 and 1930, especially labor recruitment, wage employment, taxation and trade in African foodstuffs (see Chapter III.)

Governor Voisin's development plan of 1930 also called for reorganizing and standardizing the lines of communication, running from the administration through the chief and sub-chief, to the rural population. It was believed that only through the modification of the traditional structure and, correspondingly, its function, could development or the civilizing mission be initiated.[24] The vital links were the chiefs and sub-chiefs, and their role was a pivotal one, provided they could be made to acquire European values, which the administration assumed would increase the rate of progress.[25] As chiefs became more amenable to European influences or civilization, they could better assume the responsibility for communicating ideas and directives from the administration to the masses below. They would implement directives related to the

cultivation of crops, swamp drainage, reforestation, road construction, and tax collection. Those who were incapable of following administrative orders and decrees would be replaced, scolded, beaten, or jailed.[26] Some chiefs would also have their property confiscated, or administrative officials would indiscriminately destroy the homes and crops of the chief's subjects,[27] to ensure compliance and submission.

However, Voisin's administrative reorganization plan was not entirely new either. A major program, begun in the 1920s had attempted to regroup African chieftaincies by amalgamating the hundreds of scattered enclaves and small holdings that had developed as a result of the traditional land tenure system and ibikingi.[28] The government's goal to organize the country into chiefdoms of roughly the same size, with at least 100 taxpayers in each.[29] The earlier program also had extended administrative control and development projects as well as the efforts of African agents on the hills. At the same time, European officials increased the political power of their chiefs, particularly where authority was exercised in the public interest. Those who acted on the administration's behalf were young educated notables, with a more evolved mentality because of western education. These educated chiefs eventually replaced the more traditional authorities who the administration believed were incapable of

adapting their actions to new methods.[30]

To foster agricultural development, Voisin decided to expand cotton, palm oil, coffee and tobacco, primarily because he believed high transportation costs prohibited the development of other crops.[31] He believed that the selected products would yield higher value, which would thus offset high transport costs.[32] The rationale for expanding coffee cultivation was also based on the belief that coffee would greatly influence the general economic growth of the country, provided it was undertaken by Africans. The general costs for blacks, "who have recourse to family labor in planting, maintenance, and harvesting were quite low in comparison with those which confronted the European cultivation efforts." Voisin and his officials also believed Africans would profit from coffee production.[33] Moreover, Governor Voisin called for some modifications and more rational development in animal husbandry. Only then, he argued, would livestock occupy the preponderant place in the balance of foreign exchange. But the real problem here was supervision because much of the trade could not be documented or taxed at the border (exit) points. According to administration estimates, at least 2,000 head of cattle exited annually from the country unnoticed, especially at points near frontier markets at Banyabongo and the Bahunde of the Kivu district.[34] This meant potential revenues were being lost.

Another feature of the new rationalized development called for European participation in the economy, a policy which the administration had sanctioned since 1925, when it agreed to grant concessions of large tracts of land to business interests.[35] To protect the normal development of the African population and to prevent monopolies by foreign colonists and other foreigners, the administration did not permit land transfers unless an equitable indemnity was transacted,[36] and the Africans agreed to abandon their rights.[37] Densely populated agricultural land would not be granted if African residential patterns would be upset. Furthermore, concessions in these zones were usually limited to a maximum of 500 hectares, and a second concession would be granted only after the first one was in full production. Companies or owners also had to agree to build schools and quarantine stations as part of the social contract.[38]

In 1928 the legislative branch approved three agreements which recognized the right of recipients to acquire property rights to the land. Two limited land grants could be chosen in deserted areas, generally in the proximity of forests, or tse-tse infected regions, where officials hoped European methods could make these areas healthy and productive.[39] A restrictive clause to ensure development recognized the right of ownership only if the land was placed in production within a reasonable period

of time, and social obligations were entirely fulfilled.[40] But as the table below indicates, despite what was apparently a very liberal land policy, there were few firms in Rwanda. Most were Indian and Arab firms which predominated throughout the colonial period. Increases after 1926 reflected non-European growth, and from 1923 to 1927 Belgian firms were never the majority.[41]

Table VII. The Total Number of Agricultural and Commercial Firms in Rwanda, 1923-1929.

Year	Total Number of Firms	Year	Total Number of Firms
1923	27	1927	85
1924	29	1928	94
1925	77	1929	107
1926	71		

SOURCE: "La Rapport sur l'administration Belge pendant l'année 1923," Congo I (Jan. - May, 1924), 756; Rapport 1925, 102; Rapport 1926, 103; Rapport 1927, 79; Rapport 1928, 91; and Rapport 1929, 96.

To make investment in Rwanda more attractive and as a response to the problem of limited financial resources for new but floundering companies, the administration changed its concession policy in significant ways. First, it passed Ordinance No. 18 on June 28, 1929, creating a

system of progressive renewals for agricultural leases at intervals of five years. The ordinance aimed to assist struggling companies, which were allowed to retain their profits until their holdings were in full production.[42] Second, Voisin began to promote more vigorously the concepts of partnership between Africans and Europeans and protective zones. Both concepts worked side-by-side. For example in areas designated as protective zones, companies which agreed to assist Africans would be assured of a monopoly for ten years. Protective zones would enclose an area of 70,000 hectares or more, in which companies would have full access to African labor and produce. By the end of 1929, twenty-one protective zones had been leased or were on the verge of being reserved.[43]

By permitting private enterprises to take "legitimate" advantage of African labor and production, as well as permitting companies to rationalizing their own capital, officials believed development would be more efficient and rational.[44] To further justify their actions, the administration maintained that they would profit from the creation of European agricultural zones. The companies would serve as demonstration agents and would provide the Banyarwanda with seeds, cuttings, and selected plants. Moreover, observation would lead them to unconsciously use more improved cultivation techniques.[45] The concepts of partnership and protective zones were good inducements for

European companies; the notables secured labor for them, while various companies obtained export crops either directly from Bahutu farmers or, more frequently, from Hindu and Arab agents. The latter held a near monoply in transacting business with Africans; they served as middlemen between European importers and African consumers, and between local producers and export houses, as well as for industrial firms in regions adjacent to the Belgian Congo.[46]

The final components of the developmental strategy were perhaps the most important. Voisin sought to encourage the growth of mining concessions as a means of augmenting foreign exchange. The first concession for the exploitation of six deposits of tin was awarded to the Minetain Society in 1930. Export production for that year was 164 tons, but by 1949 the output had risen to 2,267 tons, and mineral exports would become the second ranking source of foreign exchange after coffee.[47]

Then, there was the problem of insufficient pasture and Rwanda's many cattle.[48] The government believed that cattle should be improved by breeding Rwanda animals with European stock or with cattle from neighboring colonies. Culling herds would also result in less animals that would therefore require less pasture land.[49] Batutsi notables vigorously resisted reductions, however, and the administration never made much headway except in the area of improving the health of the herds.

To combat famine, non-seasonal crops such as manioc and sweet potatoes were introduced, and regulations imposed for their cultivation. The resident had the power to require each able bodied adult male to maintain 35 ares of seasonal and 15 ares of non-seasonal food crops. The latter included manioc or above 1900 meters, potatoes.[50] Manioc could be sown in bush land or on well drained slopes apart from each household's land holding.[51] Since the country lacked suitable storage facilities, the selection of these durable crops was a wise choice, and if Bahutu farmers complied with the rules, famines would no longer disrupt the productive cycle. Voisin strongly pursued this program, and recalcitrants were subject to fines of fifty to a hundred francs for failure to follow instructions to the letter.[52]

Other regulations decreed the use of bottom marsh lands for agricultural purposes, a great source of irritation to the Batutsi notables, primarily because of the need for dry season pastures.[53] The notables found ways to circumvent the new directive, usually through "benigned neglect" or gracious non-compliance. Finally, since land in Rwanda had been systematically depleted of its forests by agriculturalists seeking new fields, Belgian officials instituted a forest reclamation project, in which Banyarwanda had to plant commercial groves of fast-growing trees, particularly eucalyptus, to be used as firewood and in

construction.[54]

Voisin's basic developmental goals were to improve African agricultural production in order to resist the threat of famine, to provide enough surplus for the African to purchase the things he could not grow, pay taxes and to create foreign exchange in order to maintain colonial solvency. Government would support these goals by building roads which would open the land; by finding markets which would purchase the Africans' surplus production; and by providing proper technical knowledge and supervision. There were, however, some enormous and fundamental problems which prevented the achievement of these goals: first, population was widely dispersed in a country of precipitous slopes and denuded hillsides; second, there was the social role of cattle expressed by imperatives and taboos not only difficult to change but also deeply imbedded in the traditional political system. If the associations of value and prestige attached to cattle could be transferred to some other object or social manifestation, then the technical solution of the problem of rational stock breeding would be easy.

The third obstacle was the density and isolation of the population, which meant that there were only limited areas for expansion. The basic aim of the administration was to enable a greater number to live on the already crowded cultivated land by raising its productivity and

by encouraging private investment on non-productive land or reclaimed land. Officials would mount campaigns to control population growth and to stress the need for hard work to increase food production.[55] But to teach this kind of awareness was an expensive undertaking in the best of times and certainly impractical in times of depression. Moreover, given the spread of Catholicism, any discussion of birth control would be difficult. To encourage foreign investment in Rwanda was reasonable, but to expect this in the 1930s was not.

A fourth obstacle was traditional land and tenure, which sustained the Batutsi oligarchy, and the administration had to proceed slowly in order to avoid political instability or even revolution. Even when it had the opportunity to completely dismantle the whole system of prestations in 1938, the government refused because of the need to support the power and prestige of traditional authority through the symbol of allegiance which prestations represented.[56] Officials were prepared to leave this issue unresolved for some time and looked upon suppression as a final objective. The fifth obstacle was the absence of villages, which made it almost impossible to reach people in order to provide technical, economic, and human services.[57] Even though the governor's program encouraged the creation of open air markets, which would serve to inspire surrounding stores and eventually villages, this

aspect of development would take time. In the meantime schools and dispensaries would have to serve as a measure of village life in order to reach the people.[58] The final obstacle was Musinga.

The implementation of economic transformation lay in the efficiency of the chain-of-command, running from the administration through the chiefs and sub-chiefs to the rural masses. The vital links were naturally the chiefs. In this regard the administration was willing to respect and reinforce the authority of the Batutsi oligarchy, but only "to the extent where its functions follow our civilizing directives."[59] This aim also meant persuading Musinga to take his duties "seriously" and to participate "actively" in the administration of his territory. European official and missionary personnel expressed the belief that Musinga was supposedly indifferent to those things which "did not satisfy his egoism and instincts." He was concerned only with "keeping his people in a state of stagnation and with resisting the works of civilization."[60] They also believed that the roots of chaos and indifference lay in the existence of an autocratic, powerful monarchy who remained captive to the whims of a band of sycophantic courtiers.[61]

The crisis came to a head in 1931, with the dismissal of Musinga and the accession to the throne of his eighteen-year-old-son, Rudahigwa (hereafter Mwami Mutara). The

origins of the crisis, according to one version, can be traced back to 1926, when it was alleged that Musinga had attempted sodomy with sons of his notables serving at the palace at Nyanza. This incident caused a breach between Musinga and his chiefs, for which he blamed the White Fathers, saying they had exaggerated the facts.[62] Whether there is any truth to these claims is difficult to say, but what is beyond question is that Musinga's relations with the Catholic Church had never been very cordial. According to Alexis Kagame, "Musinga was bitterly opposed to missionary enterprise, because it undermined his authority."[63]

Musinga openly distrusted Catholic missionaries, and he adopted an attitude of passive resistance toward the administration, an attitude which Professor Marzarotti attributed to the influence of Musinga's traditional background. Consequently it was difficult for anyone to change his mental outlook. The limitations which the administration had imposed upon him contributed to his hostile attitude and latent surliness.[64]

But what really incensed officials was Musinga's systematic opposition to all European progress and improvements, his preoccupation with the past, and finally his conduct during the 1928-29 famine. Musinga had failed to support reforestation and cultivation of compulsory food crops,[65] but during the famine, he tried to get the

government to compel his starving people to supply him with the customary food tribute. The administration naturally refused the request, but persuaded him to leave his capital to tour the kingdom and encourage the people to plant food crops and trees for the reforestation program. Musinga travelled "with little enthusiasm," and his entourage "exacted tribute in food and cattle from the people."[66]

These actions were frustrating, since the administration's solution to the famine was to extend food crop cultivation in the marshy lowlands, where crops could grow even if rainfall was below normal. Officials were also thoroughly disgusted with the Batutsi notables, who tended to ignore orders to clear and plant the marshes. Notables were more concerned about the fate of their cattle which constituted their sole wealth. Since the wet lowlands offered the only certain source of pasturage during drought, Batutsi notables blocked the extension of cultivation there.[67] The frustrated Belgians sought Musinga's help in getting the Batutsi to act. The king enthusiastically punished any of his opponents who disobeyed the orders, but he did no more than his notables to extend cultivation.[68] Faced with the task of governing the kingdom without the cooperation of the notables, Governor Pastiaux tried conciliation and returned to the earlier policy of propping up the notables' prestige and

authority.[69] The governor also ordered that measures which had been disrupting buhake, one of the major grievances of the notables, be stopped. In the future, no notable would lose his client except as punishment for misbehavior.[70] But the major problem was still, what should be done with Musinga?

In September 1931, Governor General Tilkens of the Belgian Congo visited Bishop Classe in order to set the date for Musinga's deposition. He was introduced to Rudahigwa, and a week later Batutsi notables were called to Kigali ostensibly for discussion about the economic crisis, but really to isolate Musinga in Nyanza. He was conveniently alone when he was informed that his son would succeed him. The king, who seemed to have expected the news, cried a little and left on November 16, 1931, for exile at a special residence at Kamembe in the western part of Rwanda, and ultimately to Moba, Katanga, where he died on Christmas Day in 1944.[71] Only Le Drapeau Rouge, the Manchester Guardian, and the Queen Mother protested his deposition--the last even threatened suicide.[72]

Although the new mwami displayed no more sympathy towards Europeans than his father, his methods were quite different. Where Musinga openly challenged missionaries and administrators, Rudahigwa had a special talent for working within the confines of the established superstructure, rather than against it. Mwami Mutara had come of

age when European rule was already firmly established, and was better able to accommodate himself to the norms of the new system. More important, he was a product of mission schools; he shared with the new generation of educated Batutsi elite the western training and education which his father so conspicuously lacked. The deposed Musinga was never able or willing to work out a mutually satisfactory relationship with the incipient "class" of mission educated Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs and the resulting tension played a part in his dismissal.[73]

According to LeMarchand, the new generation of chiefs fully sensed the significance of the social forces that lay behind the spread of Christianity. These chiefs realized that the preservation of their traditional claims ultimately depended upon their endorsement of the new creed. Musinga viewed the adoption of Christianity as nothing short of a betrayal of his authority. Christianity meant the desacralization of the mwami-ship, and the relegation of the office-holder to a subordinate position. Musinga's obduracies stemmed from his own unwillingness to accept any sort of limitation that would alter either the sacredness of his office or the structure of his authority. Therefore, the drastic alterations eventually wrought into the system in the name of administrative efficiency made Musinga all the more suspicious of Belgian intentions.[74]

With a new mwami in place, the administration

completed its political reforms, or reorganization, and implemented other economic reforms.[75] For example, traditional taxes in kind and in work, owed to the Batutsi notables, was replaced by an annual money payment.[76] The new tax procedure freed Africans from porterage of produce delivered in tribute and from the billeting and provisioning of prestation workers--burdens never considered in the evaluation of African customary contributions; and permitted farmers to devote more time to the production of their crops. Although the government wanted to eliminate all corvées and prestations, and replace them with a flat money payment, it decided instead to regulate them in order to prevent abuse.[77]

The administration was concerned with economic development, and any potential controversy was to be avoided. This particular issue might have caused considerable instability, and was perhaps the one issue that might have united the competing functions of Batutsi noblemen. The administration, as a result, took the safest course, but it inadvertently tightened the stronghold of the Batutsi notables over Bahutu. This issue more than any other, demonstrated the relative strength of the notables as co-rulers, and it accentuated the inconsistencies in the colonial policy, especially since modernity implied the elimination of values and constraints harmful to the development process.

On the whole, the period from 1928-1931 was the apex

of the Belgian attempt to "rationalize and standardize" lines of control, and in doing so, the sanction of the Batutsi oligarchy as arbiters of the colonial system was confirmed. The famine convinced the administration that development and African survival could not be accomplished without the nobility. Nor could reforms be instituted without first considering how they would effect the court and the Batutsi notables. As arbiters of the system, the notables increased their potential for wealth in the new economy--for certain corvée and prestation they would receive a money payment. Moreover, they were part of the civil service and held the dominant places in the educational system which confirmed access to the Belgian administration. On another level the same period foreshadowed the consolidation of the Rwandan colonial economy, and the domination of it by the state and international economic systems. The former would redirect individual African initiative in the domestic economy for the benefit of the state. The economic crisis had severely weakened the emerging capitalist sector, and threatened both colonial solvency and the colony's development. The international economy would provide foreign exchange through the purchase of African surplus, allowing Africans to pay taxes and purchase imported goods.

With reorganization complete and the state in control of the economy, the government could facilitate the

expansion of coffee production. Only with well-organized, efficiently functioning productive and administrative system could colonial officials hope to encourage and profit from economic development. Passive resistance, a recalcitrant king, and Batutsi chiefs impeded consolidation, moral and social progress, and economic development or "the civilizing process." But the administration was prepared to implement its plans by any means, even to the extent of deposing the traditional monarch in favor of his son Charles Mutare Rudahigwa, "who was more amenable, open, and intelligent."[78] Only by standardizing and regulating a system of dual colonialism or overrule in which the administration and the Batutsi elite coexisted side by side or on top of each other could Belgian authorities control a doubly exploitative relationship between the masses and the Batutsi. Transforming the productive and administrative system created profound social changes, and a dual system of overrule also served to contain the expectations and aspirations of the Batutsi oligarchy, and consequently the African masses, who also had the potential for disruption. While European administrators monitored the colonial system as a whole, the Batutsi oligarchy supervised the productive efforts of the African population. The key to the whole system, however, was effective management from the top and compliance from the Batutsi who dominated the masses below.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

[1]Georges Van Der Kerken, La Crise Economique en Afrique Belge: Situation Actuelle et Perspective d'Avenir (Brussels, 1931), p. 25.

[2]Ibid., p. 39.

[3]Ibid., p. 50

[4]E. Du Bois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-34," Bulletin 1' Institut des Sciences Economiques Sixième Année, No. 2 (1935), p. 133.

[5]Other decrees prolonged this temporary exemption until December 31, 1935, and a decree of June 17, 1933, extended the exemption to cotton fabrics manufactured in the colony. Du Bois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale," pp. 133-34.

[6]In 1935, another decree levied a 300 BF per ton export duty on unroasted coffee coming into Belgian Africa and which might be reexported duty free into Belgium. An additional decree authorized the Ministry of Colonies to reduce the statistical tax collected for certain commodities at the same time customs duties were collected for products entering or leaving the country. Du Bois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale," p. 134.

[7]Also, by 1929 the number of non-African commercial firms in the mandate territories was 261, but by the end of 1930 the total had declined to 226. Ministère de Colonies. Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1930 (Brussels, 1931), p. 112.

[8]Van Der Kerken, La Crise Economique, p. 59.

[9]Ibid., p. 64.

[10]Actually this process had begun in 1930, when purchases from the Belgian Congo had begun to decline. Also appreciable decreases occurred in other export commodities to the Belgian Congo--1,212 tons in 1930 compared to 1,526 tons in 1929, a decline of 20 percent. A large segment of the decline was in hides, in spite of a reduction in duty from 10 percent to 3 percent ad valorem. Rapport 1930, pp. 29 and 113.

[11]"Variétés," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Cinquième Année, No. 4 (February 21, 1931), p. 61.

[12]Rapport 1931, p. 48.

[13]Rapport 1932, p. 29

[14]Ibid., p. 156.

[15]"Variétés," p. 61.

[16]Consortium for African Microfilm Project (hereafter CAMP). Film No. 34. Reel I. J. M. Derschied Collection. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, (1933), p. 58.

[17]Rapport 1931, p. 28.

[18]Rapport 1932, p. 250.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Gouvernement Belge. Ministère des Colonies. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge sur 1' Administration du Ruanda et de 1' Urundi, 1930 (Brussels, 1931), pp. 5-6; a decree of 18 December 1930 established forest areas and prohibited the cutting of wood without a permit, punishable by a fine not to exceed $100.00 and one month in prison. Large forest preserves along the Congo-Nile Divide and the slopes of the volcanoes were created in 1934. Pierre Leroy, Législation du Ruanda-Urundi (Usumbura, 1949), pp. 61-63.

[21]Fred E. Wagoner. "Nation Building in Africa: A Description and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 78-81.

[22]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1930, p. 5.

[23]Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," pp. 82-87.

[24]Alison L. Des Forges. "Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972), p. 237.

[25]Rapport sur l'Administration belge du Ruanda et l'Urundi, 1923. (Brussels, 1924), p. 71.

[26]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1930, p. 5.

[27]Des Forge, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," p. 263.

[28]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 46.

[29]Historique et chronologie du Rwanda also notes that the figure would later be raised to 300 taxpayers, p. 25.

[30]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement belge, 1929, p. 46.

[31]Tobacco production was already well established in Kigali, Nyanza, Gatsibu, and Ruhengeri. Also there was a flourishing domestic trade. Buyers purchased 281,350 tobacco leafs from African farmers in Mulera, and at Kisenyi the Kamembe mill purchased 281,000 tobacco leafs. Religious missions at Rwaza and Njundo bought 600,000 and 204,000 tobacco leafs respectively in 1926. Small traders purchased more than one million tobacco leafs from African farmers. In 1929, Kisenyi and Mulera produced 200 tons. Although the industry lacked sufficient market outlets from 1934 to 1937 and production consequently declined in certain areas, tobacco production remained constant throughout 1938. Even today, it is a small but viable industry. As a result of the administration's cotton campaign, 1,900 hectares were in production by 1932. Though plagued by repeated attacks from grasshoppers (which destroyed more than 100 hectares) and plant damage caused by the rose worm (ver rose) and other parasites, 856 tons were produced in 1932. Planters averaged 90 kilos per hectare. By 1937, 724 tons of cotton was produced on 4,250 hectares. Although the 1936-37 cotton season had been a particularly good one because of adequate rainfall, cotton was still plagued by cryptagamical attacks and damaged by insects and parasites. Also, planters received only 1.10BF per kilo at government supervised markets. These 12,440 African cotton farmers produced on the average 219 kilos and received approximately 240BF for their efforts. The major cotton region was Bugarama in Cyangugu territory, producing 253,000 kilos in 1937 and 335,570 kilos in 1938. But because of low prices, planters received one franc per kilo at markets supervised by the administration. By the end of 1938, there were also two ginning mills in the mandated territories. Rapport 1926, pp. 94 and 99; Rapport 1929, p. 91; Rapport 1934, p. 132;

Rapport 1937, p. 141; and Rapport 1938, p. 149 for tobacco and Rapport 1932, p. 112; Rapport 1937, p. 139; Rapport 1938, pp. 76, 147, 149, and 200 for cotton.

[32]Rapport 1930, p. 106.

[33]Ibid., p. 114.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Rapport 1925, p. 79.

[36]In 1929, the government added the following provisions to its concession policy: the official survey report had to show that the land was unoccupied and would not be needed by Africans in the future. These reports were supposed to be thoroughly scrutinized by the resident, and then by the governor who had the final approval. Rapport 1929, p. 38.

[37]Rapport 1926, p. 145. However, the 1929 Report noted that alienations were exceptional. In principal, administrative officials only consented to long term leases for 30 years, following a provisional contract of occupation for a period of five years during which half the land should have been placed in production. Rapport 1927, p. 31 and Rapport 1929, p. 38.

[38]Rapport 1927, p. 31.

[39]Rapport 1929, p. 38.

[40]Ibid.

[41]"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge pendant l'Année 1923," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1924), p. 756; Rapport 1924, p. 38; Rapport 1925, p. 102; Rapport 1926, p. 103; Rapport 1927, p. 79; Rapport 1928, p. 91; and Rapport 1929, p. 96.

[42]Rapport 1929, p. 88.

[43]In 1930, the total number of European and Asian agricultural enterprises in Rwanda had been reduced to 15. The total area in full production was only 5,745 hectares and 50 ares. But Europeans and Asians held much more land in the following categories: 14,782 hectares 75 ares 58 cent'ares were devoted to private ownership; 11,881 hectares 75 ares were on lease arrangements; 2,843 hectares on long term lease arrangements; and 1,948 hectares in the hands of missions. About 73.4 percent of the European and

Asian land was in fallow: 4.18 percent in food crops; 6.20 percent in coffee; 14.7 percent in forestry; and 1.3 percent in fruit trees. Société Coloniale des Produit tannant et Agricole (Protanag), perhaps the largest company in Rwanda had 1,115 hectares in production in Cyangugu in 1930. About 350 hectares of it was in coffee. Protanag used specialized technical personnel and equipment, such as tractors and adaptable ploughs. However, the company did not survive the economic crisis and collapsed in 1934, despite its efforts to liquidate some of its less profitable assets. Other European companies were located in the following areas: five in Gatsibu; three in Kigali; one in Cyangugu; two in Lubengera; and two in Ruhengeri. Most of these enterprises cultivated food crops and coffee. Rapport 1929, p. 39; Rapport 1930, pp. 112, and 149-150; and Rapport 1934, p. 87.

[44]Rapport 1929, p. 39.

[45]The administration also envisaged the eventual creation of individual land tenure systems among the Banyarwanda, but this was way off in the remote distant future. Ibid.

[46]Rapport 1930, p. 112.

[47]Ibid., pp. 149 and 336; Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," p. 83.

[48]Over-grazing and an excessive cattle population remains a severe problem for Rwanda. Even in 1933 there were some 80,000 head of cattle, which at a rate of at least 2.5 hectares per head of cattle, required some 300,000 hectares for adequate grazing. However, the total area of the country is just 265 hectares and only 243,151 hectare were suitable for agriculture and animal husbandry. With 60,000 adult farmers cultivating 68,763 hectares, there was not sufficient land for pasture, unless yields on pasture lands could be increased. So the concern shown by the administration was a real one. CAMP. Film No. 34 Reel I. J. M. Derschied. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Change (1933), p. 59.

[49]CAMP. Congo Manuscript. J. M. Derscheid Collection. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur, 1929, p. 44.

[50]A. Becquet, "Moyens mis en Oeuvre et les Results Obtenus dans le Lutte contre la Famine au Ruanda," Journées d'Agronomie Coloniale, (June 23-24, 1933), p. 4.

[51]Pierre Bettez Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a Community in Eastern Rwanda: (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 68.

[52]Ian Linden, Church and Revolution, p. 206.

[53]Gravel, "A Play for Power," p. 82

[54]Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[55]Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," p. 83.

[56]Rapport 1938, p. 75.

[57]Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa," p. 185.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Rapport 1930, p. 5.

[60]Ibid., p. 60.

[61]Rene LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London, 1970), p. 70.

[62]Louis de Lacger, Rwanda (Kabgayi, n.d.), pp. 531-538.

[63]Alexis Kagame, Yuhi Musinga: un Regne mouvemente (Unpublished M.S.).

[64]Permanent Mandates Commission, 16th session (1929), p. 66.

[65]Rapport 1929, 48. Congo Manuscript. "Folder No. 9. "Silhouette: M. Georges Sandrart." Alison L. Des Forges. "Defeat is the Only Bad News," p. 343.

[66]Rapport 1929, pp. 48-49.

[67]Des Forges, "Defeat is the Only Bad News," pp. 343-344.

[68]Ibid., p. 344.

[69]Ibid., p. 346.

[70]Ibid., pp. 346-7.

[71]Rapport 1931, pp. 242-243; Wagoner, Nation Building in Africa, p. 95.

[72]Rapport 1931, p. 247.

[73]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 70.

[74]Ibid.

[75]In 1938, officials remarked that the mwami's role was collaborative, and in this capacity he would make periodic tours of his kingdom and report on the results to the Resident. Rapport 1938, p. 13.

[76]Rapport 1931, p. 87.

[77]Ibid., and Rapport 1934, p. 70.

[78]Rapport 1931, p. 58.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RWANDAN COLONIAL ECONOMY: COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1920-1937

The famine of 1928-29 in Rwanda and the Great Depression of the 1930s were bench marks in the economic and colonial history of Rwanda. Both were instrumental in introducing into the country a strict system of economic planning which guaranteed the maximum productivity from the African population. Increased productivity was necessary in order to counter future famines, the drastic reduction in investments, and the sharp decline in the prices of raw materials and agricultural commodities on the world market. Economic dislocation not only threatened the solvency of the colonial economy but could have also led to political upheaval and instability. The famine, the depression, and the fear of economic stagnation and political instability led to a policy that Africans must carry on farming at all costs in order to maintain the economic activity and development of the colony. This policy found legal pronouncement in the late 1920s and legal enforcement in the 1930s, when the government instituted compulsory cultivation of export crops. Even though the decline

in agricultural export prices could have been balanced by a sharp increase in the volume of exports, the administration believed, and perhaps correctly so, that this increase would only have been achieved by reinforcing economic constraints. The administration accomplished this end, however, by enforcing strict divisions of labor between African producers and foreign capital. As this chapter shows, African producers were restricted to the production of produce, at prices fixed by the administration, whereas foreign interests obtained an effective monopoly over the industrial processing of these products and thus were able to profit from the added value.

The history of Rwandan coffee production falls into three phases. The first, from 1920 to 1931, includes the formative years which were characterized by opposition from the Batutsi oligarchy. The second, 1931 to 1937, comprises the administration's successes with the introduction and extension of the product throughout Rwanda. The final phase, although not clearly delineated, ends in 1939, when the industry collapsed from events neither Rwandans nor the colonial administration could control. This chapter will explore only the first two phases. Because the final phase involved events external to Rwanda, it will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

When Voisin decided to extend coffee cultivation in 1931, feasibility studies nor the creation of new technical

facilities were required, because as early as 1920, coffee nurseries had been constructed by the government, and in 1921, 1000 coffee plants were distributed to African farmers. In 1923, officials made every effort to extend coffee growing in the African areas, and they predicted that the first harvest by Bahutu chiefs would be sold in 1924.[1] This forecast demonstrated how little officials knew about coffee, since it takes several years for young trees to bear fruit. With extreme optimism, they proceeded to construct nurseries, to train African monitors, and to distribute coffee plants (about 100,000) in 1923.[2] In 1924, however, drought severely damaged the coffee nurseries created in 1923, and only a tenth of the plants distributed to Africans were able to develop.[3]

Undaunted by this initial setback, the administration purchased 500 kilos of seed to establish new nurseries in each of the residences. It also obtained 12,000 new plants from the Catholic mission at Mibirizi, which were planted in the territory of Cyangugu.[4] In 1924, the government distributed 100,000 young plants, the Catholic missions about 30,000, and several administrative posts lesser quantities. Guatemala, Bourbon, and Robusta were varieties given to African farmers,[5] but the administration ultimately decided to concentrate on Arabica, since it was considered superior to the other species. Furthermore, it was quite sturdy, and thus able to withstand harsh

weather conditions.[6] Total coffee production for both territories was 22 tons in 1924.

In 1925, in a policy shift, Belgian agricultural officials compelled Batutsi chiefs and notables to provide additional land to Bahutu farmers, and they intensified the coffee campaign.[7] However, the former measure enactment did not result in increased production, primarily because there was resistance from some Bahutu who considered the production of coffee as having no immediate contribution to their daily food requirements, and from Batutsi, who failed to implement the instructions, because he believed coffee cultivation was a threat to their power.[8]

In 1926, Territorial agents, either at their own initiative, or with the assistance of Batutsi chiefs, established several nurseries in the provinces of Kihunya, Baganza, Mirenge, and Bumbogo. Officials hoped eventually to distribute coffee plants to Bahutu farmers who had become proprietors of their own land. Similar efforts had produced successful results in Cyangugu territory, where a census revealed that Africans had 30,000 productive coffee plants. Officials were also pleased that the program instituted in Cyangugu had occurred without the use of force.[9] Success in Cyangugu generally and in the mandate specifically encouraged the administration to extend coffee growing to the warmer parts of the country in lower altitude zones.[10]

The mandate produced only ten tons of coffee in 1927, since extremely dry weather conditions and hail had severely damaged coffee trees. Still a large number of nurseries were established around administrative posts, missions, and on the hills during the year.[11] Nor did the disaster disrupt agricultural development plans. Although the administration closed some agricultural facilities, like the experimental agricultural station at Lusungu (closed on February 25, 1927),[12] officials also began to centralize newer stations and expand the functions of existing ones.

A new station, located between Nyanza and Butare in southern Rwanda, was opened at Rubona. Among its many functions was the responsibility of introducing cash and new food crops.[13] After the closing of the Karuzi station in 1935, the administration concentrated all of its efforts at the Rubona station. While the Kisozi station in northern Rwanda was still charged with the selection of wheat, coffee and food plants, specifically suited for the areas of high altitude, the Rubona station was responsible for devising, on a much larger scale, experiments on coffee and on food crops like manioc and sweet potatoes, and with determining whether these crops could be introduced in temperate zones. Rubona also conducted experiments in soil regeneration and in improving the breed of cattle.[14] Although Rubona assumed some responsibility for training African monitors after 1930, in 1927 the Kitega station

in Burundi trained African agricultural personnel as monitors for crops, forestry, and animal husbandry.[15]

In 1928 and 1929, African planters at Butare and Kigali received 15BF per kilo for their coffee. By the end of November 1930, the best varieties of Arabica commanded only 10BF per kilo.[16] The relative decline in coffee prices coincided with the increasing pessimism of some Belgian officials about the future of coffee in the African area. They complained that little progress had been made since 1927, which they attributed to the African complaints that coffee competed with their food production and required too much care.[17] But others, however, were undaunted, and voiced the belief that coffee would one day become a great source of wealth, provided it received government support in terms of technical and scientific assistance, easy transport terms, and limited fiscal and social expenses. They called for more frequent visits to African farms by members of the Agricultural Service, so that the people could be instructed in the proper care of coffee plants. These officials believed that European expertise would improve the yield of agriculture considerably.

To teach African farmers what European called methods of rational cultivation--land and seed selection, sowing in rows and alternate sowing, the proper use and arrangement of compost, irrigation and drainage--agricultural agents were placed in each territory.[18] These officials

concluded that the lack of progress in African agriculture had more to do with adequate care rather than any African attitude. They cited as evidence the stunted growth and high mortality rate of coffee plants after the first harvest.[19] They were also convinced that coffee growing could be profitable despite declining prices. Moreover, the coffee was the principle way of loosening the hold of the traditional political authorities and pastoral and land patrons. At the same time profits from coffee would not only increase the purchasing power of the inhabitants, but it would also have beneficial effects on all commerce, both domestic and foreign.[20]

By 1930 there was further evidence to suggest that coffee could be profitable. During the late 1920s, the world market prices of 20 francs per kilo had encouraged Belgian speculators to invest heavily in Arabica coffee plantations in the Kivu and Ituri. It was then believed that the Kivu could become another Kenya: excellent climate, the condition of the land, and the relative ease in which cheap labor could be recruited were causes for that kind of optimism. Even when the coffee market collapsed several years later, Belgian investors still believed that the price per kilo would eventually reach the pre-war level of 11BF, so companies in the Kivu continued to increase coffee acreage.[21] Similar optimism prevailed with respect to the future of coffee cultivation in Burundi.

Albert Gille, commenting on the participation of Africans in coffee production, noted that demographic and political and psychological factors were ideal and would remain so, as long as the reforms in the traditional political structure were moderated and Europeans supervised all phases of coffee production.[22]

Commercial agriculture, though small in volume, was dominated by Europeans. African production was insignificant, but the administration in Rwanda hoped that both sectors would expand, and was excited when several private groups proposed to finance the extension of African cultivation. Under their plan, technical assistance, coffee seedlings, and tobacco plants would be provided. They had apparently even secured financial assistance from Belgian financiers to back the venture. But the plan collapsed because Brussels believed the proposal was contrary to the United Nations mandate prohibiting privileged commercial concessions. There were, however, other explanations: while the Belgian Foreign Office had already decided to sponsor African commercial agriculture, the colonial apparatus was not yet ready to assume this responsibility, for the reorganization of the administrative structure was still in progress. Also, officials needed time to prepare for Batutsi opposition, which had surfaced in 1927 when Governor Marzorati sought to increase coffee cultivation.[23]

Administrative officials were convinced that the

Batutsi notables would resist any encroachment on their grazing lands, just as the Batutsi believed, with good reason, that Belgian colonialism would lessen their influence and power. In 1925, the administration consolidated the authority of notables through the creation of African tribunals. More importantly and even more threateningly, Belgian authorities prohibited the collection of certain dues in kind and reduced prestations or corvée labor, officially to one day out of seven or fifty-two days per year.[24] In 1926, officials abolished three hierarchical ranks, which, until then, had retained with them certain powers of command which cut across those of the chieftains of the various hills. These ranks had also called for dues on the part of producers to be given to the men who held the positions.[25] The Batutsi saw Marzorati's efforts favoring commercial agriculture as an additional encroachment on their prerogative and political influence, although they did not understand that these actions presaged the dismantling of the tributary mode of production.

Although the administration could anticipate the Tutsi elite's reaction to the introduction of cash crops, they were surprised by the response of Bahutu planters, who refused to add an alien crop to their traditional subsistence pattern. They understood what the administration did not grasp; land was in short supply because of population pressures and soil infertility. More significant were the

limited size of family holdings, the large number of cattle, and the specter of frequent famines. But the administration was confident that the crop was suitable for Rwanda, and for this reason "felt coffee would one day become a great source of wealth."[26] However, for the sake of caution, the cultivation program, initiated by Voisin in 1931, was extended in stages, not only to avoid risks that were inevitably involved in a much greater dispersal effort but to also give the administration time to mobilize its cadre. Moreover, the program was first initiated by chiefs and literate Batutsi, and would be introduced gradually among the Bahutu as African monitors were created to instruct them. Officials also promised to subject coffee to rigorous health standards, and African fields would be supervised by a specialized staff, who would determine the best land to use in order to prevent depreciation of the product. They would classify coffee into categories and mill and process it by modern techniques.[27]

In spite of insufficient technical personnel, Voisin's initial trials were quite satisfactory.[28] During the 1931-1932 coffee campaign, the administration followed procedures used in other parts of East Africa, particularly the clean-weeding process, the use of notables as demonstration agents and model fields of 250 to 1,000 plants.[29] To distribute seedlings and to facilitate the 1931 coffee campaign, thirty agronomists and agricultural agents, with

the encouragement of the governor, supervised the creation of nurseries, planted seedlings, and began to monitor plantations.[30] Free seedlings were distributed and the Agriculture Service supplied demonstrations on mulching techniques, not easy tasks when you consider that thirty agricultural personnel were responsible for both territories, and thousands of African novices were being encouraged to participate in the campaign. To augument its own efforts, the government also relied upon the nurseries of private companies that had adopted the principle of collaboration.[31] To avoid encroaching upon cultivated lands, officials chose to plant coffee on virgin lands and on poor pasture areas. In November 1931, additional coffee seedlings were distributed, and by the end of the rainy season, 448,300 plants were cultivated by African farmers. By the end of December of the following year, Rwandan farmers under administrative supervision, had planted an additional 309,850 coffee plants.[32]

Because notables were indifferent and neglected their coffee crops, initial results were mediocre. There were also logistical, technical, and environmental problems that had to be overcome, especially when fields were located on denuded ridges far away from the notable's homestead. Naturally the failure rate was fairly high,[33] and of the more than 764,000 coffee plants cultivated by December 1932, only 465,000 plants survived. Losses were attributed to

several factors other than exposure. First, thousands of Africans were encouraged to plant without ever having practiced the cultivation of coffee or without having received the promised professional instruction. Consequently, many plants etiolated immediately after planting. Second, others were attacked by parasites--ver gris and mole crickets--which caused a great deal of damage.[34] Severely weakened plants were destroyed, and several fields had to be abandoned entirely.[35] Decaying plants were replaced, while surviving ones were given extreme care. Many were transplanted to an artificial environment and intercalated with albizzatephrosia plants, banana trees, and other leguminous plants to provide shade. Officials instituted terracing on very high slopes and the mulching of coffee fields during the dry season.[36]

From this point on, many believed coffee planting would have satisfactory results.[37] Government officials were buoyed by the spill over effect of the campaign, for the total amount of coffee exported from the mandate in 1931 was 65,147 kilos, and the foreign exchange earned from exports amounted to 322,296BF.[38] Some European planters were more realistic, since they recognized that it would take from six to twelve years before the surviving plants would have serious possibilities.[39] The following year Rwanda produced 70 tons of coffee, and when the 1933 campaign began, about 1,500,000 coffee plants were cultivated

in the first quarter of the year throughout the mandate.[40] Generally these plants were cultivated on the versant of hills or wantonly on slopes, the only available land. Some terracing was arranged to retain rain water and to prevent deep channeling and erosion.[41]

During the 1932-1933 campaign, the administration extended coffee cultivation to the Bahutu farmers. To ensure success the administration sought to simplify planting procedures, and African initiative was severely circumscribed. Monitors, assisted by a European, selected and demarcated fields and staked out the holes for plants. The extreme supervision was a formidable task, for agents travelled from hill to hill to demonstrate the proper planting technique and provide counsel.[42] The territorial agents would also participate in a monthly meeting with the Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs, to discuss food crops and the progress of the coffee campaign and reforestation, prestations and taxes, and new policy pronouncements, regulations and ordinances. During these meetings, African tax collectors were required to verify their accounts, and individual cases were heard and judged.[43]

To facilitate supervision over geographical areas, agricultural personnel grouped individual parcels into tens or hundreds. Instead of concentrating nurseries in the principal urban centers, the Agriculture Service constructed and distributed nurseries throughout the various

provinces. Generally these nurseries serviced one or more hills, and most were built near streams, although placement depended upon the density of the surrounding population. During planting, Bahutu farmers were given between forty-nine and fifty-four plants from the local nurseries and instructed to plant them in a line near their enclosures and among their banana trees or among other shade plants.[44]

Rwandan farmers were also responsible for the construction and maintenance of post nurseries. Bahutu prepared flower-beds, fashioned thousands of poles for cloches, manufactured papyrus mat covers, and collected thousands of baskets of decayed manure. African planters performed these tasks without difficulty, but quite passively, and the construction of bedding baskets, a bottomless basket made from bamboo lath-work and held together by fibres from banana leaves, seemed to tax some people because of the amount of work involved and their other obligations. As a result, the Chief of the Agriculture Service, Mr. Everaerts, abandoned bedding and generalized the method of planting bare roots. This method practiced in Burundi with some success, rationalized the work needed before transplantation. The latter technique was used during the 1933-34 campaign.[45]

Operations were unified further during the 1935-36 campaign, and attempts were made to complete

transplantation from the nurseries to the homestead in one day and when atmospheric conditions were ideal and the sky overcast. If haziness and humidity were ideal, and if rain immediately followed planting, the success rate was generally 90 percent.[46] But weather, of course, could not be predicted, nor did the administration have the manpower. Insufficient European personnel continued to plague the administration's development policy. For example, the number of European personnel available from the 1935-36 campaign was less than in the 1933-34 operation. During the earlier period, sixty-nine Europeans were responsible for administering the territory of Rwanda, in addition to the forty-three Europeans attached to the vice governor general's staff at Bujumbura. There were, however, only twenty-three agricultural personnel, including two agricultural specialists with the governor's staff, responsible to the whole mandate.[47] In the 1935-36 campaign fifty-eight Europeans administered Rwanda, but there were only fifteen agricultural personnel for both territories. Thus officials had little choice but to entrust a greater share of the responsibility for coffee cultivation to their African cadre. As a result, training African monitors was a vital increment in the whole development strategy, despite the administrations reluctance to entrust them with the responsibility for this delicate project. During the late 1930s, African monitors for both Rwanda and Burundi numbered over 500.[48]

The Belgians also instituted guidelines to regulate the processing and sale of African coffee. According to the draft decree, henceforth coffee would be purchased only by those with a special licence, just as processing would require a separate permit. Theoretically, every processor had the right to purchase African coffee in the mandate, but, the government reserved the right to establish a minimum purchasing price to protect Africans from unscrupulous mill owners.[49] In 1933, the government formulated the criteria for determining how the minimum price for coffee would be established. The formula for a minimum price would consider market fluctuations, the conditions of processing mills, machine parts, and production difficulties and it would also be based on one-third of the average value of the market price at Anvers. The minimum quotation would apply only to the freshly picked cerise rather than processed green beans.[50]

With the exception of the purchasing licence and the minimum purchasing price, the commercialization of coffee was otherwise free. As the government believed Africans would sell poorly processed beans, it instituted quality controls,[51] just as it had issued Ordinance No. 90/A.E. of November 21, 1931, to distinguish white-produced coffee from black. The ordinance outlined the packaging and labeling procedure for coffee exported from the Belgian Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda. Coffee had to be placed in sacks of

a particular dimension and marked in large letters of no less than five centimeters high with the following information: name or mark of the planter, plantation, company, or the commercial expeditor of African coffee; "IND" to indicate African brands of coffee; and finally the name of the province. The ordinance did not apply to re-exported coffee,[52] but labeling coffee in this manner was obviously designed to placate the unfounded fears of planters who voiced opposition to African coffee cultivation and who believed the African product would lower market value. However, the government efforts did not stifle European opposition.

By the end of the first quarter of 1933, 1,900,000 plants had been distributed, and by the end of the year 1.5 million had survived. In March and April new nurseries were established, and some six million seeds were sown, but many did not germinate, because sowing had occurred too late. Plants that were quite small at the beginning of the dry season developed slowly, so in November and December, only 400,000 plants were placed in production.[53] However, in the nurseries established in October, more than 10 million seedlings were planted. Germination was perfect, and the officials expected that at least 2.5 million coffee trees would be planted during the 1934-35 agricultural season.[54]

While the administration expanded coffee productions

to generate foreign reserves, it sought to minimize the financial drain on its own treasury, in order to save money. "Colored" clerks and assistants replaced European personnel in the administration for a savings of one million francs. Reductions to European staff continued as ten European civil service posts were eliminated in 1934. Subsidies to religious missions and European agricultural concerns were readjusted,[55] and a new policy of collaboration with European enterprises and investors was devised. On the other hand, the administration claimed it had not reduced expenditures for essential services to blacks, such as medical care, disease eradication, and technical equipment for the coffee campaign.[56]

Nor did depressed conditions thwart the administration's development plans in the mandate or its optimism. Rather, officials concentrated on selected development projects and the completion of existing ones. Construction of the road from Ruhengeri to Kabale in Uganda was still in progress, and the administration anticipated the road would be open to traffic by April 1935.[57] But a number of other public work projects were abandoned or severely curtailed. Consequently the number of Africans employed by the government declined, but there was an almost simultaneous increase in African employment at missions and mining companies. Churches needed African labor because they had extended operations--the Church Missionary Society at

Shyira and the White Fathers at Rwamagana.[58] Mines which had increased production in 1935 needed large amounts of labor, especially the following European firms--Somuki in Kigali, Minetain in Kisenyi, and auriferous mines in the territories of Biumba, Butare, and Muhinga.[59]

Officials also noted that while contract labor was declining, day labor registered steady increases.[60] The elimination of contract labor reflected the unhealthy state of European industrial and commercial enterprises. Savings could be made by hiring day laborers. Salaries also declined, and as Table VIII indicates, the wages of all categories of workers were affected in 1933. In addition to the pay-scales shown in Table VIII, mining companies paid day workers 1.50BF per day; missions paid the same workers .75BF to 2.00BF. Protanag, on the other hand, successfully generalized the piecework method, and instituted the following salary scale in 1933: ground clearing, 2.11BF per day; wood cutting, 1.58BF per day; surveying, 1.7.BF; laborers, 2.40BF per day; spotting, 2.62BF; and planting, 1.46BF.[61] But despite low African wages the administration was extremely optimistic because of the increased mining activities.

A new cassiterite mine opened in 1934 in Kibuye Territory, and the latter supplied workers for the Katumba mine in Neighboring Kisenyi. Between 1200 to 1500 porters were required to transport Katumba's cassiterite to the port at

Table VIII. Salaried Employment in 1933.

Kinds of Work	Salary Scale (francs)
Laborers and Agricultural Workers	1 per day
Masons	6 to 8 per day
Carpenters	6 to 8 per day
Blacksmiths	6 to 8 per day
Painters	5 to 7 per day
Chauffeurs	100 to 400 per month
Clerks	75 to 300 per month
Typists	200 to 800 per month
Cooks	75 to 200 per month
Servants	50 to 150 per month
Roadmen	40 to 100 per month
Capitas-vendeurs	25 to 100 per month

SOURCE: Rapport presente par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Societe des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Annee 1933 (Brussels, 1934), p. 123.

Kibuye.[62] By 1934, Kigali had become the most important mining center in the country, employing 1,800 Africans, 4,000 by the end of 1935, and 6,000 workers in 1936.[63] Mining and the success of the coffee campaign were causes for additional optimism, and they might compensate for the collapse of prices on the world market.

The government believed that African coffee plants were generally well maintained. It noted that those planted on slopes, terraces, or supported by hedges of leguminous plants prevented erosion. Also African monitors traveled extensively throughout the country providing assistance and inspecting fructifications. Officials also remarked that Africans were beginning to understand the benefits of growing coffee, but that African production wasn't equivalent to the number of trees planted,[64] since young coffee trees planted during the 1931-32 campaign had been deflowered in order to prevent the spread of <u>die back</u>; and since the peasant cultivator needed to learn proper production techniques.[65] Officials failed to mention that Africans faced formidable obstacles; that it was extremely difficult to cultivate young plants on rugged terrain, in varying altitude zones, and on a variety of soil types, and that the government's personnel were either ill-suited and often ill-prepared to provide competent assistance to African coffee farmers.

However, the view from the metropole was as optimistic

as that from officials in the colony. For example an article appearing in Courrier d'Afrique, and reprinted in Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge in 1935, reported that the presence of the Agriculture Service had improved coffee production and prevented the development of diseases; nor had the presence of Europeans impeded African coffee growing.[66] In a later piece, Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge was equally complimentary about the government's efforts, though not entirely convinced that the campaign would work, because the government had forced European interests out of Arabica coffee production*. Also officials had rejected all offers of assistance from firms wanting to provide Africans with selected plants, assistance and supervision. While the experiment was both bold and daring, the article also noted that it was still too soon to draw definitive conclusions. This was obviously a lukewarm endorsement, despite what it had acknowledged as "encouraging production figures."

As of January 1, 1934, 1,317 hectares of coffee or 8 percent of the total crop area of both territories was in production, compared to 878 hectares a year earlier. The article, while noting that this was an impressive beginning, remarked that production might prove to be insignificant in the end. The real issue, however, was not African

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*See Chapter VII.

production, because officials had the cooperation of the notables, who enforced quotas and the Agriculture Department, which conducted periodic inspections of African fields. The final proof would be the product, which would be harvested in two to three years. Only then would "we" know if the planting had been perfect and the plants properly cared for.[67]

According to the article, coffee was a delicate crop which demanded extreme care. The slightest neglect would prove fatal, and improper maintenance could become a source of infection for every plant in the region, since mildew from the genre hemileia vastatrix--the most potent larva enemy of the coffee plant--spread quite quickly. Consequently the experiment should not have been implemented without collaboration with European companies. The latter could have supplied enough white agents to monitor African planters and "compel" them to maintain their trees in satisfactory condition. The government lacked sufficient personnel to oversee this phase of African coffee production. And even if the coffee was free of disease, there would still be the problem of harvesting and processing.[68]

The article was obviously an attack on the government, and it supported the European planter interests. There were, to be sure, obvious weaknesses in the government's coffee campaign, but neglect to the point of precipitating an outbreak of <u>die back</u> or hemileia vastatrix was not one

of them. The administration was extremely conscious of planter opposition, and it took pains to prevent the spread of disease. During the 1931-32 campaign young coffee trees were deflorated in order to prevent the spread of die back.[69]

The article's belief that the harvesting and processing of coffee beans would create problems for Africans was more on the mark, but it was easily rectified with time and experience. Coffee berries must be gathered as soon as they mature, as premature harvest or delay cause the beans to lose much of their quality. Since beans do not all mature at the same time, trees require constant inspection. The article questioned whether Africans were capable of providing this kind of care and surveillance. Most African farmers, it asserted, would be content "just" to send their wives or children to the fields, several times, to make a clean sweep of the berries without regard to maturity.[70]

Then there was the problem of processing the beans, either by the dry or wet method. In the former process, extreme care had to be taken not to break the berries; in the wet procedure, one had to determine when fermentation has taken place. The article expressed reservations about the Africans' ability to manage these procedures, noting that the experiment in Uganda had in recent years inspired these reservations. The 1934 coffee crop had been of inferior quality. Although the article acknowledged the government's attempts at quality control, it expressed

the belief that closer collaboration between European companies and African coffee farmers would serve as a far better control mechanism.[71] Given the magnitude of the Belgian coffee campaign, the economic crisis which affected technical requirements, the wide range of soil types and climate where coffee plants were distributed, and the Africans' unfamiliarity with the crop, it was amazing that the end product did not generate even harsher criticism. The reservations about processing procedures were the kind that good farmers would easily resolve, provided coffee was profitable.

As far as the government was concerned, the only real issue remaining was protecting African growers from Asian traders, who it charged with depreciating the real value of the product. Moreover, the Asians lacked suitable processing facilities and tended to mix ungraded coffee. Therefore, officials called for vigilance against exporters of bad coffees.[72] But in some ways both the administration and Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge missed the point entirely. In 1935, Arabica coffee from Belgian Africa just was not selling at Anvers. In fact, very little activity was taking place with either arabica or robusta. Buyers disregarded both varieties in the face of consumer disinterest.[73]

But in terms of African production, the coffee campaign was an unqualified success. Officials could boast

that 15,422,000 coffee trees had been planted in both territories by 1935. The official report to the League of Nations noted that coffee enabled Africans to earn enough money to pay taxes and to buy necessities without leaving the country to work.[74] Table IX shows that in 1932, African taxes accounted for 71 percent of total government receipts, and as the tax tables in Appendix IV reveal, this percentage remained fairly constant throughout the 1930s. The Belgian representative to the League of Nations, Mr. Halewyck de Heusch also told Permanent Commission of the mandates that no distinction was made between coffee coming from African and European planters on the foreign market. Evidently, he was unaware of Ordinance No. 90/A.E., passed in 1931 and implemented on 1 January 1935, which required that the provenance of coffee, whether European and African, be printed on all bags before exportation. Mr. de Heusch told the Permanent Commission that the costs were much higher for European producers than for Africans, and that this was a major factor in the administration's decision to discourage European operations.[75] This was an unusually frank admission that government policy was to limit European participation in coffee production, particularly when it was difficult for white planters to receive a clear statement on the same issue from Brussels.

By the 1936-37 campaign all the kinks in the program were ironed out. However, the administration was still

Table IX. The Principal Tax Receipts in 1932 (in francs)

Tax	Receipts
African head tax	11,000,000
Polygamy tax	550,000
Cattle tax	2,900,000
Income tax	1,300,000
Personal rates and taxes	621,000
Custom receipts	3,500,000

Source: Swan, Economic Situation in the Belgian Congo and the Territories of Ruanda-Urundi to August, 1933, p. 65.

concerned with saving man-hours and transportation time, and generally with reducing work to a minimum, especially in all public work projects associated with the coffee campaign.[76] In the interest of efficiency, a new procedure was introduced with respect to the creation and location of nurseries.[77] One to two malt-houses or hot bed nurseries were established in each chieftaincy. Seedlings or plants were placed in each hot bed, a slight distance apart, or 250 seedlings per square meter, in order to save space (approximately 60 percent). When this phase was completed, each taxpayer was required to build a 2.5 to 3 meters long and 1.5 meters wide flower bed alongside of his homestead (rugo). Once the flower bed was built, farmers were

required to take and transplant a hundred young plants from the administration's new nurseries. Officials believed that with the creation of these individual nurseries, Africans would pay more attention to maintenance, and monitors would pay more attention to instructing farmers on the most rational way to plant their coffee. By the end of the 1936 campaign 8.5 million coffee trees had been planted in Rwanda (see Table X). African production, it was noted, achieved good or excellent results, and Africans received 2.50 to 3.50BF per kilo. The same source also remarked that the campaign was drawing to a close, since regions were becoming saturated.[78] By the final year of the campaign 75 percent of all taxpayers had at least 60 coffee trees.[79] By the end of December 1937, some 21 million coffee trees had been distributed in the following categories: 500,000 to notables, 700,000 to Batutsi sub-chiefs, and 19,000,000 to individual Bahutu taxpayers. Approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Rwandan planters participated in the campaigns.[80]

The administration also continued its efforts to shift the burden of developing the country to the African peasantry, despite signs of economic recovery. In 1937, officials established an African Savings Fund (les caisses des trésorerie), which had all the features of forced savings and seemed to be a veiled supplementary tax for development projects. Each able-bodied adult male was required to pay an assessment of two francs; additional monies came

Table X. The Total Number of Coffee Trees Planted During the Campaigns.

Campaigns	Rwanda	Burundi	Total
Prior to 1931	447,000	110,000	557,000
1931-1932	414,000	156,000	570,000
1932-1933	930,000	850,000	1,780.000
1933-1934*	801,000	884,000	1,685,000
1933-1934**	2,000,000	3,100.000	5,100,000
1934-1935	3,430,000	2,300,000	5,730,000
1935-1936	478,000	797,000	1,275,000
1936-1937	2,150,000	2,233,000	4,383,000
1937-1938	524,000	476,000	1,000,000

SOURCE: Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1935 (Brussels, 1936). p. 134. For the years prior to 1931 to the 1934-1935 campaign.

1935-1936 campaign. "Variétés: les Plantations Indigènes de Café au Ruanda-Urundi." Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Dixième Année, No. 7 (July, 1936), p. 110.

1936-1937 campaign. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l"Année 1937 (Brussels, 1938). p. 141

1937-1938 campaign. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1938. (Brussels, 1939), p. 149.

*The first campaign.
**The second campaign.

from the costs of legal proceedings before the African tribunal. Africans could not use the fund to make personal loans but could only make deposits and withdrawals. The government, however, could use the fund for expenditures related to internal administration and economic development projects in African districts.[81] The fund and the disproportionate taxation of Africans generally prompted the League of Nations to complain about the disparities in taxes between Europeans and Africans, noting that those paid by Europeans had not increased in the same proportion. The Belgian response was a characteristic understatement, that the growth of tax revenues from Europeans "must necessarily be slower." European companies, it explained distributed their dividends a year after profits were reported. Thus, the prosperity of 1936 was actually registered in 1937 when companies paid taxes for the preceding year.[82] Nothing was said about low level of European taxation, nor did the League receive any promise that African taxation would be moderated. Actually, African taxes increased progressively during the Second World War (see Appendix IV).

When the League of Nations collapsed, officials felt even more confident about charging Rwandans for the privilege of creating an infrastructure designed to take "things" out of the country. During World War II, officials established Caisses du Pays. While portions of the head and supplementary taxes were allotted to the Caisses

du Pays, taxes on cattle injections, receipts from the mwami's fund and the territorial tribunals, disciplinary fines, imposed by Batutsi notables, profits from loans made by Caisses du Pays, gifts and subsidies from the government were also deposited. Expenditures for general administration, construction, and improvements and extensions of local roads were paid from Caisses du Pays, while the supplementary funds paid the salaries of personnel in the Agriculture Department, purchased material like pyrethrum, subsidized medical units, the Karuzi farm, and pig breeding operations.[83]

The additional funds may have been instituted to compensate for the absence of European investment, which was minimal in the best of times, but almost non-existent because of the German occupation of Belgium. Or they might have reflected the growth of African income; more likely they stemmed from the needs of a government forced to rely entirely upon its own budgetary resources. With the war, the colony could no longer count upon regular subsidies from a government in exile. Rather than allow the war to complicate development, the administration simply expanded the African tax base. In fact, the government's self-reliance did not begin with the war, but rather had its antecedents in the depression, when the metropole indirectly directed its overseas cadre to solve its own problems. In other words, local Belgian officials were responsible for

the colony's solvency.

By the beginning of World War II, the colonial state completely dominated the economy. It exerted rigorous control over the limited economic surplus and the traditional system. And since ownership of the means of production was invested in the state, control over the utilization of surplus (actually labor) was also concentrated there, through employment opportunities with the state and the production of an agricultural surplus which the state transferred to the capitalist centers in the form of cash crops or coffee production. By maintaining an artificially low level of wages, the state also created the conditions for the continued growth of an economic surplus, which could be contributed to finance the accumulation of capital (in Rwanda's case foreign exchange earnings and African taxes). Compulsory cultivation of coffee and other cash crops proved to be a powerful means of expanding production, and low wage levels promoted the growth of economic surplus, which when exported overseas gained valuable foreign exchange. But compulsion rather than free market agricultural production by Africans permitted the retention of low prices and ensured supplies where the European economy most need them--overseas and on Rwanda's peripheries. It also acted as a regulator for controlling the prices paid to the producer.

Compulsory cultivation was also a powerful means for providing taxation to finance development requirements.

The head and supplementary taxes were linked to the growth of African income. Also increases in purchase prices enlarged the fiscal base during a period of increasing expenditures when officials were obliged to rely entirely on its own budgetary resources, especially taxes on Africans. Thus the system of mandatory crops, the monopoly of the transformation of agricultural goods, and fixing of minimum prices (in practice the real prices paid) for the marketing of industrial products were combined with de facto monopoly of the purchase of agricultural goods. The depression, therefore, gave the State unparalleled importance in the planning and control of the economy. The colonial government was forced to rescue the capitalist economy and its various interests or risk making colonialism appear unprofitable to the metropole. In the course of this rescue operation the burden of the depression was placed squarely upon the non-capitalist African economy, i.e., upon African agriculture, which was sheer exploitation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

[1]"La Rapport sur l'Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1923," Congo, I (January-May, 1924), p. 754.

[2]Ibid., p. 755. Chambre des Representants. Session de 1923-24. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi presenté aux chambres (1924), p. 16.

[3]Chambre des Representants. Session de 1923-24. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi presenté aux chambres (1924), p. 35.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ministere de Colonies. Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté for le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1925 (Brussels, 1926), p. 97.

[6]J. De Ryckman de Betz, "La mise en valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Quatrième Année, No. 8 (April 19, 1930), p. 121.

[7]Rapport 1928, p. 61. Emmanuel Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda du dernier quart du XIX ème siecle a 1950," (Mémoire de Licence, Louvain, 1974), p. 95. Compulsory cultivation, conceived and elaborated by Edmund LePlae during the Ministry of Jules Renkin, was modeled on imperial rule in the Netherland's possessions. It sought to ensure African farmers of a monetary income for tax payments. Bogumil Jewsiewicki. "Notes sur l'Histoire Socio-Economique du Congo," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, III (1927), p. 225. Rapport 1928, p. 61.

[8]Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 98.

[9]CAMP. Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Rapport Annuel [N.D.]. Développement Moral et Social des Indigènes. 3 è Partie: Protection du Travail.

[10]Rwanda and Burundi exported 21 tons of coffee in 1926. Growers received 13.50BF per kilo at the coffee market at Bujumbura. Five tons of the over-all production was shipped to the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika territory received sixteen tons. Rapport 1926, pp. 100 and 105.

[11]Rapport 1927, p. 74.

[12]The Lusungu agricultural station was also responsible for seri culture, and the station was directed by a European agronomical engineer. One hundred Africans were employed on six-month contracts, to maintain the station's fifteen hectares of soja, tobacco, grapefruit, grains, black wattle, mulberry plants, and jutes. Rapport 1926, p. 81 and Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 85.

[13]Rubona possessed one of the two experimental acclimation stations in the mandate territory; the second station was located at Ndendezi in Burundi. However, the latter was closed in 1929, because officials believed the area was not suitable for experimental farming. But because the station had successfully cultivated 7,000 quinquina plants, the Agriculture Service continued to maintain these plants. Rapport 1926, p. 81; Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," p. 85; and Rapport 1929, p. 68.

[14]Rapport 1935, p. 115.

[15]The station maintained coffee nurseries and distributed coffee seeds and saplings for reforestation. Rapport 1927, p. 89.

[16]Rapport 1929, 94 and Georges Van Der Kerken, La Crise Economique en Afrique Belge: Situation Actuelle et Perspective d'Anenir (Brussels, 1931), p. 39.

[17]Rapport 1929, p. 91.

[18]CAMP. Congo Manuscripts. J. M. Derscheid Collection. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport en réponse au questionnaire par le Gouverneur (1929), p. 47.

[19]Rapport 1929, p. 91.

[20]Ruzendana, "L'Evolution du Commerce au Rwanda," pp. 98-99.

[21]Raymond Brock, "Le Café Arabica et le Kivu," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge IX, 1 (January, 1935), pp. 1-2.

[22]Albert Gille, "Les Cultures Indigènes de Café en Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge VIII, (2 February 1934), pp. 22-23.

[23]Edmund Leplae, "Les Plantations de Café au Congo Belge au Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-1935), leur Importance," Institut Royal Colonial Belge mémoire 8, III (1936), pp. 219-220.

[24]Rapport 1924, pp. 10-12 and Rapport 1925, p. 83.

[25]LePlae, "Les Plantations de Cafe au Congo Belge," p. 220.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Rapport 1930, p. 107.

[28]G. Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement de la Culture du Caféier (Arabica) chez les Indigènes du Ruanda-Urundi," Le Materiel Colonial A.S.B.L., 27° Année, No. 6 (March, 1937), p. 163.

[29]"Le Culture de Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Huitième Année, No. 1 (January, 1934), p. 13.

[30]Edmund LePlae, "Les Plantations de Café au Congo Belge," p. 220. Also the State's agronomists were young men with very little training. J. DeRyckman de Betz, a representative of the Syndicate Agricole des Cafés du Kivu, recommended that trained personnel from the Netherlands or Britain be brought to the colony, as was done in the Kivu by Saak. J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Quatrième Année, No. 4 (February 22, 1930), 52, and J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," p. 122.

[31]"Caféier Arabica du Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

[32]Ministère des Colonies. Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1932, (Brussels, 1933), p. 113.

[33]Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement," pp. 166-7.

[34]"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

[35]Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement", p. 167.

[36]Ibid.

[37]"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

[38]Belgium received 59,229 kilos of coffee, valued at 280,396,BF; France, 100 kilos at 475BF; Tanzanyika Territory, 4,034 kilos at 25,381BF; Uganda, 1484 kilos at 14,844BF; and Zanzibar, 300 kilos at 1,200BF; Rapport 1931, p. 130.

[39]"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

[40]Ibid.; Rapport 1932, p. 113.

[41]"Caféier Arabica au Ruanda-Urundi," p. 13.

[42]Rapport 1933, p. 145.

[43]Rapport 1934, p. 69.

[44]Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement," pp. 167-68.

[45]The method of planting was extremely hazardous, especially in areas of irregular and dry climate in the central and eastern regions of Rwanda. Ibid., pp. 168-170-171.

[46]Ibid., pp. 169-170.

[47]Rapport 1933, p. 145.

[48]Between 1931 and 1938 an average of 65.8 Europeans served in the Rwandan administration and in the same period Europeans in the Agricultural Service ranged between 10 and 23 for both territories. Rapport 1931, p. 15; Rapport 1932, pp. 18 and 20; Rapport 1933, pp. 23 and 26; Rapport 1934, p. 26; Rapport 1935, pp. 29 and 32; "Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1937), p. 187; Rapport 1936, pp. 21-22 and 24; "Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1938), p. 225; Rapport 1937, pp. 26-7 and 119; "Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (Jan.-May, 1939) p. 101; Rapport 1938, pp. 25-26, 28, and 128-29.

[49]Rapport 1933, p. 145.

[50]"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour le Séance du jeudi 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May, 1933), p. 65.

[51]Rapport 1933, p. 145.

[52]Rapport 1934, p. 263.

[53]Rapport 1933, p. 145.

[54]Ibid., p. 146.

[55]Rapport 1934, pp. 33-34.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Rapport 1933, p. 122.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Rapport 1935, p. 123.

[62]Ibid., p. 71.

[63]Caféier par les indigènes du Ruanda-Urundi," p. 23

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid.

[66]"Variétés," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 4 (April, 1935), p. 61. This notice also confirmed that Rwandan coffee initially sold on the market was often of inferior quality and "presented badly." But after the institutions of controls on exported coffee, these problems were eliminated and the quality improved greatly.

[67]"La Politique du Café dans les Territoires sous Mandat," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 8 (August, 1935), pp. 123-34.

[68]Ibid., p. 124.

[69]Rapport 1933, p. 122.

[70]"La Politique du Café dans les Territoires sous Mandat," p. 124.

[71]Ibid.

[72]"Declarations de M. Le Gouverneur General Ryckmans," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

[73]C. J. Alloncius, "Le Marché du Café a Anvers, 12 Novembre 1935, "Rapport de la Banque Belge d'Afrique," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

[74]"Déclarations de M. le Gouverneur Général Ryckmans," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 12 (December, 1935), p. 185.

[75]"La Culture du Caféier par les Indigènes du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Dixième Année, No. 3 (March, 1935), p. 34.

[76]Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement," p. 171.

[77]Additional quality controls were also instituted in 1937 by the Service de l'Agriculture for coffee exported abroad. Also an Ordonnance loi, issued in 1937, prohibited the shipment of green coffee beans containing excess moisture. On March 16, 1937, the Governor General's Ordinance No. 34/A.E. was passed. It established standards for quality control and the packaging of exported unripe coffee. Article II prohibited the exportation of the following kinds of coffees: unripe, musty coffees; unripe coffees containing rotten beans and possessing a nauseous odor; unripe coffees with more than 2 percent foreign materials; and unripe coffee with more than 10 percent black beans. Article III authorized the export of unripe coffees with more than 6 percent broken beans, and provided that the coffee sack carried the notation "brisures" in capital letters at least 5 centimeters high. The latter were governmental responses to European opposition to African coffee. Rapport 1939, pp. 141 and 215-216.

[78]"Variétés: les Plantations Indigènes de Café au Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Dixième Année, No. 7 (July, 1936), p. 110.

[79]Molitor, "L'Introduction et le Développement," p. 172.

[80]Rapport 1937, p. 141. "Superficie des Plantations de Caféiers au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 1 (January, 1935), p. 12.

[81]Rapport 1937, p. 71.

[82]Ibid., p. 57

[83]Ministère des Colonies, Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant les Années 1939-1944 (Brussels, 1947), p. 35.

CHAPTER SIX

EXPLOITATION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Rwandans responded to colonial rule as did other Africans. Batutsi opposed colonial penetration and consolidation. During the imperial phase both Batutsi and Bahutu rebelled against Belgian hegemony. Even during the depression, there were instances of Rwandan noncompliance with Belgian rule. In 1930 chiefs in Kisenyi refused to follow orders and to participate in the economic development of the region.[1] The following year the Deputy at Gitebe informed the Resident at Kigali that Bahutu in the region north of Budaha had refused to help repair the administrative office in the district of Kibuye, and, he reported that tax collection was proceeding with difficulty.[2] His comments portended the disturbance which occurred in 1932, when Bahutu in northern Rwanda led a tax revolt to protest their treatment at the hands of Batutsi tax collectors.[3] Before the revolt was crushed by Batutsi forces, twenty Bahutu protestors had fought a pitched battle with an equal number of Batutsi combatants, six households had been burned to the ground, and several head of livestock, some food, and personal affects had been confiscated.[4] In 1935,

another tax incident occurred at Kabaya in Kisenyi territory, where military forces occupied the area for non-payment of taxes.[5]

That same year and during the month of March, some 300 to 400 highlanders (Bahutu from Ruhengeri most likely), led by an old clan elder, unexpectedly presented themselves before a dispensary in Nyanza Territory (on the Central Plateau) and refused vaccination, charging that the Batutsi had poisoned the vaccine. They invaded the compound and held some Batutsi prisoners until they had an audience with the mwami, who was able to calm them and secure the release of the prisoners. The next day, the police occupied the compound and arrested the demonstrators.[6] Obviously, they were protesting Batutsi over-rule and European intrusion into their lives.

The boldness of the northerners was expected, for they had a reputation for independance and daring and for resisting both Batutsi and Belgian consolidation. But the episode must have been an unusual spectacle for the permanent denizens of Nyanza, where calm and caution were expected modes of behavior. One could expect incidents to occur in the north, on the periphery of the country, where Batutsi concentration and administrative presence were minimal. On the other hand, little or no resistance, or for that matter, response came from the Bahutu coffee planters in the central area, and especially from those living in

Butare Territory for fear of reprisals. While those interviewed expressed grievances against the Batutsi and the Belgians, and admitted that social tension existed on the hill between Batutsi and Bahutu, their responses also demonstrated that they did not act upon these feelings or tensions, for fear of annihilation or harsher punishment. Fear kept some Rwandans subservient.

Prior to the colonial period, Rwandans were differentiated by economic functions--the Bahutu as agriculturalists and the Batutsi as pastorialists. During the imperialist phase, a new division was superimposed, so that by the 1930s a capitalist and pre-capitalistic economy existed together. Western ideas and cash crop production accentuated existing differences. Clientship and corvée obligations denoted class inferiority and extended social distance. The Bahutu and Batusi communities were further fractured by relations of domination and exploitation, and ethnic cleavages.

The incident involving northern Bahutu at the dispensory, however, suggest that the concepts of class and class consciousness varied throughout Rwanda. Because northerners did not have the same closeness and duration of contact with the Batutsi as the Bahutu of central Rwanda, they were substantially different in the way they perceived themselves and the Batutsi. The northerners had greater clan solidarity, more cultural pride, and a deeper attachment to

their political institutions. But more important, heritage of messianic activity resulting from the imposition of both Batutsi and European over-rule gave the northern Bahutu a greater sense of class consciousness. Also early in the nineteenth century, northern Rwanda had been the birthplace of the spirit-possession Nyabingi cult.[7] The latter solidified class consciousness and produced a tradition of protest in northern region.

Nyabingi, meaning one who possesses great riches, is believed to have been the title of a murdered Queen of Karaqwe who reigned in the eighteenth century. According to one tradition, the Nyabingi sect served as the vehicle through which the queen's spirit enacted vengeance upon her murderers and other disloyal subjects. Consequently, the Nyabingi evolved into a magico-religious sect acting primarily as a protecting authority against the Batutsi and Europeans for its devotees. A British authority and colonial civil servant with firsthand knowledge of the sect reported that one outstanding feature of the cult's methods was the alleged power of self-transformation of personality and appearance exercised by its individual priests.[8] The cult's rapid development in northern Rwanda was closely related to the expansionist drive of mwami Rwabugiri in the late-nineteenth century. Later the Nyabingi added opposition against established authority, and in particular against Batutsi to its magico-religious trappings.[9] The

cult also provided various political fugitives from the court of mwami Musinga with an organizational base against the ruling dynasty. Muhumasa achieved political authority in Ndorwa through the Nyabingi, and she also managed to "bend to her will all but the most courageous and independent characters among the northerners." It was also through the Nyabingi that Ndungutse recruited his large following at Kiga. Over time, the sect transferred much of its hostility from Batutsi to Europeans, causing British, Belgian and German officials countless problems at the outbreak of the First World War.[10]

The climate of messianic unrest experienced by the northern population made them all the more receptive to forms of protest against established authority. The constraints originating from the "external" forces of control --Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs--were difficult to endure. Something of a vicious cycle developed; the northern Bahutu were from the outset psychologically conditioned to rebel against the power of the chiefs, who, in turn, were given greater freedom of repression than was ordinarily tolerated, which only invited further attempts at rebellion. The stringency of chiefly rule under the mwami made rebellion all the more probable, once any violence occurred.[11] At the same time, repression united the northern Bahutu into effective action.

The Bahutu on the central plateau, in contrast, were

marginalized. They did not function as an integrated mass. While they obviously attributed their plight to the "objective functioning of the system," they were inhibited from effective action by feelings of inferiority. They may well have believed that the Batutsi were more intelligent, refined and courageous, and that Bahutu were dim-witted, gross and cowardly. Thus the corollary proposition was that Batutsi were born to rule and the Bahutu to be ruled.[12] And because many of the Bahutu probably saw themselves through the eyes of the Batutsi, they had little incentive to compete with the overlords. Hence the attitude of sullen resignation and passive obedience. Still, they were conscious of themselves as an oppressed class and recognized the reality of their repression. But instead of changing this reality, they consciously accepted the roles allotted to them, that is, their caste position.[13] Nowhere is this sense of inferiority more prevalent than in the actual words of the coffee planters interviewed in 1978.

Each of those interviewed had planted coffee in the early 1930s and 1940s, and most of them had planted about fifty-four plants.[14] In almost every instance, coffee also occupied the smallest planting surface, with food crops, manioc, and banana groves occupying larger plots. Most of the informants believed that if coffee occupied a much larger area, "they would die of hunger."[15] Most were plagued by the memory of recent famines and the scarcity

of land. As one planter put it,

> it was very dangerous to cultivate just coffee during this particular time; after I received my property I planted coffee on the smallest portion [plot], and reserved the largest portion to food crops.[16]

Only those planters willing to rent or to purchase land or to become land-clients felt secure enough to increase coffee acreage.[17]

Available land, either reclaimed marsh areas, abandoned fields or unoccupied lands, was secured from the hill or local chief through leasing or from a Batutsi patron as a land-client. Leasing (or ukwatisha) a field for crops conferred permanent possession but not ownership, since the land could not be sold to foreigners without the chief's consent. However, the land could be exchanged with a neighbor (ukugurara umulima) without the chief's permission. Scheduled rental fees either commenced after the first or second year of occupation, depending upon whether the land conferred was virgin or developed. Payment could be made in tools, produce, livestock, beer, or a few days of work.[18] Where land was purchased, no compensation was made to the hill chief, nor were rental fees paid to the previous landowner. However, if someone requested land but did not wish to purchase it, he simply consented to or agreed to pay all the rental fees to the chief or to the private individual who granted him usufruct rights.[19]

To become a land-client, a Muhutu entered into an

arrangement where he agreed to perform certain services (some say for two years or more), either domestic or personal, for a Mututsi in exchange for the use of a parcel of land. If the arrangement lasted or if one was able to maintain his patron's "amitie," the Muhutu acquired permanent ownership of the land. To seal the bargain, the client offered the patron either some well-prepared pots of beer, a portion of the harvest, or a cow, the gift depending on the size of the land involved.[20] However, fealty in exchange for land was bothersome because "you had to do everything he asked, go everywhere he wanted to go, and give him pots of honey beer."[21] The latter was extremely irksome, because honey beer required long preparation and was reserved for special occasions.

Actual land purchases were quite common throughout Rwanda, but were very rare among my poor informants. Besides tax obligations, which were considerable (if one had additional wives and cattle),[22] planters used surplus income to pay workers engaged in their fields, to purchase clothing and food for the family members, livestock (including cows) and farm implements, and to improve their homes.[23] However, most of the informants agreed that even with additional land they would increase food crops and banana groves (the latter being a more stable source of additional income) in the same proportions as their original holdings.[24] None specialized solely in coffee production: the risks

were much too great. Nor was there much incentive for them to do so, since there were no farm loans for African farmers or "commoners" despite the administration's insistance that such funds were available.[25] Most of the farmers interviewed had never heard of agricultural loans; others maintained that only chiefs or "great men" had access to them.[26] Presumably the "greats" had more security or assets than did peasant farmers. But of even greater consequence was the allocation of labor and time, and the unsavory aspects of compulsory cultivations: subsistence farmers performed traditional obligations for the chiefs and forced labor (akazi) for the administration.

For the most part, coffee did not require more time than other crops. In cases where poor quality soils or plot size required more time most planters said their efforts were usually compensated at harvest time by the money received for the crop. The more prosperous farmers praised coffee highly, and they stressed that they did not neglect their trees. Most devoted between one to two days per week to care for them and spent the remainder of their time (or with the assistance of family members in most instances) tending to other crops--their own and frequently those of the Batutsi. One farmer maintained that while the initial planting was time consuming (i.e., in weeding and mulching), if properly maintained coffee required less attention. But a few, especially those with poor quality soil and

smaller family units, believed that the money received from coffee was not commensurate with the amount of time and effort invested. Therefore, it was time which could be used elsewhere. Another planter compared his planting duties to a form of corvée labor, and because of it, fled the country for Uganda.[27] If one considers the added productive burden imposed by the Belgian and the traditional chiefs, then the monetary reward does not appear equitable. They were expected to perform various tasks for Batutsi patrons and for Batutsi who were not patrons. These tasks took a surprising amount of the farmer's time. Several farmers voiced the unjustice of it, when they remarked that,

> we worked in their coffee fields daily, while we planted or tended to our own coffee trees, only one or two days a week. We also carried their litters, often as far as Bujumbura [Burundi].[28]

The system was, indeed, unfair: chiefs and sub-chiefs had the most extensive fields and the added advantage of Bahutu labor.[29] Naturally, social tensions and resentment on the hills between Batutsi and Bahutu increased. Some Bahutu begin to question traditional values, and the social hierarchy, the traditional personal bonds, and the old prestige were no longer accepted without question. In fact, the masses of Bahutu began to discuss, criticize and, at the same time, to demand reform and abolition of all injustices.[30] Some even questioned the role of the mwami, Because he no longer seemed supreme, especially in the

presence of whites, who tended to treat the mwami with disrespect, at best, or as an equal.[31] Irregardless of emerging protest, the exactions inflected upon Bahutu were extremely burdensome. The Batutsi oligarchy, as one chief put it, "continue to suck the muscles from us,[32] a proper assessment when you consider that farmers had their own households and enclosures to maintain and to keep in repair.

A typical household or compound (rugo) required a tremendous amount of productive effort to maintain as well. Often built in the middle of a field, it consisted of one or more houses, a granary, and perhaps a stable or an old house used as a beermaking shed, all surrounded by an enclosure made of a growing hedge. The typical productive household generally consisted of a nuclear family: father, mother, and their offspring. But often among the children could be found some of the father's brothers' children or the children of a daughter or of a sister of the household head for whom the bride's price had not been paid. Others in the household might include parents and/or grandmother, or even his wife's parents. The mother usually had her own hut within the compound or nearby, as would the household head's grown, but unmarried sons. A married man could also have unmarried "brothers" and "sisters" in his compound.[33]

Women took care of the household in general and of the children. In addition, they performed light duties in the fields. The farmers built their own houses, granaries, and

enclosures and kept them in repair. Besides weaving large storage baskets, they gathered the water and bunches of bananas necessary for beermaking, and they made the beer. Banyarwanda cared for the cattle, goats and sheep,[34] and they tended their own fields. Frequently the farmer and members of his family performed these same tasks for Batutsi.

Proceeds from coffee did not compensate for the added productive burden imposed by Belgian imperialists either. Many of the informants associated Belgian rule with an increased work load: "we grew their coffee, planted their forests and built their roads without pay."[35] In 1944, residents were also empowered to compel Banyarwanda occupying farm land or pasture land, to plant hedges and ditches, as anti-erosion measures.[36] Belgian rule reduced many Banyarwanda to "l'état de machine de travail." Many lamented that "we wake up early in the morning working for them; we had very little time to do our work."[37] But the most odorous aspect of compulsory work was forced labor (akazi), or public work projects, which Bahutu described as "strenuous" and "difficult."[38]

Rwandans were forced to work on roads (most informants could recall the Kigali-Gitarama-Butare road project), reforestation and terracing, or they transported bricks for the construction of administrative offices. One farmer remarked that each person had to transport 100 bricks in the

morning; "the sub-chiefs forced us to carry them."[39] While they were not paid for their labor, they did receive compensation:

> they beat us and we were watched so that we would not abandon these projects and leave the country. I went there to protect my family. No one could escape these projects. These projects took place everywhere.[40]

Physical punishment wasn't an exaggeration. All the informants emphasized this aspect of akazi. One farmer summarized the feelings of quite a few when he remarked,

> I trimmed anti-erosion hedges; I planted for important Batutsi and in tree plantations. These projects were directed by a chief or a sub-chief. Everyone had his own parcel and if an individual could not do both he was severely beaten. I performed these projects from my youth until the day of independence (1962).[41]

There were never any exceptions because akazi was the law, and Rwandans believed Belgians had the power to enforce it. In fact, no one dared to contest either the power of the Belgians or Batutsi for fear of being harmed or beaten unmercifully.[42] Instead of protesting, "we did what we were told, that way we had no trouble from the Belgians.[43] But the fact is they had no choice but to comply since "one either faced either the Belgians or the Batutsi," or both. White administrators were the judges, and their decisions were transmitted by chiefs who had daily contact with the African farmers. Many informants maintained that

the Batutsi continued to humiliate them, despite the Belgians and their reforms.[44] Some even contended that the Belgian presence only intensified the harshness of Batutsi rule and enabled them to "posture."[45]

The Batutsi had a lot to lose if they did not comply with administrative demands. They cultivated the best lands, and they had access to an extremely large work force, which helped them to increase their personal wealth. Under Belgian law, they could command corvée labor, and they also had access to prestations from land rentals. Food was the most common form of payment, but they could also receive honey, beer, hoes, hides and manufactured objects like mats and baskets. They possessed large herds, which they could distribute among their Batutsi and Bahutu retainers. Some owned spacious homes constructed of grass, and by 1933, others already lived in houses constructed of baked bricks and covered with tiles. A few even owned automobiles and motor bikes.[46] Because of their position in the administration (and even before the arrival of Europeans), most Batutsi led a life without any anxieties from a material standpoint. However, all of these advantages could be lost if one were suddenly dismissed by the administration for unsatisfactory performance. Consequently Batutsi chiefs ran roughshod over the Bahutu to satisfy administrative demands.

While there was never any violent opposition to coffee

planting or Belgian rule, some Bahutu emigrated rather than accept compulsory cultivation. But flight could have extreme consequences, for sometimes the lands of emigrants could be confiscated by the chiefs. It must have been a common practice, because in 1937, the administration permitted emigrants to transfer or sale their fields to family heads or clan members. These transfers or sells were recorded with the Provincial Tribunal, and the assignments included fields used for both crops, pasture and coffee. If, however, an African abandoned his fields without informing his sub-chief or without selling or transferring the land to another African, then the property could be confiscated.[47]

While it cannot be determined how many Bahutu were forced to leave because of difficulties, the general impression is that the Belgians and the Batutsi cadre had the country pretty much under control: those who refused to plant coffee were punished severely;[45] those who were uncooperative were either shunned or forced into exile by the overseers or the chiefs.[49] Other recalcitrants were chased from "their birthplace" if by chance they incurred ill-feeling from whites or the chiefs. The same respondents expressed the futility of his condition when he said:

> . . . so you can see, there was no trouble on the hill with respect to coffee. Anyway people preferred to plant coffee rather than do compulsory or akazi labor.[50]

An informant from Zivu hill in the sector of Shyanda remarked that rebellion would have been suicide; rather than plant coffee "some just left the country."[51] But the general feeling is that Rwandan farmers "were resigned" (sommes resignés), and the Belgians were very much aware of it. In much of their ethnographic literature and administrative reports submitted to the League of Nations, Belgians characterized the Mahutu as a "docile" peasant "who was stubborn and suspicious, taciturn and placid, but capable of fierce obstinancy under the appearance of a passive resignation."[52] As one farmer put it, "we were accustomed to obeying orders, so we did not resist; we were accustomed to doing things without much reasoning."[53] Others were simply afraid or perhaps just realistic:

> How can you protest against someone more powerful than you? The rulers bring you whatever he wishes, makes you do whatever he wants . . . ." We didn't have the choice of agreeing or not agreeing. We had not to judge, but to obey their orders because they were stronger than we.[54]

One planter admitted to destroying coffee and planting banana trees in retaliation for a severe beating. But he had to take refuge in the Belgian Congo, and those who followed his lead were also forced to flee to Burundi or to British territories.[55] Others blamed the chiefs and the mwami for not exercising leadership or for collaborating; some, the absence of weapons, fear or self-interest.[56] But only one

of my informants seemed to have assessed the situation properly:

> The Belgians joined force with the Batutsi, so we were powerless to revolt. Besides we were accustomed to forced labor and planting coffee was the same as all others.[57]

Bahutu were certainly overburdened, even if wives, children and family members helped to minimize the burden. The majority of the informants had to augment their subsistence with cash income from other sources in order to meet basic family needs. Every effort was made to find additional income. The Banyarwanda needed money to pay the administration's head tax, and if he had a second wife, then he had to pay a polygamy tax. His tax burden increased if he had cows, for which he had to pay a cattle tax. Moreover, Rwandans might want cash to buy items from the world markets which were substitutes for essentially traditional goods, such as hoes, machetes, and clothing. He needed money to buy items of secondary importance, such as salt, soaps, European type beer, bicycles, or to pay school fees, purchase kerosene and imported palm oil. Coffee production alone rarely furnished sufficient money for these cash expenditures. Therefore, many sold their labor locally if they could or went abroad if they could not. Those who remained at home took jobs with the administration, became teachers in mission schools, carpenters in the building trades, or policemen for the chieftaincies.

Others traded food products or homemade utensils such as mats or baskets. Many found employment with the agricultural and medical services, or as road and mine workers, the latter being the most preferred since such work generated a higher cash income than agricultural labor.[58]

Those who did not have money to pay taxes or were unable to feed their families hired themselves out as day or contract workers in the urban centers.[59] Where no local opportunities for work existed, a Banyarwanda exported his labor. Those on the eastern border might go to Buhaya in Tanganyika, or to Uganda, which, for some was easier of access, although much further afield. Those closer to the western border went to the Kivu to find work. However, the majority of the informants either relied upon their children to earn additional money or resorted to selling food crops and livestock to supplement their income. Besides beans and vegetables, the most common source of additional income was bananas. Some claimed they earned between 200 and 1000 francs per month from the sale of bananas or banana beer.[60]

The Batutsi on the other hand, comprised two distinctive types of elite, associated with different periods of history. These elite categories included traditional and non-traditional elements. The traditional elite were a small number of chiefs and many more sub-chiefs, who were almost totally lacking in education, but because of ties

to the traditional system did not lack wealth. In contrast, the non-traditional elite were those who had received substantial western education and almost in consequence relative wealth. They were much younger than their traditional counterparts. As a result, substantial differences of attitude prevailed among them, but ethnic composition strengthened their sense of solidarity and class consciousness, in spite of the government's preference for the younger generation. From the early 1930s onwards, Belgian officials used the young Batutsi as reservoir of skilled manpower that replaced "backward, incompetent or refractory chiefs."[61] An additional source of solidarity among Batutsi, according to LeMarchand, stemmed from their shared consciousness of belonging to a cultural elite whose claims to superiority were inscribed in the history of Rwanda. Higher education strengthened their claims to deference, and it gave them the means to write about their own culture, to evaluate it in the light of other cultures and, ultimately to give it new meaning. In this fashion, the Batutsi were able to inculcate a sense of cultural pride and unity among various sections of the Batutsi stratum.[62]

Batutsi administration was extremely harsh, and the general impression conveyed by Bahutu informants and the records is that the lot of the masses was unquestionably worse under Belgian rule than at any time in the past. Few Belgians, however, would have conceded this fact

without drawing attention to the "positive" side of the record, or without emphasizing "the advantages" derived from the importation of Pax Belgica, from the construction of roads, hospitals and dispensaries; from improvements in the quality and quantity of food crops and the margin of economic security this provided for the peasant masses. But if those were indeed appreciable gains, their costs in terms of human labor, taxation and regimentation was extremely heavy. When added to customary tithes, tributes, corvées, the "civilizing" aspect of the Belgian presence made the rule of the Batutsi chiefs a singularly uncivilized one. Those chiefs whom the administration rated as "elite" or "excellent" were also those who were the object of the greatest resentment from the masses of Bahutu. Furthermore, the Batutsi monopoly of chiefly positions exacerbated ethnic tensions in two ways: their awareness of both the advantages and inconveniences of their role made the Batutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs remarkably status conscious as a group vis-a-vis the Bahutu masses; and because they were looked upon as agents of the European administration, the Batutsi chiefs were generally held responsible by the peasantry for all the hardships and sufferings associated with colonial rule.[63]

Economic recovery in the late 1930s could not have been accomplished without Batutsi assistance. They mobilized labor resources and work crews, and they supervised

crop production. The Belgian report of 1937 affirms the success of their efforts to implement economic recovery, when it noted that Butare's economic improvement stemmed from the extension of coffee production and the sale of foodstuffs to the mines at Kabulantwa in Bujumbura and to the Nyongwe mines in Cyangugu.[64] Because of Batutsi efforts or administration and Belgian over-rule, Ruhengeri emerged as the most important center for food production, and the report for that year remarked that all disposable land was being cultivated. The territory had even outproduced other areas in coffee: 400 tons of the 1200 tons exported in 1937 came from Ruhengeri.[65] Through mobilization efforts, more and more Bahutu were employed by the mines--7,000 were employed as non-permanent laborers by mining companies in Kigali. In 1938 these same workers were replaced by 3,432 permanent workers, engaged under contract,[66] indicating that companies were willing and could afford to pay higher wages to stabilize their labor force. These signs of economic growth persisted throughout the year: Cyangugu territory furnished 250 tons of food for the mining center at Nyongwe in 1938.[67] Large quantities of food were purchased by local tradesmen in Ruhengeri and by company officials for their mines in Kigali.[68] Signs that prosperity had trickled down to the lowest levels were evident, when officials remarked that Bahutu farmers used their access to greater resources,

like the sale of coffee, cotton, and foodstuffs to become owners of cattle. Officials also noted that exceptional coffee growers would earn more than a thousand francs a year.[69]

Still the Mututsi role as administrator could be extremely precarious, especially when economic conditions declined. For example, in 1938, more than 22 million coffee trees were planted and production amounted to 3,000 tons. Signs of economic deterioration were evident: prices on the world market were still quite low; parchment coffee experienced a 40 percent decline while unparched coffee decreased by 37 percent. These low quotations caused Bahutu interest to wane.[70] In fact Africans were quite reluctant to care for any crop that did not have an immediate bearing on the all too recent danger of famine,[71] and declining prices for agricultural commodities only made things worse. Consequently, the Batutsi were required to monitor the masses quite closely, as a result brutality and harshness increased. To counteract African apathy, the Agriculture Department tried to improve the efficiency of African plantations by fertilizer, mulching, and by cutting down unproductive trees.[72] Officials also used force and penalties for those who failed to produce or assist in the production effort. Batutsi officials were fined for failing to provide adequate supervision of coffee trees and for failing to inspect the quality of coffee brought

to the markets by Bahutu farmers under their jurisdiction. Fines were also levied against notables who failed to have their people mulch coffee fields,[73] and the ultimate penalty was dismissal.

Exactions and supervision became more intense during the Second World War. When the German Army invaded Belgium on May 10, 1940 and the Belgian Army was forced to surrender on May 27, the Rwandan peasants were affected directly. Economic mobilization for Rwanda and Burundi and the Belgian Congo commenced in the Fall of 1940 when the Anglo-Belgian agreement was concluded. In order to provide the allies with such necessities as tin and rubber, production levels had to be increased and African labor mobilized.[74] In Rwanda, both cassiterite, used in the manufacture of tin, and tin mining were greatly extended in the west and northeast regions of the country and in the territory of Kigali. The principle mining societies--Minetain, Somuki, Mirudi, Mindfor and Georuanda--produced 12,454 tons of cassiterite between 1940 and 1944.[75] Related to the growth in production was the necessary increase in farming for the internal markets (i.e., to feed the workers in the mineral centers of both Rwanda and the Belgian Congo) and the mobilization of labor to produce for the war effort. War production was extremely demanding: African males living in traditional areas were obliged to devote a total of sixty days a year to paid and unpaid work of importance to

his local community. By 1944 obligatory labor had increased to 120 days a year.[76]

Because of war mobilization peasant life began to deteriorate. The administration demanded labor for reclamation of swamps (to make more productive land available), clearing roads and construction. In addition to these demands there were the continuous burdens of compulsory food and cash crops. Moreover, the Batutsi continued to squeeze the maximum in ubuletwa and corvée labor from the Bahutu. But the oligarachy was not completely exempted; their cattle were requisitioned to provide for meat and milk. Also the effect of pegging cattle prices at a level below their market value prevented owners from receiving a fair return for their cows. Cattle requisitions during the war enriched Belgian middlemen and impoverished Batutsi cattle owners.[77] Not only did Banyarwanda have to contend with these exactions, but they also had to compete for space with European colonists. Between 1940 and 1947, the number of European agricultural settlers rose from 42 in 1940 to 137 in 1947 in both Rwanda and Burundi.[78] Land concessions for European agriculturalists also rose from 2,679 hectares to 7,552 hectares in the same period.[79] According to the administration, European colonists came to Rwanda and Burundi to participate in the cultivation of pyrethrum which was important during the war. Others attributed the increase in European settlers to the importance assumed by the town

of Costermansville, situated in the immediate vicinity. The town needed supplies and timber which Europeans in Ruhengeri, Biumba, Kisenyi, and Cyangugu furnished.[80]

As Rwanda was pressed to become economically viable, Bahutu became increasingly resentful of Belgian rule. Yet they did not rebel. Revolutionary consciousness (or class consciousness) and an intellectual cadre had not yet developed, and would not materialize until after the war.[81] Instead, the Bahutu put up with hard work, discomfort, and the lack of freedom. They accepted the order of nature and believed that things would always remain the same. Revolution was remote or impossible, because of Belgian power and Batutsi over-rule. Those who might have led the Bahutu were quickly disposed of by the Belgian authorities. For example, Musinga might have served as a focal point of struggle, especially when he reportedly hailed the German invasion of Belgium as the end of colonial government. But when a number of Batutsi began to take a renewed interest in Musinga, he was hastily deported to the Belgian Congo.[82]

Drained and weakened by three years of wartime mobilization, customary and unofficial corvée labor and other exactions, Rwanda succumbed in 1942 to a famine that cost the lives of at least 300,000 people. Traditional foodstuffs (i.e., peas, sweet and ordinary potatoes) were blighted by mildew and destroyed by a severe drought and by insects. An epidemic of typhus brought Rwanda to near paralysis.

Food reserves were quickly exhausted. The administration poured in and transported about thirty-two million francs in emergency food supplies, which comprised about thirty percent of all receipts for both territories.[83] By mid-1944, the famine abated, partially in response to a large manioc harvest and to a compulsory food-crop program enacted by the government in 1943,[84] but deaths from famine did not stop until July.[85] To forestall the danger of future famines, the administration's program set aside, after 1943, thirty percent of the land for the cultivation of manioc, sweet and ordinary potatoes. Furthermore, each farmer was obliged to build up food stocks at the rate of 60 kilos per head of the population,[86] and all adults and able bodied inhabitants living in the traditional areas were required to cultivate 35 ares (100 square meters equal one are)[87] of seasonal and 25 ares of non-seasonal food crops. Rwandans were also compelled by law, Ordinance No. 70/AIMO of 20 November 1944, to plant hedges, dig ditches, and to carry out other types of anti-erosion works. The same ordinance gave the resident the power to require each adult African farmer or herdsman to save, as directed by the local authorities, all products such as ash, cow dung, household refuse, and to use them for fertilizing his fields.[88] All of these devices were designed to increase productivity through soil conservation and to reduce the specter of famine. But while these measures were being

enacted, there was no letup in the demands for forced labor, traditional corvée and exactions from Batutsi administrators and patrons, the most significant drains on the Banyarwanda's productive effort.

While increased food production and adequate storage could eventually prevent famine, the administration nonetheless refused to face the situation squarely. The precarious ecological balance in Rwanda meant the country could not produce enough food to feed itself and its neighbor in the Eastern Congo as well, while producing coffee for the world market and supporting the vestige of a traditional feudal system. The administration was certainly aware that periodic famines were caused partly by irregular distribution of food and population. The famine of 1928-29 and the subsequent relief programs had brought these facts to the attention of the administration. There was very little it could do about natural forces and resettlement programs were largely unsuccessful. But it never really seriously considered reforming the traditional feudal system; when some efforts were made, they were generally compromises which benefited or pleased no one. Rather than eliminate the stranglehold of the feudal system (because officials feared revolution), the administration extended and dedicated itself toward conserving institutions and traditions within the traditional society. Or they tried to ensure the production of a food surplus in good

harvest years by compulsory food programs, without moderating their own demands or those of the Batutsi.

The administration believed that by substituting dues in kind and work for money payment, the abuse and indiscretion of the chiefs would vanish. But this did not happen; corvée labor, akazi, and demands from the administration and the traditional structure increased, so that the agricultural investment and food production cycles were hindered. The former never developed fully and food production cycles were subject to frequent interruptions, so much so that the country eventually became dependent upon foreign imports to supplement basic needs and caused Bahutu to emigrate to find additional income in order to survive.

A tremendous amount of labor had to be expended on the soil and on stock to produce consumer goods. It was not enough for the head of a household to possess a certain amount of capital in land and cattle, but he had to also command and control the labor of his wife, unmarried sons, and daughters. As head of the rugo, a Muhutu could make all of these dependents work in the fields and fortunately for him, he could require his sons to give tribute labor to the political authorities in his stead or to carry out services for his patron. Thus a family head could command and control enough rights to capital goods and land to make his rugo self-supporting in the best of times, with a certain surplus for his chief and his lord. But with colonial

consolidation and Batutsi over-rule, these rights were not his own. The ultimate control of the factors of production was not his. As we have seen, labor, land, and cattle were theoretically invested with the state and in all practicality belonged to the Batutsi.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

[1]Gouvernement belge. Ministère des Colonies. Rapport presenté par le gouvernement belge au conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1930 (Geneve, 1931) p. 58.

[2]Consortium for Africa Microfilm Project (hereafter CAMP). Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941. Territoire de Lubengera. No. 39/P.I. Gitebe, January 18, 1931.

[3]The disturbance began on February 17, 1932, in the province of Ndorwa in Ruhengeri territory. A Mututsi chief, Kanabulenge, went to Bugarakata hill to collect taxes and to conduct a census registration. When he called on those who had not paid, they appeared, armed with lances and arrows. They told Kanabulenge that they had only a few francs, and when Kanabulenge insisted, the crowd began to show "insolence," but they dispersed. Two days later, a tax collector was beaten and chased by a crowd of people at Kinyababa hill in the same region. On the third day, Kanabulenge tried to collect taxes from the Bahutu at an Bugarakata hill. But despite appeals to the head of the abasingaba clan elder, the prospective tax payers refused to appear, and warned that they would resist being brought before him. Sometime later that day, the Bahutu took the initiative and attacked Kanabulenge and his party. A battle ensued near Lake Bulera, where Kanabulenge and his men had fled. In the battle, one of Kanabulenge's men was wounded. Out numbered, Kanabulenge's party sought refuge in a rugo of an old chief near the chapel-school of the White Fathers at Kinyababa. Bahutu pursuers surrounded the hut and lay seige for 16 hours before Kanabulenge took the offensive. In the struggle, a second man was seriously wounded, but Kanabalenge succeeded in chasing the attackers away.

On February 21, or the next day, the abasingaba attacked Kanabulenge. But by this time, Kanabulenge had received reinforcements who, in retaliation, began to loot Bahutu herds and burn their huts." In the battle between Kanabulege's forces and the abasingaba clan, it was reported that eight abasingaba were wounded and one was killed. CAMP Rwanda. Miscellaneous Archival Material, 1925-1941.

Territoire du Rwanda-Urundi. Pro. Justitia [Dépositions]. Ruhengeri, March 3, 1932.

[4]For a very different version of the same incident, see CAMP, Rwanda. Miscellaneous. Archival Material, 1925-1941. Territoire du Mulera. Rapport sur les événements qui se sont déroules fin fevrier . . . , March 18, 1932; Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi, Pro Justitia [Déposition], Ruhengeri, March 2, 1932.

[5]Rapport 1935, p. 30.

[6]Ibid., p. 74.

[7]Rene Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London, 1970), p. 100.

[8]J. E. T. Philipps, "The Nyabingi: an Anti-European Secret Society in Africa," Congo, 1 (1928), p. 318.

[9]Ibid., pp. 316-317.

[10]J. M. Bessel, "Nyabingi," Uganda Journal, VI (1938-1939), p. 78.

[11]Northerners were on the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in 1959. See Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 101-106.

[12]Ibid., p. 43.

[13]Ibid., pp. 96 and 134. Le Marchand also notes that the very nature of the dyadic relationships (i.e., those based on reciprocal obligations between patron and client) was the reason why Bahutu had little consciousness of themselves as a group. The roles, norms and statuses associated with clientage structure tended not only to block the emergence of a separate Bahutu consciousness but to positively reinforce the attachments of the individual Bahutu peasant to his lord. The result, up to a point, has been to hamper the development of any sort of corporate ties other than those based on feelings of personal allegiance.

[14]Some respondents had planted less than the magic "54" trees. However, only one had less than 47, although a few had planted 60 or more initially. One planter cultivated 200 coffee trees and had 480 in 1978. Those who increased the number of trees generally did so after independence in 1962. See 264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); Shyande,

Kagunga, Butare (1978), band (?); 204 Ngoma, Butare (1978), band (?); 207 Shyanda, Munazi, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 21/3/78, band (?); 228 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 236 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 6; 239 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaza, Butare, 29/3/78, band 9; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27.

[15]200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?); another planter voiced the feelings of many when he remarked that "to concentrate solely on coffee production is to invite famine." See 223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 21/3/78, band (?). Others believed that increasing the number of coffee trees would require additional labor. In fact, "nobody would cultivate just coffee. Coffee caused a lot of pain; we were dying because of it, even the chiefs who had many coffee trees. I cultivated other crops because when you don't have enough beans and sweet potatoes, you can't work in your coffee field even if you had more trees." See 224 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare 21/3/78, band (?); 230 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 240 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

[16]200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?). See Phillippe Leurquin's "Les limites physiques de la production de subsistence," in Bulletin de l'Insitut de Recherche économiques et sociales (Université de Louvain), XXIII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 59-66. Leurquin argues that it is not the shortage of land that limits production but the physical limitation imposed by the "stagnant" technology. The truth, however, is that Rwanda terrain is characterized by precipitious slopes and summits, valleys which are susceptable to flooding, and soil which is of poor quality.

[17]264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 265 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 200 Shyande, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?); 203 Ngoma, Butare, (1978), band (?); 204 Ngoma, Butare, (1978), band (?); 206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 207 Shyanda, Munazi, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 208 Shyanda, Karama, Butare, 11/3/78, band (?); 213 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 15/3/78, band (?); 215 Shyanda-Save, Butare, 16/3/78, band (?); 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7: 239 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 9; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 248 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 258 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 25.

[18]CAMP. J. M. Derschied. Film No. 34. Reel I. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, (1933), pp. 29-30, and 50.

[19]Ibid., p. 30. Batutsi also leased out their fields, or even a portion of a banana field for several years. In this particular case the person who leased the land would place his hut on it and would pledge or agree to cultivate two days or a week for the landowner. If the person who leased the land died, a member of the family, either the wife or father, would carry out the agreement and these have the right to the produce of the field. The report also notes that a Mututsi would sometimes lease land from a Muhutu, but the opposite was more frequent. Ibid., p. 50.

[20]232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5; 233 Mbazi, Mbazi, Batare, 25/3/78, band 5; 237 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwubire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7; 241 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 245, Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 254 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 1/4/78, band 17; 255 Ngoma, Sahera, Butate, 1/4/78, band 17; 256 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 3/4/78, band 17; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/14/78, band 27; Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78; band 27; 260 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 24; 261 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/14/78, band 27, 262 Ngoma, Cyawa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 25; 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 13/4/78, band 14.

[21]232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5; 233 Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78.

[22]The head tax was the same for all Africans, except the rate varied from district to district according to the resources of the district. For example, Africans whose verified annual income exceeded 9000BF net were exempt from head tax and were liable to income tax. In 1948 only 604 Africans paid income tax. According to Belgian official estimates the head tax corresponded on the average to something less than one month's income, or 8 to 9 percent of the annual income. They also claimed it was not too high, but many informants felt it inopportune or an inconvenience. Most paid the tax during the first three or four months of the year. The polygamy tax, an assessment for less than 10 percent of the population, was a tax on wealth, as was the livestock or cattle tax. United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 4th Session, Supplement No. 2, (1950), p. 34.

[23]232 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 5; 233 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5; 237 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7; 241 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23, 254 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 1/4/78, band 17; 255 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 1/4/78, band 17; 256 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 3/4/78, band 27; Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27; 262 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 25: 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 13/4/78, band 14.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Agricultural loans for Africans did not materialize, as government policy, until August 5, 1941, when Ordinance Law, No. 365/bis/Agri was passed, creating the Fonds spécial de crédit agricole indigène. The fund received advances drawn on the treasury and by voluntary contributions from the treasuries of the African circonscription and extra-customary centres. The law authorized the fund to make loans of more than 5,000BF to Africans circonscriptions, African towns, extra-customary centers, African cooperatives, legally recognized African agricultural association, or African private persons. Loans to Africans could not exceed 10,000BF except in special cases which were duly justified and had the consent of governor general, who, regardless of the amount, considered each request on the proposal of an African agricultural credit committee, after consultation with local African authorities. Moreover, loans could only be granted for the purpose of crop development and stock-breeding, harvesting, preparation and preservation of the products of farming and stock-breeding and improvement of farming conditions. Loans were limited to ten years and were subject to an interest rate of 4 percent annually.

In 1947, a modification of another Ordinance, No. 125/AIMO of April 27, 1942, gave the governors of each province the authority to grant loans of 5,000BF or less to Africans in traditional areas. The interest rate for these loans was 5 percent annually. United Nations Trusteeship Council (hereafter UNTC). Study of Population, Land Utilization and Land System in Ruanda (New York, March 26, 1957), pp. 79-80. Also see Archives Africans, Ministère des Colonies. Carton Agri 106/Dossier 47. FEDECAME: Accord de Mexico, 1957, 4è Direction Général, Agriculture. Forêts, Elevage, Colonisation, 1 ère Direction à FEDECAME. Crédit accordes en faveur de la production du Café.

[26]264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 265 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, 235 Mbazi, Mobazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 6; 243 Mbazi, Cyibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27.

[27]201 Shyanda, Kagunga, Butare, (1978), band (?); 203 Ngoma, (?) Butare, (1978), band (?); 216 Shyanda, Munamira, Butare, 16/3/78, band (?); 241 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaga, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 243 Mbazi, Cyibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 249, Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27; 259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 25; 263 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 13/4/78, band 14; 264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, band 21, 27/4/78.

[28]227 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

[29]243 Mbazi, Cyibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

[30]Rapport 1945-46, p. 35.

[31]204 Ngoma, (?). Butare, (1978), band (?); 206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 207 Shyanda, Munazi, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?); 223 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 21/3/78, band (?); 228 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 236 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78; band 6; 239 Mbazi, Gihindamuyaza, Butare, 29/3/78 band 9; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 257 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78, band 27; 264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21.

[32]249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14.

[33]Pierre Gravel, "A Play for Power. Description of a community in Eastern Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 56-57.

[34]237 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78, band 6. Also see 200 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, (1978), band (?) 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7.

[35]UNTC. Study of Population, p. 61.

[36]Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[37]210 Shyanda, Kiziguro, Butare, 13/3/78, band (?). Also see 251 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 31/3/78, band 18.

[38]Ibid.

[39]259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare 4/4/78, band 27.

[40]266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21.

[41]249 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14.

[42]238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7.

[43]204 Ngoma, (?), Butare, (1978), band (?).

[44]Abuse was a double-edged sword; the Batutsi were themselves subject to abuse from the Belgians. See 205 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?); 242 Mbazi, Kibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7.

[45]234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5 and 6; 235 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 6; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10.

[46]CAMP. J. M. Derscheid Collection, Territoire d' Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge, September 23, 1933, pp. 5-6.

[47]CAMP. Rwanda, Archival Material, 1925-1941. Residence du Ruanda. L'inspection de la S/Chefferie Rubindo a fait l'objet d'un rapport spécial en date du 15/1 denier. Ruhengeri, January 23, 1937.

[48]205 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?); 206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?).

[49]Ibid.

[50]206 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 10/3/78, band (?).

[51]220 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 20/3/78, band (?); 227 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

[52]M. Molitor, "L'Introduction et le développement de la Culture," Le Material Colonial (A.S.B.L.), XXVIII, No. 6 (March, 1937), p. 157. Also see CAMP, J. M. Derscheid Collection. Territoire de Biumba, Rapport de sortie de charge (Stevens, 1933), pp. 2-6; United Nations Trusteeship Council. Study of Population, Land Utilization and Land (26 March 1957) pp. 1-12.

[53]226 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4.

[54]231 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4-III; 234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 5 and 6.

[55]231 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 24/3/78, band 4; 234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, bands 5 and 6.

[56]246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23.

[57]259 Ngoma, Cyarwa, Butare, 4/4/78 band 27; 213 Shyanda, Save, Butare, 15/3/78, band (?); 234 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, bands 5 and 6; 238 Mbazi, Mwulire, Butare, 28/3/78, band 7. Gravel, A Play for Power," pp. 166-167.

[58]United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 15th Session, Supplement No. 2, (1955), p. 10.

[59]CAMP. J. M. Derscheid. Film No. 34, Reel I. Territoire d'Astrida. Rapport de Sortie de Charge (1933), pp. 50-51.

[60]264 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21; 265 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/3/78, band 21; 266 Ngoma, Nkubi, Butare, 27/4/78, band 21; 204 Ngoma, (?), Butare, (1978), band (?); 205 Shyanda, Zivu, Butare, 9/3/78, band (?); 235 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 25/3/78, band 6; 236 Mbazi, Mbazi, Butare, 28/3/78 band 6; 242 Mbazi, Kibabara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 243 Mbazi, Cyibarara, Butare, 29/3/78, band 7; 245 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 10; 246 Mbazi, Kazenge, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 247 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 11; 248 Mbazi, Gakoni, Butare, 30/3/78, band 14; 250 Mbazi, Muhororo, Butare, 30/3/78, band 23; 251 Mgoma, Sahera, Butare, 31/3/78, band 18; 252 Ngoma, Sahera, Butare, 31/3/78, band 18.

[61]Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes and Reports, 18th Session (1938), p. 17.

[62]LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 136.

[63]Ibid., p. 125

[64]Rapport 1937, p. 72.

[65]Ibid., p. 73.

[66]Rapport 1938, pp. 75-76.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid., p. 77.

[69]Ibid., p. 151.

[70]Ibid., pp. 77, 149, 151, and 162.

[71]Fred E. Wagoner, "Nation Building in Africa: A Description and analysis of the Development of Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968), pp. 82-83; Rapport 1939-1944, p. 82.

[72]Rapport 1939-1944, p. 82.

[73]Batutsi notables could also be fined for failure to perform the following activities: get their people to the yaws medical examinations; conduct a census of the Africans living on their hills; provide enough workers for public work projects; submit tax receipts on time; implement reforestation programs; and instruct their people to plant food crops in marsh areas. CAMP. Rwanda. Archival Material 1925-1941. Appendix. Residence du Ruanda. Sous Chef Rubindo (Mulera), Ruhengeri. Extrait du Cahier des Punitions Disciplinaires, February 1, 1937.

[74]Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960 (London & New York, 1966), pp. 143-144.

[75]A. Michiels and N. Laude, Notre Colonie: Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi. Géographie et Notre Historique (Brussels, 1949), p. 291.

[76]Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy, p. 146.

[77]Ian Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (New York 1977), p. 207.

[78]United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 4th Session, Supplement No. 2. (1950), p. 33.

[79]Ibid. European settlers and land concessions occurred mainly in the territories of Biumba, Ruhengeri, Kisenyi and Cyangugu.

[80]U. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 4th Session, Supplement No. 2. (1950), p. 33.

[81]See Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, pp. 220-281; Fred E. Wagoner, Nation Building in Africa: A Description and Analysis of the Development of Rwanda (Ph.D. Dessertation, The American University,1968), chapters 3 and 4; Newbury, "The Cohesion of Oppression: A Century of Clineship in Kinyaga, Rwanda," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), chapters 8 and 9; Gravel, "The Play for Power," chapters 4 and 5; and LeMarchand, Rwanda and Burundi Parts II and IV. These sources describe the factors and influences that led to the political emergence of the Bahutu as the dominant political force and Rwanda as an independent nation.

[82]Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, p. 207.

[83]Rapport 1939-1944, p. 16.

[84]Rapport 1945-46, p. 35.

[85]Congo Manuscripts, Folder No. 9. "Figures Coloniales: Georges Sandrart, ancien resident du Ruanda et de l'Urundi," Pourquoi Pas, No. 106 (February 11, 1952), p. 107.

[86]U. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1949. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. Trusteeship Council Official Records, 4th Session, Supplement No. 2, (1950), p. 21.

[87]United Nations Bulletin. "Tribal Traditions Hinder Progress," XVI. No. 7 (April 1, 1954), pp. 267-268.

[88]U. N. Trusteeship Council. Study of Population, pp. 61 and 65.


Coffee
FRANCAISE
SOUDAN
EQUATORIALE
AFRIQUE
UGANDA
TANGANYIKA TER
NORD
DU
RHODESIE
ANGOLA
STANLEYVILLE
COQUILHATVILLE
PONTHIERVILLE
KIGALI
BUKAVU
KINDU
USUMBURA
KITEGA
PORT FRANCQUI
LUSAMBO
LEOPOLDVILLE
KABINDA
ALBERTVILLE
MATADI
LULUABOURG

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE COLONIAL STATE, EUROPEAN PLANTERS, AND THE METROPOLE

Direct intervention by the state helped to transform the economic structure of Rwanda, and by a number of quite imperceptible transitions the Rwandans were themselves transformed. However, not everyone was satisfied with either transformation. The following discussion demonstrates that the Belgian planters in Africa had a clear concept of their interests vis-a-vis Africans and the colonial government. Almost simultaneously with their arrival in Belgian Africa, planters began to organize themselves into commercial associations. As archival sources indicate, the Ministry of Colonies at Brussels could not ignore strong commercial associations. These maintained strong parent bodies at home, which campaigned loud and long for their brothers in Africa. The most powerful lobbied their senators at Antwerp, the major entrepot for coffee, and at the legislature and the Minstry of Colonies at Brussels. While white planters were willing to compromise on such issues as zones de protection, they refused to budge when it came to African coffee cultivators, even though the latter were not serious competitors. Brazil and emerging producers in Africa generally were more important in creating the glut

on the coffee market. Consequently Belgian planters pleaded for special price support systems and protective tariffs, and other considerations from a Metropole, which was often indifferent or for the most part had other fish to fry "or beans to burn."

Planters also felt betrayed by the Metropole, because it responded to their difficulties as if they were Africans. Consequently, in asserting themselves as Belgian citizens, the planters became less tolerant in their dealings with Africans. These feelings, as, this chapter shows, stemmed from a misplaced perception that Africans in Rwanda and in the eastern Congo were competitors. Intolerance was a qualitative change, since planters in their initial role as colonizers had willingly assisted the administration in bringing "civilization" (or civilizing, as the administration called it) to Africans. The white farmers entered into the partnership arrangement with Africans, as defined in part by the concept of zones de protection, and participated in the campaign to extend African coffee cultivation. However, this chapter reveals that as the imperial phase became more entrenched, the role of the planters changed from colonizers to producers in competition with their African partners, and this new status created a crisis of confidence, racism, and protest, which were expressed through the various planter societies.

The home and colonial governments responded to the

planters pleas for protection as Belgian citizens with sympathy, but in the end weighed the planters interests against those of the Africans and decided that neither was of much consequence when the Metropole's interests were at stake. This chapter confirms that decision-making in terms of production and economic development was a state prerogative, and that the interests of both white and black planters were secondary.[1] The metropole and therefore the colonies were cost-conscious advocates of "rational and orderly administration and development." Subsidies and price supports were expensive but costs could be passed on to someone else. Protective tariffs, on the other hand, were dangerous to international trade, especially if Brazil and other exporters decided to reciprocate. Therefore, limits had to be placed on production. Many studies demonstrate that in the resolution of conflict between white and black, the colonial power resorted to its own self-interest regardless of ideology or commitment.[2]

The year 1933 was also a pivotal one for the government's rationalized development plan. Voisin had departed on June 8, 1932, leaving General Commissioner G. Morteham, as the interim Vice Governor General.[3] Morteham presided over a major policy debate concerning the role of Europeans in the Rwandan economy. The controversy, according to white planters, centered around a major contradiction between the government's support of zones de protection for

Europeans and its policy of African coffee cultivation at the expense and exclusion of European planters and settlers. Zones de protection were viewed as concessions: the government would grant 500 hectares with 99-year-leases to companies that would plant crops and raise livestock and adopt the "civilizing" principle or collaborate with African farmers. Holders of these concessions had a virtual monopoly on African labor and the exclusive right to purchase commercial crops from African farmers within a protective radius of 15 kilometers or 70,000 hectares.[4] Participants were required to install a processing mill and to furnish schools, quarantine stations, and seeds for their African charges. These zones, according to the administration, were devised to eliminate Asian and Indian competition and to rationalize economic development.[5] Most planters and companies were concerned that the zones had hardly increased since their conception in 1929, despite the urging of Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu at Brussels and intervention from the Ministry of Colonies.[6]

While there were many features and counter proposals to the concept of zones de protection, planters were quite concerned about the licence provision, introduced in 1932, to purchase African produce. However, since the licences would only be granted to those who had received authorization to install a processing mill,[7] planters understood that this feature meant that only "une société reconnue"

with adequate capital could purchase these licences.[8] The issue not only angered and confused planters, but also divided members in the colonial government. Voisin may have been a casualty of divided opinion at the Colonial Office. Upon his return to Brussels and in a meeting before the Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu on November 9, 1932, Voisin remarked that zones de protection, which would shortly be discussed in the Conseil Colonial, were indispensable in the fight to ward off anarchy, represented by the Asiatic and Hindu influence in the economic future of Rwanda and Burundi.[9]

The government added more fuel to the issue, when it announced in 1933 that African agricultural development was the sole task of the Service Agricole de la Colonie. But at the same time, it insisted that the government still needed the cooperation and assistance of European planters to instruct African farmers.[10] Officials asserted that protective zones should be rationalized and protected from competition outside of the zones. But their next statement must have completely astonished the white planters, for it directly contradicted the Colonial Office's previous statement. Officials remarked that "only European processing operations, such as coffee mills, distilleries, oil factories would be authorized to build plants outside of the zones of European settlements and concessions."

Bahutu farmers would provide these plants with quality

products and labor at the lowest possible price.[11] In short, the administration was sanctioning free trade and auctioning off African labor and produce to the highest bidders. European planters and companies were infuriated and felt the government had reneged on the promise to protect their interests and access to African goods and services. Many felt that the government had also betrayed them, since they had responded to the earlier policy of collaboration.[12] Some were thoroughly disillusioned, when the President of Union Agricole du Kivu (hereafter Unaki) informed them in February that the government no longer supported the principle of protective zones,[13] but would rather introduce a decree in the Conseil Colonial, whereby the mandated territory would no longer grant protective zones to those who cultivated coffee. Instead, the government would sell general licences to those wishing to purchase African coffee beans.[14] The government hoped this procedure would standardize the processing of coffee, to ensure

> . . . that the product for European markets was uniform in all of its characteristics . . . and would create and maintain this standard in order to establish confidence in the good name of the product, since the market price often depended upon the reputation of the product.[15]

Officials believed that the only way to achieve a standardized product was to concentrate all production in a

processing mill.[16] To secure a licence, a company or group had to offer the "proper monetary guarantee," for construction of a mill to process coffee.[17] In short, the Colonial Office had changed its mind. While its previous position had been collaboration with both European settlers and private enterprise, now it would collaborate with only those who could afford to contribute to the development of Rwanda.

The desire of the Ministry of Colonies to control European access to African goods and services reflected a reassessment of colonial policy in Belgian Africa generally, and the role of African agriculture in development specifically. As a result of an administrative debate at Brussels, which commenced in the mid-1920s, two opposing factions emerged to support conflicting development strategies. One placed a stronger emphasis on African agriculture together with the slowing-down of industrial development, and the other favored capitalism and industrialization.[18] A speech in 1933 by Prince Leopold finally tipped the balance "compromise" in favor of agricultural and moderated industrial development,[19] the latter designed to placate the pro-capitalist lobby.

In his speech before the Belgian Senate on July 25, 1933, Leopold informed the assembly that Belgium could no longer simply exploit African holdings. Instead, he proposed that development be emphasized. He urged a new agricultural policy to create African paysannats, where blacks

could acquire property and enjoy economic freedom, a right guaranteed by the Colonial Charter. Within this context, Africans would cease to be simply an outil de production for capitalist enterprises.[20] Responding, however, to the on-going economic crisis, Leopold supported the policy to maintain the current level of production, and asserted that it was even the duty of the state to support those whom the economic crisis had placed in jeopardy, an obvious ploy to gain support from the industrialists. He also counselled the government to refrain from extending commercial agricultural development for a certain number of years and concentrate on the development of African agriculture, which was far cheaper than European endeavors.[21]

While the duke did not exclude foreign participation altogether, he urged that Europeans be restricted to economic pursuits that were currently beyond the capacity of Africans such as purchasing, transportation, and the export trade. Most auditors of the prince's talk predicted correctly that it would have a profound affect on the administration's new agricultural policy, since in reality it was intended to signal a new policy direction. But they also recognized that it would not be implemented without a fight from capitalist interests,[22] whose primary concern was African labor. The new policy did not provide more freedom for blacks, but rather had the effect of binding them to the capitalist structure, as agricultural laborers or tenants

on large plantations. What emerged from this new policy by the late 1930s was a system of enforced divisions of labor between African producers and foreign capital.

Belgian planters reluctantly accepted the Metropole's new policy towards zones de protection and the licencing of new processing mills. But the President of Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu (hereafter Unaki), Pierre Ryckmans, in an April 12 meeting, warned colonial officials and the metropole that his organization would no longer assist African coffee planters. The government's policy change had seriously injured Unaki's investors, and planters did not appreciate the government's slight of their efforts to encourage cultivation and to maintain protective areas, while "simultaneously implementing the [African development] programs envisaged by Postaux and Voisin."[23] In a central committee meeting the following day, President Ryckmans read a copy of the letter drafted by the committee and sent to the Minister of colonies. The committee asked for a reexamination of the government's licencing procedure in Rwanda. The text of the letter also included a warning that if the licence procedure was not removed from the protective zones, the "promotion of collaboration between African and European farmers in the planting and processing of coffee would be seriously jeopardized." There was also a reminder that Unaki had dedicated its personnel and capital assets to create nurseries and supervise African

planting, whereas those who held commercial licence to collect African crops were not concerned with extending the coffee campaign or fighting disease harmful to agriculture. The letter expressed the hope that all concerned could work together towards a program that would safeguard the principles of free trade and protect private capital so that private enterprise could play a decisive role in the development of African agriculture in the mandated territory.[24]

The Central Committee's reference to private capital in the letter was actually to some "millions of francs" which the committee claimed it and other European companies had invested over a five-year-period in the African coffee cultivation campaign in Rwanda and Burundi, for which they received neither compensation nor consideration. Instead they were to be placed on the same footing as mill owners who could now purchase coffee plants from the Africans. The administration's response, read at Unaki's meeting on May 31, 1933,[25] was not at all sympathetic, since the objective of the new licence procedure was designed to create new capital equipment rather than award advantages to disgruntled planters. During the proceedings, several planters expressed fears that the position taken by the government would mean that African produce would be reserved exclusively for the mills within the protected areas. One planter interpreted the government's stance as the creation of a state controlled production system. And he remarked

that "absolute commercial freedom would hamper the standard of living of African farmers." But in reality the African's status would not change.

The meeting closed with some good news: planters at Bujumbura (Burundi) had gained some concessions from the Governor General. The latter approved Unaki's request to form a cooperative, which would process African coffee and establish a central processing mill. But they received no other concessions, and by the time the General Assembly of Unaki met at Brussels on December 31, 1933,[26] the zone de protection and commercial licences were sounding their last hurrahs. Mr. Ryckmans won reelection, and the General Assembly discussed price differences in the trading licences granted to Indians and Europeans--the former paid 2,000BF and Europeans 10,000BF. The differential was consistent with the administration's plan, especially so when viewed with the decree requiring Europeans to construct their commercial buildings with durable (brick) material.

Between the administration's response to Unaki's request for the re-examination of the licence procedure and the meeting of the General Assembly at Brussels, the Ministry of Colonies had conducted a tour of northeastern Congo in order to evaluate European and African agriculture development.[27] While the final report was not at all disposed toward extending African coffee cultivation in certain areas in the northeastern region (among other things,

it might be too costly to implement),[28] one attachment provided the rationale from the administration's commercial policy with respect to Europeans. The report (actually an extract from the annual report of the Service de l'Agriculture Kibali-Ituri), entitled Note Pour Monsieur le Directeur Général Claessens, reaffirmed that the only admissable policy in the Belgian colony was collaboration between the races in all areas of administration, evangelism, mining, industry, commerce, transportation, and agriculture. However, the depression, the low prices for commercial agricultural products, and the high cost of transportation hampered agricultural development to such an extent that some planters could not survive without protective tariffs or export subsidies. This was especially true for coffee, whose transportation costs were exorbitant, and therefore, it was not economically feasible for European planters in the Kivu and Ituri. In fact many European planters were on the verge of ruin.

African planters, by contrast, were in a much better position, but would only survive by taking over European food crops and coffee production. The Agricultural Department noted that an emphasis on African production would not mean the ruin or collapse of European enterprises. It simply meant that the Europeans would have to specialize in areas that were beyond the administrative, technical, and financial capabilities of the African planters. Europeans

would specialize in processing produce, transporting and selling products for the world market. If indeed the colonial government wanted Europeans to concentrate their efforts in specialized areas then the licencing and construction policies made sense, for licencing was far cheaper than the prospects of possible subsidization of European agriculture which required high capitalization.

Rather than speculate on the reasons for the price differentials for commercial licences, the General Assembly decided they would accept the government's policy on protective zones and collaboration, for only time would tell whether the absence of their technical support would adversely affect African production in the protective areas. For their part, the assembly also decided not to oppose the government's efforts to expand coffee growing among Africans. Instead, it would again wait until the experiment failed or succeeded or until it proved harmful to European crops. Unaki did not have long to wait. For the following year its members were forced out of Rwanda and Burundi, not by African competition but from actions taken by the Colonial administration to preserve coffee production as an exclusive African prerogative.

Prior to the November 5, 1934, meeting of Unaki, the Ministry of Colonies suspended European coffee production with compensation in the protective zones of the mandate. Rwanda and Burundi were appropriate starting points:

European settlement was minimal and unorganized.[29] Unaki did not respond immediately, because Pierre Ryckmans had been appointed Governor General of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.[30] So the new President, Raymond Brock officiated at the February 13 session in 1935.[31] When the meeting was called to order, the following were in attendance: the presidents of the Kivu and Ruanda-Urundi branches of Unaki and Senator Robert Godding, who became Minister of Colonies in 1940, but who in 1935, was a member of Unaki's central committee. Naturally the major topic on the agenda was the suppression of Unaki's activities in Rwanda and Burundi. Once the assembly had disposed of the issue of compensation for dispossessed members (which it believed would not be adequate), they discussed mobilization through membership in a new organization--the Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo.[32]

The Association, composed of members from Unaki and similar groups, and presided over by Professor LePlae, would defend the interests of both European robusta and arabica producers in Belgian Africa. It would also support the fight to protect Congolese coffees in Belgium, which would be accomplished by forming an alliance with the Association des Intérêts Coloniaux, a group operating out of Brussels and presently lobbying the Colonial Office for favorable transport tariffs for the colonies. The General Assembly was also informed that Mr. Brock would represent

Unaki in the Comité de l'Association des Planteurs de Café,[33] also a Brussels' based group. This collaboration, members were told, would enable Unaki to carry out defensive operations in Belgium. The membership was also asked to recruit new members and even to form alliances with such disparate group as the Crédit Agricole d'Afrique. The Assembly then went on to discuss the "African problem" and agricultural credit.

Both issues were pressing ones. African competition was perceived as real, and Brock told the assembly that "he had been led to a very distinct position against African coffee planting." His opposition was couched in paternalist terms. He warned that by 1938 the Belgian market would be inundated with surplus coffee production; consequently, African efforts should be directed toward some other crops, such as tea, quinquina, fruit trees, silkworms, castor oil. Measures would also have to be taken to limit European settlers; otherwise "our own plantations will cease being economical," because of overproduction. So within one year Unaki had come full circle on African cultivation--from no opposition in December 1933 to a "distinct position against it" in February 1935.

Overproduction was certainly a problem, but planter indebtedness was even more pressing. The metropole had responded to the economic crisis by granting agricultural credit, and interest payments were due and some members

were having difficulty meeting them. Some planters had used loans with relatively high interest and amortization charges to renovate plantations and to purchase equipment. But continuous low prices for coffee and for other produce had effected profit levels, and many planters and agricultural societies experienced difficulty raising capital costs. Capital was so short that according to the Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo, the planters willingness to sell inadvertently (because they were compelled to sell at any price) brought coffee prices below normal parity.[34] Not only had the latter contributed to under capitalization, but it also neutralized the advantage from the import duty exemption granted to Belgian coffee growers.

A.P.C.C. expressed what the colonial office had feared in 1934--that the import duty exemption of 2.50BF per kilo would not work. In fact, it was hardly beneficial to planters because of high transportation costs. Brokers and wholesalers also claimed that they could barely pay the differential required to inflate Belgian coffee prices,* and resisted larger quantities of Belgian coffee because consumers only purchased Brazilian and Columbian coffees.[35]

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*Robusta coffees of identical quality sold on the international market for 4.70BF per kilo (in Belgium 4.70 BF + 2.50BF import duty tax per kilo = 7.20BF per kilo); Belgian coffees (except African brands) sold for 5.20BF. Wholesalers and brokers paid the difference by passing the amount on to their consumers.

In 1934, Belgium imported 46,000 tons of coffee, including 16,000 tons from Belgian Africa; therefore 30,000 tons were subject to customs duty (some 75 million francs).[36] The metropole, however, feared that before long the Belgian market would become saturated with unsalable coffees from its own colonies, given their potential for expanding production. Coffee surpluses would lower prices considerably, and then it would be necessary to consider some alternative solution. The Metropole was aware that some planters preferred restricting coffee planting in their colonies. Some administrators at home even suggested granting export subsidies to encourage planters to seek foreign markets for their coffees.[37] In the end Belgium combined both alternatives, primarily, because it had no other options, given the possibility of increasing stocks and Brazilian manipulation of the international coffee market.** Not only did Brazil control the price levels of coffee but it also held the dominant position in terms of consumer preference in Belgium. Consumers could be weaned from this preference by effective advertising and promotion, and through surcharges, but circumvention of Brazil's control of the market, a position it had consolidated during the first decade of the twentieth century, could pose some enormous international problems.

** Brazil produces between 50 to 60 percent of the total world production, and therefore controls the international market.

Once it became obvious that coffee prices would not rise above 5BF per kilo, the Metropole began to ponder (out loud) the idea of restricting coffee cultivation. Almost immediately, the Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo, the Société Forestière et Commerciale du Congo Belge (hereafter Societe Forescom) and Senator Godding concurred and asked the Minister of Colonies to appoint a study group to investigate the problem. These same groups also began to urge the restriction of African coffee cultivation.[38] The Minister of Colonies demurred, but in 1935, administrators in the Brussels colonial office commented that opposition to African cultivation was mounting and "appear to be a major preoccupation of the European or Congolese plantation societies." In fact, the Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo and Société Forescom protested "daily," and "numerous complaints," perhaps orchestrated by the planters themselves, were being received at the same rate. Therefore, Director General Claessen finally agreed to support Senator Godding's suggestion of a study commission. At the urging of the Minister of Colonies, Claessen also agreed to undertake the mission and in August, 1935, left for Belgian Africa.[39]

The director general's decision stemmed from his investigation of Senator Godding's criticism of Governor Ryckmans' support of African coffee growing in Rwanda and Burundi. Apparently the Senator had misstated himself; the

director general's review discovered that Ryckmans had said that Africans coffee cultivation should be curtailed and that the range of crops diversified, which was contrary to Senator Godding's statement. Given this information, Claessen informed the Minister to disregard Senator Godding's suggestion of a study tour for fear that this action might offend the Governor.[40] However, Claessen's decision may have also been a move to prevent the issue from becoming politicized or an attempt to moderate Senator Godding's influence on the Ministry of Colonies, for Godding's criticism of Ryckmans wasn't that far off the mark.

When Ryckmans was nominated Governor General of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi on September 1934, he had just published a book, La Politique Colonial, which was extremely sympathetic to African agricultural development. In fact, Ryckmans wrote that colonization should cease if African rights were violated by Europeans. He argued that Africans should be the first to benefit from the Belgian presence in Africa, and that it was the responsibility of the Metropole (through proper monitoring) to make sure this became a reality. The book also provided an explanation for Pierre Ryckmans' waffling on certain colonial issues, since he also believed that the Metropole ought to balance the interests of colons and Africans. He further considered that governmental monitoring was absolute--because he feared if the settlers were left to their own devices,

they would promote their own interests at the expense of the African.[41] In any event, "African policy should be flexible"; and he also believed that "civilizing didn't occur overnight or within a generation."[42]

By October 2, 1935, Rubbens had decided to limit coffee production in all the Belgian colonies, and as a result of Claessen's study tour, to implement other protective devices for marketing the product.[43] The ministry evidently asked the governor general at Leopoldville for his opinion, because on November 8, Ryckmans replied by telegram that he could not support prohibiting coffee production in Rwanda and Burundi, "where the crop was the only possible resource for Africans."[44] He suggested that the import duty of 2.50BF be replaced with a consumption tax on all coffees consumed in Belgium, including Congolese varieties. In addition, a valuation produce tax should be levied on Congolese coffees, and the revenues be returned, however, to the colony as a subsidy. While he made no mention of the government's plan to restrict Belgian colonization in the Kivu,[45] he did propose the creation of a stabilization or maintenance fund exclusively for European coffees. He believed the latter would compensate for the prohibitions placed on the extension of existing coffee plantations and future ones as well. In fact, Ryckmans and Unaki envisioned the maintenance fund as a panacea for the coffee problem:

> . . . thirdly, the creation of a [price] support fund to maintain existing European plantations [but] excluding African plants and all future plantations (stop) This would make prohibition unnecessary, facilitate the placement of Congolese coffees on other market, improve Belgian/ Brazilian relations, and provide effective capital for all plantations at very little cost (stop) Unaki is in full agreement (stop).[46]

Although it was not clear how the fund would improve Belgian/Brazilian relations, a stabilization fund was a credible idea as an internal price support system. But it never took hold during the 1930s. The other recommendations were also credible from where the administration in Brussels stood, because these devices would not be credited to their accounts. In fact, they would generate additional income for the state. The valuation tax as a subsidy, however, made good sense economically only if it were also passed on to consumers. Limiting European settlement was also consistent with the metropole's grand design to substitute African production for European production (in agriculture) because of the former's lower capital overhead.

While the metropole proceeded to draft a decree limiting coffee production in its colonies, Unaki and its allies continued their offensive to moderate the decree's impact on their interests. In an interview with the Inco-presse, Service Colonial Belga of Antwerp, Unaki informed the Belgian public in November, that the vast coffee program in

Rwanda and Burundi was a drain on the public treasure, and even if it were terminated it would still constitute a bad investment. Furthermore, the release noted,

> . . . the Africans' competitive advantage was unfair; they were relieved of all charges such as rents and personal taxes. These advantages were harmful to planters on the national market, and even though the government appeared to be concerned about overproduction and quality controls, its policy on African coffee cultivation or the absence of one, results in declining prices for Congolese coffee in Belgium.[47]

Unaki, therefore, recommended that the government should follow A.P.C.C.'s suggestion and limit coffee cultivation for three years. The society also introduced new wrinkles by advocating quotas on foreign coffees entering Belgium and a subsidy for Congolese coffee surpluses re-exported from Belgium to other overseas markets.[48] Unaki lauded the valuation tax and the other proposed subsidies.

Unaki's accolades for the government's price support systems and the valuation tax were misplaced, and their receptivity to any kind of subsidy demonstrated a gross ignorance of international market selling and government's participation in it. The valuation tax and price support systems in the form of subsidies are traditional devices used to promote the marketing and selling of coffees domestically and overseas, none of which is ever beneficial to the planter in the long run. For one thing, valuation

taxes often generate hostility among consumers and inadvertently reduce consumption. Since Belgian coffees were not preferred, consumers certainly would not pay more for them. If the valuation tax worked, there was the additional problem of returning the tax as a subsidy to the planters. First of all, if the subsidy was not paid immediately but was deferred to some later date, then it could be subject to inflation. As a result, the planter would receive less than the value added tax. Secondly, there was always the problem that coffees would not be sold in sufficient quantities to make the subsidy beneficial.

The re-exportation tax subsidy would have the same effects as the valuation tax, except that if successful, it could be profitable to planters. Brokers or wholesalers would be given a special monetary incentive to sell Belgian coffee surpluses abroad. Consequently, there was the likelihood that market outlets for Belgian coffees would increase. If this happened, Belgian coffee brokers, roasters, the planters, and the metropole would benefit monetarily. The farmer would benefit from the tax; the planters from increased markets overseas; and the metropolitan government's treasury from additional revenues.

While Unaki's press release did not demonstrate an awareness of international marketing systems, it was designed to arouse public animosity toward wasteful government spending and Africans. In the process Unaki distorted

the truth. Although Rwandans did not have to pay rent for their own land, they paid more taxes than the European settlers and societies combined. For example in 1935 (see Table D-1, Appendix IV) the income, personal rates and taxes (European and Asian categories) were 1,248,001.99BF and 614,451.34BF respectively. Rwandans, on the other hand, paid 12,147,975.75BF in head, polygamy and cattle taxes. Consequently, Unaki's accusation was designed to generate public hostility against government spending and "uncivilized" Africans. They did not stop there; Unaki also accused Africans of contributing to the devaluation and defamation of Congolese agricultural products on the world market. Unaki noted that currently coffee brokers do not "dare announce that their coffee are of Congolese origin nor that they are African Arabica brands." Unaki also accused African Arabica of "lacking uniform taste," and the Union informed the Belgian public that "African coffees could not be improved."[49]

To protect themselves from African coffees, Unaki requested the following measures: "a tax of 2.50BF on all African surplus coffees in Belgium that are sent elsewhere." This measure would relieve the congestion on the domestic market and permit the government to recover funds which it had paid out to develop the African cultivation program. They also proposed the creation of a single department which would publicize Congolese coffee through an

aggressive propaganda campaign.[50] The proposals were forwarded to Governor General Ryckmans; he responded by memorandum on November 23, 1935 and rejected outright all schemes designed to change the status quo for African agricultural development. But Ryckmans expressed approval for the creation of a coffee bureau.[51]

The Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo ended the year with a salvo of its own, on December 24, when it reprimanded the Ministry of Colonies for its "illogical" and "prejudicial" treatment of European coffee planters, "after [the Ministry] had engaged these same planters, through an intensive and official propaganda campaign, to invest their capital in the cultivation of coffee." The association also chastised the ministry for its lack of support and hostility by stating that,

> the energy, demonstrated by our planters, and the tenacity they have shown in order to overcome these difficult times, merit more than inertia,--not to mention the hostility,--that they frequently encounter--without any consideration for our interests. [This kind of attitude] is difficult to swallow. [52]

The association was also critical of territorial administrators and their agents, whom it accused of implementing policies contrary to the interest of European planters, such as demanding a salary increase for Africans equal to the devaluation of Belgian currency. Planters, according to the association, were particularly upset because

inflation and the higher costs for consumer's goods would cancel out any benefit a salary increase would make. Furthermore, the association argued that the territorial agents had no right to oppose the employment of women and children as coffee pullers, for it was easier than any other kind of work; nor refuse to aid in recruiting African laborers.[53]

While the association told the Ministry of Colonies there were other examples it could cite of "unjustifiable and untimely intervention on the part of the Territorial Administrator," whose "job was to facilitate the work of European planters, rather than obstruct their activities by following to the letter, administrative rules and regulations that often have no reason for being." However, the association paused long enough to say that they fully supported a ministerial report which recommended a publicity campaign for Congolese coffees to increase consumer interest. The association also informed the ministry of a recent action taken by France to import 10,000 tons of coffee from Belgian Africa (8,000 tons of robusta and 2,000 tons of Arabica) at a reduced customs rate of 50 percent. The association hoped the Belgian government would reciprocate in some way, then perhaps the quota could be raised to 20,000 tons.[54]

The association's request that the ministry respond to the French initiative apparently was not that unusual,

nor were the ministry's efforts to secure additional markets for coffees. For example in January 1936, the ministry informed the Planters Association of a memorandum from the consul general in Nairobi suggesting the sale of the Belgian coffee there. In fact the suggestion was initiated by the Trade Association of Kenya, which also offered several inducements such as access to an international shipping lane from the port of Mombasa, where ships left regularly for Europe, the United States, South Africa, Egypt, and for countries in the Far East. Preferential and reduced freight rates, handling and commission charges from the Congo/Uganda border and special storage facilities in the Kenya Highlands were also offered. Moreover, the Trade Association advised the consul general that Belgian planters could sell their coffees at public auction or directly to established buyers.[55] Although this proposal was refused, it later became the basis for a 1938 trade arrangement that permitted Belgian Africa to ship a portion of its coffee (4,083 tons from the Congo and 3,000 tons from Rwanda and Burundi) directly to foreign markets, primarily to London and British East Africa.[56]

Direct marketing was an excellent idea, considering coffees were a glut on the metropolitan market. Since Belgian consumers preferred high quality Brazilian and Columbian brands, retailers re-exported lower qualities to other overseas markets. Therefore, it would be more economical

to ship these coffees directly from Africa, thus avoiding the triangular shipments rates involved in commissions, storage, freight and so forth. Direct shipment also gave planters a better financial return.[57]

Everyone had reason to be concerned about the marketing of coffee; prices continued to stagnate and surpluses continued to grow in 1936. Some individuals cited lack of initiative and believed that "those who pronounced the word overproduction when there was the [possibility] of resale [abroad] are only preoccupied with the limited interests of their own companies."[58] The colonial administration, however, was a bit more realistic. In February, it proceeded to modify Article 12 of the Law of May 8, 1924, which would provide legal sanction in the colonies to restrict and limit coffee cultivation for Europeans and, reluctantly, for African planters.[59] Further coffee expansion was to be prohibited, and coffee production was to be managed more efficiently. Quality controls were to be established before shipment abroad, and licences were to be issued, certifying the condition and origin of the coffee.[60]

In March 1936, a Coffee Committee established by the Ministry of Colonies examined and approved the proposal. Shortly thereafter, the ministry sent a draft decree to the Conseil Colonial,[61] to prohibit the creation of new coffee plantations and the extension of existing ones, with the exceptions of existing trees, replacements, or those

interplanted among other crops to increase yields.[62] The prohibition did not apply to the coffee campaigns in Rwanda and Burundi either, whose coffee planting was not restricted until 1938, despite vocal protest from European planters in the Kivu.[63] After considerable debate, lasting several months, the ministry passed the decree on July 22, 1936, temporarily restricting coffee planting for a period of eight years (to March 2, 1945).[64]

The Metropole actually had no other choice but to limit coffee production. Official reports indicated that coffee yields for the 1936-1937 crop year would be between 17,000 to 18,000 tons, and estimates for 1937-1938 were 23,000 tons. Only about 50 percent of these totals would be shipped to Belgium, where coffee could not be readily absorbed,[65] and the surplus would only further reduce prices, currently at 1.50BF per kilo. The glut and deflation were possibilities, given the number of hectares in production in 1936 (see Table XI) and the existing surplus of 2,400 tons.[66] The prohibition was no panacea, but it was an appropriate starting point, only after the Metropole encouraged its people to sell the coffee to others. Quality controls and subsidies were designed to improve quality to a large extent, but the colonial office also sought foreign markets for coffee, not an easy task, considering that Belgian coffees were not selling in Europe and were the least preferred (see Table XII) in Belgium.

Table XI. Total Number of Hectares Planted in Coffee in 1936.

Belgian Congo		
Europeans		
In full production		37,501
New		18,757
	Total	56,258
Africans		
In full production		377
New		2,599
	Total	2,976
Rwanda and Burundi (Africans only)		
In full production		9,692
New		9,130
	Total	18,822

SOURCE: Archives Africaines, Brussels, Ministère des Colonies. Carton Agri. (341) No. 497, 5 ème Direction Générale à Monsieur L. Orts, Secrétaire de l'Union des Producteurs de Café. Annexe: Situation de la Culture du Café au 31 Decembre 1936. Brussels, December 11, 1937.

Table XII. Coffees Imported for Belgian Consumption, 1936-1939 (in tons).

Country	1936	1937	1938	1939
France	3,811	5,862	4,595	1,311
Holland	52,741	42,234	46,234	29,894
British Indies	2,671	3,211	1,480	3,602
Dutch Indies	7,466	8,310	6,567	4,985
United States	3,163	2,009	3,985	3,010
Guatemala	1,944	2,854	2,534	3,053
Haiti	39,453	59,988	47,466	54,386
Brazil	221,067	196,814	201,482	250,055
Columbia	3,786	4,769	4,920	4,452
Misc.	9,946	11,649	7,044	10,362
Total	346,048	337,700	326,700	365,110
Belgian Congo	177,781	173,520	189,365	182,102
TOTAL Q.M.	523,829	511,220	516,309	547,212

SOURCE: Carton Agri. (343), 1940 - Dossier E. Café - Divers: Marchés, Politiques Café Robusta, et etc., Dossier E-3, Mévente des Arabicas, Comptoir des Cafes Victor DeHae à M. Van den Abeels, au Ministère des Colonies, Brussels, (with annexe). Antwerp, April 12, 1940.

Table XIII. Import Duty on Coffees in 1938 (per 100 kilos).

Countries	Belgian Francs
Italy	3,654
Hungary	3,630
Austria	3,146
Germany	1,914
Spain	1,860
Czechoslovakia	1,781
France	700
Denmark	560
Greece	536
Switzerland	478
Portugal	369
Sweden	323
Argentina	418

SOURCE: Carton Agri (342, Dossier No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528/12, Annexe I, Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge, Note confidentielle, p. 3. Brussels, April 22, 1938.

As Table XII demonstrates, Belgian coffees were actually in competition not only with those of Brazil and the rest of Latin America but also with the produce of the colonies of several other European nations. In addition, most European countries imposed stringent import duties on foreign coffee (see Table XIII). Brussels, however, believed it could address or even redress this issue through improved processing techniques and price support of subsidies to encourage producers and wholesalers to seek foreign outlets for their product. As early as February 1936, six months before the ordinance limiting coffee was passed, the metropole considered proposals to licence imports of all coffees. To guarantee quality control, the Commission Economique Interministereille would issue licences only if the entering coffees met certain standards and were shipped directly from the country of origin.[67] While this measure would eliminate dumping, it could also antagonize major producer-countries and invite retaliation. To make the new system more palatable for the foreign countries and their producers, but especially for Brazil, the metropole repealed import duties on plantation coffees on April 4, 1936.[68]

The administration would exercise quality control at the source or before coffees were shipped overseas from the colonies. While the quantity of coffee coming from the provinces would not be limited, it would have to meet

"certain" quality specifications.[70] The licencing system, so the administration believed, would stimulate the rehabilitation of "good coffees," and it would be profitable to "our merchant marines and to the port of Anvers," because it would provide the merchant fleets with about 3 million francs of freight (or about 55BF per ton).[71] By year's end, however, only the segment establishing quality controls at the point of exit remained.[72] The administration at Brussels, undoubtedly concerned about retaliation, had discarded the rest of the proposal.

Henceforth, however, coffees would not receive export authorization from Belgian Africa without possessing sufficient quality of cleanliness: odors had to be significantly reduced (i.e., less moisture would be permitted) and foreign material could not exceed 2 percent of the total weight, nor contain more than 10 percent black or partially black beans, and bags could only contain a fixed percentage of broken pieces.[73]

In 1937, the Colonial Office at Brussels even considered a private initiative from Comité National du Kivu to establish a cooperative marketing board for coffee, and agreed to contribute half the capital in the form of an interest free loan of 250,000BF from the Fonds de Colonisation. But confronted with Belgian devaluation, selling Arabica was particularly difficult; the Comité consequently planned to concentrate its efforts on organizing the sale

of Arabica.[74] The cooperative also considered a working relationship with the coffee board of Kenya to improve the reputation of Arabica coffees.[75] Unfortunately, this initiative collapsed, because it was impossible to unite settlers and planters into a single organization. In fact, the Chamber of Commerce of Costermansville protested rigorously against the venture, because it believed the Comité National was much too diversified and not representative of the coffee planters as a whole.[76] This particular episode demonstrated that the planters were not as unified as they wanted to appear; nor did they always agree on the best way to defend their interests. However, they could unite when faced with an external threat, coming from the African areas in the Kivu, Rwanda, and Burundi or from the larger plantation owners from Brazil.

Government efforts to create a marketing board for coffees were dismal failures, primarily because it had no rational approach to the problem. While it fully understood the magnitude of the situation, the administration really had no consistent way to attack it. The metropole was eager to experiment but evidently had little persistence, when it came to achieving a solution. The licencing procedure was discarded for fear of offending Brazil; the marketing board was abandoned because of planter opposition. Yet the metropole clearly understood that there was not much time left: coffee stocks were increasing,

and, as Table XIV shows, potential surpluses loomed even larger despite the prohibition ordinance of 1936. Moreover, prices continued to stagnate--the average selling price for Robusta in 1938 was 3BF per kilo and for Arabica, 5.50 to 6.00BF per kilo. The government noted that Arabica was selling at 2BF per kilo below its real value. Attempts to improve Arabica's uneven quality, fermentation and drying, however, had not closed the price gap.[77] Nor was the price likely to go up, as long as existing surpluses remained on the market. And moving stocks was almost impossible, given the import duties imposed by some consumer countries (see Table XIII).

The situation for Robusta was somewhat better. Belgians were beginning to acquire a taste for it, particularly if it was mixed with other blends, and efforts at quality control had improved its reputation.[78] The counter-offensive against Brazilian coffees, initiated in 1936, was beginning to change consumer preference.[79] The immediate problem, however, was to eliminate surplus Arabica from the national market. Consequently, Minister Rubbens decided to grant a regressive three-year subsidy (bonification) of 1.50BF, 1.00BF and .50 centimes for each kilo of Arabica sold on foreign markets. There was also the possibility that some inroads could be made on the German quota of 2,000 tons.[80] But some experts doubted this would happen, since Germans were partial to good quality

Table XIV. Coffee Cultivation in 1938.

A. European Plantations (in hectares)		
Robusta ±	38,598	
Arabica ±	17,660	
Total	56,258	hectares (of which 2/3 are in full production).
B. African Cultivation (in hectares)		
Belgian Congo ±	2,400	
Rwanda-Burundi ±	12,400	(or 19 million coffee trees)
Total	14,800	hectares (of which 2/3 are in full production).

SOURCE: Archives Africaine, Brussels. Ministère des Colonies. Carton Agri. (342), Dossier [Café, 1935-1939], Rapport Pour M. le Ministre, p. 1. Brussels, May 30, 1938.

robusta.[81] The metropole, however, was only fooling itself, especially if one considers that most foreign markets, in an attempt to improve their own trade advantages, were applying protectionist devices and restrictive quotas against their competition. British protectionism, in fact, was partially responsible for the accumulation of Arabica stocks on the Belgian market.[82]

Prior to 1938, much of the African Arabica produced in Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi went to Britain, British

East Africa, South Africa, Canada, Syria, and the United States. But after the reinforcement of protectionism the London market evaporated, and the Belgian market was forced to assume the production.* As Arabica stocks accumulated, European planters, particularly the Union Belge des Colons du Kivu (hereafter Ubelco) at Costermansville, demanded the suspension of Arabica-growing in the African areas. The Union was especially concerned about the 1939 extension campaign in Rwanda and Burundi. In a March telegram to the Ministry of Colonies, Ubelco told officials that a favorable decision would have considerable psychological effect on retailers with surpluses at Antwerp.[83] In a much more detailed memorandum of March 12, 1938, Ubelco told the ministry that the request to curtail production was justified because "the pressure from African production in Rwanda is partly the reason Arabica coffee from European plantations do not sell." But at the same time, Ubelco made a startling admission when it also told the minister that African and European coffees were of similar quality. The Union also said African coffees could be sold for a franc or 1.50BF less, "primarily because Africans don't

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*See Table XIV, which indicates that European grown Arabica was quite small in comparison to Robusta production. Also Africans were the largest producers of Arabica.

have multiple production costs that are usually detrimental to the profit level of European planters."[84]

Ubelco's remarks were significant for several reasons. First of all, it is the first time that European planters admitted that African coffees were not inferior.[86] Secondly, Ubelco's statements were thinly veiled requests for Europeans to receive special consideration because times were so bad. This attitude was even more marked when Ubelco went on to say that Africans had "received more assistance than European planters." Ubelco concluded by saying the union or European planters had not opposed the introduction of Arabica coffee production in Ruanda-Urundi, "primarily because the condition of the market was more favorable than it is today." And Ubelco wondered whether,

> they [the administration] could, at this time, approve the Ruanda-Urundi coffee project that is designed . . . to provide Africans with indispensable resources [with which] to eliminate the poverty that exists in the country, when [in fact] the present economic condition of Ruanda-Urundi has improved to such an extent that these considerations appear, in large measure, unwarranted.[86]

Ubelco noted that Africans also enjoyed many other advantages as a result of European colonialism: road construction throughout the country enabled them to sell produce profitable; and mines provided them with employment.[87] In other words, what more could they possibly want?

Ubelco, in citing these benefits, felt justified in

asking the minister to end the 1939 extension program in Rwanda and Burundi. Termination would unquestionably relieve European anxiety and allow more profit once African competition was removed. In other words, Ubelco wanted the metropole to save whites from economic ruin, "particularly" as one commentator observed, "those settlers who have put their capital and efforts of many years into the planting of Arabica in the Kivu province."[88]

The metropole's proposed telegraphic reply of March 17, 1938, was quite cryptic and non-committal:

> Took note of your telegram of March 12 (stop) We anticipate revenues to permit the exportation of "Arabica" to places [markets] other than Belgium (stop) For surplus we point out that the development of African coffee plants [in Rwanda and Burundi] have reached saturation point.[89]

But the next day, the Secretary General in the Colonial Office was more specific, recommending termination of the 1939-extension project, as well as advising officials in Rwanda and Burundi to concern themselves solely with replacing new plants for old.[90]

However, not all officialdom was certain that the suspension would be perceived as fair to African planters. In a memorandum of March 25, 1938, Governor General Ryckmans reminded the ministry of his position on African agricultural development, and warned that it might be impossible to defend such a decision before the League of Nations.[91]

In sharp contrast Governor Jungers of Ruanda-Urundi commented that the crisis in the Arabica coffee trade was indeed a real one.[92] He planned to stop the extension campaign as soon as the current crop of young plants were put into the ground; and advised his staff not to create new nurseries in 1939, but to concentrate on replacement and proper maintenance.[93] Apparently no one but Ryckmans was concerned about the metropole's commitment to African development.

In April 1938, he again told Minister Rubbens that he opposed the restrictions on several counts. First, it would have no effect on decreasing production, since intensive cultivation on existing hectares would probably be the consequence of any restriction, a particularly prophetic point. Ryckmans repeated his notion that any restriction would have serious political and psychological repercussions, although he did not elaborate. He added that suspension represented a renunciation of the government's commitment to African coffee planters in Ruanda-Urundi. Finally, he expressed concern that Africans would not fully comprehend the abrupt policy change.

> The African will not be able to understand that overnight we establish a law which makes him plant a coffee tree while at the same time we penalize him when he does not plant![94]

Ryckmans also thought that this change in policy would be offensive to the African since the administration

"prohibits him from planting at a time when he was just beginning to see, from personal experience, that planting coffee was in his own best interest." He also had reason to believe

> . . . si l'Européen touche une prime à l' exportation en contrepartie de l' interdiction de s'etendre l'indigène se verra appliquer l'interdiction sans aucune contrepartie.[95]

Ryckmans' point of view evidently prevailed to some extent, for during a Colonial Council debate the scope of the decree to suppress the 1939-extension of the coffee campaign in Ruanda and Urundi was expanded. During the debate, one member commented on the decree's duplicity, in discussing the decline in world Arabica prices.[96] While exaggerating the issue, he asked somewhat rhetorically,

> By limiting it [coffee production], aren't we going to ruin and hamper the magnificent efforts of more than 400,000 African planters who live in Ruanda-Urundi, [on the pretext] of protecting several dozen European settlers? Couldn't some other measures be envisioned to assist European planters, such as granting a subsidy for each kilo of coffee harvested?

While it can not be determined how much the council member's questions changed the focus of the debate, what emerged from the Conseil Colonial was an ordinance with the following title: "project de décret sur limitation temporaire des plantations de café au Congo Belge et au

Ruanda-Urundi."[97] Thus, the suspension had been extended to include the Belgian Congo. The change showed that the council was more concerned with coffee surpluses than in the interests of a few Belgian settlers. Members felt a need to stabilize the national market, because a recent study predicted that unless Arabica production was stabilized the output from both Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi would be 35,000 tons of coffee in four years, an amount that Belgium could not possibly absorb, so the Conseil's decided to suppress further extension in both colonies.[98] To make the decision acceptable to European planters, the council recommended they be given subsidies to finance the next harvests and reduction on transport costs, neither of which would be accorded to Africans. The decree also emphasized that neither robusta or Arabica planting was to be extended until the general economic situation changed.[99]

The planters concluded that they had been hoodwinked by the metropole. Whereas the initial decree was intended to restrict Arabica plantations in Rwanda and Burundi, what emerged was a total ban on the extension of all varieties. Although many planters immediately sought to lay the question before the Conseil de Colonisation and Unaki, in order to plan a concerted counter-attack, others were more concerned that the decree had been taken without any prior consultation with colonial officials or with private groups, such as the provincial government, the Comité National du

Kivu, or Ubelco.[100] These were the most affected and the most vocal in protesting when their interests were at stake --a point which the administration knew all to well. Other planters, however, were consoled by the subsidies offered by the government.

Brussels then turned its full attention to the subsidy issue, and proved that even the simplest device can be made so complex as to be unresolvable. From February 1938 to May, 1940--the day Germany invaded Belgium--the subsidy issue remained an albatross around the administration's neck. Nothing seemed to work or operate for very long; the administration constantly reversed itself or meticulously examined every proposal, so that in the end, subsidies were a confused and tangled mess.

The first request for a free export subsidy or an allowance of 2BF for 5,000 tons of unsaleable stocks of Arabica at Antwerp, proposed in early February, was rejected out of hand by the administration, because it constituted dumping.[101] In March, a comprehensive request for an annual subsidy of 6 million francs was proposed by Senator Godding, to permit the colonies to establish a marketing board which would sell Arabica overseas and licence foreign coffees entering Belgium.[102] Because it would require annual grants from the Colonial Budget, the Ministry of Colonies rejected the proposal.[103] However, the metropole granted a 1.50BF per kilo rebate to those European planters

who successfully exported their Arabica coffees overseas. The subsidy or rebate was designed to correct the difficulties encountered in recent months by Arabica in the Belgium market.[104]

In 1939, market conditions at Antwerp continued to deteriorate, and by July they were critical not only for Arabica but robusta as well. The reasons for adverse market conditions for robusta were quite complex, but stocks for the latter, which had suddenly grown to 7,500 tons,[105] was one factor. The sudden increase was attributed to the intensive cultivation practiced by Belgian planters who had anticipated the restrictive ordinances of 1936 and 1938.* As a result young plants were entering into the harvest cycle, and some agronomical experts in the administration also feared that intensive cultivation of robusta had the capacity to increase yields by 40 percent.[106] Moreover, the selling prices of robusta fluctuated between 3.90 and 4.11BF, compared to the world price of 3.00BF,[107] making other coffees much cheaper to purchase. Brazil was the major culprit in weakening the world market prices and the major cause for the deterioration of the Belgian market. At the beginning of the year, it had begun to dump Rio No. 7, which sold for 3.16BF per kilo (Rio No. 5, introduced

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*See p. 286 for Governor Ryckmans' prophecy and pages 287-288 for the colonial debate on the intensive cultivation issue.

earlier, sold for 3.02BF),[108] thus underselling Belgian Congo robusta.

In order to move robusta off the national market, the Ministry granted a subsidy of 70 centimes for every kilo exported elsewhere. The export subsidy was to last twelve months,[109] but because of the outbreak of the war in Europe, it only lasted for two. Brussels suspended the export tariff in September for fear that it would not receive adequate supplies of coffee for its own nationals.[110] Consequently the situation worsened as stocks accumulated at Antwerp. These were sold at a loss, and they were added to coffees which previously had buyers on the foreign markets.

The stocks which had accumulated at Antwerp prior to the Nazi invasion stemmed partially from intensive cultivation practiced in Belgian Africa. By utilizing the land to the fullest, planters hoped to increase profit margins and to circumvent the decrees of 1936 and 1938 limiting the extension of coffee plantations. Evidently the practice did not generate sufficient profits, for in February 1939, the Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge approached Minister Rubbens and requested a reexamination of the decree limiting the extension of coffee acreage. Representatives of the Société Anonyme complained that all planters were experiencing difficulty in adhering to the ordinance, which it believed was actually reducing present production levels, even though this was not the intent of the decree.

The situation was particularly pressing at the Société's Benga station, where 600 hectares was planted in coffee.[111]

The Société was considering replacing 150 hectares of the oldest trees that were planted in 1928. Under the 1938 ordinance, it could only plant on new soil if equivalent hectares were destroyed in the old plantation. The society's argument, however, was that the 150 hectares in question would not become productive until after the third year. In order to maintain current production levels, it would have to plant 150 hectares in young plants and simultaneously maintain the 150 hectares planted in 1928.[112] The ploy was of course against the law, but in the Société's view, the policy of immediate destruction of plants was "anti-economic and does not conform to the intent of the ordinance." The organizations currently produced 500 tons annually, but if they followed administrative policy to the letter, production in three or four years would decline 120 tons. Consequently, it wanted the ministry to reinterpret the decree and permit the Société to retain the old plants until the new plants matured. The older plants would then be destroyed, since planters (and the Société) would enter into a contract to destroy the old tree three years after the replacement plants were functioning.[113]

The Société had enlisted the aid of Senator Godding, who wrote to the ministry the same day the organizations' memorandum was mailed. The senator had also written to the

4th Direction General earlier in January but without satisfactory results. The director general had replied in vague terms and concluded by saying that such a plan would be extremely difficult and expensive to monitor.[114] However, on March 7, he recommended to the ministry that the matter be studied, in spite of the difficulties that would be involved in monitoring the destruction of older acreage.[115]

The issue came to a head at the May 19 meeting of the Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge in Brussels. The colonial office was ably represented by Director General Van Den Abeele, Inspector General Heys, and G. E. Sladden, the Colonies' coffee expert. Senator Godding was also in attendance. The Union sought to persuade colonial officials to permit the destruction of old trees three or four years after new ones had been planted and had become productive.[116] The Union also argued that reclamation and replantation, within the existing hectares, as suggested by the administration, would be extremely costly, especially the reclamation of exhausted land. Those who had tried to rejuvenate land containing old coffee trees, they claimed, had achieved only mediocre results. Moreover, they believed that the written pledge to destroy old trees was an adequate undertaking. Even if the decrees were repealed, planters would still uproot old trees as pledged.[117] Under the new scheme, Congolese coffee "would not be subject to a slow decline," and the objectives of the ordinances of 1936

and 1938 would be maintained. Better still, the amortization of their own capital equipment would be preserved as well.[118]

The administration was not impressed. In responding to the Union's argument that the present ordinance would impede the export of coffee from the Belgian Congo, administrative officials told them that any decline would stem from their own negligence. In fact, they could cite numerous instances where planters had put in new hectares, "applied a vague kind of pruning and inadequate mulching, and then expected these plants to produce for them."[119] If yields were declining, it was because the soil was exhausted or damaged from lack of adequate terracing and maintenance. When trees were trimmed improperly, the structure of the trees became deformed. "Obviously, it was easier to plant trees and to expect them to grow, then to perform operations which would make them more productive."120 The maintenance of the decree, "as it is presently interpreted, would not effect the amount of coffee exported, if planters adopt more rational methods of cultivation." Officials also argued that periodic spraying, inclusive pruning and judicious amounts of shading would double the average yield of coffee trees, then less than 700 kilos, in two or three years.[121] The current regulations offered practical solutions to the problem of overproduction and were also designed to direct planters toward more rational

cultivation methods, to improve the quality of coffee, and to stimulate diversification. The last, according to colonial officials, would provide greater balance to the plantation economy. But more importantly, there would not be the problem of control.[122]

Colonial officials realized that it would be almost impossible to force planters to destroy even the most marginally productive fields or bushes. Planters who had initially argued for a reexamination because they needed to redistribute general costs as much as possible and to amortize the costs of processing, would use the very same points against destroying plants when the time arrived. And how would the verification be done? Monitoring imposed a considerable task on limited agricultural personnel, who would have to determine precisely the areas to be destroyed or replanted. The procedure would require not only the retention of statistical data but would also involve considerable cost. With the depression and existing commitments, the ministry was in no mood to assume this cost too. The financial component alone made the whole request, from the vantage point of the administration, unrealistic, but the planters and their supporters persisted.

A week later, the Association des Planters de Café du Congo joined the fray at the request of Senator Godding and Mr. Moeller, president of the association. They requested a meeting with Director General Van den Abeele in Brussels

to discuss the reinterpretation. While Van den Abelle was adamant about the maintenance of the existing ordinance, he did relent somewhat by stating the administration's willingness to reassess the ordinance within two years (to August 1940). By then, he believed the colonial government would be in a better position to judge the effectiveness of the ordinance and to render a decision about its maintenance, suppression, or change.[123] The planters and their supporters were undaunted by this ploy to table the issue. Although they remained inactive until June, when an alternate solution was suggested. Instead of asking for replacement parcels, the Union ought to approach the colonial officials with some kind of formula for production quotas.[124] The latter would eliminate the need for an elaborate bureaucracy, would be considerably less expensive, and would not require the destruction of coffee trees. By limiting each plantation to a particular production ceiling, which could not be surpassed, the colonial government could estimate the maximum of amount of financial assistance needed to assist planters in achieving production levels without hindering the operations of each individual concession. The production ceiling would be fixed (and uniform) according to the type of coffee cultivated--Arabica or robusta. However, there would be no need to limit or expand the number of hectares planted, since the restriction would be placed on the amount of tonnage produced.[125]

The government's reply was essentially the same as it had always been. On June 20, 1939, it informed the Union that the existing ordinance would not be modified, and restated the reasons it had put forth in the May 19 meeting with the Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge. At the same time, officials admitted that the existing decree was expedient as long as stocks existed on the market at Antwerp. Offers of financial incentives to encourage exportation of coffee to overseas' outlets would still be available,[126] and there was the possibility of terminating the ordinance in August 1940, to be discussed by the Colonial Council in July.[127] But as far as the administration was concerned, the matter was closed until the Conseil Colonial made a decision on the proposed modifications.

With the cancellation of the export subsidies in September, there was little chance that the ordinance would be changed. Although international events changed the situation entirely, settlers at Uele, the Kivu, Biaro, and planters associated with Unaki, Comité National du Kivu, and the Kreglinger group continued to protest.[128] Settlers complained about administrative incompetence, the emigration of Banyarwanda, and the creeping pauperization of the population. Others felt they were being slighted, because the mining industries, considered more important to the war effort than agriculture, received greater financial assistance. Still others begin to fight among themselves,

questioning the credentials and suitability of reprsentative associations.[129] Colonial officials in Brussels and in the colonies responded in kind, especially to charges of favoritism and incompetence.

At the beginning of 1940, the replacement issue was superceded by the situation in the Arabica coffee market at Antwerp. Many planters were too preoccupied with survival to carry on the struggle to repeal the 1938-ordinance. Arabica prices had increased slightly because customers anticipated shortages, and there was hoarding. As a result, planters sold their product for 9BF per kilo on the national market at Antwerp and from 4.50 to 5.00BF per Kilo locally. Still the coffee surplus was 2,000 tons, and buyers expected another shipment of 1,000 tons in early February. In spite of a slight price increase, the prognosis was critical because some roasters had reported no sales for the past two months. Also officials argued that plantations in the Kivu and Ituri were no longer economically feasible.[130] By February, the situation was so acute that unsaleable Arabica stocks produced a credit coagulation, making it difficult for wholesalers to obtain money to purchase coffee and planters to secure loans to pay other creditors. In fact, planters in the Kivu and Ituri faced bankruptcy, and others found it difficult to pay bank loans. Naturally, they pressured the national and colonial governments to reinstitute the export subsidy in

order to relieve the market congestion and to improve the precarious position of commercial coffee buyers and growers.[131] But it was doubtful whether the subsidy would have improved the buyers' positions or the planters' finances. Submarine warfare in the Atlantic made lenders reluctant to grant loans; wholesalers were also plagued with high insurance costs for coffee consignments shipped from the colonies.

There were a few futile attempts to resurrect the replacement issue in March, despite the administration's ruling in November 1939 that the ordinance would not be amended or repealed.[132] Aside from a few technical points, nothing new was added to the debate.[133] As far as the administration was concerned the matter was closed, although accumulating stocks at Antwerp remained a problem. In March, the administration had considered numerous proposals, involving quotas and the institution of the re-export subsidy of 1.50BF per kilo. But these measures were discarded for fear that they might invite retaliation.[134] Even when, on March 29, 1940, the Comité Economique Interministériel proposed the stabilization of the importation of foreign coffees in Belgium on the basis of the 1938 import levels, which were 10 percent lower than those of 1939, the colonial office refused for fear of Brazilian reprisals.[135] Most officials, however, supported the reinstitution of the export allowance (bonification) of

1.50BF per kilo of Arabica exported directly from the Belgian Congo to oversea's markets,[136] even though they knew that oversea's outlets were problematical. The allowance served only as a morale booster for planters and nothing more. Most countries had already taken measures to stop the importation of foreign products from entering their countries. Many observers wondered out loud why Belgium had not done likewise.[137] The subsidy issue was still being debated when the Nazi's invaded Belgium in May, rendering the issue moot.

With the surrender of Belgium to Germany in May 1940, the planters lost their principle market. In the colony, the governor general repealed all other export duties and customs surtax on Arabica coffee. The 10 centimes licence tax was also revoked, since the creation of a new coffee marketing board* in November assumed the licencing function. However, by May the coffee economy in the colony had truly collapsed and was not revived until 1942, when exports rose appreciably, thanks largely to the Office du Café and some arrangements made with the allies.[138] Robusta struggled on until, in 1941, it found markets in Egypt and in the Sudan.[139]

When the planters found themselves in difficulty in 1934, they united and turned to the metropole for help.

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*See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the Office du Café.

The defeat over the zone de protection issue had taught them that they could bring pressure to bear only if they were a unified lobby. They demanded not only subsidies and quotas to protect and sell their coffee, but they also asked the metropole to eliminate their African competitor as well. Planters also sought to regain their own identity and confidence as Europeans and Belgian citizens vis-a-vis their African counterparts. Using their associations and through letters and press releases, they succeeded in reminding officials who they were and what they had done during the colonial phase to "civilize" or develop African agriculture and to bring prosperity to the colonies. These actions warranted respect and special consideration.

The metropole, committed to African agricultural development because of its low capital overhead, acquiesced in part to the demands of the European planters primarily because alternative solutions--either quotas on foreign coffees or the authorization of re-export subsidies--would have invited retaliation. The realistic solution would have been to replace European producers with Africans, for they could produce more for less. Africans did not require the services associated with the European "civilized" life or the power of a European planter lobby. The crisis, however, in international economies and the coffee markets made the substitution impossible. The metropole, however, could make coffee production more efficient, and at the

same time eliminate marginal European planters with only minimal cost to the administration. Consequently, rather than restrict the prohibition against the future extension of planting to Africans, the ordinance was expanded to incorporate European producers as well. However, the metropole's overriding concern was that commercial agreements with Brazil could not be jeopardized. In fact, the general policy of the Belgian government for the 1930s could be characterized as

> n'aggravant pas sensiblement les conditions d'importation d' un product intéressant et n'ayant d'autre but que de protéger un produit national dont la production se trouve d'ailleurs être l'objet de limitation legal.[140]

The administration understood that Brazil controlled the international market. Therefore, the only solution was to encourage its planters to decrease their productive capacity, dump their coffees in Europe if possible, for even lower prices, or find new outlets in Africa, Asia Minor, or North America. But because of the extreme economic dislocation within the industrialized nations brought on by the depression, no solutions would work for very long. Recovery meant creating protectionist devices to achieve one's own advantage. Consequently the administration experimented with a number of its own devices and plans in an attempt to sell its coffees. The war and the invasion by Nazi Germany provided the ultimate solution: the opportunity to start over again.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

[1]For examples of the role of the state and its relation to production and economic development, see the following studies: Martin Legassick's "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence," Economy and Society, III, No. 3 (August, 1974), pp. 253-291; B. J. Berman's and J. M. Lonsdale's "Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: the Development of the Labor Control System in Kenya, 1919-1929," Canadian Journal of African Studies, XIV, No. 1 (1980), pp. 55-81; and M. L. Morris, "The development of capitalism in South African Agriculture: class Struggle in the Countryside," Economy and Society, V, No. 3 (August, 1976) pp. 292-343.

[2]See William B. Cohen's The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880 (Bloomington & London, 1980); Rhoda Howard's Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana (New York, 1978); and Elena L. Berger's Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence (Oxford, 1974).

Cohen argues that the images formed in the course of interaction between Europeans and non-Europeans in the fifteenth century helped shape white reactions to non-Europeans. These images became deeply implanted in French culture and exercised a pervasive influence over later generations of Frenchmen. However, in the eighteenth century, despite deeply entrenched French beliefs in black inequality, Africans were treated better in Africa, when the French wanted to make political and commercial inroads than in the racially rigid plantation societies in the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. By the nineteenth century, French tolerance in West Africa had given way to racism, in the light of French expansionist aims and imperialist dreams, economic and geopolitical considerations, and when the French had acquired a preponderance of power relative to Africans. To limit an emerging colored elite, French closed entry to education and employment opportunities and tried to take away political rights previously granted. As French imperialism advanced, French dependence on the assimilated populations of Saint-Louis ceased, and a new relationship between white and black, which was more rigid and racially exclusive,

was established in the Senegambia, Western Sudan, and the west coast of Africa south from Senegal to Gabon. The late nineteenth century change in French attitude and course of action was also in response to a perceived change in British policy; to prevent areas from falling under British control, the French launched a conquest of their own. See pages XV-XIX, 120-129, 169-178, and 254-282.

Howard describes how capitalist development in Ghana was circumscribed by an external bourgeoisie bolstered by the power of a foreign state. She maintains that in colonial Ghana, the state acted on behalf of the metropolitan bourgeoisie as long as their interests coincided. Colonial rule was imperial rule, and imperial interests were not always the same as the interests of the expatriate businessmen, even though they were given the right of consultation with the colonial and home governments (through the Colonial office) and possessed considerable influence in the financial decisions made by the colonial state. She notes that racial lines were drawn between Africans and Europeans and conflicts were expressed in trading and administration. But competition in both economics and politics had been conducted on a fairly balanced basis until the mid-nineteenth century for the former and until the beginning of the twentieth century for the latter. Nor did the British, in the beginning, consider themselves as a superior race dealing with an inferior one. A number of intermarriages took place between the original European traders in Ghana and aristocratic African trading families. European tolerance collapsed, however, when European firms began to reorganize in a way that minimized the need to use African traders. Direct shipment to European employees on the coast were substituted for shipments consigned on credit to African trading partners. Howard maintains that the change to direct shipping was in part a deliberate attempt to remove African competitors, who were experiencing difficulties with repayment of debts, and the acquisition of specie to pay customs duties or to pay cash for agricultural produce. Europeans consistently undercut African in sales and overpriced them in purchasing. These devices pushed African traders out of the market. The decline of African traders as a significant economic force was accompanied by their exclusion in other spheres as well. Ghanaians were systematically excluded from the Gold Coast Chamber of Commerce by the turn of the century, as well as from government. See pages 15-17 and 146-186.

In Berger's study of the development of the mining industry on the Zambian copperbelt, she demonstrates that the state's attitude toward labor disputes, conflict between white and black laborers, and economic opportunity for

African workers were often influenced by economic considerations. During the depression, the British government refused to consider a plan to stabilize the labor force at the Northern Rhodesian copper companies because labor migration provided a means of gaining taxes from Africans. The administration also believed that a continued policy of labor migration would not alarm the white community, since such a policy was not likely to encourage the acquisition of industrial skills by African workers. And the importance of copper supplies in Britain's war effort in 1940s' outweighed adherence to the wavering principle of equal opportunity or gradual integration for Africans in the economy. Similarly, the British government was reluctant to accept the recommendations of the Dalgleish Commission on African employment opportunities because it feared labor unrest by whites at a time when copper production was strategically important to the United Kingdom.

In terms of racial relations, she notes that the Africans were tolerated in the towns out of fear of a labor shortage, but the normal relationship between white and black was that of master and servant, a circumstance which she asserts, froze the position of the African in a mixed society. He gained little protection from the colonial system for the government's wary concern for employer's rights often neutralized its duties of trusteeship. Furthermore the color bar was extended to the field of employment in transportation and construction industries and government service until 1939. See pages 19-21, 32-54, and 106-111.

[3]Vice Governor General Junger was appointed to his post on June 30, 1932. He was instrumental in reducing food prestations. In 1932, every able-bodied adult male was required to provide notables with three kilos of peas or beans and six kilos of sorghum each year. One-third was allotted to the notables of the province or the chieftain, and the remainder went to the sub-chief. Food prestations of honey, beer, hoes, hides, straw mats, and other manufactured objects were still provided for specialists, but units would be fixed in order to avoid excessive abuse. However, the same proportional distribution among chiefs and sub-chiefs would prevail. Rapport 1932, 17; Rapport 1933, p. 118.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Rapport 1929, 39; J. DeRyckman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur du Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge iV, 4 (February 22, 1930), 52-3; and "Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26, 1932), 183-6.

[6]Agricultural et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixième Année, No. 14 (October 15, 1932), p. 159.

[7]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixième Année, No. 16 (November 26, 1932), p. 183.

[8]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi. Réunion de l'Union Agricole du Kivu du jeudi 2 Mars 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 5 (April 1933), p. 52.

[9]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Sixième Année, No. 16 (November 1932), p. 183.

[10]"Agriculture Indigène: Grandes Lignes du Programme Agricole du Gouvernement," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 5 (May 1935), pp. 72-3.

[11]"Agriculture Indigène: Grandes Lignes du Programme Agricole du Gouvernement," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 5 (May 1935), p. 73.

[12]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi. Réunion de l'Union Agricole du Kivu du jeudi 2 Mars 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 5 (April 1, 1933), p. 52.

[13]"Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu. Rapport pour la Séance du Jeudi 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May 1933), p. 64.

[14]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi, Union Agricole des Regions du Kivu (Unaki). Réunion du 12 Avril 1933, "Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 7 (June 1933), p. 78.

[15]"Union Agricole des Région du Kivu. Rapport pour la Séance du Jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May, 1933), p. 64.

[16]"Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu. Rapport pour la Séance du jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May 1933), pp. 64-65.

[17]"Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu. Rapport pour la Séance du jeudi, 23 fevrier 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May 1933), p. 65.

[18]Jean-Luc Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, C. 1890-1930." in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, (eds.) Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 308-9.

[19]Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba," p. 309.

[20]E. Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-34," Bulletin l'Institut des Science Economiques, Sixieme Annee, No. 2 (1935), p. 138.

[21]Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-34," p. 138.

[22]Ibid., pp. 138-9.

[23]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi, Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu (Unaki), Réunion du 12 avril 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 7 (June 1933), pp. 78-79.

[24]"Les Zones de Protection du Café en Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 6 (May, 1933), p. 66.

[25]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi, Union Agricole des Régions du Kivu (Unaki), Réunion du 31 Mai 1933," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Septième Année, No. 7 (June 1933), pp. 79-80.

[26]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi, Union Agricole des Région du Kivu (Unaki)," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Huitième Année, No. 1 (January, 1934), pp. 2-3.

[27]Archives Africaines, Brussels. Ministère des Colonies (hereafter AA-B, MDC). Carton Agri (341), No. 370/6, Memorandum with 3 annexes, Inspection Générale de l'Agriculture et des Forêts à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, Culture du Café Kibali-ituri. Leopoldville, November 17, 1933.

[28]See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 370/6. Inspection Générale de l'Agriculture et des Forêts à Monsieur le Ministres des Colonies. Leopoldville, November 17, 1933. According to this memorandum the government planned an extensive coffee campaign in the following African areas: the territories of Faradje, Aru, Geti, Beni and Lubero. The inspector general, however, was not supportive of the policy because the campaign might prove to be too costly and was much to close to European settled areas. There were technical problems to be considered. He also told the Ministry that even though Rwanda and Burundi had access to sufficient agricultural personnel, they had not achieved the "desired" results, and the government "ought to exercise prudence."

[29]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi (Unaki), Assemblée Générale du 13 fevrier 1935," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 4 (April 1935), pp. 51-53.

[30]This was a common practice in Belgian's colonial history. Many of its leading colonial officials often came from private enterprises with dealings in the colonies. However, their performances in terms of support for colonial or African interests were never consistent. As a result Belgian colonial policy was often confused and erratic. Pierre Ryckmans is an excellent example. Unaki expected much from their former president, but he often disappointed them with his fluctuating tendencies. In his, declaration, carried by the Matin du Congo, he promised that he would assist settlers and their efforts, but emphasized at the same time that he was not a wizard and that his powers were limited. He could not alter the social and economic conditions in Belgian Africa with a magic wand. But he would do what was practical. He would support colonization and would exempt settlers from the security deposit of 10,000BF demanded from all Belgian immigrants at the frontier. Those who had failed in the colonies would be sent home free-of-charge, but those willing to work would receive free land and government technical assistance.

However, he seemed to waiver on the question of commercial crops, noting that this issue was "much more complex." He told Europeans that fruit crops and vegetables could be profitable exports, but was less clear on coffee production, offering some vague share-cropping scheme in conjunction with established companies in settled areas.

In an interview on Ruanda and Burundi, conducted while on an inspection tour, Ryckmans followed the government's line by maintaining that African coffee cultivation

represented an excellent prospect, because it would enable them to remain home (i.e. not leave their own country), pay their taxes and purchase necessities. He further maintained that coffee "is unquestionably suitable for this agricultural people." Certainly this was not Unaki's position. "Déclaration de M. le Gouverneur General Ryckmans." Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, Neuvième Année, No. 12 (December 1935), pp. 184-186.

[31]"Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi (Unaki), Assemblée Générale du 13 fevrier 1935," p. 52.

[32]See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 384, Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo (hereafter A.P.C.C.) à M. le Ministre des Colonies à Bruxelles. Anvers, February, 1935. In 1935, the Association placed its membership at 355 planters, nearly all were Belgians, with some 410 coffee plantations comprising 53,000 hectares. In this memorandum, APCC also went on record as being opposed to extending coffee cultivation to African planters and expressed opposition to the recent propaganda campaign. Over production, it reminded the ministry, would ruin everyone and contribute to the loss of both foreign and domestic capital investment. Consequently it formally asked the administration to delay its African agricultural campaign in the Congo for several years. It maintained that African plant elaeis, hevia, and food crops, were more likely to provide enormous benefit to the colony without injuring existing enterprises. When the crisis has passed, Africans could entertain the idea of planting coffee.

[33]Also see AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 314, Annexe, Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo à M. le Ministre des Colonies, Fondant d'un Comité des Planteurs de Café. Anvers, January 12, 1934. The association notified the ministry of the formation of a committee to defend the interests of its members.

[34]AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 335, Annexe III, Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo (hereafter APCC) à la Commission Permanent des Transports de l' A.I.C.B. Anvers, N.D. (but this note from Mr. R. Cambier was attached to a memorandum for A.P.C.C. of September 24, 1934, to the Minister of Colonies). Also see "Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi (Unaki), Assemblée Générale du 13 fevrier 1935," p. 52.

[35]See AA-B, MDC. Carton Agri (341), No. 335, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour le 4 ème Direction Générale, with 3 Annexes. Brussels, July 26, 1934; and Annexe I, Notes sur le Moyen de Relever le Cours des Cafés Congolais, par M. Gelliaux. Tely, June 8, 1934.

[36]Annexe I, Notes sur le Moyen de Relever le Cours des Cafés.

[37]Carton Agri (341), No. 335, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour le 4 ème Direction Générale. See AA-B, MPC. Carton Agri (341), No. 343, Sénat à M. Paul Tschoffen, Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, August 29, 1934; and No. 334, Annexe, Ministère 1r Bureau, Note Pour la 5 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, July 16, 1934. Memorandum 343 contained information about quality controls for both European and African coffees.

[38]Agri (341), No. 384, A.P.C.C. a M. le Ministre des Colonies à Brussels. Anvers, February, 1935; and No. 384/b, Sénat à Monsieur le Ministère des Colonies. Anvers, February 8, 1935.

[39]E-8, No. 5, Ministère des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Générale, le Directeur Général, Note Pour Monsieur le Ministre. Brussels, July 24, 1935. Also see E-8, No. 7, Ministère des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Général à Monsieur R. Godding. Brussels, August 5, 1935.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Pierre Ryckmans, La Politique Coloniale (Brussels, 1934), pp. 10-12.

[42]Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[43]See Carton Agri (341), No. 417, Télégramme d' Etat reçu du Gouverneur Général Ryckmans. Costermanville, No. 12, November 8, 1935. This telegram is a response to memorandum y-3-283 of October 2, 1935, which contained the Colonial Offices decision to limit coffee. Director General Claessen's return cannot be determined exactly, but the inspection tour lasted about 5 to 6 weeks, for the Colonial office forwarded its decision to Ryckmans on October 2.

[44]Ibid.

[45]See Carton Agri. (341), No. 418, Dépêches du Congo Belge: Inco-presse, Service Colonial Belga, Dépêche No. 1350, T.S.F. Anvers, November 23, 1935. This press dispatch informed its readers that Unaki was opposed to the government's policy of discouraging European settlement in the Kivu.

[46]No. 417, Télégramme d'Etat. Costermanville, No. 12, November 8, 1935.

[47]No. 418, Dépêches du Congo Belge: Inco-presse, Service Colonial Belga. Anvers, November 23, 1935. Unaki praised government efforts to help planters fight against the powerful "organizations" (marketing boards) by creating an organisation permanents.

[48]Ibid.

[49]No. 418, Dépêches du Congo Belge: Inco-presse, Service Colonial Belga. Anvers, November 23, 1935.

[50]Ibid.

[51]No. 418, Annexe, Dépêches du Congo Belge, Incopresse, Service Colonial Belga, dépêche No. 351, TSF, Heure Léo, No. 314. Anvers, November 23, 1935.

[52]Carton Agri (341), No. 426, Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, December 24, 1935.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Op. cit.

[55]Carton Agri (343), 1936 - Kenya, Dossier E. Café Divers: Marchés; Politique Café Robusta, etc.; E-1, Ministère des Colonies, 4 ème Direction à M. le President de l'Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo (with one attachment and Appendix "A"--Transport). Brussels, January 13, 1936. For the Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo's response, see memorandum for the Association a M. le Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, January 15, 1936.

[56]Carton Agri (343), 1940 - Dossier E. Café Divers: E-3 Mévente Arabica, No. 643/2, Ministère des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Générale. Note Pour la 4 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, January 31, 1940. Also see Carton Agri (341), No. 484, Incopresse, Les Debouchés Pour le Café Belge au Kenya. Costermansville, October 9, 1937. This press release notes that the most of coffee harvested in Central Africa is of average qualities and is ordinarily consumed in the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Syria. Also in the agreement, transportation tariffs had been reduced appreciably by the railways of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Incopresse notes that an agreement had been reached to reorganize the commercialization of coffee by the Association du Commerce du Café de l'Afrique Orientale, the Bourse du Café de l' Afrique Orientale, and a union or liaison between the coffee planters of East Africa and the intermediaires of a Comité Permanent composed of producers and merchants.

[57]Carton Agri (343), 1936 - Kenya; E-1, Annexes, Coffee Trade Association of Kenya à le Consulat Général à Nairobi. Nairobi, August 7, 1938. For a report on the Ugandan and Kenyan coffee production from 1907 to 1934 by Ministry of foreign Affairs, also see Carton Agri (341), No. 370, with 4 Annexes. Brussels, September 21, 1934. These reports note that there was similar opposition to African coffee cultivation by European settlers in Kenya and Uganda. British colonists believed that African production should be restricted because it was unwise to encourage the production of the same product in the same area. Secondly, it was also unwise to extend African coffee production when there was over production in Brazil (p. 12). Also see No. 312, The Liverpool Trade Review, (January, 1934), p. 26.

[58]See Carton Agri (341), No. 425, Annexe, M. René Hebette à Monsieur le Directeur Général. Brussel, January 14, 1936. Hebette apparently believed that the weaknesses in the commercialization of Belgian coffees were everyone's fault: Brazil for its "duplicity" and "smear tactics" against Belgian coffees; planters for their "lethargy and inertia for only earning 50 million francs out of 250 million francs coffee industry in the metropole." If only the latter made a little effort, they could double the quantity of coffee sold in Belgium and create new markets in the European hinterland. Growth required an organization devoted exclusively to the commercialization of coffee. Hebette may have been correct, since no central marketing board existed in the colonies or the metropole. Hebette opposed restricting coffee production; unity and additional market outlets were the answers.

[59]No. 436, Annexe, Association des Planteurs de Café du Congo à Monsieur Ed. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies. Anvers, March 12, 1936.

[60]No. 428, Ministre des Colonies à M. le Gouverneurs General à Leopoldville. Brussels, February 13, 1936.

[61]No. 436, 5 ème Direction Générale, Pour le Ministre, le Directeur. Chef de Service, à M. le President de l' A.P.C.C. Brussels, March 23, 1936.

[62]No. 439, Incopresse. Costermansville, March 23, 1936.

[63]Carton Agri (343), Dossier, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528, Service de l'Agriculture, Territoire Ruanda-Urundi à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général du Congo Belge à Leo-Kalina (with 3 annexes). Usumbura, March 30, 1938.

[64]Carton Agri (110), Dossier 59, Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Accord International du Congo, Washington: 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction à M. le Ministre du Commerce Exterieur. Brussels, July 31, 1959. According to C. Dupont, the Royal Inspector, only the Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi restricted coffee production for eight years, while the countries of Latin America expanded production in the same period. See also Carton Agri (342), Dossier Cafés C/I, Réglementation, Limitation des Plantations de Caféiers Anciens Dossiers: C/I/3 du Ministre des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Général à M. le Gouverneur Général à Leopoldville. Brussels, March 20, 1946. C/I/5, 5 ème Direction Générale, le Directeur Général, Note Pour M. le Ministre des Colonies, Brussels, October 8, 1946. C/I/8, 5 ème Direction Général à M. le Gouverneur Général à Leopoldville. October 16, 1946. C/I/9, Gouvernement Général, Agriculture et Colonisation, Congo Belge à M. le Ministre des Colonies (the series of memoranda contains annexes as well). Leopoldville, October 29, 1946.

The decision to repeal the decree limiting coffee plantations was not a unanimous one. While some administrative personnel in the Ministry believed the decree should be repealed because conditions had changed drastically and because foreign markets absorbed Belgian coffees, some technical experts wanted to restrict some areas on the basis of inadequate soil types. The director general believed abrogation of the ordinance should be accompanied by diversification in the form of vegetable production, robusta coffee and, in suitable areas, palm oil and quinquina. The governor general and Mr. Sladden, the agricultural expert of the colony and director of the Office du Café, opposed the abrogation entirely. Both believed that a repeal would pose serious danger to the coffee industry, which would be exposed to <u>une évaluation désordonnée</u>, especially if the international market experience a coffee shortage.

Instead of eliminating the ordinance, the decree should be replaced by a much more "supple" piece of legislation, which would harmonize the development of coffee cultivation in Belgian Africa with the world market. Sladden also feared that the repeal would stimulate a drain on African labor and inadvertently harm food and oleaginous production. Robert Godding, the Minister of Colonies, rejected the governor general's and Sladden's advice, and repealed the ordinance. Godding believed that the time had come to reinstate commercial freedom, and he urged the governor general "to support the abrogation because it is government policy to support commercial freedom in the areas of activity where freedom is compatible with the general

interest." But Ryckmans persisted in opposing the action on the grounds that it would be disruptive to African production, and advised a year's delay before a final decision. In the memorandum of October 29, 1946, the governor general acknowledged the minister's letter of October 16, 1946, and reported that the legislative texts limiting coffee plantations has been eliminated by legislative ordinance No. 277/ Agri of 25 September 1946. The memorandum is signed, "Pour le Vice-Gouverneur Général, E. Jungers, remplacant le Governeur Général, le Secrétaire Général, I. de Thibault. The former senator had evened the score, and with Ryckmans' dismissal, settled some old antagonisms.

[65]Carton Agri (341), No. 454, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, Spetember 2, 1936.

[66]Carton Agri. (343), Dossier [Café, 1935-1939], No. 547, Rapport Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, May 30, 1938, pp. 4-5.

[67]Carton Agri (341), No. 428, Ministre des Colonies a M. le Gouverneur Général à Leopoldville. Brussels, February 13, 1936.

[68]Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café C/11, Réglementation, c/11/4: Union des Planteurs de Café du Congo Belge a Monsieur Staner, Directeur au Ministère des Colonies. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

[70]No. 428, Ministre des Colonies à M. le Gouverneur Général à Leopoldville. Brussels, February 13, 1936.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Carton Agri (341), No. 458, Ministère des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour la 4 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, December 4, 1936. The Association des Planteurs du Café and several other societies supported the licence procedure, for they believed that only 25 percent of the coffee coming from the colony contributed to its bad reputation.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Carton Agri (343), 1937-Dossier E-gbas, Prêt Planteurs Café Kivu, No. 428/10, No. 7526, Comité National du Kivu à M. le Ministre. Brussels, March 23, 1937. No. 428/9, Ministère des Colonies, 4 ème Direction Générale, 2 ème Direction, Note Pour M. le Directeur Général du Service de l'Agriculture. Brussels, April 14, 1937.

[75]Carton Agri (343), 1939-Dossier E-gbas, Prêt Planteurs Café Kivu. No. 428/37, Comité National du Kivu à M. le Ministre, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 7, 1940.

[76]1937-Dossier E-gbas, Pret Planteurs Café Kivu, No. 428/12, Gourvernement Générale Affaires Economiques à M. le Ministre des Colonies (with annexe). Leopoldville, July 16, 1937. For the Cooperative response to the Chamber of Commerce's charges, see No. 428/11, Société Coopérative des Planteurs du Kivu à Monsieur le Ministre. Costermansville, September 10, 1937.

[77]Carton Agri (342), Dossier [Café, 1935-1939], No. 547, Rapport Pour M. le Ministre, p. 3. Brussels, May 30, 1938.

[78]Ibid., pp. 3-4

[79]Carton Agri (341), No. 452, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, September 2, 1936.

[80]No. 547, Rapport Pour M. le Ministre, p. 3. Brussels, May 30, 1938.

[81]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[82]Ibid., p. 5.

[83]Carton Agri (341), No. 512, Télégramme d' Etat, Ubelco au Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, March, 1938.

[84]Carton Agri (342), Dossier, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528, Annexe III, Union Belge des Colonies au Kivu (Ubelco) à M. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, March 12, 1938.

[85]See Carton Agri (341), No. 343, Sénat à M. Paul Tschoffen, Ministre des Colonies, Brussels (with Annexe). Anvers, August 29, 1934. The quality of European coffee is discussed in these memoranda. The senator agreed that Belgian coffees were processed quite badly; he had actually seen coffee that had received only the crudest preparation, either because of negligence or lack of technical expertise; nor did Africans comply with minimum standards of quality, processing or sorting.

[86]No. 528, Annexe III, Ubelco à M. Rubbens, Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, March 12, 1938.

[87]Ibid.

[88]Op. cit.

[89]Carton Agri (341), No. 514, Ministère des Colonies, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, projet télégramme, Ubelco, Costermansville. Brussels, March 17, 1938.

[90]Carton Agri (341), No. 513, 5 ème Direction Général, Pour le Ministre, le Secrétaire Général à Monsieur le Governeur du Ruanda-Urundi, Usumbura. Brussels, March 18, 1938.

[91]Carton Agri (342), Dossier, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528, Annexe II, Governement Général Affaires Economique Congo Belge à M. le Ministre des Colonies. Leopoldville, March 25, 1938.

[92]No. 528, Service de l'Agriculture, Territoire Ruanda-Urundi à M. le Gouverneur Général du Congo Belge à Leo-Kalina (with Annexes). Usumbura, March 30, 1938.

[93]No. 528, Annexe I, Service de l'Agriculture, Territoire Ruanda-Urundi à Monsieur le President de l'Union Belge des Colons du Kivu à Costermansville. Usumbura, March 30, 1938.

[94]No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528/12, Gouvernement Général Affaires Economiques Congo Belge à M. le Ministre des Colonies à Brussels. Leopoldville, April 22, 1938.

[95]Ibid.

[96]No. 527, Annexe I, Projet de Décrêt sur la Limitation temporaire des plantations de café au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi (1938).

[97]Ibid.

[98]Op. cit.

[99]No. 527, Annexe II, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour Monsieur le Ministre. Brussels, N.d.

[100]No. 528, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528/12, Prescobel à Brussels, Information coloniales, Costermansville, Tuesday, July 14, 1938.

[101]No. 528, Limitation des Plantation de Café, No. 528/10, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Note Pour M. le Ministre, p. 2 (with Annexe). Brussels, March 22, 1938.

[102]Ibid. Annexe, Rapport: Subvention de 6,000,000 de la Metropole, pp. 1-3.

[103]No. 528/10, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Note Pour M. le Ministre, p. 2.

[104]Carton Agri (341), No. 525, Télégramme d'Etat expédié au Gouverneur Général, Leopoldville No. 84. Brussels, April 7, 1938. No. 526, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction à Governeur Général, Leopoldville, Brussels, April 11, 1938. For a proposal of a comprehensive subsidy of 50 million francs submitted by the Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge, see No. 528/12, U.P.C.C. à Monsieur Van den Abeele, Directeur Général au Ministère des Colonies (with three annexes). Brussels, April 23, 1938.

[105]Carton Agri (343), 1939-Dossier E, Café-Divers, Marchés Politique Café Robusta, etc., Dossier No. 608/3, Annexe, Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge à M. Van den Abeele, Directeur Générale au Ministre des Colonies. Brussels, July 4, 1939. No. 608/5, télégramme, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction du Governeur Général à Leopoldville. Brussels, July 12, 1939.

[106]Carton Agri (343), 1939-Dossier E, Café-Divers: Marchés, Politique Café Robusta, etc., E-2, No. 608, 5 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Inspecteur Général ff. de Directeur Général. Brussels, July 1, 1939. He also notes that their inability to sell coffee overseas stems from the weakness of the world market price and from lack of initiative on the part of "our" brokers at Antwerpen in searching for foreign markets.

[107]No. 603/3, Annexe, Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge à M. Van den Abeele. Brussels, July 4, 1939.

[108]No. 608, 5 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Inspecteur Général M. de Directeur Général. Brussels, July 1, 1939.

[109]No. 608/5, Télégramme, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction au Gouverneur Général à Leopoldville. Brussels, July 12, 1939. No. 608/6, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction à M. le President de l'Union des P.C.C. Brussels, July 17, 1939.

[110]Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café C/11: Réglementation; C/11/4. Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge à Monsieur Staner. Directeur au Ministère des Colonies, p. 1. Brussels, February 9, 1945. The suspension lasted

until May 1940, when Germany invaded Belgium. The export subsidy granted for Arabica was also suspended.

[111]Carton Agri (342), Dossier, Café 1935-1939, No. 591 Société Anonyme de Cultures au Congo Belge a M. le Ministre des Colonies, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 22, 1939.

[112]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[113]Op. cit.

[114]For a reference to Senator Godding's memoranda of January 4 and February 22, 1939, see No. 593, annexe, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour la 4 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, March 3, 1939.

[115]No. 593, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Note Pour la 5 ème Direction Générale (with annexe). Brussels, March 7, 1939.

[116]Dossier No. 528, 2 ème Direction Générale, Limitation des Plantations de Café, No. 528/40, la Réunion du 19 Mai 1939, 11 heures, du U.P.P.C., pp. 1-2. Brussels, May 22, 1930.

[117]Ibid., p. 2.

[118]Ibid., pp. 2-3. Representatives of the U.P.P.C. also wanted the administration to sanction an annual replacement rate between 10 to 20 percent of the total area in production.

[119]Ibid., p. 6.

[120]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[121]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[122]Ibid., p. 8.

[123]No. 528/41, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, May 26, 1939.

[124]No. 528/42, Annexe, René Brasseur à la Union Professionnelle des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge, p. 2. Brussels, June 5, 1939.

[125]Ibid., p. 2.

[126]No. 528/44, Pour le Ministere le Secrétaire Général, 5 ème Direction Générale, à M. le President de l'Union

Professionnelle des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels, June 20, 1939. For the Secretary General's response to Senator Godding about the government's decision see No. 528/45, 5 ème Direction Générale, Pour le Ministre, le Secrétaire Général à M. Godding, Administrateur Délégué de la Société de Cultures au Congo Belge a Bruelles. Brussels, June 24, 1939.

[127]Ibid. See also No. 528/47, Compagnie de l' Uele à M. le Directeur Générale du Service d' Agriculture au Ministère des Colonies (with annexe)Kurukwata, par Aba, July 17, 1939. The Conseil Colonial would also discuss several related issue: first, the maintenance of the existing decree for only two more years (or to August 15, 1940); second, an amendment to the decree permitting annual and bi-annual renewal of planting (but the amount would not surpass 10 percent of the total planting area); and third, the total repeal of the decree and a return to the status quo. Also the administrative director, P. de Schlippe of the Compagnie de l'Uele warned the administration that any decision of the abrogation of the decree could possibly lead to more intensive cultivation on existing hectares. Consequently, he desired an immediate repeal of the 1938 ordinance. Also see No. 528/48, Union des Producteurs de Café Belge à M. le Ministre des Colonies. Brussels, August 3, 1939. The Producers Union supports the August 15, 1940, termination because of the three alternatives it is the least damaging to their interests.

[128]No. 528/49. Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge (U.P.C.C.) à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies. Brussels, September 8, 1939. No. 528/53, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre, par M. Van den Abeele, pp. 1-5. Brussels, November 25, 1939.

[129]No. 528/51, télégramme reçu, adressé au Ministre des Colonies de l'Unaki à Costermansville (with 3 annexes). Costermansville, November 21, 1939. Annexe I, télégramme d'Etat, reçu du Gouverneur Général Ryckmans, Leopoldville, No. 34, December 15, 1939. Annexe II, télégramme reçu de Costermansville de l'Ubelco. Costermansville, December 13, 1939. Annexe III, 5 ème Direction Général, Pour le Ministre, le Secrétaire Général à M. le Gouvnerneur Général, Leopoldville, November 27, 1939.

[130]Carton Agri (343), 1940-Dossier H, Café: Taxes Diverses, H/6, 5 ème Direction Générale. Note Pour le 3 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, January 2, 1940. No. 643/2, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour la 4 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, January 31, 1940. No. 643/6, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Note Pour M.

le Ministre. Brussels, February 13, 1940. Also see Carton Agri (343), 1940-Dossier E. Café Divers; Dossier E-3, Mévente des Arabicas, Ministère des Colonies, Note Pour la 4 ème Direction Générale. Brussels, n.d. This memorandum notes that the harvest from the Ituri region, which took place between November 1939 and January 1940, would reach the market shortly, and that the harvests from the Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi (due to be gathered from May to July) would arrive in several months. It also reports that African production might be as much as 6,000 tons and would not receive adequate prices.

[131]No. 643/1, Télégramme reçu, adressé au Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, January 28, 1940. No. 643/4, Télégramme reçu de la Chambre de Commerce de Costermansville à Ministre des Colonies. Costermansville, February 7, 1940. No. 643/6, 4 ème Direction Générale, 3 ème Direction, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, February 13, 1940.

[132]Carton Agri (342), Dossier No. 528-2 ème, No. 528/53, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre, par M. Van Den Abeele, p. 4. Brussels, November 25, 1939.

[133]For Senator Godding's criticism of the ordinance of 1938 and his new plan, see the following: Carton Agri-(342), Dossier No. 528, C/1/1, Anciens Dossiers, No. 528/60, R. Godding à M. le Ministre des Colonies (with annexe). Brussels, March 28, 1940. For the Ministry's response, see C/1/1, No. 528/61, 5 ème Direction, Note Pour M. Ministre. Brussels, April 3, 1940.

[134]Carton Agri (343), 1940-Dossier E, Café Divers; No. 643/7, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre, Brussels, March 1, 1940.

[135]Carton Agri (343), 1940 - Dossier E, Café Divers; E-3, Mévente des Arabica, 4 ème Direction Générale, 1 ere Direction, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, April 2, 1940. Memorandum also notes that the Office of Economic Affairs objected to the proposal as well.

[136]E-3, 4 ème Direction Générale, 1 ère Direction, Note Pour M. le Ministre, Brussels, April 2, 1940.

[137]E-3, Comptoir des Cafés Victor de Hae, p. 3.

[138]Dossier Café C/11: Réglementation; C 111/4, Union des Producteurs de Café du Congo Belge à Monsieur Staner, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

[139]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

[140]Dossier E-3, Mévente des Arabicas, No. 643/10, 5 ème Direction Générale, Note Pour M. le Ministre, le Procès-verbal de la Réunion du 28 mars 1940 de la sous-Commission économique Interministérielle. Brussels, April 3, 1940.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RETRENCHMENT AND RETROSPECTION

The war and the collapse of the coffee market caused only slight inconveniences that required minor shifts and modifications to an African productive system which had been successfully integrated into the world capitalist system for two decades. Since the late 1920s' the metropole and the colonial state had embarked upon a program to make the mandate economically viable. The state had created an infrastructure to move African production into the international trade network. By grafting the mandate territories to its international trade system, the state simply made it possible for Rwandans to join their brothers in the eastern Kivu and the rest of Belgian Africa, and their African counterparts in the British territories of East, Central and Southern Africa im making produce and minerals available to an already functioning mercantile system, which was accustomed to periodic dislocation. Consequently the war was just a minor but profitable irritant for the capitalist mercantile system.

This chapter will also show that the state required a professional staff of European settlers and technical

services personnel to teach African cultivators to produce for an international market and to improve plant varieties. The Office du Café Arabica and the Institute National pour l' Etude Agronomique du Congo Belge (hereafter Ineac) were devised to assist the state with these tasks. Where these services were not available and in cases where the state was not or could not be present, it relied upon Europeans regardless of nationality, Asian and Indians to perform marketing functions.

To get commodities out of Rwanda (and Burundi), there were two main international export routes. The eastern route was by lake steamer to Kigoma and then by Tanganyika to Dar-es-Salaam. The western exit involved crossing the lake to Albertville and continuing by Belgian rail and river route to Matadi, situated 80 miles up the estuary of the Congo River and the transshipment point of the Chemin de fer de Matadi à Leapoldville (C.F.M.I.).[1] From 1919 to 1927 however, nearly all products shipped to Europe from the eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi were transported by way of Dar-es-Salaam via Kigoma. In 1922, nearly 3,300 tons were shipped through this route, and in 1927, more than 5,000 tons.[2] Most shippers using the eastern lane preferred the Bujumbura-Kigoma exits over the Bukoba-Mombasa route because of rising freight costs and the rising prices of carriers to Bukoba.[3]

A shift to the west route began in 1931, when tariff

reductions in the Belgian Congo, caused several exporters to use the Bujumbura-Albertville-Stanleyville-Matadi route. For example some 190 tons of cotton and 23 tons of coffee were exported by this route. In 1932, 311 tons of cotton, 87 tons of cassiterite, and 38 tons of coffee were exported westward.[4] In 1935, the shift became more apparent: east coast trade remained more or less stationary at 17,000 tons, while the west coast overseas trade had grown to 18,000 tons.[5] The favorable rate structure and the low cost of transport over the vast area of the Belgian Congo accounted for the attraction of the western route. Most of the coffee was shipped via Matadi and only a little by the east coast route. In 1938, some 2,224 tons went by the Belgian Congo route and only about 640 tons to Dar-es-Salaam.

The movement of imports, however, did not follow the same pattern. In the 1920s, imports came via Dar-es-Salaam. In 1926, 1,805 tons of foreign commerce were shipped to Rwanda and Burundi via this route, and 203 tons moved from Matadi. In the late 1930s, the east-west route still held sway, although the volume of traffic moving from west to east had increased considerably: 5,132 tons of imports via Kigoma versus 3,995 tons by way of Matadi.[7] It was much cheaper for importers, who did not possess Belgian subsidies or inducements, to go through the Suez-Canal rather than to chance the Atlantic and the long overland and water route through the Belgian Congo.

However, lake traffic and indirect shipment of imports was another matter, particularly during the 1930s when large quantities of oil and construction materials, salt, cement and sheet metal, the durable materials required for road building and construction, were imported from the Belgian Congo. Merchandise shipped through the ports of Lake Tanganyika in 1936, 1937, and 1938 amounted to 10,000, 13,000 and 14,000 tons respectively.[9] Belgian and British firms monopolized the traffic on the Lake. Mavricas Limited of Kigoma had chartered lines to move merchandise on the Lake: the Itac, with a capacity of 300 tons and under the Belgian Flag and the Good Adventure with a carrying capacity of 40 tons and flying the British Flag. Mavricas Ltd., the railway company of the Upper Congo, the Great African Lakes Company, and the Tanganyika railways handled all freight and passenger traffic.[10]

In the eastern half of the Belgian Congo, rail movement dominated and freight was handled by several organizations: the privately owned Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga (B.C.K.), the leading rail operator in Belgian Africa in both tonnage and the volume of freight transported; Chemins de fers du Congo Supérieurs aux Grands Lacs Africains (C.F.C.S.); and the Vicicongo lines. The B.C.K. line had financial ties with the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (U.M.H.K.), and both were subsidiearies of the Société Générale. Otraco, another company which dominated

transportation in the western half of the Congo Basin, operated the 58 mile line of the Chemins de fer du Kivu, running from Uvira on Lake Tanganyika to Kamaniola. The greatest density of traffic on the system occurred on the Elizabethville-Jadotville section because of the movement of heavy minerals plus food coming from the Kasai and Lake Tanganyika areas to the mining and industrial centers of the region. More than 50 percent of the total traffic was in minerals. The transport system of the C.F.C.S. comprised 673 miles of rail line: 78 miles from Stanleyville to Panthierville; 443 miles from Kindu to Albertville; and 152 miles from Kabalo-Kabango. These lines were intercepted by 1,096 miles of water routes on the Lualaba (193 miles from Panthierville to Kindu; 491 miles from Kangolo to Buhama; and 412 miles from Lake Tanganyika). The Kamina-Kabalo cut-off had strategic and economic significance, because it offered an alternate national route to the eastern Congo, Lake Kivu, and Rwanda and Burundi; it reduced the number of transshipments from the last two areas via the route to Matadi from 7 to 5 and transport distance from 2,244 to 1,957 miles.[11]

The trading partners of Belgium or Belgian Africa included Britain and her colonies in Asia and the Near East, including India; British colonies in east, central, and southern Africa; and Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Portugal. These countries and regions took

livestock, dairy products, vegetables, fruits and coffee (for the volume of the latter see Table I) in exchange for processed meats and fish, flour and cereals, processed vegetables and sugar, salt (a major commodity), petroleum and other industrial oils, cement, printing material, unbleached muslin, machines (including parts), farming implements (hoes and machettes).[12] But as Appendices I and II demonstrate, the dominant economic and commercial relationships were between the Belgian Congo and Rwanda and Burundi, particularly from 1930 to 1938 when the Congo garnished approximately 50 to 60 percent of the export trade.

The volume and value of the export trade during this period reflected not only a growing economic relationship amongst the Belgian colonial possessions, but they also affirmed the growth of African agricultural production generally, despite the poor quality soils and unpredictable climate. If left to their own devices, African farmers could have profitted considerably from their own labors, agricultural production, especially of food crops, contributed much to the export trade. Even the famine, which virtually destroyed the trade between 1929 and 1932, as Appendix III shows, did not prevent African producers from surpassing earlier production levels, nor from earning even larger quantities of francs for the state. Aware of this trade, officials encouraged the consolidation of the economic relationship between the mandate and the Belgian Congo. For

example in 1927, they informed both the metropole and the League of Nations that this economic relationship "continues to develop." In exchange for large quantities of food and livestock, the Belgian Congo supplied Rwandans with large quantities of "Congo-made hoes," and the report notes that the exchanges took place at the market of Kamembe in eastern Rwanda.[13]

While the intra-colonial trade in food was increasing in importance, animal hides remained the principal commercial activity in the mandate.[14] This particular item probably brought higher returns than food; it certainly was much more developed as a commercial product. However, as hides declined in importance because of decreasing demand, the export of cattle became more important especially in the 1930s.[15] And as livestock rose as a principal commodity, the significance of food crops declined, particularly between 1929 and 1930, when there were prohibitions against the exportation of food because of famine in the mandate.[16] By 1934, however, African produce again led the list of export items, followed by hides, tin, coffee, and beeswax.[17] In 1937, the export of food crops to the Belgian Congo were almost double those of the preceeding year--4,652 tons in 1937 versus 2,224 tons in 1936. The cattle and smaller livestock trade in the mid-1930s had a different experience. From 1934 to 1936 the trade was erratic, primarily because of Batutsi reluctance to sell their cows. But by 1937 and

1938 the trade stabilized as the administration's policy of reducing herds took effect.

Imports, on the other hand, were not a significant factor in the economic life of Rwanda until after the Second World War, when the metropole commenced to repair the infrastructure neglected during the war and the depression. From 1920 to 1940, the volume of imports from the Belgian Congo fluctuated betwee 20 to 60 percent, and finally stabilized between 50 to 60 percent after 1940. In fact the years 1937 to 1947 (see Appendices I and III) were favorable trade years for the mandate territories, since export volume exceeded imports. However, this advantage was offset because the mandate countries paid more for their imports and received less for their export items. The extreme fluctuations in imports prior to 1940, however, suggest that despite Rwanda's expanding agricultural production, consumption of imports was comparatively weak. The low wage structure and the income Africans earned from their crops lessened their purchasing power. And during the 1930s, when the metropole reduced subsides to the mandate, the colonial administration was forced to curtail building and road construction projects. As a result of these factors, import fluctuations were quite large.

By the 1930s the Rwanda economy had been transformed structurally, but it was not as yet a fully functioning capitalist economy. Vestiges of the tributary mode of

production remained despite the substitution of money payments for dues in kind, and other elements of the feudal system were still an intrinsic and structured part of the wider system. The Batutsi had managed to retain their privileged position within the society, to the extent that they were able to garnish considerable amounts of the country's surplus production for themselves without contributing monetarily to the support of the state. Still there was a functioning system of commodity exchange or market relations, which was essentially capitalist, although linked or attached to the precapitalist mode of production. Both systems shared land, labor, and the fruits of production.

The marketing system was a prerogative which the state had allocated to the European and Asian minority through favorable concession legislation.* Europeans dominated the most profitable commercial establishments, although they were frequently outnumbered by Asian and Arab merchants.[18] For example, in 1936, Asians sold the foreign firms 4,028 tons of food crops, 253 tons of palm oil, 40 tons of butter, 1,200 tons of coffee, and 2,010 tons of raw cotton (from 11,000 cotton planters).[19] These firms, in turn, ginned African cotton and processed African coffee,[20] and either shipped these items overseas themselves or sold them to exporters and local coffee or cotton agents.

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*See Chapter 2,

Commercial establishments, in turn, profitably sold manufactured items to Africans, as Table XV demonstrates. In 1933, non-African merchants from the ten provinces in Rwanda sold 10.6 million francs worth of goods to them. In four of these provinces, African purchases constituted ninety or more percent of the total sales, and in only one province were African purchases less than fifty percent of the total value. It should also be noted that in those instances where total African commerce exceeded ninety-eight percent, Africans were highly integrated into the marketing systems of the capitalist peripheries. For example Kamembe and Kibuye were food graneries and were the closest in proximity to the capitalist core of western Congo or the Kivu region, while Kibungu shared the eastern border with British Tanganyika. This conclusion holds even for later years, when commercial activities continued to increase and as some provinces expanded sales as the commercial sector matured (see total value of sales for 1935, 1936, and 1938 of Table XV). Table XV is also significant because it indicates the weakness or absence of a truly African entrepreneurial or merchant class. Africans did not purchase European made articles from one another, but were instead the exclusive clientele of European and Asian merchants. Africans did not frequent African establishments, primarily because for the most part there were very few of them. Most Rwandans were purchasers and producers,

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian Firms in 1933.

Rwanda	Amount of Sales (Francs Belges)	% of Sales to Africans
Kigali	3,501,000.00	52
Nyanza	2,920,000.00	90
Astrida (Butare)	1,344,426.00	33
Kamembe	813,000.00	99
Kibuye	90,000.00	99
Kisenyi	838,709.35	64
Ruhengeri	1,001,269.50	67
Biumba	-	-
Gabiro	83,000.00	72
Kihungu	70,435.00	98.5
Total	10,661,839.85	

SOURCE: Rapport presenté par le Gouvnernement Belge au Conseil de la Société pendant l'Année 1933 (Brussels, 1934), p. 159.

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian Firms in 1935.

Rwanda	Amount of Sales (Francs Belges)	% of Sales to Africans
Kigali	4,366,390	30
Nyanza	3,668,000	98
Astrida (Butare)	1,829,558	62
Kamembe	1,097,000	99
Kibuye	50,000	100
Kisenyi	443,410	64
Ruhengeri	1,082,192	98
Biumba	50,000	97
Gabiro	125,000	95
Kibungu	91,166	99
Total	12,802,716	

SOURCE: Rapport 1935, p. 142.

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian Firms in 1936.

Rwanda	Amount of Sales (Francs Belges)	% of Sales to Africans
Kigali	6,234,000	50
Nyanza	4,380,000	99
Astrida (Butare)	2,332,000	92
Shungugu (Kamembe)	1,225,000	99
Kisenyi	2,081,000	46
Ruhengeri	1,607,000	99
Biumba	343,000	99
Kibungu	107,000	?
Total	18,309,000	

SOURCE: Rapport 1936, p. 147.

Table XV. Total Value of Sales by European and Asian Firms in 1938.

Rwanda	Amount of Sales (Francs Belges)	% of Sales to Africans
Kigali	7,653,000	36
Nyanza	2,287,000	99
Astrida (Butare)	4,527,000	69
Shangugu (Kamembe)	672,000	99
Kisenyi	1,834,000	79
Ruhengeri	3,770,000	72
Biumba	840,000	98
Kibungu	121,000	100

SOURCE: Rapport 1938, p. 161.

not entrepreneurs.

In addition to marketing African crops and monopolizing African purchases, Europeans produced specialized crops, but on smaller scale. For example in 1932, 5.15 percent of non-African concessions were devoted to food crops, 4.95 percent to coffee and 6.85 percent to fruit trees.[21] Although Europeans might augment African production, their major function was to provide the expertise needed to market and to process African production, for Africans did not perform these tasks.

Prior to the Second World War, Rwandans purchased an almost invariable variety of manufactured goods: light manufactured goods which were for personal use--textiles, foodstuffs and provisions which augmented the food they could no longer produce, ornaments, liquor (including European beer) and tobacco. Very few of their imports were investment goods of any description, i.e., construction goods, fuel, machinery and transport supplies. Construction goods were used by Europeans primarily and only to a limited extent by Africans. The state used heavy duty material to build mines, government buildings, storage sheds, individual residences, and to construct roads; the Africans used these materials primarily for their own housing needs and perhaps secondarily for retail shops. Few investment goods in the African area, however, had any long term uses, or could be used to develop infrastructure. African income

and savings were much too low to supply capital for a basic infrastructure or a merchant class, except in rare instances. Salaries were much too low, and African production belonged to the state.

Rwandan production of foodstuffs, hides, cassiterite, cotton and coffee for the export trade created foreign exchange earnings to augment subsidies from the metropole and to sustain the colonial development process, which was limited to maintaining an infrastructure and to facilitating the flow of African material and labor out of the country via one or the other international routes. The colonial state provided the essential services and expertise required to make Africans efficient and productive workers. Nowhere was this more evident then in the attention and care given to coffee production.

Colonial coffees lost their principle market when Belgium became inaccessible in May 1940, the coffee had extreme difficulty in finding new markets. But thanks largely to government efforts, the coffee export trade had grown appreciably by 1942. Markets were secured in the Sudan, Egypt, the Union of South Africa and the United States,[22] and prices increased.[23] Prior to the war, the economic crisis had been more damaging to Arabica coffees than to Robusta. Consequently the colonial government and representatives of the government in exile in London gave primary attention to the creation of a marketing board for

Arabica in 1940.[24] After some foolish delays, a board was authorized through the passage of an Ordinance Law, No. 337/Agri of October 15, 1940.

The Ordinance Law enabled the governor general to enact legislation, subject to legislative approval by the ministers meeting in Conseil and Mr. Vleeschauwer, Minister of Colonies, on behalf of the King of Belgium. With this power, the governor general passed Ordinance No. 378/Agri, on October 15, 1940, establishing the Office du Café Arabica. The board was headed by G. E. Sladden, the chief agronomist and a coffee expert. A second Ordinance, No. 379/Agri, issued the same day, established the licensing provision or procedure to be issued by the new office, for the exportation of Arabica coffees "from the territory of Rwanda-Urundi and the provinces of Stanleyville and Costermansville."[25] In November 1940, legislative ordinance No. 418/A.E. of October 30, 1940, was implemented. The latter regulated the export of Robusta coffee shipped to the "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt," and provided a special licence for coffees shipped from the vicinity of the province of Stanleyville. This licence was obtained from the chef de la Province. However, on September 10, 1941, the Office du Café Robusta was created, with headquarters in Leopoldville, thus centralizing the marketing procedure.

The two offices differed only in the composition of their respective commissions and standing committee

(comité permanent).[26] Together they attempted to introduce better farming, harvesting and processing methods. They were responsible for the maintenance of installations and the shipment of coffee exports. Both offices purchased African coffee at a stated price and sold it to exporters. To ensure quality both offices ensured that all varieties were of uniform standards. Moreover, they supervised African farmers, and performed the pulping, fermentation, washing and drying of coffee.[27] Thus Africans had only to gather the crop and carry it to official stations. The offices were also responsible for assessing a rémunératoire taxe on coffees exported from the provinces in the Belgian Congo and the territory of Ruanda-Urundi.[28] Finally, the offices formed necessary liaison between scientific research bodies like the Institut National pour l'Etude Agronomigue du Congo Belge (Ineac), which was responsible for developing the best plant varieties.[29]

Ineac, created in 1935, succeeded the Régie des Plantations de la Colonie, which was plagued with incompetence and lacked autonomy. The new institute coordinated virtually all biological and animal research carried on in Belgian Africa. Its work included the selection, improvement, and introduction of all plants of possible economic value, as well as reforestation, social maintenance and care, the creation of new food crops for Africans, acclimatization and the improvement of cattle, tropical veterinary research

and the study and introduction of new agricultural industries. The agricultural personnel of the mandate and in the Belgian Congo remained in close contact with Ineac stations in Rubona and Yangambi. Young agronomists attended stages of six months to a year at Ineac stations. Some shorter training sessions (stages de perfectionnement) were also provided for duty personnel and directors of the agricultural departments during their tenure in Africa.[30]

After the marketing boards were created, an Ordinance (No. 92/A.E.) was passed on March 3, 1941, permitting the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi to authorize a minimum price which commercial intermediaires could pay for African coffees en parche.[31] The same ordinance also authorized the governor to purchase parchment coffee harvested in the territory but remained unsold from exporters and coffee brokers.[32] The latter measure was designed to stabilize coffee production, and the former to protect Africans from unscrupulous merchants. But it also had the effect of completely divorcing Rwandans from participating in the marketing process. A final measure regulating the coffee industry was passed on July 6, 1946: Ordinance No. 139/A.E. fixed the date and time African coffees that could be sold at local markets which were supervised by officials or African monitors of the Office du Café Indigène du Rwanda-Urundi.[33] With the passage of this measure, African dependency was complete. While the ordinance assured the

producer of correct payment and quality control, and prevented the sale of moist coffee beans, it further defined the African's role as producer. Africans would not be left to the devices which determine rational economic judgments, instead these decisions would be made for them.

These and other institutional pressures designed to increase production eliminated the material basis of economic development for Rwandans within the normal framework of capitalism, primarily because they suppressed the profit motive in the development of production, thereby prohibiting the growth of an autonomous capitalist structure in the traditional area. Administrative price control policy, compulsory cultivation and tax policies were the most damaging for Africans. As we have seen, compulsory cultivation expanded production, while price controls kept prices and African incomes low. A low wage structure was an important element in promoting the growth of economic surplus, just as the head and polygamy and cattle taxes were levied to force African into European industries and wage employment and to enlarge the fiscal base of the administration during a period of increasing expenditures during the 1930s. By depressing wages and levying taxes, administrative policy inhibited the development of African rural capitalism. Almost simultaneously these policies extended the process of proletarianization in the rural areas, since they limited disposable income and impoverished those who were forced to

seek employment, either inside or outside of the rural area.

By using these devices to detach African agriculturalists from market influences as well, the administration was also able to make African agriculture respond to European economic interests--compulsory rather than free market agricultural production by Africans permitted the retention of low prices and ensured supplies where the European economy most needed them, the mining areas of Katanga and the eastern Kivu which were the metropole's most productive areas. It was no accident that the administration encouraged the sale and trade of African produce. As appendix IV shows, trade was extremely profitable for the state. From 1925 to 1929, custom receipts increased from 2.7 million francs to 8.4 million. During the depression, receipts fluctuated annually until 1935, when the rate of increase returned to predepression levels--7.3 million francs in 1935 to 13.1 million francs in 1937. But they fell in 1938 because of events in Europe. By 1941 receipts were fifty percent higher than those of 1937, indicative of increased international trade during the war years. Growth in African taxes for the same period were much more spectacular and reveal that the heavy burden on Africans of supplying the state with revenues. The state's monopolistic trade position for the same length of time institutionalized unequal exchange vis-a-vis the state and the Rwandan peasantry. And since the structure of the colonial economy has

changed very little since independence this relationship persists.

Proponents have argued that cash-cropping promotes and facilitates the processes of economic development and encourages technological innovation, raises worker skills, increases the range of goods that can be purchased, stimulates new wants, and creates new areas of production or higher productivity. Exports enable the state to pay for those goods and services needed for development but which it lacks the capacity to produce, and they provide an important source of direct government revenue.[34] However, these postulates are based upon a free market economy with full direct participation by producers and their representatives.

This was not entirely the case in Rwanda. Rather than leave the producers to the free market forces, the colonial state manipulated and intervened in the production and distribution system. Because of rigid government control the agricultural economy did not induce self-sustained industrialization. However, it did create enough linkage effect for some small-scale enterprises to develop, and it provided alternative earning opportunities for some farmers, particularly evident in Kinyaga or western Rwanda. They grew crops to supplement subsistence income. While this kind of activity has potential, it has not as yet generated a full-time alternative occupation for African agriculturalists generally.

However, it provided and continues to provide security against bad harvests, and to a limited extent it generates some surplus for a few Rwandans in Kinyaga.

For the majority of Rwandans, the state's agricultural economy created impotence, inequality, and indifference. The traditional elite, as a result of transformation or change brought about by the colonial state, lost status (i.e. sovereignty) but gained powers at the expense of the population at large. Bututsi siphoned labor and agricultural surplus from below and consequently accentuated class divisions and distinctions. The majority, with little or no control over the means of production, exercised little interest in the state's development plans, since planning did not facilitate the provision of social and productive services and economic infrastructure or afford greater and more diversified consumption for them. Nor should the state have received their support, since no attempt was made to know their needs as the majority perceived them. Instead the state's economic plan condoned commodity production, and in doing so, almost threatened subsistence.[35] Even those services that the administration committed to Africans were either so technocratic or demeaning (in terms of abuse) that the peasantry's appreciation or awareness of the efforts being made by the state were undermined. No social contract existed between the state and the African masses; consequently the development process had little meaning or relevance for them.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

[1]Rapport presenté par le Govnernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l' Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' Année 1932 (Brussels, 1933), p. 103. William A. Hance and Irene S. von Dangen, "Matadi, Focus of Belgian African Transport," Annals of the Association of American Geographers (March, 1958), pp. 41-42, 50, 56 and 57. The authors note that between 1906 and 1928 the southeastern portion of the Congo used ports of Beira and Mozambique and the Union of South Africa. To induce Congo trade to flow via Matadi, two special systems of commodity and through-rates were adopted in 1932. The pull of the Lobito route, opened in 1932, and to a lesser extent of Beira on the mineral traffic area remained very strong.

[2]Chambres des Representants. Session de 1923-24. Rapport sur l' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi presenté aux Chambres (Brussels, 1924), p. 18. Rapport 1925, p. 89. Rapport 1927, p. 67.

[3]Rapport 1925, p. 103.

[4]Rapport 1932, p. 103.

[5]Rapport 1937, pp. 160-161; Rapport 1938, pp. 170-171.

[6]Rapport 1926, p. 103.

[7]Rapport 1937, p. 131. The figure of 3,995 tons does not include imports designated for the Belgian Congo.

[8]Rapport 1930, pp. 29 and 120.

[9]Rapport 1937, p. 132 and Rapport 1938, p. 242.

[10]"Rapport sur l' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' Année 1934," Congo, II (June-December, 1935), p. 767.

[11]Hance and Dangen, "Matadi," pp. 61-63.

[12]Rapport 1927, pp. 81-102. The list of imported items and countries are fairly consistent, except in the late 1930s when Japan, Tanganyika, the United States, Britain and Uganda became major importing nations after the metropole. See the following annual reports: Rapport 1928, pp. 93-116; Rapport 1929, pp. 97-122; Rapport 1930, pp. 123-148; Rapport 1933, pp. 162-191; Rapport 1934, pp. 148-179; Rapport 1935, pp. 147-180; Rapport 1936, pp. 153-186; Rapport 1937, pp.158 -189; and Rapport 1938, pp. 168-199.

[13]Rapport 1927, p. 9.

[14]Rapport 1929, p. 96.

[15]Rapport 1930, p. 113.

[16]Ibid.

[17]"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May, 1937), p. 190.

[18]Rapport 1924, p. 38; Rapport 1925, p. 11; Rapport 1926, p. 103; Rapport 1927, p. 79; Rapport 1928, p. 91; Rapport 1929, p. 96; Rapport 1930, p. 112; "Rapport sur l' Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l' Annee 1934," Congo, II (1935), p. 773.

[19]"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo I (January-May, 1938), p. 229.

[20]Rapport 1938, p. 200.

[21]Rapport 1932, p. 156.

[22]Ibid., p. 3.

[23]Archives Africaines, Brussels, Ministère des Colonies. Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café C/11: Réglementation; C/II/4, d'Union des Producteur au Ministère des Colonies, pp. 1-2. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

[24]Ibid., p. 2.

[25]Ibid. The Office du Café Arabica in Rwanda was reconstituted in 1946 as the Office du Café Indigène du Ruanda-Urundi, but not without complaint. Two commercial houses in Rwanda, Genex and Old East charged that OCIRU was a violation of commercial freedom. But the actual issue involved was their commercial activities, which the two houses feared would be eliminated under OCIRU. See Carton Agri (342), d'Ordre des Pieces No. B/I/23-OCIRU. Note Pour

M. le Gouverneur Général, Office du Café Indigène du Ruanda-Urundi et Liberté Commerciale, du President O.P.A., G. Sladden, Leopoldville, January 9, 1946; and No. B/I/28, du Ministère des Colonies, 5 ème Direction Générale, le Directeur Général, Note Pour M. le Ministre. Brussels, February 28, 1946.

[26]Carton Agri (343), Dossier Café C/II; Réglementation; C/II/4, p. 4. United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa. Report on Ruanda-Urundi, 4th Session. Supplement No. 2, 1950, p. 24. In 1950 the supervisory commission of O.C.I.R.U. in Rwanda and Burundi consisted of three administrative officials, two Africans, who represented the interests of planters, and four individuals chosen for their "competence." The latter represented the coffee manufacturers and exporters.

[27]George E. Sladden and L. Michel, "Methodes de Commercialisation du Café Arabica produit par les Indigène du Ruanda-Urundi," Numero Spécial du Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge, XLIII (1952), pp. 63-64.

[28]Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café C/II: Réglementation; C/II/4, pp. 4-5.

[29]A. Becquet, "L'Organisation du Service de l'Agriculture au Congo Belge," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, XXX, No. 7 (July, 1939), p. 98.

[30]Ibid.

[31]The minimum price was calculated from the selling prices on foreign coffee markets and took into consideration expenses incurred, factory output and a normal gross profit for the exporter. As Table III below demonstrates, these prices were constantly revised. U. N. Visiting Mission to East Africa. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. 4th Session, Supplement No. 2, (1950), p. 24.

Table XVI. Minimum Purchasing Prices for Arabica Coffee *en parche* for Rwanda and Burundi (in Belgian francs).

	Ordinance No. 17/A.E., April 7, 1941	Ordinance No. 23/A.E., April 21, 1943
Kisenyi, Kibuye and Bugarama	2.35	4.15
Buture, Nyanza, Ruhengeri and Kabaya	2.10	3.80
Gitarama	2.00	3.70
Kigali	1.80	3.45

SOURCE: Archives Africaines, Brussels. Ministère des Colonies. Carton Agri (342), Dossier Cafe C/11: Reglementation; C/11/4, d'Union des Producteurs de Cafe du Congo Belge a M. Staner. Directeur au Ministere des Colonies, p. 6. Brussels, February 9, 1945.

[32]Carton Agri (342), Dossier Café C/II: Réglementation; C/II/4, p. 6.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Jimmye S. Hillman, "The Role of Export Cropping in Less Developed Countries," Journal of Agricultural Economics, LCIII, No. 2. (May, 1981), p. 376.

[35]According to Bryceson, an emphasis on subsistence production offers very little revenue for state accumulation. So the state's decision to compel Africans to plant specific food crops, as an anti-famine measure, must have been done with some reluctance. Deborah Fahy Bryceson, "Peasant Commodity Production in Past-Colonial Tanzania," African Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 325 (October 1982), pp. 558-559.

CONCLUSION

When Europeans finally entered Rwanda in 1894, they reportedly found a highly centralized feudal state with rigid class differentiation between the Batutsi aristocracy, the subjugated Bahutu, and the pariah Batwa. In 1907, the Germans established their government, but until 1916 they accomplished little beyond building a small number of administrative centers and inter-connecting roads. The Germans followed the principle of indirect administration, which was continued by the Belgians when they were assigned administrative control by the League of Nations. In the 1920s, with the introduction of a full-scale colonial government, the period of effective contact with Europeans, and the transformation of the country, began.

Once the Belgians assumed control of the mandate, their policy had two clearly linked aims: the economic development of the colony and the welfare of the African population. Both of these aims were largely fulfilled in the sense intended by the administration, that is to say that a profitable crop like coffee was widely cultivated throughout Rwanda, and many paternalistic social programs were undertaken. These successes, however, did little to equip Rwandans with the skills and infrastructure needed to

initiate, sustain, or expand economic growth, or to permit Rwandans to feed themselves, sell their surplus, create savings and purchasing power, construct schools to educate their children, or to form institutions and agencies for effective government. Consequently, since independence in 1962, Rwanda has been wracked by intermittent stagnation or even prolonged economic regression. The compulsory nature of the colonial economic structure and the corresponding indirect participation by Africans in commercial agriculture was partially responsible for this situation. Moreover, Belgian officials were not able to carry out the goals that they had set for themselves.

Initially, the administration based its policy upon two basic premises: first, that the African's basic needs were economic and, second, that a vigorous national economy would stabilize society. To accomplish these objectives, they believed that Rwanda, which was historically and geographically isolated, had to be brought into the modern world. But the link-up could not be done without stabilizing the traditional political structure. Since the Batutsi oligarchy was in place, European officials, after reshaping its structure, believed they could rely upon Batutsi administration to oversee the masses. They hoped that as the "civilizing process" took hold, abuses would be curtailed; and that other reforms such as hierarchical command structure, reductions in corvée and prestations

would lead to the dismemberment of the traditional mode of production or the feudal system, in which Batutsi controlled the allocation of labor and land. These were realistic expectations and reforms, but very little came of them, primarily because of the administration's failure to follow through. Failure to eliminate the feudal system retarded capitalist development, and subsequently the emergence of a free wage labor system divorced entirely from agricultural production.

The reforms of April 1917, establishing a hierarchical command system and attempts to decentralize administration at the local level were modified because the Batutsi oligarchy refused to cooperate with an obvious attempt on the part of officials to lessen their power and control. When Musinga and his notables threatened rebellion, Malfeyt was forced to restore the former German residency system, which left the Batutsi as mediators and arbitors between the administration and the masses below.

Similarly, attempts to reduce corvée and prestations failed because of the half-hearted measures and weaknesses of the administration. The official approach was gradually to replace tribute payments in kind with money payments from the taxable surplus from African production, rather than wipe the slate clean and deal immediately with Batutsi opposition to change. The piece-meal approach gave the oligarchy time to undermine the administration's efforts through intimidation, threat and non-compliance. The

Batutsi understood thoroughly that, money payment notwithstanding, as more demands were placed upon their system and on the Bahutu, their position of privilege and prestige would be reduced. Therefore, the oligarchy fought to retain their power as the administration worked to develop the land. The competing and dissimilar goals of the Batutsi and the Belgians made the traditional society unstable and set the stage for a major confrontation between the colonizer and the oligarchy.

By 1928 the mandate was in total disarray. The intrigues of Musinga and his royal court had brought the administration's development plans to a halt. The famine which occurred that same year decimated the countryside. These events made it more apparent that the administration would have to compromise with the notables. Famine relief could not be accomplished without their aid, nor, for that matter, could economic development. Tranquility was paramount, if Rwandans were to become effective producers. The administration thus assured the young notables that changes in the traditional system would be moderated and that the Bahutu would be left in their charge, except in matters pertaining to colonial development projects. Still this was not enough; there was the problem of what to do with Musinga and the old guard.

First of all, the Belgians set about replacing many of the recalcitrant chiefs and, in 1930, moved against Musinga, who had grown weak because of the defection of his young

notables, the disarray among his more traditional supporters, who were being removed by the administration, and his own isolation stemming from his inability to accomodate Catholic missionaries and Catholicism. With the deposition of Musinga, the administration accelerated its reorganization program, extended compulsory cultivation throughout Rwanda, announced a propaganda campaign for coffee cultivation, increased the Head Tax by 50 percent, and continued construction of infrastructure. Before the Great Depression, traditional agriculture received minimal attention primarily because of high transportation and tariff costs. The major foci of the colonial state were on labor recruitment, food production (in the western region), and mining exploration. Rich veins of tin had been discovered in eastern Rwanda in the 1920s, and several Belgian banks and business firms provided capital for this industry.[1] The provisioning of eastern Zaire from western Rwanda was also well established during this period. Colonial officials were encouraged to comply with European requests for labor, and Union Minière du Haut Katanga was the prime contractor of African labor in the ocuntry in the late 1920s. Rwandans emigrated as laborers to British territories as well.

The state's reorganization program in the 1930s reduced corvée and prestations even further, centralized geographical units for better administration, and replaced chiefs and consolidated chieftaincies. These measures allegedly standardized and regulated a system in which

Belgian officials and the Batutsi elite coexisted, or dual colonialism, so to speak. But in any event, together they controlled a doubly exploitative system in which the Bahutu peasantry were totally subordinated. Transforming the productive and administrative system created profound social changes, and a dual system of over-rule served to retard the expectations of the Bututsi oligarchy and to contain the aspirations of the African population. While the European administrators monitored the colonial system as a whole, the Batutsi supervised the productive effort of the African population. The key to the whole system, however, was the effective management from the top and compliance from the notables who dominated the masses below. With reorganization completed, the colonial state proceeded with its coffee campaign.

The government's decision to extend coffee cultivation stemmed partly from a reassessment by the metropole of the African's role in agricultural production and partly from the effects of the Great Depression. As the Belgian process of modernization began, the metropolitan government soon realized that "civilizing" was an expensive business, and they were unable to provide all the funds, particularly during the 1930s. Belgian officials concluded that "civilizing" must be paid for out of profits or the "undelivered portion" of the African wages. This increment, plowed back into the country, into roads and transportation, conservation measures, health and educational facilities, became the

"civilizing sinking fund." As the metropole's needs increased for more visible signs of economic progress, more and more Rwandans were forced into the modern sector to facilitate its development, and consequently more and more demands were placed on the Bahutu to maintain the solvency of the colony. Cash crop production was only part of this process.

Because coffee had been produced on a limited scale since 1920, the decision to extend cultivation in Rwanda did not need feasibility studies, and by 1930 there was considerable evidence that production could be profitable. World market prices of 20 BF per kilo had encouraged Belgian speculators to invest heavily in arabica coffee plantations in the Kivu and Ituri during the late 1920s. It was then rumored that the Kivu could become another Kenya: excellent climate, the condition of the land, and the relative ease by which cheap labor could be recruited caused official optimism.

Despite some initial setbacks the official government campaign was quite successful. Free seedlings were distributed; the Agricultural Service supplied demonstrations on mulching techniques and built coffee nurseries throughout the country. Although coffee prices fell during the 1930s, production increased to 70 tons in 1932, 152 tons in 1933, and 223 tons in 1934.[2] Within these years, the average price paid for African coffee ranged from 2.50 BF to 4 BF

per kilo. By 1935 the volume of exports also experienced increases in cotton, produce, beeswax, hides, and tin. Therefore, other sectors of the economy were expanding as well.

Reliance on African agriculture, however, was a major preoccupation in official colonial circles long before the Great Depression forced the metropole to take action; and even before African commerical production had matured, the authorities decided to discourage European settlement and their encroachment into the coffee and tobacco industries. The population density was already high in areas where the soil was relatively fertile, and European settlers and commercial enterprises aggravated pressures on the land. African labor was much cheaper and transportation and tariff costs were high. Also, a total reliance on Africans meant that savings could be made on those services that Europeans required and expected.

The colonial debate in the mid-1920s brought the matter to a head. Those against the administration's position called for massive infusions of private capital and industrialization, while proponents emphasized African agriculture, not industrial development. The debate continued until 1933, when the metropole announced a policy favoring African agriculture and moderate industrial development. Naturally the settlers were alarmed by this pronouncement and immediately mobilized to protect their interests. Between 1927 and 1939, European planters in Stanleyville,

Bukavu, and the Kivu and the representatives at Brussels consistently voiced opposition to African commercial cultivation.

White settlers and especially coffee planters had reason to fear competition from African planters. The depression had reduced prices for agricultural commodities generally, and Brazil's manipulation of the coffee market subjected the already low prices to extreme fluctuations. Moreover, coffees from Belgian Africa were the least preferred in Europe and in the metropole. Consequently African competition was completely undesirable. As the Great Depression worsened and budget deficits increased, the administration at home became more conscious of cost efficiency. Previously, financial assistance to planters was confined to grants and loans; Africans received famine relief and expenditures for normal education and public works.[3] In the past, private enterprises were given special incentive to invest in the "empire." Some firms received extensive land concessions for growing coffee and the black wattle tree valuable for its tannin extract.[4] Those who adopted the "civilizing" principle or collaborated with African farmers gained concessions of 500 hectares with 99 year leases. Individual holders had a virtual monopoly on African labor and produce within a limited (15 km. radius) "protective zone"; companies had 70,000 hectares with access to African labor and the exclusive right to purchase the commercial crops from African farmers. Participants were

only required to install a processing mill and to furnish schools, quarantine stations, and seeds for their African charges, as part of the social contract. These zones were devised, however, to also eliminate Asian and Indian competition and to rationalize economic development.[5]

During the Depression, European settlers were perceived as a drain on the treasury because of their repeated demands for subsidies, tariff reductions, and regulations to assure even cheaper labor costs. The relief was expensive for the metropole to provide, and it believed that its efforts to extend decrees to either cancel export duties on certain commercial commodities, such as vegetables, palm oil, and sugar cane, or to provide exemptions to cotton fabrics manufactured in Belgian Africa were more than adequate.[6] Goods coming from the colonies already entered the metropole duty free, and a decree of 1934 leavied a 300 BF per ton export duty on unroasted coffee entering the "empire,"[7] in order to restrict the entry of foreign coffees, which might be re-exported duty free into Belgium.

Authorities also sought other ways to reduce costs. Land reclamation became an integral component of the agricultural program. Chemical fertilizer, however, was not considered, because of the terrain and the traditional nature of agriculture in Rwanda, and because of its expense. Since famine would disrupt the productive cycle, the resident governor had the power to require each able bodied, adult male to maintain 35 acres of seasonal and 15 acres of

non-seasonal food crops. The latter included manioc, to be replaced by potatoes in areas above 1900 meters.[8] Lacking suitable storage, the selection of such durable crops was a wise choice. While reluctant to graft a capitalist model of production onto their traditional forms, Africans were able to adjust. Rwandan farmers accepted imposed crops, the burden of taxation to support the colonial infrastructure, traditional dues and corvée, and akazi for the modern sector. Even today many remarked that coffee was beneficial, for it "gave us money to pay taxes and to buy things."

Economic development assisted some Africans, and was apparently beneficial to the country. Trade figures for 1935 indicated that Rwanda was thoroughly integrated into the international market economy. Export earnings for that year were 45 million francs, 70 percent from Belgium and the remainder from Japan. Imports were valued at 39 million francs, of which 10.3 millions francs were attributed to Belgium and 18.1 million francs to Japan.[9] Surplus revenues from international trade were invested in the country only to the extent that they facilitated the flow of goods to markets overseas; otherwise, profits were retained or garnished by the colonial state. Some funds were repatriated to Belguim in order to repay development loans, but most revenue was used to maintain the colonial government. As we have seen, the general expansion of trade by the colonial state was a sign of Rwanda's transition from a pre-capitalist to a semi-capitalist economy during the imperial phase.

Compulsory cash crops and the sale of foodstuffs stimulated economic growth, but prevented the rational evolution of a diversified economy. Without rigid control by the state, the international economy and free market forces might possibly have activated Rwanda's agricultural economy along different lines. But once the basic infrastructure for trade was established the colonial state had fulfilled its own needs for revenues by encouraging imperial trade and commerce. Africans were only marginal beneficiaries, and only those who could effectively manipulate the system benefitted.

Dependence upon coffee to provide foreign exchange in a structurally imbalanced economy continues to plague Rwanda. Between 1929 and 1941, economic legislation was based on the belief that Africans could only be farmers, and political changes and social actions consequently barred all effective participation by the Bahutu and the Batutsi in industry and commerce. Compulsory cultivation and the pervasive colonial state, embodied in the metropole and in Belgian civil servants in the mandate, stifled the spirit of initiative and innovation within the traditional systems. Nowhere in Rwanda did chiefs, notables and peasant farmers take responsibility in economic production. They did not even exercise any real responsibility in the performance of menial tasks, such as public works, irrigation projects, and in the construction and upkeep of stretches of roads and of public buildings, which were basically the business of

Rwandans. Belgian colonialism effectively eliminated direct African participation in all spheres of influence and decision-making. Economic planning, as well as the purchasing, processing, and marketing of coffee and other export crops, was executed by Europeans with the help of mainly unskilled African labor, quasi-governmental agencies and societies, and Arab, Hindu, Greek and Indian merchants, although Asians were phased out of the export trade after 1930 and limited to intermediaries in the domestic economy. At independence, when the colonial state apparatus was removed in 1962, the economic structure collapsed. The new government was unable to function because of lack of experience.

Almost all production was abandoned, and coffee and other produce was left in the fields to rot; during the period of transition and consolidation, African simply refused to produce or to tend to their fields. Because of "indirect administration," Rwandans were ill-equipped by training or experience to operate or to recycle the dregs left by the Belgians into productive capacity. Belgian colonialism effectively had eliminated influential African participation in the world market economy. Thus, after independence, there was no African management, and Rwanda continued to depend upon expatriates to perform essential functions in the commercial sector.

In the final analysis, the absence of an African management class in Rwanda, able to take charge, has much to

do with the excessive intervention from the state (both in the metropole and in the colony) during the colonial period. State intervention successfully converted coercive force over Rwandans into a legitimate authority, which Africans reluctantly accepted. But while this conversion promoted change, it also preserved continuity within the traditional areas. The retention of the feudal system and the onset of colonialism was responsible for impeding the formation of a viable middle sector, because it distorted the process of primitive accumulation. Since there were no white settlers in any great numbers in Rwanda and little possibility of attracting foreign capital, the state's land policy and taxation on African households, designed to force workers into the capitalist sector, were used instead to foster the development of a viable African middle sector, capable of sustaining the development of the country. Failure to dismember the feudal system, coupled with the Great Depression, meant that valuable labor reserves had to serve two masters--the state and the traditional Batutsi oligarchy. African labor was used to maintain the solvency of the colony, as well as the life style of the Batutsi notables, but there was little opportunity for the peasantry to acquire capital.

Even expanded peasant production during the 1930s failed to transform the feudal system or to encourage economic specialization. The oligarchy was too entrenched, and the Bahutu could not be completely divorced from

subsistence agriculture, primarily because the risks were too great: peasant life was precarious. Moreover, while the Bahutu could be made to produce for foreign markets and could dominate the coffee economy from 1931 to 1939, and while earned export income and other revenues increased annually until the Second World War, the state could not create sufficient security to wean them away from subsistence agriculture and toward economic specialization. The environment was a limiting factor in this process, but state and Batutsi exactions were more debilitating.

CONCLUSIONS

Notes

[1]Alison L. DesForges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musiinga, 1896-1931," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972), p. 323.

[2]Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1934 (Brussels, 1935), p. 131. Production totals for 1933 and 1934 include tonnage for Burundi.

[3]Rapport 1924, p. 15; Rapport 1925, p. 104; Rapport 1929, p. 61; and Edmund Le Plae, "Les Plantations de Café au Congo Belge, leur Histoire (1881-1935), leur Importance," Institute Royal Colonial Belge mémoire 8, 111 (1936), p. 225.

[4]DesForges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," p. 323.

[5]Rapport 1929, p. 39; J. De Rykman de Betz, "La Mise en Valeur de Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge IV, 4 (February 22, 1930), pp. 52-3; and "Documentation sur le Kivu et le Ruanda-Urundi," Agriculture et Elevage au Congo Belge, VI, 16 (November 26, 1932), pp. 183-6.

[6]E. Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-34," Bulletin l'Institute des Sciences Economiques, VI, 2 (1935), pp. 133-34. Also, companies that were ill-conceived, ill-directed, or founded on pure speculation collapsed.

[7]Dubois, "La Politique Economique Coloniale, 1932-34," p. 134.

[8]A. Becquet, "Moyens mis en Oeuvre et les Resultats Obtenus dans le Lutte contre la Famine au Ruanda," Journees d'Agronomie Coloniale, (June 23-24, 1933), p. 4.

[9]"Territoire sous Mandat," Congo, I (January-May 1938) p. 228.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

Table A-1. Volume and Value of Imports, 1922-1959.

APPENDIX I



Table A-1. Volume and Value of Imports, 1922-1959.


imports (tons)
imports (francs)
Thousand of Metric Tons
Millions of Francs Belges
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
Years 1936-1959


EXPORTS
MILLIONS OF FRANCS BELGES
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
YEARS 1922-1935
EXPORTS (FRANCS)
EXPORTS (TONS)
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35


exports (tons)
exports (francs)
Thousands of Metric Tons
Millions of Francs Belges
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
Years 1936-1959

APPENDIX II

Table B-1(a) Volume of Foreign Trade 1927-1960


Graph[1] for
Table B-1(a) Volume of
Foreign Trade 1927-1960
imports from Belgian Congo
exports to Belgian Congo
% of Total Metric Tons of Trade
100
80
60
40
20
0
27
31
35
39
43
47
51
55
60
Years

APPENDIX II

Graph[2] for
Table B-1(a)
Volume of Foreign Trade 1927-1960




Graph[3] for
Table B-1(a)
Volume of Foreign Trade 1927-1960
Value in Belges Francs
Tonnage in Metric Tons
% of Total Imports from Belgian Congo
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
30
34
38
42
46
50
54
58
Year

APPENDIX III

Table C-1. Principle Food Products Exported to the Belgian Congo from Ruanda-Urundi, 1928 - 1938

APPENDIX III

Table C-1. Principle Food Products Exported to the Belgian Congo from Ruanda-Urundi, 1928-1938.

	Cattle		Livestock		All Other Food Products*	
Year	Head	Francs Belges (1,000)	Head	Francs Belges (1,000)	Metric Tons	Francs Belges (1,000)
1928[a]	1,068	213.6	360	22.4	1,018.5	1,223.2
1929[b]	1,146	290.8	--	--	269	506.9
1932[c]	15,860	2,755.8	54,517	1,104.9	708	412.2
1933[d]	6,999	978.1	25,969	476.2	1,306	678.0
1934[e]	3,103	452.6	13,811	208.9	2,709	1,315.5
1935[f]	4,050	708.7	22,750	386.7	2,256	1,814.8
1936[g]	33,600	7,140.0	115,000	2,070.0	2,244	2,591.1
1937[h]	27,000	9,600.0	34,750	1,055.0	4,652	4,918.6
1938[i]	28,000	10,350.0	50,000	1,820.0	5,751	3,344.5

*Products included are: beans, peas, sorghum, manioc flour, rice, fruits, palm oil, butter, coffee, peanuts, palm nuts, dry fish, maize flour, maize and wheat.

SOURCES AND NOTES:

[a] *Rapport presenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration de Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'Année 1928* (Brussels, 1929), 96.

[b] *Rapport 1929*, 100. Also 65 kilos of raw meat were exported at a value of BF 4,527.

[c] No itemized totals for 1930 and 1931. Products for 1932 included 155 pigs, valued at BF 19,500, and 3,600 chickens, valued at BP 7,200. *Rapport 1932*, pp. 128 and 130.

Table C-1. Continued

[d] *Rapport 1933*, pp. 162 and 164. Also 265 pigs, valued at BF 35,840 were exported.

[e] *Rapport 1934*, pp. 148 and 150. Also 120 pigs, valued at BF 13,800 were exported.

[f] *Rapport 1934*, pp. 149 and 151. Also 373 pigs, valued at BF 52,220 were exported.

[g] *Rapport 1936*, pp. 153 and 155. Also 200 pigs, valued at BF 39,000 were exported.

[h] *Rapport 1937*, pp. 158 and 160.

[i] *Rapport 1938*, pp. 168 and 171. Also 283 pigs, valued at BF 50,000 were exported.

APPENDIX IV

Table D-1. The Principal Tax Receipts in Rwanda and Burundi, 1925-1959 (in Belgian francs).

APPENDIX IV



Table D-1. The Principal Tax Receipts in Rwanda and Burundi, 1925-1959 (in Belgian francs).


1 - African Head Tax
2 - Polygamy
3 - Cattle Tax
4 - Income Tax
5 - Personal Rates & Taxes
6 - Custom Receipts
10 to 3
3/head
40-22.75-8.75
3.50/head
50-25-9
70 to 50-40 to 15
70 to 50-42 to 16
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
YEARS
0
800,000
1,600,000
2,400,000
3,200,000
4,000,000
4,800,000
5,600,000
13,600,000
21,600,000
29,600,000
37,600,000
45,600,000
125,600,000
205,600,000
285,600,000
HUNDRED THOUSANDS
MILLIONS
TEN MILLIONS
FRANCS


1 - African Head Tax
2 - Polygamy
3 - Cattle Tax
4 - Income Tax
5 - Personal Rates & Taxes
6 - Custom Receipts
70 to 50-36 to 20
75 to 50-42 to 22
80 to 50-44 to 25
75 to 50-36 to 22
60 to 32
21/head
115-65 to 40
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
YEARS
FRANCS
HUNDRED THOUSANDS
MILLIONS
TEN MILLIONS
0
800,000
1,600,000
2,400,000
3,200,000
4,000,000
4,800,000
5,600,000
13,600,000
21,600,000
29,600,000
37,600,000
45,600,000
125,600,000
205,600,000
285,600,000


1 - African Head Tax
2 - Polygamy
3 - Cattle Tax
4 - Income Tax
5 - Personal Rates & Taxes
6 - Custom Receipts
TEN MILLIONS
MILLIONS
HUNDRED THOUSANDS
FRANCS
285,600,000
205,600,000
125,600,000
45,600,000
37,600,000
29,600,000
21,600,000
13,600,000
5,600,000
4,800,000
4,000,000
3,200,000
2,400,000
1,600,000
800,000
0
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
YEARS
175 to 150-110-105
45/head
200 to 175-130 to 120
50/head
200 to 175-130 to 120
50/head
200 to 175-130 to 120
140 to 130
60/head
140 to 130


1 - African Head Tax
2 - Polygamy
3 - Cattle Tax
4 - Income Tax
5 - Personal Rates & Taxes
6 - Custom Receipts
YEARS
1957
1958
1959
1 2 3 4 5 6
140 to 130
60/head
170 to 140
160 to 135
65/head
180 to 150
75/head
145 to 130
FRANCS
HUNDRED THOUSANDS
MILLIONS
TEN MILLIONS
0
800,000
1,600,000
2,400,000
3,200,000
4,000,000
4,800,000
5,600,000
13,600,000
21,600,000
29,600,000
37,600,000
45,600,000
125,600,000
205,600,000
285,600,000

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